Territorial Defence in the structures of the Member States of NATO defence derived from the former Warsaw Pact

PASZYN, Maciej

The constant reduction of defence budgets combined with a significant reduction of the armed forces of the European NATO members coming from the Warsaw Pact creates the necessity to create alternative forms of border defence. The ideal solution to the problem seems to be the creation and development structures of Territorial Defence. Components of this type are characterized by a high defence potential, low maintenance costs and high level of popularity. Despite the obvious advantages, except for the Baltic States, these structures do not exist in the countries examined. Following the pattern of Scandinavian or Baltic Sea countries the analysed states should put a strong emphasis on the creation and development of this kind of component and support it by voluntary pro–defence organizations. Keywords: NATO, Territorial Defence, Home Guard, restructuring of the army, pro–defence organizations

Renal present national defence systems

The day of the 1st of July 1991 is a symbolic date, the end of pro–soviet politico–military pact named the “Warsaw Pact”, and the beginning of great strategic and organizational changes in the field of security for all its former members. The final end of the bipolar division of Europe was associated with the withdrawal of offensive strategic assets and preparations for total war. It supervened a “definite change in the assessment of the nature of the threats. No mention has a high global, or even a European war, war using nuclear weapons. Non–military threats and the threat of armed conflict on a local and regional level, was rather exposed.” [1] It covered the adopted changes in NATO’s strategic concept. [2] For countries detaching from the Eastern Bloc it meant a restructuring of the armed forces and moving towards professionalization. Practically for all of the former European satellite countries of the USSR, as well as for the majority of the newly established Soviet republics the overriding goal was to strive to join the North Atlantic Treaty. These efforts combined with the hardships of political changes in the economy and hence the substantial decrease in funding for defence led the country for the past 22 years to a major reduction of the armed forces.

1 This article is the written form of the presentation that was shown on the Central European Forum on Higher Military Education (CEFME) International Young Scientists Conference on December 2013, NUPS, Budapest.
2 Priv. M.Sc.
Table 1. Quantitative Potential of selected Warsaw Pact Member in 1989. [3]

| 1989 Year       | Bulgaria | Hungary | Poland | Romania | Czechoslovakia |
|-----------------|----------|---------|--------|---------|----------------|
| Land army (all) | 103,300  | 99,200  | 243,500| 146,200 | 169,600        |
| Air Force       | 4500     | 1600    | 40,900 | 5400    | 23,000         |
| Navy            | 6300     | 0       | 22,200 | 6400    | 0              |
| Supporting units| 2700     | 6000    | 33,500 | 12,000  | 4000           |
| Territorial Defence | 700    | 0       | 6900   | 1000    | 3100           |
| All armed forces| 171,000  | 106,800 | 347,000| 171,000 | 199,700        |

Militar y equipment

|                      |            |         |        |         |                |
|----------------------|------------|---------|--------|---------|----------------|
| Tanks                | 2200       | 1435    | 3330   | 3200    | 4585           |
| AFV & APC            | 2365       | 2310    | 4855   | 5000    | 4900           |
| Aircrafts            | 234        | 113     | 480    | 380     | 407            |
| Helicopters          | 51         | 96      | 195    | 220     | 101            |

Table 2. Quantitative potential of selected NATO Members in 2012. [4]

| 2012            | Bulgaria | Hungary | Poland | Romania | Czech Rep. & Slovakia |
|-----------------|----------|---------|--------|---------|-----------------------|
| Land Army (all) | 16,304   | 17,548  | 71,700 | 57,500  | 29,392                |
| Air Forces      | 6706     | 5039    | 17,200 | 9500    | 8748                  |
| Navy            | 3471     | 0       | 8100   | 6900    | 0                     |
| Supporting units| 0        | 0       | 0      | 12,000  | 0                     |
| Territorial Defence | 0    | 0       | 0      | 0       | 8177                  |
| Gov. paramilitary units | 34,000 | 12,000  | 21,400 | 79,000  | 3100                  |
| All armed forces | 34,710   | 22,587  | 100,000| 73,900  | 49,417                |
| Reserve         | 303,000  | 44,000  | 0      | 45,000  | 3080                  |

Militar y equipment

|                      |            |         |        |         |                |
|----------------------|------------|---------|--------|---------|----------------|
| Tanks                | 301        | 30      | 944    | 345     | 223            |
| AFV & APC            | 1240       | 404     | 2116   | 1715    | 944            |
| Aircrafts            | 62         | 14      | 122    | 70      | 69             |
| Helicopters          | 53         | 29      | 243    | 64      | 98             |

Data included in Table 1 and Table 2 show that the quantitative reduction of the personnel of the armed forces ranged from 57% (Romania) to 80% (Bulgaria and Hungary — without counting the number of reservists). Secondly, it is easy to notice the fact that reduction in land combat equipment reached 95–98% of output. At the same time it is necessary to cite a well-known fact that the major quantitative restrictions did not contribute to a major improvement of the quality. Despite the passage of two decades, the armies of the countries
described largely use equipment of Soviet origin, whose shelf life is forcibly extended by more costly modifications. One of the effects of these processes is a significant reduction of defence capabilities in the described countries, which calls into serious question the possible self-defence of its own borders against external enemies.

According to strategic foundations, the majority of decision-makers from Central and Eastern Europe’s answer to the question put before them is that the threat was to join NATO structures and adduce the famous 5th article stating that “The Parties [countries] agree that an armed attack against one or more of them (…) shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs to each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence (…) will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force”. [5] There is a need to declare of that, this document has been created in case of global conflict during which Soviet Union was a major adversary and collective help of all NATO states would profit in political and military advantages for all Treaty members. It is hard to imagine equal absorption in case of local conflict on the outskirts of the Alliance. Article 5th in its construction leaves a “back door” for member states which limits the range of help for an attacked country — “such action as it deems necessary”. There is also a tendency to forget about the 3rd article which has a fundamental importance for all member states. It states that “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”. [6] The main points of this article impose on each member state the duty of:

- having resources to maintain a self-reliant defence of the country’s borders, which would be supported by allied forces if necessary;
- having mobile expeditionary forces capable of quick help for attacked member states. It is important to remember that member countries in case of aggression against one of the pact members, even when the military assistance would be necessary, would need time for such assistance to take place. According to numerous previsions, it has been estimated that time needed for real military assistance for the attacked state would be from 2 to 6 weeks. During that time the attacked member state would have to rely on its own military.

The above directives deriving from the Washington Treaty and the respective duties de- riving from it, have to be placed in an actual political and military situation in Europe. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) analysis there is a stable decrease of military and defence expenditures among European members of NATO.

| Year | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| % GDP | 1.93 | 1.89 | 1.86 | 1.81 | 1.78 | 1.75 | 1.72 | 1.62 | 1.74 | 1.58 |
Table 4. The budget allocated to defence by selected countries of NATO in USD bn. [4]

| Country      | 2008 | 2011 |
|--------------|------|------|
| Latvia       | 0.47 | 0.29 |
| Lithuania    | 0.47 | 0.425|
| Bulgaria     | 1.12 | 0.725|
| Romania      | 2.6  | 2.67 |
| Hungary      | 1.64 | 1.41 |
| Slovakia     | 1.31 | 1.07 |
| Estonia      | 0.39 | 0.39 |
| Czech Rep.   | 2.85 | 2.52 |
| Poland       | 7.23 | 9.43 |
| U.K.         | 60.1 | 61.09*|
| Germany      | 44.5 | 42.33*|
| France       | 60.9 | 58.8 |
| Italy        | 34   | 21   |

Table 4 clearly shows that the tendency concerns both, Western Europe superpowers and states of the former Warsaw Pact. An obvious consequence of this trend shows that the particular countries are more interested in building and modernizing their own defence potential rather than engaging in international projects. Also it has to be added that change of priorities can be observed in documents of a major member of NATO — United States. In a document from 3rd of January 2012 concerning the “Defence Strategic Guidance of United States of America” a new path in US international policy for years 2012 to 2020 has been introduced stating “major challenges and simultaneously chances for economic and security interests seen in the development of the situation in the area extending from the Western Pacific and Eastern Asia to the Indian Ocean and Southern Asia. (...) World leadership has to be ensured with building partnerships with allied states, (...) through innovative, low–cost actions em- bracing exercises, rotation residences and extended consultancy. (...) Decrease number of personnel and change in strategic priorities will result in moving two brigades out of Europe.” [7] That document clearly states that the United States’ involvement in Europe will be systematically reduced, limiting their involvement only to instructions, military training and consultancy.

All of the above factors and processes taking place are creating a situation where most of NATO states’ defence systems deriving from the Warsaw Pact are inchoate. Determined reduction of national military forces combined with outdated equipment and budget cuts (both own and major allies) in spending on defence, creates a potential threat for the security of analysed States. Therefore, there is a situation in which armed forces of these states would not be capable of carrying out the primary task of a country’s defence. The above situation creates a need for armed force’s component which would be:

- relatively cheap;
- purposed to carry out land operations;
- purposed to carry out assistance, delay and defence actions;
- capable of carry out operations exclusively within state’s borders;
- capable of carry out operations in an area of a state as a whole.

All cited assumptions indicate Territorial Defence (also named “Home Guard”) forma- tion, the development of which seems to be ideal a solution for problems described in this chapter.
World patterns of Territorial Defence (TD)

“In most militarily significant countries in the world, have been and still are included in the structures of the armed universal ‘qualities’ (...) that allow to optimally build armies (apart from all different countries). One of them indicates a two-part structure of the armed forces — consisting of ‘mobile’ operational troops and ‘local’ territorial defence forces.” [8]

The first of these components can be today described as “operational” military forces. Consisting almost entirely of professional soldiers, they are characterized by relatively high mobility, offensive ability, plenty of combat vehicles and various types of military equipment. The maintenance and constant upgrading of this component in the force necessary for self-sufficient and effective defence of its own borders involves enormous financial costs generally in excess of the budgetary possibilities of the vast majority of countries in the world. Primarily from the necessity to pay qualified professional soldiers from the lowest to the highest levels (it is related with the increasingly high-tech combat equipment) and the cost of upkeep and permanent modernization of using equipment and armament. The current economic crisis and the resulting cut budgets for defence, as well as the rapid development of modern technologies in the armed forces of developed countries, caused a tendency to limit the size distribution of operational forces for their quality.

Undoubtedly, it is advantageous for the implementation of precise expeditionary tasks characteristic for the past two decades. On the other hand, it raises the doubt whether this kind of component would be able to accomplish the task of effectively defending the borders of its own state in the situation of a conventional, full-scale conflict. Therefore, an increasing number of countries began to develop Territorial Defence formations, as the missing element of the state defence system.

The origins of Territorial Defence formations dates back to antiquity. With the passage of centuries it has changed in nature of their character, size and structure. Taking into account the last 20 years of history and only the best developed formations of this type in the world, it can be assumed that the Territorial Defence Forces are: “a territorially formed part of the armed forces organized and used to defend (...) functioning in subordination to the territorial authority of the operational, regional and local level of command. It includes units of light infantry and types of troops formed on the basis of local material resources and reserves prepared to conduct combat operations in regular and irregular formation in constant areas of responsibility. They can carry on the fight alone, support operational forces and provide assistance to the population as part of the (...) humanitarian action”. [8] TD formations generally consist of volunteers with basic military training, appointed for periodic training, who usually have other gainful work. Often they are former professional soldiers or people trying to get into a professional army. The essence of these types of formation are “local performing tasks”, what means military activity on the areas where TD soldiers live, among communities from which they come. Excellent knowledge of the area and very strong support from the local population, they significantly increase the combat value of the sub-units of this type, forcing a potential opponent to use significant forces and resources to overcome them without guarantee of success, because the OT unit is much easier to disperse than destroy. These in turn, act on their own territory and have a very high capacity to carry out irregular warfare. In addition, formations of this type, due to the good relations with the local society,
are ideally suited to perform the tasks related to key security military facilities, logistics, anti–diversion operations, civilian control of traffic or with refugees. With the potential of armed conflict, these actions can decisively help the main force, hindering significantly the realization of tactical and operational tasks by aggressors. And all of this at a relatively low investment cost needed to maintain this type of unit. It should be remembered, that in addition to a much lower payment level (caused by the duration of the service), the State budget saves on equipment, because the basic sub-units of light infantry armament are small arms weapons, expensive heavy military equipment is not used by them. In addition, these formations, for transport purposes, are free to use civilian vehicles. Logistics is also facilitated because the TD soldiers can make use of local civil supplies with much more success in the areas of food or medicines.

At this moment it is necessary to define the difference between Territorial Defence and Reserve Army. In many descriptions and summaries these terms are often used interchangeably allegedly. According to the author of this article it is a factual mistake. This is due to several key similarities between the formations of those types. Reserves in fact, the same as TD units are mobilized periodically for the duration of exercise, in crisis situations such as natural disasters or in a war situation, and are intended for general tasks in support of the main forces of the regular army. However, in contrast to the TD, the Army Reserve is not characterized by local, territorial responsibility, it is usually equipped with heavy weapons (mostly older), and also has a limited (compared to the Professional Army) offensive capability and manoeuvrability. Accordingly, the Reserve Army should count as a component of operating forces, which often performs Territorial Defence tasks (in the case of TD absence). It is possible to have a situation in which TD formations will be included in the Army Reserve, however putting an equal sign between them is impossible because of the reasons above.

In a later part of this study the author will present three TD formations from Western countries, which will be the standard reference for the analysis of the situation in NATO States from the former communist bloc.

The potential of TD is used in wide aspects in the most powerful armies in the world, led by the largest military power in present time, which is the United States Army. The history of the U.S. National Guard (NG) goes back to the beginnings of the state and is deeply rooted in the culture of the society. With its legal powers in the constitution, its formation is a separate type of armed forces in the structure of the U.S. Army and is the strongest structure of Territorial Defence in the world. According to the Military Balance 2012, it ranks count 358 thousand soldiers, including 49.5 thousand on active duty (about 8% of all U.S. Army ground troops). In addition, the NG has its own aviation staff that counts 106 thousand people including 6641 soldiers remaining in permanent service. Despite such large manpower and overgrown command structure to the level of the 8 Divisions, the organization did not lose the regional nature of the responsibility and is still strongly rooted in local communities. The primary purpose of this formation is all kinds of actions to support regular U.S. Army at home and abroad. It is probably the only example where the component of this type carries virtually 100% of the Reserve Army task (and not vice versa as is usually). For obvious reasons, the level of potential NG is unreachable by any other formation of TD in the world. It is worth noting that the maintenance and development of this type of formation is an integral part of strategic planning by the greatest military power in the world and the expenditure for this purpose is 10% of the defence budget of the country.
The strongest of the European members of NATO, the United Kingdom, has in its structure Territorial Defence formations. The British Territorial Army (TA) has approximately 32 thousand soldiers and has elements of land, sea and air, where the burden of the defence budget fluctuates around 1%. The mentioned formation is noteworthy due to several organisational and legal solutions. 236 TA units are divided into national, territorial and sponsored. 14 national units are specialized sub-units and often support operating forces. They enable their members to acquire high-level skills (depending on specialization) in the field of communications, medicine, linguistics, artillery and engineering (often recruited here are those of preferred occupations in civilian life). 222 regional units are typical formations of light infantry that perform in common support tasks for such troops. A new idea is called “Sponsored Units”. “Employees who agreed to join the reserves continue to work with the scope of their civil activities under the responsibility of the TA on the basis of an agreement between the entrepreneurs and British Ministry of Defence (MoD). About 2000 sponsored reservists are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.” [9] The TA organization is a typical volunteer formation, and basic training lasts for 59 days a year (generally weekends). After passing this stage, annual commitment of a member of the territorial unit is 19 days (two weekends plus training camp). Soldiers of the formation have the rights to receive a number of tax reliefs. Days of service are well paid (about 50 pounds per day is the lowest amount), while the soldiers are heavily protected against possible dismissal from work: “if the employer terminates the contract of employment without the consent of the Territorial, and the cause is an obligation to perform military service in the reserve, it is guilty of a crime” [9] and must pay high compensation. In addition, through various support programs, there are several governmental and nongovernmental organizations aimed at strengthening cooperation between the British MoD, employers and soldiers. All these aspects make people willing to join the TA, and the formation is widely accepted by the local community.

Those two structures were examples of Home Guard components in the high-size of the armed forces budget leading powers of the world, in which the formations of this type were minor (more or less significant) elements of the total armed forces. Meanwhile, Sweden shows how a voluntary organization can be a primary defensive part of the state security system. Starting from 2008 it ensures a systematic decrease in the size of the defence budget in the armed forces of this country (2008 — 44 billion kroner, in 2014 — the planned 38.9 billion). This situation forced a reduction of the manpower of the regular army from 17 to 12.5 thousand soldiers. [10] Consequently, an increasing number of tasks are done by a defensive voluntary organization named “Hemvare” (Home Guard/National Guard). This formation consists of about 30 thousand members (according to the Military Balance 2012), and is a textbook example of the Territorial Defence organization. Divided into 21 battalions (this number is directly related to the number of counties) performs all types of tasks characteristic for territorial units. The battalions are divided into 2–5 companies, each of which carries out tasks in their own municipality (max. 2–3 commune for a company). Ultimately, it is assumed the number of 160 companies in 2014 (which also means a reduction, since before the budget cuts the figure was around 300). [11] The basic tasks of “Hemvare” include, among others: the defence and protection of objects, supporting crises, border monitoring, reconnaissance and anti-diversion. According to the strategic plans of the Swedish Ministry of Defence in situations of armed conflict, the Swedish army is expected to reach a size of 50 thousand mobilized soldiers in just 7 days. Over 40% of this number (22 thousand) will occur.
in the described formation of the TD, which will be automatically increased to the number of 40 battalions. [12]

The system of training, wages and law–welfare facilities in “Hemvarnet” is similar to the British Territorial Army. The distinguishing factor of Swedish TD is that it gives spe- cial attention to its relationship with national youth and pro–defence organizations. The de- scribed formation has its youth counterpart — Hemvarnsungdom (“National Youth Guard”), designed for volunteers aged 15–20 years. Military training conducted in this formation, “focuses on military sports (track, overcoming obstacles, very popular in the Scandinavian countries is orienteering, throwing a grenade), safety during training, first aid and basic prin- ciples of survival, stamina marches mostly in the mountains, very popular are self–defence games and sports; members of youth organizations from Norway and Finland also take part. Combat training is implemented for youth over 18 years of age.” [10] In addition, there is trainings in shooting, mainly with air guns. The whole course takes place on weekends and during summer and winter camps and their participants receive uniforms on loan from mil- itary warehouses. After completing the whole process of training in a youth organization, a young person can go then directly to the main formation “Hemvarnet” without the 85–day basic training (GMU — Grundlaggade Militär Utbildning). The second area of “Hemvarnet” activity, worth more attention, is the cooperation with a pro–defence organizations, which ac- cording to various estimates have about 600 thousand people, representing approximately 7% of the total population. In Sweden there are 19 organizations of this type, with the agreement with “Hemvarnet”, and 8 of them have a special status that allows its members to become soldiers of described TD formation without having to undergo GMU. It also works in the op- posite direction, because the soldiers can be sent (to become members) to the organization for specialist training. These organizations operate in the fields of: transport (SKBR), medicine (Swedish Red Cross), Radio communication (FRO), objects Protection and Security (SLK — Association for Women), reconnaissance (FMCK), water (SVK RF) air (SBK) and rescue exploration (SBK). In addition, “Hemvarnet” works with another 10 organizations including

35 thousandth Swedish National Defence Organization. All of these support organizations are founded on a very high profile formation in the functioning of local and regional commu- nities, which significantly raises the general defence awareness of Swedish society. It can be said that any possible aggressor would have an opponent in the vast majority of the Swedish population, adapted to support the military’s own army.

The example of Scandinavian TD formation perfectly shows how a limited defence bud- get can maintain a very high level of defensive potential by using social voluntary organiza- tions. All three of the above mentioned TD formations, despite substantial differences linked to the size and the target allocation, have several features in common, which are indisputable advantages characteristic of this armed forces component and should be subject to special attention. These are:

1. nationwide range of activity, enabling in a conflict case their performance of territorial tasks throughout all the country;
2. low maintenance costs due to the periodicity of paid wages, as well as co–financing by domestic private entities;
3. significant impact on the defensive awareness and basic defence training for all society;
4. decisive impact on the promotion of the Army, which increases its potential in the future.
Properly placed concerned formations of the Territorial Defence in the armed system of the country, can successfully generate uninterrupted benefits listed above. However for this to happen, it is necessary for correct promotion, development and maintenance by key decision-makers of the armed forces. Meanwhile, in NATO member countries formerly from the Warsaw Pact, there should be particular interest in the components of this type, yet the situation is generally completely opposite.

**Baltic exception**

For over 45 years all the satellite countries of the USSR and the former soviet republics were dependent in their strategic plans on the strict guidelines of Moscow. It was connected, among others, with the approach of the development of native components of Territorial Defence. Offensive strategy concepts of the Red Army, based on massive ground–air strikes and total war, required continuous maintenance of components capable of carrying tasks in support of the back of the front. The Polish People’s Republic established, in the mid–60’s, a component of Land Territorial Defence (LTD; Obrona Terytorialna Kraju — OTK), and so it is possible to describe the characteristics of the formation in the military structures of the Warsaw Pact.

LTD had in their structures elements of land, air and sea. The group had one brigade, 18 regiments and 67 battalions (as of 1970). [13: 213] It was an extensive formation having in its composition, among others, units of communication, transport, defence against weapons of mass destruction, engineering, pontoon boats, air defence, coastal defence, etc. Saturation of LTD units with heavy equipment and the nature of this equipment identify the described formation much more as Reserve Army auxiliary than a typical example of Territorial Defence. Official documents (Resolution of the National Defence Committee of 16.X.1962) determined the true task of the formation as defensive– protective and emergency– rescue, however, in practice, these troops were intended to perform support tasks for the Soviet Army moving through Polish territory towards West Germany (at that time Polish operational forces would be involved in the realization of offensive operations outside the western boundary). It should also be noted that individual LTD originated directly from the branches of the Internal Security Corps (ISC; Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego — KBW) — militarized branches subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, used after World War II to eliminate the anti-communist underground and to pacify non-constitutional social unrest. Those units were highly politicized and often used to the detriment of its own citizens. The above origin of the LTD were a blatant disregard on the part of the soldiers for operational troops of the Polish Army. LTD formations were commonly considered second-class soldiers, fit only for the tasks behind own lines, in whose ranks were sent those soldiers whom were mediocre at best, but they were correct ideologically. As a result of these factors, a general social aversion to this military organization was born. This situation was comparable to the realities of the other members of the Warsaw Pact, where all types of territorial formations were used in addition to territorial emergency operations mainly for support tasks and prevention.

Since the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, each of the former members took a different route to restructure their military forces and thus presented a different approach to the subject of Territorial Defence. It led to very large discrepancies in the functioning (or lack thereof) of this type of formation in the structures of the armed forces of the described countries. In 9 analysed States, only three Baltic republics have decided to develop the component units.
Lying on the outskirts of the North Atlantic Treaty, Estonia is located in a very difficult geopolitical position. With a modest defence budget ($393 million for the year 2011), weak domestic economy and a powerful neighbour who openly hopes to return to superpower status, this country has been forced into a concept development based on the Scandinavian model (Swedish). Due to the very high costs of modernization and maintenance, it aban-

Table 5. The contribution of the components of the TD in the structures of selected NATO forces. [4]

|            | TD numbers | Number of all regular forces | TD% of regular army* | Reserve | Other gov. paramilitary units |
|------------|------------|------------------------------|----------------------|---------|-------------------------------|
| Bulgaria   | 0          | 31,315                       | 0%                   | 303,000 | 34,000                        |
| Czech Republic | 0          | 25,421                       | 0%                   | 8177    | 3100                          |
| Estonia    | 12,000     | 5750                         | 67.6%                | 30,000  | 2300                          |
| Hungary    | 0          | 22,587                       | 0%                   | 44,000  | 12,000                        |
| Latvia     | 10,666     | 4600                         | 69.9%                | 10 666**| 5000                          |
| Lithuania  | 14,300     | 10,640                       | 57.3%                | 6 700   | 5000                          |
| Poland     | 0          | 100,000                      | 0.0%                 | 10,000  | 21,400                        |
| Romania    | 0          | 73,900                       | 0.0%                 | 45,000  | 79,000                        |
| Slovakia   | 0          | 15,799                       | 0.0%                 | 3080*** | N/A                           |

* Ratio determined by the percentage of the TD component in professional army structures

** In Latvia, TD units are counted at the same time as the Reserve

*** In Slovakia, reserve and training units count towards the total of the armed forces

Taking into account the data in Table 5 should first focus on the Baltic States.
A similar model of building a national defence system was adopted in Latvia. With an annual defence budget ranging over the past few years from 250 to 300 million USD, the country cannot afford to maintain an expanded regular army. Operating forces have in their ranks, only 4600 professional soldiers whereof “the ground army includes about 2.1 thousand soldiers grouped in one light infantry brigade with two motorized battalions, artillery squadrons, logistics battalion and HQ company.” As in the case of Estonia, in Latvia the key role in the National Defence system was delegated to the volunteer Territorial Defence organization called the “National Guard” (Zemessardze). It is a typical Home Guard organization designed to carry out the tasks of territorial defensive and disaster protection. It consists of about 10 thousand soldiers including 1.2 thousand officers and 1.9 thousand NCOs. Structurally, the Latvian GN is divided into 18 battalions, grouped into three Defensive Districts (DO):

- 1st DO has the strength of five infantry battalions and one logistics battalion;
- 2nd DO has the strength of five battalions of infantry, an artillery battalion, and a battal- ion that combats the effects of ABC weapons, and a logistics battalion;
- 3rd DO in the strength of three infantry battalions, engineer battalion, anti–aircraft squadron and logistics battalion. [14]

A characteristic feature of GN is emphasis placed on preparing its troops to conduct guerrilla operations on the rear of the enemy. Units of Latvian [14] TD do not have heavy equipment. For transport tasks they use lightly armoured Humvees and unarmoured Volvo trucks. Apart from a small amount of field artillery, the main armament of GN soldiers are small arms and mortars with a figuratively smaller calibre. The vast majority of the Latvian TD subunits can be classified as typical light infantry formations.

A more complex situation can be observed in the case of Lithuania. As in the two previ- ous cases there is a limited defence budget, ranging around the border of $400 million. This has forced the authorities of Lithuania to limit the operating component (10,640 soldiers). The main strength of the Lithuanian Land Forces is a Mechanized–Infantry Brigade “Iron Wolf” adapted to all of NATO’s requirements; maintenance absorbs a significant part of the defence budget. In addition to this element the regular army consists of three independent mechanized infantry battalions, the engineer battalion, a special purpose battalion (the Grate Jaegers battalion), military police battalion, battalion logistics and minor elements of air and naval forces. Also in this case it was decided to develop a voluntary territorial formation. In contrast to Latvia and Estonia, Lithuanian Territorial Defence is performed by two separate entities. The first is the National Defence Volunteer Forces (NDVF; Krašto apsaugos sav- norių pajėgos — KASP). It is a typical TD formation designed for the implementation of territorial operations, disaster protection, and for contact with local communities. Its size is approximately 4700 soldiers divided into five territorial battalions, a battalion training, and a small Air component. [15] Units of this formation consist almost exclusively of sub–units of light infantry. The second important element that can be assigned to the defence potential of Lithuania is a paramilitary organization, the “Rifle Union”, which mainly consists of ba- sic military training for young Lithuanians. This pro–defence organization has in its ranks about 9.5 thousand members and has territorial units throughout the country, grouped into 10 Counties. The Lithuanian “Rifle Union” closely cooperates with the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence as well as with organizations of Police, Border Guard, Lithuanian Academy of Defence and other pro–defence entities. In carrying out the training program and patriotic ed- ucation in school (also with “difficult youth”) and student youth, Union makes an invaluable
contribution to the promotions of native army forces, and for of the public preparation in the event of armed conflict.

Examples of the three described Baltic Countries are unequivocal evidence of the effectiveness of the Territorial Defence component in the State security system. Similarly, as in the cases mentioned earlier of Western countries, it is also possible to observe the key benefits of the proper activity of the Home Guard, such as: a significant increase in defence capability of the State, nation-wide coverage of the tasks or expanding cooperation in military–society, and all this with a relatively low cost level. Meanwhile, in other NATO countries stemming from the Warsaw Pact, these type of components are virtually non-existent, and the territorial tasks are carried out by other government formations. Frequently, these functions are distributed among units:

- Border Guard (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania), in the area of border monitoring;
- Police and Special Police units (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania) in potential support operations and the maintenance of public safety;
- Formation of the Reserve Army (all analysed) in the field of emergency operations and support activities;
- Regular Army units (all described functions).

If we combine this information with the data contained in Chapter I about the scale of the reduction of personnel and equipment in the analysed armed forces we get the image of incomplete defence systems of those countries. Covering a lack of potential risks of armed conflict and NATO membership, it cannot justify the failure of national military potential.

**Summary and conclusions**

There are a couple of causes for this discrepancy, between the three Baltic States and the rest of the analysed countries. First of all, the three above described countries were, so to speak, forced to create the TD components. As they were the ones, out of the analysed nine that had to create their military structure after the collapse of the Soviet Union practically from scratch. Not having any native military units, nor a sufficient budget necessary to create full-sized operating forces effective in defence of its own borders, they had to choose the Scandinavian model and base its defence system on volunteer formations. This is a characteristic of countries receiving independence (other examples being the United States after the War of Independence or Poland in the years 1918–1921). Meanwhile, the remaining six Countries came out of the Warsaw Pact with excessively powerful military structures and a huge number of heavy equipment (rapidly aging but not obsolete). Excessively powerful military potential and economic troubles made reduction a priority. Territorial Defence Units were generally badly-equipped and identified as being militarily inferior. The best example here is the process of terminating units of TD in the Polish Army, which eventually disappeared in 2008.

The second key factor causing this discrepancy is both the social and primarily military environment and attitude concerning this kind of formation. Territorial units based on volunteers always strengthen the sovereignty of the society in a newly formed State. This situation could be observed during the process of obtaining independence for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the early 1990’s. Creating from scratch ones own, independent, military structures, was undoubtedly associated in those societies with the long–awaited process of
obtaining independence and thus they supported, to a significant extent, these initiatives. The growth potential that has been duly used and has enabled the creation of a sustainable national defence system, based on local voluntary formations, and raises a new generation in the spirit of patriotism and military awareness. While in the former satellite countries of the Warsaw Pact social attitude was completely different. The population interacts with the army with reluctance (especially for executives) identifying them with a tool controlled by policy makers from Moscow. More than 45 years of political interference in the military structures created a huge distance between the society and the army. It was prevented forming of terri- torial defence structures according to Western examples. Also the approach in military society crossed out the chance of the normal development of this component. Among older staff officers, brought up on Soviet offensive strategic concepts, accustomed to a huge amount of heavy equipment, they do not quite appreciate the combat value of this type of formation and are often considered absolutely unnecessary in the new geopolitical reality. Also lower man- agement staff continue to have a deep reluctance towards these TDs, believing their soldiers ill–trained and undisciplined (which, moreover, was often proved true in the armed forces of the Soviet and post–Soviet model). A period of USSR strategic thinking as well as more than 20 years of reductions and omissions in relation to the territorial component, caused a complete lack of understanding (among the most military personnel as well as society) for the idea of the functioning of this type of structures.

Meanwhile, the political–military situation has seen a major change over the past two decades. The systematic reduction of defence spending in most European NATO States, and hence the permanent reduction of the armed forces, created the necessity to seek alternative ways of supporting defensive combat abilities of the members of the Pact. In fact the excess military capacity from the beginning of the 1990’s was limited to such a large extent that it has become insufficient for self–defence. Referred to in sections II and III are examples of TD units in the military systems of their countries; these clearly show the benefits of investing in this type of formation. It is a way of restructuring, which the other six analysed countries should take seriously, choosing between the Swedish model (based on about 30–40% share of TD in the national defence potential) and the Baltic model (60–70% share of the TD). Due to the number of the population, the area of the territory of a member state, and the current size of the native armed forces, the first solution seems favourable for Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, while the other model perfectly addresses the needs of a smaller Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Today’s geopolitical situation and consequently, the NATO strategic concept, imposes on its members the need to have a relatively small but highly mobile and technically advanced operating component, supported by numerous and well–organized defensive forma- tions. Based on the above analysis, it is necessary at this point to cite all the arguments proving the need to develop TD structures in those countries of Central and Eastern Europe:

- raise the overall military capability of a state;
- reduce the cost of maintaining the armed forces;
- upgrading regular components (less will translate into better quality);
- adapting to the guidance of the military structures of NATO;
- training and raising general awareness among the public defence;
- improving the quality of response activities;
- the creation of new part–time jobs for youth;
- improve the relationship of the military to society.
A list of the benefits from the development of the territorial component is long and should be thoroughly analysed by a state’s policy makers.

However, it is clear that territorial defence organization structure does not arise from one day to the next. For correct development they need the convenient organizational and social conditions, and the last few decades omissions certainly did not help in the process. The most important element seems to be the persuasion of those organizations, all of society, because territorial defence units need to coexist with the local population and civil structures. To carry out this task, it is necessary to have a smart, long-term promotion campaign addressed to all generations. It should refer to patriotic values, financial–organizational benefits for local communities and remind people that the territorial service is associated with prestige and the possibility of earnings. The ideal solution would be to link a variety of voluntary services facilitating the (after a specified period of time) entrance to regular army.

The second key element should be the creation of appropriate organizational structures adequate for the task faced by the component. This would involve the necessity of territorial distribution of headquarters and training centres, allocating adequate equipment (which should not be a problem due to the nature of the activities of light infantry) as well as training instructors. The last issue would be the creation of appropriate regulatory concessions and benefits of law and economics enabling members of the Territorial Defence, on the model of the British Territorial Army for example. The systematic implementation of the above processes should give the first tangible results over about 5 years after their launch. For this to happen, it is essential to have a lasting conviction for the whole initiative among decision makers, both military and political, this would be the first task of entities endeavouring to attain the described concepts.

The process of creating structures of the Territorial Defence in this situation is certainly not an easy task and is risky because it can meet with social disinterest. In the initial phase of development, this process requires a fairly significant investment of financial resources necessary to perform the tasks promotion, logistics (including the establishment of new regional training centres) and training. Hence, many high-ranking officers come to the matter reluctantly. The solution, which may compensate, to a large extent, this risk is to focus on the first phase of the process of creating TD structures for supporting the activities of pro-defence voluntary organizations. An example would be the Swedish “Hemvaret” (along with its youth part) and the Lithuanian “Rifle Union” and it can be clearly seen how great an impact on the local social consciousness organizations of this type have. Promoting bottom–up initiatives of defence should be used to create the seeds of future structures of Home Guard formation. It must be remembered that the activities of this kind of organization, which brings together, in general, young people, in addition to the present unquestionable advantages for the state, affects to much greater extent the defensive potential in the future by educating and shaping the patriotic spirit of potential future professional army personnel, and even more. It is therefore used as much as possible among the younger generation, “being in uniform is stylish.” In summary, logistics and training supporting pro-defence organization should be the duty of every Ministry of Defence, and the activities of these associations should be used to build the foundations of Territorial Defence.

This analysis of the military structures of NATO members derived from the former Warsaw Pact, and referring to selected Western countries have clearly shown the need to develop the formation of Territorial Defence by countries that do not have such structures. Undoubtedly...
benefits of the implementation of this idea, referring to the improvement of defence capabilities or budget savings in the long term cannot remain unnoticed.

Being witness to the beginning of a new era of armed conflict and in pursuit of new technological solutions, we cannot forget timeless, proven ways. It must be remembered that the involvement of society in pro–defensive organizations will widen the responsibility for the fate of the country in a conflict situation. Being adequately trained and prepared for the rigors of war will give the public faith in their own abilities. And in the words of Confucius: “The leader of a great army can be defeated. A simple peasant having faith is invincible.” [16]

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