No Calm in The Storm: Investigating QAnon Website Relationships*

Hans W. A. Hanley  
Stanford University  
hhanley@stanford.edu

Deepak Kumar  
Stanford University  
kumarde@stanford.edu

Zakir Durumeric  
Stanford University  
zakird@stanford.edu

Abstract

QAnon is a far-right conspiracy theory whose followers largely organize online. In this work, we use web crawls seeded from two of the largest QAnon hotbeds on the Internet, 8kun and Voat, to build a hyperlink graph. We then use this graph to identify, understand, and learn from the websites that spread QAnon content online. We curate the largest list of QAnon centered websites to date, from which we document the types of QAnon sites, their hosting providers, as well as their popularity. We further analyze QAnon websites’ connection to mainstream news and misinformation online, highlighting the outsized role misinformation websites play in spreading the conspiracy. Finally, we leverage the observed relationship between QAnon and misinformation sites to build a random forest classifier that distinguishes between misinformation and authentic news sites, getting a performance of 0.98 AUC on a test set. Our results demonstrate new and effective ways to study conspiracy and misinformation on the Internet.

Introduction

QAnon is a far-right conspiracy that started in 2017 and that grew from a fringe Internet theory into a massive political movement during Donald Trump’s presidency. QAnon alleges that a cabal of Satanic, cannibalistic pedophiles control American politics and media. The movement has a proclivity towards violence, which peaked on January 6, 2021, when its followers joined in the insurrection attempt of the U.S. Capital (Ovide 2021). QAnon supporters largely organize online, using both mainstream and alternative platforms to discuss the conspiracy and to organize real-world events (Associated Press 2020). In response to QAnon’s growth, many Internet companies, including Google, Twitter, Facebook, and Reddit have taken steps to remove QAnon content from their platforms (Greenspan 2020). Yet, despite these bans, QAnon remains a prominent movement.

In this work, we utilize web crawling and the resultant hyperlink graph to shed light on the online QAnon ecosystem. We analyze the extent of the conspiracy’s spread, its most important platforms and websites, and its connection to both mainstream media and misinformation sites. We also show how the relationships between QAnon websites and other domains can be utilized to accurately identify misinformation more broadly.

We begin our study by curating and releasing the largest known corpus of QAnon websites. We crawl two hotbeds of QAnon content, 8kun and Voat, as well as linked URLs to develop a directed hyperlink graph of candidate websites. We build on the pattern that semantically similar sites typically link to similar sets of websites, and we use Szymbikiewicz–Simpson coefficient graph similarity statistic, along with manual confirmation to build a final set of 324 QAnon websites. We develop a taxonomy of QAnon websites, catalog their role in spreading the conspiracy theory, and document their popularity and hosting providers.

We investigate the relationships between QAnon websites and other Internet platforms using Hypertext Induced Topic Selection (HITS) analysis. We show that despite bans, Twitter and Reddit continue to link to QAnon content and remain prominent network hubs in the QAnon ecosystem. Using this same analysis, we find strong ties between QAnon websites, misinformation sites, and platforms known for hosting abusive content. These websites include Free Republic, American Thinker, and BitChute, a popular video hosting platform described by the Southern Poverty Law Center as filled with “hate-fueled material” (Hayden 2019).

Next, we show that there is a strong connection between QAnon websites and authentic and misinformation news sources. While QAnon sites regularly link to both types of content, typically only misinformation websites (e.g., americanthinker.com, freepublic.com, and thegatewaypundit.com) directly reference QAnon sites, adding to the wealth of evidence that sites like these contribute to toxic political “echo-chambers” (Starbird et al. 2018a). Building on this observation, we demonstrate how features derived from our QAnon-based hyperlink graph can be used to identify misinformation more broadly. We train a random forest classifier on hyperlink connections to QAnon sites in order to label domains as misinformation or authentic news. With this model, we achieve 0.98 AUC on a 30% test set, illustrating how the relationships between websites and QAnon domains can be used to understand misinformation and conspiracy theories more broadly.

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While deplatforming QAnon from social media platforms may be beneficial in reducing its spread, the decision simultaneously increases the barrier to understanding misinformation. Our work shows how web crawling and hyperlink graph analysis can lead to better understanding of conspiracies and online misinformation. We hope that our results help platforms curb the spread of QAnon as well as provide a robust methodology for studying misinformation moving forward.

Background

QAnon is a conspiracy theory premised on the notion that the world is run by a cabal of pedophiles who Donald Trump will purge in a day of reckoning known as “The Storm” (Papasavva et al. 2020). The movement began in October 2017 when an anonymous 4chan user “Q” asserted that he was an official in the United States Department of Energy with high (Q-level) clearance, outlining the conspiracy in a post titled “Calm Before The Storm.” Q asserted that he was sending the world through a “Great Awakening,” and since then has regularly posted on 8kun, where Q’s followers try to uncover meaning in his messages known as “Q drops.” Because these followers post anonymously, the conspiracy theory is known as QAnon (“Q + Anon”).

QAnon has grown into a massive political movement in the United States, with an estimated 56% of self-identified Republicans believing that QAnon theories are at least partly true according to a Civiqs poll.1 More troubling than its popularity is the theory’s tendency to incite violence. On January 6th, 2021, the movement’s power was shown in full force when QAnon followers joined other conspiracy theorists to storm the U.S. Capitol (Ovide 2021). As a result of its violent tendencies, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) considers QAnon a domestic terrorist threat and QAnon followers as domestic extremists (Winter 2019).

QAnon’s growth is largely attributed to online social media. Between April and August 2020, Facebook posts about QAnon nearly doubled from 992 to 1,772 posts/day (O’Connor et al. 2020). By August 2020, over 3M Facebook accounts subscribed to QAnon pages and 157K Twitter accounts were actively spreading QAnon information (Sen and Zadrozny 2020; Timber 2020). Since then, several social media companies and technology platforms have attempted to curb QAnon’s influence by “deplatforming” the group. In 2018, Reddit banned subreddits devoted to QAnon, proclaiming Reddit QAnon-free in September 2020 (Timber 2020). In July 2020, Twitter stopped recommending accounts and content on 150K accounts that shared QAnon material, suspending 7K outright (BBC 2021). By October 2020, Facebook terminated over 1,500 pages, groups, and profiles dedicated to QAnon (O’Connor et al. 2020). Other platforms including Google, Triller, YouTube, Etsy, Pinterest, Twitch, Discord, Spotify, Vimeo, Patreon, and even the fitness company Peloton have taken steps to eliminate the movement from their platforms (Greenspan 2020). Despite the bans, QAnon remains a prominent and dangerous movement. This is in part because QAnon thrived throughout 2020 in two digital homes:

8kun. 8kun.top (previously 8chan) is an imageboard that prides itself on minimal moderation (Glaser 2019). New “Q drops” are posted on 8kun, with the site acting as the locus of the conspiracy theory. The main board dedicated to QAnon on 8kun is Qresearch; several prominent offshoots also exist including Qpatriotresearch, Qresearch2gen, Abcu, Qsocial, and Qpatriotswwg. Prior to hosting QAnon content, 8kun was used to spread the manifestos of the Christchurch, Poway synagogue, and El Paso shooters (Glaser 2019). This resulted in Google removing 8kun from search results and Cloudflare, a major CDN, terminating service for the site. 8kun became publicly accessible again in late 2019 after the voucher, WA based Internet provider Vanwatech agreed to host it (Krebs 2021).

Voat. Voat.co (previously WhoaVerse) was a news aggregator/Reddit alternative founded in 2014 by Atif Colo that shut down on December 25, 2020 (Robertson 2020). Voat had a self-described focus on free speech but was known to host “extremist right-wing content” (Robertson 2020). Content on Voat was organized into areas of interest called “subverses”, which were similar to subreddits. Voat received an influx of users following Reddit banning the PizzaGate conspiracy theory in 2016 and again in 2018 when Reddit banned all QAnon content (Papasavva et al. 2020). As a result, and as referenced on 8kun, voat.co/QRV became the “official” home of QAnon research. Many other subverses were also dedicated to Q content: v/QAnon, v/GreatAwakening, v/TheGreatAwakening, v/CalmBeforeTheStorm, v/PatriotsSoapbox, v/QRV, and v/theawakening (Papasavva et al. 2020). Unlike 8kun’s imageboard, Voat provided an easy means for followers to interact and discuss QAnon theories.

Curating a List of QAnon Websites

We begin our study by identifying and analyzing websites dedicated to QAnon. We detail how we leverage links posted on 8kun and Voat to build a resulting hyperlink graph containing 324 unique QAnon websites. We then analyze the types, popularity, and domain hosting of the websites dedicated to the conspiracy theory.

Building from QAnon Seed Sites

We use 8kun and Voat as our initial QAnon seed sites. To extend this set of QAnon sites, we first collect the sites linked by QAnon forums/subverses on 8kun and Voat. On 8kun, we identified 6 QAnon subcommunities by inspecting the 413 board descriptions on the site and manually checking those that claimed to discuss QAnon. For Voat, we compiled a list of 18 QAnon subverses based on the list curated by Papasavva et al. (Papasavva et al. 2020). Voat submissions are ephemeral, which limited our analysis to URLs available between August and December 2020 (on December 25, 2020, Voat permanently shut down). For both 8kun and Voat, a handful of popular pages contribute most of the links (e.g., Qresearch on 8kun and QRV on Voat), but we include the full set of QAnon forums/pages for maximal coverage of...

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1https://civiqs.com/results/qanon_support
QAnon-related material. In total, we collected 4M unique URLs: 3.9M from 8kun and 160K from Voat. These URLs belong to 6.9K and 7.2K domains, respectively. We refer to this set of URLs from Voat and 8kun as 8kun’s and Voat’s Hop 1 Links.

For each of 8kun’s and Voat’s Hop 1 link, we fetch the URL, parse the DOM tree, and collect the links to other pages (i.e., HTML `<a>` tags). We then crawl the external sites linked to by the Hop 1 URLs, creating an extended set of Hop 2 Links. From these two hops, we generate a directed hyperlink graph of domains that link to one another. We define domains using the Mozilla Public Suffix List.\(^2\)

**Ethical Considerations.** We collect only publicly available data on Voat and 8kun. We use the Voat API to crawl data from their website; our data collection abides by Voat’s terms of service. We crawled 8kun’s website; 8kun has no terms of service. We did not attempt to deanonymize any Internet user in the study. We further follow the best practices for web crawling as in works like Acar et al. (Acar et al. 2014).

**Finding New QAnon Domains**

While analyzing the sites linked from 8kun’s and Voat’s (Hop 1 Sites), we found that there were relatively few domains that linked back to 8kun and Voat: 80 out of 6.9K sites for 8kun and 112 out of 7.2K for Voat. Upon manual inspection, we found that a significant fraction of these bidirectionally-connected websites were QAnon focused (47 out of 80 bidirectional links for 8kun; and 51 out of 112 bidirectional links for Voat). We classify a website as a QAnon domain if the site has a QAnon banner on its homepage, has forums for promoting and discussing QAnon theories, contains a repository of Q “drops”, sells QAnon merchandise, or is a social media site made for QAnon followers.

We also found that our manually-verified QAnon sites often link to other QAnon websites beyond Voat and 8kun, hinting that we may be able to find additional QAnon websites by analyzing the hyperlink graph structure. We extend our initial hyperlink graph by more deeply crawling the 180 domains with bidirectional links with Voat and 8kun. We then use a node similarly metric to predict if a domain is QAnon focused. We detail our full crawling and graph analysis methodology below:

**Crawling Methodology.** Realizing that we could not scrape every page on every domain that we collected, we developed a methodology to scrape a large subset of each domain’s pages. To crawl a website, we iteratively retrieve the internal pages that are up to 15 hops away from the domain’s root page. For each site, we then fetch the root page, parse the DOM tree, and collect any additional links to internal pages, and then iteratively repeat the process. We show our algorithm, DEEPCRAWL, in Algorithm 1. We then collect the links to external sites from each of our Hop 1 Links, creating an extended set of Hop 2 Links, from which we generate a directed graph of domains that connect to one another.

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\(^2\)https://publicsuffixlist.org

**Computing Similarity Based on Links.** In our initial set of 180 sites with links to 8kun and Voat, we observed that 88 were centered around the QAnon conspiracy while 92 were not. To further filter links in future crawls, we utilize the Szymkiewicz-Simpson coefficient (SSC) similarity metric to assess how similar a candidate website is to Voat and 8kun. SSC is a metric used to measure the similarity of nodes in a graph using the overlap of their connections. The SSC for two sites \(x\) and \(y\) is computed as follows:

\[
SSC(x, y) = \frac{|X \cap Y|}{\min(|X|, |Y|)}
\]

where \(X\) is the set of sites with connections with domain \(x\), and \(Y\) is the set of sites with connections to domain \(y\). After calculating the SSC of each of the 180 bidirectionally linked domains relative to 8kun and Voat, we rank-order them by SSC value.

QAnon domains have a statistically significant difference in SSC values with 8kun compared to non-QAnon domains (Mann-Whitney U statistic 1583.5, \(p = 2.2 \times 10^{-8}\)). The QAnon domains in our first crawl have an average SSC of 0.5 with 8kun compared to an average SSC of 0.33 from non-QAnon websites. Similarly, we find the QAnon domains have an average SSC with Voat of 0.52 while the non-QAnon sites have an average SSC of 0.37 (Mann-Whitney U statistic 1750, \(p = 4.8 \times 10^{-7}\)). We thus find we can utilize SSC to filter a list of candidate websites to a size that can be subsequently manually verified. We detail our graph creation and QAnon identification techniques in Figure 1.

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**Algorithm 1: DEEPCRAWL(domain)**

**Result:** List of URLs from given domain

```
DEEPCRAWL(domain) =

(i = 0;
crawlSet = empty set;
colllectedURLs = empty set;
while i < 15 and size(pagesToCrawl) > 0 do
    for page in pagesToCrawl do
        urls = scrape(page);
        crawlSet.append(url);
    end
    for url in urls do
        if url not in crawlSet and url.domain == domain then
            newPagesToCrawl.append(url);
        end
    end
    i = i + 1;
    pagesToCrawl = newPagesToCrawl;
    newPagesToCrawl = empty set;
end
return crawlSet;
```

Acar et al. (Acar et al. 2014).
Final QAnon Website List. Using our list of 90 confirmed QAnon domains (88 new QAnon domains + Voat and 8kun) and the corresponding hyperlink graph, we identified an additional 3K websites that had bidirectional links with this set of 90 known QAnon domains. After performing DEEP-CRAWL on each of the 3K websites, we narrowed our list of QAnon candidate websites to the top 10 most SSC-similar websites to each of the QAnon domains in our list of 90. SCC thus enabled us to narrow down the list of 3K websites that had bidirectional links with our set of 90 QAnon domains to 600 candidate sites. We manually checked these 600 sites for QAnon content, filtering down to a final set of 324 QAnon websites.

Types of QAnon Websites
QAnon websites come in five broad categories:

Q Drop Sites. We identify 29 sites that store official “Q drops” from 8kun in an easy-to-read format. These sites typically allow users to view each “drop” in chronological order. As noted previously, Q drops are cryptic messages that contain vague references to current events or famous people. For example, Q drops often reference former President Trump’s Twitter account or famous individuals like Bill Clinton and General Michael Flynn. Our list includes sites like qanon.pub (Alexa rank 27945), qdrop.pub, and operationq.pub.

Q News and Research Sites. We find 196 Q news and research sites where users can download and interact with QAnon content. Research sites normally have open discussions of Q (one even provides a spreadsheet that allows users to post questions about the QAnon conspiracy). Other research sites merely present analyses of the news and how events fit within the QAnon conspiracy. Our list includes sites like x22report.com (Alexa rank 12,573), wwg1wga.martingeddes.com, and thepatriotthub.weebly.com.

QAnon Merchandise and Stores. We uncover 23 sites that produce QAnon entertainment, sell QAnon merchandise, or otherwise profit from the conspiracy. These websites produce merchandise ranging from books, podcasts, and movies to commemorative coins, trading cards, and branded coffee. Additionally, two sites actively promote real-life QAnon conferences where QAnon followers can meet in person. Our list includes qcon.live, thegreateawakeningsummit.com, and thebookofqanon.com.

QAnon Social Media Clones. In addition to websites that promote the QAnon conspiracy theory with blog posts and “news” articles, we found 14 QAnon domains that operate as social media sites. Several of these sites are simply QAnon-branded versions of popular sites like Reddit, Facebook, or Twitter. Our list includes sites like voat.co (Alexa rank 64,488), wglwga.com, and anonup.com.

Non-U.S. QAnon Sites. Despite QAnon being a U.S.-focused conspiracy, we note 62 non-U.S. focused QAnon sites that export the conspiracy abroad, consistent with recent research and reporting (Karlsson 2020; Farivar 2020). We find websites targeted toward audiences in Germany (22), France (13), Japan (5), the Netherlands (4), Italy (3), the UK (3), Belgium (2), New Zealand (2), Sweden (2), Canada (1), Australia (1), and Switzerland (1). We also find 3 domains directed at Spanish-speaking audiences. We lastly note that “Q drops” were translated into English, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish on one of the Q Drop sites. Some examples of non-U.S. QAnon websites include pit-hinterdenkulissen.blogspot.com (Alexa rank 38,549), digital-soldier.de, and wwg1wgadutch.wordpress.com.

QAnon Site Popularity
Several QAnon sites are relatively popular according to the Alexa Top Million list (Alexa Internet, Inc. 2020). While we do not perform any causal analysis, we observe several coarse trends in the popularity of QAnon over time. From the movement’s inception until now, there have been several crests (the Spring of 2020) and troughs (following the shut-
down of 8chan in the Autumn of 2019), with interest in the movement peaking in the aftermath of the January 6th U.S. Capitol attack. Figure 2 shows the number of domains in the Alexa Top 100K and 500K lists along with the dates when different social media companies announced they had taken action against QAnon accounts (this explains why the Facebook and Twitter crackdowns occur after a peak in QAnon interest). The largest decline in popularity was in August 2019, when Cloudflare dropped 8chan (now 8kun) after a mass shooting in El Paso where the shooter explicitly referenced inspiration from 8chan (Prince 2019). QAnon sites did not regain popularity until after 8chan was rebranded as 8kun, migrated to Vanwatech, and became protected by DDoS-Guard, “a dodgy Russian firm that also hosts the official site for the terrorist group Hamas” (Krebs 2021).

We lastly note that QAnon domain registrations have increased steadily since 2017; many popular QAnon domains are newly registered. While only 6 sites were registered in 2017, 34 were in 2018, 40 were in 2019, and 51 were in 2020. The rest in our list are older sites that eventually shifted their focus to QAnon.

QAnon Website Hosting
The 324 QAnon sites we identify are hosted by 75 providers, most prominently Automattic (58 domains), Google (53 domains), Cloudflare (39 domains), GoDaddy (18 domains, 11%), and Vanwatech (11 domains). Automattic, the home of WordPress, appears here due to the many WordPress blogs promoting QAnon content. 11 QAnon domains are hosted by the relatively unknown provider Vanwatech, which rose to prominence by offering security services and a decentralized content delivery network to 8kun after Cloudflare dropped it (Krebs 2021). Despite dropping 8kun in 2019, Cloudflare and Google still host 17.9% and 12.0% of QAnon domains respectively, highlighting their role in propelling up the conspiracy online.

The Full QAnon Ecosystem
In this section, we analyze the graph of known QAnon websites to identify prominent hubs in the QAnon ecosystem. We further illuminate QAnon’s connection to online communities, including social media platforms, authentic mainstream news providers, and known misinformation sites.

QAnon Ecosystem Hubs
To understand the structure of the QAnon ecosystem, we build a hyperlink graph centered around QAnon using the Hypertext Induced Topic Selection (HITS) algorithm (Kleinberg 1998). Starting with the 324 QAnon domains documented earlier as our root set of domains, we build a base set of domains by collecting the domains that both link to or are linked by these QAnon websites. In the directed graph of domains connected to QAnon websites, there are 198K domains and 3.6M directed edge connections.

Per HITS, we discern both hub and authority central domains (Ding et al. 2004). Hub domains are defined as domains that point to many “high authority domains and which are themselves high-value domains”. A hub typically has a large out-degree. Authority domains are defined as “valuable and information-dense domains” pointed to by many other domains. An authority ordinarily has a high in-degree. Due to the nature of the authority metric, authorities tend to be globally popular domains. In our analysis the highest authority domains are youtube.com, twitter.com, facebook.com, and google.com. Given this pattern, we primarily focus on the hubs in the QAnon ecosystem (Table 1). This also helps us shed light on one of our most pressing questions: how do users end up finding QAnon websites?

Social Media and Platform Hubs. Several prominent mainstream social media sites are hubs, most notably Twitter and Reddit. Twitter is the ninth-largest hub overall; Twitter links to 113 QAnon domains and is linked to by 248 QAnon domains. Reddit similarly links to 23 QAnon domains and is linked to by 128 different QAnon domains in our crawl. Another significant hub, YouTube, has links to 23 QAnon domains and 239 QAnon websites link to it. Last, we note threadreaderapp.com’s central role within the QAnon ecosystem. Thread Reader App is a service that al-
lows users to view Twitter threads more seamlessly. A subset of Twitter, 80 QAnon domains link to Thread Reader App pages while it links to 92 different QAnon websites. These results indicate that while social media platforms are trying to remove QAnon content, they still serve as hubs of QAnon content and enable Internet users to access the conspiracy.

**Authentic News Media.** Several mainstream news sources, including the New York Times, Washington Post, and Business Insider are prominent hubs in the QAnon network (Table 1). All three occasionally link to QAnon websites like 8kun.top in news articles, and QAnon domains frequently link to the news sites: 139 QAnon domains link to The New York Times, 133 link to the Washington Post, and 112 link to Business Insider. QAnon sites frequently link to mainstream sources, ridiculing them as “fake news” or using their news stories (e.g., presidential election news) to prop up their theories.

**Misinformation and Alternative News Media.** As seen in Figure 3 and Table 1, several misinformation websites including the Free Republic, the American Thinker, and sott.net play prominent roles. A total of 44 QAnon domains have links to the Free Republic, 83 to the American Thinker, and 70 to Sott.net. We observe that while QAnon websites utilize authentic news media as a foil, they simultaneously promote several misinformation-spreading websites to reinforce their arguments.

**QAnon websites.** While not in the top 10 largest hubs in the ecosystem, several QAnon domains play outsized roles in our analysis. The largest include stillnessinthestorm.com (hub centrality 0.086), wqth.wordpress.com (0.065), and voat.co (0.057), and 8kun.top (0.053). stillnessinthestorm.com is a blog/news site that posts regularly about QAnon and other conspiracies. Others including the Columbia Journalism Review have already documented its role in spreading misinformation. wqth.wordpress.com is a personal blog that seeks to interpret how current events fit into the QAnon conspiracy. Due to concern over potential deplatforming, the site recently moved off of Wordpress to the independent domain theqtree.com.

**BitChute.** The video hosting platform BitChute is also one of the largest hubs in our graph. 152 QAnon domains link to BitChute videos, highlighting its role in spreading the conspiracy. In our initial scrape, we also found that BitChute links to at least 132 QAnon domains. Twitter began blocking links to bitchute.com in August 2020 (Hinchcliffe 2020) due to extreme content on the site (Hinchcliffe 2020).

**Wikipedia.** 163 QAnon domains link to Wikipedia, while Wikipedia links to 11 QAnon websites in our crawl. Many QAnon domains use Wikipedia in order to provide definitions and give background to their arguments. For example, in referring to the “mainstream media” as traitors or a fifth column, one QAnon follower on the GreatAwakening Voat subverse linked to a Wikipedia article defining the term.

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3[https://www.cjr.org/fake-beta](https://www.cjr.org/fake-beta)

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4[https://github.com/several27/FakeNewsCorpus](https://github.com/several27/FakeNewsCorpus)
5[https://www.politifact.com/article/2017/apr/20/politifacts-guide-fake-news-websites-and-what-they/](https://www.politifact.com/article/2017/apr/20/politifacts-guide-fake-news-websites-and-what-they/)
6[https://github.com/Aloisius/fake-news](https://github.com/Aloisius/fake-news)
7[https://library.athenstech.edu/fake](https://library.athenstech.edu/fake)
sites labeled as “fake-news” or “disinformation” in lists curated by OpenSources, PolitiFact, Snopes, and Melissa Zimdars. In total, we crawl 189 misinformation domains from February to April 2021. Examples of misinformation domains include Breitbart, Globalresearch, and Unz, all of which have played a role in spreading conspiracy theories and misinformation online (Starbird et al. 2018a). Misinformation domains have connections with 202K other domains.

**Relationship to Authentic Sources.** Relatively few authentic media sites have connections with QAnon domains. After crawling our list of 167 authentic news sites, we found that only 36 (22%) link to QAnon sites and that authentic news websites link to an average of only 0.8 QAnon sites. The most prominent authentic news websites with directed connections to QAnon are consortiumnews.com (14 QAnon domains) and politifact.com (13 QAnon domains). This paucity of connections can be seen most directly in Figure 4.

In contrast, QAnon sites reference a large number of authentic news sources (Figure 5). For example, in Figure 6, a QAnon follower references a Hill article to call for the arrest of political leaders like Hillary Clinton. Notably, 148 (88%) of our authentic news sources are referenced by QAnon sites, with the average QAnon site referencing 26.5 authentic news sources. The most referenced included the New York Times (139 QAnon domains), Washington Post (133 QAnon domains), The Guardian (133 QAnon domains), and Bloomberg (118 QAnon domains). This is consistent with many authentic news outlets being major hubs in the QAnon ecosystem, as can be seen in Figure 3.

**Relationship to Misinformation.** As noted previously, misinformation and alternative news sources serve as major hubs of QAnon content, regularly linking their readers to QAnon centered websites. We stress that many of these outlets are not new—the Gateway Pundit, Conservative Tree-House, ZeroHedge, and RT have all been extensively documented for their roles in spreading misinformation (Starbird et al. 2018a).

In contrast to authentic news sources, misinformation websites have directed connections to many QAnon supporting domains. After crawling our 189 misinformation domains, we found that 76 (40%) link to QAnon domains, and these sites link to an average 4.5 QAnon websites. The most prominent websites with directed connections to QAnon are freerepublic.com (90 QAnon domains), benjaminfulford.net (59 QAnon domains), and theconservativetreehouse.com (51 QAnon domains). All four of these websites are known traffickers of conspiracies and misinformation (Starbird et al. 2018a). The difference in the number of directed connections made by misinformation websites with those made by authentic news domains is statistically significant, per a Mann-Whitney U test (Statistic = 12,575, \( p < 10^{-12} \)). We show this difference visually in Figure 4.

Like authentic sources, QAnon sites link to many misinformation domains: 168 of our misinformation domains are referenced by QAnon domains, with an average of 25.1 QAnon domains linking to any given misinformation website. QAnon domains frequently link to misinformation content to reinforce their views. For example, the post in Figure 7 shows a QAnon follower criticizing the “D.C. establishment” considered former President Trump an “existential” threat.

**Correlation in Misinformation Popularity with QAnon Popularity.** Given the strong connection between QAnon and misinformation, we now consider whether the popularity of QAnon domains falls and rises with that of misinformation websites. We look at the Pearson correlation in popularity of these misinformation sites with our set of QAnon domains over three and a half years (Nov. 2017–April 2021).
We find that the popularity of QAnon domains and the popularity of our misinformation websites have a Pearson correlation of 0.40, substantially higher than between authentic news domains and QAnon websites (0.068). This hints that misinformation domains may have played a role in driving users to QAnon content online.

**Relationship between QAnon and Popular Websites.** Finally, we measure the relationship between QAnon domains and broadly popular websites, instead of focusing solely on only authentic news or misinformation sites. This serves as a verification that the relationship of QAnon websites to authentic and misinformation news outlets is particularly unique. To do this, we utilize the Alexa top 10K domains from November 1, 2020, checking if QAnon domains link to these websites. We find that QAnon sites link to only 25% (2506) of these popular sites. On average, only 3 QAnon domains connected to each website, compared to an average of 25 misinformation and 26 authentic websites. Both misinformation and authentic news domains have a statistically significant difference in connections with QAnon domains when compared to generally popular websites (Mann-Whitney U test, \( p < 10^{-12} \)).

These results reinforce that QAnon followers regularly use news articles (both authentic and misinformation) to reinforce their arguments rather than other Internet sources. QAnon websites’ use of these sources provides a mechanism to further understand both authentic and misinformation more concretely, which we turn to in the next section.

**The QAnon Bellwether: Classifying Misinformation vs. Authentic News**

In the last two sections, we showed that QAnon sites have a distinct relationship with news outlets (both authentic and misinformation) compared to other popular Internet domains. In this section, we leverage this insight to help identify misinformation websites more broadly.

Recent work by Hounsel et al. (Hounsel et al. 2020) attempted to classify whether websites spread misinformation by training on features derived from a website’s domain name, registration, and DNS configuration. However, their fully deployed system is only able to properly identify misinformation with a precision of 5% (Hounsel et al. 2020). This appears to indicate that more robust features are needed to properly label domains as misinformation vs. authentic. We show that the graph between QAnon sites and other Internet sites can be used to identify whether a domain is spreading misinformation with high accuracy and precision.

**Experimental Setup**

We built a random forest classifier to determine whether a domain is misinformation or authentic news based on its graph properties and network attributes. We use a random forest model because of its high interpretability. While training, we utilized a randomized hyperparameter search, choosing the models with the highest average accuracy over 100 iterations with five-fold cross-validation.

**Feature Set.** We build a set of binary features derived from whether a given domain has a connection edge (i.e., a link to) to a set of selected websites. For our set of websites, we utilize the 100 websites that link to the most QAnon domains, the set of 100 websites that the most QAnon domains link to, and all of the QAnon domains themselves. We thus produce 490 binary connection features. As a baseline against which to benchmark our model, we train a random forest model on the domain set features in Hounsel et al. (Hounsel et al. 2020). These domain features include features based on the domain names, WHOIS domain registration data, and autonomous system network numbers.

**Training and Testing Data.** We separate our set of 167 authentic and 189 misinformation domains into training and testing data with a 70%/30% split. As input to our model, we utilize the domain set features in Hounsel et al. (Hounsel et al. 2020) as well as the binary features of whether the set of authentic and misinformation domains have directed edges to the 490 domains in our feature set.

**Performance and Evaluation**

We train random forest models on three different feature sets in this work: (1) Hounsel et al.’s domain features, (2) our set of domain connection features, and (3) a combination of Hounsel et al.’s domain features and our domain connection features. We note for interpretation purposes that we treated misinformation domains as positive instances in our random forest. As seen in Figure 8, the model using only the QAnon website-derived features performs well, achieving an AUC of 0.919 compared to the model using only domain features, which achieved a mean AUC of 0.843. Combining these features leads to even better classification results on the test set. Respectively, these three approaches achieved mean ROC AUCs of 0.8587, 0.919, and 0.988 on the test set. Similarly,
we achieved 0.856, 0.928, and 0.980 precision-recall AUCs. These results illustrate the utility of these QAnon domains’ gathered features in helping to distinguish authentic/reliable news from misinformation. Because of QAnon’s relationship to misinformation and conspiracy ideas, other domains’ connection to those same domains appears to help identify them as purveyors of conspiracy theories or non-evidenced based misinformation.

**Feature Importance.** One key benefit of utilizing the random forest model is the high degree of interpretability. Several of Hounsel et al.’s features remain important in our combined random forest model. The most important of these features, as measured by the Gini coefficient, is time-info from their registration data. Immediately subsequent to these features, we see the autonomous system being important. Like Hounsel et al. (Hounsel et al. 2020), we note that many of our misinformation domains use consumer-oriented registrars like Namecheap and GoDaddy.

However, as seen in Figure 8, our graph connection features play a large role in improving the model. The most important of these connection features are links to social media websites. We also observe that links to prominent misinformation domains are particularly useful, such as links to globalresearch.ca and zerohedge.com. As described by Starbird et al. (Starbird et al. 2018a), GlobalResearch.ca is a website operated by the Russian-backed Centre for Research on Globalization, and regularly promotes conspiracies and falsehoods. ZeroHedge is a “far-right libertarian financial blog” launched in 2009. The site regularly peddles conspiracy theories, most recently those related to COVID-19 vaccines.

We note that our connection features are likely to be robust to changes over time. As we previously discussed, authentic news outlets rarely link to misinformation outlets; this is unlikely to change in the future. Similarly, misinformation news websites are likely to still reference extreme or misleading content like QAnon, Covid-19 vaccine skepticism, or election misinformation. For example, a website that continually pushes a conspiracy theory about QAnon will continue to reference QAnon materials on other websites, even if all its domain features may look similar to that of an authentic news website. We have already shown that many misinformation websites continue to link to QAnon websites. Furthermore, these features can be regularly updated as QAnon evolves, or new conspiracy theories emerge. Thus, while other features that are used to classify misinformation from authentic news may change over time, these features that are based on conspiracy theories’ hyperlink graphs are likely to remain robust.

**Discussion**

In this work, we utilize web crawling and hyperlink graphs to uncover and document the structure of QAnon websites as well as to understand hubs of QAnon content. We further show that using the QAnon hyperlink graph structure, we can additionally identify misinformation sites more broadly. In this section, we discuss the broader implications of these findings.

**QAnon on the Internet.** Many platforms including Google, YouTube, Etsy, Pinterest, Twitch, Discord, Spotify, Vimeo, Patreon, and Twitter have taken steps to curb the spread of the QAnon conspiracy. For example, YouTube presents a Wikipedia article giving context for the theory when users search for “QAnon” on their platform. However, despite impressive crackdowns, QAnon material continues to be linked to by mainstream sources like Twitter, YouTube, PolitiFact, and the New York Times. In our analysis, platforms like Twitter and Reddit frequently host content cited by QAnon supporters. Furthermore, these platforms still link to many QAnon associated domains, undercutting their efforts to curb the spread of the conspiracy. As shown in this work, QAnon websites are well connected, and once users enter the ecosystem, it is easy for them to discover additional websites that allow the theory to spread.

We argue that platforms should consider taking a more proactive role in removing links to known QAnon websites; this may additionally require limiting articles from misinformation and alternative news outlets that continually promote the conspiracy. Some platforms have already begun taking these steps (e.g., Twitter limits the use of BitChute links (Hinchcliffe 2020)), however, much more care should be taken to ensure the conspiracy does not continue to grow online. Similarly, personal blogs play a role in promoting QAnon: 17.9% of the QAnon domains that we documented were hosted by WordPress. Given that WordPress has regularly taken down blogs that espouse the QAnon conspiracy theory or promote violence (Gooding 2020) and given the role the QAnon has had in real-world violence, we encourage WordPress to consider taking a more proactive role in limiting the promotion of QAnon content.

**Studying Conspiracy with Hyperlink Graphs.** Previous work like Starbird et al. (Starbird et al. 2018a) relies on social media data to characterize misinformation campaigns. Unfortunately, such analyses will likely become increasingly difficult as social media platforms attempt to block the spread of misinformation. In our initial analysis, we found that of the 3,071 Twitter users to linked by the QAnon hotbeds Voat and 8kun, 1,498 (48.8%) had been banned or had deactivated their account following the attack on the U.S. Capitol. At the end of 2020, only 374 (12.1%) of these users had been banned or had deactivated their accounts. Social-media-based approaches will thus largely miss much of the content of conspiracy theories like QAnon. Social media-based analyses also miss the fuller picture of domain linkage, which can help to illuminate the mutually supporting structures between different types of websites (e.g., news and QAnon). In contrast, hyperlink graphs are useful for identifying lists of semantically related domains, and thus for compiling lists of QAnon-oriented websites. Similar methods may be utilized to more broadly identify semantically similar conspiracy sites in the future.

**The QAnon Bellwether: Detecting Misinformation.** Our use of QAnon websites themselves as features in our random forest model indicates that these sites may serve as a bellwether for misinformation more broadly. Although the QAnon conspiracy may fade in popularity, we hypothesize
that misinformation websites will continue to link to sites related to conspiracy theories and that this can broadly be used as a signal to distinguish misinformation from authentic news. One area of future work is to potentially use the links from misinformation websites as a mechanism to track new conspiracies as they appear. Because conspiracy theories like QAnon are much easier to identify due to their extreme beliefs, being able to use them as a signal to label misinformation can serve to largely improve the state of the art. If researchers can proactively identify websites with deep ties to these conspiracies and phenomena, researchers may be able to help to more effectively stem misinformation and new conspiracy theories before they become violent or threaten the public.

Related Work

Similar to our work, Starbird et al., built a domain graph of a popular misinformation campaign using links shared on Twitter (Starbird et al. 2018a). Their approach relies on a Twitter social graph to draw connections between domains, whereas ours relies on the hyperlinks between misinformation pages. Furthermore, Starbird et al., manage to single out separate out different Russian government agencies and outlets that played prominent roles in helping to spread disinformation, showing explicit coordination between these entities. Our approach instead maps out the QAnon ecosystem, showing how one can understand the full phenomenon without relying on a social media site. Our approach furthermore is orders of magnitude larger (3410 links vs. 2.38M websites), largely due to the growth of the QAnon conspiracy theory. We finally note that due to social media crackdowns, accounts that explicitly promote the QAnon conspiracy have been continually removed from the platform, reducing the effectiveness of social media data. For example, top QAnon promoters Lin Wood (Reuters 2021) and X22Report (Slisco 2021) were removed from Twitter immediately following the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, 2021.

Outside of domain-related investigations, prior work has studied disinformation graphs in the context of images, memes, and toxicity (Zannettou et al. 2020; 2018; Wang et al. 2020; Papasavva et al. 2020), using shared imagery to measure conspiracy across various platforms and related websites. Our work also draws from work in disinformation identification, primarily that of Hounsel et al. who leveraged technical infrastructure components to identify patterns in disinformation websites (Hounsel et al. 2020).

As our work measures a specific social phenomenon (the QAnon movement), we also rely on research that has measured other phenomena, for example, attacks on the Syrian White Helmets (Wilson and Starbird 2020), the Manosphere (Ribeiro et al. 2020), disturbing videos targeting children (Papadamou et al. 2020), and rumors in crisis events (Starbird et al. 2018b).

Most similar to our investigation is from Papasavva et al. who investigate the posting behavior, emergent themes, and toxicity of the QAnon movement through characterizing the /r/GreatAwakening subcommunity on voat.co (Papasavva et al. 2020). Their paper shares a similar goal to ours but instead seeks to characterize the content of the QAnon conspiracy, whereas our approach focuses on the spread and development of the theory using links between QAnon websites and other services and web content.

Finally, our work draws on a long history of hyperlink network analysis, going as far back as PageRank (Brin and Page 1998) and early studies that measured the web as a graph (Kleinberg et al. 1999; Park 2003). In particular, studies show that hyperlink networks to cascade several semantic properties, like sentiment (Miller et al. 2011) and partisanship (Adamic and Glance 2005). Our work extends these prior results to modern online disinformation and evaluates whether these hyperlink network models are reflected in the modern web.

Conclusion

In this work, we showed that web crawling, hyperlink graphs, and corresponding graph metrics can provide a more holistic understanding of the QAnon conspiracy theory and how it spreads online. We showed that hyperlink graphs can be used to find semantically similar websites, which we used to build the largest known set of 324 QAnon websites. We then detailed the structure of the QAnon ecosystem and documented its connections to misinformation websites like BitChute, the Conservative Treehouse, and the Gateway Pundit. We designed a classifier that can differentiate misinformation from authentic news using features built from QAnon websites, showing that knowledge of QAnon link connections can illuminate information about misinformation on the Internet at large. We hope that our methodologies and insight into the QAnon ecosystem can help researchers and online platforms to better study dangerous online conspiracies and misinformation.

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