Growing Random Strings in CA

M. Andrecut

November 15, 2022

Calgary, Alberta, T3G 5Y8, Canada
mircea.andrecut@gmail.com

Abstract

We discuss a class of cellular automata (CA) able to produce long random strings,
starting from short "seed" strings. The approach uses two principles borrowed from
cryptography: diffusion and confusion. We show numerically that the strings are
pseudo-random using three approaches based on: Fourier transform, entropy estima-
tion, and compression. An application to cryptography is also included with the cor-
responding Python code.

Keywords: cellular automata, symmetric cryptography

1 Introduction

Cellular Automata (CA) are discrete time and space dynamical systems, consisting of an
array of identical cells, each cell implementing a finite state automaton. Formally, a CA is a
4-tuple \(\{C, S, N, R\}\), where: \(C\) is the cellular space; \(S\) is the finite set of states of each cell;
\(N\) is the neighborhood of a cell; and \(R\) is the local rule used to compute a cell’s next state.
The cellular space can be \(d\)-dimensional, and the neighborhood of a cell can have various
configurations. Each cell uses the state of its neighbors and its own state to compute the
next state. While some CA can have very simple architectures and rules, they still display
surprisingly complex behavior [1].

Due to their complex chaotic behavior, CA have been proposed as random number
generators in cryptography. This direction was initiated by Stephen Wolfram’s claims about
rule 30 implemented in an elementary CA [2]. This random generator passed a standard suite
of statistical randomness tests, and its output was used as a secret keystream in symmetric
encryption.
More recently, one-dimensional CA have been shown to be isomorphic to Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) [3], which are probably the most used systems for the generation of pseudorandom sequences with applications to cryptography and communications [4]. Thus, CA can be considered as a viable alternative for such applications [5].

Typical CA are one-dimensional fixed length registers with \( L \)-cells, where the cell states are updated synchronously according to the local transition rule. Contrary to this, here we consider a linearly growing class of CA, able to produce long random strings, starting from short "seed" strings. The local transition rule is governed by two principles borrowed from cryptography: diffusion and confusion [6], [7]. We show numerically that the resulted strings are pseudo-random using three approaches based on: Fourier transform, entropy estimation, and compression. An application to cryptography is also included with the corresponding Python code.

2 Growing random strings in CA

We assume that at time \( t \) the CA is represented as a cell register \( C(t) \) of length \( L(t) \) depending on time \( t \), where each cell is one byte (8-bits), such that the maximum number of states is \( K = 256 \), and \( S = \{0, 1, 2, ..., 255\} \). The state of the CA at time \( t \) is therefore:

\[
C(t) = [s_0(t), s_1(t), ..., s_{L(t)-1}(t)], \quad s_\ell(t) \in S, 0 \leq \ell \leq L(t).
\]  

(1)

The initial state at \( t = 0 \) is:

\[
C(0) = [s_0(0), s_1(0), ..., s_{L(0)-1}(t)], \quad s_\ell(0) \in S, 0 \leq \ell \leq L(0),
\]  

(2)

where \( L(0) > L^* > 0 \) is the initial length, and \( L^* \) is a minimum accepted length.

Using the "diffusion" (or mixing) principle, at each time \( t \) we apply the following local rule:

\[
s_\ell(t+1) = (s_{(\ell-2)\text{mod}L(t)}(t) + s_{(\ell-1)\text{mod}L(t)}(t) + s_\ell(t))\text{mod}K.
\]  

(3)

Each "diffusion" is followed by a "confusion" step, where the length of the CA is increased by appending a new cell having the state:

\[
s_{L(t)+1}(t+1) = s_{L(t)+1}(t+1) = \left(\sum_{n=0}^{\ell} s_n(t)\right)\text{mod}K,
\]  

(4)

such that:

\[
L(t+1) = L(t) + 1.
\]  

(5)

Thus, at each iteration step the length of CA grows with one cell.
In Figure 1 we show the time evolution of the CA growth, for \( L(0) = 2^4 \) and \( t = 2^4, ..., T \), where \( T = 2^{10} \). One can see that while the length grows from \( L(0) = 2^4 \) to \( L(T) = 2^{10} \) the CA exhibits random behavior.

The main question is: how to prove that the resulted strings are pseudo-random? A first option would be to show that the probability distribution of states is uniform. In Figure 2 we show the probability distribution for \( L = 2^{15} \), which is clearly uniform.

Another option would be to use the fast Fourier transform of the last state of the CA, \( F(f) = FFT(C(T)) \). In Figure 3 we give the Fourier analysis for \( L = T = 2^{15} \). The amplitude of the coefficients seems uniform, and doesn’t show periodicity. The amplitude coefficients show an expected Rayleigh distribution:

\[
p(x) = x\sigma^{-2}e^{-x^2\sigma^{-2}/2}, \quad x \geq 0,
\]  

(6)
which is the probability distribution for nonnegative random variables, while the distribution of the Fourier transform phase is uniform.

Two important measures of the randomness are the Shannon entropy $\mathcal{H}$:

$$
\mathcal{H} = - \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} p_k \log_2 p_k,
$$

and the compression ratio. Here, $p_k$ is the probability (frequency) of the state $k \in \mathcal{S}$. The compression rate can be estimated using the BZIP2 algorithm as following:

$$
r = \frac{\text{length}(\text{BZIP2}(\text{C}(T)))}{\text{length}(\text{C}(T))},
$$

where $\text{BZIP2}(\text{C}(T))$ is the compressed value of the last CA state $\text{C}(T)$. In our case, for a single run, the computed entropy is $\mathcal{H} = 0.9993882799247457$, and the compression ratio is $r = 1.073150634765625$. Which means that the entropy is very close to the maximum value $\mathcal{H}_{\text{max}} = 1$, and the BZIP2 could not actually compress the state of the CA, which means it is pseudo-random. The Python implementation of the above analysis is given below:

```python
import math
import bz2
import lzma
import numpy as np
from collections import Counter
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt

def runCA(C,L):
    C,M,Q = bytearray(C.encode()),len(C), np.zeros((L,L))
    for J in range(M,L):
        C = [(C[n-2] + C[n-1] + C[n]) % 256 for n in range(J)]
```

Figure 2: The probability distribution of states, for $L = 2^{15}$.
Figure 3: The Fourier analysis for $L = T = 2^{15}$: (top) amplitude coefficients; (middle) amplitude coefficients distribution; (bottom) phase angle distribution.

```python
C.append(sum(C) % 256)
Q[J,0:J+1] = C
return 255-Q

def entropy(C):
    p, lns = Counter(C), float(len(C))
    return -sum(count/lns * math.log(count/lns, 256) for count in p.values())

if __name__ == '__main__':
    C = "abcdefghijklmnop"
    C = runCA(C, 32768)
```
3 Application to cryptography

Ciphers are widely used cryptographic algorithms in confidential communication systems. In such a system, the sender is encrypting the "plaintext" with an algorithm (cipher) and a secret key. The resulted encrypted information is called "ciphertext" and is sent to the receiver, which later can recover the plaintext by using a secret key and the corresponding decryption algorithm. If the secret keys used for encryption and decryption are the same then the process is called "symmetric encryption", and requires the sender and the receiver to share the secret key over a secure channel which cannot be eavesdropped (Fig. 4).
Let us denote by $\mathcal{X}$, $\mathcal{K}$, $\mathcal{Y}$ the sets of all messages, keys and respectively ciphertexts. We also assume that $E(k, x) = y$ and $D(k, y) = x$, are the encryption and respectively decryption functions, with $x \in \mathcal{X}$, $k \in \mathcal{K}$, and respectively $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. In order to define a cipher, the $E$ and $D$ functions must satisfy the following correctness property $D(k, E(k, x)) = x$, $\forall x \in \mathcal{X}$, which means that $D$ must be the inverse of $E$, $D = E^{-1}$.

A "perfect cipher" does not provide an attacker with any additional information about the plaintext, given the ciphertext $[1,2]$. This means that for any two messages $x, x^* \in \mathcal{X}$, the probability that $x = x^*$ is $|\mathcal{X}|^{-1}$, where $|\mathcal{X}|$ is the size (cardinal) of $\mathcal{X}$.

The main idea we want to exploit here is that the growing CA described in the previous section can be "seeded" with the secret key and then its state can grow into a random state $k$ that then can be used to encrypt the plain text $x$ using the Vernam cipher: $y_n = k_n \oplus x_n$, $n = 0, 1, ..., N - 1$, where $N$ is the length of the plain text, and $\oplus$ is the XOR bitwise operation. The decryption is symmetrical, one can recover the plain text using the same key, by applying again the XOR operation: $x_n = k_n \oplus y_n$.

The Python code implementing the class vlCryptography.py is straightforward, and it is given below:

```python
class vlCryptography(object):
    def __init__(self, key):
        if len(key) < 9: raise ValueError("Key length must be minimum 9 characters.")
        self._key = key.encode()

    def crypt(self,x):
        if len(x) == 0: raise ValueError("Empty source.")
        key,x,M,N = bytearray(self._key),bytearray(x),len(self._key),len(x)
        for J in range(M,N):
            key = [(key[m-2] + key[m-2] + key[m-1]) % 256 for m in range(J)]
            key.append(sum(key) % 256)
        return bytes([key[n]^x[n] for n in range(N)])
```

Here, "vl" in vlCryptography stands for "very light", because the class doesn’t require any other particular Python module. An usage example is the following:

```python
import lorem
import base64
from vlCryptography import vlCryptography
```
Key = lorem.sentence()
print("Key:")
print(key,"\n")

vlC = vlCryptography(key)

plain_text = lorem.paragraph()
print("Plain text:")
print(plain_text,"\n")

cipher_text = vlC.crypt(plain_text.encode())
print("Cipher text:")
print(base64.urlsafe_b64encode(cypher_text).decode(),"\n")

print("Plain text:")
plain_text = vlC.crypt(cipher_text)
print(plain_text.decode())

For testing purposes, here we use the "lorem" module, which is text generator that looks like Latin. Also, the cipher text is encoded in base64, such that it can be printed. The first step is to generate a secret key using the "lorem" sentence method, then an instance of the vlCryptography object is initialized using the key, the plain text is generated using the "lorem" paragraph method, and then is encrypted using the "crypt" method of the vlCryptography class. Finally, the plain text is recovered from the cipher text using the same crypt method. Below we give an output example:

Key:
Est aliquam velit sed.

Plain text:
Voluptatem eius porro eius ut voluptatem. Quiquia dolor modi sed porro. Consectetur dolorem consectetur est eius amet. Voluptatem numquam est quaerat dolore numquam. Quiquia modi numquam ut quisquam non.

Cipher text:
_iPMCeDoVeh10eAZ-S1z_DA7ss5_PGV12ZU_gieT8djP8ibBIceh18T6ckQnSLXW18Vyk03xzcjxU6SVsK91OLCMr05Iy68U9OuD_U_dLakCbkcdHNsc2J2rdzsz24v9Z-0WTpcrex1z7Rc9TV1z7AdrlkMiBkflc1C1j0S9dDn93KfJfle112tcpQ_kfHgp8Rmy9WQ82H8U7KZsLJiMeGJ0VE-vFHpec21FfF87fPUhehWCyzklSFSfrvyvd7oqI22wqyi1TYk28QC4=

Plain text:
Voluptatem eius porro eius ut voluptatem. Quiquia dolor modi sed porro. Consectetur dolorem consectetur est eiusmod. Voluptatem numquam est quaerat dolore numquam. Quiquia modi numquam ut quisquam non.
4 Conclusion

Typical CA are characterized by fixed length registers. Contrary to this, here we have considered a linearly growing class of CA, able to produce long random strings, starting from short "seed" strings. The local transition rule of the CA is governed by two principles borrowed from cryptography: diffusion and confusion. We have shown numerically that the resulted strings are pseudo-random using three approaches based on: Fourier transform, entropy estimation, and compression. An application to cryptography, and the corresponding Python code, was also included.

In the end we would like to mention that "do it yourself encryption" is not encouraged, in applications it is better to use an existing validated approach. The method described here was developed only for educational purposes, and it is not fully tested and validated.

The code can be found at: https://github.com/mandrecut/vlCryptography

References

[1] S. Wolfram, A New Kind of Science, Wolfram Media (2002).
[2] S. Wolfram, Random sequence generation by cellular automata, Advances in applied mathematics, 7(2):123-169 (1986).
[3] M. Serra, T. Slater, J. Muzio, D.M.Miller, The Analysis of One-dimensional Linear Cellular Automata and Their Aliasing Properties, IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems 9(7), 767-778 (1990).
[4] S. Golomb, Shift-Register Sequences (revised edition), Aegean Press (1982).
[5] A. Fuster-Sabater, P. Caballero-Gil, On the Use of Cellular Automata in Symmetric Cryptography, Acta Appl. Math 93, 215-236 (2006).
[6] Stinson D. R., Cryptography Theory and Practice, 3rd ed., CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2006.
[7] Katz J., Lindell Y., Introduction to modern cryptography, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2008.
[8] C. Shannon, Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems, Bell System Technical Journal, 28(4), 656 (1949).
[9] https://docs.python.org/3/library/bz2.html