Second order quantification becomes problematic when a quantified concept variable is supposed to function predicatively. There is a use/mention issue. The distinction that comes into play is illustrated in Tarski’s classic biconditional

“Snow is white” is true ↔ snow is white.

The expression “snow is white” is mentioned on the left side; there it is linguistically inert and appears only as an object under discussion. On the right side it is in use and has assertoric force.

To see the sort of problem that can arise, suppose we try to define the truth of an arbitrary sentence by saying

⌜\(A\)\rix is true \(\leftrightarrow\) \(A\), \((\ast)\)

where \(A\) is taken to range over all sentences and the use/mention distinction is indicated using corner brackets. Why is this one statement not a global definition of truth?

The answer depends on whether the variable \(A\) in \((\ast)\) is understood as schematic or as being implicitly quantified. If we interpret \((\ast)\) schematically, that is, as a sort of template which is not itself an assertion but which becomes one when any sentence is substituted for \(A\), then it cannot be a definition of truth since it is the wrong kind of object (a definition can be asserted, a template cannot). We could still use it as a tool to construct truth definitions in limited settings: given any target language, the conjunction of all substitution instances of \((\ast)\), as \(A\) ranges over all the sentences of the language, would define truth for that language. But this conjunction generally will not belong to the target language, so we cannot construct a global definition of truth for all sentences in this way. More to the point, we cannot use this approach to build a language in which we have the ability to discuss the truth of any sentence in that language.

The expression \((\ast)\) could be directly interpreted as a truth definition for all sentences only by universally quantifying the variable \(A\). However, this is impossible for straightforward syntactic reasons. In the quantifying phrase “for every sentence \(A\)” the symbol \(A\) has to represent a mention, not a use, of an arbitrary sentence, since here the arbitrary sentence is being referred to and not asserted. But we need \(A\) to represent a use in the right side of the biconditional. So there is no meaningful way to quantify over \(A\) in \((\ast)\). This expression can only be understood as schematic.

(The general principle is that a schematic expression can be obtained by omitting any part of a well-formed sentence, but we can only quantify over omitted noun phrases. “Snow is white” can be schematized to either “\(x\) is white” or “Snow \(C\)”,
but “(∃x)(x is white)” is grammatical while “(∃C)(snow C)” is not. In (∗) the omission is not nominal.)

Since a quantified variable can only represent a mention of an arbitrary sentence, what we would need in order to formulate a global definition of truth is a disquotation operator \(\neg\cdot\neg\). Then we could let the variable \(A\) refer to an arbitrary sentence and write

\[
\text{For every sentence } A, \text{ } A \text{ is true } \iff \neg\neg A.
\]

In other words, we need some way to convert mention into use. But that is exactly what having a truth predicate does for us. The way we convert a mention of the sentence “snow is white” into an actual assertion that snow is white is by saying that the mentioned sentence is true. So in order to state a global definition of truth we would need to, in effect, already have a global notion of truth.

This is why no variant of (∗) can succeed in globally defining truth. A quantified variable representing an arbitrary sentence in general cannot be invested with assertoric force unless we possess a notion of truth that applies to all sentences, but writing down a global definition of truth requires us to already be able to construe such a variable as having assertoric force.

Truth seems unproblematic because in any particular instance it really is unproblematic. Any meaningful sentence can be substituted for \(A\) in (∗) with straightforward results. But the essentially grammatical problem with quantifying over \(A\) in (∗) is definitive. There is no way to use this schematic condition to globally define truth, and we can be quite certain of this because any predicate which globally verified (∗) would engender a contradiction. It would give rise to a liar paradox.

2.

Similar comments can be made about what it means for an object to fall under a concept. Just as with truth, there is no difficulty in defining this relation in any particular case. For instance, we can define what it means to fall under the concept white by saying

\[
\text{The object } x \text{ falls under the concept white } \iff x \text{ is white.}
\]

But if we try to characterize the falling under relation globally by saying

\[
\text{The object } x \text{ falls under the concept } \neg\neg C \iff Cx
\]

then, just as with (∗), a use/mention conflict arises when we try to quantify over \(C\). We can use (†) as a template to produce a falling under definition for any particular concept; we can even take the conjunction of the substitution instances of (†) as \(C\) ranges over all the concepts expressible in a given language, and thereby obtain a falling under definition for that language, but this definition could not itself belong to the language in question. As with (∗), in order to put (†) in a form that would allow \(C\) to be quantified, so that it could have global force, we would need some device for converting a mention of an arbitrary concept into a use of that concept. But that is exactly what the falling under relation does for us. That is to say, we need to already have a global notion of falling under before we can use (†) to define falling under globally. Thus, no variant of (†) can succeed in globally defining a falling under relation.

In fact, the twin difficulties with truth and falling under are not just analogous, they are effectively equivalent. If we had a globally applicable truth predicate, we could use it to define a global notion of falling under, viz., “An object falls under
the concept $C \leftrightarrow$ the atomic proposition formed from a name for that object and $C$ is true.” Conversely, given a globally applicable falling under relation, truth could be defined globally by saying “The sentence $A$ is true $\leftrightarrow$ every object falls under the predicate formed by concatenating ‘is such that’ with $A$”. We can now see that truth and falling under are practically identical notions. Falling under is to formulas with one free variable what truth is to sentences.

However, there is one striking difference between the two cases. The globally problematic nature of truth does not have any immediate implications for our understanding of logic, but, in contrast, the globally problematic nature of falling under has severe consequences for general second order quantification. As we have seen, expressions like $(\exists C)Cx$ are, taken at face value, syntactically ill-formed. The quantified concept variable $C$ cannot function predicatively because its appearance in the quantifying phrase is a mention, not a use. In order to make sense of expressions like this we need a global device for converting a mention of an arbitrary concept into a use of that concept, which is just to say that we need a global notion of falling under. But it should now be clear that a global notion of falling under, in the form of a relation which satisfies $(†)$ for every concept $C$, is something we do not and cannot have. (Cannot, because it would give rise to Russell’s paradox.) Now, if $C$ were restricted to range over only those concepts appearing in some given language, then we could use $(†)$ as a template to define falling under for those concepts and thereby render quantification over them meaningful. But sentences employing these quantifiers would not belong to the target language, so this approach cannot be used to make sense of unrestricted second order quantification. Specifically, it cannot be used to build a language in which we have the ability to quantify over all concepts expressible in that language while allowing the quantified concept variable to predicate.

Thus, we are not straightforwardly able to assign meaning to statements in which a quantified concept variable is supposed to function predicatively.

3.

This negative conclusion is unsatisfying because our syntactic considerations forbid not only the paradoxical global definitions of truth and falling under which we want to exclude, but also other global statements which appear to be meaningful. For instance, we have remarked that in limited settings truth and falling under are unproblematic, but it is not obvious how to formalize this claim itself. We cannot say that for any sentence $A$ there is a predicate $T$ such that $T(A) \leftrightarrow A$, for the same reason that we cannot quantify over $A$ in $(∗)$: the mentions of $T$ and $A$ in the quantifying phrases are followed by uses in the expression $T(A) \leftrightarrow A$. Reformulations like “such that $T(A) \leftrightarrow A$ holds” or “such that $T(A) \leftrightarrow A$ is the case” accomplish nothing because they merely employ synonyms for truth. But this prohibition is confusing because there clearly is some sense in which it is correct, even trivially correct, to say that a truth definition can be given for any meaningful sentence. We either have to adopt the mystical (and rather self-contradictory) view that this is a fact which cannot be expressed, or else find some legitimate way to affirm it.

The way forward is to recognize that truth and falling under do make sense globally, but as constructive, not classical, notions. In both cases we can recognize an
indefinitely extensible quality: we are able to produce partial classical characterizations of truth and falling under, but any such characterization can be extended. This fits with the intuitionistic conception of mathematical reality as something which does not have a fixed global existence but instead is open-ended and can only be constructed in stages. The intuitionistic account may or may not be valid as a description of mathematics, but it unequivocally does capture the fundamental nature of truth and falling under. On pain of contradiction, these notions do not enjoy a global classical existence. However, they can indeed be built up in an open-ended sequence of stages.

The central concept in constructive mathematics is proof, not truth. And this is just the linguistic resource we need to make sense of second order quantification. Writing □A for “A is provable” and p ⊢ A for “p proves A”, we have

□A ↔ (∃p)(p ⊢ A).

Note that this expression can be universally quantified because no appearance of A is assertoric, so that it is a legitimate definition of the box operator. Note also that there is no question about formulating a global definition of the proof relation, as this is a primitive notion which we do not expect to define in any simpler terms. We can therefore, following the intuitionists, give a global constructive definition of truth by saying

A is constructively true ↔ A is provable

and we can analogously give a global constructive definition of falling under by saying

x constructively falls under C ↔ C(x) is provable.

More generally, we can use provability to repair use/mention problems in expressions that quantify over all concepts. Such expressions can be interpreted constructively, and the self-referential capacity of global second order quantification makes it unreasonable to demand a classical interpretation. In particular, we can solve the problem raised at the beginning of this section. The way we say that any sentence can be given a truth definition is: for every sentence A there is a predicate T such that the assertion T(A) ↔ A is provable. Again, no appearance of A or T is assertoric, so the quantification is legitimate. More substantially, we can affirm that for any language L there is a predicate TL such that inserting any sentence of L in the template “TL(·) ↔ ·” yields a provable assertion. Thus, there is a global constructive definition of truth, and there are local classical definitions of truth, but the global affirmation that these local classical definitions always exist is constructive.

We can make the same points about falling under; here too we have both local classical and global constructive options. The new feature in this setting is that no local classical definition of falling under can be used to make sense of sentences in which quantified concept variables are supposed to function predicatively. In order to handle this problem we require a globally applicable notion of falling under, which means that the classical option is unworkable. We have to adopt a constructive approach.

4.

The global constructive versions of truth and falling under are not obviously paradoxical because the biconditional □A ↔ A is not tautological. We cannot
simply assume that asserting $A$ is equivalent to asserting that $A$ is provable. The extent to which this law holds is a function of both the nature of provability and the constructive interpretation of implication. This issue is analyzed in [4] (see also [5]); we find that the law

$$(1) \quad A \rightarrow \Box A$$

is valid but the converse inference of $A$ from $\Box A$ is legitimate only as a deduction rule, not as an implication. Although the law $\Box A \rightarrow A$ is superficially plausible, its justification is in fact subtly circular.

The relation of $\Box$ to the standard logical constants, interpreted constructively, is also investigated in [4]; we find that the laws

$$(2) \quad \Box (A \land B) \leftrightarrow (\Box A \land \Box B)$$

$$(3) \quad \Box (A \lor B) \leftrightarrow (\Box A \lor \Box B)$$

$$(4) \quad \Box (\exists x) A \leftrightarrow (\exists x) \Box A$$

$$(5) \quad \Box (\forall x) A \leftrightarrow (\forall x) \Box A$$

$$(6) \quad \Box (A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Box A \rightarrow \Box B)$$

are all generally valid. There is no special law for negation; we take $\neg A$ to be an abbreviation of $A \rightarrow \perp$ where $\perp$ represents falsehood, so using (6) we can say, for instance,

$$\Box (\neg A) \leftrightarrow \Box (A \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow (\Box A \rightarrow \Box \perp).$$

But $\Box (\neg A)$ is not provably equivalent to $\neg \Box A$ in general.

We can now present a formal system for reasoning about concepts that allows quantified concepts to predicate. The language is the language of set theory, augmented by the logical constant $\Box$. Formulas are built up in the usual way, with the one additional clause that if $A$ is a formula then so is $\Box A$.

The variables are taken to range over concepts and $\in$ is read as “constructively falls under”. Thus no appearance of a variable in any formula is assertoric and we can sensibly quantify over any variable in any formula. The system employs the usual axioms and deduction rules of an intuitionistic predicate calculus with equality, together with the axioms (1) – (6) above, the deduction rule which infers $A$ from $\Box A$, the extensionality axiom

$$(7) \quad x = y \leftrightarrow (\forall u) (u \in x \leftrightarrow u \in y),$$

and the comprehension scheme

$$(8) \quad (\exists x) (\forall r) (r \in x \leftrightarrow \Box A)$$

where $x$ can be any variable and $A$ can be any formula in which $x$ does not appear freely. (In this scheme the variable $r$ is fixed.) The motivation for the comprehension scheme is that any formula defines a concept (possibly with parameters, if $A$ contains free variables besides $r$), and what it means to constructively fall under that concept is characterized by (††). This is why we need the ability to explicitly reference the notion of provability. The ex falso law can be justified in this setting by taking $\perp$ to stand for the assertion $(\forall x, y) (x \in y)$.

We call the formal system described in this section CC (Constructive Concepts). This is a “pure” concept system in the sense that there are no objects besides concepts. Alternatively, we could (say) take the natural numbers as given and write down a version of second order arithmetic in which the set variables are interpreted as concepts. From a predicative point of view a third order system, with number variables, set variables, and concept variables, would also be natural [3].
The system CC accommodates global reasoning about concepts. For instance, using comprehension we can define the concept of a concept which provably does not fall under itself. Denoting this concept \( R \), we have
\[
r \in R \iff \Box (r \notin r).
\]
Assuming \( R \notin R \) then yields \( \Box (R \notin R) \) by axiom (1), which entails \( R \notin R \) by the definition of \( R \). This shows that \( R \notin R \) is contradictory, so we conclude \( \neg (R \notin R) \). On the other hand, assuming \( R \notin R \) immediately yields \( \Box (R \notin R) \); but since \( R \in R \) also implies \( \Box (R \in R) \), we infer \( \Box \bot \). So we have \( R \in R \to \bot \). In the language of [4], the assertion \( R \notin R \) is false and the assertion \( R \in R \) is weakly false.

Thus, we can reason in CC about apparently paradoxical concepts and reach substantive conclusions. But no contradiction can be derived, as we will now show. (The proof of the following theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 6.1 in [4].)

**Theorem 5.1.** \( CC \) is consistent.

**Proof.** We begin by adding countably many constants to the language of CC. Let \( L \) be the smallest language which contains the language of CC and which contains, for every formula \( A \) of \( L \) in which no variable other than \( r \) appears freely, a constant symbol \( c_A \). Observe that \( L \) is countable.

We define the level \( l(A) \) of a formula \( A \) of \( L \) as follows. The level of every atomic formula and every formula of the form \( \Box A \) is 1. The level of \( A \land B \), \( A \lor B \), and \( A \to B \) is \( \max(l(A), l(B)) + 1 \). The level of \( (\forall x)A \) and \( (\exists x)A \) is \( l(A) + 1 \).

Now we define a transfinite sequence of sets of sentences \( F_\alpha \). These can be thought of as the sentences which we have determined not to accept as true. The definition of \( F_\alpha \) proceeds by induction on level. For each \( \alpha \) the formula \( \bot \) belongs to \( F_\alpha \); \( c_B \in c_A \) belongs to \( F_\alpha \) if \( A(c_B) \) belongs to \( F_\beta \) for some \( \beta < \alpha \); \( c_A = c_A' \) belongs to \( F_\alpha \) if for some \( c_B \), one but not both of \( A(c_B) \) and \( A'(c_B) \) belongs to \( F_\beta \) for some \( \beta < \alpha \); and \( \Box A \) belongs to \( F_\alpha \) if \( A \) belongs to \( F_\beta \) for some \( \beta < \alpha \). (Recall that the constants \( c_A \) are only defined for formulas \( A \) in which no variable other than \( r \) appears freely. So expressions like \( A(c_B) \) are unambiguous.) For levels higher than 1, we apply the following rules. \( A \land B \) belongs to \( F_\alpha \) if either \( A \) or \( B \) belongs to \( F_\alpha \). \( A \lor B \) belongs to \( F_\alpha \) if both \( A \) and \( B \) belong to \( F_\alpha \). \( (\forall x)A \) belongs to \( F_\alpha \) if \( A(c_B) \) belongs to \( F_\alpha \) for some constant \( c_B \), and \( (\exists x)A \) belongs to \( F_\alpha \) if \( A(c_B) \) belongs to \( F_\alpha \) for every constant \( c_B \). (Observe here that if \( (\forall x)A \) is a sentence then \( A \) can contain no free variables other than \( x \), so again the expression \( A(c_B) \) is unambiguous.) Finally, \( A \to B \) belongs to \( F_\alpha \) if there exists \( \beta \leq \alpha \) such that \( B \) belongs to \( F_\beta \) but \( A \) does not belong to \( F_\beta \).

Since the language \( L \) is countable and the sequence \( (F_\alpha) \) is increasing, this sequence must stabilize at some countable stage \( \alpha_0 \). It is obvious that \( \bot \) belongs to \( F_{\alpha_0} \). The proof is completed by checking that the universal closure of no axiom of CC belongs to \( F_{\alpha_0} \), and that the set of formulas whose universal closure does not belong to \( F_{\alpha_0} \) is stable under the deduction rules of CC. This is tedious but straightforward. \( \square \)

The system CC gives correct expression to Frege’s idea of formalizing reasoning about arbitrary concepts. Frege was impeded by the fact that the global notion of
falling under is inherently constructive; treating this notion as if it were classical is the fatal mistake which gives rise to Russell's paradox. We can locate the essential error in Frege’s analysis not in his Basic Law V, or any of his other axioms, but rather in his use of a language whose cogency depends on a fictitious global classical notion of falling under.

Analyzing the proof theoretic strength of CC will show us the degree to which it is possible, as Frege hoped, to base mathematical reasoning on the pure logic of concepts. The result is disappointing. The simplicity of the consistency proof given in Theorem 5.1 already reveals that CC must be a very weak system. We now present two positive results which show how (conservative extensions of) CC can in a certain sense interpret more standard formal systems in which the box operator does not appear.

The relevant sense is the notion of weak interpretation introduced in [4]. We say that a theory \( T_2 \) in which we are able to reason about provability weakly interprets another theory \( T_1 \) in the same language minus the box operator if every theorem of \( T_1 \) is a theorem of \( T_2 \) with all boxes deleted. Observe that deleting all boxes in all theorems of CC yields an inconsistency: as we saw earlier, we can prove in CC the existence of a concept \( R \) which satisfies both \( \neg \neg (R \in R) \) and \( R \in R \rightarrow \Box \bot \), and deleting the box in the second formula produces the contradictory conclusions \( \neg \neg (R \in R) \) and \( \neg (R \in R) \). Notwithstanding this phenomenon, no inconsistent theory can be weakly interpreted in CC. This is because \( \bot \) is a theorem of every inconsistent theory, and weak interpretability would imply that \( \Box^k \bot \) must be a theorem of CC for some value of \( k \). Since CC implements the deduction rule which infers \( A \) from \( \Box A \), this would then imply that \( \bot \) is a theorem of CC, i.e., that CC is inconsistent.

The first system we consider, \( \text{Comp}(\text{PF}_T) + D \), was discussed in [II], where its consistency was proven. Here we show that the intuitionistic version of this system is weakly interpretable in an extension of CC by definitions.

\( \text{Comp}(\text{PF}_T) + D \) is a positive set theory. Its language is the ordinary language of set theory augmented by terms which are generated in the following way. Any variable is a term; if \( s \) and \( t \) are terms then \( s \in t \) and \( s = t \) are positive formulas; if \( A \) and \( B \) are positive formulas then \( A \land B \), \( A \lor B \), \( (\forall x)A \), and \( (\exists x)A \) are positive formulas; if \( A \) is a positive formula and \( x \) is a variable then \( \{ x : A(x) \} \) is a term whose variables are the free variables of \( A \) other than \( x \). The system consists of the comprehension scheme

\[
y \in \{ x : A(x) \} \leftrightarrow A(y),
\]

where \( A \) is a positive formula and \( x \) and \( y \) are variables, together with the axiom D which states

\[
(\exists x, y)(x \neq y).
\]

The desired conservative extension \( CC' \) of CC is obtained by recursively adding, for every formula \( A \) and variables \( x \) and \( y \), the term \( \{ x : \Box A(x) \} \) (whose variables are the free variables of \( A \) other than \( x \)) together with the axiom

\[
y \in \{ x : \Box A(x) \} \leftrightarrow \Box A(y).
\]

Say that a formula is increasing if no implication appears in the premise of any other implication. Note that since we take \( \neg A \) to be an abbreviation of \( A \rightarrow \bot \), this also means that an increasing formula cannot position a negation within the premise of any implication, nor can it contain the negation of any implication.
Observe that the axiom \( y \in \{ x : \Box A(x) \} \leftrightarrow \Box A(y) \) is increasing if \( A \) is positive, and the formula \((\exists x, y)(x = y \rightarrow \Box \bot)\), which is easily provable in CC, is also increasing. Since removing all boxes from these formulas recovers the axioms of Comp\((PF_T) + D\), the following result is now a consequence of ([4], Corollary 7.3).

**Theorem 6.1.** CC’ weakly interprets intuitionistic Comp\((PF_T) + D\).

It is interesting to note that the extensionality axiom of CC is not increasing, so that we cannot weakly interpret intuitionistic Comp\((PF_T) + EXT + D\) in CC’. The latter theory is in fact inconsistent [1].

We can also show that a different extension of CC by definitions weakly interprets intuitionistic second order Peano arithmetic minus the induction axiom. The extension is defined by adding a constant symbol 0 which satisfies

\[ r \in 0 \leftrightarrow \Box \bot, \]

a unary function symbol \( S \) which satisfies

\[ r \in Sx \leftrightarrow \Box (r = x), \]

and a constant symbol \( \omega \) which satisfies

\[ r \in \omega \leftrightarrow \Box (\forall z)[(0 \in z \land (\forall x)(x \in z \rightarrow Sx \in z)) \rightarrow r \in z]. \]

The following formulas are easily proven in the resulting extension CC’’:

- \( 0 \in \omega; \)
- \( x \in \omega \rightarrow Sx \in \omega; \)
- \( Sx = 0 \rightarrow \Box \bot; \)
- \( Sx = Sy \rightarrow \Box (x = y); \)
- \( (0 \in z \land (\forall x)(x \in z \rightarrow Sx \in z)) \rightarrow (\forall y)(y \in \omega \rightarrow \Box (y \in z)). \)

Since the first four of these formulas are increasing, the claimed result again follows from ([4], Corollary 7.3).

**Theorem 6.2.** CC’’ weakly interprets intuitionistic second order Peano arithmetic minus induction.

Since the induction axiom is not increasing it has to be excluded from this result. Thus, although CC proves a version of full second order induction, it nonetheless appears to possess only meager number theoretic resources.

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1See [http://www.math.wustl.edu/~nweaver/conceptualism.html](http://www.math.wustl.edu/~nweaver/conceptualism.html)