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The Human Security Research Center (HSRC) is a research unit of the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies for the field of human security. In addition to numerous other activities conducted by the Center, it has begun publishing the European Journal of Human Security (EJHS), dealing with one of the most important topics of the contemporary world – the security of human beings.
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Editorial

It is with great pleasure that we present the second issue of the European Journal of Human Security (EJHS). The first and the second issue of our Journal are both intended to familiarise the readers with EJHS’s concept and editorial policy, aimed at creating and fostering favourable conditions for the journal to distinguish itself among scholarly journals and publications in the field of security studies in its broadest sense. By meeting the highest scholarly criteria and obeying the methodological standards and rules of clear and effective communication, EJHS endeavours to provide its potential contributors with an opportunity and platform to present their research on the multifaceted concept of human security, exchange their opinions and results with other participants in this debate and contribute to a better understanding and definition of human security as one of the most important contemporary issues. In order to initiate and stimulate broad and in-depth discussions, EJHS advocates a multidisciplinary as well as interdisciplinary approach to this concept, imposing no limits as long as the concept of human security is at its very centre. Despite our initial enthusiasm and desire to publish two issues per year, EJHS has been reconceptualised as an annual publication, with occasional special thematically defined issues. Although in a new guise, EJHS relies on the tradition of the journal of Human Security/Ljudska bezbednost in its endeavours to encourage and broaden the study of human security in the region, Europe and beyond. The first step towards reaching that goal is the publication of the second issue dedicated to the articles of eminent professors, researchers and lecturers, three of which were invited to present their papers at the 4th International Conference on Human Security, held in November 2018 in Belgrade. Our Editorial Board comprises renowned
Serbian university professors and associates, while the International Board is composed of distinguished professors and lecturers from well-known universities and institutions worldwide.

The first article in this issue explores Immanuel Wallerstein’s concept of ‘time-space’ realities (a further elaboration of Braudel’s concept of the hierarchy of historical times), revealing that the longer the time periods a theory takes into consideration, the larger its spatial reach and the deeper its analytical grasp. Reflecting on the present ‘migration crisis’, the authors show that, when thinking in terms of Braudel’s ‘temps court’, i.e. with reference to Wallerstein’s ‘episodic geopolitical TimeSpace’, one adopts the viewpoint of the nation-state and, for example, installs barbed wire fences at the national borders. In the second article, the author argues that there should be a mutually reinforcing relationship between human security and societal security since state weakness is the structural cause of not only human insecurity but also societal insecurity as experienced in the daily lives of individuals and communal groups in Third World countries. The third article examines the challenges and opportunities of the rapid expansion of information and communication technology (ICT) in relation to its impacts on the traditional culture of communities in the European High North. The expansion of ICT usage touches upon all spheres of our lives, shaping a globally oriented society. Despite some challenges, this expansion offers opportunities for communities in remote regions to stay connected and keep abreast of global issues, take advantage of the latest innovations, and participate in both local and global events in a virtual environment. Finally, the fourth article sheds light on the multiple and overlapping layers of patriarchy and marginalization that affect the social position of a significant number of young mothers (aged between 18 and 30) in Serbia today. Their lives are profoundly shaped by a high unemployment rate and a labour market characterized by an erosion of workers’ rights. These circumstances have a major impact on the low-income
sector (the sector that primarily employs women), resulting in socially invisible and unrecognized poverty, private patriarchy and social pressure on young women to assume traditional gender roles at home and, consequently, their low level of resistance to oppression. It is interesting to see how the governmental gender equality policy in Serbia today marginalizes and obfuscates the structural intersectional influence of several factors contributing to the weakening of young mothers’ life opportunities and their standard of living, simultaneously propagating that women are responsible for low national fertility rates.

This issue also features a report from the 4th International Academic Conference on Human Security held November 2–3 in Belgrade. We are proud that the biannual conference is gradually becoming a tradition and an academic endeavour that the Faculty of Security Studies and Human Security Research Center have become well-known for in the region and beyond.

On behalf of the Editorial Board, we would like once again to extend our sincere gratitude to the Faculty of Security Studies, without whose continued support the Journal would not have seen the light of day, to the Human Security Research Centre and to all the contributors to the first and second issue, as well as to all the associates and colleagues for their generous and unwavering support. We hope that the issue before you will prove to be as successful and worthwhile as the first issue, and that the opinions, discussions and findings presented here will reach an even wider community of scholars and practitioners.

Sincerely,
Svetlana Stanarević and Vanja Rokvić, editors
Some Remarks on the Theory and Practice in Human Security Studies

Ivica Lj. Đorđević¹, Rastko Močnik²

This article is based upon a presentation delivered at the 4th International Academic Conference on Human Security, Belgrade, organized by the Human Security Research Center (Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade), 2-3 November 2018.

Abstract

The goal of the human security studies is “to turn theoretical insights into practical recommendations for policy-making”, i.e. to articulate theoretical considerations with practical policies. In our contribution, we will examine the relation between theoretical backgrounds and their practical consequences. Immanuel Wallerstein’s concept of ‘time-space’ realities (a further elaboration of Braudel’s concept of a hierarchy of historical times) tells us that the longer time-periods a theory takes into consideration, the larger its spatial reach, and the deeper its analytical grasp. In the case of the present ‘migration crisis’, we will argue that, thinking on the level of Braudel’s ‘temps court’, i.e. within the coordinates of Wallerstein’s ‘episodic geopolitical TimeSpace’, one adopts the point of view of the nation-state and, e.g. installs barbed wire fence on national borders. Reflecting on the level of Braudel’s ‘histoire conjoncturelle’, i.e. Wallerstein’s ‘cyclico-ideological TimeSpace’, one analyses the ‘migration crisis’ in terms of the conflict ‘the West vs. militant

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Islam’, or of the confrontation between ‘the West’ and the Russian Federation over the Near East, and starts peace talks to end the war in Syria. Taking the view of Braudel’s ‘longue durée’, i.e. Wallerstein’s structural TimeSpace, one realises that the present crisis is an episode in the dynamics of the contemporary world-system. The structural perspective shows that defence of national borders will not solve the problem, nor will the negotiation with the local ruling ‘elites’ and between the super-powers establish an adequate platform to approach the deepening misery and exploitation of the larger part of the world’s population. The former two approaches appear as pertaining to the present world-system structure, and participate in its inherent dynamics: although potentially leading to new re-articulations, they reproduce the system and eventually deepen its contradictions. However, the structural-systemic perspective does not lead towards a univocal analysis, and even less translates into a unique political strategy

**Keywords**: human security, concept of ‘time-space’ realities, contemporary world-system.

**Introduction**

We will examine the relations between theory and practice from the point of view of technological innovation, from the perspective of the critical joint where scientific theories, intervening into production practices and other social processes, transform them and eventually open new epochs in the history of societies.

Theoretical conceptualisation of the socio-historical impact of new technologies seems to vacillate between social determinism and technological determinism. In structuralist Marxism, the existing social relations are presumed decisively to filtrate scientific discoveries that are to yield technical innovations. Against the structur-
alist view, but equally within Marxist horizon, Italian operaismo\(^4\) claims that technical innovations form an essential part of the periodical transformation of the labour process, by which the capital reacts against workers’ resistance. New technical composition of labour power (the imprint of new technology upon the labour and, by the same token, the new mechanism of both class domination and extraction of surplus value) destroys the former political composition of the working class, while the workers’ efforts towards a new class-composition then open a new cycle of class struggle. While in the structur-alist interpretation, social relations rule over technological change, in the operaist view technology *is* social relations, or at least their most important part.

In the bias that opposes these two theories, one can recognise the two poles between which the present popular reactions to the New Technologies of Information and Communication (NTIC) oscillate. According to one view, we are entering an age of total control and manipulation, the power-holders’ secular dream coming true. The opposite view maintains that the NTIC have already liberated humanity, only we do not know it yet and atavistically hold to the old routines: once we realise the emancipation under way, the pre-history of humanity will come to its end. In the first view, NTIC are subordinated to and reproducing, if not intensifying the existing relations of domination and exploitation. In the second view, technology itself revolutionises society. A negative and a positive utopias are coming true: these are obviously ideological projections. By analogy, one can suspect the two opposed Marxisms to be one-sided extrapolations of a more complex theory.

\(^4\) Let us only indicate its most important theoreticians: Romano Alquati, Raniero Panzieri, Sergio Bologna; for a summary of some of their theories, see: Rastko Močnik, “Tržište radne snage i sastav radničke klase”.

scientifically productive recognition were secured (and were accordingly made twice or thrice), offers some justification to this view (Althusser, 1970: 239; 250; 285; 305).
A more comprehensive approach is needed not only to overcome the obvious one-sidedness of popular beliefs and their more sophisticated extrapolations, but also in order to assess the immanent value of the available theories and to control the eventual outcome of our own theorising. We need a broader view, able to detect the main processes of our epoch, their tensions and contradictions. The understanding of the context of theories and their producers requests an insight into historical circumstances of their production. Cox’s thesis that “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose“ (Cox, 1981: 128), directs us towards the investigation of the historical context of the emergence and applications of NTIC. Such an insight will elucidate their effects on the human condition, including the condition of their study.

Technology in the Capitalist Mode of Production

The comprehensive theory, developed by Marx, explains how the logic of the capitalist mode of production makes capitalism the most technologically dynamic epoch in human history. Products of individual capitals are socialised retroactively upon the market where the value of the commodities is determined by the abstract labour socially necessary for their production. The capital that succeeds in producing its commodities with less than socially necessary abstract labour, appropriates upon the market a portion of the totally produced surplus-value larger than the one that would befall it according to the general profit-rate. This surplus-profit is generally acquired by increasing the productivity of labour, which is achieved by technological and organisational innovation. Accordingly, technological innovation and technical development in general, a permanent technical revolution, are a basic feature of the capitalist mode. Not only are technical developments propelled, they are also determined by the capitalist structure of the production and society.
This double relation is evident, for example, in the second industrial revolution, triggered by the introduction of a new source of energy, the electricity (Cohen, 2006). Unlike the steam-machine that required important investment and dictated a centralist organisation of the factory, deployed around the steam-machine, electricity was cheap and ‘democratic’, as it could be installed in every small workshop. A renewal of small craft and its simple commodity production seemed possible. However, this did not happen: capitalism was already entering its monopolistic stage (Amin, 2012) and a return to a restricted and static production system was just not possible. Equally impossible was the expansion of the full revolutionary potential of electric energy, resumed in Lenin’s aphorism: “Communism is Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country” (Lenin, 1920).

Technical development is thus immanent to the process of valuation of capital and limited by it. What we now consider the human dimension (and, within it, the human security concerns) enters only secondarily and through various contradictions into the process. Regulation of children’s and women’s work, and partly regulation of the working time originated in the concerns of the total social capital, das gesellschaftliche Gesamtkapital as opposed to individual capitals. In these and similar cases, capitalist state intervened in the defence of the system as a whole against the abusive practices of individual capitals. Enforcement of the human dimension here resulted from the dynamics of the non-antagonistic contradiction between the whole of the capital (and its social support the capitalist class juridico-politically organised in the capitalist state) and its autonomised individual parts.

Other achievements in the human dimension, from the eight-hour working day to the social (or welfare) state, resulted from the struggles of organised labour; i.e. from the dynamics of the antagonistic contradiction between the capitalist and the working classes. In the core of the capitalist world-system, there were concessions
made by the capitalist state in order to preserve the capitalist system.

**Systemic Logic of Capitalism and NTIC**

Systemic logic of capitalism is infinite accumulation of capital, which, for individual firms, materialises as the constraint to maximise profits. They achieve this by increasing the productivity of labour (by technological and/or organisational innovation or by intensification of labour, usually by both), or by appropriating a greater share in the overall produced surplus value.

The endeavours of individual firms take place within the larger environment characterised by two main features: the pressures of the global capitalist system upon particular regions and local jurisdictions, and the class conflicts ranging from the factory floor to the global confrontations of various intensity. In general, capital compensates concessions made on the class front by strategies that keep it abreast with its competitors on the world-system front. Classically, what was lost for the capital in the duration of the working day was made up by intensification of labour. Over longer periods, workers’ struggles led to the decrease in the living labour input in the production process and to technological innovations. This propels further transformations in two directions: the adaptation of the dynamics of labour to the capacities of machinery intensifies the exploitation of labour power; it furthers concentration and centralisation of capital, and hence accelerates the dynamics of monopolisation. Firms and sectors that achieve a higher rate of accumulation upgrade their equipment, reduce the production cycle and accelerate the capital turnover. This process deepens the gap between large and small business systems, developed and underdeveloped countries. Under the conditions of globalisation, the low accumulation capacity of the underdeveloped countries has additionally hampered their situation.
The introduction of NTIC transformed all these systemic dimensions. NTIC importantly facilitated the delocalisation of labour intensive parts of production processes towards the periphery, and made firms in the core profit from the wage differential, eventually from the more lenient regulation of labour rights, environmental requirements etc. NTIC also supported processes of outsourcing and subcontracting, and enhanced the establishment of the post-Fordist ‘lean company’. However, due to the conditions of the systemic decline after the mid-seventies, their main impact was in the financial domain (Lapavitsas, 2011) and in the management strategies (Salento et al., 2013 and Duménil & Lévy, 2016). In the financial domain, NTIC accelerated processes in a spectacular way, and contributed to the creation of ‘bubbles’ and fictive capital. Yet, their transformation of managerial strategies may have long-term effects.

Contrary to the previous industrial revolutions that were initiated by new sources of energy (steam, electricity), the NTIC revolution is driven by a communicational technology, i.e. by a technology that directly informs human relations and, pertinently for our discussion, shapes the relations of production. Around mid-eighties, the intervention of NTIC into the global mode of production in the phase of the declining long-term cycle, reversed the trend of the falling rate of capital and the decreasing productivity of capital, and triggered the short recovery on the turn of the century. It provided a new momentum to the long ‘managerial revolution’, as it established a new form of the relations of production that opened new possibilities to the development of productive forces, and secured the means for the aspirations of the top management to assume a decisive position upon the socio-historical scene.5

5 Duménil and Lévy compare this transformation to the historical beginnings of capitalism in England, "where new relations of production in a first phase created the necessary preconditions for the later adjustment of productive forces (the adjustment of technology and organisation to the new relations
We see that the changes concerning the human and social dimensions have so far originated in structural contradictions, some non-antagonistic and most antagonistic, and have been consequently the achievements wrought in social conflicts. The contradictions presented so far were *systemic contradictions* – they pertained to the structure of the capitalist system and took their concrete historical forms in the ensuing struggles within the ruling class or between the ruling class and the exploited classes. For the importance of the contradiction in the development of the human and social dimensions, we should examine its concept more closely.

### Theoretical Concept of Contradiction

The concept of contradiction as we are practising here, was first proposed by Maurice Godelier (Godelier, 1967). Godelier distinguishes between “internal contradiction of a structure” and the “basic contradiction” of a mode of production. The internal contradiction is immanent to the structure and emerges together with the historical appearance of a particular structure: e.g. the contradiction between the working class and the capitalist class is specific to the capitalist mode of production. On the other hand, the basic contradiction appears only at a certain stage of historical development of a mode of production, and determines the limits of the possibility of its exist-

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The authors contend that the world-system is moving from a two-class society (labour and capital) towards a three-class society whose new upper class is the class of managers (Duménil & Lévy, 2018).
ence. It is the contradiction not within a structure (as the internal contradiction), but between the structures, e.g. in the capitalist mode, between the progressively socialised structure of productive forces and the structure of relations of production, determined by the private ownership of the means of production.

We use the term ‘systemic contradiction’ for Godelier’s ‘internal contradiction’, referring to the capitalist world-system as a social formation, not only to the structure of the mode of production. While Godelier only writes about antagonistic contradictions, we introduce the opposition ‘antagonistic / non-antagonistic contradiction’. The dynamics of the non-antagonistic systemic (‘internal’) contradiction reproduces the system, as does, e.g. the contradiction between individual capitals and the total capital (Gesamtkapital). On the other hand, and against Godelier’s conception, we contend that an antagonistic systemic contradiction may challenge the system as a whole. Actually, operaist analyses show that the struggle of the working class (conceived by Godelier as one term of the internal contradiction) periodically reaches a point where the reproduction of the capitalist relations of production can be secured only by a major transformation of the means of production and an adaptation of the relations of production themselves. Another implication of our approach is that the antagonism of Godelier’s basic contradiction may be reduced by extra-economic measures, which is precisely the case of the New Technologies of Information and Communication.

NTIC have brought a huge progress in the socialisation of the means of production, and triggered, at their advent, all sorts of optimistic expectations. Juridical regulations of their functioning, adapted to the existing structure of the relations of production (generalised monopoly capitalism) (Amin, 2012), have so far blocked their anti-systemic potential and reduced their transformative capacities. Capitalism has completely ignored the social dimension of NTIC, and it saw in them, above all, a means to increase
profits and tools that would contribute to the consolidation of the system in a global context. As the new technologies have been generated in laboratories whose work was financed by private capital, they have been commercialized from the very beginning, and put to the service of increasing profits. This situation has left very little room for restrictive regulations. Due to their financial position, the creators of new technologies have determined the conditions of their placement and application.6

**Structural Contradictions and Struggles for Human Achievements**

In the past, human achievements in the capitalist system have been mainly achieved by political practices that took support upon objective systemic contradictions. These systemic contradictions were either non-antagonistic, as in the clash opposing the interest of the total capital against the interest of individual capitals, or they were antagonistic, as when interests of the labouring classes resisted the interests of the dominating classes. Pertaining to the core countries of the system, the latter resulted in the politics of the social (or ‘welfare’) state. However, social state was also prominently established in the ‘socialist’ or, more correctly, in the post-capitalist societies.7 In post-capitalist countries, the basic social achievements were first the central element of socialist revolution. Later, they were gradually introduced by the post-capitalist state within the complex frame of the predominantly antagonistic contradiction between the working people and the party-state bureaucracy.8

6 The most drastic case is obtaining the consent for the commercialisation of living organisms. (Đorđević, 2013: 108).
7 For the concept of ‘post-capitalist societies’, see: Catherine Samary, *Plan, Market and Democracy. The experience of the so-called socialist countries*.
8 For a lucid presentation of the antagonisms in post-capitalism from October revolution to Yugoslav self-management, see: Catherine Samary. – *The internal contradictions of the*
The achievements in post-capitalist countries were, during the revolutionary phase, **anti-systemic**, as they pertained to the destruction of the capitalist system and were oriented towards the construction of the socialist system, not yet realised. Later, human-dimension achievements in these countries resulted from the working people’s resistance to the bureaucratic rule. Although popular resistance was expressing the antagonistic contradiction introduced by bureaucratic domination, the contradiction was not a systemic one, since the reproduction of bureaucracy as the ruling group never composed with any of the socially reproductive processes operating in the post-capitalist societies.\(^9\) In general, popular movements in post-capitalism were tuned to socialist aspects that were not integrated into the bureaucratic rule. In this sense, they thrived for a concrete utopia. When they detoured from this orientation, they were integrated into the neo-liberal global offensive.

In the retrospect, we see that post-capitalist systems have not abolished the basic feature of the capitalism, the exploitation of natural resources and of labour power. Both systems rely upon the easily accessible primary materials whose exploitation is endangering the survival of not only the opposing systems but also of the living world on the planet. Although there are more environmentally friendly technologies, their massive application has not occurred because it would jeopardize the level of revenue per unit of capital. The ignorant attitude towards ecolog-

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\(^9\) Ernest Mandel convincingly developed this explanation of the role of bureaucracy in post-capitalist societies (Mandel, 1979).
gy does not depend on bureaucratic state structures, but rather represents an ideological commitment built into the very foundations of the system’s structure.

Many of the present-day ecological concerns are of a similar anti-systemic character as were the demands of the revolutionary movements of the 20th century. However, as they have no pendant in the really existing capitalist structure and its systemic contradictions (as traditional revolutionary movements had in the antagonistic contradiction opposing working masses to the ruling classes), they have difficulty to organise politically and to gain important popular support. Socio-historical support of many ecological concerns is external to the capitalist system, as the systemic logic of capitalist infinite accumulation cannot bend to the necessity to restrain or even to stop ‘development’ (Latouche, 2004), to end consumerism, to reorient production from the production of exchange values to the production of the use values (Harribey, 2013), etc.

On the other side, many ecological concerns can be fitted within the frame of the existing system. Damage caused by individual capitals can be handled by state regulation, as a result of political practices objectively supported by non-antagonistic systemic contradiction ‘total capital / individual capitals’ or by an antagonistic systemic contradiction ‘population at large / total capital’. Ecological concerns can be graded according to the structural contradiction that supports particular practices aiming at their enforcement. As we have seen, so can other human concerns be graded as well.

**Structural Location of Human Security Practices**

The correspondence that links particular human concerns (including human security issues) to particular structural contradictions is of utmost importance to the practices that strive for their realisation. This corre-
spondence explains Marx’s somewhat pretentious claim that humankind sets itself only the tasks it is able to complete.10 The condition for a successful resolution of a ‘task’ is to determine “the material conditions for its solution”. As it follows from our discussion so far, the ‘material condition’ is to be searched for in a structural contradiction, not in some structural element or instance. This means that the structure does not entail any ‘germ’ of a solution, nor any element that can, if properly handled, directly yield a transformation of the structure.11 The contradiction is only the place of a possible historical dynamics that an appropriate practical intervention can trigger. If the contradiction is systemic and non-antagonistic, then the intervention will reproduce the structure in its essential features, and, beyond its immediate effects, eventually strengthen it; if the contradiction is systemic and antagonistic, then it will launch a transformation of the structure within its objective historical limits. If the contradiction is anti-systemic, the praxis that targets it may destroy the existing structure and introduce a new one.12

10 “Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation.” (Marx, 1977)

11 Godelier elaborates on this point in his polemics against the Hegelian notion of contradiction: in Hegelian philosophy, a contradiction always in some way entails its own resolution (Godelier, 1967).

12 An antagonistic systemic contradiction can evolve into an anti-systemic contradiction when combined with other systemic contradictions. E.g. the organisational support of the 20th century socialist revolutions was often based upon an ideological translation of the contradiction between industrial proletariat and the ruling classes. Such were the revolutionary parties of the bolshevik type: Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (bolsheviks) in Russia, CPY in Yugoslavia, CPC in China until Mao’s change of the line, etc. However, the peasantry provided the mass support to the revolution. In this sense, the 20th century socialist revolutions were ‘peasant wars’ (Wolf, 1969).
The global scene has revealed the true nature of the capitalist system. The established structure based on the financial power of its elements at the time of absolute domination after the collapse of its ideological opponent insists on applying orthodox models of transition from socialism to capitalism. The applied model of the organisation of the economy and political life in the area of former socialist (post-capitalist) countries can best be understood through the prism of Galtung’s theory of structural violence (Galtung, 2009). The elements of the structure by inertia continue to follow the given matrix, although there is no rational justification for this. To follow the ideological model suits socio-political elites better than the effort to start a qualitative transformation of the organisation and functioning of society. After the demolition of the Berlin Wall, while the establishment was still busy praising the victory, a group of enthusiasts started promoting the concept of HS. This concept that contained all the concerns regarding human rights, ecology, health and democratic principles most frequently used in marketing campaigns aimed at promoting the superiority of the Western system in relation to the former Eastern one. While at first glance, HS is an attempt to correct the existing system, a deeper analysis shows that it entails the idea of a radical change of the current principles that form the foundations of the modern capitalism. The idea of social justice and a more even distribution of wealth is something that in its essence resembles Marx’s ideas and welfare state, rather than what is implied by the neoliberal arrangement of the modern world.

Articulation of Theory and Practice

At this point, practice requires theoretical support. Theory will determine the contradiction at stake in a particular practical ‘task’, and will eventually indicate the ways how to approach the contradiction to liberate its transformative dynamics. Such an indication will point to several and differing lines of action, since there is no sim-
ple and direct translation of theory into practice. Such an analysis, and its transposition into practice, need a theory able to detect structural contradictions and their differences of nature. In particular, practices setting in motion anti-systemic contradictions, and consequently eventually lacking intra-systemic instances upon which to seat their actions, may need such a theory to construct their ‘perspective’ or ‘position of enunciation’, as a pre-condition of their implantation in social reality.

Fernand Braudel presented an early effort towards such a theory (Braudel, 1958) that was later re-elaborated by Immanuel Wallerstein (Wallerstein, 2001). To Braudel’s three types of historical time, Wallerstein adds three spatial extensions, and puts both together to define three different objects of knowledge:

1. The episodic time of mere events limits the view to immediate geo-political space (e.g. the nation-state); consequently, an approach limited to such time-space coordinates is unable to construe a proper object of knowledge and has to paste its event-bits together by some ideology. – This approach starts from a non-antagonistic systemic contradiction and is not properly theoretic. However, it suffices to support human concerns related to, e.g. the conditions of work, security at the workplace, wage regime (within the limits of the prevailing accumulation regime), employment arrangements (within the limits of the prevailing accumulation regime), corporate security, etc.

2. Cyclical time covers one phase in the ‘long (Kondratyev) cycle’ and allows for the horizon of ideological space, i.e. it is framed into how contemporaries ideologically perceive the contradictions of their time (e.g. as the opposition between the East and the West, or between the global South and the North etc.). – This approach situates its point of view in the antagonistic systemic contradiction. Social and political practices it supports may
bring about major transformations within the system (e.g. the non-aligned movement; or measures against cyber-terrorism).

3. Structural time, Braudel’s *longue durée*, generates the conceptual construction of structural space, i.e. it belongs to the theoretical production of an object of knowledge that has its own temporal dimensions – its cyclical reproduction and its limitation in history, and its own spatial extension – the world-system. This approach establishes a perspective that views the system from the outside, and can consequently support anti-systemic endeavours.

We can schematically present this classification as follows:

### Conclusion

Within the above classification, HS at first glance fits into the first group of objects of knowledge, as it does not directly challenge the existing ideological frame. HS concept is not focused upon fundamental change of the system, but strives for its correction in order to create a more humane environment for the life and work of human population, regardless of their geographical, religious, racial or other affiliation. However, the realisation
of the idea of a qualitative change in living and working conditions is not possible without changes within the current socio-economic paradigm. Capitalism as a world system has survived its age and has already entered the phase when its internal contradictions undermine the system. The system itself has created antagonisms within the existing structure. The transition to a new higher phase is inevitable, as it becomes a question of survival not only of the system, but also of the sustainability of the living world on the planet. Reproduction by inertia of established structures is not capable to resolve the antagonisms within the system. This is revealed in the current global problems that the system produces, but is unable to solve them. The system itself is not able to find an exit from the downward spiral into which it has fallen. Geopolitical concepts from the end of the 19th century are re-activated, protectionism is again returning to the international scene, the functioning of the Organisation of United Nations in some segments resembles the pre-WWII League of Nations, all of which points to the profound structural crisis of capitalism.

HS remains on the level of concept, it is not a theory, since its creators had no revolutionary ambitions to change the existing system. Under the given conditions, any revolutionary pretension would jeopardize the promotion of HS in the public space. The analytical frame presented by HS should draw attention to the immediate and actual problems of people without ideological connotation. Precisely this avoidance of the confrontation with the structures of the system and insistence on the need of its correction has opened the space necessary for the promotion of the concept. By its potential, the concept could lead to changes in the system and contribute to an evolutionary transition of organising socio-economic activities to a new era. The present situation shows that the resistance of neoconservative structures is still strong regardless of the obvious signals that indicate the unsustainability of the existing system. The HS approach allows quantification of dysfunctionalities and identification of the causes of the
problems, which should convince the establishment of the need for structural changes at the system level.

NTIC, as we have seen, have a dual potential: they further aggravate existing problems on the one hand, and, on the other, they create an environment in which solving the problems of the emergent global community becomes possible. The further development of the events will depend on the strength and persuasiveness of the arguments.

Many problems of the contemporary world are no longer local in nature; they are global phenomena. Citizens of the developed countries need to be aware of the fact that their political choices influence the fate of the entire humanity. How and in what way it will be possible to mobilize the NTIC's potential for the democratisation of the global political space depends not only on political and intellectual elites, but also on the owners of large-scale capital. The academic community should do everything in its power to present the necessity of systemic change to key decision-makers. NTIC offer certain opportunities to promote new views and models for solving the paradigmatic crisis, while at the same time they represent a channel through which the existing system defends itself and prevents reforms. It is urgent that social sciences offer new models and theories that will keep up with technological progress. As things stand now, technology has overtaken the analytical capacities of social sciences. This is one of the greatest security challenges of the modern world. The interests of large-scale capital have imposed the profit logic even in academic environments. Consequently, there is no serious critical analysis of the existing situation. The demise of scientific apparatuses and progressive initiatives has led to regressive responses and to the emergence of reactionary antisystemic movements, whose most drastic forms are religious fundamentalism and the revival of extremist right-wing political options.
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Reconsidering the Security Predicament of Weak States in the Context of Human Security and Societal Security

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Abstract

Nation-states are considered to have sovereignty over their territories. However, the sovereignty of weak states is questioned by several actors within them, especially in respect of the idea of the state. Since the classical formulation of “national security” seems to be inadequate for coping with insecurities in weak states, it is important to consider their security predicament with reference to human and societal security conceptions. Although much has been written on the security needs of individuals and communal groups, the interaction of the weak state concept with these two concepts has largely not been discussed among scholars of security studies. In this paper,

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it will be argued that there should be a mutually reinforcing relationship between human security and societal security because state weakness is the structural cause of not only human insecurity but also societal insecurity as experienced in the daily lives of individuals and communal groups in Third World countries.

**Keywords**: security, societal security, human security, weak state, Third World

**Introduction**

Although sovereign states are often referred to as “nation-states” in the literature, very few of them comprise only one nation or people. Even though they are taken to be *de jure* equals in the arena of international politics, in weak states the empirical sovereignty of the state is questioned by several actors within them, especially in respect of the idea of the state. In weak states, the inability of the state actor to provide the main services to its citizens not only leads to human security problems, but also jeopardizes the societal security of identity-based communities. Therefore, the classical formulation of “national security” based on the principle of national sovereignty and its preservation seems to be inadequate for coping with insecurities in weak states.

National security is the imperative of defending a territory against, and deterring, “external” military threats. For most people in the world, however, much greater threats to security come from disease, hunger, environmental degradation or domestic violence. And for others, a greater threat may come from the state itself, rather than from an “external” adversary (Newman, 2001, p. 240). While there are those who advocate the widening and deepening of the concept of security, such as economic, environmental and individual security, on the other hand there are those who advocate that such an attempt would make the concept of security incoherent and meaningless. The question then arises whether the
new conceptions and extensions of security are necessary or whether the traditional concept is the right way to address intra-state security issues in particular. This article will argue that, with the widening and deepening of the security conception, a holistic approach through considering societal security and human security is needed to understand and explain the current circumstances of contemporary security given the growing importance of intra-state security problems. These two security conceptualizations have made crucial contributions to security thinking by considering referent objects of security aside from the state.

One important point that must be acknowledged is that although much has been written on the concepts of human security and societal security, the interaction of the weak state notion with these concepts has largely not been discussed among scholars of security studies. In this article, it is argued that weak states are particular sources of insecurity for global security in the twenty-first century. It will emphasize that there should be a mutually reinforcing and complementary relationship between human security and societal security, since state weakness is the structural cause of not only human insecurity but also societal insecurity as it is experienced in the daily lives of individuals and communities in Third World countries. This paper aims to remain predominantly theoretical and conceptual; to avoid empirically unsubstantiated ideas, however, some empirical examples will be presented from several weak states without focusing on any particular one.

The article is structured into three main parts. In first part, a theoretical discussion will be addressed with a focus on human security and societal security concepts and the arguable outdatedness of the traditional security conception in respect of weak states’ security predicament. The second part will emphasize the importance of human and societal security conceptions for addressing the insecurities caused by weak states. The third part will
discuss how the regime security quest of political elites and groups in Third World countries contributes to jeopardizing human and societal security. Therefore, it is crucial to consider both human security and societal security in order to properly understand a vast array of threats that cannot be understood through the lens of the state security paradigm.

Theoretical Discussion: Thinking Inside of the State

According to the traditional security conception, violent and coercive actions of other states are the principal threats to national security. The traditional security approach thus persists in defining the field of security exclusively in terms of “the study of threat, use, and control of military force” (Walt, 1991, pp. 211–239). Military armament and/or the establishment of alliances are viewed as the only relevant and appropriate response to such military threats. The answer to the question “Who is responsible for providing security?” is that, since there is no reliable supra-national security provider for all states, the state itself is the only unit which can take care of its own security in a self-help system. In the traditional conception, the core values for whose defense the state is ready to go to war are related to the nation-state – preserving its sovereignty and national independence, and maintaining its territorial integrity (Miller, 2001, p. 17). However, the state security paradigm has proved to be too narrow for present circumstances. It has, therefore, been criticized on various grounds by scholars and practitioners especially after the end of the Cold War:

The conception of security that focuses on the security of the state may not be helpful in understanding the problem of (in)security in the Third World (Acharya, 1997, pp. 299–327). Kal Holsti argues that it is necessary to rethink the traditional security conception that focuses upon states as actors, sovereignty, security from exter-
nal threats, and war as the fundamentals of the national security problematics (Holsti, 1992). Indeed, such frameworks do not address the current security predicament of Third World countries, where threats to national security have internal rather than external manifestations, where the regime rather than the state is most frequently being challenged, and where conflicts arise from the irreconcilable demands of ethnic, religious, or national community aspirations (Job, 1992, p. 3). Therefore, security conceptions developed for Western-type states are inappropriate or incomplete for an analysis of security problems in the Third World (Holsti, 1992, p. 52).

Indeed, the ideal type is the nation-state where the ethnical and cultural borders are identical to the political ones. But this is an exception rather than the rule in contemporary world politics. Most states in the international system do not fit into the Westphalian model of the state that is emphasized by the traditional notion of security. Therefore, for example, neorealism is not able to explain internal conflicts and security issues because its main assumption is that anarchy exists in relations between states while inside the state there is order. However, civil conflicts show clearly that the state is not only the object that needs to be made secure – this is also true for the individual, the population or an ethnic group. Indeed, many humanitarian crises in Third World countries are associated with the failure of socio-political cohesion and the collapse of states.

While Barry Buzan admits that the state may indeed threaten the security of its people, he also argues that the very same state is “a necessary condition for individual security because without the state it is not clear what other agency is to act on behalf of the individual” (Buzan, 2002). Therefore, states constitute the primary nexus when it comes to security for individuals and communal groups. Accordingly, in *The Third World Security Predicament*, Mohammed Ayoob emphasizes the need for adopting an “explicitly state-centric” definition when
studying security in the “Third World” on the grounds that the state is the provider of security (Ayoob, 1995). In fairness to Ayoob, he does not neglect other potential referents for security, or its other dimensions such as the economic and environmental. He rather thinks these other dimensions and other potential referents should be taken into consideration only if they “become acute enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, or regime survival” (Bilgin, 2002, p. 106). But this focus on the state is a major point of contention in Ayoob’s work since it overlooks the fact that many of the major threats to security in the Third World are from governments towards individuals and communal groups. Although the state is a good referent object, it does not always give the right and complete answer, especially when we take into consideration that the state is composed of many other groups and individuals inside of it. In this sense, it is important to take into consideration the distinction introduced by Barry Buzan in his seminal book *People, States and Fear* between “strong” and “weak” states (Buzan, 2002, p. 106). This distinction has been an important corrective to the lack of analysis of the state in security studies.

The dominant assumption of security studies is that the people are secure if the state is secure. According to this assumption, security beyond the state seems to be impossible. However, this assumption is not valid when states ignore the security of some of their people, when they actively oppress some of their people, or when the state lacks the capacity to provide security for its people (Mutimer, 2007, p. 56). Accordingly, for scholars of Critical Security Studies, the security of the individual is no longer defined exclusively within the realm of states and as a consequence of national security. Indeed, the Commission on Human Security states that security between states remains a necessary condition for the security of people, but national security is not sufficient to guarantee peoples’ security (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 3). Trends in modern conflict, which
reflect a high level of civil war and state collapse, have resulted in a proportionately high rate of victimization and displacement of civilians (Newman, 2001, p. 244). That is why the security conception should be human-based and designed according to the necessities of human beings. The urgency of many threats faced by humanity as a whole creates a critical need for the development of the human security concept.

The concepts of national security and human security are different, but in the end they are both human-centered, i.e. they (directly or indirectly) bring the human to the forefront. This means that human security complements the notion of national and international security by having it focus more on the human component. This is because state security cannot be attained without human security and vice versa. Human security requires strong and stable institutions but this is not necessarily the case for all states because it can be observed that the conception of human security is lacking in weak states. The focus of human security is squarely on Third World countries and the human security concept has indeed been developed largely in the context of weak/fragile and developing states.

However, the individual is not the sole actor in need of security in human security discourse: the community, sub-national and supranational, the nation, and other identity-based communities are also referents of security (Amouyel, 2006, p. 11). In this respect, the concept of societal security has been introduced by the Copenhagen School as a conceptual framework for comprehending the conflictual relations between the state and sub-state groups, which not only emphasizes the changing nature of security but also addresses the role of identity in achieving security by taking care of the security needs of collective identity groups. The tremendous increase in conflicts among societal groups since the 1990s has led to a reconsideration of the established ways of thinking about security. Also, given that the state and nations
do not converge absolutely, the traditional security approach cannot introduce a suitable theoretical framework for the security needs of human collectivities. This is because until that time sub-state societal groups were not considered systematically in the context of security literature. However, post-Cold War developments such as ethnic separatism and conflicts in Third World countries have demonstrated that the security needs and interests of the state and society do not always coincide. Although societal security can be important from the state security perspective only if it threatens the security of the state (Smith, 1999, p. 84), in some circumstances achieving state security leads to an increase in societal insecurity.

Societal security is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom (Wæver et al., 1993, p. 23). This means that the concept of security is tied to very specific forms of political community, such as nations, ethnic groups or religious communities. Societal security therefore concerns those situations in which societies perceive a threat in identity terms and this conceptualization takes into account the origins, structures, and dynamics of collective identity formation. Threats against societal security emanate from inside the state rather than outside. Threats against societal security can be substantiated with discriminative language and education policies and laws against minorities, prohibition of or intervention in political elections, abolition of cultural autonomy and limitation of political participation and representation, destruction of symbols and institutions that are crucial for group identity, and ethnic cleansing, which requires the systematic destruction of members of a societal group. It can therefore be argued that threats against societal identity can have a military character (the killing of members of a group) or non-military forms. These actions are about the construction of threats against the “we” perception of the related societal group.
The state actor is the dominant unit in both securitizing and desecuritizing security issues in many circumstances. While the power of the state can be a provider of security for a societal group, at the same time it can become a threat to another one. State policies which are in accordance with preserving and improving the dominant national identity can cause repressive and discriminative practices against other identities. “National identity” can thus become a security problem for other identity-based communities. In more repressive instances, minorities may lose the ability to reproduce their cultures because the majority is using state authority to structure educational, media and other systems to favor the majority culture (Wæver, et al., 1993, p. 13). The basic problem of the state in solving societal insecurities is that it understands the issue as a political or military security problem while other parties to the issue perceive it as a societal security problem. It can be concluded that societal threats do not have a given nature but are constructed by actors themselves. Minority groups can be seen as threatening actors or vice versa depending on the identity construction processes of state and sub-state communities. Therefore, the ways of social construction of national and ethnic identities are important.

Identity-based conflicts and disagreements cannot be explained solely with reference to state institutions; their causes must also be sought in threats to the core values held by major societal groups. Therefore, one major advantage of the societal security concept is that it provides a substantive conceptual background which enables it to relate the significance of ethno-national and religious, as well as political, ideological, and socio-economic identities to the formation of social cohesion or, depending on the case, to the collapse of social structures. With the end of the Cold War, in fact, an array of new threats was identified that could not fit neatly into the established paradigm of state security. Societal actors articulate a number of threats, many of which stem from the policies of the state in which they find themselves. The paradigm of
state security fails to properly address these threats because in some cases the protection of the state’s security leads to increased insecurity of the society. From the state security perspective, the security of a society is only important insofar as it threatens the security of the state. However, the atrocities committed by states against societal groups make this position untenable. Thus societal security is introduced to account for the developments that threaten the identity of social groups in especially weak states.

**Weak State–Strong State Distinction and Societal Security**

Until the turn of the twentieth century the issue of weak states was largely perceived by Western governments as a local affair. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, it became clear that if local problems are neglected, they have the potential to cause global security problems. Therefore, for instance, the 2005 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (USA) called on the US military to strengthen the sovereign capacities of weak states to control their territories (National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2005). This new preoccupation with weak states is not limited to the USA. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has launched the Fragile States initiative in cooperation with the Low-Income Countries Under Stress program at the World Bank (World Bank, 2003). As these documents mention, weak states present a serious security threat not only to national security but to regional and international security as well. The issue of weak statehood is therefore at the core of most of today’s relevant security problems.

Although states continue to be central players in the security field, two types of states should be distinguished according to their degree of socio-political cohesion (in the sense of the identification of the populations with
the existing states and their national identities). In this respect, Barry Buzan introduced the weak state/strong state distinction as an analytical tool to show different security features among them (Buzan, 1991, pp. 96–107). Weak or strong states refer to the degree of socio-political cohesion, whereas weak or strong powers refer to the traditional distinction among states in respect of their military and economic capability in relation to each other (Buzan, 1991, p. 97). To consider the socio-political cohesion of states in respect of security studies represents an important shift from the literature of traditional security studies and the Waltzian conception of security because the neorealist conception of security rejects domestic affairs as relevant factors of national security and considers states as “like units” in terms of their security functions irrespective of their internal characteristics (Waltz, 1979, pp. 95–97). However, since the idea of the state and its institutions are internally contested to the point of violence, weak states are not properly national in scope, and do not offer clear referents as objects of national security. When there is almost no idea of the state and the governing institutions are themselves the main threat to many individuals, national security almost ceases to have content and one must look to individuals and sub-state units for the most meaningful security referents (Buzan, 1991, pp. 100–101).

Weak states typically display all or many of the following characteristics: institutional weakness and an inability to perform basic state functions such as tax collection and providing law and order; political instability, as evidenced by coups, rebellions and frequent violent changes of government; the centralization of political power in a single individual or a small elite; unconsolidated or non-existent democracies; an ongoing economic crisis; external vulnerability to international actors; intense societal divisions along religious, regional and/or ethnic lines; lack of a cohesive or strong sense of national identity; and an ongoing crisis of legitimacy for both the government of the day and the institutions of the state.
in general (Buzan, 1991, p. 100; Jackson, 2007, p. 150). In this respect, weak states face a security environment in which the primary threats to security come from internal rather than external sources. Under these conditions, weak state elites are often forced to rely on coercive power and state intimidation to secure continued rule. Political regimes in these states are therefore seen as a source of insecurities rather than a provider of security. Accordingly, military coups, guerrilla movements, secessionist movements, mass uprisings and political factionalism constitute crucial threats for social groups and individuals (Buzan, 1991, pp. 104–105). This unstable and conflictual environment may not be limited to the territorial space of the state and can threaten its neighboring countries.

Due to the lack of the necessary capacity to effectively control state borders, the insecurities of weak states such as humanitarian emergencies, insurgency, secession, rebellion, terrorism, organized crime, refugee crises and mass migration have a spill-over effect (Patrick, 2006, p. 1). Regionally, instability can spill over well past state borders and create a conflict dynamic affecting neighboring countries. Internationally, they can become safe havens for terrorist organizations and criminal groups (Ottoway & Mair, 2004, p. 1). Al-Qaeda, for example, enjoyed the hospitality of Sudan and Afghanistan, where it built training camps and enlisted members. Indeed, a major challenge for weak states is posed by the activities of a variety of violent non-state actors (VNSA), which undermine the state’s monopoly on the use of force (AĞır & Arman, 2014). With the erosion of state control, threats to human security and societal security increase, because individuals and communal groups are the direct targets of violence. Indeed, many “new wars” are predominantly driven by issues of identity and typically involve mobilization along ethnic, racial or religious lines (Kaldor, 1999). In this process, countermeasures taken by the state against VNSAs can also endanger human lives, jeop-
ardize fundamental freedoms and seriously impair the dignity of human beings.

From a security perspective, the principal distinguishing feature of weak states is their high level of concern with domestically generated threats. First, there is no socially cohesive society within the borders of the weak state, but often there are a variety of communal groups contending for their own securities. Second, the regime in power usually lacks the support of a significant component of the population, because the regime represents the interests either of a particular ethnic or social sector or of an economic or military elite that has taken control. The result is often an absence of perceived popular legitimacy to the existence and security interests of the regime. Third, the state lacks effective institutional capacities to provide peace and order, as well as the conditions for the satisfactory physical existence of the population. Fourth, the sense of threat that prevails is that of internal threats to and from the regime in power rather than externally motivated threats to the existence of the nation-state (Söderberg & Ohlson, 2003). Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no single form of national security within the weak state. Instead, there are competing notions of security advanced by contending forces within its society. So, the concept of “national” security is of limited utility in explaining the security predicament of weak states (Acharya, 1997, p. 304). As Montserrat Guibernau states, the historical, social, political and economic circumstances leading to the establishment of the nation-state in the Third World have no parallel in the context within which the nation-state emerged in Western Europe (Guibernau, 1996, p. 118). In other words, the nation-states of the Third World did not come into being as a result of the processes of social change similar or comparable to those which shaped the European nation-state system.

The central characteristic of the Hobbesian model of the state is the exchange of “security” for its citizens against the legitimate monopoly of violence within its
borders. However, the major failure of state-centered security is to not take into account that the state today is partly or completely failing to fulfill its social contract, that is to say to protect people (Amouyel, 2006, p. 11). In this case, academia talks of “failed” or “collapsed” states, “quasi-states” or “weak states” (Schneckener, 2006, pp. 23–40). Accordingly, the problem of preventing weak states from becoming failed states, and failed states from collapsing, will remain a crucial problem for global security.

A weak state reaches the stage of a failed state when its basic functions are no longer performed. The state is paralyzed and inoperative (Orchard, 2004). Citizens then naturally turn more and more to the kinds of sectional and community loyalties that are their main recourse in times of insecurity, and these affiliations are often in opposition to the state (Williams, 2008). Civil wars which characterize failed states therefore usually stem from or have roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other inter-communal enmity. These kinds of states – failed states and collapsed states (an extreme form) – are proliferating in number and posing larger challenges to world order and security. They constitute security threats because of the disorder and non-state actors which they harbor, and these threats are increasingly defining the national and international security agenda.

Inevitable Truth: A Quest for Regime Security in Weak States

Regime security is basically a question of the ability of the government, the ruling group or elite to successfully manage and overcome the problems of governance while maintaining the continuity of its authority and hold on power (Acharya, 1992, p. 144). Therefore, a common response to disorder within weak states will be one of regaining and maintaining control, rather than addressing root causes. This conception is dependent on the maintenance of appropriate security and intelligence capabil-
Ities. Also, in many weak states leaders attempt to erase the distinctions between the state and the ruler. In such situations, the objective interests of the state are indistinguishable from the subjective interests of the ruler of the regime in power (Jackson, 2007, p. 153). Thus, when a regime points to the security of the state, in reality it is the regime itself that is threatened (Wæver, 1996, p. 108). In the context of profound internal threats and constraining external conditions, national security becomes a matter of maintaining short-term regime security. In such a milieu, the regime’s instinct for self-preservation often takes precedence over the security interests of the individuals, society or the nation (Acharya, 1997, p. 303; Acharya, 1992, pp. 143–144). Therefore, in its ideal sense, the concept of national security is wholly inapplicable.

As a typical regime security strategy in weak states, political elites favor certain groups in the allocation of state resources, oppress minorities viewed as hostile, create minority scapegoat groups during times of unrest and appoint members of the elite’s own ethnic group to positions of power (Jackson, 2007, p. 154). Such strategies are self-defeating in the long run, as they further provoke even more serious opposition from social groups. For most weak state elites, however, there is no way out of this dilemma; if they neglect regime security in favor of more genuine state-building activities such as strengthening state institutions and forging a sense of national identity, they are just as likely to be overthrown in a coup or toppled by a rebellion (Jackson, 2007, p. 155). As a result, in weak states repression and identity politics undermine state institutions and threaten the welfare and livelihoods of individuals and societal groups.

The state thus often ceases to be a protector of its citizens and becomes a security threat to them as in the case of totalitarian regimes. Within the protected domain of the Westphalian state, numerous unspeakable atrocities have been committed, and human security thus violated with impunity (Møller, 2001). However, the notion of sov-
Sovereignty is considered as a normative shield for the survival of such totalitarian regimes. For instance, the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) meeting in their first extraordinary session on 3 February 2003 adopted a number of changes to the Constitutive Act. One of these changes was to extend the right of the Union to intervene in a member state to include situations where there is a serious threat to legitimate order for the purpose of restoring peace and stability in that member state (Baumi & Sturman, 2003, pp. 37–45). This amendment is not intended to protect individual and community rights but to entrench the regimes in power.

Indeed, the weak state’s sovereignty is principally guaranteed by the international community. Weakness persists in weak states because they are granted juridical sovereignty by the international community despite lacking sufficient empirical sovereignty (domestic control) (Closson, 2006). Since weak states derive their legitimacy from the international norms rather than from their own domestic social and political structures, military structures of weak states are much more focused on the domestic realm. However, a strong state should not be recognized for deriving its strength from its military capacity, but for possessing a high level of socio-political consensus centered around the idea of the state. The high level of socio-political cohesions of strong states is directly correlated with consolidated participatory democracies and strong national identities. They thus offer high levels of security from political, communal and criminal violence and ensure political freedom and civil liberties both for individuals and collectivities. In the context of the growing importance of democratic principles and human rights, sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally, to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within a state (Newman, 2007, p. 62).

In December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty released their report
entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* (R2P). The report addressed “the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk” (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). The intention behind the Report is to completely shift the focus from the “right to intervene” to the “responsibility to protect”. Thus, the responsibility to protect seems to overturn established international law that has been designed to maintain national jurisdiction free from external intervention. Accordingly, sovereignty is slowly being viewed as conditional, specifically on the ability to provide security to individuals and social groups. Indeed, with its focus on individuals as the fundamental referents of security, human security can be seen as the underlying framework for the development of the R2P. Although the shield of international norms for weak states has gradually come into question with the concept of the “responsibility to protect”, human security could thus be the best remedy to illegitimate intervention (Amouyel, 2006, p. 20) because there is a complementary relationship between human security and state security.

**Conclusion**

The end of the Cold War and globalization have caused fundamental shifts in the international arena and the state-centric and military-based security conception has consequently been revisited and criticized by new perspectives. In this process, the intra-state dimension of security is mostly privileged by scholars due to an increasing number of internal conflicts in weak Third World states, in which physical, structural and cultural violence is widespread. Indeed, when we consider the statistics of Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme, the dramatic conditions in these states display themselves clearly (UNDP, 2017). Therefore, the security conceptualizations that prioritize
individuals and communal groups reflect the broadened agenda of security and its deepening in terms of the referent objects of security. In this respect, contrary to the state security paradigm, the conceptualizations of human security and societal security give attention to the internal dimension of the state and the state itself in a critical manner.

However, complex situations in weak states cannot be explained solely with the conception of human security. What is required is not only human dignity or well-being, but also probably more significantly a minimum level of survival in respect of identity. For a society to be secure, it is not necessary to have a high level of socio-economic development. Instead, the expression and reproduction of identity in a safe manner could be equally important. Therefore, the level of human development cannot ensure the aspiration of self-determination of a society, especially under politically and societally repressive conditions. If both human and societal security needs of the people are met, societies will be more stable and less prone to fragmentation and violence. It is therefore important to create facilities to provide participation in the constructive collective project – the foundation of a successful community or nation-state.

The argument in this article suggests that the concept of security must change away from the Cold War and realist preoccupations with territorial security to focus on people’s security, and away from armaments towards a reformulation in terms of sustainable human development. However, it must be kept in mind that a man/woman still needs the state; that, without a strong state, it would be more difficult for a man/woman as an individual to face modern security challenges, risks and threats. Thus, the questions of how best to strengthen weak states and prevent state failure seem to remain one of the most urgent questions of the twenty-first century. International community engages in several peace-building activities mostly by privileging the organization of
the state in post-conflict Third World societies. However, the focus on state-building as the core of peacebuilding overlooks critical issues affecting the relationship between societal groups and the state. As a policy recommendation, peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies should consider not only the constituting of institutions, but also give priority to humanitarian and societal aspects of security. Strengthening the socio-political cohesion of the state is a complex process which includes democratization, establishing the rule of law, and providing and recognizing civil, political and community rights of the people. However, it should be kept in mind that a change in the conception of the problem leads to a change in the prescription. Thus, if the source of the security problem is the nature of the domestic regime, an accumulation of military capabilities by the state would not be a useful solution but rather a part of the problem (Miller, 2001, pp. 20–21). A real sense security for a state and its regime requires the consideration of the complementary relationship between human security and societal security.
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Human Security in Cyberspace and Climate Change: A Reflection from the European High North

Kamrul Hossain

Introduction

This article reconceptualises human security by linking it to components of the framework of cyber security. The concept of human security recognises both the enablement of and threats to human wellbeing. Cyber security, until recently, has been mainly explored from a national, rather than a human, security perspective. The connection to security in cyberspace, on a more general level, has been mainly addressed through traditional security perspectives. That is, states themselves are primarily the referent objects of cyber security, given that most threats are targeted at critical infrastructures where national authorities are the intended victims either directly or indirectly. Therefore, cyberspace is argued to be a primary operational environment for national security, which is hence to be protected with both defensive and offensive military means (Lehto, Huhtinen & Jantunen, 2011). Threats to cyber security, however, also reflect the security needs of people within states which have so far been ignored (Liaropoulos, 2015, p. 189). People’s security needs are shaped, among others, by various compo-
nents of human security concerns, such as basic needs in terms of ensuring services related to, for example, health care, education, supply of water and energy, etc. An uninterrupted functioning of critical infrastructures, which are run through digital or cyber technology, for example, ensures the fulfilment of these security needs. As a result, the aspects of cyber security having both positive and negative implications for human wellbeing go hand in hand with what the concept of human security stands for. The following article discusses aspects of cyber security that have an impact on the lives of individuals and communities at the sub-state level, as well as across states at the regional level. This article focuses on the European High North (EHN) – a trans-national region composed of the northern parts of Finland, Norway and Sweden, as well as the north-western part of Russia. Given that the region and its population, including a number of indigenous communities, faces severe challenges due to the impacts of climate change, this article examines how interlinked implications of climate change and cyber security impact human security, particularly in the EHN region.

Human Security Reconceptualised

The traditional understanding of security was reconceptualised at the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, state-centric military understandings of security – referred to as traditional security – was supplemented by a rather broadened and deepened understanding of security. The notion of security was reformed around multiple referent objects – with states not being the only referent object – and at multiple levels, both within, and beyond, the state. In other words, the concept of security refers not only to threats to states’ survival, but rather calls for a comprehensive approach to addressing threats and risks at various levels by engaging multiple actors, including individuals and communities, as referent objects. This new approach therefore develops a deeper dimension to
addressing security with greater focus on human beings at its core (Jano, 2009, p. 74).

Traditional state-centric security is largely complemented by this comprehensive approach (Ruiz De Garibay, 2007; Cilliers, 2004, p. 10). The more a state is internally secure within itself, the more its political integrity is secure. Today, security does not hold a fixed meaning (Hossain et al., 2018). It relates to a context-specific understanding, framing the concept both as contested and with many different meanings. Security nowadays does not only refer to threats to states’ existence; rather, it is more focused on the survival of humans and the promotion of their wellbeing. Reducing vulnerabilities and thereby promoting the wellbeing of individuals and communities at all levels of governance is the central purpose of security. Hence, threats impacting the lives of humans and communities, including on the sub-national, trans-national and supra-national levels, are fundamentally security concerns. The common articulation of these threats is built around the concept of human security. The United Nations (UN) Human Development Report (HDR) endorsed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994 played a crucial role in promoting and popularizing the concept. The HDR analysed human security through seven specific indicators, such as health, food, community, personal, environmental, economic and political. These seven components are interconnected – they are at times contradictory, hence one undermines the other, and at other times complementary, when one influences the other to further accelerate existing threats. For example, the promotion of environmental security contradicts the promotion of economic security, considering that the more environmentally secure a community is, the less economically secure it is (Hossain, 2017, p. 11). Similarly, environmental security is interconnected with many other components of human security, and thereby threats to environmental security may accelerate threats in other sectors too, such as in food, health, community security, etc.
The importance of human security lies in the fact that, unlike traditional security threats, human security threats arising out of, for example, threats to the environment, health and food, etc. “kill far more people” than war, genocide and terrorism combined (Human Security Report, 2005). Threats to human security create the root causes of all insecurities (UNGA, 2005). They affect the vital core of all human lives (Commission on Human Security, 2003). Therefore, fulfilling basic human needs for survival is at the heart of the concept (UNDP, 1994). As a policy tool, human security offers an “emancipatory and empowering framework” to address urgent issues in specific situations (McCormack, 2008). It has both preventive and pro-active dimensions; in other words, it embraces both top-down and bottom-up approaches. It represents both negative security – “security from” (threats) and positive security – “security to” (enablement) (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012). The referent objects of security – individuals or communities – are not only subject to protection from threats; they also exercise agency in building the capacity to avoid risks and in improving the system of protection (Commission on Human Security, 2003).

Human security is therefore more about protecting and promoting a society in which people live with a set of freedoms – from “fear”, “want” and “indignity”. These terms, however, are elusive and render the human security concept to incoherent and abstract representations (Paris, 2001, p. 90), for there are no established indicators to determine the level of threat at which point a response or prevention mechanism should be invoked. Yet these non-traditional sources of security threats do have utility in identifying specific threats that impact humans and communities (Owen, 2004, p. 382). Addressing human security threats in a policy framework provides added-value, and promotes agendas on behalf of individuals or communities who are the objects of threats. Including individuals and communities within the policy framework to define the security threats affecting them promotes capacity building for those who might other-
wise be marginalized (Hoogensen and Vigeland Rottem, p. 2004). Identifying and addressing these sources of insecurity, and promoting response mechanisms to mitigate them, requires an innovative approach (Jano, 2009, p. 75). The human security framework certainly provides such an approach – an analytical tool – offering insightful understanding of multi-dimensional aspects resulting in security threats (Booth, 2005; Sheehan, 2005). The framework asks security for whom, security for which values, how much security, and security from what threats, by what means, at what cost, and in what time period (Baldwin, 1997, pp. 12–18).

The reconceptualised model of human security, because of its broadened character, embraces yet other kinds of threats or risks linked to human safety that may result from, for example, civil safety, which includes emergency response and preparedness in case of potential natural or man-made disasters, making human security and human safety intertwined. The sources of un-interrupted functioning of the conditions, such as critical infrastructures, on which the physical existence of an individual and community is dependent can well be interpreted as part of human security. In most recent literature, human security is also addressed from the viewpoint of the present “yet invisible” reality – the so-called post-human security (Burgess, 2017, pp. 63–73), where human functions are increasingly being replaced by technological innovation. While humans still outperform machines in many functions, such as specialist thinking or complex communication (Holopainen & Jokikaarre), technological innovation is expected to increasingly take over many critical functions, which will eventually create a machine-dependent society, capable of causing other kinds of threats to human security. Any disruption to or technological failure by machines in their everyday functioning will therefore have serious consequence for humans. It is in this context that cyber security integrates the concept of human security since
it involves the protection of individuals and communities in their everyday life.

At the same time cyber security also embraces the threat and enablement approach of human security in that it seeks to safeguard cyberspace for individuals and communities, yet also promote the development of infrastructure and protection measures to secure individual and community interactions with cyber technology. Apparently, cyberspace is gradually becoming primarily a “digital civil society”, in which cyberspace is seen as a place where both material and non-material products and services are offered (Lehto, Huhtinen & Jantunen, 2011). Consequently, a broad definition of cyberspace integrating phenomena from technological and social concepts (ibid.) offers new elements in the understanding of human security, which states often “undervalue”. However, it is today argued that cyber security is addressed as a facilitating tool for human empowerment, whereby people and communities benefit from interacting with cyberspace (Liaropoulos, 2015, p. 192). A reconceptualised approach of human security thus complements the existing structure by perceiving the adoption of measures for practices and policies linked to increasingly technology-dependent humans. In this context, the following section analyses the interrelated implications arising out of climate change and cyber security posing threats to human security.

**Climate Change and Cyber Security**

The impacts of climate change are diverse and transboundary. Climate change impacts the entire ecological system, and is eventually capable of contributing to impacts on the environment, economy, infrastructure, society, politics and demography. Such impacts cause significant challenges across regions and can lead to global instability. The most common challenges climate change presents are: changes in ecosystem services on which the
life support system is dependent; an increase in natural disasters; resource scarcity; changing land use practices that result in an unequal distribution of natural resources; the large-scale displacement of populations that ultimately changes the demographic balance affecting community structure. Human suffering increases as a result of, for example, a loss of local environment contributing to poverty, poor quality of life, unequal resource distribution, lack of access to clean water, detrimental impacts on infrastructures that support critical services to humans and communities, etc. The eventual consequences of climate change can give rise to changes in the socio-political system and lead to various forms of local and regional conflict. In addition, climate change hinders the ability to produce or reproduce most basic utilities such as food, water and energy infrastructures, potentially undermining, for example, global food markets and economic growth (Allen, 2014). It is in this latter context, as discussed later in this section, that the effect of climate change relates to cyber security infrastructure.

Cyber security is generally referred to as threats arising out of cyber warfare, cyber-attacks, cybercrime, etc. From a security perspective, cyberspace is considered the next platform of modern warfare (Bruijn & Janssen, 2017). Cyber threats refer to attacks intended to damage, or obtain unauthorized access to, internet or computer network systems. These attempts include, for example, hacking into financial accounts or institutional operation systems either to obtain financial information or to make unauthorized gains. The promotion of cyber security is about undertaking measures to counteract cyber threats, such as running current antivirus programs and verifying that one’s computer system is fully secure (N2 Consultants, 2015). As previously discussed, cyber threats are generally addressed from national security perspectives. However, today the most basic resources, such as water and energy infrastructures – the so-called critical infrastructures – are increasingly integrated through cyber interconnectedness. Critical in-
Infrastructure refers to a set of physical installations or cyber systems and resources that are so essential to an organization or nation that their failure or damage would be extremely detrimental to the populations they serve (N2 Consultants, 2015). Energy, transport, the financial network system, computer-based health care and online commercial infrastructures are some of the examples. Computer-based technologies, with cyberspace and the internet being a primary conduit (Allen, 2014), are indispensable in maintaining the function of critical infrastructures. Moreover, today social and economic development in all sectors are integrally dependent on infrastructures supported by cyber technologies.

Establishing links between climate change and cyber security is complex. Climate change is linked to the impact of human behaviour affecting the earth’s atmosphere and natural environment, whereas cyberspace lies within the inner world (N2 Consultants, 2015), affecting the human-built environment. Billions of actors have an impact on the global climate, and in the same way they have an impact on functions in cyberspace (N2 Consultants, 2015). The earth’s atmosphere and cyberspace are two distinct extraterritorial arenas (Shackelford, 2016, p. 656). These two regimes are apparently unrelated. There are differences, for example in terms of the variables affecting climate and cyberspace. However, the risks associated with them both are anthropogenic (Allen, 2014). Cyberspace and the climate regime are linked by their status as originating from man-made threats (N2 Consultants, 2015). They both threaten homogenous elements, such as critical equities including food, water, energy, and infrastructures (Allen, 2014). Both the implications of climate change and cyber security threats often have an impact on the same critical infrastructures, such as the electric grid, the water supply system, etc. Impacts of climate change, such as floods or other natural disasters, increase the risk of damage to physical infrastructures, such as electricity or energy supply chains. The consequence of climate change has of-
ten been little considered during the construction of such infrastructures. This is because they were largely built at a time when threats from climate change and cyber development were either not evident, poorly-understood, or simply ignored (N2 Consultants, 2015). Furthermore, the rapid pace of the development and introduction of new technologies meant that their implementation in critical infrastructures was unprecedentedly fast and therefore vulnerable. For example, some of the important critical infrastructures in Alaska are found degraded or threatened due to the melting of permafrost because of the consequences of climate change (Allen, 2014). It is also important to look into specific regional characteristics while framing strategies for building new physical infrastructures supported by cyber technology because they might well be vulnerable unless threats to cyber security are addressed. Moreover, climate change also causes a domino effect as a disruption to any one infrastructure can cause disruptions to others due to their extensive interdependencies (Allen, 2014).

A cyber security threat – a cyber-attack for example – to computers and industrial equipment responsible for the smooth operation of these critical infrastructures, such as electric and nuclear power plants, may have serious negative impacts, not only on physical infrastructures, but also eventually on human lives and on their basic needs. When cyber-attacks on critical infrastructures coincide with vulnerabilities from climate-induced changes impacting the same infrastructures, the implications for human security are grave. The potential devastating impact on infrastructures or establishments would contribute to increased human suffering. Given the similar nature of threats originating from both cyberspace and climate regimes, cyber security is argued to reinforce human security where the effect of climate change, physical structures, and the continued functioning of critical infrastructures are interdependent. Developing strategies to mitigate these interrelated challenges thus
contributes to promoting human security as well as a climate- and cyber-secure future (Allen, 2014).

**Human Security as It Applies to Cyber Security Infrastructure**

A human security approach to cyber security is a comprehensive, complementary approach which acknowledges multiple sources of vulnerability to individuals, and includes strategies to address them. However, as referred to earlier, discussions on cyber security often fail to utilize human security as an analytical tool. Rather, states’ national security is often linked to cyber security. While it is true that a safe, secure and open cyberspace is not possible without the involvement of states, they are themselves at times violators of the security of their own subjects. In particular, in those states where an effective and functioning democracy is rather weak, intelligence agencies exploit and manipulate personal data, making cyberspace at times more insecure for citizens. Such practices also hinder the removal of known insecurities (Kerr, 2016), such as those connected to threats to personal and political security. Cyber security embraces elements that place consequences on individuals when information infrastructure is breached or its protection is not ensured. Personal data protection and privacy, the human right to private life, and protection from cyber-attacks are central to contemporary human needs and presented in cyber security literature in connection to human security (Salminen, Hossain, 2018). Threats within a cyber security framework can, if realized, restrict a number of individual and community freedoms that enable personal security. However, the promotion of human security in cyberspace does provide opportunities for empowerment, and for communities and individuals to flourish in contemporary life. Often resilience is the key term used for the promotion of such empowerment, which in other words means enhancing one’s skills in the use of computer networks and information technology and promoting
know-how on information sharing while being aware of the associated risks.

Given that this particular article examines human security as it applies to cyber security in connection to the implications of climate change, and in the context of the EHN, the particular threats referred to herein are the ones emerging from a disruption or dysfunction in the system or the failure of technology-driven digital infrastructures, which have consequences on basic human needs. Therefore, these threats are referred to as second- or third-order consequences felt by individuals and communities in their everyday life (Salminen, Hossain, 2018) given that any interruption in the functioning of such infrastructure affects crucial supplies and services, such as energy, water, health and other services, etc. These critical functions are at risk from threats that exist in cyberspace. However, the human dimensions of such threats are much less commonly associated with the human security framework despite the fact that the disruption of these utilities puts at risk individuals and communities in their everyday life – they are not necessarily purely existential threats though (Burgess, Sissel, 2008). Therefore, instead of pinpointing humans as the weakest link to cyber security (Salminen, Hossain, 2018), it is focusing on the risks inflicted upon individuals and communities as a consequence of climate change implications to critical infrastructures and to everyday services, and thereafter addressing them adequately, that would be a constitutive application of underlying human security principles.

Human security is jeopardized when a disruption increases vulnerabilities to accessing basic resources supported by digitally controlled critical infrastructures (such as energy or water supplies), services such as health and education, as well as the functioning of livelihood activities. The impacts of such disruptions go beyond physical damage to installations and infrastructure. They also involve costs associated with the repair or replacement of affected infrastructures, as well as
the subsequent economic, social and environmental impacts. If supply chains are disrupted, economic activities might be suspended, and consequently social wellbeing might be subject to threats. For example, public health and safety issues are increasingly supported by critical infrastructures whose operation is linked to the cyber security framework. Risks arising out of the impacts of climate change on these infrastructures would not only cause damage to physical infrastructures offering critical functioning, but would also potentially result in economic losses, such as the cost to rebuild assets, the cost to respond to and recover from attack as well as costs resulting from the disruption of products or services (N2 Consultants, 2015). Moreover, losses also arise in the long-term costs of environmental damage. These losses impact economic and political institutions and the ability of the government or industry to maintain order in ensuring the delivery of minimum essential public services, public health and safety (N2 Consultants, 2015). These issues contribute to significant human suffering and can be translated into a number of human security threats, such as threats to health, food, environment, economy, community, etc.

The European High North Context

The EHN can be identified as an ideal region to demonstrate how interconnected human security threats arise out of the implications of climate change and the existing cyber security framework. There is no clear definition for the EHN region. This article refers to the northern parts of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the north-western part of Russia as the EHN. It is a part of the broader Arctic region and therefore shares some common Arctic features, such as remoteness, sparse populations, sporadic and vast distances between settlements, and the presence of local and indigenous communities participating in subsistence livelihoods. However, compared to other parts of the Arctic, the EHN, with the exception of the
north-western part of Russia, is relatively well-advanced and well-developed in terms of infrastructure and connectedness. The region and its population benefit from the use of readily available modern technology. A number of major urban centres are located in the region, including: Oulu and Rovaniemi in Finland; Tromso, Alta, and Kirkenes in Norway; Murmansk, Apatity, and Kirovsk in Russia; and Luleå and Kiruna in Sweden. These urban centres are capable of extending at least some basic support services to rural communities, given that most of the EHN is accessible through a well-connected road network. However, the most remote areas in the vicinity still face critical challenges arising from a lack of adequate infrastructure and support services.

Climate change has implications for both negative and positive consequences in the EHN, as in other parts of the Arctic. Changes in the natural environment have become evident due to warming temperatures, which are two to three times greater in the Arctic region than the global average (IPCC, 2018, p. 6) and contribute to the melting of permafrost and changes in precipitation (Eskeland, Flottorp, 2006, p. 81). Such changes contribute to extreme weather patterns – an increase in temperatures can change the direction of wind and water currents, rendering some parts of the region warmer and others colder (Eskeland, Flottorp, 2006, p. 81). In other words, the region experiences more uncertainty as the implications of climate change intensify, which accelerates with the unpredictability of the region’s climatic conditions. Moreover, a long winter season, darkness, and a harsh environment, when combined with such unpredictable conditions, can result in major challenges to the region’s infrastructures and economy, and its population. Climate change, particularly in the Arctic context, is often referred to as a threat multiplier (Werrell, Femia, 2015), which exacerbates other threats to security and results in diverse challenges for humans and communities. For example, concerning livelihood practices in the EHN region, traditional and nature-based activities are either
replaced by new economic activities, such as the exploration and extractions of minerals and petroleum, tourism, transportation, the construction of infrastructure, etc. (Eskeland, Flottorp, 2006, p. 89) or adapted to take advantage of contemporary technologies. For example, GPS and satellite information systems are being adapted for use in traditional livelihoods, such as reindeer herding practices. The use of GPS collars to track reindeer provides data with exact coordinates that are useful for locating the herd (Reindeer Herders’ Association, 2015, p. 6), but the data is also useful for herders to use in mapping pasture circulation (Pöyry, 2015).

Increasingly, information technology is used as a supporting tool to promote numerous services by replacing physical public service infrastructures. In the EHN, the promotion of such services is evidently being increased as the region faces de-population as a result of the continued out-migration of the younger population, and thereby requires better and efficient support services. As a result, a digital public service support system, in particular for a growing older population, is becoming an obvious necessity. It is also partly caused by the push to adopt digital mechanisms in order to both promote effective services and reduce public expenditure on those services. Health care, education and financial sectors in the EHN are increasingly taking place online and people’s everyday needs are shaped around this. In the region, digitalization is taking over the services needed for humans’ and communities’ continued existence and prosperity. An increasingly technology-dependent, but less environmentally resilient, EHN community is becoming a regional reality. The fulfilment of the region’s needs is integrally connected to digital infrastructure; the uninterrupted functioning of such an infrastructure is hence a precondition for communities to function.

Finnish Lapland has set specific goals through a project called “Digital Lapland is Reality – the Lapps are digitally skilled and the world is in anyone’s reach” aiming at de-
veloping location-independent work, services and education by 2040 (Holopainen, Jokikaarre). Recently, construction work in Lapland to establish 4G connections for the promotion of better information networks was completed. However, because new base stations have not been constructed, shadow areas exist in mobile connections in different parts of Lapland (Holopainen, Jokikaarre). The construction of base stations or other modern physical support infrastructures is generally carried out during summer months only. This is due to the climatic peculiarity of the EHN and therefore the timeframe for such infrastructure development is often too short. The climate is a hindrance to implementing physical infrastructures. On the one hand, the unpredictable and extreme climatic conditions prevailing in the region threaten the stability of its physical critical infrastructures and their uninterrupted functioning, and on the other hand any disruption or malfunction of such infrastructures e.g. because of a cyber-attack, will cause devastating effects on humans and communities. For example, climate change in the region impacts hydropower production as changes in precipitation influence inflow, storage and production. Distribution networks may be affected because of poor infrastructural conditions (Eskeland, Flottorp, 2006, p. 85). Thawing permafrost may also have potential impacts on the physical structures that digitally support the functioning of infrastructures in favour of human needs. As a result, extreme climatic conditions prevailing in the EHN would require more stable and climate-resilient digital structures and infrastructures capable of sustaining climate change-induced threats. Moreover, malfunctioning physical information installations or critical infrastructures, either due to a climatic catastrophe or cyber-attack, would require replacement or repair, which in the fragile EHN climatic context is extremely critical and complex, as well as expensive and time-consuming. Therefore, in addition to climate-resilient infrastructures, strengthening security measures to counter any cyber-attacks on critical infrastructures should be a strategic priority in
order to eliminate potential human security threats arising out of digital disruptions or malfunctions.

Conclusion

The implications of climate change threaten the stability of critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures are dependent on technology to function. These infrastructures are operated through digital means and supported by required physical structures. The most crucial for these structures to function is to have infrastructures capable of being sustained in response to environmental change as well as threats arising out of cyber security threats. The most basic human needs, such as water and energy supply, as well as service sectors such as health, economy and education, are increasingly becoming digitalized and technology-dependent. Consequently, an emerging technology-dependent human community faces challenges that can be translated into human security threats once there is a failure or disruption in the continued functioning of critical infrastructures. This article examined the context of human security from the perspective of the interlinked implications of climate change and cyber security regimes and from the viewpoint of the EHN region. The findings herein suggest that, due to the climatic peculiarity of the region, the placement of climate-resilient, secure and sustainable critical infrastructures is necessary for a sustainable EHN community to prosper. The continued functioning of these infrastructures will not only meet critical human needs in prevailing regional conditions, but will also provide an opportunity for innovation and prosperity. It is within this context that the climate change regime, cyber security and human security frameworks are inter-connected in the EHN context.
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Repatriarchalization of Young Mothers in Serbia Today – Presence of the Multiple Layers of Oppression that Create “Female Destiny”

Nada M. Sekulić

Introduction

Based on the findings of the survey conducted among 1560 women (mothers) in Serbia (including the North of Kosovo), this paper shows the multiple and overlapping layers of patriarchy and marginalization that mark social position of a significant number of young mothers (age between 18 and 30) in Serbia today. Their life is profoundly shaped by high level of unemployment, participation at the labor market characterized by the weakening of workers’ rights, affecting particularly low income sector (sector that employs primarily women), socially invisible and unrecognized poverty, private patriarchy and social pressure on young women to assume traditional gender roles at home, followed by their low level of resistance to oppression. The governmental politics of gender equality in Serbia today marginalizes and makes obscure structural intersectional influence of several factors affecting weakening of young mothers’ life opportunities and living standard, propagating at the same time policy that women are responsible for low level of national fertility.

The data presented in this paper are based on the results of the survey conducted by the researchers of the Institute of Sociology and Social Research, Faculty of

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2 The data presented in the paper are part of the research project “Challenges of new social integration in Serbia - concepts and actors” (Ev.No. 179035)
Philosophy, University of Belgrade, on a sample of 1,560 women mothers in Serbia (including North of Kosovo), during 2017. The aim of the research was to make visible living standard of women who are mothers, since the official governmental politics is currently focused on the issue of low birth rate in Serbia, parenthood and improvement of women’s right, putting women and their reproductive rights in the focus of the public opinion scrutiny. The research provide the grass root data, that can be used to improve gender policies and approach to the main issues that need to be addressed strategically more than in sensationalist way marked by a “witch-hunt” against “insufficient” birth rate.

Since the survey partly consist of questions related to very intimate aspects of female life, and cover experience of domestic violence too, standard statistical procedures of random sampling did not seem appropriate. The field research was based on combined sampling: snow ball, quota, and voluntary sampling, while the improved reliability of the results was obtained by increasing the sample size.

However, the sample was selected carefully, according to predetermined quotas from each of the districts in Serbia, taking into account the size of the district and the share of rural and urban population. The sample represents approximately equally women of three generation: the youngest one, I group, include women 18 and 29 years old (31.4%), the second 30 to 45 (37.5%) and the oldest, third group encompassed women 46 to 60 years old (31.1%). Women over 60 were not included in the sample, due to large time gap between present moment and the experience of childbirth and early parenthood, which were the issues that have been in the focus of the research.

The snow ball network of respondents in local communities was made in such a way to exclude selection of close relatives (kinship of the first and second level), with additional restrictions on the permitted number of respondents in the same streets, residential buildings and blocks.
Our sample include 35.2% women from the Belgrade region, 22.7% from Šumadija and Western Serbia, and 22.2% from Southern and Eastern Serbia. 17% respondents were from Vojvodina (17%) and 2.9% from North Kosovo. Other characteristics of the sample were not pre-planned.

The theoretical approach in this paper is based on intersectional theory. The term intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989) has become the key concept through which feminist scholars frame the issue of the disparities among women related to structural influence of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Though the notion of the intersectionality was coined to explain mostly the interplay between gender and race (Hooks, 1982) and, according to some authors, implies that black women deserves paradigmatic importance in defining the term (Cooper, 2015), over time other identities and forms of oppressions were added to the theory and now there is a wide range of its applicability. Intersectionality helps us to understand that women are not simple and homogeneous social group of people who share the same life experiences, but highly stratified and diverse social category related to people who do not share necessarily same values, political attitudes or existential opportunities. This concept put forwards the issue of social disparities among women. Intersectionality relates to those aspects of social life where there is a visible simultaneous, interwoven and growing impact of the multiple factors on deterioration of women social position, suppressing their upward mobility and pushing them down, making each of these factors much stronger and more influential than if they operated independently. It implies not only that women are socially stratified into different social layers, but also that those who are disadvantaged have more chances to become cumulatively more disadvantaged, and those privileged have tendency to become cumulatively more privileged. As social category, women are exposed to different vectors of social forces that shape their social position. It means that gender is not necessarily uni-
fying principle. Even the opposite, since the “forms of gendered oppression imply the devaluation of the subjectivity of the oppressed” (Collins, 1986), women often themselves naturalize their disadvantaged position as “female destiny” or even “female nature”. Women of lower status naturalize their femininity as “bad fate”, while women with better status articulate femininity as privileged social position and subtle form of human existence, underestimating gender inequality. In this paper we will discuss several domains in which we see the impact of intersectionality on women’s social weakening: education, wages, domestic labor and values.

**Education**

4.7% of our respondents completed only primary level of education. 8.4% finished three years secondary school, while most of them completed four years secondary education (48.2%). 32.6% of respondents graduated from faculties or colleges, and 6.2% has master or doctorate degree. It was interesting to notice that most of those who completed elementary school and least of those who completed college were among the youngest generation (5.1% among youngest respondents completed only primary school compared to 4.3% of respondents from the second group /30-45 years old/ and 4.8% among the oldest, III group /46-60/); 27.8% among the youngest graduated from faculties or colleges compared to 39.3% of those in the II second group and 29.5% among the oldest ones /46-60/) \(\chi^2=30.77, \text{ Sig..000, Cont. Coefficient}=0.14\).

If we look into the further characteristics of those with the lowest level of education, we notice that most of them (31.5%) are housewives. (Among those who completed secondary school there are only 7.5% housewives, and less than 2% among respondents with higher education). Low level of education is distinctly associated with taking traditional and patriarchal female roles in the family. \(\chi^2=201.69, \text{ Sig.=.000, Cramer’s V}=0.18\)
As it was expected, education is also strongly related to the income ($\chi^2=328,002$, Cramer’s $V=0.26$, Sig=.000). The lower the level of education, the lower the income. Not less than 50% of those with only primary education have salary below 150 € monthly, while additional 45.8% of them receive only between 150-300 € monthly. The highest income relate to the group of the most educated respondents.

Education frames the job opportunities, and consequently, women with the lowest education level can apply only for unsecure, poorly paid and unskilled jobs. The least of them, compared to other women, are permanent employees (24.7%). (63.6% respondents with college degree have permanent jobs). In our sample, women with primary education work mostly as cleaning-ladies (9.6%), and unskilled workers in stores, super markets (13.7%) or in restaurants (2.7%). Women with secondary degree can afford a little better job – but most of them still work in stores and super markets (16.4%), 6.3% as nurses, and 5.2% in administration. It is noticeable that 3.1% of them still can’t afford better job than cleaning. Women who graduated from colleges or faculties work mostly as educators (11.8%), in trade sector (7.5%) or in administration (4.5%).

Education relates to marital status too ($\chi^2=42.08$, Sig=.012, Cramer’s $V=.08$). Among those respondents with the lowest level of education are the highest percentage of those in unregistered marriages (12.3%), and the lowest percentage of those married (64.4%) which indicates that unregistered marriage is not “alternative” form of partnership in Serbia today, postmodern phenomenon, a kind of “free relationship”, but represents unstable form of traditional partnership which expose women to higher risks of poverty and uncertainty.

The number of children is growing with a decrease in education ($\chi^2=66.93$, Sig=.000, Cramer’s $V=.104$). Women with only elementary education have the highest number of children (8.4% among them have 4 or more children, compared to 0% of them with master or doctor-
al degree). Women with master and doctoral degree have mostly only one children (53.1%), compared to 25% of those with elementary education. The following table (table 1.) illustrates the link between level of education and the number of children.

**Table 1.** $\chi^2$ between the level of education and the number of children

| education/numb. of children | one | two | three | more than 3 |
|-----------------------------|-----|-----|-------|-------------|
| elementary                  | 25  | 52.8| 13.9  | 8.4         |
| secondary                   | 36.3| 52.2| 10.3  | 1.2         |
| college and faculty         | 43.5| 47.6| 7.9   | 1.0         |
| MA and PhD                  | 53.1| 42.7| 4.2   | 0.0         |

$\chi^2=66.93$, Sig=.000, Cramer’s $V=.104$

These data clearly show that the population policy focused simply on producing more births doesn’t address the issue of the improvement of the quality of the parenthood and leads to the weakening of the social position of women. Unfortunately, Serbia doesn’t belong to the category of those countries where the growing number of children relates to improvement of living standards (Bobic, 2013).

In addition, there is a strong connection between level of education and presence of planned and rationally chosen parenthood. Almost half of women with the lowest level of education had experience of abortion (49.3%), while this number significantly decreases with the improvement of education. (Table 2).

**Table 2.** $\chi^2$ between the level of education and the experience of abortion

| education/abortion         | abortion |
|---------------------------|----------|
| elementary education      | 49.3     |
| secondary                 | 34.8     |
| college and faculty       | 26.3     |
| MA and PhD                | 18.8     |

$\chi^2=28.90$, Sig=.000, Cramer’s $V=1.14$
Wages

The material standard of the respondents is extremely low. The average wages are far lower than the official average. In our sample, 14.7% of the respondents have personal monthly income below 150€, and additional 46.9% have a salary between 150 to 300€, which is still considerably below the official governmental estimation. According to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, the average wages (net) in Serbia in September 2017 was 48.2 thousand. RSD, and gross salary was 66.4 thousand. RSD (around 400€ net /560€ gross). Actually, only 37.9% of respondents have salaries that fit this amount (300-500€). 5.9% who have salaries between 500 to 700€ and only 3.4% respondents who earn over 700€ per month.

It is disappointing to see that the youngest generation have the lowest monthly incomes and that they are least represented among those who have the highest wage. While 19.9% among them have monthly income below 150 €, only 11.3% from the middle generation and 14.4% among the oldest one have such a low income. ($\chi^2=34.15, \text{ Sig.}=.000, \text{ Cont.Coeff. } 0.164$). (Table 3) When we look into these data, we should take into consideration that we talk about young people who don’t work for pocket money, but provide with their income sustenance of their family and children.

Table 3. $\chi^2$ between age/income

| age/income   | -150 | 150-300 | 300-500 | 500-700 | +700 |
|--------------|------|---------|---------|---------|------|
| gen I (18-29)| 19.9 | 52.9    | 21.7    | 3.8     | 1.8  |
| gen II (40-45)| 11.3 | 44.1    | 33.5    | 7.6     | 3.4  |
| gen III (46-60)| 14.4 | 45      | 30.1    | 5.9     | 6.4  |

$\chi^2=34.15, \text{ Sig.}=.000, \text{ Cramer’s V}=0.12$

The husbands (partners) of our respondents have significantly higher monthly income than them. Only 4.7% of husbands earn less than 150 € per month. There are 31% whose salary is between 150 and 300€, and 37.9%,

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between 300 and 500. 16% of them have salary between 500 and 700 euros. The salary over 700 euros has 10.4%.

**Table 4. Monthly income of husbands/partners.**

*Difference between three generations*

| age/income in € | -150 | 150-300 | 300-500 | 500-700 | +700 |
|-----------------|------|---------|---------|---------|------|
| gen I (18-29)   | 3    | 28.5    | 40.2    | 16.6    | 11.6 |
| gen II (40-45)  | 4.9  | 27.8    | 40      | 17      | 10.4 |
| gen III (46-60) | 6.7  | 38.1    | 32      | 14      | 9.2  |

χ²=22.27, Sig.012, Cramer’s V=0.1

Such a gap maintains, restore and perpetuate the image of men as breadwinners and lead to the reproduction of patriarchy, regardless of the fact that women equally as men participate at labor market today and families need incomes of both of them.

In this case too, the youngest generation of women are the most burdened with the gap. The income gap between them and their male partners is significantly higher than the gender gap in the second and the third generation.

A single-factor analysis of variance, using the Bonferroni correction, proves the statistical significance of this difference. The difference in income between the youngest and oldest men (husbands) is inversely proportional to the difference in wages of the youngest and the oldest generations of women. While the youngest men have higher wages than the oldest one, the situation with woman is just the opposite. Since Levene’s test didn’t confirm the homogeneity of the variance inside the three generations of women (Sig.=000), we applied the robust test of equality of means (Welch, F=15.03; Brown-Forsythe=13.52; Sig.=.000) on analyses of women respondents themselves, and ANOVA (F=5.58, Sig.=.004) (Levene’s test: Sig.=.498) on the analyses of respondents’ husbands.

Concerning the wages of women themselves, Post hoc test (Tukey) shows that there is a significant difference between I and II group and II and III group, while I and III
group are similar (table 5). The youngest women has the lowest salary. (I /the youngest group/M =2.16; II=2.49; III=2.44),

**Table 5. One-factor analyses of variance measuring the generational difference in wage between respondents and between their husbands**

a) Generational difference in income between women respondents

| Generation | Generations I, II, III | Mean | Std. Error | Sig. |
|------------|------------------------|------|------------|------|
| I (18-29)  | II                     | -.339* | .068       | .000 |
|            | III                    | -.282* | .071       | .000 |
| II (30-45) | I                      | .339*  | .068       | .000 |
|            | III                    | .057   | .065       | 1.000 |
| III (46-60)| I                      | .282*  | .071       | .000 |
|            | II                      | -.57   | .065       | 1.000 |

Confidence Interval 99%

If we compare their husbands, we see that there is a significant difference only between the youngest generations of husbands and the oldest one, but in this case, the youngest generation has the highest wage ( I M= 3.13, II=3.06, III=2.85).
b) Generational difference in income between respondents’ husbands (age refers only to women)

| Generation       | Generations I, II, III | Mean | Std. Error | Sig.  |
|------------------|------------------------|------|------------|-------|
| I (18-29)        | II                     | .074 | .080       | 1.000 |
|                  | III                    | .281*| .086       | .003  |
| II (30-45)       | I                      | -.074| .080       | 1.000 |
|                  | III                    | .208 | .084       | .042  |
| III (46-60)      | I                      | -.281*| .084       | .003  |
|                  | II                     | -.208| .084       | .042  |

Confidence Interval 99%

These findings serve as strong markers of the ongoing process of repatriarchalization, particularly if we take into consideration that the educational level of the youngest generation of women and their husbands is higher than in the other two generations, which cumulatively contribute to the increase of gender inequality.

**Housework and Care for Children**

Private patriarchy is strong generator of gender inequality (Walby, 1990). It's persistence during the epoch of modernization is long lasting and based on bourgeois
division between public and private spheres, focused on protection of privacy/private property as the main principle of democracy. This division is one of the most important cause of the contemporary prevailing double burden of women, who take responsibility for most of the duties in household including the care for children and sick and elderly, while on the other side, they work for wages outside their homes and constitute the labor force without which contemporary market is unimaginable. It is obvious that it is necessary to develop broader political mechanisms for improvement of women's rights in order to change this condition which represent structural anomaly of modern society. However, it is also obvious that changes in attitudes and awareness of people are necessary too, and that it is not easy to change them, since nobody entitled for privilege gives up easily benefits of such position. This pertains to women themselves, since they often consider family sphere the protected realm of their feminine micro-social power, on which they build their self-esteem and their best social representations (Sekulić, 2017). If they pursue affirmation in public life, they face many constraints, based on gender regimes and prejudices, and consequently, many of them get out of public life and find retreat in familiar and intimate surroundings, usually making compromises with the traditional patriarchal requirements related to gender roles. (Milic, 1994)

Here we compare three generation of women to show the difference in distribution of domestic labor and care for children. Hypothetically we expected to see a drop of gender gap in the youngest group of women. We measured distribution of housework and parenting in two periods: 1) When first child was born. We considered this period of parenting formative. Couples' relationship before that formative moment was optional and without serious duties, but from that moment it had to be transformed. This phase is transitional. 2) The second period relates to present distribution of housework. In the framework of the research, we considered present mo-
ment “mature” and stable phase in which distribution of gender roles have become permanent.

Concerning the first, formative phase of parenthood, data confirmed our presumptions. The youngest generation shared their parenting duties with their partners more than the older ones. While 45.7% respondents from the youngest generation (18-29) did baby bathing together with their husbands/partners, 35.7% those from the second generation (30-45) used to share that task with their partners and even less, 28.4% did the same in the oldest generation (46-60). ($\chi^2=60.39$, Sig.000, Cramer’s $V= .14$).

The same relates to tasks of putting baby to sleep, changing diapers, calming baby when it cries, going for a walk or to doctor with baby, making photo album… However, it should be noticed that, after all, in all cases predominantly women perform these duties. There isn’t even one activity relating to parenting where men would take most of the burden. “There are only two activities – taking baby to walk (51.3%) and going to doctor (60.5%) - which are considered predominantly joint activity. All other tasks are predominantly female jobs. According to these indicators, formative period is a milestone that legitimate excessive use of women’s resources, exposing it openly as socially accepted custom, and for women a binding norm. (Radovic, Markovic, 2017). In addition, difference between generations concerning housework is not distinct and significant. While parenting include higher engagement of men, this doesn’t relate to “housewives’ job”. For example, only 11.9% respondents of the youngest generation shared cooking with their husbands, and roughly the same situation is with the other two generations (11.9% shared this duty with their husbands in the second generations, and only 6.6% in the oldest one). It seems that housework (cleaning, cooking, ironing) functions as a primary symbol of femininity, even more than parenting.
One of the questions posed to the respondents was: Have they ever been criticized for being bad mothers? (Radovic, Markovic, 2017: 144) The crossing-data (Hi-Square) indicates that the slightest criticism for being “bad mother” received women who in the formative period of their parenting shared their housework tasks with their partners equally. The most criticized as bad mothers are precisely women who in the same formative period (immediately after the arrival of baby), took all responsibilities for the housework. This information (the more women work, the more criticism) is interesting because it indicates that at least some of young women become a “good” mother by strong patriarchal social pressure and guilt mechanisms. In addition, those women criticized for being “bad mothers” are statistically more exposed to domestic violence than those who were not criticized ($\chi^2=35.082; \text{Cramers’s V}=0.15; \text{Sig}=.000$)

The following table shows the level of the respondents’ housework burden.

**Table 6. The percentage of women who perform their household tasks without the help of husbands**

|        | I  | II | III |
|--------|----|----|-----|
| cooking| 71.1| 77.2| 86.6|
| laundry| 85.5| 88.2| 92.8|
| dishes | 71  | 71.6| 81.5|
| cleaning| 67.1| 70.9| 79.6|
| shopping| 27.7| 35.4| 50.1|
| care of children | 51.6| 55.8| 67.2|

Despite the fact that the youngest generation is less burden with housework than the older ones, the overall picture shows that private patriarchy is widespread in Serbia.

This alone does not indicate increase in patriarchalism, but it indicates that the traditional division of roles in households in Serbia is not even questioned by most of our respondents. However, the clear mark of repatriarchalization is the fact that 80% women of the young-
est generation state that they are mostly or completely satisfied with the present division of housework in their homes. The same applies to the older generations, but in a lesser degree. 63.2% women of the second generation (30 and 45) are satisfied too, and 55.8% of those who belong to the oldest generation (46-60).

We can explain this unusual generational distribution of answers concerning housework and equality only hypothetically. Probably because high percentage of housewives and unemployed women is noticed exactly among the youngest generation, they took housework and care for children as just and rightful distribution of domestic labor. If this is the case, repatriarchalization is obviously generated by the reduction of employment opportunities and life chances for the youth in general, affecting particularly young mothers.

Social change, including changing of patriarchal conditions, comes from social dynamic. Whenever there is a stalemate, social reforms will be slowed down or even reversed. Pushing women out of public life, even if this isn’t declaratively promoted, actually lead to repatriarchalization, simply by making the patriarchal division of labor at home socially functional.

**Patriarchal Values**

In order to estimate the level of patriarchalism, we used standard (shorten) scale of patriarchalism. Factor analyses shows that the items have normal distribution, Keiser-Meyer-Okin’s index is = 0.730, Bartlett spherical test, 000, and Cronbach’s alpha = 0.766, the correlation matrix between the items has satisfactory coefficients above 0.3 (Min., 323, Max., 550). Analysis of the main components revealed the existence of only one component, which explains together 58,889 percent of the variance, and all unrotated factorial saturation were over 0.6. (“If only one spouse is employed, it is better if the employed one is husband.” (.544) “Most household jobs are
by their nature more suited to women.” (641) “It is good if man and woman are equal in marriage, but it is better if husband has the last word.” (530) “Men are closer to the public and women to private jobs.” (640)

Having confirmed that the scale is valid, we applied one-factor analysis of variance in order to define connections between the age (three different generations of respondents) and their level of patriarchalism.

The outcomes clearly confirm significant similarities between the youngest and the oldest generation, while the middle one seems to be the less patriarchal. Robust test of equality means confirmed significant difference in variance between the three generations of women (Welch, F=7.6; Brown-Forsythe=7.29; Sig=.001) (I /the youngest group/M =11.24; II,M=10.31;III M=11.21), while the multiple comparison (Tukey) shows that there is a significant difference between I and II group and II and III group, while I and III group are similar (table 7)

**Table 7. One-factor analyses of variance measuring the difference in the level of patriarchalism between three generations of respondents**

| Generation | Generations I, II, III | Mean | Std. Error | Sig. |
|------------|------------------------|------|------------|------|
| I (18-29)  | II                     | .926*| .279       | .003 |
|            | III                    | .026 | .292       | .996 |
| II (30-45) | I                      | -.926*| .279      | .003 |
|            | III                    | -.900*| .280      | .004 |
| III (46-60)| I                      | -.026 | .292     | .996 |
|            | II                     | .900*| .280       | .004 |

Confidence Interval 95%
The analysis points to repatriarchalisation, since the youngest generation of women, which would be expected to be the least patriarchal, has a higher level of patriarchalism than the middle generation, and there is no difference in the level of patriarchalism between them and the oldest generation.

**Conclusion**

The outcomes of the research do not indicate improvement of the equality of women in Serbian society today. In general, women’s salaries are significantly lower than those of their partners, and the balance of life between private and public life is still undermined by the high burden on women with the responsibilities at home, in circumstances where family’s budget depends on the paid work of both partners. Care for the elderly and sick stays exclusively female task. The outcomes of this research makes clear that the improvement of gender equality is not possible in conditions of a general decline in living standards. Several indicators point out that the values of women are marked by repatriarchalization. The retrograde direction becomes obvious when we compare three generations of respondents. The material standard of the youngest generation is the most uncertain, their average
wage the lowest, the difference in income between them and their husbands/partners the biggest and therefore the dependence on the partner and the immediate social support is obvious. At the same time, the traditional division of gender roles, the burden of women with household tasks and care strongly persist among the youngest mothers. Concerning their attitudes and values, the generation of the youngest has values and attitudes that are more similar to the generation of the oldest generation, than to the middle aged respondents, who are the most emancipated.
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The 4th International Academic Conference on Human Security – Human Security and New Technologies

Nenad Stekić1

The 4th International Academic Conference on Human Security – Human Security and New Technologies was held on November 2–3 2018 at the Rectorate building of the University of Belgrade. The two-day event was organized by the Human Security Research Center of the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies and made possible by the OSCE Mission to Serbia and Ministry of Education of Science and Technological Development Republic of Serbia. The Conference was an opportunity for scholars and practitioners to present and exchange their research results, experience and views on long-standing human security issues, such as violence of different forms and origin, but also some emerging issues, including how new technologies create both new opportunities and threats to human security. As pointed out in the Call for Papers for this year’s Conference, a wave of new technologies “is moving fast and causing changes on a global level, simultaneously affecting every individual human being and every community, whereas the fusion of technologies has resulted in a blurred line between physical, digital and biological sphere”. This is why, unlike previous conferences, whose common thread was to attempt to shed light on some aspects of (predominantly) social phenomena, the 4th Conference was fully dedicated to a specific issue – new technologies and development.

The Conference was officially opened by Mr Petar Bulat, Vice-Rector of the University of Belgrade, Mr

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Vladimir Cvetković, Dean of the Faculty of Security Studies, H.E. Mr Andrea Orizio, Head of the OSCE Mission to Serbia, and Mr Goran Matić, Director of the Office of the National Security Council and Classified Information Protection of the Republic of Serbia. After a short press break, the special introductory session consisting of keynote lectures began. The first lecture was delivered by prof. Rastko Močnik, who presented state-of-the-art theory and practice in examining human security phenomena. He warned of the increasing diversification in the human security research approach and, consequently, in its research agenda. The second keynote lecture was given by Nathaniel Raymond from Yale University’s Jackson Institute of Global Affairs. Mr Raymond’s lecture “Reconceptualising Human Security for the Digital Age” explored the changeable nature of threats to human security and called for new ways of responding to them. These two lectures were followed by a short discussion between the panellists and spectators.

In the next keynote lecture, Mr Bülent Sarper Ağır from Adnan Menderes University in Turkey pointed to the challenges faced by academics in researching specific technological aspects of human security. While emphasizing the significance of examining social phenomena from the human security perspective, he also highlighted some research opportunities in the field. The very last keynote lecture was held by Mr Aleksej Tarasjev, an evolutionary biologist from the University of Belgrade’s Institute for Biological Research “Siniša Stanković” (IBISS). His lecture was dedicated to biosafety and related international framework and policy issues in Serbia. These two talks were followed by another short discussion.

The Conference participants then split into four panels. The first panel was dedicated to technological aspects of human security such as encrypted telecommunications, international intelligence sharing, mass surveillance through metadata and some aspects of the GDPR. It consisted of seven presentations that put emphasis on
the digitalisation of human security in the modern era. The panellists agreed that future threats will be difficult to address as digital uncertainty rises with cyber development. The panel was moderated by Mr Đorđe Krivokapić from the Faculty of Organisational Sciences – University of Belgrade and Mr Milan Miljković from the Office of the National Security Council and Classified Information Protection of the Republic of Serbia.

The second panel focused on research dealing with warfare, hybrid aggression, law enforcement in crisis situations and some relevant aspects of open data and social media in examining specific human security threats such as depleted uranium weapons and emergencies. Six papers in total were presented during this panel, which was moderated by Mr Zoran Jeftić and Mr Goran J. Mandić, both from University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies.

The third panel, with three subcategories, was held on the second day of the Conference. The first subcategory examined major issues such as urban security, local governance, smart cities and urban development strategies, while the second provided an overview of vital emergency response issues such as fire safety and CBRN threats. Lastly, authors presented analyses of climate change and its impact on social communities, as well as of public perceptions of urban security. Eight papers were presented at the panel, which was moderated by Ms Vesela Radović from the Institute for Multidisciplinary Research – University of Belgrade and Ms Marijana Sumpor from the Institute of Economics in Zagreb.

The fourth panel focused on mass migration issues and the role of media in violence prevention. Some presentations looked at right-wing extremism propaganda and the impact of the gender digital divide on security and women’s human rights. This panel consisted of nine presentations and was moderated by Ms Jasmina Gačić from the Faculty of Security Studies in Belgrade and Mr...
Srdan Korać from the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade.

Aside from its official academic part, the Conference also offered a two-part Method Workshop event, which gathered thirty postgraduates with the aim of advancing their knowledge in research-oriented issues. The first part, presented by Mr Nathaniel Raymond was titled “Data as People: Information, Rights, and the Future of Freedom”. The second part, “The Use of Personal Protective Equipment in CBRN Training”, was presented by representatives of the Vinča Institute of Nuclear Sciences of the University of Belgrade.

The biannual Conference gathered over forty academics and scholars from thirteen countries, who presented thirty papers. The event was also attended by around ninety spectators and thirty method workshop participants. As with previous conferences, the event was featured in several media reports. Apart from high quality research presented at the Conference and spirited and fruitful debates, the Conference – a major endeavour of the Human Security Research Center – contributed to the field of human security by bringing new insights into the potential future explorations of the concept. All the papers presented at the Conference were published in the Proceedings of Human Security and New Technologies prior to the Conference.
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Articles can be submitted directly via e-mail (as MS Word documents) to ejhs@fb.bg.ac.rs. The editors of EJHS welcome articles (6,000–12,000 words), discussion papers (2,000–5,000 words) and reviews and essays (1,000–2,000 words or shorter).

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Manuscripts should be prepared using the APA Style Guide. All pages should be typed with 1.5 line spacing. The body of the manuscript should be in 12-point Times New Roman. Reference and endnote pages should be in 10-point Times New Roman font with 1.5 line spacing.

The manuscript should include three major sections (in this order): Title Page with abstract, Main Body, and References. Title page should contain the full article title, abstract (no more than 150 words), author(s) biography (no more than 50 words), each author’s complete name and institutional affiliation(s), acknowledgments and credits.
Illustrations, pictures and graphs should be supplied with the highest quality and in an electronic format. Figures/charts and tables created in MS Word should be included in the main text.

The reference list should be arranged in alphabetical order according to the author’s/authors’ last name(s).

If there is more than one work by the same author, order them according to their publication date – oldest to newest. Manuscripts submitted to European Journal of Human Security should strictly follow the APA manual; every in-text citation must have the detailed reference in the Reference section and every reference listed in the Reference section must be cited in the text.

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