administration-specific behavior. The problem for positive political science is that there is no way to distinguish (in econometric jargon, to identify) the two in data.

Naturally, partisan effects shine through Beck’s estimates of administration-specific models. (If they did not, Beck’s party models in Table 2 would have produced null results.) Take the results Beck displays in Table 4, model (3), which are based on the administration model he seems to favor. Although, as I pointed out earlier, every entry in Table 4 for “estimated eight-year impacts” is miscalculated, the magnitudes should preserve the rank order. Notwithstanding Beck’s remarks about these results, only Carter’s rank (6) is inconsistent with what a partisan view would anticipate: ranks 1, 2, and 3 are occupied by Democrats; ranks 4, 5, and 7 by Republicans. It is now obvious that the unemployment performance of the Reagan administration, once it is fully realized, will not disturb this pattern. Certainly we have nothing here that someone who has emphasized the usefulness of taking a party/class linkage view of the American political economy would find alarming.

Finally, let me say that although I am indifferent to Beck’s results indicating that replacing a partisan measure(s) with a sequence of administration-specific terms in time-series unemployment models adds 0.005 or so to explained (ex post) variance, I do take issue with his sympathetic view of the ( nihilistic) policy implications of the new classical macroeconomic theory: “policy makers have little systematic effect on real macroeconomic outcomes, such as unemployment, because the private market adjusts fully for government policy,” or, less strongly, “the American economic system gives private market actors much room to adjust to government policy” (Beck, 1982, p. 92). These remarks were published as we entered the most severe recession since the 1937-1938 contraction during the Great Depression; subsequent events have proved such views to have little or no empirical relevance.

Under Chairman Paul Volcker’s leadership and with the Reagan administration’s encouragement, the Federal Reserve has pursued a truly Draconian monetary policy. As a result, real income and output have declined sharply, and as I edit these remarks (January 1983), unemployment stands at close to 11%, the highest rate since 1941. Estimated conservatively, the aggregate costs of excessive unemployment have been on the order of 450 billion 1982 dollars of lost output during Reagan’s first two years, which amounts to approximately $5,350 per household. Apparently, market actors, though strangulating from soaring real interest rates (and apparently also immune to the logic of the new supply-side economics), did not understand that they “rationally” were expected to adjust fully to these government policies by varying prices but not output and employment.

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References

Beck, N. Parties, administrations, and American macroeconomic outcomes. American Political Science Review, 1982, 76, 83-93.

Hibbs, D. A. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review, 1977, 71, 1467-1487.

ON BOOK REVIEWS

TO THE EDITOR:

Contrary to what is suggested in my review of Biblical Games by Steven Brams (American Political Science Review, 1982, 76, 725-726), Professor Brams used the Hebrew Bible (non-apocryphal) version of the story of Esther. Also, “dominant strategy” is defined on page 20 of the book, and there is a game without a dominant strategy for both players on page 110. I was not able to report at the time of writing that the book is available as an MIT Press paperback for $5.95.

JEFFREY A. HART

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TO THE EDITOR:

Perhaps a brief response will be permitted on one issue in Robert Booth Fowler’s openminded and sympathetic review of my Strategies of Political Emancipation (American Political Science Review, 1982, 76, 465-457): “Equally puzzling is Bay’s relentless attack on the United States as the fulcrum of evil with little attention to the limitations of other cultures and experiences in contemporary nationhood.”

First, for the record. Without telling me, the publishers had deleted my subtitle: An Analysis of the Nature of Oppression in Liberal-Corporate Society. Had I known in advance, I would have wanted to make this focus of my inquiry explicit in the Introduction.

Second, on the issue of “anti-Americanism.” The late Norwegian socialist writer Sigurd Evensmo once answered this charge well: It makes as little sense to be anti-American as it would to be anti the Tennessee River. But, he continued, it makes good sense to be in favor of projects like the Tennessee Valley Authority, which tamed the destructive powers of a mighty river. On similar
grounds he saw the need for a sustained international struggle to expose and resist the destructive uses of the vast military and economic powers of this country, or of those who rule it—powers that have given us not only Vietnam and Pinochet and El Salvador but also an arms race that threatens the human race with extinction.

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Errata

For the communication entitled "Comment on Beck and Alford" (1982, 76, pp. 876-877), every mention of Beck should be read Lewis-Beck.

Owing to a typographical error, the last paragraph on p. 113, column 1, of "The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems" by Alphons J. C. van de Kragt, John M. Orbell, and Robyn Dawes (March, 1983) was incorrect. It should have read:

In experiments concerned with public good provision, we observed subjects—given the opportunity for discussion—organizing themselves in a manner that invariably produced the public good in question, and that did so in an optimal manner without underprovision and with only little overprovision.

Forthcoming Articles

The following articles have tentatively been scheduled for publication in the September, 1983 issue:

J. R. Chamberlin and P. N. Courant, "Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule"

R. Duvall and J. R. Freeman, "The Technobureaucratic Elite and the Entrepreneurial State in Dependent Industrialization"

W. Gormley, J. Hoadly, and C. Williams, "Potential Responsiveness in the Bureaucracy: Views of Public Utility Regulation"

A. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China"

T. W. Luke, "The Proletarian Ethic and Soviet Industrialization"

A. Melzer, "Rousseau's Moral Realism: Replacing Natural Law with the General Will"

N. R. Miller, "Pluralism and Social Choice"

S. Patterson and G. A. Caldeira, "Getting Out the Vote: Participation in Gubernatorial Elections"

L. Preston, "Freedom and Authority: Beyond the Precepts of Liberalism"

S. Smith, "Hegel's View on the Morality of War"

F. Way and B. J. Burt, "Religious Marginality and the Free Exercise Clause"

F. Zemens, "Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in Political Systems"