Reusing Multi-Stage Multi-Secret Sharing Schemes Based on CRT
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Abstract—Three secret sharing schemes that use the Mignotte’s sequence and two secret sharing schemes that use the Asmuth-Bloom sequence are proposed in this paper. All these five secret sharing schemes are based on Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) [8]. The first scheme that uses the Mignotte’s sequence is a single secret scheme; the second one is an extension of the first one to Multi-secret sharing scheme. The third scheme is again for the case of multi-secrets but it is an improvement over the second scheme in the sense that it reduces the number of public values. The first scheme that uses the Asmuth-Bloom sequence is designed for the case of a single secret and the second one is an extension of the first scheme to the case of multi-secrets.

Novelty of the proposed schemes is that the shares of the participants are reusable i.e., same shares are applicable even with a new secret. Also only one share needs to be kept by each participant even for the multi-secret sharing scheme. Further, the schemes are capable of verifying the honesty of the participants including the dealer. Correctness of the proposed schemes is discussed and show that the proposed schemes are computationally secure.

Index Terms—Multi-Secret, Mignotte’s sequence, Asmuth-Bloom sequence, CRT, Secret sharing scheme

I. INTRODUCTION

The requirement of the key being secret brings several problems. Storing a secret key with only one person or server or database reduces the security of the system to the security and credibility of that agent. Besides, not having a backup of the key introduces the problem of losing the key if a mishap occurs. On the other hand, if the key is held by more than one agent an adversary with a desire for the key has more flexibility of choosing the target. Hence the security is reduced to the security of the least secure or least credible of these agents. Secret sharing schemes are introduced to solve these problems of key management. The main idea of these schemes is to share a secret among a set of agents such that only the predefined coalitions can come together and reveal the secret, while no other coalition can obtain any information about the secret. Thus, the keys used in areas requiring vital secrecy like large-scale finance applications and command control mechanisms of nuclear systems, can be stored by using secret sharing schemes.

Secret sharing was first proposed by Blakley[3] and Shamir[4]. The scheme by Shamir relies on the standard Lagrange polynomial interpolation, whereas the scheme by Blakley[3] is based on the geometric idea that uses the concept of intersecting hyperplanes.

The family of authorized subsets is known as the access structure. An access structure is said to be monotone if a set is qualified then its superset must also be qualified. Several access structures are proposed in the literature. They include the \((t, n)\)-threshold access structure, the Generalized access structure and the Multipartite access structure. In the \((t, n)\)-threshold access structure there are \(n\) shareholders. An authorized group consists of any \(t\) or more participants and any group of at most \(t−1\) participants is an unauthorized group. Let \(U\) be a set of \(n\) participants and let \(2^U\) be its power set. Then the ‘Generalized access structure’ refers to situations where the collection of permissible subsets of \(U\) may be any collection \(\Gamma \subseteq 2^U\) having the monotonicity property.

In multipartite access structures, the set of players \(U\) is partitioned into \(m\) disjoint entities \(U_1, U_2, \ldots, U_m\) called levels and all players in each level play exactly the same role inside the access structure.

In multi-secret sharing schemes the problem of sharing many secrets is addressed. In these schemes, every participant needs to keep only one shadow and many secrets can be shared independently without refreshing the shadow. In order to reconstruct a secret, each involved participant only needs to submit a pseudo shadow computed from the real shadow instead of the real shadow itself. The reconstruction of a secret cannot compromise the secrecy of the remaining secrets that haven’t been reconstructed. A typical scenario wherein the multi-secret sharing problem occurs is as follows.

Suppose that a company has \(l\) secrets which are important for business functionalities. Each secret contains a key information needed to perform a business operation. The company does not trust any single employee to access any one of the secrets. The company decides that each secret be shared among a set of employees/participants according to a specific threshold access structure. The company may use multiple secret sharing schemes to share these secrets. However, each employee needs to keep multiple shadows to participate in each game of secret sharing corresponding to each secret. So, there will be a shadow/share management problem in this method. Hence the need for multi-secret sharing schemes.
A. Detection of cheaters

A verifiable secret-sharing scheme [13] provides its shareholders with an ability to verify that (a) the secret shadows obtained from the dealer are derived consistently from the same secret and (b) the secret shadows obtained from the other shareholder in the secret reconstruction process are genuine shadows. This ability is important because a dishonest dealer can cheat share holders by giving them fake shadows. Also communication errors can result in fake shadows. A shareholder may also cheat others in the secret reconstruction process by presenting a fake shadow to prevent others from obtaining the real secret. Secret sharing schemes involving cheaters is discussed in [5] and Cheating detection and identification in CRT based schemes was presented by pasaila [7].

B. Related Work

Secret sharing scheme that uses Mignotte’s sequence and is based on Chinese Remainder Theorem [8] is introduced in [1], and it is modified to result in another scheme by Asmuth-Bloom [2], J. He, E. Dawson [9], proposed a multi-stage secret sharing scheme based on one way function in 1994 [10], [11], [12]. They used Lagrange interpolation polynomial in order to perform secret sharing. Later in 2000, Chien et al. [15] proposed a new type of (t, n) multi-secret sharing scheme based on the systematic block codes. Subba Rao Y V and Chakravarthy Bhagvati [14] came up with a multi-stage secret sharing scheme based on CRT. In the later scheme multiple secrets are shared to different groups, such that each group receives a share of the secret intended for it.

C. Motivation

Mignotte’s and Asmuth-Bloom Secret Sharing Schemes are based on CRT. They are designed to handle single secret only and hence they are not capable of handling multiple secrets. So, to share multiple secrets, one needs to initiate multiple (one for each secret) secret sharing schemes. Also the shares distributed in connection with (corresponding to) one secret cannot be reused for a different secret. That is shares need to be distributed whenever a new secret is to be shared. This results in receiving a participant to keep multiple shares corresponding to each secret. So, there will be a share management problem. This paper addresses this aspect of the secret sharing schemes and proposes several schemes that overcome this issue.

The paper is organised as follows: The following subsections gives an overview of Mignotte and Asmuth-Bloom schemes. Section 2 gives an overview of the Mignotte’s and Asmuth-Bloom Schemes. Section 3 and 4 propose Mignotte’s sequence based reusable secret sharing schemes designed for single and multiple secrets respectively. Section 5 improves on the multi-secret Sharing Scheme given in Section 4 by reducing the number of public values required. Sections 6 and 7 propose Asmuth-Bloom sequence based reusable secret sharing schemes designed for single and multiple secrets respectively. Our results are shown in section 8 and Concluding remarks are in section 9.

II. Existing Schemes

A. Overview of Mignotte’s SSS

Mignotte’s sequence: Let t and n be two integers such that \( n \geq 2 \) and \( 2 \leq t \leq n \). A \((t, n)\) Mignotte’s sequence is a sequence of pairwise co-prime positive integers \( p_1 < p_2 < \ldots < p_n \) such that

\[
\prod_{i=0}^{t-2} p_{n-i} \leq \prod_{i=1}^{t} p_i
\]

This can be seen to be equivalent to

\[
\max_{1 \leq i_1 < \ldots < i_{t-1} \leq n} (p_{i_1} \cdot p_{i_2} \cdot \ldots \cdot p_{i_{t-1}}) < \min_{1 \leq i_1 < \ldots < i_t \leq n} (p_{i_1} \cdot p_{i_2} \cdot \ldots \cdot p_{i_t})
\]

To share a secret \( S \) among a group of \( n \) users, the dealer does the following:

1) Distribution:
   - The secret \( S \) is chosen as a random integer such that \( \beta < S < \alpha \)
     
     where \( \alpha = \prod_{i=1}^{t} p_i \) and \( \beta = \prod_{i=0}^{t-2} p_{n-i} \).
   - Compute shares \( I_i = S \mod p_i \) for all \( 1 \leq i \leq n \).
   - Distribute shares \( I_i, 1 \leq i \leq n, \) to \( n \) participants.

2) Reconstruction:
   - Given \( t \) distinct shares \( I_{i_1}, I_{i_2}, \ldots, I_{i_t} \) the secret \( S \) is reconstructed using the standard variant of Chinese Remainder Theorem, as the unique solution modulo

\[
p_1 \cdot \ldots \cdot p_t
\]

of the system,

\[
S \equiv I_{i_j} \mod p_{i_j}, 1 \leq j \leq t
\]

B. Overview of Asmuth-Bloom SSS

A sequence of pairwise coprime positive integers (can also be called as Asmuth-Bloom sequence) \( p_0, p_1 < \cdots < p_n \) is chosen such that

\[
p_0 \prod_{i=1}^{t-2} P_{n-i} < \prod_{i=1}^{t} P_i
\]

To share a secret \( S \) among a group of \( n \) users, the dealer does the following:

Distribution:
   - The secret \( S \) is chosen as a random integer of the set \( Z_{p_0} \).
   - Compute shares \( I_i = X = (S + \gamma p_0) \mod p_i \) for all \( 1 \leq i \leq n \) where \( \gamma \) is an arbitrary integer such that

\[
p_0 \prod_{i=0}^{t-2} P_{n-i} < (S + \gamma p_0) < \prod_{i=1}^{t} P_i
\]

   - Distribute shares \( I_i, 1 \leq i \leq n, \) to participants.

Reconstruction:
   - Given \( t \) distinct shares \( I_{i_1}, I_{i_2}, \ldots, I_{i_t} \) the modified secret \( X \) is reconstructed using the standard variant of Chinese Remainder Theorem, as the unique solution modulo \( p_{i_1} \cdot \ldots \cdot p_{i_t} \) of the system
\[ X \equiv I_{ij} \mod p_{ij}, 1 \leq j \leq t \]

- The original secret can be reconstructed using \( S = X \mod p_0 \)

C. Two-variable one-way function

A two-variable one-way function \( F(r, z) \) is a function that maps a random value \( r \) and a share \( z \) onto a bit string \( F(r, z) \) of a fixed length. This function has the following properties.

- Given \( r \) and \( z \), it is easy to compute \( F(r, z) \);
- Given \( z \) and \( F(r, z) \), it is hard to compute \( r \);
- Having no knowledge of \( z \), it is hard to compute \( F(r, z) \) for any \( r \);
- Given \( z \), it is hard to find two different values \( r_1 \) and \( r_2 \) such that \( F(r_1, z) = F(r_2, z) \);
- Given \( r \) and \( F(r, z) \), it is hard to compute \( z \);
- Given pairs of \( r_1 \) and \( F(r_1, z) \), it is hard to compute \( F(r', z) \) for \( r' \neq r_1 \).

III. REUSABLE SINGLE SECRET SCHEME BASED ON MIGNOTTE’S SEQUENCE

In the previous schemes i.e Mignotte [1], Asmuth-Bloom [2], the shares are directly related to the secret. That is a new set of shares needs to be distributed whenever a new secret is to be shared. So, we hereby propose a scheme [6] that overcomes this limitation; thereby allowing the shares to be reusable.

Overview of the scheme

Initially, the dealer comes up with the number of participants, \( (n) \), threshold value, \( (k) \), the secret (\( S \)) to be shared among the participants \( P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n \), one way function, \( (f) \) and the Mignotte’s sequence \( p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n \) to be used. Also the dealer chooses random values \( y_i, 1 \leq i \leq n \), and distributes them one each to the participants (i.e. \( y_i \) to \( P_i \)) as the pseudo shares of the participants. The dealer then computes the (real) shares \( Z_i \) of the participants \( P_i, 1 \leq i \leq n \), from the secret. Now the dealer applies the chosen one-way function \( f \) to each of these random numbers \( y_i \), subtracts each of these resulting numbers \( f(y_i) \) from the corresponding real shares \( Z_i, 1 \leq i \leq n \), of the participants. These values are made public. While reconstructing the secret, the participants first apply one-way function to the pseudo share, which they possess, adds the resulting value \( f(y_i) \) to the corresponding public share and recovers the actual share \( Z_i \) of these shares. These shares are then used to recover the secret using CRT.

A. Distribution
- Dealer chooses a publicly known \((k, n)\) Mignotte’s sequence \( p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n \);
- Chooses randomly \( y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n \) such that \( y_i \in Z_p \), as the pseudo share of the \( i^{th} \) participant.
- Chooses the secret \( S \) such that \( \beta < S < \alpha \), where \( \alpha = \prod_{i=1}^{k} p_i \) and \( \beta = \prod_{i=0}^{k-2} p_{n-i} \).
- Computes \( Z_i = S \mod p_i, 1 \leq i \leq n \).
- Computes \( d_i = (Z_i - f(y_i)) \mod p_i, 1 \leq i \leq n \), as the shift values, where \( f \) is the chosen one way function.
- For every \( i, 1 \leq i \leq n \), deliver \( y_i \) to the \( i^{th} \) participant through a secure channel and publish \( d_i \).

B. Reconstruction
- Each participant calculates his actual share by computing \( Z_i = (d_i + f(y_i)) \mod p_i \).
- The secret is reconstructed from the shares \( Z_i \) of \( k \) or more participants using CRT.

C. Example:

1) Distribution:
- Consider a publicly known \((3, 5)\) Mignotte’s sequence to be \( 5, 7, 11, 13, 17 \).
- Let the random values be \( y_1 = 3, y_2 = 4, y_3 = 8, y_4 = 5, y_5 = 10 \) and the chosen one way function be the exponentiation of 2 modulo 17.
- Consider the secret as 297 which lies between \( \beta \) and \( \alpha \), where \( \beta = 221 \) and \( \alpha = 385 \).
- Compute \( Z_i = S \mod p_i, 1 \leq i \leq 5 \).
- \( Z_1 = 297 \mod 5 = 2 \), \( Z_2 = 297 \mod 7 = 3 \), \( Z_3 = 297 \mod 11 = 0 \), \( Z_4 = 297 \mod 13 = 11 \), \( Z_5 = 297 \mod 17 = 8 \).
- Compute shift values \( d_1 = Z_1 - f(y_1) \mod p_1, 1 \leq i \leq 5 \).
- \( d_1 = (2 - 8) \mod 5 = 4 \), \( d_2 = (3 - 16) \mod 7 = 1 \), \( d_3 = (0 - 1) \mod 11 = 10 \), \( d_4 = (11 - 15) \mod 13 = 9 \), \( d_5 = (8 - 4) \mod 17 = 4 \).
- These values are made public and \( y_i, 1 \leq i \leq 5 \), are privately delivered to the participants.

2) Reconstruction:
- Three participants, say \( Z_1, Z_2, Z_5 \), want to pool their shares and reconstruct the secret. So they calculate their actual shares by computing \( Z_i = (d_i + f(y_i)) \mod p_i \) for \( i = 1, 2 \) and 5. That is
- \( Z_1 = (4 + 8) \mod 5 = 2 \), \( Z_2 = (1 + 16) \mod 7 = 3 \), and \( Z_5 = (4 + 4) \mod 17 = 8 \).
- The secret is reconstructed from the following equations using CRT.

\[
S \equiv 2 \mod 5
\]
\[
S \equiv 3 \mod 7
\]
\[
S \equiv 8 \mod 17
\]

We have \( M = 5 \times 7 \times 17 = 595 \), \( m_1 = \frac{M}{5} = 119 \), \( m_2 = \frac{M}{7} = 85 \), \( m_3 = \frac{M}{17} = 35 \) and \( N_1 = 4, N_2 = 1, N_3 = 1 \) where \( N_i, 1 \leq i \leq 3 \) are such that \( m_1 N_1 = 1 \mod 5, m_2 N_2 = 1 \mod 7, m_3 N_3 = 1 \mod 17 \).
Therefore, \( S = (2 \times 119 + 4 \times 85 + 1 \times 35) \mod 595 = 297 \)
Hence the secret.

IV. PROPOSED MULTI-STAGE MULTI-SECRET SHARING SCHEME BASED ON MIGNOTTE’S SEQUENCE

Overview of the scheme

As in the previous single secret scheme, here also the dealer initializes all the required parameters. The only difference is
that the dealer chooses multiple, say \( l \), secrets \( S_i, 1 \leq i \leq l \), instead of a single secret. The chosen secrets \( S_i, 1 \leq i \leq l \), are then modified to \( S'_i = S_i + S_{i+1}, 1 \leq i \leq l - 1 \), except the last secret \( S_l \), which remains as it is. Successful reconstruction of the secrets is possible only when the secrets lie between the values of \( \beta \) and \( \alpha \). So as to bring the modified secrets (i.e. \( S'_i = S_i + S_{i+1} \)) to this range, we divide each of the modified secret by 2. While doing so, we modify the secrets \( S'_i \) by subtracting 1 from the odd secrets and record this by setting a flag bit \( b_i \). The resulting values are the final modified secrets \( (S''_i) \), from which the actual shares \( (Z_{ij}) \) of the participants are generated. From the actual shares \( Z_{ij}, 1 \leq i \leq l, 1 \leq j \leq n \), and the pseudo shares \( y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n \), public values \( d_{ij} \) are computed. Verification values are also derived from the actual shares. Both the sets, i.e. the set of the public \( (d_i \text{ values}) \) and the set of verification values are made public. The random values (i.e. pseudo shares \( y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n \) which were chosen by the dealer are distributed privately to each participant. In the verification phase, any participant can compute the hash value by using verification function and check whether they are equal to the published verification values.

In the reconstruction phase, participants compute their actual shares by adding the images of the one-way function of their secret shadows to the public values. CRT is used to reconstruct the modified secrets, which are then multiplied by 2. \( S_{l-1} \) is then recovered by subtracting the previously reconstructed secret \( S_l \).

A. Initialization

In this phase, all the variables are initialized and the secrets are chosen.

Algorithm 1 Initialization

1. Let \( \{P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n\} \) be the \( n \) participants and \( k \) be the threshold value.
2. Consider a publicly known \( (k, n) \) Mignotte’s sequence, say \( p_1 < p_2 < \ldots < p_n \).
3. Randomly choose \( n \) secret shadows \( y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n \) such that \( y_i \in Z_{p_i} \) as the pseudo shares.
4. Choose the secrets \( S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_l \) such that \( \beta < S_i < \alpha \), \( 1 \leq i \leq l \), where \( \alpha = \prod_{i=1}^{2+k} P_i \) and \( \beta = \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} P_i \).

B. Distribution

In the distribution phase, actual secret is modified except the \( l^{th} \) secret. Shares are computed from these modified secrets.

Algorithm 2 Distribution of Shares

1: Compute \( S''_i = S_i + S_{i+1}, 1 \leq i \leq l - 1 \)
2: For \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, l - 1 \)
    Begin
3: If \( (S'_i \pmod{2} == 1) \) then \( S''_i = (S'_i - 1)/2 \) and set \( b_i = 1 \)
4: Else \( S''_i = S'_i/2 \) and set \( b_i = 0 \)
End.
5: \( S''_l = S'_l \)
6: Compute \( Z_{ij} = S''_i \pmod{p_j} \)
7: Compute \( d_{ij} = (Z_{ij} - f_i(y_j)) \pmod{p_j} \), where \( f \) is a one-way function and \( f'(x) \) denotes \( i \) successive applications of \( f \) to \( x \). i.e \( f^i(x) = x \) and \( f'(x) = f(f^{i-1}(x)) \) for \( i \geq 1 \)
8: Compute \( F(r, Z_{ij}) \), where \( r \) is a random value
End.
9: Distribute \( y_j \) to each participant through a secure channel and publish all \( d_{ij}, F(r, Z_{ij}) \) values, \( r \) and two-variable one-way function \( F(r, z) \).

C. Verification

In this phase, each participant can verify the allocated share. Reconstructor also can verify the shares provided by the participants.

Algorithm 3 Verification of shares

1: Participants can verify their shares by calculating \( F(r, Z_{ij}) \), where \( Z_{ij} \) itself can be computed by using pseudo shares \( y_j \) and the corresponding public values \( d_{ij} \).
2: Similarly, reconstructor also can verify honesty of the other participants by computing \( F(r, Z_{ij}) \).

D. Reconstruction

Secrets are reconstructed in sequential order starting from the last, i.e. the \( l^{th} \) secret. Any \( k \) or more participants can pool their shares and reconstruct these secrets.

Algorithm 4 Reconstruction of secrets

1: Each participant \( j, 1 \leq j \leq n \), willing to take part in the reconstruction calculates \( Z_{ij} = (d_{ij} + f_i(y_j)) \pmod{p_j}, 1 \leq i \leq l \)
2: Any \( k \) participants can pool their shares and reconstruct the secrets \( S_1, S_{l-1}, \ldots, S_1 \) in a sequential order as follows
3: If \( i = l \), then construct \( S''_l = S'_l \) and hence the secret \( S_l \) using CRT from the shares \( Z_{ij} \)
   For \( i = l - 1, l - 2, \ldots, 1 \) do the following:
4: Construct \( S''_i \) using CRT from the shares \( Z_{ij} \)
5: \( S'_i = S''_i \pmod{2} \)
6: If \( b_i = 1, S'_i = S'_i + 1 \)
7: Compute the \( i^{th} \) secret as \( S_i = S'_i - S_{i+1} \)
E. Example

We hereby illustrate the proposed scheme with artificially small parameters.

1) Initialization:
- Consider a group of 5 participants \( \{P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5\} \)
  where \( n = 5 \) and the threshold, \( t = 3 \).
- Consider the Mignotte’s sequence as \( 5, 7, 11, 13, 17 \) in which
  \( \beta = 221 \) and \( \alpha = 385 \).
- Let the random values be:
  \( y_1 = 3, y_2 = 4, y_3 = 8, y_4 = 5, y_5 = 10 \).
- Consider the secrets to be
  \( S_1 = 251, S_2 = 282, S_3 = 323, S_4 = 317 \) which lie between \( \beta \) and \( \alpha \).
- Let the chosen one way function be exponentiation of 2 modulo
  \( 3^2 \).
- Let the chosen one way function be exponentiation of 2 modulo
  \( 3^2 \).

2) Distribution:
- Compute \( S_i^j = S_i + S_{i+1} \) for \( i = 1, 2, 3 \) and
  \( j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 \). This gives
  \[Z_{11} = 1, Z_{12} = 0, Z_{13} = 2, Z_{14} = 6, Z_{15} = 11 \]
  \[Z_{21} = 2, Z_{22} = 1, Z_{23} = 5, Z_{24} = 3, Z_{25} = 13 \]
  \[Z_{31} = 0, Z_{32} = 5, Z_{33} = 1, Z_{34} = 8, Z_{35} = 14 \]
  \[Z_{41} = 2, Z_{42} = 2, Z_{43} = 9, Z_{44} = 5, Z_{45} = 11 \]
- Compute public values \( d_{ij} = (Z_{ij} - f^i(y_{ij})) \) mod \( p_j \), \( 1 \leq i \leq 4, 1 \leq j \leq 5 \).
  \[d_{11} = 3, d_{12} = 5, d_{13} = 1, d_{14} = 4, d_{15} = 7 \]
  \[d_{21} = 1, d_{22} = 0, d_{23} = 3, d_{24} = 7, d_{25} = 14 \]
  \[d_{31} = 3, d_{32} = 3, d_{33} = 8, d_{34} = 6, d_{35} = 13 \]
  \[d_{41} = 3, d_{42} = 5, d_{43} = 4, d_{44} = 1, d_{45} = 9 \]
- \( y_i, 1 \leq i \leq 5 \) values are delivered to each participant through a secure channel and \( d_{ij}, 1 \leq i \leq 4, 1 \leq j \leq 5 \)
  values are published.

3) Reconstruction: Since the threshold is 3, let us assume that the participants \( P_1, P_2 \) and \( P_3 \) cooperate in the reconstruction procedure. So, they perform the following operations to reconstruct the secret.
- Each participant calculates his actual share for secret \( S_i \) i.e., the \( j \)th participant calculates
  \( Z_{ij} = (d_{ij} + f^i(y_{ij})) \) mod \( p_j \). Also they know from the public values that \( b_1, b_2 \) and \( b_3 \) are 1, 2, and 0 respectively.
- Construct the secret \( S_4 \) by pooling shares \( Z_{41}, Z_{42}, Z_{45} \) and using CRT as follows:
  \[M = 5 \times 7 \times 17 = 595, m_1 = 119, m_2 = 85, m_3 = 35 \text{ and } N_1 = 4, N_2 = 1, N_3 = 1 \]

Therefore, \( S_4 = ((2 \times 119 \times 4) + (2 \times 85 \times 1) + (11 \times 35 \times 1)) \) mod 595 = 317.
- Computing \( S_i'' \), \( S_i''' \) by pooling shares \( (Z_{31}, Z_{32}, Z_{35}), (Z_{21}, Z_{22}, Z_{25}), (Z_{11}, Z_{12}, Z_{15}) \) respectively, we have,
  \( S_3'' = ((0\times119\times4)+(5\times85\times1)+(14\times35\times1)) \) mod 595 = 320;
  \( S_3''' = ((2\times119\times4)+(1\times85\times1)+(13\times35\times1)) \) mod 595 = 302; and
  \( S_3'''' = ((1\times119\times4)+(0\times85\times1)+(11\times35\times1)) \) mod 595 = 266.
- Since \( b_3 = 0 \), we have \( S_3' = S_3''' \times 2 = 640 \).
- Similarly \( b_2 = 1 \) implies that \( S_2' = (S_2'' + 2) = 1 + 605 \) and \( b_1 = 1 \) implies that \( S_1' = (S_1'' + 2) = 1 + 533 \).
- Construct secrets \( S_4, S_3, S_1 \) sequentially by evaluating the expression \( S_i = S_{i-1} - S_{i+1} \) as follows:
  \( S_4 = S_1' - S_4 = 640 - 317 = 323 \)
  \( S_3 = S_2' - S_3 = 605 - 323 = 282 \)
  \( S_1 = S_2' - S_1 = 353 - 282 = 251 \)

Hence the required secrets.

F. Correctness

In the following correctness of the proposed multi-stage multi-secret scheme is discussed.

Theorem The secrets can be reconstructed if and only if the set of participants reconstructing the secrets is an authorized set.

Proof
- Case 1: \( S_1 \) reconstruction
  As explained in the reconstruction, each participant \( P_j, 1 \leq j \leq n \) can compute the actual share \( Z_{ij} \) corresponding to the secret \( S_i = S_i' = S_i'' \) from \( d_{ij} \). Note that \( S_i'' \) is such that \( \beta < S_i'' < \alpha \). This is because \( S_i'' = S_i' = S_i \) and \( \beta < S_i < \alpha \). Since \( \alpha = \prod_{i=1}^{k} P_i \) and \( \beta = \prod_{i=0}^{k-2} P_{n-i-1} \)
  from the principle of CRT, any \( k \) or more participants will be able to reconstruct \( S_i'' \) where as any set of atmost \((k - 1)\) participants will not be able to reconstruct the same.
- Case 2: Reconstruction of remaining secrets
  Following the same procedure explained in case 1, one can reconstruct \( S_i''_{i-1} \) and hence \( S_i''_{i-1} = S_i''_{k-1} = S_i \) from which \( S_i = S_i''_{i-1} = S_i'' \) can be computed. Similarly the other secrets can be recovered. Note that all this is possible by an authorized set and not by an unauthorized set. This is because the product of any \( k - 1 \) primes is less than or equal to \( \beta \); whereas the secrets \( S_i, 1 \leq i \leq l - 1 \) and hence \( S_i'' \) lie in the interval \((\beta, \alpha)\).

V. IMPROVED MULTI-STAGE MULTI-SECRET SHARING SCHEME BASED ON MIGNOTTE’S SEQUENCE

Note that the previous scheme uses flag bits, which are made public, to keep track of whether the modified secrets are even
or odd. This increases the number of public values by \( l - 1 \),
where \( l \) is the number of secrets. But the number of public
values is one of the parameters that determine the goodness
of a scheme; that is, lesser the number of public values of a
scheme better it is. Motivated by this observation, we hereby
propose an improved scheme for multi-secrets. Overview and
correctness of this scheme is similar to the previous one.

A. Distribution Phase

**Algorithm 5** Distribution of Shares

1. For \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, l \) and \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, n \) do the following:
   - Calculate \( Z_{ij} = S_i \mod p_j \).
2. For \( i = l \) and \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, n \) do the following:
   - Compute \( d_{ij} = (Z_{ij} - f'(y_j)) \mod p_j \).
3. For \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, l - 1 \) and \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, n \) do the following:
   - Compute \( d_{ij} = Z_{ij} \oplus f'(y_j) \oplus (S_{i+1} \mod p_j) \).
4. Compute \( F(r, Z_{ij}) \) where \( r \) is a random value
5. Distribute \( y_j \) to each participant through a secure channel
   and publish all \( d_{ij} \), \( F(r, Z_{ij}) \) values, \( r \) and two-variable
   one-way function \( F(r, z) \).

B. Reconstruction

Secrets are reconstructed in sequential order starting from
the \( i^{th} \) secret. Any \( k \) participants can pool their shares and
reconstruct these secrets.

**Algorithm 6** Reconstruction of secrets

1. For \( i = l \) and \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, n \) do the following:
   - calculate \( Z_{ij} = (d_{ij} + f'(y_j)) \mod p_j \).
2. For \( i = l - 1, l - 2, \ldots, 1 \) and \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, n \) do the following:
   - compute \( Z_{ij} = (d_{ij} \oplus f'(y_j) \oplus (S_{i+1} \mod p_j)) \).
5. Any \( k \) participants can pool their shares and reconstruct the
   secrets \( S_i, S_{i-1}, \ldots, S_1 \) in a sequential order using
   CRT from the shares \( Z_{ij} \).

Note: Verification is same as in the previous schemes.

C. Example

Let the values of the parameters be as in the example of the previous
section.

1) Distribution: Only those steps that differ from the previous
one are given. The difference is only in the calculation of the true
and public values of the secrets.

- Compute \( Z_{ij} = S_i \mod P_j \) for \( i = 1, 2, 3, 4 \) and
  \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, 5 \). This gives

\[
\begin{align*}
Z_{11} &= 1, \quad Z_{12} = 6, \quad Z_{13} = 9, \quad Z_{14} = 4, \quad Z_{15} = 13 \\
Z_{21} &= 2, \quad Z_{22} = 2, \quad Z_{23} = 7, \quad Z_{24} = 9, \quad Z_{25} = 10 \\
Z_{31} &= 3, \quad Z_{32} = 1, \quad Z_{33} = 4, \quad Z_{34} = 11, \quad Z_{35} = 0 \\
Z_{41} &= 2, \quad Z_{42} = 2, \quad Z_{43} = 9, \quad Z_{44} = 5, \quad Z_{45} = 11
\end{align*}
\]

- Compute public values \( d_{ij} = (Z_{ij} \oplus f'(y_j) \oplus (S_{i+1} \mod P_j)) \). \( 1 \leq i \leq 3, 1 \leq j \leq 5 \)

\[
\begin{align*}
d_{11} &= 11, \quad d_{12} = 20, \quad d_{13} = 15, \quad d_{14} = 2, \quad d_{15} = 3 \\
d_{21} &= 0, \quad d_{22} = 2, \quad d_{23} = 1, \quad d_{24} = 11, \quad d_{25} = 25 \\
d_{31} &= 3, \quad d_{32} = 1, \quad d_{33} = 9, \quad d_{34} = 12, \quad d_{35} = 10 \\
d_{41} &= 3, \quad d_{42} = 5, \quad d_{43} = 4, \quad d_{44} = 1, \quad d_{45} = 9
\end{align*}
\]

- Calculate \( d_{ij} = (Z_{4j} - f'(y_j)) \mod p_j, 1 \leq j \leq 5 \).

\[
\begin{align*}
d_{41} &= 3, \quad d_{42} = 5, \quad d_{43} = 4, \quad d_{44} = 1, \quad d_{45} = 9
\end{align*}
\]

- \( y_j, 1 \leq j \leq 5 \) are given to each participant through a
secure channel and \( d_{ij}, 1 \leq i \leq d_{ij}, 1 \leq i \leq 4, 1 \leq j \leq 5 \) values
are published.

2) Reconstruction: Assume that the participants \( P_1, P_2 \) and
\( P_5 \) cooperate to reconstruct the secrets.

- Compute \( Z_{ij} = (d_{ij} + f'(y_j)) \mod p_j \) for \( j = 1, 2, \) and
5.

- Construct the secret \( S_4 \) as 317 by pooling shares \( Z_{41} = 2, \quad Z_{42} = 2, \quad Z_{45} = 11 \) and using CRT

Compute \( Z_{ij} = (d_{ij} \oplus f'(y_j) \oplus (S_{i+1} \mod p_j)) \) for \( i = 1, 2, 3, 2, 1 \) and \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, 5 \).

Compute \( S_3 \) as 323, \( S_2 \) as 282, \( S_1 \) as 251 by pooling shares \( S_{31}, S_{32}, S_{35}, S_{21}, S_{22}, S_{25}, S_{11}, S_{12}, S_{15} \)
respectively.

D. Comparison

The comparison between the previous Multi-Stage Secret
sharing scheme and Improved Scheme is shown below.

VI. PROPOSED SINGLE SECRET SHARING SCHEME
BASED ON ASMUTH-BLOOM SEQUENCE

Overview of the scheme

Initially, the dealer comes up with the number of participants
\( n \), threshold value \( k \), the secret \( S \) to be shared among
the participants \( P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n \), one way function \( f \), value
\( \gamma \) and Asmuth-Bloom sequence \( p_0, p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n \) to be used.
Also the dealer chooses random values \( y_1, 1 \leq i \leq n \), and
distributes them one each to the participants (i.e \( y_1, P_1 \)) as
the pseudo shares of the participants. The dealer modifies the
secret to \( X = S + \gamma p_0 \) and then computes the (real) shares
of the participants \( P_i, 1 \leq i \leq n \), from \( X \). Now the dealer
applies the chosen one-way function \( f \) to each of these random
numbers \( y_1 \), extracts each of these resulting numbers \( f(y_i) \)
from the corresponding real shares \( Z_i, 1 \leq i \leq n \) of the
participants and distribute the chosen random numbers \( y_i \)
participant \( P_i \). While reconstructing the secret, the
participants first apply one-way function to the pseudo share,
which they possess, adds the resulting value \( f(y_i) \) to the
corresponding public share and recovers the actual shares, \( Z_i \).
These shares are then used to recover \( X \) using CRT, from
which the actual secret \( S \) is reconstructed.

A. Distribution

- Let the chosen \((k, n)\) Asmuth-Bloom sequence be

\[ p_0, p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n. \]
Choose \( y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n \) such that \( y_i \in Z_{p_0} \) as the pseudo shares.

• Choose the secret \( S \) such that \( S \in Z_{p_0} \)

• Modify secret \( S \) to \( X = (S + \gamma p_0) \), where \( \gamma \) is an arbitrary integer such that \( \beta < (S + \gamma p_0) < \alpha \) where \( \beta = p_0 \prod_{i=0}^{k-2} P_{n-i} \) and \( \alpha = \prod_{i=1}^{k} P_i \).

• Compute shares \( Z_i = X \mod p_i, 1 \leq i \leq n \).

• Compute \( d_i = (Z_i - f(y_i)) \mod p_i \) as the shift values, where \( f \) is the chosen one way function.

• For every \( i, 1 \leq i \leq n \), deliver \( y_i \) to the \( i^{th} \) participant through a secure channel and publish \( d_i \).

### B. Reconstruction

• Each participant calculates his actual share by computing \( Z_i = (d_i + f(y_i)) \mod p_i \).

• The modified secret \( X \) is reconstructed from the shares \( Z_i \) of \( k \) participants using CRT.

• The original secret \( S \) is then reconstructed using \( S = X \mod p_0 \).

### C. Example:

The proposed scheme is hereby illustrated with artificially small parameters.

1) Distribution:

• Consider a publicly known \((3, 4)\) Asmuth-Bloom sequence. Let it be \(3, 11, 13, 17, 19\).

• Let the random values be: \( y_1 = 3, y_2 = 4, y_3 = 8, y_4 = 5 \) and the chosen one-way function be the exponentiation of 2 modulo 17.

• Consider the secret as 2, as \( 2 \in Z_{p_0} \).

• We need to consider \( \gamma \) such that \( \beta < (S + \gamma p_0) < \alpha \) where \( \beta = p_0 \prod_{i=0}^{k-2} P_{n-i} \) and \( \alpha = \prod_{i=1}^{k} P_i \). So choose \( \gamma = 431 \) which gives \( X = (2 + 431 \times 3) = 1295 \).

• Computing \( Z_i = X \mod p_i \).

\[
\begin{align*}
Z_{i_1} &= 1295 \mod 11 = 8, \\
Z_{i_2} &= 1295 \mod 13 = 8, \\
Z_{i_3} &= 1295 \mod 17 = 3, \\
Z_{i_4} &= 1295 \mod 19 = 3
\end{align*}
\]

• Computing shift values by \( d_i = [Z_i - f(y_i)] \mod p_i \).

\[
\begin{align*}
d_1 &= (8 - 8) \mod 11 = 0, \\
d_2 &= (8 - 16) \mod 13 = 5, \\
d_3 &= (3 - 1) \mod 17 = 2, \\
d_4 &= (3 - 15) \mod 19 = 7.
\end{align*}
\]

These values are made public and \( y_{i,i} = 1, 2, \ldots, n \) are privately delivered to the participants.

2) Reconstruction:

• Any participant, say \( Z_1, Z_2, Z_3 \) wants to pool their shares and reconstruct the secret.

Hence they calculate their actual shares by \( Z_i = (d_i + f(y_i)) \mod p_i \).

\[
\begin{align*}
Z_1 &= (0 + 8) \mod 11 = 8, \\
Z_2 &= (5 + 16) \mod 13 = 8, \\
Z_3 &= (2 + 1) \mod 17 = 3.
\end{align*}
\]

• The secret is reconstructed from the following equations using CRT.

\[
\begin{align*}
S &\equiv 1 \mod 11, \\
S &\equiv 12 \mod 13, \\
S &\equiv 2 \mod 17
\end{align*}
\]

We have \( M = 11 \times 13 \times 17 = 2431 \), \( M_1 = 2431/11 = 221 \), \( M_2 = 187 \), \( M_3 = 143 \) and \( N_1 = 1, N_2 = 8, N_3 = 5 \).

Therefore, \( X = [(8 \times 221 \times 1) + (8 \times 187 \times 8) + (3 \times 143 \times 5)] \mod 2431 = 1295 \) and the secret \( S = 1295 \mod 3 = 2 \).

Hence the secret.

### VII. Proposed Multi-stage Multi-secret Sharing Scheme Based on CRT Sequence

#### Overview of the scheme

The dealer initializes all the parameters and chooses the required multiple secrets \( S_i, 1 \leq i \leq l \), as against the single secret of the previous scheme. In the distribution phase, the chosen secrets except the last are modified to \( S_i' \) by adding two consecutive secrets, i.e. \( S_i' = S_i + S_{i+1} \). Successful reconstruction of the secrets is possible only when \( (S_i + \gamma p_0) \) lies between \( p_0 \prod_{i=0}^{l-2} P_{n-i} \) and \( \prod_{i=1}^{l} P_i \). So as to bring the modified secrets (i.e \( S_i' = S_i + S_{i+1} \)) to this range, we divide the modified secrets by 2. The resulting values are the new modified secrets \( (S_i'') \). Again from these modified secrets \( X \) values are computed, from which the actual shares \( (Z_{ij}) \) of the participants are generated. From the actual shares \( Z_{ij}, 1 \leq i \leq l, 1 \leq j \leq n \), and the pseudo shares \( y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n \) public values are computed. Verification values are also derived from the actual shares. Both the sets, i.e the set of the public and the the set of the verification values are made public. The random values (i.e. pseudo shares \( y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n \)) which were chosen by the dealer are distributed privately to each participant. In the verification phase, any participant can compute the hash value by using the verification function and check whether they are equal to the published verification values or not.

In the reconstruction phase, participants can compute their actual shares by adding the images of the one-way function.

### TABLE I

| S.No | Property          | Previous Scheme       | Improved Scheme      |
|------|-------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 1    | No. of Public values | \( (n + (l - 1)) \)   | \( (ln) \)             |
| 2    | Information Leak  | Leak information to intruders | No information is leaked |
| 3    | Computationally Security | Less secure | More secure |

The proposed scheme is based on Asmuth-Bloom sequence.
of their secret shadows to the public values. CRT is used to reconstruct the \( X \) values, from which modified secrets are computed and if the flag bit corresponding to the modified secret is 1, then the modified secret is multiplied by 2 and 1 is added to it. Otherwise the modified secret is just multiplied by 2. The actual secrets are then computed from these modified secrets.

A. Initialization

In this phase, all the variables are initialized and the secrets are chosen.

Algorithm 7 Initialization

1: Let \( \{P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n\} \) be the \( n \) participants and \( k \) be the threshold value.
2: Consider a publicly known \((k,n)\) Asmuth-Bloom sequence, say \( p_0, P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n \).
3: Randomly choose \( n \) secret shadows \( y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n \) such that \( y_i \in Z_{p_i} \) as the pseudo shares.
4: Choose the secrets \( S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_l \) such that \( S_i \in Z_{p_i} \), \( 1 \leq i \leq l \).

B. Distribution

In the distribution phase, actual secrets are modified except the last. Shares are computed from these modified secrets.

Algorithm 8 Distribution of Shares

1: Compute \( S_i' = S_i + S_{i+1} \), for \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, l - 1 \)
2: If \( (S_i' \mod 2 == 1) \) then, \( S_i'' = (S_i' - 1)/2 \) and \( b_i = 1 \), for \( 1 \leq i \leq l - 1 \)
   Otherwise, \( S_i'' = S_i' \)/2 and \( b_i = 0 \), for \( 1 \leq i \leq l - 1 \)
3: \( S_0'' = S_l' = S_l \)
4: \( X_i = (S_i'' + \gamma p_0) \), where \( \gamma \) is an arbitrary integer such that \( (S_i + \gamma p_0) \) lies between \( p_0 \prod_{i=1}^{l-2} P_{n-i} \) and \( \prod_{i=1}^{l-1} P_i \).
5: For \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, l \) and \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, n \) do the following:
   a: Compute \( Z_{ij} = X_i \mod p_j \)
   b: Compute \( d_{ij} = (Z_{ij} - f'(y_j)) \mod p_j \), where \( f \) is a one-way function and \( f'(x) \) denotes \( i \) successive applications of \( f \) to \( x \).
6: Compute \( F(r, Z_{ij}) \), where \( r \) is a random value
7: Distribute \( y_j \) to each participant through a secure channel and publish all \( d_{ij}, F(r, Z_{ij}) \) values, \( r \) and two-variable one-way function \( F(r, z) \).

C. Verification

In this phase, each participant can verify the allocated shares. Reconstructor also can verify the shares provided by the participants.

Algorithm 9 Verification of shares

1: Participants can verify their shares by calculating \( F(r, Z_{ij}) \), where \( Z_{ij} \) itself can be computed by using pseudo shares and the corresponding public values.
2: Similarly, reconstructor also can verify honesty of the other participants by computing \( F(r, Z_{ij}) \).

D. Reconstruction

Secrets are reconstructed in sequential order starting from the last, i.e the \( l^{th} \) secret. Any \( k \) participants can pool their shares and reconstruct these secrets.

Algorithm 10 Reconstruction of secrets

1: Each participant \( j, 1 \leq j \leq n \), willing to take part in the reconstruction, calculates \( Z_{ij} = (d_{ij} + f'(y_j)) \mod p_j \), \( 1 \leq i \leq l \)
   Case 1: If \( i = l \)
   2: Construct \( X_l \) value from corresponding shares \( Z_{ij} \) using CRT.
   3: Compute \( S_i = S_i' = S_i'' = (X_l \mod p_0) \)
   Case 2: For \( i = l - 1, l - 2, \ldots, 1 \) do the following:
   4: Construct \( X_i \) using CRT from the shares \( Z_{ij} \)
   5: Construct \( S_i'' = X_i \mod p_0 \)
   6: \( S_i' = S_i'' + 2 \)
   7: If \( b_i = 1 \), \( S_i' = S_i' + 1 \)
   8: Compute the \( i^{th} \) secret as \( S_i = S_i' - S_{i+1} \)

E. Example

We hereby illustrate the proposed scheme with artificially small parameters.

1) Initialization:
   • Consider a group of 5 participants \( \{P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5\} \) wherein 3 participants are sufficient to reconstruct the secret. That is the number of participants, \( n \), is 5 and the threshold, \( k \), is 3.
   • Consider the Asmuth-Bloom sequence as \( 8,17,23,29,31,37 \) (where \( p_0 = 8 \))
   • Let the random values be: \( y_1 = 6, y_2 = 13, y_3 = 24, y_4 = 29, y_5 = 35 \)
   • Consider the secrets to be \( S_1 = 2, S_2 = 3, S_3 = 5, S_4 = 7 \) which lie in \( Z_{p_0} \).

2) Distribution:
   • Compute \( S_i' = S_i + S_{i+1} \) for \( i = 1, 2, 3 \) so that we have \( S_1', S_2', S_3' \) for \( 1, 2, 3 \).
   • Check the condition \( (S_i' \mod 2 == 1) \) and correspondingly compute \( S_i'' \),
   \( S_1'' = (S_1' - 1)/2 = 2 \) and \( b_1 = 1 \)
   \( S_2'' = 8/2 = 4 \) and \( b_2 = 0 \)
   \( S_3'' = 12/2 = 6 \) and \( b_3 = 0 \)
   \( S_4'' = 7 \)
   • Compute \( X_1 = (S_1'' + \gamma p_0) \), consider \( \gamma = 1200 \) as \( (S_i'' + \gamma p_0) \) should lie between \( p_0 \prod_{i=0}^{l-2} P_{n-i} \) and \( \prod_{i=1}^{l-1} P_i \).
   Therefore, \( X_1 = 9602, X_2 = 9604, X_3 = 9606, X_4 = 9607 \).
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED SCHEMES

| S.No | Scheme                        | Multi-Secret | Reusable | No. of public values | Sequence used        |
|------|-------------------------------|--------------|----------|----------------------|----------------------|
| 1    | Mignotte Scheme (existing)    | Single       | No       | No public values     | Mignotte Sequence    |
| 2    | Asmuth-Bloom Scheme (existing)| Single       | No       | No public values     | Asmuth-Bloom Sequence|
| 3    | Reusable Single Secret Sharing Scheme I | Single     | No       | No public values     | Mignotte Sequence    |
| 4    | Proposed Multi-Stage Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme I | Multi       | Yes      | In + (i-1)           | Mignotte Sequence    |
| 5    | Improved Multi-Stage Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme | Multi       | Yes      | In                   | Mignotte Sequence    |
| 6    | Reusable Single Secret Sharing Scheme II | Single     | Yes      | No public values     | Asmuth-Bloom Sequence|
| 7    | Proposed Multi-Stage Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme II | Multi       | Yes      | In + (i-1)           | Asmuth-Bloom Sequence|

- Compute $Z_{ij} = X_i \mod p_j$, for $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$ and $j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5$. This gives:
  - $Z_{11} = 14, Z_{12} = 11, Z_{13} = 3, Z_{14} = 23, Z_{15} = 19$
  - $Z_{21} = 16, Z_{22} = 13, Z_{23} = 5, Z_{24} = 25, Z_{25} = 21$
  - $Z_{31} = 1, Z_{32} = 15, Z_{33} = 7, Z_{34} = 27, Z_{35} = 23$
  - $Z_{41} = 2, Z_{42} = 16, Z_{43} = 8, Z_{44} = 28, Z_{45} = 24$

- Compute public values $d_{ij} = (Z_{ij} - F^i(y_{ij})) \mod p_j$, $1 \leq i \leq 4, 1 \leq j \leq 5$:
  - $d_{11} = 10, d_{12} = 12, d_{13} = 26, d_{14} = 21, d_{15} = 14$
  - $d_{21} = 8, d_{22} = 18, d_{23} = 21, d_{24} = 21, d_{25} = 20$
  - $d_{31} = 0, d_{32} = 16, d_{33} = 6, d_{34} = 11, d_{35} = 21$
  - $d_{41} = 0, d_{42} = 21, d_{43} = 4, d_{44} = 4, d_{45} = 20$

- As $y_{ij}, 1 \leq j \leq 5$ values are delivered to each participant through a secure channel and $d_{ij}, 1 \leq i \leq 4, 1 \leq j \leq 5$ values are published.

3) Reconstruction: Since the threshold is 3, let us assume that the participants $P_1, P_2$ and $P_3$ cooperate in the reconstruction procedure. So, they perform the following operations to reconstruct the secret.

- Each participant calculates his actual share for secret $S_i$, i.e., the $j^{th}$ participant calculates $Z_{ij} = (d_{ij} + f^j(y_{ij})) \mod p_j$. Also they know public values $b_1, b_2$ and $b_3$ i.e., 1.0 and 0 respectively.

- Construct the value $X_4$ by pooling shares $Z_{41}, Z_{42}, Z_{45}$ and using CRT as follows:
  - We have $M = 17 \times 23 \times 37 = 14467$, $m_1 = \frac{37}{23} = 851, m_2 = \frac{23}{37} = 629, m_3 = \frac{17}{37} = 391$
  - and $N_1 = 1, N_2 = 3, N_3 = 30$

  Therefore, $S_4 = (2 \times 851 + 1) + (16 \times 629 + 3) + (24 \times 391 + 30) \mod 14467 = 9607$.

- Now calculate secret $S_4$ as $S_4 = X_4 \mod p_0$ so that $S_4 = 9607 \mod 8 = 7$. Hence the secret $S_4$.

- Compute $X_3, X_2, X_1$ by pooling shares $(Z_{31}, Z_{32}, Z_{35}), (Z_{21}, Z_{22}, Z_{25}), (Z_{11}, Z_{12}, Z_{15})$ respectively. Therefore,$X_3 = ((1 \times 851 + 1) + (15 \times 629 + 3) + (29 \times 391 + 30)) \mod 14467 = 9606$
  - $X_2 = ((16 \times 851 + 1) + (13 \times 629 + 3) + (21 \times 391 + 30)) \mod 14467 = 9604$
  - $X_1 = ((14 \times 851 + 1) + (11 \times 629 + 3) + (19 \times 391 + 30)) \mod 14467 = 9602$.

- Construct $S''_3, S''_2, S''_1$. Therefore,
  - $S''_3 = X_3 \mod p_0 = 9606 \mod 8 = 6$
  - $S''_2 = X_2 \mod p_0 = 9604 \mod 8 = 4$
  - $S''_1 = X_1 \mod p_0 = 9602 \mod 8 = 2$

- Since $b_3 = 0$, we have $S'_3 = S''_3 \ast 2 = 12$
  - and $b_2 = 0$, we have $S'_2 = (S''_2 \ast 2) = 8$
  - also since $b_1 = 1$, we have $S'_1 = (S''_1 + 2) = 15 = 5$

- Construct secrets $S_3, S_2, S_1$ sequentially using the expression $S_i = S'_i - S'_{i+1}$ and arrive at
  - $S_3 = S'_3 - S'_4 = 12 - 7 = 5$
  - $S_2 = S'_2 - S'_3 = 8 - 5 = 3$
  - $S_1 = S'_1 - S'_2 = 5 - 3 = 2$

Hence the required secrets.

F. Correctness

Correctness of the scheme is same as the one given in section 4 except that $X$ values replace $S''$ values and that $S_i = X_i \mod p_0$ for $1 \leq i \leq l$.

VIII. OUR RESULTS

Three Schemes that use the Mignotte’s Sequence and then two Schemes that use the Asmuth-Bloom Sequence proposed by this paper. The first and the fourth Schemes are designed for single secret; whereas the remaining three Schemes are designed for multiple secrets. Among the proposed Schemes, third Scheme is an improvement over the Second one in the sense that it reduces the number of required public values. Also discussed in the paper is the correctness of the schemes. Novelty of our schemes, in contrast to the existing schemes is that the shares are reusable. Table II represents the comparative analysis of existing schemes (Mignotte and Asmuth-Bloom) and proposed schemes.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have proposed three secret sharing schemes that use the Mignotte’s sequence and two secret sharing schemes that use the Asmuth-Bloom sequence. All these five secret sharing schemes are based on Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). The first scheme that uses the Mignotte’s sequence is a single secret scheme. It is extended to the multi-stage multi-secrets in the second scheme, which is later improved to result in a third scheme. The first scheme that uses the Asmuth-Bloom sequence is designed for the case of...
a single secret and the second one is an extension of the first scheme to the case of multi-secrets. A novel feature of our schemes is that the shares of the participants are reusable, i.e., same shares can be used even with a new set of secrets. It also checks the dealer participant’s honesty. This feature finds its use if the dealer distributes fake shares to the participants or a participant may provide a fake share to other participants in reconstruction. Correctness of the scheme is also discussed.

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