The Cloud Needs a Reputation System

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ABSTRACT

Today’s cloud apps are built from many diverse services that are managed by different parties. At the same time, these parties, which consume and/or provide services, continue to rely on arcane static security and entitlements models. In this paper, we introduce Seit, an inter-tenant framework that manages the interactions between cloud services. Seit is a software-defined reputation-based framework. It consists of two primary components: (1) a set of integration and query interfaces that can be easily integrated into cloud and service providers’ management stacks, and (2) a controller that maintains reputation information using a mechanism that is adaptive to the highly dynamic environment of the cloud. We have fully implemented Seit, and integrated it into an SDN controller, a load balancer, a cloud service broker, an intrusion detection system, and a monitoring framework. We evaluate the efficacy of Seit using both an analytical model and a Mininet-based emulated environment. Our analytical model validates the isolation and stability properties of Seit. Using our emulated environment, we show that Seit can provide improved security by isolating malicious tenants, reduced costs by adapting the infrastructure without compromising security, and increased revenues for high quality service providers by enabling reputation to impact discovery.

1. INTRODUCTION

Building and deploying any distributed “app” today is radically different from a decade ago. Where traditional applications of the past required dedicated infrastructure and middleware stacks, today’s apps not only run on shared—cloud—infrastructure, they rely on many services, residing within and outside of underlying cloud. An app, for example, can use Facebook for authentication, Box for storage, Twilio for messaging, Square for payments, Google AdSense for advertising, etc. This trend of deploying and consuming services (often referred to as the mesh economy) can be seen by the rapid growth of cloud platforms which integrate services (and not just compute) like Amazon Web Services [1], Microsoft Azure [10], Heroku [5], IBM BlueMix [6], and CloudFoundry [2], to name a few. More importantly, these emerging platforms further encourage the construction of apps from even smaller—micro—services (e.g., GrapheneDB, Redis, 3scale, etc.), where such services are developed and managed by different tenants.

Despite the shift in how applications are being disaggregated, the management of security between services and tenants remains largely the same: one focused on a perimeter defense with a largely static security configuration. This is exacerbated by the isolation mechanisms being provided by cloud providers. It is also reinforced by the research community, which has also focused on technologies that ensure isolation [20, 32, 41, 47]. While isolation enables tenants to reason about their perimeter, perimeter defense is widely considered insufficient [16, 25, 36, 45, 49, 51, 52]. Attackers are largely indistinguishable from innocent parties and can rely on their relative anonymity to bypass the perimeter. Furthermore, erecting virtual perimeters in the cloud wastes an opportunity for efficiency optimizations available in a multi-tenant cloud infrastructure, especially since inter-tenant communication has been shown to be an important component in intra-cloud data center traffic [15]. Such intra-cloud traffic will, of course, only grow as apps move onto Platform as a Service (PaaS) clouds like CloudFoundry, Heroku, and IBM BlueMix.

The insufficient nature of static security configuration has received some attention from the research community in the form of highly programmable network infrastructures such as software-defined networking (SDN) [17, 28] and network function virtualization (NFV) or software-defined middlebox infrastructure [11,13,19,23,34,39,44]. To date, existing research has largely focused on the systems to enable a dynamic security infrastructure, but leave the automated use of these newly programmable infrastructures as an open topic.

In this paper, we argue that the cloud needs a reputation system. Reputation systems leverage the existence of many, collaborating parties to automatically form opinions about each other. A cloud can leverage the power of the crowd—the many interacting tenants—to achieve three primary goals: (1) focus isolation-related
resources on tenants that more likely cause problems, (2) optimize communication between behaving parties, and (3) enable a security posture that automatically adapts to the dynamicity of tenants and services entering and leaving a cloud infrastructure.

In addition to the above three goals, we believe a reputation-based system can encourage a culture of self-policing. A report from Verizon [48] shows that a large majority of compromises are detected by a third party, not the infected party itself, as the infected software starts interacting with external services. In service-centric clouds, being able to monitor sentiment through the reputation system will allow a good intentioned tenant to know something is wrong (e.g., when its reputation drops). This is a missing feature in traditional, security-centric infrastructures that are based on isolation from others.

We introduce Seit¹, a general reputation-based framework. Seit defines simple, yet generic interfaces that can be easily integrated into different cloud management stacks. These interfaces interact with a reputation manager that maintains tenant reputations and governs introductions between different tenants. Together, the interfaces and reputation manager enable reputation-based service differentiation in a way that maintains stable reputations at each tenant and separates misbehaving tenants from well-behaved tenants. Specifically, this paper makes the following contributions:

- An architecture that represents a practical realization of an existing reputation mechanism that is resilient to common attacks on reputation systems and adapted to support the operating environment of the cloud’s dynamically changing behavior. We optimize that mechanism with a query mechanism that supports the abstraction of a continuous query being performed.
- The demonstration of the feasibility with a prototype implementation and integration of Seit across a number of popular cloud and network components, including: Floodlight [3] (an SDN controller), CloudFoundry [2] (a Platform as a Service cloud), HAProxy [4] (a load balancer), Snort [37] (an intrusion detection system), and Nagios [7] (a monitoring system).
- A proof, through an analytical model, that the system is able to effectively isolate bad tenants, and that the system can remain stable despite the high dynamics.
- The demonstration of the effectiveness of Seit and the cloud components we integrated through an evaluation that shows (1) an effective ability to protect tenants from attackers by propagating information about malicious behavior by way of reputations updates, (2) an effectiveness in reducing costs of security middlebox infrastructure without compromising security, and (3) the incentives to provide good service in a PaaS cloud where users have information about service reputation in selecting a provider.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we survey related work. Section 3 highlights how a reputation-based system can benefit different cloud environments, and also identifies key design challenges. Section 4 describes the architecture of Seit. Section 5 provides Seit’s implementation details. We analyze the isolation and stability of properties of Seit in Section 6. We evaluate Seit’s efficacy in Section 7. The paper concludes in Section 8.

2. RELATED WORK

Seit builds on past research in cloud systems and reputation systems. Here, we discuss these works.

Cloud Systems for Inter-tenant Communication. Communication within clouds has largely focused on isolation mechanisms between tenants. A few systems focused explicitly on handling inter-tenant communication. In particular, CloudPolice [33] implements a hypervisor-based access control mechanism, and Hadrian [15] proposed a new network sharing framework which revisited the guarantees given to tenants. Seit is largely orthogonal to these. Most closely related to Seit is Jobber [38], which proposed using reputation systems in the cloud. With Seit, we provide a practical implementation, demonstrate stability and isolation, integrate with real cloud components, and provide a full evaluation.

Reputation for Determining Communication. Leveraging reputation has been explored in many areas to create robust, trust-worthy systems. For example, Introduction-Based Routing (IBR) creates incentives to separate misbehaving network participants by leveraging implicit trust relationships and per-node discretion [18]. With Seit, we leverage IBR in a practical implementation for a cloud system and extend it to support more dynamic use. Ostra [30] studied the use of trust relationships among users, which already exist in many applications (namely, social networks), to thwart unwanted communication. Ostra’s credit scheme ensures the overall credit balance unchanged at any times so that malicious, colluding users can pass credits only between themselves, protecting against sybils. SybilGuard [50] also uses social networks to identify a user with multiple identities. At a high level, Ostra and Seit have some similarity, namely in the objective of thwarting unwanted communication. The biggest difference is that Ostra was designed for person-to-person communication (email, social networks, etc.), whereas Seit is

¹Seit means reputation or renown in the Arabic language.
designed for machine-to-machine communication. This then impacts how communication is handled. In Ostra, communication is either wanted or unwanted; unwanted communication is blocked. Seit goes beyond simply being able to block certain users and allows for a variety of responses. Further, being machine-to-machine as opposed to being person-to-person impacts how feedback is handled. In Ostra, feedback was explicit based on human input, whereas Seit integrates with a variety of systems that provide implicit feedback of varying strength.

**Reputation for Peer-to-peer Systems.** In peer-to-peer systems, reputation-based approaches involving other participants are used for better decisions about cooperation such as preventing free-riders and authentic file pieces in the system. For example, EigenTrust [24] aims to filter inauthentic file pieces by maintaining a unique global reputation score of each peer based on the peer’s history of uploads. Dandelion [42], PledgeRouter [26], FairTorrent [40], and one hop reputation system [31] aim at minimizing the overhead of maintaining reputation scores across peers either by placing a central trusted server or by limiting the scope of reputation calculations. Seit is targeting an environment where there is not a direct give-and-take relationship; as such, we leverage a richer reputation mechanism that maintains a graph of all user interactions and uses it to determine local reputation for each user.

### 3. REPUTATION MATTERS

In this section, we elaborate on the potential benefits provided by a cloud reputation-based system, covering four different systems. Using these examples, we then identify the key design challenges in building a cloud reputation-based system.

#### 3.1 Motivational Examples

**Reputation-augmented SDN Controller.** An IaaS cloud provides tenants with an ability to dynamically launch and terminate virtual machines (VMs). The provider’s network is also becoming highly programmable using SDN approaches. SDN policies, in general, use explicit rules for managing flows (blocking some, allowing some, or directing some through a sequence of (security) middleboxes [17]). A reputation-based system would extend the SDN interfaces to enable flow control using implicit rules. Instead of a tenant needing to specify, for example, specific flows to block, it could specify that flows originating from sources with low reputation scores should be blocked. This is illustrated in Figure 1(a), where Tenant T2 is blocking the traffic from T1. Likewise, the tenant can specify a set of middlebox traversal paths that then get tied to a given reputation score. This is illustrated in Figure 1(b), where Tenant T3 views T1 as good, so gives it a direct path; Tenant T3 also views T2 as suspect, so forces its traffic through a middlebox.

**Reputation-augmented PaaS Brokers.** PaaS clouds offer the ability to compose applications using services provided by the platform. In some cases, a PaaS cloud provides all of the services (e.g., Microsoft Azure [10]). In other cases, platforms, such as CloudFoundry [2], provide an environment where many service providers can offer their services.

As illustrated in Figure 2, service consumers use a broker to (1) discover services and (2) bind to them. Service discovery, in general, implements a simple search capability, focusing on returning one-to-one match with the needed service (e.g., version 2.6 of MongoDB). With a reputation-based system, service discovery can be enriched to include many new metrics that capture the quality of service as perceived by other users. So, if two different providers offer version 2.6 of MongoDB, then consumers can reason about which service offer better quality.

In a similar way, a reputation-based system can be useful for service providers during the binding phase, since it maintains historical information on consumers of the service. In CloudFoundry, for example, the service provider (e.g., MongoDB) is responsible to implementing multi-tenancy. Most data stores do not create separate containers (or VMs) per tenant; they simply create different table spaces for each tenant. With a reputation-based system, service providers can implement different tenant isolation primitives. An untrusted tenant is provisioned a separate container and is charged more because of the additional computing resources that are required.

**Reputation-based Load Balancing.** Tenants and services can directly implement a reputation-based system without explicit support from the cloud providers. The resulting system in this setup would resemble a peer-to-peer reputation-based system, where reputation is used to provide differentiated services.

Figure 3 illustrates the integration of a reputation-based system into a web service, where load balancers are used to distribute client load across identical in-
stances of the service. Typically, load balancers aim for even distribution [8]. With a reputation-based system, the web service can differentiate its users based on their reputation, directing good/trusted clients to a set of servers, and bad/untrusted clients to a different set of servers.

**Sentiment-based Self-policing.** In traditional infrastructures, the administrator has great visibility of what is happening inside of the infrastructure through a variety of monitoring tools. The administrator, however, has limited visibility into how the infrastructure is viewed externally. Major outages are obvious and are easy to detect. Other types of issues might, at best, result in an email (or other reporting mechanism) being sent to the administrator. Sentiment analysis is widely used in corporations (e.g., monitor Twitter feeds to observe whether there is any positive or negative chatter affecting its brand [14, 21]). With a reputation-based system, a service can monitor its sentiment as perceived by its consumers. By monitoring one’s sentiment, the tenant can determine whether others are having a negative experience interacting with it, then trigger a root cause analysis. This is supported by a report from Verizon [48] which says that in many cases, infiltrations are largely detected by external parties, not by the infected party itself.

### 3.2 Design Challenges

Reputation systems have been used in peer-to-peer systems to prevent leachers [24,35,40,42], and in person-to-person communication systems to prevent unwanted communication [30]. Applying to the cloud has the unique challenges in being machine-to-machine, highly variable, and highly dynamic interactions. In this subsection, we identify five design challenges when building a cloud-based reputation-based system.

**Integration.** Cloud components and services come in all shapes and sizes. Integrating a reputation-based system do not require substantial development efforts. Similar to service life-cycle calls in PaaS clouds [2], a reputation-based system must define simple, yet generic interfaces that can be easily implemented by service providers. More importantly, the interfaces should support configurable query language that provides support for efficient continuous query and feedback.

**Interpretation of a Reputation.** Depending on the service, reputations can be interpreted in many ways. Here, there is challenge in defining what constitutes good or bad, and doing it automatically (i.e., a human will not be explicitly marking something as good or bad). Even more, in machine-to-machine communication, an interaction is not necessarily binary (good or bad), as there is a wide range of possible interactions.

**Isolation.** In a human-centric reputation-based system (e.g., Stack Overflow [9]), a global user reputation is desirable. In contrast, the cloud consists of a wide variety of systems. The reputation mechanism must be effective in clustering tenants into groups (e.g., to isolate bad tenants) based on both local (tenant) view and global view.

**Stability.** The ability to isolate bad tenants prevents system oscillations as tenants adjust their reputations: instead, misbehaving tenants will converge to a low reputation, and other tenants to a higher reputation. Moreover, the reputation mechanism should be stable to short-term fluctuations in behavior. For instance, if a tenant accidentally misbehaves for a short time before resuming its normal behavior, it should be able to eventually recover its reputation instead of being immediately and permanently blacklisted by other tenants.

**Resiliency.** Finally, a reputation mechanism must be resilient to attacks of the reputation mechanism itself. In particular, an attacker falsely manages to build up a good reputation before launching an attack by, for example, sybils, or other tenants controlled by it that effectively say good things about the attacker.

### 4. SEIT

SEIT was designed with the above challenges in mind. Figure 4 shows an overview of SEIT’s architecture. SEIT includes a collection of interfaces that are specific to the individual components and parties within the cloud.
Seit also consists of a centralized reputation manager that interfaces with both the cloud provider(s) and each tenant. In this section, we introduce these two main components and describe how they address the above challenges.

4.1 Integration Interfaces

To make Seit fully integratable into cloud systems, we need interfaces between user components (e.g., firewalls, load balancers, network controllers, etc.) and the reputation manager. Seit includes a framework to create a shim around existing components. As shown in Figure 5, Seit shims extend a component’s existing interface with (potentially) two additional interfaces that interact with Seit’s reputation manager. The two additional interfaces represent two subcomponents: inbound and outbound logic. The shim’s inbound logic interprets how incoming reputation updates should impact the execution of the component. The outbound logic translates how alerts, events, and status updates from the component should impact the reputation that is sent back to the reputation manager. Both inbound and outbound logics are component specific; some components only implement one of these two logics. Here, we provide a few examples to clarify the design and interface of shims:

- **SDN Controller in IaaS Clouds:** The IaaS network controller is what manages the physical cloud network. We assume that the network controller has an interface to set up a logical topology (e.g., place a firewall in between the external network and local network), and an interface to block traffic. The shim’s inbound logic will extend these capabilities to make use of reputations. For example, if reputation is less than 0, block; between 0 and 0.8, direct to a security middlebox; greater than 0.8, provide a direct connection.

- **PaaS Broker:** The PaaS broker’s responsibility is to effectively serve as a discovery mechanism for services in the cloud. With Seit, we can extend it to enrich and filter the results. Whenever a search request arrives at the broker, the shim’s outbound logic would interpose on the request and queries the reputation manager to get the reputations of the searched services; the inbound logic would then sort and filter the results based on user-defined criteria. For example, it may be configured to filter out any services that would have less than a 0.3 reputation for a given user, and sort the remaining results.

- **Load Balancer:** As mentioned earlier, a reputation-augmented load balancer can be used to provide differentiated services to trusted and untrusted users. Here, the shim’s inbound logic assigns new connections to servers based on the tenant’s reputation score.

- **Infrastructure Monitor:** Infrastructure monitoring tools present information about the infrastructure to the administrators. Monitoring can be used as a way to alert administrators of changes in services reputations. This would be implemented in the shim’s inbound logic. It can also be used to update the reputation of services based on monitoring information (e.g., detecting port scans by a tenant). This would be implemented in the shim’s outbound logic.

- **Intrusion Detection System:** An intrusion detection system (IDS) monitors network traffic and looks for signatures within packets or performs behavioral analysis of the traffic to detect anomalies. In this case, the shim’s outbound logic is designed to intercept the alerts from the IDS, and allow users to configure the feedback weights for each alert type. For example, the shim can decrease...
the tenant’s reputation by 0.1 when seeing a connection drop alert. Similarly, it can decrease the reputation by 0.5 when seeing a port scan alert.

The above discussion presented only a few examples. We envision all components being integrated with Seit to provide feedback. For simplicity, the above discussion also focused on negative feedback. Positive feedback might be time-based, packet-based, or connection-based. For example, a web server might provide positive feedback when it goes through an entire session with well-formed http requests. An IDS might provide positive feedback for every megabyte of traffic that does not trigger an alert.

4.2 Reputation Manager

The reputation manager is responsible for maintaining a view of the reputations as perceived by various tenants. The core of the reputation manager is a reputation graph and means to query the graph.

4.2.1 Reputation Graph

In Seit, reputation is modeled as a graph with nodes representing tenants\(^3\) and edges representing one node’s (tenant’s) view of the other node (tenant) when the two have direct communication with each other. Here, we describe the mechanism for building and using this reputation graph.

Seit adapts the introduction-based routing (IBR) protocol [18] used in P2P networks for tenant interactions because of its ability to incorporate feedback in a highly dynamic graph, and its resilience to sybil attacks. IBR, however, is not an intrinsic requirement of Seit. Seit requires only that reputation scores are maintained for each tenant’s view of other tenants and uses these scores to determine the form of interaction between them. We, thus, do not consider the full spectrum of reputation system properties; considerations such as the possibility of gaming the system are out of the scope of this paper.

Calculating Reputations. IBR in P2P networks allows peers to use participant feedback as a basis for making their relationship choices. While IBR can be decentralized (as it was originally designed for P2P networks), in centralizing the design, we internally use the IBR model, but eliminate the signaling protocol between peers. We give an example of IBR’s reputation calculation in Figure 6. The main idea is that tenants can pass feedback to each other based on their introductions to other tenants. Positive feedback results in a higher reputation, and negative feedback in a lower reputation.

Nodes \(A, B, C\) and \(D\) in Figure 6 are peers. The straight lines indicate established connections. Each node maintains a reputation score (trust level) for the nodes connected to it. When Node \(A\) wants to communicate with Node \(D\), it must follow the chain of connections between it and \(D\) and ask the nodes in the chain for introduction to the node after. Node \(A\) starts asking \(B\) for introduction to \(C\). Node \(B\) looks at node \(A\)’s behavior history (represented by reputation score \(AB\)) from its local repository and decides whether or not to forward \(A\)’s request to \(C\). If the request is forwarded, \(C\) looks at behavior history of \(B\) (\(BC\)) and decides whether or not to accept the introduction request. The process continues until \(A\) reaches \(D\). If \(B, C,\) or \(D\) rejects a request, node \(A\) will not be able to communicate with \(D\). After the connection is established between \(A\) and \(C\), \(C\) assigns a reputations score to \(A\) (\(CA\)) which is \(x\times R(BC)\), where \(x\) is a scaling parameter and \(R(BC)\) is the reputation score of \(B\) to \(A\). Similarly, \(D\) assigns reputations score of \(DA\) which is \(y \times R(DC)\). If \(A\) starts behaving negatively (e.g., sending malicious packets to \(D\)), \(D\) will decrease \(A\)’s score \(DA\) and also decreases \(C\)’s score \(DC\) since \(C\) took the responsibility and introduced \(A\) to \(D\). \(C\) will do the same and decrease \(A\)’s score \(AC\) and \(B\)’s score since it introduced \(A\) to \(C\). Finally, \(B\) will decrease \(A\)’s reputation score \(AB\). This approach ensures that nodes are especially cautious about whom they introduce. Eventually, misbehaving nodes will be isolated, with no other nodes will be willing to introduce them when their scores fall under the minimum trust level score. We will show this property in Section 6.

To reiterate, the IBR introduction mechanism is hidden from tenants. They simply ask for a connection to another tenant and are informed whether a path is available and accepted, and if so, what the reputation score is.

Bootstrapping the Reputation Graph. When a tenant joins Seit’s framework, it receives a default global reputation score (assigned by the reputation manager) and zero local reputation score until it begins to interacts with other tenants. Upon being introduced to a tenant, the introduced tenant’s initial reputation score will be based on the introducer’s score; it can then evolve based on the reputation calculations that we describe next. In general, the speed with which a tenant builds a reputation depends on several factors such as number of tenants it interact with, the services it provides to these tenants, and any privacy and security threats to these tenants. A new tenant does, however, have an incentive to provide good services: its actions at one tenant can propagate to others through introductions, influencing its reputation at these other tenants. Since individual tenants do not have a global view of these introduction relationships, these dynamics also

\(^3\)In the future, we will explore reputations for a finer granularity than tenants.
make it difficult for a malicious tenant to target a particular victim, as it must first find an introduction chain to reach the target.

### 4.2.2 Configurable Query Interface

In centralizing the IBR mechanism, we can provide a highly configurable interface to query the reputation. Here, we elaborate on both the initial query configuration as well as for subsequent queries.

**Initial Query.** A reputation query can be as simple as calculating the shortest path between two nodes, creating a new edge between the nodes, and then only updating the direct edge between the two nodes upon reputation feedback (direct feedback). In the reputation mechanism we are using, the feedback also impacts the edges of the initial path between the two nodes (indirect feedback).

This adds an interesting aspect to the initial query: should an intermediate node allow the search to include certain outgoing edges in the query or not (or, in IBR terms, whether a node should make an introduction). To support each user’s flexibility, Seit provides the ability to configure two aspects:

- **Outgoing Edge Selectivity:** The idea behind introduction-based routing is analogous to real life: if a person I trust introduces someone, I am likely to trust that person more than if they were a random stranger. If I have a good interaction with that person, it generally strengthens my trust in the person that made the introduction. A bad interaction can have the opposite effect. As such, people are generally selective in introductions, especially in relationships where there is a great deal of good will built up. In Seit, the tenant has full control over the thresholds for which an introduction is made. They can introduce everyone with a low threshold; they can also be selective with a very high threshold.

- **Query Rate Limit:** A consideration in serving as intermediate nodes (making introductions) is the magnitude of the potential impact to one’s reputation. For this, Seit includes the ability to limit the rate at which a given node serves as an intermediate node. In doing so, it allows the system to adapt the reputations based on these new interactions, so that future requests to serve as an intermediate node will have that additional information. As an extreme example, say there is no rate limiting, Tenant A’s reputation is above the threshold for Tenant B to introduce it to Tenant C through Z. Tenant A then attacks C through Z, and B’s reputation suffers accordingly. Instead, if B was rate limited, A could only connect to C, and need to build up good reputation with C, or wait sufficient time, to be able to connect to the other tenants.

**Subsequent (implicit) Queries.** In Seit, we support the view that any interaction should reflect the current reputation and that it is the current reputation that should be used when handling any interaction. In other words, a reputation query should be performed continuously for all ongoing interactions. This, of course, would be highly impractical.

Instead, Seit integrates triggers within the reputation manager. Reputation changes whenever feedback is received—positive or negative. Within Seit, the affected paths through the graph that are affected by any single edge update is tracked. Then, upon an update of an edge due to feedback being received, Seit will examine a list of thresholds in order to notify a tenant when a threshold has been crossed (which ultimately are sent to each component).

These threshold lists come from the shims within each tenant’s infrastructure. The shims are what the tenant configures (or leaves the defaults) to specify actions to take based upon different reputation values. When a Shim is initialized, or the configuration changes, the shim will notify the Seit reputation manager of these values.

### 5. IMPLEMENTATION

We have built a prototype of the Seit reputation manager, and integrated it with several cloud components. We discuss these here.
| Category                      | System               | Description                                                                                                                                 |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| IaaS SDN Controller          | Floodlight [3]       | The shim maps the reputation to OpenFlow rules via the Floodlight REST API to block or direct traffic.                                         |
| PaaS Broker                  | CloudFoundry [2]     | The shim interfaces between the CloudFoundry broker and the CloudFoundry command line interface (used by the users) to filter and sort the marketplace results based on their reputation. |
| Load Balancer                | HAProy [4]           | This shim alters the configurations written in a haproxy.cfg file to specify load balancing based on the reputation (directing tenants to servers based on reputation). Upon every change, the shim will tell HAProy to reload the configuration. |
| Infrastructure Monitoring    | Nagios [7]           | We took advantage of JNRPE (Java Nagios Remote Plugin Executor) [22] to build a Java plugin that is listening for any reputations sent by Seit’s reputation manager, and displays this sentiment and configures alerts for when sentiment (collective reputation of the tenant running Nagios) drops. |
| Intrusion Detection System   | Snort [37]           | Snort alerts are configured to log to Syslog. By using SWATCH [43] to monitor Syslog, the Seit shim is alerted to all Snort alerts. The shim parses the alerts and extracts information such as source IP and alert type and send the feedback to the reputation manager. |

Table 1: Implemented shims

We prototyped the reputation manager in approximately 7300 lines of Java code. We implemented the reputation manager as a scalable Java-based server that uses Java NIO to efficiently handle a large number of tenant connections. We also provided an admin API to setup, install, and view policies across the cloud, as well as facilitate new tenants and their services.

Rather than the reputation manager interfacing with each component, within each tenant, we built a per-tenant server to serve as a proxy between the tenant’s components and the reputation manager. This proxy is a light weight Java process that can be installed on any tenant machine. It listens on two separate interfaces for internal and external communications. The internal interface is used to communicate with a tenant’s own components, while the external interface is used to communicate with the reputation manager. The proxy can be configured with a text configuration file that specifies the following: (i) a list of components, each of which has the name of the component, IP, type (service, executor, sensor), component description and its tasks; (ii) the edge selectivity threshold to specify when to refuse or accept connections or introduction requests from a tenant; and (iii) the query rate limit.

All communication in Seit is performed through a common messaging interface. The API includes (1) a registration request from the components when they boot up for the first time, (2) a connection request when one tenant requires communication with another tenant, which includes both the initial request and a message to approve (sent to both source and destination) or reject the request (sent only to the source), (3) a feedback message containing the components desire to positively or negatively impact the reputation score for a given connection (impacting both the reputation of the other tenant, but also the introducers responsible), and (4) a configuration message setting new thresholds and query configurations.

We built a shim interface for a number of cloud components, one for each example discussed in Section 4.1. Table 1 summarizes these components.

6. ANALYSIS OF SEIT’S ISOLATION AND STABILITY

Using IBR allows Seit to both separate misbehaving tenants from well-behaved tenants and maintain stable reputations at each tenant. In this section, we formally show that these properties hold.

We consider an IBR system with $N$ tenants, each of whom desires services from other tenants and can provide some services in return.\(^5\) We consider a series of discrete timeslots $t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$ and use $q_{ij}[t] \in [-1, 1]$ to denote tenant $i$’s feedback on the services provided by tenant $j$ at time $t$. This feedback may include both the received fraction of tenant $i$’s requested service (e.g., 3GB out of a requested 5GB of SQL storage) as well as whether the service was useful (e.g., sending malicious packets). We let $R_{ij}[t] \in [0, 1]$ denote tenant $j$’s reputation score at tenant $i$ during timeslot $t$.

Tenants update their reputation scores in every timeslot according to feedback from the previous timeslot, as described in Section 4.2. We suppose that these updates are linear in the feedback received, and define $q_{ij}^{ibr}[t]$ as a weighted average of the feedback $q_{kj}[t]$ provided by all tenant pairs that contribute to $j$’s reputation at tenant $i$ (e.g., including tenants that $j$ introduced to $i$). The reputation dynamics then follow

$$R_{ij}[t + 1] = \max \left\{(1 - \alpha)R_{ij}[t] + \alpha q_{ij}^{ibr}[t], 0\right\} \quad (1)$$

where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ is a parameter chosen by tenant $i$. A larger $\alpha$ allows the reputations to evolve more quickly.

**Isolation of Misbehaving Tenants.** In typical scenarios, tenants will likely act based on their reputation

\(^5\)Different tenants may provide different services; our analysis is agnostic to the type of the service.
scores of other tenants: for instance, tenant $i$ would likely provide better service to tenants with higher reputation scores. We can approximate this behavior by supposing that the service provided by tenant $j$ to tenant $i$ (and thus $i$’s feedback $q_{ij}[t]$ on $j$’s service) is proportional to $i$’s reputation score at $j$: $q_{ij}[t] = \pm R_j[t]$, where the sign of $q_{ij}[t]$ is fixed and determined by whether tenant $j$ is a “good” or “bad” tenant. The reputation dynamics (1) are then linear in the $R_{ij}$, allowing us to determine the equilibrium reputations:

**Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Reputations).**
Equilibria of (1) occur when, for each pair of tenants $(i, j)$, either $q_{ij}^{ibr}[t] = R_{ij}[t]$ or $R_{ij}[t] = 0$ and $q_{ij}^{ibr}[t] < 0$.

These equilibria are Lyapunov-stable, and the system converges to this equilibrium.

**Proof.** We can find the equilibria specified by solving (1) with $q_{ij}[t] = \pm R_{ij}[t]$. To see that the equilibria are Lyapunov-stable, we note that (1) can be written as $R'[t + 1] = \Sigma R[t]$, where $R[t]$ is a vector of the $R_{ij}[t]$ and $\Sigma$ a constant matrix. It therefore suffices to show that $\Sigma$ has no eigenvalue larger than 1. We now write $\Sigma = (1 - \alpha)I_{2N} + \alpha \Sigma_1$, where each row of $\Sigma_1$ sums to 1 since $q_{ij}^{ibr}$ is a weighted average. Thus, the maximum eigenvalue of $\alpha \Sigma_1$ is $\alpha$, and that of $\Sigma$ is $(1 - \alpha) + \alpha = 1$. Since linear systems either diverge or converge to an equilibrium and the $R_{ij}$ are bounded, the system must converge to this (unique) equilibrium.

This result shows that equilibria are reached when tenants agree with each others’ reputations: the overall feedback $q_{ij}^{ibr}[t]$ that tenant $i$ receives from tenant $j$ is consistent with tenant $j$’s reputation at tenant $i$.

We can interpret Prop. 1’s result as showing that at the equilibrium, tenants segregate into two different groups: one group of “bad” tenants who provide bad-quality service and have zero reputation, receiving no service; and one group of “good” tenants with positive reputations, who receive a positive amount of service. Thus, tenants may experience a desirable “race to the bottom.”

We illustrate these findings in Figure 7, which simulates the behavior of 100 tenants, 10 of which are assumed to be malicious ($q_{ij}[t] = -1$). Tenants’ reputations are assumed to be specified as in (1) and are randomly initialized between 0 and 1, with $\alpha = 0.1$. The figure shows the average reputation over time of both bad and good tenants. We see that good tenants consistently maintain high reputations at good tenants, while bad tenants quickly gain bad reputations at all tenants.

**Stability.** While the analysis above considers binary “bad” and “good” tenants, some “bad” misbehaviors are not always malicious. For instance, tenants may occasionally send misconfigured packets by accident. Such tenants should be able to recover their reputations over time, instead of being immediately blacklisted at the client. Conversely, if malicious tenants occasionally send useful traffic in order to confuse their targets, they should not be able to improve their reputations permanently. We now show that this is the case:

**Proposition 2 (Reputation Stability).** Let $\{R_{ij}[t], t \geq 0\}$ and $\{R_{ij}'[t], t \geq 0\}$ respectively denote the reputation scores given the feedback $q_{ij}^{ibr}[t]$ and $q_{ij}'^{ibr}[t]$. Suppose $q_{ij}^{ibr}[0] \neq q_{ij}'^{ibr}[0]$ and $q_{ij}[t] = q_{ij}'[t]$ for $t > 0$. Then $\lim_{t \to \infty} |R_{ij}[t] - R_{ij}'[t]| \to 0$.

The proof follows directly from (1). If tenants misbehave temporarily ($q_{ij}^{ibr}[0] < 0$ and $q_{ij}'^{ibr}[0] > 0$ but $q_{ij}^{ibr}[t] > 0$), the effect of this initial misbehavior on their reputations disappears over time.

7. EVALUATION

In this section, we evaluate both the performance of Sei’s implementation through micro-benchmarks as well as the benefits of using reputation in a number of contexts. We used three large Linux servers to run the experiments: Server 1: 64GB RAM, 24 Intel CPUs (2.4GHz each), and running the reputation manager; Server 2: 64GB RAM, 24 CPUs (2.4GHz each), and running Mininet. Server 3: 32GB RAM, 12 Intel CPUs (2.00GHz each), and running Floodlight.

7.1 Performance Overhead

Despite its benefits, a reputation-based system does introduce some overhead. In this subsection, we study the extent of these overhead.

**Query Throughput and Latency.** The reputation manager performs a query when a tenant wants to connect to another tenant. We performed a micro benchmark where we varied the number of tenants in the network and calculated both the throughput (number of queries per second) and latency (time to calculate a
single query on average) of our implementation. Shown in Figure 8a is the throughput that the reputation manager can handle for a given number of tenants. To calculate throughput, we took a snapshot of the reputation graph from a simulated execution, and injected queries at a fixed rate. The max throughput was the maximum query rate we were able to achieve such that the total time to receive all responses was within a small threshold of the total time to send all queries (the response time is linearly related to the request time until overload, at which point it becomes exponentially related). Important to note is these results (i) reflects initial queries, which will not be frequent, and (ii) reflects a single instance. This can be mitigated if the reputation manager is designed as distributed component (and left as future work). Shown in Figure 8b is the average latency of a single query, on the order of milliseconds. This is similar (in order of magnitude) to the overheads imposed, for example, by a typical SDN flow setup (and we expect queries to be less frequent than flow setups).

**Impact of Dynamic Behavior.** To see how much dynamic behavior impacts an example component, we varied the frequency of reputation change notifications sent to an HAProxy component. In our setup with HAProxy running in its own virtual machine, iperf [46] reported HAProxy with a static configuration as being able to achieve a rate of 8.08 Gbps. With Seit updating the reputation (meaning the reputation changed to cross a threshold) at a rate of once every second only reduced the throughput of HAProxy to 7.78 Gbps; at (an extreme) rate of once every millisecond, it reduced the throughput to 5.58 Gbps.

### 7.2 **Seit Benefits**

The main motivation for using Seit is that it can improve a variety of aspects of a cloud operation. Here, we evaluate the benefit of Seit in three contexts chosen to show: (i) security improvements, (ii) efficiency gains (cost savings), and (iii) revenue gains.

### 7.3 **Set up and Parameters**

We built an evaluation platform using Mininet [27] to emulate a typical cloud environment. In each experiment, we run the Seit reputation manager along with configuring a tenant setup specific to each experiment. This evaluation platform allows us to specify four key parts of an experiment:

- **Graph Construction:** How the graph is built (i.e., how interconnections are made).
- **Sensor Configuration:** What is the sensor (i.e., what does the sensor detect in order to provide feedback)
- **Reputation Use:** What can be controlled (i.e., what component/configuration does reputation impact).
- **Traffic Pattern:** What is the traffic pattern. Importantly, in each case rates are chosen based on the emulation platform limitations (absolute values of rates are not meaningful).

### 7.4 **Improved Security by Isolating Attackers**

One benefit of Seit is that it provides the ability to cluster good participants and effectively isolate bad participants. Here, we show Seit’s effectiveness in thwarting a simulated denial of service (DoS) attack, where an attacker overwhelms his victims with packets/requests in order to exhaust the victim’s resources (or in the case of elastically scalable services, cause the victim to spend more money). In our evaluation, we are mimicking an attack that happened on Amazon EC2 [12, 29], where hackers exploited a bug in Amazon EC2 API to gain access to other tenants accounts and then flood other servers with UDP packets.

We considered three scenarios in each run. The first scenario is a data center where tenants do not use any kind of reputation feedback and each tenant independently makes a local decision to block or allow communication. In the other two scenarios, tenants use Seit, and thus report about any attacks they detect and use reputation to isolate bad tenants. The only difference between the two scenarios is the attack pattern. In one, the attacker will attack its victims sequentially; in the other, the attacker establishes connections with all of its victims simultaneously and attacks them in parallel.
• **Graph Construction:** For the graph construction, we select the number of tenants for the given run of the experiment. For each tenant, we select the number of other tenants it connects to randomly from 1 to 5. For each tenant, we set their ‘tenant quality’: 3% are explicitly marked as attackers with tenant quality of 0, the rest are randomly assigned a quality metric from 0.1 to 1.0.

• **Sensor Configuration:** While Seit can support a variety of sensors, in this experiment we use a simplified model, where traffic explicitly consists of good packets and bad packets, and a simple sensor that detects “bad” packets with probability 0.9.

• **Reputation Use:** the IaaS network controller (in our case, a Floodlight controller) will block a tenant from being able to send traffic to another tenant when the reputation of the sender drops below some value.

• **Traffic Pattern:** Tenants generate traffic according to a simplistic model of a fixed rate and fixed inter-packet gap, where the probability of sending a good packet or bad packet is based on the tenant quality configuration (e.g., $q < 0.05$, representing a malicious tenant, always send bad packets, $0.05 \leq q < 0.5$, representing a careless tenant, send bad packets infrequently, and in proportion to the tenant quality, and $0.5 \leq q$, always send good packets). Attackers send traffic at a rate 10 times higher than other tenants (1 every 10ms vs 1 every 100ms). Each attacker sends a total 100 packets to each target while the rest send 50 packets. Attackers deviate from the connection graph determined above, instead attempt connection to 25% of the other tenants randomly.

We measured the total number of attack packets generated by attackers and the total number of these packets that reached the victims. We varied the total number of tenants in each run starting from 32 tenants up to 1024 tenants.

As shown in Figure 9, without Seit, over 90% of the attack packets will reach the victims, overloading the security middleboxes. With Seit, on the other hand, we are able to isolate the attacker. With more tenants in the cloud, we should be able to block more attack traffic as there will be greater amount of information about the attacker. A byproduct that is not shown is that, in this experiment, we are also decreasing the total overall traffic on the network by blocking at the source.

### 7.5 Decreased Costs by Managing Middlebox Chaining Policy

Another benefit of being able to differentiate users with reputation is that we can decrease the cost of operating security middleboxes, without compromising security. Here, we explore this benefit:

We place the constraint that a single middlebox instance can only handle 10 packets per second. This then allows us to capture the tradeoff between cost and security effectiveness (in our experiments, measured as number of bad packets that ultimately reached an end host).

We ran two variants of this experiment. In one variant we allow the number of middleboxes to scale to what is needed to match the traffic in a given time interval. In the other variant, we fix the budget to a specific number of middleboxes, in which case, if the middleboxes are overloaded, they will fail to process every packet. In each case, we calculate the total cost of operation (number of middlebox instances needed) as well as the security effectiveness (percentage of attack packets reached destination host). As shown in Figure 10, we can see that using Seit has a distinct improvement in security when being held to a fixed budget, and a distinct reduction in cost when shooting for a specific security coverage to handle the varying load.

### 7.6 Increasing Revenue by Managing PaaS Broker Search

In PaaS clouds, such as CloudFoundry, service providers offering similar service need a way to differentiate themselves. With a reputation system as provided
with Seit, service providers that have the highest quality of service get rewarded with more customers. Using the Seit integration with the CloudFoundry broker which sorts and filters search results, we evaluate the relationship between quality of service and revenue.

- **Graph Construction:** In this experiment, we have 1024 tenants, where we selected 256 tenants as service providers, 256 tenants as both service provider and service users, and the rest as service users only. For simplicity, we assume all service providers are providing identical services. To distinguish between service providers, we use four discrete tenant quality values 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 (higher is better). To bootstrap the experiment, we create an initial graph where for each service user tenant, we randomly select the number of service provider tenants it connects to (from 1 to 5).

- **Sensor Configuration:** Here, clients make requests and receive responses. The sensor detects whether a request got a response or not; Dropped requests are proxy for poor service.

- **Reputation Use:** For a PaaS broker, service tenant users perform a search for services to use. In the broker, we filter and sort the search results according to the service provider’s reputation. We assume a client performs a new search every 20 seconds. The service user will choose among the top results with some probability distribution (1st search result chosen 85% of the time, 2nd result 10% of the time, 3rd result 5% of the time).

We run the experiment for two minutes, and as a proxy for revenue, we count the number of times a service user selects a given service provider. As shown in Figure 11, the expected benefits hold. As tenants with the greatest tenant quality (0.8) had a greater revenue (showing over 2000 times they were selected), while tenants with lowest tenant quality had the least revenue (being selected around 300 times).

**8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK**

Cloud systems today are fostering ecosystems of interacting services. In this paper, we presented Seit as an inter-tenant framework that manages the interactions within the cloud through the use of a reputation-based system. The Seit architecture overcomes key challenges of using a reputation system in cloud environments around integration, isolation, stability, and resiliency. Using practical implementation, we demonstrate Seit’s benefits across a wide spectrum of cloud services. As future work, we plan to integrate more components and improve the overall performance of Seit. We also want study the implications of incremental deployments, where some tenants do not implement Seit. Finally, we want to study scalability challenges when managing a large number of components and tenants, especially across autonomous geodistributed clouds.
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