A Devastating Example for the Halfer Rule

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Abstract
How should we update \textit{de dicto} beliefs in the face of \textit{de se} evidence? The Sleeping Beauty problem divides philosophers into two camps, halfers and thirders. But there is some disagreement among halfers about how their position should generalize to other examples. A full generalization is not always given; one notable exception is the Halfer Rule, under which the agent updates her uncentered beliefs based on only the uncentered part of her evidence. In this brief article, I provide a simple example for which the Halfer Rule prescribes credences that, I argue, cannot be reasonably held by anyone. In particular, these credences constitute an egregious violation of the Reflection Principle. I then discuss the consequences for halving in general.

Keywords: Sleeping Beauty problem, Halfer Rule, Reflection Principle, evidential selection procedures

1 Introduction
It is far from a settled matter how \textit{de dicto} beliefs should be updated when we obtain \textit{de se} information. The Sleeping Beauty problem is particularly effective at bringing out conflicting intuitions. In it, Beauty participates in an experiment. She will go to sleep on Sunday. The experimenters will then toss a fair coin. If it comes up Heads, Beauty will be awoken briefly on Monday, and then put back to sleep. If it comes up Tails, she will be awoken briefly on Monday, put back to sleep, again awoken briefly on Tuesday, and again put back to sleep. Essential to the problem is that Beauty will be unable to distinguish any of these three possible awakenings (Monday in a Heads world, Monday in a Tails world, and Tuesday in a Tails world). In particular, when being put back to sleep after a Monday awakening, Beauty will be administered a drug that prevents her from remembering this awakening, but otherwise leaves her brain unaffected. The experiment will end on Wednesday, when Beauty will be finally awoken in a noticeably different room, so that there is no risk of her mistaking
this event for one of the brief awakenings. Beauty is at all times fully informed
of these rules of the experiment.

Now, when Beauty finds herself in one of the brief awakening events, what
should be her credence (subjective probability) that the coin has come up Heads?
Thirders believe that the correct answer is 1/3, which would be the long-run
fraction of Heads awakenings if the experiment were to be repeated many times.
Halfers, on the other hand, believe that Beauty’s credence should be unchanged
from Sunday, when it should clearly be 1/2. One benefit of being a halfer is
that being a thirder (or supporting any fraction other than 1/2) seems to violate
the Reflection Principle [van Fraassen, 1984, 1995]: if on Sunday you are certain
that tomorrow, on Monday, you will have credence (say) 1/3 in some event, then
you should have credence 1/3 in that event now already. But (applying what
is known as the Principal Principle) clearly on Sunday the credence in Heads
should be 1/2, because the coin is fair. Elga [2000] already notes the conflict
between thirding and the Reflection Principle, attributing this observation to
Ned Hall, and considers the Sleeping Beauty problem a counterexample to the
Reflection Principle.

Even if we were certain of the correct answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem
– presumably, 1/3 or 1/2 – this would fall short of knowing how de dicto beliefs
should be formed in the face of de se evidence in general. All it would do is
place a constraint on how they should be formed. Indeed, halfers disagree on
how the 1/2 answer should generalize to other examples. But one natural gen-
eralization that has been discussed in several articles [Halpern, 2006, Meacham,
2008, Briggs, 2010] is the following, called the “Halfer Rule” by Briggs.

The Halfer Rule. Determine which possible (uncentered) worlds are ruled out
by the centered evidence; set their probabilities to zero. For those that are not
ruled out, renormalize the probabilities, so that they again sum to one while
keeping the ratios the same.

If Beauty adopts the Halfer Rule, she indeed places credence 1/2 in Heads
after being awoken, because no possible worlds are ruled out. Again, not all
halfers agree with the Halfer Rule in general. For example, the Halfer Rule
prescribes that, if Beauty is always told at some point during her Monday
awakening that it is Monday, her credence in Heads at that point should still be
1/2, because still no possible world is ruled out. But Lewis [2001] advocates a
version of halfing that results in a credence of 2/3 in Heads after being told it is
Monday. This is a violation of the Reflection Principle – Beauty knows that she
will change her credence to 2/3 on Monday, regardless of how the coin came up,
and yet sticks with 1/2 on Sunday – and arguably one that is more serious than
the third’s alleged violation of it, because in this case Beauty knows where

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1For my purposes, it is not necessary to specify how credences in centered worlds are
determined, i.e., how the total credence in a possible world is divided across its centers. This
is because I will only consider credences in uncentered events in what follows. Titelbaum
[2014] gives an example where halfers obtain an implausible credence in a centered event, if a
certain condition on how the halfer distributes credence across centers holds.
in time she is when her credence is \( \frac{2}{3} \). Indeed, Draper and Pust [2008] have pointed out that this credence of \( \frac{2}{3} \) would make Beauty susceptible to a very simple diachronic Dutch book, where she is sold one bet on Sunday when her credence is \( \frac{1}{2} \) and another on Monday when her credence is \( \frac{2}{3} \), resulting in a sure loss overall.\(^2\)

More recently, Pittard [2015] has also argued against the Halfer Rule. As he points out, his own interpretation of halfing can lead to a disagreement paradox where two participants in an experiment obtain different credences in spite of having the same information. (The Halfer Rule does not lead to this disagreement paradox in his example.) It should be noted that it would be trivial to turn these disagreeing participants into a money pump by arbitrage of their different credences.\(^3\)

In summary, the Halfer Rule is not universally agreed to constitute the correct generalization of halfing. On the other hand, it is a very natural generalization, it has attracted significant support, and it avoids problems that other interpretations of halfing encounter. However, I will now proceed to show that it is fatally flawed.

## 2 A Variant with Two Coins

The Sleeping Beauty variant that I need is very simple. Beauty will be put to sleep on Sunday, and be awoken once on Monday and once on Tuesday. As always, she will be unable to remember her Monday awakening on Tuesday. Two fair coins, called “one” and “two,” will be tossed on Sunday. When she wakes up on Monday, Beauty will be shown the outcome of coin toss one. When she wakes up on Tuesday, she will be shown the outcome of coin toss two. Beauty cannot distinguish the two coins, so seeing the outcome of the coin toss still does not tell her which day it is. She only learns that the coin corresponding to today came up (say) Heads. Figure 1 illustrates the example.

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\(^2\)One may wonder whether, similarly, we could set up a Dutch book against the thirder based on her alleged violation of the Reflection Principle. But this would involve her being offered bets on Monday awakenings, without being told that it is Monday, but not on Tuesday awakenings, and it has been argued that this does not constitute a fair Dutch book because the bookie is exploiting information that Beauty does not have [Hitchcock, 2004]. (Also, from being offered the bet Beauty might infer that it is Monday and thereby change her credences and decline the bet.)

\(^3\)Pittard nevertheless defends these credences, arguing that it may be reasonable to consider this a robustly perspectival context, one in which two disputants should end up having different beliefs in spite of them having the same evidence, being able to communicate without restriction, etc. This may be reminiscent of the perspectival realism described by Hare [2010] (see also Hare [2007, 2009]). Hare [2007] goes into some detail discussing what conclusion two interlocutors, each of whom takes herself to be “the one with present experiences,” should reach. If indeed they should not be able to reach complete agreement, as seems likely, then this would appear to be a robustly perspectival context. However, in this case it does not seem possible to turn the situation into a money pump, because it does not seem possible to settle any bets made in a satisfactory way; we cannot adjudicate from a neutral perspective. Indeed, Hare concludes that the interlocutors should agree that the other is correct from the other’s point of view. In contrast, bets made by the participants in Pittard’s experiment could
Now consider the following question. When Beauty is awoken and observes a (say) Heads outcome, what should be her credence that the coin tosses came up the same? That is, what should be her credence in the event “(both coins came up Heads) or (both coins came up Tails)”? It seems exceedingly obvious that the answer should be 1/2. Clearly this was the correct credence on Sunday before learning anything (by the Principal Principle), and intuitively, the outcome of the coin toss today – whatever it is – tells Beauty absolutely nothing about whether the coins came up the same. This requires that the coins are fair; if each coin had, say, a 2/3 chance of coming up Heads, then learning that today’s coin has come up Tails would give Beauty evidence that the coins are less likely to have come up the same. But we explicitly assume that the coins are fair.

I will argue in more detail that 1/2 is the correct answer shortly. But, for the reader who is already convinced of that, let me get to the point and show which credences result from applying the Halfer Rule. The possible worlds that are consistent with a Heads observation are HT (coin one came up Heads and coin two came up Tails), TH, and HH. Because each of these three worlds has the same probability ex ante, applying the Halfer Rule results in placing credence 1/3 in each of these worlds. But this implies placing only 1/3 credence in the event that both coins came up the same, because of the three remaining worlds only HH has them coming up the same. By symmetry between Heads and Tails, the Halfer rule also prescribes 1/3 credence in the event that both coins came up the same if Tails is observed.

3 The Halfer Rule and the Reflection Principle

What is so wrong about the Halfer Rule suggesting that the correct credence is 1/3 in the above example? Well, it is now the Halfer Rule that runs afoul of the Reflection Principle: if Beauty is certain that her credence on Monday (or, for that matter, Tuesday) will be 1/3, then why is it not 1/3 already on

Incidentally, applying the Thirder Rule does give the right answer: of all Heads awakenings, two are in the HH world, in which the coins come up the same, and the remaining two are in the HT and TH worlds, in which the coins do not come up the same. So if we use the Thirder Rule, the resulting credence in the event that both coins came up the same is 2/4 = 1/2. (I apologize for any confusion caused by the unfortunate coincidence that the Halfer Rule prescribes 1/3 in this context, and the Thirder Rule 1/2.)
Sunday? In fact, it seems to me that this violation of the Reflection Principle is more serious than the thirder’s alleged violation of it in the original Sleeping Beauty problem, for the following reason. In the original problem, it would be unreasonable to say that the fact that the thirder will end up having a credence of 1/3 on Tuesday implies that she should already have a credence of 1/3 on Sunday. After all, she does not always wake up on Tuesday, and if she were capable of, in her sleep, recognizing that she has not been awoken, she would assign credence 1 in Heads then. That is why the purported violation focuses on the Monday credence in Heads, not the Tuesday one. But it seems illegitimate to consider Monday separately from Tuesday, because Beauty cannot distinguish them. Thus, it seems debatable whether the thirder really violates the Reflection Principle – more precisely, whether she violates any version of this principle by which we would care to abide. By contrast, in the two-coins example considered here, it does not seem that the argument that Monday and Tuesday should be considered together can be of much help to the supporter of the Halfer Rule, because Beauty is always awoken and, according to the Halfer Rule, always ends up with a credence of 1/3. But I leave formalizing the sense in which the violation is more serious for another day.

To make matters yet worse for the Halfer Rule, consider the following twist to the two-coins example. On both Monday and Tuesday, after Beauty has observed the coin toss outcome and been awake for a little while longer, the experimenter tells her what day it is. Say she observed Heads and was then told (a bit later) that it is Monday. Now only two worlds survive elimination: HH and HT. The Halfer Rule will assign each of them credence 1/2, resulting in a credence of 1/2 that both coins came up the same. But this is yet another violation of the Reflection Principle: after seeing the outcome of the coin toss but before learning what day it is, Beauty, if she follows the Halfer Rule, places credence 1/3 in the event that the coins came up the same, but she also knows that once she is told what day it is, in either case, she will shift her credence to 1/2. This is perhaps the most egregious violation of the Reflection Principle that we have encountered, because in this case she is not put to sleep and does not have memories erased as she transitions from one credence to another. Again, I leave formalizing the sense in which the violation is more serious than

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5The Thirder Rule still gives 1/2 as well, because there are only two possible centered worlds remaining, namely Monday in HH and Monday in HT.

6On the face of it, the same happens in the Shangri La example given by Arntzenius [2005]. (I thank an anonymous reviewer for Philosophical Studies for calling my attention to this.) In this example, someone experiences A or B according to the outcome of a coin toss. He knows, though, that at a certain point in time after the experience, any memories of B will be replaced by false memories of A, while any memories of A will be left intact, so that he will not be able to tell the two cases apart. Then, while experiencing A, he has credence 1 in Heads, in spite of knowing full well that he will later have credence 1/2 in Heads, without his memory being compromised in this particular case. Of course, this is entirely due to the fact that in a parallel case, his memory would be compromised to be indistinguishable from what he currently knows will be his (true) memory of A. Thereby, he will lose a piece of information that he currently has. But nothing similar happens in the enriched two-coins example. At the point in time when Beauty is told what day it is, her memory is never compromised, and she never loses information.
Figure 2: A cost-cutting variant of the two-coins example in Figure 1, the only modification being that Beauty is no longer awoken on Tails.

the other violations for another day.

4 What Options Remain for the Halfer?

If the Halfer Rule is untenable, then is there another full generalization of halfing that is more defensible? I have already mentioned a few interpretations of halfing that do not always agree with the Halfer Rule and get into their own brands of trouble as a result. In this final section, I hope to assess a bit more systematically how halfing may be generalized in a trouble-free way.

One helpful example to consider is a variant of the two-coins example introduced earlier. The only modification that is needed to obtain this variant is the following. To cut down on the cost of the various drugs involved in the awakenings, the experimenter has decided to only awaken Beauty when the coin corresponding to the current day has come up Heads. On Tails days, the experimenter just lets her sleep. Beauty is of course informed of this modification at the outset. As a result, on a Heads awakening it is no longer necessary to show her that the coin has come up Heads, because this is already implied by the fact that she was awoken at all. On the other hand, nothing is lost by showing her the Heads outcome anyway. Figure 2 illustrates the modified example.

Now what should Beauty believe upon awakening (with Heads)? It appears to me that in this variant, any reasonable generalization of halfing must place credence $1/3$ in each of the worlds HH, HT, and TH. Specifically, TT is ruled out by the evidence, HT and TH should have the same credence by symmetry, and it appears that the only motivation one could have for giving HH a higher credence is that this world has more centers – but that is thirder reasoning! If these $1/3$ credences are right, it leads to the following question. How could the fact that we no longer awaken Beauty on Tails days affect her correct credence on Heads days? If one answers that, well, in fact, it should not affect it, then all is lost for the halfer. It implies that the halfer is stuck with the Halfer Rule’s prescribed credences for the original two-coins example, which are untenable.

So, the halfer must adopt a position that allows for the prescribed credence to change when we change whether Beauty is awoken under other conditions – conditions that she herself would be able to distinguish from the current ones. This may seem unappealing; in particular, the thirder needs to make no such move. Still, reasonable generalizations of halfing may fit the bill. For example, consider the following approach, based on specifying the evidential selection procedure. The halfer could treat her current waking experience as

|    | HH (1/4) | HT (1/4) | TH (1/4) | TT (1/4) |
|----|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Monday | see Heads | see Heads | asleep | asleep |
| Tuesday | see Heads | asleep | see Heads | asleep |
being randomly selected from her waking experiences in the actual world. In
the original two-coins example, by Bayes’ rule this results in

\[
P(\text{HH|see H}) = \frac{P(\text{see H|HH})P(\text{HH})}{P(\text{see H|HH})P(\text{HH}) + P(\text{see H|HT})P(\text{HT}) + P(\text{see H|TH})P(\text{TH})}
\]

\[
= \frac{1 \cdot (1/4)}{1 \cdot (1/4) + (1/2) \cdot (1/4) + (1/2) \cdot (1/4)} = 1/2
\]

thereby escaping the Halfer Rule’s fatal mistake. But in the modified (cost-
cutting) two-coins variant, we obtain

\[
P(\text{HH|see H}) = \frac{P(\text{see H|HH})P(\text{HH})}{P(\text{see H|HH})P(\text{HH}) + P(\text{see H|HT})P(\text{HT}) + P(\text{see H|TH})P(\text{TH})}
\]

\[
= \frac{1 \cdot (1/4)}{1 \cdot (1/4) + 1 \cdot (1/4) + 1 \cdot (1/4)} = 1/3
\]

so that this is still a sensible generalization of halving. Still, this generalization is
not without its own troubles. For one, applying this generalization to the
scenario described by Pittard [2015] results in the same credences that he ad-
vocates, which lead to his disagreement paradox. (Indeed, he argues for these
credences based on a similar evidential selection procedure.)

It seems, then, that generalizing to arbitrary examples will require the halfer
to adopt a rule that leads to one variety or another of unintuitive consequences.
Perhaps a rule can be found whose unintuitive consequences are, upon further
inspection, quite reasonable, or at least a bullet worth biting in order to hold
on to halving. But the so-called Halfer Rule is not it. It leads to unacceptable
consequences, including egregious violations of the Reflection Principle – and
this principle is one of the main motivations for being a halfer in the first place.

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