Abstract

Interactive querying of a database degrades the privacy level. In this paper we answer the fundamental question of characterizing the level of differential privacy degradation as a function of the number of adaptive interactions and the differential privacy levels maintained by the individual queries. Our solution is complete: the privacy degradation guarantee is true for every privacy mechanism and, further, we demonstrate a sequence of privacy mechanisms that degrade in the characterized manner. The key innovation is the introduction of an operational interpretation (involving hypothesis testing) to differential privacy and the use of the corresponding data processing inequalities. Our result improves over the state of the art and has immediate applications to several problems studied in the literature.

1 Introduction

Differential privacy is a formal framework to quantify to what extent individual privacy in a statistical database is preserved while releasing useful aggregate information about the database. It provides strong privacy guarantees by requiring the indistinguishability of whether an individual is in the database or not based on the released information, regardless of the side information on the other aspects of the database the adversary may possess. Denoting the database when the individual is present as $D$ and as $D'$ when the individual is not, a differentially private mechanism provides indistinguishability guarantees with respect to the pair $(D, D')$. More generally, we consider pairs of databases that indistinguishability is guaranteed for as “neighbors”. The formal definition of $(\epsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy is the following.

**Definition 1.1** (Differential Privacy [DMNS06, DKM+06]). A randomized mechanism $M$ over a set of databases is $(\epsilon, \delta)$-differentially private if for all pairs of neighboring databases $D$ and $D'$, and for all sets $S$ in the output space of the mechanism $\mathcal{X}$,

$$
P(M(D) \in S) \leq e^\epsilon P(M(D') \in S) + \delta.
$$

A basic problem in differential privacy is how privacy of a fixed pair of neighbors $(D, D')$ degrades under composition of interactive queries when each query, individually, meets certain differential privacy guarantees. A routine argument shows that the composition of $k$ queries, each of which is $(\epsilon, \delta)$-differentially private, is at least $(k\epsilon, k\delta)$-differentially private [DMNS06, DKM+06].
A tighter bound of $(\tilde{\varepsilon}, k\delta + \tilde{\delta})$-differential privacy under $k$-fold adaptive composition is provided, using more sophisticated arguments, in [DRV10] for the case when each of the individual queries is $(\epsilon, \delta)$-differentially private. Here $\tilde{\varepsilon} = O\left(k\varepsilon^2 + \varepsilon \sqrt{k \log(1/\tilde{\delta})}\right)$. On the other hand, it was not known if this bound could be improved until this work.

Our main result is the exact characterization of the privacy guarantee under $k$-fold composition. Any $k$-fold adaptive composition of $(\epsilon, \delta)$-differentially private mechanisms satisfies this privacy guarantee, stated as Theorem 3.3. Further, we demonstrate a specific sequence of privacy mechanisms which under (in fact, nonadaptive) composition actually degrade privacy to the level guaranteed. Our result entails a strict improvement over the state-of-the-art: this can be seen immediately in the following approximation – using the same notation as above, the value of $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ is now reduced to $\tilde{\varepsilon} = O\left(k\varepsilon^2 + \varepsilon \sqrt{k \log(e + (\varepsilon \sqrt{k}/\delta))}\right)$. Since a typical choice of $\tilde{\delta}$ is $\tilde{\delta} = \Theta(k\delta)$, in the regime where $\varepsilon = \Theta(\sqrt{k}\delta)$, this improves the existing guarantee by a logarithmic factor. The gain is especially significant when both $\epsilon$ and $\delta$ are small.

We start with the view of differential privacy as providing certain guarantees for the two error types (false alarm and missed detection) in a binary hypothesis testing problem (involving two neighboring databases), as in previous work [WZ10]. We brings two benefits of this operational interpretation of the privacy definition to bear on the problem at hand.

- The first is conceptual: the operational setting directs the logic of the steps of the proof, makes the arguments straightforward and readily allows generalizations such as heterogeneous compositions. While the state-of-the-art work [DRV10] needed recourse to sophisticated mathematical results in [RTTV08, TZ08, GT04] to derive their results, our strengthening is arrived at using relatively elementary techniques.

- The second is technical: the operational interpretation of hypothesis testing brings both the natural data processing inequality, and the strong converse to the data processing inequality. These inequalities, while simple by themselves, lead to surprisingly strong technical results. As an aside, we mention that there is a strong tradition of such derivations in the information theory literature: the Fisher information inequality [Bla65, Zam98], the entropy power inequality [Sta59, Bla65, VG06], an extremal inequality involving mutual informations [LV07], matrix determinant inequalities [CT88], the Brunn-Minkowski inequality and its functional analytic variants [DCT91] – Chapter 17 of [CT12] enumerates a detailed list – were all derived using operational interpretations of mutual information and corresponding data processing inequalities.

One special case of our results, the strengthening of the state-of-the-art result in [DRV10], could also have been arrived at directly by using stronger technical methods than used in [DRV10]. Specifically, we use a direct expression for the privacy region (instead of an upper bound) to arrive at our strengthened result.

The optimal composition theorem (Theorem 3.3) provides a fundamental limit on how much privacy degrades under composition. Such a characterization is a basic result in differential privacy and has been used widely in the literature [DRV10, HLM10, BBDS12, GRU12, MN12, HR13]. In each of these instances, the optimal composition theorem derived here (or the simpler characterization of Theorem 3.3) could be “cut-and-pasted”, allowing for corresponding strengthening of their conclusions. We demonstrate this strengthening for two instances: variance of noise adding mecha-
nisms in Section 4.1 and BBDS12 in Section 4.2. We further show that a variety of existing noise adding mechanisms ensure the same level of privacy with similar variances. This implies that there is nothing special about the popular choice of adding a Gaussian noise when composing multiple queries, and the same utility as measured through the noise variance can be obtained using other known mechanisms. We start our discussions by operationally introducing differential privacy as certain guarantees on the error probabilities in a binary hypothesis testing problem.

2 Differential Privacy as Hypothesis Testing

Given a random output $Y$ of a database access mechanism $M$, consider the following hypothesis testing experiment. We choose a null hypothesis as database $D_0$ and alternative hypothesis as $D_1$:

- $H_0 : Y$ came from a database $D_0$, 
- $H_1 : Y$ came from a database $D_1$.

For a choice of a rejection region $S$, the probability of false alarm (type I error), when the null hypothesis is true but rejected, is defined as $P_{FA}(D_0, D_1, M, S) \equiv P(M(D_0) \in S)$, and the probability of missed detection (type II error), when the null hypothesis is false but retained, is defined as $P_{MD}(D_0, D_1, M, S) \equiv P(M(D_1) \in \bar{S})$ where $\bar{S}$ is the complement of $S$. The differential privacy condition on a mechanism $M$ is equivalent to the following set of constraints on the probability of false alarm and missed detection. Wasserman and Zhu proved that $(\varepsilon, 0)$-differential privacy implies the conditions (1) for a special case when $\delta = 0$ [WZ10, Theorem 2.4]. The same proof technique can be used to prove a similar result for general $\delta \in [0, 1]$, and to prove that the conditions (1) imply $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy as well. We refer to Section 8.2 for a proof.

**Theorem 2.1.** For any $\varepsilon \geq 0$ and $\delta \in [0, 1]$, a database mechanism $M$ is $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private if and only if the following conditions are satisfied for all pairs of neighboring databases $D_0$ and $D_1$, and all rejection region $S \subseteq \mathcal{X}$:

\[
\begin{align*}
P_{FA}(D_0, D_1, M, S) + e^\varepsilon P_{MD}(D_0, D_1, M, S) & \geq 1 - \delta, \quad \text{and} \\
e^\varepsilon P_{FA}(D_0, D_1, M, S) + P_{MD}(D_0, D_1, M, S) & \geq 1 - \delta.
\end{align*}
\]

This operational perspective of differential privacy relates the privacy parameters $\varepsilon$ and $\delta$ to a set of conditions on probability of false alarm and missed detection. This shows that it is impossible to get both small $P_{MD}$ and $P_{FA}$ from data obtained via a differentially private mechanism, and that the converse is also true. This operational interpretation of differential privacy suggests a graphical representation of differential privacy as illustrated in Figure 1.

\[
\mathcal{R}(\varepsilon, \delta) \equiv \{(P_{MD}, P_{FA}) \mid P_{FA} + e^\varepsilon P_{MD} \geq 1 - \delta, \quad \text{and} \quad e^\varepsilon P_{FA} + P_{MD} \geq 1 - \delta\}.
\]

Similarly, we define the privacy region of a database access mechanism $M$ with respect to two neighboring databases $D$ and $D'$ as

\[
\mathcal{R}(M, D, D') \equiv \text{conv}\left(\{(P_{MD}(D, D', M, S), P_{FA}(D, D', M, S)) \mid \text{for all } S \subseteq \mathcal{X}\}\right),
\]

where $\text{conv}(\cdot)$ is the convex hull of a set. Operationally, by taking the convex hull, the region includes the pairs of false alarm and missed detection probabilities achieved by soft decisions that
might use internal randomness in the hypothesis testing. Precisely, let $\gamma : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{H_0, H_1\}$ be any decision rule where we allow probabilistic decisions. For example, if the output is in a set $S_1$ we can accept the null hypothesis with a certain probability $p_1$, and for another set $S_2$ accept with probability $p_2$. In full generality, a decision rule $\gamma$ can be fully described by a partition $\{S_i\}$ of the output space $\mathcal{X}$, and corresponding accept probabilities $\{p_i\}$. The probabilities of false alarm and missed detection for a decision rule $\gamma$ is defined as $P_{\text{FA}}(D_0, D_1, M, \gamma) \equiv P(\gamma(M(D_0)) = H_1)$ and $P_{\text{MD}}(D_0, D_1, M, \gamma) \equiv P(\gamma(M(D_1)) = H_0)$.

**Remark 2.2.** For all neighboring databases $D$ and $D'$, and a database access mechanism $M$, the pair of a false alarm and a missed detection probabilities achieved by any decision rule $\gamma$ is included in the privacy region:

$$ (P_{\text{MD}}(D, D', M, \gamma), P_{\text{FA}}(D, D', M, \gamma)) \in \mathcal{R}(M, D, D'), $$

for all decision rule $\gamma$.

Let $D \sim D'$ denote that the two databases are neighbors. The union over all neighboring databases define the privacy region of the mechanism.

$$ \mathcal{R}(M) \equiv \bigcup_{D \sim D'} \mathcal{R}(M, D, D'). $$

The following corollary, which follows immediately from Theorem 2.1 gives a necessary and sufficient condition on the privacy region for $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy.

**Corollary 2.3.** A mechanism $M$ is $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private if and only if $\mathcal{R}(M) \subseteq \mathcal{R}(\varepsilon, \delta)$.

To illustrate the strengths of the graphical representation of differential privacy, we provide simpler proofs for some well-known results in differential privacy in Appendix A.
**Theorem 2.4** (Data processing inequality for differential privacy). If a mechanism $M$ dominates a mechanism $M'$, then for all pairs of neighboring databases $D_1$ and $D_2$,

$$\mathcal{R}(M', D_1, D_2) \subseteq \mathcal{R}(M, D_1, D_2).$$

We provide a proof in Section 8.1. Wasserman and Zhu [WZ10, Lemma 2.6] have proved that, for a special case when $M$ is $(\varepsilon, 0)$-differentially private, $M'$ is also $(\varepsilon, 0)$-differentially private, which is a corollary of the above theorem. Perhaps surprisingly, the converse is also true.

**Theorem 2.5** ([Bla53, Corollary of Theorem 10]). Fix a pair of neighboring databases $D_1$ and $D_2$ and let $X$ and $Y$ denote the random outputs of mechanisms $M$ and $M'$, respectively. If $M$ and $M'$ satisfy

$$\mathcal{R}(M', D_1, D_2) \subseteq \mathcal{R}(M, D_1, D_2),$$

then there exists a coupling of the random outputs $X$ and $Y$ such that they form a Markov chain $D \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y$.

When the privacy region of $M'$ is included in $M$, then there exists a stochastic transformation $T$ that operates on $X$ and produce a random output that has the same marginal distribution as $Y$ conditioned on the database $D$. We can consider this mechanism $T$ as a privatization mechanism that takes a (privatized) output $X$ and provides even further privatization. The above theorem was proved in [Bla53, Corollary of Theorem 10] in the context of comparing two experiments, where a statistical experiment denotes a mechanism in the context of differential privacy.

### 3 Composition of Differentially Private Mechanisms

In this section, we address how differential privacy guarantees compose: when accessing databases multiple times via differentially private mechanisms, each of which having its own privacy guarantees, how much privacy is still guaranteed on the union of those outputs? To formally define composition, we consider the following scenario known as the ‘composition experiment’, proposed in [DRV10].

A composition experiment takes as input a parameter $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and an adversary $A$. From the hypothesis testing perspective proposed in the previous section, $b$ can be interpreted as the hypothesis: null hypothesis for $b = 0$ and alternative hypothesis for $b = 1$. At each time $i$, a database $D_i^{b}$ is accessed depending on $b$. For example, one includes a particular individual and another does not. An adversary $A$ is trying to break privacy (and figure out whether the particular individual is in the database or not) by testing the hypotheses on the output of $k$ sequential access to those databases via differentially private mechanisms. In full generality, we allow the adversary to have full control over which database to access, which query to ask, and which mechanism to be used at each repeated access. Further, the adversary is free to make these choices adaptively based on the previous outcomes. The only restrictions are the differentially private mechanisms belong to a family $\mathcal{M}$ (e.g., the family of all $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private mechanisms), the internal randomness of the mechanisms are independent at each repeated access, and that the hypothesis $b$ is not known to the adversary.
\textbf{COMPOSE}(A, \mathcal{M}, k, b)

Input: A, \mathcal{M}, k, b
Output: V^b

\textbf{for} i = 1 \textbf{to} k \textbf{do}
\hspace{1cm} A requests (D_i, D_{i-1}, q_i, M_i) for some M_i \in \mathcal{M};
\hspace{1cm} A receives y_i = M_i(D_i, b, q_i);
\textbf{end for}

Output the view of the adversary V^b = (R^b, Y^b_1, \ldots, Y^b_k).

The outcome of this k-fold composition experiment is the \textit{view of the adversary} A: V^b \equiv (R, Y^b_1, \ldots, Y^b_k), which is the sequence of random outcomes Y^b_1, \ldots, Y^b_k, and the outcome R of any internal randomness of A.

\subsection*{3.1 Optimal privacy region under composition}

In terms of testing whether a particular individual is in the database (b = 0) or not (b = 1), we want to characterize how much privacy degrades after a k-fold composition experiment. It is known that the privacy degrades under composition by at most the ‘sum’ of the differential privacy parameters of each access.

\textbf{Theorem 3.1} (\cite{DMNS06, DKM+06, DL09, DRV10}). For any \( \varepsilon > 0 \) and \( \delta \in [0,1] \), the class of \((\varepsilon, \delta)\)-differentially private mechanisms satisfy \((k \varepsilon, k \delta)\)-differential privacy under k-fold adaptive composition.

In general, one can show that if \( M_i \) is \((\varepsilon_i, \delta_i)\)-differentially private, then the composition satisfies \((\sum_{i=1}^k \varepsilon_i, \sum_{i=1}^k \delta_i)\)-differential privacy. If we do not allow any slack in the \( \delta \), this bound cannot be tightened. Precisely, there are examples of mechanisms which under k-fold composition violate \((\varepsilon, \sum_{i=1}^k \delta_i)\)-differential privacy for any \( \varepsilon < \sum_{i=1}^k \varepsilon_i \). We can prove this by providing a set \( S \) such that the privacy condition is met with equality: \( \mathbb{P}(V^0 \in S) = e^{\sum_{i=1}^k \varepsilon_i} \mathbb{P}(V^1 \in S) + \sum_{i=1}^k \delta_i \).

However, if we allow for a slightly larger value of \( \delta \), then Dwork et al. showed in \cite{DRV10} that one can gain a significantly higher privacy guarantee in terms of \( \varepsilon \).

\textbf{Theorem 3.2} (\cite{DRV10} Theorem III.3). For any \( \varepsilon > 0, \delta \in [0,1] \), and \( \hat{\delta} \in (0,1] \), the class of \((\varepsilon, \delta)\)-differentially private mechanisms satisfies \((\hat{\varepsilon}, k \delta + \hat{\delta})\)-differential privacy under k-fold adaptive composition, for

\[ \hat{\varepsilon} = k \varepsilon (e^\varepsilon - 1) + \varepsilon \sqrt{2k \log(1/\hat{\delta})}. \] (4)

By allowing a slack of \( \hat{\delta} > 0 \), one can get a higher privacy of \( \hat{\varepsilon} = O(k \varepsilon^2 + \sqrt{k \varepsilon^2}) \), which is significantly smaller than \( k \varepsilon \). This is the best known guarantee so far, and has been used whenever one requires a privacy guarantee under composition (e.g. \cite{DRV10, BBDS12, HR13}). However, the important question of optimality has remained open. Namely, is there a composition of mechanisms where the above privacy guarantee is tight? In other words, is it possible to get a tighter bound on differential privacy under composition?

We give a complete answer to this fundamental question in the following theorems. We prove a tighter bound on the privacy under composition. Further, we also prove the achievability of
the privacy guarantee: we provide a set of mechanisms such that the privacy region under \( k \)-fold composition is exactly the region defined by the conditions in (5). Hence, this bound on the privacy region is tight and cannot be improved upon.

**Theorem 3.3.** For any \( \varepsilon \geq 0 \) and \( \delta \in [0,1] \), the class of \((\varepsilon, \delta)\)-differentially private mechanisms satisfies

\[
( (k-2i)\varepsilon, 1 - (1 - \delta)^k (1 - \delta_i) ) \text{-differential privacy}
\]

under \( k \)-fold adaptive composition, for all \( i = \{0, 1, \ldots, \lfloor k/2 \rfloor \} \), where

\[
\delta_i = \frac{\sum_{\ell=0}^{i-1} \binom{k}{\ell} (e^{(k-\ell)\varepsilon} - e^{(k-2i+\ell)\varepsilon})}{(1 + e^\varepsilon)^k}.
\]

Hence, the privacy region of \( k \)-fold composition is an intersection of \( k \) regions, each of which is \(( (k-2i)\varepsilon, \delta_i)\)-differentially private: \( R(\{(k-2i)\varepsilon, \delta_i\}_{i=0}^{\lfloor k/2 \rfloor}) \equiv \bigcap_{i=0}^{\lfloor k/2 \rfloor} R((k-2i)\varepsilon, \delta_i) \). We give a proof in Section 5 where we give an explicit mechanism that achieves this region under composition. Hence, this bound on the privacy region is tight, and gives the exact description of how much privacy can degrade under \( k \)-fold adaptive composition. This settles the question left open in [DMNS06, DKM+06, DL09, DRV10] by providing, for the first time, the fundamental limit of composition, and proving a matching mechanism with the worst-case privacy degradation.

To prove the optimality of our main result in Theorem 3.3, namely that it is impossible to have a privacy worse than (5), we rely on the operational interpretation of the privacy as hypothesis testing. To this end, we use the new analysis tools (Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 2.5) provided in the previous section. Figure 2 illustrates how much the privacy region of Theorem 3.3 degrades as we increase the number of composition \( k \). Figure 3 provides a comparison of the three privacy guarantees in Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 for 30-fold composition of (0.1, 0.001)-differentially private mechanisms. Smaller region gives a tighter bound, since it guarantees the higher privacy.

### 3.2 Simplified privacy region under composition

In many applications of the composition theorems, a closed form expression of the composition privacy guarantee is required. The privacy guarantee in (5) is tight, but can be difficult to eval-
Figure 3: Theorem 3.3 provides the tightest bound (left). Given a mechanism $M$, the privacy region can be completely described by its boundary, which is represented by a set of tangent lines of the form $P_{FA} = -e^\tilde{\epsilon} P_{MD} + 1 - d_\tilde{\epsilon}(P_0, P_1)$ (right).

The next theorem provides a simpler form expression which is an outer bound of the exact region described in (5). Comparing to (4), the privacy guarantee is significantly improved from $\tilde{\epsilon}_{\tilde{\delta}} = O(k \epsilon^2 + \sqrt{\Delta \log(1/\delta)})$ to $\tilde{\epsilon}_{\tilde{\delta}} = O(k \epsilon^2 + \min\{\sqrt{k \epsilon^2 \log(1/\tilde{\delta})}, \epsilon \log(\epsilon/\tilde{\delta})\})$, especially when composing a large number $k$ of interactive queries. Further, the $\tilde{\delta}$-approximate differential privacy degradation of $(1 - (1 - \delta)^k(1 - \tilde{\delta}))$ is also strictly smaller than the previous $(k \delta + \tilde{\delta})$. We discuss the significance of this improvement in the next section using examples from existing differential privacy literature.

**Theorem 3.4.** For any $\epsilon > 0$, $\delta \in [0, 1]$, and $\tilde{\delta} \in [0, 1]$, the class of $(\epsilon, \delta)$-differentially private mechanisms satisfies $(\tilde{\epsilon}_{\tilde{\delta}}, 1 - (1 - \delta)^k(1 - \tilde{\delta}))$-differential privacy under $k$-fold adaptive composition, for

$$\tilde{\epsilon}_{\tilde{\delta}} = \min \left\{ k \epsilon, \frac{(e^\epsilon - 1) \epsilon k}{e^\epsilon + 1} + \epsilon \sqrt{2k \log \left( e + \frac{k \epsilon^2}{\tilde{\delta}} \right) \frac{1}{\tilde{\delta}}}, \frac{(e^\epsilon - 1) \epsilon k}{e^\epsilon + 1} + \epsilon \sqrt{2k \log \left( \frac{1}{\tilde{\delta}} \right)} \right\}.$$  \hfill (7)

In the high privacy regime, where $\epsilon \leq 0.9$, this bound can be further simplified as

$$\tilde{\epsilon}_{\tilde{\delta}} \leq \min \left\{ k \epsilon, k \epsilon^2 + \epsilon \sqrt{2k \log \left( e + \frac{\sqrt{k \epsilon^2}}{\tilde{\delta}} \right)}, k \epsilon^2 + \epsilon \sqrt{2k \log(1/\tilde{\delta})} \right\}.$$  

A proof is provided in Section 6. This privacy guarantee improves over the existing result of Theorem 3.2 when $\tilde{\delta} = \Theta(\sqrt{k \epsilon^2})$. Typical regime of interest is the high-privacy regime for composition privacy guarantee, i.e., when $\sqrt{k \epsilon^2} \ll 1$. The above theorem suggests that we only need the extra slack of approximate privacy $\tilde{\delta}$ of order $\sqrt{k \epsilon^2}$, instead of $\Omega(1)$ as suggested by the existing results.

### 3.3 Composition Theorem for Heterogeneous Mechanisms

We considered homogeneous mechanisms, where all mechanisms are $(\epsilon, \delta)$-differentially private. Our analysis readily extends to heterogeneous mechanisms, where the $\ell$-th query satisfies $(\epsilon_\ell, \delta_\ell)$-differential privacy (we refer to such mechanisms as $(\epsilon_\ell, \delta_\ell)$-differentially private mechanisms).
Theorem 3.5. For any $\varepsilon_{\ell} > 0$, $\delta_{\ell} \in [0,1]$ for $\ell \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$, and $\tilde{\delta} \in [0,1]$, the class of $(\varepsilon_{\ell}, \delta_{\ell})$-differentially private mechanisms satisfy $(\tilde{\varepsilon}, 1 - (1 - \tilde{\delta}) \prod_{\ell=1}^{k} (1 - \delta_{\ell}))$-differential privacy under $k$-fold adaptive composition, for $\tilde{\varepsilon} = \min \left\{ \sum_{\ell=1}^{k} \varepsilon_{\ell}, \sum_{\ell=1}^{k} \frac{(e^{\varepsilon_{\ell}} - 1)\varepsilon_{\ell}}{e^{\varepsilon_{\ell}} + 1} + \sum_{\ell=1}^{k} 2\varepsilon_{\ell}^2 \log \left( e + \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{\ell=1}^{k} 2\varepsilon_{\ell}^2}{\tilde{\delta}}} \right), \sum_{\ell=1}^{k} \frac{(e^{\varepsilon_{\ell}} - 1)\varepsilon_{\ell}}{e^{\varepsilon_{\ell}} + 1} + \sum_{\ell=1}^{k} 2\varepsilon_{\ell}^2 \log \left( \frac{1}{\tilde{\delta}} \right) \right\}$. (8)

This tells us that the $\varepsilon_{\ell}$’s sum up under composition: whenever we have $k\varepsilon$ or $k\varepsilon^2$ in (7) we can replace it by the summation to get the general result for heterogeneous case.

4 Applications of the Optimal Composition Theorem

When analyzing a complex mechanism with multiple sub-mechanisms each with $(\varepsilon_0, \delta_0)$-differential privacy guarantee, we can apply the composition theorem (Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.4). To ensure overall $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy for the whole complex mechanism, one chooses $\varepsilon_0 = \varepsilon / (2\sqrt{k \log(e + \varepsilon / \delta)})$ and $\delta_0 = \delta / 2k$, when there are $k$ sub-mechanisms. The existing composition theorem guarantees the desired overall privacy. Then, the utility of the complex mechanism is calculated for the choice of $\varepsilon_0$ and $\delta_0$.

Following this recipe, we first provide a sufficient condition on the variance of noise adding mechanisms. This analysis shows that one requires smaller variance than what is previously believed, in the regime where $\varepsilon = \Theta(\delta)$. Further, we show that a variety of known mechanisms achieve the desired privacy under composition with the same level of variance. Applying this analysis to known mechanisms for cut queries of a graph, we show that again in the regime where $\varepsilon = \Theta(\delta)$, one can achieve the desired privacy under composition with improved utility.

For count queries with sensitivity one, the geometric noise adding mechanism is known to be universally optimal in a general cost minimization framework (Bayesian setting in [GRS12] and worst-case setting in [GV12]). Here we provide a new interpretation of the geometric noise adding mechanism as an optimal mechanism under composition for counting queries. In the course of proving Theorem 3.3 we show that a family of mechanisms are optimal under composition, in the sense that they achieve the largest false alarm and missed detection region. Larger region under composition implies that one can achieve smaller error rates, while ensuring the same level of privacy at each step of the composition. In this section, we show that the geometric mechanism is one of such mechanisms, thus providing the new interpretation to the optimality of the geometric mechanisms.

4.1 Variance of noise adding mechanisms under composition

In this section, we consider real-valued queries $q : \mathcal{D} \to \mathbb{R}$. The sensitivity of a real-valued query is defined as the maximum absolute difference of the output between two neighboring databases:

$$\Delta \equiv \max_{D \sim D'} |q(D) - q(D')|,$$

where $\sim$ indicates that the pair of databases are neighbors. A common approach to privatize such a query output is to add noise to it, and the variance of the noise grows with sensitivity of the query.
and the desired level of privacy. A popular choice of the noise is Gaussian. It is previously known that it is sufficient to add Gaussian noise with variance $O(k\Delta^2 \log(1/\delta)/\varepsilon^2)$ to each query output in order to ensure $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy under $k$-fold composition. We improve the analysis of Gaussians under composition, and show that for a certain regime where $\varepsilon = \Theta(\delta)$, the sufficient condition can be improved by a log factor.

When composing real-valued queries, the Gaussian mechanism is a popular choice \cite{BBDS12,HR13}. However, we show that there is nothing special about Gaussian mechanisms for composition. We prove that the Laplacian mechanism or the staircase mechanism introduced in \cite{GV12} can achieve the same level of privacy under composition with the same variance.

We can use Theorem 3.4 to find how much noise we need to add to each query output, in order to ensure $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy under $k$-fold composition. We know that if each query output is $(\varepsilon_0, \delta_0)$-differentially private, then the composed outputs satisfy $(k\varepsilon_0^2 + \sqrt{2k\varepsilon_0^2} \log(e + \sqrt{k\varepsilon_0^2/\delta}), k\delta_0 + \tilde{\delta})$-differential privacy assuming $\varepsilon_0 \leq 0.9$. With the choice of $\delta_0 = \delta/2k$, $\tilde{\delta} = \delta/\sqrt{2}$, and $\varepsilon_0^2 = \varepsilon^2/4k \log(e + (\varepsilon/\delta))$, this ensures that the target privacy of $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ is satisfied under $k$-fold composition as described in the following corollary.

**Corollary 4.1.** For any $\varepsilon \in (0, 0.9]$ and $\delta \in (0, 1]$, if the database access mechanism satisfies $(\sqrt{\varepsilon^2/4k} \log(e + (\varepsilon/\delta)), \delta/2k)$-differential privacy on each query output, then it satisfies $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy under $k$-fold composition.

One of the most popular noise adding mechanisms is the Laplacian mechanism, which adds Laplacian noise to real-valued query outputs. When the sensitivity is $\Delta$, one can achieve $(\varepsilon_0, 0)$-differential privacy with the choice of the distribution $\text{Lap}(\varepsilon_0/\Delta) = (\varepsilon_0/2\Delta)e^{-\varepsilon_0|x|/\Delta}$. The resulting variance of the noise is $2\Delta^2/\varepsilon_0^2$. The above corollary implies a certain sufficient condition on the variance of the Laplacian mechanism to ensure privacy under composition.

**Corollary 4.2.** For real-valued queries with sensitivity $\Delta > 0$, the mechanism that adds Laplacian noise with variance $(8k\Delta^2 \log(e + (\varepsilon/\delta))/\varepsilon^2)$ satisfies $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy under $k$-fold adaptive composition for any $\varepsilon \in (0, 0.9]$ and $\delta \in (0, 1]$. The mean squared error achieved by the Laplacian mechanism is $O(k^2 \Delta^2 \log(e + (\varepsilon/\delta))/\varepsilon^2)$.

In terms of variance-privacy trade-off for real-valued queries, the optimal noise-adding mechanism known as the staircase mechanism was introduced in \cite{GV12}. The probability density function of this noise is piecewise constant, and the probability density on the pieces decay geometrically. It is shown in \cite{GV13} that that with variance of $O(\min\{1/\varepsilon^2, 1/\delta^2\})$, the staircase mechanism achieved $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy. Corollary 4.1 implies that with variance $O(k\Delta^2 \log(e + (\varepsilon/\delta))/\varepsilon^2)$, the staircase mechanism satisfies $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy under $k$-fold composition.

Another popular mechanism known as the Gaussian mechanism privatizes each query output by adding a Gaussian noise with variance $\sigma^2$. It is not difficult to show that when the sensitivity of the query is $\Delta$, with a choice of $\sigma^2 \geq 2\Delta^2 \log(2/\delta_0)/\varepsilon_0^2$, the Gaussian mechanism satisfies $(\varepsilon_0, \delta_0)$-differential privacy (e.g. \cite{DKM06}). The above corollary implies that the Gaussian mechanism with variance $O(k\Delta^2 \log(1/\delta) \log(e + (\varepsilon/\delta))/\varepsilon^2)$ ensures $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy under $k$-fold composition. However, we can get a tighter sufficient condition by directly analyzing how Gaussian mechanisms compose, and the proof is provided in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.3. For real-valued queries with sensitivity $\Delta > 0$, the mechanism that adds Gaussian noise with variance $8k^2 \Delta^2 \log \left( e + \left( \frac{\varepsilon}{\delta} \right) \right) / \varepsilon^2$ satisfies ($\varepsilon, \delta$)-differential privacy under $k$-fold adaptive composition for any $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\delta \in (0, 1]$. The mean squared error achieved by the Gaussian mechanism is $O(k^2 \Delta^2 \log \left( e + \left( \frac{\varepsilon}{\delta} \right) \right) / \varepsilon^2)$.

It is previously known that it is sufficient to add i.i.d. Gaussian noise with variance $O(k^2 \Delta^2 \log(1/\delta) / \varepsilon^2)$ to ensure ($\varepsilon, \delta$)-differential privacy under $k$-fold composition (e.g. [HT10, Theorem 2.7]). The above theorem shows that when $\delta = \Theta(\varepsilon)$, one can achieve the same privacy with smaller variance by a factor of $\log(1/\delta)$.

4.2 Cut queries of a graph and variance queries of a matrix

Blocki et. al. [BBDS12] showed that classical Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform can be used to produce a differentially private version of a database. Further, they show that this achieves the best tradeoff between privacy and utility for two applications: cut queries of a graph and variance queries of a matrix. In this section, we show how the best known tradeoff can be further improved by applying Theorem 3.4.

First, Blocki et. al. provide a differentially private mechanism for cut queries $q(G, S)$: the number of edges crossing a $(S, \bar{S})$-cut in a weighted undirected graph $G$. This mechanism produces a sanitized graph satisfying ($\varepsilon, \delta$)-differential privacy, where two graphs are neighbors if they only differ on a single edge. The utility of the mechanism is measured via the additive error $\tau$ incurred by the privatization. Precisely, a mechanism $M$ is said to give a ($\eta, \tau, \nu$)-approximation for a single cut query $q(\cdot, \cdot)$, if for every graph $G$ and every nonempty $S$ it holds that

$$\mathbb{P}\left( (1 - \eta) q(G, S) - \tau \leq M(G, S) \leq (1 + \eta) q(G, S) + \tau \right) \geq 1 - \nu . \quad (9)$$

For the proposed Johnson-Lindenstrauss mechanism satisfying ($\varepsilon, \delta$)-differential privacy, it is shown that the additive error $\tau_0$ incurred by querying the database $k$ times is bounded by [BBDS12, Theorem 3.2]

$$\tau_0 = O\left( |S| \sqrt{\frac{\log(1/\delta) \log(k/\nu)}{\varepsilon}} \log \left( \frac{\log(k/\nu)}{\eta^2 \delta} \right) \right) . \quad (10)$$

Compared to other state-of-the-art privacy mechanisms such as the Laplace noise adding mechanism [Dwo06], Exponential mechanism [MT07], Multiplicative weights [HR10], and Iterative Database Construction [GRU12], it is shown in [BBDS12] that the Johnson-Lindenstrauss mechanism achieves the best tradeoff between the additive error $\tau_0$ and the privacy $\varepsilon$. This tradeoff in (10) is proved using the existing Theorem 3.2. We can improve this analysis using the optimal composition theorem of Theorem 3.4 which gives

$$\tau = O\left( |S| \sqrt{\frac{\log(e + \varepsilon/\delta) \log(k/\nu)}{\varepsilon}} \log \left( \frac{\log(k/\nu)}{\eta^2 \delta} \right) \right) . \quad (11)$$

This is smaller than (10) by (a square root of) a logarithmic factor when $\varepsilon = \Theta(\delta)$. The proof of the analysis in (11) is provided in Appendix D.

1 The original theorem is stated for a single query with $k = 1$. Here we state it more generally with arbitrary $k$. This requires scaling $\nu$ by $1/k$ to take into account the union bound over $k$ query outputs in the utility guarantee in (9).
A similar technique has been used in [BBDS12] to provide a differentially private mechanism for variance queries $v(A, x) = x^T A^T A x$: the variance of a given matrix in a direction $x$. The proposed mechanism produces a sanitized covariance matrix that satisfy $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy, where two matrices are neighbors if they differ only in a single row and the difference is by Euclidean distance at most one. With the previous composition theorem in Theorem 3.2 the authors of [BBDS12] get an error bound $\tau_1 = O\left(\frac{\log(1/\delta) \log(k/\nu)}{\varepsilon^2 \eta} \log^2 \left(\frac{\log(k/\nu)}{\eta^2 \delta}\right)\right)$. Using our tight composition theorem, this can be improved as $\tau = O\left(\frac{\log(e^\varepsilon + \varepsilon/\delta) \log(k/\nu)}{e^\varepsilon \eta} \log^2 \left(\frac{\log(k/\nu)}{\eta^2 \delta}\right)\right)$. Again, for $\varepsilon = \Theta(\delta)$, this is an improvement of a logarithmic factor.

4.3 Optimality of the geometric noise adding mechanism under composition

In this section, we consider integer valued queries $q : D \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ with sensitivity one, also called counting queries. Such queries are common in practice, e.g. “How many individuals have income less than $100,000?””. Presence of absence of an individual record changes the output at most by one. Counting query is a well-studied topic in differential privacy [DN03, DN04, BDMN05, BLR13] and they provide a primitive for constructing more complex queries [BDMN05].

The geometric noise adding mechanism is a discrete variant of the popular Laplacian mechanism. For integer-valued queries with sensitivity one, the mechanism adds a noise distributed according to a double-sided geometric distribution whose probability density function is $p(k) = ((e^\varepsilon - 1)/(e^\varepsilon + 1)) e^{-\varepsilon |k|}$. This mechanism is known to be universally optimal in a general cost minimization framework (Bayesian setting in [GRS12] and worst-case setting in [GV12]). In this section, we show that the geometric noise adding mechanism is also optimal under composition.

Consider the composition experiment for counting queries. For a pair of neighboring databases $D_0$ and $D_1$, some of the query outputs differ by one, since sensitivity is one, and for other queries the output might be the same. Let $k$ denote the number of queries whose output differs with respect to $D_0$ and $D_1$. Then, we show in Section C that the privacy region achieved by geometric mechanism, that adds geometric noise for each integer-valued query output, is exactly described by the optimal composition theorem of (5). Further, since this is the largest privacy region under composition for the pair of database $D_0$ and $D_1$ that differ in $k$ queries, no other mechanism can achieve a larger privacy region. Since the geometric mechanism does not depend on the particular choice of pairs of databases $D_0$ and $D_1$, nor does it depend on the specific query being asked, the mechanism is optimal universally for every pair of neighboring databases simultaneously.

Here, optimality is with respect to the composed privacy region itself. Among the mechanisms guaranteeing the same level of privacy, one with larger privacy region under composition is considered better, in terms of allowing for smaller false alarm and missed detection rate in hypothesis testing whether the database contains a particular entry or not. In this sense, larger privacy degradation under composition has more utility. The geometric mechanism has the largest possible privacy degradation under composition, stated formally below; the proof is deferred to Appendix C.

**Theorem 4.4.** Under the $k$-fold composition experiment of counting queries, the geometric mechanism achieves the largest privacy region among all $(\varepsilon, 0)$-differentially private mechanisms, universally for every pair of neighboring databases simultaneously.
5 Proof of Theorem 3.3

We first propose a simple mechanism and prove that the proposed mechanism dominates over all \((\varepsilon, \delta)-differentially private mechanisms\). Analyzing the privacy region achieved by the \(k\)-fold composition of the proposed mechanism, we get a bound on the privacy region under the adaptive composition. This gives an exact characterization of privacy under composition, since we show both converse and achievability. We prove that no other family of mechanisms can achieve ‘more degraded’ privacy (converse), and that there is a mechanism that we propose which achieves the privacy region (achievability).

5.1 Achievability

We propose the following simple mechanism \(\tilde{M}_i\) at the \(i\)-th step in the composition. Null hypothesis \((b=0)\) outcomes \(X_{i,0} = M_i(D_{i,0}, q_i)\)’s which are independent and identically distributed as a discrete random variable \(\tilde{X}_0 \sim \tilde{P}_0(\cdot)\), where

\[
\tilde{\mathbb{P}}(\tilde{X}_0 = x) = \tilde{P}_0(x) \equiv \begin{cases} 
\delta & \text{for } x = 0, \\
\frac{(1-\delta)e^{\varepsilon}}{1+e^{\varepsilon}} & \text{for } x = 1, \\
\frac{1-e^{\varepsilon}}{1+e^{\varepsilon}} & \text{for } x = 2, \\
0 & \text{for } x = 3. 
\end{cases}
\]

(12)

Alternative hypothesis \((b=1)\) outcomes \(X_{i,1} = M_i(D_{i,1}, q_i)\)’s are independent and identically distributed as a discrete random variable \(\tilde{X}_1 \sim \tilde{P}_1(\cdot)\), where

\[
\tilde{\mathbb{P}}(\tilde{X}_1 = x) = \tilde{P}_1(x) \equiv \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{for } x = 0, \\
\frac{1-\delta}{1+e^{\varepsilon}} & \text{for } x = 1, \\
\frac{1-e^{\varepsilon}}{1+e^{\varepsilon}} & \text{for } x = 2, \\
\delta & \text{for } x = 3. 
\end{cases}
\]

(13)

In particular, the output of this mechanism does not depend on the database \(D_{i,b}\) or the query \(q_i\), and only depends on the hypothesis \(b\). The privacy region \((\varepsilon, \delta)\) of a single access to this mechanism is \(\mathcal{R}(\varepsilon, \delta)\) in Figure [1]. Hence, by Theorem 2.5, all \((\varepsilon, \delta)-differentially private mechanisms\) are dominated by this mechanism.

In general, the privacy region \(\mathcal{R}(M, D_0, D_1)\) of any mechanism can be represented as an intersection of multiple \((\tilde{\varepsilon}_j, \tilde{\delta}_j)\) privacy regions for \(j \in \{1, 2, \ldots\}\). For a mechanism \(M\), we can compute the \((\tilde{\varepsilon}_j, \tilde{\delta}_j)\) pairs representing the privacy region as follows. Given a null hypothesis database \(D_0\), an alternative hypothesis database \(D_1\), and a mechanism \(M\) whose output space is \(\mathcal{X}\), let \(P_0\) and \(P_1\) denote the probability density function of the outputs \(M(D_0)\) and \(M(D_1)\) respectively. To simplify notations we assume that \(P_0\) and \(P_1\) are symmetric, i.e. there exists a permutation \(\pi\) over \(\mathcal{X}\) such that \(P_0(x) = P_1(\pi(x))\) and \(P_1(x) = P_0(\pi(x))\). This ensures that we get a symmetric privacy region.

The privacy region \(\mathcal{R}(M, D_0, D_1)\) can be described by its boundaries. Since it is a convex set, a tangent line on the boundary with slope \(-e^{\tilde{\varepsilon}_j}\) can be represented by the smallest \(\tilde{\delta}_j\) such that

\[
P_{\text{FA}} \geq -e^{\tilde{\varepsilon}_j} P_{\text{MD}} + 1 - \tilde{\delta}_j, 
\]

(14)

for all rejection sets (cf. Figure [3]). Letting \(S\) denote the complement of a rejection set, such that \(P_{\text{FA}} = 1 - P_0(S)\) and \(P_{\text{MD}} = P_1(S)\), the minimum shift \(\tilde{\delta}_j\) that still ensures that the privacy region
is above the line \([14]\) is defined as \(\tilde{d}_j = d_{\tilde{x}_j}(P_0, P_1)\) where

\[
d_{\tilde{x}}(P_0, P_1) \equiv \max_{S \subseteq \mathcal{X}} \left\{ P_0(S) - e^{\tilde{x}} P_1(S) \right\}.
\]

The privacy region of a mechanism is completely described by the set of slopes and shifts, \(\{(\tilde{\varepsilon}_j, \tilde{\delta}_j) : \tilde{\varepsilon}_j \in E \text{ and } \tilde{\delta}_j = d_{\tilde{x}_j}(P_0, P_1)\}\), where

\[
E \equiv \{0 \leq \tilde{\varepsilon} < \infty : P_0(x) = e^{\tilde{x}} P_1(x) \text{ for some } x \in \mathcal{X}\}.
\]

Any \(\tilde{\varepsilon} \notin E\) does not contribute to the boundary of the privacy region. For the above example distributions \(\tilde{P}_0\) and \(\tilde{P}_1\), \(E = \{\tilde{\varepsilon}\}\) and \(d_{\tilde{x}}(\tilde{P}_0, \tilde{P}_1) = \delta\).

**Remark 5.1.** For a database access mechanism \(M\) over a output space \(\mathcal{X}\) and a pair of neighboring databases \(D_0\) and \(D_1\), let \(P_0\) and \(P_1\) denote the probability density function for random variables \(M(D_0)\) and \(M(D_1)\) respectively. Assume there exists a permutation \(\pi\) over \(\mathcal{X}\) such that \(P_0(x) = P_1(\pi(x))\). Then, the privacy region is

\[
\mathcal{R}(M, D_0, D_1) = \bigcap_{\tilde{\varepsilon} \in E} \mathcal{R}(\tilde{\varepsilon}, d_{\tilde{x}}(P_0, P_1)),
\]

where \(\mathcal{R}(M, D, D')\) and \(\mathcal{R}(\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta})\) are defined as in \(\text{[3]}\) and \(\text{[2]}\).

The symmetry assumption is to simplify notations, and the analysis can be easily generalized to deal with non-symmetric distributions.

Now consider a \(k\)-fold composition experiment, where at each sequential access \(\tilde{M}_i\), we receive a random output \(X^i\) independent and identically distributed as \(\tilde{X}_b\). We can explicitly characterize the distribution of \(k\)-fold composition of the outcomes: \(\mathbb{P}(X^1, \ldots, X^k = x_k) = \prod_{i=1}^k \tilde{P}_b(x_i)\). It follows form the structure of these two discrete distributions that, \(E = \{e^{(k-2i)/2k}, e^{(k+2-2i)/2k}, \ldots, e^{(k-2\ell)/k}, e^{k\ell}\}\). After some algebra, it also follows that

\[
d_{(k-2i)\varepsilon}(\tilde{P}_0^k, \tilde{P}_1^k) = 1 - (1 - \delta)^k + (1 - \delta)^k \sum_{\ell=0}^{i-1} \binom{k}{\ell} \left( e^{\varepsilon(k-\ell)} - e^{\varepsilon(k-2i+\ell)} \right) \frac{1 + e^{\varepsilon k}}{(1 + e^{\varepsilon})^k}.
\]

for \(i \in \{0, \ldots, [k/2]\}\). From Remark 5.1 it follows that the privacy region is \(\mathcal{R}(\varepsilon_i, \delta_i) = \bigcap_{i=0}^{[k/2]} \mathcal{R}(\varepsilon_i, \delta_i)\), where \(\varepsilon_i = (k - 2i)\varepsilon\) and \(\delta_i\)'s are defined as in \(\text{[6]}\). Figure 2 shows this privacy region for \(k = 1, \ldots, 5\) and for \(\varepsilon = 0.4\) and for two values of \(\delta = 0\) and \(\delta = 0.1\).

### 5.2 Converse

We will now prove that this region is the largest region achievable under \(k\)-fold adaptive composition of any \((\varepsilon, \delta)\)-differentially private mechanisms.

From Corollary 2.3 any mechanism whose privacy region is included in \(\mathcal{R}(\{\varepsilon_i, \delta_i\})\) satisfies \((\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta})\)-differential privacy. We are left to prove that for the family of all \((\varepsilon, \delta)\)-differentially private mechanisms, the privacy region of the \(k\)-fold composition experiment is included inside \(\mathcal{R}(\{\varepsilon_i, \delta_i\})\).

To this end, consider the following composition experiment, which reproduces the *view of the adversary* from the original composition experiment.
At each time step $i$, we generate a random variable $X_{i,b}$ distributed as $\tilde{X}_{i}$ independent of any other random events, and call this the output of a database access mechanism $\tilde{M}_{i}$ such that $\tilde{M}_{i}(D_{i,b}, q_{i}) = X_{i,b}$. Since, $X_{i,b}$ only depends on $b$, and is independent of the actual database or the query, we use $\tilde{M}_{i}(b)$ to denote this outcome.

We know that $\tilde{M}_{i}(b)$ has privacy region $\mathcal{R}(\varepsilon, \delta)$ for any choices of $D_{i,0}, D_{i,1}$ and $q_{i}$. Now consider the mechanism $M_{i}$ from the original experiment. Since it is $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private, we know from Corollary 2.1 that $R_{M_{i}}$ the mechanism $M_{i}$ accepts on a query, we use $\tilde{M}_{i}$ the following Markov chain:

$$\tilde{M}_{i}(b) \in \mathcal{R}(\varepsilon, \delta),$$

$$\{\tilde{M}_{i}(b)\}_{b \in \{0, 1\}} \subseteq \mathcal{R}(\varepsilon, \delta).$$

Hence from the converse of data processing inequality (Theorem 2.5), we know that there exists a mechanism $T_{i}$ that takes as input $X_{i,b}, q_{i}, D_{i,0}, D_{i,1}$, and an $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private mechanism $M_{i}$, and produces an output $Y_{i,b}$ which is distributed as $M_{i}(D_{i,b}, q_{i})$ for all $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Hence, $Y_{i,b}$ is independent of the past conditioned on $X_{i,b}, D_{i,b}, D_{i,1}, q_{i}$, $M_{i}$. Precisely we have the following Markov chain:

$$(b, R, \{X_{\ell,b}, D_{\ell,0}, D_{\ell,1}, q_{\ell}, M_{\ell}\}_{\ell \in [i-1]}) \rightarrow (X_{i,b}, D_{i,0}, D_{i,1}, q_{i}, M_{i}) \rightarrow Y_{i,b},$$

where $R$ is any internal randomness of the adversary $A$. Since, $(X, Y) \rightarrow Z \rightarrow W$ implies $X \rightarrow (Y, Z) \rightarrow W$, we have

$$b \rightarrow (R, \{X_{\ell,b}, D_{\ell,0}, D_{\ell,1}, q_{\ell}, M_{\ell}\}_{\ell \in [i]}) \rightarrow Y_{i,b}.$$

Notice that if we know $R$ and the outcomes $\{Y_{\ell,b}\}_{\ell \in [i]}$, then we can reproduce the original experiment until time $i$. This is because the choices of $D_{i,0}, D_{i,1}, q_{i}, M_{i}$ are exactly specified by $R$ and $\{Y_{\ell,b}\}_{\ell \in [i]}$. Hence, we can simplify the Markov chain as

$$b \rightarrow (R, X_{i,b}, \{X_{\ell,b}, Y_{\ell,b}\}_{\ell \in [i-1]}) \rightarrow Y_{i,b}. \tag{15}$$

Further, since $X_{i,b}$ is independent of the past conditioned on $b$, we have

$$X_{i,b} \rightarrow b \rightarrow (R, \{X_{\ell,b}, Y_{\ell,b}\}_{\ell \in [i-1]}). \tag{16}$$

It follows that

$$\mathbb{P}(b, r, x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}, y_{1}, \ldots, y_{k}) = \mathbb{P}(b, r, x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}, y_{1}, \ldots, y_{k-1})\mathbb{P}(y_{k} | r, x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}, y_{1}, \ldots, y_{k-1})$$

$$= \mathbb{P}(b, r, x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k-1}, y_{1}, \ldots, y_{k-1})\mathbb{P}(y_{k} | b)\mathbb{P}(y_{k} | r, x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}, y_{1}, \ldots, y_{k-1}),$$

where we used (15) in the first equality and (16) in the second. By induction, we get a decomposition of $\mathbb{P}(b, r, x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}, y_{1}, \ldots, y_{k}) = \mathbb{P}(b | r, x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k})\mathbb{P}(y_{1}, \ldots, y_{k}, r, x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k})$. From the construction of the experiment, it also follows that the internal randomness $R$ is independent of the hypothesis $b$ and the outcomes $X_{i,b}$’s: $\mathbb{P}(b | r, x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}) = \mathbb{P}(b | x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k})$. Then, marginalizing over $R$, we get $\mathbb{P}(b, x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}, y_{1}, \ldots, y_{k}) = \mathbb{P}(b | x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k})\mathbb{P}(y_{1}, \ldots, y_{k}, x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k})$. This implies the following Markov chain:

$$b \rightarrow \{(X_{i,b})_{i \in [k]}\} \rightarrow \{(Y_{i,b})_{i \in [k]}\}, \tag{17}$$

and it follows that a set of mechanisms $(M_{1}, \ldots, M_{k})$ dominates $(\tilde{M}_{1}, \ldots, \tilde{M}_{k})$ for two databases $(D_{i,0})_{i \in [k]}$ and $(D_{i,1})_{i \in [k]}$. By the data processing inequality for differential privacy (Theorem 2.4), this implies that

$$\mathcal{R}(\{M_{i}\}_{i \in [k]}, \{D_{i,0}\}_{i \in [k]}, \{D_{i,1}\}_{i \in [k]}) \subseteq \mathcal{R}(\{\tilde{M}_{i}\}_{i \in [k]}, \{D_{i,0}\}_{i \in [k]}, \{D_{i,1}\}_{i \in [k]}) = \mathcal{R}(\{\varepsilon_{i}, \delta_{i}\}).$$
This finishes the proof of the desired claim.

Alternatively, one can prove (17), using a probabilistic graphical model. Precisely, the following Bayesian network describes the dependencies among various random quantities of the experiment described above. Since the set of nodes \((X^1, b, X^2, b, X^3, b, X^4, b)\) d-separates node \(b\) from the rest of the Bayesian network, it follows immediately from the Markov property of this Bayesian network that (17) is true (cf. [Lau96]).

![Bayesian network](image)

Figure 4: Bayesian network representation of the composition experiment. The subset of nodes \((X^1, b, X^2, b, X^3, b, X^4, b)\) d-separates node \(b\) from the rest of the network.

6 Proof of Theorem 3.4

We need to provide an outer bound on the privacy region achieved by \(\tilde{X}_0\) and \(\tilde{X}_1\) defined in (12) and (13) under \(k\)-fold composition. Let \(P_0\) denote the probability mass function of \(\tilde{X}_0\) and \(P_1\) denote the PMF of \(\tilde{X}_1\). Also, let \(P_0^k\) and \(P_1^k\) denote the joint PMF of \(k\) i.i.d. copies of \(\tilde{X}_0\) and \(\tilde{X}_1\) respectively. Also, for a set \(S \subseteq \mathcal{X}^k\), we let \(P_0^k(S) = \sum_{x \in S} P_0^k(x)\). In our example, \(\mathcal{X} = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}\), and

\[
P_0 = \begin{bmatrix}
\delta & \frac{(1-\delta)\epsilon}{1+\epsilon^2} & \frac{1-\delta}{1+\epsilon^2} & 0 \\
0 & \frac{1-\delta}{1+\epsilon^2} & \frac{1-\delta}{1+\epsilon^2} & \delta
\end{bmatrix},
\]

\[
P_1 = \begin{bmatrix}
\delta^2 & \frac{(1-\delta)\epsilon^2}{1+\epsilon^2} & 0 \\
\delta \frac{(1-\delta)\epsilon}{1+\epsilon^2} & \frac{(1-\delta)\epsilon}{1+\epsilon^2} & 0 \\
\delta \frac{(1-\delta)\epsilon}{1+\epsilon^2} & 0 & \frac{(1-\delta)\epsilon}{1+\epsilon^2} \\
0 & 0 & 0
\end{bmatrix},
\]

\[
P_0^k = \begin{bmatrix}
\delta^k & \frac{(1-\delta)\epsilon^k}{1+\epsilon^2} & \frac{(1-\delta)\epsilon^k}{1+\epsilon^2} & 0 \\
\delta^{k-1} \frac{(1-\delta)\epsilon}{1+\epsilon^2} & \frac{(1-\delta)\epsilon}{1+\epsilon^2} & 0 \\
\delta^{k-1} \frac{(1-\delta)\epsilon}{1+\epsilon^2} & 0 & \frac{(1-\delta)\epsilon}{1+\epsilon^2} \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0
\end{bmatrix},
\]

etc.
We can compute the privacy region from \( P^k \) and \( P^k \) directly, by computing the line tangent to the boundary. A tangent line with slope \(-e^\delta\) can be represented as

\[
P_{FA} = -e^\delta P_{MD} + 1 - d_\delta(P^k_0, P^k_1).
\]

To find the tangent line, we need to maximize the shift, which is equivalent to moving the line downward until it is tangent to the boundary of the privacy region (cf. Figure 3).

\[
d_\delta(P^k_0, P^k_1) = \max_{S \subseteq \mathcal{X}_k} P^k_0(S) - e^\delta P^k_1(S).
\]

Notice that the maximum is achieved by a set \( B \equiv \{ x \in \mathcal{X}_k | P^k_0(x) \geq e^\delta P^k_1(x) \} \). Then,

\[
d_\delta(P^k_0, P^k_1) = P^k_0(B) - e^\delta P^k_1(B).
\]

For the purpose of proving the bound of the form (17), we separate the analysis of the above formula into two parts: one where either \( P^k_0(x) \) or \( P^k_1(x) \) is zero and the other when both are positive. Effectively, this separation allows us to treat the effects of \((\epsilon,0)\)-differential privacy and \((0,\delta)\)-differential privacy separately. In previous work [DRV10], they required heavy machinery from dense subsets of pseudorandom sets [RTTV08] to separate the analysis in a similar way. Here we provide a simple proof technique. Further, all the proof techniques we use naturally generalize to compositions of general \((\epsilon,\delta)\)-differentially private mechanisms other than the specific example of \( \tilde{X}_0 \) and \( \tilde{X}_1 \) we consider in this section.

Let \( \tilde{X}^k_0 \) denote a \( k \)-dimensional random vector whose entries are independent copies of \( \tilde{X}_0 \).

We partition \( B \) into two sets: \( B = B_0 \cup B_1 \) and \( B_0 \cap B_1 = \emptyset \). Let \( B_0 \equiv \{ x \in \mathcal{X}_k : P^k_0(x) \geq e^\delta P^k_1(x) \} \) and \( B_1 \equiv \{ x \in \mathcal{X}_k : P^k_0(x) \geq e^\delta P^k_1(x) \} \) and \( P^k(x) > 0 \}. Then, it is not hard to see that \( P^k_0(B_0) = 1 - \mathbb{P}(\tilde{X}^k_0 \in \{1,2,3\}^k) = 1 - (1 - \delta)^k \), \( P^k_1(B_0) = 0 \), \( P^k_0(B_1) = P^k_0(B_1|\tilde{X}^k_0 \in \{1,2\}^k) \mathbb{P}(\tilde{X}^k_0 \in \{1,2\}^k) = (1 - \delta)^k P^k_0(B_1|\tilde{X}^k_0 \in \{1,2\}^k) \), and \( P^k_1(B_1) = (1 - \delta)^k P^k_1(B_1|\tilde{X}^k_0 \in \{1,2\}^k) \). It follows that

\[
\begin{align*}
P^k_0(B_0) - e^\delta P^k_1(B_0) &= 1 - (1 - \delta)^k, \\
P^k_0(B_1) - e^\delta P^k_1(B_1) &= (1 - \delta)^k (P^k_0(B_1|\tilde{X}^k_0 \in \{1,2\}^k) - e^\delta P^k_1(B_1|\tilde{X}^k_0 \in \{1,2\}^k)).
\end{align*}
\]

Let \( \tilde{P}^k_0(x) \equiv P^k_0(x|x \in \{1,2\}^k) \) and \( \tilde{P}^k_1(x) \equiv P^k_1(x|x \in \{1,2\}^k) \). Then, we have

\[
d_\delta(P^k_0, P^k_1) = P^k_0(B_0) - e^\delta P^k_1(B_0) + P^k_0(B_1) - e^\delta P^k_1(B_1) = 1 - (1 - \delta)^k + (1 - \delta)^k (\tilde{P}^k_0(B_1) - e^\delta \tilde{P}^k_1(B_1)). \tag{19}
\]

Now, we focus on upper bounding \( \tilde{P}^k_0(B_1) - e^\delta \tilde{P}^k_1(B_1) \), using a variant of Chernoff’s tail bound. Notice that

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{P}^k_0(B_1) - e^\delta \tilde{P}^k_1(B_1) &= \mathbb{E} \tilde{P}^k_0 \left[ \mathbb{I} \left( \log(\tilde{P}^k_0(X^k)/\tilde{P}^k_1(X^k)) \geq \delta \right) \right] - e^\delta E \tilde{P}^k_0 \left[ \mathbb{I} \left( \log(\tilde{P}^k_0(X^k)/\tilde{P}^k_1(X^k)) \geq \delta \right) \right] P^k_0(X^k) \\
&= \mathbb{E} \tilde{P}^k_0 \left[ \mathbb{I} \left( \log(\tilde{P}^k_0(X^k)/\tilde{P}^k_1(X^k)) \geq \delta \right) \right] \left( 1 - e^\delta \frac{\tilde{P}^k_0(X^k)}{\tilde{P}^k_1(X^k)} \right) \\
&\leq \mathbb{E} \left[ e^{\lambda^{2\delta - \lambda} + \lambda \log \lambda - (\lambda + 1) \log(\lambda + 1)} \right], \tag{20}
\end{align*}
\]
where we use a random variable $Z \equiv \log(\tilde{P}_0^k(\tilde{X}_0^k)/\tilde{P}_1^k(\tilde{X}_1^k))$ and the last line follows from $I(x \geq \varepsilon)(1 - e^{\varepsilon - x}) \leq e^{\lambda(x - \varepsilon) + \lambda \log \lambda - (\lambda + 1) \log(\lambda + 1)}$ for any $\lambda \geq 0$. To show this inequality, notice that the right-hand side is always non-negative. So it is sufficient to show that the inequality holds, without the indicator on the left-hand side. Precisely, let $f(x) = e^{\lambda(x - \varepsilon) + \lambda \log \lambda - (\lambda + 1) \log(\lambda + 1)} + e^{\varepsilon - x} - 1$. This is a convex function with $f(x^*) = 0$ and $f'(x^*) = 0$ at $x^* = \varepsilon + \log((\lambda + 1)/\lambda)$. It follows that this is a non-negative function.

Next, we give an upper bound on the moment generating function of $Z$.

$$
E_{P_0}[e^{\lambda \log(P_0(X)/P_1(X))}] = \frac{e^\varepsilon}{e^\varepsilon + 1} e^{\lambda \varepsilon} + \frac{1}{e^\varepsilon + 1} e^{-\lambda \varepsilon} \leq \frac{e^{\varepsilon - 1/2} \lambda e + 1}{\lambda e + 1} \lambda^2 e^2,
$$

for any $\lambda$, which follows from the fact that $pe^x + (1 - p)e^{-x} \leq e^{(2p-1)x+(1/2)x^2}$ for any $x \in \mathbb{R}$ and $p \in [0, 1]$ [AS04, Lemma A.1.5]. Substituting this into (20) with a choice of $\lambda = \frac{\varepsilon - k \varepsilon(e^\varepsilon - 1)/(e^\varepsilon + 1)}{k \varepsilon^2}$, we get

$$
\tilde{P}_0^k(B_1) - e^{\tilde{\varepsilon}} \tilde{P}_1^k(B_1) \leq \exp\left\{ \frac{e^\varepsilon - 1}{e^\varepsilon + 1} \lambda e k + \frac{1}{2} \lambda^2 e^2 k - \lambda \varepsilon + \lambda \log \lambda - (\lambda + 1) \log(\lambda + 1) \right\}
$$

$$
\leq \exp\left\{ - \frac{1}{2 k \varepsilon^2} \left( \varepsilon - k \varepsilon \frac{e^\varepsilon - 1}{e^\varepsilon + 1} \right)^2 \log(\lambda + 1) \right\}
$$

$$
= \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\varepsilon - k \varepsilon(e^\varepsilon - 1)/(e^\varepsilon + 1)}{k \varepsilon^2}} \exp\left\{ - \frac{1}{2 k \varepsilon^2} \left( \varepsilon - k \varepsilon \frac{e^\varepsilon - 1}{e^\varepsilon + 1} \right)^2 \right\}
$$

$$
\leq \frac{1}{\sqrt{k \varepsilon^2 + \sqrt{2 \log(e + (\sqrt{k \varepsilon^2}/\delta))}} \frac{e^\delta}{k \varepsilon^2} + 1},
$$

for our choice of $\varepsilon = k \varepsilon(e^\varepsilon - 1)/(e^\varepsilon + 1) + \varepsilon \sqrt{2k \log(1/\delta)}$. The right-hand side is always less than $\tilde{\delta}$.

Similarly, one can show that the right-hand side is less than $\tilde{\delta}$ for the choice of $\varepsilon = k \varepsilon(e^\varepsilon - 1)/(e^\varepsilon + 1) + \varepsilon \sqrt{2k \log(1/\delta)}$. We get that the $k$-fold composition is $(\varepsilon, 1 - (1 - \delta)^k(1 - \delta))$-differentially private.

7 Proof of Theorem 3.5

In this section, we closely follow the proof of Theorem 3.4 in Section 6 carefully keeping the dependence on $\ell$, the index of the composition step. For brevity, we omit the details which overlap with the proof of Theorem 3.4. By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we only need to provide an outer bound on the privacy region achieved by $\tilde{X}_0(\ell)$ and $\tilde{X}_1(\ell)$ under $k$-fold
composition, defined as
\[
P(\tilde{X}_0^{(\ell)} = x) = \tilde{P}_0^{(\ell)}(x) = \begin{cases}
\delta_x & \text{for } x = 0 , \\
\frac{(1-\delta_x)e^{\ell \epsilon}}{1+e^{\ell \epsilon}} & \text{for } x = 1 , \\
\frac{1-\delta_x}{1+e^{\ell \epsilon}} & \text{for } x = 2 , \\
0 & \text{for } x = 3 .
\end{cases}
\]

Next, we give an upper bounds on the moment generating function of \( \tilde{X}_1^{(\ell)} \), and \( \tilde{P}_1^{(\ell)}(x) \) is defined as
\[
P(\tilde{X}_1^{(\ell)} = x) = \tilde{P}_1^{(\ell)}(x) = \begin{cases}
0 & \text{for } x = 0 , \\
\frac{(1-\delta_x)e^{\ell \epsilon}}{1+e^{\ell \epsilon}} & \text{for } x = 1 , \\
\frac{(1-\delta_x)e^{\ell \epsilon}}{1+e^{\ell \epsilon}} & \text{for } x = 2 , \\
\frac{1-\delta_x}{1+e^{\ell \epsilon}} & \text{for } x = 3 .
\end{cases}
\]

Using the similar notations as Section 6, it follows that under k-fold composition,
\[
d_\epsilon(P_0^k, P_1^k) = 1 - \prod_{\ell=1}^k (1 - \delta_\ell) + (\tilde{P}_0^k (B_1) - e^{\tilde{\epsilon}} \tilde{P}_1^k (B_1)) \prod_{\ell=1}^k (1 - \delta_\ell) .
\] (21)

Now, we focus on upper bounding \( \tilde{P}_0^k (B_1) - e^{\tilde{\epsilon}} \tilde{P}_1^k (B_1) \), using a variant of Chernoff’s tail bound. We know that
\[
\tilde{P}_0^k (B_1) - e^{\tilde{\epsilon}} \tilde{P}_1^k (B_1) = \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{P}_0^k} \left[ \left( \log(\tilde{P}_0^k (\tilde{X}_0^k)/\tilde{P}_1^k (\tilde{X}_0^k)) \right) \right] - e^{\tilde{\epsilon}} \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{P}_1^k} \left[ \left( \log(\tilde{P}_0^k (\tilde{X}_0^k)/\tilde{P}_1^k (\tilde{X}_0^k)) \right) \right] \\
= \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{P}_0^k} \left[ \left( \log(\tilde{P}_0^k (\tilde{X}_0^k)/\tilde{P}_1^k (\tilde{X}_0^k)) \right) \right] \left( 1 - e^{\tilde{\epsilon}} \tilde{P}_1^k (\tilde{X}_0^k) \right) \\
\leq \mathbb{E} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{P}_0^k} \left[ e^{\lambda \log(P_0^k (X)/P_1^k (X))} \right] \right] \\
\leq e^{\frac{\lambda - 1 - \delta}{\prod_{\ell \in [k]} (1 - \delta_\ell)}} \left( 1 + \frac{2}{\prod_{\ell \in [k]} (1 - \delta_\ell)} \right) - \text{differentially private}.
\]

for any \( \lambda \). Substituting this into (21) with a choice of \( \lambda = \frac{\tilde{\epsilon} - \sum_{\ell \in [k]} \xi_\ell (e^{\ell \epsilon_\ell} - 1)/e^{\ell \epsilon_\ell}}{\sum_{\ell \in [k]} \xi_\ell^2} \), we get
\[
\tilde{P}_0^k (B_1) - e^{\tilde{\epsilon}} \tilde{P}_1^k (B_1) \leq \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\tilde{\epsilon} - \sum_{\ell \in [k]} \xi_\ell (e^{\ell \epsilon_\ell} - 1)/e^{\ell \epsilon_\ell}}{\sum_{\ell \in [k]} \xi_\ell^2}} \exp \left\{ - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\ell \in [k]} \xi_\ell^2 \left( \tilde{\epsilon} - \sum_{\ell \in [k]} \xi_\ell e^{\ell \epsilon_\ell} \right)^2 \right\} \\
\leq .
\]

Substituting \( \tilde{\epsilon} \), we get the desired bound.

Similarly, we can prove that with \( \tilde{\epsilon} = \sum_{\ell \in [k]} (e^{\ell \epsilon_\ell} - 1)/e^{\ell \epsilon_\ell} + 1 \), we get
\[
\tilde{P}_0^k (B_1) - e^{\tilde{\epsilon}} \tilde{P}_1^k (B_1) \leq \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\tilde{\epsilon} - \sum_{\ell \in [k]} \xi_\ell (e^{\ell \epsilon_\ell} - 1)/e^{\ell \epsilon_\ell}}{\sum_{\ell \in [k]} \xi_\ell^2}} \exp \left\{ - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\ell \in [k]} \xi_\ell^2 \left( \tilde{\epsilon} - \sum_{\ell \in [k]} \xi_\ell e^{\ell \epsilon_\ell} \right)^2 \right\}
\]

the desired bound also holds.
8 Proofs

8.1 Proof of Theorem 2.4

Consider hypothesis testing between $D_1$ and $D_2$. If there is a point $(P_{MD}, P_{FA})$ achieved by $M'$ but not by $M$, then we claim that this is a contradiction to the assumption that $D-X-Y$ form a Markov chain. Consider a decision maker who have only access to the output of $M$. Under the Markov chain assumption, he cannot simulate the output of $M'$ by generating a random variable $Y$ conditioned on $M(D)$ and achieve every point in the privacy region of $M'$ (cf. Theorem 2.2). Hence, the privacy region of $M'$ must be included in the privacy region of $M$.

8.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1

First we prove that $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy implies [1]. From the definition of differential privacy, we know that for all rejection set $S \subseteq X$, $\mathbb{P}(M(D_0) \in \bar{S}) \leq e^\varepsilon \mathbb{P}(M(D_1) \in \bar{S}) + \delta$. This implies $1 - P_{FA}(D_0, D_1, M, S) \leq e^\varepsilon P_{MD}(D_0, D_1, M, S) + \delta$. This implies the first inequality of [1], and the second one follows similarly.

The converse follows analogously. For any set $S$, we assume $1 - P_{FA}(D_0, D_1, M, S) \leq e^\varepsilon P_{MD}(D_0, D_1, M, S) + \delta$. Then, it follows that $\mathbb{P}(M(D_0) \in \bar{S}) \leq e^\varepsilon \mathbb{P}(M(D_1) \in \bar{S}) + \delta$ for all choices of $S \subseteq X$. Together with the symmetric condition $\mathbb{P}(M(D_1) \in \bar{S}) \leq e^\varepsilon \mathbb{P}(M(D_0) \in \bar{S}) + \delta$, this implies $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy.

8.3 Proof of Remark 2.2

We have a decision rule $\gamma$ represented by a partition $\{S_i\}_{i \in \{1, \ldots, N\}}$ and corresponding accept probabilities $\{p_i\}_{i \in \{1, \ldots, N\}}$, such that if the output is in a set $S_i$, we accept with probability $p_i$. We assume the subsets are sorted such that $1 \geq p_1 \geq \ldots \geq p_N \geq 0$. Then, the probability of false alarm is

$$P_{FA}(D_0, D_1, M, \gamma) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i \mathbb{P}(M(D_0) \in S_i) = p_N + \sum_{i=2}^{N} (p_{i-1} - p_i) \mathbb{P}(M(D_0) \in \cup_{j<i} S_j).$$

and similarly, $P_{MD}(D_0, D_1, M, \gamma) = (1 - p_1) + \sum_{i=2}^{N} (p_{i-1} - p_i) \mathbb{P}(M(D_1) \notin \cup_{j<i} S_j)$. Recall that $P_{FA}(D_0, D_1, M, S) = \mathbb{P}(M(D_0) \in S)$ and $P_{MD}(D_0, D_1, M, S) = \mathbb{P}(M(D_1) \in \bar{S})$. So for any decision rule $\gamma$, we can represent the pair $(P_{MD}, P_{FA})$ as a convex combination:

$$(P_{MD}(D_0, D_1, M, \gamma), P_{FA}(D_0, D_1, M, \gamma)) = \sum_{i=1}^{N+1} (p_{i-1} - p_i) (P_{MD}(D_0, D_1, M, \cup_{j<i} S_j), P_{FA}(D_0, D_1, M, \cup_{j<i} S_j))$$

where we used $p_0 = 1$ and $p_{N+1} = 0$, and hence it is included in the convex hull of the privacy region achieved by decision rules with hard thresholding.

9 Acknowledgement

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A  Examples illustrating the strengths of graphical representation of differential privacy

Remark A.1. The following statements are true.

(a) If a mechanism is $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private, then it is $(\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta})$-differentially private for all pairs of $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ and $\tilde{\delta} \geq \delta$ satisfying

$$\frac{1-\delta}{1+e^{\tilde{\varepsilon}}} \geq \frac{1-\tilde{\delta}}{1+e^{\tilde{\varepsilon}}}.$$ 

(b) For a pair of neighboring databases $D$ and $D'$, and all $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private mechanisms, the total variation distance defined as $\|M(D) - M(D')\|_{TV} = \max_{S \subseteq \mathcal{X}} \mathbb{P}(M(D') \in S) - \mathbb{P}(M(D) \in S)$ is bounded by

$$\sup_{(\varepsilon, \delta)} \|M(D) - M(D')\|_{TV} \leq 1 - \frac{2(1-\delta)}{1+e^{\varepsilon}}.$$ 

Proof. Proof of (a). From Figure 1, it is immediate that $\mathcal{R}(\varepsilon, \delta) \subseteq \mathcal{R}(\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta})$ when the conditions are satisfied. Then, for a $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-private $M$, it follows from $\mathcal{R}(M) \subseteq \mathcal{R}(\varepsilon, \delta) \subseteq \mathcal{R}(\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta})$ that $M$ is $(\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta})$-differentially private.

Proof of (b). By definition, $\|M(D) - M(D')\|_{TV} = \max_{S \subseteq \mathcal{X}} \mathbb{P}(M(D') \in S) - \mathbb{P}(M(D) \in S)$. Letting $S$ be the rejection region in our hypothesis testing setting, the total variation distance is defined by the following optimization problem:

$$\max_S \quad 1 - P_{MD}(S) - P_{FA}(S)$$

subject to $\quad (P_{MD}(S), P_{FA}(S)) \in \mathcal{R}(\varepsilon, \delta)$, for all $S \subseteq \mathcal{X}$. \(\Box\)

From Figure 1 it follows immediately that the total variation distance cannot be larger than $\delta + (1-\delta)(e^{\varepsilon} - 1)/(e^{\varepsilon} + 1)$.

B  Analysis of the Gaussian mechanism in Theorem 4.3

Following the analysis in Section 6, we know that the privacy region of a composition of mechanisms is described by a set of $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ pairs that satisfy the following:

$$\delta = \mu_0^k(B) - e^{\varepsilon} \mu_1^k(B),$$

where $\mu_0^k$ and $\mu_1^k$ are probability measures of the mechanism under $k$-fold composition when the data base is $D_0$ and $D_1$ respectively, and the subset $B = \arg \max_{S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^k} \mu_0^k(S) - e^{\varepsilon} \mu_1^k(S)$.

In the case of Gaussian mechanisms, we can assume without loss of generality that $D_0$ is such that $q_i(D_0) = 0$ and $D_1$ is such that $q_i(D_1) = \Delta$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$. When adding Gaussian noises with variances $\sigma^2$, we want to ask how small the variance can be and still ensure $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy under $k$-fold composition.
Let \( f_0^k(x_1, \ldots, x_k) = \prod_{i=1}^k f_0(x_i) = (1/\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2})^k e^{-\sum_{i=1}^k x_i^2/2\sigma^2} \) and \( f_1^k(x_1, \ldots, x_k) = \prod_{i=1}^k f_1(x_i) = (1/\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2})^k e^{-\sum_{i=1}^k (x_i - \Delta)^2/2\sigma^2} \) be the probability density functions of Gaussians centered at zero and \( \Delta \mathbf{1}_k \) respectively. Using a similar technique as in (20), we know that

\[
\mu_0^k(B) - e^\varepsilon \mu_1^k(B) \leq \mathbb{E}_{\mu_0^k}[\mathbb{I}(\log(f_0^k(X^k)/f_1^k(X^k)) \geq \varepsilon)] - e^\varepsilon \mathbb{E}_{\mu_0^k}[\mathbb{I}(\log(f_0^k(X^k)/f_1^k(X^k)) \geq \varepsilon)]
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E}_{\mu_0^k}[\mathbb{I}(\log(f_0^k(X^k)/f_1^k(X^k)) \geq \varepsilon)] (1 - e^\varepsilon f_1^k(X^k)/f_0^k(X^k)) \leq \mathbb{E}[e^{\lambda Z - \lambda \varepsilon - \lambda \log \lambda - (\lambda + 1) \log(\lambda + 1)}],
\]

where \( \tilde{X}^k \) is a random vector distributed according to \( \mu_0^k \), \( Z \equiv \log(f_0^k(\tilde{X}^k)/f_1^k(\tilde{X}^k)) \), and the last line follows from \( \mathbb{I}(x) (1 - e^{-x}) \leq e^{\lambda(x - e) + \lambda \log \lambda - (\lambda + 1) \log(\lambda + 1)} \) for any \( \lambda \geq 0 \).

Next, we give an upper bound on the moment generating function of \( Z \).

\[
\mathbb{E}_{\mu_0}[e^{\lambda \log(f_0(X)/f_1(X))}] = \mathbb{E}[e^{\lambda \Delta X/\sigma^2}] e^{\lambda \Delta^2/2\sigma^2} \leq e^{(\Delta^2/2\sigma^2)} e^{\lambda^2/2\sigma^2(\lambda + 1)},
\]

for any \( \lambda \geq 0 \). Substituting this into (24) with a choice of \( \lambda = \frac{\sigma^2}{k \Delta^2} (\varepsilon - \frac{k \Delta^2}{2\sigma^2}) \), which is positive for \( \varepsilon > k \Delta^2/2\sigma^2 \), we get

\[
\mu_0^k(B) - e^\varepsilon \mu_1^k(B) \leq \exp\left\{ (k \Delta^2/2\sigma^2) \lambda^2 + (k \Delta^2/2\sigma^2) \lambda - \varepsilon \lambda + \lambda \log \lambda - (\lambda + 1) \log(\lambda + 1) \right\}
\]

\[
\leq \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\sigma^2}{k \Delta^2} (\varepsilon - \frac{k \Delta^2}{2\sigma^2})} \exp\left\{ - \frac{\sigma^2}{2k \Delta^2} \left( \varepsilon - \frac{k \Delta^2}{2\sigma^2} \right)^2 \right\}
\]

\[
\leq \frac{1}{1 + \sqrt{\frac{2\sigma^2}{k \Delta^2} \log(1 + \frac{\sqrt{k \Delta^2/\sigma^2}}{\delta}) + \frac{1}{\delta} \sqrt{\frac{k \Delta^2}{\sigma^2}}}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\frac{k \Delta^2}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{2 \log(1 + \frac{1}{\delta} \sqrt{k \Delta^2/\sigma^2})}} e^{\delta} \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{k \Delta^2}} + 1},
\]

for our choice of \( \sigma^2 \) such that \( \varepsilon \geq k \Delta^2/(2\sigma^2) + \sqrt{(2k \Delta^2/\sigma^2) \log(1 + \frac{1}{\delta} \sqrt{k \Delta^2/\sigma^2})} \). The right-hand side is always less than \( \delta \).

With \( \sigma^2 \geq (4k \Delta^2/\varepsilon^2) \log(1 + \varepsilon/\delta) \) and \( \sigma^2 \geq k \Delta^2/(4\varepsilon) \), this ensures that the above condition is satisfied. This implies that we only need \( \sigma^2 = O((k \Delta^2/\varepsilon^2) \log(1 + \varepsilon/\delta)) \).

### C Analysis of the geometric mechanism in Theorem 4.4

Theorem 4.4 follows directly from the proof of Theorem 3.3 once the appropriate associations are made. Consider two databases \( D_0 \) and \( D_1 \), and a single query \( q \) such that \( q(D_1) = q(D_0) + 1 \). The geometric mechanism produces two random outputs \( q(D_0) + Z \) and \( q(D_1) + Z \) where \( Z \) is distributed accruing to the geometric distribution. Let \( P_0 \) and \( P_1 \) denote the distributions of the random output respectively. For \( x \leq q(D_0) \), \( P_0(x) = e^\varepsilon P_1(x) \), and for \( x > q(D_0) \), \( e^\varepsilon P_0(x) = P_1(x) \). Then, it is not difficult to see that the privacy region achieved by the geometric mechanism is equal
to the privacy region achieved by the canonical binary example of \( \tilde{X}_0 \) and \( \tilde{X}_1 \) in (12) and (13) with \( \delta = 0 \). This follows from the fact there is a stochastic transition from the pair \( \tilde{X}_0 \) and \( \tilde{X}_1 \) to \( q(D_0) + Z \) and \( q(D_1) + Z \); further, the converse is also true. Hence, from the perspective of hypothesis testing, those two (pairs of) outcomes are equivalent.

It now follows from the proof of Theorem 3.3 that the \( k \)-fold composition privacy region is exactly the optimal privacy region described in (5) with \( \delta = 0 \). We also know that this is the largest possible privacy region achieved by a class of \((\varepsilon, 0)\)-differentially private mechanisms.

## D Analysis of Johnson-Lindenstrauss mechanism

For cut queries, Johnson-Lindenstrauss mechanism proceeds as follows:

| Johnson-Lindenstrauss mechanism for cut queries [BBDS12] |
|---------------------------------------------------------|
| **Input:** A \( n \)-node graph \( G \), parameters \( \varepsilon, \delta, \eta, \nu > 0 \) |
| **Output:** An approximate Laplacian of \( G \): \( \tilde{L} \) |
| 1: Set \( r = 8 \log(2/\nu) / \nu^2 \) and \( w = \sqrt{32} \log(2/\delta) \log(4r/\delta) / \varepsilon \) |
| 2: For every pair of nodes \( I \neq j \), set new weights \( w_{i,j} = w/n + (1 - w/n)w_{i,j} \) |
| 3: Randomly draw a matrix \( N \) of size \( r \times (\binom{n}{2}) \), whose entries are i.i.d. samples of \( \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \) |
| 4: Output \( \tilde{L} = (1/r)E_G^T N^T NE_G \), where \( E_G \) is an \( (\binom{n}{2}) \times n \) matrix whose \((i, j)\)-th row is \( \sqrt{w_{i,j}}(e_i - e_j) \) |

Here \( e_i \) is the standard basis vector with one in the \( i \)-th entry. Given this synopsis of the sanitized graph Laplacian, a cut query \( q(G, S) \) returns \( 1/(1 - w/n)(1 \sum_{S}^T \tilde{L} \mathbb{1}_S - w|S|(n - |S|)/n) \), where \( \mathbb{1}_S \in \{0, 1\}^n \) is the indicator vector for the set \( S \). If the matrix \( N \) is an identity matrix, this returns the correct cut value of \( G \).

We have the choice of \( w \in \mathbb{R} \) and \( r \in \mathbb{Z} \) to ensure that the resulting mechanism is \((\varepsilon, \delta)\)-differentially private, and satisfy \((\eta, \tau, \nu)\)-approximation guarantees of (9). We utilize the following lemma from [BBDS12].

**Lemma 1.** With the choice of

\[
    w = \frac{4}{\varepsilon_0} \log(2/\delta_0) \quad \text{and} \quad r = \frac{8 \log(2/\nu)}{\eta^2},
\]

each row of \( NE_G \) satisfy \((\varepsilon_0, \delta_0)\)-differential privacy, and the resulting Johnson-Lindenstrauss mechanism satisfy \((\eta, \tau, \nu)\)-approximation guarantee with

\[
    \tau = 2|S| \eta w,
\]

where \(|S|\) is the size of the smaller partition \( S \) of the cut \((S, \bar{S})\).

The error bound in (10) follows from choosing

\[
    \varepsilon_0 = \frac{\varepsilon}{\sqrt{4r \log(2/\delta)}} \quad \text{and} \quad \delta_0 = \frac{\delta}{2r},
\]

and applying Theorem 3.2 to ensure that the resulting mechanism with \( r \)-composition of the \( r \) rows of \( ME_G \) is \((\varepsilon, \delta)\)-differentially private. Here it is assumed that \( \varepsilon < 1 \).
Now, with Theorem 3.3, we do not require $\varepsilon_0$ to be as small, which in turn allows us to add smaller noise $w$, giving us an improved error bound on $\tau$. Precisely, using Theorem 3.4 it follows that a choice of

$$\varepsilon_0 = \frac{\varepsilon}{\sqrt{4r \log(e + 2\varepsilon/\delta)}} \quad \text{and} \quad \delta_0 = \frac{\delta}{2r},$$

suffices to ensure that after $r$-composition we get $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy. Resulting noise is bounded by $w \leq 4\sqrt{4r \log(e + 2\varepsilon/\delta) \log(4r/\delta)}/\varepsilon$, which gives the error bound in (11). The proof follows analogously for the matrix variance queries.

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