PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN AND THE EXTRINSIC VALUE OF ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY

JANE GATLEY

Abstract: External pressure on Higher Education Institutes in the United Kingdom has brought the question of the extrinsic value of academic philosophy into focus. One line of research into questions about the extrinsic value of philosophy comes from the Philosophy for Children (P4C) movement. There is a large body of literature about the benefits of P4C. This paper argues that the distinctive nature of the P4C pedagogy limits the claims made by the P4C literature about the extrinsic value of philosophy to claims about the value of P4C. While this is not a problem within the P4C literature that recognises these limitations, the paper makes three claims about why it is sometimes inappropriate to extend claims from research into the value of P4C to claims about the value of non-P4C philosophy. It argues that more research is needed to investigate the value of non-P4C philosophy.

Keywords: metaphilosophy, P4C philosophy, philosophy of education, teaching philosophy.

Introduction

As universities strive to demonstrate the relevance and value of their work, academic philosophy departments have compelling reasons to turn to literature about Philosophy for Children (P4C). This paper explores the relationship between P4C and philosophy, concluding that the relationship is complicated to the extent that claims about the value of P4C might not be true of academic philosophy, and vice versa. Transferring the rationale behind P4C to academic philosophy is not always warranted; similarly, the P4C model is not always the best pedagogy for bringing about the potential benefits of academic philosophy. In what follows I set out three reasons to back up these claims, all related to the distinctive nature of the P4C model. These reasons are that (1) adhering to a principled P4C model can preclude certain benefits of academic philosophy from being realised; (2) the benefits of P4C might not hold true of other models of academic philosophy; and (3) it is plausible that the benefits of P4C are more closely related to its focus on dialogue and could be achieved by non-philosophical means. I conclude that more research is needed into the extrinsic value of non-P4C models of philosophy. Experimenting with existing and new
methods of engaging in philosophy is necessary to ensure that progress can be made towards identifying how, why, and when philosophy is relevant and valuable to wider society.

The Extrinsic Value of Philosophy

Claims about the extrinsic value of philosophy form part of the justification for the public funding of academic philosophy departments. By extrinsic value, I mean the value of philosophy as a means of bringing about (1) personal goods, such as enhanced well-being, better decision-making abilities, and critical thinking skills, and (2) societal goods, such as greater democratic engagement, improved communication between community groups, and social cohesion. The greater the impact of philosophy departments on these goods, the easier it is to argue that philosophical research and teaching should be publicly funded. At least, this sort of reasoning has proved persuasive to policy makers.

Emphasis on the extrinsic value of philosophy is growing due to external pressure. In the United Kingdom, the Research Excellence Framework (REF) incentivises certain forms of public-facing philosophy by measuring the “impact” of university departments. Here, “research carried out at HEIs [Higher Education Institutes] should, in at least some cases, lead to some positive social or economic benefit to non-academic partners” (REF 2014, 6). The apparent trend is that this pressure will increase. The United Kingdom is introducing a Knowledge Excellence Framework (KEF), which focuses exclusively on the societal impact of research. The proposed aim of this is “enhancing the contribution higher education makes to the economy and society” by providing “specific funds and support that encourages them to do this more effectively” (HEFCE 2018).

A quick exploration of impact case studies submitted for the 2014 REF brings up a number of instances of submissions that take a P4C approach, for example Philosophy in the City: Inspiring the Next Generation, submitted by the University of Sheffield, and Philosophical Dialogue and Rhetoric Creating an Alternative Space for Thinking Together, submitted by St. Mary’s University. Both of these projects were centred on doing philosophy with members of the public using a P4C approach (REF 2018). In addition, many departments are now offering their undergraduates opportunities to engage in P4C-type philosophy for credit, with the universities of Bristol, Leeds, Nottingham, and Sheffield running modules in which students take philosophy into schools to engage in public-facing philosophy themselves. These case studies and modules are responses to the pressure to demonstrate impact, through extrinsically valuable philosophical activity.

While my focus is on the situation in the United Kingdom, a similar picture appears elsewhere. In the “Department Advocacy Toolkit”
published by the American Philosophical Association, P4C is listed as a method of “community involvement,” and public engagement is noted as a pressing concern for “all departments, but especially those at risk,” in the U.S. system (APA 2017, 27 and 40). P4C is a global phenomenon, and there is no clear reason why its allure would not be felt by philosophy departments elsewhere under the same pressure to demonstrate the extrinsic value of their work. While many philosophy departments do not turn to P4C to demonstrate the extrinsic value of philosophy, many do, and it seems likely that many more will do so in future.

**Philosophy for Children**

P4C refers to a loosely related set of models for doing philosophy that trace their roots back to Matthew Lipman’s work to develop a pedagogy for teaching thinking skills through philosophy. The following excerpt from an interview provides Lipman’s account of the origins of P4C: “Back in the early ’70s, when my own children were about 10 or 11 years old, the school they were attending did not give them the instruction in reasoning that I thought they needed. I was teaching logic at the college level at the time, and I felt that I wasn’t accomplishing very much with my students because it was too late, they should have had instruction in reasoning much earlier” (Brandt 1988, 34). Since its introduction by Lipman, P4C has spread across the world, with the International Council of Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC) listing sixty-three countries involved in P4C (ICPIC 2016). Simultaneously, P4C has developed into a diversity of approaches, which makes any definitive account of P4C problematic. Accordingly, I restrict my exposition of P4C to approaches that emphasise use of the Community of Inquiry (CoI) or analogous pedagogies. I refer to these as principled P4C approaches, since they take the Deweyan principles behind Lipman’s model of P4C seriously.

Lipman was influenced by Dewey’s view that “what should be happening in the classroom is thinking. . . . The route he [Dewey] proposed . . . is that the educational process in the classroom should take as its model the process of scientific inquiry” (Lipman 2003, 14). Following this approach, the focus of a principled P4C model is on inquiry with the aim of developing critical, creative, and caring thinking amongst participants through open-ended philosophical dialogue (Lipman 2003). Understanding the importance of Dewey’s influence on Lipman is key to understanding the CoI. For Dewey, education aims to help children to develop. This entails “continual reorganising, reconstructing [and] transforming” of a child’s experiences (Dewey 1916, 59). Since the CoI derives from this Deweyan understanding of education, in order to enact a CoI in a classroom it is important that “a community of inquiry attempts to follow the inquiry where it leads rather than be penned in by the boundary
lines of existing disciplines” (Lipman 2003, 20). P4C is thus committed, in a principled way, to open-ended dialogue and minimal teacher-led exposition. It is worth noting that Dewey did not write about or propose the CoI, but it is a Dewey-inspired approach that gives P4C a distinctive nature and value.

A useful distinction in coming to understand the CoI is Michael Hand’s distinction between *directive* and *non-directive* teaching. Directive teaching has “the aim of persuading,” while non-directive teaching “has no persuasive aim” (Hand 2018, 37). Directive teaching can include dialogue and does not imply didactic teaching. Hand gives the example of two teachers who both present children with a video debate about “whether there is a justified moral requirement to vote in general elections” (37). The non-directive teacher facilitates a class discussion whilst remaining neutral. The directive teacher “ensures that (what he takes to be) the sound arguments for the requirement, and the sound objections to arguments against it, are thoroughly aired and understood, either by giving the floor to pupils able to articulate them or by feeding them into the discussion himself” (37–38). In both cases, students are engaged in dialogue, but in one case the teacher is neutral and in the other the teacher is not. P4C is non-directive for principled reasons, meaning that teachers should facilitate without guiding the discussion and that any content must be presented in stimulus form rather than developed by the teacher. To directively engage in P4C would undermine the CoI’s emphasis on child-centred inquiry.

The following account of P4C by Joanna Haynes is a fair representation of a typical principled P4C session: participants are asked to pause for thought, either through small-group discussion or pair work or in silence. The next step involves questioning. In some sessions this is spontaneous and natural, but in others children’s questions are written on a board and grouped to allow children to vote on the questions they would like to start with. Group discussion is then facilitated with the aim of building on one another’s ideas. The teacher should record the discussion and aim for closure at the end of the session with some form of review (Haynes 2008, 31–38). While the content of P4C sessions will vary depending on the desires of the participants, the structure of the session is prescribed and distinctive compared to other activities undertaken at school. It is this prescribed structure, based on the CoI, that I am referring to when I speak of the principled P4C model.

The principled P4C model is dominant in the United Kingdom. SAPERE (Society for the Advancement of Philosophical Enquiry and Reflection in Education) is the largest U.K.-based organisation offering training and guidance for those wishing to do philosophy in communities. The society’s mission statement reads: “We train teachers in Philosophy for Children which encourages children to think critically, creatively, collaboratively and caringly” (SAPERE 2018). The SAPERE model of P4C is clearly CoI based: “Children are taught how to create their own
philosophical questions. They then choose one question that is the focus of a philosophical enquiry, or dialogue. . . . The teacher, as facilitator, supports the children in their thinking, reasoning and questioning, as well as the way the children speak and listen to each other in the dialogue” (SAPERE 2018). SAPERE takes a principled stance against directive inquiry. The only guidance permitted by the facilitator is to encourage critical, caring, and creative thinking.

It is worth noting that the second-largest P4C organisation in the United Kingdom, the Philosophy Foundation, takes a less principled approach and allows for some directive teaching, in particular to introduce philosophical problems. Nonetheless, the Philosophy Foundation still emphasises what it calls “philosophical enquiry” and its own “dialectical method of facilitation . . . with minimal interference from the facilitator” (Philosophy Foundation 2018). More broadly, P4C is not always principled, but many of the approaches to doing philosophy that associate themselves with P4C draw inspiration from the principled model and share a commitment to some form of non-directive dialogue-based group inquiry, such as the CoI. Furthermore, much of the research conducted into the extrinsic value of P4C takes principled P4C approaches as its subject (e.g., Gorard, Siddiqui, and See 2015).

The Appeal of P4C to Academic Philosophy Departments

Philosophical activities that aim to bring about extrinsic goods (for example, public-facing philosophy) are increasingly influenced by the literature and methods associated with P4C. The philosophy departments offering undergraduate modules for teaching philosophy in schools have affiliations with P4C organisations that provide training. The module in Sheffield works with SAPERE and the Philosophy Foundation. Bristol and Leeds are both affiliated with Thinking Space, which has close ties with SAPERE. There are several reasons why this strong relationship between P4C and public-facing philosophy is developing and should be expected to develop further.

The organisations promoting P4C, at least in the United Kingdom, have excellent reputations. They are well organised and well resourced and play an important role in creating and publicising research into the importance of philosophy. For example, SAPERE claims to have trained more than twenty-seven thousand teachers (SAPERE 2018). Anyone wishing to demonstrate his or her credentials to an external organisation would be justified in turning to SAPERE for accredited training. Furthermore, SAPERE has worked hard to promote P4C in the media and to ensure that high-quality research into the benefits of P4C has been conducted and publicised. In particular, SAPERE’s work with the Educational Endowment Foundation in conjunction with Durham University led to
the influential evaluation of P4C demonstrating that P4C sessions were correlated with improvements in children’s reading and mathematics scores (Gorard, Siddiqui, and See 2015). P4C is thus established, respected, and effective. At first glance it seems like an ideal model for philosophy departments to adopt with the extrinsic value of philosophy in mind.

Alongside empirical research into the benefits of P4C on cognitive test scores (Trickey and Topping 2004; Gorard, Siddiqui, and See 2015), a range of further benefits of P4C have been proposed. These can be summarised as cognitive: P4C improves critical thinking skills (Lipman 2003); non-cognitive: P4C develops social skills, confidence, and communication skills (Fisher 2013; Haynes 2008; Siddiqui, Gorard, and See 2017); emancipatory: P4C is a critical pedagogy that reverses harmful power dynamics in schools (Haynes and Murris 2011); political: P4C is an essential element of education for democratic societies (Fisher 2013); hedonic: philosophy is enjoyable and natural to children (Matthews 1980); and moral: P4C develops moral and epistemic virtues (Fisher 2013; Hobbs 2018).

This wealth of empirical and theoretical research into the extrinsic value of P4C provides grounds for holding that the philosophical activities undertaken in academic philosophy departments might have similarly rich extrinsic value for individuals and society. Even if the benefits are not clearly transferrable between P4C and academic departments, departments might be tempted to engage in P4C-type philosophical activities in their public-facing work. The cognitive, non-cognitive, emancipatory, political, hedonic, and moral benefits are all worthy goals and mean that P4C is enthusiastically implemented by a lively international community of practitioners (Gregory, Haynes, and Murris 2017, xxi). P4C has a large body of literature associated with it that highlights many benefits to society, making it an attractive model for departments wanting to demonstrate impact.

I am concerned with the relationship between philosophical activities conducted by academic philosophy departments and P4C. While the benefits of P4C ground a convincing case for the extrinsic value of P4C, I will outline issues that arise if research into P4C is taken to ground claims about the extrinsic value of a broader range of philosophical activities without due rigour and care. Focusing on the P4C benefits listed is unproblematic if the benefits of P4C are the same as the benefits of other models of doing philosophy, but I will argue that they are not necessarily identical, meaning that it is unclear what the extrinsic value of other models of philosophy, including approaches prevalent in academic philosophy, might be.

**P4C Can Restrict the Potential Extrinsic Value of Philosophy**

The first potential problem of adopting a P4C model is that doing so might preclude some valuable aspects of philosophical research from
being communicated. For example, a public lecture or directly taught lesson might be a more effective means of communicating important philosophical ideas developed in academic philosophy departments. Little research exists into the extrinsic value of some of the more expositional or directive aspects of philosophy. My first point is that there might be some additional value to non-P4C models of philosophy teaching and outreach, such as lectures, books, radio programmes, film screenings, and directive teaching, that would be prevented from being realised if the P4C model were strictly followed at all times.

P4C has specific educational aims that on a principled P4C approach threaten to overrule other potential aims. Gert Biesta points out that the aims of P4C are not necessarily the only aims possible when bringing philosophy into schools, or by extension any other public-facing philosophy. Since philosophy is a very broad and potentially undefinable field, “the question as to what philosophy might achieve is difficult to answer because philosophy in its many forms and guises may achieve many things” (Biesta 2011, 306). P4C might be a poor instrument for attempting to optimise the extrinsic value of the aspects of philosophical work that academic philosophers are engaged with, particularly if those aspects differ from P4C in their methods and aims.

Take, for example, philosophical research into implicit bias and stereotype threat. This is extremely impactful research, if impact is measured by its implications for society. Implicit biases “are unconscious biases that affect the way we perceive, evaluate, or interact with people from the groups that our biases ‘target.’ Stereotype threat is sometimes consciously felt but also sometimes unconscious, and it concerns ways that a person’s (awareness of their) own group membership may negatively affect their performance” (Saul 2013, 39). Jennifer Saul and others working in this field apply this finding to issues in philosophy of language, social justice, and epistemology, showing that there is a need to be aware of implicit bias and stereotype threat because these lead to sexism, racism, homophobia, and other instances of prejudice and discrimination. Awareness of implicit bias and stereotype threat is the first step in reforming social structures and individual practice, and this is a moral imperative. A report by the Kirwan Institute claims that “addressing implicit bias on multiple levels (e.g., individual and institutional) is critical for achieving social justice goals” (2016, 15). The report identifies criminal justice, policing, health care, education, employment, and housing as particular areas of relevance. This line of philosophical research has an impact on how we view ourselves, the language we use, how institutions function, government policy, interpersonal relations, politics, and so on. Being aware of implicit bias and stereotype threat is beneficial to society; there is clear scope for its extrinsic value.

If communicating Saul’s research were the aim of a philosophy session, then P4C would not be the best way to do this. Non-directive dialogue about prejudice and discrimination is unlikely to reach the conclusion
that implicit bias and stereotype threat exist. By their very nature, implicit bias and stereotype threat are unconscious, so it is unlikely that those engaged in a CoI would spontaneously come to conclude that they exist. Furthermore, people are resistant to the idea that they hold such biases. One of the most surprising features of implicit bias is that “psychological research over the last decades has shown that most people—even those who explicitly and sincerely avow egalitarian views—hold what have been described as implicit biases against such groups as blacks, women, gay people, and so on” (Saul 2013, 40). While a CoI might lead to sincere agreement that bias is wrong, the members of the CoI might continue to hold implicit biases without being aware of them. A better way of communicating Saul’s research is to add an explicatory element as to how her philosophical work is presented to the public. In the case of this research, a public lecture would communicate the issues of importance in a way that the P4C model could not. Adding an element of dialogue afterwards would be good practice, but the aim of communicating the research is achieved through directive explication, not through the CoI. P4C is not always going to be appropriate to the aims of communicating philosophical research. In some cases, a principled P4C model might impede the communication of research by restricting the explication of impactful ideas with high extrinsic value.

P4C practitioners might argue that Saul’s work could be communicated through a principled P4C model if Saul’s exposition of implicit bias and stereotype threat is used as the stimulus to frame the session. Non-directive dialogue could then be facilitated around the research findings. This, however, only highlights the point that it is not the dialogue doing the valuable philosophical work here. Instead, the directive elements playing the role of communicating Saul’s research would be the impactful part of the session. Rather than using a P4C model focused on non-directive dialogue, the potential impact of Saul’s work would best be realised by communicating it clearly and directly, perhaps through a lecture followed by a discussion, maybe in a newspaper article, or possibly using a structured seminar or a directive lesson in a school.

Another example derives from whether or not moral education should be conducted using P4C. On the one hand, the existence of “reasonable disagreement about moral standards” means that directly teaching moral standards is controversial (Hand 2018, 9). Hand argues, however, that there are certain moral standards that are not subject to reasonable disagreement and so can justifiably be directly taught. Accordingly, while non-directive moral inquiry might play an important role where moral standards are disputed, when it comes to justified moral standards we are warranted, and perhaps obliged, to communicate them using more directive methods (Hand 2018, 70). For example, in my work as a school teacher, when covering medical ethics as part of the religious education course in U.K. secondary schools, non-directive inquiry often

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led students to the conclusion that genetic screening and genetic engineering offer attractive options to improve the health and quality of future lives. Often, the discussion would result in what amounted to an emerging endorsement of eugenics. It would be wrong, as a teacher, not to step in and point out the pitfalls of eugenics, and further to point out why eugenics should not be taken seriously as a position. This can only be done directly, showing that directive moral teaching has value and significance that would be difficult to realise using a principled P4C approach.

There is very little published empirical research on the extrinsic value of philosophy outside the P4C literature; Andrew Fisher and Jonathan Tallant “are aware of no attempts to distil specific peer-reviewed published philosophical research into child-friendly work-shops in order to bring about the kinds of positive, social impacts that traditional P4C sessions have achieved” (2015, 10). This is something that they addressed in a small-scale empirical research project on the benefits of philosophy lessons in schools. The aim of the research was to see “whether we could draw upon published research in high-ranking philosophy journals, done by professional philosophers at a research-intensive University, to bring about an impact in a range of children's lives” (3). Rather than adopting a principled P4C model, Fisher and Tallant planned lessons with the research that they wanted to communicate in mind. They identified a few areas of research that seemed to have potential extrinsic value to school children and identified a particular aim that they thought might be achieved. They conclude, based on the data collected, that “it would seem that there is no obvious impediment to generating such positive social impacts” (13). They provide preliminary evidence that non-P4C models of philosophy can have extrinsic value.

My aim so far has been to show that there is some potential extrinsic value to philosophy that could not be communicated using P4C. There might be more benefits stemming from academic philosophy than the lists of benefits attributed to P4C. However, further experimentation with different ways of engaging in philosophy and further empirical and theoretical research need to be conducted to establish whether this is the case. As Biesta points out, “Questions of definition and effect are important when philosophy is being mobilised to do something” (2011, 306). P4C comes with a set of ready-made aims that might not match up with the research being communicated. Those wishing to use philosophical research to bring about extrinsic goods should not assume that P4C is the best model to achieve their aims. P4C literature sometimes carries the assumption that adherence to the P4C pedagogy trumps the content and aims of communicating philosophical research. This assumption might prevent certain benefits of academic philosophical research from being realised.
The Extrinsic Value of P4C and the Extrinsic Value of Philosophy

The second complication raised by the distinctive nature of a principled P4C model is that it is unclear whether the benefits of P4C are true of non-P4C models of philosophy. When academics give public philosophy lectures, publish philosophical research in popular media, organise public-facing events such as cinema screenings, spend time doing philosophy in organisations such as prisons or schools, or run seminars and lectures for their own students, they might not be bringing about the same extrinsically valuable goods as someone who runs a principled P4C session. I will argue that there are reasons for thinking that at least some of the proposed benefits of P4C are not necessarily brought about when philosophy is conducted using a different model.

The influential Education Endowment Foundation (EEF) evaluation of P4C (Gorard, Siddiqui, and See 2015) led to a raft of headlines endorsing the benefits of philosophy in education: “Philosophy sessions boost primary school results” (BBC 2015), “philosophical discussions boost pupil’s maths and literacy progress” (Guardian 2015), and “primary school children learn faster and fight less if they study philosophy” (Times 2015). These headlines make misleading claims about philosophy because the evaluation was of SAPERE sessions. These sessions rely heavily on student dialogue and take a non-directive teaching approach favouring facilitation; they take a principled P4C approach. The philosophical content is often limited to the facilitator guiding students to ask philosophical questions and think philosophically, but the questions and answers discussed are those of the students. Headlines equating philosophy with SAPERE are thus misleading. It is unclear whether a public lecture or directive lesson with prescribed content would bring about all of the benefits attributed to P4C.

A lesson on the cosmological argument for the existence of God, which is commonly taught in secondary schools in the United Kingdom, would one hopes bring about greater knowledge and understanding of the argument, and might lead to a change in attitude or behaviour concerning discussions about the existence of God, but it is unclear whether it would improve students’ non-cognitive abilities, reverse harmful power dynamics, develop virtues, contribute to civic education, or be enjoyable and natural to students. It is dubious whether this model of philosophy would bring about any of the benefits associated with P4C. This is a single example of the divergence between the extrinsic value of P4C and other ways of engaging with philosophy. Although many facets of philosophy may share the extrinsic value associated with P4C, that this is so should not be taken for granted.

In the same way that the benefits of communicating some academic philosophical research directly might be precluded by taking a principled P4C approach, some of the extrinsic value of a principled P4C
approach might be lost by taking other approaches to philosophy. P4C is not identical to philosophy, and so different approaches to doing philosophy might be more appropriate than P4C in light of the aim of bringing about extrinsic goods associated with philosophy. Alternatively, a principled P4C approach might be the best model for achieving the stated aims. Either way, it is important to think carefully about which approach to take in order to best meet the aims being pursued. This is not a problem for philosophy departments per se or for P4C per se; what it highlights is a lack of research into the extrinsic value of non-P4C philosophy. Since the P4C model and pedagogy are so distinctive, the claims of P4C are unlikely to apply to other models of philosophy, and since there is very little research into these other models of philosophy, we simply do not know whether they also have extrinsic value, or what this extrinsic value might be.

**Dialogue and P4C Benefits**

The final complication in the relationship between P4C and academic philosophy is that the value of P4C is plausibly non-philosophical in origin and might be just as effectively realised without recourse to any philosophical content or method. The value of P4C might come from the principled emphasis on dialogue encouraged by non-directive inquiry.

The Communication Trust reported that “recent research put the average length of a pupil’s contribution to class discussion at just four words” (2013, 17). In light of this, it would be unsurprising if an intervention that was almost entirely composed of student dialogue led to significant changes in how students felt about their education and their other lessons. In a small case study on the potential of P4C to develop classroom dialogue, it was reported that “the children experienced new and valued opportunities to express opinion in class during P4C sessions. All those interviewed emphasised the importance of this to them suggesting that it led to feelings of personal satisfaction and even joy” (Barrow 2015, 83). This highlights the centrality of dialogue to P4C and the possibility that it is increased classroom dialogue that explains many of the benefits of P4C.

As part of an investigation into the effect of classroom dialogue, Christine Howe and colleagues (2018) state that “three aspects of teacher-student dialogue strongly predicted performance on SATs when they occurred in combination (but not alone): elaboration, where building on, elaborating, evaluating, clarifying of a previous contribution was invited or provided; . . . querying, where a previous contribution was doubted, challenged, rejected . . . student participation, where across the lesson multiple students were seen to engage with each other’s ideas, and not merely respond to their teacher’s questions.” These aspects of dialogue are all encouraged in P4C but are not exclusive to it. Howe’s work highlights the point that classroom dialogue can take place in subjects that
are already on the curriculum and does not require any inclusion of philosophy. In addition, the conclusion that dialogue can raise attainment in SATs is remarkably similar to the conclusions of the EEF report showing that P4C improved attainment in Cognitive Ability Test (CAT) scores in those participating in sessions (Gorard, Siddiqui, and See 2015). It is worth reflecting on whether the extrinsic value of P4C is more closely tied to the emphasis of principled P4C on dialogue, rather than to the connection between P4C and philosophy.

Dialogue as part of the CoI might be driving improvements in maths and reading results in the EEF study, but what else can we attribute to it? Many of the claims made about P4C might be the result of dialogue. Lipman’s claim that P4C develops creative, caring, and critical thinking can plausibly be attributed to dialogue. Discussing important ideas with peers in a non-judgemental and supportive classroom environment might explain these benefits. Similarly, improvements in democratic participation are plausibly the result of becoming better acquainted with classmates and learning how to interact with them to negotiate new shared understandings of controversial ideas. Free and open discussion of questions that interest children might help them to bring meaning to their experiences and to come to understand one another’s perspectives. Learning to interact with one another under the watchful eye of a facilitator whilst dealing with tricky issues seems like an excellent way of developing epistemic and moral virtues. The CoI encourages children to interact with one another in a way that is often stifled by a busy school curriculum. These benefits might not transfer to models of philosophy that do not emphasise dialogue in the same way.

If this is correct, and the extrinsic value of P4C derives from the CoI rather than philosophical content, then perhaps the conclusion is that those involved in demonstrating the extrinsic value of philosophy should adopt the CoI as part of their pedagogy and side-line other facets of academic philosophy. This, however, returns us to the first problem highlighted: that strict adherence to principled P4C precludes certain benefits of philosophy from being communicated. Another potential response to the idea that the benefits of P4C are related to dialogue rather than to philosophy is to claim that all philosophy is necessarily dialogical, and all dialogue is philosophical. This, however, misconstrues the relationship between philosophy and dialogue. Philosophy can be conducted dialogically, and Socratic dialogue plays a central role in Western philosophy, but philosophy is not necessarily dialogical. Philosophy can be a solitary pursuit; for example, plenty of philosophical writing occurs alone. Personal reflection and introspection on philosophical questions are other aspects of philosophy that do not involve dialogue. Furthermore, dialogue might harm philosophical thinking if it is mismanaged so that quieter people are side-lined or carefully thought-out views are carelessly undermined.
Some might respond that dialogue and philosophy are too tightly intertwined to be separated. For example, Peter Worley argues that the key to philosophical thinking is “external and internal” Socratic dialogue that “has become a standard method in philosophy” (2009, 150). While there are reasons for agreeing that philosophy is closely linked to dialogue, the idea that all dialogue is philosophical requires substantiation. Philosophy does not have a monopoly over dialogue, and if philosophy is to have distinctive extrinsic value, or impact, then this sort of dialogue needs to be differentiated from the sort of dialogue that regularly takes place in book clubs, political meetings, and social gatherings. The onus is on the philosophical community to identify exactly what it is that makes philosophical dialogue distinctive. This is not an impossible task, but it is necessary if claims about the extrinsic value of P4C are to be transferred to claims about the extrinsic value of a broader range of academic philosophical activities.

If philosophers choose to champion dialogue and downplay philosophical content, then they risk severing the link between their academic research and the extrinsic value that they are under pressure to demonstrate. Fisher and Tallant point out that studies on the benefits of P4C are problematic because “none of them deploy contemporary philosophical research to try to bring about the benefits described” (2015, 2). Alternatively, claiming that non-P4C models of philosophy bring about the benefits associated with P4C needs independent justification because it is plausible that the benefits of P4C are linked to dialogue, whereas dialogue might be absent in non-P4C models of philosophy. For example, since public lectures rarely employ substantial non-directive dialogue in the sense encouraged by P4C, the benefits associated with the CoI are unlikely to be realised during a public lecture. The principled nature of the P4C model means that its benefits are not necessarily identical to the benefits of other possible models for philosophical activity.

Conclusion

Clearly, the P4C model brings many associated benefits and can achieve worthy aims. Its extrinsic value has been well researched, and there is a body of empirical and theoretical literature that sheds light on this value. In addition, P4C can be practised in a way that draws on multiple traditions and avoids the pitfalls of taking a principled P4C approach. Take for instance Graeme Tiffany’s work to use community philosophy “to promote conversations and develop positive relationships between different groups of people within a community” (2009, 1). Since Tiffany’s aim seems best achieved through the caring, critical, and creative thinking fostered by dialogue within a CoI, P4C seems an excellent fit. In fact, Tiffany was mindful of the aims of his work and “drew on two traditions:
first, the experience of Philosophy for Children (P4C) and especially its method of Community of Enquiry; and, second, the informal education sector and its emphasis on relationships, democracy and mutual learning. A major conclusion of the project was that authentic practice required elements of both these traditions, but differed from them” (2009, 5). This sort of careful evaluation of whether principled P4C is the best approach, and the willingness to learn from rather than fully adopt a principled P4C model, is exemplary.

P4C can be an excellent model with which to have a positive impact on society using philosophy, but only if it is the right instrument for the stated aims. If P4C is the wrong instrument, then those attempting to recreate the extrinsic value associated with P4C risk preventing the potential benefits of their research from being realised. They might be using the P4C model where a different model would have been more appropriate. They also risk making claims about the extrinsic value of philosophy that would be true of P4C but are not true of the model of philosophy they are employing. Uncritically adopting a principled P4C model might undermine claims about the extrinsic value of philosophy because these can be reduced to claims about the value of dialogue. This leaves philosophy departments in a difficult position, since they have little distinctive extrinsic value to offer individuals and society if all they can lay claim to is another forum for dialogue that could be achieved by existing non-philosophical means.

As philosophy departments come under more pressure to demonstrate some positive impact on society, they should not automatically turn to P4C. Instead, they should think carefully about the potential extrinsic value of their own philosophical activities. Sometimes this will align with the value of P4C, but at other times the two will not marry. In these cases, those working in academic philosophy departments would do well to investigate the potential value of their philosophical research and to experiment with new and existing models of philosophical activity. Many questions about the impact of philosophy remain neglected, such as: Are there further potential benefits to taking philosophy into schools beyond those advocated by P4C practitioners? What is the value of philosophical research conclusions and philosophical theories? What is philosophical thinking? How is philosophical dialogue distinctive? There is a long way to go towards identifying whether and how philosophy is extrinsically valuable despite the large body of work on the extrinsic value of P4C.

School of Education
University of Birmingham
Edgbaston, B15 2TT
United Kingdom
Jane.gatley@gmail.com

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