The prospects for lasting peace and security in Burundi towards development

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Introduction

The country of Burundi has experienced authoritarian governance, politics which is exclusionary and repeated rounds of violence expressed ethnically involving the 1972 genocide and the civil war which began in 1993 (Curtis, 2012). Burundi’s modern history has been marked fundamentally by inequitable treatment during the European colonial rule which privileged the Tutsi in all spheres of life-generating inter-group conflict with the largest Hutu ethnic group constituting 85% of the country’s population (Takeuchi, 2013).

Early in the nineties, this inter-group tension escalated into a violent civil war lasting for more than 10 years (Oliva, 2016). The logic behind the discriminatory treatment under the colonial rule as a result of the Euro-centric Hamitic hypothesis an ideology whose basis was that the ethnic group of Tutsis was superior originating from Europe, while the Hutu ethnic group was inferior originating from Africa (Sanders, 1969; Chrétien, 2000). Burundi is a landlocked small country located in central Africa between Tanzania and Rwanda occupying only 27834 square kilometres densely populated with close to 11.89 million people in 2020 according to the world population review (WPR,2020). Burundi attained its political independence in 1962 on the 1st of July becoming a constitutional monarchy. However, the abolishment of the monarchy in 1966 saw the proclamation of a republic by a Tutsi named Michel Micombero who assumed power as a president.

The political independence denoted the commencement of political volatility for the next 30 years marked by successive coups waged by the Tutsi armed forces, Hutu insurrections, insurgents’ mass killings in the years 1965, 1972, 1988 and then 1992 (Hatungimana, 2011). The following represents all the past presidents and the current one according to their ethnic group: (Tutsi)-Michel Micombero, (Tutsi)-Jean Baptiste Bagaza,(Tutsi)-Pierre Buyoya,(Hatu)-Sylvestre Nibantunganya,(Hatu)-Melchior Ndadaye, (Tutsi)-Pierre Buyoya II, (Hutu)-Domitien Ndayizeye, (Hutu)-Pierre Nkurunziza, (Hutu)-Evariste Ndayishimiye- current. This list of successive presidents of Burundi since independence up until today is a testament that Burundi conflict and instability have not necessarily been an issue of ethnicity but one of some other underlying socio-economic factors.

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The open and latent contemporary intra-state tensions cannot be resolved, managed and prevented exclusively by political negotiations, peacekeeping, peace-making, application of force or diplomatic means. There could be more complex reasons including but not limited to state failure, resource predation, social inequality and violation of human rights. These may require collaborative international support in areas such as good governance, environmental preservation, sustainable economic development, cultivating democratic principles and protection of human rights. It is therefore imperative to acknowledge that development and security are mutually dependent as a critical first move in crafting effective policies and strategies to enhance development in Burundi. However, the international players need a deep understanding of how their development and security assistance is conceptually interlinked practically and at every specific stage of a conflict (IPA, 2004). This study explores Burundi’s security and peace prospects by interrogating the origins of state fragility, manifestations, and effects with a thrust on the potential recurrence of political instability following the 2020 general elections. The findings will help to locate Burundi’s quest for democracy and development.

This study aims to highlight the prospects for lasting peace and security in Burundi towards development. This study was qualitative and employed a systematic review research methodology in identifying relevant texts. Document analysis was then used to interpret meaning from documents giving them voice over the study area (Bowen, 2009). Thus, Bowen (2009) asserts that it is a method which is less expensive used to obtain empirical data through an unobtrusive or nonreactive process. The documents were regarded as social facts organised for use (Atkinson & Coffey, 1997). Some expert and academic documents were collected from credible sources such as newspapers, manuals, journals, survey data, background papers and reports from organisations among others. The criteria for selection included publications, time period, keywords, and country-specifics. The document analysis is especially applicable to intensive studies creating rich descriptions of the area under study (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1995). Even though document analysis has been utilised in many cases to supplement some other methods, it is also employable as a stand-alone research method (Bowen, 2009). Data analysis was iteratively blended with both elements of thematic analysis and content analysis. Thus, the content was coded into similar analyzable themes (Bowen, 2009).

Conceptual Framework

This section reviews literature under the following areas; the conceptual contest, the pre-colonial era in Burundi, Burundi under colonisation, the independent Burundi, volatility in politics and state collapse, cyclical violence and the pursuit of peace, and peace negotiations led by Africa.

Peace agreements in theory may be classified under the peace-making rubric or preventive diplomacy. Preventive engagement is any intercessory or structural means meant to gradually decrease the underlying obstructions causing disputes and conflicts (Lund, 2002). Boutros Boutros-Ghali the then UN Secretary-General described preventive diplomacy in his ground-breaking report entitled ‘An Agenda for Peace’ in 1992 as including the activities taken to diminish the spreading of conflicts if they happen (UNSG, 1992). On the other hand, he described peace-making as any activity that brings conflicting parties to some accord, principally through non-violent means as provided in the Charter of the United Nations’ Chapter VI (Apauli, 2017). The non-violent ways provided in the UN Charter involve mediation, adjudication, negotiation, inquiry, conciliation, arbitration and regional diplomacy. The Arusha Agreement was ostensibly designed for limiting the increase of hostility in Burundi as a form of preventive diplomacy and to help conflicting parties to get to a negotiating table. A peace agreement bridges peace from war (Olson, 1998) and it is meant to have conflicts transformed into relationships that are more beneficial between groups and people (Wallensteen, 2007). In international contemporary politics, the significance of peace agreements is that they assist in curtailing violence. Wallensteen (2007) argue that an agreement provides a mutual understanding of issues as well as new group relationship. Bekoe (2003) observes that if signatories of the peace agreement have to see the promises through, they have to feel obligated to do so not just for purposes of positive gains as a result of complying but because of the negative ramifications of defaulting. A party which reneges or undermines execution of the agreement has to be effectively sanctioned. In general, agreements of peace are vulnerable to factions that are not willing to honour obligations or are vulnerable to those bent on implementing the provisos without good faith.

Stedman (1997) contends that processes of peace tend to create spoilers. Such spoilers are described as parties and leaders to a peace accord who employ violence to undermine efforts of achieving peace (Stedman, 1996). They can be part of the team of negotiators or part of those excluded from negotiations. While spoilers from inside are those actors or parties in the negotiations for peace showing a semblance of willingness to broker a solution though eventually unable to meet key agreement obligations, spoilers from outside are those parties or actors excluded completely, for some reason, unwittingly or actively from the peace negotiations process (Stedman, 1996). Regarding Burundi, whereas the CNDD-FDD a rebellious group never participated in the Arusha Agreement negotiation process to its logical conclusion, it only came to be a participant after concluding a disparate ceasefire accord in 2003 with Burundi’s transitional government. That disparate accord became part of the Arusha Agreement, hence the CNDD-FDD is deemed to be an Arusha Agreement actor. Notwithstanding this, in 2005 when the group assumed power it embarked systematically on attempts to undermine the Arusha Agreement resulting in a crisis (Apauli, 2017). Given the discussion by Stedman (1997) above, the Nkurunziza led CNDD-FDD is therefore thought to have been a spoiler from the inside.

Typically, development is a term referring to the strategies and processes through which states and societies seek to attain more equitable and prosperous living standards (IPA, 2004). Activities directed towards development have often been limited to the provision of education and health, infrastructural improvements and socio-economic growth (IPA, 2004). Theories of development do not always provide explanations that are comprehensive as argued by Abuiyada (2018). For instance, the term does not provide a
single perspective on economic, political and social betterment. Rather, it stands as a hybrid concept for numerous strategies that are espoused for transforming the socio-economic environment from the present state to the desired state (Pearson, 2000). Actors for international development are organisations whose mandate is to assist in creating conditions that are favourable for development. These include agencies and specific UN departments, international financial institutions (IFIs), multilateral and bilateral donors like the international NGOs and regional development banks. Development actors have traditionally attempted to reduce risks that are related to the conflict in their programmes. They have preferred to circumvent conflict regarding it as an externality which is negative to be shunned, or shift developmental aid to humanitarian aid. They have not often worked on the conflict and recognized the connection between development and conflict (Apuli, 2017). However, in recent years an increased convergence has been witnessed in the activities and strategies of development and security actors operating in countries that are stricken by conflict. The assumption being that challenges confronted by countries which are not stable have to be holistically addressed to achieve lasting prosperity and peace which is sustainable (IPA, 2004).

Suffice to note that the Arusha accord served Burundi fairly well during the period of transition but the moment the CNDD-FDD and Nkurunziza assumed power, it’s wearing down started (Apuli, 2017). It appears that when Nkurunziza sought to have the troisième mandate (extension of his term of office beyond two terms) was a sign for the absolute act of breaching the Arusha Agreement provisions. The guarantors’ silence only encouraged Nkurunziza together with his allies to proceed as spoilers in contempt of the Arusha Agreement. To that effect and extent, the win by Nkurunziza of a troisième mandat confirmed what could have been a fait accompli, thereby making further allusions to the Arusha institutional framework ring incredibly hollow. (Apuli, 2017). The United Nations was set up based on three pillars that are mutually supportive namely: human rights, development, security and peace (UNHR, n.d). Yet it is the conflict which has wreaking consequences on fulfilling human rights and development issues (UNHR, n.d). The Right to Development of 1986 Article 1(1) adopted by the United UN Declaration provides for an:

“Inalienable human right under which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized” (UNDRD, 1986: online).

It is recognized that international security and peace are important if this objective is to be achieved. Further, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966) implores states to marshal available maximum resources for the progressive achievement of economic, cultural and social rights

The pre-colonial era in Burundi

Before Burundi was colonised it was a kingdom which was well organized and strong. The society was largely made up of four groupings namely: The Twa who were entertainers, hunters and potters; the Ganwa who (constituted the ruling class now known as the subgroup of the Tutsi) who were largely cow herders; and the group called the Hutu who were cultivators. It was not quite clear how the Tutsi and Hutu were related although the actual historical relationship may have been debated (Hatungimana, 2011). A Hutu who was rich could have been considered as Tutsi, whereas an underprivileged Tutsi was seen as a Hutu. The Tutsi and Hutu people with high social standing and merits had the potential to be raised to the status of the Ganwa. Intermarriages were however tolerated among all the groups. Also, all the groups had a common, still speak and spoke the same language, and same religious orientation (Ndahiziyiye, 2005).

Ndahiziyiye classifies the population of Burundi according to the occupational preference per given group. The Hutu are classified as farmers, the Twa being potters while the Tutsi are classified as herders, but in general, these three occupations complement each other in daily activities. In these circumstances, it is difficult to grasp what could be the real triggers of conflict in the social order reflecting a harmonious and interdependent style of life Hatungimana, 2011). It makes this study necessary and relevant because even though the three Burundian groups have been able to live together peacefully throughout the pre-colonial era there has been no indication whatsoever of ethnic tension between the Tutsis and Hutus. The Arusha Agreement on Burundi is also clear that in the pre-colonial era all groups which inhabited the country had their allegiance owed to the same monarchy, the Umwami. Their religious belief was based as well on the same god, Imana, sharing the same language (Kirundi) and culture, and living in the same territory. Despite the movements due to migration and the subsequent settlement in Burundi by diverse groups of people, every person recognises oneself as a Burundian (Hatungimana, 2011). However, Lemarchand (1996) asserts that amid the racist ideological support and ethnic chain of command skewed against the group of the Hutus, the colonialists from German in the period between 1889 to 1918 and from Belgian later in the period between 1918-1962 changed this divide into more pronounced identity rigidities. In this case, the coloniser considered the minority Tutsi as being somewhat superior in comparison to the Twa and Hutu.

Ethnicity in Burundi appears to have been overstated such that a more comprehensive study is required. However, when emphasizing the significance of Burundi ethnicity from independence to the present today, it is prudent to observe that the ethnicity definition is not quite applicable to Burundi. One definition that is most commonly used to denote ethnicity is found in the Dictionary of Anthropology (Barfield 1998:99) stating that: “it is a grouping of individuals belonging to the same culture, the same religion, the same language, same customs and traditions and recognize themselves as such.” An almost similar definition is provided by the New Oxford American Dictionary (Stevenson & Lindberg, 2015: online):
An ethnic group (or ethnicity) is a group of people whose members identify with each other through a common heritage, consisting of often a common language, a common culture (often including a shared religion) and ideology that stresses common ancestry or endogamy."

These two definitions reveal seven essential elements that help to distinguish diverse ethnic groups predicated on their distinctions given that ethnic groups should have their own: traditions, culture and language, ideology, religion, territory and special interests. In the population of Burundi, these characteristics seem to have never been in existence and do not currently exist (Hatungimana, 2011). This is a reality which the Arusha Agreement has confirmed in Article 1:15. Though, Chretien (2000) provides another ethnic group definition in agreement with the commonly used definition adding that the Tutsi and Hutu from the Great Lakes of Africa could be exceptionally considered as ethnic groupings. For Chretien people residing in the Great Lakes, Tutsis and Hutus included, ethnic groups may not have to be differentiated by culture, geographic space, language or history (Chretien, 2000). Accordingly, although the issue of ethnicity is of importance to Burundi, it is not necessary the only source of strife. Ethnicity could only be a manifestation or used as a pretext whose cause sits elsewhere.

**Burundi under colonisation**

According to Hatungimana (2011), the Tutsi constitute 14% of the Burundi population while the Twa constitutes 1% and the Hutu 85%. As alluded before the Burundi history does not appear to account for any ethnic conflict deemed to be serious, that may have occurred prior to the country’s colonisation by the close of the 19th century as argued by Nkurunziza (2018). During the pre-colonial era, Burundi was strong, centralised and well-structured, under a monarchy which was secular whose power and authority was not contestable. As a demonstration of Burundi’s strength at that time, in 1884 a group of Arab slave-traders infiltrated the state looking for slaves and suffered a shameful defeat from the national army (Gahama, 2001). Subsequently, the slave trade in Burundi was never experienced, unlike what happened in other regional kingdoms. The attempts by colonialists from Belgian to overpower the Burundian population was faced with related defiance. Many of the missionaries among those Europeans who first got into the state of Burundi were exterminated (Bonneau, 1949). For that reason, the modus operandi of colonialists from Belgium on the traditional Burundi state was to ensure stamping authority. They had to undermine the established governance system by instituting policies of divide and rule violating Burundi’s secular identity (Nkurunziza, 2018).

**Independent Burundi**

Just after the political independence attained in July 1962, there were incessant fighting and splits of political parties due to internal conflicts. These two groups that were contesting each other are the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia Group. Casablanca was a group which favoured continental integration and pan-Africanism for the good of Burundi, although the Monrovia Group advocated for the pan-Africanism it did not do so by sacrificing national sovereignty (Manirakiza, 2006). Immediately after independence political leaders were heavily seized with political infighting and counter-plotting making successive governments greatly unstable. From independence to the period leading to 1966, apparently no meaningful government was ever there. This instability eventually gave rise to the 1965 initial major political upheaval. In the course of these hostilities, other governance aspects like democracy and economic development had little space on the leadership agenda (Nkurunziza, 2018). Despite that the colonial Belgium authority has been recognised for creating Burundi’s state of fragility and insecurity, the political leadership of Burundi, mostly those from the Tutsis who reigned for the greater part of the post-colonial era, may have prolonged the situation. A couple of months towards the independence of Burundi, the decorated liberation hero, Prince Louis Rwagasore, was a victim of political assassination by political enemies who tacitly worked in cahoots with authorities from Belgium (Stapleton, 2017). Rwagasore who operated under the party known as the Unité pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) ably united the Tutsis and Hutus in his project for independence based on his clear vision of development (Nkurunziza, 2018).

Chrétiens (2000) argues that historians believe it is the colonialists who divided the Tutsi and Hutu according to race yet they were originally regarded as social groupings. This discriminatory policy undermined not just the original structures of the state but created also, over the years, the polarity between the Tutsis and Hutus. More expressly, in the period 1928 up until 1934, colonial Belgian had to introduce administrative transformations that were far-reaching (Gahama, 2001). These privileged the Tutsis whom they considered to be first-class and foreordained for rulership ahead of the perceived backward commoners in the mould of Hutus (Sandrart, 1953). For instance, whereas chiefs were traditionally chosen by kings as governors at regional level drawn from the groups of the Ganwa, Tutsi and Hutu, reforms imposed by colonialists for administrative purpose replaced all presiding chiefs of the Hutu identity with those of either Ganwa or Tutsis. As a result, the percentage of Hutu chieftainship went down to zero in the year 1945 from 20% back in the year 1929 (Reyntjens, 1994). This meddling into the practices of traditional leadership did not just relegate the Hutu leadership, it also created a system of rigid dominion over the Twa and Hutu by the Tutsis and Ganwa. Expectedly, this policy generated fierce resentment amongst the Hutus, prompting them to initiate numerous futile attempts to forcibly take over power from the Ganwa and Tutsis. On the contrary, the Tutsi political elite worked to perpetuate and strengthen a system which was in their favour. The Tutsis also used the attempts by the Hutus to usurp power as a scapegoat to callously subjugate them. Therefore, in independent Burundi, it is not easy to discount or overlook the simmering tension as merely a thing of the past. This schism has continued from the post-colonial era to this day.
Volatility in politics and state collapse

In this political circumstance of instability, a contingent of leaders with the Hutu identity who were perturbed by the perceived or real ostracism, made attempts in October 1965 without success to overthrow the government (Nkurunziza, 2016). They believed that their majority in terms of population guaranteed them an opportunity to seize power, just like what happened in 1959 in the neighbouring Rwanda which stood as their political governance model. On the contrary, the Burundi Tutsi leadership saw the Social Revolution of 1959 in Rwanda as an adverse model not to be followed at any rate. Thus, all Hutus’ attempt to wrestle power in the country were repressed mercilessly, constantly stoking up hostilities between the political leaders among the two major groups (Nkurunziza, 2016). As a consequence, some of the Hutu elites instigated the Hutu countrymen/women in the province of Muramvya to kill hundreds of Tutsis. In their response, the army of the Tutsi exploited this opportunity to eliminate the Hutu’s most powerful members. About five thousand Hutus were killed by the army in Muramvya as a way of revenging the killings of the Tutsi (Stapleton, 2017). This became the first massive killings of a political nature in the country.

After the Hutu elite were annihilated the previous year, in November 1966 a Tutsi group of officers mainly from the Southern part of the Bururi province waged a coup d’état and overthrew a monarchy which had reigned for centuries (Nkurunziza, 2018). This ended the political system which to some extent had the composition although not in equal proportions of Tutsi and Hutu leaders drawn across all the regions in the post-independence era of Burundi. The Tutsi’s small influential group from Bururi put in an unlawful system which concentrated military, economic and political powers in their own hands. The side-lining of non-Bururi Tutsis and Hutus further even made the country more polarised. The coup d’état of 1966 came to be one of an extended series of them. Nkurunziza (2018) notes that the other coups which resulted in power take-over were executed in the year 1976, in 1987, in 1993, and then in 1996. Recently, in May 2015 some officers attempted without success to grab power followed by bloody authoritarianism which plunged Burundi into turbulence.

The political instability with the legacy of most people suffering in Burundi whereby injustices and other crimes were committed by agents of the state, ever since the period in the 1960s, was never acknowledged or punished. Also, the rule of law was hamstrung permitting political leaders to even be involved in bloody battles in order to be in control of the state, this further deepened the insecurity and fragility of the state. Failure by the successive administrations to acknowledge the past crimes perpetrated by the state has alienated the population’s sizeable sections, especially the casualties of the crimes (Nkurunziza, 2018). The initial attempt made to seek a permanent solution to the conflict in Burundi has until now been the negotiations held in Arusha town of Tanzania popularly known as the Arusha Agreement for Burundi’s peace and reconciliation. These negotiations managed to bring together members from a wide spectrum including the army, political parties, civil society, international community and the government. The negotiations culminated into a peace agreement endorsed in August 2000 then enforced in November in 2001. This agreement successfully brought an end to the protracted episode of civil war in the period 1993-2003. Further, it permitted the Hutu political elite who came from those that had experienced protracted persecution by previous regimes to assume power following a bloodbath of war. This political agreement was quite radical by ending the Tutsi elite’s domination in the political affairs of Burundi ever since the 1930s. Taking into consideration the political discrepancies which the agreement meant to rectify, it appeared tipped towards a single group that was traditionally side-lined.

The latest political leadership did not find it possible to defy the temptations and trials of unlimited power, more so the desire to retaliate on previous embarrassments, probably as a result of their less experience in power politics. As envisaged in the Arusha Agreement power-sharing collapsed when the new political leaders flanked to uphold the conditions of power-sharing made after difficult negotiations. When the Arusha Agreement failed to deliver as was expected it entrenched state insecurity and fragility which led to state collapse. From April 2015 the Republic of Burundi experienced a situation of political decadence and violence, resulting in deaths of close to 1,200 people while over 400,000 individuals were displaced. The country’s economy contracted by 4% in 2015 and 2016 by 1% only (Nkurunziza, 2018). The economic projections that have so far been made for the intermediate-term are quite bleak. For instance, according to the International Monetary (IMF, 2017), in the period between 2018 to 2022 the GDP’s growth is estimated to fluctuate from 0.0% to 0.5% (IMF, 2017). The country’s failure of political leadership to effectively implement the Arusha Agreement as the single available best opportunity for lasting peace and security appears to have taken the country back to the previous cyclical trajectory of violence.

Cyclical violence and the pursuit of peace

The episode of 1972 deeply affected Burundi such that it had to define when political hostility would occur in the future (ICG,2016). Most of the succeeding Hutu elites would either be previous refugees who came back to the country after fleeing in 1972 as adults or young ones of those Hutu’ who were slain. Members most well-known in this group included: the former president now late Pierre Nkurunziza, whose father died during the 1972 political subjugation and cruelty; the first democratically elected civilian president in 1993, Melchior Ndayizeye who was formerly a Hutu refugee in 1972; and two of Ndadaye’s successors, Domitien Ndayizeye and Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, were also both former refugees in 1972 (Stapleton, 2017). However, in October 1993 after being elected and hardly three months in office, Ndadaye was killed by fellows of the Tutsi who were dominant in the army, sparking off the most prolonged civil war. The reaction to the assassination of the president whose identity was Hutu by the Hutu group was very swift to the extent that others contended that it was a planned assassination by some of the Hutu elite (ICG,2016; Stapleton,2017). The army dominated by the Tutsi, just like in the past, continued to repress the Hutus but this never ended the violence. Almost 17%
of the country’s population either fled or were killed (Nkurunziza, 2018). The elite of the Hutu believed the assassination of Hutu president in October was an effort to reclaim power by the Tutsi’s old leadership after a loss during the plebiscite. For the very first time, Hutus had to organise a powerful uprising that triggered a war which raged for ten years. Most of its political leaders and the military were orphaned children who survived repressions by the government in 1972.

When the war raged on, warring parties were gotten together by the international community to forge what climaxed into the Arusha Agreement. In 2005, the country conducted general elections in which CNDD-FDD became the winner controlled by the insurgent Hutu group. The power transfer to the Hutu elite, previous repressions victims orchestrated by the dominated Tutsi administrations, was welcomed by several Burundians as bringing in a fresh political dispensation where political aggression will not be tolerated. However, experiences revealed that the present-day political leadership just assumed the same strategies and practices which they complained about (Nkurunziza, 2017). The security role by state institutions in various April 2015 activities of violence has been shown when the third term of office was unconstitutionally sought by a sitting president. More than 1,200 people were maimed and killed while some were left to languish in detentions by mostly the agents of the state (Nkurunziza, 2018). Whereas those non-state actors who are engaged in brutality are more often killed in the process of state repressions, not very much may have been put in place to isolate and indict those actors of the state illegally involved in violent acts. This has been problematic and hampering a peace resolution process in the violence cycle. Whitaker (1985) argues that very life-threatening problems occur if the institution which is responsible for causing or threatening death works with or in complicity with the State. Since agents of the state dare to torture and kill with impunity implies that the law is applied selectively just to those who are powerless and defenceless. When impunity continues, then victims of today will most likely seek to appropriate justice into their hands then perpetuate conflict.

**Peace negotiations led by Africa**

The Burundi conflict involved African prominent leaders who have personally invested their political capital by attempting to look for a lasting solution. As earlier stated, the negotiations held in Arusha marked the first thoughtful attempt to look for a permanent solution to the political problem in Burundi by Africans. The former Tanzanian President, Julius Mwaliimu Nyerere, a highly esteemed international politician, expedited the process of negotiations till his demise in 1999. From then on, another highly esteemed statesman of Africa, the former South African President, Nelson Madiba Mandela took over the process of negotiations. This calibre of main negotiation facilitators drew the international community’s attention to the Burundian crisis. As such the signing ceremony of the Arusha Agreement was witnessed and graced by some personalities of international standing such the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Anan. As noted by Nkurunziza (2016) there were shortcomings identified with the Arusha Agreement. Despite this, it provided a footing upon which an inclusive and credible system of politics in Burundi had to be built on. The Arusha Agreement recognises in its first paragraph that the signatories to it are conscious that development, justice, the rule of law, stability, unity and national reconciliation are the key aspirations for the Burundi people. Also, that the parties are prepared to set aside their differences and promote what is common to them and to realise people’s interest (Arusha Agreement, 2000). The cornerstone of the Arusha Agreement is predicated on national reconciliation to enhance peacebuilding through the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission mandated to investigate the past atrocities. The agreement is replete with good provisions if well implemented, but Nkurunziza (2016) argues that selective implementation remains a major concern which favours various ruling leaders. None of the regimes assigned to implement the Arusha Agreement had some concern to revisit the past for fear that their criminalities would resurface (Lemarchand, 2002).

In 2015 the Peace and Security Council of the African Union pledged to send into Burundi a strong force of 5 000 officers for peacekeeping (Nkurunziza, 2018). This was resented and opposed by the Burundian government prompting the African Union to do a volte-face in January 2016. The United Nations Security Council then pledged in July 2016 to dispatch 288 police officers to Burundi and monitor the political situation. The Burundi government repudiated again to oblige, arguing that the country’s police force was able to manage the situation (Nkurunziza, 2018). For Burundi international diplomacy partly failed owing to contradictions from within. For this reason, Toyne (1969) argues that international intervention should not engage in some treaties involving the same despotic holders of political power. One wonders what incentive the Burundi regime had by disallowing the international forces from intervention. Perhaps, the distressed Burundi people have had a bad experience of the international criminal law’s ‘principle of the “commission by omission” and the “duty to act” which in their view can no longer be seen as a dependable foundation of justice. Then again, the country’s politicians may have learnt that it is possible to easily defy the will of the international community and forestall any external intervention. For Burundi, this does not bode well in the country’s prospect of peacebuilding.

**Conflict causes**

The main implications were guided by the following themes; conflict causes, key assumptions, violence and instability in the past, impunity and governance, the approach to political realism, truth and reconciliation constraints.

**Poverty**

The Human Development Report (HDR, 2020) reveals that Burundi’s value of the Human Development Index (HDI) for 2019 sits at 0.433. This places Burundi in the lowest global category of human development-standing at position 185/189 territories and countries, sharing this rank with South Sudan. This HDI is lower than 0.513 which is the average for all low human development countries and also below 0.547 which is the average for Africa Sub-Saharan countries (HDR, 2020). In 2015 the widespread poverty in Burundi
was positioned by the UNDP Human Development Index at 184/ 188 with the country’s 81.8% people believed to have multidimensional poverty (HRD,2020).

**Demographic burden**

The demographic demands present the country of Burundi as one of Africa’s most densely populated states, being the 11th highest in terms of growth rate in the world which was estimated to be 2.85% in 2020(CIA-Library,n.d). Being one of the African continent's most densely peopled nations; its people are largely concentrated in the North and the West along Lake Tanganyika’s Northern shore where most of the masses stay in farmlands (CIA-Library,n.d).

**Lack of rule of law**

The UN Commission of Inquiry on Burundi (RCIB,2019) reveals that the former President Pierre Nkurunziza and his cabals have been directly responsible for most serious delinquencies and violation of human rights. These include; arbitrary arrests and imprisonments, summary executions, torture, forced disappearances and sexual violence. However, the UN Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB,2017) has cautioned that it is not exactly possible to quantify most of the abuses that happened and even those continuing to happen in a repressive and closed situation in Burundi.

The persistent insecurity in Burundi which has been pervasive has been a result of the paucity of the rule of law. The country has used state institutions as repression instruments coupled with the deliberate absence of checks and balances in the execution of power. This led to the alienation of most people in Burundi from political leadership. Some state violence victims resorted also to violence as a strategy for survival (kill first before they kill you) or as a means of retaliation against crimes committed in the past. The challenge of dispensing justice emanates from a compatibility constraint of incentives, where the current and past political leadership which is expected to facilitate justice might be among the chief suspects.

**Violence and instability in the past**

The killing of a freshly elected leader during a coup d’etat in 1993, sparked the longest civil war in Burundi. Contrary to this, in the period from the 1980s to the 1990s, the presidents Mainassara and Sankara of Niger and Burkina Faso respectively were killed by army personnel who later assumed power, yet the two incidents never sparked civil wars. This could be suggestive that Burundians were unable to absorb the politically motivated assassination shock which Niger and Burkina Faso managed to do. The recurrent political hostility over the past years in Burundi must not be construed as being a result of successive civil wars. Rather, the cyclical political hostility has been due to the unwillingness or failure by the political leadership and the state to effectively address the major violence causes from the early days when Burundi attained its political independence. One of the major causes of violence remains as the effect of disproportionate battles between the political leaders from the two main camps, the Tutsis and Hutus not necessary based on ethnicity. Instead, each camp takes a fight for state capture and enjoy the loots.

**Bad governance**

Burundi needs to address this element of bad governance like what Rwanda is doing and poised to do under Kagame’s government, if the country has to emerge from the current trap of fragility and insecurity. State fragility in this case is primarily analysed in the lens of conflict and insecurity. The failure by Burundi to reconstruct its institutions and economy could be attributed more to the choices which the political elites have made in the past and/or which they are still making. Contrasting and comparing the cases of Rwanda and Burundi, two nations with initial comparable historical, cultural, institutions, societal mix, and economic conditions for development, it shows that Burundi might have long assumed a trajectory completely different from what it is if the right choices were made.

**The approach to political realism**

Just like the case of the world’s poorest economies, power in Burundi is the primary source of economic wealth. Abandoning power means a return to poverty. Hence anyone who assumes power will do whatever is possible to cling on to it. What matters most for many is the satisfaction of their ego, this is the reason why certain individuals in power possess more wealth than the governments which they purport to run.

**Truth and reconciliation constraints**

Although Burundi’s peace and security is rooted in the colonial policies of divide and conquer, the recurrence and persistence of fights pitting the Tutsis and Hutus is a reflection of the ineptitude by the post-colonial leadership in Burundi to tame and reform these discordant policies. The new political leadership had a duty to restore the unity identified with Burundians during the pre-colonial era. Yet, since independence, all the various regimes that got into power chose to exploit the real or perceived differences between the Tutsi and Hutu as a ploy to tightly cling onto power and continue enjoying the spoils. It is therefore the insensitivity of these governments compelling the leadership to be reliant on violence so as to stay in power, further compromising the state peace and security needed for development.
Critical assumptions and implications

Land dispute

This may account for most of the violent activities including beyond the country’s political challenges after decades of displacements and civil war. Though several international and national actors may have spent some years dealing with the land issue, it may continue affecting relationships countrywide.

Severe fragmentation among the opposition

It may not be easy to mount a significant political challenge by the opposition to the government, especially from exile. Up until unity among the opposition, there is not much hope for Burundi to peacefully resolve the latent and overt crisis even after the 2020 general elections. However, the power-sharing culture in Burundi, the diverse landscape of the media and the strength of civil society could salvage the country from collapse.

The prospects and going forward

Burundi’s history of post-colonialism has revealed that there will never be lasting stability and peace in the absence of justice. As enshrined in the Arusha Agreement, Burundi does not have a choice apart from revisiting its brutal past and unemotionally redraw the history of the country in a more objective manner. Under the present circumstances, it is only the impartial international players who seem to be the rightful players who can ably assist to have the country move forward. These neutral players will have to closely work with some nearby countries, especially from the regional economic community, in this case, the East African Community, which appears to have substantial influence over Burundi’s political leadership. International and regional collaboration could, if needed, have the Burundi political leadership persuaded into adopting and implementing an enduring peace and development roadmap. That roadmap may have to be based on or developed from the Arusha Agreement or a complete departure from it.

Conclusion

The concept of sharing power in an institutionalised manner, based on the quotas of ethnic groups, has been conceived by the peace process architects in Burundi as the fundamental guiding principle in the quest for a conflict resolution. The Pretoria and Arusha peace processes, the AU and UN, and the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative have equally maintained this understanding. But this study concludes that although power-sharing could be a necessary move, presumably as a measure of building confidence, sharing power per se is not an adequate condition for sustainable development and peace. The logic behind power-sharing is noble in that it protects the minority group. In Burundi, while the Tutsis represent the numerical minority group, for a period conservatively above forty years, they have represented a socio-economic and political majority. Despite the Hutus being a numerical majority group, they have been subordinated and excluded in the society of Burundi. Therefore, the contention that the Tutsi group who are a numerical minority deserving protection is applicable to the Twa and Hutu as well, or even for more protection. Because of the argumentation and understanding of peace, security and development discussed in this study, it is suggested that state-building or state reconstruction in Burundi be a prelude towards development and peace. To do this, a shift is needed from an exclusionary, predatory state, politics of patronage and politics of ethnicity, to a developmental state which ensures law and order, distributive justice, legitimacy, national integration, economic opportunity, and provides basic service delivery. Peace, security and development are dependent upon the realisation of a system which is democratic, providing genuine political participation and representation, security, equal economic opportunity and social mobility transcending boundaries of ethnic groups.

The prevailing simmering insecurity affecting development in Burundi appears to be merely political, created by a comparatively insignificant number of people who are reluctant to comply with the democratic rubrics which brought them into power. As a result, they are trying to weaken the political multi-ethnic agenda that has ushered in Burundi into a path tangential to the genocide cycles that have been detrimental to peace, security and development. What is required now, apart from a paradigm shift is an active engagement by the international community to restore and implement in full, the Arusha Accord. This needs to be done before a new wave of violence and disintegration begins post-2020 general elections. This is imperative before it becomes costly to Burundi, the international community and the region.

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