REASON. GOOD. EVIL

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Abstract: The publication presents the issues of philosophical anthropology fundamental for Leszek Kołakowski’s interests, which attempt not only at finding answers but also asking questions about the condition of human nature, the constitutive conditions for human existence in the transcendental dimension, the essence of tensions and conflicts that may pose a threat to the survival of the European civilization, and, finally, questions about whether there are orientation marks and points of support that constitute the necessary conditions for its further existence and development. This area of concern places the human being at the heart of the matter as a causal being - taking action and endowed with freedom of will which presupposes the ability to do good and evil. Understood in this dimension, exceeding the features of zoological species, participates in the moral and cognitive sphere, in the sphere of unconditional moral imperatives, which cannot be empirically determined. Humanity transcends the properties of nature and is not defined by specific determinants that distinguish it from other species. Therefore, manhood is a moral notion, an attempt to make an endless intellectual effort to marginalize the natural instincts in order to convince people that the man is a moral being, a self-contained goal, not a means.

Keywords: man, morality, consciousness, freedom, subjectivity, myth.

Introduction

Leszek Kołakowski very often deals with the problem of the nature of good and evil, which is fundamental for the way the man functions in the world. These categories, organizing the moral space of human being, the space of axiological communication, are in consequence also decisive for the life of civilization. The spiritual strength of the European culture is, on the one hand, the awareness of unfinished identification, which determines constant self-criticism and is responsible for the unbelievable flourishing of the culture as well as its fall or trip, and, on the other hand, this spiritual strength is revealed in the temptation to discover the unconditionally binding norms and precepts which affirm this potential of humanity as an abstract or idealistic response to the barbaric part of the human nature. The canon of the
European culture is established on abstract values. Concepts such as mankind, humanity, freedom, goodness and truth are not natural phenomena or natural objects. Their participation in the creation of the moral paradigm of the European culture is constantly being updated through their participation in the field of the necessity of reason, in the sphere of captivating moral imperatives, which cannot be proved experimentally. The vitality of this culture, its survival, depends on the moral conviction that hardly definable concepts, such as human dignity, which is not an empirical finding, are strong enough to rebut, for example, the thesis on the advantages of slavery. The question remains whether our civilization is able to establish absolutely binding norms, independent of our experience, so that the boundary between good and evil, and thus the distinction between good and evil, can be established regardless of the decisions of individuals caused by immediate circumstances, in favor of seeking absolute criteria above them.

„For centuries, philosophy has affirmed its legitimacy by asking and answering questions inherited from the Socratic and Pre-Socratic legacy: how to distinguish between what is real and unreal, true and false, good and evil. There is one man with whom all European philosophers identify, even if they reject his ideas in their entirety. It is Socrates; a philosopher unable to identify with this archetypical figure does not belong to this civilization” (Kołakowski, 1990). Kolakowski belongs to the culture, which inherited the thought of Socrates, the culture that established the civilization of Christianity: „... I am a Christian […] I do not think it is possible to belong to our culture being completely non-Christian” (Kołakowski, 1984). Therefore, he takes up the challenge of identifying the division defining the boundaries between good and evil in the experience of human existence. Evil, being a determinant of human condition, belongs to the catalogue of final – metaphysical – questions, which cannot be converted into scientific questions. Kolakowski's philosophical thought is focused on the presence of evil in the world, on the constant updating of the awareness of the existence of evil, which is not fanaticism, a mistake, but a fundamental motif in the thought horizon and an indelible sign of human existence and human nature. Kolakowski is opposed to a culture that denies the existence of evil and reinforces the conviction that evil is unreal, and it boils down only to the conceptual layer, especially as some researchers have denied its presence or qualified it as a pseudoproblem: „at some point, philosophers had to realize and face the simple, painfully undeniable fact: among the questions that have kept the European philosophy alive for two and a half millennia, not a single one has ever been resolved to our general satisfaction; all of them are still controversial or have been annulled by a decree of philosophers” (Kolakowski, 1990). Kolakowski takes up the classical question of the European tradition and stands next to Manicheans, Gnostics, St. Augustine or Kant: „I am associated with a certain tradition in the history of Christianity, and opposed to another. I find more inspiration in a tradition that is linked to the Manichaean sources of Christianity, and I am rather distrustful of the pantheistic tradition. I'm Manichean” (Kolakowski, 1984). Kolakowski is engaged in a dialogue with the past, tradition, but the identification of evil is also done through the
participation, presence in the world oriented towards evil. It is the contemporary evil measured by totalitarianism. The development of Kołakowski's philosophical thought is focused around the idea of evil rooted in ideological systems searching for immanent laws governing human liberation, systems searching for secular forms of salvation: „in every utopia of final reconciliation there is a cultural danger. The destructive effects of a doctrine that assumes that the ability to improve has no limits and that our predictions of the final reconciliation or total synthesis are well established are undeniable” (Kołakowski, 1984). Kołakowski's philosophy of evil is a conglomeration of the dramatic content of the modern man, within which trust in reason threatens nihilism, and humanism transforms into anti-humanism. Conducting a dialogue with the tradition, undertaking a polemic with the theory of Spinoza's pantheism and the theory of evil according to St. Augustine, Kołakowski remains engaged in the present, especially referring to the tragedy of evil of the contemporary man. He sympathizes with the opinion that by addressing this problem philosophy faces a risk and admits that, until it exceeds the fire test of this issue and until it knows exactly what it is and whether it is at all. Facing the philosophy of the 20th century, evil is a time of contempt for the essence of human humanity. Kołakowski discovers evil in a metaphysical dimension, just like Tischner who notes that Thomism is the philosophical thought that remains outside the analysis of totalitarianism, indifferent to the evil of Oświęcim: „I do not claim that this philosophy is completely without value. It seems to me, however, that after Auschwitz and the Gulag it cannot be cultivated in the same way as before. History is not without significance for the fate of philosophy. History is a test of fire for every philosophy, where something burns out and something remains. The Thomists themselves must once again answer the question of what has burnt out and what remains. Thomism escapes all subjectivity and all intimacy of the human person, above all it is blind to what questions its basic admiration for the world; it still defends faith as admiration for all admiration. However, in the modern times the man has less and less reasons to admire the world. Can an Auschwitz prisoner admire the magnificence of the world? A Thomist walks the world stage like a child in a cemetery, happy to see flowers growing among the crematoria” (Tischner, 1992).

**Totalitarian evil**

Kołakowski also sees evil in its eschatological dimension, a dimension that is beyond the experience of the past epochs, identifies the evil that we experience, but also the evil that experiences us (Wodziński, 1994), which foreshadows the apocalyptic annihilation of our time through the entanglement in the history of Antichrist (Kołakowski, 1984). His announcement heralded the individuals who were the incarnation of the ultimate evil: „I recall that at the beginning of the war, in Switzerland, I heard the great theologian Karl Barth answer the famous
question: is Hitler the Antichrist? If I'm not mistaken in my memory, his answer was yes: „this man, whom I do not need to mention by name […] is certainly not the Antichrist. For he has no power over our eternal salvation. The true Antichrist will only be revealed at the end of history as our merciless accuser. And then we will have no other intercessor to God than Christ himself. However, the man you are thinking about is only a little man, the first harbinger of the Antichrist. And the war he is waging against the Church and the Christian world is only the first signal for us to prepare ourselves for the final Fight and the Final Judgment” (Rougemont, 1992). When defining the shape of the catastrophe of the contemporary times, Kolakowski notes that: „In addition to his functions at the beginning of the world, the Christian devil was to have his tasks at its expected end. If he moves the entire human history, that is, the history of hardship, suffering and misery, it was natural to expect that he would not easily give up his successes and that in the last phase of human destinies his activity could increase significantly” (Kołakowski, 1984). Sołowiow presents the created world, the world of phenomena and things, as ruthlessly bad, realizing the negation of the divinity in relation to the power of the devil, hence the aspect of the end of history that often appears in the writings of this philosopher and resonates with the thought of Kolakowski: „The Antichrist is a problem of the metaphysics of history. The Antichrist is not a revelation of this old evil, which can be traced from the first days of human history, but of our evil, the evil of the coming age, which will be much more terrible than the past” (Solowjow, 1988). Sołowiow recognizes the tragedy of good and evil in a finite and destructible reality, therefore, he definitely seeks the sources of this ultimate evil, which is an evil in the totalitarian dimension for the experience of human life. Tischner notes that the sensitivity to the experience of totalitarianism, to which the Thomistic philosophy was indifferent, took place within the totalitarian doctrine: „a critical analysis of the communist system was made by a former Marxist, Kolakowski” (Tischner, 1992). The totalitarian evil is a real part of the history of Europe and the philosophical European thought confirming the scope of humanistic values that cannot be reduced by the perspective of time. It cannot remain indifferent to the crisis of the present day, it makes an in-depth analysis of the causes and, above all, an understanding of the presence of evil (Kant, 1993). In the European tradition, which in its history and philosophy seeks wisdom to defend itself against the fear of annihilation (Kolakowski, 1987), a heideggerian reflection on the evil of wasted time, which is so poor that it is no longer able to recognize its own waste, is present (Heidegger, 2004), even though the problem is unreasonable and does not easily undergo operations of reason. The difficulty of reflecting on the presence of evil also results from the fact that the contemporary consciousness, while experiencing a serious spiritual crisis, must overcome the chaos of conscience without any help or reference to theodicy (Kolakowski, 1987).

Kolakowski notes that our world needs methane, i. e. a change of spirit: „it is certain that no party or political movement can seek a victorious therapy for moral emptiness. You can't impose artificial ideals or mirages on people. New generations should seek in themselves ways to discover meaningful life forms. Political movements, with the exception of the totalitarian
ones, are in any case incapable of providing solutions to metaphysical and religious unrest. We should assume that we have no recipe for creating a perfect world, that we have no secret of happiness or the key to the mystery of the universe. However, we are perhaps capable of creating more modest things and achieving more modest goals, capable of giving meaning to life. In a world full of poverty, hunger and oppression, at least one thing seems certain: neither technical nor political means alone are sufficient to give rise to the hope for a peaceful and just order. We need more than that” (Kolakowski, 1982). Kolakowski opposes the optimistic Enlightenment tradition visualizing reconciliation and harmony of the universe: „I am trying to say that in every utopia of final reconciliation there is a cultural danger, and that – which is the reverse side of the same matter – the concept of the original sin contains an insightful intuition of the human fate” (Kolakowski, 1984). Total negation of evil or recognition of its accidental presence in the history of humanity implies a reality dependent on the individuals realizing the idea of human good according to abstract criteria. Kolakowski’s source of the presence of our culture in its moral dimension is the principle of an irrevocable imperative, stating that: „we acquire moral knowledge not because someone convinces us that Kant or Husserl or Plato were right, but because we are able to feel guilty and actually experience guilt when we violate the rules that we know are legitimate” (Kolakowski, 1999a). Kolakowski consistently shows that the criteria for distinguishing between „good" and „evil" „are ways in which people mutually reinforce themselves in the fairness of their behavior” (Kolakowski, 1999a), therefore the negation of evil gives birth to an absurd world, the sense of which is realized through illusion, nothingness, and then „wouldn't it be right to call it anything rather than something?” (Kolakowski, 1984). Kolakowski identifies the limits of secular autonomy through the relations to the Christian tradition, he particularly refers to the universal Christianity of the reality of evil in man: „there are reasons why we need Christianity, but not just any. We do not need Christianity, which causes political revolutions, cooperates with the so-called sexual liberation, sanctifies all our desires and liberates violence. There are enough forces in the world to do all this without the help of Christianity. People need a Christianity that helps them to go beyond the direct pressures of life, that shows them the inevitable limits of human destiny and enables them to accept them, a Christianity that teaches them this simple truth that there is not only tomorrow but also the day after tomorrow, and that the difference between success and failure is rarely clear. We need a Christianity, which is neither gold, nor purple, nor red, but grey” (Kołakowski, 1984). „If, in the end, according to our uncertain hope, the Christian world proves itself capable of essential repair and transformation, the self-repairing forces will draw upon only their own source (non-Christian critics may weaken Christianity, but they cannot repair it themselves); then they can recreate this knowledge only through the constant concentration of attention on the spiritual resources which are associated with the name of Jesus” (Kolakowski, 1989).


Christian Europe

Kolakowski selects the fundamental values of human existence by writing that Europe is Christian by birth (Kołakowski, 1984). These values define the condition sine qua non of the functioning of European culture, defining the area of such values as: openness, tolerance, self-critical skills: „it can ultimately be said that the European cultural identity is reinforced by the refusal to accept any kind of completed identification, and thus by uncertainty and anxiety” (Kołakowski, 1984).

Christian Europe reaffirms its strength and unity in the perspective of permanent conflicts of values, directions of development, balancing around maintaining balance in decisively different concepts of the world and man. The European culture has made the antimony by its own power, which consistently participates in strengthening its sense – the perception of the world revealed through the image of God and its opposite, identifying the reality through the negation of God: „the Christian idea, as it has been formed and articulated over the centuries, had to constantly resist heretical tendencies which confirmed one part of this tension by neglecting or forgetting the other” (Kołakowski, 1984).

Kolakowski points out that the European culture, while shaping its moral identity, must experience constant uncertainty and internal anxiety; all the doctrines favoring the idea of total human salvation in the empirical reality and legitimizing the principles of moral relativism constitute a threat to historical continuity, and, in the dimension of human life, nihilistic contents are the consequence. Christianity secures the existence of the man against the illusion of overcoming the evil of the original sin, Christianity makes the man aware of the truth about his creation: „our natural forces cannot find a reliable shelter against evil: all we can do is practice the art of balancing, opposing dangers. This is what the Christian tradition proclaims, saying that some of the effects of the original sin are inevitable, and that if salvation is possible, it is only by grace” (Kołakowski, 1984). Christian Europe sets the limits of human autonomy through the experience of good and evil. In metaphysical faith and religious worship Christianity constantly verifies the constitutive values for the duration of culture. Hence the optimism in looking at the third millennium and the noticeable symptoms of religious revival (Kołakowski, 1990). Kołakowski's position proves that the exclusion of sacrum from the reality of human existence will never be final. Its presence reveals the sense of the world in contradiction to the utopia of perfect human autonomy, which is an illusion; therefore, the European culture, dependent on the hierarchy of values, intuitively rejects the alternative of the consistently scientific image of the world (Kołakowski, 1990). Christian Europe, indicating the spiritual need of the man to reach the absolute existence, remains outside the nihilistic projects. The perspective of the development of the Christian civilization means that: "It is an act of renunciation that is only possible within a particular culture, namely one which
was able to make an effort to understand another because it had learned to question itself’’ (Kolakowski, 1984).

The crisis of the contemporary Christian Europe is part of the heritage of the Enlightenment. Kolakowski captures the crisis of the Christian culture through the opposition of religious faith and scientific knowledge, the opposition of sacrum and profanum. The emancipation of reason legitimized the abolition of this opposition, accepting trust in its unlimited possibilities, thus questioning the order of axiological categories. Thus, it legitimized extreme relativism threatening nihilism (Kolakowski, 1984). The desacralization of the European culture was a process of secularization of reason in the face of the traditional metaphysical beliefs. The tendencies of relativism, scientism and empiricism have limited the tasks of philosophy in favor of scientific activities that effectively predict phenomena and are useful in mastering the forces of nature, Kolakowski notes: „when this rule became the highest value, the entire religious heritage of humanity became questionable and eventually lost all sense. The treatment of religious sensitivity as a meaningless thing did not result from science, nor from the possible conflict between the scientific truth and the content of revelation, but from human preferences, from our hierarchy of values that gives priority to those mental activities that promise to extend the rule of nature; science was something that could be relied upon with verifiable results in view; religion did not provide such support” (Kolakowski, 1988).

The philosophy of enlightenment

The ideology of the European Enlightenment, while constituting the autonomy of reason, confirmed the axiological relativism emphasizing the relative character of the values which denied them objective existence. Reason as a criterion for cognition satisfied the human need to create a general picture of reality (Kolakowski, 1999). In this sense, the perception of the world supported by scientific knowledge ultimately denied the possibility of knowing universal rules, related to the truth not conditioned by biological, social or psychological needs. Each time moral norms are set or invalidated according to the „capricious decisions of the man”, they anticipate the tragedy of civilization because: „without believing that the difference between good and evil depends neither on the capricious decisions of the individual nor on the political circumstances of each case, and that it is not reduced to the difference between good and evil, our civilization is threatened by decay” (Kolakowski, 1984). From this perspective, the freedom of Enlightenment, supported by the criterion of reason, distinguishes between good and evil (philosophical anthropology values freedom as a conscious act of will, realized through the choice of the way of being in the world). The Enlightenment rooted the fundamental meaning of this decision in the man, implying the pursuit of self-fulfillment and self-cognition taking place with the exclusion of absolutely binding norms. In consequence, the man affirms
nihilism – the man of the Enlightenment justifies the objective absence of evil through the criterion of reason (Kołakowski, 1987).

In the reflection on the reality of human epistemological consciousness, the philosophy of the Enlightenment has been defined by the opposition to the Christian tradition that constitutes the European value of humanism and democracy. The philosopher notes that the development of totalitarian ideologies, including the rule of scientistic rationalism revealing the technological spirit in culture, historically identifies itself with the heritage of the Enlightenment: „The fundamental bonds that have sustained the human community – the family, the religion – have been mocked or violently broken. In short, the Enlightenment is a major cultural disaster. Human existence has been reduced to its purely natural determinants, so that human beings have become completely interchangeable - like bricks in a wall: this is how the foundations of the 20th-century totalitarianism were finally laid” (Kołakowski, 1999). The European Enlightenment defined the paradigm of culture by defining a pattern of interpretation of the phenomena of reality through a set of research methods based on the criteria of scientific correctness and rationality, defining the scope and limits of epistemology. Thus the Europe of the Enlightenment „elevating the man to the dignity of the potentially omnipotent creator” (Kołakowski, 1999) was realized through the ideas of naturalism, atheism and rationalism, which were in permanent conflict with the tradition of Christianity.

Kołakowski stresses that despite the absorption of the leading Christian content – the idea of human rights, equality and brotherhood – the Enlightenment confirmed the European mentality in opposition to the philosophy of Christian provenance, supporting the implementation of these ideas in a degenerate form. Humanism, expressing the concept of human freedom as the ability to identify good and evil, which values are not defined by historical cases, turned against the popular utilitarianism of the Enlightenment, which sanctioned the awareness that moral norms do not constitute a collection of synthetic judgments a priori (Kołakowski, 1984). At this point, it is worth noting the special Enlightenment ministry which occurred in Kant's philosophy. Even if theology and ethics do not have their own synthetic judgments a priori and radically separate the Practical Reason and the Pure (theoretical) Reason, the regulatory ideas of reason put our knowledge in order, constitute a form of reaching „things themselves", legitimize the categorical imperative, and thus the „state of goals”. A man who ceases to be a „tool"; and becomes a „target"; is at the same time a cognitive powerhouse. His epistemic field was freed from theology and axiology, his religious faith was deepened by the practical reaching of the Absolute. Perhaps, however, Kant, the late man of the Enlightenment, gives the Enlightenment a more valuable interpretation than Kołakowski. By defining the concept of a person as an autonomous entity, distinguished by the value of experience and moral action, Christianity has constituted an „ontological status of personality” (Kołakowski, 1999) affirming the essence of humanity: „the belief in an irreducible and unique core of personality is certainly not a scientifically proven truth [...] but without this belief the notion of personal dignity and human rights is an arbitrary invention, suspended in a vacuum, untenable, easy to defend, easy to
disregard” (Kołakowski, 1999). Kołakowski points out that the existence of unconditional values affirms the importance and purpose of human life. He stresses that „humanity is not defined by specific determinants distinguishing it from other animal species” (Kołakowski, 1999), thus, there is no natural „equality” of people justified by empirical criteria. The hierarchy of absolute values constitutive of human rights sources refers to the area of the opposition sacrum-profanum, an area that identifies humanity in the moral dimension. Ethical hedonism is the doctrine of the Enlightenment: „Step by step, the Enlightenment moves away from its source in order to take on a non-Christian or anti-Christian form. In its final stages, the Enlightenment turns against itself: humanism turns into moral nihilism, cognitive uncertainty ends in epistemological nihilism, affirmation of the person undergoes an unprecedented metamorphosis, from which it emerges as a totalitarian theory (Kołakowski, 1999).

The Enlightenment history of reason is a modernized version of the myth of the „man”. By identifying the myth of the Enlightenment with the myth of reason, Kolakowski points to the danger of the unconditional control of the reality by the myth: „The myth can grow like cancer tissue, it can aim to replace positive knowledge, the law, it can try to seize almost all areas of culture with violence, it can overgrow with despotism, terror, lies. It is also dangerous because it can relieve its participants from the responsibility for their own situation, dry up their desire for freedom and throw doubt on the value of freedom itself. […] The complete tame of the world and the total abolition of its alienation may be an illusion and is not free from evil faith” (Kołakowski, 1990). Kolakowski identifies the „deadly certainty of myth” by pointing out the Enlightenment Reason, which is the governing criterion of the Truth that is realized through the barbaric forms of denial of humanity. The Enlightenment’s reason liberating the man from immaturity, granting him the right to use reason, affirming the Good, sanctioned evil for a mad vision of perfection: „Never have so many people been murdered in the name of a doctrine as in the name of the principle that people are good by nature” (Kołakowski, 1984). Kołakowski undermines the myth of Reason and Evil by means of an act of reason. „It is an exciting occupation to observe how reason destroys Reason in philosophical work (Kołakowski); reason, as an ordinary human power of thought, undermines the claims of reason – a philosophical construct that was the embodiment of the Enlightenment’s Gnostic desire to ensure man's full existence outside of God or gods” (Kłoczowski, 1987).

The philosophical call of the Enlightenment era sapere aude affirming the idea of humanitas has triumphed in relation to the soteriology of reason implying a promise that one will become all, all will become one. The transformation of Enlightenment Reason was to be the birth of the Beginning, the constitution of the New Time, sanctioning the mythical consciousness of Reason, abandoning the borders of rationality. The Enlightenment Reason, however, rejected the truth of the Original Sin, denied the Evil, went into a „metaphysical abyss” and revealed the Evil. „The concept of original sin contains an insightful intuition of human fate” (Kołakowski,
1984). Kołakowski defines the modus operandi of human humanity in this way from the axiological perspective, because evil experiences the man and sin determines his condition.

Analyzing the reason of Enlightenment, which is the source of totalitarian systems, Kołakowski notes: „It is true that the internal threat to Europe comes not only from the weakened will of self-affirmation, but also from its endogenous barbaric sides. Totalitarianism has strong European sources whose various forms can be traced throughout the history of socialist utopias, nationalist ideologies and theocratic tendencies. Europe, as it turned out, is by no means completely immune to its own barbaric past, which has been able to return before our very eyes in appallingly victorious forms; nevertheless, Europe has been able to mobilize powerful resources against this past” (Kołakowski, 1984). The philosopher who defines the condition of the European civilization judges that it is based on the metaphysical presence of evil in the world of affirmed human values, creating an opportunity for its humanity: „To say that evil is accidental, to say that evil does not exist, that we do not need a sense that is imposed on us as a sense that is already constituted and binding. To say so much, however, is also to say that in order to decree any meaning, we have no other means than our natural impulses; it means, therefore, either to share the childish trust of former anarchists in the natural goodness of man, or to acknowledge that man is affirmed only when he becomes again what he was before culture, i. e. to affirm himself only as an untamed animal. The final word of the ideal of total liberation is, therefore, a sanction for naked violence; in the end, it is a consent to despotism and the destruction of culture” (Kołakowski, 1984).

For Leszek Kołakowski, humanity is a moral category and the man as a moral being exists only in the abstract perspective and in the perspective of continuous becoming, thus assimilating a set of values, practicing experience and moral behaviour, taking responsibility for one's own actions. In other words, man loses his childhood, but gains a future, rejects the fear of maturity and gets rid of infantile regression, but gains the awareness of life on his own account. A mature image of man goes beyond a life in a determined world, a moral man constitutes a sensible reality and appears as a free person.

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