Quantum secure direct communication with private dense coding using general preshared quantum state

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Abstract

We study quantum secure direct communication by using a general preshared quantum state and a generalization of dense coding. In this scenario, Alice is allowed to apply a unitary operation on the preshared state to encode her message, and the set of allowed unitary operations forms a group. To decode the message, Bob is allowed to apply a measurement across his own system and the system he receives. In the worst scenario, we guarantee that Eve obtains no information for the message even when Eve access the joint system between the system that she intercepts and her original system of the preshared state. For a practical application, we propose a concrete protocol and derive an upper bound of information leakage in the finite-length setting. We also discuss how to apply our scenario to the case with discrete Weyl-Heisenberg representation when the preshared state is unknown.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Dense coding is known as an attractive quantum information protocol. While the original study considers the noiseless setting [1], many subsequent studies extended this result to more general settings [2–7]. However, all of them focused only on the communication speed in various noisy settings. While dense coding with the noiseless setting realizes twice communication speed, it also realizes quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) as follows [8]. In dense coding, the sender, Alice, and the receiver, Bob, share perfect Bell states and Alice encodes her message by application of a unitary operation. Since Alice’s local state is a completely mixed state, the eavesdropper, Eve, cannot obtain any information about the message even when Eve intercepts the transmitted quantum state. However, it is not easy to prepare a perfect Bell state between Alice and Bob. In fact, when we apply entanglement distillation or entanglement concentration [9–12], we can generate a perfect Bell state or its approximation. Such entanglement distillation operations can be combined with conventional QKD [13–15]. However, such operations requires extra quantum operations in addition to quantum operations for QSDC. Hence, it is preferable to find a protocol to realize secure communication without generating a perfect Bell state. Since secure information transmission over quantum channels is one of major topics in quantum information, it is more important to investigate secure communication via dense coding in a realistic noisy setting. Of course, QSDC can also be realized without dense coding [16–18].

In addition, the preceding studies [2, 3, 6] allowed Alice to use any quantum operation on a single input system. However, implementing arbitrary quantum operations even on a single quantum system is difficult and unnecessary. From a practical viewpoint, it is sufficient to restrict allowed quantum operations to only a subset of unitaries. Since a combination of several possible unitaries is also available, it is natural that such a subset forms a group $G$. When the message-encoding operations are limited to a subgroup of unitary operators, the limit of information transmission has been studied by exploiting the resource theory of asymmetry [3, 5, 7, 19–25]. However, their analyses did not cover the secrecy analysis. Therefore, it is desirable to investigate secure information transmission via preshared entanglement in the framework of the resource theory of asymmetry. On the other hand, many existing studies [2, 3, 6, 26–29] addressed the asymptotic analysis, which shows only the transmission rate. However, no upper bound or finite-length effect for this
setting were given. In this paper, we will derive an upper bound for information leakage under a finite-length practical code and the corresponding asymptotic transmission rate.

Now, we present our communication model in detail. Alice and Bob are assumed to share \( n \) copies of a quantum state \( \tau_{AB} \) on \( \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B \), and Eve has her own system \( \mathcal{H}_E \) correlated to the above state. Hence, their total state is \( n \) copies of a quantum state \( \tau_{ABE} \). To send her message, Alice is allowed to apply unitaries from the set \( \{U_g\}_{g \in G} \), where \( U_g \) forms a projective unitary representation on \( \mathcal{H}_A \) of a group \( G \). Then, after the application of her unitaries, Alice sends her encoded system to Bob. In the worst case, Eve intercepts the transmitted quantum system via a noiseless channel and keeps it. If the transmitted state is not intercepted, Bob receives the quantum system as the output of \( n \) times use of a certain quantum channel \( \Lambda_A \). Bob decodes the message from the joint system composed of his original system and his receiving system. Finally, to check the correct decoding, Alice and Bob apply the error verification. If the verification fails, the communication aborts.

In this scenario, we have two requirements. The first is completeness, in which, the communication aborts with low probability when the transmitted state is not intercepted and the channel from Alice to Bob is the channel \( \Lambda_A \). The second is soundness, which is composed of the secrecy and the reliability. [S1: Secrecy]: Even when Eve intercepts the transmitted quantum system via a noiseless channel, the amount of the information leakage to Eve is negligible. Here the information leakage is evaluated by trace distance. [S2: Reliability]: If the communication does not abort, Bob can recover the message correctly with high probability.

Although quantum key distribution (QKD) is also required to satisfy these requirements \([30–33]\), our method is different from QKD in the following point. Our method requires prior shared quantum state, but QKD does not require it. Due to this difference, our method has the following advantages. In QKD, Eve can intercept all the states sent by Alice and the state information leak out inevitably. Due to this possibility, QKD can be used only for random number distribution and cannot be used for sending messages. However, in our model, even when Eve intercepts the quantum channel from Alice to Bob, Eve cannot obtain any information for Alice’s message while Bob cannot recover it.

To satisfy the reliability, Alice and Bob apply the error verification, which requires a negligible amount of secure keys shared by Alice and Bob \([34\text{, Section VIII}]\). This method allows Bob to verify whether Bob can recover the message correctly. Hence, if the above two
conditions of the soundness are satisfied, even if Bob cannot recover the message, Alice and Bob can repeat the same procedure because there is no information leakage. Therefore, the above pair of requirements are reasonable.

Indeed, some existing papers studied a similar problem setting [8, 35–38] [39, Chapter 7] and proposed corresponding coding scheme [40, 41]. However, their analysis is limited to the asymptotic analysis in a special example, and did not cover the finite-length setting or the general case. Some of the above studies employed the classical-quantum (cq) wire-tap channel model [26, 27, 42, 43], which is a quantum analogue of wire-tap channel model [44–46] and is composed of two channels, the cq channel \( W_B \) from Alice to Bob and the cq channel \( W_E \) from Alice to Eve. In the above scenario, we discuss the channel \( W_E \) to guarantee the [S1] secrecy, and do the channel \( W_B \) to guarantee the requirement [S2] reliability. Using the wire-tap channel model, we derive an achievable transmission rate dependently of the shared entangled state and the channel from Alice to Bob. This achievable transmission rate is given as the difference between the error correcting rate and the sacrificed rate. In addition, we derive finite-length evaluations dependently of the error correcting rate and the sacrificed rate. In the evaluation of information leakage, we derive a new finite-length bound for information leakage for quantum wire-tap channel.

Usually, to achieve the above transmission rate, the receiver is required to apply measurement across many received quantum systems. Such a measurement is called a collective measurement and its implementation is quite difficult. However, when all encoded states on the joint system consisting of a received system and a memory system on Bob’s side are commutative, the above rate can be achieved without the use of collective measurement. That is, when Bob applies a specific measurement on each joint system, the given achievable rate can be attained by the combination of classical encoding and decoding operations by Alice and Bob. In addition, when the group \( G \) is a vector space over a finite field, such classical encoding and decoding have calculation complexity \( O(n \log n) \), where \( n \) is the coding block length. Under this type of coding, we derive formulas for secrecy and reliability dependently of the block length \( n \) and the sacrificed rate. In this way, our results are useful in practical cases.

Here, we emphasize that our protocol is not a simple application of wire-tap channel model while the preceding studies [37, 38, 39, Chapter 7] simply applied the wire-tap channel model to their problem setting. In fact, when Eve receives the output of \( W_E \), Bob cannot receive
the output of $W_B$. That is, Bob can decode the message only when Eve does not receive the output of $W_E$. Therefore, Bob needs to check whether Eve intercepts the transmitted system. Indeed, such an additional step is not needed if the channel is given as a broadcast channel like the studies [47–49]. For this aim, we propose a protocol to combine the conventional wire-tap code and the error verification while the existing studies [8, 35, 38, 40, 41, 39, Chapter 7] did not consider the error verification.

In the next step, we apply our general results to the case when the unitary operation is given as Weyl-Heisenberg representation and the preshared state is Bell diagonal state, which is almost the same as the setting of quantum secure direct communication in [8, 50]. Such a preshared state can be generated by distributing a Bell state over Pauli channel. Then, we numerically calculate the asymptotic transmission rate. Also, to clarify the finite-length effect, we make numerical plots for the sacrificed rate, error correcting rate, and the transmission rate as a function of the coding block length $n$ when we fix other parameters. Further, in a realistic case, the preshared entangled state is not necessarily known. To cover this case, we propose another protocol to include the estimation process. This protocol is designed so that it works well even when the preshared entangled state is not necessarily a Bell diagonal state.

Indeed, our setting covers various situations beyond the above example. For example, our method can be applied to the case with Alice, Bob, and Eve shared correlated classical variables, as pointed in [51, Section VI] [52, 53]. More generally, it is possible to apply it to the case when Alice and Bob shared correlated classical variables and Eve has a correlated quantum state [54]. Such a situation can be realized when Eve makes collective attack in QKD and Alice and Bob estimate Eve’s attack operation perfectly. In addition, the recent research [7, Section IV] presented other three quantum interesting examples for a pair of a group $G$ and an entangled state. Our method can be applied to the noisy situations in these examples. These cases show the generality of our problem setting.

The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes our results for a general model of private dense coding with preshared state. Section III applies these general results to the case with Weyl-Heisenberg representation. Section IV presents our protocol for the unknown preshared state in the above setting. Section V discusses modular code for quantum wire-tap channel, and derives a new finite-length evaluation for information leakage for quantum wire-tap channel. Section VI describes the error verification
process. Section VII gives a practical code construction with a vector space over a finite field. Section VIII discusses our results. Appendix D proposes an estimation method for a Bell diagonal state by one-way local operation and classical communication (LOCC). This estimation method works even for the general unknown state, though it is designed for Bell diagonal state.

II. PRIVATE DENSE CODING MODEL

A. General model description

Assume that Alice, Bob, and Eve share \( n \) copies of the quantum state \( \tau_{ABE} \) on the system \( \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B \otimes \mathcal{H}_E \). We consider a (projective) unitary group representation of a finite group \( G \) on \( \mathcal{H}_A \). That is, for \( g \in G \), we have a unitary operator \( U_g \) such that for \( g, g' \in G \), there exists a complex number \( c(g, g') \) to satisfy

\[
U_g U_{g'} = c(g, g') U_{gg'}.
\]

When \( c(g, g') \) is 1, \( \{U_g\}_{g \in G} \) is called a unitary group representation. Otherwise, it is called a projective group representation. We also consider a quantum channel from Alice to Bob, which is a trace preserving completely positive (TP-CP) map \( \Lambda_A : \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{H}_A) \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{H}_B') \), where \( \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{H}) \) expresses the set of density operators on the system \( \mathcal{H} \). Then, we impose the group covariance condition to the channel \( \Lambda_A \) as

\[
\Lambda_A(U_g \rho U_g^\dagger) = U_g \Lambda_A(\rho) U_g^\dagger, \forall g \in G, \forall \rho \in \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{H}).
\]

The initial state \( \tau_{ABE} \), the available operation set \( \{U_g\} \) and the channel \( \Lambda_A \) constitute a private dense coding setting \( \text{PDC}(\tau_{ABE}, \{U_g\}_{g \in G}, \Lambda_A) \).

Our task is the secure transmission of the message \( M \in \mathcal{M} \) from Alice to Bob by using \( n \) copies of their shared state under the following conditions; Alice is allowed to freely communicate to Bob via a public channel. Alice can apply a unitary \( U_g \) for \( g \in G \) on her local states and sends it to Bob after Bob receives the quantum systems sent by Alice, he acknowledges the fact. This task has the following criteria.

(C): Completeness: The PDC protocol is \( \epsilon_C \)-complete if the error verification aborts with probability no larger than \( \epsilon_C \) when the state is not intercepted and the channel from Alice to Bob is exactly \( \Lambda_A \).
FIG. 1. This figure illustrates the basic setting of private dense coding with general preshared state. (a) In the worst case, the encoded state is intercepted by Eve. (b) Without interception by Eve, Bob receives Alice’s state through channel $\Lambda_A$. (c) The case when there exists a channel $\Lambda_B$ such that $\Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) = \Lambda_B(\tau_{AB})$.

(S): Soundness: This part is composed of two conditions.

(S1): Secrecy: The PDC protocol is $\epsilon_E$-secure if the amount of the information leakage to Eve is upper bounded by $\epsilon_E$ even in the worst case, i.e., when Eve intercepts the whole transmitted quantum state via noiseless channel. The information leakage is evaluated by

$$d(M, E)_{\tau_{ME},t} := \min_{\sigma_E} \|\tau_{ME,t} - P_M \otimes \sigma_{E,t}\|_1,$$

where $E$ expresses all the systems that Eve obtains during the protocol including the intercepted system $A$. $\tau_{ME,t}$ expresses the final state of our protocol, and $P_M$ is the uniform distribution for the message $M$.

(S2): Reliability: The PDC protocol is $\epsilon_B$-reliable if the relation $M = \hat{M}$ holds with significance level $\epsilon_B$, where $M$ is Alice’s original message and $\hat{M}$ expresses Bob’s recovered message. Significance level is the probability of accepting the hypothesis to be shown, given that the hypothesis is assumed to be incorrect. Now, $A_b$ is the event that Bob aborts the protocol so that $A_b^c$ is the event that Bob does not abort the protocol. Hence, $\mathbb{P}[A_b^c | M = m, \hat{M} = \hat{m}]$ expresses the probability that Bob does not abort the protocol when Alice’s original message and Bob’s recovered message are $m$ and $\hat{m}$, respectively. Then, the above condition is rewritten as

$$\sup_{m \neq \hat{m}} \mathbb{P}[A_b^c | M = m, \hat{M} = \hat{m}] \leq \epsilon_B.$$

For a given protocol $P_n$ for private dense coding with $n$ copies of $\tau_{ABE}^{\otimes n}$, its parameters $\epsilon_C$, $\epsilon_E$, and $\epsilon_B$ are denoted by $\epsilon_C(P_n)$, $\epsilon_E(P_n)$, and $\epsilon_B(P_n)$, respectively. Also, the rate of
the message $\frac{\log |M|}{n}$ is denoted by $R(P_n)$. In this setting, Soundness is more important than completeness because soundness shows the quality of our private communication when it is successful. Hence, the parameter of completeness $\epsilon_C$ is not required to be too small. For the parameter $\epsilon_C$ for Completeness, the value $1 - \epsilon_C$ is called a power in the context of statistical hypothesis testing. While there is no definite value for power, Cohen [55] suggested $0.8$ as a conventional level, which corresponds to the choice $\epsilon_C = 0.2$. However, a larger power (i.e., smaller $\epsilon_C$) can be chosen in practice. The reason is the following; Consider the case when Alice and Bob abort the protocol mistakenly while it runs without Eve’s interception. They can run the same protocol again until it is successful. In contrast, the two parameters $\epsilon_E$ and $\epsilon_B$ of soundness need to be very small rigorously. Hence, the two parameters $\epsilon_E$ and $\epsilon_B$ are called security parameters because they express our confidence level.

B. Protocol with finite-length setting

Section VII A constructs our PDC protocol by combining wire-tap code and error verification. Since the cost of error verification is negligible, it is sufficient to consider the cost for wire-tap code. That is, we focus on a cq wire-tap channel model [26, 27, 42, 43], where the channel $W_B$ to Bob is the cq-channel $g(\in G) \mapsto W_B(g) := \Lambda_A(U_g \tau_{AB} U_g^*) = U_g \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) U_g^*$, and the channel $W_E$ to Eve is the cq-channel $g(\in G) \mapsto W_E(g) := U_g \tau_{AE} U_g^*$.

For $n$ copies of the state $\tau_{ABE}$, combining wire-tap codes and error verification with the parameters $R_1$, $R_2$, and $t$, Section VII A constructs a PDC protocol $P_n$ of private dense coding such that $R(P_n) = R_1 - R_2 - \frac{t}{n}$ and

$$
\epsilon_C(P_n) \leq 4 \min_{0 \leq t \leq 1} 2^{sn \left[ R_1 - \log d_A + H^+_1(t|A|B|\Lambda_A(\tau_{AB})) \right]} \tag{4}
$$

$$
\epsilon_E(P_n) \leq \min_{0 \leq t \leq 1} 2 - \frac{2^n}{2^n} 2^{\frac{\log d_A - H^+_1(t|A|E|\tau_{AE})}{2^{t}} - R_2 + 2 \left[ t \left( R_1 - \log d_A + H^+_1(t|A|B|\Lambda_A(\tau_{AB})) \right) \right]} \tag{5}
$$

$$
\epsilon_B(P_n) \leq 2^{-t} \tag{6}
$$

where $d_A$ is the dimension of $\mathcal{H}_A$. Here, $R_1$ and $R_2$ are called the error correcting rate and the sacrificed rate for secrecy, respectively, and $t$ is called the sacrificed length for reliability. In the above formulas, two types of Rényi conditional entropies $H^+_1(t|A|B|\Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}))$ and
\( \tilde{H}^\uparrow_{1+t}(A|E|\tau_{AE}) \) are used.

\[
H^\uparrow_{1+t}(A|B|\rho_{AB}) := -D_{1+t}(\rho_{AB}|| I_A \otimes \rho_B),
\]

where \( I \) is the identity operator and we put the measured quantum state at the last entry of information quantities. The Petz version [56] and the sandwiched version [57, 58] of quantum relative entropy are defined as follows. For \( t \in (-1, \infty) \),

\[
D_{1+t}(\rho|| \sigma) := \frac{1}{t} \log \text{Tr} \rho^{1+t} \sigma^{-t},
\]

\[
\tilde{D}_{1+t}(\rho|| \sigma) := \frac{1}{t} \log \text{Tr}(\sigma^{-\frac{1}{t+t+1}} \rho \sigma^{-\frac{1}{t+t+1}})^{1+t}.
\]

The sandwiched form is always no larger than the Petz form according to Araki-Lieb-Thirring trace inequality [59]. In the \( t = 0 \) case, the above quantities are defined by taking the limit \( t \to 0 \), which is exactly \( D(\rho|| \sigma) := \text{Tr} \rho (\log \rho - \log \sigma) \). Hence, \( \lim_{t \to 0} H^\uparrow_{1+t}(A|B|\rho_{AB}) = \lim_{t \to 0} \tilde{H}^\uparrow_{1+t}(A|B|\rho_{AB}) = H(A|B|\rho) := H(AB|\rho) - H(B|\rho) \), where \( H(AB|\rho) = -\text{Tr} \rho_{AB} \log \rho_{AB} \) and \( H(B|\rho) = -\text{Tr} \rho_B \log \rho_B \).

In addition, as explained in Section V when the following conditions hold, it is possible to make a PDC protocol with small calculation complexity.

(B1): The group \( G \) forms a vector space over a finite field \( \mathbb{F}_q \).

(B2): The states \( \{ U_g \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) U_g^\dagger \}_{g \in G} \) are commutative with each other.

C. Asymptotic setting

In the asymptotic setting of the PDC model, we impose the condition \( \epsilon_C(P_n), \epsilon_E(P_n), \epsilon_B(P_n) \to 0 \) as \( n \to \infty \) for a sequence of PDC protocols \( \{ P_n \} \) from a theoretical viewpoint. Under the above condition, the rate \( \lim_{n \to \infty} R(P_n) \) is called an achievable private rate for a private dense coding setting PDC(\( \tau_{ABE}, \{ U_g \}_{g \in G}, \Lambda_A \)). The supremum of achievable private rates is called the private capacity for PDC(\( \tau_{ABE}, \{ U_g \}_{g \in G}, \Lambda_A \)), and is written as \( C(\tau_{ABE}, \{ U_g \}_{g \in G}, \Lambda_A) \).

As stated as Lemma 4, the capacity of the above wire-tap channel model \( (W_E, W_B) \) equals the private capacity for PDC(\( \tau_{ABE}, \{ U_g \}_{g \in G}, \Lambda_A \)). However, the capacity of wire-tap channel does not have a known single-letterized expression while the classical setting has [45].
Hence, we consider an achievable private rate $R_*$ by using the formulas (4), (5), and (6). For this aim, we define the map $\mathcal{G}$ as $\mathcal{G}(\rho) := \sum_{g \in G} \frac{1}{|G|} U_g \rho U_g^\dagger$.

Since $\lim_{t \to 0} \tilde{H}_{1+t}^\dagger(A|E|\tau_{AE})$ equals

$$R_{1,*} := H(\Lambda_A \circ \mathcal{G}(\tau_{AB})) - H(\Lambda_A(\tau_{AB})) = H(\mathcal{G}(\Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}))) - H(\Lambda_A(\tau_{AB})), \quad (11)$$

the parameter $\epsilon_C(P_n)$ goes to zero with $R_1 < R_{1,*}$. Similarly, since $\lim_{t \to 0} \tilde{H}_{1+t}^\dagger(A|E|\tau_{AE})$ equals

$$R_{2,*} = H(\mathcal{G}(\tau_{AE})) - H(\tau_{AE}), \quad (12)$$

the parameter $\epsilon_E(P_n)$ goes to zero with $R_2 > R_{2,*}$. When $t = \sqrt{n}$, $\epsilon_B(P_n)$ and $\frac{t}{n}$ go to zero. Hence, the following is an achievable private rate;

$$R_* = H(\mathcal{G}(\Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}))) - H(\Lambda_A(\tau_{AB})) - H(\mathcal{G}(\tau_{AE})) + H(\tau_{AE}). \quad (13)$$

In fact, the above achievable rate can be considered as the difference between two mutual informations. When we denote the choice of an element $g \in G$ by the random variable $X$, (11) and (12) become $R_{1,*} = I(X; BB')$, $R_{2,*} = I(X; AE)$ and the achievable private rate of the above wire-tap channel model is given as $I(X; BB') - I(X; AE)$ [26, 27, 42, 43].

### D. Asymptotic analysis with noiseless channel

For further analysis, we assume that $\Lambda_A$ is the noiseless channel and $\{U_g\}_{g \in G}$ is irreducible. Then the rates $R_*, R_{1,*}$, and $R_{2,*}$ are simplified to

$$R_{1,*} = \log d_A - H(A|B)_\tau, \quad R_{2,*} = \log d_A - H(A|E)_\tau, \quad R_* = H(A|E)_\tau - H(A|B)_\tau \quad (14)$$

because $H(\mathcal{G}(\tau_{AB})) = H(\frac{\Lambda_A}{d_A}) = \log d_A + H(\tau_B)$, $H(\mathcal{G}(\tau_{AE})) = H(\frac{\Lambda_A}{d_A} \otimes \tau_B) = \log d_A + H(\tau_E)$, where $d_A := \dim \mathcal{H}_A$. Here, $H(A|E)_\tau$ expresses the conditional entropy when the density matrix is $\tau_{AE}$. When the total state $\tau_{ABE}$ is a pure state and $\Lambda_A$ is the noiseless channel, we have the relations $H(\tau_{AE}) = H(\tau_B)$ and $H(\tau_{AB}) = H(\tau_E)$. Hence, the rate $R_*$ is simplified to

$$R_* = 2H(\tau_{AE}) - H(\tau_E) = 2H(A|E)_\tau = -2H(A|B)_\tau. \quad (15)$$

In fact, as shown in Appendix A when $\Lambda_A$ is the noiseless channel, $\tau_{ABE}$ is a pure state, and $\tau_{AB}$ is maximally correlated, i.e., there exist bases $|v_{j}^A\rangle$ and $|v_{j}^B\rangle$ on $\mathcal{H}_A$ and $\mathcal{H}_B$ such that
\[ \tau_{AB} = \sum_{i,j} a_{ij} |v^A_j, v^B_j\rangle \langle v^A_j, v^B_j|, \]
then the above cq wire-tap channel \( W_B, W_E \) is degraded \cite{42, 60}, i.e., there exists a TP-CP map \( \Gamma \) such that \( W_E(g) = \Gamma(W_B(g)) \). In this case, as shown in Corollary \cite{3} due to the group symmetric condition, the quantity \( (15) \) gives the private capacity of our PDC model, i.e., the maximum secure transmission rate.

Here, we should remark the relation with the method studied in the preceding research \cite{61}. The reference \cite{61} considers the secure key distillation from a preshared state \( \tau_{ABE} \) with the same condition for this subsection. They showed that their one-way method achieves the key generation rate \( H(A|E)_{\tau} \). However, since our method is allowed to use quantum communication from Alice to Bob, it achieves twice of their rate.

\section*{E. Reduction to noiseless case}

In the latter part of the above subsection, we assume that the channel \( \Lambda_A \) is noiseless. When our model with noisy channel \( \Lambda_A \) satisfies the following condition, its analysis can be reduced to the case with the noiseless channel.

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(A1)] There exists a TP-CP map \( \Lambda_B \) on \( \mathcal{H}_B \) such that \( \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) = \Lambda_B(\tau_{AB}) \).
\end{enumerate}

Indeed, the reliability of PDC(\( \tau_{AB} \), \( \{U_g\}, \Lambda_A \)) is equivalent to the reliability of PDC(\( \Lambda_B(\tau_{AB}) \), \( \{U_g\}, \text{id}_A \)) because the reduced state of \( \Lambda_B(\tau_{AB}) \) to \( \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B \) equals \( \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) \), where \( \text{id}_A \) is the identical channel. The secrecy is also equivalent because the reduced state of \( \tau_{AB} \) to \( \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_E \) equals the reduced state of \( \Lambda_B(\tau_{AB}) \) to \( \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_E \). Therefore, the analysis with preshared state \( \tau_{AB} \) and noisy channel \( \Lambda_A \) is reduced to the analysis with preshared state \( \Lambda_B(\tau_{AB}) \) and the noiseless channel.

\section*{III. APPLICATION TO WEYL-HEISENBERG REPRESENTATION}

\subsection*{A. PDC model with Weyl-Heisenberg representation}

In this section, we discuss the private dense coding with preshared state with Weyl-Heisenberg representation. That is, the dimension of space \( \mathcal{H}_A \) is a prime \( d_A = p \), the group \( G \) is Weyl-Heisenberg group \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \) and the group representation is given as a set of implementable operations as follows. In addition, the rate \( R_s \) can be achieved by a protocol
with small calculation complexity as explained latter. The $X$ and $Z$ operators on the $p$-dimensional quantum system are defined as

$$W(x, z) = X^x Z^z$$

$$X = \sum_{j \in \mathbb{F}_p} |j + 1 \rangle \langle j|,$$

$$Z = \sum_{j \in \mathbb{F}_p} \omega^j |j \rangle \langle j|,$$

with $\omega = e^{i2\pi/p}$. In this case, the private dense coding with preshared state is the same as the protocol discussed in [37, 50].

As a typical noise model, we employ a generalized Pauli channel acting on a $d$-dimensional quantum system defined as

$$\Lambda[P_{XZ}](\rho) = \sum_{(x,z) \in \mathbb{F}_p^2} P_{XZ}(x,z)W(x,z)\rho W(x,z)^\dagger. \quad (16)$$

That is, we assume that the preshared state is generated by transmission of a maximally entangled state $|\Phi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{p}} \sum_i |i\rangle_A |i\rangle_B$ from Bob to Alice via the channel $\Lambda[P_{XZ}]$ acting on $\mathcal{H}_A$. In this case, the joint state $\tau_{AB}$ on $\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$ is given as the generalized Bell diagonal state;

$$\rho[P_{XZ}] := \sum_{(x,z) \in \mathbb{F}_p^2} P_{XZ}(x,z)W(x,z)|\Phi\rangle \langle \Phi|W(x,z)^\dagger. \quad (17)$$

To guarantee the secrecy under the worst case, we assume that Eve controls all the environment of the channel $\Lambda[P_{XZ}]$. Hence, the state on the system $\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B \otimes \mathcal{H}_E$ is the pure state $\tau_{ABE} = |\Psi\rangle \langle \Psi|$, i.e., the purification of $\rho[P_{XZ}]$, which is given as

$$|\Psi\rangle_{ABE} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{x,z} \sqrt{P(x,z)}W(x,z)|\Phi\rangle_{AB} |x,z\rangle_E. \quad (18)$$

Also, the channel $\Lambda_A$ from Alice to Bob is given as another generalized Pauli channel $\Lambda_A[\tilde{P}_{XZ}]$. That is, we focus on private dense coding $\text{PDC}(|\Psi\rangle, \{W(x,z)\}, \Lambda[\tilde{P}_{XZ}]_A)$ as depicted in Fig. 2, where $(x,z) \in \mathbb{F}_p^2$ by default. Since we have

$$\Lambda[\tilde{P}_{X,Z}]_A \circ \Lambda[P_{XZ}]_A(|\Phi\rangle \langle \Phi|) = \Lambda[\tilde{P}_{X,Z}]_B \circ \Lambda[P_{XZ}]_A(|\Phi\rangle \langle \Phi|), \quad (19)$$

we can alternatively apply the model $\text{PDC}(\omega_{ABE}, \{W(x,z)\}, \text{id}_A)$, where $\omega_{ABE} := \Lambda[\tilde{P}_{X,Z}]_B(|\Psi\rangle \langle \Psi|)$. 

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In the private dense coding model \(\text{PDC}(\omega_{ABE}, \{W(x, z)\}, \text{id}_A)\), it can be shown that the state received by Bob is always Bell diagonal (see Appendix B), i.e., the condition (B2) holds. Therefore, Bob can extract the information via the measurement \(\Pi_{x,z} = \text{Proj}(W(x, z)\mid \Phi)\) without any state demolition. Once this measurement is applied, the channel from Alice to Bob is given as a classical channel \(W^c\), which is given as \(W^c(x, z\mid x', z') := (\tilde{P}_{XZ} * P_{XZ})(x - x', z - z')\), where the convolution \(\tilde{P}_{XZ} * P_{XZ}\) is defined by

\[
\tilde{P}_{XZ} * P_{XZ}(x, z) := \sum_{x'z'} \tilde{P}_{XZ}(x', z') P_{XZ}(x - x', z - z').
\]

That is, Bob can apply classical decoding to the channel \(W^c\) without any information loss.

Since the group \(G\) forms a vector space over a finite field \(\mathbb{F}_p\) and the states received by Bob are commutative with each other in the above way, the conditions (B1) and (B2) are satisfied so that the rate \(R_*\) can be achieved by a protocol with small calculation complexity. For this model, we have the following lemma, whose proof is shown in Appendix C.

**Lemma 1.** The key information quantities in the setting \(\text{PDC}(\omega_{ABE}, \{W(x, z)\}, \text{id}_A)\) can be expressed as follows.

\[
H(A\mid B)_\omega = H(XZ\mid \tilde{P}_{XZ} * P_{XZ}) - \log d_A \tag{21}
\]

\[
H(A\mid E)_\omega = \log d_A - H(XZ\mid P_{XZ}) \tag{22}
\]

\[
\tilde{H}^{1-t}_1(A\mid B)_\omega = H_{1-t}(\tilde{P}_{XZ} * P_{XZ}) - \log d_A \tag{23}
\]

\[
\tilde{H}^{1+t}_1(A\mid E)_\omega \geq \log d_A - H_{1+t}(P_{XZ}), \tag{24}
\]

where \(H_{1+t}(\rho) := -D_{1+t}(\rho\parallel I)\).

By applying (21) and (22) to the formulas (11), (12) and (13), the rates \(R_*, R_{1,*}, \text{ and } R_{2,*}\) are calculated as

\[
R_{1,*} = 2\log d_A - H(\tilde{P}_{XZ} * P_{XZ}) \tag{25}
\]

\[
R_{2,*} = H(P_{XZ}) \tag{26}
\]

\[
R_* = 2\log d_A - H(P_{XZ}) - H(\tilde{P}_{XZ} * P_{XZ}). \tag{27}
\]

**B. Application of PDC protocol**

The high-dimensional quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [50] is similar to our PDC model. As its generalization, we propose the following protocol based on our PDC...
model. The aim of the following protocol is that Alice transmits her message $M \in \mathcal{M} := \mathbb{F}_p^{n_2}$ to Bob by using two quantum channels, i.e., $\Lambda[P_{XZ}]$ from Bob to Alice and $\Lambda[\tilde{P}_{XZ}]$ from Alice to Bob, and a free public channel in both directions. In the following scenario, Bob distributes quantum states via $\Lambda[P_{XZ}]$ initially. Next, Alice sends back the received system to Bob via $\Lambda[\tilde{P}_{XZ}]$ after her coding operation. While we assume there is no possibility that the channel $\Lambda[P_{XZ}]$ from Bob to Alice is changed or intercepted, Eve is assumed to receive the environment of the channel $\Lambda[P_{XZ}]$. That is, by using a unitary $U$ from $\mathcal{H}_B$ to $\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_E$ whose reduction to $\mathcal{H}_A$ is $\Lambda[P_{XZ}]$, the transmission process from Bob to Alice is regarded as the application of the unitary $U$, and Eve has the system $\mathcal{H}_E$ of the output of the unitary $U$. In addition, we consider that Eve intercepts the second quantum communication from Alice to Bob in the worst case. Due to the above assumption, Completeness (C) and Soundness (S) can be applied to this problem setting in the same way as the PDC model.

To state our protocol, we prepare a classical error correcting code $\varphi = (\varphi_e, \varphi_d)$ for $n$ uses of the classical channel $W^c$ with decoding error probability $\epsilon(\varphi)$, where $\varphi_e$ is a classical linear encoder that maps $\mathbb{F}_p^{n_1}$ to a linear subspace $\mathcal{L}$ of $\mathbb{F}_p^{2n}$, and $\varphi_d$ is a classical decoder that maps $\mathbb{F}_p^{2n}$ to $\mathbb{F}_p^{n_1}$. Here, $n_1$ is called the coding length of the code $\varphi$. Then, we prepare the message set $\mathcal{M} := \mathbb{F}_p^{n_2}$, the set for covering variable $\mathcal{Y} := \mathbb{F}_p^{n_3}$, which will be used to cover the message in error verification, the message set for wire-tap code $\mathcal{M}' := \mathcal{Y} \times \mathcal{M} = \mathbb{F}_p^{n_2+n_3}$, and two sets of random seeds $S := \mathbb{F}_p^{n_1-1}$, $S' := \mathbb{F}_p^{n_2+n_3-1}$. We prepare two universal hash function (UHF) families $f_S : \mathbb{F}_p^{n_1} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}'$ and $g_{S'} : \mathcal{M}' \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$, which is defined in (64) and (65), respectively. Then, combining the encoder of classical error correcting code $\varphi_e$ and the random seed $S$, we define the function $\psi_S$ by (66). Under the above preparation, we propose Protocol 1, which is also illustrated in Fig.3.

**Protocol 1**

**Entanglement distribution:** Bob starts the protocol by generating $n$ entangled state $|\Phi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_j |j\rangle_B |j\rangle_A$. Then he sends the system $A$ of the states to Alice and keeps the rest $B$ system.

**Encoding:** When Alice intends to send the message $M \in \mathcal{M}$, Alice generates random variables $S \in \mathcal{S}$, $S' \in \mathcal{S}'$, $Y \in \mathcal{Y}$, and $L_2 \in \mathbb{F}_p^{n_1-(n_2+n_3)}$ independently according to the uniform distribution. Alice chooses elements $X^n = (X_1X_2 \ldots X_n) := \psi_S(Y, M, L_2) \in \mathbb{F}_p^{2n}$. Alice applies private dense coding operation $W(x_i, z_i)$ on the $i$-th state and sends them back to Bob.
FIG. 2. This figure illustrates the setting PDC(⟨Ψ⟩, {W(x, z)}, Λ[PXZ]A). U is the unitary that reduces to the Pauli channel Λ[PXZ] by tracing out system E. Entanglement distribution is done via the application of the unitary U to the maximally entangled state. |Ψ⟩ABE is the output state of the above entanglement distribution. (a) In the worst case, Alice’s state is intercepted by Eve through a noiseless channel. (b) Without interception by Eve, Bob receives Alice’s state through channel Λ[PXZ]. (c) The noiseless reduction of original setting.

Reception: Bob applies projective measurement Π = {Πx,z} with Πx,z = Proj(W(x, z)A |Φ⟩) on the composite system of the received states and the kept states to obtain classical string \( \hat{X}^n = (\hat{X}_1 \hat{X}_2 ... \hat{X}_n) \) with \( \hat{X}_i \in \mathbb{F}_p^2 \), where the projection operator on state |ψ⟩ is denoted by Proj(|ψ⟩). Specifically, if \( p = 2 \), the measurement becomes Bell state measurement. Finally, Bob acknowledges this reception to Alice via the public channel.

Public communication from Alice to Bob: Alice sends the variables S, S', and C := gS′(M, Y) to Bob via the public channel.

Decoding & Verification: Bob performs classical decoding to \( \hat{X}^n \), i.e., he obtains \( (\hat{M}, \hat{Y}) := f_S(\varphi_d(\hat{X}^n)) \). If \( g_S(\hat{M}, \hat{Y}) = C \), he accepts the message \( \hat{M} \). Otherwise, he aborts the protocol.

Due to (69), we find that this protocol has \( \epsilon(\varphi) \)-completeness. Using (70) and (71) with (23), we find that this protocol has Soundness with parameters \( \epsilon_E \) and \( \epsilon_B \) when \( n_1 - (n_2 + n_3) \) and \( n_3 \) are chosen to be \( \hat{m}_2(\epsilon_E) \) and \( \hat{m}_3(\epsilon_B) \) defined as

\[
\hat{m}_2(\epsilon_E) := \frac{1}{\log p} \min_{0 \leq i \leq 1} H_{1/t} (P_{XZ}) - \frac{1 + t}{t} \log \epsilon_E - 2 \tag{28}
\]
\[
\hat{m}_3(\epsilon_B) := -\frac{\log \epsilon_B}{\log p}. \tag{29}
\]

As explained in Proposition 1, there exists an error correcting code \( \varphi \) with the average decoding error probability \( \epsilon_C \) and coding length \( \hat{m}_1(\epsilon_C) \)

\[
\hat{m}_1(\epsilon_C) = \frac{1}{\log p} \max_{0 \leq i \leq 1} 2 \log d_A - H_{1-t} (P_{XZ} * P_{XZ}) + \frac{1}{t} (\log \epsilon_C - 2). \tag{30}
\]
FIG. 3. This figure illustrates Protocol 1. Real lines express quantum information flow. Dotted lines express classical information flow. |Φ⟩ = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_i |i⟩_A |i⟩_B is the initial state generated by Bob and U is a unitary performed by Eve. In Alice’s encoding part, ψ_S is the encoder acting on the message M and random number Y, L_2. W(x_i, z_i) is the encoding operation on the i-th state. In Bob’s decoding part, Π_{x,z} is a generalized Bell state measurement and the classical decoder f_S \circ \varphi_d is a concatenation of the decoder of a classical error correcting code and a universal hash function. In addition, they decide if the protocol aborts by comparing the results of universal hash function g_{S’}. Note that C and the random seeds S, S’ are transmitted via a public channel. The explicit definitions for ψ_S, g_{S’}, f_S are given in Section VII A.

These relations show the existence of a protocol that is \( \epsilon_C \)-complete, \( \epsilon_E \)-secure, and \( \epsilon_B \)-reliable. A simulation of the rates \( R_1 = \frac{\hat{m}_1(\epsilon_C)}{n} \), \( R_2 = \frac{\hat{m}_2(\epsilon_E)}{n} \), \( R_3 = \frac{\hat{m}_3(\epsilon_B)}{n} \) and \( R = R_1 - R_2 - R_3 \) in qubit case is shown in Fig. 4. The values defined in (28) and (29) have a practical meaning because \( \epsilon_E \)-secure and \( \epsilon_B \)-reliable conditions can be satisfied with these numbers \( \hat{m}_2(\epsilon_E) \) and \( \hat{m}_3(\epsilon_B) \) and calculation complexity \( O(n \log n) \), as explained in Section VII A. However, (30) does not have such a practical meaning for completeness because it assumes the combination of the random coding and maximum likelihood decoder. In contrast, the asymptotic rate (25) has a practical meaning because there exist error correcting codes to achieve the rate (25) with a small calculation complexity as explained in Section VII while
FIG. 4. This figure illustrates the error correcting rate $R_1$, the sacrificed rate for secrecy $R_2$, the sacrificed rate for error verification $R_3$ and the message rate $R = R_1 - R_2 - R_3$ in asymptotic and finite block length settings. (a) Asymptotic rate in depolarizing channel $E(\rho) = (1-p)\rho + pp_{\text{mix}}$. Note that $R_3 = 0$ asymptotically and the message rate reaches zero when $p \approx 0.18$. (b) Finite length rate in depolarizing channel with depolarizing probability $p = 0.05$ with criteria $\epsilon_C \leq 0.2, \epsilon_B \leq 10^{-9}, \epsilon_E \leq 10^{-9}$. It is shown that the rates almost achieve the asymptotic limit at block length $10^6$.

their finite-length analysis is not so simple.

IV. APPLICATION TO UNKNOWN STATE WITH WEYL-HEISENBERG REPRESENTATION

In the PDC model, we consider the case when the preshared state $\tau_{ABE}$ is unknown. This case corresponds to the case when the channel from Bob to Alice is unknown in the model stated in Subsection III B. In this case, Alice and Bob need to estimate it before their secure communication. As a simple problem setting, we assume that Alice and Bob share $n'$ copies of the state $\tau_{AB}$ while they do not know the form of $\tau_{AB}$, which is called the independent and identical density (i.i.d.) condition. In the worst case, Eve controls the whole of the environment system of the state $\tau_{AB}^{\otimes n'}$. To satisfy the secrecy requirement, Alice and Bob need to identify the form of $\tau_{AB}$ and assume the worst case.

Suppose that Alice and Bob use $n' - n$ copies for the estimation of $\tau_{AB}$. In this case,
they estimate $\tau_{AB}$ by using only two-way LOCC, which is often called local tomography.

However, the estimation of the unknown state without any assumption requires many types of measurements. If $\mathcal{H}_A$ and $\mathcal{H}_B$ have the same dimension and the unknown state $\tau_{AB}$ is a Bell diagonal state $\rho[P_{XZ}]$, we can reduce the number of measurements for the estimation as explained in Appendix D.

When $\mathcal{H}_B$ is the same-dimensional as $\mathcal{H}_A$ and $\tau_{AB}$ is a general state, we can apply discrete twirling to the state $\tau_{AB}$:

$$T(\tau_{AB}) := \frac{1}{d^2} \sum_{x,z} (W(x,z)_A \otimes \overline{W(x,z)}_B)\tau_{AB}(W(x,z)_A \otimes \overline{W(x,z)}_B)^\dagger,$$  \hspace{1cm} (31)

where $\overline{W(x,z)}_B$ is the complex conjugate of $W(x,z)_B$. It is known that the above state is a Bell diagonal state [62, Example 4.22], [63, 64]. Hence, when Alice and Bob apply the above discrete twirling and apply the estimation of a Bell diagonal state, they can apply private dense coding whose shared state is the estimated Bell diagonal state. However, as shown in Appendix D the twirled state $T(\tau_{AB})$ can be estimated by applying the estimation method given in Appendix D to the state $\tau_{AB}$.

Therefore, combining the above method with Protocol 1, we propose Protocol 2, in which the encoding and decoding processes contain the procedure for the discrete twirling. In the following protocol, we assume that the communication channel from Bob to Alice is given as the $n'$ times use of the same channel from Bob to Alice while the channel is not known.

**Protocol 2**

**Entanglement distribution:** Bob starts the protocol by generating $n'$ entangled state $|\Phi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_j |j\rangle_B |j\rangle_{A'}$. Then he sends the $A'$ halves of the states to Alice and keeps the rest system $\mathcal{H}_B$. Then, they share state $\tau_{AB}^{\otimes n'}$.

**Estimation:** Alice and Bob choose $n' - n$ samples, and estimate the twirled state $T(\tau_{AB})$ of the shared state $\tau_{AB}$ by using the method explained in Appendix D. Based on the estimation of $\tau_{AB}$, they decide their error correcting code $\varphi$ and the integers $n_1, n_2, n_3$.

**Encoding:** Alice generates a string $\tilde{X}^n = (\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2, \ldots, \tilde{X}_n)$ with $X_i = (x_i, z_i) \in \mathbb{F}_d^2$ according to the uniform distribution. Alice encodes her message $M$ into a string $X^n = (X_1 X_2 \ldots X_n) := \psi_S(Y, M, L_2)$ with $X_i \in \mathbb{F}_p^2$. For every elements $(x_i, z_i) := \tilde{X}_i + X_i$, Alice applies operation $W(\tilde{x}_i, \tilde{z}_i)W(x_i, z_i)$ on the remaining $i$-th state and sends them back to Bob.
Pubic communication from Alice to Bob 1: Alice sends the string $X^n$ to Bob via the public channel.

Reception: Bob applies unitaries $W(\bar{x}_1, \bar{z}_1) \cdots W(\bar{x}_n, \bar{z}_n)$ to $\mathcal{H}_B^\otimes n$, where $(\bar{x}_i, \bar{z}_i) := \bar{X}_i$. Then, Bob applies projective measurement $\Pi = \{\Pi_{x,z}\}$ on the composite system of the received states and the kept states to obtain classical string $\hat{X}^n = (\hat{X}_1 \hat{X}_2 \ldots \hat{X}_n)$.

Pubic communication from Alice to Bob 2: The same procedure as the same step of Protocol 1.

Decoding & Verification : Bob performs classical decoding to $\hat{X}^n$, i.e., he obtains $(\hat{M}, \hat{Y}) := f_S(\varphi_d(\hat{X}^n))$. If $g_{S'}(\hat{M}, \hat{Y}) = C$, he accepts the message $\hat{M}$. Otherwise, he aborts the protocol.

Since the estimation method given in Appendix D works well, due to the discussion in Subsection III B, this protocol achieves the rate given in (27) with the limit $n \to \infty$. For further analysis on the above protocol, notice the relation

$$W(\hat{x}, \hat{z})_A \otimes (W(\bar{x}, \bar{z})_B)\dagger |\Phi\rangle\langle \Phi|W(\hat{x}, \hat{z})_A \otimes W(\bar{x}, \bar{z})_B$$

(32)

$$=W(\hat{x} + \bar{x}, \hat{z} + \bar{z})_A \otimes I_B|\Phi\rangle\langle \Phi|W(\hat{x} + \bar{x}, \hat{z} + \bar{z})_A \otimes I_B.$$  

(33)

The operator (32) expresses a positive operator-valued measurement (POVM) element of the unitary $W(\bar{x}_i, \bar{z}_i)$ and the measurement $\Pi$ as a whole performed in Reception step. The above relation shows that Bob can apply the measurement with POVM elements given in (33) instead of (32). That is, when the outcome of the measurement corresponding to (33) by $(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) := (\hat{x} + \bar{x}, \hat{z} + \bar{z})$, Bob outcome $(\hat{x}, \hat{z})$ of the above protocol is given as $(\bar{x} - \bar{x}, \bar{z} - \bar{z})$.

Therefore, Protocol 2 is converted to the following protocol.

Protocol 3

Same steps as Protocol 2: They make the same steps as Entanglement distribution, Estimation, and Encoding as Protocol 2.

Reception: Bob applies projective measurement $\Pi = \{\Pi_{x,z}\}$ on the composite system of the received states and the kept states to obtain classical string $X^n = (X_1 X_2 \ldots X_n)$.

Pubic communication from Alice to Bob: Alice sends the variables $S, S', C := g_{S'}(M, Y)$, and $\bar{X}^n$ to Bob via the public channel.

Decoding & Verification : Bob performs classical decoding to $X^n - \bar{X}^n$, i.e., he obtains $(\hat{M}, \hat{Y}) := f_S(\varphi_d(X^n - \bar{X}^n))$. If $g_{S'}(\hat{M}, \hat{Y}) = C$, he accepts the message $\hat{M}$. Otherwise, he aborts the protocol.
V. MODULAR CODE FOR QUANTUM WIRE-TAP CHANNEL

A. Formulation for quantum wire-tap channel

This section proposes a modular coding scheme with fixed error correcting code for quantum wire-tap channels and analyze its performance in finite length setting because this code construction is used for our PDC protocol. In the wire-tap channel model, the legitimate user Alice wants to send messages to another legitimate user Bob through a channel reliably and secretly in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. The classical wire-tap channel has been extensively investigated since the debut of Wyner’s wire-tap channel model [44], which was subsequently generalized by Csiszár and Körner [45]. The quantum wire-tap channel was also explored both in asymptotic setting [26, 27] and finite setting [43]. It acts as an approach to analyze the secrecy of QKD protocols [61] and QSDC protocols [36, 37].

Here we focus on classical-quantum (cq) wire-tap channel, which consists of two cq channels: $W_B : x(\in \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow W_B(x)$ from Alice to Bob and $W_E : x(\in \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow W_E(x)$ from Alice to Eve. Here, $W_B(x)$ and $W_E(x)$ are states on quantum systems $\mathcal{K}_B$ and $\mathcal{K}_E$, respectively. Alice’s and Bob’s procedures are called an encoder $\Gamma$ and a decoder $\Pi$, respectively. When they use $n$ times of the above channel, an encoder is a map $\Gamma$ from a message set $\mathcal{M}$ to $\mathcal{X}^n$. A decoder $\Pi$ is a POVM $\{\Pi_m\}_{m \in \mathcal{M}}$ on $\mathcal{K}_B^\otimes n$. A pair of an encoder $\Gamma$ and a decoder $\Pi$ is called a code $\Phi$. The decoding error probability is denoted by $\epsilon(W_B|\Phi)$. The ratio $\frac{\log |\mathcal{M}|}{n}$ is called the transmission rate and is denoted by $R(\Phi_n)$.

Here we measure the information leakage with a slightly different quantity from (3),

$$\bar{d}(M; E)_{\tau_{ME}} := \|\tau_{ME} - P_M \otimes \tau_E\|_1,$$  \hspace{1cm} (34)

where $\tau_{ME}$ is the joint state between Eve’s system $E$ and the message $M$ with the uniform distribution. Note that mutual information $I(M; E)$ as another frequently used criterion can be upper bounded by trace norm through Fannes’ inequality. When Alice’s encode is $\Gamma$, we denote the above value by $\bar{d}(M; E)[\Gamma]$.

A rate $R$ is said to be achievable for the wire-tap channel $(W_B, W_E)$ if there exists a sequence of codes $\Phi_n = (\Gamma_n, \Pi_n)$ such that when the time channel use $n$ goes to infinity, the decoding error probability $\epsilon(W_B|\Phi_n)$ and information leakage $\bar{d}(M; E)[\Gamma_n]$ go to zero and the transmission rate $R(\Phi_n)$ goes to $R$. The secrecy capacity for the wire-tap channel is
defined as the supreme of all possible achievable rate, which is calculated as [27]

\[ C(W_B, W_E) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} \max_{P_{Y|X^n}} \left[ I(T; B^n) - I(T; E^n) \right]. \] (35)

As a corollary, the rate \( I(X; B) - I(X; E) \) is always achievable.

To ensure that the transmitted message can be decoded reliably, an error correcting code for channel \( W_B \) is needed. To keep the eavesdropper ignorant of the message, some randomization should be performed on the message. Hence, the modular coding scheme here is constructed as a concatenation of an inverse UHF family and an ordinary error correcting code. Such structure has been introduced in classical situations [65]. In contrast to random coding [27, 43] and ad hoc coding inspired by specific error correcting code [66–68], our scheme is more practical for implementation thanks to the modular structure. Also, our secrecy bound is improved compared with [43].

We take the following notations for the next parts. If a probability transition matrix \( \Gamma : \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{X} \) is applied to a random variable \( V \), we use the symbol \( \Gamma \circ P_V \) to denote the probability distribution of the transition output, and the symbol \( \Gamma \times P_V \) to denote the joint distribution of both the input and the output. In other words, we define \( \Gamma \circ P_V(x) := \sum_v P_V(v) \Gamma(x|v) \) and \( \Gamma \times P_V(x, v) := P_V(v) \Gamma(x|v) \). Similarly, for the quantum channel \( W_E \), we have the notations \( W_E \circ P_X := \sum_x P_X(x) W_E(x) \) and \( W_E \times P_X := \sum_x P_X(x) |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes W_E(x) \). Also, we define the cq channel \( W_E \circ \Gamma \) as \( W_E \circ \Gamma(v) := \sum_x \Gamma(x|v) W_E(x) \). In addition, for any set \( \mathcal{X} \), we denote the uniform distribution on the set \( \mathcal{X} \) by \( P_{\mathcal{X}} \).

B. Modular code construction

The modular code is constructed based on an existing error correcting code. Before the construction, we introduce a UHF family \( \{f_S\}_{S \in \mathcal{S}} \), where \( f_S \) is a function from a set \( \mathcal{L} \) to another set \( \mathcal{M}' \) and \( S \in \mathcal{S} \) is a variable to identify the function and is subject to the uniform distribution \( P_S \) on \( \mathcal{S} \).

The function family \( \{f_S\}_{S \in \mathcal{S}} \) is called a UHF family when the following condition holds;

**(C1):** The relation

\[ \Pr[f_S(l) = f_S(l') \leq \frac{1}{M'}], \] (36)

holds for any \( l \neq l' \in \mathcal{L} \), where \( M' := |\mathcal{M}'| \).
Specifically, we impose an additional balanced condition:

(C2): The relation

\[ |\{ l \in L : f_s(l) = m' \}| = L_2 := \frac{L_1}{M'}, \quad (37) \]

holds for any \( s \in S, m' \in M' \), where \( L_1 := |L| \).

Throughout this paper we always mean the balanced version by UHF family. The inverse of \( f_s \) generates a random map. That is, for a given \( m' \in M' \), we define the distribution \( \Gamma[f_s]_{m'} \) as the uniform distribution on the set \( \{ l : f_s(l) = m \} \).

Suppose that our existing error correcting code is given as \( (L, \{ \Pi_l \}_{l \in L}) \), where \( L \) is a subset of channel input set \( X \) and \( \{ \Pi_l \}_{l \in L} \) is a POVM for decoding \( L \). We prepare a UHF family \( \{ f_s \}_{s \in S} \) from \( L \) to \( M' \). Before communication, Alice randomly chooses \( S = s \), which will be shared via the public channel. When Alice intends to send the message \( m' \in M' \), she generates \( L \) subject to the distribution \( \Gamma[f_s]_{m'} \). Therefore, when Alice intends to send \( m' \in M' \), Bob receives the state \( W_B \circ \Gamma[f_s]_{m'} \).

The decoder at Bob’s side is a POVM \( \Pi[f_s] \) with elements

\[ \Pi[f_s]_m = \sum_{l : f_s(l) = m} \Pi_l. \quad (38) \]

Then the encoder and the decoder constitute the code \( \Phi[f_s] = (\Gamma[f_s], \Pi[f_s]) \). The performance of a wire-tap code consists of error probability and secrecy. When the message \( M \) is subjected to uniform distribution, we have the average error probability

\[ \epsilon(W_B|\Phi[f_s]) = \sum_{m' \in M'} \frac{1}{M'} \Tr(1 - \Pi[f_s]_{m'}) W_B \circ \Gamma[f_s]_{m'}. \quad (39) \]

When we denote the decoding error probability of the code \( \varphi \) by \( \epsilon(W_B|\varphi) \), we have

\[ \epsilon(W_B|\Phi[f_s]) \leq \epsilon(W_B|\varphi). \quad (40) \]

For the information leakage, taking the average for \( S \), we have

\[ \bar{d}(M'; ES)[\Gamma[f_S]] := \| \tau_{M'E S} - P_{M'} \otimes \tau_{E|S} \|_1 \]

\[ = \mathbb{E}_S \| \tau_{M'E|S} - P_{M'} \otimes \tau_{E|S} \|_1, \]

\[ = \mathbb{E}_S \bar{d}(M'; E)[\Gamma[f_S]], \quad (41) \]

where \( \tau_{M'E S} = \sum_s P_S(s) \langle s | \otimes W_E \circ \Gamma[f_s] \times P_{M'} \) and \( M' \) and \( S \) are subjected to independent and uniform distribution. The quantity \( \bar{d}(M'; ES) \) is often useful for our analysis.
C. Finite-length analysis for general wire-tap channel

For our finite length analysis, we introduce Rényi mutual information as

\[
I_{1+t}^{\uparrow}(A; B|\rho_{AB}) := D_{1+t}(\rho_{AB}\|\rho_A \otimes \rho_B),
\]

(42)

\[
\tilde{I}_{1+t}^{\uparrow}(A; B|\rho_{AB}) := \tilde{D}_{1+t}(\rho_{AB}\|\rho_A \otimes \rho_B).
\]

(43)

Another version of Rényi mutual information is given as

\[
I_{1+t}^{\downarrow}(A; B|\rho_{AB}) := \inf_{\sigma_B \in D(H_B)} D_{1+t}(\rho_{AB}\|\rho_A \otimes \sigma_B),
\]

(44)

\[
\tilde{I}_{1+t}^{\downarrow}(A; B|\rho_{AB}) := \inf_{\sigma_B \in D(H_B)} \tilde{D}_{1+t}(\rho_{AB}\|\rho_A \otimes \sigma_B).
\]

(45)

For the secrecy, we have the following theorem, which is shown in Appendix E.1.

**Theorem 1.** Assume \( W_E \) is a cq channel. For any subset \( L \subset X \), we choose a UHF family \( \{f_s\}_{s \in S} \) defined on \( L \). Then, the wire-tap code \( \Phi[f_s] \) with encoder \( \Gamma[f_s] \) satisfies the following relation for the average information leakage.

\[
\bar{d}(M; ES)[\Gamma[f_s]] \leq 2^{\frac{1}{1-t} \log L_2 + \tilde{I}_{1+t}^{\downarrow}(X; E|W_E \times P_L)}.
\]

(46)

Since an error correcting code for a cq channel can always be transformed into a modular wire-tap code, we have the following proposition on error probability according to previous result [69].

**Proposition 1.** Assume \( W_B \) is a cq channel. There exists an error correcting code \( \varphi = (\mathcal{L}, \{\Pi_t\}_{t \in \mathcal{L}}) \) such that

\[
e(W_B|\varphi) \leq 4 \min_{P_X, 0 \leq t \leq 1} 2^{\frac{1}{1-t} \log L_1 - I_{1+t}^{\downarrow}(X; B|W_B \times P_X)}.
\]

(47)

When we choose a UHF family \( \{f_s\}_{s \in S} \) defined on a subset \( L \) chosen in the way as Proposition 1, the combination of (40) and (47) implies the inequality

\[
e(W_B|\Phi[f_s]) \leq 4 \min_{P_X, 0 \leq t \leq 1} 2^{\frac{1}{1-t} \log L_1 - I_{1+t}^{\downarrow}(X; B|W_B \times P_X)}
\]

(48)

for any \( s \in S \).

Theorem 1 gives a single shot bound on information leakage. However, they are inconvenient to evaluate because of the dependence on the subset \( L \) in (46). The following corollary shows evaluable bound independent of \( L \) in the \( n \)-fold channel situation (see Appendix E.2 for the proof).
Corollary 1. When the cq channels $W_E$, $W_B$ take the $n$-fold form $W_E^n$, $W_B^n$, there exists a wire-tap code $\Phi[f_s]$ generated from $\varphi = (\mathcal{L}, \{\Pi_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{L}})$ such that

$$\epsilon(W_B|\Phi[f_s]) \leq 4 \min_{0 \leq t \leq 1} 2^{t \left[ \log L_1 - n \max_{Q_X} I_{1-t}^t(X;B|W_B \times Q_X) \right]}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (49)

Corollary 2. For any subset $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \mathcal{X}^n$, we choose a UHF family $\{f_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$ defined on $\mathcal{L}$. Then, the wire-tap code $\Phi[f_s]$ with encoder $\Gamma[f_s]$ satisfies the following relation for the average information leakage.

$$\bar{d}(M'; ES)[\Gamma[f_s]] \leq \min_{0 \leq t \leq 1} 2^{\frac{1}{4} t \left[ - \log L_2 + n \max_{Q_X} \hat{I}_1^t(X;|E|W_E \times Q_X) \right]}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (50)

For any $0 < t < 1$ and arbitrarily small $\delta$, take $\log L_1 = n \max_{Q_X} \hat{I}_1^t(X;B|W_B \times Q_X) - n\delta$, $\log L = \max_{Q_X} \hat{I}_1^t(X;E|W_E \times Q_X) + n\delta$, then any coding rate below $\max_{Q_X} I(X;B|W_E \times Q_X) - \max_{Q_X} I(X;E|W_E \times Q_X)$ is achievable by taking $t \to 0$.

D. Finite-length analysis for symmetric wire-tap channel

Next we discuss the symmetric channel case. A channel $W : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{H})$ is symmetric if the input set $\mathcal{X}$ is a group and there exist a unitary projective representation $\{U_x\}_{x \in \mathcal{X}}$ and a state $\rho_0 \in \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{H})$ such that $W(x) = U_x \rho_0 U_x^\dagger$. When $W_E$ is symmetric, the security evaluation in our criterion automatically implies the semantic security [43, Lemma 7]. Although Lemma 7 in [43] showed the semantic security by using the additive condition, i.e., the commutativity of $\mathcal{X}$, this derivation uses only the above symmetric condition and does not use the commutativity of $\mathcal{X}$. In fact, while we will discuss a wire-tap channel $(W_B, W_E)$ for our analysis on private dense coding, both channels $W_E$ and $W_B$ satisfy the symmetric condition. As the following theorem, which is shown in Appendix E 3, we can simplify our upper bounds for the error probability and secrecy in the symmetric case.

Theorem 2. When $W_E$ is a symmetric cq channel, the upper bound in (50) is simplified to

$$\bar{d}(M'; ES)[\Gamma[f_s]] \leq \min_{0 \leq t \leq 1} 2^{\frac{1}{4} t \left[ - \log L_2 + n \max_{Q_X} \hat{I}_1^t(X;E|W_E \times Q_X) \right]}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (51)

When $W_B$ is a symmetric cq channel, the upper bound in (49) is simplified to

$$\epsilon(W_B|\Phi[f_s]) \leq 4 \min_{0 \leq t \leq 1} 2^{t \left[ \log L_1 - n \max_{Q_X} \hat{I}_1^t(X;B|W_B \times Q_X) \right]}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (52)
Theorem 2 shows that the rate

\[ R_\ast = I(X; B| W_\ast) - I(X; E| W_\ast) \]  

(53)

is achievable for our modular code in the symmetric case while this achievability is known in existing studies [26, 27, 43]. To see our advantage over existing studies, we focus on the exponential decreasing rate of information leakage for an encoder \( \Gamma[f_S] \). When the sacrificed rate \( R_2 = \log L_2 \) is fixed, \( \bar{d}(M'; ES)[\Gamma[f_S]] \) should decrease exponentially as \( n \to \infty \). The exponential decreasing rate (exponent) is defined by

\[ e_d(R_2|W_\ast) := \lim_{n \to \infty} -\frac{1}{n} \log \bar{d}(M'; ES)[\Gamma[f_S]]. \]  

(54)

Then (51) yields

\[ e_d(R_2|W_\ast) \geq \max_{0 \leq t \leq 1} \frac{t}{1 + t}(R_2 - \tilde{I}_{1+t}^\ast(X; E| W_\ast \times P_X)). \]  

(55)

The above lower bound of the exponent is strictly larger than the result

\[ e_d(R_2|W_\ast) \geq \max_{0 \leq t \leq 1} \frac{t}{2}(R_2 - I_{1+t}^\ast(X; E| W_\ast \times P_X)) \]  

(56)

obtained in [43] using random coding method.

Also, as shown in Appendix E 4, we have the following lemma.

**Lemma 2.** When the cq wire-tap channel \((W_B, W_E)\) is degraded and both channels \(W_B, W_E\) are symmetric, the secrecy capacity is \( I(X; \hat{B}) - I(X; \hat{E}) \), where \( X \) express the random variable that takes values in the finite group \( G \) according to the uniform distribution on \( G \).

**VI. ERROR VERIFICATION**

Now, we explain how the reliability can be realized by error verification [34, Section VIII][70]. Assume that Alice sends the information \((M,Y) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{Y}\) via wire-tap code and Bob obtains \((\hat{M}, \hat{Y}) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{Y}\). \( M \) and \( Y \) are assumed to obey the uniform distribution on \( \mathcal{M} \) and \( \mathcal{Y} \) independently. They intend to check whether \( M = \hat{M} \) holds without leaking the information for \( M \). For this aim, Alice prepares a UHF family \( \{g_{S'}\} : \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{Y} \), where \( S' \) is the random seed to decide the hash function. Here, we additionally impose the following condition;
(C3): For any \( m \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{Y}, \) and \( s' \in S' \), there uniquely exists \( y(m, s', c) \in \mathcal{Y} \) such that
\[
c = g_{s'}(m, y(m, s', c)).
\] (57)

The condition (C3) implies the balanced condition (C2). Then, Alice sends the random seed \( S' \) and \( C := g_{S'}(M, Y) \) to Bob via the public channel. When \( g_{S'}(\hat{M}, \hat{Y}) = C \), Bob accepts his decoded message \( \hat{M} \). Otherwise, he aborts the protocol.

Denote the length of \( \mathcal{Y} \) by \( t \), i.e. \( t = \log|\mathcal{Y}| \). In the following, we show that the relation
\[
\sup_{m \neq \hat{m}} \Pr[\text{Ab}^c(m, \hat{m})] \leq 2^{-t}
\] (58)
holds when \( S' \) is independent of \( M, Y, \hat{M}, \hat{Y} \). For this aim, it is sufficient to show the relation
\[
\Pr[g_{S'}(m, Y) = g_{S'}(\hat{m}, \hat{Y}) | M = m, \hat{M} = \hat{m}] \leq 2^{-t}
\] (59)
for any \( m \neq \hat{m} \in \mathcal{M} \). The above relation follows from the following relation; The relation
\[
\Pr[g_{S'}(m, y) = g_{S'}(\hat{m}, \hat{y})] \leq 2^{-t}
\] (60)
for any \( m \neq \hat{m} \in \mathcal{M} \) and \( y, \hat{y} \in \mathcal{Y} \). However, this relation follows from the definition of UHF. Hence, we obtain the (58), which is Reliability (S2).

The following lemma shows that the publicly shared variables for error verification give no information about the message \( M \).

**Lemma 3.** Assume that \( M' = (M, Y) \) is subject to the uniform distribution and \( E' \) is a quantum system correlated to \( M' \). When \( S' \) is an independent variable of other systems \( M', E, \) and \( C = g_{S'}(M, Y) \), we have
\[
d(M; E'S'C) \leq d(M'; E').
\] (61)

This lemma is shown in Appendix [F].

**VII. DETAILED ANALYSIS FOR PRIVATE DENSE CODING**

In this section, we provide the concrete protocol construction for general private dense coding setting and derive the nonasymptotic and asymptotic performance of the protocol. Then we show that the code can be practically implemented when certain conditions are satisfied.
A. Protocol construction

We propose our concrete protocol for private dense coding PDC(τ_{ABE}, \{U_g\}_g∈G; Λ_A) by combining a wire-tap channel code and error verification. Assume that n copies of ρ_{ABE} are given among Alice, Bob, and Eve. Alice and Bob prepare an error correcting code φ = (L, \{Π_l\}_l∈L) for n uses of cq-channel g(∈ G) ↦→ Λ_A(U_gρ_{AB}U_g^†). For our efficient construction of our protocol, we choose a prime power q, which corresponds to the size of our finite field \mathbb{F}_q to be used. Then, we assume the condition for the code φ;

|L| = q^{n_1}. \quad (62)

If this condition does not hold, we decrease the number of |L| to satisfy this condition. We choose a bijective map φ_e from \mathbb{F}_n^{n_1} to L. We prepare the message set \mathcal{M} := \mathbb{F}_q^{n_2}, the set for covering variable \mathcal{Y} := \mathbb{F}_q^{n_3}, and the message set for wire-tap code \mathcal{M}' := \mathcal{Y} \times \mathcal{M} = \mathbb{F}_q^{n_2+n_3}.

For \( V ∈ \mathbb{F}_q^{d_1+d_2−1} \), we introduce the \( d_1 \times d_2 \) Toeplitz matrix \( T_{d_1,d_2}(V) \), which is defined as

\[
T_{d_1,d_2}(V)_{i,j} := V_{i−j+d_2}. \quad (63)
\]

We employ two UHF families \( f_S : \mathbb{F}_q^{n_1} → \mathcal{M}' \) and \( g_{S'} : \mathcal{M}' → \mathcal{Y} \), where \( S ∈ \mathcal{S} := \mathbb{F}_q^{n_1−1} \) and \( S' ∈ \mathcal{S}' := \mathbb{F}_q^{n_2+n_3−1} \) are uniform random variables. The UHF \( f_S \) is defined as

\[
f_S(L) = \begin{pmatrix} f_{S,1}(L) \\ f_{S,2}(L) \end{pmatrix} := (I, T_{n_2+n_3,n_1-(n_2+n_3)}(S)) \begin{pmatrix} L_1 \\ L_2 \end{pmatrix}, \quad (64)
\]

where \( L = (L_1, L_2), L_1 ∈ \mathbb{F}_q^{n_2+n_3}, L_2 ∈ \mathbb{F}_q^{n_1-(n_2+n_3)} \) and \( f_{S,1}(L) ∈ \mathcal{Y}, f_{S,2}(L) ∈ \mathcal{M} \). Similarly, the UHF \( g_{S'} \) are defined with \( S' ∈ \mathcal{S}' := \mathbb{F}_q^{n_2+n_3−1} \) as

\[
g_{S'}(M,Y) := (I, T_{n_3,n_2}(S')) \begin{pmatrix} Y \\ M \end{pmatrix}. \quad (65)
\]

When Alice intends to send the message \( M ∈ \mathcal{M} \), Alice generates random variables \( S ∈ \mathcal{S}, S' ∈ \mathcal{S}', Y ∈ \mathcal{Y}, \) and \( L_2 ∈ \mathbb{F}_q^{n_1-(n_2+n_3)} \) independently according to the uniform distribution. Alice applies the encoder \( ψ_S \) defined as [52, Appendix A-B]

\[
ψ_S(M,Y,L_2) := φ_e \begin{pmatrix} I, -T_{n_2+n_3,n_1-(n_2+n_3)}(S) \\ 0, I \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} M' \\ L_2 \end{pmatrix}, \quad (66)
\]
where \( M' = (M, Y)^T \). It is easy to verify that the encoder \( \psi_s \) is an example of the encoder \( \Gamma[f_s, m'] \) proposed in Section V B. Then, based on an error correcting code \( \varphi \) for cq-channel, and integers \( n_2, n_3, \) prime power \( q \), we give our protocol \( P(\varphi, n_2, n_3, q) \) as follows.

**Protocol 4**

**Encoding:** To begin with, there are \( n \) preshared states \( \tau_{ABE} \) between Alice, Bob and Eve. When Alice intends to send the message \( M \in \mathcal{M} \), Alice generates random variables \( S \in \mathcal{S}, \ S' \in \mathcal{S}', \ Y \in \mathcal{Y}, \) and \( L_2 \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n_1-(n_2+n_3)} \) independently according to the uniform distribution. Alice chooses elements \( (g_1, g_2, \ldots, g_n) := \psi_S(Y, M, L_2) \). Alice applies private dense coding operation \( U_{g_i} \) on the \( i \)-th state and sends them to Bob.

**Decoding 1:** Bob applies measurement \( \Pi = \{\Pi_l\}_{l \in \mathcal{L}} \) on the composite system \( (\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B)^\otimes n \) and obtains \( \hat{L} \in \mathcal{L} \). Bob acknowledges this decoding to Alice via the public channel.

**Public communication from Alice to Bob:** Alice sends the variables \( S, S' \), and \( C := g_{S'}(M, Y) \) to Bob via the public channel.

**Decoding 2 & Verification:** When \( g_{S'} \circ f_S \circ \varphi_e^{-1}(\hat{L}) \neq C \), Bob aborts the protocol. Otherwise, he recovers the message as \( \hat{M} := f_{S,2} \circ \varphi_e^{-1}(\hat{L}) \).

In the above protocol, the part except for the error correcting code \( \varphi = (\mathcal{L}, \{\Pi_l\}_{l \in \mathcal{L}}) \) has calculation complexity \( O(n \log n) \) due to the following reason. Toeplitz matrix can be constructed as a part of circulant matrix. For example, the reference [71, Appendix C-B] gives a method to give a circulant matrix. Also, the reference [71, Appendix C-A] gives an algorithm for multiplication of a circulant matrix with calculation complexity \( O(n \log n) \). Hence, if the error correcting part can be efficiently implemented, this protocol can be efficiently implemented.

**Remark 1.** In the above protocol, Alice needs to perform the public communication to Bob after Bob receives the quantum states. If Eve knows the variables \( S' \) and \( C = g_{S'}(M, Y) \) before Bob receives the quantum states, Eve has a possibility that she can send the quantum state \( \rho \) to Bob such that Bob’s outcomes \( \hat{M}, \hat{Y} \) satisfy \( C = g_{S'}(\hat{M}, \hat{Y}) \) and \( \hat{M} = M \). To avoid this risk, Alice needs to perform the public communication to Bob in this order.
B. Performance of our PDC protocol

To apply the analysis of wire-tap channel in the evaluation of our PDC protocol, we have the following lemma, which is shown in Appendix G.

**Lemma 4.** Given a PDC model PDC($\tau_{ABE}$, $\{U_g\}_{g \in G}$, $\Lambda_A$), we consider the two channels $W_B(x) = U_x \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) U_x^\dagger$ and $W_E(x) = U_x \tau_{AE} U_x^\dagger$. Then, the information quantities can be expressed as

\[
I_{1-t}(X; BB' | W_B \times P_X) = \log d_A - H_{1-t}(A | B | \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB})) \tag{67}
\]

\[
\tilde{I}_{1+t}(X; AE | W_E \times P_X) = \log d_A - \tilde{H}_{1+t}(A | E | \tau_{AE}). \tag{68}
\]

Using this lemma and Theorem 2, as performance evaluation of our PDC protocol, we have the following theorem, which is shown in the end of this subsection.

**Theorem 3.** Given integers $n_2, n_3$, a prime power $q$, and an error correcting code $\varphi = (\mathcal{L}, \{\Pi_l\}_{l \in \mathcal{L}})$ such that $|\mathcal{L}| = q^{n_1}$ the protocol $P(\varphi, n_2, n_3, q)$ satisfies the following inequalities

\[
\epsilon_C(P(\varphi, n_2, n_3, q)) \leq \epsilon(\varphi) \tag{69}
\]

\[
\epsilon_E(P(\varphi, n_2, n_3, q)) \leq \min_{0 \leq t \leq 1} 2^{-\frac{t}{2n_1} 2^{\frac{tn_1}{2n_1}} \left( -\frac{n_1 + n_2 - n_3}{n} \log q + \log d_A - \tilde{H}_{1-t}(A | E | \tau_{AE}) \right)} \tag{70}
\]

\[
\epsilon_B(P(\varphi, n_2, n_3, q)) \leq q^{-n_3}, \tag{71}
\]

where $\epsilon(\varphi)$ is the decoding error probability of the error correcting code $\varphi$.

For a more concrete bound on $\epsilon_C(P(\varphi, n_2, n_3, q))$, we apply Proposition 1 to the case with $\log \mathcal{L}_1 = n_1 \log q$. When $\varphi$ is an error correcting code given in Proposition 1, we have

\[
\epsilon_C(P(n_2, n_3, q)) \leq 4 \min_{0 \leq t \leq 1} 2^{\frac{tn_1}{2n_1} \left( \log q - \log d_A + \tilde{H}_{1-t}(A | \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) \right)} \tag{72}
\]

The RHS of (72) follows from the application of (67) to the RHS of (47) in Proposition 1. Hence, (69) implies (72).

Therefore, the key evaluations (4), (5), and (6) in Subsection II A are obtained as follows. That is, (72), (70), and (71) imply (4), (5), and (6), respectively. That is, the combination of Theorem 3 and Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of a PDC protocol stated in Section II A.

**Proof of Theorem 3.** When the error correcting code recovers $\mathcal{L}$ correctly, the protocol does not abort. Hence, combining (40) with the above fact, we obtain (69). The relation (71) follows from (58).
The cq-channel $g(\in G) \mapsto \Lambda_A(U_g \rho_{AE} U_g^\dagger)$ is symmetric, Theorem 2 guarantees that

$$d(M', EAS) \leq \tilde{d}(M', EAS) \leq \min_{0 \leq t \leq 1} 2^{-\frac{2t}{1+t}} 2^{\frac{1}{1+t}(-\frac{n_1-n_2-n_3}{n} \log q + \log d_A - \tilde{H}_1^t(A|E|\tau_{AE}))},$$  \hspace{1cm} (73)

To derive the RHS of (73), we used (68). Applying Lemma 3 to the case with $E' = EA$, we obtain (70) from (73). Therefore, we obtain Theorem 3.

C. Capacity formulas

The private capacity characterizes the asymptotic performance from a theoretical viewpoint. The following theorem shows the equivalence between private capacity of private dense coding and the secrecy capacity of corresponding wire-tap channel.

**Theorem 4.** For the PDC model $PDC(\tau_{ABE}, \{U_g\}_{g \in G}, \Lambda_A)$ and corresponding wire-tap channels $W_B(x) = U_x \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) U_x^\dagger$ and $W_E(x) = U_x \tau_{AE} U_x^\dagger$, the private capacity of the PDC model equals the secrecy capacity of $(W_B, W_E)$, i.e.,

$$C(\tau_{ABE}, \{U_g\}_{g \in G}, \Lambda_A) = C(W_B, W_E).$$  \hspace{1cm} (74)

Then, we have the following corollary.

**Corollary 3.** When $\tau_{ABE}$ is a pure state, and $\tau_{AB}$ is maximally correlated, we have

$$C(\tau_{ABE}, \{U_g\}_{g \in G}, \text{id}_A) = 2(H(\tau_{A,E}) - H(\tau_E)) = 2H(A|E)_{\tau} = -2H(A|B)_{\tau},$$  \hspace{1cm} (75)

where $\text{id}_A$ is the noiseless channel on $H_A$.

This corollary can be shown as follows. Appendix A shows that the wire-tap channel $(W_B, W_E)$ of the above case is degraded. Due to Lemma 2 and the group symmetric condition, the secrecy capacity of $(W_B, W_E)$ is the RHS of (75). Then, Theorem 4 guarantees (75).

D. Practical code construction with vector space over finite field

Next, we show that the error correcting part $\phi$ can be efficiently implemented, under the following conditions (B1) and (B2) introduced in Section II because the above subsection shows that other parts can be efficiently implemented.
(B1): The group $G$ forms a vector space $\mathcal{X}$ over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$.

(B2): The states $\{U_x \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) U_x^\dagger\}_{x \in \mathcal{X}}$ are commutative with each other.

To discuss the calculation complexity for the error correcting code, it is sufficient to consider the case when the channel from Alice to Bob is $\Lambda_A$, i.e., is not intercepted by Eve. Due to (B2), we can choose a basis $\{|e_\omega\rangle\}_{\omega \in \Omega}$ on $\mathcal{H}_{B'} \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$ that commonly diagonalizes $U_x \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) U_x^\dagger$ for all $x \in \mathcal{X}$. We denote the measurement corresponding to this basis by $\{\Pi_\omega\}_{\omega \in \Omega}$, and define the distribution $P_\Omega(\omega) := \text{Tr} \Pi_\omega \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB})$. We obtain the classical channel $W^c(\omega|x) := \text{Tr} \Pi_\omega U_x \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) U_x^\dagger$. Without any information loss, Bob’s decoding can be reduced to the application of classical decoding for the classical channel $W^c$ to the outcomes via the measurement $\{\Pi_\omega\}_{\omega \in \Omega}$.

Since the density matrix $U_x \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) U_x^\dagger$ has the same eigenvalue as $\Lambda_A(\tau_{AB})$ including the multiplicity, there exists a permutation $\pi_x$ on $\Omega$ such that $P_\Omega(\pi_x(\omega)) = \text{Tr} \Pi_\omega U_x \Lambda_A(\tau_{AB}) U_x^\dagger$. Since $\pi_x \pi_{x'} = \pi_{x+x'}$, the relation $W^c(\omega|x) = P_\Omega(\pi_x(\omega))$ implies that the channel $W^c$ is a symmetric channel.

In this symmetric setting, we can choose an error correcting code as a linear subspace $L \subset \mathcal{X}^n$ on $\mathbb{F}_q$. Such an error correcting code $L$ can be constructed by using LDPC codes [66] or polar codes [67]. It has been demonstrated that polar codes can achieve channel capacity for any discrete symmetric channels with a sufficiently small decoding error probability $\epsilon_C$ such that the encoder $\phi_e$ and the decoder $\phi_d$ have calculation complexity $O(n \log n)$ [72–75].

VIII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

We have formulated the framework of private dense coding to realize quantum secure direct communication. While this method requires preshared quantum state, it works even when noise exists. This method guarantees the secrecy against the eavesdropper, Eve, even when Eve intercepts the quantum system transmitted by Alice. To cover the finite-length effect, we have derived a formula for the amount of information leakage dependently of the block length of our code and the sacrificed rate. When the channel to Eve is symmetric, this formula has better bound (Theorem 2) than an existing bound [43, (78)].

In our method, Alice’s encoding operation is limited to unitary operation given as a projective unitary representation of a group $G$. Also, when a certain commutative condi-
tion holds, we have shown that Bob’ decoding measurement can be restricted to a special measurement over a single joint system between Bob’s receiving system and Bob’s local system. That is, Bob does not need to make any measurement across multiple joint systems. Further, when the group is a vector space over a finite field, we have proposed a practical coding method, whose encoding and decoding operations have the calculation complexity $O(n \log n)$, where $n$ is the block length.

We have applied our results to the case when Alice’s encoding operation is limited to the Weyl-Heisenberg representation. Although this case is similar to the case studied by preceding papers [50], we have derived a security formula for the information leakage in the finite-length setting. In this setting, to cover an unknown preshared state, we have proposed another new protocol that contains estimation process of the preshared state.

There are many protocols and experiments that fit into our setting [8, 50, 76–79]. However, the rigorous performance in a practical situation is unclear. Our results reduce the gap between the theoretical performance and experimental setting. For a realistic application, we need to combine the error estimation and our evaluation for information leakage [28]. Such evaluation is a future study. This paper assumes that the preshared state is $n$-fold i.i.d condition. However, the realistic case does not necessarily satisfy this condition. Removing this condition is another future topic.

Unfortunately, this study have not analytically derived the asymptotically tight transmission rate, which is called the capacity. As stated in Corollary 3, our analytically obtained transmission rate is tight when $\tau_{ABE}$ is a pure state, and $\tau_{AB}$ is maximally correlated. This problem was inherited by the following property of wire-tap channel. When the wire-tap channel model is degraded, $\max_{P_X} I(X; B) - I(X; E)$ is the capacity, i.e., the optimal transmission rate. Otherwise, this value is not the capacity in general and the analytical derivation of the capacity is an open problem. Hence, to resolve this problem, it is needed to derive the capacity for a wire-tap channel model under the symmetric condition. It is another future problem. In addition, recently, the one-step QSDC protocol was proposed [80, 81]. Since this protocol has a form different from our private dense coding, we cannot directly apply our result to this problem. Hence, the analysis on this problem is another future study.
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Appendix A: Maximally correlated state

In this appendix, we show that the cq wire-tap channel $W_B, W_E$ is degraded when $\Lambda_A$ is the noiseless channel, $\tau_{ABE}$ is a pure state, and $\tau_{AB}$ is maximally correlated.

We choose bases $|v_A^j\rangle$ and $|v_B^j\rangle$ on $\mathcal{H}_A$ and $\mathcal{H}_B$ such that $\tau_{AB} = \sum_j a_j |v_A^j, v_B^j\rangle\langle v_A^j, v_B^j|$. We diagonalize $\tau_{AB}$ as $\tau_{AB} = \sum_j s_j |u_j\rangle\langle u_j|$, where $(b_{j,j'})$ is a unitary matrix. Then, by choosing a basis $|v_E^j\rangle$, the pure state $\tau_{ABE}$ is written as $\sum_j \sqrt{s_j} |u_j\rangle|v_E^j\rangle$. We choose $t_{j'}$ and normalized vectors $(c_{j'j})$ for $j'$ as $t_{j'} := \sum_j s_j |b_{j,j'}|^2$ and $\sqrt{s_j} b_{j,j'} = \sqrt{t_{j'}} c_{j'j}$. We define $|u_E^{j'}\rangle := \sum_j c_{j'j} |v_E^j\rangle$. Hence, we have $\sum_j \sqrt{s_j} |u_j\rangle|v_E^j\rangle = \sum_j \sqrt{t_{j'}} |v_A^{j}, v_B^{j}\rangle|v_E^{j'}\rangle = \sum_j \sqrt{t_{j'}} |v_A^{j}, v_B^{j}\rangle|u_E^{j'}\rangle$, which implies that

$$\tau_{AE} = \sum_{j'} t_{j'} |v_A^{j'}, u_E^{j'}\rangle\langle v_A^{j'}, u_E^{j'}|.$$  \hfill (A1)

We define the TP-CP map $\Gamma$ as

$$\Gamma(\rho) := \sum_{j'} \langle v_B^{j'} | \rho | v_B^{j'} \rangle |u_E^{j'}\rangle\langle u_E^{j'}|.$$

Then, we have

$$\Gamma(\tau_{AB}) = \sum_j \langle v_B^{j'} | \tau_{AB} | v_B^{j'} \rangle |u_E^{j'}\rangle\langle u_E^{j'}|$$

$$= \sum_{j'} t_{j'} |v_A^{j'}, u_E^{j'}\rangle\langle v_A^{j'}, u_E^{j'}| = \tau_{AE}.$$  \hfill (A3)

Since $U_g$ acts only on $\mathcal{H}_A$, the cq wire-tap channel $W_B, W_E$ is degraded.
Appendix B: Bob receives Bell diagonal state

Here, we show that Bob’s received state is Bell diagonal in the setting PDC(\(|\Psi\rangle, \{W(x, z)\}, \Lambda[\tilde{P}_{XZ}]_A\)). When Alice’s operation is \(W(x, z)\), Bob’s state on \(H_B \otimes H_{B'}\) is

\[
\Lambda[\tilde{P}_{XZ}]_A(W(x, z)\Lambda[P_{XZ}]_A(|\Phi\rangle\langle\Phi|)W(x, z)^\dagger) \\
=W(x, z)(\Lambda[\tilde{P}_{XZ}]_A \circ \Lambda[P_{XZ}]_A(|\Phi\rangle\langle\Phi|))W(x, z)^\dagger \\
=W(x, z)\Lambda[\tilde{P}_{XZ} + P_{XZ}]_A(|\Phi\rangle\langle\Phi|)W(x, z)^\dagger \\
=\Lambda[F_{x,z}[\tilde{P}_{XZ} + P_{XZ}]_A(|\Phi\rangle\langle\Phi|) \\
=\rho[F_{x,z}[\tilde{P}_{XZ} + P_{XZ}]],
\]

(B1)

where the distributions \(\tilde{P}_{XZ} + P_{XZ}\) and \(F_{x,z}[P_{XZ}]\) on \(\mathbb{F}_p^2\) are defined as

\[
\tilde{P}_{XZ} + P_{XZ}(x, z) := \sum_{x', z'} \tilde{P}_{XZ}(x', z')P_{XZ}(x - x', z - z'),
\]

(B2)

\[
F_{x,z}[P_{XZ}](x', z') := P_{XZ}(x' - x, z' - z),
\]

(B3)

and the density matrix \(\rho[P_{XZ}]\) is defined as

\[
\rho[P_{XZ}] := \sum_{x,z} P_{XZ}(x, z)W(x, z)|\Phi\rangle\langle\Phi|W(x, z)^\dagger.
\]

(B4)

Appendix C: Proof of Lemma

For the setting PDC(\(\omega_{ABE}, \{W(x, z)\}, \text{id}_A\)), recall that \(\omega_{ABE} = \Lambda[\tilde{P}_{-X,Z}]_B(|\Psi\rangle\langle\Psi|)\), where

\[
|\Psi\rangle_{ABE} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{x,z} \sqrt{P(x, z)}W_A(x, z) |\Phi\rangle_{AB} |x, z\rangle_E
\]

(C1)

is the purification of \(\rho[P_{XZ}]\). Then the reduced density matrices are

\[
\omega_{AE} = \sum_j \frac{1}{d} \text{Proj}(\sum_{x,z} \sqrt{P(x, z)}W(x, z) |j\rangle_A |x, z\rangle_E),
\]

\[
\omega_E = \sum_{x,z} P_{XZ}(x, z) |x, z\rangle_E \langle x, z|,
\]

\[
\omega_{AB} = \rho[\tilde{P}_{XZ} + P_{XZ}],
\]

\[
\omega_B = \rho_{B,\text{mix}}.
\]

(C2)
The quantities for asymptotic rate are as follows:

\[
H(A|E)_\omega = H(\omega_{AE}) - H(\omega_E) \\
= \log d_A - H(XZ|P_{XZ}),
\]

\[
H(A|B)_\omega = H(\omega_{AB}) - H(\omega_B) \\
= H(XZ|\tilde{P}_{XZ} * P_{XZ}) - \log d_A.
\]

The quantities for finite analysis are as follows:

\[
\tilde{H}_{1+t}(A|E)_\omega \geq \tilde{H}_{1+t}(A|E)_\omega \\
= -\tilde{D}_{1+t}(\omega_{AE}\|\omega_E) \\
= -\frac{1}{t} \log \text{Tr}(\omega_{E}^{-\frac{1}{1+t}}\omega_{AE}\omega_{E}^{-\frac{1}{1+t}})^{1+t} \\
= -\frac{1}{t} \log \frac{1}{d_A^s} \left( \sum_{x,z} P_{XZ}(x,z)^{\frac{1}{1+t}} \right)^{1+t} \\
= \log d_A - \tilde{H}_{1+t}^i (P_{XZ}),
\]

\[
H_{1-t}(A|B)_\omega = -D_{1-t}(\omega_{AB}\|\omega_B) \\
= \frac{1}{t} \log \text{Tr} \rho [\tilde{P}_{XZ} * P_{XZ}]^{1-t} \rho_{mix}^s \\
= -\log d_A + H_{1-t}^i (\tilde{P}_{XZ} * P_{XZ}).
\]

Appendix D: Estimation of Bell diagonal state

1. Case with Bell diagonal state

We consider the state estimation on the composite system \( \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B \) by using local measurements when the unknown state is given as a Bell diagonal state \( \rho[P_{XZ}] \), which is defined in (17). Here, we consider only the case when \( d \) is a prime \( p \) and the arithmetics is performed in \( \mathbb{F}_p \) in the following part. First, we prepare the relation;

\[
W(x,z)W(x',z') = \omega^{x'z-xx'}W(x',z')W(x,z). \tag{D1}
\]

For \( k, l \), we measure the marginal distribution \( P_{X-kZ} \) as follows. We say that the following measurement is \( M(lX-kZ) \). Alice measures \( W(k,l) = X^kZ^l \) and obtains the outcome \( \omega^Y \). Bob measures \( (X^kZ^l)^T = Z^lX^{-k} \), and obtains the outcome \( \omega^Y \). We denote the eigenvector
of $X^k Z^l$ with eigenvalue $\omega^j$ on the system $\mathcal{H}_A$ by $|j\rangle_{X^k Z^l A}$. We define $|j\rangle_{Z^l X^{-k} B}$ in the same way. We have

$$|\Phi\rangle = \sum_{j=0}^{p-1} \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} |j\rangle_{X^k Z^l A} |j\rangle_{Z^l X^{-k} B},$$

(D2)

and (D1) implies

$$W(k, l)W(x, z) |j\rangle_{X^k Z^l A} = \omega^x z^j W(x, z) W(l, k) |j\rangle_{X^k Z^l A} = \omega^{x - zk + j} W(x, z) |j\rangle_{X^k Z^l A}.\]$$

(D3)

That is, $W(x, z) |j\rangle_{X^k Z^l A}$ is a constant times of $|x - zk + j\rangle_{X^k Z^l A}$. Hence, when we measure operator $X^k Z^l$ for state $W(x, z) |\Phi\rangle$, the outcome $\omega^Y$ is $\omega^{x - zk}$.

We consider that the state $\rho[P_{XZ}]$ is generated by applying the operator $W(x, z)$ to the state $|\Phi\rangle$ with probability $P_{XZ}(x, z)$. When $W(x, z)$ is applied, the outcome $\omega^{Y - \bar{Y}}$ is $\omega^{x - zk}$. That is, $Y - \bar{Y}$ obeys the distribution $P_{Y - \bar{Y}}(X - KZ)$. We define $E[\omega^{x - k Z}] := \sum_{s=0}^{p-1} \omega^s P_{Y - \bar{Y}}(s)$. We define the equivalent relation $(x, z) \sim (x', z')$ in $\mathbb{F}_p^2$ as $(x, z) = (ax', az')$ with an element $a \in \mathbb{F}_p$. Since $P_{Y - \bar{Y}}(as) = P_{Y - \bar{Y}}(s)$ and $(\mathbb{F}_p^2 \setminus \{0\})/ \sim = \{(1, 0), (1, 1), \ldots, (1, p - 1), (0, 1)\}$, we can calculate $E[\omega^{x - k Z}]$ only by measuring $P_X, P_{X + Z}, \ldots, P_{X + (p - 1) Z}$, and $P_Z$, which requires $p + 1$ types of measurements.

**Lemma 5.** We have the following relation;

$$P_{XZ}(l, j) = \frac{1}{d^2} \sum_{b, z} \omega^{-j l + b d - j z} E[\omega^{(b - j) X + z Z}].$$

(D4)

For $z \neq 0$, $E[\omega^{(b - j) X + z Z}]$ can be calculated from the distribution $P_{(b - j) X + Z}$, and $E[\omega^{(b - j) X}]$ can be calculated from the distribution $P_X$. Hence, from $p + 1$ distribution $P_X, P_{X + Z}, \ldots, P_{X + (p - 1) Z}$, and $P_Z$, we derive the distribution $P_{X, Z}$.

**Proof.** To show Lemma[5], we consider the linear space $\mathcal{V}$ of complex functions on $\mathbb{F}_p^2$ and its dual space $\mathcal{V}^*$. We define $e_{(x, z)} \in \mathcal{V}^*$ as $e_{(x, z)}(f) := f(x, z) \in \mathbb{C}$ for $f \in \mathcal{V}$. Then, we define the following function $\mathcal{F}$ from $\mathcal{V}^*$ to $p \times p$ complex matrices;

$$\mathcal{F}[e_{(x, z)}] := (|x\rangle_x x \langle x|)(|z\rangle_z z \langle z|),$$

(D5)

We extend $E[\omega^{k X + l Z}]$ as an element of $\mathcal{V}^*$ as

$$E[\omega^{k X + l Z}](f) := \sum_{(x, z)} \omega^{k x + l z} f(x, z).$$

(D6)
Hence, it is sufficient to show that $F$ is invertible and the following relation holds,

$$\langle l | x x \langle l | (j | z z \langle j |) = \frac{1}{p^2} \sum_{b, z} \omega^{-jl+bl-jz} F[E[\omega^{(b-j)X+zZ}]]. \quad (D7)$$

We have

$$F[E[\omega^{lx-kZ}]] = \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} \sum_{(x, z):lx-kz=j} \omega^j \langle x | x \langle x | (| z z \langle z |)$$

$$= \sum_{x, z} \omega^{lx-kz} \langle x | x \langle x | (| z z \langle z |)$$

$$= (\sum_{x} \omega^{lx} \langle x | x \langle x |) (\sum_{z} \omega^{-kz} | z z \langle z |) = X^l Z^{-k}. \quad (D8)$$

Since the set $\{X^l Z^{-k}\}_{l,k}$ spans the set $d \times d$ matrices, the map $F$ is invertible.

In fact, we have

$$\langle l | x x \langle l | (j | z z \langle j |)$$

$$= \frac{\omega^{-jl}}{\sqrt{d}} | l \rangle x z \langle j |$$

$$= \frac{\omega^{-jl}}{p} \sum_{b=0}^{p-1} \frac{\omega^{bl}}{\sqrt{p}} \langle b | z z \langle j |$$

$$= \frac{\omega^{-jl}}{p} \sum_{b=0}^{p-1} \omega^{bl} \frac{1}{p} \sum_{z=0}^{p-1} \omega^{-jz} X^{b-j} Z^z$$

$$= \frac{1}{p^2} \sum_{b, z} \omega^{-jl+bl-jz} F[E[\omega^{(b-j)X+zZ}]], \quad (D9)$$

which implies (D7).

2. Case with general state

Even when $\rho_{AB}$ is not a generalized Bell diagonal state, the resultant state $T(\tau_{AB})$ of discrete twirling \cite{31} is a generalized Bell diagonal state.

When the state is given as the twirled state $T(\tau_{AB})$ and the measurement $M(lX - kZ)$
is applied, the probability with the outcome $y$ is
\[
\sum_{j=0}^{p-1} x^j z^l, A \langle j + y \mid z^{-1} x^j, B \rangle \frac{1}{d^2}
\]
\[
\left( \sum_{x, z} (W(x, z)_A \otimes W(x, z)_B^T) \tau_{AB}(W(x, z)_A \otimes W(x, z)_B^T) \right) \mid j + y \rangle x^j z^l, A \langle j \mid z^{-1} x^j, B
\]
\[
= \sum_{j=0}^{p-1} \frac{1}{d^2} \sum_{x, z} x^j z^l, A \langle -xl + zk + j + y \mid z^{-1} x^j, B \rangle -xl + zk + j \rangle \tau_{AB}
\]
\[
= \sum_{j=0}^{p-1} x^j z^l, A \langle j + y \mid z^{-1} x^j, B \rangle \tau_{AB} \mid j + y \rangle x^j z^l, A \langle j \mid z^{-1} x^j, B.
\]

That is, the distribution of the outcome with the input state (31) is the same as the distribution of the outcome with the input state $\tau_{AB}$. Hence, when (31) is given as $\rho[P_{XZ}]$, the distribution $P_{lX - kZ}$ can be estimated by applying the measurement $M(lX - kZ)$ to the state $\tau_{AB}$.

Note that the twirling operation needs public communication about the choice $(x, z)$. If they apply the twirling operation, Eve can perfectly recover the environment of the twirled state $T(\tau_{AB})$. Therefore, we can analyze the twirled state $T(\tau_{AB})$ for secrecy without applying it. To conclude, we show that we do not need to apply the twirling operation.

**Appendix E: Proofs in Section V**

This appendix gives the proof details in Section V.

1. **Proof of Theorem 1**

For a cq state $\rho_{L, E} = \sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} |l\rangle \langle l| \otimes X_l$ and a function $f : \mathcal{L} \to \mathcal{M}'$, we define the cq state $f(\rho_{L, E}) := \sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} |f(l)\rangle \langle f(l)| \otimes X_l$. Recall the expression of $\bar{d}(M'; ES)$ in (34), where

\[
\tau_{M'E|S=s} = \sum_{m'} \frac{1}{M'} |m'\rangle \langle m'| \otimes \sum_{l \in f^{-1}_s(m')} \frac{1}{L^2} W_E(l)
\]

\[
= f_s(W_E \circ P_{\mathcal{L}}),
\]

\[
\tau_{E|S=s} = Tr_{M'} \tau_{M'E|S=s} = W_E \circ P_{\mathcal{L}}.
\]

Then, we introduce the privacy amplification lemma [82].
Lemma 6. $\tau_{LE} \in D(\mathcal{H}_L \otimes \mathcal{H}_E)$ is classical on $L$, $\{f_S\} : \mathcal{L} \to \mathcal{M}'$ is a UHF family, then
\[ E_S \| f_S(\tau_{LE}) - P_{\mathcal{M}'} \otimes \tau_E \|_1 \leq 2^{\frac{1-t}{1+t}} 2^{rac{t}{1+t} (\log |\mathcal{M}'| - \tilde{H}^1_{1+t}(L|E), r)} . \] (E1)

follows immediately by using the above lemma.

\[ d(M', ES) = E_S \| \text{id}_E \otimes f_S(W_E \times P_L) - P_{\mathcal{M}'} \otimes W_E \circ P_L \|_1 \]
\[ \leq 2^{\frac{1-t}{1+t}} 2^{rac{t}{1+t} (\log |\mathcal{M}'| - \sup_{\sigma_E} \tilde{H}^1_{1+t}(L|E|W_E \times P_L))} \] (E2)
\[ = 2^{\frac{1-t}{1+t}} 2^{rac{t}{1+t} (-\log b + \tilde{H}^1_{1+t}(L|E|W_E \times P_L))}. \]

2. Proof of Corollaries 1 and 2

The following lemma would be useful in the proof.

Lemma 7. For $n$-fold channel $W^n_B$, the following inequalities hold for $t > -1$ and $t > -\frac{1}{2}$ respectively.
\[ \max_{Q_{X^n}} I_{1+t}^i (X^n; B^n|W^n_B \times Q_{X^n}) = n \max_{Q_X} I_{1+t}^i (X; E|W_B \times Q_X) \] (E3)
\[ \max_{Q_{X^n}} \tilde{I}_{1+t}^i (X^n; B^n|W^n_B \times Q_{X^n}) = n \max_{Q_X} \tilde{I}_{1+t}^i (X; B|W_B \times Q_X). \] (E4)

Proof of Lemma 7. The equation (E3) for Petz version has been shown in [83], so we focus on (E4). Before the proof of Lemma 7, we prepare the following proposition.

Proposition 2. (Proposition 4.2 of [87]) For $t \geq -\frac{1}{2}$, we have
\[ \sup_{Q_X} \tilde{I}_{1+t}^i (X; E|W \times Q_X) = \inf_{\sigma \in \mathcal{X}} \sup_{x \in X} \tilde{D}_{1+t}(W(x)||\sigma). \] (E5)

Then, we define the quasi-entropy for convenience,
\[ \Xi_{1+t}(\rho||\sigma) := \text{Tr} (\sigma^{-\tilde{I}_{1+t}} \rho \sigma^{-\tilde{I}_{1+t}})^{1+t}. \] (E6)

For $t > -\frac{1}{2}$ and any probability distribution on $\mathcal{X}^m$, we have
\[ \tilde{I}_{1+t}^1(X^n; E^n | W^{\otimes n} \times Q_X^n) \]
\[ = \inf_{\omega \in D(H_E^{1+n})} \frac{1}{t} \log \sum_{x^n \in X^n} Q_X^n(x^n) \Xi_{1+t}(W^{\otimes n}(x^n) \| \omega) \quad (E7) \]
\[ \leq \inf_{\sigma \in D(H_E)} \frac{1}{t} \log \sum_{x^n \in X^n} Q_X^n(x^n) \Xi_{1+t}(W^{\otimes n}(x^n) \| \sigma^{\otimes n}) \]
\[ = \inf_{\sigma \in D(H_E)} \frac{1}{t} \log \sum_{x^n \in X^n} Q_X^n(x^n) \prod_{i=1}^n \Xi_{1+t}(W(x_i) \| \sigma) \quad (E8) \]
\[ \leq \inf_{\sigma \in D(H_E)} \sup_{x \in X^n} \frac{1}{t} \log \left( \Xi_{1+t}(W(x) \| \sigma) \right)^n \]
\[ = \inf_{\sigma \in D(H_E)} \sup_{x \in X^n} n \tilde{D}_{1+t}(W(x) \| \sigma) \quad (E9) \]
\[ = n \sup_{Q_X} \tilde{I}_{1+t}^1(X; E | W \times Q_X), \quad (E10) \]

where (E7) and (E9) follow from the definitions, (E8) follows from the multiplicativity of \( \Xi_{1+t} \) and (E10) follows from Proposition 2.

By using Lemma 7, we have
\[ \max_{Q_X^n} I_{1-t}(X^n; B^n | W^n_B \times Q_X^n) \geq \max_{Q_X^n} I_{1-t}^1(X^n; B^n | W^n_B \times Q_X^n) \quad (E11) \]
\[ = n \max_{Q_X} \tilde{I}_{1-t}^1(X; B | W_B \times Q_X), \quad (E12) \]
where (E11) follows from definition. (49) is obtained by substituting above inequality into (48). Hence, we obtain Corollary 1.

Combining (7) and (E4), we obtain the following bound
\[ \tilde{I}_{1+t}^1(X; E | W_E \times P_L) \leq n \max_{Q_X} \tilde{I}_{1+t}^1(X; E | W_E \times Q_X), \quad (E13) \]
where \( P_L \) is a distribution on \( X^n \) such that for \( x^n \in L \), \( P_L(x^n) = \frac{1}{|L|} \). Substituting (E13) into (46) yields (50). Hence, we obtain Corollary 2.

3. Proof of Theorem 2

For a given distribution \( Q_X \) on \( X \), we have
\[ 2^{\tilde{I}_{1+t}^1(X; E | W_E \times Q_X)} = \inf_{\sigma \in D(H_E)} \sum_{x \in X} Q_X(x) \Xi_{1+t}(W_E(x) \| \sigma). \quad (E14) \]
Given two distributions $Q_X$ and $Q_X$ and $0 < \lambda < 1$, we have
\[
2^{\tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|W_E \times \lambda Q_X + (1-\lambda)Q_X)} = \min_{\sigma \in \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{H}_E)} \left( \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} (\lambda Q_X(x) + (1-\lambda)\tilde{Q}_X(x))\mathbb{E}_{1+\ell}(W_E(x)\|\sigma) \right) \\
\geq \lambda \min_{\sigma \in \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{H}_E)} \left( \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} Q_X(x)\mathbb{E}_{1+\ell}(W_E(x)\|\sigma) \right) + (1-\lambda) \min_{\sigma \in \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{H}_E)} \left( \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \tilde{Q}_X(x)\mathbb{E}_{1+\ell}(W_E(x)\|\sigma) \right) \\
= \lambda 2^{\tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|W_E \times Q_X)} + (1-\lambda) 2^{\tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|W_E \times \tilde{Q}_X)},
\]
which implies that the map $Q_X \mapsto 2^{\tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|W_E \times Q_X)}$ is concave.

Given an element $x_0 \in \mathcal{X} = G$, we define the distribution $Q_{X,x_0}$ and the cq channels $W_{E,x_0}$ and $U_{x_0}(W_E)$ as $Q_{X,x_0}(x) := Q_X(x_0)\|_{W_E}, W_{E,x_0}(x) := W_{E,x_0}(x_0)\|_{W_E}, U_{x_0} \circ W_E(x) := U_{x_0}W_E(x)U_{x_0}^\dagger$, respectively. Then, we have
\[
\tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|W_E \times Q_X) = \tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|W_{E,x_0} \times Q_{X,x_0}) \\
= \tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|U_{x_0} \circ W_E \times Q_{X,x_0}) = \tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|W_E \times Q_{X,x_0}),
\]
where the second equality follows from the unitary invariance of quasi-entropy and the last inequality follows from the symmetric condition $W_E(x) = U_x\rho_0U_x^\dagger$. Due to (E16) and (E15), the uniform distribution $P_X$ on $\mathcal{X}$ satisfies
\[
2^{\tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|W_E \times P_X)} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{X}|} \sum_{x_0 \in \mathcal{X}} 2^{\tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|W_E \times Q_{X,x_0})} \\
\leq 2^{\tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|W_E \times P_X)}.
\]
Thus, we have
\[
\max_{P_X} \tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|W_E \times P_X) = \tilde{I}^\lambda_{1+\ell}(X;E|W_E \times P_X).
\]
The combination of (E16) and (E18) implies (51).

4. Proof of Lemma 2

It is known that the capacity of the degraded wire-tap channel is $\sup_{Q_X} I(X;\hat{B})_{Q_X} - I(X;\hat{E})_{Q_X}$ [42, 60, (9.75)]. Also, in this case, for $x_0 \in \mathcal{X}$, we define the distribution $Q_{X,x_0}$ as $Q_{X,x_0}(x) := Q_X(x_0)$. Due to the symmetric condition, we find that
\[
I(X;\hat{B})_{Q_X} - I(X;\hat{E})_{Q_X} = I(X;\hat{B})_{Q_{X,x_0}} - I(X;\hat{E})_{Q_{X,x_0}},
\]
(E19)
Since $\sum_{x_0 \in \mathcal{X}} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{X}|} Q_{X,x_0} = P_X$ and the map $Q_X \mapsto I(X; \hat{B})_{Q_X} - I(X; \hat{E})_{Q_X}$ is known to be concave for degraded channels [60, (9.76)], we have

\[
I(X; \hat{B})_{P_X} - I(X; \hat{E})_{P_X} \geq \sum_{x_0 \in \mathcal{X}} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{X}|} \left( I(X; \hat{B})_{Q_{X,x_0}} - I(X; \hat{E})_{Q_{X,x_0}} \right)
\]

\[
= I(X; \hat{B})_{Q_X} - I(X; \hat{E})_{Q_X}.
\]

Hence, $\sup_{Q_X} I(X; \hat{B})_{Q_X} - I(X; \hat{E})_{Q_X} = I(X; \hat{B})_{P_X} - I(X; \hat{E})_{P_X}$. We obtain Lemma 2.

Appendix F: Proof of Lemma 3

Recall the definition of $C$, $c = g_{s'}(m, y) = y + T(s')m$. (F1)
For fixed $s', m$, the map between $y$ and $c$ is bijective so we have the function $y = y(m, s', c)$. Then, we evaluate $d(M; E' S' C)$ as follows.

$$d(M; EAS'C) = \min_{\sigma_{EAS'C}} \|\tau_{MEAS'C} - P_M \otimes \sigma_{EAS'C}\|_1$$

$$\leq \min_{\{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m\}_{m,y}} \|\sum_{s', m, y} P_M(m)P_{S'}(s')P_Y(y|m)\langle m|\otimes \tau_{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m} \otimes |s'\rangle\langle s'| \otimes |g_s'(m, y)\rangle\langle g_s'(m, y)|\rangle\|_1$$

$$= \min_{\{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m\}_{m,y}} \|\sum_{s', c} P_M(m)P_{S'}(s')P_Y(c|m)\langle m|\otimes \tau_{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m} \otimes |s'\rangle\langle s'| \otimes |c\rangle\langle c|\rangle\|_1$$

$$= \min_{\{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m\}_{m,y}} \|\sum_{s', y} P_{S'}(s')P_Y(y)\sum_{m} P_M(m)\langle m|\otimes \tau_{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m} \otimes |s'\rangle\langle s'| \otimes |c\rangle\langle c|\rangle\|_1$$

$$= \min_{\{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m\}_{m,y}} \|\sum_{s'} P_{S'}(s')\sum_{m} P_M(m)\langle m|\otimes \tau_{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m} \otimes |s'\rangle\langle s'| \otimes |c\rangle\langle c|\rangle\|_1$$

$$= \min_{\{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m\}_{m,y}} \|\sum_{s'} P_{S'}(s')\sum_{m} P_M(m)\langle m|\otimes \tau_{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m} \otimes |s'\rangle\langle s'| \otimes |c\rangle\langle c|\rangle\|_1$$

$$= \min_{\{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m\}_{m,y}} \|\sum_{s'} P_{S'}(s')\sum_{m} P_Y(m)\sum_{y} P_M(m)\langle m, y|\otimes \tau_{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m} \otimes |s'\rangle\langle s'| \otimes |c\rangle\langle c|\rangle\|_1$$

$$= \min_{\{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m\}_{m,y}} \sum_{s'} \sum_{m} P_Y(y)P_M(m)\langle m, y|\otimes \tau_{E_{A,Y} = y, M = m} \otimes |s'\rangle\langle s'| \otimes |c\rangle\langle c|\rangle\|_1$$
\begin{align*}
&\leq \min_{\{\sigma_{EA,M=m}\}_{m}} \sum_{s'} P_{S'}(s') \left\| \sum_{m,y} P_{y}(y) P_{M}(m) |m,y\rangle \otimes \tau_{EAY=y,M=m} \right\|_1 \\
&\quad - \sum_{y} P_{y}(y) \left( \sum_{m} P_{M}(m) |m,y\rangle \otimes \left( \sum_{m} P_{M}(m) \sigma_{EA,M=m} \right) \right) \\
&= \min_{\{\sigma_{EA,M=m}\}_{m}} \sum_{s'} P_{S'}(s') \left\| \sum_{m,y} P_{y}(y) P_{M}(m) |m,y\rangle \otimes \tau_{EAY=y,M=m} \right\|_1 \\
&\quad - \left( \sum_{m,y} P_{M}(m) P_{y}(y) |m,y\rangle \otimes \left( \sum_{m} P_{M}(m) \sigma_{EA,M=m} \right) \right) \\
&= \min_{\sigma_{EA}} \sum_{s'} P_{S'}(s') \left\| \sum_{m,y} P_{y}(y) P_{M}(m) |m,y\rangle \otimes \tau_{EAY=y,M=m} \right\|_1 \\
&\quad - \left( \sum_{m,y} P_{M}(m) P_{y}(y) |m,y\rangle \otimes \sigma_{EA} \right) \\
&= d(M'; EA).
\end{align*}

Then, we obtain (61).

**Appendix G: Proof of Lemma 4**

Denote
\begin{equation}
\omega_{XAE} = W_{E} \times P_{X} = \sum_{x \in X} \frac{1}{|X|} |x\rangle \langle x| \otimes U_{x} \tau_{AE} U_{x}^{\dagger}.
\end{equation}

By definition,
\begin{equation}
\bar{I}_{1+t}^{\downarrow}(X; AE|\omega_{XAE}) = \min_{\sigma_{AE}} \frac{1}{t} \log \Xi_{1+t}(\omega_{XAE} \| \omega_{X} \otimes \sigma_{AE}).
\end{equation}

Notice that \( \omega_{XAE} \) is invariant under group operation \( \{U_{x}\}_{x \in X} \) and quasi-entropy \( \Xi_{1+t}(\cdot\|\cdot) \) (see (E6) for definition) is invariant under unitary operation. Thus the minimizer \( \sigma_{AE} \) is also invariant under group operation \( \{U_{x}\}_{x \in X} \), which means it takes the form \( \sigma_{AE} = I_{A} d_{A} \).

Then we have
\begin{align*}
&\bar{I}_{1+t}^{\downarrow}(X; AE|\omega_{XAE}) \\
&= \min_{\sigma_{E}} \frac{1}{t} \log \Xi_{1+t}(\omega_{XAE} \| \omega_{X} \otimes I_{A} d_{A} \otimes \sigma_{E}) \\
&= \min_{\sigma_{E}} \frac{1}{t} \log \frac{d_{A}^{p}}{|X|} \sum_{x} \Xi_{1+t}(U_{x} \tau_{AE} U_{x}^{\dagger}\|\sigma_{E}) \\
&= \log d_{A} - \tilde{H}_{1+t}^{\dagger}(A|E|\tau_{AE}).
\end{align*}
Appendix H: Proof of Theorem 4

Recall that an achievable rate for wire-tap channel requires $\epsilon(W_B) = \Pr[M \neq \hat{M}]$ and $d(M; E)$ go to zero asymptotically. An achievable rate for PDC protocol requires $\epsilon_C, \epsilon_E$ and $\epsilon_B$ go to zero asymptotically. We will prove Theorem 4 by showing the conversion between these conditions.

Protocol 4 gives a conversion from a specific wire-tap code to a PDC protocol. However, this type of conversion can be made for any wire-tap code. Since the consumed length for covering variable $Y$ is negligible in comparison with $n$, we have the relation $\leq$ in (74).

Conversely, the asymptotic setting of the PDC model requires the following; Alice transmits her message with asymptotically zero error under $n$ times use of the channel $W_B$. Also, when Eve receives her information via $n$ times use of the channel $W_E$, Eve obtains no information for Alice’s message.

Now, we consider a PDC protocol $P_n$ of $\epsilon_C-$ complete, $\epsilon_E-$ secure, and $\epsilon_B-$ reliable with a message $M \in \mathcal{M}$ and a random variable $S \in \mathcal{S}$ to be sent via public channel. We have a conditional distribution $P_{G^n|M,S}$ such that Alice chooses an element $(g_1, \ldots, g_n) \in G^n$ subject to $P_{G^n|M,S}$ and applies $U_{g_1} \otimes \cdots \otimes U_{g_n}$ dependently of $S$ and $M$. Also, we denote the decoder $\Pi^S$ dependently of $S$.

In the following, we consider the case when the channel from Alice to Bob is $\Lambda_A^{\otimes n}$. We denote the recovered message by Bob by $\hat{M}$. Then, we have

$$\Pr[M \neq \hat{M}] = \Pr[M \neq \hat{M}, Ab^c] + \Pr[M \neq \hat{M}, Ab] \quad (H1)$$

$$\leq \Pr[Ab^c | M \neq \hat{M}] + \Pr[Ab] \quad (H2)$$

$$\leq \epsilon_B + \epsilon_C, \quad (H3)$$

Also, there exists a distribution $Q_S$ of $S$ such that

$$\|P_{S,M} - P_M \times Q_S\|_1 \leq \epsilon_E, \quad (H4)$$

which implies

$$\|P_S - Q_S\|_1 \leq \epsilon_E. \quad (H5)$$

Thus, we have

$$\|P_{S,M} - P_M \times P_S\|_1 \leq 2\epsilon_E. \quad (H6)$$
Hence, we have

$$\sum_{s \in S} P_S(s) \left( P(M \neq \hat{M} | S = s) + \| P_{M|S=s} - P_M \|_1 \right) \leq 2\epsilon_E + \epsilon_B + \epsilon_C. \quad \text{(H7)}$$

When $S = s$ and the distribution $P_{M|S=s}$ is replaced by $P_M$ we denote the decoding error probability by $\Pr[M \neq \hat{M}|S = s][P_M]$. Then, we have

$$\Pr[M \neq \hat{M}|S = s][P_M] \leq \Pr[M \neq \hat{M}|S = s][P_{M|S=s}] + \| P_{M|S=s} - P_M \|_1 \leq \Pr[M \neq \hat{M}|S = s] + \| P_{M|S=s} - P_M \|_1. \quad \text{(H8)}$$

That is, we have

$$\sum_{s \in S} P_S(s) \Pr[M \neq \hat{M}|S = s][P_M] \leq 2\epsilon_E + \epsilon_B + \epsilon_C. \quad \text{(H9)}$$

In the following, we consider the case when Eve intercepts the transmitted state. There exists a state $\sigma_{SE}$

$$\| \rho_{MSE} - P_M \otimes \sigma_{SE} \| \leq \epsilon_E. \quad \text{(H10)}$$

Due to the same reason as (H6), we have

$$\| \rho_{MSE} - P_M \otimes \rho_{SE} \| \leq 2\epsilon_E. \quad \text{(H11)}$$

We define the joint state $\bar{\rho}_{MSE}$ as

$$\bar{\rho}_{MSE} := \sum_{s \in S, m \in M} P_M(m)P_S(s)|m, s\rangle\langle m, s| \otimes \rho_{E|M=m, S=s}. \quad \text{(H12)}$$

Then, we have

$$\| \bar{\rho}_{MSE} - P_M \otimes \rho_{SE} \|_1 \leq \| \bar{\rho}_{MSE} - \rho_{MSE} \|_1 + \| \rho_{MSE} - P_M \otimes \rho_{SE} \|_1 \leq 4\epsilon_E. \quad \text{(H13)}$$

That is,

$$\sum_{s \in S} P_S(s)\| \bar{\rho}_{ME|S=s} - P_M \otimes \rho_{E|S=s} \|_1 \leq 4\epsilon_E. \quad \text{(H14)}$$

Due to (H9), (H14), and Markov inequality, there exists $s_0 \in S$ such that

$$P(M \neq \hat{M}|S = s_0)[P_M] \leq 3(2\epsilon_E + \epsilon_B + \epsilon_C) \quad \text{(H15)}$$

$$\| \bar{\rho}_{ME|S=s_0} - P_M \otimes \rho_{E|S=s_0} \|_1 \leq 12\epsilon_E. \quad \text{(H16)}$$
In the same way as (H6), we have
\[ \|\tilde{\rho}_{ME|S=s_0} - P_M \otimes \tilde{\rho}_E|S=s_0\|_1 \leq 24\epsilon_E. \] (H17)

Now, as our wire-tap encoder, we choose \( P_{G^n|M=m,S=s_0} \) for each message \( m \in \mathcal{M} \). We choose \( \Pi^o \) as our wire-tap decoder. The decoding error probability of this wire-tap code is evaluated by (H15), and the information leakage of this wire-tap code is evaluated by (H17). Hence, we have the relation \( \geq \) in (74).

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