Polytope Codes Against Adversaries in Networks

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Abstract—Network coding is studied when an unknown subset of nodes in the network is controlled by an adversary. To solve this problem, the class of polytope codes is introduced. Polytope codes are linear codes operating over bounded polytopes in real vector fields. The polytope structure creates additional complexity, but it induces properties on marginal distributions of code vectors so that validities of codewords can be checked by internal nodes of the network. It is shown that a cut-set bound for a class planar networks can be achieved by the polytope codes. It is also shown that this cut-set bound is not always tight, and a tighter bound is given for an example network.

I. INTRODUCTION

Network coding allows routers in a network to execute possibly complex codes in addition to mere forwarding; it has been shown that allowing them to do so can increase throughput [1]. However, taking advantage of this use of coding at internal nodes means that the sources and destinations must rely on other nodes—nodes they may not have complete control over—to reliably perform certain functions. If these internal nodes do not perform the function correctly, or, worse, maliciously attempt to subvert the goals of the users, launching a so-called Byzantine attack [2], [3], standard network coding techniques fail.

Suppose an omniscient adversary controls an unknown portion of the network, and may arbitrarily corrupt the values sent on certain links. We wish to determine how the size of the adversarial part of the network influences the capacity. If the adversary may control any $z$ unit-capacity edges in the network, then it has been shown that, for the multicast problem (one source and many destinations), the capacity reduces by $2^z$ compared to the non-Byzantine problem [4], [5]. To achieve this rate, only linear network coding is needed. Furthermore, if there is just one source and one destination, only routing is needed at internal nodes.

The above model assumes that any set of $z$ edges may be adversarial, which may be overly pessimistic depending on the situation. If the adversary cuts a certain number of transmission lines in a network, this would be a reasonable model. If, on the other hand, the adversary seizes a single router, it will control the values on all links connected to that router; the number of these links may vary in number depending on which router is attacked. It is easy to construct examples (see [6]) for which allowing the adversary to control any set of $z$ edges results in a much lower throughput than allowing them only to control $z$ edges if they all emerge from the same node. It is therefore reasonable to consider the problem of the adversary controlling any set of $z$ nodes, as we do in this paper.

A. Related Work

Byzantine attacks on network coding were first studied in [7], which looked at detecting adversaries in a random linear coding environment. The $z$ unit-capacity edge adversary problem was solved theoretically in [4], [5]. In [8], the same problem is studied, providing distributed and low complexity coding algorithms to achieve the same asymptotically optimal rates. In addition, [8] looks at two adversary models slightly different from the omniscient one considered in [4], [5] and in this paper. They show that higher rates can be achieved under these alternate models. In [9], a more general view of the adversary problem is given, whereby the network itself is abstracted into an arbitrary linear transformation.

Network coding under Byzantine attacks that are more general than the simple edge-based model was first studied in [6] and [12]. The former studied node-based attacks by means of several examples, and the latter looked at the problem of edge-based attacks when the edges could have unequal capacities. This problem was found to have similar complications to the node-based problem. Both found that linear coding is suboptimal, and that simple nonlinear operations used to augment a linear code can improve throughput. It is shown in [13] that the node-based problems subsumes even the unequal edge problem.

All of these works, in addition to ours, seek to correct for the adversarial errors at the destination. An alternative strategy known as the watchdog, studied for wireless network coding in [10], is for nodes to police downstream nodes by overhearing their messages to detect modifications. In [11], a similar approach is taken, and they found that nonlinear operations similar to ours can be helpful, in which comparisons are made to detect errors.

B. Main Results

The primary contribution of the present paper is to elaborate the theory of polytope codes, originally introduced in [6] under the less descriptive term “bounded-linear codes”. Polytope codes make use of probability distributions defined over polytopes in real vector fields. The main innovation of these distributions is that it they possess properties having to do with constraints against their marginal distributions. This property is stated and proved is Section V, and it allows more effective checks at internal nodes in a network; these checks either detect and correct adversarial actions or force adversaries to act properly.
Polytope codes are used to prove that the cut-set bound, stated in Section III, is tight for a certain class of planar networks. Planarity requires that the graph can be embedded in a plane such that intersections between edges occur at nodes. This allows additional comparisons that might otherwise not be present, allowing the code to more well defeat Byzantine attacks.

Finally, we show in Section VIII that the cut-set bound is not always tight, by giving an example with a tighter bound.

II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

Let \((V, E)\) be an directed acyclic graph. For each edge \(e \in E\), there is an edge capacity \(c_e\), which we assume to be an integer. One node in \(V\) is denoted \(S\), the source, and one is denoted \(D\), the destination. We wish to determine the maximum achievable throughput from \(S\) to \(D\) when any set of \(z\) nodes in \(V\) \(\setminus \{S, D\}\) are traitors; i.e. they are controlled by the adversary. Given a rate \(R\) and a block-length \(n\), the message \(W\) is chosen at random from the set \(\{1, \ldots, 2^{nR}\}\). Each edge \(e\) holds a value \(X_e \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR}\}\).

A code is be made up of three components:

1) an encoding function at the source, which produces values to place on all the output edges from the source. Let \(\{S, D\}\) be the set of edges in \(E\), and all values of \(W\). That is, the destination always decodes correctly no matter what the adversary does. Let the capacity \(C\) be the supremum over all achievable rates.

III. CUT-SET UPPER BOUND

Theorem 1: Consider a cut \(A \subseteq V\) with \(S \in A\) and \(D \notin A\). Let \(E_A\) be the set of edges that cross the cut. For two not necessarily disjoint sets of possible traitors \(T_1, T_2\), let \(E_1\) and \(E_2\) be the subset of edges in \(E_A\) that originate at nodes in \(T_1\) and \(T_2\) respectively. Let \(\tilde{E}\) be the set of edges in \(E_1 \cap E_2\) in addition to all edges \(e \in E_1 \cup E_2\) for which there is no path that flows through \(e\) followed by any edge in \(E_A \setminus E_1 \setminus E_2\). The following upper bound holds on the capacity of the network:

\[
C \leq \sum_{e \in E_A \setminus \tilde{E}} c_e. \tag{1}
\]

Proof: A version of this theorem was proved in [6]. The proof follows along the lines of the Singleton bound. 

IV. CAPACITY OF A CLASS OF PLANAR NETWORKS

Theorem 2: Let \((V, E)\) be a network with the following properties:

1) It is planar.
2) No node other than the destination has more than two unit-capacity input edges (i.e. either one 2-capacity edge or two unit-capacity edges).
3) No node other than the source has more output capacity than input capacity.

If \(z = 1\), cut-set bound is tight for this network.

Proof: Omitted due to space limitation. See [13]. Section VI illustrates the proof for an example, and Section VII briefly sketches how planarity is used.

The key ingredient in the proof of the above theorem is the use of a new class of codes referred to as Polytope Codes, introduced next in Sec. V. Polytope codes are nonlinear codes, but they are not drastically different from linear codes; they are linear codes defined on polytopes in real field. The proof of the above theorem seems to suggest that the cut-set bound may be tight for a much larger class of networks. Indeed, we conjecture that this theorem can be generalized, and that polytope codes achieve capacity for all planar networks and all \(z\).

Fig. 1 shows an example of a network that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2. Thus the capacity of this network (achieved by a polytope code) is 4. If only linear codes are allowed, the maximum achievable rate is 3 (see [6] for a proof of a similar fact). The polytope code used to prove achievability is discussed in detail in Section VI.

V. THE POLYTOPE CODE

We begin with a simple example of the distribution underlying the polytope code. For some positive integer \(k\), consider the set of \(X, Y, Z, W \in \{-k, \ldots, k\}\) satisfying

\[
X + Y + Z = 0 \tag{2}
\]
\[
3X - Y + 2W = 0. \tag{3}
\]

This is the set of integer lattice points in a polytope. Let the distribution \(p(xyzw)\) be uniform over these points. The region of \((X, Y)\) pairs with positive probability is shown in Fig. 2. Observe that even though \(X\) and \(Y\) are linearly independent in the subspace given by (2)–(3), they are not statistically independent, because the boundedness of \(Z\) and \(W\) requires that \(X\) and \(Y\) satisfy certain linear inequalities. Nevertheless,
Hence, therefore, for large $k$.

Note also that

$$\lim_{k \to \infty} \frac{H(X)}{\log k} = \lim_{k \to \infty} \frac{H(Y)}{\log k} = 1. \quad (5)$$

Therefore, for large $k$, $X$ and $Y$ are nearly independent in that their joint entropy is close to the sum of the individual entropies. The four variables $X, Y, Z, W$ make up something like a $(4, 2)$ MDS code, in that each pair is close to independently for large $k$, and any two completely determine the other two. These distributions over polytopes can be made to perform many of the same functions as standard linear variables defined over finite fields.

More generally, given a matrix $F \in \mathbb{Z}^{u \times m}$, consider the polytope

$$\{x \in \mathbb{Z}^m : Fx = 0, |x_i| \leq k \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, m\}. \quad (6)$$

We may also describe this polytope in terms of a matrix $K$ whose columns form a basis for the null-space of $F$. Let $p(x)$ be a uniform distribution over this polytope. In a polytope code, each codeword is a sequence $x^n$ with joint type equal to $p(x)$. Each edge in the network holds a sequence $x^n$. The following lemma generalizes the entropy calculations performed above.

**Lemma 1:** According to $p(x)$, for any $S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, m\}$

$$\lim_{k \to \infty} \frac{H(X_S)}{\log k} = \text{rank}(K_S) \quad (7)$$

where $K_S$ is the matrix made up of the rows of $K$ corresponding to the elements of $S$.

Recall that in a linear code operating over the finite field $\mathbb{F}$, we may express the elements on the edges in a network $x \in \mathbb{F}^m$ as linear combinations of the message $x = Kw$, where $K$ is a linear transformation over the finite field, and $w$ is the message vector. Taking a uniform distribution on $w$ imposes a distribution on $X$ such that $H(X_S) = \text{rank}(K_S) \log |\mathbb{F}|$. This differs from (7) only by a constant factor, and also that (7) holds only in the limit of large $k$. Hence, polytope codes achieve a similar set of entropy profiles as linear codes.

In a polytope code, every node in the network observes several sequences $x^n$, from which it may determine their joint type. It will check whether the joint type matches the corresponding distribution from $p$, and forward a bit specifying whether it does along all its outgoing edges. In addition, all nodes will continue forwarding these comparison bits all the way to the destination. The number of these bits is determined only by the size of the network, so they occupy an arbitrarily small amount of link capacity as $n$ grows. These comparisons force a traitor to make a choice: it changes the comparison to its location, or it is constrained so that the comparison pass. The following theorem allows us to analyze how these constraints influence the traitors’ actions.

**Theorem 3 (Fundamental Property of Polytope Codes):**
Let $p(x)$ be a probability distribution for $x \in \{-k, \ldots, k\}^m$ such that $p(x) > 0$ only if $Fx = 0$. For another distribution $q(x)$ on the same space subject to

$$q(A_l x) = p(A_l x) \text{ for } l = 1, \ldots, L \quad (8)$$

where $A_l \in \mathbb{R}^{u_l \times m}$, $q$ must be identical to $p$ if the following properties of $F$ and the $A_l$ hold:

1) There exists a positive definite matrix $C$ such that

$$F^T CF = \sum_{l=1}^{L} A_l^T \Sigma_l A_l \quad (9)$$

for some $\Sigma_l \in \mathbb{R}^{u_l \times u_l}$.

2) There exists an $l^*$ such that the value of $A_{l^*} x$ uniquely determines $x$ subject to $Fx = 0$. That is, the matrix $[A_{l^*} \ F]$ has full column rank.

**Proof:** By (8), for all $l$ and all $y \in \{-k, \ldots, k\}^{u_l}$,

$$\sum_{x : A_l x = y} q(x) = \sum_{x : A_l x = y, Fx = 0} p(x) \quad (10)$$

where we have used the fact that $p(x)$ is only positive if $Fx = 0$. Multiplying (10) by $y^T \Sigma_l y$ and summing over all $y$ and all $l$, then applying (9), yields

$$\sum_{x} [x^T F^T CF x] q(x) = \sum_{x : Fx = 0} [x^T F^T CF x] p(x). \quad (11)$$
Observe that \( x^T F^T C F x = 0 \) if \( F x = 0 \) and positive if \( F x \neq 0 \), because \( C \) is positive definite. Therefore the right hand side of (11) is 0, and the left hand side is a linear combination of \( \{ q(x) : F x \neq 0 \} \) with strictly positive coefficients. Therefore \( q(x) = 0 \) if \( F x \neq 0 \).

Now we make use of the property (2). For any \( x \in \{-k, \ldots, k\}^m \) with \( F x = 0 \), we may rewrite (10) for \( l^* \) as
\[
\sum_{x': A_{l^*} x' = A_{l^*} x, F x' = 0} q(x') = \sum_{x': A_{l^*} x' = A_{l^*} x, F x' = 0} p(x').
\]
(12)

But observe that \( A_{l^*} x' = A_{l^*} x \) and \( F x' = 0 \) imply that \( x' = x \). That is, there is only one term in the summation. Hence, \( q(x) = p(x) \) for all \( x \).

\[\Box\]

**VI. APPLICATION OF POLYTOPE CODES AGAINST ADVERSARY NODES**

Consider the example in Fig. 1, shown with a routing scheme for a polytope code that we will show achieves the cut-set bound of 4 with one traitor. In Fig. 1, variables \( X_1 \sim X_8 \) comprise the polytope code equivalent of an (8, 4) MDS code. That is, the matrix \( F \) imposing constraints on the \( X \)s is such that any four variables are linearly independent, and determine the other four. Recall that each of these variables represents a sequence \( x^n_i \) transmitted across the respective link so that \( (x^n_1, \ldots, x^n_8) \) has joint type equal to \( p(x_1 \cdots x_8) \), and each message is associated with one such joint sequence. In addition to these sequences, comparison bits are generated and sent through the network, as discussed above.

To decode, the destination first compiles a list \( \mathcal{L} \subset V \) of which nodes may be the traitor. It does this by taking all its available data: received comparison bits as well as the \( x^n_i \) sequences it has access to, and determines whether it is possible for each node, if it were the traitor, to have acted in a way to cause these data to occur. If so, it adds that node to \( \mathcal{L} \).

For example, if the comparison bit from node 8 reports that \( x_i \) was 1, then \( x_i \) is the traitor, and therefore the destination must be a node that can influence one of those two symbols; i.e. \( \mathcal{L} \subset \{L, j \neq i \} \). Observe that the true traitor is in \( \mathcal{L} \).

Depending on \( \mathcal{L} \), the destination chooses which variables to decode from. Any traitor action leads to some \( \mathcal{L} \), so it is comprehensive to consider all values for \( \mathcal{L} \). If \( |\mathcal{L}| = 1 \), then this single node must be the traitor, so the destination can simply disregard all symbols that came into contact with that node (there are at most 2) and decode the message from the rest. Now consider the case that \( |\mathcal{L}| \geq 2 \). Say node \( i \) is the traitor, and \( j \in \mathcal{L}, j \neq i \). This places certain constraints on the behavior of node \( i \) that we may exploit. The following lemma allows us to conclude that the code is effective.

**Lemma 2:** If node \( i \) is the traitor, but \( j \in \mathcal{L} \), then \( i \) could only have corrupted variables that are also touched by node \( j \).

By Lemma 2, the destination can ignore variables touched by all nodes in \( \mathcal{L} \) and decode from the rest. For example, suppose node 3 is the traitor and node 6 is in \( \mathcal{L} \). The only symbol node 3 may have corrupted is \( X_5 \), so the destination may decode from the rest.

To prove Lemma 2, in principle one needs to check the condition for all pairs \( i \) and \( j \). We illustrate the argument for one pair; generalization is not hard. Suppose that node 3 is the traitor and it acts such that it appears to the destination that node 2 may be the traitor. Because node 2 and node 3 do not share any symbols, we wish to show that node 3 cannot transmit to nodes 6 and 7 anything but the true values of \( X_5 \) and \( X_6 \) respectively. Let \( q(x_1, \cdots, x_8) \) be the empirical type of the sequences sent through the network, where it may be different from \( p \) if node 3 has changed \( X_5 \) or \( X_6 \). The following conditions hold on \( q \):
\[
\begin{align*}
q(x_1 x_2 x_7 x_8) &= p(x_1 x_2 x_7 x_8), \quad (13) \\
q(x_2 x_5) &= p(x_2 x_5), \quad (14) \\
q(x_6 x_7) &= p(x_6 x_7), \quad (15) \\
q(x_1 x_5 x_6 x_8) &= p(x_1 x_5 x_6 x_8). \quad (16)
\end{align*}
\]

Condition (13) holds because \( X_1, X_2, X_7, X_8 \) cannot be influenced by node 3, so they retain their true values. Condition (14) holds because if it did not, node 5, which observes \( X_2 \) and \( X_5 \), would detect it, and forward the information to the destination. Since node 2 cannot influence \( X_2 \) or \( X_5 \), this would remove 2 from \( L \). Similarly, (15) holds because \( X_6, X_7 \) are compared at node 7. Finally, if (16) did not hold, then the destination could tell that node 2 was not the traitor, because \( X_1, X_5, X_6, X_8 \) are untouched by node 2.

We wish now to apply (13)–(16) to Theorem 3 to conclude
\[
q(x_1 x_2 x_5 x_6 x_7 x_8) = p(x_1 x_2 x_5 x_6 x_7 x_8). \quad (17)
\]

This is enough to show that \( X_5 \) and \( X_6 \) cannot be corrupted by node 3, because under \( p \), if node 3 had turned \( X_5 \) or \( X_6 \), it would have been detected at \( L \). Similarly, both \( X_6, X_7 \) are compared at node 7. If (16) did not hold, then the destination could tell that node 2 was not the traitor, because \( X_1, X_5, X_6, X_8 \) are untouched by node 2.

**VII. PLANAR NETWORKS**

We briefly sketch how the arguments in Section VI can be extended to prove Theorem 2. We need to generate a routing scheme for an arbitrary network, then prove a more general form of Lemma 2. The key observation in order to do this in general is that the important comparisons that go on inside the
network are those that involve a variable that does not reach the destination (e.g. (14) and (15) involve $X_2$ and $X_7$). This is because those symbols that do reach the destination can be examined there, so further comparisons inside the network do not add anything. Therefore the key routing problem is to carefully design the paths of these non-destination symbols to maximize the utility of their comparisons. In particular, we design these paths so that, as much as possible, for a node having one direct edge to the destination and one other output edge, the output edge not going to the destination holds a non-destination variable. The advantage of this is that any variable, before exiting the network, is guaranteed to cross a non-destination variable at a node where the two variables may be compared, but this routing requirement may not be possible if the network is not planar.

VIII. LOoseness of the Cuts-Set BOUND

We show that the cut-set bound given in Theorem 1 is not tight. We do this in two parts. First, consider the problem that a special subset of nodes are designated as potential traitors, and the code must guard against adversarial control of any $z$ of those nodes. We refer to this as the limited-node problem. Certainly the limited-node problem subsumes the all-node problem, since we may simply take the set of potential traitors to be all nodes. Furthermore, it subsumes the unequal-edges problem studied in [12], because given an instance of the unequal-edge problem, an equivalent limited-node problem can be constructed as follows: create a new network with every edge replaced by a pair of edges of equal capacity with a node between them. Then limit the traitors to a non-destination variable at a node where the two variables may be compared, but this routing requirement may not be possible if the network is not planar.

Consider the network shown in Figure VIII. All edges have capacity one, and there is at most one traitor, but it is restricted to be one of the black nodes. The cut-set bound is 2, but in fact the capacity is no more than 1.5.

Consider a code achieving rate $R$. For $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$, let $X_i$ be the random variable representing the value on the output edge of node $i$. Let $Y$ be the value on edge $(9, D)$ and let $Z$ be the value on $(10, D)$. Let $p$ be the honest distribution on these variables, and define the following alternative distributions:

$$q_3 = p(x_1 x_2 x_3|x_3) p(y|x_1 x_2 x_3) p(z|x_2 x_4),$$

$$q_4 = p(x_1 x_2 x_3|x_4) p(y|x_1 x_2 x_3) p(z|x_3 x_4).$$

If node $3$ or node $4$ is the traitor, they may induce these distributions. Therefore

$$R \leq I_{q_3}(X_1 X_2 X_4; Y Z),$$

$$R \leq I_{q_4}(X_1 X_2 X_3; Y Z).$$

Observe that $q_3(x_3 x_4 z) = q_4(x_3 x_4 z)$, meaning any joint entropy made up of three variables is the same for each distribution. Using this fact, (21), (22), that all edges have capacity $1$, and standard information theoretic inequalities, one can conclude that $R \leq 1.5$.

IX. CONCLUSION

The main contribution of this paper has been to introduce the theory of polytope codes. As far as we know, they are the best known coding strategy to defeat generalized Byzantine attacks on network coding. However, it remains difficult to calculate the best possible rate they can achieve for a given network. We have proved that they achieve the cut-set bound, and hence the capacity, for a class of planar graphs, and we conjecture that this holds for all planar graphs. One would obviously hope to find the capacity of all networks, including non-planar ones. We have shown that achieving the cut-set bound is not always possible, meaning there remains significant work to do on upper bounds as well as achievable schemes. Whether polytope codes can achieve capacity on all networks remains an important open question.

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