The Role of Islamic Religious Higher Education in the Revitalization of Religious Moderation in Indonesia

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Abstract: The purpose of this study is to describe the consistency of PTKI (Islamic Religious College) in fighting for religious moderation in Indonesia. This research is a literature review with a sociological-historical approach. Where through this approach, the revitalization of PTKI's religious moderation becomes a critical discourse to know. The research data is in the PTKI religious moderation movement in social and historical contexts, both in the academic corridor, curriculum, campus activism, and social roles. Data collection techniques with documentation. Researchers documented data on the PTKI movement to fight for religious moderation during the New Order and Post-Reformation eras. Data analysis used the descriptive analysis method. The study results indicate that PTKI is an Islamic institution that is consistent in fighting for the agenda of religious moderation. During the New Order period, PTKI, through campus intellectuals, pioneered the Islamic reform movement and, at the same time, made an essential contribution to the process of democratic socio-political change marked by the 1998 reform movement. In the following period (post-reform), PTKI still presents itself as an agent of moderate Islam who actively teaches, campaigns, and affirms religious moderation in its contestation with radical political Islam groups. However, PTKI's active involvement in responding to religious radicalism has contributed significantly to strengthening Indonesia's moderate Islam in the changing socio-political context.

Keywords: PTKI; religious moderation; radicalism; Indonesia.

Abstrak: Tujuan penelitian ini guna mendeskripsikan konsistensi PTKI (Perguruan Tinggi Keagamaan Islam) dalam memperjuangkan moderasi beragama di Indonesia. Penelitian ini merupakan kajian pustaka dengan pendekatan sosiologis-historis. Di mana melalui pendekatan ini, revitalisasi moderasi beragama PTKI menjadi diskursus yang penting untuk diketahui. Data-data penelitian berupa fenomena pergerakan moderasi beragama PTKI dalam konteks sosial dan sejarah, baik dalam koridor akademik, kurikulum, aktivisme kampus, maupun peran sosial. Teknik pengumpulan data dengan dokumentasi.
Peneliti melakukan dokumentasi atas data-data pergerakan PTKI dalam upaya memperjuangkan moderasi beragama pada masa Orde Baru dan Pasca Reformasi. Analisis data menggunakan metode analisis deskriptif. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa PTKI merupakan institusi Islam yang konsisten dalam memperjuangkan agenda moderasi beragama. Pada periode Orde Baru, PTKI melalui kalangan intelektual kampus, memelopori gerakan perbaruan Islam dan sekaligus berkontribusi penting dalam proses perubahan sosial-politik demokratik yang ditandai oleh gerakan reformasi 1998. Pada periode berikutnya (pasca reformasi), PTKI masih menampilkan diri sebagai agen Islam moderat yang aktif mengajarkan, mengkampanyekan dan meneguhkan moderasi beragama dalam kontestasinya dengan kelompok-kelompok Islam politik radikal. Bagaimanapun, keterlibatan aktif PTKI dalam merespon gerakan radikalisme agama telah berkontribusi penting bagi penguatan moders dalam konteks sosial-politik yang terus berubah.

Kata kunci: PTKI; moderasi beragama; radikalisme; Indonesia.

INTRODUCTION

The strengthening of religious radicalism that has lasted for 20 years after Indonesia's reformation has become a severe challenge to moderate Islam, which has colored Indonesian Islam’s face for a long time.¹ The presence of Laskar Jihad, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Islamic Community Forum (FUI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Laskar Jihad, Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI), Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama' Communication Forum ah (FKAWJ), and other radical political Islam groups, not only enliven the dynamics of post-reform Indonesian Islam. Moreover, the rise of political Islam,² which is actively fighting for the Islamization agenda and at the same time is often

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¹ Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).
² Historically, the rise of political Islam was influenced by several interrelated factors, namely: first, the emergence of secular radical forces (nationalist, populist and socialist/communist) which then dominated national politics in newly independent countries. Second, once independent, the new countries faced an international political situation marked by the Cold War which made social-radical forces the target of their conquest to stem the influence of the Soviet Union. In the process of destruction, the imperialists built alliances, both open and closed, with the military and political Islam. third, as the secular-radical forces were destroyed, the void in the political map was filled by political Islam with its jargons which were full of revivalism. Read Coen Husain Pontoh, Kata Pengantar Politik Tanpa Emansipasi, Indoprogress (1 September 2001), xiv.
involved in acts of religious violence such as the Muslim-Christian civil war in Poso, the Bali bombings I, II, and III, the persecution of minorities Ahmadiyah, Shia, Baha'i, and others, contributed to coloring the development of Islam in contemporary Indonesia. Not a few scholars later revised their assessment of Indonesian Islam, which was known to be moderate, tolerant, and pluralist for an extended period, now it tends to display a conservative and radical face.³

However, the strengthening of religious radicalism in post-reform Indonesia has now sparked serious and ongoing attention among social, political, and Islamic scholars in Indonesia. Most of them believe that the strengthening of radical groups cannot be separated from the absence of moderate-progressive Islamic agents in fighting for the agendas of tolerance, pluralism, and democracy. They considered that the role of post-reform moderate Islamic agents was no longer as progressive as in the previous period, especially the 1980-1990s period. Likewise, Muslims and Indonesian society appear to be more intolerant and more conservative than before.⁴

This article argues that Indonesian Islam in the post-reform era does not fully display its conservative and radical face, as most scholars describe. The rise of political Islam groups has indeed influenced the development of Indonesian Islam. However, the presence of these intolerant minority groups cannot completely change the face of Indonesian Islam from being dominant in

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³Jeremy Menchik, “Moderate Muslims and Democratic Breakdown in Indonesia, Asian Studies Review, 2019; Marcus, Mietzner, “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia”, Pacific Affairs 91, No. 2 (2018), 261-282; Greg Fealy, “Reformasi and the Decline of Liberal Islam”, Thushara Dibley and Michele Ford (ed.) Activists in Transition: Progressive Politics in Democratic Indonesia, Cornell University Press, (2019).
⁴Greg Fealy, “Reformasi and the Decline of Liberal Islam”, Thushara Dibley and Michele Ford (ed.) Activists in Transition: Progressive Politics in Democratic Indonesia (Cornell University Press, 2019); Kikue Hamayotsu, “The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance”, Journal of Contemporary Asia 43 (4), 658-677https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.780471
displaying its moderate character to radical Islam. Even though the moderation quality of Indonesian Islam has decreased due to rampant intolerance, discrimination, and religious violence stemming from the activism of radical political Islamic groups, in general, Indonesian Islam is still under the control of moderate Muslim groups. Compared to radical groups, moderate Muslims still occupy the majority position where their influence is still dominant in determining the format of Indonesian Islam.

This article also argues that moderate Islamic agents are not absent, passive, and defensive in responding to conservativism and religious radicalism in post-reformation Indonesia. They have always played an essential role in promoting religious moderation for a more tolerant, pluralist, and democratic Indonesia. Suppose moderate Muslims are absent and do not do anything meaningful at all. In that case, Indonesian Islam will certainly experience drastic changes due to the expansion of religious radicalism movements, as has happened in several Muslim countries in the Middle East. It is a commonplace that the role played by moderate Islamic agents has ups and downs from one period to the next.

The head of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) said that around 39% of students in Indonesia are now exposed to radicalism. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Minister of Defense, Ryacudu, stated that 23.4% of students from all universities experienced the same thing. While the percentage of 23.3% of high school students, 18.1% of private employees, 19.4% of civil servants, 9.1% of BUMN employees, and 3% of TNI soldiers. Still from the same source. As of June 2021, BIN released 85% of the millennial generation exposed to radicalism. Most of them are exposed through social media platforms. This percentage refers to most of the population in Indonesia. Furthermore, with the same data source, 15% of people with various professions are vulnerable to being exposed to radicalism.

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5 Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn” (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013).

6 Budi Gunawan, “Seminar Nasional Bersama BIN: Meneguhkan Peran Serta BEM PTNU dalam Menangkal Radikalisme dan Terorisme”, https://youtu.be/eSB1hlfsi6I

7 Safir Makki, BIN: 85% Millenial Rentan Terpapar Radikalisme, CNN Indonesia 6 Juni 2021, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210615195226-12-654763/bin-85-persen-milenial-rentan-terpapar-radikalisme
They are also exposed a lot through social media platforms. The spread of the radicalism virus is allegedly fast through social media platforms. Intensive handling is needed involving various parties to prevent this expansion. It is proven that in that year, there was an act of terrorism in the form of a suicide bombing in Makassar, precisely in March 2021, and a shooting at the National Police Headquarters in the same month and year. Further research is still under investigation, whether the perpetrators of terrorism have embryos from social media platforms or others.

Data from BIN shows how easy it is for radicalism to enter various sectors of work and education. So it is appropriate for the government through ministries and non-ministerial government agencies to work together in countering radicalism in these two sectors, none other than the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia.

The decision of the Director-General of Islamic Education at the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia No. 7272 of 2019 concerning the establishment of the Religious Moderation House is a response and fresh air for PTKI managers to stem radicalism in the university environment. However, the implementation of the decision reaped the pros and cons of various elements. Following up on the decision of the Director-General of PI, some PTKIN spread throughout Indonesia as many as 58 institutions, 32 universities have established Religious Moderation Houses. Meanwhile, 26 universities do not yet have a formal institution of Religious Moderation House. Furthermore, religious moderation is the spirit that animates the entire program of the Indonesian

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8 Annisa and Putra, Radicalism in Social Media as A Challenge in the Age of Globalization, Propaganda: Journal of Communication Studies Vol. 1, No. 2 (2021), doi=https://doi.org/10.37010/prop.v1i2.279
9 Najahan Musyafak, dkk, Dissimilarity Implementasi Konsep Moderasi Beragama di Perguruan Tinggi Keagamaan Islam, Prosiding Muktamar Pemikiran Dosen PMII, 2021, 453.
Ministry of Religion. The declaration of religious moderation in 2019 is in line with the decisions of the United Nations (UN). To strengthen this, the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia also cooperates with various ministries, such as the Ministry of Defense and State Agencies.

Referring to the Decree of the Director-General of Islamic Education of the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia above, it is appropriate for PTKI to play a role in religious moderation because of its nature as an Islamic Higher Education institution. Religious moderation in PTKI can be integrated through curriculum units and study centers such as establishing the Religious Moderation House (RMB). Another thing that is no less important is the dissemination of religious moderation values in the campus environment. This attitude can then respond to the movement of the academic community and students to find the values of religious moderation, although there are no specific indicators and barometers in determining the success of this program.

Furthermore, this article analyzes the role of moderate Islamic agents from the PTKI in reinforcing the post-reformation moderation of Indonesian Islam. Post-reform Indonesia is marked by two important things, namely the revival of Religion and, at the same time, democracy. Many scholars predict that opening the democratic era will provide an easy way for agents of democracy, including moderate Muslims, to fight for moderate agendas for a more democratic Indonesia. In fact, for more than 20 years after the reformation, the journey of moderate Muslim groups in fighting for the agenda of tolerance, pluralism, and democracy has not gone smoothly without obstacles due to both internal divisions among moderate Muslims themselves and the intervention of external forces. Even sharp criticism emerged that judged moderate Muslim groups tended to take a safe, pragmatic, and even defensive position compared to the previous period. A challenging question to investigate is how consistent is the role of moderate Islamic agents from the PTKI (UIN, IAIN, STAIN) in strengthening Indonesia's

10 Kementerian Agama RI, *Moderasi Beragama*, (Jakarta: Badang Litbang dan Diklat kementerian Agama RI, 2019), 117.
11 Vedi R. Hadiz, *Dinamika Kekuasaan: Ekonomi Politik Indonesia Pasca-Soeharto*, ‘Introduction’, Jakarta: LP3ES, 2005.
moderate Islam post-reform? It is interesting to raise this issue considering the many criticisms that have specifically been addressed to the existence and role of the PTKI, which has long been known for its moderate and pluralist Islamic teachings. At the same time, the role he played in the post-reformation period seemed less progressive than in the previous period.\(^{12}\)

To be able to answer the question above, this article approaches it with a sociological-historical approach. As stated by Minhaji, the socio-historical approach is an approach that uncovers social phenomena through historical evidence. What is the basis for the occurrence of a case based on empirical evidence through documentation techniques. This approach has become a trend in Islamic studies in the west. Minhaji also said that the strength of the socio-historical approach lies in the validation of the data found. This approach can read social phenomena, religious facts, and social structures far back reconstructed for contemporary reading models.\(^{13}\) Using a socio-historical approach in the reading model for revitalizing religious moderation cannot be separated from the historical formation of the PTKI in the New Order era. At that time, the role of the Minister of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia, such as Muki Ali and Munawir Sjahdali, significantly determined the direction of PTKI. As the embryo of several intellectual figures, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta emerged, such as Harun Nasution and Nurcholish Madjid. From IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta there are Zaini Dahlan and Simuh. They are Muslim intellectual figures from the PTKI who broke the revitalization of religious moderation, which other PTKI then followed. However, the government slightly restricted freedom of Religion and

\(^{12}\) Dina Afrianty, “Islamic Education and Youth Extremism in Indonesia”, *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 7:2 (2012), 134-146. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2012.719095

\(^{13}\) Akh. Minhaji, *Sejarah Sosial dalam Studi Islam: Teori, Metodologi, dan Implementasi*, (Yogyakarta: UIN Suka Press, 2010).
media coverage, which resulted in few conservative groups. It was only in the post-Soeharto era that conservative groups emerged along with the changing climate of reform.

Through this approach, the author will gain new insight into the changing forms of the role of moderate Muslims, which in practice will be influenced by various types of power constellations. Not all social actors have the ability and complete freedom to determine the direction and form of religious moderation. Because every social actor will be faced with a variety of pretty complex choices, however, the choices available and the possible actions of social actors are not solely sourced from their awareness and abilities but are also determined by the results of these power constellations. At the same time, the changing role of moderate Muslims in strengthening religious moderation, almost certainly, involves an inseparable passage from the previous period. It may be that socio-political and democratic changes seem like a historical discontinuity.

**Islamizing Indonesia: Past and Present**

The struggle of groups of Islamism or political Islam\textsuperscript{14} to realize Indonesia based on Islamic law has been carried out since the beginning of the formation of Indonesia as an independent nation-state. In various debates regarding the State and its ideology, political Islamists have been involved in violent conflicts with nationalists and socialists to fight for a format for the Indonesian nation-state based on Islamic teachings. According to them, Islam is the Religion of the majority of the Indonesian people, and because of that, it is only natural that Islam becomes the formal ideology for the Indonesian nation-state.\textsuperscript{15} When this debate almost reached consensus by deciding the format of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia with the ideology of Pancasila, Islamist groups were still

\textsuperscript{14} These two terms are often used as an alternative to the term fundamentalism or radicalism which comes from the Christian tradition and is thick with religious nuances. Scholars generally apply the term political Islam to the discourses and activities of activists who conceptualize Islam not only as a religion, but also as a political ideology or political order. Bassam Tibi, *Islam dan Islamisme*, (Bandung: Mizan, 2012), 1; Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi, dan Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca-Orde Baru*, (Jakarta: LP3ESKITLV, 2008), 18.

\textsuperscript{15} The debate on state ideology, see Faisal Ismail, *Ideologi Hegemoni dan otoritas Agama: Wacana Ketegangan Kreatif Islam dan Pancasila*, (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1999).
negotiating their agenda by proposing the Jakarta Charter,\textsuperscript{16} the point of which is in the first principle of Pancasila, which reads "Belief in One Supreme God" is added by "the obligation to carry out the Shari'a for its adherents." For the time being, the struggle of the Islamists had to stop in line with the compromise of the founding fathers who agreed on Indonesia as a nation-state which was not based on any particular religion or ideology, but on the ideology of Pancasila, the constitutional basis of the 1945 Constitution, and the principles of Bhineka Tunggal Ika.\textsuperscript{17}

The struggle of political Islam groups did not stop when formulating the form of the Indonesian nation-state. They continue to fight for their political agenda, both through constitutional and non-constitutional channels. This movement is massively echoed to this day, especially during elections and state agendas that involve the public's role.\textsuperscript{18} Masjumi is a formal political vehicle used by them to continue to fight for Indonesia based on Islamic law. Meanwhile, some of them have chosen violent methods by carrying out rebellions. DI/TII, led by Sekarmadjii Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, was one of the exponents of political Islam who chose to take up arms and carry out a rebellion in West Java against the central government (August 7, 1949). A similar action was taken by Kahar Muzakkar, who carried out the rebellion in North Sulawesi (1952). In addition,

\textsuperscript{16} For a more detailed explanation of the Jakarta Charter, see Saifuddin Anshari, \textit{"The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the Gentleman’s Agreement between the Islamic and Secular Nationalism in Modern Indonesia"}, Thesis M.A. (McGill University, 1976).

\textsuperscript{17} Faisal Ismail, \textit{Ideologi Hegemoni dan otoritas Agama: Wacana Ketegangan Kreatif Islam dan Pancasila}, (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1999), 54-58.

\textsuperscript{18} M. Suyudi dan Wahyu Hanafi, \textit{Bahasa dan Politik Islam; Gerak dan Perilaku Diskursif Politisasi Islam Pihak Oposisi dalam pemilu 2019 di Indonesia dalam Konteks Politik Bahasa}, Julal Dialogia, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2020), 6 https://doi.org/10.21154/dialogia.v18i2.2440
Daud Beureueh also led the rebellion in Aceh (1953) against the central government to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state.\textsuperscript{19}

The ideological struggle can be one of the prominent features of Indonesia's socio-political configuration after colonialism in the Old Order era. At least three dominant ideologies involved in the political struggle are nationalism, Islamism, and socialism-communism. The ambition of Sukarno, the first president of the Republic of Indonesia, to unite these various ideologies into one political basket known as NASAKOM (Nationalist, Islamic and Communist) did not produce encouraging results. Instead of successfully managing these ideological differences and contradictions, Sukarno stumbled upon the actions of the September 30, 1965 Movement carried out by the PKI with the victims of 7 (seven) TNI generals.\textsuperscript{20}

The fall of Sukarno had a fundamental change in the political configuration of the Indonesian nation. Some of the changes referred to include the end of the Old Order regime under Sukarno's leadership, the presence of the New Order regime led by Suharto (Second President of the Republic of Indonesia), the dissolution and banning of the PKI. After the PKI was banned, practically no leftist radical forces became competitors for other political forces. The only severe political threat is the power of Islam. Starting from the political experience of the Old Order, Suharto then took a very extreme policy by depoliticizing. Simplification of political parties to only three parties (Golkar, PPP, and PDI), application of Pancasila ideology as a single principle,\textsuperscript{21}

Practically, during the New Order period, Islamic political forces could not play an essential role in fighting for their political agenda. As a result of the New Order's repressive policies, they preferred to go underground. Traditionalist Islamic groups such as NU then choose to change direction to become socio-religious organizations which in their activism are more oriented towards populist

\textsuperscript{19} Douglas E. Ramage, \textit{Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance}, (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), 17.

\textsuperscript{20} MC Ricklefs, \textit{A History of Indonesia}, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 278.

\textsuperscript{21} Greg Fealy, \textit{Ijtihad Politik Ulama, Sejarah NU 1952-1967}, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1998).
and national politics than power politics.\textsuperscript{22} Meanwhile, conservative and radical Islamic groups, such as ex-Masyumi, prefer the cultural route through da'wah's media. Some other conservative-radicalized groups, such as the Wahhabi-Salafi group and other trans-national Islamic agents, also use cultural spaces to fight for their political agenda.

In the 1990s, political Islam groups used public spaces, especially campuses and mosques, to serve as media for their religious-political struggle. Campus Da'wah Institutions (LDK) emerged on well-known campuses such as ITB, UGM, UI, IPB, PKS mass-based tarbiyah activists, KAMMI (Indonesian Muslim Mahasisma Action Unit), HTI, and others, is the impact of the New Order's depoliticization repressive policies. These political Islam factions take advantage of cultural spaces to continue to fight for the agenda of Islamization of Indonesia from below. Their activism is no longer focused on the Islamization of power through formal and non-formal political means but has turned towards the Islamization of society.

Along with the increasing influence of Islam in the 1990s, Suharto, who initially stayed away from Islamic forces, preferred to approach and even use conservative Islam to confront reformist Islam. The formation of ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) by Habibie, with Suharto's blessing, is a testament to the closeness of the New Order regime to conservative Islamic forces.\textsuperscript{23} This is understandable because, in the 1990s, the Suharto regime faced fierce resistance from reformist Islamic forces led by Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholis Madjid, Amien Rais, and others. According to Hefner, ICMI's entry

\textsuperscript{22} \textsuperscript{22} Andree Feillard, \textit{NU vis a vis Negara: Pencarian Isi, Bentuk dan Makna}, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999); Robin Bush, \textit{Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia}, Singapore: ISEAS, 2009.

\textsuperscript{23} Marcus Mietzner, \textit{Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation}, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 163-169.
into the New Order’s power has made it a regimeist Islam, an Islam that has become a pillar or a pro with the status quo.24

How is the development of religious radicalism in Indonesia after the New Order? After the New Order, the era of openness and freedom provided an opportunity for various social groups, including political Islam groups, to re-present their existence. After being repressed throughout the New Order authoritarianism regime, political Islam groups ranging from moderate to radical groups such as the Tarbiyah group or PKS activists, FPI, MMI, FUI, HTI, Laskar Jihad, Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI), and others, have returned to color. The landscape of religious life in post-New Order Indonesia. Along with the proliferation of these radical groups, various intolerance, discrimination, and religious violence have also increased.25 The intolerant attitude of the Muslim majority towards fellow Muslim minorities and non-Muslim minorities, acts of discrimination carried out by hardline Islamic groups against Shi’a minority groups,26 Ahmadiyya,27 China, Christians, and others, and acts of terrorism carried out by jihadists are a series of problems of religious radicalism that have strengthened in Indonesia after the New Order.28

At least, the trend of increasing religious intolerance and violence throughout the post-New Order period can also be observed from the results of surveys released by various research institutions. The last ten years survey (2001-2010) conducted by BabyCenter for the Study of Islam and Society shows an increase in intolerance in

24 Robert W. Hefner, ICMI dan Perjuangan Menuju Kelas Menengah Indonesia, (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1995).
25 Kikue Hamayotsu, “The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance”, Journal of Contemporary Asia 43 (4), 658-677 https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.780471
26 Read Al-Makin, Homogenizing Indonesian Islam: Persecution of the Shia Group in Yogyakarta, Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, 201710.15408/sdi.v24i1.3354
27 Regarding this case, read, for example, Bastiaan Scherpen, Enforcing Religious Freedom in Indonesia: Muslim Elites and Ahmadiyah Controversy after the 2011 Cikeusik Clash, in Kees van Dijk and Nico JG Kaptein (ed.) Islam, Politics and Change, the Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto, Leiden University Press, 2016, 14.
28 In 2002, the public will never forget the tragedy of the Bali Bombing 1 at Paddy's Pub and Sari Club which claimed 202 lives. Three years later, the Bali Bombing 2 tragedy again hit the Kuta and Jimbaran areas, which claimed 23 lives. The perpetrator was a member of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) with ties to Al-Qaeda, the international terrorist organization under the leadership of Osama bin Laden. The JI organization actually grew at the beginning of the reform era and then resumed its terrorist acts in various places, such as the case at the Marriott Hotel, Ritz Charlton, Kuningan and the Jakarta Stock Exchange attack. Read Muhammad AS Hikam, Deradikalisasi: Peran Masyarakat Sipil Indonesia Membendung Radikalisme, Jakarta: Kompas, 2016, hal., 31-32.
Indonesian society, especially the majority Muslim community. The survey, which took a sample of 1,200 Muslim adults, both male, and female, showed that 57.8% of respondents stated that they rejected the construction of churches or places of worship of other religions. More than a quarter or 26.7% said they objected to their children being taught or educated by non-Muslims. Komnas HAM survey results also noted 74 cases in 2014, increasing to 78 cases in 2015 and nearly 100 cases in 2016. Research results from the Setara Institute stated that the most frequent violations of freedom of religion and belief (KBB) were in 2020, which amounted to 62 cases. This number details 32 cases of religious blasphemy, 17 cases of refusal to establish a house of worship, 8 cases of violating religious activities, 6 cases of allegedly destroying houses of worship, 5 cases of refusal to worship activities, and 5 cases leading to violent activities. This action was driven by non-state actors, such as citizen groups, religious organizations, and MUI. Meanwhile, the Research Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah said 16% of students in Indonesia have a low religious tolerance/intolerant attitude. This figure shows that 24.89% have low intolerance, and 5.27% have very low intolerance.

Meanwhile, even in the early period of Jokowi’s administration, religious intolerance and violence were still relatively high. The results of the LSI survey show that 59.1 percent of Muslim respondents objected to non-Muslims becoming president. A total of 56.1 percent of respondents expressed objections to non-Muslims becoming vice president, 52 percent objecting to non-Muslims becoming governors, and 51.6 percent objecting to non-Muslims becoming regents/mayors.

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29 thebalitimes.com, (29 September 2010).
30 Kompas.com, 05/01/2017.
31 Kompas.com, 06/04/2021 URL https://national.kompas.com/read/2021/04/06/18065451/riset-setara-institute-intolerant-atas-kebebasan-beragama-berbelian
32 Kompas.com, 02/03/2021. URL https://national.kompas.com/read/2021/03/02/13353621/riset-ppim-uin-jakarta-3016-persen-mahasiswa-indonesia-intoleran?page=all
33 Read the full CNN Indonesia article "LSI: Intoleransi di Era Jokowi Masih Tinggi” selengkapnya di sini: https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20191103183341-32-445250/lsi-intoleransi-di-era-jokowi-masih-tinggi
In education, campus radicalization driven by political Islam groups also experienced rapid development after the New Order. Not a few campus intellectuals are interested and fascinated by the agenda of the political struggle of radical Islam in the form of the application of Islamic law. Although not all of them are affiliated with radical Islamic movements that have sprung up, especially after the reformation, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Jema’at Islamiyah (JI), Da’wah Movement Salafis and the like, but the agenda and orientation of their struggle are relatively the same, that is, they both have an interest in the enforcement of Islamic law, primarily through formal political decisions. The results of a study by the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), for example, found a surprising fact where 39 percent of students in Indonesia were categorized as radical. The results of the BNPT research also show the exact figure, namely, 39% of students from 15 provinces are attracted to radicalism. Still from the same source. As of June 2021, BIN released 85% of the millennial generation exposed to radicalism. Most of them are exposed through social media platforms. This percentage refers to most of the population in Indonesia. Furthermore, 15% of people with various professions are exposed to radicalism, such as civil servants, private employees, employees, and other professions with the same data source.

34 Most analyzes suggest that the emergence of radical movements is related to opportunities for openness for Islamic groups to express their opinions. This condition is different from the New Order era which almost did not provide any space for its citizens to do the same thing. This is also related to the weakness of the state during the post-New Order period. Din Wahid, “Pentas Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia”, Book Review, Studia Islamika, Vol. 7 No. 2, 2007 https://doi.org/10.36712/sdi.v7i2
35 Formal decisions are needed and are very important because they can provide a strong legal basis. This means that all aspects of Islamic law will be used as sources of law in Indonesia. Endang Turmudi dan Riza Sibbadi (ed.) Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia…, 123.
36 Angling Adhitya Purbaya, “BIN: 3 Universitas Diawasi Khusus Terkait Penyebaran Radikalisme,” detiknews, diakses 30 April 2018, https://news.detik.com/read/2018/04/28/162247/3995680/1536/bin-3-universitas-diawasi-khusus-terkait-penyebaran-radikalisme.
37 Survei BNPT: 39 Persen Mahasiswa Tertarik Paham Radikal | Republika Online,” 39, diakses 30 April 2018, http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/17/07/26/otonnj7382-survei-bnpt-39-persen-mahasiswa-tertarik-paham-radikal.
38 Safir Makki, BIN: 85% Milenial Rentan Terpapar Radikalisme, CNN Indonesia 6 Juni 2021, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/2021061515195226-12-654763/bin-85-persen-milenial-rentan-terpapar-radikalisme
ISLAMIC UPDATES AND SOCIAL-POLITICAL CHANGE:

PTKI under the New Order Authoritarianism

The renewal of Islamic thought for democratic socio-political change was one of the most prominent roles of PTKI intellectual agents throughout the New Order period. This role is present as a critical response of PTKI to strengthening the mainstream of Indonesian Muslim religious understanding, which is a textualist, literalist, and ideological. As is well known, in the early periods of the establishment of the PTKI (decade 1960), the socio-political context of Indonesia was still colored by political-ideological conflicts and struggles involving Muslim groups. Each group uses religious sentiments as a means to fight for its practical and ideological political interests. As a result, Muslims are polarized into various groups based on their respective religious, political ideologies and involved in the endless political struggles and conflicts of primordialism. Instead of catching up with the far more advanced Western society, Indonesian Muslims struggle with their stagnant position. Religion, which ideally can be a source of intellectual achievement, becomes a stumbling block for Muslims to progress.

Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Madjid, Zakiyah Darojat, Hasbi As-Shiddiqie, and Mukti Ali are few PTKI intellectuals who have taken an essential role in launching the Islamic reform movement. The PTKI environment wants Islam to be positioned as a dogmatic or ideological religious teaching and an ocean of knowledge that can be studied through scientific study methodologies. At the same time, they are also concerned that Indonesian Muslims can understand and apply Islamic teachings in a more rational, inclusive, and pluralist manner. The discourse of Islamic thought that they offer is an antithesis to the
domination of political Islam, which is considered one of the determining factors in bringing about the stagnation and decline of Indonesian Muslims.\(^{39}\)

Interestingly, the Islamic reform movement launched by PTKI intellectual agents is connected with similar movements driven by several liberalists and progressive Muslim intellectuals outside the PTKI. Abdurrahman Wahid, Ahmad Wahib, M. Dawam Rahardjo, Johan Effendy are a few – to borrow Gramsci’s term – organic intellectuals who take an essential part in the Islamic reform movement through civil society organizations. M. Dawam Rahardjo, together with his friends, founded the LPES which has played an essential role in producing moderate, progressive and liberal discourses of Islamic thought. Likewise, Abdurrahman Wahid actively carried out Islamic reforms, especially in the traditionalist Muslim internal environment, by utilizing Islamic boarding schools and NU organizations.\(^{40}\) The production of reformist Islamic thought carried out also played a significant role in strengthening the more rational, critical, and progressive Islamic thought discourse among the PTKI academic community.

However, the activism of Islamic reform carried out by PTKI intellectuals in collaboration with progressive civil society agents, which has been going on since the 1970s, has produced encouraging results. They were the ones who opened the faucet for the birth of PTKI intellectuals, academics, and activists with their moderate and progressive style of religious thought. Azyumardi Azra, Komaruddin Hidayat, Bachtiar Effendy, M. Amin Abdullah, Masdar Farid Mas'udi, Adnan Amal, and many others are academics second-generation PTKI intellectuals who began to play an essential role in the late 1980s-1990s period.

Azyumardi Azra, as an actor who opened religious moderation on the scale of Islamic Religious College. He dialogued the historical ideas of Islam in the classical period with the reality that is currently happening in Indonesia.\(^{41}\) It is different with M. Amin Abdullah. The figure of this contemporary Muslim philosopher gives the idea of inclusive religious moderation. There is no limit to

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39 Greg Barton, *Gagasan Islam Liberal di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999).
40 Ibid.
41 Azyumardi Azra, *Moderasi Islam di Indonesia: Dari Ajaran Ibadah hingga Perilaku*, (Malang: Prenada Press, 2010).
religious tolerance. M. Amin Abdullah and Komaruddin Hidayat view the inclusiveness of Religion that comes from the text. According to him, one does not need to be trapped in conservatism, purification, and fundamentalism. Because such attitudes lead to acts of intolerance.\footnote{M. Amin Abdullah, *Islamic Studies di Perguruan Tinggi*, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006).} Even a much younger generation emerged in the 1990s, including Jadul Maula, Imam Aziz, Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Ahmad Suaedy, Abd. Muqsith Ghozali, Rumadi, Marzukui Wahid, and others. Jadul Maula, as a young figure who drives NU, has more dialogue on aspects of cultural and religious relations. According to him, Religion can be lighter and less burdensome if it is related to culture. He has commented a lot on purificatory behaviors that are often echoed by conservatism circles. While Ulil Abshar Abdalla and Abd. Muqsith Ghozali voiced the refreshment of Islam through religious reconstruction. These two young men were very aggressive in incising the idea of moderate Islam, even though both of them had been labeled heretical because they carried the Liberal Islam Network.\footnote{Aksin Wijaya, *Satu Islam Ragam Epistemologi: Dari Epistemologi Teosentrisme ke Antroposentrisme*, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2014).}

In line with the growth of the second and third generations of progressive intellectuals of the PTKI (the 1980s-1990s), the Islamic reform movement, which was sown by the first generation, began to grow and develop rapidly. At the same time, the variants of cultural Islam or moderate Islam championed by PTKI intellectuals began to shift the dominance of political Islam that had triumphed since the Old Order period and the beginning of the New Order (1950-the 1970s). In the view of some scholars, the 1980-1990s period was a golden period for the revival of reformist religious thought and movement discourse. Generations of young PTKI intellectuals, both lecturers and students, are increasingly playing an essential role in the renewal of Islamic thought and, at the same time, democratic
socio-political transformation. The reconstruction of religious understanding at IAIN Syarif Hidayataullah Jakarta includes the figures of Nurcholish Madjid, Komaruddin Hidayat, and Azyumadi Azra. Then at IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta appeared M. Amin Abdullah and Faisal Ismail. At IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, there is Abd A’la. Then at STAIN Malang, there is Imam Suprayogo. They are Muslim intellectuals of the 1980-1990 generation of PTKI who brought a climate of religious moderation which state and private PTKI followed in each of some regions.\textsuperscript{44} The discourse of religious moderation that is echoed includes openness in-text discourse, social behavior, to the reproduction of contemporary fiqh law. In their activism, they are not limited to using campus instruments but are also actively engaged in the world of NGOs. LKiS (Yogyakarta), eLSAD (Surabaya), Democracy Forum (Jakarta), Desantara (Jakarta), Fahmina (Cirebon), and others are some NGOs that were established and became the activity sites for PTKI activists in fighting for the democratization agenda. At its peak, the Islamic reform movement, led by the progressive intellectuals of the PTKI, also contributed significantly as the backbone of the 1998 reform movement that succeeded in overthrowing the New Order authoritarianism regime and at the same time ushering Indonesia into a new phase known as the reform era or the post-New Order era.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{DERADICALIZATION AND CONSOLIDATED MODERATION:}
\textit{PTKI in the Era of Post-Reformation Openness}

The occurrence of socio-political transformation from the period of authoritarianism to the period of democracy also impacts changes in religious configuration in Indonesia. The forces of political Islam that had fallen due to the New Order's repressive policies now have re-emerged in the Indonesian public sphere after the New Order. They can even take advantage of the momentum of openness and, at the same time, the development of internet-based information

\textsuperscript{44} Azyumardi Azra, \textit{Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi dan Modernisasi di Tengah Tantangan Milenium III}, (Jakarta: Prenada Media Group, 1999).

\textsuperscript{45} Robert W. Hefner, \textit{Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia}, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).
technology to spread their religious understanding. Even though they are in a minority position, their religious activism can color and even change the Indonesian Islamic landscape from being dominant in displaying a smiley face (smile Islam) to a more conservative, intolerant, and even radical direction.\textsuperscript{46}

The spread of political Islam groups has a severe impact on increasing intolerance and at the same time deconsolidating democracy. The era of openness that reformist agents should have been well utilized, including from among Muslims, to consolidate their power in pushing the transition process towards consolidating democracy, happened just the opposite. In the criticism of some experts, the role played by moderate Muslim agents after the New Order is considered no longer as progressive as in the previous period. This condition also provides opportunities for radical groups to play their intolerant role more freely. This increasing intolerance is considered to have contributed significantly to the decline in the quality of Indonesian democracy. After having improved in the period 1999 to 2000.\textsuperscript{47}

The strengthening of religious radicalism after the New Order forced moderate Muslim agents, including PTKI, to respond critically. Several factors trigger acts of radicalism, among others; ideological fundamentalism, economics, religious freedom, to the pressure of political currents. Where during the reformation period, freedom of expression was increasingly widespread. They seemed trapped in the new order era and felt free to voice and act during the reformation. However, radicalism threatens not only democracy but also the

\textsuperscript{46}Martin van Bruinessen (ed.). \textit{Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn”} (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013)
\textsuperscript{47}Vedi R. Hadiz, \textit{Dinamika Kekuasaan: Ekonomi Politik Indonesia Pasca-Soeharto, ‘Pengantar’}, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2005); Jeremy Menchik, Moderate Muslims and Democratic Breakdown in Indonesia, \textit{Asian Studies Review}, (2019); Marcus Mietzner, “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia”, \textit{Pacific Affairs} 91, 2, (2018), 261-282 https://doi.org/10.5509/2018912261
moderate face of Indonesian Islam and, at the same time, the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In this context, PTKI seeks to take an essential role in promoting or mainstreaming religious moderation ideas. Personally, PTKI academics and intellectuals actively voice ideas of religious moderation. Azyumardi Azra (UIN Jakarta), M. Amin Abdullah (UIN Yogyakarta), Noorhaidi Hasan (UIN Yogyakarta), Masdar Hilmy (UIN Surabaya), Mujiburrahman (UIN Banjarmasin), extra-campus student activists such as PMII and HMI are still quite active in voicing religious moderation and at the same time being productive in producing discourses of tolerant, inclusive and pluralist religious thought. For them, being silent or passive, 48 The efforts made by PTKI then lead downstream, such as revamping the curriculum, student organizations, SMEs, study centers, and studies.49

If we look closely, there are differences in the role of PTKI today compared to the previous period in fighting for the agenda of religious moderation. The distinction deeply rooted in the PTKI struggle in the past had many interactions with the government. Freedom of expression is not as easy as it was post-reform. At that time, the voices that had a relationship with the resilience of the State were closely guarded. Not everything can be expressed. Another factor is the lack of mass communication media as it is today. In the post-reform era, the religious moderation movement is easier to play while many factors provide interventions such as law, media, and social. Previously, the personal role of Muslim academics was quite prominent, and as shown by the religious reform movement carried out by Nurcholish Madjid, Harun Nasution, Mukti Ali, Johan Effendy, and others, now the institutional role seems to be more prominent. The movement of PTKI to re-voice the war against various forms of radicalism and at the same time intensify efforts to revitalize the idea of moderate Islam, especially

48 Azyumardi Azra, Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism, Center for the Study of Contemporary Islam (CSCI) Islamic Issues Briefing Paper Series 1, (The University of Melbourne, 2005).
49 Toto Suharto dan Ja’far Assagaf, Membendung Arus Paham Keagamaan Radikal di Kalangan Mahasiswa PTKIN, Al-Tahrir; Jurnal Pemikiran Islam, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2014), 3 10.21154/al-tahrir.v14i1.72
in the last two decades, has been strengthened and has even taken place in a more systematic, structured, and massive manner. The success of the Ministry of Religion in fighting for the moderation agenda to be included in the national strategic program was followed up by PTKI with various strategic programs, including:

First, incorporate the idea of religious moderation into the curriculum structure. Although this is not a new thing, for a long time, the curriculum in almost all PTKIs has accommodated the treasures of classical and modern knowledge. This condition is an essential contribution to forming an academic tradition in PTKI that is moderate, inclusive, and pluralist.50

Second, the establishment of the House of Religious Moderation (RMB). Almost all PTKI have RMB, which is a mandate from the policy of the Directorate of Islamic Higher Education (DIKTIS) of the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia. RMB has a strategic position as a campus mouthpiece in promoting the ideas of religious moderation and at the same time as a media to fight religious discourse with political Islam groups. Seminars, workshops, education and training, webinars, especially during the current Pandemic, are a series of activities carried out by RMB in order to promote and strengthen the idea of religious moderation.

Third, recruitment of education and education personnel involves tests of national insight and religious moderation. However, an employee selection system like this can ensure that the human resources (HR) who participate in PTKI have Islamic and national commitments. The government later established the same system as a national policy implemented in all government agencies. This policy

50 Dina Afrianty, “Islamic Education and Youth Extremism in Indonesia”, *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 7:2 (2012), 134-146. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2012.719095
was taken as a response to the rise of government employees, especially outside the Ministry of Religion, exposed to radicalism ideology. It seems that this public policy can limit political Islam agents who work as government employees to carry out their ideological agenda, namely to Islamize the government bureaucracy.

CONSISTENCY OF PTKI BECOME A RELIGIOUS MODERATION AGENT:

Several Supporting Factors

The ability of PTKI, both institutionally and personally, in its academic community to present itself as an agent of religious moderation is, of course, influenced by many factors. At least two determinant factors support it, namely structural and cultural. Structural factors related to, among others;

First, institutional leadership. Since its inception until now, PTKI leaders have come from moderate Muslim academics. This of course has an important effect on the process of managing the campus institutional bureaucracy. In many ways, academic policies made by the leadership, almost certainly, take into account the values of religious moderation. The appointment of structural officials to fill strategic positions starting from the vice chancellor, dean and vice dean, head of department, head of study program, head of institution, head of section and so on, in addition to basing on the aspect of professionalism, of course also considers aspects of national insight and religious moderation.

Second, The continuity of PTKI’s leadership originating from moderate Muslim academics, of course, cannot be separated from policymakers at a higher level, namely the Ministry of Religion. In its history, not a single Minister of Religion has come from radical political Islam circles. The minister of Religion is held by political elites, religious leaders, the military, and professionals with nationalism-religious backgrounds. Indeed, there are Ministers of Religion who come from the nationalist and military circles, but their political and religious aspirations are generally not affiliated with hardline groups. As an illustration, the
current list of Indonesian Ministers of Religion from the Old Order to post-New Order periods can be illustrated in the table below.

**Table 1. List of Ministers of Religion in Indonesia**

| No | Name                     | Cabinet                | Beginning      | End            | Representation          |
|----|--------------------------|------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 1. | Wahid Hasyim             | Presidential           | August 19, 1945| November 14, 1945| NU                      |
|    |                          | Syahrir I              | November 14, 1945| March 12, 1946  | Masyumi-Muhammadiyah   |
| 2. | Rasjidi                  | Syahrir II             | March 12, 1946  | October 2, 1946 | Masyumi-NI              |
| 3. | Fathurrahman Kafrawi     | Syahrir III            | October 2, 1946 | 26 June 1947    | PSII                    |
| 4. | Achmad As'ari            | Amir Syarifuddin I    | July 3, 1947    | October 9, 1947 | Masyumi-Muhammadiyah   |
| 5. | Anwaruddin               | Amir Syarifuddin I    | October 9, 1947 | November 11, 1947| PSII                    |
|    |                          | Amir Syarifuddin II   | November 11, 1947| January 29, 1948| PSII                    |
| 6. | Masjkur                  | Hatta I                | January 29, 1948| August 4, 1948  | Masyumi-NI              |
| 7. | Teuku Mohammad Hasan     | Emergency              | December 19, 1948| March 31, 1949  | Masyumi-NI              |
|    |                          |                        | March 31, 1949  | July 13, 1949   | Masyumi-NI              |
| 8. | Masjkur                  | Hatta II               | August 4, 1949  | December 20, 1949| Masyumi-NI              |
|    |                          |                        | August 4, 1949  | September 6     | Masyumi-NI              |
| 9. | Fakih Usman              | Halim                  | January 21, 1950| September 6     | Muhammadiyah            |
| 10.| Wahid Hasyim             | Natsir                 | September 6, 1950| April 3, 1951   | Masyumi-NI              |
|    |                          | Sukiman Suwirjo        | April 27, 1951  | April 3, 1951   | Masyumi-NI              |
|    |                          |                        | April 27, 1951  | July 12, 1952   | Muhammadiyah            |
| 11.| Fakih Usman              | Wilopo                 | April 3, 1952   | March 19, 1956  | NU                      |
|    |                          |                        | April 3, 1952   | March 19, 1956  | Masyumi                 |
| 12.| Masjkur                  | Ali Sastroamidjojo     | July 30, 1953   | August 19, 1955 | NU                      |
|    |                          | Burhanuddin Harahap    | August 12, 1955 | January 19, 1956| NU                      |
| 13.| Muhammad Ilyas           | Burhanuddin Harahap    | January 19, 1956| March 19, 1956  | Masyumi                 |
|    | Mohammad Sardjan (ad-interim) | Burhanuddin Harahap | January 19, 1956| March 19, 1956  | Masyumi                 |
| No. | Name                           | Cabinet       | Beginning      | End            | Representation |
|-----|--------------------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| 15. | Muhammad Ilyas                 | Sastroamidjojo| April 9, 1956  | July 10, 1959  | NU             |
|     |                                | II Work       | July 10, 1959  | February 18, 1960 |               |
|     |                                | I work        |                |                |                |
| 16. | Wahib Wahab                    | Work II       | February 18, 1960 | March 6, 1962 | NU             |
|     |                                | Work III      | March 6, 1962  | November 13, 1963 |               |
|     |                                | IV work       | November 13, 1963 | August 27, 1964 |               |
|     |                                | Dwikora I     | August 27, 1964 | February 22, 1966 |               |
| 17. | Saifuddin Zuhri                | Dwikora II    | February 22, 1966 | March 28, 1966 | NU             |
|     |                                | Ampera I      | July 28, 1966  | October 14, 1967 |               |
|     |                                | June 14, 1967 | October 14, 1967 | September 11, 1971 |               |
| 18. | Muhammad Dahlan                | Ampera II     | June 10, 1968  | March 28, 1973  | NU             |
|     |                                | I . Development | September 11, 1971 | March 28, 1978 |               |
| 19. | Mukti Ali                      | Construction II| March 28, 1973 | March 29, 1983  | Golkar         |
| 20. | Alamsyah Queen of Officers     | Construction III| March 29, 1978 | March 21, 1988  | Golkar         |
|     |                                | IV Pembangunan Development V | March 19, 1983 | March 17, 1993  |               |
|     |                                | Development VI | March 17, 1993 | March 14, 1998  |               |
|     |                                | Construction VII | March 14, 1998 | May 23, 1998    | Muhammadiyah   |
|     |                                | Development Reform | May 23, 1998 | October 21, 1999 |               |
|     |                                | National Union | October 29, 1999 | July 23, 2001  | NU             |
| 21. | Munawir Sjadrzali              | Said Husain Agil | August 10, 2001 | October 20, 2004 | NU             |
| 22. | Tarmizi Taher                  | Al Munawar    | October 21, 2004 | October 20, 2004 | NU             |
| 23. | Muhammad Quraish Shibab        | Muhammad Mafth Basuni | October 22, 2009 | May 28, 2014    | PPP-NU         |
| 24. | Abdul Malik Fadjar             | Suryadharma Ali | May 28, 2014    | June 9 2014     | Golkar Party   |
| 25. | Muhammad Tolcah Hasan          | Agung Laksono (executive task) | June 9 2014 | October 20, 2014 |               |
| 26. | Said Husain Agil               | Luqman Hakim Saifuddin | October 27, 2014 | October 20, 2019 | PPP-NU         |
### Table: Ministrer of Religion in Indonesia

| No | Name               | Cabinet         | Beginning        | End              | Representation  |
|----|--------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| 31 | Fachrul Razi       | United Indonesia| October 23, 2019 | December 23, 2020| Retired TNI    |
| 32 | Yaqut Cholil Qoumas| United Indonesia| December 23, 2020| Now              | PKB-NU         |

Data source: [Wikipedia](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daftar_Menteri_Religion_Indonesia)

### Third

The success of the Ministry of Religion in fighting for religious moderation as a national strategic program is an institutional political breakthrough that has a broad impact. This policy has implications for the obligation of every government or state agency, from the central to the regional levels, to include religious moderation in its priority programs. Within the PTKI, the national policy was followed up with various strategic programs, including the reconstruction of a curriculum based on religious moderation, reorientation of education and teaching, research and scientific publications, and community service-oriented towards strengthening religious moderation.

While cultural factors are related to several important aspects, namely first, the academic tradition of PTKI, unlike PTU, whose core studies are social sciences, humanities, science, and technology, PTKI makes Islamic studies its central business core. Islamic Education (Islamic Education, Islamic Education), Islamic Law (Family Law, Islamic Criminal Law, Islamic Civil Code), Da'wah (Islamic Community Development, Islamic Guidance, and Counseling, Da'wah Management), Adab (History of Islamic Civilization, Arabic Language and Literature), and Ushuluddin (Study of the Qur'an and Hadith, Comparison of Madzhab, Islamic Philosophy) are five clumps of Islamic scholarship that have been a concern for studies at PTKI. The study of the dimensions of Islamic scholarship involves a rich source of literature that does not come from only one
school of thought. In addition to classical literature, Islamic studies also adopt contemporary literature, not only the products of Muslim scholars' thoughts but also the works of orientalists. This condition has contributed significantly to shaping the academic tradition and religious attitudes of the PTKI academic community with its critical, moderate, and pluralist character.  

While PTU was limited to making Islamic education a complementary course, PTKI itself placed almost 30 percent of non-Islamic studies subjects such as Pancasila and Citizenship Education, Indonesian Language, English, Sociology, Anthropology, History, and Politics into the curriculum. This condition then led the PTKI academic community to have more ability to integrate Islamic sciences and secular sciences. Even when some PTKIs underwent the institutional transformation from institutes to Islamic universities, these institutions also opened themselves to study social sciences, humanities, science, and technology at PTU. In this way, it does not necessarily secularize the PTKI. Instead, it allows institutions to integrate these two scientific clumps, religious and non-religious scholarship, positioned dichotomously. Integration and interconnection in Islamic studies and social-humanities or Islam with science-technology are PTKI's paradigmatic breakthroughs to respond to status changes.

As stated above, the critical and inclusive academic tradition makes the PTKI academic community not dogmatic, literalist, and textual in understanding Religion. This academic attitude makes most of them not easily influenced and exposed to religious radicalism that has also hit higher education institutions. The survey results show that the understanding of religious radicalism targets the PTU academic community more than the PTKI. The results of a study by the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), as corroborating the data described earlier, found that

51 Dina Afrianty, “Islamic Education and Youth Extremism in Indonesia”, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 7:2 (2012), 134-146. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2012.719095

52 However, this does not mean that there are no PTKI graduates who are not exposed to radicalism. Dina Afrianty's findings related to the involvement of alumni of one of the UIN in Indonesia in acts of terrorism, is certainly a note in itself. However, when compared to PTU, the number of academics and PTKI graduates exposed to radicalism is relatively less. Read Dina Afrianty, “Islamic Education and Youth Extremism in Indonesia”, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 7:2 (2012), 134-146. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2012.719095
39 percent of students in Indonesia were categorized as radical.\footnote{Angling Adhitya Purba, “BIN: 3 Universitas Diawasi Khusus Terkait Penyebaran Radikalisme,” \textit{detiknews}, diakses 30 April 2018, https://news.detik.com/read/2018/04/28/162247/3995680/1536/bin-3-universitas-diawasi-khusus-terkait-penyebaran-radikalisme.} The results of the BNPT research also show the exact figure, namely, 39% of students from 15 provinces are attracted to radicalism.\footnote{“Survei BNPT: 39 Persen Mahasiswa Tertarik Paham Radikal | Republika Online,” 39, diakses 30 April 2018, http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/17/07/26/otonj7382-survei-bnpt-39-persen-mahasiswa-tertarik-paham-radikal.}

Second, net work. The critical role of PTKI in mainstreaming religious moderation is supported by the ability of the academic community and alumni to build social networks. Not a few of the academics and activists of PTKI networked with various NGOs, as stated above. From modernist Islamic academics, figures such as Nurcholish Madjid, Mukti Ali, Harun Nasution, Azyumardi Azra, Komarudin Hidayat, and Amin Abdullah have vital networking with Muhammadiyah organizations and some international NGOs. Abdurrahman Wahid, Masdar Farid Mas'udi, Marzuki Wahid, and traditionalist Islamic academics have vital networking with pesantren, NU, Rahima, Fahmina, AMAN, and various other NGOs.

Third, Public Intellectuals. Not a few PTKI academics position themselves as ivory tower scientists. In addition to being campus academics, they also position themselves as public intellectuals who speak a lot, write both opinions and books, and carry out religious literacy based on moderate values on the one hand, and actively counter radicalism on the other. Muslim intellectual figures from the first generation such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Johan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib, Hasbi As-Shiddiqie, Mukti Ali and others, and the second generation such as Azyumardi Azra, Quraish Shihab, Komarudin Hidayat, M. Amin Abdullah, and others, until the third generation such as Noorhaidi Hasan,
Al-Makin, Masdar Hilmy, Achmad Muzakki, Mun'in Sirry, Sumanto Al-Qurtuby, Nadirsyah Hossen, and others, they all include academics who play the role of progressive public intellectuals. However, their discourses of religious thought also played an essential role in strengthening religious moderation in every era.

CONCLUSION

The study results show that PTKI has played a progressive role in strengthening the face of Indonesian Islam, which is moderate, inclusive, and pluralist. This role was pioneered by a small number of progressive Muslim academics and intellectuals in launching the Islamic reform movement in 1970. In the next 20 years (1980-1990), this movement produced quite encouraging results along with changes in the academic world, the religious diversity of the Ummah. Islam and socio-political change. In the academic world, Islamic studies are no longer dominated by dogmatic, textualist, and literalist approaches but also rational, scientific, and contextual approaches by accommodating a variety of disciplines and interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches. In Muslim life, there have been changes in the orientation of the Muslim struggle from power-oriented politics to people-oriented and national-oriented politics. The reform movement that succeeded in overthrowing Suharto's authoritarian regime cannot be separated from the reformist role of intellectuals and PTKI activists.

After the New Order, the challenges faced by PTKI in its struggle to continue to strengthen religious moderation were increasingly severe. The emergence of openness and freedom after the New Order was used by various social groups, including religious radicalism groups, to express their identities and at the same time promote their respective ideologies. Religious violence sponsored by radical groups thrives in coloring public religious spaces in Indonesia. Faced with this new challenge, PTKI remains a progressive actor in strengthening the moderate face of Religion in Indonesia. Compared to the previous period, there was a change in the role of PTKI. If in the New Order period, intellectuals and campus academics played a dominant role,
So far, the role of PTKI in strengthening moderation and, at the same time, stemming the flow of religious radicalism has played an essential role in maintaining the face of moderate Islam in Indonesia. Even though religious radicalism movements strengthened after opening the faucet of freedom after the New Order, thus making some scholars think that Indonesia was in a cycle of conservativism and illiberal democracy, but they still could not completely change the face of Indonesian Islam. Compared to Middle Eastern Muslim countries such as Yemen, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, and others, Indonesia still occupies a position as the largest Muslim country globally, which is plural and democratic.

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