FInfer: Frame Inference-Based Deepfake Detection for High-Visual-Quality Videos

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Abstract

Deepfake has ignited hot research interests in both academia and industry due to its potential security threats. Many countermeasures have been proposed to mitigate such risks. Current Deepfake detection methods achieve superior performances in dealing with low-visual-quality Deepfake media which can be distinguished by the obvious visual artifacts. However, with the development of deep generative models, the realism of Deepfake media has been significantly improved and becomes tough challenging to current detection models. In this paper, we propose a frame inference-based detection framework (FInfer) to solve the problem of high-visual-quality Deepfake detection. Specifically, we first learn the referenced representations of the current and future frames’ faces. Then, the current frames’ facial representations are utilized to predict the future frames’ facial representations by using an autoregressive model. Finally, a representation-prediction loss is devised to maximize the discriminability of real videos and fake videos. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our FInfer framework through information theory analyses. The entropy and mutual information analyses indicate the correlation between the predicted representations and referenced representations in real videos is higher than that of high-visual-quality Deepfake videos. Extensive experiments demonstrate the performance of our method is promising in terms of in-dataset detection performance, detection efficiency, and cross-dataset detection performance in high-visual-quality Deepfake videos.

Introduction

Motivations. The proliferation of artificial intelligence has given rise to various human portrait video tampering technologies, such as DeepFakes (DeepFakes 2018), Face2Face (Thies et al. 2018), FaceSwap (FaceSwap 2018), and NeuralTextures (Thies, Zollhöfer, and Nießner 2019). Although these technologies facilitate entertainment and cultural exchanges, abusing Deepfake technologies also brings potential threats and concerns to everyone. For example, illegal information such as fake news and manipulated pornographic videos may cause a profound distrust in society, threaten national and political security, and violate individual rights and interests. (Whittaker et al. 2020).

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tails to detect Deepfake videos. However, these detection methods may be circumvented by purposefully training during the generation of fake videos. Data-driven methods (Afchar et al. 2018; Nguyen, Yamagishi, and Echizen 2019; Nguyen et al. 2019; Tan and Le 2019; Rossler et al. 2019; Zhao et al. 2021; Liu et al. 2021; Xu et al. 2021) extract the invisible features to detect these forgeries efficiently. These methods do not joint spatial information with other domain information, which may ignore crucial features of videos. Towards this end, multi-domain fusion methods (Güera and Delp 2018; Zhao, Wang, and Lu 2020; Qian et al. 2020; Masi et al. 2020; Hu et al. 2021; Sun et al. 2021) train the detection model across multiple domains such as spatial domain, temporal domain, and frequency domain making processes.

Although the aforementioned methods achieve good performances in detecting inchoate datasets, they still need improvement in recent-developed high-visual-quality Deepfake videos. Previous methods (Li, Chang, and Lyu 2018; Afchar et al. 2018; Yang, Li, and Lyu 2019; Hu et al. 2021) focus on specific features which are easily tracked in the low-visual-quality videos, while those features may be badly weakened in high-visual-quality ones and cause the detection performance reduction. Thus we need a more general manner to enlarge the tampered traces of fake videos. Besides, the artifacts dependence of aforementioned methods (Rossler et al. 2019; Zhao et al. 2021) may also cause severely overfitting when conducting the cross-dataset detection. An effective way to solve the overfitting problem is to extend the training data. However, current methods focus on the performance but not the computation efficiency, which brings undesirable time costs. Furthermore, most of the existing detection methods benefit from the powerful ability of CNN, but CNN-based methods lack theoretical interpretation, which is not conducive to the understanding of detection technology. In summary, there are three major challenges when detecting the high-visual-quality Deepfake videos, i.e., 1) it is challenging to enlarge the tampered traces in high-visual-quality Deepfake videos for better performance, 2) it is challenging to improve the robustness for cross-dataset detection and improve detection efficiency, 3) it is challenging to provide interpretable theoretical analysis.

Contributions. To address the challenges, we propose a frame inference-based detection framework (FInfer) to detect high-visual-quality Deepfake videos by inferring future frames’ facial representations. To predict future frames’ facial representations, FInfer discards the short-term local information between frames and infers more long-term global features. These long-term global features that span multiple time steps are useful for mining the regularities of faces and predicting the future frames’ facial representations. The predicted representations will be influenced by Deepfake modification and result in a mismatch with referenced future frames’ facial representations. Based on this idea, we first employ an encoder to extract useful representations from current frames and referenced future frames. Thereafter, an autoregressive model is utilized to predict the future frames’ facial representations. Ultimately, the face representations of predicted future frames and referenced future frames are jointly optimized by a representation-prediction loss. In this manner, the model can accumulate information over time to predict the future frame’s facial representations. Since the correlation of facial representations between predicted future frames and referenced future frames in the real video is higher than that in the fake video, optimizing the representation-prediction loss can improve the detection performance of high-visual-quality Deepfake videos. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider Deepfake detection from the perspective of inferring the future frames’ facial representations. The main contributions of this work are three folds:

1) We transform the Deepfake detection task to a video frame inference task, which brings a different viewpoint for Deepfake detection. Different from existing methods that extract features from frames directly, FInfer infers future frames’ facial representations by using a video prediction regression model. Ultimately, FInfer obtains the correlation of facial representations between the predicted future frames and the referenced future frames for Deepfake videos detection.

2) We use information theory to analyze the effectiveness of FInfer, which theoretically shows the interpretability of our framework. The joint entropy analysis indicates that high-visual-quality Deepfake videos with low joint entropy can be ideally detected by inferring future frames. On the other hand, the mutual information of fake videos is lower than that of real videos. The mutual information analysis demonstrates that the distinction between real videos and fake videos can be detected by FInfer.

3) We conduct extensive experiments for evaluating FInfer. Experimental results illustrate that FInfer achieves promising performance in extensive metrics.

FInfer: Frame Inference-Based Detection Framework

Fig. 2 shows the proposed frame inference-based detection framework for high-visual-quality Deepfake videos. The current frames and future frames are considered as source frames and target frames for predictions, respectively. FInfer consists of four components: faces preprocessing, faces representative learning, faces predictive learning, and correlation-based learning. First, we extract frames from videos and detect faces from frames. The Gaussian-Laplace pyramid block is utilized to transform faces data. Second, since the data dimensions of video frames are enormous, we utilize the representative learning to construct an encoder to encode the source and the referenced target faces to low dimensional space. With such an encoder, the spatial features of faces are encoded into a compact latent embedding space, which ensures the effectiveness of predictions. Third, we use an autoregressive model to predict the representations of target faces. The prediction model integrates the information of source faces and predicts the representations of the target faces. Fourth, we leverage the correlation-based learning module, which optimizes the model with a devised representation-prediction loss. The representation-prediction loss allows the whole model to be trained end-to-end. FInfer can feedback the loss to the representative learn-
The faces are extracted and transformed from videos. The faces representative learning module encodes both the source faces and target faces. The faces predictive learning module predicts the target face representations from the source face representations. The correlation-based learning module utilizes a representation-prediction loss to train Finfer. By optimizing the model, Finfer can effectively detect the high-visual-quality Deepfake videos.

Faces Preprocessing
In the faces preprocessing module, operations such as face detection, Gaussian-Laplace pyramid are utilized to improve the visibility of tamper traces. The details are provided as follows.

1. We sequentially extract the consecutive frames $X$ from videos. Since the tampered part of the Deepfake videos is the face area, we focus on the face regions and extract faces $A$ from frames to detect videos.

2. Gaussian-Laplace pyramid block is utilized to expose the boundary artifacts of faces. The Gaussian pyramid is used to generate multiple sets of faces at different scales, which can show the details of faces and the outline information of faces. The Laplace pyramid is utilized to minimize the face information loss caused by the Gaussian pyramid. Finally, the boundaries of faces are exposed.

Faces Representative Learning
In the faces representative learning module, an encoder is utilized to extract source faces information and target faces information as vectors. With the faces representative learning module, the curse of dimensionality is avoided, and the features can be represented. The details are provided as follows.

An encoder is proposed to obtain the representations of source faces and target faces, which can extract useful representations from high-dimensional frames data and improve the training efficiency. The encoder $f^\text{enc}$ consists of four convolutional layers and a full-connected layer. The first convolutional layer uses 8 filters with a kernel size of $3 \times 3$. The second convolutional layer uses 8 filters with a kernel size of $5 \times 5$. The third convolutional layer uses 16 filters with a kernel size of $3 \times 3$. The fourth convolutional layer uses 16 filters with a kernel size of $5 \times 5$. The dimension of the full-connected layer is 128. $f^\text{enc}$ maps the source faces and target faces to a sequence of latent representations $R^\text{enc}$.

$$R^\text{enc} = f^\text{enc}(A) = \{r_1^{\text{enc}}, r_2^{\text{enc}}, \ldots, r_{s+t}^{\text{enc}}\}.$$  (1)

Let $R^\text{enc}_S = \{r_1^{\text{enc}}, r_2^{\text{enc}}, \ldots, r_s^{\text{enc}}\}$ be the representations of source faces. Let $R^\text{enc}_T = \{r_{s+1}^{\text{enc}}, r_{s+2}^{\text{enc}}, \ldots, r_{s+t}^{\text{enc}}\}$ be the representations of target faces.

Faces Predictive Learning
The faces predictive learning module utilizes the regressive prediction to infer the representations of target faces. The details are provided as follows.

1. Source faces representations $R^\text{enc}_S$ are utilized as the input of the regressive prediction. Since the GRU (Oord, Li, and Vinyals 2018) solves the problem of gradient disappearance and brings high efficiency in the case of extensive training data, we adopt GRU for the regressive part that utilizes various gate functions and states.

2. The update gate is utilized to update the information that the previous faces are carried into the current faces.

3. The reset gate is utilized to update the information that is removed from the previous faces.

4. The candidate hidden states use reset gates to store the relevant information from the previous faces.

5. The hidden states are utilized to hold information for the current faces and pass it down to the network.

6. The Time-distributed layer uses facial representations series to perform a series of tensor operations.
7. The prediction module $g^{pre}$ transmits relevant information along a sequence of facial representations to make predictions. $g^{pre}$ preserves important features through various gate functions and infers representations of target faces. The output predictions can be calculated as follows,

$$R_T^{pre} = g^{pre}(R_S^{enc}) = \{r^{pre}_1, r^{pre}_2, \ldots, r^{pre}_{s+1}\}. \quad (2)$$

The predicted representations are made up of consecutive vectors with the dimension of 128 × 1.

Correlation-Based Learning

The correlation-based learning module utilizes the representation-prediction loss to optimize the model. The details are provided as follows.

1. The faces representative learning module outputs the representations of target faces $R_T^{enc}$. The output of the face predictive learning module is $R_T^{pre}$. $R_T^{enc}$ and $R_T^{pre}$ are integrated into the correlation-based learning module.

2. The correlation $corr$ between the predicted target face representations $R_T^{pre}$ and the referenced target face representations $R_T^{enc}$ is calculated as follows,

$$corr = \text{sigmoid}\left(\frac{\sum_{i=s+1}^{i=s+t} (R_T^{pre} \cdot R_T^{enc})}{t}\right). \quad (3)$$

3. In the process of backpropagation, the representation-prediction loss is employed to train the model end-to-end. The formula of the representation-prediction loss $L_N$ is shown in Eq. (4),

$$L_N = \frac{1}{N} \sum_z [(y_z \times \ln(corr)) + (1 - y_z) \times \ln(1 - corr)], \quad (4)$$

where $y_z$ represents the labels of the $z$-th video.

4. In order to optimize the proposed method, we update the faces representative learning module and faces predictive learning module iteratively and minimize the sum of the representation-prediction loss $L_N$. Such procedure is shown in Algorithm 1. The input data is $A_S$ and $A_T$. The faces representative learning module obtains the representations of source faces $R_S^{enc}$ and the representations of target faces $R_T^{enc}$. The face predictive learning module obtains the representations of predicted target faces $R_T^{pre}$. The correlation-based learning module minimizes the representation-prediction loss $L_N$.

5. After the training, the real videos have a higher correlation $corr$ because of the natural expression. The Deepfake videos exhibit stiff facial expressions, which causes some impact on the prediction. Thus, the Deepfake videos have a lower $corr$ value. Then, the model can detect the difference in facial variations between real videos and Deepfake videos.

6. Finally, we get the $corr$ and calculate the accuracy by the binary accuracy algorithm.

Algorithm 1: The algorithm process of the proposed frame inference-based detection framework.

**Input:**

The source faces $A_S$. The target faces $A_T$. The initial learning rate $\alpha_{df} = 0.001$ decayed by the factor 0.2 when the accuracy plateaus. The batch size $b = 8$. The number of iterations $num_{iter}$.

**Output:**

Trained network $\theta_{df}$, $f^{enc}$, $g^{pre}$

1: while $\theta_{df}$ have not converged do
2: for $i = 1 \rightarrow num_{iter}$ do
3: $R_S^{enc} = f^{enc}(A_S)$
4: $R_T^{enc} = f^{enc}(A_T)$
5: $R_T^{pre} = g^{pre}(R_S^{enc})$
6: $\nabla \theta_{df} \leftarrow \frac{1}{b} \sum_i b N(R_T^{pre}, R_T^{enc})$
7: $\theta_{df} \leftarrow \theta_{df} + \alpha_{df} \cdot \text{Adam}(\theta_{df}, \nabla \theta_{df})$
8: end for
9: end while

Information Theory Analyses

We provide the information theory analyses to show the interpretability of FInfer. Let $x_i$ and $x_j$ be frames of $X$, namely $x_i, x_j \in X$.

Interpretation for Detecting Videos with High-Visual-Quality

Let $P(x_i, x_j)$ be the joint probability of $x_i$ and $x_j$. $P(x_i, x_j)$ is obtained by the joint probability distribution of the frames. The joint entropy of frame $x_i$ and $x_j$ can be calculated as follows,

$$H(x_i, x_j) = -\sum_{x_i} \sum_{x_j} P(x_i, x_j) \log P(x_i, x_j). \quad (5)$$

Since the predictive learning module of FInfer utilizes current frames’ facial representations to predict future frames’ representations, the joint entropy, which demonstrates the uncertainty between two frames, shows the feasibility of prediction. Namely, the $x_i$ and $x_j$ with high uncertainty mean the joint entropy between $x_i$ and $x_j$ is high, which may incur low feasibility to predict $x_i$ from $x_j$. Fake frames with low-visual-quality may contain visible tampered traces, such as artifacts and mismatching colors in Fig. 1, which increases the uncertainty between $x_i$ and $x_j$. The uncertainty of low-visual-quality fake videos is higher than that of high-visual-quality fake videos. Therefore, it can be seen from the definition of joint entropy that the inter-frame joint entropy of low-visual-quality videos is higher than that of high-visual-quality videos.

In addition, statistical analysis is performed. Let $H^{df}(x_i, x_j)$ and $H^{high}(x_i, x_j)$ are $H(x_i, x_j)$ with high-visual-quality videos and low-visual-quality videos, respectively. According to Eq. (5), we calculate $H^{df}(x_i, x_j)$ and $H^{high}(x_i, x_j)$. Specifically, we randomly selected 200 high-visual-quality videos generated by NeuralTextures (Thies,
The color value RGB where \((Golestaneh \text{ and } Karam} 2016)\) real frames with rich details. Since low entropy of frames indicates few details of frames. There follows. Zollhöfer, and Nießner 2019) and 200 low-visual-quality videos generated by DeepFakes (DeepFakes 2018) to calculate the inter-frame joint entropy. These faces have the same face ID and face attribute. Therefore, the face content is almost the same, which can avoid the influence of face content on joint entropy. The results in Fig. 3 demonstrate that the joint entropy of low-visual-quality videos is higher than that of high-visual-quality videos, i.e.,

\[
H^h(x_i, x_j) < H^f(x_i, x_j). \tag{6}
\]

Thus, the inter-frame joint entropy of fake videos with high-visual-quality is lower than that with low-visual-quality. Low joint entropy of two frames indicates low uncertainty of two frames, which is beneficial for prediction. Therefore, Finfer has significant advantages for high-visual-quality Deepfake videos detection by predicting future frames’ faces from current frames’ faces.

**Interpretation for Detecting the Difference between Real Videos and Fake Videos**

Let \(RGB_i = \{R_i, G_i, B_i\}\) be a set of color value of RGB channel of frame \(x_i \in X\), where \(R_i, G_i, B_i\) are red, green, and blue values of \(x_i\), respectively. Let \(L = 256\) be the discrete series of RGB channel color value.

The information entropy of \(x_i\) can be calculated as follows.

\[
H(x_i) = -\sum_{v \in RGB_i} \sum_{v=0}^{L-1} P_v(x_i) \log_2 P_v(x_i), \tag{7}
\]

where \(P_v(x_i)\) represents the probability of the existence of the color value \(RGB_i\).

The mutual information can be calculated as follows.

\[
MI(x_i, x_j) = H(x_i) + H(x_j) - H(x_i, x_j). \tag{8}
\]

If the video is a fake video, Eq. (8) can be represented as follows.

\[
MI^f(x_i, x_j) = H^f(x_i) + H^f(x_j) - H^f(x_i, x_j). \tag{9}
\]

If the video is a real video, Eq. (8) can be represented as follows.

\[
MI^r(x_i, x_j) = H^r(x_i) + H^r(x_j) - H^r(x_i, x_j). \tag{10}
\]

Since low entropy of frames indicates few details of frames (Golestaneh and Karam 2016), real frames with rich details indicate a higher entropy value than that of fake frames. That is,

\[
H(x_i)^r + H(x_j)^r > H(x_i)^f + H(x_j)^f. \tag{11}
\]

The generated faces in fake videos lack of expressiveness which may bring in the inconsistency between \(x_i\) and \(x_j\). Then, the uncertainty between \(x_i\) and \(x_j\) gets larger. That is, the value of \(H^f(x_i, x_j)\) gets smaller. The faces in real videos is naturally coherent, which decreases the uncertainty between \(x_i\) and \(x_j\). Thus, the value of \(H^r(x_i, x_j)\) gets smaller. That is,

\[
H^r(x_i, x_j) < H^f(x_i, x_j). \tag{12}
\]

According to Eqs. (8-12),

\[
MI^r(x_i, x_j) > MI^f(x_i, x_j). \tag{13}
\]

Mutual information between \(x_i\) and \(x_j\) demonstrates the amount of information that \(x_i\) obtained from \(x_j\). Thus, high mutual information indicates high feasibility to predict \(x_j\) based on \(x_i\), which introduces a high correlation between the predicted \(x_j\) and the referenced \(x_i\). According to Eq. (13), the real videos with larger \(MI^r(x_i, x_j)\) will get higher correlation between the predicted \(x_j\) and the referenced \(x_j\) than that of fake videos. Therefore, the proposed Finfer can detect the difference between real videos and fake videos.

**Experimental Evaluations**

**Experimental Settings**

**Implemet Details.** We utilize FFmpeg (Cheng et al. 2012) to extract frames sequentially from videos for data pre-processing. The dlib (King 2009) is adopted to detect face regions from frames. We discard videos if the dlib does not recognize the correct face regions. The extracted face regions are input to the faces representative learning module, which produces the face representations for experiments. The batch size is set as 8. In the training phase, we set the learning rate as 0.001, which will be divided by 5 when the accuracy plateaus. The Adam optimizer (Kingma and Ba 2014) is utilized to optimize the model. We set the default threshold, whose value is 0.5, to calculate binary accuracy. All experiments are conducted in keros on NVIDIA Titan Xp. The accuracy (ACC) and area under Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC) are utilized to denote the evaluation metrics for extensive experiments.

**Datasets.** The FaceForensics++ (FF++) (Rossler et al. 2019) dataset, the Celeb-DFF dataset (Li et al. 2020), the WildDeepfake dataset (Zi et al. 2020), and the DFDC-preview dataset(Dolhansky et al. 2019) are utilized to show the performance of Finfer. The FF++ dataset contains 1000 original videos and four types of forgery videos, i.e., DeepFakes, Face2Face, FaceSwap, and NeuralTextures. The Celeb-DFF dataset contains 5639 high-visual-quality Deepfake videos with celebrities generated by improved synthesis processes. The WildDeepfake dataset contains 7314 high-visual-quality face sequences generated from 707 Deepfake videos. The DFDC preview dataset contains about 5000
dicting can be inaccurate, and we only conduct the experiments on shall be limited to a certain extent. We analyze the impact of the $s$ and $t$ as follows.

To improve the detection accuracy, we vary $s \in \{10, 20, 30, 40\}$ and $t \in \{10, 20, 30, 40\}$ and test the appropriate $s$ and $t$ for Flinfer on the Celeb-DF dataset. Table 1 shows the detection performance of Flinfer, which demonstrates that Flinfer achieves the highest detection accuracy when choosing $t = 20$ and $s = 30$. Therefore, in the following experiments, we set $t$ and $s$ as 20 and 30, respectively.

### Ablation Study: Impacts of the Gaussian-Laplace Pyramid Block

We perform ablation studies on Flinfer to evaluate the effect of the Gaussian-Laplace pyramid block, which is utilized for faces preprocessing. Specifically, we evaluate Flinfer without and with the Gaussian-Laplace pyramid block and show the results on the first and second line of Table 2, respectively. The experimental results demonstrate that the detection accuracy of Flinfer with Gaussian-Laplace pyramid block is better than that without Gaussian-Laplace pyramid block. That may be because the Gaussian-Laplace pyramid block can expose the manipulation traces and amplify artifacts. As a result, Flinfer with the Gaussian-Laplace pyramid block is beneficial for representing the faces and predicting the future frames’ facial representations.

### In-Dataset Detection Performance Comparisons

We use ACC and AUC to measure the detection performance on high-visual-quality Deepfake datasets, i.e., Celeb-DF, WildDeepfake, DFDC-preview. We sample 20 frames for each video to calculate the frame-level ACC and AUC scores. The comparison results are listed in Table 3. Compared with baseline methods, Flinfer achieves comparable detection performance.

We also show the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve in Fig. 4. The abscissa shows the false positive rate (FPR), and the ordinate shows the true positive rate (TPR). The closer the curve to the top left corner, the better the detection performance. Fig. 4 demonstrates that Flinfer achieves the satisfying detection performance compared with baseline methods in detecting high-visual-quality Deepfake videos.

Flinfer learns the facial variation rules of facial expressions by inferring the future frames’ facial representations and comparing the correlation $corr$. We plot $corr$ of the
videos from the testset. As shown in Fig. 5, with few exceptions, the corr of real videos is higher than the Deepfake videos.

Detection Efficiency Comparisons

We evaluate the number of Multiplication-Addition operations (Mult-Adds) to show the efficiency advantages of FInfer. We utilize $k$, $C_{in}$, $C_{out}$, and $M_{out}$ to denote the kernel size of a convolutional layer, the number of the input channel, the number of the output channel, and the size of the output feature map, respectively. The number of Mult-Adds $M_A$ of the convolutional layer is calculated by adding up the multiplication computation, addition computation, and bias computation, i.e.,

$$M_A = 2 \times k \times C_{in} \times C_{out} \times M_{out}. \tag{14}$$

We compare the number of Mult-Adds of FInfer with that of baseline methods, which are calculated according to Eq. (14). Table 4 shows that the number of Mult-Adds of FInfer is $96.75 \times 10^6$, which is smaller than that of baseline methods. Therefore, FInfer boosts the detection efficiency compared with baseline methods.

| Method          | Celeb-DF | WildDeepfake | DFDC-preview |
|-----------------|----------|--------------|--------------|
| Meso4           | 67.53    | 66.17        | 64.47        |
| Recurrent-network | 71.20    | 86.52        | 66.87        |
| FWA             | 64.73    | 60.16        | 55.46        |
| Xception                                   | 75.02    | 72.97        |
| FT-two-stream                           | 80.74    | 86.67        | 68.78        |
| FInfer           | 90.47    | 93.30        | 75.88        |

Table 3: Comparisons of the in-dataset evaluation (ACC (%) and AUC (\%)) between FInfer and baseline methods on Celeb-DF, WildDeepfake, and DFDC-preview datasets.

Figure 5: Histogram of correlation scores of fake (green) and real (red) videos.

Cross-Dataset Detection Performance Comparisons

To evaluate the robustness of FInfer, we conduct the cross-dataset experiments that are trained on FF++ with multiple forgery methods but tested on Celeb-DF. The cross-dataset results are shown in Table 5. The first column is the in-dataset detection performance of FF++, and the second column is the cross-dataset detection performance of Celeb-DF. Multi-attention achieves the state-of-the-art performance in FF++, however, its cross-dataset AUC is behind ours. Though SPSL and Two-branch achieve better cross-dataset detection performance than FInfer, the results in Table 4 illustrate that the detection efficiency of FInfer is better than SPSL and Two-branch. In addition, FInfer achieves

| Method          | FF++     | Celeb     |
|-----------------|----------|-----------|
| Meso4           | 84.70    | 54.80     |
| MesoInception4  | 83.00    | 53.60     |
| Recurrent-network | 90.13    | 63.56     |
| FWA             | 80.10    | 56.90     |
| Xception                                   | 99.70    | 65.30     |
| Multi-task                                | 76.30    | 54.30     |
| Capsule                           | 96.60    | 57.50     |
| EfficientNet-B4                      | 99.70    | 64.29     |
| Multi-attention                  | 99.80    | 67.44     |
| LTW                           | 98.50    | 64.10     |
| FT-two-stream                  | 92.47    | 65.56     |
| SPSL                         | 96.91    | 76.88     |
| Two-branch                   | 93.18    | 73.41     |
| $F^{3}$-Net                   | 98.10    | 65.17     |
| FInfer           | 95.67    | 70.60     |

Table 5: Cross-dataset evaluation (AUC(\%)) on Celeb-DF by training on FF++. Results of some other methods are cited directly from (Zhao et al. 2021).

| Method          | WildDeepfake | DFDC-preview |
|-----------------|--------------|--------------|
| Meso4           | 59.60        | 59.74        |
| Recurrent-network | 63.65        | 67.03        |
| FWA             | 66.67        | 67.35        |
| Xception                                   | 59.32        | 60.54        |
| FT-two-stream                           | 54.69        | 59.82        |
| FInfer           | 70.82        | 69.46        |

Table 6: Comparisons of the cross-dataset evaluation (ACC (%) and AUC (\%)) between FInfer and baseline methods on WildDeepfake, and DFDC-preview datasets.

Table 4: Comparisons of the number of Mult-Adds ($\times 10^6$) between FInfer and baseline methods.

| Method          | Celeb-DF | WildDeepfake | DFDC-preview |
|-----------------|----------|--------------|--------------|
| Meso4           | 114.34   | 5003.34      | 8220.21      |
| Recurrent-network | 913.46    | 362.81       | 574.00       |
| FInfer           | 1994.76  | 408.80       | 96.75        |
The performance of FInfer on WildDeepfake and DFDC-preview datasets. Furthermore, we test other high-visual-quality Deepfake videos datasets, i.e., WildDeepfake and DFDC-preview. The results in Table 6 and Fig. 6 demonstrate that FInfer achieves competitive cross-dataset detection performance on WildDeepfake and DFDC-preview datasets.

The aforementioned comparison results show that the performance of FInfer is better than most baseline methods in detecting high-visual-quality Deepfake videos. That may be because that most baseline methods capture features that are weakened in the high-visual-quality videos, which causes an impact on the detection. Furthermore, FInfer detect the high-visual-quality Deepfake videos by incorporating frame inferences into the training process. When detecting high-visual-quality videos, FInfer infers the target frames’ facial representations and compares the predicted target frames’ facial representations with the referenced target frames’ facial representations rather than extracting features directly from the frames, which benefits the detection model.

**Conclusions**

In this paper, we propose FInfer for a high-visual-quality Deepfake videos detection case. We formulate the Deepfake detection task as a future frames’ facial representation inference task, which presents a different perspective for Deepfake videos detection. Besides, we adopt information theory analyses for FInfer, which demonstrates the effectiveness of FInfer theoretically. Extensive experiments show that FInfer achieves competitive detection performance and detection efficiency in different detection cases.

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