A Survey of Microarchitectural Side-channel Vulnerabilities, Attacks and Defenses in Cryptography

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Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the confidentiality of computer applications and systems. One popular type of such attacks is the microarchitectural attack, where the adversary exploits the hardware features to break the protection enforced by the operating system and steal the secrets from the program. In this paper, we systematize microarchitectural side channels with a focus on attacks and defenses in cryptographic applications. We make three contributions. (1) We survey past research literature to categorize microarchitectural side-channel attacks. Since these are hardware attacks targeting software, we summarize the vulnerable implementations in software, as well as flawed designs in hardware. (2) We identify common strategies to mitigate microarchitectural attacks, from the application, OS and hardware levels. (3) We conduct a large-scale evaluation on popular cryptographic applications in the real world, and analyze the severity, practicality and impact of side-channel vulnerabilities. This survey is expected to inspire side-channel research community to discover new attacks, and more importantly, propose new defense solutions against them.

CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy → Side-channel analysis and countermeasures.

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Microarchitecture, Cryptography, Vulnerability Analysis

1 INTRODUCTION

The history of side-channel attacks dates back to the year of 1996, when Kocher [121] demonstrated that the data leaked from timing channels was sufficient for an attacker to recover the entire secret key. To generalize, vulnerable implementations of cryptographic operations can exhibit secret-dependent non-functional behaviors during the time of execution, which an adversary can observe and utilize to fully or partially recover sensitive information. Since then, numerous types of side channels (e.g., execution timing [16, 26], acoustic emission [79], electromagnetic radiation [78] and power consumption [47]) have been discovered and exploited to defeat modern cryptographic schemes, allowing adversaries to break strong ciphers in a short period of time with very few trials.

Among these side-channel threats, microarchitectural attacks are particularly dangerous and prevalent. A fundamental cause of such attacks is the conflict between performance and security. During the evolution of computer architecture, various strategies were introduced to speed up the execution, which may bring side channels that leak the information of applications running on the system. One example is Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT), where multiple threads execute in parallel and share the same CPU core and functional units. This brings not only high performance, but also side channels due to contention for the shared hardware components. Another example is caching: a small hardware component is introduced (e.g., CPU caches, Translation Look-aside Buffer, DRAM row buffer) to store the previously accessed data, which is usually expected to be used again soon due to the principle of locality. Fetching data directly from this component is much faster. However, such timing differences can reveal the victim program’s access traces [86, 151, 155].

It is obviously infeasible to disable those features for side-channel mitigation, which can incur tremendous performance overhead. Therefore, effective elimination of side-channel vulnerabilities...
has been a long-standing goal. Although security-aware cryptographic applications, systems and architectures were designed to mitigate side-channel attacks, it is however still very challenging to remove all side-channel vulnerabilities from the software implementations and hardware designs. As such, the arms race between side-channel attacks and defenses remains heated.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of microarchitectural side-channel attacks and defenses in cryptographic applications. Since we focus on hardware attacks on software, it is necessary to study the vulnerabilities and defense opportunities in both hardware and software levels. We are particularly interested in three questions: (1) *What are the common and distinct features of software vulnerabilities and hardware flaws that lead to side-channel attacks?* (2) *What are the typical mitigation strategies for applications, operating systems and hardware, respectively?* (3) *What is the status quo of cryptographic applications in terms of side-channel vulnerabilities?*

**Existing surveys.** Past efforts summarized side-channel studies from different perspectives and fail to answer the above questions. First, some works mainly focused on the physical attacks [100, 148, 184], networking attacks [196, 227] or fault injection attacks with integrity breach [66], which have different characteristics or requirements from microarchitectural side-channel attacks. Second, a few surveys [21, 76, 188] only considered the hardware flaws that result in side channels, while ignoring the software vulnerabilities. Third, several efforts focused on vulnerabilities and countermeasures in one certain cryptosystem (e.g., Elliptic Curve Cryptography [13, 70, 71], Pairing-based cryptography [66]). These summaries are outdated due to a large quantity of newly discovered vulnerabilities and implementation improvements afterwards. Fourth, some works only considered specific platforms (e.g., Trusted Execution Environments [172], smart card [195], cloud [18, 196]) or target applications (e.g., key logging [100, 144]), which did not provide comprehensive conclusions.

**Our contributions.** Our survey has three significant contributions. First, we characterize microarchitectural side-channel attacks comprehensively. We summarize the attack vectors in both hardware designs (Section 3) and software implementations (Section 4). Second, we identify and abstract the key defense strategies, which are categorized into application, system and hardware, respectively (Section 5). Third, we conduct a large-scale evaluation of mainstream cryptographic applications. We analyze the side-channel vulnerabilities and the corresponding patches in various libraries and products, and evaluate the severity and impact from a practical perspective (Section 6). We hope this work can help researchers, developers and users better understand the current status and the future direction of side-channel research and countermeasure development.

# 2 BACKGROUND

## 2.1 Basics of Side-channel Attacks

In a microarchitectural side-channel attack, the adversary steals secrets by exploiting observable information from the microarchitectural components. Given a secret input $S$, the target application exhibits certain runtime behaviors $R$ (e.g., memory access patterns) and causes the underlying host system to reveal some characteristics $I$. By identifying the correlation $I \sim R \sim S$, the adversary is able to capture the microarchitectural characteristics as the side-channel information and infer the secret input. The success of microarchitectural side-channel attacks relies on vectors from both software and hardware levels.

**Software vectors.** One necessary condition for microarchitectural attacks is that *application’s runtime behaviors need to be correlated with the secrets: $R \sim S.* Generally there are two sources of leakage. (1) *Secret-dependent control flow:* when the secret $S$ changes, the application executes another code path. (2) *Secret-dependent data flow:* the application may rely on the secret $S$ to determine the data access location. They yield different behaviors distinguishable by the attacker.
Hardware vectors. The key factor is that application’s behaviors can be reflected by the microarchitectural characteristics: $I \sim R$. Two kinds of techniques exist to capture useful microarchitectural characteristics. (1) An adversary can directly check the states of the hardware component altered by the execution of the application. In this case, the attacker program needs to share the same component with the victim. (2) An adversary can measure the application’s execution time to indirectly infer its microarchitectural characteristics. In this case, the attack can be performed without the need to co-locate with the victim, but is only able to capture coarser-grained side-channel information. Thus, a large quantity of sessions are needed to statistically infer useful information.

2.2 Multi-core Architecture

Figure 1 shows the overview of a multi-core system in a hierarchic structure. Basically, a computer has multiple CPU packages and DRAM chips, interconnected by memory buses (right). Each package is comprised of multiple CPU cores, Last Level Caches and a memory controller (middle). Each CPU core consists of a pipeline, Translation Lookaside Buffer and two levels of caches (left).

![Fig. 1. A Multi-core System](image)

CPU Core. A key feature in modern processors is the multi-stage pipeline, which allows executing instructions in a continuous and parallel manner. The pipeline involves various functional units. For instance, the Branch Prediction Unit predicts the next branch to follow using recently executed branch targets held in the Branch Target Buffer (BTB). The Arithmetic Logic Unit is responsible for the arithmetic and bit-wise operations of integers, while the Floating Point Unit performs computation on floating point numbers. Modern pipeline designs support Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT), where multiple threads can execute concurrently in the pipeline. This feature can facilitate side-channel attacks in two ways: (1) the pipeline and functional units are shared among all active threads on the core, and such contention can expose side-channel information. (2) The attacker can measure the victim states concurrently at the same core without interrupting the execution of the victim, and obtain finer-grained information than in the case without SMT.

Processes use virtual addresses for data access, but the memory system uses physical addresses to store the data. Thus, the processor must perform a translation from virtual to physical addresses, based on the page table maintained by the operating system. To accelerate the translation, a hardware component named Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) is introduced to store recent translations, which can be retrieved later at a much higher speed than walking the page table.

CPU caches store recently accessed data for the processor to reuse in the near future and avoid time-consuming main memory access. A cache system is hierarchical and typically consists of three levels. Level 1 (L1) and Level 2 (L2) caches are on-core, while Last Level Caches (LLCs) are off-core. Caches closer to the processor are faster to access. There are separate data cache and instruction cache in L1, while L2 and LLC both have mixed data and instruction caches. The smallest

\footnote{For remote timing attacks, the adversary does not need to launch spy programs on the victim machine, hence SMT does not affect the attack results.}
storage unit in a cache is a cache line that stores aligned adjacent bytes, which means the processor has to fetch or evict the cache line in its entirety. Modern caches commonly employ the $n$-way set-associative design, where a cache is divided into multiple sets, each containing $n$ cache lines. A data block is mapped to one cache set determined by its memory address. It can be stored in an arbitrary cache line within this set, selected by a replacement policy. For instance, the Least Recently Used (LRU) policy selects the cache line that is least recently accessed to hold the new block when this set is full. Particularly, a cache that has only one way in every set (i.e., $n = 1$) is a direct-mapped cache, while a cache that has only one set is called fully-associative.

**Package.** Each package has one LLC that caches data from applications running on all cores. If a data access request cannot be fulfilled by the LLC, the memory controller will be involved. The memory controller buffers the requests in multiple queues, schedules them for high performance and fairness, and directs them to the DRAM chips. Cores, the LLC and the memory controller are interconnected by the memory buses with very high bandwidth.

**Computer.** A computer consists of several packages and DRAM chips. A DRAM chip has several banks. Each bank can be viewed as a two-dimensional array with multiple rows and columns, and has a row buffer to hold the most recently used row to speed up DRAM accesses. A memory access to a DRAM bank may either be served by the row buffer (buffer hit), which is fast, or in the bank itself (buffer miss), which is slow. Packages and DRAM chips are interconnected in a Non-Uniform Memory Architecture (NUMA): each DRAM is associated with a package, and each package can access all DRAM chips, but it’s faster for the package to access its own local DRAM.

**Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).** This feature protects the security of unprivileged programs from the malicious OS through isolated execution and memory encryption. It has been implemented in ARM TrustZone [11] and Intel SGX [48]. However, as the design of TEE does not consider side-channel attacks, it is possible to use conventional techniques to steal secrets from the protected application. If the attacker is the malicious OS, she can obtain fine-grained information in an easier way by manipulating the OS interrupt (e.g., SGX-Step [197]). If the attacker is a normal user, she can use enclaves to hide malicious behaviors [176].

### 2.3 Cryptography

**Asymmetric cryptography.** Also known as public key cryptography, it adopts two keys: the user keeps a private key to herself and distributes a public key to the world. This design can provide confidentiality protection: anyone can use the public key to encrypt a message, which can only be decrypted by the user using the private key. It can also provide digital signature functionality: given a message, the user can use her private key to generate a signature, which can be verified by anyone using the public key and cannot be forged without the private key. Various algorithms were designed for asymmetric cryptography.

The most famous algorithm is RSA [164]. The key pair is generated using two large prime numbers that are kept secret, and the public key includes their product. The security of RSA relies on the practical difficulty of prime factorization of large numbers. ElGamal [67] is another public-key cryptosystem, defined over any cyclic group, such as the multiplicative group of integers modulo $n$. Its security is supported by the difficulty of solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Yet another approach is Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [137] that is based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. Its security depends on the difficulty of solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem. Schemes based on ECC are designed for digital signature (ECDSA) and key exchange (ECDH).

**Symmetric cryptography.** It uses the same key for both encryption and decryption, which is shared between two participants and cannot be distributed to the general public. There are generally
two types of symmetric-key algorithms. (1) In stream ciphers, each digit of the plaintext is encrypted at a time by a digit from a key stream to produce the ciphertext stream. One common component in stream ciphers is digital shift registers, which generate the key stream from a random seed value. (2) In block ciphers, fixed-length blocks of plaintext bits are blended with the key blocks to generate the ciphertext blocks. The encryption process usually adopts the Substitution-Perturbation Network (SPN), which takes a block of the plaintext and the key as the input, and applies multiple alternating rounds of substitution and permutation. AES is the most widely adopted block cipher, which is implemented as a multi-round SPN.

**Post-quantum cryptography.** The advent of quantum computers in the near future can break the security of classical asymmetric cryptography. As such, post-quantum cryptography, a family of asymmetric ciphers, is proposed to survive attacks by a quantum computer. One popular scheme is lattice-based cryptography. For instance, NTRU [95] utilizes simple polynomial multiplication in the ring of truncated polynomials. Bimodal Lattice Signature Scheme (BLISS) [65] provides the digital signature function secure against quantum computers. Other algorithms were proposed based on the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) hard problem [135].

**Cryptographic protocol.** SSL/TLS allows a server and a client to use the handshake protocol to exchange a symmetric key $K$ for later secure communications. Specifically, the client first sends a list of its supported cipher suites and the server responds with a list of its supported cipher suites and the server certificate. Then the client picks a cipher (e.g., RSA) supported by both parties, and generates a random secret string $K$ as the master key. The client generates a random non-zero padding string $\text{pad}$ that is at least 8 bytes, creates a block $0x00|0x02|\text{pad}|0x00|K$, encrypts it using the server’s public key and sends the ciphertext to the server. The server decrypts and accepts the message only when the format is valid. Finally, the server sends a “finished” message to the client, and the client replies with a “finished” message, marking the completion of the key exchange.

After the key is established, the server and client adopt CBC-MAC to encrypt messages. The plaintext $P$ is created by concatenating the message $m$, its Message Authentication Code (MAC) and a padding string chosen to make the byte length of $P$ a multiple of the block size. Then $P$ is divided into blocks of $b$ bytes, each block encrypted with key $K$. The final message is the concatenation of a header and all encrypted blocks. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext in CBC mode and validates the padding format and the MAC. If both are correct, she accepts the original intact message $m$.

### 2.4 Threat Model

**What we cover.** The target of our surveyed works is microarchitectural side-channel attacks. Microarchitecture is defined as the hardware implementation of an Instruction Set Architecture (ISA). We mainly focus on the x86 ISA (e.g., Intel and AMD) due to its wide adoption in modern PCs and servers, although some techniques can also be extended to the ARM processors [87, 128]. Some works may need the processor to have additional hardware features such as Intel SGX [28, 51, 85, 92, 126, 138, 139, 176, 180, 198, 207, 222], Intel TSX [61, 108] and AMD’s cache-way predictor [129]. We will mention the requirements when discussing these works.

We consider the attacker as a normal user in the target system without root privileges. She can launch a malicious program on the same machine as the victim program, but cannot control the scheduling of the attacking process or the victim. One exception is the TEE scenario, where the attacker can be the OS that has the privilege to schedule all processes, but cannot introspect into the victim’s protected memory. In remote timing attacks, the attacker can only query the victim cryptographic program remotely without launching the malicious program on the host machine.

**What we do not cover.** The following attacks and scenarios are out of the scope of this paper.
Physical side-channel attacks: these require the attacker to be physically local to the target system in order to collect the physical signals (e.g., power consumption [47], electromagnetic radiation [78], acoustic emission [79]) during the execution.

Network side-channel attacks: an adversary can exploit the network application features (e.g., response messages, packet pattern and size) as side channels to attack the network services protected by the cryptographic protocols, including RSA padding oracle attacks [23] and CBC-MAC padding oracle attacks [202]. These network attacks have fundamentally different causes from microarchitectural attacks, and hence are not summarized in this paper. Note that we still consider the timing attacks which analyze the information leaked from the microarchitectural states of a remote machine.

Transient execution attacks: Meltdown [130] and Spectre [120] attacks were demonstrated to bypass the protection schemes in OSes, followed by many variants [39, 41, 43, 107, 175, 192]. Although side channel techniques are used in such attacks as a tool to leak secrets, these attacks target all data in the protected memory region instead of only cryptographic secrets.

Invasive attacks: following the most conventional microarchitectural side-channel attacks, we assume the attacker can only passively spy the behaviors of the victim, rather than actively compromising the integrity of the victim data. For instance, Rowhammer [118], an inherent vulnerability in modern high-density memory modules, can induce bit flips in the adjacent rows by frequently accessing a memory row. Fault attacks can also be achieved via physical means (e.g., laser injection) [66]. Although such active attacks can break cryptographic ciphers (e.g., RSA [19], AES [233]), we do not elaborate relevant works about Rowhammer [74, 116, 134, 147] and fault attacks [96, 114, 168, 186] in this paper. Note that Rambleed [123] is an exception as it does not interfere with the victim data.

Attacks against non-cryptographic applications: at the application level, attacks exist to identify keystrokes [182] and application states/activities [185]. At the system level, adversaries may infer host configurations [173] and memory layout information [98]. We do not systematize these attacks.

3 CHARACTERIZATION OF HARDWARE ATTACK VECTORS
We characterize the attack vectors of side-channel techniques from the level in the computer system and the category of side-channel information, as summarized in Table 1.

3.1 Instruction Level
We first consider the instruction level attacks, which aim to identify when and what instructions are issued by the victim program. Based on the instruction trace, the adversary can infer the cryptographic secrets. Modern processors normally contain numerous arithmetic or logical functional units to perform designated computation. To launch an instruction level attack, the adversary must share the same CPU core and the target functional units with the victim process. The contention on these units can leak information of issued instructions from the victim to the adversary.

Multiply instruction. Multiplication is a fundamental operation in cryptographic applications. Hardware multiplier units are implemented in the CPU core to accelerate the computation. Wang et al. [212] demonstrated that processes running on the same core can interfere with the multiplier units, and the adversarial process is able to identify the multiply instruction of the victim based on the timing difference. Acicmez et al. [6] designed a side-channel attack against the RSA implementation in OpenSSL by distinguishing the multiplications from square operations.

If the SMT is enabled, the attacker and victim programs only need to share the physical core, instead of the logical core. An attacker in a different logical core from the victim but the same physical core can monitor the victim concurrently without interrupting it. This setting improves the success rate of side-channel attacks, and is commonly adopted by these works.
Floating point instruction. Another type of arithmetic operations is computation on floating point numbers. Such operations usually have large internal states, and are accelerated by the Floating Point Unit (FPU). Thus, FPU context switch can cause longer computation time. Additionally, floating point instructions with different operands also have distinguishable execution times, which can leak sensitive information [12]. However, this technique is limited to applications with floating point instructions for critical operations, which are relatively rare in cryptographic applications.

Branch instruction. Given that branch operations widely exist in many applications, speculative execution is introduced to accelerate such operations. The basic idea is to guess a branch path and execute the code in that path. Correct branch prediction saves the wait time for branch condition calculation and can significantly improve the performance, dominating the small overhead due to a misprediction. The speculation is implemented by hardware units, such as Branch Target Buffer (BTB) which records the target addresses of multiple previous branches. The adversary can observe the reduced execution time of the victim thanks to this technique and deduce the corresponding operations. Aciicmez et al. [4] demonstrated such an attack against RSA in OpenSSL by selectively evicting entries from the BTB. Similar attacks were realized in the Intel SGX platform [126]. Evtyushkin et al. [69] further exploited the directional branch predictor as a new attack vector to steal secret from an SGX enclave.

Micro-operation. The execution of an instruction can be divided into multiple micro-operations in the CPU pipeline. Contention on the corresponding functional units can also reveal the traces of micro-operations. Aldaya et al. [7] demonstrated a novel side-channel vector exploiting the port contention in the Execution Engine, a built-in component of modern processors with Intel Hyper-Threading technology. The adversary can capture side-channel information derived from port contention with very fine spatial granularity.

3.2 Cache Level

The cache system has become one of the most popular microarchitectural side channels due to its large channel capacity and low attack requirement. According to the granularity of leaked information, these attacks can be further divided into three categories. Below we briefly discuss the attack techniques and the literatures. Detailed modeling of these attacks can be found in [237].

Cache set. This type of attack aims at identifying the cache set trace of the victim process, with the limitation that different memory accesses mapped to the same cache set cannot be distinguished.
There are multiple techniques to achieve this goal. The most common technique is Prime-Probe [151]. The adversary first fills the critical cache set with its own memory lines (Prime). Then the victim executes for a period of time and potentially touches the set. After that, the adversary can measure the access time to those previously loaded memory lines (Probe). A longer access time indicates that the corresponding cache set has been used by the victim. While it is normally observed through cache hits, [32] proposed that the adversary can use cache miss information for better attack efficiency.

Prime-Probe was first adopted to attack the AES encryption on the L1 data cache [149, 151, 155]. Then Acicimez et al. [1] applied it to L1 instruction cache to check whether certain instructions are executed by the victim. This attack was enhanced in [2], which combines vector quantization and hidden Markov models to monitor each instruction cache set individually. Zhang et al. [238] further explored the attack in the cloud, and demonstrated the practicality to steal information across VMs using the Prime-Probe technique.

Researchers shifted the interest from L1 cache to LLC as the adversary and victim do not need to share the same CPU core. Liu et al. [133] proposed the first Prime-Probe attack on LLC by reverse engineering the cache slice mapping and attacking specific cache sets. Following this work, Kayaalp et al. [113] further relaxed the attack assumptions and achieved higher resolution. Besides that, Inci et al. [101] conducted the Prime-Probe attack on Amazon EC2 and retrieved the RSA key from the co-located instance. Irazoqui et al. [103] used the technique to monitor cache set traces of LLC in both Xen and VMware ESXi hypervisors, recovering the AES key in just a few minutes. This attack technique can also be mounted from a browser with the portable code, e.g., JavaScript, as demonstrated in [77].

Prime-Probe attacks were also applied to the Intel SGX platform, enabling a malicious OS to retrieve secret information from the enclave applications [28, 51, 85, 92, 138]. Since the OS is responsible for process scheduling and interruption, it can easily conduct Prime-Probe side-channel attacks on different levels of caches either synchronously or asynchronously. Besides, the attacker can also use SGX to conceal the cache attacks [176].

Another technique to monitor the cache set access is Evict-Time [151]. At the Evict stage, the adversary fills up one cache set and evicts the victim’s memory lines out of the cache. Then at the Time stage, the victim executes certain blocks of code (e.g., encryption of one plaintext) and the corresponding execution time is measured. A long execution time means that the victim has accessed the critical cache sets during the execution and competed for the cache with the adversary.

In addition to timing attacks, Disselkoen et al. [61] proposed the Prime-Abort attack on the Intel Transactional Memory (TSX) processors, where the occurrence of aborts is used to infer the victim’s access. At the Prime stage, the adversary initiates a TSX transaction for its memory blocks and fills up the target cache sets. When the victim evicts the adversary’s block out of the cache, the adversary observes an abort and detects the victim’s access.

Cache line. We next consider the attacks that can retrieve information at the granularity of one cache line, typically realized by the Flush-Reload technique. This requires the adversary to share the same memory line with the victim, e.g., via memory deduplication. The adversary first evicts the critical memory lines out of the cache using dedicated instructions (e.g., clflush). After a period of time, she reloads these lines into the cache and measures the access time. A shorter time indicates that the memory lines were accessed by the victim and betrays the access trace to the adversary. This attack was first mounted by Gullasch et al. [91] against the AES implementation on the L1 cache. Then Yarom and Falkner [225] adopted this technique on the LLC to monitor the square and multiply operations and steal keys from the RSA implementation. This method was further used to
attack other ciphers such as ECDSA [15, 199]. Gruss et al. [90] proposed a cache template attack, which leverages Flush-Reload to automatically build templates and attack critical applications.

A variant of Flush-Reload is Flush-Flush [89], where the Reload operation is replaced by Flush at the second stage. This technique works as the execution time of Flush can also reflect whether the memory line is in the cache or not. This technique can reduce the activity on the cache and achieve better stealthiness, but has higher error rates due to the noise in the observation.

Cache line states with the replacement policy can also leak side-channel information. Lipp et al. [129] exploited the cache way predictor in the AMD processor to identify the victim’s memory accesses with two new techniques: Collide-Probe and Load-Reload. Briongos et al. [33] reverse engineered the cache replacement policies of the Intel processors and then proposed the Reload+Refresh technique to monitor memory accesses in a cache set without evicting the victim’s data. Xiong et al. [221] also presented that the LRU states of cache lines can leak information, and demonstrated the attacks on both Intel and AMD processors. Bhattacharya et al. [20] discovered that the prefetching state of the cache lines can result in non-constant time encryption, which leaks timing information for the attacker to reveal the key from CLEFIA.

Cache bank. The adversary can even get finer-grained side-channel information than the cache line. A cache line is divided into multiple cache banks. Concurrent requests to the same line but different banks can be served in parallel. However, requests to the same bank would cause a conflict, resulting in observable execution delay. This cache bank conflict can reveal the access pattern of the secret within one cache line. Yarom et al. [226] demonstrated such a side-channel attack on L1 cache targeting RSA in OpenSSL. Moghimi et al. [139] designed a cache attack in the SGX platform, which is based on the false dependency of memory read-after-write (i.e., 4K Aliasing). This creates a new timing channel, enabling the adversary to observe the memory accesses in the same cache line with different offsets.

3.3 Memory Page Level

The memory page is the smallest unit for memory management in the OS and computer architecture. It is a contiguous and aligned memory block with a specific size, e.g., 4KB. The microarchitectural components responsible for manipulating memory pages can leak side-channel information at the granularity of the page size, which is coarser than that of instruction level or cache level attacks, but still allows the adversary to steal secrets from certain applications.

Page. The TLB is an address translation cache, which is similar to CPU caches in terms of timing channels. Gras et al. [86] introduced a TLB-based side-channel attack, where interferences with the TLB are exploited to infer the victim’s memory page trace. Canella et al. [40] identified a new attack, which exploits the interactions with the store buffer to steal information of store addresses.

Page faults can also be used as side-channel information to capture the memory accesses [180, 222]. A malicious OS can allocate a restricted number of physical pages to the victim application. When the application needs to access pages not available in the memory, a page fault is triggered and reported by the CPU. The OS is thus able to observe the memory pages the application tries to access. This technique, however, can induce huge performance overhead due to the large number of page faults. Researchers then proposed more advanced attacks [198, 207], where the adversary can infer the accessed pages based on the flags in the page table entries, without the need to raise page faults. Moghimi et al. [141] combined the SGX-Step mechanism [197] with the page-fault based technique to count the number of instructions issued within one page. This can reveal more information (instruction-level) about the victim program inside SGX enclaves for cryptanalysis.

DRAM bank row. Each DRAM bank has a row buffer that caches the recently used DRAM row which normally contains multiple pages. It accelerates the memory access, but also introduces
a timing channel. Pessl et al. [158] designed a DRAM-based attack by reverse engineering the DRAM addressing schemes. This attack is less practical as it can only recover very coarse-grained information. However, Kwong et al. [123] recently exploited the data-dependent bit flips induced by the Rowhammer [118] to reveal RSA private key stored in the adjacent pages bit by bit.

### 4 CHARACTERIZATION OF SOFTWARE ATTACK VECTORS

We systematically characterize side-channel vulnerabilities from past works based on different operations in different cryptographic algorithms and protocols. Table 2 summarizes the vulnerabilities covered in this paper. For each vulnerability, we present the vulnerable operations, causes and the corresponding attack techniques.

| Category | Operation | Implementation | Application | Cause | Attack Technique | Reference |
|----------|-----------|----------------|-------------|-------|------------------|-----------|
| Asymmetric Cryptography | Modular Multiplication | Base and Karatsuba multiplication | RSA | ■ Remote timing | [38] |
| | Square-and-multiply & Double-and-add | RSA | ■ Cache Flush-Reload | [225] |
| | ECDH | ■ Cache Prime-Probe | [135, 238] |
| | EdDSA | ■ TLB | [86] |
| | Square-and-Multiply-always & Double-and-Add-always | RSA | ■ Branch | [63] |
| | ECDH | ■ TLB | [86] |
| | RSA | ■ Cache Prime-Probe | [135] |
| | ECDH | ■ Execution Port | [7] |
| | RSA | □ Cache Prime-Probe | [104] |
| | ECDH | □ Cache Prime-Probe | [135] |
| | ECDH | □ Cache Prime-Probe | [35] |
| | RSA | □ Remote timing | [37] |
| | RSA | □ Cache Flush-Reload | [224] |
| | RSA | □ Remote timing | [194] |
| | RSA | □ Remote timing | [14, 26] |
| | RSA | □ Remote timing | [162] |
| | RSA | □ Cache Prime-Probe | [149, 151] |
| | RSA | □ Cache Evict-Time | [151] |
| | RSA | □ Cache Flush-Reload | [91, 105] |
| | RSA | □ Remote timing | [82] |
| | RSA | □ Remote timing | [229] |
| | RSA | □ Remote timing | [125] |
| | RSA | □ Remote timing | [36] |
| | RSA | □ Remote timing | [193] |
| | RSA | □ Page Fault | [215] |
| | RSA | □ Cache Flush-Reload | [8] |
| | RSA | □ Branch | [3] |
| | RSA | □ Branch | [112] |
| Symmetric Cryptography | Substitution-Permutation | Table lookup | MISTY1 | □ Remote timing | [193] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [194] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [5, 16, 26] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [162] |
| | AES | □ Cache Prime-Probe | [149, 151] |
| | AES | □ Cache Evict-Time | [151] |
| | AES | □ Cache Flush-Reload | [91, 105] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [82] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [229] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [125] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [36] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [193] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [194] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [162] |
| | AES | □ Cache Prime-Probe | [149, 151] |
| | AES | □ Cache Evict-Time | [151] |
| | AES | □ Cache Flush-Reload | [91, 105] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [82] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [229] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [125] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [36] |
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| | AES | □ Remote timing | [193] |
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| | AES | □ Remote timing | [193] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [194] |
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| | AES | □ Remote timing | [82] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [229] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [125] |
| | AES | □ Remote timing | [36] |

| Post Quantum Cryptography | Distribution Sampling | Table lookup | CDT sampling | □ Cache Flush-Reload | [34, 157] |
| | Rejection sampling | BLISS | □ Cache Flush-Reload | [34, 157] |
| | Failure Rate Reduction | BLISS | □ Branch | [68, 196] |
| | Error Correcting Code | Ring-LWE | ■ Remote timing | [52] |
| | Message Randomization | Padding-Hash | NTRU | ■ Remote timing | [181] |
| | RSA-PAD | Uniform response message | TLS | ■ Page, Cache, Branch | [220] |
| | XML Encryption | ■ Cache, Branch | [166] |
| | CBC-MAC-PAD | Constant-time compression | TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 | ■ Cache Flush-Reload | [106] |
| | | TLS | ■ Page, Cache, Branch | [220] |
| | | TLS | ■ Cache Prime-Probe | [167] |

Table 2. Side-channel vulnerabilities. (■: control flow, □: data flow)

### 4.1 Asymmetric Cryptography

**Modular multiplication.** Given three integers \( x, y \) and \( m \), this operation is to calculate \( x \cdot y \mod m \). Both OpenSSL and GnuPG implement two multiplication routines: naive multiplication and Karatsuba multiplication [110]. The selection of the routine is based on the operand size: the
naive routine is taken for small multiplicands, while Karatsuba routine is adopted for large ones. Such implementation introduces control-flow side channels about the operands: Karatsuba routine is typically faster than the native routine. An adversary can measure the execution time to infer the sizes of the operands, and then recover the secret key [38].

**Modular exponentiation & scalar multiplication.** We consider the two operations together as they share similar implementations and vulnerabilities. Modular exponentiation is to calculate $x^y \mod m$, where $x$, $y$ and $m$ are three integers. Scalar multiplication is to calculate $yx$ where $y$ is a scalar and $x$ is a point on the elliptic curve. The implementations of these two operations can reveal the secret key $y$ in RSA and ElGamal, or the secret scalar $y$ in ECC via side channels.

The first implementation of modular exponentiation is *square-and-multiply* [84], where the calculation is converted into a sequence of SQUARE and MULTIPLY operations. The binary representation of $y$ is denoted as $y_{n-1}y_{n-2}...y_0$. Then starting from $n - 1$ to 0, for each bit $y_i$, SQUARE is called. If $y_i$ is 1, MULTIPLY is also called. Similarly, scalar multiplication adopts the *double-and-add* implementation [93], which runs a sequence of PointDouble and PointAdd based on each bit $y_i$. Such implementations are vulnerable to control-flow attacks: the execution of MULTIPLY or PointAdd depends on bit $y_i$. By observing the traces of SQUARE and MULTIPLY in modular exponentiation, or PointDouble and PointAdd in scalar multiplication, an adversary can fully recover $y$. In earlier days, this implementation has been attacked via side channels [60, 121]. More recently, successful attacks were demonstrated against RSA in GnuPG via cache PRIME-PROBE [133, 238] and FLUSH-RELOAD [225] attacks, and against EdDSA via TLB attacks [86].

The second implementation of modular exponentiation is *square-and-multiply-always*, which was designed to mitigate the above vulnerability. It always executes both SQUARE and MULTIPLY operations for each bit, and selects the output of SQUARE if $y_i$ is 0, or the output of MULTIPLY following SQUARE if $y_i$ is 1. Similarly, *double-and-add-always* [93] was proposed for scalar multiplication in ECC. These implementations execute a fixed number of SQUARE (PointDouble) and MULTIPLY (PointAdd) operations, defeating remote timing attacks. However output selection still requires a secret-dependent branch, which is usually smaller than one cache line. If it fits within the same cache line with the preceding and succeeding code, then it is not vulnerable to microarchitectural attacks. However, Doychev and Köpf [63] showed that for Libgcrypt, some compiler options can put this branch into separate cache lines, making this implementation vulnerable to cache-based attacks. Gras et al. [86] showed that this branch can be put into separate pages, and the implementation is subject to TLB-based attacks.

The third implementation is *sliding window* [27]. For modular exponentiation, the exponent $y$ is represented as a sequence of windows $d_i$. Each window starts and ends with bit 1, and the window length cannot exceed a fixed parameter $w$. So the value of any window is an odd number between 1 and $2^w - 1$. This method pre-computes $x^v \mod m$ for each odd value $v \in [1, 2^w - 1]$, and stores these results in a table indexed by $i \in [0, (w - 1)/2]$. Then it scans every window, squares and multiplies the corresponding entry in the table. Similarly, for scalar multiplication, the scalar $y$ is represented as a $w$-ary non-adjacent form ($w$NAF), with each window value $d_i \in \{0, \pm 1, \pm 3, ..., \pm (2^{w-1} - 1)\}$. It first pre-computes the values of $\{1, 3, ..., 2^{w-1} - 1\}x$, and stores them into a table. Then it scans each window, doubles and adds $d_ix$ (in case $d_i < 0$, adding $d_ix$ becomes subtracting $(-d_i)x$).

Two types of vulnerabilities exist in such implementations. The first one is a secret-dependent control flow: different routines will be called depending on whether a window is zero. By monitoring the execution trace of those branches, the adversary learns if each window is zero, and further recovers the secret. Such attacks have been realized against RSA [17, 155] and ECDSA [7, 9, 15, 72, 199]. The second one is a secret-dependent data flow: the access location in the precomputed table is determined by each window value. By observing the access pattern, the adversary is able to
recover each window value. Attacks exploiting this vulnerability have been mounted on RSA [101], ElGamal [133] and ECDSA [35].

The fourth implementation is fixed window [111], designed to approach true constant-time implementation. Similar to sliding window, it also divides the secret $y$ into a set of windows, pre-computes the exponentiation or multiplication of each window value, and stores the results in a table. The differences are that the window size is fixed as $w$, and the table stores both odd and even (including zero) values. It removes the critical control flow branch at the cost of more memory and slower run time. To remove the critical data flow, this approach can be combined with scatter-gather memory layout technique [31], which stores the pre-computed values in different cache lines instead of consecutive memory locations. Specifically, each window value is stored across multiple cache lines, and each cache line stores parts of multiple window values. When $\text{MULTIPLY}$ or $\text{PointAdd}$ is executed, multiple cache lines are fetched to reconstruct the window value, hiding the access pattern from the adversary. Recently, Moghimi et al. [140] performed a black-box timing analysis to steal private keys from the fixed window scalar multiplication inside the Intel Trusted Platform Module (TPM).

This implementation is still vulnerable to attacks [226] using the cache bank, the minimal data access unit in caches. As previously mentioned, the timing difference between hitting the same bank and hitting different banks in the same cache line enables the adversary to infer the window values accessed during the gathering phase, and then recover the secret bits. Garcia et al. [156] discovered a software bug in the DSA implementation in OpenSSL 1.0.2h: the flag to enable the fixed-window exponentiation is not correctly passed to the call site and thus the modular exponentiation still takes the insecure sliding window code path.

The fifth implementation is masked window, derived from the fixed window implementation to further hide the cache bank access patterns. The idea is to access all window values instead of just the one needed, and then use a mask to filter out unused data. It performs a constant sequence of memory accesses, and has been proven secure against different types of cache-based attacks [63].

The sixth implementation, Montgomery ladder [109, 145], is a variation of double-and-add-always for scalar multiplication. It also represents $y$ in the binary form and executes both $\text{PointAdd}$ and $\text{PointDouble}$ functions for each bit, irrespective of the bit value. The outputs of the functions are assigned to the intermediate variables determined by the bit value. A difference from double-and-add-always is that in Montgomery ladder, the parameter of $\text{PointDouble}$ is also determined by the bit value. Thus, the implementation contains even more secret-dependent branches. Yarom and Benger [224] adopted cache Flush-Reload technique to identify the branch patterns in an attack to ECDSA in OpenSSL. Brumley and Tuveri [37] discovered that a loop in OpenSSL 0.9.8 begins from the most significant non-zero bit in $y$ to 0. So the number of iterations is proportional to $\log(y)$. This presents a vulnerability for remote timing attacks.

The last approach is Branchless Montgomery ladder [124], which replaces branches in Montgomery ladder with a function that uses bitwise logic to swap two intermediate values only if the bit is 1, and thus removes the timing channel. However, the implementations of $\text{PointAdd}$ and $\text{PointDouble}$ can still bring side channels. First, OpenSSL adopts a lookup table to accelerate the square operation in these two functions. The access pattern to the table can leak information about the secret in ECDH [179]. Second, the modulo operation $x \mod m$ in these two functions adopted the early exit implementation: $x$ is directly returned if its value is smaller than $m$. This branch can be exploited by the adversary to check whether $x$ is smaller than $m$, and then deduce secrets in ECDH [80]. Third, Kaufmann et al. [112] discovered that in Microsoft Windows, the multiplication function of two 64-bit integers has an operand-dependent branch: if both operands have their 32 least significant bits equal to 0, then the multiplication is skipped and the result will be 0. This early exit branch was exploited to attack ECDH.
Modular Inverse. This operation is to calculate the integer \( x^{-1} \) given \( x \) and \( m \) such that \( x^{-1}x \equiv 1 \) mod \( m \). It can also be used to check if two integers are co-prime. One possible implementation is Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm (BEEA) [111], which uses arithmetic shift, comparison and subtraction to replace division. It is particularly efficient for big integers, but suffers from control flow vulnerabilities due to the introduction of operand-dependent branches. Branch prediction [3] attacks were demonstrated to recover the value of \( m \) in ECDSA and RSA. Page fault [215] and cache FLUSH-RELOAD [8] techniques were adopted to attack the gcd operation in RSA key generation.

An alternative approach is Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA). It calculates quotients and remainders in each step without introducing secret-dependent branches. It is less efficient but secure against control flow side-channel attacks. Currently there are no side-channel vulnerabilities discovered in this implementation. However, some cryptographic libraries have software bugs that may disable this implementation accidentally. García and Brumley [75] discovered that in OpenSSL 1.0.1u, the constant-time flag in ECDSA is not set for the secret nonces. Thus, the modular inverse computation still calls the vulnerable BEEA function instead of the secure EEA one.

4.2 Symmetric Cryptography

Symmetric ciphers, including block ciphers and stream ciphers, are also vulnerable to microarchitectural side-channel attacks. Different from asymmetric ciphers which usually contain lengthy and complex mathematical operations, symmetric ciphers typically leverage lookup tables instead of branch instructions or data-dependent rotations in computation. As a result, symmetric ciphers are more susceptible to data-flow side-channel vulnerabilities than control-flow ones.

Substitution-Permutation. This is a series of linked mathematical operations used in block ciphers. It takes a block of the plaintext and the key as inputs, and applies several alternating rounds of substitution boxes and permutation boxes to produce the ciphertext block.

The most common implementation of Substitution-Permutation is table lookup, which converts the algebraic operations in each round into memory accesses. Since the accessed entries of the lookup tables are determined by the secret keys and the plaintexts, an adversary can capture such access patterns to infer secrets. There are generally three types of attacks.

The first one is to steal the keys based on the entire execution time. Tsunoo et al. [193] discovered that the numbers of cache hits and misses when accessing the lookup table can affect the encryption time. Based on this observation, a cache timing attack was mounted on the block cipher MISTY1 [193] and further other ciphers, including DES [194], AES [16] and Camellia [241]. After that, an improved attack technique [26] was designed that leverages the cache access collisions to attack AES in OpenSSL. Acıicmez et al. [5] introduced a realistic remote cache timing attack to steal the AES key by analyzing only the first two encryption rounds.

The second type of attacks is to build “templates” to infer the access pattern of the lookup table during encryption. Accesses to different entries in the lookup table can cause changes in encryption time, and such timing difference is only related to the lookup indexes when the host system configuration is deterministic. Hence, the adversary can construct a template trace of execution time on a system with the same configuration as the victim one, and then perform correlation analysis on the trace. Bernstein [16] used a large quantity of plaintexts to construct the timing template, and achieved remote cache timing attack on the first round of AES in OpenSSL. A few follow-up studies [42, 150, 152] reproduced the attack and analyzed why it can reveal the key remotely. This technique was further applied to other block ciphers, e.g., CLEFIA [162].

The third type checks the state of the cache during or after the encryption to infer the internal state of the target cipher. Osvik et al. [151] analyzed the cache state after encryption to deduce lookup operations in the first two rounds of AES. They carried out the attacks in both synchronous
and asynchronous modes. Neve et al. [149] followed this method to target the last round of AES in OpenSSL, and successfully recovered the key with only 14 plaintexts. Recent work tried to sniff the cache state of each table lookup operation to obtain finer-grained side-channel information. Gullasch et al. [91] manipulated the OS scheduler to craft a spy process that steals the cache set address of each table lookup very precisely. Irazoqui et al. [105] adopted the cache Flush-Reload technique to obtain detailed access pattern of the victim cipher.

**Shift register.** This critical component in stream ciphers is designed to generate pseudorandom key streams. In some stream ciphers, the core logic is implemented as lookup table operation to achieve efficiency. This gives rise to data flow side-channel vulnerabilities.

Gierlichs et al. [82] performed a theoretical analysis on the susceptibility of eSTREAM candidates against side-channel attacks, and discovered that some of them are vulnerable from cache timing attacks due to the usage of lookup tables. Zenner [229] described a cache timing attack on the HC-256 stream cipher and offered multiple suggestions for hardening the cipher. He further analyzed eSTREAM finalists, and pointed out that most stream ciphers are surprisingly resistant to cache timing attacks, as long as the lookup table is not adopted [230]. Leander et al. [125] applied the cache timing analysis on LFSR-based stream ciphers, and proposed a general framework showing that the internal state of these ciphers can be recovered with very little computational effort. On this basis, Brumley et al. [36] presented a cache timing attack on the SNOW 3G stream cipher, recovering the full cipher state in a short time.

### 4.3 Post-Quantum Cryptography

Although post-quantum cryptography is secure against quantum computer based attacks, the implementations of those algorithms may contain side-channel vulnerabilities that are subject to attacks even by a classical computer.

**Distribution sampling.** This operation is to sample an integer from a distribution. It is essential for BLISS [65] to make the signature statistically independent of the secrets. However, an adversary can adopt side-channel attacks to recover the sampled data, and hence the secrets.

One popular and efficient sampling method is Cumulative Distribution Table (CDT) sampling [154], which pre-computes a table $T[i] = \mathbb{P}[x \leq i | x \sim D_{\sigma}]$. At the sampling phase, a random number $r$ is uniformly chosen from $[0, 1)$, and the target $i$ is identified from $T$ that satisfies $r \in [T[i-1], T[i])$. Some implementations adopt a guide table $I$ to restrict the search space and accelerate the search process. BLISS adopts this approach to sample blinding values from a discrete Gaussian distribution, and add them to the signature. However, the access pattern to the two tables reveals information about the sampled values. An adversary can adopt the cache Flush-Reload technique to recover the blinding values, and further the secret key in BLISS [34, 157].

Rejection Sampling [81], alternatively, samples a bit from a Bernoulli distribution $B(\exp(-x/2\sigma^2))$. The implementation can bring side-channel opportunities to steal the secret $x$: (1) a lookup table $ET[i] = \exp(-2^i/(2\sigma^2))$ is pre-computed to accelerate the bit sampling, causing a data flow vulnerability; (2) the sampling process needs to iterate over each secret bit and different branches will be executed for different bit values, resulting in a control flow vulnerability.

Practical attacks that exploit those vulnerabilities exist. First, rejection sampling can replace CDT sampling for blinding value generation. An adversary could utilize cache [34, 157] or branch [68] based attacks to recover the sampled values in BLISS. Second, this approach can also be used to sample random bits to probabilistically determine whether the blinding value is positive or negative, and whether the signature should be accepted or rejected. An adversary can infer the secret from this process via cache or branch traces [68, 190].

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**Failure rate reduction.** Post-quantum schemes may have certain failure rate during encryption or decryption due to its statistic nature. Thus it is necessary to devise mechanisms to reduce the possibility of failure. Error Correcting Code (ECC) is adopted to significantly reduce the failure rate, but its implementation can reveal whether the ciphertext contains an error via timing channels: a ciphertext without an error is much faster to decode than one with errors. An adversary can exploit such information to recover the key [52].

**Message randomization.** Some post-quantum schemes require the message to be randomized during encryption and decryption. This process can also create side-channel vulnerabilities. For instance, encryption and decryption in NTRU use hash functions to randomize the messages. However, the number of hash function invocations highly depends on the input message. As a result, the total execution time of encryption or decryption will vary on different inputs. By measuring such time information, an adversary is able to recover the secret input [181].

### 4.4 Cryptographic Protocol

In addition to cryptographic algorithms, side-channel attacks were proposed to target cryptographic protocols (specifically, their padding mechanisms).

**RSA-PAD.** SSL/TLS commonly adopts RSA to exchange the symmetric key \( K \), following Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS). The client pads the key \( K \), encrypts it using RSA and sends the ciphertext to the server. When the server receives the ciphertext, she accepts the decrypted message only if the first two bytes are 0x00||0x02. Otherwise, she sends an error message back to the sender and aborts the connection. This message serves as a side channel to recover the plaintext [23]: when the client sends out a ciphertext, the adversary can intercept the message and send a modified one to the server. From the server’s response, the adversary can learn if the first two bytes of the plaintext are 0x00||0x02 (PKCS conforming) or not. This can reduce the scope of the plaintext. The attacker can repeat this process until the scope is narrowed down to one single value.

A common defense is to unify the responses for valid and invalid paddings: if the decrypted message structure is not PKCS conforming, the receiver generates a random string as the plaintext, and performs all subsequent handshake computations on it. Thus, the adversary cannot distinguish valid ciphertexts from invalid ones based on the responses. However, the adversary can still adopt microarchitectural attack techniques to identify such information. Xiao et al. [220] adopted cache and control inference attacks to identify several control-flow vulnerabilities, which are mainly for improper error logging and reporting mechanisms. Ronen et al. [166] evaluated TLS implementations in several applications, and found seven of them were vulnerable to cache FLUSH-RELOAD and branch prediction attacks, due to secret-dependent control flows in data conversion, padding verification and padding oracle mitigation. Zhang et al. [239] adopted the cache FLUSH-RELOAD technique to capture the access traces as the padding oracle of XML encryption.

**CBC-MAC-PAD.** Standard network protocols adopt CBC-MAC to encrypt messages. The plaintext \( P \) is composed of the message, its Message Authentication Code (MAC) and a padding string \( pad \), and is encrypted in CBC mode. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext and validates the padding format and the MAC. If both are correct, she accepts the original intact message \( m \). If the format is invalid, she rejects the message with a decryption_failed error response. If the format is correct but the MAC is incorrect, she rejects the message with a bad_record_mac error response. These three conditions with three different responses create a side channel [202]: an adversary can modify the ciphertext and send it to the receiver for decryption. Based on the response, he can learn whether the chosen ciphertext is decrypted into an incorrect padding. This oracle enables the adversary to learn each byte of an arbitrary plaintext block.
Different countermeasures were designed to mitigate such side channels: responses for both invalid padding format error and invalid MAC error are unified to be indistinguishable to the adversary [142]. Dummy MAC validation, padding data and compression operations were added to make the validation constant-time. However, these implementations still contain secret-dependent control flows, rendering them vulnerable to microarchitectural attacks. An adversary can obtain the padding validation results via cache FLUSH-RELOAD [106], PRIME-PROBE [167] or control-flow inference [220] techniques.

5 SUMMARY OF SIDE-CHANNEL COUNTERMEASURES

In this section, we summarize the potential defenses against microarchitectural attacks, and categorize them into three application-level, four system-level, and three hardware-level strategies.

5.1 Application-level Strategies

Runtime behavior unification. Control flow vulnerabilities exist when different secret values lead to different code paths that are distinguishable by the adversary using certain side-channel techniques. Two strategies can be used to remove such control flow.

The first strategy is always-execute-and-select-by-condition. All possible code paths are executed regardless of the branching condition. Based on the secret value, the correct result is assigned to the return variable. This technique is adopted in modular exponentiation (square-and-multiply-always), scalar multiplication (double-and-add-always) and CBC-MAC-PAD (constant-time compression). This strategy is effective against remote timing attacks. However, the control flow in result selection can still be observed by a local adversary via microarchitectural attacks. Additionally, if the values for all code paths are pre-computed and stored in memory, the adversary can also infer the secret via data flow, exemplified by sliding window implementations in modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication. The second strategy is always-execute-and-select-by-bit. The difference between this strategy and the previous one is that the selection phase employs bitwise operations of the secret, and thus avoids introducing branches or access patterns. The branchless Montgomery ladder algorithm adopts this solution for constant-time conditional swap in scalar multiplication.

Data flow vulnerabilities exist when different values of the secret lead to different memory accesses that can be observed by the adversary. Two strategies can remove such data flow. The first strategy is always-access-and-select-by-bit. It accesses all critical locations, and selects the correct value based on the bitwise operation. It is adopted in masked window modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication. The second strategy is calculate-on-the-fly. We can calculate the value every time it is used instead of pre-computing all values and storing them into a table, particularly when the calculation is inexpensive and does not introduce secret-dependent control flows. Branchless Montgomery ladder adopts this method in the square operation of scalar multiplication.

Runtime behavior randomization. For asymmetric ciphers, one possible approach is cryptographic blinding. There are generally two types of blinding techniques.

We can adopt the key blinding technique: a random factor is blended into the secret key, but the original key and the randomized key generate the same cryptographic result. The adversary can only obtain the randomized key via side-channel attacks, which is useless without knowing the blended random factor. For ECDSA and ECDH, the randomized key is \( k + sr \) where \( r \) is a random number and \( s \) is the group order. The scalar multiplication generates \( (k + sr)G \), the same as \( kG \) [47]. For RSA and ElGamal, the randomized key is \( d + r\phi(n) \) where \( r \) is a random number and \( \phi \) is the Euler’s totient function. The decryption yields \( c^{d + r\phi(n)} \mod n \), which is the same as \( c^d \mod n \). In both cases, the true value of \( k \) is hidden from side-channel adversaries.
We can also utilize plaintext/ciphertext blinding, which randomizes the plaintexts or ciphertexts that are adaptively chosen by the adversary. The randomized texts cause the adversary to recover a wrong key via side-channel analysis. This solution works only if correct ciphertexts can be produced from randomized plaintexts and vice versa. For ECDSA and ECDH, we can choose a random point \( R \) and use \( G' = G + R \) in computation. The adversary cannot recover \( k \) from the side-channel observation without the knowledge of \( R \) \([47]\), but we can easily reproduce the correct result \( kG \) by subtracting \( kR \) from \( kG' \). For RSA and ElGamal, we can generate a random value \( r \), and replace \( c \) with \( c \cdot r^e \). Now the decryption process is randomized to be \( (c \cdot r^e)^d \mod n = c^d \cdot r^{ed} \mod n \). To get \( c^d \mod n \) we can simply multiply the result by \( r^{-1} \), as \( r^{ed} \cdot r^{-1} \equiv 1 \mod n \).

For symmetric ciphers, the main target of side-channel attacks is the lookup table. One simple mitigation idea is to periodically randomize the entries in the table at runtime. Brickell et al. \([30]\) designed compact and frequently randomized S-box for AES. Although the implementation is nearly 2× slower, it can indeed defeat the cache timing attack proposed in \([16]\).

**Software vulnerability identification.** Some static approaches were designed to identify or verify potential side-channel vulnerabilities in commodity software. Abstract interpretation is a common approach to analyze the source code and measure the information leakage (bounds). CacheAudit \([63, 64]\) modeled the relationship between the adversary’s observation and program’s execution traces as a Markov chain, and quantified the upper bound of the adversary’s probability of success and the information leakage. Molnar et al. \([143]\) modeled control-flow side channels with a program counter transcript, in which the value of the program counter at each step is leaked to an adversary. FlowTracker \([165]\) adopted information flow tracking to analyze the assembly instructions and identify the implicit flow edges in constant-time implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Irazoqui et al. \([104]\) designed a static code analysis tool to look up implicit features of microarchitectural attacks. SC-Eliminator \([219]\) eliminated side-channel leakage using program repair, which conducts code transformations on unbalanced conditional jumps and cross cache line memory accesses to equalize the execution time. Wang et al. \([205]\) proposed Secret-Augmented Symbolic domain to track program secrets and their dependencies for precision and coarse-grained public information for scalability. Various approaches were proposed \([10, 14, 22, 25, 53, 122, 163]\) to verify constant-time behavior of a program, and check if it has secret-dependent conditional jumps or memory accesses.

There are also some dynamic analysis approaches, which focus on concrete program executions and identify vulnerabilities from runtime execution traces. Zankl et al. \([228]\) profiled the number of executions in a modular exponentiation operation, and calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient between this number and the Hamming weights of the exponent to identify information leakage during modular exponentiation. Wang et al. \([206]\) proposed CacheD to identify the vulnerable instructions by feeding different secrets into the program and checking if each instruction has memory accesses to different cache locations. Shin et al. \([179]\) used the FLUSH-RELOAD technique to collect two cache activity traces with two different secret inputs, and applied K-means clustering algorithm to check the dependency between cache activities and secret inputs. Mutual information was adopted \([102, 218]\) to measure the side-channel information leakage and the relationship between secret inputs and memory activities. Weiser et al. \([216]\) exploited Intel Pin tool to collect execution addresses, and applied statistic Kuiper’s test and Randomized Dependence Coefficient to discover vulnerabilities at the granularity of byte addresses. Xiao et al. \([220]\) proposed a framework to identify padding oracle attacks in SSL/TLS protocols in SGX secure enclaves.
5.2 System-level Strategies

**Process execution partitioning.** Since one enabling factor of microarchitectural attacks is the shared hardware components, we can enforce resource isolation for each process. The strategy is spatial partitioning, i.e., assigning different parts of the hardware units to processes. For instance, in the cloud scenario, hypervisor-based solutions were designed to defeat LLC attacks by partitioning the LLC, via page coloring [177], page locking [117], and Intel Cache Allocation Technology [177]. Zhou et al. [243] prevented **Flush-Reload** attacks by managing dynamic page mapping to avoid cache line sharing, and thwarted **Prime-Probe** attacks through reduction of cross-domain cache line eviction. Hardware Transactional Memory was leveraged to eliminate the cache interference and prevent the adversary from evicting the victim’s memory lines out of the cache [44, 88]. To defeat side-channel attacks in web browsers, Schwarz et al. [174] designed a fine-grained permission system to restrict the behaviors of JavaScript interface and functions.

**Process scheduling.** Since a lot of microarchitectural side-channel attacks require the attacker and victim programs to run concurrently on the same machine, one possible strategy is to carefully schedule different programs to achieve temporal partitioning. Zhang and Reiter [240] introduced an OS-based solution, which frequently flushes the local microarchitectural states (BTB, TLB, caches) to reduce side-channel leakage during context switches. Similar ideas were proposed in [83, 200], where CPU caches are flushed during VM switches to defeat cache side-channel attacks in the cloud. To reduce the overhead of state cleansing operations, Sprabery et al. [183] implemented the scheduling as an extension to the Completely-Fair-Scheduler in Linux.

**Measurement randomization.** This idea is to add randomization to the adversary’s measurements, making it difficult or infeasible to capture accurate information based on the observations. This was first proposed in [97] to fuzz the timing information to reduce timing channels. Vattikonda et al. [201] modified the **rdtsc** instruction from the hypervisor to randomize the emulated timer. Martin et al. [136] optimized this approach by adding random noise in each predefined epoch. Li et al. [127] introduced Stopwatch, which disables precise timing measurement in the cloud server to mitigate timing-channel attacks.

An alternative way is to add randomization inside the application during compiling. Crane et al. [50] designed an approach to dynamically randomize the control flow in the application to defeat cache side-channel attacks. Braun et al. [29] inserted random temporal paddings into the source application to obfuscate the adversary’s observations.

**Attack Detection.** In addition to prevent side-channel attacks, another direction is to detect the occurrence of side-channel attacks at runtime. The key insight is that the victim and attacking programs involved in a microarchitectural side-channel attack exhibit unusual behaviors compared to normal applications, which can be observed by the privileged software. For instance, signature-based detection systems [46, 55, 153] were proposed to detect side-channel attacks using hardware performance counters. NIGHTs-WATCH [146] leveraged machine learning techniques to detect cache attacks based on the performance counter values. Zhang et al. [236] combined both signature-based and anomaly-based detection methods to identify cache **Prime-Probe** and **Flush-Reload** attacks with high fidelity. Hunger et al. [99] proposed mimicking the behaviors of the victim to attract and identify the adversary by monitoring its common characteristics. To detect page-level side-channel attacks in Intel SGX, multiple techniques [45, 178, 187] took advantage of the Intel TSX feature.
5.3 Architecture-level Strategies

**Hardware resource partitioning.** Computer architects and researchers have designed security-aware architectures to protect critical applications from side-channel attacks. One straightforward way is to partition the shared resources to prevent processes from interfering with one another.

As the CPU cache is the most popular target for microarchitectural attacks, a lot of efforts have been spent to enhance the security of cache architectures. The simplest way is to divide the cache into multiple partitions by ways, and allocate them to different processes exclusively, such as Statically Partitioned cache [94] and SecVerilog cache [231, 232]. However, statically partitioned caches can significantly reduce the effective cache capacity for each process, causing huge performance degradation and unfairness.

A more promising direction is dynamic partitioning. Partition-Locked cache [213] assigns a protection bit to each memory line to denote whether it needs to be locked in the cache. Green et al. [87] identified an undocumented feature AutoLock on ARM processors to prevent evictions of lines in core-private caches. Vantage [170] enforces fine-grained partitioning during replacement instead of physically restricting the placement of cache lines. NoMo Cache [62] reserves certain blocks in every cache set for each thread, which cannot be evicted by other threads. The number of those blocks is dynamically adjusted based on the activity of the thread. To maintain high associativity while partitioning the cache, Futility Scaling [204] keeps evicting cache lines with the largest scaled futility to retain a number of useful lines. SecDCP Cache [209] improved over SecVerilog cache by dynamically partitioning the cache for different processes based on the cache miss rate of instructions at runtime. The work was further enhanced in FairSDP [171], which improves the fairness among competing threads. SHARP Cache [223] implements Core Valid Bits to cache lines, enabling the OS to prioritize the cache lines for eviction when cache conflict occurs. This can reduce the interference among different processes. DAWG [119] introduces minimal modifications on the hardware to fully isolate cache hits and misses on certain lines invalidated due to flush-caused invalidation.

This partitioning strategy is also adopted by other platforms and scenarios. To mitigate side-channel attacks in Trusted Execution Environment, Sanctum Cache [49] assigns different memory regions to different enclaves or OSes to disable cache sharing, and flushes the caches during context switching from the enclave mode to the non-enclave mode. Following this work, HybCache [59] selectively applies partitioning only for isolated execution domains, making the sharing of cache resources more flexible and efficient.

For other microarchitectural components, Static-Partition TLB [58] was introduced, which follows the idea of static-partitioning cache and Sanctum to isolate the TLB accesses between the victim and the attacker. Wang et al. [210] designed approaches to prevent information leakage via on-chip networks by restricting low-security traffic. To protect the memory controllers, Wang et al. [208] adopted temporal partitioning to group memory access requests in queues according to their security domains, and separate the requests serving different domains in different time slots. This design was further improved by the lattice priority scheduling [73] and quantitative security guarantee [211] to reduce performance overhead and increased scalability.

**Resource usage randomization.** This strategy is to randomize the resource usage of the processes to obfuscate the side-channel observation. Random Permutation cache [213] maintains a dynamic and random memory-to-cache mapping table for each process to ensure the accessed set is unpredictable. Newcache [132, 214] introduced a virtual Logical Direct-Mapped (LDM) Cache with two mappings: the one from memory addresses to the LDM cache is direct-mapped for high performance, while the other from the LDM cache to the physical cache is fully-associative for
strong security. Non Deterministic Cache [115] leverages cache access delay to obscure the relationship between cache accesses and the observed timing information. Random Fill Cache [131] randomizes cache prefetching by bringing the accessed memory line along with random neighbors to the cache, so the memory access pattern is convoluted. TSCache [191] makes the cache access pattern and timing leakage unpredictable in the embedded devices with injection of randomized cache timing behaviors. CEASER Cache [160] encrypts and remaps the addresses of memory lines, which can efficiently decrease the probability of conflict caused by cache misses. An improved version, CEASER-S [161] was then designed to divide the cache into multi-way partitions and adopt random placement among these partitions, further increasing the uncertainty in memory-to-cache mapping. SCATTER Cache [217] translates the memory address and process information to a random cache set index, and guarantees that each cache way has its own specific index. Phantom Cache [189] proposed a novel localized randomization method, which randomly places a loaded memory block at a location in its fixed mapping range. Purnal et al. [159] introduced a generic model for randomization-based caches with systematic analysis, which can also serve as a baseline for future cache design.

Randomization can be applied to other microarchitectural components as well. Random-Fill TLB [58] decorrelates the memory access from the actual TLB entry by randomizing the address translation for TLB misses, which can result in non-deterministic observations. Camouflage [242] hides the timing information by shaping the time of memory operations into a predetermined distribution and adding fake memory traffic as needed.

**Hardware vulnerability identification.** Multiple approaches were designed to model security-aware hardware architectures and measure their vulnerabilities under different attacks. Demme et al. [54] proposed the Side-channel Vulnerability Factor (SVF), a metric to quantify the system’s vulnerabilities by measuring the correlation between the attacker’s observations and the victim’s actual execution. [20, 235] introduced improved metrics over SVF to assess other hardware components and attacks. Zhang et al. [234] modeled the cache architectures as finite-state machines and then quantitatively revealed potential side channel leakage. He et al. [94] used probabilistic information flow graph to model the interaction of the attacker and the victim in the cache architecture and measure the cache’s resilience against side channels. More analyses of secure cache architectures have been done using computation tree logic [56], three-step model [57], attack graphs [203], and neural networks [237].

### 5.4 Discussions of These Defenses

Among aforementioned three categories of defense strategies, the application-level ones are the most widely adopted in the cryptographic community due to two reasons: (1) they are easy to implement and patch the vulnerabilities immediately; (2) these approaches bring little computational overhead to the applications. However, these solutions are not very general, and the designs require manual analysis by experts. Hence, it is difficult to guarantee modern applications are free of side-channel vulnerabilities inside the tremendous amount of code. We will perform a comprehensive study about two popular cryptographic applications in the next section.

There are relatively fewer system-level or architecture-level strategies applied to real-world platforms or products, although a lot of general solutions have been well developed in academia. These solutions may have performance issues, and are much harder to implement in the existing machines, especially for the new hardware designs. So currently the most practical defense solutions for side-channel attacks are still based on modifying cryptographic algorithms and implementations.
6 EVALUATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC LIBRARIES

From a practical perspective, we review, analyze and evaluate the development of side-channel attacks and defenses in two commonly used cryptographic libraries: OpenSSL and GNU Crypto (GnuPG, Libgcrypt and GnuTLS). We collected the history of side-channel vulnerabilities and countermeasures (1999 – 2019) from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), the version control history and the source code. Tables 3 and 4 show the evolution of the libraries.

| ID | Patch Date   | Version       | Operations                  | Implementation            | CVE      | CVSS | Countermeasures                              |
|----|--------------|---------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|----------|------|----------------------------------------------|
| 1  | 2001/07/09   | 0.9.6b        | RSA-PAD                     | Uniform error message     | 2003/03/03 | 3   | 10  | 2.9  | Dummy checking for TLS                      |
| 2  | 2003/02/19   | 0.9.8a, 0.9.7a| CBC-MAC-PAD                 | Uniform error message     | 2003/03/03 | 3   | 10  | 2.9  | RSA blinding                               |
| 3  | 2003/04/10   | 0.9.6j, 0.9.7b| Modular multiplication      | Basic and Karatsuba       | 2003/03/31 | 5   | 10  | 2.9  | Uniform error message                       |
| 4  | 2005/05/05   | 0.9.8         | RSA-PAD                     | Uniform error message     | 2003/03/24 | 5   | 10  | 2.9  | Uniform version error message               |
| 5  | 2005/10/11   | 0.9.7         | Modular exponentation       | Sliding window            |          |     | Fixed window                                |
| 6  | 2007/10/11   | 0.9.8f        | Modular inversion           | Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm |          |     | Euclidean Extended Algorithm               |
| 7  | 2011/09/06   | 1.0.0         | Scalar multiplication       | Montgomery ladder         | 2011/05/31 | 2.6 | 4.9 | 2.9  | Make the bit length of scalar constant      |
| 8  | 2012/01/04   | 0.9.8a, 1.0.0f| CBC-MAC-PAD                 | Padding data initialization| 2012/04/05 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Dummy checking for DTLS                     |
| 9  | 2012/03/12   | 0.9.9a, 1.0.0b| RSA-PAD (PKCS#7, CMS)       | Error message             | 2012/03/12 | 5   | 10  | 2.9  | Uniform error message and dummy checking    |
| 10 | 2012/03/14   | 1.0.1         | Scalar multiplication       | Sliding window            | 2012/03/24 | 5   | 10  | 2.9  | Dummy data padding                          |
| 11 | 2013/02/05   | 0.9.8a, 1.0.0c, 1.0.1d| CBC-MAC-PAD                 | Dummyme data padding      | 2013/01/24 | 2.6 | 4.9 | 2.9  | Dummy data padding                          |
| 12 | 2014/04/07   | 1.0.1g        | Scalar multiplication       | Montgomery ladder         | 2014/03/25 | 1.9 | 3.4 | 2.9  | Branchless Montgomery ladder                |
| 13 | 2014/06/05   | 0.9.8a, 1.0.0m| CBC-MAC-PAD                 | Error message             | 2014/03/06 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Disable fallback of SSLv3.0                |
| 14 | 2014/10/15   | 0.9.8c, 1.0.0n, 1.0.1i| CBC-MAC-PAD                 | Disable SSLv2 ciphers     | 2014/05/06 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Disable SSLv2 protocols                     |
| 15 | 2015/06/28   | 1.0.1, 1.0.2f| RSA-PAD                     | Uniform error message     | 2015/06/28 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Disable SSLv2 ciphers                      |
| 16 | 2016/03/01   | 1.0.1s, 1.0.2g| RSA-PAD                     | Uniform error message     | 2016/03/01 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Disable SSLv2 ciphers                      |
| 17 | 2016/05/03   | 1.0.1l, 1.0.2h| CBC-MAC-PAD (AES-NI)        | Uniform error message     | 2016/05/03 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Disable SSLv2 ciphers                      |
| 18 | 2016/09/22   | 1.0.1c, 1.0.2i| Modular exponentation       | Fixed window               | 2016/09/22 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Disable SSLv2 ciphers                      |
| 19 | 2018/08/14   | 1.1.1        | Modular multiplication      | Branchless Montgomery ladder | 2018/08/14 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Branchless Montgomery ladder                |
| 19 | 2018/08/14   | 1.0.2p, 1.1.0i| Modular inversion           | Binary Greatest Common Divisor | 2018/08/14 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Extended Euclidean Algorithm               |
| 20 | 2018/09/11   | 1.1.1        | Modular inversion           | Binary Greatest Common Divisor | 2018/09/11 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Extended Euclidean Algorithm               |
| 21 | 2018/11/20   | 1.0.2q        | Modular multiplication      | Branchless Montgomery ladder | 2018/11/20 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Branchless Montgomery ladder                |
| 22 | 2019/02/26   | 1.1.2        | Modular multiplication      | Branchless Montgomery ladder | 2019/02/26 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Branchless Montgomery ladder                |
| 23 | 2019/09/10   | 1.1.1d, 1.1.0l, 1.0.3h| RSA-PAD (PKCS#7 decrpt)     | Branchless Montgomery ladder | 2019/09/10 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 2.9  | Branchless Montgomery ladder                |

Table 3. Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL (For CVSS column, B: Base; E: Exploitability; I: Impact)

6.1 Vulnerability Severity

We examine the severity and practicality of side-channel attacks as well as the attention developers paid to them. We establish the measurements for these threats and compare them with other vulnerability categories. We adopt the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) to assess each CVE. CVSS is a widely-accepted industry standard to identify and assess vulnerabilities across diverse platforms. It contains three metric groups: Base, Temporal, and Environmental, each

The latest CVSS version is v3.0. We adopt CVSS v2.0, as old vulnerabilities were not assigned CVSS v3.0 scores.
| ID | Patch Date   | Version | Operations                        | Implementation | CVE Date       | CVSS  | CVE | Countermeasures                      |
|----|--------------|---------|-----------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------|-----|--------------------------------------|
| 1  | 2006/09/08   | T1.4.3  | RSA-PAD                           | Error Message  | 2012/01/05    | 4.3   | 4.9 | Uniform error message                |
| 2  | 2006/09/21   | T1.5.1  |                                   |                | 2012-0390     | 4.3   | 4.9 | Dummy checking for DTLS              |
| 3  | 2012/05/06   | T3.0.11 |                                 | Uniform error message | 2013-1619 | 4.3   | 4.9 | Dummy data padding                   |
| 4  | 2013/02/04   | T2.12.3, T3.0.28, T3.1.7 | CBC-MAC-PAD            | Uniform error message | 2013-4242  | 1.9   | 3.4 | Square-and-Multiply always          |
| 5  | 2013/07/25   | Pl.4.1.4, L1.5.3 | Modular exponentiation | Square-and-Multiply | 2013-4242  | 1.9   | 3.4 | Square-and-Multiply always          |
| 6  | 2013/12/16   | L1.6.0  |                                   | Basic and Karatsuba multiplication | 2013-4256  | 2.1   | 3.9 | Exploitation blinding                |
| 7  | 2013/12/18   | Pl.4.16  |                                   |                |                |       |     |                                      |
| 8  | 2014/08/07   | L1.5.4  |                                   |                |                |       |     |                                      |
| 9  | 2014/08/27   | P1.4.19, L1.6.3 | Modular multiplication | Basic and Karatsuba multiplication | 2014-3591  | 1.9   | 3.4 | ElGamal Blinding                     |
| 10 | 2015/02/27   | P1.4.19, L1.6.3 | Modular multiplication | Basic and Karatsuba multiplication | 2015-0837  | 4.3   | 8.6 | Remove control flow                 |
| 11 | 2016/02/09   | L1.6.5  |                                   | Scrolling window | 2016-4919     | 1.9   | 3.4 | Double-And-Add-always               |
| 12 | 2016/02/18   | L1.5.5  |                                   | Scrolling window | 2017-7511     | 1.9   | 3.4 | Remove control flow                 |
| 13 | 2016/04/15   | L1.7.0  |                                   | Scrolling window | 2017-0837     | 4.3   | 8.6 | Remove control flow                 |
| 14 | 2017/06/29   | L1.7.8  |                                   | Scrolling window | 2017-7511     | 1.9   | 3.4 | Double-And-Add-always               |
| 15 | 2017/07/18   | L1.8.0  |                                   | Sliding window  | 2017-7526     | 4.3   | 8.6 | RSA blinding                        |
| 16 | 2017/07/19   | Pl.4.22 |                                   |                |                |       |     |                                      |
| 17 | 2017/08/27   | L1.7.9, L1.8.1 | Modular exponentiation | Branchless Montgomery ladder | 2017-0379  | 5     | 10  | Input validation                     |
| 18 | 2018/06/13   | L1.7.10, L1.8.3 | Pl.4.22 | Early exit | 2018-0495     | 1.9   | 3.4 | ECDSA blinding                       |
| 19 | 2018/07/16   | T3.3.10, T3.5.19, T6.3.6 | CBC-MAC-PAD | Pseudo constant time | 2018-10846  | 1.9   | 3.4 | New variant of pseudo constant time (Not fully mitigated) |
| 20 | 2018/12/01   | T3.6.5  | RSA-PAD                           | Pseudo constant time | 2018-10846  | 1.9   | 3.4 | Hide access pattern & timing        |

Table 4. Vulnerabilities in GNU crypto (For the version column, P: GnuPG; L: Libgcrypt; T: GnuTLS. For CVSS column, B: Base; E: Exploitability; I: Impact)

consisting of a set of metrics. We consider the Base score that well represents the inherent quality of a vulnerability. It comprises two sub-scores, Exploitability that defines the difficulty to attack the software and Impact that defines the level of damage to certain properties of the software under a successful attack. The score ranges from 0 (least severe) to 10 (most severe). Detailed computation of those scores can be found in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) website. The score of each side-channel vulnerability is collected from the NVD and CVE websites. It is worth noting that CVSS is a general metric for characterizing software vulnerabilities. It does not contain evaluation criteria for microarchitectural threats, and may not comprehensively reveal the inherent features of microarchitectural attacks. However, it can reflect the attitude of the cryptographic community towards side-channel attacks in a practical way.

For OpenSSL and GNU Crypto, the top vulnerabilities are denial-of-service, arbitrary code execution, buffer overflow, and memory corruption. Table 5a compares the average scores and quantities of these vulnerability categories. We observe that side-channel vulnerabilities are regarded less severe than other types due to lower Exploitability and Impact sub-scores. Side-channel attacks usually require stronger adversarial capabilities, in-depth knowledge about the underlying platforms, and a large amount of attack sessions, but only cause partial confidentiality breach as they leak (part of) keys or plaintexts. In contrast, other vulnerabilities may enable less experienced attackers to exploit them for executing arbitrary code or disabling the services entirely.

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4https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v2-calculator
5https://nvd.nist.gov/
6https://cve.mitre.org/
7There are some mistakes in CVEs: (1) all side-channel vulnerabilities should only have partial confidentiality impact, while CVE-2003-0131, CVE-2013-1619 and CVE-2018-16868 were also assigned partial integrity or availability impact. (2) CVE-2018-10844, CVE-2018-10845 and CVE-2018-10846 should have local access vector, but they were assigned network access vector. We corrected them in our analysis.
Next we break down and compare different types of side-channel vulnerabilities, as shown in Table 5b. We first consider the two categories of operations: asymmetric ciphers and protocol padding. We did not find any side-channel CVEs related to post-quantum cryptography as its development is still at an early stage. We also skip the vulnerabilities in symmetric ciphers, as there are only two reported CVEs (row 10 in Table 3 and row 3 in Table 4). This is because symmetric ciphers are simpler and thus less vulnerable than asymmetric ones, and the widely-adopted AES-NI instruction set extension can effectively mitigate existing vulnerabilities. We observe that vulnerabilities in protocol padding are generally more severe than those in asymmetric ciphers due to higher Exploitability. The underlying reason is that Exploitability is determined by the access vector: network vector and local vector are neck and neck for vulnerabilities in asymmetric ciphers, but the former dominates access vectors of padding oracle attacks, rendering them more exploitable. We also compare microarchitectural attacks with network and physical attacks. From Table 5b we can observe that network attacks are most severe due to high Exploitability. Scores of microarchitectural attacks are also higher than that of physical attacks, as some microarchitectural vulnerabilities can be exploited via remote timing measurement, while all physical attacks must be conducted on site.

6.2 Vulnerability Response

We evaluate the responses to discovered side-channel vulnerabilities from application developers. **Response speed.** For each vulnerability, we measure the vulnerability window, defined as the duration from the vulnerability publication date to the patch release date. If the patch release date is earlier than the vulnerability publication date, the vulnerability window is negative. Obviously a narrower vulnerability window (in case of positive) leads to fewer chances of exploit and less damage.

Figure 2a shows the cumulative distribution of vulnerability windows for OpenSSL and GNU Crypto. We can see that both libraries responded to side-channel vulnerabilities very actively: 56% and 50% of the vulnerabilities were fixed by the two libraries respectively before publication; more than 80% of the vulnerabilities were fixed within one month of their disclosure; each library has only one case that spanned more than 4 months, the longest being 198 days in GnuPG. Figures 2b and 2c compare the vulnerability windows of different operations and attack types, respectively. Although network attacks are more severe than local attacks, they were fixed at similar speeds.

**Response coverage.** We found that the majority of discovered vulnerabilities were addressed in OpenSSL and GNU Crypto, except that microarchitectural padding oracle vulnerabilities \[167, 220\] still exist in both libraries at the time of writing. One possible reason is that such host attacks require stronger adversarial capabilities and can only work in limited contexts, and thus are less severe.

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8A side-channel vulnerability may be published in different ways, including online archives, formal academic publications and the CVE system. We use the earliest of all such dates.
6.3 Cross-branch Patch Consistency

An application usually maintains different development branches concurrently. An adversary can still attack unpatched branches if the fix is not applied to all live branches at the same time. For instance, OpenSSL replaced the vulnerable sliding window scalar multiplication with branchless Montgomery ladder in version 1.1.0i on August 14, 2018, but not in the 1.0.2 branch. This left a chance for port-based attacks [7] to work on the sliding window implementation in OpenSSL 1.0.2, which urged the developers to apply the patch to 1.0.2q on November 20, 2018.

For each vulnerability, we measure the cross-branch vulnerability window, defined as the duration from the first patch release date to the date when all live branches are patched. Table 6 shows the number of patches in different vulnerability windows for both libraries. In most cases, a patch was applied to all live branches at the same time (0 days). Some patches are however still missing in certain branches at the time of writing (never). For example, OpenSSL 1.0.1 introduced masked-window multiplication and AES-NI support that were never ported to 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 branches before their end of life. OpenSSL 1.0.2r includes a bug fix for protocol error handling, but it is not applied to 1.1.0 and 1.1.1. Some new side-channel bug fixes, not critical though, in OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 1.1.1b were not included in 1.0.2 and 1.1.0. For GNU Crypto, CVE-2015-0837 was fixed in GnuPG 1.4.19 and Libgcrypt 1.6.3, but not in Libgcrypt 1.5.x. Fortunately this branch has reached its end of life on December 31, 2016.

| Duration (days) | 0  | 59 | 98 | 120 | 196 | never |
|-----------------|----|----|----|-----|-----|-------|
| Counts          | 15 | 2  | 1  | 1   | 1   | 6     |

| Duration (days) | 0  | 9  | 13 | 20  | 232 | 356  | never |
|-----------------|----|----|----|-----|-----|-------|-------|
| Counts          | 8  | 1  | 1  | 1   | 1   | 1     | 7     |

(a) OpenSSL
(b) GNU Crypto

Table 6. Number of patches for cross-branch windows

6.4 Countermeasure Type

We study four categories of countermeasures commonly adopted by cryptographic libraries to fix side-channel vulnerabilities: (1) introducing brand new implementations; (2) selecting existing secure implementations; (3) fixing software bugs; (4) enhancing robustness of existing implementations. Countermeasure classification for OpenSSL and GNU Crypto is shown in Figure 3.

In the earlier days, the primary fix for side-channel vulnerabilities in OpenSSL was to introduce new implementations. After many years’ evolution, every cryptographic operation now has secure implementations, and brand new solutions become unnecessary. Recent patches were often minor bug fixes. Besides, previously developers only patched the code upon revelation of new issues. Now they proactively fortify the implementation without the evidence of potential vulnerabilities. This definitely improves the security of the library against side-channel attacks.

Fig. 2. Cumulative distributions of vulnerability windows
GNU Crypto has fewer vulnerabilities and patches compared to OpenSSL, and prefers to use traditional solutions for some common issues. For instance, to mitigate the vulnerability in sliding window scalar multiplication, OpenSSL adopted a new solution, masked-window multiplication, while Libgcrypt regressed to less efficient double-and-add-always. Besides, development of GNU Crypto is generally several years behind that of OpenSSL.

6.5 Comparisons with Other Libraries

Finally we summarize side-channel CVEs in other cryptographic applications (Table 7).
Vulnerable Categories. Table 8 shows the breakdown of vulnerabilities in different categories. We observe that vulnerabilities exist widely in many applications, besides OpenSSL and GNU Crypto. We believe a lot of unrevealed vulnerabilities still exist in various applications, for two reasons.

First, researchers tend to study common cryptographic libraries, encouraging their developers to continuously improve the code. Other less evaluated applications may still contain out-of-date vulnerabilities, but their developers are unaware or ignorant of them. For instance, RSA padding oracle attack was proposed 20 years ago and has been mitigated in common libraries like OpenSSL and GnuTLS, but it still exists in about one third of top 100 Internet domains including Facebook and PayPal, as well as widely used products from IBM, Cisco and so on [24].

Second, microarchitectural attacks usually require the source code to be available, prohibiting researchers from discovering vulnerabilities in closed-source applications. For instance, Table 8 shows that the majority of vulnerabilities found in closed-source applications are padding oracles via remote timing or message side channels, likely because no source code is needed to experiment with these attacks. We do not know if they also suffer from padding oracle attacks via microarchitectural side channels, as current studies [106, 166, 167, 220] evaluated them only on open-source libraries. It is also unclear if they possess vulnerabilities related to asymmetric ciphers for the similar reason.

Response speed and coverage. Figure 4 compares the response speeds of different applications. Interestingly, they all responded to the vulnerabilities very fast. Most vulnerabilities were published only after the release of corresponding patches, leaving no vulnerability windows to exploit.

Regarding the coverage, most discovered vulnerabilities were addressed, with a few exceptions (annotated with \( \bullet \) in Table 7) where too little public information is available. For these cases, we are unable to ascertain whether these issues were solved or not.

|                      | CVSS | Count |
|----------------------|------|-------|
|                      | Base | Exploit | Impact |
| OpenSSL             | 3.14 | 6.09   | 2.90   | 10    |
|                     | 4.25 | 8.46   | 2.90   | 13    |
| GNU Crypto          | 2.58 | 4.88   | 2.90   | 9     |
|                     | 2.70 | 3.90   | 2.90   | 6     |
| Open-source         | 3.89 | 7.10   | 3.27   | 31    |
|                     | 4.25 | 7.86   | 3.30   | 24    |
|                     | 3.69 | 6.89   | 3.13   | 15    |
| Closed-source       | 2.60 | 4.90   | 2.90   | 1     |
|                     | 4.36 | 4.33   | 3.09   | 32    |
|                     | 4.28 | 8.47   | 2.90   | 7     |

Table 8. Severity comparisons

7 CONCLUSION

Microarchitectural side-channel attacks against cryptographic implementations have been an enduring topic over the past 20 years. Many vulnerabilities have been discovered from previous cryptographic implementations, but unknown ones likely still exist in today’s implementations. The good news is that the community resolved these vulnerabilities very actively, and hence large-scale side-channel attacks causing severe real-world damages have not happened so far. Besides, years of efforts have fortified common cryptographic libraries and applications against side-channel attacks, and recently discovered vulnerabilities were less significant or surprising.

Looking ahead, we expect continuous arms race between side-channel attacks and defenses. We encourage researchers to discover new vulnerabilities and attacks, evaluate them on a wider range of applications, and develop novel countermeasures for them.
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