THE LIFE-TIME OF TOMORROW PARTY OF JAPAN AND ITS NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENTS IN JAPAN’S POLITICS

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Abstract

The nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan on 11th March 2011 was unimaginably scary for the Japanese people and it was easily expected that Japan was going to abandon nuclear power with anti-nuclear political parties. Contrarily, Japan decided to maintain nuclear power with pro-nuclear political parties. This decision of Japan was influenced by the negative impacts brought by the Tomorrow Party of Japan (TPJ), the largest political party in the history of Japan which was established primarily to abandon nuclear power. The purpose of this paper is to look at the life-time of TPJ from 28th November to 27th December in 2012 and examine the negative impacts by TPJ on the anti-nuclear movements in Japan’s politics. The paper then discovers that the Japanese people came to lose trust in anti-nuclear political parties because they recognized, due to TPJ, that ‘anti-nuclear’ can be abused by politicians for elections, the characteristics of the ‘anti-nuclear’ village are not so different from those of the nuclear power village and the anti-nuclear party is an amateur without leaders. The paper finally concludes that it will take much time and efforts to regain a lost trust in anti-nuclear political parties.

Keywords: Anti-nuclear movement in Japan's politics, The tomorrow party of Japan, Japan's energy policies, The nuclear power village, The anti-nuclear power village, The nuclear accident at fukushima daiichi.

Contribution/ Originality

This study is one of very few studies which have investigated the negative impacts on the anti nuclear movements in Japan’s politics, made by the largest anti-nuclear political party in the history of Japan, the Tomorrow Party of Japan (TPJ), which has prevented Japan from moving towards deneutralization.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Nuclear Issues and Political Parties in Two Elections

The nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan terrified/has terrified the Japanese people. It was easily expected that Japan would abandon nuclear power and turn its sources of energy from nuclear energy to renewable energy. However, as of December 2014, Japan is going to depend heavily on nuclear power. For instance, on 14th December 2014, the general election for
the House of the Representatives was held. Though almost only four years have passed after the accident, energy issues are not the main concerns in the election. Furthermore, the ruling coalition comprised by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and New Komei, won in the election as the coalition dominates 326 seats of all the 475 seats in the House of the Representatives (291 seats for LDP and 35 seats for New Komei). Though some opposition parties could increase its seats, it can be said that the ruling coalition, especially LDP, triumphed in the election.

LDP considers that nuclear power is an important source of energy under the strict safety conditions (Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 2014). Its manifesto argues that LDP will re-operate nuclear power plants, which have stopped operation due to safety reasons, where it is recognized by the nuclear regulatory commission that those plants conform to new regulatory standards. However, the manifesto at the same time maintains that the dependency on nuclear power will be reduced as much as possible by saving energies thoroughly, introducing renewable energies at the maximum and making fire energy generation highly efficient. Regarding the partner of the coalition, New Komei, its manifesto does not mention nuclear power issues (see New Komei (2014)). Its manifesto just suggests some items on energy such as the maximum introduction of renewable energies and promotion of excellent products for energy savings. Thus, it is commonly understood that the coalition will not abandon nuclear power. Indeed, after the election, on 17th February 2015, the nuclear regulatory commission recognized that new regulatory standards have been satisfied by two reactors of the Takahama Nuclear Power Plant, which stopped its operation due to the regular inspection since 2011 (the reactor no.1, no.2 and no.4) and 2012 (the reactor no.3). Thus, it is expected that the Takahama Nuclear Power Plant as well as the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant which has already satisfied the standards are going to restart their operation possibly in the summer of 2015, though all nuclear power plants have not been in operation since September 2013 (as of 4th March 2015).

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the largest opposition party with 75 seats, in its manifesto, insists that the party will achieve ‘zero nuclear power’ in the 2030s by maximising the use of renewable energies and promoting technologies for saving energies (DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan), 2014). The second largest opposition party, Japan Innovation Party with 41 seats, suggests that the re-operation of nuclear power plants should not be allowed without sorting out the problem of ‘nuclear wastes’ generated from energy production in nuclear power plants (Japan Innovation Party, 2014). It is ambiguous whether the party is perfectly against nuclear power, but it can be assumed from its manifesto that the party opposes to nuclear power because it seeks to make Japan the ‘renewable energy country’.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP), the third largest opposition party with 21 seats, is undoubtedly against nuclear power. The manifesto of JCP strongly proposes the immediate disuse of nuclear power and even the cancellation of exporting nuclear power technologies (Japan Communist Party (JCP), 2014). The equal-fourth largest parties are the Party for Future Generations, the People’s Life Party and the Social Democratic Party of Japan, with 2 seats respectively. The Party for Future Generations, unlike other opposition parties, clearly suggests on keeping nuclear power technologies, although it is necessary to get Japan out of too much
dependence on nuclear power by diversifying sources of energies (Party for Future Generations, 2014). The People's Life Party (2014) maintains that re-operation of nuclear power plants, creation of new plants and expansion of the existing plants must not be allowed. Finally, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (2014) proposes that re-operation of nuclear power plants must not be admitted and creation of new nuclear power plants and expansion of the existing nuclear power plants will be cancelled. Thus, generally speaking, the ruling coalition is for nuclear power, while opposition parties are against it. Because of the triumph for the ruling coalition, it can be said that nuclear power is allowed by the Japanese people. It can be however counter-argued that nuclear power is not allowed by the Japanese people because LDP and New Komei were chosen because their economic policies, especially the increase in the consumption tax ratio, rather than nuclear power policies, were approved because economic issues were the main issues for the election. Indeed, no political parties brought nuclear power issues to the forefront in this election.

In contrast, in the previous general election for the House of the Representatives on 16th December 2012, there was a political party which was established to abandon nuclear power and promote renewable energies. That party is the Tomorrow Party of Japan (TPJ). The party was born just before the election (28th November 2012) and ‘died’ just after the election (27th December 2012). Before the election, TPJ had 61 former members in the House of the Representatives. It was theoretically the third largest party as DPJ, the then ruling party, had 230 former members and LDP, the largest opposition party, had 119 former members.

The result in the 2012 election was disastrous for TPJ as TPJ obtained only 9 seats, namely losing 52 seats. Because, unlike other opposition parties, TPJ had in reality only one policy goal, the abolishment of nuclear power and the promotion of renewable energy, it cannot be too much exaggerated to say that its complete defeat in the election meant triumph for nuclear power. It can be again counter-argued that LDP was chosen not because the Japanese people favoured LDP's energy policies, but because other policies that LDP suggested, especially economic policies, were better than those of the opposition parties for the public. However, as choosing LDP was obviously going to make Japan depend on nuclear power again, it should be unreasonable to suppose LDP won but ‘anti-nuclear power’ did not lose in the election. ‘Anti-nuclear power’ in reality perfectly defeated in the election.

1.2. Research Objects and Methodology

The party’s miserable loss in the election thus meant a lot to Japan’s future energies. The purpose of this paper is then to disclose the negative impacts that TPJ made on the anti-nuclear movements in Japan’s politics. For that purpose, this paper examines the life-time of TPJ based on the newspaper analysis. The examination discloses that the negative impacts brought by TPJ on the anti-nuclear movements in Japan’s politics are that the life-time of TPJ has made people believe: ‘anti-nuclear’ can be abused by politicians for elections, the characteristics of the ‘anti-nuclear’ village are not so different from those of the nuclear power village and the anti-nuclear party is an amateur without leaders. Finally, this paper concludes that much time and efforts would be necessary for anti-nuclear parties or anti-nuclear groups to regain public trust in them.
2. LIFE-TIME OF TPJ

2.1. The Birth of TPJ

On 28th November 2012, Yukiko Kada established the Tomorrow Party of Japan (TPJ). She became the representative of the party and Tetsunari Iida became the acting representative. Kada was the Governor of Shiga Prefecture. Iida was an anti-nuclear protester, an advocate for renewable energies and owners of several renewable energy-related companies, and he lost in the election for the Governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture in July 2012. Although when the party was established after the House of the Representatives was dissolved on 16th November, there was no member of parliaments (MPs) in the party but she said she was going to ask former and present MPs in some parties including People’s Life First to take part in the party1. In addition, Kada announced that she did not run for the election but Iida ran for the election.

TPJ published ‘Lake Biwa Declaration’2 and ‘Promises for the Future’3, which included six policy proposals that TPJ promised to achieve. The declaration was publicly supported by some celebrities such as Kazuo Inamori (CEO, Kyocera), Ryuichi Sakamoto (musician) and Bunta Sugawara (actor). Though the policy proposals included various issues such as cutting unnecessary use of tax before consumption tax rate is increased and debureaucratization, its main policy proposal was apparently the ‘graduation from nuclear power’, which suggested gradual decommission of all the nuclear reactors so that zero nuclear reactors would be realized by 2022. Because DPJ had already proposed zero nuclear reactors by the 2030s, TPJ proposed its earlier achievement so that TPJ could be recognized as the leading party in abandoning nuclear power4. She severely criticized that LDP published the manifesto that seemingly proposed to promote nuclear power though LDP was responsible for the nuclear accidents at Fukushima Daiiichi as LDP created the safety myth of nuclear power and did not prepare for nuclear accidents5. On the same day, People’s Life First and the party for Japan’s tax reduction, anti-trans-pacific-partnership and abandoning nuclear power as well as some former MPs in Green Wind (political party) and Tomoko Abe, who left the Social Democratic Party of Japan, decided to take part in TPJ under the flag of abandoning nuclear power6.

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1 Yomiuri Shinbun, November 27th 2011. Retrieved from http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/election/shugiin/2012/news1/20121127-OYT1T00948.htm
2 Lake Biwa Declaration. Retrieved from http://kadayukiko.net/%E3%81%B3%E3%82%8F%E3%81%93%E5%AE%A3%E8%A8%80/
3 Miraiheno Yakusoku. Retrieved from http://www.nippon-mirai.jp/promise/index.html
4 Nihon Keizai Shinbun. 28 November 2012. Retrieved from http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS28006_Y2A121C1MM0000/
5 Asahi Shinbun, 27 November 2012. Retrieved from http://www.asahi.com/politics/update2/1127/OSK201211270043.html
6 Wall Street Journal Japan, 27 November 2012. Retrieved from jp.wsj.com/public/page/0_0_WJPP_7000-554861.html
Concerning the establishment of TPJ, LDP and DPJ criticized that proposals for other policies rather than nuclear policies were unambiguous and that politicians in various parties joined TPJ just for the election. Shigeru Ishiba, the Chief Secretary of LDP, said that he did not understand commonalities among the political parties which took part in TPJ in policy goals rather than abandoning nuclear power. Takeshi Gono, the Policy Chief of DPJ, argued that it was questionable if the members of TPJ had consensus on policy issues such as increases in the consumption tax rate and social security and that it seemed that they gathered to help each other for the election.

Another criticism against TPJ was that ‘the party was actually the new Ozawa party’ (Masahiko Takamura, the Vice-President of LDP)\(^7\). Namely, it was often supposed that TPJ was controlled by Ichiro Ozawa, the leader of People’s Life First. Ozawa, it was believed, used Kada and her clean image to increase seats in the election because he suffered his dirty image. Although Kada had strongly argued that Ozawa would not play a central role in TPJ when the party was established, it became apparent that the management of TPJ depended on Ozawa just two days after the establishment. Kada entrusted the management of the party and election affairs to Ozawa because she had not had experience in both. Consequently, Iida stepped down from the acting representative to a vice representative and Yuko Mori, a member of the House of the Councillors, who had close relationship with Ozawa, became a vice representative. Further, on 1\(^{st}\) December, Kada admitted that she established TPJ because Ozawa asked her to establish the party\(^8\). This fact clearly damaged the clean image of the party.

### 2.2. Conflict over the Proportional Representation Lists

TPJ’s honeymoon ended just in a week and the split in TPJ was made disclosed when TPJ submitted its proportional representation lists of candidates to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. TPJ was required to hand in documents required for the proportional representation lists of candidates by 5 p.m. of December 4\(^{th}\). Generally, in order to prevent troubles, political parties had in the documents for prior examination by the election administration commission of the Ministry before the closing day.

However, TPJ could not take the prior examination because of the severe conflicts within the party over rankings in its proportional representation lists of candidates. Moreover, among 11 proportional representation blocks, TPJ handed in the documents for the Hokuriku Shinetsu block at 9:30 am on the day. However, after the submission, Iida called the Ministry and requested that, though the ‘Ozawa side’ of TPJ was going to submit the documents, the Ministry

\(^7\) Nihon Keizai Shinbun. 28 November 2012. Retrieved from http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS28006_Y2A121C1MM40000/

\(^8\) Yomiuri Shinbun. 2 December 2012. Retrieved from http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/election/shugiin/2012/news1/20121202-OYT1T00452.htm

\(^9\) Sankei News. 5 December 2012. Retrieved from http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/121205/elc12120508200057-n1.htm
would not accept the documents and he wanted to change its rankings because the documents were made by the Ozawa size without the authorization by Kada. While the previous list gave candidates different rankings, candidates were in the same ranking in the new list. In the previous list, former MPs were put at higher places in the list. Though there were three candidates in a Chugoku block in which Iida was a candidate, his ranking was the third because the other two candidates were the former MPs. Thus, he wanted to change the rule in the previous list. Iida succeeded in changing the lists of eight blocks but the Ozawa side succeeded in keeping the lists of three blocks unchanged.

Regarding the other blocks, TPJ submitted the documents for those blocks just thirty minutes before the closing time. Furthermore, when the documents were submitted, a staff member of the Ministry found that an official copy of the family register for one candidate, required to run for elections, was missing. Though TPJ could bring the document to the Ministry nearly at the closing time, the examination of the documents finished at 10:30 pm due to the inexcusably late submission of the documents by TPJ. This inappropriate behaviour of TPJ was reported and severely criticized by the media.

2.3. Inappropriate Behaviour in the Operation and Closing of its Public Opinion Poll

Another inappropriate behaviour of TPJ regarding its web-based opinion poll was also reported by the media. On 3rd December, the website, named 'the pre-general election on internet' was opened. Although the link to the opinion poll site was not created on the official website of TPJ, the opinion poll site indicated that it was managed by TPJ. On the website, a question, ‘Are you for abandoning nuclear power generation?’ was given. The result of the opinion poll was published in real time. By 14:30 on the day, the site had had almost 20,000 votes, and 65.5% were for abandoning nuclear power generation and 34.7% were against it. At 14:30, the real-time result was suddenly deleted and the question was changed to ‘Are you for the promotion of nuclear power’ because the previous question was, according to the explanation by the website, difficult to understand. Though almost 11,000 votes had been gathered for this question by 14:30, 70% were again for the promotion of nuclear power and 30% were against it. As well as changing the question, the website reset and manipulated the results several times. Finally, the site itself was closed late at night on the day. Then, J-Cast News asked TPJ about the opinion poll site and TPJ answered that they did not know the site. However, on the next day, J-Cast News again asked TPJ about the site and TPJ admitted that the website was managed by TPJ and the website was closed because TPJ considered that it was problematic to keep the website due to security concerns.

10 Tokyo Shinbun. 6 December 2012. Retrieved from http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/shuin2012/all/CK2012120602000167.html
11 J-Cast News. 3 December 2012. Retrieved from http://www.j-cast.com/2012/12/03156576.html?p=all
12 The manipulation of the results can be watched at YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8AAELYYvEn8#t=48
13 J-Cast News. 3 December 2012. Retrieved from http://www.j-cast.com/2012/12/03156576.html?p=all
problems and mischiefs made on the website. It may be possible that the results unfavourable for TPJ were due to the mischiefs made by the voters. However, it may be also possible that the results reflected the opinions of the voters. Thus, a series of actions by TPJ were undoubtedly inappropriate because TPJ did not listen to and accept the public opinions that were contradictory to those of TPJ.

2.4. Complete Defeat in the Election and the Death of TPJ

Before the general election to be held on 16th December, several newspapers conducted public opinion polls, indicating that TPJ was not supported by the public. According to the public opinion poll by Asahi Shinbun\(^{14}\), only 3\% of the respondents were going to vote for TPJ in the proportional representation constituencies. Further, 23\% supported TPJ, while 62\% did not support TPJ. Just like the public opinion polls, TPJ lost catastrophically, while LDP triumphed in the election. Though LDP increased its seats from 119 to 294, TPJ decreased its seats from 61 to 9. Only two candidates, Ichiro Ozawa and Shizuka Kamei, were elected in the single-seat constituencies, and seven candidates were elected in the proportional representation constituencies. Though Iida ran for both constituencies, he lost in both of them.

After the election, the conflict within TPJ became severer. On 24\(^{th}\) December, TPJ held the first general meeting for members in both the House of the Councillors and the House of the Representatives\(^{15}\). In the meeting, Kada proposed that Tomoko Abe became a co-representative of the party. Further, she maintained that Iida stayed in the same position though he failed to be an MP, and that Ozawa and Kamei became *advisors* for the party. The Ozawa side rejected the proposal and suggested that Ozawa became a co-representative. Then, on 26\(^{th}\) December, Kada told the press that TPJ was going to split into different parties\(^{16}\).

On 28\(^{th}\) December, TPJ changed its name to the People’s Life Party and the Kada group left TPJ and established a new political ‘group’, named ‘the Tomorrow Party of Japan’\(^{17}\). Kada could not establish a new political ‘party’ because the political party requirements in Japan prescribed that five members were necessary for a political group to become a political party. Consequently, political party subsidies (approximately 865 million yen) were given to the People’s Life Party but the Tomorrow Party of Japan could not receive any subsidies. The Ozawa side abandoned Kada.

\(^{14}\) Asahi Shinbun. 2 December 2012. Retrieved from http://www.asahi.com/senkyo/sousenkyo46/news/TKY201212020405.html

\(^{15}\) Sankei News. 25 December 2012. Retrieved from http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/121225/stt12122500370000-n1.htm

\(^{16}\) Nihon Keizai Shinbun. 26 December 2012. Retrieved from http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASJ8265031_W2A221C1000000/

\(^{17}\) Sankei News. 28 December 2012. Retrieved from http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/121228/stt12122812320007-n1.htm
because it became apparent that she was no longer ‘useful’ to obtain public support\(^{18}\). Thus, the life-time of TPJ as a political party ended on 28\(^{\text{th}}\) December.

Further, as the Shiga Prefecture Congress demanded that Kada had to stop holding two posts, the Governor and the representative of the Tomorrow Party of Japan, Kada decided to resign as representative\(^{19}\). Thus, after she lost in the election, Kada also deserted the group and the idea of abandoning nuclear power at the national level. Though Abe became the representative of the group, she moved to another political party, Green Wind in March 2013. Since then, although the group has been alive, it has been inactive at all. Thus, it can be said that the life-time of TPJ, as a political group, ended too.

3. NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF TPJ

The life-time of TPJ has clearly had a number of both minor and major negative impacts on the anti-nuclear power movements in Japan’s politics. The most significantly negative impacts brought by TPJ are that the life-time of TPJ has made people believe: ‘anti-nuclear’ can be abused by politicians for elections, the characteristics of the ‘anti-nuclear’ village are not so different from those of the nuclear power village and the anti-nuclear party is an amateur without leaders.

3.1. The Abuse of ‘Anti-Nuclear Power’ for Elections

First, the life-time of TPJ has made the Japanese people believe that an anti-nuclear flag can be abused by politicians for elections (Kashiwagi, 2012; Ando, 2013; Hayakawa, 2013);(Shinbun, 2013). Whether politicians in really sought to abandon nuclear power or not, the public in Japan came to recognize that ‘anti-nuclear’ was nothing but means for elections. Politicians joined TPJ as they totally agreed to the party’s main idea of abandoning nuclear power just before the election. However most of the elected politicians left TPJ just after the election with a huge amount of money (party subsidies) though the party still maintained the ‘anti-nuclear’ idea. People consequently believed that they deserted TPJ because ‘anti-nuclear’ was not helpful for elections (Kodama, 2012). In addition, TPJ was finally abandoned by everyone, including Kada and Iida, which definitely has made people sure that all the politicians in TPJ did not seriously seek to achieve the abolishment of nuclear power by the party.

Further, the blunder that TPJ made when it submitted documents for proportional representation lists of candidates has made people consider that the members in TPJ were obsessed to become an MP. In order to realize the target of abandoning nuclear power, it was obvious that they had to cooperate with each other to fight against pro-nuclear candidates in other political parties. However, candidates in TPJ fought with each other to be in as advantageous positions in the election as possible.

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\(^{18}\) Nihon Keizai Shinbun. 27 December 2012. Retrieved from http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS27047_X21C12A2PP8000/

\(^{19}\) Nihon Keizai Shinbun. 3 January 2013. Retrieved from http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS03029_T00C13A1PE8000/
3.2. The Exclusiveness, Non-Transparency and Dishonesty of the ‘Anti-Nuclear Village’

The policy community of nuclear power, the closed networks between government officials and the nuclear industry, is often called the ‘nuclear power village’ (Shimura, 2011). The nuclear power village ‘connotes the nontransparent, collusive interests that underlie the establishment’s push to increase nuclear power despite the discovery of active fault lines under plants, new projections about the size of tsunamis and a long history of cover-ups of safety problems’ (Onishi and Belson, 2011). Hino (2011) also identified the characteristics of the village as follows: the village is closed; villagers do not admit their failures but emphasize their excuses; and they do not try to answer sincerely inconvenient questions for them.

As the policy community is highly exclusive, not allowing other actors to enter the community and do not listen to opinions from others, including public opinions, TPJ did not listen to the public opinions (Le Grand, 2013). Although most of the voters said that they were for the promotion of nuclear power and against abandoning nuclear power in TPJ’s web-based public opinion polls, whether they made fun of TPJ or not, TPJ did not respond sincerely to their opinions and closed the website because their opinions were at odds with those of TPJ.

Furthermore, the decision-making process in the TPJ village was not transparent. Although TPJ caused the troubles in submitting the documents for the proportional representation lists of candidates, people could not know how/why TPJ changed the rankings in the lists and why TPJ had to submit the documents so late. Either, the public could not see how/why People’s Life First joined TPJ.

Moreover, TPJ was dishonest and emphasized excuses, not answering sincerely, for inconvenient questions. When TPJ was established, Kada behaved like Kada and Iida established the party without any influence from Ozawa. However, Kada later admitted that Ozawa asked her to establish the party without apologising for hiding this truth to the public. When TPJ closed its website for the public opinion poll, TPJ at first said dishonestly that TPJ had no relation with the site. However, TPJ later admitted that the website was owned by TPJ and TPJ closed the website because of ‘security reasons’ and ‘mischiefs’ made in the website. TPJ did not explain what the security reasons and mischiefs were and did not apologize for this inappropriate behaviour as if TPJ did not do anything wrong. Moreover, when TPJ completely lost in the election, TPJ did not admit its failures during the election campaign and excused that TPJ lost because TPJ did not have a sufficient time to prepare for the election (Ishibashi et al., 2013). Even when TPJ was split into People’s Life Party and the new Tomorrow Party of Japan, TPJ justified the split and the Japanese people could not know why the party was separated.

3.3. TPJ as an Amateur Party without Leaders

TPJ showed that anti-nuclear party was an amateur and did not have leaders who could control anti-nuclear politicians. The Kada side at first sought to manage the party and its election campaign but the Kada side had to ask the Ozawa side to do so because her side did not have knowhow in the party management and election campaigns. Further, as shown in submitting documents for the proportional representation lists of candidates, the party did not take a normal
procedure to participate in the election, which also demonstrated that the party was an amateur. Moreover, the life-time of TPJ indicated that there were no anti-nuclear leaders who could control the 'hard-to-control' politicians. When the People's Life Party joined TPJ, Kada and Iida confidently maintained that they were able to control Ozawa and his fellows. However, in the end, it was made apparent that the 'leaders' in the anti-nuclear fields were too naïve to become leaders in 'national politics' because Kada and Iida were easily used in the election campaign and dumped after Ozawa found that they were useless.

4. CONCLUSION

This study at first looked at the life-time of TPJ and then disclosed the three negative impacts that TPJ had on the anti-nuclear movement in Japan's politics. The three negative impacts were that the life-time of TPJ has made people believe: 'anti-nuclear' can be abused by politicians for elections, the characteristics of the 'anti-nuclear' village are not so different from those of the nuclear power village and the anti-nuclear party is an amateur without leaders.

The life-time of TPJ and its negative impacts on the anti-nuclear movement in Japan's politics have rarely been discussed because it has been generally believed by the anti-nuclear side that people did not choose TPJ as economic issues simply did more matter for the voters in the election. Though TPJ might lose in the election partly because the voters considered that economic development was more important than abandoning nuclear power, it should be admitted that the results were significantly influenced by the failures of TPJ in the election.

The negative impacts of TPJ were indeed so strong that no major political party was established to aim primarily for abandoning nuclear power and most of the politicians who strongly advocated 'anti-nuclear' have lost in major elections. For instance, Morihiro Hosokawa, a former Prime Minister, lost in the election for the Governor of Tokyo in 2013, though Hosokawa cooperated with Junichiro Koizumi, a former Prime Minister, to abandon nuclear power.

The Politicians in TPJ might not expect that the negative impacts caused by them would so seriously influence the anti-nuclear movements in Japan's politics. Kada and Ozawa were seemingly not interested in abandoning nuclear power and they just used 'anti-nuclear' for the election. Shinbun (2013) reported that Ozawa and Kada participated only briefly anti-nuclear demonstration marches in front of the Prime Minister's official residence, asking the participants to vote for TPJ, during the election campaign. However, though anti-nuclear demonstration marches were held twice by the mid-January 2012 after the election, Ozawa and Kada did not participate either of them. It was natural that the Japanese people were no longer able to trust the 'anti-nuclear' parties or candidates because of TPJ. As the old saying tells us, 'you will never get a second change to make a good first impression’. It will require much time and strong efforts for the anti-nuclear side to win back its lost trust.

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