SOCIOLOGY | RESEARCH ARTICLE

Return of the Lost Son: Disengagement and social reintegration of former terrorists in Indonesia

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Abstract: People involved in terrorism do not always survive as part of a group or fail to assimilate into society. Many former terrorists have returned to their community and even taken part in the deradicalization movement. (1) This study aims to find out: First, the background of the former terrorists’ involvement, profiles, and roles in the act of terrorism; Second, the returning process of the former terrorists as well as the conditions allowing them to return to moderate ideology and abandon terrorism, and analysis of their returning process. To the best of our knowledge, little attention has been paid to this aspect in the previous studies; (2) Methods used for the data collection were interview, observation, and documentation; (3) Results exhibited that former terrorists undergo a disengagement process from their groups and acts of terrorism. Besides, clear evidence of the former terrorists’ reintegration into society is shown. It reflects a termination of the beginning of the dehumanization symptom that causes them to be exposed. (4) Conclusion: reorientation is

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PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

The title of paper “Return of the Lost Son: Disengagement and Social Reintegration of Former Terrorists in Indonesia.” This paper shows: (1) the background of former terrorist will affect the behavior change process for each individual in society; (2) former terrorist who are directly or indirectly involved can become good and useful people for others; (3) the structure of a society can become a medium for social integration, including former terrorists. It turns out that a terrorist can turn into a person who is converted and lives a normal life, as well as in with society without barriers and distances. Every human being can change from one situation to another dynamically. In the process of returning a terrorist, a mediator is urgently needed among the people, because as a contributor in the success of social reintegration so that there is mediation towards a peaceful and dignified life.
required to realize harmonization in the disengagement. It is further concluded that the terrorists who have been put in jail for committing terrorism may turn into people with moderate ideology and return to their everyday life in society.

**Subjects**: Islamic Studies; Sociology of Religion; Terrorism Studies

**Keywords**: Disengagement; social reintegration; former terrorists; religious terrorism; mediated structure

1. Introduction

A statement claiming that it is not easy for former terrorists to return to being moderate is not entirely grounded. It is based on the trend that shows the changing orientation of the former terrorists and their reintegration into society (Schuurman, 2019). The data of deradicalization in Lamongan confirmed that 30 out of 100 terrorists have returned to society. They even become part of a deradicalization movement initiated by the government and non-government organizations (Fauzi, 2020). As shown by Jainuri (2016), Holbrook & Horgan (2019), and Price (2020), terrorists are an ideological group whose existence is bound by a particular ideological belief. However, the facts show the contrary as it is not unreasonable for terrorists to return to the moderate ideology. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the former terrorists’ changing attitudes is indispensable as it can explain the possible orientation of their life after being involved in terrorism.

So far, terrorism studies have emphasized the actors of the terrorism movement and its consequences. As indicated by Marx, terror occurs on structural conditions involving disadvantaged people with fearlessness, powerlessness, and meaninglessness. In other words, terror is a response to gap or negligence (Marx & Engels, 1995). Concurrently, terrorism has also been seen as a catastrophe for humankind by ignoring others’ right to live (Fitzpatrick, 2003). In Zuhdi (2020), religion has become a force that legitimizes acts of violence. Mubaraq (2011) posits that terrorism deals with the misinterpretation of the verses of the Quran. However, these previous studies put little attention to the dynamic aspects of terrorism in which changes may occur in groups that have been considered perpetrators. Changes in their attitudes and disengagement process from their terrorist groups have not been well elucidated.

The current study aims to fill the gaps of previous studies by explicitly analyzing the reintegration process of former terrorists. In line with that, three questions will be answered in this article: (1) what are the background and profile of former terrorists who returned to the society as they leave terrorism behind, (2) what are the underlying conditions that allow them to return to moderate ideology, and (3) what are the forces that contribute to the return of terrorists. The former terrorists’ reintegration process may become a reference for a better social arrangement in counterterrorism in a broader sense.

The underlying assumption of this study is that terrorists cannot merely be treated as perpetrators of violation that threatens humanity’s existence. They also need to be seen from broader perspectives. In fact, the terrorists are also victims of both structural and cultural situations. As indicated in Abadie (2020), many terrorists come from socially and politically disadvantaged groups. At the same time, terrorists are also a group with low-quality human resources that demand empathy. In various cases of terrorism, terrorists are a group of people who are under pressure and coercion that forces them to get involved in radical movements (Zimmerman, 2020). This precondition triggering their involvement in terrorism is deemed a vital context that allows them to experience an orientation change before they eventually return to the community.
2. Literature review

2.1. Disengagement

Horgan (2005) defines disengagement as “letting go” or “abandoning” a shared social norms (the group), values, attitudes, and aspirations that were rooted during their period as terrorists. Disengagement and deradicalization undertake distinctive processes (Johnson, 2020). Deradicalization effort gains greater attention as it has been closely monitored to assure the result and claim of success. A more irresistible challenge is to emphasize some conceptual and terminological clarity. Although deradicalization has served as the up-to-date buzzword in counterterrorism, it is deemed imperative to clarify the dissimilarity between this term and disengagement. Disengagement is used to confirm that someone has left terrorism (Stern, 2010). The contributing factors that brought the Red Army Faction (RAF) to an end and put particular emphasis on the causes and characteristics of each RAF member to disengage from the group involve the evolution, ideology, and setback of the three RAF generations. First, the demise of a terrorist organization instigates terrorism to terminate and set their former members free. Second, it can be used to confirm, challenge, or abolish terrorism (Moghadam, 2012).

Personal experiences of former Indonesian terrorists who have been through deradicalization, it is found out that they experience identity threats due to their identity as former terrorist convicts. Thus, it brings negative impacts to their positive mindsets. Many former terrorists have confidently reevaluated their past and reformulated it as part of their current identity, particularly when disapprovals from their former peers arise. To fight the public stigma, they hide their former identity while at the same time strengthening their personal characteristics in interpersonal relationships. (Syafiq, 2019). Most people who once joined the radical groups realize the factors and processes involved in leaving the groups and reintegrating into society. The social identity mechanisms involved in radicalization may also be another essential factor of disengagement, deradicalization, and readjustment. (Berger, 2016). Several determining factors influence one person’s decision to break away from the Salafi-Jihadi group; these factors comprise the disagreement with the group leaders regarding strategy and practice and educational and employment opportunities (Kenney & Hwang, 2020). Certain conditions can influence Islamic extremist groups to deliberately demilitarize and delegitimize violence as they may temporarily put their violence priority aside. It is driven by the interaction among the political contexts, organizational dynamics, and public attitudes. When the acts of violence become costly, and the non-violent alternatives are available, they may cease the violence. However, it does not shift their ideology (Matesan, 2020).

2.2. Social reintegration

Reintegration, negotiation, deradicalization, rehabilitation, and other soft measures, are non-military strategies applied to overcome the fundamental problems that trigger terrorism (Onapajo & Ozden, 2020; Pašagić, 2019). Onapajo (2020) investigated the case of children involved in the Boko Haram’s conflict, which has hit northeast Nigeria and other Lake Chad areas for more than ten years. Onapajo (2020) prioritized the principles of child safety in building peace. In parts of the Republic of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic controlled by ISIS, children were subjected to systemic indoctrination into the extremist ideology, many of whom were actively integrated into ISIS several years later (Pašagić, 2019). In an article entitled “Interview with Mira Kusumariin, Executive Director of the Coalition of Civil Society against Violent Extremism (C-SAVE)” (Pašagić, 2019), the vital role of civil society at the international, regional, and domestic levels in helping children who were previously related needs to be implemented. It is to support the ex-terrorists or people affected by the armed conflict to rejoin the community. In this case, empathy is also essential.

Rehabilitation is considered a global imperative in the fight against terrorism. As an example, Sri Lankan rehabilitation program to reverse the radicalization process focuses on two aspects: a) efforts to turn people who have been involved in terrorism into the community; and b) ensuring that the rehabilitation program is maintained after they are reintegrated with the community (Hettiarachchi, 2019). However, the challenge arises when terrorist networks actively seek to re-radicalize the former
terrorists who have been integrated into the community. Another challenge has also been mentioned by Babanoski (2020), in which the social reintegration process is very much dependent on the socio-political, cultural and security conditions in the country. To maintain social acceptance and rehabilitation, involvement and reconciliation from the community are required (Hettiarachchi, 2019). In this case, the community members ought to help the former terrorists pave their way for acceptance as they are vulnerable citizens; and upon the reintegration, they need continuous support (Hettiarachchi, 2019). In other words, rehabilitation and deradicalization need with one-sustained interventions.

2.3. Religious terrorism
Terrorism is a form of psychological warfare (Vandercar et al., 2020). Fundamentally, pure religious terrorism is motivated by religious motives and goals without worldly attachment (Jainah & Handayani, 2019). Further, Jainah and Handayani (2019) also revealed that the difference between pure terrorism and secular terrorism lies in the motive of secular terrorism driven by religious and political considerations. Islam never teaches violence, let alone terrorism. However, the causal relationship between Islam and terrorism remains as many terrorists never cease to provide religious justification for their actions. (Dawson, 2017). Bombers offer a reason for their actions laden with religious rhetoric. Terrorism can politically paralyze the state’s extraordinary power by shifting the constituency of the country (Johnston & Bose, 2020). The primary purpose of terrorism is to make people unattached and destroy social trust with fear (Godefroidt & Langer, 2020). Varaine (2020) mentioned two ideological directions of the terrorism movement: right-wing terrorism and left-wing terrorism. Right-wing terrorism moves under long-term periods of economic deprivation. Meanwhile, left-wing terrorism moves under improving economic conditions. The main characteristic of terrorism is the use of violence, which can take the form of any behaviour that results in the creation of a state of fear and danger in the human psyche. The purpose of terrorism is, therefore, to deliberately arouse and exploit fear, and its far-reaching psychological consequences go well beyond the immediate victims (Zubrzycki, 2020).

Four aspects are always highlighted in the discussion of terrorism, i.e., personal ideology, tactics, strategic thinking, and motives (Norris, 2020). From the data on terrorism and hate speech occurring in 165 countries, Piazza (2020) found out that a) hate speech by politicians can escalate domestic terrorism; and b) the impact of hate speech on domestic terrorism is mediated through the increase of political polarization. Saiya and Scime (2015) argued that arguments on the connection between freedom and terrorism are mostly inadequate: some argue that civil liberties restrictions are obligatory to prevent terrorism. Others, however, find that respects for the rights undermine the support for terrorists; thus, it may reduce the likelihood of the terrorism act. Analyzing data on terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism Database between 2001 and 2009 in 174 countries, Saiya and Scime (2015) revealed that religious terrorism is a consequence of spiritual freedom inadequacy.

2.4. Mediated structure
A mediator’s role in the community is indispensable to realizing successful interventions (Zancanaro et al., 2020). The mediator stands between situational simulations and behavioral responses (Roth & Jornet, 2019). The third party’s knowledge about conflicts has shaped the mediator’s ability to effectively end the dispute through negotiation (Wiegand et al., 2020). The mediator’s primary role is to share information and contextual knowledge about the conflict and those involved. It is quite a contrast from a combatant who has an incentive to provide false information (Wiegand et al., 2020). The third-party intervention affects the outcome of the mediation. Simultaneously, it can also benefit the mediator as they may gain sufficient are no longer required to mediate the disputing parties (Rezaee, Daryakenari & Thies, 2018). When the mediated structure is eventually maintained, it can strongly encourage instantiation in the direction of the opposition (Kunin, 2012).

They are making the right decision on whether or not to admit terrorist charges requires the authorities with a comprehensive understanding of the terrorists’ concession consequences.
(Mertes et al., 2020). Aksenova (2017) argues that one of the biggest challenges in overcoming terrorism is the mismatch between the terrorism act and the traditional role that the criminal justice system gives to victims, perpetrators, and mediators. Offenders are “criminals” in society’s eyes as they violate norms; victims individually suffer from harm; and the court, along with law enforcement agencies, serves as legitimate mediators. However, these roles are often reversed or mixed in the fight against terrorism. The terrorist suspects may become new “victims” if they are tortured, barred from entering a country, or otherwise mistreated as the court imposes sanctions labeling the suspects as “new criminals.” They may get harmed by accidental attacks as their misery is meant to send particular messages to the world (Aksenova, 2017).

2.5. Deradicalization

Terrorists are a serious threat that at any time can endanger the safety of the nation and state, as well as national interests. The threat of the need for danger with one of the government programs, namely Deradicalization. Deradicalization is all efforts to neutralize radical ideas through interdisciplinary approaches, such as law, psychology, religion, economics, education, humanity and socio-culture for those who are affected by radicals/violence (Varaine, 2020). In Indonesia, students at seven prominent public universities have been significantly exposed to radical groups. The religious radicalism among such Muslim students, how these youth were deradicalized as a result of their rejection of the dogmatic ideologies and practices of absolutist Islamic groups. It argues that there is no direct connection between religious radicalism and violent terrorism, and that radicalized youth have an opportunity to question the impact of their involvement in the radical networks on themselves and others and deradicalize themselves without necessarily ascribing to the kind of religious understanding promoted by the state (Sirry, 2020).

The policy of countering terrorism in Indonesia is carried out through hard power (namely law enforcement) and soft power (in the form of counter-radicalism and de-radicalization). The deradicalization program of terrorism carried out by the Indonesian government, especially the National Counterterrorism Agency, has been running less than optimally, with indicators of the many acts of terrorism occurring in Indonesian territory. The implementation of the pentahelix model in the terrorism deradicalization program in Indonesia, which involves five parties, namely academics, business, community, government, and the media (ABCGM). The results showed that the less than optimal de-radicalization program of terrorism in Indonesia was caused by the absence of business actors (business community) and the media. So far, only the government, academia, and society have been involved, even though important business groups are involved in providing funds through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to former terrorists for business capital, while the media is also very important in creating anti-radicalism and anti-terrorism narratives in print, electronic, online, and social media. The conclusion is that the pentahelix model is very suitable to be applied in the deradicalization program. Therefore, this study provides suggestions for implementing the pentahelix model in the terrorism deradicalization program in Indonesia (Subagyo, 2021). The interplay between different push and pull factors at individual, organizational, and societal levels that played a role in the already mentioned processes in three periods of time—engagement with, life within, and disengagement from an armed organization. The dialogical framework conceptualizes the development trajectory as relationships between a variety of positions of the self (I-positions), which generate different personal meanings involved in processes of disengagement and deradicalization.(Da Silva et al., 2020).

3. Materials and methods

This study raises the disengagement of former terrorists, both from their interactions within their former groups and the acts of terrorism. This study is imperative for several reasons; First, a public belief that former terrorists often find it hard to adjust even return to the moderate needs to be elucidated through an in-depth study. Therefore, this study intends to explore the facts that show the former terrorists’ tendency to shift their orientation and reintegration into society. Second, many previous studies on terrorism only focused on the terrorists as perpetrators/subjects, not victims/objects. These previous studies need to be complemented by other studies that analyze
terrorists not only as subjects. Third, terrorism represents the symptoms of dehumanization/neglect of the terrorists’ rights as citizens that the state should protect. Therefore, this study is significant in explaining the symptoms.

This study was qualitative research investigating the disengagement of former terrorists from their groups and terrorism. The primary data were observation and interview results. Meanwhile, the secondary data were in the form of documents. The interview method was carried out in the following ways and stages: first, grouping and categorizing former terrorist convicts. Second, take an emotional approach and convey the aims and objectives of the research. Third, choose from those who are willing to be interviewed according to the required data. Fourth, make appointments for interviews and write transcripts as raw data. Fifth, check the validity of the data by triangulating other sources of informants. The observations were made by observing directly things related to the daily life of former terrorist convicts, such as: working to earn a living for their families, any activities that lead to awareness and conviction to return to the right path, all their efforts to invite fellow ex-terrorists to help them become useful people. Documentation is a form of activity or systematic process of searching, using, investigating, compiling, and providing documents to obtain knowledge, information, and evidence relating to the conviction of ex-terrorist convicts and also to disseminate them for the purposes of this research. The stages include: First, presenting information, official and accurate evidence that is useful for records. Second, as an effort to record and categorize the information in the form of writing, photos, videos, etc. Third, presenting it as data that is able to explain various things related to the return of former terrorist convicts.

There were three essential data sources required in this study. First is the data of terrorists who have successfully returned to the straight path, including their involvement in the terrorism movement and their roles. These data were obtained from several key informants, namely Ali Fauzi, Suyanto, Ansari Hassan, Sumarno, Iwan Setiawan. Second is the data of the disengagement process that has shifted the mindset, attitudes, and behavior of the former terrorists. The process included the individual process (internal & external) and institutional (institutional involvement and political state involvement). These data were gathered from the chairperson of Lingkar Perdamaian Foundation, chief of Densus 88, chairperson of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency, and rector of the University of Muhammadiyah Malang. Third, the data of their conversion process to become members of the society. Primordial ties in Indonesian society and culture, institutional strategy and approach, and state commitment were pivotal in this study. These data were also acquired from the chairperson of Lingkar Perdamaian Foundation, chief of Densus 88, chairperson of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency, and rector of the University of Muhammadiyah Malang.

The data in this study were obtained through interviews, observation, and documentation. First, the interviewees were the chairperson and management of Lingkar Perdamaian Foundation, also the former terrorists undergoing the reintegration process. The steps in conducting an interview: 1. Determine the theme and the informant of the interview. 2. determine the ethic of interview. 3. Provide questions to be asked to the informant. 4. Write the answer according to what the informant said and record it. 5. After getting the answer, thank the informant. Second, the observations were conducted when the program was planned, carried out, managed, and evaluated. Stages of Observation in this paper: 1. Knowing the purpose of observation. 2. Determine the object to be observed. 3. Prepare observation tools: field notes, recordings, photos. 4. Determine the secondary data required. 5. Carry out observations. 6. Record the observed results. Third, documentation complemented the data in archives, programs, names of former terrorists, track records, and photographs from their involvement in terrorism until their return to the moderate ideology.

The collected data were then analyzed using descriptive qualitative. The qualitative data analysis was carried out through data condensation, data reduction, data presentation, data verification, and conclusion drawing. Data validation was implemented through the research period.
extension about the deradicalization program of former terrorist convicts with the chairperson of Lingkar Perdamaian Foundation, chief of Densus 88, chairperson of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency, the chief police officer, and the head of Lamongan military district, as well as University Muhammadiyah Malang, and eventually the triangulation of all sources and methods.

4. Results
The reintegration process of former terrorists is a statement about the dynamics in the terrorism world. So far, former terrorists tend to be seen as perpetrators firmly holding their group’s ideology and commitment. However, this study showed the other way around as terrorists may return to their society and shift their orientation to leave radicalism. This tendency can be explained by altering the former terrorists’ characteristics, the process of changing their attitudes and orientation, and their returning process to society.

4.1. Characteristics of former terrorists who have successfully returned to the straight path
Former terrorist convicts have varied and distinctive profiles of social, economic, political, and religious characteristics. Some come from low and moderate economic levels, while some others are affiliated politically to certain parties. They also have heterogeneous religious knowledge. According to Fauzi, some of the former terrorists dropped out of school and were unemployed. Later, they started to get involved in the terrorism movement. Some had direct involvement, while some others had indirect involvement. People with direct participation provide indoctrination, instructions, and execution of the bombing. Meanwhile, terrorists with indirect movement serve as people who buy, store, and provide explosives. Also, some women were married to former terrorist convicts to deceive certain parties so that they would not get caught (interview, 10 August 2020).

In acts of terrorism, these former terrorists had different roles, including bomb assemblers, potassium nitrate/black powder buyers, surveyors, mediators, executors, mentors, and others. Several names of these former terrorists are Ali Fauzi, Suyanto, Ansari Hassan, and Sumarno. Ali Fauzi stated (see Figure 1):

“I was a bomb-maker in the Jemaah Islamiyah group. I underwent military training in the Southern Philippines in the mid-1990s. I make Tenggulun Village in Lamongan a transit point for the ex-terrorist convicts. I made it a storage area for about 13 tons of explosives, used by Jemaah Islamiyah in various terror attacks in Indonesia from 2000–2009. On the northern coast of East Java, dozens of people have left for Syria and Iraq, while JAD-related members’ arrests are still going on for the last few years. The JAD members have been accused of several attacks, including the church bombing in Surabaya, May 2018, the police station attack in Medan last November, and the stabbing of former Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Wiranto. As the recruitment and training process continues, terrorist attacks are still inevitable. And these, I think, run much faster than deradicalization efforts. I often visited a prison in Lamongan for the deradicalization program. And, I use my personal experiences of leaving violence to persuade ex-terrorist convicts to abandon destructive thoughts “. (interview, 10 August 2020).

Fauzi later explained that his Jemaah Islamiyah journey began after getting a letter from his brother, who had been in Afghanistan for years. It was an extensive process until he eventually came to realize that his decision was criminal. It is a story of a bomb maker who uses his personal experience to persuade other former terrorists to abandon destructive acts. He also added that his action in the deradicalization program caused death threats from his former comrades. He has excellent skills in assembling bombs. He said, “I can assemble a bomb in five minutes. It is even easier than making a kite” (interview, 10 August 2020).

Courtesy: suya.co.id.tribun
4.2. Disengagement process that shifts mindset, attitude, and behavior of former terrorists

Former terrorist convicts who return to moderate ideology need an individual process that is a particular awareness influenced by internal and external factors (See Figure 2). This is reflected in Ali Fauzi’s personal experience:

“The way the police officers treat me does help me to leave terrorism. I was not directly involved in the Bali Bombing. But I provided many pieces of training in many conflict areas in the early 2000s, including Ambon and Poso. I spent nine months in prison when I was detained along with other Jemaah Islamiyah members in Malaysia, an experience that made a choice. I was treated humanely. If they had tortured me, I might have held a grudge against them for the rest of my life. When I first met the police officers, I said Inna lilahi for my heart was filled with anger and hatred. This feeling, however, slowly changed as I witnessed how well they treated the prisoners. My deepest sympathy as a brother goes to the men behind the Bali Bombing 1, Amrozi and Ali Gufron, who were executed in 2008, and Ali Imron, who must serve life imprisonment. (interview, 5 September 2020).

Some former terrorist convicts attended an event that invited victims of the Bali Bombing 1 and the Australian Embassy in Tenggulun last October 2019. The night before, Ali held a meeting that asked 200 people, including many former terrorist convicts, villagers, and police officers. The

Figure 1. Ali Fauzi and his brothers.

Figure 2. Former terrorist convicts.

Courtesy: pressreader.com
meeting was held in the mosque’s courtyard in front of the office of Lingkar Perdamaian Foundation, the foundation founded by Ali Fauzi in 2016 (observation, October 2019).

In the meeting, they listened to the story of the Bali Bombing 1 victim, Suyanto, and the victim of Australian embassy bombing attack in Jakarta, Iwan Setiawan. “I crawled, and I saw a lot of corpses and body pieces,” said Suyanto, who underwent treatments for years due to the severe injuries he had suffered. Suyanto was the only employee of Sari Club—where a bomb weighing more than a ton exploded—who survived the first Bali Bombing in October 2002. The former terrorist convict, Ansori Hassan, also gave his testimony (interview, 5 September 2020).

The disengagement process that has been able to change the mindset, attitudes, and behavior of the former terrorist convicts involves a huge contribution of Lingkar Perdamaian Foundation, founded in 2016 by Ali Fauzi, a former terrorist convict. According to Ali, the result of the deradicalization program in this foundation, although slower than the birth of new terrorists, has been quite fruitful. Ali Fauzi and his foundation have successfully embraced thirty former terrorists. These thirty people are among around 100 terrorists; some of them were detained due to their links to Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) and a terrorist group that calls themselves the Islamic State or ISIS. (interview, 5 September 2020).

The state involvement as a political area is shown the extent to which the state is committed to the deradicalization of the terrorist convicts; it is shown through the Indonesian correctional facility, 88 Special Detachment, and National Counter Terrorism Agency. The data National Counter-Terrorism Agency displays that there are currently around 600 former terrorist convicts in Indonesia, with hundreds of their family members, including their children and wives, who are estimated to also be exposed to radicalism. (interview, 5 September 2020).

In interview, the Director of Convict Guidance and Production Job Training at the Directorate General of Corrections, Ministry of Law and Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia stated:

“In the Republic of Indonesia, since ten years ago the implementation of the Deradicalization Program (Guidance) can be carried out through deradicalization in correctional institutions (prisons) with the target of terrorism convicts in it by identifying, rehabilitating, reeducating and resocializing. External deradicalization targets potential radicals, ex-convicts, their families and their networks by identifying, fostering National and Religious Supervision and Development of Independence” (Ilham Djaya, interview, 2020).

As for the interview activities, the Head of the Center for Legal and Human Rights Development and Action, the Director of Deradicalization of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), the Ministry of Religion, the Ministry of Education and Culture, since ten years ago, produced several recommendations:

“(1) Strengthening regulations with the revision of Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism by including elements of hate speech and criminalization of persons/groups conducting military training at home or abroad, (2) Strengthening synergy between stakeholders as an effort to prevent acts of terrorism. (3) Increasing understanding, practice and development of correct religious values and strengthening national character education in schools/education units, (4) Patterns of strengthening approaches to families, and (5) Systematic control (IT) of visitor data terrorist convicts as an element of preventing the spread and radical actions that are still happening.” [Yayah Mariani, interview 2020]

A wooden house measuring 7 × 10 meters in front of the Baitul Muttaqin Mosque in Tenggulun Village, Solokuro, Lamongan has turned into a headquarters for former combatants and former convicts of terrorism cases. The house is the administrative center and activities of the Lingkar Perdamaian Foundation. The foundation was initiated by Ali Fauzi, the younger brother of those
convicted of the Bali Bombings, Ali Gufron, Amrozi, and Imron (In this Place Dozens of Former Terrorists Become Peace Agents, 2017).

4.3. Shifting process to return to the society

The shifts in the mindset, attitude, and behavior of former terrorists involve a long-winding process as they return from being terrorists to become members of society once again. One of these processes is utilizing a primordial bond between these former terrorists and the people. They have a relationship with them like parents, siblings, comrades, and neighbors in Indonesian culture and society. Ali Fauzi often tells the former terrorists convicts and terrorist prisoners about his personal experiences:

For me, meeting the victims is the most memorable event that has destroyed my self-ishness. I can open my soul after seeing the tragic impacts of the attacks on the victims and their families. Their words feel like lightning to me. One of the victims that I can never forget is Max Boon, a Catholic and Dutch citizen who was the victim of the bombing of JW Marriott Hotel Jakarta in July 2009. He was seriously injured, lost two legs, got impaired eardrums, and suffered from serious burns. However, one day he said that he forgave me. His words’ effect is so painful that I keep it in my mind for the rest of my life. It has changed me from being a terrorist to an ambassador for peace. (Interview, 20 September 2020).

Another former terrorist, Sumarno, who opened an Umrah and Hajj travel agent and gained suspicion from some people, also told gave his testimony:

“I am one of the former terrorist convicts interviewed by BBC News Indonesia in Tenggulun. I opened an Umrah and Hajj travel agency with a friend. This business was initially challenging as many clients walked away when they learned that their Umrah tour guides were former terrorists. Actually, I never revealed where I come from, but my clients kept on insisting. I finally told them that I am from Solokuro (Tenggulun), the Bali bombers’ place. I was personally involved in terrorism because I sent explosives three times to Bali in October 2002, and I kept the weapons of the other members of the Jemaah Islamiyah group. Due to this reason, I spent three years in the Lamongan prison. The meeting with the victims hit me so hard that it eventually inspired me to change. After a few years, I tried to get the trust of the clients back. I always tell them frankly that I am the nephew of Ali Gufron and Amrozi was my mentor. I admit that I committed a huge sin, and I have promised to help the former terrorists return to the right path (interview, 20 September 2020).

He has implemented his personal experience in leaving violence since 2016 through Lingkar Perdamaian Foundation. Together, they started to embrace former terrorist convicts while they were still in prison. The facts have shown that recruiting new terrorists is much easier as many people are attracted to join such a group. On the other hand, deradicalization needs a longer time and process. The biggest threat, he said, has come from his former comrades in the Jemaah Islamiyah group affiliated with Al-Qaeda and other radical groups. Likewise, Fauzi explains:

The most powerful threat comes from my former comrades because they hate the changes that happen to me. I used to speak of war, but now I only want to talk about peace. That is part of the challenges, I will not go back. It is a war between groups that preach about radicalization and groups that preach about deradicalization. (Interview, 20 September 2020).

Fauzi, as the Chairperson of Lingkar Perdamaian Foundation, shared his experience when starting the deradicalization program:

The deradicalization program begins from prisons by approaching the terrorist convicts, especially those who will soon be released. At the first meeting, they usually accuse us of being more infidels than the police officers. Yet, such prejudice will quickly change after several sessions. Prejudice may change depending on the approach. After they are released from prison, We pick them up and give them a ride to go home. We usually invite some other
former terrorist convicts to pick them up. It helps them to feel a sense of camaraderie. However, I admit that the hatred against the government and police officers is more tedious to be changed, and it takes more time (interview, 20 September 2020).

Fauzi also holds a regular religious study called Pengajian Jalan Terang every month in his office. During the study, a big screen containing photos and videos of the bombings is displayed. Many of the former terrorists shed their tears as they reflect on the terror and listen to the stories of the bombing victims. There is a study about the concept of rahmatan lil alamin, a clear path that influences them to leave destructive thinking. In addition to shifting their ideology, they have to face an economic challenge as they have to find work or start a business to support their life. (interview, 20 September 2020).

When asked which group is currently faster in recruiting its new members, Ali replied:

From the data, radical groups tend to get recruits more quickly as they only need to pull the trigger. Meanwhile, the deradicalization process is more time-consuming. It requires comprehensive efforts from both government and the private sector to succeed. Moreover, terrorist recruitment can be done through social media, like Facebook, Instagram, and Whatsapp. Yet, the deradicalization effort is carried out in a structured manner involving the community. I am confident that if the community gets involved, the deradicalization program may win. Unfortunately, not many people are ready to become people like me due to the challenges and threats we may encounter along the way. Honestly, I am not afraid because what I am doing right now is of good deeds. After all, then I will eventually die, and I am ready to sacrifice all (interview, 20 September 2020).

The process of shifting the mindset, attitude, and behavior of the former terrorist convicts require the state’s commitment in the form of political pressure in the implementation of this unique deradicalization program. Although it has not been evaluated, there are two aspects involved in any successful program. First is the acceptable and humane behavior of the state officials, including police and prison officers. Second, a continuous mentoring program that assists each former terrorist for two or three weeks and up to one year. An economic factor is also essential in determining whether an ex-convict may return to the violence or not. In some programs, financial assistance for their family is provided, such as financial support for their children’s tuition fees. If it is implemented properly, the former convicts will no longer treat the government as their enemy. (interview, 20 September 2020).

5. Discussion
This study has found out three explanatory findings. First, the former terrorist convicts who have succeeded in reintegrating into society come from various social, economic, political, and religious characteristics. Some of them are indeed intellectual actors, others join the group because they are financially funded, some are forced, some are loyal friends, and the rest merely join the group for no specific reason. They also have different roles in their acts: providing indoctrination, serving as combatants, mastering information and technology, assembling bombs, recruiting “future brides”, supplying funds, providing explosive logistics, and marrying women to cover up their identities. Second, the disengagement process that can change the mindset, attitude, and behavior of former terrorists is individually influenced by internal and external factors. The internal aspect is the awareness that comes from within the former terrorists. In contrast, the external factor includes their concerns about the condition of their own family, witnessing the loss of the victims and their family, support from other former terrorists who have abandoned radicalism, advice from their Ustadz. The Lingkar Perdamaian Foundation has also made massive efforts, which has carried out a deradicalization program for the ex-terrorist convicts. The foundation’s deradicalization program includes visiting the prisoners, assisting them in finding jobs, supporting the victims’ families, sending the former terrorists’ children to school, and supporting the community to accept them. In this case, the state politically provides compensation, such as making the former terrorists as informants, reducing their detention period, providing access like other people,
and raising their social awareness. Third, their transformation shows that the primordial ties in the society are substantial. The sense of empathy reflects it among the family, relatives, and neighbors that goes hand in hand with a non-violent culture and local wisdom. Besides, institutional strategies and approaches are applied; for example, Lingkar Perdamaian Foundation embraces the former terrorists to be empowered. However, the state’s commitment has not been all-out.

This paper reflects that the former terrorists are also part of the society who have the same citizenship rights as others. However, they are no longer recognized as citizens with the same rights. It is one of the adverse effects of dehumanization that has resulted in the exposure of the former terrorists trapped in the terrorist acts in Indonesia. Therefore, it victimizes them. Dehumanization act has neglected their rights as citizens who have the same position as other citizens. In addition, the economic difficulties that has forced them to commit such an extraordinary crime is a systemic impact of the state’s lack of serious commitment to treating the former terrorists as victims of social injustice and inequality.

The findings of this study differ from those of several previous studies. Much previous research mainly treats former terrorists as perpetrators who violated the law and humanitarian order. However, this study highlights the former terrorists as victims of unfair economic conditions and double-standard legal policy. The hard-power approach may gain significant results, but this approach is deemed ineffective in the long term. In this case, the emphasis of the military approach does not help much in dealing with the roots of terrorism. Terrorism is not only a problem of physical violence but also ideology; it is closely linked to social, economic, political, and even cultural factors in society (Prasetyo, 2020). Therefore, the soft power approach, such as disengagement and deradicalization programs, are used to neutralize the influence of radical ideology that often serves as the basis of terrorism (Triskaputri, 2019). The pulling factor of radicalization is regarded as the major factor of violence in many cross-study studies focusing on numerous geographic areas and ideologies from 2001–2015 (Barton, 2020).

Religion has been used as an authoritarian securitization and violence legitimation tool. A state-controlled religious institution used religion, fear, trauma, insecurity, grievances, and conspiracy theories to dehumanize a religious community, and presented it as an existential threat to the nation, the global community of believers, and religion (Yılmaz & Albayrak, 2021). In line with this, the findings of this study can be a lesson learned for the reintegration and rehabilitation of the terrorist. Appropriate government policies may help the former terrorists regain their rights as Indonesian citizens equal to the others.

6. Conclusion
The findings show that intolerant terrorists may turn into good people living their everyday lives as part of society. The idea of terrorist disengagement has also been able to help former terrorists abandon the idea of terrorism. The concept of social reintegration has been able to help the former terrorists return to the community. Finally, the mediated structure has been carried out by Lingkar Perdamaian Foundation, government representatives, namely: the National Counter-Terrorism Agency, Densus 88, Lamongan correction facility, the chief police officer, and the chief military district of Lamongan area. Given this current study’s limitation, further research is proposed on why many former terrorists turn to be more extreme and radical.

Sociological analysis of terrorism convicts has revealed the hidden reality of their practice and involvement in the process of returning to the right path or ordinary life, unlike normative analysis, which generally positions terrorists as subjects. In contrast, sociological analysis reveals social constructions that place terrorists as objects. Instead of getting justice and equality as parties with human rights, terrorists tend to be blamed without the accompanying rights. In many cases, terrorists experience harmful and pejorative stigma, not only during litigation but also when reintegrating themselves into society.
This paper has explored the reality of terrorism, showing that the legal process that ensnares these terrorist convicts has weakened the position of terrorists, even when other parties are involved. This dehumanize can only be suppressed through education, which is needed to increase public understanding of the law (especially among terrorists). Knowledge and capacity must be developed not only among terrorists but also among the government and law enforcement. Terrorists need educational and legal literacy to free them from punishment and dependence on other parties, mainly stemming from their limited knowledge of the legal process of acts of terrorism. At the same time, legal support must be intensified to ensure that terrorist groups achieve justice and equality. Terrorist convicts need internal and external support that puts their interests first during the process of their return to the right path. This article recommends a new construction in looking at the phenomenon of the emergence of an awareness of terrorist prisoners, the fundamental transformation of educational and legal literacy among terrorists, as well as a paradigm shift towards justice and equality of human rights. At the same time, the terrorists whose weak position is hegemonized in the court process must be given space to support them to return to society.

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