Uddyotakara’s Criticism of the *Apoha*-Theory Reconsidered

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Uddyotakara’s criticism of the *apoha*-theory under Nyāyasūtra (NS) 2.2.66\(^1\) has been studied by several scholars. Hattori and Matilal translated it into Japanese and English respectively, and Much provided a synopsis of Uddyotakara’s discussion and clarified the correspondence between his criticism and Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS).\(^2\) After those studies, Pind’s work on Dignāga’s *apoha* was published.\(^3\) By virtue of it, we can easily imagine Sanskrit text of PS V. In addition Thakur’s new edition of Nyāyavārttikā (NV) is available.\(^4\) In this essay, using these works, I will examine Uddyotakara’s criticism of *apoha*-theory again, and try to clarify its characters.

Uddyotakara starts his criticism after establishing Nyāya’s doctrine of meaning. His criticism begins with the phrase, “someone said that neither universal nor shape nor individual is a referent of term” (na vyaktyāṛti jātayah padārtha iti kecit, p. 672.1). Judging from this phrase his main purpose of criticism seems be not to attack Dignāga’s *apoha*-theory but to defend Nyāya’s doctrine against Dignāga’s objections.

Uddyotakara’s discussion in NV can be sectioned into four parts: (P) Dignāga’s arguments cited from Dignāga’s works (pp. 672.1–674.2), (U1) counter-objections against Dignāga’s arguments (pp. 674.3–679.3), (U2) additional counter-objections (pp. 679.4–686.5) and (U3) criticism of the concept of *apoha* (pp. 686.6–689.10).\(^5\)

Firstly, let us examine Dignāga’s arguments (P) and Uddyotakara’s counter-objections against them (U1). They are summarized in Table 1.

**Table 1**

| P: Dignāga’s arguments cited in NV | U1: | Corresponding PS and PSV |
|-----------------------------------|-----|--------------------------|
| P-1: An universal cannot be a referent of the term, “existent” because it is appositional with terms for individuals (p. 672.3–8). | U1-1: pp. 674.4–675.14 | PS V 2cd and PSV ad PS V 2d |

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### Table 1

| P-2: A connection cannot be a referent of term because of the same reason (p. 672.8). | U1-2: p. 676.1–3 | PS V 2c, V 3 and PSV |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| P-3: Individuals cannot be referents of term because of their infinity and deviance (pp. 672.8–673.1) | U1-3: pp. 676.3–677.6 | PS V 2ab and PSV |
| P-4: A possessor of universal cannot be a referent of term because of the lack of independence (p. 673.1–6) | U1-4: pp. 677.6–678.10 | PS V 4a and PSV ad PS V 4a (PS V 8cd) |
| P-5: Our representation of the primary meaning of the term, “existent” cannot be metaphorically transferred to a possessor of universal (p. 673.6–9) | U1-5: pp. 678.11–679.3 | PSV ad PS V 4b2, PS V 5ab, V 6cd, V 6ab |
| P-6: The term, “existent” cannot denote the particulars having uniqueness, A term excludes the referents of other terms in its own referent (p. 673.9–674.2). |                      | PS V 11d |

Dignāga’s arguments cited in NV correspond to PS V.2–11 and its PSV in content. As Pind pointed out, however, Uddyotakara seems to cite them from PS and PSV as well as Dignāga’s other works, Sāmānyaparīkṣā, its commentary and so on. For example, Uddyotakara cites the following phrase at the end of P (p. 674.2): *anyapadārthāntarāpoham hitvā* (NV\(^T\) omits: em. “hi”) *svārthe kurvati śrutir abhidhatta ity ucyate* (NV\(^T\) omits). This phrase is not found in PS or PSV, but cited in Nayakacakra (NC) and its Vṛtti (NCV). ⁶ Pind suspects this phrase to be quoted from Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa. ⁷ He also thinks that Uddyotakara reproduced Dignāga’s arguments on the basis of Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa in several portions. ⁸ Whether Pind’s supposition is true or not, we can safely say that Uddyotakara’s discussions would be cited from Dignāga’s lost works except the case of P-2, which is treated lightly in them.

The term, “sāmānādhikaranya” is used throughout P-1 and U1-1, while Dignāga uses the term “aprthakṣruti” instead of “sāmānādhikaranya” in PS V 2d. Uddyotakara also cites Dignāga’s unknown verse, which is a slightly revised version of Vākyapadiya (VP) III.14.8 ⁹ in U1-1 (p. 675.13–14). In P-3 Uddyotakara represents Dignāga’s opinion in terms of the phrase, “sacchabdaḥ pindāṇāṃ vācako bhaveṣyatiḥ na yuktam” (p. 672.8–9), instead of the proposition of PS V 2, “na jātiśabdo bhedāṇāṃ . . . vācakah.” In contrast Uddyotakara uses that of PS V 2 in U1-3 (p. 676.3) and U2.

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In P-5, the reasons for the impossibility of metaphorical transference are summarized in the following passage: “kramayrttyabhāvāt,” “yugapasasambhavāt,” and “ayathārthajñānotpattiprasaṅgāt” (p. 673.8). These passages are not found in PS or PSV but cited in NCV, while the similar arguments are found in PS V 5, 6 and its PSV.

In addition the order of arguments in NV differs from that in PS. In NV the argument about individuals (P-3), which is placed at the head of Dignāga’s discussion in PS, is positioned after that about the connection, while the other arguments follow the order in PS.

U2 is a criticism of Dignāga’s proposition, “na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ vācakaḥ.” Its detail is illustrated by Table 2.

Table 2

| U2-1-1: p. 679.4–7 | If no individual is denotable, or if terms for universal denote nothing then the qualification is meaningless. |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| U2-1-2: pp. 679.7–680.3 | The terms “jātiśabda” and “bhedānāṃ vācaka” are contradicted. It must be said that terms are not able to denote, and that individuals are not denotable. If the term for universal does not denote universal, it is a contradiction. |
| U2-1-3: p. 680.4–8 | If any terms were not able to denote, and if their referents were not denotable, any proposition would not hold. |
| U2-2-1: p. 680.8–12 | (Objection) Any term does not denote its referent in any other way than the exclusion of others. |
| U2-2-2: p. 680.12–15 | (Answer) What is the cause of representation of similarity is the very universal. |
| U2-3: p. 680.15–17 | If the individuals or some part of them are taken as the subject of the proposition, the previous fault is true in such an argument. |
| U2-4: pp. 680.18–686.5 | The statement that terms do not denote individuals is contradicted with the co-reference (sāmanādhikaranya) between “existing” (sat) and “substance” (dravya). Since no relation between primary and secondary items holds in the apoha-theory, any co-reference and metaphorical reference (upacāra) cannot be explained. |

In this table, U2-1-2 and U2-3 are closely linked with U1-3. In U1-3, Uddyotakara has already pointed out the contradiction of Dignāga’s proposition. He says, “Who says that the term for universal denotes individuals? You have rejected only eloquence concocted by yourself” (kaś caivam āha—jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ vācaka iti? svayamprakīktām vācoyuktām bhavān pratiśedhāti, p. 676.4). U2-3 seems to be a repetition of the portion of U1-3 (p. 676.12–16). In addition U2-1-3 and U2-4 seem to expound on the end of U1-3 (p. 677.4–
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6), which explains that Dignāga’s proposition is contradicted with co-reference between “existing” (*sat*) and “substance” (*dravya*).

Table 3

| U3-1: p. 686.6–11 | The initial representation (*ādiprayaya*) does not hold without any affirmative referent of term. |
| U3-2: p. 687.1–4 | Is the *anyāpoha* (exclusion of others: not non-cow) existence (*bhāva*) or non-existence (*abhāva*)? |
| U3-2-1 | If it is an existence and cow, there is no problem. |
| U3-2-2-1 | If it is an existence and non-cow, the referent of term would be confused. |
| U3-2-2-2 | If it is a non-existence, the command and its agreement should not hold. |
| U3-3-1: p. 687.5–12 | In the case of *apoha*, there are two domains (*rāṣṭi*). One is negated and the other is not. But the term, “*sarva*” (all) does not have such domains. |
| U3-3-2 | Even if “one” and so on are the negation of “all,” the aggregate named “all” does not hold without “one” and so on. |
| U3-4: p. 687.13–18 | What is the object of “*apoha*” (exclusion) forming an action? |
| U3-4-1-1 | If it is a cow, a cow should have non-existence of cow. |
| U3-4-1-2 | If it is non-cow, the object of action should differ from its own. |
| U3-4-2-1 | If non-cow is negated in cow, the non-cowness to be negated should connect with cow. |
| U3-4-2-2 | Without the representation of cow, we can negate nothing in cow. Indeed there is no initial representation of cow. |
| U3-5: p. 688.1–5 | Is the *anyāpoha* different (*vyatirikta*) from cow or not? |
| U3-5-1 | If it is different, is it dependent (*āśrīta*) or not? |
| U3-5-1-1 | If it is dependent, it is an attribute (*gūna*), and has no co-reference. |
| U3-5-1-2 | If it is not dependent, there is no genitive-relation. |
| U3-5-2 | If it is not different, it is the cow itself. |
| U3-6: p. 688.6–7 | Is the *anyāpoha* concerning each entity one or many? |
| U3-6-1 | If it is one, it is the cowness itself. |
| U3-6-2 | If it is many, it does not hold because of infinitury just like individuals. |
| U3-7: p. 688.8–13 | Is the *anyāpoha* denotable or not? |
| U3-7-1 | If it is denotable, there is an infinite regress (*anavasthā*). |
| U3-7-2 | If it is not denotable, it would be contradicted with Dignāga’s passage, “*anyāsabdārthāpoha*” (the exclusion of referents of other terms). |
| U3-8: pp. 688.13–689.9 | The term, “*aneka*” (not-one) must be dependent on particulars. Without dependence on particulars, the understanding of particulars through the term for general (*sāmānyasaba*) is not justified. |
| U3-8-1 | Since both terms, “blue” and “lotus” are primary, there is no qualifier-qualified relation (*vīṣeṣanīvesyabhāva*) between them. |
| U3-8-2 | In the case of *anyāpoha*, items in co-reference cannot be explained. |
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To sum up, most of U2 is parallel to some portions of U1-3. What U2 adds to U1-3 is U2-2, which explains the similarity between the realistic concept of universal (jāti) and apoha.

Finally, Uddyotakara criticizes the concept of apoha itself. The points of his criticism are summarized by Table 3.

In his criticism, U3-5 and U3-6 are clearly parallel to the arguments about universal (sāmānyajāti) which is described by Uddyotakara as differing from individuals, one and the cause of representation of similarity (NV ad NS 2.2.64, p. 669.13). Moreover the initial representation discussed in U3-1 seems to be one of subjects in the argument of universal. In the argument of universal he says: “Before the cowness, this is neither cow nor non-cow... and before connecting with the cowness the entity does not exist,” (prāg gotvāt nāsau gauh nāpy agaur iti ... na ca prāg gotvayogād vastu vidyate, NV ad NS 2.2.64, p. 669.11–13). At least he imagines the situation preceding the first representation of cow in the case of universal, while there is a difference between the epistemological viewpoint and the ontological that. The fault of apoha theory in U3-4 also arrives at the impossibility of the initial representation. Moreover U3-7-1 shows the problem that the realistic concept of universal might also cause, that is the infinite regress.

In addition, U3-2 is discussed in the framework of Vaiśeṣika. Uddyotakara seems to regard non-existence (abhāva) as an independent category of Vaiśeṣika-system (cf. NV ad NS 1.1.4, p. 97.7; ad NS 1.1.14, p. 204.10). U3-3 about the division into two domains might take the same line of U3-2. That is to say, two domains in U3-3 can be interpreted as the domain of non-existence and that of existence, while the term, “domain” (rāśi) might remind the discussion about the trairūpya-theory.11)

Through the above observations, we can see that Uddyotakara realizes the similarity between apoha and his own concept of universal. As it is shown in U3-8, however, he regards the term denoting apoha to make no reference to particulars. Although this problem might be solved in Dignāga’s system through the concept of sabdāntarāpoha, Uddyotakara neglects such an aspect of apoha theory, probably because he focuses his attention on the referent of term.

To sum up, the sources of Uddyotakara’s criticism is a mixture of Dignāga’s PS, PSV and his lost works. Uddyotakara seems to cite Dignāga’s arguments from them fairly freely. The inconsistency of citation and the redundancy of arguments are found in his discussion. These facts, however, would offer a key to Uddyotakara’s intention, that is to refute Dig-
nāga’s opinion that neither universal nor individual is a referent of term. For this reason he selects the proposition which is easy to criticize, and persistently criticizes it. Indeed it would seem to Uddyotakara that the proposition in P-3, “sacchabdaḥ pinḍanāḥ . . .” has no contradiction. The change of order of P-3 could also be explained by his intention. He regards P-4 and P-5 to be attendant on P-3, and P-3 as the most serious problem.

From Uddyotakara’s point of view, the apoha functions as a new type of universal at some points, while there remain some problems caused from its negative character. On the other hand, the problem is that the apoha theory seems to have difficulty in denoting individuals. Uddyotakara would think that any theory of meaning cannot be established without any reference to individuals. Especially the reference to individuals plays an important role in explanation of co-reference and metaphorical reference. In this sense, Uddyotakara would have to deny the statement that only the apoha is the referent of term.

In order to defend Nyāya’s doctrine of meaning from Dignāga’s argument, there are two issues that Uddyotakara has to address. One is Dignāga’s argument that neither individuals nor universal is a referent of term, and another is his opinion that only the apoha is a referent of term. The former is Uddyotakara’s main concern. As regards the latter, it is dubious that he has an intention to refute the concept of apoha exhaustively.

1) NV: Nyāyadarśana with Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara’s Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra’s Tatparyatikā & Viśvanātha’s Vṛtti, ed. T. N. Tarkatirtha and A. Tarkatirtha, Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18, 29 (Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing & Publishing House, 1936–1944; repr., Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1982). The page numbers in this essay refer to this text.

2) Hattori Masaki 服部明正, “Nyāyavārttikā, II.2.66 ni okeru apoha-rōn hihan” Nyāyavārttikā, II.2.66におけるアポーハ論批判 [Uddyotakara’s criticism on the Apoha-theory in the Nyāyavārttikā, II.2.66], in Mikkyō to Indo shishō: Matsuo Gikai hakushi koki kinen ronshū 密教と印度思想: 松尾義海博士古稀記念論集 (Kyoto: Shuchiin Daigaku Mikkyōgakkai, 1980); Bimal Krishna Matilal, “Apoha: Uddyotakara’s Critique of Dinnaga,” The Indian Journal of Buddhist Studies 1, no. 2 (1989): 4–12; Matilal, “Apoha: Dinnaga as Interpreted by Uddyotakara,” The Indian Journal of Buddhist Studies 1 (1989): 53–60; Michael Torsten Much, “Uddyotakaras Kritik des apoha-Lehre (Nyāyavārttikā ad NS II 2.66),” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie 38 (1994): 351–366.

3) Ole Pind, “Dignāga’s Philosophy of Language Dignāga on Anyāpoha” (PhD diss., Universität Wien, 2009).

4) NV:\textsuperscript{T}: Nyāyavārttikā of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara, ed, Anantalal Thakur (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997).

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5) Much sectioned Uddyotakara’s discussion into three, that is, put together U2 and U3 into one. As a matter of fact, we have the impression that Uddyotakara’s counter-objection has finished at the end of U1. At the end of U1 he says: “... Therefore, since the creeper of false reasons is surely removed, it is established that the referent of term is individual, shape and universal” (p. 679.2–3). But U2 is closely linked with U1.

6) (Dvādaśāra) Nayacakra, edited with Simhasūragani’s commentary by Muni Jambuvijaya (Bhavnagar: Sri Jain Atmanand Sabha, 1966–1988), p. 612 and others.

7) Pind 2009, pp. 182–183.

8) Especially P-1, P-5, and U3-1 in Table 1. See Pind 2009, pp. 141–142, 147, 160, and 164.

9) Vākyapadiya of Bhartrhari with the Prakṛṭakapraṇāśa of Helārāja, kaṇḍa III pt. ii, ed. Subramania Iyer (Poona: Deccan College, 1973), p. 153.26–27: vibhaktibhedo niyamād guṇagunyabhidhāyinoḥ/ sāmānādhikaranyasya prasiddhir dravyasabdāyoh// V-translation of PSV ad PS V 2d cites it in original form (Derge 66b6). But Uddyotakara cites it as Dignāga’s opinion in the following form: . . . sāmānādhikaranyāsiddhīḥ (NV: -karanyasyāsiddhiḥ) sādṛvyāśabdāyoh//.

10) krama-vṛtyab̤hāvāc ca, . . . tan nāpi guṇopakārāt, sphaṭikavad viśeṣanaprakarṣam agrhitvā viśeṣya pratyayapraśaṅgāt . . . kiṃca ayathārthajñānotpatteḥ . . . kiṃca yugapadasambhavāc ca, NCV, p. 625.

11) As far as my limited observations go, Uddyotakara uses the term, “rāṣṭi” only in his objections against Buddhist logic (cf, NV ad NS 1.1.5, p. 164.3; ad NS 1.1.35, p. 301.13; ad NS 3.1.1, p. 703.4). I guess that Uddyotakara borrows this term from some work of early Buddhist logic.

(Key words) Uddyotakara, apoha, Dignāga, jāti

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