The Future is Uncertain for the Mono Party China-pluralized Africa Economic Relations: A Critical Analysis of Chinese Economic Strategies in Zambia and Tanzania

Basebya KA*

Department of Communication Studies, Communication University of China, Beijing, China

*Corresponding author: Basebya KA, Professor, Department of Communication Studies, Communication University of China, Beijing, China; Tel: +8613121273177; E-mail: arisreality@gmail.com

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Abstract

With pluralized democracies in Africa and the authoritarian mono-party China’s propensity of aligning, making friendships and bilateral agreements with ruling political parties, elites and government regardless public contentment and engagement, the likeness of rebellions and diverting resentments on Chinese investments is high. This article answers the question on how the authoritarian China where the Communist Party and government affairs are largely inseparable manages to push and secure investments in pluralized and frail democracies in both Tanzania and Zambia while keeping ties with ruling political parties at the same time disengage with other civil voices and undermines corporate citizenship.

The article analyzes China’s adaption to win and secure investments and the misplays evolve such as Confucianism crushes with pluralism democracies, party to party outreach whilst sidelines other political actors, maltreatment of media/PR/CSRs, profit maximization at the expense of humanity and Beijing loosening control and monitoring of overseas Chinese enterprises that have distorted China’s image and turn into battle field for pluralized and populism politics. Based on interviews from 26 respondents who were purposively and snow balling sampled and 73 extensive secondary resources, the article concludes that there is uncertain to the future of the authoritarian mono-party China’s economic presence in pluralized Africa and suggests the need for laying new foundations and approaches to advance Chinese political-economic relations with Zambia, Tanzania and Africa in general.

Keywords: Authoritarianism; Pluralism; Politics; Investments; Relations; Strategies

Introduction

Historically, China has been enjoying brotherly and all weather friendship with many African countries. The relationship which is traced back from liberation against imperialism and later in late 1970s gradually switched from ideology-driven foreign policy to authoritarian capitalism [1], helped China to penetrate economically in many parts of Africa as a friend with total confidence and support from local politics.

However, with the introduction of multiparty and pluralized democracies in late 1980’s in Africa, the mono-party China maintained its ties with these two countries as same as the party to party outreach strategy. While in Zambia the Movement for Multiparty Democracy that replaced the freedom fighter United National Independence Party (UNIP) maintained close relationship with the Communist Party of China (CPC) before later the opposition Patriotic Front party (PF) used anti-Chinese political campaigns and policies to come into power, in Tanzania the liberation Revolutionary Party - Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) still ruling up to date with close ties to CPC whereas the opposition political parties and civil voices seem to be vigilant and critical on China’s interests and budes to the country.

As the matter of fact, pluralized democracies came with many political and democratic institutions including civil societies, private and free press and opposition parties that brought new rules of the game to Sino-Africa political-economic relations such as alternations on ruling parties’ regimes that poses a dilemma on China’s party to party outreach strategy.

For instance during the 2008 and 2011 general elections in Zambia, anti-Chinese investments dominated the political campaigns under the opposition Patriotic Front party led by Michael Chilufya Sata ‘King Cobra’. This hasn’t changed much the political trends towards China’s presence to the country. The then opposition party Patriotic Front which is now an incumbent was accusing Chinese investors of killings, paying slavery wages, not abiding to labor law, poor working environment, use corruption to win tenders, paying less revenue to the government due to close relationship with top government and the then ruling party’s officials (MMD officials). The current opposition parties such as United Progressive People (UPP) and United Party for National Development (UPND) are also accusing PF government of the same corruption practices in favor of Chinese investors. These misconducts that may also be evident in Tanzania as seen from riots, demonstrations and deaths, are clearly connected to weak democracies, political institutions in regulating the political-economic environments and regimes’ favoritism of non-complying investors as described by Leopold & Wafo [2].

However, despite of the political and civil institutional fragility, the authoritarian China’s strategies to invest in undeveloped democratized Africa have not changed since 1954 when the country launched Sino-Africa policy and pragmatically revised the policy in 2006. The
strategic changes that include continued exchanges with friend political parties “in particularly with ruling parties” [3], none state interferences, sincerity, friendship and equality among the parts involved seems to have cracks.

While China maintains none interference policy, senses of evading the role of empowering African fragile democratic and political institutions that are tasked the role to oversee investments are on the raise hence China's gains on the problem [4]. Also, the party to party outreach strategy which targets ruling political parties in a multi-party Africa is critically warning. Therefore this article portrays the dilemma and fate of authoritarian China's strategic economic relations with pluralized Africa.

Literature Reviews
Schoeld defines pluralized democracies as one in which there are periodic elections and alternations between political parties in running government’s affairs. Pluralized democracy can either have two major political parties or more than two parties and diversified public (civil) voices, but the important point is that a single party does not stay in power for a guaranteed long and permanent period of time as it is for the case of authoritarian mono-party politics.

Michels [5] adds that under pluralized politics, political parties are ultimately vehicles to reflect the diversity of the country, to respond to voter expectations and help make citizens’ livelihoods better in practical ways. “It is the reason why this form of democracy is symbolized by the parties' alternations and contrasting voices on most of the decisions made by the ruling party or anyone who holds public account because the idea is to demonize the ruling party so that to make it lose next general election” [5]. Therefore, the argument put forward is; with multiparty politics isn't just about winning political elites or endorsements to guarantee investments security rather abiding to the established local rules and legal frameworks and seeking public engagements. This will clearly protect the investments against political populism, reneges and public discontents regardless the incumbent political party.

Indeed, while Leopold & Wafo [2] reveals how politics can be a real risk to investments especially when local politics are fragile or undergoes fluctuations and investors take less precautions and vigilances, Robock categorizes political risks into macro and micro dimension. “The former refers to the dimension of political risk that will affect all investment players in the host country or in a certain geographic region, while micro-political risk is firm-specific, meaning that it affects only a single firm or select group players”. This will definitely depends on the compliances and how individual firms secured their economic opportunities with regard to the laws of the land.

Whereas changes on ruling parties as anticipated by Leopold & Wafo [2] can be seen as a threat to investments especially those relies on particular regimes rather than rules, the struggle among political parties in clenching power in the country can be a threat to investments as it may lead to parties feuding with each other, raising senses of nationalism and resulting in inefficiency. Indeed, while Levitsky & Murillo [6] partly agree with pluralism politics in creating security for FDIs they also raise the issue of vitality of the political institutions especially in developing countries where pluralized democracy is still fragile. In their arguments they principally agree with Kohler [7] who argues that as multi-party politics becomes fragile also investments regulatory and checks institutions becomes weak.

Therefore the legal system doesn't work effectively and so in this case, the bureaucratic in charge of FDIs regulation and ruling classes may act as a rent seeking device working through red tape and other harassment tools. “These may result in questionability from the opposition political parties, civil societies and also the public as investments and economic potentials turn into a ground for personal gains and oppressions”[7].

Consequently; the proponent of free movement of capital and attracting foreign capitals such as Haglund and Smith tasked governments with the chore of setting good environments for attracting foreign direct investments (FDIs) at the same time making sure revenues and wellbeing of the citizens/majority is realized. On this, Dupasquier argue that there is a challenge with most of the emerging pluralized democracies whereby due to diverted public interests and gains from investments, budgetary and technical deficiencies, governments fail to invest and create necessary environment for accountability and holding multinational companies.

Therefore in pluralized democracies as Franck stipulates the mass media's role in monitoring the conduct of government officials and investors is vital in order to leap from FDIs as it is for civil societies which are considered to be an important mechanism of public oversight and accountability of government and state institutions. Indeed, a report by all party African parliamentary group shoes that many African parliaments are now more effective at shaping legislation, monitoring and challenging the executive, and representing citizens’ views though the challenges remain on insufficient constitutional and other provisions that continue to constrain oversight and watchdog institutions.

Given that pluralism democracy is tailored by Western powers, there are many efforts in funding and make various developing countries’ political and democratic institutions workable through capacity building, various accountability initiatives and signing accords such as Open Government Partnership (OGP), Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI), Publish What you Earn/Pay and so forth Schmaljohann, OECD, OGP [8-10]. While for China doing this (especially partnering with civil voices, opposition political parties and private press) is to infringe its long standing noninterference on countries’ internal affairs whereas it keeps ties with ruling political parties in pluralized and competitive democratic Africa, this article answers the questions to what extent is the mono-party authoritarian China’s strategizes in winning and securing investments in pluralized Africa? How effective are the strategies and what explain their success and uncertain?

Reflections on the research designs, methodologies and case selection
In addressing these explorative and analytic questions the article employs qualitative design whereas 26 respondents are purposely and through snow ball selected based on their expertise, experiences and positions they hold. Moreover, 73 articles, official documents and directives from Tanzania, China and Zambia are purposive and randomly featured to the article in response to various questions. The selected two countries of Zambia and Tanzania share some commonalities and differences in relations to political-economic of investments that gives distinct Sino-Africa economic relation experiences. However the unique feature is the 1,860 km long Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) built and financed by China from 1970-1975. The spirit of Pan-African socialism among the leaders
of Tanzania and Zambia and the symbolism of China’s support for newly independent African countries gave rise to TAZARA's designation as the “Great Uhuru Railway”, Uhuru being the Swahili word for Freedom. Indeed, while the then mono-party Zambia has been in a traditional and friendly ties with authoritarian China since 1960’s, the relationship was largely boosted by the close ties between the authoritarian mono-party China (Communist Party) with friend political parties of Union for National Independent Party (UNIP) under Kenneth Kaunda and the first multiparty regime, Movement for Multiparty Democracy under Fredrick Chiluba. However, with pluralized democracies and the alleged corruptions, public exclusion on investment benefits, personal gains and favoritism to Chinese investors by government officials, the 2006, 2008 and 2011 general elections were thrived with anti-Chinese investments. The late opposition leader Michael SATA of Patriotic Front party (PF) who later in 2011 became new president after defeating the CPC’s friend political party MMD changed some rules regarding Chinese investments. Some of the changed moves included threatening deportation of Chinese nationals and nationalizing Chinese companies that were welcomed by former regimes [11-14]. As the matter of fact; in 2013 during SATA’s presidency, Yamfwa Mukanga announced the cancellation of the Chinese owned copper mining Collum Company due poor safety, health and environmental record. Indeed, the current opposition parties led by United Progressive People (UPP) and United Party for National Development (UPND) still maintains anti-Chinese investments campaigns as their populism ground. For instance during the 2016’s general election Dr. Saviour Chishimba a presidential candidate for UPP campaigned to terminate the contracts that have been corruptly given to Chinese investors by PF party which currently has initiated ties with CPC as they have official exchanges and ties (Zambia Daily website on May 15, 2017 & Lusaka Times June 19, 2014). This creates the vicious circle of anti-Chinese rhetoric and political campaigns regardless the regime that comes into power. This has now forced current ruling PF party under President Edgar Lungu to take firm stands on matters concerning investments and irregularities. For instance, on June, 2017, there was a diplomatic row between Lusaka and Beijing over Zambia’s move to detain 31 Chinese nationals alleged to run copper mines and smelting plants without proper documents and employing children. “We are here to put an end to this criminality. Foreign investors who come into this country must work within the confines of the law. Those who break the law will be flushed out” Stephen Kampyongo, who is a Zambia’s minister of home affairs comments [14-19].

On the other hand; the milieu between Sino-Tanzania ties is not apart from that of China-Zambia relationship as it also evolves from political solidarity and socialism ideological affiliations before it moved to pragmatism but with one arm of party to party outreach. CPC establishes close relationship and friendship with the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere’s Tanganyika National Union (TANU) that changed its name to the Revolutionary Party – Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1977. CCM is the incumbent political party in Tanzania. Contrary to Zambia where the advent of multi-party system evidenced the fall of CPC’s friend political parties of UNIP and MMD and give challenge to Chinese investments on aligning with new political regimes especially since 2011 after PF came into office, in Tanzania ever since the introduction of multi-party system in 1992, CCM as the liberation party and friend to CPC has been ruling up to date. The relationship has been less strained on Chinese investments and economic interests to the country although the 2015 general election which saw President John Pombe Magufuli ‘The Bulldozer’ from the same CCM party taking office has posed a challenge on the previous political-economic of investments which favored China. For instance; the cancellation of a tender awarded to a consortium of Chinese railway companies led by China Railway Materials (CRM) to build a central corridor’s Standard Gauge Railways line (SGR) with a secured loan from China’s Exim Bank is a prickle to China-Tanzania bilateral relationship [20]. “The initial contract that was to be funded under the $ 7.9 billion fund from China’s Exim Bank had been awarded, but President Magufuli cancelled following irregularities and alleged corruptions. The Chinese Consortium was disqualified from re-entering the race” a Senior Government official who asked for anonymity comments in an interview with the East African Newspaper. Also in August, 2017 the Prime Minister Kassim Majaliwa when he was on official visit to Morogoro eastern region of Tanzania ordered the arrest and deportation of Chinese Nationals who were illegally running mines under the Chinese company Zhong Feng since 2010. Currently there is scrutiny on various deals made by previous governments as President Magufuli labeled the Corruption Fighter want thoroughly investigations and take legal actions against investments’ irregularities and corruptions.

Findings, analysis and discussion

The regulation and checks condition of Chinese investments in Tanzania

For more than two decades, Chinese companies have increased tremendously in terms of contractual activities, especially in construction. Since 2000 China has financed many projects in Tanzania including the 60,000-seater ultra-modern stadium in Dar es Salaam that cost US$ 34.24 million with China donating US$ 19.1 million; Rehabilitation of Amani Stadium in Zanzibar [21,22].

Chinese companies have emerged in many construction deals. According to information from the Tanzania National Roads Agency (TANROADS), in the past 10 years, more than 14 Chinese companies have entered 58 road construction projects of 3,140.85km long worth US$ 1.75 billion. Chinese investments in Tanzania have been growing rapidly. According to Chinese Ministry of Commerce website the total volume of Chinese investments in Tanzania have reached 4 $ billion. China stands as the largest trading partner of Tanzania.

However, in order to benefit from Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) and capital, Tanzania has established different regulatory institutions such as Tanzania Revenues Authority (TRA), Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC), Tanzania Minerals Commissioner's Office, National Environment Management Commission (NEMC) and Prevention and Combating Corruption Bureau (PCCP) and other with minor roles but directly responsible for creating suitable environment for investments [23]. Also, Tanzania is a signatory of several multilateral and bilateral agreements on protection and promotion foreign investments such as Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes –ICSID.

However, investments regulations in Tanzania start from the ministerial level where the above listed institutions have been established. The ministries that are direct linked with investments registrations and regulation are; Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Service and Good Governance and
Ministry of Tourism and natural resources. However; other ministries such as the Ministry responsible for Environment and ministry of home affairs, are also tasked with policies formulation, implementation and investments' sustainability.

Nonetheless, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NASACP - November 1999) for Tanzania and a 1996 Presidential Commission of Enquiry on Corruption (Warioba Commission) reveal the following chronic challenges to the investment registration and normalisation; greed and abuse of power; poor discipline; deficiencies in management systems, procedures and controls.

According to Sitta other weaknesses are; weak legal and judicial systems; weak oversight and watchdog institutions (among these, the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB), the Controller and Auditor General (CAG), Parliament, and the mass media); political interference; and low public awareness [24-28]. While there are various legal reforms in strengthening the capacity of these institutions such as the abolishing of Prevention of Corruption Bureau Act of 1991 to replace it by the current Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act of 2007 (PCCA) which renamed the PCB the "Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau" (PCCB), empowering the Auditor General Office in 2008 and running the program for legal sector reform, still these challenges prevail.

Articulately, the report of the body of experts on oversights shows that, the Tanzania Parliament has clearly defined powers of scrutiny and oversight and these are duly exercised in line with legislation. However, with the ruling party CCM holding a large majority in Parliament (More than 70 percent of all MPs) and with the exercise of internal party discipline very well established, the report concludes that "there is no real sense in which the Legislature can hold the Executive (Government of the ruling party) to account especially if the issues seems to halt the party's interests and core benefits" [29,30].

Indeed Eric Kabendera who is an analyst on Tanzania current affairs, shows that it is sometimes common for a Parliamentary oversight committee to be denied rights to contractual and investment information from the government despite of the privileges the legislative has. Kabendera points the case of a Parliamentary oversight committee on Public Accounts (PAC) which summoned the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC), a para-statal responsible for implementing petroleum exploration and development policies on behalf of the government, to provide it with the Gas pipeline construction contract signed with China Petroleum and Technology Development Company in 2013, but the corporation said that its parent Energy and Minerals ministry still had them in its possession. "Before the committee could summon the ministry to provide the contract, the Speaker's office reportedly intervened and halted the move" Kabendera says [31-33].

While the legislature seems to be restrained, Haapanen [11] portrays that the civil society is perceived as being quite active on social policy issues, but its impact is limited by organizational and capacity constraints. "They are perceived as having success in influencing gender rights and human rights, with less influence on transparency and building citizenry welfare, one of Tanzania's major challenges"[11].

With regard to the media, Dr. Ayub Rioba who is a lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam, School of Journalism and Mass Communication explains that, despite of the prior socialist ideologies, managerial and legal challenges that affect the media, in recent years the independent media outlets have managed to expose government dealings, smacking of corruption as well as direct corrupt practices [34].

"The most notable reports include the purchase of the radar system from BAE in the UK, purchase of presidential jet at inflated prices, privatization exercise in general and NBC in specific and IPTL power deal which continue to milk the tax payers" adds Dr. Rioba.

However Dr. Rioba points many challenges facing the Tanzania Press like lack of skilled journalists in many fields especially economics, inadequate funds to the media houses, low wages, lack of security when investigating serious frauds and poor legal system that limit freedom of accessing and disseminating information.

The Implication of fragile check institutions on Chinese investments

Chinese investors use a hands-on approach and reputation for 'getting things done quickly'. "The environment they meet whether in favor of few elites or top government officials instead of the entire public is okay for them".

Indeed scholars and analysts have demonstrated the quandary of weak political and regulatory institutions to the future of Chinese investments citing the tendency of host governments to ignore public interests and China's 'getting things done quickly' tendency. Yusuph Halimoja a columnist of Jamhuri newspaper in Tanzania explains that failure of the government to involve citizens in exploitation of their natural resources is sabotage and denying their power hence any stationed investment to their locality will definitely face resistances and be unsecured.

Halimoja points the confrontation and public anger on the 532 km natural gas pipeline linking the southern Tanzanian gas fields to the country's business capital city, Dar es Salaam – financed by the Chinese government-owned Export-Import Bank (Exim) to the tune of $ 1.2 billion [35-38]. Tanzanians from Southern Tanzania of Mtwara region for almost six months in 2013 demonstrated against the project and later they resolved to violence, destructions and attacking of Chinese nationals within the area. "The demands of the citizens were clear, the contract of the project was secret without clarity on the community benefits, rumored that few elites benefited from the deal and that the actual cost was inflated" Halimoja says.

Halimoja explains that; the government tried to use powers to force the project while it was smeared with secret and whether citizens are going to benefit remained unclear. Although the parliament, religious groups and opposition parties voiced the same citizenry concerns on this Chinese funded and built project still the government moved on with the project [39-40].

However, check and regulatory weaknesses aren't only witnessed to this secretly signed contract with China Petroleum and Technology Development Company, a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Company, but also politicians and analysts are raising concern over lack of policy continuity, legal and special policy frameworks to the industry where Chinese have invested.

Julius Mtatiro who is an acting Chairman of one of the major opposition party Civic United Front (CUF), reveals that while Chinese investors such as Exim Bank, China Petroleum and Technology Development Company have already invested to the gas and oil sector there was no specific policy guiding the industry. Furthermore Nape Nnauye who is one the vocal CCM MP from Mtwara questions the
utilization and benefits of the project and the gas in general as he sees no continuity on the national plans about the resource. "We in South of Tanzania gas and oil was said to be our savior...unfortunately this process is ill equipped...we don't know whether the project is still there or not...the government should tell us the truth whether the project is still there or not" Nnauye questioned the government in the parliament early 2017.

The regulation and checks condition of Chinese investments in Zambia

Zambia's trade volume with China has increased from US$100 million at the beginning of the 21st century to over $3 billion in recent years, according to Chinese Ambassador to Zambia Yang Yaunying to the interview with the Lusaka Times newspaper.

Some of the Chinese companies investing in Zambia include; NFC Africa Mining, the Zambia China Cooperation for Economic Development and the Jinchaun Mining Group. Others are; Zhougui Mining Group whose pledged investment is about US$ 5 billion to the project which mine copper and other minerals in North Western and Copper belt provinces and employ over 1,000 Zambians.

However, according to Kapembwa [12], Zambia has no specific “Policy” per se governing MNEs and FDI's as all the investments in Zambia are overseen by the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) that it means to spearhead all investment promotion and facilitation activities. "The agency is responsible of ensuring that the investment policy framework, macroeconomic policies, infrastructure and the costs of doing business are streamlined to levels that make the country's producers more competitive regionally and internationally".

Moreover, Kapembwa identify three agencies collaborate to oversee investments in Zambia; the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development that assumes primary responsibility for regulating the operation of mines [40]. It contains the Mines Safety Department, which monitors the health and safety performance of mining companies. In addition, two other state agencies play a significant role in regulating mining activities; Firstly, the Environmental Council of Zambia monitors the environmental impact of mining operations under the Environmental Prevention and Pollution Control Act of 1990 cap 204 which was amended to Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act, 1999 (Act No. 12 of 1999) and the current updates of Environmental Management Act, 2011 (No. 12 of 2011). Secondly, the Zambian Revenue Authority collects tax revenues from mine operators.

Notwithstanding, Kapembwa say that "These regulatory institutions are undermined by three key factors; first, they are persistently underfunded, resulting in a shortage of skilled inspectors workers, secondly, regulators rely on self-reporting by investors something halt revenues and perfection and finally, regulatory actions used to be subjected to veto act by the ruling party and corrupted by corruptions".

In describing the role of the parliament as the government oversight body; Sosthenes Banda who is an economist based in Lusaka says that, in recent days the body has formed grave oversight committees that are led by different political parties [41]. "Example the Public Account Committee (PAC) has been following closely investments and making sure they pay tax and comply with the law of land" Banda explains whilst points constraints such budget deficit, politicizing and conflicts between political parties and national interests.

With regard to the media and civil society as watchdog institutions, Banda see them as weak due to lack of understanding, lack of clear information from investors and the government also insufficient resources such as facilities, fund and trained personnel.

Implication of fragile check institutions on Chinese investments

The environment of the political-economic of investments shows Chinese investments in Zambia have suffered number of strikes and demonstrations that involves gunfire, injuries and killings. For instance, in 2005, an explosion at a company associated with China Nonferrous killed more than 40 workers, said Brighton Kateka, chief inspector of machinery at the Mines Safety Department, under Zambia's Ministry of Mines [42]. In 2006, six Zambians were shot and wounded by managers during a riot of mine workers at a Chinese owned Chambishi Mine. Five years later in 2011, Chambishi's shootout was repeated by another Chinese-owned company – Collum Coal Mine – when two Chinese managers at the mine shot and wounded 12 miners who were protesting against salary delays and poor working conditions. As not enough in 2012 Coal miners in Zambia killed one Chinese manager and injured another during a riot according to BBC report by Ryan Villarreal.

Many human right groups including local NGOs say that Chinese investors have held the worst record in terms of negligence and abuse of Zambian employees due to feeble government institutions. However, all these incidents didn't happen due to absence of knowledge of the law of the land or absence of regulatory and check institutions in place. As Joseph Katoma a Zambia member of parliament for Patriotic Front party said “The Chinese mine investors knew the right thing to do under the previous government but they took advantage of the weak and corrupt leadership of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) government".

Definitely the Patriotic Front government after ousting the MMD from office revised most of the terms and operations of Chinese investments in Zambia set by MMD. For instance the government set minimum wages for different work classes by 67% on average. This resulted to massive riots by Zambia employees to demand wage increment from Chinese owned enterprises that forced the Chambishi unit of China Nonferrous Metals to rehire 1,000 miners it had fired during a wage strike [43].

Moreover, safety regulators have hit the Zambian units of China Nonferrous with a series of fines for infractions and clashes with workers. Early on, miners lacked boots, goggles and ear protection, according to Kateka. "When the Chinese first came, they didn't know the laws of Zambia. We found it difficult to work with them. Sometimes political interferences favored them and haltered laws implementation" says Mr. Kateka, himself a former NFCA miner. Consequently; after criticisms to Chinese owned Collum Coal mine due to poor record on safety, health and environmental protection, the government of Zambia seized the company and took over operating control amidst fears of safety [44]. The Zambia's mining minister Yamfwa Mukanga, said Collum has a poor record on safety, health and environmental grounds. "Collum coal mine has failed to consistently provide employees with approved personal protective equipment," he said at a news briefing, citing, among other things, that the mine lacked any emergency facilities like ambulances or a first-aid station.
China’s strategies of securing investments

Foreign Diplomacy and Sino-Africa Policy

Condon [13] argues that mutual economic benefit and non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs is the main priority of Chinese involvement in Africa. This is China’s official policy statement, even if this means ignoring corruption and human rights abuses by the host regime as far as it results to cash flows. "China believes that its successful ‘growth at any cost’ strategy at home can be applied in Africa, and is not shy about it” [13].

Indeed, China choose not to be in direct or indirect involvement with local private media, civil societies and other pressure groups that stand as watchdogs and checks to the host governments on matters related to civil and political rights. As Condon [13] put it; “Chinese authorities have asserted that civil and political rights (CPR) should not be given primacy over economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR).

As many scholars such as Kapembwa [12] reveal, African leaders have chosen China as the reprise friend and partner after long pressure, strings and Western powers’ interventionism especially in curbing corruptions, adhering to civil and political rights and also upholding democratic governances.

On the other side, some analysts such as Iyasu [4] see China’s non-interference foreign policy as no longer sustainable in light of China’s growing economic importance to Africa and its emerging superpower status [45]. He argues that, the policy has allowed China to stay silent on major concerns in Africa, something that has led to open accusations from African analysts and activists.

“No doubt non-interference was a workable model when China’s economic interaction with the world in general and Africa in particular was at a minimal. With China’s status as a global power, its non-interference is not a policy befitting a global power with growing international responsibilities and obligations. Simply put, with power comes responsibility”[4].

Soft Power and Media Expansion

With the growing criticisms of Western media on Chinese investments’ human rights record and ignoring of good governance, in 2008 the Chinese communist party set $7 billion campaign as a bid to expand the country’s soft power strategy. This was based on the notion that biased Western news media and activists have painted a distorted portrait of China and the then President of China Hu Jintao insisted on the need to counteract the situation.

According to Andrew Jacobs an analyst based in Nairobi Kenya, the soft power approach insisted on media expansion within the region, foreign aid, business links, scholarships, academic institutes and training programs to majority of African students especially where China has direct interests like Zambia and Tanzania.

“At a time when most Western broadcasting and newspaper companies are retrenching, China’s state-run news media giants are rapidly expanding in Africa and across the developing world [46]. They are hoping to bolster China’s image and influence around the globe, particularly in regions rich in natural resources needed to fuel China’s powerhouse industries and help feed its immense population” Jacobs insists.

Indeed, Chinese media investors are gaining a bigger foothold across Africa. A Chinese company, Star Times, controls stake in Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation adding its presence to more than 13 other African countries including Zambia where also China opened the first overseas Bank of China branch. Chinese media expansion is also witnessed through the ‘going global’ by various state owned media although as Jiang, Li, Ronning & Tjonneland, Gagliardore, Repnikova & Stremlau [14] argues their level of global affections still unclear. For example the State-run radio broadcaster China Radio International (CRI), China’s leading English-language state newspapers (China Daily, people’s daily and Global Times), China’s state news agency, Xinhua along with its own television channel and CCTV-CGTN-Africa are stationing and lighting in Africa [47].

Nonetheless; Godfrey York argues that, while Western powers focus on empowering private media and so doing civil societies in the pursue to work as watchdogs and create checks and balances within government, Chinese actors prefer to frame their activities in the media sector as forms of collaboration and exchange with government actors, aimed at encouraging mutual understanding, strengthening diplomatic and economic ties, and at counterbalancing the negative reporting of both China and Africa in Western media [48].

“The fundamental difference is that Western-style media in Africa views itself as a watchdog and a protector of public interests, while the Chinese model seeks to defend the state from jeopardy or questions about its doings. The formula is a familiar one used widely in China’s domestic media. It leads to a tightly controlled pro-China message” says Douglas Farah. a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Washington.

Indeed Farah’s view affirms the stance of Hu Zhanfan, the former president of CCTV who views journalism as good mouth piece and a tool for propaganda. He regards a journalist who prefers professionalism instead of propaganda as one who lost identity and ready to betray his nation. “The first social responsibility and professional ethic of media staff should be understands their role clearly and being a good mouthpiece,” Hu adds.

Party to Party Outreach

The Communist Party of China (CPC) has maintained tie in a pragmatic way with ruling parties in both Tanzania and Zambia through exchanges, visits and both moral and material support. As Liu Yunshan, the retired member of the Politburo Standing Committee and head of Publicity Department of the CPC insisted to the meeting with Tanzania’s ruling party CCW top officials in June, 2012 that party-to-party exchanges have served as crucial basic and bilateral relations between Tanzania and China [49].

“The CPC values its ties with CCM and attaches great importance to jointly promoting the comprehensive development of China-Tanzania friendly cooperative relations” Yunshan.

For the case of Zambia there is a contentious on the party to party outreach program. CCP has been in friendly relation with the ousted ruling party Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) and the current regime under Patriotic Front party (PF) used anti-Chinese political campaigns such as nationalization of Chinese investments and threatening deportation of Chinese investors as they were called investors and not investors.

Joseph Katema a member of parliament for Patriotic Party who is now the Minister of Chiefs and Traditional Affairs accuses the former
ruling MMD party of benefiting from Chinese investments through funding political campaigns,-corruptions and weak leadership. Conversely, the PF party after coming into office; seems to make a U-turn with regard to relationship with CPC. While when it was in opposition benefited politically from anti-Chinese investments campaigns by criticizing the MMD relations with CPC; currently the PF is vying for strong relations with CPC whereas it is also criticized by the opposition UPP. "The CPC has valuable lessons to share with PF about the role of the political party in the service of the people." Says the then General Secretary Wynter Kabimba in a bilateral meeting with CPC delegates in Lusaka reported by Times of Lusaka on June 19, 2014.

However; Phiri Mkandawile an analyst based in Zambia argues that; mono-party China alignment with ruling parties in multi-part (pluralized) Africa is a good thing as it gets things done but it leaves questionable and political rooms to the opposition parties especially if there are irregularities or public dissatisfactions. "For aligning with ruling parties CPC/China already chooses to sideline the opposition and to the great extent civil voices, this turns the Chinese interests into political battle field" Mkandawile.

**Back door channels and Winning Elites**

Given the circumstances of investments’ regulatory and check institutions fragility Chinese investors as Beijing's policy seems to propagate, have also chosen to work with whatever the environment they meet. Indeed, more revealed in Zambia corruptions and rent seeking behaviors have forced Chinese investors to align with the situation with less consideration to the law of the land and moral business practices [50].

With regard to corruption and misconducts by Chinese investors, a Chinese analyst Yi-Chong (2014) reveals that it is a common and informal strategy to win investments and get things done by some of Chinese investors in Africa. For him this is due to Beijing's loosening control of overseas private investors and individual Chinese nationals as corruption is severely punishable in China.

On this; Chilufya Chileshe an analyst based in Lusaka Zambia from the Institute of Southern African International Affairs goes beyond by showing the risk of using bribery and corruptions by some Chinese firms as the means of winning business opportunities. He questioned the authenticity and durability of corruptly won deals as they are subjected to terminations, reneges and public exhaustion.

**Low Cost and Profit Maximization**

In his response, Yi-Chong points low cost in implementing projects as the strategy to attract host governments to sign deals with Chinese firms but which insists low laborers from China. This has been the reason for developing countries including Zambia and Tanzania to opt Chinese firms in many projects while Chinese have used this as impunity to avoid high cost and rightist laborers from host countries.

He adds that, in order to maximize profit Chinese investors are avoiding employing local people who seems to demand higher wages or cause strikes in working places. Instead they prefer Chinese contracted workers who are used to work under harsh conditions with low wages as they do back home.

"These contract workers are primarily from China's rural areas, with little or no education and no exposure to the outside world and unable to communicate with local people." Yi-Chong explains.

**China’s Strategies to Secure Investments**

**China’s extraordinary involvement with Zambia**

China’s relation with Zambia has passed through tough times due changes on ruling parties and also enactment of different rules of the game that resulted to changes on the political-economic environments [51]. However, with strategic interests to the region China applied pragmatic approaches to align with the new environments though findings envisage rough outcomes on Chinese investors within the country.

Sosthenes Banda an economic analyst says that after the 2011 general election in Zambia which saw the sweeping of 'all weather CPC's friends' UNIP and MMD the opposition Michael Sata from the Patriotic Front party won the election and because of his anti-Chinese campaigns many analysts expected that Chinese investors and in particular nationals would have been deported as he was referring them as investors and not investors.

"China was close to the previous ruling party MMD enough to threaten to cut diplomatic tie if PF was to come into office. And the expectation of many people is that Sata was going to deport Chinese but now it is different. After Sata took office Zhou Yuxiao (the then) Chinese envoy to Zambia was the first to pay Sata a congratulatory visit, and Beijing issued Sata an invitation for a state visit. Today you see many Chinese here than before" Banda explains while admitting fluctuations on the Chinese investments’ environment.

Apart from the courtesy visit to the state house by the Chinese envoy and special presidential invitation to Beijing that were considered as special strategy to clear the odd on Chinese investments to the region, many analysts unveil dramatic change of Beijing approach towards Lusaka that involved soft diplomacy.

According to Phiri Mkandawile who is an expert on political science, China organized number of banquet in which Chinese business men and Zambia officials attended, also during the 2012 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing, Sata was given special consideration to deliver a speech to the summit. Mkandawile also, reveals the remarkable increase of scholarships to Zambian students and signing of the common consensus between Beijing and Lusaka.

Nevertheless; despite of the extraordinary Sino-Zambia engagement and exchanges under PF party's government led by President Edgar Lungu, still the opposition UPP under Dr. Saviour Chishimba maintains anti-Chinese political campaigns and populism as it accuses Chinese of winning investment contracts corruptly. During the 2016 general election Dr. Chishimba promised to terminate Chinese investment contracts [52]. "Late Michael Sata spoke passionately against Chinese investment when he was opposition. But the Chinese Ambassador was the first official to be invited at the State House when PF won the 2011 elections...God willing when I become president, I am going to terminate the contracts that have been corruptly given to the Chinese investors" Dr. Chishimba who is a challenger to the current regime says to the interview with one of the local media outlet for the 2016 election campaigns.

**Sino-Zambia Specified Policy (Directives)**

Sino-Zambia political-economic relationship has many peculiarities that forced Beijing not only to redefine her approach but to the extent...
of threatening cutting diplomatic ties. Thanks to pragmatism and soften strategies taken by Beijing to defend interests.

For instance, in 2011 after serious calamities to Chinese investments in Zambia, China released a document that directed Chinese investors in Zambia to observe local procedures and operate in agreed code of conducts.

The document (policy) that was the response to secure investments in Zambia, gave the priorities related to workplace safety in the face of heavy criticism from civil groups inside Zambia. It also held responsible Chinese local managers for failures related to safety standards and security at their plants.

According to Haglund (2008), that is a general request for all the Chinese companies in Zambia by Beijing. Haglund quotes a Deputy CEO of Chinese NFC Africa, who said, "We have to follow (Beijing's) order to stay here, to take away less, and to give back more". That is a general request for all the Chinese companies in Zambia by the Chinese government. It is one of the six policies for all the projects and enterprises in Zambia.

Investments Bidding and Funds Securing

Funding of projects (investments) is another challenge affecting sustainability and security of Chinese investments in both Tanzania and Zambia. According to Chong [16] African governments due to financial deficits and unpredictability fail to pay their dues on time and sometimes cause losses to the investors or Chinese firms [53]. He adds that due to change of regimes the new government may not honor the previous deals as it was witnessed in Zambia through nationalization and hitting punishments on Chinese owned enterprises and discontinuing previous made deals in Tanzania.

In securing their investments and ensure sustainability "Chinese enterprises prefer not to bid for projects funded by host governments because if the host government funds the project, the date of payment is uncertain, especially when the ruling party changes and the new government may not honor the contract signed by the previous government" Yi-Chong explains.

With regard to bidding and winning tenders, Yi-Chong articulates that Chinese companies have been affected by late coming to the global economies and investments and some of them have been facing acute competitions and complications from the West including lack of tactics and lobbying strategies in fulfilling business demands. This has forced them to opt to bibles as the means to soften and acquire business opportunities in Africa.

Corporate Social Responsibilities (CSRs)

Bednarz reveals how Chinese enterprises have been using CSR in both Zambia and Tanzania to win public image (support) but with the earlier seems to benefit more due to different political economic of investments revealed earlier.

For instance NFCA, an enterprise in Zambia with the investment from CNMC, donated 86 million ZMK (about 30,000 USD) and 30 million ZMK (about 10,000 USD) to Zambia Copper Belt Province University and Kalulushi City Health Department, respectively. "This is another measure of NFCA to fulfill its social responsibility and benefit the local community".

Other Chinese enterprises with their fulfilled CSRs in brackets are; CNMC controlled Luanshya Copper Mines Ltd. (LCM) (Donated fertilizers and seeds worthy of US$ 5500 to farmers of Luanshya and Roan area), International Economic and Trading Co. Ltd (Financial contribution and established traffic command and rescue team) and NFCA has been engaged in promoting social and economic development of the local Zambian community including annual scholarships to 18 Zambian students.

In Tanzania fewer Chinese CSR are reported. This may be due to still existing favorable political economic of investments to Chinese compare to Zambia. However some Chinese companies have been donating and supporting various government run programs and institutions [54], For instance China Railway Group ltd. (CREC No. 7 Bureau) has delivered more than a thousand sets of bags, books and writing materials freely to the local schools and the general manager of Holley-Cotec, Mr. Lu Chun-ming, presented Duo-Cotecxin to the then President of Tanzania Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete.

Misplays of Chinese strategies and investors

Confucius ideas crushing with Pluralized democracies

Traditionally China has been found on the Confucius ideas and philosophies which emphasize leaders’ correctness and citizens should obey and follow whatever leaders decide. Chinese leaders and to be specific Chinese enterprises enjoys most social submission and unquestioning compliance back at home. Therefore as Gafu Yang an associate professor at LYG Teachers’ college Lianyunang, Jiangsu, China says, given its high power distance, in China, one has to employ honorifics when speaks to a superior or an elder.

Similarly, a Kenyan scholar Joseph Nyasani highlights that the traditional Africa used to embrace higher authorities or power. "Pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Africans were traditionally natural benign docility to higher authority or power. They were also enduring hospitality, friendliness, the consensus and common framework-seeking principle, ubuntu, and the emphasis on community rather than on the individual" Nyasani adds.

However, due to the introduction of pluralized democracies, the tale is different, freedom of expression and assembly are accentuated. Criticisms to the authorities and civil disobediences are now common [55]. Individual accumulation of wealth even diverting public deals for personal gains is now ordinary. These have also impacted political-economic of investments in Africa.

As a Chinese analyst Wang Xiaojuan says "Since gaining independence, most African countries have built multi-party democratic regimes; ruling and opposition parties compete to govern; power is balanced between government, parliament and the judiciary; federal and state governments vie for decision-making powers. State constitutions endow citizens with the rights of association, publication and freedom of speech. In addition, there are other domestic laws or regulations to protect citizens’ rights to establish labor unions and guarantee a minimum wages".

But for Chinese investors as Wang [17] argues they learn at home that you need to maintain good relations only with government, and rely on central and local governments to deal with the interest of different stakeholders and ensure everything goes smoothly. "They naturally apply that lesson to their work in Africa: even when faced with criticism from other political actors, they still hide behind their good relations with the local government. They believe that the government will speak on their behalf and make sure everything is fair."
But not all silence is golden. Often, Chinese companies’ lack of transparency and open communication, this simply gives opposition parties campaigning space” Wang [17].

Indeed; Cheng Cheng an associate research fellow with the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China reveals the menace of Chinese investors’ reliance on government and political actors instead of complying fully with laws and regulations and prioritize legal tools to protect company’s interests [56]. For him this needs to be done by avoiding partisan politics and avoid back-door deals that lead to political struggles. “They need to comply with laws and regulations and use legal tools to protect company’s interests…avoid back-door deals” writes Cheng.

Maltreatment of Media, CSRs and Public Relations

Haglund comes with the idea of ‘social contract’ for investors. By this he meant that it is not appropriate for Chinese investors to only seal deals with authorities in Africa and to be specific in Zambia and Tanzania without seeking social acceptance and approval. This should not be the responsibility of host governments alone but also of Chinese investors [57].

Indeed ‘Social Approval’ for investors apart from being realized through abiding with laws, traditions and customs where investments are stationed is also achieved through Corporate Social Responsibilities (CSR) and adhering to Public Relations.

However, Yi-Chong sees large SOEs especially central SOEs integrate ‘corporate social responsibilities’ (CSRs) into their missions and have policies about it. He argues that while to the larger enterprises the situation on CSR is at least welcoming, for the case of smaller public or private firms; as one Chinese foreign affairs official explained, ‘they are interested in quick money and not aspects such as CSR’. For the case of Zambia for instance, Chinese investors had to wait for Beijing to give directives on CSR incorporation in their business missions. This proves lack of knowledge on this important aspect.

Indeed, in the world of Public Relations and Corporate Social Responsibility there are right and wrong strategies. Right strategies achieve both internal and external harmonization of an enterprise while the other may either meet few objectives or neither all.

Phiri Mkandawile point a donation made by China Nonferrous Metal Mining (Group) Co. Ltd (CNMC) to “Ubutala Ubwa Bumi” (A Haven of Well-being) a charity organization of the then First Lady of Zambia Dr. Christine Kaseba at the State House of Zambia. In that ceremony the First Lady attended together with President of CNMC Mr. Luo Tao.

For him, this can be seen as good CSR but not directly aimed at achieving social acceptance/ contract [58]. “Normally local Zambians criticize authorities of granting tenders and contracts on natural resources corruptly and with less public involvement and gains, a CSR that target and benefits the same elites (authorities) seems to sideline the public again. It is a CSR of exclusion” he explains.

Similar comments on CSR and Public Relations have been given by Sauli Swai an analyst on Media Communications and CSR from Tanzania. He argues that Chinese enterprises in Tanzania have poor CSR and Public Relations and that have resulted to less information and service delivery to the public.

“We have been facing number of catastrophes here like floods; you see how the public is suffering from poor education facilities, health, lack of clean drinking water and so forth. We expect Chinese corporate companies to be in a frontline but it is not as we expect. Only; we see the same companies all the time, we rarely hear from Chinese firms” he adds [59].

With consideration to Public Relations which is a profession meant to create mutual trust and relationship between the enterprise and its internal and external publics; many analysts believe that it is achieved through proper utilizing of media while sticking on ethical standards of truthfulness, fairness and balancing interests.

However China’s strategy in utilizing media as a soft power to penetrate in Africa and to be specific in Zambia and Tanzania seems to take a contentious way which repel to the act.

Sauli Swai mentions unenthusiastic doings by Chinese enterprises and nationals in Tanzania and how local and Chinese affiliated media gave them less attention. “In recent years, though in a way not linked to China at large we have witnessed Chinese nationals caught involving in poaching of elephants and rhinos in Tanzania. We have witnessed those caught giving briberies and so forth” Swai adds whilst criticizing Chinese media such as CGTN Africa, CRI, Xinhua News Agency and People’s Daily for giving less coverage these incidents.

Furthermore; Chinese analyst Cheng writes that, though Chinese investments are enormously stationed in Africa as it is for the case of Zambia and Tanzania, is rarely to hear PR news and campaigns from them. He sees less cooperation between Chinese firms and local media as he vows for the need of Chinese companies in Africa to strengthen their sense of Public Relations and manage communications with the local media if they are to stay longer in African markets.

China’s party to party outreach policy, Pluralized Africa and regimes changes

The Communist Party of China’s relationship with ruling parties in both Zambia and Tanzania has served strategically in penetration and securing various economic opportunities [60]. And as revealed for the case of Zambia this political solidarity among ruling parties has served in favoring and waiving legal and institutional requirements for Chinese investors during MMD government. However; Gao Xiangyang who is a Deputy Director General of the African Affairs Bureau of CPC though she says that the CPC is strictly following key principles in its bond with political parties in other countries, she however, admits that the relationship between CPC and African political (ruling) parties suffered a jolt from the beginning of the 1990’s with the advent of multiparty democracy spurring on by the fall of the Soviet Union, which brought mixed reactions in China. “The misgivings were due to the fact that when parties with which the CPC had relations failed in elections, there were interruptions as the parties did not have understanding of the socialist ideals” Gao says.

However; the Zambian analyst Mkandawile utters that for a monoparty China to align with ruling or particular political parties in pluralized Africa is choosing to sidelines other political parties and to the great extent civil voices. This may force China to hold up regimes that stand on China’s interests and economic gains hence as Mariam [18] argues with this approach China may spurs suppression of democratic institutions and civil liberties by backing illegitimate regimes that don’t honor power successions and term limits.
The use of Chinese laborers and cultural incompatibility

Chinese enterprises use Chinese laborers to many projects and investments in both Zambia and Tanzania. Although this has been a concern to most of the researchers especially on the area concerning depriving local people employments, there are rising new concerns on cultural compatibility, language barrier, global exposure and low level of education to Chinese managers abroad not alone workers.

As Yi-Chong says “When small (Chinese) sub-contractors hire poorly-educated and poorly-paid workers and managers, who cannot integrate with local communities, it becomes a headache for the Chinese diplomats in host countries….These problems are not unique in these operations in Africa; they are serious problems in China too”.

He adds that “Cultural differences often exacerbate the tension; locals assume the highly disciplined Chinese workers in identical boiler suits, toiling day and night must be doing so under duress”.

Indeed, some Zambian Workers associations’ leaders say language gaps and culture clashes are as much to blame for labor frictions as wage differences. They see how Chinese works and supervise locals to the projects as strange and they are not used to as Sikufela Mundia, president of the National Union of Miners and Allied Workers was quoted “The way the Chinese work is a bit strange to us” [61].

Mundia said it is not only low wages that causes strikes and crushes between local workers and Chinese managers in Zambia rather cruelly treatment of employees and poor human resources management in general. “They (Chinese managers) seem to care less about employees, even when they complain of mistreatments and illness” he adds.

Profit maximization at the expense of humanity

However, the issue of human resources mismanagement like low wages and ignoring their wellbeing and even less CSR as discussed earlier is due to profit maximization and unregulated competition among Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and private firms as portrayed by Yi-Chong [16].

Yi-Chong sees the tendency of China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) to evaluate SOEs and their top managers based on their performance and profits as one of the sources of poor performance of Chinese Enterprises in host countries like Zambia as they only consider profits at any cost. “A large number of Chinese firms have fierce competition among them in infrastructure sectors and profit demands….this have created serious challenges for the Chinese government to regulate them at home and overseas” [16].

He adds that; “large group of small SOEs and private enterprises have brought into Africa fierce and unregulated competition and practices which are not acceptable in Western democracies and African countries. Tension therefore often arises between local people and these poorly regulated small enterprises”.

Beijing loosening control and monitoring of overseas enterprises

Though monitoring of investors is done by host governments must also be the duty of home governments (where investors come from) through their embassies as sometimes some of the players divert from country’s foreign policy and seriously affecting the image at the global level. However, as one the officials from China Development Bank who was quoted by Sun [14] in his project titled ‘Africa in China’s Foreign Policy’, “China's SOEs and other firms enjoy close connections with senior African officials, effectively evading monitoring and advice from the local Chinese embassy”.

Sun adds that even having the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce both serving the goal of China’s ‘Go Global’ policy, it has become difficult to make the Enterprises accountable adding that some larger SOEs are made even difficult to manage due to their high bureaucratic ranking and strong political backing from senior Chinese leaders at home [62].

Discussion and Conclusion

The option of both Tanzania and Zambia government to contract Chinese enterprises in extracting natural resources and run other public owned possessions recline on the principle that all the natural resources and wealth belong to common citizens. That means, while on one hand governments welcome investors from China, in democratic procedures however, citizens should decide and be involved in all stages concerning investments.

Unfortunately, as revealed in this article, both side hosts and some investors from China seem to overlook this principle and indeed public exclusion and resistances have been common. The article reveals that while Chinese investors managed to win economic opportunities in Zambia during MMD era, local people including civil societies, media and workers to Chinese investments were belligerent of poor wages, working safety, environmental degradation, corruptions and so forth. Despite of the concerns, still Chinese investments had impunity from the MMD government as the party to party outreach strategy softens the hard liners and responsible departments. However; the coming of Patriotic Front political party into office and sweeping away of the CPC’s friend party as revealed posed serious dilemma and forced for alterations. Nevertheless; while PF party came into office through anti-Chinese campaigns and attacking MMD for lawlessness and ties with CPC, now PF is attacked by the opposition politicians for the same misconducts and offering contracts corruptly. This poses endless rearrangement and policy shifts whenever the friend party to CPC is swept away from office. It calls for a need to revise this approach as in pluralized competitive politics there are ruling parties’ alternations hence for a mono party China this will either permanently be a thorn or needs for China’s affection and push for changes on governance model among world states.

But one thing the article has unveiled is that, while these Chinese investments’ host governments have established check institutions but lack strong regulatory, oversight and watchdog capabilities to hold accountable responsible rent seeking officials so that the public can gain from investments, the Chinese with the policy of non-interference on internal affairs have chosen to work with whatever the condition of the institutions whether accountable or not. For China to fund or even empower civil societies, private media and other private actors which are tasked to oversee and question irregularities of government doings is to intervene with internal affairs of a host country.

Historically, China and majority of African countries including Zambia and Tanzania originates from the same imperial domination bowels. However, while China managed to escape post imperial interventionism and enjoyed policy autonomies because of protectionism measures, Tanzania and Zambia suffered and even their current political and investment regulatory institutions are foreign tailored, funded and indeed some of them still immature and weak enough to hold multinational companies.
This is what make western powers put more emphasize on institutional capacity buildings in Africa on one hand while pushing their investments and one would expect China also to involve in this approach or in a collaborative way that strengthen institutional capabilities. This is because China is strong institutionally and economically therefore to deracinate these weak government and check institutions bear more positive image of friendship rather than to leave as they are and take advantage of them.

As China opts none interference on internal affairs by evading the role to empower oversight and watchdog voices whereas the Chinese enterprises have shirked CSR and PR records, mean choosing to invest in an already risky alarming environment. This is because these weak regulatory, oversight and watchdog institutions are constrained in executing their duties of regulating and hold to account investors and corrupt government officials something exclude the public from benefiting on natural resources and public wealth. Therefore; for the public to be sidelined from investment benefits and denied civil rights means rebellious eye on investments that are stationed in their localities.

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