Nexus of Military and Economic Cooperation: Japanese Challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq

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This article asks whether the Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) has helped achieve its intended objectives in peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq. The analysis shows that with the use of ODA and para-military resources provided by Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), Japanese money has been invested heavily in Afghanistan and Iraq for the past two decades, with no major signs of improvement in “human security”, which constitutes the major argument for Japan to assist peacebuilding projects abroad. Japan still seems to have a good reason to keep assisting these fragile nations, and expecting a “co-play” between ODA and JSDF to reduce the fragility.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Official Development Assistance (ODA), UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)

Introduction

A significant amount of money has been spent as Official Development Assistance (ODA) by Japan since the mid-1950s. Intended as war reparations to Southeast Asian countries victimized by Japan during the Second World War, the officially announced objectives of ODA tend to include international development issues, the topics for which vary according to specific needs and time. By the end of the 1990s, Japan had become the largest contributor of ODA in the world. After 9/11, major countries doubled and tripled military and non-military assistance to countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, with Japan currently ranking as the fourth or fifth highest contributor.

The turning point came in 2003, when the Japanese ODA Charter, the most influential policy guidance adopted by the Cabinet, was drastically revised to ensure that “peacebuilding” becomes and remains one of the central missions of ODA, alongside poverty reduction, sustained growth, and global issues. Since then, Japan has committed assistance more explicitly to international peace operations through projects in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2005, the ODA Mid-Term Policy issued operational guidelines. It defines peacebuilding as a process “to prevent the occurrence and recurrence of conflicts, alleviate the various difficulties that people face during and immediately after conflicts, and subsequently achieve long-term stable development” and underlines the importance of “human security”.

Major changes came in aid administration in 2008, when the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) became the sole implementing body for Japanese ODA under the leadership of Madame Sadako Ogata, the former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who cochaired the United Nations
Human Security Commission with Professor Amartya Sen. Peacebuilding programs were centered among the four policy directives of “reconstruction of social capital”, “reconstruction of the economy”, “recovery of governance”, and “assurance of security”. Madam Ogata broadened the concept of peacebuilding to include various forms of humanitarian assistance for developing countries under the title of “human security”. Since then, peacebuilding has also been concerned with “political and security mechanisms to address conflicts”. The new version was issued in 2015 after undergoing public consultation. In order to ensure that the new charter is easy to implement and realistic, it is important to take stock of and draw lessons from past experience. The central question in this case is very similar to one asked for public policy evaluation: To what extent has the policy achieved its intended objectives, in this case, peacebuilding?

Measuring Japanese Contributions to Peacebuilding¹

In order to address this question, it is important to understand that Japanese assistance for peacebuilding consists of two policy streams. The first is an economic and humanitarian stream of ODA, running from the ODA Charter to the Mid-Term Policy, and extending to focal points for International Cooperation, the Country Assistance Program, and the Rolling Plan. The second is the military or para-military stream of peacekeeping operations (PKO), spanning the PKO Law, Implementation Order, and Implementation Plan. The Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) serves as the main implementing body for the second stream. However, very little is known about the SDF’s contributions toward reconstruction in postwar countries. This chapter tries to shed light on the SDF’s recent efforts to coordinate between economic assistance and military or para-military operations. The noteworthy research by Collier (2007) and Collier et al. (2003) has contributed to “mainstreaming” the subject for both academic and practical circles of development, but there is virtually no contribution treating assistance from Japan as rigorously in the economics literature.

It is not straightforward to define a list of recipients of peacebuilding assistance from Japan, and there are nuanced differences among researches about the definition of peacebuilding itself. The Japanese government has pursued “human security” as the central theme of peacebuilding. Thus, efforts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity (poverty), environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organized crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees, and anti-personnel land mines are listed as peacebuilding efforts through ODA. This study uses information from the web site of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and identifies 26 countries that have received ODA from Japan in terms of “peacebuilding” or “consolidation of peace”. Two immediate observations can be made. First, a large portion of ODA was assigned to infrastructure projects in the listed countries that received considerable ODA (Iraq, Sri Lanka, etc.). The purpose of this infrastructure building, most of which was assisted via yen loans, is not limited to “peacebuilding in a narrower sense” but looks forward to the long-term building of the countries in a broader sense.

Second, in most countries, the conflict-affected area makes up only a part of the country’s territory. Examples include Aceh in Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, and the northeastern area of Sri Lanka. Therefore, only a part of the ODA to these countries can be included in the amount of ODA for peacebuilding, and this is not the case for most of the countries that receive ODA from Japan. The official data show that the amount of ODA for peacebuilding in the target countries has rapidly expanded, especially after 2006. The

¹ This section is adapted from Daimon-Sato (2015).
average amount for 1999-2005 was 789 million yen, and that for 2006-2009 was 5,283 million yen (6.7 times higher than the former period). Among the six areas of assistance, “demining” has been the priority area for the last 10 years, with Cambodia as the largest recipient. ODA for “security system management and reform” expanded after 2005, with the largest recipient being Afghanistan. However, the magnitude or effectiveness of assistance is not always captured in the costs of capital investments. One noteworthy example is the so-called “Security System Management and Reform” (SSR), which is recognized as a newly emerging important agenda point in recent years. Traditionally, Japan did not extend ODA assistance to SSR, but this has changed since 2006. One of the new features of Japan’s aid to SSR is the budgetary support provided for the salaries of the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) after 2008. Japan drastically changed its attitude towards budgetary support from negative to positive, due largely to the international pressure.

The Situation of Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries

The Situation in Afghanistan for the Past Two Decades

Even after the collapse of the Taliban administration and the election of a democratic president in Afghanistan, there have been no signs of improvements in domestic security, and many Afghans, particularly those in rural areas, have not been able to lift themselves out of extreme poverty. Since the 9/11 that happened in 2011, the US troops have stationed in Afghanistan for nearly two decades until its partial retreat in 2016, and have had to be therefore that long. As of 2021, there have been no signs of improvement in the situation in Afghanistan, and it is gradually being neglected by the world. In order to overcome this situation, it is important to recognize that Afghanistan plays an important role in regional stability and that its destabilization leads to regional instability. The US attacked Al Qaida and Taliban in 2001, but it is ironic that the US has been negotiating the terms of complete US withdrawal from Afghanistan with Taliban in around August 2019 in Doha, Qatar. The Trump Administration had promised US citizens to cut military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As such, human security (see definition below) continues to be under constant threat. This situation has led to a dependence on poppy cultivation, and disillusionment with the new “democratic” government has resulted in sympathy for the return for Taliban regime. Additionally, the problem of returning refugees and internally displaced people (IDP), who have nowhere to go, adds further pressure. The issues of insecurity rooted in poverty, poppy cultivation, and refugees not only affect Afghanistan itself, but also have a great impact on neighboring countries. To resolve the regional issues, problems in Afghanistan must be dealt with. The problem of poverty in Afghanistan has various interrelated factors, with one factor leading to another factor, and if we do not address the issue from a wholistic perspective, investments will very likely be wasted without producing the intended effects and impact. In addition, as the government in Afghanistan has insufficient tax revenue—due to the high risks of investing in the private sector, transit trade being hindered by the deteriorating security condition, and an ineffective domestic tax collection system—there is still a long way to go before it achieves public fiscal sustainability.

In the Medium-Term ODA Policy formulated in February 2005, the Japanese government defined “human security” as “focusing on individual people and building societies in which everyone can live with dignity by protecting and empowering individuals and communities that are exposed to actual or potential threats”. Assistance that is focused on “human security” is necessary since, as mentioned above, most people in Afghanistan are not in a situation where they “can live with dignity”. Therefore, keeping in mind the “four
priority issues (of poverty reduction, sustainable growth, addressing global issues, and peace-building) and the
definition of human security, in order to reduce the vulnerabilities faced by people, communities and countries”, Japan
has been providing assistance to “human security” based on the pillars of the “peace process”, “domestic
security”, and “reconstruction and humanitarian assistance” in Afghanistan, which is shifting from a period of
reconstruction to development.

To date, JICA has provided assistance to Afghanistan based on the three main pillars of “integrated
regional development centered on agricultural and rural development”, “basic human needs, such as education
and healthcare”, and “infrastructure development, such as roads”. Moreover, the Japanese government has
contributed funds to areas such as assistance for democratization and governance (support for elections, etc.),
security improvements (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR), Disbandment of Illegal Armed
Groups (DIAG), support for the police and border management, etc.), and reconstruction. The aim of these
activities is to establish peace and, at the same time, to reduce poverty and promote growth. While poverty
reduction is extremely challenging in the current security situation in Afghanistan, the government must
successfully tackle poverty before it can have the support of the people and suppress the rebel forces. In
Afghanistan, peace and poverty reduction are inseparable. In addition, long-term industrial and basic
infrastructure must be built, as a country’s ability to provide a certain level of social and economic services
through its tax revenue is contingent on the contribution of the agriculture, livestock industry, and private sector
to sustainable economic growth and on secure transit trade. Furthermore, ensuring security and reducing
poverty in Afghanistan are essential for regional stability and prosperity.

Geopolitical Importance

Afghanistan is located in the center of traffic and trade routes that connect East and South Asia—primarily
China and India—in the east, Central Asia in the north, and Iran and the Middle East in the west. Due to its
geographical position, the development of regional cooperation with neighboring countries is crucial to resolve
development issues and improve socioeconomic development in Afghanistan. In addition, if Afghanistan
tackles common regional issues by taking advantage of regional cooperation, this would likely promote peace
and stability in Afghanistan and the neighboring region, and hence, regional cooperation arguably has the
potential to play an extremely important role in the stability and development of the entire region, including the
countries around Afghanistan.

The Afghan government states the following on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “After
decades of instability, Afghanistan now has the opportunity to realize the potential of a ‘land bridge’ that
connects Central Asia, South Asia, and West Asia. If there are peace and prosperity, Afghanistan, with its
strategic location, can offer great opportunities for economic development, not only in its country but also to
neighboring countries. Afghanistan has the responsibility to work with neighboring countries to create policies
and organizational mechanisms to transform this potential into concrete regional projects.” Thus, it is the wish
of the Afghans to live in harmony with neighboring countries, a natural desire when we consider the country’s
history.

From another perspective, Pakistan, a neighboring country, has many commonalities with Afghanistan, in
terms of religion, culture, and ethnicity. It also shares a long border and has mutual political and economic
interests. To bring about the stabilization of security and long-term development in Afghanistan, greater
attention must be given to its relationship with Pakistan and an integrated effort to address common issues,
such as development around the border. The Afghan government also recognizes that the range of regional cooperation within the framework of Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) (trade and investment, resource development, refugees, crime, smuggling of drugs and weapons, etc.) cannot be achieved without the cooperation of regional partners, particularly Pakistan.

Japan has been providing assistance directed at reconstruction development in Afghanistan since 2002 and will continue to provide support following the development strategy, which is based on the official formulation of ANDS in April 2008. Moreover, Japan has been supporting the framework for cooperation in this region, such as hosting a “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue with Central Asian countries in 2006. With regard to future support for Afghanistan, it is vital to consider its socioeconomic development from the perspective of regional cooperation. In March 2009, the Obama Administration in the United States also announced a new diplomatic and aid policy for Afghanistan and the surrounding region, and shifts taken by the United States will be important factors for Japan when considering the support measures for Afghanistan.

The Need for Multilevel Support

Challenges are mounting in Afghanistan. These are mainly due to weaknesses in governance structures in the aspects of: (i) law and order, (ii) industrial infrastructure, and (iii) human resources, and as a result, there is limited domestic integration (nation-building) as the government lacks the ability to provide key services to its people, and at the same time, integration with neighboring countries as well as the international economy (globalization) is not progressing. These vulnerabilities cannot be overcome without commitment from three levels—not only the effort of the Afghan people themselves, but also the cooperation of bordering countries and countries in the region, as well as the cooperation and support of the international community.

The definition of law and order, narrowly speaking, means that there is fair enforcement of government policies based on the legal system. Anyone who disrupts public order will be punished according to law. In certain cases, the police force is mobilized to maintain security. This premise, which is a given in nations ruled by law, does not apply in Afghanistan. Drug cultivation, which is supposed to be an illegal act, has become a source of funds for Taliban rebels, and drugs are smuggled across borders to neighboring countries and the international community. The country’s own police force is unable to maintain security, and the country depends on the military power of foreign countries. Although the United Nations has approved the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), it is effectively under the direction of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Neighboring countries need to unite and take border measures to contain transnational crime, including the leakage of drugs and terrorist activities. Otherwise, it will induce a chain-reaction, harming neighboring countries and even encouraging international terrorist activities (e.g., the 9/11 incident and subsequent terrorist attacks worldwide). Therefore, in order to break the “international chain of security deterioration”, it is essential to establish systems of cooperation system not only at a domestic level within Afghanistan, but also with neighboring countries and the international community. This is why international donors, including Japan, are obliged to tackle the Afghanistan issue.

Neighboring countries have ties of varying strengths with Afghanistan; however, it is inextricably linked with Pakistan, which once supported the rapid growth of the Taliban, and both countries are also known as “Af-Pak”. The move of the Taliban forces to Pakistan after being expelled from Afghanistan is evidence of this close relationship. Pakistan’s domestic stability depends on the extent of control it exerts over its powerful military and its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). How is the President of Pakistan going
to deal with rebel forces such as the Taliban? The situation is unpredictable. The Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008, in which a terror group from Pakistan is said to have been involved, and the Lahore police academy attacks in April 2009 discredited the current administration’s ability to maintain security. In the race against India, Pakistan conducted a nuclear test in the 1990s and has become a nuclear-armed state along with India. The White House’s white paper on the US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New Comprehensive Strategy) recognizes that Pakistan together with Afghanistan should not be isolated and the importance of strengthening support for both countries from a multifaceted perspective.

If weak law and order is the fundamental problem in Afghanistan, challenges to its economic base and labor force exacerbate the situation. Afghanistan still does not have an economic base to serve as a main source of foreign currency. This is also the reason that people cultivate drugs—an illegal source of cash income. Although natural gas and mineral resources have been found underground in Afghanistan, the country lacks the technical capabilities as well as the facilities and transportation infrastructure to mine, process, and transport them to the destination. Although there are regional initiatives such as transit agreements and common tariffs with neighboring countries, Afghanistan has not been able to play its role as a “land bridge” that its government publicizes, and this is the factor that hinders investment activities by multinational corporations drawn to the natural resources in Central Asia and seeking to enter the region, as shown in the example of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, a scheme that is barely moving forward. This is related to the lack of infrastructure in Afghanistan, as well as the weaknesses in integration and connectivity with the surrounding and international markets. The idea of promoting economic recovery by incorporating the Afghan economy into the regional economy has been recognized as being a part of the Bonn process that started in 2002. Though this idea had already been raised in a declaration of Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA)—which was started under the initiative of Afghanistan—Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS), and ANDS, in reality, there is still a long way to go as the interests (military strategy, domestic situation, and economic interests) of great powers—the United States, Russia, India (and recently, China)—in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and surrounding countries (Iran, Central Asia) are in conflict.

Afghanistan is placed at the lowest levels, compared to other countries, of the Human Development Index in terms of its poverty rate, illness and mortality rate, literacy rate, and the gender index, which points to its weak labor force. An endless stream of people from the economically poor class who do not possess the required level of skills to earn an income are deprived of employment opportunities, which are already scarce, due to deteriorating security and droughts, and move to Iran or Pakistan as economic refugees. Economic refugees are an economic and social burden for neighboring countries, but if they simply deport them, these countries will be severely criticized by the international community. In order to strengthen Afghanistan’s human capital and prevent the outflow of economic refugees, such measures are essential: implementation of a safety net policy, including poverty measures, and unemployment and employment measures (e.g., restoration of irrigation facilities in rural areas, promotion of agriculture and agricultural product processing, and securing of employment by means of vocational training); increasing access to education and health care; and integration of refugees into communities. However, support from neighboring countries is also needed to bring back refugees who have left the country (e.g., providing education consistent with the education curriculum in Afghanistan, and providing vocational training for refugees as well as repatriation lump-sum payments on the premise of them returning).
National integration is a process that depends on the will of the people who identify themselves as Afghans and are willing to live on their land. The formation of a national identity requires policies for people at the lowest economic strata and the training of people from the middle and upper classes who will take on the actual work of nation-building as government officers, politicians, engineers, police officers, and military personnel. Afghanistan lacks a labor force that can take on these responsibilities. In the past, there were Afghans who studied overseas in countries such as Uzbekistan during the Soviet occupation. However, in recent years, more and more of the next generation of government officials are studying in India. President Karzai himself studied at a university in India. Regional cooperation of this nature in higher education is also beneficial.

**Direction of Cross-Regional Cooperation**

The long-term objective of cross-regional cooperation centered on Afghanistan is to promote mutual positive spillovers in the region in areas such as harmonization of systems, economic growth, and transfer of technology, through trade expansion and increased investments in the regional economy. For this reason, stabilization of the situation in neighboring countries is extremely important for landlocked countries, both in terms of the market and to secure routes to export destinations. However, in the current situation, Afghanistan and Pakistan are not receiving positive spillover effects and are, instead, creating negative spillovers such as increased costs of transportation. In addition, from a short-term perspective, some countries around Afghanistan (especially Central Asian countries) are concerned that strengthening connectivity with these two countries might lead to negative effects such as deteriorating security and an influx of refugees, and they are not willing to engage in furthering ties.

In general, an economic disadvantage of landlocked countries is that they are geographically dependent on neighboring countries for access to export ports. In order to mitigate the disadvantages, it is necessary to conclude agreements on transit trade with neighboring countries, as well as to improve regulation issues such as the reduction and elimination of intra-regional tariffs and to improve the infrastructure to access export ports. The alternative would be to develop measures that offer advantages or incentives for neighboring countries to conduct economic activities with the affected countries. An example is the establishment of a special economic zone to provide tax incentives for foreign investments.

Through a regional cooperation system, regional security can be achieved by providing region-specific public goods, such as measures on security, the environment, infectious diseases, and management of natural resources, as well as by developing regional solidarity based on common languages and a shared culture. In particular, as terrorist groups, which affect the deteriorating security condition, are suspected of raising money from dealing in the global drug market, it is necessary to eradicate this source of funding. Therefore, it is necessary to prohibit money laundering and to closely monitor the situation to find out if international funds that flow into Afghanistan are related to drug dealings, and regional information sharing is thus essential.

**Support Strategies for Neighboring Countries in the Region**

Afghanistan, as well as neighboring countries will mutually benefit from regional cooperation. Moreover, providing support to neighboring countries will also benefit Afghanistan. However, neighboring countries adopt different positions in relation to regional cooperation involving Afghanistan, due to various circumstances and contexts. It is therefore necessary to consider a support strategy for regional cooperation in line with the circumstances of neighboring countries.
In recent years, profitable infrastructure has been developed in many developing countries based on Public-Private Partnership (PPP) and Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) models that utilize private capital and technology. However, the central and local government continues to take on the building of low profitability infrastructure (especially in rural and poor areas) as public projects if many people require them. As for cross-regional infrastructure, assessing the needs (in particular, the impact on rural areas and the poor, and the job creation effect) and profitability is necessary in order to be able to choose the best way to provide support from a variety of options. At the same time, it is necessary to not only develop the infrastructure, but also improve related systems and policies. For example, simplifying customs clearance procedures, similar to developing roads across borders, reduce transportation costs. In addition, when infrastructure is developed, attention should be paid to the interests of local residents (in particular, a situation may arise in which monopoly profits are pursued when infrastructure is developed in an area [rent-seeking], and a conflict of interest results in an unfavorable event), and considerations have to be given to the resettlement of people and the environment.

Japan has a track record of providing ODA loans for infrastructure development in Central Asia, South Asia, and Iran, and this knowledge and experience should be tapped on to develop a cross-regional network.

Road. After the collapse of the Taliban administration in Afghanistan, priority was placed on completing cross-regional roads that connect to the great Ring Road and the borders; improving national roads, state roads, and roads within cities; and alleviating poverty in rural areas and increasing access to markets by improving local roads. The construction of all sections of the cross-regional roads within Afghanistan was slated for completion by 2010, but the construction is still incomplete to date. Regarding connectivity across the borders, Afghanistan shares eight border points with neighboring countries. However, in some parts of the North-South route (Central Asia and Afghanistan), bridges have not been constructed, and transportation requires ferries (e.g., the Shair Khan Bandar at the Tajikistan border). Moreover, further developments are needed as bridges that were built during the Soviet era are old and the rail system in certain areas lacks the standards required of future rail transportation.

When developing roads to strengthen connectivity with neighboring countries, an integrated development that incorporates access to export ports and port development is necessary. For example, the main road that connects Uzbekistan to Iran via Afghanistan is currently being planned for development, and the export disadvantages of inland countries will be reduced only if access from the main road in Iran to the export port is secured. Additionally, the development of the roads is expected to have a synergistic effect when a port terminal equipped with facilities that can efficiently load import and export containers is developed. In other words, the concurrent development of the infrastructure built with the same purpose as that of the cross-regional road network leads to such synergistic effects.

These synergies can be extended not only to the concurrent development of infrastructure that shares the same purpose, but also to the development of non-infrastructure projects. This includes the development of systems such as simplified customs clearance procedures. It is necessary to keep an open mind about options such as developments in the social sector, including the building of schools and hospitals, development of industrial parks and industrial clusters, and different combinations of the above with road infrastructure. Here, there is a need for organic coordination between compensated, voluntary, and technical support.

Rail Transport. Compared to other modes of transportation, railways can handle mass transportation and is environmentally friendly. Development should occur in a way that exploits the comparative advantage of railways. For example, mineral resources can be considered as Afghanistan’s future industrial base, and to cater
to this, a route to transport mined stones to domestic and overseas processing factories would be necessary. In addition, with a view of trade between India and Central Asia increasing in the future, there are high hopes for railways to safely transport large quantities of goods in both directions.

Rail transport has been the main means of transport in Central Asia since the Soviet era, and the railway network has been well established in both India and Pakistan. Currently, there is no railway network in Afghanistan, but there are some railways that are completed and connect the borders with neighboring countries, such as the Herat-Sangan (Iranian border) Line. In the future, the Iran-Afghanistan Line, Iran-Pakistan Line, Uzbekistan-Afghanistan Line, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan Line, and Chinese Border-Afghanistan Line are routes in the railway network that should be strengthened. However, unlike roads, the railway track gauges are different in South Asia (1,676 mm), the former Soviet Union (1,520 mm), and Iran (1,435 mm). Therefore, since it is not possible to run the train by simply connecting the tracks, it is necessary to replace the railroad truck at the border (as is currently done on the Moscow-Europe route). A railroad truck replacement facility is essential when the areas around Afghanistan are connected by rail.

In order to establish a railway network with neighboring countries, it is necessary to first establish a railway network in Afghanistan. Currently, in Afghanistan, there is an F/S for the construction of railway from Kabul to Islam Qala in the east and from Kandahar to Herat in the west and a F/S for the construction of railway from Hairatan to Herat and from Shirkhan Bandar to Mazari Sharif to Herat. The concept for the future railway network must consider these projects as a starting point. Should railways be developed in Afghanistan in the future, assuming that the results of the F/S indicate a potential for profitability, examples of possible projects for neighboring countries include provision of technical support to reform the railway sector and yen loans to Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asian countries to procure railway wagons (Japan already has a record of providing these loans to Pakistan, India, etc.). (However, in Pakistan, due to inefficient management, there has been a significant decline in Pakistan Railway’s share of passenger and freight transport, and the current financial situation has resulted in a large chronic deficit. Therefore, fundamental improvements in the management of the national railway [plan for reform] are a prerequisite for support.)

Electricity. Traditionally, electricity has been mutually traded in Central Asian countries. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan also sell electricity to Afghanistan. The consumption of the bought electricity comprises about one quarter of Afghanistan’s domestic electric consumption. In order to deal with the shortage of power supplied in Afghanistan, there is a need not only to build power generation facilities in Afghanistan, but to also promote power sales contracts with neighboring countries and to develop power transmission facilities in and outside Afghanistan.

Furthermore, in order to achieve power transmission from Central Asia to Pakistan and India via Afghanistan (CASA-1000 Plan), in addition to developing power generation and transmission facilities in Afghanistan, development and enhancement of power generation facilities in Central Asia are required. Although the CASA Plan ranks differently among the priorities of the countries involved in the Plan, there is a growing momentum to promote it as a medium- to long-term plan.

Natural Gas. Among the international donors, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has taken the lead in developing and promoting the F/S for the TAPI gas pipeline project. On the basis of Japan’s assistance, the possible and appropriate forms of cooperation for TAPI, such as private investments, ODA (financial and technical cooperation), and Other Official Flows (OOF) should be examined, and if necessary, preparations for the assistance will begin.
The major obstacle to realizing the TAPI is the fact that its pipeline runs through the areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan with the poorest security. If there is no chance that security will improve in the future, it may be necessary for Japan to find ways to implement the project, including assessing alternative routes that avoid areas with poor security.

**Support for Pakistan**

Pakistan is an ally of China, and Japan’s support for Pakistan is strategically important to prevent the country from relying too heavily on China. Afghanistan’s problems are inseparable from Pakistan, but if Pakistan, a nuclear state, was to be isolated internationally, the damage to the local economy and the international community would be incomparably greater than if Afghanistan was isolated. At a Donors Conference held in April 2009 in Tokyo, a total of US$5.28 billion of support for Pakistan from 40 participating countries (including US$1 billion from both Japan and the United States, US$640 million from the EU, and US$700 million from Saudi Arabia) was announced. Pakistan’s priorities in terms of development are security issues, especially the rapid rise of radical forces, such as the neo-Taliban, that are carrying out terrorist activities in and outside Pakistan. Based on the fact that radical forces are concentrated in specific areas (FATA/NWFP/Balochistan), focused support should be directed toward the areas and fields of high priority.

Pakistan provides most of Afghanistan’s import and export routes to third countries and also gains various direct and indirect economic benefits (port use fees, custom clearance charges, transport-related businesses, etc.) by the passing of imports and exports between Afghanistan and third countries. As such, Pakistan’s priorities lie in the strengthening of security around the borders and main route as well as in the development and expansion of transportation infrastructure and the development of related infrastructure (port, etc.). In addition, arrangements to reduce the costs of logistics from Afghanistan and Central Asia to India (such as loosening traffic regulations for transportation trucks) will be necessary.

**Iran**

Japan’s support for Iran demonstrates that it has a different approach from the United States in its foreign policy toward Iran. It is necessary for Japan to resume full-scale assistance at some point while observing the trend of the United States foreign policy toward Iran under the Trump administration. With this in mind, the provision of assistance to Afghanistan should prioritize the granting of incentives (vocational training, repatriation lump-sum payments, etc.) to bring refugees back (including economic refugees), prevention of drug smuggling by strengthening border security, development of infrastructure (road and port) and systems (customs clearance procedures and transit agreements) in order to increase mutual access with outside markets including the Indian market via Iran from the Afghanistan border (west side).

Furthermore, many Afghans in Iran are generally more likely to be educated and have skills (carpentry, plumbing, electrical work, etc.) compared to many Afghan refugees who still remain in Pakistan. However, the biggest problem is that the skilled returnees from Iran will re-enter Iran because they are unable to secure a job in Afghanistan. Incidentally, in Mashhad, a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) has been providing courses (on computers, English, etc.) for Afghans and Iranians in coordination with the Iranian government for many years.

**India**

India is sensitive about foreign countries providing large amounts of assistance to Pakistan, and Pakistan is wary of India becoming powerful and exerting a strong influence in South Asia. Therefore, assistance to India
should contribute to improving the relationship between India and Pakistan. This is because one can assume that such assistance to India would have a positive effect on the interactions between Afghanistan and India. India is eager to secure natural resources (especially oil and natural gas) around the Caspian Sea in the future for economic reasons, and in this respect, India and Pakistan share a common interest. Japan should consider how it could best (monetary and technical support, etc.) contribute to the elusive gas pipeline projects.

Central Asian Countries

The focus of aid provided to the Central Asian countries after the collapse of the former Soviet Union was to facilitate the transition to a market economy; but since the 9/11 incident, their position as a strategic base for countries providing assistance to Afghanistan has strengthened. As part of the initiative to provide this assistance, since 2004, regional cooperation has been promoted to resolve regional issues, such as drugs, terrorism, environment, energy, water, transportation, trade, and investment, based on the framework of “Central Asia plus Japan”. Furthermore, at the second “Central Asia plus Japan” meeting in June 2006, which representatives from Afghanistan also attended to, it was confirmed that the ODA would be used to address these regional issues. In the future, in cooperation with organizations such as Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), the connectivity of the North-South route should be improved by providing regional public goods such as regional infrastructure and systems.

Regional Cooperation in the Area of Human Security

Security. The biggest obstacle to regional cooperation centered on Afghanistan is the security of the Af-Pak region. In several Central Asian countries, the reality is that Islamic extremist groups threaten domestic security, and this is a factor that prevents these countries from engaging in further interactions with Afghanistan. Under these circumstances, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has signed an intra-regional agreement on security and has been sharing information on border security and crime data. In the future, while maintaining conventional efforts such as border security, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation with existing regional organizations (Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)) in order to strengthen and expand regional cooperation on security.

Furthermore, it is necessary to facilitate the reconciliation process through UN agencies or regional cooperation organizations. In such a case, it would be extremely important to carefully select mediators seen to be neutral from the perspective of the rebels rather than from only the United States. The ability of one country—Afghanistan—is limited in preventing the “international chain of security deterioration” referred to at the beginning. Additionally, even if routine measures are repeatedly taken, including those that involve the military as well as the police forces, it will be difficult to improve the situation without addressing the root cause. This may be the right time for Japan to make the most of its neutral status and step forward in the process of reconciliation with the rebel forces, in addition to the standard measures, including DIAG, that Japan has been working on.

Measures Against Drugs. Drugs are a source of funding for terrorists and are inextricably linked to security issues. The region that covers southern Afghanistan to the border of Pakistan has the largest share of drug cultivation, and this region is an area with weak security (area with weak law and order). According to a survey conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the reasons for cultivating drugs are: “to earn a higher income (compared to earnings from other crops)” (53%); “poverty (as there is no other source of income)” (32%); and “lax government controls” (7%). Though this reason ranked third, it
suggests that the cultivation of drugs is related to the government’s ability to maintain security. Afghanistan has been adopting many anti-drug measures. However, it is first necessary to strengthen the border security of Afghanistan and neighboring countries and to increase surveillance so that drugs cannot be smuggled out of Afghanistan. In some cases (though this is not necessarily what Japan should do), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or drug-specific surveillance teams could be placed around the border to further strengthen measures to prevent smuggling at the water’s edge. For this purpose, it is necessary to share information and know-how within the region and to create a system that prevents drugs from flowing out of Afghanistan as soon as possible.

The price of drugs traded inside Afghanistan is in a general state of decline compared to the price of drugs in 2005, and there has been a significant dip in the trade price in the western region. In the north, the trade price has been lower in comparison to other regions; however, the prices in regions that had a relatively high trade price in 2005 are dropping to the level of those in the north region. As if in synchrony with this trend, as of 2009, the “zero drug cultivation” regions have been expanding, particularly in the region around western and northern Afghanistan, and it has been reported that cultivation in the south has declined as well. This situation suggests that there are fewer incentives for drug growers to cultivate drugs when the drug trade price drops, given the level of risk involved. In other words, “If there is no buyer, there are no benefits from cultivation”.

All these suggest that strengthening of regulations aimed at those on the demand-side of drugs is needed, and it is particularly important to increase the monitoring of incoming money flow for the purpose of the drug trade (money laundering). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has led efforts to counter money laundering (support for the development of the judicial system, training of administrative officials, holding of workshops, etc.), and Japan’s contribution, such as in providing technical assistance in line with the UNODC’s work in Afghanistan, will be of value.

**Integration Into the Regional Economy**

When the economy in the region picks up and economic activities in the region and in Afghanistan are integrated, it is not only the movement of goods that will increase, but also the movement of people. For Afghan workers with limited employment opportunities in their own country, it is natural for them to seek higher wages in the regional labor market, and the Afghan economy benefits from the remittances sent to their families in the country. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the rectification of the current situation, in which money is sent through informal routes, and the development of a financial market, through which Afghans living overseas can easily send money (e.g., simplification of remittance procedures, tax incentives and fee reductions, etc.), would result in the inflow of private funds from overseas and lead to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the future. At the RECCA Islamabad meeting held in May 2009, it was confirmed that the Afghan Central Bank would receive support to establish a system that promotes formal remittances to Afghanistan. It is also possible for Japan to send experts and conduct training to improve the financial market in Afghanistan.

In terms of the movement of people, for neighboring countries, while the inflow of workers from Afghanistan (especially unskilled workers) provides cheap labor, there is a concern about the social and economic impact that may arise when foreign laborers remain in their countries for a long period of time. In particular, as is evident in Iran and Pakistan, Afghan laborers who become economic refugees after moving into these countries amid chaotic circumstances are a huge burden on the regional society in areas such as security.
In the context of Afghanistan, it is necessary to actively recruit foreign workers in the short term due to a shortage of skilled workers and engineers. In fact, the Afghan government issued work permits to about 18,000 people a year around 2006-2007 in order to meet their labor demands. To summarize, in the short term, as neighboring countries require cheap labor and Afghanistan needs to recruit skilled foreign workers and engineers, an agreement in the region or between two countries regarding labor migration to create a mechanism that benefits both parties would have value. Such an agreement was proposed at RECCA in May 2009.

However, from a long-term perspective and in view of the development of Afghanistan’s economy, it is essential that the Afghans who have acquired higher-level skills overseas return to the country to assume critical roles within the government and the private sector. More than a few countries have engaged these returnees to achieve economic development, such as Indonesia, China, and in the past, Japan. At the above RECCA meeting, the enhancement of the skills development program to obtain the required technology and skills was also proposed. In addition, there is potential in creating a mechanism for Afghans to acquire skills through On-the-Job-Training (OJT) in places such as the private sector in Pakistan and Iran, and to bring them back.

**Japan’s Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (HRA) in Iraq**

It is well known that Japanese Government under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who was considered to be closer to the US President George Bush personally, participated in post-Iraq War reconstruction efforts both economically and militarily. Globally Japan pledged: (a) maximum US$5 billion in reconstruction assistance, (b) personnel contributions by the Self Defense Forces (SDF), (c) debt relief, and (d) technical assistance (capacity building.) For the first time in the post-WWII history, SDF was sent to war-torn areas where the uncertainty is still largely present, and also the first case in which ODA cooperated with SDF. An SDF contingent was dispatched to Al-Samawah of Iraq that had been left out of earlier development, where the basic livelihoods of locals there had been highly devastated due to civil wars. It was known that Al-Samawah was the poorest province in Iraq and had the highest unemployment rate, meaning that there was a high demand for economic development.

**ODA Activities in Al-Samawaharea**

Members of the SDF contingent provided technical assistance for medical personnel at four major hospitals, technical training to ambulance personnel, and technical training managing pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical warehouses. These operations led to the early recovery of a basic medical infrastructure and improved overall emergency medical capability in Al-Samawah.

In addition, water supply services provided through the SDF contingent camp helped solve water shortage at early stage of the post-conflict recovery.

**Cooperation Between SDF Operations and ODA Activities**

The initial recovery efforts by SDF were done in a good cooperation with Japan’s ODA activities. For example, the water pipeline chart in Al-Samawah and other facilities, as sited initially by SDF, including the terminal water pipeline, were eventually followed by UNDP as Assistance through Multilateral Institutions (Multilateral Assistance), an ODA function. These collaborative activities vastly improved the water supply system in Al-Muthanna Province. The SDF contingent and MOFA staff in Al-Samawah City complemented each other through mutual cooperation.
International Coordination

At that time in Iraq, the United States and the United Kingdom had been carrying out civil-military operations. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) team and the Department for International Development (DfID) team were deployed to the area of responsibility of the US Armed Forces and the UK Armed Forces. However, its operations were implemented by operating a civilian-military division of labor; the operations by the forces did not attempt to relate with the activities by the development teams.

Cooperation between the SDF contingent operations and the ODA activities was very different from that practiced by the operations and activities of the United States, the United Kingdom in the sense that the military was deeply involved in the details of the “development” in the case of Japan. And such cooperation has become one of the good examples that have produced a good circulation as a factor to stabilize the security.

Added point for lessons learned from Iraq is that the decision of dispatch of SDF was taken very promptly by political will by Koizumi Cabinet at that time. The HRA for Iraq, as it was undertaken in the unstable period immediately after the war ended, was totally different from previous United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO). In the previous UNPKO, cooperation between the SDF operations and the ODA activities was absent or very informal at best. For Iraq, however, the HRA was quick because of the Iraq Special Measures Law supported by all parties including the opposition parties.

The cooperation between SDF and ODA in Iraq became a model case for post-conflict peace-building cooperation in Japan. In less-developed areas and especially immediately affected by conflicts, it is critical to facilitate developments implemented by civilians while maintaining secured condition by armed forces as in Iraq. Moreover, if the armed forces are capable of fostering development in such an environment, they will also be able to break the vicious cycle of deteriorating security and delays in development. In the past, roles that armed forces had played in international peace operations had been generally limited to those civilians cannot do; such as maintaining security and monitoring cease-fires. However, in a non-permissive environment, there may be a case that civilians cannot provide development assistance even supported by military. This is one of the challenges that must be met to effectively implement peace operations like cases in Iraq.

Conclusions

Even though civilian development actors ideally supervise and survey on-site of construction works by themselves, they become unfit in a non-permissive environment. Therefore, development works by armed forces, such as the SDF contingent, become effective complement to fill the gaps of civilians’ absence. Armed force is able to share military information closely related to security that is impossible to obtain by the civilians. Therefore, it is safer for civilian actors to implement operations with military support than to do them alone.

Though SDF-ODA cooperation became an example for Haiti in 2011, when the country was hit by a big earthquake, and SDF-ODA worked together as a team, this teamwork has declined recently. As of 2019, the number of Japanese personnel to UNPKO is among the lowest, while there is a constant increase in UPKO personnel by China. China has contributed significantly to the UNPKO activities in the past, more than 100 times of personnel has been sent from China than from Japan.

Apparently, China has no intention to use UNPKO politically for their own benefits. They are purely in pursuit of contribution to UNPKO. If this is true, then there is no point that Japan and China compete with each other but they should collaborate more with each other to achieve one of the main objectives of SDGs, which is peacebuilding.
Peace is not built in a day, but addressing state fragility is a step forward to mitigate conflict risks, though it does not guarantee the sustainability of institutional stability or rule of law. In the short run, there might be some positive correlation between foreign aids and peacebuilding. Police reforms to achieve community-based and human rights-focused policing have been achieved through taking certified courses offered by the technical assistance.

In terms of complementarity between economic and military assistance, this article has suggested that given that some kind of cooperation between ODA and non-ODA operations have joint or multiplier effects on statebuilding, it remains to be seen more robust analysis with hard evidence. Aid effectiveness is to a large extent an empirical question. Hopefully, this study has helped to shed light on key aspects of economic and military cooperation to establish peacebuilding in the post-conflict circumstance.

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