FUNDAMENTALISM VERSUS SOCIAL INJUSTICE

(Political Economic Dimension of the Indonesian Fundamentalism)

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ABSTRACT

Karen Armstrong in The Battle for God expresses her fear of the rise of fundamentalism. She alerts and takes a deep look at its horrific manifestations. She stresses that “One of the most startling developments of the late twentieth century has been the emergence within every major religious tradition of militant piety popularly known as “fundamentalism"….Fundamentalists have gunned down worshippers in mosque, have killed doctors and nurses….have shots their president, and have even toppled a powerful government….Fundamentalists have no time for democracy, pluralism, religious toleration, peacekeeping, free speech....”1 Indonesia can be an “exact laboratory” to prove Armstrong’s concerns about fundamentalism, where there have been series of terrorist attacks and suicide bombings since 2000 that behooves the Indonesian stakeholders to giving their very eyes on the roots of the problem. There have been 552 acts of terror in 21 years since 2000.2 However, is fundamentalism solely rooted in the religious militant piety? The studies of the roots of fundamentalism are generally divided into two lines of thoughts. The first is those who admit the religious militant piety as the only root of fundamentalism. The other is those who take into account the problem of social injustice in the field of politics and economy as the foundation of the movement of the fundamentalists. This article is going to examine the second opinion of the absence of social justice and multidimensional approach of development at all level as the backbones and the determining factors of the emergence of the Indonesian fundamentalism.

1 Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000): p. 5.
2 See the report of Kompas.com (30/03/2021, 15:46 WIB), 552 Aksi Teror Terjadi Sejak Tahun 2000, Terbanyak di Era SBY-Susilo Bambang Yudhoyon: 552 Acts of Terror since 2000 and most Occurred in the Era of SBY. It is shown in the report of the Department of Politics and Security of LAB 45 (Laboratorium Indonesia 2045). LAB 45 is a research institute that concern on the multidimensional issues and on the global development in the field of politics and economy. The institute places its eyes on the process of transformation, and provides research and analyses for the Indonesian stakeholders in pursuing the goal of Indonesia as an advanced state in 2045.
INTRODUCTION

The rise of the concern on the Indonesian fundamentalism has been undertaken since the rise of terrorist attacks that has been started up four decades ago. The hijacking of Garuda Airline in 1981 by the religious extremist group of Komando Jihad (Jihad Command) and the bombing of Borobudur temple in 1985 waken and echo the awareness of the Indonesian people, particularly the stakeholders of the danger of fundamentalism. After the fall of authoritarian regime of Suharto in 1998 Indonesia not only “inbreathing the fresh air of democracy” but also at the same time getting into social turbulence because of the noxiousness the religious revivalism, cultism and fundamentalism bear into the societal life that has been uneasy to be ceased till the present days. Armstrong’s point could be very precise to describe the face of Indonesian society in which “the fundamentalists have no time for democracy, pluralism, religious toleration, peacekeeping, free speech…..” I take an example from the report of Aliansi Nasional Bhinneka Tunggal (National Alliance of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) in 2015, referring to the research data of University of Canberra. It shows that there have been 1000 churches burned and banned by the fundamentalist and the extremist groups.

The required question needed to be placed on the table of discourse of fundamentalism is: Is Indonesian fundamentalism merely a militant piety of those who concern only in the preservation of religious authority, doctrines and its dogmas? Through this article I invite the readers to look closer at the complexity of the Indonesian fundamentalism, particularly from the political economic dimension. The article is going to focus on the relation between the

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3 Komando Jihad (Jihad Command: JC) is an Islamic fundamentalist extremist group. It was founded in 1968 and exterminated through the intelligent raid operation in mid of 1980s. The emersion of JC remains a controversy among researchers and analysts that are split into two groups. The first group is those who admit the viewpoint of the New Order regime that the establishment of JC and the sequences of its acts of terror aim to form the Islamic state of Indonesia and the Indonesian Islamic Revolutionary Council, and also to express their political stand against national Constitution of 1945 and the national principle of Pancasila. The second group is those who admit the theory of conspiracy that the establishment of JC was purely a political delude of the New Order regime to distract public attention from the election fraud of 1977. However, the dissent of the two groups does not dismiss the fact that JC in essence has an objective of the establishment of Islamic state.

4 Karen Armstrong (2000), The Battle for God: p. 5.

5 See Report of CNN Indonesia (Wednesday, 14/10/2015). Pembakaran Gereja Capai 1000 Kasus Pasca Reformasi: Churches Burned Reaching 1000 Cases after Reformation.
problem of political economy and the revival of fundamentalism as a social movement against social injustice. In brief words we may say that Indonesian fundamentalism basically is a movement of class struggle against social injustice. But, before examining further on the problem of fundamentalism, it would be important to briefly highlight of what fundamentalism and how it began in human civilization.

The word 'fundamentalism' was first popularized by Curtis Lee Laws, an editor at the journal Watchman-Examiner, in 1920 in a compilation for the journal entitled The Watchman-Examiner - a National Baptist Paper. This word is used limited to the scope of theological thought and religious movements. George C. Marsden defines fundamentalism in the following phrase that "a fundamentalist is an evangelical who is angry about something….Evangelical is broadly defined to include those in traditions that emphasize the Bible as the highest religious authority…." Fundamentalism was originally used to explain the renunciation of the American conservative Protestants against the liberalists and their liberal theology.

Liberal Protestantism is an intellectual movement within the Christian church that attempt to adapt Christian doctrines to the rise of the evolutionary science and to the development of biblical criticism. The liberalists endeavor to reshape Christian theology in the presence of modern science. Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection, for example, re-question and concurrently reshape the beliefs of Christians in the theory of creation of the universe. Darwinian theorem rocks the Christian creationism and their belief of the divine miracle that this universe was created in six days as written in the Book of Genesis. Meanwhile, liberal theology is a modern Christian theology in which scripture is no longer taken literally as in traditionalist church. Bible in liberal theology is interpreted in the light of reasoning and adapted to modern intellectual and socio-cultural context. It is also an intellectual revolutionary in theosophy,

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6 C.L. Laws was an editor of a journal founded by the American Baptist group, a journal for all Baptists. Laws has been editors of this journal since 1913 and ended in 1939.
7 The Watchman Examiner is a bulletin of Baptist Church organization which regularly publishes articles relating to the mission of the Baptist church. This bulletin was first published in 1913.
8 George C. Marsden is an American historian, specifically history of American culture and Christianity. Marsden most dominantly concerns on the history of the interaction between American culture and Christianity-evangelicalism.
9 George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2006): p. 235-236.
10 Thomas Schirrmacher, Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous (Bonn: Verlag fur Kultur and Wissenschaft-Culture and Science Publication, 2013): p. 9.
particularly theology and philosophy of the era of enlightenment and rationalism.

The huge alteration on Christian theology the rationalism swayed was the transformation of interpreting dogmas or sacred texts that took into account modern science and ethics. The scripture is no longer interpreted and taken into account solely on triple conviction of traditionalist Christians: *sola scriptura*-inerrancy of bible (*Scripturalism*), *sola fide*-the salvation of man comes only from justification by faith (*solafricanism*), and *sola gratia*-salvation comes only from the divine grace.\(^\text{11}\) According to James Barr there are three major features of the fundamentalists' doctrines: 1) a very strong emphasis on the inerrancy of the Bible, the absence from it of any sorts of error; 2) a strong hostility to modern theology and to the methods, results and implications of modern critical study of the Bible; 3) an assurance that those who do not share their religious viewpoint are not really 'true Christians' at all.\(^\text{12}\)

Religious doctrines and dogmas in face of modern science are driven to be interpreted under the light of reason and also taking into consideration the relevance to its social context. Fundamentalism then can be understood as the repudiation over the rationalistic exegesis of sacred texts that inclines to discredit supernatural facet of Christian beliefs. Fundamentalism that at the very beginning aimed to sustain, if we may use the term of Karen Armstrong, the “Bible based-society and state - *Biblicism*”\(^\text{13}\) eventually extends to political movement as arose in the Moral Majority Organization of Jerry Falwell.\(^\text{14}\) The shift is assuredly like a necessary prerequisite, specifically in third world states or developing countries, in confronting any sorts of ill-systems of politics and economy.

Fundamentalism in the contemporary discourse is no longer associated only with the militant piety of the extremist groups, but also to political ideological movements.\(^\text{15}\) The tragedy of 09/11 has been taken as the vile feature of fundamentalism, particularly in the barbarous act the extremist religious group of Al-Qaeda which legitimizes violence. The feature of fundamentalism

\(^{11}\) See Josiah Trenham, *Rock and Sand: An Orthodox Appraisal of the Protestant Reformers and Their Teachings*, ed. Michael Monos (US: Newrome Press LLC, 2018): p. 187-192. See also Ewald M. Plass, *What Luther says: An Anthology* (St. Louis: Concordia, 1959): p. 63. See also John R. de Witt, *What is the Reformed Faith*? (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1981): p. 5.

\(^{12}\) James Barr, *Fundamentalism* (London: SCM Press, 1981): p. 1.

\(^{13}\) See Karen Armstrong (2000), *The Battle for God* p. 294.

\(^{14}\) Jerry Falwell (1933-2007) was an American Baptist pastor, a strong believer, and conservative activist. He was also a politician of the Republican Political Party. See also Thomas Schirrmacher (2013), *Fundamentalism*: p. 11.

\(^{15}\) Thomas Schirrmacher (2013), *Fundamentalism*: p. 11-12.
then is not only to claim of the absolute truth of the religious militants, but also associated with the detrimental acts of intolerance, anti-plurality, anti-democracy, anti-human rights, and terrorism. Karen Armstrong aptly explicates it in her challenging statement that “Fundamentalists have gunned down worshippers in a mosque, have killed the doctors and nurses who work in abortion clinics, have shot their presidents, and have toppled down a powerful government….Fundamentalists have no time for democracy, pluralism, religious toleration, peacekeeping, free speech, or of the separation of church and state….”

INDONESIAN FUNDAMENTALISM

The caution on the emergence of Indonesian contemporary fundamentalism in general is not only propelled by the religious devotion of the perpetuation of religious dogmas and doctrines of the religious supremacists against modern ideologies, but also driven by the necessity of transforming social system. The insistence of the implementation of “Qur’an-based society - Qur’anism” or “Sharia-based state - Shariaism” of the hardline religious groups such as HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir),17 JI (Jemaah Islamiyah: Islamic Congregations),18 FPI (Front Pembela Islam: Front of Islamic Defenders),19 and JT (Jamaah Tabligh),20 for example, is not only aimed at itself,

16 See Karen Armstrong (2000), The Battle for God: p. 5-6. See also Thomas Schirrmacher (2013), Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous: p. 14.

17 HTI is an Islamic political organization. Ideologically it promotes the establishment of Islamic state under the law of Islamic Sharia or Islamic law. HTI is neither a religious or social organization, nor a scientific-academic movement. It is an Islamic organization that strives to uphold the Khilafah Islamiyah (Islamic caliphate or Islamic state). Though HTI partisans do not consider their movement political, but in fact their activities are political. In Indonesian politics HTI is affiliated with PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), an Islamic political party that promotes the establishment of Islamic state. In Ahmad Syafii Maarif’s observation, the political mission of PKS is very much inspired by the movement of Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) headquartered in Egypt that thriving the implementation of sharia.

18 JI has close links with al-Qaeda and Islamic insurgents in the Philippines. JI is claimed to be headed by Indonesia’s most radical cleric, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Ba’asyir has been known as a controversial Islamic cleric for some reasons such as his fundamentalist ideology manifested in his conviction of anti-Pancasila and the establishment of Islamic state. See Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (editors), Islam, Politics and Change: The Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016): p. 13.

19 FPI is an Islamic fundamentalist conservative organization, established in 1998 after the downfall of the authoritarian regime of Suharto. Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, the founder of FPI, was supported by the political and military elites in establishing FPI. The pivotal aim of its establishment contained in three objectives as well as its demands: 1. Adversity of Islamic congregation under the reign of civil and military elites, particularly the violation of human rights against the Islamic people. 2. Moral decadency that is increasingly rampant in all sectors. 3. An obligation to preserve and maintain the Islamic values in the social life.
but rather implicitly contains as counterattack against any unjust systems of politics, economy, social and culture by providing an alternative of the Islamic system. Ahmad Syafii Maarif (forth: ASM) describes the phenomenon of the fundamentalist movement of those religious groups in sarcastic terms, that they are nothing more than just “preman berjubah: robed hoodlum” and the theology they impose to other groups and people in the societal life is “teologi maut: the death theology”. However, their movements are very much provoked by the political aims. On this matter, ASM stresses that the center of the identity politics in Indonesia dominantly is ethnicity, closed ideologies and religion for the interest of the local elites.

In practical ground, the advent of the Indonesian fundamentalism is marked by the movements of militant religious organizations like HTI, JI, FPI and JT, and political parties like PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Party of Prosperous Justice) ASM categorizes as a militant religious party that politically urge the implementation of Islamic law into the state constitution. ASM examines that though in its official organizational documents, PKS admits democracy, pluralism, and nationalism of Indonesia, and even its political constitution is officially guided by the Madinah Charter that profess the plurality of religion of Indonesia, PKS practically is no doubt endorses an Islamic exclusive political agenda. PKS in paper is inclusive, but its inclusiveness, for ASM, is merely a temporary political tactics and a strategy of adapting its political strategy with the sociological facts of the Indonesian society.

Then it must be admitted that investigating the origin of the Indonesian fundamentalism is the same as tracing back to the history of the advent of religious groups and organizations. The convincing hint of the emergence of Indonesian fundamentalism can be found in the rebellion of DI/TII/NII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia/Negara Islam Indonesia: Islamic State/Indonesian Islamic Army/Indonesian Islamic State) led by Sekarmadji Maridjan

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20 Jamaah Tabligh is an Islamic organization for preaching. The main objective of this group is to restore the Islamic teachings, doctrines and traditions to the practices of the time of the prophet Muhammad, including the reviving of the practices of rites and Islamic custom.
21 See the report of Kompas.com (08/04/2017), *Syaffi Maarif: Negara Tidak Boleh Kalah oleh Penganut “Teologi Maut” = State Should not be Overpowered by Adherents of “Theology of Death”. See also Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita = Identity Politics and the Future of Our Pluralism (Jakarta: PUSAD Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 2010).
22 Ahmad Syafii Maarif (2010), *Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita*: p. 3.
23 See the analysis of Ahmad Syafii Maarif et al, *Syariat Islam Yes, Syariat Islam No: Dilema Piagam Madinah dalam Amandemen UUD 1945: Islamic Sharia Yes, Islamic Sharia No: The Dilemma of Medina Charter in the Amendment of 1945 Constitution, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001).
24 Ahmad Syafii Maarif (2010), *Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita*: p. 26.
Kartosoewirjo. DI was established in August 7th 1949. The rebellion was basically both a confrontation and political standing of the Islamic group against the Dutch imperialism who attempted to reoccupy Indonesia through a very political treaty, called Renville Treaty (Perjanjian Renville). It was West Java from which DI emerged that was re-annexed by the Dutch. Kartosoewirjo’s political conviction to establishing Negara Islam Indonesia - NII (Indonesian Islamic State: IIS) under the principle of Islamic Sharia (Islamic Law), in spite of driven by political aims against the annexation of Dutch, also strongly compiles the requirements of fundamentalism. Here is the original proclamation of DI/TII:

“The Proclamation of the Establishment of NII/IIS: We, the Muslims of the Indonesian nation, declare: the establishment of NII/IIS, then the law that applies to NII/IIS is Islamic law. Allah the Great! Allah the Great! Allah the Great!

Signed: S.M.Kartosoewirjo. Madinah-Indonesia, 12 Sjawal 1368/August 7th 1948."

The establishment of IIS basically has two main reasons; terminating the re-occupancy of Dutch over Indonesian territory particularly West Java and disenchantment of Kartosoewirjo over Sukarno who acceded to the Renville Treaty. IIS politically has a beneficial objective for Indonesia that of terminating

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25 Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo (1905-1962) is one of the Islamic prominent figures in Indonesian history who led the rebellion of Darur Islam against the Indonesian government from 1949 to 1962. The aim of his rebellion is to compel the implementation of sacred teaching of Al-Qur’an and the establishment of Islamic state of Indonesia based on Sharia law. At his young age, Kartosoewirjo was succeed to study at ELS, a school established by the Dutch for European, after graduating from Inlandsche School der Tweede Klasse (ISTK), a school established by the Dutch for native Indonesians. At the time of his education at ELS he met Notodiharjo, a modern Islamic figure and from him Kartosoewirjo learned the ideas of modern Islam. His political activity and ideas was starting to evolve when he took another step of his education at Nederlands Indische Artsen School and after joining Syarikat Islam (Islamic Association), an Islamic merchant association, under the guidance of its top leader, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto. His political ideas and movement was very much influenced Tjokroaminoto.

26 Renville Treaty is a political treaty between the Dutch and the Indonesian government held in December 8th of 1947 on the US warship of Renville that was anchored in Jakarta. The treaty was mediated by special committee of the three states of Australia, Belgium and United States. Three points of agreement of the treaty gave rise to rebellion of DI/TII: 1. The Netherlands only recognizes Central Java, Yogyakarta and Sumatra as part of the Indonesian territory. 2. The agreement was made on a demarcation line separating Indonesian territory from the occupied territory of the Dutch. 3. The Indonesian national army (TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia) had to withdraw from West Java and East Java.

27 See Karl D. Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion (California: University of California Press, 1980). See also Djashar Djamil, Tri Suseno, and Wahyu Juantono, Pemberontakan DI/TII: Di Jawa Barat dan Jawa Tengah serta Operasi Penumpasannya. The Rebellion of Islamic State/Indonesian Islamic Army: In West Java and the Operation of Its Extermination (Jakarta: Penerbit Dinas Sejarah Angkatan Darat, 2018).
colonialism of the Dutch. For the short term end, employing religious ideology as a bind of patriotic spirit against the imperialists was practically advantageous for Indonesia. It is only applicable and beneficial in time of struggling for independence. But, it was disadvantageous for the long term end because employing the religious ideology for political purpose in time of independence in the multicultural state of Indonesia leads to various social detriments. However the repudiation of the Renville Treaty is compulsion for Indonesia only because the treaty takes side for the Dutch and noxiousness for the Indonesian.

In general, Indonesian fundamentalism has its typical characteristic. Indonesian fundamentalism has its roots in the movement of preserving religious doctrines and it evolves hand in hand with political preference notably with the Islamic politics. Indonesian fundamentalism is political in nature. Its emergence is slightly driven by the need of Islam against the ideology religiously unprofessed. It is mostly driven by political preferences of the political Islamists. It evolves side by side with the political contention between the two groups; the defenders of the unitary system of state and religion, and the defenders of the separation of the two like in the movement of Darul Islam. To comprehend the Indonesian fundamentalism must be at once taking in the political movements of the religious political parties and religious organizations, from the time of pre-independence till the present. Indonesian fundamentalism, if we may refer to the classification of Azyumardi Azra, is kind of a hybridization of “pre-modern fundamentalism or traditional fundamentalism” and “contemporary fundamentalism or neo-fundamentalism”. Traditional fundamentalism breaks out from a certain circumstances within Muslims themselves, and the rise of the contemporary fundamentalism is more of a reaction to the penetration of social systems that are considered unfair for the fundamentalists.

In my point of view, the formative factors of the Indonesian fundamentalism are divided into two ways of thoughts. The first is those who consider the “claim of the absolutism of religious truth” as a single determining factor of the rise of the Indonesian fundamentalism. Religious creed on the inerrancy of sacred texts requires them to take into account religious dogmas as a sole reference for any applicable laws and norms. It is a traditional

28 Azyumardi Azra, *Pergolakan Politik Islam: dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme, hingga Post-Modernisme* Islamic Political Upheaval: from Fundamentalism, Modernism, to Post-Modernism (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996): p. 111. See also Achmad Jainuri, *Orientasi Ideologi Gerakan Islam: Konservatisme, Fundamentalisme, Sekularisme dan Modernisme = Ideological Orientation of Islamic Movement: Conservatism, Fundamentalism, Secularism and Modernism* (Surabaya: Penerbit LPAM-Lembaga Pengkajian Agama dan Masyarakat = Publisher of the Institution of Religious and Community Studies, 2004): p. 73-74.
fundamentalism that is purely a religious fundamentalism. It is a traditional fundamentalism. Azra defines traditional fundamentalism as the movement of reviving the genuineness of religious dogmas, sacred texts and traditions. It is more genuine in the sense that it is purposefully inward-oriented to its adherents. It is a pure religious movement of upholding of faith and tradition which is exclusively limited to its adherents. Magisterial fundamentalism\textsuperscript{29} can also be referred to this type of fundamentalism that can be defined as an act of maintaining the authority of dogmas, doctrines, and religious traditions. I call this type of fundamentalism as \textit{religio-theologico fundamentalism} (RTF). It is a movement of maintaining religious doctrines and their authority through theological rationalization at least for its adherents. The second is those who perceive the emergence of the Indonesian fundamentalism as the act of repelling any unjust systems of social, politics, economy and culture. This type of fundamentalism can be categorized as contemporary fundamentalism. Its emergence in essence is a desideratum of repelling contemporary social systems that are considered not in line with beliefs of the fundamentalists. Some scholars categorize it as militant fundamentalism.\textsuperscript{30} Both types are applicable to the Indonesian fundamentalism.

I rather call the combination of the two types as \textit{religio-politico fundamentalism} (RPF). RPF is a fundamentalism that is not purely a religious movement. It is also an outward-oriented movement and that is political interest. In RPF, the movement of purifying the religious teachings and traditions are used as political strategy to influence the political choices of its adherents. We may say that in RPF religion is used as an instrument for political interest and vice versa. I take an example among the others of the existence of RPF ASM delivers in his analysis.

The metamorphosis of the movement of the Indonesian Islamic organizations, particularly the fundamentalist groups, can be taken as the vivid instances of RPF, particularly their place in the phenomenon of identity politics. It is undoubtedly to stress that the discourse of fundamentalism in Indonesia goes hand in hand with the discourse of the phenomenon of identity politics. The phenomenon of identity politics in Indonesia can be placed as one of the main indications of the phenomenon of RPF. Identity politics originally is defined for the first time by L.A. Kauffman. He traces its early phase from the

\textsuperscript{29} See https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330514457. The paper presented at the National Seminar on Religious Fundamentalism and Social Order at Andhra University, Visakhapatnam, February 26-27, 2010 by Domenic Marbaniang, Religious Fundamentalism and Social Order: A Philosophical Perspective: p. 9.

\textsuperscript{30} Domenic Marbaniang (2010), Religious Fundamentalism and Social Order: A Philosophical Perspective: p. 9-10.
student movement of anti-violence, known as SNCC; The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in America. SNCC mainly concerned on the advocacy of civil rights in America in the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{31} The movement was expanded to the identity politics in 1970s in the midst of social issues such as minority class, gender, feminism, race, skin color, ethnicity and many others. The bottom aim of identity politics in American history is the struggle of the alienated minority groups and ethnics against the domination of majority class in the field of politics, economy, social, culture, education, and many other aspects of social life. Identity politics in early time of its emersion was closely to Marxian class struggle against any sorts of unjust systems of politics and economy.

Identity politics in Indonesia, particularly the politics of the Islamic fundamentalist groups along the Reformation era, can be considered as negative identity politics. It is reasonable of saying it that their movements in the Indonesian politics are much more exclusive under the spirit of religious political objectives. Identity politics is considered one of the main features of fundamentalism performed by the fundamentalist groups. Their political movement can be counted as identity politics not only in terms of “class struggle”, but also closely to an exclusive religious movement. They employ and exploit religion as political instrument for the sake of their political preference. Their identity politics is very close to militant fundamentalism that is eliminative in the form of alienating and eliminating other groups that are not in line with their religious ideology. The acknowledged analysis of ASM convincingly elucidates about the single line of relation between identity politics and fundamentalism. He tightly concerns on the feature of the Indonesian fundamentalist groups. ASM in general associates fundamentalism with the establishment and the movements of religious groups from the Reform Movement in 1998 to the present. He insists that the emergence of the fundamentalist groups come up hand in hand with the dynamic of identity politics, and the roles of the Islamic fundamentalist groups are notable in shaping the problems of fundamentalism in Indonesia. In his scientific oration entitled "Identity Politics and the Future of Our Pluralism"\textsuperscript{32} at the Nurchloish Madjid Memorial Lecture (NMML), ASM presented the problem of fundamentalism.

\textsuperscript{31} Ahmad Syafii Maarif (2010), Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita: p. 4. See also L.A. Kauffman, The Anti-Politics of Identity; Socialist Review, No. 1, Vol. 20 (Jan.-March 1990): p. 67-80.

\textsuperscript{32} Ahmad Syafii Maarif (2010), Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita: p. vii.
Contemporary scholars, I consider Dustin Berna’s explication as one of the more relevant points, correlate fundamentalism with the political economic turmoil. There are four conditions within fundamentalism he takes into account:

“1. Marxism; he socioeconomic inequality argument of Marx is the sole reason for collective action of Islamic fundamentalists. 2. Resource mobilization theory; resources (the resources are money and population) are positively associated with the number and strength of Islamic fundamentalist movements. 3. Political process theory; the key foundation of political process theory includes the import role that political institutions play in facilitating social movement….This is especially true in the Islamic world because westernization, modernization, Americanization, poverty, socioeconomic inequality, and lack of democracy all help facilitate Islamic collective behavior, specifically the rise and success of Islamic fundamentalists. 4. New social movement theory; the social movement participants are looking to enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society and that membership in these movement(s) falls into two categories: those who paying the costs of modernization and those who have been marginalized by the development of the welfare state and the new middle class”.

The four conditions Dustin takes to picture the relation between fundamentalism and political economic turmoil are relevant to the Indonesian RPF. The rise of the Indonesian fundamentalist groups contains a Marxian movement in the sense that their movement is a social movement. The fundamentalists through political movement stand to fight against the socioeconomic inequality. It is fitted to place this view on Indonesian context. In 2020 the number of poor people is about 26.42 million. The economic imbalance between the haves and the have not is sharply getting wider. "The income of one conglomerate in Indonesia is almost the same as the income of 37 million farm workers." This wide gap between the rich and the poor is the Indonesia’s biggest problem today. In front of the problem, the resource mobilization theory is very much relevant that the Islamic fundamentalist

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33 See Dissertation of Dustin Berna that has been accepted for inclusion in University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertation by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. See: D. Dustin Berna, A Revolutionary Perspective on Social Movement: Fundamentalism in the Islamic World (Louisiana: Univeristy of New Orleans, 2008): p. 4-7.

34 See https://www.bps.go.id/pressrelease/2020/07/15/1744/persentase-penduduk-miskin-maret-2020-naik-menjadi-9.78-persen.html. Press release of Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia) on 15.07.2020 with the title: “Presentase Penduduk Miskin Maret 2020 naik menjadi 9.78 persen” (The percentage of poor people in March 2020 increased to 9.78 percent).

35 The researcher and analyst at Megawati Institute, Faishal Rahman, discovers that the income of 40 richest people in Indonesia approximately grow 17 percent between 2006 and 2016. See: Tempo.co, ed. Dewi Rina Cahyani, Wednesday, 21.03.2018 at 17:25.
groups, as they confidently stand to tackle down the inequality and striving for justice. Islamic fundamentalism is basically a social movement against the discriminatory system in the contemporary era, including against the imperialism in the colonial time. The bottom line of the movement of the Islamic fundamentalists can be viewed as an “alternative system” proposed by the fundamentalists groups against the contemporary system that fail to bring prosperity by employing religious fervor as an alternative choice to amplify their militancy in striving for fairness.

PURSUANCE OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT

Indonesian fundamentalism is a complex social fact that must be closely scrutinize beyond the religious movement of preserving religious supremacy and absolutism; militancy of claiming and standing up for the absolute truth of sacred texts, religious doctrines and religious traditions. To comprehend it requires a multidimensional approach beyond its untoward implications into social lives such as intolerance, extremism, and terrorism. It needs to be examined from various perspectives, and its linkage to the economic and political quandaries is fundamental to be comprehensively comprehended. This is the time to deeply examine the emergence of the Indonesian fundamentalism as a reaction to any unjust system of economy and politics, both in global and national level.

I use the analysis of contemporary researchers to examine the Indonesian fundamentalism, like Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, Yahya Wijaya, and other scholars. Risakota, for example, perceives that Indonesian fundamentalism is a sort of socio-political and socio-economic movement of the religious groups in tackling down any kinds of the unfairness of socio-economic and political system. Rissakota both quotes and rejects the idea of Paul F. Knitter who perceives that “The free market has become the new, universal,

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36 Place this situation in the Armstrong’s analysis. She convinces that the one of the main goals of the Islamic fundamentalism and the movement of Islamic politics is to pursue social justice. See Karen Armstrong, Sejarah Islam; Telaah Ringkas -Komprehensif Perkembangan Islam Sepanjang Zaman terj.Yuliani Liputo, Bandung: Mizan, 2014): p. 224. See also the analysis of R. Hrair Dekmejian in Sireen T. Hunter (editor), The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988): p. 9-10. In Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences, Dekemjian underlines of the multidimensional crisis, particularly a crisis in the socio-political and economic fields as one of the main factors of the emergence of Islamic revivalism.

37 See Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, Globalization and Religion from an Indonesian Perspective in Heidi Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (editor), Overcoming Fundamentalism: Ethical Responses from Five Continents (Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009): p. 89-109.
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absolute, and exclusive religion of peoples all over the world.”³⁸ He objects the common view that the Indonesian fundamentalism is rooted in the argumentation emphasizing that globalization as a new idolatry is a fundamentalist religion of consumerism (greed, lies and waste), and therefore fundamentalism is perceived as a rhetorical wake-up call to the major religions to oppose this new idolatry. Globalization, he insists, is not religion, not even false religion.³⁹ He assesses that the rise of the Indonesian fundamentalism is more of a reaction against any sorts of unjust socio-economic and political system. He states that “Religions should play a part in modifying the mosaic of structures that make up globalization, especially those that tend towards idolatry, destruction of the environment and oppression of the poor”.⁴⁰

According to Rissakota “The power of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia does not come from petrodollars but rather from a compelling counter narrative in opposition to the determinist narrative of world systems theory”.⁴¹ It can be viewed that the Indonesian fundamentalism is a counter narrative against the deterministic systems, one of which is capitalism. He repels the historical perspective on global domination that claims that “religion is a secondary category. Religion is considered only a sub-system of economics. In dependency theory, religion may be seen as a tool for domination. Religion may be a political base or an interest group. Or religion is viewed as a commodity, something that is “sold” for economic motives. He takes on the same line with George Yudice’s assessment⁴² that religion and culture are increasingly understood as resources to be managed. But in any case, religion is considered marginal. The real system of globalization runs on wealth and power.”⁴³ He refuses the idea that place religions as an instrument for economic or political motives.

He further explains that:

“I do not believe that religion is a sub-system of economics. In different ways, Durkheim, Mendieta, Benedict Anderson and Charles Taylor all argue that religion shapes the fundamental social imaginary that makes human communities possible, including the global community. Whether or not this is so, religion, at the least, is a basic structure of human communities that interacts with other basic structures,

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³⁸ Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 90.
³⁹ Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 90.
⁴⁰ Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 91.
⁴¹ Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 104.
⁴² Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 103. See also George Yúdice, The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).
⁴³ Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 103.
including economic structures, to create and maintain our world. Religion is one of the major forces of globalization, tying people together across the globe, transcending race, nationality, culture and class. We may view religion as sometimes the handmaid of imperialism, blessing the colonizers and softening up their victims for domination. But that is not the whole story. Religion also frequently works for liberation, resistance to oppression, education, health and human equality. Religion will never be just a subsystem of economics because people from all religions are frequently motivated by transcendent values that cannot be “tamed” by economic greed.”

If we posit Rissakota’s assessment in the context of the Indonesian fundamentalism, it denotes an important perspective about the emergence of fundamentalism as a class struggle from the oppressed groups both economically and politically against the deterministic system of capitalism. Religion shown in the movement of fundamentalists is used as the instrument binding them to achieve their goal of transforming and rectifying inequitable system. Religious dogmas are also used as the alternative ideological values proposed to replace the values the fundamentalists consider unfair and unjust. Fundamentalism in the perspective of the theory of the social function of religion as in the idea of Marx, Freud, and Durkheim is defined as a social act and movement of transforming the social systems applicable in the society.

Another researcher, Yahya Wijaya, marks the emergence of the Indonesian fundamentalism as a reaction against the deterministic systems of politics and economy. In “Islamic Fundamentalism on the Economy” he looks into the movement of HTI as an act of confronting injustice in economic and political field. The objective of HTI’s fundamentalism in insisting the implementation of Sharia is to promote the transformation of economic welfare and politics. In “Controversies over Sharia” he takes example of the dispute between two groups of fundamentalists in Indonesian parliament; Christian fundamentalists and Islamic fundamentalists that affiliate to political parties. Christian fundamentalists firmly stand to oppose the implementation of Sharia law. While, the Islamic fundamentalists argue that moral decadency of Indonesia is only able to be overcome by the strict implementation of Islamic law in any

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44 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 103-104
45 See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, translated by Karen Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995).
46 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 132-140.
47 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 143-144.
level. Its implementation is not only for Muslim society but also must be applied in any field of economy, politics, public service, education, and other sectors. He writes:

“Fifty-six members of the Indonesian parliament recently submitted a petition protesting by laws which they consider Sharia-based. Most of these members of parliament are affiliated with a political party which is supported by both conservative-Evangelical and Pentecostal/Charismatic Christians. The petition reflects the tension which exists between the Muslim and Christian communities, particularly their fundamentalist wings, concerning the attempt to implement Sharia more explicitly in Indonesia. The Muslims are concerned with increasing moral problems of the country, which, they believe can only be solved by implementing Sharia more comprehensively and assertively, not only in the conventional areas, such as marriage and worship within the Muslim community, but also in the wider public sphere of politics, the economy, public services, the media, civil law and education.”

The implementation of Sharia in pluralistic society of Indonesia not only endangers the principle of equality, but its primary threat to social order lies in its feature of exclusionism. Urging the implementation of a single standard of religious norms into pluralistic society in the name of the “majority reason” only leads to the elimination and alienation the other religious adherents. I stand in the same line with the scholars who stress that the implementation of Sharia is a simplistic and lacks a credible analysis of contemporary social problems.

In his further commentary of "Islamic Fundamentalism on the Economy", Yahya explains that the use of the Sharia principle in the economic field is a motion of resistance to the (Western) capitalist system. While reaffirming the assessment of Pradana Boy, he writes that "the phenomenon of the Sharia economy is related to the increase of religious fundamentalism, which derives the attempt to Islamize all levels of societal life....this attempt as a cultural strategy of Islamic fundamentalism to tackle the domination of global (read: Western) capitalism and its cultural invasion. Sharia is understood as a form of local culture to be reasserted in order to "de-westernize" the society."

In his conclusion Yahya stresses that the Indonesian fundamentalism is not only defined and understood in the scope of “truth claim” but also in the ethics of economic problems. He insists that:

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48 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 139.
49 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 140.
50 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 143.
“The contradiction between Christian and Islamic fundamentalist groups is not limited to the matter of “truth claims” as focused on in much inter-religious dialogue. In terms of economic ethics, there is potential conflict between the two groups in a way that reflects Samuel Huntington’s theory on the Clash of Civilizations. Whilst the Christian fundamentalist-neo-Pentecostal groups tend to take the existing market economy for granted, feeling free to employ its strategy and culture, the Islamic ones struggle for an alternative, designed according to the system operated in the early period of the development of Islam. However, a practical confrontation between them will not easily occur, since the ambition of the Islamic groups to put their concept into practice by first getting rid of the existing economic system, finds it hard to gain enough support from the wider Islamic community. Even the Muslim business community which may share the ideal of the fundamentalist groups, in practice takes a more pragmatic way, making possible easy relations with any business actor in the marketplace, regardless of religious affiliation.”

**RECOMMENDATION**

Siswono Yudohusodo, Minister of Transmigration of Suharto’s administration, 27 years ago forewarned of the problem of social injustice as the bottom source of any sorts of any revolt. In his welcoming speech during the book launch of “Demografi Politik: Pembangunan Indonesia Dari Riau Sampai Timor-Timur” (Demography of Politics: The Development of Indonesia from Riau to East Timor), he alerted that “Ketidakadilan sosial merupakan alasan bagi segmen-segmen masyarakat untuk memilih jalannya sendiri-sendiri: social injustice is the reason of why social groups take their own approaches”. The main context of his note was the revival of insurgent groups of Free Papua Movement, Free Aceh Movement and Disintegration Movement of East Timor.

The core point of his remarks lies in the example he took of the historical proof of the split of India and Pakistan in 1948 that he considered as an example. Disintegration of India and Pakistan had roots in social clash between Hindus and Muslims. Pakistanis who are dominantly Muslims are discriminated by the Hindus. It went the same to the split of Pakistan and Bangladesh which

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51 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), *Overcoming Fundamentalism*: p. 147.
52 See the report of Suara Pembaruan, book launch with the title “Siswono: Ketidakadilan Sosial Merupakan Roh Pemberontakan”: p. 17. The book is “Demografi Politik: Pembangunan Indonesia Dari Riau Sampai Timor-Timur”, written by fellow researcher of LIPI (Indonesian Institute of Sciences), Riwanto Tirtosudarmo. *See also* Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, “Demografi Politik: Pembangunan Indonesia Dari Riau Sampai Timor-Timur” (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996).
are both Muslim countries. Siswono ensured that those problems are rooted in
the absence of social justice. What Siswono has stated and alerted almost three
decades ago has still been relevant in our time.

Indonesia is not only suffered from the rebellious acts of separation, but
also from social cleavage such as fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism, and
terrorism of the hardliner groups. Bassam Tibi aptly explicates it that religious
fundamentalism has nothing to do with spiritual belief, but dominantly it is
related to political activity in which religion is employed as a political
instrument. He emphasizes that "Religious Fundamentalism not as a spiritual
faith, but as a political ideology based on the politicizing of religion for
sociopolitical and economic goals in the pursuit of establishing a divine
order. By definition, then, this ideology is exclusive, in the sense that it
attacks opposing options, primarily those secular outlooks that resist the
linking of religion to politics."

The phenomenon of Indonesian contemporary fundamentalism that is
characterized by acute segmentation among Indonesian people based on
ethnicity, religion, and race have to be comprehended through tracing the roots
on the ill policies at any sectors since the time of New Order regime.
Fundamentalism that is perceived as the source of socio-cultural clash in our
time has the roots in the past. We may consider the analysis of Daniel Dhakidae
in *Cendikiawan dan Kekuasaan* (Intellectual and Power) and the Harold
Crouch in *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* that closely examine of this
problem. And also I place the important report of Adam Schwarz of the
discriminatory policies of New Order regime that bears the identity politics or
racial politics along the Reformation era. They envision the face of Indonesia in
the future through identifying the policies the stakeholders performs in all
sectors. The revival of the fundamentalist groups at the present must be
perceived as the “rotten fruit” of the ill-policies in the past, particularly in the
sector of politics and economy. Schwarz report on the economic policy that was
dominated by Chinese ethnic, for example, bears a religious sentiment, and it is
fundamentalism as one of the horrific excess. This is the convincing ground of

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53 Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, (University of California Press: 1998) Cet. 1, h. 20.
54 See the analysis of Daniel Dhakidae, *Cendikiawan dan Kekuasaan Dalam Negara Orde Baru = Intellectual and Power in State of New Order Regime* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2003): p. 561-608.
55 See Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (USA: Cornell University Press, 1978).
56 See Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (San Francisco: Westview Press Boulder, 1994).
why fundamentalism is counted as a rebellious act against social injustice and discriminatory systems.

It is convincingly acceptable to admit of what Budiono Kusumohamidjojo stresses that the phenomenon of the revival of fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism and terrorism must be taken as the alert of the fact of the absence of the implementation of Pancasila, particularly of its fifth principle; *Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia* (Social justice to the Indonesian people). The absence of social justice is the upshot of the triple primitivism; bureaucratic primitivism in the form of corruption-collusion-nepotism, political primitivism in the form of oligarchic politics, and social primitivism in the form of racial supremacy. The first two primitivisms are the causes, while the third is the outcome. Fundamentalism therefore cannot only be regarded as religious arrogance and supremacy, but also as an alternative choice and at the same time as an act of repelling any kinds of the unfairness of social systems.

Fundamentalism from this side of reference must be conceded as a wake-up call of the importance of transforming systems, approaches and public institutions in any fields. The “gradual Christianization” movement in the American fundamentalists or “gradual Islamisation” in the Indonesian fundamentalist and puritans must not merely be discerned as the religious movement *an sich*. They are the explicit expression and the vivid utterance of the counteraction against injustice. The *Jemaah Tabliyah* movement in Indonesia that adopted the ideology of *Ikhwanul Muslim/Muslimin* (Muslim Brotherhood), for example, is importantly viewed as the social movement. The movement copies the idea of “gradual Islamisation”: moving in phases from Islamising individuals, to Islamising families, to Islamising society, and then Islamising the polity. It is an alternative movement and also an express of their resentment of the absence of social justice.

Though the essentialist theorists of religion like Edward Burnett Tylor, James George Frazer, Rudolf Otto, and including Ernest Bloch disagree with functionalist theorists that reduce religion to economy and politics, fundamentalism as a socio-religious movement is very much shaped by the political economic aspects. Bloch, for example, states that “religion would be ill perceived if reduced to economic and social conditions because religion is an

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57 See Budiono Kusumohamidjojo, *Filsafat Politik dan Kotak Pandora Abad ke-21: Political Philosophy and the Pandora’s Box of the 21st Century* (Yogyakarta: Percetakan Jalasutra, 2014): p. 227-231

58 Edited by Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (2016), *Islam, Politics and Change: The Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto* p. 48
entity in itself. Though it is embedded in social realities, it is not simply a reflection of them and can affect both social and economic conditions of life”.

The essentialists in some reasons are on the mark, but fundamentalism from the perspective of social function of religion of the functionalists like Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Emil Durkheim and many others has its relevance in social movement against social injustice. Amartya Sen on the other hand warns of the importance of placing the social justice on the first place if the world intends to engage in discussion of ways and means of stopping terrorism, and the movements alike.

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