A Secured Public Auditing Protocol with Dynamic Structure for Cloud Data

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Abstract: At present Cloud computing is a very successful paradigm for data computing and storage. It increases the concerns about data security and privacy in the cloud. Paper covers cloud security and privacy research, while focusing on the works that protect data confidentiality and privacy for sensitive data being stored and queried in the cloud. As Survey enlist all the research carried out related to data security and users privacy preserving techniques in detail. Data sharing can be achieved with sensitive information hiding with remote data integrity auditing, propose a new concept called identity based shared data integrity auditing with sensitive information hiding for secure cloud storage. Initially every data would be outsourced to the cloud only after authorized or activated by the proxy. The key would be generated to the file randomly by the key generation Centre. The transaction details such as key mismatch, file upload and download, hacking details would be shown to the proxy and cloud server. If the match occurs, automatically file would be recovered by the user even if hacker access or tamper the file. The main motive is to ensure that when the cloud properly stores the user’s sanitized data, the proof it generates can pass the verification of the third party auditor. And the paper provides various research work done in the field

Keywords: Auditing, Privacy, Cloudsecurity.

I. INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing has emerged as a successful paradigm that considerably simplifies the deployment of computing and storage infrastructures of both large and small enterprises. Major enabling features of the cloud computing infrastructure include pay per use and hence no up-front cost for deployment, perception of infinite scalability, and elasticity of the resources. The Software as a Service (SaaS) paradigm, such as web-based emails and online financial management, has been widely adopted for almost a decade. The launch of Amazon Web Services (AWS) in the second half of 2006, followed by a plethora of similar offerings such as Google AppEngine, Microsoft Azure, etc., have popularized the model of “utility computing” for other levels of the computing substrates such as Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS) models. The widespread popularity of these models is evident from the tens of cloud based solution providers [1] and hundreds of corporations hosting their critical business infrastructures and hence business data in the cloud [2].

Concerns about data security and privacy in the cloud, however, are increasing, as vulnerabilities were found in cloud service provider sites [2], [3], and user data leakage incidents were reported for a number of cloud based application services [4], [5]. Users cannot control and audit their sensitive data stored in the cloud by themselves.

A. Security and Privacy Threats

First by presenting a general overview of various security and privacy threats that could arise in the context of data oriented services, and specifically data oriented services deployed in the cloud. Consider cloud service providers and any unauthorized parties that can monitor and control data and activities in the cloud as adversaries. Assume the adversaries are honest but curious. Identify the desirable features for ensuring a secure and privacy-preserving database service in the cloud.

B. Data Confidentiality

Schemes and techniques for ensuring data confidentiality while still allowing data management and query processing on the protected data in the cloud are to be known. To protect the confidentiality of sensitive private data stored in the cloud, encryption is a widely accepted standard technique. Different encryption schemes can be used on different granularities of the relational data. Encrypting the data, however, makes it difficult for the cloud to process queries on the data on behalf of the users, thus various techniques have been proposed for querying encrypted data. These techniques make different trade-offs between two conflicting goals, data confidentiality and query efficiency. The perfect state of strong confidentiality and high efficiency is unlikely to be achievable under today’s encryption schemes. Alternatively, have exploring trusted computing instead of encryption and querying on encrypted data.

(i) Querying Encrypted Data

Considers encrypted data in the cloud and the data should not be disclosed to adversaries during query processing, while the adversaries could launch statistical analysis and inference attacks to infer the data contents. Start with the early work of querying encrypted data using keyword search on encrypted texts [7], and then focus on providing a survey of the techniques for processing various database queries such as range queries and aggregation queries on encrypted data. Processing range queries requires the ability to compare a ciphertext data value with the encrypted query range boundary values. This can be achieved by providing the cloud provider with some rough information about the data [8] or building obfuscated index structures in the cloud [12][15]. Addressing how each of the techniques achieves the ability of ciphertext comparison, and discuss their advantages and limitations in terms of preserving data confidentiality, query efficiency, the overheads associated with the cloud and the roles of the cloud and the query client in the query processing. Processing aggregation...
queries can be achieved using a special encryption scheme called homomorphic encryption that allows addition and multiplication on ciphertexts without the need for decryption [11], [16], [17]. About these computation properties of homomorphic encryption and further delve into a recent hot topic about fully homomorphic encryption [18]–[20]. Continuing the discussion about fully homomorphic encryption, exploration of some open questions and challenges: Is there a single technique or system that can process all the common database queries on encrypted data [11], [15], [19]?

(ii) Trusted Computing

An alternative to data encryption and querying on encrypted data is to store the encrypted data in the cloud but decrypt and process the plaintext data in a secure trusted container in the cloud [21]–[24], present this idea of trusted computing as the last part of data confidentiality. Trying to address the following questions: What is trusted computing? What is a trusted hardware? Why and how can it be trusted by users? Finally compare the previous approaches, i.e. data encryption and querying encrypted data, with trusted computing from the three angles of security, performance and database functionalities.

C. Access Privacy

Ensuring data confidentiality is not enough to safeguard data in the cloud. When data is being queried, queries may reveal partial information about the data. Even if both the data and the queries are encrypted, partial information about the data may still be inferred by monitoring users’ query access patterns and by analyzing users’ accessed positions on the encrypted data. Hence, ensuring access privacy is also needed. The most representative cryptographic protocol for protecting access privacy in general, Private Information Retrieval [25], a special memory structure that obfuscates query access patterns over encrypted data, Oblivious RAM [26], and practical alternative techniques for protecting access privacy. For completeness, the data to which accesses are protected can be plaintext private, public data or ciphertext private data.

Private Information Retrieval (PIR) solves the problem of privately retrieving a data item from a remote database server without revealing to the server which item is retrieved [25]. There are PIR solutions that only use one server [27] and solutions that rely on multiple servers [25]. As earlier single server PIR solutions have been criticized for incurring expensive computation costs and being impractical [28], a recent single server PIR construction was proposed as a fast PIR solution [29]. The discussion of whether PIR is practical is on-going [30]. Goal here is to understand the basic rational of PIR protocols and clarify whether these PIR proposals are practical in terms of computation and communication costs as well as from the cloud service point of view.

Oblivious RAM: One way to make PIR more practical, as proposed in [31], [32], is to employ an oblivious RAM [26] on the cloud server. The basic idea of oblivious RAM is to shuffle and resort data items in the RAM during data accesses. Implementing this idea and making it practical is not trivial. Illustration of a recent practical implementation [35] to end the discussion on oblivious RAM.

Practical Alternative Techniques: PIR and oblivious RAM provide strong access privacy, but from a query processing point of view presentation of significant performance overheads. Therefore, some alternative techniques, covered search and index shuffling for protecting accesses to encrypted index [34], and hybrid approaches that apply PIR like cryptographic operations on selected partial data [35]–[37].

II EXISTING AND RELATED WORK

More organizations and individuals would like to store their data in the cloud. However, the data stored in the cloud might be corrupted or lost due to the inevitable software bugs, hardware faults and human errors in the cloud. The sensitive information should not be exposed to others when the cloud file is shared.

Encrypting the whole shared file can realize the sensitive information hiding, but will make the shared file unable to be used by others. If the file has been hacked by hacker it only recovers the file.

In order to verify the integrity of the data stored in the cloud, many remote data integrity auditing schemes have been proposed. To reduce the computation burden on the user side, a Third Party Auditor (TPA) is introduced to periodically verify the integrity of the cloud data on behalf of user. Ateniese et al. [35] firstly proposed a notion of Provable Data Possession (PDP) to ensure the data possession on the untrusted cloud.

In their proposed scheme, homomorphic authenticators and random sampling strategies are used to achieve blockless verification and reduce I/O costs. Juels and Kaliski defined a model named as Proof of Retrievalability (PoR) and proposed a practical scheme. In the scheme, the data stored in the cloud can be retrieved and the integrity of these data can be ensured. Based on pseudorandom function and BLS signature, Shacham and Waters proposed a private remote data integrity auditing scheme and a public remote data integrity auditing scheme.

In order to protect the data privacy, Wang et al. proposed a privacy-preserving remote data integrity auditing scheme with the employment of a random masking technique. Solomon et al. utilized a different random masking technique to further construct a remote data integrity auditing scheme supporting data privacy protection. This scheme achieves better efficiency compared with the scheme in . To reduce the burden of signature generation on the user side, Guan et al. designed a remote data integrity auditing scheme based on the indistinguishability obfuscation technique. Shen et al. introduced a Third Party Medium (TPM) to design a light-weight remote data integrity auditing scheme. TPM helps user generate signatures on the condition that data privacy can be protected. In order to support data dynamics, Ateniese et al. [34] firstly proposed a partially dynamic PDP scheme. Erway et al. used a skip list to construct a fully data dynamic auditing scheme. Wang et al. proposed another remote data integrity checking scheme supporting full data dynamics by utilizing Merkle Hash Tree.

To reduce users’ key exposure, Yu et al. proposed key-exposure resilient remote data integrity auditing schemes based on key update technique. The data sharing is an important application in cloud storage scenarios. To protect the identity privacy of users, Wang et al. designed a privacy-preserving shared data integrity auditing scheme by modifying the ring signature for secure cloud storage. Yang et al. constructed an efficient shared data integrity auditing scheme, which not only supports the identity privacy but only achieves the identity traceability of users. Fu et al. designed a scheme by exploiting a homomorphic verifiable group signature. In order to support efficient user revocation, Wang et al. proposed a shared data integrity auditing...
scheme with user revocation by using the proxy resignature. With
the employment of the Shamir secret sharing technique, Luo et al.
constructed a shared data integrity auditing scheme supporting user
revocation. The aforementioned schemes all rely on Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), which incurs the considerable overheads from
the complicated certificate management. To simplify certificate
management, Wang et al. proposed an identity-based remote data
integrity auditing scheme in multi-cloud storage. The scheme used
the user’s identity information such as user’s name or e-mail
address to replace the public key. Wang et al. designed a proxy-
oriented remote data integrity auditing scheme based on identity
introducing a proxy to process data for users. Yu et al. proposed
an identity-based data integrity auditing scheme satisfying
unconditional anonymity and incentive. Zhang et al. proposed an
identity-based remote data integrity auditing scheme for shared
data supporting real efficient user revocation. Other aspects, such
as privacy-preserving authenticators and data deduplication in
remote data integrity auditing have also been explored. However,
existing remote auditing data integrity schemes cannot support data
sharing with sensitive information hiding. How to achieve data
sharing with sensitive information hiding in identity-based integrity
auditing for secure cloud storage.

III PROPOSED SYSTEM

Remote data integrity auditing is future to guarantee the
integrity of the data stored in the cloud. In some common cloud
storage systems such as the Electronic Health Records system, the
cloud file strength contains some sensitive information.

Exploring how to achieve data sharing with sensitive
information hiding in identity-based integrity auditing for secure
cloud storage. A sanitizer is used to sanitize the data blocks
corresponding to the sensitive information of the file and
transforms these data blocks’ signatures into valid ones for the
sanitized file.

In the phase of integrity auditing, signatures are used to verify
the integrity of the sanitized file. As a result, the file stored in the
cloud able to be shared and used by others on the condition that the
sensitive information is hidden, while the data integrity auditing is
still able to be efficiently executed in remote.

IV METHODOLOGY

investigate how to achieve data sharing with sensitive information
hiding in remote data integrity auditing, and propose a new concept
called identity-based shared data integrity auditing with sensitive
information hiding for secure cloud storage. The sanitizer can be
viewed as the administrator of the information system in a hospital.
The personal sensitive information should not be exposed to the
sanitary.

To preserve the privacy of patient from the sanitizer, the
medical doctor will blind the patient’s sensitive information of
each record before sending this record to the sanitizer. The medical
doctor then generates signatures for this blinded record and sends
them to the sanitizer. The sanitizer stores these messages into
record information system.

V MODULE DESCRIPTION

A. FILE UPLOADING AND ACTIVATION

The data owner firstly needs to generate signatures for data
blocks before uploading them to the cloud. These signatures are
used to prove the cloud truly possesses these data blocks in the
phase of integrity auditing. And then the data owner uploads these
data blocks along with their corresponding signatures to the cloud.
The data stored in the cloud is often shared across multiple users in
man cloud storage applications. The data owner activate the file
to check whether the uploaded file is appropriate or not then the
Proxy also activate the file to check the file is Good.

B. DATA INTEGRITY AUDITING

Data integrity auditing scheme that realizes data sharing
with sensitive information hiding. However, the data stored in the
cloud might be corrupted or lost. Data integrity auditing on the
condition that the sensitive information of shared data is protected.

C. SENSITIVE INFORMATION SHARING

Sensitive information hiding to ensure that the personal
sensitive information of the file is not exposed to the hacker, and
all of the private information of the file is not to be known to
the cloud and the shared users. This method not only realizes the
remote data integrity auditing, but also supports the data sharing on
the condition that sensitive information is protected in cloud
storage.

D. GENERATING KEY SIGNATURE

A potential method of solving this problem is to encrypt
the whole shared file before sending it to the cloud, and then
generate the signatures used to verify the integrity of this encrypted
file, finally upload this encrypted file and its corresponding
signatures to the cloud. This method can realize the sensitive
information hiding since only the data owner can decrypt this file.
However, it will make the whole shared file unable to be used by
others.
E. FILE SECURITY AND RECOVERY

If a file has been partially overwritten or otherwise compromised, the chances of any usable recovery are low, even with the best recovery software in the existing system. In our proposed work, users can easily recover the file while deleted files are inaccessible and are in danger of being overwritten, they can often be recovered.

VI RESULTS AND VALIDATION

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HOME:

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CLIENT REGISTER:

VI RESULTS AND VALIDATION

PROXY LOGIN:

VI RESULTS AND VALIDATION

VII RESULT AND CONCLUSION

Proposed a character-based information respectability reviewing plan for secure distributed storage, which bolsters information offering to delicate data covering up. In our plan, the record put away in the cloud can be shared and utilized by others depending on the prerequisite that the touchy data of the document is ensured.

Moreover, the remote information honesty examining is still ready to be proficiently executed. The security evidence and the exploratory investigation exhibit that the proposed plot accomplishes attractive security and productivity.

FUTURE WORK

i) All possible various encryption algorithms which best suitable for cloud computing environment can be implemented

ii) Encryption and decryption option may be given to different user based on sensitivity level of data their sharing

iii) Feature of encrypting the key added

iii) Authentication can be added

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