Abstract

The goal of this paper is twofold. First and foremost, we aim to experimentally and quantitatively show that the choice of a multiwinner voting rule can play a crucial role on the way minorities are represented. We also test the possibility for some of these rules to achieve proportional representation.

1 Introduction

The use of voting rules as a mean of manipulation to advantage or disadvantage minorities is widespread. With the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 in the United States, the right of minorities to register and vote was largely secured. It was soon discovered, however, that minority voting did not guarantee the election of minorities or minority-preferred candidates. This was a result of a widespread use of manipulation by the choice of voting rules [7, 8, 23]. Manipulation of electoral rules, however, is not a prerogative exclusive of American cities. Pande [15] provides a discussion of electoral rules and racial politics in elections in India. Alexander [1, p. 211] describes in detail the 1947 Gaullist manipulations.
of electoral rules in France; in the Paris area, where the Gaullist alliance was weak, they introduced proportional representation but in rural areas, where the alliance was strong, they introduced plurality. Kreuzer [10, p. 229] describes strategic manipulation of voting rules in postwar Germany.

In this paper we undertake an experimental study of the effect that some voting rules have on representation of minorities. The American literature has dealt at length with manipulation by re-districting, often called “gerrymandering,” that is crafting the electoral districts to the advantage of the designer [9]. In the present paper, we do not tackle the districting question. Our work applies to the case of a district that elects \( k > 1 \) delegates as well as to the, formally equivalent, case of a country that does not uses districting for electing its Parliament. Moreover, we consider the rules which take into account not only the first preferences of voters but also the second, third and further preferences. For these rules not based on districting, the aspects of the causal connection between electoral systems and vote-seat disproportionality remains obscure [17].

We adopt a standard spatial two-dimensional model of voting, assuming that both voters and candidates have ideal political positions on the plane and Euclidean preferences. Applied research has shown that having two dimensions is often sufficient to have meaningful descriptions of voters’ political opinions [20]. The idea for this paper stems from a previous work of Faliszewski, Sawicki, Schaefer and Smolka regarding a selection method for genetic algorithms based on multiwinner voting [6].

2 Preliminaries

Elections and Voting Rules Let \( V = \{v_1, \ldots, v_n\} \) be the set of \( n \) voters and \( C = \{c_1, \ldots, c_m\} \) be the set of \( m \) candidates. The voters have their intrinsic preferences over candidates, which are represented as preference orders (i.e., rankings of the candidates from best to worst). By \( \text{pos}_v(c) \) we denote the position of candidate \( c \) in the preference ranking of voter \( v \). For example, a voter \( v \) who likes \( c_1 \) best, then \( c_2 \), then \( c_3 \), and so on, would have preference order \( c_1 \succ c_2 \succ \cdots \succ c_m \). For this voter, we would have \( \text{pos}_v(c_1) = 1 \), \( \text{pos}_v(c_2) = 2 \), and so on.

We are interested in multiwinner elections, where the goal is to select a committee of size \( k \) (i.e., a size-\( k \) subset of \( C \)). A multiwinner election rule is a formal decision process that given preferences of the voters and a positive integer \( k \in \mathbb{N} \) returns a committee that, according to this rule, is most preferred by the population of the voters viewed as a whole.

Many multiwinner rules rely on the notion of score for the candidates. For each integer \( t \in \{1, \ldots, m\} \), the \( t \)-Approval score of candidate \( c \) in vote \( v \) is 1 if \( v \) ranks \( c \) among top \( t \) positions, and is 0 otherwise. The Borda score of candidate \( c \) in vote \( v \), denoted \( \beta(c, v) \), is \( m - \text{pos}_v(c) \). The Plurality score of a candidate is his or her 1-Approval score. Given one of these notions of score, the total score of a candidate in the election is the sum of his or her scores from all the voters.

The following rules are considered in this paper:
**Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV).** SNTV selects a committee that consists of those $k$ candidates with the highest Plurality scores.

**Bloc.** Bloc selects a committee that consists of those $k$ candidates with the highest $k$-Approval scores (one can think of Bloc as if each voter gave a point to each candidate from his or her ideal committee).

**$k$-Borda.** $k$-Borda selects a committee that consists of those $k$ candidates with the highest Borda scores. In the world of single-winner voting rules ($k = 1$), Borda is usually seen as electing some kind of compromise candidate.

**Chamberlin–Courant Rule.** For each voter $v$ and each committee $C$ a representative of $v$ in $C$ is the most preferred member of $C$, according to $v$. The Chamberlin–Courant rule \[3\] selects a committee so that the sum of the Borda scores of the voter representatives is maximized (alternatively, one can think of minimizing the average position of a voter’s representative). Formally, the Chamberlin–Courant rule selects a committee $C$ that maximizes the value $\sum_{v \in V} (\max_{c \in C} \beta(c, v))$. Unfortunately, computing a winning committee under the Chamberlin–Courant rule is NP-hard \[18, 11\]. For the purpose of this paper, we were able to compute Chamberlin–Courant results using its formulation as an integer linear program (ILP) by running the CPLEX optimization package. Lu and Boutilier \[11\] and Skowron et al. \[21\] offer approximation algorithms that one could use for larger elections.

**Monroe Rule.** Monroe \[13\], similarly to Chamberlin and Courant, explored the concept of a representative of a voter. He, however, required that each committee member should represent roughly the same number of voters. A function $\Phi: V \to A$ is a Monroe assignment for a committee $C$ if for each candidate $a \in C$ it holds that $\lfloor n/k \rfloor \leq \Phi(a) \leq \lceil n/k \rceil$. Intuitively, Monroe assignments represent valid mappings between the voters and their representatives. Let $\mathcal{A}(C)$ denote the set of all Monroe assignments for a committee $C$. According to the Monroe rule, the score of committee $C$ is defined as $\text{score}_M(C) = \max_{\Phi \in \mathcal{A}(C)} (\sum_{v \in V} \beta(\Phi(v), v))$. The committee $C$ that maximizes $\text{score}_M(C)$ is selected as the winner. Intuitively speaking, the idea behind the Monroe rule is to partition the electorate into roughly same-sized districts and assign to each district a distinct candidate with as high Borda score as possible. Just like the Chamberlin–Courant rule, Monroe rule is NP-hard to compute \[18\], but this time for most of our experiments the ILP formulation turned out to be too complex for CPLEX to solve within reasonable amount of time. Thus, instead we used the Greedy-Monroe approximation algorithm of Skowron et al. \[21\, Algorithm A\] which is guaranteed to select a committee $C$ whose $\text{score}_M(C)$ is close to being the maximum.

**Single Transferable Vote (STV).** STV is a multi-round procedure that operates as follows. In each round, if there exists a candidate $c$ who is preferred the most by at least

\[1\]Note that these “virtual districts” are based on voters’ preferences and not on geographical location.
\( q = \left\lceil \frac{n}{k+1} \right\rceil + 1 \) voters, then \( c \) is added to the winning committee. At the same time we remove from further consideration exactly \( q \) voters which rank \( c \) on top, and delete \( c \) from the preference rankings of all other voters. Otherwise, i.e., if each candidate is most preferred by less than \( q \) voters, then we select a candidate which is most preferred by the smallest number of voters and delete this candidate from preference rankings of all voters.\footnote{Occasionally, we run into trouble when computing STV winners. For example, for \( n = 600 \) voters and committee size \( k = 52 \) we should use quota value \( q = \left\lceil \frac{600}{53} \right\rceil + 1 = 12 \). In each round in which STV puts a candidate into a committee, it also deletes \( q \) voters. Yet, \( k \cdot q = 624 \) so we do not have enough voters. Fortunately, in our experiments such situations were occurring only for committee sizes over 50. Thus we do not give results for STV for committees of sizes larger than 50.}

We note that this description of STV is not complete and there is a lot of room for various tie-breaking decisions (for example, it is not obvious which voters exactly to delete when a candidate is added to the committee). We describe our approach to tie-breaking below. See Tideman and Richardson \cite{22} for an overview of the STV rule and its variants.

The next two rules do not exactly fit in our framework because they are based on districting.

**First Past The Post (FPP).** Under FPP voters are divided into territorial districts (constituencies) of approximately equal sizes and each constituency elects their own representative by using the Plurality rule (i.e., the candidate with the highest Plurality score wins within the constituency).

**District-Based Borda.** The same as FPP, but with the use of Borda scores instead of Plurality scores.

We shall consider these two last rules under the assumption of random districting. This means that we assume that any territorial district represents an unbiased collection of the political opinions, and we create “districts” artificially by choosing a random partition of the electorate. We thus obtain two voting rules that could be called “Random district FPP” and “Random district Borda.” These rules deserve to be studied as benchmarks for comparison with the others.

Occasionally, our voting rules run into situations where they have to break ties (this is particularly imminent in the definition of STV, but all rules face this issue). To simplify our experiments, we break all ties, whenever they occur, uniformly at random.

**Spatial Models of Elections** Euclidean preferences \cite{4} stipulate that both candidates and voters can be represented as points in an Euclidean space, and that voters rank candidates according to the increasing order of Euclidean distances from themselves. The idea is that points correspond to political programs. Candidates are represented by their actual programs, whereas voters are represented by the ideal programs they believe in \cite{16,12,5}.

As the empirical analysis of elections shows \cite{20}, the dimension of the political space seldom exceeds two. Usually, the left-right spectrum is the main one and the second dimension could be, for example, caused by the influences of religion. In our model we assume that voters have two-dimensional Euclidean preferences.
3 Results

We present results of two experiments. The purpose of the first experiment is to get an initial understanding of the rules discussed. The purpose of the second one is to assess how these rules treat minorities.

3.1 Initial Experiment: On Representativity

The voting rule in a representative democracy ideally accomplishes two tasks: selects a representative set of delegates (e.g., a parliament) and assigns voters to delegates. This means the two main purposes of a voting rule is to achieve a certain level of representativity and a certain level of accountability. These two requirements are not easy to combine. One standard solution to this is to use First-Past-the-Post (FPP), a system which operates with electoral (usually territorial) districts of approximately the same size and allows voters in each district to elect their representative using Plurality. This perfectly solves the problem of accountability but the representativity of such a system is known to be poor because it tends to be detrimental for minorities, especially for a minority that is spread in all districts. On the other hand, party-list proportional-representation systems [19] can be quite good on representativity, provided that the threshold of representation is small, but very poor on accountability.

There seems to be a certain tension between accountability and representativity of multiwinner voting rules as well, and some rules seem to accommodate both desires better than others. While we do not yet have a good measure of voting rules’ accountability, in this section we attempt to evaluate the representativity of their outcomes. Our idea is simply that a rule is more representative when it is more likely for each voter that some candidate with similar political views is elected.

Misrepresentation Formally, we take the following approach. Let \( d \) denote the Euclidean distance in our two-dimensional space of political programs. Given a voter \( v \) and a winning committee \( W \), we define \( \Psi(v) = \min_{c \in W} d(v, c) \) to be the distance between \( v \) and the closest member of \( W \). If we view distances as meaningful characteristics of preferences, it is natural to consider \( \Psi(v) \) as a measure of \( v \)’s misrepresentation in the committee. For an election \( E = (C, V) \) and a committee \( W \), we define \( D(E, W) = \frac{1}{|V|} \sum_{v \in V} \Psi(v) \) to be the average misrepresentation of the voters.

Note that our definition does not embody any notion of efficiency. As an example, imagine that a small group of voters is very homogeneous and has preferences very different from the rest of the electorate. If this group elects a single delegate, representation can be very good for this group, according to our definition. But, depending on how the decisions are taken in the Parliament, it may well be that this delegate has no real power.

Candidates Of course representativity chiefly depends on who are the candidates. To focus on the effect of the voting rule itself, we consider in this paper that the set of candidates, on its own, is a good representation of the electorate. This is easily done by drawing
candidates’ political platforms from the same distribution as the voters ideal points. At least for large values of \( k \), this achieves the goal.\(^3\)

**Results** We have measured the average misrepresentation for our rules in the following setting. We generated 60 elections with 300 candidates and 600 voters each, all distributed uniformly on a \( 6 \times 6 \) square. For each election we have computed the results of all our voting rules, for committees of sizes from 1 to 97 with a step of 3. For each case we have computed the average misrepresentation of the voters. We present our results on Figures 1 and 2. Absolute values of the computed average misrepresentation is not very meaningful, and thus one should focus on relative comparison of the voting rules.

On Figure 1 we show the results for Random-District-FPP, SNTV, STV, Greedy-Monroe, and Chamberlin–Courant. We can see that STV, Greedy-Monroe, and Chamberlin–Courant achieve next to indistinguishable results. SNTV achieves somewhat worse results (but for large committees it converges with the previous three), and FPP does not converge to the others even for very large committees.

On Figure 2 we show the result for Bloc, \( k \)-Borda, Random-District-Borda, and FPP. \( k \)-Borda is the least proportional rule (indeed, inspection of the results has shown that \( k \)-Borda picks a cluster of candidates in the center of our square; it is designed to find candidates that are least offensive to all the voters). While adding random districts to Borda (i.e., considering Random-District-Borda) helps significantly, the results are still worse than for the rules from Figure 1. Bloc also does poorly with respect to proportionality (it finds concentration areas with many voters and chooses clusters of candidates there; for large committees it tends to return the same or similar committees as \( k \)-Borda).

There is a simple but important conclusions from this experiment. For the case of uniform distribution of candidates and voters, there seems to be a single natural notion of representation of the voters, and all our voting rules that were designed to find correct representation (in the context of preferences orders) appear to find it. It is quite remarkable since the definitions of our rules can be significantly different (it certainly is not obvious that STV and Chamberlin–Courant would be finding, in essence, the same kinds of results).

### 3.2 A Polarized Society

The choice of an electoral system has a major impact on the survival of small political parties. The Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom is an example of such a party. They have some left-wing and some right-wing policies so many researchers place them squarely in the middle of the UK political spectrum. However, the existence of a centrist party under FPP is extremely challenging.\(^4\) Even under the mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system of New Zealand, centrist parties often struggle, as exemplified by the virtual demise of Peter Dunne’s United Future party in 2013.

\(^3\) The assumption that the set of candidates is identical to the set of voters is often met in the Political Economy literature since \([14, 2]\) and labelled the “citizen-candidate” model.

\(^4\) “Why being centrist hasn’t helped the Lib Dems”. New Statesman. 6 October 2014. Retrieved 26 April 2016.
Figure 1: Average misrepresentation of the voters for rules that aim at achieving proportional representation. The vertical bars indicate standard deviation.

Figure 2: Average misrepresentation of the voters for the other rules. The vertical bars indicate standard deviation.
Here we deal with multiwinner voting rules that do not rest on the existence of political parties. In order to explore the question of the “squeezing of the center” in this framework, we consider the following situation.

The population itself is polarized in the sense that most voters are extreme. Precisely, we suppose that the electorate is made of three sub-populations: two large groups and a small one, with the small group, the “centrist voters” in between the two large groups. The voters depicted by the black dots are taken from three Gaussian distributions. The mean values for these Gaussians are, respectively, (-2,0), (0,0), and (2,0); standard deviation is 0.25 in each case. For the left and the right party, we generated 100 voters for each, while for the centrist party we generated 50 voters (i.e., altogether, there are 250 voters; the large parties have 40% of the electorate each, whereas the centrist party has 20% of the electorate).

As to the candidates, we now suppose that they are not taken from the same distribution as the voters, as in the previous experiment, but that they are spread uniformly over the whole political spectrum (there are 600 of them; depicted as gray points). This leaves open the possibility to elect “compromise” candidates that would lie in between two groups.

In Figure 3 we present a sample election and results of choosing a committee of size 34 (committee members are depicted as large red dots). At first sight, we see that SNTV, STV, Chamberlin–Courant, and Greedy-Monroe do a good job in terms of representing the smaller centrist population. On the other hand, Random-District-FPP and Random-District Borda seem to provide very scattered, erratic results, with FPP underrepresenting the minority, and Random-District Borda overrepresenting it. Bloc ignores the minority completely, whereas $k$-Borda seems to focus on it completely.

**Proportionality**

A key concept in the theory of representation is the concept of proportionality. This notion has a clear meaning when votes and candidates are labeled alike: When voters vote for parties, one can check whether the number of elected candidates from a party is proportional to the party’s score. When delegates are elected by districts, one can check whether or not the number of seats allocated to each district is proportional to the population of the district.

In order to check if our four election rules that did best in terms of voter representation indeed represent the centrist group proportionally, we can think of the candidates as belonging themselves to the three groups. We simply consider that a candidate “belongs” to the group closest to her location.

We have generated 65 elections according to the above-described scheme; for each, we have computed committees of size 1 to 97 (with a step of 3), and computed how many candidates from each party were selected. We show the results in Figure 4 (we also include Random-District-FPP for comparison). We see that, after all, there is some difference between the proportionality achieved by our four rules. While STV and Greedy-Monroe seem to select roughly 20% of the candidates from the centrist party (the desired number), SNTV and Chamberlin–Courant overshoot. Greedy-Monroe does even better than STV because it is far more stable (the standard deviation of the results for Greedy-Monroe is noticeably smaller than for STV). FPP undershoots significantly.
Figure 3: Results for two big groups of voters and a smaller centrist one, for committee size $k = 34$, for the case where 600 candidates are distributed uniformly over the $6 \times 3$ rectangle over the positions of the voters.
To verify the robustness of our results with respect to the location of the candidates, we have repeated our experiment for the same distribution of voters (however, we have now used 500 voters instead of 250) and for 250 candidates distributed in the same way as the voters. That is, now we assumed that the structure of preferences that lead to the formation of the groups is also present among the candidates. This is the same “citizen-candidate” hypothesis that was made in the first experiment, and it gives a more direct way of modeling party affiliations of candidates. In Figure 5 we present the results for a sample election, for committee size $k = 34$. Comparing to Figure 3, we can see that now all the rules seem to behave more proportionally. We believe that the reason for this fact is that, in some sense, the rules have far fewer candidates to choose from; there are no maverick candidates all over the political spectrum that would distract the voters. However, still it is visible that our four proportional representation rules seem to be doing best, that $k$-Borda overrepresents the center, and that Bloc underrepresents it. Interestingly, district-based rules seem to be doing fine.

In Figure 6 we show the average number of candidates from the centrist party elected by the four rules (and Random-Districts-FPP; added for comparison; this is a result from generating 100 elections). As one might have expected from Figure 5, the scenario where candidates and voters are identically distributed is easy for the rules that aim at proportional representation by design. All these rules perform well. Interestingly, for larger committees FPP overshoots significantly.
Figure 5: Results for two big parties and a smaller centrist party, for committee size $k = 34$, for the case where candidates and voters follow the same distribution.
4 Conclusion and further work

Firstly, we have confirmed that the choice of a voting rule has a profound effect on representation of minorities and any electoral system designer must take this into consideration. Secondly, we have initiated the study on evaluation of multiwinner voting rules with respect to their ability to provide faithfully represent the voters. To this end, we have considered two parameters: (1) the average misrepresentation, and (2) the proportion of voters elected from a smaller centrist party.

It turned out that among our rules, STV, SNTV, Chamberlin–Courant, and Greedy-Monroe, four rules that to large extent were designed to achieve proportional representation, indeed achieve it. Nonetheless, we have seen that additional mechanisms for ensuring proportionality built into Greedy-Monroe (and, to some degree, into STV) indeed give them advantage in more challenging settings. On the other hand, rules based on random-districting (in particular FPP) turn out to be not reliable. Naturally, rules that were designed with other principles in mind than proportional representation ($k$-Borda and Bloc, in our case) do not fare well compared to the others. Since we located the minority in the center of the political spectrum, we cannot say, at this point, if the same results would hold in other cases. We consider this work only a starting point and we are working on further experiments.
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