Economic Development, Political and Socio-Political Violence Crisis in the Sub-Saharan Africa: An Economic Panel Study

Winfred Okoe Addy, Yao HongXing, Samuel Kofi Otchere, and Jean-Jacques Dominique Beraud

**ABSTRACT**

Social and political instability threatens the economic and social development of nations. Political persecution is therefore characterized by socio-political instability as a barrier to development that creates economic difficulties, limited public and private investments and hinders national development. This article describes political persecution and economic development through a close examination of the African ministry which covers key issues such as welfare and drug trafficking. We use various measures to measure political violence and economic development, and we use the crisis management strategies of Driscoll and Kraay and a comprehensive time-based approach to measure (GMM) for a sample of Sub Saharan African countries in the period 2000-2014. In the example of political persecution, we find that the combination of individual achievement, education, capture, and health has a negative impact on politics, but GINI, unemployment, drugs and homeless people that have a positive impact on violence. In the example of the economy, political violence, armed with bribery and corruption, has a negative impact on economic development, but population, security, employment, political participation, housing have a negative impact on production and on economic progress. Positive impact on economic development. The findings underscore the importance of implementing social policies and guidelines against political violence to increase economic growth and development, productivity, political participation and human security in the regions of Africa.

**Keywords:** Economic development, Political violence, Socio-political instability, social conditions.

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**I. INTRODUCTION**

Recent literature suggests that measuring interdependence in sociopolitical communication systems is one way [1]. Several studies have worked on political and governmental instability as a government and political instability [2]. Numerous studies have shown that economic and social sustainability is essential for effective economic development. Political violence has been identified as a cause of economic collapse and political instability that undermines human development and social status due to its catastrophic effects on people, nature and the physical environment [3]. In many developing countries, many of which are poor and oppressed, illegal armed groups create high levels of inequality and social inequality and conditions for development that seek to strengthen political power through violence [4], [5]. Several studies over the past year have suggested that economic growth and a development plan for peace potential, the country's institutional status and political influence should be considered [6]. Furthermore, economic growth and development are associated with endogenous political turmoil per se for economic and political groups that control the regulation of global political and economic activity [7]. Furthermore, social and cultural attitudes are involved in these groups[8]-[10].

Violent and criminal activity has been investigated using various methods. From the economics of crime theory, [11] suggests that actionable action is the result of rational decision-making based on a cost-benefit analysis including the impact and available opportunities of the crime. Criminality in the context of penalty stop the criminals. This prediction is likely to generate income through legal means, and increased compliance with the law will reduce the incentive to engage in criminal activity and hence violence. In the area of crime [12], formulate a concept of cultural action, based on three basic requirements for crime to occur: incitement to criminals, a reasonable objective, and no conviction. So if any of these conditions is met, no crime will happen [13]. Have argued that conflict and inequality patterns in public relations affect the observation of crime.

In developing countries, political violence has increased over the past decade. The main causes are poverty, inequality and the decline in economic growth and the state of the state. In general, times are worse in poor countries and in low per
capita income and slow economic growth that has a negative impact on investment, economic development and the lack of opportunities for the population. [14] studied a number of factors that influenced political conflict and unrest in developing countries, showing falling incomes, economic instability, inequality, competition for property, and corrupt governments. They provoke conflicts and political conflicts. [15] studied economic and organizational policy. Conflicts and political persecution influence the destruction of economic, political and natural resources. [16] studied political violence in various forms, leading to low income, weak state governments, political critics, widespread ownership, and areas of terrorism and unrest, especially in low-income countries.

Political violence is taught in different settings using different methods. [17] study socio-political instability and economic growth using different economic methods in a group of countries over a period of 30 years. Their results showed that in low-income countries political violence has a profound and negative impact on economic growth, while in developing countries it is essential that growth be inhibited and / or suppressed by violence economic growth. [18] examined democracy, development and conflict using an important approach, to show that the high incomes of society demonstrate their vulnerability to political persecution and your government’s low income, democracy must be commensurate with economic and economic factors – large economic policies to increase security. [19] examine the political and social uncertainties associated with the use of statistical components, showing that there is a wide range of economic factors, including income growth income, income status and nature of government policy, political influence. [20] examined the cause of the effects of political uncertainty on economic growth using a system of force factors, such as the common time method, suggesting that economic growth is caused by political factors. However, these studies did not examine the link between political violence and economic development.

Therefore, the purpose of this study is to help better understand political violence defined as acts of coercion and committed by individuals or private organizations with the intentions to destroy existing political and social systems to drive theoretical change, and also to abolish the main political system and replace it with another system.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The cause of political persecution is: the maintenance, alteration, alteration or destruction of the model State or society. This type of violence includes acts of destruction or destruction of a group of people who have a social, political, ethnic, racial, religious, cultural or ideological identity. [5] When studying political violence, we use an important approach to take advantage of the large-scale variability and general conditions of the population of the African regions. The article helps writing by studying political persecution and economic development using an example from a developing country Ghana, which the government has described as a democratic government with minor conflicts or religions. However, conflicts in this country have been going on for years, which has generated high levels of violence. Most of the military confirmed the political unrest in Africa, after a mixture of drug trafficking, guerrillas and military forces that work on behalf of the judiciary and democracy, but not in search of wealth [21]. Furthermore, unlike previous studies, the model used in this study combines generalization, interruption, and drug modification to determine the relationship between political and developmental conflicts protect the economy with an empirical approach.

III. METHODOLOGY

The models proposed in this paper to analyze political violence and economic development are as follows: The model for political violence in (1):

$$ P_{\text{Per}_i t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_{\text{Pop}_i t} - \beta_2 \text{GD}_{P_i t} - \beta_3 \text{ED}_U_{i t} + \beta_4 T_{E_i t} + \beta_5 \text{GINI}_i t + \beta_6 M_{L_i t} + \beta_7 N_{P_i t} - \beta_8 H_{C_i t} - \beta_9 A_{R_i t} + \mu_{i t} $$

where Pper represents political persecution( Violence); Pop the population; GDP Gross Domestic product per capita; EDU represents education such as the expansion of secondary and tertiary education in schools; The TE identifies changes related to terrorism, such as alcohol abuse; GINI is a measure of equal income in the group; The ML highlights the importance of the labor market, such as unemployment; The NP is the population that does not have access to the group; HC representing health; and AR is the number of people arrested or detained for each division in The Sub Saharan Africa due to terrorism and its related activities.

The Hypotheses elaborated in this study are: the impact of terrorism on the political stability of the Sub Saharan African countries, its impact on GDP, level of education and the health care system. The proposed model of economic development is shown in equation 2 below

The hypotheses tested in this model are as follows: departments with higher traits of terrorism activities, inequality of resources, unemployment rates and displaced populations increase political violence, whereas departments with higher levels of GDP, education, health coverage and arrests decrease political violence. The model for economic development in (2):

$$ \text{GDP}_{i t} = \beta_0 + \psi_1 P_{\text{Per}_{i t}} + \psi_2 P_{\text{Pop}_{i t}} + \psi_3 \text{PROD}_{i t} + \psi_4 C_{P_{i t}} + \psi_5 E_{R_{i t}} + \psi_6 P_{D_{i t}} - \psi_7 A_{R_{C_{i t}}} + \psi_8 \text{CO}_{P_{i t}} + \mu_{i t} $$

where GDP is the aggregate-level production per capita by department; Pper represents political persecution; PO is the population; Prod is manufacturing production by department; CP represents construction production by department; ER represents the relevant characteristics of the labour market such as the employment rate; PD is political division; ARC are armed actions perpetrated by illegal armed groups of a department; and CO is a measure of corruption in the Sub Saharan Africa i in period t. The sign before a variable signals its expected effect on economic development, according to literature on this topic [22]-[24],[8]. The hypotheses tested in this model are as follows: departments with higher political violence, armed actions and corruption will show lower economic development, whereas departments with higher
populations, saving, manufacturing and construction production, employment rates and political participation will show higher economic development.

To study political violence, economic development and its relationship with terrorism activities, we use regional and statistical data in order to capture all sides of the sub-Saharan African countries. This model is used because it is possible to determine the effects of invisible elements. Unobserved parameters are not considered variables that detail units or individuals and, therefore, cannot be included in the selection model. In addition, it is a case-by-case model that will help solve the problem, since it can be managed to maximize the impact of political violence and economic development in the regions and over time [25], [26]. In addition, to promote regional and invisible effects over time in the African regions, a part-time study model reveals that permanent effects are not necessary, but verifies the need for temporary effects of the entity to manage the impact of the management.

Equation (1) and (2) show the basic principle of a model that pays attention to the invisible elements, where all are present or in the face of adverse events. In the models suggested in this study, there are differences or collateral effects of specific units on the main buildings in each region that influence social, economic and political conditions.

IV. DATA ANALYSIS

This section provides estimates of typical sample effects and control models using Driscoll and Kraay standard error rates. This model was used to correct the problem of heterozygosity and cross-sectional dependence found in the results of the Wald and Wooldridge tests. However, the results of both studies show similarities and trends in political violence and economic development, as well as in public relations, drug trafficking and seizures. The results show that political and economic developments are expected in various areas. First, population, inequality, unemployment, and depopulation have had a positive impact on politics, and the GDPpc, education, and capture have had a negative impact on politics. Second, population, regional readings, and job classifications are positively associated with economic development, while political violence and armed movements are negatively associated with economic development (see Tables I and II). These results confirm the model proposed in this study of political and economic violence in African regions.

The experiments carried out on the proximity of the residue to the modeling effect show problems of heterogeneity and transverse dependence. To correct these problems, the model was revised using common errors from [27] and used by [28]. This comparison takes into account the problems of heterogeneity and transverse dependence. In addition, this option allows you to correct any level of autocorrelation. Tables I and II show the results of randomized controlled trials using common effects based on Driscoll and Kraay errors. Economic development: In this example, economic development is measured by GDP per capita. Results show that political, armed and corrupt violence undermines economic development and population growth, saving money, jobs, political participation and housing construction and production to boost development. Economic. Table I shows the results of the module. These results confirm our hypothesis and respond to the results of [29], who showed that political violence, corruption and low income from social finance have a detrimental effect on the developing economy.

Political violence and armed movements have a major impact on economic development. Ministers with strong political and military forces are undermining economic development. The nonprofit economy, political collapse, and political unrest interact in different ways: economic and political causes contribute to violence, and violence negatively affects economic growth and political development [14]. Furthermore, the Geneva Declaration on Violence and Armed Development recognizes that weapons of violence and conflict will impede the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Conflict and conflict, conflict reduction, respect for human rights, good governance and peacebuilding are important measures to reduce poverty, promote economic growth and development and improve the welfare of the population. Therefore, reducing the number of development weapons should be a priority for states. They must ensure full compliance with conditions and promote policies and agreements to reduce and prevent violence, find solutions to conflicts, and foster peace efforts to develop growth, development and economic prosperity. crowd multiplication [30].

Population has a positive impact on economic development. Several studies have shown that population is likely to have a positive impact on economic development in many third world countries, as it creates a large workforce.

Ministers with the most savings are richer. Some economies have shown that high levels of economic growth and development lead to higher savings, while higher savings through better resources lead to higher investments. On the other hand, this good budget helps to improve the quality of life as a result of the population with more and richer job opportunities, which leads to richer development [31], [32].

Fabrication and construction shops are well linked to economic development. Production and construction are essential to achieve sustainable economic growth and development, as these activities contribute to the economic development process in new or remodeled cities, improve development, increase productivity and business opportunities, a more stable and successful labor market for the population [33], [34].

Labor costs have a positive impact on economic development. Economic growth is a prerequisite for the development of a country and the population achieves this growth. Therefore, the labor market must generate a good economy and increase competition and sustainable employment in order to create full employment and employment opportunities for the population, an important element of economic growth and development.

Political participation is closely linked to other economic developments. Numerous studies have shown that economic development leads to higher levels of citizen involvement, as the series of social changes result from an economic change that radically changes class, organization, culture and society. And these changes are linked to the new changes. types of political participation; Corruption negatively impacts economic development [35]. Injury is a problem that affects the social, political and economic activities of society [36].
This threat affects economic development, mainly due to the reduction in internationally funded foreign exchange funds due to the high level of trade and the incentive of many organizations to step up payments[37]-[39].

| Parameter               | [1] Fixed Effects | FE Driscoll and Kraay Fixed Effects | [2] Fixed Effects | FE Driscoll and Kraay Fixed Effects | [3] Fixed Effects | FE Driscoll and Kraay Fixed Effects | [4] Fixed Effects | FE Driscoll and Kraay Fixed Effects | [5] Fixed Effects | FE Driscoll and Kraay Fixed Effects | [6] Fixed Effects |
|-------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|
| Constant                | 1.470* (0.36)    | 1.470* (0.44)                       | 1.483* (0.36)    | 1.483* (0.47)                       | 1.325* (0.36)    | 1.325* (0.57)                       | 1.363* (0.39)    | 1.363* (0.55)                       | 1.466* (0.64)    | 1.466* (0.41)                       | 1.466* (0.21)    |
| Political violence      | -0.037* (0.01)   | -0.037* (0.01)                      | -0.034* (0.00)   | -0.034* (0.00)                      | -0.036* (0.01)   | -0.036* (0.00)                      | -0.036* (0.00)   | -0.036* (0.00)                      | -0.033* (0.01)   | -0.033* (0.01)                      | -0.024* (0.01)   |
| Population              | 0.854* (0.02)    | 0.854* (0.03)                       | 0.845* (0.02)    | 0.845* (0.04)                       | 0.854* (0.02)    | 0.854* (0.04)                       | 0.855* (0.02)    | 0.855* (0.04)                       | 0.852* (0.04)    | 0.852* (0.02)                       | 0.798* (0.05)    |
| Saving                  | 0.041* (0.01)    | 0.041* (0.02)                       | 0.043* (0.01)    | 0.043* (0.02)                       | 0.022           | 0.022                               | 0.021           | 0.021                               | 0.016           | 0.016                               | 0.121* (0.02)    |
| Manufacturing production| 0.033 (0.02)     | 0.033 (0.02)                        | 0.030           | 0.030                               | 0.039           | 0.039                               | 0.037           | 0.037                               | 0.035           | 0.035                               | 0.035 (0.02)     |
| Construction production | 0.042* (0.02)    | 0.042* (0.02)                       | 0.043* (0.02)    | 0.043* (0.02)                       | 0.042           | 0.042                               | 0.042           | 0.042                               | 0.042           | 0.042                               | 0.071* (0.04)    |
| Employment rate         | 0.051 (0.03)     | 0.051 (0.03)                        | 0.051 (0.03)     | 0.051 (0.03)                        | 0.051           | 0.051                               | 0.051           | 0.051                               | 0.054* (0.03)   | 0.054* (0.03)                      | 0.071 (0.06)     |

Political Participation

| Armed actions           | -0.011 (0.01) | -0.011 (0.00) | -0.035 b (0.01) | -0.035* (0.01) |
| Corrupting              | -0.016 (0.01) | 0.00          | 0.00            | 0.00            |
| 306.57 F model          | 234.19        | 247.32        | 198.73          | 207.02          |
| F-test for OLS vs. FE F(22, 105) = 357.61 (Reject OLS) | 152.75 | 180.86 | 173.61 | 173.61 |
| Hausman test*           | 82.89         | 79.06         | 83.02           | 79.39           |
| Wald test               | 3575.49       | 3765.66       | 5359.31         | 5779.95         |
| Wooldridge test         | 83.19         | 81.16         | 78.26           | 85.87           |
| No. Obs                 | 325           | 325           | 325             | 324             |

Note: Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. * Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 10% level. If Prob>ch2 is < 0.05 reject random effects.

In terms of Political violence, Table II shows the consequences of political violence. The results show that employment, education, budgeting and the PCGDP have a negative impact on political violence. Population, GINI, unemployment, and drug use have a positive effect on political violence (Table II). These conclusions are consistent with the conclusions of [40], who considers the sovereignty of the State in relation to coercion and violence and considers that the associated political violence is uncontrollable to the state.

Changes to economic growth and development, GDP per capita and budgets will have a significant negative impact on political violence, but the GINI index has positive and significant effects. This result suggests that increased economic growth and development is associated with a decline in politics, but high levels of political persecution reflect unequal divisions and high income levels are consistent with our conclusions for the Sub Saharan situation.

The results for the entire population show a positive correlation with political persecution. Perhaps this positive coordination exists because the districts' populations are loosely connected, poor and high, which makes them more vulnerable in politics. The results of the number of arrests highlighted the importance of the presence of the state in reducing politics. Furthermore, political violence reduces social investments that change economic development and growing regions, reduces the quality of life and creates political upheaval, according to the findings of [14].

Drug, measured in hectares of drug production, have a positive effect on political violence resulting from increased use of cocaine or other drugs [41], [42]. Furthermore, in Africa, drug traffickers have created a new set of values for African society. This action is evident from the sale and loss of legal provisions that demonstrate the general adequacy of state governance undertaken by this country in the mid-1980s and late 1990s. This crisis was gradually weakened by drug traffickers with specific international skills. They oppose dishonest organizations of any kind and show that anyone can come to power through the use of force [43]. The incredible population has a positive and significant impact on political violence. In Africa, legitimate armed groups and their actions against the population are the main reason for the intensification of actions to increase poverty and inequality, lack of health and limited resources to generate job opportunities with the population. These factors can cause violence in these vulnerable people [44].
Health protection has a negative impact on politics, showing that high health standards lower politics[45] points out that political violence is an important health problem because political violence causes an increase in disease and deaths in the population, with widespread and lasting negative effects on health. Human health, and it has changed and provided adequate health services. Political persecution can continue over time; once conflicts are discovered, new persecutions will emerge elsewhere.

Education, measuring insurance for secondary and secondary education, shows that an increase in insurance training afterwards has significantly reduced political violence, has significant social benefits as it should education after have committed acts of violence [46], [47] states that there are four main reasons why education can be more effective than violence:

(i) More school fees, which increases the cost of access to violence;
(ii) Education which can have a direct impact on the financial benefits of crime;
(iii) Training which can modify the adjustments required for risk or tolerance;
(iv) Education which may be of interest to social networks or people of age.

Unemployment has a positive impact on politics, reflecting the high unemployment rate, which creates a lot of political unrest. Unemployment can be a major cause of high conflict activities, as it increases the anxiety of less active workers, who may suffer from economic expectations and disruptions involved in politics [48].

These results show that political violence is closely linked to social status, kidnappings, and economic growth and development. A strong state creates a great social status. Political persecution is usually associated with negative changes such as a weakening of the situation and injustice, which is similar to the case of Ghana [49]. According to the [50], for Latin America, high levels of violence and limited access have hampered economic growth and development. As a result, violence escalates as the judgment process weakens, financial opportunities are scarce, and the labor and labor market are neglected.

V. CONCLUSION

In this article, we will try to explain political and economic development and general social relationship and political persecution using lasting effects on regional data for Sub-Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2014. To study political and economic development, we use. Use statistical and
statistical analysis of permanent and region-specific databases with the usual Driscoll and Kraay error to capture the specific characteristics of each region (for example, stage of development or political affiliation).

In the example of political violence, we find that the number of individuals who produce, educate, capture, and heal has a negative impact on politics. Political violence. Furthermore, social status and drug trafficking are important factors that influence government practices in the regions of Africa.

In the economic development model, we see that political violence, armed movements and corruption are negatively related to economic development, but the population, security, cost is affected by employment, political participation, production, and construction. Good for economic development. These results show that the rise of the developing economy is associated with a reduction in political and regional persecution and with the increase of the armed forces and corrupt practices slows down economic development.

The results show that political violence is closely linked to social and economic conditions. These views are determined by the fact that state and political violence are not usually associated with negative changes such as weak status and ineffective justice. High levels of political violence and ample opportunities to stifle economic development. As a result, political persecution increases when the judiciary is weak, economic opportunities and political participation are limited, and education and health are weak.

The findings underscore the importance of implementing public policies and ways to reduce political activity and increase economic and human development, employment, and security in the regions of Africa. These policies and guidelines should include employment in schools and greater opportunities in the labor market, and should participate in political policies that include the power of judges, [51]. Reduction of corruption and participatory creation of the state. Useful in all areas.

In this paper, we attempt to explain and analyze political violence and economic development and their relationships with the social conditions and the political violence using fixed effects on panel data from African Sub regions between 2000 and 2014. To examine political violence and economic development, we employ a panel data model with department-specific fixed effects and fixed effects with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors to capture all of the characteristics particular to each department (e.g., the levels of development or political violence).

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