On Instantiating the Algebraic Group Model from Falsifiable Assumptions

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\textbf{Abstract.} We provide a standard-model implementation (of a relaxation) of the algebraic group model (AGM, [Fuchsbauer, Kiltz, Loss, CRYPTO 2018]). Specifically, we show that every algorithm that uses our group is algebraic, and hence “must know” a representation of its output group elements in terms of its input group elements. Here, “must know” means that a suitable extractor can extract such a representation efficiently. We stress that our implementation relies only on falsifiable assumptions in the standard model, and in particular does not use any knowledge assumptions.

As a consequence, our group allows to transport a number of results obtained in the AGM into the standard model, under falsifiable assumptions. For instance, we show that in our group, several Diffie-Hellman-like assumptions (including computational Diffie-Hellman) are equivalent to the discrete logarithm assumption. Furthermore, we show that our group allows to prove the Schnorr signature scheme tightly secure in the random oracle model.

Our construction relies on indistinguishability obfuscation, and hence should not be considered as a practical group itself. However, our results show that the AGM is a realistic computational model (since it can be instantiated in the standard model), and that results obtained in the AGM are also possible with standard-model groups.

\textbf{Keywords:} indistinguishability obfuscation, algebraic group model, Schnorr signatures

\section*{Table of Contents}

1 Introduction ........................................... 2
  1.1 Technical overview .................................. 4
  1.2 Related work .................................. 5

2 Preliminaries ........................................... 6
  2.1 Subset membership problem .......................... 6
  2.2 Dual-mode NIWI .................................. 6
  2.3 Probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation ........ 7
  2.4 Re-randomizable and fully homomorphic encryption .. 8

3 Statistically correct input expanding pIO ............ 9
  3.1 Puncturable PRFs ................................ 11
  3.2 Construction .................................. 13

4 How to simulate extraction – Algebraic Wrappers ... 14
  4.1 Group schemes .................................. 15
  4.2 An algebraic wrapper ............................. 15
  4.3 Construction .................................. 17

5 How to use Algebraic Wrappers – Implementing proofs from the AGM ............................ 24
  5.1 Diffie-Hellman Assumptions ......................... 25
  5.2 Schnorr Signatures ................................ 28
  5.3 Signed ElGamal .................................. 32

\* Supported by ERC Project PREP-CRYPTO 724307.
\** Supported by ERC Project PREP-CRYPTO 724307, and by DFG project GZ HO 4304/4-2.
1 Introduction

The generic group model. In order to analyze the plausibility and relative strength of computational assumptions in cyclic groups, Shoup [Sho97] and Maurer [Mau05] have proposed the generic group model (GGM). In the GGM, any adversary can only interact with the modeled group through an oracle. In particular, all computations in that group must be explicitly expressed in terms of the group operation. To prevent an adversary from locally performing computations, that adversary gets to see only truly random strings (in [Sho97]) or independent handles (in [Mau05]) as representations of group elements.

The discrete logarithm and even many Diffie-Hellman-style problems are hard generically (i.e., when restricting group operations in the above way) [Sho97; MW98]. Hence, the only way to break such a generically hard assumption in a concrete group is to use the underlying group representation in a nontrivial way. In that sense, the GGM can be very useful as a sanity check for the validity of a given assumption, or even the security of a given cryptographic scheme. However, generic groups cannot be implemented: there exist cryptographic schemes that are secure in the GGM, but insecure when instantiated with any concrete group [Den02].

The algebraic group model. The algebraic group model (AGM, [FKL18]) is a relaxation of the GGM that tries to avoid impossibilities as in [Den02] while preserving the GGM’s usefulness. Specifically, the AGM only considers algebraic (rather than generic) adversaries. An algebraic adversary $A$ can make arbitrary use of the representation of group elements, but must supply an explicit decomposition for any of its output group elements in terms of input group elements. In other words, $A$ must also output an explanation of how any group element in its output was computed from its input using the group operation.

Now [FKL18] show that many GGM proofs only use this type of algebraicity of an adversary, and carry over to the AGM. At the same time, GGM impossibilities like [Den02] do not apply to the AGM, since algebraic adversaries are able to work with the actual group (and not only with random or abstract representations of group elements).

The AGM and knowledge assumptions. The AGM is closely related to the notions of knowledge assumptions and extractability. To illustrate, assume that for any (possibly non-algebraic) adversary $A$, we can find an extractor $E$ that manages to extract from $A$ a decomposition of $A$’s output in terms of $A$’s input. Then, composing $E$ and $A$ yields an algebraic adversary $A_{\text{alg}}$. In this situation, we can then say that without loss of generality, any adversary can be assumed to be algebraic. Conversely, any algebraic adversary by definition yields the results of such an extraction in its output.

This observation also provides a blueprint to instantiating the AGM: simply prove that any adversary $A$ can be replaced by an algebraic adversary $A_{\text{alg}}$, possibly using an extraction process as above. If this extraction requires $A$’s code and randomness but no other trapdoor, we obtain an AGM instantiation based on a knowledge assumption such as the knowledge of exponent assumption [Dam92]. Indeed, this was recently done by [KP19] under a very strong generalized version of the knowledge of exponent assumption. Unfortunately, such knowledge assumptions are not falsifiable in the sense of Naor [Nao03]. It is thus not entirely clear how to assess the plausibility of such a universal and strong knowledge assumption. Naturally, the question arises whether an AGM implementation inherently requires such strong and non-falsifiable assumptions. Or, more generally:

Can we achieve knowledge-type properties from falsifiable assumptions?

Note that in the AGM, the discrete logarithm assumption implies the existence of extractable one-way functions (EOWFs) with unbounded auxiliary input. The existence of such EOWFs, however, conflicts with the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation, [BCPR14]. Due to this barrier, we can only hope for an instantiation of some suitably relaxed variant of the AGM from falsifiable assumptions.

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3 Other black-box abstractions of groups with similar ramifications exist [Nec94; BL96].

4 This observation about algebraic adversaries has already been made in [BV98; PV05]. Also, similar but more specific knowledge assumptions have been used to prove concrete cryptographic constructions secure, e.g., [Dam92; HT98; BP04; Den06].
Our strategy: private extraction. There is also another way to instantiate the AGM: show that it is possible to extract a decomposition of A’s outputs from these outputs and a suitable (secret) extraction trapdoor. In other words, our idea is to avoid non-falsifiable knowledge assumptions by assuming that extraction requires a special trapdoor that can be generated alongside the public parameters of the group. This entails a number of technical difficulties (see below), but allows us to rely entirely on falsifiable assumptions.

Specifically, our main result is an algebraic wrapper that transforms a given cyclic group into a new one which allows for an extraction of representations. More specifically, an element of the new group carries an encrypted representation of this group element relative to a fixed basis (i.e., set of group elements). Upon group operations, this representation is updated, and a special trapdoor (generated alongside the public parameters) allows to extract it.

Our results. Our strategy allows us to retrieve several AGM results (from [FKL18; FPS19]) in the standard model, in the sense that the group can be concretely implemented from falsifiable assumptions.\(^5\) In particular, we show that in our group,

- the discrete logarithm assumption, the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, the square Diffie-Hellman assumption, and the linear-combination Diffie-Hellman assumption (see [FKL18]) are all equivalent,
- the security of the Schnorr signature scheme [Sch91] can be tightly reduced to the discrete logarithm assumption escaping impossibility results due to [FJS19]. Similarly, Schnorr-signed ElGamal can be shown tightly IND-CCA2 secure.\(^6\)

While, on a technical level, the AGM proofs from [FKL18; FPS19] need to be adapted, the general AGM proof strategies (that rely on extraction) can be replicated.

Limitations. We note that not all known AGM proofs can be transported to the standard model. For instance, [FKL18] also prove the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham [BLS04] signature scheme tightly secure in the AGM. Their reduction relies on the fact that the view of a signature forger is statistically independent of how simulated signatures are prepared by the reduction. However, with our algebraic wrapper, group elements (and thus BLS signatures) always carry an encrypted representation of how they were generated. In this case, our private extraction strategy also reveals additional (statistical, computationally hidden) information to an adversary. This additional information is problematic in the AGM-based BLS proof of [FKL18]. We believe it is an interesting open problem to obtain a tight security proof for the BLS scheme with our group.\(^7\)

Furthermore, as we will detail below, the amount of information we can extract from a group element is limited by the size of that group element. In particular, in settings in which no a-priori bound on the size of a desired algebraic representation is known, our techniques do not apply. This can be problematic, e.g., for constructions that depend on \(q\)-type assumptions.

Our assumptions. We stress that our algebraic wrapper relies on a strong (but falsifiable) computational assumption: the existence of subexponentially strong indistinguishability obfuscation (subexp-iO).\(^8\) Additionally, we assume a re-randomizable encryption scheme. Together with subexp-iO, this implies a number of other strong primitives that we use: a variant of probabilistic iO (see [CLTV15]), fully homomorphic encryption (see [CLTV15]), and dual-mode non-interactive zero-knowledge (see [HU19]).

Interpretation. Due to their inefficiency, we view algebraic wrappers not as a tool to obtain practical cryptographic primitives. Rather, we believe that algebraic wrappers show that the AGM is a useful and

\(^5\) Note that by “standard model”, we mean that the group itself is formulated without idealizations and can be concretely implemented. While our construction itself does not rely on the ROM, we still can transfer some ROM proofs in the AGM to ROM proofs using our concrete group instantiation. We stress that a standard model instantiation of the (full-fledged) AGM from very strong non-falsifiable assumptions is already known due to [KP19].

\(^6\) Tight security reductions provide a tight relation between the security of cryptographic schemes and the hardness of computational problems. Apart from their theoretical importance, tight reductions are also beneficial for practice, since they allow smaller keylength recommendations.

\(^7\) We note that impossibility results for tight reductions of schemes like BLS (e.g., [Cor00]) do not apply in our case, as the representation of our group elements is not unique.

\(^8\) We note that iO and knowledge assumptions contradict each other [BCPR14]. However, we stress that the notion of private extractability we obtain does not contradict iO.
realistic abstraction and not merely an idealized model which heuristically captures known adversaries: we show that AGM proofs can be replicated in the standard model, and even without resorting to knowledge assumptions.

On implementing idealized models. Replacing idealized (heuristic) models with concrete standard-model implementations is a widely studied intriguing problem. A well-known example for this is the line of work on programmable hash functions. A programmable hash function due to [HK12] is a cryptographic primitive which can be used to replace random oracles in several cryptographic schemes. Following their introduction, a line of work [FHP13; HSW13; HSW14] leveraged multi-linear maps or indistinguishability obfuscation to transport proofs from the random oracle model to the standard model. Our results can be interpreted as following this endeavor by leveraging indistinguishability obfuscation to replace the AGM with a standard model implementation (from falsifiable assumptions). From this angle, our algebraic wrapper relates to the AGM as programmable hash functions relate to the ROM.

1.1 Technical overview

Algebraic wrappers. In the following, we speak of group schemes ([AFHL16], also called encoding schemes in [GGH13]) as a generalization of groups with potentially non-unique encodings of group elements. This implies that a dedicated algorithm is required to determine if two given group elements are equal. Our algebraic wrapping process takes a group $G$ (which we call “base group”) as input, and outputs a new group scheme $H$ which allows for an efficient extraction process. Concretely, every $H$-element $h \in G$, plus auxiliary information $aux$.

Intuitively, $aux$ carries (encrypted) information that allows to express $h$ as a linear combination of fixed base elements $b_1, \ldots, b_n \in G$. The corresponding decryption key (generated alongside the group parameters) allows to extract this information, and essentially yields the information any algebraic adversary (in the sense of the AGM) would have to provide for any output group element. However, we are facing a number of technical problems:

(a) The group operation algorithm should update $aux$ (in the sense that the linear combinations encrypted in the input elements should be added).

(b) Validity of $aux$ should be ensured (so that no adversary can produce an $H$-element from which no valid linear combination can be extracted from $aux$).

(c) It should be possible to switch the basis elements $b_1, \ldots, b_n$ to an application-dependent basis. (For instance, to prove a signature scheme like Schnorr’s [Sch91] secure, one would desire to set the basis vectors to elements from an externally given computational challenge.)

(d) To preserve tightness of reductions from the AGM (which is necessary in some of our applications), it should be possible to re-randomize group element encodings statistically.

Our solution largely follows the group scheme from [AFHL16]. In particular, (a) will be solved by encrypting the coefficients $z_1, \ldots, z_n$ with $h = \sum b_i z_i$ using a homomorphic encryption scheme in $aux$. Hence, such coefficient vectors can be added homomorphically during the group operation. For (b), we will add a suitable non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of consistency in $aux$. For (c), we adapt a “switching” lemma from [AFHL16]. In [AFHL16], that lemma allows to switch between two different representations of the same group element, but under a fixed basis. In our case, we show that similar techniques allow to also switch the group elements that form this basis. This switching property already implies a notion of computational re-randomizability. Finally, for (d), we introduce a re-randomization lemma using techniques from (c) in conjunction with a novel notion for probabilistic iO.

At this point, one main conceptual difference to the line of work [AFHL16; AH18; FHHL18] is that the basis elements $b_1, \ldots, b_n$ appear as part of the functionality of the new group scheme $H$, not only in a proof. In particular, our construction must be able to deal with arbitrary $b_i$ that are not necessarily randomly chosen. This issue is dealt with by additional linear randomization of the base group elements.

9 That is, formally, the group is defined as the quotient set of all well-formed bitstrings modulo the equivalence relation induced by the equality test.

10 Note that this approach is related to [BSW12] in the sense that we restrict the homomorphic operations an adversary can perform on encodings by requiring a consistency proof.
Another main conceptual difference to [AFHLP16; AH18; FHHL18] is the notion of statistical re-randomizability of group elements. The group schemes from [AFHLP16; AH18; FHHL18] do not satisfy this property. This will be resolved by developing a stronger notion of statistically correct probabilistic iO which may be of independent interest.

We note, however, that our techniques are inherently limited in the following sense: our extraction can only extract as much information as contained in (the auxiliary information of) group elements. Technically speaking, we cannot treat settings in which the size of the basis \( b_1, \ldots, b_n \) is not known in advance (e.g., in case of constructions based on \( q \)-type assumptions).

Applications. The applications we consider have already been considered for the AGM in [FKL18; FPS19]. Hence, in this description, we focus on the technical differences that our extraction approach entails for these proofs.

First, recall that in the AGM by [FKL18], an adversary outputs an algebraic representation of each output group element to the basis of its input group elements. Therefore, this basis depends also on the respective security game. On the other hand, in security proofs with our algebraic wrapper, a reduction needs to select such a basis in advance. The appropriate selection of such a basis is one of the main challenges when transferring proofs from the AGM to our setting. Namely, even though the basis as well as the representation of each group element is hidden, the choice of representations will still be information-theoretically known to the adversary. Therefore, security games that are identically distributed in the AGM might only be computationally indistinguishable in the wrapper, depending on the choice of a basis.

When transferring proofs from the AGM to our new group scheme, we thus use a technique we call symmetrization to extend the basis in such a way that security games are identically distributed in the relevant situations. In a nutshell, symmetrization achieves a uniform way to express challenge elements across most games of a security proof, and yields statistical security guarantees.

Another challenge is the implementation of tight security reductions in the wrapper. In some security reductions, the basis of the group and the algebraic representations of oracle responses need to be switched in order to be able to extract a useful algebraic representation. However, as we only achieve computationally indistinguishable group element representations, switching the representations of \( q \) oracle responses would lead to a \( q \)-fold computational loss, compromising the tightness of the reduction.

We show that it is possible to circumvent this loss by constructing oracle responses via the group operation from so-called origin elements, reducing the number of elements whose representation gets switched to a constant. In a nutshell, we derive many coordinated oracle answers from just few group elements (the “origin elements”), such that switching these origin elements affects (and changes) all oracle answers.

1.2 Related work

This work builds upon the line of work [AFHLP16; AH18; FHHL18] who build group schemes from iO. [AFHLP16] lays the conceptual foundations for the construction of group schemes with non-unique encodings from iO and uses this framework to equip groups with multilinear maps. [FHHL18] extends this approach by allowing partial evaluations of the multilinear map yielding a graded encoding scheme. In contrast to [AFHLP16; FHHL18], [AH18] does not extend the functionality of an underlying group, but builds a group scheme with reduced functionality (group elements lack a unique representation). The resulting group scheme allows to mimic commonly used proof techniques from the generic group model. This is demonstrated by proving the validity of an adaptive variant of the Uber assumption family [Boy08] in the constructed group scheme. Our results can hence be viewed as an extension of [AH18].

[KP19] make a first step towards instantiating the AGM. The authors identify an equivalence between the AGM and a very strong generalized version of the knowledge of exponent assumption [Dam92], thus giving rise to the first instantiation of the AGM.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of EC20 for many helpful comments and for pointing out an error in previous versions of Lemmas 9 and 10.
2 Preliminaries

Notation

Throughout this paper $\lambda$ denotes the security parameter. For a natural number $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $[n]$ denotes the set $\{1, \ldots, n\}$. A function $\text{negl} : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is negligible in $\lambda$ if for every constant $c \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists a bound $n_c \in \mathbb{R}$, such that for all $n \geq n_c$, $|\text{negl}(n)| \leq n^{-c}$. Given a finite set $S$, the notation $x \leftarrow S$ means a uniformly random assignment of an element of $S$ to the variable $x$. Given an algorithm $A$, the notation $y \leftarrow A(x)$ means evaluation of $A$ on input of $x$ with fresh random coins and assignment to the variable $y$. The notation $A^{O}$ indicates that the algorithm $A$ is given oracle access to $O$. Given a random variable $B$, $\text{supp}(B)$ denotes the support of $B$.

Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a finite cyclic group with generator $g$ and order $p$. For $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, the notation $[x]_G$ denotes the group element $g^x$. Note that using this notation does not imply knowledge of $x$. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be a field and $V$ be a vector space over $\mathbb{K}$ of finite dimension $n$. For $i \in [n]$, $e_i$ denotes the vector which carries 1 in its $i$-th entry and 0 in all other entries.

In game based proofs, $\text{out}_i$ denotes the output of game $G_i$. Further, we will use this notation to highlight differences to previous hybrids.

2.1 Subset membership problem

Let $\mathcal{L} = (L_\lambda)_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a family of families of languages $L \subseteq X_\lambda$ in a universe $X_\lambda = X$. Further, let $R$ be an efficiently computable witness relation, such that $x \in L$ if and only if there exists a witness $w \in \{0,1\}^{\text{poly}(|x|)}$ with $R(x,w) = 1$ (for a fixed polynomial $\text{poly}$). We assume that we are able to efficiently and uniformly sample elements from $L$ together with a corresponding witness, and that we are able to efficiently and uniformly sample elements from $X \setminus L$.

Definition 1 (Subset membership problem, [CS02]). A subset membership problem $L \subseteq X$ is hard, if for any PPT adversary $A$, the advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{L,A}^{\text{imp}}(\lambda) := \Pr[x \leftarrow L : A(1^\lambda, x) = 1] - \Pr[x \leftarrow X \setminus L : A(1^\lambda, x) = 1]$$

is negligible in $\lambda$.

We additionally require that for every $L$ and every $x \in L$, there exists exactly one witness $r \in \{0,1\}^*$ with $R(x, w) = 1$. Note that given a cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$ of prime order $p$ in which DDH is assumed to hold, the Diffie-Hellman language $L_{((1,x))}_G := \{(y, xy) | y \in \mathbb{Z}_p\}$ (for randomly chosen generators $[1]_G, [x]_G$) satisfies this definition. Another instantiation of Definition 1 is the language containing all commitments to a fixed value using a perfectly binding commitment scheme with unique opening.

2.2 Dual-mode NIWI

A dual-mode NIWI proof system is a variant of NIWI proofs [FS90] offering two computationally indistinguishable modes to setup the common reference string (CRS). A binding mode CRS provides perfect soundness guarantees whereas a hiding mode CRS provides perfect witness indistinguishability guarantees.

Note that there are instantiations of NIWI proof systems without common reference string [BP15]. These instantiations, however, do not satisfy perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability simultaneously.

Definition 2 (Dual-mode NIWI proof system, [GS08; AFHL16]). A dual mode non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) proof system for a relation $R$ is a tuple of PPT algorithms $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{HSetup}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}, \text{Ext})$.

\text{Setup}(1^\lambda). On input of $1^\lambda$, \text{Setup} outputs a perfectly binding common reference string $\text{crs}$ and a corresponding extraction trapdoor $td_{\text{ext}}$.

\text{HSetup}(1^\lambda). On input of $1^\lambda$, \text{HSetup} outputs a perfectly hiding common reference string $\text{crs}$.
We require all with CSX. Definition 3 (to denote efficient sampling according to S family of (efficiently samplable) distributions λ in Let C2.3 Probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation

secure one-way functions and a secure lossy encryption scheme. unstructured assumptions, namely, sub-exponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation, sub-exponentially errors assumption. The recent paper [HU19] proposes an instantiation of (a statistically secure, statistically assumption holds, or the pairing is symmetric and the DLin assumption holds. [PS19] build a (statistically construction [GS08] relies on pairing-friendly groups where either the pairing is asymmetric and the SXDH assumption holds, or the pairing is symmetric and the DLin assumption holds. [PS19] build a (statistically

Perfect witness-indistinguishability under HSetup. For every λ ∈ N, all crs ∈ supp(HSetup(1^λ)), all (x, w0) and (x, w1) with (x, w0), (x, w1) ∈ R, the output distributions of Prove(crs, x, w0) and of Prove(crs, x, w1) are identical.

There are several instantiations of dual-mode NIWI proof systems satisfying the above definition. The construction [GS08] relies on pairing-friendly groups where either the pairing is asymmetric and the SXDH assumption holds, or the pairing is symmetric and the DLin assumption holds. [PS19] build a (statistically secure, statistically extractable and statistically zero-knowledge) dual-mode NIZK from the plain learning with errors assumption. The recent paper [HU19] proposes an instantiation of (a statistically secure, statistically extractable and statistically witness-indistinguishable) dual-mode NIWI proof system based on strong but unstructured assumptions, namely, sub-exponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation, sub-exponentially secure one-way functions and a secure lossy encryption scheme.

2.3 Probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation

Let C = (C_λ)_{λ ∈ N} be a family of sets C_λ of probabilistic circuits. The set C_λ contains circuits of polynomial size in λ with input length n(λ) expecting (at most) m(λ) random bits. A circuit sampler for C is defined as a family of (efficiently samplable) distributions S = (S_λ)_{λ ∈ N}, where S_λ is a distribution over triplets (C_0, C_1, z) with C_0, C_1 ∈ C_λ such that C_0 and C_1 take inputs of the same length and z ∈ {0, 1}^{poly(λ)}. We write S(1^λ) to denote efficient sampling according to S_λ.

Definition 3 (X-ind sampler, [CLTV15]). Let X(λ) be a function upper bounded by 2^λ. The class S^{X-ind}_{X-ind} of X-ind samplers for a circuit family C contains all circuit samplers S = (S_λ)_{λ ∈ N} for C such that for all λ ∈ N, there exists a set X_λ ⊆ {0, 1}^* with |X| ≤ X(λ), such that

X-differing inputs. With overwhelming probability over the choice of (C_0, C_1, z) ← S_λ, for every x /∈ X_λ, for all r ∈ {0, 1}^{m(λ)}, C_0(x; r) = C_1(x; r).

X-indistinguishability. For all (non-uniform) adversaries A, the advantage

X(λ) - \left( \Pr[Exp_{S,A}^{sel-ind}(X(λ)) = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right)

is negligible, where Exp_{S,A}^{sel-ind}(X(λ)) is defined in Figure 1.
Definition 4 (Probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation for a class of samplers \(S\), [CLTV15]). A probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscator for a class of samplers \(S\) over the probabilistic circuit family \(C = (C_\lambda)_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}\) is a uniform PPT algorithm \(\piO\), such that the following properties hold.

Correctness. For every PPT adversary \(A\), every \(C \in C_\lambda\), the advantage of \(A\), given the description of the circuit \(C\), to distinguish oracle access to the original randomized circuit \(C\) from oracle access to \(\piO(C)\) is negligible. Note that \(A\) is not allowed to query the oracle more than once on the same input.

Security with respect to \(S\). For all circuit samplers \(S \in S\), for all PPT adversaries \(A\), the advantage

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{pio-ind}}_{\piO, S, A}(\lambda) := \left\lfloor \text{Pr} \left[ ((C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow S(1^\lambda)) : A(1^\lambda, C_0, C_1, z, \piO(1^\lambda, C_0)) = 1 \right] - \text{Pr} \left[ ((C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow S(1^\lambda)) : A(1^\lambda, C_0, C_1, z, \piO(1^\lambda, C_1)) = 1 \right] \right\rfloor
\]

is negligible.

[CLTV15] present the to date only known construction of \(\piO\) for \(X\)-ind samplers over the family of all polynomial sized probabilistic circuits. Given a probabilistic circuit \(C\) with size at most \(\lambda\), \(\piO(C)\) samples a PRF key \(K\) and obfuscates the deterministic circuit \(\overline{C}\) which on input of \(x\) evaluates the deterministic circuit \(C(x; F(K, x))\). Furthermore, this construction respects the support of the original randomized circuit, i.e. for all circuits \(C \in C_\lambda\), all inputs \(x \in \{0, 1\}^*\) (of matching length), all \(\Lambda \in \text{supp}(\piO(C))\), \(A(x) \in \text{supp}(\overline{C}(x))\).

2.4 Re-randomizable and fully homomorphic encryption

Definition 5 (Public-key encryption (PKE), [Gam85]). An IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme for message space \(M\) is a tuple of algorithms \(\text{PKE} = (\text{KGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})\) such that the following properties are satisfied.

Perfect correctness. For all \((pk, sk) \in \text{supp}(\text{KGen}(1^\lambda))\), all \(m \in M\),

\[
\text{Pr} \left[ \text{Dec}(sk, \text{Enc}(pk, m)) = m \right] = 1.
\]

IND-CPA security. For all legitimate PPT adversaries \(A\),

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{ind-cpa}}_{\text{PKE}, A}(\lambda) := \left\lfloor \text{Pr} \left[ \begin{array}{c} (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KGen}(1^\lambda) \\ (m_0, m_1, st) \leftarrow A(pk) \\ c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m_0) \end{array} : A(pk, c^*, st) = 1 \right] - \text{Pr} \left[ \begin{array}{c} (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KGen}(1^\lambda) \\ (m_0, m_1, st) \leftarrow A(pk) \\ c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m_1) \end{array} : A(pk, c^*, st) = 1 \right] \right\rfloor
\]

is negligible, where legitimate means that \(A\) always outputs two messages \(m_0, m_1 \in M\) of identical length.

Without loss of generality, we assume that \(sk\) is the random tape used for key generation. Therefore, making the random tape of \(\text{KGen}\) explicit, we write \((pk, sk) = \text{KGen}(1^\lambda; sk)\).

A re-randomizable public-key encryption scheme allows to perfectly re-randomize any ciphertext.
Definition 6 (Perfectly re-randomizable public-key encryption, [PR07]). A perfectly re-randomizable public-key encryption scheme with message space \( \{0,1\}^* \) is a tuple of PPT algorithms \( E = (KGen, Enc, Dec, Rerand) \) such that \( (KGen, Enc, Dec) \) is a perfectly correct PKE scheme such that the following additional properties are met:

- For all \( (pk, \cdot) \in \text{supp}(KGen(\lambda)) \), all messages \( m \in \{0,1\}^* \), all ciphertexts \( C \in \text{supp}(Enc(pk, m)) \), \( Rerand(C) \) is distributed identically to \( Enc(pk, m) \).
- For all \( (pk, \cdot) \in \text{supp}(KGen(\lambda)) \), all (maliciously chosen) ciphertexts \( C \), and all \( C' \in \text{supp}(Rerand(C)) \), \( Dec(sk, C') = Dec(sk, C) \).

For our purposes it suffices to let \( E.Rerand \) receive the public key as input. Furthermore, in contrast to [PR07], we do not require that with overwhelming probability over the choice of \( (pk', \cdot) \leftarrow E.KGen(\lambda) \), \( \text{supp}(E.Enc(pk, \cdot)) \cap \text{supp}(E.Enc(pk', \cdot)) = \emptyset \). The ElGamal encryption scheme [Gam85] is a perfectly correct and perfectly re-randomizable public-key encryption scheme.

Fully homomorphic encryption. Let \( C = (C_\lambda)_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) be a family of sets of polynomial sized circuits of arity \( a(\lambda) \), i.e. the set \( C_\lambda \) contains circuits of polynomial size in \( \lambda \). We assume that for any \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \) the circuits in \( C_\lambda \) share the common input domain \( \{0,1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda) \cdot a(\lambda)} \) for a fixed polynomial \( \text{poly}(\lambda) \). A homomorphic encryption scheme enables evaluation of circuits on encrypted data.

Definition 7 (Fully homomorphic public-key encryption (FHE), [Gen09]). A fully homomorphic public-key encryption scheme with message space \( M \subseteq \{0,1\}^* \) for a deterministic circuit family \( C = (C_\lambda)_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) of arity \( a(\lambda) \) and input domain \( \{0,1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda) \cdot a(\lambda)} \) is a tuple of PPT algorithms \( \text{FHE} = (KGen, Enc, Dec, Eval) \) such that \( (KGen, Enc, Dec) \) is a perfectly correct IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme and the following properties are met.

Perfect correctness. For all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), all \( (pk, sk) \in \text{supp}(KGen(\lambda)) \), all \( m_1, \ldots, m_{a(\lambda)} \in M \), all \( c_i \in \text{supp}(Enc(pk, m_i)) \), all \( C \in C_\lambda \), and all \( c \in \text{supp}(Eval(pk, C, c_1, \ldots, c_{a(\lambda)})) \), \( \text{Dec}(sk, c) = C(m_1, \ldots, m_{a(\lambda)}) \).

Compactness. The size of the output of \( \text{Eval} \) is polynomial in \( \lambda \) and independent of the size of the circuit \( C \).

Due to [CLTV15], probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation in conjunction with (slightly super-polynomially secure) perfectly correct and perfectly re-randomizable public-key encryption yields a perfectly correct and perfectly re-randomizable fully homomorphic encryption scheme.

3 Statistically correct input expanding pIO

Looking ahead, we require a notion of statistically correct probabilistic IO. More precisely, we require statistical closeness between evaluations of the original (probabilistic) circuit and the obfuscated (deterministic) circuit. Clearly, in general, this is impossible since the obfuscated circuit is deterministic and hence has no source of entropy other than its input. However, as long as a portion of the circuit’s input is guaranteed to be outside the view of the adversary (and has sufficiently high min-entropy), the output of the obfuscated circuit and the actual probabilistic circuit can be statistically close.

Therefore, we compile probabilistic circuits such that they receive an auxiliary input \( aux \) but simply ignore this input in their computation. Even though the obfuscated circuit is deterministic, the auxiliary input can be used as a source of actual entropy.

First try. We recall that the pIO construction from [CLTV15] obfuscates a probabilistic circuit \( C \) by using IO to obfuscate the deterministic circuit \( \overline{C}(x) := C(x; F_K(x)) \). A natural idea to achieve statistical correctness is to modify this construction such that the auxiliary input \( aux \) is directly XORed on the random tape which is derived using \( F \), i.e. to obfuscate the circuit \( \overline{C}(x, aux; F_K(x) \oplus aux) \). For uniform auxiliary input \( aux \), statistical correctness follows immediately. However, security breaks down. Consider two circuits \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \) such that \( C_1 \) outputs the first bit on its random tape and \( C_2 \) outputs the second bit on its random tape. Since \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \) produce identical output distributions, it is desirable that a probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscator conceals which of the two circuits was obfuscated. However, this construction admits a successful attack. An adversary can evaluate the obfuscated circuit \( A \) on inputs \( (x, aux) \) and \( (x, aux \oplus 1) \). If both evaluations yield identical outputs, \( C_2 \) was obfuscated, otherwise \( C_1 \) was obfuscated.
Using an extracting PRF. Our construction of statistically correct pIO applies an extracting puncturable PRF on the entire input of the circuit to derive the random tape for the probabilistic circuit. An extracting PRF guarantees that PRF outputs are uniformly distributed (even given the PRF key) as long as the input has high min-entropy. This is achieved using a universal hash function and the leftover hash lemma.

**Definition 8 (ℓ-expanding compiler).** An ℓ-expanding compiler \( \mathcal{E}_\ell \) takes as input a probabilistic circuit \( C \) of polynomial size \( p(\lambda) \), expecting inputs \( x \in \{0,1\}^n(\lambda) \) and randomness \( r \in \{0,1\}^m(\lambda) \), and outputs a circuit \( \hat{C} \) of polynomial size \( p'(\lambda) = p(\lambda) + \ell(\lambda) \) expecting inputs \( (x, \text{aux}) \in \{0,1\}^n(\lambda) \times \{0,1\}^\ell(\lambda) \), randomness \( r \in \{0,1\}^m(\lambda) \) such that for all \( x \in \{0,1\}^n(\lambda) \), all \( \text{aux} \in \{0,1\}^\ell(\lambda) \) and all \( r \in \{0,1\}^m(\lambda) \),

\[
C(x; r) = \hat{C}(x, \text{aux}; r).
\]

The compiler \( \mathcal{E}_\ell \) which simply appends \( \ell(\lambda) \) input gates (without any additional edges) to the original circuit satisfies the above definition.

Our construction of pIO will first expand the given circuit as above and then use a slightly modified version of the pIO scheme of [CLTV15] to obfuscate the expanded circuit. In the following we formally define the properties of this expanding probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscator.

**Definition 9 (ℓ-expanding X-ind sampler).** Let \( S \) be a circuit sampler. With \( \hat{S} \) we denote the circuit sampler which on input of \( 1^{p(\lambda)+\ell(\lambda)} \) samples \( (C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow S(1^{p(\lambda)}) \) and outputs the circuits \( \hat{C}_0 := \mathcal{E}_\ell(C_0), \hat{C}_1 := \mathcal{E}_\ell(C_1) \) and auxiliary information \( \hat{z} := (C_0, C_1, z) \). The class \( S^X(\ast) \)-ind of ℓ-expanding X-ind samplers for a circuit family \( C \) contains all circuit samplers \( S = (S_\lambda)_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) for \( C \) such that the circuit sampler \( \hat{S} \) is an X-ind sampler according to Definition 3, i.e., \( \hat{S} \in S^X \)-ind.

We note that since the compilation process of \( \mathcal{E}_\ell \) is reversible, we could actually omit \( C_0, C_1 \) from \( \hat{z} \).

Unfortunately, not all X-ind samplers \( S \) induce a sampler \( \hat{S} \) which also is an X-ind sampler. This is justified by the following observation. In order for \( \hat{S} \) to satisfy the X-differing inputs property, we need to set \( \hat{X}(\lambda) := X(\lambda) \cdot 2^{(\lambda) \leq 2^{p(\lambda)+\ell(\lambda)}, \) where \( p(\lambda) \) is the security parameter used for \( S \). X-indistinguishability, however, requires that \( X(\lambda) \cdot 2^{(\lambda) \cdot \text{Adv}_{S, A}^{\mathcal{X}(\ast)-ind}(p(\lambda) + \ell(\lambda)) \) is negligible (for all PPT adversaries \( A \)). Due to X-indistinguishability of \( S \), we are only guaranteed that \( X(\lambda) \cdot \text{Adv}_{S, A}^{\mathcal{X}(\ast)-ind}(p(\lambda)) \) is negligible (for all PPT adversaries \( A \)), which does not suffice to prove \( \mathcal{X}(\ast)-\text{indistinguishability of } \hat{S} \).

Nevertheless, ℓ-expanding X-ind samplers cover a wide class of circuit samplers. In the following we present two lemmas which facilitate the usage of ℓ-expanding X-ind samplers.

**Lemma 1.** Let \( S \) be a circuit sampler for \( C \) which outputs two circuits \( C_0 \) and \( C_1 \) which always behave exactly identically on identical inputs and random tapes. Then, \( \hat{S} \in S^X(\ast)-\text{ind} \).

**Proof.** Let \( \hat{S} \) be the sampler which on input of \( 1^{p(\lambda)+\ell(\lambda)} \) samples \( (C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow S(1^{p(\lambda)}) \) and outputs \( (\hat{S}_\ell(C_0), \hat{S}_\ell(C_1), (C_0, C_1, z)) \). Let \( X(\lambda) := 0 \) and \( \hat{X} := \emptyset \). Since for all \( x \notin X \), aux \( \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)} \) and \( r \in \{0,1\}^{m(\lambda)} \), \( \hat{S}_\ell(C_0)(x, \text{aux}; r) = C_0(x; r) = C_1(x; r) = \hat{S}_\ell(C_1)(x, \text{aux}; r) \), \( \hat{S} \) satisfies X-differing inputs. Since \( X(\lambda) = 0 \), X-indistinguishability is trivially satisfied. Hence, \( \hat{S} \in S^X \)-ind and, therefore, \( \hat{S} \in S^X(\ast)-\text{ind} \).

**Lemma 2.** Let \( S \) be a circuit sampler for \( C \) which outputs two circuits \( C_0 \) and \( C_1 \) such that for all inputs \( x \), \( C_0(x) \) and \( C_1(x) \) produce the exact same distribution. Then, \( \hat{S} \in S^X(\ast)-\text{ind} \).

**Proof.** Let \( \hat{S} \) be the sampler which on input of \( 1^{p(\lambda)+\ell(\lambda)} \) samples \( (C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow S(1^{p(\lambda)}) \) and outputs \( (\hat{S}_\ell(C_0), \hat{S}_\ell(C_1), (C_0, C_1, z)) \). Let \( X(\lambda) := 2^{p(\lambda)+\ell(\lambda)} \) and \( \hat{X} := \{0,1\}^{p(\lambda)+\ell(\lambda)} \). Since there is no input for the circuits which is outside of \( X \), X-differing inputs is trivially satisfied. Furthermore, as for all inputs \( x \) the distributions \( C_0(x) \) and \( C_1(x) \) are identical, the same holds for the distributions \( \hat{S}_\ell(C_0)(x, \text{aux}) \) and \( \hat{S}_\ell(C_1)(x, \text{aux}) \) for all inputs \( x \) and all \( \text{aux} \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)} \). Thus, for all adversaries \( A \), \( \text{Exp}_{\hat{S}, A}^{\mathcal{X}(\ast)-\text{ind}}(p(\lambda) + \ell(\lambda)) = \frac{1}{2} \).

Hence, \( \hat{S} \in S^X \)-ind and, therefore, \( \hat{S} \in S^X(\ast)-\text{ind} \).

Our expanding pIO scheme satisfies similar correctness and security properties as defined in [CLTV15] but additionally guarantees statistical correctness.

\(^{11}\) Note that \( \hat{S} \) is called with security parameter \( p(\lambda) + \ell(\lambda) \) to compensate for the expanded circuits.
Definition 10 ($\ell$-expanding pIO for the class of samplers $S$). An $\ell$-expanding probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscator for the class of samplers $S$ over $C = (C_\lambda)_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a uniform PPT algorithm $\piO^*_S$, satisfying the following properties.

Input expanding correctness. For all PPT adversaries $A$, all circuits $C \in C$,
\[
\left| \Pr[A^{O_c(\cdot)}(1^\lambda, C) = 1] - \Pr[A \leftarrow \piO^*_S(1^{p(\lambda)}, C) : A^{O_c(\cdot)}(1^\lambda, C) = 1] \right|
\]
is negligible, where the oracles must not be called twice on the same input $(x, aux)$.

\[
O_{C}(x, aux) \quad \text{return} \quad C(x; r)
\]

\[
O_{A}(x, aux) \quad \text{return} \quad A(x, aux)
\]

Security with respect to $S$. For all circuit samplers $S \in S$, for all PPT adversaries $A$, the advantage
\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{pio-ind}(\cdot)}^{\piO^*_{S,A}}(\lambda) :=
\left| \Pr \left[ (C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow S(1^\lambda) : A(1^\lambda, C_0, C_1, z, \piO^*_S(1^{p(\lambda)}, C_0)) = 1 \right] \right|
- \left| \Pr \left[ (C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow S(1^\lambda) : A(1^\lambda, C_0, C_1, z, \piO^*_S(1^{p(\lambda)}, C_1)) = 1 \right] \right|
\]
is negligible in $\lambda$.

Support respecting. For all circuits $C \in C_\lambda$, all inputs $x \in \{0,1\}^{n(\lambda)}$, all aux $\in \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}$, all $A \in \supp(\piO^*_S(1^{p(\lambda)}, C))$, $A(x, aux) \in \supp(C(x))$.

Statistical correctness with error $2^{-\epsilon(\lambda)}$. For all circuits $C \in C_\lambda$ and all joint distributions $(X_1, X_2)$ over $\{0,1\}^{n(\lambda)} \times \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}$ with average min-entropy $\ell(\lambda) \geq H_\infty(X_2 \mid X_1) > m(\lambda) + 2e(\lambda) + 2$, the statistical distance between
\[
\left\{ \left( A \leftarrow \piO^*_S(1^{p(\lambda)}, C) : (A, A(X_1, X_2)) \right) \right\}
\]
and
\[
\left\{ \left( A \leftarrow \piO^*_S(1^{p(\lambda)}, C) : (A, C(X_1; U_{m(\lambda)})) \right) \right\}
\]
is at most $2^{-\epsilon(\lambda)}$.

Setting $\ell := 0$ recovers the original definition of pIO for X-ind samplers due to [CLTV15]. Furthermore, instantiating an easy modification of the construction of pIO for $S^{X\text{-ind}}$ due to [CLTV15] with a suitably extracting PRF family satisfies our definition of $\ell$-expanding pIO.

3.1 Puncturable PRFs

As preparation for our construction, we introduce several variants of puncturable pseudorandom functions (pPRFs). Puncturable PRFs allow to puncture a key at a certain amount of inputs, such that the punctured key works on all remaining inputs as before. Furthermore, evaluations at punctured points are pseudorandom even given the punctured key.

Definition 11 (Puncturable PRF, [GGM84; BW13; BGI14; KPTZ13]). A puncturable family of PRFs is a tuple of PPT algorithms $F = (\text{Key}, \text{Puncture}, \text{Eval})$ and two computable functions $m(\lambda), m(\lambda)$ satisfying the following properties.

Functionality preserved under puncturing. For all PPT adversaries $A$ such that $A(1^\lambda)$ outputs a set $S \subseteq \{0,1\}^{n(\lambda)}$, for all $x \not\in S$, all $K \in \supp(\text{Key}(1^\lambda))$ and all $K_S \in \supp(\text{Puncture}(K, S))$ we have
\[
\text{Eval}(K, x) = \text{Eval}(K_S, x).
\]

Pseudorandom at punctured points. For all PPT adversaries $(A_1, A_2)$, we have
\[
\left| \Pr[A_2(s, K_S, \text{Eval}(K, S)) = 1] - \Pr[A_2(s, K_S, U_{m(\lambda) \cdot |S|}) = 1] \right|
\]
is negligible, where the probabilities are over $(S, s) \leftarrow A_1(1^\lambda), K \leftarrow \text{Key}(1^\lambda), K_S \leftarrow \text{Puncture}(K, S)$ and $U_{m(\lambda) \cdot |S|}$.
For ease of notation we often write \( F(K,x) \) to denote \( F.\text{Eval}(K,x) \).

**Definition 12 (Statistically injective puncturable PRF, [SW14]).** A statistically injective puncturable PRF family with error \( \epsilon(\cdot) \) is a family of puncturable PRFs \( F \) mapping \( n(\lambda) \) bits to \( m(\lambda) \) bits such that \( F(K,\cdot) \) is injective with probability at least \( 1 - \epsilon(\lambda) \).

**Lemma 3 ([SW14]).** If one-way functions exist, then for all efficiently computable functions \( n(\cdot), m(\cdot), \epsilon(\cdot) \) such that \( m(\lambda) \geq 2n(\lambda) + \epsilon(\lambda) \), there exists a statistically injective puncturable PRF family with error \( 2^{-\epsilon(\lambda)} \) mapping \( n(\lambda) \) bits to \( m(\lambda) \) bits.

**Definition 13 (Average min-entropy, [DORS08]).** Let \((X,Z)\) be a joint distribution. The average min-entropy of \( X \) conditioned on \( Z \) is

\[
\tilde{H}_\infty(X \mid Z) := -\log(\max_{z \sim Z} \Pr[X = x]).
\]

As already indicated, we instantiate the construction of [CLTV15] with a pPRF which allows to use the entropy provided via the auxiliary input \( \text{aux} \) such that the obfuscated circuit is evaluated with statistically uniform random coins. The following definition captures this pPRF property.

**Definition 14 (Special extracting puncturable PRF, [SW14]).** A special extracting puncturable PRF family with error \( \epsilon(\cdot) \) for average min-entropy \( k(\cdot) \) is a family of puncturable PRFs \( F \) mapping \( n(\lambda) = n'(\lambda) + n''(\lambda) \) bits to \( m(\lambda) \) bits such that for all \( \lambda \) and all joint distributions \((X_1, X_2)\) over \( \{0,1\}^{n(\lambda)} \times \{0,1\}^{n''(\lambda)} \) with average min-entropy \( \tilde{H}_\infty(X_2 \mid X_1) > k(\lambda) \), the statistical distance between

\[
\{ K \leftarrow \text{Key}(1^\lambda): (K, X_1, F(K, X)) \} \text{ and } \{ K \leftarrow \text{Key}(1^\lambda): (K, X_1, U_{m(\lambda)}) \}
\]

is at most \( \epsilon(\lambda) \), where \( X := (X_1, X_2) \).

The leftover hash lemma states that universal hash functions are good randomness extractors. In other words, if the input of a universal hash function has sufficiently high (average) min-entropy, the output of that hash function is statistically close to uniform even given the function description.

**Lemma 4 (Leftover Hash Lemma for average min-entropy, [HILL99]).** Let \( \mathcal{H} \) be a 2-universal hash function family mapping \( n \) to \( m \) bits. If \( \tilde{H}_\infty(X \mid E) \geq k \) and \( m = k - 2 \log(\frac{1}{\epsilon}) \), then \( \Delta(\{ H \leftarrow \mathcal{H}: (H, E, H(X)) \}; \{ H \leftarrow \mathcal{H}: (H, E, U_m) \}) \leq \epsilon \).

Looking ahead, we need that the statistical distance between

\[
\{ H \leftarrow \mathcal{H}: (H, E, H(X)) \} \text{ and } \{ H \leftarrow \mathcal{H}: (H, E, U_m) \}
\]

is at most \( \epsilon \). Since \( \tilde{H}_\infty(X \mid E) = \tilde{H}_\infty((X, E) \mid E) \), this is implied by Lemma 4.

**Theorem 1.** If one-way functions exist, then for all efficiently computable functions \( n'(\cdot), n''(\cdot), m(\cdot), k(\cdot) \) and \( \epsilon(\cdot) \) such that \( n = n' + n'' \geq k \geq m + 2\epsilon + 2 \), there exists a special extracting puncturable PRF family mapping \( n \) bits to \( m \) bits with error \( 2^{-\epsilon} \) for average min-entropy \( k \).

**Proof.** The proof is very similar to [SW14]. Let \( F \) be a family of statistically injective puncturable PRFs with error \( 2^{-\epsilon} \) mapping \( n \) bits to \( 2n + \epsilon + 1 \) bits. By Lemma 3, such a PRF family exists from one-way functions. Let \( \mathcal{H} \) be a family of 2-universal hash functions mapping \( 2n + \epsilon + 1 \) bits to \( m \) bits. We define a family \( F' \) of puncturable PRFs as follows.

- \( F'.\text{Key}(1^\lambda) \)
- \( h \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \)
- \( K \leftarrow F.\text{Key}(1^\lambda) \)
- return \( K' := (K, h) \)

- \( F'.\text{Eval}(K', x) \)
- return \( h(F.\text{Eval}(K, x)) \)

- \( F'.\text{Puncture}(K', S) \)
- \( K_S \leftarrow F.\text{Puncture}(K, S) \)
- return \( K'_S := (K_S, h) \)
Due to [SW14], $F'$ is a family of puncturable PRFs mapping $n$ bits to $m$ bits.

Let $(X_1, X_2)$ be a joint distribution over $\{0, 1\}^n = \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^{n'}$ such that $\mathbb{H}_\infty(X_2 \mid X_1) \geq m + 2\epsilon + 2$. Fix a key $K$ such that $F(K, \cdot)$ is injective. Hence, $\mathbb{H}_\infty(X_2 \mid X_1) = \mathbb{H}_\infty(F(K, (X_1, X_2)) \mid X_1)$. Lemma 4 implies that the statistical distance between

$$\{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}: (h, X_1, h(F(K, (X_1, X_2))))\} \text{ and } \{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}: (h, X_1, U_m)\}$$

is at most $2^{-(\epsilon+1)}$. The probability that a randomly sampled key $K$ yields a non-injective PRF is at most $2^{-(\epsilon+1)}$. Therefore, the statistical distance between

$$\{K' \leftarrow F'.\text{Key}(1^\lambda): (K', X_1, F'(K', (X_1, X_2)))\}$$

and

$$\{K' \leftarrow F'.\text{Key}(1^\lambda): (K', X_1, U_m)\}$$

is at most $2^{-\epsilon}$.

\[\square\]

### 3.2 Construction

**piO$(1^\lambda, C)$**

\[
X' := (\lambda \log^2(\lambda))^{1/\epsilon} \quad \text{piO'}$_1$(1$^\lambda$, $C$)
\]

\[
K \leftarrow F'.\text{Key}(1^\lambda) \quad C := E(C)
\]

\[
\text{let } E[C, K](x) := C(x; F(K, x)) \quad \Lambda \leftarrow \text{piO}(1^\lambda+\ell(\lambda), \tilde{C})
\]

\[
\Lambda \leftarrow \text{iO}(1^{\lambda'}, E[C, K]) \quad \text{return } \Lambda
\]

**piO$(1^\lambda, C)$**

\[
\text{Fig. 2: Construction of piO for } X\text{-ind samplers from [CLTV15] (left) and of } \ell\text{-expanding piO (right), both definitions for circuits of size } \lambda. \text{ The polynomial } q(X') \text{ denotes an upper bound on the size of } E[C, K] \text{ and } F \text{ denotes a special extracting sub-exponentially secure pPRF with distinguishing gap } 2^{-\lambda'} \text{ (for a constant } \epsilon). \]

Figure 2 defines our construction of an $\ell$-expanding piO scheme piO$^*_\ell$. We use the piO scheme for $X$-ind samplers piO from [CLTV15] instantiated with a special extracting pPRF as a subroutine. Note that as in [CLTV15], the security parameter used for the obfuscator needs to be scaled to the supported circuit size.

**Theorem 2.** Let $\epsilon$ be an efficiently computable function. Let $F$ be a sub-exponentially secure special extracting PRF family with distinguishing advantage $2^{-\lambda'}$ (for some constant $\epsilon$) and error $2^{-\epsilon(\lambda)}$ mapping $n(\lambda) = n'(\lambda)+\ell(\lambda)$ bits to $m(\lambda)$ bits which is extracting if the input average min-entropy is greater than $m(\lambda)+2\epsilon(\lambda)+2$. Let piO denote the construction of piO from [CLTV15] instantiated with $F$. Then, piO$^*_\ell$ as defined in Figure 2 is a statistically correct input expanding piO for the class of samplers $S_{X-\ell}$. \[\]

**Proof.** We recall that due to [CLTV15], piO is correct and secure with respect to $X$-ind samplers.

**Input expanding correctness.** Note that input expanding correctness does not follow in a black-box manner from the correctness of piO since input expanding correctness allows an adversary to query the randomized circuit multiple times on the same input $x$ using different auxiliary inputs aux. This can not be simulated by an adversary on correctness of piO.

Input expanding correctness follows from pseudorandomness of the PRF used in the construction of piO. Let $G_0$ denote the game in which the adversary gets $C$ as input and has oracle access to $O_C(\cdot, \cdot)$ and let $G_1$ denote the game in which the adversary gets $C$ as input and has oracle access to $O_{\Lambda}(\cdot, \cdot)$ for $\Lambda \leftarrow \text{piO}^*_\ell(1^\lambda, C)$. Consider an intermediate game $H$, where the oracle $O_{\Lambda}(x, \text{aux})$ evaluates $\tilde{C}(x, \text{aux}; R(x, \text{aux}))$ for a truly random function $R$. By the security of the PRF $F$, oracle access to $F(K, \cdot)$ (for a randomly sampled key $K$) and a truly random function are indistinguishable. Hence, by perfect correctness of iO and the security of $F$, $G_1$ and $H$ are indistinguishable. Furthermore, since $\tilde{C}(x, \text{aux}; R(x, \text{aux})) = C(x; R(x, \text{aux}))$, $H$ and $G_0$ are identically distributed.

**Security with respect to $S_{X-\ell}$.** Since piO is secure with respect to $X$-ind samplers (and $E(C) \in C$), piO$^*_\ell$ is secure with respect to expanding $X$-ind samplers.
More formally, let \( S \in S^X^{-(*)\text{-ind}} \) be a circuit sampler and let \( A \) be an adversary on the security of \( \piO^*_f \). We construct a circuit sampler \( \hat{S} \) (as described above) and an adversary \( B \) on the security of \( \piO \). \( \hat{S} \) on input of \( 1^\lambda \), calls \( S(1^\lambda) \) to obtain \( (C_0, C_1, z) \) and outputs \( (E \ell(C_0), E \ell(C_1), \hat{z} := (z, C_0, C_1)) \). On input of \( (E \ell(C_0), E \ell(C_1), \hat{z}, A) \), \( B \) calls \( A \) on input of \( (C_0, C_1, z, A) \) and outputs \( A \)'s output. Hence, for \( b \in \{0, 1\} \),
\[
\Pr \left[ (C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow S(1^\lambda): A(1^\lambda, C_0, C_1, z, \piO^*_f(1^\lambda, C_b)) = 1 \right] = \Pr \left[ (E \ell(C_0), E \ell(C_1), (C_0, C_1, z)) \leftarrow \hat{S}(1^\lambda): B(1^\lambda, E \ell(C_0), E \ell(C_1), (C_0, C_1, z), \piO(1^\lambda, E \ell(C_b))) = 1 \right].
\]

Therefore, for all \( S \in S^{X^{-(*)\text{-ind}}} \), all PPT adversaries \( A \), there exists a sampler \( \hat{S} \in S^X_{\text{ind}} \) and a PPT adversary \( B \) such that
\[
\text{Adv}_{\piO^*_f, S, A}^{\text{pio-ind}(\ast)}(\lambda) = \text{Adv}_{\piO^*_f, \hat{S}, B}^{\text{pio-ind \text{-ind}}} (\lambda)
\]
which is negligible since \( \hat{S} \in S^X_{\text{ind}} \).

**Support respecting.** Follows directly by the definition.

**Statistical correctness with error** \( 2^{-e(\lambda)} \). Let \( e(\lambda) \) be an efficiently computable function. Let \( C \in \mathcal{C} \) be a circuit expecting inputs \( x \in \{0, 1\}^n(\lambda) \) and randomness \( r \in \{0, 1\}^m(\lambda) \), and let \( \tilde{C} := E \ell(C) \) be its corresponding \( \ell \)-expanded circuit. Let \( X := (X_1, X_2) \) be a joint distribution over \( \{0, 1\}^n(\lambda) \times \{0, 1\}^\ell(\lambda) \) with average min-entropy \( \ell(\lambda) \geq \tilde{H}_\infty(X_2 \mid X_1) > m(\lambda) + 2e(\lambda) + 2 \). Then, by Theorem 1, the statistical distance between
\[
\{K \leftarrow \text{Key}(1^\lambda): (K, X_1, F(K, X))\} \text{ and } \{K \leftarrow \text{Key}(1^\lambda): (K, X_1, U_{m(\lambda)})\}
\]
is at most \( 2^{-e(\lambda)} \). Since, for all distributions \( A, B \) and for every randomized function \( f \), the statistical distance between \( f(A) \) and \( f(B) \) is upper bounded by the statistical distance between \( A \) and \( B \), we have that the statistical distance between
\[
\{K \leftarrow \text{Key}(1^\lambda): (K, C(X_1; F(K, X)))\} \text{ and } \{K \leftarrow \text{Key}(1^\lambda): (K, C(X_1; U_{m(\lambda)}))\}
\]
and the statistical distance between
\[
\{\Lambda \leftarrow \piO^*_f(C): (\Lambda, C(X_1; F(K, X)))\} \text{ and } \{\Lambda \leftarrow \piO^*_f(C): (\Lambda, C(X_1; U_{m(\lambda)}))\}
\]
are at most \( 2^{-e(\lambda)} \).

It seems plausible that our construction also achieves security with respect to \( X \)-ind samplers. This, however, would come at the cost of a non-black box proof reproducing the hybrid argument of [CLTV15].

## 4 How to simulate extraction – Algebraic Wrappers

In order to instantiate the AGM, we need to first find a way to conceptualize what it means to be a group in a cryptographic sense. This is captured by the notion of a group scheme or encoding scheme, [GGH13]. In a nutshell, a group scheme provides an interface of algorithms abstracting the handling of a cryptographic group. As we want to prove hardness of certain problems based on hardness assumptions in an already existing base group, we incorporate this existing group into our group scheme.

More specifically, we introduce the concept of an algebraic wrapper, i.e. a group scheme that allows to extract a representation which – similar to the AGM – can be used in a security reduction. A similar approach has already been taken by [KP19]. [KP19] define their group scheme as a linear subspace of \( \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \) for an existing group \( \mathbb{G} \) in such a way that the Generalized Knowledge of Exponent Assumption (GKEA) can be used to extract a representation (membership can for instance be tested via a symmetric pairing). Hence, that group scheme can also be viewed as an extension, or a wrapper, for the underlying base group. However, [KP19] relies on GKEA in the base group which more or less directly yields an equivalence between algebraic
groups and GKEA. The existence of algebraic groups, however, implies the existence of extractable one-way functions with unbounded auxiliary input (since the AGM allows an additional unstructured input from \(\{0,1\}^*\)) which in turn conflicts with the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation, [BCPR14]. Due to this contradiction and the difficulty to assess the plausibility of knowledge-type assumptions, we strive for a weaker model which can purely be based on falsifiable assumptions.

**Extraction trapdoors.** In [KP19], extraction is possible as long as the code and the randomness which where used to produce a group element are known. Since we strive to avoid knowledge-type assumptions, we need to find a different mechanism of what enables extraction. We observe that in order to reproduce proof strategies from the algebraic group model, extraction is only necessary during security reductions. Since the reduction to some assumption in the base group is in control of the group parameters of the wrapper, the reduction may use corresponding trapdoor information which we define to enable extraction. We call this notion private extractability.

### 4.1 Group schemes

A group scheme or encoding scheme [GGH13] abstracts the properties of mathematical groups used in cryptography. Group schemes have recently been studied in [AFHL16; AH18; FHH18; KP19]. In contrast to traditional groups, group elements are not bound to be represented by a unique bitstring (henceforth referred to as encoding). This allows to encode auxiliary information inside group elements.

Formally, a group scheme \(\mathbb{H}\) consists of the algorithms \((\text{GGen}_\mathbb{H}, \text{Sam}_\mathbb{H}, \text{Val}_\mathbb{H}, \text{Add}_\mathbb{H}, \text{Eq}_\mathbb{H}, \text{GetID}_\mathbb{H})\). A group generation algorithm \(\text{GGen}_\mathbb{H}\), which given \(1^\lambda\), samples group parameters \(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}\). A sampling algorithm \(\text{Sam}_\mathbb{H}\), given the group parameters and an additional parameter determining the exponent of the desired group element, produces an encoding corresponding to that exponent. A validation algorithm \(\text{Val}_\mathbb{H}\), given the group parameters and a bitstring, decides whether the given bitstring is a valid encoding. The algorithm \(\text{Add}_\mathbb{H}\) implements the group operation, i.e. expects the group parameters and two encodings as input and produces an encoding of the resulting group element. Since group elements do not necessarily possess unique encodings, the equality testing algorithm \(\text{Eq}_\mathbb{H}\) enables to test whether two given encodings correspond to the same group element (with respect to the given group parameters). Note that \(\text{Eq}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \cdot)\) defines an equivalence relation on the set of valid bitstrings. Finally, again compensating for the non-unique encodings, a group scheme describes a “get-identifier” algorithm which given the group parameters and an encoding of a group element, produces a bitstring which is unique for all encodings of the same group element.\(^{12}\) Note that \(\text{Eq}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, a, b)\) can be implemented using \(\text{GetID}_\mathbb{H}\) by simply comparing \(\text{GetID}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, a)\) and \(\text{GetID}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, b)\) as bitstrings. The “get-identifier” algorithm compensates for the potential non-uniqueness of encodings and allows to extract, for instance, symmetric keys from group elements.

For a group scheme it is required that the quotient set
\[
\{a \in \{0,1\}^* \mid \text{Val}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, a) = 1\}_/\text{Eq}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \cdot)
\]
equipped with the operation defined via \(\text{Add}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \cdot, \cdot)\) defines a mathematical group (with overwhelming probability over the choice of \(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H} \leftarrow \text{GGen}_\mathbb{H}(1^\lambda)\)). We say that an \(a\) is (an encoding of) a group element (relative to \(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}\)), written as \(a \in \mathbb{H}\), if and only if \(\text{Val}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, a) = 1\).

A group scheme requires that encodings corresponding to the same group element are computationally indistinguishable as formalized by the “Switching Lemma(s)” in [AFHL16; AH18; FHH18].

Due to the non-uniqueness of encodings, we henceforth use the notation \(\hat{a}\) to denote an encoding of a group element.

### 4.2 An algebraic wrapper

Given a cyclic group, an algebraic wrapper is a group scheme which equips a given group \(G\) with a notion of extractability while preserving its group structure and complexity theoretic hardness guarantees. In particular, we achieve a property which we refer to as “private extractability” with respect to a given set of group elements.

\(^{12}\) Previous work refers to this algorithm as “extraction algorithm”. However, in order not to overload the word “extraction”, we rename this algorithm in this work.
elements in the base group. More precisely, the group generation algorithm expects group parameters $p_{pp_G}$ of the base group together with a set of group elements $[b]_G \in G^n$ in that base group, henceforth referred to as basis, and produces group parameters $p_{pp_{\widehat{G}}}$ of the wrapper group together with a corresponding trapdoor $\tau_H$. This trapdoor enables to extract a representation with respect to the basis $[b]_G$ from every encoding. Looking ahead, this property will allow to implement proof strategies of the algebraic group model, [FKL18].

More precisely, encodings can be seen to always carry computationally hidden representation vectors with respect to the basis $[b]_G$. The private extraction recovers this representation vector. Given the trapdoor, we require that it is possible to “privately” sample encodings which carry a specific dictated representation vector. We require that publicly sampled encodings and privately sampled encodings are computationally indistinguishable. We refer to this property as “switching”. In order to preserve tightness of security reductions when implementing AGM proofs with our algebraic wrapper, we require a statistical re-randomization property.

Furthermore, we require that representation vectors compose additively (in $Z^n_p$) with the group operation and do not change when encodings are re-randomized.

Let $B_{pp_G}^n := \{ ([1]_G, [x_2]_G, \ldots, [x_n]_G) \tau \in G^n \mid x_2, \ldots, x_n \in Z_p \}$ be the set of what we call “legitimate basis vectors”. Note that we require the first group element to be the generator of the group. This is necessary to allow public sampling.

**Definition 15 (Algebraic wrapper for $G$).** An algebraic wrapper $\Pi$ for $G$ is a tuple of PPT algorithms $(\text{GGen}_G, \text{Sam}_G, \text{Val}_G, \text{Add}_G, \text{Eq}_G, \text{Get}_G, \text{Rerand}_G, \text{PrivSam}_G, \text{PrivExt}_G, \text{Unwrap}_G)$ such that $(\text{GGen}_G, \text{Sam}_G, \text{Val}_G, \text{Add}_G, \text{Eq}_G, \text{Get}_G, \text{Rerand}_G, \text{PrivSam}_G, \text{Unwrap}_G)$ constitutes a group scheme and the following properties are satisfied.

$G$-wrapping. The algorithm $\text{Unwrap}_G(\pi, \cdot)$ is deterministic and for all $\pi \in \text{GGen}_G(1^\lambda)$, all $[b]_G \in B_{pp_G}^n$, all $(\pi, \tau) \in \text{supp}(\text{GGen}_G(1^\lambda))$, $\text{Unwrap}_G(\pi, \cdot)$ defines a group isomorphism from $\Pi$ to $G$.

Extractability. The algorithm $\text{PrivExt}_G$ is deterministic. Furthermore, for all $\pi \in \text{GGen}_G(1^\lambda)$, all $[b]_G \in B_{pp_G}^n$, all $(\pi, \tau) \in \text{supp}(\text{GGen}_G(1^\lambda))$, we require that $\text{PrivExt}_G$ always extracts a representation of $[x]_G$ with respect to $[b]_G$, i.e. for $x := \text{PrivExt}_G(\tau_G, \pi)$, $[x \cdot b]_G = \text{Unwrap}_G(\pi, \pi, \pi)$.

Correctness of extraction. For all $\pi \in \text{supp}(\text{GGen}_G(1^\lambda))$, all $[b]_G \in B_{pp_G}^n$, all $(\pi, \tau) \in \text{supp}(\text{GGen}_G(1^\lambda))$, all $\hat{\tau} \in \Pi$, we require that $\text{PrivExt}_G$ respects the group operation in the sense that for all $\hat{\tau}_2 \in \text{supp}(\text{Add}_G(\pi, \tau, \hat{\tau}))$, $z^{(1)} = \text{PrivExt}_G(\tau_G, \pi, \tau_G)$ satisfy $z^{(2)} = z^{(1)} + z^{(1)}$. Furthermore, for all $\pi \in \text{supp}(\text{GGen}_G(1^\lambda))$, all $[b]_G \in B_{pp_G}^n$, all $(\pi, \tau) \in \text{supp}(\text{GGen}_G(1^\lambda))$, all $\hat{\tau} \in \Pi$, we require that re-randomization does not interfere with private extraction in the sense that for all $\hat{\tau} \in \text{supp}(\text{Rerand}_G(\pi, \pi, \pi))$, $\text{PrivExt}_G(\tau_G, \pi, \pi) = \text{PrivExt}_G(\tau_G, \pi, \pi)$.

Correctness of sampling. For all $\pi \in \text{supp}(\text{GGen}_G(1^\lambda))$, all $[b]_G \in B_{pp_G}^n$, all $(\pi, \tau) \in \text{supp}(\text{GGen}_G(1^\lambda))$, we require that

- for all $v \in Z^n_p$, $\text{Pr}[\text{PrivExt}_G(\tau_G, \pi, \text{PrivSam}_G(\tau_G, \pi, v)) = v] = 1$, and
- for all $x \in Z^n_p$, $\text{Pr}[\text{PrivExt}_G(\tau_G, \pi, \text{PrivSam}_G(\tau_G, \pi, x \cdot e_1)) = x \cdot e_1] = 1$.

$k$-Switching. We say a PPT adversary $A$ is a legitimate $k$-switching adversary if on input of base group parameters $p_{pp_G}$, $A$ outputs two bases $([b]^{(i)}_G)_{i \in \{0,1\}}$ and two lists comprising $k$ representation vectors $(v^{(i)}(j), i \in \{0,1\})$ such that $[b]^{(0)}_G, [b]^{(1)}_G \in B_{pp_G}^n$, $v^{(0)}(i), v^{(1)}(i) \in Z^n_p$ for some $n \in N$ and all $i \in [k]$ and $\text{Exp}_G(\tau_G, \pi, \tau_G, \pi, v^{(0)}(i), [v^{(0)}(i)]_G = \text{Exp}_G(\tau_G, \pi, \tau_G, \pi, v^{(1)}(i), [v^{(1)}(i)]_G)$ for all $i \in [k]$.

For all legitimate $k$-switching PPT adversaries $\lambda$, $\text{Adv}_{G, A}^{k\text{-switching}}(\lambda) := \text{Pr}[^{k\text{-switching}}_{G, A, 0}(\lambda) = 1] - \text{Pr}[^{k\text{-switching}}_{G, A, 1}(\lambda) = 1]$ is negligible, where $\text{Exp}_G(\tau_G, \pi, \pi, \pi, v^{(0)}(i), \pi)$ is defined in Figure 3.

Statistically re-randomizable. We say an unbounded adversary $A$ is a legitimate re-randomization adversary if on input of base group parameters $p_{pp_G}$, $A$ outputs $[b]_G$ and a state $s$ such that $[b]_G \in B_{pp_G}^n$, and, in a second phase, $A$ on input of $([pp_G], \rho_G, s)$ outputs two valid encodings $\pi_0, \pi_1$ (and a state $s$) such that $\text{PrivExt}_G(\tau_G, \pi_0) = \text{PrivExt}_G(\tau_G, \pi_1)$.

For all unbounded legitimate re-randomization adversaries $A$, $\text{Adv}_{G, A}^{rerand}(\lambda) := \text{Pr}[^{rerand}_{G, A, 0}(\lambda) = 1] - \text{Pr}[^{rerand}_{G, A, 1}(\lambda) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2^k}$.
The relations $\Val_r$ for $b \in \{0,1\}$ is defined in Figure 3.

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Exp}_{\text{rand},b} (\lambda) & \text{Exp}_{\text{k-switching},b} (\lambda) \\
\hline
pp_G & pp_G \\
\langle [b]_G, st \rangle & \langle [b]_G, st \rangle \\
\langle pp_G, \tau_{bl} \rangle & \langle pp_G, \tau_{bl} \rangle \\
\hat{h} & \hat{h}' \\
\text{return } \mathcal{A}(\hat{h}, st) & \text{return } \mathcal{A}(\hat{h}', st) \\
\end{array}
\]

Fig. 3: The re-randomization and k-switching games.

For simplicity we require that encodings are always in $\{0,1\}^{\text{enc}(\lambda)}$ for a fixed polynomial $\text{enc}(\lambda)$.

The k-switching property allows to simultaneously switch the representation vectors of multiple group element encodings. It is necessary to switch all encodings simultaneously since private sampling can only be simulated knowing the trapdoor $\tau_{bl}$ which is not the case in $\text{Exp}_{\text{k-switching},b} (\lambda)$.

4.3 Construction

Our construction follows the ideas from [AFHL16; AH18; FHHL18]. Let $\text{GGen}_G$ be a group generator for a cyclic group $G$. Let $TD$ be a family of hard subset membership problems. Let $\text{FHE} = (\text{KGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Eval}, \text{Rerand})$ be a perfectly correct and perfectly re-randomizable fully homomorphic public-key encryption scheme. Let $pp_G$ be group parameters for $G$ and $[\Omega]_G \in \mathbb{G}^n$ for some $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $TD \subseteq X$ be a subset membership problem from $TD$ and $y \leftarrow X \setminus TD$ and $pk$ be a public key for FHE. For ease of notation, we define $\text{pars} := \langle pp_G, TD, y, pk, [\Omega]_G \rangle$. Let $\Pi := (\text{Setup}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}, \text{HSetup}, \text{Ext})$ be a perfectly complete, perfectly sound and perfectly witness-indistinguishable dual-mode NIZK proof system for the language

$$L := \{ y := (\text{pars}, [x]_G, C) \mid \exists w: (y, w) \in \mathcal{R} := \mathcal{R}_1 \vee \mathcal{R}_2 \vee \mathcal{R}_3 \}.$$ 

The relations $\mathcal{R}_1, \mathcal{R}_2, \mathcal{R}_3$ are defined as follows.

\[
\mathcal{R}_1 = \left\{ (\text{pars}, [x]_G, C), (sk, v) \right\} \cup \left\{ (\text{pars}, [x]_G, C), (sk, \nu) \right\} \\
\mathcal{R}_2 = \left\{ (\text{pars}, [x]_G, C), (r, v) \right\} \cup \left\{ (\text{pars}, [x]_G, C), (r, \nu) \right\} \\
\mathcal{R}_3 = \left\{ (\text{pars}, [x]_G, C), (u_x) \right\} \cup \left\{ (\text{pars}, [x]_G, C), (u_y) \right\} \cup \left\{ (\text{pars}, [x]_G, C), (u) \right\}
\]

With $m'(\lambda)$ we denote a polynomial upper bound on the number of random bits $\text{FHE.Rerand}(1^\lambda, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ expects and with $m''(\lambda)$ we denote a polynomial upper bound on the number of random bits $\Pi.\text{Prove}(1^\lambda, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ expects. Let $\ell(\lambda) := m'(\lambda) + m''(\lambda) + 2(\lambda + 1) + 3$. Let $\piO^*$ be a $\ell$-expanding pO scheme for the class of samplers $\mathcal{S}^{X,\text{-ind}}$ and let $\piO^*$ be a $\ell$-expanding pO scheme for the class of samplers $\mathcal{S}^{X,\text{-ind}}$. Further, let $p_{\text{add}}(\lambda)$ denote a polynomial upper bound on the size of addition circuits and $p_{\text{rerrand}}(\lambda)$ denote a polynomial upper bound on the size of re-randomization circuits which are used during the proof, see fig:cadds for details.

Our algebraic wrapper $\Lambda$ is composed of the PPT algorithms $(\text{GGen}_G, \text{Sam}_H, \text{Val}_H, \text{Add}_H, \text{Eq}_H, \text{Rerand}_H, \text{PrivExt}_H, \text{PrivSam}_H, \text{GetID}_H, \text{Unwrap}_H)$ which are defined in Figures 4a and 4b. We note that the algorithm $\text{Val}_H$ which is evaluated inside $C_{\text{Add}}$ and $C_{\text{rerrand}}$ only requires a certain part of the public parameters as input. In particular, $\text{Val}_H$ does not depend on $A_{\text{Add}}$ and $A_{\text{rerrand}}$.

During “honest” use of the algebraic wrapper $y \notin TD$ and, hence, due to perfect soundness of $\Pi$, there exists no proof for relation $\mathcal{R}_3$. 

17
GGen₁(pp₁, b₁) = [(b₁, ..., bₙ)]ₙ
α₁ := 1, α₂, ..., αₙ ∈ Zₙ
Ω₁ := [(b₁, ..., bₙ)]ₙ⁺¹
(pk, sk) ← FHE.Gen₁


With basis we mean a set of group elements in the base group.

13

Differences to [AFHLP16; AH18; FHHL18]. [AFHLP16; FHHL18] introduce similar constructions of a group scheme featuring a multilinear map and of a graded encoding scheme, respectively. More precisely, [AFHLP16; FHHL18] equip a base group with encodings carrying auxiliary information which can be used (in an obfuscated circuit) to “multiply in the exponent.” We observe that these constructions already wrap a given base group in the sense that “unwrapping” encodings yields a group isomorphism to the base group.

Our construction builds upon these group schemes. In order to enable extractability with respect to a dynamically chosen basis, our group parameters must be generated depending on that basis.

This modification, however, comes at the cost of the multilinear map functionality. This is because any implementation of a multilinear map requires knowledge of discrete logarithms of each group element encoding.

13 With basis we mean a set of group elements in the base group.

PrivSam₁(τ₁₁, v ∈ Zₙ)

v⁺ := (v₁ α₁⁻¹, ..., vₙ αₙ⁻¹)⁺
[x]₁ := [b⁺ v₁] = [Ω⁺ v⁺]_₁
C := Enc(pk, v⁺, r)
π := Prove(crs, (pars, [x]ₙ, C), (sk, v⁺))
return [x]ₙ, C, π

PrivExt₁(τ₁₁, h)

if ¬Val₁₁(crs, h) then
return ⊥
parse h := ([x]₁, C, π)

(b) Definition of the algorithms PrivSam₁, PrivExt₁, Rand₁₁ and the circuit C_rand₁₁.

Eq₁₁(pp₁, h₁, h₂)
if ∃ j ∈ [2]: -Val₁₁((crs, pars), h_j) then
return ⊥
parse h₁ := ([x]₁, C, π₁₁)
return [x]₁

GetD₁₁(pp₁, h₁)
if ¬Val₁₁(crs, pars), h₁ then
return ⊥
parse h := ([x]₁, C, π₁₁)
return [x]₁

Add₁₁(pp₁, h₁, h₂)

C_add₁₁(pars, crs, sk, b₁, h₁, h₂, r)
if ∃ j ∈ [2]: ¬Val₁₁((crs, pars), h_j) then
return ⊥
parse h₁ := ([x]₁, C, π₁₁)
[x₂]₁ := [x₂]₁
C_out₁ := FHE.Eval(pk, C⁺ [x₂]₁, C₁, C₂)
If C⁺ [x₂]₁ computes addition in Zₙ
v₁ := Dec(sk, C₁)
v₂ := v₁ + v₂
π_out := Prove(crs,
(pars, [x₂]₁, C_out₁), (sk, v₂))
return h_out := ([x₂]₁, C_out₁, π_out)

(b) Definition of the algorithms GGen₁, Sam₁₁, Val₁₁, Eq₁₁, GetD₁₁, Add₁₁, Unwrap₁₁ and the circuit C_add₁₁.

Fig. 4: Algorithms of our algebraic wrapper construction.
to a fixed generator. This is undesirable for our purposes, since we want to be able to use sets of group elements as basis which we do not know discrete logarithms of (for instance group elements provided by a reduction). Thus, we have to give up the multiplication functionality.

Furthermore, looking ahead, we crucially require that the basis can be altered via computational game hops during proofs. We solve this problem by linearly perturbing the given basis \( \mathbf{b} \) (except for its first entry to enable meaningful public sampling). We refer to this perturbed basis as \( \mathbf{\Omega} \). Our group element encodings are defined to carry representation vectors with respect to \( \mathbf{\Omega} \). By construction of \( C_{\text{add}} \), these representation vectors are treated homomorphically by the group operation.

To preserve tightness of security reductions, we additionally introduce a statistical re-randomization mechanism.

As opposed to [AFHLP16; FHHL18], [AH18] uses a quite different approach. In [AH18], the group scheme is constructed from scratch, meaning there is no necessity for an underlying group. The consequences are twofold. On one hand, very strong decisional assumptions can be proven to hold in the resulting group scheme. On the other hand, however, the group scheme from [AH18] lacks a \textsc{GetID}_{\mathbb{H}} \) algorithm limiting its applicability.

**Theorem 3.** Let (i) \( \text{GGen} \) be a group generator for a cyclic group \( \mathbb{G} \), (ii) \( T \mathcal{D} \) be a family of hard subset membership problems, (iii) \( \text{FHE} = (\text{KGen, Enc, Dec, Eval, Rerand}) \) be a perfectly correct and perfectly re-randomizable fully homomorphic public-key encryption scheme, (iv) \( \Pi := (\text{Setup, Prove, Verify, HSetup, Ext}) \) be a perfectly complete, perfectly sound and perfectly witness-indistinguishable dual-mode NIZK proof system for the language \( \mathcal{L} \), (v) \( \text{piO} \) be a \( \text{piO} \) scheme for the class of samplers \( S_{\mathcal{X}}^{\text{ind}} \) and (vi) \( \text{piO}^* \) be an \( \ell \)-expanding \( \text{piO} \) scheme for the class of samplers \( S_{\mathcal{X}}^{\text{ind}} \). Then, \( \mathcal{H} \) defined in Figures 4a and 4b is an algebraic wrapper.

**Proof.** Since the algorithms defined in Figure 4a equip the base group \( \mathbb{G} \) with non-unique encodings but respect its group structure, the tuple \( (\text{GGen}_\mathbb{H}, \text{Sam}_\mathbb{H}, \text{Val}_\mathbb{H}, \text{EVal}_\mathbb{H}, \text{Add}_\mathbb{H}, \text{GetID}_\mathbb{H}) \) forms a group scheme such that \( \text{Unwrap}_\mathbb{H}(\mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \cdot) \) defines a group isomorphism from \( \mathcal{H} \) to \( \mathbb{G} \). Hence, \( \mathcal{H} \) satisfies \( \mathbb{G} \)-wrapping.

**Lemma 5.** The group scheme \( \mathcal{H} \) defined in Figures 4a and 4b satisfies extractability.

**Proof (of Lemma 5).** The algorithm \( \text{PrivExt}_\mathbb{H} \) is clearly deterministic. Let \( \mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{G} \in \text{supp} \left( \text{GGen}_\mathbb{G} \right), \mathbf{b}_\mathbb{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n \) and \( (\mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \tau_\mathbb{H}) \in \text{supp} \left( \text{GGen}_\mathbb{H}(\mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{G}, \mathbf{b}_\mathbb{G}) \right) \). Since \( y \not\in T \mathcal{D} \) and because \( \Pi \) is perfectly sound, every valid encoding \( \hat{h} = ((x)_\mathbb{G}, C, \pi)_\mathbb{H} \) must satisfy either relation \( R_1 \) or \( R_2 \) with respect to \( \text{pars} \). Hence, decryption of \( C \) yields a vector \( \mathbf{v} \) such that \( \mathbf{\Omega} \mathbf{v} = (x)_\mathbb{G} \) or \( C \) was produced as an encryption of a vector \( \mathbf{v} \) such that the above is true. Due to perfect correctness of \( \text{FHE}, \text{FHE.D} \), \( \text{Dec}(sk, C) \) recovers this \( \mathbf{v} \) in both cases. Therefore, the output \( \mathbf{z} \) produced by \( \text{PrivExt}_\mathbb{H}(\tau_\mathbb{H}, \hat{h}) \) satisfies

\[
\left( b_1 \cdot \alpha_1, \ldots, b_n \cdot \alpha_n \right) \cdot \mathbf{b}_\mathbb{G} = (v_1, \ldots, v_n) \cdot \left( b_1 \cdot \alpha_1, \ldots, b_n \cdot \alpha_n \right) = (x)_\mathbb{G}.
\]

Since \( (x)_\mathbb{G} = \text{Unwrap}_\mathbb{H}(\mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \hat{h}) \), extractability follows.

**Lemma 6.** The group scheme \( \mathcal{H} \) defined in Figures 4a and 4b satisfies correctness of extraction.

**Proof (of Lemma 6).** We first prove that \( \text{Add}_\mathbb{H} \) respects private extraction in \( \mathbb{Z}_p^n \). Let \( \mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{G} \in \text{supp} \left( \text{GGen}_\mathbb{G} \right), \mathbf{b}_\mathbb{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n \) and \( (\mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \tau_\mathbb{H}) \in \text{supp} \left( \text{GGen}_\mathbb{H}(\mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{G}, \mathbf{b}_\mathbb{G}) \right) \). Let \( \hat{h}_0 = ((x)_\mathbb{G}, C_0, \pi_0)_\mathbb{H}, \hat{h}_1 = ((x)_\mathbb{G}, C_1, \pi_1)_\mathbb{H} \) with \( \mathbf{v}^{(0)} = \text{Dec}(sk, C_0) \) and \( \mathbf{v}^{(1)} = \text{Dec}(sk, C_1) \). Let \( (x_2)_\mathbb{G}, C_2, \pi_2) \mathbb{H} := \hat{h}_2 := \text{Add}_\mathbb{H}(\mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \hat{h}_0, \hat{h}_1) \) and \( \mathbf{v}^{(2)} = \text{Dec}(sk, C_2) \). Since \( \text{FHE} \) is perfectly correct and \( \text{piO} \) is support respecting, we have \( \mathbf{v}^{(2)} = \mathbf{v}^{(0)} + \mathbf{v}^{(1)} \) (in \( \mathbb{Z}_p^n \)). Therefore, we have

\[
\mathbf{v}^{(2)} \circ (\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) = \mathbf{v}^{(0)} \circ (\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) + \mathbf{v}^{(1)} \circ (\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) = \text{PrivExt}_\mathbb{H}(\tau_\mathbb{H}, \hat{h}_2) = \text{PrivExt}_\mathbb{H}(\tau_\mathbb{H}, \hat{h}_0) + \text{PrivExt}_\mathbb{H}(\tau_\mathbb{H}, \hat{h}_1) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n.
\]

Furthermore, \( \text{Rerand}_\mathbb{H} \) does not interfere with private extraction. Let \( \mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{G} \in \text{supp} \left( \text{GGen}_\mathbb{G} \right), \mathbf{b}_\mathbb{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n \) and \( (\mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \tau_\mathbb{H}) \in \text{supp} \left( \text{GGen}_\mathbb{H}(\mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{G}, \mathbf{b}_\mathbb{G}) \right) \). Let \( \hat{h} = ((x)_\mathbb{G}, C, \pi)_\mathbb{H} \) with \( \mathbf{v} = \text{Dec}(sk, C) \). Let \( (x'_\mathbb{G}, C', \pi')_\mathbb{H} := \hat{h}' \in \text{supp}(\text{Rerand}_\mathbb{H}(\mathbf{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \hat{h})) \) and \( \mathbf{v}' = \text{Dec}(sk, C') \). Since \( \text{FHE} \) is perfectly correct and \( \text{piO}^*_\mathbb{H} \) is support respecting, \( \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{v}' \) and thus \( \text{PrivExt}_\mathbb{H}(\tau_\mathbb{H}, \hat{h}) = \text{PrivExt}_\mathbb{H}(\tau_\mathbb{H}, \hat{h}') \).
Lemma 7. The group scheme \( H \) defined in Figures 4a and 4b satisfies correctness of sampling.

Proof (of Lemma 7). Let \( pp_{G} \in \text{supp}(\text{Gen}_{G}) \), \( [b]_{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_{p}^{n} \) and \( (pp_{\overline{H}}, \tau_{\overline{H}}) \in \text{supp}(\text{Gen}_{\overline{H}}(bb_{G}, [b]_{G})) \).

We know that \( \text{PrivExt}_{\overline{H}}(\tau_{\overline{H}}, \cdot) \) and \( \text{PrivSam}_{\overline{H}}(\tau_{\overline{H}}, \cdot) \) act inversely to each other. Let \( v \in \mathbb{Z}_{p}^{n} \) and \( ([x]_{G}, C, \pi)_{\overline{H}} := \hat{h} \in \text{supp}(\text{PrivSam}_{\overline{H}}(\tau_{\overline{H}}, v)) \). By correctness of FHE, FHE. Dec\((\overline{sk}, C)\) = \( v \odot (\alpha_{1}^{-1}, \ldots, \alpha_{n}^{-1})^\tau \). Hence, \( \text{PrivExt}_{\overline{H}}(\tau_{\overline{H}}, \hat{h}) \) outputs \(((v_{1} \cdot \alpha_{1}^{-1}) \cdot \alpha_{1}, \ldots, (v_{n} \cdot \alpha_{n}^{-1}) \cdot \alpha_{n})^{\tau} = v\).

Next, we prove that \( \text{PrivExt}_{\overline{H}}(\tau_{\overline{H}}, \cdot) \) and \( \text{Sam}_{\overline{H}}(pp_{\overline{H}}, \cdot) \) act inversely to each other for multiples of \( e_{1} \). Let \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_{p} \) and let \( ([x]_{G}, C, \pi)_{\overline{H}} := \hat{h} \in \text{supp}(\text{Sam}_{\overline{H}}(pp_{\overline{H}}, x \cdot e_{1})). \) By correctness of FHE, FHE. Dec\((\overline{sk}, C)\) = \( x \cdot e_{1} \odot (\alpha_{1}^{-1}, \ldots, \alpha_{n}^{-1})^\tau = x \cdot e_{1} \) since \( \alpha_{1} = 1 \). Hence, \( \text{PrivExt}_{\overline{H}}(\tau_{\overline{H}}, \hat{h}) \) outputs \((x \cdot \alpha_{1}, 0, \ldots, 0)^{\tau} = x \cdot e_{1} \) since \( \alpha_{1} = 1 \).

\( \square \)

Lemma 8 (Removing information from \( pp_{G} \)). Let \( \text{Gen}_{\overline{H}} \) denote the distribution of public parameters sampled as in \( \text{Gen}_{\overline{H}} \) with the difference that \( y \in \text{TD} \) is a yes-instance of the subset membership problem, \( \text{crs} \) is sampled according to \( \text{HSetup} \) and \( \text{Add}, \text{rerand} \) are produced for the circuits \( C_{\text{Add}} \) and \( C_{\text{rerand}} \), see Figure 6. Then, for all legitimate PPT adversaries \( A \),

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{swap}}^{\text{swap}}(\lambda) := \left| \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{swap}}^{\text{swap}}(\lambda, \text{Add}, \text{rerand}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{swap}}^{\text{swap}}(\lambda, \text{Add}, \text{rerand}) = 1] \right|
\]

is negligible, where \( \text{Exp}_{\text{swap}}^{\text{swap}}(\lambda, \text{Add}, \text{rerand}) \) is defined in Figure 5 and where legitimate means that \( A \) on input of \( pp_{G} \) guarantees \( [b]_{G} \in \text{supp}(\text{Gen}_{G}, \lambda) \) for some \( n \in \mathbb{N} \).

Proof (of Lemma 8). The proof strategy is closely related to the proof of the “swap lemma” from [AFHL16; AH18]. After some preparations, we replace the no-instance of the subset membership problem with a yes-instance \( y \in \text{TD} \) enabling relation \( R_{3} \) to be satisfied. The extraction trapdoor \( t_{\text{ext}} \) for \( \text{crs} \) used inside the obfuscated circuits can then be replaced by the witness \( w_{y} \) for \( (y, w_{y}) \in R_{3} \). This enables to switch \( \text{crs} \) from binding to hiding mode. Due to perfect witness-indistinguishability, the obfuscated circuits can be replaced by variants which always use \( w_{y} \) to simulate proofs. We refer the reader to Table 1 for an overview on the hybrid games. We assume that the circuits \( C_{\text{Add}}, C_{\text{Add}}^{(1)}, C_{\text{Add}}^{(2)}, C_{\text{Add}}^{(3)} \) are padded to size \( p_{\text{add}}(\lambda) \) and the circuits \( C_{\text{rerand}}, C_{\text{rerand}}^{(1)}, C_{\text{rerand}}^{(2)}, C_{\text{rerand}}^{(3)} \) are padded to size \( p_{\text{rerand}}(\lambda) \), see Figure 6.

| \( y \in \text{TD} \) | \( \text{Add} \) | \( \text{rerand} \) | \( \text{crs} \) | Remark |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| \( G_{0} \) | NO | \( C_{\text{Add}} \) | \( C_{\text{rerand}} \) | Setup |
| \( G_{1} \) | NO | \( C_{\text{Add}}^{(1)} \) | \( C_{\text{rerand}}^{(1)} \) | Setup | piO and piO’ |
| \( G_{2} \) | YES | \( C_{\text{Add}}^{(2)} \) | \( C_{\text{rerand}}^{(2)} \) | Setup | subset membership problem |
| \( G_{3} \) | YES | \( C_{\text{Add}}^{(3)} \) | \( C_{\text{rerand}}^{(3)} \) | Setup | piO and piO’ |
| \( G_{4} \) | YES | \( C_{\text{Add}}^{(1)} \) | \( C_{\text{rerand}}^{(1)} \) | \( \text{HSetup} \) | CRS indistinguishability |
| \( G_{5} \) | YES | \( C_{\text{Add}}^{(3)} \) | \( C_{\text{rerand}}^{(3)} \) | \( \text{HSetup} \) | piO and piO’ |

Game \( G_{0} \). This game is identical to \( \text{Exp}_{\text{swap}}^{\text{swap}}(\lambda) \).

Game \( G_{0.1} \). \( G_{0.1} \) is defined as \( G_{0} \) but \( \text{Add} \) is produced via \( \text{piO}(1^{\text{add}}(\lambda), C_{\text{Add}}^{(1)}) \), see Figure 6. Indistinguishability between \( G_{0} \) and \( G_{0.1} \) follows from the security of \( \text{piO} \) with respect to \( S^{X_{\text{ind}}} \). More formally, let \( A \) be a legitimate PPT adversary distinguishing \( G_{0} \) and \( G_{0.1} \).
Let $S$ be the circuit sampler which on input of $1^{\text{pad}(\lambda)}$ samples $\mathbf{pp}_G \leftarrow \mathbb{GGen}_G(1^{\lambda})$, calls $A(\mathbf{pp}_G)$ to obtain $(\mathbf{b}_G, st)$ and produces parameters as $\mathbb{GGen}_G(\mathbf{pp}_G, \mathbf{b}_G)$ (except for the obfuscated circuit $A_{\text{Add}}$) and outputs $C_0 := C_{\text{Add}}, C_1 := C_{\text{Add}}^{(1)}$ and auxiliary information $z := (\text{crs, pars} = (\mathbf{pp}_G, \mathbf{TD}, y, pk, \mathbf{b}_G), \lambda_{\text{rerand}}, (sk, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n, \mathbf{b}_G), st)$. Since $y \notin \mathbf{TD}$ and $H$ is perfectly sound, the circuits $C_{\text{Add}}$ and $C_{\text{Add}}^{(1)}$ behave exactly identical on identical inputs and random tapes. Hence, for the function $X(\lambda) := 0$ and a differing domain $X := \{0, 1\}$, the circuit sampler $S$ satisfies $X$-differing inputs and $X$-indistinguishability and, hence, is an $X$-ind sampler.

We construct an adversary $B$ on the security of $\mathbb{pO}$. On input of $(1^{\text{pad}(\lambda)}, C_0, C_1, z, A)$, $B$ defines $\mathbf{pp}_G := (\text{crs, pars}, A, \lambda_{\text{rerand}})$ and $\gamma_0 := (\mathbf{pp}_G, sk, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n, \mathbf{b}_G)$, calls $A(\mathbf{pp}_G, \gamma_0, st)$ and outputs $A's$ output. If $A$ is produced via $\mathbb{pO}(1^{\text{pad}(\lambda)}, C_{\text{Add}})$, $S$ together with $B$ perfectly simulate $G_{0.1}$ for $A$. Otherwise, if $A$ is produced via $\mathbb{pO}(1^{\text{pad}(\lambda)}, C_{\text{Add}}^{(1)})$, $S$ together with $B$ perfectly simulate $G_{0.1}$ for $A$. Hence, $|\Pr[\text{out}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_0 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{pio}, \mathbb{pO}, S, B}^{\text{pio-ind, smp, rerand}}(\lambda)$.

**Game $G_1$.** The game $G_1$ is identical to $G_{0.1}$ except that $A_{\text{rerand}}$ is produced via $\mathbb{pO}_f(1^{\text{pad}(\lambda)}, C_{\text{rerand}})$, see Figure 6. Indistinguishability between $G_{0.1}$ and $G_1$ follows from the security of $\mathbb{pO}_f$ with respect to $S_f^{X=0}$-ind. The proof is very similar to the previous game hop. The main difference is that the used circuit sampler needs to be in $S_f^{X=0}$-ind.

Let $A$ be a legitimate PPT adversary distinguishing $G_{0.1}$ and $G_1$. Let $S$ be the circuit sampler which on input of $1^{\text{pad}(\lambda)}$ samples $\mathbf{pp}_G \leftarrow \mathbb{GGen}_G(1^{\lambda})$, calls $A(\mathbf{pp}_G)$ to obtain $(\mathbf{b}_G, st)$ and produces parameters as $\mathbb{GGen}_G(\mathbf{pp}_G, \mathbf{b}_G)$ (except for the obfuscated circuit $A_{\text{rerand}}$ and such that $A_{\text{Add}}$ is produced for $C_{\text{Add}}^{(1)}$), and outputs $C_0 := C_{\text{rerand}}, C_1 := C_{\text{rerand}}^{(1)}$ and auxiliary information $z := (\text{crs, pars} = (\mathbf{pp}_G, \mathbf{TD}, y, pk, \mathbf{b}_G), \lambda_{\text{rerand}}, (sk, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n, \mathbf{b}_G), st)$. Since $y \notin \mathbf{TD}$ and $H$ is perfectly sound, the circuits $C_{\text{rerand}}$ and $C_{\text{rerand}}^{(1)}$ behave exactly identical on identical inputs and random tapes. Therefore, by Lemma 1, $S \in S_f^{X=0}$-ind. Hence, $|\Pr[\text{out}_1 = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_0 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{pio}, \mathbb{pO}, S, B}^{\text{pio-ind, smp, rerand}}(\lambda)$.

**Game $G_2$.** The game $G_2$ is defined as game $G_1$ except that $y \leftarrow \mathbf{TD}$ is a yes-instance of the subset membership problem. This game hop is justified by the hardness of the subset membership problem. Hence, $|\Pr[\text{out}_2 = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_1 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{pio}, \mathbb{pO}, S, B}^{\text{pio-ind, smp, rerand}}(\lambda)$.

**Game $G_2.1$.** $G_{2.1}$ is defined as $G_2$ but $A_{\text{Add}}$ is produced via $\mathbb{pO}(1^{\text{pad}(\lambda)}, C_{\text{Add}}^{(2)})$, see Figure 6. Due to the perfect extractability of $H$ and the fact that for every $y \in \mathbf{TD}$ there exists exactly one witness $w_y$ for the statement $y \in \mathbf{TD}$, the two circuits $C_{\text{Add}}^{(1)}$ and $C_{\text{Add}}^{(2)}$ behave exactly identical on identical inputs and random tapes. Hence, for every PPT adversary $A$, there exists a circuit sampler $S \in S_X^{X=0}$-ind and a PPT adversary $B$ such that $|\Pr[\text{out}_2 = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_2 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{pio}, \mathbb{pO}, S, B}^{\text{pio-ind, smp, rerand}}(\lambda)$.

**Game $G_3$.** The game $G_3$ is identical to $G_{2.1}$ except that $A_{\text{rerand}}$ is produced via $\mathbb{pO}_f(1^{\text{pad}(\lambda)}, C_{\text{rerand}}^{(2)})$, see Figure 6. Indistinguishability between $G_{2.1}$ and $G_3$ follows from the security of $\mathbb{pO}_f$ with respect to $S_f^{X=0}$-ind. Again, due to the perfect extractability of $H$ and the fact that for every $y \in \mathbf{TD}$ there exists exactly one witness $w_y$ for the statement $y \in \mathbf{TD}$, the two circuits $C_{\text{rerand}}^{(1)}$ and $C_{\text{rerand}}^{(2)}$ behave exactly identical on identical inputs and random tapes. Hence, by Lemma 1, for every PPT adversary $A$, there exists a circuit sampler $S \in S_f^{X=0}$-ind and a PPT adversary $B$ such that $|\Pr[\text{out}_3 = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_2 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{pio}, \mathbb{pO}, S, B}^{\text{pio-ind, smp, rerand}}(\lambda)$.

Thus, $G_3$ does not make use of the extraction trapdoor $td_{\text{ext}}$ corresponding to $\text{crs}$ anymore.

**Game $G_4$.** The game $G_4$ is defined as $G_3$, except that $\text{crs}$ is produced via $\mathbb{HSetup}(1^{\lambda})$, i.e. in hiding mode. This game hop is justified by CRS indistinguishability of $H$. Hence, $|\Pr[\text{out}_4 = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_3 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{pio}, \mathbb{pO}, S, B}^{\text{pio-ind, smp, rerand}}(\lambda)$.

**Game $G_4.1$.** $G_{4.1}$ is defined as $G_4$ but $A_{\text{Add}}$ is produced via $\mathbb{pO}(1^{\text{pad}(\lambda)}, C_{\text{Add}}^{(3)})$, see Figure 6. Let $S$ be a circuit sampler, which produces public parameters as in $G_4$ and outputs the circuits $C_0 := C_{\text{Add}}^{(2)}$ and $C_1 := C_{\text{Add}}^{(3)}$ (and suitable auxiliary information $z$). The circuit sampler $S$ is an X-ind sampler for $X(\lambda) := 2^{\text{pad}(\lambda)} \leq 2^\lambda$ and $X := \{0, 1\}^\text{pad}(\lambda)$ since $X$-differing inputs is trivially satisfied and $X$-indistinguishability is satisfied since perfect witness indistinguishability of $H$ implies that for every input $x = (\tilde{a}_1, \tilde{a}_2) \in \{0, 1\}^\text{pad}(\lambda)$, the output distributions produced by $C_{\text{Add}}^{(2)}(x)$ and $C_{\text{Add}}^{(3)}(x)$ are identical. Hence, for every PPT adversary $A$, there exists a circuit sampler $S \in S_X^{X=0}$-ind and a PPT adversary $B$ such that $|\Pr[\text{out}_4 = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_4 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{pio}, \mathbb{pO}, S, B}^{\text{pio-ind, smp, rerand}}(\lambda)$.

**Game $G_5$.** The game $G_5$ is identical to $G_{4.1}$ except that $A_{\text{rerand}}$ is produced via $\mathbb{pO}_f(1^{\text{pad}(\lambda)}, C_{\text{rerand}}^{(3)})$, see Figure 6. Indistinguishability between $G_{4.1}$ and $G_5$ follows from the security of $\mathbb{pO}_f$ with respect to $S_f^{X=0}$-ind.
Proof (of Lemma 9). We recall that an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is a legitimate $k$-switching adversary if $\mathcal{A}$ on input of $\mathbf{pp}_G$ always guarantees that $[b]_{G_0}^0, [b]_{G_0}^1 \in \mathbb{F}_p^m$ and $\mathbf{v}(0), \mathbf{v}(1) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ and $[x]_{G_0}^* := [[\mathbf{v}(0), \mathbf{v}(1)] \cdot b(0)]_G = [[\mathbf{v}(1), i) \cdot b(1)]_G$ for all $i \in [k]$. Let $G_0^b$ be the original game $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{E}, A, b}^k(\lambda)$. We proceed over a series of hybrids defined in Figure 7.
$$G_1^b$$

$${\text{pp}}_\text{G} \leftarrow \text{GGen}_\text{G}(1^b)$$
$$(\{[b]_G^{(j)}\},(v^{(0), (i)}),_{i,j}) \leftarrow A(1^b, \text{pp}_G)$$

$$[x_1]^L := ([b]_G^{(1)} \cdot v^{(1), (i)})_G$$
$$v^* := (v^{(0), (i)}, \alpha_1, \ldots, v^{(b), (i)}, \alpha_n)^T$$
$$C_i^* := \text{Enc}(pk, v^*)$$
$$\pi_i^* \leftarrow \text{Prove}(\text{crs}, (\text{pars}, [x_i]^L, C_i^*), (sk, v^*))$$
\(h_i^* := ([x_i]^L, C_i^*, \pi_i^*)_{\text{H}}\)
return \(A(\text{pp}_G, (h_i^*)_{i \in [k]})\)

$$G_2^b$$

$${\text{pp}}_\text{G} \leftarrow \text{GGen}_\text{G}(1^b)$$
$$(\{[b]_G^{(j)}\},(v^{(0), (i)}),_{i,j}) \leftarrow A(1^b, \text{pp}_G)$$

$$[x_1]^L := ([b]_G^{(1)} \cdot v^{(1), (i)})_G$$
$$v^* := (v^{(0), (i)}, \alpha_1, \ldots, v^{(b), (i)}, \alpha_n)^T$$
$$C_i^* := \text{Enc}(pk, v^*)$$
$$\pi_i^* \leftarrow \text{Prove}(\text{crs}, (\text{pars}, [x_i]^L, C_i^*), (sk, v^*))$$
\(h_i^* := ([x_i]^L, C_i^*, \pi_i^*)_{\text{H}}\)
return \(A(\text{pp}_G, (h_i^*)_{i \in [k]})\)

Fig. 7: Games used in proof of Lemma 9. We recall that \(\alpha_1 = 1\) and \(\alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_n\) are uniformly distributed over \(\mathbb{Z}_p^\times\).

\(G_0^b \rightarrow G_1^b\). The difference between these games is only conceptual. Since \([x_1]^L = ([b]_G^{(1)} \cdot v^{(1), (i)})_G\), \([x_1]^L_{\text{G}}\) is independent of \(b\). Hence, \(Pr[\text{out}_1^b = 1] = Pr[\text{out}_0^b = 1]\).

\(G_1^b \rightarrow G_2^b\). The only difference between the games \(G_1^b\) and \(G_2^b\) is that \(\text{pp}_G\) is produced via \(\text{GGen}_G(\text{pp}_G, [b]_G^{(b)})\) and \(\text{GGen}_G(\text{pp}_G, [b]_G^{(b)})\), respectively. Let \(A\) be an adversary distinguishing game \(G_1^b\) from game \(G_2^b\). We construct an adversary \(B\) against Lemma 8. On input of \(\text{pp}_G\), \(B\) calls \(A\) on input of \(\text{pp}_G\) to obtain \(([b]_G^{(1)}, [b]_G^{(1)}), (v^{(0), (i)})),_{i \in [k]}, (v^{(1), (i)})),_{i \in [k]}, st)\). \(B\) outputs \(([b]_G^{(b)}, st)\) and obtains \((\text{pp}_G, \tau)\) which is either sampled according to \(\text{GGen}_G(\text{pp}_G, [b]_G^{(b)})\) or according to \(\text{GGen}_G(\text{pp}_G, [b]_G^{(b)})\). Since, \(\tau\) contains \(sk\) and \((\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)\), \(B\) is able to simulate the game \(G_1^b\) (respectively, \(G_2^b\)) for \(A\). More precisely, \(B\) samples \(h_i^*\) as in \(G_1^b\), calls \(A\) on input of \((\text{pp}_G, (h_i^*)_{i \in [k]}\) and outputs \(A\)’s output. If \(\text{pp}_G\) is sampled using \(\text{GGen}_G\), \(B\) perfectly simulates \(G_1^b\) for \(A\) and if \(\text{pp}_G\) is sampled using \(\text{GGen}_G\), \(B\) perfectly simulates \(G_2^b\) for \(A\). Hence, \(Pr[\text{out}_1^b = 1] = Pr[\text{out}_0^b = 1] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda)\).

\(G_2^b \rightarrow G_3^b\). Games \(G_2^b\) and \(G_0^b\) only differ in the witnesses which are used to produce the consistency proofs \(\pi_i^*\). Since \(\text{crs}\) is produced via \(\text{HSetup}(1^\lambda)\), the proofs produced in \(G_2^b\) and \(G_3^b\) are identically distributed due to the perfect witness indistinguishability of \(H\). Hence, \(Pr[\text{out}_2^b = 1] = Pr[\text{out}_0^b = 1]\).

\(G_3^b \rightarrow G_4^b\). Note that the secret key \(sk\) is not necessary to simulate \(G_3^b\) and \(G_4^b\). Additionally, \(v^*_i\) is only used to call \(\text{Enc}(pk, v^*_i)\). This allows to apply the IND-CPA security of \(\text{FHE}\).

Claim. For all legitimate k-switching PPT adversaries \(A\), we have \(Pr[\text{out}_4^b = 1] = Pr[\text{out}_3^b = 1] \leq k \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda)\).

Proof. We use a standard hybrid argument. The hybrid game \(G_3^b, k\) is defined as \(G_0^b\) except that for \(j < i\), \(C_j^*\) is produced via \(\text{Enc}(pk, 0)\) and for \(j \geq i\), \(C_j^*\) is produced for \(\text{Enc}(pk, v^*_i)\). Hence, \(G_0^b, k\) is identical to \(G_3^b, k\) and \(G_0^b, k+1\) is identical to \(G_4^b\). We construct an adversary \(B\) against the IND-CPA security of \(\text{FHE}\). On input of \(pk\), \(B\) guesses an index \(\nu \in [k]\), samples \(\text{pp}_G \leftarrow \text{GGen}_G(1^\lambda)\), calls \(A(\text{pp}_G)\), obtains \(A\)’s output \((\{[b]_G^{(j)}\}_{j \in [0, 1]}, (v^{(0), (i)})),_{i \in [k]}, (v^{(1), (i)})),_{i \in [k]}, st)\) and produces \(\text{pp}_G\) as in \(G_3^b\). Note that \(B\) knows \(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\) and \(w_y\).

For \(\mu \in \{1, \ldots, \nu - 1\}\), \(B\) produces \(h_{\mu}^*\) as in \(G_3^b\). For \(\mu \in \{\nu + 1, \ldots, k\}\), \(B\) produces \(h_{\mu}^*\) as in \(G_4^b\). For \(\mu = \nu\), \(B\) outputs \(M_0 := (v^{(0), (\mu)}, \alpha_1, \ldots, v^{(b), (\mu)}, \alpha_n)^T\) and \(M_1 := 0\) to the IND-CPA game (together with its internal state). On input of \(C^*\), \(B\) uses \(C^*\) as \(C_{\mu}^*\), computes \([x_{\mu}^L]^L := ([b]_G^{(1)} \cdot v^{(1), (i)})_G\) and \(\pi_{\mu}^* \leftarrow \text{Prove}(\text{crs}, (\text{pars}, [x_{\mu}^L], C_{\mu}^*), (w_y))\). Finally, \(B\) calls \(A\) on input \((\text{pp}_G, (h_{\mu}^*)_{i \in [k]})\) and outputs \(A\)’s output.
If \( C^* \) is an encryption of \( M_0 \), \( B \) perfectly simulates \( G_{4, \nu} \), otherwise \( B \) perfectly simulates \( G_{3, \nu+1} \). Hence, 
\[
\Pr[\text{out}_b^3 = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_b^4 = 1] \leq \sum_{i \in [k]} \Pr[\text{out}_{3,i}^b = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_{3,i}^b = 1] \leq k \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{ind-cpa}}_{\text{FHE}, B} (\lambda).
\]
\( G_4^0 \approx G_{4,\nu}^1 \). A legitimate \( k \)-switching adversary guarantees \( \left([v^{(0), (i)}]\cdot b^{(0)}\right)_G = \left([v^{(1), (i)}]\cdot b^{(1)}\right)_G \) and \( b_G^{(0)} \), \( b_G^{(1)} \in \mathbb{B}^{p_{\text{bg}}} \). Therefore, these games only differ by the fact that in \( G_{4, \nu}^0 \), \( \left([1]\right)_G = ([1], [b_2,b_3], \ldots, [b_n,b_n]) \) for \( \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_n \) chosen uniformly at random from \( \mathbb{Z}_p^n \). Except for \( \left([1]\right)_G \), the view of \( A \) is independent of \( \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_n \).

Therefore, \( \Pr[\text{out}^b_4 = 1] = \Pr[\text{out}^b_4 = 1] = 1 \).

Note that since \( G \) has unique encodings, \( A \) is unable to extract auxiliary information from the encodings of \( [x_i^*]_G \). This is crucial since such auxiliary information may for instance reveal how \( [x_i^*]_G \) was computed. □

**Lemma 10.** The group scheme \( \mathbb{H} \) defined in Figures 4a and 4b satisfies statistical re-randomizability.

**Proof (of Lemma 10).** The circuit \( C_{\text{rerand}} \) takes inputs from \( \{0,1\}^{\text{pom}(\lambda)} \) and expects a randomness from \( \{0,1\}^{m(\lambda)} \times \{0,1\}^{m'(\lambda)} \). We recall that \( \text{pIO}_\ell^x \) is an \( \ell \)-expanding pIO scheme for \( \ell(\lambda) = m'(\lambda) + m''(\lambda) + 2(\lambda + 1) + 2 \). Since for every distribution \( X_1 \) over \( \{0,1\}^{\text{pom}(\lambda)} \), \( \text{H}_\ell[U_{\ell(\lambda)} \mid X_1] = \ell(\lambda) > m'(\lambda) + m''(\lambda) + 2(\lambda + 1) + 2 \), the statistical distance between

\[
\{A_{\text{rerand}} \leftrightarrow \text{pIO}_\ell^x(C_{\text{rerand}}) : (A_{\text{rerand}}, A_{\text{rerand}}(X_1, X_2)) \}
\]
and
\[
\{A_{\text{rerand}} \leftrightarrow \text{pIO}_\ell^x(C_{\text{rerand}}) : (A_{\text{rerand}}, A_{\text{rerand}}(X_1; U_{m'(\lambda)+m''(\lambda)})) \}
\]

is at most \( 2^{-(\lambda+1)} \).

Let \( \widehat{h}_0 \equiv ([x_0]_G, C_0, \pi_0)_\mathbb{H}, \widehat{h}_1 \equiv ([x_1]_G, C_1, \pi_1)_\mathbb{H} \in \mathbb{H} \) be the encodings chosen by the adversary \( A \). Since \( A \) is a legitimate re-randomization adversary, \( \text{PrivExt}_\mathbb{H}(\tau_{\mathbb{H}}, \widehat{h}_0) = \text{PrivExt}_\mathbb{H}(\tau_{\mathbb{H}}, \widehat{h}_1) \). Due to perfect correctness of FHE and since \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\times \) are invertible, \( \text{Dec}(sk, C_0) = \text{Dec}(sk, C_1) \). Due to perfect re-randomizability of FHE, the ciphertexts produced by \( C_{\text{rerand}}(\widehat{h}_0) \) and \( C_{\text{rerand}}(\widehat{h}_1) \) are identically distributed. Furthermore, since \( C_{\text{rerand}}(\widehat{h}_0) \) produces the consistency proof using the witness \( (sk, \text{Dec}(sk, C_0), \text{Dec}(sk, C_1)) \), the distributions produced by \( C_{\text{rerand}}(\widehat{h}_0) \) and \( C_{\text{rerand}}(\widehat{h}_1) \) are identical. Therefore, \( \text{Adv}_{\text{rerand}}^{\text{A}} (\lambda) \leq 2 \cdot 2^{-(\lambda+1)} = 2^{-\lambda} \).

Note that since \( G \) has unique encodings, \( A \) is unable to extract auxiliary information from the encodings of \( \text{Unwrap}_{\mathbb{H}}(pp_{\mathbb{H}}, \widehat{h}) \). This is crucial since such auxiliary information may be used to distinguish whether \( \widehat{h}_0 \) or \( \widehat{h}_1 \) was used to derive \( \widehat{h} \). □

Theorem 3 then follows by Lemmas 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10. □

**5 How to use Algebraic Wrappers – Implementing proofs from the AGM**

In the following, we demonstrate how proof techniques from the algebraic group model can be implemented with our algebraic wrapper. Mainly, we want to use the extracted representation provided by the algebraic wrapper in a similar way as in AGM proofs. We adapt the proofs of Diffie-Hellman assumptions from [FKL18] in Section 5.1 as well as the proof for the EUF-CMA security of Schnorr signatures from [FPS19] in Section 5.2. Before we demonstrate how to use the algebraic wrapper, we sketch two modifications which will be necessary when we replace the AGM with the algebraic wrapper.

**The symmetrization technique.** Information-theoretically, the basis\(^{14}\) the algebraic wrapper enables extraction for, as well as the representation vectors inside group element encodings are known to the adversary. However, several security reductions in [FKL18] employ case distinctions where different reduction algorithms embed their challenge in different group elements. For instance, in the CDH game, the discrete logarithm challenge \( Z \) can be embedded either in \([x]_G \) or \([y]_G \), leading to two different security reductions. Due to the ideal properties of the AGM, both reductions simulate identically distributed games.

However, transferring this strategy directly using algebraic wrappers fails, since the two reductions are information-theoretically distinguishable depending on the choice of basis. An unbounded adversary who

\(^{14}\) With basis we mean the set of group elements in the base group to which we can extract.
knows which game he is playing could therefore influence the representation of his output in such a way that it always becomes impossible for the reduction to use the representation to compute the discrete logarithm. We call such a situation a bad case. It is necessary that the different reduction subroutines have mutually exclusive bad cases, so that extraction is always possible in at least one game type. Thus, we need find a way that even these representations (and the basis used to generate $pp_H$) are identically distributed.

We therefore introduce a proof technique which we call symmetrization. We extend the basis and group element representations in such a way that the games played by different reduction subroutines are identically distributed (as they would be in the AGM). This is done by choosing additional base elements to which the reduction knows the discrete logarithm (or partial logarithms), so that these additional base elements do not add any unknowns when solving for the discrete logarithm. With this technique, we achieve that the games defined by the different reduction algorithms are identically distributed but entail different mutually-exclusive bad cases. For the CDH reduction, this means that both challenge elements $[x]_{H}$ and $[y]_{H}$ are contained in the basis, so that it is not known to the adversary which one is the reduction’s discrete logarithm challenge. This allows to adopt the proofs from AGM.

The origin element trick. Applying the algebraic wrapper to AGM proofs where an oracle (e.g. a random oracle or a signing oracle) is present, entails the need to change the representation vectors of all oracle responses. One possibility to realize this is to apply $Q$-switching, where $Q$ denotes a polynomial upper bound on the number of oracle queries. However, as the switching property only provides computational guarantees, this naive approach results in a non-tight reduction. Since we are interested in preserving the tightness of AGM proofs when applying the algebraic wrapper, we use so-called origin elements from which we construct the oracle responses using the group operation. This enables to use $n$-switching for a constant number $n$ of origin elements instead of $Q$-switching for $Q$ oracle responses.

Limitations of our techniques. While our algebraic wrapper provides an extraction property that is useful for many proofs in the AGM, it also has its limitations. Mainly, the base elements to which the PrivExt algorithm can extract need to be fixed at the time of group parameter generation. Therefore, we cannot mimic reductions to assumptions with a variable amount of challenge elements, where extraction needs to be possible with respect to all these challenge elements. For instance, $q$-type assumptions which are used in [FKL18] to prove CCA1-security of ElGamal and the knowledge-soundness of Groth’s ZK-SNARK.

Furthermore, there are security proofs in the AGM that rely on the representation used by the reduction being information-theoretically hidden from the adversary. An example for this is the tight reduction for the BLS scheme from [FKL18]. As the reduction can forge a signature for any message, it relies on the representations provided by the adversary being different from what the reduction could have computed on its own. In the AGM, it is highly unlikely that the adversary computes the forged signature in the exact same way as the reduction simulates the signing oracle, because the reduction does not provide the adversary with an algebraic representation. However, since we need to be able to extract privately from group element encodings, the group elements output by the reduction information theoretically contain algebraic representations. Therefore, information-theoretically, an adversary sees how the reduction simulates hash responses and signatures, and thus could provide signatures with a representation that is useless to the reduction.

This problem is circumvented in the Schnorr proof in Section 5.2 due to the representation provided by the adversary already being fixed by the time it receives a challenge through the Random Oracle. We leave it as an open problem to transfer the BLS proof to the algebraic wrapper.

Another limitation is that due to the reduction being private, we cannot use the extraction in reductions between problems in the same group. That is, our wrapper does not allow for “multi-step” reductions as in the AGM.

5.1 Diffie-Hellman Assumptions

We show how to adapt the security reductions for Diffie-Hellman problems from [FKL18] to our algebraic wrapper (see Figure 8 for the definitions). The main proof idea, namely to use the representation of the adversary’s output to compute the discrete logarithm, stays the same; however, due to the nature of our wrapper, we need to apply the symmetrization technique to achieve the same distributions as in the AGM.
This results in we additionally use PrivSam where all group elements are represented in the first component. We then switch to a basis and each group element.

Let \( \eta, \iota, \theta \) be a valid solution \( s \). For a valid solution \( s \), the following holds in \( G_1 \):

\[
\begin{align*}
  x \cdot y &= \eta + \theta \cdot x + \iota \cdot y \\
  x &= \frac{\eta + \iota \cdot y}{y - \theta}
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{cdh} \quad \begin{array}{c}
  x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
  s \leftarrow A([1]_G, [x]_G) \\
  \text{return } s = [x]_G
\end{array} \quad \text{sqdh} \quad \begin{array}{c}
  x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
  s \leftarrow A([1]_G, [x]_G) \\
  \text{return } s = [x^3]_G
\end{array} \quad \text{lcdh} \quad \begin{array}{c}
  x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
  u, v, w, s \leftarrow A([1]_G, [x]_G, [y]_G) \\
  \text{return } s = [u \cdot x^2 + v \cdot xy + w \cdot y^2]_G
\end{array}
\]

Fig. 8: The different types of Diffie-Hellman games shown in [FKL18]

**Theorem 4.** Let \( G \) be a group where the discrete logarithm is hard. Then, the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in an algebraic wrapper \( \mathbb{H} \) for \( G \) of dimension \( \geq 3 \).

**Proof.** We show this as a series of games. The first game \( G_0 \) corresponds to the “honest” CDH game in \( \mathbb{H} \) where all group elements are represented in the first component. We then switch to a basis and group element representations that allow the reduction to embed its challenge and extract a useful representation. The reduction uses the extracted representation like in [FKL18] to compute the discrete logarithm. The games are shown in Figure 9.

**Game hop from** \( G_0 \) \( \rightarrow G_1 \). The two games in Figure 9 are computationally indistinguishable due to re-randomizability and 2-switching. For the re-randomizability, we define four hybrid games \( H_0 \) \( \rightarrow H_3 \) where \( H_0 \) is \( G_0 \). In \( H_1 \), we use PrivSam\( \mathbb{H} \) for generation of \( \hat{1} \). In \( H_2 \), we additionally use PrivSam\( \mathbb{H} \) for \( \hat{x} \) and in \( H_3 \) we additionally use PrivSam\( \mathbb{H} \) for generation of \( \hat{y} \). A reduction between distinguishing the hybrid games and re-randomization embeds its challenge encoding in the group element contained in the challenge and thus simulates either \( H_i \) or \( H_{i+1} \) perfectly. As the representation vectors of the challenge group elements are the same, this reduction constitutes a legitimate adversary in the rerand game, and therefore \( \text{Adv}_{\text{rerand}}(\mathbb{H}, \lambda) \leq \frac{1}{2^\lambda} \). This results in

\[
|\Pr[\text{out}_{G_0} = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_{H_3} = 1]| \leq \frac{3}{2^{2\lambda}}
\]

We apply 2-switching to hop from \( H_3 \) to \( G_1 \). The reduction to 2-switching works as follows: Assume there is an adversary that can distinguish games \( G_0 \) and \( G_1 \). Then, a reduction chooses the two bases for the games, and the corresponding representation vectors of \( \hat{x} \) and \( \hat{y} \) as in the two games. On input of the group parameters and the vectors, it uses these elements as well as Sam\( \mathbb{H} \)(pp\( \mathbb{H} \), 1) as a challenge to the distinguisher between the games and outputs whatever the distinguisher outputs.

**Games** \( G_{1.0} \) and \( G_{1.1} \). Here, the reduction applies the symmetrization technique to achieve identical distribution of the two games. To the CDH-adversary, the embedding of \( Z \) is information-theoretically hidden.

A reduction algorithm for the discrete logarithm simulates the games of type \( G_1 \) by replacing \( X \) with its discrete logarithm challenge. If the CDH adversary \( A \) wins the game, the reduction extracts \( (\eta, \iota, \theta) = \text{PrivExt}_{\mathbb{H}}(\tau, s) \). For a valid solution \( s \), the following holds in \( G_{1.0} \):

\[
\begin{align*}
  x \cdot y &= \eta + \theta \cdot x + \iota \cdot y \\
  x &= \frac{\eta + \iota \cdot y}{y - \theta}
\end{align*}
\]
The bad case here is if \( y = \theta \), in which case the reduction can not solve for \( x \). However, if the challenge is embedded in \( \hat{y} \) (as in \( G_{1,1} \)), we can solve as follows:

\[
y = \frac{n + \theta \cdot x}{x - \xi}
\]

If both \( \xi = x \) and \( \theta = y \), then \( \eta = -xy \), because

\[
\eta + \theta \cdot x + \xi \cdot y = xy \\
\eta + y \cdot x + x \cdot y = xy \\
\eta = -xy
\]

The reduction can check in either game type whether both bad cases appeared by checking if \( [xy]_G = \text{Unwrap}_H(s) = X^\theta = y' \). In this case, the reduction can solve for \( x \) or \( y \) (depending on where the challenge was embedded) as \( x = -\frac{\eta}{\xi} \) and \( y = -\frac{\eta}{\xi} \).

As the games \( G_{1,0} \) and \( G_{1,1} \) are identically distributed, the probability that the discrete logarithm was embedded in such a way that it is possible to extract is at least \( \frac{1}{2} \). Thus

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{DLOG}}^{\text{CDH}}(\lambda) \geq \frac{\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},_H}^{\text{CDH}}(\lambda) - 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}',_H}^{\text{2-switching}}(\lambda) - \frac{3}{2}}{2}
\]

which concludes the proof. \( \square \)

We further show that \( \text{[FKL18]}'s proof for the square Diffie-Hellman and linear combination Diffie-Hellman assumptions can be transferred to the algebraic wrapper.

**Theorem 5.** Let \( \mathbb{G} \) be a group where the discrete logarithm is hard. Then, the square Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in an algebraic wrapper \( \mathbb{H} \) of dimension \( \geq 2 \) for \( \mathbb{G} \).

\[
\begin{array}{l}
G_0 \\
\text{pp}_0 \leftarrow \text{GGen}_0(1^\lambda) \\
x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
\beta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
\text{pp}_\mathbb{H} \leftarrow \text{GGen}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_0, (1, \beta)^T) \\
1 = \text{Rerand}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \text{Sam}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, 1)) \\
\hat{x} = \text{Rerand}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \text{Sam}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, x)) \\
s \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \hat{x}) \\
\text{return } \text{Eq}_\mathbb{H}(s, \text{PrivSam}_\mathbb{H}(1^2, x_0, 0))
\end{array}
\quad
\begin{array}{l}
G_1 \\
\text{pp}_1 \leftarrow \text{GGen}_1(1^\lambda) \\
X \leftarrow \mathbb{G} \\
\text{pp}_\mathbb{H} \leftarrow \text{GGen}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_1, (1, X)^T) \\
\hat{1} = \text{Rerand}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \text{Sam}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, (1, 0)^T)) \\
\hat{x} = \text{Rerand}_\mathbb{H}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \text{PrivSam}_\mathbb{H}(1^2, (0, 1)^T)) \\
s \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{pp}_\mathbb{H}, \hat{1}, \hat{x}) \\
\text{return } \text{Eq}_\mathbb{H}(s, \text{PrivSam}_\mathbb{H}(1^2, (x^2, 0)^T))
\end{array}
\]

**Fig. 10:** Square Diffie-Hellman games

**Proof.** Under 1-switching and re-randomizability, the games in Figure 10 are computationally indistinguishable. The game hop works the same as for CDH. A reduction can embed its discrete logarithm challenge as \( X \). It can check the solution by solving for the discrete logarithm of \( X \) (if it is impossible to solve for \( x \), it returns 0). The discrete logarithm solvable works as follows.

For a successful adversary in \( G_1 \), the reduction can solve for \( x \) because \( x^2 = \eta + \theta \cdot x \) for \( (\eta, \theta) = \text{PrivExt}_\mathbb{H}(s) \). For a correct square Diffie-Hellman solution this quadratic equation has at least one solution. Let \( x_1, x_2 \) the (possibly equal) solutions to the equation. The reduction can compute \( [x_1]_G \) and \( [x_2]_G \) to check which of the two possible solutions is the correct one. Thus,

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},_H}^{\text{SQ-DH}}(\lambda) \geq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},_H}^{\text{SQ-DH}}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}',_H}^{\text{1-switching}}(\lambda) - \frac{2}{2^\lambda}
\]

\( \square \)

**Theorem 6.** Let \( \mathbb{G} \) be a group where \( \text{DLOG} \) is hard and \( \mathbb{H} \) be an algebraic wrapper of dimension \( \geq 3 \) for \( \mathbb{G} \). Then, the linear-combination Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in \( \mathbb{H} \).
Proof. Similar to the above theorems, we embed the DLOG-challenge as one of the base elements. The games are similar to Figure 9. When the adversary outputs \(z, u, v, w\), we extract \(\eta, \theta, \iota\) s.t. \(\eta + x \cdot \theta + y \cdot \iota = z\). In the case that \(u \neq 0\), we can solve the resulting quadratic equation for \(x\) (with probability \(\frac{1}{2}\) this is where the DLOG was embedded). In the case that \(w \neq 0\), we solve for \(y\) in a similar fashion. As the games are identically distributed, (even an unbounded adversary cannot decide where the DLOG challenge is embedded), we can solve for the DLOG with probability \(\frac{1}{2}\) in these cases. In the case that \(w = 0\) and \(u = 0\), we can either solve for
\[
x = \frac{-\eta - \iota \cdot y}{vy - \theta}
\]
or for
\[
y = \frac{-\eta - \theta \cdot x}{vx - \iota}.
\]

This is analogous to the reduction for CDH. Thus the probability that a reduction \(R\) solves the DLOG problem is
\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{DLOG}}^R(\lambda) \geq \frac{\text{Adv}_{\text{LC-DH}}^A(\lambda) - 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{2-switching}}^A(\lambda) + 3}{2
\]
\]

\[\square\]

5.2 Schnorr Signatures

We apply the algebraic wrapper to mimic the proof of tight EUF-CMA security of Schnorr Signatures from [FPS19].

Theorem 7. Let \(G\) be a group generator for a cyclic group \(G\) such that DLOG is hard relative to \(G\) and let \(H\) be an algebraic wrapper of dimension \(\geq 2\) for \(G\). Then, the Schnorr signature scheme in \(H\) is tightly EUF-CMA secure in the random oracle model.

More precisely, for all PPT adversaries \(A\), there exists a PPT adversary \(B\) and a legitimate switching adversary \(A''\) both running in time \(T(A) + (q_s + q_h) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)\) and \(T(A'') \approx T(A) + (q_s + q_h) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)\) such that
\[
\text{Adv}_{\Sigma_{\text{schorr}}.A}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{B.}\text{G}}^{\text{DLOG}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{A''}}^{\text{1-switching}}(\lambda) + \frac{O(q_s(q_s + q_h))}{2^{\lambda}},
\]

where \(q_h\) is a polynomial upper bound on the number of random oracle queries, \(q_s\) is a polynomial upper bound on the number of signing queries and \(\text{poly}\) is a polynomial independent of \(q_s\) and \(q_h\).

\begin{align*}
\text{KGen}(pp) & \quad \text{Sign}(sk, m) \\
\text{x} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p & \quad \text{r} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
\tilde{t} := \text{Rand}_{\mathbb{Z}}(pp, \text{Sam}_{\mathbb{Z}}(pp, 1)) & \quad \tilde{R} \leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\mathbb{Z}}(pp, \text{Sam}_{\mathbb{Z}}(pp, r)) \\
\tilde{X} := \text{Rand}_{\mathbb{Z}}(pp, \text{Sam}_{\mathbb{Z}}(pp, x)) & \quad c := H(\tilde{R}, m) \\
pk := (pk, x) & \quad s := r + c \cdot x \mod p \\
\text{sk} := (sk, x) & \quad \text{return } (\sigma := (\tilde{R}, s)) \\
\text{return } (pk, sk) & \quad \text{Ver}(pk = (pp, \tilde{X}, m, \sigma = (\tilde{R}, s)) \\
& \quad c := H(\tilde{R}, m) \\
& \quad \text{return } \text{Eq}_{\mathbb{Z}}(pp, \text{Sam}_{\mathbb{Z}}(pp, s), \tilde{R} \cdot \tilde{X}^c)}
\end{align*}

Fig. 11: The Schnorr signature scheme \(\Sigma_{\text{schorr}}\). Note that to compensate for the non-uniqueness of group element encodings, the (random oracle) hash value of a group element encoding is computed for the unique identifier produced by \(\text{GetID}_{\mathbb{Z}}(pp, \cdot)\).

Proof. We use the origin element trick to avoid using \(q_s\)-switching (see Definition 15) which would compromise tightness of the reduction. Figure 12 shows the EUF-CMA game with Schnorr signatures instantiated with the algebraic wrapper. We note that for groups with non-unique encodings, the hash function hashes the unique identifier returned by \(\text{GetID}_{\mathbb{Z}}\), hence, encodings corresponding to the same group element are mapped to the same hash value. The reduction uses a table \(T\) to keep track of previously made hash queries and their responses, as well as a set \(Q\) to keep track of the messages the adversary has requested signatures for.
A reduction to this property works as a series of parameters and the trapdoor. Then, it simulates $H^{Exp}$, these two games are identically distributed.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Exp}^{\text{euf-cma}}_{\text{Sch}}(\lambda) \\
p_{\text{p}} &\leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \\
(p_{\text{p}}, \tau_{\text{s}}) &\leftarrow \text{Genu}(p_{\text{p}}, (1|\xi_2, [\beta_2]|_2)^T) \\
x &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
\xi_1 &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\text{d}}(p_{\text{p}}, \text{Sam}_{\text{u}}(p_{\text{p}}, 1)) \\
\xi_2 &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\text{d}}(p_{\text{p}}, \text{Sam}_{\text{u}}(p_{\text{p}}, x)) \\
pk &\leftarrow (p_{\text{p}}, \xi_1, \xi_2) \\
Q &\leftarrow \varnothing, T := [] \\
(m^*, \tilde{R}^*, s^*) &\leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{secp}}(\lambda, pk) \\
\text{if } m^* \in Q \text{ then return } 0 \\
\hat{e} &\leftarrow H(\tilde{R}^*, m^*) \\
\text{return } \text{Eq}(p_{\text{p}}, \text{Sam}_{\text{u}}(p_{\text{p}}, s^*), \tilde{R}^* \cdot \xi_{2}^{-})
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 12: The EUF-CMA game for Schnorr signatures. Note that $\beta_2$ can be chosen arbitrarily.

\[
\begin{align*}
G_i \\
p_{\text{p}} &\leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \\
(p_{\text{p}}, \tau_{\text{s}}) &\leftarrow \text{Genu}(p_{\text{p}}, (1|\xi_2, [\beta_2]|_2)^T) \\
x &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
\xi_1 &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\text{d}}(p_{\text{p}}, \text{Sam}_{\text{u}}(p_{\text{p}}, 1)) \\
\xi_2 &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\text{d}}(p_{\text{p}}, \text{Sam}_{\text{u}}(p_{\text{p}}, x)) \\
pk &\leftarrow (p_{\text{p}}, \xi_1, \xi_2) \\
Q &\leftarrow \varnothing, T := [] \\
(m^*, \tilde{R}^*, s^*) &\leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{secp}}(\lambda, pk) \\
\text{if } m^* \in Q \text{ then return } 0 \\
\hat{e} &\leftarrow H(\tilde{R}^*, m^*) \\
\text{return } \text{Eq}(p_{\text{p}}, \text{Sam}_{\text{u}}(p_{\text{p}}, s^*), \tilde{R}^* \cdot \xi_{2}^{-})
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 13: The randomness for signatures is drawn using an $x$-component. $G_1$ is identically distributed to $\text{Exp}^{\text{euf-cma}}_{\text{Sch}}(\lambda)$.

**Game hop from** $\text{Exp}^{\text{euf-cma}}_{\text{Sch}}(\lambda) \rightsquigarrow G_1$. Since $r = s - cx \mod p$ and hence $\text{GetID}_{\text{ID}}(p_{\text{p}}, \tilde{R}_1) = \text{GetID}_{\text{ID}}(p_{\text{p}}, \tilde{R}_2)$, these two games are identically distributed.

**Game hop** $G_1 \rightsquigarrow G_2$. In $G_2$ (see Figure 14), we construct $\tilde{R}_2$ from origin elements through the group operation instead of sampling. This game hop is justified by the re-randomizability of the algebraic wrapper. A reduction to this property works as a series of $q_x + 1$ hybrids where $H_0 = G_1$, where $q_x$ denotes a polynomial upper bound on the number of signing queries. In $H_i$, the first $i$ signature queries are answered as in $G_2$ and the $i + 1$-th to $q_x$-th signature queries are answered as in $G_1$. In the last hybrid, the public key is also changed to private sampling. If there is an (unbounded) adversary that distinguishes $H_i$ and $H_{i+1}$, the reduction $\mathcal{A}$ uses this adversary to attack the re-randomizability as follows. On input of base group parameters $p_{\text{p}}$, $\mathcal{A}$ picks a basis $([1]_G, [\beta_2]_G)$ and gives it to the rerand challenger. It receives public parameters and the trapdoor. Then, it simulates $H_i$ to the adversary for the first $i$ signature queries, i.e. it samples $\tilde{R}_{2,j} \leftarrow \text{Rerand}(p_{\text{p}}, (\xi_2^j \cdot \xi_2^{-})$ for $j < i$. For the $i + 1$-th signature query, $\mathcal{A}$ sends the two elements

\[
\begin{align*}
G_j \\
p_{\text{p}} &\leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \\
(p_{\text{p}}, \tau_{\text{s}}) &\leftarrow \text{Genu}(p_{\text{p}}, (1|\xi_2, [\beta_2]|_2)^T) \\
x &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
\xi_1 &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\text{d}}(p_{\text{p}}, \text{Sam}_{\text{u}}(p_{\text{p}}, 1)) \\
\xi_2 &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\text{d}}(p_{\text{p}}, \text{PrivSam}_{\text{u}}(p_{\text{p}}, x)) \\
pk &\leftarrow (p_{\text{p}}, \xi_1, \xi_2) \\
Q &\leftarrow \varnothing, T := [] \\
(m^*, \tilde{R}^*, s^*) &\leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{secp}}(\lambda, pk) \\
\text{if } m^* \in Q \text{ then return } 0 \\
\hat{e} &\leftarrow H(\tilde{R}^*, m^*) \\
\text{return } \text{Eq}(p_{\text{p}}, [s^*]_{\text{ID}}, \tilde{R}^* \cdot \xi_{2}^{-})
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 14: We construct the randomness from two origin elements. This is statistically close to $G_1$ due to the re-randomizability.
\(\widetilde{h}_0 = \text{Sam}_{\mathbb{H}}(pp_{\mathbb{H}}, s_{i+1} - c_{i+1} \cdot x)\) and \(\widetilde{h}_1 = \xi_1^{c_{i+1}} \cdot \xi_2^{-c_{i+1}}\) to the challenger and receives a challenge \(\widehat{C}\). It uses this challenge \(\widehat{C}\) as \(R_{\mathbb{H}G_{i+1}}\) to answer the \(i + 1\)-th hash query and responds to the remaining queries as in \(H_{i+1}\), i.e. it samples \(R_{k} \leftarrow \text{Rerand}_G(pp_{\mathbb{H}}, \text{Sam}_{\mathbb{H}}(pp_{\mathbb{H}}, s_j - c_j \cdot x))\) for \(j > i + 1\). Depending on the challenge encoding \(\widehat{C}\), \(A'\) either simulates \(H_i\) or \(H_{i+1}\) perfectly and outputs the output of the corresponding game.

In hybrid \(H_{q,+}\), all signature queries are answered as in game \(G_2\). The last step to game \(H_{q,+} = G_2\) changes how \(\xi_2\) (which is part of the public key) is sampled. An adversary distinguishing \(H_{q,+}\) and \(H_{q,+} = G_2\) can be used to build an adversary \(A'\) in \text{rerand} similarly as above. More precisely, \(A'\) outputs the encodings \(\widetilde{h}_0 \leftarrow \text{Sam}_{\mathbb{H}}(pp_{\mathbb{H}}, x)\) and \(\widetilde{h}_1 \leftarrow \text{PrivSam}_{\mathbb{H}}(\tau_{\mathbb{H}}, x)\) (note that \(\tau_{\mathbb{H}}\) is known during the \text{rerand} game) and uses the challenge encoding from the \text{rerand} challenger as \(\xi_2\). We note that this last game hop paved the way to apply 1-switching.

Due to correctness of sampling and correctness of extraction, the representation vectors of the elements used in the \text{rerand} game are identical and hence \(A'\) is a legitimate adversary in the \text{rerand} game and its advantage is upper bounded by \(\frac{1}{2^\lambda}\). Therefore,

\[
|\Pr[\text{out}_1 = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_2 = 1]| \leq \frac{q_\lambda + 1}{2^\lambda}.
\]

**Game hop** \(G_2 \rightsquigarrow G_3\). In game \(G_3\) (see Figure 15) we switch the basis and the representation of the origin element \(\xi_2\). This game is justified by 1-switching. Let \(A\) be an adversary distinguishing \(G_2\) and \(G_3\). We construct an adversary \(A''\) on 1-switching as follows. Initially, \(A''\) on input of \(pp_{\mathbb{G}}\), outputs \([b]_G^{(G_2)} = [(1, \beta_2)]_G\) and \([b]_G^{(G_3)} = [(1, x)]_G\) and the representation vectors \(v^{(G_2)} := (x, 0)^T\) and \(v^{(G_3)} := (0, 1)^T\). In return, \(A''\) receives public parameters \(pp_{\mathbb{G}}\) and an encoding \(\widehat{C}\) and samples \(\xi_2 \leftarrow \text{Rerand}_G(pp_{\mathbb{G}}, \widehat{C})\).

The trapdoor \(\tau_{\mathbb{H}}\) is not necessary to simulate \(G_2\) and \(G_4\) (except for sampling \(\xi_2\)). Hence, \(A''\) perfectly simulates \(G_3\) or \(G_4\) for \(A\) depending on the challenge provided by the 1-switching challenger. Thus, \(|\Pr[\text{out}_3 = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_2 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_1^{\text{switching}}(\lambda)\). Note that \(A''\) is a legitimate switching adversary since \([1, \beta_2]_G \cdot (x, 0)^T = [x]_G = [(1, x)]_G \cdot (0, 1)^T\) and hence \(\text{Adv}_1^{\text{switching}}(\lambda)\) is negligible.

**Game hop** \(G_3 \rightsquigarrow G_4\). In \(G_4\) (see Figure 16), we introduce a list \(U\) to keep track of the representations of group elements used in Random Oracle queries. The games \(G_3\) and \(G_4\) differ in the fact that \(G_4\) extracts the representation vectors contained in the encoding of a group element when this group element message tuple is queried for the first time and stores this representation in a list. Furthermore, \(G_4\) introduces an abort condition which is triggered if the representation of \(\widehat{R}_*\) originally used to query the random oracle on \((\widehat{R}_*, m^*)\) already contained the response in the second component \(\zeta^*\). This corresponds to the game hop from \(G_0\) to \(G_1\) in [FPS19]. The game only aborts if the hash \(T[(\text{GetID}_H(pp_{\mathbb{H}}, \widehat{R}_*), m^*)\] is the same as the second component \(\zeta^*\) of the representation extracted from \(\widehat{R}_*\). Since the hash \(T[(\text{GetID}_H(pp_{\mathbb{H}}, \widehat{R}_*), m^*)]\) is chosen uniformly at random after the representation \((\gamma^*, \zeta^*)\) is fixed, the probability that an unbounded adversary can find such an \((\widehat{R}_*, m^*)\) is upper bounded by \(\frac{q_h}{P}\), where \(q_h\) denotes a polynomial upper bound on the number of random oracle queries. Hence, \(|\Pr[\text{out}_4 = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_3 = 1]| \leq \frac{q_h}{2^\lambda}\).

**Game hop** \(G_4 \rightsquigarrow G_5\). In game \(G_5\) (see Figure 17), we change how signature queries are answered such that it is not necessary anymore to know the discrete logarithm of the public key. This game hop corresponds
to the hop from $G_1$ to $G_2$ in [FPS19]. On one hand, since $\text{GetID}_R(pp_{R_1}, \widehat{R}_1) = \text{GetID}_R(pp_{R_2}, \widehat{R}_2)$, replacing $\widehat{R}_1$ with $\widehat{R}_2$ does not change the distribution. On the other hand, as we are only able to answer a signing query if we can program the random oracle at $(\widehat{R}_2, m)$ (for randomly chosen $\widehat{R}_2$), the signing oracle has to abort in case the hash was already queried before. Since $\widehat{R}_2$ is a independently sampled uniformly random group element, this happens only with probability $\frac{1}{p} \leq \frac{1}{2\pi}$. Hence, by a union bound, this abort occurs at most with probability $\frac{2}{\pi}(q_t + \lambda)$ cases, where $q_t$ denotes a polynomial upper bound on the number of signing queries and $q_h$ denotes a polynomial upper bound on the number of random oracle queries. Conditioned on the event that no abort occurs, $G_4$ and $G_5$ are distributed identically. Hence, by the Difference Lemma due to Shoup [Sho04], we have $|\Pr[out_5 = 1] - \Pr[out_4 = 1]| \leq \frac{q_t(q_h + q_s)}{2\pi}$. As in [FPS19], on extraction of the initial representation $(\gamma^*, \zeta^*)$ of $\widehat{R}^*$ from a valid signature $(\widehat{R}^*, s^*)$ output by the adversary, the reduction can use that $\widehat{R}^* = [\gamma^*]_{\mathbb{G}} \cdot [\zeta^* \cdot z]_{\mathbb{G}} = [s^* - c^* \cdot z]_{\mathbb{G}}$. Therefore,

$$z = s^* - c^* \cdot \zeta^*.$$

Due to the added check in $G_4$, an adversary can only win $G_4$ or $G_5$ when $\zeta^* - c^* \neq 0$ and therefore the overall advantage of an adversary $B$ on DLOG in $\mathbb{G}$ is

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{DLOG}}_{B, \mathbb{G}}(\lambda) \geq \Pr[out_5 = 1]$$

$$\geq \Pr[out_4 = 1] - \frac{q_s(q_t + q_h)}{2\lambda}$$

$$\geq \Pr[out_3 = 1] - \frac{q_h}{2\lambda} - \frac{q_s(q_t + q_h)}{2\lambda}$$

31
\[ \geq \Pr[\text{out}_2 = 1] - \text{Adv}^{1\text{-switching}}_{\mathcal{A}'}(X) - \frac{q_s(q_s + q_h)}{2^\lambda} \]
\[ \geq \Pr[\text{out}_1 = 1] - \frac{q_s(q_s + q_h)}{2^\lambda} - \text{Adv}^{1\text{-switching}}_{\mathcal{A}'}(X) - \frac{q_h(q_s + q_h)}{2^\lambda} \]
\[ \geq \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{B}'}(\Lambda)(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{q_s(q_s + q_h)}{2^\lambda} - \frac{q_h(q_s + q_h)}{2^\lambda} \]
\[ \geq \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{B}'}(\Lambda)(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{O(q_s(q_s + q_h))}{2^\lambda} - \text{Adv}^{1\text{-switching}}_{\mathcal{A}'}(X) \]

which concludes the proof. \( \square \)

5.3 Signed ElGamal

In the hashed ElGamal key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM), a public key is a group element \( Y \), the corresponding secret key is \( y = \text{dlog}_p(Y) \). For encryption, one picks a random exponent \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) to compute a key \( H(Y^x) \) accompanied by an encapsulation \( X := g^x \). Given the encapsulation and the secret key \( y \), the receiver can recover the key \( K = H(X^y) \). [FPS19] showed that Schnorr-signed ElGamal, a variant of hashed ElGamal, is tightly IND-CCA2 secure under the DLOG assumption in the AGM and the random oracle model. Schnorr-signed ElGamal (see Figure 18) works similarly as hashed ElGamal but every encapsulation is accompanied by a Schnorr signature for message \( X \) under public key \( X \). Decryption works as before with the difference that decryption aborts if the provided Schnorr signature is invalid.

In this section, we demonstrate that our algebraic wrapper can be applied to mimic the proof of tight IND-CCA2 security of Schnorr-signed ElGamal \( \text{PKE}_{\text{EIG}} \) from [FPS19]. In contrast to our tight reduction for Schnorr signatures from Section 5.2, the tightness for Schnorr-signed ElGamal does not require the "origin element trick" since it is not necessary to apply switching to oracle responses.

Fig. 18: The Schnorr-signed ElGamal encryption scheme \( \text{PKE}_{\text{EIG}} \). Note that to compensate for the non-uniqueness of group element encodings, the (random oracle) hash value of a group element encoding is computed for the unique identifier produced by \( \text{GetID}_{\mathbb{H}}(\cdot) \). The hash function \( H \) maps tuples of group elements from \( \mathbb{H} \) to elements in \( \mathcal{K} \) and the hash function \( H' \) maps group elements from \( \mathbb{H} \) to \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) elements.

**Theorem 8.** Let \( \text{GGen}_G \) be a group generator for a cyclic group \( G \) such that DLOG is hard relative to \( \text{GGen}_G \) and let \( \mathbb{H} \) be an algebraic wrapper of dimension \( \geq 2 \) for \( G \). Then, \( \text{PKE}_{\text{EIG}} \) in \( \mathbb{H} \) is tightly IND-CCA2 secure in the random oracle model.

More precisely, for all PPT adversaries \( \mathcal{A} \), there exists a PPT adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) and a legitimate switching adversary \( \mathcal{A}' \) both running in time \( T(\mathcal{B}) \approx T(\mathcal{A}) + (q_d + q_h) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda) \) and \( T(\mathcal{A}') \approx T(\mathcal{A}) + (q_d + q_h) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda) \) such that

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_{\text{EIG}}, \mathcal{A}'}^{\text{ind-CCA2}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{B}_G}^{\text{DLOG}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}', \mathbb{H}}^{2\text{-switching}}(\lambda) + \frac{O(q_d + q_h)}{2^\lambda}, \]

where \( q_h \) is a polynomial upper bound on the number of random oracle queries, \( q_d \) is a polynomial upper bound on the number of decryption queries and poly is a polynomial independent of \( q_d \) and \( q_h \).

**Proof.** The proof strategy follows (up to some preparations) the outline of [FPS19]. The hybrid \( G_0 \) is identical to \( \text{Exp}_{\text{PKE}_{\text{EIG}}, \mathcal{A}'}^{\text{ind-CCA2}}(\lambda) \). The initial game transitions until hybrid \( G_3 \) are preparation steps due to the algebraic wrapper. The following hybrids \( G_1, G_2, G_3 \) correspond exactly to the hybrids \( G_1, G_2, G_3 \) from [FPS19], respectively. The preparation steps set up the randomness for the challenge ciphertext as \( x^* := z \cdot y \). Further, the randomness for the signature in the challenge ciphertext is chosen using an \( x^* \)-component similar to the
proof of Schnorr signatures Section 5.2. Subsequently, re-randomizability and switching are applied such that the public key \( \hat{Y} \) uses the representation vector \((0, 1)^T\) and the randomness for the challenge ciphertext \( \hat{X} \) uses the representation vector \((0, z)^T\). The remaining proof proceeds as in [FPS19].

For simplicity, we introduce the notation \( \hat{A} = \hat{B} \) for \( Eq_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \hat{A}, \hat{B}) \). We proceed over a series of games starting from the IND-CCA2 game in the random oracle model, see Figure 19. The hash functions \( H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \) and \( H' : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathcal{K} \) behave exactly as their counterparts \( H \) and \( H' \), respectively, and act solely as helper functions. The adversary \( A \) only has access to the oracles \( H \) and \( H' \) (and \( \text{Dec} \)). Throughout the proof, the behavior of \( \hat{H} \) and \( \hat{H'} \) will not be altered.

\[
G_0 \\
\begin{align*}
pp_{\mathcal{H}} &\leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\mathcal{H}}(1^\lambda) \\
(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \tau) &\leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\mathcal{H}}((1^\lambda), [\beta]|_{\mathcal{H}})^T \\
y &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
G &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{Sam}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, 1)) \\
\hat{Y} &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{Sam}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, y)) \\
pk := &\left( pp_{\mathcal{H}}, G, \hat{Y} \right) \\
T, T' &\leftarrow [] \\
x, r &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
\hat{X} &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{Sam}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, x)) \\
\hat{R} &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{Sam}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, r)) \\
c' &:= H(\hat{R}, \hat{X}) \\
s' &:= r' + c' \cdot x \mod p \\
k_0 &:= H(\hat{Y}^*), k_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{K} \\
b' &\leftarrow A^{\hat{H}, \hat{H}'}(pk, k_0, (\hat{R}, \hat{X}, s')) \\
return b = b'
end
\]

\[
H(\hat{R}, \hat{X}) \\
\begin{align*}
if &\left(\text{GetID}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \hat{R}), \text{GetID}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \hat{X})\right) = \perp \text{ then} \\
if &\left(\text{GetID}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \hat{R}), \text{GetID}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \hat{X})\right) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
return &\left(\text{GetID}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \hat{R}), \text{GetID}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \hat{X})\right)
end
\]

\[
H'(\hat{K}) \\
\begin{align*}
if &\left(\text{GetID}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \hat{K})\right) = \perp \text{ then} \\
\text{return} &\left(\text{GetID}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \hat{K})\right) \leftarrow \mathcal{K} \\
\text{return} &\left(\text{GetID}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \hat{K})\right)
end
\]

\[
\text{Dec}(\hat{R}, \hat{X}, s) \\
\begin{align*}
if &\hat{R} = \hat{R}^* \land \hat{X} = \hat{X}^* \land s = s' \text{ then} \\
\text{return} &\perp \\
if &\hat{s}_s \not= \hat{R} \cdot \hat{X}^* \text{ then} \\
\text{return} &\perp \\
k &:= H(\hat{X}^*) \\
\text{return} & k
end
\]

Fig. 19: The description of \( G_0 \). \( G_0 \) is identical to \( \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{H}^{\text{ind-cca2}}}(\lambda) \).

**Game hop** \( G_0 \rightsquigarrow G_1 \). Similarly to the security proof of Schnorr signatures, we first change how the signature in the challenge ciphertext is generated. Particularly, the randomness used for the signature is chosen using a \( y \)-component, see Figure 20. Because \( x^* \) is in both games uniformly distributed and \( r^* = s^* - c' \cdot x^* \mod p \) and \( \text{GetID}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \hat{R}) = \text{GetID}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \hat{R}^*) \), \( G_0 \) and \( G_1 \) are distributed identically.

\[
G_1 \\
\begin{align*}
pp_{\mathcal{H}} &\leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\mathcal{H}}(1^\lambda) \\
(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \tau) &\leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\mathcal{H}}((1^\lambda), [\beta]|_{\mathcal{H}})^T \\
y &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
G &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{Sam}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, 1)) \\
\hat{Y} &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{Sam}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, y)) \\
pk := &\left( pp_{\mathcal{H}}, G, \hat{Y} \right) \\
T, T' &\leftarrow [] \\
x, r &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
\hat{X} &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{Sam}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, x)) \\
\hat{R} &\leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{Sam}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, r)) \\
c' &:= H(\hat{R}, \hat{X}) \\
s' &:= r' + c' \cdot x \mod p \\
k_0 &:= H(\hat{Y}^*), k_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{K} \\
b' &\leftarrow A^{\hat{H}, \hat{H}'}(pk, k_0, (\hat{R}, \hat{X}, s')) \\
return b = b'
end
\]

**Game hop** \( G_1 \rightsquigarrow G_2 \). In \( G_2 \) (see Figure 21), the encodings \( \hat{Y}, \hat{X} \) and \( \hat{R}^* \) are produced using private sampling or the group operation instead of public sampling. Since these encodings are re-randomized, this game hop is justified by the re-randomizability of the algebraic wrapper \( \mathcal{H} \). More precisely, we successively replace \( \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{Sam}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, y)) \) by \( \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{PrivSam}_{\mathcal{H}}(\tau, y)) \), \( \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{Sam}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, x^*)) \) by \( \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{PrivSam}_{\mathcal{H}}(\tau, x^*)) \) and, finally, \( \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{Sam}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, s^* - c' \cdot x^*)) \) by \( \text{Rand}_{\mathcal{H}}(pp_{\mathcal{H}}, \text{PrivSam}_{\mathcal{H}}(\tau, s^*) \).
\( \tilde{G}^\ast \cdot (\tilde{X}^\ast)^{-c^\ast} \). Due to correctness of sampling, we have \( \text{PrivExt}_H(\tilde{T}_H, \text{Sam}_H(p_{pp_H}, y)) = y \cdot e_1 = \text{PrivExt}_H(\tilde{T}_H, \text{PrivSam}_H(\tilde{T}_H, y)) \) and \( \text{PrivExt}_H(\tilde{T}_H, \text{Sam}_H(p_{pp_H}, x^*)) = x^* \cdot e_1 = \text{PrivExt}_H(\tilde{T}_H, \text{PrivSam}_H(\tilde{T}_H, x^*)) \). Further, due to correctness of sampling and correctness of extraction, we have \( \text{PrivExt}_H(\tilde{T}_H, \text{Sam}_H(p_{pp_H}, s^* - c^* \cdot x^*)) = (s^* - c^* \cdot x^*) \cdot e_1 = \text{PrivExt}_H(\tilde{T}_H, \tilde{G}^\ast \cdot (\tilde{X}^\ast)^{-c^\ast}) \). Hence, due to statistical re-randomizability, \( |Pr[out_2 = 1] - Pr[out_1 = 1]| \leq \frac{3}{2\cdot \pi} \).

**Fig. 21:** The description of the hybrid \( G_2 \).

**Game hop** \( G_2 \rightarrow G_3 \). Towards removing the necessity to know \( y \) for the simulation, we change the basis to be \( [b]_G := ([1]_G, [y]_G)^T \) and adapt the representation vectors used for private sampling of \( \tilde{Y} \) and \( \tilde{X}^* \) accordingly, see Figure **22**. This game hop is justified by 2-switching. We construct an adversary \( A^\prime \) on 2-switching as follows. Initially, on input of \( pp_G \), \( A^\prime \) outputs two basis vectors \( [b]_G^{(G_2)} := ([1]_G, [y]_G)^T \) and \( [b]_G^{(G_3)} := ([1]_G, [y]_G)^T \) and representation vectors \( v^{(1),(G_2)} := (y, 0)^T \), \( v^{(2),(G_2)} := (z, 0)^T \), and \( v^{(1),(G_3)} := (0, 1)^T \), \( v^{(2),(G_3)} := (0, z)^T \). In return, \( A^\prime \) receives public parameters \( pp_H \) and two encodings \( C^{(1)} \) and \( C^{(2)} \). \( A^\prime \) computes \( \tilde{Y} \leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\text{pp}_H}(C^{(1)}) \) and \( \tilde{X}^* \leftarrow \text{Rand}_{\text{pp}_H}(C^{(2)}) \) and simulates the remaining game as in \( G_2 \). Note that this is possible since \( \tilde{T}_H \) is not necessary. \( A^\prime \) simulates either \( G_2 \) or \( G_3 \) for \( A \) depending on the challenge provided by the 2-switching game. Hence, \( |Pr[out_2 = 1] - Pr[out_2 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{H,A^\prime}^{2\text{switching}}(\lambda) \). Since \( A^\prime \) is a legitimate 2-switching adversary, \( \text{Adv}^{2\text{switching}}_{H,A^\prime}(\lambda) \) is negligible.

**Fig. 22:** The description of the hybrid \( G_3 \).
Game hop $G_3 \rightsquigarrow G_4$. From this point on, we are able to closely follow the lines of [FPS19]. In $G_4$ (see Figure 23), the oracle $H$ stores the private extractions of the encodings used to call $H$ in a list $U$. Furthermore, the decryption oracle obtains representation vectors corresponding to the supplied encodings $\hat{R}$ and $\hat{X}$ by first looking for a matching entry in $U$ and, if no such entry is present, by applying private extraction. Let $(\nu, \mu)$ and $(\nu', \mu')$ be the thus obtained representation vectors of $\hat{R}$ and $\hat{X}$, respectively. Game $G_4$ additionally introduces an abort condition. If $\mu + \mu' \cdot c = 0$ and $\mu' \neq 0$, $G_4$ aborts and outputs a random bit. The games $G_3$ and $G_4$ only differ if $G_4$ aborts.

Note that all values in the table $T$ are set in an adversarial call to either $H$ or Dec, except for $c^* = T([\text{GetId}_H(pp_{3|1}, R_3^0), \text{GetId}_H(pp_{3|1}, X^*)])$ which is set using $\tilde{H}$ in the game. If $\text{Dec}(\tilde{R}, \tilde{X}, s) \neq \bot$, then $(\tilde{R}, \tilde{X}) \neq (R_3^0, X^*)$ since otherwise $s = s^*$. Hence, the value $c = T([\text{GetId}_H(pp_{3|1}, \tilde{R}), \text{GetId}_H(pp_{3|1}, \tilde{X})])$ is independent of $(\nu, \mu, \nu', \mu')$. Therefore, the probability that $G_4$ aborts is upper bounded by the probability that $c$ is chosen as $c = -\frac{\mu}{\nu} \mod p$ which can be upper bounded by $\frac{1}{p} \leq 2^{-3}$. By a union bound, the probability that $G_4$ aborts is upper bounded by $\frac{q}{2^k}$. Since $G_3$ and $G_4$ behave identical unless $G_4$ aborts, we have $|\Pr[out_{G3} = 1] - \Pr[out_{G4} = 1]| \leq \frac{q}{2^k}$.

![Fig. 23: The description of the hybrid $G_4$.](image)

**Game hop $G_4 \rightsquigarrow G_5$.** Figure 24 shows the description of $G_5$. Instead of sampling $r^*$ and querying the $\tilde{H}$ for $c^*$ to obtain $s^* = r^* + c^* \cdot x^*$, $G_5$ samples $s^*$ and $c^*$ independently and computes $\tilde{R}_3^0 = \text{Rerand}_3(pp_{1|2}, G, (X^*)^{-c^*})$ as in $G_4$. This behavior is identical to $G_4$ except for the event that the tuple $(\tilde{R}_3^0, X^*)$ already has an entry in $T$. If this event occurs, $G_5$ aborts. Since $\tilde{R}_3^0$ and $X^*$ are uniformly random and $T$ contains at most $q_d$ Dec-queries and $q_h$ $H$-queries, the probability that $G_5$ aborts but $G_4$ does not can be upper bounded by $\frac{q_d + q_h}{2^d}$. Hence, $|\Pr[out_{G5} = 1] - \Pr[out_{G4} = 1]| \leq \frac{q_d + q_h}{2^d}$.

**Game hop $G_5 \rightsquigarrow G_6$.** Game $G_6$ (see Figure 25) introduces two further abort conditions ($\ast$) and ($\ast\ast$). As in [FPS19], we show that if $G_6$ differs from $G_5$, then we can solve discrete logarithms.

We construct an adversary $B$ on the discrete logarithm problem. Given $(pp_{1|1}, [1]_G, [y]_G)$, $B$ produces $(pp_{1|1}, \tau_{3|2}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_3(pp_{1|1}, [1]_G, [y]_G)$ and simulates $G_6$ for $A$. Note that $\hat{Y}$ and $\hat{X}$ can be sampled without knowing $y$ (and $x^*$).

- $B$ simulates queries to $H'$ as follows. When $A$ queries $H'$ for $\hat{K}$, $B$ computes $(\nu'', \mu'') \leftarrow \text{PrivExt}_3(\tau_{3|2}, \hat{K})$. Hence,

$$\text{Unwrap}_3(pp_{1|1}, \hat{K}) = (\nu'', \mu'') \cdot ([1]_G, [y]_G).$$

35
Therefore, $|\Pr[\text{out}_6 = 1] - \Pr[\text{out}_5 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{G_6}^{\text{DLOG}}(\lambda)$. □
Fig. 25: The description of the hybrid $G_6$. The view of $A$ is independent of $b$.

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