FAITH IN A JUST WORLD AND WAYS TO COMBINE WITH STRESS AND AMBIGUOUS SITUATION

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ABSTRACT

Aim. The research undertaken by the author is aimed at explaining how people who believe in the justice of the world deal with situations of ambiguity and related uncertainty. It was also assumed that the manifested aversion to ambiguity in the subjects correlated with the need for cognitive closure and that people who believe in a just world judge their own effectiveness better, and that people used different strategies to reduce discomfort (stress) related to uncertainty and ambiguity.

Methods. The method by which it was possible to answer the research problem posed was a correlation analysis. Five questionnaires were used: the M. Kossowska cognitive closure scale (2003), the E. F. Mcquarri and D. G. Mick ambiguity tolerance scale, the C. Dalbert Just World scale (in-house translation), the COPE inventory and the GSES scale.

Results and conclusions. The analyses show that all three hypotheses put forward by the author are confirmed. Along with increasing tolerance of ambiguity, the preference for order and predictability decreases. In turn, as faith in the just world increases, it increases strongly (as a component of the need for cognitive closure). It has also been confirmed that people apply equal strategies for coping with stress in difficult situations to reduce discomfort. Most people surveyed believe in world justice, the more often they use active coping, planning, seeking instrumental support, avoiding competitive activities, turning to religion, positive re-evaluation and development, refraining from action and acceptance as a coping strategy, less often they reach for alcohol and other psychoactive substances. Finally, the author presents the limitations of the research carried out and proposes directions for further analysis to finally indicate the possibilities of applying the results in practice.

Key words: faith in a just world, coping with stress, ambiguity of the situation, the need for cognitive closure, a sense of self-efficacy.

INTRODUCTION

In the life of modern man there is no place for “certainty”. It can be stated with full firmness that everything is ambiguous, uncertain and unclear. At the present day, as well as the help that can be obtained from the state, various types of scholarships, grants, competitions, make it possible for people to achieve a lot if they manage their lives properly. However, the multitude of possibilities of development paths means that a person has to reckon with the fact that he/she will
always be accompanied by uncertainty and ambiguity. Whenever there is a choice of possibilities, there will be room for ambiguity and uncertainty.

**TOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY AND UNCERTAINTY**

Ambiguity tolerance is defined as “the tendency to perceive (interpret) ambiguous situations as desirable”, while ambiguity intolerance is defined as “the tendency to perceive (interpret) ambiguous situations as sources of danger”. (Budner, 1962, p. 29). Budner proposes to describe a situation of ambiguity as one in which it cannot be categorised or structured due to lack of sufficient data on it. The author distinguishes three types of these situations: new (there is no indication of how to react to it), complex (there are too many of these indications), social (where indications do not provide the expected solution). These situations are characterised by novelty, complexity, or insolubility. In turn, Eysenck (1954) indicates that the tolerance of ambiguity is almost a definition in itself. It is a concept he describes in relation to the concept of cognitive rigidity.

In turn, uncertainty is characteristic of situations in which the person making a decision is not and cannot be certain of the effect of the decision he is making. Much depends on how the person will deal with it, what the tolerance of uncertainty and ambiguity is. The difference between ambiguity and uncertainty is that in the first concept a given situation is assessed and valued in order to react to it in some specific way, and in the second concept we already face the effect of our reaction to the situation.

**A SENSE OF AMBIGUITY AND FAITH IN A JUST WORLD**

A sense of ambiguity accompanies man in every situation in which he has to make a choice. It can be stated that this takes place in almost every activity (Bauman, 1995). Uncertainty can even be defined as a cultural problem, because every human being undertakes actions aimed at reducing this sense of ambiguity due to the impossibility of functioning in conditions of complete unpredictability.

In society it is described as individualistic, and Polish society is one of these (Koralewicz, & Ziółkowski, 2003; Bokszański, 2007). One of man’s most important goals is to strive for autonomy and emancipation and to realise his own aspirations (Bokszański, 2007; Beck, 2002). Nevertheless, in order for man to function properly, it is necessary to satisfy basic needs, first of all of a lower order, and then to deal with the needs of a higher order (Maslow, 2016). One of the most important needs to be satisfied is to provide a sense of security, that is, a sense of order. This is related to the reduction of the sense of fear of unknown situations, which are associated with a lack of control. Therefore, a sense of control is one element of a sense of security. However, it may happen to be illusory, but as long as it allows a person to function properly, it gives the impression that nothing is threatening him or her, thus giving him or her a sense of stability and certainty. These concepts are related to the belief in a just world, which M. Lerner describes as a belief that
in life people generally receive what they deserve and at the same time deserve what they encounter (Lerner, 1980). From the need for security in order came the phenomenon (also called the hypothesis) of the just world, which is one of the cognitive errors to which man still submits and which allow him to function in society. J. Czapiński (1994) expresses his conviction that the sense of a just world is a hypothesis which man has had since birth and which he corrects in the course of development and acquisition of experience, and treats injustice and the evil he experiences as a deviation from the norm. E. Aronson claims that belief in the justice of the world is that people judge others on the basis of happy or unhappy situations in their lives for their guilt or merit (Aronson, 2009).

Under the influence of this cognitive error, people feel that they are getting what they deserve and that those who commit wrong (from the evaluator’s point of view) acts will sooner or later be punished, and that if something happens to someone, it is solely their merit (Moskowitz, 2009; after: Lerner, 1966). Although this is not actually the case, faith in the justice of the world gives people the feeling that nothing bad will happen to them, gives them a sense of security, allows them to think that our environment is largely controllable and stable, and that people’s behaviour is predictable. At the same time, faith in a just world makes it possible to fight the fear that something bad could happen to us (Sikora, 1993).

Believing in a just world makes us feel safe, reduces the fear of unpredictability, uncertainty, and at the same time can contribute to the devaluation of people who are suffering from misfortune beyond their control, such as cataclysm, sudden family death, poverty, etc. (Moskowitz, 2009).

One of the first studies on the sense of world justice was the experiments of M. Lerner and C. Simmons (McRaney, 2010). Only women participated in one of them. Their task was to observe another woman who received electrical impulses as part of a study on learning (in fact, this was not the case). Some of them, after some time from the beginning of the study, were given the opportunity to decide in an anonymous vote whether the woman they were observing (“the victim”) should continue to receive electrical impulses. Each respondent who had the opportunity to vote indicated that she believed that the study should be stopped. The respondents did not agree to the suggestion of some of them. The results of the study indicate that the women who completed the “learning research” assessed the “victim” as much more attractive than those who did not stop the study despite voting against the continuation of the study. The women who did not have the opportunity to vote, and therefore had no influence on the situation, assessed the ‘victim’ as guilty of the impulses received. The last group of women who were not able to vote, and therefore had an influence on the situation, considered the respondent to be guilty of the impulses received (McRaney, 2010).

Another study by M. Lerner and his colleagues (McRaney, 2010) consisted in the fact that two men solved puzzles, after which one of them (for observers it was said that he was chosen randomly) received a large sum of money. Those who observed the men and the one who received the prize indicated that he solved the riddles better, was smarter and had more talent. Although the researchers clearly
indicated that the prize was awarded at random. The above experiment shows that people tend to judge the unjust without a rational explanation.

Researchers from the University of Gothenburg (Stromwall, Alfredsson, Landstrom, 2013) in their research intended to check if and what are the links between believing in world justice and blaming rape victims. 166 people between the ages of 15 and 84 were asked to read a description of the rape situation. The descriptions differed from the person who raped, they were: a stranger, an acquaintance of the victim, the person the victim went on a date with, the victim’s permanent partner. The investigators were then asked to determine the extent to which the victim had contributed to the situation and were then handed over to them to fill in a scale to check their faith in world justice. The results indicate that belief in the world’s justice is strongly linked to blaming the victim regardless of who the perpetrator was to her. It is worth noting that the described effect was stronger in women than in men, especially when the rape was carried out by a stranger to the victim. Such an assessment by the women surveyed may be related to the need to ensure a high level of their own safety, thus explaining that rape only happens to those women who, through their irresponsible behaviour, “ask for problems themselves”. Such judgments of society may hinder the recovery of rape victims (Ullman, Filipas, Townsend, & Starzynski, 2006).

The people examined in these experiments assessed the effectiveness of these “subjects”. This means that they better judge the winner (and therefore more effective in their actions). In the second study with women - the sense of effectiveness of the respondents (i.e. those who made decisions) made these women more attractive.

According to Correia and Vala (2004), people who believe more in a just world pay less attention to the causes of victimisation and more attention to the actual victimisation, while participants with little faith in a just world evaluated both types of information to the same extent. It can be concluded that the processing of information is different depending on the person’s belief in the righteous world.

Based on suggestions from previous research (e.g. Furnham and Procter, 1989), it is considered necessary to distinguish between belief in a personal righteous world, where we are generally treated, and belief in a righteous world in general, where people in general get what they deserve (e.g. Dalbert, 1999). Bègue and Muller (2006) show in their research that people tend to support the personal more than the general belief in a just world and that both constructs have a different meaning. Personal belief in a just world is a better predictor of adaptive outcomes (e.g. subjective well-being) and belief in a just world in general is a better predictor of difficult social attitudes, for example.

Research by Dalbert (2001) shows that belief in a just world leads to intuitive reactions such as striving for people to behave fairly while avoiding unjust behaviour and showing confidence in justice. Hence the conclusion that belief in a just world has an adaptive function and can therefore be seen as a resource for maintaining well-being (Dalbert, 2001).

Moreover, people who believe in world justice are more likely to help those in need (Bierhoff et al., 1991), assuming that the people they help are perceived by
them as weaker and help those in need or are members of their group (e.g. Correia et al., 2007). Faith in a just world is generally seen as a personal disposition, but the results indicate that the experience of justice has an additional, inverse effect on faith in a just world. Research has shown that experiences of justice in school and family change personal belief in a just world (Dalbert and Stoeber, 2006).

**Self-efficacy**

Self-efficacy is linked to faith in the justice of the world. Self-efficacy is one of the cognitive components of the personality that is responsible for what we believe to be true and false in relation to us and the world (Pervin, 2001). According to Bubble (2005), how people behave, what they think, feel, what motivation and perseverance to act, what choices they make, is largely determined by belief in their own effectiveness. According to Bandra (2001), four main factors influence the development of self-efficacy:

- substitution experiences of observing others and how they achieve their goals, so that we start to believe that they have a similar level of ability, we will also be able to cope in this way;
- emotional arousal, which is expressed in the body’s physiological state, such as a rapid heartbeat associated with the situation, and at the same time enthusiasm, which in combination signals the satisfaction of the success expected;
- real achievements, which give real expression to what is our strength and weakness, what are our possibilities and limitations;
- persuasion, that is, what other people say about us - what we can do, what we present ourselves, what our opportunities for achievement are.

**Stress management styles**

A stressful situation requires a specific action to be taken by a person to respond to it. Every person has their own internalised styles of dealing with stress. Lazarus (1993) indicates that a person’s behaviour in a specific situation is a conscious action, which consists of the result of the interaction between the style of dealing with stress and a given situation. According to Lazarus (1993) there are two ways of coping with stress: task orientation and coping focused on lowering emotional tension. Parker and Endler (1992) also distinguish avoidance as a form of reducing emotional tension, which consists of three coping styles:

- a style focused on the task of taking action to solve the problem or change the situation using cognitive processes;
- an emotion-centred style aimed at minimising or even removing the premises that cause the situation, primarily to reduce the emotional tension that accompanies the situation; those who use this style do not take action to resolve a stressful situation, but only seek to reduce the tension that accompanies them in these circumstances, as a result of these actions the
situation does not change and the tension increases, as do the negative emotions that accompany it;
• a style focused on avoidance works well for rejecting thoughts of problems, not allowing them to be experienced or trying to solve them, while at the same time performing other activities such as entertainment, spending time in the company of other people, cleaning, etc. as a substitute.

Objective and research hypotheses

The aim of this work is to check whether the tolerance of ambiguity is related to the need for cognitive closure, and to explain how people who believe in the justice of the world deal with ambiguity situations, what strategies they use to counteract the negative aspects of ambiguity and how they evaluate their own effectiveness. On the basis of the analysis of the literature, three research hypotheses have been put forward, which will be presented together with a description in the next part of the paper.

• Hypothesis 1: Tolerance of ambiguity is related to the need for cognitive closure
• Hypothesis 2: Tolerance of ambiguity and belief in a just world is linked to strategies for dealing with stress
• Hypothesis 3: People who have a high level of tolerance for ambiguity and faith in a just world better judge their own effectiveness

Method

The survey was conducted in an electronic form using a form created on the Profitest.pl platform. In order to answer the research questions and test the hypotheses raised, statistical analyses were carried out with the IBM SPSS Statistics package in version 25. The analysis of basic descriptive statistics and the analysis of correlation with Pearson’s r coefficient were performed using it. The statistical significance level was assumed to be $p < 0.05$.

The examined variables were: explanatory variables - dealing with stress, the need for cognitive closure, self-efficacy; explanatory variable - tolerance of ambiguity and belief in a fair world. It should be noted at this point that these are correlated studies, and therefore the indicated relationship may be the opposite. Perhaps this is a premise for continuing research into belief in a just world and tolerance of ambiguity. The subjects were also asked to provide information regarding age, gender, marital status, education and place of residence.

Subjects

The survey was attended by 101 people. Among the respondents were 87 women (86.1%) and 13 men (12.9%). 1 person did not answer the question about
gender. The respondents were between 16 and 51 years old (M = 26; SD = 7.305), mostly bachelors/wives (36.6%), followed by those in an informal relationship (25.7%) and married (23.8%). Among the surveyed persons, the largest number were those with higher education (64.4%) or in the course of studies (14.9%). 69.6% of the surveyed declare that they live permanently in a city with over 150 thousand inhabitants.

**The survey procedure**

The survey was conducted using a web form on the Google Profittest.pl platform between 20 February and 9 August 2019. The form contained the necessary information about the author and the purpose of the survey (not directly), ensuring the anonymity of the respondents. Then the respondents were redirected to complete the personal questionnaire, followed by the Cognitive Closing Need Scale, Ambiguity Tolerance Scale, Just World Scale, COPE and GSES. The subjects were recruited for the study by providing a link to the questionnaire among the co-workers of the author of the study, and then it was made available further. The link to the survey was also posted on Facebook discussion groups.

**Research tools**

In the study, the following tools were combined into one web form:

- The scale of the need for cognitive closure of M. Kossowska
- The ambiguity tolerance scale E. F. Mcquarri and D. G. Mick
- Just World C. Dalbert scale.
- COPE - multidimensional inventory to measure stress management in the adaptation of Z. Juczyński, N. Ogińska-Bulik
- GSES - a scale of generalised self-efficacy, which is part of the collection “npppz - a measurement tool in health promotion and psychology” by Z. Juczyński

**Test results and limitations**

Basic descriptive statistics of the measured quantitative variables together with a normal distribution test

In the first step 18 outlier observations exceeding the third standard deviation were removed. Next, basic descriptive statistics were calculated together with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which investigated the normal distribution of variables measured on the quantitative scale. As a result, it turned out that the distribution of world justice, sense of self-efficacy, concentration on emotions and their discharge, preference for predictability and three factors of coping with stress (active coping, evasive behaviour and seeking support and concentration on emotions) is similar to normal distribution. The other variables have a distribution
Table 1.

Basic descriptive statistics with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.

|                          | M   | Me  | SD  | Sk. | Kurt. | Min. | Max. | K-S   | p         |
|--------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|------|------|-------|-----------|
| Age                      | 29.41 | 26.00 | 7.31 | 1.33 | 1.71  | 16.00 | 51.00 | 0.18  | <0.001    |
| World Justice            | 26.72 | 27.00 | 7.61 | -0.26 | 0.10  | 7.00  | 42.00 | 0.05  | 0.200     |
| Self-efficacy            | 29.86 | 30.00 | 4.78 | -0.18 | 0.30  | 16.00 | 40.00 | 0.09  | 0.067     |
| Tolerance of ambiguity   | 45.12 | 46.00 | 8.92 | -0.20 | 0.37  | 20.00 | 68.00 | 0.10  | 0.010     |
| COPE                     |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| Active coping            | 2.86 | 2.75 | 0.48 | 0.30 | -0.02 | 1.75  | 4.00  | 0.12  | 0.001     |
| Planning                 | 2.93 | 3.00 | 0.69 | -0.41 | 0.23  | 1.00  | 4.00  | 0.14  | <0.001    |
| Looking for              | 2.97 | 3.00 | 0.73 | -0.68 | 0.13  | 1.00  | 4.00  | 0.17  | <0.001    |
| instrumental support     |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| Looking for              | 2.94 | 3.00 | 0.89 | -0.78 | -0.23 | 1.00  | 4.00  | 0.20  | <0.001    |
| emotional support        |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| Avoiding competing       | 2.50 | 2.50 | 0.66 | -0.28 | 0.14  | 1.00  | 4.00  | 0.15  | <0.001    |
| activities              |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| A return to religion     | 1.83 | 1.25 | 0.98 | 0.91 | -0.46 | 1.00  | 4.00  | 0.23  | <0.001    |
| Positive revaluation     | 2.92 | 3.00 | 0.51 | -0.35 | 0.12  | 1.50  | 4.00  | 0.15  | <0.001    |
| and development          |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| Refraining from acting   | 2.60 | 2.75 | 0.54 | -0.47 | 0.46  | 1.00  | 3.75  | 0.13  | <0.001    |
| Acceptance               | 2.58 | 2.50 | 0.69 | -0.30 | -0.34 | 1.00  | 4.00  | 0.12  | 0.002     |
| Focusing on emotions     | 2.77 | 2.75 | 0.75 | -0.15 | -0.36 | 1.00  | 4.00  | 0.09  | 0.055     |
| and discharging them     |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| Denial                   | 1.77 | 1.75 | 0.58 | 0.53 | -0.35 | 1.00  | 3.25  | 0.15  | <0.001    |
| Distraction              | 2.36 | 2.50 | 0.68 | -0.01 | -0.02 | 1.00  | 4.00  | 0.10  | 0.017     |
| Discontinuation of       | 1.80 | 1.75 | 0.61 | 0.71 | 0.06  | 1.00  | 3.50  | 0.14  | <0.001    |
| activities               |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| Use of alcohol or other  | 1.73 | 1.00 | 0.94 | 1.03 | -0.24 | 1.00  | 4.00  | 0.29  | <0.001    |
| psychoactive agents      |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| A sense of humour        | 1.87 | 1.75 | 0.76 | 0.82 | 0.08  | 1.00  | 4.00  | 0.13  | <0.001    |
| Active coping            | 2.76 | 2.75 | 0.40 | -0.14 | 0.49  | 1.75  | 3.94  | 0.00  | 0.081     |
| Evasive behaviour        | 2.01 | 2.04 | 0.43 | -0.10 | -0.37 | 1.00  | 3.13  | 0.00  | 0.149     |
| Seeking support and      | 2.63 | 2.63 | 0.64 | -0.27 | -0.12 | 1.00  | 3.94  | 0.00  | 0.200     |
| concentrating on         |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| emotions                 |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| Cognitive Need Scale     |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| Closure                  |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| Intolerance of ambiguity | 4.13 | 4.17 | 0.90 | -0.65 | 0.36  | 1.83  | 5.83  | 0.00  | 0.003     |
| Preference for order     | 4.06 | 4.14 | 0.88 | -0.59 | 0.03  | 1.71  | 5.71  | 0.00  | 0.011     |
| Preference for           | 3.80 | 3.88 | 0.83 | 0.18 | -0.43 | 2.13  | 5.75  | 0.00  | 0.107     |
| predictability           |     |     |     |     |       |      |      |       |           |
| Mental closure           | 2.92 | 2.83 | 0.67 | 0.08 | 0.00  | 1.33  | 4.50  | 0.00  | 0.002     |
| Definitely               | 3.61 | 3.60 | 0.91 | 0.21 | -0.25 | 1.80  | 5.80  | 0.00  | 0.021     |

Note: M - mean; Me - median; SD - standard deviation; Sk. - obliqueness; Kurt. - ¬kurtosis; Min and Max - lowest and highest value of decomposition; K-S - Kolmogorov Smirnov test result; p – significance.
that is far from the Gauss curve. However, the values of the diagonalities of these variables do not exceed an absolute value of 2, which indicates a slight diagonality of their distribution and allows the use of parametric tests to verify the research hypotheses. Basic descriptive statistics and normal distribution tests are presented in Table 1.

**Tolerance of ambiguity and world justice and the need for a cognitive closure**

In the next stage of statistical analysis, it was decided to check whether ambiguity tolerance and world justice are linked to the need for cognitive closure, including ambiguity intolerance, preference for order, preference for predictability, mental closeness, and decisiveness. Thus, correlation analyses with Pearson’s r-factor were conducted. As it turns out, the tolerance of ambiguity coexists with ambiguity intolerance, preference for order and predictability. All these relationships are strong and negative. This means that as the ambiguity tolerance increases among the subjects, the ambiguity intolerance and the preference for order and predictability decreases.

No statistically significant correlations were obtained between ambiguity tolerance and mental closeness and determination. Moreover, statistically significant correlations between world justice and decision making were noted. This correlation is weak and positive. This shows that as faith in world justice grows, so too does the test person’s. The remaining variables are not correlated with world justice. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2.

Table 2.
The relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and world justice and intolerance of ambiguity, preference for order and predictability, mental closeness and determination.

| Tolerance of ambiguity | World justice |
|------------------------|---------------|
| Intolerance of ambiguity | r Pearson: -0,53, Relevance: <0,001 | -0,01, Relevance: 0,956 |
| Preference for order | r Pearson: -0,53, Relevance: <0,001 | 0,15, 0,141 |
| Preference for predictability | r Pearson: -0,56, Relevance: <0,001 | -0,05, 0,631 |
| Mental closure | r Pearson: -0,05, Relevance: 0,617 | -0,07, 0,523 |
| Definitely | r Pearson: 0,16, Relevance: 0,105 | 0,24, 0,016 |

*Note: The table uses the dimensions for cognitive closure.*
Tolerance of ambiguity and world justice
and strategies for dealing with stress

Then, in order to verify the relationship between ambiguity tolerance and belief in a fair world and stress management strategies, analogous correlation analyses with Pearson’s r-factor were performed. The results of these analyses indicate single relationships with the ambiguity tolerance. It coexists with cessation of activities and sense of humour. Both of these compounds are weak. The former is negative and the latter is positive. It follows that with an increase in ambiguity tolerance, respondents will choose cessation of activities less frequently as a strategy for dealing with stress, and more often use their sense of humour to reduce stress. Other ways of coping with stress are not linked to ambiguity tolerance. Instead, faith in a just world is correlated with active coping, planning, seeking instrumental support, avoiding competing, turning to religion, positive re-evaluation and development, abstinence, acceptance and consumption of alcohol and other psychoactive substances. Only the last correlation is negative and the others are positive. It also turns out that ways of dealing with stress such as planning, avoiding competing activities and refraining from acting correlate with moderate force and faith in a just world. The rest of the statistically significant correlations are weak correlations. The more subjects believe in world justice, the more often they benefit from active coping, planning, seeking instrumental support, avoiding competitive action, turning to religion, positively re-evaluating and developing, refraining from action, and acceptance as a stress management strategy. In turn, as faith in a just world increases, the frequency of recourse to alcohol and other psychoactive agents to reduce stress decreases. The results of these correlation analyses are presented in Table 3.

Table 3.
The relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and belief in a just world and strategies for dealing with stress.

| Tolerance of ambiguity | World justice |
|------------------------|--------------|
| Active coping          | r Pearson 0,02 | 0,26 |
|                        | Relevance 0,882 | 0,010 |
| Planning               | r Pearson 0,09 | 0,39 |
|                        | Relevance 0,350 | <0,001 |
| Looking for instrumental support | r Pearson -0,14 | 0,22 |
|                        | Relevance 0,177 | 0,025 |
| Looking for emotional support | r Pearson -0,02 | 0,19 |
|                        | Relevance 0,831 | 0,057 |
| Avoiding competing activities | r Pearson -0,15 | 0,31 |
|                        | Relevance 0,149 | 0,002 |
| A return to religion   | r Pearson -0,09 | 0,21 |
|                        | Relevance 0,349 | 0,035 |
In order to deepen the above correlation analyses, additional correlations with Pearson’s r-factor were performed for three stress management factors: active coping, evasive behaviour and support seeking and focus on emotions. No statistically significant correlations were found for ambiguity tolerance. On the other hand, world justice is linked to active coping and support-seeking and emotional focus. The first of these correlations is moderate, while the second is weak. Both of these correlations are positive. This means that the more faith in a righteous world is held by those surveyed, the more often they use active coping or seek support and focus on their emotions. Table 4 shows the exact values of these correlation analyses.

| Tolerance of ambiguity | World justice |
|------------------------|--------------|
| Active coping          | r Pearson    | 0,06 | 0,36 |
|                        | Relevance    | 0,544 | <0,001 |
| Evasive behaviour      | r Pearson    | 0,02 | -0,15 |
|                        | Relevance    | 0,843 | 0,130 |
| Seeking support and    | r Pearson    | -0,13 | 0,23 |
| concentrating on       | Relevance    | 0,198 | 0,021 |

**Table 4.**
The relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and world justice and active coping, evasive behaviour and the search for support and focus on emotions.
TOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY AND WORLD JUSTICE AND SELF-EFFICACY

Then analogous correlation analyses were performed to check whether there is a link between ambiguity tolerance and self-efficacy and world justice. In addition, it was checked whether the world’s justice is linked to self-efficacy. It turns out that the sense of self-efficiency coexists both with the tolerance of ambiguity and with the belief in a just world. Both of these relationships are positive and moderate. This shows that the greater the tolerance of ambiguity of the subjects and the higher level of belief in the righteousness of the world, the greater is their self-efficacy. On the other hand, the ambiguity tolerance is not correlated with the world righteousness at the level \( p < 0.05 \). The results of correlation analyses for the above mentioned variables are presented in Table 5.

Table 5. The relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and self-efficacy and world justice.

|                      | Tolerance of ambiguity | World justice |
|----------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| Self-efficacy        | \( r \) Pearson        | 0.36          | 0.38          |
|                      | Relevance              | <0.001        | <0.001        |
| World Justice        | \( r \) Pearson        | -0.06         | -             |
|                      | Relevance              | 0.548         | -             |

DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The aim of this study was to test the relationship between coping with stress, the need for cognitive closure, self-efficacy and belief in a just world and ambiguity, hypothesising that ambiguity tolerance is linked to the need for cognitive closure, ambiguity tolerance and belief in a just world is linked to strategies for coping with stress, and that people with a high level of ambiguity tolerance and belief in a just world better assess their own effectiveness.

The analyses carried out allowed us to confirm all three hypotheses proposed by the author. It turned out that as the tolerance of ambiguity increases, the intolerance of ambiguity and the preference for order and predictability decreases. And as faith in the justice of the world grows, so does the confidence (as a component of the need for cognitive closure) of the subjects. Increased ambiguity tolerance in respondents makes them less likely to choose to stop acting and more likely to use sense of humour as a strategy for dealing with stress. The above results confirm the conclusions drawn from Webster and Kruglanski’s (1994) study that ambiguity tolerance is related to the need for cognitive closure. The results obtained are also consistent with studies conducted by Mannetti, Pierro, Kruglanski, Travis and Bezinovic (2002).

The research also shows that, according to Carver, Scheier and Jagdish (2009), people use equal strategies for dealing with stress in difficult situations to reduce discomfort. Most people surveyed believe in world justice, the more often they
benefit from active coping, planning, seeking instrumental support, avoiding competitive action, turning to religion, positively re-evaluating and developing, refraining from action and accepting stress as a coping strategy. In turn, as faith in a just world increases, the frequency of recourse to alcohol and other psychoactive agents to reduce stress decreases. Moderate belief in a just world allows for less stress to be felt by the test persons. The more faith in a just world, however, the more often they use active coping or seek support and focus on their emotions. It also turns out, that the greater tolerance of ambiguity is characteristic for the investigated people, and they have a higher level of faith in the righteous world, the greater is their feeling of own effectiveness.

Attention should be paid to the limitations of the author’s analyses. 101 people took part in the study, which is a small number. Additionally, it is a sample in which there is a definite predominance of the examined females (87 persons), which limits the possibility of generalising the obtained results. The research sample also consisted mostly of people with higher education, during their studies, which gives almost 70% of the total sample. Similarly, the majority of the respondents live in a city of over 150 thousand inhabitants. There were no people from outside large urban centres and other than those with higher education in the sample. The sample should be mapped to the actual population. For this reason, in subsequent surveys, a larger number of the surveyed persons should be taken into account and a better fit of the surveyed group to the general population should be ensured.

An additional proposal for further research is to analyse how age or education level is related to tolerance of ambiguity and sense of world justice. It would also be worthwhile to attempt to examine the relationship between personality structure according to Eysenck (1987), which consists of three independent dimensions: psychoticism, extraversion and neuroticism, and a sense of world justice and tolerance of ambiguity. Persons in the neuroticism continuum - emotional balance closer to neuroticism is characterised by an increased level of anxiety (Horney, 2009), even if the situation should not trigger such a reaction. Rationa-lising the lack of risk to the neurotic is not effective because it is deeply rooted in them. Therefore, neurotics try to suppress this unpleasant feeling of anxiety and the accompanying helplessness. These people often become “helpers” for their partners, to whom they sacrifice, support them, and at the same time expect to be rewarded for this in the form of gratitude or reciprocity. Neurotics have a high level of sense of justice. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that a high sense of world justice characterises people who are closer to neuroticism in the neuroticism - emotional balance continuum.

Extraversion is one of the dimensions of the Great Five Zawadzki, Strelau, Szczepaniak, Śliwińska, 1997). People who are in the continuum of controversy-extraversion closer to this second dimension are characterised by a high level of activity, feel positive emotions in most cases, have a large number of positive relations with other people, are cordial, active and look for sensations. Therefore, it can be assumed that greater tolerance for ambiguity is connected with extraversion.
Being aware of the limitations of the research carried out, it can be concluded that despite this, the analyses carried out have shown that the phenomenon of tolerance of ambiguity, combined with the sense of world justice, opens up opportunities for dealing with these problems due to the fact that ambiguity, uncertainty, changeability, fluidity - these are terms that often appear in the description of postmodern social reality of which we are participants (Bauman, 2007). It is worth dealing with these issues, if only for the sake of prevention and possible therapeutic actions, which should include contemporary young people (Chancellor, 2016), as well as all those who have difficulties in finding themselves in social life. For these reasons, it seems advisable and justified to continue research in the above mentioned directions. Understanding the intermediary processes concerning the examined phenomenon may be crucial in developing support systems promoting the improvement of mental functioning of people who have problems with quick adaptation to changes and creating proper prevention programmes to help these people.

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