Security of an RFID Based Authentication Protocol with Bitwise Operations for Supply Chain

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Short Report

Keywords: Authentication protocol, PUF, Cryptanalysis, RFID, Impersonation Attack, Supply Chain

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Security of an RFID based Authentication Protocol with Bitwise Operations for Supply Chain

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Abstract Due to the stringent computational capabilities of low-cost RFID tags, several lightweight secure authentication protocols have been proposed for an RFID-based supply chain using bitwise operations. In this paper, we study the vulnerabilities associated with bitwise operations by doing cryptanalysis of a secure lightweight authentication protocol for RFID tags. The bitwise operations like rotation and XOR show that the protocol is vulnerable to tag, reader, and supply chain node impersonation attacks. We find that the major cause of the vulnerability is bitwise operations and suggest using the physically unclonable functions rather than bitwise operations to secure such lightweight protocols.

Keywords: Authentication protocol, PUF, Cryptanalysis, RFID, Impersonation Attack, Supply Chain

1. Introduction

Supply chain is the management of the entire flow of goods, data, finance and production, and supervises the processes until it transforms them into final products or reaches their destination. A well-managed and immutable supply chain is needed to identify the origin of counterfeit goods which have somehow reached to the consumers Dabbene, Gay, and Tortia (2014). In supply chain many departments link with each other by using RFID tags for the acquisition of their own data.

Recently, several lightweight authentication protocols have been proposed with the goal of achieving secure authentication through bitwise operations...
because of limited computational capabilities of low-cost RFID tags. For low cost computation and energy constraints devices, often bitwise operations are suggested without crypto-primitives, which lead to different vulnerabilities Xin, Zhang, and Yang (2020). These bitwise operations have not been shown to help and create secure protocol Safkhani and Shariat (2018); Sidorov et al. (2019); Mujahid, Naim-ul Islam, and Sarwar (2017); Safkhani et al. (2021); Sun and Mu (2017); Izza, Benssalah, and Drouiche (2021). In this paper, we show that single or multiple uses of rotation (ROT) functions and XOR operations without crypto-primitives does not secure protocol against various attacks, by doing cryptanalysis of a recently published Jangirala et al.’s protocol, “Designing secure lightweight blockchain-enabled RFID-based authentication protocol for supply chains in 5G mobile edge computing environment (LBRAPS)” Jangirala, Das, and Vasilakos (2019).

The LBRAPS protocol is based on one way hash function, bitwise rotation (ROT) function and bitwise exclusive OR (XOR). It comprises of two phases, 1) initialization, 2) authentication and key agreement. The authors have proved that LBRAPS is immune to various active attacks by formal security analysis based on Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool and claimed that the protocol is secure against many known threats such as mutual authentication, tag impersonation attack and reader impersonation attack. However, the key issue related to their design is that an attacker can easily acquire the credentials by the means of capturing the transmitted messages as it based on only bitwise rotate function. We demonstrate that the protocol is not immune to reader impersonation, tag impersonation and supply chain node impersonation attacks. We have also proposed countermeasures to secure the protocol.

2. Review of Jangirala et al.’s Protocol

There are three participants in the protocol, the tag $T$, the reader $R$ and the supply chain node $S$. The common notations used are shown in Table 1. The protocol has two phases: initialization phase, and login and authentication phase.

2.1. Initialization Phase

To setup the protocol, the identity $ID_T$ of tag $T$ or reader $R$ is considered as password, and the blockchain produces public key address for each account identifier. Therefore, the tag stores the record \{ID$_T$, Bal$_{BC}$\} in its database, where balance amount and tag identity in blockchain under department Dept$_i$ are Bal$_{BC}$ and ID$_T$, respectively. Similarly, every reader $R$ also saves $ID_R$ in its repository. Consequently, the $S$ and $R$ exchanges a secret-key $X_{RS} = h(ID_S\|B_S\|ID_R)$, where $B_S$ denotes the blockchain connected with the $S$. $R$ initiates the transaction message and forwards it towards $T$. Additionally, $R$ must have an initial balance in its account in order to make transactions. Consequently, Bal$_{BC}$ denotes the balance of $T$ in the blockchain and for every new transaction it is presented as Bal$_{New} = Bal_{BC} + S_{Amount}$, where $S_{Amount}$ denotes the amount of $S$ transactions.
2.2. Login and Authentication Phase

The entities $S$, $T$ and $R$ follow the subsequent steps for establishment of session key between $T$ and $S$.

Step 1: The reader $R$ engenders a nonce $R_N$ and current time-stamp $T_R$. Furthermore, it calculates: $M_R = ROT(R_N \oplus ID_T \oplus T_R, T_R \oplus ID_T)$ and $C_R = h(M_R||ID_T||R_N)$, and then sends the request message $MSG_1 = \{M_R, C_R, T_R\}$ to $T$ through an insecure channel.

Step 2: After receiving the message $MSG_1$ from $R$, $T$ first validates the time-stamp $T_R$. If it does not hold, the session is aborted by $T$. Otherwise, $T$ fetches the nonce $R_N$ of $R$ as $R_N = (M_R \gg (ID_T \oplus T_R)) \oplus ID_T \oplus T_R$, and computes: $C'_R = h(M_R||ID_T||R_N)$ and validates: $C'_R = C_R$. If it holds, $T$ also calculates: $C_T = h(R_N \oplus ID_S \oplus Bal_{new})$, $M_T = ROT(R_N \oplus ID_S \oplus T_T, T_T \oplus ID_T)$ and $Auth_R = h(C_T||R_N||M_T||ID_T||T_T)$. After above computations, $T$ transmits the message $MSG_2 = \{C_T, Auth_R, M_T, T_T\}$ towards $R$ via an insecure channel.

Step 3: After receiving the message $MSG_2$ from $T$, $R$ validates the time-stamp $T_R$ to check the authenticity of the received message. If it holds, $R$ verifies if $Auth_R = h(C_T||R_N||M_T||ID_T||T_T)$. If it holds, $R$ then engenders two nonces $R_a$, $R_b$ and selects $T'_R$, and calculates: $M_Q = R_a \oplus ID_S \oplus R_b$, $M_Q = X_{RS} \oplus R_a$ and $Reader_{check} = h(R_a \oplus ID_S \oplus Bal_{new} \oplus (R_b||T'_R))$. Afterwards, $R$ transmits the message $MSG_3 = \{M_Q, M_P, Reader_{check}, T'_R\}$ to $S$ belongs to $Dept_1$ of the blockchain.

Step 4: Upon receiving the message $MSG_3$ from the reader $R$ and $S$ verifies the authenticity of time-stamp $T'_R$. If it holds, $S$ starts the predefined smart-contract on the blockchain to proceed the authentication mechanism. The authentication mechanism is enabled via the $S$ of blockchain by validating if the $ID_T$ presents in $S$ repository. If it is not available, the session is aborted, else $S$ gets $Bal_{BC-REC}$ and performs the following

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Notations} & \text{Elucidations} \\
\hline
R, T, S & \text{Reader, tag and supply-chain node} \\
ID_R, ID_T, ID_S & \text{Identity of the reader, tag, and supply chain node} \\
X_{RS} & \text{Secret key between reader and supply chain} \\
Dept_i & \text{$i$th department} \\
Bal_{BC} & \text{Dept, balance amount in blockchain} \\
SK & \text{Session key} \\
RROT(X,Y) & \text{Blockchain associated with $S$} \\
ROT(X,Y) & \text{Left rotate of $X$ by hamming weight of $Y$} \\
RROOT(X,Y) & \text{$X\gg Y$, right rotate of $X$ by hamming weight of $Y$} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]
calculations: $R_0 = X_{RS} \oplus M_Q$, $R_a = M_P \oplus ID_S \oplus R_b$, $S_{\text{checkA}} = h(R_a \oplus ID_S \oplus Bal_{BC-REC} \oplus (R_b||T_S^R))$ and $S_{\text{checkB}} = h(R_a \oplus ID_S \oplus (Bal_{BC-REC} + S_{\text{Amount}}) \oplus (R_b||T_S^R))$. Afterwards, the validation is completed by checking the condition $(S_{\text{checkA}} = \text{Reader_check})$ and if it holds, $S$ records $Bal_{BC-REC} = Bal_{BC}$, otherwise if $(S_{\text{checkB}} = \text{Reader_check})$ is true, $S$ acknowledges $ID_R = S_{\text{Amount}}$, $ID_T$, and records $Bal_{BC-REC} = Bal_{BC-REC} + S_{\text{Amount}}$ in distributed ledger $Ledger_{BC}$. Consequently $S$ engenders a random nonce $S_R$ at current time-stamp $T_S$ to calculate $S_P = ROT(T_S, ID_S \oplus X_{RS}) \oplus ROT(S_R, X_{RS})$, $S_Q = ROT(S_R, ID_S) \oplus ROT(T_S, X_{RS})$, $SK_{ST} = h(ID_T \oplus Bal_{BC-REC} \oplus S_R \oplus ID_S)$ and $S_5 = h(SK_{ST}||S_R||Bal_{BC-REC})$. Here, $SK_{ST}$ is the session key enabled by $S$ so that by validating the correct message, $T$ can maintain the similar session key. The $S$ then transmits the message $MSG_4 = \{S_P, S_Q, S_5, T_S\}$ to $R$ through an insecure channel.

Step 5: After receiving the message $MSG_4$ from $S$, $R$ verifies the validity of received time-stamp $T_S$. If it holds, $R$ extracts the random nonce $S_R$ of $R$ as $S'_R = RROT(S_Q \oplus ROT(T_S, X_{RS}), ID_S)$ and checks it to authenticate $S$ by validating $S_P = ROT(T_S, ID_S \oplus X_{RS}) \oplus ROT(S'_R, X_{RS})$. If it validates, $R$ further calculates $R_Q = ROT(S_R, ID_R) \oplus ROT(T_S, R_N)$ and sends the message $MSG_5 = \{S_S, R_Q, T_S\}$ towards $T$ through an insecure channel.

Step 6: After receiving the request message $MSG_5$ from $R$, $T$ fetches nonce $S_R$ as $S'_R = RROT(R_Q \oplus ROT(T_S, R_N), ID_R)$, calculates session key $SK_{ST} = h(ID_T \oplus Bal_{New} \oplus S'_R \oplus ID_S)$ to validate both $S$ and $R$ by checking the condition $S_S = h(SK_{ST}||S'_R||Bal_{BC-REC})$. If it does not match, $T$ rejects the communication request, else if it holds, then $T$ modifies $Bal_{New} = Bal_{BC} + S_{\text{Amount}}$ in its database record. After maintaining the session key $SK_{ST} = h(ID_T \oplus Bal_{New} \oplus S'_R \oplus ID_S)$ between $T$ and $S$ with the help of $R$, the blockchain balance has modified in the distributed-ledger with updated balance $Bal_{New}$. The reason for maintaining the session key between $T$ and $S$ is that depending on the potential need, the blockchain will intercept with the concerned department where $T$ and $S$ want to communicate safely with the $SK_{ST}$ session key.

3. Cryptanalysis of the protocol

We assume adversarial model same as Jangirala et al.’s in which an adversary $A_{ad}$ can block, alter or even delete the message on the radio link between a reader and tag. It can also perform cloning and physical attack. Further, we suppose that there are various readers in the system and the adversary has control over the public channel.
3.1. Reader Impersonation

The tag stores \{ID_T\} in its memory during initialization process. Suppose ID_T are some how leaked (stolen or retrieved through power analysis Yang et al. (2016)) to \mathcal{A}_{ad}, we shall show that the SK can be constructed and impersonation is possible, because the reader uses \{ID_T\} in the generation of login message MSG_1 = \{M_R, C_R, T_R\}. Therefore, an \mathcal{A}_{ad} can easily steal these parameters and can utilize them to mount impersonation attack on a legitimate reader. For this purpose, an \mathcal{A}_{ad} performs the following steps:

Step 1: First of all, the \mathcal{A}_{ad} randomly selects \(R_{N}^{A_{ad}}\) at time \(T_{R}^{A_{ad}}\) and computes: \(M_{R}^{A_{ad}} = \text{ROT}(R_{N}^{A_{ad}} \oplus ID_T \oplus T_{R}^{A_{ad}} \oplus ID_T)\) and \(C_{R}^{A_{ad}} = h(M_{R}^{A_{ad}} || ID_T || R_{N}^{A_{ad}})\).

Step 2: After the above calculations, \mathcal{A}_{ad} sends the request message MSG_1 = \{M_{R}^{A_{ad}}, C_{R}^{A_{ad}}, T_{R}^{A_{ad}}\} to the tag.

Step 3: Upon receiving request message MSG_1, the tag first checks validity of time period \(T_R\). Then, it extracts \(R_N\) as \(R_N = (M_{R}^{A_{ad}} \gg (ID_T \oplus T_{R}^{A_{ad}})) \oplus T_{R}^{A_{ad}} \oplus ID_T\). Actually, this \(R_N\) is generated by adversary during login process. Hence, Both \(R_N\) and \(R_{N}^{A_{ad}}\) always will be equal. Afterwards, tag calculates \(C_{R}^{'} = h(M_{R}^{A_{ad}} || ID_T || R_{N})\) and also validates \(C_{R}^{'} = C_{R}^{A_{ad}}\), hence it holds true and tag deems the adversary as a legal reader.

Hence, \mathcal{A}_{ad} has successfully impersonated as a legal reader and the protocol is vulnerable to reader impersonation attack. The detail is given in the Fig. 1.

3.2. Tag Impersonation

The tag stores \{ID_T\} in its memory during initialization process. Suppose ID_T are some how leaked (stolen or retrieved through power analysis Yang et al. (2016)) to \mathcal{A}_{ad}. However, an adversary \mathcal{A}_{ad} can easily extract these parameters and can easily impersonate a valid tag after acquiring the login message MSG_1 = \{M_R, C_R, T_R\}. To impersonate a legitimate tag the adversary follows these steps:

Step 1: Whenever the reader sends message MSG_1 = \{M_R, C_R, T_R\} to the tag, the \mathcal{A}_{ad} intercepts it and extracts \(R_{N}^{A_{ad}}\) as \(R_{N}^{A_{ad}} = (M_{R}^{A_{ad}} \oplus ID_T \oplus T_{R}^{A_{ad}}) \oplus T_{R}^{A_{ad}} \oplus ID_T\) and calculates: \(C_{R}^{A_{ad}} = h(M_{R} || ID_T || R_{N}^{A_{ad}})\). Next, he checks \(C_{R}^{A_{ad}} = C_{R}\), if it does not hold true, then the session will be terminated, otherwise the \mathcal{A}_{ad} generates \(T_{T}^{A_{ad}}\) and calculates: \(C_{T}^{A_{ad}} = h(R_{N}^{A_{ad}} \oplus ID_T \oplus Bal_{Ned})\), \(M_{T}^{A_{ad}} = \text{ROT}(R_{N}^{A_{ad}} \oplus ID_T \oplus T_{T}^{A_{ad}} \oplus T_{R}^{A_{ad}} \oplus ID_T)\), and \(Auth_{T}^{A_{ad}} = h(C_{T}^{A_{ad}} || R_{N}^{A_{ad}} || M_{T}^{A_{ad}} || ID_T || T_{T}^{A_{ad}})\). Afterwards, the \mathcal{A}_{ad} sends MSG_2 = \{C_{T}^{A_{ad}}, Auth_{T}^{A_{ad}}, M_T, T_T\} to the reader through insecure channel.
| Supply chain node | Compromised Reader | Tag |
|-------------------|---------------------|-----|
| Selects $R_{A_{ad}}^{k-1}$ and $T_{M}^{k-1}$ | $M_{A_{ad}}^{k-1} = \text{ROT}(R_{A_{ad}}^{k-1} \oplus ID_{r} \oplus T_{M}^{k-1})$ | $C_{A_{ad}}^{k-1} = h(M_{A_{ad}}^{k-1} \mid ID_{r} \mid R_{A_{ad}}^{k-1})$ |
| Checks $T_{R}$ | $R_{S} = (M_{A_{ad}}^{k-1} \ggot (ID_{r} \oplus T_{M}^{k-1}))$ | $\oplus T_{A_{ad}}^{k-1} \oplus ID_{r}$ |
| Generates $T_{F}$ | $C_{F} = h(M_{A_{ad}}^{k-1} \mid ID_{r} \mid R_{S})$ | Validates $C_{F} = C_{A_{ad}}^{k-1}$ |
| Generates time-stamp $T_{R}$ | $Auth_{R} = h(C_{F} \mid R_{S} \mid ID_{r} \mid T_{F})$ | $\{MSG_{A_{ad}}^{k-1} = C_{A_{ad}}^{k-1}, Auth_{A_{ad}}^{k-1}, M_{A_{ad}}^{k-1}, T_{A_{ad}}^{k-1} \}$ |
| Engenders two nonces $R_{a}, R_{b}$ and selects $T_{R}$ | $M_{F} = R_{a} \oplus ID_{g} \oplus R_{b}$ | $M_{Q} = X_{RS} \oplus R_{b}$ |
| $Reader_{check} = h(R_{a} \oplus ID_{g} \oplus Bal_{New} \oplus (R_{b} \mid ID_{r} \mid T_{F}))$ | $\{MSG_{A_{ad}}^{k} = M_{Q}, M_{P}, Reader_{check}, T_{R} \}$ | $\{MSG_{A_{ad}}^{k+1} = S_{f}, S_{g}, S_{a}, T_{S} \}$ |
| $\{MSG_{A_{ad}}^{k+2} = S_{a}, R_{Q}, T_{S} \}$ | $\{MSG_{A_{ad}}^{k+3} = S_{g}, R_{Q}, T_{S} \}$ |

Session key shared successfully

---

**Figure 1.** Reader impersonation attack.

Step 2: On receiving message $MSG_{2} = \{C_{T}^{A_{ad}}, Auth_{R}^{A_{ad}}, M_{T}^{A_{ad}}, T_{T}^{A_{ad}}\}$ from tag, reader checks validity of time-stamp $T_{R}$ and calculates $Auth_{R} = h(C_{T}^{A_{ad}} \mid R_{S}^{A_{ad}} \mid M_{T}^{A_{ad}} \mid ID_{r} \mid T_{T}^{A_{ad}})$. After the above calculations, reader checks whether $Auth_{R}^{A_{ad}} = Auth_{R}$. The verification check will be passed and reader sends message to the supply chain, it means that the $A_{ad}$ has successfully impersonated to a legitimate tag.

Hence, the $A_{ad}$ can successfully impersonate a valid tag and the protocol is exposed to tag impersonation attack. The detail is illustrated in the Fig. 2.
### 3.3. Supply Chain Node Impersonation Attack

The supply chain node and reader share a secret key $X_{RS} = h(ID_S\|B_S\|ID_R)$ during initialization phase, which is session specific. The reader and supply chain node has also used this shared secret key during login and authentication phase. However, it is obvious that both the supply chain node and the reader need to store $X_{RS}$ in some memory so that $X_{RS}$ can be used later during login and authentication phase. Suppose, an $A_{ad}$ has compromised the reader and revealed $X_{RS}$ via power analysis Yang et al. (2016). Since $ID_T$ and $ID_R$ is already revealed to an $A_{ad}$ (Sec. V of refJangirala, Das, and Vasilakos (2019)).

![Figure 2. Tag impersonation attack.](image-url)
therefore, after extracting these parameters \( \{ID_R, ID_T, X_{RS}\} \), supply chain
node impersonation attack is possible in this protocol. The detail of this attack
is given below.

Step 1: Whenever the reader sends \( MSG_3 \) to supply chain, the \( A_{ad} \) intercepts
the message \( MSG_3 = \{M_Q, M_p, Reader_{check}, T_R^{'}, \} \) and saves them for
later use. Next, an \( A_{ad} \) requires these parameters \( \{S_P, S_Q, S_s, T_S\} \) to im-
personate legal supply chain node. To get these parameters, \( A_{ad} \) execute
subsequent steps:

Step 2: Firstly, \( A_{ad} \) randomly generates a number \( S_R, T_S \) and then calculates
\( S_P = ROT(T_S, ID_S \oplus X_{RS}) \oplus ROT(S_R, X_{RS}) \) and \( S_Q = ROT(S_R, ID_S)
\oplus ROT(T_S, X_{RS}) \).

Step 3: The \( A_{ad} \) calculates valid session key \( SK_{ST} = h(ID_T \oplus Bal_{BC-REC} \oplus
S_R \oplus ID_S) \) and \( S_S = h(SK_{ST} \parallel S_R \parallel Bal_{BC-REC}) \).

Step 4: Then, the \( A_{ad} \) can send request message \( MSG_5 = \{S_P, S_Q, S_S, T_S\} \) as
legal supply chain node.

Step 5: Upon receiving request message \( MSG_4 = \{S_P, S_Q, S_S, T_S\} \), the reader
checks validity of time-stamp and calculates \( S_R^{'}, = RROT(S_Q \oplus ROT(T_S,
X_{RS}), ID_S) \). After the above calculation the reader checks whether \( S_P = ROT(T_S, ID_S \oplus X_{RS}) \oplus ROT(S_R, X_{RS}) \). The validation check will be
passed then it means \( A_{ad} \) has successfully impersonated to a legal supply
chain node.

Hence, the \( A_{ad} \) can impersonate on behalf of legitimate supply chain node and
the protocol is exposed to supply chain node impersonation attack. The detail
is shown in the Fig. 3.

4. Countermeasures

The protocol is vulnerable to tag and reader impersonation attacks because
during the registration phase their identity is stored in their memory and can
be extracted. Also, we have seen that the use of bitwise rotation functions is not
effort for designing secure protocol, although point multiplication has also be
used. Similarly, the supply chain node also stores its secret key in its memory in
the registration phase which can also be revealed.

One way to make authentication protocol secure is to use bitwise operations
with secure communication using strong crypto-primitives such as one-way hash
function, encryption, elliptic curve cryptography and public key cryptography,
etc. These techniques require more computation and energy resources. Though,
it would be a challenge for attackers to impersonate the tag, reader and supply
chain nodes, but this solution is not suitable for low cost tags with energy and
computational constraints and also relies on the assumption that the server is
trusted and physically secured.
The other solution which we propose for light protocol is use of physically unclonable function (PUF) [Koeberl et al. (2013)] can be utilized embedded with the micro-controller of RFID tag and reader. The certificate authority randomly generates a small subset of challenges during registration phase and applies them to the PUF in order to produce a corresponding set responses. For each token the challenge response pair (CRPs) are stored in a secure database by the certificate authority. Later, the CRPs are used for the token authentication. Without access to a given PUF (Weak or Strong), it is impossible for attacker to arrive at response corresponding to a challenge to impersonate tag and reader. Since the output of PUF is always unique and depends on the physical characteristics of the device for which it is determined, therefore, any attempt to temper the memory...
of RFID tag or reader will automatically change the behavior of the PUF. The key from PUF can be generated only when required for a cryptographic operation and can be instantaneously erased thereafter. Consequently, the output of the challenge-response pair will be changed and the adversary can be resisted to impersonate as a valid entity.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have shown the vulnerabilities associated with using bitwise operations by doing the cryptanalysis of a RFID-based supply chain protocol, which uses operations like ROT and XOR. We have shown that protocol is vulnerable to tag, reader and supply chain node impersonation attacks due to bitwise operations and propose using Physically Unclonable Function for such kind of lightweight protocols. In future, we plan to implement and analyze the RFID PUF-based solution for supply chain.

6. Declarations

Availability of Data and Material
There is no data or any other material associated with this manuscript.

Competing Interests
The authors proclaim that they have no competing interests.

Author’s Contributions
MAA and ANM analyzed the requirements of the security for supply chain infrastructure, crypt-analyzed the protocol, and proposed the remedy to overcome the security flaws. The initial draft of manuscript was written by MAA and later reviewed by ANM. Both the authors have read and approve the final manuscript.

Code Availability
Not Applicable

Funding
Not Applicable

Acknowledgement
Not Applicable

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Figures

| Supply chain node | Compromised Reader | Tag |
|-------------------|--------------------|-----|

Selects $R^A_{N}$ and $T^A_{K}$

$M^A_{N} = \text{RO}(R^A_{N} \oplus ID_{T} \oplus T^A_{K})$,

$C^A_{K} = h(M^A_{N} \| ID_{T} \| R^A_{N})$

$\{MSG_1^{Ad} = M^A_{N}, C^A_{K}, T^A_{K}\}$

Checks $T_{N}$

$R_{N} = (M^A_{N} \| ID_{T} \| T^A_{K})$

$\oplus T^A_{K} \oplus ID_{T}$

$C^A_{K} = h(M^A_{N} \| ID_{T} \| R_{N})$

Validates $C^A_{K} = C^A_{K}$

Generates $T_{T}$

$C_{T} = h(R_{N} \oplus ID_{T} \oplus Bal_{new})$

$M_{T} = \text{RO}((R_{N} \oplus ID_{S} \oplus T_{T}) \oplus ID_{T})$

$Auth_{R} = h(C_{T} \| R_{N} \| M_{T} \| ID_{T} \| T_{T})$

$\{MSG_2^{Ad} = C^A_{T}, Auth^A_{R}, M_{T}, T_{T}\}$

Generates time-stamp $T_{K}$

$Auth_{R} = h(C_{T} \| R_{N} \| M_{T} \| ID_{T} \| T_{T})$

Engenders two nonces $R_{a}, R_{b}$ and selects $T^A_{K}$

$M_{P} = R_{a} \oplus ID_{S} \oplus R_{b}$

$M_{Q} = X_{R_{a}} \oplus R_{b}$

$Reader_{check} = h(R_{a} \oplus ID_{S} \oplus Bal_{new} \oplus (R_{d} \| T^A_{K}))$

$\{MSG^{Ad}_{3} = M_{Q}, M_{P}, Reader_{check}, T^A_{K}\}$

$\{MSG^{Ad}_{4} = S_{P}, S_{Q}, S_{S}, T_{S}\}$

$\{MSG^{Ad}_{5} = S_{S}, R_{Q}, T_{S}\}$

Session key shared successfully

**Figure 1**

Reader impersonation attack.
| Supply chain node | Reader | Compromised Tag |
|------------------|--------|-----------------|
| Selects $R_N^{att}$ and $T_R^{att}$ | $M_{att}^R = ROT(Pr_N^{att} \oplus ID_r \oplus T_R^{att})$ | $C_R^{Att} = h(M_{R}^{att} \mid ID_r \mid R_N^{att})$ |
| $T_R^{Att} \oplus ID_r$ | | $\{MSG_1 = M_{R}^{att}, C_R^{Att}, T_R^{Att}\}$ |
| $C_R^{Att}$ | Checks $T_R$ | Checks $C_R^{Att} = C_R$ |
| Extracts $R_N^{att} = (M_{R} \oplus (ID_r \oplus T_R^{Att})) \oplus T_R^{Att} \oplus ID_r$ | Generates $T_T^{Att}$ | Generates $C_T^{Att} = h(R_N^{Att} \oplus ID_r \oplus Bal_{new}^{Att})$ |
| $C_T^{Att} = h(M_{R} \mid ID_r \mid R_N^{att})$ | $M_{att}^T = ROT(Pr_T^{att} \oplus ID_s \oplus T_T^{att})$ | $M_{att}^T = ROT(Pr_T^{att} \oplus ID_s \oplus T_T^{att})$ |
| $T_T^{Att} \oplus ID_r$ | Auth$_R^{Att} = h(C_T^{Att} \parallel S_T^{new} \parallel M_{att}^T)$ | Auth$_R^{Att} = h(C_T^{Att} \parallel S_T^{new} \parallel M_{att}^T)$ |
| Auth$_R^{Att}$ = Auth$_R$ | $\{MSG_2 = C_T^{Att}, Auth_R^{Att}, M_T, T_T\}$ | $\{MSG_2 = C_T^{Att}, Auth_R^{Att}, M_T, T_T\}$ |
| Engenders two nonces $R_a$, $R_b$ and selects $T_2$ | $M_p = R_a \oplus ID_s \oplus R_b$ | $\{MSG_3^{Att} = M_Q, M_P, Reade_{check} \parallel T_2\}$ |
| $M_Q = X_{RS} \oplus R_b$ | $Reade_{check} = h(R_a \oplus ID_s \oplus Bal_{new} \parallel (R_a \parallel T_2))$ |
| | $\{MSG_4^{Att} = S_{P}, S_{Q}, S_{S}, T_3\}$ | $\{MSG_5^{Att} = S_{S}, R_Q, T_S\}$ |
| | Session key shared successfully |

**Figure 2**

Tag impersonation attack.
Figure 3

Supply chain node impersonation attack.