Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption with Hidden Sensitive Policy for Recruitment in Smart City

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Abstract
Smart city, as a promising technical tendency, greatly facilitates citizens and generates innumerable data, some of which is very private and sensitive. To protect data from unauthorized users, ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) enables data owner to specify an access policy on encrypted data. However, there are two drawbacks in traditional CP-ABE schemes. On the one hand, the access policy is revealed in the ciphertext so that sensitive information contained in the policy is exposed to anyone who obtains the ciphertext. For example, both the plaintext and access policy of an encrypted recruitment may reveal the company’s future development plan. On the other hand, the decryption time scales linearly with the complexity of the access, which makes it unsuitable for resource-limited end users.

In this paper, we propose a CP-ABE scheme with hidden sensitive policy for recruitment in smart city. Specifically, we introduce a new security model chosen sensitive policy security: two access policies embedded in the ciphertext, one is public and the other is sensitive and fully hidden, only if user’s attributes satisfy the public policy, it’s possible for him/her to learn about the hidden policy, otherwise he/she cannot get any information (attribute name and its values) of it. When the user satisfies both access policies, he/she can obtain and decrypt the ciphertext. Compared with other CP-ABE schemes, our scheme supports a more expressive access policy, since the access policy of their schemes only work on the “AND-gate” structure. In addition, intelligent devices spread all over the smart city, so partial computational overhead of encryption of our scheme can be outsourced to these devices as fog nodes, while most part overhead in the decryption process is outsourced to the cloud. Therefore, our scheme is more applicable to end users with resource-constrained mobile devices. We prove our scheme to be selective secure under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption.

Keywords: Smart city; Attribute-based encryption; Hidden sensitive policy; Cloud server; Fog nodes

1 Introduction
Smart city is a new concept brought up with the technological revolution. It can provide various digital services for citizens to make their life more convenient among all aspect of daily life including education, health care, traffic transport, job recruitment and so on. Based on the Internet of Things (IoT), thousands of smart devices underlying these services produce outsource large amounts of data to a cloud server. Cloud server is an internet-based paradigm that provides massive
data storage and processing services for innumerable enterprises and individuals.

Fog computing [1] as an extension of cloud computing provides resource services at
the edge of the network, such as access points, routers and base stations. As shown
in Fig. 1, such devices can be found everywhere in the smart city bringing about
many attractive features, such as low latency, mobility and location-awareness.

Generally speaking, data and services on the cloud are open and accessible to
anyone, and data owner will lose any control on the data as soon as it uploaded to
the cloud. In many distributed applications, it is necessary to enforce a specific access
control policy on sensitive data which is intended to be read only by authorized
users.

To solve these problems, attribute-based encryption (ABE) [2] is initially intro-
duced by Sahai et al. to achieve scalable and fine-grained access control on en-
crypted data. ABE schemes are generally divided into two types: key-policy ABE
(KP-ABE) [3] and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [4]. In CP-ABE, the data
owner specifies an access policy in the ciphertext and the private key of end user
is associated with an attribute set. Anyone can decrypt the ciphertext if his/her
attributes satisfy the access policy. It is on the contrary for the KP-ABE. Since the
access policy is defined by the data owner, CP-ABE is more suitable for the data
sharing in cloud storage scenario.

One problem in traditional CP-ABE scheme [4,5] is that the access policy is sent
along with a ciphertext to inform end users which attributes satisfy the access policy
so that sensitive information contained in the policy will be revealed to anyone who
obtains the ciphertext. However, this property is not suitable for many application
scenarios, such as medical, industrial and financial fields. For example, the access
policy of patient’s medical file may expose individual privacy; a company may hire
some certain qualified people who satisfy a specific policy and this policy may expose
the company’s future development strategy.

If it is not known which attributes should be used for decryption, the decryption
will be infeasible for authorized users. As a trade-off between the policy privacy
and the feasibility, Nishide et al. [6] first introduced the notion of CP-ABE with
partially hidden access policy. In their scheme, each attribute consists of two parts:
attribute name and its values, instead of hiding the whole attribute, only attribute
value is concealed in the access policy. Although this method protects the privacy of
the policy to some extent, it also has some drawbacks: in some cases, the attribute
name still contains sensitive and valuable information, and it’s still revealed in the
access policy; If the end user has multiple values for each attribute, the decryption
time maybe super-polynomial, since he/she has to guess which attribute value is
exactly embedded in the ciphertext. Inner-product predicate encryption (IPE) [7]
can also be applied to construct a CP-ABE scheme with fully hidden policy, but
the access structure must be transformed to an inner-product predicate, which give
rise to a super-polynomial blow up in ciphertext size.

Sometimes, one part of information of the access policy is very sensitive and should
be kept secret while another part is not. For example: sharing a recruitment in the
cloud, and it can only be accessed by specific applicants. The access policy may be
defined as { [ Gender: male or female ] AND [ Education: M.D. or PH.D. ] } AND { [ Probability and statistics: statistics or econometrics] AND [ Computer science and
technology: data mining or machine learning \}). In this case, the “Probability and statistics: statistics or econometrics” and “Computer science and technology: data mining or machine learning” in the access policy are obviously more sensitive, since it may reveal commercial confidentiality that the company is managing to achieve transformation with the help of IoT.

Another problem in the existing ABE schemes [3–5] is that the number of pairing and exponentiation operations for ciphertext decryption is linear with the complexity of access policy, which means the computation cost of end user is quite expensive. This property is not suitable for users on their resource-constrained mobile devices. To reduce the computational overhead of end user, some cryptographic operations with heavy computational load can be outsourced to third-party service [8,9].

1.1 Motivation

In the above mentioned example, data owner could encrypt the data in a different way such that any one obtaining the ciphertext can only learn about the public access policy (i.e., [ Gender: male or female ] AND [ Education: M.D. or PH.D. ]), while the sensitive information in the secret policy (i.e., [ Probability and statistics: statistics or econometrics ] AND [ Computer science and technology: data mining or machine learning ]) including attribute name and its values should be fully hidden. Fig. 2 and 3 graphically shows this example.

There seems to be a simple solution to protect the privacy of sensitive policy. Specifically, one can use a classic CP-ABE to encrypt the sensitive access policy under the public access policy as first part of the ciphertext, and use CP-ABE to encrypt the message under the secret-access-policy as the second part. However, in this method, the cloud can’t check whether the end user has sufficient authorities to access the ciphertext, since we want the ciphertext can only be obtained by authorized end users. Another drawback of this method is that the decryption overhead of the second part ciphertext can’t be outsourced to the cloud.

1.2 Contributions

Motivated by the above observation, in this paper, to protect the privacy of recruitment, we propose a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption with hidden sensitive policy for recruitment in smart city. In our scheme, company, as a data owner, publishes an encrypted recruitment for the applicant, as the end user, in the cloud. Only authorized end user can access the encrypted recruitment, and the privacy of the sensitive access policy is preserved from authorized end users. The contribution of our scheme is shown as follow.

**Hidden sensitive policy:** There are two access policies in the encrypted recruitment, one is public and the other is secret and fully hidden. Anyone satisfies both access policies, he/she can decrypt the ciphertext. For the privacy of sensitive policy, we propose a new security model i.e., *chosen sensitive policy attack* (CSPA): only if user’s attributes satisfy the public policy, it’s possible for him/her to learn the secret policy, otherwise he/she cannot get any information of it. Specifically, the end user generates two sets of randomized secret keys, where each component of the one set corresponds to a public attribute name (or value) and each component of the other set corresponds
to an attribute index (user-generated hash value). The end user uploads the two sets to the cloud to check whether he/she has authority to decrypt the ciphertext with double policies. Only on the premise that user’s attribute set satisfies the public access policy, the cloud can detect whether the attribute contained in each leaf node in the access tree of secret policy exists in the user’s attribute set, and then inform the user of the corresponding relationship between the leaf node and the attribute index. In this process, since the cloud does not know which attribute the attribute index corresponds to, it cannot learn about which attribute the leaf node in the access tree of secret policy stands for. An unauthorized end user can’t obtain the ciphertext or learn the secret policy either. Therefore, our scheme protects the privacy in sensitive access policy of the recruitment from unauthorized applicants.

Expressive and efficient: Our scheme is expressive and efficient. Our scheme supports any monotone access structure instead of restricted policy such as AND-gates on multi-values. The size of the ciphertext scales linearly with the complexity of the access policy. End user doesn’t need to test several times, which cloud be super-polynomial in some previous schemes, before finding the attributes for successful decryption, even if he/she has multiple values for each attribute.

Applicable for resource-limited end user: With the help of thousands of fog nodes in the smart city, the computational overhead of data owner generating the sub-ciphertext of the public access policy can be outsourced, and most computational overhead of decryption is shifted from end user to the cloud, leaving a constant number of operations to decrypt the ciphertext. Therefore, it is more suitable for resource-constrained end users.

2 Discussion and Result

2.1 Discussion

Sahai et al. [2] first introduced the concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE), which can be divided into two forms: ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [4] and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [3]. Bethencourt et al. [4] proposed the first CP-ABE scheme, in which the access policy is very expressive and specified by the data owner. From then on, ABE schemes with various functionalities have been widely constructed, e.g., supporting regular languages [10,11], with unbounded attribute size [10,12,13], with constant-size ciphertext [14], with multi-authority [15–17], and with adaptive security [18–20]. One drawback in traditional CP-ABE schemes [4,5] is that the number of pairing and exponentiation operations for ciphertext decryption is linear with the complexity of access policy, which means the computation cost of end user is quite expensive. This defect in attribute encryption makes it unsuitable for users with resource-constrained devices. To reduce the computation cost of end user, Green et al. [9] provided a new methods for efficiently and securely outsourcing decryption of ABE ciphertexts. In their scheme, most of the heavy cryptographic operations of decryption algorithm are outsourced to the cloud, leaving only a small number of operations for the end user. Li et al. [21] also considered to outsource key-issuing and decryption simultaneously for ABE schemes by introducing two cloud service providers. In the wake of 5G and IoT techniques, fog
computing [1] is considered to be a new data resource that can provide high-quality outsourcing services. In fog computing environment, Zuo et al. [22] proposed a practical CP-ABE scheme with outsourced decryption, while Zhang et al. [23] supports outsourced encryption, outsourced decryption and attribute update. However, the access policy must be revealed in most of these schemes, since end users need to know how they combine their secret key components for decryption. This may lead to privacy disclosure, so research on the anonymity of access policies is necessary. Nishide et al. [6] first introduced the concept of partially hidden access policy to achieve anonymity, in which the attribute is split into an attribute name and its values, and only the attribute values are hidden. Some other works [24–26] improved the efficiency and security of [6], but their policies are all restricted with AND-gates on multi-values as in [6]. Later, Lai et al. [27] proposed an expressive fully secure CP-ABE scheme with the LSSS-based partially hidden policy in composite order groups. Based on Lai’s scheme, Cui et al. [28] proposed a more efficient one in prime order groups. However, looking for the correct attributes for successful decryption, both [27] and [28] need authorized users to test several times, which could be super-polynomial in special cases, for instance, user has many values for each attribute. All the above schemes focus on the partially hidden access policy, while the public attribute names may also lead to the leakage of sensitive information. Some other schemes based on the inner-product predicate encryption [18, 29] and hidden vector encryption [30] are proposed to protect the policy privacy, but their efficiency are seriously restricted, which means that the size of ciphertext could be super-polynomial.

2.2 Result

In this paper, we propose a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption with hidden sensitive policy for recruitment in smart city. In our scheme, sensitive access policy of encrypted recruitment is fully hidden; expressive policy is supported; the ciphertext size is polynomial; the most computational overhead of decryption is outsourced to the cloud server, leaving a constant number of operations for the end user. We summarize the comparisons of various CP-ABE schemes with hidden policy in Table 1.

3 Method

3.1 Preliminaries

In this section, we introduce some background knowledge, which includes access structure, access tree, bilinear maps, Diffie-Hellman assumption and its variants.

3.1.1 Access Structures

Definition 1 (Access structure [4]) Let \( \{P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n\} \) be a set of parties. A collection \( \mathcal{A} \subseteq 2^{\{P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n\}} \) is monotone if \( \forall B, C: \) if \( B \in \mathcal{A} \) and \( B \subseteq C \) then \( C \in \mathcal{A} \). An access structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a collection (respectively, monotone collection) \( \mathcal{A} \) of non-empty subsets of \( \{P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n\} \), i.e., \( \mathcal{A} \subseteq 2^{\{P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n\}} \setminus \{\emptyset\} \). The sets in \( \mathcal{A} \) are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in \( \mathcal{A} \) are called the unauthorized sets.
Table 1: Comparison of CP-ABE schemes with hidden policy.

| Schemes          | Access policy          | Policy hidden        | Ciphertext size | Decryption time         | Decryption outsourced |
|------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| Nishide et al. [6] | AND-gates on multi-values | partially hidden     | linear          | deterministic and linear$^1$ | no                    |
| Li et al. [24]   | AND-gates on multi-values | partially hidden     | linear          | deterministic and linear | no                    |
| Lai et al. [25]  | AND-gates on multi-values | partially hidden     | linear          | deterministic and linear | no                    |
| Zhang et al. [26] | AND-gates on multi-values | partially hidden     | linear          | deterministic and linear | no                    |
| Lai et al. [27]  | LSSS                   | partially hidden     | linear          | opportunistic and linear$^3$ | no                    |
| Cui et al. [28]  | LSSS                   | partially hidden     | linear          | opportunistic and linear | no                    |
| Lweko et al. [18] | inner product predicates | fully hidden         | super-polynomial | opportunistic and linear | no                    |
| Michalevsky et al. [29] | inner product predicates | fully hidden         | super-polynomial | opportunistic and linear | no                    |
| Khan et al. [30] | LSSS with hidden vectors | fully hidden         | super-polynomial | opportunistic and linear | no                    |
| **Ours**         | Tree-based structure   | secret policy is fully hidden | linear          | deterministic and constant$^4$ | yes                   |

1. “deterministic and linear”: End user needs to test fixed the number of times, usually is one, to look for the correct attributes for successful decryption, and the decryption time scales linearly with the complexity of the access policy.

2. “deterministic and constant”: The test time for the cloud is fixed and the decryption time is constant.

3. “opportunistic and linear”: Several tests may be required, which cloud be super-polynomial when user has many values for each attribute. The decryption time scales linearly with the complexity of the access policy.

In this paper, attributes take the role of the parties and we only focus on the monotone access structure $A$, which consists of the authorized sets of attributes. Obviously, attributes can directly reflect a user’s authority.

**Definition 2 (Access tree [4])** Let $T$ be a tree representing an access structure. Each non-leaf node of the tree represents a threshold gate, described by its children and a threshold value. If $\text{num}_x$ is the number of children of a node $x$ and $k_x$ is its threshold value, then $0 \leq k_x \leq \text{num}_x$. When $k_x = 1$, the threshold gate is an OR gate and when $k_x = \text{num}_x$, it is an AND gate. Each leaf node $x$ of the tree is describe by an attribute and a threshold value $k_x = 1$.

We introduce a few functions defined in [4] as follows. $\text{parent}(x)$ denotes the parent of the node $x$ in the tree. The access tree $T$ also defines an ordering between the children of every node, that is, the children of a node are numbered from 1 to $\text{num}$. The function $\text{index}(x)$ returns such a number associated with the node $x$, where the index values are uniquely assigned to nodes in the access structure for a given key in an arbitrary manner. Each leaf node $x$ corresponds to an attribute $a_j$, and this relationship should be revealed in the access tree $T$. To protect the privacy of access policy, we defined the access tree with hidden attributes $\hat{T}$.

**Definition 3 (Access tree with hidden attributes $\hat{T}$)** $\hat{T}$ is an access tree with structure the same as normal access trees, except that it doesn’t reveal any information about the correspondence between leaf nodes and attributes.
For better understanding, assuming that $x_i, y_i$ are the indexes of leaf nodes and $a_i$ is the corresponding attribute, the comparison of two kinds of access tree is shown as following Fig. 4 and 5.

**Definition 4 (Satisfying an access tree [4])** Let $\mathcal{T}$ be an access tree with root $r$. Denote by $\mathcal{T}_x$ the subtree of $\mathcal{T}$ rooted at the node $x$. Hence $\mathcal{T}$ is the same as $\mathcal{T}_r$. If a set of attributes $\gamma$ satisfies the access tree $\mathcal{T}_x$, we denote it as $\mathcal{T}_x(\gamma) = 1$. We compute $\mathcal{T}_x(\gamma)$ recursively as follows. If $x$ is a non-leaf node, evaluate $\mathcal{T}_{x'}(\gamma) = 1$ for all children $x'$ of node $x$. $\mathcal{T}_x(\gamma)$ returns 1 if and only if at least $k_x$ children return 1. If $x$ is a leaf node, then $\mathcal{T}_x(\gamma)$ returns 1 if and only if $\text{att}(x) \in \gamma$.

### 3.1.2 Bilinear Map and DBDH Assumption

We briefly recall the definitions of the bilinear map and the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption. Let $G_0$ and $G_T$ be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order $p$. Let $g$ be a generator of $G_0$ and $e$ be an efficient computable bilinear map, $e : G_0 \times G_0 \rightarrow G_T$. The bilinear map $e$ has a few properties: (1) Bilinearity: for all $u, v \in G_0$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, we have $e(u^a, v^b) = e(u, v)^{ab}$. (2) Non-degeneracy: $e(g, g) \neq 1$. We say that $G_0$ is a bilinear group if the group operation in $G_0$ and the bilinear map $e : G_0 \times G_0 \rightarrow G_T$ are both efficiently computable. Notice that the map $e$ is symmetric since $e(g^a, g^b) = e(g, g)^{ab} = e(g^b, g^a)$.

Given the bilinear map parameter $(G_0, G_T, p, e, g)$ and three random elements $(x, y, z) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^3$, if there is no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary $B$ can distinguish between the tuple $(g, g^x, g^y, g^z, e(g, g)^{xyz})$ and the tuple $(g, g^x, g^y, g^z, \vartheta)$, we say that the DBDH assumption holds, where $\vartheta$ is randomly selected from $G_T$. More specifically, the advantage $\epsilon$ of $B$ in solving the DBDH problem is defined as

$$\left| \Pr[A(g, g^x, g^y, g^z, e(g, g)^{xyz}) = 1] - \Pr[A(g, g^x, g^y, g^z, \vartheta) = 1] \right|. \quad (1)$$

**Definition 5 (DBDH)** We say that the DBDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm has a non-negligible advantage $\epsilon$ in solving DBDH problem.

### 3.2 System and Security Model

In this section, we introduce the system description, system model, threat model and security model of our scheme.

#### 3.2.1 System Description

As shown in Fig. 6, we consider a ciphertext retrieval scenario in fog computing environment. It consists of five parties: Key Authority Center (KAC), Data Owner (DO), Cloud Server (CS), End User (EU), and Fog Nodes (FN). The specific role of each party is given as follows:

- **Key Authority Center (KAC):** The KAC is a fully trusted third party which is in charge of generating public parameters and secret keys.
- **Data Owner (DO):** The DO defines the access structure to encrypt a ciphertext $CT$ with the help of fog nodes.
- **Cloud Server (CS):** The CS has huge computing power and storage capacity, it can provide computing and storage services to both data owner and end user, especially to help end user partially decrypt the ciphertext.
End User (EU): Resource-constrained user submits a trapdoor to the CS, which will help him/her to partially decrypt the ciphertext.

Fog Nodes (FN): Some computational overheads can be outsourced from the DO to the fog nodes during the encryption process.

3.2.2 System Model

Our scheme includes the following six algorithms:

- **Setup**: Given security parameter $\lambda$ and a set of all possible attributes $\mathcal{L}$, the KAC generates public key $PK$ and master secret key $MSK$.

- **KeyGen**($PK, MSK, S$) $\rightarrow$ $SK$: On input the public key $PK$, the master secret key $MSK$ and an attribute set $S$, the KAC generates a secret key $SK$ for the EU.

- **Enc**($PK, T_1, T_2, M$) $\rightarrow$ $CT$: On input $PK$, two access policies $T_1, T_2$ and message $M$, with the help of fog nodes, the DO generates the ciphertext $CT$, in which $T_1$ is public and $T_2$ is fully hidden.

- **TrapSK** $\rightarrow$ $Tr$: The EU generates the trapdoor $Tr$ by his own secret key $SK$ and submits $Tr$ to the CS.

- **Tran**($CT, Tr$) $\rightarrow$ $\widehat{CT}$ or $\perp$: This algorithm contains two steps:
  - At first, the CS interacts $Tr$ and $CT$ to verify whether the EU has authority to decrypt $CT$. If $S \not\models T_1 \lor S \not\models T_2$, it outputs $\perp$.
  - If $S \models T_1 \land S \models T_2$, the CS partially decrypts $CT$ and returns the precomputed ciphertext $\widehat{CT}$ to the EU.

- **Dec**($\widehat{CT}, SK$) $\rightarrow$ $M$: On input $\widehat{CT}, SK$, the EU decrypts $\widehat{CT}$ and outputs $M$.

3.2.3 Threat Model

In this paper, we assume that the KAC is a fully trusted third party, while the CS and FN are honest-but-curious entities, which exactly follow the protocol specifications but also are curious about the sensitive information of ciphertexts and trapdoors. Users are not allowed to collude with CS or FN. Nevertheless, malicious users may collude with each other to access some unauthorized ciphertexts.

3.2.4 Security Model

Our scheme achieves chosen plaintext security by the following security game between a PPT adversary $A$ and a challenger $C$.

- **Initialization**: $A$ chooses and submits two challenge access policies $T_1^*$ and $T_2^*$ to its challenger $C$.

- **Setup**: $C$ runs **Setup** algorithm and returns the public key $PK$ to $A$.

- **Phase 1**: $A$ adaptively submits any attribute set $S$ to $C$ with the restriction that $(S \not\models T_1^* \lor S \not\models T_2^*)$. In response, $C$ runs **KeyGen** algorithm and answers $A$ with the corresponding $SK$.

- **Challenge**: $A$ chooses two equal-length challenge messages $(m_0, m_1)$, and submits them to $C$. Then $C$ picks a random bit $\vartheta \in \{0, 1\}$, runs **Enc** algorithm to encrypt $m_\vartheta$ with $T_1^*$ and $T_2^*$, and returns the challenge ciphertext $CT^*$ to $A$.

- **Phase 2**: This phase is the same as Phase 1.
multiplicative cyclic groups with prime order $p$

\[ \Delta \] any string to a random element of $\mathbb{Z}_G$ and $L$

\[ \text{versary winning the above security game with a non-negligible advantage } \epsilon \]

be the security parameter which determines the size of groups. Let $e$

hidden sensitive policy.

3.3 Construction of Our Scheme

Our scheme achieves IND-CSPA security if there exist no PPT adversary winning the above security game with a non-negligible advantage $\epsilon$ under the DBDH assumption.

In addition, we define a new security model chosen sensitive policy attack (CSPA) for our scheme by following the security game between $A$ and $C$.

- **Initialization**: $A$ chooses and submits a challenge access structure $T_1^*$ to its challenger $C$.
- **Setup**: $C$ runs Setup algorithm and gives $PK$ to $A$.
- **Phase 1**: $A$ adaptively submits any attribute set $S$ with the restriction that $S \not= T_1^*$. In response, $C$ runs Trap algorithm and responds $A$ with the corresponding trapdoor $Tr$.
- **Challenge**: $A$ submits $m^*$ and two challenge hidden policies $T_2^{a*}$ and $T_2^{b*}$ with the same structure. Then, $C$ picks a random bit $\vartheta \in \{0,1\}$, and returns the challenge ciphertext $CT^*$ encrypted with $T_1^*$ and $T_2^{\vartheta*}$.
- **Phase 2**: This phase is the same as Phase 1.
- **Guess**: $A$ outputs a guess bit $\vartheta'$ of $\vartheta$. We say that $A$ wins the game if and only if $\vartheta' = \vartheta$. The advantage of $A$ to win this security game is defined as $Adv(A) = \Pr[\vartheta' = \vartheta] - \frac{1}{2}$.

**Definition 6** Our scheme achieves IND-CPA security if there exist no PPT adversary winning the above security game with a non-negligible advantage $\epsilon$ under the DBDH assumption.

3.3 Construction of Our Scheme

In this section, we present the concrete construction of CP-ABE scheme with hidden sensitive policy.

Without loss of generality, we suppose that there are $n$ possible attributes in total and $\mathcal{L} = \{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n\}$ is the set of all possible attributes. Assume $G_0, G_T$ are multiplicative cyclic groups with prime order $p$ and the generator of $G_0$ is $g$. Let $\lambda$ be the security parameter which determines the size of groups. Let $e : G_0 \times G_0 \rightarrow G_T$ be a bilinear map and $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ be a hash function which maps any string to a random element of $\mathbb{Z}_p$. We also define the Lagrange coefficient

\[ \Delta_i,L(x) = \prod_{j \in L, i \neq j} \frac{x - j}{x - i} \],

where $i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and a set $L$, of elements in $\mathbb{Z}_p$. The details of our scheme are as follows.

- **Setup**($1^\lambda, \mathcal{L}$) $\rightarrow$ ($PK, MSK$): Given a security parameter $\lambda$ and all possible attributes $\mathcal{L}$, the KAC chooses a bilinear group $G_0$ with prime order $p$ and generator $g$. Next, it picks $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and $h \in \mathbb{G}_0$. For each attribute $a_j \in \mathcal{L}$, it selects $v_j, v_j' \in \mathbb{G}_0$. Finally, it generates the public key $PK$ and master secret key $MSK$ as

\[ PK = \left\{ \mathbb{G}_0, g, h, g^\alpha, e(g, g)\beta, e(g, h)\beta, \left\{ g^{v_j}, h^{v_j}, g^{v_j'}, h^{v_j'}, a_j \mid \forall a_j \in \mathcal{L} \right\} \right\} ; \]

\[ MSK = \{ \alpha, \beta, \{ v_j, v_j', a_j \mid \forall a_j \in \mathcal{L} \} \} . \]
• **KeyGen**(MSK, S) → SK: While receiving an attribute set S from the EU, the KAC selects r, r′ ∈ R Z∗ p and returns the secret key SK as

\[
SK = \left\{ g^{\beta + \alpha r}, h^{\beta + \alpha r}, \alpha r h^{r'}, h^{\alpha r + r'}, g^{r'} \right\}
\]

(4)

• **Enc**(PK, T₁, T₂, M) → CT: The DO chooses ck ∈ R Z∗ p as a symmetric encryption key and encrypts message M with ck, Eck(M), by using symmetric encryption (AES). Then, it encrypts ck with the help of the FN as follows:

1. The DO sends T₁ to the FN. The FN randomly chooses a polynomial q for each node x of T₁ from the root node R₁ in a top-down manner: for each node x of T₁, the degree of qx is dx = kx - 1, where kx is the threshold value of x; beginning with root node R₁, the FN pick s₁ ∈ R Z∗ p, sets qR₁(0) = s₁ and randomly choose dR₁ = kR₁ - 1 other points of qR₁, to define the polynomial completely; for any other node x, they set qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)) and choose dx other points to define qx completely. The FN generate the CT₁ as

\[
CT₁ = \left\{ T₁, g^{s₁}, h^{s₁}, \{ C₁' = g^{vjejx(0)} \}, C₂' = h^{vjejx(0)}, x \mid ∀x ∈ X₁ \right\}
\]

(5)

where X₁ is a set of attributes corresponding with all leaf nodes in T₁ and each x ∈ X₁ is corresponding with attribute aj. Note that T₁ is stored in CT₁ in the form of plaintext, so the privacy of the access policy of T₁ is exposed.

2. The DO picks s₂ ∈ R Z∗ p and sends gss, hss to FN to generate CT₁ as

\[
CT₁ = \{ g^{ss}, h^{ss}, c(g, h)^{ss}, CT₁' \}.
\]

(6)

3. The DO picks s₃, s₄ ∈ R Z∗ p and generates the ciphertext CT₂ corresponding with the T₂ in the same way of CT₁. For each node y of T₂, qy(0) and dy are defined exactly the same with above qx(0) and dx; for the root node R₂ of T₂, qR₂(0) = s₃. Then,

\[
CT₂ = \{ g^{s₃}, h^{s₄}, CT₂' \},
\]

(7)

and

\[
CT₂ = \left\{ \hat{T₂}, g^{s₃}, h^{s₄}, \{ C₂'' = g^{v'y'(qy(0) - s₂)} \}, C₂' = h^{v'y'(qy(0) - s₂)}, C₃' = g^{qy(0)}, C₄' = h^{qy(0)}, C₅' = c(g, h)^{qy(0)}, y \mid ∀y ∈ X₂ \right\}
\]

(8)

where each leaf node y is corresponding with attribute aj and X₂ is a set of all leaf nodes in T₂. Since T₂ is just the structure of T₂, T₂ can not reflect the corresponding relationship between leaf nodes and attributes. Therefore, the privacy of the access policy of T₂ can be preserved.
4. The DO computes $C = ck \cdot e(g, g)^{\beta(s_2 + s_1)}$ and sends $E_{ck}(M), C, CT_2$ to FN, which generate and upload to the final ciphertext $CT$ to the CS, where

$$CT = \left\{ T_1, T_2, E_{ck}(M), C, CT_1, CT_2 \right\}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

- **Trap($SK$) → $Tr$:** The **Trap** algorithm proceeds as follows. The EU chooses $x', y', z', k \in R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and computes the attribute index $H_j = H(k \parallel j)$ for each $a_j \in S$, and generates the following trapdoor $Tr$ with its $SK$ as

$$Tr = \begin{cases} 
T_0 = x' + y', T_1 = h^{(\alpha + r')x' + y' + z'}, T_2 = g^{x' + y' + z'}, \\
T_3 = g^{(\beta + \alpha)x'}, T_4 = h^{(\beta + \alpha)y'}, T_5 = g^{\alpha x' h^{x'}}, T_6 = g^{x' 
\end{cases}, \hspace{1cm} (10)$$

where the set $\{T_{10}^{H_j}, T_{13}^{H_j}, H_j \mid \forall a_j \in S\}$ is sorted by $H_j$. Due to the hash functions, the corresponding relationship between the tuple $\{T_{10}^{H_j}, T_{13}^{H_j}, H_j\}$ and attribute $a_j$ is preserved. The EU keeps $x', k$ secret and sends $Tr$ to the CS.

- **Tran($CT, Tr$) → $\overline{CT}$ or ⊥:** This algorithm conducts the following steps: access verification and ciphertext precomputation.

  - **Access Verification:** Due to this process is a recursive procedure, we first define a recursive algorithm $F_x = F_x(C_1^x, C_2^x, T_{10}^j, T_{11}^j, x)$ intaking $(C_1^x, C_2^x, x)$ in $CT_1$ and $(T_{10}^j, T_{11}^j)$ in $Tr$ respectively.

    For each node of $T_1$, the CS runs a recursive algorithm as follows:

    1. If $x$ is a leaf node of $T_1$, Let $a_j$ is the corresponding attributes of node $x$. If $a_j \in S$, the CS computes

       $$F_x = e(C_2^x, T_{10}^j \cdot e(C_1^x, T_{11}^j))$$

       $$= e(h^{xqz(0)}, g^{x'

       $$= e(g, h)^{\alpha x' h^{x'}}, \hspace{1cm} (11)$$

       If $a_j \not\in S$, set $F_x = null$.

    2. If $x$ is a non-leaf node, the recursive algorithm is defined as: for all child nodes $z$ of $x$, where $a_i$ is the corresponding attributes of node $z$, the CS computes $F_z = F_z(C_1^z, C_2^z, T_{10}^j, T_{11}^j, z)$ recursively. Let $S_x$ be an arbitrary $k_x$-sized set of child nodes $z$ satisfying $F_z \neq null$. If $S_x$ doesn’t exist, $F_x = null$. Otherwise, the CS calculates

       $$F_x = \prod_{z \in S_x} F_{x}^{\Delta_{1,s_z}(0)}$$

       $$= \prod_{z \in S_x} (e(g, h)^{\alpha x' h^{x'}} q_{parent(z)}(\text{index}(z)))^{\Delta_{1,s_z}(0)}$$

       $$= e(g, h)^{\alpha x' h^{x'}}, \hspace{1cm} (12)$$

   else set $F_x = null$. The CS keeps $x, k$ secret and sends $F_x$ to the EU.
where \( i = \text{index}(z) \) and \( S'_z = \{ \text{index}(z) \mid \forall z \in S_z \} \).

By calling the above algorithm on the root node \( R_1 \) of \( T_1 \), the CS gets \( F_{R_1} = e(g, h)^{\alpha r s_1(x' + y')} \). Then, the CS computes \( D \) as

\[
D = \frac{e(T_1, g^{s_1 + s_2})}{F_{R_1} \cdot e(T_2, h^{s_1 + s_2})} = \frac{e(h^{(\alpha r + r')(x' + y') + z'}, g^{s_1 + s_2})}{e(g, h)^{\alpha r s_1(x' + y')} \cdot e(g^{r'(x' + y') + z'}, h^{s_1 + s_2})} = e(g, h)^{\alpha r s_2(x' + y')}.
\]

Then, for each leaf node \( y \in \tilde{T}_2 \), the CS defines

\[
F_{y, H_j} = e(C_{y}^{q_j}, T_{H_j}^{H_j}) \cdot e(C_{y}^{q_j}, T_{H_j}^{H_j}),
\]

and checks whether there exists an \( H_j \in \{ H_j \}_{a_j \in S} \) such that

\[
C_{y}^{q_j} \cdot F_{y, H_j} \cdot D = e(T_3, C_{y}^{q_j}) \cdot e(T_4, C_{y}^{q_j}).
\]

If \( S \models T_1 \) and there exists an \( H_j \in \{ H_j \}_{a_j \in S} \) such that the \( a_j \) is the corresponding attribute of leaf node \( y \), then

\[
C_{y}^{q_j} \cdot F_{y, j} \cdot D = e(g, h)^{\beta q_j(0)(x' + y')} \cdot e(g^{q_j(0) - s_2}, h^{\frac{\alpha y'}{r'}}),
\]

\[
e (h^{q_j(0) - s_2}, g^{\frac{\alpha y'}{r'}}) \cdot e(g, h)^{\alpha r s_2(x' + y')} = e(g, h)^{(\beta + \alpha r)q_j(0)(x' + y')} = e(g^{(\beta + \alpha r)q_j(0)}, h^{q_j(0) - 4} \cdot e(h^{(\beta + \alpha r)y'}, g^{q_j(0)}) = e(T_3, C_{y}^{q_j}) \cdot e(T_4, C_{y}^{q_j}).
\]

By running the above functions recursively, the CS can find out whether this EU has the attribute corresponding to each leaf node of \( \tilde{T}_2 \), and then check whether it has the authority to access the ciphertext \( CT \), e.t., \( S \models T_1 \) and \( S \models \tilde{T}_2 \). If \( CT \) is accessible, CS outputs the following Table 2. Otherwise, the algorithm outputs \( \perp \). Assume that the EU has the attributes corresponding to \( t \) leaf nodes in \( \tilde{T}_2 \).

| Leaf nodes of \( \tilde{T}_2 \) | Hash value of the index of the corresponding attribute |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| \( y_1 \)                    | \( H_{y_1} \)                                  |
| \vdots                       | \vdots                                        |
| \( y_t \)                    | \( H_{y_t} \)                                  |

- **Ciphertext Precomputation**: If \( CT \) is accessible, i.e., \( S \models T_1 \) and \( S \models \tilde{T}_2 \), the algorithm is similar to the recursive procedure defined in the above algorithm.
1. $S \models T_1$. For each node of $T_1$,

(1) If $x$ is a leaf node of $T_1$. If $a_j \in S$, the CS sets $G_x = G_x(C_1^x, T_{10}^1, x)$ and computes

$$G_x = e(C_1^x, T_{10}^1) = e(g^{v_xq_x(0)}, g^{\alpha r_x}) = e(g, g)^{\alpha r_q(0)x}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (17)

If $a_j \notin S$, set $G_x = \text{null}$.

(2) If $x$ is a non-leaf node, for all child nodes $z$ of $x$, the CS computes

$G_z = G_x(C_1^z, T_{10}^j, z)$ recursively. Let $S_x$ be an arbitrary $k_x$-sized set of child nodes $z$ satisfying $G_z \neq \text{null}$. If $S_x$ doesn’t exist, $G_x = \text{null}$. Otherwise, the CS calculates

$$G_x = \prod_{z \in S_x} G_z^{\Delta_{i,S_x}(0)} = \prod_{z \in S_x} (e(g, g)^{\alpha r_xq_{\text{parent}(z)}(\text{index}(z))})^{\Delta_{i,S_x}(0)} = e(g, g)^{\alpha r_q(0)x'},$$ \hspace{1cm} (18)

where $i = \text{index}(z)$ and $S_x' = \{\text{index}(z) \mid \forall z \in S_x\}$. Then CS gets $G_{R_x} = e(g, g)^{\alpha r_{x'}x'}$, and computes

$$A' = \frac{G_{R_x} \cdot e(T_6, h^{s_1+s_2})}{e(T_5, g^{s_1+s_2})} = \frac{e(g, g)^{\alpha r_{s_1}x'} \cdot e(g'^{x'}, h^{s_1+s_2})}{e(g^{\alpha r x'} h^{x'}, g^{s_1+s_2})} = e(g, g)^{\alpha r_{s_2}x'}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (19)

$$A = \frac{e(T_3, g^{s_2})}{A'} = \frac{e(g^{(\beta + \alpha)r}x', g^{s_2})}{e(g, g)^{\alpha r_{s_2}x'}} = e(g, g)^{\beta s_2 x'}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (20)

2. $S \models \hat{T}_2$. For each $y_i$ in the Table 2, the CS sets $G_{y_i} = G_{y_i}(C_1^{y_i}, T_{10}^{H_{y_i}}, y_i, A)$ and computes

$$G_{y_i} = e(g^{v_{y_i}(q_{y_i}(0) - s_2)}, g^{\alpha r_{y_i}}) \cdot A = e(g, g)^{\alpha r_{q_{y_i}(0)}x'}. \hspace{1cm} (21)$$

Since $S \models \hat{T}_2$, for the root node $R_2$ of $\hat{T}_2$, the CS can compute $G_{R_2} = e(g, g)^{\alpha r_{s_2}x'}$ in a recursive manner, and then computes

$$B = \frac{e(T_3, g^{s_2}) \cdot e(T_5, g^{s_1+s_4})}{G_{R_2} \cdot e(T_6, h^{s_1+s_4})} = \frac{e(g^{(\beta + \alpha)r}x', g^{s_2}) \cdot e(g'^{r x'} h^{x'}, g^{s_1+s_4})}{e(g, g)^{\alpha r_{s_2}x'} \cdot e(g'^{r x'}, h^{s_1+s_4})} = e(g, g)^{\beta s_2 x'}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (22)
Finally, the CS returns the precomputed ciphertext

\[ \widetilde{CT} = \{ E_{ck}(M), A, B, C = ck \cdot e(g, g)^{\beta(s_2+s_4)} \} \]

to the EU.

- **Dec((\widetilde{CT}, x') \rightarrow M):** The EU derives the symmetric secret key \( ck \) as

\[
ck = \frac{C}{(AB)^{\tau'}} = \frac{ck \cdot e(g, g)^{\beta(s_2+s_4)}}{e(g, g)^{\frac{\beta(s_2+s_4)\tau'}{2}}},
\]

and uses \( ck \) to decrypt \( E_k(M) \) by symmetric decryption.

**Remark 1** Different from previous schemes, we let the attribute \( a_j \) (or leaf node \( x \), attribute index \( H_j \)) appear in the component of secret key (or ciphertext, trapdoor) just to make it clearer which attribute (or leaf node, attribute index) the component of secret key (or ciphertext, trapdoor) corresponds to.

**Remark 2** Once the EU has access to the ciphertext, the CS will find out that the leaf nodes in the access tree must correspond to some attributes in \( S \). Therefore, we made a small modification to the Trap algorithm, replacing \( \{ T_{10}', T_{11}', a_j \mid \forall a_j \in S \} \) with \( \{ T_{10}', T_{11}', a_j \mid \forall a_j \in S_1 \} \), where \( S_1 \subseteq S \). Since the public access policy is revealed in the ciphertext, the end user can decide the attribute set \( S_1 \) by their own.

In addition, the Trap algorithm can be run offline while the device is charging.

**Remark 3** The computational overhead of the CS to run the Access Verification algorithm scales linearly with \( |T_1| + |S| \cdot |T_2| \), supposed that \( |S| \) is the number of attributes the EU owned and \( |T_1|, |T_2| \) is the number of leaf nodes in the access tree \( T_1, T_2 \) respectively. Thus, it doesn’t need a super-polynomial time to find out the correct attributes for successful decryption.

### 3.4 Analysis of Our Scheme

In this section, we provide a formal security analysis of our scheme.

#### 3.4.1 Security Analysis

**Theorem 1** Supposed that a PPT adversary \( A \) can break the IND-CPA security of our scheme with a non-negligible advantage \( \epsilon > 0 \), then there exists a PPT simulator \( B \) that can distinguish a DBDH tuple from a random tuple with an advantage \( \frac{\epsilon}{2} \).

**Proof 1** Given the bilinear map parameter \((\mathbb{G}_0, \mathbb{G}_T, p, e, g)\). The DBDH challenger \( C \) selects \( a', b', c' \in \mathbb{Z}_p \), \( \theta \in \{0, 1\} \), \( R \in \mathbb{G}_T \) at random. Let \( \mathcal{Z} = e(g, g)^{a'b'c'} \), if \( \theta = 0 \), \( R \) else. Next, \( C \) sends \( B \) the tuple \( \langle g, g^{a'}, g^{b'}, g^{c'}, \mathcal{Z} \rangle \). Then, \( B \) plays the role of challenger in the following security game.

- **Initialization:** \( A \) submits two challenge access policy \( T_1^* \) and \( T_2^* \) to \( B \).

- **Setup:** \( B \) chooses \( \beta', x \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) at random and sets \( h = g^x, g^a = g^{a'}, e(g, g) = e(g, g)^{\beta} = e(g, g)^{\beta + \beta' c'} = e(g, g)^{\beta} e(g^{a'}, g^{b'}) \), \( e(g, h) = e(g, g)^{\beta x} \). For each attribute \( a_j \in \mathcal{L}, B \) picks \( s_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p \). If \( a_j \in T_1^* \), set \( g^{v_j} = g^{s_j} \), otherwise \( g^{v_j} = g^{a_j} \); if \( a_j \in T_2^* \), set \( g^{v_j} = g^{b_j} \), otherwise \( g^{v_j} = g^{c_j} \). The \( B \) sets \( h^{v_j} = g^{v_j x}, h^{v_j'} = g^{v_j' x} \).
and sends PK to A, where

$$\text{PK} = \left\{ g_{j_0}, g, h, g^\alpha, e(g, g)^\beta, e(g, h)^\beta, \{g_j^v, h_j^v, g_j^v, h_j^v, a_j \mid \forall a_j \in \mathcal{L}\} \right\}. \quad (24)$$

- **Phase 1:** A adaptively submits any attribute set $S \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ to B with the restriction that $(S \neq \mathcal{T}_1 \cup S \neq \mathcal{T}_2)$. In response, B picks $\hat{r}, \hat{r} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ at random, computes $g^r = g_{\hat{r}}$, $g^{\hat{r} + \alpha r} = g^{\beta + \hat{r} + \alpha'(r - \hat{r})} = g^{\beta + \hat{r} + \alpha r}$, $h^{\alpha + r} = g^{\beta + \hat{r} + \alpha r}$, $\alpha r$.

- **Challenge:** A submits two equal-length challenge messages $\{m_0, m_1\}$ to B. Then, B chooses $s_1, s_2 \in R \mathbb{Z}_p$ and generates

$$CT_1^* = \left\{ \mathcal{T}_1^*, g^{s_1}, h^{s_1}, \{C_{j,1} = g^{v_j s_2(0)} \mid j \in \mathcal{T}_1^* \}, \mathcal{T}_2^*, h^{s_2}, \{C_{j,2} = h^{v_j s_2(0)} \mid j \in \mathcal{T}_2^* \} \right\};$$

where $X_1^*$ is a set of attributes corresponding with all leaf nodes in $\mathcal{T}_1^*$ and each $x^* \in X_1^*$ is corresponding with attribute $a_j$. The B sets

$$CT_1 = \{g^{s_2}, h^{s_2}, e(g, h)^{\beta s_2}, CT_1^*\}, \quad (26)$$

and generates $CT_2^*$ in a similar method. B picks $s_3 \in R \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets $g^{s_4} = g_{\hat{r}',}^r$, $h^{s_4} = g^{s_2 s_4}$, $e(g, g)^{\beta(s_2 + s_4)} = Z \cdot e(g, g)^{\beta'}, \alpha r$. So,

$$CT_2 = \{g^{s_4}, h^{s_4}, CT_2^*\}, \quad (27)$$

where

$$CT_2^* = \left\{ \mathcal{T}_2^*, g^{s_3}, h^{s_3}, \{C_1^g = g^{v_j s_2(0) - s_2}, \mathcal{T}_2^*, \{C_2^g = h^{v_j s_2(0) - s_2}, C_3^g = g^{q_2(0)}, \mathcal{T}_2^*, \{C_4^g = h^{v_j s_2(0)}, C_5^g = e(g, h)^{\beta s_2(0)}, y \mid \forall y \in \mathcal{T}_2^* \right\}. \quad (28)$$

Finally, B randomly picks $\theta' \in \{0, 1\}$, sets $C^* = m_{\theta'} \cdot Z \cdot e(g, g)^{\beta', \beta'}$, and returns A the final challenge ciphertext $CT^* = \{\mathcal{T}_1^*, \mathcal{T}_2^*, C^*, CT_1^*, CT_2^*\}$.

- **Phase 2:** This phase is the same as Phase 1.

- **Guess:** A outputs a guess bit $\theta''$ of $\theta'$. If $\theta'' = \theta'$, B guesses $\theta = 0$ which indicates that $Z = e(g, g)^{\alpha' \beta'}$ in the above game. Otherwise, B guesses $\theta = 1$ i.e., $Z = \mathcal{R}$. 
If \( Z = R \), then \( CT^* \) is random from the view of \( A \). Hence, \( B \)'s probability to guess \( \theta \) correctly is

\[
\Pr \left[ B \left( g, g^{a'}, g^{b'}, g^{c'}, Z = R \right) = 1 \right] = \frac{1}{2}.
\]  

(29)

Else \( Z = e(g, g)^{ab'c'} \), then \( CT^* \) is available and \( A \)'s advantage of guessing \( \theta' \) is \( \epsilon \). Therefore, \( B \)'s probability to guess \( \theta \) correctly is

\[
\Pr \left[ B \left( g, g^{a'}, g^{b'}, g^{c'}, Z = e(g, g)^{ab'c'} \right) = 0 \right] = \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon.
\]  

(30)

In conclusion, \( B \)'s advantage to win the above security game is

\[
\text{Adv}(B) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \Pr \left[ B \left( g, g^{a'}, g^{b'}, g^{c'}, Z = e(g, g)^{ab'c'} \right) = 0 \right] + \Pr \left[ B \left( g, g^{a'}, g^{b'}, g^{c'}, Z = R \right) = 1 \right] \right) - \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2} \epsilon.
\]  

(31)

**Theorem 2** Supposed that a PPT adversary \( A \) can break the IND-CSPA security of our scheme with a non-negligible advantage \( \epsilon > 0 \), then there exists a PPT simulator \( B \) that can distinguish a DBDH tuple from a random tuple with an advantage \( \frac{\epsilon}{2} \).

**Proof 2** The proof process of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 1. The DBDH challenger \( C \) sends \( B \) the tuple \( \left( g, g^{a'}, g^{b'}, g^{c'}, Z \right) \), in which \( Z = e(g, g)^{ab'c'} \) or \( R \). \( B \) chooses a challenge access structure \( T^* \) initially. \( B \) returns public key in the same way as in Theorem 1. Then \( A \) adaptively submits any attribute set \( S \) with the restriction that \( S \neq T^* \). Since \( B \) can generate secret keys as in Theorem 1, it can naturally answer \( A \) with the corresponding trapdoor \( T_r \). In the challenge phase, \( A \) submits \( m^* \) and two challenge policies \( T_{0}^* \) and \( T_{1}^* \) with the same structure, i.e., \( T_{0}^* = T_{1}^* \). \( B \) randomly picks \( \theta' \in \{0,1\} \), generates \( CT_{2}^* \) with \( T_{2}^* \) and returns the challenge ciphertext \( CT^* \). If \( A \)'s advantage of guessing \( \theta' \) is \( \epsilon \), then \( B \)'s advantage to distinguish a DBDH tuple from a random tuple is \( \frac{\epsilon}{2} \).

### 3.4.2 Complexity Analysis

In this section, we compare the computational overhead with some other related schemes with hidden policy from a technical point of view. Some schemes only supports AND-gate policies, to represent an expressive policy \( f \), we transmute it to a conjunctive normal form and \( f = f_1 \lor \cdots \lor f_n \), and then represent each \( f_i \) by a conjunctive clause as \( f_i = \text{att}_{i,1} \land \cdots \land \text{att}_{i,l} \). Without loss of generality, we suppose each attribute \( \text{att}_i \) has two values \( \text{att}_{i,1}, \text{att}_{i,2} \), and consider such a simple access policy

\[
f = (\text{att}_{1,1} \lor \text{att}_{1,2}) \land (\text{att}_{2,1} \lor \text{att}_{2,2}) \cdots \land (\text{att}_{n,1} \lor \text{att}_{n,2}),
\]

which means that there are \( 2^n \) access strategies. Now, we discuss the computational overhead of each scheme as following Table. 3.

As shown in Table. 3, schemes [6, 24, 25] restricted with AND-gates on multivalues give rise to an exponential size of ciphertext for supporting an expressive
### 4 Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a CP-ABE scheme with hidden sensitive policy for recruitment in smart city. To protect the sensitive policy of encrypted recruitment from unauthorized applicants, two access policies embedded in the ciphertext, one is public and the other is sensitive and fully hidden, only if user’s attributes satisfy the public policy, it’s possible for him/her to learn about the hidden policy, otherwise he/she cannot get any information (attribute name and its values) of it. When the user satisfies both access policies, he/she can obtain and decrypt the ciphertext. The access policy in our scheme is expressive and computational overhead of encryption (half part) and decryption (most part) can be outsourced to fog nodes and cloud server respectively. Thus, our scheme is more applicable for resource-limited end users.

### 5 List of Abbreviations

| Access policy          | Hidden Policy | Ciphertext size | Test time       | Decryption time | Group order |
|------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------|
| Nishide et al. [6]     | AND-gates on multi-values | partially hidden | $2^n\|G_T\| + (4n + 1)\|G\|$ | user: super-polynomial | user: $(3n + 1)e$ | p            |
| Li et al. [24]         | AND-gates on multi-values | partially hidden | $2^n\|G_T\| + 8n\|G\|$ | user: super-polynomial | user: $4ne$ | p            |
| Lai et al. [25]        | AND-gates on multi-values | partially hidden | $2^n\|G_T\| + (4n + 2)\|G\|$ | user: super-polynomial | user: $(n+1)e$ | pq $r$       |
| Cui et al. [28]        | LSSS         | partially hidden | $\|G_T\| + (6n + 2)\|G\|$ | user: super-polynomial | user: $(6n + 1)e$ | p            |
| Ours                   | Tree-based structure | secret policy is fully hidden | fog: $(2 + 2n_1)\|G\|$ | cloud: \(2(n_1 + n_2 + n_2 + 1)e\) | cloud: $(n_1 + n_2 + 6)e$ | no pairing $p$    |

$\|G_T\|$: the size of group element of $G_T$. $\|G\|$: the size of group element of $G_0$.

$e$: Bilinear pairing. $n$: Number of possible attributes in the access policy.

$n_1$: Number of attributes in the public access policy. $n_2$: Number of attributes in the secret access policy. $n_1 + n_2 = n$.

access policy. Since the attribute value is hidden in [28], for finding the correct attribute value for successful decryption, [28] needs end user to test super-polynomial times. In addition, all the above schemes only protect the privacy attribute value, but expose the information of attribute name. Some other schemes based on the inner-product predicate encryption [18,29] that we haven’t discussed in detail here, because transform an inner-product predicate to an expressive access policy will also cause an exponential size of ciphertext. In our scheme, the size of ciphertext, test time and decryption time are all polynomial. Partial overhead for generating the ciphertext is outsourced to fog nodes and most overhead during test and decryption is outsourced from end user to the cloud.

### Competing interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Table 4: List of Abbreviations.

| Complete spellings                                      | Abbreviations | Complete spellings                                      | Abbreviations |
|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| attribute-based encryption                             | ABE           | Internet of Things                                      | IoT           |
| ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption            | CP-ABE        | Data Owner                                              | DO            |
| key-policy ABE                                         | KP-ABE        | Cloud Server                                            | CS            |
| decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman                     | DBDH          | End User                                                | EU            |
| Inner-product predicate encryption                      | IPE           | Fog Nodes                                               | FN            |
| chosen sensitive policy attack                          | CSP           | Key Authority Center                                     | KAC           |

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Author's contributions

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