On Scheduling and Redundancy for P2P Backup

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Abstract—An online backup system should be quick and reliable in both saving and restoring users’ data. To do so in a peer-to-peer implementation, data transfer scheduling and the amount of redundancy must be chosen wisely. We formalize the problem of exchanging multiple pieces of data with intermittently available peers, and we show that random scheduling completes transfers nearly optimally in terms of duration as long as the system is sufficiently large. Moreover, we propose an adaptive redundancy scheme that improves performance and decreases resource usage while keeping the risks of data loss low. Extensive simulations show that our techniques are effective in a realistic trace-driven scenario with heterogeneous bandwidth.

I. INTRODUCTION

The advent of cloud computing as a new paradigm to enable service providers with the ability to deploy cost-effective solutions has favored the development of a range of new services, including online storage applications. Due to the economy of scale of cloud-based storage services, the costs incurred by end-users to hand over their data to a remote storage location in the Internet have approached the cost of ownership of commodity storage devices.

As such, online storage applications spare users most of the time-consuming nuisance of data backup: user interaction is minimal, and in case of data loss due to an accident, restoring the original data is a seamless operation. However, the long-term storage costs that are typical of a backup application may easily go past that of traditional approaches to data backup. Additionally, while data availability is a key feature that large-scale data-centers deployments guarantee, its durability is questionable, as reported recently [1].

For these reasons, peer-to-peer (P2P) storage systems are an alternative to cloud-based solutions. Storage costs are merely those of a commodity storage device, which is shared (together with some bandwidth resources) with a number of remote Internet users to form a distributed storage system. Such applications optimize latency to individual file access: indeed, users hand over their data to the P2P system, which is used as a replacement of a local hard drive. In such a scenario, low access latency is difficult to achieve: the online behavior of users is unpredictable and, at large scale, crashes and failures are the norm rather than the exception. As a consequence, storage space is sacrificed for low access latency: a P2P application stores large amounts of redundant data to cope with such unfavorable events.

In this work we study a particular case of online storage: P2P backup applications. Data backup involves the bulk transfer of potentially large quantities of data, both during regular data backups and in case of data loss. As a consequence, low access latency is not an issue, while short backup and restore times seem a more reasonable goal.

Given these considerations, here we seek to optimize backup and restore times, while guaranteeing that data loss remains an unlikely event. There are two main design choices that affect these metrics: scheduling, i.e. deciding how to allocate data transfers between peers, and redundancy, i.e. the amount of data in the P2P system that guarantees a backup operation to be considered complete and safe. The endeavor of this work is to study and evaluate these two intertwined aspects.

First, we describe in detail our application scenario (Sec. II), and show why the assumptions underlying a backup application can simplify many problems addressed in the literature. We then set off to define the problem of scheduling in a full knowledge setting, and we show that it can be solved in polynomial time by reducing it to a maximal flow problem. Full knowledge of future peer uptime is obviously an unrealistic assumption: thus, we show that a randomized approach to scheduling yields near optimal results when the system scale is large and we corroborate our findings using real availability traces from an instant messaging application (Sec. III).

We then move to study a novel redundancy policy that, rather than focusing on short-term data availability, targets short data restore times. As such, our method alleviates the storage burden of large amounts of redundant data on client machines (Sec. IV). With a trace-driven simulation of a complete P2P backup system, we show that our technique is viable in practical scenarios and illustrate its benefits in terms of increased performance (Sec. V).

We conclude by studying a range of data maintenance policies when restore operations may undergo some natural delays. For example, detecting a faulty external hard-drive may not be immediate, or obtaining a new equipment upon a crash may require some time. We show that an “assisted” approach to data repair techniques (which involves a cloud-based storage service) can significantly reduce the probability of data loss, at an affordable cost (Sec. VI).

II. APPLICATION SCENARIO

In this work, similarly to many online backup applications (e.g., Dropbox1), we assume users to specify one local folder containing important data to backup. We also assume that

1https://www.dropbox.com/
backup data remains available locally to peers. This is an important trait that distinguishes backup from storage applications, in which data is only stored remotely.

Backup data consists of an opaque object, possibly representing an encrypted archive of changes to a set of files, that we term \textit{backup object}. In the spirit of incremental backups, we consider that each backup object should be kept on the system indefinitely. Consolidation and deletion of obsolete backups are not taken into account in this work.

A backup object of size $o$ is split into $k$ original fragments of a fixed size $f$, with $k = o/f$. Since backup data is stored on unreliable machines characterized by an unpredictable online behavior, the original $k$ blocks are encoded using erasure coding (e.g., Reed-Solomon). This creates $n$ encoded fragments having size $f$, of which any $k$ are sufficient to recover the original data. The redundancy rate is defined as $r = n/k$. Here we assume that encoded fragments reside on \textit{distinct} remote peers, which avoids that a single disk failure causes the loss of multiple fragments.

\textbf{Backup Phase}: The backup phase involves a data owner and a set of remote peers that eventually store encoded fragments for the data owner. We assume that any peer in the system can collect a list of remote peers with available storage space: this can be achieved by using known techniques, e.g. a centralized “tracker” or a decentralized data structure such as a distributed hash table.

Data backup requires a \textit{scheduling policy} that drives the choice of where and when to upload encoded fragments to remote peers. Moreover, a \textit{redundancy policy} determines when the data is safe, which completes the backup operation.

\textbf{Maintenance Phase}: Once the backup phase is completed and encoded fragments reside on remote peers, the maintenance phase begins. Peer crashes and departures can cause the loss of some encoded fragments; during the maintenance phase, peers detects such losses and generate new encoded fragments to restore a redundancy level at which the backup is safe again.

For a generic P2P storage system, in which encoded fragments only reside in the network and peers do not keep a local copy of their data, the maintenance phase is critical. Indeed, peers need to first download the whole backup object from remote machines, then to generate new encoded fragments and upload them to available peers. This problem has fostered the design of efficient coding schemes to mitigate the excessive network traffic caused by the maintenance operation (see e.g. [2], [3]).

In a backup application, the maintenance phase is less critical: the data owner can generate new encoded fragments using the local copy of the data with no download required.

\textbf{Restore Phase}: In the unfortunate case of a crash, the data owner initiates the restore phase. A peer contacts the remote machines holding encoded fragments, downloads at least $k$ of them, and reconstructs the original backup data. Again, a scheduling policy drives the process.

Since the ability to successfully restore data upon a crash is the ultimate goal of any backup system, in our application the restore traffic receives higher priority than the backup and maintenance traffic.

\textbf{A. Performance Metrics}

We characterize the system performance in terms of the amount of time required to complete the backup and the restore phases, labelled \textit{time to backup} (TTB) and \textit{time to restore} (TTR).

In the following Sections, we use baselines for backup and restore operations which bound both TTB and TTR. Let us assume an ideal storage system with unlimited capacity and uninterrupted online time that backs up user data. In this case, TTB and TTR only depend on backup object size and on bandwidth and availability of the data owner. We label these ideal values \textit{minTTB} and \textit{minTTR}, and we define them formally in Sec. III.

Additionally, we consider the \textit{data loss probability}, which accounts for the probability of a data owner to be unable to restore backup data.

A P2P backup application may exact a high toll in terms of peer resources, including storage and bandwidth. In this work we gloss over metrics of the burden on individual peers and the network, considering a scenario in which the resources of peers are lost if left unused.

\textbf{B. Availability Traces}

The online behavior of users, i.e., their patterns of connection and disconnection over time, is difficult to capture analytically. In this work we will perform our evaluations on a real application trace that exhibits both heterogeneity and correlated user behavior. Our traces capture user availability, in terms of login/logoff events, from an instant messaging (IM) server in Italy for a duration of 3 months. We argue that the behavior of regular IM users constitutes a representative case study. Indeed, for both an IM and an online backup application, users are generally signed in for as long as their machine is connected to the Internet.

In this work we only consider users that are online for an average of at least four hours per day, as done in the Wuala online storage application\(^2\). Once this filter is applied, we obtain the trace of 376 users. User availabilities are strongly correlated, in the sense that many users connect or disconnect around the same time. As shown in Fig. 1(a), there are strong differences between the number of users connected during day and night and between workdays and weekends. Most users are online for less than 40% of the trace, while some of them are almost always connected (Fig. 1(b)).

\section{III. The Scheduling Problem}

Scheduling data transfers between peers is an important operation that affects the time required to complete a backup or a restore task, especially in a system involving unreliable machines with unpredictable online patterns. Because of churn, a node might not be able to find online nodes to exchange data with: hence, TTB and TTR can grow due to idle periods of time. Unexpected node disconnections require a method to

\(^2\)http://www.wuala.com/
handle partial fragments, which can be discarded or resumed. Moreover, the redundancy rate used to cope with failures and unavailability may decrease system performance. Finally, the available bandwidth between peers involved in a data transfer, which may be shared due to parallel transmissions, is another cause for slow backup and restore operations.

In this Section, we focus on the implications of churn alone. We simplify the scheduling problem by assuming the redundancy factor to be a given input parameter, and neglecting the possibility of congestion due to several different backup, restore or maintenance processes interfering. Furthermore, we do not consider interrupted fragment transfers. In Section IV, we define an adaptive scheme to compute the redundancy rate applied to a backup operation and in Section V we relax all other assumptions.

We now define a reference scenario to bound TTB and TTR. Consider an ideal storage system (e.g. a cloud service) with unbounded bandwidth and 100% availability. A peer $i$ with upload and download bandwidth $u_i$ and $d_i$ starting the backup of an object of size $o$ at time $t$ completes its backup at time $t'$, after having spent $\frac{o}{u_i}$ time online. Analogously, $i$ restores a backup object with the same size at $t''$ after having spent $\frac{o}{d_i}$ time online. We define $\min\text{TTB}(i, t) = t' - t$ and $\min\text{TTR}(i, t) = t'' - t$. We use these reference values throughout the paper to compare the relative performance of our P2P application versus that of such an ideal system.

Because we neglect congestion issues, we can focus on a backup/restore operation as seen from a single peer in the system. Let us consider a generic peer $p_0$ and $I$ remote peers $p_1, \ldots, p_I$ used to store $p_0$’s data. We assume time to be fractioned in time-slots of fixed length. Let $a_{i,t}$ be an indicator variable so that $a_{i,t} = 1$ if and only if $p_i$ is online at time $t$. Each peer $i$ has integer upload and download capacity of respectively $u_i$ and $d_i$ fragments per time-slot.

We now proceed with a series of definitions used to formalize the scheduling problem.

**Definition 1:** A backup schedule is a set of $(i, t)$ tuples representing the decision of uploading a fragment from $p_0$ to peer $p_i$, where $i \in \{1 \ldots I\}$ at time-slot $t$. A valid backup schedule $S$ satisfies the following properties:

1) $\forall t : |\{(i : (i, t) \in S)\}| \leq u_0$: no more than $u_0$ fragments per time-slot can be uploaded.
2) $\forall (i, t) \in S : a_{i,t} = a_{0,t} = 1$: fragments are transferred only between online peers.
3) $\forall (i, t), (j, u) \in S : i \neq j$: no two fragments are stored on the same peer.

**Definition 2:** A restore schedule is a set of $(i, t)$ tuples representing the decision of downloading a fragment from a set of remote peers $p_i \in P$ at time $t$, where $P$ is set of storage peers that received a fragment during the backup phase. A valid restore schedule $S$ satisfies the following properties:

1) $\forall t : |\{(i : (i, t) \in S)\}| \leq d_0$: no more than $d_0$ fragments per time-slot can be recovered.
2) $\forall (i, t) \in S : a_{i,t} = a_{0,t} = 1$.
3) $\forall (i, t) : (j, u) \in S, i \neq j$.
4) $\forall (i, t) \in S : p_i \in P$: fragments can only be retrieved from storage peers.

**Definition 3:** The completion time $C$ of a schedule $S$ is the last time-slot in which a transfer is performed, that is:

$$C(S) = \max\{t : (i, t) \in S\}.$$ 

In the following, we first consider a full information setting, and show how to compute an optimal schedule which minimizes completion time provided that the online behavior of peers is known a priori. Then, we compare optimal scheduling to a randomized policy that needs no knowledge of future peer uptime; via a numeric analysis, we show the conditions under which a randomized, uninformed approach achieves performance comparable to that of an optimal schedule.

**A. Full Information Setting**

We cast the problem of finding the optimal schedule for both backup and restore operations as finding the minimum completion time to transfer a given number $x$ of fragments. For backup, $x$ will correspond to the number $n$ of redundant encoded fragments; for restores, $x$ will be equal to the number $k$ of original fragments. We show that this problem can be reduced to finding the maximum number of fragments that can be transferred within a given time $T$. We then use a max-flow formulation and show that existing algorithms can solve the original problem in polynomial time.

**Definition 4:** An optimal schedule to backup/restore $x$ fragments is one that achieves the minimum completion time to transfer at least $x$ fragments. Let $S$ be the set of all valid schedules; the minimum completion time is:

$$O(x) = \min\{C(S) : S \in S \land |S| \geq x\}. \tag{1}$$

The following proposition shows that the optimal completion time can be obtained by computing the maximum number of fragments that can be transferred in $T$ time-slots.

**Proposition 1:** Let $S$ be the set of all valid schedules and $F(t)$ be the function denoting the maximum number of fragments that can be transferred within time-slot $t$, that is:

$$F(t) = \max\{|S| : S \in S \land C(S) \leq t\}. \tag{2}$$

The optimal completion time is:

$$O(x) = \min\{t : F(t) \geq x\}.$$
We can now iteratively compute \( F(t) \) with growing values of \( t \); the above Proposition guarantees that the first value \( T \) that satisfies \( F(T) \geq x \) will be the desired result.

We now focus on a single instance of the problem of finding the maximum number of fragments \( F(T) \) that can be transferred within time-slot \( T \), and show that it can be encoded as a max-flow problem on a flow network built as follows. First, we create a bipartite directed graph \( G' = (V', E') \) where \( V' = V \cup P \); the elements of \( V \) are \( \{ t_i : i \in 1 \ldots T \} \) represent time-slots, the elements of \( P \) are \( \{ p_i : i \in 1 \ldots I \} \) represent remote peers (only storage nodes for restores). An edge connects a time-slot to a peer if that peer is online during that particular time-slot: \( E' = \{ (t_i, p_j) : t_i \in V \land p_j \in P \land a_{i,j} = 1 \} \). Source \( s \) and sink \( t \) nodes complete the bipartite graph \( G' \) and create a flow network \( G = (V, E) \). The source is connected to all the time-slots during which the data owner \( p_0 \) is online; all peers are connected to the sink.

The capacities on the edges are defined as follows: edges from the source to time-slots have capacity \( u_0 \) or \( d_0 \) (respectively, for backup and restore operations); edges between time-slots and peers have capacity \( d_i \) or \( u_i \) (respectively, for backup and restore operations); finally, edges between peers and the sink have capacity \( m \). Note that in this work we assume individual fragments to be uploaded to distinct peers, hence \( m = 1 \). To simplify presentation, we assume integer capacities \( u_k = d_k = 1 \forall k \in [0, I] \).

Fig. 2 illustrates an example of the whole procedure described above, for the case of a backup operation. Fig. 2(a) shows the online behavior for time-slots \( t_1, \ldots, t_8 \) of the data owner and the remote peers \( \{ p_1, p_2, p_3 \} \) that can be selected as remote locations to backup data. The optimal schedule problem amounts to deciding which remote peer should be awarded a time-slot to transfer backup fragments, so that the operation can be completed within the shortest time. This problem is encoded in the graph of Fig. 2(b). Time-slots and remote peers are represented by the nodes of the inner bipartite graph. An edge of capacity 1 connects a time-slot to the set of online peers in that time-slot, as derived from Fig. 2(a). The source node has an edge of capacity \( u_0 = 1 \) to every time-slot in which the data owner is online (in the figure, \( t_4, t_5 \) are shaded to remind \( p_0 \) is offline): this guarantees that only 1 fragment per time-slot can be transferred. The sink node has an incident edge with capacity \( m = 1 \) from every remote peer.

Each source flow represents a valid schedule. For backup operations, the schedule is valid because the three equations of Def. 1 are verified by construction of the flow network. Similarly, for restore operations the equations of Def. 2 are satisfied by construction, since only remote peers in the set \( P \) are part of the flow network.

In the particular case of the example the smallest value of \( t \) ensuring \( F(t) \geq 3 \) is 3, corresponding to a flow graph that contains only the \( t_1, t_2, t_3 \) time-slot nodes. The resulting optimal scheduling corresponds to the thick edges in Fig. 2(b).

For a flow network with \( V \) nodes and \( E \) edges, the max-flow can be computed with time complexity \( O \left( VE \log \left( \frac{V^2}{E} \right) \right) \) [4]. In our case, when we have \( p \) nodes and an optimal solution of \( t \) time-slots, \( V \) is \( O(p+t) \) and \( E \) is \( O(pt) \). The complexity of an instance of the algorithm is thus \( O \left( pt \left( p \log \frac{p}{p} + t \log \frac{1}{p} \right) \right) \).

The original problem, i.e., finding an optimal schedule that minimizes the time to transfer \( x \) fragments, can be solved by performing \( O(\log t) \) max-flow computations. In fact, an upper bound for the optimal completion time can be found in \( O(\log t) \) instances of the max-flow algorithm by doubling at each time the value of \( T \), then the optimal value can be obtained, again in \( O(\log t) \) time, by using binary search. The computational complexity of determining an optimal schedule in a full information framework is thus \( O \left( pt \log t \left( p \log \frac{p}{p} + t \log \frac{1}{p} \right) \right) \).

B. Random Scheduling

In practice, assuming complete knowledge of peers’ online behavior is not realistic. We introduce a randomized scheduling policy which only requires knowing which peers are online at the time of the scheduling decision. In Sec. III-C, we compare optimal and randomized scheduling using real traces.
For backup operations, in each time-slot, fragments are uploaded from the data owner to no more than \( u_0 \) remote peers chosen at random among those that are currently online and that did not receive a fragment in previous time-slots. This satisfies Def. 1. For restore operations, in each time-slot, \( d_0 \) remote peers in the set \( P \) are randomly chosen among those that are currently online and data is transferred back to the data owner. This satisfies Def. 2.

We now use Fig. 2 to illustrate a possible outcome of the randomized schedule defined here and compare it to the optimal schedule computed using the max-flow formalization. We focus on the backup operation of \( x = 3 \) fragments carried out by the data owner \( p_0 \). In Fig. 2(a), the data owner may randomly select \( p_1 \) to be the recipient of the first fragment in time-slot \( t_1 \). Since we assume \( m = 1 \) fragment can be stored on a distinct peer, this choice implies that time-slot \( t_2 \) is “wasted”. In time-slot \( t_3 \) the data owner has no choice but to store data on peer \( p_3 \). Only in time-slot \( t_7 \) the backup process is complete, when the last fragment is uploaded to peer \( p_2 \). Hence, this randomized schedule writes as \( (p_1, t_1); (p_3, t_3); (p_2, t_7) \).

The optimal schedule is obtained by computing the max-flow on the flow network in Fig. 2(b) (thick edges in the figure), and writes as \( (p_2, t_1); (p_1, t_2); (p_3, t_3) \). The backup operation only requires 3 time-slots to complete.

### C. Numerical Analysis

Here, we take a numerical perspective and compare optimal and randomized scheduling in terms of TTB and TTR. We focus on a single data owner \( p_0 \) involved in a backup operation. The input to the scheduling problem is the availability trace described in Sec. II-B, starting the backup at a random moment; we set the duration of a time-slot to one hour. Let \( u_0 = 1 \) fragment per time-slot be the upload rate of \( p_0 \). We report results for \( x \in \{40, 60, 80\} \) backup fragments, and vary the number of randomly chosen remote peers so that \( I \in \{1.1x, 1.2x, \ldots , 2x\} \). We obtained each data point by averaging 1,000 runs of the experiment; furthermore, for each of those runs, we averaged the completion times of 1,000 random schedules in the same settings.

Fig. 3 illustrates the ratio between the TTB achieved respectively by optimal and randomized scheduling, normalized to the ideal backup time \( \minTTB \). We observe that both optimal and randomized scheduling approach \( \minTTB \) when the number of remote peers available to store backup fragments increases: a large system improves transmission opportunities, and TTB approaches the ideal lower bound. However, when the number of backup fragments grows, which is a consequence of higher redundancy rates, randomized scheduling requires a larger pool of remote machines to approach the performance of the optimal scheduling. We also note that heterogeneous and correlated behavior of users in the availability trace results in “idle” time-slots in which neither optimal nor randomized scheduling can transfer data.

This very same evaluation can be used to evaluate a restore operation, even if the parameters acquire a different meaning.

In this case, the number \( x \) of fragments that need to be transferred is the number of original fragments \( k \), and the number of remote peers \( I \) will correspond to the number of encoded fragments \( n \). For restores, as the redundancy rate \( \frac{n}{k} \) grows, backups will be more efficient.

We conclude that randomized scheduling is a good choice for a P2P backup application, provided that:

- to have efficient backups, the ratio between number of nodes in the system and number of fragments to store is not very close to one;
- to have efficient restores, the redundancy rate is not very close to one.

As a heuristic threshold, in our analysis we obtain that a value of \( \frac{I}{x} = 1.5 \) is sufficient to complete backup and restore within a tolerable (around 10%) deviation from \( \minTTB \) or \( \minTTR \), respectively. In the following, we will therefore use randomized scheduling and make sure that such a ratio is reached in order to ensure that scheduling does not impose a too harsh penalty on TTB and TTR.

Birk and Kol [5] analyzed random backup scheduling by modeling peer uptime as a Markovian process. Albeit quantitatively different due to the absence of diurnal and weekly patterns in their model, their study reached a conclusion that is analogous to ours: in backups, the completion time of random scheduling converges to the optimal value as the system size grows.

### IV. Redundancy Policy

In the literature, the redundancy rate is generally chosen \textit{a priori} to ensure what we term \textit{prompt data availability}. Given a system with average availability \( a \), a target data availability \( t \), and assuming the availability of each individual peer as an independent random variable with probability \( a \), a \textit{system-wide} redundancy rate is computed as follows. The total number \( n \) of redundant fragments required to meet the target \( t \), when \( k \) original fragments constitute the data to backup is computed.
as [6]:
\[
\min \left\{ n \in \mathbb{N} : \sum_{i=k}^{n} \binom{n}{i} a^i (1-a)^{n-i} \geq t \right\}. \tag{3}
\]

We label this method fixed-redundancy, and use it in the following as a baseline approach.

Ensuring prompt data availability is not our goal, since peers only retrieve their data upon (hopefully rare) crash events. Data downloads correspond to restore operations, which require a long time to complete because of the sheer size of backup data. Hence, we approach the design of our redundancy policy by taking into account the tradeoffs that a backup application has to face. On the one hand, low redundancy improves the aggregate storage capacity of the system, TTB decreases, and maintenance costs drop. On the other hand, two factors discourage from selecting excessively low redundancy rates. First, TTR increases, as less peers will be online to serve fragments during data restores; second, there is a higher risk of data loss.

Our redundancy policy operates as follows. During the backup phase, peers constantly estimate their TTR and the probability of losing data and adjust the redundancy rate according to the characteristics of the remote peers that hold their data. In practice, data owners upload encoded fragments until the estimates of TTR and data loss probability are below an arbitrary threshold. When the threshold is crossed, the backup phase terminates.

Note that TTB is generally several times longer than TTR. First, in the restore phase, peers are not likely to disconnect from the Internet. Second, most peers have asymmetric lines with fast downlink and slow uplink; third, backups require uploading redundant data while restores involve downloading an amount of data equivalent to the original backup object. Because of this unbalance, we argue that it is reasonable to use a redundancy scheme that trades longer TTR (which affects only users that suffer a crash) for shorter TTB (which affects all users).

We now delve into the details of how to approximate TTR and data loss probability.

A. Approximating TTR

Similarly to the optimal scheduling problem, predicting accurately the TTR requires full knowledge of disk failure events and peer availability patterns. We obtain an estimate of the TTR with a heuristic approach; in Sec. V we show that our approximation is reasonable.

We assume that a data owner \( p_0 \) remains online during the whole restore process. The TTR can be bounded for two reasons: \( i \) the download bandwidth \( d_0 \) of the data owner is a bottleneck; \( ii \) the upload rate of remote peers holding \( p_0 \)'s data is a bottleneck. Let us focus on the second case: we define the expected upload rate of a generic remote peer \( p_i \), holding a backup fragment of \( p_0 \) as the product \( a_i u_i \) of the average availability and the upload bandwidth of \( p_i \). The data owner needs \( k \) fragments to recover the backup object; suppose these fragments are served by the \( k \) “fastest” remote peers. In this case, the “bottleneck” upload rate is that of the \( k \)-th peer \( p_j \) with the smaller expected upload rate. If we consider \( l \) parallel downloads and a backup object of size \( o \), a peer computes an estimate of the TTR as

\[
eTTR = \max \left( \frac{o}{d_0}, \frac{o}{l a_j u_j} \right). \tag{4}
\]

B. Approximating the Data Loss Probability

Upon a crash, a peer with \( n \) fragments placed on remote peers can lose its data if more than \( n - k \) of them crash as well before data is completely restored. Considering a delay \( w \) that can pass between the crash event and the beginning of the restore phase, we compute the data loss probability within a total delay of \( t = w + eTTR \).

We consider disk crashes to be memoryless events, with constant probability for any peer and at any time. Disk lifetimes are thus exponentially distributed stochastic variables with a parametric average \( \overline{t} \): a peer crashes by time \( t \) with probability \( 1 - e^{-t/\overline{t}} \). The probability of data loss is then

\[
\sum_{i=n-k+1}^{n} \binom{n}{i} \left( 1 - e^{-t/\overline{t}} \right)^i \left( e^{-t/\overline{t}} \right)^{n-i}. \tag{5}
\]

Data loss probability needs to be monitored with great care. In Fig. 4, we plot the probability of losing data as a function of the redundancy rate and the delay \( t \). Here we set \( \overline{t} = 90 \) days and \( k = 64 \); when the time without maintenance is in the order of magnitude of weeks, even a small decrease in redundancy can increase the probability of data loss by several orders of magnitude.

In summary, our redundancy policy triggers the end of the backup phase, and determines the redundancy rate applied to a backup object. Since we trade longer TTR for shorter TTB, our scheme ensures that data redundancy is enough to make data loss probability small, and keeps TTR under a certain value.

Finally, we remark that our approximation techniques require knowing the uplink capacity and the average availability of remote peers. While a decentralized approach to resource monitoring is an appealing research subject, it is common practice (e.g. Wuala) to rely on a centralized infrastructure to monitor peer resources.
V. SYSTEM SIMULATION

We proceed with a trace-driven system simulation, considering all the factors identified in Sec. III: churn, correlated uptime, peer bandwidth, congestion, and fragment granularity.

A. Simulation Settings

Our simulation covers three months, using the availability traces described in Sec. II-B, with the exception that peers remain online during restores. Uplink capacities of peers are obtained by sampling a real bandwidth distribution measured at more than 300,000 unique Internet hosts for a 48 hour period from roughly 3,500 distinct ASes across 160 countries [7]. These values have a highly skewed distribution, with a median of 77 kbps and a mean of 428 kbps. To represent typical asymmetric residential Internet lines, we assign to each peer a downlink speed equal to four times its uplink.

Our adaptive redundancy policy uses the following parameters: we set the threshold for the estimated TTR to satisfy $e^{\text{TTR}} \leq \max(1 \text{ day}, 2 \cdot \text{minTTR})$ and we keep the probability of data loss smaller than $10^{-4}$, when $w = 2$ weeks is the maximum delay between crash and restore events (see Sec. IV-B).

Each node has 10 GB of data to backup, and dedicates 50 GB of storage space to the application. The high ratio between these two values lets us disregard issues due to insufficient storage capacity (which is considered to be cheap) and focus on the subjects of our investigation, i.e., scheduling and redundancy. The fragment size $f$ is set to 160 MB, resulting in $k = 64$ original fragments per backup object.

We define peers’ lifetimes to be exponentially distributed random variables with an expected value of 90 days. After they crash, peers return online immediately and start their restore process; in Sec. VI, we also consider a delay between crash events and restore operations.

As discussed in Sec. IV-B, we compare against a baseline redundancy policy that assigns a fixed redundancy rate. Here we set a target data availability of $t = 0.99$, and use the system-wide average availability $\alpha = 0.36$ as computed from our availability traces. Hence, we obtain a value $n = 228$ and a redundancy rate $n/k = 3.56$.

Our simulations involve 376 peers. This is sufficient to ensure that the performance of a randomized scheduling is close to optimality (see Sec. III).

For each set of parameters, the simulation results are obtained by averaging ten simulation runs.

B. Results

Fig. 5 shows the cumulative distribution function of minTTR and minTTR; these baseline values are deeply influenced by the bandwidth distribution we used, and their gap is justified by the asymmetry of the access bandwidth and the assumption that peers stay online during the restore process.

We now verify the accuracy of our approximation of TTR, expressed as the ratio of estimated versus measured TTR. This ratio has a median of 0.92, with 10th and 90th percentiles of respectively 0.50 and 2.56. The values of TTRs vary mostly due to the diurnal and weekly connectivity patterns of users in our traces, but for most cases the eTTR is a sensible rough estimation of TTR.

The adaptive policy pays off, with an average redundancy rate of 1.91 against a flat value of 3.56 for the baseline approach (Fig. 6(a)); the maintenance traffic decreases accordingly, and the system almost doubles its storage capacity. In addition, TTB is roughly halved with the adaptive scheme (Fig. 6(b)); a price for this is paid by crashed peers, which will have longer TTR (Fig. 6(c)). As we argued in Sec. IV, we think this loss is tolerable and well offset by the benefits of reduced redundancy. We observe tails where a minority of the nodes have very high TTB/minTTR and TTR/minTTR ratios. They are nodes with very high bandwidths and therefore low values of minTTR and minTTR (see Fig. 5); their backup and restore speeds will be limited by the bandwidth of remote nodes which are orders of magnitude smaller.

These results certify that our adaptive scheme beneficially affects performance. However, lower redundancy might result in higher risks of losing data: in the following section, we analyze this.

VI. DATA LOSS AND DELAYED RESTORE

Our simulation settings put the system under exceptional stress: the peer crash rate is two orders of magnitude higher than what is reported for commodity hardware [8]. In such an adverse scenario, we study the likelihood and the causes of data loss, and their relation to the redundancy scheme.

In addition, we discuss the implications of delayed response to crashes, affecting both restore and maintenance operations. We consider the following scenarios:

- **Immediate response**: Peers start restores as soon as they crash. Moreover, they immediately alert relevant peers to start their maintenance.
- **Delayed response**: Crashed peers return online after a random delay. If this delay exceeds a timeout, peers suffering from fragment loss start their maintenance.
- **Delayed assisted response**: After the above timeout, a third party intervenes to rescue crashed peers whose data is at risk, by maintaining it.

In our simulations, delays are exponentially distributed random variables with an average of one week; the timeout
value is one week as well.

For performance reasons, assisted maintenance can be supported by an online storage provider, which is used as a temporary buffer. Here we assume a provider with 100% uptime, unlimited bandwidth and storage space: maintenance is triggered upon expiration of the timeout, conditioned to a data loss probability greater than \(10^{-4}\).

In our experiments, due to the inflated peer crash rates, between 11.4% and 14.6% of crashed peers could not recover their data. In Table I, we focus on those peers. The majority of data loss events affected peers that crashed before they completed their backups, according to the redundancy policy (unfinished backups column). This can be due to two reasons: the backup process is inherently time-consuming, due to the availability and bandwidth of data owners; or the backup system is inefficient.

To differentiate between these two cases, we consider unavoidable data loss events (rightmost column in the table). If a peer crashes before minTTB, no online backup system could have saved the data. Data backup takes time: this simple fact alone accounts for far more than all the limitations of a P2P approach. Users should worry more about completing their backup quickly than about the reliability of their peers.

The difference in redundancy between the high rate used by the fixed baseline and the adaptive approach does not impact significantly the data loss rate, excepting the case of non-assisted delayed response. Assisted maintenance is an effective way to counter this effect.

In Fig. 7 we show the costs of assisted repairs in terms of data traffic. Given that prices on storage service are highly asymmetric\(^4\) we only consider the outbound traffic, from provider to peers. Data volumes are expressed as fractions of the total size of backup objects in the system. There is a striking difference between the adaptive and fixed redundancy schemes: higher redundancy results in less emergency situations in which the server has to step in. The amount of data stored on the server has a peak load of less than 2.5% of the total backup size: the assisted repairs are quick, therefore only a small fraction of the peers need assistance simultaneously.

### VII. Related Work

Redundancy rates and data repair techniques in P2P backup systems have been investigated from various angles. Various works \([9],[10]\) determine redundancy as a function of node failure rate in order to guarantee data durability at the expense of data availability. Many other approaches (e.g., \([11],[13]\)) adopt formulae similar to Equation 3 to guarantee low latency through prompt data availability, but require high redundancy rates in typical settings. Our proposal strives to provide both durability and performance at a low redundancy cost, relaxing prompt data availability by requiring that data becomes recoverable within a given time window.

A complete system design requires considering several problems that were not addressed in this paper; fortunately, many of them have been tackled in the literature.

When a full system needs to be backed up, convergent encryption \([14],[15]\) can be used to ensure that storage space

\(^4\)To date (July 2010), inbound traffic to Amazon S3 is free: http://aws.amazon.com/s3/#pricing.
does not get wasted by saving multiple copies of the same file across the system.

Data maintenance is cheap in our scenario, where it is performed by a data owner with a local copy. When maintenance is delegated to nodes that do not have a local copy of the backup objects, various coding schemes can be used [2], [3] to limit the amount of required data transit. For these settings, cryptographic protocols [16], [17] have been designed to verify the authenticity of stored data.

A recurrent problem for P2P applications is creating incentives to encourage nodes in contributing more resources. This can be done via reputation systems [18] or virtual currency [19]. Specifically for storage systems, an easy and efficient solution is segregating nodes in sub-networks with roughly homogeneous characteristics such as uptime and storage space [20], [21].

Backup objects, whose confidentiality can be ensured by standard encryption techniques, should encode incremental differences between archive versions. Recently, various techniques have been proposed to optimize computational time and size of these differences [22].

It may happen that resources offered by peers are just not sufficient to satisfy all user needs. In this case, a hybrid peer-assisted system can be developed where data is stored on a centralized data center and on peers. This can result in scenarios having performances comparable with centralized systems, at a fraction of the costs [23].

VIII. CONCLUSION

The P2P paradigm applied to backup applications is a compelling alternative to centralized online solutions, which become costly for long-term storage.

In this work, we revisited P2P backup and argued that such an application is viable. Because the online behavior of users is unpredictable and, at large scale, crashes and failures are the norm rather than the exception, we showed that scheduling and redundancy policies are paramount to achieve short backup and restore times.

We gave a novel formalization of optimal scheduling and showed that, with full information, a problem that may appear combinatorial in nature can actually be solved efficiently by reducing it to a maximal flow problem. Without full information, optimal scheduling is unfeasible; however, we showed that as the system size grows, the gap between randomized and optimal scheduling policies diminishes rapidly.

Furthermore, we studied an adaptive scheme that strives to maintain data redundancy small, which implies shorter backup times than a state-of-the-art approach that uses a system-wide, fixed redundancy rate. This comes at the expense of increased restore times, which we argued to be a reasonable price to pay, especially in light of our study on the probability of data loss. In fact, we determined that the vast majority of data loss episodes are due to incomplete backups. Our experiments illustrated that such events are unavoidable, as they are determined by the limitations of data owners alone: no online storage system could have avoided such unfortunate events. We conclude that short backup times are crucial, far more than the reliability of the P2P system itself. As such, the crux of a P2P backup application is to design mechanisms that optimize such metric.

Our research agenda includes the design and implementation of a fully fledged prototype of a P2P backup application. Additionally, we will extend the parameter space of our study, to include the natural heterogeneity of user demand in terms of storage requirements. To do so, we will collect measurements from both existing online storage systems and from a controlled deployment of our prototype implementation.

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