On the Purity of European Consciousness and the Limits of Being-Time in the Existential Anthropology of the Late M. Heidegger

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The issue of the European thinkers’ purity of consciousness is studied from the standpoint of the later M. Heidegger (in polemic with F.J. Gonzales and T. Sheehan). The article shows that Heidegger, having embarked upon the searching for new thinking, chooses the European thinking origins and, starting from the “Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)”, he already refuses to distinguish between being and time, that is, he is looking for a third principle (thinking) for their joint grip. We believe it is no longer the being that follows from the understanding of time, but being and time from the understanding of thinking (and even thinking of being). In this new dimension of consciousness, thinking falls into the time-like phenomenology dimension, commuting with being and time. Based on the analysis of the subsequent working of Heidegger, we can conclude that thinking must go through the metaphysics path to return to its wholeness (at the origins), but already to the existential-temporal unity. Thinking, commuting with being and time, starts to bend like the light in the black hole (according to the general theory of relativity of Einstein) and split (Heidegger uses the term “the Clearing of Being”). Existential thinking is a special case of this gap. It was that new dimension of thinking that the mystics and the Eastern sages aspired to. The topos, where being is joined to time, is the ultimate (pure) thinking that has overcome ignorance or attachment to the material world. It is through this dimension we begin to understand not only what being is, but also what time is, as thinking begins to distinguish its time, it temporalizes and starts to listen to its own “breathing” or temporalization of time (Heidegger wrote about). In such dimension, thinking turns into that original topos, when all connected with being flows inherently, be it Gods, humans, or the things grasping (everyone goes the way of being). The ideas of later Heidegger suggest that thinking can appear only where the being clearly exists (and Tao in its non-manifestation). Thinking arises only in conjunction with being and a new topos (thinking of being). Thinking is the gift of the being through the clearing (interspace), the one that allows you to grasp both the being and Tao. Nevertheless, based on the later M. Heidegger, it can therefore be concluded that almost fifty years after the writing of “Being and Time”, European thinkers still have not learned to think, since what awakens true thought, what should encourage us to think, and what is associated with pure thinking, has not yet awakened. It does look as if the later Heidegger was close to the idea that

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time reveals not only the being but also consciousness. In the classical dimension of thinking of being beyond the boundaries, both time and the being disappear, thereby closing the path to pure thinking (to avoid the “true”).

Keywords: consciousness, pure thinking, European thinking, logical and rational thinking, pure being, being and time, existential anthropology, M. Heidegger.

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Introduction

The European culture route to the purity of consciousness proved to be very thorny and contradictory. But in fact, the depth of culture can be measured precisely by the purity allowing you to discover in consciousness. We know about the existence of ancient high cultures (Egyptian, Iranian, Sumerian, Aramaic, etc.); however, we still have not figured out whether these cultures’ pure thinking patterns were the same as those in Ancient Greece and in our time. Cultures and civilizations disappear, but thinking remains. Moreover, we constantly talk about the fact that the ancient high civilizations were destroyed since thinking of their representatives became more and more polluted, as they did in Egypt and the Sumerians, and at the origins of the Old Testament thought. For instance, did the Aryans who came to India bring the light of thinking or the pollution of war? Does the tribal war, described in the Bhagavad Gita, bring us to the inner tension of the hero’s (Arjuna) thought; or is it an inevitable fact of thought pollution (although even Krishna interprets it as something that should not prevent a warrior from doing his duty)? (Edgerton, 1972) In a word, we still (even in the 21st century) face the problem of interpreting the purity of thinking or the fact that our consciousness is filled with the dirt of war. The most prominent thinkers of the 20th century sought to decipher the essence of pure thinking (for example, E. Husserl, 1983; S. Freud, 2015; M. Scheler, 1962; Sri Aurobindo, 1998; A. Badiou, 2003, 2005; etc.), but, ultimately, they failed to convince the mass society of the need to purify consciousness. As in the days of the ancient Greeks and the time of the Bhagavad Gita writing, we are standing in front of a wall of war and evil in misunderstanding, although A. Badiou leads us to the idea that a mask (correlating with an event), betrayal (correlating with loyalty), coercion of the unnameable (correlating with the power of the true) are the evil figures, and that any attempt to name the unnameable, to call the “community of people” capitalism, socialism, democracy or communism leads to catastrophic evil (Badiou, 2001). For evil (as well as good) is born at the origins of thought, where a person attempts to name something (a form of being of sociality in particular). And the named one, transferred to the masses, becomes evil, and we call it the “Idea” and the “Ideal State” (Plato), the beginning of the world (Aristotle) or communism (Marx). The events of the 20th century showed how fascism, under the guise of socialism, burst into the European consciousness, and the dirty events were committed under the name of communism. This is the nature of human consciousness, which, striving for purity, does evil; this requires considering at what stage of the way purity consciousness can be transformed into its opposite (evil).

This article is aimed at exploring Heidegger’s understanding of the European consciousness purity, and to show in this context that starting from the very first works (“Being and Time” (Heidegger, 1962) through the works after the turn (see Heidegger, 1979, 1979, 1983, 1992) and ending with the last work “What is called thinking?” (Heidegger, 1968) that Heidegger’s work is undergoing a profound internal transformation from fundamental ontology to
fundamental anthropology. Such a study is based on our earlier works on Heidegger (Okorokov, 2018, 2020), as well as the article on the pure consciousness of early Heidegger (primarily, “Being and Time” (Okorokov, 2022). Similar issues in Heidegger’s work were studied by both Ukrainian: A. Bogachov (Bogachov, 2021), I. Karivets (Karivets, 2020), R. Kobets (Kobets, 2020), E. Boliaki (Boliaki, 2012), L. Gordon, and A. Wohlman (Gordon & Wohlman, 2019), M. Peters (Peters, 2019), R. Huttunen, and L. Kakkori (Huttunen & Kakkori, 2021), M. Lambert (Lambert, 2020), G. Petropoulos (Petropoulos, 2020), R. Uljée, G. Tsagdis, and F.W. Zantvoort (Uljée et al., 2020), F. Westerlund (Westerlund, 2020), E. Husserl (Husserl, 1983), M. Scheler (Scheler, 1962), S. Freud (Freud, 2015), A. Badiou (Badiou, 2005), Sri Aurobindo (Sri Aurobindo, 1998), and others.

A. Bogachov, on the one hand, points out the difficulties of the Ukrainian translation of “Being and Time”; on the other hand, he seeks support for such a translation in the work of F. Westerlund (Bogachov, 2021). I. Karivets writes that in the fundamental ontology, thinking is understood as being in tradition without tradition, and that thinking is arbitrary and spontaneous (Karivets, 2020). R. Kobets focuses on the fundamental ontological projection of thinking as a kind of science of cognition and the Dasein project (Kobets, 2020).

F. Westerlund reveals the contradiction between Heidegger’s attempt to establish Husserl’s phenomenological experience and apply a radically historicist approach to understanding thinking; that is, the boundaries of phenomenological thinking are explored through Heidegger’s existential experience (Westerlund, 2020). G. Petropoulos analyzes the complex relationship of Heidegger to Plato, where the latter is revealed as a thinker of the transitional period in the affirmation of the truth of being (Petropoulos, 2020). R. Huttunen, L. Kakkori believe that, given the fact that there are two types of thinking (calculating and meditative), Heidegger can be considered a technological essentialist, and overcoming technological thinking is very difficult (Huttunen & Kakkori, 2021); and we can agree with it, taking into account that for more than two thousand years technological thinking has been dominant in the European consciousness.

M. Lambert focused on the positions of Chad Engelland concerning the relationship between Heidegger and Kant, suggests that, despite significant transformations and changes in the work of early and later Heidegger, Kant remains a crucial interlocutor throughout his career and brings him to the border of his later thinking, that is, at different periods, Kant becomes even more important for him than his teacher Husserl, and in an attempt to surpass Kant, Heidegger tries to “jump over his own shadow,” which, according to Heidegger, is the task of any philosopher. That is why early and later Heidegger tries to distance himself from Kantian transcendental thinking (Lambert, 2020). In our opinion, the later Heidegger departed from Kantian transcendental philosophy quite seriously, as he did not find any transcendental support for European thinking, especially since the German thinker diverged from the Kantian transcendental idea of time as a form of inner feeling.

Hegel, Heidegger and Derrida, according to R. Uljée, G. Tsagdis, and F.W. Zantvoort, are the three founding figures of modern European philosophy, and three thinkers whose intertwined heritage continues to enliven fierce philosophical disputes. But it was their debates that initially shaped the philosophy of the 20th century. Heidegger criticized Hegel as the archetype and culmination of the entire Western philosophical tradition, but Derrida would also criticize Heidegger for logocentric and ontotheological motives in his thought, that is, for his hidden Hegelianism. According to Hegel, thinking itself has a history, and the central premise of the Heideggerian project is that thinking can exist only in the continuous deconstruction of its history; it means that there is a relationship between history and time,
the consciousness of time and the presence of time modalities in his writing. In other words, Heidegger suggests that thought development moves around the relationship of temporality (Dasein), the history of being and the meaning of the Event (Ereignis), among which, according to Derrida, a crucial role is played by the priority of temporality over the event (Uljée et al., 2020).

The relationship between Heidegger and Plato (and with Greek thought as a whole), essentially, the relationship between the first and last thinkers of the metaphysical era is crucial given modern critics. Many modern researchers of Heidegger’s work have written on these relations, but we would like to single out the works of two remarkable critics, F.J. Gonzales (Gonzales, 2009) and T. Sheehan (Sheehan, 2015).

F.J. Gonzales and T. Sheehan have revealed that Heidegger, largely based on Plato, misinterpreted him, and it may question the entire teaching of Heidegger as the finalizer of modern European culture. As the role of Plato is significant for Heidegger as well.

However, we want to show that Heidegger’s transcription of Plato is only a certain reconstruction of the Greek philosopher, an attempt to modernize him, to show that from the point of view of modern culture, he is, firstly, relevant, and, secondly, the path of his thinking anyway leads to contradictions, that is, according to Heidegger, Plato did not solve the global problems of culture and failed to smooth out the contradictions between thinking and being. In our language, Plato was only on the outskirts of understanding pure consciousness but closed its light by the world of ideas for himself (and for us).

In other words, on this matter, we are on Heidegger’s side, since he tried to show inconsistent thinking not only of Plato, but of all subsequent European (metaphysical) culture, and not only in the field of fundamental ontology, but the later Heidegger in the field of fundamental (existential) anthropology (given the phenomenological influence of Husserl).

Gonzales is trying to reveal the phenomenological motives of Plato but is not such a phenomenological image of Plato just another new (not existential, as in Heidegger, but phenomenological) reconstruction of Plato. The problem remains open.

Moreover, one can say that Gonzales, regarding Socrates and Plato, falls into the same trap as Heidegger. Things he reproaches Heidegger for (inaccurate reading and speculation), he applies to them himself (see, for example, Gonzales, 2009: 289-290, 295). Gonzales has many statements, such as, “It is clear that Plato would not accept this move” (Gonzales, 2009: 295), etc.). To who is it clear, and how? Has Plato incarnated in Gonzales?

Neither Gonzales nor Sheehan, despite the fundamental analysis of Plato’s ideas, have brought us closer to understanding the true essence of modern European thinking; even European classical thinking also froze on Plato’s ideas, as no one could clearly express those passages that have come down to us from the pre-Socrates. So, what’s happening next, are we forever stuck in the shadow of the outstanding thinker of antiquity, enchanted by his thinking?

But it is not just about how talented Plato was, but whether there are alternative ways for European culture. In our opinion, there are, because there is a path of Chinese, Indian, and Japanese cultures, but there is a path of ancient civilizations, the study of which (say, following the example of M. Eliade or Prabhupada) could shed light on the origin of our thinking. In the East, this kind of illumination sometimes was called the appearance of God (Brahman or Krishna) on Earth. Even in European culture, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, appeared in human form (and this is an element of the alternative Platonic spiritual culture). In the East, when culture comes to a standstill, new spiritual avatars appear (Buddha, Shankara, Ramanuja, Chaitanya, etc.). There has been no renewal in Europe since Plato and Christ.
So perhaps Spengler is right, and this is the decline of (old) Europe, and it needs renewal (it would be better not the way R. Girard prophesied, not a sacrificial renewal). Maybe enough bloody sacrifices that lead only to consciousness simulations (for a certain historical period), we would like psychoanalysis not to be omnipotent and the repressed consciousness to be replaced by a spiritual one. So that neither Oedipus nor the Sphinx would lead us along the path of pure consciousness, but Mo Tzu or Christ (with their universal love and humanity).

European culture desperately needs new spiritual (ancient) sources to discover a new spiritual tradition (such as Zoroastrianism for Pythagoras). Thinking, divorced from spiritual roots, produces only success (money, computers, networks, robots, etc.) or (in the classical sense) logos and metaphysics.

When it comes to the opposition of dialectics and being in Heidegger’s concept, according to F.J. Gonzales, one can only say that neither Plato nor Heidegger succeeded in expressing the temporal properties of dialectics, based on the fact that dialectical thinking is still not absolute (ideal), but is always unfolded in time. In this context, it would be nice to apply the diachronic approach to language, proposed by F. de Saussure, to statements about being. In other words, all classical (modern included) European thinking considers logos (and any natural language then) as static. But such logos (and such a language) does not apply to being, according to Heidegger. However, neither Heidegger nor his critics (in particular, Gonzales and Sheehan) could see language as an event unfolding in time. And just as Heidegger was looking for an event-based approach to being in “Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)”, it was necessary to find such an approach to language. Who knows, perhaps, in this case, there would be a language capable of expressing being. Neither F.J. Gonzales nor Heidegger did not explore this possibility. Maybe in such a linguistic topos, the harshly negative language of Gonzales would be less critical of Heidegger.

Thus, many researchers of Heidegger’s work are trying to understand the existential-anthropological motives of the later M. Heidegger, that is, to comprehend the transition from the fundamental ontology of the early to the existential anthropology of the later Heidegger. We strive to comprehend this transition in the context of research into the essence of the purity of modern European thinking. This idea can be expressed in another way: modern European culture is clearly on the way to a new way of thinking formation.

M. Heidegger, completing “Being and Time”, faced the need for thinking through what time is, and concluded that time, in turn, must be revealed from the horizon of being. Since the fundamental way of being existence is understanding, the German philosopher was forced to consider the very possibility of such an understanding and decided to look for the purity of European consciousness, which must now (just like time) unfold from the historical horizon of the being of European culture. Thus, Heidegger made a significant turn from fundamental ontology, first to the history of being, and, ultimately, to the history of the essence and purity of European consciousness study.

However, Heidegger is one of the few European thinkers who tried to understand the complexity of this path of purification of consciousness in European culture and came to the disappointing conclusion that we, unlike the East, are still at the origins of this path. Perhaps that is why the last work of Heidegger is named symbolically – “What is called thinking?” (Heidegger, 1968).

One can reduce the study of F.J. Gonzales on Heidegger to the justification of Plato (as opposed to Nietzsche and Heidegger’s misreading, who interpreted Platonian truth as unconcealed, but sometimes critically (inaccurately) assessed it as correctness). You can justify T. Sheehan’s new reading of Heidegger’s work, considering purely English accuracy.
in comparing the terminology of Aristotle and Heidegger. T. Sheehan stated, “as regards philology and historical science (Historie), his (Heidegger) hyper-valorization of the pre-Socratics based on a heavily theorized construal of a handful of fragments is highly questionable. He himself even called into doubt the historical (historisch) correctness of his own interpretations of archaic Greek thought” (Sheehan, 2015: 254). “Professor Tezuka was quite right: when it comes to the needless confusion that dogs Heidegger’s philosophy (not only among analytical philosophers but among Heideggerians as well), much of the blame must be laid at Heidegger’s own doorstep” (Sheehan, 2015: 12).

All this is correct and true, and there are modern critics well versed in ancient texts and the etymological intricacies of Heidegger’s complex work. Although, where T. Sheehan doubts (of the vagueness of the pure origins of European thought, as if there were only fragments before Plato, and only he and Aristotle brought European thought into the system), one can object that, after all, Indian thought starts from the obscure Vedas, and the Chinese from the obscure Book of Changes, and thereunder, what should we consider the clarity of Buddha and Lao Tzu to be the origins of Indian and Chinese thought. Any understanding (system) implies tradition. Wasn’t there Bharata in India and Homer in Europe, who already implied polishing of thought?

This is not the task. No teaching can escape criticism. The task is to figure out whose idea of thinking is more correct, Plato’s or Heidegger’s. Could not Plato be mistaken in truth, goodness, thinking, and education interpretation? He could. And just as Heidegger could be wrong in interpreting Plato? But this is not the reason to judge both. Who has not erred in understanding the essence of thought? The task is rather to find an approach to thinking that would straighten out all the problems of modern European thinking (it does not matter whether we follow the path of Plato following Gonzales and Badiou or follow the path of Heidegger). Or perhaps there is a third way, and not just a way to the second dimension (as in Heidegger). This article is aimed at considering alternatives to different ways of thinking, that is, to introduce a conditional “purity of thinking,” according to the following type: the purer the thinking, the more accurately it reflects being, fundamentally avoiding the category of truth, that confused everything in European thinking, and which Plato, Heidegger, Badiou, F.J. Gonzales, and T. Sheehan tried to correct. The purity of thinking is about the divine dimension, and the truth of thinking is about the human dimension.

The purpose of the research

Our goal is to show that Heidegger, who has always sought a way to understand pure being, was increasingly striving to understand the purity of thought and explore ways to a new dimension of thinking associated with being-time in his later work, that is, to show that Heidegger’s work is a consistent transition from understanding the purity of being to understanding the purity of thinking, the turn of the outstanding German thinker from fundamental ontology to the history of being, the formation of ideas on the continuum (topos) of being and time, and further to the history of research (or understanding) of the purity of European thinking (as T. Sheehan said, his clearing (enlightenment) or understanding of the continuum (topos) being-thinking).

Presentation or basic materials

M. Heidegger turned out to be the thinker who initially at the fundamental-ontological level, while Sheehan considers it to be meta-metaphysical (in his opinion, “Heidegger’s
meta-metaphysical inquiry, on the other hand, takes up where metaphysics leaves off") (Sheehan, 2015: 15)), revealed the internal conflict of European consciousness and, in search of a way to resolve it, began to consider anthropology at the level of human existence, a different level of fundamental reading of human being (called Dasein (Heidegger, 1962) in “Being and Time”). At this level, the problems that arose were hidden behind the boundary of the existence of things (and the world), and, thus, European thinkers were forced to study the inner realm of being (consciousness), which turned out to be completely different from that which all classical culture pointed to. Being in its anthropological underside turned out to be that non-being, or that incomprehensible link in thinking, which in the language of Parmenides opened the way to metaphysics, and in the language of J.-P. Sartre turned out to be a fundamental (deep property) of consciousness itself.

In T. Sheehan’s language, this means the following, “In its briefest formulation, Heidegger argues that the pre-Socratics (we will limit the discussion to Parmenides and Heraclitus) discovered the hidden clearing, ἀλήϑεια-1, but failed to see that the appropriation of ex-sistence is the reason why there is a clearing at all” (Sheehan, 2015: 252). That is, Parmenides discovered the complexity of understanding being by thinking, and discovered the enlightenment of human thought (clearing) for grasping things, but did not understand the essence of this complexity, which was revealed only by Heidegger.

The German thinker tried to understand the essence of this enlightenment (“clearing”) and to find a direct path for a human to being (initially through facticity and Dasein). But some researchers believe that Heidegger was wrong on this path. Thus, F. Gonzales considers it his main objective to show that Plato is “right” and Heidegger is “wrong” (Gonzales, 2009: 299). Is it possible, in principle, to designate the topos in which we clearly understand how thinking grasps being? The Greeks discovered this and erected there a building of philosophy. But they did not understand why, when we try to grasp being, we lose the understanding of thinking itself, and were forced to embark on the path of metaphysics, through the introduction (understanding and naming) of such concepts as ἀλήϑεια, εἶδος and οὐσία things (see, for example, (Sheehan, 2015: 70). This is why, according to Sheehan, “Greek philosophy and in fact could be raised only by going beyond metaphysical thinking – or, as he (Heidegger) put it, “stepping back” from metaphysics into a region that is before and the basis for it” (Sheehan, 2015: 85).

Together with the Greeks and Heidegger, we found ourselves in that wonderful place where thinking, having thought about why things appear to us at all, should we rely on λόγος (word, language) in this place, as Heraclitus understands the way of thinking, or being, in the interpretation of Parmenides, or we must find in this place clearing (enlightenment), according to Heidegger, can become permeable to itself. Heidegger seeks to show us that as long as we strive to understand things as something external to thinking, that is, we are in subject-object relations with them, thinking seems obvious to us (in the light of λόγος ἀλήϑεια, εἶδος, οὐσία, etc.), but as soon as we strive to carry out this operation, proceeding from thinking itself, we instantly take the path of being – and everything becomes foggy and confused. Perhaps, in this place (topos), we are already invading the realm of being-thinking. As Sheehan writes, “It is with us human beings that Sein comes into play (…). Or again: When Heidegger claims that in the modern world “things, to besure, are still given (…) but Sein has deserted them,” this “desertion” does not mean the disappearance of the “out-there-ness” of things (their existentia or Vorhandensein) but refers, rather, to the loss of the understanding of how things become meaningfully present at all: “Where struggle [πόλεμος] ceases, things certainly do not disappear, but world [i.e., the meaning-giving clearing] disappears.” On both accounts,
therefore – (1) that Sein was not his focal topic, and (2) that what he did mean by Sein was the intelligibility of things (Sheehan, 2015: 11). Here is another answer for our study. Sein was not the basic theme of Heidegger. What was the main focus then? Clearing as that thinking that approaches the understanding of Sein (in our interpretation, this is pure thinking).

Thus, the Greeks discovered that it was not possible to break through to thinking that grasps οὐσία (being, the constant presence of things). Heidegger is surprised that there, where philosophy and metaphysics flourished and where thinking begins (at the origins), we are still in ignorance and misunderstanding. And that means modern culture is opposed to ancient Greek (at its origins). Gonzales states, “The opposition between Plato and Heidegger is not an opposition between the nihilistic forgetting of being, on the one hand, and the attempt finally to think being in a new beginning – though this of course, is how Heidegger wants us to understand it – but rather an opposition between two different approaches to thinking being” (Gonzales, 2009: 292-293). Two thousand years after the Greeks, we are again (thanks to Heidegger) at the origins (horizon) of thinking and in a twofold sense: on the one hand, like the Greeks, we do not see thinking that grasps things in their being, on the other – we are looking for the origins of thinking as such (in the historical-temporal aspect), and we are trying to think like the Greeks to understand the originality of the thinking of European culture. In both cases, the main initiator of both approaches was Heidegger (actually, early and later).

For example, J-P. Sartre was looking for a detour (through Nothingness – from the depths (horizon) of consciousness). Both Heidegger and Sartre were confronted by Parmenides’ fundamental insights that the path to being lies on both sides of the understanding of human thinking (from the truth of being and from the truth of non-being).

But Parmenides closed the second way for Europeans, pointing out that it was the goddess (Dike) who opened the first one to him. The gods, through the consciousness of a human (Heraclitus and Parmenides), endowed a human with the gift of thinking, but in human performance, this gift, as Nietzsche and Heidegger would say, turned into “fetters” of all European thinking (metaphysics and logic), and, as we saw after Nietzsche and Heidegger, the path to a new misunderstanding (Nothingness), because the metaphysical multiplication of thoughts is the path of consciousness into the void of illusory ideas (about the world), as the Hindus would say the path to ignorance or consciousness obscured by Maya – the Indian interpretation of the obscuration of clearing (enlightenment, mental glades). Thinking becomes opaque on the way to grasping being (first of all, one’s being, which early Heidegger tried to formulate through ex-sistence). However, after turn, later Heidegger seeks to solve this problem by searching for the European thinking origins as such (that is, through an analysis of the thinking of the ancient Greeks, primarily the understanding of Plato and Aristotle). Our task is to figure out how close later Heidegger was to what we call pure being.

Heidegger clearly shows that metaphysics is just a limit of thinking, which draws a circle of visibility of ideas about beings (or about things) from the positions of λόγος and ἀλήθεια. Both the world and the cosmos in such a system of knowledge are reduced to a system of things, and the beginning is only the horizon of this system, conjectured from knowledge about things (according to Heidegger, the most profound foundations). In such a metaphysical system of knowledge, the more “thinking turns to the existent …, the more resolutely philosophy moves away from the truth of being.” (In the existential dimension, on the contrary, “Dasein… the foundation of the truth of being” (Heidegger, 2020: 223). Only a person who can listen to a being can understand its meaning (penetrate its dimension) and find himself on the other side of existence (the world of things). Consequently, Heidegger
concludes that the original appropriation of the first beginning (and hence its history) means the acquisition of soil in another beginning (Heidegger, 2020: 224). Only through the source (the first appropriation of the history of being (destruction) is a person able to break the circle of being and enter the dimension of truth (as openness) of being, that is, enter the horizon of understanding of being, which Heidegger associates with time. But this, according to Sheehan, is a particular time, “In any case, in his later writings Heidegger was finally clear: these so-called “time” words were only preliminary attempts to name the thrown-open or disclosed clearing, ἀλήϑεια-1. “Time” is a preliminary name for the openness of the clearing” (Sheehan, 2015: 97).

On the approaches to understanding non-logos (beyond logic), thinking problems begin everywhere. European culture has only succeeded in understanding the thinking, that is, known as logos (logical and rational). As Gonzales writes, “It is with this conception of λόγος, as it comes to characterize modern logic, that, according to Heidegger, “The way is cleared for the development of thinking as reckoning, grounding, and deducing...” (144-45). Thinking ceases to be a matter of receiving the gift of a being’s self-showing and becomes instead a matter of reliably connecting a predicate to a subject by means of proof, inference, or calculation. Thinking becomes mastery” (Gonzales, 2009: 235). This is the thinking that, according to Heidegger, must be overcome, otherwise, the path to understanding thinking itself becomes closed. Thinking turns into computer calculus, as Sheehan states, “recognizing the “danger” (Gefahr) of the epoché of technik for what it is: the obliteration of the hidden source of meaningful presence” (Sheehan, 2015: 265).

Is it possible to find another way in understanding European thinking, the pinnacle of which is modern computer thinking? This is the main task of the later Heidegger. But the German thinker begins with a careful analysis of how the Greeks thought of the basic concepts, first of all, Plato and Aristotle, and transforms the idea of truth: “time” as the naming the “truth” of being, and this is all as a task, as “on the way,” not as doctrine and dogmatics (Heidegger, 2020: 237). Human is such a creature that thinks and understands being on the way, that is, in time; therefore, time is the basic truth of being (in fact, as in Heraclitus and Parmenides).

Heidegger is influenced by Parmenides, for he says that one must not think of being, but speak of the time of being (Heidegger, 2020: 237). Everything follows from time; it is the basis for understanding being, its main essence. As long as we think about being (about things), both time and being disappear beyond the horizon of ideas about things. “Now the guiding principle of Western thinking is the essence and thinking, “thinking” – ratio – reason as a guiding question and anticipatory grasp of the interpretation of essence, is called into question, but in no case is it that thinking is replaced by “time and everything is relied only on more “temporarily” and more existentially” (Heidegger, 2020: 237-238). Here Heidegger clearly shows the path of new thinking, which is no longer focused on reason, but rather on time (as an understanding of being) and, accordingly, existence. Existential thinking is strictly related to time. The German thinker strives to choose for himself: (and this is not a choice between Plato or Aristotle, but a choice between Heraclitus or Parmenides (time and λόγος or being and οὐσία, or maybe a choice of dimension, where they are one).

If Einstein tried to unite space and time and mathematics into a single continuum (topos), then Heidegger carries out the same operation for being and time, as the path of logos research leads to a dead end. At least, he is already trying to get away from their delimitation in “Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)”, that is, he is looking for a third beginning (thinking) for their joint grasp. This dimension of thinking, in which the connection between being and time is revealed, is existential. Along the way, Heidegger embarks on the path of
creating existential anthropology (in that he surpasses the narrowness of the phenomenology of E. Husserl and the anthropology of M. Scheler). Heidegger is trying to discover a new dimension of consciousness, in which thinking, time and being, commuting with each other, overcome the classical (rational and empirical) variations associated with an attempt to grasp them as separate structures. The turning point to a new understanding is not “Being and Time”, in which the role of thinking is still very vague and confused because the German thinker is only trying to overcome the fascination with the Greeks. In this regard, Gonzales asserts the following, “This weakness of λόγοι is precisely the weakness with which we see Heidegger continually struggling in “Zeit und Sein.” It is what leads Heidegger to reject the assertion, and therefore logic, as the paradigm for thinking being” (Gonzales, 2009: 293). Λόγοι (logos or logics) are closed. How, then, to start thinking about being? In that context, the later work “Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)” is important. Dasein personifies only approaches to the problem of understanding thinking, something like viscous mythological thinking, in which everything is still intertwined and the selection of clearing (enlightenment) is still extremely difficult.

However, if the transition has been made, then metaphysics becomes impossible in the new dimension of consciousness (Heidegger, 2020: 238). We fall into the “other beginning” as “a jump that transforms being ... into its more original truth” (Heidegger, 2020: 238). Only here Heidegger, through understanding the event of being, begins to understand the true meaning of the new thinking, in which the initial truth is the connection between being and time (one might say, being-time). Moreover, according to Sheehan, here he understands time “from thinking.” “In the first beginning, truth (as unconcealedness) is a character of beings as such... In the other beginning, truth is recognized and grounded precisely as the truth of being and being itself precisely as the being of truth, i.e., as the intrinsically turning event (...). The leap into the other beginning is the return to the first, and vice versa. (...) is not a transposition into something past, as if this could be made “actual” again in the usual sense” (Heidegger, 2020: 240, 241). Heidegger only emphasizes that both beginnings of thinking – essential and existential – are complementary, and to achieve the second, it is necessary to go through the first as a certain stage of the path. But in the first beginning, “time is experienced here in a concealed way as temporalizing, as transporting, and thus as an opening up; ... Motion as the presenting of the changeable as such” (Heidegger, 2020:249). This is an interpretation of the ideas of Heraclitus (the mysterious transition from non-existence to existence) and Plato (our thinking is synchronous with walking). We only see movement because we think (we go in thinking) synchronously with it. Therefore, in Heidegger’s concept, “every apprehension and determination (concept) of beingness and being is a matter of thinking” (Heidegger, 2020: 256). Thinking is rigidly connected with the comprehension and definition of being. To grasp a thing, one needs thinking (and then the understanding of how thinking itself does this is closed); to grasp being, gross logos thinking is not enough already (Heraclitus and Parmenides showed this); in this place, Heidegger uses the term clearing (enlightenment), allowing to “sharpen vision” (perception of thinking itself). But what is there on the horizon (over the border) of such existential thinking? Heidegger is on this side of thinking (in this dimension). And then, a natural question arises: does thinking distinguish between being and what is beyond its borders (non-being)? According to Parmenides, it does not (thinking is on this side, in conjunction with things), and this is the fate of classical European culture. Heidegger, relying on Nietzsche, argues that culture is unfolded. Comparable with Nietzsche, the old gods have left our Earth (our classically tuned consciousness), and now we want new gods (of being) to come into our thinking, and we have discovered another dimension (another beginning associated with being).
This is the situation of our time, our thinking slightly opens the entrance to a new dimension, according to Heidegger, and begins to understand the essence of its closeness to the classical understanding of being. Gonzales describes this reversal of Heidegger as follows, “Heidegger’s belief in the possibility of a direct naming of being, in contrast, assumes that being is somehow present or manifest in the name itself; the name is not a conventional sign for being, but naturally belongs to, or is appropriated by, being as its own presencing” (Gonzales, 2009: 296).

Sheehan takes this Heidegger twist even deeper, “However, Heidegger’s own work takes two major steps away from metaphysics and its traditional concern with “being.” In the first place, Heidegger’s philosophy was not in pursuit of Sein at all. Rather, he was after das Woher des Seins, the “whence” of being, “that from which and through which… being occurs.” (We note the frustrating ambiguity in the meaning of “Sein” in this case. It could refer either to the clearing or to the being of things. Here, I take it in the second sense.). Originally Heidegger called this “whence” the intelligibility of being (= der Sinn von Sein).

Over the years he reformulated that as the “disclosedness” or “place” or “clearing” or “openness” or “thrown-open realm” for the being of things, all ex aequo (Sheehan, 2015: 9). And even further, Sheehan directly points to the essence of how Heidegger resolves the problem of the eclipse of being (understanding thinking), “In his later work, especially from 1960 until his death in 1976, Heidegger expressed himself a bit more clearly. He declared that the merely formal indication “das Sein selbst” finally turns out to be die Lichtung, the thrownopen clearing, which he designated as the Urphänomen of all his work. The clearing is the always-already opened-up “space” that makes the being of things (phenomenologically: the intelligibility of things) possible and necessary. Heidegger calls it the open region of understanding and the realm of disclosedness or clearing (understandability)” (Sheehan, 2015: 20). Sheehan did a great job and managed to unite the seemingly divergent realm of being in Heidegger into a system. But it is easier to systematize an event that has already taken place (even if it is a rather complex and divergent event) in Heidegger’s work. Therefore, Sheehan, like many other commentators on his work, is only trying to create a logical-etymological system, whereas Heidegger himself argued the impossibility of a single reading of being. Something like how Einstein tried to put the genie (the divergent energy-momentum of the Universe) into a bottle through corrections. However, Einstein’s theory still held out. Heidegger’s genius is that he saw the Greeks’ mistake in understanding being, which led them and all European culture to elevate metaphysics to the highest place in thinking and considered the question of being closed to thinking. And here Heidegger, according to Sheehan, actually made a discovery, “…Heidegger’s question turns out to be 1. not “Whence beings?” – the answer to that is: being; 2. nor even “Whence being at all?” – the answer to that is: the open clearing; 3. but rather “Whence and how is there ‘the open’?” or equally “Whence and how is there the clearing?”

And the answer to that question will be Ereignis – the appropriation of existence to its proper state of thrown-openness” (Sheehan, 2015: 69). But our thought is not about where in the teachings of Heidegger and his magnificent commentator Sheehan the thread of comprehension of being breaks, but about what is beyond this “appropriation of being” border and whether it can be overcome. At this point, Heidegger’s teaching breaks off. We are trying to continue it by referring to the Eastern tradition. And if Sheehan can be understood in such a way that thinking breathes time (filled with time), then we, following the example of Gonzales and Sheehan, are trying to grasp this dimension of thinking, in which it begins to understand its fullness of time and being (from the horizon of spirituality).
One of the variants of such grasping of being is the abyss. In “Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event),” Heidegger ties the beginnings of thinking and being to it. In particular, “time-space as abyss (…) Space-time as arising out of the essence of truth… Space and time… themselves arise out of time-space, which is more original” (Heidegger, 2020: 371, 460). Heidegger looks at approaches to a new understanding of being and considers time-space (almost like Einstein’s) to be part of being (the basis that is bottomless).

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“Abyss as absence, as grounding in self-concealment, self-concealment in the way of thinking of grounding” (Heidegger, 2020: 469). For that which is bottomless can only be connected with thinking as a way of transitioning to another dimension, which in our dimension is seen as groundless (it is in this sense that such thinking can be associated with being). And at the same time, “the abyss is… in itself a receptacle-space-counter-moving-in-a-sweep place-of-instant “interspace” as which Dasein must be founded” (Heidegger, 2020: 479). That is, existential thinking must begin with the feeling of the abyss, and in the same place, it collides with interspace as a receptacle for thinking on a different level. There is a feeling that Heidegger, apparently not knowing the physics of his day so thoroughly, was nevertheless somehow involved in Einstein’s work (or at least got to know him remotely) and tried to transfer Einstein’s physical approaches to the field of fundamental ontology, and later fundamental (deep ) epistemology (although the word epistemology is inappropriate here, and there is no other suitable word for the science of deep thinking, and for now I call it existential (deep) anthropology (not at all in the sense of Scheler).

In such a context, thinking becomes that clearing, within which a connection with being is necessarily traced, whether it be the existence of Gods, people, or things (everyone goes through the path of being and thinking involved in it). However, in ancient Indian philosophy, in this place, they spoke of the unmanifested state (deep divine sleep of thinking without dreams). On the other hand, it is similar to atheistic Buddhism (and maybe also Jainism). Apparently, according to Heidegger, thinking can only appear where being already exists. For people, where the thought comes into contact with being, there is an effect of clearing, called by Heidegger the interspace, which, therefore, is a kind of transitional event associated with being, with human, and with divine thinking. It is only in the field of being that thinking as such (from-thinking) is manifested, and only then does the conception of being, the gods, and the good arise. A person thinks, finds himself in society and is connected with the Gods only through the presence of being-thinking. Thinking, according to Heidegger of the period “Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)”, is the gift of being through enlightenment (and interspace).

To get into this clearing, thinking must first (following the example of the Greeks) go through the logical and metaphysical path (λόγος, ἀλήθεια, φύσις, εἶδος and οὐσία) and only later make a jump into a new dimension, since “transitional thinking cannot… rid itself of the metaphysical tradition” (Heidegger, 2020: 527). “Only the transition to the other beginning, the first overcoming of metaphysics (under the transitional necessity of retaining its name), raises this distinction to the level of knowledge and thereby places it into question for the first time—not casually, but as what is most question-worthy” (Heidegger, 2020: 520). Only when it comes into contact with another dimension the thinking faces the need to overcome metaphysics. The question is also whether it is possible to stay in this other dimension for a long time, or it is possible to stay in an existential state for a long time. Heidegger leaves this question unanswered. However, his student Binswanger developed existential therapy, therapy for prolonged immersion in a new dimension of being. Maybe this is the question of whether it is possible to tame a thermonuclear reaction. And the new (spiritual) thinking,
striving for an understanding of being and divinity, resembles this process. Classical thinking, formed at the level of low (logos) energies, says “no”. Spiritual thinking can get into these new (high-energy) states.

A more thorough answer to the question of whether European thinking has matured to deep purity, Heidegger provides in his last work, “What is called thinking?” (Heidegger, 1968). And he begins his research with the assertion that it is necessary to learn to think. And the very mind that dominated European thinking for thousands of years and closed the understanding of clearing only deploys its logos in thinking itself (how can one not recall the Sankhya teaching, in which this idea was realized back in the 6th century BC, then there is in that historical time about which Jaspers wrote and in which, according to Heidegger, we should learn wisdom from the ancient Greeks). Returning us to this past, Heidegger writes that the main thing in thinking is the ability to keep this source, as, “What keeps us in our essential nature holds us only so long, however, as we for our part keep holding on to what holds us. And we keep holding on to it by not letting it out of our memory. Memory is the gathering of thought” (Heidegger, 1968: 3). What did the Greeks leave us that keeps us? Most of Heidegger’s writings for almost fifty years after “Being and Time” (see, for example, works Heidegger, 1979, 1979, 1983, 1992) relate to the search and analysis of the origins of European being and thinking, the search for what initially keeps us. In this beginning, he analyzes the thought of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides, on whom he writes in this period as the original European thinkers (and their conceptions of λόγος, οὐσία, οὐσία, the ideas of Plato and Aristotle about ἀλήθεια are what, fortunately, or unfortunately, preserves European thought right up to the present). This keeps almost unchanged, although outwardly, retains European thinking to this day. Heidegger, followed by A. Badiou, showed that Christian thought deconstructed (replaced) ancient thought and modern thinkers deconstructed medieval thought. And it turned out that we kept hidden (replaced) knowledge, which resulted in modern technical thinking in its entirety. In these matters, Heidegger has a lot of uncertainty. For example, Sheehan writes, “Is Heidegger arguing that the forgottenness of appropriation is the driving force of Western history or only a reflection of such forces in philosophical terms? Or is it something in between? Heidegger is notoriously vague about all of this. He seems to agree with Hegel that philosophy, his own included, arrives too late to direct the course of history” (Sheehan, 2015:292). In “The Question of Technik,” the severe limitations of Heidegger’s thought are on full display.

First of all, on the perhaps impossible assumption that one could get to the essence of such a complex, multilayered phenomenon as modern “technology” – whether as machines or mindset or the world of meaning… (Sheehan, 2015: 290). Sheehan all the time tries to explain that Heidegger made a lot of mistakes in interpreting the basic concepts of Greek (and therefore all European) thinking, but he also writes that Heidegger does not understand modern European (technical) thinking. And here, you can stand up for Heidegger and whoever crept deeper than him to the very depths of European thinking. There are such? In these matters, he surpassed even the Greeks, pointing out the limits of their thinking about being. That is, he raised the thought of the Greeks to new heights, but, unfortunately (and here we agree with Gonzales and Sheehan), he did not overcome them or pointed to their limitations.

Heidegger experienced this transformation of European consciousness most profoundly in his testamentary essay “What is Thinking?”, where he continued to give lessons in thinking and writes, “In order to be capable of thinking, we need to learn it first” (Heidegger, 1968: 4). So, what does that leave us with? We have been studying for two and a half thousand
years and it turns out we have not yet learned, for “prevailing man has for centuries now acted too much and thought too little” (Heidegger, 1968: 4). But the saddest thing is that “Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking” (Heidegger, 1968: 6). We do not think, as that which awakens pure thought, which should call us to think, and has always been associated with pure consciousness, has not awakened in us, as the ratio (mind or intellect) – following any Eastern system, is the lowest level of thinking. Somewhere in this sphere is the thinking of Heidegger, who was once also related to Eastern thought. We have learned to think with the mind (together with the understanding), immersed in the world of things, and the world of genuine pure consciousness is still closed to us. As the German philosopher puts it, “…man is not capable of really thinking as long as that which must be thought about, withdraws… science itself does not think, and cannot think” (Heidegger, 1968: 7, 8). So, first of all, based on the experience of the Hindus, there must be a transition to genuine (pure) thinking, the path of thinking (in India, the spiritual path) must be made. Heidegger pushes the Europeans to the fact that thinking is not memory or reason, but a path (transition) to another (pure) state. Frankly speaking, the German philosopher himself is still on his way and is just trying to find words on how to express the purity of thinking, and what it means to think correctly. For him, as a European thinker, even at the end of his life, this is still a painful problem, a problem of ambiguity, dissatisfaction, and doubts about the correctness of the path chosen by Europeans. In existential thinking, capable of listening to being as such, the path to a true understanding of thought is concealed, which is a movement from an indefinite future (from freedom of thinking as a project) to a distant (deep) past (for the late Heidegger, this is the path to the obscure origins of Greek thinking). But the path from the uncertainty of the future to the uncertainty of the past is certainly vague. Hence all the anxieties of the German thinker were well outlined by Gonzales and Sheehan. However, he is well aware that to obtain clarity, this path (destruction) must be passed, but with unpredictable consequences (after all, a European person always stops at the threshold of purity of thought). What is obvious to the Hindu is obscured by the horizon of obscurity to a European.

European thinking strives for universality (the logic for all, for the idea), while Hindu thinking leads to an individual path (clarification), without passing it through is impossible to make the transition to purity (obtaining higher spiritual knowledge) and liberation (from ignorance). Thus, universal European thinking is radically different from the Eastern one; it is conceptual (as J. Deleuze and F. Guattari pointed out) and leads only to the storage of universal knowledge (concept). We trust the wisdom of Pythagoras, Heraclitus and Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle, without bothering to think about how Heidegger did it or whether their thinking is genuine. Then we turn concepts into idols of the mind (according to Fr. Bacon), which finally close access to the realm of the clearing.

Europeans move from one extreme (the existence of facts) to another (the existence of concepts and notions), forgetting that individual thinking must be active, flow and formed along the way. Only Heidegger begins to understand this, having listened to the purity of being at its source. Over the half-century of his philosophical career, Heidegger’s project went through two major developments: (1) the transition from ex-sistence as the openedness of the clearing to the clearing itself as the source of all meaning; and (2) the decisive insight into the hiddenness of the appropriated clearing (Sheehan, 2015: 265). Thus, Heidegger began to approach the mystery of European (basically any) thinking, the mystery of the origin of thinking, connected either with the soul, with being, or with God. Sheehan describes this movement of Heidegger as follows: “Even Aristotle, although he overcomes dialectic,
still remains oriented toward λόγος in his entire question of being. So close are ὄν and human λόγος in this proto-phenomenological ontology that Aristotle can say that it is the human being who performs the act of bringing the encountering thing into its state of uncoveredness. Heidegger comments on Aristotle, “Uncoveredness [the Unverdecktsein of things] is a specific accomplishment of ex-sistence, an accomplishment that has its being in the soul: ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχή.” That is, human beings disclose things in their being, and this disclosing (Erschließen as ἀληθεύειν) is “a determination of the being of human ex-sistence itself.” Thus, when it comes to discovering the being of things, “λόγος is and remains the guiding thread” (Sheehan, 2015: 82). Heidegger’s discovery is, first of all, a return to the origins of thinking (Greeks), to the openness of things for thinking.

Being, in his opinion, is not a way of existence of something, but the openness of the something (thing) to our consciousness, the possibility of it (thing) integrating into our clearing. In this sense, when pure being coincides with pure thinking, only there is clearing capable. The question of to what extent this topos (appropriation of openness or enlightenment) is associated with the soul or God is still open. After the studies of Heidegger, Gonzales and Sheehan, it becomes obvious that this deep topos is concealed from gross (material) thinking. It is not for nothing that the Indian thinkers Shankara and Ramanuja, analyzing the state of a person in this dimension, spoke of a subtler world, which they can reach only by purifying (from gross materiality) their thinking. But this dimension, according to Shankara, is covered by Maya (illusion of ignorance).

Thus, we must understand the transition to this new dimension of thinking by gift, presence, or clearing. After all, the Greeks, on the one hand, clearly had in mind gross material things, and on the other hand, they spoke of an “open clearing” of thinking. Gonzales describes this development of philosophy in terms of the ancient Greeks, “…philosophy, in its attempt to disclose the things themselves, must both begin with λογος; and break through it employing a “speaking for and against” (“Furrund Gegensprechen”) that destroys the autonomy and self-sufficiency that λογος has in Gerede and in this way “leads more and more to what is at issue and lets that be seen. What is needed, in short, is dialectic: a speaking that passes through speech” (Gonzales, 2009: 24). That is, before coming to a clearing, a person must rely on λογος (word, language) and go through the path of dialectics (clash of opinions). It is this Platonic-Socratic dialectics, according to Heidegger, that completely confused Greek thought. Gonzales is trying to figure out where Heidegger turned off the path paved by Plato and went into the depths of Greek thought and concluded that, on the one hand, this is his turn from Plato to Aristotle (Plato must be read through Aristotle (Gonzales, 2009:25), and on the other hand, to the Presocratics (primarily Heraclitus and Parmenides). Along the way, Heidegger revealed, according to Sheehan, the key contradictions of Greek thought, its incompleteness and subsequent slide into seemingly strict metaphysics.

Initially, Heidegger tried to break into the depths of Greek thought through existence (Dasein), believing that a human’s thinking is his exclusive privilege, allowing him to see being (something like an escape from Plato’s cave), but later in the 30s-40s for years he was inclined to think that the depths of understanding of thinking are a gift of the gods (through the thought of Heraclitus and Parmenides) at the origins of European thought (that is, in the distant past); the later Heidegger, rather, is inclined to understand the purity of consciousness as a gift from the future, a gift that has not yet been realized.

In this context, Heidegger’s thought strives for the primordiality of the European tradition (in this regard, he is a student of Nietzsche), and then the purity of thought is associated with approaching the origins (in our case, European culture, in a rough interpretation of the
critical (fundamental) analysis of the origins of European consciousness – λόγος, ἀλήθεια, logic and metaphysics). In other words, for a long time, Heidegger thinks about the origins of the ancient gift to posterity, successively moving from Parmenides (Heidegger, 1992) to Heraclitus (Heidegger, 1979), and the gift of metaphysical thought (Heidegger, 1983), and revealing the symptoms of the purity of words, language and thought of the Greeks (Gods’ light in Heraclitus and Parmenides, the light and authenticity of truth in Plato and Aristotle, which we wrote about in earlier work (Okorokov, 2018). The connection between thinking, being and time can also be found in our earlier works (Okorokov, 2020, 2022). Heidegger is trying to discover the purity (deep understanding) of being and, at the same time, is increasingly striving for the purification of European thought (purity of thought). All of Heidegger’s work is a consistent transition from the study of purity (depth of understanding) of being (primarily based on the study of the Greeks) to purity (depth of understanding) of thought, this is the path of transformation of consciousness (from fundamental ontology (the field of existence appropriation) to existential anthropology (the appropriation field (not the property) of European thinking).

But if the early Heidegger sought to understand being from the horizon of time (understanding time unusually, as a deep field of existence), separating them in a European way, then the later Heidegger begins to understand being in a situation when thinking and time are already manifested, that is, he seeks contours of being-time-thinking.

The German thinker takes us along that fine line connecting the source of thought (its distant past) with its ultimate goal (the distant future) as if balancing between the past and the future, not daring to connect them, as Aristotle did in the neologism entelechy, and pull apart completely. In this sense, time is, as it were, clamped in thinking (pressed to it by being).

And the very thought of the philosopher balances in space from myth to logos manifested at the origins (in the distant past), and the fundamental pure project of thinking (in the distant future). After all, time in thinking leads not only to synchrony (the way of thinking of the Greeks) but also to diachrony (the clash of times and traditions).

Myth as a narrating word (to narrate here means to make it obvious, to allow the most shining in unhiddenness to appear), myth as an appeal that precedes anything human and makes it possible to think, and in the West, thought about thinking has flourished as “logic” (Heidegger, 1968: 19-21), which is opposed to the opinion that exists in the common history of philosophy. Following the Greeks, Heidegger deduces both myth (as a narrating word) and logos (as a word, as a form of correct thought) in the form of certain openness (unhiddenness), revealing in the depths of thought, to the level of unfolding in the light of openness (whether these are gods or being) consciousness.

However, all these movements of European consciousness are so vague at the origins that the German philosopher constantly says (referring to Hölderlin), “We are a sigh that is not read” (Heidegger, 1968: 18), we are still learning. When we attempt to learn thinking and what calls for thinking, are we not getting lost in the reflection that thinks on thinking? Yet, all along our way, a steady light is cast on thinking… It issues from thinking itself, and only from there (Heidegger, 1968: 28). This is a defining feature of our thought: when we learn to think, the way of thinking is illuminated from somewhere deep. This feature of our thinking was constantly emphasized by German thinker in various works. (Heidegger, 1979, 1983, 1992) To think correctly and authentically truly means to be in the light (to stand on the path of the day (light) according to Parmenides). Many European thinkers and church fathers wrote about the inner light, and Heidegger tries to find the ontological basis of its source. He is fundamental in this problem too: in the search for an understanding of pure
being (you can say light or the source of being), he develops a fundamental ontology (the logic of understanding existence), and in the search for an understanding of the purity of thought – fundamental anthropology (light divine logic and one cannot say that this is light λόγος or φύσις, as Heraclitus and Aristotle would say). If Heidegger’s “to be” means to think fundamentally (from the depths of thought or time), then to think fundamentally (purely) would mean to be in the understanding (in the light) of pure being (at its origins or in the distant future), that is, in essence, be on the road (from the past to the future or vice versa).

As the German thinker points out, “Thinking is thinking when it answers to what is most thought-provoking. In our thought-provoking time, what is most thought-provoking shows itself in the fact that we are still not thinking.” (Heidegger, 1968: 28) Where we (Europeans) are in the understanding of thinking in our time, in fact (in the language of the East) means that our thought is still very polluted (by gross material objects and desires) and to think in the purity of understanding (spiritual or at least, according to Heidegger, existential) we have not yet learned (the inner light of the gods and being is closed from us, although at the origins the thought of Heraclitus and Parmenides, according to Gonzales and Sheehan, was still so pure that it collided with being in the clearing, another matter, that she could not explain it, and later on was completely closed by metaphysics, or, better, omitted into metaphysical (logos) thinking).

It is this kind of our (metaphysical or dirty technical) thinking that calls not for virtue and purity; but for false (rude) thoughts and, ultimately, for war (destruction of what is incompatible with it). That is where racial hatred often comes from. Spengler’s proposition is only the negative, though correct, the consequence of Nietzsche’s words, “The wasteland grows” (Heidegger, 1968: 38) “…why the bridge must be found to that nature by which man can overcome his former nature, his last nature.” (Heidegger, 1968: 59) This man, going above and through himself, is Zarathustra, whose cup (consciousness) overflowed, and he descended from above (from the mountains) to people to pour out the light of his wisdom on them (the path of the superman begins with his sunset). “Man, unless he stops with the type of man as he is, is a passage, a transition; he is a bridge; he is “a rope strung between the animal and the superman” (Heidegger, 1968: 60), a passage where you can easily slide back (into your animal past); and this transition needs to be clarified so that the one who goes will find (clarity). “Man is the animal that confronts face-to-face” (Heidegger, 1968: 61), thinking even before action (or thinking), a being whose thinking is stretched out in time.

Before you can think, you must already be able to think. But how then does the first thought manifest itself after birth? This is not yet Heidegger’s problem, for his man is already on the move. “The superman is the man who passes over, away from the man as he is so far? But away whereto?” (Heidegger, 1968: 82). For the German thinker, this one, through whom one passes, is the last person, then a new hypostasis (with a new understanding of consciousness). We are still in transition and have not reached the superman, although, judging by the date of writing the work under study, Heidegger should have already understood the nature of the thinking of Hitler and Stalin. The German thinker is looking for a ground for a new human because thinking about war always calls for aggressiveness, as it calls for revenge (movements of aggressive thinking from the past to the future). However, the Rubicon has already been crossed, the precedent has already been set, since Nietzsche’s thinking refers to getting rid of the spirit of revenge. It is in this new (after Nietzsche) space of thinking that superman is “Caesar with the soul of Christ” (Heidegger, 1968: 88). Here, you can put an ellipsis, as only Nietzsche and Heidegger can connect the will to power with divine love, but the latter sees this gap and tries to overcome it, arguing that “will” and “willing” are the
of the Being of beings as a whole… Revenge is the will’s revulsion time and its “It was.” (Heidegger, 1968: 95). Or, can it be understood that the effort of the will overcomes time and the being of (false) consciousness; the will overcomes the course of movement of the false consciousness. Heidegger connects (following Nietzsche) another source (will) to the understanding of the purity of thinking.

He needs to show that not only being, but also consciousness is revealed from the depths of time. That is, the time has come to write “consciousness and time” (yes, Sheehan has already tried to shed light on this problem, considering time or as calculated for being (Sheehan, 2015: 276), or as something present (Sheehan, 2015: 280). “It is time, it is high time finally to think through this nature of time… that all metaphysics leaves something essential unthought: its own ground and foundation (…) This is the ground on which we have to say that we are not yet truly thinking as long as we think only metaphysically (…) In accordance with this manner of inquiry, time is conceived as something that in some way is, something that is in being, and so the question of its Being is raised” (Heidegger, 1968: 100). Doesn’t this, in turn, mean that time also opens not only from the horizon of understanding being, as Heidegger intended (in the third chapter of “Being and Time”), meaning the link being and time in its uncertainty, but also from the horizon of understanding thinking. The German philosopher brings us to yet another linkage consciousness-being, or rather, to the fundamental trinity being-thinking-time, each member of which disappears without the presence of the other two. It can also be said that the understanding being clears up from the horizon of time, or time clears up from the horizon of the questioned being. So, the understanding of pure thinking from the horizon of understanding of pure being is the way (as the movement of the time) to understanding the origins of pure being. And European metaphysical thinking has not passed this path, since the existing modern thinking still shows itself as present (immanent) beyond the boundaries of such metaphysical thinking, both the understanding of time and the understanding of being disappear; that is, the path to understanding the pure (in Eastern thought, subtle) thinking.

In search of an understanding of the purity of thought, Heidegger constantly brings us back to “the thought of the eternal recurrence of the same is Nietzsche’s weightiest thought” (Heidegger, 1968: 108), (we are talking about the fact that what returns is an extreme degree return of the world of becoming to the world of being). But what comes back? The thinking itself, returning to its origins, to that beginning, in which one hears the rumble (as Deleuze would say, commenting on Plato) of becoming a being. At the origins of being, thinking has not yet been clouded by subsequent becoming and, consequently, what is called thinking must also be pure. But if “pollution” is in its infancy, then what about the fact that consciousness is the path? Here, it is necessary to separate the consciousness that is being cleansed on the way and the thinking that is polluted when moving away from the sources. Nevertheless, the pollution of consciousness (in contact with things in the phenomenal sense) is a necessary stage of its formation, that is, purification. When Heidegger, appealing to Nietzsche, spoke of the eternal return, we must understand that he is, first of all, a European thinker, returning us all to Plato and Aristotle (in search of a clearing). And this indicates that consciousness is constantly on the path of pollution and purification, like the truth, which the Greeks (and Heidegger) constantly opens and closes. Nietzsche’s idea is deeper and turns us towards Eastern thinking. Where there is a birth of a thought, its decline follows, and where a thought declines, its formation begins (essentially, as in the teaching of Lao Tzu about Tao, the main property of which is return). To understand itself, the thought must return to its origins (to its beginning).

Heidegger learned from Nietzsche and Schopenhauer to subtly understand the nature of Eastern thinking. Hence the pessimism of the German thinker about modern European
thinking. In his opinion, the statement suggests that we do not yet think (...) the former essence of thinking is formulated in representation and as a kind of representation (Heidegger, 1968: 105, 106). But, after all, assertion and representation are the groundings of European consciousness (more precisely, according to Heidegger, Europeans guess that “the forming of thoughts and the forming of ideas may well be one and the same thing.” (Heidegger, 1968: 44) Hence the conclusion of the German thinker that in thinking “we are on the way, in thought, to the essence of thought (...) Our manner of thinking still feeds on the traditional nature of thinking, the forming of representational ideas.

But we still do not think inasmuch as we have not yet entered into that nature which is proper to thinking (...) The real nature of thought might show itself, however, at that very point where it once withdrew, if only we will pay heed to this withdrawal, if only we will not insist, confused by logic.” (Heidegger, 1968: 45) Heidegger’s verdict is clear: we (Europeans) have not learned (or, more precisely, concerning the first Greeks, have forgotten how) to think, and therefore we are sure that the Greeks taught us to think logically correctly, based on concepts, conclusions and statements, while the Greeks were teaching us to understand the nature of clearing.

It seems to us that there is no other way of thinking, except the logical one. Heidegger objects. He asks, “Is logic perchance itself the calling that calls on us to think?” (Heidegger, 1968: 154) Implicitly relying on an understanding of thinking in the Eastern tradition, he well hears all the contradictions of modern European thinking (however, as Gonzales и Sheehan would correct, he hears the ancient Greeks poorly, unclearly, or confusingly). And true thinking must keep its (pure) source; if we are in the field of thinking of Plato and Aristotle, then, perhaps, the source (of the divine thought of Heraclitus and Parmenides) is already closed. This was the reason Heidegger (40s-60s) shifts the source of his thinking to an earlier tradition and turns us to the thought of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides. We could argue with Gonzales и Sheehan, who stated that the thought of Plato and Aristotle is still in the field of clearing. But what about the world of ideas and metaphysics; what did other thinkers create? After all, European thinkers turn to them for understanding how we need to think (in this regard, according to Gonzales and Sheehan, the pre-Socratics have come down to us only in fragments, and we look at them through the prism of commentators Plato and Aristotle). But clearing shines through only from these vague and obscure sources of thought. And if Heidegger had found answers to his questions about being in Plato and Aristotle (and the early Heidegger studied both a lot and carefully), would he have turned to Heraclitus and Parmenides? Here is needed further research.

In our earlier works (Okorokov, 2018, 2020, 2022), we tried to reveal the essence of thinking, unfolding time, and the movement of thought to its origins. On this issue, the pedantic (if not to say still thinking in a logical-metaphysical way) Heidegger, who studied only the problem of the manifestation of being in Greek thinking (clearing), does not want to move to an earlier (and purer) source of thought and stops at Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides (although he is already reproached for returning to these thinkers).

His thought breaks off at this point, because he, as a European thinker, is not inclined to look for meanings in Eastern cultures, believing that European thought, as the birthplace of philosophy, is original and self-sufficient. However, even the most superficial appeal to Lao Tzu and Confucius, an appeal to Buddhism, Jainism and the six philosophical systems of India, which also arose in the 6th century BC, leads to the idea of the high philosophical culture of China and India of that period (Jaspers also draws our attention to this, who nevertheless did not dare to write about priorities). We understand that the origin of European
thinking has not yet been clarified. Heidegger stopped exactly at the place where he still hears the “sounds” of being.

But nothing is clear with modern thinking either. According to Heidegger, the own essence of thinking could show itself to us when we remain on the road “We are on the way in thought, to the essence of thought (…) We are under-way (…) between divergent ways (…)” As a marker on our path of thought, we quoted the words of the West’s last thinker, Nietzsche. He said, “The wasteland grows (…) The representative of traditional thinking who is closest to us in time, and hence most stimulating to this discussion, is Nietzsche. For his thought, in traditional language, tells what is “The wasteland grows; woe to him who hides wastelands within!” (Heidegger, 1968: 45-46, 55) According to the ideas of the German thinker, we, immersed in the thoughts of Nietzsche, are, actually, at the very bottom, in the scorched desert of thinking (in the face of nothingness, that is, the subsequent universal nihilism). However, at the same time, we are still on the road. And, perhaps, the true essence of thinking will still manifest itself, for it preserves this authenticity, laid down at the origins (of Greek thought). After all, according to Heidegger, “No thinking, therefore, creates for itself the element in which it operates. But all thinking strives as if automatically, to stay within the element assigned to it” (Heidegger, 1968: 65). Is it possible to understand this in such a way that, according to Nietzsche’s testament, the will holds the element intended for thinking? But such a will is the ability to retain, store and disperse thinking. The will to power is reduced to the translation of the dominant type of thinking (regardless of its content). Here we can find ourselves in the centre of the discussion that unfolded in the Eastern teachings of the 6th century BC about the nature of consciousness and its connection with the soul. In ancient Indian understanding, consciousness is a property of the soul, and only the soul directs the work of consciousness through its energies. Europeans do not think like that and rather talk about freedom of mind, will, thought, et cetera. Thinking is free in its choice of elements for further advancement. However, are we rushing with such conclusions? But what about tradition? Can a European think like a Hindu? Blavatsky, Roerich – where are their thinking pushing us? And vice versa, Prabhupada, didn’t he plant a seed of doubt in the souls of Americans and Europeans?

But the freedom of thinking hangs in the groundless topos, as this is another reservoir for the ambiguity of thinking (except that N. Berdyaev, following J. Boehme, appears Ungrund or Nothingness as the basis of freedom). In a word, according to the recipe of the ancient Greeks, Heidegger had no choice but to look for the maintaining beginning of thinking, which should have appeared as a gift back in Ancient Greece at the origins of European culture. The Greeks discovered it, but have we kept this gift, and if we have kept it, why is the “clearing is growing?” The same Nietzsche, having said, “The gods are dead,” according to Heidegger, indicates the path of transition through the former person and designates him as “superman” (…) The superman is first of all a man who goes beyond, who passes over (…) “The last man” is the type of man that immediately precedes the appearance of the superman (…) (So, Nietzsche tells us that the transition to a new form of thinking has taken place, but also) according to Heidegger, “thoughtful doctrine of man’s essential nature is in itself alone a doctrine of the Being of beings” (Heidegger, 1968: 72, 79), which in this sense is still moving in the line with the ideas of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle, as “in modern metaphysics, the Being of beings appears as the will” (Heidegger, 1968: 98). The prescription of the Greeks for thinking as a curse, on the one hand, it keeps us, on the other hand, it closes the very thing that keeps us. The Greeks created logic, but logic becomes a barrier to entry into the spiritual world. That is why Heidegger asks, “Why does the traditional doctrine of
thinking bear the curious title “logic”? (Heidegger, 1968: 113) Mass and global society is, in fact, the depth of the “fall” (according to Heidegger) of European thought (the clearing is still growing). From the depths of this fall, Heidegger asks, “What is it that calls us into thinking?” (Heidegger, 1968: 114). So, somewhere in the depths, we still keep something (as a gift) of true (pure) thinking.

Let us try, according to Heidegger, to collect together everything that is an entry into thinking. A thought usually means an idea, a view or an opinion, or a notion. “Memory” initially did not at all mean the power to recall. The word the whole disposition in the sense of a steadfast intimate concentration upon the things that essentially speak to us in every thoughtful meditation (…) “memory” means as: a concentrated abiding with something not just with something that has passed, but in the way with what is present and with what may come (…) Memory initially signifies man’s inner disposition and devotion (…) “Soul” in this case means not the principle of life, but that in which the spirit has its being, the spirit of the spirit, Master Eckhart’s “spark” of the soul. “Keeping” alone freely what is to-be-thought, what is most thought-provoking, it frees it as a gift.” (Heidegger, 1968: 139-140, 148, 151) It does not store memory, but that which contributes to thinking (for example, prayer).

Therefore, when a person’s memory turns into a repository of information (as in modern computers), this indicates the loss of a divine gift. Now, Heidegger’s statement that “the history of Western thought begins, not by thinking what is most thought-provoking, but by letting it remain forgotten (…) The beginning of Western thought is not the as its origin (…) The beginning is, rather, the veil conceals the origin – indeed an unavoidable veil (…) The origin keeps itself concealed in the beginning.” (Heidegger, 1968: 152) We are accustomed to referring to the Greeks, starting with Plato and Aristotle, to the logical and metaphysical type of thinking. However, Heidegger believes that “all of the great thinking of the Greek thinkers, including Aristotle, thinks non-conceptually (…) Concept and system alike are alien to Greek thinking” (Heidegger, 1968: 212-213) We closed the true thought of the Greeks from ourselves, attributing to it the logical-rational element of thinking. The problem is that, according to Heidegger, “thinking does not stem from thought, but that thoughts first arise out of thinking” (Heidegger, 1968: 145), in other words, the thinking itself is a gift, as the German philosopher believes, relying on Heraclitus and Parmenides, the gift gods. The gods opened the depths of thought to the ancient Greeks, but they can also close them, especially after Nietzsche’s statement that the gods have left our Earth. It only seems to humans that they are powerful in their ratio (mind). Being in the logos, a European person closes from himself the true sources of thinking, which do not belong to him (they come from somewhere above). Although a person relies on the logic of the movement of the body and mind and exalts rational and pragmatic theories, the body and mind are only superficial manifestations of deep thinking. Any work of the hand and mind is controlled by thinking, and in the East, they would add the soul. As soon as a person forgets about this, he falls into the power of manipulation and forgets that thinking is a gift from the gods. Along with this, the gift itself disappears, that is, pure thinking closes, and the clearing grows and can close the horizon of thinking. These are the symptoms that are observed in modern Western thought.

Conclusion

If the path to being lies through a complex understanding of human understanding of truth (from openness and closeness, from understanding being and understanding non-being), then Heidegger followed the path that the Greeks suggested to him – understanding the deep (fundamental) structures of existence (Dasein).
Even in Ancient Greece, the Gods, through the consciousness of Heraclitus and Parmenides, endowed a European man with the gift of understanding thinking. However, in the ancient Greek variation, this gift turned into an attempt to combine general concepts with a specific human existence, and this turned out to be possible by creating logos worlds (λογοι), divine in essence, but formed by human thinking into closed conceptual and semantic complexes-topoi (the world of ideas, logic, metaphysics, etc.), because only a person who was carried away by understanding things in thinking could see ideas and types behind concrete things.

It was the ontic interpretation of this gift, as Heidegger would say, that turned into “fetters” for all European thinking (metaphysics and logic) and, as we saw after Nietzsche and Heidegger, the path to nihilism (Nothing), for the metaphysical (logos) multiplication of thoughts and leading to the creation of illusory worlds, as the Hindus would say, the path to ignorance or consciousness obscured by Maya.

Only through the source (reading the history of being (destruction) by thinking) can a person break the circle of appropriation of the existent and enter another (open) dimension of thinking that can lead to clearing, where only the Heideggerian “clearing” opens, leading to the understanding of being. It was only through this mental survey of being that Heidegger came to understand the openness of being in time. Not only being but also the time in Heidegger is revealed in the depths of thinking. So, the German thinker concluded that thinking can hear being from its “openness to understand” (things) and its “openness to understand” time. Understanding one’s openness (openness) is a fundamental (deep) resource of thinking, which European thinking called intuition or insight.

The later Heidegger, thanks to Nietzsche, begins to hear the importance of the human way for understanding being (and time), and time becomes a fundamental source for understanding not only being (early Heidegger) but also thinking (later Heidegger). Everything flows from time – Heidegger begins to hear the “whispers” of Anaximander and Heraclitus. But as long as we think the existent (the essence of the thing), we cease to hear the more fundamental sources of thought (the openness of the world to thought) – being and time, what Heidegger called “the forgetting of being.” However, in the depths of pure (open) thought, Heidegger discovers a new way of thinking (another beginning), which is already unfolding towards the understanding-grasping of time (in a rough approximation of the truth of being) and, accordingly, existence. Existential thinking opens up only on a time scale. But here, the German thinker chooses the path: and this is not a choice between Plato and Aristotle, but a choice between them and the pre-Socratics (Heraclitus or Parmenides), because only in the latter and only through them (albeit in the transcription of Plato and Aristotle) did he see the possibility of understanding being. Kierkegaard chose good and evil together, and Heidegger chose thinking and being together.

If Einstein tried to combine space-time (mathematics for thinking) and energy (nature) into a single topos, then Heidegger performs the same operation for being and time. At least in the work “Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)” one hears the possibility of their unification, and then there is a search for a third principle (thinking) to grasp their unity. And now it is not being that opens beyond the horizon of time, but also being and time – from the horizon of thinking. So, we can get into a new dimension, where being and time open in unity, a special case which Heidegger called an existential. Later Heidegger brings us to this unity and embarks on the path of creating existential anthropology (for lack of another term, for here, in a metaphysical context, it would be appropriate to say existential (almost quantum) epistemology).
So, from our point of view, the later Heidegger opened the way to a new dimension of consciousness, in which thinking, being and time commute with each other and break away (remove deep) from reason and empiricism (we find ourselves in an existential world, more precisely, the world of the vital reading of phenomenology). The source of this understanding is not “Being and Time,” in which the role of thinking is only secondary, but the work “Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event),” which reveals the main ideas of the later Heidegger.

Dasein is only an introduction to a new dimension of thinking, something like a mythological insight, the viscosity of which does not yet allow one to discern the depths of thinking, but only reveals what is on its surface (existentials).

According to Heidegger’s listening of the entire course of European thinking, we can say that the originally integral (in fact, mythological) thinking went through the path of logical and metaphysical formalization (in the system of concepts), to return, in the person of Heidegger, to its origins (integrity, but already formalized in the existential-temporal topos). Actually, according to Hegel’s behest, Heidegger’s thinking went all the way to European thinking. New thinking, captured by the being and time field, unable to withstand the pressure of openness, begins to bend like the light in the black hole (according to the general theory of relativity) and split, break (Heidegger here uses the term “clearence of being” and at the same time the clearing). Existential thinking is a special case of this gap. But it was precisely this kind of thinking that mystics and Eastern sages aspired to. Through this dimension lies the path to understanding the emptiness of thinking and nirvana. The Indian “Atman is Brahman” means a stable stay in the topos of such thinking, when individual thinking merges with the universal (it is sometimes called Nothingness and emptiness, and sometimes omniscience, as among the Jains).

That is why the unbroken paths of Heidegger and Sartre passed around the theme of Nothingness. The topos of thinking, in which being commutes with time, is the ultimate (pure) thinking that has overcome ignorance or attachment to the material world. Consciousness manifests itself in its purity where it reveals pure being, and pure being means the temporalizing of pure thinking.

Only in such a dimension of thinking do the secrets of being and time begin to be revealed, which, showed all of Heidegger’s work.

But in such a dimension, does thinking distinguish between being and non-being? According to Parmenides, it does not, and this is the fate of classical European culture. Heidegger, relying on Nietzsche, states that in the rupture of the existence of culture, thinkers began to hear the energy of non-existence. As soon as Nietzsche also heard this breath of time, he announced that the old gods were gone, but immediately added – now we want new gods (gods of pure being) to appear in our thinking, in essence, opening the doors to a new dimension of thinking, asking about being, non-being and time. However, this is a dimension in which we begin to understand not only what being is, but also what time is because thinking itself begins to hear its own time and discovers that it is time itself and listens to the temporalizing of time (on which Heidegger wrote).

If existential thinking opens a little from the feeling of the abyss and, in the same place, falls into the interspace as a receptacle of a different quality than ontic thinking, then pure (deep) thinking already listens to its own time. One gets the feeling that later Heidegger having nothing to do with physics, is still familiar with Einstein’s work since he transfers Einstein’s spatio-temporal insights into the area of the deep ontology of thinking.
In such a context, thinking is that universal topos, to which all that is connected with being necessarily flows, be it Gods or people (everyone goes the way of being). Essentially the same ideas can be found in atheistic Buddhism (and maybe Jainism). Apparently, according to Heidegger, thinking can appear only where being already exists (see Lao Tzu’s Tao). In the place where a person’s thought contacts the being, the effect of clearing occurs, discovered by Heidegger among the Greeks and called interspace, which, therefore, is a kind of transitional event associated with being, human thinking, and the Gods. Only in the field of being is the true nature of thinking as such (out of thinking) revealed, and only then does the idea of being and time itself, of gods and goodness, arise.

A person thinks, discovering himself in society, but is connected with the Gods through the presence of being. Thinking, as can be concluded based on Heidegger’s reflections, is the gift of being through clearing, and interspace.

One more conclusion can be drawn, both Plato and Heidegger, turned to the metaphor of the ultimate being (the Allegory of the Cave), like Einstein, who relied on the metaphor of light in different aspects of thinking about being. The gods illuminated the way of thinking of Heraclitus and Parmenides, but Einstein also referred to thought experiments in understanding light. Light is the ultimate limit of European thinking, which only thinking itself is capable of surpassing. That light border, which European thinkers were afraid to cross, was crossed long ago by Eastern sages.

Almost fifty years after the writing of “Being and Time,” early Heidegger’s intuitions began to be confirmed. It turned out that even modern European thinkers have not taken decisive steps to understand the deep nature of thinking itself (except for the experience of the Freudians and S. Grof’s experiments with altered states of consciousness). Another conclusion also possible from the later Heidegger, that we (Europeans) still do not think, because that which awakens true thought, which should call us to think, has not yet awakened. It has always been associated with pure consciousness because the ratio (mind or intellect) – following any Eastern system, is the lowest level of purity of consciousness. Something similar was understood by Heidegger. The ideas of Eastern teachings are not alien to him. We (Europeans) have learned to be involved in the world of objects (“The System of Objects” by Baudrillard) and are always immersed in the material world, while the true world of pure thinking turned out to be closed to us. It seems that the later Heidegger was close to the idea that time reveals not only being but also consciousness. That is, the era of the transformation of thinking is coming.

That’s one way of putting it – if, according to the Greeks, the understanding being was revealed a little from the horizon of time. According to Husserl’s testament, the time of thinking is revealed from the understanding of its inner essence. Pure thinking can only be revealed from the horizon of understanding pure being. European (in fact, metaphysical) thinking has not gone through this route, since it is still under the sign of “techne” and suppresses all other (higher) dimensions of being, and at the same time, topoi of understanding time and being are also suppressed. Thinking is not just a “clearing” that meets things, but also a path that needs to be passed. And since his return to himself has not still taken place, Heidegger, relying on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, is quite pessimistic. The time for pure thinking has not yet arrived.

Thus, in later works, Heidegger writes a lot not only about the externalization of metaphysics but also about the substitution of genuine (pure) European thought. In this sense, did Heidegger manage to turn us to the true origins of European thinking? The question remains open, since his followers (deconstructivists of all levels) mercilessly brought down...
European metaphysical thought, but did not find a way out (perhaps, but A. Badiou). We say that the Greeks were at the origins, but we forget that all the early Greeks learned to think in the Middle East and Egypt (in older cultural areas). And even behind the thinking of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides, the purity of the light of the Gods (Artemis and Dike) was hidden, or maybe that’s what they called “light from the East.” In both cases, their thinking was not independent (but this fact is hidden in the fog of history). Therefore, Heidegger reconstructed the thinking of the Greeks in the etymological plane in the context of the phenomenological and Nietzschean ideas of his teachers.

And since pure (in itself) being eluded Heidegger all the time, as it was with the ancient Greeks, the later Heidegger began to look for another (in our understanding, pure) dimension of thinking, in which being would reveal its nature. Our earlier study was devoted to the search for the purity of consciousness of the early Heidegger, now it is supplemented by an analysis of the purity of European thinking in the later Heidegger.

This made it possible to confirm the idea expressed in the previous article: although we are used to believing that the German thinker was looking for the nature of being and throughout his life he was engaged in the study of being, nevertheless, the second important topic, and, apparently, a higher priority in Heidegger’s work, is the theme of the possibility of that purity of European consciousness, which will allow us to understand the deep nature of being.

The same path was followed by the entire European culture, starting from the ancient Greeks, but, judging by the conclusions of Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Badiou, F. Gonzales, T. Sheehan and other thinkers, we are still in the mode of the predominance of the logical-rational nature thoughts (the desert is growing) and do not understand the deep sources of pure thinking. As the later Heidegger said, we (Europeans) have not yet learned to think.

We would also like to mention the magnificent Heidegger studies of F. Gonzales and T. Sheehan. These works are worthy of being included in the treasury of modern analysis of antiquity and Heidegger’s work; though, they change little in the general trends in modern European culture understanding, much is clarified in their attempt to find an interrelation between modern and ancient culture, that is, in what the later (and indeed early) Heidegger. However, Heidegger himself is a worthy student of Nietzsche and Husserl, and he is quite modern in an attempt to overcome the Greek metaphysical thought as he sees it.

But even his work has not yet changed anything in the general field of understanding of the entire European culture as a whole, starting from antiquity. Does it stimulate thinking? Undoubtedly. Nevertheless, whether we want it or not, the working of Nietzsche, Heidegger and postmodernists is a sentence for the Greeks, not because they were not wise enough, but because they opened the era of metaphysical (logical-rational-mathematical or calculating, according to Heidegger) thinking, which the Europeans perceived as a complete phenomenon of thought. This is heard in our time. Anyone who finds a way out of this modern ambiguous situation truly deserves respect. Respect for the Greeks, coupled with the destruction of their thought. Is this not a paradox of modern thinking?

F. Gonzales and T. Sheehan, like A. Badiou, sought a way out through a new interpretation of the Greeks (through understanding Heidegger’s position). And this is their huge achievement. However, they did not pay attention to the fact that any interpretation of the Greeks, including the Heideggerian, except for the spiritual (in our reading, Eastern), is still the way to calculating (or calculating, according to Heidegger) thinking, which without immersion in spirituality is not capable of generating anything more than lamentations about the beauty of Greek thought and contemporary problems of European culture (although
A. Badiou felt this and interpreted the truth as an event, and called the naming of the unnamed the path to evil). In this case, it seems we need an outside point of view.

And it can be the East (and ancient cultures), as there were simply no other sources of thought yet. But we have not forgotten the precepts of hermeneutics, understanding (being and pure thinking as well) begins with tradition. And how many ancient scrolls are still hidden in the Middle East and the Himalayas? We speak of a return to the ancient (wise, but bygone) civilizations of a non-European type. To survive, we must consider their experience, the experience of wise, but descended into non-existence civilizations, from which only traces (of being) remained (as Derrida would put it) and, it’s really bad to say, dust.

The Europeans step on their rake again and again, because through Oedipus and Freud they drove their consciousness into that corner from which the Greeks will not give salvation, as psychoanalysis ends in the unconscious, and what is beyond consciousness (calculated thinking) Europeans do not know. This is a dead end (topos), constantly returning us to techne. Oedipus as a symbol urges us to the dependence (non-property). The mass man raised the banner of Oedipus.

In these matters, Eastern wisdom is closer to me; I consider both Plato’s thought and Heidegger’s thought to be its derivative (most of the largest pre-Socratics studied in the Middle East and Egypt). To reiterate, the West is inevitably drawn to the East, since it holds spiritual wisdom. But the West tried to logicize Eastern ideas (in the Christian aspect including, and this is also from the East and from Aramaic origins) and, apparently, unsuccessfully. Heidegger aptly likened that logos, logic and metaphysics are only a stage in the formation of any high culture, but those who stop at this stage will ultimately receive modern Europe with its fascism and Stalinism, and liberalism (in the European version) just another phase of pandering to the basest instincts. Freud, and indeed Jung, will be overcome, and exactly by religious thinkers. Heidegger is only a symbol of the changes that have begun in modern European thinking. It’s already happening.

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