Violent conflict in the Deep South of Thailand has persisted for over 13 years. The longer the conflict has lasted, the more complicated, varied and systematic it has become. All these variations indicate that violence in the Deep South has been driven mainly by intrinsic factors and their ongoing dynamic, which has become entrenched into a raging “system of violence.” This article proceeds step by step by first examining literature and second summarizing recent data between 2004 and 2017 from the recent study of the Deep South Incident Database (DSID). Then, the patterns of violent and peace dynamics will be analyzed and deduced based upon this empirical data. The next step will be the syntheses of related constructs and concepts that indicate rivalry between different ideas behind variations of the situation. Lastly, some critical remarks and observations about approaches to cope with the conflict as well as bringing about a sustainable peace process in the future will be presented. Based on empirical data available, this chapter attempts to define the system of violence in Thailand’s Deep South, forged as it is by different social and discursive processes.

**Keywords:** Deep South, Violence, Discursive, Endogenous, Conflict
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2019, violent conflict in the Deep South of Thailand has persisted for 15 years since its 2004 upsurge. The region includes the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and parts of Songkla province. The longer the violence has lasted, the more complicated, varied and systematic it has become. This study argues that several variations of violence, which are detailed herein, indicate that violent conflict in Thailand’s Deep South has been principally driven by intrinsic factors and their ongoing dynamic, which has helped to sustain this system of violence over time. To explore these trends and patterns, this article proceeds as follows. Firstly, the study reviews literature about the Deep South. Secondly, data analysis will be presented through summarizing recent statistics between 2004 and 2017 from Deep South Watch Database (DSW). Thirdly, the patterns of violence and peace dynamics will be analyzed and deduced based upon this empirical data. Fourthly, the study explores the syntheses of related constructs and concepts that indicate rivalry between different ideas behind variations of the situation. Lastly, some critical remarks about approaches to foster a sustainable peace process in the future will be illustrated.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the 2004 exacerbation of violence in Thailand’s Deep South, there have been many academic studies about it. An early effort to explain the crisis was a book edited by McCargo (2007) in which he began the introduction chapter with a question, ‘What lies behind the recent violence in the Thai south?’ There are many conceivable answers. Many academics have tried to address that challenging question (e.g. McCargo 2008; Satha-Anand 2008; Arpornsuwan 2008; McCargo 2012). Other studies have elaborated patterns of violence while identifying it as an insurgency (Gunaratna et al. 2005; Jitpiromsri 2007; Human Rights Watch 2007; Abuza 2008; Liow and Pathan 2010; Jitpiromsri and McCargo 2010). In recent years, however, studies have turned to issues concerning conflict resolution and peace processes (McCargo 2014; Chambers et al. 2016; Abuza 2016; International Crisis Group 2016; Chalermsripinyorat 2018). Nevertheless whereas there is much decent research about this matter, studies tend to generalize and are still inadequate. In the area of peace and conflict studies, one has seen a rapid expansion in research on micro-level processes, focusing on the dynamic nature of violence during conflict. Thus, it is noteworthy to consider studies concerning trends, dynamics, processes and the system of violent conflict in Thailand’s Deep South.

Recent theoretical developments in conflict studies examine the intentions of insurgents. Stathis M. Kalyvas (Kalyvas 1999, 245) advances a theoretical
framework for the analysis of violence in civil wars and applies it to insurgent violence in Algeria. His thesis is that massacres can be considered a “rational strategy” that aims to punish and deter civilian defection under constraints of conflict contexts. Hence, violent attacks are likely to be committed by insurgents who make strategic, calculated assessments amidst fragmented and unstable rule over the civilian population, mass civilian defections from the state and an escalation of violence. These elements are encountered in situations of state counter-attacks against insurgents. Counterattacks typically mix purely military strategies with ‘pacification’ techniques. The most important strategy for either side is expanding organizational support. Kalyvas finds in his research that, although civil wars and their violence vary extensively, core observations from observers, practitioners, and scholars often pinpoint recurring elements, suggesting an underlying logic (Kalyvas 2006, 9). Internal factors may converge to produce what he calls “distinct endogenous dynamics,” as violence spirals and rival actors increasingly clash against each other. Thus, any of these factors have a reciprocal effect. They reinforce each other and interact over time (Ibid.).

Kalyvas’s seminal studies are relevant to an old conceptual framework of counterinsurgency approach proposed by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. (1970). Leites and Wolf (1970) contend that it is necessary to generalize and theorize to develop and illustrate a way of analyzing insurgent conflicts. They thus propose a “system model” which identifies insurgent movements as operating systems, working in a process of converting inputs into outputs and outcomes. This is the use of the rational choice model to formulate the system and process of violent conflicts, similar to demand-supply mechanisms in the economic marketplace (Leites and Wolf 1970, 28-45). Interestingly, this systematic theoretical argument highlights micro-mechanisms or endogenous processes to explicate a complex phenomenon in civil wars and identity conflicts. Therefore, conflict and violence processes in any social context involve some internal logic, which need to be decoded, described and interpreted (Ibid.). Similarly, the study at hand seeks to show how intrinsic or endogenous factors have driven actors to ratchet up their violence over time.

III. CONFLICT DATASET AND THAILAND’S SOUTHERN VIOLENCE

In recent years, various conflict monitoring databases have been developed to observe, monitor, and analyze violent incidents in different regions of the world. One such internationally recognized dataset is the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which has developed clear categories and definitions, including a geo-referenced event dataset (Kreutz 2010; Sundberg et al. 2012; Sundberg and Melander 2013). Deep South Watch (DSW) in Thailand also developed a more locally attached conflict database with a standardized format.
for a long-time-frame through internal development and collaboration with international and academic organizations (Morel 2016). Deep South Watch Database (DSW) is a conflict monitoring database developed through research projects at the Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD) of Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus. Based on DSW’s empirical dataset, this article attempts to define patterns and systems of violence forged by different endogenous social (discursive) processes.

IV. PATTERNS, TYPES, AND NATURE OF CONFLICT

Data from Deep South Watch Database (DSW) in Figure 1 shows that, from January 2004 to April 2017, there were 19,279 incidents of violent conflict in the region of Deep South. From these incidents, there were 6,544 deaths and 12,963 injuries. Within almost 14 years, the casualties in the conflict amounted to 19,507 cases. The pattern of violent incidents is clearly seen as a varied model, especially when observed with regard to time-series of annual incidents. The first four years from 2004 to 2007 saw the escalation of violence, while the conflict situation in the period from 2008 to 2011 became significantly reduced and vacillated. However, the years between 2012 and 2017 have been a transitional period where the levels of annual incidents are moving from relatively high to gradually low. Some internally intrinsic factors might have developed during this episode, which needs to be taken into consideration.

![Graph showing monthly incidents from January 2004 to 2017](image)

Source: Deep South Watch Database, The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (DSW/CSCD) (2017)

**FIGURE 1. MONTHLY INCIDENTS FROM JANUARY 2004 TO 2017**
Judging by the pattern of data scattered across 13 years, as seen in Figure 2, the seasonality of violence trends is more or less formulated, which is distinctive. There have been two spikes of escalation, the first in 2007 which involved 2,409 incidents and the second in 2012 which involved about 1,851 incidents. This has led to a hypothesis that there might be a five-year violent cycle of ups and downs in the future, *ceteris paribus*, with all other intervening factors being held constant. But the internal and external dynamics are also difficult to determine, as seen from changes over time in Thai state policy toward the Deep South conflict: from a more military-oriented to a more politically-oriented policy to espousing a potential peaceful solution and the increasing roles of civil society movements.\(^3\) The variations in fractions and alignments among the separatist movements, including Barisan Nasional Revolusi (B.R.N), the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and some other groups has also been conspicuous. International factors, like the policy of Malaysia and other neighboring countries are also important. Ultimately, the field of conflict is quite open, dynamic and complex.\(^4\)

![Graph showing annual incidents from 2004 to 2018](image)

Source: Deep South Watch Database, The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (DSW/CSCD) (2018)

**Figure 2. Annual Incidents from 2004 to 2018**

Thus, the determining factor for the future development of the situation in the Muslim-majority southernmost provinces could be either internal or external. A conflict management approach needs to be fairly inclusive. However, statistical variations still abound. Interestingly enough, a gradually diminishing general level of violent conflict from 2013 to 2017 is obvious and noticeable. This could be a harbinger of future developments. But if this trend does not change, what has been the cause of this phenomenon?
Figure 3 illustrates that the impact of violent incidents over the years on the lives of Deep South people has been immense. Overall, there were about 6,544 fatalities, but the number of deaths from violence has significantly decreased since 2013 from 521 people to 309 in 2016. Even though the number of annual injuries was different, the number of annual fatalities has steadily decreased. The decreasing level of deaths has been related to a decreasing level of incidents per year, particularly since 2013. When compared with the dramatic decrease of incidents in 2008, which was a consequence of the robust mobilization of armed forces by the government (up to around 60,000 persons), which offered strong enforcement of the Martial Law Act and the Emergency Decree, the changing situation in 2013 was a consequence of the first official peace dialogue between Thai government and the BRN delegates in Kuala Lumpur (Jitpiromsri 2013, 541-582).

As Table 3 shows, the state’s crackdown of 2008 immediately and categorically pacified the insurgency down to a certain level and then brought about long-term fluctuations in the situation until it grew again more in 2012, while the peace approach, which started in 2013, paved the way for the fine-tuning and adaptation of all parties in the fields that facilitated moves toward a more sustainable peace and order. The general characteristics of the violent conflict in the sub-region were also transformed.

Source: Deep South Watch Database, The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (DSW/CSCD) (2018)

**Figure 3. Comparison of Annual Deaths and Injuries**
Types of violence could be a decent indicator of the nature of the local violent conflict during this period. As shown in Figure 4, from 2004 to 2017, 40.19% of the major incidents were identified as shootings, while bomb attacks were the second type of incidents, amounting to 16.24%. Law enforcement operations, including surround-and-arrest operations of the authorities, amounted to 9.17% and arsons were about 9.17%. When compared specifically with the 2016 data, the pattern of violent incidents seemed to be similar with shootings amounting to 45.89% and bomb attacks at a relatively higher percentage-21.23%. In recent years, even though the shootings were still a major type of operation, the bomb attacks increased and sabotage on the infrastructures, roads, bridges and electric poles grew. For instance, 6.01% of operations in 2016 involved cases of sabotage.

Moreover, despite the decreasing incidents of violence in recent years, Figure 5 clearly shows that 80% of the fatalities from these incidents were mostly caused by shooting incidents. Statistics in Figure 5 also reveals that there was a sizable number of fatalities from bomb attacks (10.06%), followed by the number of people who died from assaults with sharp weapons (2.91%), and other attacks or clashes (2.54%). This marks the conflict as having generalized one-sided attacks, characteristic of insurgency in asymmetrical conflicts. However, it is unfortunate that the proportion of fatalities and injuries are high among civilians, unarmed soft targets including females and children as shown in Figure 6. The majority of victims of violence (deaths and wounded) amounted to 61.25% which were soft targets, while soldiers, polices, and paramilitaries (considered hard targets) amounted to only 36.48 of the casualties.

Source: Deep South Watch Database, The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (DSW/CSCD) (2018)

**Figure 4. Types of Incidents from 2014 to 2017**
Questions remains: why did the trend of incidents increase throughout the early years of the whole series but decrease later, while in the course of in-between years there were oscillations and variations? How are we to understand these changing configurations and dynamics? What actually is the
driver behind all of these subtleties? When deeply scrutinized, these embodiments have shown chains of violence, reactions and remarkable dynamics. The examination of violent incidents in the Deep South of Thailand occurring for almost 15 years could possibly make one perceive some hidden, active phenomena that have evolved within the chains and system of this violence, signifying the root-cause of the conflict and signifying an approach about how to cope with it. The driving forces most likely involve intrinsically dynamic factors that should be closely monitored.

On the other hand, in Figure 7, the geography of the incidents from 2004 to 2016 has shown that most of the violence occurred in Narathiwat province with 6,959 incidents or 36% of all violent incidents. This is followed by Pattani province with about 6,279 incidents (33%), and Yala province with 5,357 incidents (28%). There are only 683 incidents (3%) in Songkla province. Interestingly enough, when observed only in 2015, Pattani had the highest level of violence with 310 incidents, followed by Narathiwat with 276 incidents and Yala with 176 incidents. The time-series data in Figure 8 reveals that, over the years from 2004 to 2008, Yala province had the highest frequencies of incidents, but the levels of violence in Narathiwat and Pattani province have become higher from 2008 until 2017. As Figure 7 shows, Narathiwat province has had the highest level of violence making it the principal insurgency battleground. Indeed the distribution of incidents in different geographical areas has revealed some hidden dynamic factors around the sub-regions.

Source: Deep South Watch Database, The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (DSW/CSCD) (2018)

FIGURE 7. INCIDENTS IN THE DEEP SOUTH BY PROVINCES (JANUARY 2004 TO APRIL 2017)
When it comes to the statistics at the district-level during the period of 13 years shown in Figure 9, geographical and historical patterns become more apparent. The 10 most frequent violent districts are Yala City, 1,713 incidents, Ra-nge district of Narathiwat, 1,191 incidents, Raman district of Yala, 1,099 incidents, Roe-sor district of Narathiwat, 1,054 incidents, Bannang-sata district of Yala, 1,035 incidents, Yarang district of Pattani, 1,016 incidents, Nongchik district of Pattani, 863 incidents, Pattani City, 840 incidents, Saiburi district of Pattani, 790 incidents, amd Bajor district of Narathiwat, 639 incidents.

It is remarkable that these violent locations happen to coincide with the historical foundation of the conflict before 1909, when the Siamese State annexed Patani territories into “Siam mapped.” Figure 10 clearly elaborates the geographic locations of this violence. The most frequent violent districts, Pattani, Yaring, Nongchik, Yala, Raman, Saiburi and Ra-nge were identified as the seven Malay towns with semi-independent status under Siamese suzerainty before Bangkok had signed the Anglo-Siamese Treaty in 1909 to make them legal parts of modern Siam. In 1901, King Chulalongkorn commenced state-building efforts, centralizing Bangkok’s legal control over the seven Malay towns and eventually
transforming them into Monthon and provinces in 1909; thereupon, diverse forms of Malay rebellions ensued intermittently around the areas (Aphornsvuan 2007).

Later on, there were many significant events that historically characterized the resistance of Patani to Bangkok. For instance, there was the uprising of villagers in Bajoe district of Narathiwat province in 1947 and the killings of five people by Thai marines at Gor Tor bridge in Bajoe district in 1975, instigating large-scale protests in Pattani province (ICG 2005, 13). In terms of cultural space, these localities have also maintained a unique Malay-Muslim tradition and way-of-life, representing a strong identity of Patani, Malay and local Islamic culture. As a consequence, while the dispersion of violent incidents over 15 years appears to have varied around different areas, historically and culturally, the major locations and intensity of violent conflict have developed, randomly if not intentionally, around certain specific spaces—the old towns where historical memories are still vivid.

Source: Deep South Watch Database, The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (DSW/CSCD) (2018)

**Figure 9. 10 MOST FREQUENT VIOLENCE AMPHOE (DISTRICTS) FROM 2004 TO 2017**
V. DYNAMICS AND SYSTEM OF VIOLENCE

The relationships between identity factors, including history, ethnicity, and religion to the patterns of violence represent the formation of a specific system of violence and internal political dynamics. There are two configurations observed in this vibrant situation. On the one hand, there is a dynamic relationship within the field of armed conflict between weapons of the Thai state and insurgent movements, the non-state armed groups, which have fervently embraced ethno-nationalist ideology, including some other intervening actors such as some criminal mobsters, drug-dealers or illegal businesses. On the other hand, there exists persistent forces that have emerged from relations among civil society and other social groups within the field of peace and non-violent movements leading to an expanding political field. The latter is simmering, dynamic and growing, especially regarding the yearning for more democratic political space.

In a long and winding pathway of local development, the interactions between the space linking violent conflicts and peace efforts have been formative, generative, and sometimes, self-contradictory. They are closely related, reciprocally defining the trends, and dynamic. In the field of peace efforts, civil society and
other social forces are actively playing significant roles in helping both directly and indirectly to reinforce the circumstances conducive to the reduction of violence from all parties. On the other hand, the changes and variations of violence in the conflict have also defined the tension and variations in the political and peace space.

The escalation of violence from 2004 to 2007 involved an eruption of the hidden conflict attached to history and the buildup of resistant forces that had prepared themselves for more than 20 years since the 1980s to be venting pent-up frustration in 2004. The mistake of the government in dealing with violent conflict during that time by using even more repressive measures was also a catalyst for violent escalation. De-escalation in 2008 was a result of policy adaptation to “manage” the insurgency through mobilization of forces and political measures to solve the problem through the politics-leading-military approach. There was a large-scale state mobilization of resources, including about 60,000 troops, full enforcement of the Martial Law and Emergency Decree, as well as pooling lot of development budgets into the Deep South from 2008 onwards (Jitpiromsri 2013, 560). The budget expenditures for the conflict resolution in the troubled South are shown in Figure 11. The reduction of violence, to a certain extent, and the use of the political approach had led to the emerging fields and breeding grounds of many local civil society organizations. Opening political space became a significant step in the creation of a political platform for civil society “insiders,” which has gradually expanded since 2010.6

![Figure 11. Annual Budget of Expenditures for Solution of the Problems in Southern Border Provinces: Fiscal Year 2004 to 2017](https://example.com/figure11)

Source: Budget Bureau, The Annual Budget, From 2004 to 2017. *Budget of Expenditures for 2017 including Integrated Program on Mobilization of Problem Rectification of Southern Border Provinces, Functional Budgets as well as Personnel Expenditures.
In 2012, violent incidents increased again reaching 1,851 incidents. The armed resistance groups adjusted their tactical operations to be more focused on high profile bomb attacks in public spaces. Meanwhile, a new factor emerged as the National Security Council (NSC) issued the Policy for Administration and Development of the Southernmost Provinces under the mandate of the Legislation for Administration of the Southern Border Provinces enacted in 2010. The policy document demanded for the first time that the government go about creating circumstances suitable and conducive to dialogue aimed at finding an exit from the conflict, while assuring participation of concerned parties and stakeholders in the peace-building processes (ICG 2012, 10). The government therefore had to endorse dialogue between the stakeholders, particularly supporting the continuity of a peace dialogue with groups of people holding different opinions and ideology from the state. Theoretically and in practice, the decline of violence became realized steadily from 2013 until 2017 as a result of the peace dialogue, starting in Kuala Lumpur on February 28, 2013.7

The test of trust between the conflicting parties was proven in the first round of talk between the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and the Barisan Nasional Revolusi (B.R.N.), the presumed leading organization of separatists. These talks commenced in 2013 and there was an informal agreement to observe a ceasefire during Romadon month of that year. Even though the final weeks of that Holy Month witnessed an unfortunate breach of the agreement, the whole month of that temporarily agreement brought about a significant reduction of armed conflict, being the record lowest over the years and months before that (McDermott 2014, 5-6). Moreover, the proportional reduction of violent attacks on the civilians soft-targets; compared to the attacks on the hard targets had been the lowest over the whole series of violent years. The patterns of variation are seen in Figure 12. Indeed, the reduction of violence was, more or less, associated with the peace dialogue.

Nevertheless, after the third round of dialogue in June 2013, political complications and turmoil in Bangkok made it impossible for Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s government to continue the Deep South dialogue. After the coup in 2014 by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) led by the Army, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha (the NCPO leader who became the junta’s appointed Prime Minister) issued NCPO Order 97/2557 stating that the peace dialogue policy based upon the previous administration would be continued. Consequently, the Prime Minister’s Order of 230/2557 was enacted to organize the structure of a new peace dialogue team. The implication was that the military regime would still maintain the peace dialogue to cope with the on-going conflict in the Deep South. However, the official term for this dialogue was changed to the “Happiness Peace (NCPO 2015).” Peace talks were an inconvenient truth for the Thai military as a critical factor contributing to a significant decrease of
violence in the Deep South since 2013.

Source: Deep South Watch Database, The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (DSW/CSCD) (2018)

**Figure 12. Types of Casualties (2004 to 2017) by Soft and Hard Targets**

VI. CONTINUING PEACE/HAPPINESS NARRATIVES: VIOLENCE AND PEACE FIELDS

Peace talks have persisted involving an attempt to expand the roles of peace dialogues at three levels. The top level (Track 1) involves a dialogue between the Thai government and the exiled leaders of the militants’ movements. Then there are Track 2 and 3, dialogues involving a peace process with the local CSOs and grass-root networks, Track 2 and 3 (Lederach 1997, 39). The military government has adapted itself to using the peace process to solve southern conflict problems, while trying to intensely use security measures to lessen the level of insurgents’ violent operations—the negative peace approach. The government thus uses both soft power—committing to dialogue—coupled with hard power—the mobilization of security forces and enforcement of the Martial Law Act and Emergency Decree. Most Deep South people surveyed accept that the peace dialogue is a more suitable and sustainable approach to the problems.8

The trajectory of the peace process has yet to be a straight line. Intermittently, this “line” has crisscrossed, been paradoxical, clumsy, and a mixed bag given that peace processes in general tend to be political, comprising both certainty and uncertainty. The sustainability of this process embodies the
persistence of transcendental ideas from different segments of society. Narratives about peace abound, often overlapping and interconnecting in public spheres. At this juncture, it is obvious that in the “developed” public spheres, violent actors appear to be surrounded and hard-pressed by a mounting anti-violence discourse, a repercussion from reckless armed operations that violate the public safety and threaten lives of civilians. The creation of common spaces and discursive practices has been functional and effective in supporting peace and anti-violence from all sides, which might affect the transformation of violent conflict. On the other hand, inadvertently, this might isolate and frustrate some of violent actors possibly pushing them toward violent extremists.

The dynamics of public discourses and narratives bring about the “enunciative function,” the significant operation of words and communications that are fairly discursive and paradoxical (Foucault 2003). This condition, however, could possibly enable knowledge, thoughts and exchange of speeches in the field of communication, a powerful social and political influence. But the processes as such are also associated with sporadically confounded and disordered conditions, which embody the actuality of a multifaceted social life. This has proven to be part of the nature of the peace process: while some talks are just ramblings, others have really sought to change society as a whole.

The peace process has been shaped by contesting dialogues and operations in the context of a violent conflict, the argumentation of reconciliation, nationalist discourses of both Thais and Patani-Malays, and violent retribution. Discourse runs the gauntlet, unexpectedly and randomly walking through public spaces and contestations, even becoming a policy enunciation about peace offered by the Thai National Security Council (NSC) in 2012. The contestation of discourses for and against peace commenced in 2013 until the peace dialogue was renewed in 2014 under the military regime and continues until now.

To reassure the legitimacy and validity of the peace dialogue, the Thai government’s Peace Dialogue Panel states that peace dialogue is not at all a mysterious matter since it involves representatives of relevant government agencies in charge of solving southern border provinces’ problems as members of the dialogue panel, including the Office of National Security Council (NSC), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Royal Thai Army (RTA), the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), the Internal Security Operations Command Region 4 Forward Command (ISOC 4), and the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC). In terms of structure and administration, the dialogue team has a full mandate from the Prime Minister in pursuant to Prime Minister’s Office Order 230/57 dated on 26 November 2014 (See The Peace Dialogue Panel July 2017, 3).

Clearly, violent conflict and peace in the Deep South have thus grown into
a somewhat self-sustainable system. This system is linked to the creation of spaces, both social and political. Politically, it is the creation of relationships and networks and operations of communication fields affecting the peace dialogue. Despite counter-arguments concerning the certainty and clarification of peace talks between the Thai government and the insurgent organizations (MARA Patani or B.R.N.), the talks themselves have directly and empirically affected the level of violence, changing circumstances that used to be a contributing factor to the violence in the public space. The talks have also influenced different relations on the ground about violence.

In the process, the development of a system of violence has become closely associated with the creation of political space, the development of social networks, operations and communication fields that result in the peace discourse and, consequently, influence operations of that discourse, or what Foucault (2003) refers to as the “discursivity” of peace and conflict processes. Despite a sensible counter-argument that peace dialogue in the Deep South was initiated inappropriately and the current process is still vague in some ways, its actual outputs and outcomes are consequential to the transformation of general circumstances that could empirically decrease the violence as seen from the decline of violent incidents from 2013 to 2017. More importantly, in the open political space, endogenous societal relationships have dramatically changed. In 2017, the number of civil society organizations, according to the official record, skyrocketed to about 500 groups. The locally driven activities of CSOs and people's organizations concerning peace efforts have become more pro-active, although the military government has tried, time and again, to influence and set restrictions on such political space.

VII. RISK FACTORS AND THE VARIATIONS

While there is a downward trend of violence, risk factors should also be seriously considered. Over time, there are chunks of incidents that could not be accounted for. Questions still remain: What is the cause of these unaccounted for incidents? Who is behind them? And in recent years, the proportion of unidentifiable incidents appears to be increasing. The variations of monthly incidents are, more or less, conspicuous. Some hidden and residual factors need to be taken into consideration. What is to be done to understand these factors?

Deep South Watch Database (DSW) was able to elaborate on the causes of incident occurring over 14 years. It is clear that from 2004 to 2017, shown in Figure 13, the majority of the incidents (72.3%) were identified as caused by insurgency or insurgent-related. This was followed by the incidents that all sources from military, police and civilian authorities agreed upon as being unable to determine the cause whatsoever (19.45%). Figure 13 shows that the incidents...
derived from pure crimes was about 4.88% and the incidents identified as being caused by drugs or drug-related crimes amounted to 2.88%. Interestingly, the specific data of 2016 in Figure 14 indicates that the proportion of insurgency-related incidents decreased to 51%, while the proportion of unaccounted-for incidents increased to 33%. Crime-related incidents were 11% and drug-related incidents amounted to 3%\textsuperscript{14}.

Source: Deep South Watch Database, The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (DSW/CSCD) (2018)

**FIGURE 13. INCIDENTS FROM 2004 TO 2017 BY CAUSES OF INCIDENTS**

Source: Deep South Watch Database, The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (DSW/CSCD) (2018)

**FIGURE 14. INCIDENTS IN THE DEEP SOUTH IN 2016 BY CAUSES OF INCIDENTS**

Source: Deep South Watch Database, The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (DSW/CSCD) (2018)
The trend of changes between 2004 and 2016 is phenomenal, as seen from Figure 15. Comparing the series of change by the proportion of different causes of violence over 13 years, we can see that from 2004 to 2005, the cause of violence identified as unclear was only 10%, but, in 2014, the proportion of incidents that was unclear and unaccounted for had increased to 18% and in 2016, it had moved up to 33%. It is fair to say that the change has begun to be palpable since 2014, the year of the NCPO’s coup. There are two interpretations about that pattern of changes. In the protracted, prolonged violence, some conflicts are becoming more confused and complicated. There are more cases of violent incidents in the later years that are so complicated that one could not whittle them down to any single cause. On the other hand, the statistics that became unclear have significantly expanded after 2014, the years after the military regime took over the civilian elected government.

Theoretically, it is likely that there might be some efforts by the authorities to manipulate the official information concerning the cause of violence to belittle the separatist movement, to blur the root cause of the conflict. This is a natural process of ‘peace estrangement’ conducted by the state actors in general, disheartening the peace efforts and blurring the cause of the conflict15.

The variations and uncertainty sometimes consist of sporadic spikes of violent escalation. The fluctuations of violence have less effect on the big picture, the entire tendency of the situation in the long term, as the general trend of incidents appears to be gradually diminishing (See Figure 16). Nonetheless, they have contributed to a sense of insecurity and anxiety among local people. The variant situations, however, might have a significant impact on the overall trend-line of the violent situation, if they sustain a high level of frequencies and intensity. As it stands today, among the leadership of local civil society movements, the political spaces that have been opened up for the peace process have led to increased positive attitudes toward the general situation and peace talks. Yet some people at the grass-root level retain relatively negative attitudes, even though many of them, with mixed feelings, are hoping for a better situation shaped by peace talks, if they produce tangible outcomes.

Notwithstanding the alterations, the general trend of the security situation appears to be better off—a noticeable decline in incidents of violence. This downward trend indicates that the situation in the region of the Deep South seems to be relatively improving. A caveat is that the tendency of variations in terms of daily and monthly levels of incidents is still persistent and, thus, has slightly increased in recent years. Figure 17 demonstrates the stable trend of monthly variations of violence from 2004 to 2018, which was, at the outset higher, then got lower and then slightly increased again in recent years. Gazing deliberately,
one can imagine that it has more or less constituted a unique figuration, a somewhat nonlinear reverse U-shape trend. There exists internally contesting forces under the surface of this unstable situation that offset the trend toward more violence. In the same vein that Kalyvas (2006) advanced his theoretical framework to study violent conflict in many countries, we can consider it as an analogous trend in Thailand’s Deep South that varied internal factors might have converged to produce “distinct endogenous dynamics.” Certainly, there is a logic of violence, which is produced by more than two political actors and overlapping monopolies of violence as well as political negotiations. This turns violent conflict into a process with “strategic implications.” And the process will persist as long as both parties concerned still have leverage.

Source: Deep South Watch Database, The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (DSW/CSCD) (2018)

**Figure 15. Causes of Incidents in the Deep South from 2004 to 2018**
To render the point apparent about the simmering social forces emerging from below, data from Figure 18 confirms the varied psychological dimension of people around the conflict situation mentioned above. In the survey of local
people’s attitudes toward the peace processes by academic institutes in the Deep South during July and August of 2016, most people (56.1%) supported the peace talk policy as a major approach to solve the conflict problems, but the survey also revealed that a sizable group (26.7%) of people were not sure if the peace talks could actually help solve the problems. The latter group might have observed that they should wait to see the final results of the talks between the government and the separatist movements. Furthermore, the ongoing variation in the violence could have a significant effect on people’s attitudes and the confidence in the peace talks.

Various academic networks conducted a survey again with a similar sample size but different samples between April and May 2017, about six months after the previous one. At that point, the support for a peace dialogue seemed to have grown a little higher (57%). The statistical difference is not significant. The amount of people who do not support the peace dialogue is lower in the later survey, 5.7%, but it is not significant as well. The same pattern is shown in the group of people who are undecided and had no comment. Within one year in the second half of 2016 and early 2017, most people on the ground appeared to support a peaceful solution to the conflict while few of them disagreed with the peace talks. Yet a sizable number of people still had mixed feelings about the peace-building situation.16

![Comparison between two peace surveys](chart.png)

Sources: Academic Network for Peace Survey, Peace Survey 2: The People’s Opinion Survey on Peace Processes in the Southernmost Provinces of Thailand, King Prajadhipok’s Institute 2016; Academic Network for Peace Survey, Peace Survey 3: The People’s Opinion Survey on Peace Processes in the Southernmost Provinces of Thailand, King Prajadhipok’s Institute 2017.

**Figure 18. Comparison between Two Peace Surveys: On August/July 2016 and April/May 2017 “Do You Support the Peace Dialogue to Be the Solution of Current Violent Conflict?”**
It is thus evident that the uncertainty and variations of the conflict processes need to be elucidated and elaborated upon further in order to resolve many difficulties in the conflict resolution for the long-term. The question remains: to what extent does the variation of violence actually influence the “endogenous system of violence” mentioned earlier? Though the answer to that question remains murky, it is evident that conflict and violence in the Deep South will not come to an end effortlessly, without a doubt. Indeed, the logic of violence is that fields and spaces of social movements have been transformed to be more politically oriented rather than leaning toward violence. This has led to consolidating the intrinsic mechanism counter-balancing a wayward drift toward an extremely violent situation. But it is still inadequate without support from other factors.

On the other hand, the external environment of the system (including the external factors) is also important in the complicated and dynamic scheme of conflict resolution and peace processes. In fact, the external actors in the peace process have become more engaged over the years. Among these actors are neighboring countries- Malaysia, Indonesia, and other ASEAN member states. Inter-governmental and international organizations are also critical, including the European Union, United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, the United Nations International Children’s Educational Fund (UNICEF) and other international foundations, such as the Asia Foundation, and SASAKAWA Peace Foundation. The influence of international factors to the peace resolution in the Deep South of Thailand has been significant and could become crucial. Thus, the Thai military regime has sought to control the external communities’ roles in the southern conflict. The international organizations have come to help supporting the capacity building of civil society and people’s organizations, training them to be better able to deal with the peace processes at the middle level. The sensitive issue about human rights is also promoted and covered by international actors, to the chagrin of the Thai government. Interestingly, some mediator organizations (e.g. Humanitarian Dialogue [HD]), have long been involved in the peace dialogue and have tried to renew its role against the backdrop of the continuing peace dialogue17.

Empirical literature on Thailand’s Deep South insurgency helps to locate the continuing nature and trends of the region’s violent conflict. The violence persists but is gradually decreasing. There are some hopes for the peace process, but there is still a long way to go to find a sustainable peace solution. The system of violence and peace is functioning with competing forces. The intrinsic social forces have also emerged and become influential to counter the violence, while international factors are, more or less, significant intervening variables. In a somewhat systematic way, both the Thai government and the insurgents are finding a way out from the conflict, which is reasonable. But some international
observers still think that the peace dialogue offers no traction and has gotten stuck in a “self-serving stalemate” which is “generally bearable to both parties (ICG 2016).” An ultimate solution to the conflict has not yet become available. To transcend the difficulties and unpredictable variants, all parties in the rival fields may have to “think the unthinkable” about adjusting toward a political formula for peace. In the end, whether the future of Thailand’s Deep South is autonomy or independence, what was a previously unthinkable need to now be well conceived (McCargo 2012, 129-152). This is the positive peace, which is more sustainable in the long run.

VIII. CONCLUSION: DISCOURSES FOR PEACE, HUMANITARIANISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

To find solutions and create more traction for the peace dialogue, three major discourses should be enunciated and linked together in an integrated process (which accepts greater self-determination proposals of the resistance movement) that leads to a more positive peace. First, there must be a sincere peace discourse that is practical and yields concrete outcomes. Actualization of the peace safety zone is necessary. Civilian protection must be protected. A second discourse involves humanitarian principles in violent conflict. The militants and Thai government forces need to understand the humanitarian approach to refrain from attacking civilian targets, directly and indirectly. Rules of engagement in armed conflict are essential. The third and final discourse pertains to human rights. The violation of human rights is detrimental to the rule of law and order as well as human values. There should not be unlawful operations against civilians. In sum, these three principles and values (peace building, humanitarianism, and human rights) are interrelated and should be pushed by all in the conflict. They are conducive to any eventual and durable peace in Thailand’s Deep South.

REFERENCES

Abuza, Zachary. 2008. *Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace.

Abuza, Zachary. 2016. *Forging Peace in Southeast Asia: Insurgencies, Peace Processes, and Reconciliation*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.

ACLED. 2019. (The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project). March 15, 2019, accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.acleddata.com/2019/03/15/covering-the-deep-south-improving-acleddata/.

Academic Network for Peace Survey. 2016. Peace Survey 2: The People’s
Opinion Survey on Peace Processes in the Southernmost Provinces of Thailand. King Prajadhipok’s Institute.

Academic Network for Peace Survey. 2017. Peace Survey 3: The People’s Opinion Survey on Peace Processes in the Southernmost Provinces of Thailand. King Prajadhipok’s Institute.

APS (Academic Network for Peace Survey). Report of Peace Survey 2. March 1, 2017, accessed February 12, 2019. https://deepsouthwatch.org/th/node/1003.

Aphornsuvan, Thanet. 2007. “Rebellion in Southern Thailand: Contending Histories.” Policy Studies 35 (Southeast Asia). Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, accessed February 23, 2019. https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/rebellion-southern-thailand-contending-histories.

Apornsuwan, Thanet. 2008. Background of the Theory of Separatism in Southern Thailand. Bangkok: Thammasat University and Toyota Foundation [in Thai].

Chalermsripinyorat, Rungrawee. 2018. “Making Thailand’s southern peace dialogue meaningful.” New Mandala. November 12, 2018, accessed February 19, 2019. https://www.newmandala.org/making-thailands-southern-peace-dialogue-meaningful/.

Chambers, Paul, Napisa Waitoolkiat and Srisompob Jitpiromsri. 2016. “Locating the Local: Untangling Ownership over Security Sector Processes of Peace-Building in Southern Thailand.” In World Anthropologies in Practice: Situated Perspectives, Global Knowledge edited by John Gledhills. London: Bloomsbury.

Davis, Anthony. 2017. “Glimmers of Hope Amid Southern Thailand Violence.” NIKKEI Asian Review. May 3, 2017, accessed February 19, 2019. https://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Anthony-Davis/Glimmers-of-hope-amid-southern-Thailand-violence?page=1.

NCPO (National Council for Peace and Order). 2015. “Order of the Prime Minister's Office 230/2557 Re: Establishment of a mechanism to drive the process of talking for 'happiness peace' in the southern border provinces.” November 1, 2015, accessed February 19, 2019. https://deepsouthwatch.org/th/node/7717.

Deep South Watch. 2017. “Peace Survey 3.” Deep South Watch. September 25, 2017, accessed February 12, 2019. https://deepsouthwatch.org/th/node/11322.

Foucault, Michel. 2003. Archaeology of Knowledge, London and New York: Routledge Classics.

Gavriely-Nuri, Dalia. 2015. Israeli Peace Discourse: Cultural Approach to CDA, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Gunaratana, Rohan, Arabinda Acharya and Sabrina Chua. 2005. Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic.

Human Rights Watch. 2007. “No One Is Safe: Insurgent Violence Against Civilian
in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces.” 19(13). Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/08/27/no-one-safe/insurgent-attacks-civilians-thailands-southern-border-provinces.

ICG (International Crisis Group). 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, not Jihad.” Asia Report No. 98, May 18, 2005, accessed February 23, 2019. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/10752/098_southern_thailand.pdf.

ICG (International Crisis Group). 2016. Southern Thailand’s Peace Dialogue: No Traction. Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°148, Bangkok/Brussels. September 21, 2016, accessed February 12, 2019. https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/southern-thailand-s-peace-dialogue-no-traction.pdf.

ICG (International Crisis Group). 2012. “The Evolving Crisis in the Deep South.” December 11, 2012, accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.refworld.org/pdffid/50c71dd512.pdf.

Jitpiromsri, Srisompob. 2007. “Unpacking Thailand’s Southern Conflict: The Poverty of Structural Explanation.” In Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence edited by Duncan McCargo. Singapore: NUS Press.

Jitpiromsri, Srisompob. 2013. “Challenges and Prospects of ‘Southern’ National Security Forces in the Southern Frontiers., In Knights of the Realm: Thailand’s Military and Police, Then and Now.” edited by Paul Chambers, 541-582. Bangkok: White Lotus Press.

Jitpiromsri, Srisompob and Duncan McCargo. 2010. “The Southern Thai Conflict Six Years On: Insurgency, Not Just Crime.” In Contemporary Southeast Asia. 32(2): 156-83.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 1999. “Wanton and Sensless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria.” Rationality and Society 11(3): 243–285.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kreutz, Joakim. 2012. “How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 47(2): 243-250.

Lederach, John Paul. 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Leites, Nathan and Charles Wolf, Jr. 1970. Rebellion and Authority. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.

Liow, Joseph Chinyong and Don Pathan. 2010. “Confronting ghosts: Thailand’s Shapeless Southern Insurgency.” New South Wales: Lowy Institute for International Policy.

Manager Online. 2017. “SBPAC reveals 80% progress on the civil society extinguishing southern fire [in Thai].” MGR Online. December 18, 2017, accessed February 12,2019.https://mgronline.com/daily/detail/9600000127310.

McCargo, Duncan. 2007. Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence. Singapore:
McCargo, Duncan. 2008. *Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand*. New York: Cornell University Press.

McCargo, Duncan. 2012. *Mapping National Anxieties: Thailand’s Southern Conflict*. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

McCargo, Duncan. 2014. “Southern Thailand: From Conflict to Negotiations?” New South Wales: Lowy Institute for International Policy, April 23, 2014. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/southern-thailand-conflict-negotiations.

McDermott, Gerard. 2014. “The 2013 Kuala Lumpur Talks: A Step Forward for Southern Thailand.” *Peace Research* 46(1): 5-34. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24896051?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

Morel, Adrien. 2016, *VIMS Violence Incidents Monitoring Systems: A Methods Toolkit*. Washington D.C. The World Bank.

Panjor, Romadon. 2018. “Reviewing the Happy Peace and Knowing Illiberal Peace under the Shade of Authoritarian Rule [in Thai].” Deep South Watch. August 20, 2018. https://deepsouthwatch.org/th/node/11856.

Pathan, Don. 2014. “Negotiating the Future of Patani.” *Patani Forum*.

Pathan, Don and Ekkarin Tuansiri. 2017. “Elusive Peace: Insurgency in Thailand’s Far South. Patani Forum Special Report [in Thai].” Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.academia.edu/37305493/Elusive_Peace_Insurgency_in_Thailands_Far_South.

Prachatai. 2015. “Implementing Order 230 in Preparation for the 4th Dialogue [in Thai].” Prachatai. November 8, 2015, accessed February 23, 2019. https://prachatai.com/journal/2015/11/62327.

Satha-Anand, Chaiwat. 2008. *Imagined Land?: State and Southern Violence in Thailand* [in Thai]. Bangkok: Samnakphim Matichon.

Sundberg, Ralph, Kristine Eck and Joakim Kreutz. 2012. “Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 49(2): 351–362.

Sundberg, Ralph and Erik Melander. 2013. “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4): 523–532.

SWGP (Strategic Working Group for Peace). 2016. *International Actors in a Deadly Conflict of the Southern Borders* [in Thai]. Policy Research Paper, Bangkok: Thailand’s Research Fund (TRF).

Thai Government Public Relations Department. Accessed February 19, 2019. http://thailand.prd.go.th/ewt_news.php?nid=4459&filename=index.

Thai News Update 24. “Southern Border Provinces Development Policy, 2012-2014.” Thai News Update 24. February 13, 2012, accessed February 19, 2019. http://thainewsupdate24.blogspot.com/2013/03/southern-border-provinces-development.html.

The Peace Dialogue Panel. 2017. *The Peace Dialogue Process in Southern Thailand: From Conflict to Negotiations*. Bangkok: Thailand’s Research Fund (TRF).
ENDNOTES

1 See origin, sources, development, and design of the DSID conflict database in the World Bank 2015; See ACLED in collaboration with Deep South Watch, 2019.

2 The latest updated violence in Thailand’s Deep South is reported by Deep South Watch. The statistics as of from January 2004 to March 2019 are 20,276 incidents with 6,972 deaths and 13,572 injuries. Readers can follow updates at https://deepsouthwatch.org/en/node/11920.

3 There were changes in Thailand’s policies toward the conflict resolutions in the Deep South, which was more oriented toward opening space for civil society movements in 2013; See Jitpiromsri 2013, 569-573.

4 The development of peace dialogues in Thailand’s Deep South has unfolded since 2005 and evolved from unofficial talks to official talks in 2013, continuing until now (2019). See Pathan 2014; McCargo 2014; Davis 2017.

5 The geo-body of Siam was transformed from the old configuration to the modern map and the Anglo-Siamese Treaty in 1909. See Winichakul (1990).

6 Duncan McCargo seems to be the earliest academic who talks about opening political space to resolve the conflict in Thailand’s Deep South He proposes that the Thai state bring in mechanisms to ensure active participation of Malay Muslims in their own affairs, called participatory legitimacy. See McCargo 2008, 18.

7 In 2017, the NSC issued a new policy confirming that the government would create mutual trust, allowing local people to play a greater role in local development and in solving southern problems, promoting awareness of co-existence in a multicultural society, enhancing the potential of local residents, building confidence in the peace dialogue process, and creating better understanding about the situation in the Deep South. See Thai Government Public Relations Department.
Most people supported the peace dialogue in the public opinion survey conducted by 15 academic agencies in the Deep South. Peace Survey 2 in 2017 reveals that 56.1% of respondents supported the current peace dialogue. See APS (2017).

The statement is not easily stamped in people’s memories and it is not ideal form that can be actualized in anybody in any condition. It is endowed with content relative to the field in which it is placed and may be re-evoked. This is the repeatable materiality that defines the enunciative function, according to Michel Foucault. A statement is a specific and paradoxical object, but also objects that men “produce, manipulate, use, transform, exchange, combine, decompose and recompose, and possibly destroy.” This is relevant to the paradoxical nature of the peace processes and their formulation. See the meaning of discourse in Foucault 2003, 117-118.

The Secretary General of Thai National Security Council (NSC) in 2012 accepted that members of civil society organizations take part in drafting the Administration and Development Policy for the Southern Border Provinces (2012-2014), which would be used as the direction for resolving problems in the Deep South and, eventually, later being renewed and extended in 2017. Thai News Update 24 (2012).

Peace initiatives of the civilian government and military government faced the same problems- the lack of an honest broker or mediator in the process, a disconnection between negotiating rebel groups and armed militants on the ground. Both problems posed serious problems for the talks. See Pathan and Tuansiri 2017, 61.

In December 2017, the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) stated that there were about 490 civil society organizations applying for grants for the government’s “Project on the Participation of Civil Society Organizations in Solving Problems and Development of Southern Border Provinces.” 223 organizations were funded by the 50 Million Baht Grant. That there are many organizations registering for funds indicates that the number of active organizations on the ground has increased in recent years. But the motivations behind the establishment of this grant are still controversial among civil society groups. See Manager Online (2017).

On August 2017, the military government allocated B50 millions fund for developing the civil society organizations in the Deep South. There were many organizations that applied for the government fund, while some organizations stayed away from the process. The military fund was criticized as an approach of authoritarian government designated to bring about ‘Illiberal Peace’ to the conflict resolution of the Deep South. See Panjor (2018).

Causes of individual incidents are required to be analyzed and recorded by the
local military commander, police, and chief of the district where the incidents took place. The government has set up this official rule for the sake of compensation scheme.

15 This might be peace estrangement discourse at work. Peace estrangement discourse is a set of linguistic, discursive and cultural devices intended for creating doubt regarding the positive meaning associated with the concept of peace. The actual condition of peace may be described as an inherently dangerous or peace initiatives may be represented as deceptive. The Israeli government used this kind of method to destabilize the Arab-Israeli peace process. See Gavriely-Nuri 2015, 8.

16 The academic institutes that participated in the survey included faculties and research centers from Prince of Songkla University, both Pattani and Hatyai campus, Yala Rajabhat University, Princess of Narathiwat University, Fatoni University, Mahidol University, King Prajadhipok Institute and Asia Foundation. The survey in 2016 contained 1,572 samples and in 2017 has 1,608 samples randomly selected based upon a probability sampling method. See Deep South Watch (2017).

17 There are 44 international actors trying to engage in finding solutions of the conflict in the Deep South. Thai government is very concerned about these organizations. See SWGP (2016).