Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Protocol

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Abstract. In this paper, we propose pretty simple password-authenticated key-exchange protocol which is based on the difficulty of solving DDH problem. It has the following advantages: (1) Both $y_1$ and $y_2$ in our protocol are independent and thus they can be pre-computed and can be sent independently. This speeds up the protocol. (2) Clients and servers can use almost the same algorithm. This reduces the implementation costs without accepting replay attacks and abuse of entities as oracles.

key words: password, key exchange, authentication

1 Introduction

We consider the following situation. Two entities, at least one of them is a human, beforehand share a human memorable password, which is secure against on-line (and serial) exhaustive searches, but vulnerable against off-line (and parallel) exhaustive searches. Human entities have only passwords in mind and have no unmemorable secrets, such as private-keys, public-keys (or fingerprints of them), secret information to use ID-based cryptosystems. Two entities run a protocol and share a new secret (we call it keying material) that is secure against off-line exhaustive searches. The shared keying material is then used to generate keys for identifying the other entity and then establishing a secure channel (where secrecy and/or data integrity are provided).

While such secure channels can be established using public-keys like SSH and SSL, users must verify the validity of the public-keys used in them (using signature-verification keys or fingerprints of the public-keys). For ordinal users, it is very troublesome to carry them anywhere and anytime, and then perform verification. Due to this troublesomeness, users may skip the verification of the public-keys and weaken the security of it.

Password-authenticated key-exchanges are very convenient for users (especially when they log in their own servers remotely with their hands empty) since they do not need to carry any verification-keys or fingerprints with them and do not need to verify the public-keys for PKI. While such protocols have been proposed in [4,9,6,5,8,7,3,2], most of them are a little bit complicated.

One of the advantages of PKI is that unknown users can communicate securely.
In this paper, we propose pretty-simple protocol which is based on the difficulty of solving DDH problem. It has the following advantages: (1) Both $y_1$ and $y_2$ are independent and thus they can be pre-computed and sent independently. This speeds up the protocol without leaking the information on the passwords. (2) Clients and servers can use almost the same algorithm. This reduces the implementation costs without accepting replay attacks and abuse of entities as oracles.

2 Our Protocol

Our protocol is defined over a finite cyclic group $G = \langle g \rangle$ where $|G| = q$ and $q$ is a large prime (or a positive integer divisible by a large prime). While $G$ can be a group over an elliptic curve, in this paper we assume $G$ is a prime order subgroup over a finite field $F_p$.

Both $g$ and $h$ are two generators of $G$, chosen so that its DLP (Discrete Logarithm Problem), i.e. calculating

$$a = \log_g h,$$

should be hard for each entity. Both $g$ and $h$ may be chosen as system parameters or chosen with the negotiation between entities. For example, $g$ may be a random generator of $G$ and $h := \text{Hash}(g)^{(p-1)/q} \mod p$, or a client chooses $g := g_0^{s_1}$ for a random $s_1 \in (Z/qZ)^*$ where $g_0$ is a random generator of $G$, and then sends its commitment $\text{Hash}(g)$ to a server, the server replies $h := g_0^{s_2}$ for a random $s_2 \in (Z/qZ)^*$, and finally the client reveals $g$ to the server.

The protocol consists of the following two phases: a secrecy-amplification phase and a verification phase.

In the secrecy-amplification phase, the secrecy of a pre-shared weak secret, i.e. a human memorable password that may be vulnerable against off-line attack, is amplified to a strong secret, i.e. a keying material that is secure even against off-line attack. In the verification phase, an ordinal challenge-response protocol is used to verify whether the other entity has the same secret or not. The point to notice is that challenges should be chosen to be unique at every session and at every entity, and to be uncontrollable by an entity in one side to avoid replay attacks and abuse of one entity in the other side as an oracle.

Both phases are describe as follows.

2.1 Secrecy-Amplification Phase

The secrecy-amplification phase is illustrated in Fig. A client chooses a random number $r_1 \in (Z/qZ)^*$ and then calculates $y_1 := g^{r_1} \cdot h^{\text{pass}_c}$ using its password $\text{pass}_c$. It sends $y_1$ to a server. The server also calculates $y_2 := g^{r_2} \cdot h^{\text{pass}_s}$ using its password $\text{pass}_s$ and a random number $r_2 \in (Z/qZ)^*$, and then sends it to the

\footnote{Since we assume the DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman) problem is hard, it is reasonable to assume that DLP is also hard.}
Client (Alice) \hspace{1cm} Server (Bob)

\[ r_1 \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^* \hspace{1cm} y_1 := g^{r_1} \cdot h^{\text{pass}_c} \hspace{1cm} r_2 \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^* \]

\[ k_{mc} = (y_2 \cdot h^{-\text{pass}_c})^{r_1} \hspace{1cm} y_2 := g^{r_2} \cdot h^{\text{pass}_s} \hspace{1cm} k_{ms} = (y_1 \cdot h^{-\text{pass}_s})^{r_2} \]

**Fig. 1.** Secrecy-amplification phase of our protocol

Now, the client’s keying material is \( k_{mc} = (y_2 \cdot h^{-\text{pass}_c})^{r_1} \) and the server’s one is \( k_{ms} = (y_1 \cdot h^{-\text{pass}_s})^{r_2} \).

Only when they run the protocol using the same password, they can share the same keying material. Otherwise distinguishing the other’s one is as hard as solving DDH problem that is defined as follows:

**Definition 1 (DDH problem)** Given \( g_b \in \mathbb{G} \) and \( d = (d_1, d_2, d_3) = (g_b^{x_1}, g_b^{x_2}, g_b^{x_3}) \) where \( x_3 \) is either \( x_1 \cdot x_2 \) or not with probability \( 1/2 \), then decide whether \( g_b^{x_3} = g_b^{x_1 \cdot x_2} \) or not.

One of the advantages of this protocol is that both \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \) are independent and thus they can be pre-computed and sent independently. This means the servers can transmit \( y_2 \) first (or before it receives \( y_1 \)). This speeds up the protocol without leaking the information of the passwords since they are masked with random numbers \( r_2 \) (or \( r_1 \)).

Another advantage is that both the clients and the servers can use almost the same algorithm. This reduces the implementation costs without accepting replay attacks and abuse of entities as oracles since \((y_1, y_2)\) cannot be controlled by one entity and it is unique at every sessions and entities.

### 2.2 Verification Phase

Whether the other entity shares the same keying material with me is verified in this phase as follows: Both the client and the server exchange \( v_1 := KH_{km_c}(\text{Tag}_s||y_1||y_2) \) and \( v_2 := KH_{km_s}(\text{Tag}_c||y_1||y_2) \) each other where \( v_1 \) is generated by the server and \( v_2 \) is generated by the client respectively. \( KH_k() \) is a keyed hash function whose key is \( k \). Both \( \text{Tag}_s \) and \( \text{Tag}_c \) are pre-determined distinct values, e.g. \( \text{Tag}_s = 0 \) and \( \text{Tag}_c = 1 \). The client verifies \( v_1 = KH_{km_c}(\text{Tag}_s||y_1||y_2) \) and the server verifies \( v_2 = KH_{km_s}(\text{Tag}_c||y_1||y_2) \).

Similarly to the secrecy-amplification phase, both \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \) can be transmitted independently each other. (This verification phase may be skipped if data-integrity is provided after the secrecy-amplification phase using the shared keying material.)

While adversaries can perform exhaustive searches for the keying material using \( r_1 \) or \( r_2 \), that is not a matter if strong secret can be shared at the secrecy-amplification phase and no efficient algorithm is known to find the key \( k \) of
than exhaustive searches. The latter property can be satisfied using practical functions, such as HMAC so far, and then \( KH_k() \) does not need to be a random oracle.

3 Conclusion

We proposed pretty simple password-authenticated key-exchange protocol which is based on the difficulty of solving the DDH problem.

Our protocol has the following advantages: (1) both \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \) are independent and thus they can be pre-computed and sent independently. This speeds up the protocol, but does not leak the information on the passwords since they are masked with random numbers \( r_1 \) (or \( r_2 \)). (2) Clients and servers can use almost the same algorithm. This reduces the implementation costs, but does not weaken the security against replay attacks and abuse of entities as oracles since \( (y_1, y_2) \) cannot be controlled by one entity and it is unique at every sessions and entities.

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