Quantitative Metrics for Evaluating Explanations of Video DeepFake Detectors

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Abstract

The proliferation of DeepFake technology is a rising challenge in today’s society, owing to more powerful and accessible generation methods. To counter this, the research community has developed detectors of ever-increasing accuracy. However, the ability to explain the decisions of such models to users is lacking behind and is considered an accessory in large-scale benchmarks, despite being a crucial requirement for the correct deployment of automated tools for content moderation. We attribute the issue to the reliance on qualitative comparisons and the lack of established metrics. We describe a simple set of metrics to evaluate the visual quality and informativeness of explanations of video DeepFake classifiers from a human-centric perspective. With these metrics, we compare common approaches to improve explanation quality and discuss their effect on both classification and explanation performance on the recent DFDC and DFD datasets.

1 Introduction

“DeepFake” refers to the realistic alteration or generation of multimedia content, in visual, audio, or textual form. The most striking application of DeepFakes are generative deep learning models that can alter a person’s appearance in videos. From early attempts [75, 76], the quality of these face-swapping techniques has increased consistently to the point that both casual and attentive observers can be fooled. While some applications can be positively innovating [85], DeepFakes can be designed with malicious intent, such as online disinformation or public defamation. In response, the research community has introduced datasets [21, 57, 63, 65] and methods [12, 15, 36] for the automatic monitoring and detection of DeepFakes. However, benchmark performance has become the de-facto goal, shadowing other aspects that are crucial for the correct deployment of such models.

In practice, as automated DeepFake detectors acquire a significant role for moderation and censorship of online communities, it becomes necessary to inspect and explain their
Figure 1: **Explanation heatmap** for one sample from DeepFake Dataset obtained by applying SmoothGrad to a classifier regularized with Total Variation. The resulting heatmap is visually smooth (TV = 0.25), localized (σ = 731), and concentrates around visible manipulation artefacts (M_{in} = 18.1%), i.e. the eyes and one corner of the mouth.

decision process. From the users’ perspective, it is not acceptable that “black-box” models manage their freedom of expression and online safety. Instead, users require intuitive explanations to validate DeepFake forgeries, prevent unjustified censorship, and trust automated moderation systems. From the perspective of companies and regulators, interpretability is necessary to justify the enforcement of DeepFake detectors, in accordance to the right to explanation of legal frameworks such as the GDPR \[23\]. Also, developers of such tools can benefit from explanations to verify the learned representation, mitigate unwanted bias, and defend against adversarial attacks.

Several methods for explaining visual classifiers exist, e.g. \[69, 71\], which can be compared in terms of faithfulness to the model and correctness to the data. However, researchers lack quantitative tools to evaluate human-centric properties of explanations and claims of improved informativeness are often based on subjective comparisons. This work introduces a quantitative framework to evaluate DeepFake explanations \(w.r.t\) to human perception, which can be applied in practical deployments of DeepFake classifiers. In particular, we contextualize existing metrics, i.e. manipulation detection, and propose new ones as needed, namely for smoothness, sparsity, and locality. We apply these metrics to state-of-the-art video recognition models and compare several techniques intended for improving explanations, forming a quantitative baseline on the DeepFake Detection Challenge dataset and the DeepFake Dataset \[21, 65\]. Last, we empirically evaluate how to best communicate heatmap-based explanations to users, discuss limitations and future directions for DeepFake explainability.

## 2 Related work

**DeepFake generation.** Since their inception, generative models have been applied to manipulate faces, bodies and voices in online media. Today’s availability of online content and ease of access to open-source frameworks, allow anyone with consumer-grade hardware to generate DeepFakes. While legitimate applications of this technology exist, e.g. dubbing, DeepFakes have been infamously used for disinformation, fraud, hatred, sexual abuse, and other crimes \[17, 82\]. This work focuses on visual forgery of faces in videos, which can be categorized as face swapping, in which the appearance of a face is replaced with another \[19, 40, 41, 58\]; or facial reenactment, in which expressions are edited \[76, 77\]. Such manipulations can be produced via purely learning-based generative models \[19, 59, 77\] or hybrid computer graphics approaches \[40, 76\]. For survey of methods and applications, we refer the reader to the works of Tolosana et al. \[78\] and Masood et al. \[47\].
DeepFake detection. In response to the widespread misuse of DeepFakes, researchers and companies have started focusing on automated detection of forged media. Forensic approaches vary from detecting anatomical inconsistencies [3, 42, 43], to analyzing digital artefacts [2, 48, 89]. Other approaches are purely learning-based [5, 30] and can integrate advanced architectures and optimization techniques [11, 15, 36, 55, 56]. Key to this effort is the release of large-scale datasets of images [18, 27, 34, 54], audio [94], and videos [21, 44, 57, 63, 65, 95], which allow to train deep models for forgery detection.

Explainable AI. Although powerful, deep learning models are often deemed “black-boxes” to illustrate the opacity of their decision process. The field of study of Explainable AI (XAI) tries to address these shortcomings to allow users, researchers, and regulators to gain insights into such models (model interpretability) and their outputs (decision explainability) [28, 50]. In the visual domain, in particular for classification, it is common to explain the decision of a model using heatmaps which highlight important areas of the input [22, 61]. Backpropagation-based approaches generate heatmaps by computing gradients [33, 69, 71, 72, 74, 88, 93] or gradient surrogates [53, 68, 73]. Alternative approaches construct proxy models that are locally faithful and easier to interpret, e.g. LIME [64]. Recently, transformer models [7, 22, 83] have popularized using attention maps as explanations [1, 14, 87], although these might not be representative [32].

DeepFake explainability. As social platforms integrate automated tools for DeepFake detection and moderation in their pipelines [80], it becomes crucial to offer proper justification when some content is blocked. Prototype-based explanations as in Trinh et al. [80], could teach users to identify manipulation artefacts on their own. Similarly, SHAP-based methods can be adapted to to videos by defining 3D super-pixels [46, 62]. Focusing on input features, Wang et al. [84] suggest pre-processing steps that result in more human-interpretable heatmaps, according to a qualitative evaluation. Finally, human-annotated explanations, e.g. Mathew et al. [49], provide direct insight on manipulation techniques.

3 Method

3.1 Explanations methods

Our goal is to establish quantitative metrics to evaluate explanations of visual DeepFake classifiers. In particular, we focus on heatmap-based methods [8, 71, 91] that associate each pixel to a scalar proportionally to its importance w.r.t. the classifier decision. Formally, we define a video $v \in \mathcal{V}$ as a mapping from a discrete grid $\mathcal{G} = T \times H \times W$ to the RGB color space. A DeepFake classifier is then a function $f : \mathcal{V} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ that maps a video to the probability distribution $p(\text{FAKE}|v)$. An explanation method is a function $\Phi : \mathcal{V} \times F \rightarrow \mathcal{H}$ that maps a pair $(v, f)$ to a relevance heatmap $h : \mathcal{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$, where $\mathcal{F}$ and $\mathcal{H} = \{h \mid \int h d\lambda = 1\}$ denote the set of classifiers and heatmaps respectively. With this notation, popular gradient-based explanation methods are expressed as: Sensitivity $\nabla f(v)$ [8]; Gradient×Input $\nabla f(v) \cdot v$ [11]; SmoothGrad $\mathbb{E}_{\epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \delta I)}[\nabla f(v + \epsilon v)]$, where $v \epsilon$ adds random color perturbations [21]; and Integrated Gradients $(v - v_b) \cdot \int_0^1 \nabla f(v_b + \alpha(v - v_b)) d\alpha$, where the baseline $v_b$ is a uniform black video [22]. Note that $\nabla$ and $\int$ are discretized operators over $\mathcal{G}$ (see Appendix D).

Explanation methods are commonly compared according to their faithfulness, i.e. the ability to correctly explain a decision [1, 6, 11, 22, 32, 33]. Faithfulness is quantified by the dele-
deletion score \( E_v \left[ \int f(v \odot (1 - h_\alpha)) d\alpha \right] \), where \( h_\alpha \) is a binary mask obtained by selecting the most important pixels from the explanation \( \Phi(f, v) \) such that their cumulative relevance is \( \alpha \in [0, 1] \). A low deletion score indicates a faithful explanation method: if relevant pixels are masked out first, the prediction confidence should drop sharply. For our baseline model, SmoothGrad achieves the lowest deletion score (paired one-sided t-test \( p < 10^{-5} \)) and is therefore selected for all evaluations of visual quality. We report per-method hyperparameters and per-dataset scores in Appendix D.4. Clearly, faithfulness is a necessary property of explanation methods, however, their heatmaps can still appear noisy and uninformative for humans, hence the need for quantitative metrics of visual quality.

3.2 Evaluation metrics

As discussed in Section 2, several works address the representativeness or visual appearance of heatmaps. However, the improvement is often demonstrated through qualitative examples, while quantitative comparison is lacking. Understandably, defining general-purpose metrics for quantifying explanation properties is not trivial [6], as the perceived quality depends on the data itself, on the target user, and the downstream task. Focussing on explanations of video DeepFake classifiers, we discuss a set of desirable human-centric properties [10, 38, 51] and formulate quantitative metrics for their evaluation.

3.2.1 Visual quality

The first set of metrics considers general properties of explanation heatmaps that facilitate their understanding and communicability. Complex models can take decisions based on features that are not easily accessible to users, e.g. texture details or high-frequency patterns [26, 84]. Instead, we expect models that focus on human-interpretable cues [38] such as small manipulation artefacts, teeth misalignment, non-circular pupils, or irregular skin complexion, to produce smoother, sparser and more localized heatmaps.

**Smoothness.** Explanations that vary excessively between neighboring pixels or frames are not meaningful to humans [84]. The smoothness of a heatmap \( h : \mathcal{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+ \) is measured as its Total Variation (TV), where low values indicate higher local consistency:

\[
TV(h) = \int_{\mathcal{G}} \| \nabla h \|_1 d\lambda. \tag{1}
\]

**Spatial locality.** Unambiguous explanations should concentrate on few spatially-close patches of a video, i.e. their relevance should be localized. If we consider \( h \) as the distribution of a random vector \( \rho \in \mathcal{G} \), we can measure locality through the volume of its variance matrix:

\[
\sigma = | \det(\Sigma) | = | \det \left( \mathbb{E}_h [\rho \rho^T] - \mathbb{E}_h [\rho] \mathbb{E}_h [\rho^T] \right) |. \tag{2}
\]

A low \( \sigma \) will favor sharp unimodal distributions, e.g. a Gaussian with low dispersion, as opposed to scattered multimodal heatmaps. In the context of DeepFakes, this means highlighting single manipulation artefacts instead of allocating mass to distinct parts of the face. For other tasks, spatial locality can be extended to account for domain-specific requirements.
Sparsity. While TV and $\sigma$ capture spatial properties, the individual values shall also be sparse, since few highly important regions are more indicative of a good explanation than several mildly relevant ones. Both $L_0$ norm and Entropy $[70]$ are popular measures of sparsity, but the Gini Index $[29]$ is preferred according to Hurley and Rickard $[31]$. For a heatmap $h : \mathcal{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ and sorting indices $i = \{1, \ldots, THW\}$ such that $h(\rho_i) \leq h(\rho_{i+1})$:

$$G = \frac{2}{THW} \sum_i i \cdot h(\rho_i) - \frac{THW + 1}{THW}.$$  

(3)

3.2.2 Manipulation detection

Smooth, sparse and localized heatmaps appear visually appealing, but do they convey the location of manipulation cues? Offering specific evidence greatly increases trust in the model, helps diagnosing failure cases, and encourages users to develop a critical eye for spotting DeepFakes. In the XAI literature, manipulation detection is commonly evaluated through user studies $[69, 84]$, which suffers from reproducibility issues, or under a weakly-supervised paradigm $[9, 13, 39, 69]$, which risk introducing bias from the additional annotations.

We argue that DeepFakes offer a unique possibility for the objective evaluation of weakly-supervised manipulation detection. Given a real video $v_R$, its fake(s) $v_F$, and a face parsing model $s : \mathcal{G} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}$ that maps pixels of $v_R$ to $\mathcal{P} = \{\text{eyes, nose, mouth}\}$, an ad-hoc evaluation sample can be produced such that the manipulation is limited to a specific semantic region:

$$v_p(\rho) = \begin{cases} v_F(\rho) & \text{if } s(\rho) = p \\ v_R(\rho) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \forall p \in \mathcal{P}$$  

(4)

Assuming a well-trained detector and a faithful explanation method, heatmaps for $v_p$ should closely match the manipulated region. Since an objective ground-truth is available by construction, it’s possible to assess manipulation detection using common segmentation metrics. First, $M_{in}$ measures the percentage of heatmap mass inside the ground-truth mask, i.e. $\int_\mathcal{G} m_p(\rho) h(\rho) d\lambda$, to ensure that little or no relevance is assigned to non-manipulated regions. Second, precision at 100 ($P_{100}$), i.e. the fraction of the 100 most relevant pixels that falls inside the ground-truth, accounts for manipulation artefacts significantly smaller than the selected region. Additional manipulation detection metrics are reported in Appendix D.5.

As a point of discussion, both humans and computers may "look at" other parts of a video to assess whether one portion is manipulated, e.g. noting the mismatch between a smiling mouth and two frowning eyes. However, when asking "why is the video fake?", we expect to be pointed at the visible manipulation and not at other natural-looking features. Therefore, in this context, manipulation masks are considered as the ground-truth explanation.

4 Experiments

The previous section establishes a set of desirable qualities of explanations and proposes evaluation metrics built on sound mathematical foundations. We now consider several techniques from previous works and quantify their effect on explanations using these metrics. Section 4.1 analyses the effects of: i) data preparation $[84]$; ii) loss-based regularization $[66]$; iii) augmentation-based regularization $[20]$; and iv) model architecture $[26, 81]$. Both and classification performance (Tab. 1) and explanation quality (Fig. 2) are reported for each experiment. Furthermore, Section 4.2 discusses post-processing techniques for heatmap visualization, which are important for communicating explanations to users in practice.
Training dataset. All models are trained on videos from the DeepFake Detection Challenge [21] in “high-quality” compression (constant rate quantization 23). Specifically, we train on 19k real and 100k fake videos, and use the official validation split of 2k real and 2k fakes for hyper-parameter tuning. Each video is preprocessed using the MTCNN face detector [92], the main face is heuristically determined among all detections, then cropped and resized to 224×224 pixels. Part segmentation is obtained with the BiSeNet face parser [90] and aggregated into background, face, nose, mouth, eyes, ears. Additional details on data preparation and dataset statistics are provided in Appendix A.

Explanation datasets. For a cross-dataset evaluation of explanation quality metrics we employ a held-out subset of DFDC, which has a distribution similar to training videos, and a subset of the DeepFake Detection Dataset (DFD)[57], which is more challenging due to the potential distribution shift. Visual quality metrics (Sec. 3.2.1) are computed on the explanations of fake videos, while manipulation detection (Sec. 3.2.2) is evaluated on three part-swaps per video, namely eyes, mouth and nose. Notably, manipulation detection can only be evaluated on a subset of temporally and spatially aligned videos due to the part-swapping procedure. Additional details are provided in Appendix A. While the proposed metrics can be flexibly applied to any dataset of real-fake video pairs, we release the code for preprocessing, training and evaluation on DFDC and DFD to encourage comparison and facilitate reproducibility: github.com/baldassarreFe/deepfake-detection.

Classifier. Our baseline model is a 3D CNN trained with no pre-processing, no regularization and no data augmentation except random color augmentations. Specifically, the backbone feature extractor is an S3D model [86] pre-trained on Kinetics 400 [35]. The output of each convolutional block is pooled, concatenated, and fed to a 2-layer MLP classification head. Such shortcut connections proved beneficial over a sequential model in early experiments, likely due to the multi-scale nature of manipulation artefacts. During training, the AdamW optimizer [45] minimizes a cross-entropy loss \( \mathcal{L}_{CE} \) based on binary video labels until a validation loss stops improving. Additional details about hyperparameters and training can be found in Appendix C. For each model variant described below, Table 1 reports the average cross-entropy loss and AUROC over 3 runs on the official test split. While all models achieve satisfactory results on both datasets, performance drops when generalizing from DFDC to DFD. For this reason, we consider explanation metrics evaluated on DFDC more indicative of explanation quality in the following experiments.

Table 1: Classification metrics: \( \mathcal{L}_{CE} \) is categorical cross-entropy (↓), \( A_{ROC} \) is the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (↑). Average values over 3 runs, full results in Tables 3 and 4. Reported values account for class imbalance as detailed in Table 2.

|               | DFDC test |           | DFD |           |
|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----|-----------|
|               | \( \mathcal{L}_{CE} \) | \( A_{ROC} \) | \( \mathcal{L}_{CE} \) | \( A_{ROC} \) |
| S3D Baseline  | .447      | 89.0      | .694 | 80.2      |
| S3D Bilateral | .696      | 54.2      | .746 | 45.8      |
| S3D Gaussian  | .542      | 81.8      | .760 | 66.4      |
| S3D TV Loss   | .460      | 87.4      | .698 | 75.8      |
| S3D Cutout    | .481      | 87.2      | .655 | 79.6      |
| MViT          | .430      | 96.4      | .513 | 90.0      |
4.1 Quantitative results

Data preparation. As opposed to train-time augmentation, this term indicates transformations that are applied identically to all samples, e.g., face detection and cropping described above. For image DeepFakes, Wang et al. observe that generated images have a weaker high-frequency content than real ones and the explanations of models that rely on this clue are dominated by uninterpretable high-frequency noise. They suggest pre-processing all samples with a bilateral filter to encourage focusing on other more interpretable features. In the same spirit, we investigate whether removing high-frequency video components improves smoothness and locality of the explanations in a quantifiable way.

Two variants are considered: a per-frame bilateral filter or a spatio-temporal Gaussian filter; both configured so that common artefacts remain visible. Only training videos are filtered, leaving validation, test and explanation splits unaltered. As reported in (Tab. 1), filtered videos result in lower classification performance, which corresponds to the observation in, and models trained with bilateral filtering fail to converge, thus we exclude them from explanation evaluation. Disappointingly, blurring does not improve explanation metrics in a consistent way (Fig. 2), except for a slightly higher Gini Index that indicates sparser heatmaps. It is surely possible that stronger filters could produce more marked effects, but at the cost of lower classification performance (Tab. 1). Otherwise, this outcome could be attributed to different generation techniques or compression formats between images and videos. Nevertheless, we recommend against this type of smoothing preprocessing for video DeepFakes until proven more effective.

Regularization loss. Regularization refers to training-time techniques that smooth or constrain the loss landscape so that the optimization process yields more desirable solutions that generalize better and/or yield better explanations. A common technique is to add a per-layer Total Variation (TV) term to the loss function during training. Considering the activation tensor $A^\ell \in \mathbb{R}^{T \times H \times W}$ of an intermediate layer $\ell$, its anisotropic total variation is:

$$L_{TV}^\ell = \frac{1}{THW} \sum_d \Omega_{1D}(A^\ell_d),$$

Figure 2: **Quantitative explanation metrics**: visual quality (top) and manipulation detection (bottom) for the evaluation subsets of DeepFake Detection Challenge (DFDC) and DeepFake Detection Dataset (DFD). Higher values indicate better explanation quality, except for TV and locality $\sigma$. Mean and standard deviation of 3 runs, full results in the appendix.
where the summation considers all 1D slices of $\mathbf{A}$ orthogonal to its axes and $\Omega_{1D}$ indicates the 1D total variation. Averaging over all convolutional blocks in our architecture, the optimization objective results $L = L_{\text{task}} + \alpha\mathbb{E}_{L}\left[L_{TV}\right]$, where $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}^+$ is a hyperparameter. The additional term places a smoothness constrain on the activations of intermediate layers, which we hope will result in localized peaks in the heatmap corresponding to visible artefacts in the video, though TV does not control the location of such peaks.

The first effect of TV regularization is noticeable during the initial phases of training. For unconstrained models, we observe that $\mathbb{E}_{L}\left[L_{TV}\right]$ tends to increase during the initial phase of training and stabilizes at around 0.5 after one epoch. On the other hand, when $\alpha = 1$, the optimization process is dominated by $L_{TV}$ for the first epochs and classification loss starts decreasing only after this term drops below 0.1. From the results in Table 1, a strong TV regularization affects classification performance negatively. However, we also observe a significant improvement over the baseline for locality, sparsity, and manipulation in Figure 2. In fact, the average $\sigma$ for DFDC decreases from 814 to 726, indicating more spatially-focused explanations. Also, the Gini Index increases from 75% to 77%, meaning that fewer pixels are responsible for the bulk of the heatmaps. With respect to manipulation detection, the heatmaps produced by TV-regularized models match more closely the ground-truth, resulting in higher $P_{100}$ for both DFDC and DFD.

Video cutout. Cutout data augmentation which can greatly improve classification performance by masking input patches at random during training [20]. We adapt Cutout to video data by replacing masking with heavy spatio-temporal blur: since motion blur occurs naturally, the augmented samples are maintained closer to the data manifold. We expect Facial Cutout to guide the network towards more meaningful representations, where the relationship between semantic parts of the face are better understood, hence improving part-based manipulation detection. On the other hand, removing parts of the input might yield more spread out heatmaps, as the network learns to capture information from more diverse locations. In our experiments, we observe slightly better generalization to DFD for regularized models (Table 1), which confirms the regularization properties of Facial Cutout. However, the effects on explanations are limited, resulting in slightly higher Total Variation and manipulation detection scores (Figure 2).

Architecture. The architecture of a model represent a strong inductive biases on what features can be easily learned [26, 81]. As an alternative to the baseline S3D model, we consider another state-of-the-art architecture for video classification, namely a multi-scale vision transformer (MViT) [24]. The former, based on 3D convolutions, begins with forming local representations which are aggregated into more complex features in later layers. The latter, based on attention, allows all layers to attend to the input as a whole and encourages representation learning through progressive token aggregation. We expect the different inductive biases and information flow to affect the explanation heatmaps generated by these architectures. In particular, we fine-tune the MViT-B $16 \times 4$ variant with the default hyperparameters: random color augmentation, temporal subsampling, cosine learning rate annealing, and weight initialization from Kinetics 400. For ease of comparison, MViT explanations are obtained with SmoothGrad while attention-specific methods are left to future work.

For the classification task, MViT achieves the best performance on the two datasets (Tab. 1), which we attribute to the longer training cycle. The explanation heatmaps obtained with this architecture are also significantly smoother (TV) and sparser (Gini Index) than CNN-based
models, while spatial locality remains similar (\(\sigma\)). Furthermore, the bottom row of Fig. 2 indicates that MViT heatmaps are stronger detectors of manipulated areas, focusing most of the heatmap inside the ground-truth mask (\(M_{\text{in}}\)). We attribute these promising results to: i) a more robust classifier which can better distinguish fake videos and is thus likely to have learned a good representation of manipulation artefacts; and ii) the underlying inductive bias of attention and its effect on gradient propagation used for heatmap generation.

### 4.2 Communicating explanations

As discussed, gradient-based explanations often appear too noisy for users to easily parse. We propose four simple techniques to post-process heatmaps into increasingly more structured visualizations: i) enhanced heatmaps, clip extreme values and smooth to eliminate high-frequency noise; ii) gaussian matching, draw an ellipse corresponding to the mean and variance of each frame; iii) blob detection, run a DoG blob detector [16, 60] and highlight each blob according to its relevance; and iv) semantic aggregation, aggregate the heatmap into semantic regions and highlight each part based on its relevance.

A small-scale user study (34 participants) is carried out to quantify user satisfaction with respect to each of these visualization techniques. Each user is presented a set of 10 videos as in Fig. 3a and is asked to rate the four visualizations, which appear in random order. A score of 0 means that the visualization is not helpful to detect the DeepFake, while 5 means it easily allowed for its detection. To minimize appreciation bias, ratings are centered per-user before aggregation by subtracting the average score. From the results in Fig. 3b we observe a clear relationship between user satisfaction and more structured visualizations. However, when the classifier performs poorly and heatmaps are uninformative, users will be dissatisfied regardless of post-processing. However, we also note that when the classifier performs poorly, users will be generally dissatisfied.

### 5 Conclusion

The Explainable AI has developed a plethora of explanation methods of varying degrees of faithfulness. However, to the best of our knowledge, quantitative metrics to compare the quality of such explanations are lacking. This work attempts to lay out an objective evaluation framework for DeepFake explanations, which we hope will drive the development of detectors that are better aligned with human cognition. The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a family of such metrics, novel or adapted from existing works, to measure visual quality and manipulation detection.
In our experiments we consider several techniques for training DeepFake detectors and study their impact on explainability metrics in a quantitative way, whereas previous work was limited to qualitative comparisons. We observe that TV regularization has the largest impact across most metrics. On the other hand, controlling high-frequency components of the input is of little utility, at least when realistic video compression settings are considered. Finally, we observe that recent architectures such as MViT significantly outperform any of the S3D variations in both detection and explanation quality. We recommend further study of transformer-based DeepFake classifiers and how to employ attention as an explanation.

Ethical statement. As DeepFake technology becomes increasingly accessible, so is the potential for malicious use. It is therefore urgent to present society with the necessary tools to address this problem and facilitate the safe and ethical use of these creations. We believe this line of work can bring positive societal impact by facilitating good governance and wider adoption of DeepFake detectors across all media. Furthermore, more explainable DeepFake detectors can be used to educate the public to better distinguish between real and generated content. From their perspective, users must feel confident about the technologies that routinely affects their interactions, which may otherwise fall victim to mistrust.

Limitations and future work. This project leads to many natural avenues for future research in Explainable AI. First, although the proposed metrics are drawn from existing literature and are based on sound mathematical foundations, an extensive study of the correlation between these metrics and human preference would increase their reliability. Second, it is surely possible to conceive more refined metrics for DeepFake detection to address the shortcomings discussed in Section 3.2. For instance, we have already mentioned that locality ($\sigma$) favors unimodal over multimodal heatmaps, whereas more faceted metrics of localization are desirable. Third, as made evident from the experiments on DeepFake Dataset, when classification performance is not perfect explanations can be meaningless. Thus, combining explanations and uncertainty estimation would provide a more complete picture of any DeepFake detector. Finally, we remark that the proposed metrics are not meant to supplant human judgment, e.g. user studies, but rather to provide a non-interactive and repeatable benchmark that is more suitable for guiding the development and facilitating the deployment of better DeepFake detectors.

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