RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL PUBLIC SENTIMENT TOWARDS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN IN SOCIAL MEDIA: INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA CASES

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Abstract

Purpose of the study: This paper depicts the use of social media for political campaign in Indonesia and Malaysia whilst especially aiming at investigating religious and political sentiment of Indonesian (young) voters (reflected in their Twitter accounts, especially the tweets and memes) that supported Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla (hereafter Jokowi’s camp) and Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa camps (hereafter Prabowo’s camp) in the 2014 Presidential Election Indonesia.

Methodology: This qualitative study is a discourse analysis that deploys the Hallidayan transitivity system, language evaluation theory as well as social semiotics. Using stratified purposeful sampling, the data (tweets and memes of two contest political camps – the Islamic(ist?) versus the Nationalist) were taken during the campaign days (4 June – 5 July 2014).

Main Findings: In the Indonesian case, the (c)overt black campaign of both camps operates in the framework of the contestation as well as the synthesis of the nationalist/Islamist(ist?) strands. They are deployed to be rhymed in the brand resonance the both camps’ campaign team forged. As for Malaysian, the use of social media platforms by its young electorates did not guarantee the popularity gained by the (legislative) candidates, as they overlooked the people’s collective memories of the 1998 Reform Movement that resonated with Malaysian identity.

Implication of this study: As a preliminary part of multiyear research funded by Indonesia’s Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education, the findings become the textual foundation in producing the recommendation for public policy on the political campaign in social media (in this case the Twitter). Compared to other social media platforms, Twitter was chosen as it provides limited numbers of characters for its users (especially the two main camps – Jokowi’s versus Prabowo’s camps), not only to tweet but that more importantly also the tweets represent the perennial discursive contestation of the Islamic (-ist?) versus Nationalist strands to the current 2019 elections Indonesia.

Novelty/Originality of this study: The (c)overt black campaign of both camps operates in the framework of the contestation as well as the synthesis of the nationalist/Islamist(ist?) strands. They are deployed to be rhymed in the brand resonance the campaign team forged. A similar contesting strategy is deployed, such as countering similar religious and political issues that represent the supporters/volunteers(read also: public) sentiment in the cyberwar (in the form of utterance and visual war).

Keywords: Religious and Political Sentiment, The 2014 Presidential Election Indonesia, Discursive Contestation, Tweets, Memes, Transitivity System, The Language of Evaluation, Social Semiotics.

INTRODUCTION

The use of social media for the political campaign cannot be perceived as a new phenomenon in digital democracy. However, for Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s contexts, this can be arguably be seen as the pristine phenomenon where the use of social media, especially by their (young) electorates, amplified compared to the previous elections. For Malaysia, the 2013 General election (hereafter “the GE13”) had been perceived as the first social media election (Jaharudin, 2014; Sani, 2014) where the ruling government coalition (Barisan Nasional) met its derisory failure for its popular votes (Sani, 2014). Whilst for Indonesia, not only does the political campaign in social media, in this case, the 2014 Presidential Election (hereafter “Pilpres 2014”), represent the freedom of (hate?) speech, but also an arena where the nationalist and Islamist(ist?) strands synthesize and contest. This paper depicts the different results in the social media deployment for political campaign in the 2013 Malaysia’s General Election and the 2014 Indonesia’s Presidential Election, whilst at the same time, it also focuses on the investigation of religious and political public sentiment (in this case the supporters/volunteers of the two presidential candidates’ camps – Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto) in the 2014 Presidential election. This paper is organized discussing the review of the literature (the social media deployment in various countries), method, the result and discussion (religious and political public sentiment in Pilpres 2014 represented in tweets and memes of their respective supporters/volunteers) and conclusion. Previous related studies pertaining to the relevant aspects are integrated with a review of the literature section.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Prior to discussing the social media deployment in the GE13 and Pilpres 2014, the discussion of the Janus face of the social media use for political campaign is imperative, as it illuminates not only how the social media has been employed in a positive lens, but also how social media has been deployed to meet manipulative ends. Although the voice of netizen
in social media represents the grassroots’ democracy (Sani, 2014; Purbo in Lim, 2017) the results of the social media deployment for political campaigns differed in several countries. For instance, Borondo, et.al (2012) found that social media (Twitter) was deployed as a measurement tool to predict the support of the electorates in the 2011 Spain. In alignment with this, Tumansajin, et.al (2011) found that the number of tweets could predict the success of the candidates in Germany, whilst in Italy, they were also used as election outcome indicators (Caldarelli, Chessa, Pammolli, Pompa, Puliga, 2014). In addition to this, these ideal uses of social media in Lim’s note (2017) subsume into netizen participation, i.e. in forms of civic engagement and exchanges as well as political participation transformation. And at the same time, as Lim continues, the dark side of social media users not limited to surveillance, loss of privacy, and information debasement. Thompson (2011) also found that social media has been deployed as the medium to propagate radical movements, such as in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Lim (2017) also contends that the Brexit phenomenon in UK and Trump’s victory in 2016 U.S.A could also be perceived as the results of the social media’s dark face.

The Social Media Deployment in The GE13 Malaysia

As earlier mentioned, the use of social media for a political campaign in Malaysia’s GE13 and Indonesia’s Pilpres 2014 produced different results. Jaharudin (2014) argued that the failure of Barisan Nasional (hereafter “BN”) in winning the heart of its young electorates stemmed from the fact that BN, which is led by Malaysia’s current Prime Minister, overlooked the electorates’ collective memories, i.e. Reformasi 1998 (the 1998 Reform) and Gabungan Pilihan Raya Bersih dan Adil (hereafter “BERSIH”). The young Malaysian netizen (read: 20-40 year-old-electorates) demanded political transformation in the proliferated forms that mirrored the 1998 Reform movements, i.e. open political debate, mass z mobilization, political campaign for government’s opposition. Jaharudin (2014) found that the young electorates (71%) preferred parties that represent public interest to religion (14%), certain groups (11%) whilst associated themselves as native Malaysian identity (54%), religious identity (33%) and certain groups identity (12%). This percentage substantially also reflects the political disposition of Malaysia’s young voters.

However, as Jaharudin’s continues, although Najib Razak’s political campaign adopted today’s political/cultural trend in using social media, his maneuver could not be perceived successful as his policies have been merely seen populist and thus failed to solve the country’s basic problems, i.e. socioeconomic imbalance, human rights, university autonomy (Puyok, 2013). Sani (2014) also adds that BN cannot detach itself from “the issue of graft and abuse of power, such as in the Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ) scandal, National Feedlot Corporation (NFC) cow-and condominium fiasco, and the Scorpene submarine saga”.

Nonetheless, this failure did not make BN lost its majority voters. It still won the hearts of 50.87% voters compared to its opposition (Pakatan Rakyat or PR) 47.38% (Sani, 2014) from a total of 13,268,002 registered voters (Jaharudin, 2014) or 13.3 million voters in Sani’s record. However, PR dominated the registered popular votes of young electorates, i.e. 41.98% (Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia, 2013).

In alignment with Jaharudin and Sani, deploying interaction strength plot design to analyze the passive interactions on Facebook Page (FP) between the legislative candidates’ posts and the passive users (the ones who gave the emoticon “like”), Khairuddin & Rao (2017) found that in the 33 days of campaigning each legislative candidates of the GE13 posted “on average 164 posts, and managed to acquire on average 49,260 likes from the total of 8,348 posts with the total number of likes 2,512,248”. However, these numbers do not reflect the hypothetical correlation of measurement popularity, i.e. the more “likes” one gets in social media (in this case FP), the higher one’s chance of being elected. As Khairuddin & Rao continue, from the 17 active candidates on FP that posted more than 164 posts, four of them failed to win the election. At the same time, from 12 candidates that were successful in obtaining more than 49,260 likes, three of them also failed. Nonetheless, Khairuddin & Rao did not further qualify the comments posted or the political/cultural meaning behind the posts and the likes.

The Social Media Deployment in the Pilpres 2014 Indonesia: the Contestation of Nationalist/Islamic/st Strands

Nielsen Media Center recorded Indonesia had 83.7 million of internet users (the urban middle-class society, Sen & Hill, 2007) in kominfo (2014). This number increased to 132.7 million in 2017 (Lim, 2017). Lim suggests us that when investigating the use of Internet for political campaign, we need to trace back to the 1999 Indonesia – the time when PKS (Prosperous Justice Party – Indonesia’s Islamist Party (Lim, 2017) or “moderate” Islamic party (Tomsa, 2012), or “normalized” Islamic party (Bubalo, Fealy & Mason, 2008) deployed its Internet networking for political purposes. PKS’s massive network with university campuses, Islamic boarding schools, and mosques has arguably secured its place in the hearts of its loyalists.

This paper does not intend to trace back to 1999 Indonesia, as the elaboration for this paper is seen unnecessary. However, in short, the trend of campaigning in the general elections in Indonesia since the time of its independence had been dominated by mass mobilization, then shifted to the saturated use of outdoor-advertising-campaigning, especially in the 2009 elections (Leiliyanti, 2013) and the amplification of social media campaigning (the 2014 up to now). The use of the Internet for the political campaign was amplified, especially in the 2012 Gubernatorial election in DKI Jakarta Province (contesting Fauzi Bowo’s camp, the incumbent, versus Joko Widodo’s). It is then accelerated in the 2014 Presidential election, when two pairs of candidates: Prabowo Subianto (hereafter Prabowo)-Hatta Rajasa and Joko
Widodo (hereafter Jokowi)-Jusuf Kalla contested. This amplification arguably stemmed, especially from when Jokowi’s camp re-deployed its cyber army in the 2012 Gubernatorial of DKI Jakarta Province. No fixed number found pertaining to the number of Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s cyber army. Nugroho and Setia (2014) noted that there are 148 Jokowi’s volunteer network, whilst Arianto (2014) noted that the total number of Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s army is 1,248. Nugroho, Setia, and Arianto are parts of Jokowi’s cyber army.

If we take a closer look on some of the candidates’s cyber army and their non-mainstream media, such as Jaringan Indonesia Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa, Blog Special Return, Sahabat Prabowo, Relawan Pendukung Prabowo, Relawan Kemenangan Prabowo Hatta, dan Relawan Pendukung Prabowo until NKRI 1, AllforOne, PKS Piyungan, iniolah.com, SelamatkanIndonesia.com, PrabowoSubianto.info, PKS.or.id, PKSPiyungan.org, PKSNongsa.org, SuaraNews.com, Voa-Islam.com, Arrahmah.com, Obor Rakyat, DakwaTuna (sic.),com. Petikan.com, InfoIndonesiaKia.com, IntrikNews.com, AsatuNews.com, DetikIslam.com, Obor Rahmatan Lil ALamin, GenerasiOptimis.org, LaskarJokowi.com, Jokowi.id, BaraNews.com. (Leiliyanti, Irawaty &Diyantari, 2017), we can identify how these two camps polarised by synthesizing and contesting the nationalist and Islamic/ist?) strands. For instance, as Lim (2017) argued that the non-mainstream media that supported Ahok (Jokowi’s long-term ally and DKI Jakarta’s Vice Governor during Jokowi’s gubernatorial administration) “arrahmahnews.com (a spoof of arrahmah.com), voa-islamnews.com (a copy of voa-islam.com), and pkspuyengan.com (a spoof of the now-defunct pkspiyungan.com)”. This reinforces the image positioning of Prabowo’s campaign (ultra)nationalist/nonauthoritarian Muslim candidates and Jokowi’s campaign (Nationalist Muslim candidates), (Mietzner, 2014, 2015, 2016; Fealy, 2016; Salamah, 2015; Woodward, 2015; Djelantik, 2016; Hamayotsu, 2014; Njoto-Feillard, 2015; Subijanto, 2014; Roosa, 2014).

Although both camps claimed themselves representing the nationalist strand, Prabowo’s camp is seen inclining to Islamisation agenda (or in Hefner’s term regimist Muslim) as Woodward (2015) argues that Prabowo is affiliated with Islamist hardliner, whilst Jokowi is framed as pious Muslim. Jokowi’s religious side had been questioned and criticized by his opponents, especially when he donned his umroh clothing, not an incorrect manner when conducting umroh a few days prior to the election. The donning arguably signified Jokowi’s overt demonstration of his Muslimness albeit the criticism. As for Prabowo, known as Suharto’s (Indonesia’s former (New Order regime) President) son-in-law, Prabowo has been adopting the centralised passive patron-client politics along with his maneuver adopting Sukarno’s (the first Indonesia’s President) nationalist attributes, such as the safari suit, peci, the suffix “–kurn”, during the campaign days. On the contrary, Jokowi represents the anti-thesis (Roosa, 2014; Subijanto, 2014; Tyson &Purnomo, 2016).

Similar to Najib Razak’s political campaign, with the support of each camp’s supporters/volunteers, Jokowi won the election in derisory percentage(53.15% votes), whilst Prabowo 46.85%. In this light, adopting Lim’s (2017) argument the use of social media in political/cultural realm represents “algorithmic enclaves” in the post-truth politics (Taspell, 2017), i.e. when the supporters/volunteers of each campaign forge an imagined community where “shared identity online” is created by overturning the facts while glorifying the emotion to defend “their beliefs and protecting their resources from both real and perceived threats”.

METHOD

As part of multi-year research funded by the Indonesia’s Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education that focuses on analyzing tweets and memes of the supporters/volunteers of the 2014 Indonesia’s Presidential candidates as well as election regulations in order to produce recommendation for public policy on political campaign in social media, this paper limits itself to discussing one tweet and one meme of each camp as the sample. This is conducted to provide concise explication that exemplifies the mechanism of the contestation of the nationalist/islamic strands on each camp. The data were randomly taken during the campaign days (4 June-5 July 2014).

The analysis of tweets is typically conducted under quantitative research design (Khairuddin &Rao, 2017). However, this paper concentrates on textual analysis of the tweets and memes deploying the Hallidayan transitivity system, and language appraisal theory and social semiotics. Hallidayan transitivity system and language appraisal theory are deployed to examine the written expressions whilst social semiotics the memes.

In the systemic functional linguistics realm, the Hallidayan transitivity system is used to scrutinize the representation system based on the clause level. The clause itself represents the flow of events or what’s-going-on of the inner and outer experiences. There are six processes in the language system that represent the experiences: material process (action verb, representing outer experience), mental process (mental verb, representing inner experience), relational process (linking verb, representing the relation of inner and outer experiences), behavioral process (representing the amalgam of physical and mental activities, such as the verb “watch”), verbal process (saying verb), and existential process (signified by the word “there”). This postulation is then developed by Martin and White (2005) into language appraisal theory and by Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006) into social semiotics.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Religious and Political Public Sentiment in Pilpres 2014 Tweets and Memes
Leiliyanti and Divantari (2016) and Leiliyanti, Irawaty, and Divantari (2017) found that the supporters/volunteers of each camp are trapped in the obscurity of negative/black campaigns. They cannot detach themselves from the complex matrix of power in which the nationalist/Islamic/(st?) strands synthesis and contest.

Below exemplifies the complexity

![Figure 1: Tweet and meme 1 (Jokowi's camp)](image)

**Table 1: Details of Tweet and meme 1 (Jokowi’s camp)**

| No. | Conjunction | Clause | Ellipsis | Process Type |
|-----|-------------|--------|----------|--------------|
| 1.  | @sahal_AS  @BurhanMuhtadi @saiful_mujani @TomiLebang Kita | laporkan Obor Rakyat, muncul lagi yg ini. Astaghfirullah >. | Verbal |
| 2.  |  |  | Relational |
| 3.  |  |  |  |

The figure 1 & table 1 shows tweet “@sahal_AS @BurhanMuhtadi @saiful_mujani @TomiLebang Kita laporkan Obor Rakyat, muncul lagi yg ini. Astaghfirullah >.” above arguably adumbrates the rebound effect from the picture that entails the tweet, i.e. the picture of Jokowi along with a tabloid cover (presumably Obor Rakyat, a controversial tabloid that is allegedly associated with Prabowo’s camp) that Jokowi supports Christians and Chinese. Tyson and Purnomo (2016) position Obor Rakyat as part of the opponent camp’s black campaign that propagated three main issues: “Jokowi as bad Muslim; Jokowi as puppet president and Jokowi is closely associated with Chinese financiers”. However, their thesis argument, i.e. Obor Rakyat merely represents rumor politics and smear campaign, was built under the framework of documentary analysis, survey and interview, especially in Surakarta, Jokowi’s hometown, needs re-examination. From the references they deployed (such as, Sunny Tanuwidjaja, Ahok’s former staff that is now revealed to be the man behind the currently established political party, Partai Solidaritas Indonesia or Indonesia’s Solidarity Party), it is shown their messianic subjective pretension that fulsomely glorified Jokowi (read: Jokowi as Ratu Adil or (Javanese) Messiah). No linguistic examination on the tabloid articles is found. They merely attempted to examine the outcomes of the tabloid by conducting a survey and interview in Surakarta. The portion to balance the image glorification is also relatively small.

Notwithstanding the fact, the Chinese and Christian association written on Obor Rakyat’s front cover has made the supporter of Jokowi furious (if not angry – that is reflected from the declarative mood of inviting the readers by deploying verbal process, i.e. reporting the tabloid (“kita laporkan Obor Rakyat” ([Let’s] report Obor Rakyat)). The next clause (relational clause) “muncul lagi yang ini (this [the association] re-emerges)” signifies the reason behind the invitation, i.e. Jasmev’s (Jokowi’s cyber troop) justification for their invitation to make the readers file a report to the police. The reason is encapsulated in the deployment of euphemistic engagement to adduce the invitation. The account which tweeted, JASMEV 2014, mentioned Sahal-AS, BurhanMuhtadi, saiful_mujani, and TomiLebang, its allies. At this point, the act of displaying the cover and posting a pertinent tweet can be seen in two folds. It represents Jokowi camp’s counter-attack (if not response) to the opponent (as Jokowi’s camp perceives that such attempt not only leads to defamation but more importantly also overt black campaign). On the other side, as Tyson and Purnomo (2016) argue that the defamation and discredit potentially boost Jokowi’s positive image.

At the end of their tweet, the Islamic expression “Astaghfirullah” which is used to ask for God’s forgiveness indicates they hope to overcome the (bad?) situation caused by Obor Rakyat, whilst overtly showing their Islamic credential. In this sense, this Islamic expression seems to be the linguistic tool to dilute their resentment.
The meme above ((Figure 2 & table 2) shows a person wearing peci did a ritual that does not comply with Islamic teaching. Without mentioning the name of the candidate (on the tweet) that is visually demonstrated bowing to a tomb, the picture visually informs us that the unmentioned-name candidate is Prabowo Subianto. JASMEV 2014 shared the meme and added a question asking the opinion of the readers pertinent to Prabowo’s act. Although the tweet is in the form of a question, it might (be used?) to lead people’s/voters’ opinion on the candidate. The statement was added with a smile that symbolizes/shows happiness (victory?).

A closer examination shows that although the peci donning culturally associates with Muslimness as well as nationalist (Leiliyanti, 2013), the highlight lies in the act of bowing (the action verb “bowing” in the material clauses) the tomb. The action verbs “sujud” and “nyembah” in this context share similar meaning “bowing”. However, this two-time deployment of a similar action verb can be seen as an act of reinforcing the defamation (the two-time deployment avers the visual act of bowing)

The meme was posted on June 14, later from the previous tweet—which was tweeted on June 7. The issue which was posted by JASMEV 2014 counters the tweet and meme that shows Jokowi supports Christians and Chinese. They deploy this issue related to religion to backfire the opponent. This is seen as imperative as the act of bowing makes Prabowo, who is framed closely associate himself as a pious Muslim, violates the Islamic teaching of bowing to a tomb in this case.
The meme above (figure 3 & table 3) demonstrates the fragmentation of Prabowo’s face along with the written text “ngomong apa sh, jok..E-Government, E-Budgeting, E gue culik lo lama-lama (What did you say, Jok..E-Government, E-Budgeting, [E] I will later to kidnap you)”. The first statement is a question that is addressed to Jokowi (the meme uses informal addressing expression called “jok”). The question asked of what “Jok” had said that are e-government and e-budgeting followed by two-level dots that (probably) show there are other “E-s” that Jokowi mentioned. The last statement(it is more like a threat) says that “E gue culik juga lo lama-lama” or in English “I will later kidnap you”. Not only does this meme give the impression that Prabowo is the one who is going to do the aforementioned criminal act (kidnapping Jokowi?), but that it also reinforces the ossification of Prabowo’s negative stigma as the one who was allegedly behind the activist abduction in May 1998 riot (Leiliyanti, 2013). Jokowi’s political platforms, the E-Government and E-Budgeting, were deployed as the bridge that linguistically rhymed with the punchline “E gue culik lo lama-lama”. The letter “E” is articulated with the long “a”, in which it does not carry any meaning instead of affirming the action (read: kidnapping/abducting). In this light, we argue that although the allegation of abducting the student activists is still disputable, his opponent also deployed a similar strategy (see the analysis of tweet 1) in propagating the (c)over black campaign, targeting on the negative side(s) of the candidate.

The above tweet (figure 4 & table 4) was taken from the Fadli Zon twitter account. Fadli Zon is one of Prabowo’s campaign team, who later becomes Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives (2014-2019). His tweet criticized Jokowi’s program, i.e. e-budgeting, — the program that had been developed during Jokowi’s Gubernatorial administration. The noun “nonsense” is used as the attribute in identifying the e-budgeting program. No further pertinent explanation found, except the media link he used as a reference.

If we relate this tweet with the previous meme, we will find that these two not only correlate (if not correspond) with each other but that they also can be seen as representing the reinforcement of negative stigma. When the previous meme was deployed to discredit Prabowo, the latter was employed to counter the opponent’s program. By this, in this context, the contestation operates by overturning the facts while glorifying the emotion as the resultant.
Fadli Zon’s tweet (figure 5 & table 5) mocks Jokowi as a “puppet presidential candidate”. Jokowi once again is attributed as a Chinese toy label. The highlight of this tweet not only lies on the puppet candidate, but more importantly also on the semantic domain of attitudes (represented by the words “kak”, “lah”, and “pantesnya(sic.)”). No linguistic parallel in English that has a similar association to these is found, probably expect for the word “pantesnya” or “properly”. The literal translation of this tweet will arguably be like “how come puppet presidential candidate participates in the presidential candidates’ debate”, “it doesn’t fit the frame”, “he’s properly Chinese toy”. The attitudes represented from the words “kak”, “lah”, and “pantesnya(sic.)” indicate the control of behavior and the taste management (Martin & White, 2005). In this sense, Fadli Zon’s linguistic attitudes demonstrate his behavioral control that represents his political disposition. The attitudes signify two folds: Zon’s linguistic illiteracy that the three-time deployment of the words shows Zon’s incompetency in articulating his political altercation. By this, he cannot control the rebound effect of his tweet in his camp and the opponents.

The four linguistic examinations above indirectly represent the religious and political public sentiments towards the two contesting camps. Each camp’s tweets and memes attempted to visually and linguistically demonstrate the contestation as well as the synthesis of one’s political strands (the Islamic and the Nationalists) that resonate with the camps’ religious-political image. At the same time, this textual discursive contestation also shows how these shared identities online of the two camps ostensibly glorified the emotion (read also: sentiments) of each camps’ supporters/volunteers rather than the facts contextualizing the texts. The evaluative lexis, such as “laporkan” ([let’s] report) and “muncul lagi yang ini” (this [the association] re-emerges) on tweet and meme demonstrate the deployment of judgment of behavior (Martin & White, 2005) in “laporkan” ([let’s] report), whilst the latter indicates the engagement element, i.e. in form of playing voices and opinions as the latter statement indicated. As for tweet and meme 2, they indicate the supporters/volunteers’ act of instantiating the germination of questioning Prabowo’s Islamic credential (through the -sub-clause “[b]bagai mana pendapat kakak kakak (sic)” or what do you think, sisters/brothers? I literally translate the word kakak-kakak into sisters/brothers, as in Indonesian context, especially in online discourse, those words are used to address the interlocutors in online platforms), i.e. his act of bowing the tomb (see: the meme. Prabowo was frequently perceived as affiliated himself with the plausible Islamic (/st?) hardliners). The proceeding clause (“klo ada Capres sujud nyembah maka seperti ini ya?:)” or seeing the presidential candidate bow to the tomb-like this?:)) affirms the indirect act of assessing behavior to Islamic normative principle of forbidding such act. As for meme 3, though the first two noun phrases (E-Government, E-Budgeting) indicate Jokowi’s campaign political programs, the punchline lies on the gallows humor, i.e. the third clause (Egue cikut juga lama-lama). As earlier discussed that not only does this humor represent the ossification of Prabowo’s stigma, but that it also indicates the projection of Prabowo’s alleged act of abducting student’s activists during the 1998 May riot. The adverb “lama-lama” or “later” functions to amplify the graduation of such phenomenon (Prabowo as the mastermind of the abduction). As for tweet 4, it represents the way Fadli Zon, one of Prabowo’s closest allies, in countering the Jokowi’s campaign attack. On this tweet, he did not provide one to one response (if not counter attack) to each opponent’s tweet attacks, but rather attacking Jokowi’s campaign by perceiving the current Indonesian president as a political puppet during the 2014 presidential debate.

By this, as implicitly indicated, this study limits itself to the discourse analysis (in this case on the textual level one) of the aforementioned tweets and memes for the Indonesian case. As for the Malaysian case, the comparative study merely concentrates on the findings from previous literature. They demonstrated different results (as previously discussed) from the use of social media platforms by the (young) electorate of these two neighboring countries.

CONCLUSION

As earlier mentioned, The use of social media in Malaysia (GE13) and Indonesia (Pilpres 2014) produced different results. Though the legislative and presidential candidates in Malaysia frequently posted on their social media platforms during the 33-day-campaign, they did not directly correlate with the level of popularity gained especially from the young electorate. This plausibly resulted from the act of overlooking the people’s collective memories of the 1998 Reform Movement and BERSIH. The public sentiments, especially the young ones in Malaysia, demonstrated that they preferred the social media platforms to bring about the political transformation that instantiated the demands of the 1998 Reform Movement which resonate with Malaysian identity.

SUGGESTION

As for the Indonesian case, the (co)ver black campaign of Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s camps operates in the framework of the contestation as well as the synthesis of the nationalist/Islamic(/st?) strands. They are deployed to be rhymed in the brand resonance the campaign team forged. A similar contesting strategy is deployed, such as countering similar religious and political issues that represent the supporters/volunteers (read also: public) sentiment in the cyberwar (in the form of utterance and visual war). The proposition of algorithmic enclave in the post-truth era seems to hold its credibility in this context.

LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD

This research is limited to one case that occurred in social media for a political campaign in Indonesia and Malaysia. Due There is a phenomenon in religious and political public sentiment towards the political campaign in social media.
IMPLICATION

The findings become the textual foundation in producing the recommendation for public policy on the political campaign in social media (in this case the Twitter). Compared to other social media platforms, Twitter was chosen as it provides limited numbers of characters for its users (especially the two main camps – Jokowi’s versus Prabowo’s camps), not only to tweet but that more importantly also the tweets represent the perennial discursive contestation of the Islamic (-/st?) versus Nationalist strands to the current 2019 elections Indonesia

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