On Equilibria in Quantitative Games with Reachability/Safety Objectives

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Abstract. In this paper, we study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with both reachability and safety objectives. In this framework a player with a reachability objective aims at reaching his own goal as soon as possible whereas a player with a safety objective aims at avoiding his bad set or, if impossible, delaying its visit as long as possible. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria with finite memory in quantitative multiplayer reachability/safety games. Moreover, we prove the existence of finite-memory secure equilibria for quantitative two-player reachability games.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium, Turn-based quantitative game, Secure equilibrium, Reachability/Safety objectives.

1 Introduction

General framework. The construction of correct and efficient computer systems (hardware or software) is recognized as an extremely difficult task. To support the design and verification of such systems, mathematical logic, automata theory [10] and more recently model-checking [7] have been intensively studied. The model-checking approach, which is now an important part of the design cycle in industries, has proved its efficiency when applied to systems that can be accurately modeled as a finite-state automaton. In contrast, the application of these techniques to computer software, complex systems like embedded systems or distributed systems has been less successful. This could be partly explained by the following reasons: classical automata-based models do not faithfully capture the complex interactive behavior of modern computational systems that are usually composed of several interacting components, also interacting with an environment that is only partially under control. Recent research works show that it is suitable to generalize automata models used in the classical approach to verification, with the more flexible and mathematically deeper game-theoretic framework [14,15].

Game theory meets automata theory. The basic framework that extends computational models with concepts from game theory is the so-called two-player zero-sum games played on graphs [8]. Many problems in verification and design of reactive systems can be modeled with this approach, like modeling controller-environment interactions. Given a model of a system interacting with a hostile environment, given a control objective (like preventing the system to reach some bad configurations), the controller synthesis problem asks to build a controller ensuring that the control objective is enforced whatever the environment will do. Two-player zero-sum games played on graphs are adequate models to solve this problem [10]. Moves of Player 1 model actions of the controller whereas moves of Player 2 model the uncontrollable
actions of the environment, and a winning strategy for Player 1 is an abstract form of a control program that enforces the control objective.

The controller synthesis problem is suitable to model purely antagonist interactions between a controller and a hostile environment. However in order to study more complex systems with more than two components whose objectives are not necessarily antagonist, we need multiplayer and non zero-sum games to model them adequately. Moreover, we do not look for winning strategies, but rather try to find relevant notions of equilibria, for instance the famous notion of Nash equilibria [14]. On the other hand, only qualitative objectives have been considered so far to specify, for example, that a player must be able to reach a target set of states in the underlying game graph. But, in line with the previous point, we also want to express and solve games for quantitative objectives such as forcing the game to reach a particular set of states within a given time bound, or within a given energy consumption limit. In summary, we need to study equilibria for multiplayer non zero-sum games played on graphs with quantitative objectives. This article provides some new results in this research direction.

Related work. Several recent papers have considered two-player zero-sum games played on finite graphs with regular objectives enriched by some quantitative aspects. Let us mention some of them: games with finitary objectives [6], games with prioritized requirements [1], request-response games where the waiting times between the requests and the responses are minimized [11,17], and games whose winning conditions are expressed via quantitative languages [2].

Other works concern qualitative non zero-sum games. The notion of secure equilibrium, an interesting refinement of Nash equilibrium, has been introduced in [5]. It has been proved that a unique secure equilibrium always exists for two-player non zero-sum games with regular objectives. In [9], general criteria ensuring existence of Nash equilibria, subgame perfect equilibria (resp. secure equilibria) are provided for n-player (resp. 2-player) games, as well as complexity results.

Finally, we mention reference [3] that combines both quantitative and non zero-sum aspects. It is maybe the nearest related work compared to us, however the framework and the objectives are pretty different. In [3], the authors study games played on graphs with terminal vertices where quantitative payoffs are assigned to the players. These games may have cycles but all the infinite plays form a single outcome (like in chess where every infinite play is a draw). That paper gives criteria that ensure the existence of Nash (and subgame perfect) equilibria in pure and memoryless strategies.

Our contribution. We here study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In this framework each player aims at reaching his own goal as soon as possible. We focus on existence results for two solution concepts: Nash equilibrium and secure equilibrium. We prove the existence of finite-memory Nash (resp. secure) equilibria in n-player (resp. 2-player) games. Moreover, we prove that given a Nash (resp. secure) equilibrium of a n-player (resp. 2-player) game, we can build a finite-memory Nash (resp. secure) equilibrium of the same type, i.e. preserving the set of players achieving their objectives. For the case of Nash equilibria, we extend our results in two directions. First we prove that finite-memory Nash equilibria still exist when the model is enriched by allowing n-tuples of non-negative costs on edges (one cost by player). This result provides an answer to a question we posed in [4]. Secondly, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in quantitative games where both safety and reachability objectives coexist.
Our results are not a direct consequence of the existing results in the qualitative framework, they require some new proof techniques. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first general result about the existence of equilibria in quantitative multiplayer games played on graphs.

**Organization of the paper.** Section 2 is dedicated to definitions. We present the games and the equilibria we study. In Section 3 we first prove an existence result for Nash equilibria and provide the finite-memory characterization. Similar results concerning secure equilibria in two-player games are established in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss the extensions of our results on Nash equilibria.

A part of these results has been published in [4], namely the existence of finite-memory Nash (resp. secure) equilibria in multiplayer (resp. 2-player) games, and the fact that given a Nash equilibrium we can build a finite-memory Nash equilibrium of the same type. Additionally in this paper we give proofs of the previous results and we extend our existence result for Nash equilibria in the two directions mentioned above, namely (i) $n$-tuples of non-negative costs on edges and (ii) reachability/safety objectives. Moreover, in the two-player case, we prove that given a secure equilibrium, we can build a finite-memory secure equilibrium of the same type.

## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 Definitions

We consider here quantitative games played on a graph where all the players have reachability objectives. It means that, given a certain set of vertices $\text{Goal}_i$, each player $i$ wants to reach one of these vertices as soon as possible.

This section is mainly inspired by reference [9].

**Definition 1.** An infinite turn-based quantitative multiplayer reachability game is a tuple $G = (\Pi, V, (V_i)_{i \in \Pi}, v_0, E, (\text{Goal}_i)_{i \in \Pi})$ where

- $\Pi$ is a finite set of players,
- $G = (V, (V_i)_{i \in \Pi}, v_0, E)$ is a finite directed graph where $V$ is the set of vertices, $(V_i)_{i \in \Pi}$ is a partition of $V$ into the state sets of each player, $v_0 \in V$ is the initial vertex, and $E \subseteq V \times V$ is the set of edges, and
- $\text{Goal}_i \subseteq V$ is the goal set of player $i$.

We assume that each vertex has at least one outgoing edge. The game is played as follows. A token is first placed on the vertex $v_0$. Player $i$, such that $v_0 \in V_i$, has to choose one of the outgoing edges of $v_0$ and put the token on the vertex $v_1$ reached when following this edge. Then, it is the turn of the player who owns $v_1$. And so on.

A play $\rho \in V^\omega$ (resp. a history $h \in V^+$) of $G$ is an infinite (resp. a finite) path through the graph $G$ starting from vertex $v_0$. Note that a history is always non empty because it starts with $v_0$. The set $H \subseteq V^+$ is made up of all the histories of $G$. A prefix (resp. proper prefix) $p$ of a history $h = h_0 \ldots h_k$ is a finite sequence $h_0 \ldots h_l$, with $l \leq k$ (resp. $l < k$), denoted by $p \leq h$ (resp. $p < h$). We similarly consider a prefix $p$ of a play $\rho$, denoted by $p < \rho$.

We say that a play $\rho = \rho_0\rho_1 \ldots$ visits a set $S \subseteq V$ (resp. a vertex $v \in V$) if there exists $l \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\rho_l$ is in $S$ (resp. $\rho_l = v$). The same terminology also stands for a history $h$. Similarly, we say that $\rho$ visits $S$ after (resp. in) a prefix $\rho_0 \ldots \rho_k$ if there exists $l > k$ (resp. $l \leq k$) such that $\rho_l$ is in $S$. For any play $\rho$ we denote by $\text{Visit}(\rho)$ the set of players $i \in \Pi$.

\footnote{The general case of reachability/safety objectives is handled in Subsection 5.1}
such that ρ visits Goal_i. The set Visit(h) for a history h is defined similarly. The function Last returns, given a history h = h₀...hₖ, the last vertex hₖ of h, and the length |h| of h is the number k of its edges.

For any play ρ = ρ₀ρ₁... of G, we note Costᵢ(ρ) the cost of player i, defined by:

$$\text{Cost}_i(\rho) = \begin{cases} l & \text{if } l \text{ is the least index such that } \rho_l \in \text{Goal}_i, \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We note Cost(ρ) = (Costᵢ(ρ))ᵢ∈Π the cost profile for the play ρ. The aim of each player i is to minimize the cost he has to pay, i.e. reach his goal set Goalᵢ as soon as possible.

A strategy of player i in G is a function σ : V*ᵢ → V assigning to each history hv ending in a vertex v of player i, a next vertex σ(hv) such that (v, σ(hv)) belongs to E. We say that a play ρ = ρ₀ρ₁... of G is consistent with a strategy σ of player i if ρₖ₊₁ = σ(ρ₀...ρₖ) for all k ∈ N such that ρₖ ∈ Vᵢ. The same terminology is used for a history h of G. A strategy profile of G is a tuple (σᵢ)ᵢ∈Π where σᵢ is a strategy for player i. It determines a unique play of G consistent with each strategy σᵢ, called the outcome of (σᵢ)ᵢ∈Π and denoted by ⟨(σᵢ)ᵢ∈Π⟩.

A strategy σ of player i is memoryless if σ depends only on the current vertex, i.e. σ(hv) = σ(v) for all h ∈ H and v ∈ Vᵢ. More generally, σ is a finite-memory strategy if the equivalence relation ∼ᵢ on H defined by h ∼ᵢ h’ if σ(hδ) = σ(h’δ) for all δ ∈ V*ᵢ has finite index. In other words, a finite-memory strategy is a strategy that can be implemented by a finite automaton with output. A strategy profile (σᵢ)ᵢ∈Π is called memoryless or finite-memory if each σᵢ is a memoryless or a finite-memory strategy, respectively.

For a strategy profile (σᵢ)ᵢ∈Π with outcome ρ and a strategy σ’ᵢ of player j (j ∈ Π), we say that player j deviates from ρ after a prefix h of ρ if there exists a prefix h’ of ρ such that h ≤ h’, h’ is consistent with σ’ᵢ and σ’ᵢ(h’) ≠ σᵢ(h). We also say that player j deviates from ρ just after a prefix h of ρ if h is consistent with σ’ᵢ and σ’ᵢ(h) ≠ σᵢ(h).

We now introduce the notion of Nash equilibrium and secure equilibrium.

**Definition 2.** A strategy profile (σᵢ)ᵢ∈Π of a game G is a Nash equilibrium if for all player j ∈ Π and for all strategy σ’ᵢ of player j, we have:

$$\text{Cost}_j(\rho) \leq \text{Cost}_j(\rho’)$$

where ρ = ⟨(σᵢ)ᵢ∈Π⟩ and ρ’ = ⟨σ’ᵢ, (σᵢ)ᵢ∈Π \{j}⟩.

This definition means that player j (for all j ∈ Π) has no incentive to deviate since he increases his cost when using σ’ᵢ instead of σᵢ. Keeping notations of Definition 2 in mind, a strategy σ’ᵢ such that Costᵢ(ρ) > Costᵢ(ρ’) is called a profitable deviation for player j with respect to (σᵢ)ᵢ∈Π. In this case either player j pays an infinite cost for ρ and a finite cost for ρ’ (ρ visits Goalᵢ, but ρ does not), or player j pays a finite cost for ρ and a strictly lower cost for ρ’ (ρ’ visits Goalᵢ earlier than ρ does).

As our results on secure equilibria stand for two-player games, we define this notion only in this context. In order to define the concept of secure equilibrium, we need first to associate two appropriate binary relations ≪₁ and ≪₂ on cost profiles with player 1 and 2 respectively. Given two cost profiles (x₁, x₂) and (y₁, y₂):

$$(x₁, x₂) ≪₁ (y₁, y₂) \iff (x₁ > y₁) ∨ (x₁ = y₁ ∧ x₂ < y₂).$$

Note that the length is not defined as the number of vertices.

Our definition naturally extends the notion of secure equilibrium proposed in [5] to the quantitative reachability framework. A longer discussion comparing the two notions can be found in Section 2.2.
We then say that player 1 prefers \((y_1, y_2)\) to \((x_1, x_2)\). In other words, player 1 prefers a cost profile to another either if he can decrease his own cost, or if he can increase the cost of player 2, while keeping his own cost. We define the relation \(\prec_2\) symmetrically.

**Definition 3.** A strategy profile \((\sigma_1, \sigma_2)\) of a two-player game \(G\) is a secure equilibrium if there does not exist any strategy \(\sigma_1'\) of player 1 such that:

\[
\text{Cost}(\rho) \prec_1 \text{Cost}(\rho')
\]

where \(\rho = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)\) and \(\rho' = (\sigma_1', \sigma_2)\), and there does not exist any strategy \(\sigma_2'\) of player 2 such that:

\[
\text{Cost}(\rho) \prec_2 \text{Cost}(\rho')
\]

where \(\rho = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)\) and \(\rho' = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2')\).

In other words, player 1 (resp. 2) has no incentive to deviate, with respect to the relation \(\prec_1\) (resp. \(\prec_2\)). Note that any secure equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. A strategy \(\sigma_j'\) such that \(\text{Cost}(\rho) \prec_j \text{Cost}(\rho')\) is called a \(\prec_j\)-profitable deviation for player \(j\) with respect to \((\sigma_1, \sigma_2)\) (for \(j \in \{1, 2\}\)).

Let us go back to the multiplayer framework and define the notion of type of an equilibrium.

**Definition 4.** The type of a strategy profile \((\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi}\) in a reachability game \(G\) is the set of players \(j \in \Pi\) such that the outcome \(\rho\) of \((\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi}\) visits \(\text{Goal}_j\). It is denoted by \(\text{Type}((\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi})\).

In other words, \(\text{Type}((\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi}) = \text{Visit}(\rho)\).

The previous definitions are illustrated in the following example.

**Example 5.** Let \(G = (V, V_1, V_2, v_0, E, \text{Goal}_1, \text{Goal}_2)\) be the two-player game depicted in Figure 1. The states of player 1 (resp. 2) are represented by circles (resp. squares). Thus, according to Figure 1, \(V_1 = \{A, C, D\}\) and \(V_2 = \{B\}\), the initial vertex \(v_0\) is the vertex \(A\), and we set \(\text{Goal}_1 = \{C\}\) and \(\text{Goal}_2 = \{D\}\).

![Fig. 1. A two-player game with \(\text{Goal}_1 = \{C\}\) and \(\text{Goal}_2 = \{D\}\).](image)

An example of play in \(G\) is given by \(\rho = (AD)\omega\), which visits \(\text{Goal}_2\) but not \(\text{Goal}_1\), leading to the cost profile \(\text{Cost}(AD)\omega) = (+\infty, 1)\). The play \(\rho\) is, among others, the outcome of the strategy profile \((\sigma_1, \sigma_2)\) where \(\sigma_1(hA) = D\) and \(\sigma_2(hB) = C\), for all histories \(h\).

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4 We will keep this convention through the article.
5 Note that player 1 has no choice in vertices \(C\) and \(D\), that is, \(\sigma_1(hv)\) is necessarily equal to \(A\) for \(v \in \{C, D\}\).
Let us show that the strategy profile \((\sigma_1, \sigma_2)\) is not a Nash equilibrium, by proving that player 1 has a profitable deviation \(\sigma'_1\) in which he manages to decrease his own cost. With \(\sigma'_1\) defined by \(\sigma'_1(h) = B\), we get the play \(\langle \sigma'_1, \sigma_2 \rangle = (ABC)^\omega\) such that \(\text{Cost}((ABC)^\omega) = (2, +\infty)\), and in particular \(\text{Cost}_1((ABC)^\omega) < \text{Cost}_1(\rho)\).

On the opposite side, one can show that \((\sigma'_1, \sigma_2)\) is not a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, player 2 has a \(\prec\)-profitable deviation in which he can increase player 1’s cost without modifying his own cost. With \(\sigma'_2\) the strategy of player 2 defined by \(\sigma'_2(hB) = A\), we get the play \(\langle \sigma'_1, \sigma'_2 \rangle = (AB)^\omega\) such that \(\text{Cost}((AB)^\omega) = (+\infty, +\infty)\), and \(\text{Cost}((\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2)) \prec \text{Cost}((\sigma'_1, \sigma_2))\).

Notice that all strategies discussed so far are memoryless. In order to obtain a Nash equilibrium of type \(\{1, 2\}\), finite-memory strategies are necessary. We define the following finite-memory strategy profile \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\):

\[
\tau_1(hA) = \begin{cases} D & \text{if } h = \epsilon \\ B & \text{if } h \neq \epsilon \end{cases}; \quad \tau_2(hB) = \begin{cases} C & \text{if } h \text{ visits } D \\ A & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}
\]

The outcome \(\pi = ((\tau_1, \tau_2))\) is equal to \(AD(ABC)^\omega\) and has costs \((4, 1)\). In order to prove that \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\) is a Nash equilibrium, we prove that no player has a profitable deviation. For player 2 it is clearly impossible to get a cost less than 1. To try to get a cost less than 4, player 1 must use a strategy \(\tau'_1\) such that \(\tau'_1(A) = B\). But then player 2 chooses \(\tau_2(AB) = A\). The prefix \(ABA\) of the outcome of \((\tau'_1, \tau_2)\) shows that player 1 will increase his cost of 4.

However \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\) is not a secure equilibrium since player 2 has a \(\prec\)-profitable deviation \(\tau'_2\) such that \(\tau'_2(hB) = A\) for all histories \(h\). One can show that, in this example, there is no secure equilibrium of type \(\{1, 2\}\).

The questions studied in this article are the following ones:

**Problem 1** Given \(G\) a quantitative multiplayer (resp. two-player) reachability game, does there exist a Nash equilibrium (resp. a secure equilibrium) in \(G\)?

**Problem 2** Given a Nash equilibrium (resp. a secure equilibrium) in a quantitative multiplayer (resp. two-player) reachability game \(G\), does there exist a finite-memory Nash equilibrium (resp. secure equilibrium) with the same type?

We provide positive answers in Sections 3 and 4. Notice that these problems have been investigated in the qualitative framework (see [9]).

### 2.2 Qualitative Games vs Quantitative Games

We show in this section that Problems 1 and 2 cannot be reduced to problems on qualitative games.

Given a quantitative multiplayer reachability game \(G\), one can naturally define a qualitative version of \(G\), denoted by \(\overline{G}\), such that the payoff\(^6\) are qualitative. Given a play \(\rho\) of \(G\), the qualitative payoff of player \(i\) is defined by:

\[
\text{Payoff}_i(\rho) = \begin{cases} \text{Win} & \text{if } \text{Cost}_i(\rho) \text{ is finite} \\ \text{Lose} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}
\]

\(^6\) For qualitative games, we use the notion of payoff rather than the notion of cost since \(\text{Win}\) (resp. \(\text{Lose}\)) can be seen as a payoff of 1 (resp. 0) and the aim of the players is to maximize their payoffs.
We note $\text{Payoff}(\rho) = (\text{Payoff}_i(\rho))_{i \in I}$ the qualitative payoff profile for the play $\rho$. In this framework, player $i$ aims at reaching his own goal set, i.e. at obtaining payoff $\text{Win}$. With this idea in mind, one can naturally adapt the notion of Nash (resp. secure) equilibrium to the qualitative framework.

The existence of Nash (resp. secure) equilibria in $n$-player (resp. 2-player) qualitative games $\mathcal{G}$ has been proved in [9, Corollary 12] (resp. [5, Theorem 2]) for reachability objectives, and more generally for Borel objectives.

The next example illustrates that lifting Nash equilibria in $G$ to Nash equilibria in $\mathcal{G}$ does not work. We developed new ideas in Sections 3 and 4 to solve Problem 1.

Example 6. Let us now consider the two-player game $G$ depicted in Figure 2, such that $\text{Goal}_1 = \{B, E\}$ and $\text{Goal}_2 = \{C\}$. Notice that only player 1 effectively plays in this game. We are going to exhibit a secure (and thus Nash) equilibrium $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ in the qualitative game $\mathcal{G}$ that cannot be lifted neither to a secure nor to a Nash equilibrium in the quantitative game $G$. The strategy profile $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ is defined such that $\langle (\sigma_i, \sigma_i) \rangle = ADE^\omega$. It is a secure equilibrium in $\mathcal{G}$ with the qualitative payoff profile $(\text{Win}, \text{Lose})$. However $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ is not a Nash (and thus not a secure) equilibrium in $G$. Indeed, the play $ABC^\omega$ provides a smaller cost to player 1, i.e. $\text{Cost}_1(ABC^\omega) < \text{Cost}_1(ADE^\omega)$. Notice that in this example, there is no equilibrium in $G$ of type $\{1\}$.

Fig. 2. A game $G$ with an equilibrium in $\mathcal{G}$ that can not be lifted to $\mathcal{G}$.

The next proposition shows that on the opposite side, any Nash equilibrium in a quantitative game $G$ can be lifted to a Nash equilibrium in the qualitative game $\mathcal{G}$.

Proposition 7. If $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$ is a Nash equilibrium in a quantitative multiplayer reachability game $G$, then $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$ is also a Nash equilibrium in $\mathcal{G}$.

Proof. For a contradiction, let us assume that in $\mathcal{G}$, player $j$ has a profitable deviation $\sigma'_j$ w.r.t. $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$. This is only possible if $\text{Payoff}_j((\langle \sigma_i \rangle_{i \in I})) = \text{Lose}$ and $\text{Payoff}_j(\langle \sigma'_j, (\sigma_i)_{i \in I \setminus \{j\}} \rangle) = \text{Win}$. Thus when playing $\sigma'_j$ against $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I \setminus \{j\}}$, player $j$ manages to visit $\text{Goal}_j$. Clearly enough, $\sigma'_j$ would also be a profitable deviation w.r.t. $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$ in $G$, contradicting the hypothesis. \qed

Note that Proposition 7 is false for secure equilibria. To see that, let us come back to the game $G$ of Figure 2. The strategy profile $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ such that $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) = ABC^\omega$ is a secure equilibrium in the quantitative game $G$ but not in the qualitative game $\mathcal{G}$.

2.3 Unraveling

In the proofs of this article we need to unravel the graph $G = (V, (V_i)_{i \in I}, v_0, E)$ from the initial vertex $v_0$, which ends up in an infinite tree, denoted by $T$. This tree can be seen as a
new graph where the set of vertices is the set $H$ of histories of $G$, the initial vertex is $v_0$, and a pair $(hv, hv') \in H \times H$ is an edge of $T$ if $(v, v') \in E$. A history $h$ is a vertex of player $i$ in $T$ if $\text{Last}(h) \in V_i$, and it belongs to the goal set of player $i$ if $\text{Last}(h) \in \text{Goal}_i$. Moreover for all vertices $v$ and that forces the play to visit $v$ from which he wins the game, player 1 (resp. player 2) has a winning strategy from $v$.

We denote by $T$ the related game. This game $T$ played on the unraveling $T$ of $G$ is equivalent to the game $G$ that is played on $G$ in the following sense. A play $(\rho_0)(\rho_0\rho_1)(\rho_0\rho_1\rho_2)\ldots$ in $T$ induces a unique play $\rho = \rho_0\rho_1\rho_2\ldots$ in $G$, and conversely. Thus, we denote a play in $T$ by the respective play in $G$. The bijection between plays of $G$ and plays of $T$ allows us to use the same cost function $\text{Cost}$, and to transform easily strategies in $G$ to strategies in $T$ (and conversely).

We also need to study the tree $T$ limited to a certain depth $d \geq 0$: we note $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ the truncated tree of $T$ of depth $d$ and $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ the finite game played on $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$.

More precisely, the set of vertices of $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ is the set of histories $h \in H$ of length $\leq d$: the edges of $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ are defined in the same way as for $T$ except that for the histories $h$ of length $d$, there exists no edge $(h, hv)$. A play $\rho$ in $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ corresponds to a history of $G$ of length equal to $d$. The notions of cost and strategy are defined exactly like in the game $T$, but limited to the depth $d$. For instance, a player pays an infinite cost for a play $\rho$ (of length $d$) if his goal set is not visited by $\rho$.

### 2.4 Qualitative Two-player Zero-sum Reachability Games

In this section we recall well-known properties of qualitative two-player zero-sum reachability games [8, Chapter 2]. This will be necessary in our proofs.

**Definition 8.** A qualitative two-player zero-sum reachability game is a tuple $G = (V, V_1, V_2, E, \text{Goal})$ where

- $G = (V, V_1, V_2, E)$ is a finite directed graph where $V$ is the set of vertices, $V_1, V_2$ is a partition of $V$ into the state sets of player 1 and player 2, and $E \subseteq V \times V$ is the set of edges,
- $\text{Goal} \subseteq V$ is the goal set of player 1.

Given an initial vertex $v_0 \in V$, the notions of play, history and strategy are the same as the ones defined in Section 2.1. Player 1 (resp. player 2) wins a play $\rho$ of $G$ if $\rho$ visits $\text{Goal}$ (resp. $\rho$ does not visit $\text{Goal}$). The game is said zero-sum because every play is won by exactly one of the two players.

In zero-sum games, it is interesting to know if one of the players can play in such a way that he is sure to win, however the other player plays. We can formalize this by introducing the notion of winning strategy. A strategy $\sigma_i$ for player $i$ is a winning strategy from an initial vertex $v$ if all plays of $G$ starting in $v$ that are consistent with $\sigma_i$ are won by player $i$. If player $i$ has a winning strategy in $G$ from $v$, we say that player $i$ wins the game $G$ from $v$. We say that a game $G$ is determined if for all $v \in V$, one of the two players has a winning strategy from $v$.

Martin showed [13] that every qualitative two-player zero-sum game with a Borel type winning condition is determined. In particular, we have the following proposition:

**Proposition 9 (8).** Let $G = (V, V_1, V_2, E, \text{Goal})$ be a qualitative two-player zero-sum reachability game. Then for all $v \in V$, one of the two players has a memoryless winning strategy from $v$ (in particular, $G$ is determined).

Moreover for all vertices $v$ from which he wins the game, player 1 (resp. player 2) has a memoryless strategy that is independent of $v$ and that forces the play to visit $\text{Goal}$ within at most $|V| - 1$ edges (resp. to stay in $V \setminus \text{Goal}$).
3 Nash Equilibria

From now on we will often use the term game to denote a quantitative multiplayer reachability game according to Definition 1.

3.1 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium

In this section we positively solve Problem 1 for Nash equilibria.

Theorem 10. In every quantitative multiplayer reachability game, there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium.

The proof of this theorem is based on the following ideas. By Kuhn’s theorem (Theorem 11), there exists a Nash equilibrium in the game Trunc_d(T) played on the finite tree Trunc_d(T), for any depth d. By choosing an adequate depth d, Proposition 13 enables to extend this Nash equilibrium to a Nash equilibrium in the infinite tree T, and thus in G. Let us detail these ideas.

We first recall Kuhn’s theorem [12]. A preference relation is a total reflexive transitive binary relation.

Theorem 11 (Kuhn’s theorem). Let Γ be a finite tree and GΓ a game played on Γ. For each player i ∈ Π, let ≼_i be a preference relation on cost profiles. Then there exists a strategy profile (σ_i)_{i ∈ Π} such that for every player j ∈ Π and every strategy σ'_j of player j in GΓ we have

Cost(σ'_j) ≼_j Cost(σ)

where ρ = ⟨(σ_i)_{i ∈ Π}⟩ and ρ' = ⟨σ'_j, (σ_i)_{i ∈ Π \ \{j}⟩.

Note that Cost(σ'_j) ≼_j Cost(σ) means that player j prefers the cost profile of the play ρ than the one of ρ', or they are equivalent for him.

Corollary 12. Let G be a game and T be the unraveling of G. Let Trunc_d(T) be the game played on the truncated tree of T of depth d, with d ≥ 0. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium in Trunc_d(T).

Proof. For each player j ∈ Π, we define the relation ≼_j on cost profiles in the following way: let (x_i)_{i ∈ Π} and (y_i)_{i ∈ Π} be two cost profiles, we say that (x_i)_{i ∈ Π} ≼_j (y_i)_{i ∈ Π} iff x_j ≥ y_j. It is clearly a preference relation which captures the Nash equilibrium. The strategy profile (σ_i)_{i ∈ Π} of Kuhn’s theorem is then a Nash equilibrium in Trunc_d(T).

Proposition 13 states that it is possible to extend a Nash equilibrium in Trunc_d(T) to a Nash equilibrium in the game T, if the depth d is equal to (|Π| + 1) · 2 · |V|.

Corollary 12 and Proposition 13.

Proposition 13. Let G be a game and T be the unraveling of G. Let Trunc_d(T) be the game played on the truncated tree of T of depth d = (|Π| + 1) · 2 · |V|. If there exists a Nash equilibrium in the game Trunc_d(T), then there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium in the game T.

The proof of Proposition 13 roughly works as follows. Let (σ_i)_{i ∈ Π} be a Nash equilibrium in Trunc_d(T). A well-chosen prefix αβ, with β being a cycle, is first extracted from the outcome ρ of (σ_i)_{i ∈ Π}. The outcome of the required Nash equilibrium (τ_i)_{i ∈ Π} in T will be equal to αβ^ω. As soon as a player deviates from this play, all the other players form a coalition to
punish him in a way that this deviation is not profitable for him. These ideas are detailed in Lemmas 15 and 16. One can see Lemma 15 as a technical result used to prove Lemma 16. The proof of Lemma 15 relies on a particular case (stated below) of Proposition 9. More precisely, we consider the qualitative two-player zero-sum game $G_j$ played on the graph $G$, where player $j$ plays in order to reach his goal set $\text{Goal}_j$, against the coalition of all other players that wants to prevent him from reaching his goal set. Player $j$ plays on the vertices from $V_j$ and the coalition on $V \setminus V_j$.

**Proposition 14** ([5]). Let $G_j = (V, V_j, V \setminus V_j, E, \text{Goal}_j)$ be the qualitative two-player zero-sum reachability game associated to player $j$. Then player $j$ has a memoryless strategy $\nu_j$ that enables him to reach $\text{Goal}_j$ within $|V| - 1$ edges from each vertex $v$ from which he wins the game $G_j$. On the contrary, the coalition has a memoryless strategy $\nu_{-j}$ that forces the play to stay in $V \setminus \text{Goal}_j$ from each vertex $v$ from which it wins the game $G_j$.

**Lemma 15.** Suppose $d \geq 0$. Let $(\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi}$ be a Nash equilibrium in $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ and $\rho$ the (finite) outcome of $(\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi}$. Assume that $\rho$ has a prefix $\alpha\beta\gamma$, where $\beta$ contains at least one vertex, such that

\[
\text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Visit}(\alpha\beta\gamma) \\
\text{Last}(\alpha) = \text{Last}(\alpha\beta) \\
|\alpha\beta| \leq l \cdot |V| \\
|\alpha\beta\gamma| = (l + 1) \cdot |V|
\]

for some $l \geq 1$.

Let $j \in \Pi$ be such that $\alpha$ does not visit $\text{Goal}_j$. Consider the qualitative two-player zero-sum game $G_j = (V, V_j, V \setminus V_j, E, \text{Goal}_j)$. Then for all histories $hu$ of $G$ consistent with $(\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi \setminus \{j\}}$ and such that $|hu| \leq |\alpha\beta|$, the coalition of the players $i \neq j$ wins the game $G_j$ from $u$.

Condition $\text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Visit}(\alpha\beta\gamma)$ means that if $\text{Goal}_j$ is visited by $\alpha\beta\gamma$, it has already been visited by $\alpha$. Condition $\text{Last}(\alpha) = \text{Last}(\alpha\beta)$ means that $\beta$ is a cycle. The play $\rho$ of Lemma 15 is illustrated in Figure 9.

Lemma 15 says in particular that the players $i \neq j$ can play together to prevent player $j$ from reaching his goal set $\text{Goal}_j$, in case he deviates from the play $\alpha\beta$ (as $\alpha\beta$ is consistent with $(\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi \setminus \{j\}}$). We denote by $\nu_{-j}$ the memoryless winning strategy of the coalition. For each player $i \neq j$, let $\nu_{i,j}$ be the memoryless strategy of player $i$ in $G$ induced by $\nu_{-j}$.

**Proof (of Lemma 15).** By contradiction suppose that player $j$ wins the game $G_j$ from $u$. By Proposition 14 player $j$ has a memoryless winning strategy $\nu_j$ which enables him to reach his goal set $\text{Goal}_j$ within at most $|V| - 1$ edges from $u$. We show that $\nu_j$ leads to a profitable deviation for player $j$ w.r.t. $(\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi}$ in the game $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$, which is impossible by hypothesis.

Let $\rho'$ be a play in $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ such that $hu$ is a prefix of $\rho'$, and from $u$, player $j$ plays according to the strategy $\nu_j$ and the other players $i \neq j$ continue to play according to $\sigma_i$. As the play $\rho'$ is consistent with the memoryless winning strategy $\nu_j$ from $u$, it visits $\text{Goal}_j$ and we have

\[
\text{Cost}_j(\rho') \leq |hu| + |V| \\
\leq (l + 1) \cdot |V| \\
\leq d
\]

(by Proposition 14) (by hypothesis) (as $\alpha\beta\gamma \leq \rho$).
We consider the following two cases. If \( \text{Cost}_j(\rho) = +\infty \) (i.e. \( \rho \) does not visit \( \text{Goal}_j \)), we have
\[
\text{Cost}_j(\rho') < \text{Cost}_j(\rho) = +\infty.
\]
On the contrary, if \( \text{Cost}_j(\rho) < +\infty \) (i.e. \( \rho \) visits \( \text{Goal}_j \), but after the prefix \( \alpha\beta\gamma \) by hypothesis), then we have
\[
\text{Cost}_j(\rho') < \text{Cost}_j(\rho)
\]
as \( \text{Cost}_j(\rho) > (l + 1) \cdot |V| \).

Since \( \rho' \) is consistent with \( (\sigma_i)_{i \in H \setminus \{j\}} \), the strategy of player \( j \) induced by the play \( \rho' \) is a profitable deviation for player \( j \) w.r.t. \( (\sigma_i)_{i \in H} \) in both cases, which is a contradiction. \( \square \)

Now that we have proved Lemma 15 we use it in order to obtain Lemma 16 which states that one can define a Nash equilibrium \( (\tau_i)_{i \in H} \) in the game \( T \), based on the Nash equilibrium \( (\sigma_i)_{i \in H} \) in the game \( \text{Trunc}_d(T) \).

**Lemma 16.** Suppose \( d \geq 0 \). Let \( (\sigma_i)_{i \in H} \) be a Nash equilibrium in \( \text{Trunc}_d(T) \) and \( \alpha\beta\gamma \) be a prefix of \( \rho = ((\sigma_i)_{i \in H}) \) as defined in Lemma 15. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium \( (\tau_i)_{i \in H} \) in the game \( T \). Moreover \( (\tau_i)_{i \in H} \) is finite-memory, and \( \text{Type}((\tau_i)_{i \in H}) = \text{Visit}(\alpha) \).

**Proof.** Let us set \( H = \{1, \ldots, n\} \). As \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) end in the same vertex, we can consider the infinite play \( \alpha\beta\omega \) in the game \( T \). Without loss of generality we can order the players \( i \in H \) so that
\[
\forall i \leq k \quad \text{Cost}_i(\alpha\beta\omega) < +\infty \quad (\alpha \text{ visits } \text{Goal}_i)
\]
\[
\forall i > k \quad \text{Cost}_i(\alpha\beta\omega) = +\infty \quad (\alpha \text{ does not visit } \text{Goal}_i)
\]
where \( 0 \leq k \leq n \). In the second case, notice that \( \rho \) could visit \( \text{Goal}_i \) (but after the prefix \( \alpha\beta\gamma \)).

The Nash equilibrium \( (\tau_i)_{i \in H} \) required by Lemma 15 is intuitively defined as follows. First the outcome of \( (\tau_i)_{i \in H} \) is exactly \( \alpha\beta\omega \). Secondly the first player \( j \) who deviates from \( \alpha\beta\omega \) is punished by the coalition of the other players in the following way. If \( j \leq k \) and the deviation occurs in the tree \( \text{Trunc}_d(T) \), then the coalition plays according to \( (\sigma_i)_{i \in H \setminus \{j\}} \) in this tree. It prevents player \( j \) from reaching his goal set \( \text{Goal}_j \) faster than in \( \alpha\beta\omega \). And if \( j > k \), the coalition plays according to \( (\nu_{i,j})_{i \in H \setminus \{j\}} \) (given by Lemma 15) so that player \( j \) does not reach his goal set at all.

We begin by defining a punishment function \( P \) on the vertex set \( H \) of \( T \) such that \( P(h) \) indicates the first player \( j \) who has deviated from \( \alpha\beta\omega \), with respect to \( h \). We write \( P(h) = \perp \) if no deviation has occurred. For \( v_0 \), we define \( P(v_0) = \perp \) and for \( h \in V^+ \) such that \( \text{Last}(h) \in V_i \) and \( v \in V \), we let:
\[
P(hv) = \begin{cases} 
\perp & \text{if } P(h) = \perp \text{ and } hv < \alpha\beta\omega, \\
i & \text{if } P(h) = \perp \text{ and } hv \not< \alpha\beta\omega, \\
P(h) & \text{otherwise } (P(h) \neq \perp). 
\end{cases}
\]

The Nash equilibrium \( (\tau_i)_{i \in H} \) is then defined as follows: let \( h \) be a history ending in a vertex of \( V_i \),
\[
\tau_i(h) = \begin{cases} 
v_i & \text{if } P(h) = \perp (h < \alpha\beta\omega); \text{ such that } hv < \alpha\beta\omega, \\
\nu_{i,P(h)}(h) & \text{if } P(h) = i, \\
\sigma_i(h) & \text{if } P(h) \neq \perp, i \text{ and } P(h) > k, \\
\text{arbitrary} & \text{if } \nu_{i,P(h)}(h) \neq \perp, i \text{ and } P(h) \geq k \text{ and } |h| < d, \\
\sigma_i(h) & \text{if } P(h) \neq \perp, i \text{ and } P(h) \geq k \text{ and } |h| \geq d.
\end{cases}
\]
where arbitrary means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily (in a memoryless way). Clearly the outcome of \((\tau_i)_{i \in H}\) is the play \(\alpha \beta^\omega\), and Type\((\tau_i)_{i \in H}\) is equal to Visit(\(\alpha\)) (= Visit(\(\alpha \beta\)).

It remains to prove that \((\tau_i)_{i \in H}\) is a finite-memory Nash equilibrium in the game \(T\). We first show that the strategy profile \((\tau_i)_{i \in H}\) defined in Equation (1) is a Nash equilibrium in the game \(T\). Let \(\tau_j'\) be a strategy of player \(j\). We show that this is not a profitable deviation for player \(j\) w.r.t. \((\tau_i)_{i \in H}\). We distinguish the following two cases:

(i) \(j \leq k\) \(\text{Cost}_j(\alpha \beta^\omega) < +\infty\), \(\alpha\) visits Goal\(_j\).

To improve his cost, player \(j\) has no incentive to deviate after the prefix \(\alpha\). Thus we assume that the strategy \(\tau_j'\) causes a deviation from a vertex visited in \(\alpha\). By Equation (1) the other players first play according to \((\sigma_i)_{i \in H\setminus\{j\}}\) in Trunc\(_d(T)\), and then in an arbitrary way.

Suppose that \(\tau_j'\) is a profitable deviation for player \(j\) w.r.t. \((\tau_i)_{i \in H}\) in the game \(T\). Let us set \(\pi = \langle(\tau_i)_{i \in H}\rangle\) and \(\pi' = \langle\tau_j', (\tau_i)_{i \in H\setminus\{j\}}\rangle\). Then

\[
\text{Cost}_j(\pi') < \text{Cost}_j(\pi).
\]

On the other hand we know that

\[
\text{Cost}_j(\pi) = \text{Cost}_j(\rho) \leq |\alpha|.
\]

So if we limit the play \(\pi'\) in \(T\) to its prefix of length \(d\), we get a play \(\rho'\) in Trunc\(_d(T)\) such that

\[
\text{Cost}_j(\rho') = \text{Cost}_j(\pi') < \text{Cost}_j(\rho).
\]

As the play \(\rho'\) is consistent with the strategies \((\sigma_i)_{i \in H\setminus\{j\}}\) by Equation (1), the strategy \(\tau_j'\) restricted to the tree Trunc\(_d(T)\) is a profitable deviation for player \(j\) w.r.t. \((\sigma_i)_{i \in H}\) in the game Trunc\(_d(T)\). This contradicts the fact that \((\sigma_i)_{i \in H}\) is a Nash equilibrium in this game.

(ii) \(j > k\) \(\text{Cost}_j(\alpha \beta^\omega) = +\infty\), \(\alpha \beta^\omega\) does not visit Goal\(_j\).

If player \(j\) deviates from \(\alpha \beta^\omega\) (with the strategy \(\tau_j'\)), by Equation (1) the other players combine against him and play according to \(\nu_{-j}\). By Lemma 15 this coalition wins the game \(G_j\) from any vertex visited by \(\alpha \beta^\omega\). So the strategy \(\nu_{-j}\) of the coalition keeps the play \(\langle\tau_j', (\tau_i)_{i \in H\setminus\{j\}}\rangle\) away from the set Goal\(_j\), whatever player \(j\) does. Therefore \(\tau_j'\) is not a profitable deviation for player \(j\) w.r.t. \((\tau_i)_{i \in H}\) in the game \(T\).

We now prove that \((\tau_i)_{i \in H}\) is a finite-memory strategy profile. According to the definition of finite-memory strategy (see Section 2) we have to prove that each relation \(\approx_{\tau}\) on \(H\) has finite index (recall that \(h \approx_{\tau} h'\) if \(\tau_i(h\delta) = \tau_i(h'\delta)\) for all \(\delta \in V^*V_i\)). In this aim we define for each player \(i\) an equivalence relation \(\approx_{\tau_i}\) with finite index such that

\[
\forall h, h' \in H, \ h \approx_{\tau_i} h' \Rightarrow h \approx_{\tau_i} h'.
\]

We first define an equivalence relation \(\approx_P\) with finite index related to the punishment function \(P\). For all prefixes \(h, h'\) of \(\alpha \beta^\omega\), i.e. such that no player is punished, this relation does not distinguish two histories that are identical except for a certain number of cycles \(\beta\). For the other histories it just has to remember the first player, say \(i\), who has deviated. The definition of \(\approx_P\) is as follows:

- \(h \approx_P h'\) if \(h = \alpha \beta^l \beta'\), \(h' = \alpha \beta^m \beta'\), \(\beta' < \beta\), \(l, m \geq 0\)
- \(hv \approx_P h'v'\) if \(v, v' \in V_i\), \(h, h' < \alpha \beta^\omega\), but \(hv, h'v' \notin \alpha \beta^\omega\)
- \(hv \approx_P hv\delta\) if \(h < \alpha \beta^\omega\), \(hv \notin \alpha \beta^\omega\), \(\delta \in V^*\).
The relation \( \sim_p \) is an equivalence relation on \( H \) with finite index.

We now turn to the definition of \( \sim_{\tau_i} \). It is based on the definition of \( \tau_i \) (given in (11)) and \( \sim_p \). To get an equivalence with finite index we proceed as follows. Recall that each strategy \( \nu_i \) is memoryless and when a player plays arbitrarily, his strategy is also memoryless. Furthermore notice that, in the definition of \( \tau_i \), the strategy \( \sigma_i \) is only applied to histories \( h \) with length \( |h| < d \). For histories \( h \) such that \( \tau_i(h) = v \) with \( hv < \alpha \beta^\omega \), it is enough to remember information with respect to \( \alpha \beta \) as already done for \( \sim_p \). Therefore for \( h, h' \in H \) we define \( \sim_{\tau_i} \) in the following way:

\[
\begin{align*}
 h \sim_{\tau_i} h' \text{ if } & h \sim_p h' \quad \text{and} \quad (P(h) = \bot \\
 & \text{or } P(h) = i \text{ and Last}(h) = \text{Last}(h') \\
 & \text{or } P(h) \neq \bot, i, \text{ and } P(h) > k \text{ and Last}(h) = \text{Last}(h') \\
 & \text{or } P(h) \neq \bot, i, \text{ and } P(h) \leq k, \quad |h|, |h'| \geq d \text{ and} \\
 & \text{Last}(h) = \text{Last}(h')).
\end{align*}
\]

Notice that this relation satisfies

\[
h \sim_{\tau_i} h' \Rightarrow \tau_i(h) = \tau_i(h') \quad \text{and Last}(h) = \text{Last}(h')
\]

and has finite index. Therefore if \( h \sim_{\tau_i} h' \), then \( h \sim_{\tau_i} h' \) and the relation \( \approx_{\tau_i} \) has finite index. \( \square \)

We can now proceed to the proof of Proposition 13.

Proof (of Proposition 13). Let us set \( I = \{1, \ldots, n\} \) and \( d = (n + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V| \). Let \( (\sigma_i)_{i \in I} \) be a Nash equilibrium in the game \( \text{Trunc}_d(T) \) and \( \rho \) its outcome.

To be able to use Lemma 10 we consider the prefix \( pq \) of \( \rho \) of minimal length such that

\[
\exists l \geq 1 \quad |p| = (l - 1) \cdot |V| \\
|pq| = (l + 1) \cdot |V| \\
\text{Visit}(p) = \text{Visit}(pq). \tag{2}
\]

The following statements are true.

* \( l \leq 2 \cdot n + 1 \).
* If \( \text{Visit}(p) \nsubseteq \text{Visit}(\rho) \), then \( l < 2 \cdot n + 1 \).

Indeed the first statement results from the fact that in the worst case, the play \( \rho \) visits the goal set of a new player in each prefix of length \( i \cdot 2 \cdot |V|, 1 \leq i \leq n \), i.e., \( |p| = n \cdot 2 \cdot |V| \). It follows that \( pq \) exists as a prefix of \( \rho \), because the length \( d \) of \( \rho \) is equal to \( (n + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V| \) by hypothesis. Thus \( \text{Visit}(p) \subseteq \text{Visit}(\rho) \). Suppose that there exists \( i \in \text{Visit}(\rho) \setminus \text{Visit}(p) \), then \( \rho \) visit \( \text{Goal}_i \) after the prefix \( pq \) by Equation (2). The second statement follows easily.

Given the length of \( q \), one vertex of \( V \) is visited at least twice by \( q \). More precisely, we can write

\[
pq = \alpha \beta \gamma \quad \text{with} \quad \text{Last}(\alpha) = \text{Last}(\alpha \beta) \\
|\alpha| \geq (l - 1) \cdot |V| \\
|\alpha \beta| \leq l \cdot |V|.
\]

In particular, \( |p| \leq |\alpha| \). See Figure 3 We have \( \text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Visit}(\alpha \beta \gamma) \), and \( |\alpha \beta \gamma| = (l + 1) \cdot |V| \).

As the hypotheses of Lemma 10 are verified, we can apply it in this context to get a finite-memory Nash equilibrium \( (\tau_i)_{i \in I} \) in the game \( T \) with \( \text{Type}(\tau_i)_{i \in I} = \text{Visit}(\alpha) \). \( \square \)
Proposition 13 asserts that given a game $G$ and the game Trunc$_d(T)$ played on the truncated tree of $T$ of a well-chosen depth $d$, one can lift any Nash equilibrium $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$ of Trunc$_d(T)$ to a Nash equilibrium $(\tau_i)_{i \in I}$ of $G$. The proof of Proposition 13 states that the type of $(\tau_i)_{i \in I}$ is equal to Visit$(\alpha)$. We give an example that shows that it is impossible to preserve the type of the lifted Nash equilibrium $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$.

Example 17. Let us consider the two-player game $G$ depicted in Figure 4 with Goal$_1 = \{C\}$, Goal$_2 = \{E\}$. One can show that $G$ admits only Nash equilibria of type $\{2\}$ or $\emptyset$. Indeed, on one hand, there is no play of $G$ where both goals are visited, and on the other hand given a strategy profile $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$ such that $\langle(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}\rangle$ visits Goal$_1$ (i.e. $\langle(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}\rangle$ is of the form $A^+BC^\omega$), playing $D$ instead of $C$ is clearly a profitable deviation for player 2.

We will now see that for each $d \geq 2$ the game played on Trunc$_d(T)$ admits a Nash equilibrium of type $\{1\}$. From the above discussion, this equilibrium can not be lifted to a Nash equilibrium of the same type in $G$. A truncated tree Trunc$_d(T)$ is depicted in Figure 5. One can show that the strategy profile leading to the outcome $A^{d-1}BC$ (depicted in bold in the figure) is a Nash equilibrium in Trunc$_d(T)$ of type $\{1\}$. Following the lines of the proof of Proposition 13 we see that this Nash equilibrium is lifted to a Nash equilibrium of $G$ with outcome $A^\omega$ and type $\emptyset$.

On the other hand, notice that from the proof of Proposition 13 we can construct a Nash equilibrium such that each player pays either an infinite cost, or a cost bounded by $|I| \cdot 2 \cdot |V|$.

### 3.2 Nash Equilibria with Finite Memory Preserving Types

In this section we show that given a Nash equilibrium, we can construct another Nash equilibrium with the same type such that all its strategies are finite-memory. We then answer to Problem 2 for Nash equilibria.

**Theorem 18.** If there exists a Nash equilibrium in a quantitative multiplayer reachability game $G$, then there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium of the same type in $G$.

The proof is based on two steps. The first step constructs from $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$ another Nash equilibrium $(\tau_i)_{i \in I}$ with the same type such that the play $\langle(\tau_i)_{i \in I}\rangle$ is of the form $\alpha\beta^\omega$ with Visit$(\alpha) =$ Type$(\sigma_i)_{i \in I})$. This is possible thanks to Lemmas 19 and 20 by first eliminating unnecessary cycles in the play $\langle(\tau_i)_{i \in I}\rangle$ and then locating a prefix $\alpha\beta$ such that $\beta$ is a cycle that can be infinitely repeated.
The second step transforms the Nash equilibrium \((\tau_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}\) into a finite-memory one thanks to Lemma 16 given in Section 3.1. For that purpose, we consider the strategy profile \((\tau_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}\) limited to the tree \(T\) truncated at a well-chosen depth.

The next lemma indicates how to eliminate a cycle in the outcome of a Nash equilibrium.

**Lemma 19.** Let \((\sigma_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}\) be a strategy profile in a game \(G\) and \(\rho = \langle(\sigma_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}\rangle\) its outcome. Suppose that \(\rho = pq\tilde{\rho}\), where \(q\) contains at least one vertex, such that
\[
\text{Visit}(p) = \text{Visit}(pq) \\
\text{Last}(p) = \text{Last}(pq).
\]
We define a strategy profile \((\tau_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}\) as follows:
\[
\tau_i(h) = \begin{cases} 
\sigma_i(h) & \text{if } p \not\leq h, \\
\sigma_i(pq) & \text{if } h = p\tilde{\rho}
\end{cases}
\]
where \(h\) is a history of \(G\) with \(\text{Last}(h) \in V_i\). We get the outcome \(\langle(\tau_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}\rangle = p\tilde{\rho}\).

If a strategy \(\tau'_j\) is a profitable deviation for player \(j\) w.r.t. \((\tau_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}\), then there exists a profitable deviation \(\sigma'_j\) for player \(j\) w.r.t. \((\sigma_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}\).

**Proof.** Let us set \(\mathcal{I} = \{1, \ldots, n\}\). We write
\[
\rho = \langle(\sigma_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}\rangle \text{ of cost profile } (x_1, \ldots, x_n), \\
\pi = \langle(\tau_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}\rangle \text{ of cost profile } (y_1, \ldots, y_n).
\]

We observe that as \(\rho = pq\tilde{\rho}\), we have \(\pi = p\tilde{\rho}\) (see Figures 6 and 7). It follows that
\[
\forall i \in \mathcal{I}, \ y_i \leq x_i. \tag{3}
\]

More precisely,
\[
\begin{align*}
- \text{ if } x_i = +\infty, \text{ then } y_i = +\infty; \tag{4} \\
- \text{ if } x_i < +\infty \text{ and } i \in \text{Visit}(p), \text{ then } y_i = x_i; \\
- \text{ if } x_i < +\infty \text{ and } i \not\in \text{Visit}(p), \text{ then } y_i = x_i - (|q| + 1). \tag{5}
\end{align*}
\]
Let $\tau'_j$ be a profitable deviation for player $j$ w.r.t. $(\tau_i)_{i \in \Pi}$, and $\pi'$ be the outcome of the strategy profile $(\tau'_j, (\tau_i)_{i \in \Pi \setminus \{j\}})$. Then

$$\text{Cost}_j(\pi') < y_j.$$  

We show how to construct a profitable deviation $\sigma'_j$ for player $j$ w.r.t. $(\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi}$. Two cases occur:

(i) player $j$ deviates from $\pi$ just after a proper prefix $h$ of $p$ (like for the play $\pi'_1$ in Figure 7). We define $\sigma'_j = \tau'_j$ and we denote by $\rho'$ the outcome of $(\sigma'_j, (\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi \setminus \{j\}})$. Given the definition of the strategy profile $(\tau_i)_{i \in \Pi}$, one can verify that $\rho' = \pi'$ (see the play $\rho'_1$ in Figure 6). Thus

$$\text{Cost}_j(\rho') = \text{Cost}_j(\pi') < y_j < x_j$$

by Equation (3), which implies that $\sigma'_j$ is a profitable deviation of player $j$ w.r.t. $(\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi}$.

(ii) player $j$ deviates from $\pi$ after the prefix $p$ ($\pi$ and $\pi'$ coincide at least on $p$). This case is illustrated by the play $\pi'_2$ in Figure 7. We define for all histories $h$ ending in a vertex of $V_j$:

$$\sigma'_j(h) = \begin{cases} \sigma_j(h) & \text{if } pq \not\subseteq h, \\ \tau'_j(p\delta) & \text{if } h = pq\delta. \end{cases}$$

Let us set $\rho' = (\sigma'_j, (\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi \setminus \{j\}})$. As player $j$ deviates after $p$ with the strategy $\tau'_j$, one can prove that

$$\pi' = p\pi'$$

and

$$\rho' = pq\pi'$$

by definition of $(\tau_i)_{i \in \Pi}$ (see the play $\rho'_2$ in Figure 6). As $\text{Cost}_j(\pi') < y_j$, it means that $j \not\in \text{Visit}(p)$ (otherwise the deviation would not be profitable for player $j$). Since $\text{Visit}(p) = \text{Visit}(pq)$, we also have

$$\text{Cost}_j(\pi') + (|q| + 1) = \text{Cost}_j(\rho').$$  

By Equations (4) and (5), we get

- either $x_j = y_j = +\infty$ and $\text{Cost}_j(\rho') < x_j$,
- or $x_j = y_j + (|q| + 1)$ and $\text{Cost}_j(\rho') < x_j$,

which proves that $\sigma'_j$ is a profitable deviation for player $j$ w.r.t. $(\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi}$.  

\[\square\]
While Lemma 19 deals with elimination of unnecessary cycles, Lemma 20 deals with repetition of a useful cycle.

**Lemma 20.** Let \((\sigma_i)_{i \in I}\) be a strategy profile in a game \(G\) and \(\rho = (\sigma_i)_{i \in I}\) its outcome. We assume that \(\rho = pq\tilde{\rho}\), where \(q\) contains at least one vertex, such that

\[
\text{Visit}(p) = \text{Visit}(\rho) \\
\text{Last}(p) = \text{Last}(pq).
\]

We define a strategy profile \((\tau_i)_{i \in I}\) as follows:

\[
\tau_i(h) = \begin{cases} 
\sigma_i(h) & \text{if } p \not\leq h, \\
\sigma_i(p\delta) & \text{if } h = pq^k\delta, \ k \in \mathbb{N}, \text{ and } q \not\leq \delta
\end{cases}
\]

where \(h\) is a history of \(G\) with \(\text{Last}(h) \in V_i\). We get the outcome \(\langle(\tau_i)_{i \in I}\rangle = pq\omega\).

If a strategy \(\tau'_j\) is a profitable deviation for player \(j\) w.r.t. \((\tau_i)_{i \in I}\), then there exists a profitable deviation \(\sigma'_j\) for player \(j\) w.r.t. \((\sigma_i)_{i \in I}\).

**Proof.** We use the same notations as in the proof of Lemma 19. Here we have \(x_i = y_i\) for all \(i \in I\) since \(\text{Visit}(p) = \text{Visit}(\rho)\). One can prove that \(\pi = pq\omega\) (see Figures 8 and 9).

---

**Fig. 8.** Play \(\rho\) and its prefix \(pq\).

**Fig. 9.** Play \(\pi = pq\omega\).

We show how to define a profitable deviation \(\sigma'_j\) from the deviation \(\tau'_j\). We distinguish the following two cases:

(i) player \(j\) deviates from \(\pi\) just after a proper prefix \(h\) of \(pq\).

We define \(\sigma'_j = \tau'_j\). As in the first case of the proof of Lemma 19 we have \(\text{Cost}_j(\rho') < x_j\), which implies that \(\sigma'_j\) is a profitable deviation of player \(j\) w.r.t. \((\sigma_i)_{i \in I}\).

(ii) player \(j\) deviates from \(\pi\) after the prefix \(pq\), i.e. after a prefix \(pq^k\) and strictly before the prefix \(pq^{k+1}\) \((k \geq 1)\).

We define for all histories \(h\) ending in a vertex of \(V_j\):

\[
\sigma'_j(h) = \begin{cases} 
\sigma_j(h) & \text{if } p \not\leq h, \\
\tau'_j(pq^k\delta) & \text{if } h = p\delta.
\end{cases}
\]
One can prove that
\[ \pi' = pq \tilde{\pi}' \quad \text{and} \quad \rho' = p \tilde{\rho}'. \]

And then, in the point of view of costs we have
\[ \text{Cost}_j(\rho') < \text{Cost}_j(\pi') < y_j = x_j, \]

which proves that \( \sigma'_j \) is a profitable deviation for player \( j \) w.r.t. \((\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi}\). \( \square \)

The next proposition achieves the first step of the proof of Theorem 18 as mentioned in Section 3.2. It shows that one can construct from a Nash equilibrium another Nash equilibrium with the same type and with an outcome of the form \( \alpha \beta \omega \). Its proof uses Lemmas 19 and 20.

**Proposition 21.** Let \( (\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi} \) be a Nash equilibrium in a game \( G \). Then there exists a Nash equilibrium \( (\tau_i)_{i \in \Pi} \) with the same type and such that \( \langle (\tau_i)_{i \in \Pi} \rangle = \alpha \beta \omega \), where \( \text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Type}(\langle (\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi} \rangle) \) and \( |\alpha \beta| < (|\Pi| + 1) \cdot |V| \).

**Proof.** Let us set \( \Pi = \{1, \ldots, n\} \) and \( \rho = \langle (\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi} \rangle \). Without loss of generality suppose that
\[ \text{Cost}(\rho) = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \quad \text{such that} \quad x_1 \leq \ldots \leq x_k < +\infty \]
and \( x_{k+1} = \ldots = x_n = +\infty \)

where \( 0 \leq k \leq n \). We consider two cases:

(i) \( x_1 \geq |V| \).

Then, there exists a prefix \( pq \) of \( \rho \), with \( q \) containing at least one vertex, such that
\[ |pq| < x_1 \]
\[ \text{Visit}(p) = \text{Visit}(pq) = \emptyset \]
\[ \text{Last}(p) = \text{Last}(pq). \]

We define the strategy profile \( (\tau_i)_{i \in \Pi} \) as proposed in Lemma 19. By this lemma it is actually a Nash equilibrium in \( G \). With \( \pi = \langle (\tau_i)_{i \in \Pi} \rangle \), we have
\[ \rho = pq \tilde{\rho} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi = p \tilde{\rho}. \]

Thus if the cost profile for the play \( \pi \) is \( (y_1, \ldots, y_n) \), we have
\[ y_1 < x_1, \ldots, y_k < x_k \]
\[ y_{k+1} = x_{k+1} = +\infty, \ldots, y_n = x_n = +\infty \]

(ii) \( (x_{l+1} - x_l) \geq |V| \) for \( 1 \leq l \leq k - 1 \).

Then, there exists a prefix \( pq \) of \( \rho \), with \( q \) containing at least one vertex, such that
\[ x_l < |pq| < x_{l+1} \]
\[ \text{Visit}(p) = \text{Visit}(pq) = \{1, \ldots, l\} \]
\[ \text{Last}(p) = \text{Last}(pq). \]

We define the strategy profile \( (\tau_i)_{i \in \Pi} \) given in Lemma 19. It is then a Nash equilibrium in \( G \), and for \( \pi = \langle (\tau_i)_{i \in \Pi} \rangle \), we have
\[ \rho = pq \tilde{\rho} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi = p \tilde{\rho}. \]
Hence if the cost profile for the play \( \pi \) is \((y_1, \ldots, y_n)\), we have
\[
\begin{align*}
y_1 &= x_1, \ldots, y_l = x_l; \\
y_{l+1} &< x_{l+1}, \ldots, y_k < x_k; \\
y_{k+1} &= x_{k+1} = +\infty, \ldots, y_n = x_n = +\infty.
\end{align*}
\]
By applying finitely many times the two previous cases, we can assume without loss of generality that \((\sigma_i)_{i \in H}\) is a Nash equilibrium with a cost profile \((x_1, \ldots, x_n)\) such that
\[
\begin{align*}
x_i &< i \cdot |V| \quad \text{for } i \leq k; \\
x_i &> +\infty \quad \text{for } i > k.
\end{align*}
\]
Let us go further. We can write \( \rho = \alpha \beta \rho' \) such that
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Visit}(\alpha) &= \text{Visit}(\rho) \\
\text{Last}(\alpha) &= \text{Last}(\alpha \beta) \\
|\alpha \beta| &< (k + 1) \cdot |V| \leq (n + 1) \cdot |V|.
\end{align*}
\]
Indeed, the prefix \( h \) of \( \rho \) of length \((k + 1) \cdot |V|\) visits each goal set \( \text{Goal}_i \), with \( i \leq k \), and after the last visited \( \text{Goal}_k \), there remains enough vertices to observe a cycle. Notice that \( \text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Visit}(\alpha \beta) = \text{Visit}(\rho) = \text{Type}(\sigma_i)_{i \in H} \).

If we define the strategy profile \((\tau_i)_{i \in H}\) like in Lemma 20 we get a Nash equilibrium in \( G \) with outcome \( \alpha \beta \omega \) and the same type as \((\sigma_i)_{i \in H}\). \( \square \)

We are now ready to prove Theorem 18

Proof (of Theorem 18). Let us set \( H = \{1, \ldots, n\} \). Let \((\sigma_i)_{i \in H}\) be a Nash equilibrium in the game \( G \). The first step consists in constructing a Nash equilibrium as in Proposition 21. Let us denote it again by \((\sigma_i)_{i \in H}\). Let us set \( \rho = (\sigma_i)_{i \in H} = \alpha \beta \omega \) such that \( \text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Type}(\sigma_i)_{i \in H} \) and \( |\alpha \beta| < (n + 1) \cdot |V| \). The strategy profile \((\sigma_i)_{i \in H}\) is also a Nash equilibrium in the game \( T \) played on the unraveling \( T \) of \( G \).

For the second step we consider \( \text{Trunc}_d(T) \) the truncated tree of \( T \) of depth \( d = (n + 2) \cdot |V| \). It is clear that the strategy profile \((\sigma_i)_{i \in H}\) limited to this tree is also a Nash equilibrium of \( \text{Trunc}_d(T) \).

We know that \(|\alpha \beta| < (n + 1) \cdot |V| \) and we set \( \gamma \) such that \( \alpha \beta \gamma \) is a prefix of \( \rho \) and \(|\alpha \beta \gamma| = (n + 2) \cdot |V| \).
Furthermore we have \( \text{Last}(\alpha) = \text{Last}(\alpha \beta) \) and \( \text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Visit}(\alpha \beta \gamma) \) (since \( \text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Type}(\rho) \)). Then this prefix \( \alpha \beta \gamma \) satisfies the properties described in Lemma 15 (by setting \( l = n + 1 \)). By Lemma 16 we conclude that there exists a Nash equilibrium \((\tau_i)_{i \in H}\) with finite memory such that \( \text{Type}(\tau_i)_{i \in H} = \text{Visit}(\alpha) \), that is, with the same type as the initial Nash equilibrium \((\sigma_i)_{i \in H}\). \( \square \)

4 Secure Equilibria

In the previous section, we positively solved Problem 1 and Problem 2 for Nash equilibria. We here solve these two problems for secure equilibria, but in two-player games only. The main results are stated in Theorems 22 and 28 below. In this section, we exclusively consider two-player games.

Theorem 22. In every quantitative two-player reachability game, there exists a finite-memory secure equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 22 is based on the same ideas as for the proof of Theorem 10 (existence of a Nash equilibrium). By Kuhn’s theorem (Theorem 11), there exists a secure equilibrium in the game $\mathrm{Trunc}_d(T)$ played on the finite tree $\mathrm{Trunc}_d(T)$, for any depth $d$. By choosing an adequate depth $d$, Proposition 25 enables to extend this secure equilibrium to a secure equilibrium in the infinite tree $T$, and thus in $G$.

The notion of secure equilibrium is based on the binary relations $\prec_j$ of Definition 3. One can easily see that $\prec_j$ is not reflexive. To be able to apply Kuhn’s theorem, it is more convenient to define secure equilibria via a preference relation. Given two cost profiles $(x_1, x_2)$ and $(y_1, y_2)$:

$$(x_1, x_2) \preceq_j (y_1, y_2) \text{ iff } (x_1, x_2) \prec_j (y_1, y_2) \lor (x_1 = y_1 \land x_2 = y_2).$$

The relation $\preceq_j$ is clearly a preference relation. We can now provide an equivalent definition of secure equilibrium.

**Proposition 23.** A strategy profile $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ of a game $G$ is a secure equilibrium iff for all strategies $\sigma_1'$ of player 1 in $G$, we have:

$$\text{Cost}(\rho') \preceq_1 \text{Cost}(\rho)$$

where $\rho = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ and $\rho' = (\sigma_1', \sigma_2)$, and symmetrically for all strategies $\sigma_2'$ of player 2.

Since $\preceq_1$ and $\preceq_2$ are preference relations, we get the next corollary by Kuhn’s theorem.

**Corollary 24.** Let $G$ be a quantitative two-player reachability game and $T$ be the unraveling of $G$. Let $\mathrm{Trunc}_d(T)$ be the game played on the truncated tree of $T$ of depth $d$, with $d \geq 0$. Then there exists a secure equilibrium in $\mathrm{Trunc}_d(T)$.

Now that we can guarantee the existence of secure equilibrium in finite trees, it remains to show how to lift them to infinite trees. The next proposition states that it is possible to extend a secure equilibrium in $\mathrm{Trunc}_d(T)$ to a secure equilibrium in the game $T$ with the same type, if the depth $d$ is greater or equal to $(|\Pi| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V|$ and there are only two players. It also says that we can construct a secure equilibrium in $\mathrm{Trunc}_d(T)$ from a secure equilibrium in $T$, while keeping the same type.

**Proposition 25.** Let $G$ be a two-player game and $T$ be the unraveling of $G$.

(i) If there exists a secure equilibrium of a certain type in the game $T$, then there exists a secure equilibrium of the same type in the game $\mathrm{Trunc}_d(T)$, for some depth $d \geq (|\Pi| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V|$.

(ii) If there exists a secure equilibrium of a certain type in the game $\mathrm{Trunc}_d(T)$, where $d \geq (|\Pi| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V|$, then there exists a finite-memory secure equilibrium of the same type in the game $T$.

To prove Proposition 25, we need the following technical lemma whose hypotheses are the same as in Lemma 14. Recall that Lemma 15 states that for all $j \in \Pi$ such that $\alpha$ does not visit $\text{Goal}_j$, the players $i \neq j$ can play together to prevent player $j$ from reaching his goal $\text{Goal}_j$, from any history $hu$ consistent with $(\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi \setminus \{j\}}$ and such that $|hu| \leq |\alpha \beta|$. We denote by $\nu_{-j}$ the memoryless winning strategy of the coalition, and for each player $i \neq j$, $\nu_{i,j}$ the memoryless strategy of player $i$ in $G$ induced by $\nu_{-j}$.

\[\text{Remark that } \preceq_j \text{ is a kind of lexicographic order on } (\mathbb{N} \cup \{+\infty\}) \times (\mathbb{N} \cup \{+\infty\}).\]
Lemma 26. Suppose \( d \geq 0 \). Let \((\sigma_1, \sigma_2)\) be a secure equilibrium in \( \text{Trunc}_d(\mathcal{T}) \) and \( \rho = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \) its outcome. Assume that \( \rho \) has a prefix \( \alpha\beta\gamma \), where \( \beta \) contains at least one vertex, such that

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Visit}(\alpha) &= \text{Visit}(\alpha\beta\gamma) \\
\text{Last}(\alpha) &= \text{Last}(\alpha\beta) \\
|\alpha\beta| &\leq l \cdot |V| \\
|\alpha\beta\gamma| &\leq (l + 1) \cdot |V|
\end{align*}
\]

for some \( l \geq 1 \). Then we have

\[(\text{Visit}(\alpha) \neq \emptyset \lor \text{Visit}(\rho) \neq \{1, 2\}) \Rightarrow \text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Visit}(\rho).\]

In particular, Lemma 26 implies that if \( \alpha \) visits none of the goal sets, then \( \rho \) visits either both goal sets or none. Notice that in the case of Nash equilibria, we can have situations contradicting Lemma 26 and in particular the previous situation, as it can be seen in Example 17.

Proof. By contradiction, assume that \( 2 \in \text{Visit}(\rho) \setminus \text{Visit}(\alpha) \) (the case where \( 1 \in \text{Visit}(\rho) \setminus \text{Visit}(\alpha) \) is symmetric). The hypothesis implies that \( 1 \in \text{Visit}(\alpha) \) or \( 1 \notin \text{Visit}(\rho) \).

By Lemma 15 player 1 wins the game \( \mathcal{G}_2 \) from \( \text{Last}(\alpha) \), that is, has a memoryless winning strategy \( \nu_{1,2} \) from this vertex. Then if player 1 plays according to \( \sigma_1 \) until depth \( |\alpha| \), and then switches to \( \nu_{1,2} \) from \( \text{Last}(\alpha) \), this strategy is a \( \prec_1 \)-profitable deviation for player 1 w.r.t. \( (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \). Indeed, if \( 1 \in \text{Visit}(\alpha) \), player 1 manages to increase player 2’s cost while keeping his own cost. On the other hand, if \( 1 \notin \text{Visit}(\rho) \), either player 1 succeeds in reaching his goal set (i.e. strictly decreasing his cost), or he does not reach it (then gets the same cost as in \( \rho \)) but succeeds in increasing player 2’s cost. Thus we get a contradiction. \( \square \)

We can now give the proof of Proposition 25. The idea for showing case (i) is to look at the play \( \pi \) of the secure equilibrium in \( \mathcal{T} \) and consider the depth \( d \) needed to visit all the goal sets of the players in \( \text{Visit}(\pi) \). Then, the secure equilibrium in \( \text{Trunc}_d(\mathcal{T}) \) is defined exactly as the secure equilibrium of \( \mathcal{T} \).

The proof of case (ii) works pretty much as the one of Proposition 13 (whereas the latter proposition does not preserve the type of the Nash equilibrium). Thanks to Lemma 26 the proof reduces into only two cases depending on when the goal sets are visited. In the most interesting case, a well-chosen prefix \( \alpha\beta \), with \( \beta \) being a cycle, is first extracted from the outcome \( \rho \) of the secure equilibrium \( (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \) of \( \text{Trunc}_d(\mathcal{T}) \). The outcome of the required secure equilibrium of \( \mathcal{T} \) will be equal to \( \alpha\beta\omega \). As soon as a player deviates from this play, the other player punishes him, but the way to define the punishment is here more involved than in the proof of Proposition 13. In the other case, the proof is simpler, but the ideas are quite the same.

Before entering the details, let us introduce a notation. For any play \( \rho = \rho_0\rho_1 \cdots \) of \( \mathcal{G} \) and any player \( i \in \Pi \), we define \( \text{Index}_i(\rho) \) as the least index \( l \) such that \( \rho_l \in \text{Goal}_i \) if it exists, or \(-1\) if not.

Proof (of Proposition 25). First let us begin with the proof of (i). Suppose that there exists a secure equilibrium \( (\tau_1, \tau_2) \) in \( \mathcal{T} \) and that the play \( \pi \) is the outcome of this strategy profile. Let us set \( d := \max\{(|\Pi| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V|, \text{Index}_1(\pi), \text{Index}_2(\pi)\} \) and define \((\sigma_1, \sigma_2)\) as the strategy profile in \( \text{Trunc}_d(\mathcal{T}) \) corresponding to the strategies \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\) restricted to the finite tree. Clearly

\[\footnote{We are conscious that it is counterintuitive to use the particular value \(-1\), but it is helpful in the proofs.}\]
the outcome $\rho$ of $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ is a prefix of $\pi$ and $\operatorname{Visit}(\rho) = \operatorname{Visit}(\pi)$, so $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ and $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ are of the same type. It remains to show that $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ is a secure equilibrium in $\operatorname{Trunc}_d(T)$.

Assume by contradiction that player 1 has a $\prec_1$-profitable deviation $\sigma'_1$ w.r.t. $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ (the case of player 2 is symmetric). We write $\rho'$ for the outcome of $(\sigma'_1, \sigma_2)$ in $\operatorname{Trunc}_d(T)$. There are two cases to consider: either player 1 manages to decrease his cost in $\rho'$ w.r.t. $\rho$, or he pays the same cost as in $\rho$ but he is able to increase the cost of player 2 in $\rho'$ w.r.t. $\rho$. In both cases, if player 1 plays according to $\sigma'_1$ in $T$ until depth $d$ and then arbitrarily, one can easily be convinced that we get a $\prec_1$-profitable deviation w.r.t. $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ in $T$. This leads to a contradiction.

Now let us proceed to the proof of $(ii)$. Let $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ be a secure equilibrium in the game $\operatorname{Trunc}_d(T)$, where $d \geq (|I| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V|$, and $\rho$ its outcome. We define the prefixes $pq$ and $\alpha\beta\gamma$ as in the proof of Proposition 13 (see Figure 3).

By Lemma 20 there are only two cases to consider:

(a) $\operatorname{Visit}(\alpha) = \emptyset$ and $\operatorname{Visit}(\rho) = \{1, 2\}$;
(b) $\operatorname{Visit}(\alpha) = \operatorname{Visit}(\rho)$.

We define a different secure equilibrium according to the case.

Let us start with case (a): $\operatorname{Visit}(\alpha) = \emptyset$ and $\operatorname{Visit}(\rho) = \{1, 2\}$. We define the following strategy profile:

$$\tau_i(h) = \begin{cases} \sigma_i(h) & \text{if } |h| < \max\{\text{Index}_1(\rho), \text{Index}_2(\rho)\}, \\ \text{arbitrary} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

where $i = 1, 2$, and arbitrary means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily, but in a memoryless way. Note that the outcome of $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ is of the form $\alpha'(\beta')^\omega$ where $\operatorname{Visit}(\alpha') = \operatorname{Visit}(\rho) = \{1, 2\}$ and $\beta'$ is a cycle. So, $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ has the same type as $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$. It remains to prove that $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ is a finite-memory secure equilibrium in $T$.

Assume by contradiction that player 1 has a $\prec_1$-profitable deviation $\tau'_1$ w.r.t. $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ in $T$ (the case for player 2 is symmetric). The strategy $\sigma'_1$ equal to $\tau'_1$ in $\operatorname{Trunc}_d(T)$ is clearly a $\prec_1$-profitable deviation w.r.t. $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$, which is a contradiction with the fact that $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ is a secure equilibrium in $\operatorname{Trunc}_d(T)$. Moreover, as done in the proof of Lemma 11, $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ is a finite-memory strategy profile.

Now we consider case (b): $\operatorname{Visit}(\alpha) = \operatorname{Visit}(\rho)$. Like in the proof of Lemma 10 we consider the infinite play $\alpha\beta^\omega$ in the game $T$. The basic idea of the strategy profile $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ is the same as for the Nash equilibrium case: player 2 (resp. 1) plays according to $\alpha\beta^\omega$ and punishes player 1 (resp. 2) if he deviates from $\alpha\beta^\omega$, in the following way. Suppose that player 1 deviates (the case for player 2 is similar). Then player 2 plays according to $\sigma_2$ until depth $|\alpha|$, and after that, he plays arbitrarily if $\alpha$ visits $\text{Goal}_1$, otherwise he plays according to $\nu_{2,1}$.

We define the same punishment function $P$ as in the proof of Lemma 10 for $v_0$, we define $P(v_0) = \perp$ and for $h \in V^+$ such that $\text{Last}(h) \in V_1$ and $v \in V$, we let:

$$P(hv) = \begin{cases} \perp & \text{if } P(h) = \perp \text{ and } hv < \alpha\beta^\omega, \\ i & \text{if } P(h) = \perp \text{ and } hv \not\prec \alpha\beta^\omega, \\ P(h) & \text{otherwise (}P(h) \neq \perp). \end{cases}$$

Notice that in the second case, when $\rho$ does not visit $\text{Goal}_1$ in $\operatorname{Trunc}_d(T)$, player 1 may reach his goal set in $T$ when deviating in this way, and this would be profitable for him in this game.
The definition of the secure equilibrium \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\) is as follows: for \(h \in H\) such that \(\text{Last}(h) \in V_i\):

\[
\tau_i(h) = \begin{cases} 
    v & \text{if } P(h) = \perp \land (h < \alpha \beta^\omega); \text{ such that } hv < \alpha \beta^\omega, \\
    \text{arbitrary} & \text{if } P(h) = i, \\
    \sigma_i(h) & \text{if } P(h) \neq \perp, i \text{ and } |h| \leq |\alpha|, \\
    \nu_{i, P(h)}(h) & \text{if } P(h) \neq \perp, i \text{ and } |h| > |\alpha| \text{ and } \alpha \text{ does not visit } \text{Goal}, \\
    \text{arbitrary} & \text{otherwise } (P(h) \neq \perp, i \text{ and } |h| > |\alpha| \text{ and } \alpha \text{ visits } \text{Goal})
\end{cases}
\]

where \(i = 1, 2\), and \text{arbitrary} means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily (in a memoryless way). Clearly the outcome of \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\) is the play \(\alpha \beta^\omega\), and the type of \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\) is equal to \(\text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Visit}(\rho)\), the type of \((\sigma_1, \sigma_2)\). Moreover, as done in the proof of Lemma 16, \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\) is a finite-memory strategy profile.

Remark that the definition of the strategy profile \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\) is a little different from the one in the proof of Lemma 16 because here, if player 1 deviates (for example), then player 2 has to prevent him from reaching his goal set \(\text{Goal}_1\) (faster), or having the same cost but succeeding in increasing player 2’s cost.

It remains to show that \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\) is a secure equilibrium in the game \(T\). Assume by contradiction that there exists a \(\prec_1\)-profitable deviation \(\tau'_1\) for player 1 w.r.t. \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\). The case of a \(\prec_2\)-profitable deviation \(\tau'_2\) for player 2 is similar. We construct a play \(\rho'\) in \(\text{Trunc}_d(T)\) as follows: player 1 plays according to the strategy \(\tau'_1\) restricted to \(\text{Trunc}_d(T)\) (denoted by \(\sigma'_1\)) and player 2 plays according to \(\sigma_2\). Thus the play \(\rho'\) coincide with the play \(\pi' = (\tau'_1, \tau_2)\) at least until depth \(|\alpha|\) (by definition of \(\tau_2\)); it can differ afterwards. We have:

\[
\begin{align*}
\rho &= (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \text{ of cost profile } (x_1, x_2) \\
\rho' &= (\sigma'_1, \sigma_2) \text{ of cost profile } (x'_1, x'_2) \\
\pi &= (\tau_1, \tau_2) \text{ of cost profile } (y_1, y_2) \\
\pi' &= (\tau'_1, \tau_2) \text{ of cost profile } (y'_1, y'_2)
\end{align*}
\]

The situation is depicted in Figure 10.

![Fig. 10. Plays \(\rho\) and \(\pi\), and their respective deviations \(\rho'\) and \(\pi'\).](image-url)
By contradiction, we assumed that \( \tau'_1 \) is a \( \prec_1 \)-profitable deviation for player 1 w.r.t. \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\), i.e. \( (y_1, y_2) \prec_1 (y'_1, y'_2) \). Now we are going to show that \( (x_1, x_2) \prec_1 (x'_1, x'_2) \), meaning that \( \sigma'_1 \) is a \( \prec_1 \)-profitable deviation for player 1 w.r.t. \((\sigma_1, \sigma_2)\) in \( \text{Trunc}_d(T) \). This will lead to the contradiction. As \( \tau'_1 \) is a \( \prec_1 \)-profitable deviation w.r.t. \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\), one of the following three cases stands.

1. \( y'_1 < y_1 < +\infty \).
   As \( \pi = \alpha \beta^\omega \), it means that \( \alpha \) visits \( F_1 \), and then:
   \[
y'_1 < y_1 = x_1 \leq |\alpha|.
   \]
   As \( y'_1 < |\alpha| \), we have \( x'_1 = y'_1 \) (as \( \rho' \) and \( \pi' \) coincide until depth \( |\alpha| \)). Therefore \( x'_1 < x_1 \), and \( (x_1, x_2) \prec_1 (x'_1, x'_2) \).

2. \( y'_1 < y_1 = +\infty \).
   If \( y'_1 \leq |\alpha| \), we have \( x'_1 = y'_1 \) (by the same argument as before). As \( \text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Visit}(\rho) \), we have \( x_1 = y_1 = +\infty \) and \( x'_1 < x_1 \) (and so \( (x_1, x_2) \prec_1 (x'_1, x'_2) \)).
   We show that the case \( y'_1 > |\alpha| \) is impossible. By definition of \( \tau_2 \) the play \( \pi' \) is consistent with \( \sigma_2 \) until depth \( |\alpha| \), and then with \( \nu_{2,1} \) (as \( y_1 = +\infty \)). By Lemma 15 the play \( \pi' \) can not visit \( \text{Goal}_1 \) after a depth \( > |\alpha| \). Note that this implies \( y_2 < +\infty \) and \( x_2 = y_2 \) (as \( \pi = \alpha \beta^\omega \)). Since \( \rho' \) and \( \pi' \) coincide until depth \( |\alpha| \), \( y_2 < y'_2 \) and \( x_2 = y_2 \leq |\alpha| \), we have
   \[
x_2 = y_2 < x'_2
   \]
   showing that the cost of player 2 is increased. In order to ensure that \( \sigma'_1 \) is a \( \prec_1 \)-profitable deviation, it remains to show that either player 1 keeps the same cost, or he decreases his cost.
   If \( y'_1 = y_1 < +\infty \), it follows as in the first case that:
   \[
y_1 = x_1 \leq |\alpha| \quad \text{and} \quad x'_1 = y'_1.
   \]
   Therefore \( x_1 = x'_1 \), i.e. player 1 has the same cost in \( \rho \) and \( \rho' \). And so, \( (x_1, x_2) \prec_1 (x'_1, x'_2) \). On the contrary, if \( y'_1 = y_1 = +\infty \), it follows that \( x_1 = +\infty \) (as \( \text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Visit}(\rho) \)).
   And so, we have that \( x'_1 < +\infty = x_1 \), or \( x'_1 = x_1 \). But in both cases, it holds that \( (x_1, x_2) \prec_1 (x'_1, x'_2) \).

In conclusion, we constructed a \( \prec_1 \)-profitable deviation \( \sigma'_1 \) w.r.t. \((\sigma_1, \sigma_2)\) in \( \text{Trunc}_d(T) \), and then we get a contradiction. \( \square \)

**Remark 27.** Let us notice that in case \( i \) of Proposition 24, the proof remains valid if we take \( d = \max\{0, \text{Index}_1(\pi), \text{Index}_2(\pi)\} \). Thus, in the statement of case \( i \), the constraint \( d \geq (|\Pi| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V| \) can be replaced by \( d \geq 0 \).

We can now proceed to the proof of Theorem 22.

**Proof (of Theorem 22).** Let us set \( d := (|\Pi| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V| \) and apply Corollary 24 on the game \( \text{Trunc}_d(T) \). Then we get a secure equilibrium in this game. By Proposition 24 there exists in \( \mathcal{G} \) a finite-memory secure equilibrium with the same type. \( \square \)

Theorem 22 positively answers to Problem 1 for secure equilibria in **two-player** games. The next theorem solves Problem 2 for the same kind of games.
Theorem 28. If there exists a secure equilibrium in a quantitative two-player reachability game \( G \), then there exists a finite-memory secure equilibrium of the same type in \( G \).

Proof. Let \( (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \) be a secure equilibrium in \( G \). By the first part of Proposition 25, there exists a secure equilibrium of the same type in the game \( \text{Trunc}_d(T) \), for a certain depth \( d \geq (\Pi + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V| \). If we apply the second part of Proposition 25 we get a finite-memory secure equilibrium of the same type as \( (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \) in \( G \).

\( \square \)

The proof of Theorem 28 is based on Proposition 25 which, roughly speaking, ensures that every secure equilibrium of \( \text{Trunc}_d(T) \) can be lifted to a secure equilibrium of the same type in \( T \), and conversely. Notice that Proposition 25 has no counterpart for Nash equilibria, since we can not guarantee that the type can be preserved, as it can be seen from Example 17. This approach makes the proof of Theorem 28 rather different than the proof of Theorem 18.

Notice that Proposition 25 stands for two-player games because its proof uses Lemma 26 that has been proved only for two players.

5 Extensions of the Model

5.1 Safety Objectives

Let us now consider quantitative games played on a graph where some players have reachability objectives, whereas others have safety objectives. As previously, the players with reachability objectives want to reach their goal set as soon as possible. The players with safety objectives want to avoid their bad set or, if impossible, delay its visit as long as possible. Let us make that precise through the following definition.

Definition 29. An infinite turn-based quantitative multiplayer reachability/safety game is a tuple \( G = (\Pi, \Pi_r, \Pi_s, V, (V_i)_{i \in \Pi}, v_0, E, (\text{Goal}_i)_{i \in \Pi_r}, (\text{Bad}_i)_{i \in \Pi_s}) \) where

- \( \Pi \) is a finite set of players partitioned into \( \Pi_r \) and \( \Pi_s \) which are the players with reachability and safety objectives respectively,
- \( G = (V, (V_i)_{i \in \Pi}, v_0, E) \) is a finite directed graph where \( V \) is the set of vertices, \( (V_i)_{i \in \Pi} \) is a partition of \( V \) into the state sets of each player, \( v_0 \in V \) is the initial vertex, and \( E \subseteq V \times V \) is the set of edges, and
- \( \text{Goal}_i \subseteq V \) is the goal set of player \( i \), for \( i \in \Pi_r \); \( \text{Bad}_i \subseteq V \) is the bad set of player \( i \), for \( i \in \Pi_s \).

For any play \( \rho = \rho_0 \rho_1 \ldots \) of \( G \), we note \( \text{Cost}_i(\rho) \) the cost of player \( i \). For \( i \in \Pi_r \) the cost is defined as before and for \( i \in \Pi_s \) the cost is defined by:

\[
\text{Cost}_i(\rho) = \begin{cases} 
- l & \text{if } l \text{ is the least index such that } \rho_l \in \text{Bad}_i, \\
- \infty & \text{otherwise}.
\end{cases}
\]

As before, the aim of each player \( i \) is to minimize his cost, i.e. reach his goal set \( \text{Goal}_i \) as soon as possible for \( i \in \Pi_r \), or delay the visit of \( \text{Bad}_i \) as long as possible for \( i \in \Pi_s \). The notions of play, strategy, outcome and Nash equilibrium extend in a natural way. The main result of this subsection is the following theorem which solves Problem 1 in this framework.

Theorem 30. In every quantitative multiplayer reachability/safety game, there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium.
In order to prove Theorem 30, we have to revisit the results of Section 3. Let us first notice that Lemma 15 remains true in this framework when player $j$ belongs to $H_r$. Lemma 16 remains true, however we have to slightly adapt its proof.

**Proof (of Lemma 16 in the case of reachability/safety objectives).**

Let us first introduce some notations. In the rest of the proof, we denote by $H_i^j$ (resp. $H_s^j$) the subset of players $i \in H_r$ (resp. $i \in H_s$) such that $\alpha$ visits $\text{Goal}_i$ (resp. $\text{Bad}_i$) and by $\Pi^\infty_i$ (resp. $\Pi^\infty_s$) the set $H_i \setminus H_i^j$ (resp. $H_s \setminus H_s^j$).

The punishment function $P$ is defined exactly as in the proof of Lemma 16. For $v_0$, we define $P(v_0) = \bot$ and for $h \in V^+$ such that $\text{Last}(h) \in V_i$ and $v \in V$, we let:

$$P(h) = \begin{cases} \bot & \text{if } P(h) = \bot \text{ and } hv < \alpha \beta^\omega, \\ i & \text{if } P(h) = \bot \text{ and } hv \neq \alpha \beta^\omega, \\ P(h) & \text{otherwise (} P(h) \neq \bot). \end{cases}$$

The difference with the proof of Lemma 16 arises in the definition of the Nash equilibrium $(\tau_i)_{i \in H}$. The new equilibrium needs to incorporate an adequate punishment for the players with safety objectives. More precisely, in order to dissuade a player $j \in H_i^j$ from deviating, the other players punish him by playing the strategies $(\sigma_i)_{i \notin H \setminus \{j\}}$ in $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$. Notice that a player $j \in H^\infty_s$ has no incentive to deviate. Formally we define the Nash equilibrium $(\tau_i)_{i \in H}$ as follows. For $h \in H$ such that $\text{Last}(h) \in V_i$,

$$\tau_i(h) = \begin{cases} v & \text{if } P(h) = \bot (h < \alpha \beta^\omega); \text{ such that } hv < \alpha \beta^\omega, \\ \text{arbitrary} & \text{if } P(h) = i, \\ \tau_i, P(h)(h) & \text{if } P(h) \neq \bot, i \text{ and } P(h) \in \Pi^\infty_i, \\ \sigma_i(h) & \text{if } P(h) \neq \bot, i \text{ and } P(h) \in \Pi^f_i \cup \Pi^s_i \text{ and } |h| < d, \\ \text{arbitrary} & \text{otherwise}, \end{cases}$$

where *arbitrary* means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily (in a memoryless way). Clearly the outcome of $(\tau_i)_{i \in H}$ is the play $\alpha \beta^\omega$, and $\text{Type}(\tau_i)_{i \in H}$ is equal to $\text{Visit}(\alpha)$ ($= \text{Visit}(\alpha \beta)$).

It remains to prove that $(\tau_i)_{i \in H}$ is a finite-memory Nash equilibrium in the game $T$. In order to do so, we prove that none of the players has a profitable deviation. For players with reachability objectives, the arguments are exactly the same as the ones provided in the proof of Lemma 16. Let us now consider players with safety objectives. In the case where $j \in H^\infty_s$, player $j$ has clearly no incentive to deviate. In the case where $j \in H^f_s$, to decrease his cost, player $j$ has no incentive to deviate after the prefix $\alpha$. Thus we assume that the strategy $\tau'_j$ causes a deviation from a vertex visited in $\alpha$. By Equation 10 the other players first play according to $(\sigma_i)_{i \notin H \setminus \{j\}}$ in $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$, and then in an arbitrary way.

Suppose that $\tau'_j$ is a profitable deviation for player $j$ w.r.t. $(\tau_i)_{i \in H}$ in the game $T$. Let us set $\pi = \langle \tau_i \rangle_{i \in H}$ and $\pi' = \langle \tau'_i, (\tau_i)_{i \notin H \setminus \{j\}} \rangle$. Then

$$\text{Cost}_j(\pi') < \text{Cost}_j(\pi).$$

On the other hand we know that

$$\text{Cost}_j(\pi) = \text{Cost}_j(\rho) \leq |\alpha|.$$

So if we limit the play $\pi'$ in $T$ to its prefix of length $d$, we get a play $\rho'$ in $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ such that

$$\text{Cost}_j(\rho') \leq \text{Cost}_j(\pi') < \text{Cost}_j(\rho).$$
Notice that we do not necessarily have that $\text{Cost}_j(\rho') = \text{Cost}_j(\pi')$ (as in the proof of Lemma 10) since the bad set $\text{Bad}_j$ can be visited by $\pi'$ and not by $\rho'$. As the play $\rho'$ is consistent with the strategies $(\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi \setminus \{j\}}$ by Equation (9), the strategy $\tau'_j$ restricted to the tree $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ is a profitable deviation for player $j$ w.r.t. $(\sigma_i)_{i \in \Pi}$ in the game $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$. This is impossible. Moreover, as done in the proof of Lemma 10, $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ is a finite-memory strategy profile.

Since Lemma 10 holds in the context of reachability/safety objectives, Proposition 13 ensures that the equilibrium in $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ provided by Kuhn’s theorem (Corollary 12) can be lifted to $T$. This proves Theorem 30.

5.2 Tuples of Costs on Edges

In this subsection, we come back to a pure reachability framework and we extend our model in the following way: we assume that edges are labelled with tuples of positive costs (one cost for each player). Here we not only count the number of edges to reach the goal of a player, but we sum up his costs along the path until his goal is reached. His aim is still to minimize his global cost for a play. We generalize Definition 1.

**Definition 31.** An infinite turn-based quantitative multiplayer reachability game with tuples of costs on edges is a tuple $G = (\Pi, V, (V_i)_{i \in \Pi}, v_0, E, (\text{Cost}_i)_{i \in \Pi}, (\text{Goal}_i)_{i \in \Pi})$ where

- $\Pi$ is a finite set of players,
- $G = (V, (V_i)_{i \in \Pi}, v_0, E)$ is a finite directed graph where $V$ is the set of vertices, $(V_i)_{i \in \Pi}$ is a partition of $V$ into the state sets of each player, $v_0 \in V$ is the initial vertex, and $E \subseteq V \times V$ is the set of edges,
- $\text{Cost}_i : E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+_{>0}$ is the cost function of player $i$ defined on the edges of the graph,
- $\text{Goal}_i \subseteq V$ is the goal set of player $i$.

We also positively solve Problem 1 for Nash equilibria in this context.

**Theorem 32.** In every quantitative multiplayer reachability game with tuples of costs on edges, there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium.

To prove Theorem 32, we follow the same scheme as in Section 3. In particular, we rely on Kuhn’s theorem (Corollary 12) and need to prove a counterpart of Lemma 15, Lemma 16 and Proposition 13 in this framework.

Let us first introduce some notations that will be useful in this context. We define $c_{\text{min}} := \min_{i \in \Pi} \min_{e \in E} \text{Cost}_i(e)$, $c_{\text{max}} := \max_{i \in \Pi} \max_{e \in E} \text{Cost}_i(e)$ and $K := \lceil c_{\text{max}} \rceil$. It is clear that $c_{\text{min}}, c_{\text{max}} > 0$ and $K \geq 1$.

We also adapt the definition of $\text{Cost}_i(\rho)$, the cost of player $i$ for a play $\rho = \rho_0 \rho_1 \ldots$,

$$\text{Cost}_i(\rho) = \begin{cases} \sum_{k=1}^{l} \text{Cost}_i((\rho_{k-1}, \rho_k)) & \text{if } l \text{ is the least index such that } \rho_l \in \text{Goal}_i, \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The counterpart of Lemma 15 is the following one, taking into account the constant $K$ defined before.
Lemma 33. Suppose $d \geq 0$. Let $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$ be a Nash equilibrium in $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ and $\rho$ the outcome of $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$. Assume that $\rho$ has a prefix $\alpha \beta \gamma$, where $\beta$ contains at least one vertex, such that

\[
\text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Visit}(\alpha \beta \gamma) \\
\text{Last}(\alpha) = \text{Last}(\alpha \beta) \\
|\alpha \beta| \leq l \cdot |V| \\
|\alpha \beta \gamma| = (l + K) \cdot |V|
\]

for some $l \geq 1$.

Let $j \in I$ be such that $\alpha$ does not visit $\text{Goal}_j$. Consider the qualitative two-player zero-sum game $G_j = (V, V_j, V \setminus V_j, E, \text{Goal}_j).$ Then for all histories $hu$ of $\mathcal{G}$ consistent with $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I \setminus \{j\}}$ and such that $hu \leq \alpha \beta$, the coalition of the players $i \neq j$ wins the game $G_j$ from $u$.

Proof (Sketch). As for the proof of Lemma 15 we proceed by contradiction and define a play $\rho'$ in the very same way. We can deduce that

\[
\text{Index}_j(\rho') \leq |hu| + |V| \\
\quad \leq (l + 1) \cdot |V| \quad \text{(by Proposition 14)} \\
\quad \leq (l + K) \cdot |V| \quad \text{(by hypothesis)} \\
\quad \leq d \quad \text{(as $K \geq 1$)}
\]

The case where $\text{Cost}_j(\rho) = +\infty$ is solved in the same way. For the other case $\text{Cost}_j(\rho) < +\infty$, we note $c_j(hu)$ the sum of the costs of player $j$ along the prefix $hu$. We have the following inequalities (see Figure 11):

\[
\text{Cost}_j(\rho') \leq c_j(hu) + c_{\text{max}} \cdot |V| \\
\text{Cost}_j(\rho) > c_j(hu) + c_{\text{min}} \cdot K \cdot |V| \quad \text{(as $\text{Index}_j(\rho) > (l + K) \cdot |V|$)} \\
\quad \geq c_j(hu) + c_{\text{min}} \cdot \frac{c_{\text{max}}}{c_{\text{min}}} \cdot |V| \quad \text{(as $\alpha \beta \gamma \leq \rho$)}
\]

Then we have $\text{Cost}_j(\rho') < \text{Cost}_j(\rho)$, and since $\rho'$ is consistent with $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I \setminus \{j\}}$, the strategy of player $j$ induced by the play $\rho'$ is a profitable deviation for player $j$ w.r.t. $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$. This contradicts the fact that $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$ is a Nash equilibrium in the game $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$. \hfill \square

The following lemma is the counterpart of Lemma 16.

Lemma 34. Suppose $d \geq 0$. Let $(\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$ be a Nash equilibrium in $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ and $\alpha \beta \gamma$ be a prefix of $\rho = (\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$ as defined in Lemma 16 where $|\alpha \beta \gamma| = (l + K) \cdot |V|$ for some $l \geq 1$ such that $l \leq \frac{|V|}{|V|_K} + 1$.

Then there exists a Nash equilibrium $(\tau_i)_{i \in I}$ in the game $T$. Moreover $(\tau_i)_{i \in I}$ is finite-memory, and $\text{Type}(\tau_i)_{i \in I} = \text{Visit}(\alpha)$.

Proof. We prove this result in the very same way as Lemma 16. The only difference lies in the case $j \leq k$ when we show that $(\tau_i)_{i \in I}$ is a Nash equilibrium. We suppose that $\tau'_j$ is a profitable deviation for player $j$ w.r.t. $(\tau_i)_{i \in I}$ in the game $T$. So we have $\text{Cost}_j(\tau'_j) < \text{Cost}_j(\tau)$.

Indeed when $j > k$, i.e. when player $j$ has not reached his goal set, the coalition punishes him in the exact same way as Lemma 16 by preventing him from visiting his goal set.
where $\pi = \langle (\tau_i)_{i \in I} \rangle$ and $\pi' = \langle (\tau'_i, (\tau_i)_{i \in I \setminus \{j\}}) \rangle$. As $\text{Index}_j(\pi) \leq |\alpha|$, we know that $\text{Cost}_j(\pi') \leq |\alpha| \cdot c_{\max}$ and

$$
\text{Index}_j(\pi') < |\alpha| \cdot \frac{c_{\max}}{c_{\min}} \leq (l - 1) \cdot |V| \cdot K \\
\leq d \quad \text{(by hypothesis)}.
$$

The first inequality can be justified as follows. For a contradiction, let us assume that $\text{Index}_j(\pi') \geq |\alpha| \cdot \frac{c_{\max}}{c_{\min}}$. It follows that $\text{Cost}_j(\pi') \geq |\alpha| \cdot \frac{c_{\max}}{c_{\min}}$, this contradicts the fact that $\text{Cost}_j(\pi') < |\alpha| \cdot c_{\max}$.

As in the proof of Lemma 16, we limit the play $\pi'$ in $T$ to its prefix of length $d$ and get a profitable deviation for player $j$ w.r.t. $\langle (\sigma_i)_{i \in I} \rangle$ in the game $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$, contradicting the fact that $\langle (\sigma_i)_{i \in I} \rangle$ is a Nash equilibrium in $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$.

Moreover, as done in the proof of Lemma 16, $\langle \tau_1, \tau_2 \rangle$ is a finite-memory strategy profile. $\square$

As a consequence of the two previous lemmas, Proposition 13 remains true in this context, we only have to adjust the depth $d$ of the finite tree.

**Proposition 35.** Let $G$ be a game and $T$ be the unraveling of $G$. Let $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ be the game played on the truncated tree of $T$ of depth $d = \max\{(|I|+1)\cdot|K|\cdot|V|, (|I|-(K+1)+1)\cdot|V|\cdot|K|\}$. If there exists a Nash equilibrium in the game $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$, then there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium in the game $T$.

**Proof.** The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 13. Let $\langle (\sigma_i)_{i \in I} \rangle$ be a Nash equilibrium in the game $\text{Trunc}_d(T)$ and $\rho$ its outcome. We consider the prefix $pq$ of $\rho$ of minimal length such that

$$
\exists l \geq 1 \\
|p| = (l - 1) \cdot |V| \\
|pq| = (l + K) \cdot |V| \\
\text{Visit}(p) = \text{Visit}(pq).
$$

In the worst case, the play $\rho$ visits the goal set of a new player in each prefix of length $i \cdot (K+1) \cdot |V|$, $1 \leq i \leq |I|$, i.e. $|p| = |I| \cdot (K+1) \cdot |V|$. So we know that $l \leq |I| \cdot (K+1) + 1$ and $pq$
exists as a prefix of $\rho$, because the length $d$ of $\rho$ is greater or equal to $(|I| + 1) \cdot (K + 1) \cdot |V|$ by hypothesis.

Given the length of $q$ ($K \geq 1$), one vertex of $V$ is visited at least twice by $q$. More precisely, we can write

$$pq = \alpha \beta \gamma$$

with \( \text{Last}(\alpha) = \text{Last}(\alpha \beta) \)

\[ |\alpha| \geq (l - 1) \cdot |V| \]

\[ |\alpha \beta| \leq l \cdot |V| \cdot K \]

We have $\text{Visit}(\alpha) = \text{Visit}(\alpha \beta \gamma)$, and $|\alpha \beta \gamma| = (l + K) \cdot |V|$

Moreover, the following inequality holds:

$$d \geq (|I| \cdot (K + 1) + 1) \cdot |V| \cdot K \geq l \cdot |V| \cdot K \quad \text{and so,} \quad l \leq \frac{d}{|V| \cdot K}.$$

Then, we can apply Lemma 34 and get a finite-memory Nash equilibrium ($\tau_i$) in the game $T$ such that $\text{Type}((\tau_i) \in I) = \text{Visit}(\alpha)$.

Thanks to Corollary 12 and Proposition 35, one can easily deduce Theorem 32.

Let us comment on the depth $d$ chosen in Proposition 35. It is defined as the maximum between $d_1 := (|I| + 1) \cdot (K + 1) \cdot |V|$ and $d_2 := (|I| \cdot (K + 1) + 1) \cdot |V| \cdot K$. One can easily prove that $d_1 < d_2$ if and only if $K^2 > \frac{|I|}{|I| + 1}$.

We now investigate an alternative method to handle simple cost functions. More precisely, we only consider cost functions $(\text{Cost}_i) \in I$ such that for all $i, j \in I$ we have that $\text{Cost}_i = \text{Cost}_j$ and $\text{Cost}_i : E \to \mathbb{N}_0$. In other words, it means that there is a unique non-zero natural cost on every edge. Later on we are going to compare the depths of the finite trees obtained by the two methods.

In the case of these simple cost functions, we can directly deduce Theorem 32 by replacing any edge of cost $c$ by a path of length $c$ composed of $c$ new edges (of cost $1$) and then applying the results of Section 3 on this new game. If we write $G' = (I, V', (V'_i) \in I, v_0, E', (\text{Goal}_i) \in I)$ the new game obtained by adding new vertices and edges when necessary, it holds that:

$$|V'| \leq |V| + (c_{\text{max}} - 1) \cdot |E|$$

$$\leq |V| + (c_{\text{max}} - 1) \cdot |V|^2 \cdot |E| \cdot K.$$  

If we apply Proposition 13, the depth $d'$ of the finite tree that is considered satisfies:

$$d' = (|I| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V'|$$

$$\leq (|I| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot (|V| + (c_{\text{max}} - 1) \cdot |E|)$$

$$\leq (|I| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot (|V| + (c_{\text{max}} - 1) \cdot |V|^2) \cdot K.$$

Whereas if we apply Proposition 35 directly on the initial game $G$, we have the following equality:

$$d = \max\{|I| \cdot (K + 1) \cdot |V|, |I| \cdot (K + 1) + 1 \cdot |V| \cdot K\}.$$

Let us first notice that if all the edges of $G$ are labelled with the same cost (i.e., $c_{\text{max}} = c_{\text{min}}$ and $K = 1$), then

$$d' = (|I| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot (|V| + (c_{\text{max}} - 1) \cdot |E|),$$

and

$$d = (|I| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V|.$$
And so,

if \(c_{\text{max}} = c_{\text{min}} = 1\), then \(d' = d = (|I| + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot |V|\), and
if \(c_{\text{max}} = c_{\text{min}} > 1\), then \(d' > d\).

When \(K > 1\), the comparison between \(d\) and \(d'\) depends on the values of many parameters of the game. For example, if the graph of the game has five vertices, three edges of cost 1 and one edge of cost 100, then it is more interesting to use the game \(G'\) and techniques from Section 3 to construct the Nash equilibrium, because in this case, \(d' = (I + 1) \cdot 2 \cdot 104\) and \(d = (|I| \cdot 101 + 1) \cdot 5 \cdot 101\), and so \(d >> d'\).

6 Conclusion and Perspectives

In this paper, we first prove the existence of finite-memory Nash equilibria for quantitative multiplayer reachability games played on finite graphs. We also prove that this result remains true when the model is enriched by allowing \(n\)-tuples of non-negative costs on edges (one cost by player), answering a question we posed in [4]. Moreover we extend our existence result to quantitative games where both safety and reachability objectives coexist. Secondly, we prove the existence of finite-memory secure equilibria for quantitative two-player reachability games played on finite graphs.

There are several interesting directions for further research. First, we intend to investigate the existence of secure equilibria in the \(n\)-player framework. Notice that the proof techniques related to our results on secure equilibria rely on the two-player assumption. Furthermore, we also want to investigate deeper the size of the memory needed in the equilibria. This could be a first step towards a study of the complexity of computing equilibria with certain requirements, in the spirit of [9]. We also intend to look for existence results for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally we would like to address these questions for other objectives such as Büchi or request-response.

Acknowledgement. This work has been partly supported by the ESF project GASICS and a grant from the National Bank of Belgium. The third author is supported by a grant from L’Oreal-UNESCO/F.R.S.-FNRS. The authors are grateful to Jean-François Raskin and Hugo Gimbert for useful discussions.

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