Inferring the intensity of Poisson processes
at the limit of the detector sensitivity
(with a case study on gravitational wave burst search)

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Abstract

We consider the issue of reporting the result of search experiment in the most unbiased and efficient way, i.e. in a way which allows an easy interpretation and combination of results and which do not depend on whether the experimenters believe or not to having found the searched-for effect. Since this work uses the language of Bayesian theory, to which most physicists are not used, we find that it could be useful to practitioners to have in a single paper a simple presentation of Bayesian inference, together with an example of application of it in search of rare processes.

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1 Introduction

An often debated issue in frontier science research is how to report results obtained from search experiments at the limit of the detector sensitivity. Sometimes researchers have simply to state a clear null result, i.e. when all members of the experimental team agree that no new phenomenon is indicated by the data. At other times they may have some hints that the data could indicate the presence of the searched-for signal, as a result of a more or less pronounced excess of events above the expected background level. In lucky, and rare, cases new phenomena are seen in such a spectacular way that all researchers agree and everybody is convinced. Clearly, reporting the result may become problematic in the second case. “The experiment was inconclusive, and we had to use statistics”, somebody once said.

The purpose of this paper is to show how results of the search for rare phenomena can be presented, in order to best use the information contained in the experimental data, i.e. in the most powerful and unbiased way. Since the three situations sketched out above are, in reality, never so sharply separated, the presentation of the result should not depend on whether researchers feel that their case is a negative, doubtful, or positive one. Moreover, it is important that the pieces of evidence from different experiments can be combined in the most efficient way. If, for example, many independent data sets each provide a little evidence in favour of the searched-for signal, the combination of all data should enhance that hypothesis. If, instead, the indications provided by the different data sets are incoherent, their combination should provide a stronger constraint on the intensity of the postulated process.

Typical fields of research in which the above described problematic situation arises are, to give a few examples, neutrino oscillations, rare decays, new particles, gravitational waves, and dark matter. All these processes have in common the fact that, under stationarity of the search conditions, the physical process can be modelled with high accuracy by a Poisson process, and the physical quantity (a mass, a cross-section, a branching ratio, a rate, etc.) of interest will be related to the intensity $r$ of that process.

Although the methods described in this paper are of general use, we think that they can be better understood by way of a case study. We consider the problem of inferring the rate of bursts of gravitational waves (g.w.) on Earth. This case presents typical features common to other frontier searches, but the problem remains unidimensional, since only one quantity is inferred and thus easy to describe. The extension to higher dimensions

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1) The many recent papers [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] on ‘limits’, not to mention notes internal to experimental teams, give an idea of the present interest in the subject. However, this article is not a review of the various ‘prescriptions’ suggested by the many authors involved in the discussion. In fact, the point of view presented in this paper is that the search of the Holy Grail containing the unique and objective prescription to calculate limits is a false problem. Since the cited papers — with the exception of Ref. [8] and, to some extent, Ref. [17] — are written in this spirit, they are irrelevant for this work. Another common point of all the cited authors, with the sole exception of Ref. [8], is to consider the frequentist concept of coverage as good guidance. Zech [8] considers coverage “a magic objective of classical confidence bounds. It has an attractive property from a purely aesthetic point of view but it is not obvious how to make use of this concept”. Our opinion about frequentistic coverage is even more severe, and it has been discussed extensively in Ref. [20]. Moreover, comments on Refs. [8] and [1], which have triggered most of the cited papers, can be found in Refs. [18] and [19]. In particular, one should not overlook the fact that the results obtained by frequentistic confidence intervals, as well as those obtained by frequentistic hypothesis tests, are usually misunderstood and might even induce researchers to draw misleading scientific conclusions [18, 21].

2) For example, in neutrino oscillation search the results are given in terms of the mixing angle and of the mass-squared difference. Note that, also in this case, it would be very interesting to have the result
is, at least conceptually, straightforward.

Since the methods used in the paper are based on Bayesian inference and subjective probability, to which most researchers are at present not accustomed, we feel that it is necessary to introduce this matter in an extensive and elementary way. In particular, we also think it is important to clarify some of the philosophical aspects which physicists tend to ignore, but which are crucial to the understanding and acceptance of the inferential framework which will be used. Therefore, we consider it is convenient for the reader to have a description of the case study and of the inferential framework in an almost self-contained article.³

The paper is structured in the following way. In the next section we recall the present status and future prospects of g.w. burst search, stressing some of the important aspects of the experiments which affect our general considerations about the analysis strategy. Then, the inferential framework to be used to report results will be presented and discussed in depth, though remaining at an introductory level. In the core of the paper the inferential model will be applied to the case study, with general considerations and numerical examples. Finally some conclusions will be drawn.

2 Gravitational-wave burst search

2.1 Status and perspective

The interest in g.w.’s is related to the astrophysical information they contain and also to the implications their detection would have for fundamental physics.⁴ Their detection would, in fact, lead to confirmation of Einstein’s general relativity predictions in a more direct way than Hulse and Taylor’s observations. Gravitational-wave detectors could provide a direct measure of the waves and could also test their properties. In particular, using a network of detectors, wave speed and polarization state can be inferred. Regarding the emission process, the importance of g.w.’s lies in the fact that they pass through matter without being significantly absorbed or scattered, unlike electromagnetic waves and even weakly interacting neutrinos. Thus the information about the emission process carried by g.w.’s is really unique (see Ref. for a review of g.w. sources).

At present, one of the most interesting activities within that section of the community which is operating resonant antennae is the search for evidence of g.w. bursts. These are defined as bunches of g.w.’s whose time width is smaller than the time constant of the detectors (the latter being typically of the order of milliseconds). Thus their energy spread is expected to be flat across the whole of the frequency bandwidth of the detector. A burst of g.w.’s can be produced in a gravitational collapse associated with supernova explosions, or during the final stage of the coalescence of binary systems (neutron stars, black holes), or in processes involving massive black holes, such as the capture of a near body.

Astrophysical estimates of rates and signal amplitudes for these processes on Earth would seem discouraging in the light of the present theoretical ideas. In fact, given the sensitivity of the present antennae, the expected rates are much too low to give a sizable excess of candidate events above the expected background. The available detectors could, in fact, detect a g.w. burst from the Galaxy if a process radiated 1% of a solar mass

³ Brief and extensive physicist’s introductions to subjective probability and Bayesian inference can be found in Refs. and .

⁴ in terms of cross-section of the process searched for, kept separate from the interpretation in terms of the postulated oscillations. Then, one would deal also in this case with unidimensional problems, i.e. cross-sections for bins of the incoming neutrino energy.
\( (M_\odot) \), which would yield a dimensionless wave amplitude on Earth of \( 10^{-18} \) \[25, 26\]. However, the expected supernova rate in the Galaxy could be in the range of one per 10-100 years (see e.g. Ref. \[27\]) and an emission of 1\% \( M_\odot \) into g.w.’s seems quite improbable. Nevertheless, there is no solid ground for supposing that this hypothesized fraction of energy is released into g.w.’s and even larger fractions are conceivable \[22\]. Moreover, the burst rate could increase by a factor of about 1000 if the antennae were sensitive to astronomical events within a distance of 10 Mpc, thus including the Virgo cluster. Improved bar detectors \[28, 29\], as well as planned interferometers \[30\], are expected to reach this level of sensitivity.

In conclusion, although current prospects are not encouraging, the many uncertainties on the physics processes involved might still mean that surprises are in store and for this reason it is important to be prepared to exploit to the full the information provided by operating and planned detectors.

2.2 Search strategy

Gravitational-wave bursts are very weak signals, embedded in the noise of the detector. Thus, they can be extracted from the detector data by proper filtering, optimized to increase the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for this class of events \[31\]. The analysis is very difficult because of the low SNR, the rarity of the events, the uncertainty regarding their shape, and the non-stationary noise of the detectors \[32\]. In fact, although some of the sources of noise, like narrow-band Brownian noise and electronic wide-band noise, are well understood and their expectations can be modelled with reasonable accuracy, there are other sources of background which are not easy to handle, and not even easy to recognize.

A filter for g.w. burst search is optimized to increase the SNR for \( \delta \)-like signals, and a candidate event is defined when the filtered signal exceeds a certain energy threshold. The candidate event is characterized by energy, arrival time, above-threshold duration, and other relevant quantities related to the spectral content in different bandwidths \[32\]. All event characteristics are, in fact, important. For example, the shape of the electric signal coming from the transductor can be used to discriminate g.w. bursts from background.

The rarity of the events looked for and the presence of irreducible background make it impossible to do this search using a single detector, even if seismic, electromagnetic and other sensors are often used to veto the data of a g.w. detector (see e.g. Refs. \[33, 28\]). Therefore, a coincidence among at least two parallel and distant detectors is required\[4\]. Gravitational-wave bursts are, in fact, supposed to irradiate the Earth uniformly so that detectors spread out across the Earth’s surface should be able to detect g.w.’s related to the same physical event. Hence the whole analysis procedure consists of data filtering, event selection, vetoes when necessary, and the final coincidence analysis.

An important parameter of the procedure for extracting g.w. burst candidates is the coincidence window, that is the time width within which the coincidences are considered. The window can be fixed by considering the physics of the process and the characteristics of the apparatus \[34\].

At present five resonant g.w. antennae are in operation, and this is really the first time that it is possible to search for g.w.’s with such a high number of detectors working simultaneously: Explorer \[33\], NAUTILUS \[28\] and AURIGA \[29\] in Italy; Allegro \[35\] in

\[4\] ‘Parallel’ means oriented in such a way as to be sensitive to the same polarization and direction of the incoming wave, and ‘far’ means located at a distance such that the long-range correlated background is considered to be negligible.
USA; Niobe in Australia. A collaboration has been established between the experimental groups, with the aim of performing coincidence searches of g.w. bursts. The joint effort resulted in 1997 in a data exchange protocol, in which candidate events are precisely defined and the procedure for exchanging data was agreed (see e.g. Ref. and related web sites). It is, then, important to agree on an optimal way for publishing results such that all information contained in the data can be used in the most efficient way.

Coincidence experiment procedures are essentially the same as those used since the beginning of g.w. experiments. Recently they have been used for the analysis of Explorer and Allegro 1991 data and analyses of Explorer-NAUTILUS (1994-1996) and Explorer-Niobe (1995). The only relevant background to coincidence analysis is due to accidental coincidences, which can be estimated with high accuracy by off-timing techniques.

For the sake of simplicity we consider here only coincidences between a couple of parallel detectors. The rate of background due to the accidental coincidences between the candidate events is usually evaluated by the average of the coincidences at shifted times. Alternatively, one can make use of individual background rates and of the coincidence window to evaluate the background as . The two estimations of the expected accidental coincidence rate usually give the same result . Once is evaluated, the observed number of coincidences in a given observation time due to background is described by a Poisson distribution. This is because accidental coincidences fulfil the conditions which define a Poisson process, if the noise is stationary during . Therefore, the observed frequency distribution of off-timing coincidences is expected to be very close to the Poisson probability distribution of parameter . As the distributions actually observed are indeed of that kind, researchers are highly confident about the probability distribution of background coincidences.

3 Probability of accidental coincidences versus probability of burst rates

Let us begin by illustrating the kind of problems that can arise in interpreting results of coincidence experiments, if not properly stated. Let us imagine that coincidence events have been observed during the effective observation time . The probability of observing events, given a Poisson process of intensity , is

\[ P(n_c \mid r_b) = \frac{e^{-r_b T} (r_b T)^{n_c}}{n_c!}. \] (1)

Two remarks are now in order. First, one should be very careful about calling the ‘probability of the observed number of coincidences’, because what has been observed is sure and no longer belongs to the domain of the uncertain, to which probability applies (the certain event has probability 1). is, instead, the probability of observing the hypothetical number of coincidences , under the condition that the stochastic process is described by a Poisson of constant and precisely known intensity during the observation time . Second, does not provide, by itself, a result concerning what the researchers are interested in, i.e. the rate of g.w. bursts. In fact, is a probabilistic statement about the possible outcome , and not about the uncertain rate of g.w. bursts. However, it is rather intuitive that, if the observed number of coincidences is of the order of the expected value of the background, i.e. , the background is considered to describe the outcome of the experiment well, while if , suspicion is raised that some of the observed coincidences could be attributed to g.w. bursts (or, more precisely, to any other physical effect not considered as background). In this paper
we consider that the only hypothesized but known background is a contribution of g.w. bursts. As a consequence, there will be g.w. burst rates in which we believe more, others in which we believe less, and others that we rule out. In other words, we are faced with an inferential problem, which must treated with care to avoid reporting the result in a way which might be misleading (see e.g. examples given in Ref. \[18\]).

To give a numerical example, let us take the case of $\lambda_b = r_b \cdot T = 100$, and let us assume that 130 coincidences have been observed. The probability of $n_c = 130$, given $\lambda_b = 100$, is $6 \cdot 10^{-4}$, but one should not say that ‘there is a probability of $6 \times 10^{-4}$ that the data come from the background’. In fact this would imply that, ‘with 99.94% probability, the data do not come from background’, i.e. ‘they have to be attributed almost certainly to a genuine signal’. Indeed, the observation of a low-probability event does not imply that the hypothesis considered to be the cause of it (the so-called ‘null hypothesis’ $H_0$, in our case $H_0 = \text{‘background is the only source of candidate events’}$) has to be ruled out.

One can recognize, behind the logic of standard hypothesis tests with which we are all familiar, a revised version of the classical proof by contradiction. In standard dialectics, one assumes a hypothesis to be true, then looks for a logical consequence which is manifestly false, in order to reject the hypothesis. The ‘slight’ difference introduced in the ‘classical’ statistical tests is that the false consequence is replaced by an improbable one. The argument might seem convincing at first sight, but it has no logical grounds. In fact, no matter how small the probability is, whatever is observed is not in contradiction with the null hypothesis, unless it is really impossible. This becomes self-evident when the probability of whatever can be observed is so small that this kind of reasoning would rule out $H_0$ whatever one observes. For example, in our numerical example even $P(n_c = 100 | \lambda_b = 100) = 4\%$ is below the standard probability level under which an event is declared ‘improbable’. This is the reason why statisticians have invented ‘p-values’, i.e. ‘probability of the tail(s)’ (see e.g. Ref. \[19\]). For example, one would say, in our case, that the reason why the data are against the null hypothesis is not simply because $P(n_c = 130 | \lambda_b = 100) = 6 \cdot 10^{-4}$, but because $P(n_c \geq 130 | \lambda_b = 100) = 0.23\%$. But this does not solve the problem, it makes it worse because one is considering the conditional probability of not only what has actually been observed, but also what has not been observed (see e.g. Refs. \[20\] and \[41\]).

Although we cannot presume to have been fully convincing with these very brief critical remarks and therefore refer the reader to more general discussions on the subject (see e.g. Ref. \[22\] and references therein), the message is that one is not allowed to evaluate the probability of an effect (or, even worse, the probability of an effect plus that of all rarer effects not actually observed), given a certain cause, and then to consider it as if it were the probability of the cause itself.

Some readers might wonder why this paper is making such a big deal about the criticism expressed above, which after all seems to be founded on intuition, logic and good sense. The reason is that the standard education of physicists on the subject of probability is based on a very peculiar and unnatural point of view (frequentism) which prevents probability of causes, i.e. what Poincaré calls ‘the essential problem of the experimental method’ \[12\], being talked about. However, despite their education, physicists constantly make use of this concept, most of the time correctly, as happens in simple routine applications. But sometimes the combination of good intuition and unsuitable statistical approach yields wrong conclusions, as reported, e.g., in Ref. \[18\]. Given this situation, we think that there is a strong probability that what we are going to say about the way of reporting results will be misunderstood, if it is not clear what is meant by probability of
causes (or of hypotheses, or of true values) and how this can be evaluated on the basis of all available knowledge. Therefore, for the convenience of the reader, in the next section we give a short introduction to the problem of inference, extracted from Ref. [20] and adapted to this context.

4 From data to true values

4.1 Learning from observations: creating or modifying knowledge?

Every measurement is made with the purpose of increasing the knowledge of the person who performs it, and of anybody else who may be interested in it, like the members of a scientific community. It is clear that the need to perform a measurement indicates that one is in a state of uncertainty with respect to something, e.g. the value of a well-defined physics quantity. In all cases, the measurement has the purpose of modifying a given state of knowledge. One might be tempted to say ‘acquire’, instead of ‘modify’, the state of knowledge, thus indicating that the knowledge could be created from nothing by the act of measuring. However, it is not difficult to see that, in all cases, what we are dealing with is just an updating process, in the light of new facts and of some reason. To give an example about which everyone has good intuition, let us take the case of the measurement of the temperature in a room, using a digital thermometer (just to avoid uncertainty in the reading), and let us suppose that we get 21.7°C. Although we may be uncertain about the tenths of a degree, there is no doubt that the measurement will have narrowed the interval of temperatures considered possible before the measurement: those compatible with the physiological feeling of a comfortable environment. According to our knowledge of the thermometer used, or of thermometers in general, there will be values of temperature in a given interval around 21.7°C in which we believe more and values outside the interval in which we believe less. It is, however, also clear that if the thermometer had indicated, for the same physiological feeling, 17.3°C, we might suspect that it was not well calibrated, while if it had indicated 2.5°C we would have no doubt that the instrument was not working properly.

The three cases correspond to three different degrees of modification of the knowledge. In particular, in the last case the modification is null (but even in this case we have learned something: the thermometer does not work!).

So, what makes us improve our knowledge after an empirical observation, is not the observation alone, but the observation framed in prior knowledge about measurand and measurement. Trained physicists always have such prior knowledge and often use it unconsciously. Imagine someone who has no scientific or technical education at all, entering a physics laboratory and reading a number on an instrument: His scientific knowledge will not improve at all, apart from the triviality that a given instrument displayed a number (not much of a contribution to knowledge!)

4.2 From the probability of the observables to the probability of the true values

Summarizing the argument so far, after having performed an experiment, which has resulted in the observed value $x$ being read on an instrument, there are some values of the physical quantity (generically indicated by $\mu$) in which we believe more (we say ‘they are more probable’) and some others in which we believe less. The different possible true values can be characterized by a p.d.f. $f(\mu \mid x)$, conditioned by the observation $x$. To be more precise, $f(\mu)$ depends on many other pieces of information, like knowledge of the instruments, of the kind of measurement, and of reasonable values of $\mu$ to be expected.
So using $K()$ to indicate the ‘knowledge’, to be precise, we should write

$$f(\mu \mid x) \rightarrow f(\mu \mid x, K(\text{instr.}), K(\text{meas.}), K(\mu)),$$

although one often simply writes $f(\mu \mid x)$, or even $f(\mu)$, implicitly assuming the conditions.

Clearly, $f(\mu \mid x)$ cannot be evaluated as relative frequencies of a long-run experiment. It would be absurd to imagine a distribution of the values of $\mu$ for a given value $x$ read on the instrument, as true values are not directly observable, being related to abstract concepts. Instead, relative frequencies can be used to evaluate the detector response:

$$f(x \mid \mu) \equiv f(x \mid \mu, K(\text{instr.}), K(\text{meas.})).$$

This can be done either by calibration with respect to a reference value or by Monte Carlo simulation, as is currently done when $\mu$ refers to a quantity for which a calibration cannot be made.\(^5\) More often, $f(x \mid \mu)$ is evaluated by reasonable assumptions, like when we assume a Gaussian model of error distribution, or that the observed number of accidental coincidences is described by a Poisson distribution. For example, one has to remember that, no matter how much the off-timing distribution might be Poisson-like, this empirical observation cannot be considered, strictly speaking, a proof, having the same strength as mathematical theorem. Nevertheless, the fact that this observation will lead practically all researchers to believe a certain hypothesis makes it a typical example of the type of inferential process we are talking about.

The function $f(x \mid \mu)$ is usually called likelihood, since it quantifies how likely it is that $\mu$ will produce any given $x$. Note that this function can be easily misinterpreted: As a probability density function it is a function of $x$, since it describes the beliefs on $x$ for a given value of $\mu$. As a mathematical function it is also a function of $\mu$ in the sense that the p.d.f. $f(x \mid \mu)$ depends on the ‘parameter’ $\mu$. However, it is not correct to say that $f(x \mid \mu)$ measures the belief that $x$ comes from $\mu$ (in the sense that the observable $x$ has to be attributed to the true value $\mu$). Instead, this degree of belief is denoted by $f(\mu \mid x)$. The confusion\(^6\) between $f(\mu \mid x)$ and $f(x \mid \mu)$ is a source of really terrible mistakes [18, 20].

So, the problem is how to get from the observation $x$ to $f(\mu)$. Before going to the formal derivation of the formula to update the beliefs, let us try to justify intuitively the general rule, considering what happens when $\mu$ can assume only two values. If they seem to us equally possible, it is natural to favour the value which gives the highest likelihood of producing $x$. For example, assuming $\mu_1 = -1$, $\mu_2 = 10$, considering a Gaussian likelihood with $\sigma = 3$, and having observed $x = 2$, one would tend to believe that the observation is most likely caused by $\mu_1$. If, on the other hand, we add the extra information that the quantity of interest is positive, then $\mu_1$ is no longer the most probable cause but an impossible one; $\mu_2$ becomes certain. There are, in general, intermediate cases in which, because of previous knowledge, one tends to believe a priori more in one or other of the causes. (For example, one could imagine a small Monte Carlo in which $\mu_1$ and $\mu_2$ are randomly chosen with probability ratio 1 to $10^5$: where, then, does $x = 2$ come from?) It follows that, in the light of a new observation, the degree of belief of a given value of $\mu$ will be proportional to

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\(^5\) Note that a Monte Carlo program is nothing but a summary of the most reliable beliefs about the phenomenology and the measurement process under study.

\(^6\) Anticipating what will become clear in a while: if the prior is uniform, then $f(x \mid \mu)$ and $f(\mu \mid x)$ have identical mathematical expression. This is the reason why the likelihood curve is often taken as if it were probability information about $\mu$. 

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the likelihood that \( \mu \) will produce the observed effect;
- the degree of belief attributed to \( \mu \) before the observation, quantified by \( f_0(\mu) \) (the ‘prior’).

We have finally

\[
\frac{f(\mu | x)}{f(x | \mu)} \propto f_0(\mu) .
\]  

(2)

This is one of the ways of writing Bayes’ theorem. The proportionality factor is simply given by the normalization of \( f(\mu | x) \) to 1. At this point it is important to write Bayes’ formula once more, making all conditions explicit:

\[
f(\mu | x, K(\text{instr.}), K(\text{meas.}), K_0(\mu)) \propto f(x | \mu, K(\text{instr.}), K(\text{meas.})) \cdot f(\mu | K_0(\mu)) ,
\]

where \( f(\mu | K_0(\mu)) \equiv f_0(\mu) \).

### 4.3 Derivation of Bayes’ theorem from a physicist’s perspective

The concepts illustrated in the previous section can be formalized using the following reasoning.

- Before doing the experiment we are uncertain on \( \mu \) and on \( x \): we know neither the true value, nor the observed value. Generally speaking, this uncertainty is quantified by \( f(\mu, x) \).
- Under the hypothesis that we observe \( x \), we can calculate the conditional probability

\[
f(\mu | x) = \frac{f(\mu, x)}{f(x)} = \frac{f(\mu, x)}{\int f(\mu, x) \, d\mu} .
\]  

(3)

- At this point, it seems we are stuck, because we are usually more uncertain about \( \{\mu, x\} \) than about \( \mu \). However, we note that \( f(\mu, x) \) can be calculated from \( f(x | \mu) \) and \( f(\mu) \):

\[
f(\mu, x) = f(x | \mu) \cdot f(\mu) .
\]  

(4)

This is the key observation to solve our problem.

- If we do an experiment we need to have a good idea of the behaviour of the apparatus, therefore \( f(x | \mu) \) must be a narrow distribution. The most uncertain contribution remains the prior knowledge about \( \mu \), quantified by \( f_0(\mu) \) (the subscript is to remind us that this is a prior about \( \mu \)). Note that it is all right that \( f_0(\mu) \) is rather broad (‘vague’), because we want to learn about \( \mu \) itself, performing an experiment with an apparatus having a narrow response around true values.
- Putting all the pieces together we get the standard formula of Bayes’ theorem for uncertain quantities:

\[
f(\mu | x) = \frac{f(x | \mu) \cdot f_0(\mu)}{\int f(x | \mu) \cdot f_0(\mu) \, d\mu} .
\]  

(5)

The steps followed in this proof of the theorem should convince the reader that \( f(\mu | x) \) calculated in this way is the most we can say about \( \mu \) with the given state of information.

One may be worried about the presence of \( f_0(\mu) \) in the result; but this is simply unavoidable, and for this reason we should be relaxed about it [19]. \( f_0(\mu) \) becomes irrelevant in routine cases because the likelihood is usually very narrow (when seen as a mathematical function of \( \mu \)) with respect to \( f_0(\mu) \), such that the prior is reabsorbed in
the normalization factor. In contrast, in the sophisticated frontier-science measurements $f_0(\mu)$ does matter, as will be illustrated below.

Let us conclude this very short introduction on Bayesian inference.

- It is impossible to give a probabilistic result on a physics quantity without passing through priors ("it is impossible to make the inferential omelette without breaking the Bayesian egg", some like to say).
- When the probabilistic result seems not to depend on priors, we are in a condition (or we make the tacit assumption!) in which the prior distribution acts as a constant; this approximation is very good when the likelihood is much narrower than the prior, as usually happens in routine measurements.
- In frontier science, priors must be considered with much care, and this will be the main task of this paper.

5 Inferring gravitational-wave burst rate

5.1 Modelling the inferential process

Now that the inferential scheme has been set up, let us rephrase our problem in the language of Bayesian statistics:

- the physical quantity of interest, and with respect to which we are in a state of great uncertainty, is the g.w. burst rate $r$;
- we are practically sure about the expected rate of background events $r_b$ (but not about the number which will actually be observed);
- what is certain is the number $n_c$ of coincidences which have been observed (stating that the observed number of coincidences is $n_c \pm \sqrt{n_c}$ does not make any sense!), although we do not know how many of these events have to be attributed to background and how many (if any) to g.w. bursts.

For a given hypothesis $r$ the number of coincidence events which can be observed in the observation time $T$ is described by a Poisson process having an intensity which is the sum of that due to background and that due to signal. Therefore the likelihood is

$$f(n_c \mid r, r_b) = \frac{e^{-(r+r_b)T}((r+r_b)T)^{n_c}}{n_c!}, \quad (6)$$

and, making use of Bayes’ theorem, we get

$$f(r \mid n_c, r_b) \propto \frac{e^{-(r+r_b)T}((r+r_b)T)^{n_c}}{n_c!} f_0(r). \quad (7)$$

At this point we are faced with the problem of what $f_0(r)$ to choose. The best way of understanding why this choice can be troublesome is to illustrate the problem with numerical examples. Let us consider $T$ as unit time (e.g. one month), a background rate $r_b$ such that $r_b \times T = 1$, and the following hypothetical observations: $n_c = 0$; $n_c = 1$; $n_c = 5$.

\[ To make it clear, if one wants to measure the temperature in a room one does not choose a thermometer with an r.m.s. error of 5 degrees, because one’s physiological prior is more accurate than what could be learned from such a measurement; but the same instrument provides useful information at 200ºC or at -50ºC. \]
Figure 1: Distribution of the values of the rate $r$, in units of events/month, inferred from an expected rate of background events $r_b = 1$ event/month, an initial uniform distribution $f_o(r) = k$ and the following numbers of observed events: 0 (continuous); 1 (dashed); 5 (dotted).

5.2 Uniform prior

One might think that a good ‘democratic’ choice would be a uniform distribution in $r$, i.e. $f_o(r) = k$. Inserting this prior in (7) and normalizing the final distribution we get (see e.g. Ref. [20])

$$f(r | n_c, r_b, f_o(r) = k) = \frac{e^{-r T} (\left((r + r_b) T\right)^{n_c}}{n_c! \sum_{n=0}^{n_c} \left(\frac{r_b T}{n!}\right)^n}.$$ (8)

The resulting final distributions are shown in Fig. 1. For $n_c = 0$ and 1 the distributions are peaked at zero, while for $n_c = 5$ the distribution appears so neatly separated from $r = 0$ that it seems a convincing proof that the postulated physics process searched-for does exist. In the cases $n_c = 0$ and 1, researchers usually present the result with an upper limit (typically 95 %), on the basis that $f(r)$ seems compatible with no effect, as suggested by Fig. 1. For example, in the simplest and well-known case of $n_c = 0$ the 95 % C.L. upper limit is 3 events/month. The usual meaning one attributes to the limit is that, if the physics process of interest exists, then there is a 95 % probability that its rate is below 3 events/month, resulting from

$$\int_0^3 f(r | n_c = 0, r_b = 1, f_o(r) = k) \, dr = 0.95.$$ (9)

But there are other infinite probabilistic statements that can be derived from $f(r | r_b, n_c = 0)$. For example, $P(r > 3 \text{ events/month}) = 5 \%, P(r > 0.1 \text{ events/month}) = 90 \%, P(r > 0.01 \text{ events/month}) = 99 \%$, and so on. Without doubt, researchers will not hesitate to publish the 95 % upper limit, but they would feel uncomfortable stating that they believe 99 % that, if the g.w. bursts exist at all, then the rate is above 0.01 events/month. The reason for this uneasiness can be found in the uniform prior, which might not correspond

---

8) If one assesses a probability value of 99 %, one should be as confident that the event will turn out to be true as one would be of extracting a white ball from an urn containing 99 white balls and one black. If this is not the case, one is, consciously or not, responsible for misinformation. So, other people, trusting the person who made that probability assessment, will form their opinion and make their decisions using a probability value which does not correspond to what that person believes.
to the prior knowledge that researchers really have. Let us, then, examine more closely the meaning of the uniform distribution and its consequences. Saying that \( f(r) = k \), means that \( dP/dr = k \), i.e. \( P \propto \Delta r \); for example,

\[
P(0.1 \leq r \leq 1) = \frac{1}{10} \quad P(1 \leq r \leq 10) = \frac{1}{100} \quad P(10 \leq r \leq 100) \ldots ,
\]

and so on. But, taken literally, this prior is hardly ever reasonable. The problem is not due to the divergence for \( r \to \infty \) which makes \( f(r) \) not normalizable (these kinds of distributions are called ‘improper’). This mathematical nuisance is automatically cured when \( f(r) \) is multiplied by the likelihood, which, for a finite number of observed events, vanishes rapidly enough for \( r \to \infty \). A much more serious problem is related to the fact that the uniform distribution assigns to all the infinite orders of magnitude left of 1 a probability which is only 1/9 of the probability of the decade between 1 and 10, or 1% of the probability of the first two decades, and so on. This is the reason why, even if no coincidence events have been observed, the final distribution obtained from zero events observed (continuous curve of Fig. 1) implies that \( P(r \geq 1 \text{ event/month}) = 37 \% \).

5.3 Jeffreys’ prior

A prior distribution alternative to the uniform can be based on the observation that what often seems uniform is not the probability per unit of \( r \), but rather the probability per decade of \( r \), i.e. researchers may feel equally uncertain about the orders of magnitudes of \( r \), namely

\[
P(0.1 \leq r \leq 1) = P(1 \leq r \leq 10) = P(10 \leq r \leq 100) \ldots .
\]

This implies that \( dP/d \ln r = k \), or \( dP/dr \propto 1/r \). This prior is known as Jeffreys’ prior \(^{13}\), and it is indeed very interesting, at least from a very abstract point of view (though it tends to be misused, as is discussed in Ref. \(^{19}\)). If we take Jeffreys’ prior literally, it does not work in our case either. In fact, when inserted in Ref. \(^{7}\), it produces a divergence for \( r \to 0 \). This is due to the infinite orders of magnitude left of 1, to each of which we give equal prior probability, and to the fact that the likelihood \(^{3}\) goes to a constant for \( r \to 0 \). Therefore, for any \( r_o > 0 \), we have \( P(r < r_o)/P(r > r_o) = \infty \). To get a finite result we need a cut-off at a given \( r_{\text{min}} \).

As an exercise, just to get a feeling of both the difference with respect to the case of the uniform distribution, and the dependence on the cut-off, we report in Fig. 2 the results obtained for the same experimental conditions as Fig. 1, but with a Jeffreys’ prior truncated at \( r_{\text{min}} = 0.1 \) and 0.01. One can see that the final distributions conditioned by 0 or 1 events observed are pulled towards \( r = 0 \) by the new priors, while the case of \( n_c = 5 \) is more robust, although it is no longer nicely separated from zero.

5.4 Role of priors

The strong dependence of the final distributions on the priors shown in this example should not be considered a bad feature, as were an artifact of Bayesian inference. Putting it the other way round, the Bayesian inference reproduces, in a formal way, what researchers already have clear in their minds as a result of intuition and experience. In the numerical examples we are dealing with, the dependence of the final distributions on the priors is just a hint of the fact that the experimental data are not so strong as to lead every scientist to the same conclusion (in other words, the experimental and theoretical situation is far from the well-established one upon which intersubjectivity is based). For this
reason, one should worry, instead, about statistical methods which advertise ‘objective’
probabilistic results in such a critical situation.

When the experimental situation is more solid, as for example in the case of five
events observed out of only 0.1 expected from background, the conclusions become very
similar, virtually independent of the priors (see Fig. 3), unless the priors reflected really
widely differing opinions.

The possibility that scientists might have distant and almost non-overlapping pri-
ors, such that agreement is reached only after a huge amount of very convincing data,
should not be overlooked, as this is, in fact, the typical situation in frontier research.
Even 100 events observed out of 0.1 expected from background are not a logical proof of
the existence of bursts, since the observation is not in contradiction with the background

Figure 2: Final distributions for the same experimental configuration of Fig. 1, but with a
Jeffreys’ prior with cut-off at $r_{\text{min}} = 0.01$ events/month (left plot) and $r_{\text{min}} = 0.1$ events/month
(right plot).

Figure 3: Distribution of the values of the rate $r$, in units of events/month, inferred from five
observed events, an expected rate of background events $r_b = 0.1$ events/month, and the following
priors: uniform distribution $f_o(r) = k$ (continuous); Jeffreys’ prior truncated at $r_{\text{min}} = 0.01$
(dashed). The case of the Jeffreys’ priors is also reported for $r_b = 1$ event/month (dotted).
alone. Nevertheless, any reasonable physicist will agree that this is highly unlikely (we shall come back to evolution of beliefs in Section 7.3.)

5.5 Priors reflecting the positive attitude of researchers

Having clarified the role of priors in the assessment of probabilistic statements about true values, and their critical influence on frontier-research results, it is clear that, in our opinion, “reference priors do not exist” [19, 44]. However, we find that the “concept of a ‘minimal informative’ prior specification - appropriately defined!” [15] can sometimes be useful, if the practitioner is aware of the assumptions behind the specification.

We can now ask ourselves what would be a prior specification common to rational and responsible people who have planned, financed and operated frontier-type experiments. This is what we call the positive attitude of researchers [20]. Certainly, the researchers believed there was a good chance, depending on the kind of measurement, that they would end up with a number of candidate events well above the background; or that the physical quantity of interest was well above the experimental resolution; or that a certain rate would be in the region of sensitivity. One can show that the results obtained with reasonable prior distributions, chosen to model this positive attitude, are very similar to those obtainable by an improper uniform prior and, in particular, the upper/lower bounds obtained are very stable (see Sections 5.4.3 and 9.1.1 of Ref. [20]).

Let us apply this idea to the exercise we are dealing with: 0, 1 or 5 events observed over a background of 1 event (Fig. 1). Searching for a rare process with a detector having a background of 1 event/month, for an exposure time of one month, a positive attitude would be to think that signal rates of several events per month are rather possible. On the other hand, the fact that the process is considered to be rare implies that one does not expect a very large rate (i.e. large rates would contradict previous experimental information), and also that there is some belief that the rate could be very small, virtually zero. Let us assume that the researchers are almost sure that the rate is below 30 events/month. We can consider, as examples, the following prior distributions.

- A uniform distribution between 0 and 30:
  \[ f_\circ(r) = \frac{1}{30} \quad (0 \leq r \leq 30). \]  
  \( (12) \)

- A triangular distribution:
  \[ f_\circ(r) = \frac{1}{450} (30 - r) \quad (0 \leq r \leq 30). \]  
  \( (13) \)

- A half-Gaussian distribution of \( \sigma_\circ = 10 \)
  \[ f_\circ(r) = \frac{2}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_\circ} \exp \left[ -\frac{r^2}{2\sigma_\circ^2} \right] \quad (r \geq 0). \]  
  \( (14) \)

The last two functions model the fact that researchers might believe that small values of \( r \) are more possible than high values, as is often the case. Moreover, the half-Gaussian distribution also models the more realistic belief that rates above 30 events/month are not excluded, although they are considered very unlikely.\(^9\) The three priors are shown in the upper plot of Fig. 4. The resulting final distributions are shown in the lower plot of the

\(^9\) We will see in Section 7.2 that realistic priors can be roughly modelled by a log-normal distribution. With parameters chosen to describe the positive attitude we are considering, this distribution would give results practically equivalent to the three priors we are using now.
same figure. The three solutions are practically indistinguishable, and, in particular, very similar to the results obtained by an improper uniform distribution (Fig. 1). This suggests that the improper uniform prior represents a practical and easy way of representing the prior specification for this kind of problem if one assumes what we have called the positive attitude of the researchers. Therefore, this prior could represent a way of reporting conventional probabilistic results, if one is aware of the limits of the convention. Seeking a truly objective probabilistic result — we like to stress the concept again — is a dream.

Figure 4: The upper plot shows some reasonable priors reflecting the positive attitude of researchers: uniform distribution (continuous); triangular distribution (dashed); half-Gaussian distribution (dotted). The lower plot shows how the results of Fig. 1, obtained starting from an improper uniform distribution, (do not) change if, instead, the priors of the upper plot are used.
6  Prior-free presentation of the experimental evidence

At this point, we want to reassure the reader (who we imagine at this point to be swirling around in the stormy sea of subjectivism) that it is possible to present data in an ‘objective’ way, on the condition that all thoughts of providing probabilistic results about the measurand are suspended.

Let us take again Bayes’ theorem (Eq. (2)), which we rewrite here in terms of the uncertain quantities of interest

\[ f(r \mid n_c, r_b) \propto f(n_c \mid r, r_b) \cdot f_0(r), \tag{15} \]

and consider only two possible values of \( r \), let them be \( r_1 \) and \( r_2 \). From (15) it follows that

\[ \frac{f(r_1 \mid n_c, r_b)}{f(r_2 \mid n_c, r_b)} = \frac{f(n_c \mid r_1, r_b)}{f(n_c \mid r_2, r_b)} \cdot \frac{f_0(r_1)}{f_0(r_2)}. \tag{16} \]

Bayes factor

This is a common way of rewriting the result of the Bayesian inference for a couple of hypotheses, keeping the contributions due to the experimental evidence and to the prior knowledge separate. The ratio of likelihoods is known as the Bayes factor and it quantifies the ratio of evidence provided by the data in favour of either hypothesis. The Bayes factor is considered to be practically objective because likelihoods (i.e. probabilistic description of the detector response) are usually much less critical than priors about the physics quantity of interest.\[ 10 \]

The Bayes factor can be extended to a continuous set of hypotheses \( r \), considering a function which gives the Bayes factor of each value of \( r \) with respect to a reference value \( r_{REF} \). The reference value could be arbitrary, but for our problem the choice \( r_{REF} = 0 \), giving

\[ R(r; n_c, r_b) = \frac{f(n_c \mid r, r_b)}{f(n_c \mid r = 0, r_b)}, \tag{17} \]

is very convenient for comparing and combining the experimental results [46, 47, 48]. The function \( R \) has nice intuitive interpretations which can be highlighted by reordering the terms of (16) in the form

\[ \frac{f(r \mid n_c, r_b)}{f_0(r)} \Bigg/ \frac{f(r = 0 \mid n_c, r_b)}{f_0(r = 0)} = \frac{f(n_c \mid r, r_b)}{f(n_c \mid r = 0, r_b)} = R(r; n_c, r_b) \tag{18} \]

(valid for all possible a priori \( r \) values). \( R \) has the probabilistic interpretation of relative belief updating ratio, or the geometrical interpretation of shape distortion function of the probability density function. \( R \) goes to 1 for \( r \to 0 \), i.e. in the asymptotic region in which the experimental sensitivity is lost: As long as it is 1, the shape of the p.d.f. (and therefore the relative probabilities in that region) remains unchanged. Instead, in the limit \( R \to 0 \) (for large \( r \)) the final p.d.f. vanishes, i.e. the beliefs go to zero no matter how strong

\[ \text{Note that this assumption might be questionable in the sophisticated field of g.w. search. For example, the effects of local sources of noise in the detectors are not well understood. This is what makes a substantial difference between a single detector and a coincidence experiment. The likelihood function summarizes the best knowledge about the g.w. burst detection and identification, and about noise behaviour, the tail of which can be very critical. In a coincidence experiment the detailed knowledge of the background becomes uncritical, as the only relevant hypothesis which makes accidental coincidence described by a Poisson distribution is the stationarity of the experimental conditions over the considered observation time.} \]
they were before. In the case of the Poisson process we are considering, the relative belief updating factor becomes

\[ R(r; n_c, r_b, T) = e^{-r T \left( 1 + \frac{r}{r_b} \right)^{n_c}}, \]  

with the condition \[ r_b > 0 \] if \( n_c > 0 \).

Figure 5 shows the \( R \) function for the numerical examples considered above. The abscissa has been drawn in a log scale to make it clear that several orders of magnitude are involved. These curves transmit the result of the experiment immediately and intuitively:

- whatever one’s beliefs on \( r \) were before the data, these curves show how one must change them;
- the beliefs one had for rates far above 20 events/month are killed by the experimental result;
- if one believed strongly that the rate had to be below 0.1 events/month, the data are irrelevant;
- the case in which no candidate events have been observed gives the strongest constraint on the rate \( r \);
- the case of five candidate events over an expected background of one produces a peak of \( R \) which corroborates the beliefs around 4 events/month only if there were sizable prior beliefs in that region.

Moreover there are some technical advantages in reporting the \( R \) function as a result of a search experiment.

- One deals with numerical values which can differ from unity only by a few orders of magnitude in the region of interest, while the values of the likelihood can be

---

11) The case \( r_b = n_c = 0 \) yields \( R(r) = e^{-r} \), obtainable starting directly from Eq. (17), defining \( R \), and from Eq. (6), giving the likelihood. Also the case \( r_b \to \infty \) has to be evaluated directly from the definition of \( R \) and from the likelihood, yielding \( R = 1 \ \forall r \); finally, the case \( r_b = 0 \) and \( n_c > 0 \) makes \( r = 0 \) impossible, thus prompting a claim for discovery – and it no longer makes sense for the \( R \) function defined above to have that nice asymptotic behaviour in the insensitivity region.

12) It really is a ‘must’ and not a ‘suggestion’. In fact, although probabilities may depend on individuals (‘subjective’), the way they are updated follows from standard logic (yielding Bayes’ theorem) and thus is ‘objective’.
extremely low. For this reason, the comparison between different results given by the $\mathcal{R}$ function can be perceived better than if these results were published in terms of likelihood.

Since $\mathcal{R}$ differs from the likelihood only by a factor, it can be used directly in Bayes’ theorem, which does not depend on constants, whenever probabilistic considerations are needed\footnote{Note that, although it is important to present prior-free results, at a certain moment a probability assessment about $r$ can be important, for example, in forming one’s own idea about the most likely range of $r$, or in taking decisions about planning and financing of future experiments.}. In fact,

$$f(r \mid n_c r_b) \propto \mathcal{R}(r; n_c, r_b) \cdot f_o(r).$$  (20)

The combination of different independent results on the same quantity $r$ can be done straightforwardly by multiplying individual $\mathcal{R}$ functions:

$$\mathcal{R}(r; \text{all data}) = \Pi_i \mathcal{R}(r; \text{data}_i).$$  (21)

Finally, one does not need to decide a priori if one wants to make a ‘discovery’ or an ‘upper limit’ analysis as conventional statistics teaches (see e.g. criticisms in Ref. \cite{41}): the $\mathcal{R}$ function represents the most unbiased way of presenting the results and everyone can draw their own conclusions.

7 A case study based on realistic detector performances

7.1 Prior-free results

We now give a numerical example which uses the realistic parameters of an actual g.w. antenna and simulates possible experimental outcomes that g.w. researchers could be faced with. One of the best performances, in terms of sensitivity and duty cycle, was obtained with the Explorer antenna in 1991 \cite{26,33}. The antenna worked with a duty cycle of 67% for $\simeq 180$ days, i.e. 122 effective days, at a noise level of $\simeq 8$ mK (that is in terms of signal amplitude $h = 7 \cdot 10^{-19}$). At the chosen threshold, $h = 2.5 \cdot 10^{-18}$, the event rate was roughly 100 events/day. We shall take this as the reference value of the background rate for our numerical examples.

We now imagine a coincidence analysis between two antennae having the 1991 Explorer characteristics, parallel to each other, far enough apart not to be sensitive to the same local effects and being operated for 1000 days. We consider here a fixed window of 0.2 s (see e.g. Refs. \cite{28} and \cite{34}), yielding an expected number of accidental coincidences of $r_b = 100 \times 100 \times 0.2/86400 = 0.02$ events/day. The expected number of accidental coincidences is, then, $E[n_c \mid r_b, T] = r_b T = \lambda_b = 20$ (the product $r_b T$ will be indicated hereafter by $\lambda_b$). Let us consider the following numbers of observed coincidences: $n_c = 10, 15, 20, 24, 29, 33, 38$, roughly corresponding to a difference between observation and background expectation ranging from $-2$ to $+4$ standard deviations $[\sigma(n_c \mid \lambda_b) = \sqrt{20}]$. The corresponding $\mathcal{R}$ values are shown in Fig. 6. We see that all results exclude rate values above $\approx 0.1$ bursts/day, while the experiment loses sensitivity below $\approx 0.001$ bursts/day.

In the case of excess of observed coincidences above the background expectation ($n_c > \lambda_b$), the $\mathcal{R}$ function has a peak at $r_m = n_c/T - r_b$, with a peak value of $\mathcal{R}_m = e^{-r_m}(n_c/\lambda_b)^{n_c}$. The peak rises very rapidly with $n_c$. For example, for $n_c = 38$ the peak value is roughly 600, at $r_m = 1.8 \cdot 10^{-2}$ bursts/day.

\footnote{See comments about the choice of the energy threshold in Section \ref{10.2}.}
Figure 6: Belief updating ratios on a log-log scale for different observations. The abscissa shows the signal rate, in events per day. The continuous curve correspond to an observation equal to the background, the other curves to a difference between observation and background expectation ranging from $-2$ to $+4$ standard deviations. The grey curve (+4 st. dev.) is the case that will be studied in more detail (see Figs. 7, 8 and 9).

7.2 Turning the results into probabilities

A peak value of 600 might seem impressive, especially if ‘advertised’ on a proper scale (in linear scale the plateau level $R = 1$ will be confused with 0, and the curve $f(r|n_c = 38)$ will appear very well separated from $r = 0$), and could easily convince non-experts that the searched-for signal exists. Nevertheless, confronted to such a result, there could be experts with strong physically motivated priors who would still maintain their scepticism, while others would hesitate. The reason is that in this domain of research prior knowledge is largely non-intersubjective. Even researchers who are members of the same experimental team do not usually share the same opinion, and the case of 38 events over an expectation of 20 is typical of those cases over which there could be disagreement: disagreement which could cause the result to be left unpublished for years, unless a charismatic and optimistic team spokesman persuaded his fellows to claim a discovery.

It is interesting to use Bayes’ theorem in a reversed mode to understand which kind of prior produces sceptical, hesitant and optimistic reactions. (We assume that researchers act in good faith and that they care about their reputation.) Above we have met two classes of priors: the uniform in $r$ and the uniform in $\log r$. One can easily imagine their effects, on the basis of the discussion concerning the example in Section 5 (see Figs. 2, 3). But we do not think that there is a single physicist whose prior beliefs correspond exactly to those of Eq. (10) or (11). It is much more reasonable to expect that someone would have a rough idea of the order of magnitude of g.w. burst rate, provided that they exist at all. Now, an easy way to model an uncertain order of magnitude is to think of a normal distribution in $\log r$, with most of the probability mass concentrated in some decades. The corresponding distribution of $r$ is called lognormal. Although this parametrization is, like any other, rough, it has some formal advantages which somehow reflect the prior knowledge of researchers: varying the two parameters of the distribution, one can choose the orders of magnitude of the value where the beliefs are concentrated; the probability density function goes to zero as $r \to 0$ (in agreement with the working hypothesis that the searched-for signal does exist, and hence at a non-null rate); the probability density function is defined for all positive values of $r$, thus capable of persuading even initially
Table 1: Dependence of initial and final probability for $r \geq 0.01$ bursts/day as a function of the prior parameters (see text).

| Reaction      | Prior parameters | $P(r \geq 0.01$ burst/day) |
|---------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
|               | $E[\log_{10}(r)]$ | $\sigma(\log_{10}(r))$ | prior | final     |
| sceptical     | $-4$             | $0.5$                       | $3.2 \cdot 10^{-5}$ | $0.9\%$   |
| hesitant      | $-3$             | $0.5$                       | $2.3\%$     | $50\%$    |
| optimistic    | $-2$             | $0.5$                       | $50\%$     | $85\%$    |

very sceptical people to change their mind as soon as the accumulated evidence starts to produce a narrow peak in $R$. When this situation of strong evidence is achieved, scientific conclusions (summarized in the final probability density function) will not depend on the details of the priors: All researchers will agree on the interpretation and the result will be considered objective (although, we repeat, it is only intersubjective).

Considering the situation of 38 events observed over an expected background of 20 events, the prior knowledge corresponding to the subsequent sceptical, hesitant and optimistic reactions can be modelled with a Gaussian in $lr = \log_{10}(r)$ having standard deviation 0.5 (i.e. half a decade) and averages of $-4$, $-3$ and $-2$. Table 1 gives the parameters of the three priors, as well as the probabilities that $r$ is above 0.01 bursts/day before and after the new experimental data. Figures 7 and 8 show the modelled priors and

![Figure 7: Pessimistic (continuous), optimistic (dotted) priors plotted in different scales \([lr \text{ stands for } \log_{10}(r)]\). The dashed line represents an intermediate situation. The grey curve is the $R$ function for 38 observed events out of 20 expected.](image)
the corresponding final distributions. The figures are drawn with several scales because each way of representing them can help one to get a feeling of what is going on.

Figure 8: Several representations of the final distributions resulting from the three different priors of Fig. 7 and the evidence from 38 observed events out of 20 events expected from background (grey curve of Fig. 7). Note that the $f$ stands for the generic symbol of p.d.f., but its mathematical function depends on the variable via the Jacobian.
7.3 Evolution of beliefs

We conclude this section with some remarks about the choice of the priors used to illustrate this situation. First, it is clear that the chosen model is important, but what we want to show is the rough distribution of beliefs. For example, although different parameters of the lognormal, or a different function of the probability, will produce numerical variations in the probability of the sceptical reaction, the qualitative conclusions will not change: Nobody possesses a psychological perception of probability which enables them to tell exactly whether their intuitive probability is 0.5, 1 or 2%. What matters is that these probabilities are perceived as rather low and well separated from the range which characterizes hesitation ($\approx 40–60\%$) or almost certainty ($\gtrapprox 90–95\%$). Second, although we are not going to enter into the detail of trying to explain why the three different researchers have such different priors, it is important to understand that, since we have in mind real researchers, priors are not simply abstract, aesthetic or philosophical ideas about the physical quantity. They summarize a complex prior knowledge, based on previous experimental observations as well as on theoretical ideas related to this and other observables (we shall come back to this point in Section 9). For example, looking at the numbers in Table 1 and the plots in Fig. 8 one could easily imagine that if the sceptical person was faced for a second time with independent evidence of similar strength to that provided by the 38 observed events (which could again come from antenna data, but also from other astrophysical information), he/she could be now in a situation similar to that of the hesitant person and the next time could be in the situation of the optimistic person. This evolution is illustrated in Fig. 9 which shows the p.d.f. of the initially sceptical researcher as he/she is faced four consecutive times with such rather strong (and quantitatively identical – clearly an academic exercise) evidence. After the fourth occasion, he/she will be strongly convinced that the rate is well above $10^{-2}$ bursts/day (see dotted curve of Fig. 9). Asymptotically, when a large number of pieces of evidence are in hand, the beliefs will be concentrated around the peak of the likelihood (i.e. $1.8 \cdot 10^{-2}$ bursts/day), as the prior distribution becomes irrelevant.\(^{15}\)

8 Reporting a result with an upper/lower bound

Although the $R$ function (which, we repeat, contains the same information as the likelihood function, but has the practical advantages we have illustrated) represents the most complete and unbiased way of reporting the result, it might also be convenient to express with just one number the result of a search which is considered by the researchers to be unfruitful. Before trying to give some recommendations, it is important to start by saying that any attempt to find a precise prescription, with the hope that a single number will summarize the experimental information completely, is a false endeavour. Nowadays it is not difficult, in fact, to provide the complete function $R$, parametrized in some way, no matter how complicated $R$ might be. This parametrization could be posted on a web page, or sent on request, if it was too voluminous for a published paper, as might be the case for multidimensional problems, or if several $R$ functions are obtained, depending on\(^{15}\) Given the rough modelling of the sceptical prior of this numerical example, one needs about 20 exposures to evidence of the kind considered, before the barycentre of the final distribution reaches the simulated `true value' of $1.8 \cdot 10^{-2}$ bursts/day. This is due to the rapidly decreasing tail of the log-normal distribution. It seems to us that, outside the order of magnitude considered more probable, the intuitive priors of experienced physicists for this kind of frontier physics quantity have flatter tails. As a consequence, once the final distribution has moved from the decades that one believed to be more probable, the convergence to the true value becomes faster.
Figure 9: Evolution of the p.d.f of a sceptical person (the grey curve is his/her initial prior) updated four times by independent evidence characterized by the same $R$ function provided by 38 observed events over an expected background of 20. Top and bottom plots differ only by the scales.

different assumptions about systematic effects or about the underlying phenomenology.\textsuperscript{16}

If, anyway, one wants to report the result considered inconclusive as a single number\textsuperscript{17} having the meaning of a bound, Fig. 6 suggests that this number should be in the region of $r$ where $R$ has a transition from 1 to 0. This value would then delimit (although roughly) the region in which the $r$ values are most likely to be excluded from the region in which it is most likely that the true value lies. One may take, for example, the value of $r$ for which $R(r) = 5\%$ or $1\%$ of the insensitivity plateau\textsuperscript{18} value (i.e. 0.05 or 0.01),

\textsuperscript{16} For example, the ZEUS Collaboration has recently published polynomial parametrizations of log-likelihoods, which contain the same amount of information of $R$, for each possible coupling of new contact interactions between electrons and quarks.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17} As is well known, in the case that $R$ depends on two parameters, like in neutrino oscillation analyses, one obtains a contour plot.

\textsuperscript{18} One could choose, alternatively, a value corresponding to a percentage of the maximum of the likelihood, and hence of $R$. As a convention, this could work as well, but: a) there is a problem of how to handle local maxima of the likelihood in cases more complicated than the one under study; b) if the maximum of $R$ is high enough, the $R$ function corresponding to the bound could be larger than 1. Note that, in the case of local maxima and minima of $R$, the condition $R(r) = 5\%$ or $1\%$ yields multiple solutions. In this case it seems to us natural to choose the one farthest from the insensitivity region.
or any other conventional number. What is important is not to call this value a bound at a given probability level (or at a given confidence level – the perception of the result by the user will be the same! [18]). This would be incorrect. In fact the \( \mathcal{R} \) function is not sufficient by itself for assessing a probabilistic statement about the quantity of interest.

If we had to suggest a possible convention for the upper bound, it would be to choose \( r_L \) such that \( \mathcal{R}(r_L) = 5\% \). The advantage of this convention is that it is easy to recover standard limits\(^{19}\) based on the rule “upper limit equals 3” (divided by the observation time) when no events are observed. In this case, in fact, the likelihood is \( f(n_c = 0 | r) = e^{-r T} \), and also \( \mathcal{R}(r; n_c = 0) = e^{-r T} \). Moreover, a standard Bayesian inference with \( f_o(r) = k \) (see discussion in Section 5.5) produces the same\(^{20}\) upper bound \([\text{Eq. (9)}]\).

We end this discussion about summarizing the objective result provided by the \( \mathcal{R} \) function in one number with a few cautionary remarks. First, we repeat that this result should not be called a 95\% confidence level upper bound. Second, as can easily be seen from Fig. 6 we do not think that it is worthwhile trying to define a conventional limit with the precision of a percentage level. Even defining the limit precisely, the expected statistical fluctuations of results from one experiment to another can easily change \( r_L \) by \( \approx 50\% \). Therefore, if one really wants to quote a number for the upper limit, together with the \( \mathcal{R} \) function, one should simply state the order of magnitude\(^{21}\) of \( r_L \) obtained, for example, with the \( \mathcal{R} = 5\% \) convention.

Finally, if one is interested in a limit having a probabilistic statement, one has to pass through the priors. In this case a possible way of producing conventional probabilistic limits would be to use a uniform distribution, as discussed in Section 5.5. Upper bounds calculated as 95\% probability upper limits for the results of Fig. 6 are given in Table 2 and are compared with the bounds obtained using the \( \mathcal{R} = 5\% \) rule. We see that the results are very similar, if we remember that high accuracy in these bounds is not needed, as discussed above.\(^{22}\)

Table 2: Comparison of the upper bounds obtained on the rate \( r \) using the \( \mathcal{R} = 5\% \) rule, or evaluated as a 95\% probability upper limit given by a Bayesian inference with uniform priors, with reference to the example of Section 7.1 (see Fig. 6). The values of the upper bounds are rounded to remember that we do not consider their exact value to be relevant (more digits are given within parentheses).

| Observed number of events | 10   | 15   | 20   | 24   | 29   | 33   | 38   |
|--------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 95\% prob. (10^{-2} evts/day) | 0.5  | 0.7  | 1.1  | 1.4  | 2    | 2    | 3    |
| \( \mathcal{R} = 5\% \) rule (10^{-2} evts/day) | \(0.51\) | \(0.73\) | \(1.06\) | \(1.43\) | \(1.96\) | \(2.41\) | \(2.98\) |
|  | \(0.54\) | \(0.81\) | \(1.30\) | \(1.91\) | \(2.90\) | \(3.83\) | \(5.13\) |

\(^{19}\) In this particular case the coincidence of the result obtained by the frequentistic prescription, the \( \mathcal{R}(r_L) = 5\% \) convention, and the standard Bayesian result is due to a numerical effect due to the particular likelihood.

\(^{20}\) In the most general case, the 95\% probability bound limit will be different from that obtained by the \( \mathcal{R} = 5\% \) convention, and this is all right as the meaning of the two bounds is different (see previous footnote).

\(^{21}\) For a discussion about the significant digits of limits, see Sections 9.1.4 and 9.3.5 of Ref. [20].

\(^{22}\) Another argument to understand our point is that the upper/lower limits should be considered to belong to the same category of uncertainties, and not of true values.
9 Does the searched-for process exist?

We have seen how to make the inference about the g.w. burst rate $r$, under the assumption that g.w. bursts exist. At this point some readers might have the objection that they are not interested in the values of the rate, but rather in whether g.w. bursts exist at all.

It is quite well understood by scientists and philosophers that, while the observation of a phenomenon proves its existence, non-observation does not prove non-existence (the classic example that philosophers like for this reasoning is that of the black swan). In our case, the problem is complicated by the fact that even the observations are not certain proof of the existence. This is because, as long as some background events are expected, we cannot be absolutely (mathematically) sure that the searched-for signal has been observed, no matter how many events are observed above those statistically expected from background alone. This argument concerns not only the frontier problems we are dealing with in this paper, but all theoretical concepts, including true values of physical quantities. So, to speak rigorously, we should only talk about beliefs. “Nevertheless, physics is objective, or at least that part of it that is at present well established, if we mean by ‘objective’ that a rational individual cannot avoid believing it. . . . The reason is that, after centuries of experimentation, theoretical work and successful predictions, there is such a consistent network of beliefs, that it has acquired the status of an objective construction: one cannot mistrust one of the elements of the network without contradicting many others. Around this solid core of objective knowledge there are fuzzy borders which correspond to areas of present investigations, where the level of intersubjectivity is still very low.” [20] As a consequence, it is not a question of proving or disproving something (unless some impossible consequences have been observed), but rather of how difficult it is to insert/remove something in/from what is considered to be the most likely network of beliefs.

Applying these considerations to the case study, the answer to the question whether or not g.w. bursts exist involves a complex knowledge of astrophysical and cosmological facts and theories. As a consequence, we tend to believe that they could exist until the experimental evidence is such that even the lowest conceivable rates of bursts carrying enough energy to pass the effective energy threshold, evaluated by the best of our knowledge, are ruled out. On the other hand, we tend to believe that they have really been observed experimentally when energy, rates and shapes of the signals match with the rest of the knowledge [23].

10 Dependence of the g.w. burst result on some systematic effects

This last section is dedicated to systematic effects on the result. Every experiment belonging to the class of inference that we are treating in this paper has its own problematics. We consider here only some of the effects which are more relevant for the case study we are dealing with, although some of the problems are common to other experiments. As a general recommendation, we find very helpful the detailed study of the sources of uncertainty, as e.g. listed in the ISO Guide [23], and the use of conditional probability. For a general scheme for the evaluation of uncertainties due to systematic effects, see Section 2.10.3 of Ref. [20].

[23] For example, if one observed a very high rate of very energetic bursts, which seems incompatible with the possible sources in the Universe, most physicists would tend to believe that there was something wrong with the experiment.
Returning to the inference of the g.w. burst rate, we have considered so far a case study performed using realistic parameters, but we have assumed ideal conditions concerning some aspects of the coincidence experiment. We will see below how the analysis strategy changes if we assume that the background is not perfectly known, or if it is not stationary; or if the physics process is not stationary. Before going into a discussion of these effects we need to consider the uncertainty about the optimal coincidence window and about the minimum g.w. energy to which the coincidence experiments are sensitive.

10.1 Choice of the coincidence window

The coincidence window should be set considering the physical behaviour of the sources, the distance between the detectors and the detector characteristics, i.e. the limited resolution introduced by the sampling time. But other effects can influence the choice, such as the noise that distorts the events or the fact that real signals may have unexpected shapes. So, in practice, the optimal coincidence window is usually chosen in order to maximize SNR, as a compromise between the demands for a reduced rate of accidental background on the one hand and for not missing physical events on the other. Therefore, the choice of the coincidence window involves unavoidably some arbitrariness, and several values of the window can be envisaged, to cope with the possible assumptions about the signals looked for. As a conclusion, we do not think that there is just one way of reporting results, and the \( R \) values corresponding to different reasonable choices should be presented separately.

10.2 Uncertainty on the minimum energy of g.w. bursts

At this point, we need to define more precisely the quantity \( r \) which is the subject of the measurement (the measurand). In fact, the case study assumed two parallel detectors responding to the same physical event which produced the burst of g.w.’s irradiating the Earth. This implies that \( r \) is the rate of g.w. bursts with energy greater than the highest energy threshold\(^{24} \) of the two detectors. Calling the differential energy spectrum of g.w. bursts \( \phi(E) \) \((= d r/dE)\), we have

\[
 r = r(E_{\text{min}}) \equiv \int_{E_{\text{min}}=E_{\text{thr}}^{\text{max}}}^{\infty} \phi(E) \, dE ,
\]

which states that \( r \) does, indeed, depend on the minimal energy \( E_{\text{min}} \) required for the burst to be detected. This minimal energy is related to the maximum of the two threshold energies \( E_{\text{thr}}^{\text{max}} \). Obviously, one will be interested in measuring the detailed \( \phi(E) \), when the high sensitivity of future detectors will allow measurement of many burst candidates for different energy thresholds.

It is easy to understand that the definition of the measurand given by Eq. \( (22) \) does not correspond to what is actually detected. In fact there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the energy resulting from the filter \( E_m \) and the energy of the burst. This is true for all kinds of measurements, with the only difference being that in the case of g.w. detection the spread of \( E_m \) around the true energy \( E \) can be rather large, depending on SNR. In fact, the intrinsic physical reason for this spread is noise: the measured energy of the detected signal depends on the randomness of size and phase of the noise.

\(^{24}\) We clarify that when we talk about energy, we really refer to g.w. energy, and not to mechanical energy released to the antenna.
at the moment of g.w. interaction \[39, 50\]. A further source of spread is the performance of the filter used in the analysis, as shown in Ref. \[34\].

This kind of problem can be partially solved, at the expense of a greater uncertainty about the measured quantity, if one is able to model the distortion of the spectrum $\phi(E)$ into $\phi(E_m)$. This can be done by mapping the transition probability $E \rightarrow E_m$ with a p.d.f. $f(E_m | E)$, which, in a discrete approximation, can be thought of as a transfer matrix. The knowledge of this transfer matrix then allows $\phi(E_m)$ to be unfolded to infer $\phi(E)$. However, unfolding g.w. burst energy spectra goes beyond the purposes of this paper. Therefore, hereafter it will be assumed that $r$ corresponds to the definition of the measurand given in Eq. (22).

10.3 Non-stationarity of the signal

Another assumption which entered in our previous considerations is that the g.w. bursts have a constant rate during the observation time. This assumption is consistent with the present status of knowledge and it leads researchers to model the arrival time of the bursts with a Poisson process of constant intensity over the whole period of observation. Nevertheless, one can envisage analysing the data with the hope of finding evidence for g.w. bursts in a short period, perhaps triggered by other independent observations which happened in the same period.\[26\] With this possibility in mind, it is preferable to analyse the data in subperiods, in order to exploit the potential of the information collected. The result over the full period of observation can be easily recovered by merging the partial results, as discussed in Section 3. It is easy to prove that, in fact, the result over the full period during which the noise has been stationary is exactly the same as can be evaluated by combining the subperiods, since

\begin{equation}
\mathcal{R} = \Pi_i \mathcal{R}_i = e^{-r} \sum_i T_i \left(1 + \frac{r}{r_b}\right)^{\sum_i n_{ci}} = e^{-r T} \left(1 + \frac{r}{r_b}\right)^{n_c} , \tag{23}
\end{equation}

where $T = \sum_i T_i$ and $n_c = \sum_i n_{ci}$. For this reason, it is preferable to keep results on short periods of observations separate.

10.4 Uncertainty on the value of the background rate

We have assumed that expected background rate is well known, as can be cross-checked using the off-timing technique and estimation from individual background rates. Nevertheless, one may be in a state of uncertainty about $r_b$; for example if the observation time is very small at a given level of background (see discussion below concerning the non-stationarity of background). In this case $r_b$ will be an uncertain number too and so will

\[25\] For examples of unfolding methods currently used in particle physics, when this kind of problem is encountered, see Refs. \[51\], \[53\] and \[52\]. An elementary introduction to the problem of unfolding methods, as well as of other simple methods, can be found in Ref. \[54\]. More sophisticated methods for spectrum unfolding and, generally speaking, image reconstruction, are presented in Refs. \[55\] and \[56\], respectively.

\[26\] Given the actual levels of background in present-generation detectors, it is very unlikely that one would be persuaded that a genuine train of g.w. bursts had really arrived in a short observation time, unless it happened to be a truly spectacular phenomenon. Nevertheless, one could ‘gate’ the candidate events by other pieces of evidence coming from independent sources of information concerning something that happened in a narrow time window. Such independent information could be related to optical, neutrino or $\gamma$-ray burst observations.
be characterized by a p.d.f. \( f(r_b) \). One then has a likelihood \( f(n_c \mid r, r_b) \) for each possible value of \( r_b \). The likelihood which takes into account all possible values of \( r_b \), each weighted with its degree of belief \( f(r_b) \), is obtained by the rules of probability, yielding

\[
f(n_c \mid r) = \int f(n_c \mid r, r_b) f(r_b) \, dr_b.
\] (24)

The case of a well-known background rate (\( r_b = r_{b0} \)) is recovered when \( f(r_b) \to \delta(r_b - r_{b0}) \), where \( \delta(\cdot) \) is the Dirac delta function. Note that \( f(n_c \mid r) \) will no longer be a Poisson distribution, and therefore the expression of the \( R \) function will also be more complicated than that of Eq. (19), although this is just a computational complication. This consideration leads to the prediction that the frequency distribution of random coincidences made over a long period of time, during which \( r_b \) fluctuates, can look quite different from a Poisson distribution.

A last remark concerns the meaning of \( f(r_b) \). This function is meant to describe the uncertainty about the exact value of \( r_b \) in a period which is considered to be stable to the best of our knowledge, and not the measured frequency distribution of the background rate during a long period. If one knows that different subperiods each had a different value of \( r_b \) (within the unavoidable uncertainty), this information must be used in a different way, as will be shown in the next section.

### 10.5 Non-stationarity of the noise

One of the most important and unavoidable problems in coincidence experiments is the non-stationarity of the noise. In fact, the chance of detecting a g.w. of minimum energy \( E_{\text{min}} \) depends not only on the filter threshold but also on the level of noise. A high level of noise acts as a high effective threshold for the g.w. signals, and, therefore, the high rate of collected data with a filter threshold much lower than this effective threshold contains no useful information for the coincidence analysis.

One might envisage two possible strategies for the data-taking of the individual antenna.

- **Fixed energy threshold**, as, for example, used in Ref. [26]. The threshold is fixed at a constant energy level independent of the detector noise. It follows that the event rate due to the background varies according to the detector noise level. However, as said above, this option does not imply that the rate of events due to g.w.’s is constant.

- **Varying energy threshold**, as, for example, used in Ref. [39]. The threshold level is given in terms of SNR, i.e. the energy of the threshold varies according to the detector noise. The event rate due to the background remains constant, while that due to the signals varies according to each threshold value (i.e. according to each sensitivity level of the detector).

We are aware of the complexity of this problem, and a full treatment of it goes beyond the purpose of this paper. However, we think that some general considerations can be made. The basic observation is that, as far as possible, in the final analysis one should try to keep the definition of the measurand fixed, as discussed above. If this goal is achieved (within the unavoidable uncertainties), although only in subperiods, it easy to combine the results referring to the same measurand by multiplying the \( R \) functions of each subperiod:

\[
\mathcal{R} = \prod_i \mathcal{R}_i = \prod_i e^{-r_i T_i} \left( 1 + \frac{r_i}{r_{bi}} \right)^{n_{c,i}}.
\] (25)
In contrast, results referring to different measurands, i.e. coincidences obtained at different effective thresholds, should be kept separate.

As a consequence of the above considerations, the natural procedure seems to be somewhat in between the two strategies outlined above. During the data-taking it is preferable to vary the threshold setting in order to keep the SNR at its lowest possible value and thus maximize the chance of detecting g.w. events. The large amount of background events which are collected in this way can be reduced by applying a more sophisticated selection before using the g.w. burst candidates for the coincidence procedure. Then, at the moment of the final analysis, the data should be reorganized according to the effective threshold of the less sensitive antenna (see Section 10.2). This is equivalent to performing many experiments at different effective thresholds, the result of each of which should be presented separately.

At this point, we think that a very simple simulation could help to make our points clearer. Let us take a numerical example by considering the case of two periods over which the system was stationary, with effective energy threshold $E_{th_i}$ ($i = 1, 2$). We take each period of $T_i = 1000$ days, for a total observation time of 2000 days. In each time interval the background rate is indicated by $r_{bi}$ and we simulate $n_{th_i}$ genuine g.w. bursts, plus a number of random coincidences exactly equal to the expectation value. Although the situation is obviously oversimplified, we think that it should help to make the general considerations more easily comprehensible.

10.5.1 Consequences of analysing together data taken at different effective thresholds

Let us consider $r_{b1} = 0.02$ events/day, yielding 20 background events in $T_1$ at the effective energy threshold $E_{th_1}$. At this energy threshold we simulate 18 genuine g.w. bursts. The result of this simulation is therefore $n_{c1} = 38$ observed coincidences.

During the period $T_2$ of a more noisy situation the threshold has been properly raised, to $E_{th_2} > E_{th_1}$, in order to keep $r_{b2} = 0.02$ events/day. Let us assume this result was obtained by doubling the threshold, i.e. $E_{th_2}/E_{th_1} = 2$. On the other hand, the number of coincidences due to g.w. bursts changes, as a certain fraction of the bursts will go below threshold. To get the order of magnitude of the effect, let us take the number of sources within the sensitivity volume increase as $d^3$, where $d$ is the maximum Earth-source distance reachable at the chosen threshold. Instead, the energy of g.w.’s released in the antenna goes like $d^{-2}$. Thus, the rate of observable bursts is the ratio of the two energy thresholds at the $-3/2$ power. Then, during $T_2$ we get $n_{c2} \approx 20 + 18 \times 2^{-3/2} \approx 26$.

The upper plot of Fig. 10 shows the situation: the dotted curve is the $R_1$, the black dashed curve is the $R_2$ (its peak value is $\approx 1.1$). The peak of $R_1$ and the peak of $R_2$ occur at different abscissae ($r_{m1} = 1.8 \cdot 10^{-2}$ bursts/day, $r_{m2} = 0.6 \cdot 10^{-2}$ bursts/day), as expected due to the difference in the thresholds. Since the two periods refer to different measurands, the product $R_1 \cdot R_2$ has no inferential meaning. Let us plot it, just to see what one would obtain by making improper use of the combination rule given by Eq. (21). Let us imagine also, for comparison, the full period analysed as a single coincidence experiment. The corresponding $R$ function is indicated by $R_{AV}$ and is obtained using a total number of simulated coincidences $n_c \approx 40 + 18 + 6 = 64$. Figure 10 shows that $R_1 \cdot R_2$ and $R_{AV}$ coincide, but this does not justify the use of $R_{AV}$, as we know that $R_1 \cdot R_2$ is wrong too. It is important to note that the position of the peak has moved

These very long subperiods are chosen to give a sufficient number of coincidences when we consider only two data samples. Obviously, the same considerations hold if the subperiods have lengths of hours, as is more reasonable.
to a value strongly influenced by the data taken in the less sensitive period. The peak value is also reduced. Both these effects are a consequence of the mixing of different physics quantities. This effect can be shown more clearly by a new simulation in which the effective threshold during $T_2$ is raised by a factor of 5 (bottom plot of Fig. 10). While the first period contains quite strong evidence in favour of g.w. bursts of energy $E > E_{th_1}$ and the second period provides a strong constraint for bursts of the higher energy $E_{th_2}$, the incorrect combinations mix up the two pieces of information, effectively spoiling both individual results.

10.5.2 Combination of data having the same effective threshold

The results on the burst rate, with g.w.’s having a minimum energy $E_{th_1}$, can only be obtained using the data collected during $T_1$. In contrast, information about g.w. bursts exceeding $E_{th_2}$ can be obtained from both periods. The proper combination of the two pieces of information is achieved by selecting the subsample of events taken during $T_1$ which have $E > E_{th_2}$. The rate of background events exceeding $E_{th_2}$ can be evaluated by taking an exponential law relating threshold and rate, obtained assuming a Gaussian noise for the amplitude [50]. We then obtain $r'_{b_1} = r_{b_1} e^{-E_{th_2}/E_{th_1}} \approx 2.7 \cdot 10^{-3}$. The number of observed events in our simplified simulation is therefore $n'_{c_1} = 2.7 + 18 \times 2^{-3/2} \approx 9$. 

Figure 10: Effect of naïve combination of data taken at different effective thresholds. In both plots the dotted curve is the $R$ function of the data taken in the low-noise period ($T_1$). The black dashed curve is the $R$ function of the data taken in the more noisy period ($T_2$) such that the threshold had to be varied by a factor of 2 (upper plot) or 5 (lower plot). The continuous and the grey dashed lines (overlapping) represent $R_1 \cdot R_2$ and $R_{AV}$ (see text).
Figure 11: Combination of data sets using the same effective energy threshold. The dotted curves are the $R$ functions of the data taken in low noise period ($T_1$), selected to have an effective threshold equal to the data taken in the more noisy period ($T_2$). The ratio of the selection threshold to the data taking threshold is a factor 2 (upper plot) and a factor 5 (lower plot). The continuous lines represent $R_{1\&2} = R_1 \cdot R_2$, i.e. the correct combination of the two datasets. The grey dashed lines represent, instead, the result obtained by a naïve average of the two data sets.

The $R$ functions relative to $E > E_{th_2}$ for the two periods are plotted in the upper plot of Fig. [11]. The dotted curve is $R_1$ and the black dashed curve is $R_2$. The peaks of $R_1$ and $R_2$ are now both at $r_m = 0.6 \cdot 10^{-2}$ bursts/day, as the data refer to the same effective energy threshold. The combined result is obtained by multiplying the two partial results (i.e. $R_{1\&2} = R_1 \cdot R_2$) and is shown by the continuous line in Fig. [11]. The evidence achieved by the combination of the two results is much better than was obtained in the good (i.e. low-noise) period alone. This is a general result obtained in a natural way in the approach presented, and is in qualitative agreement with intuition. In fact, it is reasonable to think that, if data are analysed correctly, even a very noisy period, in which the detector is practically blind, should not spoil the evidence provided by the good period. The overall evidence should increase as long as new data sets each containing a bit of information are added to the analysis. The formalization of these considerations comes from the observation that $R$ has a constant value of 1 for $r_b \to \infty$ [see footnote immediately after Eq. (19)].

The $R$ function obtained by averaging the two periods, and indicated again by $R_{AV}$, is now obtained using $r_{b_{AV}} = 1.13 \cdot 10^{-2}$ events/day and $n_c = 35$ coincidences. The
corresponding $R_{AV}$ function is shown, for comparison, by the grey dashed line in Fig. 11. This way of combining the data is unjustified, as it is not derived from general rules of inference. Besides general arguments, the figure shows that the naïve combination is less efficient at using at best the evidence provided by the two sets of data. As before, a new simulation in which the expected background rate during $T_2$ is five times that during $T_1$, can illustrate more clearly this result. In fact, in the bottom plot of Fig. 11, one can now see that the noisy period provides only a very small piece of evidence; nevertheless, the correct combination of the two periods takes advantage even of this very tiny piece of evidence, and the combined $R_{1\&2}$ has a peak slightly higher than $R_1$. One can see that the naïve combination of the two periods, on the other hand, spoils the result obtained by the first period alone. This is obviously absurd: It is true that an infinitely noisy period brings no new information to the physical quantity of interest, but neither should it spoil the result achieved in the good period.

### 11 Conclusions

The problem of reporting the result about the intensity of a Poisson process at the limit of the detector sensitivity and in the presence of background has been analysed from the perspective of probabilistic inference. This approach assumes that probability is related to the status of uncertainty and its value classifies the plausibility of hypotheses in the light of all available knowledge. We consider this approach the most general one to draw probabilistic conclusions in conditions of uncertainty, which is always the case when we want to infer the value of a physics quantity from experimental observations.

This approach is also known as Bayesian statistics because of the key role played by Bayes’ theorem in updating probability in the light of new data. We have given arguments to show that Bayes’ theorem is quite natural and produces results in qualitative agreement with intuition. That probabilistic conclusions depend also on priors is natural too, although their presence tends to produce uneasiness in the practitioners. This kind of ‘priors anxiety’ can be overcome if one understands their meaning and their role, which we have illustrated here with examples.

We have shown that the contribution of the priors becomes irrelevant in routine cases, i.e. when the response of the detector is very narrow around the true value. However, in frontier-science measurements, priors become crucial; so crucial that it is preferable to refrain from providing probabilistic results. In this situation, the most objective way of reporting the result is to give directly likelihoods, or rescaled likelihoods in the form of relative belief updating ratios ($R$ functions), described in this paper. The advantage of reporting $R$ functions is that they are easily perceived and the combination of several experimental results can be achieved in the most efficient way.

From the perspective illustrated in this paper, we consider a false problem that of finding a unique and objective prescription to calculate upper/lower limits (or contour curves, in the case of two-dimensional problems), which would summarize efficiently the result of the experiment and would allow a consistent combination of results. Nowadays it is easy to provide the complete $R$ function, or several $R$ functions, depending on assumptions with regard to systematic effects. Nevertheless, we understand that it can be practical to summarize the results with a number which roughly separates the region in which the experiment loses sensitivity (and $R$ goes to 1) from the region practically ruled out by the data ($R \rightarrow 0$). This number can be based on a conventional value of the $R$ function in the region of transition between 1 and 0. We have shown that similar numbers for the bounds can be obtained using a standard Bayesian inference which uses
a uniform prior. The upper/lower bounds calculated in this latter way can be interpreted as the probabilistic limits that would be evaluated by the researchers sharing a positive attitude toward the possibility of the planned search.

The ideas illustrated in this paper have already been applied to combine all pieces of evidence able to constrain the Higgs boson mass [15] and to the analysis of deep-inelastic scattering events to search for new contact-type interactions between electrons and quarks [16,17]. We have shown here that they are very useful in the analysis of gravitational wave bursts in coincidence experiments. Indeed, the publication of the results in terms of \( \mathcal{R} \) functions for signals above a well-defined effective threshold (within unavoidable uncertainty) represents an efficient way of taking advantage of all possible pieces of evidence hidden in the data.

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Note added

We would like to bring the attention of the reader to an interesting report [57] which appeared while the present paper was going through the final editing procedures. Although much of the effort of the author has been dedicated to “deduce correct confidence limits”, the report of Eitel shows for the first time (log-)likelihood functions of neutrino oscillation experiments as 3-D plots (Figs. 2, 5 and 13). Since offsets in log-likelihoods are equivalent to factors in likelihoods, these results can be easily reinterpreted with the language developed in our paper: The asymptotic insensitivity region corresponds to level 100 of Fig. 2 and level 0 of Fig. 13 (unfortunately, level \( \approx 84 \) is out of scale in Fig. 5). Moreover, the similarity between the curves of Fig. 14 of Ref. [57] and the \( \mathcal{R} \) functions of our paper is self-evident. Indeed, these curves transmit the experimental result immediately and intuitively. Comparing Figs. 13 and 6 (and then extrapolating to Fig. 5, where the ‘flat ridge’ is missing), one can realize how misleading the standard way of presenting neutrino oscillation results as spots in the \( \{ \sin^2 2\theta, \Delta m^2 \} \) plane can be. Figure 6 gives the impression that LSND rules out all parameter space outside the spots. However, Fig. 14 shows that LSND only rules out the parameter region which is also excluded by KARMEN. Most of the complementary region is the region of insensitivity. In the boundary between these two regions (where KARMEN has already lost sensitivity), there is certainly a spot where there is very high evidence (we assume no systematic effects have been overlooked), but this evidence cannot lead us to necessarily believe that the true values of \( \sin^2 2\theta \) and \( \Delta m^2 \) are there, unless we have other reasons to believe it.

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