The 1994 Hutu and Tutsi Ethnopolitics Conflict in Rwanda: Genocide Revenge Settlement Through the Gacaca Reconciliation System

Probo Darono Yakti
Universitas Airlangga

Abstract

The conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes in Rwanda at the end of the 20th century opened the eyes of the international community that ethnic issues could escalate into a political issue which encouraged genocide. This politicization led to the deaths of more than 800 thousand Tutsis due to planned mass killings by the Hutu government. This justifies Gilroy and Wright’s argument about ethnic politicization which can form exclusivity regarding one’s nationality within the state. By using a discourse analysis and qualitative-explanatory research approach, a comprehensive explanation is obtained to understand the problem in its entirety and explore the research questions: how to explain the conflict in Rwanda between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes from the aspect of politicizing the identity issue in the era of postcolonialism? this paper, raises number of issues surrounding the Hutu and Tutsi conflict. It is concluded that it is true that there is ethnic politicization in Rwanda. Teh findings become a lesson to other regions of the world that experience the same problems and can offer options for methods of conflict resolution as displayed by Rwanda: reconciliation, accommodation, and the Gacaca system.

Keywords: Rwandan ethnic conflict; genocide; ethnic politicization; discourse analysis; qualitative-explanatory.

Konflik yang terjadi antara suku Hutu dan Tutsi di Rwanda pada akhir abad ke-20 membuka mata dunia terhadap kenyataan bahwa isu etnis dapat terescalasi menjadi isu politik yang mendorong terjadinya genosida. Politisasi isu etnis tersebut menyebabkan timbulnya delapan ratus ribu korban nyawa dari suku Tutsi sebagai akibat dari pembunuhan massal terencana oleh pemerintah Hutu. Hal ini membenarkan argument Gilroy dan Wright tentang politisasi etnis yang membentuk ekslusivitas nasionalisme dalam satu negara. Dengan menggunakan metode analisis diskursus dan pendekatan kualitatif-eksplanatif penjelasan komprehensif diperoleh mengenai konflik Rwanda dengan menjawab pertanyaan penelitian: bagaimana menjelaskan konflik Rwanda antara suku Hutu dan Tutsi dari aspek politisasi identitas pada era pasca-kolonial? Tulisan ini menjelaskan berbagai isu seputar konflik Hutu dan Tutsi. Disimpulkan bahwa politisasi etnis terjadi di Rwanda. Temuan lantas menjadi pelajaran bagi kawasan lain di dunia yang menghadapi isu serupa dan memberikan beberapa opsi metode resolusi konflik seperti yang ditunjukan Rwanda yaitu: rekonsiliasi, akomodasi, dan Sistem Gacaca.

Kata Kunci: Konflik etnis Rwanda; genosida; politisasi etnis; analisis diskursus; kualitatif eksplanatif.
Introduction

This paper focuses on discussing the genocide that took place in Rwanda, where there was ethnic politicization between the Hutu and the Tutsis. The event that took place in 1994 seized the attention of the international community considering that at that time according to the UDHR50 (1998) around 800 thousand to two million Tutsi who was a minority were massacred by the Hutu militia and nearly 500 thousand Tutsi women were raped. Hutu people at that time had filled 85 percent of Rwanda's population in the Central African region. Whereas Tutsi is 14 percent and the remaining 1% is Twa (Andre 2018, 278). At first, the conflict occurred due to the post-colonial order which had been formed by Germany and later Belgium to exclude Tutsi as privileged people as administrators of the course of the state helping the colonial parties to become feudalists or landlords. Tutsi’s exclusivity became an act of revenge for the Hutu for many years during the European occupation.

Hutu held the reins of power for almost 4 decades, which during his reign a number of racial policies as happened in the colonial period repeated again. It’s just the difference, not exclusive to Tutsi but Hutu. The hatred of the people of the Tutsi continued to escalate until it peaked in the 1990s. Resistance was carried out by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) since 1990 by attacking Rwanda and struggled to end in negotiations that began in 1992 (History.com Editors 2018). One of the RPFs was led by Paul Kagame, a Tutsi who is currently in power as president of Rwanda. Negotiations between RPF and the Hutu government reached an agreement in 1993 resulting in a peace agreement between the RPF and the Rwandan government (BBC 2019). It did not last long, on April 6, 1994, at night there was a shooting incident against a plane that brought Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana who was a Hutus.

Upon hearing the news that the plane had been hit by a rocket and killed all of its passengers, Hutu extremists accused the RPF or Tutsi of masterminding the incident. Genocide in Rwanda and the Tutsi tribe were victims of the 100-day event. The importance of this case to be discussed is that ethnicity should be as diverse as possible to be easily politicized so as to ignite a great conflict. Hintjens (1999, 242) also argues that up to 50 years since one of the biggest crimes against humanity in the world in 1995 when the conflict broke out in Rwanda there was no consensus explaining why humans could kill each other due to political and power problems. The author proposed a research question, how to explain the conflict in Rwanda between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes from the aspect of politicizing the identity issue in the era of postcolonialism?
Method

Qualitative methods to produce explanatory research are prioritized as a promising tool in examining issues that have become traditional problems since the beginning of the issue of identity as the trigger of the birth of major conflicts in the world. With explanatory qualitative type research, the author can also freely describe the problems that occur in Rwanda to be one example of how the pattern of the use of racial identity issues can be a valuable lesson for each country to increase awareness of the potential that can occur with ethnic backgrounds as exploited political commodities.

Conceptual Framework

Cultural Racism & Racial Exclusivity

Susan Wright (1998, 10) views that cultural racism was the result of New Right in England which was sparked by the government of PM Margaret Thatcher who emphasized certain forms of cultural hegemony towards other cultures. Finally, there is an alienation of other cultures that are outside the values of what is called Englishness. This value can then be compared to what happened in Africa, especially seeing that one group feels superior and the other is considered not indigenous. This feeling can then be ignited by other tools such as religious and racial politics. Within certain limits, cultural racism will have an impact on people’s behavior to hate a group and make exclusive barriers.

Gilroy (1987, 60) reveals that with the formation of Englishness which became the identity of the British public, there could be an exclusive sense between people who felt “British” towards a society that was “not British”. If thrown back on the problems suffered by Rwandan people, especially the Hutu and Tutsis, it would seem the exclusion of the Hutu people as native Rwandans, feeling the majority had the right to act as they wished to get rid of and “cleanse” the minority Tutsis. This theory is a contradiction of inclusiveness because when society can be embraced by the state in an inclusive manner, there will be no meaningful social segregation and the community can live peacefully through a number of formulated agreements that were ripe at the beginning by the founders of the nation.

Racial exclusivity can also lead to racial struggle and racial hierarchy as well. Both are the main factors of the emergence of pressure on the economy and politics (Hintjens 1999, 242). In addition, racial exclusivity also gives rise to the seeds of racial ideology, thus forming a psychological justification that leads to feelings of rooted hatred to the stamp of certain groups as common enemies that must be fought and eliminated.
Conflict Resolution

Gilroy (1987, 60) reveals that with the formation of Englishness which became the identity of the “British” public, there could be an exclusive sense between people who felt British towards a society that was “not British”. If thrown back on the problems suffered by Rwandan people, especially the Hutu and Tutsis, it would seem the exclusion of the Hutu people as native Rwandans, feeling the majority had the right to act as they wished to get rid of and “cleanse” the minority Tutsis. In addition, there are a number of theories that can be taken from psychology that can be brought into the realm of international relations in the context of the conflicts that occurred in Rwanda. Forsyth (2009) explains that there are two most important domains in solving conflicts. Internal aspects, which are represented by the nature of assertiveness and external aspects, represented by empathy. Both are quite easy to distinguish because it involves individual aspects and one’s social aspects towards other individuals.

This human nature is then reduced to five conflict resolution models: avoidance, yielding, competitive, conciliation, and cooperation. The first technique, avoidance conflict style, is to avoid talking to sensitive topics. This technique is often used in Chinese society to reduce hatred and hostility between individuals or groups who are in conflict. The second technique, yielding conflict style tends to give mutual accommodation to opposite parties by providing space for mutual understanding and achieving resolution. The third technique, competitive conflict style, refers more to the omission of the conditions of hostile parties in a competitive climate so that a win-lose result is expected to occur. The fourth technique, conciliation conflict style is an extension of yielding, with a much more transactional agreement. The fourth technique requires an approach that is able to bridge the interests of both parties so that both feel satisfied. The last model, cooperation conflict style is a method that requires high tolerance for both parties to succumb to each other and open a space for dialogue. The hope is that using this method at the end of the agreement will create a win-win solution.

Result

Origin of Hutu and Tutsis

The Hutu tribe, has inhabited a large lake area in Central Africa between 500 and 1000 BC. As a native tribe, Hutu is an agrarian society that lives in large families. Whereas Tutsi or Watutsi were nomads who came in the Great Lakes region of Ethiopia from four hundred years ago. The Tutsi settled among the Hutu, adopted the prevailing procedures, languages, and
and norms and both lived in harmony (PBS NewsHour 1999; CNN 1996). The physical difference of Hutu tends to be slightly shorter and Tutsi appears higher (Independent 1996). But British explorer John H. Speke once stated that Hutus were “primitive race” Negroes, whose hair was curly, had a nose with fat deposits and was a pocket mouth. Whereas the Tutsi are seen as the best blood descendants of Abyssinia or ancient Ethiopia so that they are far superior (Andre 2018, 178).

While there is one of the most minority tribes called Twa, which is a tribe of hunters and gatherers, the population is only 1 percent and dwarf. Usually, a Hutu man will have a tendency to marry a Tutsi woman to improve heredity, where her children will become part of the Tutsi and can improve their destiny (African Studies Center 2019; Andre 2018, 278). In its journey, the Tutsis began to take control of the lands of Hutu by surrendering them to the king or Mwami who were native races. Tutsi relied on ownership of further warfare expertise to achieve economic, political and social control of the Hutu tribe. Eventually, a patron-client relationship was called Ubuhake. In this system, there was an exchange between the care of Tutsi’s livestock with personal security guarantees through military services. Secondly, Tutsi increasingly mastered and acted feudally by exchanging agricultural products and personal services with the use of land and livestock (African Studies Center 2019).

Before colonization took place in Rwanda, these three tribes lived peacefully as noted by Gahama (2002). This situation of difference was actually exploited by the German colonial side to carry out political divisions with the Rwandan people. Precisely in 1890 when Germany politically colonized the Kingdom of Tutsi (Boudreaux 2009, 87). The existence of the Hamitic Myth, which was exploited by getting closer to the Tutsis and thought they were close relatives of the Hamites who were stigmatized as helping angels from Europe made social segregation thicker in society. A number of historical experiences show that Tutsi is a society that is quite adaptive to the dynamics that occur in society. In the end a number of tasks relating to German power politics in Rwanda were delegated to the Tutsi. The theory that can be referred to in conducting this divisive politics is Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882) who divided the world community into three major ethnic groups, namely the Caucasian originating from Europe, Mongoloid namely Asia, and Negroid or the European nation. The rest, the world’s population is descended from these three tribes (van Haperen 2012, 99).

After Versailles treaty, Rwanda was under the colonial rule of Belgium which took part in strengthening identity politics in Rwanda by emphasizing the
distance between the Hutus and the Tutsis (Boudreaux 2009, 87). Belgium carried out identity politics by imposing a tribal inclusion policy on identity cards (van Haperen 2019, 99). Within certain limits, this policy forms the stereotype of a number of people. A number of important officials at the mayor level are held by Tutsi, school access is also exclusive to the Tutsi community in addition to freedom for mobility and loyalty to the government. This situation runs from year to year, giving rise to high social jealousy for the Hutus because they are marginalized politically and economically. The Hutu people used to be the second-class society who work mostly as cattle herders must work for the Tutsi people (Batware 2012, 6-7). The Hutu tribe, supported by the Roman Catholic Church succeeded to overthrow the Tutsis power which considered a representation of the ex-European colonial order social system in 1959 (Boudreaux 2009, 87).

**Inter-tribal Conflict and Civil War**

Inspired by the Mahutu Manifesto in March 1957, the 1959 Revolution managed to expel around 300,000 Tutsi from Rwanda who made up the majority of the country in Uganda (Willame 1995). This made the Tutsi which previously landlords increasingly minority. Finally, the Rwandan king who was a Tutsi was forced to step down so that the Hutu could take power in the form of a republic and his people became the country’s first president (History.com Editors 2018). Rwanda declared independence in 1962 after, on June 27, 1962, the UN general assembly considered Belgium failing to implement a trust agreement.

Rwanda’s first president was Gregoire Kayibanda, who was the leader of the Parmehutu party that focused on addressing the issue of the emancipation of Hutus (African Studies Center 2019). This began the Hutu leadership in the First Republic period which ran 11 years from 1962 to 1973 (White 2007, 475). During his presidency, Rwanda had begun to aggressively commit a number of violence against the economic-dominant Tutsis. For example, in 1963 when 12 thousand Tutsi were killed after failing to carry out an attack on Rwanda from. The Tutsi rebellion took place from 1961 to 1967 through a number of guerrillas launched from Burundi and Uganda (Sebahara 1998).

During this period, ethnic segregation policies on the national identity card were maintained to prevent the Tutsi from entering the government and military sectors, while securing the interests of the Hutus to exercise full power in their power (White 2007, 475). This effort is carried out through a discriminatory quota system and prevents people in military and government services from marrying across ethnic lines. This policy, which continues to be encouraged through legislation and other administrative
Violence increasingly became when Major General Juvenal Habyarimana was appointed President of Rwanda after making a coup on Kayibanda. Habyarimana formed the Revolutionary Movement of National pour le Development (MRND) which later became the beginning of dangerous racial politics in Rwanda. In 1990, a civil war-struck Rwanda with a force of 5 to 10,000 Tutsi rebels attacking Rwanda from Uganda. The rebellion ended with a ceasefire agreed upon by Habyarimana and the rebels on March 29, 1991. With the signing of a new constitution, Tutsi was given space to politicize by allowing political parties to form seven new parties in November 1991. There was a debate when the opposition party consisting of MDR, PSD, LP, and PSR refused to join the government coalition unless the prime minister (PM) was chosen from the party outside the MRNDD (successor to MRND) and the Comite de Difense de la Revolution (CDR) (African Studies Center 2019). The latter President Habyarimana-backed CDR is an attempt by Habyarimana to overcome the influence of the Tutsi who will one day return to capture Rwanda from the hands of “Hutu Power”.

In 1993, the conflict escalated again with hundreds of Hutu and Tutsi victims, this was counterproductive considering that the government led by Hutu and Tutsi’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had signed a power-sharing agreement between Hutu and Tutsi through the Arusha Agreement in Tanzania on July 22, 1992. A number of packages were firearms, knives, and grenades are sent via air parcels to civil society (Power 2001). Ami R. Mpungwe, as a chief facilitator of Arusha accord, said that “these conflicts (Rwandan conflicts) are extremely tenacious because they revolve around the fundamentals of human life: land, safety, security, identity, recognition, esteem and unhindered opportunities for human development as a whole.” As a consequence, the community experienced segregation which was quite damaging to the social order and brought ethnic conflict as a barrier to unity that occurred in Rwanda.

In addition, the government carried out a scenario to tackle the Tutsi regain control of the Rwandan government through the establishment of the Interahamwe militia, which meant the people who attacked together, and Impuzamugambi, which meant people who had the same goal (White 2007, 476). These two militias were supported by a number of factions within the military and presidential guards. In their minds, it was implanted that every Hutu had been threatened by the Tutsi, rather than instilling that the country of Rwanda was threatened by rebel groups.
Collective responsibility is built on the individual responsibility that this individual action is a movement that does not make one individual bear the overall responsibility (White 2007, 476).

Peace in Rwanda is supported by the existence of the United Nations and Belgium sending peacekeepers to stop the killings through UNAMIR, but after the killing of 10 Belgian soldiers in Rwanda, the troops’ mission was immediately withdrawn from Rwanda in April 1994 (BBC 2019; History.com Editors 2018). While France in mid-June 1994 decided to send 2,500 troops to create a safe zone in the southwest region of Rwanda. The French intervention was supported by the United Nations and was called the Turquoise operation on June 22 which gave support to the Hutu government which was positioned as a victim because the Tutsi with their RPF managed to drive the tribe away to escape to Zaire. But the entry of the French-led UNAMIR II forces did not last long because shortly afterward the RPF through the RPA could occupy the Rwandan capital Kigali on July 4, and fully controlled Rwanda on July 18, 1994. Dallaire in his book noted that the superiority of the RPF army is sole because it has won all recent contests because of superior leadership, training, experience, efficiency, mobility, discipline, and high morale (Dallaire 2003, 67).

The UN forces refused to intervene due to a push from the United States under Bill Clinton who did not have much interest in Rwanda not to sacrifice many troops, the term “genocide” was avoided to show the US was not interested in reducing the effects of the massacre in Rwanda (EndGenocide 2016; Power 2001). Major General Dallaire of Canada believes the intervention of the 5,000 UN troops he leads is enough to save hundreds of thousands of Rwandan people from death. In fact, he mentioned that 2,000 troops sent by the UN to Rwanda were left with conditions without strength. This number continues to decrease until there are only 270 peacekeeping forces left (Washington Times 2004; Vox 2014).

The difficulty of fighting in Rwanda is caused by a strong government. The ruling party at that time, the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) had a youth wing organization called the Interahamwe (“People Who Attack Together”) and Impuzamugambi (“People Who Have the Same Purpose”) who owned militias. Both can be mobilized at any time to execute the massacre (BBC 2019). These two organizations used garden tools, knives, and pistols to kill Tutsi from village to village one by one and from town to town until these militia planning the “best planning killings of the 20th century” killed 333 people every hour and 8,000 people every day (Vox 2014; Corry 1998).
Extremist Hutus then took control of radio stations and newspapers by broadcasting hate propaganda against the Tutsi and the RPF allover Rwanda, which the message was “get rid of pests, ticks, ibyitso or maids, and inyenzni or cockroaches.” These frightening messages were followed by reading names - the name on radio and television, one of which is Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), for anyone who wants to be killed. Furthermore, the massacre also involved priests, nuns, and newly-formed militias consisting of military officials, politicians, and business people (BBC 2019). The US military tried to intervene the RTLM but failed (Power 2001). Besides RTLM, the Hutu extremists published a propaganda magazine for Hutu called Kangura as a spin-off of Tutsi’s Kanguka magazine (Kanguka means “wake up” from Hutu’s oppression). Kangura was read publicly during the open campaign of the Interahamwe militia in public meetings and was disseminated at the time of the genocide (Melvern 2004, 49). In one of the covers of the magazine “Kangura” which incited the Hutu to carry out massacres of the Tutsi, in the front page of the magazine it stated “Tutsi: God Race”, while the text on the right of the knife meant “what weapon can we use to kill cockroaches for noble purposes? “(Thompson 2007, 68).

Starting from the Rwandan capital Kigali, the Rwandan government supported by Hutu, began a massacre that was followed by ordinary people who dissolved in the incitement of enthusiasm of the ruling MRND party (History.com Editors 2018). Within 100 days of fighting from 7 April to 15 July 1994, no fewer than 800 to 900 thousand Tutsis and hundreds to thousands of moderate Hutus were killed including politicians, human rights activists, journalists, and clergy. The number of genocides carried out by Hutu groups is the largest number in a short time in history (Graybill 2004, 1120; BBC 2011). Ironically, young Tutsi women were raped and made sex slaves before being slaughtered (White 2007, 472). The conflict ended with the entry of the RPF army supported by the Ugandan army, until on July 4, 1994, finally the Rwandan capital Kigali was successfully released while making that date the date of the release of Rwanda. A truce is immediately announced (BBC 2011).

**Analysis of the Conflict Factors**

According to White (2007, 472), there are nine factors underlying the civil war and genocide in Rwanda. First, the historical aspect of colonialism as mentioned earlier with the presence of Europeans including Germany and Belgium. Second, the side effects of colonialism namely ethnocentrism which divides Hutus and Tutsis as a result of the privilege of the Tutsi race. This was confirmed by Saidi & Talibu (2015, 299) as a political imbalance which then triggered a civil war in 1965. For example, in the
context of wealth distribution due to uneven distribution of resources, and the dominance of Tutsis in the armed forces. Third, political pressure formed after the post-colonialism era in which among the Rwandan people themselves had not reached a consensus regarding their national identity. Fourth, human rights violations that have ingrained between the two races.

Fifth, social injustice arising from the privilege of one tribe. Sixth, poverty arises due to patron-client relations between Hutus and Tutsis. Seventh, environmental degradation arising from natural destruction and exploitation of resources. Eighth, policies from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that are too binding on Rwandan citizens, especially ethnic Hutu. For the record, in the 1980s and 1990s, Rwanda received foreign aid from the IMF aimed at helping the government accelerate the handling of the conflict. But in reality, IMF funds were used to build several hotels belonging to relatives of the authorities. So that this assistance has never been implemented (Boudreaux 2009, 90). Ninth, donor countries that too provide complicated requirements for financial assistance to Rwanda. And finally, the effects of the post-Cold War era which gave tense tension after the two great powers clashed.

The post-colonial order has a major impact on the structure of society facing social stratification. A kind of discriminatory practice, racial myths, fears, and hatred were spread to accumulate unrest between the three tribes. This is in line with the statement that history is used to influence one’s personality, culture, role, and motivation for suicide, and within certain limits, it is used as the main reason for creating or rationalizing brother murder, genocide, and self-destruction (Wilson 1993, 28; White 2007, 474). Tutsis are considered to be similar to Europe with a biased characteristic, stated that they are closer to whites than blacks as African Negroes in general, and superior or more “human” (Hildyard 1999).

Thus, there is a socio-political dynamic that occurs in the Hutu community. The chaotic situation was then accompanied by political turmoil caused by a misunderstanding of the state concept that occurred in African countries in general. If it is drawn back to the above factors, the absence of consensus among African countries was the initial trigger that was also experienced by the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. The state was formed first, before forming national entities that could strengthen unity in the face of Europeans. Colonialism then divided Africa like tarts in the Concert of Europe. In previous studies such as that carried out by Uvin (199, 254) looking for a common thread from the history of inter-tribal conflict in Rwanda was difficult when the glasses used came from a Western perspective which consisted of colonists, missionaries and ethnographers who had reached the African continent first even when the era of world
exploration was carried out by explorers.

**The Use of Punishment and Reconciliation**

The method of resolving the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda is through the use of punishment and reconciliation. Only then will the “amnesia” step be taken, meaning forgetting the dark past between the two. First, the government was formed by an agreement between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes to appoint the president and vice president as representatives of the two tribes. Until finally on July 17 it was agreed that Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu to become president and Paul Kagame, a Tutsi to be vice president and minister of defense, where he could control the military (History.com 2018; Vox 2014). With representatives of the two tribes in the government, a balance of power is formed in the government that guarantees both parties can reconcile and forgive each other.

Second, the United Nations then formed the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda for Acts of Genocide (ICTR) in October 1994. ICTR, based in Arusha, Tanzania has the task of prosecuting war criminals as long as genocide takes place. Mahmood Mamdani (in Graybill 2004, 1121) confirmed: “If South Africa exemplifies the pursuit of reconciliation without justice, Rwanda exemplified the opposite of justice without reconciliation.” In 1995, the ICTR began indicting and prosecuting a number of officials with the rank of high with their role in the genocide, despite obstacles due to the many whereabouts of unknown suspects.

In the end in September 1998, the ICTR issued the first sentence for genocide after the trial, stating Jean-Paul Akayesu was guilty of his actions as mayor of Taba (History.com 2018). At that time there were 70 cases handled, eight defendants were released and 61 people were sentenced to death, and around 20,000 people were tried (African Studies Center 2019; EndGenocide.org 2016).

The NRMD party was found guilty of playing a leading role in organizing the convicted genocide. A new constitution was implemented in 2003 to eliminate the mention of tribal differentiation. And sentences on suspects continued in 2008 when three former Rwandan senior military and defense officials were charged with involvement in planning the genocide (History.com Editors 2018). And 10 thousand people have died in prison when detained, before undergoing a court hearing (BBC 2019).

Even Pasteur Bizimungu, the third Rwandan President was arrested in 2002 on the grounds of being involved in the conflict. In 2004 Bizimungu was tried for his recognition of involvement in the formation of militias
using state funds to return to revenge. He served a sentence of three years until 2007. But criticism was made by a number of political observers in Rwanda when Bizimungu was officially forgiven by President Kagame (Reuters 2007).

Third, the traditional Gacaca system is used to help deal with trauma, forget the dark past, and reconcile the general public to live side by side even though in the end this is very difficult to implement since the community still remembers the stigma inherent in members of the Hutus (EndGenocide.org 2016). Gacaca itself means “gathering and discussing issues” (BBC 2019).

Gacaca also allows each village to try and punish guilty individuals who have participated in genocide. In 2009 Gacaca tried 1.1 million cases, of which 2,291 remaining cases are currently in process (Galloway 2010). In addition, a monument was also built to remember the genocide violence that almost brought down Rwanda, precisely in the Ntarama Catholic Church which is located south of the capital (Al Jazeera 2012). The place is currently titled Ntarama Genocide Memorial Center. The ICTR was officially disbanded in 2014 when Rwandan society consisting of Hutus and Tutsi re-blended into one and ensured that there were no more potential conflicts that arose in the future (EndGenocide.org 2015). In its development in 2012, 12,000 Gacaca courts were held each week in villages centered on crowds and markets with more than 1.2 million cases (BBC 2019).

**Conclusion**

It can be concluded that the author’s thesis statement proves that the politicization of the identity issue provides a condition of vulnerable countries such as Rwanda facing ethnic cleavage as a side effect with the Hutu conflict against the Tutsis. The post-colonial order that was formed with the deteriorating socio-economic conditions finally sparked social jealousy in which the scale of the conflict was enlarged through ethnic issues. The conflict escalated when 1994 saw a large genocide against Tutsi which killed at least 800 thousand people. The Tutsi then prepared a rebellion, which was also seen as an act of revenge, from abroad to expel Hutu from power and to organize a democratic government that was inclusive of all tribes and officially ended all armed conflicts and inter-ethnic civil war.

The Tutsi’s RPF succeeded in legitimizing power in the governance and social order in Rwanda. Three steps were taken by the government formed by a coalition between Hutu-Tutsi, each represented by Pasteur
Bizimungu and Paul Kagame. The first is involving both Hutu and Tutsi in the government. Hutus and Tutsi get little coercion to accept each other so that in the end foster cooperation between the two most hostile parties. The second is by enforcing the law on perpetrators of genocide crimes, both individuals, institutions and parties. The second aspect shows that law enforcement is as fair as possible because the deterrent effect on suspects must still be executed as a form of compliance with the constitution held by Rwanda while at the same time giving the highest respect for human rights. And the last is to reconcile in the midst of the community to live in harmony through the Gacaca system for preventive efforts to tackle previous events through interactive dialogue among Rwandan citizens. The third aspect provides valuable lessons for the Hutu and Tutsi communities widely to reconstruct lives that are far better than before and eliminate the seeds of pre-existing hostility and renew social contracts so that similar incidents do not recur in the future.
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