Abstract—Research on optical TEMPEST has moved forward since 2002 when the first pair of papers on the subject emerged independently and from widely separated locations in the world within a week of each other. Since that time, vulnerabilities have evolved along with systems, and several new threat vectors have consequently appeared. Although the supply chain ecosystem of Ethernet has reduced the vulnerability of billions of devices through use of standardised PHY solutions, other recent trends including the Internet of Things (IoT) in both industrial settings and the general population, High Frequency Trading (HFT) in the financial sector, the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and inexpensive drones have made it relevant again for consideration in the design of new products for privacy. One of the general principles of security is that vulnerabilities, once fixed, sometimes do not stay that way.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the publication sixteen years ago of the first two papers on optical TEMPEST, open source information on security of compromising emanations—and side channels in general—has exploded. Before the late 1990s, only a handful of papers had been published in the open literature on the subject of TEMPEST[1] and the topic was mostly relegated to the folklore of infosec; the only two scientific studies of unintentional compromising emanations remained van Eck [2] and Smulders [3] although Wright’s book around the same time [4] described anecdotal reports dating back to the first world war. But following Kocher’s seminal 1996 paper on side channel attacks [5] and Kuhn & Anderson [6] having shown—essentially by adding forward error correction to EMC—that covert channels were not limited by the system boundary, two papers appeared within a week of each other on complementary aspects of optical emanations [7], [8]. Since then, these two papers, between them, have been cited more than 300 times.

A. Organisation

The first part of this paper is a brief review of the results in the first paper on optical TEMPEST and a critique of mistakes that were made by one of the first investigators of the phenomenon, in the methodology, model building, writing, and acceleration side channels.
Table I  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE ORIGINAL OPTICAL TEMPEST RESEARCH PAPER OF 2002 (ADAPTED FROM [5] TABLES I AND II).

| Class | Correlated with | Risk  | How many |
|-------|----------------|-------|----------|
| I     | State of the device | Low   | 10 percent (4) |
| II    | Activity Level     | Medium| 54 percent (21) |
| III   | Data (content)     | High  | 36 percent (14) |

Class III optical emanations were measured almost entirely coming from data communication devices, ranging from low cost to very high cost equipment. For reasons described in the next section, Ethernet devices were mostly unaffected, though we looked hard to find any that might be. We named the effect ‘optical TEMPEST’.

B. Missed opportunities

Around this time, I made a serious mistake. Unbeknown to me, Markus Kuhn, a postgraduate student at Cambridge, was working along similar lines [9]. I had thought about optical emanations from video display screens but dismissed the idea as physically impossible, without ever testing it. I was wrong. I thought the decay time of Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) phosphors was too slow to carry information about the video signal, so the diffuse light available to non-line-of-sight interception, and consequently, I never looked for it.

Markus Kuhn found and successfully exploited a tiny ripple near the peak of the response curve of CRT phosphors. The gross shape of the curve belies the fact that that tiny ripple is detectable in the time domain optical signal, if your detector is fast enough.

Kuhn’s detector—a photomultiplier tube—was better than mine; the gain–bandwidth product of a photomultiplier is superior to that of the large-area photodiode/transimpedance amplifier combination I used, but we were looking for different things: Kuhn was looking for diffuse emanations from the entire screen at once, and I was looking for for line-of-sight photons from a particular LED on an isolated piece of equipment (although we did eventually figure out how to separate multiple superimposed signals from diffuse optical emanations collected by non-line-of-sight means). The difference is that Markus Kuhn actually looked, and he found an effect that I missed.

C. Delay of first publication

Why didn’t we publish in the nineteen-nineties? Part of the reason was perfectionism; I wanted to be able to explain the phenomenon and make predictions, not only describe it. In addition, by that time I had left the bank and was working for a defence contractor on a classified project. I had a security clearance now, and a greatly expanded awareness of counterintelligence sources and methods.

And so, following procedures, we submitted the paper to NSA for approval to publish. It took a year and a half to approve. Eventually, NSA wrote back and said, ‘approved for public release’. I wonder what they spent all that time doing.

D. Roads not taken

Universal Serial Bus (USB) devices hadn’t happened yet, but today they’re ubiquitous. Later and informal investigation of some light-up USB cables—a fad that didn’t last—turned up evidence of Class II optical emanations related to data passing through the USB cable, but evidence for Class III optical emanations remains inconclusive.

Considered narrowly outside the scope of optical TEMPEST, for the purpose of this paper, are line-of-sight attacks that essentially reduce to direct or indirect imaging of the display [16–21]. This is somewhat unfair, as the original attack by Loughry & Umphress required, for the most part, line-of-sight access—except, as previously mentioned, in §8.2 of our original paper—but in the time domain, not space. Optical TEMPEST is a time domain effect. Other remote attacks employing optical means, such as visual or interferometric measurement of keyboard or printer acoustic emanations [22–25], or a highly novel reverse covert channel using a document scanner [26], are outside the scope of this paper. Screen burn-in, for example, is data remanence, not optical TEMPEST [27]. Finally, induced optical emanations [28–35] and [8] Appendix A are properly considered out-of-band covert channels [36–38], despite being compromising optical emanations in the time domain, because they are purposely induced by a nefarious software or hardware agent, or by activity that is controllable by a third party, introduced into the target system by the attacker. Control and remote sensing of magnetic fields, or instantaneous electrical power demand, similarly are a covert channel, not TEMPEST [39, 40].

III. MAC AND PHY

Of the potential optical signal sources available in a standard office computer (power light, hard disk activity indicator, keyboard LEDs, network interface link indicators, charging indicators on laptops, optical disc read head and activity indicators, scanners, motherboard LEDs, optical mouse, and, of course, the screen), we looked hard, at the time, at the other two large populations of blinking LEDs in the world: disk activity light[4] and Network Interface Cards (NICs). Neither source proved fruitful; we were unable to find any evidence of Class III optical emanations from storage devices or link

3Actually, it didn’t quite happen that way. Our paper was approved for publication very quickly, in only a few weeks; we submitted it to the 10th USENIX Security Symposium where it was immediately accepted. A few days later, NSA called us back, and in a panic, insisted that we withdraw the paper from the conference. I had to apologise to the programme chair; it was awfully embarrassing, and the delay in publishing was almost two years.

4Guri et al. finally made it work in 2017 by hovering a drone in the air outside the building [39]; unlike data exfiltration using keyboard LEDs [41] Chapter 90, the hard disk LED channel is covert, not clandestine.
activity indicators on Ethernet cards. The one exception—and it was a bad one—was WAN interfaces on the back panel of enterprise routers, devices which live in racks that sometimes back up to windows; see [8, §4.3.1]. Aside from those, the complete absence of compromising optical emanations from Ethernet link activity LEDs is believed to be a consequence of the fact that the Ethernet protocol is well divided into two layers: MAC and PHY.

In the Ethernet protocol, the Media Access Control layer (MAC) marshals bits into frames and hands them off to the Physical layer (PHY), which deals exclusively with voltages and waveforms and wires, or radio, or fiber optics. The MAC talks to the PHY using a protocol called Media Independent Interface (MII)—GMII for gigabit Ethernet—over a pair of 4-bit-wide parallel channels (for sending and receiving) clocked at 25 MHz [42].

In the case of twisted pair wire, only a few suppliers make PHY chips and generally they do it right, providing dedicated pins on the PHY chip for connecting LEDs for status indication and internally stretching pulses to the LEDs to make high-speed activity visible to human eyes. In most PHYs, the minimum duration of pulse stretching is programmable, and in some PHYs it can even be turned off [43, Table 39]. The contrast here with the situation we found regarding relatively low-speed serial interfaces is stark; there, the temptation was seemingly overwhelming for circuit designers to drive LEDs directly from generously high voltage and high current serial communication signals—arguably providing reliable indication of signal quality and perhaps of marginal signal levels at very low cost. Garden variety LEDs are plenty fast enough to reproduce amplitude-modulated signals well into the nanosecond range without any special driver circuits required.

A. High Frequency Trading (HFT)

Sometimes, security problems that you thought you had fixed already, come back to bite you.

In the early years of this century, a new style of automatic financial trading appeared, facilitated by the convergence of gigabit per second networks, computers with 64-bit address spaces, and deregulation [44]. Their trading advantage came from the finite speed of light; by physically locating their trading algorithms as close as possible to the exchange, they could eke out a response time advantage measured in milliseconds. With the margin between success and failure so narrow, and backers willing to spend money on bespoke hardware in return for larger profits, HFT traders pursued ever-smaller improvements in latency and responsiveness to changes in market conditions and requirements, culminating in Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) or Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) implementation of a minimal gigabit Ethernet MAC, as fast as physics would allow and additionally capable of three things that conventional Ethernet hardware could not do:

1) ultra-low latency (µs),
2) ability to read data transmitted near the beginning of an Ethernet packet before the entire packet had been received, and
3) ability to cancel a speculative trade—if needed—after the Ethernet packet had begun transmitting, but before it had finished

Their systems did not have to be universally interoperable, only compatible enough to talk to the exchange, and that only for the few months the hardware was typically used before being replaced by something even faster [45].

The risk in this kind of cowboy engineering is that of Chesterton’s fence; non-obvious safeguards may be dropped, leaving the implementation vulnerable to exploitation. While not described in that reference (ibid.) it is not unreasonable to speculate that HFT engineers—there were many HFT groups besides the one in Korea—may have looked critically at the PHY in their search for another few microseconds to harvest. And developmental hardware, especially, sometimes needs monitoring or diagnostic LEDs for debugging. It is purely speculation, but there might be a ‘window’ of opportunity for rival HFT firms with a telescope and very high speed photodetector to exploit any incautiously situated LED indicators connected directly to high-speed registers.

IV. DESIGN OF A NEW PRODUCT WITH OPTICAL TEMPEST PRINCIPLES IN MIND

Optical TEMPEST began in a bank, took a holiday in the Intelligence Community (IC), and now has circled back to fintech. The remaining frontier is privacy.

Under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe, and to a lesser extent the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) in the United States, the privacy of individuals and their personal information is protected by law. In the U.S. at least, this makes health care providers more risk-sensitive than they are cost-sensitive. One particular problem—amongst many—that needs to be solved in the U.S. arises from a quirk of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the main regulator of medical diagnostic and therapeutic devices. The cost of gaining FDA approval for use of a medical device is high, necessitating sometimes years of clinical trials, and extensive design and development documentation. As a result, perhaps millions of vulnerable medical devices—only a few years old—exist that never have got the required security patches for their embedded computers’ operating system (OS) as recommended by the OS manufacturer. The reason for the shortfall in software maintenance is the excessive cost of FDA recertification in the event any diagnostic- or therapeutic-relevant changes are made to the configuration of a medical device [46].

The trick was accomplished by purposely corrupting the checksum at the end of a packet, relying upon correct behaviour of the exchange’s Ethernet interface to discard the packet instead of processing it.

The situation is little different in either commercial aviation or military and intelligence community systems for classified information: process maturity, formal or semi-formal design, and exhaustive testing before certification and approval for use.
fact, the analogous situation happens in classified military and intelligence community networks as well. Commercial aviation experiences the problem less than either classified networks or healthcare for two reasons: firstly, being mobile, aviation control systems tend to be more isolated and special-purpose embedded computers than the Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) hardware favoured by medical device and intelligence community developers; and secondly, DO-178 [47].

In this section I describe some of the design considerations for new hardware development informed by experience with optical TEMPEST vulnerabilities and countermeasures. The notional infosec product described is intended to isolate vulnerable medical devices with the aim of protecting individuals’ privacy by eliminating a potential mode of entry of hackers to the hospital’s internal computer networks.

In a parallel universe to the HFT hardware designers in the previous section, we use similar techniques to different ends; the MAC here is a state machine implemented in hardware, not for low-latency but for high-security; the PHY returns, for security reasons—in the interest of complete transparency of implementation—to its roots in the magnetics of IEEE 802.3i, where the number of turns in a toroidal transformer can be counted by hand. The design and development methodology is that of the intelligence community, but the anticipated buyer does not reside in the U.S., and is not expected particularly to trust the U.S. government. The only reasonable defence against this level of mistrust is believed to be complete openness and transparency of design, development, and implementation.

A. Simplicity and transparency of implementation

Part of the design is essentially an optoisolator for the purpose of domain separation between the ‘private’ and ‘public’ sides of the privacy problem. Integrated circuit optoisolators can be bought but they are designed for galvanic isolation, not infosec.

The receiver side of the optoisolator circuit is shown schematically in Figure 1. The photodiode operates in reverse bias (i.e., photoconductive) mode for two reasons: firstly, speed, and secondly, simplicity of implementation. The same photodiode operated in photovoltaic mode would be more sensitive to very low level signals and have a lower dark current, but would require a transimpedance amplifier for current-to-voltage conversion, which would make the design more complicated and thereby more difficult to evaluate for security. There is no amplifier stage because electronics are relatively more difficult to verify than optics. Not shown are three additional layers of protection, implemented by passive and active optical, mechanical, and physical means between emitter and detector to ensure that information flows only in one direction.

The rest of the design is equally unconventional (Figure 2). Rather than using available ‘IP’ blocks (Intellectual Property—pre-designed software modules delivering standard functionality such as ARM cores or Ethernet MAC in a chip), we prefer a clean-room design approach built up from IEEE 802.3 standards using semi-formal methods, avoiding closed-source IP. The result, we believe, in combination with open tests, will be considered trustworthy by everyone in the world.

B. Energy Gap

The gold standard of information isolation is the ‘air gap’—physically separating a system containing sensitive information from attackers. But as Clive Robinson and others have pointed out, in the era of wireless networking, air gapping is insufficient. He coined the term ‘energy gap’ to include both physical communication channels—RF, acoustic, optical, thermal, magnetic, or acceleration—in addition to more analogical interpretations of ‘energy’ such as the work factor required to break encryption. The design of our notional product puts principles of physics, not algorithms or mathematics, between the attacker and his target, in an attempt to widen the energy gap. Optical TEMPEST risks are sealed up in machined metal cavities; mechanical interlocks supplement logical ones.

C. Design discussion

Simplicity of implementation is paramount. There are no amplifiers, no MAC or PHY chips, no process nodes that cannot be de-capped and have a representative sample to be examined under a microscope. The development tool chain must be open source and international.

It must be acknowledged that optical TEMPEST, ironically, is a vulnerability that can be exacerbated by extreme reliance on simplicity of implementation, as happened with LED indicators on data communication equipment from about 1968–1998. But experience with optical TEMPEST and side channels has inspired so many other researchers to find and exploit diverse vulnerabilities, that the only remaining avenue of approach is to strike as many components as possible from the system, in the belief that a component that is not there cannot fail, has no vulnerabilities, and lasts forever.

Of course, Stuxnet proved that air gaps can fail in other ways, because they must necessarily be bridged by sneakernet [48], [49].
V. CONCLUSION

Since the publication in 2002 of the first peer-reviewed research on compromising optical emanations, other researchers have carried it further. But technological progress has shifted the boundaries of what was possible, necessitating revisiting the same vulnerabilities from time to time. This is a general principle of security; vulnerabilities, once fixed, sometimes do not stay fixed.

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