The Erlangen Papyrus 4 and Its Socratic Origins

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Abstract

P. Erlangen 4 is papyrus fragment of an ancient Greek, “Socratic” dialogue discussing cures for the (desire) of the beautiful—and, by implication, the meaning of moral beauty itself. Previous discussions have made general comparisons with the works of Plato, Xenophon and Aeschines. Prior to its philosophical analysis, I will re-examine the fragment, suggesting new reconstructions of the text, accompanied by an English translation. Although the precise authorship still remains a mystery, I will attempt to show that its philosophical language, argument and dramatic background are closer to the remains of Antisthenes than other Socratic writers and in particular to one of his Alcibiades compositions. The possibility will then be considered that it originated in one of his works or with one of his immediate followers.

Keywords

Greek philosophy – Antisthenes – Socrates – papyrology

In the papyrus collection of the University of Erlangen is preserved a fragment of an ancient, “Socratic” dialogue that discusses cures for the (desire) of the beautiful—and, by implication, the meaning of moral beauty itself (P.Erl.4).¹

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¹ P.Erl.4 (= R.A. Pack (1965) 115 no. 2103) was first published by W. Schubart (1942) 12-17 nr. 7.
Previous discussions have made general comparisons with the works of Plato, Xenophon and Aeschines of Sphettus. Although the precise authorship of this text still remains a mystery, here I will attempt to show that its philosophical language, argument and dramatic background recall the remains of the Socratic philosopher, Antisthenes, and in particular one of his Alcibiades compositions. The possibility will then be considered that it originated with one of his works or at least one of his immediate followers.

The papyrus itself is dated to the 2nd-3rd centuries AD and was originally acquired in Egypt although its exact archaeological provenance is unknown. There survive three scraps of connected columns of writing, but only the second has preserved anything like a continuous text and that only in lines 27-61. Although the hand-writing is clear and carefully supplemented with occasional punctuation marks as well as supra-linear corrections entered around the time that the text was copied, the task of clarifying its contents is fraught with difficulties. This stems partly from occasional fading of the ink and lacunae, but mainly because of damage to the margins of the text in critical places. Nonetheless, the text is sufficiently legible to establish its language as Attic Greek of the 5th/4th century BC albeit in a simple, stark style of its own. This interesting Socratic composition is not well known outside of philological circles and needs to be re-examined for its philosophical content. Accordingly, I will divide this paper into three separate sections:

1. a brief survey of previous scholarship;
2. my own collation of the facsimiles and translation;
3. philosophical and contextual analysis of the text;
4. provenance of the composition.

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2 It is one of the papyrus fragments obtained from the Berlin Coptologist, Carl Schmidt (1868-1938) who had presumably purchased it in Egypt (W. Schubart 1941 99-100).

3 There is an old b/w facsimile of the papyrus in W. Schubart (1942), frontispiece, but the University of Erlangen has put up an excellent modern photograph on the internet (http://papyri-erlangen.dl.uni-leipzig.de/receive/ErlPapyri_schrift_00006480). Although I consulted both, my primary work is based on the latter. I wish to thank Dr. J. Mayr (University library Erlangen-Nuremberg) and Prof. H. Essler (University Würzburg) for their helpful remarks concerning the digital and photographic copies and the technology used.

4 Cf. W. Schubart (1942) 15 (“Der Stil spricht meines Erachtens in seiner schlichten Klarheit für ein verhältnismäßig hohes Alter”). On the internet site, the fragment is now catalogued as “in sokratischem Stile” (above n. 3). As we shall see, it is also characterized by absence of elision and crasis as well as by occasional asyndeton.
Previous Scholarship

The text’s first editor was the noted papyrologist, Wilhelm Schubart, who finally regarded it as a “Prosaschrift (literarischer Brief?) über den Eros”. However, on the basis of paragraph spacing and occasional punctuation marks in the manuscript, Prof. Reinhold Merkelbach re-edited it as a dialogue marking places for two speakers. In his opinion, it was a “sokratischer Dialog” held between an authoritative, “older” Socratic-like figure and an anonymous younger companion. Although ages and names are not actually specified, his assumptions cannot be far from the truth: the first speaker—whom he marked as (A)—has the role of a handsome erômenos while the second speaker—whom he marked as (B)—has that of a philosophically critical erastês. Moreover, the text is a critique of (A) as a beautiful (καλός) person while the subtext assumes the equally traditional Socratic topic of eros although the latter is not explicitly mentioned in the section that survives. Thus, the actual subject under discussion is not Schubart’s “der Liebe zu dem schoenen Knaben”, but “the beautiful person” (καλός) and its moral meaning.

Adopting Schubart’s early date, Merkelbach compared the fragment to the work of Socrates’ pupil, Aeschines of Sphettus, but was unwilling to identify it with the latter’s Alcibiades dialogue specifically since our fragment seems to have been composed in direct speech in contrast to the surviving fragments of his Alcibiades which were apparently narrated in indirect speech. Although

5 W. Schubart (1942) 12-15, no. 7. He had first brought it to light with alternative headings as a dialogue or letter (Schubart (1941) 99).
6 R. Merkelbach (1958), 107 (no. 1099) in which he reviewed a selection of the collection, but also re-edited Schubart’s transcription of the first sections of the fragment.
7 The dramatic roles of erastês/erômenos assumed in its opening characterize conversations attributed to Socrates (K.J. Dover (1978) 81-91, 153-170) and his pupils (E. Cantarella (1992) cap. 3). Albeit that the search for sexual and “physical beauties” (καλοί) described in the papyrus (ll. 27-32, 48-51) is applicable to Athenian norms also outside of philosophy (K.J. Dover (1994) 69-73)—and undoubtedly characteristic of actual symposia (C. Calame (2005) 103)—its discussion of the morally “beautiful” is closer to that in the Platonic dialogues (M.C. Nussbaum (2001) cap. 6), and to an extent the Symposium (C. Calame (1992) 139-153; M. Gagarin (1977) 26-29).
8 W. Schubart (1942) 14. The papyrus details cures (ἰάματα) for the (desire) of a beautiful person (καλός) in the sense of a “therapy of desire” discussed by M.C. Nussbaum (2009) ix-xi), but notably the extant fragment discusses the moral application of the word “beautiful” (καλός; ll. 55-57) to a person rather than to “Beauty” itself (τὸ καλὸν).
9 SSR II VIA 48, 80; CPF 1.1* (1989) 120-134 (pt. 8 no. 1 (Alcibiades); Dittmar (1912) 266-274 frs. 2, 7, 8, 11). On its style, see: C.H. Kahn (1994) 89. Merkelbach also compared the description of
the ascription of *P.Erl.4* to Aeschines is still occasionally raised, recent scholars prefer to make more general comparisons with some dialogue of his that is no longer identifiable. Nonetheless, we should note that almost all of Aeschines’ remaining fragments seem to have been narrated in *oratio obliqua* rather than in direct dramatic form as in our fragment. We should thus be open to consider the possibility that the text of our fragment may be connected with some other Socratic writer. Many of these wrote not only in dramatic *oratio recta*, but also in a “mixed form”. Even Plato’s *Parmenides* is infamous for its preliminary section in a mixed form of *oratio obliqua* (126a-137c) preceding the main section set in direct speech. In his *Hercules* compositions, Antisthenes also sometimes introduced the dramatic speeches of his characters *in persona* (below n. 97). In these circumstances, it is difficult to decide whether a fragmentary text preserved in direct speech, as our fragment, was not originally introduced by a speaker in some lost opening section. The speaker in these cases may or may not have intervened in the process of the narration, but having spoken, stood aside as in the prologue of a drama.

Latterly, Hendrik Obsieger has drawn our attention to an interesting verbal similarity between *P.Erl.4* and Plato’s description of the young Charmides. However, in contrast to our text, Plato’s dialogue raises no direct moral censure of Charmides himself and, as we shall see, the verbal similarity does not

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Socrates’ attack on Alcibiades (Cic. Tusc. iii.77; cf. *SSR* II VIA 47) to the manner in which speaker (B) in our fragment gives (A) a dressing down.

10 Cf. A. Carlini (1989), 147-148 (*P.Erlangen 7: Aeschines Alcibiades?*, text not reproduced), but the fragment is notably not included by Giannantoni in *SSR* VIA. The authoritative collection of R. Pack (1965) 115 no. 2103 repeats Merkelbach’s doubts concerning its origins in Aeschines’ *Alcibiades*.

11 Not only was Aeschines’ *Alcibiades* narrated (above, n. 8), but his other dialogues too: e.g., *SSR* VIA 88 (Telauges), 75 (Kallias), 70 (Aspasia) and 79 (Miltiades). In general: U. Hoelscher (1974), 271-272. There is no reason to suppose that Aeschines’ *Axiochus* and *Rhinon* were any different.

12 Summary of the ‘minor Socratics’ in: M. Luz (2012) 30-33. Discussion: K. Düring (2011) 24-47; P.A. Vander Waerdt (1994) part. I.

13 H. Obsieger (2007) 85-86: Charmides is described as facially handsome (ἐυπρόσωπος), but ἀπρόσωπος in comparison with the beauty of the rest of his body (Charm. 154d-e). In our fragment, (A) is ἀπρόσωπος [τὸ ἔν]δον although previously considered physically καλὸς τὸ πρόσωπον (ll. 53-57).

14 In general: R.F. Stalley (2000) 266. This is not to deny the usual Platonic irony that the young Charmides proposes “Socratic” definitions of *sophrosyne* that are logically flawed and that the historical Charmides joined his uncle Critias as one of the Thirty Tyrants (M. Luz (2001) 100-102).
necessarily signify a borrowing from Plato. Other interesting points examined by Obsieger are a number of verbal comparisons between the fragment and discussions of love from the late Greco-Roman period although he dismisses the possibility that the fragment was their direct source rather than Plato himself.\textsuperscript{15} However, if it emerges from the following examination that the fragment is connected to a Socratic writer other than Plato, then the possibility remains that it is reflected in both later literature and perhaps even in Plato himself.

Text and Translation

Obviously, the philosophical content and origin of this fragment cannot be determined without prior clarification of its arguments. However, the latter cannot be properly understood without further clarification of the text.\textsuperscript{16} Today, facsimiles of the papyrus examined with the help of computer analysis enable us to consider alternative reconstructions in several places.\textsuperscript{17}

Although continuous, the text is divided into two sections:

1. the tail-end of a sentence attributed by Merkelbach to speaker (A);
2. and a reply attributed to speaker (B) comprising the main body of the surviving text.

The notes accompanying the following text are intended mainly to explain my reconstruction of the papyrus readings while those of contextual, philosophical and literary interest accompany the following translations.

The first decipherable words are the final part of an argument or clause in (A)’s address to (B).

\textsuperscript{15} H. Obsieger (2007) 86; first raised by W. Schubart (1942) 13 n.
\textsuperscript{16} I am still greatly indebted to the work of Profs. Schubart and Merkelbach and Hendrik Obsieger although in several critical places my own conjectures at reconstruction depart from theirs.
\textsuperscript{17} Computer analysis enables us not only to enlarge the images (above n. 3), but also to cut and paste the copyist’s own letters into the lacunae in order to determine which letters and which size of lettering would best fill the margins and lacunae more exactly than traditional methods were able to do. Before rejecting previous readings, I experimented with different sizes of the copyist’s letters for the relevant lacuna although for the most part the copyist was fairly uniform except for letters such as ω and ε. The number of letters per line, on the other hand, do show some variation.
We may suggest the following as a free translation:

(27) “... you were observing (?) where people tried to avoid some what even boys experience with their fathers conspicuous as they can get neither lack of attention nor forgiveness.”

At this point in the text, Merkelbach concludes from indications in the papyrus that there is a change of speaker (B) whose reply seems to be not so much dialectical as an authoritative and critical address:

18 Schubart: ἐτῆς ἐφυλάττοντος (dismissed by Merkelbach with no alternative suggestion). Magnified, we can read: his open σ as the bottom of a damaged ε, the surviving capital of Ξ with a dot of a vertical as a possible Τ and the Ι as a long vertical of a letter like Π. Although ἐτῆς ἐφυλάττοντος (perhaps, δι-/ετῆς or παρ-/ετής) is conjectural, the rest of the sentence requires a similar concept to precede it.

19 Schubart: τοὺς φυλάττοντος— but this would extend well beyond the right margin and when magnified, the σ of his τοὺς is seen as open ε forming an augment for an imperfect ἐφυλάττοντος (“on their guard against”/“tried to avoid”) governing διπερ as direct object and preceded by ὅπερ as the subject.

20 Schubart’s restoration of the antithesis ἀγνοιας ἀγνοιας is contextually the most plausible for the space given though ἀγνοιας has largely disappeared.

21 Schubart: δύνασθαι; Merkelbach: δύναμαι spoken by speaker (A), but the lacuna has space for four letters. My suggestion δυνάμενοι agrees grammatically and contextually with the previous subject (παῖδες).

22 I.e. “(cases) where people avoided” embarrassing situations where authority figures are present to criticise them.

23 The genitive πατέρων could be dependent on the following clause—the boys get “neither lack of attention nor forgiveness” from fathers—but Schubart was correct to make it dependent on “boys” (“wie den Söhnen der Väter...”). However, he renders τῶν φανερῶν πατέρων as “fathers of status” (Stande) as if = ἐπιφανῶν, but φανερός means “conspicuous, remarkable” only for objects (LSJ s.v. 1.a-c) while for people and gods it is the sensually conspicuous, not socially conspicuous (s.v. II.1). The sole example for “persons of distinction” (φανερώτερους) in LSJ, refers to the “more conspicuous” in dress (Philos. VA 2.20 despite the Loeb trans.).

24 If we accept Schubart’s restoration (ἀγνοιας... συγγνώμης), “neither lack of attention nor forgiveness” (above n. 19), the text could refer to the boys’ being pestered by potential erastai—who do not fail to notice and attend them—and to the lack of tolerance of any fathers who are conspicuous nearby.

25 l. 32 cuts short with a new “paragraph” and a short left-hand stroke above l. 33.
τὸ μὲν σύμπαν ἀληθὲς, ὅτι ὁ τρώσας ἰάσεται. 26 ἄλλος δὲ ἄλλως ὁ μὲν ἐκων ὁ δὲ ἐκων ἐπεὶ καὶ σὺ ἱάσω με φῦ βρυλόμενος. 27 ἢδιστα μὲν οὐ βουλόμενος. ὁ μὲν ἐκων ὁ δὲ ἀκων ἐπεὶ καὶ σὺ ἱάσω με φῦ βρυλόμενος. 27 ἢδιστα μὲν οὐ βουλόμενος.

26 Presumably the copyist’s iotaism for ἰάσεται although we find ἰάσω in line 7. The expression perhaps derives from Euripides’ Telephus where the hero is wounded (ἐτραυματίσθη) by Achilles (C. Preiser (2000) 339-340 and test. 14P, 175-6 and test. 5P), only to be cured by rust (ἰός) taken from the lance with which he had been struck (Apollo. Ep. 3. 20). Plato also uses this expression but to describe a situation where the burden of emending a wrong lies in the hands of the causal agent (Gorg. 447b—cf. schol. ad loc. and Olymp. in Gorg. I.7.7; also E.R. Dodds (1985) 189-190). His expression derives at least from the Telephus saga if not from Euripides’ Telephus more directly (below n. 48).

27 Schubart’s reading, but my collation reveals less letters damaged. His restoration is a fair conjecture based on line-spacing and the Socratic antithesis of ἕκων-ἄκων (below, n. 37). Even when a bad or ignorant person is helpful it may be involuntary (ἄκων) and not willingly (οὐ βουλόμενος) done.

28 ἐξουσία: Merkelbach deletes it as a marginal gloss on φιλανθρωπία τῷ καλῷ; Obsieger transfers it to read: ἱάματα...τοῦ καλοῦ ἐξουσία, ἐνίοτε δὲ τὰ πικρὰ (but see below n. 38).

29 ὀλὸν σὲ with the meanings “just as you” and “you for example” are grammatically disconnected. What is understood is “to the likes of you” and possibly the smudges above οἰ of οἷον hide another supralinear correction with part of ζ and a point of σ remaining making ξ οἷον σὲ which at any rate needs to be understood from the context.

30 Schubart: ἐπελάτε[πευν]—but he himself notes that ἐπι-λατερεῖω is undocumented and grammatically problematic—and that the ending [πευν] would be cramped in the space before the right margin. However, we may note that his reading ΛΑ in this word can be read as M (Schubart’s A lacks a true cross-line) and his damaged Τ before the lacuna would then suit the left leg of a Π. Thus, I suggest ἐπεμπ[π] to govern ἐμὲ indicating the Socratic mission to seek out someone fair (ἐπὶ καλῷ τωί in l. 49) when he is sent to the likes of you (speaker (A)).
εὐρέι τῳ τὰ στέρνα, ἡδὲ ὄφθης σὺ δὲ μοι ὄψασθαι.31

ηπίστουν τῇ ἐκκαθαρισθεὶς33

σὲ εἶναι φύτῳ καλὸν

τὸ πρόσωπον [ἄλλα]

νῆ Δία καλοῦ σ’ [οἱ34]

τὸ λοιπὸν ὄρη

ὡμένου φὺ [συμβοῦσθαί ὅλοι] [συμβοῦσθαι δι’].35

31 Schubart: ἐπὶ καλὸ τῷ προσώπῳ εὐρὺ τὰ στέρνα, ἡδὲ ὄ̣ν ἵματι. The accusative ΕΥΡΥΝ lacks grammatical balance but magnified, Schubart’s Ν is clearly ΤΩ with the vertical of the preceding Υ now making an independent I and its dislocated left arm as the trace of an elevated ε just but not touching the vertical. Grammatically, I take both cases of τωι not as a def. article but dat. of τις now balanced in three cases:—καλῷ τωὶ…εὑρέι τω(ι)…ἡδὲι—the first two with parallel accusatives of respect: πρόσω[πον…στέρνα.

32 Schubart: [Σέριφος (a Seriphian old maid) is impossible as there is space in the next line for a letter before ἄφος. His alternatives γραῦς/Σέριφος or γραῦς/ἔριφος would be too cramped to fit in both right and left margins, besides which his citations are late with a meaning out of context (“eine alte Jungfer”). My reconstruction is based on a common paraomia for the unexpected, ἔλαφος ἀντὶ παρθένου, indicating the astonishing (Ach. Tat. VI. 2 ll. 3-4; Liban. Epist. 785 l. 1-2, Rhet. 509 3). This was used generally for any unexpected windfall and not just for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia from which it is derived (Eur. I.A 105; schol. vet. in ll. 1.108-9).

33 Schubart: ἐκκαθαρισθεῖς—given the requirements (dat. fem. abstract, εκτετείμενοι letters), it is the best suited conjecture ("paßt noch am ehesten"), accepted by Merkelbch and Obsieber. A less likely alternative is ἐκβάσει ("deviation") but the sese required is more of disbelief in an exceptional emotional or mental derangement in the past (below, n. 44).

34 Schubart: -νὴ διαβληθ or νὴ Δία βληθεί—when magnified the damaged ΒΛΗ can be seen as ΚΑΛ (Λ lacking right stroke) followed by the bases of its ending (ΟΥ). Schubart’s independent σ’ before the margin would make sense equally as σοῦ (with ὄρμων l. 60) or σ’ o五官 (with τοῦ λοιποῦ l. 59, viz. τοῦ σώματος), the former making more sense as a criticism—the rest of your body "seeming beautiful to you”—and the latter stating that “your body does seem beautiful”.

35 Schubart: μονο [ν..]. However, σοῦ can be read as σοῦ with sufficient space after it for Schubart’s συμβοῦσθαί συμβοῦσθαί. The latter would require an infinitive to follow and the surviving letters δι… could possibly make sense as διαλέξασθαί/διαλέγειν.
The following is a free translation of the reconstruction with notes of contextual interest:

“(33) The entire truth is that “he who causes injury will (himself) be the cure”36 (35) but this is so in different ways for different people: one person voluntarily—and another involuntarily for you too will cure [me though unwillingly].37 At any rate, sweetest are cures for beauty that are love of mankind38 (40) but sometimes bitter ones are also possible and help39—and yet some one else (may be cured) by arrogance and wickedness40 for they are turned off by them forthwith (45) just as is the blade of a sword falling on something more solid.

36 On the origin of the expression and its use in Plato, see above n. 26. It was also a common saying in Hellenistic love literature (Charito vi.3.7; Anth. Gr. v.291; W. Schubart (1942) 13 n. 34) referring to a beloved who could prove a cure for the eros aroused in a lover (cf. Ach. Tat. vi. 2 ll. 3-4). Later, Olympiodorus read the last use of the expression back into Plato in that only Socrates and his pupils were proficient in curing afflictions of the soul (loc. cit.).

37 Although the last letters are faded, the sense is in line with “the Socratic paradox” of voluntary-involuntary (ἔκων-ἀκων) actions mentioned before (ll. 35-36): no one errs willingly—viz. knowingly—and thus wrong is done because of ignorance (cf. C. Rowe (2011) 206-207; H. Segvic (2005) 171-185). Conversely, even when a bad or ignorant person is helpful it may be involuntary (ἀκων) and not willingly (οὐ βουλόμενος) done.

38 Besides its common use (human feeling, common courtesy), φιλανθρωπία was used by the orator Aeschines (1.171) for “intercourse of lovers” (LSJ s.v.) but the context implies a borrowed sense and if it applies to our fragment, it would be a double entendre where the primary sense is that: the best cure for being besotted with a specific beauty is to seek it in love (φιλία) of mankind/society in general (see below n. 73).

39 Transferred by Obsieger to the previous clause so as to read “sweetest <and possible (καὶ ἐξουσία) > are cures for beauty in a love of mankind, but sometimes bitter ones also help” (above n. 28). However, the point of the antithesis in the original would be thus lost: not only are there sweet cures for longing after someone particular through transference of this to a general love of mankind, but bitter ones cure love being also effective/possible (see below n. 82 on its modality) as when people are turned aside/put off (ἐπεστράφησαν; ll. 44-45) by bad behaviour and wickedness (ὑβρίς καὶ σκαιότης) of the beloved (ll. 42-43).

40 In the case of a young erômenos, a charge of ὑβρίς would normally refer to his “arrogance” and "social attitude" while in cases of an adolescent or older erastês it could even range up to "outrage/abuse" in the role of the active party. Since the word ὑβρίς is here accompanied by “wickedness” (σκαιότης) it is likely that (A) was no young innocent. This is not to say that our text necessarily implied any of the legal ramifications of a charge of ὑβρίς (D.M. MacDowell (1976), 14-21), but implied more than the milder, ironic use of “scoffer”
As for me, the unexpected 41 used to dispatch me to the likes of you in search of someone with a good looking face, (50) of someone broad of chest, pleasant to touch.42 Yet, you looked no (windfall)—“a fawn substituted for a virgin (sacrifice)”43—but someone so lacking good looks within (55) that I disbelieved my own distraction44 at your being so facially good-looking, but truly by Zeus, although the rest (of your body)45 seems good-looking to you, I do not consent to join a dis(cussion ?)46 . . .”

Contextual Analysis

Although the surviving text does not refer to the concepts of love (ἔρως) and desire (ἐπιυθμία) explicitly, we may gather from its analysis of the various cures common in Plato (M. Gagarin (1977), 29-33). The combination of ὑβρις καὶ σκαιότης would at least bespeak serious moral censure.

41 The “unhoped for” (τὸ παρ ̓ ἐλπίδα) is a synonym for what is “contrary to all expectaton” (Suda E 2315). We may understand that his unexpected principle sent (B) to seek not only (A) but also other handsome (i.e. young) pupils (on this and Socrates’ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον, see below n. 60). In addition, ἐλπίς is a code-word in literature of the period used by the erastês when approaching the ἐρωμένος.

42 This list of attributes in asyndeton is perhaps a literary borrowing used as a general description of the object of (B)’s search for someone of (A)’s type (ὁίον σε) but without implying that (A) and those like him were necessarily beautiful within (cf. ll. 53-54), but could be in fact morally disappointing (ll. 52-53).

43 With my reconstruction of the manuscript (above n. 32), speaker (B) denies that (A) is an unexpected substitute for real beauty because of his inner ugliness. In Achilles Tatius (vi. 2.4) the guard is thunder-struck at “the proverbial” unexpected fawn substitute (Ἐλαφον ἀντὶ παρθένου) for an escaped maiden. In the papyrus, speaker (B) is surprised that he can no longer believe his former derangement/affixation with (A), now seen as a poor substitute for beauty (l. 55).

44 ἐκ[στά]σει (Schubart: “schwärmerische Begeisterung”): but used by medical writers both for physical “dislocation” (ecstasy) of joints (Hip. Art. 56.9), and for temporary distraction of the mind from the body, i.e. disorientation amd derangement of mental or emotional functions often accompanying madness (e.g. Aph. 7.5.1, Coac. 243, 249, 292, 476). In philosophy, it is commonly used of mental, emotional and sexual derangement (e.g. Arist. Cat. 10a, GA 768a, [Arist.] Phgn. 808b). “). In the fragment, it is more akin to temporary “affixation” with (A)’s good-looks.

45 Cf. ll. 49-51: face, chest, touch.

46 The intention is uncertain: “I do not agree with your wish” or “I do not consent” whereby speaker (B) presumably declines expanding on the last topic: (A)’s image of his own beauty (cf. l. 43). If the dialogue continued along Socratic lines, we would perhaps expect (B) to lead the discussion from the particular towards knowledge of beauty of within (cf. L 53).
for beauty and the beautiful (ἰαμάτα... τοῦ καλοῦ; ll. 39-40) that the subtext must refer to a therapy for the desire of beauty and in particular the desire for physical beauty.\(^{47}\) Previous scholars have noted that the saying quoted in the opening lines (ll. 34-35)—“he who causes injury is (himself) the cure”—was incorporated into discussions of love in Hellenistic-Roman literature where the beloved is himself/herself a prescription for love (φάρμακον ἔρωτος).\(^{48}\) However, we should note that this expression circulated as early as Plato\(^{49}\) and possibly Antisthenes.\(^{50}\) In fact, the subject of desire for beauty comprises an independent topic for discussion in many a Socratic writing.\(^{51}\) Nonetheless, our text is characterized by a number of features of its own. Whereas the discussion in Plato’s Symposium, for example, is devoted to a study of the essence and actions of Eros itself\(^{52}\)—and that of Aeschines to the role of eros in Socratic paideutic\(^{53}\)—the fragment examines the practicalities and effects of eros not as an ideal but as a corrective study on the path to understanding inner beauty. The same may be said of the dramatic structure of the fragment as a type of Socratic dialogue presented in dramatic form between an apparently younger, although, as we shall see, not necessarily young erômenos (A) and an apparently

\(^{47}\) Although ἔρως was not used exclusively of sexual appetite (B.S. Thornton (1997) 13-14), physical desire is clearly one aspect of the present discussion (cf. ll. 49-51). The cure discussed is to turn our erotic desire for physical beauty into one for beauty “within” (cf. ll. 53-54). This somewhat recalls how Plato makes true ἔρως lead us to grasp moral beauty (G. Vlastos (1973) 19-21, 38-42). While “therapeutic arguments” to purge desire were common in Hellenistic philosophy (M.C. Nussbaum (2009) 13-16), they are to be contrasted with less stringent views of erotic desire associated with the Socratics who used it as a means to philosophize (J.C.B. Gosling—C.C.W. Taylor (1984) 37-40).

\(^{48}\) E.g., Ach. Tat. vi. 2 ll. 3-4. Later reflected in the Roman saying: amoris uulnum idem sanat, qui facit (Publ. Syr. A31). On the background, see above n. 26.

\(^{49}\) Plato’s use of the expression (above n. 26) may reflect not just sayings derived from the Telephus saga in general (Olymp. in Gorg. 1.7.7), but also from Euripides' Telephus more directly (loc. cit. 1.45.4.2-4 where other expressions in the Gorgias are derived by him from the Telephus).

\(^{50}\) Antisthenes often quoted Euripides critically (e.g., below n. 90) but the beggar philosophy of the Telephus has been said to suit Cynics like Crates (D.L. vi.87) better than Antisthenes (D.R. Dudley (1937) 7; H.D. Rankin (1986) 183-184).

\(^{51}\) Especially Xen. Mem. i.iii. 8-25, Symp. iii.7, 12-14 (see: G. Danzig (2005) 331-357; B. Huss (1999) 32-34). The theme is also mentioned indirectly in Aeschines’ Alcibiades (SSR VIA 53.74), where Socrates’ eros for Alcibiades is the educational theme of Aeschines’ dialogue (C.H. Kahn (1998) 21).

\(^{52}\) Both in Socrates’ opening interrogation of Agathon (199c-d) and in Diotima’s following conversation with Socrates.

\(^{53}\) Notably in the Alcibiades, but also the Aspasia (C.H. Kahn (1998) 89-103).
older erastês and critic (B), who attempts to lead (A) to improve his understanding of beauty.

However, before examining the philosophy of this fragment, we need to clarify a few points relating to its dramatic background. The first decipherable words (ll. 27-32) are the final clause of a sentence that has been variously interpreted to denote:-

1. (A)'s affair with a third party not indicated in the fragment;
2. (A)'s expression of eros for (B) whereby he attempts to gain his attention only to be refused by him;
3. (A)'s rebuff of a previous appeal made by speaker (B) to himself.

Schubart and Merkalbach aired the first two options: as if an apparently young speaker (A) wished to develop a “Liebesbeziehung” only to receive a dousing (“kalte Dusche”) in the following section (ll. 33-57) from the hands of the “Socratic” figure (B).54 However, leaving aside their identities for the moment, a number of arguments can be raised against the first two suggestions:

1. It is clear that speaker (B) had appealed to (A) ironically as his cure for love (καὶ σὺ ἰάσω μὲν; l. 37) although, if the restoration is correct, he was by then said to be unwilling (οὐ βουλόμενος; ll. 37-38) to help him in this role. If this is so, it would be easiest to infer that (A) had not willingly sought out the companionship of (B) in the opening sentence.
2. Moreover, even if the restoration of ll. 37-38 is incorrect, it is still clear that (B) took the opening words to refer to himself so that he rather than some third party was likely to be the subject of (A)’s broken sentence. Unless (A) had previously rebuffed (B), how could (B) have known of this later?55
3. Significantly, (B) had apparently known (A) from previous occasions and already had a change of feeling for him from well before this conversation began: “you seemed to me (σὺ δὲ μοι ὤφθης)” to be no surprising windfall (ll. 51-53) so that “I began to discredit (ἠπίστουν)” my own (previous feel-

54 It is unclear from R. Merkelbach (1958) whether he understood (A) to be attempting to form a connection with some third person not indicated in the fragment and intimated in the analogy of the Schubart’s boys under guard—or form a connection with the Socratic speaker (B) himself as suggested by Merkelbach’s comparison with Alcibiades and Socrates in Plato Symp. 216 ff.

55 It would not be logical for (A) to turn to (B) for advice concerning a third party and for (B) to reply that (A) could cure him (B). If that were the case, then we would expect (B) to have replied that he (B) could cure (A)—willingly or not.
nings) of “distraction for your beauty” (ll. 47-56). The tenses of these two verbs suggest that all this occurred some time prior to the present conversation. It would then seem that (B) had not approached (A) in order to initiate a relationship but to resume an old one cloaked as a former lover, but in reality a moral critic. With no serious intent of courting him he tries to question him about something negative in his attitude that was not there when he had first met him.

4. Speaker (A)’s opening remarks about what boys experience when their fathers are conspicuous is thus most easily interpreted as a general analogy rather than a reference to specific boys with whom he is attempting to form a connection as Schubart had previously supposed. As a response to (B)’s approach to chide him, (A) could easily be interpreted to say: remember that people try to avoid what boys also experience in this situation when they cannot gain paternal forgiveness nor totally escape the attention (of lovers). It is thus easiest to deduce from this that (A) too is attempting to escape the paternalistic and critical notice of people like (B) just as boys do before their fathers (above n. 23);

Nothing specific is given to explain (B)’s change of attitude, but having said that (A) would prove an involuntary cure for (B)’s “derangement”—i.e. temporary affixation with (A)’s good looks—(B) adds that one type of cure for lovers (like himself) is the revulsion (they felt) when they “were turned off” (ἀπεστράφησαν) at (observing) their beloved’s arrogance and wickedness (ὑβρίς καὶ σκαιότης; ll. 42-45). In fact, my suggestion for the reconstruction of the first word of the fragment—“you were observing”—ἐτήρεις (or παρ-/ετήρεις, δι-/ ἐτήρεις)—where people try to avoid a case where there is paternal criticism—could imply that (B) had been observing (A) for some time with this in mind, or at least observing cases similar to his own. Considering that shortly afterwards (B) points out that (A) had an ugly soul—“unhandsome within” (l. 53)—the latter’s previous behaviour could consistently be classed as arrogance and wickedness of the sort that he described. The charge of ὑβρίς could range from mere arrogance (social “attitude”) to down-right sexual assault but when coupled with the word “wickedness” (σκαιότης), the charge is more likely to be closer to the latter (above n. 40). That (A) is described several times as “handsome” should not mislead us into thinking that he was still one of the young καλοί by the norms of that period. The serious charge made against him by (B) would be more suited to a (young) adult rather than an innocent boy. (B)’s previous encounters with him when he was still distracted by (A) were possibly when (A) was younger and had not yet turned (B) off with his bad behavior. Whether long or short, a sketch of this was most probably set forth in the lost
opening of the dialogue. I would thus conclude that it was (B) who approached (A) at the beginning of the dialogue with the intent of criticizing something in his behavior and although still claiming authoritative rights over (A) he is spurned as early as the opening sentence.

From the above conclusions, I would like to suggest the following reconstruction for the lost introductory scene: the authoritative (Socratic) speaker (B) had previously approached the handsome (A) in order to renew his acquaintance despite the lack of attention (ἀγνοία) that he had latterly paid (A)—and despite a lack of forgiveness or tolerance (συγγνώμη) for (A)’s recent actions that had caused him revulsion. Although not stated explicitly, it could be inferred that some of (A)’s actions were of an erotic nature since (B)’s following reply is to explain the cures for (desiring) the beautiful. In consequence, (A) rejects (B)’s authority in that people try avoid what also happens to boys in this situation when they are chided by paternal authority. To an extent, this interpretation is substantiated by (B)’s immediate reply (l. 33): “The entire truth is…” (τὸ μὲν σύμπαν ἀληθές). In other words, (A)’s preceding rebuttal is only a partial truth for in (B)’s view there are cures for a desire for beauty and (A) himself is no “prize catch” because of his ugliness of soul. Although this reconstruction is the opposite of that suggested by previous scholars, we may surprisingly come to the same conclusions as theirs: that speaker (B)’s approach may be compared to Socrates’ paideutic method. There he generally took the initiative in opening a philosophical discussion with younger speakers. In the jocular guise of an elderly suitor (erastês) attracted by a younger would-be erômenos, Socrates also tried to help them rethink their moral position.

56 The first decipherable words are the tail-end of a sentence that was preceded by at least one and a half fragmentary columns no longer decipherable. This is more than enough space to set out at least an opening dialogue with (A).

57 The καί (even/also) introducing οἱ παῖδες implies that the speaker does not include himself among the boys and perhaps not even in their age-group. As a general analogy he had passed that stage but was still pestered by (B)’s courtship and paternal criticism. We may contrast the Platonic Alcibiades I-11 featuring Alcibiades as a young boy to Antisthenes’ Alcibiades and in particular to Plato’s Symposium. In the last two compositions, Socrates encounters an older Alcibiades who recalls his relations with him in his boyhood (219a-e).

58 This is a feature characterizing not only the dialogues of Plato, Xenophon, Aeschines and Antisthenes—but of several later Ps.-Platonic imitations as well. In Aeschines’ Alcibiades, Socrates mentions his ἔρως and τὸ ἐρόν as a means for interrogating Alcibiades (SSR 53 (74)). In those Platonic dialogues where Socrates’ conversant is the initiator of the discussion as in the Meno the speaker is usually an adult rather than a younger companion. See: D.K. O’Connor (1994) 151-180; C.H. Kahn (1994) 87-106.
The opening of the Platonic dialogue, *Alcibiades I*, depicts a dramatic scene that in many of its details resembles my suggested interpretation of the fragment:59

1. Socrates admits that he had neglected speaking to Alcibiades “for so many years” (103a).
2. Although previously prohibited by his divine sign (δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα) from approaching the boy, he is not so now, but is full of expectant optimism (εὔελπις) for renewing their friendship (a-b).
3. However, Alcibiades has by this time grown proud, thinking himself the fairest and greatest of all (104a) replying haughtily: what expectation do you (Socrates) entertain (εἰς τίνα ἐλπίδα βλέπων) that you trouble me so (104d)?

While Socrates’ optimistic hope (εὔελπις) for renewing his acquaintance with Alcibiades is dramatically dependent on the absence of his divine (δαιμόνιον) sign, our fragment uses the “unexpected” itself as an active principle for bringing the speakers together: “the unexpected (τὸ παρ ἐλπίδα) used to dispatch me to the likes of you” (ll. 48-49). The latter would then be a protreptic principle positively urging (B) to speak to (A). In this respect it still recalls Socrates’ divine sign—the δαιμόνιον—but not the solely prohibitive sign described by Plato, but the both positive and negative signs recorded in Xenophon.60 Furthermore, some credence must be given to the latter’s testimony that Antisthenes also recognised both aspects of Socrates’ divine sign.61 We may

59 The authenticity of *Alcib. I* is still not decided, but this does not affect my argument. Although *Alcib. II* is almost definitely spurious, it is difficult to suppose that Plato did not compose his own version of an “Alcibiades” given that the other Socratics (Aeschines, Antisthenes, Phaedo and a short record in Xenophon) had produced one. C.H. Kahn (1994) has drawn some interesting parallels between *Alcib. I* and Aeschines’ *Alcibiades* but there are also points of contact with our fragment.

60 On the “unexpected” τὸ παρ ἐλπίδα, see above n. 41. Although Socrates’ customary divine sign (τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον and τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον) was merely prohibitive in Plato (e.g., *Apolog*. 40c, 31d, *Euthyphr*. 3b, *Phd*. 108b), the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον in Xenophon was both protreptic and prohibitive (*Xen*. *Mem*. 1.1.2). On its use, see: M.L. McPherran (2011) 125-127. This was also noted in the *Anon. Theaet*. *Comment*. col. 56 ll. 43-47: ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι ἂν ἦν τὸ Σωκράτους δαιμόνιον ἀποτρεπτικὸν αἰεί, ἑπιτρέπον ποτὲ συνεῖναι (= CPF 1.*** 95 p. 716).

61 Xen. *Symp*. viii.5-6: sometimes you (Socrates) do not speak to me citing your δαιμόνιον as an additional pretext (i.e. as a prohibitive principle)—and, at other times, when there is another matter, you are sent in pursuit of me (i.e. sent by a protreptic principle). On its role “in his erotic relationships” and Antisthenes, see: D.K. O’Connor (2011) 68.
tentatively conclude from this that the author of the fragment reflects a tradition used by Xenophon and his Antisthenean sources where Socrates is sometimes actively urged by an unexpected δαιμόνιον to take specific actions.\(^\text{62}\) This also makes it more likely that speaker (B) of our text should be compared if not identified with Socrates himself.

However, there are significant differences between the dramatic background of our text and that of *Alcibiades I*. In the latter, Alcibiades is young enough to be still in the tutelage of his uncle Pericles (104b), still beset by many suitors (104c) and not quite old enough to speak to the assembly (105a). While the most serious charge raised against him by Socrates is his haughtiness (104c), we have seen that our fragment brings charges not only of ὑβρίς but also wickedness implying a somewhat sinister, older figure.

In contrast to *Alcibiades I* and even Plato’s *Symposium*, Antisthenes’ *Alcibiades* gave a much more vituperative and disparaging account of the General than anything that Plato ever wrote. There an older Alcibiades—still “good looking (ὡραίος) at any age”—is accused of sexual excesses and depravity.\(^\text{63}\) A development of this theme is also reflected in a papyrus *chria* ascribed to Socrates that what he taught Alcibiades by day was undone by others at night. Since the latter immediately continues with a *chria* ascribed to Antisthenes both could come from the same source.\(^\text{64}\) While there is no direct proof that the wickedness and hybris of speaker (A) of our fragment is to be identified with Alcibiades himself, speaker (B) and his unexpected sign is

\(^{62}\) There has been renewed interest in Xenophon’s originality with the possibility of Plato occasionally borrowing from him as in their *Symposia* (e.g. G. Danzig (2005) 331-357), but by and large Xenophon is more reliant on the dialogues of Plato than *vice versa*.

\(^{63}\) Alcibiades’ unfading good looks (*SSR* VA 198-199) and moral depravity were described not only in Antisthenes’ *Alcibiades*, but also in one of his *Cyrus* compositions where he detailed his indiscriminate sex with a mother, daughter and sister in “Persian style” (*SSR* VA 141; vol. 4 (N. 31) 300-301, 303-304). To that may be added Alcibiades’ alleged intimate relations with Anytus (Ἀλκιβιάδου ἑρατῆς; Pl. *Apolog.* 18 b schol.) followed by openly robbing and mugging him in front of his guests (*Amatorius* 762c ως Ἀνύτο... ἐρώντι μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου... ἐπεκώμασεν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ λαβὼν ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης εἶς ἤμισυ τῶν ἐκπωμάτων ἀπήλθεν). Be these stories anecdotal or not and the reader may feel little sympathy for Anytus, Plutarch repeats them (*Vit. Alcib.* 4.193d-e) in a biography that relies on Antisthenes as a source (see below n. 74). They certainly ring of the sexual-political calumny of 5th century Athenian politics concerning the historical Alcibiades in particular: V. Wohl (2002) cap. III (“Perverse Desire: The Eros of Alcibiades”).

\(^{64}\) The 2nd AD papyrus PFlor. 11.113 (= Mertens-Pack3 no. 2584), ascribes this *chria* to Socrates (PFlor 113, col. 11.17-26; cf. *CPF* 1*** sect. 93 2T pp. 718-719) immediately preceding the *chria* or fragment from Antisthenes (col 11.26-36; cf. *CPF* 1* sect. 18 2T p. 238). See: M. Luz (2014), forthcoming.
closer to an Antisthenean Socrates than a Platonic one thus making the identification of (A) possible but not certain.

Speaker (B)’s immediate reply to (A)’s rebuff takes its queue from the oracle concerning Telephus’ wound to be cured with rust of the lance that injured him (ll. 34-45). As in later love literature (above n. 36), the meaning of the subtext is presumably that (A) would be the cure for (B)’s feelings for his beauty (above n. 43). However, (B) examines this concept more finely than in love literature by philosophically analysing the different types of cures (ἰάματα) for love of Beauty and beauties by which “you (A) may cure me (B)” (ll. 34-47):

1. there are voluntary cures for beauty that are pleasant and based on a love of mankind
2. and involuntary bitter cures are also possible and effectively help as when the beloved unintentionally cures (suitors) when they are turned off—viz. by disgusting them—and thus reveals the arrogance and evil of his nature (ll. 41-45).

According to the literal classification of our text, (B) allocates different types of cures for different cases (ἄλλος δὲ ἄλλως). The erômenos may cure the erastês either voluntarily (ὁ μὲν ἑκὼν) or involuntarily (ὁ δὲ ἄκων): the most pleasant is a transfer of love for a particular erômenos to a general love for mankind (φιλανθρωπία)—and the bitter (τὰ πικρά) cures are those brought about by revulsion (ἀπεστράφησαν) at the erômenos’ outrage and wickedness (ll. 36-45). Although it is possible that this list is meant to be divided into three separate options,65 a neater and more Socratic division would be a bifurcate division based on:

1. voluntary
2. and involuntary action.66

Speaker (A) belongs to the latter as he is said—or at least appears—to prove an unwilling cure and is by implication also one of those who bring about revulsion. Voluntary cures, on the other hand, would then be the most pleasant

65 1. voluntary and involuntary; 2. pleasant and bitter; 3. those achieved through arrogance and wickedness.
66 The voluntary would be pleasant whereby the erastês universalizes his feelings into a general love for all (presumably moral) people while the involuntary would be unwillingly done, bitter and witness to a display of arrogance and wickedness. See above (n. 37) on the Socratic theory of voluntary/involuntary moral actions.
cures for the beautiful leading to a love of mankind (ἥδιστα μὲν οὖν ἰάματα φιλανθρωπία τοῦ καλοῦ)—viz. from love for a particular beautiful person to love of Man.

We should first note that the possibility of leaving this love of beauty “uncured” is not considered in the text so that we may conclude that these cures are not merely possible, but advisable for a virtuous person if not imperative. The assumption that love or desire for a physically beautiful object like speaker (A) must or ought to be cured implies that love and desire for physical beauty is considered a sickness and pathos which has to be redirected if not removed by means of cures of the types listed in the fragment. This understanding is perhaps implied when “I (B) began to disbelieve (ἠπίστουν)” my former (manic) “derangement” (ἐκστάσει) or affixation with (A)’s beauty” (above n. 43). We do not find this solely negative connotation of a curative eros in the fragments of Aeschines where it has been described as a paideutic tool for Socrates to further the conversation (above n. 51). Plato’s use of the curative function of Eros is by contrast not only negative but also positive even in the one ironic phrase closest to the use in our fragment: that sacrifices and divination are none other than the preservation and cure of Love (περὶ Ἔρωτος φυλακήν τε καὶ ἱασίν; Symp. 188c).67 Needless to say, our fragment does not class the cures (ἰάματα) for desire of the beautiful with the suspect practices of sacrifices and divination, but treated the cures seriously at least in the preserved section of the dialogue.

In contrast to Plato and Aeschines and by comparison with our fragment, Antisthenes was well known for his extremism in treating eros as a disease and madness: it is an “evil of nature” (τὸν τε ἔρωτα κακίαν φησὶ φύσεως) and although the wretched call this disease divine (θεὸν τὴν νόσον καλοῦσιν), once admitted it needs “to be excised or treated with hellebore” or even “reduced by diet”!68 His

67 Plato’s presentation of this remark by Eryximachus is surely ironic and although it has been interpreted to refer to the preservation of the good Eros and the curing of the bad (K.J. Dover (1980) 111), it has also been described as a “remarkable” restatement of the two Loves in physiological terms (M.L. McPherran (2006) 85-86). Elsewhere, Plato is more ambivalent: desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) and other sensations should be purged Pythagorean style (Phd. 66c; ἔρωτες and ἐπιθυμίαι beset us like diseases)—but elsewhere he considered them an integral part of the human frame needing to be controlled by prudence and wisdom (Rep. 485c, 429c-d etc.).

68 SSR VA 118-120, 123-124. He apparently compared eros to the “divine disease” attacking mind and body: viz. epilepsy and seizures. His maxim—“I had rather go mad than enjoy myself (ἡσθείην)” makes special reference to quick sexual encounters (122). On eros, desire and madness in the classical period in general, see: K.J. Dover (1994), 127. Although the Stoa also considered emotions a pathos especially eros, our text is not characterized by its
argument was based on Socratic principles: that submission to pleasure and eros was a result of ignorance (διὰ τούτων ἡττᾶσθαι τοὺς ἀμαθεστέρους δι’ ἀγνοιαν ἡδονής) and thus involuntary (ἐκστασις) in contrast to those with temperance (τὴν σωφροσύνην) who were knowledgeable and whose actions were performed voluntarily (ἐκων). Argument in our fragment is based on similar assumptions: (B)’s feelings for (A) are a medical derangement (ἐκστασις) that is only temporary (above n. 44). Secondly, there are involuntary and unwilling agents (ll. 36-38) and the moral who do not cause revulsion are presumably voluntary agents. Nonetheless, Antisthenes did leave a place for philosophical, spiritual love in his system: only a good person is worthy of love (ἀξιέραστος) and the moral are his friends. One example was Socrates himself whose relations with Antisthenes are idealised in Xenophon who significantly uses this term in a central part of Socrates’ speech on the soul and spiritual love. It is interesting that the term ἀξιέραστος is not used by Plato although he perhaps parodied it when he described how Alcibiades viewed his relationship with Socrates. In our fragment, the term ἀξιέραστος is not used explicitly but the concept is there by implication: if love is cured by turning away from the wicked (ll. 42-45), then its cure through love of mankind (ll. 39-40) would be through its opposite—viz. through the good who are morally worthy of love.

The next concept in our fragment, φιλανθρωπία (love of mankind/common courtesy; ll. 39), is treated as a cure for the desire of a particular person and as a means of escape to a general love of all. However, we may gather from the following clause that the latter was no ‘blind’ unselective affection encompassing love for anyone and everyone. Since this cure precludes those who cause technical vocabulary. Furthermore, Antisthenes’ works were read by leading Stoics who often reflect his ideas (M. Luz (1994), 114-121).

69 SSR VA 122-123, but also his Odysseus speech that ἀμαθία is ἐκων (VA 54.20; vol. IV 260 N. 26). On the Socratic argument, see above n. 37.

70 D.L. VI.105 (= SSR VA 135.10); vi. 12 (134): The ἀξιέραστος is wise and a friend to whoever is like himself (134). Possibly, these citations originate in one of Antisthenes’ Hercules compositions (H.D. Rankin (1986) 102-103). For the reconstruction of the context of this work: see: M. Luz (1996), 101-103; idem (1994) 114-121.

71 Xen. Symp. viii. 14-15 (Socrates’ argument on the soul’s advance in prudence is that it becomes more worthy of love (ἀξιέραστος) to a moral lover), viii. 3-4 (Antisthenes love for Socrates), viii. 5-6 (Socrates’ love for Antisthenes), iv. 42-44 (Antisthenes speech on his philosophical debt to Socrates who taught him to find time for the morally ἀξιοθέατα and ἄξιακουστα). For a general discussion of this work and the relationships of the characters, see B. Huss (1999) 381.

72 Symp. 218c (Alcibiades to Socrates): ἐμοῦ ἐραστῆς ἢξιος γεγονέναι μόνος. As we shall see, there was no love lost between Plato and Antisthenes.
revulsion by exhibiting *hybris* and wickedness (*ll*. 41-45), φιλανθρωπία must embrace solely those of mankind who are morally worthy of love. The term, φιλανθρωπία is not central to the philosophy of Plato and has even been judged by some to have negative connotations for him. Although the term is not attested in the fragments of Antisthenes with any certainty, we should note that the latter’s *Hercules* composition(s) included an encounter between two heroes of antiquity who were considered to exemplify φιλανθρωπία *par excellence* in ancient tradition:

1. Hercules whose deeds were re-interpreted as acts of a benefactor (εὐεργέτης) to man;
2. and Prometheus who was conceived as a technological and civic friend of mankind (φιλάνθρωπος).

This encounter is described in one of the few connected quotations of any length surviving from Antisthenes’ dialogues albeit in a Syriac translation. Here Prometheus upbraids Hercules for wasting time on worldly trifles (“your toil is very contemptible in that you are occupied with the things of the world”) and tries to turn him round to “more exalted” goals. Possibly, a similar role was

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73 φιλανθρωπία is *not* included as a stage in Diotima’s passage from love for a particular beauty to that in general since ideal Beauty is the final goal for the passage from both (*Symp*. 210a-d). Mention of eros as φιλανθρωπότατος and as the reason for those cured (ιαθέντων) for man’s happiness is mentioned but in Aristophanes’ comic speech (189c-d) and perhaps with its secondary meaning of intercourse (above, n. 38). Some conclude from this that Plato did not consider it a virtue (K.J. Dover (1980) 114). It appears twice more in Plato: 1. Used sarcastically of Socrates’ accusers (*Euthyphr*. 3d); 2. once in passing of God (*Leg*. 713). The three ‘forms’ of Middle (?) Platonic φιλανθρωπία explained in D.L. iii.98 are not positive and perhaps ironic.

74 Plutarch described Socrates’ affection for Alcibiades as one of εὐνοίας καὶ φιλ[ανθρωπία](ς) (Vit. Alcib. 1 191e) in the same sentence as he cites Antisthenes’ *Alcibiades* (192, Ziegler)—or the previous sentence (*SSR* VA 201) depending on how you punctuate. Later, he uses the word sarcastically for Anytus’ description of Alcibiades’ robbery and muggery (above n. 63) as if done φιλανθρωπώς (4.193e).

75 Syriac dited with a discussion and English translation in: M. Luz (1996) 90-92; Mach’s Latin trans. in *SSR* VA 96. Hercules’ deeds were generally thought to show τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ τὴν εὔνοιαν (Isocr. 5: 114). See also: R. Høistad (1948) 31-37) on Hercules’ role in Antisthenes and earlier philosophy. Prometheus’ connection with φιλανθρωπία (*Philostr*. VA 11.3) was preceded by a similar role given him by Antisthenes’ older contemporary, Protagoras, although perhaps not in these words (G.B. Kerferd (1989) 168-169) and associated with 5th century Sophist ideas of progress (E.A. Havelock (1957) 407-409).
given to the φιλανθρωπότατος Cyrus in Antisthenes’ “companion” volume.不像从Antisthenes的两个英雄通过行动从人类来更好地生活，作者的我们的片段将角色的φιλανθρωπία视为唯一的方式，通过美来引导我们的人类，这与Socrates被Alcibiades（见注73）提出的φιλανθρωπία相提醒。我们应该，然而，根据我们对人类中所有良善人的普遍对美的爱与Platonic对美的爱的不同，将片段与Antisthenes区分开来。Diotima在她关于erõtika的演讲中只将第二步的“哲学家的阶梯”献给爱美的所有人。然而，爱在这个阶段的演讲中不仅仅是一个开始，她认为我们必须最终学会爱纯粹，不混杂与美的自身（211d-e）。不仅我们的片段没有提到美的本身，而且在它对这个世界中美的爱的分析中也没有提到。另一方面，如果我们的片段与Antisthenes的比较是正确的，那么这一差异从Diotima的演讲中不是令人惊讶的，考虑到Antisthenes已知的对Platonic Form的批评。我们可以至少得出这样的结论：在精神上，对人类的普遍的爱更接近于Antisthenes和Xenophon而不是Plato。

The same may be concluded from the metaphor in our fragment that lovers are immediately turned back by them too (i.e. hybris and wickedness) “as is the blade of a sword (ξίφους ἀκμή) falling on something more solid (στερεωτέρῳ)” (ll. 43-48). What evolves from this bold epic metaphor is that the virtuous are, as it were, protected in moral armor. Although Plato has much to say about inner strength, it is Antisthenes who is known for expressing the concept of “Socratic strength (Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος)” in striking epic metaphors as when he compared virtue to a weapon not able to be seized by another (ἀναφαίρετον ὅπλον). It is true that the idea in our fragment is not that virtue is itself a weapon, but that virtue is something more solid than the sword blade (of the

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76 Xenophon’s partly Antisthenean figure of Cyrus was both “καλλιστος in appearance and φιλανθρωπότατος in soul” (Cyr. 1.2.1) in a positive sense just as his Socrates was described as φιλάνθρωπος (Mem. 1.2.60). Antisthenes’ Hercules and Cyrus compositions may be termed “companion volumes” as both proved that toil (πόνος) was a good thing (ἀγαθόν) common to both Greeks and non-Greeks (D.L. vi.2 = SSR VA 97).

77 SSR VA 149: “I see a horse, Plato, I do not see horsesiness (ἱππότητα)”. See also K. Düring (2011) 42-44.

78 In language it recalls Penelope whose heart was ever more solid than stone (σοὶ δ’ ζεί πραδής στερεωτήρῃ ἐστι λίθοι; Od. xxxiii. 103), but here the idea is that she stubbornly refuses to recognise Odysseus, not that she is protected from the suitors.

79 D.L. vi.12 = SSR VA 134.
wicked), which cannot penetrate a shield or armor. Perhaps, a more exact comparison would then be to Antisthenes’ other Homeric metaphors of prudence (φρόνησις) resembling “a city wall most safe” (τείχος ἀσφαλέστατον)—or “the walls of the soul” unshakable (ἀσάλευτα) and unbreached (ἀρραγή). This was not just a general contingency but a modal one since the soul’s wall is built on unassailable arguments (ἐν τοῖς αὐτών ἀναλώτοις λογισμοίς) so that it is not in the power of anyone to topple (καταρρεῖν) it or for it to be betrayed (προδίδοσθαι). This modal aspect of “virtue not able to be lost (ἀναπόβλητον)” is important for Antisthenes’ general philosophy. Significantly, it is also to be deduced from the fragment before us: bitter cures (i.e. the behaviour of the arrogant and wicked) not only help (واجبلئ) in curing us but are also (modally) capable (ἐξουσία) of accomplishing this (ll. 40-41). However, if the actions of the wicked have the ἔξουσία to cure us indirectly, they lack the ἔξουσία to hurt us directly. Consequently, their effect is like a sword-blade on the more solid in that they not only do not affect the virtuous but lack the ability to do so.

We should next note that the classification of cures for beauty in our text does not necessarily mean that beauty itself is so classified. The passage closes with a simple dichotomy of outer (physical) attributes and inner (moral) ones, but re-applies the term “beautiful” (καλός) only to the latter. Speaker (B) began to disbelieve that (A) had been considered (viz. could have been considered) “so handsome and fair of face” (οὕτω καλὸν τὸ πρόσωπον; ll. 56-57) since you (A) are seen to be unhandsome within (ἀπρόσωπος τὸ ἔνδον; ll. 53-54). He does not of course mean that (A)’s physical attributes had changed during the conversation, but that the application of the term καλός no longer applied.

The philosophy of the text is thus once more akin to Alcibiades I in respect of its understanding of καλός in its spiritual, moral sense. In the latter:

1. the term καλός is narrowed down to a meaning approximating to our concept of the “morally good” and not to be used properly in the sense of physically “beautiful”.  

80 D.L. vi.13; SSR VA 134, 106, 107.
81 SSR VA 134. The good cannot lose their morality once attained although they can be twisted around (διαστρέφεθαι) and turned back by sophists (135). See also: R. Höistad (1948) 85; M. Luz (1996) 100.
82 SSR VA 99 (= D.L. VI.105): virtue is ἀναπόβλητον. Thus, in our fragment, it is important to retain ἔξουσία in its original place in the manuscript (above n. 28); the suggestion to transfer it (above n. 39) ruins the logical point.
2. its conclusion is similar to that in our fragment: we are the soul (130c) for he who speaks to Alcibiades does not speak to his face (πρόσωπον) but to his (inner) soul (130e).

3. Thus, the lover of Alicibades’ body does not love Alcibiades himself (131c) while the one who loves his soul is for ever with him (131d).

On the other hand, *Alcibiades* I does not discuss the special themes of our fragment: the cure for the desire of someone who is καλός and the application of the term itself. It is only fair to point out that our text assumes the dichotomy of outer and inner beauty of body and soul close to its apparent opening.³³ By contrast the *Alcibiades* I deduces “we” are the soul close to its end. Our fragment cannot be simply derived from that dialogue but develops its argument on the “inner soul” from that point onward. There is possibly also a hint in our text of the general direction which the author planned to take in the remainder of this work. Speaker (B) describes himself as sent to seek out (ἐπί) someone sensually beautiful (“handsome of face, broad of chest, sweet to touch”). That (B) is dispatched “to the likes of you (οἷόν σε)” (A) (ll. 47-48) ironically disguises the difference between them since (B) is aware of the distinction between someone “lacking good looks within” and someone “good-looking” only on the outside while (A) still seeks the physically beautiful without knowledge of this distinction. This is borne out the close of the fragment (ll. 58-60) where (B) berates (A) for (still) considering, by Zeus, that the rest (of your body) is good-looking (νὴ Δία καλοῦ σοι τοῦ λοιποῦ ὁρωμένου), viz. in addition to his face.³⁴ We thus see that (A)’s conceit and love of physical beauty was still not assuaged at this point. It is fair to assume that the author would have later described how (B) is led to a better understanding of true beauty much in the manner of other Socratic authors. That the last legible words in the papyrus (ll. 60-61) indicate that (B) was unwilling to go further with him (οὐ συμβούλομαι) in discussion (?)³⁵ does not necessarily indicate a sudden end of the conversation without its expected denouement. More than likely (B) was simply unwilling to discuss (A)’s bodily beauty any further and was about to pass on to his next point.

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³³ It is admittedly difficult to assess how much of the preceding text is lost, but the fact that speaker (A) was still haughty—i.e. not yet brought down by (B)—and (B) explains how he had been sent to speak to him, suggests that we are close to the introduction of the dialogue.

³⁴ Cf. Cf. ll. 49-51 and above n. 45.

³⁵ The word “discussion” is of course a conjecture—δι. . . . being all that remains, but the grammar and sense require something along this line (above n. 34).
We see that our text adopts an absolute stand on “inner beauty” as real beauty much as in many simple Socratic discussions. This is quite different from that proposed in Plato’s Republic and Symposium where all physical beauty is unreal and distinct from ideal Beauty itself (τὸ κάλλος, καλλονή). Rather our text assumes that there are seemingly beautiful people but that an individual’s real beauty is dependent on their inner (ἔνδον) state (ll. 53-54). In contrast to an idealist stand where all physical beauty has a value only in relation to an external Form, the philosophy of the fragment is based on values and norms rooted in this world. This approach has sometimes been associated with the philosophy of the historical Socrates and the “Socratic dialogues” of Plato, Aeschines and Xenophon.86 However, we should not overlook Antisthenes’ Alcibiades dialogue where he discussed the normative beauty of Alcibiades’ body in contrast to his moral depravity (above n. 63). It was possibly there that he concluded that Socrates really “despised (ὑπερεῖδεν)” Alcibiades’ beauty (D.L. II.31) much as did speaker (B) in regard to (A)’s good-looks in our fragment. Furthermore, in a much misunderstood line, Antisthenes is said to have gone even further: that unless Achilles was of “his sort (τοιοῦτος)” —i.e. possessing not only Alcibiades’ physical beauty, but also his lack of a moral one— then he (Achilles) “was not ‘really beautiful’.”87 This last citation also shows how Antisthenes was aware of the ambivalent use of the word καλός in society. Consequently, he developed his epistemological theory of language and morality: that there is only one proper meaning for each moral concept. This meaning is to be defined in no other terms than itself since all that one can say of an object/concept is that it is itself.88 One may define τὸ καλὸν merely as καλὸν and any other addition to this definition would refer to something else and be

86 Obviously, judgement of the evidence on Socrates changes with each generation of scholars, but a balanced view is still in: G. Vlastos (1991) 79. On the history of the problem, see: L.A. Dorion (2011) 1-23. C.H. Kahn (2006) 110-130 has recently proposed sweeping away the idea of Plato’s Socratic dialogues.

87 SSR VA 199: Proclus In Alcib. 114: εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, οὐκ ἦν ὁ ἄρα ἦν ἄντως καλός. Similarly, Olymp. In Alcib. p. 28: Alcibiades modelled “for statues of Hermes” on account of the (normative) “beauty of his body (καλός ἦν τῷ σώματι)”, but unlike Achilles (whom Antisthenes admired in his Hercules), Alcibiades lacked (moral) beauty: “unless Achilles had been of his sort (lacking moral beauty), he was not handsome (οὐκ ἦν ἄρσιας). To interpret it as if Alcibiades was the standard of beauty which Achilles could not achieve if he were not like him physically, makes no sense of Antisthenes’ criticism of Alcibiades and admiration of Achilles.

88 Aristot. Metaphys. 1024b32-34. Other testimonies with roughly the same content are ascribed to his pupils the Antistheneioi rather than Antisthenes himself (SSR VA 150). See also: H.D. Rankin (1986) 47-58; F.D. Caizzi (1964) 50-51.
both an epistemological and a moral contradiction.\(^89\) The moral aspect of his theory was encapsulated in his parody of a cento from Euripides’ *Æolus*: “the shameful is shameful whether it seems so or not (αἰσχρὸν τὸ γ’ αἰσχρὸν, κἂν δοκῇ κὰν μὴ δοκῇ)”.\(^90\) Underlying Euripides’ original line was a justification not only of incest but also of Protagoras’ relativism and theory of amorality: the shameful is what seems correct or incorrect to me (at the time)—viz. that moral value is dependent on what seems (δοκῇ) correct to the individual. Antisthenes’ response is that the shameful cannot be defined other than itself and is thus always shameful. Interestingly enough, substantially the same cento is raised by Socrates in Plato’s *Euthydemus* as a preemptive response to relativist sophisms: “Is not the morally good, good and the shameful, shameful?”\(^91\) Significantly, Plato’s Socrates does not expand on this point in the eristic match of that dialogue, but Antisthenes makes it the basis of his epistemological and moral theory. Laying aside the insignificant detail that Plato here adds the example of “the morally good” as well as “the shameful”, the real difference between him and Antisthenes is that of presentation. Antisthenes includes the Protagorean response—“whether it seems so or not” (κἂν δοκῇ κὰν μὴ δοκῇ)—as an inferential rider in his definition of the “shameful”—whereas Plato raises it separately as Dionysiodorus’ response to Socrates (Ἐὰν ἔμοιγε…δοκῇ). Obviously, Antisthenes and Plato would agree in rejecting Protagoras in this matter although Socrates’ immediate response to Dionysiodorus is merely to attack the logic of his relativism (“the same would then be different”) rather than its immorality as in Antisthenes. It is difficult to decide who is prior—Antisthenes or Plato—but the former’s bon mot is both complete in itself—rather than split into two sections as in Plato—and as a parody of Euripides it is a close scan of his iambic trimetres.

\(^89\) “Gold is gold” and to describe it as a “yellow metal” would be in reference to something else (“the yellow” and “metal”). Although Socrates also sought one general definition for the virtues, he did not claim as Antisthenes that it was impossible to contradict (οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν) as if each party of a debate was referring to totally different objects/concepts. See: H.D. Rankin (1986), cap. 2; M. Luz (2012) 133-135.

\(^90\) *Theosoph. B* v 30 (P.F. Beatrice (2001) 36: “Antisthenes fr. novum” = Erbse 715 p. 56) previously discussed in: M. Luz (2000) 88-95; other sources are quoted only as anecdotes not a citation (*SSR* VA 195). Antisthenes’ parody is in response to a relativist line from Euripides’ lost *Æolus* (fr. 19N) where probably it was incest that was justified (Plut. *Quomodo Adul.* 33c): “What is shameful if the perpetrators think it not so?” (τί δ’ αἰσχρὸν εἰ μὴ τοῖς χρωμένοις δοκεῖ).\(^91\) *Euthyd. 301b* where Socrates asks: ο’ το καλὸν καλὸν ἐστιν καὶ το αἰσχρὸν αἰσχρὸν; and the sophist Dionysiodorus gives substantially the same Protagorean response: only “if it seems so to me (Ἐὰν ἔμοιγε…δοκῇ)".
In the case of our fragment, there are similar fundamentalist assumptions: that καλός has only one true meaning (“internal beauty”) whether “you seemed (ὤφθης) to me” to be physically beautiful or not. Thus speaker (A) cannot be described as truly καλός in spite of his physical appearance. It is true that the text does not make any reference to the details of Antisthenes’ epistemological arguments any more than to Plato’s metaphysical ones. However, it is fair to surmise that (B) could have continued after the present text to point out that τὸ καλὸν is (always) καλὸν so that true beauty would not apply to speaker (A) thus contributing to the latter’s understanding of the concept. Similarly, (A) is now said to be so unhandsome within that (B) disbelieved his former distraction (ἔκστασις) and affixation with his (physical) beauty. Unlike Aeschines who has been said to use the theme of bacchantic ecstasy to describe Socrates’ love for Alcibiades in order to rebuild and educate him, our dialogue uses ἔκστασις in a negative, medical connotation as a feeling to be discarded.

Finally, as noted by Obsieger (above n. 13), there is a verbal similarity between the description of (A) as “fair of face” (καλὸς τὸ πρόσωπον) and “ugly of face” (ἀπρόσωπος) in our text (ll. 56-57, 53) and Plato’s description of Charmides as both εὐπρόσωπος and ἀπρόσωπος (Charm. 154d-e). Shortly after this last passage, Plato also briefly discusses cures for body and soul (155b-e) although admittedly not cures for desire of beauty as in our fragment. However, despite this similarity, Plato is surely ironic and critical in this passage. In place of the serious moral issue raised by speaker (B), he uses the terms εὐπρόσωπος/ἀπρόσωπος to construct a salacious joke out of them. This only serves as a prelude to his description of how Socrates deceptively enticed the young Charmides over with a promise of prescribing a cure for a head-ache (155b-e),

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92 SSR VIA fr. 12.74 (“Ἐγώ δὲ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα ὅν ἐτύγχανον ἐρών Ἀλκιβιάδου οὐδὲν διάφορον τῶν Βασιλέων ἐπεπόνθειν) from which C.H. Kahn (1994) 94 suggested that “no one before Aeschines proposed to understand the protreptic and educational influence of Socrates in term of eros”.

93 On the negative, medical sense of manic “distraction/disorientation”, see above n. 43. Plato uses only the verb (ἐξίστασθαι) and in a postive sense, but, similar to our fragment, we find Socrates warning that liaisons with the beautiful are like a spider’s sting that “distracts you out of your wits (καὶ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐξίστησι)”; Mem. 1.iii.12). A similar metaphor is attributed to Antisthenes but in relation to flatterers and informers: of all creatures (θηρία) they bight the worst (SSR VA 130).

94 Charmides is followed by many erastai from behind (154c); Chaerephon remarks that the boy is ἐυπρόσωπος but would prove ἀπρόσωπος if he only stripped but, interjects Socrates, only if he has one little addendum to him (d) . . . a good soul (εὐπρόσωπος) of his naked body is the soul.
which he had obtained from some unnamed Thracian who claimed to cure body and soul (156e). At the end of the dialogue, this Thracian charm fails and is not worth anything (175e). One gets the impression that the introduction and end of this dialogue were written in mockery of someone's “worthless” discussion of a cure for body and soul which Charmides in fact had requested to copy down (ἀπογράψομαι) at the beginning of the dialogue (156a), but which Socrates thought not worth while conceding throughout. It is thus interesting to note that Antisthenes was himself said to have been half-Thracian and with his open criticism of Plato in his dialogue Sathon or On Contradiction could easily have been represented in the Charmides as the author of a Thracian charm that Socrates did not think worth copying. Whether this is so or not, the terms εὐπρόσωπος/ἀπρόσωπος in our fragment are less likely to be a borrowing from Charmides itself and more a reflection of the source that the latter parodied.

Provenance

One cannot consider this problem without some remarks concerning style. It is clear that the linguistic style and grammar of the fragment is simple and stark (above n. 4), but to such an extent that it cannot be exactly described as spoken speech since it overlooks many options for enclitics and elision (e.g., ὁ δὲ ἄκων, ἄλλος δὲ ἄλλως, σε ἔπεμπεν, ἀλλὰ ἀπρόσωπος) which surely would have been elided when spoken. We could perhaps compare this text to two speeches preserved in Antisthenes’ name: the “Ajax” (SSR VA 53) and the “Odysseus” (54) concerning the contest for Achilles’ armour. Both employ elision but comparatively less than we would otherwise expect. Without attempting to read too much into the story of Antisthenes’ sophistic and rhetorical origins from the period before he met Socrates (D.L. VI. 1-2), the rhetorical address of speaker (B) in the fragment may be described as a formal set-speech to be contrasted with the colloquial but literary style of writers like Plato and to a lesser extent Xenophon. Certainly, a formal rhetorical style is characteristic of Antisthenes’

95 On other aspects of Plato and Thracian charms, see: Luc Brisson, “L’incantation de Zalmoxis dans le Charmide (156d-157e)” in: Robinson-Brisson (2000), 278-286.

96 Antisthenes’ mother was a Thracian (D.L. VI.1; SSR VA 1). If our papyrus reflects his work, we could better understand Charmides’ mockery of a discussion of εὐπρόσωπος/ἀπρόσωπος. On his part, Antisthenes’ mockery of “Platon” as Sathon (SSR VA 147-148)—“a big nob” (LSJ s.v. σάθων/σάθη), so to speak—would have had to precede Plato’s dialogue.
Hercules compositions. On the other hand, within a short space of 28 lines, our fragment also cites two literary sayings (ll. 34-35, 52-53) and adds one epic allegory (45-46). In addition, the sensuous description of the object of (B)'s search (ll. 49-51) has a poetic ring to its cluster of adjectives grouped in asyndeton even though its exact literary origins cannot be identified. All of these allusions are certainly a characteristic of the literary interests of Socratic writings in general, but a more critical appraisal of the style of our fragment may lead us to suspect that several of the literary allusions are worked into (B)'s address as mere rhetorical centos. Their obvious contrast is Plato's literary allusions, worked by and large into the conversation of his dialogues in a more natural and flowing manner. In short, the literary allusions in (B)'s address do not weaken the conclusion that his style is that of a set-speech, but rather confirm it. We can then conclude that the author of the fragment composed a philosophical dialogue characterized by many of the features of rhetorical set-speeches. While Plato's dialogues have often been compared to drama, the interaction between Socrates and his interlocutors could be compared to a form of expanded stoichomythia. The fragment, by contrast, better resembles the longer rhetorical addresses placed in the mouth of leading characters in Greek drama.

Regarding its concepts and discussion, it is fair to assume that the P.Erl. 4 is a fragment of a Socratic dialogue whoever its author was. However, it does not share Plato's epistemology, metaphysics and ethics on several cardinal issues. Many of its expressions and arguments have an Antisthenean flavour especially in regard to his theory of the infallibility of virtue, his extreme negative attitude to eros needing to be cured, the positive role of the love of mankind as a cure for it, the negative sense associated with erotic ἐκ[κστασις, as well as the value of normative beauty supposed to be dependent on the prior value of inner spiritual beauty. However, without identification of any known citation in this fragment one cannot make a final definitive claim that the author was Antisthenes himself rather than an imitator writing in the rhetorical style of his dialogues.

Aristotle does mention “Antisthenes” who were active in his day writing on logical and epistemological problems (SSR VA 150). Yet, there are no signs that they also wrote imitations of Antisthenes' ethical dialogues. If our fragment were one of the latter, it would most resemble his Alcibiades. Moreover, we know that Antisthenes introduced this dialogue in person adding that “he per-

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97 The Prometheus-Hercules episode of the Hercules is composed of set-speeches. The surviving example as a critical address to Hercules spoken by Prometheus, recalling to a certain extent Prodicus’ Choice of Hercules (M. Luz (1996) 88-89).
sonally had been an observer (αὐτόπτης) of Alcibiades’ (habits)” (SSR VA 198).

However, this is not unusual in his dialogues written as they were in a mixed style of direct and indirect speech. Thus, his Hercules composition(s), for example, comprised a number of set speeches in oratio recta, but Antisthenes periodically interjected remarks of his own in between.98 There is nothing in this fragment that disproves an Antisthenian origin but no final proof that it is. However, whether it is an imitation or not, its reflection of Antisthenes’ thought and ideas make it a valuable contribution to this field of study.

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98 The the Syriac translation of Themistius’ citation from Antisthenes indicates that Antisthenes introduced the speeches of the Hecules in persona (M. Luz (1996) 88-89) as he did in his address to a picture of Achilles (SSR VA 95) and others (93) in this dialogue.
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