Automatic Firmware Emulation through Invalidity-guided Knowledge Inference
(Extended Version)

Wei Zhou¹, Le Guan², Peng Liu³ and Yuqing Zhang¹,4,5

¹National Computer Network Intrusion Protection Center, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
²Department of Computer Science, University of Georgia, USA
³College of Information Sciences and Technology, The Pennsylvania State University, USA
⁴School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University, China
⁵School of Computer Science and Cyberspace Security, Hainan University, China

Abstract
Emulating firmware for microcontrollers is challenging due to the tight coupling between the hardware and firmware. This has greatly impeded the application of dynamic analysis tools to firmware analysis. The state-of-the-art work automatically models unknown peripherals by observing their access patterns, and then leverages heuristics to calculate the appropriate responses when unknown peripheral registers are accessed. However, we empirically found that this approach and the corresponding heuristics are frequently insufficient to emulate firmware. In this work, we propose a new approach called μEmu to emulate firmware with unknown peripherals. Unlike existing work that attempts to build a general model for each peripheral, our approach learns how to correctly emulate firmware execution at individual peripheral access points. It takes the image as input and symbolically executes it by representing unknown peripheral registers as symbols. During symbolic execution, it infers the rules to respond to unknown peripheral accesses. These rules are stored in a knowledge base, which is referred to during the dynamic firmware analysis. μEmu achieved a passing rate of 95% in a set of unit tests for peripheral drivers without any manual assistance. We also evaluated μEmu with real-world firmware samples and new bugs were discovered.

1 Introduction
The rapid emergence of Internet of Things (IoT) technology makes microcontrollers (MCUs) an increasingly serious security concern. Since most real-world IoT devices run on MCU-based SoCs (System on Chip) and since MCUs lack many security threat mitigation mechanisms available on PC/mobile platforms, many recent security incidents have been related to MCU security. In MCU firmware, the main task runs in an infinite loop that constantly monitors and handles external events. The task code implements the core logic of the application and integrates necessary libraries, such as the TCP/IP stack and MQTT protocol. The external events on the other hand, are abstracted by the kernel (if any) and peripheral drivers. The mentioned security incidents were the result of vulnerabilities within either the task code [29, 40] or the driver code [5, 22, 37].

Dynamically analyzing the task code in MCU firmware is challenging, since its execution depends on (1) the runtime environment constructed during device bootstrapping, and (2) the driver functions directly invoked by the task. For example, to find a bug in the task code caused by improper handling of input from the UART interface, the driver code of the UART peripheral should be executed without hanging or crashing the firmware. To satisfy these requirements, an emulator must emulate the logic of diverse peripherals on real-world MCUs. For example, when the firmware reads a register of a custom-made peripheral, the emulator should return an appropriate value depending on the current peripheral status. Given the high-diversity in the ecosystem of MCU SoCs in the market, it would require a huge amount of manual effort to develop an emulator for (multiple types of MCU SoCs in) the ecosystem, if the logic of diverse peripherals could not be automatically handled.

To address this challenge, three lines of research are being conducted. First, several solutions [15, 32, 34, 42] propose to forward the interactions with unsupported peripherals to the real hardware. However, these hardware-in-the-loop approaches cannot be used for large-scale automatic dynamic analysis. Second, abstraction-based approaches side-step the problem of peripheral emulation by leveraging the abstraction layer available on firmware. For example, by emulating such an abstraction layer in Linux kernel, many Linux-based firmware binaries can be emulated [17, 20, 30, 41]. Recently, HALucinator [19] has been proposed to automatically match the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) APIs in firmware and replace them with host implementations. However, this approach requires ecosystem-wide standardization and is problematic for firmware on custom-made SoCs [36, 38, 43]. In real-world firmware development, developers can invoke driver functions in arbitrary ways. It is therefore difficult to decouple the security testing of task code of firmware from driver code execution. Moreover, since this approach com-
pletely skips the peripheral logic in firmware, dynamic analysis cannot find any bugs in the peripheral drivers. **Third**, full-system emulation [16, 21, 25] aims to emulate the entire firmware without relying on real hardware. For example, $\text{P}^2\text{IM}$ [21], a representative approach in this direction, observes the access pattern of an unknown peripheral and infers its interaction model [21]. Then $\text{P}^2\text{IM}$ combines expert-provided heuristics and such interaction models to figure out how to infer the appropriate responses from peripherals. Laelaps [16] uses symbolic execution to explore possible branches, and then leverages heuristics to predict a “good” one to follow.

Although the third research direction has shown exciting potential for achieving device-agnostic emulation with high fidelity, based on our empirical studies, we still found they frequently fail to properly execute complex samples. For example, $\text{P}^2\text{IM}$ has to blindly guess the appropriate responses for read operations to the status registers of peripherals, which is impractical considering the large search space. Restricted by the exploration depth, Laelaps [16] can only find a good branch for a short period of future execution. But this decision might not be the best in the long run. Both of them may crash or hang the emulation.

These failures are caused by a largely-ignored fact is that firmware emulation is collectively affected by multiple peripheral registers. By “collectively”, we mean that in many cases how one peripheral access should be handled at time $t$ is dependent upon the time $t$ values of several other registers. For example, in following code snippet extracted from the Ethernet driver, the $\text{CR}$ and $\text{SR}$ registers are both used to decide a branch target. When the $\text{SR}$ register was accessed, the response to it is dependent upon the value of the $\text{CR}$ register at that moment.

```c
if (EMAC->CR & EMAC->SR == 0x1E7FF)
    Enable_Ethernet_Interrupt();
```

Based on this key insight, the emulator should recognize how multiple peripheral registers can affect firmware execution and correspondingly decide the coordinated responses.

Meeting this requirement is challenging due to the lack of firmware semantics. For example, $\text{P}^2\text{IM}$ observes the interaction patterns of each peripheral and handles each peripheral access individually without taking the above-mentioned dependency into consideration. However, the observed execution trace does not provide enough contextual information to properly categorize registers or calculate a coordinated response.

**Our idea.** As mentioned before, to dynamically analyze task code of firmware, it is important to emulate the hardware behaviors entirely, including those of peripherals. Only in this way can we reach to (buggy) task code responsible for handling input retrieved from the I/O interface. To learn peripheral behaviors and correspondingly emulate driver code, we observe that analyzing the interaction patterns of every peripheral is actually unnecessary. As long as we can decide an appropriate dependency-aware response at each peripheral access point, the emulation may succeed. To realize this idea, two questions need to be answered. How to judge whether a peripheral input is appropriate or not? How to obtain such an appropriate peripheral input?

In this work, we answer these questions with two observations and correspondingly developed a system called $\mu\text{Emu}$. **Observation 1:** If a response is incorrectly fed to the firmware, the error will eventually be reflected in the execution state. In particular, the emulation would enter an invalid state. **Observation 2:** An invalid execution state is directly reflected on an invalid path. To avoid executing invalid paths, we can represent all the peripheral responses by symbolic execution to collectively reason about peripheral responses that can avoid such states/paths. Through collective reasoning, we can achieve dependency-aware peripheral access handling. Through symbolic execution, we can achieve constraint-satisfaction-based response finding.

Following these two observations, we propose $\mu\text{Emu}$, a dynamic analysis tool for find bugs in the task code of firmware for ARM MCUs. The core component of $\mu\text{Emu}$ is a device-agnostic emulator aiming at emulating driver code of unknown peripherals. We infer necessary knowledge for properly emulating a specific firmware image using invalidity-guided symbolic execution. Our system is comprised of two phases, the knowledge extraction phase and the dynamic analysis phase. In the knowledge extraction phase, it takes the firmware-under-test as input and mixes concrete and symbolic execution (i.e., concolic execution) to extract essential information for the subsequent dynamic analysis phase. The information is stored in a knowledge base (KB) for later references. Replacing concrete execution with concolic execution, the proposed approach can reach deep paths and extract additional knowledge. Using a symbolic constraint solver also enables the proposed approach to accurately find the appropriate peripheral readings. In the firmware dynamic analysis phase, $\mu\text{Emu}$ matches the entries in the extracted knowledge base and responds with appropriate values when a register of a (custom-made) peripheral is read. The knowledge base guides the execution to always stay in valid states, while value mutations of data registers, which can be controlled when the attacker has access to the I/O interface, help find new execution paths and firmware defects.

During knowledge extraction, $\mu\text{Emu}$ only switches to another path when the current path is found invalid. Therefore, the path explosion problem faced by many symbolic-execution-based approaches, including Laelaps [16], is alleviated naturally. Moreover, knowledge (e.g., a concrete value for a particular register) extracted at an earlier time point – if found useful – can always be used at a later time point. This avoids potential symbolic execution. As a result, path explosion is further reduced and time-consuming solver invocations are minimized. In contrast, Laelaps needs to enter
with AFL, a state-of-the-art fuzzing tool, world firmware samples. Evaluation results show that µEmu (i.e., if the current path remains valid, µEmu will stick to it) in the knowledge extraction phase can be used to emulate multiple valid paths in the dynamic analysis phase. This is because µEmu adopts a tiered caching mechanism, in which a cache entry uses progressively more context information to decide a response. Accordingly, (a) the bottom tier knowledge enables the emulator to use the last written value as the response to a peripheral read access; such values are dynamically determined and can fork new branches. (b) the upper tiers use more restrictive matching rules and therefore can record multiple branch matching rules based on different contexts during knowledge extraction. In the dynamic analysis phase, new paths can be emulated when contexts are changed.

We evaluated µEmu with 66 unit tests for testing the basic function of individual peripherals. Compared with the passing rate of 79% achieved by P2IM, µEmu achieves 95% without any manual assistance. With very little manual assistance, all unit tests can be passed. We also evaluated µEmu with 21 real-world firmware samples. Evaluation results show that µEmu is capable of emulating real-world firmware. By bridging it with AFL, a state-of-the-art fuzzing tool, µEmu also helped us find previously-unknown bugs in the task code of the tested samples.

In summary, we made the following contributions.

• We proposed using symbolic execution to emulate MCU firmware without relying on real hardware. We achieved this through an invalidity-guided recursive knowledge extraction algorithm. The cached results in turn allow us to build a knowledge base for the firmware used for dynamic analysis.

• We implemented our idea on top of S2E. We show the practicality of our approach by evaluating it on a collection of 21 real-world firmware samples covering more than 30 different kinds of peripherals with several popular MCUs.

• We also integrated a modified AFL fuzzer with µEmu. Through fuzzing analysis, we reproduced existing bugs as well as found new bugs. µEmu is open source at https://github.com/MCUSec/uEmu.

2 Background

2.1 MCU Peripherals

MCUs have widely adopted in power-effective embedded devices such as drones, robots and programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Their firmware typically comprises the task code (including the core logic implementation and dependent libraries), the kernel code (if any), and the driver code for peripherals. MCU peripherals are mainly used to communicate with the external world. There are two types peripherals, on-chip peripherals and off-chip peripherals. The functions of on-chip peripherals are invoked by writing to or reading from peripheral registers, which are typically memory-mapped into the system memory. For example, on ARM Cortex-M MCUs, peripheral registers are mapped from 0x40000000 to 0xffffffff. The values of peripheral registers change non-deterministically depending on the internal logic of the peripheral. To increase efficiency, using interrupts is a common practice. Off-chip peripherals are oblivious to the MCU core. They are connected to the MCU core via on-chip peripherals, which serve as proxies between the firmware and off-chip peripherals. For example, the SPI peripheral, which is a general-purpose communication bus, is commonly used to connect EEPROM and BlueTooth peripherals.

MCU peripherals are very diverse. On the one hand, there are hundreds of different types of peripherals dedicated for different tasks. On the other hand, even for the same type of peripheral such as UART, manufacturers often implement it in customized ways. This diversity imposes a major obstacle for us to emulate a previously-unseen firmware image. Specifically, the internal logic of each peripheral has to be accurately and individually emulated.

2.2 Dynamic Symbolic Execution and S2E

Symbolic execution [31] is a powerful automated software testing and analysis technique. It treats program inputs as symbolic variables and simulates program execution so that all variables are represented as symbolic expressions. Dynamic symbolic execution (a.k.a. concolic execution) combines concrete execution and symbolic execution and inherits the advantages of both. It has been widely used to finding deep vulnerabilities in commercial software [15, 24]. S2E [18] is one of the most popular open-source symbolic execution platforms. Since it is based on QEMU, it enables full system symbolic execution and thus supports testing both user-space applications as well as drivers. More importantly, S2E exposes useful APIs to extend its functionality. An active community constantly writes and maintains many useful S2E plugins for performance improvement (e.g., better state pruning algorithms) or new program analysis tool development. Although QEMU supports multiple architectures, the latest S2E only supports emulating x86/x86-64 architecture [11]. In the following paragraphs, we introduce necessary technical background for understanding this paper.

CPU Emulation and Hardware Emulation. The original S2E is tightly coupled with QEMU. It leverages the Dynamic Binary Translation (DBT) of QEMU to emulate CPU and combines it with KLEE [15] for concolic execution. The hardware such as peripherals is emulated by QEMU.

KVM Interface. S2E developers found it tedious to update with the upstream QEMU. Since version 2.0, they reconstructed the S2E architecture to de-couple it from QEMU using the KVM interface. The new S2E only uses QEMU as a KVM client for hardware emulation, and maintains the
concolic execution engine by its own (in essence, the old DBT code in QEMU). The concolic execution engine exposes a KVM interface for the QEMU hardware emulator to invoke. As a result, as long as the KVM interface is stable, when QEMU is updated, S2E can also be easily updated to benefit from the ever-improving emulation capability of QEMU.

**Effective Concolic Execution.** S2E extracts CPU emulation and DBT functions from the original QEMU and extends them with KLEE for concolic execution. It can automatically switch between the symbolic execution engine and concrete execution engine. Specifically, when a memory location containing symbolic data is de-referenced, S2E re-translates the current translation block into LLVM IR and switches to KLEE. When there is no longer any symbolic data in any registers, it will switch back to the DBT engine. When encountering a branch whose target is determined by a symbol, S2E forks a new execution state. S2E explores each execution state independently. To achieve this goal, S2E maintains dedicated memory to store the hardware state for each state.

### 2.3 Terminology

**Branch.** A branch instruction is the last instruction in a basic block. It causes the program to deviate from its default behavior of executing instructions in order.

**Branch Target.** Depending on whether a branch is taken or not, there are typically two branch targets to be executed following the branch instruction. In this paper, we mainly consider conditional branches in which one or more peripheral readings decide which branch target to follow.

**Conditional Registers.** At each branch, one or more peripheral registers decide the branch target. We call these registers as conditional registers.

**Execution Path/Trace.** An execution path/trace refers to a dynamic flow in the control-flow graph of the program. It starts from the program entry point and ends at an exit point. In a firmware image, two different execution paths/traces are created when the execution faces a branch which is determined by a peripheral reading. In this paper, we use path and trace interchangeably to refer to the dynamic control flow of the firmware.

**Execution State.** An execution state is a break point in an execution path. It contains a program’s memory, registers, peripheral states, etc. S2E switches among execution states to explore the program. When the firmware exits, the current execution state corresponds to a unique execution path.

**Invalid Execution State.** An invalid execution state disrupts normal firmware execution, including crashing or stalling firmware execution, and skipping designed operations. At the core of our system is an exploration algorithm that constantly detects and avoids invalid execution states caused by wrong peripheral readings.

**Valid Execution State.** Valid execution states are execution states that are not invalid. By responding to the firmware execution with the values stored in the knowledge base, µEmu keeps the firmware emulation in valid execution states.

### 3 Overview

The goal of µEmu is to find bugs in task code of firmware related to improper handling of malformed input retrieved from data registers of the I/O interfaces. Therefore, it needs to emulate the peripheral drivers, especially those related to I/O, by automatically generating appropriate responses when an unknown peripheral register is accessed. However, we cannot guarantee the same readings as real peripherals. Rather, the provided (response) values should pass the firmware’s internal checks so that the firmware execution could reach a useful state for practical security analysis.

#### 3.1 High-level Idea

Our work is based on three insights. First, in MCU firmware, conditional register readings often directly influence the execution path. Second, by representing the peripheral registers as symbols, the relationship between the peripheral register and the path can be captured by symbolic expressions. Third, if an incorrect path is selected, the firmware will reach an invalid state. Therefore, our approach represents all the readings from unknown peripherals as symbols, and leverages symbolic execution and an invalid state detection mechanism to automatically extracts knowledge about how to respond to peripheral accesses. The extracted information includes (1) a knowledge base regarding how to respond to unknown peripheral accesses so that the execution will stay valid; and (2) a set of identified data registers used for I/O operations.

The knowledge base is a cache of knowledge learned from symbolic exploration. In a firmware execution, the same peripheral register could be accessed many times and the peripheral returns a value depending on the current hardware state machine. In µEmu, we model an approximate hardware state machine using peripheral context (e.g., the current function arguments), and use this context to match a cache entry. Specifically, in the knowledge extraction phase µEmu starts with a simple matching rule aiming to match many similar peripheral accesses. However, when the cached value is proven wrong (by invalidity checks in future execution), it is rejected and upgraded. The upgraded matching rule considers complex execution context and thus only matches specific peripheral accesses with the same context. In short, a cache entry uses progressively more context information to decide a response. While the simple matching rule helps µEmu quickly reduce the exploration space of symbolic execution, the context-aware matching rule kicks in when the simple one cannot handle the complex situations.

### 3.2 Threat Model

µEmu is a bug-driven firmware emulator. The ultimate goal is to find software bugs in the task code of firmware that can be leveraged to hijack the control flow of the firmware,
steal confidential information, launch DoS attacks, etc. In this paper, we focus on finding memory-related bugs by fuzzing. However, the capability of emulating firmware execution allows $\mu\text{Emu}$ to be used with other dynamic analysis tools. The attacker is assumed to have access to standard I/O interfaces of the device, e.g., the SPI or UART, and thus can feed malformed data to these interfaces. We do not consider powerful attackers who can cause circuit-level manipulation, including arbitrarily changing the values of control registers or status registers. Therefore, $\mu\text{Emu}$ calculates appropriate values for accesses to control/status registers so that peripheral drivers avoid entering error handling states. It also identifies data registers used in I/O, which can be controlled by the attacker. During dynamic analysis, we consider the input to the data registers as untrusted and find memory corruptions caused by the malformed input.

### 3.3 Our Approach

$\mu\text{Emu}$ is a two-phase system for emulating and analyzing MCU firmware (Figure 1). For each firmware image, we first run a knowledge extraction phase in which a knowledge base regarding how to respond to peripheral accesses is built. Moreover, a set of data registers used for I/O operations are identified. In the second phase, we use dynamic analysis approaches to test the firmware. When a custom-made peripheral is accessed, the appropriate response value is directly obtained by referring to the $KB$. Accesses to data registers are directly bridged to the analysis tools such as a fuzzier to test the task code of the firmware. If a query does not match any cache entries in the $KB$, the knowledge extraction phase needs to be incrementally re-executed to enrich the $KB$.

#### Knowledge Extraction Phase

At the core of the knowledge extraction phase is an invalidity-guided symbolic execution engine. During symbolic execution, peripheral readings calculated (via a constraint solver) during previous exploration are cached in $KB$ using a tiered caching strategy. When a register of an unknown peripheral is accessed, $\mu\text{Emu}$ represents it as a symbol. If this symbol directly impacts a branch target during symbolic execution, $\mu\text{Emu}$ chooses a default branch target and caches the solved values for later accesses. The cached values help the symbolic execution engine decide a favorable branch target when the same peripheral is accessed later on. Specifically, the cached value is used in a tentative concrete computation to decide the corresponding branch target. We adopt a tiered caching strategy. $\mu\text{Emu}$ starts with a simple matching rule aiming to let a cache entry match as many similar peripheral accesses as possible. If later we find the cached value was wrong, we reject it and upgrade the matching rule for the corresponding peripheral register. The indicator for a wrong cache entry is that the execution state becomes invalid (Section 4.3). The upgraded matching rule captures more complex peripheral behaviors by incorporating richer execution context into it (Section 4.2). The cache is hit only if the execution context matches. In essence, the upgraded matching rule helps provide accurate responses that reflect the specific execution context, but it sacrifices generality.

When the current execution state is detected invalid, the symbolic execution engine switches to another branch target and updates the matching rule and the corresponding cache entries in $KB$. If both branch targets lead to an invalid execution state, our algorithm rolls back to the parent branch and continues with unexplored targets (Section 4.4). We follow a depth-first-search (DFS) algorithm in the exploration. This is because the firmware usually enters an invalid state very soon after reading an incorrect conditional register value. With DFS, we can quickly recover and switch to the right branch. Our algorithm runs until the firmware exits (which rarely happens) or no new basic block can be observed for a quite long time.

Although $\mu\text{Emu}$ follows the DFS algorithm to explore one valid path, it does not mean dynamic analysis can only work on this path. In fact, as discussed in Section 1, the knowledge base built in the knowledge extraction phase can be used to emulate multiple valid paths in the dynamic analysis phase. Besides, our $KB$ can be dynamically enriched when the execution meets a new peripheral register or a new execution context of existing peripheral registers.

#### Dynamic Analysis Phase

Leveraging the $KB$, $\mu\text{Emu}$ facilitates efficient dynamic analysis of firmware by allowing arbitrary firmware to be emulated. When a register of a custom-made peripheral is accessed, the $KB$ is referred and an appropriate response value is returned and fed to the emulation. To demonstrate the application of this emulation capability in bug hunting, we incorporated AFL [45], a popular fuzzing tool, to $\mu\text{Emu}$ (Section 4.6). In our prototype, we channeled the test-cases generated by AFL to the identified data registers to fuzz the task code. In addition, our design is not specific to AFL and any other fuzzing tools can be used as a drop-in replacement.

### 3.4 A Running Example

We show a running example of the proposed approach in Figure 1. On the left, we show three execution traces on a firmware image. A branch is represented by a node, which is marked with the address of the peripheral register that determines the corresponding branch targets. In the example, two branches both correspond to reading the peripheral register mapped at $0x40064006$ at PC $0x1a9a$. After the knowledge extraction phase, our algorithm decides that the third trace is valid, and the corresponding $KB$ should be used in the firmware analysis phase.

In what follows, we explain how the third trace is selected and how its $KB$ is constructed. At the first branch, the left-side target is selected by default. The solver calculates a value $0x30$ that can lead execution to that target. This value is recorded as $0x1a9a$ later. $0x30$ should be used to decide a favorable
branch target. This caching rule is encoded by the T1 label. Along the trace 1, the symbolic execution engine finds that the execution state is invalid because it meets one of the rejecting conditions (see Section 4.3). Therefore, it switches to trace 2 (step 2). Correspondingly, Entry 1 is calculated for trace 2. At this time, the cached value is 0x0 (step 3). Using this value, the symbolic execution engine finds that the left branch target is favorable at branch 2 and should be taken (step 4). However, the execution state is proven wrong again and the execution switches to trace 3 (step 5). Since trace 3 is forked from trace 2, its KB is inherited. However, to reach the right target at branch 2, the symbolic execution engine finds that value 0x20 should be used, which conflicts with Entry 1. Therefore, the caching rule is upgraded to T2. Compared with T1, T2 considers the specific execution context when a peripheral register is read, which is encoded as a hash value in the entry (step 6). As a result, two entries of type T2 are created, one for each branch. In the dynamic analysis phase, which is shown on the right part of Figure 1, µEmu queries the KB of peripheral register access and tries to match any entries in the KB (and calculate the hash of execution context if necessary). This KB keeps µEmu in valid traces.

4 System Design & Implementation

We first describe the system architecture of µEmu (Section 4.1). Then we elaborate the design and implement of KB cache strategy (Section 4.2), invalid states detection (Section 4.3), invalidity-guided KB extraction algorithm (Section 4.4), and interrupt handling (Section 4.5). Finally, we describe how we integrated µEmu with AFL (Section 4.6).

4.1 µEmu Framework

µEmu is designed and developed based on S2E version 2.0, a QEMU-based concolic execution tool for program analysis (an architecture overview of µEmu is shown in Figure 2). As mentioned in Section 2.2, S2E provides tens of useful plugins and APIs for analysts to use for customized analysis. Therefore, major functions of µEmu were developed as plugins to S2E using the provided API.

Due to the aforementioned code reconstruction in S2E 2.0, the ARM support has been dropped [11]. With this release, S2E completely switched to the KVM interface to decouple the hypervisor from the core symbolic execution engine. Although the benefit of switching to the KVM interface is obvious, it sacrifices broad architecture support because not every architecture can be easily managed by the KVM interface. Particularly, ARM MCUs exhibit some specifics making them incompatible with the canonical KVM interface.

We made two contributions in adding ARM support to S2E. First, we ported the DBT for ARM to S2E CPU emulation so as to emulate ARM MCUs. This task is relatively straightforward because the upstream QEMU already supports the ARM architecture, including ARM Cortex-M series MCUs. We directly extracted the corresponding logic implemented in QEMU that decodes the ARM instruction and further interfaced it with the TCG front-end compiler. Due to the nature of intermediate representation, the back-end of TCG was largely untouched. Then we made necessary modifications to
facilitate the communication with the core S2E logic and to generate events that are used by the callback functions in the S2E plugin framework. These are essential for µEmu to place hooks at translation block boundaries and other interesting execution points.

The second task is to make the emulated ARM Cortex-M CPU accessible via the KVM interface. In essence, S2E provides a virtual CPU (vCPU) capable of symbolic execution, and QEMU manages the vCPU via KVM interfaces. Except for the canonical KVM interfaces (e.g., KVM_CREATE_VCPU to allocate a vCPU instance), ARM Cortex-M CPUs exhibit many specifics that render the implementation more challenging. We added several customized interfaces for QEMU to fully manage the ARM Cortex-M vCPU via the KVM interfaces.

We developed four custom-made plugins to implement the designed functions in µEmu: the InvalidStateDetection plugin for invalid state detection (Section 4.3), the KnowledgeExtraction plugin for invalidity-guided KB extraction and firmware emulation (Section 4.4), the InterruptControl plugin for interrupt injection (Section 4.5), and the FuzzerHelper plugin for fuzzer integration (Section 4.6). In total, we contributed more than 800 lines of C code to extend S2E with ARM Cortex-M support. The four plugins are completed with 829, 3,395, 311, and 560 lines of C++ code, respectively.

4.2 KB Caching Strategy

In µEmu, we use a tiered caching strategy aiming to capture both static and dynamic behaviors of peripherals. Specifically, four matching rules are defined and selected adaptively based on the concrete execution context to handle the diverse complexity of real-world firmware.

4.2.1 T0 – Storage Model

Strictly speaking, T0 is not a matching rule. Rather, it models the simple storage model of peripheral registers. That is, the peripheral register stores the most recent value written to it and responds to the following read operations with it, exactly as the way normal memory works. This behavior is quite common in MCUs. For example, the firmware writes control values to configuration registers, which when accessed, should respond the same value to the firmware. T0 is activated before any other caching rules, provided that there was a write conditional registers in the KB (see Table 4). For example, in the code snippet shown in Listing 1, the peripheral register at 0x00 should always have the 17th bit set to break the while loop. Other values are invalid and never used in the firmware. When T0 is proven wrong, it is upgraded to the caching rule T1.

4.2.2 T1 – PC-based Matching

This matching rule reflects the greedy nature of the proposed algorithm. It is designed to match broader peripheral accesses, thus avoiding the path explosion issue. To this end, it does not match specific execution context to maximize applicability. Specifically, the PC (pc) and the peripheral address (addr) uniquely determine the cached value. The corresponding entry in the KB is encoded as T1_addr_pc_NULL_value. For example, T1_0x40023800_0x10000_NULL_0x00 specifies that when the firmware reads from address 0x40023800 at PC 0x10000, the value 0x00 should be used to decide the favorable branch target. Based on our observation, many peripheral registers have a fixed value at a particular PC or even arbitrary PCs. Therefore, the T1 cache rule comprises most entries for conditional registers in the KB (see Table 4). For example, in the code snippet shown in Listing 1, the peripheral register at 0x00 should always have the 17th bit set to break the while loop. Other values are invalid and never used in the firmware. When T1 is proven wrong, it is upgraded to the caching rule T2.

```c
1 while(MEMORY[0x40023800] & 0x2000)
2  ...
3  if(HAL_GetTick() >= timeout)
4  return HAL_TIMEOUT;
```

Code Listing 1: Code snippet of Oscillator configuration function.

4.2.3 T2 – Context-based Matching

The T1 matching rule cannot handle complex situations where the returned value of the same peripheral register should change with the execution context. In Listing 2, we show such an example.

```c
1 while(huart->TxXferCount){
2  ...
3  if(UART_WaitOnFlagUntilTimeout(huart, 0x80, 0, tickstart, Timeout) != HAL_OK)
4  return HAL_TIMEOUT;
5  huart->Instance->DR = *pDataa++;
6  if(UART_WaitOnFlagUntilTimeout(huart, 0x40, 0, tickstart, Timeout) != HAL_OK)
7  return HAL_TIMEOUT;
```

Code Listing 2: Code snippet of UART transmission in STM32 MCUs.

This code transfers a byte array via the UART interface. Before putting a byte on the data register, it checks the status register regarding whether the hardware is ready (line 3). If it is ready, the status register should have a bit set as indicated by the second parameter 0x80 of the function UART_WaitOnFlagUntilTimeout, which simply reads the status register and compares it with the second parameter. After all the data have been sent, the firmware reads the status register again to check whether the transmission is completed (line 7). Similarly, the condition is indicated by the second parameter which is 0x40. The code can only return true if all the checks are passed. In this example, accessing the same peripheral register (status register of UART) at same PC (in UART_WaitOnFlagUntilTimeout()) should yield different values, which cannot be handled by T1.

To address this issue, in addition to the current pc and peripheral register at addr, the T2 matching rule also compares the execution context when the peripheral is accessed. We calculate a hash value over the concatenation of execution
context and encode it into the cache entry. The resulting entry is expressed as $T_2\_addr\_pc\_contextHash\_value$. The execution context is defined as up to three levels of caller PCs plus current function arguments. Therefore, in the example shown in Listing 2, the second argument directly distinguishes the two invocations to UART_WaitOnFlagUntilTimeout() at line 3 and 7.

To show how the calling context differentiates the execution context, we show another example in Listing 3. This function constantly polls the current time ($cur\_time$) and then compares it with the time obtained before ($timestart$) until the difference exceeds the maximum delay specified in the function parameter ($timeout$). On a real device, the function $ticker\_read()$ reads from the peripheral a monotonically increasing counter. To break the while loop, $cur\_time$ must be equal to or greater than $timestart$ plus $timeout$.

Code Listing 3: Code snippet of the wait() function.

Since the calling PCs at line 1 and 3 are different, we can easily use the $T_2$ caching rule to distinguish the two invocations to $ticker\_read()$. When $T_2$ is proven wrong, it is upgraded to the caching rule $T_3$.

4.2.4 $T_3$ – Replay-based Matching

However, we find that there are still corner cases which $T_2$ cannot handle. This is particularly disconcerting when the corresponding code is related to device initialization, since the device will not boot. Such an example is shown in Listing 4.

Code Listing 4: Code snippet of RF configuration.

In this MCU, the RF function is implemented on top of the UART interface. Specifically, the data input channel of UART is used as the control channel of the RF configuration. When the RF module has been properly initialized, the same UART data channel is re-purposed for RF communication. In the code snippet, the function $rf\_read\_buf()$ reads four bytes from the UART data register. The result must match the string literal “OK\r\n” to conform to the RF control protocol. The $T_2$ caching rule cannot distinguish the four read operations to the UART data register, since their execution contexts are exactly the same. When the caching rule is upgraded to $T_3$, instead of caching a single reading, each cache entry is associated with an array of readings. In the example, when $\mu$Emu finds the path to pass the $strncpy$ check at line 2, four symbols obtained from $rf\_read\_buf()$ are solved together to obtain the “OK\r\n” string literal and the results are stored in the cache entry. Therefore, the $T_3$ caching rule is encoded as $T_3\_addr\_pc\_null_\{v1,v2,\ldots\}$.

In the firmware dynamic analysis phase, the values in the array are replayed in order, so that the execution will follow the same flow. Therefore, it is the most specific to firmware but is able to capture arbitrary firmware behaviors.

Based on our evaluation, the $T_3$ caching rule is rarely activated. When it is activated, most likely the corresponding register is used for receiving external data, as explained in the aforementioned example. Therefore, in the firmware dynamic analysis phase, we treat registers of type $T_3$ as one kind of fuzzing input points, after replaying all the cached readings in the array.

4.3 Invalid Execution State Detection

As mentioned before, $\mu$Emu learns appropriate cache values through invalidity-guided exploration. It is based on the assumption that during normal execution, a properly programmed firmware should never run into any invalid states. If an invalid state is detected, one or more of previously cached values in the $KB$ should be wrong. In this section, we define invalid states and the rationales behind them. In addition, we also detail how the InvalidStateDetection plugin identifies invalid states. If an invalid state is detected by the InvalidStateDetection plugin, it notifies the KnowledgeExtraction plugin.

**Infinite Loop.** Typically, if the firmware execution encounters an unrecoverable error, it will halt itself by running a simple infinite loop. If an infinite loop is detected, there should be a wrongly cached peripheral reading.

The plugin keeps records of the control flow for each execution path. If it observes repeated cycles in the control flow, a loop is detected. To further confirm an infinite loop, the plugin also makes sure that the processor registers are the same in each loop. If a register contains symbolic values, $\mu$Emu solves them to concrete ones and makes the comparison. $\mu$Emu only monitors infinite loops that occurred within the last few translation blocks. This number is denoted as BB#_INV1 and the default value is 30 based on our empirical study. BB#_INV1 cannot be too large for two reasons. First, monitoring a long control flow history is time-consuming. Second, it could mistakenly recognize the main logic of the firmware as invalid, because the main logic of the firmware is indeed implemented in an infinite main loop. Fortunately, the length of the repented in the main loop is often much larger than that in an invalid infinite loop. Setting BB#_INV1 to 30 effectively separates them. In addition, infinite loop detection is only activated when there are at least one symbol involved in the context. The idle thread, which is typically implemented as an infinite loop in MCU OSs, never triggers a positive infinite loop detection.

**Long Loop.** It is also common that the firmware waits for a certain value in a peripheral register. This value indicates that the peripheral has finished certain operations. This kind of wait operation is often accompanied by a timeout mechanism,
as exemplified in Listing 1. If $\muEmu$ does not cache a correct value for this register, there will be a long loop, taking tens of seconds to complete.

To identify a long loop, the InvalidStateDetection uses the same strategy to detect loops as is done in infinite loop. It also counts the number of repeated cycles. If it exceeds an adjustable value, the plugin confirms a long loop. The adjustable value is denoted as $BB#_{INV2}$ and we set it as 2,000 by default based on our empirical study. Long loop detection is only activated when there is at least one symbol involved in the context. Therefore, Libc functions such as memcpy and memset never trigger a positive long loop detection.

Invalid Memory Access. Invalid memory regions are those not mapped in the address space. Mapped regions include ROM, RAM, system regions and external peripheral regions. All other are unmapped. If the firmware accesses an unmapped memory address, two reasons are possible. First, the firmware itself is buggy and would encounter a memory error even on the real device. We consider it unlikely to happen and we did not observe this in all the tested samples. Second, $\muEmu$ might learn a wrong response for the peripheral read operation. The InvalidStateDetection plugin will report an invalid state if this happens.

User-defined Invalid Program Points. Finally, if an analyst has obtained some prior knowledge about the firmware via static analysis or $\muEmu$ itself, we provide an interface allowing him to manually configure additional invalid points. This mechanism is useful since analysts have the option to fine-tune the extracted knowledge about the firmware, boosting emulation efficiency. For example, an execution point that should never be executed (e.g., failed assertion) can be explicitly specified by the analysts.

4.4 Invalidity-guided KB Extraction

In this section, we depict the proposed knowledge base extraction algorithm for automatic peripheral modeling.

Branch Target Selection and Switch Algorithm. The algorithm, shown in Algorithm 1 and denoted as $KB_{Learn}()$, is based on DFS. It takes a basic block and the current $KB$ (empty for first round) as inputs, and then symbolically executes from there. The initial input to the algorithm is the entry point of the firmware, which is typically the reset handler. The output is the updated $KB$ after this round of learning.

The algorithm starts from a given branch target. The firmware would then read a register of an unknown peripheral. $\muEmu$ assigns a symbol to it and continues execution until a branch is met. The algorithm gets the symbol responsible for the branch target and then updates the $KB$ using the algorithm listed in Algorithm 2, which we explain later. The main body is a while loop to step over basic blocks. After finishing each basic block, it checks if the current execution state meets the termination conditions (explained later). If so, the algorithm returns the current $KB$. If no termination condition is met, it then checks if the current execution state is valid or not based on the conditions mentioned in Section 4.3. If the state is valid, it judges if a branch is reached. If a branch is not reached, the next basic block is selected to continue the while loop. If a branch is reached, the algorithm selects a favorable target according to the existing $KB$ and sets it as the next branch target. The non-favorable target is pushed back to a stack for future exploration. Then, the algorithm gets the symbols responsible for the favorable branch target and updates the $KB$. The only condition to break the while loop is that an invalid execution state is detected in line 8. If this happens, the next branch target is popped from the stack, and the algorithm recursively executes from there.

KB Update Algorithm. Next, we explain the knowledge base update algorithm shown in Algorithm 2, denoted as $KB_{Update}()$. It takes the current $KB$ and a symbol as inputs. First, the symbolic execution engine solves a concrete value for the symbol that could lead the execution to the current branch target. The returned concrete value is used to construct a new cache entry. If the new entry does not conflict with the current $KB$, it is inserted to the $KB$. Otherwise, the caching rule of the corresponding symbol is upgraded. Specifically, T0 is upgraded to T1; T1 is upgraded to T2 and so forth.

| Algorithm 1: Algorithm for automatic KB extraction, denoted as $KB_{Learn}()$. |
|---|
| **Input**: $KB$  |
| **Input**: selected_target  |
| **Output**: $KB$  |
| 1. symbol $\leftarrow$ get_symbol();  |
| 2. $KB_{Update}(KB, symbol)$;  |
| 3. do  |
| 4. targets[] $\leftarrow$ execute_BB(selected_target);  |
| 5. if meet termination condition then  |
| 6. | return $KB$;  |
| 7. end  |
| 8. if current state is invalid then  |
| 9. | break;  |
| 10. end  |
| 11. if sizeof(targets) $\geq 1$ then  |
| 12. | selected_target $\leftarrow$ next_BB(selected_target);  |
| 13. else  |
| 14. | selected_target $\leftarrow$ favorable_target(targets);  |
| 15. | other_target $\leftarrow$ non_favorable_target(targets);  |
| 16. | unexplored.push(other_target);  |
| 17. | symbol $\leftarrow$ get_symbol();  |
| 18. | $KB_{Update}(KB, symbol)$;  |
| 19. end  |
| 20. while true;  |
| // switch execution state  |
| 21. selected_target $\leftarrow$ unexplored.pop();  |
| 22. $KB_{Learn}$(selected_target);  |
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for updating the knowledge base, denoted as KB_Update()

```
Input: KB
Input:symbol
1 new_entry ← solver(symbol);
2 if new_entry conflicts with KB then
   // upgrade caching rules
3     if type(symbol) == T0 then
4         type(symbol) ← T1;
5     else if type(symbol) == T1 then
6         type(symbol) ← T2;
7     else if type(symbol) == T2 then
8         type(symbol) ← T3;
9     end
10 replace the conflicting entry with new_entry;
11 else
12     KB ← KB | new_entry;
13 end
```

**Termination Condition.** Real-world firmware typically runs in an infinite loop to respond to external events, therefore would never exit. Therefore a round of knowledge extraction could last forever. In our prototype, we monitor the lastly executed 30,000 basic blocks and make sure that no new basic blocks are reached. If this happens, this round of knowledge extraction terminates. Note the number of monitored basic blocks is an empirical value and can be adjusted by changing BB#_Term.

**Reinforced Learning.** To emulate a firmware image, µEmu starts execution from the entry point following KB_Learn(). The first round usually takes a long time since the KB has not been set up. As more cache entries are being built, accesses to peripheral registers lead to more cache hits. However, one-shot knowledge extraction cannot guarantee full coverage of all peripherals, especially considering that many hard-to-reach code regions are only executed when specific events happen. If we find that the current KB does not include cache entries for certain registers or the context hash/PC cannot be matched, µEmu needs to conduct another round of knowledge extraction phase to learn additional peripheral behaviors. We call it reinforced learning. In a real firmware emulation, multiple rounds are needed when new peripherals are discovered by new test-cases.

### 4.5 Interrupt Handling

The interrupt is important for peripheral to interact with the external world. Without interrupts, many firmware behaviors cannot be triggered.

#### 4.5.1 Interrupt Delivery

Although QEMU has implemented a virtual interrupt controller (i.e., NVIC) for ARM Cortex-M MCUs, which could be used to dispatch and respond to interrupts, this function is largely limited to implementing system peripherals such as SYSTICK, because QEMU does not know when to fire interrupts for custom-made peripherals. First, to find out which interrupt is activated, the InterruptControl plugin checks the NVIC Interrupt Set Enable Register (ISER). Then, for deterministic replay of interrupt sequences, our prototype follows a similar interrupt firing strategy as PIM. The plugin delivers activated interrupts (via setting the corresponding bit of the NVIC Interrupt Status Pending Register (ISPR)) in a round-robin fashion at a fixed interval defined by the user. As empirical values, in our evaluation, we set the interval to be once every 2,000 basic blocks during the knowledge extraction phase and once every 1,000 basic blocks during the analysis phase.

#### 4.5.2 Caching Strategy for Interrupts

Using the caching strategy explained in Section 4.2, we found that the code coverage inside the interrupt handler is severely limited. It turned out our algorithm over-approximates the paths. Normally, the interrupt handler of a peripheral often executes different paths based on the values of the control register and status register. All these paths are valid from the viewpoint of our invalidity checking mechanism. Unfortunately, with the cache mechanism, only one path can be executed. An example is shown in Listing 5, in which the UART driver decides to invoke the receive or transmit function based on the value of the status register isrflags and control register crlflags. When these registers have cache entries in the KB, the emulated path would be fixed.

```c
void UART_IRQHandler ( UART_Handle *huart) {
  uint32_t isrflags = READ_REG(huart->SR);
  if (((isrflag & USART_SR_RXNE) != RESET)) {
    /* UART in Receiver mode */
    if (((isrflag & USART_SR_RXNE) != RESET) && ((crlflag & USART_CRI_RXNEIE) != RESET)) {
      UART_Receive_IT(huart);
    return;
  }
  /* UART in Transmitter mode */
  if (((isrflag & USART_SR_TXE) != RESET) && ((crlflag & USART_CRI_TXEIE) != RESET)) {
    UART_Transmit_IT(huart);
  return;
  }
  ...

Code Listing 5: Code snippet of the UART interrupt handler in the STM32 HAL library.
```

To solve this problem, µEmu tries to execute different paths in an interrupt handler. Specifically, µEmu monitors the execution context. If the interrupt context is detected, the symbolic execution engine tries to explore all the possible paths. The readings for a peripheral register that lead to all valid execution states are collectively stored in the corresponding cache entry. In the firmware dynamic analysis phase, the values in each entry are randomly selected. As such, paths in an interrupt handler will be randomly executed.
However, it usually takes multiple tries before triggering the intended interrupt event. We rely on an observation to increase the accuracy of interrupt event prediction. Specifically, in peripherals, the status registers are often dependent on the control registers and thus can be ignored in condition statements. Moreover, control registers are typically recognized as T0, so we can accurately infer their values by referring to the most recent written values. Therefore, \( \mu \text{Emu} \) looks peripheral registers of type T0 at first. If it is found, \( \mu \text{Emu} \) uses the most recently written value to it to calculate the branch target, regardless of whether other registers are also involved in the condition statement. If it is not found, \( \mu \text{Emu} \) randomly selects all possible values of type T1 and T2 to drive the execution. This optimization helps \( \mu \text{Emu} \) accurately handle many common peripherals such as UART and I2C.

### 4.6 Fuzzer Integration

The FuzzerHelper plugin is used to accommodate AFL so that it can be bridged to \( \mu \text{Emu} \). Also, it automatically finds fuzzing input points to feed data to the tested tasks.

**AFL Accommodation.** Although AFL already supports fuzzing binaries running QEMU, it is limited to fuzzing userspace binaries. As such, we only use AFL for test-case generation and leave the rest to FuzzerHelper, including the coverage instrumentation, fork sever, and crash/hang detection. This also allows us to readily replace AFL for alternative fuzzing tools with minimal re-engineering effort. We implemented the same path coverage algorithm with the AFL. Concretely, the code coverage information is collected by tracking the translation block transitions. Then, we share the bitmap of code coverage information with AFL via shared memory. For the fork sever, we consider the moment the firmware reads the first byte of test-case as the fork point. We used the existing interface forkAndConcretize in S2E to take a snapshot of the whole execution state when the execution reaches the fork point for the first time. We choose the default fork point as the program point at which the firmware reads a data register for the first time. Then, every time the execution finishes reading test-case or the firmware crashes/hangs, the plugin rolls back to the fork point and clones another state to continue fuzzing. For crash detection, we implemented a very basic memory error detector, which checks the memory access permissions based on regions: R+X for the whole ROM, R+W for RAM, peripherals, and system control block, and no access for the rest. We also consider HardFault as a crash indicator because typically it means an unrecoverable error. The timeout is set as 10 seconds for hang detection.

**Data Registers Identification.** In fuzz testing, it is essential to identify input channels under attackers’ control. In MCUs, this corresponds to peripheral data registers. We found candidate data registers often exhibit the following characteristics, which gave us opportunities to identify them automatically. First, the T3 registers are mostly data registers. This is because the readings from them are often protocol data, as exemplified in Listing 4. Second, data registers are often read in interrupt handlers but their readings are consumed in the non-interrupt context. Third, compared with other kinds of registers, data registers are frequently accessed during execution (more than hundreds of times). If a register has one of the above characteristics, we mark it as a data register for fuzzing. As shown in Table 6, this method enables us to accurately identify data registers for real-world fuzzing.

## 5 Evaluation

The main evaluation questions for \( \mu \text{Emu} \) are as follows. 1) whether it is able to emulate the behaviors of different kinds of unknown peripherals correctly; 2) whether the performance is within an acceptable range for practical uses; 3) whether it enables analysis tools like fuzzers to find real-world bugs of the task code of firmware. All experiments were conducted on an 8-core/16-thread Xeon server with 48GB RAM, running a Ubuntu 18.04 OS.

### 5.1 Unit Tests

We conducted the same unit-test experiment as was done in P2IM to ensure a head-to-head comparison. It tests how \( \mu \text{Emu} \) can handle individual peripheral functions.

#### 5.1.1 Experimental Setup

We reused the same 66 firmware samples in the P2IM experiment [3]. These samples cover eight most popular MCU peripherals, three MCU chips (STM32 F103RB, NXP MK64FN1M0VLL12, and Atmel SAM3X8E), and three widely used MCU OS/system libraries (NuttX, RIOT, and Arduino). Each unit-test sample represents a unique and feasible combination of a peripheral, an OS, and an SoC. After rebooting, the firmware performs the basic peripheral operations. For each unit test, we first ran the knowledge extraction phase. During dynamic analysis, we overrode the testcases generated by AFL with the expected data extracted from the unit test to emulate data input.

#### 5.1.2 Experiment Results

The results are summarized in Table 1. All the unit tests finished the knowledge extraction phase within one minutes with one round. It suggests the high efficiency of our knowledge extraction algorithm. Out of 66 samples, only three unit tests failed, suggesting a passing rate of 95%, which is higher than the result in P2IM (79%).

**Failed Tests in P2IM.** A major reason for failed tests in P2IM is register mis-categorization. When the register is treated as another type, the resulting response is very likely to be wrong. We attribute failed tests to several reasons, including mis-categorization (MC), invalid assumption (IA) and limited exploration (LE), which are explained in Section 5.3.

**Failed Tests in \( \mu \text{Emu} \).** Invalidity checking plays an important role in \( \mu \text{Emu} \). If an unexpected path is not recognized as invalid, \( \mu \text{Emu} \) may lead the emulation to it. The failed tests
were all caused by this issue. In Listing 6, we show such an example in which the firmware reads a byte via the I2C bus. It first checks the status register. If an error condition is detected in line 3, the function returns an error. Otherwise, the normal function is performed.

```
1:  int i2c_read_bytes(...){
2    I2C_TypeDef *i2c_dev = i2c_config[dev].dev;
3    if ((i2c_dev->SR & 6) == 2)
4       return Error;
5    ...  
6    data = i2c_dev->DR;  
7}
```

Code Listing 6: Code snippet in which µEmu fails to extract correct information.

In this example, the error returned in line 5 is not handled. As a result, regardless of the path being executed in the function, the execution error cannot be detected by the proposed invalidity checking mechanism. In our evaluation, three out of 66 test-cases have this issue. We argue that this problem is mainly due to not following the best practice in programming. In particular, well implemented firmware should detect the error code and handle it immediately. This problem can also be mitigated by invoking the provided interface to specify invalid program points. In this example, line 4 should be avoided. Therefore, the analyst can configure the address of line 4 as an invalid program point, so that the InvalidStateDetection plugin is able to detect it (Section 4.3) when line 4 is executed. After adding one additional invalid point to each failed sample, µEmu achieved a 100% passing rate.

### 5.2 Fuzzing with µEmu

#### 5.2.1 Experimental Setup

To comprehensively evaluate our work, we obtained the ten firmware samples used in P²IM [3], two used in HALucinator [1], two used in Pretender [4], and one used in the paper WCWNCY [35]. In addition, we collected six extra firmware samples running on real-world commercial devices. The source and a brief description for each extra firmware sample can be found in Appendix C. In total, our sample set includes 21 real-world firmware images. In general, these samples collectively cover more than ten MCU models from top MCU vendors such as Atmel, NXP, Maxim, and STM by revenue [13]. Each of them includes a diverse set of peripherals, including UART, CAN, Radio, USB, etc. and popular OSs/libraries such as FreeRTOS, RIOT, and Arduino. All on-chip peripherals used by each firmware is listed in Table 5.

In the experiment, 15 samples were tested under the default configuration without any manual inputs during KB extraction. For the remaining six samples, only one user-defined invalid program point (see Column 5 in Table 6) needs to be added for each to enhance the invalidity checking. Except for three samples which need analysts to specify one additional data register (i.e., bracketed registers in the last column in Table 6), others directly used the automatically identified data registers. The detailed information about the configuration for each tested sample can be found in Table 6 of Appendix D.

As a comparison, we used P²IM to conduct experiments on the same set of firmware samples. To ensure a fair comparison, we strictly followed the instructions on P²IM GitHub repo [2] and communicated with the authors when something uncertain was encountered. We performed the following manual works when using P²IM. First, for each sample, we modified the source code to explicitly invoke the function startForkserver for AFL fuzzing integration. Second, we manually added new board and MCU memory regions to the P²IM source code. Note that the same information is also needed for µEmu. However, we provided an easy-to-use Lua-based interfaces to quickly configure the MCU without modifying the QEMU C source code.

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1. https://github.com/RiS3-Lab/p2im/blob/master/docs/prep_fw_for_fuzzing.md
2. https://github.com/RiS3-Lab/p2im/blob/master/docs/add_mcu.md
5.2.2 Experiment Results
For each sample, we first ran a round of knowledge extraction, and then started fuzzing for 24 hours. If reinforced knowledge extraction is triggered, µEmu automatically switches back and forth between the knowledge extraction phase and dynamic analysis (fuzzing) phase. We evaluated the results in three aspects. First, we measured the total time and the number of rounds needed in KB extraction. We show the performance improvement with the cache mechanism. Second, we measured the path coverage with and without µEmu and compared the result with P^2IM. Finally, we show the fuzzing results.

Knowledge Extraction Performance. We recorded the total number of rounds of reinforced learning and the total time spent on knowledge extraction across multiple rounds. Table 2 shows the results. In the worst case, the knowledge extraction phase took less than ten minutes, while for most samples the knowledge extraction phase can complete within two minutes. Some complex firmware like Gateway discovered multiple new peripheral registers during fuzzing and therefore switched between the knowledge extraction phase and the fuzzing phase back and forth several times.

The performance of knowledge extraction is good enough for practical use cases, especially considering that the KB can be reused multiple times in firmware analysis. The reason for knowledge extraction process being so efficient is attributed to the cache mechanism used in the exploration algorithm. In the right part of the knowledge extraction performance column in Table 2, we show the number of paths being searched and consumed time in the symbolic execution with and without using cache KB during the knowledge extraction phase. For the experiments without using cache, a target branch was randomly selected in the exploration. As shown in the table, using the cache to select favorable branches, much less time is spent and fewer paths need to be explored to finish a round of knowledge extraction. Without using cache, some firmware cannot finish the first round. In these cases, we forcibly stopped the execution after two hours.

Coverage Improvement. As shown in Table 2, the code coverage increases 10x to 140x compared to that in the normal QEMU without peripheral emulation.

In the column showing the results of P^2IM, we marked a letter “Y” for samples that P^2IM can emulate and noted the coverage in the bracket. For those that P^2IM cannot emulate, we marked a letter “N” and noted the reasons. The detailed explanation for the failure reasons can be found in Section 5.3. We observe slight improvement in code coverage over P^2IM.

Fuzzing. We used our tool to fuzz the task code in the collected samples. These tasks take inputs from the identified data registers. We were able to reproduce all the bugs mentioned in previous works, except for XML parser sample in WYCNINWYC [35]. This missed bug is caused by a heap overflow, which can only be detected with a fine-grained memory checker such as AddressSanitizer [39]. Designing an advanced memory checker is orthogonal to this work.

In addition to known bugs, we also found two previously unknown bugs in Steering Control and µTaskerUSB. The bug in µTaskerUSB is caused by an out-of-bound write. The USB driver only uses a receive buffer of 512 bytes to read an input of up to 1,024 bytes, resulting in DoS or data corruption. This result is encouraging because the same samples have been extensively fuzzed in previous works, and we can reasonably anticipate that µEmu is likely to find more bugs. The bug in Steering_Control is caused by a double-free of a string buffer, allowing for arbitrary write. More specific-
cally, the firmware uses dynamic memory to store the received data from the serial port. If the memory allocation fails, the same buffer will be freed twice. We have reported the bugs to the corresponding device vendors. Since Steering_Control was also tested by P2IM but P2IM failed to find the bug, we further studied the root cause. It turned out this is due to the way it handles test-cases. Specifically, P2IM requires the user to manually set the fork point for fuzzing. In this firmware configuration, P2IM only handles very few bytes at the beginning of each test-case, whereas this bug is only triggered when a long input has been processed. We note this issue is not caused by P2IM’s limited emulation capability and is fixable by specifying a proper forking point.

Since we adopted a different strategy in selecting the fork point with P2IM (automatic vs. manual), it is unfair to directly compare the number of executed test-cases per second to evaluate the fuzzing speed. Instead, we measured the execution time to complete one million basic blocks for μEmu and P2IM to evaluate the speed. In our experiments, we observed a slight slow-down of μEmu compared with P2IM (1.2x to 1.7x). We attribute this to the slower execution speed of S2E. S2E introduces nearly 1.5X runtime overhead over the vanilla QEMU due to the check of symbolic data in each translation block execution. This problem can be alleviated using the single-path mode of S2E [10].

**False Crashes/Hangs.** In our evaluation, we observed some false positives in Steering_Control, GPS_Tracker and 3Dprinter. After careful examination, they were caused by the lack of Direct Memory Access (DMA) support in μEmu. DMA allows the peripherals to directly access the RAM independent of the processor. Since it is not simply responding values to peripheral access operations, symbolic execution cannot provide any useful knowledge. A recent work [33] has been specifically designed to handle DMA.

### 5.3 Failure Reasons in P2IM

This section explains the root causes for failed emulations in P2IM. We use the same notation as Table 2 to refer to the causes.

**MC – Mis-categorization of Registers.** P2IM categorizes the peripheral registers based on their access patterns. However, register mis-categorization could happen as acknowledged by the P2IM authors. For the firmware samples provided by P2IM [3], register mis-categorization merely slowed down the fuzzing process and affected coverage improvement. For others, we found that mis-categorization actually severely influenced the usability of P2IM. That being said, we did observe failed emulations with P2IM. For example, in the Rf_Door_Lock firmware, P2IM mistakenly categorized the RCC register as control register which actually should be a combination of control and status register. As a result, P2IM always returned the last written value to this register which cannot satisfy the firmware expectation and eventually hung the execution. In addition, P2IM groups registers based on spatial adjacency. Registers within 0x200 bytes are considered to belong to the same peripheral. This assumption is not applicable for complex peripherals like USB, CAN and Radio Controller, which have large or separated range. This also leads to register mis-categorization. The sample Thermostat, LiteOS_IoT and Zephyr_SocketCan also stalled during emulation due to register mis-categorization.

**IA – Invalid Assumption about Registers.** P2IM models a special kind of register which combines the functionality of the control register and the status register. It assumes that the control bits and status bits do not overlap. However, we found this assumption does not always hold. For example, on the STM32F103RE chip, the first bit of a register in the ADC peripheral is used as both the control bit and status bit. The 3DPrinter firmware sets this bit as one and then waits for it to become zero. Since P2IM recognized this bit as control bit, it always returned one, making the firmware stalled. The same occurred to the sample used in XML_Parser.

**LE – Limited Exploration.** P2IM cannot find appropriate values for status registers based on existing heuristics. Therefore, it proposes explorative execution. Specifically, it pauses and snapshots the execution at register reading points. Then, P2IM spawns a worker thread for each candidate value. The worker thread runs with the assigned candidate and terminates when it is about to return to the next level callee. Finally, the best value which does not crash or stall the execution is picked. The problem with explorative execution is that it is impossible to try all the candidates in the search space, because there could be as many as 232 candidates for a peripheral register in a 32-bit MCU. P2IM simply narrows down the search space by only investigating candidates with a single bit set, meaning that only 32 plus 1 candidates are checked. However, based on our experiments, multi-bit status registers are quite common, especially in complex peripherals like CAN and USB. For example, the two samples used in HALucinator use the SYSCtrl peripheral to control device oscillators and clock sources. When the firmware enables the DPLL48M (i.e., Digital Frequency Locked Loop) feature, a multi-bit status register (at 0x40000080C) is in use. P2IM cannot find the expected values, so the emulation was stalled.

## 6 Limitations

Leveraging symbolic execution, μEmu can achieve dependency-aware peripheral access handling and constraint-satisfaction-based response finding. This enables μEmu to use less heuristics but achieve better accuracy compared with other works. However, when heuristics fail, there are still some corner cases and human efforts are needed.

First, the proposed invalidity checking might not cover all invalid states. Ideally, a proper implementation should check the error code immediately after peripheral operations and handle the exception, e.g., by letting the firmware enter an infinite loop. However, if the firmware continues normal
execution, µEmu cannot distinguish which branch target is better and have to randomly selected one. We show such an example in Listing 6. In this example, fuzzing test-cases cannot be fed to the emulator via the data register of the I2C peripheral. As a result, bugs caused by inputs from the I2C peripheral cannot be discovered. To deal with this kind of false negatives, the analyst needs to provide user-defined program points that µEmu should avoid reaching. Note that analysts can examine the log information generated by µEmu to quickly find out this information.

Second, µEmu may mistakenly treat a legitimate long loop as invalid state. For example, we observed standard string and memory functions such as memset was sometimes detected as an invalid long loop. This is because the contexts of these function invocations involve symbolic values, which activate the invalid state detector plugin. Such false positives can be easily detected since all valid paths inevitably pass this point during firmware execution. Therefore, if we found many paths fall in invalid states at the same point due to same reason, we can exclude these points from invalid states detection.

Third, we rely on the characteristics described in Section 4.6 to identify data registers. However, we did observe rare cases when a true data register does not exhibit these characteristics. If a data register is mis-categorized as a T1 or T2 type, µEmu would only respond to it with a few fixed values and the fuzzer cannot reach paths that depend on the input from the data register. In our evaluation, this rarely occurs. As shown in Table 6, we missed only three out of 43 data registers. Note that the 43 data registers were identified by reviewing the chip manual and therefore can serve as the ground-truth. If a false negative is discovered, we allow analysts to directly add additional data registers via the configuration file.

In addition, µEmu detects infinite/long loops only if the processor context contains one or more symbols. However, it might happen that the counter of a long loop is a concrete value but is dependent upon a symbol outside the loop. µEmu would miss the detection of this long loop because all the registers in the loop are concrete values. Fortunately, we did not observe any such cases in our experiments. Considering the diversity and complexity of real-world firmware, we acknowledge this limitation.

7 Related Work

To enable executing MCU firmware in an emulated environment, most of the previous works [28, 32, 34] follow a hybrid emulation approach, which forward the peripheral access requests to the real hardware. However, this approach suffers from poor performance. M.Kammerstetter et al. [27] propose utilizing a cache for peripheral device communication to improve the performance. However, hardware-in-the-loop approaches are not scalable for testing large-scale firmware images. Instead of fetching data from real devices, our approach infers proper inputs with symbolic execution.

Recently, several research efforts [16, 19, 21, 25] have been focused on firmware emulation without hardware dependence. Similar to µEmu, Laelaps [16] also uses the symbolic execution to infer appropriate responses to unknown peripheral accesses. However, Laelaps only stays in symbolic execution mode for a short period (less than six basic blocks based on the paper) before the path explosion problem begins to influence its performance. Therefore, a peripheral input, after six basic blocks, has to be concertized and cannot be involved in constraint solving. In other words, Laelaps can only find the “best” short-term path, which may not be a valid path in the long run. In addition, the architecture of Laelaps does not support caching. Every access to peripherals traps the system into the symbolic execution engine, leading to unacceptable performance overhead. For example, in fuzzing the synthesized vulnerable firmware, Laelaps executed less than 1,000 test-cases in an hour [16]. The low performance makes it very inefficient in fuzzing, which relies on executions per second.

PRETENDER [25] observes interactions between the hardware and firmware, and uses machine learning and pattern recognition to create models of peripherals. Thus, it needs real devices to collect the interactions between the original hardware and firmware, and then learns the behavior. This approach is less scalable if the firmware was written for unpopular MCUs. Moreover, the analyzed firmware cannot activate more peripheral features apart from those already learned on real devices.

P2IM [21] generates responses to peripheral accesses based on the categorization information of the peripheral. It observes the access pattern of peripherals and relies expert-provided heuristics to categorize each peripheral register. We discuss how mis-categorization influences the accuracy of P2IM in handing complex peripherals like USB, CAN and Radio in Section 5.3. Moreover, it cannot generate responses for many kinds of registers, in particular status registers. This is because P2IM uses a concrete exploration algorithm to guess valid readings of registers, while the huge search space makes it impractical. For example, if the firmware waits for a status register to have multiple bits set, P2IM can never find the expected value as discussed in Appendix 5.3.

HALucinator [19] avoids peripheral emulation by replacing the high-level hardware abstraction layer (HAL) functions with a host implementation. In this sense, it does not really model peripherals. Therefore, comparing HALucinator with µEmu, P2IM or Laelaps is not perfectly fair. Since HAL functions are replaced by host functions, it does not need to consider low-level implementation, such as DMA. However, since low-level drivers are skipped for emulation, bugs resting there can never be exposed. Also, building a database that matches all HAL libraries needs the HAL source code from all the major MCU vendors. As a result, the wide adaptation of HALucinator demands collaboration from industry. SoCs with proprietary SDKs (e.g., Samsung SmartThings [38] and Philips [36]) cannot be supported by HALucinator. Given
the clear advantages and disadvantages of HALucinator and µEmu/P²IM/Laelsaps, we argue that a combination could generate a state-of-the-art tool for analyzing MCU firmware. We can first use HALucinator to match any HAL functions and hook them with host implementations. During run-time, if any unknown peripheral is accessed, µEmu, P²IM or Laelsaps can kick in and emulate the rest.

Apart from the emulation capability itself, a distinct advantage of µEmu to related work is the tight integration with S2E, a platform for software analysis. Therefore, there are many excellent plugins which are readily available. Also, analysts can develop new plugins for µEmu so that other dynamic analysis mechanisms can be integrated.

8 Conclusions
This paper presents µEmu, a new tool to emulate firmware execution, for the purpose of finding bugs in task code of firmware, with a focus on those caused by malformed inputs from I/O interfaces. It automatically finds appropriate responses for accesses to unknown peripherals, allowing for executing MCU firmware in an emulated environment without requiring real hardware. Our algorithm leverages symbolic execution to find new paths and uses invalidity checking to make sure that the firmware execution does not enter an invalid state. At the same time, µEmu learns the appropriate values for peripheral access and store them into a knowledge base. After the knowledge extraction phase, with the returned knowledge base, µEmu efficiently responds to peripheral reading operations for dynamic analysis. We have implemented our idea on top of S2E and developed a fuzzing plugin. Evaluation results show that µEmu is capable of emulating real-world firmware and finding new bugs.

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A Number of Blocks Used for Coverage Calculation

B Summary of Cache Types in the KB

Table 3: Number of Blocks Used for Coverage Calculation

| Ref | Firmware | Reached TB # | Reached TB # | Total BB* |
|-----|----------|--------------|--------------|-----------|
|     | (uEmu)   |              | (uEmu)       |           |
| P2IM |          |              |              |           |
| UNIC | 162 | 164 | 2424 |
| Console | 457 | 845 | 1830 |
| Drone | 1539 | 1282 | 1715 |
| Gateway | 2104 | 2176 | 3992 |
| Heat_Press | 490 | 530 | 1622 |
| PLC | 505 | 524 | 1910 |
| Rellow_Oven | 954 | 823 | 2354 |
| Robot | 1086 | 1177 | 2511 |
| Soldering_Iron | 1799 | 1338 | 2756 |
| Steering_Control | 529 | 471 | 1623 |
| HALacimator | 6LoWPAN_Sender | 2648 | N | 5482 |
| 6LoWPAN_Receiver | 2596 | N | 5481 |
| Predratter | RF_Door_Lock | 763 | N | 2003 |
| Thermostat | 1007 | N | 3952 |
| WYC | XML_Parser | 2187 | N | 8311 |

*: We use IDA pro 7.0 to calculate the total basic block number.

Table 4: Number of entries for each cache type in the KB

| Cache Type | Regs. Read by Firmware | Conditional Regs. Read by Firmware |
|-----------|------------------------|----------------------------------|
| T0 | T1 | T2 | T3 | Total | T0 | T1 | T2 | T3 | Total |
| firmware | | | | | | | | | |
| CNC | 17 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 40 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 14 |
| Console | 12 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 2 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| Drone | 32 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 39 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 8 |
| Gateway | 47 | 15 | 0 | 1 | 63 | 6 | 15 | 0 | 1 | 22 |
| Heat_Press | 5 | 14 | 0 | 1 | 20 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 1 | 15 |
| PLC | 14 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Rellow_Oven | 27 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| Robot | 19 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 25 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| Soldering_Iron | 38 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 54 | 11 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 27 |
| Steering_Control | 9 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 26 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 16 |
| 6LoWPAN_Sender | 18 | 29 | 0 | 1 | 48 | 3 | 29 | 0 | 1 | 33 |
| 6LoWPAN_Receiver | 18 | 29 | 0 | 1 | 48 | 3 | 29 | 0 | 1 | 33 |
| RF_Door_Lock | 21 | 14 | 2 | 1 | 38 | 5 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 19 |
| Thermostat | 19 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 40 | 5 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 26 |
| XML_Parser | 26 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 3 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| GPS_Tracker | 11 | 16 | 0 | 1 | 28 | 1 | 14 | 0 | 1 | 16 |
| LiteOS_IoT | 36 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 47 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 12 |
| Zepyhr_SocketCan | 23 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| 3Dprinter | 26 | 16 | 0 | 1 | 43 | 1 | 16 | 0 | 1 | 18 |
| utasker_MODBUS | 43 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 62 | 5 | 11 | 1 | 0 | 17 |
| utasker_USB | 29 | 31 | 0 | 1 | 61 | 5 | 17 | 0 | 1 | 23 |

| | 317 | 304 | 9 | 15 | 830 | 6 | 213 | 9 | 15 | 302 |
### Table 5: Details of real-world firmware samples

| Firmware          | MCU           | OS/Sys lib. | On-chip Peripherals Used by Firmware                                                                 |
|-------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CNC               | STM32F429ZI   | Bare metal  | TIM2,TIM4,USART2,PWR,SYSCTL,EXTI1,GPIOA,GPIOB,GPIOD,GPIOE,RCC,FLASH                                 |
| Console           | MK64FN1M0VLL12| RIOT        | RTC,SIM,PORTA,PORTB,PORTE,WWDG,MCG,UART,SMC,GPIOB,GPIOE                                             |
| Drone             | STM32F103RB   | Bare metal  | TIM2,TIM3,TIM4,EXTI1,GPIOA,GPIOB,GPIOC,TIM1,USART1,RCC,FLASH                                         |
| Gateway           | STM32F103RB   | Arduino     | TIM1,TIM2,TIM3,TIM4,EXTI1,AFIO,GPIOA,GPIOB,GPIOC,ADC1,GPIOC,RCC,FLASH,UART                           |
| Heat_Press        | SAM3X8E      | Arduino     | ADC,PMC,UART,CHIPID,EXT1,PINOA,PINOB,PINOC,PINOD,WDT                                              |
| PLC               | STM32F429ZI   | Arduino     | USART3,PWR,GPIOB,RCC,FLASH                                                                         |
| Reflow_Oven       | STM32F103RB   | Arduino     | USART2,AFIO,GPIOA,GPIOB,GPIOC,ADC1,RCC,FLASH                                                        |
| Robot             | STM32F103RB   | Bare metal  | TIM2,EXTI1,GPIOA,TIM1,USART1,RCC,FLASH                                                              |
| Soldering_Iron     | SAM3X8E      | Arduino     | TDA,RTC,MCU,UART,CHIPID,EXT1,GPIOA,GPIOB,GPIOC,PINOD,WDT                                          |
| Steuerling_Control| STM32F103RB   | FreeRTOS    | TIM2,TIM3,JWDG,EXT1,GPIOA,GPIOB,GPIOD,ADC1,TIM1,RCC,BLACK                                          |
| 6LoWPAN_Sender    | SAM R21      | Contiki     | PORT,CNTR,EXTI1,TIM3,TC1,TC4,SP1,SYSCTRL1,CLK1,KPM,MCNCTRL,USB,MTB,RFD3CTRL                      |
| 6LoWPAN_Receiver   | SAM R21      | Contiki     | PORT,CNTR,EXTI1,TIM3,TC1,TC4,SP1,SYSCTRL1,CLK1,KPM,MCNCTRL,USB,MTB,RFD3CTRL                      |
| RF_Door_Lock      | MAX26600     | Mbed        | GPIO1,TIMER,UART,DA0,DA1,DA2,DA3,AFEE,ICL,CLKMAN,PM,GMAN                                          |
| Thermostat        | MAX26600     | Mbed        | GPIO1,TIMER,UART,DA0,DA1,DA2,DA3,AFEE,ICL,CLKMAN,PM,GMAN                                          |
| XML_Parser        | STML152XE    | Mbed        | TIM5,RTC,UART,PWR,PORTA,PORTC,RCC,FLASH                                                           |
| GPS tracker       | SAM3X8A      | Arduino     | UART0,UART1,ADC,EFC0,WDT,PIO,CHIPID,SMC,USB                                                        |
| LiteOS_IoT        | STM32L431    | LiteOS      | UART2,TC2,PWR,SYSCFG,EXTI1,UART1,RCC,FLASH,GPIOA,GPIOB,GPIOC                                       |
| Zephyr_SocketCan  | STM32L432KC  | Zephyr      | TIM2,UART2,PWR,RCC,FLASH,GPIO,CAN                                                                 |
| μTasker.MODBUS     | STM32F429ZI   | μTasker     | TIM2,TIM4,JWDG,UART2,TIM3,PWR,UART1,SYSCFG,GPIOA,GPIOB,GPIOD,FLASH,ETHERNET                        |
| μTasker_USB        | STM32F429ZIETFU | μTasker   | TIM2,TIM4,JWDG,UART2,TIM3,PWR,UART1,SYSCFG,GPIOA,GPIOB,GPIOD,FLASH,ETHERNET                        |

### C Details of Real Firmware Samples

**GPS/GLONASS Vehicle Tracker.** This is an open-source firmware for GPS/GLONASS vehicle tracker provided by Geolink [23]. It includes many advanced features such as real-time tracking, analog sensors, CAN bus, battery monitor, external commands, and many others.

**Marlin 3D printer.** Marlin [44] is an open source firmware for the RepRap family of replicating rapid prototypers – popularly known as “3D printers”.

**Lite OS IoT Demo.** LightOS [26] is the IoT OS released by the Huawei. This is the IoT demo firmware for commercial testing multiple functions, including serial, sensor and NB-IoT communication module running on the IoTClub board [6].

**Socket CAN Test on Zephyr.** Zephyr [14] is an RTOS built for IoT applications supported by Linux Foundation. This socket CAN sample [12] is a server/client application that sends and receives raw CAN frames using BSD socket API.

**μTasker MODBUS and μTasker USB.** μTasker [7] is an embedded OS with many ready-made projects targeting a board class of embedded processors. The MODBUS demo [8] demonstrates the use of the MODBUS extension with μTasker over Ethernet (MODBUS TCP). The MODBUS protocol is widely used in PLC devices. The USB demo [9] provides a menu-driven terminal interface via USB. It can be commanded to operate as an RS232 device.

### D Detailed Configuration of Each Tested Firmware Sample

In Table 6, we list the detailed configuration of each sample.
Table 6: Configuration used in the experiment in Section 5.2

| Firmware         | BB#_INV1 | BB#_INV2 | BB#_Term | User-defined Program Points | Automatically Identified Data Registers (Missed Ground Truth) |
|------------------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| CNC              | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40004404, 0x400200010, 0x40020C10                           |
| Console          | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40068A07                                                  |
| Drone            | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40005410, 0x40013804                                      |
| Gateway          | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40004404, 0x40005410                                      |
| Heat_Press       | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x400E0818                                                  |
| PLC              | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40004804                                                  |
| Reflow_Oven      | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40004404, 0x40010C08, 0x401244C                            |
| Robot            | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40005410                                                  |
| Soldering_Iron   | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40005410, 0x40010808                                      |
| Steering_Control | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x400E0818                                                  |
| 6LoWPAN_Send      | 80       | 2,000    | 30,000   | i2c_master_wait_for_bus     | 0x42001828, 0x42000828, (0x42000C28)                        |
| 6LoWPAN_Receiver  | 80       | 2,000    | 30,000   | i2c_master_wait_for_bus     | 0x42001828, 0x42000828, (0x42000C28)                        |
| RF_Door_Lock     | 30       | 2,000    | 20,000   | Mbed_Die                    | 0x40039020                                                  |
| Thermostat       | 30       | 2,000    | 20,000   | Mbed_Die                    | 0x40039020, 0x4010D800                                      |
| XML_Parser       | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40004C04                                                  |
| GPS_tracker      | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40098018, 0x4009C018                                      |
| LiteOS_IoT       | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40004424, (0x48000010)                                    |
| Zephyr_SocketCan | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40004424, 0x40065B0-0x40065BC                             |
| 3Dprinter        | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | Fail_Config                 | 0x40013804                                                  |
| µµµtasker_MODBUS | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | Error_ConfigEthernet        | 0x40004804, 0x40004404, 0x40011004                          |
| µµµtasker_USB    | 30       | 2,000    | 30,000   | none                        | 0x40004804, 0x40004404, 0x40011004, 0x50001000-0x5001FFC     |