Robust Hate Speech Detection via Mitigating Spurious Correlations

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Abstract

We develop a novel robust hate speech detection model that can defend against both word- and character-level adversarial attacks. We identify the essential factor that vanilla detection models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks is the spurious correlation between certain target words in the text and the prediction label. To mitigate such spurious correlation, we describe the process of hate speech detection by a causal graph. Then, we employ the causal strength to quantify the spurious correlation and formulate a regularized entropy loss function. We show that our method generalizes the backdoor adjustment technique in causal inference. Finally, the empirical evaluation shows the efficacy of our method.

1 Introduction

Online social media bring people together and encourage people to share their thoughts freely. However, it also allows some users to misuse the platforms to promote the hateful language. As a result, hate speech, which “expresses hate or encourages violence towards a person or group based on characteristics such as race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation”\(^2\), unfortunately becomes a common phenomenon on online social media. As a result, many online social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have policies prohibiting hate speech on their platforms. In order to prevent the spread of hate speech, programs have been deployed to automatically filter out hateful contents. However, in response to these programs, malicious users develop various approaches to evade detection, making hate speech very difficult to be detected by vanilla machine learning approaches. One of the common strategy is to deliberately revising texts, especially misspelling hate words, while preserving the intended meaning, such as typing the f-word as “fxxk”. Some malicious users also replace racial slurs with other names, such as technology brands or products, to evade detection. Such strategy can be treated as the evasion attacks in the field of the adversarial attacks, where the adversary aims to evade detection by revising the malicious samples (Sun et al., 2020).

Research on defending against adversarial attacks in the text domain has been received significant attention in recent years (Wang et al., 2021a; Xu et al., 2020). However, how to make the hate speech detection model robust to malicious users is still under studied. Many existing adversarial defense methods assume that attackers replace the words in the original text by their synonyms in order to preserve semantic similarity (e.g., (Si et al., 2020; Ye et al., 2020)). However, in practice the malicious users may use the words with different semantic meanings for the word substitutions. For example, in the coded hate speech, the word “Google” may be used to represent “African-American” and “Skittles” may be used to indicate Muslim (Magu et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2022).

In this paper, we develop a novel robust hate speech detection model. We target the situation where a group of target words could be replaced with any words even with entire different semantic meanings. We identify the essential factor to defend such attacks as to capture the causation between the semantic meaning of input text and the label and remove the spurious correlation between them. To this end, we use causal graphs (Pearl, 2009) to describe the causal relationship among the semantic meaning of input text, the target words, and the label. The impact of the adversarial attack is modeled as the causal strength of the arrow between the target words and the label in the graph. We then formulate the learning problem by integrating the causal strength into a regularized entropy loss. Finally, we analyze the objective function and

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\(^1\) Code is available at: https://github.com/zthsk/CEBERT

\(^2\) https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/hate-speech
show that it generalizes the backdoor adjustment which is a technique widely used for removing spurious correlation in machine learning. The empirical evaluation shows that our method can defend against both word- and character-level attacks.

**Related Work.** Hate speech detection as a supervised text classification task has attracted a lot of attention in the natural language processing community (Badjatiya et al., 2017; Schmidt and Wiegand, 2017; Fortuna and Nunes, 2018; Rajamanickam et al., 2020; Tran et al., 2020; Mou et al., 2020). Vanilla hate speech detection techniques are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Thus, several frameworks are proposed to achieve robustness on various adversarial attacks (Wang et al., 2021b) such as adversarial data augmentation (Si et al., 2020; Jin et al., 2020), adversarial training (Li and Qiu, 2020; Morris et al., 2020), and certified defenses (Ye et al., 2020; Zeng et al., 2021). Different from above works, we propose a causal graph-guided models and employ the causal strength to measure the impact of adversarial attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that leverage causal modeling to tackle the challenge of adversarial attacks on hate speech detection.

2 Method

A hate speech detection model can be defined as a functional mapping from \( T \) to \( Y \), where \( t \in T \) is a set of input texts and \( y \in Y \) is the target label set. In general, the output of the detection model is the softmax probability of predicting each class \( k \), i.e., \( f_k(t; \theta) = P(Y = y_k | t) \), where \( \theta \) is the parameters of the model. We assume a given group of target words (usually hateful or sentiment words) denoted by \( H \), and use \( X \) to indicate the remaining text excluding the words in \( H \), i.e., \( T = \langle X, H \rangle \). Adversarial examples are inputs to detection models with perturbations on \( H \) that purposely cause the model make mistakes.

2.1 Causal Graph for Hate Speech Detection

Causal graphs are widely used for representing causal relationships among variables (Pearl, 2009). A causal graph is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) \( G = \{\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}\} \), where \( \mathcal{V} \) denotes a set of variables, and \( \mathcal{E} \) indicates causal relationships.

We propose a causal graph for modeling the hate speech detection shown in Fig. 1. In this graph, in addition to \( X, H, Y \), we also use \( I \) to indicate the hate intent from a user. As we cannot know the real intent of the user, we treat \( I \) as a hidden variable indicated by the dash variable. The causal graph can be explained as follows: if the user tends to share hateful content, he/she chooses the target words (which may be perturbed later) while expressing the hateful meaning in the rest part of the text. As a result, \( I \) is the parent of \( H \) and \( X \), which are in turn the parents of \( Y \). For example, given a text \( T \), e.g., “We don’t want more [religious group] in this country. Enough is enough with those MAGGOTS.”, \( H \) is the word “MAGGOTS” while \( X \) indicates the remaining text.

Based on the causal graph, we identify one major reason that vanilla detection models are not robust to adversarial attacks: the detection models make predictions based on both the semantic meanings of texts and the spurious correlation between \( X \) and \( Y \) via \( H \) (i.e., \( X \leftarrow I \rightarrow H \rightarrow Y \)) that significantly relates to the occurrence of the target words. When the target works, like the f-word, are strongly correlated with the hate label in the training dataset, the model trained on such data may easily make predictions based on the occurrence of the target words without considering the meanings of entire texts. Therefore, once the adversarial attacks that remove such correlations are conducted, the detection model is easy to be fooled.

2.2 Causal Strength for Measuring Spurious Correlation

In order to make the detection model robust to any perturbation, one needs to prevent the model from learning the spurious correlation. To this end, we propose to penalize the causal influence of \( H \) on \( Y \) during the training so that the spurious correlation can be blocked. Inferring causal influences of input on predictions is a challenging task in machine learning. In this paper, we advocate the use of the causal strength proposed in (Janzing et al., 2013), the idea of which is to measure the impact of an intervention that removes certain arrows in the causal graph. This definition naturally aligns with our context where we want to measure the impact of removing the correlation between the target words and the hate labels by modifying the target words.
i.e., the causal strength of the arrow $H \rightarrow Y$. Symbolically, denote the causal strength of $H \rightarrow Y$ by $\mathcal{C}_{H \rightarrow Y}$. Quantifying $\mathcal{C}_{H \rightarrow Y}$ requires to consider the conditional distribution of $Y$ should we cut the arrow $H \rightarrow Y$. This distribution, which is referred to as the “post-cutting” distribution in (Janzing et al., 2013), is given by

$$P_{H \rightarrow Y}(y|x) = \sum_{h' \in H} P(y|x, h') P(h'). \quad (1)$$

Denote by $P$ and $P_{H \rightarrow Y}$ the factual joint distribution and the “post-cutting” joint distribution respectively. Then, the causal strength $\mathcal{C}_{H \rightarrow Y}$ is given by the Kullback–Leibler divergence $D[P||P_{H \rightarrow Y}]$, i.e., $\mathcal{C}_{H \rightarrow Y} = D[P||P_{H \rightarrow Y}] = D[P(Y|X, H)||P_{H \rightarrow Y}(Y|X)]$

$$= \sum_{x, h, y} P(x, h, y) \log \frac{P(y|x, h)}{\sum_{h'} P(y|x, h') P(h')}.$$  

(2)

Finally, by adding the causal strength as a regularization term into the cross-entropy loss, we obtain the regularized cross-entropy loss as follows.

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{CE} + \lambda \mathcal{C}_{H \rightarrow Y} = (1 - \lambda) \mathcal{L}_{CE} + \lambda \mathcal{L}_I, \quad (4)$$

where $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ is the coefficient for balancing the model utility and the model robustness.

### 2.4 Connection to Backdoor Adjustment

We further analyze the meaning of the term $\mathcal{L}_I$ in Eq. (4). As mentioned earlier, the reason that causes the traditional detection model to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks is the spurious correlation between $X$ and $Y$. The backdoor adjustment is a classic technique for removing the spurious correlation (Pearl, 2009). It has been applied to various tasks like image captioning (Yang et al., 2021) and question answering (Qi et al., 2020) to improve the model robustness. In our context, this idea means to use the interventional distribution $P(Y|do(X))$ instead of the actual distributions $P(Y|X, H)$ or $P(Y|X)$ for predicting the label, where $do(\cdot)$ is the do-operator (Pearl, 2009) in Pearl’s structural causal model that performs an intervention on the input variable (i.e., $X$ in our case).

By applying the backdoor adjustment based on the causal graph Fig. 1, the interventional distribution $P(Y|do(X))$ is computed as

$$P(y|do(x)) = \sum_{h', i} P(i) P(h'|i) P(y|x, h')$$

$$= \sum_{h'} P(h') P(y|x, h'). \quad (5)$$

Comparing Eqs. (1) and (5), we see an expected coincidence in the two formulas. This is because both the “arrow cutting” and the backdoor adjustment break the path $X \leftarrow I \rightarrow H \rightarrow Y$. The issue of directly using the interventional distribution $P(Y|do(X))$ for the prediction is that the model utility depends on how close $P(Y|do(X))$ is to the actual distribution, which cannot be controlled by the user. Thus, our loss formulation Eq. (4) can be considered as a generalization to the backdoor adjustment-based approaches, which is grounded on the causal strength theorem.

### 2.5 Practical Considerations

In Eq. (1), there is a summation over all the possible target words. Since target words are usually sentiment words, in this paper we propose to build a sentiment lexicon that includes the commonly
Table 1: Results on the clean test dataset.

| Model      | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | Pos. Class F1 | Macro F1 |
|------------|----------|-----------|--------|----------------|----------|
| BERT Base  | 0.909±0.002 | 0.945±0.002 | 0.943±0.005 | 0.945±0.001 | 0.840±0.000 |
| hateBERT   | 0.910±0.001 | 0.948±0.001 | 0.942±0.001 | 0.945±0.001 | 0.846±0.005 |
| RANMASK    | 0.908±0.006 | 0.923±0.046 | 0.945±0.011 | 0.944±0.003 | 0.840±0.016 |
| TAVAT      | 0.916±0.002 | 0.966±0.006 | 0.931±0.007 | 0.948±0.001 | 0.864±0.005 |
| MIXADA     | 0.912±0.003 | 0.954±0.008 | 0.939±0.008 | 0.946±0.002 | 0.854±0.009 |
| CEBERT     | 0.876±0.002 | 0.915±0.002 | 0.936±0.002 | 0.925±0.001 | 0.774±0.015 |

Table 2: Results on the replaced test dataset.

| Model      | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | Pos. Class F1 | Macro F1 |
|------------|----------|-----------|--------|----------------|----------|
| BERT Base  | 0.696±0.004 | 0.887±0.004 | 0.723±0.007 | 0.797±0.003 | 0.596±0.005 |
| hateBERT   | 0.703±0.009 | 0.895±0.004 | 0.724±0.010 | 0.801±0.007 | 0.606±0.011 |
| RANMASK    | 0.698±0.027 | 0.882±0.011 | 0.733±0.047 | 0.800±0.025 | 0.592±0.016 |
| TAVAT      | 0.676±0.038 | 0.902±0.007 | 0.682±0.057 | 0.775±0.036 | 0.594±0.024 |
| MIXADA     | 0.696±0.022 | 0.895±0.007 | 0.716±0.035 | 0.795±0.020 | 0.604±0.015 |
| CEBERT     | 0.859±0.002 | 0.909±0.001 | 0.922±0.002 | 0.915±0.001 | 0.750±0.000 |

Table 3: Results on the misspelled test dataset.

| Model      | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | Pos. Class F1 | Macro F1 |
|------------|----------|-----------|--------|----------------|----------|
| BERT Base  | 0.732±0.005 | 0.924±0.005 | 0.729±0.019 | 0.802±0.038 | 0.654±0.005 |
| hateBERT   | 0.737±0.031 | 0.939±0.003 | 0.728±0.038 | 0.820±0.026 | 0.666±0.027 |
| RANMASK    | 0.723±0.034 | 0.925±0.019 | 0.726±0.056 | 0.811±0.031 | 0.642±0.023 |
| TAVAT      | 0.727±0.039 | 0.948±0.012 | 0.709±0.060 | 0.810±0.036 | 0.660±0.027 |
| MIXADA     | 0.726±0.007 | 0.938±0.007 | 0.716±0.015 | 0.812±0.007 | 0.656±0.005 |
| CEBERT     | 0.860±0.002 | 0.909±0.002 | 0.922±0.004 | 0.916±0.001 | 0.752±0.004 |

used sentiment words. Note that the words in the lexicon do not need to be synonyms of particular sentiment words and can include both hate and non-hate words. In our experiments, we construct the lexicon based on the hate word vocabulary provided by Ahn\(^3\) and the positive word vocabulary provided by Parade\(^4\).

3 Empirical Evaluation

3.1 Experimental Setting

We first build a list \(L\) of target words based on Ahn and Parade that contains 446 hate words and 126 non-hate words. We then randomly select \(m\) words from the list as our sentiment lexicon \(H\). The default value of \(m\) is 16 in the experiments.

We curate a dataset by combining three dataset that are frequently used for hate speech detection: the OLID dataset (Zampieri et al., 2019), the White Supremacy Forum (De Gibert et al., 2018), and the AHSD dataset (Davidson et al., 2017). The combined dataset is then pre-processed by removing texts that do not contain any word in the list \(L\). The resulting dataset contains 27368 texts among which 4818 texts are regular and 22550 texts are hate. It is then randomly split into training and test set by the ratio 4:1. Each experiment is repeated five times using different random seeds.

We consider five baselines in the experiments: the base BERT and HateBERT (Caselli et al., 2021) are vanilla detection models; MixADA (Si et al., 2021) is an adversarial data augmentation method; TAVAT (Li and Qiu, 2021) is an adversarial training method; and RanMask (Zeng et al., 2021) is a certified defense method.

To evaluate the robustness of all models, we use three different versions of the test dataset: the clean version, the word-level attack version where each word from the texts present in the list \(L\) is randomly replaced by one of the words in \(L\), and the character-level attack version where each word in \(L\) is replaced by a misspelled version.

Our model uses the pre-trained BERT as the base model which is then fine-tuned by minimizing Eq. (4) on our training data. By default \(\lambda = 0.5\). The prior probability \(P(h')\) for a target word \(h'\) is calculated by dividing the total occurrence of \(h'\) in the training data by the total occurrence of all the words in \(L\) in the training data. We refer to our

\(^3\)https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~biglou/resources/

\(^4\)https://parade.com/1241177/marynliles/positive-words/
model the CEBERT.

3.2 Experimental Results

Robust Hate Speech Detection. We first evaluate the performance of all models on three test datasets in terms of accuracy, precision, recall and F1 scores of the positive (i.e., hate) class as well as the Macro F1. The mean and standard deviation of five runs are shown in Table 1. As can be seen, the base BERT model produces good accuracy and F1 on the clean data but the worst results on the misspelled dataset. Other baselines improve the performance on the perturbed datasets, but the improvements are limited. CEBERT, on the other hand, trades off the performance on the clean data for the robustness and achieves the best performance on the perturbed datasets with a large margin compared with baselines.

Sensitivity Analysis. We also evaluate the influence of $\lambda$ in Eq. (4) on CEBERT that balances $L_{CE}$ and $L_I$. We can observe from Fig. 2 that only using the $L_I$ loss ($\lambda = 1$) to fine-tune the BERT model can achieve the best performance on the perturbed datasets, but the performance on the clean dataset becomes slightly worse. On the other hand, a small value of $\lambda$ in range between 0.1 and 0.2 can produce a balanced performance.

4 Conclusions

We developed a robust hate speech detection model by leveraging the causal inference to mitigate spurious correlations. The experiment results show that our model can achieve better performance under both word- and character-level attacks compared with other baselines.

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Ethical Considerations

In this paper, we have improved the robustness of hate speech detection. One limitation of our proposed method is it assumes that we are given a list of target words that could be manipulated. If the list does not contain all target words, then the performance of our method may be lower than expected.

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