When the Catholic Mary Tudor came to the English throne in 1555, about 800 committed English Protestants fled abroad rather than live under a papist monarch. They found refuge in various parts of Protestant Europe and soon settled into the familiar routine of exile life everywhere, grumbling about their hosts and quarrelling among themselves. The internal squabbling among the Frankfurt community, primarily over their mode of worship, drove one group of exiles, commonly perceived as the more radical elements, to pack their bags for Geneva. Led by Anthony Gilby, John Goodman, William Whittingham and John Knox, this band of Protestants formally established the English church at Geneva on 1 November 1555. Once the Protestant Elizabeth succeeded to the crown of England, these and other exiles returned home to play whatever part they could in shaping the Elizabethan Church of England and by May 1560 the English church at Geneva had been dissolved. Much, of course, hangs on whether the returning exiles were able to make the political running and whether they brought the pure gospel of John Calvin home with them. The Marian exiles have been exhaustively studied, their thinking analysed and their influence debated: the Genevan refugees were the subject of a substantial work by Charles Martin as long ago as 1915. In his brief book, an accessible single volume, Dan Danner, an American Professor of Theology, seeks to update Martin's study in tracing the history of the English church at Geneva and its members, whilst ‘collating the theology of the influential minds who resided there under Calvin's tutelage’ (p. 8). Danner approaches his task in four short chapters plus an introduction and epilogue. The first chapter is a brief sketch of some of the historiography of the English Reformation in which Danner shows himself impatient of attempts to quantify and assess the spread of Protestantism; he is more interested in those ‘influential minds' who contributed to the loosely-defined English puritan tradition. The next two chapters offer potted biographies, based principally on printed sources, their own writings, and recent scholarship, of the most notable exiles. Some of these, such as the entries on Gilby and Whittingham, are substantial and helpful accounts of their subjects' careers and thinking before, during and after exile. Danner attempts to relate their later actions to their experiences of exile, but occasionally and understandably has to resort to supposition, to fall back on rhetorical questions, to admit plain bafflement, or, as in the case of Thomas
Sampson, to combine all three. The final chapter on the theology of the exiles, which one might suppose of most interest to readers of this journal, grafts the biographical approach on to a thematic analysis: ‘the procedure will be to select certain relevant topics that, when given systematic treatment, become a compendium of theological markings or interest-points’ (p. 103). This translates as short expositions of subjects such as biblical authority, soteriology, covenant and eucharistic theology, eccesiology and church-state relations, in which the ideas of the principal exiles are compared to those of Calvin and others. Most of what is said is unexceptional, and Danner usefully reminds us of how distinctively English was the exiles emphasis on the fruits of a lively faith. Indeed, the point Danner wishes to establish is that there was an indigenous English Protestant tradition, and that in several areas, such as soteriology or tyrannicide, the exiles were in line with their native outlook and at odds with Calvin. It was, he claims, a later generation of English Protestants who self-consciously called themselves ‘Calvinists’. While many would instinctively agree with him on these matters, Danner does not allow himself sufficient detail or space to drive his argument home. An ungainly prose, and an arcane subject approached in a narrow way, make this a less satisfying book than one would wish. But experts on the Marian exiles will certainly wish to consult Danner’s study. He shows that on certain subjects the English exiles returned from Geneva with views that were subtly but significantly different from those of Calvin.

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Writing and European Thought 1600–1830. Nicholas Hudson. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994. pp. 222. £32.50 ISBN 0-521-45540-5

As the reproduction of Rembrandt’s Belshazzar’s Feast on the dust jacket of Nicholas Hudson's Writing and European Thought 1600–1830 so beautifully illustrates, ‘writing’ has a richly layered history in early modern European thought. Hudson’s study seeks to record the diversity of opinions on the history and value of writing, and to place these opinions in their specific historical contexts of debate and disagreement. In spite of this emphasis on diversity, Hudson's history takes the form of a narrative exposition in which the debates about writing evolve more or less chronologically through five main periods.

In the Renaissance period, this study argues, hieroglyphics and ancient Hebrew writing were venerated by occult philosophers who saw these writings as sacred scripts which were intimately connected with the nature of the universe. The seventeenth century as the age of scientific revolution
witnessed a movement away from the concern with the occult, which was now seen as a form of religious and political repression, and towards an admiration of alphabetical writing as the badge of all truly civilized societies and as the indispensable tool for rational analysis and the advancement of public and useful knowledge, with some reformers aspiring to introduce a universal character based on a rationalized orthography. During the age of Enlightenment conjectural histories of writing slowly gave way to empirical research into ancient alphabets and inscriptions which suggested that the invention of writing had been a gradual affair rather than the work of individual genius. The realization spread that the quest for a fully rationalized orthography as an accurate phonetic transcription of the varieties of the speaking voice was infeasible and, in some quarters where scholars were reacting against the earlier rationalist admiration for phonographic writing, undesirable too. There arose a new appreciation of the losses as well as the gains of literacy, together with a revaluing by some scholars of the expressive and emotive powers of speech and even a mourning for the loss of an original innocence of impassioned eloquence. By the end of the eighteenth century there was therefore little unanimity on the progressivity of the civilizing effects of writing, and so the age of Romanticism was one in which the dialectics of these contending views on the relative merits of orality and literacy were mediated. The Romantics valued the spontaneity, naturalness and passion of orality, but they tended to argue that these characteristics were not absent from writing; their objective was therefore not to reject writing as the epitome of the formal and rational principles of the age of reason, but to reinvigorate it in ways which could combine the universality of written discourse with the immediacy and expressiveness of speech. Finally, the modern period, our own, looking back on the earlier debates, is one in which this dialectic is still being played out, as both writing and speech, literacy and orality, are being revalued and also subjected to wider cultural and political critiques.

This chronological account of the ways in which perceptions of writing have been ambivalent and conflicting rather than uniformly reverent or hostile is offered in opposition to what are taken to be two contrasting arguments: Derrida's account of ‘logocentrism’ as the Western philosophical deprecation of writing as the faded supplement to speech; and the ‘literacy myth’ that the print culture of the west produced a visually orientated culture which expressed confidence in the progressive qualities of literacy and print over oral culture. Against these arguments Hudson's account offers the seventeenth century as an age of admiration for writing, and the eighteenth century as a specific and localised moment of ‘logocentrism' and orality which, in its celebration of the expressive powers of speech, was reacting against the formalism of the age of reason and the pervasiveness of print culture. Hudson's argument is thus that an appreciation of the context of the time helps to provide a more disaggregated intellectual history which trims the applicability of sweeping generalisations either against or in favour of writing.
Hudson’s account may remind historians of philosophy that understandings of the linguistic medium of their own discourse have not been historically invariant. Calls for historical contextualization, however, lead to the question of what the appropriate historical contexts might be and how individual texts relate to those larger contexts, and such questions inevitably imply theoretical issues too. Reliance simply on ‘history’ as a guide to interpretative practice does not by itself provide a means of reading texts but rather pushes theoretical questions of interpretation one stage further back. One such theoretical question which is never really addressed in this study concerns the nature of ‘language’ itself as the object of study in its written and spoken forms, but this lack of theorisation severely constrains the extent to which Hudson’s account is able to engage with Derrida’s arguments.

By framing a history of writing largely in terms of the extent to which writing and speech are thought to function effectively as means of communication, Hudson’s account supposes that periods which apparently valorise writing as a means of communication may be taken as evidence of the falsity of Derrida’s arguments while periods which valorise speech may be taken as examples of ‘logocentrism’. This approach fails to engage with Derrida’s argument which is not that speech has simply been valorised at the expense of writing. Rather Derrida’s account of ‘logocentrism’ provides an analysis of systems of thought/writing which are based on a series of hierarchical oppositions – such as that between speech and writing – but where these sustaining and constitutive oppositions turn out to be radically unstable. Although speech is privileged in these systems in so far as the voice (or rather the ‘sound-image’, not necessarily the audible voice) enjoys a relationship of immediacy and interiority with the mind/meaning that is not available to written language which operates at one remove from the voice and so remains outside this privileged inner space, yet, it is argued, such a system based on the interiority of the voice turns out to be incomplete without a prior (idealized) notion of writing which is thus surreptitiously – or metaphorically – reimported from the outside into the inside, or rather into an originary authorizing centre, thus undermining the original hierarchy by means of which the system is ostensibly constituted. Hence, to argue, as Hudson’s study does, that the disparagement of writing in the eighteenth century in favour of the expressive powers of speech (including gesture and facial movement) represents an ‘outburst of “logocentrism”’ (p. 92; cf 163) is a grotesque distortion of Derrida’s arguments.

Hudson’s dialectical movement across the centuries based on the relative valorisations of writing and speech therefore fails on theoretical grounds as a reply to Derrida, whatever the merits or demerits of his arguments. As a study of writing taken on its own terms, however, there remains the issue of the relation between writing and its contrasted term. The dominant contrast (determined by the attempt to engage with Derrida) is that between writing and speech, but at times the contrast is between visual and oral culture (in engaging with the ‘literacy myth’) although this is not the same contrast as
between writing and speech since visual is not restricted to script and speech is not restricted to oral (for example gesture and facial movement are visual not oral). One of the arguments of the book is that it was during the early modern period that it became understood that writing and speech are distinct and dissimilar forms of communication: in the earlier period scholars mistakenly thought that alphabetic writing could ‘paint’ speech in all its tones and other vocal qualities, whereas by the end of the eighteenth century the distinction between conventional alphabets and phonetic alphabets was better understood together with the impossibility of using any alphabet literally to paint speech. In delineating the essential separateness of writing and speech as different means of communication, however, Hudson's study does not address the theoretical implications of the intricate interconnections between accounts of language, speech and writing. For example, Hudson's study includes Hobbes and Locke within the seventeenth century bias in favour of written language over spoken, but in Leviathan (I.iv) and An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Book III) language is presented in terms of speech. This chapter in Leviathan is also cited as an example of the seventeenth-century admiration of the invention of the alphabet above all else (p. 37), yet Leviathan argues here that speech is a greater invention than letters.

Furthermore Hudson's text reveals the instabilities of its own oppositions between writing and speech. Galileo is cited as an admirer of alphabetical writing, but the passage quoted extols writing in terms of the qualities of speech, in that writing enables ‘talking with those who are in India . . . speaking to those who are not yet born’ (p. 37, emphasis added), and Warburton’s history of writing was based on his belief that ‘the development of writing had been guided by “the uniform voice of nature”’ (p. 55, emphasis added). Sheridan, on the other hand, the active proponent of the priority of speech over writing, extolled ancient Greek orality and aurality with reference to the Greeks' study of the ‘book of life’ as the original source of wisdom: “Hence arose their accurate knowledge of the human heart,” Sheridan concluded, “which they studied in the original, in the great volume of society”’ (p. 110, emphasis added). Perhaps Hudson should have taken note of Rembrant's Belshazzar's Feast since the writing on the wall was incomprehensible to Belshazzar and his court until Daniel provided an oral interpretation.

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**Spinoza: A Life.** Steven Nadler. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. pp. xiii + 407. £22.95 ISBN 0-521-55210-9

There have been many great philosophers whose life is of little interest in comparison with their work; a few, however, have been not only important
philosophers but also remarkable human beings. Such a philosopher is Spinoza, whose life has fascinated many people since the heyday of romanticism. Coleridge, for example, wrote in 1816 of ‘the complete German edition of Spinoza’s works with his life by Colerus, a work absolutely necessary to me’. Since the early nineteenth century, scholars have laboured to increase our less-than-adequate knowledge of Spinoza’s life, and they have made much progress, particularly during the last sixty years or so. But their work has been piecemeal in character, and available only in the form of booklets or articles. What has been needed is a reliable large-scale work which puts together in systematic form the information that is now available. Steven Nadler, in his *Spinoza: A Life*, offers us such a book.

The first half of the book is devoted to Spinoza’s life within the Jewish community of Amsterdam. The first chapter concerns the early history of the Jewish settlement in Amsterdam, while the second places Spinoza within the context of his family. A short third chapter, entitled ‘Bento/Baruch’ discusses what might be termed Spinoza’s pre-school years; the title indicates that Spinoza was not just a Jew, whose sacral name was ‘Baruch’, but a Portuguese Jew, who would have been known to his family and friends as ‘Bento’. Chapter 4 gives an account of the kind of education that young Bento would have received. It is now generally agreed that Spinoza was not intended for the rabbinate, and that his full-time education ended when he was in his early teens. The intention was that he should play a part in the family business, and he in fact did so from about 1649. Chapter 5 discusses this part of his life, a period which came to an end when he was excommunicated for heresy in July 1656. This celebrated event is discussed at length in Chapter 6. The leaders of the synagogue have often been condemned for religious intolerance, but Nadler points out (p. 147) that the political situation was such that they were desperately anxious not to offend the Dutch authorities, who frowned on what they regarded as anti-religious views.

Despite the labours of scholars, the exact nature of the heresies for which Spinoza was excommunicated is still unknown. There is also much that is obscure about the next five years of his life, during which he probably remained in Amsterdam. It is certain that during this period he wrote his (unfinished) *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, and it is probable that he began work on his *Short Treatise*. But the precise dates of their composition are not known. Nadler discusses the *Tractatus* in his seventh chapter, and also introduces the reader to some of Spinoza’s friends – men such as Jelles, Balling, de Vries, Koerbagh and Meyer. In a later chapter (p. 193) Nadler rightly criticizes what he calls ‘the myth of Spinoza the recluse’, saying that on the contrary he had ‘several close and devoted friends . . . and many acquaintances’. From 1661, the year in which his published correspondence begins, Spinoza’s activities are more fully chronicled. In that year he moved to Rijnsburg, a village near Leiden, where he completed his *Short Treatise* and wrote much of his geometrical version of Descartes’s *Principles of Philosophy*. In his eighth chapter, Nadler discusses the *Short Treatise*; he also
discusses the trade which Spinoza adopted, the grinding of lenses. He makes the interesting suggestion that Spinoza's work on lenses 'more likely arose not primarily from pecuniary need but from scientific interests' (p. 183), his point being that Spinoza was able to rely on his friends for financial support.

In 1665 Spinoza moved from Rijnsburg to Voorburg, a village near The Hague, where he stayed until late 1669 or early 1670. Here, there is another gap in our knowledge of Spinoza's life; there are only three letters extant for the period between March 1667 and early 1671. However, it is clear that the period was a fruitful one for Spinoza. He had already been working on his Ethics, and a draft was almost complete by 1665; in the same year he turned his attention to his defence of free thought and free speech, the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, which was published in 1670. Nadler devotes two chapters to the Voorburg period. Chapter 9 contains a long account of the Ethics. The decision to place the Ethics here is questionable; the draft that was nearly complete in 1665 differed substantially from the final version, and it would surely have been better to defer discussion of the Ethics until the last chapter. Chapter 10 is chiefly devoted to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus; there is also an account (pp. 255–9) of the statesman Jan de Witt, without whose support the publication of the Tractatus would hardly have been possible. But Nadler has to admit (p. 259) that 'the nature of Spinoza's personal relationship with de Witt remains purely a matter of speculation'. The last two chapters concern Spinoza's move from Voorburg to The Hague, where he remained until his death in 1677. Chapter 11 has two main themes: the frenzied theological opposition to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, and the French invasion of the Netherlands in 1672. It includes the murder of de Witt in August 1672 and Spinoza's angry response to it, and concludes with Spinoza's visit to the camp of the Prince of Condé in summer 1673. Chapter 12 is concerned with Spinoza's last years, and includes a discussion of the Tractatus Politicus.

Nadler's concern in this book is not to praise Spinoza, but to understand him; to show (p. xiii) how the various aspects of Spinoza's life came together to produce one of history's most radical thinkers. In this aim he succeeds admirably; his book is full, judicious, very well documented, and attractively written. One could mention a few defects. It is, for example, strange that in discussing the Tractatus Politicus Nadler refers to the nineteenth century translation made for R. H. M. Elwes by A. H. Gosset, and not to the more recent and much superior translation by A. G. Wernham (Spinoza's Political Works, Oxford, 1958). Again, one would have liked a much fuller account of Adriaan Heereboord, the Leiden professor from whom Spinoza seems to have derived much of his knowledge of Scholastic terminology. But these are minor flaws. This is an excellent book, and it deserves a wide audience.

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Le débat Locke-Filmer. Franck Lessay. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, ‘Léviathan’, 1998. pp. 399. ISBN 2-13-049333-5

Together with their French translation, this book provides a substantial commentary on two major works of seventeenth-century English political theory: Robert Filmer's Patriarcha, probably written around 1630 but published in 1680, and Locke's First Treatise of Civil Government (1690), which is less often read than the Second Treatise.

Thanks to a careful examination of the historiography and context of both works, Franck Lessay convincingly justifies the choices he has made in his translation, particularly his decision to use the Laslett manuscript for Locke's treatise. Both texts actually raise intricate dating problems, on which their interpretation largely depends. The translation itself has been submitted to a highly precise philological and translation scrutiny. The analysis of the notions of imperium and dominium, in the introduction, thus proves illuminating.

Franck Lessay's faultless scholarship and abundant critical apparatus enable him to highlight not only the reality of Locke's debate with Filmer, but equally the polemical, historical and philosophical issues involved in that controversy. The Exclusion Crisis (1679–1681) appears to have been the focal point on which the meaning and the fate of both books relied. Filmer's Patriarcha was an ideological engine of war launched by the Tories against the Exclusionists. Locke retaliated in the First Treatise (and, to a lesser extent, in the Second Treatise) in support of the Whig cause.

Filmer's patriarchalism rests on the theologico-political argument of Adam's absolute monarchy over Creation. Considered as a historical document, and in this specific case as a source of law, the Bible teaches us that God gave Adam absolute sovereignty over the world. The obedience of the rest of mankind to Adam is but a metaphor of its obedience to God. Since every man depends on his parents for his life and preservation, all men are born in subjection. There is no difference in nature between the functions and duties of a father and those of a king. As a consequence, kings are above laws, and when laws do exist, they are not meant to prevent the tyrannical exercise of sovereignty, but rather to keep the people in check. The English Common Law cannot obtain against the King's will. Moreover, it is subject to the interpretation of the King's judges. Just like the King's Council, Parliaments are invested with an advisory role only. Likewise, property is first and foremost the King's property. It originates in the private estate granted by God to Adam, which included the whole world and was conveyed to Adam's heirs (whether direct or indirect), namely kings. Filmer's absolutism leads him to legitimize usurpation, which is but a manifestation of God's secret design. Whatever the specific source of his power, the usurper nonetheless enjoys an absolute, patriarchal sovereignty over his subjects. Like any other ruler, he stands above the laws, because if he were subjected to them, he would
cease to be a proper sovereign (Filmer’s argument, on that point, is highly reminiscent of Hobbes’s).

By radically sapping the foundations that Filmer gives to power and property, Locke initiates a theory of legitimacy which, to a large extent, has remained ours to this day. Considered as mostly allegorical, the Bible cannot be used as a source of law. Adam becomes the symbol of mankind as a whole, not the actual father of every individual man. He thereby loses both his right of property over the world and his absolute monarchical power. Locke ironically points out that monarchy did not exist in the garden of Eden. The fact that Adam was created first does not necessarily mean that he had a royal status. Accordingly, Locke wonders who Adam’s subjects might have been. A child is no subject, and Adam’s power over Eve was not a public power, but a private one, restricted to their common interests. Therefore, it could not be absolute. That Adam was supposed to have dominion over the world in no way implied that he should rule over men yet unborn. Lastly, if procreation were to be regarded as the foundation of sovereignty, the latter should have been bestowed on Eve in the first place. Actual fatherhood cannot be conveyed like an estate or a right, and as a result, sovereignty is not necessarily hereditary. Otherwise, all men being Adam’s sons, they would all be kings. God remains the only Lord and owner of Creation, of which Adam enjoyed only the usufruct, on a par with his fellow-men. The Bible rather seems to affirm the original community of all things amongst men. When asserting that all men were born free and equal, that the power of one man over another cannot be established unless by mutual consent, and that every man has a right to his share of such earthly possessions as are necessary to our preservation, Locke lays the foundations of a radically different kind of society and sovereignty.

Both authors have, in a measure, fallen victims to the dichotomous movement of history and of the controversy with which their names have been associated, sometimes in a simplistic and excessive manner that Franck Lessay aptly exposes. Locke usually stands as the champion of equality among men naturally endowed with rights, while Filmer is regarded as the archaic eulogist of divine right monarchy. However, Franck Lessay shows the limits of that opposition. Not only were major concepts of political theory refined through Locke’s long refutation of Filmer (concepts relating to property, natural liberty and equality), but, beyond the ideological and philosophical antagonism of their views, Filmer and Locke appear in retrospect as the inheritors of a common tradition, which maintained the reality of a natural order willed by God and the naturality of the social nexus. To that extent, the reconstruction of the ‘Locke-Filmer debate’ refers one to the somewhat forgotten roots of modern politics.

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This book is the best available introduction to the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* for advanced students. It is rivaled only, perhaps, by *The Cambridge Companion to Locke* edited by Vere Chappell. Jolley's book discusses all of the most important topics examined in the *Essay*—innate ideas, secondary qualities, substance, mechanistic explanation, the materiality or immateriality of the mind, personal identity, free will, real and nominal essence, knowledge and faith, and some other topics—with sensitivity to issues of interpretation and philosophical acuity. The book also takes sojourns into topics that are not often treated, except in passing, in student companions to the *Essay*. It includes, for instance, a useful discussion of the project of the *Essay*—Jolley concludes that the sense in which Locke considers himself to be an ‘under-laborer’ in the service of the more purely scientific enterprises of Newton and Boyle has been exaggerated. It also includes suggestive discussion of such topics as animal consciousness, the claim that morality is capable of demonstration, and the means through which we come to know natural law. The final chapter of the book examines some of the central theses of *The Second Treatise of Government* and connects these to discussion of the *Essay* (albeit across a thin bridge) through their common efforts to champion freedom, epistemic or political. While more thorough attention to the influence that Locke had on the later British Empiricists would have been useful, careful attention is given throughout to the differences between Locke's views and Descartes's, and to Leibniz's criticisms of Locke's positions.

Given the book's scope, it is not surprising that some of the topics are given shorter treatment than scholars of Locke will desire. But while the book does not break new interpretive ground, it provides an excellent spring-board for discussion of virtually any topic examined in the *Essay*. Even on topics where many will disagree strongly with Jolley's interpretive and philosophical claims, they will still find his remarks to make an excellent foil to contrast with their own views, and will often find reason to reconsider what they thought unquestionable.

The book is most successful where its introductory aims are kept firmly in mind. For instance, in the discussion of freedom of will Jolley suggests two ways of understanding Locke's talk of power to 'suspend' the effect of one's desires on one's will. On one interpretation, Locke claims human beings are invested with some form of 'contra-causal' freedom, a power to choose contrary to the thrust of the full list of causal influences on choice; on another, Locke is claiming that the presence in the causal chain leading to choice of certain (deterministic) deliberative processes, of which suspension can be a part, is enough, on occasion, to give the choice a special status with respect to freedom. Jolley presents reasons for believing each of these interpretations without attempting to coerce his reader's assent to one or
the other. In my view, the case clearly favors some form of the second of these two interpretations of suspension. At IV.XX.15, for instance, Locke makes it clear that ‘suspension’ is voluntary action, and is thus caused by volition; it is very difficult to reconcile this remark with a ‘contra-causal’ interpretation of suspension. Be that as it may, Jolley does an excellent job of clearly identifying the issue and providing thoughtful students with enough of an edifice on each side to build further productive argument. It is really this, rather than the adjudication of interpretive disputes, that the book aims, and manages repeatedly, to provide.

Where the book is less successful is in places in which Jolley pushes a more controversial interpretative line but, because of the project's wide scope, can't spend the space needed to engage satisfactorily with objections. One example is in Jolley's discussion of the idea of substance in general. Jolley rejects Michael Ayer's suggestion that for Locke substratum and essence are only conceptually, and not metaphysically, distinct by emphasizing the role that substratum plays for Locke in unifying various qualities. That is, Jolley emphasizes that for Locke a particular collection of qualities are thought all to belong to the same object by virtue of the fact that they are tied together by a single substratum in which they inhere. Jolley notes that Locke never makes any effort to answer the puzzling question of how this unifying role could be played by real essence. But out of a desire to avoid voicing a ‘bare substratum interpretation’ – an interpretation under which the thing which unifies qualities has no features of its own – Jolley claims that for Locke the underlying substratum has features which allow it to play the role of unifier, features that only God can grasp.

The trouble with this interpretation is that it saddles Locke with a regressive theory of just the sort that he seems to reject in his sarcastic remark about the:

\[\text{Indian \ldots who, saying that the World was supported by a great Elephant, was asked, what the Elephant rested on; to which his answer was, a great Tortoise: But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-back'd Tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what. (Essay, II.XXIII.2)}\]

Any appeal to qualities that serve to explain how various observable qualities are supported or bundled together leaves open the question of what supports or bundles the qualities that are being appealed to in the explanation. What this means is that if substratum has qualities which serve to explain its unifying role, we cannot only not know what they are, we cannot even begin to understand what it would be like to know what they are; they must be qualities of a very peculiar sort. In fact, we might say, they can't be \textit{qualities}, in anything like the way we think of them, at all. The result: it is not clear that Jolley's interpretation, in the end, is much different from the ‘bare substratum’ interpretation.
Although the last two paragraphs are somewhat negative, I want to re-emphasize the admiration that I have for this book. The book is an absolutely terrific resource for students. Jolley keeps his pedagogical aims firmly in mind without ever condescending to protect his audience from intricacies and complexities of importance to interpreters. The book is a first-rate piece of work that should be of great interest to scholars and of invaluable use to teachers.

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*Philosophy, History and Civilization: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on R. G. Collingwood*. D. Boucher, J. Connelly, T. Modood (eds). Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1996. pp. 388. £35 hb ISBN 0-7083-1308-6

D. Boucher, J. Connelly and T. Modood's (eds), *Philosophy, History and Civilization* is an anthology containing sixteen articles on Collingwood's thought which span from his conception of philosophy and philosophical method, the influence of the Italian idealists on Collingwood's philosophical development, his philosophy of religion and philosophy of history, the relationship between his theoretical writings in the philosophy of history and his archaeological writings and practice, his philosophy of education and political philosophy as well as the internal development of his thought, in particular the question of the relationship between metaphysics and history. To the best of my knowledge only a couple of these articles had been previously published in specialized journals, so that most of them constitute new critical material unavailable elsewhere. The anthology opens with Boucher's ‘The Life, Times and Legacy of R. G. Collingwood' which contains a mine of information about Collingwood's Oxford background and his intellectual development. By the same author is ‘The Place of Education in Civilization' which discusses Collingwood's notion that education is necessary to initiate the new generations into the inheritance of civilization. It is Collingwood's concept of education as a process of socialization indispensable to the development and maintenance of civilization that, according to Boucher, constitutes the most interesting aspect of Collingwood's philosophy of education. The role of education in the transmission of civilization is also discussed by A. J. Milne in his 'Civilization and the Open Society' which focuses on the main features which, according to Collingwood, characterize civilized living and proceeds to provide a comparative analysis of Collingwood's concept of civility and of Popper's conception of the open society which brings to light unexpected similarities between the two thinkers. Collingwood's conception of philosophical method is discussed, with reference to
Collingwood’s aesthetic theory in T. J. Diffey’s ‘Aesthetic and Philosophical Method’ and, in its own right, by T. Modood’s ‘Collingwood and the Idea of Philosophy’. The latter contains an excellent account of Collingwood’s doctrine of the overlap of classes and an interesting attempt to defend Collingwood’s account of the scale of forms. After a brief interlude on Collingwood’s philosophy of religion, with D. M. MacKinnon’s discussion of ‘Faith and Reason in the Philosophy of Religion’, the anthology continues with three articles tracing the philosophical impact of the Italian idealists on Collingwood’s philosophical development. H. S. Harris’s ‘Croce and Gentile in Collingwood’s New Leviathan’ and Rik Peter’s ‘Croce, Gentile and Collingwood on the Relationship between History and Philosophy’ focus on Croce’s and Gentile’s influence, whereas J. Connelly’s ‘Art Thou the Man: Croce, Gentile or de Ruggiero?’ suggests that de Ruggiero was the crucial figure in Collingwood’s philosophical development and that it was above all with him Collingwood had a fruitful and non-deferential exchange of ideas. Collingwood’s conception of metaphysics and philosophical method in relationship to history are discussed by A. Oldfield in ‘Metaphysics and History in Collingwood’s Thought’ and by R. Martin in ‘Collingwood’s Claim that Metaphysics is a Historical Discipline’. Oldfield defends Collingwood against Toulmin’s charge of epistemological relativism and argues that Collingwood is best understood as an epistemological pluralist who acknowledged the different perspectives of natural science, history, art etc., rather than an epistemological sceptic or relativist. Martin also addresses the question of the relationship between metaphysics and history in Collingwood and argues that the key to an appropriate understanding of Collingwood’s controversial claim that metaphysics is a historical discipline must be sought for in the development of Collingwood’s thought from an alleged earlier non-relativist, non-historicist period to a later historicist phase. Martin claims that the idea of normativity which was contained in the doctrine of the scale of forms in the earlier An Essay on Philosophical Method, and which was allegedly forsaken in An Essay on Metaphysics, persists in the later and apparently purely descriptive phase of his thought. Collingwood, Martin argues, never abandoned the view that philosophy has a normative as much as a descriptive role: in the later thought the notion of normativity is preserved in the view that different conceptions of the same discipline, such as, for instance, history, can be ordered hierarchically, a view that echoes Collingwood’s earlier doctrine of the scale of forms. Martin’s article is one of the few which has been reprinted in this anthology; it is a classic which is often referred for its controversial claim that the re-enactment doctrine does not apply to absolute presuppositions. The anthology also contains three articles on Collingwood’s philosophy of history: L. Pompa’s ‘Collingwood’s Theory of Historical Knowledge’, J. van der Dussen’s ‘Collingwood on the Idea of Process, Progress and Civilization’ and B. Haddock’s ‘Vico, Collingwood and the Character of a Historical Philosophy’. Whereas L. Pompa focuses on some difficulties inherent in Collingwood’s account of historical knowledge both van der Dussen
and Haddock agree on the view that Collingwood scholarship, especially in the case of the philosophy of history, has been dominated by a tendency to emphasize the epistemological aspect of Collingwood’s theoretical study of history thereby giving priority to questions of an epistemic nature such as ‘how do historians know the past?’ to the detriment of questions of an ontological or conceptual nature such as ‘what are historical processes? What does historical change consist in?’ They suggest that such bias may be due to an unjustifiable separation of critical from speculative philosophy of history. To redress this bias, van der Dussen focuses on the concepts of process, progress and civilization and Haddock makes a very convincing case for the claim that a re-evaluation of Vico’s influence on Collingwood’s philosophy of history may provide a badly-needed corrective to the widespread tendency to interpret the re-enactment doctrine in overly individualistic terms. Haddock’s reading of Collingwood in the light of Vico’s influence shows both why the re-enactment doctrine need not be confined to the thought of individual agents and how Collingwood’s distinction between the idea of nature and the idea of history may be fruitfully illuminated by a comparison with Vico’s claim that the historical world, as a human artifact, can be rendered intelligible in ways which are foreclosed to nature. The anthology concludes with two articles exploring the relationship between Collingwood’s theoretical writings on history and his archaeological studies and practice. M. Browning’s ‘A Baconian Revolution: Collingwood and Romano-British Studies’ considers Collingwood’s twofold revolution in historical as well as archaeological method and argues that due consideration of Collingwood’s archaeological writings restores an often overlooked empiricist component to his philosophy of history. I. Hodder’s ‘Of Mice and Men: Collingwood and the Development of Archaeological Thought’ explores the reasons why archaeologists have often been reluctant to acknowledge their debt to Collingwood’s theoretical writings and suggests that this is due not so much to their distrust of Collingwood’s theoretical writings but to their views about his archaeological practice which was regarded by many as too cavalier towards the data and for this very reason, unscientific. Hodder argues that now that Collingwood’s archaeological work has become out of date, archaeologists will no longer feel the need to distance themselves from his theoretical writings and may therefore acknowledge their intellectual debt to him. As I have tried to illustrate, this anthology provides a comprehensive and sympathetic critical assessment of Collingwood’s thought in its historical setting.

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