Quantum Discontents, or What Is Wrong with Our Science Practice

Gennady Shkliarevsky

Historical Studies Program, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504, USA; shkliar@bard.edu

Received: 22 October 2018; Accepted: 20 November 2018; Published: 23 November 2018

Abstract: For more than eighty years, quantum theory (QT) has dominated physical science. This domination remains unchallenged to this day. Some physicists celebrate this remarkable stability. Others lament this fact and argue that QT inhibits our understanding of physical reality. They feel that numerous problems that have accumulated in physical science require stepping beyond the horizon outlined by QT. The article offers a critical examination of the foundational assumptions of QT that shape its practice. It uses two interpretations of QT as case studies—Copenhagen interpretation and the theoretical perspective advanced by American physicist David Bohm—to explain one major problem that continues to plague our study of physics. The article sketches a path to a possible solution and outlines a new science practice that this solution will require.

Keywords: quantum theory; Copenhagen interpretation; Bohmian mechanics; quantum uncertainty; determinism; subject-object relations; systems theory

1. Introduction

For more than eighty years, quantum theory (QT) has dominated the science of physics. It has been a rich source of ideas and perspectives that have shaped many spheres of our knowledge, from physics to chemistry, computer science, information, chemistry, biology, psychology, philosophy, and even social sciences. One cannot think of our civilization without thinking about quantum theory.

In the course of its history, QT has experienced many changes. Indeed, QT as we know it today is in many ways very different from and much richer than its original formulation in the early 20th century. Yet its fundamental features remain unchanged. Today, many basic premises and conclusions of QT are still the same as they were at the time of its inception; its controversies and paradoxes still provoke hot debates. The most important and controversial problems of QT are still awaiting their solutions.

Many researchers feel that this remarkable staying power proves that QT is fundamentally correct. There are, however, others—and their number is growing—who are very resentful of the fact that physics has not been able to step much beyond the horizon circumscribed by QT. They see its continued domination as the principal cause of what they see as stagnation in our physical science. In their view, QT has become an obstacle to the evolution of our knowledge about physical reality and a hindrance to its progress. They feel that numerous problems that have accumulated in physical science require stepping beyond the horizon outlined by QT.

The article offers a critical examination of the foundational assumptions of QT that shape its practice. It uses two interpretations of QT—the Copenhagen interpretation and the theoretical perspective advanced by American physicist David Bohm—as case studies to explain one major problem that continues to plague our study of physics. The article sketches a path to a possible solution and outlines a new science practice that this solution will require.
2. The Copenhagen Interpretation and Its Critique

The Copenhagen interpretation (CI) is the original interpretation of QT that to this day remains one of the more widely used. The rise of CI has marked a significant progress in our understanding of physical reality. It has also, however, produced a great deal of confusion. For one thing, the formulation of CI has created a profound rift in our knowledge of physical reality. As a result of its rise, our knowledge has become divided into two very different parts—classical and nonclassical physics; so different, in fact, that one often gets the impression that we are dealing with two different, if not totally incommensurable, realities. Perhaps nothing illustrates this difference better than visualizability. Classical physics frequently uses images of objects—balls, bricks, planets, galaxies, etc.—that we envision moving and interacting with each other. Nonclassical physics is all about mathematical formulas and equations that describe processes and effects that are impossible to visualize. In Erwin Schrödinger’s apt description, CI is “a formal theory of frightening, indeed repulsive, abstractness and lack of visualizability” [1] (p. 681).

The lack of visualizability, to which Schrödinger points, is not a whim of the framers of CI; it is due to the main innovation that CI has made. One of the principal novelties in CI is the recognition of the agency of the observer. According to CI, we cannot observe physical reality in isolation. When we conduct observations, we act upon reality and our actions produce effect. As Bohr has stressed: “when searching for harmony in life one must never forget that in the drama of existence we are ourselves both actors and spectators” [2] (p. 236). Quantum reality manifests itself by responding to actions by the observer. Strictly speaking, CI does not deal with individual particles. It assigns individuality to interactions. According to Bohr,

The individuality of the typical quantum effects finds its proper expression in the circumstance that any attempt of subdividing the phenomena will demand a change in the experimental arrangement introducing new possibilities of interactions between objects and measuring instruments that in principle cannot be controlled [2] (p. 210).

And elsewhere:

In quantum mechanics, we are not dealing with an arbitrary renunciation of a more detailed analysis of atomic phenomena, but with a recognition that such an analysis is in principle excluded [2] (p. 235).

In other words, CI tells us that we observe the interaction, made possible by mediation, between reality, on one hand, and the observer and the instruments that the observer chooses to use, on the other. This approach basically recognizes that mediation is necessary for the production of knowledge. Such mediation involves both the instruments chosen and the interpretation of results by the observer. Incidentally, this recognition applies to reality in general, not just to quantum reality.

This approach has had a profound impact on research methodology. CI guides researchers to deal strictly with the experimental results that they observe, rather than reflect on reality that they, according to CI, cannot in principle observe. In light of CI, such reflections are but idle speculations. When quantum experiments produce what from the common sense view appears as paradoxes, we should accept these paradoxes as given, no further questions asked.

Paradoxes create conflicting images that defy our imagination and are impossible to visualize. Indeed, how do you picture such well-known quantum phenomena as entanglement, superposition, or wave function? Moreover, the framers of CI have specifically forewarned us against making any attempts to envision quantum processes. Richard Feynman, a renowned physicist and a recipient of a Nobel Prize for his achievements in quantum physics, cautioned:

Do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possible avoid it, “But how can it be like that?” because you will get ‘down the drain’, into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped. Nobody knows how it can be like that [3] (p. 129).
Since CI does not allow any probing beyond the phenomena accessible to observation, those who subscribe to CI must accept paradoxes and reject visualizability. CI guides researchers to practice instrumental approach and rely on formidable mathematical formalism that allows them to calculate and predict the results of quantum experiments. Summarizing his understanding of the achievement of CI, Werner Heisenberg, one of the principal framers of this perspective, wrote:

The conception of the objective reality of the elementary particles has thus evaporated not into the cloud of some obscure new reality concept, but into the transparent clarity of mathematics that represents no longer the behavior of the particles but rather our knowledge of this behavior [4] (p. 2).

Mathematical formalism expunged visualizability from quantum mechanics. "Shut up and calculate" has become the most widely applied rule among practitioners.

As has already been indicated, the rejection of visualizability has become one of the markers of the dominant interpretation of QT. As has already been mentioned, this fact has left the system of our knowledge of physical reality deeply divided into two parts: Classical and nonclassical physics. The continued popularity of CI perpetuates this division. The perpetuation of the division hinders the equilibration of two parts (classical and nonclassical) of the system of our knowledge of physical reality. The equilibration of differences is the process that creates new and more powerful levels of organization, which is essential for the evolution of systems, including systems of knowledge. The failure to equilibrate our knowledge of physical reality explains the repeated attempts to create alternative interpretations that challenge CI.

There is another reason why CI spurs the creation of new interpretations. As has been indicated earlier, CI recognizes the agency of the observer. According to this interpretation, we cannot in principle observe reality by itself, but only the way it manifests itself in interactions with the instruments selected by the observer. In other words, what the observer observes is not reality by itself, but only the phenomenal level of interactions. Thus, CI formalism describes interactions between reality and the observer, not reality itself, since it is only this level that is accessible to the observer in experiments. The bizarre quantum phenomena that mathematical formalism describes appear on the phenomenal level of interactions—the only level accessible to observation. Therefore, strictly speaking, the conclusions that CI draws from observations of the phenomenal level cannot be extended to reality as it is; such extension is unwarranted by the interpretation itself.

When CI observes uncertainty on the phenomenal level of interactions, it cannot really extrapolate from these observations that reality is uncertain. According to its own premises, the only correct conclusion that it can make is that we do not know how reality is, since uncertainty is observed only on the phenomenal level. We cannot assume that observing the manifestation of reality is the same as observing reality itself. Therefore, CI does not warrant the conclusion about uncertainty of reality that is accepted by the proponents of CI unquestionably and without any qualifications.

Since, strictly speaking, quantum experiments do not warrant any conclusions about the nature of reality, the key proposition that CI makes about the inherent uncertainty of physical reality can only be accepted as an axiom. However, in order to be accepted as a foundational proposition, it must be justified. Otherwise, we can only see such a proposition as subjective and arbitrary. CI does not provide such justification. Moreover, such justification is in principle impossible. As Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman explain in their widely-accepted exposition of the celebrated achievement of Kurt Gödel, the famous Austrian logician and mathematician, Gödel’s proof shows “that it is impossible to establish the internal logical consistency of a very large class of deductive systems unless one adopts principles of reasoning so complex that their internal consistency is as open to doubt as that of the systems themselves [5] (p. 5)”. Nagel and Newman further explain:

The import of Gödel’s conclusions is far-reaching, though it has not yet been fully fathomed. These conclusions show that the prospects of finding for every deductive system an absolute proof of consistency that satisfies the finitistic requirements of Hilbert’s proposal is most
unlikely. They show also that there are an endless number of true statements which cannot be formally deduced from any given set of axioms by a closed set of rules of inference [5] (p. 109).

According to Nagel and Newman, Gödel did not think of his results as due “to some odd defect in the specific system PM (Principia Mathematica),” but “are applicable to any system” [5] (p. 95) (italics in the original).

Many computer scientists have argued in the same way that true uncertainty may exist, but its existence cannot be demonstrated logically since the metaprocedures required for such a demonstration will necessarily reveal inconsistencies that contradict the original axiom. Hans Primas, for example, shows that if an axiomatic principle, such as determinism, cannot be satisfied, “it can be enforced by choosing a larger state space [6] (p. 10).” Such enforcement, according to Primas, is perfectly compatible with mathematical probability theory because:

Every mathematically formulated dynamics of statistically reproducible events can be extended to a description in terms of a one-parameter group of automorphisms on an enlarged mathematical structure which describes a fictitious hidden determinism. Consequently, randomness in the sense of mathematical probability theory is only a weak generalization of determinism [6] (p. 1).

Jean Bricmont also sees ontic determinism lurking behind the appearance of quantum randomness [6–8].

There is only one conclusion one can draw from the above discussion. CI does not and cannot provide either empirical evidence or logical justification for its foundational proposition about reality. It is impossible to prove that reality is uncertain. Thus, CI may be true, but it is impossible to prove that it is true. In the absence of such proof—either empirical or logical—we have no choice but to view CI as subjective and arbitrary. In other words, CI cannot and does not produce a definitive interpretation of quantum mechanics. This fact and also the need to solve the problem of the division in the system of our knowledge of physical reality (so that the system could further evolve) justifies and legitimizes efforts to construct interpretations based on different foundational propositions that rival CI.

3. Bohmian Mechanics

There are many interpretations that challenge the dominant position of CI. They include Bohmian mechanics, the pilot-wave theory, the hidden variable interpretation, the many-worlds interpretation, the many-minds interpretation, the consistent histories approach, and some others [9–12]. However, despite the growing variety of new versions, CI still retains its commanding presence. Some critics explain these failures by the power of scientific establishment that backs CI and controls the resources necessary for developing these alternative interpretations. Indeed, the power of scientific establishment is considerable. It controls much of research funding, access to publications, the power of appointments and tenure decisions, etc.; and it certainly uses this power to support the theoretical perspective it has chosen to back up. In his famous book The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Thomas Kuhn points out a high degree of inertia in our scientific community. Many other researchers have expressed similar concerns [13–19]. However, force alone cannot explain the enduring dominance of CI. In order to explain the failure of alternative versions to open new vistas in studying physical reality, one should take a closer look at the challengers. Examining these failures is certainly important for making progress.

It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed analysis of all theoretical perspectives that offer alternatives to CI. Such an analysis requires a separate study. This paper will focus only on one interpretation that has attracted more attention than others. It is what has been dubbed as Bohmian mechanics, named after its creator, American physicist David Bohm.
Bohm first formulated his theory back in the early 1950s [20]. Initially, the theory was quite successful and was able to gain some support in the physics community. However, as time passed, its influence waned and it has only recently experienced some revival [12,20].

Bohm certainly accepts the most important contribution of CI—its mathematical formalism. In contrast to CI, however, in Bohmian mechanics, this formalism is more than just a convenient way to calculate and predict outcomes of quantum experiments. The phenomena that quantum equations formalize are, for Bohm, the actual aspects of reality. Bohmian mechanics explains even the weirdest quantum phenomena—such as nonlocality, superposition, and backward causality—in terms of causes and effects. In Bohm’s theoretical perspective, for example, nonlocality—a quantum phenomenon that involves speeds faster than the speed of light—is not merely a mathematical representation of some results of quantum experiments. It is, for Bohm, a fundamental property of reality. The famous wave function is not just a convenient formula for calculating outcomes of quantum experiments; in the Bohmian world, it actually guides particles and determines their state.

Quantum formalism is essentially mathematical equations of motion that, like all other mathematical equations, obey the logic of mathematics. Viewing this mathematical formalism as more than just the way of calculating and predicting the outcomes of the phenomena it describes, but as representing the actual aspects of quantum reality, entails one inevitable consequence. In order to conserve the logical necessity of mathematical equations, Bohm has to recognize determinism as the fundamental property of reality. Thus, in contrast to CI that sees uncertainty as a fundamental property of reality, Bohmian mechanics recognizes that quantum reality is fully determinate. Indeed, Bohm acknowledges the existence of uncertainty, but this uncertainty is strictly epistemological, that is, it is due to our lack of knowledge about reality, rather than the way this reality is [12,20].

One can see from the above that Bohm completely and radically reverses CI. The strategy of reversal results in several consequences that do not work in favor of the Bohmian alternative. As a mere inversion of CI, Bohmian mechanics has the same explanatory power as CI. Like CI, Bohm also essentially interprets, or rather reinterprets, the phenomena that can be observed on the level of interactions. When he accepts these phenomena as fundamental properties of physical reality, he commits the same logical mistake by attributing to reality what essentially belongs to the phenomenal level, which is unwarranted. We certainly cannot view the manifestations of reality on the level of phenomena as the actual and real properties of reality by itself. Since Bohm’s fundamental proposition about the determinate nature of reality is derived from mathematical formalism, we must view it as an axiomatic proposition that Bohm uses to organize his theoretical perspective. However, he also does not provide a logical justification for this claim. Moreover, there can be no proof for ontic determinism. Just like the existence of uncertainty and randomness is impossible to prove, their existence is also impossible to disprove, which undermines any claim of ontic determinism: If there is a possibility that reality can be uncertain, then the claim that reality is determinate must be in doubt.

Jean Bricmont simply dismisses the entire issue of the intrinsic nature of determinism as ultimately irrelevant. Bricmont examines two current definitions of determinism. He finds that one definition in which determinism is conflated with predictability renders determinism trivially false. Considering the other definition that avoids the conflation, Bricmont asks a pertinent question: Is there a function—in a Platonic sense (that is, independent of our ignorance)—that determines a finite sequence of sets of numbers that never repeats itself in a unique way? His answer is that the existence of such a function is simply impossible to disprove because one can always find a function or even many functions that map “each set into the next one” [7] (p. 2). Bricmont’s conclusion dismisses the whole issue of determinism as utterly irrelevant to science. In his view, “there is no notion of determinism that would make the question [of determinism] scientifically relevant ontically it [determinism] is true but uninteresting [that is, impossible to disprove]” [7] (p. 2). “I don’t know,” he adds, “how to formulate the issue of determinism so that the question becomes interesting” [7] (p. 1). The point is that either determinism or uncertainty may actually exist in the ontic sense, but this existence is impossible to prove; and if the
claim that reality is either uncertain or determinate cannot be justified, any theory based on either of
these claims cannot be accepted as definitive.

In a practical sense, Bohmian determinate mechanics also offers no advantages in comparison
with CI. While its determinism suggests that since all particles in the universe have a determinate
position, we can calculate their positions at any moment if we know their initial position and the wave
function of the universe, in practice, the acquisition of such knowledge encounters an insurmountable
problem. In order to perform such calculations, one should know the initial position of particles,
including particles in the brain of the observer and their wave function. Observing particles in
one’s own brain requires constructing a position from which such observation can be conducted.
However, the problem is that such a position should also be accessible to observing, which will
inevitably lead to the problem that Niklas Luhman defined as infinite regress that inevitably results
from observing the observing. Bohmian mechanics does not resolve this problem. In principle,
we can know the position of every particle in the universe; in practice, however, such knowledge is
impossible [12] [21] (p. 479) [22] (p. 329).

In contrast to CI, Bohmian mechanics is visualizable. But that is probably the only significant
difference between the two interpretations. Just like CI, Bohm’s perspective also rests on the shaky
foundation of a subjective and arbitrary axiomatic proposition. It offers few, if any, practical advantages
in comparison with CI. As a result, one cannot accept Bohmian mechanics as a definitive interpretation
of quantum theory. Just like CI, it offers nothing that can help to integrate classical and nonclassical
physics and, consequently, does not contribute to the further evolution of the system of our knowledge
of physical reality. Due to these reasons, Bohmian mechanics fails to present a real and constructive
alternative to CI.

4. The Solution

As has been indicated earlier, the division in the system of our knowledge of physical reality
creates a problem. It prevents this system from evolving and transcending the boundaries of the
existing knowledge. The achievement of this goal requires the creation of a new perspective that would
be broad enough to include both classical and nonclassical physics as its two specific cases—that is,
cases that are true under special circumstances or assumptions. How can we solve this problem of
division and create such broader perspective? Ironically, CI suggests a solution, but it fails to follow
through on its own suggestion.

CI claims that the observer has access only to interactions between quantum reality and the
instruments that the observer chooses to conduct observations. So, what is this interaction and what is
its nature?

According to CI, observations affect the objects that we observe. In other words, they change
these objects in some way. Therefore, the act of observing is a creative act that changes reality.

However, there is more to this interaction. The objects of observation are not passive. They also
respond to the action by the observer and affect the outcome of interactions. Therefore, the response of
objects to observing changes the outcome and, consequently, also represents a creative act.

The conclusion that follows from the above considerations is that the process of interaction that
takes place between the object and the observer (subject) is a creative act. CI is absolutely correct:
The only reality available to us is the process of creation. This process creates our knowledge.

We are part of the universe. Like any other object in our universe, we interact with other objects.
Hence, we are fully justified in generalizing our interactions with objects we observe to all other
interactions. Therefore, interactions with objects we observe are a subset of a more general type of
interactions that take place among all objects in our universe. It is a universal process of interactions
and this process is creative. It creates objects in our universe and our universe as a whole.

The main property of our universe is its uniqueness: It is all there is. There is nothing outside
it; in fact, there is no outside. As there is nothing outside our universe, nothing can come into it and
nothing can disappear from it because there is nowhere to disappear. Consequently, everything must
be conserved. Conservation is fundamental to our universe; it originates in the uniqueness of our universe and it gives rise to the process of creation.

Our universe contains an enormous variety of different forms. All these forms are finite; and the resources for sustaining finite forms are also finite. In order to conserve finite forms, their range of possibilities, or degrees of freedom, must expand, which will allow them access to new resources. Gaining new possibilities requires new properties, that is, properties that have had no prior existence; in other words, it requires an act of creation. New properties can arise only as a result of the integration of differences that leads to the emergence of the new and more powerful levels of organization. Conservation is impossible without the process of creating such new and more powerful levels of organization. If a system does not evolve and does not create new levels of organization, it begins to disintegrate.

We humans are also creations of this process. As its creations, we are also part of this process. We have inherited from this process our capacity to create. Over the course of our history, we have demonstrated this capacity in works of art, in science and technology, in organizing our society and its institutions. Our civilization itself is remarkable evidence of our creativity. It is the source of our power and prosperity.

Given the importance of the process of creation in our life, one would expect that we would use it as the main organizing principle of our practice. Yet, odd as it may seem, this process is not central to our civilization. Our civilization is decidedly anthropocentric. Since at least the Enlightenment, if not earlier, we have made the human subject the main organizing principle of our civilization, its practice, and institutions.

This article has shown that the adoption of subjectivity as the main organizing principle of our mental universe is essentially a subjective and arbitrary act—it is not supported either by justification or by experimental verification. For this reason, it cannot and does not provide us with a definitive way of interpreting reality. It generates confusion, inconsistencies, and paradoxes that hinder the progress of our civilization and create many current problems that we as a civilization face today, including the stagnation of our physical science that remains split between two separate and rather incommensurable, despite some similarities, conceptions of reality.

As this article suggests, the solution of the problem that plagues the system of our knowledge of physical reality is in creating the frame for a new theoretical perspective that would be able to integrate both classical and nonclassical physics as its particular cases; that is, cases that are true under special circumstances or axioms. Such a frame will require a foundation that is capable of including axiomatic propositions upon which both classical and nonclassical physics rest.

The process of creation can serve as the basis for such integration. The foundational proposition for classical physics is the centrality of the object. By contrast, nonclassical physics is organized around the recognition of the centrality of the subject and subjectivity. This article agrees with CI that we cannot observe quantum reality as it is; we can only access the interaction between this reality and the observational instruments chosen by the subject. This article has shown that the process of creation is the essence of this interaction, and this process is ultimately the source of everything that exists in our universe. Therefore, this process can serve as a foundational proposition that integrates subjectivity and the object. A theoretical perspective constructed on this foundation can integrate classical and nonclassical physics. Therefore, we should adopt the process of creation as the main focus of our science practice.

The process of creation appears in different guises (the process of emergence or the construction process) in a variety of theoretical perspectives: Systems theory, theory of emergence, complexity theory, theory of self-organization, creativity studies, and others.

Different researchers define this process in different ways. The definition that in the view of this author fits best is the following: The process of creation is an operation that generates new levels and forms of organization of reality. The distinct feature of such created forms of organization is their irreducibility. We cannot reduce them. That is to say, we cannot establish linear causal relations
between the new form that has emerged and the level of organization of reality from which it has emerged. We cannot reduce life, for example, to chemical elements. We cannot reduce consciousness to biological processes that, according to the theory of evolution, gave rise to it. We cannot explain the behavior of insects that have clear signs of intelligence present. We cannot reduce order to the chaos that has preceded it (for more on the process of creation see [23–26]).

One important advantage of using the process of creation as the organizing principle of our science practice is the fact that, unlike determinism or uncertainty, it can be both justified and empirically validated. One can imagine reality without uncertainty or determinism, as the Copenhageners and Bohm do. However, one cannot imagine reality without the process of creation. If there were no creation, there would be nothing. Leibniz, among other philosophers, had a clear understanding of this fact when he asked his famous question that he considered the fundamental question of metaphysics: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Moreover, all humans have a capacity to creation. There are numerous examples of creation—from particles and atoms, to stars and galaxies, and everything else. These are powerful empirical confirmations of the existence of the process that created them all.

What will such new science practice organized around the process of creation involve? It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed answer to this question; such an answer has been provided elsewhere [27]. However, an outline of the main points may be in order.

First of all, we must recognize that the main motive of our intellectual activity is not knowledge. Knowledge is merely a byproduct of this activity. Its true motivation is the construction of new and increasingly more powerful levels of our mental organization as a way of conserving our mental constructions. These new and more powerful levels of organization will allow us to establish new one-to-one correspondences between our mental constructs and reality, thus generating new knowledge.

Since the construction of new and more powerful levels of organization involves integrating differences, the most important form of validation of new knowledge is its inclusiveness and comprehensiveness. This does not mean that experimental support is not necessary. Our mental activity emerges from practical activity. Therefore, this process should also allow the inversion from theoretical constructs to practice. However, mental constructs are the most powerful forms of organization of reality and they can always create one-to-one correspondences with physical reality, and such correspondences alone cannot validate knowledge.

This approach follows from the understanding that the process of creation is the source of our knowledge and, in fact, the source of everything that exists in our universe. By understanding this process and applying this knowledge to our practice, we will place our practice on the solid foundation of our reason and rationality and will no longer rely on domination and force in determining what constitutes knowledge and what does not.

5. Conclusions

Over fifty years ago, Thomas Kuhn in his now famous book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* addressed the issue of stagnation in the evolution of our knowledge [13]. It is in many ways a pessimistic book. It recognizes that our science community has a tendency to succumb to inertia that leads to long periods of stagnation. Moreover, the author suggests that such stagnation is inevitable and there is nothing that we can do to ameliorate this condition. He does not believe that human reason and rationality are capable of overcoming this inertia and prevent it from hindering the progress of our knowledge. In a way, he suggests a very anti-Enlightenment conclusion that human reason cannot be the arbiter in our practice, including our science practice. According to Kuhn, only death and destruction can ultimately settle the conflict between stasis and change, between old ways and innovation. The old generation should die out so that the new one could pave the way for new ideas and theories. But even death and destruction may not necessarily be a guarantee against inertia and stagnation, and assure the ascension of new ideas. The modern tools of indoctrination and thought
control may be powerful enough to prevent the rise of a new generation and the spread of new ideas. Inertia and stagnation may very well become an inescapable condition of our civilization.

In a way, Kuhn tells us that we are the source of our progress. For this reason, the only guarantee we can have against stagnation is our full commitment to a science practice that is based on reason and rationality—not domination and force, no matter how benevolent the motivation behind them may be. We need to understand the process that plays a critical role in knowledge production—the process that is fundamental to the existence of our universe and that we have inherited in the course of a long and arduous evolution. We need to place our hope in the capacity of our reason to understand even this fundamental process that transcends our own existence; and we must work hard to realize this hope.

To conclude, this article has argued that quantum physics is based on assumptions about reality. In the cases examined in this piece, they are assumptions that reality is uncertain (the Copenhagen interpretation) or, on the contrary, that it is deterministic (Bohm). Both assumptions are unjustified. The absence of justification means that there was no rational control over the construction of the theory, that the theory may very well be based on a wrong assumption, that reality is neither uncertain nor deterministic, that these are false choices, and that we should start asking once again some fundamental questions as to how reality actually is. It means that it may be time to leave our safe communities of common faith and start sailing toward new shores.

Funding: This research received no external funding

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

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