Penyebab Kegagalan Kudeta Militer di Turki Tahun 2016

Causes of the Failed of the Military Coup in Turkey in 2016

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ABSTRAK

Campur tangan militer dalam politik di Turki kembali terjadi dengan kudeta militer langsung pada 15 Juli 2016, namun kudeta tersebut mengalami kegagalan. Padahal, militer Turki sebelumnya berhasil melakukan kudeta langsung maupun tidak langsung pada tahun 1960, 1971, 1980 dan 1997. Dari masalah tersebut, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis penyebab kegagalan kudeta 2016 serta menggambarkan penyebab terjadinya kudeta dan membandingkan kudeta 2016 dengan kudeta langsung 1960 dan 1980. Metode kualitatif digunakan dengan melakukan studi pustaka, serta data yang bersumber pada jurnal ilmiah, pemberitaan, artikel, dan sumber lainnya yang terkait. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan, kegagalan kudeta militer pada 2016 tidak hanya dikarenakan penolakan dari masyarakat tetapi juga kegagalan kelompok kudeta dalam menangkap aktor-aktor kunci pemerintahan seperti Presiden Erdogan dan Perdana Menteri Binali Yildirim. Kegagalan menangkap aktor kunci tersebut membuat mereka mampu memobilisasi massa melawan kelompok kudeta, seperti yang dilakukan Presiden Erdogan yang mengumumkan penolakan kudeta melalui FaceTime yang disiarkan CNN Turk serta mengajak masyarakat menolak kudeta tersebut. Penolakan yang sama juga dilakukan oleh Binali Yildirim. Inilah salah satu faktor yang menyebabkan turunnya masyarakat Turki ke jalanan menolak upaya kudeta. Padahal melihat kudeta sebelumnya, militer selalu mendapatkan dukungan dari masyarakat Turki. Di samping itu juga terdapat peran teknologi yang menghubungkan aktor kunci dengan masyarakat Turki. Penelitian ini berkontribusi dalam menjelaskan pentingnya peran aktor kunci negara dalam melawan kudeta militer, serta memberikan gambaran cara bagi pemerintah sipil dan masyarakat umum dalam mengatasi kudeta militer.

Kata Kunci: Kudeta Militer, Erdogan, Teknologi, Turki

ABSTRACT

Military interference in politics in Turkey resumed with an outright military coup on July 15, 2016, but the Coup failed. The Turkish military has always successfully conducted coups, both directly and indirectly, which occurred in 1960, 1971,
1980, and 1997. From these problems, The study aims to analyze the causes of the failure of the 2016 coup and describe the causes of the Coup and compare the 2016 coup with the 1960 and 1980 direct coups. A qualitative method was used in this research by conducting literature studies and data sourced from scientific journals, news reports, articles, and other related sources. The results showed that the failure of the military Coup in 2016 was due to rejection from the community but also the failure of the coup group to arrest key government actors such as President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yildirim. The failure to arrest these key actors enabled them to mobilize the masses against the coup group, as did President Erdogan, who announced his rejection of the Coup through FaceTime broadcast by CNN Turk and invited the public to reject the Coup. Binali Yildirim also rejected the same problem. This is one of the factors that led to the descent of Turks to the streets against the coup attempt. Even though seeing the previous Coup, the military always received support from the Turkish people. In addition, there is also the role of technology that connects key actors with Turkish society. This research explains the important role of key state actors in countering military coups and provides an overview of ways for civilian governments and the general public to resist military coups.

**Keywords:** Military Coup, Erdogan, Technology, Turkey

**INTRODUCTION**

Pretorianism or commonly referred to as military intervention into politics, has always been an interesting study to study and observe, especially regarding coups. Moreover, the trend of military coups is currently continuing to decline. Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne (2011) stated that from 1950 to 2010, there were 457 coup attempts, of which 230 (50.3 percent) failed, and 227 (49.7 percent) succeeded. Even from 2011 to 2017, there were 29 with only seven successful coups and 22 failed coups (McCarthy, 2017). One such failed Coup occurred in Turkey in 2016. So it is interesting to see what caused the military Coup in Turkey to fail, whereas the direct coups in 1960 and 1980 and indirectly in 1971 and 1997 experienced success.

In the case of Turkey, the military was in power during the time of Mustafa Kemal. However, the role of the Turkish military changed to that of guardian or overseer of Turkish secularism after 1923 (Perlmutter, 2000). The Turkish military will interfere in politics when the military considers civilians a threat due to various factors such as the threat of secular ideology, internal...
conflicts of political or civil parties that cause political instability, poor economy, and threats from separatists. The intervention will be carried out by the military either directly (through a coup in which the military takes power directly from the legitimate government and declares the government to be subordinate to the military) or indirectly (half-coup, where the military ultimatums and threatens to take over the civilian government by the military when the state is deemed to be under threat).

The military's dominant role in politics in Turkey was already evident in the early days of Mustafa Kemal's reign. However, Mustafa Kemal changed the position of the military, which at first was very domineering, then became the protagonist, namely that the military played a role in maintaining the principle of Kemalism with the excuse of protecting the Turkish constitution. The military's role was slowly changed by Mustafa Kemal, as seen in Article 148 of the Military Law, which was enacted in 1930 and contained a 5-year prison sentence for the military who participated in political parties and political activities. This is then confirmed in article 35 of the Internal Law of the Armed Forces, which contains the main task of the armed forces, namely protecting and defending Turkish land. This provision was later reaffirmed in 1961. The Turkish military used the article as the basis for intervening or intervening in Turkish politics. These interventions are usually accompanied by the defense of the Kemalist ideology and the threat to state security (Hale, 2011).

The military continued to play its loyalty to the regime and participated in Ataturk's programs until before 1950. At this time, there was a symbiosis between the military and its single party, the CHP (Republican People's Party). Only entering 1950, the political map in Turkey began to change with the victory of the DP (Democratic Party / Democratic Party) led by Adnan Manderes by defeating the CHP party. However, on May 27, 1960, for the first time, the military carried out a direct coup against the government of Adnan
Menderes, citing political and economic instability (Hale, 2011). This first Coup saw the Turkish military act as watchdogs or guards.

After the direct Coup in 1960, the Democratic party was dissolved by the military. Since then, the power has been in the hands of the National Unity Committee (KPN) led by General Cemal Gursel, who was later appointed as Head of State concurrently Prime Minister and Minister of Defense (Basyar, 2015). After forming a civilian government and the election of a parliament, the military gave power back to civilians in 1961.

The indirect Coup reaffirmed the military's role as a guard in 1971, the direct Coup in 1980, the indirect Coup in 1997, and the direct Coup in 2016. The military intervention in Turkish politics was successful through the direct coups of 1960 and 1980 and the indirect Coup. Directly in 1971 and 1980. This can be seen from the success of the military taking power or replacing civilians who are considered a threat or unsuccessful in running their government. However, the military failed to intervene in the form of a direct coup in 2016. The direct Coup, launched on July 15, 2016, was initially considered successful but ultimately failed (Anadolu Agency, 2016). So it is interesting to see what factors caused the failure of military intervention or intervention in the 2016 direct coup.

Several researchers have previously explained the causes of the failure of the military Coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016. Caliskan (2017), for example, mentions that one of the factors in the failure of the military Coup carried out by the Gulenist Faction on July 15, 2016, was the rejection that came from the community. The descent of the Turkish people into the streets is a form of public rejection of the Coup launched by the military. This public rejection of the coup attempt was the first time in Turkish history (Caliskan, 2017). Other writers such as Yayla (2016) also support the rejection theory even though he prefers the rejection to come from various community groups, including political forces. According to him, the failure of the Turkish military Coup was
caused by rejection from political party leaders, both from the AKP and the opposition, rejection from various circles of society, the courts, and the media.

As for Unay and Dilek (2016), the Turkish military Coup on July 16, 2016, occurred at an inopportune time. The Coup occurred when Turkey’s economy was relatively stable with relatively good economic growth. For them, this is the reason for the rejection from the public for the Coup carried out by the military. This is in contrast to the direct coups of 1960 and 1980 in Turkey. During the Coup, Turkey was experiencing an economic crisis, so the military Coup was supported by the Turkish people.

Caliskan, Yayla, Unay, and Dilek have the same view in seeing the cause of the failure of the Coup, namely the rejection of the community. In contrast to the researcher's view, this study looks at the failure of the military Coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016, not only due to the rejection from the public but also the failure of the coup group to arrest key actors in the government, especially the failure to arrest President Erdogan. This failure to arrest President Erdogan allowed him to give orders to the public to reject the coup attempt. In the Coup's failure, we can also see how the role of technology used by key actors to reach the masses in opposing the Coup and the information that occurred when the Coup occurred.

Edward Luttwak (1979) mentions a successful coup involves two stages, namely (1) direct takeover and (2) winning and maintaining control. These two stages are important for a coup to be successful. The first stage is to arrest and neutralize key installations and players such as the government, defense, and public order ministries, military and police headquarters, television and telecommunications facilities, key transportation, and detention of government leaders and other potential opponents. Thus, this first stage destabilizes the situation and eliminates the old control regime "over critical state mechanisms". The second stage is a more difficult and sensitive stage which requires the coup d'etat to use organs confiscated from the state to stabilize or restore the situation. This can be achieved by ensuring
unity within the coup forces, winning the support of the bureaucracy and the military, maintaining public order, and striving to gain conformity, cooperation, and popular acceptance. This needs to be done so that there is no opposition to the Coup carried out.

This study uses the coup theory described by Edward Luttwak. This is because Luttwak's view talks about how to overthrow the government quickly and precisely and the importance of capturing key actors. This view can be used to look at the case of the Failed Coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016, where at the beginning of the Coup, the military managed to control strategic places but failed to capture key actors.

This study describes the causal factors and how these factors influenced the failure of the military Coup in Turkey in 2016 by analyzing when the Coup was carried out until it failed using Edward Luttwak's coup theory. In addition, this study also describes the reasons used by the military to carry out a coup and compares the direct coups carried out by the military in 1960 and 1980 with this 2016 coup.

RESEARCH METHODS

This research uses qualitative methods because this research emphasizes more on "words," not "numbers," with the researcher as the key instrument (Margret et al., 2014). In addition, the data analysis is qualitative/inductive, and the results emphasize meaning. The data is obtained through documentation obtained through various data sources such as books, journals, articles, papers, videos and news from mainstream media which discuss the chronology of the Coup, the history of the Coup to the failure of the military Coup in Turkey so that it can answer research questions. The data obtained were then analyzed and presented in a descriptive-analytic manner by describing the role of the military in Turkey because of the Coup's failure, and a comparison was made of the coups that have occurred in Turkey.
The stages of the data analysis technique carried out in this study are, First, the data obtained through books, journals, articles, papers, videos, and news from mainstream media relevant to the research are collected as much as possible. Second, the data that has been collected is validated so that the data obtained is valid and unbiased. Third, the data obtained are then grouped according to the topic of discussion. Fourth, the data is then analyzed and interpreted so that the information obtained can answer research questions and provide conclusions. In analyzing this problem, Edward Luttwak's coup theory is used because this theory has been widely used to explain the failure or success in a country.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Cause of Coup

Before the failure of the direct Coup on July 15, 2016, the military had always been successful in intervening in Turkish politics, either in direct coups or in semi-coups. Military intervention through coups has occurred since 1960 with a direct coup against the government of Adnan Menderes, a half-coup in 1971 against the government of Sulayman Demirel, a direct coup in 1980, and the last half-coup in 1997 under Erbakan's reign. Interventions through such coups have always been successful, especially those carried out directly. However, the direct Coup launched by the Turkish military on July 15, 2016, failed. The cause of the failure of the military Coup is then interesting to study.

Regarding the reasons for the direct Coup on July 15, 2016, it still needs further investigation. Atilla Yayla (2016) stated that the coup attempt that took place on July 15, 2016, was carried out by the Gulenist military group (Gulenist Terror Organization (FETO)), which intended to overthrow the legitimate government. Yayla explained that the motivation for carrying out this Coup was not based on protecting secular values but obeying orders from their leader, Fetullah Gulen, who was opposed to Erdogan because the AKP and
Erdogan began to arrest Gulen supporters who were considered to have established a parallel state. The Gulen network exists in various government, military, educational, and business structures. Yayla argued that this Coup was carried out by the radical Islamic movement led by Fetullah Gulen, not the military guarding secular ideology. Koray Caliskan (2017) also mentioned that the Coup was carried out on July 15, 2016, because Gulen’s network in the military was the last network to fight the government, which continued to reduce Gulen’s power in the bureaucracy, media, courts, and business.

Yayla and Caliskan’s opinion is different from that of Francesco F. Milan. According to Milan (2016), the reason that the 2016 military coup was carried out because of the large number of dismissed military officers is not a strong reason why the Coup was carried out. Milan said that the military Coup in 2016 was triggered by the former’s dissatisfaction with Erdogan’s failed foreign policy. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s vision of zero problems with neighboring countries did not work. Erdogan’s approach to the civil conflict in Syria has been criticized, especially from the CHP. Criticism also came from media such as Hurriyet (secular media) and Zaman (pro-Gulen). Since 2005, ISIS attacks on Turkey, especially the bombing tragedy in Ankara, have caused anxiety in Turkish society.

From some existing data and writings, there are indications that the Coup perpetrators were from the Gulenist group, but of course, this needs more in-depth research. These indications can be seen from the confession of the former followers of Gulen, the Chief of the General Staff who was arrested by the coup group, the confession of the coup group, video recordings, and other evidence. This is by what Caliskan (2017) conveyed, who argues that Fetullah Gulen’s network spreads to various institutions ranging from bureaucrats, education, courts, companies, and the military. The professor from Harvard Kennedy School, Dani Rodrik (2016), also shares the same view that the Gulen movement focuses not only on school and charity activities but is far from it. Rodrik (2016) explained that they carried out wiretapping,
disinformation, extortion, and judicial manipulation, especially in their controlled institutions. The Gulen Movement is a highly hierarchical organization. People who have followed him for years (such as Hanefi Avci or Rusen Cakir) report that very few important decisions go unnoticed by Gulen.

Gulen also has many sympathizers in the military, which is the last bastion for Gulenists to survive in politics in Turkey. This is because the government purged the Gulenist power in the media, courts, police, corporations, and education. Rodrik (2016) stated that the Gulen network had begun to enter military institutions since the arrest of the secular military for the alleged Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases during 2008-2011. These positions were then filled by the Gulenists, who were formerly close to Erdogan. And even the Kemalist military had no reason to stage a coup in 2016 because the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases had been dropped, and Erdogan did not want to be involved in them. Before the Coup, the government planned to purge Gulen's network of military institutions in August. The Gulenist faction in the military took action before the government carried out a purge within the military.

One sign of the involvement of the Gulenist faction in this Coup was when The coup group took general Hulusi Akar hostage. Hakan Evrim of the coup group offers Akar to talk to Gulen, but Akar refuses the offer. This statement is reinforced by Akar's testimony that the coup groups attempted to link him with Fetullah Gulen to talk to him (Rodrik, 2016).

Lieutenant Colonel Levent Turkkan, a former aide to the Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar, also testified that he was a Gulenist involved in the Coup. He testified that he had spied on activities within the Turkish military and top military officials, such as wiretapping the Chief of Staff Necdet Ozel. He also said that 60-70 percent of those involved in the Coup were Gulenists. Turkkan stated, "I believe 60-70 percent of those people who have been accepted inside the armed forces since the 1990s are linked to Gulen" (Anadolu Agency, 2016).
Several of the arrested coup groups also acknowledged Gulen's role. This was also supplemented by evidence of the participation of former police officers involved in the Coup. The former police officer was previously fired for alleged ties to Gulen. Other testimonies also came from several military officials who acknowledged their loyalty to Gulen. As testimony from the Turkkans, not 100 percent of the coup plotters were Gulenists, but those outside the Gulen group did not like Erdogan. The former Chief of the General Staff of Turkey, General Ilker Basbug, said that, apart from the Gulenists, others may be displeased with Erdogan's rule in the coup attempt (Tol, Mainzer, & Ekmekci, 2016). This means that most of the groups involved in the coup attempt were driven by the Gulenist faction in the military, supported by groups who dislike Erdogan. However, of course, an in-depth research is needed about who the perpetrators of the Coup were.

Despite these differences of opinion, the military Coup carried out by the Turkish military on July 15, 2016, was based on reasons to restore constitutional order, human rights, and freedoms. The military uses Ataturk's motto, namely "Peace at Home Council." However, this reasoning is not appropriate because there is no threat or economic instability like the previous coups. In the 1960 coup, the 1971 half coup, 1980, and the 1997 half coup, the military always used economic, political, and threats from Islam or anything that threatened the Kemalist ideology. The third or one of these reasons is always used as an excuse by the military to intervene or take over the government. However, the Coup that took place on July 15, 2016, had a different context from the previous Coup, due to the absence of political or economic instability in Turkey. The reason for the Coup due to economic or political instability is unacceptable.

Failed Coup

Edward Luttwak (1979) mentions a successful coup involves two stages, namely (1) direct takeover and (2) winning and maintaining control. In
the military Coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016, the coup group attempted to control important cities in Turkey, including Istanbul and Ankara. This Coup was carried out at 10.00 pm on July 15, 2016. At first, the coup group succeeded in taking control of the state broadcaster (TRT) and the general staff headquarters in Angkara. The coup group also managed to control the Bosphorus Bridge and Fatih Sultan Mehmet bridge connecting Asia and Europe located in Istanbul, bombed the parliament building, and arrested the Chief of General Staff, Hulusi Akar (Al Jazeera, 2017). The coup group also arrested Deputy Chief of Staff General Yasar Guler, General Salih Zeki Colak, Gendarmerie Commander General Galip Mendi, Air Force Commander Abidin Unal, and Turkish Navy Commander Bulent Bostanoglu. The declaration of the Coup was made through the official High Command website and state TV TRT. Coup plotters also used tanks, heavy armor, attack helicopters, and warplanes (Gurcan, 2016).

The explanation above shows that in the first stage of the Coup, the coup plotters seemed to have succeeded in controlling strategic places and capturing key military actors. However, the coup plotters failed to arrest key state actors such as President Erdogan and Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim. Whereas the first step that must be done, as said by Luttwak, is to neutralize key actors such as the President and the Prime Minister. This caused the two actors to be successful in garnering public support to take to the streets to resist the coup attempt and being successful in garnering support from the military. However, the coup plotters failed to arrest President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yildirim.

CNN Turk said a coup plotter attempted to arrest President Erdogan at a hotel located in Maramis by fielding about 25 soldiers. However, these efforts failed (Hanifan, 2016). Just as the arrests were about to occur, Erdogan left the hotel and flew to Istanbul's Ataturk International Airport to resist the coup attempt (Anadolu Agency 2016). An eyewitness testified to the BBC that he...
heard helicopters and gunfire in Marmaris after Erdogan left the premises (BBC, 2016).

Serkan Yazici, who is the owner of the hotel where Erdogan is staying, testified on the Coup night. He said, "I offered the president to take him to the Greek islands, but he got upset with my offer and continued, 'what will I do in the Greek islands? I'm asking you how to go to Istanbul'. Daily Sabah (2016) also reported that about 30 soldiers descended from helicopters to attack Erdogan. There was a shootout between Erdogan's bodyguards and the coup group at the hotel, which killed two of Erdogan's bodyguards and injured seven others. The night after the Coup, Turkish troops managed to confiscate weapons. Allegedly used by the coup group during the attack on Erdogan's lodging, 12 assault rifles and three grenades were found in a wooded area near the Grand Yazıcı Marmaris Hotel. Police also confiscated assault rifles, pistols, grenades, ammunition, helmets, body armor, and night vision equipment near the hotel (Anadolu Agency, 2016).

The attempted arrest of President Erdogan in Marmaris was admitted by one of the soldiers who participated in the attack, General Gokhan Sonmezates, in court. Gokhan Sonmezates said, "My mission was to take the president and bring him to Akinci air base safe and sound" (Pamuk, 2017). The attempted arrest or assassination of Erdogan was also witnessed by people staying at the hotel and admitting that there was indeed an attack by the military using helicopters and other combat weapons against their hotel (Thompson, 2016). Ali Gundogan, a local journalist who was at the scene, also testified that the coup groups told him they didn't want to hurt the residents. They just wanted to arrest President Erdogan (Gutman, 2016). Erdogan also testified in the media that he and his family would die if they remained in the hotel 10 to 15 minutes before he left the hotel (Middle East Eye, 2017). Erdogan then decided to go to Istanbul. From the Marmaris hotel, Erdogan took a helicopter to Dalaman Airport, near the Aegean coast, who then switched to using a business jet and decided to fly to Istanbul (Gutman, 2016).
Attempts to assassinate Erdogan did not stop there. According to a Reuters report, on the flight to Istanbul, two F-16 fighter jets driven by the coup group had locked Erdogan's plane within shooting range. Still, anti-terrorism officials quoted by The Guardian said that fire was not fired after the plane pilot tricked him. The Gulenist group mentioned that it was a Turkish Airlines flight (civil aviation) (The Guardian, 2016). This caused Erdogan to land in Istanbul successfully.

Erdogan's success in escaping his arrest was also due to the contribution of Ziya Ilgen, who informed Erdogan that soldiers were patrolling the Bosphorus Bridge and conducting checks (Sahin, 2017). First Army Commander Umit Dundar, who is in Istanbul, called Erdogan an hour before the arrival of the Gulenists. Umit Dundar called Erdogan and informed him that a coup had taken place and three Blackhawk helicopters carrying rebel soldiers were on their way to kill or capture him. Dundar also convinced Erdogan to come to Istanbul. Dundar said, "I am at your side, there is a huge coup, and the situation is out of control in Ankara. Come to Istanbul, and I will secure your access to the roads and accommodations there" (El Bar, 2016). The explanation above shows that information about the Coup was leaked and reached Erdogan, which caused Erdogan to escape from the Gulenist group's arrest attempt.

Erdogan's choice of landing in Istanbul was due to Umit Dundar's security guarantee. However, apart from that, the election of Istanbul as a landing is also inseparable from the political aspect, namely the influence that Erdogan has in the city. As a former mayor who is considered successful in changing the face of Istanbul, Erdogan's arrival at Ataturk Airport was welcomed by his loyalists. The choice of the city of Istanbul is also due to the condition of the capital Ankara which is still not safe. Erdogan's safe landing in Istanbul is a sign that the Coup failed.

Attempts were also made to arrest Prime Minister Binali Yildirim. Gulenists attacked Prime Minister Binali Yildirim's convoy. This attack by
members of the Gendarmerie was carried out on Friday night, July 15, 2016, on the border of the northern province of Kastamonu, when Yildirim was traveling from Istanbul to Ankara to control the emergency caused by the Coup. Hurriyet Daily News quoted the Minister of Home Affairs, Efkan Ala, as saying, "Coup attempters targeted Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım’s car as well." The road trip was taken at Yildirim’s request. This is due to the risk of unsafe air travel. The journey is carried out by convoy and takes an alternative route through Kostamonu. And having survived the attack, Yildirim was taken to the district governor’s house. He then monitored developments and stayed until the Ankara situation was normal (Hurriyet, 2016). Binali Yildirim finally managed to escape the arrest attempt.

The failure of the coup group to arrest the key government actors was a recklessness that affected the outcome of the Coup. This led to President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yildirim being able to rally forces to fight the attempted Coup. With the power of the media and technological advances, the two figures expressed their rejection of the attempted Coup and asked the public to reject it.

The first rejection of the attempted Coup came from Prime Minister Binali Yildirim. Yildirim conducted a telephone interview with the NTV station at 11 pm. Yildirim stated that there had been an attempted coup by part of the military (Popp, 2017). Through the television station, Yildirim expressed his condemnation and rejection of the attempted Coup. Yildirim said "There was an illegal act by a group within the military that was acting out of the chain of military command. Our people should know that we will not allow any activity that would harm democracy." Yildirim said that the security forces would respond to the attempted Coup (Worley & Feliks, 2016).

Rejection of the attempted Coup also came from President Erdogan. Through the FaceTime application using an iPhone, Erdogan interviewed CNN Turk with Hande Firat, head of CNN Turk in Ankara, broadcast live at 12.24 midnight. Through the interview, Erdogan said that the coup act was carried
out outside the chain of command and was a parallel state-driven uprising. Erdogan condemned the attempted Coup and threatened severe punishment for the coup perpetrators. Erdogan also called on the public to take to the streets, gather in squares and airports. Erdogan added, "Go to the streets and give them their answer." Through this interview, Erdogan also expressed his desire to fly to Ankara (Pagliery, Pallotta, & Ellis, 2016). However, his desire to fly to Ankara changed after getting a call from Umit Dundar, who told him to go to Istanbul and guarantee his safety (Popp, 2017). In the end, Erdogan decided to fly to Istanbul.

The Turkish public welcomed Erdogan's call to the public to take to the streets against the attempted Coup. Erdogan's call caused more and more people to take to the streets to reject the attempted Coup (Duran & Altun, 2016). The call to prayer is held in Turkish mosques to appeal to the public to reject the attempted Coup. After Erdogan's call, in several locations, masses of Erdogan supporters took to the streets to reject the attempted Coup by chanting 'Allahu Ekber' and using the Rabia symbol, which is a symbol of solidarity with the Muslim Brotherhood after Mohammad Morsi was in the Coup in Egypt. Erdogan then landed at Istanbul’s Ataturk Airport at 03.00 am, after a mass of supporters captured the airport. In front of his supporters and under the banner of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Erdogan made a public statement on television by again condemning the coup act. He vowed to punish the coup groups (IISS, 2016) severely.

Veysel Kurt said that the failure of the Turkish military Coup, apart from the rejection from the people, was the strong leadership of Erdogan, who was able to bolster the masses against the Coup and appear to reject the Coup. Erdogan's appearance via FaceTime on the CNN Turk television channel by giving information on the rejection of the Coup, according to Muhittin Ataman and Gloria Shkurti, directly impacted the Coup's failure. Before Erdogan's call, there were already people who came down to reject the Coup. However, more and more people took to the streets after Erdogan appeared, asking people to
take to the streets to reject the Coup. Erdogan's presence through FaceTime on CNN Turk succeeded in mobilizing the masses to oppose the Coup (Duran & Altun, 2016). People taking to the streets to secure important locations such as the main airport and television stations respond to Erdogan's call for people to take to the streets. People who took to the streets in response to Erdogan's call came from the mosque and from the entire spectrum of Turkish society (Ataman, 2016).

Erdogan's central role is also evident from Nebi Mis's research, which states that four statements often appear when people take to the streets "to protect Erdogan." Meanwhile, one of the four main criteria for the decline of the public against the Coup is Erdogan's call on FaceTime for people to take to the streets (Ataman, 2017). The presence of Erdogan and Binali Yildirim also gave peace to the people and raised the spirit of the people to reject the Coup. The public also considered that Erdogan's leadership and crisis management were the most prominent factors in thwarting the Coup (Mis et al., 2016).

From the above view, it is seen the importance of capturing key state actors. Although the military managed to control strategic places at first, it failed to neutralize these key actors. The failure of the Gulenists to arrest key government actors, such as President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, was one of the causes of the failed Coup. The failure of this Coup was seen when the two key figures appeared on television stations condemning the attempted Coup and also asking the public to reject the attempted Coup. The failure was even more apparent when Erdogan landed safely in Istanbul, which his supporters greeted. He succeeded in mobilizing the strength of the Islamist and secular camps. Through FaceTime broadcast by CNN Turk, Erdogan was able to mobilize the masses against the Coup.

In addition, Erdogan also tried to convince the secular camp by holding a conference under Mustafa Kemal's photo, which showed that he was a Kemalist. On the other hand, he also did not lose the mass of his Islamic supporters. This is because Erdogan is considered an Islamic figure and
represents the AKP who managed to win 49.50 percent of the vote in the November 1, 2015, election. This can also be seen from the Islamic symbols present at the time of the Coup when Erdogan masses chanted Takbir and the symbol "Rabia" at the beginning of the people's resistance to the Coup. The symbol of "Raabia" itself is a symbol of solidarity with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which was led by Mohammad Morsi, who was overthrown by the military. Mohammad Morsi himself is Erdogan's closest ally in Egypt. And Erdogan condemned the coup act carried out by the Egyptian military.

This shows how big key actors' influence can mobilize the masses to fight the attempted Coup. The 2016 coup demonstrated the importance of capturing key actors, both military and government actors. The need to arrest these key actors is also evident from the direct coups of 1960 and 1980 described in table 1, where the coup group controlled strategic places and neutralized key actors from the military and government. This is different from the direct 2016 coup, which only arrested military actors but failed to arrest government actors, namely President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, which was one of the causes of the failed Coup.

The 1960 coup was carried out against the Democratic Party and the government of Adnan Menderes. Through a bloodless coup in 1960, the coup plot led by Cemal Gursel succeeded in overthrowing the government and arresting key government actors such as President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, and officials from the Democratic Party who were deemed to have violated the constitution (Hidayat, 2015). Adnan Menderes himself was later sentenced to death along with two of his ministers. The military carried out a coup due to the threat of the state and the Kemalist ideology due to economic, political instability, and the growing issue of Islam. Adnan Menderes is considered to have exploited Islam to gain political support. Over the radio, the coup plotters announce the takeover of power. The success of this Coup cannot be separated from the support of the people who consider the Adnan Menderes government to have failed in overcoming domestic
economic, and political problems. When the military Coup was successful, Turkish people took to the streets to celebrate and support the military action (Rothman, 2016).

In the 1980 coup, the military also arrested all political leaders and actors in Turkey, such as Bulent Evecit and Prime Minister Suleyman Demeriyel. Coup plotters also controlled strategic places, such as the Bosphorus Bridge and state radio (Global Security, 2013). The reasons for the Coup were economic instability, domestic political instability, and the increasing symbolism of Islam brought by Necbrettin Erbakan’s National Salvation Party. The 1980 coup was also supported by Turkish society, which was saturated with endless conflicts and political instability (Dzakirin, 2012).

Table 1 shows a comparison between the direct coups of 1960 and 1980 with the 2016 coup, especially regarding the Coup results, where the 1960 and 1980 coups were successful while the 2016 coup failed. This study observes that the direct coups in 1960 and 1980 had different economic and political contexts from the direct coups in 2016, which gave rise to different responses from the public. During the 1960 and 1960 coups, Turkey’s economic and political conditions were unstable.

As for the 2016 coup, Turkey’s economic and political conditions were relatively stable. In the 1960 and 1980 coups, coup plotters also managed to control strategic places and arrest key government actors. This Coup also received support from the community. In the 2016 coup, the coup plotters failed to arrest President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım. The public also rejected the 2016 coup. This means that the 1960 and 1980 coups succeeded in carrying out the first and second stages, namely (1) controlling strategic places and capturing key actors and (2) garnering support from the community, the military, and the international community. However, in the 2016 coup, the coup plotters were unable to carry out both stages.
Table 1. Comparison of the Direct Coup of 1960, 1980, and 2016

| The Situation Before the Coup | 1960 Coup | 1980 Coup | 2016 Coup |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| The Situation Before the Coup | Economy Crisis | Economy Crisis | Stable economic conditions |
|                              | Domestic political instability | Domestic political instability | Stable domestic political conditions |
|                              | Increasing symbols of Islam | Increasing symbols of Islam | |

| Mastery of Strategic Places | Coup plotters controlled state communication tools such as radio and immediately controlled government centers. | Coup plotters control state communication tools such as radio, state television, the Bosphorus bridge, and government centers | The coup plotters controlled the state's communication tools, namely the TRT television station, the general staff headquarters in Angkara, the airport, the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge, and the Bosphorus connecting Asia and Europe in Istanbul, carried out bombings on parliament buildings and government buildings. |

| Arrest of Key State Actors | Arrested President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, and officials from the Democratic Party. Adnan Menderes and two of his ministers were sentenced to death. | Arrested Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and political actors such as Bulent Ecevit and Necmettin Erbakan. | Succeeded in arresting Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar, Deputy Chief of Staff General Yasar Guler, Army Commander General Salih Zeki Colak, Gendarmerie Commander General Galip Mendi, Air Force Commander Abidin Unal and Turkish Navy Commander Bulent Bostanoglu. However, it failed to capture key government actors such as President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım |

| Community Response | Support the Coup | Support the Coup | Refusing the Coup |

Source: processed by researchers from various sources.
The failure in the first stage, namely capturing key state actors, resulted in the second stage's inability to carry out the Coup. The second stage is how the coup plotters use the tools of the state they have controlled to attract the support of the public, the military, and the international community. Although the military was able to control strategic places and control state TV, the coup plotters could not attract the sympathy of the civilian population and the military. The results will be different if the coup group successfully neutralizes President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım. There is a possibility that the Coup will be successful. One factor in the emergence of public rejection is Erdogan's call to the public to take to the streets to reject the coup attempt. The public welcomed Erdogan's call.

Another interesting thing about the failure of the military Coup in Turkey is the technological advances that President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım have exploited. Through FaceTime and social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp, the two figures could garner public support to resist the coup attempt. Changes in society and technology indirectly affect the failure of the Coup. Without this technology, Erdogan and Binali Yıldırım would not be able to rally the masses against the Coup quickly. The failure to arrest key actors and the inability of the coup plotters to control social media led to the coup attempt being opposed by the Turkish public. In the end, July 15, 2016, was thwarted with 238 people dead and 2190 injured.

CONCLUSION

The 2016 military coup in Turkey was to restore constitutional order, human rights, and freedoms. However, the Coup that was launched failed. One of the contributing factors was the failure of the coup plotters to arrest key state actors, especially President Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, who are important symbols of Turkey. Using advances in technology, Erdogan and Binali Yıldırım moved people into the streets to oppose the coup attempt. Arresting key state actors is an important part of the two phases of a coup. As
a result, the second phase of the Coup was to gain public support, which other military factions and international support failed to obtain. The rejection of the community happened because key state actors succeeded in mobilizing the masses against the Coup. This distinguishes the 2016 military coup from the 1960 and 1980 coups, wherein the 1960 and 1980 key state actors were neutralized, and the Coup was successful.

The description of the causes of the failure of the military Coup in Turkey can provide input for the civilian government and the general public in dealing with in the event of a Coup so that the key state actors in the world must realize how important their role is in resisting the Coup attempt and influencing the public to reject the Coup. It will be interesting to investigate further how the impact of the military’s role in politics when the Coup failed, especially considering the case in Turkey after the failed Coup in 2016.

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