Social aggregation as a cooperative game

Daniele Vilone\textsuperscript{a,b}, Andrea Guazzini\textsuperscript{c,*}

\textsuperscript{a} Center for the Study of Complex Dynamics, Università degli Studi di Firenze, Florence, Italy
\textsuperscript{b} Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Leganés (Madrid), Spain
\textsuperscript{c} Institute for Informatics and Telematics, National Research Council (CNR), Pisa, Italy

\section{Introduction}

The study of the evolution of social systems is a topic nowadays attracting the interest of researchers from different domains such as physics, psychology and mathematics. In fact, an interdisciplinary approach provides a more powerful way to understand and model such complex systems \cite{1}. One important issue within this field is the understanding of the phenomena of social aggregation, as for instance urbanization, cultural clusterization and imitative processes in econophysics.

The classical approach of sociophysics is by means of Statistical Mechanics: the system under analysis is considered in a thermodynamical way, \textit{i.e.} it is seen as composed by a great number of identical elementary units and, starting from the rules governing the microscopical dynamics of individuals, the general behavior at macroscopical level is achieved. Consequently, this methodology is very useful in those systems whose peculiarity is produced by statistical laws rather than by specific microscopic details \cite{2–7}.

On the other hand, a different approach is also possible, by means of the analysis of cooperative behaviors, in particular the study of the emergence of cooperation in systems of generic agents \cite{8–10}, in financial markets \cite{11} or in academic networks \cite{12}. The main theoretical scaffolding to face such issues is borrowed from game theory, largely used in econophysics, which focuses on the evolution of the strategies that agents use during their interactions \cite{13,14}.

Social norms, beliefs, attitudes and opinions are also concepts which have attracted the interest of researchers from a great number of different fields \cite{15–18}. Certainly, it is quite hard to define explicitly those objects, but reaching a reliable representation of them is a required step in order to implement models for social dynamics. Psychology and sociology are

\textsuperscript{*} Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 050 3153059.
E-mail addresses: daniele.vilone@gmail.com (D. Vilone), andrea.guazzini@gmail.com (A. Guazzini).

0378-4371/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.03.024
useful tools to provide definitions for concepts like the previous ones, but what we need here is just an operational definition in order to make our models useful.

On the one hand, sharing the same beliefs, attitudes, opinions and in general social norms, means to use the same “cultural coordinates” to communicate, enhancing the process of “social meaning negotiation” [19], defined as the interaction of two individuals who do not share the same lexicon or meanings, and increasing the probability to converge to the same “social cluster”. On the other hand, social fragmentation can be viewed also as the result of this same process [19]. Moreover, social norms are objects intrinsically linked together and there is a natural resistance to changing cultural coordinates because it is possible to see them as the product of well-established neural circuits and because frequently a change would cause a cascade effect on the others. Thus, importing a psychological representation of cultural coordinates (CC) means at least to take into consideration three main characteristics:

- CCs are hard to change.
- People who have the same CC belong to the same cultural cluster.
- The degree of cultural separation among agents, that is how much their social norms are different, can be defined as a sort of “distance” in the abstract space of the CC.

The last crucial ingredient we have to consider here is the role of the environment on the negotiation strategies. Indeed, from a sociological point of view, it is well-known that belonging to a big cultural cluster (i.e. sharing the same CC with a great amount of people) increases the individual fitness [20,21]. Consequently the macroscopic features of a population influence the probability of changing its own CC to increase the size of the group.

Finally, the main role of social sciences in this challenge is to link in an ecological way the microscopic dynamics (i.e. the evolution strategy of an individual) with the macroscopic phenomenology (i.e. the state of the whole system).

2. Social aggregation and game theory

The purpose of this paper is to study the phenomena of social aggregation trying to unify the statistical mechanical approach with the game-theoretical one, and using the psychological concepts depicted in the Introduction. More precisely, we want to write down models whose microscopical dynamics is defined starting from the payoff matrix of each individual (or player, or agent; in the following we will use these terms with the same meaning). The payoff matrix tells us the gain (or loss) of a player after an interaction according to the strategies used by itself and its opponent (we consider only two-body interactions so that if the possible strategies are M, we will have an $M \times M$ payoff matrix — see in the next paragraph), and the outcome of such an interaction will determine the following dynamics. In other words, in our models the interaction between two individuals will be determined (also) by their payoff matrix, and in their turn the payoff matrices of the individuals will evolve according to the dynamics. The details of the dynamics, i.e. the payoff matrix, will be determined on the basis of the psycho-sociological considerations. We stress that our aim is just to suggest a new methodology, therefore the models introduced here have the minimum amount of refinement required for such a purpose.

The starting point is the phenomenological consideration that for a human being it is in general more convenient to belong to a big group than to a small one, even though moving to join a big group can have a cost in terms of fitness (that is, somehow it implies a loss). Then, let us consider a system of $N$ agents where every agent belongs to a cluster. Each cluster represents a group of individuals who share the same cultural coordinates. From a psychological point of view we have to consider two main assumptions. First, we assume that every agent has the advantage of belonging to a group which is as big as possible. Nevertheless, at the same time an agent tends to maintain his CC (so that it has to pay a cost in order to change them). On the basis of such considerations we can state that the fitness of an individual increases with the number of other individuals sharing its same social norms, i.e. with the size of its cluster. On the other hand, the fitness decreases according to an “economic criterion”, that is according to the work the individual accomplished in order to merge with its actual group. In practice, when a player $i$ meets an opponent $j$ from a stranger cluster, its payoff matrix is

$$
\hat{A} = \{A_{\kappa \lambda}\} = \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{w_1(m_j) - w_2(d_{ij})}{w_1(1)} & w_1(m_j - m_i + 1) - w_2(d_{ij}) \\
0 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
$$

where the indices $\kappa, \lambda$ can indicate the strategies $C$, “cooperation” (availability to join the opponent’s group), or $D$, “defection” (that is “no cooperation”); while $m_i$ is the population of the cluster of the player $i$, $m_j$ the population of the opponent’s cluster, and $d_{ij}$ is the distance (in the CC space) between the two clusters. Finally, the function $w_1(m)$ is the fitness contribution of $m$ individuals, and $w_2(d)$ is the work (i.e. the loss of fitness) an agent has to bear to cover a distance equal to $d$: for what is stated above, both are positive increasing functions of their arguments. As one can see, we chose the simplest case of only two pure strategies ($C$ and $D$), in order to deal with a simple $2 \times 2$ payoff matrix.

The meaning of Eq. (1) is then the following: when a player adopting the strategy $C$ (i.e. a “cooperator”) meets another cooperator, its payoff will be given by the element $A_{11}$ of the payoff matrix: indeed they put in common their CC, and this is equivalent to the merging of their groups into one, and moreover we assume that they “meet in the middle”, so that the work spent is half of that due to the original distance between them. If the opponent does not cooperate (i.e. is a “defector”), the first player has to cover the entire distance $d_{ij}$ to gain the CC of the opponent’s cluster, and it will lose contact with its original group, gaining the payoff given by the matrix element $A_{12}$. On the contrary, if the first player does not cooperate...
(but the opponent does) it will not spend anything but gain for its group only the presence of the second player \((A_{21} = 1)\). Finally, if two defectors meet, nothing will happen \((A_{22} = 0)\). Of course, it is meant that only players from different clusters can meet, or equivalently, that when two players from the same group meet, nothing happens.

It must be noticed that the property of the clusters to merge when two cooperators meet is a strong assumption. Anyway, there are many situations in which this assumption is quite realistic. For example, let us consider the spreading of technological or cultural advances through different populations: when an individual meets from a stranger group a new technique useful to face successfully some not yet resolved problem, presumably he will import that into his original social cluster. If the new technique improves appreciably the fitness of the population, then it will soon become a common knowledge of all the members, and under this aspect the two clusters have merged together. Similar processes can happen for other cultural instances, as for example languages, religions and traditions. Finally, we stress the fact that the goal of this paper is just to present a couple of simple toy models in order to show how this new approach should work. Thus, the models we are going to present in the following sections, both developed starting from Eq. (1), are very simple and deserve to be improved in the future.

At last, for sake of simplicity we adopt for the fitness functions \(w_1(m)\) and \(w_2(d)\) the simplest possible shape, that is, we assume them to be proportional to the population and to the distance, respectively. Moreover, to make easier calculations, we set equal to 1 the proportionality constants \((\Rightarrow w_i(x) = x)\), so that the payoff matrix gets the general form

\[
\hat{A} = \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{m_j - d_{ij}}{2} & m_j - m_i + 1 - d_{ij} \\
0 & 0
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

We stress the fact that choosing the direct proportionality between the fitness functions \(w_1\) and \(w_2\) and their arguments \(m\) and \(d\), respectively, is due to the search for simplicity (the intuitive principles “a group two times bigger helps me twice” and “reaching a group two times farther costs twice” are understood); different behaviors (as for instance logarithmic or power law ones) could actually also be taken into consideration, but, for what we stated in the beginning of this section, at least as a first approximation we think our choice can be fully satisfactory.

3. Static homogeneous model

As a first step our study, we analyze an oversimplified static model, which we call the “static homogeneous model” (SHM): we assume that the system is always perfectly homogeneous, so that all the players obey the same payoff matrix. More precisely, we consider a system made up of a great number of identical clusters, each one of the same size \(m\) and at the same distance from each other: \(d_{ij} = 2x(1 - \delta_{ij})\). Moreover, we consider such a distance \(2x\) big enough to consider the fitness contribution of one individual negligible with respect to the work needed to cover it: \(2x \gg 1\) (anyway, as it is easy to verify, this approximation does not change appreciably the physics of the model). So, the payoff matrix \(\hat{A}\) of Eq. (2) becomes

\[
\hat{A}_H = \begin{pmatrix}
1 + \varepsilon & -2x \\
1 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]

where \(\varepsilon = m - x - 1\) (this will turn out to be the crucial parameter of the SHM). Of course it is always \(x > 0\). Now, we want just to understand which is the rational strategy the agents should adopt when meeting foreigners (interactions between players of the same clusters are not taken into account), in the given configuration, neglecting any possible time evolution.

Given \(p(t)\) the density of cooperators, its behavior is given by replicator equation \([22,23]\)

\[
\frac{\dot{p}}{p} = f_c - \langle \hat{A}_H \rangle
\]

where \(f_c\) is the averaged payoff of a cooperator and \(\langle \hat{A}_H \rangle\) the averaged payoff of a generic player. We have to stress the fact that we consider this system as frozen, and the time evolution given by the previous equation must be seen just as a mathematical trick in order to discover the Nash equilibria of the matrix (3). Explicitly, the replicator equation becomes

\[
\frac{dp}{dt} = (2x + \varepsilon) \cdot p(1-p)(p - \omega)
\]

with

\[
\omega = \frac{2x}{2x + \varepsilon}.
\]

The Nash equilibria of Eq. (5) are in general the roots of the polynomial at the right side:

\[
\begin{align*}
p^E_1 &= 0 \quad \text{(no cooperators)} \\
p^E_2 &= 1 \quad \text{(all cooperators)} \\
p^E_3 &= \omega \quad \text{(mixed equilibrium)}.
\end{align*}
\]
In order to understand the phenomenology, it is important to find also the stability of the equilibria given in Eq. (7). The explicit evaluation of the stability is left in Appendix, here we just give the results obtained.

CASE $\epsilon < 0$ — The payoff matrix is here a Prisoner’s Dilemma one. This condition is equivalent to $m < x + 1$: the distance among clusters is high enough that the work needed to merge with another group is always greater than the maximum gain possible in case of cooperation. Thus, in this case the Nash equilibrium $p^E_1 = 0$ is the only one which is stable: $p^E_2 = 1$ is unstable and $p^E_3$ is not physical, since $\omega > 1$.

CASE $\epsilon > 0$ — Now we have a Stag Hunt payoff matrix. In this case all the three equilibria given in Eq. (7) are physical. More precisely, pure equilibria $p^E_1$ and $p^E_2$ are stable, while the mixed equilibrium $p^E_3$ is unstable. Because now it is $m > x + 1$, the gain in fitness in case of mutual cooperation is bigger than the loss due to the distance, so that the stable equilibrium $p^E_2$ is perfectly understandable. The fact that the equilibrium $p^E_1$ is stable also in this case could be a little bit surprising, but a deeper analysis of the situation gives back a more intuitive picture: the basin of attraction of equilibrium $p^E_2$ increases for $m$ (and then $\epsilon$) increasing, while at the same time the basin of $p^E_1$ decreases, disappearing in the limit $\epsilon \to +\infty$. In this sense, we could state that for great values of $\epsilon$ the equilibrium $p^E_2$ is somehow “more stable” than $p^E_1$, and viceversa for small values of $\epsilon$. More precisely, the basin of attraction of $p^E_1$ becomes bigger than the basin of $p^E_1$ (that is, the all-cooperators equilibrium becomes “more stable” than the no-cooperators one), when it is $m > 3x + 1$. A phase diagram of the SHC is given in Fig. 1.

Despite its roughness, this simple model allows us to draw some preliminary conclusions. In particular, it seems to be clear that cooperation is an advantageous strategy only when the size of the clusters is much bigger than their averaged distance. In the next section we will improve our investigation by means of the dynamical homogeneous model.

4. Dynamical homogeneous model

The main feature of the SHM is that the system is frozen, i.e. does not evolve in time: we set it in a given configuration (a great number of equal clusters of the same size and at the same distance from each other) and wonder which is the most rational strategy agents should adopt in order to improve their own fitness, without making them “play the game” for real. What we want to do now is to write down a model with the general properties stated in Section 2, which can also evolve dynamically in time. For this purpose, we are now going to introduce the “dynamical homogeneous model” (DHM).

DHM is implemented as follows. At $t = 0$ we divide a system of $N$ individuals into clusters each one of size $m_0$, so that we have initially $N/m_0$ clusters of the same size (we always set $N$ as a multiple of $m_0$). Every generic cluster $i$ is identified by a natural variable $g_i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N/m_0\}$; then, the distance between two agents belonging to the clusters $j$ and $k$ respectively will be $d_{jk} = |g_j - g_k|$ (notice that with such a definition the distance is a discrete variable too). Moreover, each agent has a default strategy (cooperative or not cooperative), picked up randomly, so that the initial density of cooperators is $\rho_0$. The dynamics works in this way: at each elementary step two different agents, $i$ and $j$, are drawn. If they belong to the same cluster, nothing happens. Otherwise, they “play the game” according to the payoff matrix (2) and their actual strategy: if both players cooperate, their clusters merge (the smallest is absorbed by the biggest one); if one player defects, the defector leaves its cluster and joins the opponent’s one; if nobody cooperates, nothing happens. After the game, a player computes
what it would have gained if it had adopted the other strategy (remaining fixed the strategy of the opponent). If such virtual payoff is greater than the real one, the player will change its strategy at the next interaction. For simplicity, in order to have easier simulations, even though the payoff is always calculated by means of the matrix (2), in case of two clusters merging (when a pair of cooperators from different groups meet), the smallest group enters the biggest one: in practice, they spend fitness as “meeting in the middle”, but in fact, it is the small cluster to reach the big one in its position. Time is measured in Monte Carlo steps, so that on average every agent interacts once per time unit. We accomplished all our simulations with \( \varrho_0 = 1/2 \) and for several values of \( m_0 \) and \( N \).

In Fig. 2 we report the typical behavior of the DHM for a particular choice of the parameters \( N = 3024, m_0 = 4 \). This figure well summarizes the phenomenology of our model. We can clearly distinguish three different dynamical regimes: at early times we have Regime I, that we also call “exponential decay regime” for reasons we will soon explain, then we find a steady-state regime or Regime II, and finally we have Regime III, in which the system rapidly reaches a frozen state: we are going to study them separately in the following subsections.

Before analyzing in details the three regimes, it is convenient to write down the equations ruling the evolution of the main quantities which characterize the state of the system. Concerning the cooperators density, which will be here indicated by \( \varrho(t) \), starting from the payoff matrix \( \hat{A} \) written in Eq. (2), it is easy to see that its time evolution must be ruled by the equation

\[
\frac{d\varrho}{dt} = \left( \frac{N - m_i}{N} \right) \left( -2\beta_{ij}\varrho^2 + (1 - \beta_{ij} - \alpha_{ij})\varrho(1 - \varrho) + 2(1 - \alpha_{ij})(1 - \varrho)^2 \right)_{i,j}
\]

(8)

where \( i \) is an agent randomly extracted, \( j \) another agent randomly extracted not belonging to the same cluster of \( i \), \( m_i \) the size of the cluster of \( i \), \( \beta_{ij} \) the probability that \( m_j - d_{ij}/2 \) is smaller than one, \( \alpha_{ij} \) the probability that the quantity \( m_j - m_i + 1 - d_{ij} \) is smaller than zero. Finally, the symbol \( \langle \cdots \rangle_{i,j} \) means of course the average over every possible couple \( i, j \) (with \( i \) and \( j \) belonging to different clusters). Analogously, the time evolution of the averaged size of the survived clusters, \( m(t) \), will be given by

\[
\frac{dm}{dt} = \left( \frac{m_i(N - m_i)}{N^2} \cdot m_j\varrho^2 \right)_{i,j}
\]

(9)

4.1. Exponential decay regime

At the very early stages of the dynamics, we can assume that the payoff matrix of each agent (when interacting with foreigners) has the form

\[
\hat{A}_0 = \left( \begin{array}{cc}
    m_0 - \frac{d_{ij}}{2} & 1 - d_{ij} \\
    1 & 0
\end{array} \right)
\]

(10)

with \( m_0 \simeq m, \forall i \) and, as we have already stated, \( d_{ij} = |g_i - g_j| \). In such a case we have \( \beta_{ij} = \beta \\forall i \) and \( \alpha_{ij} = 1 \\forall i, j \); in the limit \( N \gg m_i \) (we will treat the case of \( m_0 \) equal to a finite fraction of \( N \) in Section 4.4) Eqs. (8) and (9) become

\[
\dot{\varrho}(t) = -\beta\varrho(\varrho + 1)
\]

(11)

and

\[
\dot{m}(t) = \frac{m^2 \varrho^2}{N}
\]

(12)
whose solutions are, respectively

\[ \varrho(t) = \frac{\varrho_0 e^{-\beta t}}{1 + \varrho_0 (1 - e^{-\beta t})} \simeq \varrho_0 e^{-\beta t} \tag{13} \]

and

\[ m(t) = \frac{4N\beta \varrho_0}{4N\beta - \varrho_0 (1 - e^{-2\beta t})}. \tag{14} \]

Now, given \( d = \langle d_i \rangle \), in this regime it is \( \beta = \text{Pr}(m_0 - d/2 < 1) \), and this probability depends in general on \( m_0 \) and \( N \). Anyway, it is straightforward to understand that \( \beta(m_0 = 1) = 1 \forall N \), and that \( \lim_{N \to \infty} \beta(m_0) = 1 \forall m_0 \). On the basis of these considerations, we expect an exponential decay of \( \varrho(t) \) at the early stages of dynamics, with coefficient \( \beta \) equal to one for \( m_0 = 1 \), and tending to one for increasing values of the size \( N \) of the entire system if \( m_0 > 1 \). This fact is fully confirmed by Figs. 3 and 4.

Regarding the averaged size of survived clusters, we see from Eq. (14) that, while it remains valid, \( m(t) \) is bigger than \( m_0 \) and smaller than the quantity

\[ m^\infty = \left( \frac{1}{m_0} - \frac{1}{4N\beta} \right)^{-1} \simeq m_0 \left( 1 + \frac{m_0}{4N\beta} \right) \simeq m_0, \]

so that \( m(t) \) is practically constant during this regime: a proof of the last statement is given already in Fig. 2, where it is clear how \( m(t) \) is a quasi-constant in the initial stages of the dynamics. More precisely, it is a quasi-constant apart a small initial increase due to the interactions among cooperators during the very early times of the dynamics, and indeed such an increase vanishes in the limit \( \varrho_0 \to 0^+ \) (see Fig. 5). It must be noticed that, because for every survived cluster \( k \) it must be \( m_k > 0 \), and we are dealing with small values of \( m_0 \), this means that the cluster’s distribution inside the system remains
rather close to the initial one (see also Fig. 7). Moreover, we emphasize the fact that the quantity \( m^\infty \) is just a limit superior of \( m(t) \) during the exponential decay regime, and not a value that the averaged size can effectively reach.

The exponential decay regime will last until the cooperator’s density is not too small: we expect actually that it should end when \( \varrho \) becomes of the order of \( N^{-1} \). From Eq. (13) we gain

\[
\varrho_0 e^{-\beta t^*} \approx \frac{1}{N} \implies t^* \approx \frac{1}{\beta} \log(\varrho_0 N).
\]

For the case depicted in Fig. 3 (\( \beta = 1, \varrho_0 = 0.5, N = 10,000 \)), previous relation gives \( t^* \approx 8.5 \), in good agreement with the numerical data. For values of \( m_0 \) greater than 1, the evaluation of \( t^* \) directly from Eq. (15) is more delicate because in this case also the quantity \( \beta N \) depends in its turn on \( N \), and moreover there are bigger fluctuations in the system (when two cooperators meet their groups merge, and this causes bigger fluctuations in the cluster’s distribution as \( m \) increases); however the relation \( t^* \propto \log(N) \) is valid \( \forall \varrho_0 \), as we will see in Section 4.2. Therefore, for \( N \to +\infty \) this regime never ends; \( \varrho(t) \to 0 \) and, from Eq. (14), we find \( m(t) \approx m_0 = \text{const.} \). Then, in the thermodynamical limit (when \( m_0 \ll N \) for every finite \( m_0 \)) we have a similar result of the SHM, where the unique (stable) Nash equilibrium is the complete absence of cooperators. On the other hand, this is coherent with the fact that, if we set the system \textit{ab initio} with \( \varrho_0 = 0 \), nothing will ever happen.

### 4.2. Steady state

Once, for finite values of \( N \), the cooperator’s density became very small and the system left Regime I, the Eq. (11) was therefore not valid any more. Indeed, in this case almost every interaction will be between two defectors, so that Eq. (8) becomes

\[
\dot{\varrho}(t) \simeq -2(1 - \alpha)(1 - \varrho)^2
\]

where we took into account that from Eq. (14) the cluster’s distribution is practically the initial one, and then we assumed again \( N \gg m_i \) and \( \alpha_i = \alpha \forall i, j \). But, as we have just said, the cluster’s density is still almost equal to the initial one, so that it must be also \( \alpha = \text{Pr}(1 - d < 0) \simeq 1 \), from which

\[
\dot{\varrho}(t) \simeq 0 \implies \varrho(t) \simeq \varrho_0 = \text{const.}
\]

In Fig. 6 we can see this behavior for the case \( N = 3024 \) and \( m_0 = 2 \); in Fig. 7 we show instead how the majority of the agents remains in the initial cluster also during this second dynamical regime.

As we can easily see, \( \varrho(t) \) is actually almost constant, just slightly increasing because of small fluctuations in the cluster’s distribution which make \( \alpha \) not perfectly equal to one, but a very little bit smaller. On the other hand, \( m(t) \) keeps on behaving as in the exponential decay regime. This can be seen by inserting Eq. (17) into (12), obtaining

\[
\dot{m}(t) = \frac{\varrho_0^2}{N} m^2(t) \implies m(t) \simeq \frac{m_0 N}{N - m_0 \varrho_0^2 t}
\]

where we exploited again the fact that \( m(t) \) does not change too much during Regime I. Now, while the quantity \( m_0 \varrho_0^2 t \) remains much smaller than \( N \), also \( m(t) \) remains close to \( m_0 \) (see Figs. 2 and 6). However, once the relation \( m_0 \varrho_0^2 t \ll N \) ceases to be true, the system exits from the steady state regime, because at this point \( m(t) \gg m_0 \) and the cluster’s distribution is now quite different from the initial one: so, also the quantities \( \alpha_i \) in Eq. (8) become considerably smaller than 1 and this changes dramatically the shape of \( \varrho(t) \) too, as shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 6. Plot of the cooperators density and of the normalized size of survived clusters for $N = 3024$ and $m_0 = 2$ after 100 simulations. After the initial decay, there is a clear steady state regime in which both $\varrho(t)$ and $m(t)/N$ remain almost constant.

Fig. 7. Upper graph: cooperators density and averaged clusters size (divided by $N$) for a DHM system with $N = 10,000$ and $m_0 = 1$ until $t_{\text{max}} = 20$ time units (data averaged after 100 different simulations). Lower graph: density of "conservative sites", that is the sites which are still in the initial cluster, for the same system of the upper graph. As one can see, after an initial drop, the majority of agents (about 60%) are still in their original group also during the steady state regime.

Before starting the analysis of the subsequent regime, it is worth taking a look to the behavior of $\varrho_{ss}$ as a function of $N$ and $m_0$. For $m_0 = 1$, from Eq. (15) it has to be necessarily

$$\varrho_0 e^{-\beta t^*} \equiv \varrho_{ss} \sim \frac{1}{N}. $$

The same behavior is found for higher $m_0$, as one can see in Fig. 8, so that we can conclude stating the relation

$$\varrho_{ss}(N; m_0) \sim N^{-1} \quad \forall m_0.$$ (19)
Fig. 8. Plot of the behavior of $\rho_{ss}$ as a function of the system’s size $N$ for $m_0 = 3$ (diamonds) and $m_0 = 4$ (circles). The full lines are power-law fits $\sim N^{-\gamma}$, with $\gamma = 1.02 \pm 0.02$ ($m_0 = 4$) and $\gamma = 1.05 \pm 0.01$ ($m_0 = 3$).

Fig. 9. Plot of the behavior of $t_F$ as a function of $N$ for $m_0 = 4$ (stars) and $m_0 = 5$ (circles); the dashed lines are power-law fits with exponent $\delta = 0.83 \pm 0.02$ and $\delta = 0.81 \pm 0.02$, respectively.

Of course, the last equation, together with (15), demonstrates also that the time $t^*$ for leaving Regime I is proportional to $\log(N)$ for every value of $m_0$.

4.3. Frozen state

It is straightforward to understand that the steady state cannot last forever. Indeed, according to Eq. (18), the survived cluster’s averaged size should diverge after a time $\tilde{t}$ given by

$$\tilde{t} = \frac{N}{m_0 \rho_{ss}^2} \sim N^3.$$

Anyway, it is obviously impossible that $m \to +\infty$, since of course $m(t) \leq N$. In fact, the dynamics freezes well before this time $\tilde{t}$: in Fig. 9 we report the behavior of the freezing time for a couple of values of $m_0$, from which it is possible to see that the freezing time $t_F$ follows actually a power-law on $N$, but with exponent $\delta \approx 0.8$ instead of 3.

Here we wonder what kind of frozen state is finally reached by the system. Let us consider the general equation (9) ruling over the evolution of $m(t)$. Assuming the sizes of survived clusters as independent from each other at every time, so that we can write $\langle m_im_j \rangle = \langle m_i \rangle \langle m_j \rangle = m^2 \forall t$, we obtain

$$\frac{dm}{dt} = \frac{m^2(N - m)}{N^2} \rho^2(t). \quad (20)$$

By integrating last relation, we find now

$$\frac{m(t)e^{-[N/m(t)]}}{N - m(t)} = K \cdot \exp \left[ \int_0^t \rho^2(\tau)d\tau \right] \quad (21)$$
being $K$ a suitable (positive) constant. Now, in the limit $t \rightarrow +\infty$, there is an instant $t^F$ (the freezing time we introduced above) such that $\rho(t) = \rho(t^F) \forall t \geq t^F$, and given $\rho^F$ this cooperator's density of the frozen state, from Eq. (21) it is clear that there are only two possible final configurations:

- (A) – If we have $\rho^F = 0$ (no cooperators in the final state), then it must necessarily be $m^F < N$, that is the frozen state is disordered.
- (B) – If instead we have $\rho^F > 0$ (finite fraction of cooperators in the final state), then the integral at right side diverges, so that it must be $m^F = N$, thus the frozen state is ordered (i.e. only one survived cluster remains in the system).

Configuration (A) is completely lacking in cooperators, so, in order to be frozen, the difference in size between two clusters must be always less than their distance minus 1: in the opposite case, as one can see from the payoff matrix (2), there would be players who could become cooperators after an interaction. On the other hand, Configuration (B) is pretty easy to understand, since when the entire system is occupied by just one cluster, dynamics stops by definition. Now, in the steady state regime, the cooperators density is so small that it is possible to get a fluctuation pushing the system in the disordered frozen state, with no cooperators and many clusters in it. If instead such a fluctuation does not happen, the normal dynamics given by Eqs. (8) and (9), or even more simply by (21), will drive the system into the ordered frozen state, with a finite density of cooperators, and one mega-cluster occupying the whole system. For these reasons we expect that the probability of the system to end in the disordered frozen configuration increases with $O_0$ decreasing, i.e. with $N$ increasing and $m_0$ decreasing. Actually, for $m_0 = 1$ and after 1000 simulations, we observed the system ending in the ordered state only three times for $N = 100$, just once for $N = 200$, and never for higher $N$. On the other hand for $m_0 > 4$, we never observed the system falling in the disordered configuration, since in this case $O_0$ becomes small enough only at very high $N$, when the freezing time is too big to be observed. Finally, the ratio between the number of times in which the frozen state is ordered over the number in which it is ordered drops from 0.86 for $N = 200$ to 0.1 for $N = 2000$ in the case $m_0 = 2$, and it is still 0.95 for $N = 3024$ when $m_0 = 3$.

An interesting aspect of the ordered configuration is that the density of cooperators is in this case finite but less than one: so, even though the disordered frozen state is just the Nash equilibrium $p^E_f = 0$ of the SHM (see Section 3), the ordered one is not the perfect counterpart of the analogous in SHM. That can be explained because when the system is very close to the completely ordered state, the agents belonging to the biggest cluster have no interest in cooperation, so that most of them will be defectors. This is shown in Figs. 2 and 10 where it is easy to see how the abundance of cooperators in the frozen ordered state is always much smaller than 1/2 (remaining around 1/3). On the other hand, this is not a real Nash equilibrium, since it does not exist in the thermodynamical limit.

### 4.4. Limit of very large initial clusters

Until now we have dealt with small values of the initial cluster’s size $m_0$: more precisely, so far we have exploited the thermodynamical limit supposing fixed $m_0$ as $N$ increases. Now, one could wonder what happens to the system if we set instead $m_0 = zN$ (with $0 < z < 1$) before doing the limit $N \rightarrow +\infty$. Indeed, in the SHM, a transition between the phase with the unique stable Nash equilibrium $p^E_f$ and the phase with two stable equilibria (in particular the new one $p^E_2$) takes place for $m = x + 1$, $x$ being the half averaged distance among all clusters. An analogous transition in DHM somehow happens, but in a rather trivial way: indeed, when $m_0$ diverges (even remaining much smaller than $N$), a single interaction between two cooperators will create a new cluster very much bigger than the others, thus the system will reach the ordered state soon, typically after much less than 10 time units.
5. Conclusions and perspectives

In this paper we have depicted some new ideas for the study and the understanding of the phenomena of social aggregation in human communities. First, we suggested a theoretical treatment based on both statistical mechanics and game theory. Secondly, a fundamental feature of our approach is the interplay between the inclination of every agent to cooperate with others (in order to live in groups as big as possible), and an opposite attitude not to move away from the actual group since joining a new one involves a work accomplished by the agent itself. This work, needed by an individual when it associates to a stranger cluster, is interpreted as a “distance” in the abstract space of cultural coordinates: the more two groups have different CC, the further they are from each other in this space, and the greater the amount of work an individual must do to go from one cluster to the other. In order to test the reliability of this approach, we conceived a couple of very simple toy models, both constructed with the general features described above, the first one being a pure evolutionary population model, the second one an agent model with a well defined dynamics at a microscopical level.

The results obtained with such toy models suggest that cooperation is the most suitable strategy only in presence of very big clusters, so that the gain in fitness of the individuals who join these big groups is greater than the distance they had to cover to reach their new “accommodation”. More precisely, using the language of game theory, we found that cooperation is an evolutionary stable Nash equilibrium, when the averaged size of clusters is bigger enough with respect to the averaged distance among them.

These models are of course a tough simplification of the real world, and contain some unsatisfactory features: in particular, the property of the clusters to merge when two cooperators of them meet is quite strong, and also the definition of distance between clusters appears to be somehow arbitrary. Improving the models in these aspects can be the goal of future researches. Anyway, despite such problems, our results are qualitatively realistic for some important social phenomena which involve human societies. Indeed, our results suggest that in an area occupied by a great deal of small communities, distributed more or less uniformly, nobody is interested in moving from home to another community, since there is no real difference among the communities, and a displacement would mean only a work to accomplish without any gain in fitness. However, when some of these communities, because of a change in the external conditions, or for a simple fluctuation, become quite big with respect to the other ones, they assume the role of centers of attraction, destinations of the immigration of people from anywhere, so that these centers reach soon the typical size of a metropolis. It is interesting to notice that similar conclusions (i.e. the ability of bigger clusters to attract even more and more individuals until ending up dominating the entire system) were achieved also by very different social aggregation models, as for example the one in Ref. [24], where a diffusion-limited aggregation model for urban migration suggests a mechanism whereby a metropolitan area can reach big dimensions. These aggregation mechanisms seem actually to be what really happened during several urbanization phenomena through history, as for instance the “urban explosion” in the basin of the Mediterranean Sea around the XII Century BC, or also in Western Europe during the Industrial Revolution. It is worth noticing that in this picture the merging of two groups when only two cooperators interact is not so unrealistic, since presumably an immigrant will call and invite to the big city his former fellow citizens. Moreover, in many cases this same dynamics is apparently at work when religions, political parties, idioms or other kinds of social aggregations grow up inside a society. On the other hand, also finding the exact shape of the payoff matrix (1) is not a trivial job: while in this work just an intuitive evaluation of its elements was enough for our aim, for future studies a better knowledge of its elements will be fundamental in order to get models also quantitatively more fitting with the real world. For such a purpose, more accurate and precise historical data are needed, because distinguishing the exact behaviors of the fitness functions \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \) (are they really directly proportional to their arguments?) in processes of human social aggregation could be not so easy, and considering that the results of the models are deeply infected by the shape of the fitness functions – for instance Eq. (8) and its consequences depend strongly on the shape of \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \) – makes us understand the importance of this aspect towards improving this kind of approach.

Finally, it is worth also mentioning the remarkable (and realistic) result that, as we saw in Section 4.3, it is not really necessary that every individual has to cooperate in order to merge different clusters into one: on the contrary, the fraction of cooperators can be less than 0.5 also in systems made up of only one big cultural cluster.

Of course, deeper studies and further interpretations are needed, but the fact that such oversimplified models give already qualitatively reasonable results is very encouraging and suggests continuing with this kind of study.

Acknowledgements

We thank F. Bagnoli and T. Carletti for the very useful suggestions they gave us during the editing of this article. This work was partially funded by the European Commission under the FET-ADRA SOCIALNETS (217141) and FET-AWARENESS RECOGNITION (257756).

Appendix

In order to determine the stability of the Nash equilibria shown by Eq. (7) it is enough to integrate the replicator equation given in (5), obtaining

\[
\frac{p^{1-\omega}(1-p)^{\omega}}{|p - \omega|} = G \cdot \exp[2\chi(\omega - 1)t]
\]

(A.1)
being a positive integration constant. Now, solving explicitly in \( p \) the relation \((A.1)\) is in general impossible, but if we define the quantity \( L_\omega \in \mathbb{R} \) as

\[
L_\omega \triangleq \lim_{t \to +\infty} \exp[2x(\omega - 1)t]
\]

it is easy to see that for \(-2x < \varepsilon < 0\), that is \( \omega > 1 \), we have \( L_\omega = +\infty \) and this implies necessarily \( p \to 0^+ \) (the exponent \( 1 - \omega \) is naturally negative); on the other hand, for \( \varepsilon < -2x \), that is \( \omega < 0 \), it is \( L_\omega = 0 \), implying again necessarily \( p \to 0^\circ \) (now the exponent \( 1 - \omega \) is positive). So, it is proven that only \( p_1^E \) is stable for \( \varepsilon < 0 \). Finally, for \( \varepsilon > 0 \), that is \( 0 < \omega < 1 \), it results \( L_\omega = 0 \), with both exponents \( \omega \) and \( 1 - \omega \) positive, implying that \( p \) can tend to \( 0^\circ \) or \( 1^- \), but not to \( p_3^E = \omega \), which is therefore unstable.

Regarding the evaluation of the size of the basins of attraction in the case \( \varepsilon > 0 \), we could effectively compute the smallest fluctuation needed to escape from each of them. Anyway, it is for sure easier, watching Fig. 1, if we consider that the unstable equilibrium \( p_3^E \) is the separator between the two basins, so that the basin of stability of \( p_1^E \) is of course of size \( \omega = 2x/(2x + \varepsilon) \), while the basin of \( p_2^E \) has size \( 1 - \omega = \varepsilon/(2x + \varepsilon) \). Besides, such basins will be equal for \( m^* = 3x + 1 \).

References

[1] C. Castellano, S. Fortunato, V. Loreto, Rev. Modern Phys. 81 (2009) 591.
[2] G. Deffuant, D. Neau, F. Amblard, G. Weisbuch, Adv. Complex Syst. 3 (1–4) (2000) 87.
[3] F. Bagnoli, T. Carletti, D. Fanelli, A. Guarrino, A. Guazzini, Phys. Rev. E 76 (2007) 066105.
[4] P. Clifford, A. Sudbury, Biometrika 60 (3) (1973) 581.
[5] R. Holley, T. Liggett, Ann. Probab. 3 (4) (1975) 643.
[6] D. Vilone, C. Castellano, Phys. Rev. E 69 (1) (2004) 016109.
[7] R. Axelrod, J. Conflict Resol. 41 (2) (1997) 203.
[8] R. Axelrod, W.D. Hamilton, Science 211 (4489) (2008) 1390–1396.
[9] M.A. Nowak, R.M. May, Nature 359 (1992) 826.
[10] R. Jiménez, H. Lugo, J.A. Cuesta, A. Sánchez, J. Theoret. Biol. 250 (2008) 475–483.
[11] L.J. Jing, J. Econ. Behav. Org. 65 (3–4) (2008) 489–505.
[12] E. Pugliese, C. Castellano, M. Marsili, L. Pietronero, 2008, arXiv:physics.soc-ph/0805.1164v1.
[13] J. Von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton, 1944.
[14] J.W. Friedman, Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford, 1990.
[15] F. Mengel, J. Econ. Behav. Org. 67 (2008) 608–623.
[16] F.A.C.C. Chalub, F.C. Santos, J.M. Pacheco, J. Theoret. Biol. 241 (2006) 233–240.
[17] I. Kolstad, J. Socio-Econom. 36 (2007) 58–72.
[18] H.H. Tuu, S.O. Olsen, D.T. Thao, N.T.K. Anh, Appetite 51 (2008) 546–551.
[19] P. Foster, Appl. Linguist. 19 (1) (1998) 1–23.
[20] L.-A. Giraldeau, T. Caraco, Evol. Ecol. 7 (4) (1993) 429–438.
[21] G. Caldarelli, A. Capocci, P. De Los Rios, M.A. Munoz, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89 (2002) 258702.
[22] J. Hoffbauer, K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, Cambridge, 1998.
[23] M.A. Nowak, Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard, 2006.
[24] R. Murcio, S. Rodriguez-Rome, Physica A 388 (2009) 2689–2698.