Nonadaptive Mastermind Algorithms for String and Vector Databases, with Case Studies

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Abstract

In this paper, we study sparsity-exploiting Mastermind algorithms for attacking the privacy of an entire database of character strings or vectors, such as DNA strings, movie ratings, or social network friendship data. Based on reductions to nonadaptive group testing, our methods are able to take advantage of minimal amounts of privacy leakage, such as contained in a single bit that indicates if two people in a medical database have any common genetic mutations, or if two people have any common friends in an online social network. We analyze our Mastermind attack algorithms using theoretical characterizations that provide sublinear bounds on the number of queries needed to clone the database, as well as experimental tests on genomic information, collaborative filtering data, and online social networks. By taking advantage of the generally sparse nature of these real-world databases and modulating a parameter that controls query sparsity, we demonstrate that relatively few nonadaptive queries are needed to recover a large majority of each database.

1 Introduction

Privacy and data protection are important and growing concerns when dealing with character strings or vector data. Medical databases are constrained by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) rules to keep identifying data private, for instance. Such databases in the future will commonly store DNA strings of patients, which will need to have their privacy protected for obvious reasons. Likewise, attribute vectors, which reflect the presence or absence of each of a large number of possible attributes, are common in biotechnology; for example, chemical attribute vectors (e.g., see [1, 2]) indicate the presence or absence of each of about a million attributes.

Privacy concerns also exist for online social networks and other databases which store user preferences in vector form. For instance, knowledge of a social

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network user’s set of friends (representable as a row in an adjacency matrix) is potentially a gateway privacy leak, for friendship overlaps have been shown to be sufficient to de-anonymize individuals across multiple social networking sites [3]. Likewise, the movie rating vectors in the database used for the Netflix Prize contest consists of ratings of movies by individual users, which are generally deemed as sensitive information. Full access to such databases may be constrained by privacy agreements or legitimate proprietary reasons for keeping these databases private, even as they allow for limited types of queries to be performed on them.

Each time a client queries such a database and it responds with an answer, it reveals some information about its contents, even if the client and the database are using a Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) protocol (e.g., see [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]) to process such a query. Thus, we can provide a crude characterization of the risk of privacy loss in biological, medical, or proprietary databases in terms of the existence of efficient algorithms that can take advantage of the data leakage present in query responses to be able to replicate part or all of the content of the database. We refer to such schemes as data-cloning attacks.

Formally, in an algorithmic data-cloning attack, a querier, Bob, is allowed certain types of queries to a database, $\mathcal{X}$, that belongs to a data owner, Alice. Bob’s goal is to replicate all or a large part of $\mathcal{X}$ through as few queries on $\mathcal{X}$ as possible (and with low computational overhead). In this paper, we focus on databases where $\mathcal{X}$ is a collection $\mathcal{X} = (X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_g)$ of character strings or vectors, over a fixed-size alphabet. With respect to the types of databases we consider, we assume that Alice is willing to process comparison queries from Bob, each of which consists of Bob providing a single vector $Q$ (which is not necessarily revealed in plaintext to Alice) and, possibly using a Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC). Alice reveals a response vector $(r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_g)$, where each $r_i$ is the score for some type of comparison of $Q$ with $X_i$. In the simplest case, each score $r_i$ can be a single bit denoting whether the query $Q$ shares any common entries with $X_i$. As mentioned above, the risk to this data-cloning attack, then, can be characterized by the number of queries and how much processing time is needed so that Bob can replicate all of $\mathcal{X}$ or a large portion of $\mathcal{X}$.

1.1 Our Contributions

Inspired by a game known as Mastermind, we present a number of algorithms for performing a Mastermind attack on an entire string or vector database, $\mathcal{X} = (X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_g)$, so as to clone all or a large portion of $\mathcal{X}$. All of our methods assume only the SMC protocol of Jiang et al. [8], where a querier, Bob, issues a query string or vector, $Q$, and receives a vector of responses $(r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_g)$, where each $r_i$ is a single numerical response score measuring the similarity of $Q$ and $X_i$ according to some public metric. Since vectors taken over a universe of size $c$ can be viewed as character strings taken over an alphabet of size $c$, we will, without loss of generality, focus our descriptions on the case when $\mathcal{X}$ consists of $g$ character strings. We will also assume that each string in
\( \mathcal{X} \) is the same length, since we can view smaller strings as being padded with an additional character not in the original alphabet.

We show that repeated querying of such a database can clone all or a large portion of it, often with a surprisingly small, sublinear number of queries. The risk profile we explore in each type of attack, then, is the number of queries needed to execute it. Specifically, let us suppose that \( \mathcal{X} \) contains \( g \) strings, each of length \( n \), taken over an alphabet of size \( c \), with at least \( g' \leq g \) of these strings having at most \( d < n \) differences from a public reference string, \( R \). We show that at least \( g' \) of the strings in \( \mathcal{X} \) can be cloned using (at most) the following number of queries:

\[
2(c-1)(2d\log n + \min\{d\log g, d^2\log(en/d)\}).
\]

This result applies to situations, common in many real-world databases (e.g. \([1, 12, 2]\)), where strings in the database can be characterized in terms of a small number of differences with a reference string, \( R \).

We also provide several case studies showing empirical data that demonstrates that our randomized attack can work effectively on real-world databases. For instance, we apply our attack to a database of mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) strings and the database of movie-ratings vectors provided for the Netflix Prize contest, showing that large portions of these databases can be cloned using a number of queries that is much smaller than the length of the strings or vectors in these databases.

If, in practice, Bob learns more than the information contained in the response vector \((r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_g)\), that only strengthens his attack. The point of this paper is that even with just the information leaked in the responses, Bob can construct a small number of query vectors that are sufficient to learn all or a sizeable fraction of the vectors in \( \mathcal{X} \). Moreover, our Mastermind attack is oblivious (that is, nonadaptive), in that Bob can construct all his query vectors in advance, so that the format of no query depends on the outcome of another. We describe a randomized construction for Bob’s query vectors, which allows the attack to be fairly surreptitious, in that each query looks random (because it is random).

2 Attack Scenarios

Before describing our nonadaptive Mastermind attack in precise detail, we show how it applies to a wide variety of attack scenarios to provide motivating examples. We illustrate three such attack scenarios below.

2.1 Genetic Signatures

Suppose the vectors in \( \mathcal{X} \) represent the genetic signatures of people in some population, such as a high school, college, or corporation. Bob’s goal in this Mastermind attack is to learn the genetic signatures for as many people in his population of interest as is reasonably possible. He can employ his attack so long
as there is a website or tool for $\mathcal{X}$ that allows him to test a query vector $Q$ against the vectors in $\mathcal{X}$ to determine which ones share a mutation with $Q$, with respect to a reference $R$. In mitochondrial DNA, the reference $R$ is roughly 16,500 base pairs long, but has only about 4,000 known mutations [15, 16], suggesting that each vector in $\mathcal{X}$ is sparse relative to $R$.

In this example, Bob could be posing as a medical researcher and claim that his vectors are testing for combinations of genetic markers for disease. Alternatively he could claim to be a forensic analyst with DNA from a crime scene, which he wants to test against members of $\mathcal{X}$ (in this case, he is likely to receive a similarity score between his query $Q$ and the vectors in $\mathcal{X}$, which he can easily convert into an overlap-detection bit). In either case, a minimum amount of overlap information can allow him to learn the entire genetic signatures of a large number of members of $\mathcal{X}$.

The privacy implications of such an innocuous attack are significant. Alice’s genetic signature could then be used by an unethical employer or insurance company to discriminate against her based on his risks for future diseases. Also, as illustrated in Figure 1, it is possible using a genetic signature derived from a short string of Alice’s mitochondrial DNA to trace her maternal lineage to an ancestral location [14, 13], which is information that could then be used for ethnic discrimination [17].

2.2 Social Network Friendship Ties

Suppose the vectors in $\mathcal{X}$ represent the rows of the adjacency matrix (e.g., Figure 2) defined by the friendship ties for an online social network, like Facebook, possibly restricted to the population in a specific city, college, high school, or
large corporation. In this scenario, Bob wants to learn the friendship relationships of as many people as possible. For instance, he may wish to do racial profiling [18] or do a cross-networking identification attack [3], since 89% of Facebook users use their real names [19].

In this case, Bob’s query vectors correspond to a relatively small number of pseudonyms that Bob creates in the social network and for which he defines a certain number of random friendship ties. For instance, he could create such ties using automated social engineering techniques (e.g., using the name of an affiliated city, college, etc.) as well as the property that a fairly large percentage of social networking users are likely to accept random friendship requests from people in their community (roughly 10 to 25% of student Facebook users accept random friendship requests from people who say they are in the same university [20]). Given his set of pseudonyms, Bob employs the group-testing attack by having each of his pseudonyms ask the social networking site if this pseudonym shares any friends with the people in Bob’s population of interest. Note that he will receive a useful response vector from everyone that has privacy settings that allow for testing for mutual friends in common. That is, even if someone chooses to share friendship information only with “friends of friends,” which is one of the more restrictive standard privacy settings in Facebook, Bob can still get valid responses for his queries with respect to such people. Moreover, if Bob employs an oblivious group-testing attack, he can use the same set of pseudonyms for everyone whose privacy he is attacking. Thus, once he has set up his pseudonyms, he can target the privacy of any user in the online social network at will.

2.3 User Preference Data

Suppose the vectors in $X$ represent the preferences of people in a site, such as Amazon or Netflix, that employs collaborative filtering to support product
recommendations. Specifically, we assume in this scenario that products are numbered 1 to $k$ and each vector $X_i$ in $\mathcal{X}$ has a discrete rating (e.g. 1-5 stars, or a missing rating) in position $j$, provided by user $i$. Bob’s goal in this scenario is to discover as many vectors in $\mathcal{X}$ as reasonably possible and in so doing discover the product preferences of a large number of targeted people. His motivation could, for instance, be economic, in that he may want to open an online store that caters to a specific demographic; hence, we may want to learn the product preferences for a known population of people in this group. In terms of information leakage, all that is needed in order to allow for Bob’s group-testing attack to work is for the collaborative filtering site have a way for him to create pseudonyms, have these pseudonyms rate products, and allow for these pseudonyms to test if they share any ratings in common with users in the target population. So long as the collaborative filtering web site allows for users to check for overlapping scores with other users, Bob can employ the nonadaptive Mastermind attack.

2.4 Exploiting Sparsity

The above set of attack scenarios are illustrative of the risks to privacy that the group-testing attack provides, in that it can greatly amplify the information gained from just a relatively small number of single-bit privacy leaks. The risk to the group-testing attack can be characterized in terms of the number of queries and how much processing time is needed so that Bob can replicate a large portion of $\mathcal{X}$. As we will elaborate in Section 4, the critical factor here is a sparsity parameter, $d$, which, in a group testing context, refers to the small number of “defective” items in the large group.

Interestingly, each of the attack scenarios mentioned above possess such a parameter, allowing for Bob to employ efficient Mastermind attacks with a relatively small number of queries. For example, an individual’s genetic signature will typically have a relatively small number of indicators for mutations with respect to a reference DNA string – with mitochondrial DNA, most people have fewer than 100 mutations with respect to a commonly-used reference string. Furthermore, most people in social networking sites, such as Facebook, have less than a few hundred friends. Likewise, most collaborative filtering preference vectors, such as in the Netflix Prize contest, have ratings for at most a few hundred items. Thus, there are several modern contexts that have all the pieces in place to allow for the Mastermind attack to be used.

It is worth noting that realistic attacks can also be constructed in many other domains. For instance, sensitive image data, such as captured by biometric devices, may be represented as sparse vectors, making it susceptible to a Mastermind attack, especially when efficient tools exist for comparing a query (e.g. a fingerprint or an iris scan) to the entire database.
3 Background and Related Work

We give a brief background of the Mastermind game and attacks inspired by that game, as well as related work on privacy models and attempts to mitigate privacy leaks.

3.1 Mastermind

Adapting the terminology of the Mastermind attack [21] to attacks on an entire database, we discuss in this section the relationship between the Mastermind attack and the Mastermind boardgame. Mastermind [22, 23] is a two-player board game, which is played between a codemaker and a codebreaker, using colored pegs (Figure 3). Mastermind begins with the codemaker selecting a character string, $X$, of length $n$, using an alphabet of size $c$, whose members are called “colors.” The codebreaker then makes a sequence of queries, $Q_1, Q_2, \ldots$, about $X$’s identity. For each guess $Q_i$, the codemaker provides a score on how well $Q_i$ matches $X$. In the board game, this is done using colored pegs, but we assume in this paper that the score is simply a matching function, $b(Q_i) = |\{j : Q_i[j] = X[j]\}|$, which counts the number of places where $Q_i$ and $X$ match. The codebreaker, of course, is trying to discover $X$ using a small number of guesses.
Chvátal [22] studied the combinatorics of the general Mastermind game, showing that it can be solved in polynomial time using $2n \lceil \log c \rceil + 4n$ guesses. Chen et al. [24] showed how this can be improved to $2n \lceil \log n \rceil + 2n + \lceil c/n \rceil + 2$ guesses and Goodrich [25] showed how this bound can be improved to $n \lceil \log c \rceil + \lceil (2-1/c)n \rceil + c$. Unfortunately, from the perspective of the cloning problem, all of these algorithms are adaptive, in that they use results of previous queries to construct future queries. Adaptive algorithms can only be used effectively for the interactions between a single pair of strings. For a sequence of queries to be used against an entire database of strings, we need a nonadaptive algorithm, that is, an algorithm where queries are not dependent upon answers from previous queries, which is equivalent to the codebreaker making all his guesses in advance.

Chvátal [22] also gives an existence proof for a nonadaptive method for solving Mastermind. If the number of possible colors, $c \leq n^{1-\epsilon}$, for some constant $\epsilon > 0$, which will almost always be the case for biological databases, Chvátal shows the existence of a nonadaptive method using only

$$G = (2 + \epsilon)n \frac{1 + 2\log c}{\log n - \log c}$$

guesses. In fact, he shows that making $G$ guesses at random will be sufficient to determine a unique solution with high probability, using only the $b(Q_i)$ type of scores. Unfortunately, this existence proof does not immediately lead to a polynomial-time algorithm. Indeed, it is NP-complete to determine if a collection of Mastermind guesses with $b(Q_i)$ type of responses is satisfiable [25]. Nonetheless, in this paper, we will show that Mastermind attacks based on reductions to group testing can efficiently clone a sparse database of interest using a sublinear number of nonadaptive queries.

### 3.2 Related Privacy Models

Following a framework by Bancilhon and Spyritos [26], Deutsch and Papakonstantinou [27] and Miklau and Suciu [28] give related models for characterizing privacy loss in information releases from a database, which they call query-view security. In this framework, there is a secret, $S$, that the data owner, Alice, is trying to protect. Attackers are allowed to ask legal queries of the database, while Alice tries to protect the information that these queries leak about $S$. While this framework is related to the data-cloning attack, these two are not identical, since in the data-cloning attack there is no specifically sensitive part of the data. Instead, Alice is trying to limit releasing too much of her data to Bob rather than protecting any specific secret. Similarly, Kantarcioglu et al. [29] study privacy models that quantify the degree to which data mining searches expose private information, but this related privacy model is also not directly applicable to the data-cloning attack.

There has been considerable recent work on data modification approaches that can help protect the privacy or intellectual property rights of a database by modifying its content. For example, several researchers (e.g., see [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35]) advocate the use of data watermarking to protect data rights. In
using this technique, data values are altered to make it easier, after the fact, to track when someone has stolen information from a database. Of course, by that point, the data has already been cloned. Alternatively, several other researchers (e.g., [36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]) propose using generalization or cell suppression as methods for achieving quantifiable privacy-preservation in databases. These techniques alter data values to protect sensitive parts of the data, while still allowing for data mining activities to be performed on the database. We assume here that Alice is not interested in data modification techniques, however, for we believe that accuracy is critically important in several database applications. For example, even a single base-pair mutation in a DNA string can indicate the existence of an increased health risk.

As mentioned above, we allow for the queries Bob asks to be answered using SMC protocols, which reveal no additional information between the query string \( Q \) and each database string \( X_i \) other than the response score \( r_i \). Such protocols have been developed for the kinds of comparisons that are done in genomic sequences (e.g., see [4, 44, 45]). In particular, Atallah et al. [4] and Atallah and Li [46] studied privacy-preserving protocols for edit-distance sequence comparisons, such as in the longest common subsequence (LCS) problem (e.g., [47, 48, 49]). Troncoso-Pastoriza et al. [50] described a privacy-preserving protocol for regular-expression searching in a DNA sequence. Jha et al. [7] give privacy-preserving protocols for computing edit distance and Smith-Waterman similarity scores between two genomic sequences, improving the privacy-preserving algorithm of Szajda et al. [9]. Aligned matching results between two strings can be done in a privacy-preserving manner, as well, using privacy-preserving set intersection protocols (e.g., see [51, 45, 52, 10, 53]) or SMC methods for dot products (e.g., see [6, 54, 11]). In addition, the Fairplay system [5] provides a general compiler for building such computations.

Du and Atallah [55] study an SMC protocol for querying a string \( Q \) in a database of strings, \( \mathcal{X} \), as in our framework, where comparisons are based on approximate matching (but not sequence-alignment). Their SMC protocols for performing such queries provide a best match, not a score for each string in the database. Thus, their scheme would not be applicable in the attack framework we are considering in this paper. The SMC method of Jiang et al. [8], on the other hand, is directly applicable. It provides a vector of scores comparing a string (or vector) \( Q \) to a sequence of strings (or vectors), as we require in this paper. Thus, our Mastermind methods can be viewed as an attack on repeated use of the SMC protocol of Jiang et al.

Goodrich [21] studies the problem of discovering a single DNA string from a series of genomic Mastermind queries. All his methods are sequential and adaptive, however, so the only way they could be applied to the data-cloning attack on an entire biological database is if Bob were to focus on each string \( X_i \) in \( \mathcal{X} \) in turn. That is, he would have to gear his queries to specifically discovering each \( X_i \) in \( n \) distinct “rounds” of computation, each of which uses a lot of string-comparison queries. Such an adaptation of Goodrich’s Mastermind attacks to perform data cloning, therefore, would be prohibitively expensive for Bob. Our approach, instead, is based on performing a nonadaptive Mastermind
attack on the entire database at once.

We note that others have investigated de-anonymization techniques on both social networks [56] and Netflix data [57]. These works are complementary to our goal of cloning the databases themselves.

4 Exploiting Sparsity in an Algorithmic Data-Cloning Attack

In this section, we describe the details of our nonadaptive Mastermind data-cloning attack. It is often the case that all or a large fraction of the strings in a real-world string database can be characterized in terms of a small number of differences with a public reference string. In these situations, which are quite common, we can apply a reduction to nonadaptive group testing, which results in an an efficient Mastermind attack as we will see.

4.1 Non-adaptive Combinatorial Group Testing

Group testing was introduced by Dorfman [58], during World War II, to test blood samples. The problem he addressed was to design an efficient way to detect the few thousand blood samples that were contaminated with syphilis out of the millions that were collected. His idea was to pool drops of blood from multiple samples and test each pool for the syphilis antigen. By carefully arranging the group tests and then discovering which groups tested positive and which ones tested negative he could then identify the contaminated samples using a small number of group tests (much smaller than the number needed to explicitly test each individual blood sample), thereby sparing thousands of G.I.'s from needless disease exposure. In this paper, we show that Dorfman's humanitarian discovery has an unfortunate dark side when it comes to privacy protection, for it enables privacy leaks to be amplified in a data-cloning attack.

In the combinatorial group testing problem (e.g., Du and Hwang [59]), one is given a set $S$ of $n$ items, at most $d$ of which are “defective,” for some parameter $d \leq n$, and one is interested in exactly determining which of the items in $S$ are defective. One can form a test from any subset $T$ of $S$ and in a single step determine if $T$ contains any defective items or not. If one can use information from the result of a test in formulating the tests to make in the future, then the method is said to be adaptive. If, on the other hand, one cannot use the results from one test to determine the makeup of any future test, then the method is said to be nonadaptive. For the application to the Mastermind attack, we are interested in nonadaptive methods.

There are several existing nonadaptive group testing methods [59], but these approaches are meant for a more general context than in our database cloning attack. In particular, these methods are designed to work for any set of items having $d$ defective members. In our case, we are instead interested in specific sets of items that are derived from the database we are interested in cloning.
Because of this, we can, in fact, derive improved bounds than would be implied by existing combinatorial group-testing methods.

Suppose we are given a collection, $\mathcal{C}$, of sets $\mathcal{C} = \{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_g\}$, which are not necessarily distinct, such that each set $S_i$ contains $n$ items, at most $d$ of which are “defective.” We want to design a nonadaptive group testing scheme that can exactly identify the subset, $D_i$, of at most $d$ defective items in each set $S_i$ in $\mathcal{C}$. Our approach to solving this problem is based on a randomized approach used by Eppstein et al. [60].

A nonadaptive group testing algorithm can actually be viewed as a $t \times n$ 0-1 matrix, $M$. Each of the $n$ columns of $M$ corresponds to one of the $n$ items and each of the $t$ rows of $M$ represents a test. If $M[i,j] = 1$, then item $j$ is included in test $i$, and if $M[i,j] = 0$, then item $j$ is not included in test $i$. Since this is a nonadaptive testing scheme, we assume that no test depends on the results of any other. That is, every row of the matrix $M$ is defined in advance of any test outcomes. The analysis question, then, is to determine how large $t$ must be for the results of these tests to provide useful results.

Let $C$ denote the set of columns of $M$. Given a subset $D$ of $d$ columns in $M$, and a specific column $j$ in $C$ but not in $D$, we say that $j$ is distinguishable from $D$ if there is a row $i$ of $M$ such that $M[i,j] = 1$ but $i$ contains a 0 in each of the columns in $D$. If each column of $M$ that is in $C$ and not in $D$ is distinguishable from $D$, then we say that $M$ is $D$-distinguishing. Furthermore, we generalize this definition, so that if $M$ is $D_i$-distinguishing for each subset, $D_i$, in a collection, $\mathcal{D} = \{D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_g\}$, of columns in $C$, then we say that $M$ is $\mathcal{D}$-distinguishing. Finally, we say that the matrix $M$ is $d$-disjunct (e.g., see Du and Hwang [59], p. 165) if it is $\mathcal{D}$-distinguishing for the collection, $\mathcal{D}$, of all of the $\binom{n}{d}$ subsets of size $d$ of $C$.

Note that if $M$ is $D$-distinguishing, then it leads to a simple testing algorithm with respect to $D$. In particular, suppose $D$ is the set of defective items and we perform all the tests in $M$. Note that, since $M$ is $D$-distinguishing, if an item $j$ is not in $D$, then there is a test in $M$ that will determine the item $j$ is not defective, for $j$ would belong to a test that must necessarily have no defective items. So we can identify $D$ in this case—the set $D$ consists of all items that have no test determining them to be nondefective.

Of course, if $M$ is $d$-disjunct, then this simple detection algorithm works for any set $D$ of up to $d$ defective items in $C$. Unfortunately, building such a matrix $M$ that is $d$-disjunct requires $M$ to have $\Omega(d^2 \log n / \log d)$ rows [59, 61]. So we will instead build a matrix that is $\mathcal{D}$-distinguished for the collection, $\mathcal{D}$, of defective subsets determined by the sets of items in $\mathcal{C}$, with high probability.

Given a parameter $t$, which is a multiple of $d$, we construct a $2t \times n$ matrix $M$ as follows. For each column $j$ of $M$, we choose $t/d$ rows uniformly at random and we set the values of these entries to 1, with the other entries in column $j$ being set to 0. Note, then, that for any set $D$ of up to $d$ defective items, there are at most $t$ tests that will have positive outcomes (detecting defectives) and, therefore, at least $t$ tests that will have negative outcomes. Our desire, of course, is for columns that correspond to samples that are distinguishable from the defectives ones should belong to at least one negative-outcome test. So, let
us focus on bounds for $t$ that allow for such a matrix $M$ to be chosen with high probability.

Let $C$ be a set of (column) items having a fixed subset $D$ of $d$ defective items. For each (column) item $j$ in $C$ but not in $D$, let $Y_j$ denote the 0-1 random variable that is 1 if $j$ is falsely identified as a defective item by $M$ (that is, $j$ is not included in a test of items distinguished from those in $D$). Let $Y_j$ be 0 otherwise. Observe that the $Y_j$’s are independent, since $Y_j$ depends only on whether the choice of rows we picked for column $j$ collide with the at most $t$ rows of $M$ picked for the columns corresponding to items in $D$. There are a total of $2t$ rows, at most $t$ of which contain a test with a defective item. Thus, the probability of any non-defective item joining any particular test having a defective item in it is at most $1/2$; hence, any $Y_j$ is 1 (a false positive) with probability at most $2^{-t/d}$, since each item is included in $t/d$ tests at random.

Let $Y = \sum_{j=1}^{n} Y_j$, and note that the expected value of $Y$, $E(Y)$, is at most $\mu = n/2^{t/d}$. Thus, if $\mu \leq 1$, we can use Markov’s inequality to bound the probability of the (bad) case when $Y$ is non-zero as follows:

$$\Pr(Y \geq 1) \leq E(Y) \leq \mu = \frac{n}{2^{t/d}}.$$ 

Thus, if we set

$$t \geq 2d \log n,$$

then $M$ will be $D$-distinguishing with probability at least $1 - 1/n$, for any particular subset of defective items, $D$, from a set $C$ of $n$ items. Likewise, if we set

$$t \geq 2d \log n + d \log g,$$

then $M$ will be $D$-distinguished, with probability at least $1 - 1/n$, for the collection of $g$ subsets of defective items determined by the sets in $C$. Finally, we can use the fact (e.g., see Knuth [62]) that

$$\binom{n}{d} < (en/d)^d,$$

so that if we set

$$t \geq 2d \log n + d^2 \log(en/d),$$

then $M$ will be $d$-disjunct with probability at least $1 - 1/n$, which implies $M$ will work for any subset of at most $d$ defective items. Therefore, we have the following.

**Theorem 1.** If

$$t \geq 2d \log n + \min\{d \log g, d^2 \log(en/d)\},$$

then a $2t \times n$ random matrix $M$, constructed as described above, is $D$-distinguished, with probability at least $1 - 1/n$, for any given collection, $D = \{D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_g\}$, of $g$ subsets of size $d$ of the $n$ columns in $M$. 

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Proof. Let \( \mathcal{D} \) be a given collection of \( g \) (not necessarily distinct) subsets of size \( d \) of the \( n \) columns in \( M \). If

\[
d^2 \log(en/d) > d \log g,
\]

then \( M \) is \( \mathcal{D} \)-distinguished by construction, with probability at least \( 1 - 1/n \). If, on the other hand,

\[
d^2 \log(en/d) \leq d \log g,
\]

then \( M \) constructed as above is \( d \)-disjunct, with probability at least \( 1 - 1/n \), which implies it is \( \mathcal{D} \)-distinguished w.h.p. for any collection \( \mathcal{D} \) of subsets of size \( d \) of the \( n \) columns of \( M \).

As mentioned above, this is a way of constructing a simple nonadaptive group testing method for identifying the defective items in the collection, \( \mathcal{D} \), of subsets of up to \( d \) defective items determined by the sets in \( \mathcal{C} \).

### 4.2 Reducing Mastermind to Group Testing

In this section, we describe how to use nonadaptive group testing to construct an efficient Mastermind cloning attack. Consider the case when \( \mathcal{X} \) is a database of \( g \) strings of length \( n \) each, with each of them having at most \( d \leq n \) differences with a reference string \( R \). We assume that each string in \( \mathcal{X} \) is drawn from an alphabet of \( c \) characters, which, without loss of generality, we assume are integers in the range \([0, c-1]\).

Suppose, like before, that we have a \( 2t \times n \) nonadaptive group testing matrix, \( M \), for a set of size \( n \) having at most \( d \) defectives, where

\[
t \geq 2d \log n + \min\{\log g, d^2 \log(en/d)\}.
\]

As before, we begin our general Mastermind cloning attack by making a query for the reference string, \( R \). Let \( r \) be the response score for the query for \( R \). Next, we create \( c-1 \) different string queries, \( Q_{k,l} \) for each of the \( 2t \) tests in \( M \), defined, for \( l = 1, 2, \ldots, c-1 \), as follows:

\[
Q_{k,l}[j] = \begin{cases} 
R[j] & \text{if } M[k,j] = 0 \\
(R[j] + l) \mod c & \text{else.}
\end{cases}
\]

Each such query against a string \( X_i \) will have some response, \( r_{k,l,i} \). We interpret test \( (k, l, i) \) as having a “positive” response, that is, it does not detect a defective, if, in making the comparison of \( Q_{k,l} \) with the string \( X_i \), the response

\[
r_{k,l,i} = r - b_{k,0,i},
\]

where \( b_{k,0,i} \) is the number of characters in \( X_i \) matching their associated (color-0) location in \( R \) at places where there are 1’s in row \( k \) of \( M \). Intuitively, each 1 in row \( k \) of \( M \) indicates a place where we test a deviation from the reference value in \( R \) at that location to the color \( l \) away. If none of these locations is a match with the current \( X_i \) string, then none of these locations take a color
that is \( l \) additive colors from their reference value. In other words, defective “items” in the associated group testing method correspond to locations where \( X_i \) differs from the reference string with characters that are exactly \( l \) away from their reference values.

Of course, being able to determine if such a test for \( Q_{k,l} \) against string \( X_i \) is “positive” or “negative” requires that we know the value \( b_{k,0,i} \), which we don’t immediately know. We do immediately know the number, \( b_k \), of 1’s in row \( k \) of \( M \), however. And, after we perform the queries for each \( Q_{k,l} \) against a string \( X_i \), we learn each response \( r_{k,l,i} \). That is, we have \( c \) linear equations in \( c \) unknowns from these queries and their responses. Specifically, we have the equation, 

\[
b_k = b_{k,0,i} + b_{k,1,i} + \cdots + b_{k,c-1,i},
\]

where \( b_{k,l,i} \) denotes the number of places \( j \) where there is a 1 in row \( k \) of \( M \) and the character in position \( j \) of \( X_i \) is \( l \) away from the reference, that is, places where \( X_i[j] = (R[j] + l) \mod c \) and \( M[k,j] = 1 \). We also have \( c - 1 \) equations,

\[
r_{k,l,i} = r - b_{k,0,i} + b_{k,l,i},
\]

for \( l = 1, 2, \ldots, c - 1 \), which can each be rewritten as \( b_{k,l,i} = r_{k,l,i} - r + b_{k,0,i} \). This allows us to rewrite

\[
b_k = c b_{k,0,i} - (c - 1)r + \sum_{l=1}^{c-1} r_{k,l,i},
\]

Thus, we can determine the value of \( b_{k,0,i} \) as

\[
b_{k,0,i} = \frac{b_k + (c - 1)r - \sum_{l=1}^{c-1} r_{k,l,i}}{c},
\]

which in turn tells us which of the \( Q_{k,l} \) tests are “positive” and which ones are “negative.” Essentially, we are performing a combinatorial group test for each possible shift we can make from a color in reference \( R \).

Thus, if there are at most \( d \) locations where \( X_i \) differs from the reference string and \( M \) is \( D \)-distinguished for the set of at most \( d \) locations of difference for each string in \( \mathcal{X} \), then this scheme will learn the complete identity of each string in \( \mathcal{X} \). That is, this method will clone \( \mathcal{X} \), with high probability. Therefore, by Theorem 1, we have the following:

**Theorem 2.** Given a database \( \mathcal{X} = (X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_g) \), of strings of length \( n \) defined over an alphabet of size \( c \), there is a nonadaptive Mastermind cloning method that can discover each string in \( \mathcal{X} \), using \( 2t(c - 1) \) tests, with probability at least \( 1 - (c - 1)/n \), where \( t \) is the smallest multiple of \( d \) such that

\[
t \geq 2d \log n + \min\{d \log g, d^2 \log(en/d)\},
\]

and \( d \leq n \) is the maximum number of differences any string in \( \mathcal{X} \) has with \( R \).
5 Case Studies

To test the real-world risks of the nonadaptive Mastermind cloning attack, we applied our methods to case studies involving random samples from a number of real-world string and vector databases, including genomic and social network data. We briefly describe the data sets used and then discuss experimental results which reveal that relatively few tests are needed to recover large proportions of each database.

| Name       | Strings | Length  | Max Diff | Colors |
|------------|---------|---------|----------|--------|
| Genomic    | 457     | 16,568  | 492      | 4      |
| Netflix    | 1,000   | 17,700  | 1988     | 6      |
| Epinions   | 2,000   | 131,827 | 517      | 3      |
| Slashdot   | 2,000   | 82,144  | 378      | 3      |
| Slashdot (All) | 82,144 | 82,144  | 428      | 3      |
| Facebook-UNC | 18,163 | 18,163  | 3,795    | 2      |
| Facebook-Unif | 1,000  | 72,261,577 | 2,164    | 2      |

Figure 4: Data sets used in experiments, along with histograms of differences from reference $R$. These data sets have varying characteristics.

5.1 Data Sets

We analyze several different data sets with varying characteristics to test our approach. For each data set, Figure 4 shows the number of strings $g$, string
length $n$, maximum difference $d$ from the reference $R$ across strings (where “difference” is defined as the number of entries in which the string differs from $R$), and the number of unique colors $c$ present in the database.

The Genomic database consists of 457 human mitochondrial sequences downloadable from GenBank\(^1\). We use the Revised Cambridge Reference Sequence (rCRS), of length 16,586 bp as the reference string $R$. Figure 4 shows the distribution of sequence differences from $R$, which reveals that the differences from $R$ are relatively few and are concentrated at several different modes. In this data, there are four colors, namely the nucleotides A, C, T, and G.

Our movie-rating database is taken from the Netflix Prize data\(^2\), which consists of 100 million movie ratings and 480,189 different Netflix users. In our experiments, we use a representative subset of 1,000 randomly selected users. Each user has an associated string over 17,770 movies, where each position $i$ stores the rating (from 1 to 5) given by the user for movie $i$. An entry of 0 signifies that the user has not rated that movie. Thus, there are six different unique colors in this database (0-5). Our reference string $R$ consists of all zeros, representing the case where no movies are rated. According to Figure 4, the majority of users rate less than 300 movies. This sparsity allows the group testing attacks to be very efficient, as we will see in the experiments.

We also analyze online social networks such as Epinions, Slashdot, and Facebook. Available from the SNAP Library\(^3\), Epinions and Slashdot are “signed” networks, where positive and negative links appear in the network’s adjacency matrix [63]. The Epinions network is the site’s “Web of Trust” where users specify the other users that they trust or distrust. Similarly, in the Slashdot network, users can specify both “friends” and “foes”. Hence, in both these databases, there are three unique colors: 0 (no link), 1 (good link), and -1 (bad link). In our experiments for both Epinions and Slashdot, we select a random subset of 2,000 users and utilize the corresponding rows in the adjacency matrix as our database. We also simulate a single large-scale group testing attack on the entire Slashdot-All adjacency matrix with 82,144 users.

The two Facebook data sets that we analyze are Facebook-Uniform and Facebook-UNC. Facebook-Uniform, provided by the authors of [64], is an unbiased sample of 957K unique users obtained by performing Metropolis-Hastings random walks over the Facebook network. Each user is associated with a (sparse) binary vector of size 72 million which denotes adjacencies. We restrict ourselves to a random subset of 1,000 users in Facebook-Uniform. Meanwhile, Facebook-UNC is a self-contained Facebook network of approximately 18,000 students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill [65].

For all the social network data sets, we use a reference string $R$ of all zeros. Figure 4 shows that these networks are also sparse, which is often the case in many real-world settings.

\(^1\)http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Genbank/index.html
\(^2\)http://www.netflixprize.com
\(^3\)http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html#signnets
Table 1: Theoretical number of tests needed to clone entire database (a) by baseline method (b) by nonadaptive Mastermind attack.

|                | Baseline | Mastermind |
|----------------|----------|------------|
| Genomic        | 49,704   | 76,752     |
| Netflix        | 88,500   | 536,760    |
| Epinions       | 263,654  | 66,176     |
| Slashdot       | 164,288  | 46,872     |
| Slashdot (All) | 164,288  | 58,208     |
| Facebook-UNC   | 18,163   | 227,700    |
| Facebook-Uniform | 72,261,577 | 190,432 |

5.2 Experiments

Our experimental approach is based on the analysis in Section 4. Similar to randomly selecting $\frac{t}{d}$ rows from $2t$ rows (for each column in the nonadaptive group matrix $M$), we stochastically set each entry in $M$ to 1 with probability $p = \frac{1}{2^d}$. This procedure enables us to add additional tests to $M$ until the string is cloned or until a cutoff of 100,000 + $c$ tests is reached, where $c$ is the number of unique colors in the database. We initialize with the same random seed for each string, ensuring that the same exact tests are performed on each string. This scheme allows us to determine the actual number of tests needed to clone the strings.

Before delving into the experimental results, we report in Table 1 the theoretical number of tests needed to clone the entire database with high probability, using the nonadaptive Mastermind technique. These numbers are based on $n$, $g$, $d$, $c$, and the bound in Theorem 2. Table 1 also shows the number of tests needed by a baseline technique to exactly clone the entire database. This baseline technique generates tests based on the reference $R$. For each entry $j$ within $R$, and for each color offset $l$, a test is created where the entry $j$ in $R$ is replaced with its color offset $l$, namely $(R[j]+l) \mod c$. Thus, the baseline method needs $(c - 1) \ast n$ tests to recover the database. Interestingly, the baseline technique can beat the theoretical bound (with $d$) when $n$ is small, as is the case for the Genomic, Netflix, and Facebook-UNC data.

Fortunately, our Mastermind attack can take advantage of the sparsity in the data to improve its efficiency. Since each string’s distance from $R$ is usually much smaller than $d$, it is empirically advantageous to use a target $\hat{d}$ that is much smaller than $d$. For instance, the Netflix data has a maximum difference $d = 1988$, but the mean difference from $R$ is $d_{\text{mean}} = 202$ and the median is $d_{\text{median}} = 92$. Thus, there are different possible choices for $\hat{d}$.

For each data set (excluding Slashdot-All and Facebook-Uniform due to their large scale), Figure 5 shows the number of tests needed to exactly clone a string (averaged across all strings in the database), as a function of $\hat{d}$. In a few instances, when the strings are very far from $R$, the algorithm may reach the
Figure 5: Mean and median number of tests required until string is cloned (averaged across all strings in database), for various settings of target distance $d$. Typically, it is advantageous to set $d$ to be much less than $d$, since most of the vectors are sparse and are close to the reference $R$. 
Figure 6: Number of tests required to clone each string, ordered by the string’s distance from $R$. Each string is represented by a dot. While the number of tests increases rapidly for small $d$ when the vector is far from $R$, note that many vectors are close to $R$, allowing for a majority of the database to be captured quickly.
cutoff value, causing the mean to be undervalued; thus, we also plot the median number of tests since the median is more robust to outliers. Generally, we see that mean and median number of required tests decreases as $\hat{d}$ is decreased from $d$. For instance, for the Slashdot database, the mean/median number of tests is 18,000 if $\hat{d} = d = 378$, but if $\hat{d} = 50$, the mean/median number of tests is 3,000 and if $\hat{d} = d_{\text{mean}} = 13$, the median number of tests required is 700. Sometimes, the mean number of tests increases if $\hat{d}$ is too small though. If $\hat{d} = d_{\text{mean}} = 13$, the mean number of tests required is around 4,000. Thus, there is a tradeoff. If $\hat{d}$ is too small, it would take longer to exactly clone a string that is far away from $R$. If $\hat{d}$ is too large (e.g. $\hat{d} = d$), then many inefficient tests would be performed on strings that are close to $R$. We assume that a good estimate for $\hat{d}$ (such as the median distance from $R$) can be obtained a priori, e.g. through scientific knowledge in the case of the Genomic database, or publicly available information in the cases of Netflix, Epinions, Slashdot, and Facebook.

We also investigate the relationship between the number of required tests and the vector’s distance from $R$. In Figure 6, we observe that the number of tests required to clone a vector is very low (and nearly constant) when the vector’s distance from $R$ is itself low and close to $\hat{d}$. As the vector’s distance increases, the number of required tests grows more quickly due to the mismatch between the distance and $\hat{d}$. For each data set, we display different scatter plots for different settings of $\hat{d}$. For instance, for the Slashdot data, the number of tests is relatively constant across all distances when the $\hat{d} = 200$; however, at this setting, the number of required tests is at least 10,000, even when the vector is close to the reference $R$. In contrast, when $\hat{d} = 3$, the number of required tests is only in the hundreds, around the vicinity of $\hat{d}$; however, when the vector’s distance from $R$ is significantly greater (e.g. over 100), the scatter plot increases dramatically. It is important to note that most vectors are close to $R$ due to the sparsity of the data, and thus, even when the scatter plot dramatically increases when the distance from $R$ is great, there are relatively few vectors that fall within this regime.

Providing another perspective, Figure 7 shows the decrease in error (defined
as the number of differences between the string and the state of the reconstructed string) as the number of tests increases, for a randomly selected Netflix user who has rated 68 movies. One can see that using \( \hat{d} = 202 \) induces a slower rate of convergence than when using smaller settings for \( \hat{d} \). The case where \( \hat{d} = d = 1988 \) is not shown since its rate of convergence is even slower.

In Figure 8, the percentage of the database cloned by the nonadaptive Mastermind attack is plotted as a function of the number of tests, for various \( \hat{d} \). We highlight some examples which demonstrate the efficiency of this attack. For the Genomic data (using \( \hat{d} = d_{\text{median}} = 18 \)), 78% of the database is successfully recovered after 2,000 tests, and over 99% of the database is recovered after 3,000 tests, which is significantly less than both the baseline result and the theoretical bound in Table 1. For the Netflix data (using \( \hat{d} = d_{\text{median}} = 92 \)), 63% of the strings are recovered after 10,000 tests. For the Epinions data (using \( \hat{d} = d_{\text{mean}} = 8 \)), 68% of the strings are recovered after only 500 tests. For the Slashdot data (using \( \hat{d} = d_{\text{mean}} = 13 \)) 82% of the strings are recovered after only 1,000 tests.

For Facebook-UNC, we see that the Mastermind attack displays different behavior for different choices of \( \hat{d} \). When \( \hat{d} = 3 \), the attack is able to quickly recover (the sparsest) 15% of the data set after only 500 tests, but as the number of tests increases, the rate of progress slows significantly. When \( \hat{d} = 25 \), 52% of the database has been successfully recovered after 2000 tests. Thus, using only a couple thousand nonadaptive tests, we are able to clone the friend lists of half (9K out of 18K) of the Facebook users at the University of North Carolina.

We also performed a large-scale nonadaptive Mastermind attack on Slashdot-All with 82,144 users. Figure 9 shows that 55% of the strings are recovered after 2,500 tests and that 81% of the strings are recovered after 4,000 tests, using \( \hat{d} = 50 \). Even when using a \( \hat{d} \) which may be suboptimal, our empirical results suggest that it is possible to substantially outperform both the baseline method as well the theoretical bounds in Table 1 in practice, as long as \( \hat{d} \) is chosen to be less than \( d \).

We also ran the same experiment on Facebook-Uniform for \( \hat{d} = 108 \) (the median distance from \( R \)). Figure 9 shows that over 70% of the data set can be reconstructed with 10,000 tests, despite the fact that the vector length of this data set is huge (\( n = 2,261,577 \)). Since Facebook-Uniform contains an unbiased sample of users, these users are representative of the global Facebook population. Furthermore, our theory states that the number of required tests increases at a rate of at most \( \log(g) \) where \( g \) is the number of Facebook users. In fact, the theoretical number of tests needed to guarantee that 50% of a 300-million user Facebook network is cloned is less than 20,000 (assuming \( d_{\text{median}} = 130 \))\(^4\). These results imply that an attacker may be able to recover over half of the global Facebook social network with several thousands of seemingly innocuous nonadaptive Mastermind queries.

\(^4\)According to http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics, \( d_{\text{mean}} = 130 \), and so \( d_{\text{median}} \) should be even smaller, suggesting that the Mastermind attack can be even more efficient.
Figure 8: Percentage of strings cloned as a function of the number of tests, for each data set, using various $d$. 
It is worth noting that experiments have also been conducted on a variety of other data sets not mentioned in this paper – the nonadaptive Mastermind attack also performs very well on those data sets. Results on cloning databases of binary attribute vectors (i.e. where the number of colors $c = 2$) are described in previous work [66].

Our empirical results have shown that there is sensitivity to the choice of $\hat{d}$ in certain cases. One possible improvement is to use a tiered approach, where $\hat{d}_1$ is used to construct the first 5000 tests, $\hat{d}_2$ is used to construct the next 5000 tests, etc. Each $\hat{d}_i$ could correspond to different mode. Nonetheless, even when using a single $\hat{d}$, our results demonstrate that it is possible to clone a large fraction of a sparse database, by simply performing a nonadaptive Mastermind attack.

6 Conclusion

We have studied the Mastermind cloning attack, both from a theoretical and experimental perspective, and have shown its effectiveness in being able to copy the contents of a string database through a sublinear number of string-comparison queries. Furthermore, our approach benefits from being fully nonadaptive and surreptitious in nature (due to the randomized query construction), which is useful in real-world settings.

A natural direction for future work, of course, is on methods for defeating our nonadaptive Mastermind attack, which we have not addressed in this paper. Certainly, having Alice randomly permute the responses from her database with each query could help, since it would make it harder (but not necessarily impossible) for Bob to correlate responses between different queries. Of course, requiring Alice to always randomly permute her responses would take extra time, and it may also require additional space if she needs to store every response query so that users can refer back to her responses for other, limited types of selection queries she may allow. So the technique of using random per-
mutations can reduce the risks associated with the Mastermind cloning attack, but it doesn’t necessarily eliminate these risks, and it comes with additional costs.

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