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COMPARING OFFICIAL AND LITERARY DISCOURSES ON SINO-SOVET BORDER CROSSINGS OF 1962

Abstract. Official discourse (soviet and Chinese) interpreted the reasons of ethnic groups exodus etatist – border defense, L control over population migrations, economic losses and maintenance of bilateral relations at certain level. Q.Zhumadilov drew the line of affirmation of Kazakhs migration from China as salvation, but essential ethno-demographic resource for maintenance of ethnic potential of Kazakhs in soviet Kazakhstan. The official soviet discourse being diplomatic in form, especially, when it concerned the regulating technicalities with the Chinese officials, was civic in nature. The Soviet Union interpreted the right to patronize the former Russian/ soviet citizens residing in China through the mission or responsibility to protect. Although the main motivation was to gain as many loyal to the soviet regime human force for realization of state building projects within the USSR. The Chinese discourse was mainly political administrative in form, and legal in nature, as it referred to the right to supervise the population of the province and prevent intervention of alien forces into it domestic sphere.

Key words: Kazakhs in China, repatriation of 1962, Qabdesh Zhumadilov, Yli-Ta border incident
Comparing official and literary discourses on sino-soviet border crossings of 1962

Introduction

Historically all migrations of Kazakhs out of their ancestral lands were politically motivated—the choice of the political conditions and regimes that would provide favorable survival opportunities. Return to the native lands also was conditioned by acceptance of the political frameworks for realization of the ethnic group potential. Kazakhs, divided historically between China and Russia, since 1916 were thrown into a systematic struggle of choices between political regimes and endless attempts to establish home on their native lands, under the regime that better suited the ethnocultural concept of proper governance. The Kazakh repatriation from China in the Soviet times has been one of the most understudied and poorly reflected in the academic literature topics. The western research stressed the role of great powers competition that overshadowed the problems of ethnic minorities. For great powers, the fate of minorities was never a case of serious consideration, and fell under their plans of bilateral alliance emergency or confrontation urgency, access to the precious natural resources. The ethnic minorities’ voice in the Soviet discourse was mainly represented by Uighurs, while Kazakhs were silenced and had to keep repatriation memories as mythologized domestic legends. Few literary works of Soviet times were written by Qabdesh Zhumadilov (novels “Tagdyr”/”Fate”, “Songy kosh”/”The last migration” and some autobiographical essays) who firsthand witnessed the events of border crossing. In the post-1991 period, when ethnic repatriation could become one of the cornerstones of state and nation building, the choir voices on the Kazakh life in China is not uniform due to a number of reasons. The regime in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan due to geopolitical constraints has to accept the Chinese version of the ethnic situation in China, and ignores the alternative, mainly Kazakh versions, of their life course development under the communist regime in XUAR, especially since 1962. The life of Kazakhs in China was poorly studied topic in the USSR due to many reasons, and ideological constraints were the most serious. Thus, the problems in understanding the situation of ethnic Kazakhs in modernizing and globalizing China and search of the ways to handle their repatriation to the historical homeland stem from a growing gap between the official discourses on the divided Kazakh world, the type of disseminated information on the Kazakh ethno-political history via mass media and educational institutions, corrupted collective memory that ignores many problematic spots, and unintentional silenced voices on the nature of their problems inside China.

The Kazakh migrations from China in 1940s, 1950s and 1960s have not yet become the objects for academic research based on Kazakh voices, and therefore, were not included into the history of Kazakh people at large, nor incorporated into the ethnic and civic collective memory. The paper intends to understand the differences between the official discourse on the nature of spring 1962 border crossings over the Sino-Soviet border and the literary (Kazakh) one, voices by Qabdesh Zhumadilov. The paper is based on the interpretation of the literary work of Qabdesh Zhumadilov (Songy kosh) [Zhumadilov, 1992] and the documents in the Wilson Center Digital Archive.

The main part

The Sino-soviet border crossings were part of relations between USSR and China, and survival strategies of ethnic groups, occasionally being strictly monitored by one of the parties. But since mid-1950s border control was overshadowed by “fraternal” competition between the leadership of two states in the light of power struggle for supremacy in the world communist movement, heated debates of which version of socialism and communist ideology is true, and shifting paradigm of relations with the capitalist world from war to peaceful co-existence proclaimed as the call of the epoch by the Soviet
leadership. [Li Mingjiang, 2011] The paper argues that the despite the soviet politics to encourage ethnic minorities migration from China, it would not be so large scale, if it did not correspond their plans for ethnic core maintenance under the soviet regime in much more favorable conditions rather than in China during the Maoist reforms.

Qabdesh Zhumadilov is one few writers who dared to raise the Kazakhs’ fate in China in the turbulent Maoist era in series of his novels. His works proved to be a breakthrough in the wall of silence erected by the soviet and Maoist regimes on the topics of the fate of Kazakhs as part of ethnic minorities that were subjected to the painful processes of socialist modernizations. Works of Zhumadilov were warmly accepted by the generation of the 1960s Kazakhs soviet writers who witnessed the negative effects of the totalitarian regime on the lives of soviet people. The general public also positively reacted to the return of their co-ethnics, as divided families kept memories and cared of their lost relatives. But as time passed by, memories of the repatriation faded away and new generations of general public and intellectuals concentrated on other topics, mostly raised by the conflicting processes of state and nation building. Present day ethnic repatriation, especially from China, has been not handled in due way, as many aspects of the earlier state-controlled repatriation waves were not explained to the public.

The Kazakh context for 1962 migration from China

“The Qazaqs lived in movement and made their own decisions about how to create a life as free as possible of outside interference. They did not wait for events and leaders to come to them, but actively negotiated, investigated, and fought back” (Nathan Light, 1994).

Xinjiang, a westernmost province of China proved to be a hospitable area for several generations of nomadic Kazakhs who escaped there in the turbulent times under the existential threat in the Russian and soviet times. The XUAR (the Xinxiang Uighur Autonomous Region) of the People’s Republic of China borders eight countries, and its border with the Republic Kazakhstan is the longest one (1782.75 km). The Kazakhs have been part of the multiethnic (47 ethnic groups live there) and multi-confessional (Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism) population of the XUAR. Kazakhs live in the Ili-Kazakh autonomous district, Boro-Tala-Mongol, Bayangol-Mongol, Chanzi-Hui, Kyzylsu-Kyrgyz. Kazakhs in China were engaged in struggle for the liberation during the turbulent political processes of 1930s and 1940s that to great extent was fueled by the ideas of lost alternatives for Kazakh statehood under the Bolshevik regime in the soviet Kazakhstan (not an abstract idea, as noted Nathan Light). Ideas of Kazakh statehood restoration were imported to the Kazakh populated Chinese lands by the “Alash” ideologues Raimzhan Marsekov, Akhmet Baitursunov, Myrzhaqyp Dulatov, who visited Shaushkek in spring 1918 (prior to the Bolshevik victory) and met with the local tribal chiefs during a gathering/qyryltai and ignited deeply set liberation sentiments in the hearts of Kazakhs there. Although Alash movement was purged in the soviet Kazakhstan under the Stalinist repressions, that did not mean the idea be dead as well, it was alive in the Kazakh populated Chinese lands. The tragic consequences of the soviet modernizations of the Kazakh nomadic socium caused large scale exodus to China away from famine and reprisals. The survived Alash intellectuals- Raimzhan Marsekov, Ziat Shakarim uly, Ibrai Zhainakov, Tyrsun Mustafin and others went to Xinxiang in early 1930s, where they opened there educational centers and got into enlightenment activities, raising new generation of Kazakh liberal-minded intellectuals. But in 1938 Xinxiang Shen Shicai administration arrested them, and deported to the USSR. Alash ideas were also disseminated by the teachers in gymnasiums who fled to Xinxiang in earlier times, and national-liberation ideology (Kazakh statehood creation) motivated people to get into struggle for independence in 1940s. The rebellions led by Ospan Batyr in 1940s were supported in other regions of Xinxiang, driving Kazakhs to join in different periods the soviet backed East Turkestan Republic and after its abrogation by the soviet side, the nationalists/goumindang. The USSR stopped supporting the East Turkestan Republic in favor of the Mao forces, and virtually neglected the Kazakh resistance led by Ospan batyr, for a major reason of geoeconomic and strategic significance of Xinxiang and Altay area, in particular. Rich deposits of ores and uranium were critically important for the USSR, while Ospan batyr refused to fall under the soviet control. [Barmin, 2001] The fate of Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in Xinxiang was settled by a compromise reached between Stalin and Mao, the soviet side agreed to stop supporting the East Turkestan Republic. After the soviet troops left the province, the leaders of national liberation movements (the soviet appointees) were physically eliminated. Since establishment of communist control over Xinxiang, the ideas of political representation in form of autonomy motivated the ethnic minorities in the province to get into heated debates with the central authorities that led to purges and reprisals. Kazakhs under rigid communist con-
control restrictions lost “command of their own history when their choices” were “constrained” (Li Mingjiang, 2011:41).

In 1950s Kazakhs in China were trapped between the soviet and Chinese modernization projects. The Chinese perception of the nomadic political economy rested on the Marxist vision of the property/ownership as the major source of social injustice, exploitation, alienation subject to radical uprooting and establishment of the state control over all resources. The ethnic minorities in Xinxiang, especially Kazakhs, interpreted their stay in China as temporal that depended on whether the regime in power would accept their traditional way of life (nomadic seasonal migration) and does not interfere into their internal socio-cultural practices under the guidance of tribal elite. But border crossings occurred caused by personal choices of individual families seeking re-union with their relatives in the soviet Kazakhstan. Moreover, out-migrations were practical due to the Stalinist regime initiated repatriation in 1950s as integral part of the soviet politics of the post-war reconstruction regulation within the country and prevention of external interference into the domestic affairs based on claims to patronize the deprived of citizenship émigrés. The Yalta agreements of 1945 stipulated compulsory repatriation of soviet citizens after the WWII. A number of factors contributed to the temporal success of the soviet diplomacy in the repatriation of Russian and soviet citizens from China since 1949. Firstly, the shared porous border made illegal border crossings effective for most of immigrants bypassing the check points, although they faced some problems in legalization afterwards. Secondly, the legal grounds outlined in the series of Sino-soviet agreements reached both with the nationalist Guomindang government and the communists under Mao referred to the right of return and the responsibility to protect, that the Chinese regimes had to respect, mostly due to the role of USSR in the global affairs of that period. Thirdly, the real power that the USSR possessed and could often dictate its will upon the weaker neighbors.

Stalin’s formula “One must have only one motherland/fatherland” reinforced the revised law on citizenship (dated of 19 August 1938) which extended the soviet citizenship applied to all former Russian subjects (status by November 7th, 1917), they were subject to repatriation to the USSR. At that time the repatriation meant forced return to historical homeland, although not all returnees were soviet subjects. The objectives behind the formula were pragmatic: need for population growth, shortage of labor force, control over population transfers, security- suspicions that people (former soviet citizens or close to them by some criteria, like those born on the territory now USSR) could be exploited for anti-soviet strategies of alien forces. The nature of the soviet approach to repatriation did not change considerably after death of J. Stalin, but some critical reassessment to the reasons behind the immigration from the USSR were notable. The soviet regime discriminated between the émigré of pre-soviet times, especially those who escaped after rebellion of 1916, during the famine of early 1920s, but was critical to those who fled in early 1930s in protests against the soviet politics of modernization/sedentarization, collectivization, famine and reprisals. The incoming immigrants were filtered by the security structures at all stages of their return, and post-return accommodation. The security concerns prevailed as infiltrated agents of foreign states aimed to collect data, could disseminate propaganda, arrange sabotage acts, etc. The KGB officers worked out a manual to decode various categories of so called perebezhchiki/defectors from China.

The soviet authorities changed the status of incoming repatriates from immigrating soviet citizens to the organized working group category (rabochie po orgnabory) dispatched to different regions across the soviet territory (Postanovlenie, 1959).

The Kazakh exodus from China in late 1950s and early 1960s to great extent was caused by the negative for ethnic minorities (and especially Kazakhs) consequences of the Maoist reforms – creation of communes, confiscation of cattle to justify the class principle in equal ownerships over the means of production, and state controlled regulation of all aspects of the cattle breeding. Kazakhs in China before the Maoist reforms used to live divided along the Juz/tribal belonging, tribal hierarchy and clans. Economic activities followed the same principle due to the tribal/clans affiliation and individual households were given certain rights for pastureland usage depending on their position in the tribal hierarchy and relationships’ distance to the tribal chief, who was the main distributor of the living resources.

Modernization of traditional societies implies reconstruction of the economic basis, followed by social structure transformation. Traditional forms of mindset generated by tribal and religious roots were to be eradicated. The Maoist regime launched the class struggle in the ethnic minorities’ areas and through reforms reshuffled the tribal hierarchy mostly by their loyalty to the regime, history of their anti-Chinese activities in 1930s and 1940s, resettled many potentially non-loyal tribes. [Rakhimov, 1981] While the cattle was confiscated, the tribal hierarchy
eroded, followed by the erosion of tribal solidarity, and policies to co-opt Kazakhs out of elevated tribes into the administrative structures were enforced. The poor results of the Great Leap campaignforward led to widespread food shortage and incoming to Xinjiang of impoverished and famine driven Han migrants from the neighboring regions. People starved, diseases and epidemics spread, that in turn stimulated ethnic minorities’ bottom driven projects to migrate by all means to the soviet territory. The USSR viewed ethnic minorities in XUAR as an additional resource instrument, and since early 1950s were signed a number of agreements with the PRC government to support in training professionals and intellectuals out of the ethnic minorities. Upon return, they could get into various professional activities, and propagate their co-ethnics about the better life in the soviet Kazakhstan. Those who moved to the soviet Kazakhstan earlier also reported especially since the launch of the Virgin lands campaign on the first positive effects of the harvesting, described abundance of food and other social benefits, thus heating more the return drives of their co-ethnics. [Interview with Qabdesh Zhumadilov, 2019]

The central Beijing regime stimulated outmigration of the Russian speaking population, but the provincial Xinxiang authorities rejected the out-migration of the ethnic minorities, especially of Uighurs and Kazakhs. Meanwhile, the grounds were laid out by the communist party course of nationality issues settlement by creating national-territorial units in Xinjiang, and three of them embraced Kazakh population.[Аблажей, 2014] In general, the internal situation in XUAR in 1958-1959, especially in the Kazakhs’ living areas grew tense, as the nationalist cleansings campaigns intensified. From December 1957 to April 1959 was held anti-nationalist campaign in the Ili-Kazakh autonomous oblast that purged an “anti-party” group of Kazakhs who held the top administrative and party posts. [Zimianin, 2019] The “Kazakh nationalists” were accused in separatist plans for creation of the Kazakh autonomy out of the XUAR to turn it into a separate national-territorial unit, for protests against sinization of the region, encouragement of the Kazakh migration to the oblast to increase the ethnic Kazakhs number statistically, ousting the ethnic Uighurs and Hans, and counteraction to the socialist modernization of the nomadic economic system. [Zapis besedy, 1958] In such conditions, for many Kazakh elite representatives escape to the USSR could be the best option. While in the light of out-migration of ethnic groups from XUAR, the Chinese authorities launched immigration to the province of Han population. In 1958, the communist party of China initiated the program for agrarian modernization that envisioned creation of collective communes. By mid-1958 over 600.000 nomadic households of XUAR, including the Kazakh ones, were sedentarized (Syroezhkin, 1994).

In most areas of Altay, Ili and Tarbagatai districts “communization” was held within one-two months, and by fall 1958 all the cattle, pastures, fields, inventory, and communes were administered by the state officials. Inside the communes any forms of collective activities were banned, and all aspects of everyday life came under the state regulation. The deconstruction of the traditional socio-economic basis of the Kazakh society, and radical change of their lifestyle caused greater out-migration expectations. [Syroezhkin, 1994] The Chinese authorities under the given conditions could not afford mass repatriation of Kazakhs, otherwise most of the areas could depopulate, and economic activities would stagnate. (Ablazhei, 2014:89) Out of 150 those soviet citizens aimed to leave China from XUAR, 110.000 were ethnic Kazakhs. (Ablazhei, 2014:89). And among them about 200,000 were stateless persons. Since early 1959, the soviet consulates reported on the growing number of applications for soviet citizenship and documents. (Ablazhei, 2014:90). The applicants indicated that in case of denial of repatriation, they would cross the border illegally. (Ablazhei, 2014:90) But the Chinese authorities in XUAR claimed that permit for repatriation would be granted only to those with soviet documents of 1946-1948 type, not of prior period. Moreover, it was emphasized that the authorities do not encourage migration of children over 16. (Ablazhei, 2014:90). Although, property of the emigrants could be bought out or compensated by the Chinese side.

In March 1959, was introduced a new order for repatriation. Stateless persons, even with invitations from relatives living in the USSR, were not allowed to move, and soviet documents obtained earlier were scrutinized. (Ablazhei, 2014:91). The Chinese side stressed the civic-national character of ethnic Kazakhs’ status in XUAR, and prevented their out-migration under legal and fake pretexts. In some cases, property confiscations and arrests occurred. (Ablazhei, 2014:91). The situation grew worse and in 1959, the Chinese authorities categorically refused to facilitate repatriation, and declared non-compensation for the property of emigrants. (Ablazhei, 2014:91). In October 1959, the Xingjian bureau of CCP issued a decree that prohibited purchase of goods and cattle from repatriating soviet citizens, while repatriates were not allowed to
sell it on their own, re-sell or destroy. (Ablazhei, 2014:91). In addition to that, the repatriating people could not get back their shares pooled into the communities and collective farms. There were cases when they could not get back their documents on education, labor cards, and salaries, when leaving their working places (Ablazhei, 2014:92).

Under these conditions, the soviet consulates were recommended by the Moscow authorities not to irritate the Chinese side, and delay the repatriation scheme until the situation in the province would stabilize, and not to encourage the administrators in places to speed up the repatriation procedures. Meanwhile, the XUAR authorities adopted several urgent measures to prevent out-migration of high ranking officials of Kazakh ethnicity, and the “rightist nationalists” were to stay in the country forever. (Ablazhei, 2014:92). Under such circumstances, the soviet consulates in a hasty manner adopted a simplified way for visa issues to potential repatriates. In 1959, group visas were granted, while the number of required documents was minimized, that increased the number of repatriating Kazakhs. (Ablazhei, 2014:93). Those who could not get repatriation permits from the Chinese authorities, had to cross the Sino-soviet border illegally. (Ablazhei, 2014:93). The Chinese authorities reacted by taking measures to stop the repatriation at all, closed the soviet consulates in Chuguchak and Shara-Sume that covered the Ili-Kazakh autonomous district, so that only Kulja and Urumchi consulates were responsible for more works with repatriates. Above all, in 1959 was halted the activities of the Association of Soviet Nationals that also dealt with the repatriation issues. But despite the barriers imposed by the Chinese authorities, the soviet side could arrange repatriation for 60,000 people from China in 1959, and among them 57.5 thous. were from Xinxiang. In November 1959, the Chinese side suggested to halt repatriation, although over 9.000 soviet citizens remained in China, and out of them 6.000 lived in XUAR, mostly Kazakhs and Uighurs. (Ablazhei, 2014:94).

The soviet authorities did not make any legal barriers on the way or repatriation from China, and did not differentiate between the composition of repatriates by their ethnicity, social background, and inside the Kazakh populace- their clan-juz affiliation. The tribal groupings of mostly Middle and in lesser extent of the Great Juzes arrived to the soviet Kazakhstan. The soviet regime did not publicize the tribal factor, as the incoming repatriates were dispatched across the republic by the state regulations. However, tribal and juz affiliation based identity in the soviet Kazakhstan was not studied academically, but was persecuted as an internal enemy to be eradicated by all means socially, economically, morally and psychologically for the sake of new identity creation- soviet people. The arriving repatriates were legalized by the soviet bodies in quite short period of time. In words of 1950-1960s repatriates from China, special teams came to sites of repatriates’ concentration, and after collecting all necessary information provided them with documents.

The Maoist Cultural Revolution was disastrous for the Kazakhs (as well as for other ethnic groups in China), many perished during the cleansing campaigns, imprisoned, persecuted, while virtually all aspects of the ethnic life were tabooed. The survival strategies for most Kazakhs lined in accommodating with the regime requirements. Elements of client-patron relations in the Kazakh socium, types and means for relations maintenance were eroded and gradually substituted by the Chinese sociocultural markers. The lexicon also corrupted to employ necessary terms in the Chinese equivalents to match the situation or reality under construction, and Kazakh are aware of the consequences of gradual language loss. Some Kazakhs could get education, joined the party ranks and made relatively successful careers on the service to the communist regime and moved closer to the administrative centers. While majority maintained the nomadic life style in rural area, but the state controlled virtually all aspects of their life course – specially designated people out of trusted Kazakhs reported to the authorities, doctor and teacher accompanied the migrating commune. Education was mainly elementary, in Kazakh language, but focused on history and culture of China. (Chinese film “Songy kosh”/ “The last migration”)

Mingjiang Li, argues that the confrontation between the USSR and China since the onset of Khrushchev coming to power after death of J.Stalin, went on several interrelated dimensions, and by 1962 the soviet politics towards Albania and peaceful co-existence with the capitalist world dominated the Chinese rhetoric. While the incident with exodus of ethnic minorities from Xinxiang in April 1962 did not become a serious agenda in bilateral exchange of accusations: “… the Xinxiang incident ‘was mainly resolved through diplomatic channels, and at least before November of that years, did not lead to a dramatic deterioration in relations between the two countries’.” // Mingjiang Li, Ideological dilemma: Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet split, 1962-63. Cold War History. Vol. 11, No. 3, August 2011, 387-419. P. 399
The situation in border areas grew critical by March 1962, despite the efforts undertaken by the provincial authorities to control spread of famine and relative problems by establishing norms for regular food rationing. [Cable from Yili district party committee, 1962] It culminated in April 1962 large scale migration of ethnic minorities to the Soviet territory occurred, known as Yili-Tasheng border incident, causing lengthy diplomatic debate between the Soviet and Chinese diplomats. [Mao, 2018] The Chinese authorities identified two complex reasons behind the Kazakh flight to the Soviet territory as economic (difficulties in livelihood), and political (internal factionalism and local nationalism). [Telephone reporting points from comrade Xu Huang, 1962] The Chinese authorities could stop border crossings, and accused the Soviet side in violation of a number of provisions, but could not go too far in their accusations. The overall Soviet violations covered the following areas:

1. Illegal issuance of Soviet passports to the Chinese nationals by the Soviet consulates in Wulumuqi (Urumqi) and Yining; 2. The illegal registration activities conducted by the Soviet consulate in Yining among China’s ethnic minorities; 3. Arrogance and rudeness towards our local responsible cadres; 4. Instigation of border residents to flee abroad; 5. Illegal activities conducted by the Soviet National Association.” [Report, 1962]

All the issues around the illegal border crossings from China were settled through diplomatic channels – notes, meetings, and memorandums at the level of diplomatic representative offices of both sides. The meetings were exchanges of statements, game of words, and test of each other’s nerves and insinuations of the positions adopted earlier on the nature of the border crossing. The Soviet diplomats reiterated that the Soviet government was seriously concerned with the border crossing “unpleasant” situation, but denied all accusations from the Chinese side on instigations and provocations. The conversations rolled around several topics: gaps in the border wire fences, favorable treatment of border crossers on the Soviet side, insistence of the return of border crossers. [Minutes, 1962] On April 30 in the Chinese report the border crossers were named as “ethnic minority residents from Xinjiang’s border areas”, thus recognizing the ethnic specifics of the border incident. [Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 1962] The Chinese lexicon to criticize the Soviet policies fell within the revisionist formulas, while the domestic problems were summed in the line of “class contradictions” and activities of “landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, rightists, and especially reactionary local nationalists” (Cable from the Xinjiang foreign affairs office, 1962).

The Sino-Soviet diplomatic discourse on 1962 ethnic minorities’ migration from China to the Soviet Kazakhstan followed several lines: 1) technical aspects of border crossing – in which border section, who, how, how gaps/hole appeared in wire fences, how many, how people got there and were transported into the Soviet territory; 2) statistics – how many in early stage, and growth in the following period, what they brought, economic/material losses and subsequently, gains of the Soviet side (pointed by the Chinese, and silenced by the Soviet diplomats); 3) legal issues- people’s civic statuses and how they obtained the Soviet passports, violation of Chinese territorial integrity and interference into domestic affairs from the Soviet side (emphasized by the Chinese and ignored by the Soviet); 4) domestic economic problems in China (implied by the Soviet side, but overshadowed by the Chinese accusations in the Soviet instigations for ethnic groups’ migration). The Soviet side stated that it was not just illegal border crossing, but exodus, and the reasons for such large scale migration were born on the Chinese territory. The Chinese authorities admitted the economic problems by allocating food, cloth, and other essential commodities to inhabitants of XUAR). 5) Controversies between “fraternal” parties and “regimes” over the models of socialism buildup that was integral part of the struggle for the leadership in the communist world between the USSR and PRC. 6) Chinese attempts to relinquish the status of younger brother/son in relations with the USSR, acting as senior brother/son, that actually were relations between patron and client, or master and satellite.

In series of conversations with the Soviet diplomats and notes to the Soviet diplomatic representative office, the Chinese side avoided sharp formulas, coding the Soviet position as regrettable, surprising, not convincing, and referring to the Soviet diplomats as comrades, emphasizing that the “solidarity between China and the Soviet Union” was of great significance”. Moreover, in hope that the USSR would not support India in it confrontation with Beijing, the Chinese diplomats assured that “neither country shall do anything to influence this solidarity. We have no reason to allow such things to happen again on our border which will affect our solidarity”. [Response to the Soviet side’s memorandum, 1962] The Soviet technical tonality in addressing to the Chinese side was diplomatic – exchange of notes, memorandums, regular meetings in preliminary agreed time schedule (even late in the evening). The Soviet side
escaped direct accusations that could lead to greater confrontation between two states. Ethnic factor was not implied. The Chinese discourse was political-administrative with strong legal connotation towards the soviet politics and the XUAR provinces inhabitants: the soviet politics was intervention into domestic affairs and violation of customary practices of border control and border crossings. Moreover, the Chinese side directly pointed that anymore, no soviet intervention into provincial affairs and extended civic patronage over its inhabitants would be tolerated. The limited soviet control over Xinxiang affairs and its resources was closed.

But where are Kazakhs in the Sino-soviet discourse on border crossings? From the very start of the official positions exchange between the soviet and Chinese diplomats on the border crossing, the parties avoided naming the ethnic groups, pointing only to their proximity to the Sino-soviet border – “the Chinese border residents”, in the soviet designation, or their qualitative characteristics - “bad people”, “people”, “people who crossed the border”, “evildoers”, by the Chinese side. But further on, the parties had to call them nomads (that implied the nature of their mindset and way of life) and by the end of the 1962, Kazakhs, and Uighurs (the Chinese side). While the soviet side neglected ethnicity of the border crossers in exchanges with the Chinese diplomats, but emphasized that (naming them by ethnicity) when people arrived on the soviet territory (from the Q.Zhumadilov’s interviews and accounts of 1962 witnesses), as they were allocated across the soviet territory by ethnic principle, and Kazakhs- by territorial affinity.

Discourse of Q.Zhumadilov on 1962 repatriation was affirmative in several interrelated lines as his life course positively changed under the soviet regime, and in the post-1991 period he is a recognized patriarch of Kazakh literature and the only narrator of the events and life of Kazakhs in China and their struggle for independence/statehood. He stressed the positive changes (in short- or long-term perspectives) in the lives of repatriated families and their contribution to ethnic potential maintenance and reproduction in the soviet times. While materialized independence and Kazakh statehood out of the soviet model to the Republic of Kazakhstan after 1991 was given as a teleological message from the past. But Zhumadilov regretted on the lost lives of those who fought for liberation, but could not survive until 1962 migration and see the embodiment of independent statehood. The return to traditionalism in Zhumadilov vision, was irreversible, a during the modernization eras (both in the soviet Kazakhstan and Maoist China) most fundamental aspects of the traditional life were deconstructed (nomadism, social structure based on clan hierarchy and respect to traditional authority of the tribal chiefs). Moreover, clan based solidarity eroded and degraded and related ethical and moral value system that cemented and fermented the ethnic identity. The cultural life under intervention of communist ideology in the Maoist version was falling apart. Zhumadilov emphasized the chances for statehood on the ancestral land (in Xinxiang) would never come true.

It is quite problematic to identify who was Zhumadilov in the novel. He coded the names of Kazakh activists involved in the heated debates in China on the reformating the system of XUAR administration, although the soviet side was well aware of the intra-ethnic groups political debates. The Kazakh leaders suggested the Chinese authorities to introduce options to provide equal representation of Kazakhs and Uighurs in the administrative structures of XUAR, or create a separate republic within the XUAR for Kazakhs only, and unconditionally eliminate the Han Chinese from the province as administrators and settlers. Zhumadilov in the post-1991 interviews and articles reiterated that the true motivation behind the Kazakh migration from China was search of statehood model to match the ethnocultural framework by main criteria- independence, political representation, economic sufficiency, ethnic reproduction in favorable conditions. Zhumadilov mentioned that the migration was prepared at three levels- bottom (grass root initiatives of common folk fueled by the success stories of earlier migrants), mid (activities of the soviet diplomatic agencies and their corresponding networks among the locals) and upper (the soviet leadership approval of migration and readiness to accommodate border crossers). Q. Zhumadilov stressed that only those who were “clean” before the Kazakh folk and the soviet regime (or least could justify their old “mistakes”) moved to the Soviet Kazakhstan. But the fate of those who could not migrate and were purged, persecuted, was not narrated in the novel. The Kazakh ethno-cultural identity development in China stagnated, while hopes for any kind of political representation were corrupted to match the Maoist regime frameworks. Zhumadilov also does not mention the escape of Uighurs, while Russians were vividly and in a warm way described as complimentary to Kazakhs and willing to return to their historical homeland. The novel was written in the 1970s when the Sino-soviet confrontation was in apex, and any criticism of the Chinese domestic politics could have serious consequences for bilateral relations,
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Ethnic minorities in China and Q. Zhumadilov himself. The Soviet Kazakh statehood model was not perfect, Kazakhs were poorly represented in the political-administrative structures, aspects of Kazakh ethnic culture were degrading, including language, Kazakh history was revised to accommodate the Marxist-Leninist scenarios of nomad’s modernization into agrarians and working class.

The Kazakh leaders from China were not much welcomed in the USSR as they were the source of potential rise of a new wave of national-liberation consciousness fermenting against the Moscow dictate. The requirements for the national/ethnic writers within the socialist realism (even in the late Soviet subjectivity format) unconditionally included the Russian/Slavic component as positive, therefore image of Russians who realized the true meaning of historical processes was positive. Uighurs were seen by Zhumadilov (although he does not mention them) corrupted by the Maoist regime, as many of them were coopted into the administrative structures, and the debates between the Kazakh and Uighur leaders on the autonomous province status in 1950s revealed a wide and deep gap between interests of Kazakh and Uighur people. The Chinese side picked out of the Uighurs the loyal ones and made to preside over other ethnic groups in the XUAR. The Soviet discourse was civic by nature and humanitarian in form, when it referred both the opening the border for human exodus from China due to their even visual physical representation—old people, women with children, tired, barefoot, cold from night trips and rains. Most of the border crossers were Soviet passport holders, or were designated by the Chinese side as former Russian/Soviet residents. The supervision over the life course of XUAR inhabitants was to remain only within the Chinese jurisdiction and political-administrative apparatus.

Zhumadilov discourse was basically ethnic but teleological in its unveiling trajectory, as the general line is focused on the idea that migration to the Soviet Kazakhstan was logical and decision came from the bottom of the Kazakh hearts who dreamed of safe life for their future generations and ethnogenetic potential maintenance: “Thus, since the early times striving for freedom, the last Kazakh migration returned to its people and joined the path of great progress” [Zhumadilov, 1992: 703]. The author contextualized the Kazakh exodus from China into the endless fight of Kazakhs for their statehood during the wars with Jungars and failed rebellions of 1930s and 1940s. Zhumadilov does not discuss the revolutionary ideas, principles of Marxism/Leninism and Maoism. The central idea is to show how Kazakhs of China came to the very point of realization that the only path to survival is migration to the USSR [20].

Table – Number of people arrived from China for the period 1954-1963

| Time period                      | families | people  |
|---------------------------------|----------|---------|
| From 1954 until 1961            | 22695    | 134117  |
| April – May 1962                | 16606    | 71796   |
| September 1962 to 1 January 1963| 5766     | 26643   |
| 1962                            | 22373    | 90439   |
| January 1963 to May 1963        | 1830     | 20407   |
| Total                           |          | 253492  |

Source: Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan (CSA of RK), fund 1987, opis 1, delo 126, list 22-31. There is wide discrepancy on the number of repatriates during 1962-1963 between the Chinese (60 thous.), official Soviet (close to 200 thous. but including those who left by May of 1964), Kazakh (Zhumadilov, 200 thous.), and Western sources. Mosley gives the figure as 60.000, Dreyer J. – close to 100000. Mendikulova G. Istoricheskie sud’by kazakhskoi diaspor. Proishozhdenie i razvitie. Almaty, 1997, p. 225. Zhanguttin based on the Kazakh archives funds (Ministry of sovkhozes of USSR), states in April-May 1962 from China “in non-organized way to the territory of Kazakhstan” arrived 16606, 71796 people. Out of them 74.2 % had Soviet citizenship, while 1.3 were citizens of PRC, and 24.5 were stateless. (Altayev A., Zhanguttin B. Kratkie ocherki istorii Kazakhstana. Uchebnoe posobie dlia vuzov.- Almaty, “Bastau”, 2008, p. 197.) In September –December 1962 came 766 families, or 26643 people.
Conclusion

The official soviet discourse being diplomatic in form, especially, when it concerned the regulating technicalities with the Chinese officials, was civic in nature. The Soviet Union interpreted the right to patronize the former Russian/soviet citizens residing in China through the mission or responsibility to protect. Although the main motivation was to gain as many loyal to the soviet regime human force for realization of state building projects within the USSR. The Chinese discourse was mainly political administrative in form, and legal in nature, as it referred to the right to supervise the population of the province and prevent intervention of alien forces into it domestic sphere.

Qabdesh Zhumadilov represented the voice of Kazakhs who failed to materialize the dream of state building project in China proper, and in their last migration/Songy kosh to the soviet Kazakhstan hoped to find the Promised Land for safe ethnocultural development.

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