Deep K-TSVM: A Novel Profiled Power Side-Channel Attack on AES-128

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ABSTRACT The appearance of deep neural networks for Side-Channel leads to strong power analysis techniques for detecting secret information of physical cryptography implementations. Generally, deep learning techniques do not suffer the difficulties of template attacks such as trace misalignment. However, the generalization of a trained deep neural network that can accurately predict Side-Channel leakages largely depends on its adjustable variables (parameters of a neural network). Although pre-training is no longer mandatory, it is needed for parameter selection of a deep neural network to improve the success rate and provide a better insight into the network’s inner functionality. In this paper, we propose a novel model via Twin support vector with a deep kernel approach when targeting a hardware implementation of AES-128. The proposed model is pre-trained with the Restricted Boltzmann Machine method in a layer-wise manner and then fine-tuned via gradient descent. Further, we used the grid search technique for the selection of each hyperparameter which is used to compute class probabilities of every test trace in our deep model based side-channel attack. Based on our analysis and experiments, this model empirically shows its effectiveness by outperforming some of its competitors in profiling attack methods such as convolutional neural networks and multilayer perceptron models. We also evaluate our model on both masked and unmasked AES implementation. The results indicate that the proposed approach has achieved a success rate of greater than 99% even with a single trace using Keras library with Tensorflow. We investigate the correct “key rank” according to the number of traces; our model reaches the key rank ≤ 10 when attacking the third AES SBox.

INDEX TERMS Hardware security, side-channel analysis, deep learning, machine learning, profiling attacks, twin SVM, RBM, kernel function.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the field of security and cryptography, Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) is a powerful attack that benefits from any leakage of a system such as power consumption and electromagnetic (EM) radiations, to retrieve the secret information [1]. Power-based side-channel attacks, according to how much they have access to the device under the attack (victim device), are categorized into non-profiling [2] or profiling attacks [3], [4]. Non-profiled side-channel attacks include statistical calculations on the power consumption of a device under the attack to retrieve the secret key. Profiled side-channel attacks assume the attacker has complete control on a copy version of the victim device to measure an infinite number of side-channel traces. Then the attacker classifies the leakages based on obtained data correlation and provides a predictive model to retrieve secret information of a new device.

One popular subset of profiling attacks is template attack (TAs) [5], in which an adversary is able to retrieve the secret information even with few traces of data. The attack phase is defined in two stages. The first stage creates a template for the operation of a copy version of the victim device by an infinite number of power traces and known different secret keys and public data. The second stage retrieves the key of a victim device using the template of the first stage with a small number of traces from the victim device. In high dimensional side-channel attacks, building a leakage model becomes difficult, hence, the points of interest are extracted from traces in order to have more informative kinds of traces. Note that each trace generally includes a large number of sample points which make the attack very costly, hence points of interest are selected which are samples with the most informative leakage from the device. Another powerful subset of profiling
attacks is a side-channel attack that uses Machine Learning (ML) approaches [3]. Exploring and studying machine learning techniques in unmasked and masked side-channel attacks implementation show that this approach enhances attack accuracy and is more efficient when compared to standard profiled attacks. However, the main drawback of this technique is the need for human processing to find the most informative data.

In order to extract the point of interest in machine learning algorithms, several dimension reduction techniques including Principal Component Analysis (PCA) can be employed and Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA). PCA is also a common approach in SCA to reduce the amount of noise in the traces by keeping high variance data. The PCA generally transforms the dataset and fits with the training dataset.

With the emergence of big data, deep learning (DL) techniques have been assumed to outperform other profiling attack techniques as they learn patterns from the raw data themselves and identify features automatically without extensive statistical analysis. Cagli et al. [6] utilized deep neural networks to retrieve cryptographic secret information by investigating convolutional neural networks (CNNs). They attacked the AES masked with a jitter-based countermeasure and tried to deal with the trace misalignment by considering data augmentation in their convolutional neural network. Kim et al. [7] come up with a technique to overcome the misalignment problem. They solved the problem by inserting noise to the input traces or inserting random delays through dummy operation.

Although these publications provide a good insight on how to deal with side-channel attacks challenges using deep learning models, none of them have investigated the relation between initial parameters and the pre-training stage for generalization problems.

In most side-channel attacks when targeting AES-128, an attacker targets a subkey (one byte) and not the whole 128-bit (16 bytes) key. After finding one subkey, the attacker only needs to repeat his attack 15 more times to recover the remaining 15 bytes. Usually, in security papers [8], [9], authors only explained their methods and results on subkey; since the rest can be recovered in the same manner/technique. Figure 1 shows a diagram of a side-channel attack on one of the rounds of AES-128 cryptosystem using a neural network. AES encrypts 16 bytes of plaintext in several steps. The first step is SubBytes, where each byte of plaintext is replaced with a value from a lookup table, called SBox. Then the replaced value is passed through the second step named Shift Rows, in which each row is shifted except the first row which remains unchanged. Next, the MixColumns step is applied to combine the four bytes in each column, and then each byte is combined with a byte of the key in the Add Round Key step.

In this work, we propose a novel and powerful deep learning model, “Deep Kernel learning Twin Support vector machine” (Deep K-TSVM) classifier. We apply our 256-class deep model against both masked and unmasked AES-128 implementations. Our proposed model successfully breaks the cryptographic implementation using just one trace of the target device. Further, we study how generalization affects the performance of the attack. We pre-train a 256-class deep model with a deep Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) for the initial weight of the neural network. In addition, we use grid search technique for proper choice of hyperparameters to prevent over or under-fitting problems.

In summary, our main contributions are as follows:

- We propose a novel deep learning model which provides an efficient combination of deep neural networks and TSVM. The learning stage of the model carries out in two phases of pre-training with the RBM method and fine-tuning with the help of gradient descent.
- The proposed model is able to effectively break the cryptographic implementation even with a single trace. Our results indicate that the proposed model outperforms state-of-the-art techniques such as CNNs, NeuroSVM, and Multilayer perceptron (MLP) based attacks.
- We evaluate the impact of the hyperparameter selection in the generalization of our deep model. We also demonstrate how good is the effect of pre-training in the performance of the model.
- We investigate the correct key candidate from sorted probabilities of each possible value in the Identity (ID) leakage model and discuss that these probabilities. We also discuss how the information of these probabilities can be considered as a valid metric to evaluate deep model-based side-channel attacks.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the Preliminaries and related works to conduct profiling side-channel attacks. Section III describes datasets that have been used to examine our method. Section IV explains the details of our proposed novel model “Deep K-TSVM”. In Section V, we discuss numerical calculations and experiments to examine the performance of the proposed model. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section VI.

II. PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORK
Since our work aims to improve the generalization of deep neural network models based on side-channel attacks, in this
section, we take a brief look at related publications on this topic in the recent few years. We also review some recent studies about supervised learning models including support vector machine (SVM) based side-channel attacks.

A. PROFILED SCA APPROACHES

Deep learning based side-channel attack models is a group of profiling attacks in which different factors easily affect their accuracy. Hence, there are alternative metrics for evaluating the success rate of the deep neural networks when attacking the victim device. In Table 1, the table summary of related works on SCAs using different learning methods, we provide a related survey on datasets, classifier, and kernel mapping of each method.

1) DEEP LEARNING BASED PROFILING SCAs

In every deep neural network, there is a learning step that requires a fixed-size training dataset for network training (in side-channel analysis, this step is known as the profiling phase) and fixed-size datasets for network testing (in side-channel analysis, this step is called the attack phase). In this paper, we use k-fold cross-validation method. In this method the whole data split randomly in k (the number of folds) disjunct subsets and iteratively use one of them as test set, while the rest of the data are used as the training set. The average error across all trails is the estimated generalization error.

Assume \( T_i \) as a single side-channel trace (which is captured using a random plaintext and a random secret key), and \( P_i \) as a vector of selected points of interest in the trace \( T_i \) (selected features). Then the class of each trace is defined based on the chosen leakage model because each label \( L_i \) of the input trace \( T_i \) is computed using a function (leakage model) of the secret key and \( P_i \).

In profiled side-channel attack based deep learning, the adversary first collects a number of traces from a device which is a copy version of the device under the attack (on the best scenario, he has full controls on the copied device). He uses collected traces as the training set with known target labels \( L_i \), to train his deep neural network. Then, in order to complete the attack, the adversary starts the attacking stage by applying the profiled model on a testing traces which have been collected from a different device called the victim device (device under the attack) with an unknown secret key value.

A demonstration of deep learning based profiled side-channel attacks is shown in Figure. 2. The device with the color gold in Figure. 2 is the copy version of the target device which is unlocked and the attacker can use this to measure an infinite number of traces for training his deep mode. Then he will use the trained network to unlock the device with the color gray in Figure. 2, as it is shown in the picture that he uses a very few traces (here a single trace) of the target device to retrieve the key.

In works [6], [7], some techniques have been proposed in profiled side-channel attacks to overcome the trace misalignment problems, they insert noise to input traces to solve this problem, however, this only helps some certain attacks by making the attack more difficult such as Gaussian template attack and does not affect deep learning based side-channel attacks and make no difference to their improvement. In 2017, Picek et al. studied the significance of how to improve the selected model with proper parameter tuning using tenfold cross-validation [19]. However, some of the classifiers in their works performed worse after the parameters tuning, and their proposed model, in the end, reaches an accuracy of 70% (not a high accuracy for learning methods) even with low noise in their traces. Also, different successful attacks against masking countermeasures on AES have been proposed. For example in 2014, Zeng et al. came up with an attack on the hardware implementation of AES which was masked with a Rotating SBox masking scheme which is a lightweight countermeasure. They used a support vector machine as the classifier of their model to find the secret mask. After that, they attacked each SBox with computing and use the hamming weight of the output byte of the mask SBox as the label of the model to retrieve the secret key [15]. However, the success rate in this model completely depends on the number of sample points. When there are a few sample points, the success rate is very low for this model.

2) PERFORMANCE METRICS

Accuracy and loss function are common metrics to evaluate deep learning models. Accuracy is used to measure a specific learning algorithm performance by computing the rate of correct classifications. A loss function is usually applied to optimize a particular learning algorithm and shows how good the learning model is based on several iterations. However, these metrics are highly dependent on the small changes in parameters and hyperparameters which control the learning process. In other words, parameters (e.g. weights and bias) and hyperparameters (e.g. learning rate and layer-size) should be tuned to obtain a good performance model during the network training phase. Hence, training a deep neural network with high performance and well generalization is challenging for any new data. Generalization is a term used for this challenge to describe a model’s ability to react to new data.

Generalization may lead to under-fitting or over-fitting problems. In under-fitting, a model has a poor performance on the training data and is unable to make accurate predictions, even for the training data. Over-fitting occurs when the
learning model is highly accurate in fitting to training data, however, it is unable in the prediction of unseen data. In the profiled attack scenario, the over-fitting problem becomes more acute since the adversary has an unlimited number of traces from the copied version of the victim device in the training phase with known key but he should make a prediction with a very few numbers of real traces with an unknown key from the victim device.

Fortunately, there are alternative metrics that can be used in side-channel attack scenarios to overcome the generalization problems. Key rank and guessing entropy are examples of such alternative metrics which evaluate and analyze the ability of a deep model in revealing the secret key [20]. Cagli et al. [6] also showed that the accuracy achieved by the deep learning models cannot be a valuable alternative metric for Key rank which is a common performance measurement of side-channel attacks.

There are several publications that represent the performance of machine learning and deep learning techniques which have been applied for the purpose of side-channel attacks. Maghrebi et al. [18] have shown the improved performance of deep learning compared to the other side-channel attacks techniques, however, they also showed that on average, 200 traces are needed for recovering the key. Hettwer et al. [5] directly used the secret key as a label of the model; they also claimed that this would give more ability to the network to learn the most meaningful features of the leakage which is needed for classification. Additionally, there have been studies in supervised machine learning-based profiling side-channel attacks such as [13]–[15], [21] which use support vector machine, LS-SVM, KNN, and RF for the classification problem. In most cases still, a large number of traces is required to reach a stable key rank. In 2018, Benadjila et al. [16] showed the role of points of interest which is exactly the same as the features extraction module in deep learning models which have a significant effect on the performance of side-channel attacks. However, the selection of feature extraction module and the size of points of interest can be different depends on the victim device and deep learning structures. An overview of the related works is given in Table 1.

Although all of these works give us a better view of the side-channel attacks challenges and solutions, pre-training the initial weights and proper choice of hyperparameter for generalization problem of the learning model has left for future works. Also, the deep structure of kernel mapping has not been investigated in side-channel attacks. In this work for the first time, we propose a deep kernel mapping with TSVM with pre-training of initial values and fine-tuning stage. We target hardware implementation of masked and unmasked AES-128, and we were able to retrieve the correct secret key even with a single trace.

### B. Support Vector Machine & NEROSVM

Support vector machine is a supervised machine learning method which performed for linear binary classification and aims to provide a binary classifier with a high generalization ability using a specific hyperplane. In other words, consider the training set: \( \{(x_i, y_i); i = 1, 2, \ldots, N\} \), where \( x_i \in \mathbb{R} \) is the input and \( y_i \in \{1, -1\} \) indicates the corresponding label of the two classes. A linear soft margin support vector machine model explores for a proper hyperplane \( (Wx + b) \) which has the maximum margin from the two classes. This hyperplane could be obtained by calculating the following optimization problem:

\[
\min_{W,b} \frac{1}{2} ||W||^2 + C \sum_{i=1}^{N} \xi_i^2 \\
\text{s.t. } y_i(Wx_i + b) \geq 1 - \xi_i, \quad \xi_i \geq 0, \quad i = 1, \ldots, N
\]

where \( \xi_1, \ldots, \xi_N \) are the non-negative deviations from the margin. The parameter \( C \) is called the penalty factor which controls the trade-off between the amount of margin increase and the number of missclassified sample points. The matrix of weight represented by \( W \) and the vector of bias is shown by \( b \).

We can show the equation (1) as the following unconstrained problem:

\[
\min_{W,b} \frac{1}{2} ||W||^2 + C \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left[ \max(1 - y_i(Wx_i + b), 0) \right]^2
\]
It is shown in [25] that support vector machine attack performs better than the template attack especially when the captured traces are noisy. In work [26], authors distinguished power traces of an unmasked AES implementation using Least Square support vector machine (LS-SVM) as a variant of SVM, and the number of classes is defined by computing the hamming weight of the output of the SBox. TSVM [27], as an extension of support vector machine, is learned by solving two smaller quadratic programming problems, therefore it is approximately four times faster than the classical support vector machine [28]. The two optimization problems for each hyperplane of TSVM are as follows:

$$\begin{align*}
\text{min} & \quad \frac{1}{2} \|W_A + e_1 b_1\|^2 + e_1^T \xi \\
\text{subject to} & \quad (W_B + e_1 b_1) + \xi \geq e_2, \quad \xi \geq 0
\end{align*}$$

(3)

$$\begin{align*}
\text{min} & \quad \frac{1}{2} \|W_B + e_2 b_2\|^2 + e_2^T \eta \\
\text{subject to} & \quad (W_B + e_1 b_2) + \eta \geq e_1, \quad \eta \geq 0
\end{align*}$$

(4)

where $e_1$ and $e_2$ are the column vectors of ones with a length equal to the row number of matrix $A$ and $B$. The error vectors are shown by $\xi$ and $\eta$ [28].

According to the optimization problems of the TSVM model, it predicts new samples using perpendicular distance. Consider the new sample point $x$, it will be assigned to a specific class that has the minimum distance from its hyper-plane. In other words, if we show the perpendicular distance of sample $x$ from the each hyperplanes of TSVM with $d_i$, the new sample point $x$ will be assign to the class $i$ which has the minimum $d_i = |x^T w_i + b|/\sqrt{w_i^T w_i}$ for $i = 1, 2$.

Although TSVM is one of the strong classification models in machine learning techniques, its performance is very sensitive to the selection of the appropriate kernel function. However, choosing an appropriate kernel function for a problem is not an easy task. Saeedi and Kong [29] investigated the influence of kernel on the accuracy of the support vector machine-based side-channel attacks using RBF kernel function. Several approaches have been proposed to learn a suitable kernel function for support vector machine. For example, Cho and Saul [30] calculate the inner product of a mapping function $\Phi$ and propose a multilayer structure of the kernel function as follows: $k^{(l)}(x_i, x_j) = \langle \Phi(\Phi(\ldots(\Phi(x_i)))), \Phi(\Phi(\ldots(\Phi(x_j)))) \rangle$. However, their method came up with a limitation where the multi-layer kernel is limited to a single type of mapping function. Another model called Neural network support vector machine (NEROSVM), introduced by Ghanty et al. [31] proposed for selection of appropriate kernel function. This model consists of two distinct but related modules called the feature extraction module (SFM) and classification module. Figure 3 represents the NEROSVM model which has $m$ different trained MLPs labeled as $(MLP_1, \ldots, MLP_m)$. The output layer and its associated connections from each of the MLPs are removed after the networks are trained. Note that the combination of the two first layers is considered a feature extraction module. Feature extraction module of NEROSVM consists of several submodules $(SFM_1, \ldots, SFM_m)$, each of them takes the same $p$ dimensional data $X = (x_1, \ldots, x_p)^T$ as input, and transfer it to a $n$ dimensional hidden vector. Indeed, each submodule of the feature extraction module is obtained from a MLP network including just one hidden layer [31]. The classification module is driven from the collected outputs of the $m$ submodules.

To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few works have considered combining neural network and machine learning techniques which are supervised learning approaches. Therefore, rather than combining MLPs and SVMs, we develop a deep structure of RBM with TSVM as a strong learning model to provide a template particularly suitable for application in SCA.

### III. Leakage Classification

In deep learning based side-channel, attacks according to the selected leakage model, accuracy only computes the number of classes a deep neural network could correctly predict divide by the total number of predictions that have been made. Hence it is necessary to take into account an alternative metric to accuracy such as key rank that we talked about some of the associated publications with this method in II-A2. We also describe how to calculate this metric in the following subsection III-A

#### A. Class Probability

Deep learning models have great potential in side-channel attacks to map the problem into a supervised classification instead of computing the Gaussian probability density function used in regular template attacks.

An accuracy is a common approach in deep learning models to identify the rate of correct classification and just consider labels with great reliability. This approach is related to the side-channel analysis evaluation metric. In fact, neurons in the output layer show the number of classes in the deep
learning model. Probabilities of each neuron in the output layer could be obtained using the Softmax activation function, which is equal to the class probabilities for each trace of the leakage model. As we know accuracy is considered as an evaluation metric in side-channel analysis to distinguish class probabilities for every trace and its associated secret key in the selected model. However, any small changes in the structure of a deep model have an impact on these probabilities. Therefore alternative metric such as key rank is computed for each correct key candidate.

The number of classes based on the selection of the leakage model could be different. If we consider $K$ is the number of classes and we indicate the number of traces that have been captured from the victim device with $T$, the output of the deep neural network is a $k \times T$ matrix. Then the log-likelihood for each key candidate is computed to distinguish classes. We computed the probabilities of each class of two different datasets and we were able to attack successfully on both masked and unmasked implementations.

B. DATASETS

For evaluating the performance of our model, we examined it on the public ASCAD dataset provided by Benadjila et al. [16] which has 50000 profiling traces, and 10000 attack traces. The traces are recovered from an 8-bit AVR microcontroller from a masked implementation of AES-128. The database consists of raw traces that contain the measurements from the entire encryption, however, the authors have preselected a window in the raw traces that correspond to the SBox operation and consists of 700 features. We consider the masked ASCAD with the leakage function of $\text{SBox}(p \oplus k)$ and we describe the unmasked ASCAD with the leakage function of $\text{SBox}(p \oplus k) \oplus M$, where M is the mask [32]. Figure 4 shows the corresponding data trace for ASCAD which comprises 700 sample points.

Also, we use an open TeSCASE dataset to evaluate our model. This dataset has 1,400,000 power traces, and every trace includes 3125 samples [33]. The traces are captured from the Virtex-5 FPGA embedded on a SASEBO-GII board of masked and unmasked implementation of AES-128 and can be accessed on the TeSCASE website. Figure 5 shows the corresponding data trace for TeSCASE which comprise 3000 sample points.

For profiling and attacking phases in our proposed model, we apply 10-Folds Cross-Validation to split the data into 10 different folds. We consider 9 folds to train our model and keep the last fold as test data, we then average the model against each of the folds.

IV. PROPOSED DEEP LEARNING BASED SCAS

We propose a new deep learning architecture for profiled side-channel attacks which consist of two main modules. The first module is feature extraction module that maps the input data into a feature space to make the problem a linear separable classification (selection of point of interests). The second one is the classification module which identify label for each input trace.

For the first module to learn the pattern of inputs we use a deep architecture of RBM which is a stochastic neural network and learn a probability distribution from the raw input data. RBMs are shallow, two-layer undirected neural networks. The first layer in RBM is called the visible layer, and the second one is the hidden layer. Each layer of deep RBM can extract features in order to feed them as the input of the subsequent layer.

For the second module, we use the TSVM classifier which is an extension of the support vector machine and is fed by the last layer of the feature extraction module. The performance of TSVM mainly depends on the choice of its Kernel function which plays exactly the same role as the feature extraction module in the proposed model. This classifier follows the grid search optimization algorithm to select values of $c_1$ and $c_2$ for the two optimization problems in equations (3) and (4). The proposed model is trained in two steps, first, we pre-train the parameters with RBM, and then in the second step, we fine-tune all parameters using gradient descent.

A. DEEP K-TSVM

Our deep kernel learning TSVM consists of I/O and several hidden layers, in which the output of the last hidden layer is considered as the input layer of the TSVM to find two decision boundaries. It is assumed the adversary classified the leakages based on the label that is achieved by calculating
the Hamming Weight (HW) of the output of the SBox values at the first round (9 classes) or achieved based on the identity (ID) leakage model (256 classes) of the AES-128.

The architecture of our proposed model is shown in Figure 6 which has \( r \) different trained RBMs labeled as \( (\text{RBM} 1, \ldots, \text{RBM} r) \). Hidden units of each RBM pass their values to visible units of the next layer. In other words, the hidden units of each layer can be considered as the visible units in the next layer. Note that the input layer \( h_0 \) and the hidden layers \( (h_1, \ldots, h_r) \) are considered as feature extraction module of deep K-TSVM model which maps raw data to a proper feature space. The classification module obtained by dividing the output of the \( r+1 \)th layer into two vectors, and consider each vector as input of one of the hyperplanes of the TSVM classifier.

For each sample \( x_i \) and the relevance of hidden layers consider the following calculations:

\[
\begin{align*}
   h_0^i &= x_i; \quad y_i = \pm 1 \\
   h_j^i &= \sigma(W^j h_{j-1}^i + b^j) \quad 1 \leq j \leq r, \\
   \phi(x_i) &= h_r^i; \quad y_i = \pm 1
\end{align*}
\]

where \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), \( \sigma(x) = \frac{1}{1+e^{-x}} \) is the sigmoid activation function and \( h_j^i \) denotes the \( i^{th} \) neuron in the \( j^{th} \) hidden layer.

The optimization problems for deep K-TSVM can be written as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
   &\min_{W^j, b^j, \xi_i} \frac{1}{2} ||\phi(A)W_r^{r+1} + e_1 b_{r+1}^1||^2 + C_1 e_2^T \sum_{i, y_i = -1} \xi_i^2 \\
   &- (W_r^{r+1}\phi(x_i) + b_{r+1}^1) \geq 1 - \xi_i, \quad \xi_i \geq 0, \quad y_i = -1
\end{align*}
\]

and

\[
\begin{align*}
   &\min_{W^j, b^j, \eta_i} \frac{1}{2} ||\phi(B)W_r^{r+1} + e_2 b_{r+1}^2||^2 + C_2 e_2^T \sum_{i, y_i = +1} \eta_i^2 \\
   &- (W_r^{r+1}\phi(x_i) + b_{r+1}^2) \geq 1 - \eta_i, \quad \eta_i \geq 0, \quad y_i = +1
\end{align*}
\]

where \( h_j^i = \phi(A) \) for \( y_i = +1 \) and \( h_j^i = \phi(B) \) for \( y_i = -1 \).

The initial value of the parameters \( W_j \) and \( b_j \), are obtained using contrastive divergence (CD) learning [34]. This learning is a training algorithm that is commonly used when the direct evaluation of a function is not possible and needs to be approximated. In other words, a CD is a training algorithm that is applied to approximate the gradient of the model. RBM is considered as a probabilistic learning model which optimizes the log-likelihood values for its parameter selection by running a Markov chain on its dataset.

The unconstrained optimization problems of (6) and (7) can be written as the following quadratic programming problems:

\[
L_{D1} = \min \frac{1}{2} ||\phi(A)W_r^{r+1} + e_1 b_{r+1}^1||^2 + C_1 e_2^T \sum_{i, y_i = -1} \xi_i^2 \\
- (W_r^{r+1}\phi(x_i) + b_{r+1}^1) \geq 1 - \xi_i, \quad \xi_i \geq 0, \quad y_i = -1
\]

\[
L_{D2} = \min \frac{1}{2} ||\phi(B)W_r^{r+1} + e_2 b_{r+1}^2||^2 + C_2 e_2^T \sum_{i, y_i = +1} \eta_i^2 \\
- (W_r^{r+1}\phi(x_i) + b_{r+1}^2) \geq 1 - \eta_i, \quad \eta_i \geq 0, \quad y_i = +1
\]

Algorithm 1 describes the learning process of Deep K-TSVM with respect to the weights of equations (8) and (9).

\begin{algorithm}
\caption{Learning Deep K-TSVM}
\begin{algorithmic}[1]
\Require Datasets=\{(x^i, y^i); \ i = 1, \ldots, n\}, maxepoch
\Ensure Parameters=\theta : \{w_k^j, b_k^j; \ (1 \leq j \leq r + 1), k = 1, 2\}
\State \textbf{Pre-training Stage:}
\hspace{1em} initialize \( w_k^j \approx 0, b_k^j \approx 0; \quad 1 \leq j \leq r, \quad k = 1, 2 \)
\hspace{1em} learning \( w_k^j, b_k^j \ with CD\)
\State \textbf{Fine-tuning Stage:}
\hspace{1em} initialize \{w_k^{r+1} \approx 0, b_k^{r+1} \approx 0; \ k = 1, 2\}
\For {epoch=1:maxepoch}
\For {i = 1 : n}
\State Update weights of (8) & (9) by Gradient descent
\EndFor
\EndFor
\end{algorithmic}
\end{algorithm}

We apply the one-versus-all method which consists of multiple separate binary classifiers, one binary classifier for each possible outcome [24]. This method extends the binary...
In the second step, we collect all probabilities of each possible value in the ID classification model as a list of outputs and sort the order of elements in the output list. The key rank is the index of the targeted key byte inside the list. We also define a certain threshold of \( N^* \leq 10 \) for all key guesses in computing key rank, such that the number of traces \( n \) and the size of hyperparameters \( \theta \) are minimum: 
\[
\min \{n, \theta : N^* \leq 10\} \quad \text{where} \quad n, \theta \geq 1.
\]

**Algorithm 2** Deep K-TSVM SCA Attack

**Input:** Pl: Plaintext, key: 16-byte Key, tr: traces

**Output:** keyRank: Average “key rank” of one byte

1. Initialize maxepoch, SOP
2. for epoch = 1: maxepoch do
3. Split tr and Pl into profile \((tr_p \text{ and } Pl_p)\) and attack \((tr_a \text{ and } Pl_a)\) subsets
4. train Deep K-TSVM with Algorithm 1
5. for num = 0: size\((Pl_a)\) do
6. makes prediction for \(tr_a[num]\)
7. for k = 0: 255 do
8. \(L = SBox(Pl_a[num]) \oplus k\);
9. add probability prediction of class L to \(SOP[k]\)
10. store the key rank
11. end for
12. end for
13. compute average key rank of all epochs.

In Algorithm 2, the SOP represents the sum of probabilities. The symbol \( \oplus \) denotes xor. According to this, we try to recover the third byte of the AES key. However, the other remaining bytes can be attacked in the same way to retrieve 16 bytes of the key. We show in the experimental result (section V) that our model outperforms other state-of-the-art techniques with a key rate of \( \geq 99\% \). The accuracy for the testing set is nearly similar to that of the training set, \( \geq 99\% \) which proves no over-fitting in our model.

**V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS**

In the following, we present results from Deep K-TSVM against masked and unmasked hardware implementation of AES-128. We also test the effect of pre-training on the performance of the proposed model using RBM. We examine the architecture of our proposed model with different hyper-parameters. However, the activation function, optimizer, and the number of epochs in the proposed model structure are obtained using the grid search optimization algorithm. Our model outperforms recent works mentioned in section II such as [17] which require 15,000 profiling traces in their MLP model and 20,000 profiling traces in their CNN model to reach a key rank lower than 20. We also compare our proposed model with four different models. The first model is an MLP with and without PCA, and the second model is a 5-layer convolutional neural network, NeuroSVM is the third model, and the fourth model is CNN-SVM. Table 3 is giving

| Model                  | Hyperparameter                      |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| MLP with 2 hidden layer| Epochs: [10,30,50]                  |
|                        | Optimizers: [SGD, RMSprop, Adam, Nadam] |
|                        | Activation: [ReLU, sigmoid, Softmax] |
| NeuroSVM               | Epochs: [10,30,50]                  |
|                        | Optimizers: [SGD, RMSprop, Adam, Nadam] |
|                        | Learning rate: [0.01,0.001, 0.0001]  |
|                        | P Dropout: [0.01,0.1,0.2]           |
|                        | Activation: [ReLU, sigmoid, Softmax] |
| ConvNet                | Epochs: [10,30,50]                  |
|                        | Optimizers: [SGD, RMSprop, Adam, Nadam] |
|                        | Learning rate: [0.01,0.001, 0.0001]  |
|                        | Activation: [ReLU, sigmoid, Softmax] |
| Deep K-TSVM            | Epochs: [10,30,50]                  |
|                        | Optimizers: [SGD, RMSprop, Adam, Nadam] |
|                        | Learning rate: [0.01,0.001, 0.0001]  |
|                        | Activation: [ReLU, sigmoid, Softmax] |

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TABLE 3. Network settings.

| Model      | Network details                                      |
|------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| MLP        | • Input layer: the number of samples in the processed trace  
  • First hidden layer: 100 neurons  
  • Second hidden layer: 50 neurons  
  • Output layer: 256 neurons |
| ConvNet    | • Input layer: the number of samples in the processed trace  
  • Convolution layer:  
    * number of filters = 8  
    * filter length = 32  
  • Max Pooling layer with a Pooling size: 2  
  • Dropout  
  • Convolution layer:  
    * number of filters = 8  
    * filter length = 16  
  • Max Pooling layer with a Pooling size: 2  
  • Dropout  
  • Convolution layer:  
    * number of filters = 8  
    * filter length = 8  
  • Max Pooling layer with a Pooling size: 2  
  • Dropout  
  • Convolution layer:  
    * number of filters = 8  
    * filter length = 8  
  • Max Pooling layer with a Pooling size: 2  
  • Dropout  
  • Convolution layer:  
    * number of filters = 8  
    * filter length = 8  
  • Max Pooling layer with a Pooling size: 2  
  • Dropout  
  • Input Dense layer: 512 neurons  
  • Output Dense layer: 256 neurons |
| Deep K-TSVM| • Input layer: the number of samples in the processed trace  
  • DKTTSVM-1: 100 neurons  
  • DKTTSVM-2: 64 neurons  
  • Output layer: 256 neurons |

TABLE 4. Accuracy (%) of our deep K-TSVM and its competitors on two different datasets.

| Datasets       | Model      | Unmasked | Masked |
|----------------|------------|----------|--------|
| ASCAD dataset  | MLP with PCA | 0.0045   | 0.0037 |
|                | 5-Layer CNN | 0.7136   | 0.5491 |
|                | MLP without PCA | 0.0050   | 0.0061 |
|                | NeuroSVM    | 0.0047   | 0.0046 |
|                | CNN-SVM     | 0.6703   | 0.6741 |
|                | Deep K-TSVM | 0.9938   | 0.5914 |
| TeSCASE dataset| MLP with PCA | 0.0034   | 0.0030 |
|                | 5-layer CNN | 0.9126   | 0.8994 |
|                | MLP without PCA | 0.0041   | 0.0037 |
|                | NeuroSVM    | 0.0048   | 0.0057 |
|                | CNN-SVM     | 0.7215   | 0.7094 |
|                | Deep K-TSVM | 0.9983   | 0.9966 |

FIGURE 7. Effect of pre-training on the deep K-TSVM performance.

details of each network in our experiment. All models are trained and evaluated using two different datasets, the first one is ASCAD dataset traces, and the second one is TeSCASE dataset.

Although accuracy is not a common method for evaluating the performance of deep learning based side-channel attack techniques, in addition to the key rank average, we have examined this criterion for the proposed model to evaluate the robustness of the deep model with some previous work. Table 4 reports the attack accuracy of our proposed method and its competitors, multilayer perceptron [18] and 5-layer CNN [35], NeuroSVM and CNN-SVM based side-channel attacks. The bold values show that our proposed model performs better than MLP, 5-layer CNN, NeuroSVM, and CNN-SVM.

From Table 4, we can notice the following:

- Our model outperforms its competitors when applied on both datasets, however, the accuracy for 5-layer convolutional neural network on masked TeSCASE dataset has reached a high value of (91.26%) which is still less than the accuracy of our Deep K-TSVM (99.83%).
- MLP with PCA on masked TeSCASE dataset has the lowest accuracy among the other models.

We also investigated the effect of pre-training on the accuracy of our model, which is shown in Figure 7. It can be concluded that the proposed model performs better when applied to two datasets using the pre-training method provided by RBM.

A. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF UNMASKED AES-128

Figure 8 shows the correct key rank according to the number of traces for unmasked TeSCASE and ASCAD datasets when attacking the third byte of the key with five different models. From these results, we can conclude the following:

- The Deep K-TSVM even with a single trace outperforms the four other models since it has the lowest key rank (better performance). The 5-layer CNN performs better than the other ones except for our proposed model. 5-layer CNN requires about 200 power traces to reach a stable key guess while the CNN-SVM requires at least 400 attack traces to reach a stable key guess, however, it has a better performance than MLP with the PCA model and the NeuroSVM.
• The MLP with PCA performs worse compared to MLP without model on both datasets. This is because the PCA may remove some data components which are informative for linear classification representation, and negatively impact the accuracy of the non-linear profiling model of the MLP network.

B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF MASKED AES-128 DATASETS

We have also evaluated our model over protected hardware implementation, and apply the proposed model to the AES-128 dataset with masking countermeasures. The mask schemes for ASCAD and TeSCASE datasets are described in [16] and [36] respectively. Figure. 9 shows the average key rank for our proposed model and its four other competitors, multi-layer perceptron [18] and 5-layer CNN [35], NeuroSVM, and CNN-SVM based side-channel attacks according to the number of traces.

From Figure. 9(a), it can be concluded that our model performs better than other neural networks. The 5-layer CNN performs worse at attacking protected datasets than attacking unmasked AES-128, which means the masking techniques make it hard to retrieve the key.

Figure. 9(b) shows the result of attacking to masked AES implementation on ASCAD dataset [16]. According to the results presented in this section, it is obviously illustrated that our Deep K-TSVM performs much better than its four different competitors.

VI. CONCLUSION

We proposed a new deep architecture for profiled side-channel attacks which includes two main modules, feature extraction, and classification modules. Our proposed Deep k-TSVM uses a deep architecture of RBM to map datasets (power traces) and learn the pattern of inputs, and it uses TSVM as the classifier. We trained our deep neural network in two different steps. First, we pre-trained the parameters with RBM by the captured power traces from the copy version of the victim device, and in the second step, we fine-tuned all parameters using gradient descent. Our Deep K-TSVM is a better attack compared to the state-of-the-art profiling attacks such as MLP and convolutional neural network-based side-channel attacks. Finally, we showed that our model with a single power trace of the AES-128 is able to recover the secret key with a success rate of ≥ 99% and a key rank of ≤ 10 on two different datasets, ASCAD, and TeSCASE.

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