Compositional Stochastic Model Checking Probabilistic Automata via Assume-guarantee Reasoning

Yang Liu, Rui Li

School of Information Engineering, Nanjing University of Finance & Economics, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210046, China

ABSTRACT

Stochastic model checking is the extension and generalization of the classical model checking. Compared with classical model checking, stochastic model checking faces more severe state explosion problem, because it combines classical model checking algorithms and numerical methods for calculating probabilities. For dealing with this, we first apply symmetric assume-guarantee rule (SYM) for two-component systems and symmetric assume-guarantee rule for n-component systems into stochastic model checking in this paper, and propose a compositional stochastic model checking framework of probabilistic automata based on the NLT algorithm. It optimizes the existed compositional stochastic model checking process to draw a conclusion quickly, in cases the system model does not satisfy the quantitative properties. We implement the framework based on the PRISM tool, and several large cases are used to demonstrate the performance of it.

1. INTRODUCTION

Formal verification can reveal the unexposed defects in a safety-critical system. As a prominent formal verification technique, model checking is an automatic and complete verification technique of finite state systems against correctness properties, which was pioneered respectively by Clarke and Emerson [1] and by Queille and Sifakis [2] in the early 1980’s. Whereas model checking techniques focus on the absolute correctness of systems, in practice such rigid notions are hard, or even impossible, to ensure. Instead, many systems exhibit stochastic aspects [3] which are essential for among others: modeling unreliable and unpredictable system behavior (message garbling or loss), model-based performance evaluation (i.e., estimating system performance and dependability) and randomized algorithms (leader election or consensus algorithms). Automatic formal verification of stochastic systems by model checking is called stochastic model checking or probabilistic model checking [4].

Stochastic model checking algorithms rely on a combination of model checking techniques for classical model checking and numerical methods for calculating probabilities. So, stochastic model checking faces more severe state explosion problem, compared with classical model checking [5]. There are some works to deal with this problem through bounded probabilistic model checking [6], abstraction refinement [7], compositional verification [8] and so on. The crucial notion of compositional verification is “divide and conquer”. It can decompose the whole system into separate components and conquer each component separately. The compositional verification techniques include assume-guarantee reasoning [9], contract-based methods [10] and invariant-based methods [11]. This paper focuses on assume-guarantee reasoning, which is an automatic method of compositional verification. To account for the relationship between the whole system and its different components, assume-guarantee reasoning gives some rules, which can change the global verification of a system into local verification of individual components.

Theoretically speaking, applying the assume-guarantee reasoning into stochastic model checking is a feasible way to solve the state explosion problem. There is some research work done in this direction [12–15]. We argue that applying the assume-guarantee reasoning into stochastic model checking should solve the following four issues, which is named as AG-SMC problem: (1) How to generate appropriate assumptions. (2) How to check the assume-guarantee triple. (3) How to construct a counterexample. (4) How to verify a stochastic system composed of n (n ≥ 2) components.

1.1. Related Work

According to the generation type of assumptions, we divided the existed work into two categories.

1.1.1. Manual interactive assumption generation

On the existing theory of Markov Decision Process (MDP) model of combinatorial analysis [16], Kwiatkowska et al. [17] first gives
out assume-guarantee reasoning for verifying probabilistic automaton (PA) model, including asymmetric assumption-guarantee rule (ASYM), circular assumption-guarantee rule (CRIC) and asynchronous assumption-guarantee rule (ASY). It solves the AG-SMC problem as follows: (1) It generates the assumptions through the manual interactive method. (2) In the triple of the form \( \langle A \rangle_{PA} M (P)_{PG} \) system model M is a PA, the assumption \( \langle A \rangle_{PA} \) and guarantee \( (P)_{PG} \) are probabilistic safety properties, represented by deterministic finite automaton (DFA). When system component M satisfies assumptions A with minimum probability PA, it will be able to satisfy property P with minimum probability PG. Checking the triple can be reduced to multi-objective model checking [18], which is equivalent to a linear programming (LP) problem. (3) It does not involve to construct the counterexamples. (4) It verifies a stochastic system composed of \( n \geq 2 \) components through multi-component asymmetric assume-guarantee rule (ASY-N). The core idea of ASYM-N rule is similar to CRIC rule, i.e., the component \( M_1 \) satisfies the guarantee \( \langle A \rangle_{PA} \), then the guarantee \( \langle A \rangle_{PA} \) as the assumption of the component \( M_2 \), let the component \( M_2 \) can satisfy the guarantee \( \langle A \rangle_{PA} \), ..., until the component \( M_n \) that satisfies the assumption \( \langle A \rangle_{PA} \) can satisfy the guarantee \( (P)_{PG} \). If all above-mentioned conditions hold, the entire system model \( M_1 || M_2 \cdots || M_n \) will satisfy the guarantee \( (P)_{PG} \).

1.1.2. Automated assumption generation

Bouchekir and Boukala [19], He et al. [20], Komuravelli et al. [21], Feng et al. [22] and [23] are the automated assumption generation methods for solving the AG-SMC problem. They can be divided into the following three kinds further.

1.1.2.1. Learning-based assumption generation

Based on the learning-based assume-guarantee reasoning (LAGR) technology and the ASYM rule proposed in Segala [16], Feng et al. [22] proposes L* -based learning framework for PA model, which can be used to verify whether the given PA model satisfies the probabilistic safety property. Feng et al. [22] uses the cases to demonstrate the performance of its method, including the client–server, sensor network, and the randomized consensus algorithm. For the AG-CSMC problem, Segala [16] can be specifically described in the following four aspects: (1) The weighted assumption can be represented by Multi-terminal Binary Decision Diagrams (MTBDD). Based on the L* learning algorithm, He et al. [20] proposes an MTBDD learning algorithm to automatically generate the weighted assumption, which is represented by a k-Deterministic Finite Automaton (k-DFA). MTBDD learning algorithm can make membership queries on binary strings of arbitrary lengths and answer membership queries on valuations over fixed variables by the teacher. (2) Through the weighted extension of the classical simulation relation, He et al. [20] presents a verification method of the assume-guarantee triple containing the weighted assumption. (3) Similarly to Feng et al. [22], He et al. [20] also constructs the necessary probabilistic counterexamples in the learning process through Han et al. [24]. (4) The verification problem of a stochastic system composed of \( n \geq 2 \) components is not solved.

Feng et al. [23] makes further research based on Feng et al. [22] and uses several large cases to demonstrate the performance of it, including client–server, sensor network, randomized consensus algorithm and Mars Exploration Rovers (MER). For the AG-CSMC problem, compared with Feng et al. [23] and Feng et al. [22], the contribution of Feng et al. [23] is reflected in the better solution of the first sub-problem and the solution of the fourth sub-problem, which will be illustrated in the following two aspects: (1) Feng et al. [23] compares the assumption generation process between the L* learning algorithm and the NL* learning algorithm, and finds that NL* often needs fewer membership and equivalence queries than L* in large cases. (2) Based on Segala [16], Feng et al. [23] uses the ASYM-N rule to propose a learning framework for compositional stochastic model checking, and uses it to verify the multi-component stochastic system. So far, in the learning-based assumption generation method, four sub-problems of AG-CSMC problem have been solved basically.

1.1.2.2. Symbolic learning-based assumption generation

One deficiency of learning-based assumption generation method is that the learning framework is sound but incomplete. Based on ASYM rule, He et al. [20] proposes an assume-guarantee rule containing weighted assumption for the first time, and provides a sound and complete learning framework, which can verify whether the probabilistic safety properties are satisfied on the MDP model. Through randomized consensus algorithm, wireless LAN protocol, FireWire protocol and randomized dining philosophers, He et al. [20] demonstrates the performance of its method. For the AG-CSMC problem, He et al. [20] can be specifically described in the following four aspects: (1) The weighted assumption can be represented by Multi-terminal Binary Decision Diagrams (MTBDD). Based on the L* learning algorithm, He et al. [20] proposes an MTBDD learning algorithm to automatically generate the weighted assumption, which is represented by a k-Deterministic Finite Automaton (k-DFA). MTBDD learning algorithm can make membership queries on binary strings of arbitrary lengths and answer membership queries on valuations over fixed variables by the teacher. (2) Through the weighted extension of the classical simulation relation, He et al. [20] presents a verification method of the assume-guarantee triple containing the weighted assumption. (3) Similarly to Feng et al. [22], He et al. [20] also constructs the necessary probabilistic counterexamples in the learning process through Han et al. [24]. (4) The verification problem of a stochastic system composed of \( n \geq 2 \) components is not solved.

In Bouchekir and Boukala [19], the method realizes automatic assumption generation through the Symbolic Learning-based Assume-Guarantee Reasoning technology, also known as the Probabilistic Symbolic Compositional Verification (PSCV). The PSCV method provides a sound and complete symbolic assume-guarantee rule to verify whether the MDP model satisfies the Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) property. It is a new approach based on the combination of assume-guarantee reasoning and symbolic model checking techniques. Bouchekir and Boukala [19] uses randomized mutual exclusion, client–server, randomized dining philosophers, randomized self-stabilizing algorithm and Dice to demonstrate the performance of its method. For the AG-CSMC problem, Bouchekir and Boukala [19] can be specifically described in the following four aspects: (1) Appropriate assumptions are automatically generated by symbolic MTBDD learning algorithm, and represented by interval MDP (IMDP), thus ensuring the completeness of symbolic assume-guarantee rule. Moreover, in addition, to
reduce the size of the state space, the PSCV method encodes both system components and assumptions implicitly using compact data structures, such as BDD or MTBDD. (2) Bouchekir and Boukala [19] uses the method in He et al. [20] to verify assume-guarantee triple. (3) To refine assumptions, the PSCV method [27] uses the causality method to construct counterexamples, i.e., it uses K* algorithm [28] in the DiPro tool to construct counterexamples, and applies the algorithms in Debbi and Bourahla [29] to construct the most indicative counterexample. (4) Verification of a stochastic system composed of \( n \geq 2 \) components is not involved.

1.1.2.3. Assumption generation based on abstraction-refinement

The method in Komuravelli et al. [21] is similar to Counterexample Guided Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR) [30]. It uses the Assume-Guarantee Abstraction Refinement technology to propose an assume-guarantee compositional verification framework for Labeled Probabilistic Transition Systems (LPTses), which can verify whether the given LPTS model satisfies the safe-PTCL property. Komuravelli et al. [21] uses the client-server, MER and wireless sensor network to demonstrate the performance of its method. For the AG-CSMC problem, Komuravelli et al. [21] can be specifically described in the following four aspects: (1) The method can use tree counterexamples from checking one component to refine the abstraction of another component. Then, it uses the abstraction as the assumptions for assume-guarantee reasoning, represented by LPTS. (2) It uses a strong simulation relationship to check the assume-guarantee triple. (3) The process of constructing tree counterexample can be reduced to check the Satisfiability Modulo Theories problem, and then solve it through Yices [31]. (4) It also verifies an \( n \)-component stochastic system \( (n \geq 2) \) by the ASYM-N rule.

1.2. Our Contribution

This paper presents some improvements based on the probabilistic assume-guarantee framework proposed in Feng et al. [23]. On one hand, our optimization is to verify each membership and equivalence query, to seek a counterexample, which can prove the property is not satisfied. If the counterexample is not spurious, the generation of the assumptions will stop, and the verification process will also terminate immediately. On the other hand, a potential shortage of the ASYM displays that the sole assumption A about \( M \) is present, but the additional assumption about \( M \) is nonexistent. We thus apply the SYM rule to the compositional verification of PAs and extend the rule to verify an \( n \)-component system \( (n \geq 2) \). Through several large cases, it is shown that our improvements are feasible and efficient.

1.3. Paper Structure

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the preliminaries used in this paper, which include PAs, model checking and the NL* algorithm. Section 3 presents a compositional stochastic model checking framework based on the SYM rule and optimizes the learning framework. Then, the framework is extended to an \( n \)-component system \( (n \geq 2) \) in Section 4. Section 5 develops a prototype tool for the framework, and compares it with Feng et al. [23] by several large cases. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and presents direction for future research.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. Probabilistic Automata

Probabilistic automata [3,17,32,33] can model both probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior of systems, which is a slight generalization of MDPs. The verification algorithms for MDPs can be adapted for PAs.

In the following, \( \text{Dist}(V) \) is defined as the set of all discrete probability distributions over a set \( V \). \( \eta \) is defined as the point distribution on \( v \in V \). \( \mu_1 \times \mu_2 \in \text{Dist}(V_1 \times V_2) \) is the product distribution of \( \mu_1 \in \text{Dist}(V_1) \) and \( \mu_2 \in \text{Dist}(V_2) \).

Definition 1. (probabilistic automaton) A probabilistic automaton (PA) is a tuple \( M = (V, \tau, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \delta, L) \) where \( V \) is a set of states, \( \tau \in V \) is an initial state, \( \alpha_1 \) is an alphabet for all the action, \( \delta \subseteq V \times (\alpha_1 \cup \{\tau\}) \times \text{Dist}(V) \) is a probabilistic transition relation. \( \tau \) is an invisible action, and \( L : V \rightarrow 2^{\alpha_2} \) is a labeling function mapping each state to a set of atomic propositions taken from a set \( \alpha_2 \).

In any state \( v \) of a PA \( M \), we use the transition \( v \xrightarrow{\alpha} v' \) to denote that \((v, \alpha, \mu) \in \delta\), where \( \alpha \in \alpha_1 \cup \{\tau\} \) is an action label. \( \mu \) is a probability distribution over state \( v \). All transitions are nondeterministic, and it will make a random choice according to the distribution \( \mu \).

A trace through \( M \) is a (finite or infinite) sequence \( v_0 \rightarrow v_1 \rightarrow v_2 \rightarrow \cdots \) where \( v_0 = \tau \), and for each \( i \geq 0 \), \( v_i \xrightarrow{\alpha} v_i+1 \) is a transition and \( \mu_i(v_i) > 0 \). The sequence of actions \( \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1}, \ldots \), after removal of any \( \tau \), from a trace \( t \) is also called a path. An adversary \( \sigma \) is sometimes referred to as scheduler, policy, or strategy, which maps any finite path to a sub-distribution over the available transitions in the last state of the path. This paper focuses on finite-memory adversaries, which store information about the history in a finite-state automaton (see Baier and Katoen [3] Definition 10.97; pp. 848). We define \( \text{Trace}_M^\sigma \) as the set of all traces through \( M \) under the control of adversary \( \sigma \) and \( \text{Ad}_{\alpha_i} \) as the set of all potential adversaries for \( M \). For an adversary, we define a probability space \( \text{Pr}_M^\sigma \) on \( \text{Trace}_M^\sigma \), and the probability space can know the probability of the adversary \( \sigma \).

Definition 2. (Parallel composition of PAs) If \( M_i = (V_i, \tau_i, \alpha_{i1}, \alpha_{i2}, \delta_{iL}) \) and \( M_j = (V_j, \tau_j, \alpha_{j1}, \alpha_{j2}, \delta_{jL}) \) are PAs, then their parallel composition is denoted as \( M = [M_i|M_j] \). It is given by the PA \((V_i \times V_j, \tau, \alpha_i, \alpha_j, \delta_{iL} \cup \delta_{jL}, L) \) where \( \delta_{iL} \cup \delta_{jL} \) is defined such that \((v_i, v_j) \xrightarrow{\alpha} \mu_i \times \mu_j \) if and only if one of the following holds:

\[
\begin{align*}
 v_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha} \mu_1, v_2 \xrightarrow{\mu_2} \mu_2 \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha \in \alpha_{i1} \cap \alpha_{j1} \quad (1) \\
 v_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha} \mu_1, \mu_2 = \eta_i \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha \in \alpha_{i1} \cap \alpha_{j1} \cup \{\tau\} \quad (2) \\
 v_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha} \mu_2, \mu_1 = \eta_j \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha \in \alpha_{i1} \cup \alpha_{j1} \cup \{\tau\} \quad (3) \\
 \text{and} \\
 L(v_i, v_j) = L_i(v_i) \cup L_j(v_j) \quad (4)
\end{align*}
\]

Definition 3. (Alphabet extension of PA) For any PA \( M = (V, \tau, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \delta, L) \) and set of actions \( y \), we extend the alphabet of \( M \) to
y, denoted \( M[y] \), as follows: \( M[y] = (V, \bar{\nu}, \alpha_M \cup y, \delta_{M[y]}) \) where \( \delta_{M[y]} \) is a probabilistic transition relation on \( M[y] \), and \( \delta_{M[y]} = \delta_M \cup \{(v, \alpha, \eta) | v \in V \land \alpha \in y \langle M \rangle \} \).

For any state \( v = (v_1, v_2) \) of \( M[|M|] \), the projection of \( v \) on \( M \), denoted by \( v \langle M \rangle \). Then, we extend it to distributions on the state space \( V \times V \) of \( M[|M|] \). For each trace \( t \) on \( M[|M|] \), the projection of \( t \) on \( M \), denoted by \( t \langle M \rangle \), i.e., the trace can be acquired from \( M \) by projecting each state of \( t \) onto \( M \) and removing all the actions not in the alphabet \( \alpha_M \).

**Definition 4.** (Adversary projections) Let us suppose that \( M_1 \) and \( M_2 \) are PAs, \( \sigma \) is an adversary of \( M_1 \). The projection of \( \sigma \) on \( M_1 \) is denoted as \( \sigma \langle M_1 \rangle \), which is the adversary on \( M_1 \) for any finite trace \( t_1 \) of \( M_1 \), \( \sigma \langle M_1 \rangle \langle t_1 \rangle \) equals:

\[
\sum |Pr^\sigma(t) \cdot \sigma(t) | t \in \text{Trace}_{M_1,M_2} \land t \langle M_1 \rangle = t_1 \land \mu \langle M_2 \rangle = \mu_1 |
\]

(5)

### 2.2. Model Checking for Probabilistic Automata

Here, we concentrate on action-based properties over PAs, defined regarding their traces. In essence, we use regular languages over actions to describe these properties. A regular safety property \( P \) signifies a set of infinite words \( \omega \), the usual notation is \( L(P) \), that is represented by a regular language of bad prefixes, because its finite words any (possibly empty) extension is not in \( L(P) \). Formally, we describe that set for \( P \) by a DFA \( P_\omega = (V, \bar{\nu}, \alpha_\omega, \delta_\omega, F) \), \( V \) is a set of states, \( \bar{\nu} \in V \) is an initial state, \( \alpha_\omega \) is an alphabet, transition function \( \delta_\omega: V \times \alpha_\omega \rightarrow V \land \text{a set of accepting states } F \subseteq V \), which can store the set of bad prefixes of infinite words \( \alpha_\omega \). Formally, a regular safety language \( L(P) \) is defined as:

\[
L(P) = \{ \omega | \omega \in \alpha_\omega \} \text{no prefix of } \omega \text{ is in } L(P_\omega) \}
\]

(6)

Provided a PA \( M \) and regular safety property \( P \), alphabet \( \alpha \subseteq \alpha_\omega \), an infinite trace \( t \) of \( M \) satisfies \( P \), denoted \( t \models P \), if and only if \( t \nmid \alpha_\omega \in L(P) \). For a finite trace \( t' \) of \( M \), if some infinite traces \( t \) of which \( t' \) is a prefix satisfies \( P \), we denote as \( t \models P \). For an adversary \( \sigma \in Adv_M \), we define the probability of \( M \) under \( \sigma \) satisfying \( P \) as:

\[
Pr^\sigma_{M}(P) \triangleq Pr^\sigma_{M} \{ t \in \text{Trace}_{M,M} | t | P \}
\]

(7)

That is to say \( Pr^\sigma_{M}(P) \) indicates the probability of a corresponding trace \( t \) (the trace \( t \) is included by the component \( M \) under adversary \( \sigma \) and satisfies the property \( P \)).

Next, we define the minimum probability of satisfying \( P \) as:

\[
Pr^{min}_{M}(P) \triangleq \inf_{\sigma \in Adv_M} Pr^\sigma_{M}(P)
\]

(8)

\( \inf_{\sigma \in Adv_M} Pr^\sigma_{M}(P) \) denotes that \( P \) of infimum is taken over by all adversaries \( \sigma \) for \( M \).

A probabilistic safety property \( P \) contains a safety property \( P \) and a sound probability bound PG. For example, the probability of a success happening is at least 0.98. We have a PA \( M \) satisfies this property, denoted \( M = (P)_{\omega} \), if and only if the probability of satisfying \( P \) is at least PG for any adversary:

\[
M \models (P)_{\omega} \iff \forall \sigma \in Adv_M \cdot Pr^\sigma_{M}(P) \geq PG \iff Pr^{min}_{M}(P) \geq PG
\]

(9)

According to the above formulae, the verification of a probabilistic safety property \( P \) on a PA \( M \) can be transformed into calculation of the minimum probability \( Pr^{min}_{M}(P) \), i.e., we should calculate the maximum probability of reaching a set of accepting states in the product of \( M \otimes P_\omega \) (see Kwiatkowska et al. [33] Definition 6 for details), where the DFA \( P_\omega \) represents the safety property \( P \). In fact, a finite-memory adversary is necessary, because such an adversary always exists, which leads to \( Pr^\sigma_{M}(P) = Pr^{min}_{M}(P) \). Particularly, this extreme case also holds:

\[
M \models (P)_{\omega} \iff \forall t \in \text{Trace}_M \cdot t | P
\]

(10)

**Definition 5.** (Assume-guarantee triple) If \( (A)_{\omega_{PA}} \) and \( (P)_{\omega_{PG}} \) are probabilistic safety properties, a PA and alphabet \( \alpha \subseteq \alpha_\omega \), \( \sigma \) then:

\[
(A)_{\omega_{PA}} \cdot (P)_{\omega_{PG}} \iff \forall \sigma \in Adv_M[\alpha]\}

(11)

\[(Pr^\sigma_{M}[\alpha]\cdot) \geq \text{PA} \Rightarrow Pr^{\sigma}_{M}(P) \geq \text{PG})
\]

where \( (A)_{\omega_{PA}} \) is also called as assumption and \( M[\alpha] \), as is described in Section 2.1, \( M \) with its alphabet extended to include \( \alpha_\omega \).

Determining whether an assume-guarantee triple holds can reduce to multi-objective probabilistic model checking [18,33]. In the absence of an assumption (denoted by (true)), checking the triple can reduce to normal model checking:

\[
\{\text{true}\}.M(P)_{\omega_{PG}} \models M \models (P)_{\omega_{PG}}
\]

(12)

### 2.3. NL* Learning Algorithm

The NL* Learning algorithm [34] is a popular active learning algorithm (since they can ask queries actively) for Residual Finite-State Automata (RFSA) [35,36]. It is developed from L* algorithm, and has some similar features with L* algorithm. It also needs an automaton to accept each unknown regular language, and a Minimally Adequate Teacher (MAT) to answer membership and equivalence queries.

Generally, the RFSA may generate extra nondeterministic choices in the product PA [37] and it is a subclass of Nondeterministic Finite-state Automata (NFA). So, we must transform NFA A into a corresponding DFA A through the standard subset construction algorithm [38]. Although we cannot acquire more succinct assumptions because of the transform step, NL* algorithm may have a faster learning procedure than L* algorithm [23].

### 3. ASSUME-GUARANTEE REASONING WITH SYM RULE

#### 3.1. Symmetric Rule

At present, compositional stochastic model checking is implemented based on the ASYM [22,23,33,39], which can generate the corresponding assumption for only one component of the system. We present the SYM for the compositional stochastic model checking PAs.
Theorem 1. Let us suppose that $M_i, M_j$ are PAs and $(A_{M_i})_{22PA_{M_i}}$, $(A_{M_j})_{22PA_{M_j}}$ (P) are probabilistic safety properties. Respectively, their alphabets satisfy $\alpha_{M_i} \subseteq \alpha_{M_i}$, $\alpha_{M_j} \subseteq \alpha_{M_i}$ and $\alpha_p \subseteq \alpha_{M_j} \cup \alpha_{M_i}$. co($A_{M_i})_{22PA_{M_i}}$ denote the co-assumption for $M_i$, which is the complement of $(A_{M_i})_{22PA_{M_i}}$, similarly for co($A_{M_j})_{22PA_{M_j}}$ the following SYM rule holds:

1: \( \left\langle A_{M_i} \right\rangle_{22PA_{M_i}} M_i \{P\} \}_{P_{22PG}} \)
2: \( \left\langle A_{M_j} \right\rangle_{22PA_{M_j}} M_j \{P\} \}_{P_{22PG}} \)
3: \( L(\text{co}(A_{M_i})_{22PA_{M_i}} \parallel \text{co}(A_{M_j})_{22PA_{M_j}}) = \emptyset \)
4: \( \text{true} M_i \parallel M_j \{P\} \}_{P_{22PG}} \)

Theorem 1 indicates that, if each assumption about corresponding component can be acquired, we will be able to decide whether the property $(P)_{22PG}$ holds on $M_i\parallel M_j$. The particular interpretation of Theorem 1 is shown below.

The meaning of the premise 1 is “whenever $M_i$ satisfies $A_{M_i}$ with probability at least $PA_{M_i}$, then it will satisfy $P$ with probability at least $PG$”, $(A_{M_i})_{22PA_{M_i}}$ also indicates these traces with probability at least $PA_{M_i}$ in $A_{M_i}$. So it can be represented by $\left\langle A_{M_i} \right\rangle_{22PA_{M_i}}$ (see Section 2.2). The premise 2 is similar to the premise 1.

In the premise 3, the assumption and its complement have the same alphabet. There is no common trace in the composition of the co-assumptions. Note that co($A_{M_i}$)$_{22PA_{M_i}}$ (i.e., $(A_{M_i})_{22PA_{M_i}}$) can be represented by $\left\langle A_{M_i}^{err} \right\rangle_{22PA_{M_i}}$.

So an infinite trace can be accepted by $L(co(A_{M_i})_{22PA_{M_i}} \parallel co(A_{M_j})_{22PA_{M_j}})$, which can convert into a prefix of the infinite trace is not accepted by $L(\left\langle A_{M_i}^{err} \right\rangle_{22PA_{M_i}} \parallel \left\langle A_{M_j}^{err} \right\rangle_{22PA_{M_j}})$.

Proof of Theorem 1. We provide the proof of Theorem 1 in the following. This requires Lemma 1, which derives from Kwiatkowska et al. [33].

**Lemma 1.** Let us suppose that $M_i, M_j$ are PAs, $\sigma \in \text{Adv}_{M_i\parallel M_j}$, $\gamma \subseteq \alpha_{M_i\parallel M_j}$ and $i = 1, 2$. If $A$ is regular safety properties such that $\alpha_{M_i} \subseteq \alpha_{M_i\parallel M_j}$, then:

$$\text{Pr}_{M_i\parallel M_j}^\sigma(A) = \text{Pr}_{M_j}^{\sigma_{M_i\parallel M_j}}(A)$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

Proof (of Theorem 1). The proof is by contradiction. Assume that the premise 1, 2 and 3 hold, but the conclusion does not. Since $M_i\parallel M_j \not\equiv (P)_{22PG}$ we will be able to find an adversary $\sigma \in \text{Adv}_{M_i\parallel M_j}$ such that $\text{Pr}_{M_i\parallel M_j}^\sigma(P) < PG$. Now, it follows that:

$$\text{Pr}_{M_i\parallel M_j}^\sigma(P) < PG$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

By Lemma 1 since $\alpha_p \subseteq \alpha_{M_j} \cup \alpha_{M_i} \subseteq \alpha_{M_i\parallel M_j}$,

$$\Rightarrow \text{Pr}_{M_i\parallel M_j}^{\sigma_{M_i\parallel M_j}}(P) < PG$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

by the premise 1 and Definition 5

$$\forall \sigma \in \text{Adv}_{M_i\parallel M_j},$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)

$$\left(\text{Pr}_{M_i\parallel M_j}^{\sigma_{M_i\parallel M_j}}(A_{M_i}) \geq PA_{M_i}\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

$$\Rightarrow \text{Pr}_{M_i\parallel M_j}^{\sigma_{M_i\parallel M_j}}(P) \geq PG$$

by modus tollens since (15) and (16)

$$\Rightarrow \text{Pr}_{M_i\parallel M_j}^{\sigma_{M_i\parallel M_j}}(A_{M_i}) < PA_{M_i}$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)

Similarly

$$\text{Pr}_{M_i\parallel M_j}^{\sigma_{M_i\parallel M_j}}(A_{M_j}) < PA_{M_j}$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)

Our assumption contradicts (19), so this adversary $\sigma$ is nonexistent. Next, we will use a simple example to illustrate the rule (taken from Kwiatkowska et al. [33]).

**Example 1.** Figure 1 shows two PAs $M_i, M_j$. The switch of a device $M_i$ is controlled by a controller $M_j$. Once the emergence of the detect signal, $M_i$ can send a warn signal before the shutdown signal, but the attempt may be not successful with probability 0.2. $M_j$ issues the shutdown signal directly, this will lead to the occurrence of a mistake in the device $M_i$ with probability 0.1 (i.e., $M_i$ will not shut down correctly). The DFA $P_{err}$ indicates that action fail never occurs. We need to verify whether $M_i\parallel M_j = (P)_{22PG}$ holds.

For checking whether $(\text{true})M_i\parallel M_j \not\equiv (P)_{22PG}$ holds, we use the rule (SYM) and two probabilistic safety properties $(A_{M_i})_{22PA} \parallel M_j$ and $(A_{M_j})_{22PA} \parallel M_i$ (see Section 3.2 for details) as the assumptions about $M_i, M_j$. They are represented by DFA $A_{M_i}^{err}$ and $A_{M_j}^{err}$ in Figure 2 (since alphabet $\alpha_{M_i}$ same as $\alpha_{M_j}$, $A_{M_i}^{err}$ is also same as $A_{M_j}^{err}$). Note that only state $a_i$ is in the set of accepting states $F$ (see Section 2.2) and indicates that the safety property $P$ is violated.

![Figure 1](attachment:image.png)

**Figure 1** (a) Probabilistic automata $M_i$, (b) probabilistic automata $M_j$ and (c) DFA $P_{err}$ for the safety property $P$. 

We can compute the probability of $A_M$ and $A_M'$ in the premise 1 and 2, because we can solve these queries: $(A)_{\exists a_2} M(P)_{\exists a_2}$ and $(A)_{\exists a_2} M(P)_{\exists a_2}$ through multi-objective model checking, as shown in Etessami et al. [18] and Kwiatkowska et al. [33]. Actually, if there exists any adversary of the component $M$ that satisfies the strongest assumption $(A)_M$, but violates the probabilistic safety property $(P)_{\exists a_2}$, the interval $I_w$ will be empty in the second question.

Through premise 3, in $\langle A''_{M_1} \rangle_{s_{a_2}}$, we can find a counterexample $\text{cex}(0.2,\ \text{shutdown})$, but corresponding counterexample in $\langle A''_{M_1} \rangle_{s_{a_2}}$ is nonexistent (since action fail exists). So prefixes of all infinite traces in $\langle A''_{M_1} \rangle_{s_{a_2}}$, can be accepted by $L(\langle A''_{M_1} \rangle_{s_{a_2}})$ and we can think $M_1 || M_1 \models (P)_{\exists a_2}$ holds. Note that if a trace in $\langle A''_{M_1} \rangle_{s_{a_2}}$ corresponding to multiple traces in $M_1$, we give preference to the trace with action fail. Besides, we can find that the trace (shutdown) is a prefix of (shutdown, warn), (shutdown, shutdown) and (shutdown, off), so there is no need to consider for the last three traces.

### 3.2. Improved Learning Framework for SYM Rule

Inspired by assume-guarantee verification of PAs [23], we propose an improved learning framework that generates assumptions for compositional stochastic model checking two-component PAs with SYM. The inputs are components $M_1$, $M_2$, a probabilistic safety property $(P)_{\exists a_2}$ and the alphabets $\alpha_{a_2}$, $\alpha_{a_3}$. The aim is to verify whether $M_1 || M_2 \models (P)_{\exists a_2}$ by learning assumptions. If these assumptions exist, it can conclude that the $(P)_{\exists a_2}$ holds on the system $M_1 || M_2$. It outperforms [23] in cases the model does not satisfy the properties. Essentially, the original learning framework [23] only searches a counterexample after the conjectured assumption generation. Our method is to search a counterexample in each membership and equivalence query to prove $M_1 || M_2 \not\models (P)_{\exists a_2}$.

#### 3.2.1. Overview

The NL*-based learning framework for compositional stochastic model checking with rule SYM is shown in Figure 3. Here, the MAT first answers a membership query: whether a given finite trace $t_i$ should be included in the assumption $A_{M_i}$. If $t_i$ is not in the assumption $A_{M_i}$, we will try to find corresponding traces in $M_i$ and $M_i'$ if their probability violates the probabilistic safety property $(P)_{\exists a_2}$, $t_i$ will be not a spurious counterexample. We can think the model does not satisfy the property, otherwise continue to answer the next membership query after checking until the appearance of a conjectured assumption $A_{M_i}$. Then, the MAT answers an equivalence query.

Through a multi-objective model checking technique [18,33], we can calculate the probability of a conjectured assumption, which is an interval $I_{t_i}$. If $I_{t_i}$ is an empty interval, the framework will construct a probabilistic counterexample $\text{cex}(\sigma, w, c)$. $\sigma$ is an adversary for $M_i$ with $Pr_{\sigma}(P) < PG$. $w$ is a witness for $(A_{M_i})_{\exists a_2}$ ($PA_{M_i}$ is a lower bound of the interval $I_{t_i}$) in $M_i[\alpha_{a_2}]$, i.e., a set $w$ of infinite traces in $M''_{i}$ is defined as $Pr(w) \geq PA_{M_i}$ and $t_i \uparrow_{\exists a_2} \models A_{M_i}$ for all $t_i \in w$. A set $c$ of finite traces in $M''_{i}$ (i.e., $M''_{i,<}$) such that $Pr(c) > 1 - PG$ and $t_i \uparrow_{\exists a_2} \not\models P$ for all $t_i \in c$. In short, probabilistic counterexamples are more complex than nonprobabilistic counterexamples. More details are provided in Feng et al. [22] and Ma et al. [40]. Next, we must check whether the appearance of a trace $t_i$ in the probabilistic counterexample $\text{cex}(\sigma, w, c)$ causes the violation of $(P)_{\exists a_2}$ on $M_i || M_2$. If the trace exists, the execution of the learning algorithm will be terminated.

Otherwise, the learning algorithm will refine the original conjecture and generate a new assumption. When all the conjectured assumptions are successful to be generated, we judge whether there exists any common trace that can be accepted by $L(co(A_{M_1}), |co(A_{M_2})|)$. It requires us to do Counterexample Analysis. If counterexample does not exist, we can conclude that $M_1 || M_2 \not\models (P)_{\exists a_2}$.

On the contrary, we need to check whether it is a spurious counterexample, let the conjectured assumption becomes stronger than necessary. If the spurious counterexample exists, the conjectured assumption must be refined once again. When the conjectured assumption is updated, the framework will return a lower and an upper bound on the minimum probability of safety property $P$ holding. This measure means that it can provide some valuable information to the user, even if the framework could not produce an accurate judgment. More details are described in the following sections.

#### 3.2.2. Answering membership queries

Minimally adequate teacher is responsible for the membership queries, i.e., checking $t_i \models M_1 || M_2 \models (P)_{\exists a_2}$, $t_i$ represents the trace in which each transition has probability 1. If trace $t_i \models M_1 || t_i \models M_2$ and $t_i \uparrow_{\exists a_2} = t_i$, then $P_1$ and $P_2$ are the probability of trace $t_i$ and $t_i$ respectively. If the trace $t_i$ or $t_i$ has action fail and $P_1 \cdot 1 > 1 - PG$ (i.e., $\langle P_1 \rangle_{\exists a_2}$), $t_i$ will not be included in assumption $A_{M_1}$, and it will be in $A''_{M_1}$. Then, we use $t_i$ to verify $c \in L(M_1 || M_2)$. If $P_1 \cdot P_2 > 1 - PG$, $t_i$ will be the counterexample $c$ of $L(M_1$). We define $\text{cex}(\sigma', c')$ as a probabilistic counterexample trace, and $\text{cex}(\sigma', c') = \text{cex}(P_1 \cdot P_2, c')$. If $t_i$ is the counterexample $c$, we can conclude $M_1 || M_2 \not\models (P)_{\exists a_2}$. Then the learning algorithm is terminated and returns the probabilistic counterexample trace $\text{cex}(\sigma', c')$. Otherwise, the MAT continues to answer the membership queries, until it produces a conjectured assumption $A_{M_1}$, similarly for $t_i || M_2 \models (P)_{\exists a_2}$. Note that alphabet $\alpha_{a_2}$ is same as $\alpha_{a_1}$ in most cases, because $\alpha_{a_1}$ and $\alpha_{a_2}$ all reflect the same safety property $P$ essentially. If $\alpha_{a_1}$ is same as $\alpha_{a_2}$, $t_i || M_2 \models (P)_{\exists a_2}$ can be omitted, and $A_{M_1}$ is same as $A_{M_1'}$.
Example 2. We execute the learning algorithm on PAs $M_1, M_2$ from Example 1, and the property is set as $(P)_{PG}$. The alphabet $\mathcal{A}_{M_1}$ is {warn, shutdown, off}. To build its first conjectured assumption, the algorithm can generate some traces $t_i$:

- (warn), (off), (shutdown), (shutdown, shutdown), (shutdown, warn) and (shutdown, off).

The first two return true, i.e., they should be in the conjectured assumption. All of the others return false. Since $t_1$ has action fail and $P_1 = 1 = 0.2 \cdot 1 > 1 - 0.99 = 0.01$, trace (shutdown) returns false. We can find that the trace (shutdown) is a prefix of (shutdown, shutdown), (shutdown, warn) and (shutdown, off), so all others return false. Since $P_1 \cdot P_2 = 0.2 \cdot 0.1 > (1 - 0.99) = 0.01$, (shutdown) is a counterexample $c$ of the target language $\mathcal{L}(M_1\|M_2)$, the learning algorithm is terminated and returns the probabilistic counterexample trace $cex(0.02, \text{shutdown})$.

### 3.2.3. Answering conjectures for each component

$((A_{M_1},)_{t_{M_1}} M_1(P)_{PG} \text{ (i.e., (A_{M_1})_{0\leq t_{M_1}} M_1(P)_{PG} in SYM)})$ can be calculated by multi-objective model checking [18,33]. The widest interval $I_{a_i}$ is defined as $[P_{A_{M_i}}, 1]$ and $P_{A_{M_i}} = 1 - (1 - PG)P_i$. $P_i$ is the probability of trace $t_{M_i}$, if the trace $t_{M_i} \in M_i$ or $t_{M_i} \not\in M_i$ has action fail and $t_{M_i} \not\in A_{M_i}$. If $I_{a_i} = \emptyset$, even under the conjectured assumption $(A_{M_i})_{t_{M_i}} M_i$ still violates $(P)_{PG}$. We can construct a probabilistic counterexample $cex(\sigma, w, c)$ [22,40] to indicate that $(A_{M_i})_{t_{M_i}} M_i$ does not hold. Next, we consider whether the probabilistic counterexample $cex(\sigma, w, c)$ also belongs to the language $\mathcal{L}(M_i\|M_j)$, i.e., if $cex(\sigma, w, c)$ is not a spurious counterexample (through checking $M_i^{exo} \| M_j \not\equiv (P)_{PG}$ [22]), it will prove the conclusion $M_i \| M_j \not\equiv (P)_{PG}$. We can directly obtain a probabilistic counterexample trace $cex(\sigma', c')$ from $cex(\sigma, w, c)$. If $cex(\sigma, w, c)$ is spurious, we need to acquire all traces in the set $T = c \upharpoonright A_{M_i}$. Then, we should find out those traces, which are currently included in the conjectured assumption $(A_{M_i})_{t_{M_i}}$, but in fact should be excluded, because it violates the properties $(P)_{PG}$. In other words, we need to find some bad traces $t_i = t_{M_i} \upharpoonright A_{M_i} \not\in c$, which is not in $A_{M_i}$. All those traces $t_i$ will be provided to NL*, and it will produce a conjectured assumption $(A_{M_i})_{t_{M_i}}$ again. Similarly, we deal with the component $M_j$. 

---

**Figure 3**: NL*-based learning framework for the rule SYM.
Example 3. We still execute the learning algorithm on \( P_{A_M, I_{M}} \) and property \( (P)_{\text{Pr}^{0.98}} \) from Example 1. The first conjectured assumptions \( A_{M_i} \) and \( A_{M_i}^{*} \) are represented by \( A_{M_i}^{err} \) and \( A_{M_i}^{err*} \) in Figure 4.

We can calculate the result \( I_{M_i} = [0.9, 1] \), since:

\[
\begin{align*}
t_{M_i} &= (\text{shutdown, fail}), \\
t_{M_i}^{1} &\leftarrow_{A_{M_i}} = (\text{shutdown}) = t_{M_i}^{1} \leftarrow_{A_{M_i}}, \\
t_{M_i} &= (\text{detect, shutdown}), \\
P_{A_M} &= 1 - (1 - 0.98)/0.2 = 0.9.
\end{align*}
\]

Similarly, since:

\[
\begin{align*}
P_{A_M} &= 1 - (1 - 0.98)/0.1 = 0.8, \text{we can obtain } I_{M_i} = [0.8, 1].
\end{align*}
\]

We cannot find any trace, which is not in \( A_{M_i}^{err} \) or \( A_{M_i}^{err*} \), but actually violates the properties \( (P)_{\text{Pr}^{0.98}} \). So \( \langle (A_{M_i})_{[0.9, 1]} \rangle \) and \( \langle (A_{M_i})_{[0.8, 1]} \rangle \) will be returned to NL* algorithm.

3.2.4. Compositional verification of assumptions

If the interval \( I_{A_{M_i}} \) and \( I_{A_{M_i}}^{*} \) are nonempty, we will check premise 3 of SYM, we need to verify whether \( \mathcal{L}(\text{co}(\langle (A_{M_i})_{t_i} \rangle_{t_i} \parallel \text{co}(\langle (A_{M_i})_{t_i} \rangle_{t_i})) = \emptyset \). Here, the conjectured assumption \( A_{M_i} \) is the one derived after \( i \) iterations of learning, similarly for \( J. P_{A_M} \) is the lower bound of the interval \( I_{A_{M_i}} \) similarly for \( P_{A_M} \).

So \( \mathcal{L}(\text{co}(\langle (A_{M_i})_{t_i} \rangle_{t_i}) \parallel \text{co}(\langle (A_{M_i})_{t_i} \rangle_{t_i})) \) can simplify to \( \mathcal{L}(\text{co}(A_{M_i}^{err}) \parallel \text{co}(A_{M_i}^{err})) \), which can convert into the problem whether a prefix of the infinite trace is not accepted by \( \mathcal{L}(\langle A_{M_i}^{err} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}} \parallel \langle A_{M_i}^{err} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}}) \).

Then, counterexample is analyzed by the following process. If the trace \( t_i \in A_{M_i}^{err} \), we need to find the probability \( P_{A_M} \) of the trace \( t_{M_i} \), if and only if \( t_{M_i} \in M \) and \( t_{M_i} \leftarrow_{A_{M_i}} = t_i \). If \( t_{M_i} \) is not unique, we will first return the trace with action fail. If it is nonexistent, we will return the trace with minimum probability for all \( t_{M_i} \). When the returned trace has action fail, the spurious counterexample trace \( \text{cex}(\sigma_f, c_f) = \text{cex}(P_{M_i} \parallel t_i) \) will not exist in \( \langle A_{M_i}^{err} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}} \), otherwise it will exist.

Note that \( \text{cex}(\sigma_f, c_f) \) cannot prove \( M_i \parallel M \neq (P)_{\text{Pr}} \) and it indicates that a trace satisfies the property \( (P)_{\text{Pr}} \) in \( \langle A_{M_i}^{err} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}} \). Essentially, we call it as spurious counterexample trace. Similarly, we return the cex\((\sigma_f, c_f) = \text{cex}(P_{M_i} \parallel t_i) \) as spurious counterexample trace in \( \langle A_{M_i}^{err} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}} \). When \( \langle A_{M_i}^{err} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}} \) and \( \langle A_{M_i}^{err*} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}} \) all have spurious counterexample trace, the spurious counterexample trace \( \text{cex}(\sigma, c) = \text{cex}(P_{M_i} \parallel t_i) \) will exist in \( \langle A_{M_i}^{err} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}} \parallel \langle A_{M_i}^{err*} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}} \).

Next, if \( P_{M_i} \parallel P_{M_i} > 1 - P \), a prefix of the infinite trace is not accepted by \( \mathcal{L}(\langle A_{M_i}^{err} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}} \parallel \langle A_{M_i}^{err*} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}}) \). So we need to use the spurious counterexample traces \( \text{cex}(\sigma_f, c_f) \) and \( \text{cex}(\sigma_f, c_f) \) to weaken the corresponding assumptions, i.e., \( t_i \) and \( t_i \) will be added in the assumption \( A_{M_i} \) and \( A_{M_i}^{*} \) respectively, then the conjectured assumptions must be refined once again. Otherwise, if \( P_{M_i} \parallel P_{M_i} \leq 1 - P \), it will not be a spurious counterexample trace in \( \mathcal{L}(\langle A_{M_i}^{err} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}} \parallel \langle A_{M_i}^{err*} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}}) \).

Finally, if any spurious counterexample trace in \( \mathcal{L}(\langle A_{M_i}^{err} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}} \parallel \langle A_{M_i}^{err*} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}}) \) is nonexistent, we can obtain two assumptions \( \langle A_{M_i} \rangle_{t_i} \) and \( \langle A_{M_i}^{*} \rangle_{t_i} \) to prove \( M_i \parallel M \neq (P)_{\text{Pr}^{0.98}} \).

Example 4. We continue the execution of the algorithm from Example 3. We must do counterexample analysis for it. Intuitively, we can find a spurious counterexample trace \( \text{cex}(0.8, (\text{warn, shutdown})) \) in \( \langle A_{M_i}^{err} \rangle_{0.1} \) and \( \text{cex}(1, (\text{warn, shutdown})) \) in \( \langle A_{M_i}^{err*} \rangle_{0.1} \).

When \( 0.8 < 1 = 0.8 \), we can find that the spurious counterexample trace in \( \mathcal{L}(\langle A_{M_i}^{err} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}} \parallel \langle A_{M_i}^{err*} \rangle_{T_2-P_{A_M}}) \) may be cex(0.8, (warn, shutdown)). When \( 0.8 > 1 - 0.98 = 0.02 \), cex(0.8, (warn, shutdown)) is the spurious counterexample trace of \( \mathcal{L}(\langle A_{M_i}^{err*} \rangle_{0.1} \parallel \langle A_{M_i}^{err*} \rangle_{0.1}) \) and the trace (warn, shutdown) cannot be accepted by \( \mathcal{L}(\langle A_{M_i}^{err*} \rangle_{0.1} \parallel \langle A_{M_i}^{err*} \rangle_{0.1}) \).

So we use the spurious counterexample trace to weaken the corresponding assumption, i.e., the trace (warn, shutdown) needs to be added to the corresponding assumption. The second conjectured assumption \( A_{M_i} \) (A same as \( A_{M_i} \)) is shown in Figure 2, which can prove \( M_i |M| \neq (P)_{\text{Pr}^{0.98}} \).

3.2.5. Generation of lower and upper bounds

In each iteration of the NL* algorithm, we can obtain the tightest bounds from the iterative process of assumptions (show in the bottom of Figure 3). If the learning framework cannot provide a definitive result (i.e., the runtime is more than the waiting time), some valuable quantitative information will be returned. For each conjectured assumption, we have a lower bound \( \text{lb}(A, P) \) and an upper bound \( \text{ub}(A, P) \) on the probabilistic safety property \( P \).

We can calculate \( P_{\text{Pr}} = \min(P_{\text{Pr}^{min}(M_i), P_{\text{Pr}^{min}}(A_{M_i})}) \) and generate a corresponding adversary \( \sigma \in \text{Adv}_{M_i} (M \text{ is the component about selected assumption}) \), then we compute \( (A_{\text{Pr}}, M \langle P \rangle_{t_i = 7}) \) through multi-objective model checking [18,33].

For the interval \( \text{lb}(A, P) \leq P_{\text{Pr}^{min}}(M_i, P) \leq \text{ub}(A, P) \), we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{lb}(A, P) &= \min(I_{t_i}) \\
\text{ub}(A, P) &= P_{\text{Pr}^{min}}(M_i, P), \text{if } \sigma \in \text{Adv}_{M_i}
\end{align*}
\]
The proof of the tightest bounds is similar to Feng et al. [22]. Note that information generation of bounds may lead to little extra work.

4. ASSUME-GUARANTEE REASONING WITH SYM-N RULE

4.1. Symmetric Rule

We present a symmetric assume-guarantee rule SYM in the previous section, which can solve the problem of verification of a stochastic system about two components. Here, we will make an extension to it. Let it can be used to verify a stochastic system composed of $n \geq 2$ components: $M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n$.

**Theorem 2.** Let $M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_n$ are PAs, for $i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}, (A_{M_i})_{SP_{A_i}}$ is an assumption for the corresponding component $M_i$, $(P)_{PG}$ is a probabilistic safety property. Their alphabets satisfy $\alpha_{A_i} \subseteq \alpha_{M_i} \cup \ldots \cup \alpha_{M_n} \cup \alpha_{M_n} \cup \ldots \cup \alpha_{M_n}$ respectively. $co(A_{M_i})_{SP_{A_i}}$ denotes the co-assumption for $M_i$ which is the complement of $(A_{M_i})_{SP_{A_i}}$, the following SYM-N rule holds:

1. $\langle A_{M_1} \rangle_{SP_{A_1}} M_1 (P)_{2PG}$
2. $\langle A_{M_2} \rangle_{SP_{A_2}} M_2 (P)_{2PG}$
3. $\vdots$
4. $n$: $\langle A_{M_n} \rangle_{SP_{A_n}} M_n (P)_{2PG}$
5. $n+1$: $L\left(\text{co}(A_{M_1})_{SP_{A_1}} \cap \text{co}(A_{M_2})_{SP_{A_2}} \cap \ldots \cap \text{co}(A_{M_n})_{SP_{A_n}}\right) = \emptyset$

$\langle \text{true} \rangle M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n (P)_{2PG}$

**Proof by contradiction.** Assume that the premise 1, 2, ..., $n+1$ hold, but the conclusion does not. We can obtain an adversary $\sigma \in \text{Adv}_{M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n}$, such that $\Pr_{M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n}^\sigma (P) < PG$. Now, it follows that:

$$\Pr_{M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n}^\sigma (P) < PG$$

by Lemma 1 since $\sigma \subseteq \alpha_{M_n} \cup \alpha_{M_n} \cup \ldots \cup \alpha_{M_n} \subseteq \alpha_{M_i}$

$$\Rightarrow \Pr_{M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n}^\sigma (P) < PG$$

by the premise 1 and Definition 5

$$\forall \sigma \in \text{Adv}_{M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n}, \left(\Pr_{M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n}^\sigma (A_{M_i}) \geq PG\right) \Rightarrow \Pr_{M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n}^\sigma (A_{M_i}) \geq PG$$

by modus tollens since (23) and (24)

$$\Rightarrow \Pr_{M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n}^{\sigma_{script}} (A_{M_i}) < PA_{M_i}$$

Similarly

$$\Pr_{M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n}^{\sigma_{script}} (A_{M_i}) < PA_{M_i}, i \in \{2, 3, \ldots, n\}$$

by the premise $n+1$

$$\exists \sigma \in \text{Adv}_{M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n}, \left(\Pr_{M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n}^{\sigma_{script}} (A_{M_i}) < PA_{M_i} \land \ldots \Pr_{M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n}^{\sigma_{script}} (A_{M_i}) < PA_{M_n}\right)$$

Our assumption contradicts (27), so this adversary $\sigma$ is nonexistent. Next, we will use Example 5 to explain the rule.

**Example 5.** The example is the extension of Example 1. Figure 5 shows three PAs $M_1, M_2, M_3$ and a probabilistic safety property $(P)_{0.9}$. The component $M_i$ indicates that the time signal may reappear with probability 0.5 before the shutdown signal. We will show the verification process by the method of SYM-N rule.

Similar to Example 1, through multi-objective model checking [18,33], we can acquire three assumptions $(A)_{M_1,0.9}$, $(A)_{M_2,0.1}$ and $(A)_{M_3,0.9^*}$ which are represented by DFA $A_{M_1}^m$, $A_{M_2}^m$ and $A_{M_3}^m$ in Figure 6.

Through premise $n + 1$, we can find a spurious counterexample trace $cex(0.2, (\text{shutdown}))$ in $A_{M_1}^m$, and $cex(1, (\text{shutdown}))$ in $A_{M_3}^m$, but corresponding spurious counterexample trace in $A_{M_1}^m$ is nonexistent (since action fail exists). So prefixes of all infinite traces in $A_{M_1}^m || A_{M_2}^m || A_{M_3}^m$ can be accepted by $L\left(\langle A_{M_1}^m \rangle_{0.9^*} || \langle A_{M_2}^m \rangle_{0.9^*} || \langle A_{M_3}^m \rangle_{0.9^*}\right)$ and we can think $M_1 || M_2 || M_3 \models (P)_{0.9}$ holds.

4.2. Improved Learning Framework for SYM-N Rule

The NL*-based learning framework in Figure 7 can be used for verifying a stochastic system composed of $n \geq 2$ components: $M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n$. We first answer membership queries through solving the problem $t \models (P)_{PG}$, for $i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$. The process is similar to Section 3.2.2 but it is a little different. In Counterexample Analysis for Membership Queries, if $t \models (P)_{PG}$, the framework will verify whether $t$ is a counterexample $c$ of the target language.
$\mathcal{L}(M_1 || M_2 || \cdots || M_n)$ if $t_i$ is the counterexample $c$, the framework will return the trace $t_i$ and the product of the probabilities of corresponding traces in all components as $cex(s', w, c)$. We can find that the property is violated, i.e., $M_1 || M_2 || \cdots || M_n \not\models \langle P \rangle_{\mathcal{PG}}$. Then, we need to answer equivalence queries through tackling the problem $\langle (A_{M_1})_{i_1} || (A_{M_2})_{i_2} || \cdots || (A_{M_n})_{i_n} \rangle = \emptyset$. It can simplify to find a trace that can be accepted by:

$\mathcal{L}(co((A_{M_1})_{i_1}) || co((A_{M_2})_{i_2}) || \cdots || co((A_{M_n})_{i_n}) = \emptyset$.

In Counterexample Analysis for Conjectures, the framework will check if the counterexample $cex(\sigma, w, c)$ belongs to the target language $\mathcal{L}(M_1 || M_2 || \cdots || M_n)$. The problem can transform into checking whether $M_1 || M_2 || \cdots || M_n \not\models \langle P \rangle_{\mathcal{PG}}$ holds, similarly to Feng et al. [22]. Next, the framework needs to verify $\mathcal{L}(co((A_{M_1})_{i_1}) || co((A_{M_2})_{i_2}) || \cdots || co((A_{M_n})_{i_n}) = \emptyset$. It can simplify to find a prefix of the infinite trace is not accepted by:

Figure 7 NL*-based learning framework for the rule SYM-N.
In Counterexample Analysis for Assumptions, if we cannot find any spurious counterexample trace, \( \mathcal{L}(\langle A^m_{M_1} \rangle_{21-PA_{M_2}} \parallel \langle A^m_{M_2} \rangle_{21-PA_{M_3}} \parallel \cdots \parallel \langle A^m_{M_n} \rangle_{21-PA_{M_{n+1}}}) \)

The framework also can return the tightest bounds of the property \( P \) satisfied over the system \( M_1 \parallel M_2 \parallel \cdots \parallel M_n \) from the iterative process of assumptions. We can calculate:

\[
P_* = \min(P_{\text{min}}(A_{M_1}), P_{\text{min}}(A_{M_2}), \ldots, P_{\text{min}}(A_{M_n}))
\]

and generate a corresponding adversary \( \sigma \in \text{Adv}_{M_*} \) for \( i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \). Then, we compute \( \langle A \rangle_{s\bar{P}} M(P)_{I_{M_*}} \) through multi-objective model checking [18,33]. In the end, the lower bound \( \text{lb}(A, P) \) is \( \min(I_*) \) and the upper bound \( \text{ub}(A, P) \) is \( P_{\text{min}}(M_1 || M_2 || \cdots || M_n) \).

5. RESULTS

As shown in Figure 8, we have developed a prototype tool for our learning framework. It accepts a model and corresponding property as inputs and returns the verification result. Verification result can be classified into three categories:

1. Some assumptions are provided to prove that model satisfies the property.
2. Counterexample trace \( \text{cex}(*, \cdot) \) is provided to prove that model violates the property.
3. Bounds of which the property \( P \) holds are provided, if the appropriate assumption or counterexample cannot be obtained.

We use PRISM [25] and counterexample construction algorithm (i.e., particle swarm optimization algorithm [40]) to form a MAT. The MAT uses the PRISM modeling language to describe models and probabilistic safety properties. In the interior of the MAT, PRISM can provide the transition matrix (indicate that the transition relation of states in the model) and failure states (indicate that a property is violated) to counterexample construction algorithm. The algorithm can find all shortest paths of the same length and calculate the probability of each path, to construct probabilistic counterexamples. Through constructed counterexamples, we can respond to these queries of libalf. All experiments are run on a 3.3 GHz PC with 8 GB RAM. Feng et al. [22] uses the L* learning algorithm to produce the probabilistic assumptions. On this basis, Feng et al. [23] proves that NL* learning algorithm has more efficient than L* in large-scale cases. Our method thus is based on NL*. We use several large cases to demonstrate our learning framework and compare with the method of Feng et al. [23]. We adopt the first two cases form [23], and modify them a little, because we focus on the conditions that the model does not satisfy the properties. To ensure the correctness of the experimental results, we change the cases through different means. The first case is a network of \( N \) sensors. In the network, a channel can issue some data to a processor, but it may crash because some data packets are lost. Through the SYM rule, we make the composition of the \( N \) sensors and a channel as a component \( M_* \), the processor as the other component \( M_c \). We will verify the probabilistic safety property, i.e., network never crashes with a certain probability. We will increase the probability of probabilistic safety property to satisfy our experimental requirements, and the verified property is \( (P)_{0.99} \).

| Case study [sensor network] | Sensor numbers | Component sizes | SYM MQ Time(s) | ASYM [23] MQ Time(s) |
|-----------------------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------|
| 1                           | 72             | 16              | 25             | 2.7                 |
| 2                           | 1184           | 16              | 25             | 2.9                 |
| 3                           | 10662          | 16              | 25             | 3.9                 |

![Figure 8](image-url) Prototype tool.
reservations to use a common resource, the server can grant or deny a client’s request, and the model must satisfy the mutual exclusion property (i.e., conflict in using resources between clients) with certain minimum probability. Through the SYM rule, we make the server as a component $M_s$ and the composition of $N$ clients as the other component $M_c$. The verified property is $(P_{\text{non}})$, We use the method of Feng et al. [23] to inject (nonprobabilistic and probabilistic) failures into the server respectively. Table 2 shows experimental results for the client–server.

To consider the case where the model satisfies the properties, the last case is randomized consensus algorithm from Feng et al. [23] without modification. The algorithm models $N$ distributed processes trying to reach consensus and uses, in each round, a shared coin protocol parameterized by $K$. The verified property is $(P_{\text{SYM}})$ and $0.97504$ is the minimum probability of consensus being reached within $R$ rounds. Through the SYM rule, the system is decomposed into two PA components: $M_c$ for the coin protocol and $M_s$ for the interleaving of $N$ processes.

In Tables 1 and 2, the component sizes of the $M_c$ and $M_s$ are denoted as $|M_c|$ and $|M_s|$, and the performance is measured by the total number of Membership Queries (MQ) and runtimes (Time). Note that Time includes counterexample construction, NFA translation and the learning process. Moreover, for the accuracy of the results, we select the counterexamples in the same order as Feng et al. [23] in each equivalence query. Note that Feng et al. [23] has included comparisons with non-compositional verification, so this paper only compares with Feng et al. [23].

As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the experiment results show that our framework is more efficient than Feng et al. [23]. Obviously, we can observe that, for all cases, runtimes and the number of the membership queries in our framework are less than Feng et al. [23]. Moreover, the runtimes need less in our framework, when the model has a large scale. A larger size model may have less runtimes and the number of membership queries than a smaller model. However, this is not proportion with the model size. The efficiency of our framework depends only on the time of a counterexample (indicate that the probabilistic safety property is violated) appears in conjectured assumptions. The earlier a counterexample appears, the more efficient our framework performs.

In Table 3, the component sizes of the $M_c$ and $M_s$ is also denoted as $|M_c|$ and $|M_s|$. The performance is measured only by total runtimes (Time), because both methods have the same amount of MQ if the model satisfies the properties. Because of the cost of early detection, we can find that our methods need to spend more time than Feng et al. [23] and cost grows with the model size. But compared with acquisition of optimization in Tables 1 and 2, the cost is acceptable in Table 3.

Table 4 compares the performance of the rule (SYM) and the rule (SYM-N). We impose a time-out of 5 h. Sensor network model has $N$ sensors and client–server model has $N$ clients. In client–server model, each client and server all have a (probabilistic) failure. For the use of rule (SYM-N), we decompose $M_c$ into separate sensor and compose each sensor and a channel as a component in sensor network model, and decompose $M_s$ further into separate client in client–server model. Moreover, the performance is measured by the total runtimes (Time). In all large cases, the rule (SYM-N) has more advantage than the rule (SYM). For example, in the case of sensor network model with four sensors, the component $M_c$ has 72776 states and the component $M_s$ has 32 states. The total runtime of the compositional verification by the rule (SYM) more than 5 h, but the use of the rule (SYM-N) only needs 16.6 s. This is because the size of the component $M_c$ is too large for the rule (SYM), and the counterexample construction algorithm needs more time to give the conclusion.

### Table 2 Client–server experimental results

| Case study [client–server] | Client numbers | Component sizes | SYM | ASYM [23] |
|---------------------------|----------------|----------------|-----|-----------|
| Server (nonprobability) Client (1 failure) | 3 | 16 45 | 100 2.5 | 161 5.2 |
| | 5 | 36 405 | 325 6.9 | 519 12.4 |
| | 7 | 64 3645 | 833 63.1 | 1189 140.1 |
| Server (nonprobability) Client (N failures) | 3 | 16 125 | 175 4.6 | 213 5.9 |
| | 4 | 25 625 | 336 8.3 | 393 11.4 |
| | 5 | 36 3125 | 226 4.9 | 648 18.1 |
| Server (probability) Client (1 failure) | 3 | 16 45 | 120 0.31 | 187 5.7 |
| | 5 | 36 405 | 379 7.8 | 583 16.4 |
| | 7 | 64 3645 | 937 28.1 | 1308 45.5 |
| Server (probability) Client (N failure) | 3 | 16 125 | 176 3.9 | 265 6.6 |
| | 4 | 25 625 | 337 7.4 | 507 12.2 |
| | 5 | 36 3125 | 568 66.2 | 839 90.3 |

### Table 3 Randomized consensus algorithm experimental results

| Case study [consensus] | Component sizes | SYM | ASYM [23] |
|------------------------|----------------|-----|-----------|
| | $|M_c|$ | $|M_s|$ | Time (s) | Time (s) |
| 2 3 20 | 3217 | 389 | 12.1 | 11.6 |
| 2 4 4 | 431649 | 571 | 82.2 | 80.7 |
| 3 3 20 | 38193 | 8837 | 355.8 | 350.2 |

### Table 4 Performance comparison of the rule (SYM) and the rule (SYM-N)

| Case study [parameters] | Component sizes | SYM | ASYM-N |
|------------------------|----------------|-----|---------|
| | $|M_c|$ | $|M_s|$ | Time (s) | Time (s) |
| Sensor network [N] | 4 | 72776 | 32 | Time-out 16.6 |
| | 5 | 428335 | 32 | Time-out 40.7 |
| Client–server [N] | 6 | 49 15625 | 32 | Time-out 20.4 |
| | 7 | 64 78125 | 32 | Time-out 80.9 |
6. DISCUSSION

We first present a sound SYM for compositional stochastic model checking. Then, we propose a learning framework for compositional stochastic model checking PAs with rule SYM, based on the optimization of LAGR techniques. Our optimization can terminate the learning process in advance, if a counterexample appears in any membership and equivalence query. We also extend the framework to support the assume-guarantee rule SYM-N which can be used for reasoning about a stochastic system composed of \( n \geq 2 \) components: \( \|M_1\| \cdots \|M_n\| \). Experimental results show that our method can improve the efficiency of the original learning framework [23]. Similar to Feng et al. [22] and Kwiatkowska et al. [33], it can return the tightest bounds for the safety property as a reference as well.

In the future, we intend to develop our learning framework to produce richer classes of probabilistic assumption (for example weighted automata as assumptions [39]) and extend it to deal with more expressive types of probabilistic models.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The author declare they have no conflicts of interest.

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