The Politics of Hate: Ultranationalist and Fundamentalist Tactics and Goals

Joan Davison, Ph.D.
jdavison@rollins.edu

ABSTRACT

Ultranationalist and religious fundamentalist movements frequently use hate to mobilize people. These groups possess a sophisticated understanding of the importance of appealing to the emotions. Leaders often employ xenophobic language intended to inspire fear and justify a defensive reaction. The movements also rely heavily upon symbols, myths, and public events to simplify and communicate the “truths” of their ideologies. The leaders convey messages with tremendous affective appeal. Yet, measures exist to counter and contain the politics of hate. The development of civil society, group rights, a free media, and integrated institutions can contribute to a durable solution in cases of ethnic or religious conflict. Finally, the option of humanitarian intervention exists when the politics of hate leads to extremist violence.

I. NATIONALISM, RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM, AND THE POLITICS OF HATE

Nationalist and ethno-religious conflicts continue to influence domestic and global politics. International and non-governmental organizations appear impotent against seemingly primal struggles. The politics of blood, tribes, terror, and God dominate as the promise of post-Cold War peace and development recedes. In the midst of genocide and terrorism, our belief that we had learned a lasting lesson from the Holocaust seems sorely mistaken. The atrocities and death counts of Rwanda, Congo, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Sudan blur while nationalism and religious fundamentalism perpetuate the politics of hate.

Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations” contends that violent national conflicts are inevitable, particularly at the junction of cultures in the Middle East and Balkans (1993). Ignatieff’s Blood and Belonging acknowledges tension between ethnic groups, but posits that some minorities are justified in their struggles. He perceives political and economic oppression to be a fundamental source of ethnic conflict (1993). Anderson’s seminal work on nations as imagined communities highlights the view that nations are constructed (1991). Hobsbawm also argues that nations are constructed and therefore can change, but only slowly given the dense web of relationships upon which ethnic identity is built (1990). This
perspective further suggests that national leaders maintain allegiance by creating ethnic traditions and identifying threatening enemies (Djilas 1995; Pesic 1994; Davison and Tesan 2006). Gellner and Smith each examine nationalism as an ideology with a program (1983, 1; 1983, 171). The politics of hate as part of the program becomes necessary to demonize and dehumanize the other as the enemy (Volkan 1994, 120-22). Similarly, Appleby, Eickelman, and Juergensmeyer each demonstrate how fundamentalist leaders employ modern technology and media to agitate and mobilize their social base (1994, 36-37; 2002; 2003, 141-47). Fundamentalist groups deliver images via television, the internet, and cellphones which highlight the enemies' profanity against the sacred world they strive to defend.

Yet such conflict is not inevitable. Nationalist and religiously inspired tensions have been quelled in situations as diverse as those in Northern Ireland, Macedonia, and Malaysia. The challenge is to understand and implement the conditions and processes necessary to counter the hate and conflicts which nationalism and fundamentalism can promote (Harff and Gurr 2004, 181-90). Indeed, not all nationalisms seek to generate hate, but those that do often act systematically and employ sophisticated techniques. Charismatic leaders seek to solidify support with pleas for unity and vigilance. They sometimes exaggerate or fabricate claims about the threatening tactics and dangerous plans of the political opposition. Likewise, some fundamentalist groups justify militant conflict as an essential defense against evil enemies. Thus the politics of hate develops by stealth and then spirals as popular fears lead to conflict. Nationalist and fundamentalist supporters embrace violence spurred by ignorance and insecurity. Still, such violent conflicts are neither primal nor inevitable. Political alternatives and remedies do exist to preclude or ameliorate the implementation of the politics of hate and its violent consequences. Policy-makers and conflict mediators can learn from the resolution of other cases (Lake and Rothchild 1998, 7-22, 203-26). Religious and nationalist leaders can promote their political preferences without communicating messages of hate.

II. NATIONALISM: THE IDEOLOGY AND ITS APPEAL

Contemporary nationalisms attract followers because they provide people with identity. Nationalism’s sense of belonging offers comfort to individuals confronting alienation associated with migration, globalization or secularization (Nassar 2005, 3-15; Kaldor 1996, 43). The potency and appeal of nationalism is linked to its certainty and consolation. Nationalism asserts various rights as uncontestable facts. Typically these rights include cultural autonomy and self-determination. Often these rights also extend to claims on specific historical lands. Proponents of the nationalist cause dis-
regard the fact that these assumptions are debatable (Ignatieff 1996, 217-22). Likewise they overlook the mythical character of the very history of the nation—whether that origin extends to Romulus and Remus or to the Serbian Battle of the Field of Blackbirds or to the Promised Land of a sacred text.

Nationalism is a group’s awareness and embrace of its identity as a nation, and its desire to enhance its existence and power. Nationalism, as an ideology, is more than mere patriotism or nationalist sentiment. Nationalism calls for the supreme loyalty of its members to the nation. A nation is a people who believe they belong together because they share race, history, religion, culture, or language. A nation is different from a state. A state is an international juridical entity which effectively occupies a territory and governs a population. It is possible that a nation may occupy a state, or desire statehood. Indeed, statehood frequently is the goal of nations. It also is possible that a nation exists on a regional or global level and includes people from multiple states. This is the case with the Islamic nation. It also is true of the Kurdish nation.

Nationalism is a powerful concept because of its emotional content. Nationalist leaders appeal to potential supporters on behalf of their ancestors and grandchildren. They assert that members can neither ignore the contributions and sacrifices of the past, nor abandon the rights of future generations (Volkan 1996). Nationalism often is an appeal made to the weak and insecure. In the twenty-first century, nationalism attracts people who feel oppressed by political or economic forces (Michnik 1996, 18; Fijalkowski 1996). It offers a sense of identity to those who feel victimized. This includes both the young German encountering guest workers and the Iraqi responding to American forces. The potency of the nationalist appeal is evident among generations of Palestinians born and raised in refugee camps who still seek the right to return. Under these conditions, people lack citizenship’s identity and rights, and seek to expel occupation forces from their historical lands. The fact that Palestinian victimization raged against Israelis but not against the Jordanians and Egyptians highlights the subjective element of nationalism. Similarly, refugees who must remain in camps tend to construct and reinforce histories of injustice, while refugees who resettle and integrate into new environments tend to identify with the new situation. This is vividly apparent in the differences in attitudes held by Burundian Hutus toward Tutsis. Hutu refugees who found jobs and assimilated into Tanzanian society after the 1972 massacre de-emphasized their status and Tutsi abuses. In contrast, Hutus who remained isolated in refugee camps in Tanzania emphasized their collective identity and the atrocities they suffered. They spent the days and years in the refugee camps inculcating a nationalist identity among their youth, demonizing the Tutsi
enemy, and planning a retaliatory attack (Malkki 1990). Thus, nationalism appeals to the colonized, oppressed, threatened, and displaced. It often resonates with people who do not have control over their political lives (Nasar 2005). This is evident among the Kurds, the most populous state-less people, now spread across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran (Ignatieff 1993, 178-212).

Nationalism also appeals to groups that feel under siege or in decline. It was attractive to Germans overwhelmed by the humiliation of World War I, the Versailles Peace, and the Depression. It became a tool of many African post-colonial leaders who realized that they had to engage in nation building in order to avoid implosion after achieving independence. To this extent, it is understandable that African post-colonial nationalism initially was anti-Western. Nationalism often originates as an ideology of independence and then matures to one of national consciousness. African leaders tried to appeal beyond ethnic and class differences within their new states (Young 1986).

Many current nationalist movements develop among ethnic groups or indigenous peoples who oppose both the government and its perceived foreign allies. Sometimes the target is foreign investment and business people. The sabotage of western oil pipelines in Nigeria and Colombia serves as an example. Likewise, the Tamil Tigers often bomb banks and businesses of the “foreign” Sinhalese, including the Sri Lankan Central Bank and World Trade Center. Other groups’ targets include Western transnational and international governmental organizations. Most dramatically, insurgents bombed the UN headquarters in Iraq. Thus, the assumption that Westernization is progress is firmly rejected as the Western presence is portrayed as detrimental and the virtues of a nationalist agenda extolled.

Nationalisms often identify an enemy and warn of the need for vigilance. The enemy’s threat first compels national unity; then, in an interactive process, national unity and identity enflame xenophobia (Fijalkowski 1996; Kaldor 1996; Schopflin 1996). Young explains how ethnic tensions develop in African cities where ethnicities mingle and competition for resources is intense (1982, 89). In rural regions, ethnic groups tend to be isolated, but migration to urban areas brings political, economic, and social confrontation. People then seek comfort within their familiar group. Ignatieff also highlights how nationalism offers comfort in the midst of modernization and detachment from traditional community (1996, 223). The same process sometimes affects Muslims in the Global South. Urbanization dislocates people, while globalization highlights their poverty. Dictatorship and political oppression frequently compound the sense of despair even among the educated and middle classes. Islamic fundamentalism offers familiarity, identity, a sense of power, and a socio-economic support sys-
Militant fundamentalism often includes promises and emotional appeals not offered by moderate Muslims (Esposito 1997; Dalacoura 1998, 193-98; Sisk 2000; Ibrahim 2003; United States Institute of Peace 2002). Islamic fundamentalism also may target the foreign and modern as evil and dangerous (Nassar 2005, 6-7). Accordingly, extremists bomb tourists in Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, and Bali.

Sometimes nationalism supports violence or revolution. The nationalist revolution promises freedom and independence, and permits the group to fulfill its identity. The leaders justify the violence of the revolution as heroic and sacrificial, and highlight the glory of post-revolutionary society with songs, parades, and wall murals. Violence is permissible because the oppression is unjustifiable. It is foreign and unrepresentative of the nation. Revolution is necessary because the oppressor otherwise has no reason to abandon its political and economic exploitation of the people. In this light, Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams asserts that the IRA tactic of armed struggle proved successful and forced the current political process.

Thus, nationalism begins with the assumption of a unique, if not superior, group that must pursue its power to preserve its identity. The appeal to individuals is tremendous. It provides identity to individuals, often the weak who are either oppressed or dislocated. It should be understood that these individuals are not exclusively the uneducated or poor, but rather include the middle class and educated who in some situations are nonetheless voiceless. For example, Esposito argues that the Islamist appeal attracts the educated, even the Western educated, because professional organizations are banned in much of the Middle East (Esposito 1997, 70). Islamic organizations, like various nationalist groups, offer vehicles for discussion and participation. Individuals find not only belonging, but also comfort in the fact that they are valued. Nationalist movements tend to emphasize the membership’s character as unique, special, and strong. Fijkalkowski discusses the xenophobic reaction of middle and working class Germans to the “anomie that accompanies rapid social change” (1996, 144).

Nationalism typically extols ethnic cleansing or self-determination as the answer. It is claimed that the problems of the groups and its members will be overcome with political control. Economic and social problems will become manageable and resolvable under the nation’s leadership. The immediate goals are to build the nation and expand its power. Individual political leaders seeking to justify the consolidation or expansion of personal power further manipulate nationalism (Pesic 1994, 133-34). Milosevic continuously employed the images of the promise of Serbian greatness and the threat of Serbian defeat to rally the people and to justify his concentration and use of power. Croats, Muslims, and Albanians were threats to the Serbian nation.
Nationalism can overlap other identities. Sinn Fein tends to be Catholic and lower class, while the Unionists are Protestant and middle class. Such an overlap transforms the nationalist tensions into an ethno-religious conflict and further complicates resolution. Hutus were lower class and felt long suppressed by Tutsis. The African Christians of southern Sudan reject northern Arab Islamic laws and practices. The overlapping identities reinforce loyalties, contribute to the intensity of nationalist conflicts, and exacerbate efforts to resolve claims. Clearly, nationalism is a potent ideology. It is a keen tool for those wishing to mobilize populations. Both India and Pakistan have employed it in their dispute over Kashmir. Additionally, each deems acquisition of nuclear weapons linked to national prestige and power.

III. VIRULENT VARIETIES: ULTRANATIONALISM, NEO-NAZISM, AND NEO-FASCISM

Nationalism offers identity and demands loyalty, but ultranationalism subordinates all other claims for loyalty and allegiance. This explains why a Serbian nationalist could kill a Bosniak relative. Loyalty to the nation transcends loyalty to the family. Likewise, this notion explains the commitment of Tamil Tiger nationalists to engage in suicide missions. Ultranationalist loyalty demands the willingness to sacrifice the self. Indeed, the extremist nationalist claim not only is understood as supreme, but also is presented as urgent. Ultranationalist groups often perceive threats to their existence and argue that they must engage in preventive measures, such as ethnic cleansing or deportation, to counter these dangers. Both the radical Hutu and Serb leaderships asserted such claims. In these cases, unquestioned dedication to the group is essential for both the group’s and the individual’s survival.

Ultranationalist parties exist today throughout Europe. These right-wing movements have followers in both the post-industrial developed states of Western Europe and the democratizing states of the former Soviet bloc. The fact that support for these parties exists in states as diverse as Austria, France, Germany, Norway, and Russia suggests that there are multiple factors contributing to their attractiveness. In France, the strength of the right primarily is a response to the growing population of foreign workers, particularly from northern Africa. Haider’s popularity in Austria is attributable to his personal charisma as well as to concerns about the alienating effects of European unification. Many west European youth are attracted to extremist groups because they offer a justification for rebellion against established institutions (Fraser 2000, 55-88; Fijalkowski 1996, 144). In contrast, the growth of extremist movements in Russia is different. The mass appeal of
ultranationalism in the former Soviet Union cannot be understood as a reaction to the failure of democracy, because democracy has yet to be embraced. Rather, nationalist movements and policies are perceived as a way to control the instability associated with the transition from communism. Additionally, these movements contribute to a sense of national identity and greatness during a time of confusion and humiliation (Nodia 1996, 108-16).

Most contemporary European ultranationalists do not assert the essentiality of force and war. Violence seems unjustifiable because democracy provides European groups the freedom to make their claims in the political arena. Accordingly, there is a distinction between extremist nationalist movements, such as Le Pen’s in France, which vociferously advocate law and order and immigration controls, and atomized skinheads who embrace violence as a legitimate response to non-whites and foreigners. Furthermore, even most ultranationalists support a democratic albeit authoritarian state. They are not as extreme as neo-Nazis and fascists who embrace dictatorship. The unifying principle then seems to be that ultranationalist movements perceive the nation not only as a living and precious entity that advances individual and collective well-being, but also as an entity superior to others which demands protection and attention.

Neo-Nazism and neo-fascism are particularly troubling variants of ultranationalism. Whereas other nationalisms claim uniqueness, neo-Nazism and neo-fascism assert superiority. Many nationalist groups fight for immigration controls, autonomy, or self-determination, but a will to power drives neo-Nazis and neo-fascists. The neo-Nazis and fascists embrace violence as necessary for the security and expansion of the nation and the progress of culture and civilization (Mussolini 1939). Additionally, the social Darwinist beliefs of neo-Nazis justify dictatorship. Just as the Aryan nation asserts superiority over all other groups, so too, within the Aryan nation certain individuals are superior and ought to lead (Hitler 1926).

The skinhead culture in developed countries is particularly troubling to some politicians because of its embrace of neo-Nazi slogans, symbols, and causes. Skinheads do not fit into the traditional neo-Nazi classification because they tend to engage in decadent lifestyles that include drugs, hard rock, and pornography. Indeed, their politics are ambiguous, with some groups advocating dictatorship and others supporting anarchy. Yet it is the hate and anti-foreign violence of these groups which is particularly disturbing, not the threat that their presence presents to democracy (Sussman 2000; Fijalkowski 1996, 139-40).

While neo-Nazism exists, it seems insufficiently organized to win elections or overturn democratic institutions; but the message of hate often
culminates with attacks on individuals. Neo-Nazis and fascists embrace the use of force and terror. They reject both the equality of people and the notion that individuals possess rights inviolable by the state or nation. What is distinct about these movements is that their members do not hope to attract significant popular support and win elections. Rather, they often operate covertly and in small groups, seeking to promote their ideology through action and publicity. In the United States, many of these groups also are involved in the Christian Identity movement, which introduces the façade of an ethno-religious quality and heightens the emotional appeal and doctrinal character of the ideology. The internet is a primary tool for communication, recruitment, and propaganda.

It is critical to understand that there is a broad divide between nationalism, ultranationalism, and neo-Nazism. Nationalists are willing to negotiate, do not always view force as essential, and may be democratic. They strive to protect their uniqueness. Ultranationalists represent a nationalist extreme because their supreme loyalty to their nation coupled with an urgent sense of danger leads them to be less tolerant of the “foreign.” Political leaders can mobilize ultranationalists because of these tendencies. Finally, Neo-Nazis accept their superiority and responsibility to purify the nation. Hate and violence are integral to the movements. Indeed, a related disturbing trend is the strength of “clerical fascism” as part of the general growth of religious ideologies and in particular associated with fundamentalism.

IV. Clerical Fascism and the Fundamentalist Appeal

Many ethno-religious groups attract attention because of their authoritarian practices, totalitarian goals, uncompromising vision, and extreme tactics. Laqueur labels these dangerous religious movements as clerical fascists (1996, 4, 147). These groups embrace fascist tenets that justify violence and authoritarianism and reject tolerance and liberal democracy. They also extol a fundamentalism which rejects compromise and places conflict in a cosmic arena. Fundamentalists’ use of sacred texts and eschatological themes validates judgment and conflict in the name of God. The use of force and violence assumes a purifying and redemptive role for ethno-religious groups (Juergensmeyer 2003, 164-74).

The resurgence of religion often coincides with popular dislocation and disaffection. Malay Muslims, for example, emphasize that they have lived through four ages: European colonization, Japanese occupation, independence, and the communal riots (Nash 1991, 699-710). The Taliban organized in the religious schools which served Afghan refugees in Pakistan during the conflict with the Soviet Union (Nojumi 2002, 119-24).
Religion also interrupts the secularization of politics and privatization of religion otherwise associated with modernization. For example, as urbanization occurs and individuals leave villages and families for work, religion gains appeal because it offers a mechanism of support in a new and challenging environment (United States Institute of Peace 2002, 2). Appleby highlights that the Muslim Brotherhood provides jobs in religious schools for Egypt’s educated, that Hindu fundamentalism attracts India’s urban unemployed, and that Christian fundamentalism comforts Latin America’s slum dwellers (1994, 22-28). In developing countries and emerging regions where social welfare systems are weak, religious organizations often provide not only emotional support, but also economic support. Religious groups run hospitals, schools, soup kitchens, and shelters (Marty and Appleby 1991, 823-31; Deiros 1991, 155-56; Voll 1991; Appleby 2000, 97). Such groups exist on a spectrum from the Quakers and Mennonites to Hizbollah and Hamas, but their operations are critical to refugees and people in weak states. Sometimes these groups, for example the Mennonites, are apolitical. In other cases, they will try to influence political and economic policy and systems so that the structures which give rise to the poverty and powerlessness of those they serve are forced to change. The Quakers fall into this category. Religious beliefs provide the foundation for a worldview and the evaluation of political and economic systems and policies. Fundamentalists such as Hizbollah and Hamas differ in that they wish to impose their religious order on all aspects of public and private life. Fundamentalists accept a literal translation of sacred texts and elevate these texts above all other teachings and beliefs. Absolute commitment to the fundamentalist truth nurtures intolerance and rejection of compromise. Further, militant fundamentalists raise particular concern because they embrace the use of force as a means to achieve power and their goals.

Fundamentalists emphasize the religious basis of all life, but it is social, political, and economic conditions which support the rise of these ideologies. Fundamentalism appeals to those seeking power, status and/or revenge. It once was assumed that primarily the rural, less educated, low-income people swelled the ranks of these groups. Now it is realized that this is a myopic and simplistic conclusion. Fundamentalism attracts individuals and groups who are disenchanted by political or economic corruption or exclusion. Often this includes the unemployed, but well educated middle and upper classes. In fact, urban believers may embrace their political religious beliefs with a greater intensity than rural members because in urban regions there exists a critical mass of potential members confronting Westernization. Furthermore, newcomers to urban areas find consolation from the challenges of dislocation, modernization, and urbanization in their
fundamentalism satisfies those who desire the simplicity and status quo of the past. Familiar rituals and prayers are a source of comfort in times of globalization. There is a preference for gender stereotypes in which men work, women stay at home, and homosexuality does not exist (Juergensmeyer 2003, 202-09). Fundamentalism’s traditional foundation appeals to both men and marginalized majorities who may feel excluded by policies that respond to the needs of women and minorities. This certainly is part of the strength of Hindu fundamentalism in India, where educated Indian middle classes react to affirmative action policies that seek to alleviate historic discrimination against Muslims and lower castes (Appleby 1994, 25-28). Likewise, many Malay Muslims embraced fundamentalism in their reaction against the successful Chinese minority (Nash 1991). This phenomenon also explains the strength of the appeal of Ian Paisley to the working class Unionists in Northern Ireland. Working class Catholics threaten working class Protestants more than do upper class Protestants. Finally, it explains the appeal of fundamentalism to the white population in South Africa during apartheid. Pat Robertson made sense to Afrikaaners when he said about apartheid,

I think one man, one vote, just unrestricted democracy, would not be wise. There needs to be some kind of protection for the minority which the white people represent . . . and they need and have a right to demand a protection of their rights. (1992)

Thus, the religious fundamentalist program is deemed the only solution to crises ranging from war and occupation to modernization and secularization. These crises produce a sense of injustice and siege that are powerful vehicles for unity and mobilization (Juergensmeyer 2003, 225-26; Marty and Appleby 1991, 822-23).

Fundamentalists reap great benefits from the strong emotional content of their ideologies. The power of the promises of God and an afterlife are compelling for believers, particularly those who feel disadvantaged or oppressed in the current system. These promises are critical factors in mobilizing adherents to action. Fundamentalists typically are committed to sacred land and locations. They often accept a prescribed dress which functions as a means of identification and unity. The common dress emphasizes the significance of the religious movement over individuality (Appleby 1994, 16-18).

Additionally, contemporary fundamentalist movements benefit from their willingness to embrace new technologies and techniques to promote
their strict traditional values. Fundamentalist groups in the Middle East as well as America possess well-developed media networks. The internet is a critical tool whereby these organizations enroll and maintain membership, and engage in active public relations campaigns (Marty and Appleby 1991, 828-29).

Whether fundamentalist movements become militant seems to be linked to their ideology and the environment in which they exist. Like secular ultranationalist groups, it is less likely that fundamentalist movements will turn to militancy if they are able to operate in open democratic environments where they have access to a civil society, the media, and the political arena. Such access will make claims for the necessity of militant violence less valid. Consequently, most Christian fundamentalist groups in the United States are very active in the political arena, but do not engage in violent action (Appleby 1994, 70). It is interesting to note, however, that while not engaging in militant action, American Christian fundamentalists sometimes imply support for violent actions consistent with their cause. Paul Hill, who murdered a doctor who operated an abortion clinic, found inspiration in the writings of Christian fundamentalists. Likewise, William Pierce’s The Turner Diaries clearly influenced Timothy McVeigh in his decision to bomb the Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Pierce, a white supremacist, situated his racism in a cosmotheism similar to that of the Christian Identity movement (Juergensmeyer 2003, 27-33). Additionally, prominent Christian fundamentalist leaders occasionally voice support for violence, and even contend that God targets perpetrators of evil. Pat Robertson commented that US operatives should eliminate Venezuelan President Chavez. He also opined that Ariel Sharon’s stroke was divine retribution for the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, that God punished Florida with hurricanes because of Gay Days at Disney World, and that an apocalyptic disaster might strike Dover, Pennsylvania because the citizens voted out of office creationist school board members. Jerry Falwell suggested God permitted the terrorist attacks of September 11th because of America’s immorality. These comments associate violence with divine authority and thereby legitimate the actions. Unlike bin Laden, Falwell does not fight the holy war, but he seems to imply that 9/11 was indeed part of a holy war.

In these contexts it is possible to understand the conceptualization of militant fundamentalism as a form of clerical fascism and to appreciate some of its similarities with neo-Nazism and neo-fascism. The leader of each movement is a charismatic authoritarian who espouses activism and militancy in order to reconstitute the world consistent with the ideology’s values. All the ideologies embrace the necessity of the use of force to achieve a purer, more civilized world and are explicit about the need to
purge the territory of the enemy. Thus reminiscent of the Aryan drive to secure superiority, al-Zawahiri explains of the Muslim,

How can [he] possibly [accept humiliation and inferiority] when he knows that his nation was created to stand at the center of leadership, at the center of hegemony and rule, at the center of ability and sacrifice? How can [he] possibly [accept humiliation and inferiority] when he knows that the [divine] rule is that the entire earth must be subject to the religion of Allah—not to the East, not to the West—to no ideology and to no path except for the path of Allah? (2002)

Yet there is a significant difference between militant fundamentalism as clerical fascism and secular fascism. The secular fascist understands force as a necessary tool to purge the current world of mediocrity, weakness, and opposition. Militant fundamentalists conceive of force as a method to purge sin from the cosmic order, and also to leave this world of sin. Consequently, militant fundamentalists are more inclined to accept the need for suicide missions than are secular fascists. For the militant fundamentalist, both the opposition and the faithful are better dead than living in an earthly world of sin. God’s law is truth, so its defenders cannot compromise.

The Lebanese Islamic fundamentalist group Hizbollah organized in 1982 to gain political and economic status for the Shi’ite plurality after years of exclusion, civil war, and occupation. The organization’s roots were in the Movement of the Deprived (Sachedina 1991, 446). Hizbollah is best known for its violent opposition to the Israeli and Western occupations of Lebanon and its effective use of asymmetrical warfare and suicide attacks to demoralize the Israelis. Hizbollah also maintains an extensive public relations and media network to promote its cause and glorify its martyrs. These tactics possess tremendous emotional effectiveness. Indeed, Hizbollah convinced Hamas of the efficacy of suicide bombings, and helped them refine the recruitment and preparation of martyrs. Hizbollah and Hamas also focus upon the problems of corrupt government and weak economies. The groups provide tangible benefits such as medical care, housing, and schools. The militant fundamentalists’ willingness to undertake a popular cause heightened the relevance of Islam. As Islamic movements, the groups identify the essential problem as one of power misused for materialistic ends. They demonize not only Israel, Jews, and the West, but also secular governments as hypocritical and destructive. These claims resonate well with the oppressed, alienated, and frustrated. The appeal is broad because it is familiar and emotive, and because Hizbollah and Hamas have mastered techniques to deliver their message (Appleby 2000, 25-27, 56-57, 95-101; Legrain 1997). Lasting solutions seem distant, however,
because commitment to Allah and the Quran eliminates the possibility of compromise.

V. THE COMMUNICATION OF THE POLITICS OF HATE

The success of ultranationalist, neo-Nazi, and clerical fascist movements depends upon the communication of hate. It is important to note that some movements are explicit about the need to hate. The late leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, al-Zarqawi, proclaimed after a beheading, “God honored us and so we harvested their heads and tore up their bodies” (2005). For some fundamentalists, serving God requires hate. Randall Terry, the militant fundamentalist leader of Operation Rescue, said, “I want you to let a wave of hatred wash over you. Yes, hate is good... Our goal is a Christian nation. We have a Biblical duty, we are called by God, to conquer this country” (1993). Decades earlier, Hitler made clear his hatred of the Jews and tried to inspire the Germans to act based upon this hatred. In Mein Kampf he explicitly described his contempt for Jewish people, labeling them “liars,” “usurers,” “parasites,” “menaces,” and “eternal blood suckers.” He wrote:

With satanic joy in his face, the black-haired Jewish youth lurks in wait for the unsuspecting girl whom he defiles with his blood, thus stealing her from her people. With every means he tries to destroy the racial foundations of the people he has set out to subjugate. Just as he himself systematically ruins women and girls, he does not shrink back from pulling down the blood barriers for others, even on a large scale. It was and it is Jews who bring the Negroes into the Rhineland, always with the same secret thought and clear aim of ruining the hated white race by the necessarily resulting bastardization, throwing it down from its cultural and political height, and himself rising to be its master. For a racially pure people which is conscious of its blood can never be enslaved by the Jew. In this world he will forever be master over bastards and bastards alone. And so he tries systematically to lower the racial level by a continuous poisoning of individuals. (Hitler 1926)

It must be recalled that similarly to Hizbollah and Hamas (both of which won recent fair elections), Hitler gained office through constitutional means, with the Nazi Party winning a 44% plurality of votes in the 1932 election. Hitler’s messages and policies resonated with German supporters (Brown 1982), as does Islamic fundamentalism with the followers of Hizbollah and Hamas.

The ability to successfully convey the politics of hate relates to a number of factors including organizational strength, media control, and emotive content. Both the Nazis and fascists excelled at organization, mass mobilization, and communication. They successfully maintained parties,
paramilitaries, youth wings, and media outlets. Groups as diverse as Hizbollah and the Democratic Unionists follow this pattern. Nazi and Fascist parties took advantage of press laws, urbanization, and mass communication to agitate and attract followers. Likewise, Milosevic in Serbia and the Hutu extremists in Rwanda established ultranationalist networks and controlled important media outlets. Serbian media broadcast messages intended to stir popular emotions and mobilize the people to peak anxiety by recalling past mistreatment of the Serbs and intimating that Albanians, Croats, and Bosnians again threatened them. So too, Radio Mille Collines, the ultranationalist Hutu station, carried hate broadcasts that warned that Tutsis planned to attack the Hutus and then called for death to Tutsis and Hutu moderates, even providing the addresses of activists (Power 2002, 330-40).

Emotive content is another critical element in the communication of hate. Both Hitler and Mussolini understood that effective propaganda required an affective character. They employed extremist slogans and emotional speeches. Contemporary groups continue to recognize the mobilizing power of emotional language. Leaders realize it is critical to convince their followers of the necessity of marginalizing, controlling, cleansing, or eliminating other groups. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja emphasized this point during an NPR interview. Ntalaja rejected the contention that ethnic hatred was tribal or primordial and contended that leaders incited hatred, explaining that

> ethnic groups do have prejudices and people do tend to feel they may be different from other groups. But it’s not enough to make a person pick up a knife or a gun and kill somebody else. It is when politicians come and excite passion and try to threaten people–make people believe that they are being threatened by other groups that are going to be extinguished. (Power 1994, 356)

Leaders realize they can motivate people through fear. The Hutu press published the “Ten Commandments of the Hutu” which included, “The Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi” and “His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group” (African Rights 1995, 42-43). Milosevic warned the Serbs that Albanians in Kosovo were arming and intended to cleanse the region of Serbs so that Serbs must first act in defense. Leaders also realize that their followers will be less likely to hesitate to act aggressively if the enemy is dehumanized. As Hitler did, it is important to speak of the enemy as deadly animals, as blood-suckers and parasites, or to link the enemy to Satan. Ian Paisley continues to denounce the pope as the Anti-Christ. Al-Zarqawi referred to Shi’a Muslims as “the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying
enemy, and the penetrating venom” (2004). Hutu leaders and Radio Mille Collines called Tutsis devils and cockroaches. The Hamas media labels Jews “dogs, rats, strangling octopi, pigs, monkeys, dragons, ghouls, Evil Eyes and bug-eyed creatures to be crushed underfoot” (Oliver and Steinberg 1995, 8-9). Religious and political leaders address people at large rallies, speaking with missionary zeal, demonizing the enemy, inciting the crowds, and relying upon the appeal of fundamentalism (Marty and Appleby 1991, 822, 830). Contemporary groups employ Internet sites and satellite television to reach audiences. Al-Zarqawi mastered communication with his tapes of beheadings which he used both to attract supporters and intimidate the enemy. He staged the beheadings complete with costumes and scripts and even provided “previews” during which the victims were warned of the upcoming events.

Myths and legends constitute another powerful tool in the communication of hate. Milosevic retold ancient myths of Serbia’s founding after defeat in Kosovo. He stirred popular sensitivities by recalling histories of Ottoman and Croat mistreatment of Serb populations. While some truth existed in these histories, Milosevic emphasized the Serbian vulnerability and ignored the decades of peace that existed. Milosevic also encouraged the military and para-militaries to engage in torture and ethnic cleansing against non-Serb populations. Not only were the Albanians, Bosnians, and Croats identified as threats to the Serbs, but they also occupied important living space for the Serbs (Denich 1994, 371-72). Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionists also possess their myths. The legendary bloody hand thrown on shore to claim the territory of Ireland now becomes the namesake for the Red Hand Commandos, a group of Protestant paramilitaries. Unionists annually recall the 1690 Victory at the Battle of the Boyne, a heroic, triumphalist story of conquest intended to swell nationalistic pride and courage. Hutu refugees too assert an ancient claim to land. They tell the story of Burundi, a Hutu, who settled the country a century before Christ. Later, the Tutsis polluted Hutu civilization and stole their homeland. Hutu refugees also frequently recount Tutsi torture techniques, intending to prove the inherent evil of the Tutsis (Malkki 1990, 39-42). Likewise, Ashura, the Shia Islam holy day, marks the martyrdom of Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Mohammad. Hussein’s 680 defeat and beheading by the caliphate in Karbala is the storied single event used to solidify the division between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Shiite Muslims contend that Hussein tried to stop the perversion of Islam, and his fight and martyrdom exemplify the violent struggles and sacrifices required of followers of Shia Islam (Sachedina 1991, 430-35). Shiite Muslims commemorate the pain and sacrifice with chest-pounding and bloodletting. In recent years Sunni Muslims have responded to the Shiite reenactment of the mar-
tyrdom by reenacting their victory. Violence between Sunni and Shiite Muslims often ensues. In Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, Sunni suicide bombers have attacked Shiite mourners on Ashura.

Symbols and colors also communicate the politics of hate. Symbols often represent a code, well known to the initiated. They hold a visual appeal that complements the spoken word. The Nazi swastika continues to serve as a widely recognized symbol that ignites strong sentiments. Throughout the Basque region red flowers, shutters, and doors affirm the distinctiveness of the people and their commitment to the nation. In Northern Ireland, painted curbstones and lampposts claim territory, while murals justify both the republican and unionist causes and remember those who died fighting for their truth. The significance of certain dates, such as 1690 and 1916, is understood without explanation. Serbian flags decorate the Republik Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina. SDS graffiti dots the landscape and vows allegiance to the Serb Democratic Party of indicted war criminals Karadzic and Mladic.

Nationalist and fundamentalist groups also often provide members with uniforms to reinforce the unified identity of the group and the loyalty of the individual. PLO members wear the keffiyeh popularized by Arafat. Suicide bombers wear black military uniforms in their death photos. American white power, Christian Identity, and neo-Nazi websites offer online purchases of an array of t-shirts and accessories. Even mousepads are available. The Aryan Wear Killer Style site sells white power shirts; one carries the slogan, “Try Zyklon B–It’s a Gas” (2005). Their store also carries children’s clothing including Aryan Girls Academy and Happy Hitler Girly tees. The store accepts dollars and euros.

Film, music and art can serve as effective propaganda tools. American and European neo-Nazis and skinheads possess a rich set of music that repeats violent white power slogans. The late William Pierce owned the popular Resistance Records label. Lyrics such as “The March of Death has come to reign hatred on the weak,” and “Kill all the niggers and you gas all the jews, Kill a gypsy and a coloured too” are typical of this music, which attracts a growing following (Anti-Defamation League 2000). Television and the internet provide fast and convenient media for reaching an audience. The growing technological sophistication available to nationalist and fundamentalist groups could bolster their reach in the politics of the twenty-first century. Al Qaeda produced a video of martyrs’ funerals for recruitment purposes. At the extreme, al-Zarqawi’s theatrical introduction and broadcast of beheadings via the internet communicates the power of his movement and the vengeful hate which propels his cause. The broadcast delivers messages to his membership, potential supporters, and the enemy.

Elsewhere, parades, demonstrations, and public funerals rally national-
ist support. Such events are critical because they bring people together and place them in a social context in which their notions of truth, good and evil are endorsed and corroborated. Excellent examples include Milosevic’s use of public gatherings, the marching season in Northern Ireland, and the funerals for suicide bombers in Palestine and Lebanon. In 1989, the Serb leadership staged a massive week-long remembrance of the Ottoman defeat of the Serbs in Kosovo. The Serb Orthodox hierarchy and three hundred priests led a series of memorial services for martyrs. On the final day of the event, crowds chanted in response to Milosevic, “We love you, Slobodan, because you hate the Muslims” (Sells 1996, 69). The Protestant Orange-men marches commemorate their victory over the Catholics in 1690 with loud parades through Catholic neighborhoods. Weeks of practice marches and celebratory bonfires precede the parades. The annual event, coupled with the Unionist slogan “No Surrender,” highlights that the 1690 victory is ongoing. Hizbollah not only stages elaborate public funerals for their dead, but also maintains a museum of martyrs to honor those killed for the cause. This museum, like the Unionist parades, while emotionally gripping, greatly simplifies the reality of the political situation. Additionally, the museum, similar to the memorial murals in Northern Ireland, publicly and permanently commemorates and honors the martyrs. In an atmosphere focused on the sacrifice of the valiant and the evil of the enemy, reconciliation is difficult. Groups continue to nurture hate by demonizing and dehumanizing their enemies. Countering the hate requires political innovation and will.

VI. TEMPERING THE POLITICS OF HATE

Political alternatives and remedies do exist to abort or ameliorate the politics of hate and its violent consequences. Policy-makers and conflict mediators can learn from other cases. An instructive example is that of Macedonia. Although Macedonia witnessed some ultranationalist and ethno-religious tension, it did not experience the genocide and ethnic cleansing which bloodied its neighbors in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The Macedonian case is critical because the outcome also highlights the reality that often it is easier to facilitate a compromise before a cycle of retaliation begins. Elite cooperation between moderate representatives of ethnic groups proved significant. Leaders decided to use the media to promote tolerance rather than hate. Additionally, the Macedonians requested a preventive deployment of NATO troops to squelch any planned trouble and contain the violence in Kosovo.

Indeed, outside influence, if the actor is perceived as neutral, can be critical. In Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh, American diplomacy and aid at
least contain the conflicts (Cavanaugh 2004). The promise of EU membership serves as a powerful deterrent to nationalist conflicts throughout Europe. The carrot of future economic benefits often bears more fruit than economic sanctions. Consider that the EU successfully encouraged the Baltic states to extend equality to their Russian minorities (Davison 2006). In the case of Turkey, the prize of EU membership contains Islamic fundamentalism and presses a reassessment of the conditions of the Kurds. Crisis situations require not only peacekeepers, but also assistance to develop political, economic, and social infrastructures. Powersharing constitutions, joint development projects, unbiased and integrated schools, a free media, and independent civil society all can contribute to the withering away of extremism. Bosnia and Northern Ireland place emphasis on an integrated police force, while the Mozambique peace settlement focused upon an integrated military. The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia deems as essential the financing of an independent media and school courses on “Culture of Religion” and “Democratization and Human Rights” (Davison and Tesan 2006).

Ignatieff discusses the importance of promoting a culture of civic nationalism rather than ethnic nationalism within heterogeneous societies. Civic nationalism is inclusive, while ethnic nationalism is exclusive. The myth of blood ties is the basis of ethnic nationalism. Acceptance of the principles of rule of law and equality serve as the foundational myth for civic nationalists (1996). Such a suggestion might sound utopian to some political analysts, but in fact the EU has achieved success in advancing the concept of civic nationalism. The provision of individual and group rights is a condition for EU accession. Eight states of Eastern Europe embraced and met this condition in order to join the Union in 2004. In the Baltic states, this required the extension of rights to the Russian minority despite the history of Soviet control (Davison 2006).

Efforts to overcome ethnic and religious tensions must include guarantees of tolerance for diversity. Autonomy or federation arrangements are possible if conflicting groups live in separate regions. Spain seems inclined to avoid further conflict by implementing such autonomy accords. Alternatively, innovations from the Northern Ireland peace process might be applicable elsewhere. Particularly intriguing is the notion that sovereignty can be shared and that people can hold multiple citizenships. A Catholic now can be Irish, British, and European. Ireland, the UK, and the EU each possess different competencies in the North (Gottlieb 1994). Another Good Friday compromise intended to foster cooperation in Northern Ireland is the d’Hondt mechanism. The mechanism creates power-sharing arrangements in the legislature, cabinet, and ministries. The Dayton Accords also include the d’Hondt mechanism as a means to ensure that decisions are com-
promises between the ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While this
does impede policy-making efficiency, it seems preferable to nationalistic
dictatorships or bloody conflict. As Zartman points out, a durable solution
demands that minorities be treated equitably and not condemned to
powerlessness or lower class status (Zartman 1998, 317-36, 327-28). Addition-
ally if the subsidiarity principle is coupled with power-sharing then
many decisions will devolve to local governments and thereby balance cen-
tral government immobilism (Zartman 1998, 328).

The globalization of non-violent civil disobedience offers a legitimate
alternative to oppressed groups (Nassar 2005, 64-65; Appleby 2000, 128-
31). People power movements increasingly challenge both oppressive gov-
ernments and violent extremist alternatives. Peaceful demonstrations
forced regime changes in a wide variety of states during the past two
decades, including the Philippines, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Bolivia, and
Serbia. These social movements rely upon epistemic communities, transna-
tional rights groups and modern communication technologies to bolster
their cause.

Tempering the hate message of fundamentalists is more difficult than
tempering the message of nationalists because fundamentalists believe they
cannot compromise divine truth and authority. Consequently, efforts to
counter the fundamentalist’s politics of hate should target the underlying
conditions which make clerical fascism attractive and powerful. Certainly
these conditions include oppression, insecurity, and unemployment. Gurr
identifies state repression and discrimination against ethnic and religious
minorities as a fundamental source of conflict. He demonstrates that when
states implement individual and group rights, the likelihood of differences
spiraling to conflict declines substantially (Gurr 2000; Harff and Gurr
2004). In these cases, the state’s commitment to justice and equality coun-
ters the claims of the extremists.

Messages of hate require financing. Broadcasts, videos, and demon-
strations cost money. Therefore, it is desirable to attempt to cut the finan-
cial sources and freeze the bank accounts of violent fundamentalist groups.
The seizure of the assets of Richard Butler and the Aryan Nations com-
pound significantly weakened the organization. Intelligence suggests that
the freeze on various bank accounts critically impedes Al Qaeda’s ability to
finance other militant groups.

Another strategy is to criminalize hate speech and hate organizations.
Many states pursue this path. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the
High Representative quickly removes offending politicians from office. Ad-
ditionally, the Central Election Committee is empowered to terminate
the candidacy of any politician who uses the language of hate. Likewise,
Israel outlawed the far right Jewish fundamentalist Kahanists. The Israeli
Security Service deems the Kahanists responsible for the assassination of Rabin and the massacre at the Hebron Mosque. Yet criminalizing this organization did not stop it, and may only seem to verify the group’s claims that the Arab presence encroaches upon Jewish culture and tradition. Further, the recent uncovering of a Kahanist plot to blow up a Palestinian girls’ school suggests the ongoing strength of the organization. Criminalization might backfire and lend credence to the heroic claims of extremist groups (Frontline 2005).

Of course, the problem of militant Islamic fundamentalism seems particularly challenging. Yet Turkey, Bangladesh, and Indonesia offer models of democracy for Muslim polities. The Muslim leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina rejected extremism even in the wake of the war. Recently, the Bosniak electorate voted for a moderate President and the government deported immigrants tied to militant organizations. The Pew report Views of a Changing World 2003 also provides cause for hope. The study highlighted that many Muslims in the Middle East share Western values of freedom of speech and the press, equality, and democracy, but react with hostility toward American foreign policy in the region. Additionally, the Pew 2005 report showed that people in Jordan, Lebanon, and Indonesia responded positively to American efforts to support democracy. Clearly, there is not a monolithic Islamic world. Militant fundamentalism vies with liberal and conservative Islamist organizations. Muslim societies have difficult and significant political, economic, and religious issues to address, but change is not impossible. One option is to support “political arenas in which Islamists are able to participate but also are constrained by the need to compete with secular political parties, compelling them to moderate their positions to maintain their popularity” (Barsalou 2005, 11).

Indeed, moderates within various religious traditions should be supported. Moderate Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and Christians exist, but precisely because they are moderate they often do not view political participation as appropriate or salient. Nevertheless, broad-based participation must be encouraged, particularly in regions where religion is politicized, so that extremists cannot seize the agenda (Appleby 2000). In Sarajevo, the Franciscan Community has reached out to the population with ecumenical events. Corrymeela in Northern Ireland offers another example of religious actors advocating understanding and non-violence. Leadership of non-partisan truth commissions, such as by Bishop Tutu in South Africa and Bishop Gerardi in Guatemala, conveys and validates the alternative religious message of reconciliation and peace.

The communication of hate, particularly such that massive and systematic violence is incited, ought to be intolerable to leaders committed to equality and rights. Gurr notes that typically states seek to control discrimi-
nation and tension. National interest drives most leaders to prefer to maintain a calm political climate attractive to economic growth (2000, 275-81). When a state’s leaders, however, mobilize a people to attack or cleanse “enemies,” “sinners,” or “apostates,” then an external response becomes necessary. The problem is especially serious when a government rather than an independent religious or nationalist group perpetrates the hate. Governments provide security and therefore hold a monopoly on force. When a state discriminates against a group within its borders, the government typically possesses the military and police power to eliminate the group. Not only does the group despair about its situation, but it becomes likely that some members of the oppressed group will attempt to organize a military response. Yet many people will be caught between sides in the conflict. Often they find themselves in the middle in both a political and a physical sense.

In the last two decades, the United Nations developed criteria for humanitarian intervention (Harff and Gurr 2004, 170-80). When domestic efforts to avert or control the politics of hate fail, such that these politics produce extreme outcomes of genocide or ethnic cleansing, then global leaders possess legal and legitimate bases to respond (Hehir 2004, 25-26). Ignoring human suffering produced by the politics of hate is a form of apathy upon which extremist leaders depend. Each failure to respond emboldens other extremist leaders. The leaders of extremist groups gamble on the failure of political will by their democratic national and international counterparts. Global inaction implies acceptance of the extremist “truths” that ethno-religious identity matters, that the lives of some national and religious groups are worth more than the lives of others, and that violence is permissible to advance the cause. Yet the violence is neither tribal nor inevitable. Gurr, Zartman, Ignatieff, and Appleby offer solutions and identify cases in which leadership and political action averted bloody extremist conflict. The knowledge and tools do exist to contain the violent outcomes of the politics of hate. Ultimately, the challenge is one of political innovation and will at both the state and global levels.

Acknowledgements

Research specifically on Bosnia and Herzegovina supported by a Jack R. Critchfield Grant, 2006-2007. Research on Northern Ireland initially supported by an Ashforth Research Grant, 2000-2001 and facilitated by work at University of Ulster, Coleraine. Research on genocides in Nazi Germany, Yugoslavia and Rwanda initially supported by The Jesse Ball DuPont Fund and facilitated by work at the National Humanities Center,
1997. Research on conflict resolution initially supported by the United States Institute of Peace, 1994.

REFERENCES

African Rights. 1995. *Rwanda: Death, despair and defiance*. New York: African Rights.

Al-Zarqawi, A. 2004. Coalition provisional authority. Global Security.org. website. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2004/02/040212-al-zarqawi.htm.

———. 2005. Terrorism training. First Reponders’ website. http://www.infra gard.net/library/congress_05/first_responders/terrorism_bc.ppt.

Al-Zawahiri, A. 2002. Why we fight America. *Special dispatch series* 388. The Middle East Media Research Institute website. http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=SP38802.

Anderson, B. 1991. *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London and New York: Verso.

Anti-Defamation League. 2000. Deafening hate: The revival of Resistance Records. http://www.adl.org/resistance%20records/introduction.asp.

Appleby, R.S. 1994. *Religious fundamentalisms and global conflict*. New York: Foreign Policy Association.

———. 2000. *The ambivalence of the sacred: Religion, violence and reconciliation*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.

Aryan Wear. 2005. *Aryan wear killer style*. http://aryanwear.com/.

Barsalou, J. 2005. Islamists at the ballot box: Findings from Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and Turkey. *United States Institute of Peace Special Report*.

Brown, C. 1982. The Nazi vote: A national ecological study. American Political Science Review, 76(2): 285-302.

Cavanaugh, C. 2004. Private interview with United States Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh. November 29, 2004.

Dalacoura, K. 1998. *Islam, liberalism and human rights*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Davison, J. 2006. Democratic values and the EU: Tradeoffs for the new Europe. In *The narrative of modernity: Co-existence of differences* ed. E. Banus and E. Talmor. Pamplona, Spain: University of Navarra.

Davison, J., and J. Tesan. 2006. October 2006: The moment for a critical election. *Bosnia Daily* (September 12, 2006): 8-10.

Deiros, P. 1991. Protestant fundamentalism in Latin America. In *Fundamentalisms observed*, ed. M. Marty and R. Appleby, 142-96. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Denich, B. 1994. Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist ideologies and the symbolic revival of genocide. *American ethnologist*, 21(2): 367-90.

Djilas, A. 1995. Fear thy neighbor: The breakup of Yugoslavia. In *Nationalism and nationalities in the new Europe*, ed. C. Kupchan, 85-106. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Eickelman, D. Bin Laden, the Arab “Street,” and the Middle East’s democracy deficit. *Current History* 101(651): 36-39.

Esposito, J. 1997. Political Islam and Gulf security. In *Political Islam: Revolution, radicalism, or reform?* ed. J Esposito, 53-74. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Fijalkowski, J. 1993. Aggressive nationalism and immigration in Germany. In *Europe’s new nationalism: States and minorities in conflict*, ed. R. Caplan and J. Feffer, 138-50. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fraser, N. 2000. The voice of modern hatred: Tracing the rise of Neo-Fascism in Europe. Woodstock NY: Overlook Press.

Frontline. 2005. Israel’s next war. PBS frontline website. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/israel/view/.

Gellner, E. 1983. *Nations and nationalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Gottlieb, G. 1994. Nations without states. *Foreign Affairs* 73(3): 100-12.

Gurr, T.R. 2000. *Peoples versus states: Minorities at risk in the new century*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

Harff, B., and T. R. Gurr. 2004. *Ethnic conflict in world politics*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Hehir, J.B. 2004. Religion, realism, and just intervention. In *Liberty and power: A dialogue on religion and U. S. foreign policy in an unjust world*, ed. E. J. Dionne, J. B. Elshtain, and K. Drogosz, 11-33. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Hitler, A. 1926. Adolf Hitler. *Mein kampf*. http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein_Kampf/index.html.

Hobsbawm, E. 1990. *Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huntington, S. P. 1993. The clash of civilizations? *Foreign Affairs* 72(3): 22-49.

Ibrahim, S. 2003. Reviving Middle Eastern liberalism. *Journal of Democracy* 14(4): 5-10.

Ignatieff, M. 1993. *Blood and belonging*. London: BBC Books.

———. 1996. Nationalism and toleration. In *Europe’s new nationalism: States and minorities in conflict*, ed. R. Caplan and J. Feffer, 213-31. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Juergensmeyer, M. 2003. *Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kaldor, M. 1996. Cosmopolitanism versus nationalism: The new divide? In *Europe’s new nationalism: States and minorities in conflict*, ed. R. Caplan and J. Feffer, 42-58. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lake, D.A., and D. Rothchild. 1998. Containing fear: The management of transnational ethnic conflict. In *The international spread of ethnic conflict*, ed. D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild, 203-226. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 1998. Spreading fear: The genesis of transnational ethnic conflict. In *
international spread of ethnic conflict, ed. D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild, 3-32. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Laqueur, W. 1996. Fascism: Past present future. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Legrain, J. 1997. Hamas: Legitimate heir of Palestinian nationalism? In Political Islam: Revolution, radicalism, or reform?, ed. J. Esposito, 159-78. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Malkki, L. 1990. Context and consciousness: Local conditions for the production of historical and national thought among Hutu refugees in Tanzania. In Nationalist ideologies and the production of national cultures, ed. R. Fox, 32-62. Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association.

Marty, M., and R.S. Appleby. 1991. Conclusion: An interim report on a hypothetical family. In Fundamentalisms observed, eds. M. Marty and R. S. Appleby, 814-42. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Michnik, A. 1996. Dignity and fear: A letter to a friend. In Europe's new nationalism: States and minorities in conflict, ed. R. Caplan and J. Feffer, 15-22. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mussolini, B. 1939. The doctrine of fascism. In The social and political doctrines of contemporary Europe, ed. M. Oakeshott, 164-68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nash, M. 1991. Islamic resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia. In Fundamentalisms observed, ed. M. Marty and R. S. Appleby, 691-739. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Nassar, J.R. 2005. Globalization & terrorism: The migration of dreams and nightmares. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Nodia, G. 1996. Nationalism and the crisis of liberalism. In Europe's new nationalism: States and minorities in conflict, ed. R. Caplan and J. Feffer, 101-19. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nojumi, N. 2002. The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region. New York: Palgrave.

Oliver, A., and P. Steinberg. 1995. Embodied imperative: The command of death in the underground media of the intifada. Unpublished paper.

Pesic, V. 1994. The cruel face of nationalism. In Nationalism, ethnic conflict and democracy, ed. L. Diamond and M. Plattner, 132-35. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Power, S. 2002. “A problem from hell”: America and the age of genocide. New York: Perennial.

Robertson, P. 1992. The 700 club. Quotes from the religious right website (March 18). http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7027/quotes.html.

Sachedina, A. 1991. Activist Shi’ism in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. In Fundamentalisms observed, ed. M. Marty and R. S. Appleby, 403-56. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Schopflin, G. Nationalism and ethnic minorities in post-communist Europe. In
Europe’s new nationalism: States and minorities in conflict, eds. R. Caplan and J. Feffer, 151-68. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sells, M.A. 1996. The bridge betrayed: Religions and genocide in Bosnia. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sisk, T. 2000. Islam and democracy: Religion, politics, and power in the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Smith, A.D. 1983. Theories of nationalism. London: Duckworth.

Sussman, P. 2000. The menace of the Far Right. CNN in-depth reports. http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/germany/stories/resurgence/.

Terry, R. 1993. The News-Sentinel, August 16. Fort Wayne, Indiana. http://www.ethicalatheist.com/docs/separation_church_state.html.

United States Institute of Peace. 2002. Causes of Islamic extremism. Peace Watch 8(4): 1, 2, 14.

Volkan, V. 1996. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ancient fuel of a modern inferno. Mind and Human Interaction 7(3): 110-27.

———. 1994. The need to have enemies & allies. Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson.

Voll, J. 1991. Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab world: Egypt and the Sudan. In Fundamentalisms observed, eds. M. Marty and R. Appleby, 345-402. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Young, M.C. 1986. Nationalism, ethnicity and class in Africa: A retrospective. Cahiers d’études Africaines 103(26-3): 421-95.

———. 1982. Patterns of social conflict: State, class and ethnicity. Daedalus 3(2): 71-98.

Zartman, W. 1998. Putting Humpty-Dumpty together again. In The international spread of ethnic conflict, eds. D.A. Lake and D. Rothchild, 317-36. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
