On the Resilience of Traffic Networks under Non-Equilibrium Learning

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Abstract—We investigate the resilience of learning-based Intelligent Navigation Systems (INS) to informational flow attacks, which exploit the vulnerabilities of IT infrastructure and manipulate traffic condition data. To this end, we propose the notion of Wardrop Non-Equilibrium Solution (WANES), which specifies mean Wardrop equilibrium (MWE) as its trajectory.

Leveraging finite-time analysis methods, we discover that under the mirror descent (MD) online-learning framework, the traffic flow trajectory is capable of restoring to the Wardrop non-equilibrium solution after a bounded INS attack. The resulting performance loss is of order $O(T^α)$ ($-\frac{1}{2} < \beta < 0$), with a constant dependent on the size of the traffic network, indicating the resilience of the MD-based INS. We corroborate the results using an evacuation case study on a Sioux-Fall transportation network.

I. INTRODUCTION

The past decades have witnessed significant growth in the Internet-based traffic routing demand, along with the rapid development of modern Intelligent Navigation Systems (INS). The INS infrastructures, which consists of Online Navigation Platforms (ONP) such as Google Maps and Waze, together with the widely adopted Internet-of-Things (IoT), including smart road sensors and toll gates, are designed to make real-time, efficient routing recommendations for their users. The best-effort routing of the individuals leads to macroscopic traffic conditions, which is encapsulated by the notion of Wardrop equilibrium (WE) in congestion games.

As transportation networks become increasingly interconnected, the number of attack vectors against the entire transportation system is also on the rise. Consequently, the well-being of the traffic networks is vulnerable to emerging cyber-physical threats. For example, attacks on individual GPS devices and road sensors can lead to the unavailability of critical information and cause wide disruptions to the infrastructure. As discussed in [7], a strategic data poisoning attack on the ONP can lead to significant traffic congestion and service breakdown.

In this work, we focus on a class of man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks on ONP systems that aim to mislead the users to choose routes that are favored by the attackers. A quintessential case was demonstrated in 2014, Israel, where two students hacked the Waze GPS app and used bots to crowdsource false location information, which misled the users and caused congestion [3]. As reported in [4], the existing real-time traffic systems are intrinsically vulnerable to malicious attacks such as modified cookie replays and simulated delusional traffic flows.

This class of attacks can be further categorized as informational attacks on INS. They intercept the communication channel between individual users and the information infrastructure and exploit the vulnerabilities of data transmission to misguide users and achieve an adversarial traffic condition. While there have been efforts on preventing and detecting attacks, it is indispensable to create resilient mechanisms that can allow users to adapt and recover after the attack since perfect protection is either cost-prohibitive or impractical [5], [6]. To achieve this self-healing property, a dynamic feedback-driven learning-based approach is essential [7], and a non-equilibrium solution concept in contrast to the classical Wardrop equilibrium is needed to capture the non-stationary nature of the ante impetum and post impetum behaviors as well as enable the time-critical performance assessment and design for resiliency.

To this end, we investigate the notion of Non-Equilibrium Solution (NonES) in the context of repeated congestion games. It measures the probability of the traffic flows “enveloping” given target sets, with the envelop volume defined by a measurement function. The Non-Equilibrium learning does not necessarily yield an equilibrium solution but a trajectory that falls into the envelope with high probability. Based on NonES, we define Wardrop Non-Equilibrium Solution (WANES), which specifies mean Wardrop equilibrium (MWE) as its...
target set, and the weighted potential loss as the measurement.
In this work, we focus on a class of Mirror Descent Non-
Equilibrium learning algorithms and elaborate on its role in
the resilience of traffic networks under adversarial disruption.
We first establish a high probability bound on the distance
between the output and MWE for generic Mirror Descent
(MD) algorithms without assumptions on the boundedness
of the latency function. This high probability bound can be
transformed into the resilience metrics, showing that after
the attack, a WANES with weighted potential loss that is
sublinear in time can be recovered through learning. Next,
we develop a learning-based resiliency mechanism based on
an MD algorithm as the and two classes of flow disturbance
attacks. We demonstrate the performance resilience under
MD using an evacuation case study to illustrate the process
of learning-based recovery. A schematic illustration of our
non-equilibrium learning approach is provided in Figure 1.

Outline of this paper. We briefly discuss the related
works in Section II. In Section III, we introduce the repeated
stochastic congestion game and MWE as the solution concept,
based on which we introduce the notion of Non-Equilibrium
learning and the formalism of resilience. In Section IV, we
establish several finite-time results for the Non-Equilibrium
learning dynamics and elaborate on the numerical experiments
to illustrate the attack and resilience in Section V.

II. RELATED WORK

Our work bridges the gap between the online-learning and
resilience in traffic assignment. Traffic assignment naturally
fits in the online-learning framework, see [8], [9], [10], where
the convergence in Cesáro sense is shown as interests. Vu et al.
in [11] improved the rate of Cesáro convergence to \(O(1/T^2)\) and provided a last-iterate convergence guarantee.

The existent studies on the resilience of traffic assignment
have targeted on event-based disruptions, (see, e.g., [12]),
the system impedance to misinformation disturbance has
been rarely studied. To the best of our knowledge, the first
informational-equilibrium-poisoning concept was proposed by
Pan et al. [2], such a phenomenon occurs when the sensors,
GPS devices in the INS are under attacks [13].

III. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Preliminary: Mean Wardrop Equilibrium

We are given a traffic network represented as a directed,
finite, and connected graph \(\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})\) without self-loops.
The vertices \(\mathcal{V}\) represent road junctions, and the edges \(\mathcal{E}\)
represent road segments. The set of distinct origin-destination
(OD) pairs is \(\mathcal{W} \subseteq \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{V}\), indexed by \(w\), with cardinality \(\mathcal{W}\).
Let \(\mathcal{P} := \bigcup_{w \in \mathcal{W}} \mathcal{P}_w\) be the set of all directed paths between
origins and destinations, where \(\mathcal{P}_w \subseteq \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{E})\) is the path
set between the pair \(w\).

We assume that there is a set of infinitesimal players
over \(\mathcal{G}\), denoted by a measurable space \((\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{M}, m)\). The
players are non-atomic, i.e., \(m(x) = 0\) for all \(x \in \mathcal{X}\); they are
split into distinct populations indexed by the OD pairs, i.e.,
\(\mathcal{X} = \bigcup_{w \in \mathcal{W}} \mathcal{X}_w\) and \(\mathcal{X}_w \cap \mathcal{X}_{w'} = \emptyset\), \forall \(w, w' \in \mathcal{W}\).
For each OD pair \(w \in \mathcal{W}\), let \(m_w = m(\mathcal{X}_w)\) represent the
traffic demand. Let \(\bar{M} = \sum_{w \in \mathcal{W}} m_w\). For each player \(x \in \mathcal{X}_w\), we assume that their travel path \(A(x) \in \mathcal{P}_w\) is fixed
right after the path selection. The action profile of all
the players \(\mathcal{X}\) induces an edge flow vector \(q \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{E}}\), where
\(q_e := \int_{\mathcal{X}} \mathbf{1}_{\{x \in A(x)\}} m(dx), e \in \mathcal{E}\), and a path flow vector
\(\mu \in \Delta := \{\mu_p\}_{p \in \mathcal{W}}\), \(\mu_p := \int_{\mathcal{X}} \mathbf{1}_{\{A(x)=p\}} m(dx)\).

We define the edge-path incident matrix of graph \(\mathcal{G}\) as \(\Lambda = [\Lambda_1, \ldots, \Lambda_{|\mathcal{W}|}] \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{E} \times |\mathcal{P}|}\) such that \(\Lambda_{w,p} = 1_{\{e \in p\}}, \forall e \in \mathcal{E}, w \in \mathcal{W}, p \in \mathcal{P}_w\). Hence the compact form of edge-path
flow relation is \(q = \Lambda \mu\).

Let \((\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{P})\) be the probability space for the formalism,
\(l_e : \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \times \mathcal{O} \to \mathbb{R}_+\) be the cost/latency functions, measuring
the travel delay of the edge \(e \in \mathcal{E}\) determined by its edge flow
\(q_e\) and a state variable \(\omega \in \Omega\) that is universal for the entire
traffic network, e.g., \(\omega\) can represent the weather condition,
road incidents or anything that affects the congestion level. Let
\(l : \mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{E}|} \times \mathcal{O} \to \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{E}|\mathcal{P}|}\) denote the vector-valued latency function.
For an instance \(\omega \in \Omega\), the latency of path \(p\) is defined as
\(\ell_p := \sum_{e \in p} l_e(q_e, \omega) = \Lambda_p^\top l(\Lambda \mu, \omega)\), which can be seen as a
function of \(\mu\) and \(\omega\), written as \(\ell_p = \ell_p(\mu, \omega)\). We write
the vector-valued path latency function as \(\ell : \Delta \times \Omega \to \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{P}}\).
Each instance \(\omega\) determines a congestion game, captured by
the tuple \(\mathcal{G}^\omega = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{X}, P, \ell(\cdot, \omega))\). Each path flow profile
\(\mu \in \Delta\) induces a probability measure associated with the
positive random vector \(\ell(\mu, \cdot) : \Omega \to \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{P}}\).

Assumption 1. For all \(e \in \mathcal{E}\), the latency functions \(l_e\) are
\(\omega\)-measurable, for all \(\omega \in \Omega\), \(l_e\) are \(L_0\)-Lipschitz continuous
and differentiable in \(q_e\) with \(\frac{\partial \ell_l(q_e, \omega)}{\partial q_e} > 0\) for all \(q_e \geq 0\).

Remark. The continuity assumption reflects the fact that
adding a small amount of traffic does not drastically affect
the travel latency; the monotonicity implies the increments
of traffic does not decrease the latency.

We adopt a stochastic alternative definition of Wardrop
equilibrium. In doing so, we consider a “meta” version of the
congestion game, \(\mathcal{G}_c = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{X}, P, \mathcal{E}_c(\ell(\cdot, \omega)))\), with
the utility functions replaced by the expected latency function.
This “meta” congestion game gives rise to a solution concept
corresponding to Definition 1.

Definition 1 (Mean Wardrop Equilibrium [11]). A path flow
\(\mu \in \Delta\) is said to be a Mean Wardrop Equilibrium (MWE)
if \(\forall \omega \in \mathcal{W}, \mu_p > 0\) indicates \(\mathbb{E}[\ell_p] \leq \mathbb{E}[\ell_p']\) for all \(p' \in \mathcal{P}_w\).
The set of all MWE is denoted by \(\mu^*_c\). Equivalently, \(\mu \in \mu^*_c\)
if and only if the following variational inequality is satisfied:
\(\mathbb{E}_w[m(\mu - \mu^*_c, \ell(\mu, \omega))] \leq 0\), \forall \mu^*_c \in \Delta, \) where \(\mathbb{E}_w[\cdot]\)
is the expectation operator with respect to \(\omega\).

The MWE \(\mu^*_c\) is in general not a singleton, but a convex set
given the strict monotonicity of latency in Assumption 1. The
seeking of MWE can be cast as a minimization problem
of the expectation of the Stochastic Beckmann Potential (SBP)
[14], defined as \(\phi(\mu, \omega) = \sum_{e \in \mathcal{E}} \mathbf{1}_{\{e \in \mathcal{P}_w\}} l_e(z, \omega)dz\), where
\(\mathcal{E}_c(\mu)\) is the \(e\)th element of \(\mu\). We refer to the expectation
defined in (1) as the Mean Beckmann Potential (MBP),
\[ \Phi(\mu) := \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{\omega \in \mathcal{E}} \int_{0}^{(\Lambda \mu)_{\omega}} l_{e}(z, \omega) \, dz \right]. \tag{1} \]

It immediately follows that by Assumption 1 that, for all \( \mu \in \Delta \),
\[ \nabla_{\mu} \Phi(\mu) = \mathbb{E} [\Lambda^T(I(\Lambda \mu, \omega))] = \mathbb{E} [\ell(\mu, \omega)], \]
\[ \nabla_{\mu}^{2} \Phi(\mu) = \mathbb{E} [\Lambda^T((\nabla(\Lambda \mu, \omega))\Lambda)] \geq 0. \]

Therefore, \( \Phi \) is convex in \( \mu \). The characterization of the MWE coincides with the first-order optimality condition. Finally, we denote by \( \Phi^* \) the unique optimal BMM: \( \Phi^* := \min_{\mu \in \Delta} \Phi(\mu) \).

### B. Mirror Descent and Wardrop Non-Equilibrium

In the online-learning setting, the players make decisions repeatedly. Let the time index be \( t \in \mathbb{N}_+ \), for each OD pair \( w \), each player \( x \in \mathcal{X}_w \) receives a mixed strategy \( \pi^*(\cdot, x) : \mathcal{X}_w \rightarrow \Delta(\mathcal{P}_w) \) which is \( \mathcal{M} \)-measurable, and plays a randomized routing path \( A^t(x) \sim \pi^*(\cdot, x) \).

Under identical and independent path choice randomization within the populations of each OD pair, individual-level and population-level decision makings are equivalent due to the non-atomic nature, [9], we hereby let the history \( \mathcal{H}_t \) be a sequence of realizations of \( \omega^t, \ell^t, \) and \( \mu^t \) up to time \( t \), an online-learning algorithm \( \mathcal{A} \) maps from the space of \( \mathcal{H}_t \) to \( \Delta \), iteratively generating the traffic flow \( \mu^{t+1} \).

The individual regret with respect to a path choice \( \pi \in \mathcal{P}_w \) for \( x \in \mathcal{X}_w \), \( w \in \mathcal{W} \) is \( \mathcal{R}(x) = \mathbb{E}[\sum_{t=1}^{T} L_{\pi}(x) - L_{\mu}^t] \), where \( \mathbb{E}[\cdot] \) is taken with respect to \( \mathcal{A} \) and \( \omega \). The population regret with respect to a path flow is defined as \( \mathcal{R}(\mu) = \mathbb{E}[\sum_{t=1}^{T} L_{\mu}^t - \ell_{\mu}^t] \). Let \( \mu^* \) be one of \( \mu^* \), by convexity of \( \Phi \), a sub-linear regret bound, i.e., \( \mathcal{R}(\mu^*) = \mathcal{O}(T) \) directly implies \( \Phi(\mu^{t+1}) - \Phi(\mu^t) \) as \( T \rightarrow \infty \), where \( \mu^t := \frac{1}{t} \sum_{i=1}^{t} \mu^i \) is the empirical flow.

To achieve such sub-linear regret bound \( \mathcal{R}(\mu^*) = \mathcal{O}(T) \), a class of widely used online learning algorithms can be obtained through mirror descent (MD), as shown in Algorithm 1, with a specified instance of Bregman divergence \( D_{\Phi}(\cdot) : \Delta \times \Delta \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \). Induced by a mirror map \( \Psi : \Delta \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \), the divergence \( D_{\Phi}(\mu_1, \mu_2) := \Psi(\mu_1) - \Psi(\mu_2) - \langle \nabla \Psi(\mu_2), \mu_1 - \mu_2 \rangle \) measures the dissimilarity between two iterates \([\text{see (2)}]\), regularizing the learning process.

The mirror map \( \Psi \) is assumed to be Fréchet differentiable and strongly convex, i.e., there exists a constant \( \sigma_{\Psi} > 0 \) such that \( D_{\Phi}(\mu_1, \mu_2) \geq \frac{\sigma_{\Psi}}{2} \| \mu_1 - \mu_2 \|^2 \). Note that when the mirror map is given by \( \ell_{\mu}^t \)-norm, mirror descent (2) reduces to projected gradient descent [15]: \( \mu^{t+1} \leftarrow \arg\min_{\mu \in \Delta} \| \mu^{t} + \eta_{t} \ell_{t} - \mu \|^2 \). Hence, MD is a generalization of gradient methods and allows more freedom when designing learning algorithms. For example, when \( \Psi(\mu) = \frac{1}{2} \| \mu \|^p \), \( 1 < p < 2 \), mirror descent works favorably for sparse problems [16].

It is shown in [10] that the populational regret under MD can achieve \( \mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T}) \) in the static regime (when \( \Omega \) is a singleton), which coincides with the \( \mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T}) \) results shown for stochastic environment in [11]. These sublinear bounds suggest that the empirical flow under MD arrives at the MWE asymptotically.

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### Algorithm 1: Mirror Descent for INS

**Input**: initialize \( \mu^1 \in \Delta \), learning rate \( \eta_t \in \mathbb{R}^+ \), for \( t \in \mathbb{N}_+ \) do

**for** \( w \in \mathcal{W}, x \in \mathcal{X}_w \) **do**

- INS assigns mixed strategy \( \pi^t(x) := \frac{1}{P_{w}(\mu^t)_{p \in \mathcal{P}_w}} \) to player \( x \);
- player \( x \) samples path \( A(x) \sim \pi^t(x) \);
- nature samples \( \omega^t \sim \mathcal{P}(\cdot) \);
- INS reveals latency vector \( \ell^t(\mu^t, \omega^t) \) to \( X \);
- INS updates:
  \[ \mu^{t+1} \leftarrow \arg\min_{\mu \in \Delta} \eta_t(\mu, \ell^t) + D_{\Phi}(\mu, \mu^t) \tag{2} \]

However, the asymptotic convergence of empirical flow to the MWE does not capture the transient behavior of the learning process. The regret bounds above does not answer the following question regarding the resiliency of MD: how many iterates does MD need to recover from an informational attack and return an approximate MWE? This motivates us to shift the focus to finite sequences of iterates and associated probabilistic characterizations, based on which we propose a new solution concept for learning algorithms: Non-Equilibrium Solution (NonES). For congestion games, NonES is captured by a measurement function and a target set of flow profiles. A finite sequence of iterates (called a trajectory) produced by the learning algorithm \( \mathcal{A} \) is treated as a random variable. Then, the measurement function maps this random variable to the space where the target set is defined. Whether the trajectory (transformed by the measurement function) falls within the target set constitutes a random event. The probabilistic characterization of this random event is the basis of the non-equilibrium definition introduced in the following.

### Definition 2 (Non-Equilibrium Solutions)

For a congestion game \( \mathcal{G}_w \) denoted by the Borel \( \sigma \)-algebra over the set of path flow profiles \( \Delta \). Let \( \Delta^1 \) and \( B^1 \) be the product space and the product \( \sigma \)-algebra, respectively. Denote by \( \mathbb{P}_t \) the probability measure over the space \( (\Delta^1, B^1) \). Given a measurement function \( F : \Delta^1 \rightarrow \Delta ; \) a target set \( \mathcal{C} \subseteq \Delta \), and a positive number \( \delta > 0 \), \( \mathbb{P}_t \) is an \( (F, \mathcal{C}, \delta) \)-Non-Equilibrium solution (NonES) if

\[ \mathbb{P}_t\{\mu^t_k \in \Delta^1 | F(\mu^t_k) \in \mathcal{C}\} \geq 1 - \delta. \tag{3} \]

### Remark (Non-Equilibrium Learning)

In the context of online learning, the probability measure \( \mathbb{P}_t \) is determined by the learning algorithm \( \mathcal{A} \) and the environment stochasticity \( \omega_t \) in Algorithm 1. We refer to \( \mathcal{A} \) as Non-Equilibrium learning if the induced probability measure \( \mathbb{P}_t \) is a NonES, as formally defined in Definition 3. When no confusion arises, we also say a trajectory \( \{\mu^t_k\}_{k=1} \) under \( \mathcal{A} \) is a NonES if its associated probability measure is a NonES.

The proposed non-equilibrium solution generalizes existing (approximate) equilibrium-seeking characterizations (e.g., last iterate convergence and Cesáro convergence in Example 1),
which concerns transient properties of the underlying flow sequence. A probability measure (or equivalently a distribution) over the sequences of flows is a NonES if the sequences fall within the target set with high probability \((\delta > 0)\) or almost surely \((\delta = 0)\).

**Example 1.** A sequence of path flows \(\{\mu^k\}_{k=1}^\infty\) is said to Cesàro converge to MWE with respect to weights \(\{\eta_k\}_{k=1}^\infty\) almost surely if \(\lim_{k \to \infty} \Phi(\mu^k) = \Phi^*\), \(\mu^k = \sum_{k=1}^\infty \eta_k \mu^k / \sum_{k=1}^\infty \eta_k\), with probability 1. When \(\eta_k = 1\), for all \(k \geq 1\), the Cesàro average reduces to the empirical flow: \(\mu^k = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{t=1}^k \mu^t\). Note that in the online learning context, the weights \(\{\eta_k\}_{k=1}^\infty\) correspond to the vanishing learning rates of some algorithm \(A\) (e.g., learning rate in Algorithm 1).

The following rephrases the convergence characterization above using non-equilibrium language. Given an MWE, \(\mu^\star\), for any \(\epsilon > 0\), let the target set \(C_{\epsilon}\) be the \(\epsilon\)-approximate MBE, i.e., \(C_{\epsilon} := \{\mu \in \Delta | \Phi(\mu) - \Phi^* < \epsilon\}\). Define the measurement function as the weighted Cesàro average, \(F_t(\mu^k)_{k=1}^\infty = \sum_{t=1}^\infty \eta_t \mu^t / \sum_{t=1}^\infty \eta_t\). A sequence of flows \(\{\mu^k\}_{k=1}^\infty\) converges to MWE if for any \(\epsilon > 0\), there exists a \(T\) such that any finite subsequences \(\{\mu^k\}_{k=1}^T\), \(t > T\) is an \((F, C_{\epsilon}, 0)\)-Non-Equilibrium.

Introducing the target set and measurement function provides additional degrees of freedom for analyzing the transient behavior of a sequence of flows produced by learning processes. For example, when the measurement function is defined as the last iterate MBF, the corresponding NonES generalizes the last iterate WE convergence [11]: when the target set is defined as \(C_{\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2} := \{\mu \in \Delta | \Phi(\mu) - \Phi^* < \epsilon_1\} \forall \mu, \mu' \in \mathcal{P}_t\) s.t. \(\mu_0 < \epsilon_2 \forall \mu \in \mathcal{W}\), the corresponding NonES generalizes the \((\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2)\)-approximated Wardrop equilibrium [17]. This work studies Non-equilibrium-based resilience (to be defined in Section III-C).

**Definition 3** (Wardrop Non-Equilibrium Learning). For the congestion game \(G_c\), let the measurement function be the Cesàro average in example 1. For any \(\epsilon > 0\), define the target set as \(C_{\epsilon} := \{\mu \in \Delta | \Phi(\mu) - \Phi^* < \epsilon\}\). A probability measure \(\mathcal{P}_t\) over \((\Delta, B^\star)\) is an \((\epsilon, \delta)\)-Wardrop Non-Equilibrium solution (WANES) if \(\mathcal{P}_t(\{\mu^k\}_{k=1}^\infty \subseteq \Delta | \mu^k \in C_{\epsilon} \} \geq 1 - \delta\). Furthermore, any learning algorithm \(A\) producing such \(\mathcal{P}_t\) is said to be an \((\epsilon, \delta)\)-Wardrop Non-Equilibrium learning.

**C. Resilience to Informational Attacks**

While under normal operation, the INS traffic flow is close to the equilibrium flow set \(\mu^\star\), a one-shot perturbation in the flow can cause successive disruptions, as discussed in Section I. To see this, let the actual flow of the transportation network be \(\mu_0 \in \mu^\star\) at time \(t_0 \in \mathbb{N}_+\), an MITM attacker is able to modify this piece of information into \(\mu^t \in \Delta\) to mislead the INS. This error in turn propagates to the latency vector revealed by the INS so that at time \(t_0\) the loss vector \(\ell_{t_0}\) is replaced by \(\hat{\ell}_{t_0} := \ell(\mu^t, \omega^t)\). Hence the mirror step (2) at \(t_0\) is poisoned as follows:

\[
\mu_{t_0+1} = \arg \min_{\mu \in \Delta} \eta_t \langle \mu, \hat{\ell}_{t_0} \rangle + D_\Psi(\mu, \mu^t).
\]

The INS assigns the individual mixed strategies corresponding to poisoned \(\mu_0 + 1\), hence propagating the flow disturbance attack. Let attack \(a^\dagger := D_\Psi(\mu_0, \mu^t)\) be the Bregman divergence from \(\mu^t\) to \(\mu_0\), which stands for the attack magnitude in terms of the information geometry, as the flows can be scaled as probability distributions.

However, the intrinsic adaptability of MD enables the INS to pull the poisoned flow back to the right track, by iterative Non-Equilibrium learning in the environment. We hereby give a resilience characterization for such adaptability in Definition 4 based on the non-equilibrium notion.

**Definition 4** (Resilience). Given an attack \(a^\dagger \in \mathbb{R}_+\), let \(r_{a^\dagger}(\cdot, \cdot) : (0, 1) \times \mathbb{N}_+ \mapsto \mathbb{R}_+\) be a recovery threshold function parameterized by \(a^\dagger\), \(T \in \mathbb{N}_+\) be a recovery time length, and \(A\) be an online-learning algorithm. For \(\delta \in (0, 1)\), the INS is said to be \((r_{a^\dagger}, T, \delta)\)-resilient under \(A\) if the \(T\)-step trajectory \((\mu^1, \ldots, \mu^T)\) under \(A\) after an attack \(a^\dagger\) is a \((r_{a^\dagger}, \delta)\)-WANES, i.e., \(P_T\{\Phi(\mu^T) - \Phi^* < r_{a^\dagger}\} \geq 1 - \delta\).

The resilience of the INS is quantified by the ability to recover from a given attack \(a^\dagger\). It is natural that the ability to recover is dependent on the level of \(a^\dagger\) and the recovering time \(T\), with \(\delta\) picked as a tolerance parameter for recovery-failing tail probability.

**IV. Resilience Analysis**

A. Resilience with General \(\Psi\)

We introduce the following simplified notations. Let the optimal SBP be \(\phi^\star(\omega) := \sup_{\mu \in \mu^\star} \phi(\mu, \omega)\), which is assumed to be finite almost surely; the worst case potential is then \(\phi^\star = \sup_{\omega \in \Omega} \phi^\star(\omega)\); the realized SBP at time \(t\) is \(\phi^t = \phi(\mu^t, \omega^t)\); the MBP at time \(t\) is \(\Phi^t := \Phi(\mu^t)\). Let \(d(\mu, \mu^\star) = \inf_{\mu^\star \in \mu^\star} ||\mu - \mu^\star||^2\) be the Euclidean distance from \(\mu\) to the set of MWE. We impose a standard technical assumption that significantly simplifies the analysis.

**Assumption 2.** For all \(\mu \in \Delta, \omega \in \Omega\), the latency function satisfies that, there exist two constants \(A\) and \(B\) such that \(||\ell(\mu, \omega)||^2 \leq A\phi(\mu, \omega) + B\).

Assumption 2 indicates the linear growth of \(||\ell||^2\) with respect to \(\phi\), which can be analytically verified for some particular choices of Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) function, e.g., the additively perturbed BPR functions of form \(l_{bpr}(\lambda \mu, \omega) = t_s(1 + \alpha_2(1 + (\lambda \mu)\omega_\alpha) + \omega_\varepsilon\), where \(\omega \in \Omega \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{\ell_1}\) is the edge-wise perturbation vector, \(t_s\) is free travel time, \(C_e\) is the edge capacity, with \(\alpha_1\) and \(\alpha_2\) being two parameters. We begin our analysis with Lemma 1, which bounds the one-step change of \(D_\Psi(\mu, \mu^t)\) by MD.

**Lemma 1.** Let \(\{\mu^t\}_{t \in \mathbb{N}}\) be a sequence generated by (2), then the following holds for any \(\mu \in \Delta\):

\[
D_\Psi(\mu, \mu^{t+1}) - D_\Psi(\mu, \mu^t) \leq \eta_t \langle \mu - \mu^t, \ell^t \rangle + 2\eta^2_t \sigma^2_\Psi(A \phi^t + B) \tag{5}\n\]

\((A \phi^t + B)\) term can be replaced with a coarser bound, but this refined one-step inequality (5), as an outcome of
Assumption 2, gives a profound interpretation as it connects the divergence change to $\phi^t$. This divergence difference characterizes the system-level “rationality”: as $\phi$ gets lower, the “rationality” level gets higher, and less effort needs to be paid to change the flow.

Based on Lemma 1, Lemma 2 bounds the Euclidean distance from post-attack $\mu^t$ to $\mu^*$. To simplify the analysis, set $t_0 = 1$ by default and assume that at $t_0$, the INS already reaches the WE set, i.e., $\mu^{t_0} = \mu^*$. The attacker launches $a_1 = D_\phi(\mu^*, \mu^{t_0}) \geq \inf_{\mu \in \mu^*} D_\phi(\mu, \mu^{t_0})$, after which the MD dynamic initializes $\mu^t \leftarrow \mu^t$.

**Lemma 2.** Let $\{\mu^t\}_{t \in \mathbb{N}_+}$ be a sequence generated by (2) after the attack $a_1$, let $C_1 = \phi^* + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}$, with $\eta \leq \frac{\sigma^2}{2\eta}$ and being non-increasing, we have for all $t \in \mathbb{N}_+$, $\mu^* \in \mu^*$,

$$d(\mu^{t+1}, \mu^*) \leq \|\mu^{t+1} - \mu^*\|^2 \leq 2\overline{\sigma}^2(C_1 \sum_{k=1}^t \eta_k + a^t) \quad (6)$$

and the following upper bounds:

$$2(C_1 \sum_{k=1}^t \eta_k^2 + \eta_1 a^t + \sigma) \leq 2(C_{1t} + (C_1 \sum_{k=1}^t \eta_k + a^t)\eta_1^t + \eta_1 a^t)$$

**Lemma 2** gives a distance bound larger than $2\eta^{-1}a^t$, increasing with $t$, yet allows us to control the distance by adjusting the order of the summation $\sum_{k=1}^{t-1} \eta_k^t$, which is convergent as $t \to \infty$ under careful tuning, e.g., when $\eta_1 = \eta_1 t^{-\beta / 2}$ with $\beta \in (-\frac{1}{2}, 0)$. Later we show that, $d(\mu^{t+1}, \mu^*)$ can be controlled by the $\Theta(C_{1t} + \mu^*, \mu^*)$ with high probability, which allows us to bound the maximum of $d(\mu^{t+1}, \mu^*)$, as stated in Theorem 1.

**Theorem 1.** Let $\{\mu^t\}_{t \in \mathbb{N}_+}$ be the sequence generated by (2) after attack $a_1$, assuming that $\eta \leq \frac{\sigma^2}{2\eta}$ and is non-increasing. Let the two quantities be $c_1 := \max_{x \in \mathbb{N}_+} \eta \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \eta_j < \infty$, $c_2 := \eta_1 (\sigma^2 + 4\Phi^2 + B) + \sigma^{-1}(2A^2 + 1)(C_1 + \eta_1 a^t)$, we have for $t \in \mathbb{N}_+$, for $\delta \in (0, 1)$, w.p. $1 - \delta$,

$$\max_{1 \leq t \leq T} d(\mu^t, \mu^*) \leq C_2 \log \left( \frac{T}{\delta} \right), \quad (7)$$

where

$$C_2 = \frac{4\eta^2}{\sigma\eta} + \left( \frac{2A_1}{\sigma^2} + \frac{8\eta A_1}{\sigma^4} \right) a^t + \left( \frac{8A C_1 + 2B}{\sigma^2} \right) \sum_{k=1}^t \eta_k^2 + \left( \sum_{k=1}^t 2C_1 \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} \eta_i a^t \right) \sigma \eta$$

Intuitively, the traffic flow output by MD should fall into a logarithmic ball centered around the MWE flows, with the diameter dependent on the initial flow disturbance attack. Based on Theorem 1, we can establish the high-probability resilience results as stated in Proposition 1.

**Proposition 1** (Resilience of MD). Under attack $a^t$, let $\delta \in (0, 1)$ and $r(a^t, \cdot)$ be defined as $r(a^t, \delta, T) = \sum_{k=1}^T \eta_k C_3(a^t)^{\frac{1}{2}} \log \left( \frac{2\overline{\sigma}}{\eta} \right)$, where

$$C_3(a^t) = \left( 1 + \frac{2A_1}{\sigma^2} a^t \right) \left( (4A^2 + 1)C_2 + 4AC_1 \right) \left( 2 \sum_{i=1}^t \eta_i^2 \right) + \frac{2(4AC_1 + B)}{\sigma^2} \left( \sum_{k=1}^t \eta_k^2 \right)$$

is a constant independent of $T$ but dependent on $a^t$, with $C_2$ defined in Theorem 1. The INS is $(r(a^t, \delta, T), \delta)$-resilient under MD algorithm 1. Furthermore, with $\eta_1 = n_t^{T-1}$ and $\beta \in (-\frac{1}{2}, 0)$, then $r(a^t, \delta, T) = \Theta(T^\beta \log^2 T)$.

In Proposition 1 we give a sub-linear order for the threshold function $r(a^t)$, without imposing boundedness assumption on the latency vector. The $\Theta(T^\beta)$ order implies a.s. convergence of the MBP to the optimum, which indicates the asymptotic collapse of performance loss. In the long run, the INS is expected to recover fully from such attacks.

**B. Resilience Discussion with Bounded Attack**

In this section, we let $\Psi$ be the unnormalized negentropy, i.e., for $\mu \in \Delta$, $\Psi(\mu) = \sum_{p \in P} \mu_p \log \mu_p - \mu_p$. In this case, the MD step gives, under the initial information disturbance $\mu^*, \mu^* \propto \mu_p \exp(-\eta_1^t p) p \in P_w, w \in W$, that is, for all $w \in W$,

$$\left( \mu^* \right)^{t+1} \in P_w = \left( m_w e^{-\sum_{w_i \in E} \eta_i^t p_i} \right)_{p \in P_w} \quad (8)$$

where $e^t$ is the feedback latency vector of the post-attack flows. To illustrate the dependence of resilience on the attack parameter, we consider two types of attacks: $\text{Unif}$ attacks and $\text{Supp}$ attacks. The $\text{Unif}$ attacks are when $a^t$ is such that $\mu^* = \frac{1}{|P_w|} m_w$, for all $p \in P_w, w \in W$, in which case the flow information is uniformly redistributed. The $\text{Supp}$ attacks represent a more generic class of attacks, where the attacker poisons the flow information such that $\text{supp}(\mu^t) \subseteq \text{supp}(\mu^*)$. Both types of attacks satisfy the boundedness, i.e., $a^t < \infty$.

**Proposition 2.** Let $P = \max_{w \in W} |P_w|$, $\gamma_w = \min_{p \in P_w} \mu_p > 0$, and $\gamma_w = \min_{w \in W} \gamma_w$, under MD algorithm 1

a) Under $\text{Unif}$ attack, the INS is $(r_{\text{Unif}}, T, \delta)$-resilient, with $r_{\text{Unif}}(\delta, T) = \Theta(MWT^\beta \log P)$ for $\beta \in (-\frac{1}{2}, 0)$.

b) Under $\text{Supp}$ attack, the INS is $(r_{\text{Supp}}, T, \delta)$-resilient, with $r_{\text{Supp}}(\delta, T) = \Theta(M\gamma^2 T^\beta \gamma^2 - 1 \log T^\beta)$ for $\beta \in (-\frac{1}{2}, 0)$.

By Proposition 2, under $\text{Unif}$ attack, the resilience threshold is up to a logarithmic order of the maximum path size $P$, and linear in terms of the number of OD pairs. The capability of the MD learning to adapt and recover the system is then linearly dependent on the network size $\mathcal{E} = \Theta(|\mathcal{P}|)$ and the population complexity $M$ and $W$. However, when the attack $a^t$ becomes more random, the INS becomes less resilient as the $T^\beta$ order may be partially offset by other factors such as $\gamma$, slowing down the recovery.

**V. CASE STUDY**

This section studies an experimental setup of an evacuation process in Sioux Falls, SD, building on the South Dakota Transportation Network [18]. At each time unit, a fixed number of individuals are transported from a set of emergency locations to shelter places. We adopt the BPR function discussed in Section IV to generate the latency feedback.
The transportation network data, including OD demand, free travel time, and road capacities are obtained from [19].

We assume that the evacuation process is conducted using a learning-based mechanism, i.e., the MD algorithm. We simulate the learning process for 100 time units, at \( t_0 = 30 \), the we run the simulation for 10 times and plot the mean and a sample of the MBP trajectory in Fig. 2.

As shown in the figure, at time \( t_0 = 30 \), an attacker launches a Unif attack on the INS, causing the potential to be much higher. After the attack, we compare the learning-based resilience and the recovery without learning by setting the benchmark as a greedy assignment process, which iteratively allocates traffic demand proportional to the inverse of path latency. In comparison with the greedy assignment, which produces potential oscillation after the attack, the INS can rapidly recover the system from high MBP through MD learning within 15 time steps.

By plotting the post-attack curves of MBP difference \( \Phi^t - \Phi^* \) and \( d(\mu^t, \mu^*) \) with logarithmic order, as shown in Fig. 3, one can observe that the learning-based trajectory achieves faster recovery and better stability, corroborating that the MD-based INS provides stronger resiliency and higher efficiency.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, we have investigated the resilience of traffic networks under misinformation attacks on the Intelligent Navigation Systems (INS). The proposed non-Equilibrium learning has enabled a feedback-enabled resiliency mechanism and provided post-attack resiliency assessment and design methodologies. Through finite-time analysis of the learning dynamics, we have demonstrated the ability of INS to recover from multiple informational attacks. Future research would focus on creating scalable and distributed resilience mechanisms that can scale up with respect to the time and network size of the transportation networks. We would investigate the dynamic attack model to develop defensive strategies against strategically evasive cyber-physical threats.

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