Measuring Information Leakage in Website Fingerprinting Attacks

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Abstract—Tor is a low-latency anonymity system intended to provide low-latency anonymous and uncensored network access against a local or network adversary. Because of the design choice to minimize traffic overhead (and increase the pool of potential users) Tor allows some information about the client’s connections to leak in the form of packet timing. Attacks that use (features extracted from) this information to infer the website a user visits are referred to as Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks. We develop a methodology and tools to directly measure the amount of information about a website leaked by a given set of features. We apply this tool to a comprehensive set of features extracted from a large set of websites and WF defense mechanisms, allowing us to make more fine-grained observations about WF attack and defense mechanisms.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Tor anonymity network uses layered encryption and traffic relays to provide private, uncensored network access to millions of users per day. This use of encryption hides the exact contents of messages sent over Tor, and the use of sequences of three relays prevents any single relay from knowing the network identity of both the client and the server. In combination, these mechanisms provide effective resistance to basic traffic analysis.

However, because Tor provides low-latency, low-overhead communication, it does not hide traffic features such as the volume, timing, and direction of communications. Recent works [1], [2], [3] have shown that these features leak information about which website has been visited to the extent that a passive adversary that records this information is able to train a classifier to recognize the website with more than 90% accuracy in a closed-world scenario with 100 websites. This attack is often referred to as a Website Fingerprinting (WF) attack. In response, many works [1], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12] have proposed defenses that attempt to hide this information, by padding connections with extra traffic or rearranging the sequence in which files are requested.

Defense Evaluation. To evaluate a defense, the popular practice is to train classifiers based on altered traffic characteristics and evaluate the effect of the defense by classification accuracy. If the accuracy of the classifier is low enough, the defense is believed to be secure; one defense is believed to be better than another if it results in lower accuracy.

We argue that validating defense by accuracy is flawed. Accuracy is all-or-nothing: classifiers output a single guess and if it is wrong, this is judged to mean the defense has been successful. But this judgement relies on the choice of classifier, and also ignores cases where a classifier may confuse some pages with a small set of others. In such situations, an attacker may well be able to significantly reduce the set of likely pages represented by a fingerprint, even if they cannot reliably choose the correct page from among this set. We can see that the fingerprint can contain a great deal of information about the web page even if the classifier cannot accurately identify the correct page. Thus validating a defense by accuracy is prone to underestimate its information leakage.

In addition, we prove that in a closed-world setting with $n$ websites, a feature set that yields a classifier with accuracy $\alpha$ could leak information with the uncertain range $(1 - \alpha) \log_2(n - 1)$. Figure 1 shows the $n = 100$ case. For example, when the accuracy $\alpha = 0.05$, the possible information leakage could be as high as 6.36 bits and as low as 0.06 bits (the maximum information leakage is 6.64). To conclude, low information leakage implies low classification accuracy, but the converse is not necessarily true: accuracy is not a reliable metric to prove the effectiveness of a defense.

Feature Evaluation. Different features may carry different amounts of information. WF defense designers can evaluate features to find more informative ones to hide [5]; attackers can do so to discover highly informative features and optimize their feature set [3]. Existing works [5], [3] designed

Fig. 1: Accuracy vs. Information Leakage. Suppose a closed-world scenario of 100 websites with $H(D) = \log_2(100)$. 

$\alpha$ = 0.05

\[ H(D) = \log_2(n) \]
comparative methods to rank the features by their information leakage, but these methodologies do not give a straightforward way to quantify the relationships between features. How much information do features A and B share? If feature A is more informative than features B or C alone, are features B and C together more informative than A? These methodologies are unable to answer these questions.

**Our work.** We argue that these coarse-grained evaluations of features and defenses are overly simplistic. The analysis of new WF attack features and defenses should start with the question: how much information is leaked? To answer this question, two challenges should be addressed. The first challenge is finding a way to model the behavior of WF features and the interaction between them; these features can have highly complex relationships and behavior, exhibiting distributions that could be discrete, continuous, or even partly discrete and partly continuous. The second challenge is the curse of dimensionality when estimating the total information leakage, as the state-of-art feature sets are usually high-dimensional. Unfortunately, existing works limited their experimental measurement to features’ individual information leakage, and they cannot overcome these challenges.

In this paper, we develop WeFDE (for Website Fingerprint Density Estimation), a methodology for modelling the likelihood functions of website fingerprints, and a set of tools for measuring the information leaked by these fingerprints. The design of WeFDE addresses both of these primary challenges. The first is the choice of model for the likelihood functions of fingerprint features, which can have a wide range of shapes. We address this challenge by using adaptive kernel density estimation [13] to model the probability density function of a feature or a category of features. By allowing kernels to determine their bandwidth separately, we can adaptively model both continuous and discrete density functions; by estimating multi-dimensional kernels over sets of features, we can model the interactions between features.

The second challenge is the “curse of dimensionality,” in which the data required to estimate a d-dimensional density function scales exponentially in d. We address this by introducing a set of dimension reduction approaches. Firstly, given a set of features to model, we measure their pairwise mutual information. After recognizing highly dependent features, we exclude the redundant ones. Secondly, we use Kononenko’s Algorithm [14], [15] and DBSCAN [16] to separate features into sub-groups, which have pairwise mutual information higher than a threshold $\epsilon$ within each group, and lower than $\epsilon$ among different groups. Then we apply adaptive kernels for each sub-group with reduced dimensionality. Finally, our experiment shows that by including enough highly informative features in the measurement we are able to approximate the overall information leakage. This enables us to further reduce the dimensionality of our measurement.

We apply WeFDE to a comprehensive list of 3043 features (including, to the best of our knowledge, all features in the Tor WF literature [17], [3], [18], [4], [2], [19], [20], [1]) extracted from a 211219 Tor web browsing visits for about 2200 websites. We quantify the information leakage in various scenarios, from closed-world setting with 100, 500, 1000, or 2000 websites, to open-world setting with 500, 1000, and 2000 non-monitored websites. We apply several WF defenses to these traces, and use WeFDE to compare their accuracy and information leakage. Our experimental results demonstrate the unreliability of accuracy in evaluating WF defenses.

**Contributions.** The contributions of this paper include:

- We introduce WeFDE, a method of estimating the likelihood function of a website fingerprint. The resulting density functions can be used to measure information present in fingerprints for a given set of websites, but could potentially be further used in a variety of attacks. For example, it could be combined with prior information about likely destinations to draw Bayesian inferences; or used to inform statistical disclosure-style attacks.

- We use WeFDE to perform information leakage measurement for all 3043 features proposed in the Tor website fingerprinting literature, based on a large dataset having 211219 Tor web browsing visits to about 2200 websites. As far as we know, our work is the first large-scale information leakage measurement in the literature. We draw conclusions on the relationships between these features, and their implications for WF defense mechanisms.

- We apply WeFDE to several recently proposed Tor WF defense mechanisms, to show that validating a defense by classification accuracy is flawed. These results demonstrate that accuracy and ranking-based measures of information are unreliable guides to the utility of a defense or comparison between two defenses’ security.

The paper is organized as follows: Section II and Section III give background and related works on WF attacks and defenses, with Section IV introducing the features we investigate in this paper. Section V introduces the high-level details of our methodology, while Section VI introduces the system design in more detail. Section VII, Section VIII, and Section IX give information leakage measurement results, and Section X provides discussions. Finally, we conclude in Section XI.

### II. WF Attack Models

An website fingerprinting attacker aims at obtaining the knowledge about the website a user has visited. By traffic sniffing, the attacker can learn the traffic originated from or destined to the user. Without turning to traffic contents or its IP addresses (both can be encrypted or obfuscated), the attacker inspects the fingerprints of the traffic for detection. These fingerprints can be packet length, the transmission time, or the packet ordering. Neither Cryptographic algorithms nor the anonymous services such as Tor can cover such fingerprints. State of art attacks [3], [1], [2] demonstrate that the fingerprints carry sufficient information that the attacker can pinpoint the visited website by more than 90% accuracy (with assumptions). In the following, we introduce two attack models of the website fingerprinting attack.
**Closed-World Attack Model.** An attacker in the closed-world knows a set of websites that the user may visit. The traffic fingerprints enable this attacker to narrow down the possible websites. Let’s denote the set of websites as $\mathcal{C} = \{c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n\}$. For simplicity, $\mathcal{C}$ also refers to a random variable denoting which website is visited. We adopt an equal prior model, in which the user visits a website with probability $1/n$, and the goal of the attacker is to decide which website has been visited.

**Open-World Attack Model.** The attacker in this attack model has a set of websites for monitoring; its goal is to decide whether the user visited a monitored website or not, and if yes, which monitored website. Though the user may visit any website, a non-monitored set of websites are introduced to approximate the user visiting the non-monitored websites. We consider a popularity-prior model, in which we give prior probabilities to websites by their popularity, without considering whether the websites are monitored or not.

### III. Related Work

**Website Fingerprinting Attacks.** The first category of website fingerprinting attacks targeted encrypted protocols with no packet length hiding [21]. More recent website fingerprinting attacks focus on Tor anonymous service, in which the unique packet length is hidden by fixed-size Tor cells. Cai et al. [20] used edit distance to compare Tor packet sequences, and achieved 86% accuracy in the closed-world scenario with 100 websites. Wang and Goldberg [19] further improve the accuracy to 91% by using Tor cells instead of TCP/IP packets, deleting SENDMEs, and applying new metrics such as fast Levenshtein. Their later work [1] increases the accuracy by using a KNN classifier. Panchenko et al. [2] introduces a new method to extract the packet number information, which increases the accuracy by 2%. Recently, Hayes and Danezis [3] use random forests to construct the current state-of-art website fingerprinting attack.

**Website Fingerprinting Defenses.** Several defenses have been proposed to defeat WF attacks. One category of defenses try to randomize the traffic fingerprints by traffic morphing [8], loading a background page [7], or randomized pipelining [9]. These are demonstrated ineffective by several works [20], [1].

Another category of defenses try to hide traffic features by deterministic approaches. By holding the packets or creating dummy packets, BuFLO [4] requires the packets sent in fixed size and fixed time interval. The packets are padded until reaching a transmission time threshold $\tau$ if their original transmission time is shorter. Otherwise, BuFLO lets the traffic finish. CS-BuFLO [10] is proposed to extend BuFLO to include congestion sensitivity and some rate adaptation. Tamaraw [5] improves the efficiency of BuFLO by two methods. First, it allows different transmission rate for outbound and inbound traffic. Second, it pads to make the packet count a multiple of parameter $L$: if the packet number in one direction is more than $nL$ and less than $(n+1)L$, it sends padding packets until the count is $(n+1)L$. Supersequence [1] utilizes clustering algorithms to group websites. For each group of websites, Supersequence computes a super trace to be the manner of transmitting the instances of the websites under this group. WTF-PAD [22] uses adaptive padding to be efficient and effective. Our paper includes these defenses for information leakage evaluation. We leave recently proposed defenses [11], [12] in our feature work.

**Website Fingerprinting Evaluation.** Juarez et al. [23] evaluates the effectiveness of WF attacks in practical scenarios, enumerating several assumptions about user settings, adversary capabilities, and the nature of the web that do not always hold. Without these assumptions, the accuracy of the attacks are significantly decreased. Cai et al. [5] use a comparative method to analyze defenses. They apply generators to transform a website class $\mathcal{C}$ into $\mathcal{C}'$, making $\mathcal{C}$ and $\mathcal{C}'$ differ only by one (category of) feature. Then they evaluate whether a specific defense is successful in hiding the feature. Though they claim this method can shed light on which features convey more information, the information leakage comparison between features is unclear and not quantified.

Cherubin [24] provides the lower bound estimate for the error of a website fingerprinting attacker. Given a set of features, the error of the Nearest Neighbor classifier is used to estimate the lower bound of the Bayes error, which is further used to be the lower bound for the error of any classifier. Based on such lower bound, a new privacy metric called $(\xi, \Phi)$--privacy is proposed. Though this privacy metric is not dependent on any specific classifier, it is still a variant of the accuracy/error metric, and therefore the flaw of accuracy also applies to $(\xi, \Phi)$--privacy.

**Security Measurement by Information Theory.** There are two information leakage studies in website fingerprinting attacks, but they are limited from quantification methodology and dataset size, to feature set and analysis. Such limitations prevent them from answering the question: how much information in total is leaked from the website fingerprint?

Chothia et al. [25] proposed a system called leakiEst to quantify how much information is leaked from an observable output about a single secret value. Then leakiEst was applied on e-passports and Tor traffic to measure the information leakage. However, leakiEst can only measure the information leakage of a single feature, and it is unable to quantify the leakage of a category of features or all features. In addition, it only included 10 visits for 500 websites in their website fingerprinting dataset, and its measurement just considered 75 features. Furthermore, leakiEst didn’t quantify the information leakage under various scenarios, such as open-world setting and setting with defenses.

Mather et al. [26] quantified the side-channel information leakage about the user’s inputs in the web applications. However, the work shared many of the above limitations. The experiment only considered packet size features; the size of the dataset was unknown; the quantification only came to a single feature. Though the work included the multivariate extension, it didn’t apply it in the experiment, and it didn’t have dimension reduction to handle the curse of the dimensionality.
In comparison, our paper overcomes these limitations to answer how much information is leaked in total or from a category of features. Specifically, it includes all 3043 features proposed in Tor website fingerprinting literatures and much larger dataset with 211219 visits. The resulting information leakage quantification is therefore more accurate and representative. It’s able to quantify information leakage of a set of features with high dimension, so that it can tell how much information is leaked in total.

More importantly, our paper not only quantifies the information leakage, but also reveals and analyzes the discrepancy between accuracy and information leakage when validating website fingerprinting defenses. Our experimental results demonstrate the flaw of accuracy.

IV. TRAFFIC AND ITS FEATURES

A user’s traffic is a sequence of packets with timestamps which are originated from or destined to it. We use $T(C)$ to denote the traffic when the user visited the website $C$. Then

$$T(C) = \langle (t_0, l_0), (t_1, l_1), \cdots, (t_m, l_m) \rangle,$$

where $(t_i, l_i)$ corresponds to a packet of length $|l_i|$ in bytes with a timestamp $t_i$ in seconds. The sign of $l_i$ indicates the direction of the packet: a positive value denotes that it is originated from the server, otherwise the user sent the packet. Table I describes our collected traffic for information leakage measurement.

In the state-of-art website fingerprinting attacks [2], [3], [1], it is the features of the traffic rather than the traffic itself that an attacker uses for deanonymization. One of the contribution of this paper is that it measures a complete set of traffic features in literatures of website fingerprinting attacks in Tor [17], [3], [18], [4], [2], [19], [20], [1]. The following lists the 14 categories of features which are included in the state-of-art attacks.

1. Packet count. Counting the number of packets is found helpful for an attacker. Specifically, we include the following features based on packet count: (a) the total packet count, (b) the count of outgoing packets, (c) the count of incoming packets, (d) the ratio between the incoming packet count and that of the total, and (e) the ratio between the outgoing packet count and that of the total.

2. Time Statistics. Firstly, we look at the packet inter-arrival time for the total, incoming, and outgoing streams, individually. We extract the following statistics and add them into our feature set: (a) maximum, (b) mean, (c) standard deviation, and (d) the third quartile. Secondly, we embrace the features based on transmission time. We add the first, second, third quartile and total transmission time into our feature set.

3-4. Packet Ordering. We explore the n-gram features which are widely adopted features extracting packet ordering. A n-gram is a contiguous sequence of $n$ packet lengths from a traffic sequence. Let’s take 2-gram as an example. Suppose the traffic sequence is $\langle (l_1, t_1), (l_2, t_2), (l_3, t_3), (l_4, t_4) \rangle$, then the 2-grams are $\langle l_1, l_2 \rangle$, $\langle l_2, l_3 \rangle$ and $\langle l_3, l_4 \rangle$. We consider the frequencies of each grams as features and we measure bigram, trigram, 4-gram, 5-gram, and 6-gram for comparison.

In addition, the number of packets transmitted before each successive incoming or outgoing packets also captures the ordering of the packets. We record such features by scanning the first 300 packets of the incoming and those of the outgoing respectively.

5-8. Intervals and Bursts. We firstly adopt interval-based features to capture the traffic bursts. An interval is defined as a traffic window between a packet and the previous packet with the same direction.

We use two approaches for interval-based features: Interval-I [1] records the first 300 intervals of incoming packets and those of the outgoing. Interval-II [17] uses a vector $V$ in which $V(i)$ records the number of intervals with the packet number $i$. We use two vectors to count the incoming and outgoing intervals separately, and we fix the vectors’ dimension to be 300 (An interval having more than 300 packets is counted as an interval with 300 packets). We also apply grouping [18] on $V$ to obtain extra features: $\sum_{i=3}^5 V(i)$, $\sum_{i=6}^8 V(i)$, and $\sum_{i=9}^{13} V(i)$. We name this approach to be Interval-III.

We also adopt [1]’s approach of counting bursts. A burst of outgoing packets is defined as a sequence of outgoing packets, in which there are no two adjacent incoming packets. We extract the packet number in each burst and use the maximum and the average as features. We also add the total burst number, as well as the number of bursts with more than 5 packets, 10 packets, and 20 packets, respectively.

9. Packet Distribution. We divide the packet sequence into non-overlapping chunks of 30 packets and count the number of outgoing packets in first 200 chunks as features. We ignore the chunks after the 200 chunks if any, and pad 0s to have 200 features in case of having less than 200 chunks.

We also apply the approaches in [3] to have additional features: (a) calculate the standard deviation, mean, median, and maximum of the 200 features, and (b) split them into 20 evenly sized subsets and sum each subset to be new features.

10-12. First 30 and Last 30 Packets. We explore the information leakage from the first and last 30 packets. Particularly, we include first 20 packets as features, and we extract the packet count features (incoming packet count and outgoing packet count) from the first and last 30 packets, respectively.

13. Packet count Per Second. We count the packet number in every second. To make the feature number fixed, we count the first 100 seconds and pad 0s if the transmission time is less than 100 seconds. The standard deviation, mean, median, minimum, and maximum of these features are also included.

We also include the alternative count of packets per second features[3]. We split the packet count per second features into 20 evenly sized subsets and sum each subset to obtain the alternative features.

14. CUMUL Features. [2] introduces the CUMUL features. It extracts a cumulative representation from the packet trace, and
TABLE I: DATASET. We adopt Crawler [27] to collect the network traffic in batches. This crawler uses Selenium to automate the Tor Browser Bundle and applies Stem library to control the Tor process. It extended the circuit renewal period to 600,000 minutes and disabled UseEntryGuard to avoid using a fixed set of entry guards. We apply the method in [2] to extract the cell packets from the traffic and measure the information leakage based on the cell packets.

| Source                  | Instances | Batches |
|-------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Closed-World Alexa 1-100| 55779     | 20      |
| Open-World Monitor      | 17985     | 8       |
| World Non-Monitor Alexa 1-2000 | 137455 | 10     |

Fig. 2: Different features may carry different amount of information: time vs. total packet count

derives \( n \) features by sampling the piecewise linear interpolant of the representation at \( n \) equidistant points. We adopt such features with \( n = 100 \).

It’s worth noting that “packet” here refers to a Tor cell packet. We extract our features based on the cell packet traces. In addition, in 2011 [18] includes a feature named HTML marker, which counts the total size of incoming packets from the first outgoing packet and the next outgoing packet. Such summation was considered to be the size of the HTML document and therefore is informative. We find such claim is not accurate anymore, and we find no updated details of how to reproduce such a feature. As a result, we do not include this feature in our measurement.

V. METHODOLOGY

Information Leakage. The features leak information about which website is visited. Total packet count is a good example. Figure 2 shows that visiting www.google.de creates 700 to 1000 packets, while browsing www.facebook.com results in 1100 to 1600 packets. Suppose an attacker passively monitors a Tor user’s traffic, and it knows that the user has visited one of these two websites (closed-world assumption). By inspecting the total packet count of the traffic (in the range of 700 to 1000, or 1100 to 1600), the attacker can tell which website is visited.

Different features may carry different amounts of information. Figure 2 displays the download time in visiting www.google.de and www.facebook.com. The former loads in about 3 to 20 seconds, and the latter takes 5 to 20 seconds; Their distributions of download time are not easily separable. As a result, the attacker learns much less information from the download time than from total packet count in the same closed-world scenario.

This raises question of how to quantify the information leakage for different features. We adopt mutual information [28], which evaluates the amount of information about a random variable obtained through another variable, for this measurement, defined as:

**DEFINITION.** The amount of information that an attacker can learn from the fingerprint of the traffic instance is

\[
I(F; W) = H(W) - H(W|F)
\]

where

- \( F \) is a random variable denoting the traffic’s fingerprint
- \( W \) is a random variable about website information
- \( I(F; W) \) is the mutual information between \( F \) and \( W \)
- \( H(W) \) is the Shannon entropy of the variable \( W \), and
- \( H(W|F) \) is the conditional entropy of \( W \) given \( F \).

Considering the entropy \( H(W) \) is solely determined by the priors of each website being visited, the key of the measurement is to determine the conditional entropy \( H(W|F) \). The following sections describe how to measure \( H(W|F) \) when \( F \) is a single feature or a set of features, respectively.

VI. SYSTEM DESIGN

Aimed at quantifying the information leakage of a feature or a set of features, we design and develop our Website Fingerprint Density Estimation, or WeFDE. Comparing with existing systems such as leakiEst [25], WeFDE is able to measure joint information leakage for more than one feature, and it is particularly designed for measuring the leakage from website fingerprinting defenses, in which a feature could be partly continuous and partly discrete.

Figure 3 shows the architecture of WeFDE. The information leakage quantification begins with the Website Fingerprint Modeler, which estimates the probability density functions of features. In case of measuring joint information of a set of features, Mutual Information Analyzer is activated to help the Modeler to refine its models to mitigate the curse of dimensionality. During the information leakage quantification, the Website Fingerprint Modeler is sampled to generate samples. By Monte Carlo approach [29], the Information Leakage...
Quantifier derives the final information leakage by evaluating and averaging the samples’ leakage. In the following, we describe our modules in detail.

A. Website Fingerprint Modeler

The task of Website Fingerprint Modeler is to model the probability density function (PDF) of features. A popular approach is to use a histogram. However, as the traffic features exhibit a great range of variety, it’s hard to decide on the number of bins and width. WeFDE adopts Adaptive Kernel Density Estimate (AKDE) [30], which outperforms histogram in smoothness and continuity. AKDE is a non-parametric method to estimate a random variable’s the probability density function. It uses kernel functions—a non-negative function that integrates to one and has mean zero—to approximate the shape of the distribution.

We start by how WeFDE applies AKDE to estimate a single feature’s probability distribution:

\[
\hat{p}(f|c_j) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{c=1}^{m} \frac{1}{h_c} K\left(\frac{f - p_c}{h_c}\right)
\]

where

- \(h_c\) is called the bandwidth in AKDE,
- \(K(\cdot)\) is the kernel function of a Gaussian,
- \(p_1, p_2, \cdots, p_m\) are the observations for \(f\) in visiting \(c_j\).

Choosing proper bandwidths is important for AKDE to make an accurate estimate. If a feature is continuous, WeFDE adopts plug-in estimator[31]. In case of failure, we use the rule-of-thumb approach [31] as the alternative. If the feature is discrete, we let the bandwidth be a very small constant (0.001 in this paper). The choice of the small constant has no impact on the measurement, as long as each website uses the same constant as the bandwidth in its AKDE.

Our AKDE may model a discrete feature as if it’s continuous. The reason is that the domain of the feature \(f\) could be very large and requires much more samples than we can collect in order to accurately estimate in discrete. Take total packet count of Facebook.com as an example. We observe 238 different values from our 600 samples in the range of 576 and 1865. If the feature is processed as discrete, the estimated probability for observed values would be inaccurate, and the missed values would be considered impossible in the inappropriate way. Our solution is to consider such a discrete feature to be continuous, so that the kernels would smooth the probability distribution estimation and assign an appropriate probability to the missed values.

Our AKDE is able to distinguish a continuous-like discrete feature. Take the feature of transmission time as an example. Choosing proper bandwidths is important for AKDE to make an accurate estimate. If a feature is continuous, WeFDE adopts plug-in estimator[31]. In case of failure, we use the rule-of-thumb approach [31] as the alternative. If the feature is discrete, we let the bandwidth be a very small constant (0.001 in this paper). The choice of the small constant has no impact on the measurement, as long as each website uses the same constant as the bandwidth in its AKDE.

Moreover, our AKDE can handle a feature which is partly continuous and partly discrete (or in other words, a mixture of continuous and discrete random variables). Such features exist in a WF defense such as BuFLO [4] which always sends at least \(T\) seconds. These features would be discrete if the genuine traffic can be completed within time \(T\), otherwise, the features would be continuous. Thanks to AKDE which allows different observations to have their separate bandwidths, we compute the bandwidths separately for discrete and continuous feature values. According to [32], [33], AKDE is able to model a feature with mixed nature by selecting adaptive bandwidths for its observations.

We further extend WeFDE to model a set of features by adopting the multivariate form of AKDE. However, when applying multivariate AKDE to estimate a high dimensional PDF, we find AKDE inaccurate. The cause is the curse of dimensionality: as the dimension of the PDF increases, AKDE requires exponentially more observations for accurate estimate. Considering that the set of features to be measured jointly could be large (3043 features in case of total information measurement), we introduce Mutual Information Analyzer to mitigate the curse of dimensionality.

B. Mutual Information Analyzer

The introduction of Mutual Information Analyzer is for mitigating the curse of dimensionality in multivariate AKDE. It helps the Website Fingerprint Modeler to prune the features which share redundant information with other features, and to cluster features by dependency for separate modelling.

This Analyzer is based on the features’ pairwise mutual information. Mutual information evaluates the amount of information about a random variable obtained through another variable, and it also indicates how dependent two variables are. Suppose we have two features \(c\) and \(r\). The range of their mutual information \(I(c;r)\) is \([0, \min\{H(c), H(r)\}]\). To make the mutual information of any two features have the same range, WeFDE further normalizes the pairwise mutual information by Kvalseth’s method [34] (other normalization approaches [35] may also work). Let \(\text{NMI}_{\text{max}}(c,r)\) denote the normalized mutual information between feature \(c\) and \(r\). Then \(\text{NMI}_{\text{max}}(c,r)\) is equal to:

\[
\text{NMI}_{\text{max}}(c,r) = \frac{I(c;r)}{\max\{H(c), H(r)\}}
\]

Since \(I(r;c)\) is less than or equal to \(H(c)\) and \(H(r)\), \(\text{NMI}_{\text{max}}(c,r)\) is in the range of \([0, 1]\). A higher value of \(\text{NMI}_{\text{max}}(c,r)\) indicates higher dependence between \(r\) and \(c\) or in other words, they share more information with each other.
1) Grouping By Dependency: A workaround from curse of dimensionality in higher dimension is to adopt Naive Bayes method, which assumes the set of features to be measured is conditionally independent. Naive Bayes requires many fewer observations, thanks to the features’ probability distribution separately estimated. However, in our experiment we find dependence between some features of the website fingerprint, violating the assumption of Naive Bayes.

We adopt Kononenko’s algorithm (KA) [14], which clusters the highly-dependent features into disjoint groups. In each group, we model the joint PDF of its features by applying AKDE. Among different groups, conditional independence is assumed. KA takes the advantage of how Naive Bayes mitigates the curse of dimensionality, while keeping realistic assumptions about conditional independence between groups.

We partition the features into disjoint clusters by dependence. Firstly, we convert the mutual information matrix $M$ into a distance matrix $D$ by $D = 1 - M$, where 1 is a matrix of ones. A feature would have 0 distance with itself, and its distance to another feature decreases as their mutual information increases. We apply DBSCAN [16] on the distance matrix. DBSCAN is a density-based clustering algorithm. It assigns a feature to a cluster if this feature’s distance from any feature of the cluster is smaller than a threshold $\epsilon$, otherwise the feature starts a new cluster in our setting. Such algorithm guarantees that the distance is larger than $\epsilon$ between any two features belonging to different clusters, which equivalently means the features’ normalized mutual information is below $1 - \epsilon$. Thus, we can change $\epsilon$ to adjust the degree of independence between clusters. In this paper, we choose $\epsilon = 0.4$ in the experiments based on its empirical performance in the trade-off between its impact on information measurement accuracy and KA’s effectiveness in dimension reduction.

We model the PDF of the fingerprint by assuming independence between clusters. Suppose KA partitions the fingerprint $\vec{f}$ into $k$ clusters, $\vec{g}_1, \vec{g}_2, \ldots, \vec{g}_k$, with each feature belonging to one and only one cluster. To calculate the probability $p(\vec{f}|c_j)$, we have:

$$p(\vec{f}|c_j) = \hat{p}(\vec{g}_1|c_j)\hat{p}(\vec{g}_2|c_j)\cdots\hat{p}(\vec{g}_k|c_j)$$

where $\hat{p}(\cdot)$ is the PDF estimated by AKDE.

As a hybrid of the AKDE and Naive Bayes, Kononenko’s algorithm avoids the disadvantages of each. First, Kononenko’s algorithm does not have the incorrect assumption that the fingerprint features are independent. It only assumes independence between groups, as any two of them have mutual information below $\epsilon$. Second, Kononenko’s algorithm mitigates the curse of dimensionality. The groups in Kononenko’s algorithm have much less features than the total number of features.

2) Dimension Reduction: Besides the KA method to reduce dimension of the features modelled by AKDE, we employ two other approaches to further reduce the dimension.

The first approach is to exclude features being represented by other features. We use the pairwise mutual information to find pairs of features that have higher mutual information than a threshold (0.9 in this paper). Then we prune the feature set by eliminating one of the features and keeping the other.

Our second approach is to pick out a number of the most informative features to approximate all features’ information leakage. Given a set of features to measure, we sort the features by its individual information leakage. Instead of measuring all features’ information leakage, we pick out top $n$ features that leak the most information about the visited websites. The measurement results by varying $n$ are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8. It shows that with $n$ increasing, the top $n$ features’ information leakage would increase at first but finally reach a plateau. This phenomenon shows that the information leakage of sufficient top informative features is able to approximate that of the overall features. Such observation is also backed by [3], which discovered that including more top informative features beyond 100 has little gain for classification.

We didn’t choose other dimension reduction methods such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [36]. Our goal is to mitigate the curse of dimensionality in modelling website fingerprints by AKDE; but methods like PCA transform website fingerprints into opaque components which are much less understandable. These methods don’t fit for our case.

The Results. Figure 4 displays the outcome of our Mutual Information Analyzer. We picked out 100 most informative features (excluding the redundant ones), and we apply Mutual Information Analyzer to obtain 6 clusters. Figure 4 shows how many features each category contributes, and which cluster the feature belongs to.

We find that redundant features are pervasive among the highly informative features. We look at 183 most informative features, and 45.36% of them are redundant. This phenomenon suggests future feature set engineering may be able to find many redundant features to prune without hurting its performance for website fingerprints.

Figure 4 shows a cluster may consist of features from different categories. For example, Cluster2 has features from category 1, 8, and 14, and Cluster3 has features from category 1, 3, and 14. This phenomenon shows features from different categories may share much information (that’s why they are clustered together). Figure 4 also shows features from same category are not necessarily in the same cluster. For instance, the category 4 features are clustered into three different clusters.

Figure 4 also shows that categories do not necessarily have features to be included in clusters. We find that some categories lack top informative features, ending up with absence of their features in clusters. Here, we clarify that we don’t claim WeFDE to be free of information loss. In fact, just like other dimension reduction approaches such as PCA, there is information loss in WeFDE, but it is minimal [3]. It’s also worth noting that though some categories or features are not chosen by WeFDE, this doesn’t necessarily mean all of their information is lost, as their information may be shared and represented by other included categories or features.

Looking at individual features, we find 33 out of 83 highly
informative features are redundant with total packet count. These features include incoming packet count and 2-gram (-1, 1), but exclude outgoing packet count (NMI between total and outgoing packet count is 0.4414). The reason is that the number of incoming packets are much more than the number of outgoing packets in website browsing, so that total packet count is highly dependent on incoming packet count.

Due to page limit, we release all our measurement results in our anonymous Github repository\(^1\).

\textbf{VII. CLOSING-WORLD INFORMATION LEAKAGE}

In closed-world setting, an attacker is assumed to know the possible websites that a user may visit. The information leakage under this setting comes to \textit{which website is visited}. In the following, we give our definition about information leakage in closed-world setting.

\textbf{DEFINITION.} Suppose \(C\) is a random variable denoting possible websites that a user may visit. Then the information leakage \(I(F; C)\) in the closed-world scenario is:

\[
I(C; F) = H(C) - H(C|F) \\
H(C) = - \sum_{c_i \in C} \Pr(c_i) \log_2 \Pr(c_i) \\
H(C|F) = \int_{\Phi} p(x) H(C|x) dx
\]

(4)

where \(\Pr(c_i)\) is the probability that the visited website is \(c_i\), \(\Phi\) is the domain for the feature \(F\), and \(p(x)\) is the probability density function for variable \(x\).

\textbf{A. Experimental Results}

We adopt Alexa top 100 websites with 55779 visits in our closed-world setting, as shown in Table I. We assume equal prior probability for websites, and we set Monte Carlo sample number to 5000. We measure 3043 features’ individual information leakage and their joint leakage by categories. The following introduces part of our results. Full measurement results can be found at our anonymous Github repository.

1) \textbf{Individual Information Leakage:} Our measurement results upon individual features are shown in Figure 5. Among these 3043 features, we find: (a) 2.1% features leak more than 3 bits information, meaning that an attacker is able to narrow down the possibilities to one eighth by any of these features; (b) 19.91% features leak less than 3 bit but more than 2 bits information; (c) 23.43% features leak 1 bit to 2 bits information; and (d) 54.55% features leak less than 1 bit information. It is clear that nearly half of the features are able to help an attacker to reduce the size of the anonymity set by half. Yet our experiment shows that a single feature leaks no more than 3.45 bits information, which is the maximum leakage we observe in our experiment from the feature of rounded outgoing packet count. We also observe that outgoing packet count without rounding leaks 3.26 bits information, 0.19 bit less than the rounded one. We observe similar information leakage increase by rounding for total packet count and incoming packet count. Our results confirm the observation in [18] that rounding packet count can help website fingerprinting attacks.

Web-browsing is characterized by asymmetric traffic. The incoming packets, which contain the requested contents, usually outnumber the outgoing packets carrying the request. A natural question is, does download stream having more packets leak more information than upload stream? The answer is no: download stream leaks 3.04 bits information, 0.22 bit less than the incoming stream. Our measurement suggests that defense design should give no less amount of attention to upload stream in hiding both streams’ packet count.

The most informative timing feature is the average of inter-packet timing features in download stream with 1.43 bit leakage. Among inter-packet timing features, the maximum leaks the least information with around 0.7 bit leakage. Another category of timing features is transmission time. We observe that the information leakage increases from 25% percentile to 100% percentile transmission time. The most information leakage for transmission time comes to the total transmission time, which leaks 1.21 bit information. Furthermore, our measurement shows that information leakage of timing features has little difference for upload and download stream.

We also experiment the impact of world size on individual feature’s information leakage. We try to answer: with a larger world size, whether the information leakage of individual features increases or decreases. We further adopt Alexa top 500 and top 1000 separately for closed-world setting, and we conduct the same information leakage measurement as above. Note that the information leakage upper bound under

\textbf{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1}https://github.com/s0irrlor7m/InfoLeakWebsiteFingerprint}}
the world size 100, 500, and 1000 is 6.64, 8.97, and 9.97 bits, respectively. Our finding is that the impact of world size on information leakage is minimal, as is shown in Figure 6. Particularly, when the world size increases from 500 to 1000, the features’ individual information leakage is almost the same. Further analysis will be given in Section X-A.

2) Joint Information Measurement.: Among the 100 most informative features, many of the features share redundant information with other features. We set a threshold to 0.9, and if two features have mutual information larger than 0.9, we would consider a feature sharing most of its information with another one. Our results show that 62 of the 100 most informative features can be represented by the other 38 features, demonstrating the prevalence of redundant features in website fingerprint. This finding shows the necessity and effectiveness of our Mutual Information Analyzer in recognizing features sharing redundant information. Figure 7 also shows that after including sufficient non-redundant features, the category information leakage tends to reach plateau. This phenomenon shows that we can approximate the information of a category by including sufficient non-redundant most informative features in this category.

We further look at how Mutual Information Analyzer groups the features. We focus on all features with 100 most informative features excluding redundant ones. With $\epsilon = 0.4$ in DBSCAN, we observe 6 clusters, which have 34, 45, 13, 6, 1, 1 features respectively. The result shows that feature clustering helps WeFDE to reduce the number of features for AKDE to model from 100 to 45 at most.

Categories such as Time, Ngram, Transposition, Interval-II, Interval-III, Packet Distribution, Packet per Second, and CUMUL leak most of the information about the visited websites; other categories such as Packet Count, Interval-I, Burst, First20, First30 Packet Count, Last30 Packet Count leak 5.75, 5.86, 6.2, 4.20, 1.29, and 1.03 bits information, respectively. Our measurement shows that Interval-II and Interval-III leak more information than Interval-I, with 6.63 bits for both Interval-II and Interval-III. In addition, we find that Interval-II and Interval-III are faster than Interval-I in reaching the plateau, indicating the former two not only leak more information but also with less features. It is clear that recording intervals by their frequency of packet count (adopted in Interval-II and Interval-III) is more preferable than recording them in sequence (Interval-I).

We also experiment the impact of world-size on information leakage upon categories in closed-world setting. We find that with the increase of world size, most categories exhibit more information leakage, except First30 and Last30 Packet Count. Note that categories such as First20, Burst, Packet Count show little increase when the world size increases from 1000 to 2000. We leave the discussion to Section X-A.

VIII. OPEN-WORLD INFORMATION LEAKAGE

In the closed-world scenario, the attacker knows all possible websites that a user may visit, and the goal is to decide which website is visited; In the open-world setting, the attacker has
DEFINITION. The information leakage \( I(F; O) \) in open-world scenario is:

\[
I(F; O) = H(O) - H(O|F)
\]

\[
H(O) = - \sum_{c_i \in M} \Pr(c_i) \log_2 \Pr(c_i)
\]

\[
- \left\{ \sum_{c_j \in N} \Pr(c_j) \right\} \log_2 \left\{ \sum_{c_j \in N} \Pr(c_j) \right\}
\]

\[
H(O|F) = \int p(f) H(O|f) df
\]

\[
H(O|f) = - \sum_{c_i \in M} \Pr(c_i|f) \log_2 (\Pr(c_i|f))
\]

\[
- \left\{ \sum_{c_j \in N} \Pr(c_j|f) \right\} \log_2 \left\{ \sum_{c_j \in N} \Pr(c_j|f) \right\}
\]

where \( O \) is a random variable denoting the visited website belongs to the monitored or the non-monitored, and if it is monitored, which one. \( M \) denotes the monitored set of websites, and \( N \) denotes the non-monitored set of websites.

A. Experimental Results

We quantify the information leakage for open-world setting, and this section describes part of our results. For more information, please visit our Github repository.

Experiment Setup. We adopt the list of monitored websites from [1] and collected 17984 traffic instances in total. Our non-monitored websites come from Alexa’s top 2000 with 137455 instances in total. We approximate the websites’ prior probability by Zipf law [37], [38], which enables us to estimate a website’s prior probability by its rank. We conduct experiments with top 500, 1000, 2000 non-monitored websites separately, and we show the experimental results in Figure 8.

Figure 8 shows that the information that the open-world setting can carry is decreased when including more non-monitored websites, with 1.82, 1.71, 1.62 bit for top500, top1000, and top2000, respectively. Including more non-monitored websites decreases the entropy of the open-world setting rather than increasing it. The reduced information is in part because of the prior on monitored websites. Comparing with closed-world setting with similar world size, open-world scenario carries much less information.

Similar with the closed-world setting, Figure 8 shows that most categories except First20, First30 and Last30 Packet count, and Interval-I leak most of the information. This shows that the difference in world setting has little impact on categories’ capability in leaking information.

We also investigate how the size of the non-monitored websites influences our measurement. We focus on the total leakage and build the AKDE models for the non-monitored websites with the varying size of the non-monitored, re-
respectively. We evaluate how the difference of these AKDE models influences measurement. Specifically, we evaluate (a) how monitored samples are evaluated at these AKDE models, and (b) how samples generated by these AKDE models are evaluated at the monitored AKDE. Figure 9 shows the results. Figure 9 (a) shows that these AKDE models of the non-monitored, though differing in size, assign low probability (below $10^{-10}$ with 95% percentile) to monitored samples. Figure 9 (b) shows that though these AKDE models for the non-monitored generate different samples, the difference on how these samples are evaluated by the AKDE model of the monitored is little: they are all assigned low probability below $10^{-20}$ with 95% percentile. The results lead to the estimation that introducing extra lower rank websites into the non-monitored set would not significantly change the low probability that the non-monitored AKDE assigns to monitored samples, and the low probability that the monitored AKDE assigns to samples generated by the non-monitored AKDE, thanks to the low prior probability of these websites. The information leakage is therefore little impacted.

IX. MEASURING WF DEFENSES WITH INFORMATION LEAKAGE

A. Accuracy and Information Leakage

Using accuracy to prove a defense to be secure is flawed. This section would investigate the information leakage corresponding to a specific accuracy. We find that given a specific accuracy, the actual information leakage is far from certain.

Theorem 1. Let $\{c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n\}$ denote a set of websites with prior probabilities $p_1, p_2, \cdots, p_n$, and $v_i$ denote a visit to website $c_i$. Suppose a website fingerprinting classifier $D$ which recognizes a visit $v_i$ to be $D(v_i)$. The classifier would succeed if $D(v_i) = c_i$, otherwise it fails. Assume a defense has been applied, and this classifier has $\alpha$ accuracy in classifying each website’s visits. Then the information leakage obtained by the classifier is uncertain: the range of the possible information leakage is

$$(1 - \alpha)\log_2(n - 1)$$

Proof: see Appendix B

An Example. Figure 1 shows an example for the theorem. Note that the range is invariable no matter what we assume for websites’ prior probability. We can see a wide range of possible information leakage when a low accuracy is given, showing that low accuracy doesn’t necessarily guarantee low information leakage.
B. Information Leakage Measurement upon WF Defenses

We include Tamaraw [5], BuFLO [4], Supersequence [1], WTF-PAD [22], and CS-BuFLO [10] to quantify the information leakage upon defensed traffic.

We adopt the implementation of BuFLO, Tamaraw, and Supersequence [39] to generate the defensed traffic, with $\tau = 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80, 100, 120$ for BuFLO, $L$ ranging from 10 to 100 with step 10 and from 200 to 1000 with step 100 for Tamaraw. We include the method 3 of Supersequence, with 2, 5, or 10 super clusters, and 4, 8, or 12 stopping points. We also include the method 4 of Supersequence, with 2 super clusters, 4 stopping points, and 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 20, 35, or 50 clusters. We use the WTF-PAD implementation [40] to create the WTF-PAD traffic. We were recommended to use the default normal_rcv distributions on our dataset, as finding an optimal set of distributions for a new dataset is currently a work in progress [40]. We apply the KNN classifier [1] on our WTF-PAD traces, and we can get similar accuracy (18.03\% in our case). This classification result validates our WTF-PAD traces. We use the CS-BuFLO implementation [24] to generate simulated CS-BuFLO traces.

Upon each type of defensed traces, we evaluate the overall information leakage and the classification accuracy at the same time. The measurement is conducted in closed-world setting with 94 websites. We assume equal prior probability for websites and adopt $k = 5000$ for Monte Carlo Evaluation. We use bootstrap [41] with 50 trials to estimate the 96\% confidence interval for the information leakage and accuracy. For details about bootstrap, please see Appendix A. The classifier we adopt is a variant of the KNN classifier [1]. The only change we make is the feature set: we use our own feature set instead of its original one. The purpose is to have equivalent feature sets for classifications and information leakage measurements. The reason for choosing this KNN classifier is that it is one of the most popular website fingerprinting classifiers to launch attacks and evaluate defense mechanisms. It’s also worth noting that the original feature set of the KNN classifier is a subset of our feature set. The experimental results are shown in Figure 10.

C. Accuracy is inaccurate in comparing different defenses

Accuracy is widely used to compare the security of different defenses. A defense mechanism is designed and tuned to satisfy a lower accuracy as an evidence of superiority over existing defenses [4]. With defense overhead being considered, new defense mechanisms [5], [22] are sought and configured to lower the overhead without sacrificing accuracy too much. But if accuracy fails to be a reliable metric for security, it would become a pitfall and mislead the design and deployment of defense mechanisms. This section describes the flaws of accuracy and proves such a possibility.

Accuracy may fail because of its dependence on specific classifiers. If a defense achieves low classification accuracy, it’s not safe to conclude that this defense is secure, since the used classifiers may not be optimal. More powerful classifiers may exist and output higher classification accuracy. We prove this possibility in our experiment. To validate WTF-PAD, four classifiers were used including the original KNN classifier, and the reported highest accuracy was 26\%. But using the KNN classifier with our feature set, we observe 33.99\% accuracy for WTF-PAD. Thus, accuracy is not reliable to validate a defense because of its dependence on specific classifiers.

Defenses having equivalent accuracy may leak varying amount of information. Figure 10 demonstrates such a phenomenon when taking BuFLO ($\tau = 40$) and Tamaraw ($L = 10$) into consideration. Accuracy of both defenses is nearly equivalent, with 9.39\% for BuFLO and 9.68\% for Tamaraw. In sense of accuracy, BuFLO ($\tau = 40$) was considered to be as secure as Tamaraw($L = 10$). However, our experimental results disapprove such a conclusion, showing BuFLO ($\tau = 40$) leaks 2.31 bits more information than Tamaraw (which leaks 3.26 bits information). We observe the similar phenomenon between WTF-PAD and Supersequence.

More importantly, a defense believed to be more secure by accuracy may leak more information. Take BuFLO ($\tau = 60$) as an example. Its accuracy is 7.39\%, while accuracy of Tamaraw with $L = 10, 20, 30$ is 9.68\%, 9.15\%, and 8.35\% respectively. Accuracy supports BuFLO ($\tau = 60$) is more secure than Tamaraw with $L = 10, 20, 30$. However, our measurement shows that BuFLO ($\tau = 60$) leaks 4.56 bit information, 1.3 bit, 1.61 bit, and 1.75 bit more than Tamaraw with $L = 10, 20, 30$! Take WTF-PAD as another example. The accuracy for WTF-PAD is 33.99\%, much lower than the 53.19\% accuracy of Supersequence method 4 with 2 super clusters, 50 clusters, and 4 stopping points. But the information leakage of WTF-PAD is around 6.4 bits, much higher than the leakage of the latter which is about 5.6 bits. Our experimental results prove the unreliability of accuracy in comparing defenses by security.

Other WeFDE results on Defenses. We also vary the world size to study its impact on defenses’ information leakage. 11 shows the world size’s impact on Tamaraw is minimal. BuFLO with $\tau = 20, 60$ exhibits more information leakage with a larger world size, while BuFLO with $\tau = 120$ stay almost the same. We explain the phenomenon in Section X-A.

X. Discussion

A. World Size and Information Leakage

In this section, we discuss the impact of the world size on our information leakage measurement.

We start with the closed-world setting. We observe that with the increase of the world size, the information leakage for most categories and the total increases as well, while the individual information leakage of features is little impacted (particularly when the world size increases from 1000 to 2000). To explain the conflicting observations, we highlight the notion of maximum possible information leakage of a setting. A feature (or a set of features) leaks no more information than the information that the setting has. For example, in our closed-world setting with 100 websites, the total information leakage is 6.63 bits. But if we let the world size be 2, the total leakage is no more than 1 bit, no matter how
WeFDE can be used to launch website fingerprinting attacks. WeFDE models the likelihood function of website fingerprints, so that given a test case, WeFDE is able to decide the probability of the test case being a visit to each website. It could be further combined with prior information about likely destinations to draw Bayesian inference [42].

WeFDE can be used to evaluate a defense. When evaluating a defense by a classifier, a test case unseen by the training dataset is likely to be misclassified. But we can imagine that enlarging the dataset would eventually avoid such misclassification. This issue favors the defense design, and it is more likely to happen in probabilistic defenses such as WTF-PAD. Using WeFDE to evaluate a defense doesn’t have this problem, as all data points are used to build the model for measurement. In addition, WeFDE is independent from any classifier, and it avoids the flaw of accuracy.

WeFDE can be used to bootstrap a defense design. WeFDE can tell defense designers the information leakage from features and categories, so that designers could be guided to work on specific highly informative features and categories for hiding. In addition, when defenses are designed for a individual server or client to adopt [11], WeFDE could suggest popular fingerprints to emulate. In our future work, we will explore more about using WeFDE to bootstrap a defense design.

C. Limitations

One limitation of WeFDE is its dependence on the feature set. Though we try to include all known features to generalize WeFDE’s results, unknown informative features may exist and not be included. Fortunately, as long as new features are discovered and reported by future studies, we can always update our feature set and re-evaluate the leakage.

Another limitation is that the information leakage results are dependent on our dataset. In fact, because Tor users may have different settings, network conditions, and behaviors, finding a representative traffic dataset for Tor users is still an open question, though we include Alexa top 2000 websites with 211219 visits in our dataset. In addition, there are always more websites than we can crawl. Such dependence on dataset
limits the generalization of our WeFDE’s results. As long as representative datasets become available, we will update our information leakage accordingly.

XI. CONCLUSION

We have developed a methodology and tools that allow measurement of the information leaked by a website fingerprint. This gives us a more fine-grained analysis of WF defense mechanisms than the “all-or-nothing” approach based on evaluating specific classifiers. By measuring defenses' information leakage and their accuracy, we find that using classification accuracy to validate a defense is flawed.

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APPENDIX

A. Bootstrap: accuracy estimation for information leakage quantification

We use bootstrap [41] to estimate the accuracy of our information-theoretic measurement. Bootstrap is a statistical
technique which uses random sampling with replacement to measure the properties of an estimator.

We implement bootstrap to estimate the confidence interval of the information leakage. We describe our bootstrap in the following:

- Step 1: for the observations of the each website, we apply random sampling with replacement, in which every observation is equally likely to be drawn and is allowed to be drawn more than once (with replacement). We let the sampling size be equal to observation size.
- Step 2: we apply our measurement on the newly constructed dataset of resamples and obtain the information leakage.
- Step 3: Step 1 and Step 2 are repeated $K$ times to obtain $K$ values for the information leakage; We therefore find the confidence interval based on these $K$ values.

B. Proof of Theorem 1

Let $I(D; V)$ denote the information leakage that the classifier attains. we have:

$$ I(D; V) = H(D) - H(D|V) $$

$$ = H(D) - \sum_{v_i \in V} p(v_i) H(D|v_i) $$

(10)

We then evaluate $H(D|v_i)$, $v_i \in V$. With the accuracy $\alpha$, we have $P_r(D = v_i|v_i) = \alpha$. However, it is uncertain about the probability $P_r(D = v_j|v_i)$ where $j \neq i$, from the knowledge of the accuracy. We put the possibility in two extremes to obtain the range of possible evaluation. In one case, suppose that the classifier determines $v_i$ to be from the website $C_j$, with probability $1 - \alpha$, so that the maximum of $I(D; V)$ is obtained as

$$ \max\{I(D; V)\} = H(D) + \alpha \log_2 \alpha + (1 - \alpha) \log_2 (1 - \alpha) $$

(11)

In the other case, suppose that the probabilities $P_r(D = v_j|v_i) = (1 - \alpha)/(n - 1)$ where $j \neq i$, which means that the classifier determines the visit $v_i$ to belong to any website other than $C_i$ with equal probability. Such a case yields the minimum possible information leakage, which is:

$$ \min\{I(D; V)\} = H(D) + \alpha \log_2 \alpha + (1 - \alpha) \log_2 \frac{1 - \alpha}{n - 1} $$

(12)

As a result, the range of potential information leakage $I(D; V)$ conveyed by the accuracy $\delta$ is

$$ (1 - \alpha) \log_2 (n - 1) $$

(13)

C. Proof of Theorem 2

Let’s denote the information leakage in each closed-world setting to be:

$$ I_i = \log_2(n) + \sum_{l \in \{1, \ldots, x\}} q_l(i) \log_2(q_l(i)) $$

(14)

, where $q_l(i)$ is the probability of visiting the $i$th website in the $l$th closed-world setting conditioned on $F = \bar{f}$.

In the combined closed-world setting, the information leakage of $F = \bar{f}$ is

$$ \log_2(nx) + \sum_{l \in \{1, \ldots, x\}} \left\{ \sum_{i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}} \frac{q_l(i)}{x} \log_2\left(\frac{q_l(i)}{x}\right) \right\} $$

$$ = \log_2(n) + \frac{1}{x} \sum_{l \in \{1, \ldots, x\}} \sum_{i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}} q_l(i) \log_2(q_l(i)) $$

(15)