RESEARCH ARTICLE

THE ROLE OF THE ELECTION SUPERVISORY AGENCY ASNIRMILITARY DEFENSE COMPONENT

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Abstract

This study aims to analyze the role of Bawaslu in implementing non-military defence that occurs in the context of money politics. The research process tries to examine the cases that occurred in the Regional Head Election in Malang Raya. Money politics is a type of election violation, namely by giving and distributing money to prospective voters to be able to vote for that candidate. Money politics is closely related to corrupt behaviour and is a national threat. Therefore we need one step in anticipating this so that this does not happen again. This research uses qualitative research methods. Data mining was carried out, utilizing in-depth interviews with several sources to be able to extract primary data. Furthermore, literature studies are also used to enrich research data. The results showed that the General Election that occurred in Malang Raya was an election that was quite lively with money politics. Although the steps taken by the regional Bawaslu are quite reasonable, some adjustments and strengthening are still needed so that a similar thing does not happen. Some things that can be done are to include Bawaslu and money politics into the PKBN module. Besides, strengthening the intelligence function in election supervision is also essential.

Introduction:

State defence is an efforts to defend the sovereignty of the State, the territorial integrity of Unitary State of Republic Republic of Indonesia, and therefore the safety of the complete Nation from threats and disturbances to the integrity of the state and State. Indonesia in implementing national defence refers to a comprehensive arms that involves all citizens, territories and different national resources, and is ready early by the govt. and is administered in a very total, integrated, directed, and continuous manner to uphold state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the safety of the entire Nation from all sorts of threat. For a democratic country, the implementation of elections is momentum to reinforce the direction of democratic consolidation and strengthening of political institutions. With the implementation of the elections in Indonesia, the transition to democracy in Indonesia can go according to plan and will be able to encourage Indonesia to become a country with "South East Asia's only fully functioning democracy" (Nugroho, 2012). The implementation of quality general elections is needed as a means of realizing the sovereignty of the people in a democratic state government based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
In Law Number 15 of 2011 concerning General Election Administrators, it is stated that Election Administrators are institutions that hold elections consisting of the General Election Commission and the Election Supervisory Body as a unitary function of the election administration. The Election is aimed to elect members of the People's Representative Council, Regional Representative Council, and People's Representative Council Regions, President and Vice President directly by the people, as well as to elect the Governor, Regent and Mayor democratically. Election Supervisory Agency, in the future abbreviated as Bawaslu, is an Election administering institution that is tasked with overseeing the implementation of Elections throughout the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. As stated in article 73 paragraph (2) Bawaslu has the task of supervising the implementation of the Election in the framework of preventing and prosecuting violations for the realization of democratic elections. The Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) has a strategic role in realizing the process and results of elections that are direct, public, free, secret, honest and fair (overflow and fair). As an institution that is responsible for carrying out prevention and prosecution, Bawaslu is the key to carrying out the election stages with integrity.

In handling money politics violations at the Regional Head Election, the position of Regency / City Bawaslu as the main element of non-military defence cannot stand alone. However, it must play a role in accordance with its authority, such as in handling criminal violations of Regency / City Bawaslu money politics together with Resort / Resort Police Cities and District / City, Public Prosecutors. They are members of the Integrated Law Enforcement Center (Gakkumdu) as regulated in Article 152 of Law Number 1 of 2015 concerning the stipulation of Government Regulations instead of Law Number 1 of 2014 Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors.

Data in Bawaslu RI shows that there are 204 reports of cases of money politics practices in the 2015 regional elections. However, violations related to money politics crimes cannot be continued by the police and the prosecutor's office because at that time there was no article on Election Crime listed in Law Number 1 of 2015 concerning stipulation government regulations instead of Law Number 1 of 2014 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors. Meanwhile, in the 2017 regional elections, there were 910 reports regarding the practice of money politics. Of the 910 cases, only 64 reports/findings met the formal and material requirements after discussion at the Integrated Law Enforcement Center (Gakkumdu) in each region, both Province and District / City. Of the 64 reports, 51 reports were categorized as general crimes, but there were only 3 cases of allegations of money politics that could be processed until the court.

In addition to money politics criminal offences, in the 2018 Governor, Regent and Mayor Election, there were 8 (eight) Administrative Violation Reports that occurred in a structured, systematic, and massive manner, which were received, examined and decided by the Provincial Bawaslu. There are 3 (three) cases of TSM Administrative Violation Report in South Sulawesi Province, 2 (two) Lampung Province and 1 (one) Case for North Sulawesi, South Sumatra and Gorontalo Provinces. However, the Report of Administrative Violations that occurred by TSM that was decided by the Provincial Bawaslu was not proven legally and convincingly. (Data from the Final Bawaslu RI Report, 2018).

**Theoretical Framework**

There are several theories used in this research. Some of these theories and concepts include role theory, political theory, intelligence distributive pork-barrel political theory, the concept of state defence and strategy.

**Role Theory**

According to Kreitner, Robert and Angelo Kinicki (2014: 14) in their book, organizational behaviour says that role is the order of behaviour that a person expects from a position. Role theory tries to explain how these social expectations influence the behaviour of the recipient of the role (actor). This section explores role theory by analyzing a role episode and finding the position of a person or organization in the form of excess roles, role clashes and role ambiguity.

The role as an episode describes the interaction of two people or communities, where one party is the giver or sender of the role, and the other party is the recipient of the role. The role episode begins with the sender's perception of the needs of the group or organization's behaviour. This behaviour serves as a standard for determining expectations for the behaviour of the recipient of the role, the sender of the role then evaluates the actual behaviour of the recipient of the role qualitatively against these expectations. Verbal messages concerning the appropriate behaviour are then sent to the recipient of the role to pressure them to make the behaviour as expected. According to Edgar Schein in
Kreitner, Robert and Angelo Kinicki (2014: 14), role overload occurs when the amount expected by the sender from the recipient of the role far exceeds the ability of the recipient of the role.

**Political Theory**

Political theory is the discussion and generalization of political phenomena. In other words, political theory is the discussion of: a) the objectives of political activity, b) the means of achieving them, c) the possibilities and needs of a particular political situation and d) the obligations that result from that political goal. The concepts discussed in political theory include, among others, society, social class, State, power, sovereignty, rights and obligations, independence, state institutions, social change, political development, modernization and so on (Budiardjo, 2008).

There are two functions of political theory, first, as a basis for norms or morals for political behaviour, including for the administration of state life. Second, as an analysis tool or tools of analysis of political phenomena that are happening. The results of this analysis are then used again to make new generalizations.

**Distributive Political Theory and Pork Barel**

Pork Barel's Distributive and Political Theory of Politics is the second category of political theory, as mentioned in the above political theory. Politics cannot be separated from the distribution process of resources in it. Distributive politics is a form of understanding that politics is the arena of resource allocation and distribution. Resources are defined as anything that can empower or enable citizens in their power relations with other parties (politicians, public officials). Empirically, resources refer to goods, both material and social (Wardani 2014). The distribution of resources in politics cannot be separated from political efforts to win and gain votes in elections (Stokes in Palenewen 2014). In this case, if the political authorities focus on election victory, then the distribution of these resources can lead to various actions or strategies to win the Election (Stokes in Palenewen 2014).

One of the applications of distributive politics is related to the use of state programs or government programs to gain victory in elections. Therefore, distributive politics, in this case, will tend to benefit the ruling party in government. This is because the government party is likely to have more exclusive control in exploiting the success of government programs (Stokes in Palenewen 2014).

The application of distributive politics can be divided into two, namely programmatic (programmatic) and non-programmatic (non-programmatic) (Stokes in Palenewen 2014, 25; Stokes et al. 2013; Wardani 2014). In programmatic distributive politics, there is an intermediary role which is not the mobilization of citizens' political choices for the benefit of the candidate or as a mediator who brings together the interests of the candidate with the voters. These intermediaries have the role of gathering information and citizen aspirations regarding the problems and needs faced by residents. The information and aspirations collected will be used as demands as a form of problem-solving (Stokes in Palenewen 2014, 20).

**Strategy Theory**

The concept of strategy has a variety of definitions which can be explained as efforts or plans to achieve goals. The strategy has been known from many centuries ago, and its use was first applied in the military field. The term strategy comes from Greek which means generalship or military expertise. One of the various military strategies that are still relevant and become a benchmark today is the Sun Tzu war strategy, written in a classic work entitled "The Art of War" (AoW). Not only limited to war strategy, but Sun Tzu also discusses other life philosophies such as integrity, victory, defeat, loss, uncertainty, accountability and responsibility.

Furthermore, Harry R. Yarger (2006, p. 107) formulated the definition of strategy through a model created by Colonel Arthur Lykke. Yarger defines strategy as all about how (the way/concept) leadership will use the power (means/means or resources) available to the State to exercise control over circumstances and geographic location to achieve goals (ends) that support the interests of the State. The strategy provides directions for the use of force forcefully or persuasively to achieve specified goals. This direction is naturally proactive. It seeks to control the environment as opposed to reacting to it.

**Intelligence Theory**

Intelligence is generally known as a tool owned by the State in order to detect and detect threats and to organize in order to thwart existing threats. According to Saronto and Karwita (2001), Intelligence is identified with efforts to prevent deterrence where the security and defence functions are the most favoured in it. In line with this opinion,
Siswosumarto et al. (2012) also explained that Intelligence is an essential tool for every country to have in order to maintain the unity and integrity of the country so that the intelligence element is an essential element for every country in the world to have.

In carrying out intelligence practices, there are three main activities which are usually abbreviated as lit-pam-gal or investigation, security, and restraint. The investigation is an intelligence function in providing and managing information received and providing a classification of information materials in order to detect threats. Then, security is a function assigned to the intelligence service in order to provide and create safe conditions for every component of the Nation. Finally, raising is the function of Intelligence to organize and condition a group or individual to be willing to support and do something in order to achieve the expected conditions. Siregar (2014) explains that in mobilization, Intelligence has various leeway, such as conducting propaganda and psychological warfare. Several functions possessed by Intelligence make Intelligence have one power that can be utilized in order to secure the running of the General Election and Pilkada.

The intelligence linkage in an election event is the process of investigating electoral fraud that can be carried out by Intelligence in a more in-depth and comprehensive manner. Intelligence and Pilkada, as explained by Anriani (2018), should be an inseparable part. Intelligence must be a part of making the Pilkada more transparent and fairer. This is done to anticipate election violations and other fraud that cannot be identified if Intelligence is not involved. Therefore, researchers include Intelligence in the study that will be carried out in the context of being input to be able to provide formulations of suggestions for the next regional Election to take place more fairly and safely.

Concept of State Defense
Defending the State has become a reasonably intense discussion in recent years since it was expressed and made into the national agenda. State Defense is a concept designed to strengthen and spread the foundation of nationalism to every component of the Nation. The concept of State Defense aims, among other things, to strengthen the sense of nationalism and patriotism of the Indonesian Nation, which is considered to have faded due to changing times and globalization. Soepandji (2018) explains that the drafting of the State Defense concept emphasizes the existence of elements of state resilience which are currently weakening due to nationalism that is not as strong as before.

The importance of State Defense in the current era is very pronounced because of the borderless trend around the world, which demands openness to all access, both economically and culturally. Thus, an unstoppable exchange can lead to the fading of a sense of nationalism which is very risky. If you look further, actually Defending the State, like what has been done in Indonesia, has been done in many other areas such as Singapore and Switzerland (Soepanj, 2018). Therefore, it is proper for Indonesia to imitate and try to do the same thing so that the expected results will be obtained, namely increased social cohesion and nationalism which is again firmly embedded in the minds of every component of the Nation. One thing that can be done and benefit from the existence of the State Defense program is a better political process in Indonesia.

Research Findings And Results:-
Based on the results of the research that has been carried out, it was found that, in the 2017 Pilkada in Batu City, there were allegations of money politics (in the form of the distribution of mukenah, sarong and money Rp. 100,000) by the Mayor of Batu. On that occasion, the mayor also conveyed his appeal to elect a candidate: serial number 2, namely the pair Dewanti Rumpoko and Punjul Santoso. Dewan is the wife of the Mayor of Batu, Eddy Rumpoko. Likewise during the 2018 Regional Election in Malang City, Malang Mayor Moch Anton (as a candidate for the incumbent mayor is suspected of giving gifts or promises to members of the Malang City DPRD regarding the discussion of the Malang City Government APBD-P to 18 Malang City DPRD members for the 2014-2019 period. Therefore, the KPK was named a suspect in a bribery case related to the Malang City APBD-P discussion. Not much different from the implementation of the Pilkada of Batu City and Malang City, the implementation of the Pilkada in Malang Regency in 2015 is thought to be adorned with transactional politics, namely allegations of misappropriation of grants and social assistance. (Banos) conducted by Malang Regent Rendra Kresna as a candidate for Regent of Petahanan.

Prevention of violations of money politics is interpreted as a series of comprehensive, systematic, and right-on-target anticipatory steps carried out by Bawaslu. The hope to be achieved from the prevention agenda is that there will be no violations of money politics in the Pilkada, or at least in a minimal position when facing the election agenda. As stated in the theory of effectiveness, effectiveness can be defined as the level of the ability of an institution or
organization to be able to carry out all its main tasks or to achieve predetermined goals (Cambel, 1989). Thus, Bawaslu as an institution that is given the authority following its main tasks following statutory regulations has carried out comprehensive, systematic and targeted anticipatory steps in preventing violations of money politics, among others.

**Develop an Election Vulnerability Index**

In the context of prevention in election supervision, a comprehensive mapping is needed regarding potential violations and vulnerabilities in the implementation of elections. Therefore, a series of studies is needed to meet the public and stakeholders' needs for accurate and valid information, especially in terms of monitoring and preventing potential vulnerabilities in election administration. As stated in Law Number 7 of 2017 article 94 letter a, in preventing Election violations and preventing Election process disputes, Bawaslu is tasked with identifying and mapping potential Election vulnerabilities and violations;

For this reason, Bawaslu compiles an Election Vulnerability Index (IKP) which aims to provide data, analysis and recommendations for election supervisors and all stakeholders as material for policy formulation, program preparation and strategies in the context of monitoring and preventing election violations. It is hoped that this IKP will become a kind of preventive exercise or early warning for all parties, especially supervisors, to map areas that are prone to simultaneous Pilkada implementation. This index will make it easier for Bawaslu to develop a monitoring strategy based on vulnerable areas and on what aspects the weight of supervision is focused.

**Mapping of Voting Points (TPS) Prone**

The stages of voting and counting votes are the main stages of the Pilkada implementation process. At this stage, it is the stage most prone to violations and fraud, which affects the results of voter choice. In addition to the implementation of supervisory systems and standards that have been implemented by election supervisors, mapping of vulnerable polling stations is required as a last resort in preventing violations during the voting and counting stages. Although all polling stations have their respective potential vulnerabilities, it is essential to get a polling station with high vulnerability to determine the focus and more robust prevention strategies.

In the supervision of the voting and vote counting stages, this mapping of vulnerable polling stations is a way for election supervisors to prevent violations and fraud at the polling stations. Starting from the mapping of this vulnerable TPS, election supervisors can prepare or prepare tactical and strategic plans and steps to prevent violations and fraud at the TPS that have been identified since the beginning. Election observers can involve all election stakeholders to be involved in these prevention efforts.

Bawaslu needs to develop an instrument that is used as a standard in compiling a map of vulnerable polling stations. This TPS prone map preparation instrument was prepared as a guide for election supervisors in identifying prone polling stations in Pilkada.

**Participatory Monitoring Dissemination**

Elections are a means of manifesting people's sovereignty, as well as a means of actualizing public participation as holders of sovereignty in determining public office. As the holder of sovereignty, the position of the people in the General Election is placed as the subject, including in safeguarding the integrity of the Election, one of which is through election supervision. The Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) as an institution that is mandated to oversee the implementation of elections in Indonesia increases the participation of Indonesian citizens in overseeing the implementation of elections in order to run democratic, overflowing and fair. One of the efforts is to invite all community groups to be involved in supervision participation. From all stages of the ongoing Election, there are spaces that the community and Bawaslu can do in supervising the Election. Public participation so that the Election process runs honestly and fairly is one of the main assets to safeguard the Election process in a quality, honest, fair and democratic manner.

Elections are not merely political, ceremonial events that deny people's political participation. The public must also be the subject of the election process. Participatory supervision is carried out to create citizens who are active in following the development of democracy. Supervision is also a suitable means of political learning for the voting community. Community participation is the spirit of democracy. Public participation is needed in conducting election supervision. Political participation which is the embodiment of the people's sovereignty is a very fundamental thing in the democratic process. One of the Bawaslu's missions is to encourage participatory civil
society-based supervision. Public involvement in election supervision must first be done through a process of socialization and transfer of knowledge and skills of election supervision from election supervisors to the public.

Conclusions:-
Based on the research that has been carried out, there are several points of conclusion, which are the main results of the research. The following are some of the conclusions found by researchers during the study.

1. Elections that took place in Malang Raya, namely the Pilkada of Batu City, Malang Regency, and Malang City are examples of elections that are full of fraud. Some of the fraud that occurred was the existence of money politics that was rife in the categories of giving goods and promises. This Election is also an example and a valuable lesson for other regions because many people who were elected in the Pilkada eventually became suspects and convicted of corruption cases at the KPK.
2. Election implementers, especially Bawaslu Malang City and Regency have taken anticipatory steps in dealing with election violations that may occur. Some of these steps include holding participatory socialization and educational classes in collaboration with various universities in Malang.
3. Bawaslu is an institution outside the Ministry of Defense that should be given discretion in managing non-military defence. Primarily in carrying out its duties to supervise and take action against Election violations.
4. The existence of the State Defense Movement to fight corruption has not included money politics and political corruption as one of the chapters that should be studied in the PKBN.
5. The intelligence function has not played a significant role in election supervision so that Bawaslu and the agencies in Gakkumdu are still deemed not optimal in overseeing the Election. This can be seen from the investigation efforts which still often experience obstacles and lack of evidence to take action against or prevent election violations.

Recommendations:-
In addition to a number of the conclusions that are written above, there are many suggestions that the investigator desires to convey concerning the analysis being carried out. a number of these suggestions include.

1. To the Ministry of Defense to be ready to enter cash politics and corruption ensuing from the implementation of elections within the compiled PKBN.
2. To the social unit of the State Defense movement to involve Bawaslu in diffusing and formulating the State Defense program, particularly regarding preventing money politics in the General Election.
3. Bawaslu ought to be able to spearhead the implementation of non-military defence, especially in terms of preventing election violations and cash politics that usually occur.
4. Intelligence operate ought to be maximized in efforts to forestall election violations. in order that efforts to analyze and stop violations are often dole out properly while not a shortage of proof and evidence.

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