BUILDING HARMONY AND PEACE THROUGH RELIGIOUS EDUCATION;
Social Prejudice and Rebeliance Behavior of Students in Modern Islamic Boarding School Gontor Darussalam, East Java

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Abstrak
Penelitian ini berangkat dari fakta bahwa, pondok pesantren selalunya dikaitkan dan bahkan diidentifikasi dengan berbagai bentuk pemikiran ekstrim dan tindakan radikal atas nama agama. Sehingga banyak kalangan ditengah-tengah masyarakat yang memiliki prasangka sosial terhadap keberadaan pondok pesantren. Sungguhpun demikian penelitian ini bertujuan melihat hubungan antara prasangka sosial dan prilaku memberontak di kalangan santri Pondok Pesantren Modern Gontor Darussalam (PMDG) di Jawa Timur. Tiga teori yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah : (1) Teori prasangka sosial. (2) Teori pemberontakan (khususnya dalam konteks remaja) mengingat para santri umumnya tergolong dalam kategori remaja. Populasi penelitian ini sebanyak 2067 orang santri. Sungguh demikian sampel dalam penelitian ini sebanyak 335 orang. Adapun formula yang digunakan untuk mengukur besaran ukuran sampel adalah : n = N/1+e². Penarikan sampel dilakukan menggunakan simple stratified random sampling. Adapun teknik pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan skala psikologi dan kuesioner serta studi dokumentasi. Semenata teknik analisa data dengan menggunakan pearson correlation (product momment) untuk melihat hubungan antara variabel. Hasil penelitian ini mendapati tidak adanya hubungan yang signifikan antara prasangka sosial dan prilaku memberontak dikalnagan para santri di ponpes PMDG. Hal ini dibuktikan melalui perolehan nilai r hitung = 0.328. dan t tabel = 1,64 serta p (value) = 0.90 > 0.05.

Kata Kunci: Prasangka Sosial, Prilaku Memberontak, Pondok Pesantren Moderni Darusalam Gontor dan Santri.

INTRODUCTION
Indonesia is the most populous Muslim-majority nation in the world, and is also home to significant religious minorities of Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Confucians, and others. Indonesia has a long history of cultural pluralism with the co-existence of many different religions (...Since Indonesia’s independence, there has been an increased in observance and less culturally-influenced and universal form of Islam. This country is not an Islamic state even though it is predominantly Muslims. Today, the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia are the “traditionalists” (Nahdlatul Ulama) and “modernists” (Muhammadiyah). In the post-colonial Indonesia, several presidential regimes – most notably President Sukarno (1945-1967) and President Suharto (1967-1998) – created public policies that favored some religious groups. President Sukarno established the Pancasila or Five Principles as the foundation of its new constitution, “Belief in the One and Only God; just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; deliberation for consensus; and social justice for all of Indonesia’s people.” Later, under President Suharto, the government officially recognized five religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism. (https://ifeldp.
In addition, there has been recent violent conflict between Muslims and Christians in certain areas of Indonesia. In recognition of these tensions, several interfaith organizations and centers have been created to promote respect, dialogue, and cooperation among religious groups. Today, Indonesia is the site of the world’s largest democratic Islamic movement and provides a striking example of Islamic history and politics in a modern and pluralistic society. According to a report of the Indonesian Central Statistic Bureau in 2000, respondents identified as 88.2% Muslim, 5.9% Protestant, 3.1% Catholic, 1.8% Hindu, 0.8% Buddhist, and 0.2% “other.” “Other” includes traditional indigenous religions, other Christian groups, and Judaism. The majority of Indonesian Muslims are Sunni; however there are significant populations of Shi’a Muslims (over one million) as well as some other sects, such as the Ahmadiyya sect and syncretist traditions. In some areas of Indonesia it is difficult to find accurate statistics on religious belief because people who do not identify as one of the six religions recognized by the government (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism as of 2006) go undocumented. For a more detailed breakdown of religious demography, refer to the US International Religious Freedom Report (2006).

Based on the fact I would like to do a research about “Correlation Between Social Prejudice and Rebellion Behavior of Students” (Study at Darussalam Modern Islamic Boarding School in East Java. Because most of Islamic School was victimised produce of terrorist. I.e.; Abrar Haque, 43, the volunteer administrator of Cleveland’s Al-Ihsan School of Excellence, was arrested on money-laundering charges. To learn more about his business, federal agents seized school records. (Feb. 5, 2005) The Islamic Saudi Academy helped shaped the views of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, who presently sits in a Virginia jail accused of trying to assassinate the president of the United States. (March 1, 2005); ...Ali Asad Chandia, 28, was arrested on the accusation of aiding two terrorist groups, including the Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Taiba. He is a third-grade teacher at Al-Huda School in College Park, Maryland, a K-8 school in the suburbs of Washington, D.C. that specializes in teaching the Arabic language and the Koran. Also of note: he served as the president of the Muslim Students Association at Montgomery College in 1998-1999 and was a member of the “Virginia jihad network.” (Sep. 17, 2005) Aug. 26, 2006 update: Chandia, convicted in June on three counts of providing material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba, was today sentenced to 15 years in prison. At the sentencing hearing, Chandia not only maintained his innocence but threatened to exact revenge against all those responsible for his conviction: "those who participated in making my children orphans ... should just remember that the day of judgment is on the way (http://www.danielpipes.org Accessed March 10, 2015)."

One of the most frequently heard terms in the counterterrorism/counter-radicalism conversation in Southeast Asia is pesantren, or Islamic boarding school. More often than not, the pesantren is associated with terrorism and/or radical Islam. Yet, despite all of the negative attention, the pesantren is poorly understood outside the world of sociology, religion, or anthropology. Quite the opposite of what is often portrayed in the media,
the pesantren, in many ways, acts as a stabilizing force within Indonesian society. It is in their interest to do so. Unfortunately, a discourse (especially among counterterrorism experts on the pesantren’s role in maintaining stability and checking extremism in Indonesia is sadly lacking. A number of Indonesia observers will concede that the vast majority of pesantren are non-violent, yet there are few inquiries into the positive role of the pesantren in preventing the growth of radicalism).

Research Problems

Then, Pesantrens that called as Gontor Darussalam Modern Islamic Boarding School always assume that they have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo because they often benefit from it. In return for support from national and local governments, pesantrens disseminate an ideology that emphasizes moderation, tolerance, and religious harmony – all themes that buttress stability in a diverse country like Indonesia. Individual pesantrens and the pesantren system as a whole are not without vulnerabilities, however. With any symbiotic relationship, externalities could upset the mutually beneficial equilibrium. Well-funded extremists (foreign or otherwise) could offer inducements to any given pesantren that would alter the latter’s ideological outlook. Specifically the research want to explore about: (1) The social prejudice in Modern Islamic Boarding School (Gontor Darussalam). (2) The Rebeliance behavior of students for responding of “social stigm” of their institution. (3) Finding out wheter any connection between sosial prejudice and rebeliance behavior of students at Gontor Darusaalam Islamic Boarding School.

Theritical Background

Prejudice in any form, racial or social, is destructive and costly to society. Up until the ’60s, society accepted racial prejudice, then the target of racial prejudice rebelled and society realized the destructive force of this attitude. Today, social prejudice is accepted by society and few realize its destructive force. It kills motivation and increases overhead cost in business. It forces students to drop out of school with a failure label that prevents them from discovering their natural talent. Self-fulfilling prophecy does the rest. Social prejudice believes other people are less capable than us. If we are managers and we think other people are less capable, then we will establish a management policy that reflects that belief. Through employee turnover and self-fulfilling prophecy, our opinion will be proven right. Social prejudice is like any prejudice, “I am better than them, I come from a better neighborhood, I have a better education, and therefore I must make all the decisions.” Prejudice in any form, racial or social, carries a heavy price, it lowers efficiency and increases overhead cost. Prejudice kills communications, innovation, motivation just to name a few attributes.

Social class is a prejudice barrier between white-collar and blue-collar employees. With leaders prejudice as a role model, other, lesser-defined social prejudice barriers develop in the organization. Departments will limit communication with other departments; craftsmen will consider production workers of low intelligence to name two. At each level, people believe lower levels have low capabilities and this becomes the mindset of the organization. Self-fulfilling prophecy proves everyone right. Inthis researach I would like to explore about the rebel which held by adolescence, because in psychology we knew that It’s the poster characteristic of the teenager years: adolescent rebellion. And it’s one that causes many conflicts with parents.
Two common types of rebellion are against socially fitting in (rebellion of non-conformity) and against adult authority (rebellion of non-compliance.) In both types, rebellion attracts adult attention by offending it. The young person proudly asserts individuality from what parents like or independence of what parents want and in each case succeeds in provoking their disapproval. This is why rebellion, which is simply behavior that deliberately opposes the ruling norms or powers that be, has been given a good name by adolescents and a bad one by adults. The reason why parents usually dislike adolescent rebellion is not only that it creates more resistance to their job of providing structure, guidance, and supervision, but because rebellion can lead to serious kinds of harm.

Rebellion can cause young people to rebel against their own self-interests; -- rejecting childhood interests, activities, and relationships that often support self-esteem, It can cause them to engage in self-defeating and self-destructive behavior - refusing to do school work or even physically hurting themselves. It can cause them to experiment with high-risk excitement - accepting dares that as children they would have refused, It can cause them to reject safe rules and restraints - letting impulse overrule judgment to dangerous effect. And it can cause them to injure valued relationships - pushing against those they care about and pushing them away. So adolescent rebellion is not simply a matter of parental aggravation; it is also a matter of concern.

Although the young person thinks rebellion is an act of independence, it actually never is. It is really an act of dependency. Rebellion causes the young person to depend self-definition and personal conduct on doing the opposite of what other people want. That’s why the antidote for rebellion is the true independence offered by creating and accepting a challenge - the young person deciding to do something hard with themselves for themselves in order to grow themselves. The teenager who finds a lot of challenges to engage with, and who has parents who support those challenges, doesn’t need a lot of rebellion to transform or redefine him or herself in adolescence.

To what degree a young person needs to rebel varies widely. In his fascinating book, "Born to Rebel" Frank Sulloway (Frank Sulloway "SURVIVING YOUR CHILD’S ADOLESCENCE" (Wiley, 2013)) posits that later born children tend to rebel more than first born. Some of his reasoning is because they identify less with parents, do not want to be clones of the older child or children who went before, and give themselves more latitude to grow in nontraditional ways. So, parents may find later born children to be more rebellious. From what I have seen in counseling, rebellion tends to have different roles in a young person’s growth depending in which stage of adolescence it is expressed. Stage by adolescent stage, then, here is how rebellion seems to function.

Then, in the term pesantren goes back to Indonesia’s Hindu-Buddhist roots. “… pesantren was per-santri-en, ‘the place where the wise men were,’ santri being a version of shastri, the Sanskrit word for a man learned in the Hindu shastras, the scriptures.” (V.S. Naipaul, Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey (New York: Vintage Books, 1981, 323). Today, the pesantren is in practice an umbrella term under which a wide array of related yet diverse institutions fall. A useful construct would be, perhaps, to look at the pesantren as an institution whose primary function is education. Primarily, but not exclusively, located in rural
areas, pesantrens provide a place for study where pupils can receive religious instruction from a religious teacher (\textit{kyai}). In many cases, pesantrens are boarding schools. The traditional pesantren is duty-bound to accept any student who wants to study there and can pay a nominal tuition fee (Ronald Lukens-Bull, A Peaceful Jihad (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 65).

In modern Indonesia, pesantrens as educational institutions are divided into two types: modern and traditional (sometimes called salaf in Indonesian, ... The term salaf, in its Indonesian usage, should not be confused with the term salafism, which has become synonymous with Islamic fundamentalist globally. Stripped of its current political connotations, the Arabic word salaf means predecessors. Thusly, a salaf pesantren in Indonesia simply means a school that follows the teachings of those who came before). It would be far too easy and incorrect to equate modern pesantrens with bastions of forward-looking, liberal Islamic thought and traditional pesantrens with reactionary places that are hotbeds of radical thinking. Rather, the distinction is largely one that deals with the type of curriculum (Lukens-Bull, A Peaceful Jihad, 47) A modern pesantren will, essentially, follow a nationally accredited school curriculum, determined by the Ministry of Education and/or the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In theory, a pesantren that follows a national curriculum receives funding from the national government. At the completion of a course of study, students receive a certificate that is equivalent to that of a state-run school. Traditional pesantrens, on the other hand, focus more exclusively on religious subjects, but may teach general subjects too. In traditional pesantrens, however, the pedagogy and content are not accredited or held to a national standard. As result, financial support from the government is more limited, though not inconsequential. A single pesantren can contain both modern and traditional teaching styles and curricula.

A majority of pesantrens in Indonesia are traditional and are therefore independent of formal government control. An example of one such pesantren is the Miftahul Huda pesantren in Tasikmalaya. This pesantren is in fact the flagship pesantren of a network of hundreds of affiliated pesantrens throughout Indonesia. As such, the Miftahul Huda organization remains independent from any formal control of the central government. The choice to remain independent, however, does not necessarily indicate any hostility toward the central government or a desire to overthrow it. in an interview, the head of the pesantren in Tasikmalaya, Maoshul Asep Affandy, explained that many pesantrens choose to remain outside the national formal education structure for a variety of reasons. Among the pesantrens affiliated to Miftahul Huda, some have adopted the nationally recognized curriculum and others have not. “The choice each pesantren in our network makes is based on what fits their local circumstances best,” explained Affandy.”For instance, the pesantren here in Tasikmalaya remains traditional. This is because there are already government schools and madrassas with whom our pesantren has a close relationship. In fact, many of our students also attend the local government schools too,” Affandy added. “All the pesantrens in our network, regardless of whether they are modern or traditional, follow the same religious interpretation of the Quran,” Affandy said. Citing another reason, Affandy said that the ideal of self-sufficiency is key for many pesantrens and for that reason they did not want to lose the autonomy to design their own curricula.
(Asep A. Maoshul Affandy, interview by Hilary Dauer (April 20, 2012). Pesantren students and leaders are often expected to provide religious instruction and perform religious services for their communities (Lukens-Bull, A Peaceful Jihad, 59). In Hindu-Buddhist days in Java,” V.S. Naipul wrote, “a pesantren was a monastery, supported by the community in return for the spiritual guidance and the spiritual protection it provided.” (Naipaul, Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey, 323).

**Research Finding and Discussion**

There were two kinds of research finding in this research: (1) Descriptive analysis of respondent and spreading of mean data of variables. (2) The quantitative analysis and testing of the hypothesis.

According to Table 1.1 we found that most of the respondents at the Darussalam Islamic Boarding School (Gontor) studied at the senior high school level. Then, most of the ages of respondents at the Darussalam Islamic Boarding school (Gontor) between 15 – 17 years old. This research found that most of the respondents were coming from medium class level of economic background. Beside that, the research also found that most of the parents employees were entrepreneur or private sector. After that, most of family social-organizational background was Nahdlatul Ulama. Then, according to the mean and spreading of frequency and percentage of social prejudice and rebelliance behavior of students at Gontor Darussalam Islamic Boarding School has been shown below:

| The Categories                  | Frequency | Percentage |
|--------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| **Thee Education level**       |           |            |
| 1 Junior high school           | 167       | 49.85      |
| 2 Senior high school           | 268       | 50.15      |
| **Sum**                        | **335**   | **100.00** |
| **Ages**                       |           |            |
| 1 12 – 14 years old            | 89        | 26.57      |
| 2 15 -17 years old             | 246       | 73.43      |
| **Sum**                        | **335**   | **100.00** |
| **The economic background**    |           |            |
| 1 High class level of economic background (family income > Rp 10.000.000 / month) | 51 | 15.24 |
| 2 Medium class level of economic background (family income Rp 5000.000 – Rp 10.000.000 / month) | 189 | 56.42 |
| 3 Lower class level of economic background (family income < Rp 5000.000 / month) | 95 | 28.34 |
| **Sum**                        | **335**   | **100.00** |
| **The parents employee**       |           |            |
| 1 Civil servant                | 92        | 27.46      |
| 2 Teachers / Lecturer          | 86        | 25.67      |
| 3 Opportunity / private sector | 127       | 37.91      |
| 4 Public service               | 30        | 8.96       |
| **Sum**                        | **335**   | **100.00** |
| **The family social-organization background** | | |
| 1 Nahdlatul Ulama              | 164       | 48.97      |
| 2 Muhammadiyah                 | 106       | 30.64      |
| 3 Persis                       | 35        | 20.39      |
| **Sum**                        | **335**   | **100**    |

Source: The research reports 2014
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Table 1.2 The mean spreading, frequency and percentage of Social Prejudice

| The Categories | Frequency | Percentages |
|----------------|-----------|-------------|
| High           | 187       | 55.82       |
| Low            | 148       | 44.18       |
| Sum            | 335       | 100.00      |

Sources: The research reports, 2014

According to the Table 1.2 above, most of mean spreading were locating at the high level. It means that the social prejudicing which from the society has been implemented in Darussalam Islamic Boarding School (Gontor). Most of the social prejudice in the community based on, what information that they got from electronic media, news paper, internet and any kinds of information resource. Some of information an irresponsible and misleading to the society. Especially about violence and rebelian behavior which hipotetically taught in Islamic Boarding School (Including Gontor Darussalam as an Islamic Boarding School).

Table 1.3 The mean spreading, frequency and percentage of Rebelliance Behavior of Students

| The Categories | Frequency | Percentages |
|----------------|-----------|-------------|
| High           | 56        | 16.72       |
| Low            | 279       | 83.28       |
| Sum            | 335       | 100.00      |

Sources: The research reports, 2014

According to the Table 1.3 above, most of mean spreading were locating at the low level. It means that most of the studnets at the Darussalam Islamic Boarding School (Gontor) had not implemented rebeliance behavior; they never wanted to involved with any kinds of violence (bullying, crime activities, etc). Beside that, the Darussalam Islamic Boarding School (Gontor) never tolerate with many kinds of violence. So, they never thought about the violence activities. They always try to make confortable condition (peacefull thinking and behavior) to study and playing. Although some of the community has a bad opinion and perspective about the Islamic Boarding School, the students at the Islamic Boarding School (specially; Gontor Darussalam) the never want to condammm or critique and also doing rebeliance behavior as a revange. Because, in the Islamic Boarding School, the students never taught to be a selfis person, intolerance, irresponsible or doing destructive behavior.

Table 1.4 The Hypotesis Analysis

| Social Prejudice | Pearson Correlation | Sig. (2-tailed) | N   |
|------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Rebelliance Behavior of Students Islamic Boarding School | 0.328 | .090 | 335 |

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

According to The table 1.4 above, we got information that \( r \) = 0.328. Then the table score = 1.64 and \( p = 0.90 > 0.05 \). It means \( H_0 \) was recieve and rejected \( H_1 \). So, there were no correlation between social prejudice and rebeliance behavior of students at Gontor Darussalam Islamic Boarding School.

**DISCUSSION**

Today Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country, with approximately 88% of the population identified as Muslim. However, Indonesia is far from being homogeneous; it has a long and rich history of religious diversity. This diversity draws from Indonesia’s history of trade, immigration, European colonization, and Indonesia’s recent post-colonial political history,
all of which contribute to an environment of dynamic interaction between different cultures and religions. Current government methods for collecting religious demographic information are based on the policy of six officially recognized religions, within which all citizens must identify. However, this policy often over-simplifies and obscures the complexity of religious identity and activity at work in Indonesia.

The indigenous religious traditions of the Indonesian islands form a backdrop for the adaptation and synthesis of other religions into Indonesian culture. These indigenous traditions share several elements including: a balance between light and dark forces, the immanence of life (animism), and rituals and ceremonies for life and death. Other religions which arrived in Indonesia, starting with Hinduism and continuing through Buddhism, Islam and Christianity, were transformed by a process known as Javanization. Through this process incoming religions interacted with pre-existing indigenous values, institutions, and rituals, and eventually developed new and hybrid forms.

Hinduism arrived in Indonesia as early as the second century CE through Indian traders on the islands of Sumatra, Java, and Sulawesi. By the sixth century Buddhism had also taken root in Indonesia, and peacefully coexisted and blended with Hinduism and preexisting native traditions. The Hindu-Javanese culture was rich and vibrant and at one time spread across all of current Indonesia, culminating in the Majapahit Empire in the fourteenth century. The dominant belief systems of the Majapahit Empire were Hinduism, with either Siva or Visnu as the principle deities, and Mahayana Buddhism. In addition there was a diversity of Hindu-and Buddhist-derived sects, ascetic groups and yogic traditions, and ritual practices belonging to ancient indigenous faiths, which held various fertility, nature-centered, ancestor and death-related beliefs. The general populace also held firm to ancient beliefs in gods, spirits, and other protectors (Fic 88-89). Today the Majapahit Empire is upheld as a golden age of culture and prosperity and looked to as a source of inspiration for the modern Hindu revival movement.

Arab Muslim traders began commerce with Indonesia in fourth century CE; however, Indonesians did not begin converting to Islam until the eleventh century. By the thirteenth century Islam was established in North Sumatra. It then spread through Malaya, Brunei, Java and Malacca. Two main factors contributed to Islamic conversions in Java: 1) Islamic traders who married local women and set up Islamic commercial communities on the coast and 2) Sufi teachers who penetrated the heartland of Java and taught mystic doctrines which were easily added to the existing synthesis of Hindu and Buddhist traditions (Fic 149-150). By the fifteenth century the Majapahit Empire was in decline, and in 1520 the last Hindu kingdom in Java fell to the Sultanate of Demak. The last major independent empire on Java, prior to Dutch colonization was the Sultanate of Mataram, which ruled from the late sixteenth century to the early eighteenth century.

Although the majority of the population eventually converted to Islam, Indonesians retained much of the previous blend of Hindu, Buddhist, and native religious traditions, with unique practices, rituals, and ceremonies. Anthropologist of religion Clifford Geertz popularized the terms abagan Islam and santri Islam, to refer to the syncretic, indigenous and more ritualistic forms of Islam found in Java, versus the more pious, orthodox, Arab-influenced form. Until recently,
the majority of Muslims in Indonesia would be
categorized as abagan Muslims, with a minority
of santri Muslims. Since Indonesia’s independence
there has been a trend of Islamization, increase
in observance and turn towards a less culturally-
influenced, more universal form of Islam. Today,
the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia
are the “traditionalists” (Nahdlatul Ulama) and
“modernists” (Muhammadiyah), both promoting
santri Islam.

Christianity arrived in Indonesia during the
sixteenth century through two means: Catholic
missionaries brought by the Portuguese, and
Protestant missionaries brought by the Dutch.
Initially Christianity mixed with native ethnic
traditions, creating hybrid forms that still survive
in more isolated and rural locations. Christians
(Catholics and Protestants combined) currently
make up around seven percent of the population.
In the twentieth century there has been an
increase in missionary efforts and growth of
both Roman Catholicism and various Protestant
denominations, particularly concentrated in
Papua, Flores, and Sulawesi.

The period of Dutch colonization, from
the seventeenth to the nineteenth century
was also the period of the highest rates of
Chinese immigration to Indonesia. Traditionally
these Chinese communities have taken up
business and professional employment, belonging
predominantly to the middle class. Chinese
in Indonesia have faced great discrimination,
prejudice, and even violence, during different
periods in history, for example, during the anti-
communist purge under Suharto in 1965. Today
communities of Chinese descent in Indonesia
maintain a variety of religious traditions, including
Mahayana Buddhism, Confucianism, and
Christianity.

The Dutch colonization of Indonesia,
beginning in the seventeenth century, brought
about changes in Indonesian pluralism as the
Dutch imposed their own beliefs and policies
towards religious and cultural authorities. This
often resulted in an increase of Protestant
missionary activity. At the same time, the Dutch
supported pre-existing Islamic governance
structures in order to provide for more stable
trading partners. This in turn led to decreased
support for the traditional Muslim aristocracy
because the populace associated them with the
Dutch, and to the rising authority of rural Islamic
boarding schools and mystical leaders. These
leaders later became the basis for independence
movements, which in the twentieth century
coalesced around either Muslim or popular
nationalist parties. In post-colonial Indonesia,
several presidential regimes, most notably those of
Sukarno (1945-1967) and Suharto (1967-1998),
created public policies that favored some religious
groups and discriminated against others.

In 1945 President Sukarno established the
doctrine of Pancasila as the foundation of the new
costitution. Pancasila’s first principle states that
the state is based on "belief in the one and only
God." The adoption of Pancasila occurred over the
defeat of the so-called Jakarta Charter, a proposed
amendment to the Indonesian declaration of
independence that would make Indonesia a
Muslim nation by stating "the obligation to
practice shari’ah for its followers." Under Suharto,
the government officially recognized five religions:
Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and
Buddhism. Pancasila, the influence of shari’ah
in national policy, and the position of official
national religions are still topics of debate in
contemporary Indonesia. See section on Pancasila
and Government Practice and Policy.
An interesting phenomenon in the current Indonesian religious landscape is the Hindu revival movement, centered in Bali and Java. Unlike the rest of Indonesia, Bali retained the pre-Islamic Hindu-Javanese culture, and is still predominantly identified as Hindu. Hinduism was recognized as one of the officially designated religions in 1962, primarily in response to activism from Balinese Hindus. The largest Balinese Hindu organization, Parisada Hindu Dharma Bali, later changed its name to Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia, in order to redefine Hinduism as a national rather than solely Balinese religion.

Beginning in the 1970s, various ethnic groups on other islands began to identify as Hindu, often seeking protection for their indigenous ancestor religion under the official title of Hinduism. New Hindu communities developed in Java, centered on the restoration and rededication of ancient Hindu temples such as Pura Mandaragiri Sumeru Agung, located on the slope of Mt. Sumeru, Java’s highest mountain. Often these communities were financially supported by donors from Bali, but later grew through mass conversions and become sites of pilgrimage. Now the Hindu revival also has a strong utopian flavor; the popularity of prophecies from ancient Hindu Javanese personages such as Sabdapalon and Jayabaya, predict a dark age, identified with the current political upheaval, corruption and violence, to be followed by a golden age of peace and prosperity. The case of the Hindu revival is one of the many ways in which Indonesia’s pluralistic history interacts with the Indonesian people’s current political, social, and spiritual goals.

Being the world’s third largest democracy as well as a Muslim-majority country, Indonesia has become the site for studying the development of modern Islam and democracy. Robert Hefner writes, ”Today Indonesia deserves every democrat’s praise for having created the largest movement for a democratic Islam in the world” (Hefner, Politics of Multiculturalism, 45). Indonesia’s history of diversity makes a rich precedent and foundation for the development of civic democratic society. In addition, the case of Indonesia provides an alternative to studies of Islamic politics focused on the Middle East. Hefner states, “Marginalized in treatments of classical Islam, Indonesia must be central to any effort to come to terms with the diversity of modern Muslim politics” (Hefner, Civil Islam, 6). The situation of religion in Indonesia, and Islam in particular, is complex and undergoing constant change. There are current trends that point to an increase in more orthodox, conservative interpretations of Islam. This is evidenced by various local counties, in particular Aceh, enacting versions of shari’ah-influenced law, and the existence of extremist and militant organizations such as Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah. Some groups argue for abandoning Pancasila and instituting a fully Islamic state.

On the other hand, the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah (1912) and Nahdlatul ‘Ulama (NU) (1926), coming from the modernist and neo-traditionalist movements respectively, are committed to upholding Pancasila and not instituting a Muslim state and promoting a pluralistic democratic state. In addition, organizations such as the Liberal Islam Network (1999) are dedicated to advancing liberal Islam, which it defines as struggling for civil liberties such as freedom of expression, minority rights, women’s rights and freedom of religion. Finally, although there are several political parties that have been founded on religious grounds, elections routinely demonstrate the general population’s support for Pancasila and
for continuing a history of tolerance and diversity for the many religions co-existing in Indonesia.

There is a nation-wide network of NGOs and think tanks that manufacture ideology and then work with pesantrens to disseminate it. One such think tank is the Jakarta-based Indonesian Society for Pesantren and Community Development (P3M), which promotes the ideals of moderation and tolerance. Florian Pohl has described P3M’s work as utilizing “the extensive network of Indonesia's pesantrens, which are agents for and targets of community development... with a particular focus on pluralism and democracy (Florian Pohl, “Islamic Education and Civil Society: Reflections on the Pesantren Tradition in Contemporary Indonesia,” Comparative Education Review 50 (2006): 396.).”

Evidence of the desires of the pesantren system's leaders to maintain stability can be found in the aforementioned ideological outlook. Often in Indonesia, ideological paradigms that favor the status quo can be identified through certain code words or rhetorical totems such as pancasila (see above), tolerance, and pluralism. It is tempting to think of tolerance or pluralism as altruistic concepts but they are also useful to the national leadership of a religiously diverse country because, if accepted by society, they promote stability. If an ideology of religious harmony can be inculcated in the people, then internecine violence would be less likely. To this extent, the government funding detailed above also aids a kyai's ability to spread his (or, in some very rare cases, her) ideological beliefs. And, if a member of NU, the ideological position of the kyai will be in line, by and large, with the type of stability the government wants.

Then, pesantrens do not produce violent extremists and even terrorists. But until now, some people think that we called as social prejudice, saying can anything be learned from these outliers to the pesantren system as a whole? In particular, why were these pesantrens susceptible to an ideology that encouraged its graduates to seek an overthrow of the system? One of two conclusions would seem logical: 1) the extremist ideology that somehow infiltrated these pesantrens was so mesmerizing that it overwhelmed the rational cost-benefit analysis of the students, teachers, and the institution; or 2) some external force sweetened the incentives for taking on an ideology that rejected the current status quo and caused an individual pesantren to be an enemy rather than partner of the state. In either case, the existing system was unable to counter the allure presented by radicals in these limited cases. Time will tell if these few outliers become a trend and to what degree the government will do something to prevent the isolated phenomena from metastasizing.

CONCLUSION

In general, the pesantren system as a whole, as well as a great many pesantrens individually, maintains a close relationship with government. The relationship with government exists regardless of whether a particular pesantren receives government funding in exchange for teaching the government curriculum. (But, Darussalam Islamic Boarding School in East Java always try to build their own values . Then they try tobe a self-sufficient institution. They have thirty kinds of small and medium industry. Their want to be independent institution, (Fahmi Reza, 2013). Then, an individual pesantren is part of a religious infrastructure that is in many ways designed to keep the status quo. One manifestation of this infrastructure is the relationship between
Pesantren leaders and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the world's largest private voluntary organization, and the government. Pesantren leaders form one of the core constituencies of NU (Hefner, Civil Islam, 34).

It would not be a stretch to say that NU was born in the pesantren (Said Aqil Siradj, “Pesantren, NU, dan Politik,” in Nahdlatul Ulama: Dinamika Ideologi dan Politik Kenegaraan, ed. Khamami Zada and Ahmad Fawaid Sjadzili, (Jakarta: Kompas Penerbit Buku, 2010), 86). Today, NU can be thought of as a loosely knit association of pesantren leaders. In that sense, NU in many ways functions as an advocacy group for the association of pesantren leaders it represents. For instance, NU works closely with the government to develop job prospects for pesantren graduates (Hefner, Civil Islam, 86). Since at least the late 1950s, NU has accepted the central government’s secular, multi-confessional state ideology, known as *pancasila*, in exchange for support for NU’s educational and social programs. In 1959, NU relented on its insistence for the inclusion of Sharia Law in the constitution and began a period of cooperation and accommodation with the Sukarno regime (Robin Bush. Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009, 56.) this cooperation continues to today. In many ways, the NU’s relationship with the government is based around resource allocation (Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia, 57).

The case of Indonesia provides a factual counter argument to the fear of what an Islam-centric civil society would wreak if they were let loose in a democracy. Far from giving radicals a free reign, democracy allows Islamic civil society organizations an opportunity to be part of the system and benefit from stable government. An open society allows religious organizations to become champions of large groupings of people. These religious organizations can, as champions, assert the interests of the people they represent vis-à-vis the state. In Indonesia’s case, *NU has in some ways developed into an association of pesantrens*. Rich civil societies allow for religious institutions like pesantrens to have enough power to act independently of the government and negotiate the rules of the game as equal partners. Contrary to popular belief, pesantrens, like most civil society structures, act as indigenous barriers to radicalism (*).

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