ABSTRACT

Many cybersecurity attacks rely on analyzing a binary executable to find exploitable sections of code. Code obfuscation is used to prevent attackers from reverse engineering these executables. In this work, we focus on control flow obfuscation - a technique that prevents attackers from statically determining which code segments are original, and which segments are added in to confuse attackers. We propose a RISC-V-based hardware-assisted deobfuscation technique that deobfuscates code at runtime based on a secret safely stored in hardware, along with an LLVM compiler extension for obfuscating binaries. Unlike conventional tools, our work does not rely on compiling hard-to-reverse-engineer code, but on securing a secret key. As such, it can be seen as a lightweight alternative to on-the-fly binary decryption.

KEYWORDS

Hardware security, binary obfuscation, control flow obfuscation, on-the-fly decryption, RISC-V, concolic execution

1 INTRODUCTION

Attackers may want to steal sensitive data or cryptographic keys from a system. To mount their attacks they have to find an appropriate location in the targeted software. Attackers attempt to reverse engineer the targeted executables in order to find exploitable sections of code. To prevent reverse engineering, software vendors resort to various kinds of software obfuscations. One of the most effective obfuscation targets is the program’s control flow (CF). CF obfuscation is a technique in which a dedicated program called the obfuscator performs semantic-preserving transformations on the original program in order to hide the original control flow. This kind of obfuscation heavily relies on opaque predicates. A predicate is opaque if its resolution is hard or ambiguous for the attacker. The technique of opaque predicates is used in obfuscation tools such as Obfuscator-LLVM [3]. The construction of an opaque predicate is usually done by tailoring a computationally intensive or even uncomputable challenge for the underlying concolic execution engine such as present in BAP [2]. Some of the challenges proposed by Xu et al. [4] are: symbolic memory, floating-point algebra, covert symbolic propagation and parallel programming. Even though one may construct multiple different concrete challenges from the same basic ideas, they rarely pose a theoretical barrier to reverse engineering but rather technical difficulties. Such technical difficulties get eliminated by enhancements in concolic engines as soon as their authors implement the missing part that allows for the difficulty to surface.

Whole-executable encryption is a plausible alternative to control flow obfuscation. However, this approach incurs its own hazards. The decryption keys need to be stored securely, and the decrypted binary cannot be stored in off-chip memory at any moment in time. If an executable has to be decrypted before execution, that has to be done in a safe environment (enclave) such as offered by Intel’s SGX [1]. Furthermore, on-the-fly decryption incurs a significant performance penalty which this work aims to avoid. This work proposes the idea of hardware-assisted CF obfuscation whose integrity relies on a secret that is available only to the trusted party, like an unclonable hardware module. This approach does not depend on the ability of an attacker or concolic execution engine to evaluate particular portion of computation as long as the secret is kept safe.

2 OBFUSCATION PROCESS

The essence of our approach relies on potentially reversing all the conditional branches in the original program. The obfuscator decides whether to revert a branch by calculating a function that takes two inputs: (1) a ID of the branch, and (2) a program key. If the function returns a 1, the branch condition is reversed, otherwise it is not. In our implementation, we use a cryptographic hash with a binary output. Hence, the only part of secret information is the program key.

Listing 1 shows a segment of a C program that is compiled using our branch obfuscator. Listing 2 shows the assembly of the original program. Assuming that the hash function reverses both branches, obfuscated RISC-V assembly is shown in Listing 3.

Listing 1: C code of the original program

```c
def myfunction(int id, int key):
    hash = hash_id(id, key)
    if hash:
        return 1
    else:
        return 0
```

Listing 2: Plain code

```assembly
main:
    addi a1, zero, 4
    blt a1, a0, LBB0_2
    j LBB1_3
LBB0_1:
    lui a0, 5
    blt a0, 13
    li a1, zero
    blt a1, 13
    j LBB0_3
```

Listing 3: Obfuscated code

```assembly
main:
    addi a1, zero, 5
    blt a1, LBB0_2
    j LBB0_3
LBB0_1:
    lui a0, 5
    blt a0, 13
    li a1, zero
    blt a1, 13
    j LBB0_3
```

The obfuscator itself is implemented as an LLVM Pass - the same technique that the LLVM compiler infrastructure uses internally for
its optimizations. The place of the obfuscator in the LLVM compilation chain is given in Figure 1. It performs branch obfuscation on LLVM internal representation (IR) and thus supports all programming languages with compilers that target LLVM IR. This group of programming languages includes C, C++, Rust, Apple Swift and others. The resulting LLVM IR is then passed to the RISC-V compiler backend that emits obfuscated RISC-V assembly.

![Figure 1: Place of the obfuscator in LLVM compilation chain.](image1)

3 DEOBFUSCATION PROCESS

The obfuscated program correctly executes only on a trusted RISC-V core designed to support deobfuscation. We outline four designs here: the baseline, stalled-hash, mask-based, and the cached-hash design.

**Baseline design:** the baseline design is a 7-stage RISC-V CPU without any hardware modifications enabling obfuscation. A simplified processor architecture is illustrated in Figure 2.

![Figure 2: The original 7-stage pipeline RISC-V processor.](image2)

**Stalled-hash design:** here, the baseline CPU is equipped with a hardware hash function. When a branch instruction is in the decode stage, the hash function is fed the branch instruction address and the program key. When the branch instruction reaches the execute stage, all the stages up to and including the execute stage are stalled until the hash function produces an output. Once a (single bit) output is produced, that value is XOR-ed with the branch signal. This way, branches that would be taken may not be, and vice-versa. The modified architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.

![Figure 3: The original 7-stage pipeline RISC-V processor modified to XOR branch values with hash function outputs.](image3)

**Mask-based design:** instructions are extended with a mask bit. The mask bit specifies whether a branch should be reversed or not. Having an independent mask bit per each branch removes the possibility of an attacker predicting future branches based on existing ones. However, widening the instruction word width complicates the design of L2 caches and memory controllers. Furthermore, the masks need to be kept encrypted in memory and decrypted on-the-fly.

**Cached-hash design:** in this design, we add a hash-cache to the stalled-hash design. When a branch is in the decode, the architecture in parallel starts calculating the hash function and checks the cache for whether that branch’s hash has previously been calculated. If not, when the hash function finishes, it both feeds the value to the XOR gate, and saves the result in the cache. If the value is found in the cache, it is sent to the XOR, just in time as the branch enters the execute stage. In our experiments we used a simple 256-line, one branch per line, direct-mapped cache.

4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

We simulate the four architectures listed above. The baseline and the mask-based architectures have the same performance, so we omit the second one. Further, we test two different hash-based architectures with an 8 and a 16-cycle hash function. In Figure 4, we see the performance of different architectures on 6 different PARSEC tasks. Notice that for the 16-cycle hash, the processor can slow down as much as 60%. However, adding a (256-line, single branch hash per line) direct-mapped cache removes the majority of the performance overhead.

![Figure 4: The performance of the five architectures on 6 PARSEC tasks, measured in cycles.](image4)

5 CONCLUSION

In this work we have explored custom hardware for efficient binary control flow obfuscation. We have presented our extensions to the LLVM compiler which allow simple compile-time obfuscation. Next, we have shown several architectures that allow on-chip deobfuscation of code. Finally, we have measured the performance penalty of these hardware modifications and have shown that our cached-hash-based implementation achieves full control flow obfuscation with a small performance penalty.

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