From Low-Distortion Norm Embeddings to Explicit Uncertainty Relations and Efficient Information Locking

Omar Fawzi ∗  Patrick Hayden ∗† Pranab Sen ‡∗

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Abstract

The existence of quantum uncertainty relations is the essential reason that some classically impossible cryptographic primitives become possible when quantum communication is allowed. One direct operational manifestation of these uncertainty relations is a purely quantum effect referred to as information locking [DHL †04]. A locking scheme can be viewed as a cryptographic protocol in which a uniformly random $n$-bit message is encoded in a quantum system using a classical key of size much smaller than $n$. Without the key, no measurement of this quantum state can extract more than a negligible amount of information about the message, in which case the message is said to be “locked”. Furthermore, knowing the key, it is possible to recover, that is “unlock”, the message.

In this paper, we make the following contributions by exploiting a connection between uncertainty relations and low-distortion embeddings of $\ell_2$ into $\ell_1$.

• We introduce the notion of metric uncertainty relations and connect it to low-distortion embeddings of $\ell_2$ into $\ell_1$. A metric uncertainty relation also implies an entropic uncertainty relation.

• We prove that random bases satisfy uncertainty relations with a stronger definition and better parameters than previously known. Our proof is also considerably simpler than earlier proofs. We apply this result to show the existence of locking schemes with key size independent of the message length.

• We give efficient constructions of metric uncertainty relations. The bases defining these metric uncertainty relations are computable by quantum circuits of almost linear size. This leads to the first explicit construction of a strong information locking scheme. Moreover, we present a locking scheme that is close to being implementable with current technology. These constructions are obtained by adapting an explicit norm embedding due to Indyk [Ind07] and an extractor construction of Guruswami, Umans and Vadhan [GUV09].

• We apply our metric uncertainty relations to exhibit communication protocols that perform equality testing of $n$-qubit states. We prove that this task can be performed by a single message protocol using $O(\log(1/\epsilon))$ qubits and $n$ bits of communication, where $\epsilon$ is an error parameter. We also give a single message protocol that uses $O(\log^2 n)$ qubits, where the computation of the sender is efficient.

Keywords: uncertainty relations, information locking, low-distortion norm embedding, quantum identification, quantum equality testing, randomness extractors, quantum cryptography.
1 Introduction

Uncertainty relations express the fundamental incompatibility of certain measurements in quantum mechanics. Far from just being puzzling constraints on our ability to know the state of a quantum system, uncertainty relations are arguably at the heart of why some classically impossible cryptographic primitives become possible when quantum communication is allowed. For example, so-called entropic uncertainty relations introduced in BFSS05, DFR are the main ingredients of security proofs in the bounded and noisy quantum storage models. A simple example of an entropic uncertainty relation was given by Maassen and Uffink [MU88]. Let $B_+$ denote a “rectilinear” or computational basis of $C^2$ and $B_-$ a “diagonal” or Hadamard basis and let $B_{+n}$ and $B_{-n}$ be the corresponding bases obtained on the tensor product space $(C^2)^\otimes n$. Then we have that for any quantum state on $n$ qubits described by a unit vector $|\psi\rangle \in (C^2)^\otimes n$, the average measurement entropy satisfies

$$\frac{1}{2} (H(p_{B_{+n}, I, |\psi\rangle}) + H(p_{B_{-n}, I, |\psi\rangle})) \geq \frac{n}{2}$$

where $p_{B, I, |\psi\rangle}$ denotes the outcome probability distribution when $|\psi\rangle$ is measured in basis $B$ and $H$ denotes the Shannon entropy. Equation (1) expresses the fact that measuring in a random basis $B_K$ where $K \in_u \{+n, x^n\}$ produces an outcome that has some uncertainty irrespective of the state being measured.

A surprising application of entropic uncertainty relations is the effect known as information locking [DHL+04] (see also [Leu09]). Suppose Alice holds a uniformly distributed random $n$-bit string $X$. She chooses a random basis $K \in_u \{+n, x^n\}$ and encodes $X$ in the basis $B_K$. This random quantum state $E(X, K)$ is then given to Bob. How much information about $X$ can Bob, who does not know $K$, extract from this quantum state via a measurement? To better appreciate the quantum case, observe that if $X$ were encoded in a classical state $E_c(X, K)$, then $E_c(X, K)$ would “hide” at most one bit about $X$; more precisely, the mutual information $I(X; E_c(X, K)) \geq n - 1$. For the quantum encoding $E$, one can show that for any measurement $T$ that Bob applies on $E(X, K)$ whose outcome is denoted $I$, we have $I(X; I) \leq n/2$ [DHL+04]. The $n/2$ missing bits of information about $X$ are said to be locked in the quantum state $E(X, K)$. If Bob had access to $K$, then $X$ can be easily obtained from $E(X, K)$: The one-bit key $K$ can be used to unlock $n/2$ bits about $X$.

A natural question is whether it is possible to lock more than $n/2$ bits in this way. In order to achieve this, the key $K$ has to be chosen from a larger set. In terms of uncertainty relations, this means that we need to consider more than two bases to achieve an average measurement entropy larger than $n/2$ (equation (1)). The authors of [HLSW04] show the existence of an encoding that locks $n - 3$ bits about $X \in\{0, 1\}^n$ using a key $K \in\{0, 1\}^{4 \log n}$. They prove this result by showing that random bases satisfy entropic uncertainty relations of the form (1) with more than two measurements. Recently, [Dup10] [DFHL10] prove that random encodings exhibit a locking behaviour in a stronger sense and that it is possible to lock up to $n - \delta$ bits for any arbitrarily small constant $\delta$ while still using a key of $O(\log n)$ bits. In this setting, a locking scheme can be viewed as a cryptographic protocol that uses a key of size $O(\log n)$ to encrypt a random classical $n$-bit message in a quantum state. Knowing the key, it is possible to recover the message from this quantum state. However, without the key, for any measurement, the distribution of the message $X$ conditioned on the outcome $I$ of the measurement is close to the prior distribution of $X$ in total variation distance.

It should be noted that entropic uncertainty relations of the form of (1) with $t > 2$ measurements are not well understood. A natural generalization of rectangular bases $+n$ and diagonal bases $x^n$ called mutually unbiased bases does not work as well for more than two measurements. In fact, it was shown in [BW07, Amb09] that there are arbitrarily large sets of mutually unbiased bases $\{B_0, B_1, \ldots, B_{t-1}\}$ that only satisfy an average measurement entropy of $n/2$, which is only as good as what can be achieved with two measurements [1]. To achieve an average measurement entropy of $(1 - \epsilon)n$ for small $\epsilon$ while keeping the number of bases subexponential in $n$, the only known constructions are probabilistic and computationally inefficient [HLSW04]. Furthermore, standard derandomization techniques are not known to work in this setting. For example, unitary designs [DCEL09] define an exponential number of bases. Moreover, using a $\delta$-biased subset of the set of Pauli matrices [AS04, DD10] fails to produce a locking scheme unless the subset has a size of close to $2^n$ (see Appendix D).

1.1 Our results

In this paper, we study uncertainty relations in the light of a connection with low-distortion embeddings of $(C^d, \ell_2)$ into $(C^d, \ell_1)$. The intuition behind this connection is very simple. Consider the measurements defined by a set of orthonormal bases $\{B_0, B_1, \ldots, B_{t-1}\}$ of $(C^2)^\otimes n$. The bases $\{B_0, B_1, \ldots, B_{t-1}\}$ verify an uncertainty relation if for
every $n$-qubit state $|\psi\rangle$ and “most” bases $B_k$, the vector representing $|\psi\rangle$ in $B_k$ is “spread”. One way of quantifying
the spread of a vector is by its $\ell_1$ norm, i.e., the sum of the absolute values of its components. A vector $|\psi\rangle \in (\mathbb{C}^2)^\otimes n$
of unit $\ell_2$ norm is well spread if its $\ell_1$ norm is close to its maximal value of $\sqrt{2^n}$. For technical reasons, it turns out
that the relevant norm for us is not the $\ell_1$ norm but rather a closely related norm called $\ell_1(\ell_2)$.

This connection suggests measuring the uncertainty of a distribution by taking a marginal and measuring its closeness to the uniform distribution. This is a stronger requirement than having large Shannon entropy and it leads to the definition of metric uncertainty relations (Definition 2.1). Using standard techniques from asymptotic geometric analysis, we prove the existence of strong metric uncertainty relations (Theorem 2.3). This result can be seen as a strengthening of Dvoretzky’s theorem [Dvo01, Mil11] for the $\ell_1(\ell_2)$ norm. In addition to
giving a stronger statement with better parameters, our analysis of the uncertainty relations satisfied by random bases is considerably simpler than earlier proofs [HLSW04, DFHL10]. In particular, for large $n$, we prove the existence of entropic uncertainty relations with average measurement entropy strictly increasing with the number of measurements (this answers an open question of the survey paper [WW10]). This result also leads to better results on the existence of locking schemes (Corollary 3.4).

Moreover, adapting an explicit low-distortion embedding of $(\mathbb{R}^d, \ell_2)$ to $(\mathbb{R}^{d'}, \ell_1)$ with $d' = d^{1+o(1)}$ due to Indyk [Ind07], we obtain explicit bases of $(\mathbb{C}^2)^\otimes n$ that verify strong metric uncertainty relations for a number of bases
that is polynomial in $n$. Measuring in these bases can be performed by polynomial size quantum circuits. The main new ingredient that makes our “quantization” of Indyk’s construction verify stronger uncertainty relations than do general mutually unbiased bases is the additional use of strong permutation extractors, which are a special kind of randomness extractor. A strong permutation extractor (Definition 2.13) is a small family of permutations of bit strings with the property that for any probability distribution on input bit strings with high min-entropy, applying a typical permutation from the family to the input induces an almost uniform probability distribution on a prefix of the output bits. Our construction of efficiently computable bases satisfying strong metric uncertainty relations involves an alternating application of approximately mutually unbiased bases and strong permutation extractors. Our approximately mutually unbiased bases consist of sets of single-qubit Hadamard gates. Moreover, both the permutations and their inverses have to be efficiently computable for our construction. We build such strong permutation extractors using the results of Guruswami, Umans and Vadhan [GUV09].

We use these uncertainty relations to build an explicit locking scheme whose encoding and decoding operations
are performed by circuits of size almost linear in the length of the message. Moreover, we also obtain a locking
scheme where both the encoding and decoding operations consist of a classical computation with polynomial runtime and a quantum computation using only a small number of single-qubit Hadamard gates (Corollary 3.5). Performing these quantum operations can be done using the same technology as implementing the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [BB84]. On the way to obtaining this result, we prove a min-entropy uncertainty relation on a sparse set of BB84 states that might be of independent interest (Lemma 2.13 with Lemma 2.12). This locking scheme can be used to obtain can be used to obtain string commitment protocols [BCH+08] that are efficient in terms of computation and communication.

We also give an application of our uncertainty relations to a problem called quantum identification. Quantum
identification is a communication task between two parties Alice and Bob, where Alice is given a pure quantum
state $|\psi\rangle$ and Bob wants to simulate measurements of the form $\{|\varphi\rangle\langle\varphi|, 1 - |\varphi\rangle\langle\varphi|\}$ on $|\psi\rangle$ where $|\varphi\rangle$ is a pure quantum state. This task can be seen as a quantum analogue of the problem of equality testing [AD89, KN97]
where Alice and Bob hold n-bit strings $x$ and $y$ and Bob wants to determine whether $x = y$ using a one-way
classical channel from Alice to Bob. Hayden and Winter [HW10] showed that classical communication alone is
useless for quantum identification. However, having access to a negligible amount of quantum communication
makes classical communication useful. Their proof is non-explicit. Here, we describe an efficient encoding circuit
that also uses less quantum communication: it allows the identification of an $n$-qubit state by communicating only
a single message of $O(\log^2 n)$ qubits and $n$ classical bits.

1.2 Other related work

Aubrun, Szarek and Werner [ASW10b, ASW10a] also used a connection between low-distortion embeddings and quantum information. They show in [ASW10b] that the existence of large subspaces of highly entangled states follows from Dvoretzky’s theorem for the Schatten $p$-norm\footnote{It should be noted that this protocol has weak security garentees. As was shown in [BCH+08], string commitment protocols with a strong security definition do not exist.} for $p > 2$. This in turns shows the existence of channels
\footnote{The Schatten $p$-norm of a matrix $M$ is defined as the $\ell_p$ norm of a vector of singular values of $M$.}
We use the following notation throughout the paper. For a positive integer $n$, we define $[n] = \{0, \ldots, n-1\}$. Random variables are usually denoted by capital letters $X, K, \ldots$, while $p_X$ denotes the distribution of $X$, i.e., $P\{X = x\} = p_X(x)$. The notation $X \sim p$ means that $X$ has distribution $p$. $\text{unif}(S)$ is the uniform distribution on the set $S$. To measure the distance between probability distributions on a finite set $X$, we use the total variation distance or trace distance $\Delta(p, q) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x \in X} |p(x) - q(x)|$. We will also write $\Delta(X, Y)$ for $\Delta(p_X, p_Y)$. When $\Delta(X, Y) \leq \epsilon$, we say that $X$ is $\epsilon$-close to $Y$. A useful characterization of the trace distance is $\Delta(p, q) = \max_{X \sim p, Y \sim q} P\{X = Y\}$ (this equality is known as Doeblin’s coupling lemma). Another useful measure of closeness between distributions is the fidelity $F(p, q) = \sum_{x \in X} \sqrt{p(x)q(x)}$. We have the following relation [FvdC99] between the fidelity and the trace distance

\[ 1 - F(p, q) \leq \Delta(p, q) \leq \sqrt{1 - F(p, q)^2}. \]  

The Shannon entropy of a distribution $p$ on $X$ is defined as $H(p) = -\sum_{x \in X} p(x) \log p(x)$ where the log is taken here and throughout the paper to be base two. We will also write $H(X)$ for $H(p_X)$. The mutual information between two random variables $X$ and $Y$ is defined by $I(X; Y) = H(X) + H(Y) - H(X, Y)$. The min-entropy of a distribution $p$ is defined as $H_{\min}(p) = -\log \max_x p(x)$. We say that a random variable $X$ is a $k$-source if $H_{\min}(X) \geq k$. To refer to the $i$-th component of a vector $v \in \mathbb{R}^n$, we usually write $v_i$ except when $v$ already has a subscript, in which case we use $v(i)$. The weight of a binary vector $v$ (number of ones) is denoted by $w(v)$ and the Hamming distance between two binary vector $v, v'$ (number of components that are different) is written as $d_H(v, v')$.

### 1.3 Notation

| Inf. leakage | Size of key | Size of ciphertext | Efficient? |
|--------------|------------|--------------------|------------|
| [DHL⁺04]    | $\frac{n}{2}$ | 1                  | $n$        | yes        |
| [HLSW04]    | 3          | $4 \log(n)$       | $n$        | no         |
| [DFHL10]    | $\epsilon n$ | $2 \log(n/\epsilon^2) + O(1)$ | $n$        | no         |
| Corollary 3.4 | $\epsilon n$ | $2 \log(1/\epsilon) + O(\log\log(1/\epsilon))$ | $n + 2 \log(9/\epsilon)$ | no |
| Corollary 3.4 | $\epsilon n$ | $4 \log(1/\epsilon) + O(\log\log(1/\epsilon))$ | $n$        | no         |
| Corollary 3.5 | $\epsilon n$ | $O_\delta(\log(n/\epsilon))$ | $(4 + \delta) \cdot n$, with $\delta > 0$ | yes |
| Corollary 3.5 | $\epsilon n$ | $O(\log(n/\epsilon) \log(n))$ | $n$        | yes        |

Table 1: Comparison of different locking schemes. $n$ is the number of bits of the message. The information leakage and the size of the key are measured in bits and the size of the ciphertext in qubits. Efficient locking schemes have encoding and decoding quantum circuits of size polynomial in $n$. The locking schemes of the first and next to last actually have encoding circuits that are implementable with current technology; they only use classical computations and simple single-qubit transformations. It should be noted that our locking definition is stronger than all the previous definitions. Note that the variable $\epsilon$ can depend on $n$. For example, one can take $\epsilon = \eta/n$ to make the information leakage arbitrarily small. The symbol $O(\cdot)$ refers to constants independent of $\epsilon$ and $n$, but there is a dependence on $\delta$ for the next to last row.

that violate additivity of minimum output $p$-Rényi entropy as was previously demonstrated by [HW08]. Using a more delicate argument [ASW10a], they are also able to recover Hastings’ [Has09] counterexample to the additivity conjecture.

In a cryptographic setting, Damgård, Pedersen and Salvail [DPS04] used ideas related to locking to develop quantum ciphers that have the property that the key used for encryption can be recycled. In [DPS05], they construct a quantum key recycling scheme (see also [OH05]) with near optimal parameters by encoding the message together with its authentication tag using a full set of mutually unbiased bases.

Very recently, Gavinsky and Ito [GI10] introduced the concept of quantum hiding fingerprints and provided efficient constructions. A quantum fingerprint [BCWdW01] encodes an $n$-bit string $x$ into a quantum state $\rho_x$ of $n' \ll n$ qubits such that given $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and the fingerprint $\rho_y$, it is possible to decide with small error probability whether $x = y$. The additional hiding property ensures that measuring $\rho_x$ leaks very little information about $x$. In Section 3.3 we show that one can efficiently construct quantum hiding fingerprints by locking classical fingerprints. This gives an alternate proof of the existence of mixed-state quantum hiding fingerprinting schemes [GI10].
The quantum systems we consider are denoted $A, B, C, \ldots$ and are identified with their Hilbert spaces. The dimension of a Hilbert space $A$ is denoted by $d_A$. Every Hilbert space $A$ comes with a preferred orthonormal basis $\{|a\rangle^A\}_{a \in [d_A]}$ that we call the computational basis. The elements of this basis are labeled by integers from 0 to $d_A - 1$. For a Hilbert space of the form $\mathbb{C}^n$, this canonical basis will also be labeled by strings in $\{0, 1\}^n$. $A \simeq B$ means that the Hilbert spaces $A$ and $B$ are isomorphic. For a state $|\psi\rangle \in A$, $p_1(\psi) = \langle \psi | 1 | \psi \rangle$ is the distribution of the outcomes of the measurement of $|\psi\rangle$ in the basis $\{|a\rangle\}$. We have $p_{|a\rangle}(\psi) = |\langle a | \psi \rangle|^2$. Similarly, for a mixed state $\rho$, we define $p_\rho(a) = \text{tr}[|a\rangle\langle a| \rho]$. The tensor product $A \otimes B$ is sometimes denoted simply $AB$. $S(A)$ is the set of density operators acting on $A$. The Hilbert space on which a density operator $\rho \in S(A)$ acts is denoted by a superscript, as in $\rho^A$. Partial traces are abbreviated by omitting superscripts so that $\rho A = \rho^A | A$. The symbol $\mathbb{1}^A$ is reserved for the identity map on $A$. If $U$ is a unitary acting on $A$, and $|\psi\rangle$ a state in $A \otimes B$, we sometimes use $U|\psi\rangle$ to denote the state $(U \otimes \mathbb{1}^B)|\psi\rangle$.

The trace distance between density operators acting on $A$ is defined by $\Delta(\rho, \sigma) = \frac{1}{2} \text{tr}(\sqrt{(\rho - \sigma)^2})$. The von Neumann entropy of a quantum state $\rho^A$ is defined by $H(\rho^A) = -\text{tr} \rho \log \rho$. It will also be denoted $H(A)_\rho$. For a bipartite state $\rho^{AB} \in S(AB)$, the quantum mutual information $I(A; B)_\rho = H(A)_\rho + H(B)_\rho - H(A, B)_\rho$.

Throughout the paper, the symbol $O(\cdot)$ refers to constants that are independent of $n$ and $\epsilon$. The only possible dependence is with other variables that are clearly called constants (like $\delta$ in Theorem 2.15 for example).

## 2 Uncertainty relations

### Outline of the section

In this section, we start by introducing uncertainty relations and setting up some notation (Section 2.1). Then we define metric uncertainty relations in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we prove the existence of strong metric uncertainty relations. Explicit constructions are given in Section 2.4.

### 2.1 Background

Consider a set of orthonormal bases $B = \{B_0, \ldots, B_{1-1}\}$ of the Hilbert space $C$. Each basis $B_k = \{v_{0}^{k}, \ldots, v_{d_{C}}^{k-1}\}$ defines a measurement on $C$. The outcomes of these measurements are indexed by $x \in [d_C]$. The outcome distribution $p_{B_k, |\psi\rangle}$ when the measurement is performed on the state $|\psi\rangle \in C$ is defined by $p_{B_k, |\psi\rangle}(x) = |\langle v_{x}^{k} | \psi \rangle|^2$ for all $x \in [d_C]$. An uncertainty relation for a set of orthonormal bases $B = \{B_0, \ldots, B_{1-1}\}$ expresses the property that for any state $|\psi\rangle \in C$, there are some measurements in $B$ whose outcomes given state $|\psi\rangle$ have some uncertainty. A common way of quantifying this uncertainty is by using the Shannon entropy. The set of bases $B$ is said to satisfy an entropic uncertainty relation if there exists a positive number $h$ such that for all states $|\psi\rangle \in C$,

$$\frac{1}{l} \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} H(p_{B_k, |\psi\rangle}) \geq h.$$

For example, for a qubit space ($\dim C = 2$), consider the two bases $B_0 = \{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$ and $B_1 = \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle), \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)\right)$. It was shown in [MU88] that these two bases satisfy the following entropic uncertainty relation: for all states $|\psi\rangle \in C$,

$$\frac{1}{2} (H(p_{B_0, |\psi\rangle}) + H(p_{B_1, |\psi\rangle})) \geq \frac{1}{2}.$$

Note that this uncertainty relation cannot be improved: For any bases $B_0, B_1$, one can always choose a state $|\psi_0\rangle$ that is aligned with one of the vectors of $B_0$ so that $H(p_{B_0, |\psi_0\rangle}) = 0$, in which case $\frac{1}{2} (H(p_{B_0, |\psi_0\rangle}) + H(p_{B_1, |\psi_0\rangle})) \leq \frac{1}{2}$.

It is more convenient here to talk about uncertainty relations for a set of unitary transformations. Let $\{\{|x\rangle^C\}_{x}\}$ be the computational basis of $C$. We associate to the unitary transformation $U$ the basis $\{U^\dagger |x\rangle\}_{x}$. On a state $|\psi\rangle$, the outcome distribution is described by

$$p_{U|\psi\rangle}(x) = |\langle x | U |\psi\rangle|^2.$$

As can be seen from this equation, we can equivalently talk about measuring the state $U|\psi\rangle$ in the computational
basis. An entropic uncertainty relation for $U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}$ can be written as

$$\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \text{H}(p_{U_k|\psi}) \geq h.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

Entropic uncertainty relations have been used in proving the security of cryptographic protocols in the bounded and noisy quantum storage models [DFR07, KWW09]. For more details on entropic uncertainty relations and their applications, see the recent survey [WW10].

### 2.2 Metric uncertainty relations

Here, instead of using the entropy as a measure of uncertainty, we use closeness to the uniform distribution. In other words, we are interested in sets of unitary transformations $U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}$ that for all $|\psi\rangle \in C$ satisfy

$$\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta(p_{U_k|\psi}, \text{unif}([d_C])) \leq \epsilon$$

for some $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$. This condition is very strong, in fact too strong for our purposes, and we will see that a weaker definition is sufficient to imply entropic uncertainty relations. Let $C = A \otimes B$. (For example, if $C$ consists of $n$ qubits, $A$ might represent the first $n - \log n$ qubits and $B$ the last $\log n$ qubits.) Moreover, let the computational basis for $C$ be of the form $\{|a\rangle^A \otimes |b\rangle^B\}_{a,b}$ where $\{|a\rangle\}$ and $\{|b\rangle\}$ are the computational bases of $A$ and $B$. Instead of asking for the outcome of the measurement on the computational basis of the whole space to be uniform, we only require that the outcome of a measurement of the $A$ system in its computational basis $\{|a\rangle\}$ be close to uniform. More precisely, we define for $a \in [d_A]$,

$$p_{U_k|\psi}^A(a) = \sum_{b=0}^{d_B-1} \langle b|U_k|\psi\rangle^2.$$  

We can then define a metric uncertainty relation. Naturally, the larger the $A$ system, the stronger the uncertainty relation.

**Definition 2.1** (Metric uncertainty relation). Let $A$ and $B$ be Hilbert spaces. We say that a set $\{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\}$ of unitary transformations on $AB$ satisfies an $\epsilon$-metric uncertainty relation on $A$ if for all states $|\psi\rangle \in AB$,

$$\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta\left(p_{U_k|\psi}^A, \text{unif}([d_A])\right) \leq \epsilon.$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

**Remark.** Observe that (4) also holds for mixed states: for any $\psi \in S(A \otimes B)$, $\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta\left(p_{U_k\psi U_k^†|\psi}^A, \text{unif}([d_A])\right) \leq \epsilon$. \hfill $\Box$

**Metric uncertainty relations imply entropic uncertainty relations** In the next proposition, we show that a metric uncertainty relation is also an entropic uncertainty relation. It is worth stressing that there are no restrictions on measurements.

**Proposition 2.2.** Let $\epsilon \in (0, \frac{1}{2}\epsilon)$ and $\{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\}$ be a set of unitaries on $AB$ verifying an $\epsilon$-metric uncertainty relation on $A$:

$$\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta\left(p_{U_k|\psi}^A, \text{unif}([d_A])\right) \leq \epsilon.$$  

Then

$$\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \text{H}(p_{U_k|\psi}) \geq (1 - 2\epsilon) \log d_A - \eta(\epsilon).$$

where $\eta(\epsilon) = -2\epsilon \ln(2\epsilon)$. 


Proof  Recall that the distribution $p_{U_k|\psi}^A$ (see equation \[1\] for a definition) on $|d_A\rangle$ is a marginal of the distribution $p_{U_k|\psi}$. Thus $H(p_{U_k|\psi}) \geq H(p_{U_k|\psi}^A)$. Using Fannes’ inequality [Pan73], we have for all $k$

\[
H(p_{U_k|\psi}^A) \geq \log d_A - 2\Delta \left( p_{U_k|\psi}^A, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) \log d_A - \eta(\epsilon)
\geq (1 - 2\epsilon) \log d_A - \eta(\epsilon).
\]

\[
\square
\]

Explicit link to low-distortion embeddings  Even though we do not explicitly use the link to low-distortion embeddings, we describe the connection as it might have other applications. In the definition of metric uncertainty relations, the distance between distributions was computed using the trace distance. The connection to low-distortion metric embeddings is clearer when we measure closeness of distributions using fidelity. We have

\[
F\left(p_{U_k|\psi}^A, \text{unif}([d_A])\right) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d_A}} \sum_{a=0}^{d_A-1} \sqrt{p_{U_k|\psi}^A(a)}
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{d_A}} \sum_{a=0}^{d_A-1} \sqrt{\sum_{b=0}^{d_B-1} |\langle a|A|b\rangle_B U_k|\psi|^2}
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{d_A}} ||U_k|\psi||_{\ell^4_1(\ell^2_2)}
\]

where the norm $\ell^4_1(\ell^2_2)$ is defined by

Definition 2.3 ($\ell_1(\ell_2)$ norm). For a state $|\psi\rangle = \sum_{a,b} \alpha_{a,b} |a\rangle_B |b\rangle_B$,

\[
|||\psi|||_{\ell^4_1(\ell^2_2)} = \sum_a ||\{\alpha_{a,b}\}_b||_2 = \sum_a \sqrt{\sum_b |\alpha_{a,b}|^2}.
\]

We use $|| \cdot ||_{12} \overset{\text{def}}{=} || \cdot ||_{\ell^4_1(\ell^2_2)}$ when the systems $A$ and $B$ are clear from the context.

Observe that this definition of norm depends on the choice of the computational basis. The $\ell^4_1(\ell^2_2)$ norm will always be taken with respect to the computational bases.

For $\{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\}$ to satisfy an uncertainty relation, we want

\[
\frac{1}{t} \sum_k \frac{1}{\sqrt{d_A}} ||U_k|\psi||_{\ell^4_1(\ell^2_2)} \geq 1 - \epsilon.
\]

This expression can be rewritten by introducing a new register $K$ that holds the index $k$. We get for all $|\psi\rangle$

\[
\left\| \frac{1}{\sqrt{t}} \sum_k U_k|\psi\rangle^C|k\rangle^K \right\|_{\ell^4_1(\ell^2_2)} \geq (1 - \epsilon) \sqrt{t \cdot d_A}.
\]

(5)

Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have that for all $|\psi\rangle$,

\[
\left\| \frac{1}{\sqrt{t}} \sum_k U_k|\psi\rangle^C|k\rangle^K \right\|_{\ell^4_1(\ell^2_2)} \leq \sqrt{t \cdot d_A} \left\| \frac{1}{\sqrt{t}} \sum_k U_k|\psi\rangle^C|k\rangle^K \right\|_{\ell^2_2} = \sqrt{t \cdot d_A}.
\]

(6)

Rewriting (5) and (6) as

\[
(1 - \epsilon) \leq \frac{1}{\sqrt{t \cdot d_A}} \left\| \frac{1}{\sqrt{t}} \sum_k U_k|\psi\rangle^C|k\rangle^K \right\|_{\ell^4_1(\ell^2_2)} \leq 1,
\]

7
we see that the image of $C$ by the linear map $|\psi\rangle \mapsto \frac{1}{\sqrt{t}} \sum_k U_k |\psi\rangle \otimes |k\rangle$ is an almost Euclidean subspace of $(A \otimes K \otimes B, \ell^B_1(\ell^B_2))$. In other words, as the map $|\psi\rangle \mapsto \frac{1}{\sqrt{t}} \sum_k U_k |\psi\rangle \otimes |k\rangle$ is an isometry (in the $\ell_2$ sense), it is an embedding of $(C, \ell_2)$ into $(AKB, \ell^B_1(\ell^B_2))$ with distortion $1/(1-\epsilon)$ [Mat02].

Observe that a general low-distortion embedding of $(C, \ell_2)$ into $(AKB, \ell^B_1(\ell^B_2))$ does not necessarily give a metric uncertainty relation as it need not be of the form $|\psi\rangle \mapsto \frac{1}{\sqrt{t}} \sum_k U_k |\psi\rangle \otimes |k\rangle$. When $t = 2$, a metric uncertainty relation is related to the notion of Kashin decomposition [Kas77]; see also [Pis89] [Sza06].

A remark on the composition of metric uncertainty relations. There is a natural way of building an uncertainty relation for a Hilbert space from uncertainty relations on smaller Hilbert spaces. This composition property is also important for the cryptographic applications of metric uncertainty relations presented in the second half of the paper, in which setting it ensures the security of parallel composition of locking-based encryption.

Proposition 2.4. Consider Hilbert spaces $A_1, A_2, B_1, B_2$. For $i \in \{0, 1\}$, let $\{U_k^{(i)}\}_{k_i \in [t_i]}$ be a set of unitary transformations of $A_i \otimes B_i$ verifying an $e$-metric uncertainty relation on $A_i$. Then, $\{U_k^{(1)} \otimes U_k^{(2)}\}_{k_1, k_2 \in [t_1] \times [t_2]}$ verifies a $2e$-metric uncertainty relation on $A_1 \otimes A_2$.

Proof. Let $|\psi\rangle \in (A_1 \otimes B_1) \otimes (A_2 \otimes B_2)$ and let $p_{k_1, k_2}$ denote the distribution obtained by measuring $U_k^{(1)} \otimes U_k^{(2)} |\psi\rangle$ in the computational basis of $A_1 \otimes A_2$. Our objective is to show that

$$\frac{1}{t_1 t_2} \sum_{k_1, k_2 \in [t_1], k_2 \in [t_2]} \Delta(p_{k_1, k_2}, \text{unif}([d_{A_1}] \times [d_{A_2}])) \leq 2e. \quad (7)$$

We have

$$\Delta(p_{k_1, k_2}, \text{unif}([d_{A_1}] \times [d_{A_2}])) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{a_1, a_2} \left| p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1, a_2) - \frac{1}{d_{A_1} d_{A_2}} \right|$$

$$\leq \frac{1}{2} \sum_{a_1, a_2} \left| p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1, a_2) - \frac{p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1)}{d_{A_2}} \right| + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{a_1, a_2} \left| \frac{p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1)}{d_{A_2}} - \frac{1}{d_{A_1} d_{A_2}} \right|$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{a_1} p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1) \sum_{a_2} \left| a_2 \sum_{a_2} p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1, a_2) - \frac{p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1)}{d_{A_2}} \right| + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{a_1} p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1) - \frac{1}{d_{A_1}} \quad (8)$$

where $p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{a_2} p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1, a_2)$ is the outcome distribution of measuring the $A_1$ system of $U_{k_1}^{(1)} \otimes U_{k_2}^{(2)} |\psi\rangle$. The distribution $p_{k_1, k_2}$ can also be seen as the outcome of measuring the mixed state

$${U_{k_1}^{(1)} \psi_{A_1 B_1} U_{k_1}^{(1)}}^\dagger$$

in the computational basis $\{|a_1\rangle\}$. Thus, we have for any $k_2 \in [t_2],

$$\frac{1}{t_1} \sum_{k_1} \Delta(p_{k_1, k_2}, \text{unif}([d_{A_1}])) \leq \epsilon.$$

Moreover, for $a_1 \in [d_{A_1}]$, the distribution on $[d_{A_2}]$ defined by $p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1, a_2) = p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1) / p_{k_1, k_2}(a_1)$ is the outcome distribution of measuring in the computational basis of $A_2$ the state

$${U_{k_2}^{(2)} \psi_{A_2 B_2} U_{k_2}^{(2)}}^\dagger$$

where $\psi_{A_2 B_2}^{A_1}$ is the density operator describing the state of the system $A_2 B_2$ given that the outcome of the measurement of the $A_1$ system is $a_1$. We can now use the fact that $\{U_{k_2}^{(2)}\}$. Taking the average over $k_1$ and $k_2$ in equation (8), we get

$$\frac{1}{t_1 t_2} \sum_{k_1, k_2} \Delta(p_{k_1, k_2}, \text{unif}([d_{A_1}] \times [d_{A_2}])) \leq 2\epsilon.$$

□

This observation is in the same spirit as [IS10], and can in fact be used to build large almost Euclidean subspaces of $\ell^B_1(\ell^B_2)$. 

8
2.3 Metric uncertainty relations: existence

In this section, we prove the existence of families of unitary transformations satisfying strong uncertainty relations. The proof proceeds by showing that choosing random unitaries according to the Haar measure defines a metric uncertainty relation with positive probability. The techniques used are quite standard and date back to Milman’s proof of Dvoretzky’s theorem [Mil71, FLM77]. In fact, using the connection to embeddings of $\ell_2$ into $\ell_1(\ell_2)$ presented in the previous section, this existential theorem can be viewed as a strengthening of Dvoretzky’s theorem for the $\ell_1(\ell_2)$ norm [MS86]. It should be noted that our proof is simpler and gives better parameters than earlier results on uncertainty relations verified by random unitaries [HLSW04]. Explicit constructions of uncertainty relations are presented in the next section.

In order to use metric uncertainty relations to build quantum hiding fingerprints, we require an additional property for $\{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\}$. A set of unitary transformations $\{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\}$ of $\mathbb{C}^d$ are said to $\gamma$-approximately mutually unbiased bases ($\gamma$-MUBs) if for all elements $|x\rangle$ and $|y\rangle$ of the computational basis and all $k \neq k'$, we have

$$|\langle x|U_k^*|y\rangle| \leq \gamma.$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

1-MUBs correspond to the usual notion of mutually unbiased bases.

**Theorem 2.5** (Existence of metric uncertainty relations). Let $c = 9\pi^2$ and $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$. Let $A$ and $B$ be Hilbert spaces with $\dim B \geq 9/\epsilon^2$ and $d \overset{\text{def}}{=} \dim A \otimes B \geq \frac{9\pi^2}{\epsilon^2}$. Then, for all $t \geq \frac{18c\ln(9/\epsilon)}{\epsilon^2}$, there exists a set $\{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\}$ of unitary transformations of $AB$ satisfying an $\epsilon$-metric uncertainty relation on $A$: for all states $|\psi\rangle \in AB$,

$$\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta(p^A_{U_k|\psi\rangle}, \text{unif}([d_A])) \leq \epsilon.$$

Moreover, for large enough $d$, the unitaries $\{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\}$ can be chosen to also form 0.9-MUBs.

**Remark.** The proof proceeds by choosing a set of unitary transformations at random. See [12] and [13] for a precise bound on the probability that such a set does not form a metric uncertainty relation or a 0.9-MUB. \hspace{1cm} \square

**Proof** The basic idea is to evaluate the expected value of $\Delta(p^A_{U_k|\psi\rangle}, \text{unif}([d_A]))$ for a fixed state when $U$ is a random unitary chosen according to the Haar measure. Then, we use a concentration argument to show that with high probability, this distance is close to its expected value. After this step, we show that the additional averaging $\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta(p^A_{U_k|\psi\rangle}, \text{unif}([d_A]))$ of $t$ independent copies results in additional concentration at a rate that depends on $t$. We conclude by showing the existence of a family of unitaries that makes this expression small for all states $|\psi\rangle$ using a union bound over a $\delta$-net. The four main ingredients of the proof are precisely stated here but only proved in Appendix A.

We start by computing the expected value of the fidelity $E\left\{F(p^A_{|\psi\rangle}, \text{unif}([d_A]))\right\}$, which can be seen as an $\ell_1(\ell_2)$ norm.

**Lemma 2.6** (Expected value of $\ell_1^A(\ell_2^B)$ over the sphere). Let $|\varphi\rangle^{AB}$ be a Haar-distributed random pure state on $AB$. Then,

$$E\left\{F(p^A_{|\varphi\rangle}, \text{unif}([d_A]))\right\} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d_A}} \frac{\Gamma\left(\frac{d_A+1}{2}\right)}{\Gamma\left(\frac{d_A}{2}\right)} \frac{\Gamma\left(\frac{d_Bd_A}{2}\right)}{\Gamma\left(\frac{d_Bd_A+1}{2}\right)} \geq \sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{d_B}}.$$

We then use the inequality $\Delta(\rho, \sigma) \leq \sqrt{1 - F(\rho, \sigma)^2}$ to get

$$E\left\{\Delta(p^A_{|\psi\rangle}, \text{unif}([d_A]))\right\} \leq E\left\{\sqrt{1 - F(p^A_{|\psi\rangle}, \text{unif}([d_A]))^2}\right\}.$$
By the concavity of the function $x \mapsto \sqrt{1-x^2}$ on the interval $[0,1]$,

$$
\mathbb{E}\left\{ \Delta \left( p_A^U, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) \right\} \leq \sqrt{1 - \mathbb{E}\left\{ F \left( p_A^U, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) \right\}^2}
\leq \sqrt{1 - \left( 1 - \frac{1}{d_B} \right)}
\leq \epsilon/3.
$$

The last inequality comes from the hypothesis of the theorem that $d_B \geq 9/\epsilon^2$. In other words, for any fixed $|\psi\rangle$, the average over $U$ of the trace distance between $p_A^U|\psi\rangle$ and the uniform distribution is at most $\epsilon/3$. The next step is to show that this trace distance is close to its expected value with high probability. For this, we use a version of Lévy’s lemma presented in [MS86].

**Lemma 2.7** (Lévy’s lemma). Let $f : \mathbb{C}^d \to \mathbb{R}$ and $\eta > 0$ be such that for all pure states $|\varphi_1\rangle, |\varphi_2\rangle$ in $\mathbb{C}^d$,

$$
|f(|\varphi_1\rangle) - f(|\varphi_2\rangle)| \leq \eta|||\varphi_1\rangle - |\varphi_2\rangle||_2.
$$

Let $|\varphi\rangle$ be a random pure state in dimension $d$. Then for all $0 \leq \delta \leq \eta$,

$$
\mathbb{P}\left\{ |f(|\varphi\rangle) - \mathbb{E}\{f(|\varphi\rangle)\} | \geq \delta \right\} \leq 4 \exp \left( -\frac{\delta^2 d}{\eta^2} \right)
$$

where $c$ is a constant. We can take $c = 9\pi^2$.

We apply this concentration result to $f : |\varphi\rangle^{AB} \to \Delta \left( p_A^U, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right)$. We start by finding an upper bound on the Lipschitz constant $\eta$. For any pure states $|\varphi_1\rangle^{AB}$ and $|\varphi_2\rangle^{AB}$,

$$
|f(|\varphi_1\rangle) - f(|\varphi_2\rangle)| \leq \Delta \left( p_A^U, p_A^U \right)
\leq \frac{1}{2} \sum_{a,b} |\langle a|A|b\rangle^B| |\varphi_1\rangle| - \sum_{a,b} |\langle a|A|b\rangle^B| |\varphi_2\rangle|
\leq \Delta \left( p_A^U, p_A^U \right)
\leq \sqrt{1 - F \left( p_A^U, p_A^U \right)^2}
\leq \sqrt{2 \left( 1 - F \left( p_A^U, p_A^U \right) \right)}
\leq \sqrt{2 \left( 2 - \sum_{a,b} |\langle a|b||\varphi_1\rangle| \cdot |\langle a|b||\varphi_2\rangle| \right)}
\leq \sqrt{\sum_{a,b} |\langle a|b||\varphi_1\rangle|^2 - |\langle a|b||\varphi_2\rangle|^2}
\leq \|\varphi_1\rangle - |\varphi_2\rangle||_2.
$$

The first two inequalities follow from the triangle inequality. The third inequality is an application of (2). The fourth inequality follows from the fact that $1 - x^2 \leq 2(1 - x)$ for all $x \in [0,1]$. The last inequality follows again from the triangle inequality. Thus, applying Lemma 2.7 we get for all $0 \leq \delta \leq 1$,

$$
\mathbb{P}\left\{ |\Delta \left( p_A^U, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) - \mu | \geq \delta \right\} \leq 4 \exp \left( -\frac{\delta^2 d}{\epsilon^2} \right)
$$

where $\mu = \mathbb{E}\left\{ \Delta \left( p_A^U, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) \right\}$. The following lemma bounds the tails of the average of independent copies of a random variable.

**Lemma 2.8** (Concentration of the average). Let $a, b \geq 1$, $\delta \in (0,1)$ and $t$ a positive integer. Suppose $X$ is a random variable with 0 mean satisfying the tail bounds

$$
\mathbb{P}\{ X \geq \delta \} \leq ae^{-b\delta^2} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}\{ X \leq -\delta \} \leq ae^{-b\delta^2}.
$$
Let $X_1, \ldots, X_t$ be independent copies of $X$. Then if $\delta^2b \geq 16a^2\pi$, 
\[
P \left\{ \left| \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=1}^{t} X_k \right| \geq \delta \right\} \leq \exp \left( -\frac{\delta^2bt}{2} \right).
\]

Taking $\delta = \epsilon/3$ and using Lemma 2.8 (which we can apply because we have $(\epsilon/3)^2 \cdot \frac{d}{c} \geq 16 \cdot 4^2 \cdot \pi$), we get 
\[
P \left\{ \left| \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta \left( p_{U_k|\psi}^a, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) - \mu \right| \geq \epsilon/3 \right\} \leq \exp \left( -\frac{(\epsilon/3)^2td}{c} \right).
\]

Using this together with Lemma 2.6, we have 
\[
P \left\{ \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta \left( p_{U_k|\psi}^A, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) \geq 2\epsilon/3 \right\} \leq \exp \left( -\frac{c^2td}{18c} \right). \tag{11}
\]

We would like to have the event described in (11) hold for all $|\psi\rangle \in AB$. For this, we construct a finite set $\mathcal{N}$ of states (a $\delta$-net) for which we can ensure that $\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta \left( p_{U_k|\psi}^A, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) < 2\epsilon/3$ for all $|\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{N}$ holds with high probability.

**Lemma 2.9 ($\delta$-net).** Let $\delta \in (0, 1)$. There exists a set $\mathcal{N}$ of pure states in $\mathbb{C}^d$ with $|\mathcal{N}| \leq (3/\delta)^{2d}$ such that for every pure state $|\psi\rangle \in \mathbb{C}^d$ (i.e., $||\psi||_2 = 1$), there exists $|\tilde{\psi}\rangle \in \mathcal{N}$ such that 
\[||\psi\rangle - |\tilde{\psi}\rangle||_2 \leq \delta.\]

Let $\mathcal{N}$ be the $\epsilon/3$-net obtained by applying this lemma to the space $AB$ with $\delta = \epsilon/3$. We have 
\[
P \left\{ \exists |\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{N} : \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta \left( p_{U_k|\psi}^A, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) \geq 2\epsilon/3 \right\} \leq |\mathcal{N}| \cdot \exp \left( -\frac{c^2td}{18c} \right) \leq \exp \left( -d \left( \frac{c^2t}{18c} - 2\ln(9/c) \right) \right).
\]

Now for an arbitrary state $|\psi\rangle \in AB$, we know that there exists $|\tilde{\psi}\rangle \in \mathcal{N}$ such that $||\psi\rangle - |\tilde{\psi}\rangle||_2 \leq \epsilon/3$. As a consequence, for any unitary transformation $U$, 
\[
\Delta \left( p_{U|\tilde{\psi}}^A, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) \leq \Delta \left( p_{U|\psi}^A, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) + \Delta \left( p_{U|\psi}^A, p_{U|\tilde{\psi}}^A \right) \\
\leq \Delta \left( p_{U|\psi}^A, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) + \|U|\tilde{\psi}\rangle - U|\psi\rangle\|_2 \\
\leq \Delta \left( p_{U|\psi}^A, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) + \epsilon/3.
\]

In the first inequality, we used the triangle inequality and the second inequality can be derived as in (10). Thus, 
\[
P \left\{ \exists |\psi\rangle \in AB : \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta \left( p_{U_k|\psi}^A, \text{unif}([d_A]) \right) \geq \epsilon \right\} \leq \exp \left( -d \left( \frac{c^2t}{18c} - 2\ln(9/c) \right) \right). \tag{12}
\]

If $t > \frac{18c-\ln(9/c)}{c^2}$, this bound is strictly smaller than 1 and the result follows.

To prove that we can suppose that $\{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\}$ define 0.9-MUBs, consider the function $f : |\varphi\rangle \mapsto \langle \psi|\varphi\rangle$ for some fixed vector $|\psi\rangle$. Then, if $|\varphi\rangle$ is a random pure state, we have $E \{ f(|\varphi\rangle) \} = 0$. Moreover, using Levy’s Lemma with $\delta = d^{-0.45}$ 
\[
P \left\{ ||\langle \psi|\varphi\rangle|| \geq d^{-0.45} \right\} \leq 4 \exp \left( -\frac{d^{0.1}}{c} \right).
\]

Thus, 
\[
P \left\{ \exists k \neq k', x, y \in [d], ||\langle x|U_k^\dagger U_{k'}|y\rangle|| \geq d^{-0.45} \right\} \leq 4td^2 \exp \left( -\frac{d^{0.1}}{c} \right) \tag{13}
\]
which completes the proof. \qed
Corollary 2.10 (Existence of entropic uncertainty relations). Let $C$ be a Hilbert space of dimension $d > 2$. There exists a constant $c' \geq 1$ such that for any integer $t > 2$ such that $\frac{9 \cdot 16^2}{18 \log t} \leq d$, there exists a set $\{U_0, ... , U_{t-1}\}$ of unitary transformations of $C$ satisfying the following entropic uncertainty relation: For any state $|\psi\rangle$,
\[
\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \text{H}(p_{U_k|\psi}) \geq \left( 1 - \sqrt{c' \log t} \right) \log d - \log \left( \frac{18t}{c' \log t} \right) - \eta \left( \sqrt{c' \log t} \right),
\]
where $\eta(\epsilon) = -2\epsilon \ln(2\epsilon)$ for all $\epsilon > 0$. In particular, in the limit $d \to \infty$, we obtain the existence of a sequence of sets of $t$ bases satisfying
\[
\lim_{d \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \text{H}(p_{U_k|\psi}) \geq 1 - \sqrt{c' \log t}.
\]

Remark. Recall that the bases (or measurements) that constitute the uncertainty relation are defined as the images of the computational basis by $U_k^{\dagger}$. Note that for any set of unitaries $\{U_0, ... , U_{t-1}\}$, we have
\[
\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \text{H}(p_{U_k|\psi}) \leq \left( 1 - \frac{1}{t} \right) \log d.
\]

It is an open question whether there exists uncertainty relations matching this bound, even asymptotically as $d \to \infty$ [WW10]. Wehner and Winter [WW10] ask whether there even exists a growing function $f$ such that
\[
\lim_{d \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \text{H}(p_{U_k|\psi}) \leq \left( 1 - \frac{1}{f(t)} \right) \log d.
\]

The corollary answers this question in the affirmative with $f(t) = \sqrt{\frac{t}{c' \log t}}$. □

Proof Define $c' = 18c$ where $c$ comes from Lévy’s Lemma 2.7, $\epsilon = \sqrt{c' \log t} \overline{t}$ and decompose $C = A \otimes B$ with $d_B = \left[ 9 / \epsilon^2 \right]$. As $d \geq 9c^2 \epsilon^2$ and
\[
\frac{18c \log (1/\epsilon)}{\epsilon^2} = 18c \log \left( \sqrt{\frac{t}{18c \log t}} \right) \cdot \frac{t}{18c \log t} \leq t,
\]
we get a family $U_0, ... , U_{t-1}$ of unitary transformations that satisfies
\[
\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta(p_{U_k|\psi}^A, \text{unif}(|d_A|)) \leq \epsilon.
\]

By Proposition 2.2 these unitary transformations also satisfy an entropic uncertainty relation:
\[
\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \text{H}(p_{U_k|\psi}^A) \geq (1 - \epsilon) \log \left( \frac{d}{9 / \epsilon^2} \right) - \eta(\epsilon)
\geq (1 - \epsilon) \log d - \log(18 / \epsilon^2) - \eta(\epsilon).
\]

□

2.4 Metric uncertainty relations: explicit construction

In this section, we are interested in obtaining families $\{U_0, ... , U_{t-1}\}$ of unitaries verifying metric uncertainty relations where $U_0, ... , U_{t-1}$ are explicit and efficiently computable using a quantum computer. For this section, we consider for simplicity a Hilbert space composed of qubits, i.e., of dimension $d = 2^n$ for some integer $n$. This Hilbert space is of the form $A \otimes B$ where $A$ describes the states of the first $\log d_A$ qubits and $B$ the last $\log d_B$ qubits. Note that we assume that both $d_A$ and $d_B$ are powers of two.

We construct a set of unitaries by adapting an explicit low-distortion embedding of $(\mathbb{R}^d, \ell_2)$ into $(\mathbb{R}^{d'}, \ell_1)$ with $d' = d^{1 + o(1)}$ by Indyk [Ind07]. Indyk’s construction has two main ingredients: a set of mutually unbiased bases
and an extractor. Our construction uses the same paradigm while requiring additional properties on both the mutually unbiased bases and the extractor.

In order to obtain a locking scheme that only needs simple quantum operations, we construct sets of approximately mutually unbiased bases from a restricted set of unitaries that can be implemented with single-qubit Hadamard gates. Moreover, we impose three additional properties on the extractor: we need our extractor to be strong, to define a permutation and to be efficiently invertible. We want the extractor to be strong because we are constructing metric uncertainty relations as opposed to a norm embedding. The property of being a permutation is needed to ensure that the induced transformation on \( \mathbb{C}^{2\otimes n} \) preserves the \( \ell_2 \) norm. We also require the efficient invertibility condition to be able to build an efficient quantum circuit for the permutation. See Definition 2.14 for a precise formulation.

The intuition behind Indyk’s idea is as follows. Let \( V_0, \ldots, V_{r-1} \) be unitaries defining (approximately) mutually unbiased bases and let \( \{ P_y \}_{y \in S} \) be a permutation extractor (these terms are defined later in equation (14) and Definition 2.14). The role of the mutually unbiased bases is to guarantee that for all states \( |\psi\rangle \) and for most values of \( j \in [r] \), most of the mass of the state \( V_j |\psi\rangle \) is “well spread” in the computational basis. This spread is measured in terms of the min-entropy of the distribution \( p_{V_j|\psi} \). Then, the extractor \( \{ P_y \}_y \) will ensure that on average over \( y \in S \), the masses \( \sum_b |\langle a| b \rangle P_y V_j |\psi\rangle |^2 \) are almost equal for all \( a \in [d_A] \). More precisely, the distribution \( p_y^A \) is close to uniform.

We start by recalling the definition of mutually unbiased bases. A set of unitary transformations \( V_0, \ldots, V_{r-1} \) is said to define \( \gamma \)-approximately mutually unbiased bases (or \( \gamma \)-MUBs) if for \( i \neq j \) and any elements \( |x\rangle \) and \( |y\rangle \) of the computational basis, we have

\[
|\langle x | V_i^\dagger V_j |y\rangle| = \frac{1}{d^{\gamma/2}}.
\]

As shown in the following lemma, there is a construction of mutually unbiased bases that can be efficiently implemented \([WF89]\). The proof of the lemma is deferred to Appendix B.

**Lemma 2.11 (Quantum circuits for MUBs).** Let \( n \) be a positive integer and \( d = 2^n \). For any integer \( r \leq d+1 \), there exists a family \( V_0, \ldots, V_{r-1} \) of unitary transformations of \( \mathbb{C}^d \) that define mutually unbiased bases. Moreover, there exists a randomized classical algorithm with runtime \( O(n^2 \log \log n) \) that takes as input \( j \in [r] \) and outputs a binary vector \( \alpha_j \in \{0, 1\}^{2^n-1} \), and a quantum circuit of size \( O(n \log n) \) and depth \( O(\log n) \) that when given as input the vector \( \alpha_j \) (classical input) and a quantum state \( |\psi\rangle \in \mathbb{C}^d \) outputs \( V_j |\psi\rangle \).

**Remark.** The randomization in the algorithm is used to find an irreducible polynomial of degree \( n \) over \( \mathbb{F}_2[X] \). It could be replaced by a deterministic algorithm that runs in time \( O(n^4 \log \log n) \). Observe that if \( n \) is odd and \( r \leq (d+1)/2 \), it is possible to choose the unitary transformations to be real (see [HSP06]).

It is also possible to obtain approximately mutually unbiased bases that use smaller circuits. In fact, the following lemma shows that we can construct large sets of approximately mutually unbiased bases defined by unitaries in the restricted set

\[
\mathcal{H} = \{ H^v \overset{\text{def}}{=} H^v_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes H^v_n, v \in \{0, 1\}^n \},
\]

where \( H \) is the Hadamard transform on \( \mathbb{C}^2 \) defined by

\[
H = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}.
\]

In our construction of metric uncertainty relations (Theorem 2.16), we could use the 1-MUBs of Lemma 2.11 or the \((1/2 - \delta)\)-MUBs of Lemma 2.12. As the construction of approximate MUBs is simpler and can be implemented with simpler circuits, we use Lemma 2.12 when the choice of \( \gamma \)-MUBs is not specified.

**Lemma 2.12 (Approximate MUBs in \( \mathcal{H} \)).** Let \( n' \) be a positive integer and \( n = 2^{n'} \).

1. For any integer \( r \leq n \), there exists a family \( V_0, \ldots, V_{r-1} \in \mathcal{H} \) that define 1/2-MUBs.
2. For any \( \delta \in (0, 1/2) \), there exists a constant \( c > 0 \) independent of \( n \) such that for any \( r \leq 2^c n \) there exists a family \( V_0, \ldots, V_{r-1} \) of unitary transformations in \( \mathcal{H} \) that define \((1/2 - \delta)\)-MUBs.

Moreover, in both cases, given an index \( j \in [r] \), there is a polynomial time (classical) algorithm that computes the vector \( v \in \{0, 1\}^n \) that defines the unitary \( V_j = H^v \).
Proof. Observe that for any $v \in \{0,1\}^n$ and any $y \in \{0,1\}^n$, we have

$$H^v \left(|y_1\rangle \otimes \cdots \otimes |y_n\rangle\right) = H^{v_1}|y_1\rangle \otimes \cdots \otimes H^{v_n}|y_n\rangle = \sum_{y'_i \in \{0,1\} \text{ for } v_i = 1} \sum_{y'_i = y_i \text{ for } v_i = 0} \frac{(-1)^{v \cdot y}}{2^{m(v)}} |y'_1\cdots y'_n\rangle.$$

Thus,

$$|\langle x|H^vH^{v'}|y\rangle| = |\langle x|H^{v+v'}|y\rangle| \leq \frac{1}{2^{d_H(v,v')/2}}. \quad (15)$$

Using this observation, we see that a binary code $C \subseteq \{0,1\}^n$ with minimum distance $\gamma n$ defines a set of $\gamma$-MUBs in $\mathcal{H}$. It is now sufficient to find binary codes with minimum distance as large as possible. For the first construction, we use the Hadamard code that has minimum distance $n/2$. The Hadamard codewords are indexed by $x \in \{0,1\}^n$; the codeword corresponding to $x$ is the vector $v \in \{0,1\}^n$ whose coordinates are $v_z = x \cdot z$ for all $z \in \{0,1\}^n$. This code has the largest possible minimum distance for a non-trivial binary code but its shortcoming is that the number of codewords is only $n$. For our applications, it is sometimes desirable to have $r$ larger than $n$ (this is useful to allow the error parameter $\epsilon$ of our metric uncertainty relation to be smaller than $n^{-1/2}$).

For the second construction, we use families of linear codes with minimum distance $1/2 - \delta$ with a number of codewords that is exponential in $n$. For this, we can use Reed-Solomon codes concatenated with linear codes on $\{0,1\}^{\Theta(n^\delta)}$ that match the performance of random linear codes; see for example Appendix E in [Gol08]. For a simpler construction, note that we can also get $2^{\Omega(n^\delta)}$ codewords by using a Reed-Solomon code concatenated with a Hadamard code.

The next lemma shows that for any state $|\psi\rangle$, for most values of $j$, the distribution $p_{V_j}|\psi\rangle$ is close to a distribution with large min-entropy provided $\{V_j\}$ define $\gamma$-MUBs. This result might be of independent interest. In fact, the authors of [DFR+07] prove a lower bound close to $n/2$ on the min-entropy of a measurement in the computational basis of the state $U|\psi\rangle$ where $U$ is chosen uniformly from the full set of the $2^n$ unitaries of $\mathcal{H}$. They leave as an open question the existence of small subsets of $\mathcal{H}$ that satisfy the same uncertainty relation. When used with the $\gamma$-MUBs of Lemma 2.12, the following lemma partially answers this question by exhibiting such sets of size polynomial in $n$ but with a min-entropy lower bound close to $n/4$ instead. This can be used to reduce the amount of randomness needed for many protocols in the bounded and noisy quantum storage models.

Lemma 2.13. Let $n \geq 1$, $d = 2^n$ and $\epsilon \in (0,1)$ and consider a set of $r = \left\lceil \frac{d}{\epsilon^2} \right\rceil$ unitary transformations $V_0, \ldots, V_{r-1}$ of $\mathbb{C}^d$ defining $\gamma$-MUBs. For all $|\psi\rangle \in \mathbb{C}^d$,

$$\left| \left\{ j \in [r] : \exists \text{ distribution } q_j, \Delta (p_{V_j}|\psi\rangle, q_j) \leq \epsilon \text{ and } H_{\min}(q_j) \geq \frac{\gamma n}{2} - \log(8/\epsilon^2) \right\} \right| \geq (1 - \epsilon)r.$$

Proof. This proof proceeds along the lines of [Ind07] Lemma 4.2]. Similar results can also be found in the sparse approximation literature; see [Tro04] Proposition 4.3 and references therein.

Consider the $rd \times d$ matrix $V$ obtained by concatenating the rows of the matrices $V_0, \ldots, V_{r-1}$. For $S \subseteq [rd]$, $V_S$ denotes the submatrix of $V$ obtained by selecting the rows in $S$. The coordinates of the vector $V|\psi\rangle \in \mathbb{C}^{rd}$ are indexed by $z \in [rd]$ and denoted by $(V|\psi\rangle)_z$.

Claim. We have for any set $S \subseteq [rd]$ of size at most $d^{r/2}$ and any unit vector $|\psi\rangle$,

$$\| (V|\psi\rangle)_S \|^2 \leq 1 + \frac{|S|}{d^{r/2}}. \quad (16)$$

To prove the claim, we want an upper bound on the operator 2-norm of the matrix $(V_S)$, which is the square root of the largest eigenvalue of $G = V_S^\dagger V_S$. As two distinct rows of $V$ have an inner product bounded by $\frac{1}{d^{r/2}}$, the non-diagonal entries of $G$ are bounded by $\frac{1}{d^{r/2}}$. Moreover, the diagonal entries of $G$ are all 1. By the Gershgorin circle theorem, all the eigenvalues of $G$ lie in the disc centered at 1 of radius $\frac{|S|-1}{d^{r/2}}$. We conclude that (16) holds.

Now pick $S$ to be the set of indices of the $d^{r/2}$ largest entries of the vector $\{(V|\psi\rangle)_z\} \in [rd]$. Using the previous claim, we have $\| (V|\psi\rangle)_S \|^2 \leq 2$. Moreover, since $S$ contains the $d^{r/2}$ largest entries of $\{(V|\psi\rangle)_z\}$, we have that for all $z \notin S$, $\| (V|\psi\rangle)_z \|^2 d^{r/2} \leq \| (V|\psi\rangle)_S \|^2 = \sum_{j=0}^{d^{r/2}-1} \| V_j |\psi\rangle\|^2 = r$. Thus, for all $z \notin S$, $\| (V|\psi\rangle)_z \|^2 \leq \frac{r}{d^{r/2}}$.

We now build the distributions $q_j$. For every $j \in [r]$, define

$$w_j = \sum_{z \in S \cap (j \ldots (j+1)r-1)} \| (V|\psi\rangle)_z \|^2.$$
which is the total weight in $S$ of $V_j|\psi\rangle$. Defining $T_\epsilon = \{j : w_j > \epsilon\}$, we have $|T_\epsilon| \leq \frac{\|V|\psi\rangle_S\|^2}{\epsilon^2} \leq 2$. Thus, 

$$|T_\epsilon| \leq \frac{2}{\epsilon} \leq \epsilon r.$$

We define the distribution $q_j$ for $j \in [r]$ by

$$q_j(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{|\langle x|V_j|\psi\rangle|^2}{w_j} & \text{if } jd + x \notin S \\ \frac{w_j}{d} & \text{if } jd + x \in S. \end{cases}$$

Since

$$\sum_x q_j(x) = w_j + \sum_{x \in [d] : jd + x \notin S} |\langle x|V_j|\psi\rangle|^2 = \sum_{x \in [d]} |\langle x|V_j|\psi\rangle|^2 = 1,$$

$q_j$ is a probability distribution. Moreover, we have that for $j \notin T_\epsilon$

$$\Delta (p_{V_j|\psi\rangle}, q_j) \leq \frac{1}{2} \left( \sum_{x : jd + x \notin S} \frac{w_j}{d} + \sum_{x : jd + x \in S} \left( \frac{w_j}{d} + |\langle x|V_j|\psi\rangle|^2\right) \right) = w_j \leq \epsilon.$$

The distribution $q_j$ also has the nice property that for all $x \in [d]$, $q_j(x) \leq \frac{r}{d^{n/2}} + \frac{1}{d} \leq \frac{2r}{d^{n/2}}$. In other words, $H_{\min}(q_j) \geq \frac{n\pi}{2} - \log(8\epsilon^2)$.

We now move to the second building block in Indyk’s construction: randomness extractors. Randomness extractors are functions that extract uniform random bits from weak sources of randomness.

**Definition 2.14** (Strong permutation extractor). Let $n$ and $m \leq n$ be positive integers, $\ell \in [0, n]$ and $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$. A family of permutations $\{P_y\}_{y \in S}$ of $\{0, 1\}^n$ where each permutation $P_y$ is described by two functions $P^E_y : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ (the first $m$ bits of $P_y$) and $P^R_y : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n-m}$ (the last $n-m$ bits of $P_y$) is said to be an explicit $(n, \ell) \rightarrow \epsilon$ $m$ strong permutation extractor if:

- For any random variable $X$ on $\{0, 1\}^n$ such that $H_{\min}(X) \geq \ell$, and an independent seed $U_S$ uniformly distributed over $S$, we have

$$\Delta \left( P(U_S, P^E_{P}(X)) : \text{unif}(\{0, 1\}^n) \right) \leq \epsilon,$$

which is equivalent to

$$\frac{1}{|S|} \sum_{y \in S} \Delta \left( P^E_{P}(X), \text{unif}(\{0, 1\}^n) \right) \leq \epsilon. \quad (17)$$

- For all $y \in S$, both the function $P_y$ and its inverse $P_y^{-1}$ are computable in time polynomial in $n$.

**Remark.** A similar definition of permutation extractors was used in [RVW00] in order to avoid some entropy loss in an extractor construction. Here, the reason we use permutation extractors is different; it is because we want the induced transformation $P_y$ on $\mathbb{C}^{2^n}$ to preserve the $\ell_2$ norm.

We can adapt an extractor construction of [GUV09] to obtain a permutation extractor with the following parameters. The details of the construction are presented in Appendix [C].

**Theorem 2.15** (Explicit strong permutation extractors). For all (constant) $\delta \in (0, 1)$, all positive integers $n$, all $k \in [c \log(n/\epsilon), n]$ ($c$ is a constant independent of $n$ and $\epsilon$), and all $\epsilon \in (0, 1/2)$, there is an explicit $(n, k) \rightarrow \epsilon$ $(1-\delta)k$ strong permutation extractor $\{P_y\}_{y \in S}$ with $\log |S| \leq O(\log(n/\epsilon))$. Moreover, the functions $(x, y) \mapsto P_y(x)$ and $(x, y) \mapsto P_y^{-1}(x)$ can be computed by circuits of size $O(n \log(n/\epsilon))$.

A permutation $P$ on $\{0, 1\}^n$ defines a unitary transformation on $(\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes n}$ that we also call $P$. The permutation extractor $\{P_y\}$ will be seen as a family of unitary transformations over $n$ qubits. Moreover, just as we decomposed the space $\{0, 1\}^n$ into the first $m$ bits and the last $n-m$ bits, we decompose the space $(\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes n}$ into $A \otimes B$, where $A$ represents the first $m$ qubits and $B$ represents the last $n-m$ qubits. The properties of $\{P^E_y\}$ will then be reflected in the system $A$.

Combining Theorem 2.15 and Lemma 2.11, we obtain a set of unitaries satisfying a metric uncertainty relation.
**Theorem 2.16** (Explicit uncertainty relations: key optimized). Let \( \delta > 0 \) be a constant, \( n \) be a positive integer, \( \epsilon \in (2^{-cn}, 1) \) (\( c \) is a constant independent of \( n \)). Then, there exist \( t \leq \left( \frac{n}{\epsilon} \right)^c \) (for some constant \( c \) independent of \( n \) and \( \epsilon \)) unitary transformations \( U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1} \) acting on \( n \) qubits such that: if \( A \) represents the first \( (1-\delta)n/4 - O(\log(1/\epsilon)) \) qubits and \( B \) represents the remaining qubits, then for all \( \psi \in AB \),
\[
\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta \left( p_{U_k|\psi}, \text{unif}(|d_A|) \right) \leq \epsilon.
\]
Moreover, the mapping that takes the index \( k \in [t] \) and a state \( \psi \) as inputs and outputs the state \( U_k|\psi \) can be performed by a classical computation with polynomial runtime and a quantum circuit that consists of single-qubit Hadamard gates on a subset of the qubits followed by a permutation in the computational basis. This permutation can be computed by (classical or quantum) circuits of size \( O(n \log(n/\epsilon)) \).

**Remark.** Observe that in terms of the dimension \( d \) of the Hilbert space, the number of unitaries \( t \) is polylogarithmic.

**Proof.** Let \( \epsilon' = \epsilon/6 \). Lemma 2.11 gives \( r = \left[ \frac{2}{\epsilon'^2} \right] \leq 2^n \) unitary transformations \( V_0, \ldots, V_{r-1} \) that define mutually unbiased bases. Moreover, all these unitaries can be computed by circuits of size \( O(n \log n) \). Theorem 2.15 with \( \ell = n/2 - \log(8/\epsilon') \) and error \( \epsilon' \) gives \( |S| \leq 2^\ell \log(n/\epsilon') \) permutations \( \{ P_y \}_{y \in S} \) of \( \{ 0, 1 \}^n \) that are computable by classical circuits of size \( O(n \log(n/\epsilon')) \). We now argue that this classical circuit can be used to build a quantum circuit of size \( O(n \log(n/\epsilon)) \) that computes the unitaries \( P_y \).

Given classical circuits that compute \( P \) and \( P^{-1} \), we can construct reversible circuits \( C_P \) and \( C_{P^{-1}} \) for \( P \) and \( P^{-1} \). The circuit \( C_P \) when given input \( (x,0) \) outputs the state \( (x,P(x)) \), so that it keeps the input \( x \). Such a circuit can readily be transformed into a quantum circuit that acts on the computational basis states as the classical circuit. We also call these circuits \( C_P \) and \( C_{P^{-1}} \). Observe that we want to compute the unitary \( P \), so we have to erase the input \( x \). For this, we can then combine the circuits \( C_P \) and \( C_{P^{-1}} \) as described in Figure 1. Note that the size of this quantum circuit is the same as the size of the original classical circuit up to some multiplicative constant. Thus, this quantum circuit has size \( O(n \log(n)) \).

**Figure 1:** Quantum circuit to compute the permutation \( P \) using quantum circuits \( C_P \) for \( P \) and \( C_{P^{-1}} \) for \( P^{-1} \). \((C_{P^{-1}})^{-1}\) is simply the circuit \( C_{P^{-1}} \) taken backwards. The bottom register is an ancilla register.

The unitaries \( \{ U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1} \} \) are obtained by taking all the possible products \( P_y V_i \) for \( j \in [r], y \in S \). Note that \( t = r|S| \). We now show that the set \( \{ U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1} \} \) verifies the uncertainty relation property. Using Lemma 2.13 for any state \( |\psi\rangle \), the set
\[
T_{|\psi\rangle} \overset{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ j : \exists \text{ distribution } q_j, \Delta \left( p_{V_i|\psi}, q_j \right) \leq \epsilon' \text{ and } \forall x \in [d], q_j(x) \leq \frac{2r}{\sqrt{d}} \right\}
\]
has size at least \((1-\epsilon')r\). Moreover, for all \( a \in [d_A], p_{P_y V_i|\psi}(a) = \sum_h \langle a | A | b \rangle^2 B_y | V_i | \psi \rangle^2 = P_y | P_y(X) = a \rangle \) where \( X \) has distribution \( p_{V_i|\psi} \). By definition, for \( i \in T_{|\psi\rangle} \), we have \( \Delta \left( p_{V_i|\psi}, q_i \right) \leq \epsilon' \) with \( H_{\text{min}}(q_i) \geq n/2 - \log(8/\epsilon'^2) \). Using the fact that \( \{ P_y \} \) is a strong extractor (see (17) for min-entropy \( n/2 - \log(8/\epsilon'^2) \), it follows that
\[
\frac{1}{|S|} \sum_{y \in S} \Delta \left( p_{P_y V_i|\psi}, \text{unif}(|d_A|) \right) \leq 2\epsilon'
\]
for all $i \in T_\psi$. As $|T_\psi| \geq (1 - \epsilon')r$, we obtain
\[
1 \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta\left(p^A_{U_k}\psi\right),\text{unif}([d_A]) \leq 3\epsilon' = \epsilon/2.
\]

To conclude, we show that $t$ can be taken to be a power of two at the cost of multiplying the error by at most two. In fact, let $p$ be the smallest integer verifying $t \leq 2^p$, so that $2^p = 2t$. By repeating $2^p - t$ unitaries, it is easily seen that we obtain an $\epsilon$-metric uncertainty relation with $2p$ unitaries from an $\epsilon/2$-metric uncertainty relation with $t$ unitaries.

Note that the $B$ system we obtain is quite large and to get strong uncertainty relations, we want the system $B$ to be as small as possible. For this it is possible to repeat the construction of the previous theorem on the $B$ system. The next theorem gives a construction where the $A$ system is composed of $n - O(\log \log n) - O(\log(1/\epsilon))$ qubits. Of course, this is at the expense of increasing the number of unitaries in the uncertainty relation.

**Theorem 2.17** (Explicit uncertainty relation: message length optimized). Let $n$ be a positive integer and $\epsilon \in (2^{-c'}n, 1)$ ($c'$ is a constant independent of $n$). Then, there exist $t \leq \left(\frac{2}{\epsilon}\right)^{\log n}$ (for some constant $c$ independent of $n$ and $\epsilon$) unitary transformations $U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}$ acting on $n$ qubits that are all computable by quantum circuits of size $O(n \log(n/\epsilon))$ such that: if $A$ represents the first $n - O(\log \log n) - O(\log(1/\epsilon))$ qubits and $B$ represents the remaining qubits, then for all $\psi \in AB$,
\[
1 \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta\left(p^A_{U_k}\psi\right),\text{unif}([d_A]) \leq \epsilon.
\]

Moreover, the mapping that takes the index $k \in [t]$ and a state $\psi$ as inputs and outputs the state $U_k\psi$ can be performed by a classical precomputation with polynomial runtime and a quantum circuit of size $O(n \log(n/\epsilon))$. The number of unitaries $t$ can be taken to be a power of two.

**Proof** Using the construction of Theorem 2.16 we obtain a system $A$ over which we have some uncertainty relation and a system $B$ that we do not control. In order to decrease the dimension of the system $B$, we can apply the same construction to that system. The system $B$ then gets decomposed into $A_2B_2$, and we know that the distribution of the measurement outcomes of system $A_2$ in the computational basis is close to uniform. As a result, we obtain an uncertainty relation on the system $AA_2$ (see Figure 2).

![Figure 2: Composition of the construction of Theorem 2.16](image)

In order to reduce the dimension of the $B$ system, we can re-apply the uncertainty relation to the $B$ system.

More precisely, we start by demonstrating a simple property about the composition of metric uncertainty relations. Note that this composition is different from the one described in (7), but the proof is quite similar.

**Claim.** Suppose the set $\{U^{(1)}_0, \ldots, U^{(1)}_{t_1-1}\}$ of unitaries on $A_1B_1$ satisfies a $(t_1, \epsilon_1)$-metric uncertainty relation on system $A_1$ and the $\{U^{(2)}_0, \ldots, U^{(2)}_{t_2-1}\}$ of unitaries on $B_1 = A_2B_2$ satisfies a $(t_2, \epsilon_2)$-metric uncertainty relation on $A_2$. Then the set of unitaries $\left\{ (\mathbb{1}_{A_1} \otimes U^{(2)}_{k_2}) \cdot U^{(1)}_{k_1} \right\}_{k_1,k_2 \in [t_1] \times [t_2]}$ satisfies a $(t_1t_2, \epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2)$-metric uncertainty relation on $A_1A_2$: for all $\psi \in A_1A_2B_2$,
\[
1 \sum_{k_1,k_2 \in [t_1] \times [t_2]} \Delta\left(p^{(t_1t_2)(1)}_{U_{k_2}^{(2)}U_{k_1}^{(1)}}\psi\right),\text{unif}([d_{A_1},d_{A_2}]) \leq \epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2.
\]
For a fixed value of \( k_1 \in [t_1] \) and \( a_1 \in [d_{A_1}] \), we can apply the second uncertainty relation to the state
\[
\| (a_1|A_1 \rangle U_{k_1} |\psi\rangle \|_2 = \frac{1}{\sqrt{P_{U_{k_1} |\psi\rangle} (a_1)}} \sum_{b_1} \langle (a_1|b_1 \rangle |U_{k_1} |\psi\rangle \| b_1 \rangle \in B_1 = A_2 B_2. \]
As \( \{b_1\}_b = \{a_2\}_b \), we have
\[
\frac{1}{t_2} \sum_{k_2} \sum_{a_2} \left| P_{U_{k_1} |\psi\rangle} (a_1) \right| \left| \langle a_1|A_1 \rangle a_2 \langle b_2 \rangle B_2 (1_{A_1} \otimes U_{k_2}) |U_{k_1} |\psi\rangle \right|^2 - \frac{1}{d_{A_2}} \leq \epsilon_2.
\]
We can then calculate, in the same vein as [8]
\[
\frac{1}{t_1 t_2} \sum_{k_1, k_2} \sum_{a_1, a_2} \sum_{b_2} \left| \langle a_1|A_1 \rangle a_2 \langle b_2 \rangle B_2 (1_{A_1} \otimes U_{k_2}) |U_{k_1} |\psi\rangle \right|^2 - \frac{1}{d_{A_1} d_{A_2}} \leq \frac{1}{t_1 t_2} \sum_{k_1, k_2} \sum_{a_1, a_2} \left| \langle a_1|A_1 \rangle a_2 \langle b_2 \rangle B_2 (1_{A_1} \otimes U_{k_2}) |U_{k_1} |\psi\rangle \right|^2 - \frac{p_{U_{k_2} |\psi\rangle} (a_1)}{d_{A_2}} + \frac{1}{t_1} \sum_{k_1} \sum_{a_1} \left| p_{U_{k_2} |\psi\rangle} (a_1) - \frac{1}{d_{A_2}} \right| \leq \epsilon_2 + \epsilon_1.
\]
This completes the proof of the claim.

To obtain the claimed dimensions, we compose the construction of Theorem 2.16 \( h \) times with an error parameter \( \epsilon' = \epsilon/h \) and \( \delta = 1/8 \). Starting with a space of \( n \) qubits, the dimension of the \( B \) system (after one step) can be bounded by
\[
\frac{7}{8} n - O(\log(1/\epsilon')) \leq \log d_B \leq \frac{7}{8} n
\]
So after \( h \) steps, we have
\[
(\frac{7}{8})^h n - O(\log(1/\epsilon')) \cdot 8 (1 - (\frac{7}{8})^h) \leq \log d_{B_h} \leq (\frac{7}{8})^h n.
\]
Thus,
\[
(\frac{7}{8})^h n - O(\log(1/\epsilon')) \leq \log d_{B_h} \leq (\frac{7}{8})^h n.
\]
Note that \( h \) cannot be arbitrarily large: in order to apply the construction of Theorem 2.16 on a system of \( m \) qubits with error \( \epsilon' \), we should have \( \epsilon' \geq 2^{-c' m} \). In other words, if
\[
\log d_{B_h} \geq \frac{1}{c'} \log(h/\epsilon), \tag{19}
\]
then we can apply the construction \( h \) times. Let \( c'' \) be a constant to be chosen later and \( h = \left\lceil \frac{1}{c'' \log(h/\epsilon)} \log n - \log(c \log \log n + c \log(1/\epsilon)) \right\rceil \). This choice of \( h \) satisfies (19). In fact,
\[
\log d_{B_h} \geq c \log \log n + c \log(1/\epsilon) - O(\log(h/\epsilon)) \geq \frac{1}{c'} \log(h/\epsilon)
\]
if \( c \) is chosen large enough. Moreover, we get
\[
\log d_{B_h} = 2^{-\log n} \cdot 2^{\log O(\log \log n + \log(1/\epsilon))} \cdot n = O(\log \log n + \log(1/\epsilon))
\]
as stated in the theorem.

Each unitary of the obtained uncertainty relation is a product of \( h \) unitaries. The overall number of unitaries is product of the number of unitaries for each of the \( h \) steps. As a result, we have \( t \leq \left( \frac{2}{7} \right)^h \log n \) for some constant \( c \). \( t \) can be taken to be a power of two as the number of unitaries at each step can be taken to be power of two.

As for the running time, each unitary of the uncertainty relation is a product of \( O(\log n) \) unitaries from Theorem 2.16. Hence, each unitary can be computed by a quantum circuit of size \( O(n \text{polylog } n) \). ◻
It is of course possible to obtain a trade-off between the key size and the dimension of the $B$ system by choosing the number of times the construction of Theorem 2.16 is applied. In the next corollary, we show how to obtain an explicit entropic uncertainty relation whose average entropy is $(1 - \epsilon)n$.

**Corollary 2.18** (Explicit entropic uncertainty relations). Let $n \geq 100$ be an integer, and $\epsilon \in (10n^{-1/2}, 1/(2\epsilon))$. Then, there exists $t \leq \left(\frac{n}{\epsilon}\right)^{c\log(1/\epsilon)}$ (for some constant $c$ independent of $n$ and $\epsilon$) unitary transformations $U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}$ acting on $n$ qubits that are all computable by quantum circuits of size $O(n \polylog n)$ verifying an entropic uncertainty relation: for all pure states $|\psi\rangle \in (\mathbb{C}^2)^\otimes n$,

$$\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \mathcal{H}(p_{U_k|\psi}) \geq (1 - 3\epsilon)n - \eta(\epsilon)$$

(20)

where $\eta(\epsilon) = -2\epsilon \ln(2\epsilon)$. Moreover, the mapping that takes the index $k \in [t]$ and a state $|\psi\rangle$ as inputs and outputs the state $U_k|\psi\rangle$ can be performed by a classical randomized precomputation with expected runtime $O(n^2 \polylog n)$ and a quantum circuit of size $O(n \polylog n)$. The number of unitaries $t$ can be taken to be a power of two.

**Proof**. The proof is basically the same as the proof of Theorem 2.17 except that we repeat the construction $h = \lfloor \log(1/\epsilon)/\log(8/T) \rfloor$ times. We thus have

$$\log d_B \leq (7/8)^h n \leq \epsilon n.$$

We obtain a set of $t \leq \left(\frac{n}{\epsilon}\right)^{c\log(1/\epsilon)}$ unitary transformations. Applying Proposition 2.2 we get

$$\frac{1}{t} \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} \mathcal{H}(p_{U_i|\psi}) \geq (1 - 2\epsilon)(1 - \epsilon)n - \eta(\epsilon) \geq (1 - 3\epsilon)n - \eta(\epsilon).$$

$\square$

### 3 Locking classical information in quantum states

**Outline of the section**. We apply the results on metric uncertainty relations of the previous section to obtain locking schemes. After an introductory section on locking classical correlations (Section 3.1), we show how to obtain a locking scheme using a metric uncertainty relation in Section 3.2. Using the constructions of the previous section, this leads to locking schemes presented in Corollary 3.4 and 3.4. In Section 3.4, we observe that these locking schemes can be used to construct efficient string commitment protocols. Section 3.5 discusses the link to locking entanglement of formation.

#### 3.1 Background

Locking of classical correlations was first described in [DHL+04] as a violation of the incremental proportionality of the maximal classical mutual information that can be obtained by local measurement on a bipartite state. More precisely, for a bipartite state $\omega^{AB}$, the maximum classical mutual information $I_c$ is defined by

$$I_c(A; B)_\omega = \max \{I(M^A), I(M^B)\}$$

where $\{M^A\}$ and $\{M^B\}$ are measurements on $A$ and $B$, and $I_A, I_B$ are the (random) outcomes of these measurements on the state $\omega^{AB}$. Incremental proportionality is the intuitive property that $\ell$ bits of communication between two parties can increase their mutual information by at most $\ell$ bits. The authors of [DHL+04] considered the states

$$\omega^{XKC} = \frac{1}{2d} \sum_{k=0}^{d-1} \sum_{x=0}^{d-1} \sum_{x=0}^{d-1} |x\rangle\langle x|^X \otimes |k\rangle\langle k|^K \otimes (U_k|x\rangle\langle x|U_k^r)^C$$

(21)
for \( k \in \{0, 1\} \) where \( U_0 = \mathbb{1} \) and \( U_1 \) is the Hadamard transform. It was shown in [DHL+04] that the classical mutual information \( I_c(X K; C) = \frac{1}{2} \log d \). However, if the holder of the \( C \) system also knows the value of \( k \), then we can represent the global state by the following density operator

\[
\omega^{XKCK'} = \frac{1}{2d} \sum_{k=0}^{d-1} \sum_{x=0}^{d-1} |x\rangle\langle x| K \otimes |k\rangle K \otimes (U_k |x\rangle |x\rangle^{\dagger} C \otimes |k\rangle |k\rangle^{K'}.
\]

It is easy to see that \( I_c(X K; CK')_\omega = 1 + \log d \). This means that with only one bit of communication (represented by the register \( K' \)), the classical mutual information between systems \( X K \) and \( C \) jumped from \( \frac{1}{2} \log d \) to \( 1 + \log d \). In other words, it is possible to unlock \( \frac{1}{2} \log d \) bits of information (about \( X \)) from the quantum system \( C \) using a single bit.

The authors of [HLSW04] proved an even stronger locking result. They generalize the state in equation (21) to

\[
\omega^{XKC} = \frac{1}{td} \sum_{x=0}^{d-1} \sum_{t=0}^{d-1} |x\rangle\langle x| |k\rangle K \otimes (U_k |x\rangle |x\rangle^{\dagger} C \otimes |k\rangle |k\rangle^{K'} \tag{22}
\]

where \( U_k \) are chosen independently at random according to the Haar measure. They show that for any \( \epsilon > 0 \), by taking \( t = (\log d)^3 \) and if \( d \) is large enough,

\[
I_c(X; C)_\omega \leq \epsilon \log d \quad \text{and} \quad I_c(X K; CK')_\omega = \log d + \log t
\]

with high probability. Note that the size of the key measured in bits is only \( \log t = O(\log \log d) \) and it should be compared to the \((1 - \epsilon) \log d \) bits of unlocked (classical) information. It should be noted that their argument is probabilistic, and it does not say how to construct the unitary transformations \( U_k \). It is worth stressing that standard derandomization techniques are not known to work in this setting. For example, unitary \( t \)-designs use far too many bits of randomness [DCEL09]. Moreover, using a \( \delta \)-biased subset of the set of Pauli matrices fails to produce a locking scheme unless the subset has a size of the order of the dimension \( d [AS04, DD10] \) (see Appendix D).

Here, we view locking as a cryptographic task in which a message is encoded into a quantum state using a key whose size is much smaller than the message. Having access to the key, one can decode the message. However, an eavesdropper who does not have access to the key and has complete uncertainty about the message can extract almost no classical information about the message. We should stress here that this is not a composable cryptographic task, namely because an eavesdropper could choose to store quantum information about the message instead of measuring. In fact, as shown in [KRB07], using the communicated message \( X \) as a key for a one-time pad encryption might not be secure; see also [DFHL10]. It is however strictly stronger that the notion of entropic security [RW02, DS05, DD10] (see Appendix D for an example of an entropically secure encryption scheme that is not \( \epsilon \)-locking).

**Definition 3.1 (\( \epsilon \)-locking scheme).** Let \( n \) be a positive integer, \( \ell \in [0, n] \) and \( \epsilon \in [0, 1] \). An encoding \( E : [2^n] \times [\ell] \to S(C) \) is said to be \((\ell, \epsilon)\)-locking for the quantum system \( C \) if:

- For all \( x \neq x' \in [2^n] \) and all \( k \in [\ell] \), \( \Delta(E(x, k), E(x', k)) = 1 \).

- Let \( X \) (the message) be a random variable on \([2^n]\) with min-entropy \( H_{\min}(X) \geq \ell \), and \( K \) (the key) be an independent uniform random variable on \([\ell] \). For any measurement \( \{ M_i \} \) on \( C \) and any outcome \( i \),

\[
\Delta(p_{i|k} X | [i=I], p_X) \leq \epsilon. \tag{23}
\]

where \( I \) is the outcome of measurement \( \{ M_i \} \) on the (random) quantum state \( E(X, K) \).

When the min-entropy bound \( \ell \) is not specified, it should be understood that \( \ell = n \) meaning that \( X \) is uniformly distributed on \([2^n]\). The state \( E(X, K) \) is sometimes referred to as the ciphertext.

**Remark.** The relevant parameters of a locking scheme are: the number of bits \( n \) of the (classical) message, the dimension \( d \) of the (quantum) ciphertext, the number \( t \) of possible values of the key and the error \( \epsilon \). Strictly speaking, a classical one-time pad encryption, for which \( t = 2^n \), is \((0, 0)\)-locking according to this definition. However, here we seek locking schemes for which \( t \) is much smaller than \( 2^n \), say \( t \) polynomial in \( n \). This cannot be achieved using a classical encryption scheme.
Proposition 3.2. Let \( \epsilon \in [0, \frac{1}{2e}] \) and \( E : [2^n] \times [t] \to S(C) \) be an \( \epsilon \)-locking scheme. Define the state
\[
\omega^{XCK} = \frac{1}{td} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \sum_{x=0}^{2^n-1} |x|X \otimes |k\rangle|k\rangle^K \otimes E(x,k)^C \otimes |k\rangle|k\rangle^{K'}.
\]
Then,
\[
I_c(X;C) \leq 2\epsilon n + \eta(\epsilon) \quad \text{and} \quad I_c(XK; CK') = n + \log t
\]
where \( \eta(\epsilon) = -2\epsilon \ln(2\epsilon) \) with \( \eta(0) = 0 \).

Proof. First, we can suppose that the measurement performed on the system \( X \) is in the basis \( (|x\rangle)_x,k \). In fact, the outcome distribution of any measurement on the \( X \) system can be simulated classically using the values of the random variables \( X \).

Now let \( I \) be the outcome of a measurement performed on the \( C \) system. Using Fannes’ inequality, we have for any \( i \)
\[
H(X) - H(X|I = i) \leq 2\Delta(p_X, p_X|I = i) - \eta \left( \Delta(p_X, p_X|I = i) \right)
\]
using the fact that \( E \) defines an \( \epsilon \)-locking scheme. Thus,
\[
I(X; I) = H(X) - \sum_i P\{I = i\} H(X|I = i)
\]
\[
\leq 2\epsilon n + \eta(\epsilon).
\]
As this holds for any measurement, we get \( I_c(X; C) \leq 2\epsilon n + \eta(\epsilon) \).

The distance trace was also used in [Dup10, DFHL10] to define a locking scheme. To measure the leakage of information about \( X \) caused by a measurement, they used the probably more natural trace distance between the joint distribution of \( p_{(X,I)} \) and the product distribution \( p_X \times p_I \). Note that our definition is stronger, in that for all outcomes of the measurement \( i \), \( \Delta(p_X|I = i), p_X \) \( \leq \epsilon \) whereas the definition of [DFHL10] says that this only holds on average over \( i \). To the best of our knowledge, even the existence of such a strong locking scheme with small key was unknown.

For a survey on locking classical correlations, see [Leu09].

3.2 Locking using a metric uncertainty relation

The following theorem shows that a locking scheme can easily be constructed using a metric uncertainty relation.

Theorem 3.3. Let \( \epsilon \in (0, 1) \) and \( \{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\} \) be a set of unitary transformations of \( A \otimes B \) that satisfies an \( \epsilon \)-metric uncertainty relation on \( A \), i.e., for all states \( |\psi\rangle \in AB \),
\[
\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \Delta \left( p_{U_k|\psi)}^A, \text{unif}(|d_A|) \right) \leq \epsilon.
\]
Assume \( d_A = 2^n \). Then, the mapping \( E : [2^n] \times [t] \to S(AB) \) defined by
\[
E(x,k) = \frac{1}{d_B} \sum_{b=0}^{d_B-1} U_k^\dagger \left( |x\rangle|A^A \otimes |b\rangle|B^B \right) U_k,
\]
is \( \epsilon \)-locking. Moreover, for all \( \ell \in [0,n] \) such that \( 2^{\ell-n} > \epsilon \), it is \( (\ell, \frac{2\epsilon}{2^{\ell-n}}) \)-locking.
Remark. The state that the encoder inputs in the $B$ system is simply private randomness. The encoder chooses a uniformly random $b \in |d_B|$ and sends the quantum state $U_k^a |x^A \rangle |b^B \rangle$. Note that $b$ does not need to be part of the key (i.e., shared with the receiver). This makes the dimension $d = d_A d_B$ of the ciphertext larger than the number of possible messages $2^n$. If one insists on having a ciphertext of the same size as the message, it suffices to consider $b$ as part of the message and apply a one-time pad encryption to $b$. The number of possible values taken by the key increases to $t \cdot d_B$.

Proof. First, it is clear that different messages are distinguishable. In fact, for $x \neq x'$ and any $k$,

$$
\Delta(\mathcal{E}(x, k), \mathcal{E}(x', k)) = \frac{1}{2} \tr \left[ \left| |x^A \rangle \otimes \frac{1}{\dim B^B} |x'^A \rangle \otimes \frac{1}{\dim B^B} - |x'^A \rangle \otimes \frac{1}{\dim B^B} \right| \right] = 1.
$$

We now prove the locking property. Let $X$ be the random variable representing the message. Assume that $X$ is uniformly distributed over some set $S \subseteq |d_A|$ of size $|S| \geq 2^t$. Let $K$ be a uniformly random key in $|t|$ that is independent of $X$. Consider a POVM $\{M_i\}$ on the system $A B$. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that the POVM elements $M_i$ have rank 1. Otherwise, by writing $M_i$ in its eigenbasis, we could decompose outcome $i$ into more outcomes that can only reveal more information. So we can write the elements as weighted rank one projectors: $M_i = \xi_i |e_i^A \rangle \langle e_i^A|$. Our objective is to show that the outcome $I$ of this measurement on the state $\mathcal{E}(X, K)$ is almost independent of $X$. More precisely, for a fixed measurement outcome $I = i$, we want to compare the conditional distribution $p_{X|I = i}$ with $p_X$. The trace distance between these distributions can be written as

$$
\frac{1}{2} \sum_{x=0}^{d_A-1} |\mathbf{P} \{X = x|I = i\} − \mathbf{P} \{X = x\}|. \tag{24}
$$

Towards this objective, we start by computing the distribution of the measurement outcome $I$, given the value of the message $X = x$ (note that the receiver does not know the key):

$$
\mathbf{P} \{I = i|X = x\} = \frac{\xi_i}{td_B} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \sum_{b=0}^{d_B-1} \tr \left[ U_k |e_i^A \rangle \langle e_i^A| U_k^\dagger |x^A \rangle \otimes |b^B \rangle \right] \\
= \frac{\xi_i}{td_B} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \sum_{b=0}^{d_B-1} \langle x^A \rangle \langle b^B | U_k |e_i^A \rangle \langle e_i^A| U_k^\dagger |x^A \rangle |b^B \rangle \\
= \frac{\xi_i}{td_B} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} \sum_{b=0}^{d_B-1} |\langle x^A \rangle \langle b^B | U_k |e_i^A \rangle |^2 \\
= \frac{\xi_i}{td_B} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} p_{U_k |e_i^A} (x).
$$

Since $X$ is uniformly distributed over $S$, we have that for all $x \in S$

$$
\mathbf{P} \{X = x|I = i\} = \frac{\mathbf{P} \{X = x\} \mathbf{P} \{I = i|X = x\}}{\sum_{x' \in S} \mathbf{P} \{X = x'\} \mathbf{P} \{I = i|X = x'\}} \\
= \frac{\frac{1}{t} \cdot \sum_k p_{U_k |e_i^A} (x)}{\frac{1}{t} \cdot \sum_{x' \in S} \sum_k p_{U_k |e_i^A} (x')} \tag{25}
$$

Observe that in the case where $X$ is uniformly distributed over $[2^n]$ ($S = [2^n]$), it is simple to obtain directly that

$$
\Delta(p_{X|I = i}, p_X) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x=0}^{d_A-1} \left| \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} p_{U_k |e_i^A} (x) - \frac{1}{2^n} \right| \leq \epsilon
$$

using the fact that $\{U_k\}$ satisfies a metric uncertainty relation on $A$. Now let $S$ be any set of size at least $2^t$, let
\[ \alpha = \frac{1}{t} \sum_{x' \in S} \sum_{k} p_{U_k|x_i}^A(x') \]. We then bound
\[
\frac{1}{2} \sum_{x=0}^{d_A-1} |P \{ X = x | I = i \} - P \{ X = x \} | = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x \in S} \left| \frac{(1/t) \cdot \sum_k p_{U_k|x_i}^A(x)}{\alpha} - \frac{1}{|S|} \right| 
= \frac{1}{2\alpha} \cdot \sum_{x \in S} \left| \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} p_{U_k|x_i}^A(x) - \frac{\alpha}{|S|} \right| 
\leq \frac{1}{2\alpha} \cdot \frac{1}{t} \sum_k \left( \sum_{x \in S} |p_{U_k|x_i}^A(x) - \frac{1}{2^n}| + \frac{1}{2^n} - \frac{\alpha}{|S|} \right).
\]

We now use the fact that \( \{ U_k \} \) satisfies a metric uncertainty relation on \( A \): we get
\[ \frac{1}{t} \sum_k \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x \in S} |p_{U_k|x_i}^A(x) - \frac{1}{2^n}| \leq \frac{1}{2^n} \sum_k \sum_{x \in [d_A]} |p_{U_k|x_i}^A(x) - \frac{1}{2^n}| \leq \epsilon. \]

and
\[ \frac{1}{2} \frac{|S|}{2^n} - \alpha = \frac{1}{2} \frac{|S|}{2^n} - \frac{1}{\epsilon} \sum_{x \in S} p_{U_k|x_i}^A(x') \leq \epsilon. \](26)

As a result, we have
\[ \Delta (p_X | I = i, p_X) \leq \frac{2\epsilon}{\alpha}. \]

Using (26), we have \( \alpha \geq |S| 2^{-n} - \epsilon \geq 2^\ell - n - \epsilon. \) If \( \epsilon < 2^\ell - n \), we get
\[ \Delta (p_X | I = i, p_X) \leq \frac{2\epsilon}{2^\ell - n - \epsilon}. \]

In the general case when \( X \) has min-entropy \( \ell \), the distribution of \( X \) can be seen as a mixture of uniform distributions over sets of size at least \( 2^\ell \). So there exist independent random variables \( J \in \mathbb{N} \) and \( \{ X_j \} \) uniformly distributed on sets of size at least \( 2^\ell \) such that \( X = X_J \). One can then write
\[
\frac{1}{2} \sum_x |P \{ X = x | I = i \} - P \{ X = x \} | = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x,j} |P \{ J = j \} | (P \{ X_j = x | I = i, J = j \} - P \{ X_j = x | J = j \}) | 
\leq \frac{2\epsilon}{2^\ell - n - \epsilon}. \]

Using Theorem 3.3, together with the existence of metric uncertainty relations (Theorem 2.5), we show the existence of \( \epsilon \)-locking schemes whose key size depends only on \( \epsilon \) and not on the size of the encoded message. This result was not previously known.

**Corollary 3.4 (Existence of locking schemes).** Let \( c = 9\pi^2 \), \( n \geq 8 + \log c \) and \( \epsilon \in (0, 1) \). Then there exists an \( \epsilon \)-locking scheme encoding an \( n \)-bit message using a key of at most \( 2 \log(1/\epsilon) + \log(2 \cdot 18c \log(1/\epsilon)) \) bits into at most \( n + 2 \log(18/\epsilon) \) qubits.

**Remark.** Observe that in terms of number of bits, the size of the key is only a factor of two larger (up to smaller order terms) than the simple guessing lower bound of \( \log(1/(\epsilon + 2^n)) \).

Recall that we can increase the size of the message to be equal to the number of qubits of the ciphertext. The key size becomes at most \( 4 \log(1/\epsilon) + \log(2 \cdot 18c \log(1/\epsilon)) + 10 \).

**Proof** Use the construction of Theorem 2.5 with \( d_A = 2^n \) and \( d_B = 2^q \) such that \( 2^{q-1} < 9/\epsilon^2 \leq 2^q \) and \( d = d_A d_B \). Take \( t = 2^p \) to be the power of two with \( 2^{p-1} < \frac{18c \log(1/\epsilon)}{\epsilon^2} \leq 2^p \).
Then, there exists an efficient ε-locking scheme encoding an n-bit message in a quantum state of \( n' \leq (4 + \delta)n + O(\log(1/\epsilon)) \) qubits using a key of size \( O(\log(n/\epsilon)) \) bits. In fact, both the encoding and decoding operations are computable using a classical computation with polynomial running time and a quantum circuit with only Hadamard gates and preparations and measurements in the computational basis.

There also exists an efficient ε-locking scheme \( E' \) encoding an n-bit message in a quantum state of \( n \) qubits using a key of size \( O(\log(n/\epsilon) \cdot \log n) \) bits. \( E' \) is computable by a classical algorithm with expected runtime \( O(n^2 \text{ polylog } n) \) and a quantum circuit of size \( O(n \text{ polylog}(n/\epsilon)) \).

Proof For the first result, we observe that the construction of Theorem 3.3 encodes the message in the computational basis. Recall that the unitaries \( U \) are of the form \( U_k = P_k V_k \) where \( P_k \) is a permutation of the computational basis. Hence, it is possible to classically compute the element of the computational basis \( P_k^i |x⟩|b⟩ \). One can then prepare the state \( P_k^i |x⟩|b⟩ \) and apply the unitary \( V_k^i \) to obtain the ciphertext. The decoding is performed in a similar way. One first applies the unitary \( V_k^i \) to the quantum system \( x \), then measures in the computational basis and then applies the permutation \( P_k \) to the n-bit string corresponding to the outcome.

For the second construction, we apply Theorem 2.17 with \( n' = n + c' \lceil \log \log n + \log(1/\epsilon) \rceil \) for some large enough constant \( c' \). We can then use a one-time pad encryption on the input to the B system. This increases the size of the key by only \( c' \lceil \log \log n + \log(1/\epsilon) \rceil \) bits. □

As mentioned earlier (see equation 21), explicit states that exhibit locking behaviour have been presented in [DHL+04]. However, this is the first explicit construction of states \( ω \) that achieves the following strong locking behaviour: for any \( \delta > 0 \), for \( n \) large enough, the state \( ω^{XCK} \) verifies \( I(x;C)_ω \leq δ \) and \( I(x;CK)_ω = n + \log d_K \) where \( K \) is a classical \( O(\log(n/δ)) \)-bit system. This is a direct consequence of Corollary 3.3 taking \( ϵ = δ/(20n) \), and Proposition 3.2. We should also mention that the authors of [KRB07] explicitly construct a state exhibiting some weak locking behaviour.

### 3.3 Quantum hiding fingerprints

In this section, we show that the locking scheme of Corollary 3.4 can be used to build mixed state quantum hiding fingerprints as defined by Gavinsky and Ito [GI04]. A quantum fingerprint [BCWdW01] encodes an n-bit string into a quantum state \( ρ_x \) of \( n' \ll n \) qubits such that given \( y \in \{0,1\}^n \) and the fingerprint \( ρ_y \), it is possible to decide with small error probability whether \( x = y \). The additional hiding property ensures that measuring \( ρ_x \) leaks very little information about \( x \). Gavinsky and Ito [GI04] used the accessible information\(^3\) as a measure of the hiding property. Here, we strengthen this definition by imposing a bound on the total variation distance instead (see Proposition 2.7).

**Definition 3.6 (Quantum hiding fingerprint).** Let \( n \) be a positive integer, \( δ, ϵ \in (0,1) \) and \( C \) be a Hilbert space. An encoding \( f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow S(C) \) together with a set with a set of measurements \( \{M^y, I - M^y\} \) for each \( y \in \{0,1\}^n \) is a \((δ, ϵ)\)-hiding fingerprint if

1. **(Fingerprint property)** For all \( x \in \{0,1\}^n \), \( \text{tr}[M^x f(x)] = 1 \) and for \( y \neq x \), \( \text{tr}[M^y f(x)] \leq δ \).
2. **(Hiding property)** Let \( X \) be uniformly distributed. Then, for any POVM \( \{N_i\} \) on the system \( X \) whose outcome on \( f(X) \) is denoted \( I \), we have for all possible outcomes \( i \),

\[ \Delta(p_{X|i}, p_X) \leq ϵ. \]

We usually want the Hilbert space \( C \) to be composed of \( O(\log n) \) qubits. Gavinsky and Ito [GI04] proved that for any constant \( c \), there exists efficient quantum hiding fingerprinting schemes for which the dimension of the quantum system \( C \) is \( O(\log n) \) and both the error probability \( δ \) and the accessible information are bounded by \( 1/n^c \). Here, we prove that the same result can be obtained by locking a classical fingerprint. The general structure of our quantum hiding fingerprint for parameters \( n, δ \) and \( ϵ \) is as follows:

1. Choose a random prime \( p \in \mathcal{P}_{n,δ,ϵ} \) uniformly from the set \( \mathcal{P}_{n,δ,ϵ} \).

\(^3\)The accessible information about \( X \) in a quantum system \( C \) refers to the maximum over all measurements of the system \( C \) of \( I(X;I) \) where \( I \) is the outcome of that measurement.
2. Set \( t = \left\lceil c \log(1/\varepsilon) e^{-2} \right\rceil \), \( d_A = p \) and \( d_B = \left\lceil c'/\varepsilon^2 \right\rceil \) and generate \( t \) random unitaries \( U_0^p, \ldots, U_{t-1}^p \) acting on \( A \otimes B \).

3. The fingerprint consists of the random prime \( p \) and the state \( (U_k^p)^\dagger |x \mod p \rangle^A |b\rangle^B \) where \( k \in [t] \) and \( b \in [d_B] \) are chosen uniformly and independently. The density operator representing this state is denoted \( f(x) \equiv \frac{1}{|A^t|} \sum_{k,b} \langle x | U_k^p \rangle^A |x \mod p \rangle^A |b\rangle^B U_k. \)

Observe that even though this protocol is randomized because the unitaries are chosen at random, it is possible to implement it with polynomial resources in \( n \) as the size of the message to be locked is \( O(\log n) \) bits. In fact, one can approximately sample a random unitary in dimension \( 2^\Omega(\log n) \) using a polynomial number of public random bits. The mixed state protocol of [GI10] achieves roughly the same parameters. Their construction is also randomized but it uses random codes instead of random unitaries. For this reason, the protocol of [GI10] would probably be more efficient in practice.

**Theorem 3.7.** There exists constants \( c, c' \) and \( c'' \), such that for all positive integer \( n, \delta, \epsilon \in (0, 1/4) \) if we define \( P_{n,\delta,\epsilon} \) to be the set of primes in the interval \([l, u]\) where

\[
l = \left( \frac{c'' \cdot \log^2(1/\epsilon)}{\delta^8} \right)^{1/0.9} + 10n \quad \text{and} \quad u = l + (n/2\delta)^2
\]

and provided \( u \leq 2^n - 2 \), the scheme described above is a \((\delta, \epsilon)\)-hiding fingerprint with probability \( 1 - 2^{-\Omega(n)} \) over the choice of random unitaries.

The proof of this result involves two parts. First, we need to show that the fingerprint of a uniformly distributed \( X \in \{0, 1\}^n \) does not give away much information about \( X \). This follows easily from Theorem 2.5 and Theorem 3.3. We also need to show that for every \( y \in \{0, 1\}^n \), there is a measurement that Bob can apply to the fingerprint to determine with high confidence whether it corresponds to a fingerprint of \( y \) or not. In order to prove this, we use the following proposition on the Gram-Schmidt orthonormalisation of a set of almost orthogonal vectors.

**Proposition 3.8.** Let \( v_1', \ldots, v_r' \) be a sequence of unit length vectors in a Hilbert space. Let \( 0 < \delta < 1/m \). For any \( i \neq j \), suppose \(|\langle v_i'|v_j' \rangle| \leq \delta \). Let \( v_1, \ldots, v_r \) be the corresponding sequence of vectors got by Gram-Schmidt orthonormalising \( v_1', \ldots, v_r' \). Then for any \( i \), \(|v_i - v_i'|_2 \leq \delta \sqrt{2(i-1)}\).

**Proof:** Since \(|\langle v_i'|v_j' \rangle| < \delta < 1/r \) for any \( i \neq j \), the vectors \( v_1', \ldots, v_r' \) are linearly independent. Define \( \Pi_0 \) to be the zero linear operator. For \( i \geq 1 \), define \( \Pi_i \) to be the orthogonal projection onto the subspace spanned by the vectors \( v_1', \ldots, v_i' \). Observe that for any \( i \), \( v_1', \ldots, v_i' \) and \( v_1, \ldots, v_i \) span the same space, and \( v_{i+1} = \frac{v_{i+1} - \Pi_i(v_{i+1})}{\|v_{i+1} - \Pi_i(v_{i+1})\|_2} \). We shall prove by induction on \( i \) that \( \|\Pi_i(v_k')\|_2 \leq 4\delta \sqrt{i} \) for all \( i \) and all \( k > i \). This will prove the desired statement since

\[
\|v_i - v_i'|_2 \leq \|\Pi_{i-1}(v_i')\|_2 + (1 - \|v_i' - \Pi_{i-1}(v_i')\|_2)^2 \\
= \|\Pi_{i-1}(v_i')\|_2 + \left(1 - \sqrt{1 - \|\Pi_{i-1}(v_i')\|_2^2}\right)^2 \\
\leq 2 - 2\sqrt{1 - \|\Pi_{i-1}(v_i')\|_2^2} \leq 2 - 2\sqrt{1 - 16\delta^2(i-1)} \\
\leq 32\delta^2(i-1).
\]

The base case of \( i = 1 \) is trivial. Assume that the induction hypothesis holds for a particular \( i \). Let \( 1 \leq j \leq i + 1 \) and \( k > i + 1 \). Observe that \( v_j' = \Pi_{j-1}(v_j') + \sqrt{1 - \|\Pi_{j-1}(v_j')\|_2^2} v_j \). We have

\[
|\langle v_k'|v_j' \rangle| = \left|\langle v_k'|\Pi_{j-1}(v_j') \rangle + \sqrt{1 - \|\Pi_{j-1}(v_j')\|_2^2} \langle v_k'|v_j \rangle\right| \\
= \left|\langle \Pi_{j-1}(v_k')\Pi_{j-1}(v_j') \rangle + \sqrt{1 - \|\Pi_{j-1}(v_j')\|_2^2} \langle v_k'|v_j \rangle\right| \\
\geq \sqrt{1 - \|\Pi_{j-1}(v_j')\|_2^2} |\langle v_k'|v_j \rangle| - \|\Pi_{j-1}(v_k')\|_2 \|\Pi_{j-1}(v_j')\|_2.
\]
which implies that
\[
|\langle v'_k | v_j \rangle| \leq \frac{|\langle v'_k | v'_j \rangle| + \|\Pi_{j-1}(v'_k)\|_2 \|\Pi_{j-1}(v'_j)\|_2}{\sqrt{1 - \|\Pi_{j-1}(v'_j)\|_2^2}} \\
\leq \frac{\delta + 16\delta^2(j-1)}{\sqrt{1 - 16\delta^2(j-1)}} \leq \frac{\delta + \delta}{\sqrt{1 - \delta}} \\
\leq 4\delta.
\]
Thus, \( \|\Pi_{i+1}(v'_k)\|_2^2 = \sum_{j=1}^{i+1} |\langle v'_k | v_j \rangle|^2 \leq 16\delta^2(i+1) \), which gives \( \|\Pi_{i+1}(v'_k)\|_2 \leq 4\delta \sqrt{i+1} \) completing the induction. 

Using this result we can prove the following lemma.

**Lemma 3.9.** Let \( \{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\} \) be a set of unitary transformations on \( AB \) that define \( \gamma \)-MUBs and \( d^{-\gamma/2} \leq 1/(16td_B) \) where \( d \overset{\text{def}}{=} d_AD_B \). Define for \( y \in [d_A] \) the subspace \( F_y \) to span \( \{U_k^\dagger | y \rangle | b \rangle, k \in [t], b \in [d_B] \} \). Then for any \( x \in [d_A], y \neq x, \)

\[
X(i) \leq (I) \text{ leakage about } I
\]
where \( X \) denotes the outcome of a measurement on the state \( X \). For this, we note that the random variables \( X, Z, I \) form a Markov chain. Thus, \( X(i) \leq (I) \) leakage about \( I \).

**Proof** Consider the set of vectors \( \{U_k^\dagger | y \rangle | b \rangle \}_{k \in [t], b \in [d_B]} \). We have for all \( (k, b) \neq (k', b') \),

\[
|\langle y | (b' | U_k U_k^\dagger | y \rangle | b \rangle) | \leq d^{-\gamma/2}.
\]

Picking any fixed ordering on \([t] \times [d_B]\), define \( \{|e_{k,b}(y)\rangle\}_{k,b} \) to be the set of vectors obtained by Gram-Schmidt orthonormalising \( \{U_k^\dagger | y \rangle | b \rangle \}_{k \in [t], b \in [d_B]} \). Using Proposition 3.8, we have \( \|\langle e_{k,b}(y)\rangle - U_k^\dagger | y \rangle | b \rangle \|_2 \leq d^{-\gamma/2} \sqrt{32td_B} \). Thus,

\[
\text{tr} \left[ \Pi_{F_y} U_k^\dagger | x \rangle | b_0 \rangle \right] = \sum_{b,k} |\langle e_{k,b}(y) | U_k^\dagger | x \rangle | b_0 \rangle |^2 \\
\leq \sum_{b,k} \left| \langle y | (b' | U_k U_k^\dagger | x \rangle | b_0 \rangle \rangle\right| + \|\langle e_{k,b}(y)\rangle - U_k^\dagger | y \rangle | b \rangle \|_2^2 \\
\leq td_B \cdot d^{-\gamma} \left( \sqrt{32td_B} + 1 \right)^2 \\
\leq 2\sqrt{32} (td_B)^2 d^{-\gamma}.
\]

**Proof of Theorem 3.7** We start by proving the hiding property. For any fixed \( p \), the random variable \( Z \overset{\text{def}}{=} X \mod p \) is almost uniformly distributed on \([p]\). In fact, we have for any \( z \in [p], P\{Z = z\} \leq \frac{2^\gamma/p + 1}{2^\gamma} \). In other words, \( H_{\text{min}}(Z) \geq \log p - \log(1 + p2^{-\gamma}) \). Thus, using Theorem 2.5 and Theorem 3.3, we have that except with probability exponentially small in \( n \) (on the choice of the random unitary), the fingerprinting scheme satisfies for any measurement outcome \( i \)

\[
\Delta(p_Z|i=i), p_Z) \leq \frac{2e}{1+p2^{-\gamma}} - \epsilon \leq 4\epsilon
\]

where \( I \) denotes the outcome of a measurement on the state \( f(X) \). Recall that we are interested in the information leakage about \( X \) not \( Z \). For this, we note that the random variables \( X, Z, I \) form a Markov chain. Thus,

\[
\Delta(p_X|i=i), p_X) = \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} \sum_{z \in [p]} P\{Z = z | I = i\} P\{X = x | I = i, Z = z\} - P\{Z = z\} P\{X = x | Z = z\} \\
= \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} \sum_{z \in [p]} P\{Z = z | I = i\} P\{X = x | Z = z\} - P\{Z = z\} P\{X = x | Z = z\} \\
\leq \sum_{z \in [p]} P\{Z = z | I = i\} - P\{Z = z\} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} P\{X = x | Z = z\} \\
= \Delta(p_Z|i=i), p_Z) \leq 4\epsilon.
\]
This proves the hiding property.

We then analyse the fingerprint property. Let \( x, y \in [2^n] \) and \( p \) be the random prime of the fingerprint. We define the measurements by \( M^y = \Pi_{F_y} \) for all \( y \in \{0, 1\}^n \) where \( \Pi_{F_y} \) is the projector onto the subspace \( F_y = \text{span}\{U_k^l | y \mod p\} | b \}, k \in \{t\}, b \in [d_B]\}. \) If \( x = y \), then \( f(x) \) is a mixture of states in \( \text{span}\{U_k^l | y \mod p\} | b \}, k \in \{t\}, b \in [d_B]\}. \) Thus \( \text{tr}[M^y f(x)] = 1 \).

We now suppose that \( x \neq y \). First, we have \( P \{ x \mod p = y \mod p \} = P \{ x - y \mod p = 0 \} \leq \delta/2 \) as the number of distinct prime divisors of \( x - y \) is at most \( n \) and the number of primes in \([l, u]\) is at least \( n/(2\delta) \) for \( n \) large enough. Then, whenever \( x \mod p \neq y \mod p \), Lemma 3.9 gives

\[
\text{tr} \left[ \Pi_{F_y} f(x) \right] \leq 2\sqrt{32} \cdot (\delta \sqrt{2d_B})^{0.9} \\
\leq 2\sqrt{32} \cdot 4\epsilon^2 \sqrt{\log(1/\epsilon)} \\
\leq \frac{\delta \epsilon}{2}
\]

for \( \epsilon \) large enough with probability \( 1 - 2^{-\Omega(d_A d_B)} = 1 - 2^{-\Omega(n)} \) over the choice of the random unitaries (using Theorem 2.5). Finally, we get \( \text{tr} \left[ \Pi_{F_y} f(x) \right] \leq \delta \) with probability \( 1 - 2^{-\Omega(n)} \).

\[ \square \]

### 3.4 String commitment

In this section, we show how to use a locking scheme to obtain a weak form of bit commitment \[ [BCH+06]. \] Bit commitment is an important two-party cryptographic primitive defined as follows. Consider two mutually distrustful parties Alice and Bob who are only allowed to communicate over some channel. The objective is to be able to achieve the following: Alice secretly chooses a bit \( x \) and communicates with Bob to convince him that she fixed her choice, without revealing the actual bit \( x \). This is the commit stage. At the reveal stage, Alice reveals the secret \( x \) and enables Bob to open the commitment. Bob can then check whether Alice was honest.

Using classical or quantum communication, unconditionally secure bit commitment is known to be impossible \[ [May97, LC97]. \] However, commitment protocols with weaker security guarantees do exist \[ [SR01, DFSS05, BCH+06, BCH+08]. \] Here, we address an open question of \[ [BCH+08] \] by constructing an efficient protocol for string commitment with nontrivial security parameters using the locking scheme described in the previous section.

In a string commitment protocol, Alice commits to an \( n \)-bit string. Alice’s ability to cheat is quantified by the number of strings she can reveal successfully. The ability of Bob to cheat is quantified by the information he can obtain about the string to be committed. One can formalize these notions in many ways. Here we introduce a definition for which a protocol with nontrivial parameters can be achieved. Our definition is similar to the one of \[ [BCH+08] \] except that we use the trace distance instead of the accessible information. Our definition is slightly stronger by virtue of Proposition 3.2. For a detailed study of string commitment in a more general setting, see \[ [BCH+08]. \]

**Definition 3.10.** An \( (n, \alpha, \beta) \)-quantum bit string commitment is a quantum communication protocol between Alice (the committer) and Bob (the receiver) which has two phases. When both players are honest the protocol takes the following form.

- **(Commit phase)** Alice chooses a string \( X \in \{0, 1\}^n \) uniformly. Alice and Bob communicate, after which Bob holds a state \( \rho_X \).
- **(Reveal phase)** Alice and Bob communicate and Bob learns \( X \).

The parameters \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are security parameters.

- If Alice is honest, then for any measurement performed by Bob on her state \( \rho_X \), we have \( \Delta(\rho_X, p_X|_{I=I}) \leq \frac{\beta}{n} \) where \( I \) is the outcome of the measurement.
- If Bob is honest, then for all commitments of Alice: \( \sum_{x \in \{0, 1\}^n} p_x \leq 2^\alpha \), where \( p_x \) is the probability that Alice successfully reveals \( x \).

Following the strategy of \[ [BCH+06] \], the following protocol for string commitment can be defined using a locking scheme \( \mathcal{E} \).
Proposition 3.2. In fact, we have

Here, using Theorem 2.16, we obtain explicit examples of strong locking behaviour. Using [HHHO05], strong but non-explicit instances of locking the entanglement of formation were derived in [HLW06]. Explicit states exhibiting weak locking behaviour of the entanglement of formation have been presented in [K].

If \(|\rho\rangle\) is not efficient in terms of computation and is efficient in terms of communication only if the cost of communicating a (random) unitary in dimension \(2^n\) is disregarded. Using the efficient locking scheme of Corollary 3.5, we get

\[
\text{Corollary 3.11. Let } n \text{ be a positive integer and } \beta \in (n2^{-cn}, n) \text{ (c is a constant independent of } n). \text{ There exists an efficient } (n, c\log(n^2/\beta), \beta)-\text{quantum bit string commitment protocol for some constant } c \text{ independent of } n \text{ and } \beta.
\]

**Proof.** We use the first construction of Corollary 3.5 with \(\epsilon = \beta/n\). If Bob is honest, the security analysis is exactly the same as [BCH+08]. If Alice is honest, the security follows directly from the definition of the locking scheme.

\[
\square
\]

3.5 Locking entanglement of formation

The entanglement of formation is a measure of the entanglement in a bipartite quantum state that attempts to quantify the number of singlets required to produce the state in question using only local operations and classical communication [BDSW96]. For a bipartite state \(|\rho_{XY}\rangle\), the entanglement of formation is defined as

\[
E_f(X; Y) = \min_{\{p_i, |\psi_i\rangle\}} \sum_i p_i S(X)_{\psi_i}.
\]

where the minimization is taken over all possible ways to write \(|\rho_{XY}\rangle = \sum_i p_i |\psi_i\rangle\langle \psi_i|\) with \(\sum_i p_i = 1\). Entanglement of formation is related to the following quantity:

\[
I^+(X; Y') = \max_{\{M_i\}} I(X; I)
\]

where the maximization is taken over all measurements \(\{M_i\}\) performed on the system \(Y'\) and \(I\) is the outcome of this measurement. Koashi and Winter [KW04] showed that for a pure state \(|\psi_{XY}\rangle\), a simple identity holds:

\[
E_f(X; Y) + I^+(X; Y') = S(X).
\]

Let \(\{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\}\) be a set of unitary transformations of \(A \otimes B \cong C\) and define

\[
|\rho\rangle^{ABC\bar{A}K} = \frac{1}{d_Ad_B} \sum_{k \in [t], a \in [d_A], b \in [d_B]} |a\rangle^A |b\rangle^B \left(U_k^\dagger |a\rangle \otimes |b\rangle\right)^C |a\rangle^A' |k\rangle^K.
\]

If \(\{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\}\) satisfies an \(\epsilon\)-metric uncertainty relation, then we get a locking effect using Theorem 3.3 and Proposition 3.2. In fact, we have \(I^+(A; C)_\rho \leq 2\log d_A + \eta(\epsilon)\) and \(I^-(A; CK) = \log d_A\). Thus, using (28), we get

\[
E_f(A; A'BK)_\rho = S(A)_\rho - I^+(A; C)_\rho \geq (1 - 2\epsilon) \log d_A - \eta(\epsilon)
\]

and discarding the system \(K\) of dimension \(t\) we obtain a separable state

\[
E_f(A; A'B)_\rho = 0.
\]

Explicit states exhibiting weak locking behaviour of the entanglement of formation have been presented in [HHHO05]. Strong but non-explicit instances of locking the entanglement of formation were derived in [HLW06]. Here, using Theorem 2.16, we obtain explicit examples of strong locking behaviour.
4 Quantum identification codes

The most common task studied in information theory is that of transmitting information from a sender to a receiver over a noisy channel. Shannon’s theorem [Sha48] quantifies the amount of information that can be transmitted reliably per use of the channel as the number \( n \) of uses grows. Naturally, for nontrivial channels, the number of messages one can send reliably grows exponentially in \( n \) (in other words, the number of bits in the message grows linearly in \( n \)). Now suppose that we are aiming for a weaker task in which the sender (Alice) holds a message \( x \in \{0,1\}^n \) and the receiver a message \( y \in \{0,1\}^n \). The receiver does not want to determine \( x \) completely but merely wants to decide whether \( x = y \) or not. This task is usually called identification [AD89]. It turns out that for nontrivial channels, using randomization at the encoder, it is possible to identify \( 2^{2^m} \) messages for some \( R > 0 \) by using the channel \( n \) times [AD89]. If the channel is noiseless, this result is well-known in communication complexity: the randomized (private-coin) communication complexity of the equality function is logarithmic in \( n \) [KN97].

A natural quantum analogue to this problem would be for Alice to get a quantum state \( |\psi\rangle \in C \) and Bob a state \( |\varphi\rangle \in C \). The objective is then for Bob to be able to simulate the measurement \((|\varphi\rangle\langle\varphi|, 1-|\varphi\rangle\langle\varphi|)\) on the state \( |\psi\rangle \) [Win04]. There are many possible variations to this problem. In the model we study here, Alice receives the quantum state \( |\psi\rangle \) and Bob gets a classical description of \( |\varphi\rangle \).

Definition 4.1 (Quantum identification [Win04]). Let \( H_1, H_2, C \) be Hilbert spaces and \( \epsilon \in (0,1) \). An \( \epsilon \)-quantum-ID code for the channel \( N : S(H_1) \rightarrow S(H_2) \) consists of an encoding map \( E : S(C) \rightarrow S(H_1) \) and a set of POVMs \( \{D_{\varphi}, 1 - D_{\varphi}\} \) acting on \( S(H_2) \), one for each pure state \( |\varphi\rangle \) such that

\[
\forall |\psi\rangle, |\varphi\rangle \in C, \quad \left| \text{tr} \left[ D_{\varphi} N(E(\psi)) \right] - \langle \langle \psi | \varphi \rangle \right| \leq \epsilon.
\]

A rate \( R \) is said to be achievable for quantum identification over \( N \) if for all \( \epsilon > 0 \) and \( n \) large enough, there exists an \( \epsilon \)-quantum-ID code for \( N^\otimes n \) with encoding domain \( C \) of dimension at least \( 2^n R \). The quantum identification capacity \( Q_{\text{ID}}(N) \) is defined as the supremum of achievable rates for \( N \).

Winter [Win04] showed that the quantum identification capacity of the noiseless qubit channel \( \text{id}_2 \) is 2. Note that unlike the classical identification problem, the number of qubits one can identify using a noiseless qubits channel grows only linearly in the number of uses of the channel.

Hayden and Winter [HW10] showed that classical communication cannot be used for quantum identification. In other words, \( Q_{\text{ID}}(\text{id}_2) = 0 \) where \( \text{id}_2 \) is the noiseless (classical) bit channel. However, having access to a noiseless qubit channel makes classical communication useful. More precisely, the amortized quantum-ID capacity of the noiseless bit channel is 1, where the amortized capacity is defined as follows.

Definition 4.2 (Amortized quantum-ID capacity [HW10]). A rate \( R \) is said to be achievable for amortized quantum identification over \( N \) if for all \( \epsilon > 0 \) and \( n \) large enough, there exists an \( \epsilon \)-quantum identification code for \( \text{id}_2^\otimes m \otimes N^\otimes n \) with encoding domain \( C \) such that \( R \leq \frac{1}{n} \log \dim C - 2m \). The amortized quantum identification capacity \( Q_{\text{ID}}^a(N) \) is defined as the supremum of achievable rates for \( N \).

Remark. In the expression of the rate, we subtract \( 2m \) from \( \log \dim C \) because the quantum identification capacity of a noiseless qubit channel is two and we are interested in quantifying the contribution of \( N \).

Here, we give an explicit family of quantum identification codes for the noiseless bit channel that achieve the capacity \( Q_{\text{ID}}^a(\text{id}_2) = 1 \). Moreover, the encoder \( E \) can be computed by a quantum circuit of polynomial size and almost linear depth using polynomial time classical preprocessing (that depends only on \( n \) and not on the state \( |\psi\rangle \in C^2 \)). Our proof also gives a better bound on the number of uses \( m \) of the noiseless quantum channel: \( m \) can be taken to be \( O(\log^2 n) \). To do this, we use the metric uncertainty relation \( \{U_0, U_1, \ldots, U_{t-1}\} \) of Theorem 2.17. The construction is illustrated by Figure 3. Our proof uses the duality between quantum identification and approximate forgetfulness [HW10]. More specifically, we use Theorem 7 of [HW10]. We state the part of the theorem needed here:

Theorem 4.3 (Identification and forgetfulness, Theorem 7 in [HW10]). Let \( \epsilon > 0 \) and \( V^{C \rightarrow ABKE} \) be an isometry satisfying

\[
\forall |\psi\rangle \in C, \quad \Delta \left( \text{tr}_{ABKE} \left( V |\psi\rangle \langle\psi| V^\dagger \right), \frac{1}{\dim E} \right) \leq \epsilon.
\]

Then, there exists a family of POVMs \( \{D_{\varphi}, 1 - D_{\varphi}\} \) for \( |\varphi\rangle \in C \) such that together with the encoding map \( E(\cdot) = \text{tr}_E (V \cdot V^\dagger) \), they define an \( \eta \)-quantum-ID code for the noiseless quantum channel with \( \eta = 6 \epsilon^{1/4} \).
The system $K$ is prepared in a uniform superposition state $\frac{1}{\sqrt{t}} \sum_k |k\rangle$. Then, controlled by system $K$, the unitary $U_k$ is applied to $C = A \otimes B$. The $A$ system is then measured in the computational basis. The outcome of this measurement is sent through the classical channel. The systems $B$ and $K$ are sent using the noiseless quantum channel. The receiver constructs a POVM $D_\varphi$ based on a classical description of his state $|\varphi\rangle$ and the classical communication he receives.

**Theorem 4.4 (Quantum identification using a classical channel).** Let $n$ be a positive integer and $\epsilon \in (2^{-\epsilon' n}, 1)$ (where $\epsilon'$ is a constant independent of $n$). Then for some $m = O(\log(n/\epsilon) \cdot \log(n))$, there exists an $\epsilon$-quantum-ID code for the channel $\id_2^{\otimes m} \otimes \id_2^{\otimes n}$ encoding a system of at least $n$ qubits. Moreover, the encoding map $E$ can be implemented by a quantum circuit of size $O(n^2 \log(n/\epsilon))$. With polynomial-time classical precomputations, the depth of the quantum circuit can be made $O(n \log(n/\epsilon))$.

**Remark.** Note that $\log d_A \leq n$ uses of the classical channel $\id_2$ would be sufficient. We do not include it to simplify the statement of the theorem. It is also worth observing that using the existential result of Theorem 2.17, we can make the number of uses $m$ of the quantum channel depend only on the error $\epsilon$, namely $m = O(\log(1/\epsilon))$. □

**Proof.** Let $\{U_0, \ldots, U_{t-1}\}$ be a set of unitaries on $n$ qubits given by Theorem 2.17 verifying an $\epsilon'$-metric uncertainty relation with $\epsilon' = (\epsilon/6)^4$. We start by preparing the uniform superposition $\frac{1}{\sqrt{t}} \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} |k\rangle^K$ and apply the unitary $U_k$ on system $C$ controlled by the register $K$. We get the state $\frac{1}{\sqrt{t}} \sum_k |k\rangle^K (U_k|\psi\rangle)^{AB}$. The next step is to measure the system $A$ in the computational basis. To apply Theorem 4.3, we purify this operation by introducing a new ancilla system $E$ initialized to $|0\rangle$ having the same dimension as $A$. We replace the measurement on $A$ by a coherent copy (controlled-NOT) of the computational basis of $A$ into the ancilla $E$. We obtain the state

$$|\rho\rangle^{KABE} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{t}} \sum_{k,a,b} |k\rangle^K \langle a|A (|b\rangle^B U_k|\psi\rangle) |a\rangle^A |b\rangle^B |a\rangle^E.$$  

We now verify that the reduced state on $E$ is close to maximally mixed for all states $|\psi\rangle$.

$$\rho^E = \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k,a,b} \langle a|A (|b\rangle^B U_k|\psi\rangle) \langle a|A |E = \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k,a} \rho_{U_k|\psi}\langle a|a\rangle^E. \tag{29}$$

As a result,

$$\Delta\left(\rho^E, \frac{\id}{\dim E}\right) = \Delta\left(\frac{1}{t} \sum_k \rho_{U_k|\psi}, \text{unif}[d_A]\right)$$

$$\leq \frac{1}{t} \sum_k \Delta\left(\rho_{U_k|\psi}, \text{unif}[d_A]\right)$$

$$\leq \epsilon'.$$

Using Theorem 4.3, the encoder described in Figure 3 and some set of POVM’s $(D_\varphi, \id - D_\varphi)$ form an $\eta$-quantum-ID code for the noiseless qubit channel with $\eta = 6\epsilon'^{1/4} = \epsilon$. We conclude by observing that sending the outcome of the measurement can be done using a classical channel. The number of uses of the noiseless bit channel is $\log \dim A \leq n$. The number of uses of the noiseless qubits channel is $m = \log \dim B + \log \dim K \leq c \log(n/\epsilon) \cdot \log(n)$ for some constant $c$. 

Figure 3: The system $K$ is prepared in a uniform superposition state $\frac{1}{\sqrt{t}} \sum_k |k\rangle$. Then, controlled by system $K$, the unitary $U_k$ is applied to $C = A \otimes B$. The $A$ system is then measured in the computational basis. The outcome of this measurement is sent through the classical channel. The systems $B$ and $K$ are sent using the noiseless quantum channel. The receiver constructs a POVM $D_\varphi$ based on a classical description of his state $|\varphi\rangle$ and the classical communication he receives.
We now argue that the encoding can be computed by a quantum circuit of size $O(n^2 \text{polylog}(n/\epsilon))$ and depth $O(n \text{polylog}(n/\epsilon))$ using classical precomputation. To obtain this running time, we actually use the 1-MUBs of Lemma 2.11 in the construction of Theorem 2.17. The only thing we need to precompute is an irreducible polynomial of degree $n$ over $\mathbb{F}_2[X]$. Then, using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 2.11 we can compute the unitary operation that takes as input the state $|j\rangle \otimes |\psi\rangle$ and outputs the state $|j\rangle \otimes V_j|\psi\rangle$ using a circuit of size $O(n^2 \text{polylog}(n))$ and depth $O(n \text{polylog}(n))$. Since the permutation extractor we use can be implemented by a quantum circuit of size $O(n \text{polylog}(n/\epsilon))$, the unitary transformation $|k\rangle \otimes |\psi\rangle \rightarrow |k\rangle \otimes U_k|\psi\rangle$ can be computed by a quantum circuit of size $O(n^2 \text{polylog}(n/\epsilon))$ and depth $O(n \text{polylog}(n/\epsilon))$. \hfill $\Box$

This result can be interpreted in terms of the communication complexity of a quantum measurement simulation problem. Alice is given $n$-qubit states $|\psi\rangle \in C$ and Bob is given a classical description of $|\varphi\rangle \in C$. Namely, Bob wants to output 1 with probability in the interval $[|\langle \psi | \varphi \rangle|^2 - \epsilon, |\langle \psi | \varphi \rangle|^2 + \epsilon]$ and 0 with probability in the interval $[1 - |\langle \psi | \varphi \rangle|^2 - \epsilon, 1 - |\langle \psi | \varphi \rangle|^2 + \epsilon]$. The previous theorem shows that this task can be accomplished using $O(\log^2 n)$ qubits of communication and $n$ bits of classical communication. Using the non-explicit result of Theorem 2.5, we can show that $O(\log(1/\epsilon))$ qubits and $n$ bits of communication are enough.

This result can be thought of as an analogue of the well-known fact that the public-coin randomized communication complexity of equality is $O(\log(1/\epsilon))$ for an error probability $\epsilon$. Quantum communication replaces classical communication and classical communication replaces public random bits. Classical communication can be thought of as an extra resource because on its own it is useless for quantum identification [HW10, Theorem 11].

5 Conclusion

We have seen how the problem of finding uncertainty relations is closely related to the problem of finding large almost Euclidean subspaces of $\ell_1(\mathbb{F}_2)$. Even though we did not use any norm embedding result directly, many of the ideas presented here come from the proofs and constructions in the study of the geometry of normed spaces. In particular, we obtained an explicit family of bases that satisfy a strong metric uncertainty relation by adapting a construction of Indyk [Ind07]. Moreover, using standard techniques from asymptotic geometric analysis, we were able to prove a strong result on the uncertainty relations defined by random unitaries [HLSW04].

We used these uncertainty relations to exhibit strong locking effects. In particular, we obtained the first explicit construction of a method for encrypting a random $n$-bit string in an $n$-qubit state using a classical key of size polylogarithmic in $n$. Moreover, our non-explicit results give better key sizes than previous constructions while simultaneously meeting a stronger locking definition. In particular, we showed that an arbitrarily long message can be encrypted with a constant-sized key. Our results on locking are summarized in Table 1. We should emphasize that, even though we presented information locking from a cryptographic point of view, it is not a composable primitive because an eavesdropper could choose to store quantum information about the message instead of measuring. For this reason, a locking scheme has to be used with great care when composed with other cryptographic primitives.

As a cryptographic task, one could compare a locking scheme to an entropically secure encryption scheme [RW02, DS05]. These two schemes achieve the same task of encrypting a high entropy message using a small key. The security definition of a locking scheme is strictly stronger. In fact, for a classical eavesdropper (i.e., an eavesdropper that can only measure) an $\epsilon$-locking scheme is secure in a strong sense. This additional security guarantee comes at the cost of upgrading classical communication to quantum communication. With respect to quantum entropically secure encryption [Des09, DD10], the security condition of a locking scheme is also more stringent. However, a quantum entropically secure scheme allows the encryption of quantum states.

Nonetheless, we note that an $\epsilon$-locking scheme also hides the message from an adversary that keeps a small quantum memory. In fact using the same technique as [HMR +10, Corollary 2] based on [RRS09], if the adversary is allowed to store $m$ qubits, then the joint state of the message and the ciphertext is $(\epsilon 2^{m/2})$-close to a product state for some constant $c$. For example, if $m = O(\log n)$, then a key of logarithmic size can still be used.

A locking scheme can also be seen as a (weak) quantum key distribution protocol. In quantum key distribution, a stronger security definition should be required and it is satisfied by the BB84 protocol [BB84, SP00]. The main advantage in a locking scheme is that there is only one round of one-way quantum communication; there is no additional interaction between the two parties. With this restriction, it is actually impossible to obtain strong security conditions for a protocol that starts with a small key.

We also used uncertainty relations to construct quantum identification codes. We proved that it is possible to
identify a quantum state of \( n \) qubits by communicating \( n \) classical bits and \( O(\log(1/\epsilon)) \) quantum bits. We also presented an efficient encoder for this problem that uses \( O(\log^2(n/\epsilon)) \) qubits of communication instead. The main weakness of this result is that the decoder uses a classical description of the state \( |\varphi\rangle \) that is in general exponential in the number of qubits of \( |\varphi\rangle \). But as shown in [Win04], if Bob was to receive a copy of the quantum state \( |\varphi\rangle \), the task of quantum identification becomes the same as the task of transmission. It would be interesting to define a notion of quantum identification that can be achieved using less communication than transmission and that would allow for efficient encoding and decoding operations.

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**Appendices**

**A  Existence of metric uncertainty relations**

In this section, we prove the lemmas used in Theorem 2.5.

**Lemma 2.6** (Average value of \( \ell_1^d(\ell_2^B) \) on the sphere). Let \( |\varphi\rangle^{AB} \) be a random pure state on \( AB \). Then,

\[
\sqrt{d_A} E \left\{ F \left( \frac{p_{|\varphi\rangle}^A, \text{unif}([d_A])}{p_{|\varphi\rangle}^B} \right) \right\} = E \left\{ \| |\varphi\rangle^{AB} \|_{\ell_1^d(\ell_2^B)} \right\} = \frac{\Gamma\left(\frac{d_A+1}{2}\right)}{\Gamma(\frac{d_B}{2})} \frac{\Gamma\left(\frac{d_A d_B}{2}\right)}{\Gamma\left(\frac{d_A d_B+1}{2}\right)} \geq \sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{d_B}} \sqrt{d_A}.
\]

**Proof**  The presentation uses methods described in [Bal97].

Observe that the random variable \( \| |\varphi\rangle^{AB} \|_{\ell_1^d(\ell_2^B)} \) is distributed as the \( \ell_1^d(\ell_{2d}) \) norm of a Haar-distributed real random vector on \( S^{2d} \). We define for integers \( n \) and \( m \) the norm \( \ell_1^n(\ell_{2m}) \) of a real \( n \times m \)-dimensional vector \( \{v_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [m]} \) as for the complex case (Definition 2.3)

\[
\|v\|_{\ell_1^n(\ell_{2m})} = \sum_i \sqrt{\sum_j |v_{i,j}|^2}.
\]

Note that we only specify the dimension of the systems as the systems themselves are not relevant here. In the rest of the proof, we use \( \| \cdot \|_{12} \) as a shorthand for \( \| \cdot \|_{\ell_1^n(\ell_{2m})} \). So our objective is to evaluate the expected value \( E \{ \|\Theta\|_{12} \} \) where \( \Theta \) has the Haar distribution on the real sphere \( S^{s-1} \) and \( s = 2d \). For this, we start by relating the \( E \{ \|Z\|_{12} \} \) and \( E \{ \|\Theta\|_{12} \} \) where \( Z \) has a standard Gaussian distribution on \( \mathbb{R}^s \). By changing to polar coordinates, we get

\[
E \{ \|Z\|_{12} \} = \int_{\mathbb{R}^s} \|x\|_{12} e^{-\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^s x_i^2} \frac{1}{(2\pi)^{s/2}} dx = \int_0^\infty \int_{S^{s-1}} \|r\theta\|_{12} e^{-\frac{r^2}{2}} \frac{1}{(2\pi)^{s/2}} s^{s/2} \frac{d\sigma(\theta)}{\Gamma\left(\frac{s}{2} + 1\right)} r^{s-1} dr
\]

where \( \sigma \) is the normalized Haar measure on \( S^{s-1} \) and \( \Gamma \) is the Gamma function \( \Gamma(z) = \int_0^\infty u^{z-1} e^{-u} du \). The term \( s^{s/2} \frac{d\sigma(\theta)}{\Gamma\left(\frac{s}{2} + 1\right)} \) is the surface area of the sphere in dimension \( s - 1 \). Using the equality \( \Gamma(z + 1) = z\Gamma(z) \), we have
\[
\frac{s^{n/2}}{\Gamma(\frac{s}{2}+1)} = \frac{2^{s/2}}{\Gamma(\frac{s}{2})}. 
\]
Thus,
\[
E\{\|Z\|_{12}\} = \frac{2\pi^{s/2}}{(2\pi)^{s/2}\Gamma(\frac{s}{2})} \int_0^\infty r^s e^{-r^2/2}dr \cdot \int_{S^{s-1}} \|\theta\|_{12}d\sigma(\theta)
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2^{s/2-1}\Gamma(\frac{s}{2})} \int_0^\infty r^s e^{-r^2/2}dr \cdot \int_{S^{s-1}} \|\theta\|_{12}d\sigma(\theta)
\]

We then perform a change of variable \( u = r^2/2 \):
\[
E\{\|Z\|_{12}\} = \frac{1}{2^{s/2-1}\Gamma(\frac{s}{2})} \int_0^\infty (2u)^{(s-1)/2}e^{-u}du \cdot \int_{S^{s-1}} \|\theta\|_{12}d\sigma(\theta)
\]
\[
= \frac{2^{(s-1)/2}\Gamma(\frac{s-1}{2}+1)}{2^{s/2-1}\Gamma(\frac{s}{2})} \cdot \int_{S^{s-1}} \|\theta\|_{12}d\sigma(\theta)
\]
\[
= \frac{\sqrt{2}\Gamma(\frac{s+1}{2})}{\Gamma(\frac{s}{2})}. E\{\|\Theta\|_{12}\}. \tag{30}
\]

Now, we compute
\[
E\{\|Z\|_{12}\} = \int_{\mathbb{R}^s} \|x\|_{12} e^{-\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^s x_i^2} \frac{1}{(2\pi)^{s/2}} dx
\]
\[
= \sum_{i=0}^{d_A-1} \int_{\mathbb{R}^s} \|x_i\|^2_{12} e^{-\frac{1}{2} \|x_i\|^2_{12}} \frac{1}{(2\pi)^{s/2}} dx.
\]
where we decomposed \( x = (x_0, \ldots, x_{d_A-1}) \) where \( x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{2d_B} \). As all the terms of the sum are equal
\[
E\{\|Z\|_{12}\} = d_A \int_{\mathbb{R}^{2d_B}} \|x_0\|^2_{12} e^{-\frac{1}{2} \|x_0\|^2_{12}} \left( \int_{\mathbb{R}^{2d_B}} \|x_1\|^2_{12} e^{-\frac{1}{2} \|x_1\|^2_{12}} dx_1 \right)^{d_A-1}
\]
\[
= d_A \sqrt{2\Gamma(\frac{2d_B+1}{2})} \frac{1}{\Gamma(d_B)} \int_{S^{2d_B-1}} \|\theta\|_{2}d\sigma(\theta)
\]
\[
= d_A \sqrt{2\Gamma(\frac{2d_B+1}{2})} \frac{1}{\Gamma(d_B)}.
\]
To get the second equality, we use the same argument as for (30). We conclude using equation (30)
\[
E\left\{ \|\varphi\|_{L^4(\mathbb{R}^s)} \right\} = E\{\|\Theta\|_{12}\}
\]
\[
= d_A \frac{\Gamma(d_B + \frac{1}{2})}{\Gamma(d_B)} \cdot \frac{\Gamma(d_A d_B)}{\Gamma(d_A d_B + \frac{1}{2})}.
\]

We now prove the inequality in the statement of the lemma. We use the following two facts about the \( \Gamma \) function: \( \log \Gamma \) is convex and for all \( z > 0, \Gamma(z + 1) = z\Gamma(z) \). The first property can be seen by using Hölder’s inequality for example and the second using integration by parts. We have
\[
\log \Gamma \left( x + \frac{1}{2} \right) \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \Gamma(x) + \frac{1}{2} \log \Gamma(x + 1)
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2} \log x \Gamma(x^2)
\]
\[
= \log \sqrt{x} \Gamma(x)
\]
Thus, \( \frac{\Gamma(x + \frac{1}{2})}{\Gamma(x)} \leq \sqrt{x} \). Similarly, we have \( \frac{\Gamma(x)}{\Gamma(x - \frac{1}{2})} \leq \sqrt{x - \frac{1}{2}} \) which shows that \( \frac{\Gamma(x + \frac{1}{2})}{\Gamma(x)} \leq \sqrt{x - \frac{1}{2}} \).
We conclude that
\[ E\left\{ \|\varphi\|_{\ell^1(\ell^2)}\right\} \geq d_A \cdot \sqrt{d_B - \frac{1}{2}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{d_A d_B}} \]
\[ = \sqrt{d_A} \cdot \sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{2d_B}} \]

Lemma 2.7 (Levy’s lemma). Let \( f : \mathbb{C}^d \to \mathbb{R} \) and \( \eta > 0 \) be such that for all pure states \(|\varphi_1\rangle, |\varphi_2\rangle\) in \( \mathbb{C}^d \),
\[ |f(|\varphi_1\rangle) - f(|\varphi_2\rangle)| \leq \eta \||\varphi_1\rangle - |\varphi_2\rangle\|_2. \]

Let \( |\varphi\rangle \) be a random pure state in dimension \( d \). Then for all \( 0 \leq \delta \leq \eta \),
\[ P\{ |f(|\varphi\rangle) - E\{f(|\varphi\rangle)\}| \geq \delta \} \leq 4 \exp\left(-\frac{\delta^2 d}{c\pi^2}\right) \]
where \( c \) is a constant. We can take \( c = 9\pi^2 \).

Proof We can instead study the concentration of a Lipschitz function on the real sphere \( S^{2d-1} \). Note that the induced function (that we also call \( f \)) is still \( \alpha \)-Lipschitz. Concentration on \( S^{2d-1} \) can be proved in a simple way using concentration of the standard Gaussian distribution. This proof is due to Maurey and Pisier and can be found in Appendix V of [MS86]. Specifically, using Corollary V.2 in [MS86], we get
\[ P\{ |f(Z) - E\{f(Z)\}| \geq t \} \leq 2 \exp\left(-\frac{\delta^2 d}{18\pi^2 \eta^2}\right) + 2 \exp\left(-\frac{2d}{2\pi^2}\right) \]
\[ \leq 4 \exp\left(-\frac{\delta^2 d}{9\pi^2 \eta^2}\right). \]

In the notation of the proof of Corollary V.2 [MS86], we have set \( \delta = 1/2 \). This can be done because using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 2.6, we can show that the expected \( \ell_2 \) norm of the standard Gaussian distribution in dimension \( n \) at least \( \sqrt{2\sqrt{n - \frac{1}{2}}} > \sqrt{n} \) for \( n \geq 2 \).

We used this version of Levy’s lemma because it has an elementary proof and it gives directly the concentration about the expected value. Different versions involving the median of \( f \) and giving better constants can be found in Corollary 2.3 of [MS86] or Proposition 1.3 in [Led01] for example. \( \square \)

Lemma 2.9 (\( \delta \)-net). Let \( \delta \in (0, 1) \). There exists a set \( \mathcal{N} \) of pure states in \( \mathbb{C}^d \) with \( |\mathcal{N}| \leq (3/\delta)^{2d} \) such that for every pure state \(|\psi\rangle \in \mathbb{C}^d \) (i.e., \( \|\psi\|_2 = 1 \)), there exists \( |\tilde{\psi}\rangle \in \mathcal{N} \) such that
\[ \|\psi\rangle - |\tilde{\psi}\rangle\|_2 \leq \delta. \]

Proof A proof can be found in [HLSW04] as Lemma II.4. \( \square \)

Lemma 2.8 (Concentration of the average). Let \( a, b \geq 1 \), \( \delta \in (0, 1) \) and \( t \) a positive integer. Suppose \( X \) is a random variable with 0 mean satisfying the tail bounds
\[ P\{X \geq \delta\} \leq ae^{-b\delta^2} \quad \text{and} \quad P\{X \leq -\delta\} \leq ae^{-b\delta^2}. \]

Let \( X_1, \ldots, X_t \) be independent copies of \( X \). Then if \( \delta^2 b \geq 16a^2 \pi \),
\[ P\left\{ \left| \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=1}^{t} X_k \right| \geq \delta \right\} \leq \exp\left(-\frac{\delta^2 b t}{2}\right). \]
We choose by making the change of variable $z$.

We now bound the moment generating function $E \{ e^{tX} \}$ of $X$ using the tail bounds.

**Proof.** For any $\lambda > 0$, using Markov’s inequality

$$
P \left\{ \sum_{k=1}^{t} X_k \geq t\delta \right\} = P \left\{ \exp \left( \lambda \sum_{k=1}^{t} X_k \right) \geq \exp (\lambda t\delta) \right\}$$

$$\leq E \left\{ \exp \left( \lambda \sum_{k=1}^{t} X_k \right) \right\} e^{-\lambda t\delta}$$

$$= E \left\{ e^{\lambda X} \right\} e^{-\lambda t\delta}.$$

by making the change of variable $z = \log u$.

$$E \{ e^{\lambda X} \} \leq 1 + a \int_{0}^{\infty} \exp \left( -\frac{b}{\lambda^2} \left( z - \frac{\lambda^2}{2b} \right)^2 + \frac{\lambda^2}{4b} \right) dz$$

$$\leq 1 + a \exp \left( \frac{\lambda^2}{4b} \right) \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \exp \left( -\frac{u^2}{2b} \right) du$$

$$= 1 + a \exp \left( \frac{\lambda^2}{4b} \right) \frac{\sqrt{2\pi}}{\sqrt{2b}} e^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

We choose $\lambda = 2b\delta$ (this is not the optimal choice but it makes expressions simpler),

$$P \left\{ \sum_{k=1}^{t} X_k \geq t\delta \right\} \leq \max \left\{ 2^t, \left( 2a \frac{\sqrt{\pi} \lambda}{\sqrt{b}} \right)^t \exp \left( \frac{\lambda^2 t}{4b} \right) \right\} \exp (-\lambda t\delta)$$

$$= \max \left\{ \exp \left( -2b^2 t + t \ln 2 \right), \exp \left( \delta^2 b t - 2\delta^2 b t + t \ln (4a\sqrt{\pi}\delta \sqrt{b}) \right) \right\}$$

$$= \max \left\{ \exp \left( (-\delta^2 b + \ln 2) t \right), \exp \left( \left( -\delta^2 b + \ln (4a\sqrt{\pi}\delta \sqrt{b}) \right) t \right) \right\}.$$  

**Claim.** For all $c \geq 1$ and $x \geq c$

$$\frac{1}{2} \ln(cx) - x \leq -\frac{x}{2}.$$

The function $x \mapsto \frac{x}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \ln (cx)$ is increasing for $x \geq 1$. It suffices to show that it is nonnegative for $x = c$. To see that, we differentiate the function $y \mapsto y - \ln(y^2)$ to prove that for all $y \geq 1$, we have $y - \ln(y^2) \geq 0$. This proves the claim.

Using this inequality, we have for $\delta^2 b \geq 16a^2 \pi$,

$$-\delta^2 b + \ln (4a \sqrt{\pi} \delta \sqrt{b}) \leq -\frac{\delta^2 b}{2}$$

and 

$$-2\delta^2 b + \ln 2 \leq -\frac{\delta^2 b}{2}.$$
Finally,
\[ P \left\{ \sum_{k=1}^{t} X_k \geq t\delta \right\} \leq \exp \left( -\frac{\delta^2 bt}{2} \right). \]

\[ \square \]

B Proof of Lemma 2.11

We define \( V_0 = 1 \), and the remaining unitaries are indexed by binary vectors \( u \in \{0, 1\}^n \), for example the binary representations of integers from 0 to \( r - 2 \). The construction is based on operations in the finite field \( \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \). The field \( \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \) can be seen as an \( n \)-dimensional vector space over \( \mathbb{F}_2 \). Choose \( \theta \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \) such that 1, \( \theta \), ..., \( \theta^{n-1} \) forms a basis of \( \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \). For any \( x, y \in [n], \theta^x \cdot \theta^y \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \) can be decomposed in our chosen basis as \( \theta^x \cdot \theta^y = \sum_{\ell=0}^{n-1} m_\ell(x, y)\theta^\ell \) for some \( m_\ell(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_2 \). We can thus define the matrices \( M_0, M_1, \ldots, M_{n-1} \) from the multiplication table

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
1 & \theta & \cdots & \theta^{n-1}
\end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix}
1 & \theta & \cdots & \theta^{n-1}
\end{pmatrix} = M_0 + M_1\theta + \cdots + M_{n-1}\theta^{n-1}.
\]

where \( M_\ell = (m_\ell(x, y))_{x,y \in [n]} \). For a given \( u \in \{0, 1\}^n \), we define the matrix

\[
N_u = \sum_{\ell=0}^{n-1} u_\ell M_\ell.
\]

Notice that as \( \theta^x \cdot \theta^y = \theta^{x+y} \), the entry \( N_u(x, y) \) of \( N_u \) only depends on \( x + y \), i.e., \( N_u(x, y) = N_u(x', y') \) if \( x + y = x' + y' \). So we can represent this matrix by a vector \( \alpha_u(x+y) = N_u(x, y) \) of length \( 2n - 1 \). We then define a quadratic form on \( \mathbb{Z}_4 \) by: for \( v \in \{0, 1\}^n \),

\[
T_u(v) = v^T N_u v \mod 4.
\]

Note that the operations \( v^T N_u v \) are not performed in \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) but rather in \( \mathbb{Z} \). Using the vector \( \alpha_u \), we can write

\[
T_u(v) = \sum_{x,y \in [n]} v_x N_u(x, y)v_y \mod 4 = \sum_{z=0}^{2n-2} \left( \sum_{x=0}^{z} v_x v_{z-x} \right) \alpha_u(z) \mod 4
\]

if we define \( v_x = 0 \) for \( x \geq n \). We then define the diagonal matrix \( D_u = \text{diag} (i^{T_u(v)}) v \in \mathbb{F}_2^2 \). Finally, we define for \( 1 \leq j \leq r - 1 \),

\[
V_j = D_{\text{bin}(j-1)} H^{\otimes n}
\]

where \( \text{bin}(j) \in \{0, 1\}^n \) is the binary representation of length \( n \) of the integer \( j \).

The fact that these unitaries define mutually unbiased bases was proved in \cite{WF89}. We now analyse how fast these unitary transformations can be implemented. Note that we want a circuit that takes as input a state \( |\psi\rangle \) together with the index \( j \) of the unitary transformation and that outputs \( V_j |\psi\rangle \).

Given the index \( j \) as input, we show it is possible to compute \( u = \text{bin}(j-1) \) and compute the vector \( \alpha_{j} \equiv \alpha_u \) in time \( O(n^2 \text{ polylog } n) \). In fact, we start by computing a representation of the field \( \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \) by finding an irreducible polynomial \( Q \) of degree \( n \) in \( \mathbb{F}_2[X] \), so that \( \mathbb{F}_{2^n} = \mathbb{F}_2[X]/Q \). This can be done in expected time \( O(n^2 \text{ polylog } n) \) (Corollary 14.43 in the book \cite{vzGG99}). There also exists a deterministic algorithm for finding a irreducible polynomial in time \( O(n^4 \text{ polylog } n) \) \cite{Sho90}. We then take \( \theta = X \). Computing the polynomial \( X^x \cdot X^y = X^{x+y} \mod Q \) can be done in time \( O(n \text{ polylog } n) \) using the fast Euclidean algorithm (see Corollary 11.8 in \cite{vzGG99}). As \( x + y \in [0, 2n - 2] \), we can explicitly represent all the polynomials \( X^z \) for \( 0 \leq z \leq 2n - 2 \) in time \( O(n^2 \text{ polylog } n) \). It is then simple to compute the vector \( \alpha_u \) using the vector \( u \) in time \( O(n^2) \).

To build the quantum circuit, we first observe that applying a Hadamard transform only takes \( n \) single-qubit Hadamard gates. Then, to design a circuit performing the unitary transformation \( D_{\text{bin}(j-1)} \), we start by building a classical circuit that computes

\[
T_u(v) = \sum_{z=0}^{2n-2} \left( \sum_{x=0}^{z} v_x v_{z-x} \right) \alpha_u(z) \mod 4
\]
on inputs $v$ and $\alpha_v$. Observing that $\sum_{x=0}^n v_x v_{z-x}$ is the coefficient of $Y^z$ in the polynomial $\left(\sum_{x=0}^{n-1} v_x Y^x\right)^2$, we can use fast polynomial multiplication to compute $T_u(v)$ in time $O(n \log \log n)$ (Corollary 8.27 in [vzGG99]). Moreover, computing the inner product of two vectors can easily be implemented by a circuit of depth $O(\log n)$. Thus, $T_u(v)$ can be computed by a circuit of size $O(n \log \log n)$ and depth $O(\log n)$. This circuit can be transformed into a reversible circuit with the same size and depth (up to some multiplicative constant) that takes as input $(v, \alpha_j, g)$ where $v \in \{0, 1\}^n$, $\alpha_j \in \{0, 1\}^{2n-1}$ and $g \in \mathbb{Z}_4$, and outputs $(v, \alpha_j, g + T_u(v) \mod 4)$.

This reversible classical circuit can be readily transformed into a quantum circuit that computes the unitary transformation defined by $W : |v\rangle \mapsto |v\rangle + T_u(v) \mod 4$. Recall that we want to implement the transformation $D_u : |v\rangle \mapsto iT_u(v) |v\rangle$ efficiently. This is simple to obtain using the quantum circuit for $W$. In fact, if we use a catalyst state $|\phi\rangle = |0\rangle - i|1\rangle - |2\rangle + i|3\rangle$, we have

$$W |v\rangle \langle \phi| = iT_u(v) |v\rangle \langle \phi| = D_{\text{bin}(j-1)} |v\rangle \langle \phi|.$$ 

Finally, $D_{\text{bin}(j-1)} H^\otimes n$ can be implemented by a quantum circuit of size $O(n \log \log n)$ and depth $O(\log n)$.

### C Permutation extractors

In order to prove the existence of strong permutation extractors with good parameters, we use the construction of Guruswami, Umans and Vadhan [GUV09] which is inspired by list decoding. Their main construction is a lossless condenser based on Parvaresh-Vardy codes. Using this condenser, they build an explicit extractor with good parameters. However, this lossless condenser based on Parvaresh-Vardy codes does not seem to be easily extended into a permutation condenser. The same paper also presents a lossy condenser based on Reed-Solomon codes, which can indeed be transformed into a permutation condenser. This permutation condenser can then be used in the extractor construction instead of the lossless condenser giving a strong permutation extractor. In this section, we describe this construction. For completeness, we reproduce most of the proof here, except the results that are used exactly as stated in [GUV09].

It is also worth mentioning that to obtain metric uncertainty relations, we want strong extractors. Even though the extractors in [GUV09] are not directly described as strong, they are essentially strong. In this section, we describe all the condensers and extractors as strong.

**Definition C.1 (Condenser).** A function $C : \{0, 1\}^n \times S \to \{0, 1\}^{n'}$ is an $(n, k) \to (n', k')$ condenser if for every $X$ with min-entropy at least $k$, $C(X, U_S)$ is $\epsilon$-close to a distribution with min-entropy $k'$ when $U_S$ is uniformly distributed on $S$. A condenser $C$ is strong if $(U_S, C(X, U_S))$ is $\epsilon$-close to $(U_S, Z)$ for some random variable $Z$ such that for all $y \in S$, $Z|_{U_S=y}$ has min-entropy at least $k$.

A condenser is explicit if it is computable in polynomial time in $n$.

**Remark.** The set $S$ is usually of the form $\{0, 1\}^d$ for some integer $d$. Here, it is convenient to take sets $S$ not of this form to obtain permutation extractors. Note also that an extractor is an $(n, k) \to (m, m)$ condenser. □

**Definition C.2 (Permutation condenser).** A family $\{P_y\}_{y \in S}$ of permutations of $\{0, 1\}^n$ is an $(n, k) \to (n', k')$ strong permutation condenser if the function $P_C : (x, y) \mapsto P_y(x)$ where $P_C(x)$ refers to the first $n'$ bits of $P_y(x)$ is an $(n, k) \to (n', k')$ strong condenser.

A strong permutation condenser is explicit if for all $y \in S$, both $P_y$ and $P_y^{-1}$ are computable in polynomial time.

The following theorem describes the condenser that will be used as a building block in the extractor construction. It is an analogue of Theorem 7.2 in [GUV09].

**Theorem C.3.** For all positive integers $n$ and $\ell \leq n$, as well as $\alpha, \epsilon \in (0, 1/2)$, there exists an explicit family of permutations $\{RS_y\}_{y \in S}$ of $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ that is an $(nt, (\ell t + 1)\ell t - 4)$ strong permutation condenser with $t = \lceil 1/\alpha \cdot \log(24n^2/\epsilon) \rceil$ and $\log |S| \leq t$. Moreover, the functions $(x, y) \mapsto RS_y(x)$ and $(x, y) \mapsto RS_y^{-1}(x)$ can be computed by a circuit of size $O(n \log \log(n/\epsilon))$.

**Remark.** Note that the input space of the condenser is $\{0, 1\}^{nt}$ instead of $\{0, 1\}^n$. But one can see such a condenser as a permutation condenser $(P'_y)$ on the smaller space $\{0, 1\}^n$ defined by $P'_y(x) = P_y(x0^t)$ for all $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ where $x0^t$ is obtained by appending $t$ zeros to $x$. □
Proof  Set \( q = 2^k \) and \( \epsilon_0 = \epsilon/6 \). Consider the function \( C' : \mathbb{F}_q^n \times \mathbb{F}_q \to \mathbb{F}_q^{\ell+1} \) defined by

\[
C'(f, y) = [y, f(y), f(\zeta y), \ldots, f(\zeta^{\ell-1} y)]
\]

where \( \mathbb{F}_q^n \) is interpreted as the set of polynomials over \( \mathbb{F}_q \) of degree at most \( n - 1 \) and \( \zeta \) is a generator of the multiplicative group \( \mathbb{F}_q^* \). First, we compute the input and output sizes in terms of bits. The inputs can be described using \( \log |\mathbb{F}_q| = n \log q = nt \) bits, the seed using \( \log |\mathbb{F}_q| = t \) bits and the output using \( \log |\mathbb{F}_q^{\ell+1}| = (\ell + 1)t \). Using Theorem 7.1 in [GUV09], for any integer \( h, C' \) is a condenser where \( A \) is the seed as part of the output of the condenser. For this, we define \( C \)

in the rest of this proof, we will be using Doeblin’s coupling lemma.

error of the condenser by at most \( 2^{-\epsilon_0} \). We conclude that \( C' \) is a condenser.

Observe that the seed \( y \) is part of the output of the condenser. As we want to construct a strong condenser, we do not consider the seed as part of the output of the condenser. For this, we define \( C : \mathbb{F}_q^n \times \mathbb{F}_q \to \mathbb{F}_q^\ell \) by \( C(f, y) = [f(y), \ldots, f(\zeta^{\ell-1} y)] \). Moreover, as will be clear later when we try to build a permutation condenser, we take the seed to be uniform on \( S \) instead of being uniform on the whole field \( \mathbb{F}_q \). Note that this increases the error of the condenser by at most \( 2^{-t} \leq \epsilon_0 \) (because one can choose \( U_S \) with probability \( 1 - 2^{-t} \)). Here and in the rest of this proof, we will be using Doeblin’s coupling lemma.

Equation (32) then implies that if \( X \) has min-entropy at least \( \ell t \) and \( U_S \) is uniform on \( S \), the distribution of \( (U_S, C(X, U_S)) \) is \( 3\epsilon_0 \)-close to a distribution with min-entropy at least \( (1 - \alpha)\ell t + t - 3 \). Let \( Y \in S \) and \( Z \in \{0, 1\}^{(\ell+1)t} \) be random variables such that \( H_{\text{min}}(Y, Z) \geq (1 - \alpha)\ell t + t - 3 \) and \( (U_S, C(X, U_S)) = (Y, Z) \) with probability at least \( 1 - 3\epsilon_0 \). If \( Y \) was uniformly distributed on \( S \), then it would follow directly that for all \( y \in S, H_{\text{min}}(Y | Y = y) \geq (1 - \alpha)\ell t \). However, \( Y \) is not necessarily uniformly distributed. We define a new random variable \( Z' \) by

\[
Z' = \begin{cases} 
Z & \text{if } Y = U_S \\
U' & \text{if } Y \neq U_S 
\end{cases}
\]

where \( U' \) is uniformly distributed on \( \{0, 1\}^{(\ell+1)t} \) and independent of all the other random variables. We have for any \( z \in \{0, 1\}^{(\ell+1)t} \) and \( y \in S, \)

\[
P\{Z' = z | U_S = y\} = \frac{1}{P\{U_S = y\}} \left( P\{Z' = z, Y = y, Y = U_S\} + P\{Z' = z, U_S = y, Y \neq U_S\} \right)
\]

\[
\leq \frac{1}{P\{U_S = y\}} \left( 2^{-(1-\alpha)\ell t + 3} + 2^{-(\ell+1)t} \cdot \frac{1}{|S|} \right)
\]

\[
\leq 2 \cdot 2^{-(1-\alpha)\ell t + 3}.
\]

Moreover, we have \( (U_S, C(X, U_S)) = (U_S, Z') \) with probability at least \( 1 - 6\epsilon_0 \).

We conclude that \( C \) is a

\[
(nt, (\ell t + 1)t) \to \epsilon ((\ell t, (1 - \alpha)\ell t + 4))
\]

(33)
strong condenser.

To define our permutation condenser, we set the first \( n' = \ell t \) bits \( RS'_y(x) \) of \( RS_y(x) \) to be \( RS'_y(x) = C(x, y) \). We then define the remaining bits by defining \( RS''_y(f) = [f(\zeta y), \ldots, f((n-1)y)] \). As \( q \geq n - 1 \) and \( \zeta \) is a generator of \( \mathbb{F}_q \), the elements \( y, \zeta y, \ldots, \zeta^n y \) are distinct provided \( y \neq 0 \). So for \( y \neq 0 \), \( (RS_C', RS''_y) \) is the evaluation of the polynomial \( f \) of degree at most \( n-1 \) in \( n \) distinct points. Thus, \( f \mapsto P_y(f) \) is a bijection in \( \mathbb{F}_q^n \) for all \( y \neq 0 \). This is why the value 0 for the seed was excluded earlier.

Concerning the computation of the functions \( RS_C' \) and \( RS''_y \), they only require the evaluation of a polynomial on elements of the finite field \( \mathbb{F}_q \). Computations in the finite field \( \mathbb{F}_q \) can be performed efficiently by finding an irreducible polynomial of degree \( \log q \) over \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) and doing computations modulo this polynomial. In fact, finding an irreducible polynomial of degree \( \log q \) over \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) can be done in time polynomial in \( \log q \) (see for example [Sho90] for a deterministic algorithm and Corollary 14.43 in the book [vzCG99] for a simpler randomized algorithm). Since addition, multiplication and finding the greatest common divisor of polynomials in \( \mathbb{F}_2[X] \) can be done using a number of operations in \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) that is polynomial in the degrees, we conclude that computations in \( \mathbb{F}_q \) can be implemented in time \( O(polylog(n/\epsilon)) \). Moreover, one can efficiently find a generator \( \zeta \) of the group \( \mathbb{F}_q^* \). For example, Theorem 1.1 in [Sho92] shows the existence of a deterministic algorithm having a runtime \( O(polylog(n/\epsilon)) \).

To evaluate \( RS_y \) at a polynomial \( f \), we compute the field elements \( y, \zeta y, \ldots, \zeta^n y \), and then evaluate the polynomial \( f \) on these points. Using a fast multipoint evaluation, this step can be done in \( O(n polylog n) \) number of operations in \( \mathbb{F}_q \) (see Corollary 10.8 in[vzCG99]). Moreover, given a list \([f(y), \ldots, f((n-1)y)]\) for \( y \neq 0 \), we can find \( f \) by fast interpolation in \( \mathbb{F}_q[X] \) (see Corollary 10.12 in[vzCG99]). As a result \( RS'_y \) can also be computed in \( O(n polylog n) \) operations in \( \mathbb{F}_q \).

This condenser will be composed with other extractors, the following lemma shows how to compose condensers.

**Lemma C.4 (Composition of strong permutation condensers).** Let \( (P_1, y_1)_{y_1 \in S_1} \) be an \( (n, k) \to \epsilon \ (n', k') \) strong permutation condenser and \( (P_2, y_2)_{y_2 \in S_2} \) be an \( (n', k') \to \epsilon \ (n'', k'') \) strong permutation condenser. Then \( (P_3, y_3)_{y_3 \in S_3} = (P_1 C, P_2) \) where \( P_{C, y_3} = P_{C, y_2} \circ P_{C, y_1} \) and \( P_{R, y_3} = (P_{R, y_2} \circ P_{R, y_1}) \circ P_{R, y_1} \) is an \( (n, k) \to 2\epsilon \ (n'', k'') \) strong permutation extractor.

**Proof** \( P_3 \) is clearly a permutation of \( \{0, 1\}^n \). We only need to check that \( P_C \) is a strong condenser. By definition, if \( H_{\min}(X) \geq k \), \( \{Z_1, Z_2 \} \) is \( \epsilon \)-close to \( \{U_1, Z_2 \} \) where \( Z_2 \) has min-entropy at least \( k' \). Now putting \( Z_2 \) into the condenser \( P_C \), we get that for any \( y_2 \), \( \{U_2, P_{C, y_2} \} \) is \( \epsilon \)-close to \( \{U_2, Z_2 \} \) where \( Z_2 \) has min-entropy at least \( k'' \) for any \( y_2 \). Thus, \( Z_2 \) has min-entropy at least \( k'' \). Moreover, by the triangle inequality, we have \( \Delta \left( \{U_1, U_2, P_{C, y_2} \} \right) \leq 2\epsilon \).

Next, we present one of the standard extractors that are used as a building block in many constructions.

**Lemma C.5 ("Leftover Hash Lemma" extractor [ILL89]).** For all positive integers \( n \) and \( k \leq n \), and \( \epsilon > 0 \), there exists an explicit family \( (P_y)_{y \in S} \) of permutations of \( \{0, 1\}^n \) that is an \( (n, k) \to \epsilon \ m \) strong permutation extractor with \( \log |S| = \log(2^n - 1) \) and \( m \geq k - 2 \log(2/\epsilon) \).

**Proof** We view \( \{0, 1\}^n \) as the finite field \( \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \) and the set \( S = \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \). Then define the permutation \( P_y(x) = x \cdot y \) where the product \( x \cdot y \) is taken in the field \( \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \). The family of functions \( P_y \) is pairwise independent. Applying the Leftover Hash Lemma [ILL89], we get that if \( Y \) uniform on \( \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \), the distribution of the first \( [k - 2 \log(1/\epsilon)] \) bits of \( P_Y(X) \) together with \( Y \) is \( \epsilon \)-close to uniform. Now if \( U_2 \) is only uniform in \( \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \), \( \{U_2, P_{U_2, X} \} \) is \( \epsilon + 2^{-n} \)-close to the uniform distribution. The result follows from the fact that we can suppose \( \epsilon \geq 2^{-n} \) (otherwise, \( k - 2 \log(1/\epsilon) \leq 0 \) and the theorem is true).

The problem with this extractor is that it uses a seed that is as long as the input. Next, we introduce the notion of a block source.

**Definition C.6 (Block source).** \( X = (X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_s) \) is a \((k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_s)\) block source if for every \( i \in \{1, \ldots, s\} \) and \( x_1, \ldots, x_{i-1}, X|_{x_1=x_1, \ldots, x_{i-1}=x_{i-1}} \) is a \( k_i \)-source. When \( k_1 = \cdots = k_s = k \), we call \( X \) a \( s \times k \) source.

A block source has more structure than a general source. However, for a source of large min-entropy \( k \) (or equivalently with small entropy deficiency \( \Delta = n - k \)), one does not lose too much entropy by viewing a general
source as a block source where each block has entropy deficiency roughly $\Delta$. See Corollary 5.9 in [GUV09] for a precise statement.

**Lemma C.7** (Lemma 5.4 in [GUV09]). Let $s$ be a (constant) positive integer. For all positive integers $n$ and $t \leq n$ and all $\epsilon > 0$, setting $t = \left\lceil 8s \log(24n^2 \cdot (4s + 1)/\epsilon) \right\rceil$, there is an explicit family $\{E_y\}_{y \in S}$ of permutations of $\{0, 1\}^n$ that is an $(n, 2\ell t) \rightarrow_{\epsilon} \ell t$

A strong permutation extractor with $\log |S| \leq 2\ell t/s + t$.

**Proof** As the extractor is composed of many building blocks, each generating some error, we define $\epsilon_0 = \epsilon/(4s+1)$ where $\epsilon$ is the target error of the final extractor. The idea is to first apply the condenser $RS$ of Theorem C.3 with $\alpha = \frac{1}{8s}$ to obtain a string $X' = C(X, U_{2s})$ of length $n' = (2\ell - 1)t$ which is $\epsilon_0$-close to a $k'$-source where

$$k' = \left(1 - \frac{1}{8s}\right)(2\ell - 1)t - 4$$

The entropy deficiency $\Delta$ of this $k'$-source can be bounded by $\Delta = n' - k' \leq \frac{(2\ell - 1)t}{8s} + 4$. Then, we partition $X' = (X'_1, \ldots, X'_{2s})$ (arbitrarily) into $2s$ blocks of size $n'' = \lfloor n'/2s \rfloor$ or $n'' + 1$. Using Corollary 5.9 of [GUV09], $(X'_1, \ldots, X'_{2s})$ is $2s\epsilon_0$-close to some $2s \times k''$-source where $k'' = (n'' - \Delta - \log(1/\epsilon_0))$.

We have $\Delta \leq \ell t/(4s) + 3 \leq \ell t/(3s)$ for $n$ large enough. Thus,

$$k'' \geq \frac{2\ell t}{2s} - \frac{\ell t}{3s} - \log(1/\epsilon_0) = \frac{2}{3s} \ell t - \log(1/\epsilon_0).$$

We can then apply the extractor Lemma C.5 to all the $2s$ blocks using the same seed of size $n'' + 1$. Note that we can reuse the same seed because we have a strong extractor and the seed is independent of all the blocks. This extractor extracts almost all the min-entropy of the sources. More precisely, if we input to this extractor a $2s \times k''$-source, the output distribution is $2s\epsilon_0$-close to $m$ uniform bits where

$$m \geq 2s \cdot (k'' - 2\log(2/\epsilon_0)) \geq \frac{4}{3} \ell t - 6s \log(2/\epsilon_0) \geq \ell t.$$

Overall, the output of this extractor is $\epsilon_0 + 2s\epsilon_0 + 2s\epsilon_0 = \epsilon$-close to the uniform distribution on $m$ bits.

It only remains to show that the extractor we just described is strong and can be extended to a permutation. This follows from Lemma C.4 and the fact the condensers (coming from Theorem C.3 and Lemma C.5) are strong permutation condensers.

**Remark.** As pointed out in [GUV09], a stronger version of this lemma (i.e., with larger output) can be proved by using the condenser of Theorem C.3 and the high min-entropy extractor in [GW97] with a Ramanujan expander (for example, the expander of [LPS88]). This construction can also give a strong permutation extractor. However, using this extractor would slightly complicate the exposition and does not really influence the final extractor construction presented in Theorem 2.15. □

The following lemma basically says that the entropy is conserved by a permutation extractor. It is an adapted version of Lemma 26 in [RRV99].

**Lemma C.8.** Let $\{P_y\}_{y \in S}$ be a $(n, k)$-wise strong permutation extractor. Let $X$ be a $k$-source, then $(U_S, P^E_{P^R_{U_S}}(X), P^R_{U_S}(X))$ is $2\epsilon$-close to $(U_{S \times \{0, 1\}^m}, W)$ where $U_{S \times \{0, 1\}^m}$ is uniform on $S \times \{0, 1\}^m$ and for all $y \in S, z \in \{0, 1\}^m$

$$H_{\text{min}}(W|U_{S \times \{0, 1\}^m} = (y, z)) \geq k - m - 1.$$

**Proof** As $\{P^E_y\}$ is a strong extractor, there exists a random variable $U_{S \times \{0, 1\}^m}$ uniformly distributed on $S \times \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $\mathbb{P} \left\{ (U_S, P^E_y(X)) \neq U_{S \times \{0, 1\}^m} \right\} \leq \epsilon$. Define $\Gamma = \{(y, z) \in S \times \{0, 1\}^m : \mathbb{P} \left\{ P^E_y(X) = z \right\} < \frac{1}{2} \cdot 2^{-m} \}$. We have for every $(y, z) \notin \Gamma$ and $x \in \{0, 1\}^{n-m}$,

$$\mathbb{P} \left\{ P^R_y(X) = x | P^E_y(X) = z \right\} \leq \frac{\mathbb{P} \left\{ P^R_y(X) = x, P^E_y(X) = z \right\}}{2^{-m-1}} \leq 2^{m+1} \mathbb{P} \left\{ X = P^{-1}_y(x, z) \right\} \leq 2^{-(k-m-1)}.$$
We then show that \( \mathbb{P} \{ (U_S, P^E_{U_S}) \in \Gamma \} \leq \epsilon \). Using the fact that \( \{ P^E_y \} \) is a strong extractor, we have
\[
| \mathbb{P} \{ U_S, U_{(0,1)=m} \in \Gamma \} - \mathbb{P} \{ (U_S, P^E_{U_S}) \in \Gamma \} | \leq \epsilon.
\]
But recall that, by definition of \( \Gamma \), \( \mathbb{P} \{ (U_S, P^E_{U_S}) \in \Gamma \} \leq \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{P} \{ U_S, U_{(0,1)=m} \in \Gamma \} \), so we get
\[
\mathbb{P} \{ (U_S, P^E_{U_S}) \in \Gamma \} \leq \epsilon.
\]
Finally we define
\[
W = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
P^R_{U_S}(X) & \text{if } (U_S, P^E_{U_S}(X)) \notin \Gamma \\
U' & \text{if } (U_S, P^E_{U_S}(X)) \in \Gamma
\end{array} \right.
\]
where \( U' \) is uniform on \((0,1)^{n-m} \) and independent of all other random variables. We conclude by observing that with probability at least \( 1 - 2\epsilon \), we have \( (U_S, P^E_{U_S}(X)) = U_S \times (0,1)^m \) and \( P^R_{U_S}(X) = W \).

We then combine these results to obtain the desired extractor. The proof of the following theorem closely follows Theorem 5.10 in [GUUV99] but using the lossy condenser presented in Theorem C.3 and making small modifications to obtain a permutation extractor.

**Theorem C.9.** For all integers \( n \geq 1 \), all \( \epsilon \in (0,1/2) \), and all \( k \in \left[200 \left[200 \log(24n^2/\epsilon)\right], n\right] \) there is an explicit \((n,k) \to \left\lfloor k/4 \right\rfloor \) strong permutation extractor \( \{ P^y_y \}_{y \in S} \) with \( \log |S| \leq 200 \left[200 \log(24n^2/\epsilon)\right] \). Moreover, the function \((x,y) \to P^y_y(x)\) can be computed by circuit of size \( O(n \log(n/\epsilon)) \).

**Proof.** If \( n \leq 2 \cdot 10^6 \), we can use the extractor of Lemma C.7 with \( s = 200 \) and \( \ell \geq 1 \) such that \( 2\ell \ell \leq k \leq (2\ell + 1) t \). This gives an extractor whose seed has size \( \frac{k}{200} \leq 10^4 \leq 200 \left[200 \log(24n^2/\epsilon)\right] \) and that extracts \( \ell t \geq \frac{1}{4} \cdot 2^{(\ell+1) t} \geq \frac{k}{4} \) bits, so the statement still holds true. In the rest of the proof, we assume \( n > 2 \cdot 10^6 \).

The idea of the construction is to build for an integer \( i \geq 0 \) an explicit \((n, 2^i \cdot 8d) \to \epsilon 2^{i-1} \cdot 8d\) using \( d \) bits of seed by induction on \( i \). Fix \( t(\epsilon) = \left[200 \log(24n^2/\epsilon)\right] \) and \( d(\epsilon) = 200 t(\epsilon) \). The induction hypothesis for an integer \( i \geq 0 \) is as follows: For all integers \( i' \leq i \) and \( n \) and \( \epsilon > 0 \), there is an explicit
\[
(n, 2^{i'} \cdot 8d(\epsilon)) \to \epsilon 2^{i'-1} \cdot 8d(\epsilon)
\]
strong permutation extractor with seed size \( d(\epsilon) \). This extractor is called \( \{ P^y_y \}_{y \in S_i} \).

For both \( i = 0 \) and \( i = 1 \) we can use the extractor of Lemma C.7 with \( s = 20 \). For \( i \in \{0,1\} \), we obtain an \((n, 2^i \cdot 8d(\epsilon/(4s + 1))) \to \epsilon 2^{i-1} 8d \) strong permutation extractor with \( \epsilon = \frac{4s}{4s+1} \). For \( i \in \{0,1\} \), this gives an extractor with seed \( \frac{2^i 8d(\epsilon/(4s+1))}{20} + \frac{20}{120} t(\epsilon) + \frac{20}{200} \left[200 \log(81)\right] \leq d(\epsilon) \).

We now show for \( i \geq -1 \) how to build the extractor \( \{ P^y_y \}_{y \in S_i} \) using the extractors \( \{ P^y_y \}_{y \in S_i} \) for \( i' < i \). Using the induction hypothesis, we construct the following extractor, which will be applied four times to extract the necessary random bits to prove the induction step. The choice of the form of the min-entropy values will become clear later. Set \( \epsilon_0 = \epsilon/20 \).

**Claim.** There exists an
\[
(n, 2^i \cdot 4.5d(\epsilon_0)) \to_{\epsilon_0} 2^i \cdot d(\epsilon_0)
\]
strong permutation extractor \( \{ Q^y_y \}_{y \in T} \) with seed size \( \log |T| \leq \frac{d(\epsilon_0)}{8} \).

To prove the claim, we start by applying the condenser of Theorem C.3 with \( \alpha = 1/200 \) and \( \epsilon = \epsilon_0 \) (so we use a seed of size \( t(\epsilon_0) \)). The output \( X' \) of size at most \( 2^i \cdot 4.5d(\epsilon_0) \) is then \( \epsilon_0 \)-close to having min-entropy is at least \((1 - \alpha)2^i \cdot 4.5d(\epsilon_0) - t(\epsilon_0) \). The entropy deficiency of this distribution is \( \alpha 2^i \cdot 4.5d(\epsilon_0) + \frac{d(\epsilon_0)}{200} \leq 2^i \cdot 4.5d(\epsilon_0). \) We then divide \( X' \) into two equal blocks \( X' = (X'_1, X'_2) \), and we know that it is \( 2\epsilon_0 \)-close to being a \( 2 \times k' \)-source for
\[
k' = \frac{2^i \cdot 4.5d(\epsilon_0)}{2} - \frac{2^i \cdot 4.5d(\epsilon_0)}{100} - \log(1/\epsilon_0) \geq \left( \frac{49}{100} \cdot 2^i \cdot 4.5 - 1 \right) \frac{d(\epsilon_0)}{200}
\]
as \( \log(1/\epsilon_0) \leq t(\epsilon_0) = \frac{d(\epsilon_0)}{200} \). For the extractors we will apply next to this source, we should note that \( k' \geq 2d(\epsilon_0) \) and that \( 2^i \cdot 4d(\epsilon_0) \leq k' < 2^i \cdot 8d(\epsilon_0) \).
Figure 4: The extractor $Q$ is obtained by first applying the condenser of Theorem C.3 and decomposing the output into two parts. The Leftover Hash Lemma extractor (Lemma C.7) is applied to the first half and its output is used as a seed for the extractor $\{P_{y(i-2)}\}$ coming from the induction hypothesis.

We now apply the extractor of Lemma C.7 to $X_1'$ (viewed as a $2d(\epsilon_0)$-source) using a seed of size $\frac{2d(\epsilon_0)}{20}$ and obtaining $X''$ that is $\epsilon_0$ close to uniform on $d(\epsilon_0)$ bits. We then use the extractor $\{P_{y(i-2)}\}$ obtained by induction for $i-2$ to the $X'_2$ (of size $2^{i-2} \cdot 4.5d(\epsilon_0) \leq n$) with seed $X''$ (of size $d(\epsilon_0)$): it is an $(n, 2^{i-2} \cdot 8d(\epsilon_0)) \rightarrow \epsilon_0$ permutation extractor.

The construction is illustrated in Figure 4. Note that the number of bits of the seed is $\log|T| \leq t(\epsilon_0) + \frac{2d(\epsilon_0)}{20} \leq \frac{d(\epsilon_0)}{8}$. This concludes the proof of the claim.

Figure 5: The permutation extractor $\{Q_y\}$ described in the claim is applied four times with independent seeds in order to extract $2^{i-1} \cdot 8d(\epsilon)$ random bits.
The source \( X \) we begin with is a \( 2^i \cdot 8d(\varepsilon) \)-source. But we have \( 2^i \cdot 8d(\varepsilon) \geq 2^i \cdot 8d(\varepsilon_0) - 2^i \cdot 8 \cdot 200^2 \log 20 \geq 2^i \cdot 4.5d(\varepsilon_0) \) so that we can apply the permutation extractor \((Q_y)_{y \in T}\) of the claim. We obtain \( Q^{E_i}_y(X) \) which is \( \varepsilon_0 \)-close to \( 2^i \cdot d(\varepsilon_0) \) random bits. As \( Q^E \) is part of a permutation extractor, the remaining entropy is not lost: it is in \( Q^{R_i}_y(X) \). More precisely, applying Lemma C.8 we get \( Q^{R_i}_y(X) \) is \( \varepsilon_0 \)-close to a source of min-entropy at least \( 2^i \cdot 8d(\varepsilon) - 2^i \cdot d(\varepsilon_0) - 1 \). As \( 2^i \cdot 8d(\varepsilon) - 2^i \cdot d(\varepsilon_0) - 1 \geq 2^i \cdot 4.5d(\varepsilon_0) \), we can apply the extractor \((Q_y)_{y \in T}\) of the claim to this source. Note that the input size has decreased but as mentioned earlier this only makes it easier to extract random bits as one can always encode in part of the input space. To apply \( Q \), we use a fresh new seed that outputs a bit string that is close to uniform on \( 2^{-3} \cdot 8d(\varepsilon_0) \) bits and the remaining entropy can be found in the \( R \) register. We apply this procedure four times in total as shown in Figure 5. Note that the reason we can apply it four times is that at the last application \( 2^i \cdot 8d(\varepsilon) - 3 \cdot 2^i-3 \cdot 8d(\varepsilon_0) - 3 \geq 2^i \cdot 4.5d(\varepsilon_0) \). As the extractor \((Q_y)_{y \in T}\) has error at most \( 5\varepsilon_0 \), the total error is bounded by \( 20\varepsilon_0 = \varepsilon \).

We thus obtain an
\[
(n, 2^i \cdot 8d(\varepsilon)) \rightarrow 4 \cdot 2^{i-3} \cdot 8d(\varepsilon_0)
\]
strong permutation extractor with seed set \( S = T^4 \) so that \( \log |S| \leq 4 \cdot \frac{d(\varepsilon_0)}{s} \leq d(\varepsilon) \).

By a repeated application of the previous theorem, we can extract a larger fraction of the min-entropy.

**Theorem 2.15** For all (constant) \( \delta \in (0, 1) \), there exists \( \epsilon > 0 \), such that for all positive integers \( n \), all \( k \in [\epsilon \log(n/\epsilon), n] \), and all \( \varepsilon \in (0, 1/2) \), there is an explicit \((n, k) \rightarrow (1 - \delta)k \) strong permutation extractor \( \{P_y\}_{y \in S} \) with \( \log |S| = O(\log(n/\epsilon)) \). Moreover, the functions \((x, y) \mapsto P_y(x) \) and \((x, y) \mapsto P_y^{-1}(x) \) can be computed by circuits of size \( O(n \text{polylog}(n/\epsilon)) \).

**Proof** We start by applying the extractor of Theorem C.9. We extract part of the min-entropy of the source and the remaining min-entropy is in the \( R \) system (Lemma C.8). This min-entropy can be extracted using once again the extractor of Theorem C.9 after \( O(\log(1/\delta)) \) applications of the extractor, we obtain the desired result.

## D Impossibility of locking using Pauli operators

The objective of this section is to give an example of a construction that is not a locking scheme to illustrate what is needed to obtain a locking scheme. The \( 2 \times 2 \) Pauli matrices are the four matrices \( \{I, \sigma_x, \sigma_z, \sigma_x \sigma_z\} \) where
\[
\sigma_x = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad \sigma_z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}
\]
For bit strings \( u, v \in \{0, 1\}^n \), we define the unitary operation \( \sigma_x^u \sigma_z^v \) on \( (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes n} \) by
\[
\sigma_x^u \sigma_z^v = \sigma_x^{u_1} \sigma_z^{v_1} \otimes \cdots \otimes \sigma_x^{u_n} \sigma_z^{v_n}
\]
It was shown in [AMTdW00] that one can encrypt an \( n \)-qubits state \(|\psi\rangle\) perfectly using a key \((U, V)\) of \( 2n \) bits. To encrypt \(|\psi\rangle\), one simply applies \( \sigma_x^U \sigma_z^V \) to \(|\psi\rangle\). This can be thought of as a quantum version of one-time pad encryption. Of course, this encryption scheme also defines a \((0, 0)\)-locking scheme, but the size of the key is \( 2n \) bits. Recall that we want to use the assumption that the message is random to reduce the key size to something like \( O(\text{polylog}(n)) \) bits.

Ambainis and Smith [AS04] showed that to achieve approximate encryption, it is sufficient to choose the key uniformly at random from a subset \( S \subseteq \{0, 1\}^{2n} \) of size only \( O(n^2 2^n) \). Such pseudorandom subsets are called \( \delta \)-biased sets and have also been used to construct entropically secure encryption schemes [DS05, DD10]. For example, [DD10] showed that it is possible to encrypt a uniformly random state by applying \( \sigma_x^U \sigma_z^V \) where \((U, V)\) is chosen uniformly from a set \( S \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n \) of size \( O(n^3) \) (see [DS05, DD10] for a precise definition of entropic security). Such a scheme can seem like a good candidate for a locking scheme. The following proposition shows that this encryption scheme is far from being \( \epsilon \)-locking. Note that this also shows that the notion of entropic security defined in [Des09, DD10] is weaker than the definition of locking.

**Proposition D.1.** Consider an \( \epsilon \)-locking scheme \( \mathcal{E} \) of the form \( \mathcal{E}(x, k = (u, v)) = \sigma_x^u \sigma_z^v |x\) where the message \( x \in \{0, 1\}^n \) and the key \( u, v \in \{0, 1\}^n \) (see Definition 3.7). Suppose the key \( K \) is chosen uniformly from a set \( S \subseteq \{0, 1\}^{2n} \). Then \( |S| \geq (1 - \epsilon)2^n \).
Proof  Let $X$ be the message (recall $X$ is uniform on $\{0, 1\}^n$) and $(U, V)$ be the key. The key is uniformly distributed on $S$. We show that a measurement in the computational basis gives a lot of information about $X$. Let $I$ be the outcome of measuring $E(X, K)$ in the computational basis. We have for $x, i \in \{0, 1\}^n$,

$$
P \{ X = x | I = i \} = P \{ I = i | X = x \}
$$

$$
= \frac{1}{|S|} \sum_{(u, v) \in S} |\langle i | \sigma_u^x \sigma_v^x | x \rangle|^2 .
$$

Observing that the term $|\langle i | \sigma_u^x \sigma_v^x | x \rangle|^2 \in \{0, 1\}$, we have that for any fixed $i$, there are at most $|S|$ different values of $x$ for which $P \{ X = x | I = i \} > 0$. Thus, defining $T = \{ x \in \{0, 1\}^n : P \{ X = x | I = i \} = 0 \}$, we have

$$
\Delta(p_{X|I=i}, p_X) \geq P \{ X \in T \} - P \{ X \in T | I = i \} = \frac{|T|}{2^n} = 1 - \frac{|S|}{2^n} .
$$

By the definition of a locking scheme, we should have

$$
\Delta(p_{X|I=i}, p_X) \leq \epsilon
$$

which concludes the proof. $\square$

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