New Models for Understanding and Reasoning about Speculative Execution Attacks

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Abstract—Spectre and Meltdown attacks and their variants exploit performance optimization features to cause security breaches. Secret information is accessed and leaked through micro-architectural covert channels. New attack variants keep appearing and we do not have a systematic way to capture the critical characteristics of these attacks and evaluate why they succeed.

In this paper, we provide a new attack-graph model for reasoning about speculative micro-architectural attacks. We model attacks as ordered dependency graphs, and define a new concept, i.e. “security dependency”, between a resource access and its prior authorization operation. We prove that a missing security dependency is equivalent to a race condition between authorization and access, which is a root cause of speculative execution attacks. We show detailed examples of how our attack graph models the Spectre and Meltdown attacks, and is generalizable to all the attack variants published so far. We also show that this attack model is very useful for identifying new attacks and for generalizing defense strategies. We show that the defenses proposed so far all fit under one of our defense strategies. We also explain how attack graphs can be constructed and point to this as very promising future work for tool designers.

I. INTRODUCTION

In computer systems, hardware resources, e.g., memory, buses and caches, are often shared among different processes and threads. The sharing mechanism increases the utilization of resources. However, preventing a secret from being leaked via shared resources is fundamental and challenging.

Memory isolation plays a key role in preventing information leakage. An application should not be able to read the memory of the kernel or another application. Memory isolation is usually enforced by the operating system, to allow multiple applications to run simultaneously on the shared hardware resources without information leakage. Typically the memory isolation is applied between 1) user processes and the kernel, and 2) among different user applications.

Recently, speculative execution attacks, e.g., Spectre [26], Meltdown [29], Foreshadow [39], Foreshadow-NG [44] and Lazy-FP [37] attacks and their variants are proposed to breach the memory isolation by using a covert-channel to exfiltrate a secret obtained illegally under speculative execution. Specifically, Spectre breaches the memory isolation among user applications, while Meltdown breaches the memory isolation between kernel and user applications. Foreshadow breaches the isolation of Intel SGX secure enclaves. Foreshadow-OS and Foreshadow-VMM breach the isolation of virtual address spaces or virtual machines, respectively. All of these attacks leverage the speculative execution feature of modern processors, transferring the security-critical information to a visible micro-architecture state. The micro-architecture state can then be exfiltrated through microarchitectural covert-channels. Unfortunately, while new attack variants are continuously being discovered, we do not have a systematic way to characterize these attacks and reason about them. The attack graph model we propose serves this goal.

While both industrial and academic solutions have been proposed to defend against speculative execution attacks [11], [18], [23], [24], [26], [28], [30], [32]–[35], [38], [43], [45], there is currently no systematic way to show if these defenses can defeat speculative attacks, and why. We show that our attack graph model can explain why a defense will work.

The key questions answered in this paper are: 1) How can we systematically model the essential common characteristics of speculative execution attacks and reason about them? 2) What defense strategies can be derived from the new models? 3) Are the recently proposed defenses effective against these speculative attacks?

Our key contributions in this paper are:

- A new Attack Graph model to systematically capture the essential operations and steps in speculative execution attacks.
- The new concept of “security dependencies” in addition to data dependencies and control dependencies. We theoretically prove that a missing security dependency in an attack graph is equivalent to a race condition, which is one of the key root causes of speculative attacks.
- We derive new defense strategies from our Attack Graph model that defeat these speculative attacks.
- We evaluate all existing industry and academia defenses with our models.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Speculative Attacks

Speculative execution vulnerabilities affect most modern processors. They exploit speculative execution, Out-of-Order execution, hardware predictors and caching – all essential features for speeding up program execution. They allow an unprivileged adversary to bypass the user-kernel isolation or user-defined boundaries. In a speculative execution attack, a speculation window is induced to allow transient instructions...
that illegally access a secret, then perform some microarchitectural state changes which essentially “send out the secret” so that it can be observed by the attacker. Upon detecting mis-speculation, architectural state changes are aborted, but some microarchitectural state changes are not – thus leaking the secret.

We give a top-down description of a speculative attack in Section III and a detailed discussion of the Spectre and Meltdown attacks in Section 4. We list the first 13 published attacks and their impacts in Table I. Later, in section 5 and Table III, we also consider the newer attack variants.

B. Industry Defenses Implemented

Table II shows some industry defenses that have been implemented to try to mitigate some speculative attacks.

**Fences.** Fences, including LFENCE and MFENCE [1], are placed before memory operations to serialize the program execution and prevent speculative execution.

**Kernel Isolation.** KAISER (Kernel Address Isolation to have Side-channels Efficiently Removed) and its Linux implementation named Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI) isolate user-space memory from kernel space to prevent Meltdown attacks, by unmapping kernel pages from user-space [4].

**Prevent Mis-training.** As many Spectre variants (v1, v1.1, v1.2, v2) leverage the mis-training of the branch predictors, Intel, AMD and ARM have proposed defenses to prevent mis-training, e.g., Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS), Single Thread Indirect Branch Prediction (STIBP) and Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB). Some AMD CPUs allow invalidating branch predictor and Branch Target Buffer (BTB) on context switches [5].

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**TABLE I: Speculative attacks and their variants.**

| Attack | CVE      | Impact                                   |
|--------|----------|------------------------------------------|
| Meltdown (Spectre v3) [29] | CVE-2017-5754 | Kernel content leakage to unprivileged attacker |
| Meltdown variant 1 (Spectre v3a) [2] | CVE-2018-3640 | System register value leakage to unprivileged attacker |
| Spectre v1 [26] | CVE-2017-5753 | Boundary check bypass                      |
| Spectre v1.1 [25] | CVE-2018-3693 | Speculative buffer overflow                |
| Spectre v1.2 [25] | N/A | Overwrite read-only memory                 |
| Spectre v2 [26] | CVE-2017-5715 | Branch target injection                   |
| Spectre v4 [3] | CVE-2018-3639 | Speculative store bypass, read stale data in memory |
| Spectre RSB [27] | CVE-2018-15572 | Return mis-predict, execute wrong code |
| Foreshadow (L1 Terminal Fault) [39] | CVE-2018-3615 | SOX enclave memory leakage                 |
| Foreshadow-US [44] | CVE-2018-3620 | OS memory leakage                          |
| Foreshadow-VMM [44] | CVE-2018-3646 | VMM memory leakage                         |
| Lazy FP [37] | CVE-2018-3665 | Leak of FPU state                          |
| Spoiler [22] | CVE-2019-0162 | Virtual-to-physical address mapping leakage |

**TABLE II: Industrial defenses against speculative attacks.**

| Attack | Defense Strategy | Defense |
|--------|------------------|---------|
| Spectre | Serialization | LFence, MFence |
| Meltdown | Kernel Isolation | KAISER, Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI) |
| Spectre variants requiring branch prediction (Spectre v1, v1.1, v1.2, v2) | Prevent mis-training of branch prediction | Disable branch prediction, Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation Single Thread Indirect Branch Prediction Branch Prediction Barrier Invalidate branch predictor during context switch Retpoline |
| Spectre boundary bypass (v1, v1.1, v1.2) | Address masking | Coarse masking, Data-dependent masking |
| Spectre v4 | Serializes stores and loads | Speculative Store Bypass Barrier (SSBB), Speculative Store Bypass Safe (SSBS) |
| Spectre RSB | Prevent RSB underfill | RSB stuffing |

**Address Masking.** To address the problem of software-defined boundary bypass, the V8 JavaScript engine and the Linux kernel implement software address masking by forcing the accessed memory to be within the legal range [25].

**Industrial Defenses against Other Specific Variants.** ARM implemented Speculative Store Bypass Barrier (SSBB) and proposed Speculative Store Bypass Safe (SSBS) to avoid speculative store bypass. Intel implemented Return Stack Buffer (RSB) stuffing, e.g., inserting interrupts to increase call depth, to defend against the Spectre-RSB attack. Intel also announced a silicon-based solution, i.e., the next-generation Cascade Lake processor [6].

**Academia defenses**

Recent defenses against speculative attacks have been proposed in academia, e.g., Context-sensitive fencing [38], Secure automatic bounds checking [30], SpectreGuard [18], NDA [43], ConTeXt [35], Speckshield [11], STT [47], DAWG [24], InvisiSpec [45], Safespec [23], Conditional Speculation [28], Efficient invisible speculative execution [34] and CleanupSpec [33]. We discuss and model them in Section V.

**C. Cache Timing Channels**

Since a speculative attack typically includes a covert channel attack to leak out the sensitive secret, often a cache covert-channel, it is important to understand how cache covert channels work. Cache timing channels can be classified, based on “hit” or “miss”, “access” or “operation”. The access-based attacks leverage the difference in timing between a hit and a miss to indicate a “1” or “0” based on a single memory access, while the operation based attacks leverage the time difference for a whole operation, e.g., an encryption operation.

**Hit and access based channel, e.g., Flush-reload channel [46].** The initial state of the cacheline is set to absent by a clflush instruction. Then, if the insider-sender does not use the shared cacheline, the check by the attacker-receiver after waiting a while, will still find the cacheline absent (indicated by a slow cache miss). If the insider-sender did use the cacheline, then the attacker-receiver will find the cacheline present (indicated by a fast cache hit).
Miss and access based channel, e.g., Prime-probe channel [20]. The attacker first loads his own data to fill the cache. After waiting for the insider-sender to do something, the attacker checks if the cachelines are now absent, i.e., a slow cache miss, because the insider-sender has evicted the attacker’s cachelines.

There are also hit and operation based channel, e.g., cache collision channel [12], and miss and operation based channel, e.g., Evict-time channel [31].

The Flush-Reload attack is faster and less noisy than the other covert channel attacks. They are used as the default covert channels in most of the speculative attacks. In the rest of the paper, without loss of generality, we also assume that the flush-reload covert channel is used in the speculative attacks. Our models can also apply to the prime-probe channel, and other non-cache-based covert channels, with minor changes.

III. OVERVIEW OF SPECULATIVE ATTACKS

In speculative attacks, the microarchitectural feature attacked is speculative execution, in concert with out-of-order execution. Out-of-order (OOO) execution allows instructions to be executed once their data operands are ready, i.e., when their data dependencies are resolved. This does not need to be in sequential program order. When an instruction is issued, it is placed into a Re-Order Buffer (ROB), with the oldest instruction at the head of the ROB and the youngest at the tail. Once an instruction’s data dependencies are resolved, the instruction can be executed. It is not committed (i.e., retired) until it reaches the head of the ROB, i.e., instructions are retired in program order. This OOO execution speeds up instruction processing.

Speculative execution is a performance optimization feature that occurs when the hardware microarchitecture predicts that a certain execution path will be taken on a conditional branch, or that an instruction will not have an exception. If the prediction is correct (which is most of the time), performance is improved. However, if the prediction is wrong, then the hardware rolls back the architecturally-visible state to where it was before the speculation window started. The speculatively executed instructions appear as if they were never executed (i.e., the mispredicted instructions are aborted or squashed). While processors implement speculation correctly as defined, the micro-architectural state is not always rolled back completely, as this is not supposed to be an architecturally-visible state (i.e., visible to software). In particular, caches are considered microarchitecture, and are not rolled back.

Although the exact workflow of a speculative execution attack may vary, on a high-level, they consist of two parts:

(A) **Secret Access:** A microarchitectural feature transiently enables the illegal access of a piece of sensitive data.

(B) **Secret Send or Covert Channel:** The sensitive data can be transformed into a micro-architectural state that can be observed by an attacker.

Definition 1: an illegal access is a data or code access that is performed before the required authorization is completed that indicates that the access is allowed. The required authorization is the operation checking if the performer is allowed to access the data, or execute the code. Authorization can be in different forms, e.g., a hardware privilege level check, a software array bounds check or a store-load address dependency check.

Since our definition of “authorization” is broader than the standard user-supervisor-hypervisor access checking, we give examples to illustrate. In the Meltdown attack, the attacker tries to read a memory line before the hardware page-privilege check that indicates the performer of the memory access has kernel privilege. In the Spectre v1 attack, although the memory access is within the legal program address space, we call it an illegal access because the software-enforced array-bounds check has not been performed. In the Spectre v4 attack (store-load dependency), we call the load operation an illegal access if it reads stale data before the authorization completes that says the load address is not the same as the address of a previous store operation that is still sitting in the store buffer and its contents have not been written back to the cache.

To defend against speculative attacks, one must prevent either part A (Secret Access) or part B (Secret Send or Covert Channel). By preventing A, the access to secrets, there are no secrets to leak, through any covert or side channel. By preventing B, any secrets present cannot be exfiltrated, nor can secrets obtained thru means other than speculation, be leaked. However, there can be many types of covert channels, and stopping all of them is not possible. Although computer architecture papers have focused on preventing cache covert channels, we feel this is only a near-term solution, since the attacker can easily find other covert channels to leak the secret information. We do not want to exclude these other covert channels. Hence, in this paper, we focus on modeling the illegal access to secrets through speculative execution, and having our attack model capable of modeling any covert channel.

From our attack model, we identify the following finer-grained attack steps that are critical to the success of a speculation attack. There are 5 steps for an actual attack, and 6 if we count step (0) where the attack finds the location of a secret he wants. This is usually done some time earlier, before the actual attack.

- **Step 0:** Know where the secret is.
- **Step 1 (Setup):** Receiver (a) establishes a microarchitectural covert-channel, e.g., by flushing out cachelines, and (b) sets up for illegal access, e.g., by mis-training the branch predictor.
- **Step 2 (Authorization):** The instruction performing the authorization for the subsequent memory or register access is delayed, thus triggering the start of a speculative execution window. If the authorization turns out to be negative, then the instructions executed speculatively are called transient instructions since they are squashed. If authorization turns out to be positive, then the instructions executed speculatively are committed.
- **Step 3 (Secret Access):** Sender (illegally) accesses the secret.
- **Step 4 (Use Secret and Send Secret):** Sender transforms the secret into a microarchitectural state that survives mis-speculation.
- **Step 5 (Receive Secret):** Receiver retrieves micro-
architecture state (the transformed secret) through the covert-channel.

Steps 0, 1(b) and 2 form part A. Steps 1(a), 3 and 4 form part B.

IV. ATTACK GRAPH AND SECURITY DEPENDENCY

We now look at specific speculative execution attacks, and model the flow of relevant operations that occur, to help reason about the attacks, and identify the root causes of their success. In Section IV-A, we model the Spectre v1 attack as a flow graph, and confirm that it follows the five steps we identified in Section III. This motivates us to define an attack graph in Section IV-B, as a topological sort graph (TSG), which enables us to formally prove necessary and sufficient conditions for a race condition to occur, which we identify as a root cause of the success of speculative attacks. In Section IV-C, we propose that inserting a missing ordering edge between two operations in the attack graph will defeat the attack, and we define this as a missing security dependency in the system. In Section IV-D, we model the Meltdown attack with an attack graph, and in Section IV-E, we show that our attack graph models can be extended to all attack variants.

A. Example: Spectre v1 Attack

Spectre attacks exploit the transient instructions which can execute during a speculative execution window. On a mis-speculation, the transient instructions are aborted and all architectural-level side effects are rolled back. However, not all microarchitectural state changes are rolled back.

Listing 1 shows an example of the Spectre v1 attack, bypassing the array-bounds check, thus reading arbitrary content that is not allowed, then sending the transformed secret out using a Flush-Reload cache side-channel. Suppose the target victim’s secret is located at Secret_Location.

```plaintext
// Establish channel by flushing shared Array_A accessible to attacker
int T[256]
char Array_A[256+4K]
clfush (Array_A)
// Train the branch predictor to predict not taken
train_branch_predictor ()
mov rbx, Array_A
mov rcx, Array_Victim
mov rdx, Secret_Location in Array_Victim
// if (x < Array_Victim_Size)
// y = Array_A[Array_Victim[x] * 256];
// rdx stores the queried index x and if x >
// Victim_Array_Size, the branch should be taken
cmp rdx, Array_Victim_Size // Authorization
ja _BRANCH_TAKEN
// Speculative Execution window starts
// Illegal memory access of Secret_Location
mov al, byte [Array_Victim + rdx] // Access
shl rax, 0xc // Use
mov rbx, qword [rbx + rax] // Send
```

Listing 1: Code snippet of the Spectre v1 attack to bypass array bounds checking, using the Flush-Reload channel.

Lines 1-4 prepare the Flush-Re LOAD side channel by flushing the cachelines of Array_A, which is accessible to the attacker and the victim. In line 7, the attacker trains the branch predictor to always predict not taken. Lines 9 and 10 put the base address of shared Array_A and private Array_Victim into registers. Line 11 sets rdx such that Array_Victim[rdx] points to Secret_Location. Note that Array_Victim itself may not have sensitive data, but rdx exceeds the length of Array_Victim_Size and refers to the secret.

Lines 13-14 (bolded) show the high-level C code of the assembly code in lines 16-26. This is the crux of the Spectre v1 attack. Line 18 is an array bound check, where rdx is compared to Array_Victim_Size. However, if getting Array_Victim_Size is delayed (e.g., not in the cache), the branch predictor will predict the branch in line 19 as not taken because the attacker has mistrained the predictor in line 7. Line 23 illegally reads the secret into the low-order byte of register rax. Line 25 transforms the secret into an index of Array_A (where each value of secret refers to a new page). Line 26 exfiltrates the secret by accessing an entry at Array_A indexed by the secret, thus changing the state of the cacheline from absent to present for the Flush-Re LOAD attack. When Array_Victim_Size finally arrives and the comparison is done, the processor realizes the mis-prediction in line 19, and discards the values in rax and rdx. However, the cache state is not rolled back, and the attacker can obtain the secret by checking which entry of Array_A has been fetched (lines 30-34), since this entry gives a cache hit.

We model the Spectre v1 attack in Figure 1. This is the first example of an Attack Graph. Here, the nodes are instructions and the links are data or control dependencies. The dotted arrows represent the speculative control flow.

Following the steps in Section III, the receiver sets up the covert channel by flushing Array_A and mis-training the branch predictor, such that the branch prediction will predict “not taken” (step 1). During the program execution, the branch stalls as the branch condition has not been resolved (the authorization operation, step 2). The branch predictor allows the speculative load of the secret (“Load S”) to be performed, bypassing the program-defined authorization (step 2). After the secret is obtained, the sender exfiltrates it by fetching a secret-related entry in Array_A (step 4). Finally, the receiver retrieves the secret by reloading entries in Array_A and measuring the access time. A short access time indicates that the entry in Array_A indexed by secret has been fetched into the cache (step 5).

Some key observations and insights are:
Speculative execution window. Once the branch stalls as the condition has not been resolved, the (possibly incorrect) instructions are speculatively executed in a speculative window. The speculative window is marked by the red dotted block in Figure 1. The speculative window starts from the issue of the first speculative (or transient) instruction until the branch condition ultimately resolves. If mis-predicted, the speculated instructions are squashed; otherwise, they are committed, improving the performance.

Operations inside the speculative window race with the authorization. The speculatively executed instructions and the branch resolution (i.e., the authorization) are performed concurrently. In particular, whether the two memory load operations or the branch resolution finishes first, is non-deterministic. Hence, there are two race conditions between “Load S” (secret access), “Load R” (micro-architecture state change) and “Branch resolution” (software authorization).

The race condition allows unauthorized access. The memory operation “Load S” in the speculative window race can be outside the software-defined boundary. Thus it is an unauthorized or illegal memory access.

The race condition is due to a missing security dependency. The race condition is because of a missing security dependency (formally defined in Section IV-C) between branch resolution and “Load S”. It is neither a data dependency nor a control dependency, but a new dependency to decide when an operation can be executed. This missing security dependency could implement the “No Access without Authorization” security principle pointed out by Lee [9].

B. Attack Graph and Races

We define an Attack Graph to extend and formalize the connection between a race condition and a missing dependency. We define an attack graph as a Topological Sort Graph (TSG), a directed acyclic graph with edges between vertices representing orderings.

A vertex in a TSG represents an operation, e.g., accessing a memory line, flushing a cacheline or comparing a memory address to a bound. Figure 2 shows an example of a TSG.

A directed edge in the TSG represents a dependency of two vertices. If there is an edge from $u$ to $v$, $u$ happens before $v$.

A path is a sequence of edges that connects vertices. All paths considered in this paper are directed paths.

An ordering of vertices in a TSG is an ordered list that contains all vertices in the graph $S = \langle v_1, v_2, ..., v_k \rangle$. An ordering of vertices in a TSG is valid, if and only if for every directed edge $(v_i,v_j)$ from vertex $v_i$ to vertex $v_j$, $v_i$ comes before $v_j$ in the ordering. For example, in Figure 2, $S = [A,B,C,D,E,F,G]$ and $S' = [A,C,E,B,D,F,G]$ are both valid orderings. $S'' = [A,B,D,E,C,F,G]$ is not a valid ordering.

A race condition exists between vertex $u$ and $v$ in a TSG if there exists two different valid orderings $S_1$ and $S_2$ such that $u$ is before $v$ in $S_1$, and $v$ is before $u$ in $S_2$. Take Figure 2 as an example, there is a race condition between $D$ and $E$, because

Fig. 1: Spectre v1/v2 attacks. The speculative execution window is marked by the red dotted block. “Branch resolution” marks the completion of the delayed authorization, initiated by the conditional or indirect branch instruction. “Load S” (secret-accessing) and “Load R” (secret-sending) are unauthorized memory accesses if they bypass “Branch resolution” (software-defined authorization).

$S = [A,B,C,D,E,F,G]$ and $S' = [A,C,E,B,D,F,G]$, but $D$ is before $E$ is $S$ and $D$ is after $E$ in $S'$.

We prove the following theorem connecting a race condition with a missing dependency path.

**Theorem 1.** For any pair of vertices $u$ and $v$, the two vertices $u$ and $v$ do not have a race condition, if and only if there exists a directed path that connects $u$ and $v$.

We provide a formal proof in the Appendix A. Given a directed graph of operations, there are methods to efficiently check whether there is a path between two vertices [10], using depth-first search. If none exists, there is a race condition between these two operations.

To build an attack graph, all branch, memory access (load and store) and arithmetic instructions need to be included in the graph. Data dependencies are shown as existing edges in the attack graph. Since not all operations and race conditions in a computation are relevant, we define four types of vertices that must be represented in an attack graph:

**Authorization Operations.** The victim’s authorization operations are nodes in the attack graph, representing the permission checking and other forms of authorization, e.g., array bounds checking by a conditional branch in the user program.

**Sender’s Secret Access Operation.** The sender’s secret access operation is a node in the attack graph, representing access to the secret. For example, this is the out-of-bounds memory access (Load S) in Figure 1.

**Sender’s Micro-architecture State Changing Operation.** A node where the sender manipulates the micro-architecture state according to the secret, e.g., the memory access “Load R to cache” for the Flush-Reload covert-channel.
C. Security Dependency

**Definition 2:** A security dependency of operation \( v \) on operation \( u \) is an ordering of the two operations such that \( u \) must be completed before \( v \), in order to avoid security breaches. Operation \( u \) is typically a security protection operation, which we call an authorization operation in this paper. Operation \( v \) is typically an illegal access of data, or branch target location.

Following the “No access without Authorization” security principle [9] strictly means that the authorization has to be completed before the protected data access or code execution. This introduces a security dependency between authorization and data access (or code execution), which prevents the race condition between authorization and access, i.e. the root cause of speculative attacks. Like the well-studied data dependencies and control-flow dependencies, which must be followed to ensure the correctness of program executions, security dependencies must be followed to enforce the security of program executions.

However, as we will show in Section V-C, some security-performance tradeoffs can be made that still prevent attacks from succeeding, by making sure that even if the secret is fetched, it is prevented from being used or exfiltrated out to an attacker-receiver.

D. Modeling Meltdown Attacks

We show a code snippet of the Meltdown attack in Listing 2. The front and back parts of the Meltdown attack are similar to the Spectre v1 attack in setting up the covert channel (Step 1, lines 1-4), using and sending out the secret (step 4, lines 12-14) and testing the covert channel (Step 5, lines 16-20). The main difference is in line 10, which accesses supervisor memory and should cause an exception. If the exception is delayed, a speculative window is triggered. There is a race condition between the speculative execution of lines 10, 13-14 with the raising of the exception in line 10.

```plaintext
Listing 2: A code snippet of the Meltdown attack.

Our insight is that in the Meltdown type of attacks, the Authorization and the secret Access are actually the same instruction - a memory Load instruction. Hence, we need to look within this instruction and model its micro-architectural operations that may race with each other.

The attack graph of Meltdown in Figure 3 is similar to that for Spectre in Figure 1, except that this time we show the micro-architecture operations of the load instruction in separate nodes, rather than just a single node for a conditional branch instruction. The delayed privilege check (authorization) triggers the start of speculative execution, allowing the illegal access of the secret in the “Read from memory” operation. It also allows the micro-architectural change of the cacheline from absent to present in the “Load R to cache” instruction, which results in a hit on this cacheline, leaking the secret in the Flush-Reload cache covert channel.

E. Modeling Other Attacks

Our attack graphs can be generalized to all the speculative attacks, and potentially other micro-architectural security attacks. In Table III, we summarize the authorization nodes and illegal access nodes for all the speculative attack variants, to illustrate that our attack graph model can be generalized. We describe these attack variants below, including the newer attacks added at the bottom of Table III.

1. The Foreshadow or “L1 terminal fault” Attacks.

The Foreshadow type of attacks exploit a hardware vulnerability that allows the attacker, such as Foreshadow [39] or Foreshadow-ng [44], to read a secret from the L1 data cache, instead of from the memory, as in the Meltdown attack. The speculative execution of an instruction accessing a virtual address, whose page table entry not present or other reserved bits set, will read from L1 data cache as if the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible. The L1 terminal fault attack can be leveraged to breach the SGX isolation, as the speculative load bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection of SGX and read secret data from the L1 cache.

Hence, these attacks can be modeled by the same attack graph as for the Meltdown attack, but the attack flow goes down the “Read from cache” branch in Figure 3 instead of the “Read from memory” node. The permission check is performed for the present bit or the reserved bit in the page table, which can
cause the address translation to abort prematurely. We use the dotted red line to represent the missing security dependency.

2. **MDS attacks (RIDL, ZombieLoad and Fallout).**

Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) attacks, e.g., Rogue In-Flight Data Load (RIDL) [41], ZombieLoad [36] and Fallout attacks [13], leverage the hardware mechanism that allows a faulting load (a load to be discarded) to speculatively read stale data from microarchitectural buffers. These attacks use different microarchitectural buffers as the source for accessing the secret, shown as different attack paths in Figure 3: RIDL reads a secret from the load port, ZombieLoad reads a secret from a line fill buffer and Fallout reads a secret from the store buffers. To model these attacks in the attack graph, we also generalize the “permission check” to include the check for hardware faults or assists that may trigger this illegal secret access.

3. **Special Register attacks (Spectre v3a and Lazy FP).**

Another source of secret leakage is from the reading of special registers (i.e., not the general-purpose registers), rather than reading from the cache-memory system. We model these attacks in Figure 4, where the illegal access is reading from these registers.

The Spectre v3a (Rogue System Register Read) attack can have a delayed authorization due to privilege checking (for supervisor privilege) taking longer than reading the system register. The implied hardware prediction is that the privilege checking passes, so the system register is accessed speculatively.

In the Lazy FP attack, the floating-point registers are not immediately switched on a context switch, but only switched when a floating-point instruction is actually encountered. Hence, there is a delay in the first floating-point instruction encountered in a new context that can result in speculatively accessing the old values of the floating-point registers of the previous context. We show the missing security dependency as red arrows from authorization to the two read register nodes.

4. **Indirect branch attack (Spectre v2).**

The Spectre v2 attack mis-trains hardware predictors, e.g., the branch target buffer (BTB), such that the victim speculatively jumps to a wrong address and executes malicious gadgets (i.e., code) that can access and leak a secret. This attack can also be modeled by Figure 1. The difference with Spectre v1 is that the speculative execution starts because the computation of the target address is delayed, and so the prediction for the target address (BTB) of the indirect branch instruction is used instead. The “authorization” of the control flow defined by the indirect branch instruction is completed when the real branch target address is computed and compared with the predicted target address.

5. **Memory disambiguation triggered delayed authorization (Spectre v4).**
The Spectre v4 (Spectre-SSL) attack speculatively reads stale data (secret) that should be overwritten by a previous store. During the speculative load, address disambiguation mispredicts that the load does not depend on the previous store, i.e., that the load address is not the same as any of the addresses of store instructions still sitting in the store buffer. We model this attack in Figure 5. The authorization is address disambiguation to the illegal access (read from S). A missing dependency is shown as the red dashed arrow from address disambiguation to the illegal access (read from S).

Table III: Authorization and Access Nodes of Speculative Attacks

| Attack                  | Authorization                  | Illegal Access              |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Meltdown (Spectre v3) [29] | Kernel privilege check         | Read from kernel memory     |
| Meltdown variant1 (Spectre v3a) [2] | RDMSR instruction privilege check | Read system register        |
| Spectre v1 [26]         | Boundary-check branch resolution | Read out-of-bounds memory   |
| Spectre v1.1 [25]       | Boundary-check branch resolution | Write out-of-bounds memory  |
| Spectre v1.2 [25]       | Page read-only bit check       | Write read-only memory      |
| Spectre v2 [26]         | Indirect branch target resolution | Execute code not intended to be executed |
| Spectre v4 [3]          | Store-load address dependency resolution | Read stale data             |
| Spectre RSB [27]        | Return target resolution       | Execute code not intended to be executed |
| Foreshadow (L1 Terminal Fault) [39] | Page privilege check        | Read enclave data in L1 cache from outside enclave |
| Foreshadow-OS [44]      | Page privilege check           | Read kernel data in cache   |
| Foreshadow-VMM [44]     | Page privilege check           | Read other VMM data in cache |
| Lazy FP [37]            | FPU clean-up for new context   | Read FPU state              |
| Spoiler [22]            | Store-load dependency resolution | Execute load instruction    |
| Fallout [13]            | Store-load dependency resolution | Forward data from store buffer |
| LVI [40]                | Store-load dependency resolution | Forward data from micro-architectural buffers (L1D cache, FPU, store buffer and fill buffer) |
| RIDL [41]               | Privilege check on load        | Forward data from fill buffer and load port |
| ZombieLoad [36]         | Privilege check on load        | Forward data from fill buffer |
| TAA [13]                | TSX Asynchronous Abort Complete | Load data from L1D cache, store or load buffers |
| Cacheout [42]           | TSX Asynchronous Abort Complete | Forward data from fill buffer |

Fig. 5: TSG model of memory disambiguation triggered attack

Fig. 6: TSG model of Load Value Injection (LVI).

The LVI attack injects the attacker-desired data to the victim’s program. In this attack, the attacker attempts to leave the data in the memory buffers, access it through a memory load. A victim’s faulting load speculatively read from the buffer and unintentionally uses the data for his execution. We model this attack in Figure 6 and show a missing security dependency from victim’s load fault handling to write to the memory buffers.

A few of the entries in Table III have not been specifically described. Spectre v1.1 and Spectre v1.2 are like Spectre v1 and can be modeled by Figure 1 with a small modification. Instead of reading an out-of-bounds memory location, Spectre v1.1 writes an out-of-bounds memory location illegally. Spectre v1.2 tries to write to a Read-Only Memory location.

Spectre RSB is like Spectre v2 (Indirect Branch). Hence, it can also be modeled by Figure 1. Instead of waiting for the target address of an Indirect Branch instruction to be computed, Spectre RSB waits for the return address to be determined.

The last two entries in Table III, TAA and Cacheout, are TSX-based attacks. TSX uses Transactional Memory mechanisms to
enforce the atomic execution of a bundle of instructions called a transaction - either all the instructions are executed or none are executed. Hence, TSX can also be used to speculatively access a secret from the cache, store/load buffers or fill buffers.

V. APPLICATIONS OF ATTACK GRAPH MODEL

A. Identifying New Attacks

Our attack graph can be generalized to model or find new attacks. We describe 3 ways: by finding new sources of secrets, new exploitable hardware features for delaying authorization, and new covert channels.

First, as we have already illustrated in Section IV, the attack graphs can be extended to incorporate new sources of a secret. For instance, the microarchitectural data sampling attacks (RIDL [41], Fallout [13], ZombieLoad [36]) use a faulting load to read secret data that is left in microarchitectural data buffers by previous memory accesses even from a different thread/process. They can be identified by analyzing the hardware implementation as the hardware designer should be able to find a set of datapaths that read data from different data buffers and send it to the faulting load. Each of these datapaths can be added as a new node in the attack graph (see Figure 3). Also, in the Meltdown variant1 [2] and LazyFP [37] attacks, the unauthorized access to system registers or floating-point registers will cause an exception, and can be modeled with the nodes “Read from Special Register” or “Read from FPU” (see Figure 4). Other sources of secrets can also be identified to create new attacks.

Second, new hardware features can be found to be exploited for delaying the authorization while allowing the execution to proceed. Examples include other hardware prediction mechanisms or delayed exception mechanisms. Identifying new authorization-related features can be achieved by analyzing processor pipeline squash signals. Each cause of a potential pipeline squash can be studied for its effect at the instruction (software) level. In the example of a conditional branch, the cause of the pipeline squash is due to the resolution of a conditional branch prediction. Subsequent load instructions after this conditional branch instruction could be the access of a secret, followed by a covert send through the cache covert channel, which gives rise to the Spectre v1 attack.

Third, our attack graph can also be extended to various different covert channels. For the most representative cache covert channel, we can generalize the cacheline as a resource whose state can be changed by the covert-sender or victim program, and this state change can be observed by the covert-receiver (attacker). To extend the analysis to different covert channels such as the memory bus covert channel, functional unit covert channel or branch target buffer (BTB) covert channel, we can also model the covert channel state and find the instructions that will change this state and be detectable by the covert-receiver. This method can identify more sender-receiver pairs than the “Load R to Cache” and “Reload Array_A”.

The key takeaway of this framework is that any new combination of these three dimensions of an attack gives a new attack.

Fig. 7: The flow chart to generate the attack graph for different types of speculative execution attacks.

B. Constructing Attack Graphs

A tool can be designed to construct the attack graph and find the missing security dependencies. First, the tool needs to identify attack nodes as we introduced in Section IV. By providing a threat model with considered attacks, the tool can recognize the authorization operation such as a prior conditional or indirect branch instruction (software authorization), or load or store instruction (hardware privilege check or address disambiguation check). The flow chart to generate the attack graph for speculative execution attacks is shown in Figure 7.

For the control-flow misprediction attacks triggered by a conditional or indirect branch instruction (the left side of Figure 7), we propose a major simplification where these misprediction-based attacks can be modeled at the instruction level where the nodes are just instructions, and the arrows are control flow and data-flow dependencies between instructions. This means that the tool just needs to look for subsequent memory loads or special register access instructions after branch nodes (conditional or indirect branches) as the secret access.

For the faulty memory/register access attacks where the authorization and the secret access are done in the same instruction, the tool needs to break down such instructions into their microarchitectural level in the attack graph model, as shown in Figure 3. These are only the memory load instructions, the Read Privileged Register instructions and the instructions that Read or Write Floating-point or SIMD registers.

After identifying the secret access and the potential covert sending operations, the tool can automatically generate edges by looking for existing dependencies, e.g. data dependencies, fences and address dependencies. Missing security dependencies (races) between the authorization and the secret Access instruction and its subsequent chain of data-dependent instructions, which can be executed in the speculative execution window, can be found by automatically searching the graph.
C. Identifying Defense Strategies

A major application of our attack graph model is identifying potential defense strategies, as we illustrate in Figure 8 for the attacks triggered by branch instructions. We illustrate potential defenses that essentially add security dependencies to the system to defeat the attacks. We also show that our defense strategies cover the recently proposed defenses in industry and academia to defeat speculative execution attacks.

Strategy ①: Prevent Access before Authorization. This prevents the illegal access of the secret, until the delayed authorization is resolved.

LFENCE is an industry defense used to serialize the executed instruction before and after it. Adding an LFENCE instruction before the speculative load adds a new security dependency between the “Branch resolution” (software authorization) and “Load S” (secret access), shown in ① in Figure 8. Context-sensitive fencing [38] prevents the speculative access by inserting fences, e.g., between a conditional branch and a load to defeat the Spectre v1 attack. This is done in hardware, rather than in software. Secure automatic bounds checking (SABC) [30] serialize the branch and the out-of-bounds access to mitigate the Spectre attack, by inserting arithmetic instructions with data dependencies between branch and the access.

Strategy ②: Prevent Data Usage before Authorization. This prevents the use of the speculatively accessed secret, until the delayed authorization is resolved.

NDA [43], SpecShield [11], SpectreGuard [18] and ConTExT [35] prevent forwarding the speculatively loaded data to the following instructions so that it is not possible to use the secret, e.g., to compute the address R. SpectreGuard and ConTExT further provide the software interface for software developers to mark memory regions containing the secret as sensitive so the usage of non-sensitive data is allowed to reduce the performance overhead. Equivalently, this means adding a new security dependency between the “Branch resolution” (software authorization) and “Compute Load Address R” (data usage), shown in ② in Figure 8.

Strategy ③: Prevent Micro-architectural State Changes before Authorization. This prevents micro-architectural state modification until the delayed authorization is resolved. This defense strategy improves performance by adopting a looser security model where the secret is allowed to be accessed before authorization as long as it does not leak out.

This strategy adds the security dependency between “Branch resolution” and “Load R to cache” (cache state change), shown as ③ in Figure 8. Different hardware implementations have been proposed under this strategy. STT [47] and SpecShieldEPR+ [11] prevent loads whose address is based on speculative data. Conditional Speculation [28] and Efficient Invisible Speculative Execution [34] both allow a speculative load that hits in the cache, because the cacheline state does not change on a hit, but delay speculative loads that encounter a miss. They further reduce the overhead by identifying trusted pages and predicting data, respectively. InvisiSpec [45] and SafeSpec [23] disallow speculative cache state modification but put the speculatively requested cache line in the shadow buffer. If the prediction is later found to be correct, InvisiSpec and SafeSpec will reissue the memory access to fetch the proper cache lines. CleanupSpec [33] allows speculative cache state modification but restores the cache state on a mis-speculation.

Strategy ④: Clearing prediction. This strategy prevents the sharing of predictor states between different contexts.

For example, the industry solution from Intel, Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) [7], prevents the code before the barrier from affecting the branch prediction after it by flushing the Branch Target Buffer (BTB). It introduces a new operation, i.e. “flush predictor”, to the attack graph and adds a security dependency between “flush predictor” and the indicated branch instruction. Context-sensitive fencing [38] also shows the feasibility of inserting micro-ops by hardware during a privilege change, to prevent predictor mistraining from a different context.

We show that our attack graph can model not only proposed defenses that work, but also other defenses that will not work. In Figure 3 we show that a security dependency can be added at 4 different places to defend against the Meltdown attack, shown as red dashed lines. Defense strategies ①, ②, ③ are similar to Figure 8. Typically, only one of these defense strategies is needed.

However, sometimes a defense is not sufficient, as we now illustrate with a hypothetical Meltdown attack coupled with an attacker induced cache hit for the secret, like the L1 Terminal Fault [39]. If the secret is already in the cache, the load
We identify the common characteristics of speculative attacks and the baseline Meltdown attack that speculatively loads a secret from main-memory in Figure 3, this is insufficient when 1 can no longer prevent the secret access from the cache. In this case, an additional dependency 4, i.e. from “Authorization” to “Read S from cache”, has to be jointly added with 1 to provide a valid defense. Hence, it is important to put security dependencies in the correct places, otherwise we get a false sense of security, especially when microarchitectural performance optimizations (like load from cache if hit in cache) can bypass an insecure security dependency like 1. In fact, there has to be a security dependency arrow between the "authorization resolved" node to every node that can be a source of the secret in Figure 3, such as load ports, line fill buffers and store/load buffers.

VI. RELATED WORK

Speculative execution attacks have been defined, e.g., in [8], [25]–[27], [29], [37], [39]. To model the speculative execution attacks, Disselkoen et al. [17] proposed a memory model based on pomsets to allow speculative evaluation. However, this model only covers speculative secret access, but does not show how the secret is sent through a cache covert channel. Canella et al. [14] summarized and evaluated speculative execution attacks and defenses. However, their work does not provide a systematic model for attacks and defenses that gives insights on designing and evaluating new secure defenses. On the formal modeling side, Guarnieri et al. [19] proposed the speculative non-interference property to verify that a program behaves the same with and without speculation. Cheang et al. [15] proposed trace property-dependent observational determinism (TPOD) to verify that two traces of execution are not distinguishable. These formal methods cannot reason about the defenses, however, we can show why defenses work and which ones will not work.

Previous work has been proposed to evaluate caches' resilience against (non-speculative) side-channel attacks. He et al. [21] proposed the probabilistic information flow graph to model the cache, attacker and victim simultaneously. Zhang et al. [48] quantified information leakage via mutual information. Demme [16] proposed the Side-channel Vulnerability Factor (SVF) and Zhang et al. [49] refined it as Cache Side-channel Vulnerability (CSV) for access-based attacks. However, they do not cover speculative execution attacks.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Information leakage due to speculative execution has been a serious and unsolved problem. In this paper, we provide new attack graph models for speculative execution attacks. We identify the common characteristics of speculative attacks as illegal access of secrets during speculative execution, and covert channel exfiltration of this secret information, and break these down further into 6 critical attack steps.

We propose the attack graph as a topological sort graph (TSG), where the critical attack steps can be identified. Fundamentally, the speculation vulnerability is due to a race condition, shown as a missing edge in a TSG, between authorization and secret access nodes. In a looser security but higher performance scenario, this missing edge can be between the authorization node and the nodes that use or send out the “not-yet-authorized” data. We are the first to define the concept of a security dependency, which enforces the proper ordering of authorization before access, or authorization before use, or authorization before send operations. Security dependencies prevent race conditions that lead to security breaches.

To show the effectiveness of our proposed models, we generate attack graphs for the Spectre and Meltdown attacks, and then generalize them to all known attack variants. From our attack graphs, we can show how to generate new attacks, and how to derive new defense strategies and why they work. In fact, all proposed solutions from both industry and academia fall under one of our defense strategies. We have provided a generalizable framework to model and analyze the speculative execution attacks, and hope this helps advance more secure microarchitecture defenses and designs.

APPENDIX A

PROOF OF THEOREM 1

Proof: Necessity (⇐). It can be proved by contradiction. Assume there is not a path from u to v. Let

\[ S = [s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_k, v, s_{k+1}, \ldots, s_n] \]

\[ S' = [s_1, v, s_{k+1}, \ldots, s_n] \]

be a valid ordering sequence, where \( s_v = [s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_k] \) represents the vertices before \( v \) in \( S \). Split \( S \) into two subsequences with the same order in \( S' \):

\[ S_1 = [s_1, s_1, \ldots, s_k] \]

\[ S_2 = [s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_k] \]

where \( S_1 \) contains vertices that have a path to \( v \), \( S_2 \) contains vertices that do not have a path to \( v \). By assumption, \( u \) does not have a path to \( v \), therefore \( u \in S_2 \). Note that \( k_1 + k_2 = k \).

Construct another sequence

\[ S' = [s_1, v, s_2, s_{k+1}, \ldots, s_n] \]

\[ = [s_1, s_1, \ldots, s_k, v, s_{k+1}, \ldots, s_n] \]

We claim that ordering \( S' \) is also valid: For any \( s_1 \in S_1 \) and \( s_2 \in S_2 \), there is not an edge \((s_1, s_1)\) in the graph. Otherwise, \((s_2, \rightarrow v)\) is a path, contradicting the definition of \( S_2 \). For the same reason, there is not an edge \((s_2, \rightarrow v)\) in the graph. We categorize any edge \((z, x)\) into 3 cases, i.e. \( z \in S_1 \), \( x = v \) and \( x \in S_2 \). We show \( z \) comes before \( x \) in \( S' \) in all cases:

1. For any edge \((z, v)\) in the graph, \( z \) can only be in \( S_1 \), and thus \( z \) is before \( v \) in \( S' \).
2. For any edge \((z, s_1)\) in the graph, \( z \) can only be in \( S_2 \), \( s_1 \) is before \( s_1 \) or \( v \) in \( S' \).
3. Since \( S_2 \) are moved backward and \( s_{k+1}, \ldots, s_n \) are kept in the same position from \( S \) to \( S' \), for any edge \((z, s_1)\), \( z \) is before \( s_1 \).

From 1, 2 and 3, the ordering \( S' \) is valid. Meanwhile, \( v \) is before \( u \in S_2 \) in \( S' \), contradicting to \( u \) is before \( v \) in all valid orderings. Therefore, the assumption is not true and there must be a path connecting \( u \) and \( v \).
Without loss of generality, assume there exists a directed path from $u$ to $v$, i.e., $P=(u, w_1, \ldots, w_k, v)$. Then for any valid ordering $S$, $u$ is before $w_1$, $w_1$ is before $w_2$, ..., $w_k$ is before $v$. Therefore $u$ is before $v$ in any valid ordering.

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**Sufficiency (⇒).** The sufficiency is relatively obvious.
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