Invisible Congolese Blockage to Peace: Deprivation of Basic Communal Needs Triggers Intractable Conflict in Congo

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Abstract:  
Protracted conflicts in Africa are often presented in a framework of fragile states, but this article takes a diachronic actor-oriented perspective to analyze the Congolese ethnic conflict. It reveals how ethnic conflict is rooted in Rwandans immigrant’s unacknowledged which ties to land and political access exclusion, resulting in recurring conflict between native Congolese versus invisible Congolese—Rwandese immigrants. The focus is on the elite’s strategies and actions vice versa the actions of the invisible Congolese to repel the elite’s oppression; accompanied by negative perceptions towards each other. Deprivation of basic needs is the causal factor that fuels intractable conflict in Congo. The article concludes that needs-based conflict requires problem-solving resolution, nevertheless, the conflict would be static no matter the state’s military dependency to ‘The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—MONUSCO.

Keywords:  Protracted conflict, needs-based conflict, elite’s oppression, invisible Congolese, Rwandan immigrant’s unacknowledged, deprivation of basic needs

1. Introduction

This article focusses on the deprivation of basic communal needs towards the Rwandan immigrants in Congo which fuels recurring violent conflict in Congo since Zaire’s flag independence in the 1960s escalated to breed the two Congo wars (1996—7; 1998—2003) onwards. This is purposely chosen because the deprivation of human needs often triggers protracted social conflict. For Edward Azar, a sustained sequence of studies published from the early 1970s claims that the critical factor that persisted protracted social conflict (PSC) in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Northern Ireland, Ethiopia, Israel, Sudan, Cyprus, Iran, Nigeria or in South Africa, was the prolonged violent of communal groups struggling for their basic needs such as security, recognition and acceptance, equal access to political institutions and economic participation (Ramsbotham, 2005a).

Edward Azar finds that the most conflict and overt violence has been experienced by the Third World countries soon after the Cold War in the 1990s. This new type of conflict has been presented by various theorists with different names like, ‘Intractable Conflict’ or ‘Protracted social conflict’ (Oser, 1998), ‘the internal conflicts, ‘small wars’, ‘civil wars’, ‘ethnic conflicts’, conflict in the post-colonial states (Ramsbotham, 2005a)’new wars’ (Newman, 2004), and deep-rooted, internal wars or contemporary conflicts (Bedir, 2007).

To put clear, the aforementioned, Edward Azar has noticed that most countries in the Third World have been experienced protracted social conflict, the interventions of the Big Powers and the superpowers in these conflicts have added to their severity and expense which increase their protractedness and horrible consequences to what would either have been a less significant collection of competing interactions. For example, the intervention of the Middle East since after WW II (E. E. Azar, Jureidini, & Mclaurin, 1978).

In the hands of Peter T. Coleman, protracted social conflicts, such as those in the Middle East, Cyprus, and the Congo, are deeply disheartening, stability efforts sometimes come and go but their general trends of malignancy remain constant. Although fostering a sense of hope, these possibilities lead to growing hopelessness among stakeholders when they fail, and fuels the intractability of the conflict. The cycle of optimism and hopelessness is a basic paradox of intractable conflicts. For instance, in the Middle East, they change over the years, which is evident in intractable conflicts at all levels from estranged siblings and neighbors to warring ethnopolitical factions(Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2007).

To reveal the deprived of human basic needs which nexus with the Congo unstopped conflict, the study entitled ‘Human Needs Satisfaction and Conflict Prevention in Africa’ by Anne Abaho, demonstrates how the deprivation of the Rwandan’s basic needs in Congo fuels the Congo recurring conflict by putting clear that despite the commitment to...
preventing the conflict in the country, attempting various mediation, treaties, and military intervention as the use of MONUSCO security and peace actors to ensure that the conflict does not break out or reignite in the region, but the conflict has remained a region issue unless human needs are met (Abaho, 2020).

Since the attainment of the flag independence in the 1960s, Congo has been experienced several violent conflicts between autochthonous—Indigenous Congolese versus Allochthones Congolese—Rwandan immigrants which have threatened its corporate existence. Since the Free Zaire State, the question of the Congolese—Kinyarwandans speaker’s citizenship in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been the subject matter and a source of the conflict in Congo. The unacknowledged of the Rwandan immigrants has resulted in the exclusion from land and political access in Kivu provinces. After the end of the Belgian rule in Congo the Nande, Hunde, and Nyanga occupied the main roles in the provincial government of Northern Kivu, thwarted away and/or ended the political success of the Rwandan immigrants, which they have been granted with the Belgian administration, which was followed with the exclusion from land and political access.

The conflict in Congo has been attracted the attention of scholars, policymakers, governmental and non-governmental organizations because of its plentiful source of the conflict and its escalation, changing its territory as a battlefield in Africa, especially in the Great Lakes Regions soon after the Cold World War, resulting in what Christopher Vogel termed ‘Africa’s World War’ (Vogel, 2011), while Filip Reyntjens dubbed it as ‘The Great African War’ (Reyntjens, 2009).

Scholars have advanced several reasons and used different theories to analyze the conflict in the region and some of these theories are frustration-aggression theory, resource curse, elite theory, political economy, postcolonial theory, state fragility, and many others. However, there is a paucity of studies that used Azar’s protracted social conflict (PSC) theory to analyze the Congo conflict.

The paper argues that the deprivation of the invisible Congolese’s basic needs triggers protracted conflict in Congo. To elaborate the above arguments, the study posed the research question which is How is deprivation of Rwandan immigrants’ basic needs the causal factor of an intractable conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo? In dealing with this question, this paper is divided into five segmentations of which this introduction is a part. The second part examines Azar’s protracted social conflict theory (PSC), followed by the conceptual framework—‘Basic Communal Needs’ as germane to the study. The next segment discusses the historical background of the conflict—the existence of invisible Congolese in Zaire, the fourth analyses the relevance of the theory, the final segment is the conclusion and recommendation.

1.1. Edward E. Azar’s Theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)

The first scholar to characterize the intrastate violent conflict in the Third World countries as Protracted Social Conflict was Azar, one of the leading conflict resolution scholars. And the theoretical basis of this theory is found in his Multiple Works (E. E. Azar et al., 1978, Ramsbotham, 2005, Ramsbotham, 2018, E. E. Azar & Farah, 1981, E. E. Azar, 1979, E. E. P. international conflicts: T. propositions Azar, 1985), and several other scholars have built upon his work.

Back to Protracted conflicts are conflicts that endure over time and it has two aspects enduring rivalries and protracted social conflicts. This conflict tends to extend periods and stakes under contention which is perceived by all parties to be inseparably linked to national, societal, and individual needs where the use of violent conflict is used or considered therein (Beaudoin, 2013). Similarly, Azar (cited in Olive Ramsbotham, 2018), reveals protracted social conflict as a conflict typified by long and often violent struggle by communal groups for the necessities of life and fair access to political and economic participation (Ramsbotham, 2018).

To understand why certain conflicts, tend to be protracted, Edward Azar provides a more detailed model known as the Protracted social conflict model (PSC). To be termed as a PSC, a conflict not only that be prolonged (usually more than 10 until 25 years) but also experiences a cycle of the conflict and the tensions are higher than others with the same issue(s) and recycle of a peace deal. A PSC, however, differs from another type of a prolonged conflict referred to as enduring rivalries. The first distinction, the PSC uses non-state actor as a primary level of analysis, whereas enduring rivalries consists of states competing with one state. The second distinction is the necessity of violence. PSCs include direct violence between the parties while enduring rivalries not necessarily violent, it can be in a form of competition (Beaudoin, 2013).

In the Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, Azar (cited in Leventis & Tsokkalides, 2007) differentiates between the conflicts of a ‘protracted social’ from other typologies of conflict. Epigrammatically, PSC is a structure consisting of three large parts that are interlocking, the presence and creation of which help to situate a given dispute within a PSC category. These three broad ‘sections’ (clusters), each with several variables are (1) Genesis (communal content, human needs, governance, and the state’s role and international linkages), (2) Process dynamics (communal actions and strategies, state actions and strategies, and built-in mechanisms of conflict), (3) Outcome analysis (deterioration of physical security, institutional deformity, psychological ossification, and increased dependency and cliency).
PSC presents its clusters in a progressive way. Azar identifies that ‘Genesis’ describes a series of conditions that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual situations. This cluster will be examined separately and analyzed according to Azar’s general explanations concerning the preconditions. In ‘Process Dynamics’ according to Azar, it clarifies the factors which are responsible for triggering conflicts. Herein, the part analyses the state’s strategies being responded to communal actions and vice versa. In the case of Congo, this will reveal the Congolese’s elite’s strategies towards the Rwandan Immigrants’ Action to repeal the state’s strategies which fueling endless conflict in Congo. This part is discussed in the analysis part by connecting the state’s strategies being responded with the Rwandese’s action to repel the oppression.

The outcomes analysis reflects conditions that generate and strengthen such prolonged social conflicts (Leventis & Tsokkalides, 2007). Putting the case of Congo, the international linkage especially dependency on military intervention, the study argues that the use of ‘The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC/and or MONUSCO)’ as an alternative to peace, does not mean to solve the conflict, the eastern provinces remained unstable, especially the Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Katanga; meanwhile, the so-called rebel groups continued to fight with the government (Report, 2007).

But, in most situations where PSC is used as a conflict typology, both in the case of the Congo conflict and other examples, the first cluster—‘Genesis’ is typically the one relied on as a way of proving the existence of a PSC situation, meaning that if this set of preconditions is met, the conflict in question can be adequately described as a PSC situation. Although this particular cluster was the most significant contribution of Azar to conflict analysis during the late 1970s-1980s as it established fact outcomes analysis reflects conditions that generate and strengthen such prolonged social conflicts (Leventis & Tsokkalides, 2007). As a result, this article deploys the PSC approach in its genesis variable since it is argued, the approach can provide both a more definitive examination of its applicability and clearer identification of its strengths and limitations in the light of the conflict in the Congo.

1.2. Conceptual Framework: Basic Communal Needs

In a study of this nature, it is imperative to clarify the concept that is germane to this discourse to avoid ambiguity, and this concept is basic communal needs.

Needs as innate, organismic necessities rather than acquiring motivation, but when the needs thwarted conditions appear will lead to specifiable patterns of behaviors, regulations, goals, and should affect that do not represent the optimal development and well-being that would occur in supportive environments but which would have had some adaptive value under adverse conditions (Deci & Ryan, 2000). The recurrent and prolonged experience of anger can lead to an eruption of aggression and violence on both a person and a societal level. Such tensions on a social level may be characterized, for example, by extreme economic recessions, lack of or limited access to capital, or systemic and/or institutional discrimination against certain groups (Sturmey, Breuer, & Elson, 2017). In vise versa, according to John Burton (1990), cited in John Kenneth Steinmeyer (2018), conflict is likely to be caused by the need for identity or recognition, the security of the identity group, and other such human societal values (Steinmeyer, 2017).

Human beings have basic needs which fostering everyone to be recognized as an individual within social identity to feel safe. These human needs as physical, psychological, social, and spiritual, identity, security, and autonomy needs. If these needs are not met, people protest, and protesting can lead to rebellion and violence since sustainable development will entail fulfilling the basic needs without compromising, but unfortunately, the human needs of many people are not met, and by the same time the ability of future generations to meet their needs is being compromised (Kruja, 2013). Basic human needs as the elements required for survival and normal mental and physical health, such as food, water, shelter, protection from environmental threats, and love. Abraham Maslow’s pyramid (1943) (cited in Price J Organization 2009) identifies five basic human needs such as (1) Physiological needs; (2) Safety needs; (3) Love/belonging needs; (4) Esteem needs; and (5) Self-actualization. Basic human needs are not only necessary for human (individual) life but social life as well (Price, 2013).

There is a causal relationship between the security need and violence, the need for security arises when met with direct violence. The threat or actual use of violence also can trigger other needs. The emotion of fear is ontogenetic and
arises in response to threats to survival or continued development and violence may be defensively motivated. But there is also another important need, such as the need to identify with an ethnic group. Unlike individual violence, systemic violence happens when some groups of people are deprived of satisfying needs. Structural violence takes place especially when demands for economic well-being or self-determination are routinely denied to certain parts of society (Schwebel, 1997). The Deprivation of basic human needs leads to structural victimization; and when grievances resulting from such needs deprivation is not addressed, it leads to PSC (Piya & Maharjan, 2009).

Safety-securing needs are necessary to identify, the types of threats that could reduce the safety-securing response and the conditions that satisfy these needs. Since this level of need is conceptually higher than physiological needs (Taoarmina & Gao, 2013). However, there are different ethnic groups within a nation-state and each of these ethnic groups is likely to identify and survive with the physical territory. But in many cases of genocides and politicides represent brutal efforts to maintain the security of one identity group at the expense of other groups. Indeed, it fueled big-tribe hegemonic ethnocentrism but the ethnic minority experience insecurity, democratic instability, ethnic armed group fighting, and secessionist warfare (Gruber, 2015).

However, ethnic identity is viewed as a multidimensional construct that includes issues of group membership, self-image, ethnic affiliation, and larger cultural affiliation, and in-group and intergroup attitudes. Some of the major findings are when individuals lose ethnic/psychological contact with both their ethnic group and the larger society and experience feelings of alienation, they practice the marginalization option. The marginal group uses the integrating conflict style more than individuals with a weak ethnic identity (Ting-toomey, Yee-jung, Shapiro, Garcia, & Wright, 2000). Besides, social identity interacts with conflict interaction to create both conflict escalation and de-escalation, averts that there is a tendency to connect social identity to human needs in the sense of conflict (Bedir, 2007). According to Azar the source of protracted social conflict is the denial of those elements required in the development of all people and societies, and whose pursuit is a compelling need in all. The presence of different communal groups that experience the deprivation of their basic needs influencing by stoking the occurrence of PSC (E. E. P. international conflicts: T. propositions Azar, 1985).

1.3. Assessing the Analytic Framework of Protracted Social Conflict

The first variable is the communal content. It is considered the most important root of a protracted social conflict. Communal content, such as racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious, takes the form of identity groups (E. E. Azar, 1978, E. E. Azar, 1979, E. E. Azar & Farah, 1981, Piya & Maharjan, 2009, Ramsbotham, 2018, Ramsbotham, 2005, E. E. P. international conflicts: T. propositions Azar, 1985). The relationship between identity groups and the state is the central problem in the PSC, and this has been traced to a colonial-era when communal governments were influenced by historical rivalries and colonial policy of divide and rule. After independence, a single or a coalition of communal groups dominated the former colonies, ignoring the need of other minority groups resulting in dissatisfaction and division. In Congo after the Zaïre flag independence, the native Congolese not only that questioning the Rwandese immigrant’s identity but also excluding them from land and political access onwards, fueling recurring conflict between autochthony versus newcomers (Conflict, 2013).

Needs is the second component. Individuals have goals to fulfill through their collective identity groups and denial of these needs leads to grievances that are expressed collectively. According to Azar (cited in Leventis & Tsokkalides, 2007), there are three such needs political access, security, and acceptance. Political needs entail individual participation in political and decision making while security need involves material needs. Putting Congo Conflict, herein, presents land access needs instead of food, shelter, and protection of life. It may be argued that the dominant social group meets these needs at the cost of other social groups resulting in the neglected groups being often frustrated and feel oppressed and excluded which may lead to PSC (Oser, 1998).

Governance and the state’s role are Azar’s PSC third variable. The role of the government and governance is a key factor in the dissatisfaction or satisfaction of citizens and identity group needs. In other words, those events under this variable usually lead to legitimacy crises regarding the given governing power and authority of a given government. Vice versa, the group (or communities) perceive deprived of their needs will not accept the oppression of the regime. Moreover, the policy strategy of the state, which connects its effectiveness and governance capacity, is also important, because the inability of the state to fulfill its role of governing would prevent it from responding to the needs of its societies. These variables provide the connection between governance and the position of the state and the human needs and reflect the intrinsic factors affecting the progression of a conflict towards a PSC typology (Leventis & Tsokkalides, 2007).

When analyzing the case of Congo, connecting with Azar's government and the state's role, on 15 October 1963, in Northern Kivu Provincial Assembly; the acting provincial governor, Denis Paluku (Nande claims that the terror, panic, and anxiety in the province are caused by the Rwandan immigrants. When the minister of domestic affairs, Antoine Mihio, assigned the mission to the governor to take action for the Hutu’s security from murdered, Governor Paluku merely responded that it would be difficult to address the problem. Then, the Provincial Assembly passed Edict No. 11/63. Signed by President Raphael Buunda (Hunde-tribe), demanded all Tutsi refugees and immigrants settled in the province of Northern Kivu be expelled. And the Kibabi post office destroyed their documents, they rec
the advanced capitalist or Western countries for economic and military assistance affects the sovereignty and capacity of the state to fulfill several needs that some of its constituent groups pursue.

When putting Congo conflict, the military as an alternative to peace, after the two Congo wars (1996-7 & 1998-2003). The United Nations (UN) deployed a peacekeeping operation, namely 'The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—MONUC/and or MONUSCO)' To oversee the Ceasefire Agreement, signed in Lusaka 1999, ended at the Sun City resort in South Africa by signing a 'Global and Inclusive Agreement (GIA) in Pretoria' in December 2002.Furthermore, the European Union (EU) deployed the EU Mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the area of defense to ensure the safety of the Congolese citizens (EUSEC RD CONGO mission in 2005) (Unión Europea, 2015).While the Rwandan migrants—depending on Rwanda and Uganda and other warlords for assistance in weapons and financier

To summarize the theoretical framework of Azar: protracted social conflict likely to occur when people's fundamental needs for their communal identity have been deprived. However, this deprivation is the outcome of a multidimensional causal chain involving the role of the state and specific international links. Azar points out how structural factors, such as colonial history and divided society play an important role in the occurrence of prolonged social conflicts.

1.4. An Overview of the Conflict: The Origin of Invisible Congolese in Zaire

The DRC is the second-largest nation in the African continent, while Nigeria being the largest with a population of over 70 million. DRC is considered to be the heart of the African continent, being crossroads bordered by Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania to the east, Central African Republic and South Sudan to the north, Angola and Zambia to the south, and the Republic of Congo to the west (Kalsya et al., 2015).

To understand the cataclysmic intractable conflict in Congo which challenging peace, the study argues that one should not look at the conflict through the lens of the present events only; but rather to analyze the Congo's recurring conflict thorough understanding a brief historical background of the Rwandan immigrants in Zaire, who fuel the endless conflict in Congo. The eastern part of Congo—the two Kivu provinces (the North and South Kivu) are the center of the study. Some ethnic communities like Hunde, Nyanga, Nande, and Banyarwanda immigrants (Hutu and Tutsi) from the Kivu provinces, should be treated with caution, as their meaning and importance have varied over time in the study.

To understand the origins of Kinyarwanda speakers—Invisible Congolese in Zaire is a must to review back during the Belgian era in Congo and their 'Mission d’Immigration des Banyarwanda' (Banyarwanda Immigration Mission). The migration took place over decades, from the 1930s to the 1950s, tens of thousands of Rwandans, both Hutu, and Tutsi were transported by the colonial administration under the 'Mission d’Immigration des Banyarwanda' which was aimed to provide migrant workers in the plantations in Kivu and the mines at Katanga (North KivuPolitics, Politics, Kivu, Resources, & Park, 2015).

After the First World War, the Belgian colonial administration strongly promoted the migration of the Kinyarwanda speaking people and settled in the highlands of Kivu in what currently is Kivu province for labor purposes (Acoy & Ev, 2003). The first immigrants were Tutsi and Hutu, who arrived within the first wave, which was called ‘transplantés’ (Rwandan immigrants who arrived before Congolese independence). But by 1945, the chieftom was so saturated with immigrants that the colonial officials halted the influx. Regardless, Belgian-organized immigration continued until in 1956 to other areas in Masisi, Rutshuru, and Kalehe territories (North KivuPolitics et al., 2015).

Foray, in 1957, due to the Rwandese's population growth and aggression of the Tutsi’s chiefs, especially chief Bucyanayandi, the Belgian authorities strongly stopped immigration continuation, meanwhile, the government administration abolished the Gishari chieftom dividing it into three parts and reinstating the authority of Mwami André Kalinda. This removed the Banyarwanda community from the rights to land in the region, damaged their ‘indigenous status’, and threatened their right to belong to the land in the eyes of other ethnicities (Stearns, 2012).

The waves of Banyarwanda immigration and major land confiscation, together with the reform of Zaire customary law by the Belgians, sowed the seeds of the current dispute in Congo. Around a third of Masisi, including some of the best
agricultural land, was allocated by the colonial government for Rwandan immigrants. By the end of the colonial period, the immigrants contributed to a fourfold increase in population density in both Masisi and Rutshuru, making the Banyarwanda origin in the 'Petit Nord' (North Kivu) the largest ethnic community among the Kivus (Stearns, 2012).

It can be argued that a lot of turmoil today lies in the Congo's tragic past. Since the Zaire Free State’s history in 1885, under the personal possession of King Leopold II, King of Belgium, who reshaped the Congo customary rule, and regrouped small chiefdoms into new divisions called ‘sectors’ are currently sparking unceasing conflict in the eastern part of Congo (Macqueen, 2019). Therefore, indeed, as Azar’s PSC’s claims that the colonial legacy seeded the protracted conflict in the third world.

2. Analysis and Discussion

2.1. The Relevance of Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict Theory to the Analysis of the Congo Conflict

Azar starts his PSC model by tracing the pattern of causal relationships between conditions giving rise to a particular protracted social conflict. Azar identifies four variables in this phase, which he calls ‘Genesis,’ which serve as the preconditions for the transformation of non—conflictual situations into conflictual situations (Oser, 1998). The pre condition factors elucidated by Azar start with the communal content of the society reflecting the invisible Congolese—Rwandan immigrants in Congo. To reveal a historical analysis, the study uses the ‘genesis section’ links with the ‘process dynamic’ as described by Azar to reveal the state's strategy, built-in mechanism, and communal action when repelling the state's strategies to make the study coherent and more comprehensive.

3. The Communal Content

The communal content of society refers to the colonial era, where community groups are defined by historical rivalries and/or colonial legacy of divide and rule. As a consequence, in the post-colonial period, a single communal group or a coalition of groups emerges and dominates in many multiethnic societies which leads the recurring conflict. But Azar states that in a given community, the presence of two or more groups does not inevitably lead societies into a situation of conflict. The need to fracture and eventually develop a PSC situation within a multi-communal society or at least the factors that generally fuel the PSC’s situation to occur (E. E. Azar & Farah, 1981, Ransbotham, 2018, E. E. Azar et al., 1978, Oser, 1998).

Putting in the invisible Congolese—Rwandan immigrants as an analytical category, puts the historical analysis, since the attainment of the flag independence in Zaire, specifically during the Mobutu's regime—of 32 years (1965—1997), the customary law has been the state strategy of oppressing non-indigenousness. It argues that both ethnic and customary were institutionalized during the colonial period as colonial authorities categorized indigenous communities in an attempt to create order in the colonial territory (Hoffmann, 2019). For instance, in the Kivus provinces, the institution of traditional chiefty has remained politically salient. The figure of the traditional chief acquired an important role as an intermediary authority over these ethnic territories, called ‘chafferries’ (chiefdoms) (Hoffmann, Vlassenroot, & Mudinga, 2020). The recognition of custom as a source of law and order has been constitutive for the development of Congo’s political order and people’s sense of self. The ethnonterritorial imaginary of the colonial rule in the Congo has not been dissolved in the post-colonial period.

It has argued that a state dominated by a single communal group reduces the likelihood of problem-solving modes, the potential for conflict escalation is increased by a high degree of perceived interest in the issue being contended, and ambiguity in terms of a negotiated agreement tends to create instability in the relations between the parties involved (Kreisberg, 2002). Despite the great variety of views on the contemporary conflict, most authors acknowledge the key role of the identity group. It is the identity group—ethnic, religious, cultural, and other—and not the nation-state that is at the core of most contemporary conflicts. Ninety-four percent of worldwide violent conflicts are intrastate wars (Demmers, 2006).

However, when analyzing the case of Congo and puts what Azar identifies as one communal group to satisfy needs while others suffer from needs deprivation, the autochthonous Congolese identify themselves as ‘Sons of the Soil’ while labels Rwandan immigrants as ‘Newcomers’. The autochthon’s customary leaders draw a map from the ethnic population deemed preeminent by the colonists before 1945, revealing that there were no Banyarwanda [Rwandophones], according to the documents. Thus, ethnic citizenship determines entitlement to customary powers, which in turn, governs the explosive question of land. Under the law, all land belongs to the state, but as a state’s strategy of governance, takes the traditional chiefs as its managers, and delegates that power to the customary leadership (Jackson, 2006).

4. Human Needs

In his second cluster, human needs, Azar stresses how the dominant communal group (or coalition of groups) ignores the needs of other communal groups thereby breeding social frustration and polarization. Azar’s ideas of ‘universal and ontological human needs’ imply that they are ‘common to all and whose pursuit is an ontological drive in all (E. E. P. international conflicts: T. propositions Azar, 1985). On the security needs, Azar distinguishes between material needs like the need for nutrition and non-material needs like political access needs and acceptance need (Piya & Maharjan, 2009).

According to Azar (1990) (cited in (Leventis & Tsokkalides, 2007), the preconditions factors are not sufficient to cause a protracted social conflict, there is a need for communal actions and state’s strategies, state action and strategies, as well as a built-in mechanism collectively which referred to as process dynamic to play its role of stoking protracted conflict
to take place. In this sense, this part reveals how the state's actions and strategies together with the invisible Congolese's actions fueling the Congo conflict to PSC.

In this sense, by putting Congo's conflict in Azar's concept of human needs, we start with security needs-material and non-material needs. The study discusses material needs as (access to land) while non-material needs as (political access), vice versa the acceptance need is analyzed by connecting with the two aforementioned since the Rwandophone's identity is the root of the Congo problem which nexus with the exclusion from land and political access. However, this party will be analyzed underneath Azar's PSC analysis, but the three stages (genesis, process dynamic, and outcomes analysis) are connected to reveal the flow of the events to bring the coherence and comprehensive of the Congo unstopped conflict.

4.1. Security Needs—Material Needs

4.1.1. Acceptance Needs in Congo Nexus Exclusion from Land and Political Access

It has become clear that identity is central to the study of intractable conflict, and therefore it deserves some further attention. In its most common usage, identity refers to a perception of a self, how people understand and know themselves. But acceptance needs in Congo nexus with exclusion from land and political access. The denial of those elements required in the development of all individuals and societies to survive. Identity is defined in terms of 'shared cultural values and heritage (E. E. P. international conflicts: T. propositions Azar, 1985). On a positive note, one might argue that Azar places the 'identity' close to using invisible Congolese as an analytical category Centre stage of the group as the most relevant unit of analysis.

Land conflicting in the two Kivus provinces became more complex since controlling land is a ticket to natural resources. The indigenous Congolese (Hundes and the Nyangas communities) claim their land, in terms of the rights of 'sons of the soil' or 'land of their fathers' which was never rightfully historical to be sold or taken away from the natives (Wilson and Wilson 2018). Chiefs are still expecting to get tribute from those newcomers for using the land, in a belief that the land is the property of the 'Mwami' (Chiefs) (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2013). But the Rwandophones refused to pay tribute to the chiefs, which led to conflict escalation (Acov & Ev, 2003). It can be argued that indeed, although security and identity need their satisfaction are vital components in the development of a PSC but their deprivation per se is not enough to lead communities into a protracted social conflict situation instead the state's strategies and action vice versa the community actions. In addition, the land is the root cause of conflict in Ituri, North, and South Kivus provinces—in Eastern DRC. The question of land rights is multi-dimensional, with economic, legal, political, social, and spiritual facets. Also, land is a source of feelings of ancestral ‘belonging’, as ancestors are buried within traditional territories. 'When one loses their land not only do, they lose their livelihood, but they also lose their identity'. The Eastern DRC has different entities claiming land decision-making powers such as 'customary', 'informal' and 'state-run' (or 'statutory') and they follow both(Wilson & Wilson, 2018).

Putting Congo in Azar’s human needs variable, since the attainment of the flag independence in the 1960s, Rwandan immigrants have experienced acceptance needs be worst deprived. The question of the Congolese—Kinyarwanda speaker's citizenship is the strategy of oppressing them by nexus with the exclusion from land and political access rights, hence unstoppable violent conflict. For instance, in the 1970s, some Banyarwanda politicians and businessmen in the North Kivu after becoming part of the Mobutu’s central Government fostered the creation of the 'Nationality Law of 1972', followed with the 'Property Law of 1973' which was an advantage for Rwandan desent to get identity and rights to purchase land (Vlassenroot & Huggins, 2013). Inputting the state's strategies and action, elites' Congolese encouraged their people to rise and repel the ‘Nationality Law of 1972’ and the 'Property legislation of 1973'. The autochthonous goal was to regain back the rights of power and land control from the Rwandan immigrant and to end the Rwandophone's existence on Congolese's land which they granted from the colonial authorities. Therefore, the autochthonous strategy used the slogan of 'udongoya baba' (father’s land) in the all Hunde communities to deny the Rwandan immigrants to be favored by the 'Property Law of 1972' which was worked to the advantage of immigrants in Congo (Conflict, 2013).

Indeed, the strategies and actions of the state in Congo breeds the PSC. For instance, the coalition of elites Congolese from Nande and Hunde, in the central government amended the 'Nationality law of 1972 and implemented 'Citizenship law of 1981', which required all citizens to prove their ancestral connection to the populations residing in the territory during the Demarcation of Congo in 1885, aiming to prohibit the majority of Rwandan refugees who had migrated into the region during the 1959—1963 Rwandan independence crisis and all other groups who had fled Rwanda and Burundi into the Congo during that time (Jackson, 2007). In another hand, their official documents—Rwandese immigrants, obtained during the colonial era (stored in the civil offices) were systematically destroyed resulting in the Rwandophone be portrayed asrefugees(Conflict, 2013). It can be argued that due to the aforementioned, Congo conflict will not end, otherwise to recognize the Rwandan immigrants as Congolese autochthony.

Furthermore, given Azar's invisible Congolese's understanding of needs and 'identity groups', one could argue that Rwandan immigrants and their social ascription fuel the PSCs in Congo. The state’s strategies and action vice versa the invisible Congolese's actions stoke the PSC, for instance, during the registration for the national election in 1991, after Kinshasa announced the arrangement of the 'National Identification' to permit the proper election, local census authorities declared officially to unacknowledged the ‘transplanted’ (transferred from Rwanda) even their children as Zairean citizens. The declaration sparked the marginalized youth Rwandophones to attack and burn down various census registration centers, especially in Masisi and the operation was aborted and each ethnicity started to formulate their local militias under the influence of their local leaders to fight against invisible Congolese (Stearns, 2012).
When analyzing Congo conflict in the hands of Azar’s PSC, the state’s strategies and actions towards Kinyarwanda speakers, indeed, Rwandan’s citizenship has been deprived by the Congo government for 40 years, since the Zaire flag independence onwards. The citizenship denial in Congo is the main cause of the conflict. For instance, the Rwandophones candidate’s nationality was in doubt and be dismissed with the claim that they have not qualified to represent the ‘indigenous’ and NO ‘Rwandan’ appeared on the final party delegates list. Besides, the promulgation of 2004, during the post-war and Transition Government promulgated a new law on nationality. But it was far from clear that will resolve the core problem. Then, the DRC’s law officially excluded most, if not all Rwandans from Congo’s citizenship (Jackson, 2007).

4.2. Security Needs — Non-Material: Political Access

In the case of Congo, the Banyarwanda were oppressed by the indigenous Congolese as a state strategy of using local leaders under customary law to control power on behalf of the central government. For instance, in the pre-independence election of 1958, after the native Congolese political leaders to control the ‘Petit Nord’ (North Kivu), the Nande, Hunde, and Nyanga dismissed the Banyarwanda from local government, controlled the local administrative apparatus, and changed them from the neighborhood level to the chieftdoms. Resulting in the mistreatment of the Banyarwanda community (Stearns, 2012). In the era of world democratization, the Mobutu’s geopolitical strategy of 1991 added the mess towards the Rwandophones’s community. The regime awarded the authority positions to the indigenous Congolese only, excluding the Kinyarwanda speakers in the region. The indigenous Congolese elites were on the top provincial positions, which intensified the tensions of the Rwandan immigrants (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2013).

When analyzing the case of the Cyprus conflict, it becomes evident that the state’s strategies and communal actions stoke the Congo recurring conflict. The communal actions and strategies are actions taken by the people of the group to repel oppression from the authorities. For instance, to remove Rwandan immigrants from political access, the Congolese elites during the democratization era prohibited the Rwandophones to register as Zairian citizens and participate in the national election of 1991. They campaigned for the exclusion of Rwandophone from political participation. In response to that oppression from the autochthonous Congolese, the Magrivi (Mutuelle des Agriculteurs de Virunga) (Congolese Hutu-Banyarwanda Association) in the Rutshuru region also encouraged its members to refuse to pay tributes to the native chiefs and no longer to recognize their authorities (Conflict, 2013).

Apart from that, the Nande and Nyanga communities’ leaders in Goma, a governor (Jean-Pierre KalumboMbogho), and vice-governor (Jean Bamwisho) after being appointed by Mobutu, foray, in March 1993, Kalumbo gave a speech encouraging security forces to assist Nande, Hunde, and Nyanga against the Banyarwanda. The governor’s offensive speech was quickly followed by another speech from his vice-governor, urging the local officials to help organize a militia to counterbalance the influence of the Hutu armed groups (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2013). Following the governor’s speech (Jean-Pierre KalumboMbogho) and the speech of the vice-governor (Jean Bamwisho), fueled the Nyanga-Hunde militias on 20 March 1993 to kill dozens of Hutus and the conflict spread rapidly, with other groups arming itself and carrying out reprisals. The conflict was called ‘la Guerre de Massi’ (the Masisi War) (North KivuPolitics et al. 2015). The conflict spread to the neighboring territories of Rutshuru, Kalehe, and Walikale. The Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, Doctors Without Borders) charity reported that within three months, between 6,000 and 15,000 people were killed and 250,000 displaced (Nations, 2010).

In the pre-independence election of 1958, after the Nande, Hunde, and Nyanga occupied the main position in the provincial government of Northern Kivu, thwarted or ended the political success of the Rwandan immigrants. Besides, they used their position to impose over their ‘rivals’ (Rwandan immigrants). The implementation went hand in hand with the rise and imposition of tributes (cows, chickens, goats, and farm products) that produced discontent among Rwandan immigrants. To respond to this oppression, in late 1962, the Muvuny-Ikibbi communities repelled against the new Hunde authorities oppress. Putting in action the Hutu youths attacked the police stations in Kidibi and Karuba killing several police officers. In response, the provincial assembly came up with the recommendation that all Tutsi—immigrants and Banyarwanda refugees alike, should be marginalized, as well as expelling Tutsi, including those whose families have been in North Kivu for decades (North KivuPolitics et al., 2015).

When analyzing the case of the Congo conflict, it becomes evident that both Invisible Congolese and autochthony experienced feelings of physical and psychological threat. The existence of different rebel communal-based groups in the eastern part of Congo —the Kivus Provinces and Ituri, that terrorized members of the ‘other’ community as well as members of their own, added to both communities’ feelings of physical insecurity. Besides, it may be argued, as Azar reveals that in cases where a group needs and grievances are not accepted or addressed by political elites or the majority community and a community has no real access to, or perceives what has been denied to access like political and/or land, the risk of the emergence of a PSC is increased.

5. Governance and the State’s Role

The role of the government and governance is a key factor in the dissatisfaction or satisfaction of citizens and identity group needs. In other words, there is the possibility that events under this variable usually lead to legitimacy crises regarding the given governing power and authority of a given government. The group perceives being deprived of their needs will not accept the regime as representing them (Leventis & Tsokkalides, 2007). Bear in mind that the ‘genesis’ and ‘process dynamics’, according to Azar’s PSC analysis are combined to reveal the cohesion between the state’s strategies and community—Banyarwanda’s action to repel the state’s oppression, which influences the conflict to be PSC. Applying the immigrant Rwandese in Congo as an analytical category offers the following picture of the character of Azar’s model. The Congolese strategy is to eliminate the Banyarwanda from the Congo land. For instance, on 15 October 1963, the Provincial Assembly passed Edict No. 11/63, signed by President Raphael Buunda (Hunde), demands the all-Tutsi refugees
and immigrants settled in the province of Northern Kivu be expelled by force, returned to their native land. Some were expelled militarily directed to East Africa, notably Tanzania and Kenya as refugees. Their official documents obtained during the colonial era (stored in the civil offices) were systematically destroyed (Conflict, 2013).

Besides, in Masisi the Hunde elites introduced a bloody rule in late 1963 to ensure the submission of the Rwandan immigrants from participating in the election, by using the authoritarian instruments in their hands: police, courts, and jail. After winning the election of 1965, led the Rwandese to clash with Hunde and local security forces. The provincial authorities demanded military intervention in Masiś. Foray, on 10 November 1965, Rwandan immigrants (i.e., men, women, and children) were illegally killed and their bodies were dumped into the local rivers (Conflict, 2013). This conflict was dubbed ‘la Guerre de Kanyarwanda’ (the Kanyarwanda War) and prompted the provincial assembly to label the Banyarwanda collectively as rebels and once again demanded to be expelled (North KivuPolitics et al., 2015).

Furthermore, after the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, Mobutu’s regime strategy campaigns of ethnic cleansing to rid the DRC of the Tutsi minority—Invisible Congolese. Mobutu armed different ethnic groups in the eastern provinces of the DRC (primarily Hunde and Nyanga peoples) and allowed them to feed their emotions by encouraging the extermination of the Banyarwanda (an ethnic group made up of Hutus, Tutsis, and Twa) (Redick, 2009). But in response to what Azar’s PSC model dubbed communal action, the immigrants Banyarwanda (Hutu and Tutsi) allied with other rebel groups from Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, resulting in the first Congo war which ousted Mobutu from the regime and resulting in what Christopher Vogel termed ‘Africa’s World War’ (Vogel, 2011) while Filip Reyntjens dubbed it as ‘The Great African War’ (Reyntjens, 2009). The war included seven countries and 10 rebel groups (Daley, 2006).

Negative perceptions of the ‘other’ are evident in the case of the Congo conflict from its inception until today. Rwandophone’s perception considers the Congo government and even the international community are ‘unworkable’. Following the events initially of 1962-1965, 1993, and subsequently the two Congo wars 1996-2003 onwards as a natural consequence of the pain, suffering, and loss, that both native Congolese and invisible Congolese experienced (albeit at different points in time), hostile sentiments in both communities towards the ‘other’ were perpetrated by both elites Congolese and local chiefs who created militias vice versa immigrants Rwandophones to create rebel groups. As Azar’s PSC reveals, indeed, it can be argued that the state’s strategies and actions towards the invisible Congolese and vice versa the action of the invisible Congolese to repeal the state’s actions breeds Protracted conflict. Thus, because of the perceptions of deprivation instituted by indigenous Congolese (elites and local leaders) and the inability of the government to mitigate and deal with real and perceived grievances, Banyarwanda immigrants seem to be segregated, leading to a situation where access to social institutions be excluded due to the actions of the native Congolese.

6. International Linkage

According to Azar’s PSC precondition variables, exogenous factors that influence the possibility of disputes to become a PSC. International linkages of both types can be observed in the development of the conflict in Congo. In the same way, the previous variable (governance and the state’s role) is used to influence internal factors to be PSC, but international linkages are designed to illustrate external factors that influence the PSC. It can be divided into two types: economic dependence and relationships between political and military clients. But the dependence on advanced Western countries for economic and military assistance affects the sovereignty and capacity of the state to fulfill several needs that some of its civilians pursue (Pettersson, 2011).

In the case of the Congolese government apart from that is the mineral’s richest country in Africa. The DRC is a textbook case when it comes to the resource curse. It is estimated that its untapped reserves of raw minerals are worth US$24 trillion, but most of its population is dismally poor (Stoop, Verpoorten, & van der Windt, 2019). Meanwhile, it is economic depending from western in 2002-03 France was an important donor for the DRC provided aid amounted to US$704 million, while the United States became a major supplier of aid by providing US$740 million in 2002–03 (Gegout, 2009). While militarily depends on MONUSCO and the European Union—EU (EUSEC RD CONGO mission in 2005) (Unión Europea, 2015). On other hand, Banyarwanda immigrants—the so-called rebels, economically and militarily depend on Rwanda and warlords, although Rwanda and Uganda being always their defenders and guarantor of their safety and existence and vice versa (Group of Experts on the DRC, 2012), Rwanda being duped villain in Congo since the two wars onwards (Lemarchand, 2013). Bear in mind, Edward Azar argues that the interventions of the Big Powers and the Superpowers in these conflicts have added to their severity and expense which increase their protractedness and horrible consequences to what either have been a less significant collection of competing interactions (E. E. Azar et al., 1978).

The end of the Congolese wars, symbolized by the peace process that began in Lusaka 1999, ending at the Sun City resort in South Africa by signing a ‘Global-Inclusive Deal in Pretoria’ in December 2002—and sputters to the present, which did not bring peace to the Kivus Provinces, resulting stability in Congo to remain elusive. It was the 2002 agreement signed by all major combatants that established the basis for a move to genuine and permanent national unity. This peace agreement was further reaffirmed by Rwanda and Uganda, accordingly, resulting in withdrawing their troops in 2002 and 2003. This peace process was largely successful in the short term, but on the other hand, it created opposition figures and discontent, sowing seeds for further conflict (North KivuPolitics et al., 2015).

7. Conclusion

The state’s strategies and action towards the invisible Congolese and or vice versa of the actions to repeal the state’s strategies and action are fueling the Congo conflict to be dubbed PSC. We may ask why this happens? The answer is open, from Azar’s PSC model. The negative perception towards each other (conflicting parties) is likely to set rivalries apart from the negotiation table. Each part perceives its goal as vital for their communities to survive. The conflict over the
denial of human needs is not negotiable, and any agreement [s] arising that will give benefits to the elites instead of solving the conflict, do not last. The deprivation of human needs requires problem-solving skills to address the needs, the vice-versa would stoke the PSC to occur.

Ending overt conflict by a peace deal or military victory does not indicate achieving peace. Instead, the cessation of war or a so-called ‘post-conflict’ scenario offers a new collection of possibilities that can be seized or thrown away (Lambourne, 2003). To reveal this Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that in December 2014 and May 2015, witnessed accounts indicated that *Union des Patriotes Congolais/ UPC* (The union of Congolese Patriots) fighters attacked at least 27 villages and killed at least 91 civilians (Watch, 2017). This has been demonstrated also by Aljazeera in 2016 that rebel groups are still massacred civilians, resulting in some civilians blaming the United National Organization Stability Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to do nothing rather than being ‘helicopter tourists’ in Congo.¹

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