Proof of vijñaptimātratā and Mungwe

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1. Introduction

The proof of vijñaptimātratā (hereafter the proof), referred to as weishi biliang 唯識比量 or zhen weishi liang 真唯識量 in Chinese, has been believed to be Xuanzang’s 玄奘 work. The tradition introduced in Ji’s 基 commentary of Nyāyapraveśa (NP) (Yinming dashu 因明大疏; YDS) says that Xuanzang demonstrated the proof against non-Buddhists and Hīnayāna Buddhists who had been called to King Śīlāditya’s 世童帝 service. The proof consists of the following three parts:

Thesis: In truth (zhengu 真故), colors and forms that are mutually accepted [by proponent and opponent] (jicheng 極成) are not separate from the visual consciousness.
Reason: Because, [based on the ground] I accept (zixu 自許), they are included in the first three [of the eighteen dhātus], but are not included in the eye.
Example: Like as the visual consciousness. 1)

YDS is the first introduction in existence to the proof as Xuanzang’s creation and the authorship of the proof has not been doubted. However, Moro (2015) pointed out that the proof was not referred to in the representative biographies of Xuanzang, e.g., Datang Dacien si sanzang fashi zhuan 大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師伝 (A biography of the Tripiṭaka master of the great Cien monastery of the Great Tang dynasty) or the Xu Gaoseng zhuan 續高僧伝 (Further biographies of eminent monks), and that the description of Śīlāditya’s service had been changed along with the development of the biographies. The question of the authorship of the proof as well as its logical correctness is, therefore, still open, which is of importance since it has been regarded as a correct inference by scholars upholding Xuanzang, especially Ji’s followers in China and Japan.

In this paper, I would like to examine the authorship of the proof in Mungwe’s 文軌 commentary of NP (Inmyŏng ipp'ongni
non so 因明入正理論疏; IIRS) that is considered an earlier work than YDS.

2. Mungwe and His Commentary of NP (IIRS)

According to Ishii (1990) and Lee (1999), it is likely that Mungwe was a Silla monk, although there is no biography written about him. He is known for being severely criticized by Ji and his followers about the translation of NP. 2) Because of Ji’s criticism, IIRS is considered to be older than YDS. 3) Moreover, it should be noted that Mungwe stated in IIRS that he was fortunate to be able to enter Xuanzang’s room (幸同入室), that is, he was one of Xuanzang’s immediate disciples of āśraya-asiddha. 4)

The extent of IIRS is incomplete and the subdivisions have been preserved in Dainihon zokuzōkyō 大日本続蔵経 (X86), which includes the first volume of the three-volume IIRS, the Dunhuang manuscripts (S2437 and S4328), and Zhaocheng Jin Tripitaka (Zhaocheng Jinzang 趙城金蔵) as Yimming lun shisi guolei shu 因明論十四過類疏 that was wrongly attributed to Ji but now is regarded as the later part of IIRS. 4) The quotations also can be found in Japanese hetuvidyā literature. Zhina Neixueyuan (1977) and Shen (2008) attempted to restore IIRS on the basis of these fragments.

3. The Proof in IIRS

Unlike the proof where Xuanzang’s tradition appears in the section on the fallacy of contradiction to common sense (*lokaviruddha; 世間相違) in YDS, IIRS does not refer to the proof in the same section. However, it does refer to the proof or similar formulations in the interpretations of the term jicheng 9) and the explanations of other fallacies such as *āśraya-asiddha (所依不成), 10) *sādharmyasama (同法相似), 11) and *aviśeṣasama (無異相似). 12) It is important to note that Mungwe does not mention Xuanzang as the author of the proof in each explanation.

IIRS discusses not only the relation between the visual consciousness and “colors and forms” but also the relation between the auditory consciousness and sound in the section on *āśraya-asiddha. 13) Mungwe shows an example of a fallacy with the subject of the thesis not being accepted by either side (隨一所依不成), which can be reconstructed as follows:

Thesis: Sākya-bodhisattva’s unwholesome voice is not separate from the auditory consciousness.
Reason: Because it is included in the second three [of the eighteen dhātus] but is not included in
the ear.

Example: Like the auditory consciousness.

It is quite clear that the formula above was closely related to the proof. Mungwe also discusses the case where the subject becomes “the voice of the Buddha of other lands.” Regarding the proof, YDS, \(^{10}\) Wŏnhyŏ 元曉, \(^{15}\) and Taehyŏn’s 大賢 Inmyŏng ip chŏngni non kojŏkki 因明入正理論古迹記, \(^{16}\) as well as IIRS, discuss the examples of “colors and forms” that form the bodies of Buddha and Śākya-bodhisattva. However their discussions, except in IIRS, relate to the restriction “[based on the ground] I accept” (zixu) in the reason of the proof rather than *āśraya-asiddha.

In addition, IIRS seems to regard the proof as invalid, according to the discussion in the part on *aviśeṣasama:

Question: If one argues that “voice is not impermanent voice, because it is produced from effort. Like a pot” to criticize a proof of impermanence [of voice] (wuchang biliang 無常比量), for example, this argument would be inconsistent only with the opponent’s “impermanent voice” but consistent with its own “permanent voice.” Is a refutation like this valid or pseudo? . . . If pseudo, suppose one argues “Colors and forms that are mutually accepted [by proponent and opponent] (jicheng) are not colors and forms identical with consciousness (即識之色). Because they are included in the first three [of the eighteen dhātus] that are mutually accepted but are not included in the eye. Like as the visual consciousness” to refute the proof (weishi biliang). Since this proof is inconsistent only with the opponent’s “colors and forms identical with consciousness” but consistent with its own “colors and forms different from consciousness” (離識之色), [the refutation] should be included in the pseudo refutation.

Answer: The refutation criticizing the proof of impermanence is categorized as the pseudo refutation. [However] the refutation to the proof is included in the valid refutation . . . . \(^{17}\)

The underlined part of this quotation shows that in Mungwe’s view, there are some fallacies in the proof. Other parts in IIRS that mention the proof and the similar formulas likewise do not regard them as valid formulas. If IIRS was written under the guidance of Xuanzang, this suggests the possibility that the proof and the similar formulas were not Xuanzang’s work or that Xuanzang introduced them as examples with fallacies.

It should be noted that Mungwe uses the term weishi biliang as well as wuchang biliang in this quotation. The formula that had been expressed, “Object A is not separate from the consciousness of A,” might have been well known under the name of weishi biliang among Buddhist logicians at that time.

I also would like to focus attention on discussions in common between IIRS and other
works:

- In the quotation above, IIRS uses the terms “colors and forms identical with consciousness” and “colors and forms different from consciousness,” which are also found in a fragment of Wŏnhyo’s P’an piryang non 判比量論 that discusses the implied-subject (有法差別) of the proof. 18
- IIRS’s explanation that the proof would have the fallacy if the proof did not have the restriction “[based on the ground] I accept (zixu)” is nearly the same as that of Xuanying 玄応 and Wŏnhyo quoted by Zenju 善珠. 19
- IIRS introduces an example of contradictory formula of the proof on the basis of the theory of mixed usage of five (or six) organs. Sungyŏng’s 順憬 criticism of the proof in YDS, as well as the fragment of Wŏnhyo’s P’an piryang non quoted by Zenju, shows almost the same example and similar explanation. 20

From these, it follows that Silla scholars such as Wŏnhyo and Sungyŏng possibly inherited Mungwe’s way of interpretation, since Wŏnhyo’s P’an piryang non was written in 671 21 and, according to YDS, Sungyŏng’s criticism was made in the Qianfeng 乾封 era (666–668) after Xuanzang’s death (664).

4. On the Restriction “In truth”

The beginning of the proof has the restriction “in truth” (zhengu), which has been discussed in regards to whether or not it is identical to the restriction of Bhāviveka’s logic (*tattvatas or *paramārthatas) in East Asia. 22 Some modern scholars, such as Ejima (1980) and He (2014), also consider it as the translation of *tattvatas.

In IIRS, we can find other examples, which can be assumed to be translations of *tattvatas or *paramārthatas (就勝義, 就勝義). 23 Interpreting the term jicheng (“that are mutually accepted by proponent and opponent”), Mungwe explains the restriction “on the ultimate truth” (就勝義), though it is not connected with the proof, with examples as “Voice is thusness,” “Voice really exists,” “Voice is impermanent,” and so on. 21 He also introduced the same restriction as an example to avoid the fallacy of contradiction to common sense (*lokaviruddha) but never refers to the proof, while, as I mentioned above, YDS introduced the proof in the section of the fallacy. In addition, he seems not to mention Bhāviveka.
5. Conclusion

To conclude, I should reiterate my point that, even if the proof and the similar formulas in IIRS originated from Xuanzang, he introduced them as examples with fallacies, as Mungwe who introduced himself as a direct disciple of Xuanzang did not regard them as correct. His critical interpretation of the proof seemed to be inherited by Silla monks and it may be presumed that Ji criticized them by inventing Xuanzang’s authorship of the proof.

It is equally important to investigate the proof in a broader perspective, although it has been discussed in the context of *lokavitarkha. It would be important to pay attention to the *jati section in IIRS where many interpretations of the proof were discussed, but in which Ji and his followers were not interested since it was omitted from NP.

Notes
1) T no. 1840, 44, 115b21–27.
2) Takemura 1986, 222–226.
3) Shen argues that IIRS was written between 649 and 654 (Shen 2008, 4).
4) X86, 659b7; Shen 2008, 319.
5) Puguan 普光 also wrote his commentary “while facing the tripiṭaka master” (Duimian sanzang ji 對面三藏記), according to Chūshin Hossōshū shōsho 注進法相宗章疏 (T no. 2181, 55, 1143a23). Ji said in YDS (T no. 1840, 44, 91b29–c1) that he also “wrongly joined the queue of disciples” (基謬參 資列).
6) Takemura 1986, 217–246.
7) Shen 2008, 16–19.
8) Nikka Bukkyō Kenkyūkai 1935, 43–48.
9) X86, 662b10–663b5; Shen 2008, 322–323.
10) X86, 685b12–685a7; Takemura 1986, 233–234; Shen 2008, 349–352.
11) Nikka Bukkyō Kenkyūkai 1935, 5–3; Shen 2008, 377–379.
12) Nikka Bukkyō Kenkyūkai 1935, 6–13; Shen 2008, 380–385.
13) In the explanation of *jicheng, Mungwe introduces the thesis as “all voices are not separate from the [auditory] consciousness” (一切諸声皆不離識) without reason and example (X86, 662b12; Shen 2008: 323).
14) T no. 1840, 44, 115a8–15. See also Moro 2015, 90–91.
15) A quotation attributed to Xuanying and Wŏnhyo in Zenju’s Yuishiki bunryōketsu 唯識分量決 (T no. 2321, 71, 452c17–25). See also Moro 2015, 109–111.
A fragment found in Zōshun’s 藏俊 inmyō daishō 因明大疏抄 (T no. 2271, 68, 520b3–521a12). See also Moro 2015, 112–126.

17) Nikka Bukkyō Kenkyūkai 1935, 13; Shen 2008, 384–385.

18) Zenju’s Inmyōronsho myōtōshō 因明論疏明灯抄 (T no. 2270, 68, 318a25–27). See also Moro 2015, 111–112.

19) “極成之色,為如眼識,初三所摂眼所不摂, 非定離眼識耶.為如我宗釈迦菩薩実不善色,初三所摂眼所不摂, 定離眼識耶” (IIRS; X86, 686b18–687a7). “応師元暁師等皆云…為如我宗後身菩薩実不善色,初三所摂眼所不摂故, 定離眼識.為如眼識,初三所摂眼所不摂故, 非定離眼識” (Yuishiki bunryōketsu; T no. 2321, 71, 452c17–21). As have been pointed out in Takemura 1986, 244, the Dunhuang manuscript version is different from the Zokuzōkyō version regarding this part.

20) IIRS: “真故極成色定離於眼識 宗.自許初三摂, 眼識不摂故因.如眼根喩” (Nikka Bukkyō Kenkyūkai 1935, 2–3; Shen 2008, 378–379). YDS (T no. 1840, 44, 116a15–21) and Zenju’s Inmyōronsho myōtōshō (T no. 2270, 68, 317a7–12) also have similar formulas. See also Moro 2015, 99–109.

21) Fukihara 1967, 5.

22) See Moro 2015, chapter 3.

23) Comparing with these natural translations, in my opinion, zhengu of the proof (and zhenxing 真性 of the proof of emptiness in Bhāviveka’s Dasheng zhangzhen lun 大乘掌珍論) seems to be an exceptional case as the translation of tattvatas or paramārthatas.

24) 故勝義, 約勝義: X86, 663b1–4; Shen 2008, 323. 以勝義簡宗, 就勝義: X86, 680a4–9; Shen 2008: 343.

Abbreviations

IIRS  inmyŏng ip chŏngni non so 因明入正理論疏
NP  Xuanzang’s玄奘 translation of Nyāyapraveśa (T no. 1630).
YDS  Yinming ru zhengli lun shu 因明入正理論疏, a.k.a. Yinming dashu 因明大疏 of Ji 基 (T no. 1840).

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