Assessing the risk from the depleted Uranium weapons used in Operation Allied Force.

T.E. Liolios

† Department of Theoretical Physics, University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki 54006, Greece
‡ Hellenic War College, BST 903, Greece

Abstract
The conflict in Yugoslavia has been a source of great concern due to the radiological and toxic hazard posed by the alleged presence of depleted uranium in NATO weapons. In the present study, some worst-case scenarios are assumed in order to assess the risk for Yugoslavia and its neighboring countries. The risk is proved to be negligible for the neighboring countries while for Yugoslavia itself, evidence is given that any increase in total long-term cancer mortality will be so low that it will remain undetected. Local radioactive hotspots such as DU weapons fragments and abandoned battle tanks, fortified or contaminated with DU, constitute a post-war hazard which is not studied in this article.

1. Introduction
Operation Allied Force (OAF) has been going on for weeks in Yugoslavia, employing sophisticated weapons that carry the spectrum of radiological contamination. Over the past decades there has been a tremendous effort in weapons laboratories to use depleted uranium (DU) in conventional weapons in order to enhance their penetrability or to strengthen armor panels (tanks, artillery etc.). Depleted uranium is used in a number of armor-piercing anti-tank munitions, such as those aboard American A-10 Warthog jets, Apache helicopters, and M-1 Abrams and Bradley tanks. US. and Allied forces fired approximately 315 tons of depleted uranium during the Persian Gulf War. Yugoslav state news media have referred to "radioactive bombs" being launched by NATO. There is strong likelihood that the weapons referred to are composed of depleted uranium (DU). Its ability to self-sharpen as it penetrates armor is the main reason why tungsten, which tends to mushroom upon impact, has been abandoned. Nevertheless, the high temperatures caused by the high explosives (HE) detonated in the weapon or the friction between the ammunition and the target (armor, concrete, etc.) lead to the generation of uranium oxides which along with the tiny fragments of the weapon case pose a serious radiological hazard to living beings. So far no measurement has shown any increase in the environmental radioactivity either in Yugoslavia or in Greece. As for Yugoslavia, one has to rely on the local scientific community to detect and assess the contamination. However, as there has been severe censorship on every sort of information by the Serbs, and most likely by the NATO officials, the international scientific community should independently attempt to reliably assess the possible implications of DU that have allegedly been dropped in the Balkans. Until some counter detects the contamination the only means available are theoretical hazard predictions through computer simulations. By applying a worst case scenario, an
initial emergency assessment, or safety analysis planning is possible. Although, precise data about the performance and the composition of these weapons are classified, in a worst case scenario one can use the available unclassified data which can still yield the magnitude of the hazard and trigger an appropriate emergency planning and response. In the present work a very reliable computer code has been used which simulates explosions where nuclear material is involved. The code is "HOTSPOT" produced by S.G.Homann at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. It is a very effective Gaussian plume model suitable for radiation risk assessments at short and large distances from the source. Moreover the familiar wedge model is applied in order to predict average total long-term cancer fatalities caused by DU inhalation. Throughout the present work basic information is given about fundamental radiological properties or weapons compositions. This is imperative as the results presented here are expected to be of interest to non-experts, as well.

2. NATO weapons overview in OAF.
A thorough analysis of the weapons used by NATO against Serbia indicates that some of them are specially designed to penetrate hard targets. Despite the fact that the precise data for those weapons are classified there are some very strong arguments that indicate the presence of DU in their composition.

a) Yugoslav state news media have referred to "radioactive bombs" being launched by NATO.

b) The Tomahawk currently in use is Tomahawk Block III with improved target penetration. The only material that can improve target penetration nowadays is DU.

c) No data exist about the precise composition of the Tomahawk high density penetrator which raises an eyebrow about the motives of this secrecy.

However, its warhead must be either a kinetic energy penetrator or a multiple warhead system (MWS) with an approximate weight of 400 kg (plus 50 kg of HE). In either case, penetration performance depends on the weight per cross sectional area of the follow-through warhead. That means that a very heavy metal has to be used in its composition to maximize target penetration.

Some very penetrating weapons used in the current war are:

Tomahawk missile. An all-weather submarine or ship launched land-attack missile. It is used to attack a variety of hard fixed targets, which explains why the missile has to be extremely penetrating (which makes it a DU suspect). During the war in the Gulf, 288 missiles where fired (II generation) while so far hundreds (III generation and probably some experimental of the IV generation) are believed to have struck targets in Serbia and Kosovo. That highly sophisticated weapons carries a single conventional warhead or submunitions. The BGM-109 model weighs 1192 kg, has a length of 5.56 m, and a diameter of 51.8 cm (without the booster). A rough estimate of the typical weight of its airframe is 400 kg. Besides, in the same category we have to include the Air Force’s Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile CALCM. CALCM used to carry nuclear warheads and has been converted to conventional weapons. Its frame may have been fortified with DU to withstand the blast of anti-missile defences of the FUSSR. In any case, in a worst-case scenario, cruise missiles must be considered DU carriers. The positive aspect of that weapon is that sample fragments of its casing, scattered in the vicinity of the explosion, may reveal its composition.
BLU-107 Durandal. The Durandal anti-runway bomb was developed by the French company MATRA, designed solely for the purpose of destroying runways. Once the parachute retarded low-level drop bomb attains a nose-down attitude, it fires a rocket booster that penetrates the runway surface, and a delayed explosion buckles a portion of the runway. It can penetrate up to 40 centimeters of concrete, creating a 200 square meter crater causing damage more difficult to repair than the crater of a general-purpose bomb.

BLU-109/B. The BLU-109/B (I-2000) is an improved 2,000-pound-class bomb designed as a penetrator without a forward fuze well. Its configuration is relatively slim, and its skin is much harder than that of the standard MK-84 bomb. The skin is a single-piece, forged warhead casing of one-inch, high-grade steel. Its usual tail fuze is a mechanical-electrical FMU-143. The 1,925-pound bomb has a 550-pound tritonal high-explosive blast warhead.

Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28). The Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28) is a special weapon developed for penetrating hardened command centers located deep underground. The GBU-28 is a 5,000-pound laser-guided conventional munition that uses a 4,400-pound penetrating warhead. The bombs are modified Army artillery tubes, weigh 4,637 pounds, and contain 630 pounds of high explosives.

AGM-114 Hellfire II. Laser Hellfire presently is used as the main armament of the U.S. Army’s AH-64 Apache and US. Marine Corps’s AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters. For antiarmor roles, the AGM-114 missile has a conical shaped charge warhead with a copper liner cone that forms the jet that provides armor penetration. This high explosive, antitank warhead is effective against various types of armor including applique and reactive. Actual penetration performance is classified.

The PGU-14/B API ammunition. That Armor Piercing Incendiary round has a lightweight body which contains a sub-calibre high density penetrator of Depleted Uranium (DU). In addition to its penetrating capability DU is a natural pyrophoric material which enhances the incendiary effects. It is used by the AN/GAU-8 30mm Avenger (a 30mm seven-barrel gatling gun, mounted only on the A-10 attack jet, used primarily in the air to ground role as a soft target killer and tank buster) and also by the M230 automatic gun mounted on the Apache helicopter.

M256 120mm smoothbore cannon. It is the main weapon of the M1A1 battle tank. The primary armor-defeating ammunition of this weapon is the armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot (APDS-FS) round, which features a depleted uranium penetrator. Battle tanks have not been used yet by the NATO forces, therefore that scenario is not studied for the time being.

In our study we will focus our simulation on the Tomahawk missiles, the BLU-109 bomb and the API ammunition, as not only do they represent well our worst case scenario but also the available unclassified information suffices for our risk assessment approach. Note that the bomblet dispersion version of Tomahawk is not expected to have an improved penetration capability and therefore our models will focus on the single warhead version.

3. A short description of DU

Depleted uranium is the metallic remnant of a series of processes the uranium ore undergoes and it is roughly 60 percent as radioactive as naturally occurring uranium. On
the other hand, Uranium, a radioactive element, is a silver-white metal in its pure form. It is a heavy metal nearly twice as dense as lead ($19.2\text{g/cm}^3$) compared with ($11.4\text{g/cm}^3$). On average, each of us takes in $1.21\mu g$ ($0.65 \times 10^{-6} \mu Ci$) of uranium a day from food and water, and inhales a very small fraction $7 \times 10^{-3}\mu g$ ($2.3 \times 10^{-9} \mu Ci$) every day. In nature Uranium is composed of three isotopes (each has its own unique decay process emitting some form of ionizing radiation: alpha, beta, gamma radiation or a combination) in the following ratio:

**NATURAL URANIUM COMPOSITION**

\[
\frac{^{234}U}{92} (0.0054\%) , \frac{^{235}U}{92} (0.7\%) , \frac{^{238}U}{92} (99.3\%)
\]

In the gaseous diffusion process two fractions are produced in the form of $UF_6$: one enriched in $^{235}U$ and the other depleted in $^{235}U$. The former is further processed to give weapons-grade Uranium (WgU) whereas the latter is chemically transformed by weapons manufacturers into Uranium metal and alloys, suitable for ammunition and armor panels.

In fact, DU has a low content of $^{234}U$, and $^{235}U$ which have been removed in the depletion process. Therefore the product and by-product of the enrichment are respectively [12]:

**WEAPON-GRADE URANIUM COMPOSITION**

\[
\frac{^{234}U}{92} (1\%) , \frac{^{235}U}{92} (93.5\%) , \frac{^{238}U}{92} (5.5\%)
\]

**DEPLETED URANIUM COMPOSITION**

\[
\frac{^{235}U}{92} (0.2\%) , \frac{^{238}U}{92} (99.8\%)
\]

After the enrichment process DU can used as a fusion tamper in the thermonuclear weapons. The fusion tamper prevents the escape of thermal radiation from the thermonuclear fuel thus enhancing the burn efficiency. Moreover, fast neutrons (2.45 MeV and 14.1 MeV) from the fusion processes fission the DU tamper. This extra boost accounts for half the yield of a fission-fusion-fission nuclear bomb [13].

The most important constituent of DU is $^{238}U$, an alpha emitter with a half-life of $4.5 \times 10^9$ years and a specific activity of $3.4 \times 10^{-7} \text{Ci/g}$ (while the isotope $^{235}U$ has a specific activity of $2.2 \times 10^{-6} \text{Ci/g}$). The total combined specific activity of DU is $4.76 \times 10^{-7} \text{Ci/g}$ [14]. It has two short-lived daughters: ($^{234}Th$, half-life of 24.1 days) and ($^{234}Pa$, half-life of 1.17 minutes) which are beta and weak gamma emitters. Because of this constant nuclear decay process, very small amounts of these "daughters" are always present in DU. On the other hand $^{235}U$ (half-life $7 \times 10^8$ years) decays into $^{231}Pa$ (half-life $3.25 \times 10^4$ years), which is an alpha, beta, and gamma ray emitter. The $^{238}U$ and $^{235}U$ chains continue through a series of long-lived isotopes before terminating in stable, non-radioactive lead isotopes $^{206}Pb$ and $^{207}Pb$. Note that regardless of its size (large fragments or small particles), once entering the body, DU is subject to various degrees of solubilization—it dissolves in bodily fluids, which act as a solvent. Its main toxic effects are cellular necrosis and renal failure. The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) has established a Threshold Limit Value (TLV) [15] of $0.2 \text{mg/m}^3$ (for both soluble and insoluble compounds).
TLVs are based on the principle that there is a threshold below which no adverse health effects occur and are called time-weighted-average values because they are averaged over an 8-hour workday, for a 40-hour workweek over a working lifetime. Though TLVs were developed for the working environment, in the battlefield or in emergency planning they can still give a measure of the risk.

4. DU cancer risk

DU is radioactive and therefore carcinogenic. The principal hazard from exposure to DU aerosols is an increased probability of cancer of the lung and of other organs where the DU oxides are transported. While it is difficult to calculate the total immediate radiation effects on health in terms of exact doses to specific individuals, we can we resort to the “wedge model” in order to compute the average total long-term man-rem doses. According to this model, the total amount \( I \) of DU inhaled, as a result of a given release, is: \( I = Q b p u^{-1} \), where \( Q \) the total amount of DU released, \( b \) the breathing rate, \( p \) the average population density and \( u \) the deposition velocity. If we make the assumption that the risk is linear with dose then we can combine the committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) for \(^{238}U\) inhaled (1.2 × 10\(^{8}\) rem \( u^{-1} \)) with the ICRP cancer risk factor (5 × 10\(^{-4}\) cancers \( u^{-1} \)) to estimate cancer risks from DU inhalation with respect to population densities and deposition velocities. The results are shown in Figure 1.

5. Simulation of Tomahawk attacks

5.1 The wedge model predictions

In the present work we will limit our discussion in the conventional use of DU as this is currently employed in Yugoslavia. It is common sense that most of the attacks against industrial facilities, bridges and government buildings need weapons with enhanced penetrability. That need spells the name of DU. Such is also the case for anti-tank munition, anti-radar bombs or weapons which destroy the runways of airports. The most infamous weapon is the Tomahawk missile used day after day by the NATO alliance.

Being consistent with our worst case scenario we assume that the kinetic energy warhead of the Tomahawk missile is made of 400 kg of DU. Therefore, we have an activity of 0.192 Ci per missile. After the impact only a small quantity will constitute the respirable fraction-defined as the fraction of the released material associated with an Activity Median Aerodynamic Diameter (AMAD) of 1 \( \mu m \). The default ICRP-30 internal dosimetry conversion factors also assume an AMAD particle-size distribution of 1 \( \mu m \). During the explosion a temperature of 5000 °C is reached which exceeds the boiling point of Uranium (4700°C). That temperature will produce a large quantity of DU aerosols in the form of Uranium Oxides that may find their way into the respiratory tract.

The previous analysis of the wedge model can be used to predict maximum cancer lethality per missile. Assuming an attack in a densely populated urban area (3000 km\(^{-2}\)), we have approximately one cancer per Tomahawk missile. That is the total long-term lethality per missile assuming that all the DU carried becomes respirable, which of course is a worst-case scenario showing the maximum potential of a Tomahawk to cause cancer. (Note that the media speak of several hundreds of such missiles fired against Yugoslavia during Operation Allied Force).

5.2. The Gaussian model predictions
The default respirable fraction of 20% in a uranium explosion, used in the HOTSPOT, is indeed a realistic scenario to assess immediate risks, particularly at short distances. That being the case, each Tomahawk is supposed to carry a respirable radioactivity of $38 \text{ mCi per missile}$. To realize the magnitude of that activity, a typical radioactive quantity injected into a patient in a thyroid function test is $10 \mu Ci$ that is approximately 3800 times less. On the other hand a typical amount of radioactivity released in a large scale reactor accident is $10^8 \text{ Ci}$, that is approximately $26 \times 10^8$ more. The non-respirable fraction which consists of fragments scattered in the vicinity of the explosion, and particles much larger than $1 \mu m$ will be ignored in the rest of this study though the are highly toxic and will definitely be localized and contaminate the vicinity of the explosion. Nor will we discuss the aggravation of lethality due to open wound or injuries during the rescue operations.

Of course during the explosion the distribution of the radioactive DU is governed by such factors as wind speed, amount of explosives, deposition velocity and so on that will further reduce the lethality of the missile.

In the model of this study we make the assumption that a single Tomahawk strike is actually a 400 $\text{ kg}$ DU explosion which involves the detonation of 50 $\text{ kg}$ of HE. The release fraction is 20% (that is the percentage of the warhead that can be inhaled after the explosion\cite{21}) and the wind speed is assumed to be $8 \text{ m sec}^{-1}$. The time of day is night (stability class D), while the deposition velocity is $1 \text{ cm sec}^{-1}$. Note that the cloud effective heights calculated by HOTSPOT agree well with the experimental data for detonations of similar yields\cite{22}. The "HOTSPOT" calculations yield the 50-years CEDEs (due to inhalation as the ground shine is negligible compared to plume effects) and the ground deposition of radioactivity at various distances (Figure 2., 3.).

| Distance (km) | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 1   | 2   | 5   | 10  | 20  | 50  | 75  | 100 |
|--------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 50-year CEDE (mrem) | 4.8 | 3.9 | 2.6 | 1.7 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.26 | 0.13 | 0.046 | 0.029 | 0.021 |
| Ground depos. ($10^{-3} \mu Ci m^{-2}$) | 38  | 31  | 20  | 13  | 7.8 | 3.5 | 1.7 | 0.71 | 0.18  | 0.09  | 0.06  |

If we take into account that the current established protection standards are:\cite{23}

a) 5 rems in a year for workers (to protect against cancer).

b) 50 rems in a year for workers to any organ (to protect against threshold effects, such as radiation burns, etc.).

c) 50 rems in a year to the skin or to any extremity.

d) 15 rems in a year to the lens of the eye (to protect against cataracts).

e) 0.1 rem in a year (70-year lifetime) for members of the public.

we come to the conclusion that people who are as close as 100m at the time of the explosion are expected to receive, over a period of 50 years after the explosion, 20 times less than the maximum allowed dose per year. Needles to say, at distances larger than 20 km the doses are negligible. Of course, at close distances, the results of the blast wave will be devastating and will prevail over any other effect.

The ground deposition, on the other hand, reaches the concentration of $0.038 \mu Ci m^{-2}$ at a distance of 100m where we have to remember that a concentration of $2 \mu Ci m^{-2}$ is needed for land to be rendered unsuitable for cultivation\cite{26}, that is almost 50 times more.

To underline the impossibility of DU radiological contamination for the neighboring countries of Yugoslavia, we can assume that 1000 such attacks are made against targets in
Pristina in Northern Kosovo. That would cause a 50-CEDE of 0.046 \textit{rem} at a distance of 50 km. Note that a CT exam administers a dose of 1.1 \textit{rem} (head and body). If we rotate the isodose downwind radius of the Gaussian model to cover all possible wind directions, then a circular spot is produced which indicates the area at risk according to the present model (Figure 4). Outside the borders of that circular area the plume is not expected to deliver a dose higher than that of a pelvis x-ray.

6. Simulation of BLU-109/B bomb attacks.

In that model, consistent with our worst case scenario, we also assume that the warhead of the bomb is made of DU. In that case we have the explosion of 651 kg of DU with 243 kg of HE. Therefore assuming the use of a quantity of 1000 BLU-109/B against targets in Pristina and the same conditions as in the Tomahawk case we obtain a 50-CEDE of 0.06 \textit{rem} at a distance of 50 km. The combined CEDE of Tomahawks and BLUs would still be low: 0.1 \textit{rem} (less than a lumbar spinal x-ray). In fact, if such was the case then those attacks would have dropped some 1000 tons (200 respirable tons) of DU in Yugoslavia when according to the Iraqi authorities the war in the Gulf left 315 tons of DU in Iraq.

7. DU of the PGU-14/B API and the APDS-FS rounds.

A typical combat load for the GAU-8 gun is 1,100 30 mm rounds. Each round contains 330 gr of DU, alloyed with 0.75 weight percent titanium. The projectile is encased in a 0.8\textit{mm}-thick aluminum shell as the final DU round\cite{27}, preventing any escape of the \textit{a}−\textit{radiation} emitted. Consequently each round carries approximately $1.5 \times 10^{-4} \textit{Ci}$. Upon impact, the shell is subject to high temperatures due to friction with the armor panel. Moreover, if the armored vehicle explodes or is set on fire then the respirable activity produced by the armor panel should also be taken into account. For example, the Abrams battle tank’s thicker armor is reinforced at the turret and flanks by DU panels inserted between regular steel armor. Another source of DU is the primary armor-defeating ammunition of the M256 120mm smoothbore cannon (main weapon of the M1A1 battle tank), which is an armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot round. It is imperative that battle tanks, attacked by NATO forces in Yugoslavia, are closely examined for radioactive traces. Note that the DU rounds always leave a distinctive radioactive trace on the entrance and exit holes. Each time an A10 unloads its gun, 360 \textit{kg} of DU will be released in the environment. Assuming that an A10 unloads its gun on every mission and that the whole DU quantity becomes respirable (worst case scenario), the wedge model can be used to predict total long-term cancer fatalities per mission (Figure 5). As the average population of Yugoslavia is 100 km$^{-2}$ it turns out that it would take roughly fifty A-10 missions to have an additional cancer death. Although a commander would strive to deploy his troops as sparsely as possible, in the theater of operations the average population density of ground forces can reach urban area levels (300 km$^{-2}$ to 3000 km$^{-2}$). As a result in the battlefield cancer risk is expected to be higher. If we assume for the people of Yugoslavia an individual cancer death risk similar to that of the US. (i.e., 20%), then 5000 such attacks would increase individual cancer risk by $10^{-5}$. That increase would remain undetected against the large background. Of course, it is very unlikely that such a number of attacks has occurred so far.

8. The Hellfire case.

Due to its low yield and weight (warhead weighs less than 10 kg) any risk associated with that weapon will be much less significant than the Tomahawk
scenario risk. If the classified composition of its armor-piercing structure is indeed DU, then it is expected to pose a hazard only to people at very close distances, especially during "battle tank fires". Since no reliable data exist and no use of the weapon in question has been made yet in Kosovo, any assumption might further complicate the current situation.

9. Chemical toxicity of DU.

The toxic risk can be assessed by means of a simple model without knowing details of the population over which it is dispersed and the meteorological conditions. Suppose that 1000 tons of respirable DU is dispersed uniformly over Greece which has an area of 132,000 km². We assume that all the aerosols have been concentrated in a volume with 1 km height. This gives a concentration of $7.5 \times 10^{-3} \text{mg/m}^3$, which is about 26 times less than the threshold limit value. A similar calculation yields an air concentration of $0.04 \text{mg/m}^3$ for FYROM which should not cause much concern either.

The lifetime of the toxic cloud depends on the height and the rate at which the particles fall out. A deposition velocity of $1 \text{ cm/sec}$ is very plausible while particles larger than $1 \mu \text{m}$ will fall faster. Rain or moisture will increase that velocity. In that scenario, particles from the top of the cloud will take 27 hours to reach the ground. It is very unlikely that the cloud will remain over a city for that long. Even a light breeze ($5 \text{ m/sec}$) will carry the cloud beyond a large city (the size of Athens) in a few hours.

Of course an actual toxic cloud is not expected to have the above shape but the present model gives solid evidence that the fear of toxic poisoning, due to DU that is allegedly used in the present war, is groundless. Note that the amount of DU that could be inhaled is independent of the height and the extend of the cloud as shown in a similar study that disproved exaggerated allegations about Plutonium risks.

That absolutely worst-case scenarios show that there is no immediate hazard from the radiological or chemical toxicity of DU for the neighboring countries of Yugoslavia. Admittedly, localized DU can enter the food chain and reach inhabitants of other countries by means of exported goods or river streams. However, such aspects are regarded as less harmful than actual inhalation of the DU plume.

10. Conclusions.

We have assumed some worst-case scenarios in order to assess the radiological and chemical risk of the alleged use of DU in OAF, for Yugoslavia and its neighboring countries. For the time being, the risk for the neighboring countries is found to be negligible, while for the people of Yugoslavia itself, evidence is given that any increase in average total, long-term cancer mortality will be so low that it will remain undetected.

The use of the PGU-14/B API ammunition seems to be the most hazardous weapon used daily in the theater of operations as is openly declared a DU carrier. Its use so far has been limited to the Avenger gun of the A-10 jet. If Apache helicopters move in, the effects will escalate and need further investigation. On the other hand, accurate data about the composition of the weapons used in OAF are needed in order to accurately predict the radiological and chemical contamination of DU at very close distances, especially in order to investigate the formation of radioactive hotspots. Such data could be either obtained by the NATO authorities or by studying the fragments of the weapons in question (Tomahawk missiles, BLU bombs etc.) scattered in the vicinity of the explosion. Once DU is detected,
the above simulations can be fed with more accurate data in order to perform a precise risk
assessment in the area.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank S.Homann for providing his code HOTSPOT, as well as H.Feiveson, S.Fetter, K.Ypsilantis and A.Petkou for useful comments and discussion.

The present work was inspired by an article which used the same risk assessment models in order to study the hazards from Plutonium dispersal accidents[31].

The author is grateful to C.Zerefos for valuable information and advice on the post-war environmental hazards in Yugoslavia.

References

[1] FAS,Military Analysis Network, maintained by John Pike: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/

[2] S.Homann, ”HOTSPOT” , Health Physics Codes for the PC, Lawrence Livermore Na-
tional Laboratory, UCLR-MA-106315, (1994)

[3] ”Report to the APS by the study group on light-water reactor safety”, Rev.Mod.Phys.,
Vol. 47, Suppl.No 1., 1975

[4] FAS, op.cit.

[5] Report broadcast on MSNBC, April 1

[6] GAO/NSIAD-95-116, ”Cruise Missiles”, Chapter Report, 04/20/95

[7] Mark Hewish, Janes International Defence Review, 1/1998

[8] FAS, op.cit.

[9] FAS, op.cit.

[10] K.Tsipis, Scientific American, 20 (236) 1977

[11] Environmental Exposure Report, US DoD, http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/du/

[12] S.Fetter, Science and Global Security, 225 (1) 1990

[13] K.Tsipis. ”Understandig weapons in the nuclear age”, (1983), ISBN 0-671-44073-X,
Simon & Schuster inc.

[14] S.Homann, op. cit.

[15] 1998 TLVs and BEIs, Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical
Agents, Biological Exposure Indices, American Conference of Governmental Industrial
Hygienists
16] "Report to the APS by the study group on light-water reactor safety" op.cit.

17] $1 m^3/hr$ for an adult performing a light activity

18] Committed Effective Dose Equivalent is a weighted sum of organ dose equivalents multiplied by appropriate risk weighting factor. It stands for the total dose a person is committed to receive as the result of an intake of radioactive materials during the 50-year period after the intake.

19] International Commission on Radiological Protection (1979), ICRP Publication 30, Part 1, Vol. 2, No. 3/4, Pergamon Press, NY.

20] E.J. Kansa, LLNL, UCRL-ID-128733

21] In fact an additional fraction of the actual plume is expected to be confined inside the structure where the warhead explodes. Therefore our scenario remains consistently a worst-case one.

22] E.J. Kansa, op.cit.

23] Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation, Subpart C, 20.1201: Occupational Dose Limits for Adults; and Subpart D, 20.1301, Dose Limits for Individual Members of the Public

24] Steve Fetter and Kosta Tsipis, Scientific American, Vol. 244, No. 4 (April 1981)

25] International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP Publication 60 (Pergamon Press, Oxford, UK, 1991)

26] K. Tsipis, op.cit.

27] FAS, op. cit.

28] Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Greece has not officially recognised FYROM by the name Macedonia.

29] S. Homann, op. cit.

30] W.G. Sutcliffe at al, LLNL, UCRL-JC-118825

31] S. Fetter and F. Von Hippel, Science and Global Security 21 (2) 1990