‘Freedom is more important than health’: Thomas Szasz and the problem of paternalism

Joanna Moncrieff

When Thomas Szasz summed up his philosophical principles at the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ annual meeting in Edinburgh in 2010, he declared that ‘freedom is more important than health’. Psychiatry is the arena in which the conflict between freedom and health comes most sharply into focus, according to Szasz. This paper proposes some parallels with medicine in low-income countries for pointers towards a resolution of this conflict.

When people are very sick, they may become incapable of making informed and thoughtful decisions about what they want to be done. In this situation, relatives, friends, carers and doctors have to make judgements on the patient’s behalf. The idea that people can make judgements that are solely in another person’s best interests is what we call ‘paternalism’. Szasz, among others, was perennially suspicious of paternalism, seeing it as an evil to be avoided if possible and quoting Kant, who said ‘nobody may compel me to be happy in my own way. Paternalism is the greatest despotism imaginable’ (cited in Szasz, 1990, p. 39).

As well as infringing the autonomy of the individual, paternalism is dangerous, according to Szasz, because it disguises the fact that other motivations are always at stake. No decision about how to treat another human being is ever truly neutral or objective. In medical situations, there are always interests other than the patient’s that intrude, whether this be the interests of the family, the doctor or the community or organisation the doctor represents. The idea of paternalism only obfuscates these other influences (Szasz, 1988).

It has been argued, however, that freedom is a preoccupation of those who are already healthy, wealthy and secure. Where daily existence remains a struggle, the self-determination of each individual may seem relatively unimportant. The French philosopher Georges Canguilhem cited the surgeon René Leriche when he described health as the ‘silence of the organs’ and drew attention to the fact that the impact of disease and infirmity is often not appreciated when good health is taken for granted (Canguilhem, 2012). In some low- and middle-income countries, as in the ghettos of Western cities, where freedom means the freedom to scratch a living from the margins of affluence, its loss may not be greatly mourned. Moreover, the health problems that continue to beset much of Africa for example – malnutrition and infectious disease – are significantly reduced by simple procedures such as improved sanitation, nutrition, immunisation and the administration of antibiotics that involve little loss of dignity. The health benefits that accrue help to increase individuals’ capacity to lead autonomous and independent lives.

Even in high-income countries, freedom is sometimes subordinated to the general health of the populace. In the USA, for example, vaccination of children is mandated because the immunity of society in general is prioritised over the choice...
of individual families. Similarly, many countries, including the UK, have public health laws that contain measures to enforce treatment of tuberculosis, including the forcible confinement of an infected individual if this is thought necessary.

Although Szasz may have acknowledged that a self-aware paternalism was necessary in the care of people who are seriously physically sick, he was critical of the extension of the paternalistic principle to other areas of life, including psychiatry. In fact, Szasz argued that the reason for constructing certain forms of behaviour as illness is precisely in order to justify managing them in a paternalistic fashion. Famously, for Szasz ‘mental illness’ is not the same sort of entity as a bodily illness or disease, and can be rightly understood as an illness only in a metaphorical sense. The metaphor has been mistaken for reality because of the social functions it serves, one of which is to provide a convenient mechanism for the management of socially disruptive and unpredictable behaviour.

The purpose of the concept of mental illness in this account is thus ‘to disguise and render more palatable the bitter pill of moral conflict in human relations’ (Szasz, 1970, p. 24). Defining such situations as the illness of a particular individual enables the freedom of that individual to be curtailed and interventions to adjust unwanted behaviour to be represented as ‘treatment’. In other words, an individual can be subjected to the will of others, including being removed from society, confined in an institution and forced to take mind-altering substances, but these actions can be construed as being in the individual’s ‘best interests’. So psychiatry is the arena in which the conflict between freedom and health comes most sharply into focus, but it is also an artificial conflict, according to Szasz. The language of health and illness is only a gloss that is applied to the daily struggles that occur between people who want to behave in a certain way, and those who want them to behave otherwise.

Mental health problems do not need to be conceived of as illnesses in order to justify paternalistic intervention, however. Although ultimately rejected by the British government, the notion of basing mental health legislation on the concept of ‘capacity’ has been proposed by various commentators, including the government-appointed Richardson committee in 1999 (Department of Health, 1999). Under these proposals, intervention that was judged to be in an individual’s ‘best interests’ could be justified when that individual was deemed to have lost the capacity to make rational decisions, whether the loss of capacity was occasioned by a bona fide brain disease or an episode of mental disturbance that would be diagnosed as a mental disorder of some kind.

Reservations about paternalism apply regardless of how mental disorder is conceptualised, and judgements about the nature of ‘incapacity’ and what really constitutes the individual’s ‘best interests’ are always going to be subjective. Removing the link with illness might make the nature and purpose of coercive interventions in psychiatry more apparent, however.

Szasz felt that individuals should not be forced to receive an intervention they do not want, even if their life without such an intervention appears to be squalid, limited, unrewarding and uncomfortable. In contrast to physical medicine, where paternalism might sometimes be a necessary evil, in psychiatry it is unacceptable, because it denies human beings the dignity of making their own choices, however unwise or self-destructive those choices might sometimes seem to be. Reflecting on Canguilhem’s insights, however, suggests that, although from the point of view of sanity it may be possible to value the dignity of human freedom above the ability to function in the actual world, someone has to have a basic level of rational capacity in order to make that judgement. When this is impaired, then a paternalistic approach that aims to restore that capacity could be seen as supporting human dignity and autonomy, rather than depleting them.

Psychiatrists who work with people who are severely mentally ill face these dilemmas daily. Do they leave patients who are deeply psychotic to themselves, allowing them to sink into a state of extreme apathy and internal preoccupation, or do they force them to take antipsychotic medication that might restore some degree of contact with the external world? Similarly, do they attempt to engage such individuals in some social interaction that, initially at least, they might resist, in order to try and establish what appears to be a more rewarding and socially engaged life? If all patients woke up from their psychosis and thanked their psychiatrists for restoring them to sanity, the quandary would not exist. But most do not. Many people who are forced to receive psychiatric treatment, such as antipsychotic drugs, against their wishes either feel they have not benefited, or that the benefits do not outweigh the negative impact of the treatment. Although symptoms may be reduced, some people feel that an important aspect of their personality has been lost too, and that their mental life has become more limited. One patient summed up the dilemma like this: ‘In losing my periods of madness, I have had to pay with my soul’ (Wescott, 1979, p. 989).

Using forced treatment to increase autonomy in mental health services is thus fraught with difficulties. It is impossible to predict reliably who is likely to appreciate the effects of treatment and who might feel diminished by them. Again, a parallel with medicine in low- and middle-income countries might provide pointers to a solution.

Although the benefits of simple health measures such as improved sanitation appear obvious, they may still be resented and resisted if they are imposed from outside. Only when healthcare is designed and implemented by the community it will be able to foster the development of capable and autonomous individuals. In a similar way, society as a whole needs to take responsibility for the things we do to people who are
designated as having mental disorders. There needs to be a transparent debate about when it is justifiable to subject someone to forcible confinement and mind-altering interventions. Crucially, the verdicts of people who have experienced such measures need to be heard. As Szasz identified, however, this is unlikely to happen as long as these conditions are defined as medical illness and intervention as ‘medical treatment’. A system is possible, however, which reduces the gap that sometimes exists between freedom and sanity.

The legacy – or not – of Dr Thomas Szasz (1920–2012)

Trevor Turner

Dr Trevor Turner was asked to provide a commentary on the preceding paper in this issue, “‘Freedom is more important than health’: Thomas Szasz and the problem of paternalism”, by Joanna Moncrieff.

During the 1960s and 1970s the arguments put forward by Thomas Szasz, a Hungarian émigré who established himself in the psychoanalytic world of the USA, becoming Professor of Psychiatry at the State University of New York in Syracuse, were widely discussed and even admired. His arguments, made most forcefully in his 1961 book The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct, essentially stated that psychiatry was an emperor with no clothes. He considered that physical health could be dealt with in ‘anatomical and physiological terms’, while mental health was inextricably tied to the ‘social’ (including ethical) context in which an individual lives. He regarded the term ‘mental illness’ as a metaphor, and used the analogy of a defective television set to explain his meaning. It was as if, in his view, a television viewer would ‘send for a TV repair man because his meaning. It was as if, in his view, a television viewer was ‘to send for a TV repair man because he dislikes the programme he sees on the screen’.

As outlined in the previous article in this issue, by Joanna Moncrieff (2014), Szasz held freedom to be more important than anything, seeing psychiatrists as paternalistic and imposing a myth on capacious individuals whom they deem to have a ‘mental illness’, but who are actually suffering from degrees of social deviation rather than a formal disorder. He wrote numerous articles and books, and was popular at meetings. In the early 1990s, at a meeting of the European Association of the History of Psychiatry, he was quite charming, impervious to argument, and a little hard to understand because of his unique accent.

Szasz’s views over the 30 or 40 years of his working life never changed, the patient being someone who paid you money to receive discussion and advice. He worshipped at the throne of the contractual life, denying schizophrenia’s illness status, there being no organic factors. Detention under the Mental Health Act he saw as a threat to individual liberty, not a therapeutic event. Patients seeking help from psychiatrists he found perplexing. The logic of his view, therefore, would see Parkinsonism (when first described in the 19th century) as a non-disease, it being just a description of behaviours rather than linked to physical pathology. Martin Roth (1976) gave an excellent critique of his theories.

What did emerge from the antipsychiatry movement was the realisation that psychiatry needed to get its diagnostic house in order. The development of stricter criteria for defining schizophrenia, led by the World Health Organization, established a most reliable diagnosis. Perversely, this move away from the more psychoanalytic versions (of schizophrenia and hysteria, for example) to the first-rank and functional criteria of the modern period reduced psychiatry’s standing in the artistic and intellectual worlds. The psychotherapeutic doctor hero (Szasz, even?) in many 1960s and 1970s films has now become the white-coated figure in a secure unit, injecting people and giving them shock therapy, and even the ultimate psychiatric monster, Dr Hannibal Lecter (an ultra-Szaszian version of how he portrayed psychiatrists).

In her commentary on Thomas Szasz’ work, Dr Moncrieff has suggested that ‘Only when healthcare is designed and implemented by the community itself will it be able to foster the development of capable and autonomous individuals’. This view is quite Szaszian, in denying the specialist skills of psychiatry. But while, for example, a