UN-ACCOUNTABLE POLITICAL PARTY XYZ: IS THE BRIDGE TOWARDS CORRUPTION?

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ABSTRACT

Purpose — This study aims to reconstruct the concept of public accountability that is free from the lifeworld colonization which is carried out by the concept of the New Public Management.

Design/methodology/approach — Problem-solving in this study will be approached through the critical perspective of Habermas (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1996); (Oakes & Oakes, 2016); (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2015). The critical perspective of Habermas will reveal the lifeworld colonization of accountability for the cadre of political parties XYZ, public discussion space is the main problem in this study.

Findings — The findings of this study are that the accountability of cadre, seen from the process of implementing cadre, has eroded its meaning. That is the instant cadre process by relying on the financial strength and the strong oligarchy of capital leadership in political parties XYZ which is a bridge to corruption. The loss of the meaning of the nature of political parties as an institution given the mandate to fight for the interests of the welfare and sovereignty of the people because of the dominance of the interests of political party elites. Un-accountable cadre political party XYZ due to the thick transactional politics in the cadre process is a trigger for distrust of the public to political party XYZ. Accountability of the cadre seems to ignore deliberations in the public discussion.
room, both legislative and executive elections, hence corruption scandals are increasing in Indonesia.

**Practical Implications** — This study emphasizes the accountability of cadres who are oriented to the process of recruiting political party cadres.

**Originality/value** — This study uses the critical perspective of Habermas. Through the Habermas approach, the researcher wanted to understand the lifeworld colonization of cadre accountability that occurs in the community. Related to the cadre accountability issue, the hegemony of public discussion rooms is the main issue.

**Keywords** Un-Accountable, Political Parties, Transactional Politics, Corruption, Habermas

**Paper Type** Research Paper.

**INTRODUCTION**

Accountability is recently a central issue in the world to encourage the governance of public sector organizations as well as in Indonesia. Various studies on accountability have developed rapidly in various academic disciplines, especially in the public sector (Feriyanasyah, Irianto, & Roekhudin, 2018; Dubnick, 2014; Pinilih, 2017; Yang, 2012; Papadopoulos, 2010; Fikri et al., 2010; Bovens, 2006; Maskin & Tirole, 2004; Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003). Claims that public sector accountability tends to be bureaucratic, inefficient, and ineffective in managing public services (Hood, 1991; Ryan, 1998; Lapsley and Pallot, 2000; Qian et al., 2011; Christensen & Parker, 2010). With this pretext, the New Public Management is the best solution to improve the performance of political parties in realizing good political governance. The model that has been so far applied in the private sector is then promoted to the public sector to overcome this problem (Funnell, 2003; Funnell, 2003; Parker & Gould, 1999).

Adoption of NPM is used in public sector organizations as a response to the measurement of public sector performance and market interests (Roruguez &
Navarro, 2007). However, this reform is deemed incompatible with the public sector because it carries the spirit of a private sector that is for-profit (Doig & Wilson, 1998; Hebson, Grimshaw, & Marchington, 2003). Furthermore, the concept of NPM is a neoliberalism policy based on instrumental rationality, namely effectiveness and efficiency in decision-making involving various stakeholders (Miller & Dunn, 2006). This is what is used by political parties to colonize public discussion so that the interests of people’s welfare and sovereignty are marginalized. In the end, there was a shift in the meaning of accountability as the mandate of the people to political parties. Accountability carried out by political parties is only ceremonial to get legitimacy from the public. The reality of NPM according to Mauro et. al (2019) is just an illusion, where the organization fails to make the desired changes.

Hood (1991, 1995) explained that the concept of NPM contains seven main components, namely professional management in the public sector, the practice of performance measurement, as well as greater emphasis on controlling output and outcome; privatization in the public sector creating competition and adapting business sector management styles to the public sector (Ter Bogt et al., 2010), as well as disciplining and saving the use of resources (Ashraf & Uddin, 2016). This, which must be done by countries that get debt assistance from the IMF and Worldbank. The two organizations play a role as a player to defend capitalism which must submit to and comply with the programs offered (Rais, 2008).

Efforts are being made to free the NPM lifeworld colonization as stipulated in the political party law (Law No. 2 of 2011) chapter 35 paragraph 1\(^2\) by understanding the purpose of accountability. Accountability as stipulated in regulations increasingly paves the way for corporation power to make the largest contribution to political parties, the highest value among sources of political party revenue. Corporations as the majority shareholders of political parties, even political parties will prioritize accountability to shareholders as the concept of agency theory

\(^{2}\text{Political Party Law Number 02 Year 2011 Article 35 Paragraph 1c reads that the source of revenue comes from companies and/or business entities, at the most a value of Rp 7,500,000,000.00 (seven billion five hundred million rupiah) per company and/or business entity in 1 (one) fiscal year.}\)
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The process of care is under the shadow of the corporation which has damaged the system in political parties. For this reason, changes are needed in public accountability, especially in understanding the spirit of cadre accountability. The accountability of the political party cadre is very important in the process of printing public officials both in the executive and legislative institutions. With an understanding of the accountability of the cadre, the liberation of public accountability for the colony of instrumental rationality can be carried out. Liberation of the NPM's colonization will find a holistic picture of the accountability process of political parties that have colonized the space for public discussion and impeded the process of public accountability.

The concept of accountability is still being debated among academics. According to Laughlin (1984); Tetlock et., Al. (2013) that there is no definition of accountability that is most appropriate for each individual/institution, accountability needs to be adjusted to the conditions under which it will be applied. For Jensen & Meckling (1976) accountability is the responsibility of giving delegation by the principal and agent. Whereas Roberts & Scapens (1985) accountability is a reciprocal relationship between giving and requesting responsibility for all certain activities to interested parties. In short, accountability is the provision of information and disclosure (disclosure) of the activities and performance of the organization to the parties concerned (Gray et., Al, 1996).

The issue of accountability for the cadre of political parties is still minimal in Indonesia. Some researchers who conduct research related to accountability both in the public sector and in the private sector, the research was conducted with a variety of different approaches and theories (Manar, 2016; Kholmi, 2008; Feriaynshah, Irianto, & Roekhudin, 2018; Kumorotomo, 2010; Anzar, 2011; Paranoan, 2015; Pinilih, 2017; Musyarofah, 2013; Octasari, 2016; Purnomosidi, Triyuwono, & Kamayanti, 2012; Wibowo, 2018; Rohma, 2011). Thus, this study uses the Habermas action communication theory approach in photographing the reality of this research issue.
The community seems to be tired of fighting for their rights, thus strengthening the status quo of political parties. Accountability, which is a form of NPM colonization originating from the West, has eliminated the values of the Indonesian nation. Under the NPM paradigm, accountability is associated with the idea of increasing the effectiveness of public policies that uphold liberal values that are contrary to the culture, culture, and ideology of the political party, namely Pancasila. Therefore, to free accounting from the entanglement of capitalism, according to (Mulawarman, 2014) it is necessary to have an accounting policy based on local wisdom. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to understand the spirit of public accountability and accountability practices that occur in public relations and political parties in fighting for the interests of the people.

Based on the phenomena that have been elaborated in this study, to free the snare of corruption, it is necessary to have undistorted communication between the various actors involved in the accountability process especially the accountability of cadre in political party organizations. To be able to achieve this, it is necessary to understand the practice of accountability that occurs in the relations of political parties with stakeholders so that it can be understood how the form of NPM colonization of public accountability. Therefore, the research raised a question which is how the accountability process of political party cadre XYZ in printing public officials both in the executive and legislative institutions? The purpose of this research is to produce a construction of the concept of public accountability that is free from the lifeworld colonization carried out by the NPM concept. This study emphasizes analysis on forms of accountability that are process-oriented and that liberate public communication. This study will open the discourse of accountability for a process that is not limited to the presentation of information, but more than that, as moral accountability of political parties in preventing corruption that plagues many political party cadres.
RESEARCH METHOD

Problem-solving in this study will be approached through the critical perspective of Habermas (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1996); (Oakes & Oakes, 2016); (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2015). The critical perspective of Habermas will reveal the lifeworld colonization of accountability for the cadre of political parties XYZ, public discussion space is the main problem in this study. Critical research approach, research activities should not stop at conventional stages such as description, explanation, application, or forecasting. Research activities should go a step further, namely to the stage of awareness and action to achieve the goal of problem-solving or empowerment based on the critical awareness of research participants. This paradigm understands human nature as something dynamic and independent and should be free from the element of exploitation and pressure from certain parties. The research objective of the critical paradigm is to uncover the real relationships that exist beneath the surface, expose myths and illusions, erase false beliefs, and try to free society from existing situational shackles.

This study was excavated based on the results of interviews from informants namely the executive, legislative, political party management which is a representation of political parties (agents), civil society who are concerned to monitor the activities of political parties, media who are given the task of covering political issues in South Sulawesi (the principal). The informant's identity in this study was disguised considering the sensitivity of the topic must be carefully disclosed (Saunders et. Al., 2015). Analysis of data using a knife analysis of Habermas communication action theory. This research seeks to liberate the communication process by using the Habermas communication theory. Through the Habermas approach, this study tries to understand colonization related to the issue of cadre accountability, public discussion space is the main thing that becomes the main problem. Therefore, by using the Habermas communication action theory, the research seeks to liberate the communication process. An understanding of "lifeworld" interactions, technical systems, and social
steering mechanisms is important to achieve the goal of liberating communication so that people can achieve a better life (Barone, et al., 2013). As stated by Neuman, 2003; Efferin, 2015, that the critical approach aims to fight for the ideas of the researcher in order to bring substantial change to the community.

This research was conducted in South Sulawesi Province because the victory of the "Empty Box" at the Makassar Pilwali was a form of community resistance against political parties. The thickness of transactional politics in the process of cadre formation in the Makassar Pilwali carried out by 10 political parties triggers people's distrust of political parties. Another thing is the XYZ political party which was the winner of the 2014-2019 election period who put its cadres in the South Sulawesi Province DPRD as many as 13 people.

DISCUSSION RESULT
Un-Accountable Cadre XYZ: Bridge to Corruption

One of the functions of political parties as formal political institutions is to produce qualified candidates for politicians and national leaders. By producing reliable cadres it will support the creation of an ideal political party function. However, this is only a function that is still difficult to fulfill. An expensive political system, according to (Riwanto, 2015), triggers legislators and executives to commit corruption. Corruption is a complex phenomenon and impacts on political and economic consequences (Sikka & Lehman, 2015; Bowler & Karp, 2004) endanger public finances (Hillman, 2004), deter foreign investment and trade (Wei, 2000; (De Jong & Bogmans, 2011), and reduce economic growth (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Mendez & Sepulveda, 2006). Various cases of corruption occurred, due to expensive election stages. This is consistent with the opinion of the following informants:
"... Various cases of corruption that occur in the legislative and executive, due to the expensive election stages, so the desire to return capital when elected with a political deal through policies that favor his cronies... (AZ, Journalist)

The high cost of gaining seats in the DPR and DPRD according to informants has encouraged politicians to carry out "political corruption" systematically. This is in line with Sjafrina's research (2019) related to the impact of political dowry that political corruption will occur which results in the people's sovereignty being pawned. Political corruption (political corruption) is a term for perpetrators of corruption committed by public officials (Alkostar, 2010: 16-17). Political corruption is an act against the law and morals because it misuses the power and authority possessed by a person for the benefit of himself, the group, or other parties who seek mutual benefits economically and politically. This is according to Stupid & Dahlan (2010: xi); Anderson & Tverdova (2003) will reduce people's trust in political leaders and the loss of trust in democracy.

Producing qualified candidates for politicians is certainly a responsibility that must be carried out and must be done so as not to be abandoned by the public (constituents). The strength of transactional politics in the process of recruiting cadres who will sit in the legislature, executive and who are still sitting as management at the party level. This can be seen from the strengthened internal party decisions, both in decision-making and the nomination of regional heads determined by a handful of political elites. Transactional politics will give birth to leaders and politicians of corruption because of nature and style that is guided by economic values and transactions that lead to personal gain. The tendency of political parties to be trapped in the power of capital in carrying out regional head candidates because of the deposit of political party elites who acted as "chess pieces". It is they who will finance the candidates to participate in the fight to smooth the interests of the elite. This was revealed by the following informant:
"... Actually, corruption in the DPRD, because there is entrust and more also the interests of party elites because if he opposes the party or the general chairman, it could be in PAW ...dilemma right ... related to plates and the fate of the family". (HR, NGO, South Sulawesi Province)

Affirmation of informants is in line with research by Sikka & Lehman (2015); Roberts (2015) Another factor influencing corruption is collusion between state officials and private parties with the aim of personal gain. Mulawarman (2018) argues that behind the corruption that ensnares politicians and governments in fact only the "iceberg" of more powerful corruption is mega corruption and corporatocracy. Like the empirical findings made by Irianto (2003) on corporate scandals with accountants, it is confirmed that there have been deals made by corporations. This was reiterated by Fukuyama (2014, chap 5); Warren (2004) states that real corruption is not merely a personal motive but the interests of political party elites. The form of interests of political party elites can be accommodated by policymakers through parliamentarians or regional heads who are supporters of the general election event.

The role of political parties is clearly seen from every policy that will be discussed in parliament starting with the general view of all factions that have seats in parliament, where the faction is an extension of political parties, thus providing opportunities for political deals. Political deals that occur during discussion and policymaking are very common in parliament. This was revealed by the following information:

"... Many people in DPRD are willing to" barter "their authority by receiving injections of funds from companies that have money power in the interests of the company's economy (HR-Civil society organizations).

The expression of the informant indicated the magnitude of the influence of the power used by politicians in the interests of the corporation. In fact, it cannot be denied that transactional practices have taken place in the field, starting from the recruitment process, the following informants revealed:

"... If we use party ideology, surely all cadres can be promoted to become candidates, but if who is in power, and wants who
...? who is party and he is a strong candidate in the party, then the serial number is played. Determination of the serial number is determined by the party leader and the amount of the dowry deposited (Azis, Journalists)

The instant cadre selection process because of financial power provides evidence that the commitment of political parties to fight corruption is only a symbol to convince the public ahead of the election until it succeeded in delivering its cadres to the top of the throne of power. After reaching the peak of their power, they recycle to fight corruption by maintaining power above the pillar of corruption through the regulatory door that was rolled out in parliament. This was revealed by the following informant:

"... Now if those who fill this political party are retirees, yes ... people who have pragmatic interests, if he is a businessman, then he enters into political parties. To protect the business or to be able to get credit, for example. This is what for me damages political parties. Enter the party in an instant way, there is no pattern of regeneration in political parties. (AI, Political Observers / Academics)

The informant's statement was confirmed by Wattimena (2016) that political rulers are people who are economically capable so that they are resources and support to participate in elections both at national and regional levels. The leaders who come from these circles will lead the country by putting forward the interests of themselves and only groups, in order to pay the dowry that they spend when their self-preservation.

The instant election process of political party cadres as revealed by informants who only consider the income for political parties will damage political parties. It must be recognized that the power of money is the pulse of political parties in carrying out organizational ideology (Junaidi et al., 2011: 1), but the rationality towards the use of value for money needs to be re-evaluated in practical and theoretical contexts related to the public sector (Carnegie & West, 2005). The absence of regeneration patterns in political parties will result in political corruption consciously done to provide compensation to the party where the board member is sheltered. This compensation cannot be separated from the fact that the party becomes their vehicle to deliver them to the position of legislative member,
or the political party nominates the executive to occupy a certain organization. This political compensation is inseparable from the high political costs, so some parties require the need for political dowry (Riwanto, 2015; Monita, Lestari, & Yustikarini, 2018). How to make up for a large amount of dowry, one of which is by using information-giving facilities or tender processes that favor the interests of the elite who have financed during the election. This was revealed by the informant:

"... In parliament or in the government the expensive thing is information, such as tender information or APBD projects. Because all of you want to get a ration for the contractors or companies that have deposited or financed during the election ... and become public secret right ... (AB-Independent Auditor)

The legal facts as revealed by the informants are reflected in the flow of project fees distributed to legislators during the discussion of the APBD. This can be the evidence that the strong political deals that occur in each process of discussing the budget for income and expenditure in parliament. So many politicians who became representatives of the people in several regions that stumbled cases such as what happened in North Sumatra as many as 38 legislative members who became suspects in the discussion of the APBD by conducting a dialogue with the local government to rob the state money (Amindoni, 2018). Likewise, what happened in Malang City as many as 41 people representatives were caught in a corruption case because they had ratified the APBD by granting a project allotment at the time of the APBD implementation. The APBD corruption case in 2 regions, namely the Malang DPRD and the North Sumatra DPRD can be clear evidence that the accountability of the policies rolled out at the DPRD is still laden with the interlocking interests of political party elites. Like the following informant's expression:

"... Actually, high political costs can endanger political parties themselves, because it can be one of the triggers for someone to commit corruption, but this is what political parties do not realize because they are more concerned with interests, scooping power" (HR, NGO South Sulawesi Province)
Based on the results of the interview with the informant, the political dowry meant by the informant was not reflected in the XYZ party's financial accountability report and was never opened by the public. However, often in the trial process of corruptors, political dowry becomes a trigger for corruption. Political dowry should be a part that must be reported by political parties. The same thing was revealed in the cadre process that the political dowry was revealed in the East Java regional election, where the mass media released the practice of political dowry in East Java in the 2018 election a party cadre was asked to deposit to the party as one of the conditions of support to become a candidate for the governor of East Java (Putri & Hantoro, 2018). The arrangement of political dowry in the law was clearly not explained, but it is common knowledge to be a candidate for a certain party dowry there. This was confirmed by the informant:

"... I observe that almost all parties have a political dowry, and I always say that corruption is carried out by several regional heads and the DPRD because of pressure and pressure, which is political boarding and political dowry that they must return when elected. (JH, Anti-Corruption Activist)

The political dowry polemic, according to the informant who was a candidate for the regent candidate, stated that the political dowry exists, but it is not published and there is no recording by political parties. This is in line with Monita et al., (2018) actually happening and becoming commonplace as a political vehicle under the pretext of financing political parties. Although, the prohibition on receiving compensation is clearly stipulated in Law No. 8 of 2015 chapter 47 concerning Pilkada that parties or a combination of political parties are prohibited from receiving compensation in any form during the process of nominating a regional head. Ironically, the election organizers do not have the right by law to investigate political dowry. There is a legal power which the election organizers do not have the power to fight and provide justice to the community. As a result, the elections that were originally designed to
spread the seeds of democracy have actually reaped more corruption. In fact, when observing the dynamics that occur, it seems very strong the presence of the elections has been held hostage by elite political pragmatism. This is what is used as a legal loophole, even corruption can be dealt with as the case of the DPRD in North Sumatra and Malang DPRD.

The political process is still largely dominated by compromises of interests between the ruling elite on one side and the community elite on the other. Political institutions were defeated by the personal power of the rulers, thus narrowing the opportunities of the people to be involved in development. This was reiterated by the informants in the following interview excerpt:

"... Just look at the faces of the candidates in XYZ, I myself who has held positions in the legislative and executive, is sad to see the installation of politics. No longer see seniority or party cadres but basically who has the money. So don't dream of wanting to bring the party's ideology or vision into the struggle, don't be surprised if the election has been corrupt. This is the country's biggest obstacle ... (MR. Chairperson of South Sulawesi Province Legislative / Legislative Council).

The informant's statement indicated the thick influence of money in the political process in the XYZ Party that had violated the ideology and vision of political parties (Monita et al., 2018). This is what destroys the democratic order in Indonesia. The people's representatives no longer carry the vision and mission of political parties, but they are only preoccupied with how to return campaign funds. No doubt, several cases were revealed that council members concurrently became project brokers who brought together the interests of the authorities and regional heads. In fact, it is not uncommon to ask for a project quota openly. This relationship was built because the DPRD felt that it could monopolize executive power.
Supposedly, the big power in the DPRD is used as capital to create a more responsive, clean, and authoritative regional government.

Corruption scandals occur because of the need for organizations to win elections (Gabrillin, 2017; Junaidi et al., 2011: 20). The high corruption cases will have an impact on the lack of expenditure allocations for projects that benefit the poor, indicating that the poor will be better off (Junaidi et al., 2011: 134; Kumorotomo, 2009; Surbakti, 2015: 1). In general, the negative effects of corruption according to D'AAgostino, et al., (2016); Serritzlew, et al., (2014) will hamper economic growth and democratic development. This was revealed by the informant in the following interview excerpt:

"... As one of the pillars of democracy, what is actually damaged starts from the party's regeneration process that is not running. Everything goes from regeneration starting from the presidential election, governor, regent, everyone can enter and run, eventually, he has big capital and is able to pay political dowry to the party (AJ, Chairman of the Election Commission of South Sulawesi Province).

The expensive political costs as expressed by the informants forced political parties to do all kinds of ways to get funding. This gap is used by businessmen, conglomerates, and corporate world actors to enter and plant their oligarchs. The regeneration function is stuck and political parties prefer to hold a red carpet for power hunters with billions of rupiah in the capital. The implementation of a democratic party by carrying out party-chosen cadres according to Nurprojo (2016) is like a puppet designed to guard the interests of political party elites.

The role of political parties as a connector to the aspirations of the people is more and more remoted. This is clearly not in accordance with democracy according to the Pancasila philosophy, which bases democracy on popular sovereignty. The principle of Pancasila democracy does not only place the principle of democracy in a mathematical perspective, which is only through the most votes so that small groups and those who lose mathematically do not have space in democracy. Democracy in a unitary state, in addition to a mathematical perspective, must lay the
foundation of morality in the country's democratic system. Therefore democracy must be based on the morality of God, humanity, and unity, in order to realize the common goal of a prosperous and just society. Democracy must be based on the morality of togetherness based on the moral values of wisdom, decency, and nobility.

Corruption is a global phenomenon (Wedel, 2014) and is an endemic problem in developing countries including Indonesia. Corruption is one of the biggest obstacles to economic and social development in the era of globalization (Hough, 2013). The Corruption Eradication Commission revealed that this corruption was systemic collusion carried out by bureaucrats, people's representatives, state-owned officials to businessmen (Ahmad, 2017). The number of political costs that trigger corruption (Abraham, 2018). The same thing was expressed by the informants in the following interview excerpt:

"... The high political cost is one of the reasons why leaders commit corruption, because a large number of funds or money spent when they are candidates, has an impact on how the funds or money is returned. So the way he does is with corruption "(AI, Academics).

The statement of the informant emphasized that the practice of transactional politics triggers politicians to take shortcuts, namely seeking political financing through the wrong path. Transactional politics seems legitimized by all walks of life, from ordinary people, community leaders, to religious leaders, as a matter of fact, many religious circles take advantage of this opportunity by submitting proposals for the construction of places of worship. Although transactional politics is prohibited by law, the fact is that in the lead-up to the democratic event both regional elections and legislative elections are inevitable. Transactional politics in the cadre process is what causes corrupt behavior in the executive and legislative branches. Corruption according to Sikka & Lehman (2015) will have an impact on the development of citizens. The low accountability of the cadre of political parties XYZ makes people's trust getting worse because those who are involved in corruption are the executive and
legislative branches carried by political parties. This was confirmed by the informant:

"... Corruption in congregation carried out by the executive and legislative because of the cadre mechanism in the body of political parties that do not work, only the rich can fill the nomination of regional heads or legislative candidates, no longer see party cadres. (MR, Chairperson of South Sulawesi Province Legislative Council / Legislature).

Cadre mechanism in political parties which does not work according to the informants triggers corruption in the executive and legislative branches. Informant MR, senior politician from political party cadre xyz who has served as a member of the DPR-RI, Regent, and Chairman of the Provincial DPRD, emphasized that the party’s pragmatism was only thinking about power struggles in the election. Political parties XYZ no longer see political party cadres but who will benefit the party. The ambition of power colors every election of legislative and executive candidates in the end creating policies that legalize corruption. The corruption syndrome described by Johnston (2005) occurs because of wealth, power, and democracy. The reality of accountability in the cadre of political parties XYZ reinforces the existence of hegemony towards the succession of leadership due to the magnitude of the power of money and power. Reinforced by (Habermas, 1984, 1987; Broadbent and Laughlin (1997) show that Steering media (money and power) will influence changes in organizational systems.

CONCLUSION

The findings of this study are un-accountable political parties on the path to corruption. This happened because political parties conducted colonization of public space during the process of cadre nominating legislative and executive candidates. The function of political parties to
fight for the people's welfare and sovereignty is eroded by the many corruption cases that ensnared politicians. The lack of cadre accountability is due to the thick oligarchy in political parties by relying on financial strength.

An unaccountable cadre of XYZ political parties is due to the thick transactional politics in the cadre process, this shows that accounting reforms driven by Word Bank with the NPM program failed to bring financial reforms, especially XYZ political parties. This has led to public distrust of XYZ political parties with the concept of accountability with the aim of improving the performance of political parties. However, the concept of accountability has even legalized corruption in political party organizations with the thick of transactional politics. For this reason, the cadre process, especially the recruitment process for prospective regional leaders, must prioritize deliberation. Musyawarah is a means of opening up space for people with political parties, for better policymaking (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008). Openness in carrying cadres in elections and post-conflict local elections is an effort for political parties to create quality cadres and a form of corruption prevention. Clean public officials are certainly the dream of every political party. The function of political parties must be returned as a tool to seize power that serves the interests of the welfare and sovereignty of the people. One thing that every political party must achieve to improve cadre recruitment is to produce clean public officials. Accountability for the cadre process will result in undistorted communication between the various actors involved in the accountability process.

This research is a case study research that was conducted at one XYZ political party in Indonesia. Perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors found on this research site may be different from other political party sites, consequently, this research cannot be generalized. Future research is expected to use all political parties in Indonesia with different research issues by considering other aspects such as financial accountability, program accountability that affects corruption.
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