ABSTRACT
Structured professional judgement tools were specifically created to measure risk related to violent extremism. But there is no instrument that measures disengagement and deradicalization program. The result of an action research realized in parallel of the follow-up of 450 French jihadists enabled the creation of a trial of a specialized protocol, named NOORAPPLI 3D. It is intended for professionals who take charge of jihadists. Its main aim is to measure how disengagement/deradicalization programs manage to change attitudes associated to violent extremism. It fills practitioners’ need of deepening in order to measure the exit of radicalization and to fight recidivism. This practical guide helps professionals to consider the meaning of the radicalized individual’s engagement (engagement motives with promises of a better world and/or self), to detect his needs which were compensated by the radical discourse (psychological, socio-political…), to evaluate his level of “paranoid perspective” (rigid and persecuting emotional dimension), his level of “socialization in terrorism” (relational dimension) and his level of adhesion to the utopia of a perfect world with divine law (ideological dimension) as well as the evolution of the cognitive change provoked by these three dimensions (dichotomic thought causing an inversion of the perpetrator/victim status and the dehumanisation of victims). This article aims at submitting to critics this trial of exit of jihadist radicalization protocol. It presents a method which led to the creation of items allowing a follow-up individual to be replaced in his own trajectory of radicalization. NOORAPPLI 3D relies on results of a scientific research on contemporary jihadism but incorporates them transversely, to help professionals to measure concretely follow-up individuals, on the basis of objective facts and not according to subjective representations nor principled positions. NOORAPPLI 3D items are organized into three chapters corresponding to the three dimensions of the radicalization process (emotional, relational, ideological). For each of these items, four levels of answers are proposed. The professional will check the closest answer to the concerned subject’s situation. The items are formulated so that the professional will gather precise information on each matter: either after a discussion or by the observation of the radicalized individual’s behaviour, with a risk of dissimulation. The following items must be adapted and experimented. It will also be necessary to adapt them to help professionals of other countries because they are built upon the exit of radicalization of French jihadists who were largely recruited by French extremist leaders in the French language and tested by teams of French professionals within and outside prisons.

FOREWORD:
The question of assessing and taking charge a potential perpetrator of a terrorist attack forms a major societal issue. According to me, the present work represents an important action research given an examination of the international literature and the meeting of numerous concerned participants. This attempt of operationalisation of criteria which is compulsory in terms of evaluation and motivation, constitutes an important advance. The pursuit of such a work should foresee the deepening of relations between the defined criteria, their internal consistency, the recoveries of profiles in a same individual, as well as gender comparisons, often neglected internationally speaking. These joint analyses with relapse factors described in the international literature, will clear the specified fields of surveillance and the targets for an individualized support”.

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1 INTRODUCTION:

Certain studies seem to prove that tools used for risk assessment of criminal violence are not always suited to risk assessment of terrorist violence and violent extremisms [56]. There is a consensus to establish that a specific protocol of risk assessment of violent extremisms is necessary in most cases [71]. In a comparison of general research on the risk of criminal violence and research on terrorism, Monahan [63] noticed that there was few overlapping. The development of a specific structured professional judgement tool proved to be required. Pressman [71] recalls that the intervention destined to violent extremists necessarily differs from programs that were conceived for other violent criminals. Indeed, correctional rehabilitation is usually centred on education, the acquisition of skills to be professionally reinserted. It is also based on strategies related to mental illnesses, psychopathy, anger management and toxicomania. These characteristics are far from being the most relevant in the disengagement of violent extremists.

Several researchers focused on creating new tools. Three main instruments of structured assessment were elaborated for the terrorist risk, notably for risk assessment of extreme violence: 1) VERA [71], inspired by HCR-20 [37]; 2) the TRAP 18 tool, conceived for the detection of isolated terrorists and only available at the Global Institute of Forensic Research [57]; 3) ERG 22, the elaboration of structured guidelines to assess risk in extremist offenders implemented by the British government [53]. The latter was deployed in Great-Britain on a national scale according to a legal obligation made by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015. It aroused many criticisms about its scientific grounding and its transparency [25].

The question is now about the exit of radicalization and the prevention of recidivism, especially for former prisoners. According to Pressman [71], there is not enough information on the efficiency of disengagement/deradicalization programs. Most of these programs’ assessments are trivial or based on inaccurate data. A 2008-study financed by the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism observed it was difficult to obtain information directly from violent extremists [34] and to draw conclusions about the disengagement process. Operative deradicalization programs from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Indonesia and in Europe are said to be promising. But they are poorly documented, lack of empirical follow-ups and include a few of reliable measurement elements.

What are the indicators that help to measure if a “former” jihadist2 grieved the legitimation of violence (disengagement) or the ideology according to which it is mandated to impose divine law on people to regenerate the world (deradicalization)? How to adapt the follow-up when a convicted extremist gets out of incarceration? In France, Marc Trévidic, an antiterrorist judge, recalls that the number of jihadists linked to ISIS is so important that it puts the country in a new situation. Indeed, during the eighties, jihadists from Bosnia and Afghanistan were assessed through a police investigation, outside prison before they were incarcerated. Their “diagnosis” could be made without them knowing. Hence, the most dangerous individuals could be detected. On the other hand, an exponential number of contemporary jihadists – notably in France and in Belgium – led to an almost systematic instantaneous custody and it does not allow enough time to do a preliminary police enquiry [83]. The assessments conducted during detentions, especially in French Areas of Radicalization Assessment (ARA), cannot be in this field as reliable as those conducted without the knowledge of the free individual. Prisoners will progressively get out of detention. But their relations to the ideology and to the jihadist group will not be precisely defined and will not treated, if required.

While the previously mentioned scientifically-tested tools concern violent extremism in general (political or religious) and are centred on the risk assessment of an acting out, this trial aims at presenting the first thoughts about the results of an action research. It offers a work protocol including items able to measure how disengagement/deradicalization programs manage to change attitudes related to violent extremism. This practical guide, named NOORAAPPLI 3D3 fills practitioners’ need of deepening since it helps them to measure one’s exit of radicalization and to fight recidivism. It will allow them to consider the meaning of the radicalized person’s engagement, to target the needs (psychological, socio-political…) compensated by a radical discourse, to assess his level of “paranoid perspective” (rigid and persecuting emotional dimension), his level of “socialization in terrorism” (relational dimension) and his level of adhesion to the utopia of a perfect world with divine law (ideological dimension) as well as the evolution of the cognitive change provoked by these three dimensions (dichotomic thought causing an inversion of the perpetrator/victim status and the dehumanisation of victims). NOORAAPPLI 3D enables an adaptation of the follow-up according to the results displaying the radicalized individual’s cognitive opening and his socialization. The goal is here to present the interpretative and procedural rigor which led to the creation of items allowing a follow-up individual to be replaced in his own trajectory of radicalization.

After Horgan’s article [45], researchers did not consider engagement in terrorism as a sort of determinism, nor as a “reactive entity shaped and guided by hypothetical internal dimensions” [40], but as the result of an interaction between

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3 NOOR means Light in Arabic. It also stands for “Neutralizing Online and Offline Radicalization”. 3D refers to the three evaluated dimensions leading to an emotional, relational or ideological cognitive change.
individual and social factors. This implies “an analyses reproducing the series of sequences peculiar to existence, journeys, singular experiences on the involved individuals and universes in which they belong and evolve”. [22] Since this turning in the understanding of the jihadist process, “the consideration of individual variables was not fundamentally reassessed with regard to this interactionism” [40]. Xavier Crettiez also noted that “if studies on terrorization violence [82] favoured for a long time an historical approach or one centred on fighting structures as well as interactions with State or doctrinal evolutions such as explanation grids of violence that did not consider perpetrators’ subjectivity, biographical journeys or psychological constructions leading to armed fight” [33]. Similarly, the 2017 report of the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime [28] develops the idea that there is an important qualitative bias in the collected data’s validity, since researchers struggled to get empirical data through individual or semi-structured collective in-person interviews (often through interviews online/on social networks or in prison) and often worked with individuals in the end of their process of radicalization or who were still radicalized. Their cognitivo-affective transformation is already finished, and the interviewed persons are only able to express their adhesion to an ideology which is fully authoritative for them. This level of data and analysis is important. However, it does not enable a study on every step leading to violent extremism and an assessment on how to exit from it. How to put into perspective the initial state of individuals and the result of their cognitive-affective transformation, after they joined the group and jihadist ideology? For example, were the characteristics compiled by Elaine Pressman [71] such as identity confusion (personal and collective), rejection of collective identity, acute feeling of injustice, expression of a profound resentment, targeting of a person, a group or a country as a cause of injustice, dehumanisation (person or targeted group), hostility, hate, desire to die for cause, need of adhering to a grand ideological, religious or political cause, high level of frustration, rejection of “western” values and need morally driven by revenge or retaliation [6,14,31,32,56,65,69,71,76,81], only actual for individuals before radicalization or did they appear when they were in contact with the jihadist discourse and group? To assess this risk, the answer to this question is not fundamental. But it is when it comes to measuring a disengagement program.

Authors of researches about disengagement/deradicalization and about tools explain how difficult it can be to convince extremist individuals to establish dialogs allowing a sufficient data collection to create assessment factors [34,53]. Frequently, the sample used to create items (a population of prisoners) differs from the sample that the tool targets (public domain), which questions their wider applicability and the response bias. Individual and collective qualitative data, continuously collected during the follow-up of young people treated from April 2014 to April 2016 by the Centre for the Prevention of Sectarian Drifts related to Islam (Centre de Prévention contre les Dérives Sectaires liées à l’Islam, CPDSI), within the framework of the ministerial circulaire of May 20th 2015 (Circulaire INT A 1512017J), access to their personal characteristics before their radical commitment as well as recruits’ interactions on social-networks, their computers and/or phones, study of videos exchanged during recruitment period, follow-up and measurement of the evolution of their self-identifications and society during two years, study of arguments that reached them to exit radicalization, all these data enable the elaboration of a first reflection on the stages of disengagement from jihadist extremism.

2 MATERIAL AND METHOD:

2.1. Postulate:
It is necessary to distinguish what is the cognitive change the radicalization process caused and the initial state of the individual before radicalization, in order to better understand the interactions of micro and macro factors that provoked this journey. Only this distinction may help to identify the steps of radicalization without combining causes and effects and then to highlight the recruits’ different sensibilities to propaganda, to better inform practitioners specialized in disengagement.

Starting from the principle that the process of radicalization is the result of a combination and an interaction of individual, social, political factors and an encounter with the jihadist offer, we were based on our knowledge of radicalized persons of less than 28 years old before/during their radicalization (thanks to their parents and relatives participation to our study), on the analysis of their motivations and what propaganda reached them and on their evolution during radicalization and after the exit of radicalization. Thus, we can take stock of the collected information on these concerned individuals for two years, arrange these data in categories, then transform them into items for NOORAPPLI 3D.

2.2. Data
The available material proceeds from radicalized young people’s collection of speeches while they were being taken charge of for disengagement. It is a set of semi-structured or non-structured individual interviews young people and their family, or collective semi-structured collective interviews within support groups meetings. In most cases, communications on social networks, from their computers and phones, were exploited by the CPDSI’s multidisciplinary team, thanks to the trust relationship with relatives who asked for help for the radicalized person, then thanks to the trust relationship which was formed during the taking charge with extremists themselves. Videos that were watched and/or exchanged were analysed to better understand the young person’s relation to propaganda.

For an European research project on stages of the radicalization process and exit of radicalization and on risk and desistance factors [16,17], we first conducted a qualitative study of the data, then we asked to Professor David Cohen’s team, chief of the child and youth paediatric psychiatry service of the Paris Pitié-Salpêtrière hospital, to undertake a
quantitative verification of the engagement motives [26] we discovered with an anthropological method [68]. Then, we proceeded to crossed variables “of becoming”: what are the actual social, psychological, medical, etc., characteristics in the deradicalized individuals’ group, starting from the principle that they could have had a positive impact on the fact that they managed to grieve their partners and the jihadist ideology in an identical national and international political context? Then we did the same exercise within a non-disengaged group of young people [26]. In a second phase, we analysed these findings by crossing the quantitative and the qualitative approach, the collected data from radicalized individuals’ parents and themselves, and by reintroducing the anthropological analysis that recontextualizes these results with regard to the acquired feedback in these young people’s support during a two-year follow-up.

Then we tested NOORAPPLI 3D with these 450 cases. The aim was to verify that the obtained results throughout our follow-ups and analyses and the tool’s findings were similar.

2.3. Ethical guidelines and consent

Within the scope of this mission, parents or legal guards who voluntarily referred to the Minister of the Interior through a freephone, asked the CPDSI’s structure for help. The notion of referral caused several explicit acceptations: semi-structured interviews with parents, semi-structured interviews with radicalized minors, inter-parental collective interviews, inter-youth collective interviews, sharing of videos and information. During these different data collection spheres, parents deliberately took part in various types of recording: log files, screenshots, recordings of conservations from their private computers. An informed consent was signed by each one of them.

Radicalized adults (18 or more) were also reported to authorities by their parents or spouse who asked for them to be taken charge of. Since they are not subjected to parental authority, we only kept in the study those who accepted to stay during the two-year follow-up and who signed the same agreement as minors’ parents. We excluded from our research those who refused to consent to the exploitation of their own data. The various interviews were strictly anonymously sealed: neither last names, first names, places of birth and addresses, nor identification information are accessible. The entire collection is archived on a non-networked external hard drive. No personal data storage was made in order not to transgress the French National Commission on Informatics and Liberty’s rules and the European regulations on data protection.

2.4. The representativeness of the sample

Our sample’s population consists of 450 individuals who were signalized as “radicals” by the police, including 350 who tried to join ISIS and/or who tried to take part in the preparation of an attack on French land. They display diversified profiles (psychological, social, political, cultural, etc.), but also various offences and convictions: alternative to incarceration measures (mandatory psychological follow-up, educational monitoring, electronic tagging, judicial supervision restricting freedom of movement, etc.), placements in closed environments (educational facility for minors, prison), followed by our team while or after their sentence. Our exit of radicalization support could not be judiciary ordered, but our reports were asked by judges and prefects, in any cases. It is one of the widest studied sample in Europe outside prison and in direct relation, for a lengthy duration (two years).

However, his study has limits. Some are related to the sample itself. Indeed, it only includes individuals who were signalized by relatives to the freephone, held by the police. It only consists of superior percentage of women, youths and converted Muslims, to the known distribution of radicalized individuals in France. In our sample, families trusted more State’s authorities. Another analysis occurs: girls were less prosecuted than boys for doings of similar gravity. Representations and stereotypes related to gender for certain institutional stakeholders incited them to entrust female jihadists to psychologists and to educators rather than to the justice system. This leads to the consideration that official figures of women involved in violent extremism do not necessarily reflect reality, which diminishes the gap with our sample. Lastly, our population includes 23.5% of radicalized former offenders, previously followed by an educational service [16,17]. This percentage reflects jihadists’ national proportion.

Our studied population is not strictly representative regarding its socio-cultural categories but it is when it comes to their state of mind, since 350 of them tried to return to the Iraqi-Syria zone and/or to participle in the preparation of an attack on French territory, and the 100 other individuals were intensively related on the internet with jihadist small groups taking part in propaganda. Our sample includes individuals with various characteristics and features on living conditions, family, political, cultural, social context, physical relations with a terrorist group, motivations, grievances along with individual vulnerabilities [20,26,27]. This information detailed in our previous article [20] is seemingly representative of interactive factors that might lead to a process of radicalization tending towards violence. Researchers agree to state that a typical profile does not exist. It is why we believe that the understanding of the radicalization and exiting radicalization processes we conducted upon the two-year follow-up of individuals from our research population remains reliable and modulable to other cultures to help disengagement/deradicalization programs.

2.5. Individuals different on a social and cultural level, but all displaying “a weak existential value”

Our results show that the contemporary jihadist discourse reached very different individuals on a social and cultural level. Yet similarities overlap personal histories generating existential fragility [11]. Indeed, history personal data from before radicalization prove it: 75% of feeling of aband on, 48% of them were followed for depression before radicalization, 31% of untreated rapes/sexual abuses, 30.5% of endured physical violence [20]. The existence of an insecure family environment: 32.5% of parents suffered a serious or chronic disease, 42% of parents suffered a depression, 30.5% of parents endured physical violence, 16% of
them were sexually abused or raped, 32.5% of them were drug addicts/alcoholics and 15% of them served time in prison [20]. These data exemplify the theory of “existential fragility” which is common to criminals and to individuals who present a risk of radicalization and terrorism [1,2]. All of the young people we followed displayed an “existential deficiency”, especially individuals who “were going through a period where they experienced a feeling of loss of their bearings: loss of meaning to their life, their importance in society, to difficult death they endured, etc.” [11]. “Narcissistic and existential flaws” would be a part of a “preparatory ground” for radicalization [11,20].

Other variables, also from the young person’s history before radicalization, corroborate the existence of a weak existential value when they encounter the jihadist offer, such as the age and the migratory history of the family. The younger the individuals are, the more they look for a better world and future. It is not a mere coincidence if jihadist recruiters, who offer an ideal, a group of peers and a thrill, reach more easily the under 30 years old [55]. The family migratory history, which is not recent but mostly from the grandparents or great-grandparents’ time, appears significant (60% of ours ample) [20]. We studied these migratory histories in detail: certain trajectories did not involve a known linguistic or cultural change. There is no correlation between the cultural integration and migratory issues. We can assume that the grand founding narrative reaches more easily young people whose foreign identities and appearances are thrown in their faces and, are then victims of a social stigma [11]. Stigmatization would be a sort of a “preparatory ground” for radicalization [11,20].

2.6. An easy to use protocol, elaborated upon 450 radicalized individuals

As we previously mentioned, the NOORAPPLI 3D protocol was elaborated upon empirical data of 450 French jihadists counted by the freephone. These were analysed in two qualitative and quantitative reports for the European commission. It was based on the study of stages of exiting radicalization of the radicalized individuals followed during two years outside prison [16,17].

Items result both from a statistic analysis (conducted with the help of the child and youth paediatric psychiatry service of the Paris Pitié-Salpêtrière hospital) and from a conceptual understanding of the exiting radicalization process. Their creation is based on a pragmatic analysis of the samples’ youth who are exiting radicalization, crossed with information from scientific literature. Whereas the previously mentioned tools implement “a single approach using generic indicators common to all types of terrorism” [72] because their goal is first to spot legitimation of violence, NOORAPPLI 3D considers the jihadist’s specificity to enable not only disengagement from violence, but also a questioning on the religious ideology itself, which leads to the imposition of divine law to regenerate the world (deradicalization).

NOORAPPLI 3D features a structured approach of taking charge:

1. Which is complete, from the report to the exit of violent extremism;
2. Which is accessible to a wide category of professionals, trained to the tools’ use;
3. Which does not need specific skills in psychology or theology.

The questionnaire and the items of the NOORAPPLI 3D protocol concretely summarises the experience of the CPDSI’s team in the taking care of recent forms of jihadist-type radicalization.

The items are thereby laid out:

1. INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONNAIRE

Assessment of the individualized engagement motives and the promises of the jihadist discourse that were authoritative on the person: 90 yes/no questions, not concerned, unknown for men; 104 yes/no questions, not concerned, unknown for women.

CHAPTER 1 – EVALUATING THE EMOTIONAL DIMENSION

Items as 4 randomly offered questions:

Set of items to evaluate the “paranoid perspective” caused by conspiracy theories (7 items):
1. Relationship with non-radicalized parents
2. Relationship with radicalized parents
3. Relationship with a non-radicalized spouse
4. Relationship with a radicalized spouse
5. Relationship with her/his child
6. Relationship with former friends
7. Perception of the former non radicalized imam

Set of items to evaluate the “paranoid perspective” caused by the fear of hindering the divine Uniqueness (3 items):
1. Perception of pictures
2. Relation to music
3. Relation to leisure activities

CHAPTER 2 – EVALUATING THE RELATIONAL DIMENSION

Items as 4 randomly offered questions (7 items):
1. Relation to the jihadist group
2. Perception of her/his adhesion to the jihadist group
3. Part within the group
4. Interest/fascination for the media treatment of jihadists

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5. Commitment in the disengagement of others
6. Relation with non-terrorist prisoners
7. Relation with terrorist prisoners in a dedicated unit

CHAPTER 3 – EVALUATING THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION

Items as 4 randomly offered questions (11 items):
1. Interpretation of Tawhid/Shirk
2. Rhetoric of Tawhid/Shirk
3. Conception of the Hijra
4. Perception of the principle al Walaa wal Baraa
5. Rhetoric of the principle al Walaa wal Baraa
6. Conception of the Takfir
7. Rhetoric of the Takfir
8. Conception of the Jihad
9. Rhetoric on the Jihad
10. Perception of the Martyr
11. Relation to the jihadist ideology

CHAPTER 4

Items as 4 randomly offered questions (13 items):

Set of items assessing the inversion of the perpetrator/victim status (8 items):
1. Feeling of self-defence
2. Feeling of omnipotence
3. Feeling of paranoia / persecution
4. Feeling of empathy towards violence
5. Relation to violence
6. Perception of geopolitics
7. Conscientisation of her/his engagement motive
8. Realisation of her/his perpetrator/victim position

Set of items assessing the end of dehumanisation of “others” (5 items):
1. Perception of Christians
2. Perception of Jews
3. Perception of Atheists
4. Perception of other Muslims
5. Relation to Salafism

2.7. A protocol tested by two teams outside prison and by one team in the inside

NOORAPPLI 3D does not have the status of scientific tool. At this stage, it is only a first reflection that we present to experimentation and discussion. However, it was used respectively in 2018 and 2019 by two teams of youth workers outside prison from the Youth Protection and Juvenile Justice (Protection Judiciaire de la Jeunesse) and a multidisciplinary team (3 psychologists, 40 warders and 3 sports instructors) from a prison including an Area of Radicalization Assessment (ARA). During the experimentation inside a prison, the leadership requested that the different professional corps received an independent NOORAPPLI 3D software, so that the warders’ assessments will not influence the psychologists’, nor the sports instructors’, and vice versa. Only the main assessor had access to the whole multidisciplinary team’s answers, to detect dissimulation situations from certain prisoners (takija). The obtained answers enabled some items to be specified or summarised, or to be more clearly classified, to an improvement of assessors’ reliability and to the elaboration of guidelines when using the software.

Assessors considered this tool allowed them to take distance from their personal, ideological and affective assumptions and to be impartial on the follow-up of each radicalized person, to individualize their program. They could draw concrete conclusions and take enlightened decisions upon the items’ answers. They appreciated the ability of printing these answers in order to have a framework for their report with accurate elements. They also pointed out that NOORAPPLI 3D improved teamwork by accumulating complementary meetings of minds, especially between professionals who guard and those who interview prisoners, with from now on a common frame of reference.

3 A PROTOCOL TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF CONTEMPORARY JIHADIST ENGAGEMENT

The trajectory of radicalization begins with the significance quest [49] since it is built according to each’s motives and ideals. To help a radicalized individual to deconstruct his engagement, taking into account the wanted ideal seems to be necessary. Thus, professionals could choose the adapted type of alternative narrative or engagement, which will help him realize that there are non-violent means to reach his ideal. Besides, it is about helping professionals distinguishing the individual’s characteristics before his radicalization and those caused by a cognitive change, so that the needs the jihadist discourse happened to fill.

After recalling the eight main engagement motives our qualitative study targeted [19], confirmed by a quantitative study [26], as well as the eight risk mechanisms related to these trajectories, we will point out how we transformed these data into the NOORAPPLI 3D’s items.
3.1. The eight main targeted engagement motives

Unlike the period Al Qaida referred to, contemporary jihadist discourse related to ISIS spread out from the conquest of a territory the group wanted to populate. To reach a wider audience, it adapted its interventions and offers, especially by using the Internet [15, 48]. “Jihadists joined Al Qaida through the text, now they join ISIS through the image” [83]. Muslim men are not their only aim anymore: women and non-Muslims are also targeted, which ask for an adjustment of requests. In June 2015, national figures about radicalization stated 51% of young people from Muslim families, 49% of converts and 35% of French women committed in jihad [29]. Hence, we talk about a “mutation of the jihadist discourse” [15]. The observation of the 450 young individuals’ journey displays the existence of real individualization of engagement in Islamist extremism thanks to the radical discourse’s adaptation to each’s cognitive and emotional aspirations. Different motivations according to the different psychosocial profiles are offered. Indeed, for each engagement, there is an encounter between the unconscious young person’s needs (being useful, escaping the real world, averging himself…) his search for an ideal (regenerating a corrupt world, building a real justice, saving Muslims…) and the recruiter’s discourse offering him a coherent reason to do “jihad” (going to save children gassed by Bachar Al-Assad, building a society by imposing divine law, suppressing opponents to the world’s regeneration with divine law…).

After considering individual variables, we pointed out the diversity of trajectories of radicalization by crossing young people's micro and macro characteristics with recruiters’ promises. On the basis of our sample, we listed sept main components to the world’s regeneration with divine law…). The study of psychological trajectory allows to understand “why someone commits and withdraws, and factors explaining the course of these events” [45]. Thus, we consider dysfunctional schemas of reality interpretation leading to violence and the way they reached it. The radicalized individuals’ engagement motives function is then identified: an identity, restraint, antidepressant, protection, human bonding, sensational experience function, etc [84]. We come to the conclusion that risk assessment is not only built upon individuals’ personal characteristics; not only no “jihadist personality” exists, but also no micro or macro factor proves to be significant itself. Campelo and al. (2018), analysing engagement motives related to promises of taking part in the construction of a better world are prevailing: Isis-land with 36.5% and Lancelot with 23%, (table 1).

In our sample, genders and social classes taken together, engagement motives related to promises of taking part in the construction of a better world are prevailing: Isis-land with 36.5% and Lancelot with 23%, (table 1).

| Engagement motives | Total “Jihadists” in % | “Jihadists” boys in % | “Jihadists” girls in % |
|--------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| FORTRESS           | 3,5                    | 9,0                   | 0,0                    |
| JESUS              | 10,5                   | 23,0                  | 3,0                    |
| LICTE SAUCEN       | 15,5                   | 9,0                   | 16,8                   |
| LANCELOT           | 23,0                   | 55,2                  | 6,8                    |
| THE SAVIOR         | 11,5                   | 14,9                  | 9,9                    |
| ISL-LAND           | 36,5                   | 23,0                  | 42,0                   |
| MOTHER TERESA      | 18,5                   | 4,5                   | 25,8                   |
| THE SLEEPING BEAUTY| 21,0                   | 0                     | 31,6                   |

**TABLE 1** “Engagement motives with genders and social classes taken together from our sample” in %: sources: European research report H2020 PRACTICIES © 2019 Bouzar-Expertises

These motivational profiles were then confirmed by a quantitative approach, with the collaboration of Professor David Cohen’s team [21, 26]. With a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), several statistics factors appeared in each engagement motive [26]. This comparison highlighted dimensional correspondences of both qualitative and quantitative analyses. [21]. Various individual factors stemmed from trajectory of engagement of true positive persons and were therefore empirically justified.

We must point out that the engagement motive is not itself a dangerousness indicator, which can only be determined according to the stage of radicalization. All engagement motives can lead to dehumanisation and acting out. Even if a young person commits to do humanitarian aid, his cognitive change in the end of his process of radicalization may lead him to wanting “killing those who do not commit to do humanitarian aid” [16, 17]. Speaking about an engagement motive merely consists in searching what type of motivation the young individual first liked in the beginning of his engagement. This individualization of engagement requires a thorough research of accurate and specific indicators to help practitioners.

3.2. Eight risk mechanisms

The study of psychological trajectory allows to understand “why someone commits and withdraws, and factors explaining the course of these events” [45]. Thus, we consider dysfunctional schemas of reality interpretation leading to violence and the way they reached it. The radicalized individuals’ engagement motives function is then identified: an identity, restraint, antidepressant, protection, human bonding, sensational experience function, etc [84]. We come to the conclusion that risk assessment is not only built upon individuals’ personal characteristics; not only no “jihadist personality” exists, but also no micro or macro factor proves to be significant itself. Campelo and al. (2018), analysing
22 qualitative and quantitative studies to explain the radicalization phenomenon of young European individuals highlight the following risk factors: (1) individual factors including psychological vulnerabilities such as the first abandonment experiences, the perceived injustice and the personal uncertainty; (2) microenvironmental factors including family dysfunction and friendships with radicalized individuals; (3) societal factors including geopolitical events and social changes. Systemic factors must be added “because there is a specific encounter of recruiters and the individual, who use sectarian techniques to isolate and dehumanize the latter and propose him a new societal model”.

The conjunction of several different factors brought young individuals to commit. By studying the latter, we can analyse their radicalization process. The trajectory of the individual must be studied but not himself. In other words, the study should focus on the way “an individual gradually evolves towards radicalized beliefs in a flowing social environment in constant evolution” [30]. A risk factor is not caused by one or several personal characteristics, but the mechanism which supplies each radicalization motive. That is the reason why we propose the term “risk mechanisms”. It allows identifying each stage of cognitive change for each specific engagement motive. The measurement of risk must reflect on a succession of behaviours and beliefs potentially dysfunctional leading to acting out.

By deconstructing the processes stages, we managed to isolate the needs that the “jihadist” narrative filled. In other words, we identified the (pre)disposition of the young person that allowed the “jihadist” narrative to make sense, exercise its authority, provoke his change, and then his engagement. In each evolution stage of the young individual, the promise made by the “jihadist” narrative provokes a cognitive and behavioural change. “Considering a social-cognitive comprehension of radicalization implies to wonder on the impact of information treatment operated by the person on his own cognition” [40].

We roughly schematized below the modes of functioning of an engagement motive, by emphasizing its specific attractive force and the change of definition of oneself, others and the world this force provoked. We refer to our previous work on all risk mechanisms [21]. There follow one of the eight schemas of risk mechanisms corresponding with the eight engagement motives (schema 1):

![Schema 1. Example of different changes caused by the encounter with the Isis-land promise Source: Cabinet Bouzar Expertises - Cultes et Cultures for the report to PRACTI-CIES © 2018](image)

Naturally, we are aware that they are similarities with the mechanisms at stake between the radicalization process and the adolescence psychopathological manifestations: the attraction to an ideal place and the rejection do encounter when it is about adolescence’s and young adult’s separation and individualization [27]. We also do not ignore that various psychopathological disorders may associate and interfere with engagement motives and risk mechanisms we previously identified. As an example, some of our young persons have diverse psycho-sociopathic personality traits (extraversion, aggressiveness, early antisocial behaviour) facilitating their adhesion to a jihadist group, whereas others display schizoid personality traits (introversion, detachment, emotional poverty) or even a delusional disorder predisposing them to a lone-actor terrorist activity. Around 10% of 450 individuals’ research population suffering from patent mental disorders, which is representative of the national figure of individuals who are on file for jihadism [8].

### 3.3. Transcription of these data into NOORAPPLI’s items

NOORAPPLI 3D’s introductory chapter aims at helping to identify one’s engagement motive in order to: 1) Apprehend a radicalized person’s personal motivation that were manipulated by jihadist group to engage him; 2) Detect the individual vulnerabilities and needs that the jihadist discourse fixed; 3) Detect with what promises the jihadist group lured the individual; 4) Better adapt the exiting radicalization follow-up which must consider the significance quest of jihadist engagement; 5) Better contact with the radicalized person by establishing a more adapted alliance strategy; 6) Better target the alternative discourse and/or non-violent alternative engagements.

This first part on engagement motives includes 104 questions to which a practitioner may answer: “yes”, “no”, “not concerned”, “unknown”. For girls, there are 104 questions. For boys, there are only 90 because promises related to a search of protection (Sleeping Beauty) are specific to girls (items 91 to 104).

These items do not concern the radicalized person’s state on the day of the assessment but his state prior to his radicalization. To check the right case, the practitioner must have had investigated on the radicalized individual’s past, either by studying his educational and/or judiciary files, or with the help of his relatives (friends and family). Once the boxes are ticked, the software draws conclusions from these answers and assess the promises’ probability (7% for the boys and 8% for the girls) that could be authoritative. For instance, it will assume that promises related to Lancelot/search of justice (60%), to Mother Teresa/search of humanitarian (40%), to Licit Suicide (72%) and to Zeus/search of all-powerfulness (70%) must have been preferentially authoritative on the individual (schema 2).

In the schema 2, we notice that the jihadist discourse must have promised this masculine subject to fill his questioning about death, encouraged his search of omnipotence and gave a goal to his violence, by luring him with justice
and humanitarian goals (40% of Mother Teresa). This subject was not sensitive to promises of a better world or of restraint of his urges/addictions.

An example of results from the introductory questionnaire/male

![Image of a yes/no/answer not know chart]

**Diagram 2 – An example of results from the introductory questionnaire/male**

This questionnaire is a prerequisite to other items and helps a professional to take into account the individual’s motivational singularity. Hence, which types of vulnerabilities and needs (social, political or psychological) will be better integrated in the follow-up. Some questions may appear redundant. Others are common to several engagement motives. But they are required to a correct software calculation of the probability of the promises that were authoritative on the individual.

There follows the list of 104 interrogations allowing to detect engagement motives: the first 13 of them (1-13) concern the “Zeus” motive, the next 13 of them (14-26) are about the “Lancelot” motive, the next 11 (55-65) about the “Saviour” motive, the next 15 (66-80) about “Isis-land”, the next 10 (81-90) about the “Mother Teresa” motive and the last 14 are about the “Sleeping Beauty” motive, only for women (table 2).

| N° of item | Group of Items | Category |
|------------|----------------|----------|
| 1          | Did she/he feel guilty to have sexual urges? | Fortress |
| 2          | Did she/he watch a lot of pornography? | Fortress |
| 3          | Did she/he feel guilty to be attracted by people from the opposite gender? | Fortress |
| 4          | Did she/he have a non-assumed homosexual attraction? | Fortress |
| 5          | Did she/he feel overwhelmed by sexual thoughts? | Fortress |
| 6          | Did she/he endure sexual teasing or assaults (or attempts)? | Fortress |
| 7          | Was there any sexual assault (or attempts) in the close family? | Fortress |
| 8          | Was she/he deeply shocked by a real or virtual sexual scene? | Fortress |
| 9          | Did she/he feel an uneasiness being mixed with others because it terrified her/him? | Fortress |
| 10         | Was she/he terrified by the idea of Hell? | Fortress |
| 11         | Did she/he need to be shielded from the outside world? | Fortress |
| 12         | Did she/he see the world as a hostile environment? | Fortress |
| 13         | Did she/he have the impression of being inhabited by “evil”? | Fortress |

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Indicators of deradicalization

TABLE 2 “Questions to detect the engagement motive”, © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

4 A PROTOCOL HELPING PRACTITIONERS TO DETECT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EMOTIONAL, RELATIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS:
Once the professional identified the individual’s main engagement motives thanks to the introductory questionnaire’s computer process, items that assess if extreme attitudes and beliefs leading to violence evolved must be answered. Insofar as they are conceived to detect an acting out, items from ERG 22, TRAP 18 and VERA2 blend what is related to the jihadist discourse’s emotion (producing a paranoid and persecution feeling), relational (producing a fusion within the group feeling) and ideological dimension (creating the utopia of a better world and/or self). During the radicalization process, these three dimensions are indeed intertwined and mutually reinforced (schema 3).

The three dimensions of the radicalization process
ses two facets:

1. A behavioural facet describing the person’s visible behaviour;
2. A cognitive facet displaying what the person thinks/expresses about the adopted behaviour: how he explains it, what meaning he gives it, what is the assigned goal, what is the symbolic he sees, etc.

These two levels are offered so that the practitioner could have an indicator, even when the radicalized individual refuses to answer, to talk about some aspects, of declares the contrary of what he thinks (dissimulation). Thus, the daily observation of his behaviour will showcase his worldview, even if he refuses to talk about it.

Once these items are completed, the software will rate his answers by ranking them in 4 levels, from -2, -1, +1, +2. NOORAPPLI 3D’s quotation displays a score of the synthesis of the 3 dimensions’ state of the individual’s radicalization process and mostly measuring his disengagement/deradicalization’s evaluation between the beginning of his taking charge and when he can end it. This quotation measures the taking charge’s true effects on the individual. It can be repeated every three months.

In the following chapters, we will present items about the emotional dimension (chapter 4.1), items about the relational dimension (chapter 4.2), items about the ideological dimension (chapter 4.3) and items tracing the cognitive change caused by these three dimensions (chapter 5). To improve this article’s readability, items will be transcribed into tables, from the left to the right in four “–2 to +2” columns, separated by the “do not know” column.

4.1. Detecting the importance of the emotional dimension

Few researches detected an anxiety-provoking emotional approach, in so far as individuals must leave radicalization to be able to testify and to analyse what caused this cognitive change. NOORAPPLI 3D emotional dimension’s assessment items stem from the study of the stages of the radicalization process upon the follow-up of 450 jihadists from our sample [16,17]. Their testimonies illustrate that the jihadist’s discourse reception provokes a self-redefinition and a redefinition of others. Those redefinitions appear as the result of an anxiety-provoking emotional approach created by a jihadist discourse placing the individual in a worldview in which he must be protected from hostile elements that surround him. These words and videos produce anxiety for the one who receives them because they derive from conspiracy theories, based on a blend of true and false information related to social/political dysfunctions. Gradually, the individual will believe that only the ones who gave them to him can be trusted. Quickly, he will feel like the rest of society rejects him because he has « too much discernment » and perceives hidden truths. The work of Gérald Bronner illustrates that the essence of all social life relies on the trust between humans [23]. The anxiety-provoking emotional approach aims at the destruction of this trust basis in order to replace it by the idea that his neighbour must be distrusted because the latter could be “asleep” or an “accomplice” of negative occult forces who detain power. The anxiety-provoking emotional approach, which changes one’s definition and others’, also occurs through theology. Salafists indeed transformed the principle of divine Uniqueness (Tawhîd), the first pillar of Islam, into both a restrictive concept and a source of daily anxiety which prevents them in fine of having any feeling and relations that define human being. For instance, watching a picture would be similar to considering the artist as a creator at God’s level and would hinder Tawhîd. In the same logic, listening to music would be similar to considering the musician at God’s level. Taking part in citizenship and voting would be similar to supporting equality between God and elected people. This anxiety of “doing Shirk” (associating something at God’s level) becomes permanent: the paranoia stage reaches its height for an individual when the Salafist group explains him that, since temptation is everywhere, he could sin without even realizing it. “Uniqueness of God” and “associationism” become anxiety-provoking approach’s cornerstone that Salafist movements (pacifist and activist) implement so that the believer will be cut off from his relatives: friends, family, leisure activities, work, sports, educational institutions, traditional mosques, etc. By forbidding any culture, the radical discourse deadens individual sensations and prevents any experimentation of pleasure, the embodiment of all perceptions. The beginning of self-dehumanisation precedes others’ dehumanisation. Not only this approach decreases usual sources of positive emotions that relax and soothe human beings (cinema, music, shows, friendships, etc), but it also manages to transform them as anxiety-provoking activities (since now perceived as liable to betray God’s uniqueness). This disqualification of positive, introducing a denigration of pleasant usual activities, places the young individual in an auto-exclusion position in order to completely isolate him. He does not longer have positive interactions with his fellows and perceives them as sources of danger drifting him away from the Truth. This avoidance reinforces anxiety, considering that rupture with usual activities and meaningful people is itself anxiety-provoking. The avoidance of others will allow him to obtain approval and positive strengthening from his radical group, to spend more time with individuals sharing the same beliefs and to be more exposure to the said beliefs.

Various researches pointed out that exposure to a conspiracy speech creates an increase of a feeling of uncertainty: “uncertainty occurs when people do not understand what caused the situation in which they are, how factors related to the situation interact, and how events will develop” [87]. The same studies illustrated that this uncertainty is behind a search of compensatory measures to overcome it: “experimenting emotions reflecting an uncertainty related to the world activates a need of arranging it and structuring it through a large range of compensatory measures”
Deep down, "explicit uncertainty significantly increases anxiety and urges one to adopt a protection behaviour" [74]. This result is twofold interesting about transition towards violent acting out: on the one hand, it highlights how anxiety following conspiracy theories encourages action and, on the other hand, how low-threat perception furthers yet more action than an actual threat. While the radical discourse generates anxiety, it guides the young person towards choosing more and more dysfunctional solutions starting with social, school or professional and family ruptures [18,19] leading him to join a violent group. In other words, being buried in a "paranoid perspective" [42], the young person wants to protect himself by rejecting "this corrupt world" he tries to escape. Some go from a rejection of a corrupt world to the conviction that they must help to regenerate it.

The anxiety-provoking approach of the jihadist discourse is important because, according to the researches of Doosje et al. [36], personal uncertainty is one of the three main determining factors of a radical belief system, as well as perceived injustice and intergroup threat. This conclusion is based on Hogg's theory of uncertainty: the more individuals are uncertain in their environment, the more they are likely to identify themselves to groups, and the more the group's attributes form a unite in which individuals seem interchangeable, the more this group efficiently reduces uncertainty [43,44].

To help practitioners, it appears to be appropriate to measure the individual's level of paranoid perspective by confirming the level of rupture he caused.

4.1.1. Assessment of the paranoid perspective provoked notably by conspiracy theory

The anxiety provoked by paranoid perspective is measured by assessing rupture with former interlocutors who formerly contributed to his socialization (table 3 to 12). The items will appreciate the individual's relation with his non-radicalized (table 3) or radicalized parents (table 4), his relation with (if one) non-radicalized (table 5) or radicalized spouse (table 6), but also with his child, if he has one (table 7). Finally, a particular attention is granted to former non-radicalized friends (table 8) and to the former non-radicalized imam (table 9).

**EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Relationship with non-radicalized parents”**

**Table 3:** “Relationship with non-radicalized parents” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

| Item | Description |
|------|-------------|
| **Table 3: “Relationship with non-radicalized parents”**<br>© 2017 Bouzar-Expertises | **Table 4: “Relationship with radicalized parents”** © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises | **Table 5: “Relationship with a non-radicalized spouse”** © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises |
4.1.2. Assessment of the paranoid perspective provoked by the fear of hindering divine Uniqueness (tables 10 to 12)

Items will help professionals to assess the anxiety provoked by the fear of hindering divine Uniqueness by observing the relation with pictures, music and leisure activities.
4.2. Detecting the importance of the relational dimension or risk factors related to context (tables 13 to 19)

Pressman [72] points out the consensus between researchers about the fact that social relations are essential to the process of radicalization growth. Roberts and Horgan [75] named it “socialisation into terrorism”, reminding that the radical group enables the overcoming of engagement and intent. In other words, the individual feels ready to act when he encounters a social approbation, that must complete personal reward [3]. This is what we called in our researches the “relational dimension” of the radicalization process. It includes feelings of fusion and group elation that lead to a dichotomic thought based upon the construction of the enemy’s and dehumanisation’s global figure [18,19]. This aspect, common to jihadists who committed for Al Qaida and ISIS, is also found in other types of political extremisms. The “paranoid perspective” caused by an anxiety-provoking emotional dimension not only intensifies the individual’s isolation but also reinforces his connection within the radical group, because it becomes the only source of positive feeling. The fear of the outside emphasises similarities between the group’s members and increases their differences with the outside because they begin to feel the same emotions. The group’s identity replaces individual identity.

The biased treatment of information that affects the group unites its members by their common worldview and this collective vision brings them even more together within the group. Religious extremism facilitates this process: beyond the ideological justification it allows, Islam is presented as a narrative that not only gives a meaning to his life but also facilitates “groupism” [10], notably with the ancestral Muslim myth of *Oumma* – community of believers beyond boundaries-. As the Franco-American anthropologist Scott Atran says: “the religious aspect, of course, constitutes a cause that first unites these fellows, but what they are looking for is the bonding strength” [5]. This “relational” aspect, not to say fusional, is omnipresent in the jihadist offer and the demand of the young people from our sample who are at the age when they look for a group of peers outside family.

Michel Bénézech and Nicolas Estano [11] recall that “to Freud, the crowd enables a psychic regression of individual in the mass, decreases the repression of unconscious tendencies, make moral inhibitions disappear, instinct and affectivity being expressed intensively” [39]. Various researches prove the group’s influence in the acting out: Stanley Milgram’s experiments demonstrated the influence of situational factors, such as the presence of a person who as authority within or on the group, or the fear of losing a relation within the group [47,60]. Solomon Asch proved that individuals could change their judgement to confront to their group’s [4]. Browning’s studies [24] on Nazis also confirm the group’s importance: “Refusing to kill in Jozefow meant breaking a tacit agreement of solidarity between men from the same battalion- which was related to treason”. Another aspect appears: the prior acquaintance of group members before radicalization facilitates the fusion phenomenon and then the efficiency and rapidity of cognitive changes preceding an acting out [58,59]. These results can be correlated with the statistics on our young people, insofar as proximity variable (the fact of knowing physically a radicalized relative before radicalization) appears to be the only negative “of becoming” variable, which slows down the exit of radicalization [20]. VERA 2 takes into account this aspect with the “Personal contact with violent extremists” indicators; ERG 22 with the “Over-identification with a group” item.

A radicalized person’s relational dimension is not related to his methods of acting out. He could have taken action in isolation, while benefitting of a group elation online. In other situations, group elation or fusion feeling within the group do exist despite the fact that the individual left the group he wanted to join. It results from our experiences that he could have been suspected of spying during his virtual exchanges or, on the contrary, he could have thought that this group is not reliable [73]. But this momentarily absence of affiliation does not mean that the relational dimension is not substantial in his process.

NOORAPPLI 3D will hence assist practitioners, but not directly to identify “socialization into terrorism” [75], but to assess the level of the individual’s dependence to his (former) radical group, including if he committed or tried to commit a terrorist act in isolation. Items will assess the individuals’ relation to the jihadist group (table 13), but also his way of analysing this relation (table 14), his role within the group (table 15), his interest in jihadists’ media treatment (table 16), his will of testifying his experience without the radical group (table 17). If he is imprisoned, his relations with non-terrorist cellmates or within a terrorist dedicated unit will also inform professionals on his relationship with the jihadist group (tables 18 and 19).

### EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Relation to the jihadist group”

| Item | Description |
|------|-------------|
| **Table 13:** | "Relation to the jihadist group" © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises |

### EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Perception of her/his adhesion to the jihadist group”

| Item | Description |
|------|-------------|
| **Table 14:** | "Perception of her/his adhesion to the ji-hadist group" © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises |

*Journal of Current Medical Research and Opinion, Vol 02 Iss 10, 256–281 (2019)*
EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Part within the group”

TABLE 15: “Part within the group” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Interest/fascination for the media treatment of jihadists”

TABLE 16: “Interest/fascination for the media treatment of jihadists” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Commitment in the disengagement of others”

TABLE 17: “Commitment in the disengagement of others” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Relation with non-terrorist prisoners”

TABLE 18: “Relation with non-terrorist prisoners” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM Relation with terrorist prisoners in a dedicated unit”

TABLE 19: “Relation with terrorist prisoners in a dedicated unit” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

4.3. Assessment of the ideological dimension

Once the “paranoid perspective” feeling is settled (emotional dimension) and the individual is bonded with his new brothers/sisters (relational dimension), the jihadist discourse offers dysfunctional compensatory solutions that are based on imposition of divine law to regenerate the corrupt world (and man) through human law. This ideology causes a redefinition of certain Muslim notions. The rhetoric they use is part of all Muslims’ the common knowledge of, which interferes with diagnoses of experienced unexperienced interlocutors, leading them to adopt an approach oscillating between a lax and a discriminatory treatment. Only an interpretation of these Muslim notions will enable a good understanding of the followed ideology (traditional Muslims of different schools of thoughts, Muslim Brothers, Salafists, jihadists legitimizing violence…). The qur’anic text is undeniable concerning its literal expression, but some reading may differ. It is where jihadist chiefs are talented, by relying on scholars who mix ideas from the Muslim brothers movement (fight of divine law against human arbitrary) and notions coming from the scholars’ lineages about Ibn Hanbal (9th century), then about Ibn Taymiyya (13th century), resulting in Wahhabism (interdiction of using reason to interpret the qur’anic text), redefinition of Tawhid (Uniqueness of God) with a popularisation of the notions of Shirk (associationism), Hijra and the implementation of Takfir (possibility of excommunicating an unauthentic Muslim), the principle of al Walaa wal Baraa (non-Muslims loyalty and disavowal) and the obvious redefinition of the notions of Jihad and Martyrdom.

4.3.1. Assessment of the ideological dimension by studying his perception of Tawhid et du Shirk (tables 20 and 21)

Tawhid, the principle of divine uniqueness, is the basis of Islam and is incidentally a part of its five pillars. Indeed, it is enough to recite the Shahada for someone to become Muslim: “There is no God but God; Muhammad is the messenger of God”. The uniqueness is first a principle of peace for Muslims. Unlike the pre-Islamic era when tribes waged wars to impose others their own idol, the Islam’s gamble was to unite tribes from pre-Islamic Arabia about
submission to only one God, and largely to secure relations with Jews and Christians, named “People of the Book” in the Quran. It considers that it is the same unique God in all three monotheist religions, connected by the Abrahamic tradition. Associating another divinity to God is “associationism” for Muslims, and thus hinders the Uniqueness of God. It is commonly named “doing Shirk”, knowing that those two terms, “Tawhid” and “Shirk”, are rarely used in Muslims’ conversations. From their point of view, respecting the divine uniqueness simply consists in not worshipping other gods, which would be polytheism.

The two notions, Tawhid and Shirk, are permanently used by Salafists, then jihadists, but precisely in an opposite meaning. Salafists indeed transformed the principle of divine uniqueness into a so restrictive concept that it cuts them off any cultural production where human would have interacted: art, theatre, cinema, music, etc. But unlike Salafists, jihadists believe that they cannot only settle for protecting human temptations: they must fight polytheism by imposing divine law. In order to not get to Hell, they must be in a combat action.

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Interpretation of Tawhid/Shirk”

| Table 20: “Interpretation of Tawhid/Shirk” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises |
|---|
| **Rhetoric of Tawhid/Shirk** | **Tawhid must be practiced** |
| There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah | "Tawhid must be practiced" |
| It is necessary to correct one’s Tawhid | "Tawhid has to be practiced" |
| Tawhid is the basis of religion | "Tawhid must be practiced" |
| Without God, good deeds are vain | "Tawhid must be practiced" |
| Tawhid must be studied during one’s whole life | |
| “I must protect myself from falling to lose my religion to respect my Tawhid” | |
| "I do not know what religion I believe in," | |
| “There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.” | |

**TABLE 21: “Rhetoric of Tawhid/Shirk” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises**

4.3.2. Assessment of the ideological dimension by studying his perception of Hijra (table 22)

When the Prophet received the Revelation in the Mecca, he offered to replace the ‘t’ (to function based on blood ties) by a principle of equality between all believers. This moment named Hegira (in 622) is so fundamental that it was chosen by the second Caliph Omar as the starting point of the Muslim calendar. Hijra (emigration) represents for Muslims this historic moment. When he arrived in Medina, the Prophet summoned the inhabitants, Jewish and non-Muslim Arab tribes, and offered a pact, the “Constitution of Medina”, setting them on equal footing without a prevailing religion. When they signed it, they committed to respecting each other and defending Medina from foreign invasions. It is only after disagreements and conflicts with these tribes that the Muslim community created the Caliphate. The notion of Hijra symbolizes a fundamental historic moment. The creation of the Hijra is not related to a pact but to the Prophet’s decision of leaving a hard land to create a society based on equality. This date is also the anniversary of the birth and death of the Prophet Muhammad. Many Muslim immigrants arrived in occidental democracies, deeply convinced that there was no incompatibility between Islam and various democracies, believing that their values and purposes were common: more justice and equality. Nowadays, Salafist and/or jihadist Muslim forums reuses this term to make Muslims believe that they must rather emigrate to live on Muslim land because they are persecuted in the Occident, spreading doubts with elements directly related to the history of Islam, whereas the notion of Hijra is interpreted backwards its initial representation. Jihadists added a supplementary level: since no Muslim country really exists (because they all do Shirk by using human laws...), Muslims must take up arms to create a land only run by Sharia (divine law), where they could all do the Hijra (which will be a basis to spread)⁴.

⁴ Al Qaida means “the basis”.

**EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Interpretation of Tawhid/Shirk”**

Thanks to repented jihadists’ testimonies, we managed to isolate the rhetoric of individuals who are more or less radicalized, as table 21 displays it:
EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Conception of the Hijra”

### TABLE 22 “Conception of the Hijra” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

4.3.3. Assessment of the ideological dimension by studying the perception of the principle of al Walaa wal Baraa (non-Muslims loyalty and disavowal), (tables 23 and 24)

This notion, stemming from the meeting of the interpretation of Tawhid and Hijra by Salafists, is mainly translated by “loyalty and disavowal”. This concept forces the sincere believer to only be an ally of “Muslims” and to be disavowed of “non-Muslims”. This definition of Islam is only confided to persons sharing the same ideology, that is to say Salafists. In contrast, the definition of non-Muslims covers Muslims who are considered as heretics or wayward (Shiites, Sufis, Tablighi, etc.) Salafists raised this concept into a law, conditioning the respect of Tawhid. From their point of view, to respect Tawhid, it is indeed impossible to be mixed with people who do not share their ideology since it would make them be in contact with human productions (music, art, culture, citizenship, etc.). If the surrounding world is a systematic source of waywardness, it is first necessary to be cut off from it and then physically run away from it (doing Hijra). The outcome of al Walaa Wal Baraa is a mandatory Hijra, an illustration of this alliance, loyalty, with true Muslims who are considered as heretics or wayward (Shiites, Sufis, Tablighi, etc.) Salafists raised this concept into a law, conditioning the respect of Tawhid.

### TABLE 23: “Perception of the principle al Walaa wal Baraa” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

Thanks to repented jihadists’ testimonies, we managed to isolate the rhetoric of individuals who are more or less radicalized, as table 24 displays it:

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Rhetoric of the principle al Walaa wal Baraa”

### TABLE 24: “Rhetoric of the principle al Walaa wal Baraa” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

4.3.4 Assessment of the ideological dimension by studying the conception of Takfir (tables 25 and 26)

Ibn Taymiyya, professor at the Damascus mosque in the 13th century, explained that the decadence of the Muslim world results from the fact that Muslims ceded to be “pure Muslims” and created the notion of Takfir. Indeed, he ordered to fight Mongols because their conversion was judged unauthentic because they did not stop applying human law. He judged it circumstantial and unauthentic, whereas the grand Muslim principle is that “Only God knows” what it is in the heart of men. That is why there is no clergy and each believer refer directly to God.

Ibn Taymiyya was imprisoned most of his life for his ideas. He was accused of interpreting Qur’anic verses literally, sentenced for anthropomorphism (attributing God human behaviours) and considered as a heretic and a perseverant by orthodox authorities of the time. Mohammed Abdul Wahhab, agreements will be behind the split between Oussama Ben Laden and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Perception of the principle al Walaa wal Baraa”

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founder of the 18th century Wahhabism, rehabilitated him. Today, he constitutes one of the main theological sources of Salafists and jihadists.

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Conception of the Takfir”

Indicators of deradicalization

Today, he constitutes one of the main theological sources of Salafists and jihadists. Thanks to repented jihadists’ testimonies, we managed to isolate the rhetoric of individuals who are more or less radicalized, as table 26 displays it:

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Rhetoric of the Takfir”

4.3.5. Assessment of the ideological dimension by studying the perception of the notion of Jihad (tables 27 and 28)

In the traditional Muslim theology, jihad means “effort”. It is first about an internal struggle to do good and fight evil, temptations and feeling that are considered as harmful: jealousy, envy, pride, lack of solidarity... “Jihad of soul”, “internal jihad”, “greater jihad” are defined as the fact of one’s making efforts on oneself to be more generous. Then, there is the other jihad, named “lesser jihad”, related to the notion of self-defence, quite similar to the notion of the just war in Christian theology. In Muslim literature, in order to be authorised to defend oneself, the conditions are stated for centuries: there is a relation between the aggression of a Muslim space, the endangered population of this space and the government’s permission for defending oneself. Scholars always made a difference between the two types of jihad: defensive and offensive jihad. Obligation of defending oneself is obvious. In the second situation, when Muslims are behind the fight, authorities must control if the conditions of self-defence are fulfilled. Traditionally, jihad is never individual. Such as other monotheist religions, only God decides a man’s death.

On the contrary, jihadists believe that all situations in which they fight fall under defensive jihad (Algeria, Chechnya, Philippines, Bosnia, Syria, Iraq, Mali, etc.). The fact that these countries governments may institute some human laws is interpreted as an aggression, justifying the taking up of arms, wars. To them, until the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, Islamic law was applied, and we must go back to this golden age. Jihadists claim that the absence of the Islamic law’s application is a valid condition to be in self-defence on their own land. No need to ask the authorisation to any authority since it accepts human law. Hence, jihad becomes individual.

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Conception of the Jihad”

TABLE 27: “Conception of the Jihad” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

Thanks to repented jihadists’ testimonies, we managed to isolate the rhetoric of individuals who are more or less radicalized, as table 28 displays it:

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Rhetoric on the Jihad”

| Example Table 27: “Conception of the Jihad” |
|--------------------------------------------|

| Table 27: “Rhetoric of the Jihad” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises |

| Table 28: “Rhetoric on the Jihad” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises |

| Table 29: “Indicators of deradicalization” |

| Table 30: “Journal of Current Medical Research and Opinion, Vol 02 Iss 10, 256–284 (2019)” |
4.3.6. Assessment of the ideological dimension by studying the perception of the notion of Martyr (table 29)

The psychanalyst Fethi Benslama (2016) clearly explained the notion of martyr: “in the qur’anic text, the Chahîd (martyr) is a fallen Muslim on battlefields, which gives him an exorbitant status, mentioned in several surahs (...). But in the Islamic discourse, it is clear the two terms of fighter (mujâhid) and martyr (chahîd) do not overlap. A fighter is not necessarily a martyr, and a martyr is not necessarily a fighter. A mujâhid is certainly ready to sacrifice, may become chahîd if he is killed, but becoming a martyr is not intentionally targeted, he wants to fight and to survive. Besides, the verb “ch.h.d” can only be conjugated under passive voice (...). No voluntary actions correspond to chahîd. That is why the use of the term chahîd can only be applied to someone who dies accidentally, out of action, notably when he is young and mainly when it is a child” [12].

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Perception of the Martyr”

| Does a lot of things to be documented on what (just a formality) a young man who is not a mujâhid has done but that are not necessarily anything else? |
| Considered as a martyr when the person dies in combat and considered as a martyr only when he is killed or injured or in case of a sudden death (accident, suicide, etc.) |
| Does the person make a clear distinction between the martyr and the mujâhid? |
| Does the person know that the concept of martyr is a concept that can only be applied to someone who dies accidentally, out of action, notably when he is young and mainly when it is a child? |

TABLE 29: “Perception of the Martyr” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

4.3.7. Assessment of the relation to jihadist ideology (table 30)

It seems important, at this stage, to accompany professionals verifying whether the followed-up individual grieved the ideology underpinning the use of violence (deradicalization), if he only grieved the use of violence while still adhering to the ideology (disengagement), or whether he only has doubts on the reliability of his own group (which could sometimes be a first step towards disengagement).

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Relation to the jihadist ideology”

TABLE 30: “Relation to the jihadist ideology” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

5 ASSESSMENT OF THE COGNITIVE CHANGE CAUSED BY THE EMOTIONAL, RELATIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS (SCHEMA 4):

The emotional, relational and ideological approaches provoke a change of worldview (cognitive change), that NOORAPPLI 3D will try to measure, so that professionals will adapt their follow-up, in the end of the final chapter.

Schema about the cognitive change

THE - JIHADIST - NARRATIVE:
- Reorganizes the social and mental universe
- Supplies an imaginary
- Induces a new interpretation of events
- Proposes dysfunctional compensatory solutions

It leads to:
- A new definition of the self and others
- A new behaviour
- A new rhetoric

THIS COGNITO-AFFECTIVE CHANGE MUST BE MEASURED

Schema 4: The cognitive change: Sources European research report: H2020 PRACTICIES

The study of the cognitive changes does not obstruct a psychological work helping the radicalized individual to realize which vulnerabilities facilitated his adhesion to dysfunctional compensatory solutions offered by the jihadist discourse. The stages of the cognitive change are even more important to analyse as disengagement is feasible at each level: the earlier it is, the more it will be efficient and fast. Besides studies on his personality and history, understanding the individual’s worldview will allow professionals to help him moderate, complexify or restructure his beliefs and mental constructions that led him to violent engagements. ERG 22, TRAP 18 and VERA 2 quote some of these changes (dehumanisation of the enemy, lack of empathy outside his own group, etc.). But practitioners need to not only verify the existence of these changes in their entirety, but also assess their evolution.

Cognitive change is related to a dichotomic worldview enabling a categorisation of his environment and a simple definition of the situation of the “good” and the “bad” people. Bénézech and Estano recall that the “idée fixe” is common to fanatic and paranoid personalities. As a paranoidic, the terrorist thought system is characterised by a rigidity of mental schemas, cognitive distortions and automatic thoughts [11]. Binarity reassures the individual because it allows him to overcome his massive anxiety of the outside world intensified by the radical discourse itself [38]. It also
enables a hierarchisation of his relation to the other by self-attributing and attributing to the other a place without the possibility that compromise, and ambiguity might exist. Aaron Beck names the collective counterpart of egoism “groupism”, an illustration of a conversion of the ordinary egoism into “groupegoism”. The person inside the group transfers his own self-centred perspectives to a reference structure centred on the group. He interprets events according to his group’s interest and beliefs. “Groupism” furthers an elevation of his fellows’ image (and therefore his own) and a depreciation of outside persons. Confrontations with other groups intensify a positive penchant towards his own group and negative prejudices towards an opposing group [10]. Hence, a terrorist acting out coming from this cognitive change is justified in all their videos and speeches as “self-defence”. Testimonies of the 450 radicalized individuals illustrate that they never qualify their actions as “terrorist” but as “resistance”, “justice operation”, “defensive manoeuvre”, “self-defence”, “a necessary use of force for this strategy”, etc. [77].

They attribute an automatic malevolent attitude to every outside person. The extremistneeds hate from the outside to nurture his own hate. ‘The more he perceives the outside group’s opposition, the more he raises his own group. His brothers become more respectable, notable and moral whereas others become more and more despicable, ignoble, ignoble and immoral” [10]. The perpetrator/victim status is then reversed: members of the jihadist group deem themselves as victims of a global plot against Islam such as members of a neo-Nazi group deem themselves as victims of a “Great Replacement”. Conversely, victims of violent extremists’ acts of violence are apprehended by the latter as responsible for the radical group’s persecution. Thus, the radicalized person believes that “persecutors, victims are criminals and glorifies aggressors as saviours” [10]. This “moral disengagement” system was studied by Bandura, especially when he examined thug gangs’ beliefs system, relying on the offenders’ ability to think their acts of destruction were justified and their victims as criminals [7].

Then comes a dehumanisation of the other, a psychological process whereby “an individual perceives and treats his fellows as extrinsic or inferior to humankind” [46]. Hence, values that normally related to human beings, such as empathy and compassion, cannot be applied [47]. This is the consequence of a “simplistic division between the community to which the individual adheres to, to which he unconditionally pledges to, and another human group, disqualified and despised, perceived as a real or symbolic threat” [46]. This dehumanisation enables to not perceive “the Other” as a fellow and facilitates the transgression of the interdiction of killing. It starts with rhetoric and semantic methods that will delegitimize future targets of violence by presenting them as infra-humans: “pigs”, “vermin”, “miscreants” who do not deserve the consideration allocated to persons [7].

We sense how fundamental it will be to reintroduce an integrative complexity thinking [52,78,79,80], then to work with the radicalized individual on what we call his “perpetrator-victim” position [67]. Helping him to select what falls under his part of responsibility and his part of “victimhood” in his process of radicalization will be essential so that he could be positioned as an actor, rectify his self and others’ redefinition, and thus find another type of engagement, compatible to the social contract.

Two sets of items will be crossfed by the software to assess a presence or an absence of a dichotomous thought: first, NOORAPPLI 3D will help practitioners to verify if the individual is still inversing the perpetrator/victim status; then by assessing the end of the others’ dehumanization process.

5.1. Assessment of the inversion of the “perpetrator/victim” status (tables 31 to 38)

Will be successively assessed the individual’s feeling of self-defence (table 31), of omnipotence (table 32), his level of “paranoid perspective” (table 33), feeling of empathy towards violence (table 34), his relation to violence (table 35), his perception of geopolitics (table 36), his conscientisation of his engagement motive (table 37), his realisation of his perpetrator/victim position (table 38).

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Feeling of self-defence”

| Table 31: “Feeling of self-defence” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises |
| --- |

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Feeling of omnipotence”

| Table 32: “Feeling of omnipotence” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises |
TABLE 33: “Feeling of paranoia / persecution” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

TABLE 34: “Feeling of empathy towards violence” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

TABLE 35: “Relation to violence” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

TABLE 36: “Perception of geopolitics” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

TABLE 37: “Conscientisation of her/his engagement motive” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

TABLE 38: “Realisation of her/his perpetrator/victim position” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

5.2. Assessment of the end of the dehumanisation process (tables 39 to 43)

In order to do so, NOORAPPLI 3D will again help professionals to verify the individual’s perception of Christians (table 39), Jews (table 40), atheists (table 41), but also Muslims (table 42) and Salafism (table 43).

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Perception of Jews”

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Perception of Christians”

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Perception of Jews”

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Perception of Christians”

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Perception of Jews”

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Perception of Christians”

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Perception of Jews”

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Perception of Christians”
Indicators of deradicalization

Example for the item “Perception of Atheists”

| Item                                                                 | Score |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| Considers them as equals, have common values even if they do not believe in the same God | -2    |
| Receives them as worthless people, with no principle…               | -2    |

Table 41: “Perception of Atheists” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

Example for the item “Perception of other Muslims”

| Item                                                                 | Score |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| Does not consider them as equals, have common values even if they do not believe in the same God | -2    |
| Receives them as worthless people, with no principle…               | -2    |

Table 42: “Perception of other Muslims” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

Table 43: “Relation to Salafism” © 2017 Bouzar-Expertises

6 CASE STUDY:

Once these items are completed, the software processes the answers and provides a pie chart picturing the subject’s state. Hence NOORAPPLI 3D helps to indicate which aspects that were not developed sufficiently, to adapt the disengagement/deradicalization program, to rectify it according to the first results at the halfway point and to take the best decisions to avoid recidivism.

There follow the example of a young male of 16 years and a half, we named X, who was sentenced to 12 months in prison for participating to a terrorist initiative when he returned to France after spending three months in the Iraq-Syria zone. During his trial, he explained that he presented himself to the French Embassy of Istanbul to be repatriated and tried. He declared he was disappointed: “jihadist chiefs waged war against each other instead of uniting to free Syrians from Bachar al Assad”. X said he was trained a bit but did not fight. Now aged of 17 years and a half, he will soon be out of prison, and his investigative judge ordered he spent 6 additional months in a CEF, a closed educational facility (Centre éducatif fermé in French) after prison, to be followed by a multidisciplinary team before his legal age.

Educators from his CEF contacted the team that followed him during his detention to have a first presentation of the young person. They then met his parents. On that occasion, they learned he had a barely adult girlfriend, who gave birth at 17 when X was committed in ISIS. Their relation endured despite the fact she was not radicalized: she regularly visited him in detention. At the moment, the child began its first year of public day-care. Armed with these elements, the CEF educators talked several times with him, evoking various subjects. Then, with the will of preparing their deradicalization/disengagement program within the CEF while X is still imprisoned, they filled NOORAPPLI 3D’s introductory questionnaire. The software’s results displayed that X was probably attracted to promises of “avenging the weakest against the strongest with a group of peers” (Lancelot) and of a “fairer and more fraternal world” (ISIS-land).

Educators then completed as a teamwork the main items of the 3 dimensions and the cognitive change. The software executed its calculation according to the number of answers corresponding to +2, +1, -1 or -2. These are the four categories of answers:

a) Quotation resulting in a majority of -2 (in green): these answers mean that the intensity of the person’s radicalization process decreased, nay disappeared. No follow-up is needed on working his radicalization process, but a support may be needed for his social reinsertion.

b) Quotation resulting in a majority of -1 (in blue): these answers mean that the person is no longer in a radicalization process, but some dysfunctions must be handled. The follow-up still has to be implemented until he is stabilized.

c) Quotation resulting in a majority of +1 (in orange): these answers mean that the person remained in the jihadist ideology and displays a deeply-rooted radicalization process. The follow-up still has to be implemented until he is stabilized.

d) Quotation resulting in a majority of +2 (in red): these answers mean that the individual’s radicalization process is reinforced, as well as his double dehumanisation (of himself and future victims). It raises a question about his dangerousness level for himself and society. The follow-up needs to be implemented or adapted and reinforced.

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If the software finds too various results that spread on one item’s columns, going from -2 to +2, it shows the professional that the quoted individual used a dissimulation strategy (takya) at some point.

In the aforementioned example, the software displays a “pie chart” picturing X’s actual state of mind (schema 5):

**EXAMPLE OF A FINAL SCORE CALCULATED BY NOORAPPLI 3D SOFTWARE**

![Pie chart](image)

**Schema 5: Final score calculated by NOORAPPLI 3D software as a pie chart**

This pie chart first displays that their preliminary investigation is completed, thanks to the gathered elements from their colleagues of youth detention centres, X’s parents, his girlfriend, mother of his child and from X himself (1.43% of unknown answers). Then, professionals realise that X is dehumanised at a rate of 28%. It is hard to know whether he already was dehumanised at this point on the beginning of his incarceration or whether it contributed to it. This percentage is probably due to the fact X was in a jihadi training camp, even if it lasted for only a few weeks before he escaped. X is admittedly still highly radicalized (45% added to the 28%) but the existence of “remaining dysfunctions” (15%) shows that the taking charge when he was in a minor facility or that his deceptions about jihad provoked some doubts for X and an acceptance of reintroducing some complexity. Items for which X does not quote at +2 must be detected. Hence, educators from the CEF will adapt their disengagement/deradicalization program to his current state. With this in mind, they will print his detailed report in which they could have written their reflections as they completed each item.

The reading of NOORAPPLI 3D first chapter’s report, “emotional dimension” assess the level of rupture with his relatives and cultural activities caused by the anxiety-provoking approach of the jihadist speech (conspiracy theories and fear of hindering Tawhid). It indicates professionals on which relatives they could still rely on in X’s entourage to implement a reassuring emotional approach, to make him trust again humans. In X’s case, they notice that rupture is not completely operated with his non-radicalized parents and mostly his mother, and his non-radicalized partner. In the parents’ item, there is a difference between what X declares (he must be protected from it to not drift away from the right path) and what he does (in the end, he never questions his family rituals he assimilates as Shirk, but never really broke up with his parents). Besides, he is moved when the educator mentions his mother, which illustrates that the disaffiliation the jihadist discourse looked for did not entirely occur. The bond is also maintained with his partner, the mother of his child, despite that he tries to indocrinate her. X has indeed accepted she puts the child in a public day-care, even if he would have liked to forbid all toys and pictures. The educators’ observations point out that they felt like they could implement a strategy around the parenthood status, which will also enable to work on his filiation. They may discuss it with the psychologist to develop this aspect.

The reading of NOORAPPLI 3D’s second chapter, “relational dimension”, assesses the level of dependency and fusion with the former radical group. Reminded that X committed for promises of avenging the weakest against the strongest within a group of peers (Lancelot), the CEF team is aware that the relational aspect is truly important in his problematic (many +1 or +2 quotations).

The CEF team plans to deepen this relational dimension. Their first task consists in verifying if X manages to dissociate his group ideology from the “brothers” that compose it. Thus, professionals will better define the “front door” of their interventions.

1. If X distinguishes the two, they could at least tackle the ideological question;

2. If X does not, the professionals will not be able to mention either his former group, or his ideology, in the taking charge’s beginnings. Indeed, if professionals directly pounder on what the individual’s engagement basis is, it will lead him to develop defence behaviours and not to provoke a doubt. If the CEF team ends up in this scenario, they will only plan to go through the emotional dimension’s door, by relying on relatives (mother, partner and child) to re-establish relations and to make him trust human again. Members of the team will only work on the relation to the group overs a second phase, when X will have benefited from a sufficient “reassuring” emotional approach.

However, if he managed to separate the ideology and the group, the second work step for professionals will consist in verifying whether X manages to perceive members of the group as different individuals or as an indissoluble entity.

1. In the first case, he can be linked to some “brothers” because he went through events with them;

2. In the second situation, he can be seduced by an idealized and mystified image of the group. If X was only linked to some individuals, professionals may introduce new elements on the terrorist group actions, so that he realises that there is a difference between the chiefs’ promises and the reality of their field actions. Hence, it will X understand that, whichever the accuracy and the nobility of the searched ideal, its implementation was not truthful to the expected objective. If the CEF team ends up in the second situation (where X is seduced by a sort of an idealized and mystified image of the group), professionals will work on his psychological vulnerabilities that underpin this need and will try to enrol him in another substitution group.

Alongside those two work steps, given that the items’ results from the second chapter (relational dimension), the
The CEF team knows that X must feel gap towards his jihadist group. Two aspect must be considered: X’s feelings towards his group and the group’s feelings towards X who left by himself the Iraq-Syrian zone. How do questions of fidelity, treason and loyalty play out? Professionals will plan to observe how X will handle his nostalgia of the radical group by reproducing some behaviours that used characterized his belonging to the group (haircut, jihadist propaganda singings, rhetoric...).

When the CEF team members gather each element from the third chapter assessing the “ideological dimension” of a radicalization process, they realise that it is the area where X is the most advanced (the most +2s). At first, no questioning on the religious interpretations the jihadist group transmitted occurred when he was in prison. However, educators notice that the +2 results are mainly about his rhetoric. They consider X’s age and assume that his words outran his thoughts, in order to be differentiated from other prisoners. The professionals know that adolescents are often provocative. They will be attentive to his new positioning when he will be placed in a small group of young people in the CEF.

The CEF team will first verify X’s actual level of religious knowledge and will not settle upon the scholar posture he adopts. It is about understanding whether his rhetoric relies on an honest knowledge or on a simple repetition. If X is an individual who enriched in a learning, it will show that he intellectualised his commitment. In terms of professional posture, a counter-discourse from a skilled person (an enlightened imam good at explaining things, Islam thinker, islamologist, etc.) could be efficient provided that X is up to his knowledge and his need of being stimulated. If X appears to be an individual who is rather receptive, it will show that he firstly searches for others’ look. In terms of professional posture, the counter-discourse must not be proposed by an expert interlocutor, because it will risk humilating him and thus antagonising him. The CEF team then considers discussing with him (or to bring an exterior participant), sociologically and anthropologically of the religious fact, the goal would be to transmit him some knowledge elements without him realising it. It is also possible to organise calligraphy classes with a fine arts teacher who will convey philosophical messages and historical elements through his drawings. In any case, professionals know that it would be important enrolling him in Arab classes (Arab World Institute) to make him realise the dangers of ideologically-oriented translations. All these educational approaches will enable X to apprehend the interaction of a human factor in the understanding of a religious text, even if it is considered as sacred. He would understand, by studying Islam’s different interpretations according to movements and centuries, that humans perceive their text upon who they are and what they are going through. This consideration of human factor would help him realise that what jihadists call “divine law” is essentially the result of an eminently political human interpretation. It would help X to grieve the utopia of regenerating the world with divine law, as it was handed down by his terrorist group. This is what could be called “deradicalization”.

With the fourth chapter’s results, the team can now see that X is particularly sensitive to social and identity injustice. It is corroborated by the answers from the introductory questionnaire displaying he was touched by the promise of avenging the weakest from the strongest. Professionals decide to work on the recognition of the existence of discrimination and stigmatisation, while offering a more complex frame of reference than the conspiracy theories one. This will both create an alliance with X and will help find what he has been through and how he was personally involved. The team will then identify a part of his flaws that must have been used by the jihadist group. The aim is to lead X to realise he has flaws, so that progressively, he would correlate the latter with his needs, and then his needs and his engagement. Answers display that he already started to become aware that his engagement into the radical group filled a need for him. This work will reintroduce a human factor in what he considers is strictly divine. This first phase of educative work will lead him to work on his part of “victimhood” in his radicalization process.

Secondly, the team is startled by some items’ results. First, they are surprised by the difference between the item -1 “feeling of persecution” at a behavioural level (he initiated processes with his educators from detention to take part in a community project) and the +2 of the same item at a cognitive level (he declares no one should be trusted). This large difference seems to illustrate that X adopted a dissimulation behaviour, wanting to reassure his educative team.

The team is also startled of the results of the items measuring the feeling of persecution, paranoia and self-defence. Indeed, insofar as X chose to return to France after three months, professionals would have thought that he would have kept a certain trust in French State authorities despite his radicalization. If his feeling of persecution preceded his escape from ISIS, X would have probably stayed there instead of surrendering to authorities. Professionals thus assume that his feeling of persecution was intensified and confirmed by his incarceration, he lived as deeply unfair. They decide to work on this part of responsibility based on these elements. Even if he did not take up arms, X must understand that he adhered to a group who committed acts of violence and slaughters and also to an ideology that validated this project. Professionals will use the importance of X’s relation dimension, his relation to the group, in order to make him feel guilty: since the group was important to him, he must be punished for what the group did. Assuming the acts the group committed may help him leave the group and become a whole individual. X must appropriate again his story by not only assuming his part of victimhood but also his part of responsibility.

The CEF team decides to verify the dehumanization function that appears in the results of the concerned items. In other words, does his dehumanization stage correspond to a will of being protected to be able to watch ISIS’s propaganda videos, such as a psychological defence, or does it correspond to the deep interiorization of an ideology of hierarchization between humans that ISIS promotes?
The team also wants to confirm whether X is globally dehumanized or whether he is still able to experience feelings for other human beings? For instance, does he still experience feelings for children? Only for children for the radical group? For children he personally knows? For children from his family? For his own child? The CEF team also considers reminding him his initial engagement motive was to avenge the weakest against the strongest, which reflects a certain humanitarian feeling. Professionals deem fundamental to confront him on his cognitive change, so that he becomes aware of his dehumanization.

7 LIMITS AND DISCUSSION:
We carried out this work by crossing our experiences of practitioners and researchers, in interaction with the relatives of the followed-up radicalized individuals. To our knowledge, this is a first reflection to lead to a proposition of a tool aiming at measuring the reliability of disengagement and deradicalization and that was elaborated based on a follow-up in direct contact with 450 jihadists from various origins. NOORAPPLI 3D resumes the results from the scientific research on contemporary jihadism and notably those obtained by Elaine Pressman [71] who is incentive to integrate these data in a protocol based on a structured professional judgement in order to assess more systematically the deradicalization process. This is what we did by integrating transversally these factors to our items. Although other scientific tools are built to measure risk and NOORAPPLI 3D, a simple proposition of a work protocol, for the time being, is conceived to help a professional adapting his disengagement/deradicalization program to the followed-up individual and to measure his progression, certain themes may be common. When it is, NOORAPPLI 3D’s are written in order for the professional to gather concrete information on each point, either by discussion or by an observation of the radicalized person’s behaviour. In other words, NOORAPPLI 3D guides professionals in what they should verify to answer to the item. At the same time, he leads them in what should be improved to obtain a better result. It demands several exchanges and experimentations with the subject.

Our tool does not replace humans’ common sense but helps them to organise by relying on objective elements. We believe that jihadist disengagement’s assessment must be supported by a systematic, transparent, structured protocol taking into account the ideology, and must be specified by criterions rather than a clinical judgement approach without help and not transparent [13,35,41,61,62,64,66,70,85,86]. NOORAPPLI 3D remains a qualitative tool, requiring a certain level of professional judgement, thus training. Its use needs a reflection on professional positioning, considering jihadists’ loss of confidence in human. To assess his level of disengagement, the professional must not ask direct questions, as a classic interview, because the radicalized person can easily be dissimulating (takya). The professionals must first take into account the information on the individual’s history prior to radicalization (old educative/judiciary reports or investigation to his relative) in order to answer the introductory questionnaire on engagement motives. They also must have correct knowledges on the different dimensions of the radicalization process as well as interactive psychological, sociological, political, geopolitical factors contributing to it in order to target observations and details they need and to know how to get them. So that NOORAPPLI 3D’s score is reliable (schema 5), we consider that professionals must complete 85% of the items. Failing this, they cannot have a complete image of the radicalized person’s evolution. However, they can rely on the detailed report to guide their taking charge in order to remind on which points the subject must be treated. It is advised to assess him in the beginning of the treatment, then three months after, and then each trimester, to adapt the follow-up according to the concrete obtained results. The risk of overestimating or underestimating the person’s situation during the assessment is limited since items are detailed in four levels and that it should be carried out several times, more to measure a positive or negative evolution to establish a static image of the person.

NOORAPPLI 3D does not include items that directly concern what the other tools and scientific research name “intention factors”, distinguishing individuals who remain in an ideological engagement from those who act out. These “intention factors” are indeed integrated in several items of this assessment tool. In each item, they are proportionally deployed. For instance, in the item “Perception of Martyr” (table 29), the distinction of the targeted aim occurs in all columns, from the first (on the left) where the individual consider he will die as a martyr by saving any human (even animal) anywhere and anytime, to the fourth column (on the right) where he believes he will automatically become a martyr by killing “a miscreant” (a non-Muslim or a non-Jihadist Muslim) anywhere and anytime. Contextual factors, such as political opinions, ideologies and reactions to geopolitical factors are also transversally integrated in several items. As example, in the item “feeling of self-defence” (table 31), it goes from the first column (on the left), where he believes that if Muslims are in danger, it is mainly because of the jihadists’ attacks which could lead to a war against Muslims, through the second column where he considers Muslims as victims of a conflict within their countries and not as a proof of global will of exterminating Muslims, ending in the fourth column (on the right) where he thinks that the coalition’s bombings proves that there is a global will of a genocide towards Muslims.

NOORAPPLI 3D does not include general items on individuals’ vulnerabilities, since it was proven that these vulnerabilities were diversified, stemming from a sometimes-different historicity (personal, family and/or socio-political field) according to the person. Furthermore, these vulnerabilities are integrated in other measuring tools as “causes of radicalization” when they sometimes appear to be consequences of the anxiety-provoking approach of the jihadist discourse. We consider for instance the feeling of persecution shared by all jihadists, whether they were or were not
victims of discriminations before their radicalization. This feeling is not discriminating itself to assess the process of radicalization exit. What is determining is the professionals’ ability to propose a complexified frame of reference to this feeling of persecution so that the subject leaves the legitimation of violence [20]. The introductory questionnaire (104 preliminary questions allow to hypothesise on individuals’ engagement motives and promises the jihadist discourse showed them to answer it) enables professionals to adapt their disengagement/deradicalization program to the individual’s vulnerabilities. Hence, risk and desistance factors are individually integrated to items.

In our feedback, we notice that we took in charge more easily and compensated psychological vulnerabilities than the psychological ones. Hence, our “disengaged” and “deradicalized” group consists of more individuals who were followed before their radicalization for depression and/or lost brutally a loved one before their radicalization, than our “failures” group [20].

NOORAPPLI 3D does not include item about religious rituals practiced by Muslims, because our feedback displayed it was sensitive to distinguish certain rituals’ subtleties. For instance, a jihadist can do the “traveller’s prayer” in prison because he thinks he is “only passing through this miscreant land”. But counting the number of inclinations during his prayer (shortened when it is the traveller’s prayer) is too complicated and not feasible for professionals. Most of rituals being not symptomatic of a radicalization process (such as the fast during the Ramadan months or the 5 prayers per day…) and leading easily to stigmatization and discrimination towards non-radicalized practicing Muslims, it would be counterproductive, and was not retained in our criterions. Obviously, it does not mean that radicalized persons do not practice these rituals but that the only practice of rituals falls under freedom of religion guaranteed by the Republic and European texts, and thus should not be measured in any case. Likewise, there are no items about relations between men and woman because they would not have been decisive to distinguish radicalization exit. Certain jihadists may indeed have a conception of women similar to the traditionalist Muslims’, pietist Salafists’ or even to modernist Muslims’.

NOORAPPLI 3D considers the impossibility for professionals to answer some questions. For instance, no specific item exists about the adhesion to conspiracy theories, but it is a system of answers to items in their entirety that could measure these points, especially in the fourth chapter about cognitive change (as example: feeling of self-defence, omnipotence, paranoia/persecution, empathy towards violence, relation to violence, perception of geopolitics, realisation of his perpetrator/victim position…).

We experimented NOORAPPLI 3D on the 450 jihadists from our sample with a risk of a retrospective bias. It was about verifying that this trial tool gave the same results we previously found in our reports, which is before this tool was conceived and used. Our results confirmed the engagement motives and allowed to notice that boys were mostly sensitive to promises of a better-self whereas girls were mostly sensitive to promises of a better world (see table 1).

NOORAPPLI 3D’s results also corroborated our young individuals’ evolution after a two-year follow-up (table 44). For the most part of jihadists, all social classes taken together, it should be noted that:

1. Only 57% of our young individuals managed to grieve the utopia of divine law to regenerate societies (deradicalization) and obtained a majority of -2;
2. 24% only grieved their violent group (disengagement) and obtained a majority of -1;
3. 11.5% carried on obtaining a majority of +1 and +2, according to their degree of dangerousness;
4. 7.5% quickly left for the Iraq-Syrian zone, before their taking charge could produce results.

EXAMPLE FOR THE ITEM “Conception of the Hijra

| Condition of the Young Person after Two Years of Follow-Up | “Jihadist” All Social Classes | “Jihadist” Middle Class | “Jihadist” Lower Class |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Deradicalized (Have Mourned the Utopia of Divine Law to Regenerate a Society) | 57                            | 62                     | 51                     |
| Disengaged (Break Up with Their Group and/or Violence)     | 24                            | 21                     | 25                     |
| Subtotal % of Deaths from Violent Radicalization          | 81                            | 83                     | 76                     |
| Still Radicalized in Their Ideology (Hijra)               | 11.5                          | 11                     | 14                     |
| Left for the Combat Zone at the Moment When Their Parents Considered Us Counted as Failures Even Though There Was No Intent of Support | 7.5                            | 6                      | 10                     |
| Subtotal % of Failures                                  | 20                            | 17                     | 24                     |
| Still Muslim Today                                       | 91                            | 90                     | 92                     |

TABLE 44: “State of radicalized individuals from ours ample after a two-year follow up” © Practicies 2018

8 CONCLUSION:

Since the radicalization process has become individualised with contemporary jihadism, disengagement must also be individualised. Items that stand out from this work will have to be experimented. Researches may verify if it can help professionals of other countries, because they were built on the basis of French jihadists’ radicalization exit, largely recruited by French extremist leaders, in French. Nothing proves yet that individualisation, even the French recruitment personification, would be as advanced in other European countries and would correspond to the same promises. The questions from the introductory chapter must thus be verified. Hence, pilot studies must continue experimenting this practical guide and verify its capacity of being universally used in any country. Consultations will then be
organised to obtain a review about the revisions to carry out in order for it to be transferred in each of the aforesaid countries.

At last, it should be noted that numerous similarities exist with other extremisms leading to violence: religious and/or political, especially in anxiety-provoking dimensions and relational approaches. We notice that videos about antisemitic conspiracy theories are identical in jihadist and neo-Nazi extremism. In terms of the relational dimension, the two movements use humanitarian aid to bond their group members. Regarding the cognitive change, the same dichotomic thought is encountered, which precedes an inversion of the perpetrator/victim status and the “others”’ dehumanisation (who are not the non-Muslims anymore but the non-Whites). It is on the ideological level that the chapter 3’s items need to be adapted, by staging the various declinations of the ideology of hierarchisation of “races” and civilisations. Hence, this tool could easily be adapted to the exit of other violent extremisms, in a context in which they fuel and reinforce against one another.

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