Exploring the landscapes of “computing”: digital, neuromorphic, unconventional — and beyond

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Abstract

The acceleration race of digital computing technologies seems to be steering toward impasses — technological, economical and environmental — a condition that has spurred research efforts in alternative, “neuromorphic” (brain-like) computing technologies. Furthermore, since decades the idea of exploiting nonlinear physical phenomena “directly” for non-digital computing has been explored under names like “unconventional computing”, “natural computing”, “physical computing”, or “in-materio computing”. This has been taking place in niches which are small compared to other sectors of computer science. In this paper I stake out the grounds of how a general concept of “computing” can be developed which comprises digital, neuromorphic, unconventional and possible future “computing” paradigms. The main contribution of this paper is a wide-scope survey of existing formal conceptualizations of “computing”. The survey inspects approaches rooted in three different kinds of background mathematics: discrete-symbolic formalisms, probabilistic modeling, and dynamical-systems oriented views. It turns out that different choices of background mathematics lead to decisively different understandings of what “computing” is. Across all of this diversity, a unifying coordinate system for theorizing about “computing” can be distilled. Within these coordinates I locate anchor points for a foundational formal theory of a future computing-engineering discipline that includes, but will reach beyond, digital and neuromorphic computing.

1 Introduction: why this is a good time to rethink “computing”

Our modern societies thrive on, and are fundamentally shaped by, digital computing (DC) technologies. There are a number of reasons why DC could grow into this majestic role:

**Universality.** Every information processing task that can be specified in a formal (first-order logic) description can be solved by a digital computer program. This is so because digital computers can emulate Turing machines and Turing machines can realize general theorem provers [Jaeger2019a].
Transistors and wires. In mathematical abstraction, digital computing reduces to reading and writing 0’s and 1’s from and into hierarchical data structures. It is fully understood how this translates into transistor-and-wire based digital hardware architectures, and the corresponding microchip design and manufacturing technologies have reached astounding degrees of perfection.

Ease of use. A hierarchy of mutually cross-compilable programming languages — from hardware-specific assembler coding to graphical user interfaces for office software — allows users on all levels of expertise to exploit the potentials of digital computers.

Computing—cognition match. There is a prestabilized harmony between rational human reasoning and digital computing. A direct line of intellectual inquiry leads from Aristotle’s syllogistic rules of reasoning through Leibniz, Boole, Frege and the early 20th century logicians to Turing who in his groundbreaking paper (Turing 1936) still spoke of “computers” as humans and of the physical states of a computing system as states of mind. Writing computer programs is just an exercise in clear “logical” thinking.

Unified theory. There is a unified, standardized body of DC theory, comprising automata theory, formal languages, the theory of computability and complexity, Boolean and first-order logic. This is documented in canonical textbooks and taught to computer science students in all universities in the same way, providing a conceptual and terminological common ground for a worldwide community of DC professionals.

In view of this intellectual transparency and practical empowerment, it is understandable that today “computing” is largely identified with digital computing (= “symbolic” computing, = Turing computability, = running “algorithms”).

But progress rates of DC technologies are slowing down and seem to approach serious impasses:

Energy footprint. A widely recited estimate (Andrae and Edler 2015) claims that about 10% of the world’s energy budget is due to DC technologies, with still exponentially rising rates.

Miniaturization. Thermal and quantum noise and exploding investment costs for microchip fabrication may (or might not? see Murmann and Hoeflinger (2020)) prevent further downscaling of transistors in commercial microchip production — the “End of Moore’s law” (Waldrop 2016).

Toxic waste. Hardware replacement cycles are ever speeding up. Electronic waste “is now the fastest-growing waste stream in the world” (Zhao et al. 2019).

Software complexity. Software products are ever growing in size and complexity, perpetuating the software crisis since it was first acknowledged in the mid-1960s (Ebert 2018). Given that critical segments of our modern world become permeated by complex software systems, we may be in for ruptures of societal functionality.

Such boundary conditions have led to a surge of explorations in “brain-like”, neuromorphic computing (NC) technologies. “Learning from the brain” seems a promising route toward escaping from some of the DC impasses:

Energy efficiency. Brains need only a minute fraction of the energy consumed by digital supercomputers for “cognitive” tasks (Boahen 2017).
Unclocked parallelism. The inherent, complete parallelism of the brain’s in-memory computing (Ielmini and Wong, 2018) stands in stark contrast to the serial processing in DC systems where only a fraction of all available transistors are active at any time (Peláez, 1990).

Cognitive-style computing. Artificial neural networks (ANNs) operate in ways that seem akin to human cognitive processing. Besides the fundamental fact that ANNs are not programmed but trained, they can, for instance, generate striking visual art (Olah et al., 2017) or win against human world champions in the most cognitively demanding games (Silver et al., 2016; Berner et al., 2019).

Robustness and adaptability. Biological brains cope well individual neuron death and even extensive lesions. Their cognitive processing adapts to changing contexts, from reliable object recognition in fast-changing lighting conditions to lifelong learning. While machine learning has only begun to understand such physical and functional robustness (Saunders et al., 2019; He et al., 2019a; Zhang et al., 2019), brains are living proof that the hardware and functional brittleness of DC systems can be overcome.

Investigating neural networks has a long tradition and the field has gone through hypes in the past — the most famous one unleashed by the invention of the Perceptron (New York Times, 1958), followed by a less spectacular one around 1990 when the backpropagation algorithm made the training of (not too deep) multilayer feedforward networks broadly applicable. There are however indications that the current flush of interest in NC has sustainable foundations:

The deep learning revolution (ACM, 2018) has manifested the powers of artificial neural information processing to scientists, decision-makers and the general public alike.

Large-scale digital neuromorphic microchips, developed by the leading microchip manufacturing companies, emulate neural spiking for low-energy implementations of neural networks (Merolla and et al., 2014; Davies and et al., 2018; Neckar et al., 2019). This appears as a visible proof of the economical potential of MC.

Neuro-inspired algorithms (Lukosz, 2009; Frémaux and Gerstner, 2016) have been deployed on (partially) non-digital hardware (Indiveri and Liu, 2015; Yousefi, 2018; Tanaka and et al., 2019; Neckar et al., 2019).

Artificial neural retina and cochlear implants partially restore vision and hearing (Chuang et al., 2014; Lenarz, 2017).

Spiking neural camera sensor chips with integrated neural processing yield ultrafast computer vision (Gallego et al., 2020).

A neuro-optical internet communication link prototype is entirely passive and needs no external energy supply (Freiberger et al., 2017).

The advent of memristors in NC microchips (Yang et al., 2013) has spurred material scientists to explore a wide range of physical nanoscale phenomena for computational exploits (Coulombe et al., 2017; Torrejon et al., 2017; Prychynenko et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2020; Mirigliano et al., 2020; Prucnal et al., 2020).
However, the neurosciences do not yet provide readily implementable blueprints for engineering computing systems. How the brain “computes” is understood only in fragments. Foundational questions remain debated. For example, it is not settled how “symbols” or “concepts” (addressable, stable representational entities) emerge from neural dynamics (Gross, 2002; Durstewitz et al., 2000; Baddeley, 2003; Lins and Schöner, 2014; Jaeger, 2017; Besold et al., 2017; Wernecke et al., 2018); how several such entities are coupled into composite entities (Buzsáki and Chrobak, 1995; Slotine and Lohmiller, 2001; Legenstein et al., 2016); how information streams can be dynamically routed in a brain (Olshausen et al., 1993; Hoerzer et al., 2014; Sabour et al., 2017); or how and in what sense “information” is encoded in neural dynamics (Gerstner et al., 1997; Panzeri et al., 2017).

Stepping back from the daunting complexity of concrete biological brains, one may ask a meta question which only at first sight looks naive: how could Nature ever “invent” such magnificent systems? — For eons, biological evolution has been discovering, differentiating, optimizing and cross-coupling myriads of different biochemical, electrophysiological and anatomical phenomena, integrating them into that supremely adaptive, robust and balanced physical system that we carry in our heads. The structural, dynamical and functional complexity of this system’s organization spans many orders of magnitude of spatial and temporal scales. Yet, throughout this breathtaking complexity, there is one grand unifying boundary condition: whatever phenomenon is exploited in a brain, it arises from the biochemistry and electrophysics of wet, soft biological tissue. Biological brains must use only that which is physically possible in a biological substrate — and they positively do use that.

Current artificial NC microsystems are, and future ones likely will be, manufactured from more enduring materials. Furthermore, engineers are already active to exploit physical effects that cannot occur in biological tissue, for instance optical, ferroic, skyrmionic, or even micromechanical effects (Prucnal et al., 2020; Everhardt et al., 2019; Leonov and Mostovoy, 2015; Coulombe et al., 2017).

If (i) a grand lesson to learn from Nature’s brains is to exploit just everything which the available physical substrate offers, and if (ii) future hardware substrates will differ substantially from biological tissue, then it makes all sense to considerably widen the neuromorphic computing agenda, exploring how whatever physical phenomena in whatever material can be harnessed for “computing”.

Exploiting “the physics of the materials directly” (Zauner, 2003) is absolutely not a new idea (Zauner, 2005; European Commission Author Collective, 2009; Stepney and Hickinbotham, 2018; Horsman et al., 2017; Adamatzky, 2017a; Stepney et al., 2018). This theme has been investigated for decades from different angles under a diversity of namings — for instance unconventional, natural, emergent, physical, in-materio computing, — sometimes evoking a strong echo like DNA computing (van Noort et al., 2002), sometimes rather restricted to an academic niche like computing with fungi (Adamatzky, 2018). A variety of classification schemes have been proposed (Harnad, 1994; de Castro, 2006; Burgin and Dodig-Crnković, 2013; Stepney, 2017) for approaches in the unconventional computing (UC) research landscape. However, a unifying theoretical framework does not yet exist. Stepney and Hickinbotham (2018) list a number of existing mathematical formalisms that are tailored to specific subsets of material phenomena or computational functionalities, and otherwise remark that an “over-reaching formalism ... may be desirable”. Even when the understanding of “computing” is confined to the digital-symbolic paradigm, a general theory of computing in non-digital substrates is desired but missing (Horsman et al., 2017).

To avoid misunderstandings I point out three things that I do not think of when I speak of
exploiting physics directly. First, I am not concerned with pancomputationalism where formal concepts from symbolic computing are invoked to describe and explain the physical world (Lloyd 2013). Second, I am not dealing with physics of computation, a field that explores the physical boundary conditions of digital computing (Wolpert 2015). While these researches give inspirations for mathematical formalizations of complex, self-organizing, physical pattern formation (Zuse 1982; Wolfram 2002; Fredkin 2013), one must be aware that these traditions are immersed in the DC understanding of “computing” as discrete symbol manipulation processes. Finally, I see the wider fields of unconventional computing as hardly intersecting with quantum computing, which has already matured into a discipline of its own standing.

Let me summarize all these observations, adding my personal opinion:

1. The DC paradigm and the technologies arising from it define the standards, formal models, intuitions and expectations that shape our concept of “computing”. Only recently, flattening rates of progress and growing environmental and societal concerns have prepared the grounds for substantial investments into alternative paradigms of “computing”.

2. Neuromorphic computing is currently the most energetically investigated alternative route to “computing”. However, despite manifold promising initial achievements, swift and broad progress is hampered by a fragmentation of the field and the absence of a unifying theoretical foundation.

3. While NC is guided by the “learning from the brain” rationale, there is a long history of propositions to establish unconventional computing paradigms which shortcut the brain role model and aim at exploiting whatever physics can offer directly. Like in the case of NC, a formal theoretical foundation for UC is missing.

In this situation I venture a rather daring hypothesis:

- It is possible to generalize the theory of symbolic computing, by
  - generalizing from the physical switchable bi-stability of digital transistors to a much wider class of modulatable dynamical modes of novel nonlinear devices, and
  - generalizing from the 0 - 1 (or true - false) symbolic abstraction of physical bi-stability to a suitable qualitative abstraction of modal nonlinear dynamics,

leading to the development of a unified and comprehensive theory for modal computing (MC) which

- enables the principled exploitation of novel, non-digital nonlinear materials and devices for “computing”,
- contains DC as a special case,
- offers a basic perspective to analyse biological neural dynamics and design MC hardware, circuits and architectures, and
- unifies existing UC approaches.

As one may suspect, I cannot presently offer a worked-out definition of dynamical modes or their qualitative abstraction. Nonlinear dynamical systems can exhibit an unlimited richness of
behavioral" (Abraham and Shaw, 1992) phenomena, and the question which of them should be focused and how they should be qualitatively characterized is, at this time, a question unanswered. In another paper (in preparation) I attempt to develop intuitions and starting ideas for approaching this question.

Here I want to investigate a broader, non-mathematical, real-world question which also needs to be well understood if one wishes to establish a generalized engineering science of “computing”.

The powers of the DC paradigm do not emerge from a single, closed formal theory. Besides the model and theory of Turing machines which could be (mis)taken as “the” fundamental theory of DC, there are other formalisms, models and theories that are just as essential for the real-life manifestations of DC. They include the theories of automata, formal grammars and languages, programming languages and compiler design, computability and complexity theory, Boolean and first-order logic, and metalogical frameworks. Only the totality of these formalisms, models and theories instruments the real-world concerto of professional DC activities, from device engineering to microchip fabrication technologies, from circuit design to computer architectures and communication networks, from programming language development to human-computer interfacing, from databases to internet services, from beginners’ programming exercises to software engineering and use-case specification frameworks, and all the rest.

One of the challenges faced by NC is that such a comprehensive theories (plural) ecosystem needs a longer time to grow than this young field so far has had. As a consequence, large and always renewed ad-hoc efforts are still needed to transfer any single novel NC technique from lab A to lab B, let alone to a wider user community. Our own experiences in this regard shine through every line of our project report in He et al. (2019b). High-investment efforts to define systematic multi-level workflows in the NC domain (Zhang et al., 2020) demonstrate that there is an urgent demand to meet.

The efforts of Zhang et al. (2020) and theoretical work in the UC domain (Horsman et al., 2017) are still embedded in the original DC conception of “computing” as executing “algorithms”, which upon a finite input run a finite time — during which they are decoupled from input — and return a finite output. I believe that a generalization from digital to modal computing will have to include online processing scenarios. A prime reason for this belief is that this is the principal mode of operation for biological brains. A second reason lies in the nature of dynamical modes, which likely will turn out to be often transient and entrained to a stream of input signals. Another important difference between DC and MC is that digital computers can be programmed, whereas it may turn out that most MC systems need to be trained. Yet another difference is that DC microchips come in functionally identical copies, while MC hardware systems will not always be identically reproducible due to device mismatch. They might require individual training, leading to individual use life histories. All of this will make an MC theory ecosystem look and function profoundly different from what we know from DC.

The question that I address in the remainder of this article: what sorts of sub-theories and models are needed for any full-fledged engineering discipline so that it can claim to be a “computing” discipline?

2 Staking out the “computing” landscape

In order to reveal options for possible answers to this question, I will try to work out universals and essentials across several existing “computing” paradigms besides DC, including views from
NC and UC.

This is a very long section. At the end I provide a summary (Section 2.3) which should be more or less self-contained, such that readers can directly jump forward to it.

2.1 Approach

Figure 1 shows the main conceptual components that I want to explore in some detail and to relate to each other. I want to dissect the physical reality (bottom half of figure) into the computing hardware systems ($\alpha$) and the physical environment ($\gamma$) they are embedded in and in which they should serve some purpose. The interface boundary ($\beta$) between these two comprises the physical signals that are exchanged between the computing systems and their environment. These three segments of physical reality are mirrored in the non-physical domain of mathematical abstraction by corresponding formal representations of the physical computing system, providing information processing models (a), input / output (I/O) data models (b), and formal models of outward physical realities (c). Figure 1 fills each of these six component boxes with a number of suggestive examples.

Given a specific computing system with its environment and/or the formal models thereof, it is a matter of convention where the boundary interface is put. For instance, when discussing human brains, the visual sensory input signal boundary could be placed at the interaction between photons and photoreactive receptor molecules inside retinal photocells, or it could be assigned to the spike trains sent through the optical nerve.

One of the questions that must be implicitly or explicitly answered by any MC theory is what makes a MC system “compute”. The classical answer, which is also employed in all accounts of unconventional computing that I am aware of, is to define “computing” in the footsteps of DC. This conceptualization involves several steps, namely first encoding computational “tasks” into a formal input, which is then physically entered into a physical computing system (a step that passes the modeling mirror between abstract formalism and physical reality and involves unformalizable pragmatics), then let the physical system physically evolve until some physically observable halting condition is met, then read off the physical system’s state into a formal output (again, this step crosses the modeling mirror and involves pragmatics), then decode the output into the task’s solution. I do not think that this view of “computing” is suitable for MC, one reason being that biological brains (which an MC theory should cover as special cases) operate in a continuous temporal input-to-action interaction with the environment which is quite different from the time-decoupled single-input-to-single-output transformation functionality expressed in the classical view. I believe that brain-like (or more generally, many modal computing) systems will often be operating in a modality where they are entrained to a driving input stream. This is different from DC accounts of online processing, where the processing system is executing a series of “tasks” fast enough to stay on track with the incoming processing demands, like in the model of interactive Turing machines [van Leeuwen and Wiedermann 2001]. During the computational operations needed to solve the individual tasks however the processing machine decouples itself from incoming input. A more general view of “computing” is needed which natively covers entrained input stream processing.

While I cannot give a complete set of necessary and sufficient conditions, I think that the following four are necessary and quite informative for a physical system to be called “computing” in an defendable way:
1. “computing” requires a temporal evolution of the system that computes — this is why the temporal arrows are so prominent in the figure;

2. “computing” involves that “information” feeds into, and comes out of the computing system: computing systems must be open systems — this is why I devote a special conceptual place ($\beta$) to the interface boundary between the computing system and its environment;

3. “computing” operations going on in a computing system should be cognitively interpretable, being relatable to some aspect of human cognition — this is the heritage of the history from Aristotle to Turing (not pictured in Figure 1);

4. “computing” is meaningful, that is, some semantic account of “what” is computed should be possible — indicated in the figure by the two semantics arrows (to be detailed below).

A formal theory needs a mathematical language to be expressed. What mathematical language is used is often tied to the primary disciplinary background of the modeler. Researchers with a background in computer science or AI tend toward discrete-algebraic and logic-based formalisms; cognitive scientists may prefer probabilistic (Bayesian) frameworks; physicists tend toward dynamical systems based modeling languages. These are marked L, P, D (for Logic,
Probability, Dynamical systems) in Figure 1. The adopted background mathematics determines which phenomena can be modeled and which not. The chosen background mathematics often reflects a deep-rooted personal or community perception of physical or cognitive reality. This may evoke hefty epistemological debates, like the decades-long physical symbol systems hypothesis controversy about the physical-neural reality of “symbols” in cognizing brains (Newell and Simon 1976; Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Brooks 1991; Pfeifer and Scheier 1999; Laird et al. 2017; Buongiorno 2019). Entire modeling schools (like cybernetics, classical AI, or Bayesian agent modeling) have grown around a fundamental commitment to a specific background mathematics, and have helped to advance the very mathematical methods in return. In the final section I will argue that neither L, P or D type mathematics alone is appropriate for MC.

The two directions bottom-top and left-right in Figure 1 can be regarded as semantic axes. The bottom-top axis, which I will call extrinsic semantics, connects formal models with their physical counterparts, crossing the modeling mirror between the ontological domains of the formal and the physical. Since the physical end of this axis is just the physical reality, extrinsic semantic pairings between models and reality cannot be formalized. Instead, this link is established by social conventions and practical routines. Students learn to connect the two ontological domains by practical exercises and epistemologists work out, using plain English, what it means that a formal model is “valid” or “adequate” or even “true” in some sense or other. The left-right axis is the bridge between what happens or is “represented” inside a computing system and what happens or “exists” in its outside environment. This bridge is instantiated twice, within the formal domain where it connects segments a and c, and within the physical domain where it connects α with γ. Because these semantic relations are spanned within their respective ontological domains I will call them intrinsic semantics. Formal intrinsic semantics can be mathematically formalized because on both ends a and c of the formal intrinsic semantic arrow there are mathematically defined constructs. This will be an important theme in the detailed discussion given below. The physical intrinsic semantics comprises all the real-world interactions between a physical computing system α and its physical environment γ, mediated by physical signals. For example, what happens inside a thermostat (in segment α) interacts in physically lawful ways with what happens in the room (in segment γ) where it has been installed.

The study of semantic relations between symbols and their “meaning” is an ancient and richly thought-out theme in philosophy. I am only superficially acquainted with this body of thought and my separation of semantic relationships into extrinsic and intrinsic ones is certainly a stark simplification, and my division of everything into merely two ontological domains (formal and physical) is naive. It seems to me however that in much of the philosophical thinking, the role of of formal models of physical realities is ignored. I found the simple ontological bipartition of everything and the resulting intrinsic / extrinsic separation simply quite helpful in organizing my thinking, and I make use of it when I explain logic to computer science students (Jaeger 2019b).

The schema shown in Figure 1 suggests a simplicity than does not exist. Historical theory-building processes are in many respects like biological evolution, leading to different solutions in different niches (scientific disciplines and communities). Methodological differences can be drastic, as between the humanities and the natural sciences. But even within and between the neighboring disciplinary strands of computer science, AI, and machine learning we find distinctively different ways of formalizing and theorising about “computing”. Before one embarks on MC theory development it is instructive to inspect existing “computing” theories and formalisms at a higher resolution than in Figure 1.

The words “theory”, “formalism” and “model”, which I will use a lot, should be handled with care. I understand them in the following way. A formalism is a set of more or less rigorously
specified conventions of what kind of formal expressions one may write down. Examples are the formalism of first-order logic, the formalism of probability theory, or the formalism of ordinary differential equations. Also every programming language is a formalism. Formalisms are languages. Logicians and computer scientists often specify formalisms in complete accuracy through grammars, while mathematicians in general and physicists rely on informal conventions (which nonetheless are binding and well-understood). A model is a specification of a particular piece of reality, written down with the notational tools of a specific formalism. Finally, in the strict sense of mathematical logic, the word theory denotes the set of all theorems that can be proven from a set of axioms, like the theory of groups. Outside logic, the word is used in a wider and less strict sense, often comprising an entire collection of intended models, specifications of observation procedures, and predictions and hypotheses, like in the theory of quantum mechanics or the theory of supply and demand. I generally adopt this second usage and say “deductive theory” when I mean the first one.

A complete coverage of all formalisms and models in the symbolic-logic (L), probabilistic (P), and dynamical systems oriented (D) modeling domains is infeasible and I have to confine the discussion to selected fragments of the total modeling cosmos. The theory landscape in symbolic/digital computing is canonically worked out and its essentials fit into one textbook which all students of computer science indeed have to digest. I will be able to give an almost comprehensive account here. This is not the case for the P and D domains whose theory-building landscapes are very diverse and unifying meta-views are not available. In the probabilistic modeling domain I will consider only formalisms and models where probability distributions are represented and “computed” through sampling mechanisms, and use the acronym SPPD (“sampling-based processing of probability distributions”) to characterize this kind of formalisms and models. With regards to dynamical systems modeling I will only inspect the fragment where ordinary differential equations (ODEs) are used and speak of ODE formalisms and models.

Within each of the L, P and D domains I will find it helpful to distinguish between two kinds of formalisms and models.

The first kind captures what one could call the “mechanics” of computing processes. I will call these how-formalisms and models. In the three domains this will be the abstract models of algorithms and the programming languages (L), sampling algorithms and physics-oriented models of certain stochastic processes that are interpreted as sampling processes (P), and ODE models of brains and analog computing machines (D).

The second kind comprises formalisms and models whose core constructs capture cognitively interpretable aspects of human information processing. I will refer to these as what-formalisms and models. In the L domain this will be logical inferences on the basis of symbolic configurations, and the what-formalisms are the formalisms of symbolic logic, of which there are many. In the P domain the core cognitively interpretable constructs are probability distributions. In probabilistic accounts of cognitive processing (in theoretical neuroscience, cognitive science, AI and machine learning), probability distributions are widely considered as a useful and appropriate mathematical correlate of concepts. Probabilistic what-models there are as many as there are ways to conceive probabilistic conceptual reasoning, but all of these models are expressed in a single formalism, namely the canonical textbook formalism of mathematical probability theory. Finally, in the D domain, the cognitively interpretable mathematical constructs that can be defined on the basis of ODEs are qualitative geometrical constructs like fixed points, attractors, bifurcations and (in nonstationary dynamics) dynamical modes, and many more. In the cognitive and neurosciences, such geometrical items have become perceived as correspondents of a diverse range of cognitive phenomena. Similar to what we find in probabilistic
modeling, what-models there are many, but they are all written down using the same basic ODE formalism. Figure 2 shows a zoom into segment a of Figure 1.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 2: Zooming into Figure 1 giving an overview of themes treated in my survey of theories of computing conceived in the perspectives of symbolic/logic (L), sample-based probabilistic (P [SPPD]), and ODE-based dynamical systems (D [ODE]) modeling.

I will discuss L, P, D formalisms with regards to the themes

1. interrelationships between formalisms,
2. formal intrinsic semantics,
3. formal time, and
4. hierarchical organization of formal constructs within a formalism.

I leave a discussion of other, likewise relevant themes for another occasion. In particular I will not consider aspects of

- functionality — what tasks or problems are solved by “computing”,
- pragmatics — whether one can “program” a computing system or one has to “train” it; how can “users” interact with the “computer”, and what are the “users” in the first place,
- information — how “encoding”, “uncertainty”, “precision” are formalized,
- learning, adaption, calibration, stabilization,
- growth — extensibility of models and physical systems,
- complexity — what are measures and limits of a system’s “computing power”,

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• intra-model communication — what are “signals” and how are they propagated inside a computing systems,
• formal space — whether or how are how- or what-models metrically or topologically structured, and how this relates to formal time.

The four themes which I do discuss are key coordinates for theorizing in digital computer science. But upon inspection of non-digital information processing models in the P and D domains it will turn out that these themes are also instructive entry points to study non-digital computing concepts, and that they can be worked out in very different ways from what we are accustomed to in DC.

2.2 Findings

This subsection constitutes the main substance of this paper. It is long. An almost self-contained summary is provided as a separate subsection at the end.

2.2.1 DC formalisms and models

I begin my detailed investigation with a discussion of digital computing formalisms and models. A first overview: The how-formalisms include abstract descriptors of algorithmic processing mainly used for theoretical analysis (like the Turing machine or certain grammar formalisms) as well as formalisms that are destined for practical use, namely programming languages. Some abstract how-formalisms are useful also for practical programming, in particular lambda calculus (which directly spins off the so-called functional programming languages) and the random-access machine model (which is close to assembler programming languages). — The what-formalisms are logic formalisms, with Boolean logic and first-order logic being the standard textbook representatives. What-models are sets of logical formulas that specify what a program should compute. Such specifications are needed when one wants to formally verify that a written computer program actually fulfils its purpose — an important objective in many application domains. A special case are the so-called declarative programming languages, like Prolog or functional programming languages, which can be dually regarded as how- and what-formalisms and allow the user to write programs directly in terms of “what” tasks shall be computed by the program. All of the above are concisely explained in my online lecture notes on theoretical computer science (Jaeger, 2019b,a).

There are further formalisms that belong to the wider circles of DC theory which do not fall into the how- and what- classes that I mentioned here. For example, I exclude from consideration formal communication protocols between different computers. The formalisms that I mentioned however can be considered the bone and marrow of theoretical computer science.

Take-home message 1: The separation between how- and what-formalisms and models is not entirely clear-cut. Some how-formalisms can climb to levels of cognitively interpretable abstraction that they could also be considered what-formalisms.

Formalism interrelations. Both how- and what-models in DC are noted down using tools from discrete mathematics, being based on finite alphabets of symbols. How-models describe computing processes in terms of step-wise, rule-based updates of compound symbol configurations (example: the zipper algorithm from Box 3). There is a well understood hierarchy of
how-formalisms, defined by different levels of expressiveness. A formalism $A$ is at least as expressive as a formalism $B$ if every input-output task that can be solved with models formalized in $B$ can also be solved with a model formalized in $A$. This can be equivalently stated in a “syntactic” way, as follows. Consider a model $B$ formalized in $B$ (think of a computer program $B$ written in a programming language $B$). Then there exists a model $A$ formalized in $A$ and an encoding function $\tau_{B<A}$ which translates any symbolic configuration $b$ that can occur in a “run” of $B$ into an $A$-configuration $a$ (that is $\tau_{B<A}(b) = a$) such that, when $b \rightarrow b'$ is a configuration update step that can occur when running $B$, there is a sequence of update steps in $A$ of the form $\tau_{B<A}(b) \rightarrow a_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow a_n \rightarrow \tau_{B<A}(b')$. In technical terminology: every run of $B$ can be simulated by $A$. This leads to a hierarchy of classes of formalisms, where within each class, all formalisms have the same expressivity (they can mutually simulate each other), and where formalisms in less expressive classes can be simulated by formalisms in more expressive classes but not vice versa. This hierarchy, often referred to as the Chomsky hierarchy, is standardly explained in computer science textbooks and can be regarded as the backbone of theoretical computer science. The most expressive class known today is the class of Turing-equivalent formalisms. It comprises all practically used programming languages and many abstract mathematical formalisms, including of course the formalism of Turing machines. According to the Church-Turing hypothesis, no more expressive kind of how-formalism exists.

While all Turing-equivalent how-formalisms are equally expressive, it is nonetheless useful to arrange them, within their class, in an abstraction hierarchy, with “low-level” formalisms close to the fine-grained 0-1 switching of transistors in digital hardware (for instance assembler programming languages), and with “high-level” formalisms (like declarative programming languages or Microsoft Excel) closer to the human programmer’s cognitive representations of what it means to process information. When one writes a program in a high-level language and starts it from a high-level user interface, behind the scene it becomes level-wise compiled into lower-level ones until a version specified by the microchip manufacturer is reached, which can directly address the hardware $\alpha$, crossing the modeling mirror shown in Figure 1.

Trained computer scientists can easily create new, again equivalent how-formalisms tailored to their particular needs. This flexibility and transparency to move up and down in the abstraction hierarchy is unique in digital computing and is one reason for the current intellectual and practical dominance of DC over all other approaches to “computing”.

Take-home message 2: How-formalisms can be systematically ordered by their expressiveness. A formalism $A$ is more expressive than a formalism $B$ when all $B$ models can be simulated by $A$ models. Within the class of most expressive formalisms — the Turing-equivalent ones — one can furthermore roughly order them according to how close they are to “low” levels bordering to the physical 0-1-switching of digital circuits, or to “high” levels that are more interpretable in terms of human cognitive operations.

As to what-formalisms (formal logics), we find a wealth of different logics (plural) in the DC domain. Besides the two logics which are standardly taught to students of computer science (Boolean and first-order logic), there is also second-order logic, trimmed-down fragments of first-order logic, and indeed infinitely many more. A core theme of contemporary theoretical computer science is to work out logical frameworks (Rabe, 2008) to navigate in this richly populated landscape. A key ordering principle is logic translations, that is meta-formalisms which allow one to specify how one logic $A$ can “express” everything that another logic $B$ can. This is only superficially similar to the expressiveness hierarchy we saw for Turing-equivalent how-formalisms. The expressiveness hierarchy for how-formalisms is defined on the basis of the syntax of symbolic configurations, while for logic translations a semantical account is needed.
of what the symbolic expressions that can be written down in a logic formalism mean. This renders the study of expressiveness relations between what-formalisms much more involved than it is for how-formalisms. Research in this area is far from being canonically completed.

Take-home message 3: What-formalisms in DC are formal logics, of which there are many. Like how-formalisms they can be ordered according to their expressiveness, but here “expressiveness” is defined in terms of formal intrinsic semantics, not in terms of syntactically describable transformations of symbol configurations.

Formal time surfaces in distinctively different ways in how- versus what-formalisms. For how-formalisms the story is quickly told. The formal, discrete update rules acting on symbolic configurations become ultimately mirrored in the physical clock cycles of digital microchips. For what-formalisms it is more difficult to understand time. Explaining how time arises in what-formalisms is intimately connected to intrinsic semantics. What-formalisms cast and connect the segments $a$, $b$, $c$ from Figure 1 with the mathematical constructs of formal logic, often first-order logic. In logic-based what-formalisms, the model $c$ of the world $\gamma$ around the physical computing system $\alpha$ is usually characterized in terms of certain set-theoretic structures, called $S$-structures, where $S$ stands for the symbol alphabet of the formalism. Working out this universal connection between logic and set theory early in the 20th century was a milestone for mathematics. Logical inference (that which happens, for instance, in Aristotle’s syllogisms) became formalized through inclusion relations between classes of $S$-structures. This modern mathematical re-construction of logical inference reached its final form in the work of Tarski (Tarski, 1936). Neither $S$-structures themselves, nor inclusion relations between classes of them, incorporate a reflection of time. These set-theoretic world models can be intuitively seen as a collection of interrelated facts embodied in structured sets, a static picture, not a dynamical history. The “computing” that is formalized in segment $a$ and that physically happens in segment $\alpha$ is cast as a process of logical reasoning about the structures modeled in segment $c$ through $S$-structures. In the 2370 year-old perspective of logic, computing and reasoning are very much the same thing. Logical reasoning proceeds by carrying out steps of logical inference, like in syllogistic arguments. The premises and the conclusion of each such an inference step are written down as symbolic logic expressions. The conclusion that comes out of executing one inference step become incorporated in the premises of the next step, leading to inference chains. Inference chains are stepwise transformations of symbolic configurations, a fact which establishes the connection to how-formalisms. A “run” (or “execution”) of an algorithm can be understood as an inference chain which leads from an initial premise to a final conclusion. The initial premise is the input to the algorithm and the final conclusion is the output. These two symbolic configurations lie in the interface boundary $b$; they are the only items that are passed to and fro between the reasoning system $a$ and the environment $c$ that is being reasoned about. I return to the topic of time. Logical inference is not temporal. The relation between a premise and a conclusion is not that the former comes first in time and is temporally followed by the latter. Instead, the relation is semantical-implicational: if the former is true, then the latter is true too. Turing himself put this into plastic wording: It is always possible for the computer to break off from his work, to go away and forget all about it, and later to come back and go on with it. (Turing, 1936)

By chaining, if the first input to an inference chain holds true in the set-theoretic world model $c$, then so does the ultimate output. This is the very same structure as of mathematical proofs in general, which likewise proceed from initial premises or axioms to the final claim in a series of argumentation steps. Hence, the parlance in theoretical computer science to call certain high-level algorithm formalisms inference engines or theorem provers. But, if inference steps are natively a-temporal, how then does time enter the picture? This is a natural question to
ask, since after all human reasoning — the original inspiration for logic formalisms — evolves in real physical time. Any computational neuroscience that tries to understand human logical reasoning in terms of physical brain dynamics must provide an answer. But, in fact, this question is ignored in logic and computer science textbooks. Here is how I see it. In a dramatic abstraction, parts of reasoning in a physical brain can be regarded as a-temporal: namely, if it is assumed that a reasoning human can store symbolic configurations in un-alterable, one could say platonically immutable ways. An essential characteristic of symbols is that they just stay identically the same once “written”. Symbols are what does not change; they are exempted from time. These two facts are two sides of the same coin: (i) that logic-based what-formalisms capture a-temporal logical inference relations, which become “update” operations in how-formalisms, and (ii) that the native substrate of how- and what formalisms are symbol alphabets. When such how-formalisms are “run” on physical computing systems, the physical hardware must necessarily provide for temporally unbounded, unaltering memory mechanisms where “written” symbols defy the mutations of time. In physics terminology this means that digital hardware must encorporate subsystems that have timescales far longer than the use-time of the system. — This is also the right context to remark that by realizing logical theorem provers, digital computers can carry out anything that can be found in a mathematical proof. To the extent that some other, non-digital model of “computing” can be mathematically formalized, it can be simulated by digital computers — except for the real-world temporal aspects of the simulatee. In this sense, the digital computing paradigm is and will remain the master of all others.

Take-home message 4: digital computing derives much of its superior powers from the very fact that electrical engineers and transistor developers have found ways to locally realize extremely large time constants, with time virtually coming to standstill.

Hierarchical structuring of formal constructs. The formalisms used in DC for modeling “computing” all admit to compose symbolic configurations into more compounded ones, which then can be used as building blocks in yet higher levels of compositionality. That human cognitive processing admits the creation of compositional entities is regarded as constitutional for human intelligence by proponents of classical AI and (Chomskian) linguistics.

Compositional hierarchies of formal constructs are present both in how- and what-formalisms. I discuss the former first. Virtually all programming languages (assembler languages possibly excepted) admit the definition of compound configurations (from “lists” and “arrays” to “modules”, “objects”, “scripts”) which bind together more elementary symbolic configurations into larger ones. Abstract models of “computing” systems likewise all have provisions for defining compositional hierarchies, for instance by joining symbols into nested sequences on a Turing machine tape, by applying the lambda operator in lambda calculus, or by constructing parse trees in grammar-based formalisms. Logic deductive theories, and mathematical theories in general, create compound constructs by hierarchies of formal definitions. Compositional hierarchies of symbolic configurations in how-models correspond to an execution hierarchy of configuration update operations: “executing” or “evaluating” a higher-level, defined construct means to execute a sequence of lower-level update operations that happen inside the defined construct. The higher a compound formal construct in a compositional hierarchy, the larger the number of physical operations that are needed to realize the execution of the formal construct on a physical computing system. This multiplied physical effort leads to longer processing real time for higher-level construct execution — unless some parallelization scheme can delegate the required physical operations to a multiplicity of physical sites that operate simultaneously. Such time-space tradeoffs are an important topic in theoretical compute science. It is generally desirable, but not easy, to find formalisms and models of symbolic computing which lend them-
selves to high degrees of parallelization. In contrast to current models of symbolic computing, the human brain operates in an extremely parallel fashion. We see a face together with its nose, mouth and eyes. This is a lasting intellectual challenge for digital computing theorizing, and has motivated the title “Parallel Distributed Processing” for the bible book (Rumelhart and McClelland [1986]) that marks the start of neural network research as we know it today.

The primary mechanism in DC what-formalisms (formal logics) to capture the composition of cognitive entities employs nested functional expressions, as for instance TakeoffWeight(AirbusA320, Fuelfill(FlightLH237), NumberPassengers(FlightLH237, January24_2020)). Such logic expressions denote certain structured sets contained in $S$-structures, and they can become encoded in (parts of) symbolic configurations in how-models.

Take-home message 5: Compositional formal structures are constitutive for DC models of computation. This makes DC how- and what-formalisms immediately suited to capture the (widely but not uncontroversially claimed) compositionality of human cognitive entities. The theoretical conveniences and formal powers afforded by symbolic compositionality are inseparable from hardly yet answered questions concerning the real-time, real-space realizability of formal configuration update operations.

### 2.2.2 Probabilistic (sampling-based) formalisms and models

I now turn to probabilistic models of computation, marked with P in Figure 1. As stated earlier, in my view an important criterion to call a physical system “computing” is that its operations admit some kind of cognitive interpretation. For DC, this cognitive aspect is rational logical inference. In probabilistic “computing” models the cognitive core aspect is the ability of animals and humans to make probabilistic inferences. These are formalized in probability formalisms through conditional probabilities of the kind, “if the sky is cloudy, then the probability of rain is 0.3”. Stating and evaluating such conditional probabilities requires to have mental representations of probability distributions. I consider them the primary “mental” or “cognitive” objects in probabilistic reasoning and formalisms, analog to symbolic configurations in DC formalisms. Specifically, but not exclusively, the need for evaluating conditional probabilities arises when agents assess the chances that their actions will lead to the desired outcome. This view of biologial cognition is one of the leading paradigms in cognitive science today and is referred to as predictive brain (Clark [2013]), free energy model of cognition (Friston et al. [2010]), or Bayesian brain (Tenenbaum et al. [2006]) hypothesis. In the areas of mathematics and machine learning we find a wide diversity of worked-out computational frameworks which formalize selected aspects of the predictive brain perspective. They include models of computing with probabilistic logic (von Neumann [1956]), logic-oriented accounts of Bayesian statistics (Jaynes [2003]), observable operator models and predictive state representations of probability distributions (Jaeger [2000], Littman et al. [2001]), Boltzmann machines (Ackley et al. [1985], Hinton and Salakhutdinov [2006]), reinforcement learning approaches to modeling intelligent agents (Basye et al. [1995]), or the neural engineering framework (Eliasmith et al. [2012]). Here I restrict myself to formalisms and models which use stochastic sampling to represent and update distributions. In methods for sampling-based processing of probability distributions (SPPD for short), a probability distribution is not mathematically represented by a closed formula. Instead, it is approximately represented by a sample, that is a set of example points “drawn” from the distribution. Complex, high-dimensional distributions cannot in general be represented by analytical formulae. SPPD methods have become a major enabler for the simulation-based study of complex systems in physics (Metropolis et al. [1953]), for solving optimization problems, and in some branches of machine learning. They are often referred to as Monte Carlo or Monte Carlo
Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) [Neal 1993] or as particle swarm methods [Dellaert et al. 1999]. The requisite random sampling processes still are mostly simulated on digital computers. SPPD techniques have however become also realized in non-digital physical computing systems, namely in DNA computing [van Noort et al. 2002] for solving optimization and search problems, and more recently and with a wider application range in analog spiking neuromorphic hardware [Indiveri et al. 2011; Haessig et al. 2018; Moradi et al. 2018; Neckar et al. 2019; He et al. 2019b]. According to the neural sampling [Buesing et al. 2011; Pecevski and Maass 2011] view forwarded in theoretical neuroscience, temporal or spatial collectives of neuronal spike events can be interpreted (or used by the brain) as samples. Due to this inviting analogy to biological brains and low-power characteristics of analog spiking neurochips, research in such hardware and corresponding “algorithms” is an energetically growing field. But the main reason why I want to focus on sampling-based versions of probabilistic models is that they open views on “computing” that differ from the DC views in interesting ways.

In order to preclude a false impression, I emphasize that there are many other ways to represent distributions besides via sampling. For instance, the procedural mechanics of certain (non-spiking, non-sampling) artificial neural network models can be interpreted to compute parameters of distributions, or probability distributions can be approximately characterized and algorithmically processed through variational calculus. Both methods are widely used in current machine learning. Furthermore, firing sequences of neural spikes have been interpreted to encode “information” in other ways than as delivering stochastic samples. Precise firing time patterns of a single neuron can be considered as carrying information in a variety of ways (Thorpe et al. 2001; Izhikevich 2006; Deneve 2008).

Brushing over many specific differences between SPPD models, I will now give an account of their common traits and place them in the schematic of Figure 1. Formalism interrelations. I consider how-formalisms first. There are two kinds of how-formalisms and how-models in SPPD, depending on whether the targeted physical computing systems α are digital computers or not. In the first case, how-models are symbolic algorithms which, when executed, generate sequences of pseudo-random data points which accumulate over processing time into samples. Such algorithms are called sampling algorithms or just samplers. After down-Compilation into low-level assembler programs these sampling algorithms can be passed to physical digital computers, crossing the modeling mirror. When the targeted hardware is non-digital, how-models describe the physical mechanics of the stochastic processes that are viewed as sampling processes. For biological brains, theoretical neuroscience offers a range of such models, from detailed physiological models of how spikes are created in neurons to more abstract castings like integrate-and-fire models of neurons or just Poisson spike trains. For analog spiking neuromorphic microchips, the sample-generating, physical stochastic processes on board of such microchips is modeled with electronic engineering formalisms on the device and circuit level [Indiveri et al. 2011]. I would think that there also exist biochemical formalisms for modeling the reaction dynamics in DNA computing microreactors, but I am unfamiliar with that field.

The situation for all the sampling algorithms that have been proposed is markedly different from the situation in DC. In the DC domain, how-formalisms and models can all be precisely related to each other by mutual simulations. In SPPD I am not aware of a way how a stochastic sampling algorithm A could “simulate” another such algorithm B. The representation of a distribution by a sample is inherently imprecise. The more data point examples are added to a sample, the more precisely it captures the distribution. Different sampling algorithms could possibly become related to each other by comparing their statistical efficiency (how many
sample points are needed for a given accuracy level of representing a distribution). While this is an important optimization objective in practical SPPD designs (Neal 1993), I am not aware of a meta-theory or just attempts to systematically set different SPPD algorithms in relation to each other by comparing their statistical efficiency.

Turning to what-formalisms, these are the formalisms whose prime mathematical objects are probability distributions, considered as abstract objects independent of their concrete representation through samples or other formats. What-models are written down in the notation which students learn in probability or statistics courses. They gain their expressive powers mostly from stating and combining conditional probability relations. The analogy to the picture I drew for DC is obvious. The if-then format of conditional probability statements matches the if-then format of logical inference rules. In fact, according to one influential view of Bayesian statistics (Jaynes 2003), probabilistic what-formalisms can be considered and worked out along the guidelines of formal logic. There is however a noteworthy difference between DC and SPPD what-formalisms. In the DC domain, different logics can be related to each other through logic translations, yielding a (yet only partially explored) ordering along an expressiveness scale. Nothing like this can be found in probabilistic what-formalisms. There are no more or less “expressive” formalisms of probability theory. It makes some sense to claim that there exists only a single probability what-formalism, namely the one that is taught in probability theory textbooks (Bauer 1978).

Take-home message 6: in both domains of DC and SPPD, formal models for computing systems came as how- or what-formalisms. Unlike in DC, how-formalisms in SPPD are not related to each other, and cannot be transformed into each other in an obvious way.

Intrinsic semantics. SPPD what-formalisms are expressed using the notation of mathematical probability theory. There are two major epistemological schools of thinking about “probability”, the frequentist (or objectivistic) and the subjectivist (Bayesian) one. Their mathematical theorems almost coincide in their surface format but are interpreted differently. In frequentist interpretations “probability” means a physical property of real-world systems, namely a system’s propensity to deliver varying measurement outcomes under repeated measurements, while in Bayesian interpretations, “probability” means subjective degrees of belief. The frequentist account of probability directly arises from formal models of the physical environment (segment c in our figure). These formal models of physical reality are a probability spaces, three-component mathematical structures standardly written as \((\Omega, F, P)\), where \(\Omega\) (called “universe” or “population” among other namings) is a set of elementary events which can be intuitively understood as locations in spacetime where measurements could possibly be made; \(F\) is a certain set-theoretic structuring (a so-called sigma-field) imposed on \(\Omega\); and \(P\) assigns objective probabilities to certain elements of this structuring. The formal connection between such world models \((\Omega, F, P)\) and the descriptive what-formalisms that capture the probabilistic cognizing about the world (segment a) is established by random variables which create segment b. I remark that the term “random variable” is entirely misleading. Mathematically, random variables are functions, not variables; and they are not random, but deterministic. To make this clearer: a statement like “Peter is male” would be formalized in probability theory as \(\text{Gender}(\text{Peter}) = \text{Male}\), where \(\text{Gender}\) is the random variable, a function which deterministically returns the gender value from every concrete person (formally: from every element \(\omega \in \Omega\)). The randomness of random variables results not from that they somehow return random values, but that random arguments are given to them, following the probabilities prescribed by the item \(P\) in the world model \((\Omega, F, P)\). The mathematics behind this is involved and I allow myself at this point to recommend my probability lecture notes (Jaeger 2019c) where I attempt an intuitive, detailed introduction to the basic concepts of probabilistic and statistical modeling.
Summing up the frequentist account of probability: The outside world is cast as a structured set $\Omega$ of observation opportunities; observation apparatuses and procedures are abstracted into random variables; measured values (from ticked gender boxes in questionnaires to high-volume sensor data streams, filling segment $b$) become the data points of samples which are one way of formalizing probability distributions (segment $a$), which in turn can be seen as the key formal correlates of concepts in probabilistic accounts of cognition.

There are similarities and dissimilarities between the formalizations of intrinsic semantics in DC versus SPPD. The what-formalisms in both areas cast the physical world as highly structured sets ($S$-structures and sigma-fields) which represent, one might say, the preshaped substance of the modeled piece of the world. Both DC and SPPD what-formalisms are mathematically built around their respective intrinsic semantics. However, the meaning of “meaning”, that is, how some symbol or formula (in segment $a$) relates to something in the modeled world very much differs between DC and SPPD. Frequentist probability theory includes formal correspondents of measurement or observation procedures and their values as first-class citizens, namely random variables and the values that they can take. Segment $b$ is central in probability theory, containing what is called sample spaces. Probability theory universally separates the measurable quality (like “gender”, “speed”) from the quantitative values that this measurement categories can take, like “male” or “100 km/h”. Qualities become cast as random variables, quantities as the possible values of these variables. In contrast, the primary view adopted by logic formalisms identifies quality with quantity. That Peter is male would be formalized as $\text{Male}(\text{Peter})$. The symbol $\text{Male}$ is a so-called predicate symbol, and predications (stating that certain objects have certain properties) are the most elementary operations in first-order logic. It is however also possible to express $\text{Gender}(\text{Peter}) = \text{Male}$ in logic. To do this one has to introduce $\text{Gender}$ as a function symbol. Still there is an important difference. In the logical understanding of $\text{Gender}(\text{Peter}) = \text{Male}$, all three items (the argument $\text{Peter}$, the function $\text{Gender}$ and the value $\text{Male}$) are contained in the $S$-structure, that is they are both located inside the world model in $c$. In a probabilistic interpretation of the same English statement, $\text{Peter}$ is an element of the universe $\Omega$, sitting in segment $c$; $\text{Male}$ is an observation value which is mathematically placed outside of the world model $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P)$ (I created the segment $b$ to host it), and $\text{Gender}$ links the two. This difference between logic and probability modeling grows from deep historical roots.

Take-home message 7: Probability theory gives an account of how we observe the world; logic is about how we reason about an already observed world.

There is one more similarity between logic and probability modeling which will become central in Section 3 for my discussion of how MC theories may fit into the scheme of Figure 1. Both SPPD and logic formalisms introduce separate symbols for every observable quality of the elements of the world-substance sets in segment $c$: random variables and function symbols, respectively (like $\text{Gender}$). An implicit assumption behind this symbolic naming of qualities is that the named quality is well-defined and remains the same throughout the time when the formalism unfolds in formal time (logic derivations or formalizing sampling in $a$), and/or when this computational process becomes physically instantiated (segment $\alpha$), and/or as long as the real time evolves for the “meant” interpretation in the real world environment $\gamma$ or its model $c$. This is a highly nontrivial assumption and I will argue that it bars the way to developing a formal theory of MC.

Formal time is knitted into SPPD formalisms and models in intricate ways, often involving further theoretical elements reflecting space and temporal hierarchies. In physical computing systems (segment $\alpha$), real time is consumed on a fast timescale to generate individual sample
points, and on slower timescales to accumulate sample points into samples. In the view of neural sampling theories, where neural spikes (or possibly groupings of spikes) correspond to sample points, the fast timescale is the one of single spikes and the slow timescale the one of accumulating the effects of single spikes by mechanisms of temporal integration, for instance via building up neuron potentials or modulating synaptic efficiencies. Formal models of spike event generation (in segment \(a\)) can be expressed on different levels of granularity, ranging from modeling the electrophysiology of spike generation with differential equations to abstract representations of “spike trains” as Poisson processes. The accumulation of spike events into samples requires extensions of these formalisms to include some kind of temporal integration. — When running sampling-based algorithms on digital computers, the fast timescale reflects the runtime of program subroutines to generate sample points; these subroutines contain sub-subroutines to generate pseudo-random numbers which are normally encapsulated as primitives (the \texttt{rand} function) in programming languages. Generated sample points are formally accumulated in lists or arrays in program loops on the slow timescale of sample build-up. — This picture becomes more complex when sample points are generated in parallel strands, leading, among others, to neural population representations of samples in spiking neural network models, or to Markov random field models in non-neural algorithms (though the latter are mostly used of purposes other than sampling). But no degree of parallelization can entirely cancel the necessity for generating and accumulating sample points on respective fast and slower timescales.

Because the creation of samples needs time (formal or real, segment \(a\) or \(\alpha\)), the cognitive core items in SPPD, namely distributions, are not defined for single moments of time or created instantaneously. A sample-based representation (segment \(a\)) or realization (in \(\alpha\)) of a distribution becomes the more precisely defined the more sampling time is devoted to its generation. Sample-based representations of distributions are “smeared” over time. If one adopts neural sampling views in cognitive neuroscience, this has nontrivial consequences for the notion of mental states which I will not further pursue here. The fact that samples develop over time leads to a spectrum of ways of how SPPD models of computation can be used for practical exploits, with different schemes for administering input. On one end of the spectrum we find scenarios where the computing system is “clamped” to an unchanging input for the entire duration of the computation. Formally this means that some random variables of the model are frozen to fixed values. The sampling process is then run (in formal abstraction \(a\) or physical realization \(\alpha\)) for an extended period of time, allowing the sampling to grow the sample large enough to decode from it the result with the desired degree of accuracy (I skip the complications of initial transients and ensuring ergodicity (Neal 1993)). Typical examples are classification tasks (for instance, input is an image, desired result is a probability distribution over possible classifications (Hinton et al. 2006)) or optimization tasks (the archetype example: input is a roadmap, desired result is a round trip itinerary through all cities which with high probability is the shortest one (Kirkpatrick et al. 1983)). On the other end of the spectrum, the input is itself temporal, for instance a sensor data stream, and the desired output is likewise temporal, for instance generated motor commands in a robot or a brain, or an estimation of an agent’s motion relative to its visually perceived environment (Haessig et al. 2018), or speech-to-text recognition tasks. This is the generic situation in adaptive online signal processing and control (Farhang-Boroujeny 1998) and in the study of situated agents (Steels and Brooks 1993), which comprise humans, animals, robots, software avatars or computer game characters. Solving such tasks, where input patterns or output patterns are themselves temporally evolving, requires sampling mechanisms where the next generated sample point depends on the history of previously generated ones. Important classes of formalisms of this kind include spiking recurrent neural networks (He et al. 2019), temporal restricted Boltzmann machines (Sutskever et al. 2009) and sampling-based instantiations of dynamical Bayesian networks (Murphy 2002).
Intermediates between these two extreme ends of the spectrum (single fixed input versus non-stationary input streams) also occur, for instance when the input is a sequence of fixed patterns which are clamped each for some time before it is replaced by the next one.

**Take-home message 8:** The phenomenology of formal time in SPPD models is much richer than in DC. In DC, time reduces to discrete jumps from one well-defined, symbolic configuration to the next, and these configurations are by themselves atemporal. In SPPD models, the core cognitively interpretable constructs, namely distributions, are themselves temporally defined through the sampling process. As a consequence, formal how-models must account for at least two timescales, and the formal interpretation of generated sample point sequences as distributions must account for nontrivial conditions like duration-precision tradeoffs or temporally overlapping realizations of different distributions. All of this is alien to the fundamental DC conception of executing algorithms.

**Hierarchical structuring of formal constructs.** Human cognitive processing admits — or in some views (Newell and Simon, 1976), is even constituted by — the compounding, or “chunking” (Newell, 1990), of representational or procedural mental states or mechanisms into larger compositional items which then can again be composed again into even more comprehensive items, giving rise to compositional hierarchies of representations, mechanisms or processes. In DC this is accounted for by hierarchically organized symbolic configurations (in how-formalisms) and nested functional expressions in logic what-formalism. I can see three main ways how distributions can become hierarchically organized.

First, some how-formalisms explicitly arrange their random variables in layers, with “low” layers modeling the sensor data periphery and “high” layers modeling the cognitive interpretations of sensor input. This is the case for many instantiations of Boltzmann machines (Ackley et al., 1985; Hinton and Salakuthdinov, 2006); furthermore, the conditional dependency graph of random variables in Bayesian networks and graphical models (Wainwright and Jordan, 2003) can be hierarchically organized in reflection of a “cognitive” stratification. These are generic probabilistic information processing formalisms. Task-specific layered spiking neural architectures, where deep feedforward neural networks are being re-coded into spiking neural substrates, have recently been receiving much interest, for instance in visual object recognition tasks (Yousefzadeh et al., 2018). Furthermore, I am aware of two complex information processing architectures which model complex human cognitive dynamics on the basis of spiking neural network substrates, namely Shastri’s SHRUTI (Shastri, 1999) series of connectionist models human reasoning and language processing and Eliasmith’s almost-entire-human-brain models (Eliasmith et al., 2012).

In these hierarchically or modularly structured systems, all random variables in all levels or modules are, in principle, sampled from with the same frequency. This is in agreement with the spiking dynamics in biological brains, which likewise roughly has the same timescale everywhere — neurons in the visual cortex are not orders of magnitude faster than neurons in the prefrontal cortex, although a hierarchy of processing levels lies between them. The “cognitive” constructs, namely distributions determined through samples, are formally the same throughout levels or modules. Higher-level distributions are not made from, or composed of, lower-level ones. This is different from the compositional hierarchies in DC models, where higher-level symbolic configurations are made by binding lower-level ones into compounds. In the SPPD models pinpointed above, the assignment of being a “higher” or “lower” distribution is only in the eye of the human inventor of the model.

Second, hierarchies of distributions canonically arise in probabilistic models as conceived in Bayesian probability (Jaynes, 2003; Jaeger, 2019c) (note that “Bayesian networks” are not
Bayesian in this fundamental way of interpreting the nature of probability: they got their name merely because they employ Bayes’ rule from elementary statistics). In Bayesian probability, distributions become themselves distributed in hyperdistributions. In the original motivation of Bayesian probability, these higher-level hyperdistributions reflect the subjective prior beliefs of an intelligent agent about which lower-level distributions are more or less plausible. Applying this principle to modeling probabilistic cognitive systems one obtains formalisms which are hierarchical in a substantial sense. The relationship between a distribution and a hyperdistribution is asymmetric. A hyperdistribution could be said to control, modulate or “bias” its lower-level children distributions. This gives rise to cognitive processing models whose dynamics unfolds in an interplay of bottom-up pathways (from sensor input to their cognitive interpretations) and top-down pathways (cognitive expectations modulating the perceptions through expectations). Prominent representatives of such bidirectional cognitive processing systems are Grossberg’s Adaptive Resonance Theory models (Grossberg 2013), Friston’s free-energy models of processing hierarchies in brains (Friston 2005) and Tenenbaum’s models of human cognition (Tenenbaum et al. 2006). However, although Friston’s writings contain passing remarks on spiking neural dynamics, neither his nor other’s models of Bayesian cognitive architectures appear to have been formulated or simulated (let alone physically realized) on the basis of sampling processes. Instead, when these authors (as most other neuro-cognitive modelers) want to capture temporal processing phenomena, they use formalisms that abstract from sampling processes by time-averaged neuronal firing rates governed by differential equations (Grossberg, Friston). Or, when their focus is on the a-temporal structure of hierarchies of (static) mental concepts, they adopt the formalism of (Bayesian) probability theory. The Bayesian distribution-hyperdistribution hierarchization should be analysable in terms of sampling, at least if it is cognitively-biologically adequate and if brains actually use spikes for sampling. This would be a potentially rewarding mathematical project. Likely this has been done, but I am not aware of it.

Third, more elementary (lower-dimensional) distributions can always and precisely be mathematically combined into compound (higher-dimensional) distributions by product operations. Conversely, complex distributions can sometimes more or less approximately be factorized into products of simpler ones. Technically, this enables divide-and-conquer strategies for efficiently computing probabilities in digital implementations of graphical models (Huang and Darwiche 1994). Conceptually, this leads to insight into a specific kind of compositional structure of complex distributions. Due to its practical importance for probabilistic modeling with the aid of digital computers, factorization algorithms for distributions are being widely explored. Unfortunately, many real-world distributions cannot be satisfactorily factorized. A generalization of products of distributions is provided by tensor product representations, a standard operation in quantum mechanics (Coecke 2012) which also has been proposed as a paradigm for achieving analogs of symbolic compositionality in distributed neural activation patterns (Smolensky 1990). However, the computational efficiency gains of factorizations are lost when the component distributions become entangled in tensor products. Like with Bayesian hierarchization, I am not aware of sampling-based accounts of product and tensor product operations, but again, this should be possible if such product operations are cognitively adequate and if the brain indeed exploits sampling for representing distributions.

Take-home message 9: Compositionality of cognitive representations, mechanisms and processes — constitutive for symbolic computing — has currently no clear analog in sampling-based models of computing. When sampling is used as the core process for enacting “computing” (as in Boltzmann machines or sampling-based evaluations of other graphical models), hierarchically organized interrelations between distributions exist only in the eye of the system designer but are not formally modeled on the level of interrelations between samples. To the extent that neural
sampling is a valid view of information processing in biological brains, this means that either compositionality is not an inherent aspect of “computing”, or it means that mathematicians still have to work out how hierarchies of distributions (like in distribution-hyperdistribution relations or factorizations of distributions) can be formally expressed through samples.

2.2.3 Dynamical systems (ODE-based) formalisms and models

I now turn to formalizations of “computing” that are rooted in concepts and formalisms of dynamical systems theory, marked D in Figure 1. Since almost a century, biological systems — neural and others — have been studied in a line of investigations which is referred to as general systems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1968) or cybernetics (Wiener, 1948). This tradition co-evolved with the engineering science of signal processing and control (Wunsch, 1985). A landmark in interpreting the human brain as a dynamical (self-)control system is Ashby’s classic Design for a Brain (Ashby, 1952). In another co-evolving strand, neural dynamics became modeled in a theoretical physics spirit, by isolating and abstracting dynamical neural phenomena into systems of differential equations, exemplified in the Hodgkin-Huxley model of a neuron (Hodgkin and Huxley, 1952). Later, when the mathematical theory of qualitative behavior of dynamical systems (Abraham and Shaw, 1992) had matured and in particular after chaos and self-organization in dynamical systems became broadly studied, dynamical systems modeling rose to a commonly accepted perspective in cognitive psychology and cognitive science (Smith and Thelen, 1993; van Gelder and Port, 1995). Today the separations between these historical traditions have almost dissolved. Mathematical tools from dynamical systems theory are ubiquitously employed in modeling neural and cognitive phenomena on all scales and abstraction levels, in a diversity that defies a survey. Even when seen only from within mathematics, dynamical systems theory is a highly diversified field. Its formalisms range from finite-state switching systems to field equations; time can be discrete or continuous; the state spaces on which dynamics are described can be finite or infinite sets, vector spaces, manifolds, function spaces, graphs or abstract topological spaces, etc. Furthermore, this mathematical field has overlaps with statistical physics, information theory, stochastic processes, signal processing and control, game theory, quantum mechanics and many more.

Here I will only consider models expressed with ordinary differential equations (ODEs) which have the familiar look $\dot{x}(t) = f(x(t), \ldots)$, where $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is an $n$-dimensional real-valued state vector, $t \in \mathbb{R}$ captures continuous time and the three dots “…” can optionally be filled with input signal terms $u(t)$ or control parameters $a$. The function $f$ defines a vector field on the state space $\mathbb{R}$ which indicates the local direction and velocity of state motion. Such ODE models are by far the most widely used and most deeply studied kind of dynamical systems models; they are what mathematics students find in their introductory textbooks (Strogatz, 1994) (and physics students in theirs). The mathematical theory of qualitative behavior in dynamical systems — attractors, bifurcations, chaos, modes, “self-organization”, etc. — has been first and foremost been developed for $\dot{x}(t) = f(x(t), a)$ system models. The most pertinent reasons however why this choice of mathematical substrate is appropriate in the context of this article are that, (i) this is the most broadly used kind of formalism in the modeling of continuous-time dynamics in biological and artificial neural networks and cognitive processing; and (ii) it is the formalism used by electrical engineers when they design analog “neuromorphic” circuits (Indiveri et al., 2011).

Formalism interrelations. When discussing DC and SPPD, I found it useful to distinguish how- from what-formalisms. I will follow this strategy again and separate the ODE formalisms and models found in segments a, b, c in Figure 1 into how- and what-formalisms and models.
The how-formalism is the canonical textbook ODE formalism. Using its notation, a researcher or engineer can write down how-models (in segment \(a\)) which describe physical computing systems (in \(\alpha\)). These models directly capture the real-time, metric dynamics of continuous variables in computing systems — voltages and currents in analog microchips and neuronal circuits, “activations” of neural assemblies or concepts in models of neural cognitive processes.

The what-formalisms describes how the state trajectories \(\{x(t)\}_{t \in \mathbb{R}}\) fold into the state space \(\mathbb{R}^n\), giving rise to the zoo of geometrical phenomena which appear when state trajectories are traced over extended spans of time and space in phase portraits. Phase portraits are structured and populated by ensembles of attracting or repelling or saddle-node fixed points, oscillations, chaos, basins of attraction etc. The fascinating geometrical worlds opened by studying qualitative geometrical phenomena are most beautifully revealed in the copious picture-book [Abraham and Shaw, 1992] of Abraham (mathematician) and Shaw (artist) which I enthusiastically recommend as first reading for novices in dynamical systems.

What-formalisms for dynamical systems may look superficially analog to the what-formalisms that I discussed in logic-based and probabilistic modeling. However, in those two modeling worlds the what-formalisms have been worked out into canonical formats (formal logic and probability theory), and the relationships between how- and what-formalisms are transparently defined. This is not the case in ODE modeling, let alone in dynamical systems modeling in general. There is no canonical, complete mathematical formalism to comprehensively describe the world of geometric wonders that arise in ODE systems. Invariably, mathematicians use plain English besides formulas to describe how attractors etc. become geometrically or dynamically related to each other in phase portraits. The very notion of a phase portrait, ubiquitously used in mathematical texts, is itself not formally defined. New kinds of qualitative phenomena are continually being discovered. Most insights into the geometry of dynamics that are today available have been discovered, defined and studied, by mathematicians and theoretical physicists, for autonomous dynamical systems only. These are systems whose equations \(\dot{x}(t) = f(x(t), a)\) have no input term. The study of qualitative behavior in input-driven systems, which have an additional input term \(u(t)\) in their ODEs, is in its infancy [Kloeden and Rasmussen, 2011; Manjunath and Jaeger, 2014]. Current mathematical theory offers only painfully limited ways of inferring from a given how-model \(\dot{x}(t) = f(x(t), a)\) or \(\dot{x}(t) = f(x(t), u(t), a)\) which qualitative phenomena emerge from it. This has to be worked out on a case-by-case basis. Analytical understanding is often impossible to achieve, and numerical, intuition-guided simulations on low-dimensional subspace projections afford the only window of insight.

It might be well the case that a comprehensive what-formalism, and what-theory expressed on its basis, is principally impossible for ODE systems. Just like natural scientists will forever continue to discover new qualitative phenomena in nature, and just like biological evolution incessantly finds and exploits new qualitative phenomena on a “keep anything that works” basis, mathematicians may be in for a principally open-ended discovery journey. This open-endedness may be intrinsic in an ill-definedness of what qualitative means. If this is so, we are facing a serious problem with regards to modal computing:

1. **if** a physical system should be called “computing” only if its operations admit some kind of interpretation in cognitive terms,

2. **and if** it is the qualitative phenomena in ODE systems which can be subjects of “cognitive” interpretations, rather than the quantitative ODE mechanics,

3. **and if** the leading idea for MC is to exploit any physical phenomenon that is useful for “computing”,

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4. **and if** no comprehensive, closed what-theory is possible due to a principally open-ended richness of qualitative phenomena,

5. **then** no complete, closed theory of MC on the basis of ODE dynamical systems modeling is possible.

This is disconcerting. Physicists rely heavily on ODEs and other kinds of differential equations to model physical systems, and so do electrical engineers when they design circuits for analog microchips. ODE formalisms seem thus a natural choice for developing a theory for MC, which should be able to connect to the physics of computing systems. I see four options to deal with this roadblock:

1. Accept that a closed, complete theory is not possible and embark on MC theory building in the spirit of an open-ended discovery adventure.

2. Build an MC theory around an apriori restricted set of qualitiative phenomena. This is what DC does in relying, deep down, only on the phenomenon of bistability which gives the 0-1 bits DC is made of. This is also what we see in most neural network models in computational neuroscience and machine learning. Three examples: Freeman’s account of neural pattern representation and recognition on the basis of chaotic attractors ([Yao and Freeman 1990](#)); Rabinovich’s models of cognitive sequencing of concept activations along heteroclinic trajectories between saddle nodes ([Rabinovich et al. 2008](#)); or my own proposal for organizing and processing neural memory with certain nonlinear filters called “conceptors” ([Jaeger 2017](#)). The obvious drawback is a limitation of perspective which will miss the vast majority of useful phenomena.

3. Not adopt a dynamical systems oriented perspective. This can be utterly successful as witnessed by DC, but I am afraid it bars the way to exploiting all that physics can offer.

4. Find a new foundational mathematical formalism for dynamical systems which makes qualities, not quantities, the objects of dynamical change. This is what I find the most promising route, and I will put forth initial ideas in the final section of this article.

I return from this excursion into methodological questions and take a closer look at interrelations between ODE models. To avoid misunderstandings I start with a clarification. ODE models are used both in connection with digital and with analog computing hardware. This is done in very different ways. The use-case with digital computers: Researchers who model some dynamical real-world system of their respective discipline — physicists modeling a mass on a spring, biologists modeling predator-prey interactions — write down ODE equations and then simulate them on their digital machine. This use-case falls into the DC part of this survey. ODEs are here a what-formalism and the written-down equations a what-model, which in order to become executable has to be “coded” in a how-formalism, that is, a suitable programming language. In contrast, in connection with analog hardware, ODEs serve not to simulate some other dynamical system on the used hardware, but to model the physical computing system itself. I consider here only this second use-case.

In DC, different how-formalisms (programming languages, abstract models of “computation”) can be be encoded into each other. For SPPD how-formalisms (formalisms to specify samplers, neural spike generation mechanisms or DNA sniplet formation), mutual encodings have not been studied as far as I can see. In the dynamical systems modeling domain, if we restrict the
discussion to ODE modeling, there is only a single how-formalism, namely the ODE formalism, and the question of formalism interrelations is moot. If we would include other dynamical systems formalisms into our discussion, numerous mutual encoding relations can be found. In particular, continuous-time, continuous-space formalisms (ODEs, partial differential equations, field equations) can be arbitrarily well approximated by discrete-time, discrete-space formalisms (like numerical ODE solvers, cellular automata, finite-element formalisms). Unlike in DC, where such formalism translations are precise and transparent and can be easily established in student homework exercises, these continuous-to-discrete encodings in the D domain are approximate, finding them is not trivial and analysing the approximation quality can be very difficult.

Take-home message 10: In dynamical systems oriented modeling of computing systems (restricted here to ODE modeling), the single how-formalism is the textbook ODE formalism. In computing systems modeled by ODEs, an unbounded plethora of geometrical, qualitative phenomena may arise. A few of them, in particular fixed points, attractors, bifurcations and modes, are already widely being perceived in the cognitive and neurosciences.

Intrinsic semantics. In L and P modeling there are canonical ways how the environment (γ in Figure [1]) is mathematically modeled (in segment c), namely by the set-theoretic constructs of $S$-structures and probability spaces. In dynamical systems oriented modeling no canonical view on how to model the environment exists. The question is rarely asked and I dare say under-researched. There are historical reasons for this semantic almost-blindness. Starting with Newton, dynamical systems modeling has for a long time been the homeground of physics. Experimental physicists try hard to isolate their system of interest from the environment. This made them use a kind of ODE which are, in mathematical terminology, autonomous, that is, their equations $\dot{x} = f(x, a)$ have no input term. The historical development of dynamical systems mathematics was by and large confined to autonomous systems. Starting, say, in the 1960ies, there was explosive mathematical progress in perceiving, analysing and (importantly) visualising (Peitgen, 1986) qualitative phenomena like attractors or chaos. Other disciplines besides physics and even the general public became fascinated by dynamical systems and began to interpret their respective objects of study as qualitative dynamical phenomena. In the cognitive sciences this became a established perspective around the year 1990 (Schöner et al., 1986; Port and van Gelder, 1995). However, the available mathematical tools and metaphors were rooted in, and confined to, autonomous input-free systems. This barred the way to develop dedicatedly semantic accounts of how the modeled systems interact with their environment. In neuro- or cognitive modeling, qualitative phenomena inside the modeled neural or cognitive system were not related to its outside environment, but were mapped to system-internal cognitive constructs and processes. An important theme was (and is) how symbols and “concepts” can be interpreted by qualitative dynamical phenomena — the neuro-symbolic integration problem (Besold et al., 2017).

In my opinion, in order to work out a genuine intrinsic semantics for dynamical systems models of “computing” systems, one would have to move from autonomous system models like $\dot{x} = f(x, a)$ to input-driven ones like $\dot{x} = f(x, u, a)$. But, as I remarked earlier, mathematical theory development for qualitative phenomena in such non-autonomous systems is far less developed than for autonomous ones (Kloeden and Pötzsche, 2013). Even clarifying the notion of an attractor — the most focussed dynamical phenomenon in current dynamical systems oriented cognitive modeling — is laden with mathematical intricacies (Poetzsche, 2011; Manjunath and Jaeger, 2014). It will take a while before this venue can be widely explored outside an inner circle of specialized mathematicians.

An easier alternative to embarking on non-autonomous dynamical systems is to cast the entire
system comprised of both the “computing” agent and its environment as a single autonomous system. The computing system is then seen as a subsystem. This view has been adopted in two classical dynamical systems models of biological agents, albeit not based on ODEs but on discrete-time, finite-state cellular automata. The first is von Neumann’s model of self-replicating automata (Burks, 1966) (which also marks the invention of cellular automata in the first place), the second is the model of autopoietic living systems by Varela and Maturana (Varela et al., 1974). In both models, the “computing”, rather: “living” system is modeled as a delimited, moving, shape-changing and growing area within a cellular space-time grid. The theory of autopoietic systems is, in a sense, explicitly anti-semantic. What happens inside such a system is not reflecting, or representing, outside givens: “In this sense we will always find that one cannot understand the phenomenon of cognition as if there were ‘facts’ and objects ‘out there’, which one only would have to fetch and put into the head. [...] The experience of every thing ‘out there’ becomes configured by the human structure in a specific way...” (my translation from a German translation (Maturana and Varela, 1984) of Maturana and Varela’s book El ´arbol del conocimiento). Instead, an autopoietic system constructs its own internal world, which is shaped and connected to the outside only because this organization has to meet requirements of self-stabilization and survival. Maturana and Varela have coined the term structural coupling for this principle (Maturana and Varela, 1984). Their biologically motivated theory has given rise to schools of epistemology called (radical) constructivism (Schmidt, 1987) and enactivism (Wilson and Foglia, 2017). As far as I am aware, a mathematical formalization of structural coupling in terms of qualitative phenomena in dynamical systems has not been attempted.

ODE-based models of “computing” agents interacting with their environment are naturally designed as two coupled ODE subsystems. Call the system state vectors of the agent and the environment $x_a$ and $x_e$, respectively. The agent can perceive the environment through observations $O(x_e)$, and the environment is influenced by actions, or controls $C(x_a)$. This leads to coupled equations $x_a = f_a(x_a, O(x_e)), x_e = f_e(x_e, C(x_a))$ which fit precisely into the segments $a$ and $c$ of Figure 1 with the observations and controls placed in segment $b$. Such models are often used in nonlinear systems and control engineering (though here the match with Figure 1 is incomplete since the “controller” subsystem $x_a$ also receives a control target input from outside the modeled “plant” $x_e$). Such models have also been discussed in some works in the theory of intelligent agents, in particular Ashby’s classic model of the brain (Ashby, 1952) and, much later, Beer’s pledges to model cognitive-biological agents in terms of continuous dynamical systems rather than within the conceptual framework of symbolic computing (Beer, 1995). The fit into Figure 1 is here precise because this line of research aims at modeling autonomous agents which do not receive external “target” signals but instead generate their goals internally. In control engineering and also in the autonomous agent modeling lines, the focus of modeling lies on understanding conditions for dynamical stability. Qualitative, cognitively interpretable phenomena arising in the agent subsystem $x_a = f_a(x_a, O(x_e))$ are not typically considered in control engineering. In low-dimensional simulation experiments (Beer, 1995), Beer discusses how geometric structures in the phase portrait of the agent $x_a$ relate to geometric information obtained from the phase portrait of the environment $x_e$. Beer’s aim is to demonstrate the general usefulness of dynamical systems formalism for studying autonomous behavior. As far as I can see, research aiming at a systematic mathematical modeling of intrinsic semantic relationships between agent $x_a$ and environment $x_e$ subsystems has not been attempted yet. It would be most rewarding to develop mathematical approaches to understand qualitative phenomena which are simultaneously emerging in two subsystems $x_a$ and $x_e$ which interact with each other through observation or control signals or, more generally, through shared variables.

*Take-home message 11: The study of how cognitively interpretable, qualitative phenomena aris-
ing in the internal dynamics of an agent relate to dynamical models of its environment has barely begun for ODE formalisms. Appropriate ways of achieving this may have to wait for a further development of non-autonomous dynamical systems theory. Existing dynamical models of agent-environment interaction use the same formalism for both. This is different from logic-symbolic and probabilistic modeling where the external environment is mathematically cast differently from the “computing” system. In existing agent-environment dynamical models, both parties are modeled on the basis of the same carrier substrate, namely dynamical (sub)systems described with the same formalism.

Formal time. The formal time model is hidden in the dot in $\dot{x}$, which is the common shorthand for the derivative $\frac{dx}{dt}$ with respect to time $t$. This real-valued time $t \in \mathbb{R}$ is considered in physics, neuroscience and engineering as capturing the continuous arrow of physical time, one of the reasons why ODE formalisms are so natural for physicists and engineers. The connection to physical time is obvious, direct and convincing for natural scientists and engineers. This is fundamentally different from the formal time in DC modeling, which is logical-inferential in its origin and becomes mapped to the physical time of physical computers in essentially arbitrary scalings (faster on faster computers). The fact that a formal “1 sec” segment of $t$ really becomes one physical second when ODE circuit models are realized in analog electronic hardware has important and not easy to deal with consequences for analog computing practice. First, the designer of analog circuits must match time constants in his/her formal ODE models to the physical time on board of the microchip. Second, assigning different time constants to different system variables is an utterly delicate affair, because slightly different settings of these time constants may lead to qualitatively different system dynamics. Third, the physical input signals to (non-autonomous) ODE systems evolve in the same physical time as the computing system. Thus, analog computing systems must be timescale-matched to their input-delivering environment. On the positive side, this makes it natural to design analog computing systems that are physically embedded in their environment through continuous input- and output signals. Digital computing faces deep-rooted difficulties with continuous real-time processing and the common solution there is to build or buy machines whose digital clock frequency is so fast that the inevitable delays of “processing” the current input value become non-disruptive for the task at hand. It is however technically difficult to construct analog hardware that is both small-sized and slow. In analog electronics, small-sizedness conflicts with slowness because slow time constants spell out into large capacitors or very low voltages, both of which quickly hit limits. In our own work with analog neuromorphic microchips we found this the most challenging obstacle when we set out to implement an RNN for a task of online heartbeat classification from real-time ECG signals: these signals were too slow for our microchip and we had to find ways to exploit collective phenomena in the RNN to create slow derived system variables [He et al., 2019b].

These difficulties render the practice of designing and using analog (especially neuromorphic) computers in “situated” online processing tasks markedly different from how digital machinery is used. One cannot use the same machine and neural network model for fast and for slow tasks. The formal model timescales must match the physical machine’s which in turn must match the ones of the task. In DC, the only limit regarding time in situated online processing scenarios is given by the digital clock frequency. Provided that adequate “real-time” operating systems and programs are available, any task with slower timescales can be solved with digital machines by buffering variable values for waiting times as long as the slow task timescale demands. Furthermore, the qualitative behavior of analog circuitry and their (RNN) how-models depends sensitively on the settings of numerical parameters in the models, especially (but not exclusively) on time constants. A similar fine-tuned dependency on physical and model numerical parameters is no issue in DC. On the plus side: analog computing systems that are
directly embedded in their task environment through real-time input and output signals can, in principle and like biological brains, cope with broad-band signal interfacing with virtually zero delay (up to speed of electric signal propagation limits).

Take-home message 12: In ODE-based how-models the timescales of the model must match the physical timescales of the input / output signals if the physical computing system is used in online tasks. This is similar to the external operating conditions and internal mechanisms of biological brains, but very different from digital computing.

The hierarchical structuring of formal constructs is intimately connected with timescales in ODE modeling. When researchers in cognitive neuroscience, robotics and autonomous agents or machine learning conceive of their respective intelligent agent architectures as dynamical systems, they almost by reflex assign fast timescales to subprocesses that operate close to the sensory-motor interface boundary (segments $b$, $\beta$), and the assign slow timescales to subprocesses operating at “higher” cognitive levels. Multiple timescale dynamics are of general interest for complex systems modeling in all natural sciences. A rich body of mathematical theory has grown [Kuehn, 2015]. When writing down ODEs, slow versus fast timescales can be imposed on system variables by multiplying time constants into their differential equation. Also, in ODE systems all of whose variables have the same (fast) time constant, new descriptive variables can be discovered through mathematical analyses which reflect slowly changing collective characteristics of the underlying system. This can be done in many ways. For instance, complex chaotic attractors can be described in terms of their make-up from connected lobes, which can be discerned from each other geometrically (by approximating them with periodic attractors) or by registering dwelling times (the dynamics stays for some time in one lobe before it moves to another) or by the possibility to stabilize the lobes [Babloyantz and Lourenço, 1994]. In computational neuroscience and machine learning this is explicitly and effectively exploited in slow feature analysis [Wiskott and Sejnowski, 2002] where slowness of derived variables makes them interpretable as cognitive representations of object concepts. In physical systems, the emergence of multiple timescales is often connected to mechanisms that cannot be captured with ODEs, in particular delays in system-internal signal propagation and spatial extension of systems.

Most qualitative phenomena arising in ODE systems are described via static geometric-topological conditions in phase portraits. Time is by and large factored out in the definitions of phenomena like fixed points, attractors or bifurcations. The “speed” of state variable evolution is irrelevant for the mathematical definition of these constructs. Time enters these definition at best in the form of asymptotic (infinite duration) characterizations of convergence. With maybe the exception of a spatial hierarchical structure described for chaotic attractors or certain structures in bifurcation cascades, these “timeless” geometry-defined phenomena offer no hooks for hierarchicity. In my opinion, timescale hierarchies are key for finding hierarchicity in dynamical systems. Compared to the rich and advanced state of the art in characterizing geometry-defined phenomena, the study of timescale-induced phenomenal structuring is in an early stage. There is, to my knowledge, no established terminology for discussing this theme. I used the word “mode” earlier in this article to denote the condition that a nonstationary or non-autonomous dynamical system transits through a sequence of hierarchically nested periods where within each period it exhibits dynamical or statistical phenomena that are characteristic for this period. The word “mode” is suggestive and variously used in the literature, but it does not have a canonical definition. I use it in the (admittedly vague) sense that the values taken by slower variables characteristically modulate the behavior of the respective next-faster variables. How this modulation is discerned or quantified is up to the mathematician or physicist who tries to understand “what” is going on. A mode could be specified or quantified, for instance, by
characteristic frequency mixtures, the visited region in state space, specific signal shapes or begin- and end-marking events.

Mathematical and applied research on multiple timescale dynamics in ODE models is so rich that a comprehensive treatment cannot be attempted here. I single out one kind of system model which offers relevant insights for understanding ODE systems as “computing”. These are recurrent neural network (RNN) models where a stack of neuronal “layers” corresponds to a sequence of increasingly slower timescales, starting from a “low” fast sensor-motor interface layer to “higher” layers whose increasingly slower neuronal state variables are interpreted as representing increasingly compounded “features” or “concepts”. Examples are RNN based robot control systems where these timescale differentiations are predesigned into the neuronal hierarchy through time constants (Yamashita and Tani, 2008); or a hierarchical RNN model for the unsupervised discovery learning of increasingly slower components in multiple-timescale input signals, where the different timescales are predesigned by way of using faster or slower “leaking” in the used neuron model (Jaeger, 2007). In neuroscience, the idea that biological brains operate at fast timescales close to their sensor-motor periphery, and at increasingly slower timescales as one moves “upward” in the anatomical hierarchy toward forebrain structures, has been advanced on the basis of theoretical argument corroborated by simulation studies (Kiebel et al., 2008), and it also has been confirmed by physiological measurement (Murray et al., 2014). In machine learning architectures the formal neurons in higher layers are made slow by adorning their ODEs with slower time constants — “higher” neurons are slower neurons. With regards to biological brains, it is still unclear to which extent (and on the basis of what physiological mechanisms) individual neurons in different brain regions are slower or faster; or how or to what extent different timescales of neural integration of information arises from collective mechanisms (Goldman et al., 2008). Even when all neurons across the hierarchy are individually equally fast, slowness in higher layers can arise as a property of derived variables like spiketrain autocorrelation timescales (Murray et al., 2014) or collective variables like local field potentials (Kiebel et al., 2008).

The distinction between how- and what-models becomes a little blurred in hierarchical RNN models. They can be regarded as how-models inasmuch as they are written down as ODE systems which can become realized by electrical engineers in analog neuromorphic circuitry. On the other hand one might consider timescales a geometric, qualitative property that admits a cognitive interpretation. Then, according to my proposed informal definition, these models appear as what-models. This view is immanent in the intuitions about physical intrinsic semantics held by those cognitive modelers who posit that brain-internal variables represent objects or situations in the external environment, as revealed in this quote: “Many aspects of brain function can be understood in terms of a hierarchy of temporal scales at which representations of the environment evolve. The lowest level of this hierarchy corresponds to fast fluctuations associated with sensory processing, whereas the highest levels encode slow contextual changes in the environment, under which faster representations unfold.” (Kiebel et al., 2008).

The low-to-high layering in hierarchical RNN architectures can be feedforward (lower layers feed only to higher layers but not vice versa) or bidirectional (with both “bottom-up” and “top-down” couplings between the layers. Biological brains are eminently bidirectional, as are most formal models in computational neuroscience and machine learning. I will only consider bidirectional models here. With regards to timescales there are noteworthy similarities and dissimilarities between bidirectional hierarchical RNN models and digital computer programs. Large computer programs are written by professional programmers in a hierarchically organized fashion, with higher-level modules (subprograms, scripts, functions, objects) calling lower-level ones as subroutines. Such programs are bidirectional too: the higher-level module “calls” the
lower-level one and typically sends down initialization parameters; and conversely, the lower-level subroutines send the results of their computation upwards to the calling module. As I remarked earlier, this automatically leads to a runtime hierarchy: executing higher-level modules necessarily takes longer than executing the lower-level because the latter are called inside the higher-level one. The resulting timescale hierarchy could be called a waiting-time hierarchy: the symbolic configuration update step assigned to the higher-level module is pending in an indeterminate status as long as the called lower-level subroutines are being executed. In contrast, in bidirectional RNN systems, all neurons on all levels are active simultaneously, and the top-down and bottom-up information flows are continually streaming without need (or opportunity) for waiting. This is yet another reason why brains cannot easily be likened to symbolic computing machines, and why timescales are a key issue when one wants to develop conceptualizations of “computing” that extend beyond the DC paradigm and include brains.

For mathematical analyses of top-down influences from higher to lower layers it is decisive how much slower the higher layer develops. If the timescale separation is very large (say two orders of magnitude or more), the slow evolution speed in the higher layer can be approximately regarded as standing still compared to the fast lower layer. It is then possible and common practice to consider the variables fed to the lower from the higher layer as constant control parameters in the equations governing the lower layer, and different processing “modes” of the lower layer can be separately studied by considering different static settings of these control parameters. If the timescale separation is not very large, analyses become difficult. In RNN and cognitive dynamics research, one access route is to trace the emergence and decay of transient qualitative phenomena in the lower layer as being guided by the attractor structure that would be defined if the timescales were widely separated (Werneck et al., 2018).

Strictly layered architectures are popular in machine learning, AI and control engineering (Albus, 1993). When they are bidirectional, they probe the limits of today’s mathematical analyses. Biological brains (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991) and complex practical control architectures (Thrun et al., 2006) have a modular structure which is more complex than a linear ordering of processing layers, with many lateral and diagonal processing pathways. Furthermore, it may happen that a variable that is fast at some time may turn into a slow one later and vice versa. Analysing, or merely characterizing such timescale meta-dynamics is beyond the reach of today’s mathematics.

Take-home message 13: Timescale hierarchies, possibly structurally reflected in layered architecture designs, appear to be an important ingredient of dynamical systems models to qualify them as “computing”. Different timescales in (neuromorphic) analog hardware and their mathematical models can arise from a variety of formal and physical effects, for which we still lack a comprehensive understanding. The formal nature of multiple timescales differs fundamentally between digital computers (waiting time hierarchies) and parallel analog systems (continually interpenetrating bottom-up and top-down streams of information with different time constants).

2.3 Section summary

The purpose of this section was to help myself and the reader to understand better what we may mean when we speak of a “theory of computing”. This is a fairly well demarcated concept in symbolic / digital computing — there is a choice of university textbooks for “Theoretical Computer Science” which by and large all present the same canonical material. When today we speak of “computing”, our understanding of this word is pre-shaped by the paradigm of symbolic computing to a large extent. But brains work differently from digital computers,
and so will future non-digital hardware systems, neuromorphic or otherwise. I proposed the name “modal computing” (MC) as an umbrella term for any approach to engineer physical systems which aims at exploiting nonlinear “modal” physical phenomena for “computing” — just as cleverly, opportunistically, and resource-efficiently as biological brain evolution did. In order to establish MC as an engineering science — a faraway goal — new theories have to be developed which formally codify a conceptualization of “computing” that is as different from the DC paradigm as a brain is from a desktop computer, and maybe even more different. This is a voyage into the unknown. But it is not a voyage blindfolded. A wealth of relevant ideas, experimental designs, and formal theories has already accumulated in a diversity of disciplines and historical lines of thinking. But its richness and diversity is also confusing. In this section I attempted to find compass coordinates to help navigating in this intellectual heritage.

An exhaustive exploration of all existing relevant insight is beyond anybody’s means. I had to constrain my exploration by a number of decisions which reflect my limited knowledge and personal views:

- From the outset I declare a set of four conditions which I deem necessary for a physical system to be “computing”, namely that it operates in time, that it is open to input or output, that some aspects of it must be interpretable in cognitive terms, and that it must admit a semantic interpretation.

- I restrict myself to investigate formal mathematical theories only, which means I ignored a bounty of philosophical and empirical insight.

- As a coarse scheme for organizing my exploration I adopted a simple-minded division between physical computing systems, their environment and the interface boundary between the two on one side, and their respective formal models on the other side of what I called the “modeling mirror” (Figure 1).

- I divided formal models of computing systems into two classes. How-models capture the “mechanics” of computing processes, and what-models give accounts of the computing processes in cognitively interpretable categories which admit semantic mappings to the system’s environment.

- I limited my selection of modeling approaches to the ones whose underlying host mathematics is logic, probability theory, or dynamical systems theory (L, P and D, Figure 2). Within the P and D domains I further restricted my coverage to sampling-based models and ODE based models, respectively.

In each L, P, D domain I discussed four themes: mutual transformation / translation interrelationships between formalisms; formal semantics; how time is formalized; and how constructs within a formalism are hierarchically organized. This choice is undoubtedly influenced by my lifelong exposure to digital computing theory. Except maybe for time, these themes are central theorizing coordinates for digital computer science. All the non-digital information processing models (in the P and D domains) that I visited reveal that these themes can be worked out in significantly different ways than we know it from DC. What we see in those other domains can be called “computing” on the grounds that

- the respective authors call it so;
much of this literature relates concretely or by allusion to brains and human cognition, which is the 2370 year old root of today’s intuitions about “computing”;

all of the visited formalisms and models lend themselves to solve practically useful information processing tasks;

all satisfy the four necessary conditions that I posited (temporality, input/output, cognitive and semantic interpretability).

Theory development for DC is mature and unifying meta-views are canonical, which allowed me to inspect this domain almost in its entirety. In the P and D domains, the untamed diversity of formal models forced me to limit the coverage to quite narrow subdomains, namely sampling-based (SPPD) and ODE based modeling methods, respectively. Here is a summary of what I saw on my journey.

**Interrelationships between formalisms.** DC how-formalism (in particular, programming languages and abstract models of computing machines) can be transparently sorted into the Chomsky hierarchy, with “higher” formalisms being able to simulate all “lower” ones. Within the highest-level class of formalisms (the Turing-equivalent ones), how-formalisms can also be informally ordered according by to how far they abstract away from the 0-1 switching of binary circuits toward cognitive interpretability. What-formalisms (formal logics) can likewise be ordered according to their formal intrinsic semantic expressiveness. These ordering systems tie “the theory” of DC into a unit that fits into a single textbook. This crystalline transparency sets intimidating standards for attempts to build theories for other sorts of “computing”.

The how-models of SPPD are sampling algorithms in cases where the SPPD models are physically realized on digital machines; or they are mathematical models of stochastic physical processes when the target hardware is, for instance, analog spiking neuromorphic microchips or DNA computers. The formalisms in which one specifies sampling algorithms or neural or DNA random dynamics stem from different background mathematics, which makes it hard to analyse their mutual relationships; and if one considers sampling independently from the mechanics of the generating how-models in the abstract light of the resulting generation sequence of sample points, there is yet no generally adopted ordering criterion to compare sampling sequences (statistical efficiency might serve as such a criterion). I do not think however that finding useful ordering principles is inherently impossible, an invitation for future research. The what-formalism (singular) for SPPD is the textbook formalism of probability theory, with the cognitively interpretable concept of a probability distribution in its core.

In ODE modeling, the how-formalism is the textbook formalism of ODEs. The how-models are concretely spelled-out systems of ODEs which specify physical “computing” (analog) hardware. Physicists would state that any kind of deterministic physical system can be described by ODEs to arbitrary degrees of approximation. Thus the class of ODE computing models is as diverse as one can think of physical computing systems. If the mission statement of MC makes sense, this is an open-ended diversity, which makes it seem that finding a unifying ordering principle for ODE models is impossible. What-models arise in ODE modeling through the identification of qualitative phenomena like fixed points, attractors, bifurcations and processing modes, to name the ones which today are being most widely used as anchors for cognitive interpretations. ODEs are a well
for an unbounded number other qualitative phenomena that await discovery. This may imply that a general what-theory is impossible for ODE modeling.

It becomes clear that in the DC, SPPD and ODE domains alike we face voluminous assortments of formalisms and models. Finding criteria and mathematical (meta-) methods to relate them to each other is a sign of a domain’s integrity and maturity. Only the millennia-old field of symbolic computing can claim maturity in this regard. Here is the upshot of this high-altitude flight over the theory landscapes in DC, SPPD, and ODE:

- DC offers a wealth both of how- and what-formalism which are however transparently and comprehensively interrelated.
- SPPD has a single “master” what-formalism and a yet unsorted multiplicity of how-formalisms and models.
- Conversely, ODE modeling has a single how-formalism but what-formalizing may be principally open-ended and un-unifiable.

**Formal semantics.** Formal semantic theories can only be stated for the relationship between two formalisms. In our case this means that they give mathematical accounts of the “meaning” relationships between cognitively interpretable constructs in what-formalisms and formal correlates of objects, facts, processes etc. in mathematical models of a computing system’s environment. Such semantic relations create bridges between segments a and c in Figure 1. I find it a mandatory component of any theory of “computing” that it allows one to express how what happens “cognitively” inside a computing system, relates to conditions in its environment.

Every logic that serves as a DC what-formalism comes equipped with a formal semantic. It precisely defines how the formulas that can be written down in the logic (segment a) become interpreted in formal models (in c) of environments. These formal models are cast as certain *richly structured sets* called S-structures. Formal logics offer no mathematical account of the interface boundary b between a computing system and its environment. In the view of logicians, the symbols and expressions written down in a logic formalism are directly denoting something in the S-structures, without an intermediary exchange of “data” or “signals”. When physical digital computers (segment α) are used in the physical world γ, it is up to the physical (human or automated) user of the computer to establish a physical intrinsic semantic linkage between the computer and its task environment by providing appropriate input and interpreting the computer’s output appropriately. Formal logic is blind to the interface boundary problem and cannot capture what “appropriately” means.

In fundamental contrast, probability theory (the singular what-formalism in all probabilistic modeling, not only in SPPD) captures “data” or “signals” in its core constructs, namely random variables and sample spaces. Random variables are the formal correlate of measurement or observation procedures and apparatuses. Sample spaces are sets made from the data values that these observation procedures may deliver; they thus perfectly coincide with segment b in Figure 1. Like in logics, the formal models of the environment are richly structured sets called probability spaces, which additionally are endowed with a probability measure. In the frequentist understanding of probability, this probability measure reflects physical randomness. Probability spaces constitute segment c. Random variables can be regarded as semantic operators in that they connect segments a with c through b. However, this connection is unidirectional. While random variables capture the input given by the environment to inform the shaping of probability distributions which are modeled in a, there is no provision for capturing any impact which an output
from a probabilistic “reasoning” process modeled by the how-formalism in a could have on the probability space.

In ODE modeling the semantic situation is again fundamentally different. In dynamical systems modeling the computing system and its environment are seen as coupled subsystems within a single dynamical agent-environment system. Both subsystems a and c are described through ODEs. They are bidirectionally coupled through shared variables which constitute the interface boundary b. The mathematical substrate for how-modeling both the computing “agent” as well as its environment are vector fields — there is no difference in mathematical kind between the modeled inner and outer worlds. In dynamical systems oriented research where agent-environment interactions are studied, these interactions are not understood as “semantic”; in the epistemological view of constructivism and enactivism these models are even advanced as anti-semantic, denying that inside an agent there are mental “representations” of outward givens. — However, if one adopts the view which I take in this article, namely to locate the formal intrinsic semantic relationship between what-models and models of the environment, the semantic question arises again. Concretely, one would ask how cognitively interpretable dynamical phenomena (attractors, bifurcations, modes... in segment a) can be formally connected to environment models. This is unchartered territory.

These findings reveal that there are indeed very different ways to think about semantics. “Semantics” is not a clearly defined concept and every philosopher worth his/her salt will understand this term in a different way. This opens many degrees of freedom for developing MC theories. Here is the upshot of our high-speed drive through the semantics challenge in DC, SPPD, and ODE:

- In DC and SPPD, accounts of intrinsic semantics are firmly established in fundamental mathematical definitions. They specify how cognitively interpretable formal constructs in models of “computing” system relate to formal models of their environments. Nothing comparable is yet available for ODE modeling.
- In DC and SPPD, the mathematical “substrate” of environment models is different in kind from the substrate of the cognitively interpretable constructs in agent models, namely set-theoretic structures versus symbolic configurations and probability distributions, respectively. In ODE modeling, both sides are made of the same mathematical material, namely vector fields.
- SPPD and ODE modeling comprises canonical constructs for the interface boundary (data, signals) between a computing system and its environment; logic doesn’t.

**Formal time.** Regardless how one understands the nature of “computing”, one thing seems inevitable: physical computing systems need time to “compute”. Any formal theory of any kind of computing should also model the computing system’s time, certainly in its how-formalisms and models. They are the springboards from which system engineers jump across the modeling mirror and build machines, guided by formal how-models in the back of their minds. In the three domains that I inspected, time is modeled in interestingly different ways in how-models. Even more interesting are the differences between DC, SPPD and ODE with regard of how the physical time that is modeled in how-models relates to the “conceptual” time that is (or is not) formalized in what-models.

In DC how-formalisms, time enters in the form of update steps where one symbolic configuration is transformed into the next. These steps unfold into nonzero-duration increments of physical time on the physical digital machines. The physical duration can be longer or shorter (depending on the clock speed and the degree of CPU-internal parallelization) and
it is not modeled in typical how-formalisms (real-time operating systems excepted). When
one sees these update steps in the light of logic-based what-formalisms — the light shin-
ing from Aristotle and Turing — they are not seen as temporal at all, but as inferential.
The next symbolic configuration follows logically from the previous. The verb “follow” is
fascinatingly ambiguous, with one of its meanings being temporal succession and another
one being logical implication. There are more words which have a temporal and a logical-
inferential side, for instance “consequence”, “conclude”. Seen from this angle, the history
of DC could be summarized like this: First it took philosophers and mathematicians al-
most 2300 years to strip logical inference off from the physical brain’s physical time, a
process which became finalized in Tarski’s reconstruction of logical implication in terms
of static inclusion relations between classes of $S$-structures. Then temporal succession
was re-introduced by Turing in the form of an ordered sequence of discrete symbolic con-
figuration update “steps”. Ultimately, electrical engineers and chip manufacturers rejoin
physical time by realizing these steps within the clock cycles of digital microchips.
In SPPD how-models time can be cast as a discrete sequence of update steps (in sampling
algorithms destined for execution on digital machines), or it can be cast as the continuous
time-line $t \in \mathbb{R}$ when the sampling process is modeled for use in non-digital hardware,
in particular in analog spiking neuromorphic microchips. In both variants there appears
a fundamental difference to DC thinking. The cognitively interpretable constructs (the
probability distributions handled in what-models) need nonzero timespans to be grown.
The longer a sampling process carries on, the more precisely it defines its distribution. The
cognitively interpretable constructs are smeread out over time. If one sees a “computing”
process as reflecting some aspect of a succession of “mental states” (which Turing did —
and we all stand on his shoulders), then these mental “states” become defined only across
time, with their constituting components (the representations of distributions) growing,
overlapping in time, decaying. This is in stark contrast to the DC view where at each time
point the “mental state” is perfectly and completely defined by a symbolic configuration,
and future configurations do not gradually grow out of previous ones but are created in
their completion immediately and discontinuously.
ODE how-formalisms (ODE specifications of biological or engineered computing systems)
use the real line $\mathbb{R}$ as their model of time. The temporal evolution $\dot{x}$ of the state vector
$x$ progresses smoothly and with perfect real-valued precision. This makes it possible for
engineers and neuroscientists to directly check the adequacy of their ODE how-models
in matching their physical target systems by measuring physical system variables with
appropriate measurement apparatuses. It also makes it necessary for engineers to design
their analog hardware such that its physical timescales correspond to the ones of the
model. In the light of own experience with analog neuromorphic hardware, I consider it
a decisive challenge for future MC engineering to master timescale spreads and timescale
interactions both in theory and in physical devices and systems. The problem of setting
up (hierarchies of) appropriate time constants is intimately connected to the theme of
hierarchical organisation of “computing” and will be discussed below. — Most of the
cognitively interpretable constructs treated in what-formalisms and models (attractors,
bifurcations, etc.) are defined by topological-geometrical phenomena in phase portraits.
“Speed” becomes factored out in these analyses: phase portraits are made from trajectory
lines, and the information how “fast” the state evolution progresses along these lines is
discarded. The exception is the phenomenon of modes, which are temporally defined —
more about them later. This is a parallel with DC and probabilistic modeling, whose cog-
nitively interpretable what-constructs (symbolic configurations, distributions) are likewise
atemporal.
Human cognition proceeds in time, physical computing systems run in time, and we all share a primal intuitive understanding of “time”. One thus would expect a universal, intuitively immediately graspable capture of time in “computing” theories and formalisms. But we find diversity and detachment from intuition. Here is the upshot of our meandering sailing trip through the time modeling challenge in DC, SPPD, and ODE:

- Time in how-formalism is cast as a sequence of discrete update steps (in DC and in sampling algorithms) or as continuous (in dynamical systems models of neural sampling processes and ODEs).
- Matching formal time in how-formalism with physical time in the modeled computing systems is arbitrary in DC, and well-defined and measurable in ODE. In SPPD both occurs depending on whether the sampling becomes physically instantiated on digital or non-digital physical systems.
- The cognitively interpretable constructs that are commonly expressed in the what-models of DC, SPPD and ODE are almost all a-temporal, which is somewhat amazing since human cognition is temporal. The one exception are modes in ODE models, which are inherently temporal phenomena. They will play an important role in my suggestions for starting a theory of MC in the concluding section of this article.

Hierarchical structuring of formal constructs. A characteristic of human cognitive processing is compositionality: we can compound syllables into words into phrases, bind noses, eyes and mouths into faces, plan complex plans that unfold in cascades of sub-plans to reach sub-goals — we can think complex thoughts. This ability has been claimed constitutional for human intelligence, and it seems natural to request the same from any full-scale “computing” system and its theoretical models.

In DC how-formalisms, hierarchies appear in two main ways. First, the symbolic configurations, which are stepwise constructed when how-models are “executed”, typically are organized as hierarchically nested composites. Second, this syntactic compositionality of symbolic configurations is typically tied in with a procedural hierarchical organization of “runs” of programs or formal machine models: symbolic substructures are built within program “loops” or by calling “subroutines”, with the effect that substructures correspond to sub-intervals in processing time. Writing a nontrivial computer program amounts to breaking down the global input-to-output functionality imposed by the given task into a nested sequence of intermediate goals and subgoals. Much sweat is spent by students in software engineering classes to acquire this skill. — The symbolic expressions which are written down in DC how-formalisms (that is, logics) typically contain nested functional expressions which are encodings of (parts of) the symbolic configurations in how-formalisms.

In SPPD what-formalisms (and probabilistic models of “computing” in general), the primary cognitively interpretable constructs are distributions. Distributions can be seen as compositional in several ways. First, a number of popular stochastic spiking neural network architectures are layered, in analogy to the peripheral-to-central processing organization in human brains. When used in (for example) in face recognition tasks, samples collected from low-level neurons are considered to represent local visual features (like colors, edges or dots) of input images, whose information becomes increasingly combined and globalized in higher layers (from edges to contour segments to eyes to faces). The composition operation here is different from DC. In intuitive terms, compound symbolic configurations in DC are put together like Lego bricks. Higher-level distributions in spiking neural architectures are statistically determined from the sampling dynamics in the
lower layer. This could be likened to an argumentation process where a stream of lower-level “arguments” integrates up into higher-level “beliefs”. Second, in Bayesian models of cognitive information processing, “higher” distributions arise as hyperdistributions, that is, distributions of distributions. Third, a fundamental textbook operation on distributions is to combine them into products (where the component distributions remain statistically independent) or joint distributions (wherein the “component” distributions interact and become statistically dependent on each other). Conversely, high-dimensional distributions can sometimes be more or less precisely factorized into low-dimensional component distributions.

In ODE systems, a (in my view the) key to hierarchical structuring of qualitative phenomena are timescale hierarchies. In multiple-timescale ODE systems, the dynamics evolves through a sequence of hierarchically nested modes in alignment with the nested characteristic timescales of mode-controlling system variables. According to a widespread view in the cognitive and neurosciences, the hierarchy of timescales is a mirror of the compositional hierarchy of cognitive “representations”. This leads to the pervasive idea that cognitive architectures are layered structures in which “higher” processing layers evolve more slowly than “lower” layers. When there are both bottom-up and top-down couplings between neighboring layers, mathematical analysis becomes challenging. Furthermore, in biological brains and advanced technical control systems no linear ordering of processing layers exists. Subsystems interact not only along a single top-down / bottom-up direction, but are also coupled laterally or diagonally. Relative timescales may change, slow subsystems turning into fast ones and vice versa. Such phenomena are hardly understood.

The essence of compositional hierarchies in L, P, D is that elements that are higher in the hierarchy are made from elements from lower layers. This “made from” relation, however, can mean quite different things in different approaches to modeling “computing”. Here is the upshot of our short dash into the thickets of hierarchical structuring phenomena of DC, SPPD, and ODE:

- The symbolic configurations in DC how- and what-formalisms are structured in a static-syntactic Lego-brick kind of hierarchical compositionality.
- Probability distributions can be seen as hierarchically structured in several ways, all of which are not “syntactically” defined but can be more appropriately understood by observing that component distributions shed some of their statistical information into the compound distribution.
- A key to hierarchic organization in complex dynamical systems is a hierarchy of timescales, which induce a hierarchically nested sequence of processing modes.

The title of this section is Staking out the “computing” theory landscape. I could cover the dominion of digital computing almost in its entire extension, though of course with simplifications and omissions. This was possible because theoretical (digital) computer science is mature, unified and canonized; thus all I had to do is to map the theory to the organigram of Figure [1].

For probabilistic and dynamical systems oriented models of “computing”, unified meta-views are not in sight. In order to not get lost I selected small sectors of them, namely sampling-based computational methods to represent probability distributions, and ODE modeling. But even within this limited angle of vision, landmarks and signposts came into view which invite us to explore “computing” in many more directions than those of the digital-symbolic paradigm. Here is my personal grand total of this first expedition into the landscape of “computing”: 38
• The way of how one can conceptualize “computing” is decisively pre-shaped by the choice of mathematical “substrate” formalism (here: logic, probability theory, dynamical systems).

• Different conceptualizations of “computing” grow around different aspects of human cognition (logical inference, probabilistic reasoning and degrees of belief, continuous sensor-motor coordination).

• Digital computing will forever remain the emperor over the entire “computing” realm in the sense that digital computer programs can carry out logic inference; logic (together with set theory) can express all of mathematics; all formal how-models of “computing” are mathematical; hence digital computers can simulate all other formal procedural specifications of “computing”. However, this emulation can become prohibitively inefficient with regards to runtimes, energy consumption and microchip complexity.

• Procedural formalisms (I called them how-formalisms) are the springboards for engineers from which they jump across the modeling mirror, building physical computing systems which realize the formal specifications. Depending on the chosen mathematical substrate, different limitations and opportunities for physical designs arise. Digital system engineers must build hardware based on finite-state switching operations and memory mechanisms to stably store switching states for very long times. Once they know how to build such machines, they can capitalize on the full powers of symbolic computing theory. System engineers informed by sampling how-formalisms must find ways to harness physical stochasticity. Once they master this task, they can build machines which realize already existing, general models of probabilistic inference (graphical models, in particular Boltzmann machines). At present, physical randomness has been made exploitable for sampling only in limited ways in DNA computing (note that quantum computing exploits randomness not by sampling and was not covered in this article). System engineers guided by ODE models of cognitive processing should learn to realize an ever growing repertoire of ODE models in physical dynamics (asymptotic goal: find ways to implement any ODE specification). Then they could build machines which re-play the cognitive mechanisms that have been discovered and will be discovered, in the wider cognitive and neurosciences, as qualitative phenomena in dynamical systems. They could achieve even more if a dynamical systems understanding of “computing” disengages itself from its current reliance on “brain-inspired” neuromorphics.

• How-theories of “computing” include, implicitly or explicitly, a formal model of time, which in turn co-determines which cognitive operations can be captured in corresponding what-formalisms, and how. The importance of analysing how “computing” processes are structured in time is, in my opinion, largely under-appreciated. The same could likely be said about space, a theme which I decided to leave out in this article. Temporal and spatial phenomena are closely coupled in physical systems, a given that demands an extensive discussion which I postpone to another occasion.

3 Fitting modal computing into the landscape

Despite the limited scope of reconnaissance in the previous section I hope that what I spotted gives some helpful orientation in the search for a theory of modal computing (MC). In this concluding section I want to propose some ideas toward this end.
The mission for MC is to transform the not-so-new but still vague idea of exploiting “physics directly” into a solid engineering discipline. I advanced an even stronger version of this idea — the mission is to harness any kind of physical phenomenon which supports “computing”. This will require a collaboration between contributors who today rarely work together — material scientists, theoretical physicists, microchip engineers, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, AI and machine learning experts, computer scientists, mathematicians and epistemologists. They can only start talking with each other after they have agreed on a shared language, and they can only precisely understand what they think they are talking about after having developed a mathematical foundation underneath this language.

In my opinion, which I tried to substantiate in this serpentine article, any theory about any kind of physical systems can qualify as a theory of “computing” only if core constructs in that theory can be linked to human cognitive processing. This view is authorized by 2370 years of intellectual labour, starting with Aristotle’s syllogistic logic and not ending with Alan Turing who explicitly equated the symbolic configurations in Turing machines with “states of mind”.

In my review of the D, P and L domains I placed the formal correspondents of cognitive entities into the center of what I called what-formalisms (in segment $a$ in Figure 1), and inspected the formal semantic links which connect those formal constructs with formal models of environments (segment $c$). Across the modeling mirror, what is formally represented in models of computing systems and models of environments should have reflections in the corresponding physical computing system (in $\alpha$) and its physical environment (in $\gamma$). Furthermore, the physical computing system should enjoy physical semantic relations with its environment which make the diagram commute. This implies that there should be a correspondence between the cognitively interpretable constructs in what-formalisms (proceduralized in how-formalisms) on the one hand, and phenomena in physical computing systems on the other hand. This is in fact what we could observe in digital computing (discrete symbol operations corresponding with binary switching dynamics), in sampling-based probabilistic models (formal sample points corresponding to, for example, spikes in neural substrates or DNA snippets in DNA computing), and in ODE modeling (for instance, periodic attractors realized in oscillatory electronic circuits).

Thus, when we want to capitalize on any kind of computing-enabling physical phenomenon in MC machines, we have to address the question, What is it in human cognition that allows us to mentally represent “any” kind of physical phenomenon? Well, I am afraid that human intelligence cannot grasp “any” kind of physical phenomenon. This version of an MC mission statement seems too strong. By reversing the direction of the argument we obtain a more moderate question: What physical phenomena can be cognitively grasped? But this framing still is too wide. In the light of findings in the previous section, we should more narrowly ask this question: What temporal physical phenomena, which can be coupled into increasingly compounded complex phenomena, can be cognitively grasped? or its mirror twin: What cognitive
phenomena make us perceive and think about physical processes as being constituted of coupled sub-processes?

I want to illustrate this abstract question with one concrete example. Attach LEDs to some joints and extremity ends of a human volunteer. Let this person move in an unlit room such that only the light traces of these LEDs are visible. Then a human observer can identify whether the volunteer walks, runs, jumps, waltzes, or engages in any of hundreds human motion patterns. The observer can even tell who the performing volunteer is, even from just monitoring a single short walk, provided it is a personal acquaintance. The observer can also decompose the overall dynamic pattern presented by all the LEDs into subpatterns, for instance focusing on the right arm’s motion. — This is an example from visual sensory processing. But the scope of our twin question is far wider and could be filled with examples from other sensory modalities; not only from perception but also from action generation; or from the entire mental experience of being present in a dynamic environment; or even from a mathematician sitting still in deep thought in front of a white sheet of paper — mathematical thinking arguably being just another way of re-experiencing dynamical situatedness (Lakoff and Nunez, 2000).

If we had a formal theory which allowed us to state and work out this twin question in appropriate and precise abstraction, all that would remain is to team up with engineers and material scientists and start building machines which instantiate the formal constructs of our theory. This would be similar to, but more general than, informing electronics engineers to build analog computers which can instantiate a number of elementary mathematical operations like multiplication or integration.

Devising of such a theory does not start from a blank slate. Cognitive scientists have since long been investigating complex, gradually morphable mental representations of dynamical phenomena, developing comprehensive theory frameworks like fluid concepts (Hofstadter, 1995) or radial categories (Lakoff, 1987), or exploring complex motion pattern representations (Blasig et al., 2009; Tervo et al., 2016). These are random pointers; a structured survey remains to be done.

Theories in cognitive science, in particular in its experimental branches, are however often articulated only in natural English and corroborated by computer simulations. If one searches for inspiration from mathematically worked-out theories, one can find it in places outside the core cognitive sciences. I personally have felt instructed by mathematical models in (human and animal) motion science where one objective is to formally describe complex motor patterns and analyze how they can be controlled (Hogan and Flash, 1987; Thoroughman and Shadmehr, 2000; d’Avella et al., 2003). My LED-tracing example was borrowed from recent work in this line (Land et al., 2013). Grenander’s pattern theory, especially in the transparent rendering of David Mumford (Mumford, 1994, 2002), offers a rich and thoroughly formal account of how (primarily spatial / visual) “patterns” which are emerging in complex physical systems can be generated, compounded, transformed and encoded. A classical subfield of AI, qualitative physics (Forbus, 1988) (closely related: naive physics, qualitative reasoning) explores logic-based formalisms which capture the everyday reasoning of humans about their mesoscale physical environment. Insights gained in the fields of emergent computation (Forrest, 1990) steer attention to the powers of collective phenomena in dissipative systems, where macrolevel phenomena “self-organize” from the interactions of microlevel components. Machine learning and data mining methods for detecting concept drift (Gama et al., 2013) offer statistical characterizations of how data streams change qualitatively over time, including recent methods which exploit hierarchical structuring of distributions (Hammoodi et al., 2018). Finally, recent propositions to develop a theory of stream automata (Endrullis et al., 2020) aim at extending
the classical theory of finite-state automata to infinite data stream processing. These and other sources of mathematical inspiration remain to be surveyed and connected.

At this moment I do not see a single, uniquely compelling ansatz which holds promise to become worked out into a formal theory that could answer the twin question posed above. In a separate manuscript (in preparation) I describe in more detail why I think that such a system of interconnected formal theories can be rooted in the concept of dynamical modes, which generalize the bi-stability modes of digital switching transistors.

I believe that we are facing a quite fundamental challenge, and that at the core we are even lacking an adequate mathematical language. Newton and Leibniz devised calculus to capture continuous motion. Kolmogorov and his predecessors developed probability theory to capture the information conveyed by empirical observations. Tarski and his predecessors cast logics in its final shape in order to capture rationally derivable truth. If I were pressed to condense that twin question of MC into a similarly momentous three-word phrase I would say that we have to capture gradual qualitative change (which I want to formally cast in a concept of dynamical modes). I believe that this asks from us to discover a profoundly new mathematical language, a new branch in the tree of mathematics which grows between probability (for “gradual”), logic (for “qualitative”) and dynamical systems (for “change”). I sometimes tell my students that I hope to live to the day when one among them finds it.

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