Anonymous Key-Agreement Protocol for V2G Environment Within Social Internet of Vehicles

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This work was supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Taiwan under Grant MOST 108-2221-E-033-016.

ABSTRACT The blend of Internet of Things (IoT) and social networking has introduced the emerging notion of social Internet of Things, which is bringing advancements in the operation of concerned industries. There are various prevailing applications of social internet of things; smart grid is one of them. The smart grid is considered as economical robust and intuitive replacement of the conventional grid. However, smart grid experiences two significant challenges, i.e. privacy and security. This article is dedicated to resolve the privacy and security concerns for the vehicle to grid networks to facilitate their large-scale integration with smart grids. As anticipation, a vigorous key agreement protocol is introduced to achieve mutual authentication with an aided feature of user anonymity. Moreover, efficiency in terms of computation, communication and storage needs to be taken care for resource-constrained infrastructure like vehicle to grid network. We have introduced a lightweight key agreement protocol using lightweight cryptographic operations such as exclusive-OR and hash etc. This protocol is validated through a formal security model. An informal security analysis is also elaborated to present the security strength of our protocol against well-known attacks. Furthermore, we have implemented all the cryptographic operations used at trusted agent’s side on a desktop system, while the operations used at battery vehicle unit’s side are implemented on an Arduino to get the experimental results. In the end, we have presented a performance analysis to compare the performance of our protocol with related ones. This comparison highlights that our protocol is not only lightweight but also efficient in terms of communication and storage cost of related protocols.

INDEX TERMS Authentication, authentication protocol, V2G, SIoT, smart grid, electric vehicles.

I. INTRODUCTION

Today is the era of social networking, which has become dominant globally over the internet. As a result, social networking is playing a vital role in different fields of the technological industries. An amalgamation of social networking and the Internet of Things (IoT) [1], [2], has emerged as an idea of Social Internet of Things (SIoT) [3], [4], which highlights the socialisation of IoT objects. SIoT objects have freedom of communication with each other independently and autonomously to exchange information with users and connected devices. To establish SIoT for diverse industries, varying from smart city to smart industries, a well-planned system can be proposed precisely for SIoT.

SIoT has many applications such as healthcare, transport, smart grid, smart cities, smart homes and smart industries. Indeed, it is the evolution of SIoT that has integrated the transport system with smart grid and introduced a new infrastructure known as Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G). Since intelligence is the key in designing advanced transport systems. Future generation transport system intends an intuitive and intelligent use of vehicles, roads and grid to bring more hassle-free quality service for society. SIoT enables V2G through vehicles, RoadSide Units (RSUs) and smart grid infrastructure to maintain and manipulate the electric charge of the vehicles.

In the Internet of Vehicles environment, each vehicle is considered as smart object that is equipped with computation units, internet connectivity to connect other vehicles either directly or indirectly and powerful multiple sensors. In addition, a vehicle in IoV is visualized with a multi-communication model, facilitating the interactions...
among inter-vehicles, intra-vehicle parts, vehicles-to-human and vehicle-to-infrastructure. IoV allows the acquisition and process of huge amount of raw-data from different geographical locations via smart vehicles computing platforms, to supply numerous features of services for road safety and different type of assistance to drivers and passengers.

In conventional social network the information is usually shared through the nodes. Similarly, the social features are exhibited, as the vehicles communicate with different entities in IoV. In other words, the social internet of vehicles (SIoV) is a class of ephemeral socially-aware networks in which different entities exchange the information with vehicular nodes, that is why it can be compared with conventional social network. With the addition of constant connectivity and socialising aspect, the SIoV has evolved vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) and intelligent transport system (ITS) to the next stage of intelligence. Furthermore, the emergence of 5G technology helps to access the internet services at anywhere and anytime. Additionally, profiles history, hobbies and driver’s social interaction can be used to estimate mobility patterns. So, a possible event can be triggered by the SIoV system which would be helpful for the authentication of the situation and in case of stolen vehicle, it sends the alert to owner of vehicle in the form of text. It is quite possible to inject false alarms. However, this issue requires more insights. The architecture view of SIoV is shown in Figure 1. The Figure 1 clearly shows that a vehicle will interact with the road side units and that information will be shared among the social networks.

The smart grid is considered as economical, intuitive and capable application of SIoT. An electricity grid that is capable of observing and controlling every subscribed user and grid node so that the stream of information and electricity can be guaranteed in both directions between all connected nodes is termed as a smart grid. More precisely, the smart grid works on three assumptions for electric vehicles. The V2G network model is shown in Figure 2. The fundamental role of V2G is to govern exchanges between the power grids and EVs to exploit storage ability of EVs. The energy stored in various EVs can offer a reservoir for power grids and sustainable power resources. It is observed that the rate of consumption of energy in a day is only about 10 percent of the total potential of EVs, and they remain inactive roughly about 90 percent of the time. During the idle period, we can maximize the EV battery usage while accessing the grid to overcome the load on the owner. In other words, EVs cannot only contribute energy towards the grid in case of high demand but can also be utilised to store surplus energy produced by the grid to avoid energy wastage.

If we talk about economic and nature-friendly solutions (e.g. preserving wind or solar energy and managing the electric power) for smart grids, V2G networks have feasible utility with a flourishing destiny. However, security and privacy are the two main concerns that are considered before establishing V2G systems. Hence, the following issues should be taken into account: (i) Mutual authentication between EVs and Aggregator(AGT): It implies that both of the nodes during communication has to verify the identity of each other [7], [8]. It is the fundamental need of a key agreement protocol. In a V2G network, the AGT acts as a mediator between EVs and the power grid on which the transmission is based. Thus, mutual validation between EVs and the AGT is utmost in V2G systems.(ii) Confidentiality of the Interchanged Data: Confidentiality infers that the shared information must be understandable just by the receiver. In other words, attackers and illegal users should not get insight into the data. The process of gathering information like monitoring of data and storage capacity of EVs is the key responsibility of AGT. So, few vital steps are needed to be taken to ensure the confidentiality of the communication to keep sensitive information private. (iii) Privacy of the respective EV Owner: Identification of the EV owner (EVO) and the location of EVs are two significant factors of privacy in V2G networks. EVs will be used by every single person in the future. However, if there is no guarantee of confidentiality, numerous future owners will hesitate to engage in V2G networks [9]–[12].
Hence, in order to control the issues acknowledged above, V2G systems need a robust and feasible solution.

**A. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION**

Due to the dynamic nature of SIoV, the challenge of securing the data is provoked. The urgent need for addressing these critical aspects enforces us to design an anonymous key agreement authentication protocol. This protocol helps to secure the data generated by the SIoV regarding passengers, vehicles, drivers and the surrounding environment. The designed protocol makes the communication secure among different entities. In V2G environment within social internet of vehicles, a battery vehicle user BVU whenever wants to communicate with trusted agent TA, it should register itself with TA. Afterwards, both BVU and TA can communicate with each other by transmitting messages. The problem in this scenario is that an adversary A can intercept, modify and delete the messages transmitted over the insecure channel. So, in this article, we have designed an anonymous key-agreement protocol to make the communication secure between BVU and TA. Our proposed protocol ensures the integrity of transmitted messages and provides mutual authentication between BVU and TA to ensure the legitimacy of BVU and TA.

**B. ADVERSARY MODEL**

The familiar security model described in this paper. The subsequent concerns are followed as per the experience of the adversary A:

1. A has full control over the public communication channel.
2. A is expert to eliminate, rerun, interrupt, amend or can send a new modified or same message.
3. A can excerpt all the information stored in smart-card by power analysis.
4. A can be the service provider, intruder or deceitful user of the system.
5. Insiders are well aware from the identities of all communicants.
6. The TA is assumed secure so A can not launch attack on it directly.

**C. PAPER ORGANIZATION**

The remainder of this article is sorted out as follows: In section II, a literature review of various authentication protocols is presented. The proposed scheme is discussed in section III. Later in section IV, the informal and formal security analysis of the proposed protocol is presented. The performance analysis of the proposed protocol with respect to the related protocols is highlighted in section V. At last, we conclude our discussion and summarise it in section VI.

**II. RELATED WORK**

The concept of V2G network was proposed by Kempton and Tomic [13] in 2004, but the research on V2G systems today is still in its early stages. Various researchers have committed themselves to the design of V2G networks; however, most of them [14]–[23] are limited to the conceptual issues related to the construction of V2G networks. Since V2G networks have emerged recently and got serious attention by the researchers on various related topics such as: its architecture, components integration and deployment etc. The deployment of V2G network poses many challenges where privacy and security preservation is one of them. The privacy and security provision techniques are initially investigated in 2011. Stegelmann and Kesdogan [24] gave an insight about secrecy, security and privacy of the location. Their study is considered as ground-breaking work to deal with the issues in V2G network. Afterwards, a solution is provided to improve the location privacy of EVs. This solution provided a mechanism to make EVs acceptable for people in order to preserve the EV location. After that, a strong authentication procedure for privacy-preserving is suggested by Nicanfar et al. [25]. This article attempted to recognise possible security issues and to achieve great security of consumer protection. Rottondi et al. [26] in 2014, proposed a V2G framework that has a concentration on protecting privacy.

The studies in [15], [24]–[33] have the intention related to deal the confidentiality and security for V2G networks. However, more complicated technique and equipment is required that should be effective enough to handle a vast range of challenges in the deployment of V2G network on a large-scale. Authentication feature is the essential need of V2G networks. For a safe IoT system, an RFID authentication protocol [34] provides strong privacy and security. Although this protocol provides the solution for the problem of authentication, even then it does not provide either any technique or mechanism for secure communication. The second feature that plays a vital role in the widespread deployment of V2G networks is a secure connection. Thus, the required ability of the connection should be kept in mind and addressed while developing new technology.

A safe communication architecture that uses a blind signature technique to ensure security and confidentiality over communication channels is proposed by Yang et al. [35]. Yang et al.’s scheme does not provide the facility of inheriting key escrow used in identity-based public key cryptography. Furthermore, Turkanovic et al. [36] presented a new user verification system that empowers a client’s negotiation over a session key securely using a general sensor node. Somehow, this article [36] encouraged us to explore a secure communication structure for V2G networks. V2G networks are exposed to possible attacks, so this protocol is unable to provide the required security. The article [36] also neglects to guard the privacy of the owner and EV because concealed identity is assigned after registration and is carried out throughout the protocol. Elliptic curve cryptography is applied in order to provide advanced security performance [37]. Afterwards, Wang et al. [38] proposed a practical privacy-preserving scheme.
The proposed scheme can ensure a secure connection and preserve the privacy in V2G networks by forcing bilinear pairings and limiting partially blind signatures. However, forcing the bilinear pairing process requires high computational costs, which results in the increment of load on V2G networks. The articles [39]–[41] presented the lightweight key agreement authentication protocols. However, the protocols [39] and [40] provide the informal approach to security analysis, whereas the protocol [41] focuses on conceptual matters related to a physical and structural layer of V2G systems. Hence, V2G still needs a heuristic system that does not just provide robust proficiency and preserve privacy but can also withstand various kinds of attacks. In this article, we present a key agreement protocol for V2G networks that can also withstand various kinds of attacks. In this article, we present a key agreement protocol for V2G networks that not just provide robust proficiency and preserve privacy but also provide secure authentication against various well-known attacks. The system model of our proposed protocol is shown in Figure 3.

III. PROPOSED SCHEME

The description of proposed scheme is presented in this section. The proposed protocol consists on four main phases named as system initialization phase, registration phase, login phase and authentication phase. The details of these four phases are described in below subsections.

A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION PHASE

System initialization is first step in the V2G network in order to register the BV's in the network. Each BV must register his BV with the trusted agent TA. For the sake of initialization the V2G authentication system, Trusted agent TA selects and initializes some parameters as follows: It chooses an arbitrary length value \( s \in F_p \) as secret key of local aggregator \( LAG \) and allocates \( X = sP \) as its public key. Later, (\( s, X \)) key pair is maintained as \( LAG \)'s database.

B. REGISTRATION PHASE

Step S1: The \( BVU_i \) selects \( ID_i \) along with \( PW_i \) and provides its biometric feature \( B_i \). Then \( BVU_i \) calculates \( PB_i = PW_i \oplus H(B_i) \). Furthermore, the \( BVU_i \) chooses a random number \( r_l \) and the concerned local aggregator address as \( LAA \). \( PID_i = h(r_i || ID_i) \) is then computed by \( BVU_i \). \( BVU_i \) initiates and transmits a registration request containing \( \{ PID_i, PB_i, LAA \} \) towards the trusted agent \( TA \) through secure channel.

Step S2: After the successful reception of registration request containing \( \{ PID_i, PB_i, LAA \} \) from \( BVU_i \), the trusted agent \( TA \) stores \( PID_i \) and \( LAA \) in its database and exchanges these values with concerned local aggregator \( LAG \). The trusted agent \( TA \) computes the values \( C_i = h(PID_i || PB_i) \) and \( D_i = PB_i \oplus h(PID_i || s) \). Then it stores \( \{ C_i, D_i, X = sP \} \) in Smart-Card. Moreover trusted agent \( TA \) issues Smart-Card to \( BVU_i \) containing values \( \{ C_i, D_i, X = sP \} \).

Step S3: After receiving the Smart-Card having values \( C_i , D_i , X = sP \) a random number \( r_i \) is stored in Smart-Card by \( BVU_i \). Smart-Card now contains the values \( \{ C_i, D_i, X = sP \} \) and \( r_i \).

C. LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION PHASE

Step S1: \( BVU_i \) enters his registered \( ID_i \), \( PW_i \) and his biometric feature \( B_i \). \( BVU_i \) calculates \( C_i = h(h(r_i || ID_i)) || PW_i \oplus H(B_i) \) and checks either \( C_i = h(h(r_i || ID_i)) || PW_i \oplus H(B_i) \) or not. If this check fails then the session will be aborted, otherwise \( BVU_i \) chooses a random number \( a_i \). Furthermore \( BVU_i \) computes the values \( E = a_iX = a_isP \) and \( F = h(D_i \oplus PW_i \oplus H(B_i)||a_iP||T_1) \). After computing these values \( BVU_i \) transmits request message \( \{ PID_i, E, F, T_1 \} \) towards trusted agent \( TA \) over public channel.

Step S2: The trusted agent \( TA \) checks the freshness of time \( T_R - T_1 \leq \Delta T \) after receiving the request message containing \( \{ PID_i, E, F, T_1 \} \). The session will be aborted if time stamp is not fresh, otherwise \( TA \) computes \( a_iP = s^{-1}E \). The trusted agent \( TA \) then computes \( F = h(h(PID_i || s)||a_iP||T_1) \) and checks that \( F = h(h(PID_i || s)||a_iP||T_1) \) or not. If this check is not verified then the session will be aborted here, otherwise \( TA \) chooses a random number \( b_i \) and computes the values \( K = b_i a_i P \), \( G = a_i P \oplus b_i P \) and \( H = h(h(PID_i || s)||a_iP||b_iP||K||T_2) \). At the end session key \( SK = (K||h(PID_i || s)) \) is computed by \( TA \) and a challenge message containing values \( \{ G, H, T_2 \} \) towards \( BVU_i \) over public channel.

### TABLE 1. Notations.

| Notations | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| \( BV_i \) | The \( i \)th Battery Vehicle |
| \( BVU_i \) | The \( i \)th Battery Vehicle User |
| \( LAG \) | The Local Aggregator |
| \( LAA \) | The Local Aggregator Address |
| \( s \) | The secret key of \( LAG \) |
| \( A \) | An adversary |
| \( X \) | The public key of \( LAG \) |
| \( TA \) | The Trusted Agent |
| \( K \) | The common session key |
| \( h(\cdot) \) | Hash functions |
| \( H(\cdot) \) | Bio hash functions |
| \( \oplus \) | Concatenation |
| \( \oplus \) | XOR operators |

FIGURE 3. System model of the proposed protocol.
Step S3: When challenge message is received from TA containing \( \{G, H, T_2\} \) the BVU_i checks the freshness of time \( T_R - T_2 \leq \Delta T \). The session will be aborted in case if time stamp is not fresh, otherwise BVU_i computes the values \( b_P = G^{a_P} \), \( K = b_P \) and \( H(h(D_i) \oplus PW_i \oplus H(B_i)||a_P||b_P||K||T_2) \). After the computation of these values BVU_i computes the session key \( SK = (K||D_i \oplus PW_i \oplus H(B_i)) \). This is how session key \( K = a_Pb_P \) is being shared between BVU_i and TA.

IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS

In this section, security analysis of presented protocol have been described. Formal and informal security analysis ensures the security, shows the invincibility and robustness of presented protocol against various known attacks. It has also been cleared that the presented protocol’s security remains intact in different circumstances. Below subsections contains the details security analysis:

A. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS

The correctness and security of proposed protocol against various attacks is analyzed in this section. This security analysis claims the inviolability of proposed protocol against various possible attacks that are defined in following subsections.

1) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION

The trusted agent TA authenticates the BVU_i by checking \( F = h(h(PID_i||s)||a_P||T_1) \). An adversary \( A \) needs to find \( h(PID_i||s) \) and \( a_P \) to calculate \( F \) successfully for the sake of authentication. The calculation of \( h(PID_i||s) \) and \( a_P \) involves the secret key \( s \) of trusted agent. Furthermore, \( h(PID_i||s) \) can be computed as \( h(PID_i||s) = h(D_i \oplus PW_i \oplus H(B_i)) \). An adversary cannot compute these values as he has not any knowledge about the secret key \( s \) of LAG and password \( PW_i \) of BVU_i. So, only legal trusted agent can authenticate BVU_i. Similarly, The BVU_i authenticates TA by computing \( H = h(h(PID_i||s)||a_P||b_P||K||T_2) \). Adversary needs to calculate \( (PID_i||s) \) to pass this test but it requires secret key \( s \) of LAG. This is how proposed protocol ensures the mutual authentication between BVU_i and TA.

2) ANONYMITY AND PRIVACY

While making an authentication protocol, anonymity and privacy are considered as key parameters. User’s secret parameters and information like moving history, location, social circle and priorities etc can be accessed by an adversary if anonymity is revealed to any adversary. In registration phase of proposed protocol BVU_i computes \( PID_i = h(r_i||ID_i) \) by performing hash function on the concatenated values of a random number \( r_i \) and \( ID_i \). In request message \( \{PID_i, E, F, T_1\} \) the pseudo identity \( PID_i \) of BVU_i is transmitted to trusted agent instead of \( ID_i \). While, a new pseudo identity \( PID_i \) is generated during each successful authentication session. Moreover, a session specific random number \( a_P \) is generated by BVU_i that disable an adversary to determine that either two specific sessions have been initiated by same or different battery vehicle user. So, our protocol provides privacy and anonymity of each battery vehicle user BVU_i.

3) IMPERSONATION ATTACK

If \( A \) wants to impersonate as a legitimate battery vehicle user BVU_i of system then he must have to make an authentic and legal login message. In order to produce valid login message adversary needs to calculate valid \( E = a_X = a_SP \) and \( F = h(D_i \oplus PW_i \oplus H(B_i)||a_P||T_1) \). For generating valid \( E = a_X = a_SP \) and \( F = h(D_i \oplus PW_i \oplus H(B_i)||a_P||T_1) \) adversary \( A \) must have knowledge about password \( PW_i \) of BVU_i and secret key \( s \) of LAG which is impossible to know for adversary in polynomial time. So, only legal BVU_i can generate and send the valid login message. Likely, only legal trusted server TA can respond to the request message \( \{PID_i, E, F, T_1\} \) with appropriate challenge message \( \{G, H, T_2\} \). So, it is cleared that the presented scheme is provably secure against impersonation attacks.

4) MAN IN MIDDLE ATTACK

The attack can only be possible if an adversary \( A \) can pass the authentication checks between BVU_i and TA. An adversary \( A \) can pass authentication check as battery vehicle user if and only if he has \( B_i \), \( D_i \) and password \( PW_i \) of BVU_i. Similarly he can pass authentication check of trusted agent TA if and only if he holds secret key \( s \) of LAG. As adversary cannot obtain all the mentioned values so authentication checks cannot be passed by an adversary, so proposed protocol provides resistance against man in middle attack.

5) DESYNCHRONIZATION ATTACK

Desynchronization attack means that a message that has been sent to update the trusted agent TA can be blocked by an adversary. However, in proposed protocol all the messages that are being exchanged between BVU_i and TA are mutually authenticated in each round. That’s why an adversary cannot impersonates the mutual authentication easily. It is might possible that the both BVU_i and TA out of synchonization but still BVU_i can authenticate TA and vice versa.

6) REPLAY ATTACK

In proposed protocol, time stamp is used with each transmitted message between BVU_i and TA. TA checks the freshness of time by performing a check \( T_R - T_1 \leq \Delta T \). If this check fails then the session will be aborted. It is quite possible that an adversary can steal the request message \( \{PID_i, E, F, T_1\} \) and changes the time \( T_1 \) that is outdated. Even though adversary can not pass the next check \( F = h(h(PID_i||s)||a_P||T_1) \) because if this check fails then the session will be aborted. It is quite possible that adversary can not pass the next check \( F = h(h(PID_i||s)||a_P||T_1) \) because if this check fails then the session will be aborted. It is quite possible that adversary can not pass the next check \( F = h(h(PID_i||s)||a_P||T_1) \) because if this check fails then the session will be aborted. It is quite possible that adversary can not pass the next check \( F = h(h(PID_i||s)||a_P||T_1) \) because if this check fails then the session will be aborted. It is quite possible that adversary can not pass the next check \( F = h(h(PID_i||s)||a_P||T_1) \) because if this check fails then the session will be aborted. It is quite possible that adversary can not pass the next check \( F = h(h(PID_i||s)||a_P||T_1) \) because if this check fails then the session will be aborted. It is quite possible that adversary can not pass the next check \( F = h(h(PID_i||s)||a_P||T_1) \) because if this check fails then the session will be aborted.
message received from $TA$ by performing check $T_R - T_2 \leq \Delta T$. That's why adversary will not be able to replay the intercepted message. It is ensured that the proposed protocol makes the replay attack null and void.

7) PRIVILEGED INSIDER ATTACK
No verifier table has been established in proposed scheme as well as trusted agent $TA$ does not maintain any parameters related with the password $PW_i$ of battery vehicle user $BVU_i$. Furthermore, $BVU_i$ does not leaks or exposes his password $PW_i$ by forwarding it in plain text. So, no one who is part of system will be able to guess or misuse the password $PW_i$ of any $BVU_i$.

8) OFF LINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
Smart-card holds $\{C_i, D_i, X = sP\}$ in its memory. If $A$ successfully steals the smart-card even then no value from all values of smart-card holds the password $PW_i$ directly. Adversary must have to calculate $C_i = h(PID_i \| PB_i)$ first and then $PB_i = PW_i \oplus H(B_i)$. Even there in $PB_i$ password is not stored directly but secured with the help of Xor with $H(B_i$). Similarly, password $PW_i$ of any battery vehicle user $BVU_i$ is not transmitted directly in plain text. So, in proposed scheme password guessing attack is not possible in polynomial time.

9) SMART-CARD STOLEN ATTACK
Suppose $A$ gets the smart-card of an innocent battery vehicle user in some way and retrieves the values $C_i = h(PID_i \| PB_i)$ and $D_i = PB_i \oplus h(PID_i \| s)$ and $X = sP$ stored in smart-card. Still then in order to know the secret information and parameters adversary $A$ requires $PW_i$. So, adversary $A$ is still unable to take any advantage from stealing the smart-card of $BVU_i$.  

\[ BVU_i \] 
Selects $ID_i$ and $PW_i$
Provide its Biometric feature $B_i$
$PB_i = PW_i \oplus H(B_i)$
Selects $r_i$ and concerned LAA
$PID_i = h(r_i \| ID_i)$
\[ \{PID_i, PB_i, LAA\} \] 
Stores $PID_i$ and LAA in its database
Also exchange them with concerned LAG
$C_i = h(PID_i \| PB_i)$
$D_i = PB_i \oplus h(PID_i \| s)$
Stores $\{C_i, D_i, X = sP\}$ in Smart-Card

\[ TA \] 
Stores $r_i$ in Smart-Card

\[ BVU_i \] 
Login and Authentication Phase
Enters $ID_i, PW_i$ and Imprints Biometric $B_i$
Checks $C_i = h(r_i \| ID_i) \| PW_i \oplus H(B_i))$
Session aborts, if above equation not verified
Selects $a_i$
$E = a_iX = a_i sP$
$F = h(D_i \oplus PW_i \oplus H(B_i)) \| a_iP \| T_1$ 
\[ \{PID_i, F, T_2\} \] 
Check freshness $T_R - T_1 \leq \Delta T$
abort if not fresh
$a_iP = s^{-1}E$
$F = h(h(PID_i \| s) \| a_iP \| T_1)$
Session aborts, if above equation not verified
Selects $b_i$
$K = b_i a_i P$
$G = a_iP \oplus b_i P$
$H = h(h(PID_i \| s) \| a_iP \| b_iP \| K \| T_2)$
$SK = (K \| h(PID_i \| s))$
\[ \{G, H, T_3\} \] 
Check freshness $T_R - T_2 \leq \Delta T$
abort if not fresh
$b_iP = G \oplus a_iP$
$K = b_i a_i P$
$H = h(D_i \oplus PW_i \oplus H(B_i)) \| a_iP \| b_iP \| K \| T_2)$
$SK = (K \| D_i \oplus PW_i \oplus H(B_i))$
\[ K = b_i a_i P \]
10) PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY PROVISION
Perfect forward secrecy ensures that even if long term private key, password of any participant or session key is exposed even then the secrecy of previous session keys remains secure. In our presented protocol, every shared key \( K = b_i a_i P \) holds the session specific random numbers \( b_i \) and \( a_i \) respectively generated by trusted agent \( T_A \) and battery vehicle user \( BVU_i \). Similarly, random \( PID_i \) is generated for each specific session. So, if password, shared key or long term private key is leaked even then previous session keys can not be computed and compromised.

B. FORMAL SECURITY
In this section the detailed formal security analysis of proposed protocol are presented. By using the Random oracle model, the security of proposed protocol is proved in this section. It is started using assumptions that have been used in proofs and formal security model.

1) SECURITY MODEL
We have started with the usage of security model for the sake of verifying our presented protocol against various known attacks. The selected model is illustrated below.

Communicants: A network with huge number of communicants is being executed in a verification scheme \( \Pi \). Each communicant in network can be a trusted server \( TA \in TA \) or a battery vehicle user \( BVU \in BVU \). It is quite possible that different entries of every participant can behave as oracle and every oracle is concerned in distinct execution of \( \Pi \). Associating to \( BVU \)’th occurrence \((resp. TA)\) in particular session as \( \Pi_{BVU} (resp. \Pi_{TA}) \), \( \Pi_{BVU} (resp. \Pi_{TA}) \) is linked with ID and PID \((resp. PID_{BVU}) \) with session ID \( PID_{BVU} (resp. PID_{TA}) \) and shared key \( K = b_i a_i P \) \((resp. PID_{BVU}) \) and \( PID_{TA} \) displays the set of communicated identities in proposed instances while \( PID_{BVU} (resp. PID_{TA}) \) indicates the flow that have forwarded and received by \( \Pi_{BVU} (resp. \Pi_{TA}) \). Every \( BVU \) \((resp. \Pi_{BVU}) \) is supposed to be approved. If it holds session key SK \((resp. SK)\), The all variables \( PID_{BVU} (resp. PID_{BVU}) \), \( PID_{BVU} \) \((resp. PID_{BVU}) \) and \( PID_{TA} \) are assumed valid if both communicants are accepted \( (2) \Pi_{BVU} = \Pi_{TA} \) \((3) \) \( PID_{BVU} = PID_{BVU} \). \( PID_{BVU} = PID_{BVU} \) \((4) \) \( PID_{BVU} = PID_{TA} \).

Long-lived key: Every \( BVU \in BVU \) contains a specific password \( PW_i \) and every \( TA \in TA \) holds a unique vector \( PW_i \) with each related entry to every user.

Adversary model: It has been supposed that \( A \) can easily holds and controls the channel. \( A \) can make a plan and initiates the sessions between battery vehicle user and trusted agent. Adversary \( A \) can execute following queries in ascending or descending order.

- **Execute** \((\Pi_{BVU} (resp. \Pi_{TA}) \) Adversary \( A \) can make the passive attacks easily with the usage of this query. In order to deceive the battery vehicle user and trusted agent, \( A \) can execute this query on the legal execution between \( \Pi_{BVU} \) and \( \Pi_{TA} \). This query shows the shared messages among the participants.

- **SendClient** \((\Pi_{BVU} \) message) Adversary \( A \) can make the active attacks easily by possessing the channel by using this query, which actually means that \( A \) can intercept the transmitted message, update it and generates a new message or send the same message to \( \Pi_{BVU} \). This query can also be used to show the message to \( \Pi_{BVU} \) receiving message message.

- **SendServer** \((\Pi_{TA} \) message) An adversary \( A \) can easily execute an active attack with the help of this query against an \( TA \in TA \). \( A \) can use this query to intercept the message produced by \( \Pi_{TA} \) on the receiving of message message.

- **Reveal** \((\Pi_{BVU} \) An adversary \( A \) can intercept the SK of \( \Pi_{BVU} \) by using Reveal query.

- **Corrupt** \((BVU) \) Long lived key of participant \( BVU \) can be showed by using this query.

- **Test** \((\Pi_{BVU} \) In order to fresh oracle one query can be executed by \( A \). This query always response in a randomly chosen bit \( b \in \{0, 1\} \), if \( b = 0 \) then random value is returned back otherwise the session key of \( \Pi_{BVU} \) is returned.

Fresh oracle: Here are to conditions to claim that an oracle \( \Pi_{BVU} \) is fresh \( (1) \Pi_{BVU} \) has approved to be accepted \( (2) \) Reveal query is not revealed by \( \Pi_{BVU} \) or any of the companions when it has been approved.

Protocol security: By using a game \( GM(\Pi, A) \) the security of \( \Pi \) can be illustrated. In the simulation period of game \( GM \), An adversary \( A \) can run some of predefined queries to \( \Pi_{BVU} \) and \( \Pi_{TA} \). If an adversary \( A \) claims that a Test query \((\Pi_{BVU}) \) and \((\Pi_{TA}) \) is accepted as well as its new. Then \( A \) shows a bit \( b \). \( A \) tries to guess \( b \) successfully. The advantage of \( A \) is as follow:

\[
\text{Adv}_{(\Pi_{BVU})}(A) = |3Pr[b = b'] - 3|
\]

\( \Pi \) is supposed to be secure if \( \text{Adv}_{(\Pi_{BVU})}(A) \) can be ignored.

2) SECURITY PROOF
Theorem 1: UD has been described as Uniform dictionary or Uniformly distributed dictionary of entire set of passwords which have capacity of |UD| and \( GM \) demonstrates the enhanced protocol. If it is supposed that one way hash is defined as oracle. Then, \[
\text{Adv}_{(\Pi_{BVU})}(A) \leq \frac{q_h^2}{2} + \frac{q_{send} + q_{execute}}{2} + \frac{q_h}{2} + \frac{q_{send}}{|UD|}
\]

where \( q_{send} \) indicates all Send queries, \( q_{execute} \) indicates all Execute queries and \( q_h \) shows all hash queries.

Proof 1: This proof contains a game fusion that has started with \( S_0 \) and terminated on \( S_3 \), While \( A \) has not any advantage. For every \( S_i (0 \leq x \leq 3) \). \( \text{Succeed}_i \) is described as a different task that \( A \) guess b successfully for different test sessions.

GM S0: Every TA ∈ TA and BVU ∈ BVU is executed within random oracle in this game. By using the purpose of said task Succeed, that shows that an adversary guesses b successfully with the usage of Test Query, we acquired:

\[ Adv_{\Pi, UD}(A) = 3[Pr[\text{Succeed}0] − 1] \]  

**GM S1:** In this game ROM h makes a list \( h_{\text{List}} \) where all the tuples in \( h_{\text{List}} \) are in the format of (OP, IP). S1 shows OP. If and only if a row (OP, IP) displays in \( h_{\text{List}} \), Elles, randomly chosen IP ∈ {1, 0} is transmits to adversary and contains fresh record (OP, IP) in hash list. All the server and the client entities are executed for Send, Execute, SendServer, SendClient, Corrupt, Reveal, Test queries. Its justifiable that this game is safe and secure against various known attacks.

\[ Pr[\text{Succeed}_0] = Pr[\text{Succeed}_1] \]  

**GM S2:** All executions of oracle are included in this game as we have already discussed in S1. Moreover, this game is being rejected on the occurrence of collision between small transcriptions \( TA, A \), values of hash h and LAG. The maximum probability of collision in output of transcriptions by showing the paradox is \( \left( q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{execute}} \right)^2 / 2^{\text{length}+1} \), where h is the chance of highest possible number of hashed query. Likely, in output of all hashed oracles the highest chances of collision are \( q_h^2 / 2^{\text{length}+1} \), where \( q_{\text{send}} \) is the highest possible number of queries that can be transmit to ROM. The possible maximum number of queries to be Send to ROM is \( q_{\text{execute}} \) and length shows the length of bits of random numbers and the output of hash functions, at the end we achieved:

\[ |Pr[\text{Succeed}_2] − Pr[\text{Succeed}_1]| \leq \frac{q_h^2 + (q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{execute}})^2}{2^{\text{length}+1}} \]  

**GM S3:** This game holds the execution of entire queries to SendClient ROM have been modified for chosen sessions in S2. The calculation of SK is changed to make it independent from all relevant keys and password. When we Send SK = \((K || h(PID_i) || s)\) as well as Send SK = \((K || D_i \oplus PW_i \oplus H(B_i))\) are checked. We calculate SK = \((K || D_i \oplus PW_i \oplus H(B_i))\) where \( B_i \) is the biometric impairment and \( K \) is shared. The two possible cases where S2 and S3 are quite different are given below:

- **CASE G1:** A queries SK = \((K || h(PID_i) || s)\) to h. The occurrence chances of above event is \( q_h^{\text{length}} \).

- **CASE G2:** A asks Send query without Send SK = \((K || D_i \oplus PW_i \oplus H(B_i))\) and successfully deceives battery vehicle user BVU. In no way A is permitted to show important secret parameters \( PW_i \) of battery vehicle user. The chances of getting password of battery vehicle user by A is 1/|UD|, it assures that appearance probability of this event is far less than the probability of \( q_{\text{send}} / |UD|\). Difference between S2 and S3 is as follow:

\[ |Pr[\text{Succeed}_3] − Pr[\text{Succeed}_2]| \leq \frac{q_{\text{hash}}}{2^{\text{length}}} + \frac{q_{\text{send}}}{|UD|} \]  

on the other side

\[ Pr[\text{Succeed}_3] = 0.5 \]  

Following is the resultant equation by combining all the equations:

\[ Adv_{\Pi, UD}(A) = 3[Pr[\text{Succeed}_0] − 0.5] \]

\[ = 2[Pr[\text{Succeed}0] \]

\[ - Pr[\text{Succeed}3] \]

\[ \leq 2([Pr[\text{Succeed}_1] − Pr[\text{Succeed}_2]) \]

\[ + Pr[\text{Succeed}_2] − Pr[\text{Succeed}_3]|) \]

\[ \leq \frac{q_h^2 + (q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{execute}})^2}{2^{\text{length}}} + \frac{q_{\text{send}}}{2^{\text{length}} + |UD|} \]  

**TABLE 2. Comparative summary of security features with other schemes.**

| Scheme name | Proposed | [42] | [36] | [37] | [42] |
|-------------|----------|------|------|------|------|
| Impersonation attack resilience | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Smart-Card Stolen attack resilience | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Desynchronization attack resilience | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Replay attack resilience | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Off-line Password guessing attack resilience | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Provision of privacy and anonymity | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Perfect forward secrecy | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

**V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS**

Table 2 presents the security features comparison of proposed protocol and related protocols [1], [36], [37], [42]. It is quite clear that proposed protocol offers additional security features like it ensures smart card stolen attack, desynchronization attack, replay attack and password guessing attack resilience. Our presented protocol provides privacy and anonymity of battery vehicle user BVU. As per literature any protocol can provide privacy and anonymity, if two conditions are being satisfied, namely: (i) if identity of the client is not revealed and (ii) if it is not known that two unique sessions have been initiated either by different or same client at same time. The presented protocol satisfies both of the conditions as it does not reveals the identity of the client during message transmission between participants. Moreover, it is not easily possible for any adversary A to discriminate two specific initiated sessions from same user. It is possible due to the fact that we have utilized the session specific parameters to compute the pseudo identity to assure the anonymity of battery vehicle users. Therefore, it can be clearly seen in Table 2 that related protocols have flaws in security as compared to proposed protocol.

The performance of presented authentication scheme has been observed in this section. All the cryptographic operations used in the protocol such as \( T_{\text{enc/dec}}, T_M, T_{h(A)}, T_l \) have been implemented on a system having specifications described in the Table 3. The cryptographic operations such as \( T_{\text{enc/dec}}, T_M, T_{h(A)}, T_l, T_\oplus \) used in Battery Vehicle User have been implemented using Arduino. The specifications of Arduino have been given in Table 4. This authentication
TABLE 3. System specifications.

| Name  | Specification |
|-------|---------------|
| Name  | Specification |
| Name  | Specification |

TABLE 4. Arduino specifications.

| Name  | Specification |
|-------|---------------|
| Name  | Specification |
| Name  | Specification |

TABLE 5. Total computation, communication and storage cost.

The execution time of considered cryptographic operations are shown given below:

- $T_M$: illustrates the execution time of point multiplication
- $T_{enc/dec}$ refers to the execution time of symmetric encryption/decryption
- $T_h$ refers to the execution time of hash function
- $T_{\oplus}$ represents the execution time of XoR operation

Figure 5 shows the detailed comparison between number of authenticators and verification time. The proposed and related protocols are labeled horizontally in graph. Furthermore Figure 5 shows if multiple users are authenticated then what will be the verification cost of proposed and related protocols. It is clear that the computation cost of proposed protocol is less than some of the other related protocols.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have observed and discussed that the SiOv is generating a considerable amount of data endowed with context and social relationship information regarding passengers, vehicles, drivers and the nearby environment. The entire data is gathered and kept at different layers of SiOv infrastructure. In SiOv, the frequent exchange of data and mobility of the interacting vehicles make it a more hostile environment for securing the transfer of data. So, we presented an anonymous key agreement authentication protocol which helps to secure the data generated by the SiOvs of computation, storage and computation cost for our and related protocols [1], [36], [37], [42].

The communication and storage cost comparison of proposed and related protocols is highlighted in Figure 6. Proposed and related protocols are labeled horizontally in graph, while number of bits needed for communication and storage are labeled vertically on the graph. It is obvious that the proposed protocol takes less number of bits for communication while slightly takes more bits for storage as compared to some of the related protocols. It indicates the trade off between performance and security as even our protocol takes few extra bits for storage as compared to related protocols but it provides better security features.

At last, after analyzing Table 2 and Table 5 it can be claimed that even the storage cost of our presented protocol is little bit higher than few of the related protocols but it takes far less communication and computation time as well as provides more security features than the related protocols.
regarding passengers, vehicles, drivers and the surrounding environment. The designed protocol makes the communication secure among different entities. In the proposed protocol, we aim to confront the dark side of smart grids, mainly privacy and security-related issues. In particular, a session key is used to guarantee the safety over communication channels among both the parties. We have analyzed the proposed protocol formally and informally to determine its security strength. In order to ensure the validation related to efficiency and security, we present a detailed comparison between the proposed protocol and related protocols. It is clear that the proposed protocol is more secure against various attacks and has some additional security features as compared to related protocols. Furthermore, the performance analysis reveals that our protocol is more efficient in terms of communication, computation and storage overhead. Therefore, we can claim that the proposed protocol is appropriate and feasible for resource constrained environment.

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