Gauge Symmetry Breaking in Gauge Theories—In Search of Clarification

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Abstract: The paper investigates the spontaneous breaking of gauge symmetries in gauge theories from a philosophical angle. Local gauge symmetry itself cannot break spontaneously in quantized gauge theories according to Elitzur's theorem—even though the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry is widely employed in textbook expositions of the Higgs mechanism, the standard account of mass generation for the weak gauge bosons in the standard model. Nevertheless, gauge symmetry can be broken in gauge theories, namely, in the form of the breaking of remnant subgroups of the original local gauge group under which the theories typically remain invariant after gauge fixing. The paper discusses the relation between these instances of symmetry breaking and phase transitions and draws some more general conclusions for the philosophical interpretation of gauge symmetries and their breaking.

1 Introduction

The interpretation of symmetries and symmetry breaking has been recognized as a central topic in the philosophy of science in recent years. Gauge symmetries, in particular, have attracted a considerable amount of interest due to the central role they play in our most successful theories of the fundamental constituents of nature. The standard model of elementary particle physics, for instance, is formulated in terms of gauge symmetry, and so are its most discussed extensions. The defining characteristic of gauge symmetries is that they are not empirical but purely formal symmetries\[^1\] in that

\[^1\]See [Healey, 2007], Chapter 6, where the distinction between empirical and purely formal symmetries is spelled out in detail and the standard account of gauge symmetries as purely formal symmetries is defended with great care.
different configurations of the fields involved represent identical physical situations if they are related by gauge symmetry. For recent philosophical work on the interpretation of gauge symmetries see, for instance, [Redhead, 2002], [Brading and Castellani, 2003], [Lyre, 2004], [Healey, 2007].

The present paper focuses on a particular aspect of gauge symmetries, namely, the notion of a spontaneously broken gauge symmetry. This is a notion that may seem puzzling at first glance, for it seems natural to ask what it might mean to spontaneously break a purely formal symmetry that exists only on the level of our description of physical reality, not on the level of physical reality itself. The notion of a spontaneously broken gauge symmetry is not an exotic notion, however, for it is widely regarded as playing a crucial role in the generation of particle masses in the standard model of particle physics by the Higgs mechanism. Although it is almost universally accepted, the received view of the Higgs mechanism as a case of broken local gauge symmetry has been criticized by both physicists and philosophers of physics, see [‘t Hooft, 2007], [Earman, 2004b], [Healey, 2007], [Lyre, 2008]. ‘t Hooft, for instance, criticizing it from the point of view of a physicist, claims that the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry is “something of a misnomer”\(^2\), while Earman, from the point of view of a philosopher, expresses qualms concerning the Higgs mechanism as a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry on grounds that “a genuine physical property like mass cannot be gained by eating descriptive fluff, which is just what gauge is.”\(^3\) Worries like these about the standard picture of the Higgs mechanism as a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry are aggravated by a result known as Elitzur’s theorem (see [Elitzur, 1975]), rigorously established for the context of lattice gauge theory, according to which local (gauge) symmetry cannot be spontaneously broken at all.

In order to develop an adequate perspective on the status of spontaneous symmetry breaking in quantized gauge theories, Earman proposes that the question be tackled by means of the constraint Hamiltonian formalism, an approach in which, in contrast to the standard approach discussed in Sections 5 and 6 of this paper, gauge orbits (that is, gauge field configurations related by gauge symmetry) are quotiented out before the resulting unconstrained system of variables is subjected to a quantization procedure (see [Earman, 2004b]). This is an intriguing proposal which, if actually carried out, would no doubt shed much light on the role of symmetry breaking in gauge theories from a highly rigorous point of view. As of now, however,

\(^2\)See ([‘t Hooft, 2007] p. 697).
\(^3\)See ([Earman, 2004a] p. 1239).
it has not been performed, and whether or not physicists will be able to
perform it in the future remains a matter of speculation. It seems therefore
reasonable to ask whether a resolution of the puzzles surrounding the notion
of spontaneous symmetry breaking in gauge theories can also be achieved
from the more conventional perspective of standard (“Lagrangian”) quan-
tum field theory, as it is actually practiced by those working in the field of
high energy physics. My aim in the present paper will be to show that this
can indeed be done. A proper assessment of the role of symmetry break-
ing in gauge theories that does not merely recite the standard narrative of
the Higgs mechanism as a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry, ar-
ically, can be given on the basis of the conventional approach to quantum
field theory alone.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls some
basic features of the concepts of (gauge) symmetry and (gauge) symmetry
breaking, and Section 3 discusses the characterization of symmetry breaking as a “natural phenomenon” proposed by Liu and Emch and considers
in which sense it applies to cases where the broken symmetry is a gauge
symmetry. Sections 4 and 5 assess the fate of the notion of local symmetry
breaking in gauge theories, which, as argued in Section 4, makes sense at the
classical level but is vacuous, as discussed in Section 5, in quantized gauge
theories according to Elitzur’s Theorem. Section 6 discusses the breaking
of post-gauge fixing remnant global gauge symmetries and their relation to
transitions between distinct physical phases. It is argued that there seems
to be no fixed connection between these instances of symmetry breaking
and phase transitions in that the distinction between broken and unbroken
symmetries does not in general line up with a distinction between distinct
physical phases. Section 7 turns to the more general philosophical rele-
vance of these findings by considering their implications for claims brought
forward in the literature on philosophical aspects of gauge symmetries and
their breaking. The paper closes in Section 8 with a brief concluding remark.

2 Symmetries, gauge symmetries, and symmetry
breaking

In this section, I give a brief review of the concepts in terms of which the
questions discussed in this paper are formulated. The concepts are those
of symmetry, gauge symmetry, symmetry breaking, and gauge symmetry

\[\text{[Liu and Emch, 2005 p. 153].}\]
breaking. Readers who are familiar with these notions can skip the section without loss, perhaps apart from the last two paragraphs, which review the phenomenon of Bose-Einstein condensation in a free Bose gas in terms of broken gauge symmetry.

A symmetry $\alpha$ of a classical system is a transformation $\alpha : \gamma \mapsto \alpha \gamma$ of the coordinates or variables identifying its configurations $S_\gamma$ that induces an automorphism $\alpha : S_\gamma \mapsto \alpha S_\gamma \equiv S_{\alpha \gamma}$ which commutes with its time evolution. If the equations of motions for the system are derived from an action principle in the Lagrange formalism or as Hamilton’s equations from a Hamiltonian, this translates into the statement that the Lagrangean or Hamiltonian from which they are derived is invariant under $\alpha$. For a quantum system, a symmetry is an automorphism of the observables or canonical variables which preserves all algebraic relations. Time evolution, in the Heisenberg picture, counts as an algebraic relation among others, so the invariance of all algebraic relations under a symmetry in the Heisenberg picture implies that the symmetry commutes with the dynamics of the system.

Gauge theories are defined in terms of an action $S$ that is invariant under transformations corresponding to an infinite dimensional Lie group and depending on a finite number of arbitrary functions. As follows from Noether’s second theorem, the equations of motion apparently fail to be deterministic in this case in that they involve arbitrary functions of time. This means that any configuration of the coordinate variables at a given initial time $t_0$ does not uniquely determine the configuration of variables at a later time $t_1$. In the physical interpretation of gauge theories, however, determinism can be restored by assuming that variable configurations that are related by the symmetry represent identical physical situations. The symmetry is referred to as a gauge symmetry in this case. Classical electromagnetism is a paradigm example of a gauge theory in that (assuming the relativistic formulation in terms of four-vector fields) its action is invariant under local gauge transformations of the four-vector potential $A_\mu(x)$ having the form

$$\begin{equation}
A_\mu(x) \mapsto A_\mu(x) - \frac{1}{e} \partial_\mu \alpha(x).
\end{equation}$$

Only functions of the gauge fields that are invariant under gauge transformations of the form (1) correspond to physical quantities. The inertial frame-dependent electric and magnetic fields $E(x)$ and $B(x)$, obtained from $A_\mu(x)$ by taking certain derivatives, are examples of such quantities, and only these, not the gauge fields themselves, are observable.

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5See [Noether, 1918].
Symmetries that are gauge symmetries in the sense just discussed are often referred to as local symmetries, alluding to the fact that the parameters of symmetry transformations can be chosen “locally”, that is, independently of each other for distinct space-time regions (see, for instance, the freedom in the choice of $\alpha(x)$ in Eq. (1)). However, the idea that variable configurations related by symmetry correspond to identical physical situations applies also in contexts where the symmetry transformations depend on only finitely many parameters, and one speaks of “global gauge symmetries” with regard to these cases, in contrast to the “local” gauge symmetries discussed before. Only theories that are formulated in terms of local gauge symmetry are commonly referred to as gauge theories, however. The present paper adopts this standard use of terminology, understanding “gauge symmetry” to refer to both local and global gauge symmetries and “gauge theory” to refer to theories formulated in terms of local gauge symmetry only.

Having reviewed the notions of symmetry in general and of gauge symmetry in particular, I now turn to the notion of spontaneous symmetry breaking (“SSB” in what follows). Using first a more informal mode of speech to introduce this concept, it can be defined by the criterion that the state of a physical system spontaneously breaks some symmetry of the underlying laws of motion (exhibits SSB) if it cannot be transformed by means of “physically realizable operations” into a state that exhibits this symmetry. For a classical system, this means that there does not exist any “continuous path of configurations, all with finite energy”, that connects a symmetry breaking state to a state that has all the symmetries of the laws of motion. Note that to fulfill the condition expressed in this criterion it does not suffice for the energy of the system to be minimized in a non-symmetric state. Under realistic conditions (that is, in the absence of potential barriers of infinite height), the system needs to have infinitely many degrees of freedom in order for states of it to spontaneously break one of the symmetries of its laws of motion.

For quantum theories, the defining criterion for SSB can be made precise using the language of the algebraic approach to quantum theories in that for

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6See ([Strocchi 2008] p. 4). Strocchi’s textbook is highly recommended as an accessible introduction to the notion of spontaneous symmetry breaking that avoids both unnecessary technicalities and misleading simplifications.

7See loc. cit.

8For a classical two-dimensional point-like particle moving in a double-well potential of the form $V(x) = \lambda(x^2 - x_0^2)^2$, for instance, the symmetric position at $x = 0$ can be reached from the two non-symmetric minima at $x = \pm x_0$ by locally injecting finite amounts of energy. Therefore, the discrete symmetry of transformations $x \mapsto -x$ is not spontaneously broken by the particle locations $\pm x_0$. 
a symmetry $\alpha$ of the algebra of observables of a system to be spontaneously broken by a state $\omega$, the GNS representations associated with the states $\omega$ and $\alpha^*\omega$ (defined by $\alpha^*\omega(A) = \omega(\alpha(A))$) have to be unitarily inequivalent. Intuitively, this means that the states $\omega$ and $\alpha^*\omega$ cannot be written in the form of density matrices in one and the same Hilbert space. Turning the system from $\omega$ into $\alpha^*\omega$ is physically impossible, and this means that they cannot be linked by a unitary transformation acting on density matrices in the same Hilbert space. An expectation value $\omega(A)$ of an observable $A$ for which

$$\omega(A) \neq \alpha^*\omega(A)$$

is called a symmetry breaking order parameter for the symmetry $\alpha$ in the state $\omega$.

The notion of a spontaneously broken gauge symmetry may seem puzzling at first sight. As formulated by Smeenk, “if gauge symmetry merely indicates descriptive redundancy in the mathematical formalism, it is not clear how spontaneously breaking a gauge symmetry could have any physical consequences, desirable or not.” Part of the aim of the present paper is to remove the puzzlement expressed in Smeenk’s statement and to elucidate the physical significance of SSB for gauge symmetries. For the purposes of the present section it suffices to clarify the notion a spontaneously broken gauge symmetry at a technical level, and to do so, the account just given for SSB on the level of observables must be generalized by extending the algebra of observables to an algebra of canonical variables that are not themselves physical observables. A simple example of a quantum theory with a spontaneously broken gauge symmetry is that of Bose-Einstein condensation of a non-relativistic free Bose gas at zero temperature. Since this theory is formulated in terms of global, rather than local, gauge symmetry, it does not qualify as a gauge theory, but the spontaneous breaking of a gauge symmetry can nevertheless nicely be illustrated with it. In this case, the canonical variables are (quantized) fields $\psi(x)$, and the system has infinitely many pure ground states $\Omega_\theta$, labelled by different values of an angle variable $\theta$, all of which assign a nonzero expectation value to the (improper) field operator $A$.

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9For accessible introductions to the notions of algebras of observables, their representations, the unitary (in-)equivalence of representations, and a state’s GNS representation, see, for instance, [Ruetschi, 2006] and [Strocchi, 2008].

10See ([Smeenk, 2006], p. 488).

11The following presentation relies on ([Strocchi, 2008], Chap. 7.2). See also Chapters 13.3 and 13.4 of [Strocchi, 2008] for further details.
\(\psi(x)\):

\[
\Omega_\theta(\psi) = \sqrt{n} e^{i\theta}, \quad \theta \in [0, 2\pi),
\]

(3)

where \(n\) is the average density \(n = |\Omega_\theta(\psi)|^2\).

Physically, all states \(\Omega_\theta\) defined in Eq. (3) are equivalent to each other in that they (and their mixtures) yield the same expectation values for all observable quantities. Gauge symmetry comes into play in the form of an invariance of the dynamics under global gauge transformations of the form

\[
\psi(x) \mapsto \alpha^\lambda(\psi(x)) = e^{i\lambda} \psi(x),
\]

\[
\psi^*(x) \mapsto \alpha^\lambda(\psi^*(x)) = e^{-i\lambda} \psi^*(x),
\]

(4)

where \(\lambda \in [0, 2\pi)\).

The states \(\Omega_\theta\) are not invariant under these transformations in that

\[
\Omega_\theta(\alpha^\lambda(\psi)) = \Omega_{\theta+\lambda}(\psi) \neq \Omega_\theta(\psi)
\]

(5)

for \(\lambda \neq 0\), so they break the gauge symmetry. The GNS representations associated with the states \(\Omega_\theta\) are unitarily inequivalent, so the symmetry \(\alpha\) defined in Eq. (4) is spontaneously broken by each \(\Omega_\theta\). Gauge symmetry breaking is an unavoidable feature of one’s description if one wants to describe the free Bose gas (at zero temperature) in terms of gauge variables by means of a pure state, but the states \(\Omega_\theta\), among which one can choose, are all physically equivalent in that they assign the same expectation values to all observables.

3 Symmetry breaking as a natural phenomenon

Spontaneous symmetry breaking, as explained in the previous section, is a feature of states that cannot be transformed by means of physically realizable operations into states that have the same symmetries as the underlying laws of motions. In order to interpret the notion thereby defined, let us first focus on cases where the broken symmetry is one of the algebra of observables (that is, not a gauge symmetry), so that its breaking manifests itself as an asymmetry on the level of observables. Having in mind these cases of SSB, Liu and Emch characterize symmetry breaking by means of the non-technical and intuitive notion of a “natural phenomenon”\(^\text{12}\), contrasting it

\(^\text{12}\)See ([Liu and Emch, 2005] p. 153). Liu and Emch focus on quantum spontaneous symmetry breaking, specifically, but the characterization of symmetry breaking as a natural phenomenon does no to seem to be based on any particular quantum (as opposed to classical) aspects.
with “merely theoretical concepts” such as “renormalization, first- or second-quantization.” Whenever the state of a system spontaneously breaks some symmetry of the underlying laws of motion, the discrepancy between the symmetries of the state and those of the laws is an objective feature of the physical situation described by that state and not merely an artefact of our description. Liu’s and Emch’s characterization of SSB as a “natural phenomenon” therefore seems adequate for cases of SSB on the level of observables in that the breaking of these symmetries, whenever it occurs, is an objective matter and not merely a conventional or otherwise arbitrary feature of how we represent the physical situation.

While SSB on the level of observables seems adequately characterized as a “natural phenomenon” in the sense just discussed, the status of SSB on the level of gauge variables seems less clear. The reason for this is that gauge symmetries, as explained in the first section, are purely formal symmetries that have no physical instantiations. Whenever we describe some physical situation in terms of broken gauge symmetry, there is thus no discrepancy between the physical symmetries of the situation and those of the underlying laws of motion. This can nicely be seen, for instance, in the case of Bose-Einstein condensation mentioned at the end of the previous section, where the gauge symmetry is broken by any of the states $\Omega_{\theta}$, but the physical properties of the system, i.e., the expectation values of observables, are exactly the same for all $\Omega_{\theta}$. There is in this case no asymmetry in the physical, gauge-invariant, properties of the system which the underlying laws of motion do not have. In just the same sense in which gauge symmetries con-

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13See ([Liu and Emch, 2005] p. 153, fn. 14).
14Note that to accept the characterization of SSB on the level of observables in quantum theories as a natural phenomenon, it does not seem necessary to endorse the standard ontic view of quantum states as states quantum systems “are in”. The main reason for adopting the alternative, epistemic, conception of quantum states is that it elegantly avoids the paradoxes of measurement and nonlocality. (See [Friederich, forthcoming] for more details and an exploration of how the view might be spelled out in detail.) According to the epistemic conception of quantum states, quantum states reflect the state assigning agents’ epistemic relations to these systems, so no such thing as the “true” quantum state of a quantum system is acknowledged, and SSB cannot be characterized in terms of quantum systems’ “being in” quantum states that break some symmetry of the algebra of observables. Nevertheless, proponents of the epistemic conception of states can hold that SSB is a natural phenomenon in that an observable called a “witness” of a symmetry of the observables may have a value that, if known, requires the assignment of a state that breaks that symmetry. (For an explanation of the notion of an observable being a “witness” for SSB, see ([Liu and Emch, 2005] p. 145).) The characterization of SSB in quantum theories as a natural phenomenon seems therefore independent of the question of whether quantum states are conceived of as ontic or epistemic.
contrast with empirical symmetries in that they have no physical instantiations
gauge symmetry breaking seems to be rather an aspect of how we describe
a physical situation than an objective feature of the situation itself.

One may feel, however, that to conclude from these considerations that
gauge symmetry breaking does not deserve to be characterized as a “natural
phenomenon” in any reasonable sense would be too rash. More specifically,
one may feel that whether some physical system is described in terms of
broken or unbroken gauge symmetry relates directly to objective features of
that system. Even though SSB does not seem to be an intrinsic physical feature
of systems described in terms of broken gauge symmetry in the same way as it is for systems described in terms of a broken symmetry on the
level of observables, it might nevertheless be regarded as an extrinsic physical feature of these systems in the sense that their physical characteristics
may strongly differ from those of systems described in terms of unbroken
gauge symmetry. Instances of gauge symmetry breaking, one might want to
say, deserve to be called “natural phenomena” if and only if situations described in terms of broken gauge symmetry are qualitatively different from
those described in terms of unbroken gauge symmetry. However, since both
the notion of a natural phenomenon and that of a “qualitative difference”
between physical situations are only intuitive notions, this idea is in need of
further qualification and should be made more precise.

A natural way of doing so is to say that gauge symmetry breaking qualifies as a “natural phenomenon” just in case the distinction between broken
and unbroken gauge symmetry lines up completely with a distinction between two qualitatively different physical phases. Physical phases are
regions in the space of parameters characterizing a theory (such as, for instance, particle masses, coupling constants, or temperature) in the interior of
which the expectation values of macroscopic observables (derivatives of the
Gibbs potential), written as functions of the parameters, vary only analyti-
cally. Boundaries between the different phases are called phase transitions. Formulated in terms of this notion, the criterion for gauge symmetry breaking
to qualify as a “natural phenomenon” stated above translates into the statement that it does so just in case the transition between broken and

\[15\] Alternatively, one may reserve the notion of a phase transition for the physical process of crossing a phase boundary. This is the sense in which, for instance, cosmologists speak of phase transitions in the early universe. For a detailed and rigorous account of phase transitions in the sense of phase boundaries, see [Sewell, 1982], Chapter 4. Here I gloss over the difficulties of giving a rigorous account of thermodynamical notions such as the Gibbs potential in the relativistic, quantum field theoretical, context, assuming that at least for all practical purposes these difficulties can be met.
unbroken gauge symmetry coincides with a phase transition. Cases of SSB
on the level of observables automatically count as natural phenomena in this
sense, at least if there is a symmetry breaking order parameter in form of
the expectation value of a macroscopic observable, which seems to be the
case in all the typical cases of practical interest. An example for this is the
transition between a ferromagnetic and a paramagnetic phase of a magnetic
material where the total magnetic moment of the system serves as an order
parameter. This quantity is zero throughout the unbroken (“symmetric”)
regime but becomes nonzero in the broken regime and therefore must exhibit
a non-analyticity (that is, a cusp or a jump) where the symmetry breaking
occurs. For the breaking of a gauge symmetry, in contrast, it is not immedi-
ately clear on conceptual grounds whether it is necessarily accompanied by a
non-analyticity on the level of observables, that is, by a phase transition. A
more detailed investigation is required to decide whether specific instances
of broken gauge symmetries can count as natural phenomena in that sense.

For the case of Bose-Einstein condensation discussed in the previous sec-
tion this question is settled rather easily. We saw that the ground states
$\Omega_\theta$ break the gauge symmetry $\alpha^A$ for a free Bose gas at zero temperature.
For temperatures $T$ substantially higher than $T = 0$, however, the situation
looks entirely different. Above a certain critical temperature $T_c$ one finds
that the expectation value $\Omega(\psi)$ vanishes, which may serve as a symmetry
breaking order parameter, signalling that the gauge symmetry is unbroken
above $T_c$. The most interesting question for present purposes is whether
observable properties of the free Bose gas above the critical temperature $T_c$
are qualitatively different from those below $T_c$. Clearly they are: Thermo-
dynamical quantities such as the compressibility of the gas (which is infinite
below $T_c$ in the non-interacting case and nonzero yet finite above $T_c$) or its
viscosity (which is zero below $T_c$ and nonzero above $T_c$) show qualitative dif-
fences below and above $T_c$, and the temperature dependence of its specific
heat exhibits a cusp at $T_c$. Since for a free (i.e., non-interacting) system
the many-particle states are just symmetrized products of the single-particle
states, the microscopic origin of these features can be analyzed in terms of
occupation numbers of the single-particle states of the free bosons. For tem-
peratures $T < T_c$ below the critical temperature the occupation number $n_0$
of the single-particle ground state diverges so that the ratio $n_0/N$ remains
finite even when the total number of particles $N$ goes to infinity. According
to common jargon, particles are described as “condensing” into the single-
particle ground state in this situation. For temperatures above the critical
temperature $T_c$, in contrast, $n_0/N$ goes to zero as $N$ approaches infinity. The
“condensation” of particles into the single-particle ground state vanishes to-
together with the restoration of global gauge symmetry, as becomes manifest in the fact that $n_0/N$ can be expressed in terms of the symmetry breaking order parameter. Therefore, in the case of Bose-Einstein condensation of a free Bose gas the distinction between broken and unbroken gauge symmetry corresponds exactly to a distinction on the level of macroscopic observables insofar as situations which are described in terms of broken gauge symmetry are separated by a phase transition from situations described in terms of unbroken gauge symmetry. In Section 6 of this paper I shall argue that this does not always hold for instances of symmetry breaking in gauge theories so that these do not (in general) qualify as natural phenomena in the (weak) sense introduced before in terms of phase transitions.

4 Local gauge symmetry breaking—the classical perspective

In this section, I briefly review the textbook account of the Higgs mechanism in classical terms as a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry. To see the underlying idea, it suffices to consider, as an example, the Lagrangean of the Abelian Higgs model defined by

$$L = D_\mu \phi^* D^\mu \phi - V(\phi) - \frac{1}{4} F_{\mu\nu} F^{\mu\nu},$$

which exhibits a local $U(1)$ gauge symmetry in that it is invariant under gauge transformations of the form

$$\phi(x) \mapsto e^{i\alpha(x)} \phi(x), \quad A_\mu(x) \mapsto A_\mu(x) - \frac{1}{e} \partial_\mu \alpha(x).$$

The covariant derivative $D_\mu$ is defined as $D_\mu = \partial_\mu + ie A_\mu$, and the potential $V(\phi)$ in Eq. (6) is given by

$$V(\phi) = m_0^2 \phi^* \phi + \lambda_0 (\phi^* \phi)^2.$$  

If the coefficient of the term quadratic in the fields is taken to be negative, that is, if $m_0^2 < 0$, the potential $V$ has a minimum at a nonzero value of the Higgs field $\phi$, namely, $|\phi|^2 = -\frac{m_0^2}{2\lambda_0}$.

The classical ground states of the theory are configurations of the fields $\phi$ and $A_\mu$ of the form

$$\phi(x) = e^{i\theta(x)} v/\sqrt{2}, \quad A_\mu(x) = -\frac{1}{e} \partial_\mu \theta(x),$$
where \( \theta(x) \) is an arbitrary real-valued function of space and time and \( v = \sqrt{-\frac{m^2}{\lambda_0}} \). For any two field configurations of the form (9) there exist gauge transformations of the form (7) that transform them into one another, so all these configurations are physically equivalent. However, for \( v \neq 0 \), the transformations (7) do not act trivially on these configurations, that is, none of the field configurations (9) is itself invariant under local gauge transformations. Since turning a field configuration of the form (9) into one that is invariant under all local gauge transformations and therefore has \( \phi(x) = 0 \) for all \( x \) requires a finite amount of energy for any compact space-time region and therefore cannot be accomplished by means of (locally) injecting finite amounts of energy, local gauge symmetry is indeed spontaneously broken in any classical ground state of (6).

In order to extract the physical content of the theory defined by the Lagrangean (6), it is useful to perform the \( \theta \)-dependent local gauge transformation

\[
\phi(x) = e^{i\theta(x)} \rho(x) \mapsto \rho(x),
\]

\[
A_\mu(x) \mapsto A_\mu(x) + \frac{1}{e} \partial_\mu \theta(x) \equiv B_\mu(x),
\]

which makes it possible to eliminate the \( \theta \)-field from the Lagrangean, so that it becomes

\[
\mathcal{L} = \partial_\mu \rho \partial^\mu \rho - V(\phi) + \frac{1}{2} e^2 \rho^2 B_\mu B^\mu - \frac{1}{4} F_{\mu\nu} F^{\mu\nu}.
\]

Expanding the field \( \rho \) around its expectation value as \( \rho = v/\sqrt{2} + \eta \) and neglecting terms which are of third or higher order in the fields \( \eta \) and \( B_\mu \) one obtains

\[
\mathcal{L}^{(2)} = \frac{1}{2} \left( \partial_\mu \eta \partial^\mu \eta + m^2_0 \eta^2 \right) + \frac{1}{2} e^2 v^2 B_\mu B^\mu - \frac{1}{4} F_{\mu\nu} F^{\mu\nu}.
\]

The characteristic physical properties of the theory defined by this Lagrangean can easily be read off in that it describes a massive vector boson with a mass \( M_B = ev \) and a massive scalar boson with mass \( \sqrt{-2m^2_0} \). The real field \( \theta \), which would have played the role of a Goldstone boson in the case of an invariance under \textit{global} gauge symmetries, has been eliminated, and this shows that there are no massless scalar particles in the theory. According to how this is often expressed, the Goldstone boson has been “eaten” by the gauge field. The Lagrangean \[12\] contains only gauge-invariant fields\[16\].

\[16\]Equivalently, one could have arrived at a Lagrangean of exactly the same form by imposing the unitary gauge \( \theta = 0 \).
and, from a classical point of view at least, one could have defined the theory directly in terms of these without introducing gauge symmetry at all.\footnote{See \cite{Struyve} for a detailed discussion of these questions. If one chooses to use only gauge-invariant fields, however, one has to pay careful attention to the constraints for the variable $\eta$ occurring in Eq. \eqref{eq:12}, see \cite{Strocchi2008} p. 194.}

Classically, as we see, the Higgs mechanism can be spelled out either in terms of broken local gauge symmetry or without introducing gauge symmetry in the first place. In the formulation using local gauge symmetry, as discussed before, it is broken in any classical ground state.

In the electroweak theory part of the standard model the implementation of the Higgs mechanism is slightly more complicated than in the case just discussed in that the broken local symmetry is a (non-abelian) $SU(2) \times U(1)$ symmetry instead of the simpler (abelian) $U(1)$ symmetry of our example. Moreover, the $SU(2) \times U(1)$ symmetry is not completely broken by the Higgs field, but only up to a residual $U(1)$ symmetry, which coincides with the gauge symmetry of electromagnetism. Despite these important conceptual differences, however, the conclusion just established that the Higgs mechanism can be described as a case of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry is not affected and remains correct for the classical version of the electroweak theory. Leaving aside the classical context from now, I turn to the fate of spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry in quantized gauge theories.

5 Quantization without gauge fixing

The quantization of gauge theories is most conveniently carried out in the functional integral formulation of quantum field theory. In this approach, correlation functions that represent expectation values of the observables and fields are obtained as derivatives of a generating functional $W[\eta, J]$, which can be written as a functional integral (that is, an integral over all possible field configurations) of the form

$$W[\eta, J] = N \int \mathcal{D}\phi \mathcal{D} A_\mu \exp \left( i \int d^4x (\mathcal{L} + \eta \phi + J_\mu A^\mu) \right),$$

(13)

where $S = \int d^4x (\mathcal{L})$ is the action of the theory to be quantized. Correlation functions are obtained from $W[\eta, J]$ by taking derivatives with respect to the source fields $\eta$ and $J$ and then setting them to zero.

The expression Eq. (13) for $W[\eta, J]$ involves an integral over all possible configurations of the fields $\phi$ and $A_\mu$, which means that each gauge-equivalent class of field configurations is integrated over infinitely often. As
a result, the integral in Eq. (13) diverges in a “vicious way” in that the inverse free propagator, a function that is contained in the exponent of the integrand, cannot be inverted to obtain the free propagator itself that is required as a starting point for perturbative calculations. Non-perturbative calculations that do not require an invertible inverse free propagator in the exponent of the functional integral Eq. (13) can be performed by starting from Eq. (13), but this requires the setting of lattice gauge theory, where the gauge theory to be quantized is not formulated on the space-time continuum but rather on a discrete lattice of space-time points.

There are at least two different possible reactions to this problem, which I shall consider in the present and following section, respectively. The first of these is to choose the non-perturbative route, which in practice means to quantize the theory on a lattice and to extrapolate the results to the continuum case by letting the lattice spacing go to zero; the second reaction, discussed in the following section, is gauge fixing—the insertion of terms in the functional integral that violate gauge invariance, but in such a way that correlation functions for gauge invariant quantities are independent of the choice of gauge fixing terms. Since local gauge symmetry is explicitly broken by gauge fixing terms, one has to consider the option without gauge fixing to assess the fate of local gauge symmetry breaking in quantized gauge theories. The next section will focus on the breaking of post-gauge fixing remnant global gauge symmetries that, depending on the choice of gauge, survive in the presence of gauge fixing terms.

In gauge theories that are quantized on a lattice, scalar and fermion fields are defined on a lattice representing discretized Euclidean space-time, and the gauge fields are defined on the links connecting the lattice sites. Non-perturbative calculations based on functional integral quantization can be carried out in this setting without gauge fixing, so that gauge invariance need not be violated during the quantization procedure. Since local gauge symmetry persists after quantization, it is possible to discuss whether local gauge symmetry can be broken in gauge theories that are quantized in this way.

The most important result in this context, mentioned already in the introductory section of this paper, is a theorem due to Elitzur\textsuperscript{19}, which states that local gauge symmetry cannot be spontaneously broken at all. Mathe-

\textsuperscript{18}For the earliest introduction of lattice gauge models, see Wegner [1971]. Lattice gauge theory as sketched in this paragraph was essentially invented by Wilson, see Wilson [1974].

\textsuperscript{19}Elitzur proved the theorem for the case of a Higgs field with fixed modulus, see Elitzur [1975]. The result was generalized to the case of a Higgs field with variable modulus by de Angelis, de Falco and Guerra, see De Angelis et al. [1978].
matically, what the theorem says is that for any local gauge transformation \( \alpha : \phi \mapsto \alpha(\phi) \) the vacuum expectation value of the Higgs field \( \phi \) is invariant under the gauge transformation \( \alpha \) in the sense that

\[
\langle \phi \rangle = \langle \alpha(\phi) \rangle ,
\]

from which it follows that \( \langle \phi \rangle = 0 \). As already explained, this means that there is no nonzero symmetry breaking order parameter in form of a nonzero vacuum expectation value of the Higgs field in quantized gauge theories without gauge fixing. The proof of the theorem is crucially based on the fact that local gauge transformations depend on infinitely many parameters and does not extend to the case of global gauge symmetries, which depend on only finitely many parameters.\(^{20}\) Thus, the impossibility of breaking local gauge symmetries is not a direct consequence of the general unobservability of gauge transformations but has to do with the specific features of local symmetries.

A possible reaction to Elitzur’s theorem, tempting perhaps for those who are used to think of what is usually called the Higgs mechanism as a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry, is to regard the theorem as an embarrassment for lattice gauge theory rather than as a reductio of that way of conceiving the Higgs mechanism. The temptation to make this move, however, should be resisted on at least two grounds. The first is that if we want to assess the fate of the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry in quantized gauge theories at all, we must do so in the context of an approach where local gauge symmetry is not explicitly broken from the start, that is, an approach to the quantization of gauge theories that does not rely on gauge fixing. The Wilsonian lattice formulation of gauge theory fulfills this requirement and provides the natural framework for investigating the status of (allegedly broken) local gauge symmetries, especially in the absence of a workable approach to quantization without gauge fixing for the continuum case. The second reason for not dismissing Elitzur’s theorem as an oddity of the lattice formulation is that the crucial ingredient of its proof—the fact that local gauge transformations, in contrast to global ones, depend on an infinity of parameters labelled by the points of space-time—carries over to the continuum case, where the number of independent parameters characterizing a gauge transformation is even non-denumerably large. Another important aspect is that the proof does not seem to depend on any peculiarities of the lattice formulation of which one

\(^{20}\)See ([Strocchi, 1985], Chap. II 2.5) for a helpful sketch of the proof and ([Itzykson and Drouffe, 1989], Chap. 6.1.3) for a more rigorous textbook account of it.
could be sure that they would not be valid in whatever precise formulation one might have one day for the continuum case without gauge fixing.

Elitzur’s theorem raises the question of whether the Higgs mechanism may perhaps not work as an account of mass generation in the standard model as it shows that the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry is not sound on which textbook expositions of the Higgs mechanism are commonly based. Fortunately, however, as demonstrated by Fröhlich, Morchio, and Strocchi\(^{21}\), such fears are ungrounded, since the physical phenomena which are usually associated with the Higgs mechanism can be recovered in terms of an approach that uses only entirely gauge-invariant fields. The mass terms for the gauge bosons and fermions, in particular, are obtained in terms of expectation values of gauge-invariant combinations of the Higgs and gauge fields, such as \(\phi^*\phi\), without any need of introducing a nonzero expectation value of the Higgs field. One may conclude from the fact that mass generation through the Higgs mechanism, as demonstrated by Fröhlich, Morchio and Strocchi, can be derived completely in terms of gauge-invariant fields that to characterize the Higgs mechanism as a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry is, as Smeenk puts it, a “relatively benign case of abuse”\(^{22}\) of terminology. An alternative conclusion to draw, however, would be that the abuse of terminology involved in characterizing the Higgs mechanism as a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry is not so benign—after all, the notion is demonstrably vacuous—, but that despite its being vacuous the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry has an important heuristic value, at least historically, and may still be useful for semi-classical calculations.

Another worry that might be brought up by Elitzur’s theorem is that if we do not dispose of the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry, we can no longer make the important distinction between cases where local gauge symmetry is broken and cases where it is unbroken (“restored”). This distinction, however, is apparently crucial to describe the *electroweak phase transition*, a phase transition between two different phases of the universe as described by the electroweak theory at different values of the fundamental parameters such as temperature and the Higgs boson mass. This transition is widely believed to have actually taken place as temperature decreased in the history of the early universe so that it supposedly evolved from a phase where the \(SU(2) \times U(1)\) local gauge symmetry of electroweak theory is unbroken to the phase in which we now exist, where that

\(^{21}\)See Fröhlich et al.\par
\(^{22}\)See Smeenk (2006) p. 498.
symmetry is allegedly broken.\footnote{Detailed calculations (see, for instance, \cite{Kajantie et al. 1996}) have shown that for values of the Higgs mass not excluded by experiment the electroweak phase transition is actually not a real phase transition (in the sense of an abrupt change in thermodynamic quantities) but rather a steep crossover between two qualitatively different regimes of electroweak theory, meaning that at least some expectation values of observables vary very strongly (yet analytically) from one regime to the other. In the context of the present paper, however, the question of whether, for realistic values of the Higgs mass, the electroweak phase transition is a genuine phase transition or rather a continuous crossover is not important since we are concerned here with the more general questions of whether the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry is needed to give meaning to the distinction between the high and low temperature phases of the electroweak theory, which are sharply separated for some values of the Higgs mass.} In the phase where electroweak symmetry is said to be unbroken ("restored") the electron and the neutrino are not yet distinguishable in that they simply correspond to degenerate states of one and the same particle. At the present state of the universe, in contrast, there is obviously a substantive physical difference between the electron and the neutrino, so the supposed phase transition seems to have taken the universe from one phase to another, qualitatively very different, one. Do we have to conclude from Elitzur’s theorem that the very idea of an electroweak phase transition rests on an error in that there cannot be a transition from a situation where electroweak symmetry is unbroken to a situation where it is broken since electroweak symmetry can never be broken at all?

Fortunately, this conclusion need not be drawn since the electroweak phase transition, just as the Higgs mechanism itself, can be described in purely gauge invariant terms. An example of an observable, that is, gauge-invariant quantity that may quite drastically change at the phase transition is the expectation value $\langle \phi^* \phi \rangle$, which, if displayed as a function of parameters such as temperature and the Higgs boson mass, exhibits a “jump” along the planes in the phase diagram where the electroweak phase transition occurs.\footnote{See, for instance, \cite{Buchmüller et al. 1993} pp. 134-6.} From the fact that phase transitions are often accompanied by the breaking (or restoration) of certain symmetries and the fact that the electroweak phase transition is often associated with “electroweak symmetry breaking” one might mistakenly conclude that there is an incompatibility between Elitzur’s theorem and the electroweak phase transition. As we have just seen, however, this is not the case, for the distinction between the two different phases, one where electroweak symmetry is allegedly broken and one where it is allegedly unbroken, can be made in an entirely gauge invariant way so that the dubious notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry is altogether avoided. Phase transitions are indeed often

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accompanied by instances of symmetry breaking, but the definition of a phase transition in terms of non-analytic behavior of observable quantities does not require symmetry breaking. The electroweak phase transition, as we see, is a case in point.

The topic of phase transitions in gauge theories will concern us again in the following section while discussing the role of spontaneous symmetry breaking in the presence of gauge fixing terms.

6 Gauge fixing and symmetry breaking

Having discussed the quantization of gauge theories without gauge fixing in the lattice formulation of gauge theories, I now turn to their quantization by means of gauge fixing terms, which makes it possible to perform perturbative computations using the diagrammatic techniques invented by Feynman in the continuum as well as on the lattice. In classical gauge theories, gauge fixing amounts to the implementation of constraints for the Higgs and gauge fields such as, for instance, the unitary gauge mentioned in Section 4, which fixes the phase of the Higgs field at a constant value, say zero, at any space-time point. For the Higgs field in the Abelian Higgs model discussed in Section 4, which can be written as \( \phi(x) = e^{i\theta(x)} \rho(x) \), this means setting \( \theta(x) = 0 \) for all \( x \). Other choices of gauge fixings that tend to be better suited for practical calculations include the Coulomb gauge, defined by \( \partial_i A^i = 0 \) (where the summation is over spatial indices only), and the Lorenz gauge, defined by \( \partial_\mu A^\mu = 0 \).

In the functional integral formulation of quantum field theory, gauge fixing is implemented in the form of field-valued Dirac-\( \delta \)-functions in the functional integral. The introduction of these \( \delta \)-functions can be seen as part of a change of integration variables involving a Jacobi determinant, the so-called Faddeev-Popov determinant \( \Delta(A) \), and it requires, at least in certain gauges, the introduction of additional, purely formal, fields as integrations variables. These are the so-called ghost fields, which do not correspond to any physical degrees of freedom.\(^{25}\) The original gauge-invariant action \( S \) of the gauge theory to be quantized (corresponding to the integral in the exponent of Eq. [13]) is replaced by an “effective” action \( S_{\text{eff}} \) of the form

\[
S_{\text{eff}} = S + S_{\text{gf}} + S_{\text{ghost}} ,
\]

\(^{25}\)This can be seen, for instance, from the fact that ghost fields formally correspond to spinless fermion fields the physical existence of which is excluded by the spin-statistics theorem.
where $S_{gf}$ implements the gauge fixing in that it contains the gauge fixing constraint and $S_{\text{ghost}}$ is an additional term in the presence of ghost fields.

The gauge fixing term $S_{gf}$ in the “effective” action $S_{\text{eff}}$ explicitly violates local gauge-invariance, but the way in which it does so depends on the choice of gauge fixing made. One possibility is that the gauge freedom is completely eliminated by the gauge fixing in the sense that out of any class of gauge-equivalent field configurations exactly one is singled out by the gauge fixing constraint. This is the case for the unitary gauge, which, in the case of the locally $U(1)$-symmetric Abelian Higgs model discussed before, is given by $\theta(x) = 0$. Here, local gauge symmetry is broken completely (and explicitly) at the level of the “effective” action $S_{\text{eff}}$, so spontaneous symmetry breaking cannot occur any more, for there simply is no unbroken symmetry left to be broken.

For other choices of gauge fixing terms, however, the action $S_{\text{eff}}$ can still be invariant under symmetry transformations corresponding to some finite-parameter subgroup of the original infinite-parameter local gauge group. In the presence of gauge fixing terms of this class, the action $S_{\text{eff}}$ still exhibits certain global gauge symmetries, but no longer a local one. The spontaneous breaking of global symmetries is not forbidden by Elitzur’s theorem, and indeed the breaking of these remnant global gauge symmetries is a common phenomenon in gauge theories in the presence of gauge fixing. In what follows, I will refer to it as the spontaneous breaking of “global subgroups” of the original, local, gauge group or just “remnant symmetry breaking”. It can also be studied in the formulation without gauge fixing by introducing fields which depend not only explicitly on the spacetime variable $x$, but also implicitly, via an additional dependence on the gauge fields. An example of such a field is:

$$\Phi(x; A) = g(x; A)\phi(x),$$

where $\phi(x)$ is the Higgs field and $g(x; A)$ is a transformation that transforms it into a chosen gauge such as, say, the Coulomb or Landau gauge. The so defined $\Phi(x; A)$ has a nonzero expectation value just in case the Higgs field $\phi(x)$ itself has a nonzero expectation value for the respective choice of gauge fixing, that is, for the choices mentioned, in the Coulomb or Landau gauge.

Since local gauge symmetry cannot be spontaneously broken according to Elitzur’s theorem, the breaking of these remnant global subgroups is the only way in which gauge symmetries can be broken in quantized gauge the-

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26The example taken is Eq. (1.1) in Caudy and Greensite, [2008].
ories. To answer the question of whether gauge symmetry breaking in quantized gauge theories can count as a natural phenomenon in the sense spelled out in Section 3 in terms of phase transitions, we therefore have to investigate whether the distinction between broken and unbroken remnant gauge symmetry always lines up with a contrast between distinct physical phases. We have to ask, in other words, whether the transition from unbroken to broken global subgroups is always accompanied by an abrupt change in the expectation values of some observables.

Even though there does not seem to be any rigorous statement about the relation between (remnant) symmetry breaking and the occurrence of phase transitions in gauge theories, there is strong evidence, based on a combination of exact and numerical results, that there is no rigid connection between the two and that, therefore, remnant gauge symmetry breaking does not in general qualify as a natural phenomenon in the sense specified in Section 3. A particularly illuminating discussion of the relation between the breaking of remnant subgroups and phase transitions is given by Caudy and Greensite in the context of a study of an $SU(2)$-symmetric lattice gauge model with a fixed-modulus Higgs field. For this model, there is robust numerical evidence that there exists, in a limited region of the phase diagram, a phase transition between a “Higgs phase”, where the spectrum exhibits a gauge boson mass, and a “non-Higgs phase”, where there is no such mass and the properties of the model are more similar to those of quantum chromodynamics (QCD) in the presence of confinement. The main conclusion drawn by Caudy and Greensite from their results is that there is no general agreement between the two transition lines (that between the different phases and that between broken and unbroken remnant gauge symmetry), even though for some values of the parameters of the model the transition between the two phases does coincide with that between a regime where remnant symmetry

\footnote{There are other, non-gauge, symmetries which can be broken in quantized gauge theories such as, for instance, chiral symmetry in QCD or center symmetry in non-abelian gauge theories (the center of a group is the set of elements which commutes with all other elements), which seems to be linked to the confinement-deconfinement phase transition, see [Greensite, 2011]. The present paper is not concerned with the breaking of these symmetries but only with that of gauge symmetries.}

\footnote{See [Caudy and Greensite, 2008]. More precisely, their results are for a model with a fixed-modulus Higgs field in the fundamental color representation. Their results clearly show that in a certain range of parameters the system exhibits the typical features of a “Higgs phase” such as, for instance, the appearance of a massive spectrum associated with the gauge field degrees of freedom, even though there is no “Mexican hat potential” (which makes sense only for a Higgs field with a variable modulus).}

\footnote{See [Greensite, 2011] for an introduction to the problem of confinement that includes an in-depth discussion of how confinement should be defined in the first place.}
is broken and one where it is unbroken.

This conclusion has two distinct interesting aspects the first of which is that, according to the results reported by Caudy and Greensite, both in Coulomb and Landau gauge part of the separation line between broken and unbroken gauge symmetry is found for parameters where the existence of an accompanying phase transition can be definitely excluded. Remnant gauge symmetry breaking, thus, is not always linked to a transition between distinct physical phases as in the Bose-Einstein case discussed in Section 3 in that the transition between broken and unbroken remnant subgroups can occur in regimes where all observables vary analytically. This shows that remnant symmetry breaking is not in general a natural phenomenon in the sense specified in Section 3. A second interesting aspect of the conclusions presented by Caudy and Greensite is that, according to their results, the values of the parameters (couplings of the theory) for which there is a transition between unbroken and broken remnant gauge symmetry are dependent on the choice of remnant subgroup, that is, if gauge fixing is used, on the choice of gauge fixing terms. As Caudy and Greensite conclude, gauge symmetry breaking in gauge theories is “ambiguous” in the sense that whether or not remnant gauge symmetry is broken for a specific choice of parameters can depend on the (from a physical point of view) arbitrary choice of remnant subgroup. This observation illustrates even further why remnant symmetry breaking does not deserve to be called a “natural phenomenon” in that whether or not it occurs for a given choice of parameters depends on the unphysical (gauge) freedom of description.

In the following, final, section of this paper, I consider some consequences of the considerations presented in this and the previous sections for philosophical debates about the interpretation of gauge symmetries and their breaking.

\[30\] It is known from an exact result due to Fradkin and Shenker \cite{1979} that in the model considered by Caudy and Greensite, for any two pairs of gauge and Higgs couplings $\beta$ and $\gamma$, there exists a continuous path in the $\beta$-$\gamma$-plane along which the expectation values of all observables vary analytically. This implies that the phase boundary that separates the “Higgs phase” from the “confinement phase” cannot be such that it divides the phase diagram into a pair of half-planes, but that it rather must have an endpoint, just as the phase transition between the liquid and gaseous phases in the typical phase diagram of ordinary matter has a (critical) endpoint beyond which the distinction between liquid and gas is only gradual. Caudy and Greensite find the distinction between regimes with broken and unbroken remnant gauge symmetries to coincide in part with the phase transition between the Higgs and confinement regimes, but they also find it continuing beyond the endpoint of that transition line for parameters where all observables vary only analytically.


7 Philosophical implications

The considerations on gauge symmetry breaking presented in the previous sections have interesting philosophical ramifications. In particular, they imply that some interpretive claims about gauge symmetries and their breaking in the literature are misleading. I discuss three examples of such claims.

The first example is Peter Kosso’s contention that broken gauge symmetries belong to the class of cases where “the relevant laws of nature are exactly symmetric, but the phenomena expressing these laws are not.”\textsuperscript{31} That this characterization cannot really be adequate follows already from the fact that gauge symmetries have no physical instantiations. If a theory such as that of the Bose gas discussed in Section 3 has ground states that break (global) gauge symmetry, all these ground states are still physically equivalent in that with respect to observable quantities they all assign the same expectation values. Kosso’s question of why we should think that the fundamental interactions of nature are “gauge symmetric” even though the phenomena which we observe are not is misleading since there is no asymmetry in the phenomena that is not found in the basic laws due to the fact that gauge symmetries are purely formal and hence unobservable. The defense of the Higgs mechanism as an account of mass generation in the standard model may still raise interesting epistemological challenges, but this has nothing to do with the issue of conjecturing the fundamental laws to be symmetric in a way in which the phenomena we observe are not.

A number of claims on the nature and role of gauge symmetry breaking in gauge theories are based on failure to take into account Elitzur’s theorem and the fact that whether or not the Higgs field has a nonzero expectation values depends on the choice of gauge fixing. Margaret Morrison, for instance, argues that the Higgs mechanism is “based on the idea that even the vacuum state can fail to exhibit the full symmetries of the laws of physics.”\textsuperscript{32} As a claim about ideas that have historically played a role in the development of the Higgs mechanism this statement may be true, but Morrison argues further that even from a methodological point of view “one needs the underlying vacuum assumptions regarding the plenum and degeneracy as part of the ‘physical’ picture.”\textsuperscript{33} An integral part of this picture, as she claims, is the thought that here “we are dealing with fields whose average value is non-zero, where the vacuum is said to have a non-zero ex-

\textsuperscript{31}See (Kosso, 2000), p. 359.
\textsuperscript{32}See (Morrison, 2003) p. 356.
\textsuperscript{33}See (Morrison, 2003) p. 357.
pectation value.”

This statement, as we have seen, is not correct in that, as we know from Elitzur’s theorem, the vacuum expectation of the Higgs field is actually zero in the absence of any gauge fixing, whereas in the presence of gauge fixing it depends on the choice of gauge fixing which, practical considerations aside, is arbitrary from a physical point of view. Morrison’s central conclusion that “it would be folly to accept a robust physical interpretation of the SSB story" in the electroweak theory is quite plausible (depending on what exactly is meant by “robust physical interpretation”), but the reason she gives for drawing the conclusion, namely, “that the various vacuum hypotheses which provide the necessary theoretical foundations are essentially problematic, for both physical and philosophical reasons” is not completely convincing. The problematic aspect of the notion of spontaneous symmetry breaking in the context of the $SU(2) \times U(1)$ symmetry of the electroweak theory is not that it is based on a questionable “theoretical story about the nature of the vacuum”, but that the $SU(2) \times U(1)$ local gauge symmetry is in fact unbroken, whereas the breaking of remnant subgroups depends on the gauge fixing.

Misunderstandings about the nature and significance of SSB in gauge theories can be found not only among philosophers but also among eminent physicists. Steven Weinberg, for instance, argues in a groundbreaking paper on phase transitions in gauge theories that these phase transitions have the “philosophical implication” as regards the “reality” of gauge symmetries that “if a gauge symmetry becomes unbroken for sufficiently high temperature, it becomes difficult to doubt its reality.” Weinberg’s reasoning here seems to be that if gauge symmetries exist in both broken and unbroken forms in such a way that there is a substantial physical difference between the two cases (that is, a phase transition that separates them), these symmetries are the bearers of non-trivial physical properties and, therefore, must be real. Although there may be disagreement about the sense in which gauge symmetries are supposedly established as “real” according to this line of thought, it seems clear from the considerations presented in the previous sections that Weinberg’s argument fails, whatever exactly it is supposed to show, for several reasons. Local gauge symmetry, as we know from Elitzur’s theorem, is never broken in quantized gauge theories, so phase transitions such as the electroweak phase transition cannot be described in terms of its

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34 See ([Morrison, 2003] p. 359).
35 See ([Morrison, 2003] p. 361).
36 See loc. cit.
37 See loc. cit.
38 See ([Weinberg, 1974] p. 3359).
breaking and the existence of phase transitions cannot have any implications whatsoever for the reality of local gauge symmetries. Remnant global subgroups of local gauge groups, on the other hand, may break spontaneously, but their breaking is ambiguous in that it depends on the gauge and is not necessarily accompanied by a qualitative change in physical properties. It seems therefore problematic to regard these global symmetries as the true bearers of physical properties and thus as “real” in a more substantial sense than the original, local, symmetries. The standard view of gauge symmetries as purely formal symmetries which do not have physical instantiations, in particular, is not in the least called into question by the result that there are phase transitions in gauge theories at high temperatures which for certain choices of gauge fixing are accompanied by a restoration of remnant gauge symmetry.

8 Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to clarify the status and significance of gauge symmetry breaking in gauge theories. While local gauge symmetry itself cannot break spontaneously in quantized gauge theories according to Elitzur’s theorem, this does not hold for remnant global gauge symmetries under which the action of a gauge theory typically remains invariant after gauge fixing. The physical significance of these instances of symmetry breaking was considered by investigating their relation to transitions between distinct physical phases. Based on the results of Caudy and Greensite [2008] it was argued that there seems to be no general fixed connection between remnant gauge symmetry breaking and phase transitions in that, first, a transition between broken and unbroken remnant gauge symmetry can exist without any accompanying discontinuous change in the expectation values of observables and, second, the breaking of remnant gauge symmetry may depend on the choice of gauge fixing made.39

With respect to the Higgs mechanism the following two conclusions can be drawn from the considerations presented: The first is that the standard textbook characterization of the Higgs mechanism as a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry is misleading (even though useful from a heuristic point of view) in that it is valid only for the classical, not for the quantum, case. The second is that while remnant global gauge symmetries may indeed be broken in regimes that exhibit the typical features of a “Higgs-phase”,

39 Or, equivalently, on the choice of gauge transformation $g(x; A)$ as in Eq. (16), used to define a remnant subgroup of the original local gauge group.
it does not suffice to detect the breaking of a remnant global symmetry to establish that these features actually hold. A more direct inspection of objective, that is, gauge-invariant, quantities remains necessary.

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