Scale-free networks resistant to intentional attacks

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Abstract. - We study the detailed mechanism of the failure of scale-free networks under intentional attacks. Although it is generally accepted that such networks are very sensitive to targeted attacks, we show that for a particular type of structure such networks surprisingly remain very robust even under removal of a large fraction of their nodes, which in some cases can be up to 70%. The degree distribution \( P(k) \) of these structures is such that for small values of the degree \( k \) the distribution is constant with \( k \), up to a critical value \( k_c \), and thereafter it decays with \( k \) with the usual power law. We describe in detail a model for such a scale-free network with this modified degree distribution, and we show both analytically and via simulations, that this model can adequately describe all the features and breakdown characteristics of these attacks. We have found several experimental networks with such features, such as for example the IMDB actors collaboration network or the citations network, whose resilience to attacks can be accurately described by our model.

A large number of diverse systems in society, nature and technology can be described by the concept of a network \([1, 2]\). In a network the form of inter-relations between the system parts determines many structural and dynamic properties of the system. One such property that has received considerable attention is the robustness of a network under intentional attacks \([3, 4]\). In the course of such an attack nodes of the network are removed in decreasing order of their degree \( k \) (number of connections to other nodes). This is considered to be the most harmful type of attack on a network, since the removal of the hubs results in the largest possible damage. In fact, this vulnerability of the networks to attacks has been described as their Achilles’ heel \([3]\), because it is generally accepted that scale-free networks are easily destroyed under intentional attacks. This removal process has many and important implications, since depending on the application, it may describe the resilience of a network, such as the Internet, or the required number of vaccinations for immunization considerations, etc.

For a scale-free network, where the probability that a node has a given number of links decays as a power-law, it has been shown that the critical percentage \( p_c \) of removed nodes that results in network disintegration is very low (of the order of a few percent) \([4, 5]\). It is, thus, a well-established fact, supported by exact analytic results and simulations of attacks on model and real-life networks, that a scale-free network is very vulnerable to intentional attacks (where \( p_c \) is close to 0), although the same network is extremely robust under random node failures (where \( p_c \approx 1 \)) \([6]\).

In this Letter we show that there exists a large class of networks that are usually found in nature and society and have already been characterized as scale-free, but nevertheless remain robust against removal of the most connected nodes. We first present the results for real-life networks and then introduce a modified version for the degree distribution of scale-free networks, for which our analytic and simulation treatment support these findings.

To demonstrate this issue we performed intentional attacks and random nodes removal to many different real-life networks. The critical point was calculated via two distinct methods. In the first method, during the removal process we monitored the value of the parameter \( \kappa \equiv \langle k^2 \rangle / \langle k \rangle \), where \( \kappa \) is the connectivity parameter, and which has been shown to be a measure of the global network connectivity \([6, 7]\). A value of \( \kappa < 2 \) signifies the disintegration of a network into isolated clusters. The second method was a direct measurement of the largest cluster size. The value of \( p_c \) was identified as the one where this size assumes for the first time a value close to zero. The two methods coincide only when the network is ‘random’
and uncorrelated, in the sense that there is no inherent organization (or equivalently degree-degree correlations) in the network. In a clustered network, though, where these correlations are present, such as the IMDB actors network, the two methods give different results ($p_c = 0.96$ with the first method, but $p_c = 0.62$ with the second). Here, we considered the $p_c$ value derived by the largest cluster size calculation. The corresponding results for the fraction of nodes $P_\infty(p)$ that belong to the largest cluster of the network during an intentional attack are shown in Fig. 1, as a function of the percentage $p$ of removed nodes. While the size of the spanning cluster falls rapidly in most cases (similarly to a model random network) there are some systems where this size remains significant even for larger values of $p$.

In Table 1 we summarize the numerical results we obtained for the critical threshold $p_c$ of the networks presented in Fig. 1. Although many of these systems behave in a similar way to the configuration model network, there is a number of networks, such as actors collaboration and science citations, where the intentional attack requires removal of a considerable portion of the network nodes, which is of the order of 65%. In order to outline the common feature of these networks, in Fig. 2 we present their degree distribution. These distributions have a flat or rising part at low-degree nodes and only after a threshold value the distribution decays as a power-law. We will show that this feature alone is enough to render a network resistant to attacks, while the resilience to random node removal remains intact, as we have verified with simulations that show that in this case the critical threshold remains the same as in simple scale-free networks, i.e. $p_c \to 1$.

The analytical considerations in the current work apply to simple and random networks, where connections between nodes are completely random and the network does not include any self-loops or multiple links between two nodes. The construction of a network for our numerical calculations follows a slightly modified version of the configuration model. We start with $N$ unconnected nodes and to each node $i$ we assign a degree $k_i$ from a given distribution $P(k)$, so that each node has initially a number of unconnected links. We randomly choose two of these unconnected links. If these links belong to the same node or they belong to two nodes that are already connected we ignore this selection and randomly choose two other unconnected links. Otherwise, we establish a connection between these two nodes. We repeat this procedure until all nodes have reached their pre-assigned connectivity. The use of this method leads to a simple network (i.e. one without self-loops and multiple links) where the degree distribution follows the pre-defined $P(k)$ function. We do not impose any upper cutoff for this distribution, so that correlations between degrees are similar to those of a network with completely random connections and no upper cutoff.

We consider networks whose degree distribution is uniform for all $k$ values up to a threshold value $k_c$, while for larger $k$ values it decays as a power law $k^{-\gamma}$, where $\gamma$ is a parameter with typical values in the range 2-4. The exact form of the distribution, also plotted in Fig. 2 for $k_c = 50$ and $\gamma = 2.5$, is

$$P(k) = \begin{cases} A & 1 < k < k_c \\ B k^{-\gamma} & k \geq k_c \end{cases},$$

where the values for the $A$ and $B$ constants are

$$A = \frac{\gamma - 1}{k_c \gamma - \gamma + 1}, \quad B = k_c^{\gamma - 1} A.$$  

These values are derived by the requirement that the distribution is properly normalized and continuous. The fraction of the nodes that belong to the scale-free part of the distribution (i.e. nodes with $k > k_c$) is shown in the inset of Fig. 2 for different values of $k_c$ as a function of $\gamma$. We can conclude that the network retains a substantial scale-free character in practically all cases studied (note also that even for pure scale-free networks a large portion of the nodes has $k = 1$).

We calculate the critical threshold $p_c$ for such a network based on ideas introduced by Cohen et al [4] and

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
Network & Intentional & Random \\
\hline
Configuration model ($\gamma = 2.5$) & 0.055 & 0.99 \\
Online community\textsuperscript{1} & 0.04 & 0.90 \\
WWW (nd.edu)\textsuperscript{2} & 0.10 & 0.99 \\
IMDB actors collaboration\textsuperscript{3} & 0.62 & 0.99 \\
HEP-TH arxiv.org citations\textsuperscript{3} & 0.68 & 0.98 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Critical fraction $p_c$ for intentional attacks and random removal on different networks.}
\end{table}
Dorogovtsev and Mendes [9]. We employ a continuum approximation where the degree of a node is treated as a continuous variable. Nodes are removed according to their initial degree, so that the intentional attack finally results in the disruption of the network. We consider that the degrees of the nodes for the network at criticality, i.e. just before disruption, are given by the parameter $\tilde{k}$, with corresponding averages

$$\langle \tilde{k} \rangle = \int_{1}^{\tilde{K}} k P(k) dk , \quad \langle \tilde{k}^2 \rangle = \int_{1}^{\tilde{K}} k^2 P(k) dk .$$

(3)

The effect of an intentional attack is to remove all nodes of a network whose degree is larger than a cutoff value $\tilde{K}$, i.e. $\tilde{k} \in [1, \tilde{K}]$. This also implies that $p_c$ equals

$$p_c = 1 - \int_{1}^{\tilde{K}} P(k) dk = \int_{\tilde{K}}^{\infty} P(k) dk ,$$

(4)

where the first form is simpler to compute when $\tilde{K} < k_c$ and the second form when $\tilde{K} > k_c$. At the same time, removal of a node leads to removing all its links to other nodes. We consider random networks with no correlations in the nodes connections, which means that a removal of a node results in removal of random links with probability

$$\tilde{p} = \frac{\int_{\tilde{K}}^{\infty} k P(k) dk}{\int_{1}^{\infty} k P(k) dk} = 1 - \frac{\langle \tilde{k} \rangle}{\langle k \rangle} .$$

(5)

It has been shown [6, 7] that a random network loses its large-scale connectivity after the removal of a critical fraction $p_c$ of nodes, according to

$$p_c = 1 - \frac{1}{\kappa - 1} ,$$

(6)

where $\kappa \equiv \langle k^2 \rangle / \langle k \rangle$. This equation has been shown in Ref. [4] to be valid for removal of either nodes or links. As explained in detail there, an intentional attack leads to the equivalent of a scale-free network with upper cutoff $\tilde{K}$ where a random fraction $\tilde{p}$ of nodes has been removed. Because of the random character of the network all the links have the same probability of being removed, and this results to a new degree distribution $\tilde{P}(k)$. This fact is then used to prove Eq. (6). We can then use this equation for the network resulting after the attack, by substituting a) $p_c$ with $\tilde{p}$ from Eq. 5 and b) $\kappa = \langle k^2 \rangle / \langle k \rangle$. After a few trivial steps Eq. 6 becomes

$$\langle \tilde{k}^2 \rangle - \langle \tilde{k} \rangle = \langle k \rangle .$$

(7)

This formula, which is exact, has been already proven in Refs. [4, 9].

In order to use Eq. 7 we need to know whether the value of $\tilde{K}$ is larger or smaller than the threshold value $k_c$, so we consider each case separately. Calculation of the integrals involved yields

$$\langle \tilde{k} \rangle = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \frac{A}{2} (\tilde{K}^2 - 1) & \tilde{K} < k_c \\
\frac{A}{2} (k_c^2 - 1) + \frac{B}{\gamma - 2} (k_c^{2-\gamma} - \tilde{K}^{2-\gamma}) & \tilde{K} > k_c \end{array} \right. ,$$

(8)

and

$$\langle \tilde{k}^2 \rangle = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \frac{A}{3} (\tilde{K}^3 - 1) & \tilde{K} < k_c \\
\frac{A}{3} (k_c^3 - 1) + \frac{B}{\gamma - 2} (k_c^{3-\gamma} - \tilde{K}^{3-\gamma}) & \tilde{K} > k_c \end{array} \right. .$$

(9)

The average value of the initial degree distribution $P(k)$ (Eq. 1) can be approximated with the assumption that $k_{\text{max}} = \infty$. However, for low $\gamma$ values this assumption does not work well and for a finite-size network we should compute the integral up to the maximum value $k_{\text{max}} = \tilde{K}$, which can be found from the relation $\int_{k_{\text{max}}}^{\infty} P(k) = 1/N$, and is given in our case by $K = ((\gamma - 1)/BN)^{1/(\gamma - 1)}$. This results in a correction to the average value of the unperturbed distribution, which finally becomes

$$\langle k \rangle = \frac{A}{2} (k_c^2 - 1) + \frac{B}{\gamma - 2} k_c^{2-\gamma} - \frac{B}{\gamma - 2} \left( \frac{\gamma - 1}{BN} \right)^{\frac{\gamma - 2}{\gamma - 1}} .$$

(10)

The third term is important only for finite-size networks and vanishes as $N \rightarrow \infty$. Combining Eqs. (7)-(10) we get

$$2\tilde{K}^3 - 3\tilde{K}^2 = \frac{3\gamma k_c^2 - 4 + 8}{\gamma - 2} \left( \frac{\gamma - 1}{BN} \right)^{\frac{\gamma - 2}{\gamma - 1}} \quad \tilde{K} < k_c ,$$

$$\frac{2\tilde{K} - 3}{\gamma - 3} - \frac{1}{\gamma - 2} \left( \frac{k_c}{\tilde{K}} \right)^{2-\gamma} = \frac{3}{\gamma - 3} - \frac{2}{\gamma - 2} + \frac{k_c^{3-\gamma}}{\tilde{K}^{3-\gamma}} \left( \frac{\gamma - 1}{BN} \right)^{\frac{\gamma - 2}{\gamma - 1}} \quad \tilde{K} > k_c .$$

(11)

Solving the above equations for $k_c = \tilde{K}$ we can find the $\gamma$ value for which the lowest degree $\tilde{K}$ of the nodes that need to be removed switches from $\tilde{K} > k_c$ to $\tilde{K} < k_c$. This $\gamma$ value is

$$\gamma = \frac{2k_c^3 - 3k_c^2 + 4}{k_c^3 - 3k_c^2 + 2} .$$

(12)
The stability of the solution with respect to the network size \( N \) is shown in Fig. 4. The value of \( p_c \) is practically not influenced by \( N \) when \( \gamma \) is not close to \( \gamma = 2 \), such as \( \gamma = 2.5 \) or larger. For these smaller \( \gamma \) values the critical threshold exhibits larger variations, such as in the case of \( \gamma = 2.1 \) presented in the plot. Even in this case, though, when the network size becomes larger than a moderate size of \( N \sim 10^4 \) then the critical threshold remains practically constant.

The explanation behind the enhanced stability can be largely attributed to the increasing average number of connections per node when the \( k_c \) value increases. Although a large value for \( \langle k \rangle \) means obviously an enhanced robustness for the network, we also find that the network is resilient even for very small \( k_c \) values. Indeed, in real networks it is usually not easy to clarify the exact behavior of the degree distribution at very small degrees, and a difference between \( k_c = 1 \) and \( k_c = 2 \) or 3 can easily be unnoticed.

These findings suggest a structure that is very robust against both random failures and targeted attacks. This
optimization is desirable in most cases and the structure itself, which as we have seen emerges naturally in many instances, may be used to efficiently protect a network against most attacks. On the contrary, for immunization purposes, the existence of such networks may present difficulties for efficient strategies. Even if global knowledge of the entire network structure is available, the required number of vaccinations remains very high. In such a case, it is very important to acquire as accurate information on the network structure as possible, and especially for the low-degree part, because a simple power-law decay of the degree distribution over a large degree range does not guarantee efficient immunization, if at small values of the degree this power-law decay is not obeyed.

A study for networks that offer better resilience to attacks than simple scale-free networks has been performed in Ref. [10]. The authors find that the optimal network design for optimization against both random and intentional attack is one where all nodes have the same degree $k_1$, except for a ‘central’ node with a large degree $k_2 \sim N^{2/3}$. That work, though, has a different scope than ours since the authors kept in all instances the average value $\langle k \rangle$ constant, while in our work this average value is modified as we modify $k_c$.

In summary, we have studied intentional attacks on networks whose distribution is uniform for low degrees $k$ and decays as a power law for larger $k$. Such a structure is very robust against both random and intentional attacks, and outlines the importance of the low-degree nodes in the connectivity of the structure. Although hubs connect a large part of the network, it is true that they will be unavoidably removed sooner or later, depending on the removal strategy. However, it seems that the form of the distribution at low degrees is equally or more important than the existence of the hubs and may render a network vulnerable or stable against intentional attacks.

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