The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) As an Opposition Force in The Joko Widodo’s Era in 2014-2020

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Abstract

FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) is a mass organization that has consistently positioned itself as the opposition since the reformation. However, during the Jokowi era, the FPI’s opposition was more dominant than during before Jokowi era. Using Robert A. Dahl’s opposition theory and Maurice Duverger’s pressure group theory, as well as qualitative methods, this study wants to see the reasons for FPI as an opposition, FPI’s affiliation with Joko Widodo’s political opponents. It analyzes the relationship between ideological and political aspects. This study shows that the FPI oppositional movement is divided into two. That is, the FPI oppositional movement is based on ideological aspects and based on political aspects. This includes da’wah, political support for Jokowi’s opponents, and oppressive movements such as the 212 movements. FPI can strengthen identity politics because FPI often uses SARA issues in its movement as a radical Islamic organization.

Keywords: FPI, Pressure Group, Opposition, Jokowi’s Era, Islamic Sharia

INTRODUCTION

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is an organization that was founded on August 17, 1998 (25 Robi’uts Tsani 1419 Hijriyah). FPI has many sympathizers in almost all cities in Indonesia during its development which the central leadership in Petamburan, Jakarta (Anwar & Perdana, 2019). FPI’s background is the proliferation of tyranny, injustice, and disobedience in the community, which are considered to be able to cause many disasters. Referring from the FPI’s Musyawarah Nasional I, the purpose of FPI is (Syihab A. H., 2008): 1) the long-suffering experienced by Indonesian Muslims due to weak social control and the consequences of many human rights violations committed by the authorities; 2) Muslims must preserve and defend the dignity of Islam and its people.

During its development, FPI became one of the Islamic organizations that had an existence and influence. FPI claims that the character of its movement is a traditionalist. Traditional because they blend in with the community, so they are not exclusive. Then, in the traditionalistic, there are moderate characteristics and forcing do incriminating worship. Habib Rizieq Shihab (HRS), as the founder of FPI, said that FPI builds loyalty to Islam, not to either figure or organization. As long as the figures and organizations run according to Islamic sharia, they must be obeyed (Syihab A. H., 2008). Thus, as an Islamic Organization, FPI shows its strength as a pressure group (opposition) against political actors considered a contradiction to Islam. One of the things to do is not to provide political support for candidates who are considered to be incompatible with Islamic sharia.

As an opposition, FPI massively conducted sweeping (closing places of immorality) and demonstrations considered irrelevant to Islamic sharia. FPI opposition as a pressure group can be seen through the conflicts between FPI and the government regime. The FPI’s opposition to the government regime began during Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) reign when Indonesia’s political conditions were unstable in 1999. The role of the FPI opposition persists today.

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This stance is inseparable from FPI's ideology that the political system enforced in Indonesia (democracy) has created a corrupt system, created dictators, and caused problems due to power struggles (Syihab H. R., 2013). HRS considers that Islamic sharia and democracy have very basic and contradictory differences. The Islamic system is divine, sourced from Allah SWT, who is perfect. Democracy comes from the human mind that has limitations, so it is imperfect. The law applied to Islamic law comes from Allah SWT through the Qur'an and Sunnah, while democracy is based on a majority vote. Islamic law does not separate religious affairs from the state, but in a democratic system, the two are separated. In the Islamic system, the voice of the ulama is not equal to that of the common people, while in a democratic system, everyone has the same voting rights. That makes FPI known as a radical organization.

FPI's courage caused them to experience various threats and intimidation. FPI experienced at least five incidents. First, on April 11, 1999, there was a shooting by an unknown person. The shooting was aimed at HRS on Jalan S. Parman, Taman Anggrek Apartments. The shot penetrated the windshield and lodged in the dashboard. Second, Habib Sholeh Alatas, an advisor to the DPP-FPI, was shot on July 23, 2000. An unknown person shot him after morning prayers at the mosque. Third, the shooting of Cecep Bustomi, the FPI declarator, on July 24, 2000. He was chased by a group of unknown motorists and shot. Fourth, the shooting of the Laskar FPI monitoring team by the West Jakarta Police Headquarters on December 11, 2000. Fifth, the looting and burning of the house of FPI Shura Council Chairman Habib Sholeh Al-Habsyi on December 13, 2000. The latest case is the shooting of FPI members by the police and FPI dissolved by the Jokowi government.

The things above made the FPI’s opposition stance are stronger. During Joko Widodo (Jokowi) regime, which began in 2014, the FPI’s oppositional movements were different from the previous regimes. FPPs movement to remove immorality in the Jokowi era is not focused on sweeping, but FPI is more involved in practical politics such as demonstrations and political support. Although the sweeping movement did not completely disappear in the Jokowi era, its intensity was much reduced. The goal is to implement Islamic sharia and minimize the immorality that develops in society.

Following previous research, there have explained the causes of the rise of radical Islamic organizations that tend to oppose the government. Nurjannah (2013), In her research, explains the causes of the rise of radical Islamic organizations in great detail. The rise of radicalism in Islam is motivated by factors that include: 1) the expression of the teachings of renewal; 2) the impact of the thinking of the Ikhwanul Muslim and Jamaat Islami; 3) underdevelopment of economy, science, and technology; 4) injustice to the Muslim community; 5) the impact of Islamic teachings on da'wah, Amur mar'uf nahi munkar, jihad, which are interpreted exclusively; 6) the spirit of Arabism which has succeeded to build hatred against Western countries; 7) revolutionary reaction to modernization and globalization; 8) personality factors, such as mental terrorists. In the context of radicalism in Indonesia, Nurjannah explained that its emergence was triggered by the multidimensional crisis in the New Order era at the end of President Suharto's regime: political repression, economic inequality, and the collapse of morality, and social inequality.

Unlike Nurjannah, the author views it in the context of FPI radicalism. Two factors influence the radicalism of FPI’s thinking: First, internal factors come from organizations that see deviations from religious norms. Similarity with the explanations of Zuhri (2017) and Zada (2002), they explain that the radicalism of Islamic organizations, especially FPI, is a reaction that arises from a condition that they consider incompatible with Islamic sharia that is oriented Amur mar’uf nahi Munkar. This condition is the existence of economic, scientific, and technological backwardness, as mentioned by Nurjannah. However,
here the author sees that unstable political conditions also significantly affect the emergence of Islamic Organizational Organizations’ radicalism thoughts and movements.

Second, external factors include the inclusion of doctrines to reject the western secular system and encourage Muslims to jihad to uphold Islamic sharia. In this case, Nurjannah also explained that the spirit of Arabism had built hatred against Western countries so that these mass organizations take radical actions in upholding Islamic sharia. If Wahid saw that the radicalism stance stemmed from a lack of knowledge about sharia, reality, sunnatullah, and life, the author saw otherwise. The author sees, FPI has an understanding of Islamic sharia, which refers to the orientation of Amar ma'ruf nahi Munkar. FPI is also observant of reality so that it positions itself as an organization that is in opposition to the government.

Yamin (2018), in his book, states that there are two components of society that become pressure groups, namely HTI and FPI. As a pressure group, FPI’s stance is quite extreme and assertive. FPI does not hesitate to destroy “places of immorality.” Such acts are considered an internal contradiction of Islam because FPI does not reflect tolerance. In agreement with Yamin, Heryanto (2019) assessed that the pressure group (FPI) has a strong enough contribution support without using violence. The use of violence cannot be justified. FPI should have a positive dominant role. Since its establishment, FPI has shown a clear way towards various irregularities that occur in society. FPI openly opposes groups that disagree on applying the concept of ma’ruf nahi munkar, which focuses on what is considered right and avoiding or prohibiting wrong actions (Jurdi, 2016).

Two studies examine the FPI network, namely Zastrow (2013) and Woodward & Nurish (2016). Woodward & Nurish saw that the FPI network was formed from a coalition of conservative groups by looking at the Jakarta Election 2017. The coalition consists of FPI, PKS, HTI, Persatuan Islam (Persis), and the Salafi Organization of Makasar (Woodward & Nurish, 2016). The coalition has the same view in upholding Islamic sharia and rejecting Basuki Tjahja Purnama (Ahok) as Governor of DKI Jakarta. Zastrow explained about the FPI network to show that the FPI movement is not a moral movement but a radical-political Islamic movement in which there is a social exchange process. The network consists of interest groups, political operators, brokers/informants, and FPI activists. Interest groups play a role in controlling the FPI movement, so the movements carried out by FPI are not determined by FPI leaders but are movements desired by interest groups. Interest groups provided facilities to FPI leaders, which resulted in a mutually beneficial relationship between the elites. The role and function of the brokers are to monitor the movement of the FPI elites and maintain the confidentiality of the interest groups that are on it. Woodward & Nurish did not explain how the coalition’s system of conservative groups worked. In Zastrow’s research, it was unclear who was referred to as interest groups, political operators and brokers/informants. He also did not explain whether this network applies to every FPI movement or only under certain conditions.

Based on the above studies, it can be seen that the oppositional of FPI as a radical Islamic organization shows its existence and strength towards a government that is considered not aspirational towards Islam (Zada, 2002). The strong desire to realize an Islamic political system makes FPI contrary to Indonesia’s Government and Political System. Reviewing the opinions of Yamin (2018), Heryanto (2019), and Jurdi (2016), they saw that as a pressure group, FPI’s attitude was quite extreme and assertive. Often this attitude leads to violence and deviance. Furthermore, all the research above explains that of the oppositional conducted by FPI as a pressure group is applying the concept of Amar ma’ruf nahi Munkar. In this case, the author considers that the oppositional of FPI is formed on political interests based on ideological interests.
The author sees that not many researchers have studied the oppositional of FPI, so the strategy presented is not specific. The researchers only interpreted the reasons for FPI’s radicalism, only focusing on social conditions. They do not look at the political situation and conditions that are one of the triggers for the emergence of radicalism that leads to oppositional attitudes. They also did not discuss the political aspect as affecting the oppositional of FPI towards the government. The author also noted that there are not many specific studies discussing FPI affiliations that form a political network to build an opposition coalition. The Jokowi era was chosen as the object of this study because the author saw the intensity of the FPI opposition movement against the Jokowi government compared to the previous regime.

Based on this background, this study focuses on FPI’s opposition during Jokowi’s era in 2014-2020. This is based on the FPI opposition of the FPI, which tends to be firm and consistent since Gus Dur’s era. The purpose of this study, in general, is to find out about the opposition attitude conducted by the FPI to the government of Joko Widodo. Specifically, this study aims to: 1) Investigating the FPI’s reasons about positioned itself as the opposition during the Joko Widodo Era, knowing the FPI’s oppositional stance and FPI’s affiliation with Joko Widodo’s political opponents; 2) Analyzing the interrelationship between the ideological and political aspects of the oppositional stance of the FPI during the Joko Widodo reign. This research could provide a new proposition that the opposition carried out by Islamic organizations. Then, this study illustrates that the political power of Islamic organizations can have a latent impact from the strengthening of identity politics.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study uses the qualitative method, a research method used to describe and analyze a phenomenon, event, attitude, social activity, perception, or assessment of individuals and groups (Sukmadinata, 2012). This method sees a situation or event as an object researched by the author presented in a descriptive, focusing on this research being oppositional during the Jokowi government. In this study, the author used a case study approach to develop a case, event, activity, or process. The case was limited by time and activity, and the authors collected complete information with data collection procedures based on a predetermined time (Creswell, 2017). The author observes the attitude of the FPI opposition as an event, activity, and process that is limited by time, that is, during the Jokowi’s reign in 2014-2020.

This study uses four types of strategies in the data collection procedure. First, qualitative interviews, researcher conduct face-to-face interviews with the informant, interviews by a Zoom meeting room, or focus group interviews. The informants who have been interviewed are 1) Syahrozi as Head of the FPI Central Secretariat; 2) Irbabul Lubab as Deputy Secretary for the Enforcement of Khilafah; 3) Slamet Ma’arif as Head of Central FPI Hisbah Division, Leader of Alumni 212 (PA 212), Vice Chairman of the National Campaign Team of Prabowo-Sandi; 4) Infantry Colonel Sidik as Substitute Deputy I for Domestic Political Coordination and Mass Organization at the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs. Through the Syahrozi and Lubab, the information obtained is about the background and reasons for the FPI’s opposition, the goals and strategies of the opposition to the Jokowi reign. Information about the network and the role of FPI in PA 212 was obtained from Ma’arif. Then, information on the government’s views on the stance of the FPI oppositional was obtained through Infantry Colonel Sidik.

Second, qualitative documents in public documents such as newspapers, magazines, reports, and private documents such as letters, emails, and others. The data is sourced from mass media in official documents, archives about FPI, books, journals, news articles, research results, and dissertations. Third,
audio and visual materials, data can be photos, videotapes, and digital archives taken from online news portals, official websites, and social media platforms (YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter).

Based on the case studies researched by the author, to analyze the research data using an interactive analysis model of the Miles and Huberman model (2014) by 1) data reduction is grouping data in the form of references and documentation. The author made notes in the form of interview transcripts which the researcher then analyzes to determine the results of this study; 2) data presentation, by presenting research data descriptively and conducting analysis by linking the data and the theories used; 3) made conclusions, the authors summarize the results of data reduction and presentation of the author to clarify and sharpen the results of the study. Conclusions also aim to make it easier for readers to understand most of the research results conducted by the author.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In a democracy, the existence of opposition is a form of political participation. Political participation of opposition groups leads to independent participation based on individual awareness. This participation opens the opportunities for every citizen to play a role according to their awareness and desires. Geovanni Sartori in Barker (Sartori, 1971) explains that the opposition controls the government by controlling power as Irbabul Lubab said that the role of FPI is controlling.

"We (FPI) are the control. This control applies to whoever becomes president in Indonesia. Then we should implement the *Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*, invite people to do good individu. And for us, if Jokowi’s government is not by the constitution, then we must remind the government to return to the constitution that has been agreed upon." (The author’s interview with Irbabul on May 23, 2021, at the As-Syifa Islamic Boarding School, Parung-Bogor).

Based on the HRS words quoted through Ugur & Ince (2015) FPI defines it as a pressure group in Indonesia and has contributed to influencing state leaders to take an active role in improving and maintaining the morals and faith of Muslims as well as to take the initiative to build social, political and legal infrastructure that is in line with Islamic sharia. This is what causes them are always in opposition to whoever the Leader is. The following is the stance or ways of the FPI opposition from the Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (B.J. Habibie) era to the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) era, before Jokowi era, for detail see table 1.

At the beginning of the reign of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) in 1999, FPI was massively sweeping, such as bars, nightclubs, massage parlors, etc. On December 12, 1999, thousands of FPI members met with Sutiyoso, the Governor of DKI Jakarta, to file a demand for Sutiyoso to close places of immorality during Ramadan. FPI also issued a Statement on Rejection of a Female Presidential Candidate dated June 24, 1999. FPI’s participation in Pam Swakarsa in 1998 brought FPI and TNI General Wiranto closer together. FPI’s closeness to Wiranto was seen when hundreds of FPI militiamen came to the Komnas HAM office to protest the investigation of Wiranto in the May 1998 case. FPI demanded the disbandment of Komnas HAM on June 24, 2000. After Gus Dur’s impeachment on July 23, 2001, Megawati Soekarno Putri (Megawati) was then vice president to replace Gus Dur’s position as president. At the same time, FPI issued a statement on the tentang *Ma’lumat Penolakan Presiden Wanita* on July 24, 2001, to reject Megawati as a president.
Table 1. The FPI opposition from B.J. Habibie era to SBY era

| REGIME/ERA          | TERM            | STANCE OF FPI | CONFLICT                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|---------------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| B. J. Habibie       | 1998-1999       | Support       | 1) FPI participation to Semanggi I incident (10-13 November 1998) and Semanggi II (1999)  
2) Ketapang incident (22-23 November 1998) |
| Abdurrahman Wahid  | 1999-2001       | Oposision     | 1) Sweeping during the Ramadhan  
2) Demonstration and Dedration of the Jakarta Charter  
3) The shooting of FPI’s member, 1999 - 2000  
4) FPI protested against the examination of Wiranto by Komnas HAM for alleged human rights violations in May 1998 and violence in Timor Leste  
5) Against of Megawati as a presidential candidate on 1999, through Surat Pertanyaan tentang Penolakan Calon Presiden Wanita No: 007/Sp/DPP-FPI/VI/1999 on June 24, 1999 |
| Megawati Soekarno   | 2001-2004       | Oposision     | 1) Maklumat to reject Megawati as a president, Maktumat Penolakan Presiden Wanita No: 002/Ma’lumat/DPP-FPI/VII/2001 on July 24, 2004  
2) Sweeping  
3) Demonstration about BBM price increases  
4) HRS was imprisoned on August 11, 2003, for incitement verbally and in writing by instructing the implementation of the anti-immoral movement |
| Putri (Megawati)    |                 |               |                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Susilo Bambang     | Periode I       | Oposision     | 1) HRS was imprisoned on October 30, 2008 for Monas incident Juni 1, 2008  
2) Sweeping in Sukorejo (July 17, 2013)  
3) FPI disagrees with SBY’s reaction to the sweeping incident in Sukorejo. Threatened to impeach SBY if he wants to dissolve FPI |
| Yudhoyono (SBY)     | 2004-2009       |               |                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|                     | Periode II      |               |                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|                     | 2009-2014       |               |                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

Source: (Syihab A. H., 2008), (Indra, 2016), (Aji, 2019), (Tempo.co, 2003 ), (Velarosdela, 2020)

In the SBY regime, HRS was again caught in a case and was jailed for one year. Six months in 2008, he was found guilty of Article 170, Paragraph 1 junction Article 55 of the Criminal Code, namely advocating violent crimes together in public during the Monas Incident of June 1, 2008. During the 2nd SBY administration (2009-2014), FPI often conducted sweeps. While conducting sweeps on July 13 and 18, 2013, FPI and residents of Kendal, East Java, clashed. The car that FPI was traveling in hit a motorcyclist, and the victim died (Velarosdela, 2020). The incident caused a reaction from SBY. SBY said that the actions taken by the FPI had harmed the image of Islam. Based on these words, FPI considers SBY’s accusation not based on solid evidence because FPI is the victim of the incident. FPI threatened to overthrow the SBY government if SBY dared to dissolve FPI.

In the SBY regime, HRS was again caught in a case and was jailed for one year and six months in 2008 because of advocating violent crimes together in public during the Monas Incident of June 1, 2008. In the 2nd SBY era (2009-2014), FPI often did sweeping. While sweeps on July 13 and 18, 2013, FPI and residents of Kendal, East Java, clashed, the car that FPI was hit a motorcyclist, and the victim died. The incident caused a reaction from SBY. SBY said that the actions taken by the FPI had harmed the image of Islam. Based on these words, FPI considers SBY’s allegations not based on strong evidence because FPI is the victim of the incident. FPI threatened to impeach SBY if SBY wants to dissolve FPI.
The political stance of the FPI opposition tends to be assertive and consistent from Gus Dur's to the SBY era. When compared to the Jokowi era, FPI's opposition is more intense than the previous era. This can be seen through the conflicts that occurred during Jokowi's reign that influenced the oppositional of FPI see table 2.

Table 2. FPI and Jokowi Regime Conflict

| REGIME/ERA | TERM                      | STANCE OF FPI          | CONFLICT                                                                 |
|------------|---------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Joko Widodo (Jokowi) | Periode I 2014-2019 | Opposition             | 1) Ahok’s inauguration as Pt. Governor of DKI Jakarta (October 16, 2014) |
|            | Periode II 2019-2024     |                        | 2) The case of blasphemy by Ahok, Bela Islam Action 212 (October 14, 2016 – May 5, 2017) |
|            |                          |                        | 3) The case of porn chat and blasphemy of Pancasila by HRS (2018)         |
|            |                          |                        | 4) Prabowo and Sandiaga Uno entry to Cabinet Jokowi-Ma’ruf               |
|            |                          |                        | 5) The controversy over the extension of the FPI permit                   |
|            |                          |                        | 6) The polemic of HRS return to Indonesia                                |
|            |                          |                        | 7) Shooting incident of 6 FPI members (December 7, 2020)                  |
|            |                          |                        | 8) HRS imprisoned for incitement/invitation to crowd in the Covid-19 Pandemic |
|            |                          |                        | 9) FPI was dissolved, then FPI changed its name to Front Persaudaraan Islam |

Source: (Velarosdela, 2020), (Hidayat, 2014), (Lazuardi, 2019)

Jokowi-Ahok is the Governor and Deputy Governor of DKI Jakarta for the 2012-2017 period. Jokowi ran for President in the 2014 presidential election, then the 2014 presidential election was won by Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla (Jokowi-JK). FPI rejected the position of Governor of DKI Jakarta to be replaced by Ahok. HRS as the Leader of FPI at that time, explained several reasons for rejecting Ahok (Hidayat, 2014): 1) FPI believed that the Leader for Muslims must be Muslim; 2) Ahok is considered to have violated ethics because he often said rudely; 3) Ahok was seen as insulting the DPRD institution during the polemic on the Regional Election; 4) FPI believes, based on Perppu No. 1 of 2014 concerning the Regional Election, the deputy governor does not automatically become governor. FPI did not support Jokowi in the 2014 Presidential Election because FPI considered Jokowi to be a Presidential Candidate (Capres) who supported Ahok as Governor of DKI Jakarta.

Ahok made a mistake about the blasphemy case Surah Al-Maidah: 58 during the Jakarta Pilgub 2017. The case provoked a reaction from the FPI, so they spearheaded Action 212 or Movement 212 (formerly known as Bela Islam Action) in the Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (GNPF-MUI), as a form of protest over the case (Pamungkas & Oktaviani, 2017). The Defending Islam Action began on October 14, 2016. And continued seven times until Ahok was sentenced to 2 years in prison for the case on May 9, 2017. The leaders and Ulama involved in Action 212 formed an institution called the Persaudaraan Alumni 212. In addition, the participants of the series of actions called themselves Alumni 212 and, on December 2, 2017, held a peaceful action, namely Reunion 212.

Along with Ahok’s case, HRS was faced with a porn chat case and the desecration of Pancasila. The investigation into HRS was conducted in May 2017, then HRS was determined as a suspect in the case. Then, in February 2018, HRS became a suspect in the Pancasila blasphemy case, but the police stopped the investigation in February 2018 because there was no solid evidence. The determination of suspect status for HRS made FPI think that the Jokowi regime was criminalizing ulama.
In the 2019 presidential election, which was attended by Candidates (Paslon) Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin and Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno (Prabowo-Sandi), FPI loudly expressed its support for Prabowo-Sandi. The support HRS at Gelora Bung Karno Stadium through a video on April 7, 2019. The reason for the support is that Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno, who were the result of Ijtimah Ulama, love and respect the ulama. They said they want to reject and oppose the criminalization of the ulama and do not protect the PKI and liberals, nor did they protect heretical and immoral sects (Lazuardi, 2019). Ijtimah Ulama is related to the FPI’s rejection of Jokowi, considered a descendant of communists.

Approaching the election, PBB, a member of the Prabowo-Sandi supporters coalition, decided to support Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin in the 2019 Presidential Election. After the PBB declared support for the Jokowi-Ma’ruf, HRS instructed FPI to withdraw from the PBB legislative election. Then, during the Jokowi (2019), Prabowo, a presidential candidate supported by the FPI, entered the Jokowi cabinet structure. FPI and the PKS as coalitions members were disappointed by Prabowo’s political stance. The joining of the Gerindra Party into Jokowi’s Cabinet made the opposition power weaker so that the process of checks and balances was reduced due to the strength of the opposition that was not solid (Hidayati, 2020).

Since 2017 HRS has lived in Saudi Arabia. At the time, he received a reprimand from the Arab government for waving a black flag with lafaz (Lailaha ilallah) and was sanctioned to overstay sanctions, so he was obliged to pay a fine. HRS returned to Indonesia on November 10, 2020, after three years living in Saudi Arabia. His arrival was welcomed by most of the FPI participants at Soekarno-Hatta Airport, and then the masses moved to the Markaz FPI in Petamburan, Tanah Abang (Dimas, 2020). In the Covid-19 Pandemic, HRS caused a crowd that was considered to have violated health protocols, not only that HRS was considered to have instigated. Therefore, HRS was detained on December 14, 2020 Pasal 16 KUHP dan Pasal 93 UU Kekarantinaan Kesehatan No. 6 Tahun 2020. After HRS’s return to Indonesia, a police shooting killed 6 FPI members on December 7, 2020, at Jakarta-Cikampek Toll Road. In this case, FPI is still seeking justice by taking legal action.

FPI, on February 22, 2020, experienced problems regarding the extension of the license because the FPI’s vision and mission and AD/ART were deemed not in line with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. However, Ahmad Shabri Lubis, Leader of FPI, said that FPI did not need to extend the organization license, even though FPI’s license was because FPI had never asked the government for help. FPI’s move not to renew the license turned out to cause problems. Surat Keputusan Bersama No. 220-4780, dated December 30, 2020, FPI was declared an unregistered organization, so de jure disbanded. Various activities carried out by FPI as long as it does not have a permit are considered disturbing the peace, public order and contrary to the law.

Following the reasons above, the government prohibits the activities, symbols, and attributes related to FPI. After reading that letter, the attribute removed was carried out at the Markaz FPI Petamburan by Brimob and TNI (Ihsanudin, 2020). FPI’s legal representative informed that FPI would file a lawsuit for the Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara (PTUN). FPI tried to dialogue with the government regarding the dissolution of FPI by inviting Mohammad Mahfud (Mahfud MD) as The Minister Coordinator for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs in the 212 National Dialogue event on December 2, 2020; however, Mahfud MD was unable to attend the event (Akhmad, 2019). After the dissolution, FPI changed its name to Front Persatuan Islam, which was declared on January 3, 2021, then on January 8, 2021, they changed their name to Front Persaudaraan Islam. FPI will not register its new name because, for them, it is not essential. They prioritized investigating the massacre of 6 FPI members.

Robert A.Dahl (1998) explains that pressure groups are divided into non-structural opposition based on his goals, limited structural opposition, and large structural opposition. In this case, the FPI’s
position is as a pressure group that is included in the non-structural opposition. According to Dahl, this non-structural opposition consists of job search parties (not the ruling government coalition), pressure groups, and policy-oriented parties.

Duverger (1984) defines a pressure group as a group of community institutions with activities as groups with the will to impose their will on the authorities. Pressure groups in their activities do not want power directly. They act to influence power but are not involved in it. Pressure groups try to fight for interest by influencing political institutions to make favorable decisions. These groups can influence or even shape government policies through persuasion, propaganda, and other means deemed effective.

Pressure groups act on two different stages (Duverger, 1984). First, open action is directly suppressing government organs. Actions taken include demands for the fulfillment of promises, threats, lobbying, and others. Second, the hidden action is to exert indirect influence on the public in order to form a general view that will later affect government officials. This activity can be carried out using propaganda and violence. Regarding the role of the FPI as a pressure group during the Jokowi reign, it can be seen that the FPI oppositional movement can be divided into two, that is the FPI oppositional movement which is based on ideological aspects and based on political aspects. Both of these aspects are carried out openly, but some are carried out in secret.

Identification of FPI Oppositional Movement based on Ideological Aspect

FPI's role is based on ideological values to maintain the good name of Islam and the implementation of Islamic Sharia in society. HRS considers that Islamic Sharia and democracy have very basic and contradictory differences. The Islamic system is divine, sourced from Allah SWT, who is perfect. Democracy comes from a human mind that has limitations so imperfect. The law applied to Islamic Sharia comes from Allah SWT through the Qur'an and Sunnah, while democracy is based on a majority vote. Islamic Sharia does not separate religious affairs from the state, but in a democratic system, the two are separated. In the Islamic system, the voice of the ulama is not equivalent to the voice of the common people, while in the democratic system, everyone has the same voting rights (Syihab H. R., 2013).

HRS sees that the law in Indonesia tends to be discriminatory. Hrs further explained that the legal depravity in Indonesia stems from the iniquity of the existing legal system, even though good officials enforce it. Civil law is considered to leave many problems and give birth to new problems in the middle of people's lives (Syihab H. R., 2013): 1) social problems that are the result of the application of inhumane legal sanctions so that it becomes a cruel law; 2) problems that occur due to revenge from victims whose trial is not complete, this causes hostility; 3) waste of state money because the state is charged to build facilities and infrastructure for criminals; 4) deterrent effect problem, prison sentence does not have adequate deterrent effect; 5) the problem of a sense of security, the society does not get a sense of security because the criminal does not get a deterrent effect for his actions so they can still repeat the same crime. As HRS explained about democracy, democracy is a source of problems that give birth to dictators, corruptors, and capitalist groups. HRS considers that deliberation to reach consensus (musyawarah mufakat) in a democratic system is just nonsense because the agreement is taken from most votes, not through consensus deliberation. The use of the most votes in policy decision-making can result in incorrect policies.

Therefore, FPI considers Indonesia needs to enforce Islamic Sharia-based on Amar ma'ruf nahi Munkar. Amar ma'ruf nahi Munkar can literally be interpreted as calling for virtue and preventing evil. If you look at its position, for FPI, Amar ma'ruf nahi Munkar is fardhu kifayah, which means every Muslim must be done according to his ability. HRS (2008) explains that the application of Amar ma'ruf nahi
Munkar in society will lead people to compete in doing good, keeping each other and protecting each other from all forms of damage in the society. Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar acts as a strong fortress to protect the faith and piety of Muslims. When a person’s faith and piety are good, then the blessed door will be open to that person. Furthermore, HRS explained that if Amar ma'ruf nahi Munkar is abandoned, it will bring disaster for humans.

Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar must be done in a good and correct way by Islamic sharia. Its application is not justified to use the wrong method or “justify all ways” because it will only lead people to greater defiance. In implementing the Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar, FPI tends to be harsh and assertive. The violence that occurred while upholding amar ma'ruf nahi munkar is not contrary to the principle of gentleness taught by Islam. In this case, violence is a follow-up to the process of applying Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar, which cannot be resolved with gentleness. Assertiveness and strict attitude, not disgraceful acts because it is a joint effort to realize the perfection of the application of Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar (Syihab A. H., 2008).

However, HRS explained that mistake in society that must be fought is (Syihab A. H., 2008): 1) the things that is agreed upon as something haram, if something that is haram is still being disputed, then it is not justified to commit violence because FPI must respect differences of opinion; 2) the mistakes must be clear and real. In this case, there are two types of mistakes that cannot be fought, is an al munkarat al bathiniyyah (mistakes that occur in the heart) and al munkarat al masuriyyah (mistakes that is carried out in secret); 3) the mistake can no longer be dealt with gently, the case if handled gently makes the damage worse; 4) decisive and harsh actions taken do not cause major bad consequences.

The strategy used by FPI to implement Amar ma'ruf nahi Munkar is termed with a tree cutting strategy and a root cutting strategy. Tree cutting strategies are used when FPI is strong enough, funds are available, and equipment is sufficient. Still, the cutting-roots strategy is used when the opposite situation is by cutting the root of the problem little by little. The mechanism carried out in carrying out Amar ma'ruf nahi Munkar are (Syihab A. H., 2008): 1) decision making based on Islamic sharia from the Qur'an, as-Sunnah, and other sources of ijtihad; 2) take formal legal procedures by collecting facts and data as legal evidence, gathering concrete support from the surrounding community who are disturbed by immoral activities, and making reports and demands to the competent authorities; 3) using the power of the ummah when all procedures are deadlocked.

FPI has three paths away to struggle, that is da'wah, hisbah, and jihad. The FPI da'wah movement is inseparable from FPI’s commitment to implement Amar ma'ruf nahi Munkar. Da'wah about amar ma'ruf nahi munkar must be guided by the Qur’an and As-Sunnah, which is carried out sincerely and full of responsibility. It means that what is conveyed brings a positive influence to the social life of the people. Then, in sharing da'wah material, it must also pay attention to the applicable legal rules so that they do not conflict with each other (Sukayat, 2018).

As explained by HRS in his writing, since FPI was established to realize these ideals, FPI has formed the National Anti-Ma'iat Movement. This movement can be done through three procedures (Syihab, 2008, pp. 250-252): 1) closing places of immorality without government permission, 2) closing places of immorality legally/with permission from the government, and 3) administrative procedures.

HRS said, to implement this movement are actually compromises and negotiations to find the best solution in eliminating immorality completely. The basis of this compromise is the Hudaibiyah Agreement, like the agreement that the Prophet Muhammad had made against the kafir. The compromise offered, for example, is to gradually change the function of the place of business, either by switching professions, changing businesses, or transferring production to a halal business. All places of immorality can also be
closed periodically by reducing the place of immoral business for a certain period of time so that when it is due, the place can be closed. Another way is to concentrate the place of immorality in a certain area, then coaching to change the function is carried out. As long as the technical process is running, it should not involve physical action. FPI only monitors and supervision to ensure the process runs. But in fact, FPI is involved in acts of hate speech, threats, intimidation, and physical attacks against other religious minorities, such as Christians, Shia, and Ahmadiyah sects (Ugur & Ince, 2015).

As the movement progressed, FPI was seen as an extreme radical fundamentalist who moved without knowledge. In simple terms, FPI can be interpreted as (Syihab A. H., 2008): 1) conservative organization, not relevant to the times, 2) reactionary, opposed to progress and contrary to government policies, and 3) textual, fixated on books so that it is not flexible/rigid. This view extends and presents the FPI as a "hard-line Islamic organization," characterized by the attitude of the group or organization that tends to be assertive and uncompromising in achieving certain agendas related to Muslim groups (Zada, 2002). This can be seen from the assertiveness of FPI in eradicating immorality, both in society and in government. There is known as the radical Islamic movement.

The radical Islamic movement shows its strength as a pressure group (opposition) to the government that is considered not aspirational towards Islam (Zada, 2002). Characteristics of radicalism thought are usually seen from (Wahid, 2018): 1) Fanaticalism, without respect for other opinions; 2) Obliging others to do what is not required by Allah SWT; 3) An out-of-place hard attitude; 4) Bad thoughts and easy to give kafir labeling to other people. The thoughts of radical Islamic organizations are oriented towards the imagined forms of Islamic political society. There is wanting to realize an Islamic political system, the emergence of Islamic parties, Islamic culture, and experimentation with the Islamic state system (Zada, 2002). Therefore, they are very ideological and political, which leads to formal religious symbolism. If it is associated with the context of FPI as a radical Islamic Organization, then the author sees two factors influence the radicalism of FPI thinking: 1) internal factors that come from organizations that see deviations against religious norms; 2) external factors is the inclusion of doctrine to reject the western secular system and encourage Muslims to jihad. This prompted the FPI to perform its role of opposition to the Jokowi reign consistently.

Identification of the FPI Oppositional Movement based on Political Aspect

The FPI portrays the opposition's role as a political act. Referring to the opinion of HRS (Syihab A. H., 2008) that politics is divided into two classes: 1) High-class politics, political games based on idealism, and a vision of a mission purely for the advancement of the nation. In this class, no term compromise is bargaining. 2) Low-class politics, political games based on the advantages of power, so compromise and bargaining become frequent. FPI claims that FPI should only fight in high-class politics, namely the political struggle for the common good, not for the group.

Dahl explained that there were at least six strategies (Dahl, 1998), but in this case, FPI only used four strategies. First, the opposition focuses its attention on competition and gaining support to win the majority vote. This leads to the context of elections, where the winner of the majority vote will later form a government (cabinet or executive). Then the losing side will become the opposition. As a mass organization, FPI often supports a candidate in the election, both the presidential and local elections. This is the FPI's political support for the 1999-2019 election candidate pairs in table 3.

FPI declared political support for the Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa (Prabowo-Hatta) presidential candidates in the 2014 presidential election. This support was because FPI believed in the coalition of Islamic parties in the Prabowo-Hatta and can reject Ahok as governor of DKI Jakarta. At that
time, FPI supported three Islamic parties. PKS, PPP, and PB, so FPI encouraged all members and sympathizers to channel their votes to Islamic parties. HRS urges that in the 2014 presidential election, Muslims are expected not to vote for a presidential candidate who can make Ahok become governor (Assegaf, 2014). In the 2017 DKI Jakarta governor election, FPI provided political support for the Anies-Sandi based on the consensus of the ulama (ijtima ulama). This support is due to Ahok being a non-Muslim governor candidate. Before the DKI Jakarta governor election in 2017, FPI's relationship with Ahok was not harmonious. They often conflict with the policies issued by the provincial government, which is not by FPI's interests (Anwar & Perdana, 2019). Then in the 2018 West Java governor election, HRS expressed support for the Sudrajat-Ahmad Syaikhu. HRS conveyed a message to the candidate pair to take care of the ulama and Kyai, look after Muslims and maintain justice (Ramadhan, 2018).

In the 2019 presidential election, FPI expressed support for Prabowo-Sandi based on the decision of the Ijtima Ulama. Although Jokowi was paired with Ma'ruf Amin, an NU Ulama background, FPI remains steadfast in supporting Prabowo-Sandi. Because, for FPI, Ma'ruf Amin's involvement in the 212 Action became contradictory when Ma'ruf Amin was willing to be nominated as Jokowi's vice president.

In his writing, HRS (Syihab H. R., 2013) explained that FPI's political stance was clear, namely fully supporting all Islamic parties and in every election only channeling votes to Islamic parties. However, if you look at the table above, FPI does not always support the most Islamic parties supported by the candidate. Candidates supported by FPI from the 2014-2019 presidential election and 2017 DKI Jakarta governor election are candidates whom the Gerindra and PKS support.

Second, focus on a coalition. The coalition is carried out to increase support votes and produce a majority vote. Thus, a group that focuses on how to join the coalition that is more likely to win. With many followers and high militancy, FPI's position as the opposition has great influence. Not only political support but FPI is also affiliated with other parties who have political power, such as the Gerindra and PKS.

Third, focus on locations that have the potential to provide support. FPI is targeting a support base that has a great opportunity to support FPI. The opposition adapts certain tactics to its resources. The tactics used can be the same or different from one region to another. An example is when FPI garner support to form the 212 movements. The approach used was to launch propaganda by inviting Muslims in Indonesia to encourage the government to arrest Ahok for the blasphemy case. The tactics carried out by the FPI are usually associated with Islamic sharia. Ahead of the Governor election in 2017, FPI has the way to mass mobilization process, the Gerakan Subuh Keliling, and Tamasya Al Maidah. The strategy they used was to use the mosque as a space to urge the public to vote for Anies-Sandi (Anwar & Perdana, 2019).

Fourth, there is a threat to the government, so that the government is in a state of urgency. A threat that exists in the community encourages the government to make offers to the opposition groups to cooperate. As a large mass organization, FPI can gather the masses and mobilize them to remove something contrary to them. Politically FPI has the power to gather the masses and direct them to tend to certain political choices. For example, during the DKI Jakarta Governor Election, the massive SARA issue was intensified, and the 212 Action was carried out to remove Ahok and win the Anies-Sandi.

The Defending Islam Action Movement is a series of actions that began on October 14, 2016 (Aksi Bela Islam Jilid I). This movement was motivated by the circulation of a video of harassment of the Qur'anic verse Surah Al Maidah: 51. This happened when Ahok gave a speech on the 2017 Jakarta governor election campaign in the Kepulauan Seribu on September 27, 2016. In this action, FPI who are members of the Gerakan Nasional Penjaga Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (GNPF-MUI) act as the initiator of the action (Pamungkas & Oktaviani, 2017). The GNPF-MUI is a coalition
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consisting of FPI, HTI, Forum Umat Islam (FUI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Tarbiyah (a subsidiary of PKS).

| TERM OF ELECTIONS | SUPPORTED CANDIDATES | UNSUPPORTED CANDIDATES |
|-------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| Presidential Election 1999 | Abstain | Abstain |
| Presidential Election 2004 | Abstain | Abstain |
| Presidential Election 2009 | JK – Wiranto | 1. SBY – Boediono
Bearer Parties: Partai Golkar dan Partai Hanura
Supporting Parties: PDKK |
| Prabowo – Hatta Rajasa | Jokowi – JK
Bearer Parties: Partai Gerindra
Coalition Parties: Partai Golkar, PAN, PKS, PPP
Supporting Parties: Partai Demokrat, Partai Hanura, Partai Perindo, Partai Idaman |
| DKI Jakarta Governor Election 2017 | Anies – Sandi | 1. Agus Yudhoyono – Sylviana Murni
Bearer Parties: Partai Demokrat, PPP, PKB, PAN
Supporting Parties: PKNU, PMB, Partai Buruh, Partai Pelopor, PKDI, Partai Barnae, Pakar Pangan |
| West Java Governor Election 2018 | Sudrajat – Ahmad Syaikhu | 2. Dedy Mizwar – Dedi Mulyadi
Bearer Parties: Demokrat, Partai Golkar
Supporting Party: PAN |
| Presidential Election 2019 | Prabowo – Sandi | 3. TB. Hasanudin – Anton Charliyan
Bearer Party: PDIP
Coalition Parties: Partai Demokrat, PAN, PKS
Supporting Parties: Partai Berkarya, Partai Hanura, Partai Aceh |
| Presidential Election 2014 | Prabowo – Hatta Rajasa | Jokowi – JK
Bearer Parties: Partai Gerindra
Coalition Parties: Partai Golkar, PAN, PKS, PPP
Supporting Parties: Partai Demokrat, Partai Hanura, Partai Perindo, Partai Idaman |
| Note: |
| Nationalist Parties: Golkar, PDIP, Partai Gerindra, Partai Demokrat, Partai Nasdem, Partai Perindo, Partai Hanura, Partai Berkarya, PSI, Partai Ideal, etc. |
| Islamic Parties: PAN, PKS, PKB, PPP, PBB |
| Regional Parties: Partai Aceh, PNA |

The action was continued on November 4, 2016 (Aksi Bela Islam Jilid II or Aksi Damai 411) with the same demands because there has been no follow-up on the Ahok case. Then the Aksi Bela Islam III was held again on December 2, 2016, as Action 212. At this momentum, Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla (at that time as
President and Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia) held Friday Prayers with the masses of action, and Jokowi gave a speech to thank the masses for having carried out peaceful actions (Tempo.co, 2019). The next series of actions were the Aksi Bela Islam Jilid IV on 11 February 2017; Aksi Bela Islam Jilid V on February 21, 2017; Aksi Bela Islam Jilid VI on March 3, 2017; and the Aksi Bela Islam Jilid VII took place on May 5, 2017.

After the series of actions above, on May 9, 2017, the North Jakarta District Court decided a two-year prison for the blasphemy of Ahok. When the movement goals have been achieved, the figures and ulama involved form an institution called the Persaudaraan Alumni 212 Alumni. Participants in the series of actions named themselves Alumni 212, and on December 2, 2017, a peaceful action was held in Reunion 212.

Reunion 212 has been held three times. The 212 Reunion was first held in 2017 as a year of the 212 actions and the victory of the Anies-Sandi in 2017. In 2018, the 212 Reunion was held again to support the Prabowo-Sandi in the 2019 Presidential Election, efforts to repatriate HRS and the Republic of Indonesia sharia. Then, Reunion 212 was held again in 2019 to guard the legal process against Sukmawati Soekarno Putri and efforts to repatriate HRS to Indonesia (Wahidin, 2019). In 2020 and 2021, Reunion 212 was postponed due to the Covid-19 Pandemic.

FPI claims that any support given to a candidate pair has never received financial assistance and has never expected a reward in the form of money or position. "FPI has never received and did not expect anything from those who were supported. FPI had its capital of 600 million to make the Prabowo-Sandi campaign equipment, don’t consider it a small amount of money." (The author’s interview with Ust. Syahrozi as the Leader of the Secretary of the DPP FPI, May 23, 2021, at the As-Syifa Islamic Boarding School Parung-Bogor)

Then, FPI emphasized that FPI’s position was to support certain candidate pairs in the general election because it wanted to make the democratic party a success. FPI was committed to supporting the choice of Ijtima Ulama. After the election was over, FPI "returned to the barracks" to control the government. However, FPI’s affiliation with political parties, especially those with political influence, is considered one of the methods used by FPI to enter into practical politics. Although FPI or its figures do not directly become politicians, their closeness with political actors is very useful, especially to protect FPI’s actions which often violate the law (Natzir & Ariyani, 2018, p. 2). Then, FPI’s political support can strengthen identity politics, because as a radical Islamic organization, FPI often uses SARA issues in its movement.

CONCLUSION

FPI an opposition based on ideological values. This aims to maintain the good name of Islam and enforce Islamic sharia in society. The method used is to form an Anti-Ma’asiat National Movement based on *Amar ma’ruf Mahi Munkar* and carry out massive da’wah based on the teachings of *Ahlusunnah wal Jama’ah*. Then, FPI also played the role of the opposition as a political act. As a mass organization, FPI provides support to candidate pairs in the elections. There is in the 2014-2019 presidential election and the 2017 governor election. FPI does not provide political support to Jokowi in both the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. Vice president who has a clerical background and is supported by a majority of Islamic parties. In addition to providing political support, FPI is affiliated with other parties with political power, such as the Gerindra Party and PKS. FPI is also involved in demonstrations against events and policies deemed to violate Islamic rules. However, political support and demonstrations carried out by FPI often use the issue of SARA. The ideological and political foundations of FPI’s oppositional stance are related because ideological reasons can influence FPI’s political actions. An example is the provision of
support for pairs of candidates for election supported by ijtima ulama as representatives of ideal leaders. Islamic organization FPI often uses SARA (ethnicity, race, religion, and class differences) issues in its movement.

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