Soteria: A Provably Compliant User Right Manager Using a Novel Two-Layer Blockchain Technology

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ABSTRACT

Soteria is a user right management system designed to safeguard user-data privacy in a transparent and provable manner in compliance to regulations such as GDPR and CCPA. Soteria represents user data rights as formal executable sharing agreements, which can automatically be translated into a human readable form and enforced as data are queried. To support revocation and to prove compliance, an indelible, audited trail of the hash of data access and sharing agreements are stored on a two-layer distributed ledger. The main chain ensures partition tolerance and availability (PA) properties while side chains ensure consistency and availability (CA), thus providing the three properties of the CAP (consistency, availability, and partition tolerance) theorem. Besides depicting the two-layer architecture of Soteria, this paper evaluates representative consensus protocols and reports performance statistics.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to improve the quality of many application domains. In order to effectively train AI models, an application typically requires large quantities of personal information (PI) from users. To address data privacy issues, regulations such as GDPR [1] and CCPA [3] in the general domain and HIPAA in the medical domain need to be upheld. The eight rights of GDPR and the six of CCPA can be summarized into three categories: 1) right to consent, rectify, and delete; 2) right to be informed; and 3) right to access and transfer.

- Consent: users must explicitly opt-in and always have the ability to opt-out of PI collection.
- Informed: users have the right to know how their PI is collected, used, and shared.
- Access: users have the right to access his/her own data, transfer data to another person or entity, and erase data.

Businesses are required to comply with the consumer rights in a provable way. A robust privacy-preserving PI governance platform is needed to ensure that all transactions (including permission, revocation, data access, and deletion) on PI leave indelible and consistent records for public audit. Provability is essential in the court of law to resolve he-said-she-said cases.

To protect privacy rights in a provable manner, we propose Soteria, a user-right management system with a distributed ledger platform. The user-right management system provides a formal end-to-end solution that automatically maps user agreements in natural language into formal compliance code. Our executable sharing agreements (ESA) are a formal representation of sharing agreements that can specify a superset of the rights protected under GDPR and CCPA. These agreements can be translated into plain language automatically so users can understand them; they are translated into formal Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) formulas for enforcement. We use a distributed ledger to support auditability and revocability. We create an indelible trail of records by creating a log of every agreement signed and every query made, and a hash of the log is stored on the distributed ledger.

Soteria ensures performance scalability in terms of both latency and throughput. Soteria employs a multi-layer blockchain architecture (we previously proposed in [24]) to allow all three CAP (consistency, availability, and partition tolerance) properties [11] to be simultaneously satisfied. The base-layer blockchain guarantees PA (partition tolerance and availability) properties to ensure scalability, whereas the side chains guarantee CA (consistency and availability) properties to ensure provability. We detail our protocol selections for the base blockchain and side chains in Section 3.

The rest of this paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 defines Soteria’s architecture and user right management system. Section 3 presents and qualitatively evaluates four representative consensus protocols that satisfy consistency and availability (CA) requirements of Soteria’s side chains. In Section 4 we report our quantitative performance evaluation on Tendermint and Stellar protocols and justify our selection of Tendermint. We offer our concluding remarks in Section 5.

2. ARCHITECTURE OF SOTERIA

We use the terms user and consumer interchangeably to refer to the owner of data. (Data consumer is the term defined in CCPA to refer to an application user whose data the regulation aims to protect.) We use business and company to refer to the collector and custodian of user/consumer data. A user, and a business with that user’s consent, can access the data collected from the user stored at the business.
2.1 Components and Design Goals

Figure 1 depicts components of Soteria: URM, DTL, and ATS.

- **User right management (URM):** URM stores information about all user data and metadata that are collected and stored by a company.
- **Distributed ledger (DTL):** DTL is our multi-layer blockchain that satisfies Soteria’s requirements including privacy, throughput and latency.
- **Audit trail service (ATS):** ATS stores incurred transactions on data items for transparent auditing.

Soteria is designed to address each of the following challenges:

1. Today users are asked to consent to long hard-to-read agreements. How can we write agreements that can be understandable to users?
2. How do we ensure that the agreements users sign translate into a faithful implementation?
3. Consumers are not expected to keep records of all the agreements signed, how can a company prove that it is compliant? In particular, how do we ensure that no accesses to revoked data are performed?

While Section 3 depicts the ledger design in DTL for addressing the provability requirement, the remainder of this section presents how URM complies with regulations of consent, informed, and access described in Section 1.

2.2 ESA: Executable Sharing Agreement

In existing systems, users are required to agree to long documents that are not understandable. Furthermore, because these agreements are expressed in natural language, which can be ambiguous, it is not clear what the effect of the agreements, or whether a certain company is truly in compliance. Instead, we propose executable sharing agreement (ESA), which have well-defined unambiguous semantics; that is, whether a specific transaction complies with the agreement can be verified automatically. Furthermore, ESAs can automatically be converted into natural language unambiguously. This ensures that the contract is understandable to users and auditors.

Our ESA notation is inspired by the previously proposed ThingTalk language, designed originally for personal data sharing [16]. The syntax of an ESA is as follows:

$$\gamma \pi(r, p) : \{f_1, f_2, \ldots\} \in d, \pi(f_1, f_2, \ldots)$$

This statement reads as follows: “for consumer $\gamma$, the fields $f_1, f_2, \ldots$ from domain $d$ can be shared with any requester $r$ for purpose $p$, provided that the predicates $\pi(r, p)$ and $\pi(f_1, f_2, \ldots)$ are satisfied.

So, for example, to express that they are willing to share their abnormal PSA (a protein called prostate-specific antigen) with Stanford Medical Center, including their age and ethnicity but not their name, and only for research purposes, a patient named “Bob” might issue an ESA agreement of the form:

$$\gamma = \text{“Bob”}, r = \text{“Stanford Medical Center”} \land p = \text{research} : [\text{age, ethnicity, PSA}] \in \text{EHR}. \text{PSA} \geq 2$$

2.2.1 Translating to and from Natural Language

As consumers are not expected to understand formal languages, the ESA notation is designed to provide a natural language interface. The sharing agreements can be translated from formal to natural language using a rule-based translation. The previous example can be expressed in natural language as follows:

“Stanford Medical Center can read the age, ethnicity and PSA of Bob’s EHR for research and if the PSA is greater than or equal to 2.”

While the automatically generated sentences can be verbose and clunky due to the rule-based translation, they are understandable, and they are guaranteed to correspond exactly to the code of the agreement. Furthermore, the ESA notation is designed so that a user can define their own sharing agreement in natural language. Previous work has shown that it is possible to automatically translate natural language access controls into attribute-based policies.
and sharing agreements of the form:

Every database access is rewritten to include the sharing agreements constraints; it is timestamped and logged for later auditing.

2.3 ESA Enforcement

All writes to and reads from the database containing user data must go through the Soteria interface which ensures compliance to all the sharing agreements, which represent user consent. Soteria automatically includes an owner field for each row of the database. Every database access is rewritten to include the sharing agreements constraints; it is timestamped and logged for later auditing.

2.3.1 Verification of SQL Queries for Auditing

To prove compliance to an external auditor, Soteria stores the requester, the purpose and the final query, right before it is issued to the database, including all the clauses related to the sharing agreements. Using the set of the sharing agreements in force at the time, the auditor can then formally verify that the query was compliant.

Given a query from requester \( r \) for purpose \( p \) in the audit logs of the form:

\[
\text{SELECT } f \text{ FROM } t \text{ WHERE } \pi
\]

and sharing agreements of the form:

\[
\gamma_1 \cdot \pi_1(r,p) \odot t \cdot \pi_1(f_1,f_2,\ldots)
\]

\[
\gamma_2 \cdot \pi_2(r,p) \odot t \cdot \pi_2(f_1,f_2,\ldots)
\]

\[
\ldots
\]

the query is compliant if and only if

\[
\pi \models (\gamma_1 \land \pi_1(r,p) \land \pi_1(f_1,f_2,\ldots)) \lor
\gamma_2 \land \pi_2(r,p) \land \pi_2(f_1,f_2,\ldots)) \lor \ldots
\]

This logical formula can be verified efficiently using a satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) solver [8].

2.3.2 Formally Verified SQL Query

To ensure that all queries are compliant, Soteria uses the following algorithm to construct a query that is guaranteed by construction to satisfy the sharing agreements. Given a SQL query from requester \( r \) for purpose \( p \) of the form:

\[
\text{SELECT } f \text{ FROM } t \text{ WHERE } \pi
\]

and sharing agreements of the form:

\[
\gamma_1 \cdot \pi_1(r,p) \odot t \cdot \pi_1(f_1,f_2,\ldots)
\]

\[
\gamma_2 \cdot \pi_2(r,p) \odot t \cdot \pi_2(f_1,f_2,\ldots)
\]

\[
\ldots
\]

Soteria constructs a query of the form:

\[
\text{SELECT } \bar{f} \text{ FROM } \bar{t} \text{ WHERE } \bar{\pi} \text{ AND }
\gamma_1 \land \pi_1(r,p) \land \pi_1(f_1,f_2,\ldots) \lor
\gamma_2 \land \pi_2(r,p) \land \pi_2(f_1,f_2,\ldots) \lor \ldots
\]

where \( \gamma \) is the field in the table containing the owner of that row.

It is possible to prove that the result set of this query is consistent with the sharing agreement. Only the fields allowed by the agreement are returned, and a row is included only if the predicates in the sharing agreement in force for the row owner are satisfied.

We note that the SQL query, while correct, might not be very efficient, as it includes at least one clause for each owner of the data in the database. In our experience, this is sufficient, as in practice the same sharing agreement is used by many different consumers, so clauses can be unified when the query is constructed. As consumers’ preferences become more fine-grained, this might not be the case. Future work should investigate an optimization algorithm or an index structure suitable to queries of this form, so that both performance and formal correctness can be maintained.

2.3.3 Enforcing Requester and Purpose

A data requester can be an application user defined in CCPA or a company that stores user data. The URM component of Soteria does not verify the identity of the data requester. Such verification should be handled by the data transport protocol, and is out of scope of the Soteria protocol. Figure 1 shows that applications outside the Soteria box handles user registration and authentication. Soteria does not mandate any specific transport protocol; meaningful protocols could be REST, could be messaging-based [15], or could even be through physical media.

Furthermore, Soteria does not verify the purpose of the data access. The design assumes that at identification time, the data transport protocol will also compute the allowed purpose of data access. For example, using REST data transport, a medical data requester could be issued two different access tokens, one for clinical purposes and the other for research purposes. The correct purpose can be established through an existing business agreement between the data provider and data requester. If the data requester then uses the data in a manner inconsistent with the agreed purpose, the provider can use Soteria to establish that the fault lies with the requester.

2.3.4 Enforcing Access on Write

To support limiting what data is stored by a business entity such as AWS, queries that manipulate data (insert, update, delete) are also intercepted by Soteria, and modified to match the ESA that limit the storage of data. Write queries that are not allowed by any ESA are not executed and are not logged.

To support permanent deletion of the data upon request by the consumer, the data itself (included in the VALUES and SET clauses of the insert and update queries) is masked in the audit log, as the audit log is immutable and append-only. For this reason, an ESA about data storage that depend on the specific values cannot be audited after the fact. Soteria disallows such ESA: only the set of fields to write can be controlled.

Continuing the previous example, the patient might issue a following the data storage ESA:

\[
\gamma = \text{“Bob”: [age, ethnicity, PSA, phone, medication]}
\]

\[
\odot \text{ EHR.write}
\]

This ESA allows age, ethnicity, PSA readings, contact information and current medications to be stored. It does not allow any other column to be stored, so the following query:

\[
\text{INSERT INTO EHR SET person = “Bob”, age = 52, ethnicity = white, PSA = 1.5, phone = “555-555-5555”, smoker = TRUE, consumesAlcohol = FALSE, ...}
\]

would be rewritten as the following:

\[
\text{INSERT INTO EHR SET person = “Bob”, age = 52, ethnicity = white, PSA = 1.5, phone = “555-555-5555”, smoker = NULL, consumesAlcohol = NULL, ...}
\]

Deletions are a special case of write, because they reduce the data that is stored about a specific customer rather than store new
data. Hence, deletion is always allowed regardless of the current ESA. All deletions are logged, to prove that they were executed properly.

Additionally, upon revoking an ESA about data storage, some columns that were previously allowed might become disallowed. In that case, Soteria overwrites the data to set those columns to NULL. In case all columns are now disallowed, such as when all ESAs for a customer are revoked, Soteria deletes the row entirely. Both the database write (update or delete) and the ESA revocation are logged for later auditing.

2.4 ESA Storage and Audit

To support long-term auditability, as well as revocation of contracts, Soteria makes use of a distributed ledger (blockchain) to track which sharing agreements are in force. The use of the blockchain provides a global ordering of all the events across all parties in the system; the events include issuing a sharing agreement, accessing the data, and revoking a sharing agreement. This global ordering ensures it is always possible to verify whether a sharing agreement was in force when a data transaction occurred, without disputes.

Sharing agreements can potentially be privacy-sensitive themselves; for example, the sharing agreement in the previous section can reveal that the patient is likely to be male. For this reason, Soteria only stores the hash of the sharing agreement code, and the hash of each transaction, in the public blockchain. Upon request by a competent authority (e.g. under subpoena in a civil dispute), a data provider using Soteria can reveal the full audit logs, including the full code of the sharing agreements, and the exact transactions performed. These logs can be then matched to the hashes stored in the public blockchain to verify that they were not tampered with.

Soteria includes three types of events in the blockchain:

1. Sharing Agreement Deployment (ESAD). An ESAD event occurs when a new sharing agreement is created between a consumer who controls the data, and a provider who owns it. An ESAD transaction on the blockchain (ESAD-TX) includes the PI owner’s address, data provider’ address, the hash of the agreement code, ESA deployment date, and ESA validity status (set to true).

2. Data Transaction (DATA-TX). A data transaction indicates the transfer of data between a data provider and a data requester. DATA-TX records in the blockchain include the address of the data provider, the address of the data requester, and the hash of the exact query executed against the database. Note that, as described in the previous section, the exact query will include a reference to the consumers and their sharing constraints. Hence, given the raw audit logs, paired with the hash in the blockchain, it is possible to verify that the query was valid when executed.

3. Sharing Agreement Revocation (ESAR). A sharing agreement can be revoked by a user, making it invalid. Since the ledger is append-only, a revocation is implemented by creating a new sharing agreement transaction with the validity status set to false. Note that a rectification request issued by a user is executed in two consecutive transactions, an ESAR to revoke an existing consent and then an ESAD to create a new consent.

3. DLT CONSENSUS PROTOCOLS

Soteria adopts blockchain technology to maintain its distributed ledgers among several institutions and users. To achieve high throughput and low latency, Soteria uses a two-layer blockchain. The base layer is decentralized similar to Ethereum, and its side chains are entrusted by a group of selected validators, known as jur- ries. This two-layer approach does not compromise consistency between the data maintained by Soteria and the data on the providers’ servers, as consistency can always be verified by users on the base-layer public blockchain. Recall that the CAP theorem states that a distributed database system can only satisfy two of the three properties: consistency, availability, and partition tolerance. While the base-layer ensures availability and partition tolerance, the side chains ensure consistency and availability. Using a permissioned side chain with a jury pool, Soteria can improve both throughput and latency by limiting the number of juries. Note that permissioned blockchains are not the same as private blockchains. A permissioned blockchain gives the public the right to audit the system state but only uses a limited number of juries to conduct validation, whereas a private blockchain does not provide transparency to its system state.

Soteria’s ledger requires a consensus protocol since it supports contract revocation. A consensus protocol ensures that all validators agree on a unique order of transactions on the ledger. Note that without this strict access permission and access revocation order requirement, an append-only log suffices to support the decentralized auditability requirement.

There are several types of consensus protocols, each of which enjoys some pros and suffers some cons. An application selects a particular consensus protocol for its desired performance objectives (e.g., latency, throughput, and consistency). For instance, a protocol that guarantees immediate consistency may trade latency and throughput for achieving the consistency objective. A protocol that requires just weak consistency or eventual consistency can achieve shorter latency and higher throughput. Specifically, the PoX (proof-of-something) family protocols such as Proof-of-Work (PoW), Proof-of-Stake (PoS), and Proof-of-Importance (PoI) offer timely consistency with good network scalability but suffer from high latency and low transaction throughput. On the contrary, the BFT (Byzantine Fault Tolerance) family protocols offer good performance with limited scalability w.r.t. the number of validators. PoX is more suitable for permissionless blockchains (Soteria’s base layer), where BFT for permissioned blockchains (Soteria’s side chains).

In the remainder of this section, we survey representative BFT consensus protocols including Tendermint, Hashgraph, HotStuff, and Stellar. We summarize in Section 3.3 a qualitative comparison.

3.1 Blockchain Overview and Terminologies

A blockchain of height $H$ is composed of a sequence of $H$ blocks. Each block $b_h$, where $h = 0, \ldots, H − 1$, in a blockchain contains various numbers of transactions organized into a Merkle tree. The Merkle tree root of the $h^{th}$ block, denoted as $R_h$, summarizes the information in that block. Figure 2 shows an example blockchain. The $h^{th}$ block, where $h \in [1, \ldots, H − 1]$ points to its previous block with pointer $B_h$. (The first block, or $h = 0$ is the genesis block.) $B_h$ is the hash of three components: previous block hash $B_{h−1}$, the Merkle tree root of current block $R_h$, and some information from the $h^{th}$ block $T_h$ such as timestamp.
to respond to an audit request in 45 days.

required by regulations

delaying, latency is defined as the time required to update side-chain

her data will be inaccessible within seconds. For the purpose of au-

satisfies latency in minutes at a relatively low cost (compared
to e.g., Bitcoin). Therefore, Soteria uses Ethereum as its main

3.2 Base Chain Protocols

Proof-of-something (PoX) protocols aim to support decentralized
permissionless blockchains. As mentioned in Section 4, Sote-
ria uses a PoX blockchain as its base chain. The choice of a PoX
protocol depends on the factors of cost and *inter-chain consistency latency*, which is defined as the time between when a transaction
is committed on a side-chain and the time when the root of the trans-
action’s Merkle tree is committed on the base chain. Inter-chain consistency is different from transaction consistency. The former
ensures a consistent public view of transactions for the purpose of decentralized audits, whereas the latter ensures the validity of indi-

cidual transactions. Transactions committed on a side chain guar-

For an access revocation transaction, a side chain of Soteria can
ensure transaction-commit latency to be within seconds. In other
words, once a user revokes a prior permission to access her data,
her data will be inaccessible within seconds. For the purpose of au-
diting, latency is defined as the time required to update side-chain
information on the main chain. This inter-chain consistency latency
is the time between when a transaction commits on a side chain
and when the root of the transaction’s Merkle tree is hashd onto
the main chain. Although Soteria can only guarantee inter-chain consistency within minutes, this suffices for the auditing purpose
required by regulations. A PoS (proof-of-stake) protocol such as Ethereum satisfies latency in minutes at a relatively low cost (com-
pared to e.g., Bitcoin). Therefore, Soteria uses Ethereum as its main

3.3 Side Chain Protocols

Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols are more efficiently
but relatively small in scale in terms of the size of a jury pool (or
the number of voting members) than public blockchains. One ma-
jor milestone of BFT is the deployment of Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (PBFT), which is the first implementation that works cor-
rectly in an asynchronous system such as the Internet [17].

PBFT has two modes, normal mode and view-change mode. In
normal mode, a leader proposes a candidate value to the other repli-
cas in the pre-prepare phase. PBFT then goes through two succes-
sive voting phases: prepare and commit.

If the candidate value is accepted by a replica \( p_i \), as known as a
validator, \( p_i \) then enters the prepare phase and broadcasts a prepare
message to others consisting the candidate value. Once \( p_i \) collects
enough messages, i.e., \( 2f + 1 \) messages over \( 3f + 1 \) replicas \( f \) (denotes the number of Byzantine nodes) and agree on the same
value, it enters into commit phase. In the commit phase, replicas
conduct an election similar to the one in the prepare phase to agree
that more than \( 2f \) replicas will write the candidate value into their
respective databases.

To prevent indefinitely waiting, \( p_i \) transitions to view-change mode if a timeout is triggered. In view-change mode, replicas start
a new view to elect a new leader by sending view-change messages.

3.4 BFT/PBFT Protocols and Comparison

Since BFT/PBFT family protocols meet CA properties and perform-
ance requirements of Soteria’s side chains, we survey and
compare four representative protocols belonging to this family. For
qualitative comparison documented in Section 3.5 we survey and
present four well-documented protocols, Tendermint, Stellar, Hot-
Stuff, and Hashgraph. Enhancements proposed by some other pro-

\[ f < \frac{N}{3} \]

\[ f < \frac{N}{2} \]

\[ N \]

\[ N^3 \]

\[ N^2 \]

\[ \Theta \]

1E.g., the CCPA announced in January 2020 requires a data holder to respond to an audit request in 45 days.

2It is essential for a protocol to have been battle-tested in real-world deployments to ensure it reaches its claimed performance and fault
tolerance.
adapt to network delay, Tendermint uses a timeout function
\( timeout(r) = timeout(r-1) + r + \Delta \), where \( r \) is the round number and \( \Delta \) is a configurable constant. The initial timeout value \( (r = 0) \) is set by a configurable constant. When a timeout occurs, a new round starts with a longer timeout value.

3. Voting lock mechanism. To validate a block, each validator maintains two values, a locked value and a valid value. If a validator \( p_i \) sends a precommit message with a valid \( v \) value \((v \neq nil)\), it locks \( v \) as its locked value. If a validator \( p_i \) receives \( N - f \) prevote messages with the same valid value \( v \), it updates its valid value with \( v \). Also, if the proposer already has had a valid value, it proposes only this value to other validators. That valid value is regarded as the most recent possible value. Once a locked value \( v_{\text{locked}, i} \) is updated by \( p_i \) in round \( r_i \), it can only vote for \( v_{\text{locked}, i} \) in the following rounds unless validator \( p_i \) receives a valid value \( v_{\text{valid}, j} \) from the new proposer \( p_j \) and satisfies \( r_j > r_i \), where \( r_j \) is the round where \( p_j \) updated its valid value to \( v_{\text{valid}, j} \). Validator \( p_i \) can unlock \( v_{\text{locked}, i} \) and vote for \( v_{\text{valid}, j} \) in the prevote phase.

The intuition of Tendermint is that at block \( h \) at least one correct validator \( p_i \) proposed \( v_{\text{valid}, j} \) in round \( r_i \) is acceptable by \( N - f - 1 \) correct validators. In addition, given any of these \( N - f - 1 \) correct validators \( p_j \) and its locked value \( v_{\text{locked}, j} \) in round \( r_j \), one of the following two conditions is always satisfied, \( v_{\text{valid}, j} = v_{\text{locked}, j} \) or \( r_j > r_i \). This means that every correct validator can always send precommit message with \( v_{\text{valid}, j} \) in the same round and commit a block on block \( h \). Therefore, correct validators can always commit the same valid value, and hence guarantees the safety property \([15]\). Besides, contrary to PBFT, adapting these mechanisms does not require forwarding additional information (e.g., sending \( N - f \) valid check point messages) to the new proposer.

Tendermint can also be improved by using threshold signatures \([30]\) for reducing message complexity to improve the scalability. In addition, the protocol has been proven to achieve fairness under certain conditions \([4]\). However, since each change of leader requires waiting for a known upper bound of the network delay, which may exceed the maximum actual network delay, Tendermint does not enjoy optimistic responsiveness defined in \([29]\).

The pros and cons of Tendermint are:

- **Pros:**
  - A small jury of trusted validators, Tendermint achieves low latency with safety.
  - The number of communications is larger than the other protocols, and therefore, the size of a jury cannot be too large. This makes Tendermint a good protocol for DataX-change’s side chains, but not desirable to be its main chain.

3.4.2 Stellar

The Stellar consensus protocol (SCP) is composed of two protocols, the nomination protocol and ballot protocol. These protocols reach a consensus by using federated voting, which supports flexible trust. With flexible trust, users can choose any parties they trust to join the consensus process without a central authority.

More formally, every validator can select a set of validators to establish a quorum slice. For example, validator \( p_i \) selects a set of validators denoted as \( L \) to form quorum slice \( QS_{i(L)} \). Validator \( p_i \) can create multiple quorum slices, or \( S_i = \{ QS_{i(L_1)}, QS_{i(L_2)}, \ldots, QS_{i(L_m)} \} \). A quorum slice is defined as a set of validators sufficient to reach an agreement.

SCP assumes quorum intersection in that two quorum slices share at least one well-behaved node. SCP is a leaderless PBFT protocol, and it does not have the pre-prepare phase. However, SCP adds an accept phase to PPBFT to design its federated voting scheme to reach global consensus. Thus, federated voting includes three phases following the order of prepare, accept, and confirm.

1. **Prepare.** Once a new instance \( v \) has been created, \( p_i \) sends a message with value \( v \) to whomever trusts \( p_i \). Once \( p_i \) votes for \( v \), it will not vote for other values.

2. **Accept.** Validator \( p_i \) receives messages from the validators in its quorum slices \( QS_i \). Validator \( p_i \) can change its voted value in the prepare phase if the majority of \( p_i \)’s blocking set \( v \) for another value \( v' \) in the prepare phase. Otherwise, \( p_i \) still stands for the value \( v \) it voted in the accept phase. The blocking set of \( p_i \), \( |B_i| \), is defined as: for each quorum slice of \( p_i \), \( QS_{i(B_i)} \subseteq QS_i \), such that \( v(QS_{i(B_i)}) \cap B_i \neq \emptyset \), which means \( B_i \) contains at least one node in every quorum slice of \( p_i \).

3. **Confirm.** \( p_i \) broadcasts the value that it voted in the accept phase, thereby committing to that value.

The reason for the accept phase is that if the value voted by a validator in the prepare phase is different from the value voted by the majority of its neighbors, the neighbors can convince the validator to accept the other value. Therefore, although the SCP network structure can be configured the same as that of PBFT, SCP does not request a validator to commit a block with \( N - f \) of the same votes in any phases. Instead, validator \( p_i \) only conveys messages to those who list \( p_i \) in their quorum slices.

In summary, SCP provides users with the flexibility to make their own quorums, and its use of federated voting can lead to consensus and enjoy the safety property based on the assumptions listed in the white paper \([26]\). These assumptions may limit the freedom of network extension, since validators require adequate settings of quorum slices.

The pros and cons of SCP are:

- **Pros:**
  - Users have the privilege of selecting quorum slices composed of parties that they can trust. Second, based on the BFT-based protocol, SCP achieves low latency with safety.

- **Cons:** Setting up quorum slices may introduce network structure errors.

3.4.3 HotStuff

HotStuff is a leader-based BFT protocol in partial synchronous settings for reaching consensus. HotStuff is a four-phase consensus protocol including prepare, pre-commit, commit, and decide. (For details of these phases please refer to \([30]\).) HotStuff fulfills two properties: linearity and optimistic responsiveness:

- **Linearity.** The consensus algorithm has a linear communication complexity for committing a block in one round. Two scenarios must be considered. First, if a designated proposer (leader) is correct, the proposed block only takes \( O(N) \) messages \((N \text{ was defined as the number of validators})\) to be committed by the majority. Otherwise, a new proposer must be elected, known as view-change as defined in Section \([3]\) in the limit of \( O(N) \) messages as well. In the worst case, the total communication cost is \( O(N^2) \) for at least \( f \) \((f \approx N)\) times proposer selection. We will shortly explain how this linearity is achieved by HotStuff.
• Optimistic responsiveness. Any correct proposer \( p_i \) only has to wait for a delay of \( N - f \) messages to ensure that the candidate value \( v \) that \( p_i \) proposed can be committed (in view change mode). This message delay is independent of the known set upper bound \( \delta \) on the network’s delay [29].

HotStuff uses two techniques to achieve the linearity property. First, it adopts a simpler message transmission pattern. Instead of letting each validator broadcast messages to the others in any consensus phases, HotStuff makes all validators send signed messages to a designated leader. Then the leader integrates messages into an agreement. If \( N - f \) validator agree on the same content, the result is broadcast to the other validators to be voted on in the next phase.

Second, HotStuff employs the threshold signature scheme to reduce the message complexity. To verify whether an agreement broadcasted by the leader is actually signed by validators, the message should contain \( N - f \) valid messages signed by validators. These \( N - f \) attached signatures incur \( O(N^2) \) communication complexity in the consensus process. However, with the threshold signature technique, an agreement which only carries one signature can be verified by validators. With these two schemes, HotStuff can satisfy linearity.

In the threshold signature scheme, all validators hold a common public key \( PUB \), but each validator denoted as \( p_i \) owns a distinct private key \( PRI \). A threshold signature \( \rho \) can be defined as: \( \rho \leftarrow \text{combine}(m, S) \), where \( S = \{\rho_i \mid p_i \in V \} \). \( V \) is the set of validators where \( |V| = N \) and \( |S| \geq N - f \land \rho_i \leftarrow \text{sign}(m, PRI) \) where \( \text{sign}(m, PRI) \) means validator \( p_i \) signs the message \( m \) with its private key \( PRI \) to create the partial signature \( p_i \).

Two trade-offs are made in order to achieve linearity. First, compared to three-phase protocols, HotStuff adds an additional phase to each view, which causes a small amount of latency [30]. Second, the threshold signature can cost more computational resources. Taking RivestShamirAdleman (RSA) based implementations of threshold signature schemes as an example, given a \( (t,n) \) threshold signature scheme, at least \( t \) more participants in a group of size \( n \) can generate a valid signature collaboratively. According to the work of [22], the computation complexity can range from \( t \times T_{RSA} \) to \( 3t \times T_{RSA} \) for an individual signature generation and verification, depending on the feature design choices. \( T_{RSA} \) represents the time for computing exponent in an RSA-type scheme.) Also, in Elliptic curve based implementations, generating an individual signature still requires \( t \) times of \( T_{EC} \), the time for computing a Elliptic curve [18]. In HotStuff, \( (t,n) = (f,N) \), which means that the threshold signature scheme could cost \( f \) times of RSA-type schemes or Elliptic-curve-type schemes.

The pros and cons of HotStuff are:

• **Pros:** HotStuff optimizes the message complexity. Chained HotStuff also simplifies the algorithm and allows for more frequent leader rotation.

• **Cons:** HotStuff adopts a more sophisticated cryptography mechanism, which takes longer time to reach a consensus, compared to RSA-type schemes or Elliptic-curve-type schemes.

### 3.4.4 Hashgraph

The Hashgraph consensus protocol (HCP) is a BFT solution in a completely asynchronous model. HCP consists of a hashgraph data structure, a gossip about gossip data-transfer algorithm, and a virtual voting mechanism. We describe these components as follows.

• **Hashgraph.** A hashgraph is a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Each validator maintains a local copy of the hashgraph. A

  graph node is known as an event, which records a timestamp, transactions, and two pointers, one pointing to self-parent event and the other to other-parent event. Creating a new event can be regarded as proposing a new candidate value.

• **Gossip about gossip.** Gossip about gossip is a process of synchronizing two validators’ local hashgraph. Validator \( p_i \) randomly selects a peer \( p_j \) to transfer events that \( p_j \) does not know yet. Validator \( p_j \) only accepts events with valid signatures and places those events on its hashgraph. Finally, \( p_j \) creates a new event \( e \) whose pointers link to both \( p_i \) and \( p_j \). Event \( e \) also indicates the fact that \( p_i \) has shaken hands with \( p_j \).

• **Virtual voting.**

  The virtual voting process is similar to the process of PBFT in the normal mode. If validator \( p_i \) verifies the transactions wrapped in event \( e_{i-1} \) to be valid, validator \( p_i \) creates a new event \( e_i \) and points \( e_i \) to \( e_{i-1} \). Event \( e_i \) will be transferred when the next round of gossip about gossip process starts. Otherwise, \( p_i \) drops \( e_{i-1} \). From validator \( p_j \)’s view, if \( e_i \) has been sent to \( N - f \) validators, HCP defines that \( p_j \) can strongly see \( e_{i-1} \). The concept of ‘strongly seeing’ is similar to ‘going to the next phase’ in PBFT. Moreover, there are two voting rounds, just like prepare and commit, to confirm events. Therefore, every validator has to send each voting message to other validators directly or indirectly, which means the message complexity is still \( O(N^2) \).

• **Coin flip.** According to the FLP impossibility, it is impossible for a consensus algorithm running on an asynchronous network to achieve both safety and liveness under node failure [29]. Therefore, to avoid the impossibility in an asynchronous model, Hashgraph consensus protocol adopts randomized algorithm by allowing validators to flip coins. That is, a validator periodically votes pseudorandomly depending on the middle bit of signatures of events. Furthermore, validators do not broadcast coin-flip results since they can tally votes based on their local copies.

In HCP’s white paper [7], the safety property is proved. For liveness, HCP guarantees only termination of all non-faulty processes with probability one in its asynchronous model. However, there is no upper bound of time to reach a consensus. In addition, a local coin-flip protocol such as Ben-Or [9] requires exponential expected time to converge in the worst case [5]. Therefore, if Byzantine nodes manipulate the gossip protocol and it takes validators numerous rounds to reach consensus, the transaction latency can suffer a great deal.

The pros and cons of Hashgraph are:

• **Pros:** The message complexity is reduced by an order compared to PBFT. With a small-scale network, HCP can achieve low latency.

• **Cons:** Latency can be long in a large-scale network.

### 3.5 Qualitative Evaluation

In order to provide a qualitative comparison between these protocols we have enumerated, we collected data from relevant publications [12, 30, 7, 25]. Table [1] presents a summary including the following properties:

• Timing model: timing assumptions of different models including synchronous, asynchronous, and partial synchronous.
• Design goals: the primary performance goals that a consensus algorithm was designed to achieve. This provides the contextual information for evaluating a protocol. (A protocol designed for achieving low latency should not be derided for its weaknesses in other performance metrics.)

• Fault tolerance: the upper bound of faulty nodes (or weighted votes) that can cause system failure.

• Message complexity: the overall message complexity to commit a block. \( N \) denotes the number of validators.

• Scalability: the number of validators that the consensus protocol claims to be able to participate in the consensus process.

• Validator bound: the largest number of validators that can participate in a consensus protocol.

• Throughput: the number of transactions per second that can be committed by the majority of validators under the largest number of validators.

• Latency: the average delay before a transaction being committed under the largest number of validators.

Table 1 shows only the performance data under the largest number of validators that a protocol can support given its own hardware configuration and assumptions. In Section 4, we present our own experiments attempting to do a relatively fair comparison.

Note that Stellar is absent in most of the fields in Table 1 for three reasons. First, fault tolerance and message complexity are highly correlated with the configuration of each validator in the Stellar network. This flexible configuration makes it difficult to analyze Stellar without knowing its network structure. Second, the work of [29] focuses only on reducing latency and assumes that throughput can be improved by adding hardware. Also note that thought Table 1 does not provide an apple-to-apple comparison, it provides a birds-eye view on representative protocols’ characteristics. Although all protocols do their best to optimize performance, we can still observe a general tradeoff between latency and throughput. For instance, HCP attempts to optimize throughput, but its latency is higher than the others. Conversely, Tendermint enjoys low latency but suffers from relatively low throughput.

### 4. EXPERIMENTS

Our experiments were designed to evaluate tradeoffs between latency and throughput under different hardware and software configurations. Unfortunately, since there is no stable implementation of Hashgraph or Hotstuff to date, we evaluated only the latest versions of Tendermint and Stellar. We adopted Tendermint v0.32.1 and Stellar v12.0.0 and deployed them on Google Cloud Platform (GCP). For Tendermint and Stellar, respectively, we created up to 64 validators, and assigned an 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) 2.20 GHz CPU with 7.2 GB memory to each validator. Validators were configured into a fully connected topology. To measure realistic network latency, we deployed validators on Google servers in different geographical locations (Taiwan, Singapore, Belgium, and Columbia). Validators were distributed equally to these locations. For example, in a 64-validator implementation, 16 validators were allocated to each of the four geographic locations.

#### 4.1 Metrics

We define throughput and latency based on an end-user’s perspective. Given a set of \( N \) validators \( V = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_N\} \), throughput denoted as \( \text{TPS}_{\text{avg}} \) is written as

\[
\text{TPS}_{\text{avg}} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \text{TPS}_{i}^{\text{avg}}}{N},
\]

where \( \text{TPS}_{i}^{\text{avg}} \) denotes the average throughput of validator \( p_i \), who owns a sequence of blocks \( B' = \{h_0, b_1, \ldots, b_H\} \). In turn, \( \text{TPS}_h^{i} \) (throughput of the \( h + 1 \)th block of validator \( p_i \)) is the average throughput of all transactions in that block, which is obtained by the number of transactions in the block divided by the commit interval between \( b_{h-1} \) and \( b_h \), which is denoted as \( \Delta t_h \), or

\[
\text{TPS}_h^{i} = \frac{\sum_{h=0}^{H} \text{TPS}_{h}^{i}}{H}, \text{ where } \text{TPS}_{h}^{i} = \frac{|T_h^{i}|}{\Delta t_h}.
\]

The latency of a transaction is the time between when the transaction is submitted by a client and when the transaction is committed in a block. Each transaction \( j \) may have different latency in \( V \) validators’ databases, \( \text{Latency}_{j}^{i}, \forall p_i \in V \). We thus denote \( \text{Latency}_{\text{med}}^{j} \) as the median latency of transaction \( j \) among all \( V \) validators. The average latency of \( T \) transactions denoted as \( \text{Latency}_{\text{avg}}^{j} \) can then be written as

\[
\text{Latency}_{\text{avg}}^{j} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{T} \text{Latency}_{\text{med}}^{j}}{T}.
\]

3Hashgraph does not provide open-source release. Hotstuff’s open-source code is not free of bugs as of Q4 2019 to put into production.
4.2 Parameter Settings

Several parameters affect the block commit time, including maximum block size, transaction size, commit interval, transaction weight, and quorum-slice size \cite{30,12}.

- **Maximum block size.** The maximum number of transactions that can be included in a block as the block is confirmed.
- **Transaction size.** The capacity of a transaction in bytes.
- **Minimal commit interval.** The minimum time increment between consecutive blocks. A minimum commit interval may prolong block commit time if an implementation intends to produce a block whose latency is smaller than the commit interval. However, we assume that a block’s latency, which will be no longer than the commit interval, is an acceptable delay.
- **Transaction weight.** The probability of a transaction being committed in a block. All transactions have the same transaction weight in our experiments.
- **Quorum slice.** In Stellar, each validator has its quorum slice \cite{26}. To achieve a fully connected network, each validator’s quorum slice is comprised of the rest of the validators so that all validators join the quorum and there is no dispensable set.

| Parameter          | Details                                                                 |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Maximum block size | 3,000 transactions/block                                                 |
| Transaction size   | 212 bytes                                                               |
| Commit interval    | 5 seconds                                                               |

Table 2: Parameter Settings for Tendermint and Stellar

We used the parameter settings listed in Table 2 to compare Tendermint and Stellar. Both implementations were issued the same workload of a large number of synthetic transactions. To simulate realistic client behavior, we used a separate node to submit transactions to validators continuously for 60 seconds.\footnote{Our initial experiments indicated that the block commit intervals of both Tendermint and Stellar can be stabilized in 60 seconds. To conserve AWS budget, we therefore ran all experiments for 60 seconds.} This node sent transactions in different input rates up to 1,200 transactions/s in a round-robin fashion.

4.3 Throughput and Latency Comparison

Figure 3 presents the performance of both implementations with 4 and 16 validators (or CPU nodes). (Later in the scalability study, we present performance with larger number of nodes.) With 4 validators (or nodes), Tendermint and Stellar have nearly the same performance when the input rate is under 300. However, when input rates exceed 400 transactions/s, Tendermint achieves higher throughput and lower latency. The gap between the two protocols widens as the input rate is further increased.

Furthermore, we examine peak performance, which is defined as the highest throughput with the lowest latency. In Figure 4, we plot throughput (x-axis) and latency (y-axis) tradeoff for 4 and 16 validators of Tendermint and Stellar, respectively. The nodes on each line represent the input rates from 100 transactions/s and increasing by 100 transactions/s each time.

Figure 4: Throughput vs. latency of Tendermint and Stellar with 4 and 16 nodes. In each dashed line, the consecutive vertices represent the input rate increases, starting from 100 transactions/s and increasing by 100 transactions/s each time.
with 4 validators), its throughput initially steadily increases from an input rate of 100 to 400 transactions/s, but then begins to degrade as the input rate increases beyond 400 transactions/s.

Meanwhile, latency grows rapidly (beyond the upper bound of the figure after input rate is larger than 600 transactions/s) when throughput starts to degrade due to saturation of system resources. This resource-saturation problem suggests to us that admission control and load balancing must be implemented in a production system.

The peak performance of Stellar-4 is around 350 transactions/s with 10 seconds latency at an input rate of 400 transactions/s. Tendermint-4 can reach a performance of 490 transactions/s with 5 seconds latency at an input rate of 500 transactions/s. Increasing the number of validators from 4 to 16, the performance gap widens.

In summary, in low traffic situations (under 300 transactions/s), Tendermint-4 and Stellar-4 perform at about the same level. However, with heavier traffic, Tendermint outperforms Stellar.

### 4.4 Scalability

This section presents results of our scalability study. Figure 5 depicts Tendermint’s through and latency at input rates increased from 200 to 1,200 transactions/s. Stellar’s performance exhibits the same patterns as Tendermint’s, and we do not separately present its data. We report Tendermint vs. Stellar comparison in Figure 6.

From Figure 5(a), we observe that the throughput of Tendermint eventually saturates and degrades after the input rate has reached the capacity of the system. Throughput degradation occurs at a lower input rate when the number of validators (the number of nodes) are larger. The degradation point of 16-node Tendermint is at input rate 450 transactions/s, while the degradation point of 64-node configuration starts at 250. Figure 5(b) depicts latency versus input rate. At the same input rate when throughput starts to degrade, the latency of Tendermint also increases drastically. For smaller configurations from 4 to 16 nodes latency reaches 50 seconds at input rate 1,200, whereas for larger configurations 32 and 64 latency reaches two minutes.

It is expected that system capacity eventually limits throughput and latency. To improve overall Soteria throughput at a guaranteed latency, we can configure a 32-node system with an admission control that limits the input rate to be under 450 transactions/s. This configuration can support throughput up to 450 transactions/s with 10-second latency. When the overall throughput requirement is higher than 450, Soteria can configure another 32-node system to satisfy throughput scalability at the same latency level.

### 5. CONCLUSION

This paper presented Soteria, consisting of a user right management system (URM), a distributed ledger (DLT), and an auditing service (ATS) to support provable, auditable and scalable data governance. To protect consumer rights of privacy and to comply with data-privacy regulations, we design Soteria to fulfill the functional requirements of consent, record keeping, and transparency (for auditing). We presented the architecture of Soteria, its functional specifications, and protocol choices for its base chain and side chains. On protocol selection, we qualitatively evaluated four algorithms and experimented with two readily deployable protocols Tendermint and Stellar, and select Tendermint to be our side-chain protocol because of its scalability in throughput and latency.

We have deployed Soteria at a hospital chain, and experiment with a news aggregator to facilitate them being CCPA-compliant. As the user base is expected to grow, our future work will address various performance optimization issues that will arise with URM and DLT. Three specific topics are:

- SQL optimization. In Section 2.3, we note that the SQL query, while correct, might not be very efficient, as it includes at least one clause for each owner of the data in the database. In our experience, this is sufficient, as in practice the same sharing agreement is used by many different consumers, so clauses can be unified when the query is constructed. As consumers’ preferences become more fine-grained, this might not be the case. Future work should investigate an optimization algorithm or an index structure suitable to queries of this form, so that both performance and formal correctness can be maintained.

- Inter-chain protocol optimization. How often side chains should hash a block onto the main chain affects Soteria’s latency and throughput. While Soteria may have full control on the parameters of its side chains, the main, public chain (such as Ethereum classic) can be shared with other applications. Soteria should look into dynamic adjustment policies on its side-chain block size and hash (to the main chain) frequency.

- Interoperability with native access control policies. Most
companies have had their own access control policies and/or tools. For instance, Zelkova [6] developed by AWS is an SMT-based (Satisfiability Modulo Theories) reasoning tool for analyzing security/privacy policies and their risks. We will investigate how Soteria can complement existing tools.

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