Chapter 22: India as Global Security Actor

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Abstract

Thanks to sustained economic growth and key investments in military capabilities, India will face growing demands from within and the international community to seek and play a greater role in global security affairs. The values and interests likely to guide India’s future behavior will be a mixture of old and new, eastern and western. India’s international aspirations have an important pre-history, covered in this chapter’s first section where non-alignment, as idea and practice, is explored for its enduring significance. India’s relevance as a security actor is assessed in terms of its activities and capacity to influence developments within two security zones of major contemporary importance: Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean. Finally, a section on the constraints and challenges examines India’s ability to navigate a multi-polar world, the fallout and gains of nuclearization, the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal, as well as ‘the weaknesses from within’ in terms of human security.

Keywords: Security, India, Pakistan, China, Afghanistan, Indian Ocean, Non-alignment, Nuclearization, Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal, Human Security.
Introduction

Since India gained independence in 1947 it has faced a number of military and security challenges from within South Asia and the neighboring region. One of the least economically integrated areas in the world, South Asia hosts three nuclear weapon states: China, India and Pakistan. After four wars (in 1947, 65, 71 and 99) and a number of brinkmanship-style crises, India-Pakistan relations continue to be acrimonious, with some describing the rivalry as ‘conflict unending’ (Ganguly 2002). Despite the unstable regional environment India sought and succeeded in casting an international profile for itself.

India’s international aspirations have an important pre-history, which will be covered in the first section, where the idea and practice of non-alignment is explored to highlight and explain its enduring significance in India. India’s relevance as a security actor will then be assessed in terms of its activities and capacity to influence developments within two security zones of major contemporary importance: Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean. Finally, a section on constraints and challenges examines India’s ability to navigate a multi-polar world, the fallout and gains of nuclearization, the 2008 US-India civil nuclear agreement as well as ‘weaknesses from within’ in terms of human security. With sustained economic growth and key investments in military capabilities (see Tables 1 & 2 below for a comparative overview), India will face growing internal demands as well as from the international community to play a greater role in global security affairs. Nonetheless, there are a number of important impediments to India’s readiness and ability to take on responsibilities or to influence matters of global security.

India is among the anointed ascendant powers also known as the BRICS countries, of which China and Russia are also examined in this volume. The diffusion of power across the world tends to be identified through figures such as economic growth, trade balance and foreign exchange reserves (see for example National Intelligence Council 2012). Bourgeoning centers of production in Asia, the rise of globally competitive companies from Asia are contrasted with sluggish economies in the United States and Europe, prompting scholars, analysts and policymakers to identify a tectonic shift in the global system. Publications have proclaimed the 21st century to be the Asian century (e.g. Asian Development Bank 2011). Others have explored sources of resilience in western ideas and institutions (Fukuyama 2012 or Ferguson 2012) or have depicted change as the ‘rise of the
rest’ (Zakaria 2012). Neo-realists are concerned with the implications of shifts in polarity (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009) and the instability caused during a power transition. The liberal institutionalists instead highlight the challenges to finding a new global consensus on universal norms and codes of conduct (Moravcsik 2012). The former emphasizes security as a hard concept of military preparedness whilst the latter, draws attention to human security concerns related to terrorism, unsustainable development, internal conflict and humanitarian crises. India is central to both perspectives given its growing economy, the critical significance of India’s strategic behavior for the wider region, the strength but also weakness of the Indian state in the face of internal challenges and the resilience of its political system.

Table 1: Military Capabilities 2012 – India, Pakistan, China and USA

|               | India   | Pakistan | China   | United States |
|---------------|---------|----------|---------|---------------|
| Nuclear       | Nuclear Weapons 1 (total: deployed & other) | 80 - 100 | 90 -110 | 240 | 8,500 |
|               | Army Main Battle Tanks 2 | 3,233 | 2,411 | 7,400 | 5,855 |
| Navy          | Submarines 3 | 15 | 8 | 71 | 71 |
|               | Principal Surface Combatants 1 (aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates) | 21 | 10 | 78 | 114 |
|               | Air Force Aircraft (combat capable) 4 | 798 | 453 | 1,693 | 1,435 |
| Troops        | Active Troops (rounded) 5 | 1,325,000 | 642,000 | 2,285,000 | 1,569,000 |
|               | Paramilitary (rounded) 6 | 1,301,000 | 304,000 | 660,000 | - |
|               | Manpower fit for Military Service (rounded) 7 | 489,572,000 | 75,327,000 | 618,589,000 | 120,022,000 |

Sources:

1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2011), approximate estimates as of January 2011.
2 International Institute for Strategic Studies (2012), 56, 234, 244, 272
3 Ibid., 57, 235-236, 244-245, 273.
4 Ibid., 63, 238, 246, 274.
5 Ibid., 54, 233, 243, 272.
6 (Central Intelligence Agency 2012), 2010 estimates.
India’s Worldview

Early foundations of independent India’s foreign policy

Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, who led the country from 1947 to 1964 and simultaneously was external affairs minister, is considered the architect of independent India’s foreign policy. As a young man, Jawaharlal travelled widely and read and wrote extensively, especially during his long prison sentences in India, stimulating a strong interest in world politics and history (Nehru 1934). The violent partition that accompanied India’s independence, the first India-Pakistan war of 1947/48 and subsequent impasse over Kashmir, were early shocks for the newly established nation⁴. While the relationship with Pakistan worsened, Nehru invested all his energies in improving relations with the newly established People’s Republic of China.

Panchasheela or the five principles of peaceful coexistence were enshrined in an agreement between India and China in 1954. Nehru regarded this a crowning achievement of his diplomacy, earning him the credit of negotiating the first major international treaty with the People’s
Republic of China (Schöttli 2012, Chapter Six). While the treaty contained a preamble pertaining to Panchasheela it mainly succeeded in making India rescind all interests, claims or rights to Tibet and securing Indian recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. ‘Peaceful coexistence’ between the two giants enabled a brief phase of amity known as ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’ (“Indians and Chinese are brothers”) but was unable to prevent the 1962 border war and generated a Chinese claim over 33,000 square kilometers of land under Indian jurisdiction.

Non-alignment, the central pillar of India’s Cold War foreign policy can be linked to Mahatma Gandhi’s ideas of self-reliance, non-violence and the pursuit of truth as the basis for action (Nehru 1963). In his statements and speeches Nehru argued this was India’s only way of maintaining independence in a bi-polar global conflict. Non-alignment was not only driven by normative principles but also enabled India to receive aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union⁵. It is debatable whether non-alignment protected India and prevented South Asia from becoming a more contested arena. India’s desire to keep out the superpowers failed early on when Pakistan concluded a mutual defense treaty with the USA in 1954, nurturing close relations with both the USA and China. By 1971 Indira Gandhi signed a Treaty of Friendship with the USSR, which was to become India’s most reliable ally, calling into question, India’s ‘neutrality’ especially during the Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Within India, non-alignment served another important purpose of keeping the military in check. In reaction to Britain’s use of Indian armed forces during the 19th century and the two World Wars, independent India inherited an ambivalent attitude towards the use of physical power and force. Given Nehru’s solidarity with anti-colonial struggles⁶ it was important to demonstrate India’s credentials as peace loving and non-hegemonic. The defense budget was kept minimal and defense planning was non-existent, enabling China to quickly overrun Indian forces in 1962. Nonetheless, the decision to maintain a professional armed force (also a valuable employer) was never questioned and India early on became one of the biggest contributors to United Nations Security Council-mandated peacekeeping operations (Nambiar 2009).

It could be argued that both non-alignment and Panchasheela were a failure given the inability to prevent major wars with India’s neighbors. In neither case did the Non-Aligned Movement play a role. Nor did Panchasheela earn India the trust and amity of smaller neighbors with whom
relations remained troubled and tense throughout the 1980s and even into the 1990s. Despite this, non-alignment and Panchasheela continue to resonate with the Indian and even international publics. In a post-Cold War World, India persists in promoting the Non-Aligned Movement and Panchasheela is mentioned in major speeches and at keynote events. Some have argued that India suffers from a lack of strategic thinking (Tanham 1992) and unwillingness to assume a proactive foreign policy. Instead, India’s political culture predisposes the country to ‘muddling through’ or a preference for strategic ambiguity (Chaulia 2011, 27–28).

*Non-alignment 2.0: framing India’s Grand Strategy*

In January 2012 an unusual document was released in India entitled, “Non-alignment 2.0”, written by eight high-profile and influential thinkers – Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt Gen (Retd) Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran and Siddharth Varadarajan. ‘Non-alignment 2.0’ seeks to identify the ‘basic principles’ guiding India’s foreign and strategic policy and to present a ‘re-working’ of the ‘fundamental principle’ of non-alignment. In their words, “The core objectives of Non-Alignment were to ensure that India did not define its national interest or approach to world politics in terms of ideologies and goals that had been set elsewhere; that India retained maximum strategic autonomy to pursue its own developmental goals; and that India worked to build national power as the foundation for creating a more just and equitable global order” (Khilnani et al. 2012, 8).

Strategic autonomy, the authors propound, has and continues to underpin, India’s foreign and security policies (Khilnani et al. 2012, 6). However, why and whether ‘non-alignment’ is an overarching banner or the foundation stone for India’s policies in the 21st century is not explicitly investigated. After referring to non-alignment at the beginning, barely any mention of it is made in the report’s seventy pages. No empirical evidence is provided of when and how effectively, India has actually implemented non-alignment in the 21st century. Neither is the term examined in terms of its original application or theoretical potential as a normative framework for international relations more generally. Non-alignment is crucial to how the document is pitched but the arguments do not rest on a conceptual, empirical or theoretical application of the term.
Nonetheless the document is instructive particularly with regards the relationship between security and development that the authors construe. Very early in the document, the authors propound that “the success of India’s own internal development will depend decisively on how effectively we manage our global opportunities in order to maximize our choices—thereby enlarging our domestic options to the benefit of all Indians” (Khilnani et al. 2012, iii). In other words, development is projected as dependent on the success of India’s foreign policy—a recognition that global opportunities need to be managed opportunistically to deliver benefits at home and, a confirmation of the essential role that the state must play as mediator and manager of external events. At the same time, there is an additional dimension to India’s performance lying in its ability to act as an example, to provide a developmental model combining economic growth, social inclusion and political democracy.

Development and security are therefore tightly inter-linked, one legitimating the other: ‘Enhance India’s strategic space and capacity for independent action – which in turn will give it maximum options for its own internal development’ is the justification offered by the authors, Khilnani et al. The treatise is a securitization of development for it proclaims how urgently developmental goals (not fully specified) must be pursued, how decisions taken now will have an irreversible impact on the future and that nothing must steer India off its course. The document proclaims that India can and should be a different kind of power, one that ‘sets new standards for what the powerful must do’. India’s national power will thus act as the foundation for creating a more just and equitable global order.

The belief that India has an alternative to offer runs deep. Thanks to a legacy drawn from the freedom struggle, Mahatma Gandhi’s ideas and leadership, combined with Nehru’s extensive and erudite statements on international politics, India has actively sought to be a contributor to the ideas and practices of international politics. Non-alignment and Panchasheela are central examples, projected by Jawaharlal Nehru and his successors but there are others such as Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s proposed Action Plan for Nuclear Disarmament in 1988. Translated into measures of actual influence, India’s room to maneuver on the global stage of diplomacy has been highly constrained not least due to a lack of hard power capabilities. Other factors include an unstable neighborhood which for much of independent India’s development, has been a primary security concern given that India shares borders with each of the South Asian countries, all of
them post-colonial states. See Table 3, below, for an overview of wars, conflicts and terrorist attacks affecting India.

Table 3: Wars, Conflicts and Terrorist Attacks

| India versus Pakistan | Other international conflicts | Internal Conflicts | Terrorist Attacks |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| 2002                  | Crisis along the border: Operation Parakram | 1987 – 1990 | Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka |
| 1999                  | Kargil War                  | 1962              | China-Indian Border War |
| 1990                  | Kashmir Crisis              | 1983 – 2010       | Assam |
| 1987                  | Brass tacks Maneuvers       | 1983 – 1993       | Punjab |
| 1984                  | Siachen Glacier             | 1978 – 2009       | Manipur |
| 1971                  | Third India-Pakistan War    | 1978 – 2006       | Tripura |
| 1965                  | Second India-Pakistan War   | 1961              | ‘Liberation’ of Goa |
| 1947 – 1948           | First India-Pakistan War    | 1952 – 2007       | Nagaland |
| 1947                  | Partition                   | 1948              | Hyderabad police action |
|                       |                             | 1947              | Junagadh Intervention |
|                       |                             |                   | 2008 | Terrorist Attacks on Mumbai |
|                       |                             |                   | 2008 | Suicide bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul |
|                       |                             |                   | 2007 | Samjhauta Express bombings |
|                       |                             |                   | 2001 | Attack on the Indian Parliament |

Source: (Mitra 2011, 182) and (Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 2012).

With the fall of the Berlin wall and the Soviet Union’s collapse, India was faced not only with having to manage a severe balance of payments crisis in 199110 but also the diplomatic challenge of re-positioning itself in a newly configured global arena. To illustrate India’s recalibration of options and opportunities, the following section examines India’s response to two contemporary, global security challenges: how to stabilize and secure Afghanistan and the protection of sea lanes of communication and trade in the Indian Ocean.
India as global security actor

India in Afghanistan

The year 2011 marked a culmination in India’s involvement in Afghanistan. The signing of an Afghanistan-India Strategic Partnership was the first of its kind for Afghanistan and, in November 2011 India attended the Turkey-hosted “Security and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia” conference with all regional stakeholders. The significance of these two events lies in India’s involvement and efforts to gain, establish and consolidate its foothold in Afghanistan to exert influence not only within Afghanistan but also beyond, into Central Asia. Including provisions for India to train and equip Afghan security forces, the partnership agreement called for closer cooperation on national security issues and enhanced prospects for regional economic cooperation.

In recent years India has strengthened bilateral relations with Afghanistan and bolstered its position within multilateral arrangements. This marks a new phase in Indian strategic behavior as Indian diplomats, negotiators and decision-makers lobby across multiple fora. These include India’s presence at the various international conferences that have taken place with Afghan leaders in European cities over the past decade, the 2012 Tokyo donors’ conference and within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations.

India’s role and interests have often been sidelined despite pledging almost US$2.0 billion on various projects to emerge the fifth largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan. For instance, at the 2011 London conference the initiation of negotiations with the Taliban was announced, based on the ability to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban members. This was a policy turn that India was not in favor of, but which, in the end, it was forced to accept. Past US policy has regarded India to be a destabilizing factor given the suspicion and resentment aroused in Pakistan by every move and indication of Indian involvement (Hanauer and Chalk 2012, x). India’s efforts to become a full member (currently it has observer status) within the SCO have also been blocked by smaller members such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan expressing concern that India’s entry would require Pakistan’s and that the bitter rivalry would stymie the organization’s work. Numerous observers and analysts agree that the distrust and hostility between India and Pakistan is a major
obstacle to India consolidating its position in Afghanistan, a step that Pakistan regards in zero-sum terms\textsuperscript{11}.

India’s strategy towards Afghanistan has been two-fold: the use of soft power to win ‘hearts and minds’ and to integrate Afghanistan into a regional network of trade and transport. Indian companies and the Indian government are building roads, providing medical facilities and spearheading educational initiatives. Projects like these are not without strategic interest such as the construction of the 218-kilometer long Zaranj-Delaram highway, enabling Afghanistan’s access to the sea via Iran and providing a shorter route for Indian goods to Afghanistan. India’s Border Roads Organization completed this major project in 2008. India was also the major promoter behind the initiative to make Afghanistan a full member of SAARC in 2007. Reflecting a general effort to enhance its soft power profile, the recently launched Indian Agency for Partnership in Development is slated to manage more than $11 billion in aid transfers to countries such as Burma and Bangladesh over the next five to seven years.

While the consensus so far has been to avoid deeper engagement in Afghanistan, there are those who advocate a more assertive role, especially in order to secure the country’s single-most crucial goal, preventing Pakistan from regaining a central role in Afghan affairs (Pant 2011). Nevertheless, the likelihood of Indian military engagement is remote. India is far more likely to intensify diplomatic efforts to enhance its influence, in particular through regional players such as Iran and Russia. In this respect, India has shown persistence and skill in developing a wider Afghanistan policy to the extent that recently, it hosted Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton and, an Iranian trade delegation on the same day in New Delhi.

Turning to the Indian Ocean Region, one notices in India’s activities a similar ability to negotiate and navigate a variety of configurations.

*The Indian Ocean Region: Maritime Reorientations*

With the largest navy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), India has taken important steps to consolidate its naval capabilities through strategic exercises as well as diplomatic initiatives (Brewster 2010). These include the decision to establish a central command on the Andaman Nicobar Islands providing India a stepping-stone into South East Asia (See Map 1 below). More
recently, plans have been implemented to develop new ports along the eastern coast and in 2009 India unveiled its first indigenously designed and built, ballistic missile submarine, the *INS Arihant*. The Indian navy has been active in humanitarian and rescue operations, participating significantly in relief missions following the 2004 Tsunami disaster. In 2006, naval vessels evacuated more than 2,000 Indian, Sri Lankan, and Nepali expatriate nationals from Lebanon during its war with Israel and 16,000 Indians from Libya in 2011. Furthermore, the navy has been involved in counter-piracy operations since 2008, with substantial deployments to the European Union-lead Operation *Atalanta* in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin.

[Map 1: Indian Ocean Region]

India’s new activism is understandable given that almost ninety percent of India’s oil needs are imported via the sea. Equally important, the sea-lanes to the Persian Gulf, Europe and East Asia are vital for the country’s exports. While China makes forays into the IOR through a rapid expansion of commercial and maritime ties with Bangladesh, Iran, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, India has activated naval ties with Mozambique, Mauritius and the Seychelles. As part of its outreach to South East Asia during the 1990s (known as the ‘Look East Policy’), the *Milan* multilateral exercises were initiated in 1995 and since then institutionalized into a bi-annual event involving fourteen countries. In 2008 India proposed, and launched the *Indian Ocean Naval Symposium*, which meets regularly, bringing together navy chiefs from within the IOR. Complementing India’s new maritime thrust, in 1996 India was invited to join the security forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ERF) and in 2005, the East Asia Summit process that focuses on political and security issues in Asia. In 2010, India participated in the first expanded gathering of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting.

To date, India has been welcomed into multilateral arrangements and operations concerning the IOR. India has taken the initiative to create new institutions as well as breathe new life into existing ones, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), committed to upholding a system of open regionalism. However, as in the case of Afghanistan, Indian policymakers will have to make critical decisions about how to balance growing demands for Indian involvement with the reticence about displaying and exerting military power abroad as India develops global interests. Analysts have pointed out that, to operate in distant waters, the
Indian Navy will ultimately need operational facilities requiring special political relationships and military partnerships with the countries concerned. These were precisely the arrangements that Indian security advisors rejected during the Cold War and to which India objects when China seeks nodes of access into the Indian Ocean.

India has shown its eagerness to participate in existing multilateral security initiatives in the IOR and the capacity to lead new ones. As in the case of Afghanistan, Indian diplomats can draw upon long traditions of historical interaction across a broad swathe of regions, from Central Asia to the expanse of littoral states within the Indian Ocean where India is generally regarded as a benign power (Brewster 2010, 16). India’s success at sustaining democracy helps to project India’s non-hegemonic image and the political values of inclusion, consensus and pluralism that India has embraced. Undoubtedly, these are in need of continuous reaffirmation at home but act as compelling principles for India’s inter-state interactions.

Challenges and Opportunities

*India in a multi-polar world*

India’s ability to act on the global stage is molded as much by its will and worldview as by opportunities and constraints arising from developments within the country as well as externally. Integration into a globalizing world economy and the shedding of ideological determinants of foreign policy opened up new avenues of influence and interest for India. India’s economic reforms and thrust towards liberalization in the 1990s unleashed an economic dynamism enabling Indian companies to do business abroad and to attract foreign investments in India. Economic relations have become inter-linked with security considerations as India’s trade balance (see Table 4) and energy needs have grown over time. As a result, while relations with major trade partners such as China and the United States have drastically improved over the last two decades, they have also been susceptible to critique and concerns within the domestic political arena.
Table 4: Socio-Economic Indicators for India, Pakistan, China and the United States

|                          | 2011      | India | Pakistan | China | United States |
|--------------------------|-----------|-------|----------|-------|---------------|
| Gross Domestic Product   |           |       |          |       |               |
| (billion US$)            | 1,848     | 211   | 7,298    | 15,094|
| GDP Growth               |           |       |          |       |               |
| (annual %)               | 6.9       | 2.4   | 9.1      | 1.7   |
| GDP per capita           |           |       |          |       |               |
| (current US$)            | 1,489     | 1,194 | 5,430    | 48,442|
| Inflation, Consumer Prices |           |       |          |       |               |
| (annual %)               | 8.9       | 11.9  | 5.4      | 3.2   |
| Foreign Direct Investment |           |       |          |       |               |
| 2010 Net Inflows (billion US$) | 24.2     | 2.0   | 185.1    | 227.9 |
| Trade in 1992 (% of GDP) |           |       |          |       |               |
|                           | 18.1      | 30.5  | 36.1     | 20.8  |
| Trade in 2010 (% of GDP) |           |       |          |       |               |
|                           | 54.5      | 32.3  | 55.8     | 29.0  |
| Life Expectancy at birth |           |       |          |       |               |
| (in years)               | 65.4      | 65.4  | 73.5     | 78.5  |
| Human Development Index  |           |       |          |       |               |
| (HDI) Rank (out of 179)  | 134       | 145   | 101      | 4     |
| Gender Inequality Index  |           |       |          |       |               |
| (GII) Rank (out of 179)  | 129       | 115   | 35       | 47    |
| Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) Headcount of Poor (%) | 53.7 | 49.4 | 12.5 | - 3 |
| Territory (in thousand sq km, rounded) |           |       |          |       |               |
|                           | 3,287     | 796   | 9,597    | 9,827 |
| Population (in millions, rounded) | 1,241     | 177   | 1,344    | 312   |

1 In current US$ (Balance of Payments).
2 % of population in multidimensional poverty. Data refer to 2003 (China), 2005 (India) & 2007 (Pakistan).
3 The MPI is not available for states in the Top 20 of the HDI.

Source: All data from (World Bank 2011). Except: Life Expectancy, HDI, GII and MPI from (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2012); territory from (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2012).

Washington has emerged as India’s major defense partner, and India conducts more military exercises with the US than with any other country. During the Cold War, India refrained from purchasing weapons from the United States but has since 2005 become a major buyer. The 2005 framework agreement, which laid the foundations for the 2008 Civilian Nuclear Deal, defined a number of areas for cooperation including peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and maritime security, a departure from previous defense engagements which never specified joint political
missions. Economic relations have steadily improved, although bilateral negotiations are blocked on a number of controversial issues such as market access, intellectual property rights, high-technology export controls and the US farm subsidy program. Despite a turnaround in Indo-US relations and the highly influential role that the Indian diaspora in the United States played in this process, the Indo-US relationship remains a politically sensitive issue within India. The Congress Party, main constituent of the ruling coalition, the United Progressive Alliance II, has not been able to develop a united position on relations with the United States. Tensions within the domestic political arena were high when the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal was being negotiated with parties on the Left and Right arguing that the deal threatened to curtail India’s freedom of action. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh threatened to resign when the Congress party appeared to waver on the deal (Chari 2009, 1–17).

Relations with China have witnessed an equally drastic transformation thanks to trade and economic interaction. Bilateral trade between India and China grew to $73 billion in 2011, up from $63 billion in 2010 and less than $3 billion in 2000. Both countries are targeting $100 billion by 2015. However, in recent times India’s burgeoning trade deficit with China which is estimated to reach $60 billion by 2014-15, up nearly three-fold from $23 billion in 2010-11, has been receiving more critical attention. China is perceived as a ‘manufacturing threat’ to India and seen to be dragging its feet on enabling a diversification of Indian exports to China, especially in the areas of information technology, pharmaceuticals and engineering. Alarming figures are regularly published; such as a recent National Security Council (NSC) report, which projected that by 2014-15, over 75% of India’s manufacturing will depend on China. In December 2011, the NSC and Ministry of Commerce initiated an action plan, involving inter-ministerial consultations from the ministries of industry, external affairs, telecom, information technology, pharmaceuticals, power and agriculture to produce a China-specific strategy.

There is growing recognition that India must explore ways to enhance its leverage over China. An on-going border dispute, which receives constant media attention, producing at times, over-hyped reports, serves as a constant reminder of the national security threat that China could pose. It is not coincidence that in recent years, India has reached out to enhance economic ties with a number of South East and East Asian countries. In 2009 a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was signed between India and the Republic of Korea and in 2011, a CEPA was
signed with Japan. At the same time, India has renewed efforts to woo South Asian neighbors. Following the success of the Sri Lanka-India Free Trade Agreement (in operation since 2000), concerted effort is underway to improve trade infrastructure and connectivity with Bangladesh (Government of India, 2012). Further to the east, Myanmar is a priority area for Indian investment in infrastructure and energy resources. On the occasion of Manmohan Singh’s visit to Myanmar in May 2012, the first Indian Prime Minister to do so in 25 years, twelve agreements were signed on diplomacy and trade.

As India seeks to boost its exports, secure energy supplies and sustain economic growth, New Delhi will have to manage external relations in a way that does not stoke or succumb to nationalist sentiments. Relations with China and the United States have the capacity to produce strong political and public reactions. Apart from the domestic arena, India faces the opportunities and challenges of being labeled a “swing state” in the emerging international order (Mohan 2006). Most recently, in June 2012, American Secretary for Defense, Leon Panetta told a Delhi-based think tank that India is the ‘lynchpin’ for America’s re-engagement with Asia (The Times of India 2012). Meanwhile, at the SCO meeting in Beijing, Chinese Vice Premier, Li Kequian, widely expected to be China’s next Premier, told Indian Foreign Minister, S.M. Krishna that Sino-Indian ties would be the most important bilateral relationship in the 21st century (Pandit and Parashar 2012). While supporting multilateralism and a multi-polar world system would appear to be India’s first-order preferences, it remains to be seen how India plays its cards with regards the competitive rivalry between the United States and China.

*India - a revisionist power? Nuclearization and the Non-Proliferation Treaty*

Although most analysts and observers tend to portray India as a benign and generally stabilizing force, the decision to go nuclear in 1998 and the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal were regarded as dangerous and revisionist. Following the May 1998 nuclear tests, the Clinton regime responded by imposing economic and technological sanctions mandated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1994 and simultaneously initiated high-level talks to discuss possibilities of convergence in Indo-US economic and political interests. The timing of the tests has been as much debated as the consequences. With the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in power at the time, the nuclear tests were seen as a statement of strength and defiance by a resurgent Hindu-nationalist government.
However, relegating the tests solely to the logic of domestic political gain and nationalism unfairly neglects the strategic context within which India took this decision and makes light of the underlying cost-benefit calculations. Pakistan with a clandestine nuclear program and China with full-blown nuclear capability represented a highly asymmetric strategic environment for India. Furthermore, by 1996 the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was ready for signature, adding pressure on India to sign a treaty, which it perceived as unfair and incomplete with no time-bound framework for a complete elimination of nuclear weapons (Pande 1996).

The 1998 nuclear tests were immediately followed by Pakistan’s own tests and shortly thereafter, the Kargil War on May 3rd and ending on July 26th, 1999. Fighting at very high altitudes along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan, casualties were sustained by both with ultimately no physical change of positions and India resuming control over its territory. Whether or not nuclearization encouraged Pakistan to act rashly or, proved to India that it could still win a conventional war as a nuclear weapon state, is the subject of much discussion and debate (Krepon 2003). Since 1998, relations between the two countries have remained poor, with intermittent crises caused by acts of terrorism such as the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament leading India and Pakistan to mobilize almost a million troops on the border. Despite high volatility, both sides have developed Confidence Building Mechanisms to deal with their nuclear weapons and, following the most recent terror attack on Mumbai in 2008, New Delhi’s response was characterized by marked restraint.

The 2008 Nuclear deal included an agreement by India to have all its civil nuclear facilities safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (fourteen existing thermal power reactors and all future civil reactors and breeders) until 2014. In return, the US agreed to relax the existing restrictions on export of technologies and materials (in place since India’s first test in 1974) for India’s civil nuclear program. Furthermore, Washington promised to lobby within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to generate an ‘India-specific exemption’, a waiver that was subsequently approved in September 2008. All forty-six NSG member states are now allowed to engage in civil nuclear business with India.

Three major criticisms were launched against the waiver: that it would trigger a new nuclear arms race in South Asia; that it undermined global nuclear disarmament efforts and, irreversibly
damaged the Non-Proliferation regime. However, from an Indian perspective, the Non-Proliferation treaty was an inherently unequal treaty. Furthermore, both China and the US who have yet to ratify the CTBT which outlaws nuclear testing, were two countries India had reason to be wary of given that it fought a war with China in 1962 and the United States’ close support of Pakistan. With India’s clean record on proliferation, it has also been pointed out that the safeguards included in the nuclear deal could help India grow accustomed to international controls, paving the way to a less principled opposition to the Non-Proliferation treaty (Rauch 2010). Analysts have further argued that while India is dissatisfied with key elements of the Non-Proliferation regime, it does not fundamentally oppose it (Paul and Shankar 2007).

South Asia remains a strategically unstable area thanks to the India-Pakistan conflict, the border issue with China and the evolving situation in Afghanistan. Through its ‘all-weather friendship’ with Pakistan, China is party to the South Asian security dilemma whilst India and China have not made headway on reaching a sustainable resolution. China’s activities in India’s near neighborhood such as developing the Pakistani port of Gwadar into an access point for the Indian Ocean, infrastructure investments in Burma are regularly referred to as China’s ‘string of pearls strategy’ in Delhi. More recently, there have been reports of Chinese attempts to persuade the King of Bhutan to concede territory that would threaten India at its strategically important Siliguri corridor. The decision to develop and test missiles, most recently Agni V in April 2012 and India’s first intercontinental ballistic missile; India’s becoming the largest importer of arms13 have to be seen in context of India’s difficult strategic environment and as part of an effort to fast-track modernization of the Armed Forces14.

Human Security at home: India’s Achilles’ Heel?

Terrorist attacks and inter-community conflict continue to occur and represent a major concern for the Indian government, leading some analysts to label India a ‘soft state’. However, India’s diversity is well represented through 22 official languages recognized in the Constitution and the 28 states that contain numerous crosscutting ethnic and religious identities. A carefully designed and flexible federal system has helped New Delhi to contain and address sub-national grievances. Nevertheless, there have been controversies over the abuse of security provisions, for example over the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. Further potential for instability arises from instances
where internal migrant communities have been made targets of politically motivated attacks (for example the anti-Northern campaign in Maharashtra or recent anti-Muslim violence in the North Eastern State of Assam). While these have generally remained isolated outbreaks, they are a threat to law and order, requiring a calibrated response from state authorities to avoid escalation or retribution in other parts of the country.

Alongside India’s high growth rates are a number of dismal facts relating to human development. Whilst India’s democracy has proven its resilience over the past six decades and an impressive ability to accommodate diversity while granting an array of freedoms, it has not been effective in tackling a number of governance-related problems. Regarding the human development index (HDI) with its three dimensions of health, education and living standard, India performs worst compared to its BRICS peers. In several indicators for health, education and living standard the poorest Indian states are comparable to states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Then again one has to keep in mind the immense diversity of India as a subcontinent. For the range of human development – from the impressive human development achievements of states like Kerala to the specific needs (e.g. child school attendance, mortality, nutrition or sanitation) in mega-states like Uttar Pradesh (with nearly 200 million citizens) or Bihar (with more than 100 million citizens) see Table 5.

The Indian case implies a clear link between human development and security. The majority of the states with so called “Left Wing Extremist” (LWE) affected districts, meaning districts with Naxalite operations, are in the lower part of the human development spectrum, with proportions of people living in multidimensional poverty of up to 81% in the case of Bihar (see states marked with * in table 5). Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared that the Maoists constitute "the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country." This led to the Integrated Action Plan (IAP) to foster development in 60 tribal and backward districts in LWE affected regions. A special LWE scheme was introduced within the Security Related Expenditure (SRE). Under this scheme, financial resources spent in states on anti-naxalite operations and improvement of security-related infrastructure, are reimbursed by the Indian government. (Government of India - Ministry of Home Affairs 2010)
Table 5: Multidimensional Poverty Index for Indian States

| MPI Rank | State                  | Population (millions) 2011 | MPI | Proportion of poor (in %) | Education | Health | Standard of Living |
|----------|------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|---------------------------|-----------|--------|-------------------|
|          |                        |                             |     |                           | Schooling |       |                   |
| 1        | Delhi                  | 16.8                        | 0.062 | 14                       | 4         | 9      | 7                 |
| 2        | Kerala                 | 33.4                        | 0.065 | 16                       | 1         | 7      | 4                 |
| 3        | Goa                    | 1.5                         | 0.094 | 22                       | 4         | 9      | 4                 |
| 4        | Punjab                 | 27.7                        | 0.120 | 26                       | 8         | 13     | 9                 |
| 5        | Himachal Pradesh       | 6.9                         | 0.131 | 31                       | 4         | 7      | 9                 |
| 6        | Tamil Nadu             | 72.1                        | 0.141 | 32                       | 9         | 8      | 11                |
| 7        | Uttarakhand            | 10.1                        | 0.189 | 40                       | 8         | 10     | 15                |
| 8        | *Maharashtra           | 112.4                       | 0.193 | 40                       | 8         | 15     | 14                |
| 9        | Haryana                | 25.4                        | 0.199 | 42                       | 8         | 20     | 15                |
| 10       | Gujarat                | 60.4                        | 0.205 | 42                       | 12        | 13     | 17                |
| 11       | Jammu & Kashmir        | 12.5                        | 0.209 | 44                       | 8         | 22     | 16                |
| 12       | *Andhra Pradesh        | 84.7                        | 0.211 | 45                       | 19        | 13     | 16                |
| 13       | *Karnataka             | 61.1                        | 0.223 | 46                       | 12        | 21     | 17                |
| 14       | Eastern States         | 45.6                        | 0.303 | 58                       | 19        | 21     | 19                |
| 15       | *West Bengal           | 91.3                        | 0.317 | 58                       | 25        | 23     | 19                |
| 16       | *Orissa                | 41.9                        | 0.345 | 64                       | 23        | 19     | 24                |
| 17       | Rajasthan              | 68.6                        | 0.351 | 64                       | 21        | 32     | 28                |
| 18       | *Uttar Pradesh         | 199.6                       | 0.386 | 70                       | 18        | 36     | 37                |
| 19       | *Chhattisgarh          | 25.5                        | 0.387 | 72                       | 21        | 29     | 31                |
| 20       | *Madhya Pradesh        | 72.6                        | 0.389 | 70                       | 22        | 32     | 31                |
| 21       | *Jharkhand             | 33.0                        | 0.463 | 77                       | 26        | 45     | 30                |
| 22       | *Bihar                 | 103.8                       | 0.499 | 81                       | 35        | 52     | 35                |

* States with “Left Wing Extremist” affected districts included under Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme (Ministry of Home Affairs 2010).

1 The proportion of MPI poor population is estimated using the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) dataset 2005-06, which has a slightly different distribution of population across states.” (OPHI 2010, 6)

2 Till 2006 called Uttaranchal.

3 Eastern States include Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. (OPHI 2010, 6)

Source: all MPI data from Alkire and Santos 2010, 124–25; population figures from Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2012.
Conclusion: India’s emerging global profile

Both of India’s major political parties, the Indian National Congress and the opposition, the Bharatiya Janata Party have endorsed the aspiration to great power status. Economic growth, military modernization and effective diplomacy have buttressed the country’s ascent over the past two decades. The recognition of India’s position and relevance is evident from the numerous official visits paid by leaders of major economies and the growing number of security-related agreements that have been signed. India has entered into numerous bilateral agreements, especially within South East Asia and enhanced its visibility and presence within multilateral organizations such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit.

In terms of developing its role as a global security actor, India has the aspirations, to a large extent the capabilities, but not yet the trappings of a great power. That India is not a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council is a fact that rankles, and various strategies have been adopted to push for reform. As a member of the ‘G4 nations’ India worked together with Brazil, Germany and Japan supporting each other’s bids for permanent seats. Despite President Obama’s support for India’s candidature, announced during his visit in November 2010, India’s efforts have been futile. Not willing to bandwagon with the United States, India maintains that the pursuit of ‘strategic autonomy’ is the prime rationale behind its foreign policy.

Given India’s commitment to the norms of peaceful international discourse, critics have pointed out that India is the only major democracy aside from the United States, not to have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This is a decision that reflects an innate Indian defensiveness regarding its sovereignty but also a confidence in the strength of its own legal institutions. As India seeks to take on a greater global profile, the commitment to universal norms, of how to define them, when and how to uphold them, are bound to create situations and raise debates that will draw out ambiguities and tensions. This was the case during the Libyan crisis, which occurred while India was a non-permanent member in the Security Council.

As the crisis developed in early 2011, India’s first concern was for the safety of its citizens working in the region. On February 26, 2011 India voted in the UNSC for resolution 1970 which condemned the use of force by the Gaddafi government against its own people and imposed international
sanctions on Libya. Furthermore, the resolution unanimously referred Libya to the International Criminal Court. This appeared to mark a shift in Indian policy, one that hitherto had been critical of the ICC. However, on March 11, 2011 the Indian government appeared to revise its position when it abstained on UN resolution 1973 providing the legal basis for military intervention in the Libyan war. Various interpretations have been offered of this decision. These included the need to avoid antagonizing Muslim sentiment (outside but also crucially, within India), practical arguments based on the lack of information available to the world at that point, claims that intervention in Libya was an act of Western neo-colonialism and even that India needed to curb its own great power aspirations so as not to appear as aligning too closely with the West. Each reflects sentiments and political positions that have developed within India over many years, drawing upon the country’s historical experience and the dynamics of a difficult regional context.

This chapter has sought to highlight the particular worldview and pattern of external interaction that India has evolved over the last six decades. A nation state that is well accustomed to the need for accommodation and consensus and, one that is rightly proud of its institutions promoting participation, accountability and legitimacy, India would ideally like to lead by virtue of its example. Recognizing the failings in its example, human security is a top priority and the object of manifold government-sponsored programs aimed at social and human development. Domestic stability and welfare, nevertheless, are therefore bound to be central concerns in New Delhi for many years to come.
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Notes

1 Market integration in South Asia is the lowest in the world. Intra-regional trade between countries accounts for less than 2 per cent of GDP for South Asia, compared with 40 per cent for East Asia.

2 Following the 1971 War of Independence, Bangladesh was created out of the Eastern wing of Pakistan and in the 1980s Sri Lanka was consumed by a virulent Civil War.

3 Coined by Goldman Sachs chief economist, Terence James O’Neill (2001) in his paper “Building better global economic BRICS”, to depict the rapidly developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Since then South Africa was added to the group.

4 Having referred the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations in 1948 Jawaharlal Nehru felt betrayed when Security Council members showed sympathy for Pakistan’s defense (Wolpert 1996, 433–35).

5 Despite leaning towards the Soviet Union through the friendship treaty of 1971, India avoided undertaking joint exercises or other service to service contacts with Moscow (Singh 1986).

6 Nehru oversaw the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi (1947) and was a central promoter of the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian solidarity (1955).

7 See Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Reports.

8 A flurry of Panchasheela-related events occurred in 2004 to mark its fiftieth anniversary, despite the fact that the 1954 treaty lapsed in 1962 and has not been renewed.

9 Tabled at the United Nations the Plan proposed a three-stage process of total disarmament via a regime that was global, universal and non-discriminatory. It was one of the earliest initiatives for nuclear disarmament.

10 In 1991 the Government of India was close to a default and reportedly had foreign reserves to barely finance three weeks of imports. The crisis forced India to negotiate with the International Monetary Fund for an emergency loan and paved the way for a wave of liberalizing reforms of the economy.

11 In Afghanistan India has been accused of aiding separatist movements amongst Balochi Nationalists. India has opened four consulates in Afghanistan, in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kandahar which Pakistan claims are not simply for visa-issuing purposes. Since 2006, India has deployed its own paramilitary force to guard its workers in Afghanistan, and opened negotiations to establish its first military airbase overseas in Tajikistan.

12 Sanjaya Baru, one-time media advisor to the Prime Minister, sought to develop what he termed the ‘Manmohan Singh Doctrine’ based upon these principles (Baru 2008).

13 According to the SIPRI report published in March 2012 India became the largest importer of arms during 2007 – 2011 (SIPRI, 2012b).

14 See for instance, the 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) and five-year Services Capital Acquisition Plan and Annual Acquisition Plan.

15 HDI Ranks of Russia (66), Brazil (84), China (101), South Africa (123) and India (134) (UNDP 2012).

16 In 2006 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressed this in an interview: “Charlie Rose Interviews PM Manmohan Singh.” Council on Foreign Relations, February 27, 2006. https://secure.www.cfr.org/publication/9986 charlie_roose_interviews_indian_pm_manmohan_singh.html (accessed January 19, 2013).

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17 For an example of India’s position on the Responsibility to protect see Hall, Ian. 2013. “‘Tilting at Windmills?’ The Indian Debate over the Responsibility to Protect after UNSC 1973.” Global Responsibility to Protect, 5:1, pp. 84–108