Enhancing Template Security of Face Biometrics by Using Edge Detection and Hashing

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In this paper we address the issues of using edge detection techniques on facial images to produce cancellable biometric templates and a novel method for template verification against tampering. With increasing use of biometrics, there is a real threat for the conventional systems using face databases, which store images of users in raw and unaltered form. If compromised not only it is irrevocable, but can be misused for cross-matching across different databases. So it is desirable to generate and store revocable templates for the same user in different applications to prevent cross-matching and to enhance security, while maintaining privacy and ethics. By comparing different edge detection methods it has been observed that the edge detection based on the Roberts Cross operator performs consistently well across multiple face datasets, in which the face images have been taken under a variety of conditions. And we have proposed a novel scheme using hashing, for extra verification, in order to harden the security of the stored biometric templates.

Keywords: Cancellable Biometrics, Edge Detection, Face Biometrics, Template Security.

1. INTRODUCTION

The dimensions, proportions and physical attributes of a person’s face are unique. Biometric facial recognition systems will measure and analyze the overall structure, shape and proportions of the face: Distance between the eyes, nose, mouth, and jaw edges; upper outlines of the eye sockets, the sides of the mouth, the location of the nose and eyes, the area surrounding the cheekbones. At enrolment, several pictures are taken of the user’s face, with slightly different angles and facial expressions, to allow for more accurate matching. For verification and identification, the user stands in front of the camera for a few seconds, and the scan is compared with the template previously recorded. Benefits of face biometric systems being that it is not intrusive, can be done from a distance, even without the user being aware of it (for instance when scanning the entrance to a bank or a high security area). Weaknesses of face biometric systems: Face biometric systems are more suited for authentication than for identification purposes, as it is easy to change the proportion of one’s face by wearing a mask, a nose extension, etc. Also, user perceptions / civil liberty: Most people are uncomfortable with having their picture taken. Applications of face biometrics include access to restricted areas and buildings, banks, embassies, military sites, airports, law enforcement.

One advantage of passwords over biometrics is that they can be re-issued. If a token or a password is lost or stolen, it can be cancelled and replaced by a newer version. This is not naturally available in biometrics. If someone’s face is compromised from a database, they cannot cancel or reissue it. Cancellable biometrics is a way in which to incorporate protection and the replacement features into biometrics. It was first proposed by N. K. Ratha, J. H. Connell and R. M. Bolle \cite{1}.

Several methods for generating cancellable biometrics have been proposed. The first fingerprint based cancellable biometric system was designed and developed by S. Tulyakov, F. Farooq and V. Govindaraju \cite{2}. Essentially, cancellable biomet-
rics performs a distortion of the biometric image or features before matching. The variability in the distortion parameters provides the cancellable nature of the scheme. Some of the proposed techniques operate using their own recognition engines, such as A. B. J. Teoh, A. Goh and D. C. L. Ngo [3] and M. Savvides, B. V. K. V. Kumar and P. K. Khosla [4]. Whereas other methods, such as M. A. Dabbah, W. L. Woo and S. S. Dlay [5] take the advantage of the advancement of the well-established biometric research for their recognition front-end to conduct recognition. Although this increases the restrictions on the protection system, it makes the cancellable templates more accessible for available biometric technologies.

1.1. Edge Detection

The result of applying an edge detector to an image may lead to a set of connected curves that indicate the boundaries of objects, the boundaries of surface markings as well as curves that correspond to discontinuities in surface orientation. Thus, applying an edge detection algorithm to an image may significantly reduce the amount of data to be processed and may therefore filter out information that may be regarded as less relevant, while preserving the important structural properties of an image. The edge detection filters used for experimentation are based on Discrete Laplace operator, Sobel operator [6], Roberts Cross operator [7], Frei-Chen operator [8] and Prewitt operator [9].

1.2. Cryptosystems in Biometrics

Biometric cryptosystems as discussed by Y. Dodis, R. Ostrovsky, L. Reyzin and A. Smith [10], F. Hao, R. Anderson and J. Daugman [11], K. Nandakumar, A.K. Jain and S. Pankanti [12], Y. Sutcu, Q. Li and N. Memon [13], use techniques that associate an external key with a user’s biometric to obtain helper data. The helper data should not reveal any significant information about the template or the key and at the same time it can be used to recover the key when the original biometric is presented. The concept of data hiding in digital watermarks has been discussed by C. T. Hsu and J. L. Wu [14]. Encryption algorithm to secure the image using fingerprint and password has been discussed by Manvjeet Kaur, Dr. Sanjeev Sofat and Deepak Saraswat [15] involves more time consuming methods.

1.3. Secure Hash Algorithm

A hash function is an algorithm that transforms (hashes) an arbitrary set of data elements, such as a text file, into a single fixed length value (the hash). The computed hash value may then be used to verify the integrity of copies of the original data without providing any means to derive said original data. This irreversibility means that a hash value may be freely distributed or stored, as it is used for comparative purposes only. SHA stands for Secure Hash Algorithm. SHA-2 includes a significant number of changes from its predecessor, SHA-1. SHA-2 consists of a set of four hash functions with digests that are 224, 256, 384 or 512 bits. We have used SHA-256 for our experimentation.

The security provided by a hashing algorithm is entirely dependent upon its ability to produce a unique value for any specific set of data. When a hash function produces the same hash value for two different sets of data then a collision is said to occur. Collision raises the possibility that an attacker may be able to computationally craft sets of data which provide access to information secured by the hashed values of pass codes or to alter computer data files in a fashion that would not change the resulting hash value and would thereby escape detection. A strong hash function is one that is resistant to such computational attacks. A weak hash function is one where a computational approach to producing collisions is believed to be possible. A broken hash function is one where a computational method for producing collisions is known to exist. In 2005, security flaws were identified in SHA-1, namely that a mathematical weakness might exist, indicating that a stronger hash function would be desirable. Although SHA-2 bears some similarity to the SHA-1 algorithm, these attacks have not been successfully extended to SHA-2.
1.4. Advanced Encryption Standard

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a specification for the encryption of electronic data established by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2001 [20]. The algorithm described by AES is a symmetric-key algorithm, meaning the same key is used for both encrypting and decrypting the data. AES is based on a design principle known as a substitution-permutation network, and is fast in both software and hardware. We have used AES to generate key size of 256 bits (AES-256). High speed and low RAM requirements were criteria of the AES selection process. Thus AES performs well on a wide variety of hardware, from 8-bit smart cards to high-performance computers.

2. PROPOSED METHOD

2.1. Enrolment (shown in Figure 1)

Step 1: Input face image from dataset (ATT, YALE or IFD) which is in greyscale (or converted). The ATT dataset of faces (formerly 'The ORL Database of Faces'), YALE dataset and IFD (Indian Face Dataset) are unmodified except for conversion to JPEG and renaming of the files. Datasets used are ATT, IFD and YALE with sample images shown in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively.

Step 2: Apply edge detection filter. The edge detection filters used for experimentation are based on Discrete Laplace operator, Sobel operator, Roberts Cross operator, Frei-Chen operator and Prewitt operator.

Step 3: Invert colors of the image and then auto normalize. This is done because a major drawback to application of the edge detection filters is an inherent reduction in overall image contrast produced by the operation, which is in turn used to become an advantage in our case since it provides obscuring the original image to an acceptable level. Normalize stretches the histogram, so the whole range of colors is used as to get more information out of the image. Hence by inverting the filtered image and auto normalizing we get the contrast to an acceptable level.

Step 4: Calculate SHA-256 hash value of the final cancellable face image and encrypt it with AES-256 bit cipher. The AES-256 bit cipher is a symmetric key algorithm which uses the same password for encrypting and decrypting.

Step 5: Obtain the final filtered face image and store in the corresponding dataset. Dataset ATT-L is the set obtained after applying step 2 with Laplace edge detector filter and step 3 on ATT dataset (sample shown in Figure 6). Dataset ATT-S is the set obtained after applying step 2 with Sobel edge detector filter and step 3 on ATT dataset (sample shown in Figure 7). Dataset ATT-R is the set obtained after applying step 2 with Roberts edge detector filter and step 3 on ATT dataset (sample shown in Figure 8). Dataset ATT-F is the set obtained after applying step 2 with Frei-Chen edge detector filter and step 3 on ATT dataset (sample shown in Figure 9). Similarly for YALE and IFD datasets.

2.2. Verification (shown in Figure 2)

Steps 1 to 3: Same as in Enrolment.

Step 4: Apply face recognition methods to identify the person set. In our experiment the face recognition methods use the following: PCA (Principal Component Analysis), IPCA (Incremental PCA), LDA (Linear Discriminant Analysis) and ICA (Independent Component Analysis).

Step 5: For the set of images of the matched person, verify the SHA-256 hash values after decrypting with AES-256 cipher. This step ensures that the stored biometric templates have not been tampered with.

The proposed method starts with a non-invertible feature transformation by using edge detection filters and is combined with a key binding biometric crypto system. The SHA-256 hash value, which is AES-256 bit encrypted, helps in binding the cancellable template with an encrypted key. The AES-256 bit cipher is a symmetric algorithm and hence uses the same password for encryption and decryption. Here the password that is used to bind the values can be user driven or be at the system level, depending on the feasibility of the biometric system.

Our proposed method focuses on the Roberts’
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Figure 1. Block diagram of proposed method for enrolment.

Figure 2. Block diagram of proposed method for verification.
Cross based edge detector due to its consistently highest matching accuracy across different datasets [Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3]. According to Roberts, an edge detector should have the following properties: the produced edges should be well-defined, the background should contribute as little noise as possible, and the intensity of edges should correspond as close as possible to what a human would perceive.

After applying the edge filter(s), the image colors are inverted since edge filters discard other information than the detected edges (first image of Figure 11). The image is then auto normalized edges (second image of Figure 11) to the full dynamic range, to further enhance the remaining details. In image processing, normalization is a process that changes the range of pixel intensity values. Applications include photographs with poor contrast due to glare, for example. Normalization is sometimes called contrast stretching. In more general fields of data processing, such as digital signal processing, it is referred to as dynamic range expansion. The purpose of dynamic range expansion in the various applications is usually to bring the image, or other type of signal, into a range that is more familiar or normal to the senses, hence the term normalization. Often, the motivation is to achieve consistency in dynamic range for a set of data, signals, or images to avoid mental distraction or fatigue. For example, a newspaper will strive to make all of the images in an issue share a similar range of greyscale.

Normalization is a linear process. If the intensity range of the image is 50 to 180 and the desired range is 0 to 255 the process entails subtracting 50 from each of pixel intensity, making the range 0 to 130. Then for each pixel the intensity is multiplied by 255/130, making the range 0 to 255. Auto-normalization in image processing software typically normalizes to the full dynamic range of the number system specified in the image file format. We have found through our experiment that when the face images are auto normalized after applying edge filter and inverting colors, matching accuracy increases.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The ATT dataset [17] comprises of face frontal images with low resolution (92x112 pixels). The images have dark background (Figure 3) with most of it not present in the images by comparison to other datasets. From Table 1, LDA based face recognition method is having the best matching accuracy. The proposed method with Roberts Cross filter and Sobel filter are showing the least variation (1.3%) w.r.t. matching accuracy.

The YALE dataset [18] comprises of face frontal images with medium resolution (320x243 pixels). The face images (Figure 4) have mostly a bright background and a few with shadows. Those shadows are subsequently removed due to edge detection filtering. From Table 2, LDA based face recognition method is having the best matching accuracy. The proposed method with Roberts Cross filter, Frei-Chen filter and Prewitt filter are showing the least variation (1.7%) w.r.t. matching accuracy.

The IFD dataset [19] comprises of face frontal and some side poses images with high resolution (640x480 pixels). The face images (Figure 5) have mostly a dull background. From Table 3, LDA based face recognition method is having the best matching accuracy. The proposed method with Roberts Cross filter, Laplace filter and Sobel filter are showing the least variation (1.3%) w.r.t. matching accuracy.

The facial images across all the datasets used here are taken under controlled conditions and are less susceptible to noise. After applying the edge filter and inverting colors, we have further enhanced the image by auto normalization. The face recognition method which uses LDA combined with Roberts Cross filter in our proposed scheme shows the highest matching accuracy consistently across the wide range of facial images of different types of datasets used. There is insignificant changes w.r.t. matching accuracy (varying from 1.3% to 1.7%) across the datasets, with and without our proposed method.

Template security emphasizes on obscuring the template images, the slight reduction in accuracy is definitely acceptable. Robert’s filter is mathematically the simplest of all the compared edge
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Figure 3. From ATT dataset.

Figure 4. From Yale dataset.

Figure 5. From IFD dataset.

Figure 6. From ATT-L.

Figure 7. From ATT-S.
Figure 8. From ATT-R.

Figure 9. From ATT-F.

Figure 10. From ATT-P.

Figure 11. Before and after auto normalization.
Table 1

**Facial recognition accuracy of ATT dataset and variants**

| Classifier | Dataset | ATT | ATT-L | ATT-S | ATT-R | ATT-F | ATT-P |
|------------|---------|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| ICA        | 91.3    | 83.1| 86.9  | 86.9  | 87.5  | 88.8  |
| IPCA       | 93.1    | 87.5| 89.4  | 88.1  | 88.1  | 90.0  |
| LDA        | 94.4    | 91.3| 93.1  | 93.1  | 92.5  | 91.9  |
| PDA        | 91.3    | 83.1| 88.1  | 87.5  | 88.8  | 88.1  |

Table 2

**Recognition accuracy of face recognition methods of YALE dataset and variants**

| Classifier | Dataset | YALE | YALE-L | YALE-S | YALE-R | YALE-F | YALE-P |
|------------|---------|------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| ICA        | 83.3    | 85.0 | 81.7   | 78.3   | 86.7   | 81.7   |
| IPCA       | 71.7    | 68.3 | 75.0   | 73.3   | 78.3   | 75.0   |
| LDA        | 91.7    | 86.7 | 88.3   | 90.0   | 90.0   | 90.0   |
| PCA        | 81.7    | 86.7 | 83.3   | 80.0   | 85.0   | 86.7   |

Table 3

**Recognition accuracy of face recognition methods of IFD dataset and variants**

| Classifier | Dataset | IFD | IFD-L | IFD-S | IFD-R | IFD-F | IFD-P |
|------------|---------|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| ICA        | 76.7    | 76.3| 75.4  | 78.0  | 75.0  | 75.0  |
| IPCA       | 76.7    | 86.0| 86.9  | 86.0  | 86.0  | 86.4  |
| LDA        | 91.1    | 89.8| 89.8  | 89.8  | 89.4  | 89.0  |
| PCA        | 76.3    | 72.0| 76.3  | 75.8  | 76.7  | 77.1  |
detection methods. Hence, the proposed scheme has low impact on the speed of execution, hence can be incorporated into existing systems without too much overhead. The proposed scheme can be incorporated at the time of enrolment and verification itself. The filtered images can thus be stored instead of the unaltered face images, thereby providing a form of encryption. Since the subsequent images taken for enrolment are binary different even when it is with same camera and lighting conditions, the obscured template will be different. This in turn provides a non-invertible template, where in case the dataset of the filtered images (used for matching) is compromised, it can be revoked a new set generated without worrying about misuse of the lost data. Also, by varying the convolution kernel values of the Robert’s filter gradient, more cancellable templates can be generated for a particular face image, as discussed for difference of gaussian edge filter by G. Hemantha Kumar and Manoj Krishnaswamy [10].

By storing SHA-256 hash of the stored biometric template and encrypting with AES-256 algorithm (Table 4) we have provided a strong measure against biometric template tampering. SHA-256 hashing and AES-256 cipher can be performed computationally fast (less than a second) and hence can be easily incorporated into existing systems. Although we have assumed that the attacker will not be able to easily gain access on the various levels to compromise the entire system, even in case the entire system was being compromised, the cancellable templates can be re-issued which provides new hash values automatically. Due to the non-invertible nature of the templates there is no worry of misuse of lost data. Other schemes involve calculating the helper data (in our case the ciphered hash value) for each set of biometric templates which becomes time consuming during verification. The time taken to decrypt only once enhances the speed of execution and can be incorporated in systems which require speed as well as security. Useful scenarios for the proposed method could be in real time systems, banking, ATM access, etc.

4. CONCLUSIONS

We have shown that the final filtered images itself can be used for face matching instead of unaltered face images. The results are checked across datasets which encompasses a wide variety of images taken under different conditions as well as different resolutions and image quality. We proposed a novel method for generating cancellable face biometrics and to secure the stored templates in a way which is suitable for integration with current face matching systems with acceptable alterations.

Also, by using fast, proven and standard hashing (SHA-256) and cryptographic (AES-256) methods for data verification, the vault is further enhanced. We discussed their strengths and shortcomings, as well as their relative performance on different databases under a variety of conditions. The approach allows for enhanced template security, privacy and maintaining good ethics in biometric systems. It is important that biometrics based authentication systems are designed to withstand different sources of attacks on the system.

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Table 4
SHA-256 Hash of cancellable image before and after AES-256 bit cipher

| SHA-256 Hash unencrypted in HEX representation: | Cancellable template |
|------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 5BB05B9A86F88AA1C21C47170553C3A3FB0052F35FF | B35993D3AA0C43988449 |
| SHA-256 Hash encrypted with AES-256 cipher (key=1234) in HEX representation: | 5A8B2D5EDB8D5AEED90F67F2D786SC62DCD1B81E0 |
| D58FB2A000111ABF5736589E649E6514AC256B7453E2 |
| 6AE5D369CBFF37158457B91C7223A877591082051FF2 |
| 94EBA0B7632C3C6BE5936A2078DA86487D39CD2B2 |
| B41A43FB53A2330F85021EA394F3E86715979CF3BE7 |
| A037209CDAC7E2D896A200C89903EE48F36AFAA0F14 |
| 9F8A1D07C871537FB86EDB4AC |

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