The Role of Communities in the Transmission of Political Values: Evidence from Forced Population Transfers

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This article evaluates the role of community bonds in the long-term transmission of political values. At the end of World War II, Poland’s borders shifted westward, and the population from the historical region of Galicia (now partly in Ukraine) was displaced to the territory that Poland acquired from Germany. In a quasi-random process, some migrants settled in their new villages as a majority group, preserving communal ties, while others ended up in the minority. The study leverages this natural experiment of history by surveying the descendants of these Galician migrants. The research design provides an important empirical test of the theorized effect of communities on long-term value transmission, which separates the influence of family and community as two competing and complementary mechanisms. The study finds that respondents in Galicia-majority settlements are now more likely to embrace values associated with Austrian imperial rule and are more similar to respondents whose families avoided displacement.

Keywords: legacies, persistence, community, cultural values, forced migration, Poland, Habsburg Empire

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Cultural values often have enormous staying power, outlasting the formal institutions and historical events that had shaped them. The persistence of political preferences, religious views and civic traditions is well established, and more recent research has demonstrated the remarkable staying power of victim identities, risk, and trust attitudes (Campbell et al. 1960; Wittenberg 2006; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017; Myers 1996; Putnam 1993; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Charnysh 2015; Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2018). Some values – notably those connected to civicness and intergroup relations – are purported to have endured for over half a millennium, transmitted from one generation to the next (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2016; Voigtländer and Voth 2012).

The standard view in the theoretical literature in biology and psychology is that both families and communities contribute to value transmission (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). At the same time, social science research gives parental socialization the pride of place. Parents have been found to play a particularly important role in the formation of personality in early childhood (Piaget 1954). By contrast, communities are seen as important for shaping fast-changing beliefs about public preferences and behavioral norms (Tabellini 2008; Giavazzi, Petkov, and Schiantarelli 2019). Even scholars who recognize the significance of the context in which families are embedded argue that families can counteract community influence by increasing their socialization efforts (Bisin and Verdier 2001). However, there is also an alternative perspective: families that are in a minority in a community that is culturally different or actively hostile may be unable or unwilling to resist assimilation into the dominant value system, because assimilating increases the returns to cooperation with the majority group (Lazear 1999).

This article evaluates the role of community in the persistence of deep-seated and slow-changing values that shape political and economic behavior. We ask whether the composition of the community matters beyond the baseline of family influence. Identifying the effect of community is challenging because individuals and families often self-select into like-minded

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1We define a community as a collection of family units that communicate regularly due to living in proximity to one another.
communities in order to preserve their values. Whether an individual grows up surrounded by peers who share her family's values depends on parents' interest in inculcating these values in the first place.

Our study overcomes this endogeneity problem by leveraging as-if-random variation in community composition in the aftermath of mass displacement. We draw on a historical quasi-experiment whereby all families from the same region were forcibly resettled but only some ended up as the majority in their new communities. This enables us to identify the effect of community composition on the persistence of distinctive social values among the descendants of forced migrants and to overcome the problem of self-selection into migration or into specific community types. In this way we provide a novel test of an important theoretical proposition that remains empirically understudied.

After World War II (WWII), Poland's borders shifted westward, precipitating mass population transfers. Poles residing in provinces annexed by the Soviet Union were displaced to the territories that Poland acquired from defeated Germany. Political imperatives, such as taking swift ownership of German property while accommodating millions of uprooted Poles, as well as administrative realities, including the lack of familiarity with the new territory and the limited availability of transportation, resulted in a haphazard resettlement process. Family units remained intact, but whether families from the same area settled together at their destinations depended on factors orthogonal to migrants' characteristics and preferences: the availability of space on trains at their origin, the duration and itinerary of the trip, and the availability of housing in settlements at disembarkation. As a result, some migrants became part of the majority in their new settlements, whereas others ended up as a minority, outnumbered by Polish migrants from other, culturally distinct regions.

To study the long-term transmission of values, we focus on the population with distinct political traits prior to resettlement – Poles from the historical region of Galicia, today split between western Ukraine and southeastern Poland. Between 1772 and 1918, Poland was partitioned between the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian empires. Galicia was governed by Austria, which encouraged education in Polish, facilitated the flourishing of Polish culture and religious traditions, and held relatively free elections. By contrast, Russian and Prussian administrations suppressed schooling
in Polish, barred Poles from serving in local administration, and restricted manifestations of Polishness in religious and political spheres. As a result, by 1918, Poles in Austrian Galicia were more patriotic, religious, and politically active than their brethren under Russian and Prussian control (Wandycz 1974; Bartkowski 2003). Scholars concur that these traits have persisted into the present (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015; Zarycki 2015; Bukowski 2018).

If the persistence of cultural values is a product not only of family socialization but also of community characteristics, then the descendants of Galician Poles who ended up in settlements dominated by Galician migrants should be more likely to exhibit traits associated with Austrian rule than their brethren who ended up in the minority in villages where the majority consisted of voluntary migrants from other parts of Poland. On these traits, the population of Galician-majority settlements should also be more similar to Poles whose families were not resettled because they lived just west of the new Polish-Ukrainian border, in western Galicia.

To test these hypotheses, we collected historical data on the village-level distribution of migrants in Silesia (southwestern Poland) and conducted a survey of 593 descendants of Galician migrants in sixty resettled villages, sampling an equal number of villages where migrants from Galicia dominated and villages where they were the minority. We also surveyed 100 respondents in ten Galician villages that were not uprooted. We use this second sample as a baseline for measuring distinctively Galician values, to substantiate our claim that differences between majority and minority resettled communities stem from the more successful reproduction of Galician cultural values in majority-Galician resettled communities rather than from the selection of migrants with specific values into majority or minority communities during resettlement or from the experience of being in the majority as such.

We find that respondents in Galician-majority villages are considerably more religious and patriotic today and are more likely to turn out to vote than respondents in minority Galician settlements. On these traits, they resemble respondents in Galician villages whose families were never resettled. At the same time, the persistence of Galician cultural values in majority settlements does not appear to explain voting preferences. Finally, as expected, respondents in majority and minority settlements are indistinguishable from each other on traits unrelated to the legacies of Austrian rule in Galicia.
These findings suggest that the transmission of values is more effective when families live in like-minded communities and that major demographic disturbances or population movements weaken the transmission of historically-rooted traits. Community is thus important for value transmission insofar as it can buttress and amplify the family’s influence.

This project provides a systematic empirical test of a much-debated theoretical proposition that communities amplify the process of value transmission. We do not compare the relative weight of family to that of community in the transmission process, as families remained intact in both majority and minority communities. We study the variation in community structures that exists above and beyond family persistence. Nor do we examine how the descendants of Galician migrants differ from other residents in their communities (that is, the descendants of migrants from the Russian or Prussian partitions of Poland). This question would require a different research design and has been explored by Becker et al. (2020), who find that the descendants of forced migrants from the territories annexed by the Soviet Union have higher levels of human capital than the offspring of voluntary migrants from other parts of Poland.

We contribute to the literature on the transmission of cultural values and beliefs. In their review of the state of the literature on cognitive and institutional legacies, Simpser, Slater, and Wittenberg (2018, 434) emphasize “the need to take mechanisms seriously. Paucity of information often appears at first to be an insurmountable barrier, but... ingenuity can open unsuspected avenues for research.” By exploring the role of communities in the transmission process in an empirically novel way, we aim to strengthen the overall research agenda on cultural legacies, in which the mechanisms underlying the persistence of political traits remain understudied. Our examination of transmission mechanisms also contributes to the study of the effects of forced displacement (Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Braun and Mahmoud 2014; Nalepa and Pop-Eleches 2018; Charnysh 2019) and, more broadly, to research on the conditions under which migrants, both domestic and international, assimilate or retain their distinctive value systems (Barni et al. 2014; Fouka 2019; Giavazzi, Petkov, and Schiantarelli 2019).
Understanding mechanisms of transmission

There is a fledgling consensus in the literature on the long-run persistence of cultural values that both families and communities matter for value transmission. The emphasis on family and community as twin engines of value persistence is well-grounded in an influential theory of cultural transmission by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), who distinguish between vertical and horizontal processes. Vertical transmission refers to family socialization, and horizontal transmission describes the influence that peers and community authority figures have on the formation and evolution of values and beliefs. In recent studies of the long-term persistence of values, both vertical and horizontal transmission are commonly subsumed under the label of intergenerational socialization. For instance, in their work on the persistence of racism in the U.S. South, Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2018, 24-46) distinguish between two mechanisms of reproduction: intergenerational socialization and institutional reinforcement.

Scholars usually give the pride of place, explicitly or implicitly, to transmission within families. Tabellini (2008) hypothesizes that deeply-held moral judgements about the proper state of the world are best transmitted within families. Giavazzi, Petkov, and Schiantarelli (2019) concur, noting that communities’ socializing influence is likely limited to the induction into and transmission of fast-changing expectations about acceptable norms of behavior in a group and that communities are less important in the transmission of deeper values. Bisin and Verdier (2001) take a more favorable view of community by arguing that it can socialize individuals into specific value systems, yet they still maintain that families that invest sufficient effort into shaping their offspring’s views can successfully resist the effects of hostile community socialization. On the other end of the spectrum is (Lazear1999)’s hypothesis: in research on immigrant assimilation, he has argued that small minorities will always adopt the culture of the majority group and that families will always assimilate when outnumbered because the gains from assimilation outweigh the benefits of retaining their values.

We hypothesize that communities play an important role in the transmission of deep-seated social values, and that communities matter above and beyond the family baseline. Value transmission is much more likely to be successful in situations where the family’s efforts are
buttressed by those of other like-minded families and community elites. Put simply, the same parental effort to socialize their offspring into a set of values will be more effective when such values predominate in a given community compared to a situation in which families find themselves in an unfamiliar or hostile environment. In addition, either parents or their children will seek to conform to the majority value system (assimilating, as hypothesized by Lazear (1999)), even when that value system contradicts the one internalized by the family, in order to maximize the benefits of cooperation in a mixed community.

**Context**

To identify the impact of community on the transmission of cultural values, we leverage a natural experiment of history that closely approximates the ideal design of similar families being randomly assigned to different communities. This section provides background on the post-WWII displacement in Poland to substantiate our claim of as-if-random settlement patterns.

*The process of forced resettlement*

At the end of WWII, the Soviet Union annexed 45 per cent of pre-war Polish territory (see Figure 1). The post-1945 Polish-Soviet border largely followed the Curzon line, drawn up at the end of WWI as a proposed boundary to separate areas with ethnic Polish majorities to the west from those with ethnic Lithuanian, Belarusian, or Ukrainian majorities to the east. As compensation for the losses of eastern territories, Poland received 101,000 square kilometers from defeated Germany, including parts of Eastern Prussia and the city of Danzig.

Stalin was keen to establish states dominated by titular ethnic majorities in order to minimize the likelihood of internal conflicts. Mass population transfers were undertaken to achieve this objective: ethnic Germans were expelled from the newly reconfigured Poland, and ethnic Poles from the now-Soviet territories were ‘voluntarily repatriated’. More than 5 million Poles were resettled from areas annexed by the Soviet Union and from other parts of Poland into the territories that Poland acquired from Germany in 1945.
This article focuses on Polish migrants from the historical region of Galicia, which straddles the post-1945 Polish-Ukrainian border. These migrants comprise the largest culturally homogeneous group resettled to the formerly German territories. Focusing on Poles from eastern Galicia minimizes concerns about selection into migration, as their exodus in the aftermath of the border changes was nearly universal.\footnote{Approximately 96 per cent of ethnic Poles from Ukraine registered for repatriation (Czerniakiewicz 1987).}

At the heart of our research design is the claim that resettlement was quasi-random, with otherwise similar families assigned to different types of communities. This section uses the historical record to support this claim; in the subsequent section on research design we reinforce

\textit{Figure 1:} Changes to Poland’s territory in 1945.
the qualitative accounts of resettlement with quantitative evidence, including balance tests on pre-resettlement characteristics of the origin and destination settlements.

The Soviet government and its clients in Poland wanted to present the international community with a fait accompli in case Western allies changed their minds about the annexation of German territory (Thum 2011). Political expediency, limited state capacity after a devastating war, and the sheer vastness of the task all resulted in a highly disorganized resettlement process. Historians have described the resettlement process as "total chaos" (Kersten 2001, 83) and a "fail[ure of] coordination between officials" (Kochanowski 2001, 143).

Administrative capacity was weak as Poles from abroad, from central Poland, and from the now-Soviet borderlands streamed simultaneously into formerly German settlements. Those coming from the Soviet Union traveled along one of the three major railways running on the east-west axis (see Appendix Figure A.1). Poles leaving western Ukraine boarded along the southernmost route running from Lwów and Rawa Ruska in Galicia to Opole and Wrocław in Silesia (Śląsk). Migrants were permitted to bring personal items, farm equipment, and cash, yet most arrived empty-handed, having left in a hurry, been robbed, or been forced to trade belongings for food on a journey that took around three weeks (Kosiński 1960).

At the point of departure in western Ukraine families were instructed to appear at the nearest railway station. Whether they boarded the train with other families from their own or neighboring settlements depended on who was at the station at the time of embarkation and on the availability of space on a specific train. Residents of the same villages were often split into several transports, departing weeks or even months apart. There were no schedules or predetermined itineraries, and the initial wait for embarkation could last 10-15 days (Kulczycki 2003; Sula 2002). Once on the train, migrants were at the mercy of the postwar railway system that prioritized the movement of troops and suffered from poor management (Kochanowski 2001). In theory, migrants were supposed to be dropped off at specific locations. In practice, they were often unloaded in the middle of fields or at stations deemed convenient by train conductors. Kochanowski writes that "particularly in 1945, no arrangements were made [for arriving expellees]" (p. 145). As a result, "sometimes where the transported ended up was a matter of pure chance" (Thum 2011, 68). State Repatriation Office (PUR) Director Władysław Wolski lamented that migrants were often
offloaded partway to their destinations, in the middle of an open field, because conductors lacked route plans (Ciesielski 2000).

As forced Polish migrants weaved their way westward, Germans were evicted, and voluntary migrants from central Poland and Western Europe streamed into the formerly German settlements.\(^3\) Notably, officials in charge of resettlement did not have the most up-to-date information about the dynamics on the ground (Kochanowski 2001). As a result, once off the train, migrants were frequently sent from one destination to another when it turned out that officials had incorrect information about the availability of housing. It was not uncommon for groups of friends or neighbors or even family members to get separated at this stage, even if they succeeded in boarding the same train. In a representative account, Galician migrant Marian Samulewski (ND) described his tribulations as follows: “We were told our trip was over [...] but there were no more empty houses in Wierzchówo, so only 3-4 families were able to settle there”. Samulewski’s family stayed put in Wierzchówo; others continued on their journey.

Once a family had located a house, it was unlikely to move to reunite with former neighbors and friends from Galicia. Initially, there was too much uncertainty regarding whether accommodation would be available in some other settlement. There were also rumors of a new war with Germany and widespread expectations that resettlement was temporary, which reduced incentives to relocate. Once the initial settlement period had passed, self-sorting into village communities became difficult administratively, in part because until 1957 migrants could not freely sell or exchange land obtained from the state in the new territories (Machałek 2005). We address concerns about post-resettlement sorting in more detail in subsequent sections.

**Forced migrants from Galicia: distinctive cultural values**

This section briefly describes the Polish experience under the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian rule (1792-1918), with a focus on distinctive traits acquired by Poles in Galicia, the northernmost province of the Austrian Empire.\(^4\) Unlike their brethren in Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia,\(^3\)

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\(^3\) To further complicate matters, German-era inhabitants claiming Polish or mixed descent were permitted to remain. Villages that retained their pre-1945 inhabitants are excluded from our survey sample.

\(^4\) Final post-1815 partition boundaries are mapped in Appendix Figure A.2.
Poles who lived in the Catholic Austro-Hungarian Empire practiced Catholicism freely. Their children studied in Polish-language schools. Starting in 1869, courts and state administration in Galicia used Polish, and by 1870-71 Polish was the language of instruction at leading universities. By contrast, in the Prussian and Russian empires, the use of Polish in administration and education was limited and periodically banned (Wandycz 1974). The Austro-Hungarian Empire was also the first to introduce representative institutions and to allow regional self-governance. Poles dominated Galicia’s elected legislature and held senior positions in the provincial executive. In Prussia and Russia, Poles were largely denied access to positions in regional government or opportunities to vote for Polish candidates and parties (Wandycz 1974).

Scholars concur that Austrian rule imparted a set of distinctive political values that still distinguish Galicia from the rest of Poland. Poles in the former Austrian partition are today more religious, conservative, patriotic, and nationalist and are more likely to vote and support the democratic form of government than Poles in the former Prussian and Russian partitions (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015; Bukowski 2018; Zarycki 2015; Drummond and Lubecki 2010). In the Appendix we run a set of geographic regression discontinuity analyses, which demonstrate that religiosity and turnout rates are higher among Poles living in the former Austrian partition (Tables A.1 and A.2).

Scholars of Polish voting behavior commonly argue that cultural values rather than economic attitudes shape voting in Poland, and that religiosity is more informative of political preferences than the size of one’s pocketbook (Stanley 2019; Jasiewicz 2009). Higher religiosity and patriotism in the former Austrian partition suggests greater support for the right-wing Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), which champions the traditionalist version of Polishness rooted in Catholic values and nativism. At the same time, longer experience with elections under Habsburg rule would suggest higher support for the center-right Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska), which emphasizes progressive individualism and has positioned itself as the “chief defender of liberal-democratic transition” (Stanley 2019, 21).

5The studies referenced in this section are of Poles from western Galicia, located west of the Curzon line and largely unaffected by postwar displacement.
Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) find that both the Law and Justice and Civic Platform parties perform better in the former Austrian partition than in the former Russian partition, due to a combination of higher turnout and lower support for the post-communist Left. We replicate their analyses in the Appendix using municipal-level electoral returns from the first round of the 2015 presidential election and the 2015 parliamentary election. We find that support for the Civic Platform is slightly higher in the former Austrian partition compared to the Russian partition, whereas differences in support for Law and Justice across the border do not reach significance.\textsuperscript{6} There appear to be no differences in income, industrial production, corruption, or institutional trust on either side of the former imperial borders (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015).

Theoretical expectations

Scholars disagree about the extent to which community structures affect the transmission of cultural values given that parental socialization is such a dominant channel. We hypothesize that communities play an important role in the value transmission process, and that Galician values would be more likely to persist in majority-Galician settlements. Thus, we expect the descendants of forced migrants in villages that had been settled mostly by migrants from Galicia after WWII to be more patriotic, religious, and politically active than the descendants of the same migrant population in villages with a minority of Galician migrants ($H_1$).

Furthermore, we expect the differential persistence of Galician values in majority and minority communities to inform political preferences: we predict that the descendants of Galician migrants in majority communities will be more supportive of the Law and Justice and/or Civic Platform than their counterparts in minority communities ($H_2$). We thus hypothesize that the inherited Galician traits will have an indirect influence on respondents’ political choices. Finally, we expect that the descendants of Galician migrants in majority communities will be very similar or identical to the descendants of Galician Poles who were not displaced on traits associated with Austro-Hungarian rule, since both groups of respondents would have been surrounded by like-minded families since 1945 ($H_3$). This last hypotheses tests the proposition that differences in religiosity, patriotism,

\textsuperscript{6}Voting results across all three partitions are presented in Appendix Figure A.5.
and political engagement between majority and minority Galician communities are due to the fact that Galician-majority communities are better able to preserve unique Galician cultural traits.

It bears highlighting that these hypotheses do not challenge the standard view in the literature that family socialization is an important channel of value preservation. Rather, we test how much community structures matter beyond the family baseline.

**Research design**

**Survey sampling strategy**

To identify majority and minority Galician communities we built a dataset on the origins of the migrant population in Silesian villages that had been vacated by ethnic Germans using archival documents from the 1940s and secondary sources. Towns and cities were excluded because of high mobility. The roster of resettled villages is as complete and precise as the imperfect historical record allows. For instance, in one Silesian province (Opole), data on migrants’ exact places of origin based on historical property deeds are available for two-thirds of all the settlements. More information on how the roster was constructed can be found in the Appendix on pp. 12-13. We then randomly sampled 33 villages where, at the conclusion of the resettlement process, forced migrants from Ukrainian Galicia were in the majority and 33 villages where migrants from Ukrainian Galicia were in the minority and the majority group consisted of voluntary migrants from Central Poland (predominantly Russian partition). We will refer to these two types of villages as majority and minority. A majority village is one in which migrants from Galicia made up 60 per cent or more of the total population (81 per cent on average). In minority villages, Galician migrants were 40 per cent or less of the population (35 per cent on average). In each village, we interviewed village elites (mayors, priests, teachers) to confirm the origin of local residents (the correlation between elite reports and historical data was at $r = 0.73$). Over the course of fieldwork six villages had to be dropped: five because enumerators had difficulty finding respondents there – this proved especially challenging in minority villages – and one because

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7The indigenous population, not subject to population transfers, was in the majority in the remaining settlements.
there was confusion in the historical record and during fieldwork about the composition of its migrant population.8

Enumerators were asked to locate ten descendants of forced migrants from Galician Ukraine in each of the villages. We aimed to maximize the number of respondents and the number of communities while minimizing costs. We interviewed only the descendants of migrants from Ukrainian Galicia, not those from other origin groups. Only one respondent over the age of 18 was interviewed in every selected household.9 Overall, the survey was completed in 32 majority and 28 minority villages; 310 respondents were interviewed in majority villages and 283 in minority villages for the total of 593 second- or third-generation descendants of resettled Galician Poles.10 Villages where the survey had been completed are mapped in the southwestern quadrant of Figure 2. Minority villages are somewhat clustered in the north. This does not pose an inferential challenge given that all the settlements are located within 100 kilometers of each other. We discuss the clustering issue further in the Appendix on pp. 12-13. The survey was completed in the fall of 2016. Response rates were high by the standards of public opinion work in Europe at over 70 per cent. We present additional information about the enumerator teams and survey structure in the Appendix (p. 14).

We also interviewed 100 respondents in ten villages just west of the post-1945 Polish-Ukrainian border in the contemporary Polish province of Podkarpackie (see map in Appendix Figure A.3). These villages were in the same institutional environment as migrants’ villages of origin before 1945, but, being located on Polish territory, were not subject to resettlement. We use this comparison group to provide additional evidence that the observed differences between majority and minority villages are due to the greater persistence of Galician traits in majority communities rather than migrants’ self-selection or the experience of being in the majority as such. To

8The results remain unchanged when this village (Szklary) is retained in the sample, regardless of whether we code it as majority or minority.
9It is possible, in principle, that multiple members of the same family were interviewed if the family resided in multiple households. We did not come across any instances of this in enumerator reports, and consider this unlikely given that Silesian villages are large.
10Enumerators fell short of locating ten descendants of forced migrants from Ukrainian Galicia in several majority villages, which is why there are 310 (not 320) respondents in majority villages.
Figure 2: Sampled Silesian settlements (western Poland) and settlements of origin (eastern Galicia).
maximize the chances of finding respondents of Galician origin, we picked the ten comparison villages at random from a list of settlements that were ethnically Polish prior to WWII since ethnically mixed communities in western Galicia experienced large population turnovers during and after WWII. As a result, the western Galician settlements are not a perfect comparison group; they were historically more ethnically homogeneous than villages from which Galician migrants originated. This biases against finding similarities between the western Galician baseline and the majority-Galician settlements in western Poland.

Pre-treatment balance

A major challenge to the claim of quasi-random assignment of migrants to majority or minority communities is self-sorting. For instance, more religious or patriotic migrants might have made a special effort to band with like-minded settlers into majority-Galician villages. If this were the case, then contemporary differences in values between majority and minority communities would be due to selection rather than to the hypothesized persistence of Galician traits.

This section uses village-level historical data\textsuperscript{11} to address concerns about the selection of migrants from different types of origin villages into different types of destination villages, since there is no data on migrants’ values at the time of resettlement. Data on migrants’ settlements of origin in Galicia come from survey questions about the birthplaces of respondents’ maternal and paternal grandparents.\textsuperscript{12} Eighty-six per cent of the origin settlements are in Ukrainian Galicia; the remainder are in Volhynia, on the Russian side of the former imperial border. The settlements of origin are plotted in the southeastern quadrant of Figure 2. The symbols on the map indicate whether residents of a given settlement wound up in a majority village (triangle), a minority village (arrow), or both village types (star). The spatial pattern suggests that there is no obvious clustering by village type.

\textsuperscript{11}Detailed information on the sources for historical variables used in this section is provided in the Appendix on p. 4.
\textsuperscript{12}About 75 per cent of respondents knew the names of the settlements where their grandparents had been born. There were no systematic differences in recall between majority and minority communities.
Table 1: Pre-migration covariates in settlements of origin. Two-tailed t-tests; differences in means are presented as absolute values.

|                     | Majority migration | Minority migration | Difference of means |
|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| **Population census (1921)** |                    |                    |                    |
| Mean population     | 5524.74            | 7426.12            | 1901.38            |
|                     | (20685.50)         | (22620.57)         | (2900.65)          |
| Share male          | 0.48               | 0.48               | 0.00               |
|                     | (0.02)             | (0.02)             | (0.00)             |
| Share Catholic      | 0.46               | 0.42               | 0.04               |
|                     | (0.29)             | (0.30)             | (0.04)             |
| Share Jewish        | 0.15               | 0.21               | 0.06               |
|                     | (0.21)             | (0.25)             | (0.03)             |
| Share Polish        | 0.58               | 0.55               | 0.02               |
|                     | (0.29)             | (0.31)             | (0.04)             |
| Share Rusin         | 0.30               | 0.27               | 0.03               |
|                     | (0.27)             | (0.26)             | (0.04)             |
| N                   | 119                | 104                |                    |
| **Election results in 1928 (lower house)** |                    |                    |                    |
| Turnout             | 0.75               | 0.74               | 0.00               |
|                     | (0.11)             | (0.11)             | (0.02)             |
| Share BBWR          | 0.33               | 0.38               | 0.05               |
|                     | (0.20)             | (0.21)             | (0.03)             |
| Share PPS           | 0.05               | 0.06               | 0.01               |
|                     | (0.09)             | (0.08)             | (0.01)             |
| Share BNM           | 0.20               | 0.18               | 0.02               |
|                     | (0.18)             | (0.16)             | (0.03)             |
| Share Katol. Narod  | 0.08               | 0.09               | 0.01               |
|                     | (0.12)             | (0.12)             | (0.03)             |
| Share Lewica        | 0.03               | 0.01               | 0.02               |
|                     | (0.07)             | (0.03)             | (0.01)             |
| N                   | 43-95              | 35-85              |                    |
| **Election results in 1922 (lower house)** |                    |                    |                    |
| Turnout             | 0.54               | 0.57               | 0.04               |
|                     | (0.20)             | (0.16)             | (0.03)             |
| Share PSL “Piast”   | 0.40               | 0.39               | 0.00               |
|                     | (0.32)             | (0.34)             | (0.06)             |
| Share PPS           | 0.04               | 0.05               | 0.00               |
|                     | (0.08)             | (0.07)             | (0.01)             |
| Share Bund          | 0.01               | 0.01               | 0.01               |
|                     | (0.03)             | (0.04)             | (0.00)             |
| Share Christian Union | 0.23            | 0.20               | 0.02               |
|                     | (0.20)             | (0.15)             | (0.03)             |
| N                   | 74-91              | 63-84              |                    |

Note: We provide data for all the major parties that ran candidates across multiple districts in the region of Galicia. N is lower for electoral data because voting results were published only for settlements with over 500 voters and because parties did not run in all districts. Coefficients are group means; standard deviations and errors in parentheses.
In Table 1 we compare ethnic composition and voting behavior across the different types of origin settlements.\textsuperscript{13} Data on the ethnic composition of the origin settlements come from the 1921 Polish census, the only interwar census with information below the county level for Galicia.\textsuperscript{14} Electoral data are for the 1922 and 1928 legislative elections, which were the only free and fair elections in interwar Poland. The origin settlements are very similar in population size, ethnic and religious composition, and voting behavior. The sample size for electoral outcomes fluctuates between different political parties, but all voting differences are substantively small and do not reach significance. Turnout, the variable on which we expect differences across minority and majority destination villages, was measured for all origin settlements with at least 500 voters and is nearly identical across the two village types. Overall, the data support this project’s foundational assumption that Galician migrants who settled in majority and minority villages originated from very similar settlements.

\textbf{Table 2}: Pre-Resettlement characteristics of destination villages. Two-tailed t-tests; differences in means are presented as absolute values.

|                                      | Majority communities | Minority communities | Difference in means |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Number of inhabitants in 1939        | 606.66               | 614.11               | 7.45                |
|                                      | (374.37)             | (341.57)             | (93.02)             |
| Share employed in agriculture        | 0.56                 | 0.58                 | 0.02                |
|                                      | (0.13)               | (0.15)               | (0.04)              |
| Share employed in industry           | 0.22                 | 0.21                 | 0.01                |
|                                      | (0.10)               | (0.09)               | (0.02)              |
| Share of small farms (<5 ha)         | 0.38                 | 0.38                 | 0.00                |
|                                      | (0.17)               | (0.17)               | (0.04)              |
| Share of large farms (>20 ha)        | 0.17                 | 0.16                 | 0.01                |
|                                      | (0.13)               | (0.16)               | (0.04)              |
| Distance to railway, meters (1946)   | 3164.44              | 2639.07              | 525.37              |
|                                      | (2028.33)            | (1778.95)            | (495.88)            |
| N                                    | 32                   | 28                   |                     |

\textit{Note}: Coefficients are group means. Standard deviations/errors in parentheses.

\textsuperscript{13}Settlements of origin for migrants in both majority and minority villages at destination are included in both columns. In the Appendix Table A.5 we report similar results for t-tests weighted by the frequency at which each origin settlement was mentioned.

\textsuperscript{14}For Volhynia, census data are at the level of communes (an aggregation of several villages).
We also use data from the 1939 German census to compare economic conditions in migrants’ destination villages in western Poland on the eve of WWII. As reported in Table 2, the villages that would be settled in a few years’ time by different proportions of forced and voluntary migrants were nearly identical in size and economic structure, as measured by land ownership, characteristics of the labor force, and distance from the railway. Once again, differences across the majority and minority villages are negligible in magnitude and do not reach statistical significance.

In Appendix Table A.6, we also present balance tests on contemporary post-treatment variables across the two village types. We find no differences in education, income, or village size, though minority settlements have slightly larger populations in the present. As expected, majority and minority localities are also similar in their cultural composition, comprising predominantly migrants from the Russian and Austrian partitions in different proportions.

Results

Main findings

In Table 3, we test the hypothesis that political values associated with Austrian imperial rule in 19th-century Poland – religiosity, patriotism, and political participation – are more likely to have persisted in communities where migrants from Ukrainian Galicia are in the majority than those where they are in the minority.\(^{15}\) There are two models for each dependent variable: a bivariate model that includes only a dummy for residence in a majority village against the baseline of living in a minority village and a full model with controls. The fully-specified model includes pre-treatment controls from the 1939 German census (settlement size, share of population in agriculture, share of large farms (above 20 hectares)) and distance to the railway in 1946, as well as controls for gender and age from the survey. The models exclude post-treatment variables such

\(^{15}\)The total number of survey respondents is 593. The number of observations in this and subsequent tables is lower and varies by model because some respondents did not answer some of the survey questions that go into constructing the variables.
as settlement size in the present as well as income and education levels, because these variables might themselves be a product of variation in the resettlement dynamics.\textsuperscript{16}

|                        | Religiosity (1) | Religiosity (2) | Religiosity (3) | Religiosity (4) | Patriotism (5) | Turnout (6) |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------|
| Majority communities   | 0.28*           | 0.30**          | 0.65***         | 0.63***         | 0.22           | 0.23*       |
|                        | (0.11)          | (0.11)          | (0.17)          | (0.18)          | (0.12)         | (0.11)      |
| Female                 | 0.25**          | -0.11           |                 |                 | -0.20*         |             |
|                        | (0.08)          | (0.09)          |                 |                 | (0.08)         |             |
| Age, yrs.              | 0.03**          | -0.01           |                 |                 | 0.02           |             |
|                        | (0.01)          | (0.02)          |                 |                 | (0.01)         |             |
| Age\textsuperscript{2} | -0.00           | 0.00            |                 |                 | -0.00          |             |
|                        | (0.00)          | (0.00)          |                 |                 | (0.00)         |             |
| Distance to railway    | -0.00           | 0.00            |                 |                 | -0.00          |             |
|                        | (0.00)          | (0.00)          |                 |                 | (0.00)         |             |
| Share in agriculture   | 0.59            | -0.36           |                 |                 | -0.32          |             |
|                        | (0.43)          | (0.64)          |                 |                 | (0.60)         |             |
| Share of large farms   | -0.09           | 0.49            |                 |                 | 0.22           |             |
|                        | (0.33)          | (0.76)          |                 |                 | (0.47)         |             |
| Ln(Population)         | -0.03           | 0.18            |                 |                 | 0.20           |             |
|                        | (0.10)          | (0.17)          |                 |                 | (0.12)         |             |
| Constant               | -0.19*          | -1.91*          | -0.39*          | -1.36           | -0.13          | -1.66       |
|                        | (0.08)          | (0.77)          | (0.16)          | (1.33)          | (0.09)         | (0.91)      |
| Observations           | 557             | 557             | 499             | 499             | 512            | 512         |
| Adjusted \(R^2\)      | 0.016           | 0.264           | 0.094           | 0.126           | 0.010          | 0.037       |

\textit{Note:} Standard errors clustered at settlement level in parentheses.\textsuperscript{*}p<0.05; \textsuperscript{**}p<0.01; \textsuperscript{***}p<0.001

The dependent variables are factored indices (see detailed description in the Appendix on pp. 15-17). We use factor analysis to combine multiple survey questions into a few measures to facilitate the presentation of the findings.\textsuperscript{17} The religiosity index captures how often the respondent prays, attends religious services, and listens to religious radio programming. The

\textsuperscript{16}The coefficients are smaller, but broadly similar when these post-treatment controls are included, as shown in Appendix Table A.10.

\textsuperscript{17}The results hold if index components are used separately in place of the composite index.
The Role of Communities in the Transmission of Political Values

patriotism measure combines responses to questions about one’s level of pride in being Polish and belief in the importance of supporting the Polish government irrespective of its policies. The voter turnout index, a proxy for political participation, combines answers to questions about actual turnout in the most recent presidential election (2015) and turnout in a hypothetical upcoming parliamentary election. The estimation technique is ordinary least squares (OLS), and standard errors are clustered at the settlement level. We also replicated these and subsequent analyses using hierarchical models to allow for the fact that respondents are nested within settlements (see Appendix Table A.7). The results hold irrespective of the estimation approach.

Consistent with expectations, the residents of majority villages are more religious and patriotic today. They are also more likely to turn out to vote than their peers in minority settlements. To facilitate interpretation of these coefficients, we visualize the magnitude of the effects in terms of changes in standard deviation in the dependent variables in Figure 3. Those in majority communities are more religious by 0.28 of a standard deviation and more likely to turn out in elections by 0.22 of a standard deviation. The effect of living in a majority community on patriotism is by far the largest, amounting to an increase equivalent to 0.60 of a standard deviation.

Nineteen per cent of respondents were born to couples in which one parent is from Austrian Galicia and the other from Russian Volhynia; 15 per cent were born into Volhynia-only couples. In Table A.8 in the Appendix, we examine whether political values associated with Austrian rule are more strongly expressed once we exclude respondents of Volhynian ancestry. Among those of pure Galician ancestry all the effects associated with living in majority communities are consistently larger in magnitude and statistically significant. This analysis confirms that there is something uniquely Galician about the traits we study, as they are expressed more strongly among respondents who have both sides of the family originating in Galicia. It also suggests a mutually reinforcing rather than substitutive relationship between community and family transmission: if families compensated for community influence by amplifying their socialization efforts in

18Majority and minority communities do not differ in intermarriage rates in respondents’ families (see Table A.6).
We have now established that the core Galician values are more persistent in villages where migrants from Galicia constitute a majority. Do these values translate into political preferences (H2)? We measure party preferences using a factored index that combines reported vote for the candidate from the conservative and nationalist Law and Justice party or the more liberal Civic Platform in the 2015 presidential election and as an intention to vote for these parties in a hypothetical parliamentary election. We also examine the relevance of religion to politics – the two are linked in the literature on voting behavior in Poland (Jasiewicz 2009) – using a factored index that combines respondents’ opinions about the relevance of the Catholic Church

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**Figure 3:** Effect of living in a majority village on religiosity, patriotism, turnout, and political preferences as change in standard deviation from minority village baseline.

*Note:* 95% confidence intervals and point estimates from Models 2, 4, and 6 in Tables 3 and 4.

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19We would have liked to explore effect heterogeneity of community structures across different generations but are not able to do this because there are very few first generation respondents in the sample and not many respondents under the age of 30.
to individuals’ moral needs, problems of family life, and Poland’s social problems. The results of analyses modeled in the same way as those in Table 3 are reported in Table 4. As expected, respondents in majority villages are considerably more likely to view the Church as relevant to politics than their counterparts in minority settlements. The differences between majority and minority communities on this outcome amount to one third of a standard deviation (see the lower half of Figure 3). However, living in a majority village does not predict party preferences. The coefficients on Majority communities are positive for the Law and Justice vote and negative for the Civic Platform vote, but do not reach significance. It seems that higher religiosity and patriotism do not translate into higher support for the Law and Justice party. This might be because Galician political values do not map well onto the Law and Justice political platform or because the descendants of Galician migrants vote strategically in a region where the Civic Platform is more popular.\textsuperscript{20} This finding is consistent with results from geographic regression discontinuity analyses by us and other scholars who also do not find conclusive evidence that Poles in the former Austrian partition are more likely to support the Law and Justice Party (see Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) and our analysis in Appendix Table A.2.)

Additional tests and robustness checks

A concern mentioned earlier is that unobserved differences in the strength of social connections prior to resettlement might drive our findings on turnout, religiosity, and patriotism. It is possible that more tight-knit Galician communities were able to stay together upon resettlement, making an extra effort to travel and disembark together. Yet historical records and the fact that even majority-Galician villages contain migrants from different Galician settlements suggest that such coordination was unlikely. While we lack pre-treatment data on social capital in the origin villages, we are able to examine contemporary differences in the reported density of social ties across

\textsuperscript{20}The number of observations declines between models 1-2 and 3-6 in Table 4 because many respondents did not reveal their party preferences. Those in majority communities were more likely to conceal their preference, but not at a level that is statistically significant – see a comparison of non-response by community type in Appendix Table A.11. If we assume that non-response represents a vote for the Law and Justice Party, the coefficient on Majority communities increases in magnitude considerably.
Table 4: Political preferences in majority communities. OLS regression.

|                                | Church relevance (1) | Law and Justice vote (3) | Civic Platform vote (5) |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Majority communities           | 0.40**               | 0.07                     | -0.26                   |
|                                | (0.15)               | (0.18)                   | (0.17)                  |
| Female                         | -0.03                | -0.32*                   | 0.23                    |
|                                | (0.08)               | (0.13)                   | (0.13)                  |
| Age, yrs.                      | 0.01                 | 0.01                     | 0.02                    |
|                                | (0.01)               | (0.02)                   | (0.02)                  |
| Age²                           | 0.00                 | 0.00                     | -0.00                   |
|                                | (0.00)               | (0.00)                   | (0.00)                  |
| Distance to railway            | 0.00                 | 0.00                     | -0.00*                  |
|                                | (0.00)               | (0.00)                   | (0.00)                  |
| Share in agriculture           | 0.37                 | 0.34                     | 0.40                    |
|                                | (0.64)               | (0.88)                   | (0.85)                  |
| Share of large farms           | -0.67                | 0.46                     | -0.56                   |
|                                | (0.35)               | (0.59)                   | (0.53)                  |
| Ln(Population)                 | -0.17                | 0.07                     | -0.05                   |
|                                | (0.13)               | (0.18)                   | (0.16)                  |
| Constant                       | -0.30**              | -0.03                    | -1.79                   |
|                                | (0.11)               | (1.08)                   | (1.48)                  |
| Observations                   | 448                  | 244                      | 244                     |
| Adjusted $R^2$                 | 0.035                | -0.003                   | 0.127                   |

Note: Standard errors clustered at settlement level in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

the two village types. We do so by combining responses about the frequency of attendance at meetings, interest groups, get-togethers with friends, and joint work with others on improvements to the settlement into an index of village integration. As shown in Table A.9 in the Appendix, majority and minority villages do not differ on this index.

Respondents in majority and minority settlements are also similar on traits that are not associated with the history of Austrian rule or that are constant across the partition borders in the non-resettled regions of Poland today. In particular, they have similar levels of interpersonal trust (neighbors and strangers), institutional trust (church, police, parliament, and government), and trust in foreign governments (EU, Germany, Russia, Ukraine). Nor do they differ in attitudes...
toward Jews or Muslim migrants or in their evaluations of the communist period. We plot these null results across the two community types as predicted changes in standard deviations in Figure 4. The underlying models are presented in Appendix Table A.9.

Figure 4: Effect of living in a majority village on interpersonal trust, trust in foreign leaders, attitudes toward Jews and Muslims, views on living under communism, and social capital (village integration).

Note: Estimates and 95% confidence intervals are based on Models 2, 4, 6, and 8 in Appendix Table A.9.

While we show that majority and minority villages do not differ in their proximity to the railway, a possibility remains that, say, majority villages were more accessible, which could have implications for the persistence of cultural values. Furthermore, migrants motivated to preserve Galician values may have sorted into majority villages in the post-resettlement period when relocation opportunities opened up, contaminating the interpretation of the “community” channel of transmission. Several factors mitigate against this concern. Until 1957, resettlers to western Poland were not permitted to sell or exchange land (Machałek 2005), which impeded self-sorting across migrant communities. Anecdotally, over the course of fieldwork we did not come across any families that moved to a different village after resettlement in order to reunite with their former neighbors. The first census data on the level of in-migration date to 1988
and are only available for municipalities, one administrative level above individual settlements. The census asked whether respondents had been born in the settlement where they resided at the time. In Appendix Table A.6 we present evidence against self-sorting: proportions of the non-indigenous population are similar, at 51 and 50 per cent, in municipalities with majority and minority settlements, respectively. While these facts help mitigate against the challenge to our research design that comes from possible self-sorting following resettlement, we cannot rule out the incidence of self-sorting entirely.

By design, we did not collect data on political attitudes and behaviors among non-Galician families in majority and minority communities. Additional data collection of this kind would have been expensive, and we were not worried about the non-Galician population, because it was the same – descendants of voluntary migrants from the Russian partition – in majority and minority Galician villages. However, without information about the values of voluntary migrants from central Poland it is harder to establish that the reported effects solely reflect the weakening of Galician values in minority communities, relative to the majority communities. We addressed this concern by checking in Appendix Table A.4 whether in resettled municipalities a higher proportion of migrants from Ukrainian Galicia – irrespective of whether they are settled as majorities or minorities – is associated with a higher incidence of what we have identified as uniquely Galician political values. We found that a greater share of migrants from Western Ukraine in 1948 predicts higher contemporary levels of religiosity and turnout as well as lower vote for the Civic Platform candidate in the 2015 presidential election but not higher support for the Law and Justice Party. This once again confirms that there is such a thing as a set of Galician cultural values, and that they are in evidence in our region of study against the baseline of voluntary settlers from the Russian partition.

Comparison to western Galician villages

In this section we compare the descendants of Galician migrants to respondents in villages immediately west of the post-1945 Polish-Ukrainian border, in Podkarpackie province, to verify

21 The proportions include first-generation migrants, the youngest of whom were in their 40s in 1988.
that the Galician-majority resettled communities are different from minority settlements on specifically Galician traits, and that the transmission of these traits rather than sorting or the experience of being in the majority as such explains our findings.

We expect the descendants of migrants from eastern Galicia in majority villages to be more similar to respondents in western Galicia than respondents in the minority villages in line with $H_3$. Alternatively, if greater religiosity, patriotism, and turnout in majority-Galician resettled communities are a product of self-selection of Galician migrants with such characteristics into majority communities, then respondents in majority communities should be more patriotic, religious, and politically active than non-resettled Galicians in Podkarpackie and the residents of minority communities. To test these propositions we re-ran the analyses from Table 3 using villages west of the Ukrainian border as the reference group and binary indicators for majority and minority villages as key explanatory variables.

**Table 5:** Comparison of resettled migrants to the Western Galicia baseline. OLS regression.

|                        | Religiosity | Patriotism | Turnout | Church relevance | Law and Justice vote | Civic Platform vote |
|------------------------|-------------|------------|---------|------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| **Majority communities** | -0.39***    | 0.08       | 0.09    | -0.54***         | -0.45**              | 0.29*              |
|                        | (0.11)      | (0.16)     | (0.21)  | (0.13)           | (0.15)               | (0.14)             |
| **Minority communities** | -0.66***    | -0.57**    | -0.12   | -0.94***         | -0.50**              | 0.55**             |
|                        | (0.11)      | (0.20)     | (0.21)  | (0.15)           | (0.16)               | (0.18)             |
| **Female**             | 0.27***     | -0.10      | -0.20** | -0.04            | -0.21                | 0.19               |
|                        | (0.07)      | (0.08)     | (0.07)  | (0.08)           | (0.12)               | (0.11)             |
| **Age, yrs.**          | 0.02*       | -0.01      | 0.03*   | 0.00             | 0.03                 | 0.01               |
|                        | (0.01)      | (0.01)     | (0.01)  | (0.01)           | (0.02)               | (0.02)             |
| **Age$^2$**            | 0.00        | 0.00       | -0.00*  | 0.00             | -0.00                | -0.00              |
|                        | (0.00)      | (0.00)     | (0.00)  | (0.00)           | (0.00)               | (0.00)             |
| **Ln(Population)**     | -0.09       | 0.16       | 0.20*   | -0.17            | -0.04                | 0.02               |
|                        | (0.09)      | (0.13)     | (0.10)  | (0.11)           | (0.15)               | (0.12)             |
| **Constant**           | -0.36       | -0.79      | -1.85*  | 1.14             | -0.39                | -0.65              |
|                        | (0.61)      | (0.90)     | (0.71)  | (0.80)           | (0.99)               | (0.85)             |

| Observations | 653 | 581 | 602 | 528 | 298 | 298 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.264 | 0.121 | 0.039 | 0.160 | 0.131 | 0.045 |

*Note: Settlement size is measured for 1939 in treated villages and in 1921 for Podkarpackie villages. Standard errors clustered at settlement level in parentheses. *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$*

The results are reported in Table 5. In all models, the coefficient on Minority communities is larger in magnitude than the coefficient on Majority communities, suggesting greater similarity in responses between the residents of Galician-majority resettled communities and the non-resettled communities in Podkarpackie. Respondents in both majority and minority communities are
less religious than the non-resettled baseline, but those in the minority villages are only half as religious as the residents of Podkarpackie (Model 1). As predicted, the levels of patriotism are statistically indistinguishable for respondents in Podkarpackie and majority Galician villages in Silesia, whereas patriotism is considerably lower in the minority villages (Model 2). For turnout, there are no statistically significant differences between Podkarpackie settlements and minority villages, contrary to $H_3$, though the coefficient is negative as expected (Model 3).

With respect to political values, there are also greater similarities between the majority and non-resettled villages than between the minority and non-resettled villages. In particular, while respondents in both majority and minority communities are less likely to view church as relevant to politics, the coefficient is nearly twice as large in magnitude on the minority dummy as on the majority dummy. Respondents in both majority and minority resettled communities are less supportive of the Law and Justice Party and more supportive of the Civic Platform relative to respondents in the non-resettled villages.22

Overall, the comparison of majority and minority resettled communities to villages in southeastern Poland is consistent with the hypothesis that community bonds facilitate the transmission of historically-held values. This evidence contradicts the alternative explanation that more religious, patriotic, and politically active Galician migrants self-selected into the majority villages. The descendants of forced migrants from western Ukraine in majority communities are more similar to the comparison group of western Galicians who never moved than to the descendants of forced migrants from the same region in minority villages. We do, however, observe a considerable weakening of the Habsburg legacies in the aftermath of displacement even in majority communities, especially with respect to the norms that could not be openly expressed under communism, such as religiosity and voting, as opposed to patriotism, which was encouraged.

22Higher support for the Civic Platform in the resettled communities might be a product either of strategic voting in an area where this party is dominant or of higher investment in education by forced migrants (Stanley 2019; Jasiewicz 2009).
The Role of Communities in the Transmission of Political Values

Understanding community transmission processes

The preponderance of evidence suggests that Galician values are more likely to endure in villages with Galician majorities. The implication is that communities of like-minded families enhance and perhaps activate the transmission of cultural values carried within individual family units, even in the same institutional environment. The theorized channel of transmission is repeated social interaction with migrants from the same region, similar to the socialization process described in Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2018). As observed in ethnographic studies, the identity of the dominant group plays a key role in determining which traditions persist and which will eventually disappear (Pawłowska 1968). Even though local organizations – churches, schools, and clubs – were similar across majority- and minority-Galician villages, as shown in the Appendix, the content of the values they transmitted depended on the relative sizes of the migrant groups.23 The transmission of values also took place through daily rituals and cultural practices, outside of institutionalized settings. For example, religiosity was reinforced through regular June and May prayers under the village cross, rosary prayers in fraternities, midnight masses, and indulgences (150, 187). These types of events were considerably more common in Galician majority communities.

For instance, in the majority village of Dziadowa Kłoda, migrants from Galicia asked the priest to assign church pews based on region of origin and did not attend the funerals or weddings of migrants from other regions (Hołubecka-Zielnicowa 1970, 66). Preserving higher levels of religiosity, patriotism, and political participation was often as simple as finding oneself among peers from Galicia. In the words of Genowefa Kruk (ND), resettled to Siedlce, "Here [...] the majority of people came from Obertyn, Dolina, and Stryj [Galician settlements], so all of our traditions were simply transported here. Nothing has changed... What we did there, we do here." Similarly, Jozefa Rudnik, resettled from Usznia (western Ukraine) to Domaniów recalls: "When we came here, we brought our culture from the East" (quoted in Jakubowska 2014, 35).

23Organizations to preserve the Galician identity did not spring up until 1989; even then, they exclusively emerged in large cities like Wrocław.
The larger the share of Galician migrants, the more people would participate in social practices that reinforce political values associated with Austrian rule in a new environment. Shared values were often tied to physical reminders from migrants’ region of origin, which included church bells and works of religious and patriotic art. One example are the so-called Kresy Madonnas, religious depictions of the Virgin Mary that carry high cultural and historical significance – eighty of which are located in parishes around Silesia. In Grodziec, a majority settlement in our sample, religious and patriotic traditions are strengthened by the presence of Madonna Częstochowska, a 17th-century icon originally from the parish of Biłka Szlachecka, now in western Ukraine. Not all of the Polish resettlers from Biłka Szlachecka ended up in Grodziec; those resettled as minorities elsewhere were separated from important markers of Galician culture.

In minority villages, parental pressures often failed to prevent children’s assimilation into the norms of the non-Galician majority. For instance, Michał Sobków recalled how his mother failed to convince his sisters to wear headscarves, a practice common in her Galician village of origin but unusual in the destination village, which was dominated by migrants from other regions (Maciorowski 2011, 15). In sum, in areas where they constituted the majority, the descendants of migrants from Galicia were more likely to follow and transmit group norms and values and to resist the temptation to adopt traits associated with other groups.

Conclusion

This study leverages a quasi-experiment of history that divided a homogeneous population into different types of communities – some in which Polish migrants from Galicia dominated and others in which they constituted a minority – to evaluate the role of community in the transmission of historically-rooted values above and beyond the influence of the family. We find that respondents in majority and minority settlements are very similar to each other along a broad set of socioeconomic and geographic characteristics, but differ on the markers of historical Galician political values. Community composition thus matters for the persistence of cultural

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24 Kresy are the regions in contemporary Ukraine and Belarus that Poland lost to the Soviet Union at the end of WWII.
25 Nasz Grodziec, Parafia, Historia. N.D., http://www.grodziec.eu/parafia/historia/246-historia.
values. Where Poles from Galicia were resettled as a majority, traits associated with Austrian rule – religiosity, patriotism, and political participation – remain more prevalent today. On these traits, migrants’ descendants in majority villages resemble the population of Galician villages that were not resettled after WWII. In contrast, in settlements where Poles from Galicia are a minority these values are considerably weaker relative to both majority-Galician resettled villages and the more rooted villages west of the post-1945 Polish-Ukrainian border.

We do not seek to downplay the role of families in the value transmission process. Rather, given that family units remained intact in both majority and minority communities, we argue that, first, communities do play a role in the persistence of deeply rooted and slow-changing cultural values and, secondly, communities affect value transmission beyond and above the family. For reasons of costs and logistics we did not collect data on the nature of political values among the non-Galician residents of the majority and minority communities. Such data would be necessary to establish how well families do in value socialization when not buttressed by community support. Yet even in minority communities, Galician parents might have been reluctant to expend a great deal of effort on socializing their offspring because the majority was made up of other Poles, who speak the same language and practice the same religion. Further work would be needed to establish whether parents might be able to compensate for the absence of community reinforcement and aggressively attempt to socialize their offspring if they live in a context where the dominant majority is radically different from and/or openly hostile to the minority group, as Bisin and Verdier (2001) theorize.

Empirically, this study speaks to the conditions under which cultural persistence is more likely. We conclude that cultural values are less likely to endure once community bonds are broken either because of naturally occurring economic or social mobility or due to forced resettlement. Thus historical legacies may decay faster in cities, where community bonds are weaker, than in the countryside. Our findings also contribute to research on assimilation processes, suggesting that migrants are more likely to retain their culture when settled in an area that is densely populated with other families from their region or country of origin.
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The Role of Communities in the Transmission of Political Values: Evidence from Forced Population Transfers

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**Online Appendix/Supplementary Information**

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Figure A.1: Main railway routes used for population transfers from the USSR to the formerly German territories, 1945.
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Sources used for historical data at the village and municipality level

We digitized data on the pre-WWII population at the settlement level from following volumes of the Index of Polish Localities (Skorowidz Miejscowości Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) published by the Main Statistical Office of Poland (Główny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, GUS) in Warsaw in 1923-24:

- Województwo Lwowskie: Volume XIII;
- Województwo Stanisławowskie: Volume XIV;
- Województwo Tarnopolskie: Volume XV;
- Województwo Poleskie: Volume VIII;
- Województwo Wołyńskie: Volume IX;
- Województwo Lubelskie: Volume IV;

The data on interwar elections was compiled from the following publications:

- GUS. 1926. Statystyka Wyborów do Sejmu i Senatu odbytych w dniu 5 i 12 listopada 1922 roku. Tom VIII. Główny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: Warszawa.
- GUS. 1930. Statystyka Wyborów do Sejmu i Senatu odbytych w dniu 4 i 11 marca 1928 roku. Tom X. Główny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: Warszawa.

The data on the share of migrants from the USSR and Central Poland in 1948 at the municipality level are based on the population survey in the resettled territories conducted in December 1948. See files of the Ministry for the Recovered Territories in Warsaw [1944] 1945-1949 (Ministerztwo Ziem Odzyskanych (MZO) w Warszawie [1944] 1945-1949) in the Polish Archive of Modern Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych, AAN). The status of population in Silesian voivodeship (Ankieta Ludnościowa na 31 XII 1948. Stan Zaludnienia w Województwie Śląskim) is contained in AAN/MZO/1515o.

The data on the pre-resettlement economic characteristics of the destination villages is based on the results of the 1939 German census, available at the settlement level in the files of the Ministry for the Recovered Territories in Warsaw (MZO) in Archiwum Akt Nowych. See AAN/MZO/1655. Dane statystyczne dotyczące liczby ludności na Ziemiach Odzyskanych, stanu zatrudnienia i liczby czynnych zakładów przemysłowych. 1945-1947. B-6875.

The data on the origin of migrants in resettled villages were obtained from Dworzac and Goc (2011) and Archiwum Państwowy in Wroclaw and are discussed in more detail on pp. 12-13 of the Appendix.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY POLAND

The central assumption in the project is that the population of the former Austrian partition differs from other Poles in their higher religiosity, patriotism, and turnout. This pattern has been established by researchers who studied contemporary differences in communities that did not experience resettlement and are still located on the opposite sides of the partition boundaries within modern-day Poland (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015; Bukowski 2018). In this section, we replicate this work, demonstrating that the population of Galicia is indeed more religious and politically active than the population of the Russian partition using regression discontinuity design. This analysis identifies the causal effect of Austro-Hungarian rule, since the border between the two empires was imposed exogenously and did not follow preexisting socio-economic or geographic conditions (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015). Unfortunately, it is only possible to perform such analyses for the data available at the municipal level (religiosity, electoral and socio-economic outcomes), as existing surveys do not identify respondents’ locations at the level below the province26 and have limited sample sizes.

Perhaps the most distinct feature of Austro-Hungarian rule was cultural and religious freedom enjoyed by Poles and other ethnic groups (especially after 1867). Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) argue that differences in religiosity between Poles in the Austrian partition and other parts of Poland turned out to be the more persistent legacy, outweighing the differences in income (estimated using luminosity data), education, corruption, and trust in government institutions. To verify this pattern we use data on attendance at mass in 2015, purchased from the Institute of Statistics of the Polish Catholic Church (Instytut Statystyki Kościoła Katolickiego). As shown in Figure A.4, attendance at mass is much higher in the former Austrian partition.

The Austrian empire was the first to introduce representative institutions and to allow Poles to participate in state administration. Galicia had an elective legislature (Sejm Krajowy) where Poles predominated, as well as a provincial executive body. The persistent legacy of this early experience with quasi-democratic institutions is higher turnout on the Austrian side of the border. We use data from the first round of the 2015 presidential election as well as from the 2015 parliamentary election to the lower house (Sejm), which are closest to the outcomes measured in our survey, to evaluate this pattern.

There is some disagreement on how greater religiosity and patriotism, on the one hand, and pro-democracy attitudes, on the other hand, translate into electoral preferences. On average, voters in areas formally under Russian and Austrian control are more supportive of the religiously conservative Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), whereas voters in the Prussian partition and in the formerly German territories are more supportive of the liberal Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), as shown in Figure A.5. These patterns are strongly entrenched, but the difference is causally identified only between the former Russian and Prussian partition, which share a longer border.27 Differences between the Russian and Austrian partition are somewhat more muted, as seen from Figure A.5. Regression discontinuity analysis by Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) on differences between the Russian and Austrian partitions suggests that support for both the Law and Justice and the Civic Platform is higher on the Austrian side of the former border in four parliamentary elections (2001, 2005, 2007, and 2011), which they interpret

26 There are 16 provinces (województwa) in contemporary Poland.

27 The border between the Austrian and Prussian partition is very short, and the Prussian size of this border was affected by mass displacement, which makes the effects of imperial legacies difficult to establish conclusively using regression discontinuity methods.
as a legacy of (1) higher religiosity (relevant to support for the Law and Justice), on the one hand, and (2) more pro-democratic attitudes (relevant to support for the Civic Platform), on the other hand.

To explore whether similar patterns exist in elections covered in our survey, we evaluate differences in support for candidates from the Law and Justice party (Andrzej Duda) and the Civic Platform (Bronisław Komorowski) using data from the first round of the 2015 presidential election. We also analyze results of the 2015 election to the lower house of the Polish Parliament (Sejm). We estimate the coefficient on the Habsburg “treatment” using the *rdrobust* package in R, developed by Calonico et al. (2015). We employ the MSE-optimal bandwidth selector and Uniform or Triangular kernel to construct the local-polynomial estimator, identical on both sides of the cutoff. The forcing variable is Euclidian distance to the border between Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires calculated from the centroid of each municipality. Models include controls for urban municipalities, latitude and longitude, and their interaction.

Results are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 and illustrated graphically for religiosity and vote in the presidential election in Figure A.6. We find a nearly 11 per cent higher attendance at mass in the former Austrian partition, estimated using the MSE-optimal bandwidth of 23 kilometers around the border. We also find greater turnout (at 2.7 per cent for the presidential election and at 3.0 per cent for the parliamentary election) in the former Austrian partition, in comparison to the former Russian partition, estimated using the MSE-optimal bandwidths that range from 32 to 39 kilometers around the former imperial border. The results from the analysis of political preferences are mixed: while support for both the Law and Justice and the Civic Platform presidential and parliamentary candidates is 2.5-2.7 per cent higher in the former Austrian partition, the coefficient reaches statistical significance only for the Civic Platform support. The results are similar when the Triangular kernel is used, as shown in Table A.2. Table A.3 also demonstrates that there are no significant differences in population density, urbanization, private entrepreneurship, or education levels between the Russian and Austrian partitions in contemporary Poland.

### Table A.1: The effects of Austro-Hungarian Rule (vs. Russian rule). Linear regression discontinuity regression at the municipal level.

| Religiosity | Presidential election | Parliamentary election |
|-------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| **Coeficient** | Mass attendance | Turnout | Law and Justice | Civic Platform | Turnout | Law and Justice | Civic Platform |
| Mass attendance | 10.76** * | 0.66 | 2.57 | 2.68 | 2.98 | 1.94 | 2.65 |
| Standard error (conventional) | (2.29) | (1.10) | (1.93) | (1.14) | (1.21) | (1.91) | (1.11) |
| Robust bias-corrected CI | [5.09, 16.13] | [0.24, 4.71] | [-2.00, 7.22] | [-1.53, 5.33] | [-0.17, 5.24] | [-3.12, 5.83] | [0.10, 5.35] |
| Observations | 1393 | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 | 1465 |
| Kernel type | Uniform | Uniform | Uniform | Uniform | Uniform | Uniform | Uniform |
| Polynomial | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Bandwidth type | mserd | mserd | mserd | mserd | mserd | mserd | mserd |
| MSE-optimal bandwidth (km) | 23.18 | 29.70 | 25.66 | 23.93 | 28.78 | 25.74 | 24.71 |
| Effective # treated | 112 | 150 | 128 | 121 | 144 | 128 | 124 |
| Effective # untreated | 99 | 129 | 115 | 104 | 126 | 115 | 107 |

*Note:* *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001*

We argue that these distinctive Galician values – greater religiosity and turnout – have been transmitted from one generation to another, persisting not only among the current residents of the

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28For socio-economic outcomes we rely on municipality-level data from the 2002 census. Ideally we would also examine differences in interpersonal and institutional trust as well as prejudice toward Jews and Muslims, on which we present null results in the article, but these variables are not available at a fine-grained enough level for a regression discontinuity analysis.
Figure A.4: The share of Catholic population attending mass in 2015.

Table A.2: The effects of Austro-Hungarian Rule (vs. Russian rule). Linear regression discontinuity regression at the municipal level, alternative specification with a triangular kernel.

|                  | Religiosity | Presidential election | Law and Justice | Civic Platform | Parliamentary election | Law and Justice | Civic Platform |
|------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-----------------|---------------|------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Coefficient      | 12.47***    | 2.19^*               | 2.34            | 2.94**        | 2.51^*                | 2.28            | 2.31^*        |
| Standard error (conventional) | (2.45) | (1.05)               | (1.72)          | (1.05)        | (1.20)                | (1.69)          | (1.07)        |
| Robust bias-corrected CI | [7.53, 19.33] | [-0.65, 4.23]       | [-2.06, 6.14]   | [0.56, 5.63]   | [-0.64, 5.10]        | [-2.28, 5.58]   | [-0.29, 4.94] |
| Observations     | 1393        | 1465                  | 1465            | 1465          | 1465                  | 1465            | 1465          |
| Kernel type      | Triangular  | Triangular            | Triangular      | Triangular    | Triangular            | Triangular      | Triangular    |
| Polynomial       | 1           | 1                     | 1               | 1             | 1                      | 1               | 1             |
| Bandwidth type   | msrd        | msrd                  | msrd            | msrd          | msrd                  | msrd            | msrd          |
| MSE-optimal bandwidth | 24.70  | 38.52                 | 35.45           | 33.23         | 35.94                 | 36.90           | 32.01         |
| Effective # treated | 118       | 188                   | 176             | 165           | 178                   | 181             | 156           |
| Effective # untreated | 106       | 160                   | 148             | 137           | 152                   | 158             | 134           |

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Figure A.5: Differences in outcomes in the 2015 parliamentary election across the partition boundaries.
**Table A.3**: Placebo test: testing for differences in socio-economic outcomes from the 2002 census around the former imperial border between the Austrian and Russian partitions. Linear regression discontinuity regression at the municipal level.

|                         | Share with higher edu | Share urban | Private enterprises per 1,000 | Population per km² |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|
| Coefficient             | 0.92                  | 7.45        | -1.12                         | 71.61              |
| Standard error (conventional) | (0.50)               | (5.16)      | (4.33)                        | (56.91)            |
| Robust bias-corrected CI | [-0.29, 2.14]         | [-3.43, 20.80] | [-12.01, 8.69]                | [-71.29, 194.28]   |
| Observations            | 1465                  | 1465        | 1465                          | 1465               |
| Kernel type             | Uniform               | Uniform     | Uniform                       | Uniform            |
| Polynomial              | 1                     | 1           | 1                             | 1                  |
| Bandwidth type          | mserd                 | mserd       | mserd                         | mserd              |
| MSE-optimal bandwidth   | 25.86                 | 29.28       | 24.85                         | 38.40              |
| Effective # treated     | 130                   | 146         | 124                           | 188                |
| Effective # untreated   | 115                   | 129         | 107                           | 159                |

*Note:* *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

**Figure A.6**: Results from regression discontinuity analysis in Table A.1.
former Austrian partition, but also among residents in the resettled territories, to which migrants from the Galician territory east of the Curzon line were relocated after the war. In the main body of the article we compare the descendants of Galician migrants in majority and minority villages, but we do not measure the attitudes of other population groups in the resettled villages. Because the other migrant group is the same across majority and minority villages (Poles from the Russian partition), we assume that differences in religiosity, patriotism, and turnout are solely due to proportions of migrants from Galicia vis-a-vis other regions. One might argue that without evaluating political values of all population groups it is difficult to rule out the possibility that the differences we identify among the descendants of migrants from Galicia come from differences in intergenerational persistence rather than from differences in social relationships that arise when one finds herself in the majority or minority in a given community. By this logic, for instance, minority status itself may reduce church attendance, discourage displays of patriotic sentiment, or reduce political participation.

To address this concern, we also look at aggregate outcomes at the municipal level in the same region where we conducted our survey (Opole/Oppeln and Wrocław/Breslau provinces). To approximate our survey design, we focus only on municipalities repopulated by migrants. If the differences we observe between majority and minority villages arise due to differences in political values among the Galician and non-Galician populations, then we should observe that aggregate levels of religiosity and turnout will increase as the share of migrants from Galicia increases. To evaluate this expectation, we use the share of migrants from the USSR as our main explanatory variable. In this sample, the share of USSR migrants ranges from 6 to 84 per cent. We condition on pretreatment covariates (distance to railway, share in agriculture, large farms, urban/rural status, and the natural logarithm of population). The results presented in Table A.4 show that attendance at mass and political participation increase with the share of migrants from Western Ukraine and thus decrease with the share of migrants from other regions (i.e., from the Russian and Prussian partitions). The fact that aggregate (i.e. among all migrant groups combined) religiosity and turnout in the resettled municipalities covary with the share of the population from Western Ukraine is consistent with our argument that the population from other partitions is less religious and less likely to vote, even though the ecological inference problem prevents us from establishing differences on this variables for each migrant group separately. The results on political preferences (negative relationship between the share of migrants from the Austrian partition and support for the Civic Platform) are somewhat puzzling in view of the positive coefficient in the regression discontinuity analysis of support for the Civic Platform on the Austrian side of the partition border, but could be explained by the much higher support for the Civic Platform in the former Prussian partition, which was excluded from the regression discontinuity analysis and from which some migrants originated. They also fit findings from our survey, with the negative coefficient on Majority communities dummy for regressions of the Civic Platform vote (see Models 5 and 6 in Table 4).

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29Those with the share of migrants above 80 per cent in the 1948 municipal census, excluding eastern municipalities of Opole province dominated by the Silesian minority.

30In this region, USSR migrants came predominantly from Western Ukraine, whereas in northwest Poland USSR migrants were originating from Lithuania and Belarus.

31In this case we cannot distinguish between migrants from the Russian and Prussian partition.
**TABLE A.4:** Religiosity and voting in the 2015 parliamentary election at the municipal level. Data from Opole and Wrocław districts (*Regierungsbezirke*) for municipalities with migrant population. OLS Regression.

| Reported in 2015          | 2015 presidential election, Round 1 |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|
|                           | Mass attendance | Turnout | Law and Justice vote | Civic Platform vote |
|                           | (1)             | (2)     | (3)                  | (4)                  | (5)                  | (6)                  |
| Share from USSR           | 0.12**          | 0.09*   | 0.08**               | 0.09**               | 0.03                 | −0.13***             |
|                           | (0.04)          | (0.04)  | (0.03)               | (0.03)               | (0.03)               | (0.03)               |
| Town                      | −1.23           | 2.55    | 4.33***              | 2.20                 | −0.67                | 2.07                 |
|                           | (1.65)          | (2.29)  | (1.20)               | (1.69)               | (1.85)               | (1.75)               |
| Share in Agriculture (1939)| 9.50            | −5.32   | 10.05*               | −6.34                |
|                           | (5.41)          | (3.99)  | (4.37)               | (4.13)               |
| Large Farms (1939)        | −12.54          | 29.16   | 36.42                | 11.75                |
|                           | (38.91)         | (28.57) | (31.26)              | (29.55)              |
| Distance to Railway (1948)| −0.06           | −0.06   | 0.12                 | 0.05                 |
|                           | (0.21)          | (0.15)  | (0.17)               | (0.16)               |
| Ln(Population in 1948)    | −1.16           | 0.31    | −0.14                | 0.20                 |
|                           | (0.89)          | (0.66)  | (0.72)               | (0.68)               |
| Observations              | 109             | 109     | 109                  | 109                  | 109                  |
| Adjusted R²               | 0.11            | 0.15    | 0.12                 | 0.12                 | 0.22                 | 0.35                 |

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01
Establishing historical composition of villages

Determining the historical composition of Silesian villages was a challenge. The search for historical data on post-WWII settlement patterns first took us to a highly detailed set of data on village histories in the contemporary province (województwo) of Opole, collected by Elżbieta Dworzak and Małgorzata Goc (2011). This study uses the origins of migrant families as reported in the protocols of property transfers (protokoły przekazania gospodarstw), detailing who took possession of German property that had become available, and from local registers of settlers (rejestr osiedlonych). The property protocols and settler registers ordinarily contain information on the place of origin prior to resettlement for each head of the household. We estimate population composition from these records, assuming no systematic bias in rates of issuance of property titles across populations of different origin and no differences in family size.

These data cover 625 villages, approximately two-thirds of all the settlements in Opole and almost all the villages with any migrants from anywhere outside of the voivodeship. We verified Dworzak and Goc’s data against less-detailed ethnographic records from 1977 compiled by Rauziński and Zagórowska (Dworzak and Goc 2011; Rauziński and Zagórowska 2007). The latter source covers 938 villages in Opole voivodeship (99 per cent of the total) but contains data only on the share of migrants at the village level, essentially aggregating population into two groups: migrants (forced and voluntary) and indigenous residents (autochtoni). This source allowed us to verify that most of the villages missing from the dataset compiled by Dworzak and Goc contained no migrants from western Ukraine.

To locate additional minority villages, we supplemented the information from Dworzak and Goc with statistics on the composition of southernmost municipalities in Dolnośląskie voivodeship, also in Silesia. These data come from the records of Starostwa Powiatowe in 1948-1950, preserved in Archiwum Państwowy in Wrocław. These documents are not always complete but, to the best of our knowledge, they are the most detailed historical sources on post-WWII village composition in Silesia. To keep socio-economic factors as similar as possible, we focused on the historical counties of Oława and Oleśnica, which are adjacent to Opole province. The shares of repatriates from Kresy come from (a) Starostwo Powiatowe w Oleśnicy, Raporty statystyczne gmin 1948/50, No. 82/659/0/1/18; and (b) Starostwo Powiatowe w Oławie, Miesieczne Raporty statystyczno-sytuacyjne mc I-XII 1949, No. 82/660/0/1/16. The archival data contain a more precise estimate of total population at the end of the migration period but are aggregated at the gromada level and do not include detailed information on migrants’ villages or counties of origin.

Using information on migrants’ places of origin in these sources, we calculated the proportion of migrants in a given village who relocated from western Ukraine as opposed to other parts of Poland. We then narrowed our sample to the villages where migrants from Ukraine made up a clear majority (60 per cent or more) or minority (40 per cent or less) and where the rest of the population migrated from the territories of the Russian partition located in post-1945 Poland, to hold constant the identities of migrants’ new neighbors. We then randomly sampled majority and minority villages from this dataset.

As shown in Figure 2 in the body of the article, there is a bit of clustering among minority communities, some of which are located slightly to the northwest of majority villages. This is because migration proceeded from east to west, so migrants from Galicia arrived to easternmost Silesian destinations first and continued to be settled there until housing capacity was exceeded, as well as because we focused on a small number of counties in Dolnośląskie for which archival data was available and which were closest to Opole province. As a result, there are more minority
Galician villages in Dolnośląskie province than in Opole province. However, the distance between the cluster of majority communities in Opole and a similar cluster of minority communities in Dolnośląskie is only about 40 km, and both sets of villages are located in very similar agricultural terrain. Given what we know about the process of resettlement, the relative proximity of the two sets of villages, and similarities between northern Opole and southern Dolnośląskie voivodeships – both in the historical region of Silesia – this type of clustering does not appear to present a major challenge for our research design.
ADDITONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE SURVEY

This face-to-face survey was fielded in September and October 2016. Field teams went out simultaneously in western and eastern Poland, in the regions of Opole and Podkarpackie respectively. The survey was administered by TNS Polska. The same set of enumerators did fieldwork in all the settlements in the Opole region; another group of enumerators carried out all the interviews in Podkarpackie. The survey was administered on pre-programmed tablets. The enumerators were asked to comply with quotas by age and gender, which were derived from the latest census information on the age and gender distribution in rural communities in southwestern Poland. Thirty-five percent of respondents were to come from the 18-39 age group (of these, half men), another 35 per cent from the 40-59 age bracket (of these, half men), and the remaining 30 per cent from those over the age of sixty (of these, 30 per cent men). In the Opole region where we were looking specifically for descendants of Galician Poles, snowball sampling was used to identify descendants of forced migrants from Galicia. In the Podkarpackie region in eastern Poland where the aim was to build a representative sample of the entire population of the settlement, respondents were selected using a random step procedure. Response rates were high at over 70 per cent.

The survey opened with questions about the respondent’s family and their historical origins. It then posed a series of questions about contemporary attitudes and behaviors in the domains of economic, political, and social life. The survey closed with a section on basic demographic information. One concern with opening the survey with questions about the family’s origins is that these questions might have primed the historical Galician identity. However, it bears noting that respondents in majority and minority settlements were asked the same set of questions and therefore were subject to the same set of primes.

DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

Female: “Respondent’s gender.” (0) Male; (1) Female.

Age: “What is the year of your birth?” Year of birth.

Education: “What is your education level?” (1) Incomplete primary; (2) Elementary, unfinished middle; (3) Gymnasium; (4) General middle (school or technical school); (5) Special middle (technical institute, college); (6) Professional technical; (7) Incomplete higher; (8) Higher.

Income, categorical: “How would you describe your household’s economic situation over the past six months from the options below?” (1) We don’t have enough money for food; (2) We have enough money for food and basic clothes; (3) We can afford food and clothes, but it would be difficult to buy a new electrical appliance, like a television; (4) We can afford all of the above and have enough money to travel abroad on vacation; (5) We can do all of the above but it would be difficult to buy a new car; (6) We do not experience any financial limitations.

Income, monetary: “Here is a list of incomes and we would like to know in what group your household falls into, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in monthly. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, after taxes and other deductions.” (1) Less than 800 Zl; (2) 801-1500 Zl; (3) 1501-2000 Zl; (4) 2,001 - 3,000 Zl; (5) 3,001 - 4,000 Zl; (6)
Both parents from Galicia: “Where did the father’s side of your family live before World War II? And where did the mother’s side live before World War II? (a) Mother’s side, (b) Father’s side.” (1) Kresy Wschodnie (Ukraina → Lwów, Tarnopol, Stanisławów); (2) Kresy Wschodnie (Ukraina → Wołyń); (3) ANY other region.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Religiosity: “Please tell me how often you: (a) Pray, (b) Go to Church, (c) Listen to religious programs on the radio.” (1) More than twice weekly; (2) Weekly; (3) On major holidays; (4) Never. Factored index.32

Patriotism: “Please tell me whether you AGREE or DISAGREE with each of these: One must support one’s country irrespective of what the government does.” (0) Disagree; (1) Agree. “Some people are very proud of being Polish; others less so. How proud are you of being a Pole on a 10-point scale where 0 is not at all proud and 10 is extremely proud?” (0) Not at all proud; (1); (2); (3); (4); (5) Neither proud, nor not; (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) Extremely proud. Factored index.33

Turnout: “Did you vote in the 2015 presidential election?” (0) No, I did not vote; (1) Yes, I voted. “If a parliamentary election took place this Sunday, would you vote?” (0) No; (1) Yes. Factored index.34

Relevance of religion: “I will now read a few statements. Please tell me whether you AGREE or DISAGREE with each of these: Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office.” (0) Disagree; (1) Agree. “Generally speaking, do you think that the Church in Poland is giving adequate answers to: (a) The moral problems and needs of the individual, (b) The problems of family life, (c) The social problems facing our country today.” (0) No; (1) Yes. Factored index.35

Vote for PiS: “Whom did you vote for?” (1) Bronisław Komorowski (PO); (2) Andrzej Duda (PiS); (3) Paweł Kukiz; (4) Magdalena Ogorek; (5) Janusz Korwin-Mikke; (6) Adam Jarubas; (7) Spoilt ballot. “Which political party would you vote for?” (1) PO; (2) PiS; (3) PSL; (4) SLD; (5) KORWiN; (6) Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru; (7) Kukiz 15; (8) Partia Razem; (9) Stonoga Partia Polska. Factored index.36

Individualism: “On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?” (a) (1) Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves; (2); (3); (4); (5); (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) The state should take more

32Eigenvalue = 2.13, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76. The factor loadings are Pray = 0.89, Church=0.89, Listen to religious program = 0.73.
33Eigenvalue = 1.27, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.18. The factor loadings are Support=0.80, Proud=0.80.
34Eigenvalue = 1.69, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80. The factor loadings are Did you vote= 0.92, Would you vote =0.92.
35Eigenvalue = 2.48, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89. The factor loadings are Moral problem = 0.91, Family life problem =0.93, Social problem=0.88.
36Eigenvalue = 1.73, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80. The factor loadings are Whom did you vote for = 0.93, Would you vote for = 0.93.
APPENDIX

responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. (b) (1) Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas; (2); (3); (4); (5); (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people. (c) (1) The state should give more freedom to firms; (2); (3); (4); (5); (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) The state should control firms more effectively. (d) (1) Private ownership of business and industry should be increased; (2); (3); (4); (5); (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) Government ownership of business and industry should be increased. Factored index.37

Integration in Village Life: "In the past twelve months, how often have you... (a) attended a meeting in your village to discuss local matters; (b) attended a club/choir or some other interest group meeting in your village; (c) had friends from the village over to your house; (d) worked with other people in your village to fix or improve something." Response options: (1) At least once a week; (2) At least once a month; (3) At least once a year; (4) Never. Factored Index.38

Interpersonal Trust: Question 1: "To what extent do you trust people from the following groups: (a) Your neighbors; (b) People you meet for the first time; (c) People of another religion; (d) People of another nationality." Options: Trust Completely (5); Trust Somewhat (4); Neither Trust nor Distrust (3); Distrust Somewhat (2); Distrust Completely (1). Question 2: "Do you think that most people would take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? How would you place your view on the scale on this card?" Options: (1) Most people would try to take advantage of me; (2); (3); (4); (5); (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) Most people would try to be fair. Factored index.39

Trust in Domestic Institutions: "How much trust do you have in each of the following institutions and organizations? Is it a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very much (2), or none at all (1)?" List of institutions: (a) Church; (b) Police; (c) Parliament; (d) Government. Factored Index.40

Trust in Foreign States and Leaders: "How much trust do you have in each of the following institutions and organizations? Is it a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very much (2), or none at all (1)?" (a) the European Union; (b) German government (under Merkel); (c) Russian government (under Putin); (d) Ukrainian government (under Poroshenko). Factored index.41

Anti-Semitism: "Some say that Jews are still secretly in charge of Polish politics and economics. Others disagree. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?" Completely agree (4); Somewhat agree (3); Somewhat disagree (2); Completely disagree (1).

37Eigenvalue = 2.32, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74. The factor loadings are Responsibility=0.72, Competition=0.79, Freedom = 0.77, Private ownership = 0.76.
38Eigenvalue = 2.24, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71. The factor loadings are Meetings = 0.78, Interest groups = 0.82, Friends over = 0.57, Worked with others = 0.79.
39Eigenvalue = 2.75, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.67. The factor loadings are Neighbors = 0.58, People met first time = 0.82, People of different religion = 0.88, People of other nationality = 0.86, Trust in others scale = 0.48.
40Eigenvalue = 2.09, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.67. The factor loadings are Church = 0.58, Police = 0.60, Parliament = 0.84, Government = 0.83.
41Eigenvalue = 2.32, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.72. The factor loadings are EU = 0.63, Germany = 0.82, Russia = 0.77, Ukraine = 0.82.
Attitudes toward Communism: "We are now moving on to life under Communism after World War II. Some say that, on balance, life under Communism was good; others disagree. What is your view based on what you know?" Life under Communism was good (1); Life under Communism was bad (2).

Attitudes toward Muslims: “Let’s talk about [...] Muslim migrants from the Middle East. Which of the following should the government do in their case?” Let any Muslims come who want to (4); Let Muslims come as long as there are jobs available (3); Put strict limits on the number of Muslims who can come here (2); Prohibit Muslims from coming here completely (1).

Village Institutions:42 "Does your village have any of the following organizations? PLEASE SELECT ALL ANSWER OPTIONS THAT APPLY: (a) Church; (b) Club; (c) Volunteer Fire Brigade (OSP); (d) Agricultural circle; (e) A sports group (football team, etc.); (f) A hobby group (association of hunters, etc.); (g) Other [WRITE IN].” Additive index.

42Only village elites were asked this question.
**APPENDIX**

**Pre-treatment balance with weights**

|                          | Majority migration | Minority migration | Difference of means | Standard error |
|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| **Population census (1921)** |                    |                    |                     |                |
| Population               | 10014.28           | 17718.99           | 7704.7              | (5847.06)      |
| Share Male               | 0.48               | 0.48               | 0.00                | (0.00)         |
| Share Catholic           | 0.58               | 0.56               | 0.02                | (0.04)         |
| Share Jewish             | 0.12               | 0.19               | 0.07                | (0.03)*        |
| Share Polish             | 0.70               | 0.67               | 0.02                | (0.04)         |
| Share Ukrainian          | 0.21               | 0.17               | 0.04                | (0.03)         |
| N                        | 712                | 618                |                     |                |
| **Election results in 1928** |                    |                    |                     |                |
| Turnout                  | 0.77               | 0.75               | 0.02                | (0.02)         |
| Share BBWR               | 0.35               | 0.34               | 0.01                | (0.03)         |
| Share PPS                | 0.04               | 0.10               | 0.05                | (0.02)**       |
| Share BNM                | 0.15               | 0.11               | 0.03                | (0.02)         |
| Share Katol. Narod       | 0.13               | 0.14               | 0.01                | (0.03)         |
| Share Lewica             | 0.02               | 0.01               | 0.01                | (0.01)         |
| N (maximum)              | 567                | 535                |                     |                |
| **Election results in 1922** |                    |                    |                     |                |
| Turnout                  | 0.60               | 0.62               | 0.02                | (0.03)         |
| Share PSL “Piast”        | 0.50               | 0.42               | 0.07                | (0.05)         |
| Share PPS                | 0.03               | 0.04               | 0.01                | (0.01)         |
| Share Bund               | 0                  | 0.01               | 0.01                | (0.00)         |
| Share Christian Union    | 0.23               | 0.27               | 0.04                | (0.03)         |
| N (maximum)              | 576                | 537                |                     |                |

*Note: We provide data for all the major parties that ran candidates across multiple districts in the region of Galicia. N is lower for electoral data because voting results were only reported for settlements with over 500 voters and because parties did not run in all districts. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
## Post-treatment balance

**Table A.6:** Balance on post-resettlement covariates in destination communities. Two-tailed t-tests; differences in means are presented as absolute values.

| From the 1948 Polish census: | Majority | Minority | Difference of means |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| Indigenous, %                | mean (sd) | mean (sd) | diff (se)         |
| From the 1988 census:        |          |          |                   |
| Population not living from birth, % | 0.51 (0.07) | 0.49 (0.06) | 0.02 (0.02) |
| Population arriving in 1971-78, % | 0.09 (0.01) | 0.08 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.004) |
| Population arriving in 1979-88, % | 0.15 (0.03) | 0.16 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.01) |
| N (settlements)              | 32        | 28       |                   |
| From the 2016 survey:        |          |          |                   |
| Female, %                    | 0.57 (0.50) | 0.59 (0.49) | 0.03 (0.04) |
| Age, yrs.                    | 53.00 (17.97) | 52.44 (17.65) | 0.56 (1.46) |
| Education (index: 1-8)       | 4.65 (1.64) | 4.61 (1.76) | 0.04 (0.14) |
| Income, categorical (index: 1-6) | 2.76 (1.07) | 3.06 (1.17) | 0.29 (0.10) |
| Income, monetary (index: 1-7) | 2.77 (1.19) | 2.68 (1.47) | 0.09 (0.13) |
| Both parents from Galicia, % | 0.61 (0.49) | 0.57 (0.50) | 0.04 (0.04) |
| N (respondents)              | 233-310 | 206-283 |                   |

Note: Standard deviations/errors are in parentheses. Number of respondents varies by survey question. 

*a* At the time of the census approximately half of the population was not indigenous because we focus on villages created through mass resettlement four decades earlier. *p* < 0.05, **p** < 0.01.
Robustness checks and additional regression analyses
TABLE A.7: Hierarchical models replicating analyses in Tables 3 and 4 in the main text. Individual-level variables are Female and Age.

| model                         | Religiosity | Patriotism | Turnout | Church relevance | Law and Justice vote | Civic Platform vote |
|-------------------------------|-------------|------------|---------|------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Majority communities         | 0.26*       | 0.27**     | 0.62*** | 0.61***          | 0.22*                | 0.39**              |
|                               | (0.10)      | (0.10)     | (0.16)  | (0.16)           | (0.11)               | (0.13)              |
| Female                        | 0.25**      | -0.11      | -0.21*  | -0.00            | -0.35**              | 0.24                |
|                               | (0.08)      | (0.08)     | (0.09)  | (0.09)           | (0.12)               | (0.13)              |
| Age, yrs.                     | 0.03*       | -0.01      | 0.03    | 0.01             | 0.02                 | 0.02                |
|                               | (0.01)      | (0.01)     | (0.01)  | (0.01)           | (0.02)               | (0.02)              |
| Age²                          | -0.00       | 0.00       | -0.00*  | 0.00             | 0.00                 | -0.00               |
|                               | (0.00)      | (0.00)     | (0.00)  | (0.00)           | (0.00)               | (0.00)              |
| Distance to railway           | -0.00       | 0.00       | -0.00   | 0.00             | 0.00                 | -0.00               |
|                               | (0.00)      | (0.00)     | (0.00)  | (0.00)           | (0.00)               | (0.00)              |
| Share in agriculture          | 0.59        | -0.30      | -0.39   | 0.33             | 0.54                 | 0.29                |
|                               | (0.45)      | (0.71)     | (0.52)  | (0.61)           | (0.76)               | (0.71)              |
| Share of large farms          | -0.07       | 0.56       | 0.30    | -0.61            | 0.50                 | -0.56               |
|                               | (0.37)      | (0.59)     | (0.41)  | (0.50)           | (0.64)               | (0.59)              |
| Ln(Population)                | -0.01       | 0.21       | 0.18    | -0.18            | 0.07                 | -0.04               |
|                               | (0.10)      | (0.16)     | (0.11)  | (0.14)           | (0.18)               | (0.17)              |
| Observations                  | 557         | 557        | 499     | 499              | 512                  | 512                 |
| Log Likelihood                | -810.24     | -722.99    | -669.11 | -655.96          | -725.96              | -716.43             |
| Akaike Inf. Crit.             | 1628.49     | 1467.99    | 1346.23 | 1333.91          | 1459.92              | 1454.87             |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit.           | 1645.78     | 1515.54    | 1363.08 | 1380.25          | 1476.88              | 1501.49             |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
### Table A.8: Persistence of Galician political identities among the offspring of Galicia-only couples. OLS regression.

|                              | Religiosity | Patriotism | Turnout |
|------------------------------|-------------|------------|---------|
|                              | (1)         | (2)        | (3)     | (4)     | (5)     | (6)     |
| Majority communities         | 0.32*       | 0.34*      | 0.88*** | 0.82*** | 0.31*   | 0.31*   |
|                              | (0.14)      | (0.14)     | (0.16)  | (0.16)  | (0.13)  | (0.12)  |
| Female                       | 0.31**      | -0.11      | -0.16   |         |         |         |
|                              | (0.09)      | (0.11)     |         |         |         |         |
| Age, yrs.                    | 0.02        | -0.01      | 0.03    |         |         |         |
|                              | (0.02)      | (0.02)     |         |         |         |         |
| Age\(^2\)                    | 0.00        | 0.00       | -0.00   |         |         |         |
|                              | (0.00)      | (0.00)     |         |         |         |         |
| Distance to railway          | -0.00       | 0.00       | -0.00   |         |         |         |
|                              | (0.00)      | (0.00)     |         |         |         |         |
| Share in agriculture         | 0.66        | -0.82      | -0.63   |         |         |         |
|                              | (0.51)      | (0.59)     |         |         |         |         |
| Share of large farms         | -0.21       | 0.12       | 0.17    |         |         |         |
|                              | (0.48)      | (0.69)     |         |         |         |         |
| Ln(Population)               | 0.03        | 0.06       | 0.13    |         |         |         |
|                              | (0.13)      | (0.19)     |         |         |         |         |
| Constant                     | -0.01       | -2.06      | -0.40*  | -0.42   | -0.20   | -1.00   |
|                              | (0.11)      | (1.17)     | (0.15)  | (1.46)  | (0.10)  | (1.00)  |

| Observations | 335 | 335 | 288 | 288 | 306 | 306 |
| Adjusted \(R^2\) | 0.023 | 0.258 | 0.210 | 0.247 | 0.020 | 0.042 |

*Note:* Standard errors clustered at settlement level in parentheses. *p*<0.05; **p*<0.01; ***p*<0.001
## Table A.9: Null results: Differences in interpersonal and institutional trust, trust in foreign leaders, attitudes toward Jews and Muslims, views on communism, and social capital (levels of village integration). OLS regression.

|                      | Interpersonal Trust | Institutional Trust | Trust in Foreign Leaders | Anti-Semitic Prejudice | Pro Muslim Immigrants | Pro-Communist Attitudes | Village Integration |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
|                      | (1)                 | (2)                 | (3)                       | (4)                    | (5)                   | (6)                    | (7)                 |
| Majority communities | 0.09                | -0.09               | -0.10                     | -0.03                  | -0.11                 | -0.05                  | -0.01               |
|                      | (0.15)              | (0.10)              | (0.16)                    | (0.15)                 | (0.06)                | (0.03)                 | (0.13)              |
| Female               | -0.06               | 0.09                | 0.13                      | -0.19                  | -0.06                 | 0.03                   | -0.10               |
|                      | (0.08)              | (0.09)              | (0.11)                    | (0.13)                 | (0.05)                | (0.02)                 | (0.07)              |
| Age, yrs.            | -0.04***            | -0.00               | -0.00                     | 0.03                   | 0.01                  | -0.01                  | 0.02                |
|                      | (0.01)              | (0.01)              | (0.02)                    | (0.02)                 | (0.01)                | (0.00)                 | (0.01)              |
| Age²                 | 0.00***             | 0.00                | -0.00                     | -0.00                  | 0.00                  | 0.00                   | -0.00**             |
|                      | (0.00)              | (0.00)              | (0.00)                    | (0.00)                 | (0.00)                | (0.00)                 | (0.00)              |
| Distance to railway  | -0.00*              | -0.00               | -0.00                     | 0.00                   | 0.00                  | -0.00                  | 0.00                |
|                      | (0.00)              | (0.00)              | (0.00)                    | (0.00)                 | (0.00)                | (0.00)                 | (0.00)              |
| Share in agriculture | 0.78                | 0.72                | 0.18                      | 0.84                   | -0.16                 | 0.19                   | 0.59                |
|                      | (0.72)              | (0.49)              | (0.57)                    | (0.59)                 | (0.25)                | (0.11)                 | (0.56)              |
| Share of large farms | -0.89               | 0.06                | 0.42                      | 0.08                   | 0.13                  | 0.19                   | 1.61***             |
|                      | (0.65)              | (0.38)              | (0.58)                    | (0.49)                 | (0.24)                | (0.14)                 | (0.46)              |
| Ln(Population)       | 0.12                | 0.05                | 0.06                      | 0.01                   | -0.14*                | 0.05                   | 0.09                |
|                      | (0.14)              | (0.09)              | (0.14)                    | (0.12)                 | (0.06)                | (0.03)                 | (0.11)              |
| Constant             | 0.19                | -1.05               | -0.13                     | 0.95                   | 1.13*                 | -0.16                  | -1.17               |
|                      | (1.09)              | (0.82)              | (1.11)                    | (0.93)                 | (0.54)                | (0.25)                 | (1.05)              |
| Observations         | 554                 | 492                 | 438                       | 326                    | 447                   | 563                    | 552                 |
| Adjusted $R^2$       | 0.035               | 0.083               | 0.021                     | 0.027                  | 0.024                 | 0.032                  | 0.127               |

*Note: Standard errors clustered at settlement level in parentheses.*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
### Table A.10: Differences in political attitudes and voting behavior across different types of migrant communities with contemporary controls. OLS regression.

|                  | Religiosity | Patriotism | Turnout | Church relevance | Law and Justice vote |
|------------------|-------------|------------|---------|------------------|----------------------|
|                  | (1)         | (2)        | (3)     | (4)              | (5)                  |
| Majority communities | 0.21        | 0.55**     | 0.19    | 0.28*            | -0.12                |
|                   | (0.12)      | (0.17)     | (0.10)  | (0.12)           | (0.17)               |
| Both parents from Galicia | 0.25**      | 0.23       | 0.05    | 0.44***          | 0.20                 |
|                   | (0.09)      | (0.13)     | (0.10)  | (0.10)           | (0.16)               |
| Female            | 0.30***     | -0.10      | -0.18*  | -0.03            | -0.29*               |
|                   | (0.07)      | (0.11)     | (0.09)  | (0.09)           | (0.13)               |
| Age, yrs.         | 0.03**      | -0.01      | 0.01    | 0.00             | 0.01                 |
|                   | (0.01)      | (0.02)     | (0.01)  | (0.01)           | (0.02)               |
| Age\(^2\)         | -0.00       | 0.00       | -0.00   | 0.00             | 0.00                 |
|                   | (0.00)      | (0.00)     | (0.00)  | (0.00)           | (0.00)               |
| Income (index: 1-6) | -0.11*      | -0.09      | 0.11    | -0.23***         | -0.12                |
|                   | (0.05)      | (0.08)     | (0.06)  | (0.06)           | (0.07)               |
| Education (index: 1-8) | -0.00       | 0.10*      | 0.09*   | 0.03             | 0.06                 |
|                   | (0.03)      | (0.05)     | (0.03)  | (0.04)           | (0.05)               |
| Distance to railway | -0.00       | 0.00       | 0.00    | 0.00             | 0.00                 |
|                   | (0.00)      | (0.00)     | (0.00)  | (0.00)           | (0.00)               |
| Share in agriculture | 0.55        | -0.29      | -0.28   | 0.37             | 0.37                 |
|                   | (0.43)      | (0.70)     | (0.55)  | (0.62)           | (0.88)               |
| Share of large farms | 0.05        | 0.67       | 0.12    | -0.37            | 0.53                 |
|                   | (0.35)      | (0.84)     | (0.49)  | (0.39)           | (0.59)               |
| Ln(Population)    | 0.01        | 0.15       | 0.18    | -0.12            | 0.04                 |
|                   | (0.09)      | (0.18)     | (0.11)  | (0.13)           | (0.18)               |
| Constant          | -1.80*      | -1.54      | -2.22** | 0.25             | -1.50                |
|                   | (0.75)      | (1.40)     | (0.82)  | (1.17)           | (1.51)               |
| Observations      | 506         | 443        | 459     | 408              | 222                  |
| Adjusted R\(^2\) | 0.288       | 0.135      | 0.059   | 0.213            | 0.121                |

*Note:* Standard errors clustered at settlement level in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Table A.11: Political preferences in majority communities: Responses "Don’t know" and "Refuse to Answer" (RTA) in questions about elections. OLS regression.

|                        | Law and Justice vote, with RTA | Refusal to answer | Refusal/Don’t know |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
|                        | (1)                            | (2)              | (3)               | (4)               | (5)               | (6)               |
| Majority communities   | 0.16                           | 0.16             | 0.12              | 0.13              | 0.13              | 0.11              |
|                        | (0.10)                         | (0.10)           | (0.10)            | (0.11)            | (0.10)            | (0.11)            |
| Female                 | -0.21*                         | -0.02            | -0.05             |                   |                   |                   |
|                        | (0.09)                         | (0.09)           | (0.10)            |                   |                   |                   |
| Age, yrs.              | 0.02                           | 0.03*            | 0.04***           |                   |                   |                   |
|                        | (0.01)                         | (0.01)           | (0.01)            |                   |                   |                   |
| Age^2                  | -0.00                          | -0.00*           | -0.00***          |                   |                   |                   |
|                        | (0.00)                         | (0.00)           | (0.00)            |                   |                   |                   |
| Distance to railway    | -0.00                          | -0.00            | 0.00              |                   |                   |                   |
|                        | (0.00)                         | (0.00)           | (0.00)            |                   |                   |                   |
| Share in agriculture   | 0.43                           | 0.17             | -0.38             |                   |                   |                   |
|                        | (0.56)                         | (0.42)           | (0.44)            |                   |                   |                   |
| Share of large farms   | 0.12                           | 0.38             | 0.33              |                   |                   |                   |
|                        | (0.35)                         | (0.39)           | (0.35)            |                   |                   |                   |
| Ln(Population)         | 0.17                           | 0.12             | 0.02              |                   |                   |                   |
|                        | (0.10)                         | (0.12)           | (0.13)            |                   |                   |                   |
| Constant               | -0.15                          | -1.97*           | -0.02             | -1.58             | -0.02             | -0.89             |
|                        | (0.08)                         | (0.96)           | (0.06)            | (0.96)            | (0.07)            | (0.98)            |

Observations: 593 593 593 593 593 593

Adjusted $R^2$: 0.005 0.030 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.014

Note: Standard errors clustered at settlement level in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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