Climate policies after Paris: Pledge, Trade and Recycle
	Insights from the 36th Energy Modeling Forum Study (EMF36)

Christoph Böhringer\textsuperscript{a}, Sonja Peterson\textsuperscript{b}, Thomas F. Rutherford\textsuperscript{c}, Jan Schneider\textsuperscript{a,\ast}, Malte Winkler\textsuperscript{b}

\textsuperscript{a} University of Oldenburg, Germany
\textsuperscript{b} Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Germany
\textsuperscript{c} University of Wisconsin, USA

\textbf{A B S T R A C T}

This article summarizes insights from the 36th Energy Modeling Forum study (EMF36) on the magnitude and distribution of economic adjustment costs of greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. Under the Paris Agreement, countries have committed to emission reduction targets – so-called Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) – in order to combat global warming. The study suggests that aligning NDCs with the commonly agreed 2°C temperature target will induce global economic costs of roughly 1% in 2030. However, these costs are unevenly distributed across regions. Countries exporting fossil fuels are most adversely affected from the transition towards a low-carbon economy. In order to reduce adjustment costs at the global and regional level, comprehensive emissions trading which exploits least-cost abatement options is strongly desirable to avoid contentious normative debates on equitable burden sharing. Lump-sum recycling of revenues from emissions pricing, in equal amounts to every household, appeals as an attractive strategy to mitigate regressive effects and thereby improving the social acceptability of stringent climate policy.

1. Introduction

Anthropogenic climate change may cause irreparable harm to the ecosystems on which mankind depends. The international community has recognized the threat represented by man-made climate change since the early 1990s, and called for rigorous abatement of greenhouse gas emissions to prevent “dangerous human interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 1994). However, attempts to halt global warming have been met with limited progress so far. One reason is that climate protection constitutes a global public good. Each single country has a strong incentive to benefit from the emission abatement of other countries while cutting back on its own emission reduction to reduce abatement costs. International agreements lack real teeth when it comes to coercing common action since they lack a supranational authority. Another fundamental impediment to climate protection is the asymmetric timing of costs and benefits from emission abatement. While the decarbonization of production and consumption patterns induces economic adjustment costs in the short- and mid-term, most of the benefits of avoided climate damages will take decades to materialize given the physical inertia of the climate system.

This discrepancy in the time scale of costs and benefits explains why climate policy has historically been dominated by heated debates on the magnitude of emission abatement costs and their distribution. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) refers to international burden sharing through the notion of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), where all countries share the obligation to address the threat of climate change but responsibilities differ due to different historical contributions to global emissions and different capabilities. The CBDR principle is reflected in the Kyoto Protocol which placed the focus of greenhouse gas emission reduction on industrialized countries, while developing countries were exempted from binding climate targets. While celebrated as the first international climate treaty to become effective in 2005, the Kyoto Protocol fell short of providing a blueprint for effective climate policy based on common burden sharing. First of all, the US – responsible for a large part of...
historical greenhouse gas emissions – withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. The US government expressed concerns about the domestic compliance costs and feared that other big emitters such as China or India would gain competitive advantage from the Kyoto deal without emission reduction commitments. For similar reasons, Canada ceased to be a Party to the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 and other major industrialized regions such as Japan and Russia indicated that they will not accept new Kyoto-type commitments after the initial five year commitment period ranging from 2008–2012.

Aware of the difficulties of reaching mandatory agreements for industrialized countries only, the Paris Agreement in 2015 marked a major shift in focus. The Paris Agreement sets out a global framework to avoid dangerous climate change with the goal to limit global warming to well below 2°C, preferably to 1.5°C, compared to pre-industrial levels. The change in emphasis is twofold. First, the Paris Agreement calls for the contribution of all countries to mitigate global warming – not only from industrialized countries as in the case of the Kyoto Protocol. As of December 2020, all 196 members of the UNFCCC have signed the agreement and 189 have become parties.

Hence, the Paris Agreement is the first universal, legally binding global climate change agreement. Second, the Paris Agreement marks a shift away from top-down mandated reduction targets towards a bottom-up strategy where individual countries voluntarily commit themselves to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (UNFCCC, 2020).

The Paris Agreement is celebrated as an international breakthrough to deal with the challenge of global warming in a comprehensive manner. However, individual NDCs submitted so far fall short of aligning emission pathways with the target to limit global warming below 2°C. Recognizing that the initial voluntary pledges are inadequate to achieve the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, countries are asked to review and revise their NDCs every five years until the Paris Agreement is reviewed and revised. The first review took place in 2020 and, among other things, brought about the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow (November 2021).

On critical inspection, the Paris Agreement may not be perceived as a game changer but rather as the acknowledgment that international climate policy critically hinges on voluntary, bottom-up consensual decision making. This insight not only echoes the experience of the preceding Kyoto Protocol but also reflects the limitations met by international negotiators when it comes to feasibility, determined by the domestic political environment: Emission reduction pledges submitted abroad must indeed build on sufficient political support at home. Although the societal awareness of the risks imposed by climate change has grown significantly in many countries over the last decade – not least because of grassroot movements such as Fridays for Future – decision makers are concerned about the adverse economic effects of more stringent climate policies not only on the national economy as a whole, but more specifically on competitiveness for emission-intensive industries and in particular on the economic burden for lower-income households. Concern over the regressive impacts of climate policies across households are well justified. Putting a price on energy or energy-related pollutants such as CO₂ will raise consumer prices for energy goods such as electricity, natural gas, heating oil, or gasoline. In countries where these goods constitute a larger share of the budget in poor households compared to richer households, higher energy or emission prices tend to be regressive. Even in countries which are seemingly rich on average, populist protests for economic justice have been initially sparked by rising fuel prices — the yellow vests movement in France that started in October 2018 is a case in point.

In this context, the 36th Energy Modeling Forum study on “Carbon Pricing after Paris” (EMF36) is designed to help policymakers chart sensible climate policies which balance the unequivocal need for drastic greenhouse gas emission abatement with normative considerations on fair burden sharing both at the international level but also within domestic boundaries. Our starting point is to take stock of the economic impacts associated with the implementation of the initial NDCs under the Paris Agreement by 2030, thereby exclusively considering CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion which is the major source of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. We assume that individual countries have a vested interest in meeting their domestic emission reduction pledges at minimum compliance costs, and therefore strong impetus to exploit the cheapest abatement options domestically. Cost-effective emission reduction will be achieved by uniform emissions pricing which can be implemented in terms of an economy-wide emissions tax or an emissions cap-and-trade system. We next investigate the question of how the magnitude and regional distribution of economic adjustment costs changes as we transit towards more ambitious emission reduction targets, ultimately aligning the current NDCs by 2050 with the long-run 2°C temperature goal. Starting from this reference situation, our primary objective is to sketch the design of climate policies associated with lower economic costs for emission reduction at the international and domestic level and thereby help to increase the likelihood of reaching the ambitious Paris temperature targets through collective action. Economic theory provides fundamental guidelines which can be translated into tangible numbers by means of applied economic analysis, such as the EMF36 study. The first fundamental guideline is to exploit efficiency gains from where-flexibility at the international level. Since greenhouse gas emissions are a global externality it does not matter where emissions are reduced, as long as they are removed from the atmosphere. Cost-effective global climate policy then implies to abate greenhouse gases where it is the cheapest, i.e., to equate the costs of abatement at the margin across all abatement options. Basic economic theory suggests that NDC parties should strive for uniform global emissions pricing through international trade in emission pledges. The EU emissions trading system, which started in 2005, provides a landmark for cost-efficient where-flexibility in abatement across multiple countries. There is widespread evidence of substantial cost savings from emissions trading, both at the level of subnational as well as multilateral jurisdictions (Weyant and Hill, 1999; Metcalf, 2009; Böhringer et al., 2009; Akimoto et al., 2017; Fujimori et al., 2016). The second guideline is that emissions pricing creates revenues of which recycling can drastically affect the overall incidence of emission reduction policies (Fullerton and Muehlegger, 2019). More specifically, economic theory suggests that lump-sum recycling of revenues from emissions pricing to households can more than compensate the regressive effects of emissions pricing (Chiroule-Assouline and Fedha, 2014; Klenert and Mattauch, 2016). Indeed, when each household receives an equal share of revenues, the lump-sum transfer constitutes a larger share of additional disposable income for lower-income households; if sufficiently high, the transfers can mitigate or even overcompensate initially regressive effects of emissions pricing.

The EMF36 study provides quantitative insights into the magnitude and distribution of Post-Paris climate policy designs up to 2050, paying special attention to the role of where-flexibility and revenue recycling for making stringent emission reduction politically feasible. Based on simulations with several established energy-economy models operated by internationally recognized experts, our key findings are as follows. First, narrowing the NDCs towards 2030 in line with the 2°C temperature target will induce global economic adjustment costs of roughly 1% by 2030 relative to a business-as-usual case. Across regions,
countries exporting fossil fuels are most adversely affected from the transition towards a low-carbon economy. Second, international emissions trading can substantially reduce adjustment costs at the global and regional level, thereby reducing the propensity for contentious normative debates on equitable burden sharing. Global cost savings from comprehensive global emissions trading as compared to only domestic action range from 50%–90% depending on the stringency of the NDC pledges. Third, lump-sum revenue recycling in equal shares to households offsets the regressive effects of emissions pricing which might be crucial to improve the social acceptability of more ambitious climate policy.

Our main findings can be summarized in a climate policy triad of ‘Pledge, Trade, and Recycle’: To achieve the Paris temperature target, more ambitious reduction pledges are necessary in the short-term. Their political feasibility will hinge on cost reductions through international emissions trading and progressive revenue recycling at the domestic level.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the study design with respect to key research questions and specific policy scenarios to be shared across all modeling groups. Section 3 presents a cross-comparison of model results. Section 4 concludes.

2. Study design

Our analysis is based on a systematic cross-comparison of results from 17 internationally established energy-economy models – 15 multi-region models and two single-country models – which simulate pre-defined policy scenarios with harmonized assumptions. Seven of the participating models are static and ten are recursive-dynamic. Table 1 provides a summary of the groups participating in the model-comparison study, their models, institutions, and people involved.

Hereafter we briefly discuss model characteristics and data inputs. We then lay out and motivate the policy scenarios that are investigated in the model-cross comparison.

2.1. Models and data

All models that participate in the cross-comparison are computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. CGE models constitute a powerful numerical simulation method to perform economy-wide impact assessments of policy reforms based on microeconomic theory and empirical data. More specifically, CGE models are rooted in general equilibrium theory that combines assumptions regarding the optimizing behavior of economic agents with the analysis of equilibrium conditions (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). Producers employ primary factors and intermediate inputs at least cost subject to technological constraints; consumers maximize their well-being subject to budget constraints and preferences. Substitution and transformation possibilities in production and consumption are typically described by means of continuous functional forms where economic responses are driven by empirical estimates of elasticities and initial value shares derived from empirical economic accounts.

A key strength of CGE models is their comprehensive coverage of market interactions through price and income-responsive supply and demand reactions on behalf of economic agents. The disaggregation of macroeconomic production, consumption, and trade activities at the sector level based on regional input–output matrices enables to track structural change.

Policy reforms such as CO₂ pricing do not only affect the prices of consumer goods, but also sources of income, such as wages and returns to capital. Compared to partial equilibrium approaches such as bottom-up energy system models or microsimulation models for instance, CGE models do not only capture the incidence of changes in relative prices on the expenditure side but also on the income side. With an explicit representation of different economic agents such as firms, households, and governments, CGE models can quantify the distributional impacts of policy measures.

To summarize: CGE models incorporate key dimensions of economy-wide impact assessment in a micro-consistent framework, thereby accommodating a systematic quantitative trade-off analysis between policy objectives for economic performance, income distribution, and environmental quality.

As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, base-year data together with exogenous elasticities determine the free parameters of functional forms. For base-year calibration, the modeling groups of the EMF36 study use input data of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database which includes detailed accounts of production, consumption, bilateral trade, as well as data on physical energy flows and CO₂ emissions for up to 141 regions and 65 sectors. The modeling groups use either version 9 (Aguiar et al., 2016) with the most recent base year of 2011, or version 10 (Aguiar et al., 2019) with the
most recent base year of 2014. Some modeling groups use the GTAP-Power extension (Peters, 2016; Chepeliev, 2020), which includes a disaggregated electricity sector. As discussed below, the business-as-usual projection of the models towards 2030 is based on common data inputs from the International Energy Outlook (IEO) 2017 (EIA, 2017) and the World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2018 (IEA, 2018), respectively.

The regions and sectors of the GTAP dataset are aggregated towards the specific requirements of the EMF study. With respect to regional coverage, the composite dataset includes major industrialized and developing regions which play a key role in the international climate policy negotiations. With respect to sectoral coverage, the composite dataset maintains all primary and secondary energy carriers in GTAP: coal, crude oil, natural gas, refined oil products, and electricity. The explicit treatment of these primary and secondary energy carriers is essential in order to distinguish energy goods by CO₂ intensity and the degree of substitutability (fuel switching). In addition, we incorporate a composite sector for energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries (EITE) which are most vulnerable to emissions pricing. The remaining sectors of the GTAP dataset are categorized in four additional composite sectors: transport, agriculture, other manufacturing, and services.

Table 2 lists the set of regions covered by the fifteen multi-region models, and the set of sectors (commodities) covered by all models – including the single-country models – to warrant a coherent cross-comparison of results. Note that some models include a more detailed regional and/or sectoral disaggregation. In these cases, results were aggregated to meet the requirements listed in Table 2.

### 2.2. Scenarios

The primary objective of our analysis is to quantify the medium-term economic impacts of CO₂ pricing in the aftermath of the Paris Agreement for alternative NDC ambition levels and for different degrees of international cooperation through emissions trading. We take 2030 as the policy-relevant target year for the impact assessment which constitutes the milestone to which most Paris parties have submitted their first-round NDCs.

Against this background, we devise the EMF36 core scenarios along two dimensions which are critical for the magnitude and distribution of economic adjustment costs to Post-Paris climate policies: (i) the stringency of future NDCs (ambition), and (ii) the scope of international emissions trading across sectors and regions (cooperation). Table 5 at the end of this section presents an overview of the fifteen core scenarios that emerge as the cross-product of the two scenario dimensions for three NDC variants and five emissions trading variants.

The default policy instrument to achieve emission reduction is emissions pricing which can be equally implemented via an emissions tax or an emissions cap-and-trade system. To address public concerns on the regressive impacts of emissions pricing, revenues are recycled lump-sum to the consumers. A subgroup of models (see Table 3) distinguishes consumers by income deciles and investigates the extent to which the progressive effect of an equal-per-household rebate offsets the regressive effect of higher energy prices. CO₂ revenues are recycled lump-sum in equal shares to households. Since CO₂ pricing typically depresses other government tax revenues, we adopt the convention that the government recycles the remaining CO₂ revenues after balancing its budget in order to keep government expenditures constant.

The impacts of a policy reform (in our case: the implementation of NDCs) are usually quantified with respect to a reference situation where the reform is not in place, the so-called business-as-usual (BaU). Comparative-static analysis then provides a comparison of two different economic situations, before and after a change in specific exogenous parameters such as the imposition of emission reduction pledges. If policy targets and measures refer to the future, there is the need to establish a business-as-usual projection which captures the hypothetical evolution of the economy in the absence of these targets and measures. In the following, we describe our business-as-usual assumptions and subsequently lay out the two core scenario dimensions, i.e., the ambition level of NDCs and the degree of cooperation in multilateral climate policies through international emissions trading.

#### 2.2.1. Business-as-usual (BaU) projections

The costs of complying with future emission constraints are directly linked to the structural characteristics of an economy exhibited in a hypothethical business-as-usual (BaU) situation without such emission constraints (Dellink et al., 2020). The BaU projections do not only determine the magnitude of the effective abatement requirement, i.e., the difference between the future business-as-usual emissions and the exogenous emission ceiling, but also the ease of emission abatement as reflected by the curvature of marginal abatement cost curves.

Due to the importance of BaU projections for the economic impact assessment of future climate policy constraints, we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to assumptions on future GDP growth and CO₂ emissions in 2030 from two official, widely-used sources: the International Energy Outlook (IEO) 2017 (EIA, 2017) and the World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2018 (IEA, 2018).

Table 4 shows the CO₂ emissions and GDP values for 2011 which, based on the GTAP data, serve as the historical base-year for the model study together with the respective growth indices up to 2030 that are derived from the IEO and WEO projections.

#### 2.2.2. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)

We use the initial NDCs submitted by the Paris parties to the UNFCCC (2020) to derive three different ambition levels for emission reductions — referred to as NDC, NDC+, and NDC-2C.

Our starting point are the NDCs under the Paris Agreement as listed in Kitous et al. (2016). Various countries have provided two different pledges — unconditional pledges which we label as NDC and more ambitious pledges that are conditional on reduction efforts of other regions, financial support, or other types of assistance, which we

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3 For individual countries the modeling groups use business-as-usual projections and CO₂ emission reduction targets which are in line with our specifications in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.

4 The CEPE modeling group’s analysis is based on household-level data from Eurostat’s 2010 Household Budget Survey (HBS) and Eurostat’s 2010 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The responsibility for all conclusions drawn from these data lies entirely with the CEPE modeling group. The results and conclusions are solely those of the CEPE modeling group, and not those of Eurostat, the European Commission or any of the national statistical authorities whose data have been used.
Table 3
Models with household impact analysis.

| Model        | Specification       | Specific country                                                                 |
|--------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| BC3          | Single-country Spain|                                                                                  |
| IEG          | Single-country      | India                                                                            |
| TEA          | Multi-region        | Brazil                                                                           |
| CEPE         | Multi-region        | Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,    |
|              |                     | Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,          |
|              |                     | United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania                                        |
| JRC-GEM-E3   | Multi-region + soft-link\(^a\) | Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland,    |
|              |                     | France, Italy, Romania                                                           |
| SNoW         | Multi-region        | Norway                                                                           |
| DREAM        | Multi-region        | China                                                                             |
| UOL          | Multi-region        | Germany                                                                           |

\(^a\)JRC-GEM-E3 feeds its macroeconomic results for 11 European countries into the EUROMOD-ITT (Indirect Tax Tool) in order to perform the household impact assessment.

Table 4
BaU projections on CO\(_2\) and GDP in 2030.

| Region               | CO\(_2\) | GDP       |
|----------------------|----------|-----------|
|                      | 2011     | 2030      | 2011     | 2030      |
|                      | IEO      | WEO       | IEO      | WEO       |
| Mt of CO\(_2\)       |          |           |          |           |
| United States (USA)  | 5107     | 0.89      | 0.90     | 15 533    | 1.51      | 1.46      |
| Canada (CAN)         | 523      | 1.08      | 1.02     | 1 778     | 1.38      | 1.45      |
| Japan (JPN)          | 1028     | 0.90      | 0.80     | 5 905     | 1.13      | 1.18      |
| South Korea (KOR)    | 501      | 1.20      | 1.44     | 1 202     | 1.57      | 2.14      |
| Russia (RUS)         | 1503     | 0.95      | 1.05     | 1 904     | 1.26      | 1.33      |
| China (CHN)          | 7908     | 1.14      | 1.28     | 7 567     | 2.72      | 2.92      |
| India (IND)          | 771      | 1.86      | 2.47     | 1 880     | 3.01      | 3.80      |
| Brazil (BRA)         | 372      | 1.25      | 1.19     | 2 476     | 1.32      | 1.39      |
| Australia & New Zealand (ANZ) | 411 | 1.10      | 1.32     | 1 550     | 1.64      | 2.14      |
| Europe (EUR)         | 4211     | 0.89      | 0.80     | 19 182    | 1.29      | 1.34      |
| Middle East (MEA)    | 1808     | 1.28      | 1.29     | 3 372     | 1.74      | 1.77      |
| Africa (AFR)         | 952      | 1.33      | 1.40     | 2 076     | 1.98      | 2.00      |
| Other Americas (OAM) | 1167     | 1.15      | 1.12     | 3 471     | 1.60      | 1.55      |
| Other Asia (OAS)     | 2128     | 1.48      | 1.70     | 3 569     | 2.07      | 2.31      |

Table 5
EMF36 core scenarios.

| Acronyms | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| ambition |             |
| NDC      | Translation of unconditional nationally determined contributions |
| NDC+     | Translation of conditional nationally determined contributions |
| NDC-2C   | Scaling of NDC+ emission levels to reach 2°C temperature goal |
| cooperation |             |
| ref      | Reference case where each region reaches its reduction target without further international emissions trading |
| global partial | Emmissions trading across all regions and sectors |
| eu-china | Emmissions trading between Europe and China in EITE and power sectors |
| asia     | Emmissions trading between China, Japan and South Korea in EITE and power sectors |

Label as NDC+. We translate these NDCs into region-specific reduction requirements for CO\(_2\) emissions from fossil fuel combustion in percent from the 2030 business-as-usual emission levels projected by IEO and WEO. Given that total emission reduction pledges even for the more ambitious NDC+ fall substantially short of what is deemed to be necessary in 2030 for meeting the long-run Paris temperature goal, we construct a third ambition level — called NDC-2C. For the NDC-2C targets we scale emission levels in NDC+ uniformly across regions in order to comply with an emission reduction for 2030 compliant with the 2°C emission trajectory suggested by integrated assessment analysis.

Fig. 1 visualizes the region-specific reduction targets across the three ambition levels with respect to BaU emissions projected by IEO and WEO. The blue bars at the bottom represent reduction targets under NDC, and the orange and green incremental bars illustrate the

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\(^5\) Note that we impose a minimum reduction target of 5% for countries that state their NDCs as an emission intensity target assuming that such a target will lead to some degree of effective CO\(_2\) pricing, even if BaU projections suggest that targets are reached without CO\(_2\) pricing. These minimum targets are binding for China and India against both BaU projections, such that they have the same reduction targets of 5% under NDC despite different CO\(_2\) emission projections in IEO and WEO. For countries that state their target as a physical emission level (e.g. by specifying their own BaU emission path), we translate this emission level into effective reduction targets against the IEO and WEO BaUs. For more details on the derivation of BaU projections and NDCs, see Appendix.

\(^6\) We use an average value for reductions in global CO\(_2\) emissions from energy use in 2030 compared to 2011 in 2°C scenarios derived from data provided by the IAMC 1.5°C Scenario Explorer and Data hosted by IIASA (Huppmann et al., 2019).
additional reduction requirements under NDC+ and NDC-2C, respectively. For regions without an orange incremental bar, NDC and NDC+ are identical. Global reduction requirements are of roughly 10% for NDC and 12% for NDC+ compared to the BaU projections. For a 2°C emission trajectory (NDC-2C), the global reduction requirement is of 27% for the BaU based on WEO and 21% for the BaU based on IEO. The difference is primarily due to higher projected CO₂ emissions growth in China and India in WEO as compared to IEO. Our budget approach for NDC-2C where we scale to a given level of global emissions then implies a higher reduction requirement against WEO than IEO projections. Compared to global average reduction requirements, we see that Africa, Middle East, and Russia have rather low reduction targets under NDC, while Brazil, Canada, Europe, and South Korea have substantially stricter targets. The consideration of conditional targets (NDC+) primarily plays a role in Africa, Middle East, as well as Other Americas and Other Asia.

A region generally faces a higher reduction target against that BaU – WEO or IEO – which projects higher CO₂ emissions for the respective region in 2030. For example, Europe has an effective target of 25% against IEO projections and of 20% against WEO projections, whereas South Korea faces a higher reduction target against WEO projections.

2.2.3. International emissions trading

Our second scenario dimension considers five different degrees of international cooperation via emissions trading across sectors and regions. On the one extreme (ref), we assume that there is no international emissions trading at all, i.e., regions meet their reduction targets by strictly domestic emissions pricing. On the other extreme (global), we assume full where-flexibility such that there is only one global emission price applying to all sectors and regions. In between the two polar cases, we specify three intermediate cases that sketch more likely variants of cross-country cooperation in coordinating abatement efforts via joint emission markets. The variant partial prescribes emissions trading only in energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) sectors (as well as the power sector) where stakeholders are most concerned on adverse impacts of stringent emission constraints. In this case, regional CO₂ emissions in other sectors are kept at ref levels. Furthermore, we set up two “Club-Trading” cases which might occur within the next few years: Variant eur-chn considers emissions trading between Europe and China while variant asia considers emissions trading between China, Japan, and South Korea. For both “Club-Trading” cases, we assume partial trading across sectors, i.e. there is a joint emission market for EITE and power sectors, while all other sectors face a domestic emission constraint set at the ref emission level. Note that across all where-flexibility specifications, global emissions remain constant at the same level warranting a coherent cost-effectiveness analysis.

We denote specific scenarios composed of one ambition level and one international cooperation variant with their respective acronyms separated by a slash (“/”). For example, the scenario where regions implement their unconditional nationally determined contributions domestically without international emissions trading is labeled NDC/ref. We also refer to scenario NDC/ref as the central case, since it describes the status quo of the Paris Agreement.

3. Results

We focus on results for the year 2030 and begin our presentation with global (average) CO₂ prices and global welfare impacts. Subsequently, we discuss regional effects, before summarizing findings on welfare implications of equal-per-household revenue-recycling across income deciles.

CO₂ prices are measured in 2011-USD per tCO₂. Welfare changes are measured in terms of Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) in income denoting the amount of money that is necessary to add to or deduct from the BaU income of households so that they enjoy a utility level equal to the one in the counterfactual policy scenario on the basis of BaU prices. A negative HEV hence indicates a welfare loss as compared to the BaU welfare. We aggregate welfare results from a utilitarian perspective, that is, we adopt an agnostic position regarding cost distribution across regions when exposing global welfare results.

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7 Note that composite regions reach their reduction targets through one overall emissions budget constraint, i.e., implicitly we assume that there is emissions trading within composite regions.

8 These sectors are also covered in existing national and supranational emissions trading schemes such as the EU emissions trading scheme.
and regarding cost distribution across households when exposing regional welfare results. Across all scenarios, we do not account for the (monetized) benefits from avoided climate damages acknowledging the wide spread of estimates on the social cost of carbon. Thus, negative welfare impacts must be interpreted as gross economic adjustment costs to emission reductions from BaU and cannot be taken as an indicator for the desirability of emission reductions from a more comprehensive cost-benefit perspective. Global emission levels are constant across the different emissions trading variants such that we can perform meaningful global cost-effectiveness analysis at each respective ambition level NDC, NDC+, and NDC-2C. Note that our reduction targets relate to CO$_2$ emissions from fossil fuel combustion only, which is by far the most important source for greenhouse gas emissions.

Since important parameterizations are streamlined in common assumptions in the business-as-usual and the counterfactual climate policy scenarios, variations across models can be explained to a large extent by structural differences across models that capture the price responsiveness of production, consumption, and trade to CO$_2$ emission constraints. These differences drive the marginal and inframarginal costs of the represented economies to substitute away from carbon-intensive inputs. The abatement options include fuel switching, substitution of energy with non-energy inputs (energy efficiency), as well as output and demand reductions (energy savings). The costs of different abatement options are governed by cross-price elasticities and cost shares between various energy goods with different CO$_2$ intensities, as well as between energy and non-energy goods. Three models also include representations of advanced technologies such as carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), which can become profitable under stringent emissions constraints and provide additional abatement opportunities. However, in the 2030 time horizon these technologies play a negligible role. Other important drivers of economic impacts triggered by emission constraints include the representation of existing or anticipated climate policies and assumptions about future international energy prices or technological change with respect to carbon and energy efficiency up to 2030, that are employed to meet the streamlined regional GDP values and CO$_2$ emissions in the 2030 BaU projections. In recursive-dynamic models which incorporate vintage capital the paths of capital accumulation prior to 2030 determine the sectoral capital stocks which are no-longer malleable. Adjustment costs to emission constraints are typically amplified compared to models where capital can freely move across sectors. All these choices translate into model-specific marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves that provide a first-round approximation on the direct costs of emission abatement as the area under the MAC curve. The MAC curves are convex, indicating that it gets increasingly more expensive to abate the next unit of CO$_2$ as we decarbonize the economy. With the option for emissions trading, the direct adjustment costs to domestic emission constraints will be adjusted by cost savings through exports or imports of emission allowances. Furthermore – as captured in a general equilibrium framework – there are potentially important income effects, most notably via policy-driven changes in international prices, the so-called terms of trade, that will increase or decrease the initial direct costs of emission restrictions depending on the structural characteristics of a specific economy in international trade.

In our exposition of the results, we focus on policy-induced changes from the BaU projection by IEO, and point to differences in results as compared to the BaU projection by WEO where relevant.

### 3.1. Global impacts

We report global impacts for the two polar cases in emissions trading, ref and global, across the three different ambition levels in emission reductions NDC, NDC+, and NDC-2C. The resulting six scenarios comprise the full range on where-flexibility in emissions trading and on the stringency in emission reductions. On the low-cost end we have the combination of least ambitious emission reduction targets (NDC) and full where-flexibility (global). On the high-cost end we have the most ambitious emission reduction targets (NDC-2C) and a purely domestic implementation (ref) which does not exploit cost savings from international emissions trading.

Fig. 2 shows the global average CO$_2$ prices in ref and global for the different ambition levels. In ref this refers to the emission-weighted average across regional CO$_2$ prices, whereas in global it refers to the globally uniform (tradable) CO$_2$ price.

We first focus on ref, where regions implement their reduction targets domestically without international emissions trading. As expected, the global average CO$_2$ price increases with the ambition level reflecting the monotonicity of regional MAC curves. In the central case (NDC/ref), we find a range of 10 USD per tCO$_2$ to 69 USD, with a mean of 33 USD. For the most ambitious reduction targets in NDC-2C/ref, global average prices range from 26 USD per tCO$_2$ to 164 USD with a mean across models of 78 USD. These results are consistent with the range of findings of the High Level Commission on carbon pricing which “concludes that the explicit carbon-price level consistent with achieving the Paris temperature target is at least [...] USD 50–100/tCO$_2$ by 2030” (Stiglitz et al., 2017).
8

Fig. 3. Global welfare effects for three different ambition levels (NDC, NDC+, NDC-2C) and two polar cases of emissions trading (ref, global). Note: The lighter shaded bars represent welfare changes in ref. The darker shaded bars represent welfare changes in global.

Considering comprehensive global emissions trading, note that for each ambition level, the global average CO₂ price is necessarily lower in global compared to ref and the wedge between the two prices indicates cost-saving potentials. We find that moving to global roughly halves the required (then globally uniform) CO₂ price in most models. Fig. 3 shows the global welfare impacts in ref and global for the three different ambition levels on emission reduction NDC, NDC+, and NDC-2C. We find that at the global level welfare effects roughly mirror the results for CO₂ prices, where higher CO₂ prices correspond to higher economic adjustment costs. Under NDC/ref, we find a range of 0.07% up to 0.8%, and a mean of 0.43% for the global economic adjustment costs compared to the BaU. Under more restrictive emission caps that are in line with a 2°C path in 2030 (NDC-2C) global adjustment costs in most models more than double, ranging from 0.16% to 1.84%, with a mean of 0.94%. From a global perspective, NDC+ leads to very similar adjustment costs as NDC, reflecting that unconditional Paris pledges by individual regions only lead to roughly 2% additional global emission reduction compared to unconditional pledges.

Comprehensive international emissions trading (global) provides substantial global cost savings of 50%-90% in most models, which is in line with earlier studies on emissions trading in the context of the Paris Agreement (Rose et al., 2018; Fujimori et al., 2016). The mean global welfare loss is 0.15% in NDC/global and 0.47% in NDC-2C/global. Welfare gains through global emissions trading thereby increase with the stringency of the reduction targets. Under the actual Paris pledges (NDC) moving from ref to global increases global welfare on average by 0.28%. For the most stringent reduction targets under NDC-2C, this figure is 0.47%.12,13

A policy-relevant message arises from the comparison between NDC/ref, which depicts the status quo of the Paris Agreement, and NDC-2C/global. In most models, the global adjustment costs for NDC-2C/global are quite similar to the costs of NDC/ref. This gets reflected in the mean global adjustment costs, which are 0.43% in scenario NDC/ref, and 0.47% in NDC-2C/global. The key message here is that – from a global welfare perspective – the actual reduction pledges under the Paris Agreement can be ratcheted up roughly cost-neutrally towards much more stringent pledges in line with the 2°C temperature goal if at the same time the where-flexibility through international cooperation towards globally uniform CO₂ emissions pricing is fostered. Hence, cost savings through where-flexibility pay the bill for a more ambitious international climate policy.

For the intermediate cases of where-flexibility eu-ref, asia, and partial (omitted in Fig. 3 for the sake of clarity), most models prompt a ranking in terms of global welfare impacts that roughly mirrors the share of global CO₂ emissions eligible for international trading. In global, the share by definition amounts to 100%, in partial to around 55%, in eu-ref to 25%, and in Asia to around 20%.

3.2. Regional incidence

Welfare effects at the regional level are driven by two effects. First, regions face abatement costs in line with their emission reduction targets and abatement options that are reflected in the regions’ CO₂ prices (marginal abatement costs). Second, regions are subject to indirect spillover effects due to policy-induced price changes on international markets – i.e., terms-of-trade effects – both for energy and non-energy goods. Fossil fuel demand and thus fossil fuel prices decline under emissions pricing, which benefits fuel importers and

fraction of ref adjustment costs with higher ambition levels. The logic behind is that it becomes increasingly expensive to substitute away from carbon when production and consumption patterns are getting less carbon intensive.

13 TUB and DREAM find considerably lower cost savings from trading as indicated by their rather small CO₂ price wedges between ref and global, while the JRC-GEM-E3 finds almost no differences between the reference case and full trading from a global perspective. Note that the JRC-GEM-E3 model incorporates power market decarbonization behavior that might lead to second-best emission abatement choices.

14 This finding becomes weaker in the BaU based on projections from WEO. Here, global adjustment costs are on average 1.8 times higher in NDC-2C/global compared to NDC/ref, see also footnote 10.
hurts fuel exporters. Production costs for energy- and trade-exposed (EITE) goods increase due to emissions pricing. This does not only affect changes in comparative advantage, but the heterogeneous nature (imperfect substitutability) of traded commodities makes it possible for EITE exporters to pass through part of their domestic abatement costs via higher prices to the respective importers.

Variations across models can be traced back to modeling choices that govern the magnitude of these effects. Direct abatement costs are driven by the shape of the MAC curves that are in turn determined by cost and expenditure shares in production and consumption and the cross-price elasticities of substitution across production inputs and consumption goods. International spillovers are driven by cost shares and elasticities in international trade, which determine the ease of substitution away from more expensive imported goods in domestic production and consumption; terms-of-trade effects on international fuel markets are governed to a larger extent through the choice of supply elasticities in fossil fuel production.

We begin our exposition of regional effects with the status quo of the Paris Agreement where regions implement their Paris emission reduction pledges without further international emissions trading (scenario NDC/ref). We then explore implications of increasing the ambition level and the degree of international cooperation.

3.2.1. Regional compliance with Paris pledges

Fig. 4 shows a summary of regional CO₂ prices (marginal abatement costs), which depend on the effective reduction targets shown in Fig. 1 and the regions’ abatement abilities. As expected, regions with higher reduction targets face higher CO₂ prices. More specifically, the regions with the highest reduction targets (Brazil, Canada, Europe, and South Korea) also face the highest CO₂ prices, while regions with lower targets like Africa, China, India, the Middle East, and Russia exhibit low CO₂ prices.

Fig. 5 shows a summary of regional welfare impacts across models. We find that direct abatement costs from compliance with the reduction target as inferred from the regional CO₂ prices (Fig. 4) are strongly outweighed by terms-of-trade effects largely transmitted via changes in international fuel prices. Individual regions may even benefit from emission reduction constraints. This is the case for India and Japan as large importers of fuels, where terms-of-trade gains more than offset the direct costs of emission abatement. The major share of the burden of global emission reductions falls on the fuel exporting regions Middle East and Russia, although both regions have relatively low reduction targets and associated CO₂ prices.

An interesting example showcasing the two effects driving regional adjustment costs is South Korea, where outcomes range from more than 2% gain in welfare to a loss of 2.6%. South Korea has the highest effective reduction target among all regions (33%, see Fig. 1), leading to relatively high direct abatement costs. At the same time, South Korea is a fossil fuel importer, profiting from declining fuel prices, and an exporter of EITE goods. Which of these effects is dominating differs across models due to differences in the structure of the BaU economies and the choice of elasticities.

We observe more heterogeneity across models on the regional level than on the global level. The cross-model variation in welfare is especially large for regions which have the most ambitious climate targets and regions where international feedback effects play an important role. The largest divergence is found for Russia and Middle East as large exporters of fossil fuels. However, South Korea and Europe, with strict targets and large imports of fossil fuels also show a huge variation.

3.2.2. Ambition level and international cooperation

Fig. 6 summarizes how regional welfare is affected as we move towards higher ambition levels NDC+ and NDC-2C. Welfare effects are stated in percentage points from the respective values in NDC/ref.

which gives rise to substantial terms-of-trade effects when parameterized with empirical estimates of trade elasticities (Balistreri et al., 2018).

For most regions the alternative BaU based on WEO projections entails rather similar welfare impacts. Europe is better off under the WEO projections due to the lower effective emission reduction requirement (see Fig. 1). That in turn slightly benefits Russia, as European oil and gas imports drop less. Only for South Korea is the incidence sharply more pronounced, as its effective reduction requirement is higher, and at the same time international oil and gas prices decline slightly less.

As an example, a value of 1% would indicate that the region is better off by one percentage point measured in BaU welfare compared to the NDC case.

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15 Note that all participating models implement international trade based on the standard assumption of product heterogeneity (Armington, 1969),

16 For most regions the alternative BaU based on WEO projections entails rather similar welfare impacts. Europe is better off under the WEO projections due to the lower effective emission reduction requirement (see Fig. 1). That in turn slightly benefits Russia, as European oil and gas imports drop less. Only for South Korea is the incidence sharply more pronounced, as its effective reduction requirement is higher, and at the same time international oil and gas prices decline slightly less.

17 As an example, a value of 1% would indicate that the region is better off by one percentage point measured in BaU welfare compared to the NDC case.
Fig. 5. Regional welfare across all models in NDC/ref. Note: Box-Whisker plot shows the median (line), mean (green triangle), the first and third quartile (box), and whiskers showing the last datapoints within 1.5 times the interquartile range (IQR). Dots indicate outliers. Region keys: ALL — Global average; AFR — Africa; ANZ — Australia and New Zealand; BRA — Brazil; CAN — Canada; CHN — China; EUR — Europe; IND — India; JPN — Japan; KOR — South Korea; MEA — Middle East; OAM — Other America; OAS — Other Asia; RUS — Russia; USA — United States.

Fig. 6. Differences in regional welfare under ambition levels NDC+ and NDC-2C compared to NDC without emissions trading (ref). Note: Box-Whisker plot shows the median (line), the first and third quartile (box), and whiskers showing the last datapoints within 1.5 times the interquartile range (IQR). Outliers omitted. Region keys: ALL — Global average; AFR — Africa; ANZ — Australia and New Zealand; BRA — Brazil; CAN — Canada; CHN — China; EUR — Europe; IND — India; JPN — Japan; KOR — South Korea; MEA — Middle East; OAM — Other America; OAS — Other Asia; RUS — Russia; USA — United States.

Note that we still assume compliance via strictly domestic action, i.e., no international emissions trading. We observe that the difference between NDC and NDC+ is rather small for most regions. For regions that step up their emission reduction pledges markedly in NDC+ — Africa, Middle East, Other Americas and Other Asia — welfare declines; also fossil fuel exporters suffer slightly more under the additional negative demand shock. The highest emission reduction ambition level (NDC-2C) leads to additional global adjustment costs of 0.5% compared to NDC.\textsuperscript{18} We find that the additional global adjustment costs for scaling up emission reduction targets towards a 2°C trajectory is unevenly distributed.\textsuperscript{19} India, Japan, and South Korea do not face higher adjustment costs compared to the lowest ambition level (NDC). The gains from indirect international spillovers for these regions increase with the level of emission abatement, as direct abatement costs clearly increase as well. The fuel exporters Middle East and Russia lose overproportionally.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} Compare Section 3.1.

\textsuperscript{19} Recall that the reduction targets in NDC-2C emerge from a uniform scaling of emission levels in NDC+ and do not take into account more subtle fairness considerations.
All other regions lose roughly up to an additional 1% of BaU welfare compared to NDC.

Concerning regional welfare impacts of increased where-flexibility through international emissions trading two mechanisms are of paramount importance: (i) unequivocal direct cost savings from emissions trading through the equalization of marginal abatement costs; and (ii) ambiguous indirect welfare effects through changes in the terms of trade on energy and non-energy markets that can play out both favorable or unfavorable for individual regions. More specifically, emission allowance selling countries face higher CO\(_2\) prices under emissions trading variants compared to ref, while the opposite is true for allowance buying countries. These changes in the CO\(_2\) prices affect the cost of EITE production and thereby the scope for terms-of-trade changes on EITE markets.

Fig. 7 summarizes regional welfare impacts across models for the cases with worldwide trading schemes global and partial compared to ref for the case of the unconditional Paris pledges (NDC). We first focus on global and find that most regions gain through a comprehensive global emissions trading scheme as compared to the ref situation – gains are most pronounced for Russia, Middle East, and Europe. However, the only regions where we unambiguously find welfare gains through global cooperation are Brazil, Canada, Europe, and Other Asia. For all other regions, individual models find welfare losses from engaging in comprehensive global emissions trading, which points to the importance of terms-of-trade income effects when assessing the welfare impacts of climate policies in a more comprehensive (general equilibrium) manner.

We find, however, a robust pattern driven by changes in fossil fuel prices. Comprehensive global cooperation leads to a shift of global abatement to China and India, where cheap abatement options via reduced coal consumption can be exploited. This increases oil and gas prices and depresses coal prices vis-à-vis ref, and thereby leads to a shift in regional incidence from oil and gas producers (Middle East and Russia) to coal producers. India is even worse off under global compared to ref in most models, although still with a welfare gain compared to the BaU on average. Japan is in most models slightly worse off under global compared to ref, due to higher international oil and gas prices under global.

South Korea again shows a huge spread in results across models. On the one hand, South Korea can gain from emissions trading as it exhibits the highest CO\(_2\) prices under ref (together with Europe). On the other hand, South Korea benefits substantially from depressed oil and gas prices under ref, an effect that is weakened under global.

When only EITE sectors and the power sectors are eligible for international emissions trading (partial), we find that Europe, South Korea, Middle East, and Russia can gain most compared to ref. While Europe and South Korea benefit from partial trading due to their high CO\(_2\) prices in ref, the Middle East and Russia benefit from a shift towards coal abatement in partial. South Korea is thereby the only region that favors partial over global. The reason is that under partial trading, South Korea can reap gains from emissions trading, while the global shift from oil- and gas-related abatement towards coal is less accentuated. This is also reflected in welfare outcomes for Middle East and Russia, where we find the most pronounced gains under global attenuated under partial.

Emissions trading leads to an equalization of regional (or sectoral) CO\(_2\) prices via exports and imports of emission allowances that constitute financial transfers between regions. For regions and sectors that form part of a trading coalition, their ref CO\(_2\) price in relation to the tradable CO\(_2\) price will determine whether the country becomes an exporter or importer of emission allowances and hence shows higher or lower emission reductions as stated in their Paris pledges. Fig. 8 shows that regional buying and selling positions of emission allowances are rather stable across models: China, India, and Russia, which have the lowest CO\(_2\) prices under ref (see Fig. 4), become large exporters of emission allowances; South Korea, Europe, Canada, and Brazil become large importers.\(^{20}\)

Fig. 9 shows the differences in regional welfare in the club-trading scenarios asia and eur-chn compared to ref. We see that Europe and South Korea can gain from club trading, as they start off from very

\(^{20}\) Note that Brazil is a large importer of emission allowances as our analysis focuses on CO\(_2\) emissions from fuel combustion. Accounting for emissions from agriculture, forestry, and land use (AFOLU) would most likely make Brazil a net exporter of emission allowances.
high CO₂ prices under ref. The other regions face only minor changes in economic adjustment costs triggered by club trading.

### 3.3. Household level incidence

Our analysis on global and regional welfare implications of Post-Paris emissions pricing so far has been agnostic on the incidence across heterogeneous households within countries. For the political feasibility of emissions pricing reforms, however, a critical question is who bears the burden of higher energy prices. Taking into account distributional effects of CO₂ pricing across heterogeneous households is thus central to climate policy design.

Emissions pricing creates costs and rents which translate into incidence for households via changes in prices for consumption goods on the expenditure side and via changes in factor remuneration (plus potential transfers) on the income side. On the expenditure side, emissions pricing is often found to be regressive to the extent that it drives up prices for consumption goods for which lower-income households tend to spend larger shares of their budgets. This is typically the case for electricity, home heating fuels, gasoline, and other energy-intensive

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**Fig. 8.** Differences in regional CO₂ emissions in global and partial compared to ref under NDC. Note: Box-Whisker plot shows the median (line), the first and third quartile (box), and whiskers showing the last datapoints within 1.5 times the interquartile range (IQR). Outliers are omitted. Region keys: ALL — Global average; AFR — Africa; ANZ — Australia and New Zealand; BRA — Brazil; CAN — Canada; CHN — China; EUR — Europe; IND — India; JPN — Japan; KOR — South Korea; MEA — Middle East; OAM — Other Americas; OAS — Other Asia; RUS — Russia; USA — United States.

**Fig. 9.** Differences in regional welfare in eur-chn and asia compared to ref under NDC. Note: Box-Whisker plot shows the median (line), the first and third quartile (box), and whiskers showing the last datapoints within 1.5 times the interquartile range (IQR). Outliers are omitted. Region keys: CHN — China; EUR — Europe; JPN — Japan; KOR — South Korea.
goods whose prices will overproportionally increase under CO₂ pricing. On the income side, emission pricing affects the productivity and thus the remuneration of the primary factors labor, capital, and specific resources (e.g., fossil fuel resources). Lower-income households tend to obtain larger shares of their income through labor and transfers, while higher-income households earn more through capital income. The incidence of climate policies on the income side hinges to a large extent on how governments will use revenues from emissions pricing. To address policy concerns on the regressive impacts of CO₂ pricing, we focus on revenue-neutral lump-sum transfers to households in equal shares. Such a rebating scheme is clearly progressive. Since each household receives an equal share of CO₂ revenues, the recycled amount marks a larger share of additional disposable for lower-income households. If sufficiently high, transfers can mitigate or even overcompensate the productivity losses, which are due to very high CO₂ prices associated with a high emission reduction target and the low BaU emission intensity of the Norwegian economy. The redistributive effect of CO₂ pricing with lump-sum rebates to households is quite strong rendering initial efficiency losses from a utilitarian perspective into marked social welfare gains.

We can summarize the individual effects on different households from a societal perspective when adopting a social welfare function where we capture alternative degrees of inequality aversion. We report social welfare changes as changes in the equally distributed equivalent income as defined by Atkinson (1970). For a given degree of inequality aversion, the equally distributed equivalent income is defined as the level of income that – if obtained by every individual in the income distribution – would enable the society to reach the same level of welfare as is the case with actual incomes. Higher degrees of inequality aversion imply higher values of social welfare. For an infinite aversion to inequality, i.e., when only the welfare of the lowest-income household matters, the associated social welfare actually increases beyond business-as-usual levels. Norway stands out for high productivity and thus more than 3% in real income (HEV), the highest-income households experience losses of roughly 2%. The underlying reason becomes clear if we decompose total welfare impacts into expenditure and income effects. The Box–Whisker plots in Fig. 10 summarize expenditure and income effects across models and countries. We find that the expenditure effect – although varying sharply across countries due to different levels of CO₂ prices, emission intensities, and expenditure patterns – is negative and slightly regressive. The income effect, on the other hand, which includes the lump-sum rebates received by households, is strongly progressive and dominates such that the overall welfare effect is progressive.21

We present results for our central case scenario (NDC/ref) where regions meet their unconditional Paris pledges (NDC) through purely domestic action (ref). Fig. 10 shows the total welfare impact on income deciles (h01, ..., h10) as the mean across six models and 36 (partly overlapping) countries (blue line with circle marker). On average, we find a progressive impact. While the lowest-income households gain more than 3% in real income (HEV), the highest-income households experience losses of roughly 2%. The underlying reason becomes clear if we decompose total welfare impacts into expenditure and income effects. The Box–Whisker plots in Fig. 10 summarize expenditure and income effects across models and countries. We find that the expenditure effect – although varying sharply across countries due to different levels of CO₂ prices, emission intensities, and expenditure patterns – is negative and slightly regressive. The income effect, on the other hand, which includes the lump-sum rebates received by households, is strongly progressive and dominates such that the overall welfare effect is progressive.21

Fig. 10. Summary on decomposition of households’ total welfare into expenditure and income effects across models and regions. Note: Box–Whisker plot shows the median (line), mean (green triangle), the first and third quartile (box), and whiskers showing the last datapoints within 1.5 times the interquartile range (IQR). Outliers omitted. Graph incorporates values from the models BC3 (Spain), IEG (India), UOL (Germany), SNoW (Norway), JRC-GEM-E3-EUROMOD-ITT (11 European countries), and CEPE (21 European countries).

21 Note that mainly European countries are represented in the Box–Whisker plots in Fig. 10. In our central case, CO₂ prices in Europe are quite high, leading to high revenues and thus a strong income effect for households through lump-sum rebates.

22 For a given degree of inequality aversion, the equally distributed equivalent income is defined as the level of income that – if obtained by every individual in the income distribution – would enable the society to reach the same level of welfare as is the case with actual incomes.

23 Note that for some countries in our cross-comparison CO₂ emissions pricing is already progressive without lump-sum rebates of CO₂ revenues. This can e.g. be the case when expenditure shares are rather homogenous across households and emissions pricing leads to a significantly bigger impact on capital income than on labor income, burdening higher-income households stronger. However, the marked progressive effect illustrated in Fig. 11 stems from the recycling mechanism.
welfare gains as inequality aversion increases, i.e. poorer households matter more and more. For China and India, on the other hand, the CO₂ pricing (at relatively low levels — see Fig. 4) and lump-sum recycling involves very moderate economy-wide costs which leaves the income distribution across households relatively unaffected.

Our robust policy-relevant insight is that lump-sum recycling of revenues in equal shares to households can offset the regressive impacts of CO₂ pricing and even deliver social welfare gains with a reduction in CO₂ emissions if inequality aversion is sufficiently high.

4. Concluding remarks

Most of the benefits of emission abatement will not materialize in terms of avoided climate damages before decades due to the inertia of the climate system. The costs of emission abatement on the other hand will occur in the short- to mid-term. It is therefore not surprising that the contemporary climate policy debate is still focused on the magnitude and distribution of economic adjustment costs of stringent emission constraints, as implied by the Paris Agreement in the pursuit of the 2°C temperature target. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has codified the challenge of international burden sharing as the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities. However, the initial top-down approach on burden sharing applied in the Kyoto Protocol failed, not least due to the hardship to agree on common equity principles. The Paris Agreement inaugurated a new, bottom-up approach where countries pledge their emission reduction commitments voluntarily as so-called Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The downside of such voluntary bottom-up approach is that it may not enforce sufficient collective abatement efforts to keep the average global temperature increase below 2°C from pre-industrial level. As a matter of fact, the individual abatement pledges under the Paris Agreement submitted so far fall substantially short off what is required to meet the long-run Paris temperature target. It is thus necessary to ratchet up the current NDCs towards much more restrictive targets even in the short run.

The unequivocal pressure to increase the ambition level in climate policy while securing societal approval calls for climate policy designs that are cost-effective and appear as fair to the citizens. Inherently, the individual abatement pledges under the Paris Agreement submitted so far fall substantially short off what is required to meet the long-run Paris temperature target. It is thus necessary to ratchet up the current NDCs towards much more restrictive targets even in the short run.

The discipline of economics has identified two important instruments to decrease the overall compliance costs of emission reduction pledges and to increase societal support for stringent climate policies. Indeed, international emissions trading plays a decisive role in the cost effective containment of climate damages. Under purely domestic compliance to NDCs, there can be large differences in marginal abatement costs across countries, indicating a huge potential for cost savings. International emissions trading facilitates cost savings by allowing markets to identify where emissions reductions are the cheapest worldwide. With respect to equity concerns within societies, the recycling of additional revenues from emissions pricing is of critical importance. CO₂ pricing will at first glance have regressive impacts on households since poorer households tend to spend larger shares of their income on energy-related consumption categories such as electricity, heat or transport which will become more expensive. However, the regressive impacts of rigorous CO₂ emissions pricing can be alleviated, if not offset through lump-sum recycling of additional revenues to households in equal shares.

The findings of the EMF36 study confirm the potential of both instruments — international emissions trading and lump-sum revenue recycling to households — to facilitate ambitious Post-Paris climate policies that are in line with the 2°C temperature target. Under comprehensive global emissions trading, the 2°C target is placed within reach under approximately the same range of cost implicitly agreed upon by individual countries with their NDCs. CO₂ emission pricing can be implemented in a progressive manner when additional revenues are recycled lump-sum to households in equal shares. The progressive revenue-recycling effect dominates the regressive effects of higher energy prices. In the end, CO₂ pricing in combination with lump-sum recycling of additional revenues on an equal-per-household basis can not only make economies greener, but also societies fairer in terms of overall income distribution.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Christoph Böhringer: Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Validation, Writing – review & editing. Sonja Peterson: Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Writing – review & editing. Thomas F. Rutherford: Conceptualization, Methodology. Jan Schneider: Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Visualization, Writing – original draft. Malte Winkler: Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Writing – review & editing.

Appendix. Business-as-usual (BaU) projections and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)

Our BaU projections are indexes for GDP and CO₂ from 1990–2030 (2011 = 1). We construct two alternative BaU projections denoted IEO and WEO. Against both BaU projections we derive effective reduction
targets for CO$_2$ emissions from fossil fuel combustion in 2030 for our model regions for three different ambition levels covering (i) unconditional NDC pledges and lower bounds (NDC), (ii) conditional pledges and upper bounds (NDC$^+$), and (iii) an ambition level called NDC-2C where we scale emission levels in NDC$^+$ uniformly across regions in order to comply with an emission reduction for 2030 which is on the 2°C emission trajectory path suggested by integrated assessment analysis. The notation used in this section is summarized in Table A.1.

We map all the primary IEO and WEO data to GTAP regions, so the procedures described below apply to the individual GTAP regions from where we aggregate numbers towards the composite model regions (see Table 2). In what follows, we sketch our data sources and the steps involved to establish Baseline projections from IEO and WEO as well as the respective region-specific effective reduction targets in 2030. An Excel file with the data in use and the computational steps involved is available from the authors upon request.

A.1. BaU projections

We construct two alternative BaU projections based on IEO and WEO data for GDP and CO$_2$ emissions as indexes from 1990–2030 (2011=1) across all GTAP regions. IEO represents projections from the International Energy Outlook 2017 of the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA, 2017). WEO represents projections from the World Energy Outlook 2018 of the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2018). For historical data, we use WorldBank (2019) for GDP and EIA (2019) for CO$_2$. For years without data, we interpolate linearly.

We then aggregate the BaU data from the more disaggregate GTAP regions to our composite model regions using the weighted sum for the respective BaU items – here GDP and CO$_2$ emissions – indexed to 2011 as the base year (2011=1).

A.2. NDCs

Building on Kitous et al. (2016), we compile a dataset with regional NDCs as submitted by individual countries (see UNFCCC, 2020, for the NDC registry). The regions in our dataset cover more than 95% of global CO$_2$ emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The dataset includes for most countries a low and a high NDC pledge (equivalent to our NDC and NDC$^+$) as well as the NDC base year, the target year for meeting the NDC, the coverage of greenhouse gas emissions, and the type of the target. Countries state their NDCs typically as a percentage reduction target against a certain base year (which can be historical or a future business-as-usual), or as a percentage reduction target for emission intensity of GDP (e.g., China and India). For countries that state their targets with respect to a business-as-usual in a future target year (typically 2030) and that provide a BaU projection for 2030 of their own, we use the implied physical emission level to go forward. We translate NDCs into percentage CO$_2$ emission reduction targets vis-à-vis the BaU in 2030.

For countries stating their NDC as an emission reduction target, we calculate the effective emission reduction requirement as:

$$R_{r,c}^B = 1 - \left(1 - ndc_r^c\right) \cdot \frac{BCO_2(t_{ty})}{BCO_2(b_y)} \cdot \frac{BCO_2(b_y)}{BCO_2(t_{ty})} \cdot \frac{GDP(t_{ty})}{GDP(b_y)} \cdot \frac{GDP(b_y)}{GDP(t_{ty})},$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

For countries stating their NDC as an intensity target, we calculate the effective emission reduction requirement as:

$$R_{r,c}^B = 1 - \left(1 - ndc_r^c\right) \cdot \frac{BCO_2^N(t_{ty})}{BCO_2^N(b_y)} \cdot \frac{GDP^N(t_{ty})}{GDP^N(b_y)} \cdot \frac{GDP^N(b_y)}{GDP^N(t_{ty})} \cdot \frac{GDP^N(t_{ty})}{GDP^N(b_y)} \cdot \frac{GDP^N(b_y)}{GDP^N(t_{ty})},$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

If the NDC target year is not 2030, the required percentage reduction from 2016 (last available historical year) to the NDC target year is linearly perpetuated to 2030.

For countries that have stated their NDCs for all greenhouse gas emissions (not only CO$_2$), we convert the reduction targets towards CO$_2$ emission reduction targets from fossil fuel combustion only, as the latter constitute the relevant emission base for our model cross-comparison. The scaling factor is derived from Kitous et al. (2016):

$$F_r = \frac{1 - \frac{CO_2^{NDC}}{GDP^{NDC}}}{1 - \frac{CO_2^{NDC}}{GDP^{NDC}}},$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

that is, the ratio of the %-reductions of CO$_2$ from fuel combustion over greenhouse gas emissions.$^{24}$ We only apply scaling factors lower than 1 being cautious on the scope for more stringent emission reductions. Brazil is adjusted based on expert opinion.$^{25}$ For countries with an intensity target, we set a minimum reduction target of 5% against the 2030 baselines, reflecting the assumption that such a target will lead to some degree of effective carbon pricing, even if baseline projections suggest that targets are reached without carbon pricing. To define the NDC-2C scenarios, we follow a budget approach, where we target a global level of CO$_2$ emissions that is 11.58% below 2011 emissions.$^{26}$ We apply a uniform scaling factor to the regional emission levels in NDC$^+$ in order to achieve that target.

The reduction requirements under NDC-2C then are

$$R_{r,NDC-2C}^B = 1 - S \cdot \left(1 - R_{r,NDC}^B\right),$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

where $S$ is the scaling factor.

$^{24}$ E.g., if a country $r$ in scenario NDC reduces 10% of GHG emissions and also 10% of CO$_2$ from fuel combustion, then $F_r = 1$.

$^{25}$ Experts from Brazil identify reduction potential of 100–210 Mt CO$_2$ in 2030 (excl. APOLU). We stay rather conservative and use the lower value in order to calculate effective reduction requirements.

$^{26}$ This value is derived as an average emission trajectory suggested by integrated assessment analysis for scenarios that target a 2°C path (Huppmann et al., 2019).

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Table A.1

| Symbol | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| $r$    | Set of GTAP regions |
| $B$    | Set of BaU projections (IEO, WEO) |
| $c$    | Set of NDC scenarios (NDC, NDC$^+$, NDC-2C) |
| $R_{r,c}^B$ | Reduction requirement in region $r$ and NDC scenario $c$ as a percentage of emissions in baseline $B$ in 2030 |
| ndc$_r^c$ | Nationally intended contribution in region $r$ and $c$ |
| $b_y$  | Base year of NDC in region $r$ |
| $t_{ty}$ | Target year of NDC in region $r$ |
| CO$_2$ | CO$_2$ level in Kitous et al. (2016) in region $r$ and scenario $c$ |
| GHG$_r^c$ | GHG level in Kitous et al. (2016) in region $r$ and scenario $c$ |
| $F_r$  | Correction factor to scale from GHG to CO$_2$ reduction requirement in region $r$ |
| $S$    | Scaling factor to translate the implied emission level in NDC$^+$ to NDC-2C |
Finally, we aggregate the effective reduction targets across GTAP regions towards our composite model regions based on CO₂ emission weighted averages of GTAP data for our base year 2011.

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