Abstract—Wireless physical-layer security is an emerging field of research aiming at preventing eavesdropping in an open wireless medium. In this paper, we propose a novel waveform design approach to minimize the likelihood that a message transmitted between trusted single-antenna nodes is intercepted by an eavesdropper. In particular, with knowledge first of the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI), we find the optimum waveform and transmit energy that minimize the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the output of the eavesdropper’s maximum-SINR linear filter, while at the same time provide the intended receiver with a required pre-specified SINR at the output of its own max-SINR filter. Next, if prior knowledge of the eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable, we design a waveform that maximizes the amount of energy maintained at the pre-specified level. The extensions of these secure transmission approaches to multiple intended receivers are also investigated and semidefinite relaxation (SDR) – an approximation technique based on convex optimization – is utilized to solve the arising NP-hard design problems. Extensive simulation studies confirm our analytical performance predictions and illustrate the benefits of the designed waveforms on securing single-input single-output (SISO) transmissions and multicasting.

Index Terms—Artificial noise, broadcast channel, eavesdropping, physical-layer security, power allocation, semidefinite relaxation, signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio, SISO wiretap channel, waveform design.

I. INTRODUCTION

The broadcast nature of the wireless medium makes wireless networks ubiquitously accessible and inherently non-secure. An eavesdropper within range of a wireless transmission may intercept the transmitted signal while staying undetected. Commonly used security methods rely on cryptographic (encryption) and steganographic (covert communication) means employed at upper layers of the wireless network. It is still highly desirable, however, to enhance the core security of wireless communications by reducing the likelihood that propagating signals are intercepted by eavesdroppers in the first place. As a result, there has been growing interest recently in the development of physical layer security mechanisms for the wireless link.

A classical physical-layer secrecy setting was introduced in Wyner’s seminal work [1] in the form of two single-input single-output (SISO) channels, transmitter-to-intended-receiver and transmitter-to-eavesdropper. The Wyner Gaussian wiretap channel was a first example of an information-theoretic security framework that demonstrated the possibility of secure communications at the physical layer. If the eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of the channel of the intended receiver, perfectly secure communication between the transmitter and the intended receiver is possible with non-zero rate. Later on, the studies on secrecy capacity were extended to the cases of secure communications over SISO fading channels [2]-[7], Gaussian broadcast channels [8],[9], and Gaussian multiple access channels [10],[11]. Motivated by emerging wireless communication applications with multiple antennas, there has been recently a flurry of interesting studies of information-theoretic secrecy capacity for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channels [12]-[18], single-input multiple-output (SIMO) channels [17], and multiple-input single-output (MISO) channels [18]-[20]. Practical applications of low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes to the wiretap channel problem were considered in [21]-[23].

While many works focus on information-theoretic aspects and calculation/analysis of the achievable secrecy capacity, there is growing interest from the signal processing perspective to provide actual algorithmic security solutions that weaken the eavesdroppers’ intercepted signal and materialize -at least partly- the information theoretic secrecy capacity promises. Secret transmit (and receive) beamforming designs [24]-[29] which utilize the spatial degrees of freedom can enhance the physical layer secrecy of wireless communications by crippling eavesdroppers’ interception efforts as much as possible, while simultaneously guaranteeing a certain Quality-of-Service (QoS)/signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) at the intended receiver. In particular, [24]-[25] focused on exploiting knowledge of the eavesdropper’s MISO/MIMO instantaneous channel state information (CSI) to provide secure communications. Since eavesdropper’s CSI is unlikely to be available in many scenarios, the use of artificially injected noise (AN) was considered [26]-[28]. AN-aided methods aim to generate a disturbance signal that degrades the eavesdropper’s channel but does not affect the channel of the intended receiver, thus enabling secure communication. AN-aided methods can certainly be adopted for the case where the eavesdropper’s instantaneous CSI is known as well. In [29], the transmit beamformer and AN spatial distribution were jointly optimized according to the CSI of the intended receiver.

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and the eavesdroppers, using a semidefinite relaxation (SDR) algorithmic approach.

In this present work, we consider the core problem of secure transmissions over a multipath SISO channel where both transmitter and intended receiver have only one antenna. Other than beamforming, which uses the spatial degrees of freedom to weaken eavesdroppers’ receptions, we turn our attention to waveform design -another meaningful idea in physical-layer security- which can exploit the temporal characteristics of a multipath fading channel. To the best of our knowledge, waveform design for secure transmissions over multipath SISO channels has not been investigated in the literature before. Like other signal-processing-based approaches [24]-[29], we will use again SINR as the optimization metric to pursue physical-layer security. In particular, with knowledge of eavesdropper’s CSI, our objective is to find the optimum waveform and transmit energy that minimize the SINR at the output of the eavesdropper’s maximum-SINR linear filter, while at the same time provide the intended receiver with a pre-specified SINR at the output of its own maximum SINR filter. It is also interesting to point out that the design formulation described above is similar to cognitive radio (CR) application problems where protecting primary users from being interfered by secondary users [30],[35] parallels the problem of preventing eavesdroppers from overhearing.

In the second part of this work, we study the case where no information regarding the eavesdropper’s CSI is available and AN-aided methods are adopted in the waveform design problem. The studies are then extended to the scenario that the transmitter is to broadcast secure data to multiple intended receivers. We recognize that, regrettably, the waveform design problem for secure multicasting is non-convex NP-hard, in general. Yet, using SDR techniques we are able to develop a realizable suboptimal solution with excellent secure multicast system performance as demonstrated by simulation studies included in this paper.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The secure SISO transmission problem is formulated in Section II. Secure waveform designs are developed in Section III for one intended receiver. We then extend the studies to the case of multiple intended receivers in Section IV. In Section V, simulation results illustrate our developments and, finally, a few conclusions are drawn in Section VI.

The following notation is used throughout the paper. Boldface lower-case letters indicate column vectors and boldface upper-case letters indicate matrices; \( \mathbb{C} \) is the set of all complex numbers; \( \{ \cdot \}^T \) and \( \{ \cdot \}^H \) denote the transpose and transpose-conjugate operation, respectively; \( I_L \) is the \( L \times L \) identity matrix; \( \Re \{ \cdot \} \) denotes the real part of a complex number; \( \text{sgn}(\cdot) \) denotes zero-threshold quantization; and \( \mathbb{E}\{\cdot\} \) represents statistical expectation. \( X \succ 0 \) and \( X \succeq 0 \) state that \( X \) is positive definite and positive semidefinite, respectively; \( \text{Tr}\{X\} \) is the trace of \( X \). Finally, \( |\cdot| \) and \( \|\cdot\| \) are the magnitude and norm of a scalar and vector, respectively.

1To the extent that the bit-error-rate (BER) of the eavesdropper’s receiver is monotonically decreasing in SINR, minimization of SINR corresponds to maximization of the BER of the eavesdropper toward the 1/2 value.

![Fig. 1. SISO transmission system of a transmitter (Alice), an intended receiver (Bob), and an eavesdropper (Eve). All received signals exhibit multipath Rayleigh fading.](image)

II. SYSTEM MODEL

We consider a wireless transmission to an intended receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper who is able to overhear the transmitted signal. For convenience, we follow the common-whimsical-language in the field and name the transmitter, intended receiver, and eavesdropper, Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. A simple diagram is shown in Fig. 1 to illustrate this basic communication scenario.

Alice will be attempting to transmit confidential messages to Bob securely with the aid of an appropriately crafted waveform. The transmitted signal is

\[
u(t) = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \sqrt{E_b(n)} s(t - nT)e^{j2\pi f_c t}
\]

where \( f_c \) is the carrier frequency, \( b(n) \in \{ \pm 1 \}, n = 1, 2, \ldots \), is the \( n \)th transmitted information bit, \( E > 0 \) represents transmitted energy per bit with bit period \( T \), and \( s(t) \) is the unit-energy (\( \int_0^T |s(t)|^2 dt = 1 \)) complex continuous waveform of the form

\[
s(t) = \sum_{l=0}^{L-1} s(l)\psi(t - lT_c)
\]

where \( s(l) \in \mathbb{C}, l = 0, 1, \ldots, L - 1 \), are to be designed/optimized and \( \psi(t) \) is the continuous pulse shape function with duration \( T_c = T/L \) assumed to be given and fixed (for example, ideal square pulse, raised cosine, or otherwise).

The transmitted signal is modeled to propagate to Bob and Eve over SISO multipath Rayleigh fading channels and experience additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and interference -potentially- from other concurrent users. The combined received signal to Bob (subscript \( b \)) or Eve (subscript \( e \)) over individual multipath fading channels of impulse response \( h_{b/e}(t) \) is

\[
y_{b/e}(t) = h_{b/e}(t) \ast u(t) + z_{b/e}(t) + n_{b/e}(t)
\]

where \( z_{b/e}(t) \) is other user(s) interference and \( n_{b/e}(t) \) is white Gaussian noise. After carrier demodulation and \( \psi(\cdot) \)-pulse matched filtering over a presumed multipath extended data bit period of \( L_M = L + M - 1 \) pulses where \( M \) is the number of
resolvable multipaths, the data vector $y_b(n) \in \mathbb{C}^{L \times M}$ received by Bob takes the following general form

$$y_b(n) = \sqrt{E} b(n) \mathbf{H}_b s + z_b + n_b, \quad n = 1, 2, \ldots, \quad (4)$$

where $\mathbf{H}_b \in \mathbb{C}^{L \times M}$ is the multipath channel matrix between Alice and Bob.

$$\mathbf{H}_b \triangleq \begin{bmatrix}
   h_{b,1} & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 \\
   h_{b,2} & h_{b,1} & \ldots & 0 & 0 \\
   \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\
   0 & 0 & \ldots & h_{b,M} & h_{b,M-1} \\
   0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & h_{b,M} \\
   \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\
   0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 \\
\end{bmatrix}$$

with entries $h_{b,m} \in \mathbb{C}$, $m = 1, \ldots, M$, considered as complex Gaussian random variables to model fading phenomena, $s_b \in \mathbb{C}^L$ denotes multipath induced inter-symbol-interference (ISI), $z_b \in \mathbb{C}^L$ represents comprehensively interference to Bob from other potential concurrent transmitters, and $n_b$ is a zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector with autocorrelation matrix $\sigma_n^2 \mathbf{I}_M$. The information bits $b(n)$ are handled as binary equiprobable random variables that are independent within the data stream (i.e., in $n = 1, 2, \ldots$). Since the effect of ISI is, arguably, negligible for applications in which the number of resolvable multipaths $M$ is much less than the number of pulses $L$, for mathematical and notational convenience we will not consider the ISI terms in our theoretical developments that follow.\(^3\) Thus, Bob’s received signal in (4) is simplified/approximated by

$$y_b(n) = \sqrt{E} b(n) \mathbf{H}_b s + z_b + n_b, \quad n = 1, 2, \ldots, \quad (5)$$

Information bit detection at Bob is carried out optimally in second-order statistics terms via linear maximum SINR filtering (or, equivalently, minimum mean square error filtering) as follows

$$\hat{b}_b(n) = \text{sgn} \{\Re\{w_{\text{maxSINR},b}^H y_b(n)\}\}, \quad n = 1, 2, \ldots, \quad (6)$$

where $w_{\text{maxSINR},b} = c R_b^{-1} \mathbf{H}_b s \in \mathbb{C}^{L \times M}$, $c > 0$, is the maximum SINR filter and $R_b \triangleq \mathbb{E}\{z_b(n)z_b(n)^H\} = \mathbb{E}\{z_b(n)z_b(n)^H\} + \sigma_n^2 \mathbf{I}_M > 0$ is the autocorrelation matrix of the combined total additive channel disturbance. Practically, $R_b$ can be estimated by averaging signal-abstract observations over $N \geq L_M$ samples $y_b(n)$ in the absence of the signal of interest, $R_b := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} z_b(n)z_b(n)^H$. If interference $z_b$ from other concurrent users is not present, $R_b = \sigma_n^2 \mathbf{I}_M$, and the maximum SINR filter becomes a simple matched-filter $w_{\text{maxSINR},b} \equiv w_{\text{MF},b} \equiv \mathbf{H}_b s$. The output SINR of $w_{\text{maxSINR},b}$ can be calculated to be

$$\text{SINR}_b \triangleq \frac{\mathbb{E}\{w_{\text{maxSINR},b}^H \sqrt{E} \mathbf{H}_b s\|^2\}}{\mathbb{E}\{w_{\text{maxSINR},b}^H (z_b + n_b)^2\}} = E s^H H_b^H R_b^{-1} H_b s = E s^H Q_b s \quad (7)$$

where we define $Q_b \triangleq H_b^H R_b^{-1} H_b, \quad Q_b \succ 0$.

Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, Eve can also hear the signal transmitted by Alice. Without loss of generality and for simplicity in notation, we account the multipath channels Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve to have the same number of resolvable paths ($M$, that is). Then, the signal vector received by Eve can be expressed as

$$y_e(n) = \sqrt{E} b(n) \mathbf{H}_e s + z_e + n_e, \quad n = 1, 2, \ldots, \quad (8)$$

where $\mathbf{H}_e \in \mathbb{C}^{L \times M}$ is the Alice-to-Eve channel matrix with multipath channel coefficients $h_{e,m} \in \mathbb{C}$, $m = 1, \ldots, M$, $z_e$ is other-signals interference to Eve, and $n_e$ is AWGN.

We consider as a “worst-case” to Alice and Bob the scenario under which Eve has perfect knowledge of the multipath channel coefficients $[h_{e,1}, \ldots, h_{e,M}]$ between Alice and Eve, as well as of the waveform $s$ used by Alice. Knowledge by Eve of the waveform $s$ and the Alice-to-Eve channel coefficients $[h_{e,1}, \ldots, h_{e,M}]$ allows Eve to carry out maximum SINR filtering eavesdropping.\(^4\) With this information, Eve attempts to extract/retrieve message bits via her own linear maximum SINR filter $w_{\text{maxSINR},e}$,\(^5\)

$$\hat{b}_e(n) = \text{sgn} \{\Re\{w_{\text{maxSINR},e}^H y_e(n)\}\}, \quad n = 1, 2, \ldots, \quad (9)$$

where $w_{\text{maxSINR},e} = c R_e^{-1} H_e s \in \mathbb{C}^{L \times M}$, $c > 0$, and $R_e \triangleq \mathbb{E}\{z_e(z_e^H)\} + \sigma_n^2 \mathbf{I}_M > 0$ is the autocorrelation matrix of the total additive disturbance to Eve (which can also be sample-average estimated). The output SINR of the filter $w_{\text{maxSINR},e}$ is given by

$$\text{SINR}_e \triangleq \frac{\mathbb{E}\{w_{\text{maxSINR},e}^H (\sqrt{E} \mathbf{H}_e s)^2\}}{\mathbb{E}\{w_{\text{maxSINR},e}^H (z_e + n_e)^2\}} = E s^H H_e^H R_e^{-1} H_e s = E s^H Q_e s \quad (10)$$

where we define $Q_e \triangleq H_e^H R_e^{-1} H_e, \quad Q_e \succ 0$.

From an information theoretic perspective, as long as $\text{SINR}_e > \text{SINR}_b$ there exists in theory a sequence of coding schemes in increasing block-length such that, by adjusting the transmitting energy appropriately, only Bob can perfectly decode and obtain the message from Alice while Eve fails. In a practical realistic secure wireless transmission application, we wish that Bob can receive Alice’s signal at a minimum required SINR level that corresponds to an acceptable BER, while Eve can only have far, far inferior SINR reception performance with, consequently, BER near 1/2. In the next section, we attempt to lay the foundation for such a development utilizing Alice’s transmit waveform vector $s$ as a security design parameter\(^6\).

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3. Knowledge by Eve of Bob’s channel $[h_{b,1}, \ldots, h_{b,M}]$ would be of no value to passive eavesdropping, which is the only security breach considered in this present work.

4. Our pre-detection SINR-based development approach is independent of symbol alphabet sets and employed detectors. For simplicity and clarity in presentation, we consider herein binary symbols $b(n) \in \{\pm 1\}$ (eq. (1)) and corresponding (optimal for Gaussian disturbance) zero-threshold detection (eqs. (7), (10)).
III. SECURE WAVEFORM DESIGN

A. Known Eavesdropper Channel

We first consider the scenario under which Alice/Bob know Eve’s channel $H_e$ and disturbance autocorrelation matrix $R_e$. This may be possible, for example, if the location of Eve is known or projected/anticipated.

Our objective, in this case, is to find the transmission bit energy $E$ and the complex-valued normalized waveform $s$ used by Alice that minimize SINR, under the constraint that Bob achieves its pre-determined SINR requirement $\gamma > 0$. I.e., we would like to identify the optimal pair

$$\left( E, s \right)^{opt} = \arg \min_{E > 0, s \in \mathbb{C}^L} E s^H Q_e s$$

s.t. $E s^H Q_e s \geq \gamma$, $s^H s = 1$, $E \leq E_{\max}$,

where $E_{\max}$ denotes the maximum available/allowable bit energy for the transmitter.

The constrained optimization problem (12)-(15) is non-convex. It is easy to verify that (13) always holds with equality at an optimal point. Therefore, for any given $s$, the optimal transmitting energy can be calculated at

$$E = \frac{\gamma}{s^H Q_e s}.$$ (16)

By applying (16) to (12)-(15), the objective function can be reformulated as having only $s$ to be optimized,

$$s^{opt} = \arg \min_{s \in \mathbb{C}^L} \frac{s^H Q_e s}{s^H Q_b s}$$

s.t. $s^H Q_b s \geq \frac{\gamma}{E_{\max}}$, $s^H s = 1$. (17)

Now, our problem is to find a normalized waveform vector $s$ to minimize the SINR ratio (generalized Rayleigh quotient)

$$\text{SINR}_e = \frac{s^H Q_e s}{s^H Q_b s}$$ between Eve and Bob under constraint (13). It is clear that constraint (13) may be satisfied and the optimization problem is feasible/allowable, only if the maximum eigenvalue of $Q_b$ is no less than $\gamma/E_{\max}$. If we ignore constraint (13) for a moment, then the waveform to minimize the SINR ratio is the familiar generalized eigenvector solution (18) given by the following proposition.

**Proposition 1:** Let $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_L$ be the normalized eigenvectors of matrices $(Q_e, Q_b)$ with corresponding eigenvalues $\lambda_1 \geq \lambda_2 \geq \cdots \geq \lambda_L$, i.e. $Q_e p_i = \lambda_i Q_e p_i$, $i = 1, \ldots, L$. The normalized waveform to minimize the generalized Rayleigh quotient in (17) is the generalized eigenvector

$$s = p_L$$ (20)

with corresponding smallest eigenvalue (and attained minimum quotient/ratio) $\lambda_L$.

The eigen-design waveform in (20) is obtained with computational complexity $O((L+M-1)^3)$. It is the optimal solution with Alice transmit energy $E = \gamma/p_L^H Q_b p_L$, if $s = p_L$ happens to satisfy (13), which is a common case. If, however, (13) is not satisfied, we have to return to problem (12)-(15) and examine its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition. The findings are summarized in the following proposition whose proof is provided in the Appendix.

**Proposition 2:** Consider the solvable (maximum eigenvalue of $Q_b$ no less than $\gamma/E_{\max}$) optimization problem (17)-(19) and assume that solution (20) does not satisfy constraint (18). Then, the following KKT conditions are necessary for an $s$ to be optimal

$$(Q_e + \mu I)s = \beta Q_b s, \quad \beta > 0, \quad \mu > 0,$$

$$s^H Q_b s = \frac{\gamma}{E_{\max}},$$

$$s^H s = 1.$$ (21) (22) (23)

While, unfortunately, we cannot have closed-form expressions for $s$ from the above KKT conditions, we can pursue an efficient numerical solution by bisection. We reformulate (21) as

$$((1 - \tilde{\mu}) Q_e + \tilde{\mu} I)s = \beta (1 - \tilde{\mu}) Q_b s, \quad \beta > 0,$$ (24)

where $\tilde{\mu} \triangleq \frac{\mu}{1 + \mu}, \tilde{\mu} \in [0, 1]$. Condition (24) indicates that the optimal $s$ is a generalized eigenvector of the matrices $((1 - \tilde{\mu}) Q_e + \tilde{\mu} I, (1 - \tilde{\mu}) Q_b)$. For any given value of $\tilde{\mu} \in [0, 1]$, let $q_L(\tilde{\mu})$ denote the generalized eigenvector of $((1 - \tilde{\mu}) Q_e + \tilde{\mu} I, (1 - \tilde{\mu}) Q_b)$ that has minimum eigenvalue $\beta(\tilde{\mu})$. We can easily verify that $q_L^H(\tilde{\mu}) Q_b q_L(\tilde{\mu})$ is strictly monotonically increasing in $\tilde{\mu} \in [0, 1]$. Based on the monotonicity and bounds on $\tilde{\mu}$, we solve the KKT necessary conditions (22)-(24) with bisection on $\tilde{\mu}$ to a value $\tilde{\mu}^{opt}$ such that $|q_L^H(\tilde{\mu}^{opt}) Q_b q_L(\tilde{\mu}^{opt}) - \frac{\gamma}{E_{\max}}| < \epsilon$ where $\epsilon > 0$ is a small positive value serving as stopping threshold. The resulting $\tilde{\mu}^{opt}$, $\beta(\tilde{\mu}^{opt})$, and $s^{opt} = q_L(\tilde{\mu}^{opt})$ values uniquely satisfy the necessary conditions (22)-(24) and give the globally optimal solution. While the optimization problem can also be solved by semidefinite relaxation (SDR) [43], our proposed generalized eigen-decomposition based algorithm is direct in nature, easy to implement (straight in the complex domain), and faster.

B. Unknown Eavesdropper Channel

In many applications it is impractical to assume that Alice/Bob may have (continuously updated) information about Eve’s channel and disturbance autocorrelation matrix $R_e$. In this case, the waveform design solution of the previous section cannot be adopted due to lack of access to Eve’s SINR.

By common intuition, low-power Alice-to-Bob transmission (“whispering”) improves security by making signal interception by Eve more difficult since Eve’s SINR is proportional to the transmitting energy. Alice, then, needs to use a waveform $s$ that minimizes the transmitting energy while Bob maintains a given required QoS level

$$\left( E, s \right)^{opt} = \arg \min_{E > 0, s \in \mathbb{C}^L} E$$

s.t. $E s^H Q_b s \geq \gamma$, $s^H s = 1$, $E \leq E_{\max}$.

[5] The strong Lagrangian duality of (12)-(15) was proven in [37].
Mathematically, the optimization problem (25)-(28) is a special case of (12)-(15) under $Q_c = \alpha I, \alpha > 0$. The optimal design to minimize the transmit energy is summarized by the following proposition with straightforward derivation [38, Theorem 4.2.2].

**Proposition 3:** Let $q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_L$ be the eigenvectors of $Q_b$ with corresponding eigenvalues $\lambda_1 \geq \lambda_2 \geq \cdots \geq \lambda_L$. The waveform $s$ to minimize transmitting energy is

$$s = q_1$$

and the minimum transmitting energy is

$$E_{\min} = \gamma/\lambda_1.$$  

If $E_{\min} < E_{\max}$, Alice-to-Bob transmission can be established with waveform $s = q_1$ and transmitting energy $E_{\min} = \gamma/\lambda_1$.

To further increase security by degrading Eve’s SINR, we adopt an artificial noise (AN)-aided approach. The maximum (by the waveform design $s = q_1$) remaining transmit energy budget $E_{AN} = E_{\max} - E_{\min}$ will be utilized to insert artificially generated noise to interfere to signal reception by Eve only. Specifically, Alice shall transmit during the $n$th symbol period her data signal $\sqrt{E_b(n)}s$ along with artificially generated noise $w(n)$ of mean $\mathbb{E}\{w\} = 0$, autocorrelation matrix $R_w = \mathbb{E}\{ww^H\}$, and energy $E_{AN} = \text{Tr}\{R_w\}$. Bob’s received signal vector is then expressed as (compare to (6))

$$y_b(n) = \sqrt{E_b(n)}H_b s + H_b w(n) + z_b + n_b, \quad n = 1, 2, \ldots.$$  

(31)

With maximum SINR filtering by $w_{\max} \text{SINR}_b = c(R_b + H_b R_w H_b^H)^{-1}H_b S$, $c > 0$, $R_b = \mathbb{E}\{z_b + n_b)(z_b + n_b)^H\}$, the output SINR with AN is maximized to

$$\text{SINR}_{b,AN}^b = E_b H_b^H (R_b + H_b R_w H_b^H)^{-1} H_b s$$

where the superscript AN is added to differentiate from Bob’s SINR in (3) when no AN is injected by Alice. The autocorrelation matrix $R_w$ of AN must now be designed by Alice such that Bob’s SINR degradation due to AN is zero, that is $\text{SINR}_b - \text{SINR}_{b,AN}^b = 0$.

By Woodbury’s matrix inversion lemma [39].

$$(R_b + H_b R_w H_b^H)^{-1} = R_b^{-1} - R_b^{-1} H_b R_w (I + H_b^H R_b^{-1} H_b R_w)^{-1} H_b^H R_b^{-1}$$

and (32) can be rewritten as

$$\text{SINR}_{b,AN}^b = E_b H_b^H R_b^{-1} H_b s -$$

$$E_b H_b^H R_b^{-1} H_b R_w (I + H_b^H R_b^{-1} H_b R_w)^{-1} H_b^H R_b^{-1} H_b s$$

(33)

where the first term is Bob’s SINR without AN (see (5)) and the second term quantifies Bob’s SINR degradation due to AN. To make the second term (degradation) in (33) equal to zero, it suffices to design AN with autocorrelation matrix $R_w$ such that

$$s^H H_b^H R_b^{-1} H_b R_w = s^H Q_b R_w = 0^T$$

(34)

where $0$ is the $L \times 1$ all zero vector.

It is easy to see that, to achieve equality in (34) with waveform $s = q_1$, we should have $R_w = W \Sigma W^H$ with $W \triangleq [q_2, \ldots, q_L]$ and $\Sigma \in \mathbb{R}^{(L-1) \times (L-1)}$ a diagonal matrix with $\text{Tr}\{\Sigma\} = E_{AN}$. This means that AN $w(n)$ must be chosen as a linear combination of the $L - 1$ eigenvectors $q_2, \ldots, q_L$.

With unknown eavesdropper’s CSI, the best option available to Alice is to isotropically/uniformly spread the available transmit energy budget $E_{AN} = E_{\max} - E_{\min}$ along the $L - 1$ eigen dimensions orthogonal to $s = q_1$ to interfere with the eavesdroppers’ receiver. Therefore, AN is generated with the following autocorrelation matrix

$$R_w = E_{\max} - E_{\min} \frac{W\Sigma W^H}{L - 1}.$$  

(35)

The task of weakening Eve’s SINR (subject to meeting Bob’s QoS requirements) is now complete at a best effort basis by the AN approach when neither instantaneous nor statistical CSI of Eve is available.

**IV. SECURE MULTICASTING**

Multicasting is an efficient method of supporting group communication by allowing simultaneous transmission of the same information to multiple destinations. In the scenario of (secure) multicasting shown in Fig. 2, Alice intends to transmit securely the same data stream to multiple receivers (K Bobs) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). With K Bobs to be served, the received signal of each Bob is denoted by

$$y_{b,k}(n) = \sqrt{E_b(n)} H_{b,k} s + z_{b,k} + n_{b,k}, \quad k = 1, \ldots, K, \quad n = 1, 2, \ldots,$$

where $H_{b,k} \in \mathbb{C}^{L_M \times L}$ is the channel matrix from Alice to Bob-$k$ with multipath channel coefficients $h_{b,k,m} \in \mathbb{C}, \ m = 1, \ldots, M$, and $z_{b,k}$ is compound interference to Bob-$k$. Similar to the developments in the previous section, the output SINR of Bob-$k$’s maximum SINR filter is

$$\text{SINR}_{b,k} = E_b H_{b,k} s$$

where $Q_{b,k} \triangleq H_{b,k} R_b^{-1} H_{b,k}$. Eve’s received signal model is the same as in (9) and the output SINR of Eve’s maximum SINR filter is as in (11).
Thus, with $\text{SINR}_{\text{sum}} \triangleq \sum_{k=1}^{K} \text{SINR}_{b,k} = E s^H \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} Q_{b,k} \right) s = E s^H \tilde{Q}_b s,$

$\tilde{Q}_b \triangleq \sum_{k=1}^{K} Q_{b,k}$, then the presented secure waveform design problem is similar to (12)-(13) and can be solved by the algorithm developed in the previous section. Arguably, however, sum-SINR may not be an appropriate performance measure of choice, since no form of fairness/performance assurance among receivers can be guaranteed. Therefore, we turn our attention to the more difficult version of the problem that involves individual constraints by which each intended receiver has its own SINR requirement $\gamma_k$, $k = 1, \ldots, K$. We investigate secure waveform design for the known and unknown eavesdropper channel case.

### A. Known Eavesdropper Channel

Our objective is to find the transmission bit energy $E$ and the complex-valued normalized waveform vector $s$ that minimize $\text{SINR}_e = E s^H Q_e s$ under the constraints

\begin{align}
\text{(36)}: \quad & \max_{E > 0} \min_{s \in \mathbb{C}^K} E s^H Q_e s \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & E s^H Q_{b,k} s \geq \gamma_k, \quad k = 1, \ldots, K, \\
& s^H s = 1, \\
& E \leq E_{\text{max}}.
\end{align}

The optimization task of minimizing the quadratic objective function (36) subject to the $K > 1$ constraints in (37) and (38) is, unfortunately, a non-convex NP-hard (in $L$) optimization problem. In the following, we delve into the details of the problem and derive a realizable suboptimum solution.

To effectively approach the problem, we first let $x \triangleq \sqrt{E}s$ denote the amplitude-including transmitted waveform vector. Then, the optimization problem in (36)-(39) can be rewritten as

\begin{align}
\text{(40)}: \quad & \min_{x \in \mathbb{C}^L} x^H Q_e x \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & x^H Q_{b,k} x \geq \gamma_k, \quad k = 1, \ldots, K, \\
& x^H x \leq E_{\text{max}}.
\end{align}

This optimization problem is in general a non-convex quadratically constrained quadratic program (non-convex QCQP) and the complexity of a solver of (40)-(42) is exponential in the dimension $L$ (NP-hard problem). To circumvent this difficulty, we first observe that if we use the trace property of matrices, we are able to represent the objective function in (40) as

\begin{align}
x^H Q_e x = \text{Tr}\{Q_e X\}, \quad X \triangleq xx^H. \tag{43}
\end{align}

Thus, with $X = xx^H$, the optimization problem in (40)-(42) takes the new equivalent matrix form

\begin{align}
X' = \min_{x \in \mathbb{C}^L} \text{Tr}\{Q_e X\} \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & \text{Tr}\{Q_{b,k} X\} \geq \gamma_k, \quad k = 1, \ldots, K, \\
& \text{Tr}\{X\} \leq E_{\text{max}}, \\
& x \geq 0, \\
& \text{rank}(X) = 1. \tag{48}
\end{align}

The re-formulated design problem is, of course, still NP-hard in general. To deal -or better say avoid- this issue, we relax/drop the rank constraint in (48) and solve the simplified version by semidefinite relaxation (SDR) (40). The relaxed problem is a convex polynomial-complexity problem whose optimal solution can be efficiently obtained by available interior-point algorithms, for example the off-the-shelf solvers (41), (42). The worst-case computational complexity is $O((L + M - 1)^4 \log(\epsilon))$ for a given minimization solution accuracy $\epsilon > 0$.

When $X'$ returned by the solver happens to be of rank-1 with (eigenvalue, eigenvector) pair $(\lambda_1, a_1)$, then $x^{\text{opt}} = \sqrt{\lambda_1} a_1$ and, consequently, $s^{\text{opt}} = a_1$ for the original problem (36)-(39). If the rank of $X'$ is not one, there is no direct path to extract $(E, s)^{\text{opt}}$ from $X'$ and a Gaussian randomization procedure (40) can be employed to turn the SDR solution to an approximate solution to (36)-(39). In particular, we can draw now a sequence of samples $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N$ from $\mathcal{N}(0, X')$, i.e. Gaussian random variables with 0 mean and covariance matrix $X'$. We first apply rescaling

\begin{align}
x_i' = \left( \max_{k=1, \ldots, K} \gamma_k \right) x_i, \quad i = 1, \ldots, N, \tag{49}
\end{align}

and then test all $x_i'$ for “feasibility” on the constraints (41) and (42). Among the feasible vectors (if any), we choose the one, say $x^{(0)}$, with minimum $x^{H} Q_e x'$ objective function value. Consequently, $E^{\text{opt}}$ and $s^{\text{opt}}$ for problem (36)-(39) are set to $E^{\text{opt}} = |x^{(0)}|^2$ and $s^{\text{opt}} = x^{(0)} / |x^{(0)}|$, respectively.

### B. Unknown Eavesdropper Channel

For the unknown eavesdropper channel case, we pursue again the artificial-noise (AN)-aided method. To maximize the available energy to generate AN, we first aim at minimizing the transmitting energy while, still, each Bob’s SINR is no less than a threshold $\gamma_k$.

\begin{align}
\text{(50)}: \quad & \min_{E > 0, s \in \mathbb{C}^L} E \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & E s^H Q_{b,k} s \geq \gamma_k, \quad k = 1, \ldots, K, \\
& s^H s = 1, \\
& E \leq E_{\text{max}}. \tag{53}
\end{align}

This NP-hard problem can also be approximately solved by SDR (with randomization) after reformulating (50)-(53) in

\footnote{By Lemma 3.1 in [43], the SDR solution can always be made to have rank-one when $K \leq 2$.}
matrix form to
\[
X' = \arg \min_{X \in \mathbb{C}^{L \times k}} \text{Tr}\{X\}
\]
\[
s.t. \quad \text{Tr}\{Q_{b,k}X\} \geq \gamma_k, \quad k = 1, \ldots, K,
\]
\[
\text{Tr}\{X\} \leq E_{\text{max}},
\]
\[
X \succeq 0,
\]
where \(X \triangleq xx^H\), \(x \triangleq \sqrt{E} s\). After obtaining the optimal waveform \(s\) and the minimum energy \(E_{\text{min}}\) via the sole eigenvector of \(X'\) or an approximate solution via (49) as before, we turn our attention to the design of AN with the residual energy \(E_{\text{max}} - E_{\text{min}}\).

We recall the results from (31), (33) that, when Alice transmits AN \(w(n)\) along with the information bearing signal, the output SINR of Bob-\(k\)'s maximum SINR filter is
\[
\text{SINR}^{\text{AN}}_{b,k} = E s^H H_{b,k}^{-1} R_{b,k}^{-1} H_{b,k} R_{w} \frac{(I + H_{b,k}^{-1} R_{b,k}^{-1} H_{b,k} R_{w})^{-1} H_{b,k}^{-1} R_{b,k}^{-1} H_{b,k} R_{w}}{1 - E s^H H_{b,k}^{-1} R_{b,k}^{-1} H_{b,k} R_{w}}.
\]

To ensure that AN will not degrade the SINR of any Bob, AN should be designed with autocorrelation matrix \(R_w\) such that
\[
s^H H_{b,k}^{-1} R_{b,k}^{-1} H_{b,k} R_{w} = 0^T, \quad \forall k = 1, \ldots, K. \tag{55}
\]
Set \(v_k \triangleq H_{b,k}^{-1} R_{b,k}^{-1} H_{b,k} s, k = 1, \ldots, K\), and \(V \triangleq [v_1, \ldots, v_K]\). To achieve the equalities in (55), we need \(L \geq K + 1\) and require that \(R_w \perp V\). Let \(u_i, i = 1, \ldots, L\), be left singular vectors of \(V\) with singular values \(\lambda_1 \geq \lambda_2 \geq \ldots, \lambda_L\). Isotropical AN should be designed with autocorrelation matrix
\[
R_w = \frac{E_{\text{max}} - E_{\text{min}}}{L - K} W W^H
\]
where \(W \triangleq [u_{K+1}, \ldots, u_L]\).

V. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS

In this section, we present simulation results that show the average SINR and bit-error-rate (BER) of Eve for various target performance levels of Bob, lengths of waveform \(L\), and total energy constraints. In all simulations, the channel is assumed to be multipath fading with \(M = 3\) resolvable paths with additive interference from concurrent users and white Gaussian noise. The multipath coefficients are taken to be independent complex Gaussian random variables of mean zero and variance \(1/M\). In each channel realization, a number of concurrent users is randomly selected between 5 and 10; for each concurrent user, the energy per-bit is uniformly drawn from \([1, 4]\) and a normalized waveform of length \(L\) is arbitrarily generated from the zero-mean Gaussian distribution and placed on the same carrier \(f_c\) as Alice’s signal. Finally, the white Gaussian noise autocorrelation matrix at both Bob and Eve is set at \(I_{L+2}\) (identity matrix of size \(L + 2\)).

First, Alice attempts to establish a secure transmission to Bob using a waveform of length \(L = 8\) in the presence of eavesdropper Eve. The available transmit energy is assumed to be \(E_{\text{max}} = 100\). Three schemes are examined under varying assumptions about Eve’s CSI: i) Generalized eigenwaveform of Section III.A (known CSI); ii) artificial noise (AN) injection of Section III.B (no CSI); and iii) as a reference line, minimum required energy transmission (no CSI, no AN). The average pre-detection SINR of Eve over \(10^6\) channel realizations is plotted in Fig. 3 as a function of Bob’s pre-detection SINR requirement \(\gamma\), which is set to range from 0dB to 10dB. It can be observed from Fig. 3 that, for the case of known CSI, the generalized eigenwaveform design keeps the SINR of Eve at lowest values and provides effectively secure transmission to Bob. For unknown CSI, the AN-aided method degrades Eve’s SINR by about 2dB over the no-AN approach and maintains

\(\text{The transmission can be called perfectly secure if Eve's SINR is zero or, equivalently, when her BER is } 1/2\). This ideal security performance bound may not be achieved with practical system settings, for example the short waveform length in our SISO transmission. Nonetheless, the proposed design provides highly effective near-optimal security, especially when the waveform length grows to \(L = 16\) (Fig. 4).
a significant Bob-to-Eve SINR margin of 6dB to 8dB. In Fig. 4 we repeat the same study with a longer $L=16$ waveform (twice as many degrees of freedom). Comparing Fig. 4 to Fig. 3 we notice the much larger SINR gains on security even by AN alone.

In Fig. 5, we collect some useful statistics on the experiments of Figs. 3 and 4. We first, Fig. 5(a), calculate the probability (frequency of occurrence) that the generalized eigenwaveform optimization problem in (12)-(15) is solvable, i.e. Bob’s SINR constraint $\gamma$ can be satisfied by a waveform design for the given $E_{\text{max}}$ value. By Fig. 5(a), the problem is almost always solvable with $L=16$ and less likely solvable with $L=8$. In Fig. 5(b), we focus our attention on the unknown Eve channel case and plot the average percentage of available energy to create artificial noise. Again, $L=16$ easily supports effective creation of AN even for large SINR requirements for Bob.

To elaborate on the relationship between security performance and waveform length, in Fig. 6 we fix Bob’s SINR requirement at $6\text{dB}$ and plot the average SINR of Eve versus waveform length $L$. While for known CSI and generalized eigenwaveform design the average SINR of Eve continuously decreases as $L$ increases, this is not the case for unknown CSI and AN injection. Waveforms with longer length can reduce the transmit energy to satisfy Bob’s SINR requirement and leave more residual energy to be used for generating AN. Ironically, while the energy of AN can be increased by employing a longer waveform, Eve’s ability to suppress interference and noise is also enhanced due to the higher space dimensions and her SINR may even increase. Therefore, waveform length for the unknown CSI case must be selected appropriately to balance the availability of AN energy to Alice and space dimensions to Eve. Average SINR of Eve versus energy constraint $E_{\text{max}}$ is shown in Fig. 7. Obviously, for the unknown CSI case with AN, the average SINR of Eve is decreasing with higher energy constraint $E_{\text{max}}$, since more residual energy can be used for generating AN.

To further quantify the practical effectiveness of the proposed transmission scheme with secure waveform design, we also evaluate the bit-error-rate (BER) of Bob and Eve for both uncoded and coded transmissions. An $(1024, 512)$ low-density parity-check (LDPC) code with belief-propagation decoding is adopted for the simulation experiments. Both Bob and Eve perfectly know the coding scheme. The BER performance

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\(^{9}\)When Alice is to transmit with an optimal generalized eigenwaveform and no solution exists, Alice shall not transmit to prevent eavesdropping breach.

\(^{10}\)Of course, herein, we follow the conservative approach by which Eve is supposed to have exact knowledge of Alice’s waveform.

\(^{11}\)Punctured (weakened) LDPC codes were used in [21], [22] to support security. SINR-based security optimization, as described in this present paper, places intrinsically Bob in the “waterfall” region of the code while keeping Eve “on the top.” Therefore, puncturing is unnecessary or even detrimental to Bob’s relative performance with respect to Eve.
We presented waveform-based approaches to secure wireless transmissions between trusted (single-antenna) nodes in the presence of an eavesdropper. We formulated the problem as the search for the (transmit energy, waveform) pair that minimizes the eavesdropper’s SINR subject to the condition that the intended receiver’s SINR value is maintained at a given required SINR level (QoS determined). A low-complexity, highly-effective eigenwaveform and transmit energy design was proposed. We, then, extended the waveform design problem to multiple intended receivers (secure multicasting). Regrettably, the formulated multicasting optimization problem is non-convex and NP-hard in the waveform dimension. Nevertheless, we employed semi-definite relaxation to reach computationally manageable and performance-wise appealing suboptimal solutions. Extensive simulation experiments verified our analytical performance predictions and illustrated the benefits of waveform optimization for secure SISO transmission and multicasting.

As a natural next step in future work, waveform-based physical-layer security can be combined with the existing successful beamform-based security works in MIMO systems to carry out joint space-time security optimization. We can harness, then, the product of space (number of antennas) and time (waveform dimension) degrees of freedom (DoF) to secure the link.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

We presented waveform-based approaches to secure wireless transmissions between trusted (single-antenna) nodes in the presence of an eavesdropper. We formulated the problem as the search for the (transmit energy, waveform) pair that minimizes the eavesdropper’s SINR subject to the condition that the intended receiver’s SINR value is maintained at a given required SINR level (QoS determined). A low-complexity, highly-effective eigenwaveform and transmit energy design was proposed. We, then, extended the waveform design problem to multiple intended receivers (secure multicasting). Regrettably, the formulated multicasting optimization problem is non-convex and NP-hard in the waveform dimension. Nevertheless, we employed semi-definite relaxation to reach computationally manageable and performance-wise appealing suboptimal solutions. Extensive simulation experiments verified our analytical performance predictions and illustrated the benefits of waveform optimization for secure SISO transmission and multicasting.

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APPENDIX - PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2

We start with the original problem (12)-(15). We combine the function to be optimized with the constraints and form the Lagrangian

$$L = E s^H Q_e s + \beta (\gamma - E s^H Q_b s) + \mu (E - E_{max}) + \lambda (s^H s - 1)$$

where $\beta \geq 0$, $\mu \geq 0$, and $\lambda$ are KKT multipliers. The KKT necessary conditions of the optimization problem consist of

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial s} = E Q_e s - \beta E Q_b s + \lambda s = 0,$$  

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial E} = s^H Q_e s - \beta s^H Q_b s + \mu = 0,$$
the complementary slackness conditions, and the primal constraints

\[
\beta (\gamma - E s^H Q_b s) = 0, \quad \mu (E - E_{\text{max}}) = 0, \quad E_{\text{max}} = 0.
\]

Equation (63)

\[
s^H s = 1, \quad E \leq E_{\text{max}}.
\]

We first examine the above KKT conditions for the cases \( \beta = 0 \) and \( \beta > 0 \), separately. If \( \beta = 0 \), (59) becomes

\[
s^H Q_b s + \mu = 0
\]

which cannot be satisfied since \( \mu > 0 \) and \( s^H Q_b s > 0 \). Therefore, we must have \( \beta > 0 \) and

\[
E_s^H Q_b s = \gamma \Rightarrow E = \frac{\gamma}{s^H Q_b s}.
\]

We reach the equivalent problem \((17)-(19)\).

After applying (65) to the original KKT necessary conditions, we obtain the KKT necessary conditions for the equivalent problem \((17)-(19)\) as follows

\[
Q_{e,s} - \beta Q_{b,s} + \lambda (s^H Q_{b,s} / \gamma) = 0, \quad s^H Q_{b,s} - \beta s^H Q_{b,s} + \mu = 0, \quad \mu (\gamma / s^H Q_{b,s} - E_{\text{max}}) = 0, \quad s^H Q_{b,s} > \gamma / E_{\text{max}}.
\]

Left multiplying both sides of (66) by \( s^H \), we have

\[
s^H Q_{b,s} - \beta s^H Q_{b,s} + \lambda (s^H Q_{b,s} / \gamma) = 0.
\]

Combining (67), (69), and (71), we have \( \lambda (s^H Q_{b,s} / \gamma) = \mu \) and then (66) can be rewritten as

\[
Q_{e,s} + \mu I) s = \beta Q_{b,s}.
\]

For \( \mu = 0 \), (72) becomes

\[
Q_{e,s} = \beta Q_{b,s}
\]

that implies that the optimal waveform \( s \) is a generalized eigenvector of the matrices \((Q_e, Q_b)\). If the solution satisfies constraint (70), then it is the optimal solution; if not, then we turn to examine case \( \mu > 0 \). When \( \mu > 0 \), to satisfy (68), we must have \( \gamma / s^H Q_{b,s} - E_{\text{max}} = 0 \), and consequently (68) and (70) together become \( s^H Q_{b,s} = E_{\text{max}} / \gamma \). Then, the KKT necessary conditions are (72), together with \( \beta > 0, \mu > 0 \), and the constraints \( s^H R_{b,s} = \frac{E_{\text{max}}}{\gamma}, s^H s = 1 \). The proof of Proposition 2 is complete. ■

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