KOSOVO FORCE (KFOR) ORGANIZATION IMAGE: 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON KOSOVO SECURITY FORCES (KSF)

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Abstract

Comprehensive efforts to rebuild a society’s security and peace-enforcing have become an increasingly frequent activity of the NATO as KFOR (Kosovo Force), which is formed of many countries that its image results from these countries collateral relations. KFOR’s image has come to the fore because it affects the mission success and decisions about its existence in Kosovo. The image has two components, functional and emotional: Military symbols and uniforms of NATO (KFOR) are functional and emotional relations of countries with Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) members are emotional part.

In this research; the main objective is finding out the effects that shape KFOR image. Sublevel objectives are the effects of Kosovo’s “connections”, KSF “personal links” and “perceived mission success” with KFOR member states in KFOR image. To study these effect 3 hypothesis are formed and empirical research is done with KSF members to get a foundation of emotional relationship which affects country image. Evaluating of questionnaires with linear regression, correlation and factor analysis, besides the important effects of ethnocentrism and patriotism, military personnel relations formed by countries military involvement and activities found as predictor factors in KFOR image. As a matter of course these base components of emotions about the image will enlighten future literature about building an organizational image.

Keywords: Organizational Image, Country Image, Image, KFOR (Kosovo Force).

KOSOVA GÜCÜ (KFOR) ORGANİZASYONUNUN İMAJI: KOSOVA GÜVENLİK KUVVETLERİ’NDE (KSF) AMPİRİK BİR ÇALIŞMA

Öz

Birçok ülkenin katkılarıyla oluşan ve imajı da bu ülkelerin tamamlayıcı ilişkileri sonucu ortaya çıkan NATO’nun uluslararası yüzü olarak Kosova Gücü (KFOR) için toplumun güvenliğini yeniden tesis etmek ve barışı zorlama faaliyetleri gittikçe daha geniş kapsamlı bir çaba haline gelmektedir. KFOR’un imajının öne çıkmasını nedeni görevin başarılmasında ve Kosova’daki varlığıyla ilgili kararların alınmasında önemli rol oynamasıdır. İmajın, işlevsel ve duyuşsal iki bileşeni vardır. Bunlar NATO’yu (KFOR) temsil eden askeri işareleri ve üniformaların oluşturduğu işlevsel bileşen ve katılmıı ülkelerin Kosova Gücü (KFOR) personeli ile ilişkilerinin oluşturduğu duyuşsal bileşen.

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Bu araştırmanın temel amacı KFOR’un imajını belirleyen temel etkenlerin araştırılmasıdır. Alt amaçlar ise KFOR’un imajını belirlemeye KFOR’a dâhil ülkeler ile Kosova’nın ve KSF (Kosova Güvenlik Kuvvetleri) personelinin ilişkisi ile algılanan görev bağırlığının etkisini göz ardı edildiğinde; askeri personelin güce destek veren ülkeler ile olan askeri ilişkileri ve KSF personelinin dıyusal ilişkilerini anlamak amacıyla 3 hipotez oluşturulmuştur. Anketlerin doğrusal regresyon, korelasyon ve faktör analizleri ile değerlendirilmesinden sonra görülmüştür ki etnik animosity ve vatandaş seviliği etkisi göz ardı edildiğinde; askeri personelin gücü destek veren ülkeler ile olan askeri ilişkileri ve faaliyetleri KFOR’un imajında önemli tahminleyicidirler. Doğal olarak bu imaj hakkındaki duygu ların bu temelleri organizasyonel imajın geleceği alan yazmasına işık tutacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Örgütsel İmaj, Ülke İmajı, İmaj, KFOR (Kosova Gücü).

INTRODUCTION

On March 24, 1999, with the bombing, NATO’s resort to warfare in Kosovo has set out. NATO intervened militarily in Kosovo to halt a humanitarian disaster and restore stability. Consequently KFOR has been the representative of NATO since then and whatever will be perceived about KFOR’s image aggregate from the contributing states’ military efforts. KFOR’s image has come to the fore because it affects not only mission success, but also the duties accomplishment percentage and its power to influence the international environment and influence the peacekeeping mission (NATO, 2012a). Nevertheless, this war the difficulties of warfare coalition, and without good image such extensive allied deference seems unlikely in the future (Biddle, 2002: 149).

Kosovo crisis rooted to the historical animosity between the Serbs and the Albanians. Kosovo is considered as a heartland of old Serbia by Serbians and as a target by Albania where the 90% population is Albanians (Heraclides, 1997: 318). The more recent conflict began when Kosovo’s extended autonomous rule was abolished in 1987-89. Thereafter, the Albanian population in Kosovo was denied civil rights and subjected to oppressive rule (Choedon, 2010) and declared independence in 1991 (Heraclides, 1997: 317-320). Kosovo became a UN-run protectorate until the Kosovo Albanians made a one-sided announcement of independence in 2008 (Kostovicova et al., 2012: 574) and KSF formed. KSF is armed protection force of Kosovo but despite carrying weapons it is not officially army. Kosovo’s security force is not a conventional armed force till now because it does not play the same role as the other defensive forces in its neighboring countries (Deci, 2012) cause of limited mandate. KSF, also do not have full operational capabilities because formation process has not been filled out due to the allowance with NATO. The KSF’s mission is carrying out crisis response; explosive ordnance disposal; the control and clearance of hazardous materials; firefighting; and other humanitarian assistance tasks and civil protection operations within Kosovo; and to assist the civil authorities in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies (mission given by the Ministry for the Kosovo Security
Forces) (MKSF, 2012; Geci, 2012: 21). KSF plays very critical role because Kosovo is defenseless and Serbia could easily take over the territory as it still considers Kosovo as its own territory without KSF (Geci, 2012: 22). But integration of Balkans and Kosovo on political, economic and security will lessen the potential for instability (Muja, 2013: 9) and encourage regional development under Europen umbrella.

Future decisions on further reducing KFOR’s footprint in Kosovo determined in the light of both military and political considerations (NATO statistics, 2005). National minorities in Kosovo have rights to secession under human rights abuses and states which carry out these abuses give up their sovereign rights over such minorities (Webber, 2009: 455-456) as the image affects many organization’s outputs (Polat, 2011: 106).

NATO’s role is essential not only because the adopted legislation foresees it but also because it will help fulfill country’s aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration (Qehaja et al., 2008: 18). KFOR’s image has come to the fore because the KFOR entity in Kosovo elongated with its picture. Then this picture will be the predictor of the determination of Kosovo to pursue a relationship with KFOR (Palacio et al., 2002: 486). This inquiry targets to define the organizational image of the KFOR based on the Kosovo army members’ views. To measure this view a research is conducted with KSF members.

Image is resulting from sum of experiences, opinions, opinions, and knowledge of intangible resources that can be gained as a sense of connection (Arendt and Brettel, 2010: 1474) and cannot be separately valued (Shenkar and Yuchtman-yaar, 1997: 1362). The image consists functional and emotional components. The functional component is measurable, tangible characteristics, as psychological dimensions that are manifested by feelings and attitudes are emotional component (LeBlanc and Nguyen, 1996). NATO symbols, battle dress uniforms, tactical military equipment etc. are the functional component. Relationship and connections are the emotional and mission successes part is the functional part of constructed image of KFOR as the affective image has a greater weight in forming the overall image (Alvarez and Campo, 2014). In this research; the main objective is to find out the relationship between KFOR image and contributing state’s effect on that image. States’ images are influenced by the people’s perception about that country’s people, its economic development (Giraldi et al., 2011: 100) and may be armed forces strength.

KFOR is a complex network organization of countries (Table 1) that share mutual objectives and engage in voluntary interactions for shared mission (Choedon, 2011: 45). Table 1 shows the positive correlation between the global status and military presence of countries in Kosovo. KFOR committing countries have relationships with Kosovo meanwhile their military entities should comply with KFOR itself strictly. So countries carry out their missions with KSF, through and under KFOR at the same time without KFOR with bilateral agreements with
Kosovo. Also, some countries in KFOR have relationships with Kosovo, including historical, geographical, economical, socioeconomic etc. which ensures country familiarity (Erdoğan, 2009: 19). Kosovo Military personnel perceive what this familiarity implies (Dauber, 2001: 209). Consequently KFOR’s image is relatively affected with KFOR member countries’ connections, or countries perceived image.

Table 1: Military Personnel Numbers of Countries in Kosovo

| STATE         | NUMBER | STATE      | NUMBER |
|---------------|--------|------------|--------|
| Albania       | 9      | Luxembourg | 22     |
| Armenia       | 35     | Morocco    | 165    |
| Austria       | 542    | Netherlands| 7      |
| Bulgaria      | 10     | Norway     | 3      |
| Canada        | 9      | Poland     | 117    |
| Croatia       | 26     | Portugal   | 150    |
| Czech Republic| 7      | Romania    | 59     |
| Denmark       | 35     | Slovenia   | 308    |
| Estonia       | 1      | Sweden     | 48     |
| Finland       | 23     | Switzerland| 213    |
| France        | 337    | Turkey     | 393    |
| Germany       | 1,249  | United Kingdom | 2 |
| Greece        | 118    | United States | 760 |
| Hungary       | 195    | Ukraine    | 136    |
| Ireland       | 12     | Total      | 5,565  |
| Italy         | 574    |            |        |

Source: NATO, “KFOR placemat” (30.11.2012), http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf (30.11.2012).

Kosovo needs significant escalation on many levels for to develop economically, politically and integrating international community. The documentation from the erstwhile allies is therefore more necessary than ever earlier. Kosovo has achieved a fresh phase in its development with a new medium term aim of integrating European institutions. European politics are changing and the Balkans will be an undeniable factor in the following few years. As a historical founder, a strong EU power, and an ally of Kosovo, it is in France’s interest to take on a strategic role in Kosovo’s European shift. An informal grouping of 5 States, the US, the UK, Germany, Italy and France have played the greatest part in the settlement of the Kosovo. Germany’s role in Kosovo has transformed from one to create peace into a state-building role intended to ensure democratization and development. Germany’s role in Kosovo, in addition to shaping its strategic importance within NATO and the EU, has spotlighted Germany as a leading figure in Kosovo and in the western Balkans. (Legal Political Studies Organization Report, 2014). At the beginning US intervened in Kosovo to stop small conflicts to “fester and spread”. Without U.S. pressure NATO would not be preparing to make war on Serbia (Bandow, 1999). UK also aimed to stabilise the region through its diplomatic work between Serbia and Kosovo through diplomacy independent of the UN and EU. While initially UK aid it was focussed at crisis management post-2000 after local capacity and institutions to tackle Kosovo’s development and
transitional needs building have become the main aim (Legal Political Studies Organization Report, 2013).

Russian policy towards Kosovo is supporting Serbia, also preventing Serbia from its power ambitions, by blocking any decision in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and blocking Kosovo as an entity (Hoxha, 2012). The Kosovo war was also important of the Balkan region’s integration with the EU which has set the western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) on the road to EU membership (Cottey, 2009: 595). During the Kosovo crisis, Turkey preferred to act in accordance with international organizations, the USA and the EU. It was added that Turkey had tried to protect its influence in Kosovo through the Turkish minority and to search for new opportunities for Turkish firms in the reconstruction of Kosovo by foreign aid programs (Eroğlu, 2005: 58). Due to its strategic geopolitical position shifting borders has left ethnic Albanians scattered across Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Greece. Albania is the main supporter of Kosovo in the international arena as The Albanians that live in Kosovo, constitute half of the number of Albanians living in Albania (Aydın and Progonati, 2011: 257-259). Croatia supports the EU policy for Kosovo and has continued to take part in international peacekeeping efforts and is currently participating in several UN peacekeeping missions (Screening report, 2007).

With the declining of tension and improvement in security, KFOR and contributing countries are not just responsible for peacekeeping and protection events, but also responsible for the training, supervision and inspection of KSF. Generally image of an organization forms by perceptions of an organization’s customers (Biçer, 2008: 47). These perceptions are formed from our emotions while they can be represented in the form of intentions/goals and strategies of the countries (Zhang, 2002). These feelings are derived from individual experiences and from the processing of information on the attributes that constitute functional indicators of the image.

Reconstructing internal security in Kosovo, success in achieving stability and rule of law as a function of initial conditions are inputs, and outputs of mission. The external image is a potent expression of public opinion (Dutton et al, 1994). Because despite the associations or relations the building of image can be improved rapidly by technological breakthroughs and achievements, or put down by failing the demands and anticipations of the various publics interacting with the states (LeBlanc and Nguyen, 1996).

**METHODOLOGY**

The purpose of this research is to study the effects of Kosovo Army personnel’s connections with the KFOR state, including military training and language domination on personal perceptions about image. This image can be
shaped by attitudes and emotions and from responses so states’ image grows out of interactions, beliefs, connections, associations, evaluations that are cognitive components of states and prolongation of states’ military. Only a moral judgment bias about foreigner military presence or state can be ethnocentrism especially toward Serbia and Serbia related states. Ethnocentrism and patriotism may be significant because of conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. On the other hand construed external image (Si and Hitt, 2004: 1371) is beliefs of members others see the organization, but functional, economic and psychological benefits provided more directly identified with the state (Lievens et al., 2007).

Image of KFOR can be measured toward the attitudes of country image. Thus the first aim of this study is evaluating of familiarity, personal association, and connections of countries with Kosovo, involvement of governments in KFOR duties and power structure and overall experienced evaluation of countries within KFOR.

The second objective is to determine the image of KFOR from the perspectives of KSF members because KSF members are directly interrelated with KFOR. The figure and type of intervening troops affect how well the new security structure can defeat and deter insurgents, patrol borders, safe roads, fight organized crime, and conduct general law enforcement functions such as election security and then success of protection roles that ensure stability directly affect the public (Wilson, 2006: 155-156). These missions are functional variables as representative of KFOR so as its image (Gavrilita, 2009).

Model application involves questionnaires from KSF members. It has two main sections. First section is about expected personal attitudes of KSF members and the second section is about measuring the KFOR image.

This paper is organized as below. In the second section, image and country image theory mentioned than the research hypotheses are developed. In the third section, sample, data source, and variables in this study are described and report results of descriptive statistics, Linear Multiple Regressions and correlation analyses are showed. In the fifth section, empirical results are represented and effects of relations between personal and countries on KFOR image are discussed. Finally, findings about theoretical contributions and managerial implications and summarize conclusions are discussed.

**IMAGE AND COUNTRY IMAGE**

Over the years, the KFOR image in the Western Balkans has shifted from peacekeeping and crisis management as the degree of familiarity about the states, accumulated observations and assessment of the organization over time and assessment of states’ relative strength over KSF towards developing partnership with and promoting the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region. Cultivating a
favorable image can help to elevate the KFOR image to enhance this; contributing states should present an ideal image.

The concept of an image is a subjective model one has of something in the world (person, organization, country, place, thing, etc.) with outside world’s overall impression or perception (Carroll, 2004; Lloyd, 2007; Marshalls, 2007; Biçer, 2008). Country image is “A mental network of affective and cognitive associations connected to the country” (Roth and Diamantopoulos, 2009). A state’s image is a strategic asset that can create competitive advantage (Biçer, 2008) by public diplomacy/political, national states identity/cultural brand and armed forces (Helmi and Mulyanegara, 2011: 36).

The image of the country has character and competency dimensions (Nadeau et al., 2008). The character has been acquired by the public depends on a lot of factors, including activities conducted by the organization (Fahlioğulları, 2009) whereas competency a brief picture of capacities directly or indirectly foundational to this organization that is the net result of the interaction of a person’s beliefs, ideas, feelings, impressions which are individual assessment of the organization’s attributes (Rose, 2006; Lloyd, 2007; Polat, 2011).

Duimering (1997), argues that one’s behavior in a particular situation is related to the subjective image the person has of the situation. Like corporate image factors that affects KFOR image are; states identity, reputation, security offering, physical equipment and instructors (LeBlanc and Nguyen, 1995: 46). Identity is associated with the distinguishing features, the reputation of a state is built through the credible actions i.e. the believability that state will carry out stated intentions, Bitner et al. (1990) report that the human interaction component has an important effect.

The opinions of people, their emotions on the country and the thoughts about it, is called country image. Country image is also part of KFOR image (Figure 1). A country’s image refers to inferential and informational representations regarding people, products, culture and national symbols of a country (Gavrilitsa, 2009; Giraldi et al., 2011: 100). KFOR has armed forces to potentially influencing the image of their country of origin because governments around the globe are taking a proactive approach to gain political influence (Gotsi et al., 2011: 255).

Country image is a concept composed of three parts. First one is “cognitive component”. The cognitive component captures the beliefs held by another country: political and social character of the country (e.g. democracy level, role in world politics; and capacities/competencies of the country or technically advanced, industrialized, economic stability). Second one is “affective component” or schemas are a cognitive component of organized prior knowledge, abstracted from experience with specific instances (Roth and Diamantopoulos, 2009: 728). Affective component captures consumers’ emotional reactions to another country
(Maher and Carter, 2011: 560); Character of the people (e.g. trustworthy, friendly and competency of the people or well educated, hardworking, industrious). The last and the third one is “conative component” (behavior-related) which is the level of interaction that people want to have with the country (Gavrilita, 2009); country and person evaluations (e.g. likeable, ideal, attractive and desired country associations or interested in immigrants from, travel to, investment from, investing in, closer ties with) (Heslop et al., 2008: 357; Lopez et al., 2011: 1608; Maher and Carter, 2011: 561, Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999).

Figure 1: Predictors of KFOR Image

In Figure 1 initial conditions develop partially from natural elements as history, natural, geographical, people, culture and national symbols which are mental representations of a country. Outcomes are also developed from external factors (inputs) as the existence and effectiveness of the security forces, financial assistance for training indigenous army; providing equipment. The duration of assistance is also important for training, equipping, and mentoring of security forces at the same time constructing and renewing infrastructure. Yields may also include difficult to quantify factors such as institutional development of armed forces and reform of security ministries. However, place promoters and policy makers can review geopolitics; regulations etc. and manage the information sources (media) which could significantly improve the image of a given destination (Marshalls, 2007).

In KFOR, countries’ connections with Kosovo, including economics and social connections develop its image because individuals are biased to interactions with those countries which is consistent with self-views of them (Palma et al., 2012: 116).

But KFOR is a military organization so military connections and interactions can affect the development of that image.
To understand how the contribution of KFOR member countries’ image affected, the factors below are surveyed:

- Personnel familiarity of members of KSF with KFOR members,
- Personnel connection of KSF members with KFOR countries’ personnel,
- Perceived Kosovo connection with other KFOR countries by KSF members,
- Approval of KFOR members involvement with mission,
- Overall rating of approval of KFOR countries by KSF members
- Last KFOR’s perceived image by KSF members.

The research will also seek testimonials to the following hypotheses (Figure 1):

Hypotheses 1: KFOR member countries “connections” with Kosovo army affect KFOR image,

Hypotheses 2: Kosovo army members’ “personnel connection” with KFOR member countries affect KFOR image,

Hypotheses 3: KFOR member countries “perceived mission success” has effect on KFOR image.

FIELD STUDY

The fieldwork proceeded in the following manner, the questionnaire evolved from Sungun (2005) and Lloyd (2007). In the questionnaire of Lloyd (2007) there are nine components (performance, financial performance, products/services, management, leadership, corporate leadership, ethical management and leadership, identity, image, corporate brand) that financial, product and performance are directly related to corporate instead of country image. Also Sungun (2005) communication behaviors of publics, familiarity, organization-public relationship outcomes, and organization-public relationship types supported with scales to measure personal experience, familiarity and level of involvement. So both factors that sought to measure the perceived image of a country from a personal point of view. It was in English then translated to Albanian and again translated to English to refine the aimed jargon and then last time corrected in Albanian translation. It is structured in three main sections. The first section has five sub-sections; which are measuring the KFOR countries’ connections and perceived images. Second section measure KFOR’s image and last section consist demographic characteristics. Questions were asked to analyze country familiarity, personal connection with the country, Kosovo connection with the nations, the KFOR mission success of countries, an overall analysis of
countries. 11 questions were asked to measure the NATO image dimensions within KSF and totally five questions. In each question participants assessed the 30 countries with Likert 5 scale.

The research was conducted within the Kosovo Security Forces. The questionnaire forms were distributed to a total of 60 people (officers) because officers have higher rate of training outside the Kosovo by bilateral military agreements that can affect personal bias more than other members; 33 of them were collected back with a response rate of 53%. Kosovo Security force has approximately 2200 personnel (NATO news) but bases largely dispersed and homogenous, so stratified random sampling used depending on location and department. Some bases are at the drilling and one is near Serbia border that officers are 24/7 engaged so KSF military bases were near Pristina (capital) were involved in research. Even though small sample sizes can cause Type II errors, the sample size can be less than 346 with finite populations of less than about 250,000. A process of sampling in which groups of interest (here officers) are identified, then participants are selected at random from these groups (Beins and McCarthy, 2012: 97). Within that stratified group participants were chosen for multi stage sampling’ designs chosen from probability sampling types (Howitt and Cramer, 2011). So 60 officers were chosen from military bases because they are the representatives of their army and have more training relations with the KFOR members.

The data were analyzed using 20.0 versions of IBM SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) computer program. The statistical analysis methods used in the study are frequency analysis, normality analysis, reliability analysis, validity, factor analysis, and linear multi regression analysis. Descriptive analysis-frequency analyses were used to describe the demographic structure; other analyses mentioned latter are used to test the hypotheses of the study.

Demographic Characteristics

KSF has a policy which must be consistent with Europe that at least 15% of army should be females. As it can be seen from the Table 2 participants were also chosen regarding to that policy. So 75% is male and 25% is female officers.

| Valid | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Male  | 24        | 72.7    | 75.0          | 75.0               |
| Female| 8         | 24.2    | 25.0          | 100.0              |
| Total | 32        | 97.0    | 100.0         |                    |
| Missing| System | 1       | 3.0           |                    |
| Total | 33        | 100.0   |               |                    |

Age groups of participant also differs cause of some soldiers are coming from old Kosovo resistance groups and some participant are recruited directly from military academy of Kosovo Defense Ministry (Table 3). There are 33 participants of 32 participants are valid and 1 is missing.
As a result of war zone country Kosovo security forces officers were also have resistance past against Serbia so these highly experienced but not militarily trained people recruited in KSF. That is why almost 80% of ages are among 36-45 age category.

Table 3: Age Groups

| Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Less than 25 | 4 | 12.1 | 12.1 | 12.1 |
| Between 26 and 35 | 12 | 36.4 | 37.5 | 50.0 |
| Between 36 and 45 | 10 | 30.3 | 31.3 | 81.3 |
| Between 46 and 55 | 6 | 18.2 | 18.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 32 | 97.0 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | System | 1 | 3.0 | |
| Total | 33 | 100.0 | | |

KSF is highly educated personnel force. As it can be seen from Table 4 nearly 70% of personnel are university or higher graduates but also 28% is high school graduate.

Table 4: Level of Education

| Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| High School or less | 9 | 27.3 | 28.1 | 28.1 |
| University | 20 | 60.6 | 62.5 | 90.6 |
| Masters | 3 | 9.1 | 9.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 32 | 97.0 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | System | 1 | 3.0 | |
| Total | 33 | 100.0 | | |

Results and Discussion

Reliability analysis is conducted for the questionnaire and the Cronbach’s Alpha is .930, so the reliability of all the question groups is high and convenient. All the questions are assumed to be reliable. Validity establishes a domain in which the study’s findings can be generalized this study’s inter item correlations are high so it can be said that validity of the questionnaire is acceptable so research relies on statistical generalization (Ratnasingam, 2001).

Linear Multiple Regressions for KFOR Mission Assessment

The Linear Regression procedure examines the relationship between a dependent variable and a set of independent variables. To see the connected variables to the independent variable linear regression test is conducted.
Table 5: Regression Coefficients

| Model                        | Unstandardized Coefficients | Standardized Coefficients | t     | Sig.  |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-------|
| (Constant)                   | .418                        | .220                      | 1.899 | .069  |
| Country_Familiarity          | -2.26                       | .122                      | -.442 | -1.852|.075  |
| Personnel connection        | .006                        | .005                      | .277  | 1.165 | .254  |
| Kosovo connection           | .001                        | .004                      | .037  | 2.10  | .035  |
| KFOR Mission Impact         | .148                        | .106                      | .269  | 1.397 | .174  |
| OVERALL                     | .010                        | .006                      | .304  | 1.694 | .102  |

a. Dependent Variable: KFOR IMAGE

The Regression Model Summary (Table 5) shows that the multiple correlation coefficient (R), using all the predictors simultaneously, is .44. Meaning that 44% variance in “NATO/KFOR image” can be explained by the predictors Personnel connection, Kosovo connection, KFOR mission impact, country Familiarity total (combined). Standardized coefficients show the explanation percentage of dependent variable here KFOR image by other independent variables. In a cross-sectional design, the relationships between variables to be small and a correlation of about .40 would be considered quite a promising trend by many researchers can be expected (Howitt and Cramer, 2011). A positive correlation is expected between the KFOR’s image and nation states’ perceived mission success or mission impact even if cause-and-effect relationship between the two variables may not be expected (Gravetter and Wallnau, 2011).

To determine the vector of relations between variables correlations must be calculated. To do that correlation table was evaluated using SPSS.

Table 6: Correlation Table

|                  | COUNTRY FAMILIARITY | PERSONNEL CONNECTION | KOSOVO CONNECTION | KFOR MISSION IMPACT | KFOR ASSESSMENT |
|------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| COUNTRY FAMILIARITY |                    |                      |                   |                    |                 |
| Pearson Correlation | 1.00                | .606**              | .058              | .168               | -.210           |
| Sig. (1-tailed)     | .000                | .375                | .179              | .124               |                 |
| N                  | 33                  | 33                   | 32                | 32                 | 32              |
| PERSONNEL CONNECTION |                    |                      |                   |                    |                 |
| Pearson Correlation | .606**              | 1                    | .084              | -.152              | -.038           |
| Sig. (1-tailed)     | .000                | .323                | .203              | .418               |                 |
| N                  | 33                  | 33                   | 32                | 32                 | 32              |
| KOSOVO CONNECTION   |                    |                      |                   |                    |                 |
| Pearson Correlation | .058                | .084                | 1                 | -.084              | .004            |
| Sig. (1-tailed)     | .375                | .323                | .324              | .491               |                 |
| N                  | 32                  | 32                   | 32                | 32                 | 32              |
| KFOR MISSION IMPACT |                    |                      |                   |                    |                 |
| Pearson Correlation | .168                | -.152               | -.084             | 1                  | .417            |
| Sig. (1-tailed)     | .179                | .203                | .324              | .061               |                 |
| N                  | 32                  | 32                   | 32                | 32                 | 32              |
| KFOR IMAGE          |                    |                      |                   |                    |                 |
| Pearson Correlation | -.210               | -.038               | .004              | .417               | 1               |
| Sig. (1-tailed)     | .124                | .418                | .491              | .061               |                 |
| N                  | 32                  | 32                   | 32                | 32                 | 32              |

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
Correlation table (Table 6) shows that there is a positive and strong connection between “personnel connection” and “country familiarity” (.606). So if the country awareness is high, than personnel connection attitude is high. Country familiarity is coming from either emotion based factors (Heslop et al., 2008: 357) or countries’ military engagement with the KSF and their success that country familiarity has a positive effect and correlation with the KFOR assessments. So due to the correlation table Hypotheses 2 (KSF members’ “personnel connection” with KFOR member nation states positively effect KFOR image,) accepted. But Table 6 also shows that H₁ and H₃ are rejected because relations are not significant and Sig. values are higher than 0.01.

Factor Analysis

Factor analysis is generally used on a series of survey questions to interpret the underlying issues and how these issues may be related. The component matrix correlates an individual variable with a particular factor, where highest correlation numbers are grouped together. In this analysis variables are countries and the questionnaire was about the countries’ perceived image by KSF members. Factor analysis is needed in order to understand the differences in perception among KSF countries and to divide them in subgroups.

The set of items may have a number of minor dimensions-subscapes assume that one dominant dimension explains the underlying structure. Scale unidimensionality can be evaluated by performing an item-level factor analysis (Presser et al., 2004) to consider dividing the scale into subscales.

As it can be seen from Table 7 factor loadings (correlation numbers) formed in accordance with the country’s military involvement with Kosovo Security Force. This means military training activities, more military personnel interactions if the country has more military personnel or military supply recruitment. For countries from Norway to Croatia the highest correlation was with the first component so they grouped together and shaded grey in Table 7. The second group of countries from Greece to Hungary are shaded with the color light grey and they have the highest correlation for the second component and other countries formed the factors are mentioned with different color shades.
Factors (countries grouped) are formed accordance with the countries’ image that KSF members may differentiate (Gavrilita, 2009). This means that countries seen related either within or with Kosovo on the same expectations formed the factor groups.

Table 7: Factor Analysis

| Rotated Component Matrix* | Component |
|---------------------------|-----------|
|                           | 1         | 2         | 3         | 4         | 5         | 6         | 7         | 8         |
| Norway_KMI                | .860      | .102      | .021      | .257      | -.180     | .095      | .082      | .066      |
| Luxembourg_KMI            | .803      | .012      | .287      | -.061     | .144      | -.055     | -.029     | -.133     |
| Netherlands_KMI           | .791      | .381      | -.042     | -.037     | -.074     | .056      | .014      | .067      |
| Belgium_KMI               | .788      | .296      | -.202     | .120      | .138      | .083      | -.157     | .153      |
| Denmark_KMI               | .780      | .073      | -.141     | .161      | .079      | .058      | -.450     | .107      |
| Canada_KMI                | .764      | .235      | -.040     | .089      | .010      | -.088     | -.237     | .041      |
| Poland_KMI                | .644      | .210      | .523      | .037      | .052      | -.182     | .226      | -.065     |
| Iceland_KMI               | .640      | .392      | .196      | .148      | .051      | .298      | .072      | -.088     |
| Croatia_KMI               | .516      | .435      | -.275     | .152      | .333      | .081      | -.071     | -.108     |
| Greece_KMI                | .173      | .802      | .150      | -.075     | -.055     | .146      | .071      | -.151     |
| Bulgaria_KMI              | .363      | .635      | .250      | -.040     | .240      | -.164     | .011      | .215      |
| Latvia_KMI                | .409      | .630      | .299      | .053      | .421      | -.032     | .019      | .167      |
| Lithuania_KMI             | .511      | .599      | .060      | .144      | .203      | -.154     | .052      | .263      |
| Hungary_KMI               | .422      | .572      | -.186     | .029      | .050      | .328      | .159      | .179      |
| Slovakia_KMI              | -.008     | .203      | .814      | .001      | .024      | .017      | -.026     | .016      |
| Romania_KMI               | -.287     | .312      | .804      | .064      | .010      | .006      | .164      | -.174     |
| Portugal_KMI              | .465      | -.188     | .691      | .096      | .149      | .103      | -.003     | -.044     |
| Germany_KMI               | .058      | -.046     | .154      | .874      | .009      | -.079     | .081      | -.018     |
| Slovenia_KMI              | -.051     | -.247     | .104      | .783      | .028      | .111      | -.097     | .341      |
| Italy_KMI                 | .178      | .493      | -.166     | .686      | -.117     | .088      | -.146     | -.141     |
| France_KMI                | .256      | .281      | -.158     | .627      | .311      | -.101     | -.047     | -.352     |
| Albania_KMI               | -.075     | .062      | .107      | .015      | .889      | .071      | -.040     | .078      |
| CzechRepublic_KMI         | .395      | .337      | -.095     | .045      | .478      | -.183     | .206      | .178      |
| USA_KMI                   | .016      | .100      | -.083     | -.072     | -.107     | .862      | -.009     | -.029     |
| UK_KMI                    | .098      | -.076     | .211      | .138      | .415      | .676      | .278      | .066      |
| Turkey_KMI                | -.034     | .108      | .095      | -.090     | .007      | .118      | .830      | -.110     |
| Spain_KMI                 | .001      | -.037     | .315      | -.008     | -.215     | -.037     | .233      | -.750     |
| Estonia_KMI               | .330      | .487      | .242      | .039      | -.044     | -.098     | .288      | .587      |

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 25 iterations.

The country image model consists of not only attitudes toward the offending country and its people (Heslop et al., 2008: 355) but also personnel attitudes in this case. Rotated Component Matrix factors are not formed by randomly. From the correlation table we know that personnel connection has an effect on image so these factors grouped from different types of experiences and contacts with the countries. If we look at the bases of these experiences and contacts:

- Kosovo army is using large amount of France and the United States army equipment and maintenance material for that equipment including uniforms and arsenal. So Kosovo army soldiers have been more familiar with these countries.
material. Also officer cadets are graduated synchronously from military school and American University of Kosovo.

- Kosovo Security Force has been using Albanian army training manuals as reference publications and Albanian language.

- Germany, Italy and France have command responsibility in higher echelon of KFOR and Slovenia has military bounds and trained in same military culture of Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

- Turkey also has been training KSF more since the beginning of war and also has started Turkish language course within the KSF for the aim of training KSF members in Turkey.

- Greece, Bulgaria, Latvia and Hungary have both cultural and historic bonds to the Serbian people, found it very difficult to maintain a balanced policy in relation to supporting NATO's military intervention against Yugoslavia (Tsounarou, 2007) so these countries may be formed a group within the same factor. Their image in KFOR is not regarded same with other countries even though their military have been contributing to KFOR.

- Norway, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Canada, Poland, Iceland and Croatia are the least participant states in military sense. They have mostly 2-5 military personnel in KFOR HQ staff. Also these countries have least economic relations with Kosovo.

Lastly seen that countries that have continuing duty responsibilities- connected with the military assets and bases ratio- have formed the main factors. Image is being built; by strong action, by giving help or advice, by controlling someone; not by action that produces or produced emotion in others as stated by Gibson et al. (2012). It can be seen that not only high scales of military participation but also continuous and profound military intervention have effect on factor table (e.g. Albania and Slovenia have less troop numbers but deep military intervention but U.S. and France have far more bigger troop number contribution).

Although various informational signals emanate from the countries: information about countries’ structural positions within KFOR and with KSF, specific signals indicating performance and mission success, institutional signals indicating conformity to social norms of KSF members: strategy signals indicating strategic postures (Lloyd, 2007; Duarte, 2011) may be assumed that performance of countries or the initial contributions are effecting the image.

CONCLUSIONS

KFOR has a role of preserving the peace and security, and providing defense for Kosovo. KFOR has been accomplishing these by organization of participant nation-states’ military assets. KFOR is a big organization of countries
so nevertheless in KFOR, supporting the national policies and implementing the national states objectives embedded. It is also important to remember that any country responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the Kosovo and KFOR because country image may relate to long-term factors like international conflicts or economic responses. That is why emotional components have an effect on KFOR image.

There have been researches about how country of origin effects country image (Maher and Carter, 2011; Souiden et al., 2011; Nayir and Durmuşoğlu, 2008; Heslop et al., 2008; Lopez and Andriopoulos, 2011; Bozbay, 2007; Giraldi et al., 2011; Saydan, 2013) but there may be few research to date how armed forces and their perceived mission success affects country image. To examine these issues, empirical research is done by Kosovo Security Forces personal's perceptions of KFOR image. For this officers are chosen as sample group because they have more concurrent quality and specialties also they are the leaders of their groups. For this reason 60 officers picked up by stratified random sampling depend on military bases locations and occupations. To understand the statistical relations if any first Linear Regression procedure was done than correlations are computed to understand the direction and power of regressions. Also to see the related countries more clearly factor analysis is conducted as mentioned in literature part factors formed by perceived image of KSF personnel.

According to the regression table country familiarity, mission success of countries and personnel connections explained almost fifty percent of perceived image.

As tried to study above; historical, economical or geographical connection(s) of countries with the host country don't have significant effect on the image of the main organization. Even though there are different sizes of occupations of countries in Kosovo they have no significant effect on perceived image.

It can be surmised that personnel connections with the KFOR countries have impact on KFOR. Accomplishment and especially endeavoring subscriptions of KFOR member countries may affect personnel perception so the image. Also military culture transfer comes within military training or military doctrines. It can be said that not only scale military participation but also intensive military intervention affects the perceived image. At the same time countries which have negative political issues with Kosovo don't have significant military assets and role in KFOR -and in KSF- although they are contributing to KFOR with very limited personnel support. Instructing and helping the KSF military personnel at the same time large scale of military equipment providing affecting the perception of KSF members' perception about image of KFOR because these efforts transfer military culture and align the wave length of doing in military way reciprocally.
Hypotheses 1: KFOR member countries “connections” with KSF affect KFOR image.  \textbf{Rejected}

Hypotheses 2: Kosovo army members’ “personnel connection” with KFOR member countries affect KFOR image.  \textbf{Accepted}

Hypotheses 3: KFOR member countries “perceived mission success” has effect on KFOR image.  \textbf{Rejected}

So for the future studies; if organizations or countries try to have a positive image they have to persuade that their presence or entity can add value and success to their host countries or organizations. This can be done in military terms by training, heightened presence, initial contribution and percentage of using military doctrines which can yield the transfer of military culture.

This work has also constraints that have to be explored in more details. First military formations are highly homogeneous groups that variances may change in multinational companies. Second training has more sense in military than in civilian that not only education is given, but also shoulder to shoulder battle is performed so this kind of training make more binding relations which may bias expectations of trainees. Third only officers are chosen for the stratified sampling that other members’ expectations may be varying. In the future research, effects of training programs and trainer should be analyzed to find out how not just only training but also transfers the culture. Also, our variances could able to explain only approximately 50% of image to find out other important variables that may affect image should be researched by exploratory analysis.

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