Quantum Authentication and Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

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Abstract. We propose a quantum key distribution protocol with quantum based user authentication. Our protocol is the first one in which users can authenticate each other without previously shared secret and then securely distribute a key where the key may not be exposed to even a trusted third party. The security of our protocol is guaranteed by the properties of the entanglement.

1 Introduction

Quantum key distribution(QKD) is the most actively researched field in Quantum Cryptography. Since BB84 protocol$^1$ was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 as a start, many QKD protocols have been proposed$^{2–4}$ and implemented$^{5–7}$. The great advantage of QKD is to provide the provable security of distributed keys$^{8–10}$. However, it is assumed that the quantum channel is directly connected and previously authorized to the designated users in those protocols. This assumption is not suitable on the consideration of quantum networks. To authenticate users on the quantum networks, Quantum Authentication protocols$^{11–18}$ are proposed since Crepeau and L. Salvail first proposed a quantum identification protocol in 1995. Some Quantum Authentication protocols assume that the users have some authentication information such as entangled states$^{11–13}$ and authentication sequence$^{14, 15}$. As mentioned above, these protocols can not be operated on the quantum networks. Other quantum authentication protocols$^{16–18}$ introduced a trusted third party. Quantum authentication protocols proposed by Zeng and Zhang$^{16}$ in 2000 and Mihara$^{17}$ in 2002 are only for authentication. Alice and Bob can authenticate each other and distribute key without previously shared information only in one protocol proposed by Ljunggren and et al.$^{18}$. The major disadvantage of this protocol is the leakage of the key to the trusted third party.

In this paper, we propose a Quantum Key Distribution protocol with authentication. The proper users, Alice and Bob can authenticate each other without previously shared secret and share a secret key without leakage of information
to anyone. We organize this paper as follows. First, we propose a new QKD protocol with user authentication in chapter 2. Our QKD protocol is composed of two parts: one is authentication and the other key is distribution. Greenberger - Horne - Zeilinger (GHZ) states[19] are used to authenticate users and distribute a secret key. The security analysis of our protocol is discussed in chapter 3 and at last our conclusion is presented in chapter 4.

2 Quantum Authentication and Quantum Key Distribution protocol

2.1 Authentication

We assume that Alice and Bob do not share any prior secret information or entanglement states for authentication. To identify each other in the communication, they are supposed to introduce a trusted third party, Trent. Trent plays a role like a CA(certificate authority) in PKI(Public Key Infrastructure)[20, 21]. If there are \( n \) users in quantum networks, then \( \frac{n(n-1)}{2} \) keys are needed to communicate freely when there is no Trent. Besides, each user must distribute \( n - 1 \) secret keys with other users. However, only \( n \) keys are needed when Trent exists and each user just needs to distribute one secret key with Trent. Trent may be a loophole for security. However it can be overcome using similar methods applied to CA.

We assume that Alice has registered her secret identity \( ID_A \) and a one-way hash function \( h_A : \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m \), where * means an arbitrary length, \( l \) is the length of a counter, and \( m \) is a constant. Bob has also registered his secret identity \( ID_B \) and a one-way hash function \( h_B \) to Trent. This information is assumed to be kept secret between the user and Trent. Authentication key can, then, be generated by a hashed value \( h_{user}(ID_{user}, c_{user}) \) where \( c_{user} \) is a counter which is the number of the calls of the one way hash function \( h_{user} \).

If Alice wants to distribute a key with Bob, she notifies this fact to Bob and Trent. On receiving the request, Trent generates \( N \) GHZ tripartite states \( \left| \Psi \right> = \left| \psi_1 \right> \left| \psi_2 \right> ... \left| \psi_N \right> \). For simplicity the following GHZ state \( \left| \psi_1 \right> \) is supposed to be prepared.

\[
\left| \psi_1 \right> = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left( \left| 000 \right>_{ATB} + \left| 111 \right>_{ATB} \right)
\]

where the subscripts A, T and B correspond to Alice, Trent, and Bob, respectively. In this paper, we represent the z basis as \( \{ \left| 0 \right>, \left| 1 \right> \} \) and the x basis as \( \{ \left| + \right>, \left| - \right> \} \), where \( + = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\left| 0 \right> + \left| 1 \right> \) and \( - = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\left| 0 \right> - \left| 1 \right> \).

Next, Trent encodes Alice’s and Bob’s particles of GHZ states with their authentication keys, \( h_A(ID_A, c_A) \) and \( h_B(ID_B, c_B) \), respectively. For example, if the \( i \)th value of \( h_A(ID_A, c_A) \) is 0, then Trent makes an identity operation \( I \) to Alice’s particle of the \( i \)th GHZ state. If it is 1, Hadamard operation \( H \) is applied. If the authentication key does not have enough length to cover all GHZ particles, new authentication keys can be created by increasing the counter until the authentication keys shield all GHZ particles. After making operations on
the GHZ particles, Trent distributes the states to Alice and Bob and keeps the remaining for him.

**Fig. 1. Procedures of Authentication**

0. Alice and Bob register their secret identities and hash functions to Trent. 1. Trent generates GHZ states $|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|000\rangle_{ATB} + |111\rangle_{ATB})$. 2. Trent makes unitary operations on $|\psi\rangle$ with Alice’s and Bob’s authentication key. 3. Trent distributes GHZ particles to Alice and Bob. 4. Alice and Bob make reverse unitary operations on their qubits with their authentication key, respectively. 5. Alice and Bob choose the position of a subset of GHZ states and make a local measurement in the $z$ basis on them and compare the results.

On receiving the qubits, Alice and Bob make reverse unitary operations on their qubits with their authentication key $h_A(ID_A, c_A)$ and $h_B(ID_B, c_B)$, respectively. This authentication procedure can be written in the following form of sequences of local unitary operation, the initial state:

$$|\psi_i\rangle_1 = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|000\rangle_{ATB} + |111\rangle_{ATB})$$

state after Trent’s transformation

$$|\psi_i\rangle_2 = \{[1 - h_A(ID_A, c_A)]I + [h_A(ID_A, c_A)]H\}_A$$
$$\otimes \{[1 - h_B(ID_B, c_B)]I + [h_B(ID_B, c_B)]H\}_B|\psi_i\rangle_1$$

and finally the state after Alice’s and Bob’s local operations

$$|\psi_i\rangle_3 = \{[1 - h_A(ID_A, c_A)]I + [h_A(ID_A, c_A)]H\}_A$$
$$\otimes \{[1 - h_B(ID_B, c_B)]I + [h_B(ID_B, c_B)]H\}_B|\psi_i\rangle_2$$

$$= |\psi_i\rangle_1$$
where $|\psi_i\rangle$ is the state of the $i$-th GHZ particle and the subscript 1, 2, and 3 represents the three steps of authentication.

Next, Alice and Bob select some of the decoded qubits, make von-Neumann measurements on them, and compare the results through the public channel. If the error rate is higher than expected, then Alice and Bob abort the protocol. Otherwise they can confirm that the other party is legitimate and the channel is secure. They then execute the following key distribution procedures.

### 2.2 Key Distribution

Alice and Bob randomly make an operation either identity operation $I$ or Hadamard operation $H$ on the remaining GHZ particles. They keep the record of the operations which they made. For example, 0 represents $I$ and 1 indicates $H$. After making unitary operations, Bob sends his encrypted GHZ particles to Alice. On receiving the qubits, Alice makes Bell measurements on pairs of particles consisting of her qubit and Bob’s qubit. On the other hand, Trent measures his third qubit in the $x$ basis and reveals the measurement outcomes. In this paper we use the following notations of Bell states.

$$\begin{align*}
|\Phi^+\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\{|00\rangle + |11\rangle\} \\
|\Phi^-\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\{|00\rangle - |11\rangle\} \\
|\Psi^+\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\{|01\rangle + |10\rangle\} \\
|\Psi^-\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\{|01\rangle - |10\rangle\}
\end{align*}$$

Alice can infer Bob’s unitary operations and sometimes discover the existence of Eve using the table [1]. For example, if Trent discloses $|+\rangle$, Alice chooses $I$ operation and her Bell measurement result is $|\Phi^-\rangle$, then Alice can infer that Bob made a $H$ operation and he sent 1. On the other hand, if Trent makes public $|+\rangle$, Alice makes $I$ operation and obtains $|\Psi^-\rangle$, then Alice can detect an error.

| Operation | Transformation of GHZ states after Alice’s and Bob’s operations |
|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| $I(0)$ $I(0)$ | $|\Phi^+\rangle_{AB} |+\rangle_a + |\Phi^-\rangle_{AB} |−\rangle_a$ |
| $I(0)$ $H(1)$ | $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\Phi^+\rangle_{AB} |−\rangle_a + |\Phi^-\rangle_{AB} |+\rangle_a + |\Psi^+\rangle_{AB} |+\rangle_a + |\Psi^-\rangle_{AB} |−\rangle_a)$ |
| $H(1)$ $I(0)$ | $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\Phi^+\rangle_{AB} |−\rangle_a + |\Phi^-\rangle_{AB} |+\rangle_a + |\Psi^+\rangle_{AB} |+\rangle_a - |\Psi^-\rangle_{AB} |−\rangle_a)$ |
| $H(1)$ $H(1)$ | $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\Phi^+\rangle_{AB} |+\rangle_a + |\Psi^-\rangle_{AB} |−\rangle_a)$ |
Fig. 2. Procedures of Key distribution 1. Alice and Bob make identity operations I (0) or Hadamard operations H (1) randomly on the remaining GHZ particles after authentication. 2. Bob sends his encoded particles to Alice. 3. Alice makes Bell measurements on pairs of particles consisting of her qubit and Bob’s qubit. 4. The arbitrator measures his qubits in the x basis and publishes the results. 5. Alice infers Bob’s operation using the table [1]. 6. Alice and Bob select check bits and compare them.

Alice and Bob compare some bits of their shared key (Bob’s operation sequence). If the error rate is higher than the acceptable level, they throw away the shared sequence and restart the protocol. Otherwise they use the remaining sequences as a secret key. Usual error correction can be implemented to correct the remaining errors. Alice and Bob can reduce the Eve’s knowledge of a shared key by standard privacy amplification[22, 23].

3 Security Analysis

In the assumption, user identity and a hash function are enrolled to Trent and the information is kept secret only between the owners and the arbitrator. Moreover Trent is supposed to be a honest person whom Alice and Bob can trust.

We first analyze the process of authentication. Suppose Eve intercepts the qubits heading to Alice or Bob and disguises her or him. Let Eve use the following unitary operation $U_{AE}$ on Alice’s and her qubit $|e>$.

$U_{AE}|0e⟩_{AE} = α|0⟩_A|e_{00}⟩_E + β|1⟩_A|e_{01}⟩_E$

$U_{AE}|1e⟩_{AE} = β'|0⟩_A|e_{10}⟩_E + α'|1⟩_A|e_{11}⟩_E$

where $|α|^2 + |β|^2 = 1$, $|α'|^2 + |β'|^2 = 1$ and $αβ^* + α'^*β' = 0$. If a bit of Alice’s authentication key is 0 (1), the total states $|ξ_0⟩$ (or $|ξ_1⟩$) of system and Eve’s
probe after Alice’s and Bob’s reverse operation is as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
|\xi_0\rangle &= U_{AE} \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|000\rangle_{ATB} + |111\rangle_{ATB}) \right) |e\rangle_E \\
&= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \{ \alpha |000\rangle_{ATB} |e_{00}\rangle_E + \beta |100\rangle_{ATB} |e_{01}\rangle_E \\
&\quad + \beta' |011\rangle_{ATB} |e_{10}\rangle_E + \alpha' |111\rangle_{ATB} |e_{11}\rangle_E \} \\
|\xi_1\rangle &= H_A U_{AE} \left( H_A \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|000\rangle_{ATB} + |111\rangle_{ATB}) \right) |e\rangle_E \\
&= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} \{ |000\rangle_{ATB} (\alpha |e_{00}\rangle_E + \beta |e_{01}\rangle_E + \beta' |e_{10}\rangle_E + \alpha' |e_{11}\rangle_E) \\
&\quad + |001\rangle_{ATB} (\alpha |e_{00}\rangle_E - \beta |e_{01}\rangle_E + \beta' |e_{10}\rangle_E - \alpha' |e_{11}\rangle_E) \\
&\quad + |110\rangle_{ATB} (\alpha |e_{00}\rangle_E + \beta |e_{01}\rangle_E - \beta' |e_{10}\rangle_E - \alpha' |e_{11}\rangle_E) \\
&\quad + |111\rangle_{ATB} (\alpha |e_{00}\rangle_E - \beta |e_{01}\rangle_E - \beta' |e_{10}\rangle_E + \alpha' |e_{11}\rangle_E) \} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Eve can be detected with probability \( \frac{1+\beta^2+\beta'^2}{4} \) (when the probability of 0 and 1 in an authentication key is same) in the authentication phase. If the number of the check bits in the authentication process is \( c \), then Alice and Bob can find out the existence of Eve with probability of \( 1 - (\frac{1+\beta^2+\beta'^2}{4})^c \). Eve is, therefore, always revealed if \( c \) is large enough. Hence if the authentication is passed, then Alice and Bob confirm the other party is the designated user.

Moreover, the original secret identities of users cannot be revealed even if Eve estimates some bits of the authentication key i.e. the hashed value. Eve can infer only some bits of the authentication key by checking bits in the authentication process. However Eve cannot reverse the hash function with partial information of the hashed value obtained from the checking bits in the authentication process. Besides Eve cannot infer the next authentication key since it is used only once and changed every time.

After authentication process, only Bob’s qubits are transmitted. Eve will make operations on these qubits in key distribution phase. Suppose Eve use the above unitary operation \( U_{BE} \) on Bob’s and her qubit \( |E\rangle \). Then we can get the following states of total system composed by Alice, Bob, Trent and Eve. Equation (1) is derived from the situation when Alice and Bob choose \( I \), equation (2) when they apply different unitary operations(\( H \) and \( I \)), and equation (3) is when they make \( H \) operations.

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad & \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} \left[ |\varphi^+\rangle_{AB} \{ |+\rangle_T (\alpha |e_{00}\rangle_E + \alpha' |e_{11}\rangle_E) + \lvert-\rangle_T (\alpha |e_{00}\rangle_E - \alpha' |e_{11}\rangle_E) \} \\
&\quad + |\varphi^-\rangle_{AB} \{ |+\rangle_T (\alpha |e_{00}\rangle_E - \alpha' |e_{11}\rangle_E) + \lvert-\rangle_T (\alpha |e_{00}\rangle_E + \alpha' |e_{11}\rangle_E) \} \\
&\quad + |\psi^+\rangle_{AB} \{ |+\rangle_T (\beta |e_{01}\rangle_E + \beta' |e_{10}\rangle_E) + \lvert-\rangle_T (\beta |e_{01}\rangle_E - \beta' |e_{10}\rangle_E) \} \\
&\quad + |\psi^-\rangle_{AB} \{ |+\rangle_T (\beta |e_{01}\rangle_E - \beta' |e_{10}\rangle_E) + \lvert-\rangle_T (\beta |e_{01}\rangle_E + \beta' |e_{10}\rangle_E) \} \right]
\end{align*}
\]
We propose a quantum key distribution protocol with quantum based user authentication. User authentication is executed without previously shared secret and by validating the correlation of GHZ states. A key can be securely distributed by using the remaining GHZ states after authentication. By the properties of the entanglement of GHZ states, even the trusted third party, Trent can not get out the distributed key. We expect our protocol can well be adjusted to be incorporated in future quantum networks.

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