A Survey on Honeypot Software and Data Analysis

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Abstract—In this survey, we give an extensive overview on honeypots. This includes not only honeypot software but also methodologies to analyse honeypot data.

I. INTRODUCTION

Effective network security administration depends to a great extent on the understanding of existing and emerging threats on the Internet. In order to protect information systems and its users it is of crucial importance to collect accurate, concise, high-quality information about malicious activities [1], [2]. The fact that cyber attacks are a present threat is confirmed by recent statistics such as the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report [3] or the attacks report by ATLAS [4]. The discovery of vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, ShellShock, and Poodle, and their wide-spread prevalence across a number of operating systems draw the public attention to system security. As observed with Heartbleed, attackers were much faster in exploiting the vulnerabilities than vendors could create and roll out patches. Relying only upon tradition lines of defence such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and dynamic firewalls alone does not provide a holistic coverage on detecting novel and emerging patterns of attacks [5]. Honeypots are decoy computer resources whose value lies in being probed, attacked or compromised [6]. They complement the traditional detection mechanisms [7]. Honeypots are able to spot zero-day attacks and give insights on attackers actions and motivation.

The field of honeypot research consists of two main pillars: a) the development of honeypot software and its effective deployment b) the analysis of the acquired log data in a structured manner.

Honeypot surveys and software comparisons have been presented before, however an up-to-date comparison and classification of honeypot software does not exist according to our current knowledge. Moreover, none of the surveys focus on creating an overview of related data analysis techniques. Based on questions imposed by the data analysis, a practice-oriented review of these techniques will be presented. Eventually, the question will be elaborated which honeypot should be deployed and how the log records should be analysed.

First surveys in the field of honeypot research presented in 2003 include only a small subset of meanwhile available software and are by this time outdated [8]. Unfortunately, papers tend to only discuss a small subset of honeypot software or mention examples which denies a holistic view [9]–[12]. Mairh et al. [13] presented in 2011 a honeypot survey, which illustrates the different types of honeypots and suggests to use honeypots in educational environments. Deployment of honeypots is only done by the example of HoneyD. In 2012, Bringer [14] published the by far most exhaustive survey on recent advances in the field of honeypots by ordering a large amount of honeypot related papers by contentual category. However, it rather only considers new types of honeypot software and misses the historical development of honeypot software. Also the software release date and maintenance time spans remain unanswered, which are an indicator for the current deployability.

In this survey, we give an extensive overview about honeypot software as well as methodologies to analyze honeypot data. We briefly discuss ethical and legal concerns. Figure 1 shows an overview about the specific topics of this paper, including guidance of the paper structure.

II. BASIC BACKGROUND ABOUT HONEYPOTS

The first academic publication including explicitly the keyword honeypot dates back to the beginning of 2000 [15], [16]. One of the first broadly accepted formal definitions was introduced by Spitzner [6]: A honeypot is decoy computer resource whose value lies in being...
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Figure 1. Categorisation of honeypot literature.

probed, attacked or compromised. However, the concept of honeypots is not new and was already used implicitly in the 1990s in the field of information protection and network defences [17], [18], but was named differently, for example a (chroot) jail [19]. Later, multiple honeypots have been interconnected, called honeynet.

At the beginning of the year 2000, highly effective Unix- and Windows-based worms spread exponentially [20]. Despite the extensive distribution, capturing and analysing this incident was fairly difficult as the worms only resided in the systems memory or masqueraded themselves. One of the first honeypots dedicated to a known threat was used to analyse the sub7 malware. The honeypot emulated a Windows system infected by the sub7 trojan by responding on port 27374, which many worms used for subsequent attacks. The SANS Institute [21] captured the W32/Leaves worm within minutes. Hereafter, in the year 2002, a honeypot captured the first unknown threat, the CDE Subprocess Control Service buffer overflow. This vulnerability allowed to gain access to any Unix-based system [22]. A possible defence was introduced quickly. Since then honeypots have been established as an effective concept against vulnerabilities.

The general objective of a honeypot is either to distract attackers from their actual target, or to gather information about the attackers and attack patterns, such as the set of popular target hosts and the frequency of requests-responses. However, it is worth noting that honeypots should not be considered as an implementation to solve a certain problem but rather as a generic concept. Regardless of where and how honeypot are deployed (e.g. a router, scripts emulating specific services, virtual machines, or a standard physical system), honeypots contribute by being exposed to attacks.

A. Distinction to Other Security Concepts

Security concepts can be classified by the areas of operation which are prevention, detection, and reaction [23]. Prevention can be defined as any undertaking which (i) discourages intruders and (ii) makes breaches in the system infeasible. Detection is the process of identifying the presence of actions that harm the systems (i) confidentiality, (ii) integrity and (iii) availability. Reaction describes the execution of reactive measures after detecting harmful actions. Ideally, reaction reinforces prevention and improves future detections. Security concepts are designed to accomplish best results in their area of operation, which leads to inferior results in the remaining areas.

Besides honeypots, a combination of firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), anti-virus (AV), intrusion prevention systems (IPS), and log-monitoring can be used to improve network security. It is important to differentiate these concepts in order to use them to their full potential [13]. Traditionally, firewalls monitor and control network traffic based on predetermined, static security rules. They act as a barrier between secure and insecure networks. Advanced firewalls filter not only by network attributes, but also protocol states and application layer rules. IDS analyze whole packets, both header and payload, looking for malicious signatures. When a known event is detected an alert is generated. IPSs can be understood as an extension of IPS which not only issue alerts, but actively reject packets and dynamically add new rules. AV software is also signature based, but operates on a file-level and tries to capture infections by a trojan or virus. Complete log-monitoring of application logs, service logs, system logs etc. increases the awareness of network infrastructure or availability problems. Problems are detected by evaluating the log files statistically for known text patterns that indicate important events. Cyber security standards prevent attacks by defining security guidelines for the software and infrastructure, such as a clean configuration, hardened kernel and recent updates. Nowadays a clear distinction
between these concepts became difficult, as security solutions are hybrids that combine several concepts in order to minimize the individual trade-off.

Honeypots add little value directly to prevention as they do not protect against security breaches. At most, they inhibit attacks because attackers are concerned about wasting time and resources attacking honeypots instead of the actual target: production systems. However, they fail against automated toolkits and worms, which form one of the most common attack types and which scan, probe and try to exploit every network participant they can find. This also holds for intrusion detection systems, they might deter, however they will not actively prevent automated attacks. Firewalls are the best concept for prevention, as they hide services and block communication on unused ports or from suspicious IP-address-ranges, so that intruders are kept out or do not find any services to communicate with. Best prevention is achieved by good cyber security standards and practices, such as disabling unnecessary or insecure services, frequent update and patch policies, strong authentication mechanisms and so on.

If detection is concerned, honeypots add extensive value. It is very difficult to detect attacks on production systems because the attacks simply submerge in the vast amount of production activity. Honeypots can simplify the detection process. Since honeypots have no production activity, all connections to the honeypot are suspect by nature and therefore detect an unauthorized probe, scan, or attack with almost no false positives and negatives. As the name suggests, intrusion detection systems are designed to detect attacks. However, their effectiveness is highly dependant on the signature quality. Administrators can be overwhelmed with false positives, become numb and start to ignore those messages. On the other hand, false negatives are also possible if no appropriate signature exists as new exploits are used. Snort developed an effective signature-based recognition after years of community contribution. If we consider a traditional firewall concept without the abilities such as flow statistics (e.g., packet count), a firewall is significantly limited in the detection of attacks.

The reaction to attacks can be accelerated with the help of honeypots. The analysis of the attack is substantially easier, as attack data is not mingled with production activity data. Furthermore, in contrast to production systems, honeypots can be taken completely off-line for the analysis, which enables a proper and full forensic analysis. The insights can then be used to clean the production systems and understand the exploit, which is the first step to patch the corresponding vulnerabilities. Intrusion detection systems are primarily passive, that means that they analyse packets and create alerts. Traditionally, they do not alter the network packet flow. They only inform administrators about malicious activities. The reaction to new attacks might also include the creation of new signatures. As firewalls do not detect attacks, they cannot react dynamically to attacks. However, administrators can define new firewall rules manually, which are usually simpler then the rules from an intrusion detection system and are based rather on packet meta information than payload and packet flow [16].

Our discussion on the different security concepts shows that all concepts tend to have a specific objective. Primarily, honeypots implement reaction, IDSs implement detection, and firewalls implement prevention concepts. These concepts do not exclude but may complement each other. To achieve all objectives (prevention, detection, reaction), hybrid solutions such as IPSs have been developed. We summarize our findings in Table I, the number of (+) denotes the contribution level to the various objectives. However, this rating should be understood as a general trend of the overall capabilities, since individual deployment might shift the focus towards another objective.

B. Taxonomy of Honeypots

Marty Roesch, the developer of Snort, established one of the first classifications of honeypots [16], separating honeypots primarily based on their field of operation:
- production honeypots
- research honeypots

Production honeypots are characterized by ease of deployment and utilization and are meant to be used in production environments of companies. Their intended purpose is to achieve a higher security level within the network of one specific company by deflecting attacks. However, the production honeypots come with a

| Objective | Prevention | Detection | Reaction |
|-----------|------------|-----------|----------|
| Honeypot  | +          | ++        | +++      |
| Firewall  | +++        | ++        | +        |
| Intrusion Detection Sys. | + | ++++ | + |
| Intrusion Prevention Sys. | ++ | +++ | ++ |
| Anti-Virus | ++ | ++ | +++ |
| Log-Monitoring | + | ++ | + |
| Cyber Security Standard | +++ | + | + |

Table I

DISTINCTION BETWEEN SECURITY CONCEPTS BASED ON AREAS OF OPERATION.
trade-off between ease of operation and the quantity of collected information. By contrast, research honeypots provide comprehensive information about attacks, but are more difficult to deploy. They are usually used by research organizations and network forensics scientists in order to scrutinize attacks and to develop general counter-measures against threats. Research honeypots help to understand the motives, behaviour, tools, and organization of the black-hat community.

To set an example: A company redirects incoming traffic to unused IP-addresses to a SSH-honeypot. The honeypot identifies the attackers by IP-addresses which can be used in filter rules and block the access to the production systems. The functionality of the honeypot can be limited, as it only has to recognize the traffic and its source. A research organization however might be interested in studying the details of the attack, that is which dictionaries were used to guess the passwords in order to create a recommendation on password strength. Consequently, they have to use a research honeypot, which is more sophisticated and provides extensive log records with SSH credentials.

Another widely used classification of honeypots is based upon the characteristics of interaction, on the one hand considering the level of interaction [24]:

- low-interaction honeypots (LIHP)
- medium-interaction honeypots (MIHP)
- high-interaction honeypots (HIHP)

On the other hand, considering the direction of the interaction [25]:

- server honeypots
- client honeypots

Low-interaction honeypots simulate only a small set of services like SSH or FTP, they do not provide any access to the operating system to the attacker. LIHP produce minimal responses in order to allow protocol handshakes. As the collection of information is limited, LIHP are used mainly for statistic evaluation. However, they suffice to recognize peaks in the number of requests, for example created by autonomous worms. LIHP tend to be production honeypots.

Medium-interaction honeypots are slightly more sophisticated than LIHP, however they still do not provide any operating system functionality. The simulated services are more elaborated and provide a higher level of interaction for the attacker, as a matter of fact MIHP produce reasonable replies in hope of triggering follow-up attacks. To be an attractive target, MIHP also emulate more services than LIHP. Because of the reduced interaction capabilities LIHP and MIHP both have low chances of being compromised.

High-interaction honeypots are the most sophisticated honeypots. They are the most complex to implement, deploy and maintain, as they provide to the attacker a real operating system environment, which is not restricted. Furthermore, a huge set of services is installed. HIHP collect the largest possible amount of information, including complete attack logs, data access, traversing of file trees, executed byte codes etc. Because of the high complexity, HIHP log analysis is usually done by networks forensics scientists and less frequently automatically. HIHP tend to be research honeypots.

An overview of the properties with respect to the level of interaction is presented by Table I. However, it is important to point out that this classification is quite academic and impractical. Over time many different flavours of honeypots were created which are very difficult to divide into specific categories. That is why it became common to only differentiate between low and high honeypots, as recommended by Lance Spitzner [26]. Eventually, all honeypots that are mere port listeners or emulate services became low interaction honeypots (previously presented as low and medium) and anything that provides real services and aspects of an operating system a high-interaction honeypot [27].

Server Honeypots wait until the attackers initiate the communication, whereas client honeypots actively search for potential malicious entities and request an interaction. The most common field of application are web browsers: client honeypots request a homepage and check for unusual activities. Client-LIHP emulate components while client-HIHP use real web browsers. Traditional honeypots are server based.

The last classification is based on the physicality of the honeypot [28]:

- physical honeypots
- virtual honeypots

Evidently, a physical honeypot is a real machine on the network. A virtual honeypot is simulated (virtualized) by a host machine that forwards the network traffic to the virtual honeypot. Multiple virtual honeypots can be simulated on a single host. Virtual honeypots are usually high-interaction honeypots.

C. Specification of Honeypot Attacks

A technological attack is defined as an attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized access to or make unauthorized use of an asset; where asset is defined as anything that has value to an
Table II

| Properties of Honeypot Interaction Levels [12] |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| LIHP  | MIHP  | HIHP |
| real operating system | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| risk of compromise | low | mid | high |
| wish of compromise | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| information gathering | low | low | high |
| knowledge to deploy | low | high | high |
| knowledge to develop | low | low | very high |

organization [29]. However, honeypots are not directly of value, their value lies in being attacked. In order to define what in particular a honey pot attack is, firstly one has to accept the fact that honeypots are attacked inadvertently, they are exposed to attacks which are originally directed at production systems. That means that attacks on honeypots are no different to other systems as long as the attacker does not recognize the presence of the honeypot. Second, one has to differentiate between anomalous and normal behaviour. As honeypots are controlled environments, one can tag any anomalous behaviour as an attack [13]. However, this specification requires the differentiation between server and client honeypots. Server honeypots are completely passive, therefore all incoming requests form an anomaly and are by definition an attack. Client honeypots actively search and contact communication partners, therefore client honeypots must discern which communications comprise an anomaly. Heuristics usually verify this by looking after uncommon modifications.

D. Advantages and Disadvantages of Honeypots

Short and comprehensive lists presenting the advantages and disadvantages of honeypots have been assessed by several researchers [16], [24], [30]. We summarize the different aspects as follows.

The advantages of honeypots include:

**Valuable Data Collection** Honeypots collect data which is not polluted with noise from production activities and which is usually of high value. This makes data sets smaller and data analysis less complex.

**Independent from Workload** Honeypots do only need to process traffic which is directed at them or originates from them. This means, that they are independent from the workload which the production systems experience.

**Zero-Day-Exploit Detection** Honeypot capture everything that is used against them, this means that also unknown strategies and zero-day-exploits will be identified.

**Reduced False Positives and Negatives** Any activity with server-honeypots is an anomaly, which is by definition an attack. Client-honeypots verify attacks by detecting system state changes. These procedures result in reduced false positives and false negatives.

**Flexibility** Honeypots are a very flexible concept as can be seen by vast amount of different honeypot software. This means, that well-adjusted honeypot tools can be used for specific tasks, which furthermore might reduce redundant load.

The disadvantages of honeypots include:

**Limited Field of View** Server-honeypots have one common problem: they are worthless if no one attacks them. As long as attackers do not send any packets to the honeypot, it will be unaware of any unauthorized activity on production systems.

**Being Fingerprinted** Low-interaction honeypots emulate services, that means that their services might behave different than the real services, which can be used for fingerprinting honeypots and consequently detect them.

**Risk to the Environment** If honeypots get exploited, they can introduce a risk into the user’s environment. As discussed, the higher the interaction level, the higher the possible misuse.

III. Honeypot Software

This chapter introduces honeypot software, classified into the interaction level and their type of communication architecture. This means that honeypots will be introduced as either client or server honeypots and assigned either as low or high with respect to their interaction level. Hereby, this overview focuses on available and deployable software as we hope that this will be help the reader to choose the proper honeypot for his needs. However, we also include outdated honeypot implementations that had a significant impact on the research and were seminal during the release time. To clarify the state of maintenance we explicitly note release dates. This overview will not only illustrate how versatile honeypots are but also in which different application scenarios it can be deployed. Finally, we present honeypot related tools as well as mechanisms that detect the presence of honeypots.

A. Low Interaction Server Honeypots

1) **Common Internet Services:** The first publicly available honeypot software was released in 1997, the
Deception Toolkit(DTK) [31]. It is written in C and Perl, and emulates vulnerabilities of well-known services of Unix systems. The developers explain: “We use deception to counter attacks [...] the deception is intended to make it appear to attackers as if the system running DTK has a large number of widely known vulnerabilities.” [31].

In 1998, Back Officer Friendly (BOF) [32] was developed, originally to notice attacks by the remote administration tool Back Orifice. BOF has an outstanding ease of use considering the early stages of this research area, is runnable on Unix- and Windows based systems, and provides an emulation for several well-known services including Telnet, FTP, SMTP, POP3, and IMAP2. The main objective of BOF is to waste the time of intruders. Consequently, connection attempts are merely logged and a plain response is created.

One year later the first commercial honeypot was released: CyberCop Sting [33]. CyberCop Sting creates a virtual network on a single host and simulates different types of network devices, including Windows NT servers, Unix servers, and routers. Each virtual network device is connected to the Internet via a public IP address. It thus can receive as well as send genuine-looking packets. The simulated systems include decoys for Telnet- and Nmap-based fingerprinting.

HoneyBOT [34] is a low-interaction honeypot for Windows, which opens a range of roughly 1,000 listening sockets mimicking vulnerable services. The log tool is quite sophisticated, as raw packet level data, keystrokes, and malware (trojans, rootkits) are saved for analysis. Furthermore, a report to a centralized collection point via the syslog utility is optional. It is closely tied with a GUI, which offers a classification of log events based on port number or attacker IP address.

HoneyD [28] is one of the best-known and most seminal honeypot implementation, in particular concerning the virtualization of hosts. HoneyD is a small daemon that simulates thousands of virtual hosts at the same time, class B sized networks has been tested successfully. The hosts can be configured to run arbitrary services, and their fingerprint can be adapted so that they appear to be running certain operating systems. Different operating systems are simulated on the TCP/IP stack level by learning TCP fingerprints from reading nmap/ xprobe fingerprint files, which results in an effective deception of these common tools. Not only hosts are simulated, but also any arbitrary routing topology including dedicated routes and routers. Moreover, the routes can be annotated with latency and packet loss to improve realistic characteristics of the topology. It is possible to ping or to traceroute all virtual machines.

HOACD [35] bundles HoneyD, OpenBSD, and Arpd on a bootable CD. The objective of HOACD is to provide a ready to use honeypot system. It stores logs and configuration files on a local hard disk.

Honeyperl [36] is a honeypot written completely in Perl. Its prominent feature is the ability of being extendable by Perl modules. Many plugins exist for simulation of Telnet-sessions, SMTP etc.

Impost [37] is a network security auditing tool designed to analyse the forensics behind compromised and/or vulnerable daemons. Impost supports two modes: It can either act as a low-interaction server honeypot, which allows dynamic communication patterns by Perl scripts; or it can operate as a packet sniffer and monitor incoming data to pre-defined destination port. It is an early honeypot implementation, which combines honey-pots with full packet sniffing functionality.

KFSensor [33] is a Windows based commercial honeypot. It is designed for deployment in a Windows based corporate environment in order to improve the network security of an organization. It includes IDS functionality by (i) providing a Snort compatible signature engine, (ii) emulating Windows networking protocols (e.g., NetBios) and vulnerable system services or trojans. KFSensor resists denial of service and buffer overflow attacks.

LaBrea [39] is the first honeypot incorporating the tarpit techniques, sometimes described as sticky honeypots. LaBrea implement two functionalities. (i) It takes over unused IP addresses by replying to unanswered ARP requests in a network, and (ii) emulates hosts which answer to SYN packets with a SYN/ACK. However, LaBrea is not intended to support full TCP/ACK-connections. When the attacker sends a TCP ACK and data packets, LaBrea will not reply. Following TCP retransmission, the attacker will be delayed as he waits for the TCP timeouts and resends the data packets. LaBrea is a cross-platform tool.

NetBait [40], [41] is a commercial solution that implements honeypot farms. NetBait is available as a stand-alone product or as a service. A redirector is deployed, which forwards attacks on unused IP address ranges either to predefined honeypots within the cooperate network or to a honeypot farm which is maintained by NetBait Inc. outside the network. Users of NetBait only have to deploy a redirector in their networks, no skilled network administrators and security specialists are required, which saves costs. Moreover, NetBait is described as a distributed query processing system on
honeytrap data, which has been collected by a set of cooperating machines. NetBait supports up to 15,000 hosts per network. The company was offering their service from 2002 up to 2007.

NetFacade [42] is one of the very first commercial low-interaction server honeypots, which simulates an entire class C network with up to seven different operating systems. Its development started in 1998 and was released in 2000. However, it has seen little public exposure. Its developer, Marty Roesch, gained valuable knowledge and developed debug tools which led to the development of Snort.

A simplistic honeypot server written in Perl is single-honeypot [43], which was designed using the KISS-principle. It logs access on all ports without emulating services.

Smoke Detector [4] by Palisade Systems Inc. is another early commercial product. It distinguishes itself by not only providing a software but also offering a hardware unit, which has Smoke Detector installed and preconfigured. Smoke Detector mimics up to 22 services and emulates 19 distinct hosts in a network. Access attempts are reported. Complementary tools enable the analysis of logs.

Specter [44] is one of the longest available commercial products, being purchasable for 16 years, however no new major release has been seen since 2005. It is advertised as a smart honeypot-based intrusion detection system and offers common Internet services such as SMTP, FTP, POP3, HTTP, and TELNET. Furthermore, Specter supports the analysis of ICMP, TCP, and UDP packets on all ports. It logs malicious activities and informs the administrator automatically. Specter provides massive amounts of decoy content including images, MP3 files, email messages, password files, documents, and various types of software.

Also Symantec provided an extension to his anti-malware products by selling the Symantec Decoy Server [45]. This honeypot acts as a fully functioning server, and can simulate email traffic between users in the organization to mirror the appearance of a live mail server. It records every action for further analysis.

Tiny Honeypot (thp) [46] is a simple server honeypot which listens on every TCP port not currently in legitimate use, logging all activities, and providing enough replies and interaction to fool most automated attack tools by a short fingerprint. The goal is to distract the attackers from real services by offering a large amount of open ports with fake services. Netfilter / iptables rules are used to redirect any incoming connection requests to the thp listener. By default a login banner and root shell including some simple emulation of tools such as wget are provided. Thp can reside on production hosts with negligible impact on performance.

Nepenthes [47], [48] is a low interaction honeypot, which is designed to emulate vulnerabilities that worms misuse to spread, and to capture these worms. Nepenthes provides a modular architecture which can be easily extended to add new vulnerabilities. Other modules include functions such as the download of files, submitting of the downloaded files, and a shellcode handler. Albeit Nepenthes needs expert knowledge to emulate new vulnerabilities and to conduct a successful conversation with malware, it captures new exploits for old vulnerabilities. Unknown exploits are highlighted in the log files, an information which can be used to build new modules or better dialogues to trigger more downloads.

Dionaea [49] is meant to be a Nepenthes successor overcoming some of its shortcomings such as missing IPv6 support, multi-threading, TLS encryption for some protocols, and switching from C++ to Python as the module scripting language in hope of more contributors. The shellcode detection was extended by developing libemu [50], which detects shellcode not only by simple pattern matching but by emulation. The libemu library receives a buffer and detects even unknown shellcode fully automatically. Moreover, Nepenthes never supported port 445 (SMB) because of too many different exploitable vulnerabilities. Dionaea addresses this problem by emulating valid SMB sessions. Despite all the improvements, it is worth noting that Dionaea is not an extension of the Nepenthes code base, but rather the same developers based their implementation on the the Nepenthes architecture.

Honeytrap [51] is a low-interaction honeypot daemon which distinguishes itself from other honeypots by implementing a dynamic server concept. It uses stream monitors to check the network stream for incoming packets and starts appropriate listeners on demand. Each listener can handle multiple connections and terminates after some idle time. This concept targets completely unknown attacks which might occur on random ports and unknown protocols—no predefined emulation is required. Service emulation is not the main focus, however some basic emulation is provided. If no emulation for a protocol exists, the default response is a single newline character, which, according to the developer, is a simple but surprisingly successful approach. Honeytrap distinguishes strictly between data capture, which is implemented by the core system, and attack analysis,
which is implemented by plugins. Honeytrap supports several modes, including a mirror mode, which replies with exactly the same packets as received, hence emulating services implicitly. If the connection fails, default replies are used. Furthermore, Honeytrap can be used in proxy mode (also called meta-honeypot), which relays incoming connections to other hosts or services while still logging the communication. If ports are configured in the ignore mode, honeytrap simply does not handle those ports.

Mwcollect [52], later known as Mwcollectd [53], is designed as a versatile malware collection daemon, attempting to combine the best features of Nepenthes and Honeytrap. Mwcollect was actively developed during 2005-2006 and received a major update in 2009 after a long time of non-maintenance. Its entire functionality is based on modules, which include libcurl for HTTP and FTP downloads, TFTP, dyserv-nfqueue module, which implements the Honeytrap principle of package mirroring and dummy newline replies, as well as some Dionaea bindings, HTTP/SMB emulation, shell-code emulation via Libemu and mwserx, which is the malware aggregation/submission service used by the mwcollect Alliance.

2) Dedicated SMTP Honeypots: The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [54] defines an Internet protocol for sending emails. Mail Exchangers between email sender and receiver are usually determined via the DNS MX record. SMTP honeypots may thus operate either independently of a DNS domain name, or linked to a specific domain name using this record.

Jackpot [55] is an SMTP relay honeypot to combat email spam. It is written in Java and comes with several configuration options to make trapping and tracking of spam as efficient as possible. Spam is automatically classified by (i) using various antispm databases, (ii) automatic distinction between regular spam or relay test messages, and (iii) simulation of a very slow server by delaying replies. Jackpot assumes advanced attackers that try to detect honeypots by sending test messages to their own email inbox. To tackle honeypot detection, Jackpot delivers relay test messages to the inbox of the attacker but silently drops messages to inboxes of potential victims. All spam messages and client IP addresses are logged. Jackpot provides a HTML GUI for easy usage.

SpamD [56] is an email honeypot developed by the OpenBSD community. It handles three types of hosts: blacklisted hosts, white-listed hosts, and grey-listed hosts. Blacklisted hosts are forwarded to SpamD and tar-pitted, i.e., the communication is manipulated with delays of 1 character per second during the complete dialogue, to waste time of the attackers. Eventually emails are rejected with an error message. A blacklisted host will never be able to talk to a real mail server. In contrast to this, connection attempts of white-listed hosts are sent to a real mail server. New hosts are grey-listed by default and forwarded to SpamD, which shows a temporary failure message when they try to deliver mail. Additionally, grey-listed hosts will experience stutter during the first seconds of the dialogue. The objective behind this artificial delay is to disturb spammers that are paid for emails per minute. Those host will lose interest and thus may be identified as attacker. It is worth noting that a real mail, which prioritize quality of service, will try to retransmit for a period of time. SpamD is a lot more efficient compared to simple DNS lookups or spam blacklist checks.

Another historic SMTP honeypot, which does not have an official home page any more and was not maintained for many years, is ProxyPot [57]. It imitates an open proxy mail relay and is designed to solely log spam and record the sender identity.

Another simple SMTP honeypot is SMTPot [58], which is written in Python in less than 300 lines of code. Being a simple program it pretends to be an open mail relay and collects emails in mailbox files.

Spamhole [59] is another fake open mail relay. It accepts any email messages that the client sends to it, however, rather than actually delivering the messages, it will silently drop them.

Spampot [60] is a Jackpot clone. In contrast to Jackpot, Spampot is written in Python. Its author aimed at a higher support of different platforms. Spampot does not use any heuristics to rate mails, it simply stores 5% of the incoming spam.

3) Dedicated SSH Honeypots: Originally developed in 1995, the Secure Shell (SSH) specifies a protocol for secure remote login [61]. Today, SSH also supports tunneling and forwarding [62]. As such it is used in various application scenarios, e.g., secure copy.

Kojoney [63] is one of the very first dedicated low-interaction SSH honeypots. Kojoney2 [64] is a major extension of the Kojoney code base, which was refined, expanded, and adjusted based on long-term deployment experiences of Kojoney. Due to the popularity of another SSH honeypot, Kippo, Kojoney2 incorporates many of the most attractive features while still retaining the Kojoney core.

Kippo [65] is designed to log brute force attacks and
the entire shell interaction performed by the attacker. It provides a fake file system resembling Debian Linux with the ability to add and remove files. Some basic tools such as `cat` are integrated, however, they are configured to delude the attacker. Moreover, session logs are stored in an UML compatible format, so that they can be replayed with the original timings of the prompt. Kippo development has been continued by Cowrie [66], which has already extended the software by SFTP/SCP support and additional commands for example. Originally, Kippo was inspired by Kojoney. All three SSH honeypots are written in Python and utilize bash scripts.

4) Special HTTP and Web Honeypots: Glastopf [67] is a modern, easy to deploy low-interaction web server. This honeypot tool collects information about web application-based attacks such as local and remote file inclusion or SQL injections. Furthermore, Glastopf downloads files from links that are included in incoming requests and tries to respond such that the expectations of the attacker are satisfied and subsequent attacks are initiated. Glastopf promotes itself by implementing a vulnerability type emulation instead of specific vulnerability emulation. Once a vulnerability type is emulated, unknown attacks of the same type can be handled. While the implementation may be tedious, on the long-term operators benefit from this abstraction.

HoneyWeb by Kevin Timm [8], [68] is a HTTP-only low-interaction honeypot compatible with HoneyD. HoneyWeb emulates various web server platforms, such as Apache, Netscape, and Microsoft IIS. HoneyWeb looks at incoming URL requests, identifies which platform they suit, and finally deceives intruders by emulating specific HTTP headers. To complicate the detection of the honeypot, HoneyWeb supports the dynamic assignment of a web server platform and an attacker for a certain time frame. If the same attacker makes a UNIX-style request, which is then followed by a Windows-style request, HoneyWeb will deliver an error page. HoneyWeb is extensible by SSL.

Elasticsearch is a search server based on Lucene and provides a distributed full-text search engine with an HTTP web interface and schema-free JSON documents. It became the most popular enterprise search engine which led to new attacks for that service. That is why elastichoney [69] has been developed. It is a simple Elasticsearch honeypot designed to catch attackers exploiting remote code execution vulnerabilities in the Elasticsearch service. It is distributed as a ready-to-deploy Docker file.

Google Hack Honeypot (GHH) [70] was introduced in 2005, in order to combat search engine hackers. Those attackers carefully craft search terms (e.g., title, body text, filetype) to explore vulnerable websites, using search engines. For example, "# -FrontPage-" inurl:service.pwd will search for web pages that have been created with a misconfigured FrontPage HTML editor. The search term will reveal user names and passwords, which will give login credentials to the corresponding web servers. GHH was used to learn more about this threat by emulating a vulnerable web application referenced by a transparent hyperlink, which is hidden from common page viewers but is found using a crawler.

Honey Accounts [71] is the first honeypot framework to monitor the activity of compromised webmail accounts. The honeypot consists of Gmail accounts in combination with Google Apps Scripts to perform time-triggered and event-triggered tasks. The scripts inform the honeypot operator when an email was read, sent, or starred, by sending status messages to a separate email address under the control of the operator. To make cybercriminals aware of the honey accounts, the operator needs to leak account credentials (e.g., on paste sites).

5) Telephone Honeypots: Sandtrap [57] is a historic honeypot, which addresses the problem of war dialing, a technique of using a modem to automatically scan a list of telephone numbers in search for computer systems. Sandtrap can log incoming calls of up to 16 lines and emulate reachable modems by answering with login prompts. The caller ID (phone number) and any login attempts are logged, moreover an alert system warns administrators of suspicious activity in real time.

As the telephone-infrastructure is shifted towards the voice over IP (VoIP), this service is increasingly under attacks, which is why recent honeypot analysis concentrate around VOIP [72]. Artemisa [73] is a pure VoIP SIP-specific honeypot implementation. It registers multiple SIP accounts, which do not represent real human subscribers, at one or more VoIP service providers, and waits for incoming attacks. It includes conversation recording, a protection against message flooding, correlation rules to infer sequential and stateful attacks as well as rule-based fingerprinting of known SIP attack tools.

6) Wireless, Mobile, and Bluetooth Honeypots: Physical and virtual honeypots have been studied in detail [74], however, there is only little work in the field of mobile or wireless related honeypots. Mobile honeypots have to be distinguished from wireless honeypots, which focus on the attacks on the wireless technology. The term mobile honeypot usually refers to honeypots that focus
on attacks on mobile devices. They can either be mobile themselves in running on the mobile device, or they run on common stationary hardware (e.g., desktops) that is connected to a network of a mobile operator [76], [77]. The first class of approaches may complicate the measurement across different types of systems. In addition, they are only required if the hardware characteristics are relevant for the study.

Mobile honeypots in the sense of honeypots focussing on mobile devices are for example developed by the Chinese Chapter of the Honeynet Project [78]. They are using prototype deployments of honeypots for Bluetooth, WiFi, and MMS.

FakeAP [79] was developed as a proof of concept at the Def Con X 2002 hacking conference and introduced wireless honeypots. The key task of FakeAPs is to deceive attackers, not to log their actions, as it rapidly generates 802.11b beacon frames with random ESSID, BSSID (MAC), and channel assignments. This approach hides ones own access point from plain sight and confuses wardriving tools such as Kismet and NetStumbler.

TJ O'Connor and Ben Sangster built honeyM [80], a framework for virtualized mobile device client honeypots, which emulates in particular wireless technologies.

The bluetooth honeypot bluepot [81] was developed to capture attacks on bluetooth devices. It is designed designed to accept and store any malware sent to it and to interact with common bluetooth attacks such as Blue Bugging and Blue Snarfing. This honeypot does not require any specific device, it is written in Java and runs on any Linux machine, but it does obviously demand from the user to possess at least 1 active bluetooth interface. This honeypot has also some graphical dashboard which allows monitoring of attacks and presents some simple graphs and lists.

HoneySpot [82] summarizes the concepts of a Honeypot and wireless hotspot. It offers 802.11 wifi access with the objective of being proved, attacked, or compromised. It focuses on pure layer 2 wireless attacks that exploit weaknesses in the wireless technology, in particular subverting deployed security mechanisms.

In contrast to HoneySpot, [76] was designed to explore IP-level attacks on mobiles. The authors deploy common honeypot tools (Kippo, Glastopf, and Dianaea) on a standard Linux PC that is connected to a UMTS network.

HoneyDroid [83] is a prototype of a honeypot especially designed to run on mobile Android devices. For this purpose the Android smartphone has to be rooted and extended by Galoula, which makes common UNIX (BusyBox) services and file systems available on Android. This step makes the installation of Kippo and Honeytrap possible. Kippo has been adjusted to resemble the behaviour of the Android OS. Furthermore, an Android app is included, which reads and visualizes the different log file results and transmits them eventually to a centralized data collection point.

7) IoT Honeypots: The Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of physical devices. In terms of hardware and software, the IoT is not well-defined. Devices usually range from smartphones down to very constrained embedded hardware with network connectivity [84]. As those devices can be queried and controlled remotely, attacks on those devices emerged. IoTTPOT [85] was used by a research team to analyze the increasing threats. It analyzes Telnet-based attacks against various IoT devices running on different CPU architectures such as ARM, MIPS, and PPC. Another proof of concept in this field is honeypot-camera [86], which emulates an openly accessible webcam, including some fake images and device specific deceptions such as watermarks and daylight intensity.

The honeypot Shockpot [87] is designed around a single, critical vulnerability called Shellshock/ CVE-2014-6271 [88] for the bash shell. As the vulnerability was very far-reaching, the study of its exploitation became interesting. The pure python implementation emulates a Apache-server, that appears to processes trailing strings after function definitions in the values of environment variables. This allowed remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted environment in the original vulnerability.

8) ICS/SCADA Honeypots: Another possible deployment place for honeypots are SCADA or ICS systems, which are systems that monitor and control industrial processes in the physical world, often such systems are part of critical infrastructures and therefore particularly endangered. Compots [89] goal is to collect intelligence about the motives and methods of adversaries targeting industrial control systems. It is written in Python and speaks several common Internet protocols such as HTTP, but also some ICS-specific protocols such as kamstrup, BACnet, and mosbus.

HoneyPoint [90] is a honeypot which comes in several license versions and provides several sub-tools
(HPPE, HPSS, HPSC, HPNTA) because of commercial reasons. Its target platform is Windows. HoneyPoint offers fake network services and web applications, including manipulated documents which allow for tracking down an attacker every time the document is opened after the download. Furthermore, emulated devices in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) such as SCADA are supported.

9) Further Special Purpose Honeypots: HoneySink [91] is a honeypot which specializes on sinkholing. This allows security researchers to monitor the communication within a botnet and to prevent interaction between bots and their command and control servers. HoneySink allows its user to sinkhole any number of domains to it and configure the emulation of DNS, HTTP, FTP, IRC on a basis of protocol-domain combinations. The authors envision two main use cases: First, deployment in internal networks where self-maintained DNS servers redirect traffic to known blacklisted URLs to HoneySink. This helps to detect infected machines within your own networks. Second, HoneySink can be configured globally to respond by its own DNS functionality to requests for domains which have been taken over by law enforcement. This prevents criminals to maintain control over their bots. HoneySink is the first freely distributed network sinkhole software, which aims for being a generic framework for analysing various botnets.

B. High Interaction Server Honeypots

Argos [92] was released in 2006 and as it is based on Qemu, it focuses on efficient x86 emulation. A high-interaction honeypot environment is provided, which aims to automatically identify and produce remedies for zero-day exploits. Upon attack detection an intelligent process- or kernel-aware logging is executed, furthermore own forensics shellcodes are injected allowing in-depth analysis. Argos distinguishes itself by applying memory tainting and creating signatures for intrusion detection systems with very few false-positives. There is also a support for running as a client honeypot (using the same infrastructure as the Shelia client honeypot), however this mode became neglected.

Honeywall [93] aims at making honeypot deployments simple and effective. This CentOS-based live-CD utilizes Sebek as the dedicated honeypot software and offers a GUI for system configuration, administration, and data analysis. It features an architecture that allows you to deploy both low-interaction and high-interaction honeypots, but is designed primarily for high-interaction.

High Interaction Honeypot Analysis Tool (HIHAT) [94], [95] transforms arbitrary PHP applications into web-based high interaction honeypots in an automated fashion. HIHAT has been compatible with 4 major PHP frameworks during its active development time. Furthermore HIHAT offers a graphical user interface which enables honeypot monitoring and analysing the acquired data. Extensive statistics are generated and IP addresses are mapped to a geographic locations. Automatic malware is attracted by insertion of transparent links. Attack types, which has been spotted with HIHAT include command injection, file inclusion and bot self-propagation and are characterized by the HTTP GET request, the four different arrays provided by PHP, and the data transferred. The tool automatically filters for attack patterns via regular expression which were derived from an analysis of known attacks against web applications.

HoneyBow Sensor [96] is based on VMWare images and consists of the following 3 components: The MwWatcher malware collection tool, which monitors file system changes in real time and catches potential malware on a Win32 guest system. MwFetcher malware collection tool, which extracts potential malware from a VMware virtual disk by comparing the infected file list with the clean file list. Finally, the MwSubmitter malware submit tool, which submits potential malware samples collected by MwWatcher and MwFetcher to the mwcollect Alliance. The host tools are Linux based. Infected guests can be replaced with clean guests automatically after malware extraction.

Sebek [97], [98] is a kernel module installed on high interaction honeypots, usually virtual guest machines, for the purpose of capturing attacker’s activities such as keystrokes or file uploads on Win32 and Linux systems. It works by monitoring system call activity and recording data of interest and is based on two components: The client, which runs on the honeypots, captures activities and sends the data to the second component, the server, as stealthy as possible. The client masquerades its existence by using early root-kit techniques. The server is the centralized data collection point for all honeypots within the network.

Implementation such as Canarytokens [99] show that honeypots are not necessarily computers, they can also be computer resources, which are called honeytokens [100]. Honeytokens are an URL, domain, word or PDF document, Bitcoin wallet etc. an adversary might access. An access usually indicates a system breach and hence
will trigger a message to the admin. Canarytokens is also available as a pre-hosted service [101], which minimises the deployment effort.

C. Low Interaction Client Honeypots

PhoneyC [102], [103] is a honeypot which mimics legitimate web browsers and enables the study of malicious HTTP pages. It features the interpretation of remote links (hrefs, iframes etc.) and scripting languages via spidermonkey. Moreover, specific ActiveX and PDF vulnerabilities are emulated and heap spray and shellcode detectors are included. By using dynamic program analysis, PhoneyC removes obfuscation from many malicious pages. Different browser identities are supported. The data flow of PhoneyC is as followed: One or more URLs are passed to the client, which retrieves the content. The content is scanned by an anti-virus program if it is a file. Valid HTML files are broken up by script code languages and interpreted by the specific engines. Alerts are risen on suspicious behaviour.

HoneyC [25], [104] is a honeypot which identifies malicious servers on the web by using different visitor clients, search schemes, and analysis algorithms. It consists of three components: the visitor, the queuer, and the analysis engine. The visitor interacts with the potentially malicious servers, makes the requests and processes the response. The queuer creates a queue of servers to visit. Self-evidently, the analysis engine is the component responsible to evaluate whether security policies have been violated by deploying snort rule matching. All modules use the pipe to communicate with each other.

Thug [105] is a pure Python honeypot and build upon the experiences which were gathered by the development of PhoneyC. It aims at mimicking the behaviour of a web browser on a certain operating system in order to detect malicious contents. Thug uses the Google V8 Javascript engine and an own DOM tree implementation. This framework performs static syntax tree and dynamic code analysis. Vulnerable modules are emulated like ActiveX, Flash, Adobe Reader. Different personalities exist, which include various Windows versions, Linux, iOS, MacOS and Android but also multiple browsers like Safari, Chrome or Internet Explorer. Proxies are supported, which can be used to anonymize the access to a malicious page by for example TOR.

YALIH [106], [107] (Yet Another Low Interaction Honeyclient) is designed to detect malicious websites by integrating a combination of multiple antivirus engines and pattern matching using string or regular expressions for detection. It is capable of extracting embedded JavaScript files and performs de-obfuscation and de-minification of scripts. Yalih has an IMAP plugin in, which scans an email inbox for spam, extracts the URLs and visit these sites. Its emulated browser handles cookies and session, redirection, referrers and different browser personalities. The developers compared its effectiveness using a malware URL database and determined 15% less false negatives than Thug, 80% than HoneyC and 35% than Monkey-Spider while still requiring only a moderate scanning time.  

SpyBye [108] is developed by the same author as HoneyD, however it is a low interaction client honeypot. Originally, one had to enter an URL into a form and wait for the analysis to complete, similar to other honeypot clients. However, SpyBye matured into an HTTP proxy, which intercepts all browser requests while the user just simply visits a homepage. SpyBye intends to determine if embedded links on your web page are harmless, unknown or even dangerous and scan the content against the ClamAV engine. It is a reliable indication for a compromise if administrators scan their homepages and detect foreign URLs which were not set by them.

Monkey-Spider [9], [109] is a crawler based honeypot utilizing anti-virus solutions to detect malware. It is claimed to be fast and expandable with other detection mechanisms. It uses the well-known scalable Heritrix crawler to create arc files and then pass them along to anti-virus scanners such as ClamAV and Avast. Monkey-Spider detection is done solely by external signatures. URLs, binaries and malicious JavaScript are extracted and saved in a threats database.

ADSandbox [110] is a honeypot which utilizes at its core the Mozilla JavaScript engine SpiderMonkey within a sandbox and logs every action during the execution. After that a heuristic assesses malicious behaviour. The heuristic performs static and dynamic analysis. The user interacts with ADSandbox in two different methods: First, by means of the browser helper objects, which hands over the URLs visited within the browser to the analysis engine and displays custom error pages if embedded links on your web page are harmless. Second, the user can manually supply an URL and some additional parameters using the shell. ADSandbox is meant primarily to provide real-time protection for browser users, however it never left the prototype status.

D. High Interaction Client Honeypots

Capture Bat [111] monitors the state of the Win32 operating systems during the execution of applications.
and processing of documents. The client connects to a central capture server that requests the client to visit an URL with a specific browser. The client is run inside of a virtual machine so that infections can be reverted by resetting the virtual machine. Capture Bat provides insights on how the software operates even if no source code is available by observing state changes on a low kernel level (by the help of a file system, registry and process monitor). Event noise that naturally occurs in an operating system environment while idling or on standard execution of applications is filtered, allowing analysts to easier spot and understand the behaviour of for example malicious Microsoft Word documents.

**HoneyClient** [112], [113] is the first open source client honeypot. It is state-based and detects attacks on VMWare Windows clients running on Linux hosts by monitoring files, process events, and registry entries. Its architecture is threefold: An Agent, Manager and Util Module exist. The agent component is a SOAP server, running as a daemon within a cygwin environment on the guest. It receives messages which trigger actions like visiting a homepage with a specific web browser (Internet explorer, firefox are supported) or performing an integrity check of the Windows files. The manager module handles the guests on the host system by communicating with the agents. The Util package provides the SOAP/http protocol integration and a configuration possibility.

**Capture-HPC** [114] is a honeypot framework designed with efficiency and scalability in mind. Capture-HPC consists of a Capture Server and Capture Client. The Capture server is a simple server that manages various capture clients and the VMware servers, which host the guest OS that run the Capture clients. It distributes each URL it receives to the active clients. The Capture client consists of 2 modules: a kernel driver which uses event-based detection mechanisms for monitoring the system’s state changes (file system, registry, and processes that are running) and an user space process, which accepts action requests from the Capture server, and communicates potential state changes back to the server. An exclusion list is used to filter default events.

**Strider HoneyMonkey** [115], [116] was developed by the Microsoft Research Team and distinguishes itself by a narrow coupling with the Windows OS and by creating heterogeneous virtual hosts, which differ by their patch level. The technology was never provided publicly but was used only for internal purposes. HoneyMonkey utilizes the Internet Explorer as the Browser, however does not allow any pop-ups or installation of plugins or software. Any read or write which happens outside of Internet Explores file directories are considered malicious and highlighted for manual analysis. Furthermore, new spawned child processes of the Internet Explorer are observed. Upon detecting an exploit, the monkey notifies the Monkey Controller on the host machine to respawn a clean HoneyMonkey virtual machine, which then continues to visit the remaining URLs.

**Trigona** [117] tries to improve the efficiency of high interaction honeypot clients by combining the advantage of high interaction where no emulation is used and low interaction, where a high throughput and a small resource footprint is possible. As opposed to other frameworks Trigona does not load several VMs or resets one VM repeatedly for each URL, but initiates one VM, which access multiple, for example 200, URLs at once. The network traffic is packet captured for analysis at a later stage. The VM is reverted after a group of URLs. Exploit Kits and Malware Binaries can then be extracted from the packet captures files, the state information of the operating system are not analysed.

**HoneySpider** [118] is hybrid honeypot framework, which is based on fairly up-to-date high and low interaction honeypot tools and integrates a crawler application specially designed for the bulk processing of URLs. The framework focuses primarily on attacks involving the use of web browsers and their plug-ins by detecting drive-by downloads and malicious binaries including 0-day exploits. HoneySpider automatically obtains and analyses the malware. The first version included a simple web-client, JavaScript analysis and Capture-HPC. It evolved and possesses now a shellcode and anti-virus scanner; PDF, SWF and office documents analyser, moreover some bindings for Thug, Cuckoo and couchDB.

**SHELIA** [119] focuses on the analysis of URLs and attachments received in emails. It supports IMAP/POP, so it can read messages from an email in-box, however direct input of links and files is also possible. SHELIAs design philosophy is that false positives are much more important than false negatives because they are possibly more harmful in cases of signature creation, therefore they are avoided. This is done by detecting intrusions not by verifying modifications to the file system or registry after visiting a website, but by tracking the caller of sensitive operations. More precisely, whenever a call modifies the registry, the file system, or network activity, Shelia tracks whether the call is coming from an unauthorized area which is not supposed to contain code. Shelia runs in a virtual machine which is reset every n checks to prevent infections to survive if they are
not detected by Shelia. Upon exploit detection extensive analysis and logging to a database takes place.

**UW-Spycrawler** [120] was used for research projects, however never made publicly available as the authors focussed on Internet research rather than developing a general user-friendly framework. It focusses on the detection of malware using one of the two attack methods: Piggy-backed malware code, which comes with legitimately looking executables or drive-by download attacks, which exploit a vulnerability in the browser to install malware. UW-Spycrawler supports automatic software installation by automatically accepting the EULA and other installation steps. Piggy-backed spyware is then recognized by using a signature-based anti-spyware program (AdAware). Drive-by attacks are assumed to escape the browser-sandbox and modify the system, so URLs are marked as malicious if one of the event triggers is detected, like file and registry writes, process creation, browser crashes.

**Web Exploit Finder (WEF)** [121] is designed to detect drive-by-download attacks and consists of a VMware virtualization layer, specially crafted Windows guests and an user dashboard which communicates with the guests controls the action of the web browsers. Attacks are detected by checking for modifications to the operating system by evaluating the relevant system calls. As such changes to the operating system are not designated, a deep integration and interaction with the kernel was deployed by the so-called rootkit module.

**HoneyIM** [122] utilises Capture-HPC in a new context. The open-source instant messaging (IM) client Pidgin is used to extend the basic functionalities and to create decoy IM users. A legitimate IM user has to add the decoy IM user to its contact lists, if some IM malware compromises and tries to propagate, it will contact all users in the contact list, therefore the decoy will also receive malicious URLs etc. and thus will be registered by the HoneyIM system. Furthermore, the malware can then be analysed in the Capture-HPC environment. This helps to recognize infections in IM networks early, as HoneyIM delivers attack information to network administrators in real-time so that system quarantine and recovery can be quickly performed.

**PwnyPot** [123] is a honeypot, which does not detect malicious servers based on system changes but tries to identify the malware already during the exploitation stage, that means before any changes to the system or infections have occurred. This approach makes recognition of zero-day exploits easier as no signatures are required. Supported programs include among others Internet Explorer, Firefox, Office Products, Adobe Acrobat Reader and Flash. The main features of PwnyPot are general protections like heap spray mitigation and null page allocation prevention, return oriented programming (ROP) detection and ROP gadget dumps, moreover detection of possible DEP and ASLR bypasses. Shellcode is recognized and analysed dynamically. PwnyPot offers bindings for Cuckoo, one of the leading open source automated malware analysis systems, which can perform an automatic analysis.

### E. Honeypot Related Tools

The following tools extend the functionality of honeypots or are meant to be used simultaneously with honeypots, for example by making managing tasks easier or detection executables automatically.

**Bait-n-Switch** [124] was not a honeypot technology as such, however it was one of the first attempts to multiplex hostile and regular traffic between production systems and honeypots. It is a system which reacts to malicious intrusion attempts by redirecting all hostile traffic to a honeypot. Bait-n-Switch is realized by as a Snort extension, based on linux’ iproute2 and netfilter. The honeypot software can be chosen arbitrarily. The same developers also developed a low-interaction honeypot called **BigEye** [8], which only emulated FTP and HTTP services.

**Honeynet Security Console (HSC)** [125] is an analysis tool to view events on your personal honeynet. It focuses on visualization and grouping of of events from Snort, TCPDump, Firewall, Syslog and Sebek log files. Moreover, it correlates information between those different log file types, so that analysis can be done with a more holistic approach.

**GSOC-Honeyweb** [126] manages client honeypots via a user-friendly web interface. This application is threefold: The front-end, providing a standardized interface for various client honeypots; a business layer, communicating with a Java wrapper and a back-end, providing the data persistence to collect, store and aggregate client honeypot results. GSOC-Honeyweb should not be confused with HoneyWeb by Kevin Timm [8]. [68].

**Honesnap** [127] is a diagnostic tool which can be used to perform a number of diagnostics on data which was collected by a server honeypot. The primary intention is to provide an analysis on a directory full of pcap data. It decodes and analyses a variety of protocols supporting: outgoing packet counts and binary extraction for telnet, ssh, http, https, ftp, smtp, and IRC; incoming and outgoing connection summaries; word based
inspection of IRC traffic for basic keyword profiling. In addition, it focuses on honeypot specific data sets such as Sebek keystroke data.

**PE Hunter** [128] is a plugin for Snort for extracting Windows portable executables from the network stream and is meant to be used in front of honeypots, which trigger the transfer of the executables. It works by spotting a PE header, using a simple heuristik to calculate the file length and finally dumping the corresponding bytes to a file.

**HoneyMole** [129] incorporates Capture-HPC and supports administrators to deploy and distribute sensors worldwide which tunnel traffic in a transparent way to a centralized farm of honeypots. Sensors can be understood as simple, encrypted ethernet bridges over TCP/IP. The idea here is that sensors require minimal maintenance efforts, which saves time for administrators. Moreover, data about attacks is collected in one point, which saves time for analysts.

**TraCINg** [130] can be described as a cyber incident monitor, which can receive data from arbitrary honeypots as long as it is well-structured with JSON. Currently, only a Dionaea-plugin exists. TraCINg collects data from several honeypot sensors and tries to correlate attacks in order to find emerging worm outbreaks. It considers mutual attack sources as well as timing properties in its analysis.

### F. Honeypot Detection Tools

Not only do tools exist which extend the functionality but rather are adversaries of honeypots: honeypot detection tools. This class of tools is able to detect low- as well as high-interaction honeypots.

Low-interaction honeypots are detectable because of the service emulation, which will never be able to behave like the real service because of the nature of emulation and security concerns. This means that specific actions trigger different responses, as has been shown for example for Kippo and OpenSSH [131]. Specially crafted messages trigger a characteristic response, which often contains a specific string or number, often called *magic numbers*. This magic number identifies Kippo. Nmap also detects some of the Dionaea services as being part of the honeypot and string obfuscation is necessary to overcome the signature-based detection [130]. **Holz** [133] presented several techniques, for example VMware uses only a specific range of MAC-addresses for its virtual network interfaces, chroot and jail environments are fingerprintable by special *ls* calls and even the presence of debuggers such as *ptrace* can be detected by simple system calls. It has been shown with the help of a timing analysis, that honeypots, especially those running in virtualized environments, respond slower than real services [134]. This fact could also be used for detection, however has to be used with caution as the response time is also highly dependant on other factors like network load, routing etc. **Zou** [135] and **Wang** [136] demonstrated that botnets can be designed to be aware of honeypots. Their work is based on the following assumption: Honeypots must not participate in real (or too many real) attacks because of legal constraints. Attackers can detect honeypots in their botnet by verifying whether the compromised machines can successfully send out unmodified malicious traffic to attackers’ sensors. Sebek was detectable by the relative address space positions of the `write()` and `read()` calls, as the integration of Sebek positions these two farther away from each other [137]. This approach of verifying address space positions is used even today but for different elements, for example the interrupt descriptor table register (IDTR) [138].

### G. Summary of Honeypot Software

An overview of available honeypot software, its classification, and publication details is shown by **Table III** and **Table IV**. One of the first findings is that different honeypots exist which are applied to different protocols and network types. This highlights the universality of the concept of honeypots. Another finding is that certain honeypot software overlap in their field of operation. In this cases, the quality and maintenance life time of the honeypot influence the success.

Despite many different honeypots and related tools, the general trend is clear: Simple proof of concepts developed into complex honeypot tools which are designed to be deployed for a long time. As the intended analysis is getting more complex, management (e.g. GSOC-Honeyweb, Vagrant) and analysis tools (TraCINg) emerge and even combinations with intrusion and malware detection tools are considered (see subsection II-A subsection III-E).

**Table III** clarifies that the first honeypot and also the majority of available honeypot software are low-interaction server honeypots. The reason for this observations might be the fact, that on the one hand server
honeyhops require less implementation effort than client honeypots as they do not have to have a sophisticated crawler engine and on the other hand the emulation of services requires less maintenance effort than providing real services on high-interaction honeypots. This circumstance led to the situation, that many developer initially released small proof of concept honeypots, which should just introduce the concept. Hence, such honeypots (e.g. BOF, single-honeypot) had a rather short maintenance life time. After the approval of the honeypots effectiveness, reliable deployment was necessary, which led to more complex honeypots which were longer maintained (e.g. HoneyD, SpamD). The nowadays broadly applied state-of-the-art honeypots (Kippo, Nepenthes-Dionaea, Honeytrap) distinguish themselves with long maintenance life times. Such life times decrease deployment efforts for administrators and foster the development of community based plugins. However, it is difficult to determine if the the long development life time is responsible for success of those tools or vice versa. Another general trend is also the focus on the service, low-interaction server honeypot tend to either specialize in the emulation of on one or a few well-known services, or simply perform default answers on all ports. It is also noticeable, that high-interaction server honeypots were developed later and only few exist - Sebek and Argos has been here predominant. Although being a mere data capture tool designed to capture attacker’s activities, Sebek has to be highlighted for its pioneering influence. However, only Argos has received recent updates for newer version of Windows. One of the reasons of Argos success might be its modern memory taint analysis, which is is very good in the detection of recent attack types (compare subsection V-J).

As shown by Table IV client honeypots appeared almost 5 years later than server honeypots. Client honeypots mimic the behaviour of users in order to rate the risk imposed by the Internet, therefore the list of emulated and examined software consists of common www-technologies such as browsers and their plugins, Flash or PDF viewers (Browsers are the primary user interfaces to the World Wide Web and because of that arguably the most frequently used program by the common user). As this complex browser environments are more difficult to emulate, we see the ratio of high and low honeypots shift towards high-interaction honeypots. Client-honeypot rather implement less services than server-honeypots, however this is completely legitimate, as client honeypots actively influence which application are required. As client honeypots do not improve the security of production networks directly, low-interaction client honeypots usually are published in the context of Internet-wide research of several years (HoneyC, Monkey-Spider, PhoneyC etc). This is why this type of software has relatively long maintenance time compared to server honeypots. Besides the complete emulation of services the current trend in low-interaction client honeypots is the performance, so that a larger and faster view of the Internet is possible (Thug, YALIH). Another difference to server honeypots can be observed: For client honeypots, low as well as high interaction honeypots appeared at the same time. Furthermore, high-interaction client and server honeypots appeared almost at the same time. HoneyClient is the first high-interaction client honeypot and stands out with his long maintenance. However, it should not be deployed any more as the only currently maintained honeypot (even with an highly scalable associated project network) is HoneySpider.

This overview is limited to the classification, maintenance time and the focus on services, software architecture and its application area. Although this properties are already enough to assess the deployability to a specific scope, future work might consider more quality measures such as robustness, quality of collected data and its ease of analysis, actual containment and detection precision. However, an elaborated long-term deployment test of each honeypot would be necessary, hence it is recommended to narrow down the choice by the presented overview.

IV. Long-Term Honeypot Projects

This section introduces long-term honeypot projects and meta-projects, which are responsible for the creation and publication of significant honeypot software, data and several research papers. Rather short projects and honeypot deployments are not enlisted here, but considered in the next section which presents metrics used in the field of honeypot data analysis.

The first honeypot project was the Honeynet Project, which started off in 1999 and released a paper series which has been combined in the well-known book Know Your Enemy [139]. This project focuses on investigating the latest attacks and is developing open source security tools to improve internet security, recently also at the Google Summer of Code. Its chapters are spread out around the world and use different tools to collect informations, based on the needs client/server and low/high-interaction honeypots are used. The project is still
### Table III

**CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION OF SERVERHONEYPOT SOFTWARE BY THEIR INTERACTION LEVEL TYPE. (+) INDICATES SOME ADDITIONAL SERVICES, (++) INDICATES MANY ADDITIONAL SERVICES, (*) MARKS VAGUE TIMESTAMPS.**

| Software | Type | Maintenance | Free | Focus | Design / Details |
|----------|------|-------------|------|-------|------------------|
| DTK      | Focus | 1997-1999   | ✓    | SMB, SSH, DNS, FTP, Netstat(++) | implement many known vulnerabilities |
| BOF      | Focus | 1998-1999   | ✓    | Back Orifice, Telnet, SMTP(+) | waste intruders time, easy deployment |
| NetFacade| Maintenance-Free | 1998-2002*| ×   | not specified | class C network emulation |
| CyberCop| String | 1999-1999   | ×    | Telnet, FTP, SendMail, SNMP | emulating different network devices |
| Specter  | Maintenance-Free | 1999-2005 | ✓    | SMTP, FTP, HTTP and Telnet(+) | commercial deployment, decoy files |
| Sandtrap | Focus | 2002-2002* | ×    | dialup modem | war dialing trapping |
| single-honeypot | Focus | 2002-2002 | ✓    | all ports, but no emulation | mere logging, KISS architecture |
| HoneyWeb | String | 2002-2003 | ✓    | HTTP | various web server header emulation |
| LaBrea   | Focus | 2002-2003 | ✓    | SMTP, SMTP, FTP, HTML(++) | honeypot as a hardware |
| SMTPot   | Maintenance-Free | 2002-2003 | ✓    | SMTP | spam accumulation, KISS |
| THP      | Focus | 2002-2003 | ✓    | SMTP, HTTP, FTP, Telnet(++) | commercial deployment of honeypots |
| Jackpot  | Maintenance-Free | 2002-2004 | ✓    | SMTP | tarpt against spam |
| FakeAP   | Focus | 2002-2005 | ✓    | SMTP, POP3 | platform independence |
| HoneyBot | Maintenance-Free | 2002*-2007*| ✓    | SMTP, HTTP, FTP, HTML(++) | telnet SMTP, POP3, SMTP(++) |
| BigEye   | Focus | 2003-2003 | ✓    | SMTP | telnet SMTP, POP3 |
| Spamhole | Focus | 2003-2003 | ✓    | SMTP | telnet SMTP, POP3 |
| Spampot  | Focus | 2003-2003 | ✓    | SMTP | telnet SMTP, POP3 |
| HoneyPerl| Maintenance-Free | 2003-2003 | ✓    | SMTP, HTTP, FTP, Telnet(+) | telnet SMTP, POP3 |
| Decoy Server | Focus | 2003* | ✓    | SMTP, POP3 | fake email server traffic |
| Smoke Detector | Focus | 2003* | ✓    | FTP, HTTP, IMAP, SSH, SMB(++) | honeypot as a hardware |
| NetBait  | Focus | 2003-2007* | ×   | not specified | honeypot as a service |
| HoneyD  | Focus | 2003-2008 | ✓    | HTTP, POP3, SMTP, FTP(+) | emulating heterogeneous networks |
| KFSensor | Focus | 2003-2015 | ✓    | HTTP, SMTP, MSSQL, FTP(+) | commercial deployment of honeypots |
| SpamD   | Focus | 2003-2015 | ✓    | SMTP | tarpt against spam |
| HOACD   | Focus | 2004-2004 | ✓    | compare HoneyD | live bootable CD (HoneyD, Arpd) |
| ProxyPot | Focus | 2004* | ✓    | SMTP | email spammer identification |
| Impost  | Focus | 2004* | ✓    | all ports, but no emulation | full packet sniffing |
| Kojoney | Focus | 2004* | ✓    | SMTP | honeypot as a hardware |
| Mwcollect | Focus | 2005-2006 | ✓    | SSH (shell activity) | first dedicated SSH honeypot |
| Nepenthes | Focus | 2005-2009 | ✓    | compare Nepenthes, Honeytrap | merging Nepenthes and Honeytrap |
| GHG     | Focus | 2005-2013 | ✓    | HTTP, FTP, HTTP, HTTP, FTP, MSSQL(++) | capture worm payload |
| Honeytrap | Focus | 2005-2015 | ✓    | HTTP(4), dyn. emulation | attacks via unknown protocols |
| HoneyPoint | Focus | 2006-2014 | ×    | not specified | ICS/SCADA, back tracking intruders |
| Dionaee | Focus | 2009-2013 | ✓    | SMB, FTP, SIP, MYSQL(++) | nepenthes successor, capture payload |
| Kippo   | Focus | 2009-2014 | ✓    | SMTP | telnet SMTP, POP3 |
| Artemisa | Focus | 2010-2011 | ✓    | VoIP, SIP | Bluetooth Malware |
| bluepot | Focus | 2010-2015 | ✓    | Bluetooth | Bluetooth Malware |
| HoneySink | Focus | 2011-2011 | ✓    | DNS, HTTP, FTP, IRC | bot sink holing |
| HoneyDroid | Focus | 2011-2014* | ✓    | compare Kippo, HoneyTrap | p.o.c Android OS honeypot |
| Glastopf | Focus | 2011-2015 | ✓    | HTML, PHP, SQL | web applications, vulnerability types |
| Kojoney2 | Focus | 2012-2015 | ✓    | SMTP | applying Kojonies lessons learned |
| Compots | Focus | 2013-2015 | ✓    | krampst, BACnet, mosbus | ICS and SCADA architectures |
| IoTbot | Focus | 2013-2015 | ✓    | telnet | IoT (ARM, MIPS, and PPC) |
| honeypot-camera | Focus | 2014-2015 | ✓    | HTTP | Tornado Web, Webcam Server |
| Shockpot | Focus | 2014-2015 | ✓    | Apache, Bash | Shellshock vulnerability |
| Cowrie | Focus | 2014-2015 | ✓    | SMTP | Kippos successor |
| Canarytokens | Focus | 2015-2016 | ✓    | URL, bitcoin, PDF | honeypot tokens |
| elastichoney | Focus | 2015-2015 | ✓    | elastichoney | elastichoney RCEs |
| Sebek   | Focus | 2003-2011 | ✓    | Win32 and Linux systems | attackers OS activities, state-based |
| Honeywall | Focus | 2005-2009 | ✓    | compare Sebek, CentOS | live bootable CD |
| HoneyBow | Focus | 2006-2007 | ✓    | Win32 Systems | extraction of malware, state-based |
| Argos   | Focus | 2006-2014 | ✓    | Linux, Windows XP-7 | 0-day exploits identification, tainting |
| HIHAT   | Focus | 2007-2007 | ✓    | php-BB,-Nuke,-Shell,-Myadmin | PHP framework extension, state-based |
Table IV
OVERVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION OF CLIENT HONEYPOT SOFTWARE BY THEIR INTERACTION LEVEL TYPE. (+) INDICATES SOME ADDITIONAL SERVICES, (+++) INDICATES MANY ADDITIONAL SERVICES, (*) MARKS VAGUE TIMESTAMPS.

| Type | Software       | Maintenance | Free | Focus Services / Applications | Design / Details |
|------|----------------|-------------|------|-------------------------------|------------------|
| Low  | HoneyC [104]   | 2004 2007   | ✓    | HTTP                          | identify malicious servers with snort |
|      | SpyBye [108]   | 2007 2007   | ✓    | HTTP                          | proxy, URL check by ClamAV |
|      | Monkey-Spider  | 2007 2009   | ✓    | HTTP, JavaScript              | threat database creation, several AV |
|      | PhoneC [103]   | 2007 2011   | ✓    | HTML, JavaScript, PDF, ActiveX(+) | browser identities, dyn. analysis |
|      | ADSDK sandbox  | 2010 2010*  | ✓    | HTML, JavaScript              | transparent protection, stat/dyn. analysis |
|      | Thug [110]     | 2011 2015   | ✓    | HTML, JavaScript, PDF, Flash(+) | complete emulation, stat/dyn. analysis |
|      | YALIH [107]    | 2014 2015   | ✓    | HTML, JavaScript, (IMAP)      | precise by combining analysis methods |
| high | HoneyClient [112]| 2004 2010  | ✓    | Windows (Firefox, IE)         | proof of concept, state-based |
|      | Capture-HPC    | 2004 2009   | ✓    | Linux, Windows (Firefox, Office (+)) | efficiency, scalability, state-based |
|      | UW-Spycrawler  | 2005 2006*  | ✓    | Windows (IE)                  | spyware detection, state-based |
|      | HoneyMonkey    | 2005 2007*  | ×    | Windows (IE)                  | IE vulnerabilities, state-based |
|      | WEF [121]      | 2006 2007   | ✓    | Windows (IE)                  | drive-by-download attacks, state-based |
|      | Capture Hat    | 2007 2007   | ✓    | Windows (Word, IE)            | state changes on a low kernel level |
|      | HoneyIM [124]  | 2007 2007*  | ✓    | compare Capture-HPC           | instant messaging |
|      | SHELLIA [119]  | 2008 2009   | ✓    | Windows (IMAP, POP)           | email malware, call-tracing |
|      | Trigona [117]  | 2010 2010   | ✓    | Windows (Browsers)            | high throughput, — |
|      | HoneySpider    | 2011 2015   | ✓    | Capture-HPC, THUG             | hybrid client honeypot framework |
|      | PwnyPot [118]  | 2013 2013   | ✓    | Windows (Browsers+Plugins)    | memory corruption, shellcode detection |

alive and by far the largest honeypot association, which comprises other smaller (regional) honeypot projects.

One of the very first large-scale worldwide honeypot projects was launched by the Institut Eurocom in 2003 and is called the Leurre.com project. Its last publication dates back to 2008 and describes the infrastructure and the main insights. This project is based on a worldwide distributed system of low-interaction honeypots present in more than 30 countries. The main objective is to get a more realistic picture of internet threats by collecting unbiased quantitative data and create a long-term and location-independent perspective. [2].

The European Network of Affined Honeypots, also known as the NoAH-Project, is a project coordinated by the Foundation for Research and Technology Hellas (FORTH) and several European academic and business partners. This three-year project gathered and analysed internet attacks by deploying the high-interaction Honeypot Argos. The aim was to help NRENs (National Research and Education Networks) and ISPs (Internet Service Providers) to limit damage to their networks and to better assess threats. This project started in 2005 [140].

Deriving from the mwcollect development, the mwcollect Alliance is a non-profit community aiming primarily at malware collection. This closed community deployed Nepenthes sensors on the internet. Analysis of the data was performed on the Alliance’s server in real-time. This project was mainly active from 2006 to 2009. Members were chosen by a simple email verification, however one of the requirements were frequent contributions of new samples, that means active Nepenthes sensors. Mwcollect alliance consisted of not evenly distributed sensors across European countries [141], [142].

Telekom-Frühwarnsystem was first presented in 2013, however early cooperations with worldwide partners started in 2012. From the beginning, this project was based on a multi-honeypot platform. Initially, partners had to set up the honeypots by themselves, by this time T-Pot exists, which combines common open-source low-interaction server honeypot tools (dionaea, glastopf, kippo, honeyptrap) and reduces the maintenance for partners. Furthermore, the project is now open for uncertified contributors, however this data and its analysis are marked and separated as the community data set [143].

An overview of the various honeypot projects is shown in Table V.

V. HONEYPOT DATA ANALYSIS

In the following, we describe the process of analysing honeypot data in a step-by-step manner by means of analysis questions, which gives an overview about different methods and metrics in the field of honeypot data analysis.
The deployment of honeypots creates log records which describe the occurred incidents. The possible incidents are dependant on the type of honeypot deployed. Therefore it is important to define the problem statement that should be investigated before the actual deployment. If honeypots should look actively for communication partners, a client honeypot has to be used, a server honeypot otherwise. If we rather investigate meta-information of protocols and transactional data for specific services, low-interaction honeypots are the right choice. High-interaction honeypots should be used, if content, shellcode execution and the integrity of the operating system are of concern. A single problem statement can be answered by various metrics, each with its own approach and accuracy.

Hence, the overview in this section will follow the presented honeypot classification and will be additionally divided into problem statements and the associated metrics. However, this section depicts merely metrics used in data analysis, performance metrics which are usually applied to benchmark a honeypot are not described, as they are mostly self-explanatory and just measure CPU, RAM, HDD load or scalability.

In general, no research presents any in-depth honeypot data analysis before the year 2004. Prior to this, analysis consisted of mining IDSs alarms. However, IDSs can only be seen as complementary analysis tool. Honeypots can bring more information than simply provided by IDSs, especially if static signature based IDSs are used [145].

A. Attack Profile

McGrew [146] suggested that an attack profile which provides useful information about an honeypot attack should contain information about the following attributes:

**Motivation** Motivation describes the reason of the attack.

**Breadth/Depth** The breadth of the attack is described by the number of machines affected and the depth is the degree to which a specific target was analysed or how large the impact of the attack was on the system.

**Sophistication** Sophistication characterises the level of expertise required to perform a specific attack.

**Concealment** Concealment measures the quality of hiding the evidence of the attack.

**Attacker Source / Root Cause** Attackers should be, as far as possible, identified or the root of the attack like a specific worm depicted.

**Vulnerability** Vulnerability is the flaw in the system/protocol that allowed the attack to take place.

**Tools** Also the tools involved on a high interaction attack like root-kits or back-doors should be documented.

Discussions about attacks on honeypots should always have such an profile as their basis. Motivation often can only be guessed, however actions on high-interaction honeypots might reveal some insights. The breadth and depth can be derived from the attack frequency, the attack propagation and on high-interaction honeypots by the degree of the infection. Concealment on low-interaction honeypots is depicted by slow, not invasive but long attacks and on high-interaction honeypots by the quality of installed back-doors and root-kits. The attack source can usually be determined by transactional meta information, however the root cause of the found attack might be more difficult to identify, as it tries to explain the actual observations. Vulnerabilities are usually identified by exploit detection techniques. These characteristics are now discussed in the following subsections.

B. Attack Sources

If attacks occur on a honeypot, one has to specify where the attacks came from. The identification of an attacker is independent from the architecture or interaction type of the honeypot and can be done with different

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**Table V**

| Project               | Topology                | Begin Year | Duration   |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------|------------|
| Honeynet Project [139] | Multi-Honeypot Platform | 1999       | ongoing    |
| Leurre.com [3], [144]  | HoneyD Sensors          | 2003       | 5 years    |
| NoAH-Project [140]    | Argos Sensors           | 2005       | 3 years    |
| mwcollect Alliance [141]| Nepenthes Sensors       | 2006       | 3 years    |
| Telekom-Frühwarnsystem [143] | Multi-Honeypot Platform | 2012     | ongoing    |
granularities.

| Identifier                  | (1)          | (2)          | (3)          | (4)          | (5)          | (6)          | (7)          | (8)          | (9)          | (10)         | (11)         | (12)         |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| IP-Address or IP-Prefix     |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |              |              |              |
| Autonomous System Number    |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |              |              |              |
| Domain Name / URL / URL-Type |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |              |              |              |
| Country                     |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |              |              |              |
| UserID / Email              |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |              |              |              |
| User Agent                  |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |              |              |              |
| Operating System            |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |              |              |              |

However, in the case of the server honeypots one has to consider that they might have received a spoofed IP-address. This might be a valid IP-address with a reachable or unreachable host, or it is a martial IP-address which should not have ever left the local segments like the broadcast address 0.0.0.0 [147]. Client honeypots usually are seeded with URL-lists and crawl for new URLs. The resources behind those URLs might be off-line. Moreover, one has to acknowledge that this identifiers are very changeable. IP-addresses can move from host to host because internet network providers use IP-address-pools. That is the reason why some analysis combine IP-addresses with a timestamp and define an attack source as an IP-address that targets the honeypot environment for example within one day [145]. IP-Prefix announcements from autonomous systems change over time or might be even hijacked. The Domain Name System inherently allows the abstraction from IP-address and/or hosts, which might lead to misleading results. Client honeypot such as Monkey-Spider [9] also perform some type of URL classification based on the URL and page-content, e.g adult content, pirate, typos etc.. The country might be extracted from the AS-registration information or some (commercial) third-party product has used to be used to retrieve the data [146], [148]. However, trends show that usually the top 3 countries cause 60% of the traffic, which countries are observed is dependent on the geographical location of the honeypot node. Another way used to identify spammers in instant messaging networks is the user name or the advertised URL [149]. Spammers tend to create a lot of accounts, which distribute many different URLs, which however lead/redirect to only a small subset of websites. A minor correlation between spam and spam senders exist. Research based on honeypots supporting the SIP/VoIP protocol also use the name of the user-agent for the fingerprinting of the attack source [150]. This information can be used by any protocol with such protocol-tag, however one has to keep in mind that such information can be omitted and easily spoofed. In order to infer the operating system from which the attacks originate from, usually additional passive OS fingerprinting tools like p0f are used, which recognize the attacking OS by analysing the packet composition as each OS creates the packets slightly differently. Almost all attacking machines are Windows-based [2].

C. Attack Target

If it is specified who attacks the honeypot, the next step might be to characterize the attack, more precisely one has to determine the target of the attack. Server honeypots classify the target by a specific service, which is usually bound to a dedicated port. Port numbers are administered by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and viewable in official lists. However, services might be bound to another port. Therefore it is important to differentiate between ports and services, as an intruder might to brute force a SSH-service on another port, which can be recognized by incoming valid SSH-packets on non-default ports. Most of the time, services are bound to default ports to improve reachability, that is why many researches treat a port as representative for a service [145], [146]. If a honeypot monitors a whole network each individual IP-address can be seen as a target identifier. Such networks can be classified in detail into campus, enterprise, service provider networks. Measurements indicate differences between these classes of networks [151].

| Identifier | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|------------|-----|-----|------|------|------|
| IP         |     |     |      |      |      |
| Port       |     |     |      |      |      |
| Service    |     |     |      |      |      |

Client honeypots use a software client, which accesses a potentially malicious remote service. Therefore the target is usually the specific client software. It might be an emulated web-browser for low-interaction honeypots or a real one with plugins like Flash for high-interaction honeypots.

Moreover, high-interaction honeypots (client as well as server) allow modifications to the operating system. Therefore OS-specific changes have to be analysed, which might differ across systems. For Linux it usually means the loading of some hidden kernel-modules and new cron jobs, for Windows Systems changes in the
registry, system files and auto start entries. So an analysis might examine which OS is preferably attacked.

OS, OS component \(\text{(13)}\)

\section*{D. Attack Frequency}

One of the fundamental questions which has to be answered while deploying honeypots is if and how often honeypots are attacked? Interestingly, honeypots are exposed to attacks minutes after they have been activated \[146\]. However, this hold only true if the honeypot is accessible from the internet, if a firewall blocks all incoming connections to the firewall and only internal communication is allowed attacks are observed rarely as they would have to come from infected hosts from within this specific network or because of a local misconfiguration.

Time until First Attack \(\text{(14)}\)

Yegneswaran et al. \[1\] defined three metrics to describe the source arrivals in order to find differences for the events of misconfiguration, bot-attacks and worm-attacks. These are \(i\) the temporal source counts, \(ii\) the arrival window and \(iii\) the interarrival distribution.

The first is analysed by the number of sources per time interval and shows distinctive patterns. Worms show a logistic growth with a steep begin and end, as they propagate very fast and autonomously and are shut down abruptly by a patch. Bots show similar characteristics, however bots usually apply a poll and pull communication pattern with their C&C server using a wake up time every \(x\) seconds, which results in less steeper curves.

The arrival window checks how many new sources have arrived in a specific time frame. Using a cumulative distribution function (CDF) plot no differences between these events could have been spotted. To evaluate the source interarrival characteristics, the data is broken up in successive intervals, each with an equal number of sources (e.g., 10 intervals each with 10\% of new sources). Then the distribution of interarrival times is plotted. Bot-attacks and worm-attacks show exponential interarrivals. Moreover, the source-net dispersion can be interesting. Worm outbreaks have a much higher dispersion than bot nets and misconfigurations. A histogram can be computed on the count of sources seen from each /8 address aggregate if IP-addresses are considered, however other aggregates can be used.

Number of Sources per Time Unit \(\text{(15)}\)

Number of new Sources per Time Unit (CDF) \(\text{(16)}\)

Interarrival Time Distribution for equally-sized Source Intervals \(\text{(17)}\)

Number of Sources in specific IP-Aggregates \(\text{(18)}\)

Another metric combining the attack sources and frequency is relating the number of IP-addresses as a function of the number of attacks for each address \[152\]. This histogram follows the power-law distribution.

Number of Sources per Number of Attacks \(\text{(19)}\)

As we already have clarified the term attack is dependent on the honeypot type used. Server honeypots do assess any communication as malicious, hereby low-interaction server honeypots describe the attack frequency necessarily based on network properties like:

Received Packets per Time Unit \(\text{(20)}\)

Received Data (kB) per Time Unit \(\text{(21)}\)

Measurements \[151\] show, that if TCP is the dominant protocol, packet sizes are relatively constant and hence the ration between received packets and data per time unit is predictable. Attack frequencies usually show specific peaks, instant massaging spam for example shows two daily peaks and one if observed on a weekly scale \[149\]. Moreover, peaks in attack frequencies can usually be linked to a single service, worm-activity etc. \[148\], which is heavily exploited at this specific point of time. Instant messaging and email honeypots can use the following metrics:

Messages/Emails Received per Time Unit \(\text{(22)}\)

URLs / Attachments Received per Time Unit \(\text{(23)}\)

Received Data (kB) per Message \(\text{(24)}\)

For high-interaction server honeypots the same metrics apply, however they can be extended by a OS-specific metric:

Exploitations per Time Unit \(\text{(25)}\)

Client honeypots only count, independent from their interaction level, the exploitations per time unit and do not consider network features for the attack frequency as they actively begin the communication. That means, that it is preconfigured at which rate a client honeypot makes communication requests. So only exploitations are considered.
Another procedure used is the sessionization [152] of the data. All the packets received from the same source within a time frame or without triggering a timeout are supposed to belong to the same attack session. 24 hours frames or 30 minutes timeouts are common. Furthermore, the time between the occurrence of an attack and the next attack can be examined. The probability density function (PDF) for this metric follows a heavy-tailed power-law and can be modelled by mixture of a Pareto and an exponential distribution. The lifetime of a source can be described as the complete time we see a source active on a honeypot [1], that means it is the time span from the source’s first occurrence up to is lasts activity and might include several sessions. Botnets and misconfigurations cause short lifetimes, however worms prove to be persistent as they often miss a mechanism to stop scanning. If a specific source is observed regularly (that means it has frequent sessions or one long ongoing session), then it has a long source lifetime. Additionally, Song et al. [148] differentiate their sessions based on a IDS classification: All traffic data to the honeypot which triggers an IDS alert is labelled as a known attack session, all traffic data which ends with the transmission of shellcode but does not trigger an IDS alert is an unknown attack session. The time between sessions is also worth considering, as it displays the pause between active sessions.

Number of Sessions per Time Unit (26)  
Session Duration (27)  
Time between Sessions (28)  
Source Lifetime (29)  
(Un-) Known Attack Sessions per Time Unit (30)

Song et al. [148] demonstrated a plot, which visualizes the frequency of the most targeted port per day. They plot the destination port as a function of time using a log-scale for the ports. The log-scale is an advantage because most of the attacks happen on the smaller well-known ports. The curve shows jumps across discrete levels representing ports of well-known ports for SSH, SMB and so on.

Similar to the notation of sessions are the flows [153]. The basic flows are based on the basic IP-flow and described by a 5-tuple consisting of source and destination IP-address, source and destination port, protocol type. The attack frequency can also be described by the occurrence of basic flows: If a packet differs from another packet by any key-field or arrives after a timeout, it is considered to belong to another flow. Therefore flows are a more strict requirement than sessions. Activity flows are an aggregation of basic flows based on the source IP-address only with a timeout for the inter-arrival time between basics flows. Hence, they resemble the definition of session.

Number of Basic Flows per Time Unit (31)  
Number of Activity Flows per Time Unit (32)

E. Attack Evolution

If we observe certain temporal patterns for a specific source, port, country etc. , it may be important to detect unusual behaviour for it automatically, because those anomalies might mark important events. That means, we want to learn, what normal behaviour is and to spot if this normal behaviour changes.

One possible method is to calculate ratios for different time aggregates and compare those values for different days or to the average ratio. This method is useful to recognize temporal trends which are only visible on a specific time scale [154]. The choice of a good time granularity depends on the kind of attack phenomena which is investigated: For short high-intensity attacks, like botnet probes or flash worms, it may be more useful to apply smaller time units, while for worms with a stealthier propagation scheme a larger time unit should be used.

Francois et al. [147] demonstrated that graph intersections can be used to analyse distributed honeypot platforms. This method allows to highlight changes in the relationships between honeypots, for example if the percentage of mutual attacking IP-addresses changes for two nodes. Their research is based on two metrics, which create one value for the complete honeynet and not one value for each honeypot, which makes the analysis more simple. First, the maximal locality statistic, which is strongly related to the centrality measurement of graphs. \( \psi_k(v) \) denotes the number of arcs of the subgraph of neighbours of \( v \) at a max. distance \( k \).

\[
M_k = \max_{v \in \text{nodes}} \psi_k(v)
\]  

Second, the standardized locality statistics at time \( t \) of the distributed system, which is calculated with respect to previous values of a sliding window with a size of \( \tau \).

\[
\tilde{\psi}_{k,t}(v) = \frac{\psi_{k,t}(v) - \tilde{\mu}_{k,t,\tau}(v)}{\max(\tilde{\sigma}_{k,t,\tau}(v), 1)}
\]  (34)

with common average value

\[
\tilde{\mu}_{k,t,\tau}(v) = \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t' = t-\tau}^{t-1} \psi_{k,t'}(v)
\]  (35)
from a specific country can describe the complete data based on observations restricted to attacks originating created by linear regression. They examined, if a model events are just new minor variations of known activity. However one of the findings concludes that usually new prior to $i$ in time interval $p$ where $\beta >$ fast-scanning worms, and unusual events. $\beta >$ $\beta$ data. They use a deviation value their methodology can also be applied to pure honeypots and the intrusion detection system Bro. There-

$Y^*(i) = \sum \alpha_j X_j(t) + \beta, \quad j = 1, 2, \ldots k$ (37)

where $X_j(t)$ denotes observed attacks from country $j$, $\alpha_j$ and $\beta$ are best fit linear model parameters.

The correlation between models is measured by the correlation factor:

$R^2 = \frac{\sum (Y^*(i) - Y_{av})^2}{\sum (Y(i) - Y_{av})^2}$ where $Y(i)$ observed attacks, $Y_{av}$ average number of attacks (38)

Such correlation factors can be used to rate if the observed events are expected or vary substantially, that means have a high similarity distance to the model.

F. Propagation of Attacks

Besides analysing the attack activities in a isolated manner, one should also try to identify the propagation of attacks across several honeypots if a large honeynet is deployed. Propagation takes place, when one attacking IP-address is observed on one platform, then subsequently on another [152]. Because of the IP-address-pools, this check for reoccurrence should happen within a specific time-frame for more precise results. Already early distributed honeypot analysis show that it is beneficial to deploy a large amount of honeypots from different IP-subnets and different geographical positions [40], as it is more likely to spot an attack, local events can be characterized as such and the propagation of an attacker across targets can be depicted.

Propagation can be modelled by a propagation graph [152], where nodes represent the individual honeypots and the edges $(i, j)$ describe the probability to discover a seen IP-address at node $i$ also at node $j$. However, nodes tend to show low propagation value, if not in the same subnet.

Propagation Graph

Similarly, Vasilomanolakis et al. [7] describe the propagation of attacks by single-dimensional correlation and two-dimensional correlation.

Single-dimensional correlation aggregates attacks from the same origin, if the attack origin has been observed on at least 2 sensors. This correlation is analysed by two visualisations. First, a directed graph is created

and variance

$$\hat{\sigma}_{k,t}(v) = \frac{1}{\tau - 1} \sum_{t'=t-\tau}^{t-1} (\hat{\psi}_{k,t'}(v) - \hat{\mu}_{k,t'}(v))^2$$

$$\hat{M}_{k,t} = \max_{v \in \text{nodes}} \hat{\psi}_{k,t}(v)$$

The standardized locality statistic of a node is nearing zero if its number of edges remains stable. High positive or negative values point out significant changes in the graph structure. However, this is not a necessary conditions. The standardized locality and especially the maximum standardized locality may not differ after a change, if the number of edges for individual nodes did not change.

The first analysis was done to identify honeypots which capture unique attacking IP-addresses. Two nodes in the graph are linked only if the intersection between the corresponding sets represents less than a threshold $\alpha$ of the union of addresses. Therefore, central nodes (high locality value) capture unique IP-addresses. When the maximal standardized locality statistics is low, no changes have occurred, however a high value indicates a major topology change: the relationships of attacking IP-address differ to the previous time instances. A similar analysis can be done for ports, an edge connects to nodes only if the set intersection of their attacked ports is lower than a threshold $\beta$. $\beta > 10$ indicates botnet-waves and fast-scanning worms, $\beta > 3$ slow-scanning worms.

$$\beta_p = m p_i / \sum_{j=0}^{i-1} p_j$$ (36)

where $p_i$ denotes the number of sources triggering profile $p$ in time interval $i$, $m$ denotes the number of intervals prior to $i$ where $p$ was observed.

Bro was also used to create profiles for new events, however one of the findings concludes that usually new events are just new minor variations of known activity.

Kaaniche et al. [152] presented a time evolution model created by linear regression. They examined, if a model based on observations restricted to attacks originating from a specific country can describe the complete data set reliably. Surprisingly, they found a strong correlation between the models for single countries and the overall data set, independently from the countries proportion of the total number of attacks (some of the best fit countries account only for 2%-20% of attacks). The linear regression model is defined by:

$$Y^*(i) = \sum \alpha_j X_j(t) + \beta, \quad j = 1, 2, \ldots k$$ (37)
with nodes for all honeypots and observed attackers. A directed edge represents an attack to a honeypot, that means that multiple edges to different sensors mark the attackers presence on several honeypots. Second, the ratio of unique attackers that have been observed on various honeypots is calculated. Vasilomanolakis findings suggest that the presence on more than two sensors is very unlikely for attackers. Two-dimensional correlation includes time as an additional dimension, which means that a mutual attack has to be observed on at least two sensors within a specific time-frame. As already discussed, this time frame should be below one day because of IP-address pooling. Vasilomanolakis argues reasonably that internet-wide scanning has been significantly improved in the last years: Publicly available tools like ZMap [155] are capable of performing a complete scan of the IPv4 address space for one port with one probe per host in about 1 hour. Therefore, in order to find strong relations one can set the time frame to 1 hour and even lower. Lastly, they use a scatter plot, which uses time slots of one hour and plots the number of unique attackers present on several sensors, in addition a colour signifies on how many sensors the attackers were present. Their observations suggest, that at least one unique attacker is targeting multiple sensor per time slot.

A phase plot can also be used to visualize the successive targets, showing the next target as a function of the last target for a specific amount of attack samples [1]. Sequential IP-address scans will appear as a straight diagonal line in this visualization. Phase plots can also visualize the coverage, which is the number of probed honeynet IP-addresses by a specific source. A full coverage can be recognized as a horizontal line.

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### G. Attack Patterns

The general concept of many data mining tasks, like common pattern detection and clustering, involves the following procedure with three steps [156]:

1. **feature selection and/or extraction, pattern representation**
2. **definition of a pattern proximity measure appropriate to the data domain**
3. **grouping similar patterns**

The first step includes the extraction of certain features characterizing the relevant aspects of the data set and representing them with an adequate means, for example an array of values. An effective measure to describe the similarity of two data series is done by a similarity distance such as Mahalanobis, Pearson, Spearman etc. . The grouping or clustering of patterns is done by clustering algorithms like the K-Means-Algorithm.

Unfortunately, the discipline of pattern detection does not offer a straight forward method for all data types. Not every algorithm can handle all cluster shapes or sizes and runtime or output quality might differ severely on different data dimensionality and types. Different clustering algorithms produce different partitions of data, and even the same clustering algorithm is dependant on its initializations and configurable parameters. Indeed, the real skill in pattern detection is the choice of a proper clustering algorithm (and similarity measure) as hundreds of clustering algorithms exist [157]. This is the reason why we see so many different approaches in the field of honeypot attack pattern detection, but also any other clustering discipline.

The problem of network traffic clustering and anomaly detection is not a new discipline and has been extensively studied. Approaches commonly utilise signature based methods in combination with intrusion detection systems, statistics (e.g. Moving Average Models [158], [159], Principal Component Analysis [160], [161]) or data mining and unsupervised machine learning (e.g hierarchical clustering [162], KNN-clustering [163]). However, only some research was done explicitly in the field of honeypot traffic analysis [164]. Therefore,
we concentrate on the publications which effectively deployed and/or analysed honeypot and honeynet traffic.

The widespread procedure of association rule mining was applied by Pouget [145] to find interesting relationships and patterns between observed events. With the induction of association rules one tries to find sets of items, i.e. events, port numbers, IP-addresses and so on, that frequently occur together. It originates from customer behaviour analysis, that tries to recommend products based on sets of collectively bought items. This means that an association rule \( R \) states that if we see specific action \( a \) and \( b \), we can be confident, quantified by a percentage, that also action \( c \) will be observed: \( a \cap b \Rightarrow c \). The metrics which are applied are support and confidence. Support is the ratio between the number of transactions that include all items of the rule and all transactions. Confidence is the ratio between the number of transactions that include all items of the rule and the transactions. Rules should have a minimal support threshold so that only meaningful rules are found.

\[
\text{Supp}(R) = \frac{\# \text{transactions incl. } \{a \cap b \cap c\}}{\# \text{transactions}} \tag{47}
\]

\[
\text{Conf}(R) = \frac{\# \text{transactions incl. } \{a \cap b \cap c\}}{\# \text{transactions incl. } \{a \cap b\}} \tag{48}
\]

Pouget applied association rules to each found port sequence group and mined on the following features: number \( T \) of machines in the environment targeted by one attack source, \( n_i \) number of packets sent by attack source to honeypot \( i \) and \( N \), which is the total number of packets sent by one attack source to the whole environment. The resulting rules represented meaningful clusters, which have been ascribed to attack tools and offer a good alternative to clustering by port sequences only.

One of the first extensive works on honeypot data was done by Thonnard et al. [154], who group attacks on a honeynet by detecting common time series patterns. They have used the data from the leurre.com project and their data aggregation is based on the ordered list of ports targeted by a source identified by an IP-address. All attackers having the same attack fingerprint are classified into one set, then the number of unique source counts per time unit for each class is calculated. Furthermore, only time series which have at least one peak of activity with a minimum of \( x = 10 \) sources for a given time unit are considered. That means, that featureless data (port sequences which are not mutual) is filtered to assure a certain quality. The symbolic aggregate approximation (SAX) is used to reduce the dimensionality of the data and to make a fast similarity distance evaluation possible. SAX approximates time series data by segmenting into time intervals of equal size and summarizing each of these intervals by its mean value. Each interval is then mapped to a finite alphabet symbol. The alphabet is chosen relatively, i.e. symbol \( B \) representing the range 20%-30% of the maximum unique source count etc. Time series can then be interpreted and compared as a string. Thonnard defined similarity if more then 90% of the symbols match for a given pattern and used an alphabet with 8 symbols. If \( N \) is the number of elements in time series \( T \), the \( \text{dist}() \)-function returns the inter-symbol distance and \( \omega \) is the number of intervals in the SAX representation, then the minimum SAX distance can be calculated as follows:

\[
\text{SAX}(W_{T_1}, W_{T_2}) = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{\omega} \text{dist}(W_{T_1}(i), W_{T_2}(i))} \tag{49}
\]

Comparing the resemblance of temporal behaviour, Thonnard et al. found only three patterns of attacks:

1) continuous activity  
2) sustained bursts  
3) ephemeral spikes

Especially the ephemeral spikes can lead to a false similarity measurement, because the symbols of the alphabet are chosen relatively due to a standardization process. This means that temporal patterns with only a few spikes and many zeros or very small values have a mean value close to zero. SAX calculates a high similarity degree because all these values are represented by only one symbol. However, a similarity has not to be the case. Therefore a global and local similarity measure is necessary. Global similarity \( \text{SIM}_G \) is defined using the largest lower-bounding distance that is theoretically possible, as denoted by the abstract variables \( W_T \) and \( \tilde{W}_T \) which have maximal distance for every pair of symbols. Local similarity \( \text{SIM}_L \) compares only values, if one of the patterns exceeds the upper quantile value \( \tilde{U}_Q \) at a given time unit, 0.975 was used by Thonnard. Again, \( W_T \) and \( \tilde{W}_T \) are used to calculate the largest distance between every pair of symbols based on \( X_{UQ} \). Both measures are combined to obtain the total similarity.

\[
\text{SIM}_G(W_{T_1}, W_{T_2}) = 1 - \frac{\text{SAX}(W_{T_1}, W_{T_2})}{\text{SAX}(W_T, \tilde{W}_T)} \tag{50}
\]

\[
X_{UQ} = \bigcup_{i=1}^{N} \{x_i \mid W_{T_k}(x_i) > \tilde{U}_Q, \forall i \in \{1, \ldots, \#W_{T_k}\}\}
\]

\[
\text{SIM}_L(W_{T_1}, W_{T_2}) = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{\#X_{UQ}} \text{SAX}(W_{T_1}(x_i), W_{T_2}(x_i))}{\sum_{i=1}^{\#X_{UQ}} \text{SAX}(W_{T}(x_i), \tilde{W}_T(x_i))} \tag{52}
\]

\[
\text{SIM}_{total} = \frac{\text{SIM}_G + \text{SIM}_L}{2} \tag{53}
\]

The clustering algorithm applied is a greedy algorithm, which takes a pattern and combines all other patterns
The resulting number of principal components is less than or equal to the number of original variables \( p \) and the components are defined and ordered in such a way that the first component has the largest variance. Therefore much of the variance in the original set can be retained be choosing the first \( k \) PCs with \( k < p \). PCs are usually selected by the Kaisers’ rule \([166]\), which suggests the elimination of all PCs with a Eigenvalue of less than one.

\[
C_i = \frac{X_i - \bar{X}_i}{\sqrt{s_i}} \\
Z = A^T C \\
Z_1 = A_1^T C = a_{11}C_1 + a_{12}C_2 + a_{13}C_3 + \ldots + a_{1p}C_p \\
\vdots \\
Z_k = A_k^T C = a_{k1}C_1 + a_{k2}C_2 + a_{k3}C_3 + \ldots + a_{kp}C_p
\]

To calculate the PCs the p-dimensional vector \( X = (X_1, \ldots, X_p)^T \) is standardized by \( C_i \) for all \( i = 1..p \), where \( X_i \) is the sample mean and \( s_i \) is the sample variance for \( X_i \). Empirical experience shows that PCAs on honeypot data should be calculated using the correlation matrix \( R \) of \( C \). The Eigenvector of \( R \) is \( A = (A_1, \ldots, A_k)^T \), the Eigenvalue vector of \( C \) is \( l = (l_1, \ldots, l_p) \) and the first component equals to \( Z_1 \). The components can be interpreted by analysing the loading of the components variables, as high loading indicates significance, which allows the assignment to events like targeted attacks against open ports or scan activities. Eventually, the results can be visualized with scatter plots having a PC on each axis, which Almotairi used to find interrelations between components and also to identify extreme activities or outliers. Those can be identified by sight, however also automatically by applying contours, the population ellipsoids, around the mean values \( Z_{ik} \) is the score of the \( k^{th} \) PC of \( i^{th} \) observation, \( l_k \) is the \( k^{th} \) Eigenvalue). The first and last components can give interesting insights, as they mark the most and least important properties.

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{p} \frac{Z_{ik}^2}{l_k} = \text{const}, \quad \text{e.g.:} \quad \frac{Z_{i1}^2}{l_1} + \frac{Z_{i2}^2}{l_2} \leq 5.8 \quad (56)
\]

One of the latest honeypot attack analysis was published by Owezarski \([164]\), whose approach uses supervised machine learning methods and applies robust clustering techniques. Eventually, this method creates signatures automatically based on the clusters. This analysis is founded on a general algorithm which was applied to recognize anomalies in production traffic \([167]\) and was altered to work on server honeypots traffic.
Owezarski aims at increasing the robustness of the clustering algorithm by the divide and conquer approach sub-space clustering (SSC) and the notion of clustering ensembles. A clustering ensemble $P$ consists of a set of $N$ partitions $P_n$ produced for the same data with \( n = 1, \ldots, N \) by the same clustering algorithm. Each of these partitions provides different and independent exposure of data patterns, which then can be combined to a global cluster including all metrics and facilitating a holistic understanding of the threat. A shift of the similarity measure from patterns to the clustering results takes place. This is possible because of the downward closure property [168]: *If a collection of points is a cluster in a d-dimensional space, then it is also part of a cluster in any (d-1) projections of this space.* Moreover, high-dimensional data tends to be sparse, therefore clustering algorithms create better results in lower dimensions, which also have a smaller computational cost. The partitions are combined by the Inter Clustering Result Association (ICRA) method to correlate clusters and Inter Outlier Association (IOA) method to correlate outliers. The notion of graphs is used: a vertex is a cluster/outlier from any sub-space and an edge represents outliers. The notion of graphs is used: a vertex is a cluster/outlier from any sub-space and an edge represents outliers. Similar to Thonnard [154] a greedy algorithm is used to recognize cluster-cliques because of performance reasons. The intersection of all flows present within cluster-cliques form the anomaly of interest.

Gregio et al. [169] have demonstrated the effectiveness of classical data mining and supervised classification approaches in the honeypot data log analysis using the well-established k-nearest neighbour (KNN) algorithm, neural networks and decision trees. The purpose of this analysis is to differentiate between internet noise like inoffensive or known traffic and anomalies and real attacks. So their setup does not only include honeypot traffic which is labelled as an attack but also productive traffic which is labelled as normal. Both traffic types are used to support a learning process and to make a classification of traffic possible. KNN uses a simple classification principle: For each instance of data of unknown class the distance to data with known classes is calculated and the $k$ nearest neighbours decide by a majority vote which class is selected for the unknown element [157]. Artificial neural networks are computing structures that are composed of single processing units called neurons. Different forms of neural networks exist, however a well-understood and commonly used model is the multilayer perceptron (MLP). MLP utilizes a supervised learning technique called backpropagation for training the network and consists of multiple layers of neurons in a directed graph [170]. A decision tree is a machine learning algorithm which performs successive partitioning of the original data set into successively more homogeneous subgroups. Each node in a decision tree resembles a partition decision. Hence, the higher a decision tree is the higher the detail level of clustering [171]. For the most simple classification of traffic, either suspicious or normal, the KNN algorithm was too slow to create reasonable results, neuronal networks performed good and produced good results, however with a quite high share of false negative. Decision trees performed best and produced correct results with few false positives and a moderate number of false negatives.

Honeycomb [172] is one of the most famous HoneyD plugins and scans incoming traffic to detect repeating patterns in packet payloads using the longest common substring (LCS) algorithm. This implementation is based on suffix trees, which are used as building blocks for a variety of string algorithms. Using suffix trees, the longest common substring of two strings is straightforward to find in linear time. Suffix trees can be generated for example with the Ukkonen’s algorithm [173]. Honeycomb performs a protocol analysis which orders traffic by network and transport layer header information (IP-address or Ports). After that LCS is applied in two different ways: *Vertical pattern detection* concatenates for two connections the incoming messages into one string, respectively, and compares then the resulting string. *Horizontal pattern detection* compares for two connections two messages at the same depth in the dialogue, that means that LCS is applied to the n-th messages.

Sampling is the process of selecting a subset of individuals from within a statistical population to estimate the overall characteristics. Connection sampling can greatly benefit the analysis by reducing bandwidth and memory requirements, which ultimately improves the scalability. Yegneswaran et. al [151] have shown, that subset properties from honeypot data are able do describe trends and patterns of the overall data, such as finding heavy hitters. The data set was reduced by two methods. The first method chooses randomly flows and counts the related packets. The second method considers only a subnet of the observed network.
H. Attack Root Cause Identification

Attack root causes can be defined as the most basic cause that can be reasonably identified as the origin of a attack. The root cause can be associated to a specific attack tool, or one of its variants or configurations. One of the main tasks of honeynet data analysis is the assignment of clusters and recognized patterns to root causes. However, this is not necessarily an one-to-one relationship, as it is difficult to guarantee that a found cluster is caused by only one attack tool and that one attack tool does not cause two clusters, for example by different attack configurations. Ultimately, a cluster should always remain explicable in its formation [145].

Before a cluster can be assigned to an attack root cause, it is necessary to validate the cluster coherency, that is if we found good (meaningful) clusters. Undoubtedly, different attacks can create the same number of packets on the same ports, therefore a pure statistical analysis of transactional data might not be enough. One possible way of determining the coherence is by considering the packet data content. The payload of all packets sent from one attack source can be transformed into strings and concatenated. This creates an attack fingerprint, which then can be used to check the cluster coherency by comparing the fingerprints by a simple string distance measure like the Levenshtein distance. Pouget [145] used this method to prove that his clustering technique is meaningful, as the fingerprints from a Cluster $C$ mostly have a distance $d_i = 0$ to their cluster partners, resulting in a very low average distance $D_C$ for a cluster, which in turn means that a mutual payload exists.

$$d_i = \sum_{j \in C} \frac{D(i, j)}{n-1}$$

$$D_C = \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i,j \in C,i<j} \frac{2D(i,j)}{(n-1)n}$$

Polymorphic attacks are attacks that are able to change their appearance with every instance. Thus, polymorphic worms pose a big challenge to the honeypot pattern detection, and more specifically to root cause identification, as worms might change the attack vector for exploiting the vulnerability or the attack body might change by garbage insertions, encryption, instruction reordering and so on. Therefore (sub-) string based methods like LCS are insufficient. Different approaches exist, however their research is based on the mutual premise that despite the polymorphism the worms must have some invariant substrings. Indeed, such invariants exist [174] and the meaningful strings which can be used for classification have to be found.

Tang and Chen [175] proposed the design of a double-honeypot as a counter measure to worms. The novelty of this system is the ability to distinguish worm activities from non-attacking behaviour on honeypots, as for example misconfigurations. This system is composed of two independent honeypot arrays, the inbound array consisting of high-interaction honeypots which allows compromise and an outbound array consisting low-interaction honeypots. If a compromised inbound honeypot tries to find and infect other victims, all outgoing traffic initiated by the honeypot will be redirected by a network translator to the outbound array. If one of the outbound honeypots sees network traffic, a compromise on the inbound honeypot took definitely place. Expanding this work, Mohammed, Hashim et al. [176] proposed a double-honeynet to solve some of the limitations of the double-honeypot. The double-honeynet is a combination of two honeynets consisting only of server high-interaction honeypots. One honeynet is destined to receive incoming connection requests Once a honeypot from the first honeynet $H_1$, is compromised, a worm will attempt to make outbound connections. An internal translator intercepts all outbound traffic and redirects it to the second honeynet $H_2$, which also allows the infection. This procedure repeats, causing the worm to spread back and forth across the honeynets and to manifest different instances. Those instance are collected centrally and a signature generation algorithm is initiated: First a substrings extraction process takes place which creates the set of all possible substrings and determines their frequency. Then the PCA is applied on the frequency count to reduce the dimension and get the most significant strings, which then can be used to create a signature and to define a root cause.

Another way of assigning the attacks root cause is by determining which attack tool was used to convey the attack. This can be done by analysing port sequences or the TCP Initial Sequence Number (ISN).

$$\text{ISN}$$

$$\text{Port Sequence}$$

Some attack tools use always the same ISN or a bad random number generator with a low entropy [147], which makes it possible to assign some ISN to specific attack tools. Moreover, honeypots receive backscatter packets, which are SYN-ACK replies to spoofed SYN packets and therefore possess the ISN+1. Again, these are typical ISNs, which could be linked to specific tools.
The analysis by port sequences was introduced by Pouget et al. [145] in order to show that frequent/repetitive attacks on honeypots create large amount of data, which might lead to misleading results if general statistics are applied. However, a closer look on port sequences can reveal some hidden phenomena. A port sequence is a time ordered sequence of ports without duplicates [2] that represents the order in which the attack sources (IP-address with a timeout of 1 day for Pouget) sent packets to specific ports, for example: Attacker sends TCP requests to port 135, again on 135 and then on port 4444 creates \{135T, 4444T\}. Port Sequences can be created for observations on a single honeypot or for observations on several honeypots. Preliminary results from Pouget showed that each sequence is often limited to only one port, and that a port sequence represented as a set is almost uniquely identified by this set, however because of some rare cases the ordered sequence was preferred. Pouget observed more than twice as many port sequences as unique targeted ports. The distribution is similar to other metrics, as the top 8 sequences already characterize the activity of about 75% of the attacks [177]. These results motivated a further in-depth investigation.

Another possibility to deduce an attack to a specific attack tool was discovered by Kohlrausch [178]. During a buffer overflow the instruction counter (EIP) is overwritten with a new return address at which the shell code can be assumed. Moreover, honeypots like Argos track the preceding value of the instruction counter (faulty EIP) which is the last legitimate instruction before the exploit had taken over the control. Evaluations show, that the values of the EIP and faulty EIP are characteristic for an exploit tool and operating system pair. However, this analysis might be strongly biased by active address space randomization algorithms.

EIP and faulty EIP (61)

Another major problem in identifying a single root cause for attacks on honeypots were discovered by Alata and Pouget [179], [180]. Pouget made the observation that different sets of compromised machines are used to carry out the various stages of planned attacks. That means, that a single attacker causes different attack patterns from different machines on the honeypot. In addition, Alata observed this phenomenon also on a SSH high-interaction honeypot. Two groups of attacking machines have been spotted: The first group is composed specifically to scan hosts and perform dictionary-attacks. If they are successfully, usually a day later a machine from the second group appears. This group has no intersection with the first group in terms of IP-address and geographical lookups even reveal different countries. After a login the second machine tries to run own services or get root access. Interestingly, comparing the attack sources between low- and high-interaction honeypot data sets demonstrates that mutual IP-addresses are from the scanning group only, the second intrusion group also never appears on low-interaction honeypots.

In general, attack root cause identification requires a good knowledge of black-hat tools or recent participation on security pages and mailing pages, which usually inform about Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). That is why it can be really difficult to assign a honeypot attack cluster to a known attack tool. Moreover, because of the increasing complexity of worms it is necessary to rather perform payload analysis (byte sequences, shellcode commands etc.) [174] than pure statistical evaluations and the mere detection of a exploit. Honeypots are still used to collect worms, however the signature generation for worms evolved into its own broad field of studies and are rather the domain of intrusion detection systems [181].

I. Attack Risk Assessment

The risk estimation is rather done on high interaction honeypots, as it can be assessed based on the severity of the vulnerability and the analysis of the exploit. However, risk estimation can also be done for low-interaction honeypots based on the scope of the attack, which can be measured by three features describing the amount of communication: The number of packets of the attack, the amounts of bytes exchanged in the attack and the communication duration.

\[
\text{risk} = \log(nPackets) + \log(nBytes) + \log(duration+1)
\]

Ozewaski [164] extended this risk estimation by multiplying the risk value by the number of sub-spaces the attack is found in, which is an indication for how many network-features the attack affects.

\[
\text{risk}_{subspace} = C \times \log(nPackets) + \log(nBytes) + \log(duration + 1)
\]

SweetBait [182] is designed to be an automated response system that protects from random IP scanning worms using low-interaction (honeyD) and high-interaction (Argos) honeypots. Honeypots are used to
create signatures, which then are sent to IDS/IPS sensors in order to determine the virulence of worms on production systems. The expected virulence of worms is based on their aggressiveness, which is quantified by the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) of the number of alerts generated by each signature on each period: \[ m' = w \times a + (1 - w) \times m \], where \( m' \) is the new value, \( m \) the previous value and the weight \( 0 < w \leq 1 \) configures the computation to follow more or less aggressively the recent changes in activity levels, whereby values below 0.5 were not useful. This EWMA value is then used to predict the virulence by adjusting the value by port and protocol bias value, which is useful for especially active ports like 145: \[ A = m \times \text{port bias} \times \text{protocol bias} \]. The EWMA can be used not only to predict signatures observed by IDS, but also any temporal pattern on honeypots.

### J. Exploit Detection

As high interaction honeypots are actively exploited, they also consider the vulnerabilities which were exploited in their analysis. Two main procedures to detect exploitations and to find vulnerabilities are either the data-driven technique (example: Argos) or the operating system state monitoring (example: Capture-HPC) [178]. The former detects exploitations by dynamic taint analysis, which is based on the idea that all data from the internet is potentially malicious and therefore is marked as tainted. The data-flow of tainted data is monitored. The exploitation of a honeypot is then specified as the direct execution of tainted shell-code. Dynamic taint analysis is very accurate and reliable to detect attacks utilizing buffer overflows. The latter inspects the states of operating systems and tries to spot illegitimate actions in the file system or process management. An exploitation has occurred if modifications (sometimes even read operations) are done to this specific locations, no active execution of those modified files is required by definition, however this usually happens implicitly. Modifications can be recognized comparing the files with a backup, by comparing hash-values or by controlling the kernel-log for sensitive calls.

Argos memory tainting technique was extended by SweetBait [182], which inserted its own shellcode into the code that is under attack, which makes the gathering of more information about the memory and process states possible.

### K. Overview Honeypot Data Analysis

Table VI gives an overview over the various honeypot metrics used in research projects. Interestingly, one finding of this overview is that most of the researchers tend to pose the first three presented questions, which refer to the attack source, attack target and the frequency. Furthermore, a common consensus exists in identifying sources or targets and in describing the frequency, as many of the metrics and analysis methods are reused throughout the publications. The reason behind this circumstance is that direct (apparent) information is evaluated and in cases like the country-mapping extended by simple lookups. Direct information describes the observations and is recorded in honeypot logs during common operation: Usual honeypot logfiles contain the source, the target and the timestamp of an attack based on the IP information. It is important to note, especially for the IP, that a communication without an IP-address for the source and target would be not possible and each event has a timestamp. Therefore, it is straightforward and natural to pose analysis questions based on these features.

However, this situation is different for the remaining questions, because they attempt to derive information. Derived information explains, assesses or localizes the cause of the observations which is fundamentally more complex than mere description. Since the analysis is more complex, such research appeared later than simple descriptive analysis and less overlaps between methods exist. This is especially true for the pattern-detection, which can be done by many different similarity measures and clustering algorithms (as explained in subsection V-G). The conduct of such analysis is growing into an interdisciplinary approach, because in order to derive information, basic statistics usually do not suffice any more: sophisticated honeypot networks and methods from other fields like association rule mining, neuronal networks, memory tainting in virtual machines to name a few, have become necessary. In general, the bond between honeypots and other research fields has intensified during the last years.

### VI. Legal and Ethical Concerns

The deployment of honeypots involves the discussion about legal and ethical liability. It is important to announce beforehand, that the legal situation is country-dependent, furthermore, it is often difficult to decide which laws apply if attacker and victim are situated in different countries. However, this chapter aims to
| Problem Statement                              | Analysis                                                                 | Examples |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| Do common attack origins exist?               | IP-Address or IP-Prefix                                                 | [1], [2], [145], [147], [148], [152] |
|                                               | Autonomous System Number                                                | —        |
|                                               | Domain Name, URL, URL-Type                                              | [9], [146], [148], [149] |
|                                               | Country                                                                  | [2], [145], [146], [148], [149] |
|                                               | UserID / Email                                                           | [149], [179] |
|                                               | (Worm-) Signature                                                       | [1], [40], [148], [182] |
|                                               | User Agent                                                              | [150]    |
|                                               | Operating System                                                        | [2], [145] |
| What is the target of the attack?             | IP                                                                       | [151], [152], [164], [176] |
|                                               | Port and Transport Protocol                                             | [2], [145], [147], [153], [154], [169] |
|                                               | Service                                                                  | [145], [146], [149] |
|                                               | Software Client, Plugins                                                | [9], [106] |
|                                               | Vulnerability                                                           | [92], [179] |
|                                               | OS                                                                       | [2], [148] |
| What are the attack frequencies?              | Time until First Incoming Connection                                   | [146], [179] |
|                                               | Number of Incoming Connections per Time Unit                           | [152]    |
|                                               | Number of Sources per Time Unit                                        | [1], [144], [147], [154] |
|                                               | Number of new Sources per Time Unit (CDF)                               | [1], [2] |
|                                               | Interarrival Time (Distribution for equally-sized Source Intervals)      | [1], [152], [176] |
|                                               | Number of Sources versus the number of attacks per Source               | [152]    |
|                                               | Received Packets per Time Unit                                         | [147], [151], [169], [176] |
|                                               | Received Data (kB) per Time Unit                                       | [147], [151], [169], [176] |
|                                               | Messages/Emails Received per Time Unit                                  | [149]    |
|                                               | URLs / Attachments Received per Time Unit                               | [149]    |
|                                               | Received Data (kB) per Message                                         | [149], [165] |
|                                               | Exploitations per Time Unit                                            | [178], [179] |
|                                               | Sessions per Time Unit                                                  | [152], [169] |
|                                               | Session Duration                                                        | [152], [169] |
|                                               | Time between Sessions                                                  | [146]    |
|                                               | Source Lifetime                                                         | [1]      |
|                                               | (Un-)Known Attack Sessions per Time Unit                               | [1], [40], [148] |
|                                               | Number of Basic Flows per Time Unit                                     | [153], [164] |
|                                               | Number of Activity Flows per Time Unit                                  | [153]    |
| How to detect changes in attacks?             | Ratios between different Time Units                                     | [154]    |
|                                               | Sliding Window and Locality Statistics                                  | [147]    |
|                                               | Deviation $\beta$ value                                                | [1]      |
|                                               | Linear Regression                                                      | [152]    |
### How to compare propagation?

| Propagation Graph | 152 |
|-------------------|-----|
| Attack Graph      | 7   |
| #Unique Mutual Attackers per Targets per Time Slot | 7 |
| Phase Plots       | 1   |
| Association Rule Mining | 145 |
| Destination Net Footprint Scan | 1 |
| Ratio of Attackers per Number of Target Sensors | 7 |
| PDF of First Destination Preference | 1 |

### How to detect attack patterns?

| SecViz Visualization | 165 |
|----------------------|-----|
| Symbolic Aggregate approxXimation (SAX) | 154 |
| Principal Component Analysis (PCA) | 153, 176 |
| Sub-Space Clustering (SSC) | 164 |
| Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) | 169 |
| Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) | 172, 176 |

### How to identify a root causes?

| Cluster Coherency | 145 |
|--------------------|-----|
| Double-Honeynet | 176 |
| ISN | 147 |
| Port Sequence | 145 |
| Faulty EIP | 178 |

### How to assess the risk?

| Communication Scope | 164 |
|---------------------|-----|
| EWMA | 182 |

### How to recognize exploits?

| Data-Driven Technique | 92 |
|-----------------------|----|
| Memory Tainting | 114 |

highlight possible pitfalls and general reasoning which has to be considered.

Lance Spitzner [183] formulated the first two problems, which are entrapment and privacy.

a) **Entrapment Challenges:** Entrapment can be defined as the persuasion of an entity to commit a crime although no previous intent to commit such a crime existed. It can be argued that this does not apply to honeypots, as they do not actively persuade anyone. Server honeypots mimic production systems or services and wait for incoming connections, they are virtually invisible to other network participants unless they decide to approach those system, for example due to an IP-address range scan. Client honeypots make the first request, however, they do not persuade to commit a crime, as the exploitation is already prepared server-sided, which means that the intent of a crime already existed. On the other hand, a honeypot remains a system consciously set up for attacks and sometimes even with known security vulnerabilities which makes an attack possible in the first place.

b) **Privacy Challenges:** The privacy issue elaborates the data collection. The question arises whether a honeypot is allowed to collect information about the attackers without their knowledge or permission and thus violate their privacy? In order to answer that question one has to consider which type of data is saved by the honeypot and how the data is used by the honeypot systems and administrators.

Data is usually divided into two general categories, meta-information and content. Meta-information stores information about content and connections. For the IP this is operational/transactional data like the IP-address, IP-header, session-cookies, timestamp of the communication and so forth. This type of information is rather collected by low-interaction honeypots, however, some content might be stored depending on the level of emulation. Content data is the data which a sender actually intends
to transmit, like email-text, keystrokes and files. High-interaction honeypots focus on saving large amounts of content data, although meta-information is stored additionally. Furthermore, it is important to highlight the purpose of a honeypot and how the meta-information or content is used. As already stated, production honeypots can be used to defend production systems. Although research honeypots do not protect an organization directly, they help to understand threats, develop countermeasures and to fix exploitable bugs, therefore they contribute indirectly to the safety. Content data has more privacy issues then transactional data, as it also underlies the copyright of the author. However, one has to consider that on the one hand the attacker does not have any authorized means to save data on those honeypots (like a legitimate account) and on the other hand does decide voluntarily to transmit the content.

Common practice in the internet shows that the processing of transactional data is done frequently and is not persecuted by many countries. However, some countries such as Germany rate IP-addresses with an affiliated timestamp as personal data since backtracking of individuals is possible with the help of ISPs. That is why a storage of non-anonymized IP-addresses is only allowed for 7 days in order to ensure undisturbed operation of services [134], [185]. Such local regulations have to be considered although they might interfere with the scientific freedom.

As long as tools attempt to secure one’s own systems and their usage-emphasis lies in the improvement of the protection, the legal risks seem to be negligible. One should always keep in mind that honeypots do not only communicate with criminal, malicious entities but also with their victims. Hijacked systems are used to propagate attacks, backscatter packets arrive a result of spoofed IP-addresses. Because of that honeypot log records should always be handled with care. As far as is known, there was up to date no trial concerning honeypots explicitly. However, this holds only as long as the honeypot does not cause any harm, which leads us to the next problem statement.

c) Liability Challenges: The third concern is the liability in case of harming other systems. As honeypots offer known vulnerabilities to attackers, they can be used to harm other systems. Low-interaction honeypots emulate protocols and therefore they can be subject of a IP spoofing and amplification attack. High-interaction honeypots might allow arbitrary code execution on the machine and therefore cause even much higher damage to other systems. This means, that the original attacker is not visible to the victim, which in turn would sue the operator of honeypots they appear to be the real attacker. The argument here is, that if an administrator had taken proper precautions to keep the (honeypot) systems secure, the attacker would not have been possible, therefore the administrator is jointly responsible for any damage which has occurred. The higher the interaction level of the honeypot the higher the risk of a harmful utilization. Therefore verification checks should be done more often on high-interaction honeypots. It is recommended to reset virtual honeypots as often as possible and to use a reverse firewall to limit the amount of malicious traffic that can leave the honeypot, as it shows consciousness and the attempt to minimize possible damage, which might limit the legal liability. Another possibilities are containment systems, which restrict the rate at which a computer is allowed to make connections to other machines, for example Dantus feedback control system [186].

Not only the deployment has to be considered, but also the development and publication of honeypot software, as many countries including Germany have a valid hacker paragraph, compare the German criminal law code §202c [187]. This paragraph makes the publication of software whose purpose is to spy out or intercept data and facilitating hacking attacks a punishable offence, as it is seen as a preparation of a crime. It is not completely clarified which software is affected by this law. However, a honeypot is collecting similar information, in the same technical manner, as many other security tools like IDS sensors or even system logs, and this category of software is not banned.

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