We provide a quantum gambling protocol using three (symmetric) nonorthogonal states. The bias of the proposed protocol is less than that of previous ones, making it more practical. We show that the proposed scheme is secure against nonentanglement attacks. The security of the proposed scheme against entanglement attacks is shown heuristically. However, since the idea behind the proof is simple, we believe that a rigorous one will be found as in the case of the QKD protocols. The advantage of the proposed scheme over previous ones is that the bias $\delta$ is proportional to $1/R$. We discuss this advantage.

In this paper, we provide a quantum gambling protocol using three nonorthogonal states. In the proposed scheme, two participants Alice and Bob can be regarded as playing a game of making guesses at the identities of quantum states that are in one of three given nonorthogonal states: If Bob makes a correct (incorrect) guess at the identity of a quantum state that Alice has sent, he wins (loses). We show that the proposed scheme is secure against non-entanglement attacks. The security of the proposed scheme against entanglement attacks is shown heuristically. However, since another very useful ingredient in cryptographic tasks is the bit commitment, there has been much effort to find an unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment protocol. Howev-
er, it turns out that no such thing exists [4,5]. This motivated the search for a slightly weaker protocol, which was successful of the quantum cryptographic protocols is the no-cloning theorem [9,10]. Another closely related but different property in quantum mechanics is quantum coin tossing [8]. However, it was found that nonorthogonal quantum states cannot be distinguished with certainty [11]. It is interesting to search for protocols utilizing this property. Bennett’s later QKD scheme indeed utilizes this property [12]. Recently, Hwang et al. gave a quantum gambling scheme that utilizes this basic property [13].

We can say that the quantum money and the BB84 protocol are based on a basic property of quantum mechanics, the no-cloning theorem [9,10]. Another closely related but different property in quantum mechanics is that nonorthogonal quantum states cannot be distinguished with certainty [11]. It is interesting to search for quantum protocols utilizing this property. Bennett’s later QKD scheme indeed utilizes this property [12]. Recently, Hwang et al. gave a quantum gambling scheme that utilizes this basic property [13].

The two quantum gambling protocols [13,14] are not ideal in the sense that there is a bias $\delta > 0$: It is an unfair game by the amount of the bias $\delta$. That is, for each round of the game the expectation value of one party’s gain is given by the bias $\delta$. However, since the bias $\delta$ is proportional to $1/\sqrt{R}$ where $R$ is the money penalty, the bias $\delta$ can be made negligible by making $R$ very large in both schemes [13,14].

I. INTRODUCTION

Unforgeable quantum money proposed by Wiesner [1] opened the field of ‘quantum cryptography’. The most successful of the quantum cryptographic protocols is Bennett and Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [3], whose unconditional security was proved more than a decade later [13]. Since another very useful ingredient in cryptographic tasks is the bit commitment, there has been much effort to find an unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment protocol. However, it turns out that no such thing exists [4,5]. This motivated the search for a slightly weaker protocol, which was successful of the quantum cryptographic protocols is the no-cloning theorem [9,10]. Another closely related but different property in quantum mechanics is quantum coin tossing [8]. However, it was found that nonorthogonal quantum states cannot be distinguished with certainty [11]. It is interesting to search for protocols utilizing this property. Bennett’s later QKD scheme indeed utilizes this property [12]. Recently, Hwang et al. gave a quantum gambling scheme that utilizes this basic property [13].

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However, after the first step, Bob follows the following steps 6–9 instead of steps 2–5, at randomly chosen instances with a rate \(r\) \((0 < r \ll 1)\).

(6) Bob performs no measurement on the qubit and stores it.

(7) He announces his randomly chosen guess at the identity of the qubit.

(8) Step 4 is repeated.

(9) In the previous step, Alice has actually revealed which one she chose to tell him the qubit is (regardless of her honesty). When it is \(|\alpha\rangle\) \((\alpha = a, b, c)\), Bob performs \(\hat{S}_\alpha\).

\(\hat{S}_\alpha\) is an orthogonal measurement that is composed of two projection operators \(|\alpha\rangle\langle\alpha|\) and \(|\alpha^\prime\rangle\langle\alpha^\prime|\). Here \(|\alpha^\prime\rangle\) is a normalized state that is orthogonal to \(|\alpha\rangle\). If the outcome is \(|\alpha\rangle\), Bob announces that he performed \(\hat{S}_\alpha\) and gets \(|\alpha^\prime\rangle\) as an outcome. Then Alice must give him \(R\) \((\gg 1)\) coins. If the outcome is \(|\alpha\rangle\), Bob says nothing about which measurement he performed and follows step 5.

As in the two-state scheme \(|\alpha\rangle\), it is important in step 2 for Bob to perform the optimal measurement that assures maximal probability \(p\) of correctly guessing the identity of the qubit, in order to assure his maximal gain. The optimal measurement for the three nonorthogonal states \(|\alpha\rangle\) was recently given \(|\alpha\rangle\). It is a positive operator valued measurement (POVM) \(|\alpha\rangle\) whose component operators are, interestingly, proportional to the three operators \(|\alpha\rangle\langle\alpha|\), \((2/3)|b\rangle\langle b|\), and \((2/3)|c\rangle\langle c|\). Now it is easy to see that the maximal probability \(p\) is 2/3.

### III. Security of the Protocol

Now let us show how each player’s average gain is assured. (Here we repeat the corresponding part of Ref. \(|\alpha\rangle\) in a slightly varied form.)

First it is clear by definition that Bob can do nothing better than performing the optimal measurement, as long as Alice prepares the specified qubits. In the protocol, the numbers of coins that Alice and Bob pay are adjusted so that no one gains when Bob’s win probability is \(p\). Thus Bob’s gain \(G_B\) cannot be greater than zero, that is, \(G_B \leq 0\).

Next let us consider Alice’s strategy. As noted above, we first show the security against Alice’s nonentanglement attacks. Roughly speaking, Alice can do nothing but prepare the given states \(|\alpha\rangle\) and honestly tell Bob the identity of the state later. Otherwise she must pay \(R\) \((\gg 1)\) coins to him sometimes, making her gain negative. Let us consider this more precisely. In the most general nonentanglement attacks, Alice randomly generates each qubit in a state \(|i\rangle\) with a probability \(p_i\). Here the \(|i\rangle\)’s are arbitrarily specified states of qubits, \(i = 1, 2, \ldots, N\) and \(\sum_i p_i = 1\). However, since Bob has no information about which \(|i\rangle\) Alice has selected at each instance, his treatments of the qubits actually become equal for all qubits. Thus it is sufficient to show the security for a qubit in an arbitrary state. Let us denote the angles that the Bloch vector of a state \(|i\rangle\) makes with those of \(|\alpha\rangle\) as \(\theta_\alpha\). At randomly chosen instances with a rate \(r\), Bob checks Alice’s claim by measuring \(\hat{S}_\alpha\) when the claim is that the state is \(|\alpha\rangle\) (the steps 6–9). If the measurement’s outcomes are \(|\alpha^\prime\rangle\), the claim is proved wrong.

Then Alice must give Bob \(R\) coins. The probability that a state \(|i\rangle\) is checked is \(|\langle\alpha^\prime|i\rangle|^2 = 1 - \cos^2(\theta_\alpha/2)\) in the case when the checking measurement \(\hat{S}_\alpha\) is performed. Thus one term in Alice’s gain \(G_A = -rR[1 - \cos^2(\theta_\alpha/2)]\) where \(rR\) is set to be much larger than 1. Now it is simple to see that Alice should prepare only states that are highly nonorthogonal to one of the \(|\alpha\rangle\)’s. Thus one of the \(\theta_\alpha\) is very small. Otherwise, Alice’s gain \(G_A\) will be dominated by highly negative term \(-rR[1 - \cos^2(\theta_\alpha/2)]\) in any case.

Similarly, we can see that she should claim the prepared state to be the one that is nearest to it. Here it should be noted that we should take into account the fact that Alice obtains partial information about whether Bob has performed the measurement or not, due to Bayes’ rule. However, Alice still cannot increase her gain as long as the \(R\) is large enough, because she cannot be confident that Bob has already performed the measurement. Let \(f_u\) be Alice’s estimation of the probability that Bob did not perform the measurement. With no information, \(f_u = r\). However, Bob’s announced guess gives her partial information about his measurement’s result if he performed it. This information can be used to make a better estimate of \(f_u\). For example, in the case where Alice sends \(|\alpha\rangle\) and Bob performs the optimal measurement, we obtain using Bayes’ rule that \(f_u = (r/3)/[(r/3) + (1 - r)(2/3)]\) when his guess is \(|\alpha\rangle\). However, it is clear that \(f_u \geq r/3\) when Bob did not perform the measurement, he simply guesses it with equal probabilities regardless of what he received. Thus, by Bayes’ rule, Alice can see that there remains a probability greater than \(r/3\) that Bob did not perform the measurement. The relation \(f_u \geq r/3\) also holds for the entanglement attacks, since it is satisfied for any \(|\alpha\rangle\).

Now let us consider a state \(|i\rangle\) that satisfies the requirements \(\theta_a \sim 0\), \(\theta_b \sim 2\pi/3\), and \(\theta_c \sim 2\pi/3\), without loss of generality. The probability \(P_C\) that Bob makes a correct guess is given by \(P_C = (2/3) \cos^2(\theta_a/2)\). That for an incorrect one is given by \(P_I = 1 - P_C\). Alice’s gain is \(-1/2\) when Bob makes a correct (incorrect) guess. Let us denote Alice’s gain \(G^m_A\) \((G^n_A)\) in the case of the normal (checking) steps. Alice’s total gain is given by \(G_A = (1 - r)G^m_A + rG^n_A\). Alice’s gain \(G^m_A\) in the case of the normal steps can be obtained as

\[
G^m_A = (-1)(2/3) \cos^2(\theta_a/2) + 2\{1 - (2/3) \cos^2(\theta_a/2)\} = 2\{1 - \cos^2(\theta_a/2)\}.
\]

Alice’s gain \(G^n_A\) in the case of the checking steps (when Alice claims that the sent qubit is \(|\alpha\rangle\)) is given by
\[ G_A^r = -R[1 - \cos^2(\theta_A/2)] + \cos^2(\theta_A/2). \]  

The second term in the right-hand side of Eq. (2) is because Bob makes a random guess without performing the optimal measurement in the checking steps and thus it is disadvantageous for him. Then we can obtain that

\[
G_A = (1 - r)2\{1 - \cos^2(\theta_A/2)\} - rR\{1 - \cos^2(\theta_A/2)\} + r \cos^2(\theta_A/2) = \{2 - r(R + 2)\}{1 - \cos^2(\theta_A/2)} + r \cos^2(\theta_A/2). \tag{3}
\]

Here it is easy to see that if \( r(R + 2) \gg 2 \) the optimal choice for Alice is that \( \theta_A = 0 \). Then the maximal gain for Alice is given by \( G_A^{\text{max}} = r \). If we determine the values of \( r \) and \( R \) such that they satisfy the relation \( r(R + 2) = k \gg 2 \) (\( k \) is a constant), Alice’s maximal gain or the bias \( \delta \) is \( r \). Thus the bias \( \delta \) is proportional to \( 1/R \).

The basic reason for this advantage is that the measured states \( |\alpha\rangle \) coincide with the elements of the optimal POVM in the proposed scheme. Alice could increase her gain \( G_A^r \) for the normal steps by increasing \( \theta_A \) in both two- and three-state schemes but with the following difference. In the three-state (two-state) scheme, \( G_A^r \) increases with the second (first) order of \( \theta_A \) while the probability to be checked increases with the second order of \( \theta_A \).

Let us heuristically show the security against Alice’s entanglement attacks. In entanglement attacks, Alice does not send a separate state but sends qubits that are entangled with some other qubits she preserves. If she can change Bob’s state \( \rho_B \) as she likes, she can always win. The basic idea is that she cannot do so even in entanglement attacks. Instead, by appropriately choosing her measurement, Alice can generate at Bob’s site any ensemble \( \{p_i, |i\rangle\langle i|\} \) satisfying \( \sum_i p_i |i\rangle\langle i| = \rho_B \) (the theorem of Hughston, Jozsa, and Wootters). Let \( \rho_B = (1/2)(1 + \vec{r} \cdot \vec{\sigma}) \). Since \( \rho_B = \sum_i p_i |i\rangle\langle i| \) and \( |i\rangle\langle i| = (1/2)(1 + \vec{r}_i \cdot \vec{\sigma}) \) where \( \vec{r}_i \) is the corresponding Bloch vector, we have \( (1/2)(1 + \vec{r} \cdot \vec{\sigma}) = (1/2)(1 + \sum_i p_i \vec{r}_i \cdot \vec{\sigma}) \) and thus

\[ \vec{r} = \sum_i p_i \vec{r}_i. \tag{4} \]

Therefore, for a given \( \rho_B \) whose Bloch vector is \( \vec{r} \), Alice can prepare at Bob’s site any mixture \( \{p_i, |i\rangle\langle i|\} \) as long as its Bloch vectors \( \vec{r}_i \) satisfy Eq. (4). However, if Alice always performs a given measurement, the entanglement attacks reduce to the nonentanglement attacks: The outcomes of measurements on entangled pairs do not depend on the temporal order of the two participants’ measurements. So we can confine ourselves to the case where Alice measures first. Then the attack reduces to a nonentanglement attack where Alice generates \( |i\rangle \) with probability \( p_i \). The only thing that Alice can do to utilize the entanglement is to choose her measurements according to Bob’s announced guesses. However, the checking steps also prevent Alice from increasing her gain: She must choose the measurement that gives some mixture \( \{p_i, |i\rangle\langle i|\} \) at Bob’s site such that each \( \vec{r}_i \) is the same as one of the Bloch vectors of the three nonorthogonal states \( |\alpha\rangle \). This is because any vector \( \vec{r}_i \) that deviates from those of the \( |\alpha\rangle \)’s will decrease Alice’s gain due to the checking steps, involving a negative term containing \( rR \). Therefore, Alice has no freedom in the choice of measurements but a given choice. Thus the attack reduces to nonentanglement attacks for the reasons noted above.

IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Let us discuss the advantage of the proposed scheme. The problem of quantum gambling schemes is that Alice can claim that the error is due to noise or decoherence in the quantum channel, whenever it is checked and thus she must pay \( R \) to Bob. This problem cannot be clearly solved even if quantum error correcting codes are successfully implemented because a small amount of error always remains. The solution to this problem is that Bob aborts the whole protocol if the error rate claimed by Alice is greater than the expected residual error rate. However, Bob should actually accept his loss which amounts to the product of the number of errors and \( R \), until data for a sufficient number of errors accumulate. Thus it is hard for Bob to do so when \( R \) is too large. However, in the previous schemes (proposed scheme), we have that \( R \sim 1/\delta^2 (R \sim 1/\delta) \), namely, for a given bias the value of \( R \) of the proposed scheme is less than that of the previous schemes by a factor of \( 1/\delta \). Therefore we can say that the proposed scheme is more practical than previous ones.

In conclusion, we provided a quantum gambling protocol using three (symmetric) nonorthogonal states. We showed that the proposed scheme is secure against nonentanglement attacks. The security of the proposed scheme against entanglement attacks was shown heuristically. The advantage of the proposed scheme over previous ones is that the bias \( \delta \) is proportional to \( 1/R \). We discussed its practical advantage.

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