From the Field to the Laboratory: The Theory-Practice Research of Peter J. Carnevale

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Abstract

As colleagues and collaborators, we reflect on the work and legacy of Peter Carnevale, currently professor at the University of Southern California, and recipient of the 2002 Jeffrey Z. Rubin Theory-to-Practice Award of the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM). We review Carnevale’s main contributions, including his work on time pressure and surveillance, strategies for mediation, emotions in negotiation, and the use and integration of distinct methods for studying conflict and negotiation. We share personal anecdotes from our time as PhD students and collaborators with Peter Carnevale, and we touch on lessons learned for doing science and mentoring the next generation.

Introduction

Trained in traditional experimental research, few scholars have crossed the theory/practice divide with such a strong focus on conceptual development. Whether relying on gaps in experimental research, insights from real-world mediations, or theory development that challenges existing knowledge, Peter J. Carnevale, recipient of the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) 2002 Jeffrey Z. Rubin Theory-to-Practice Award, advances both research and practice through generating meaningful constructs. In particular, he is known for his field and laboratory studies on surveillance and accountability, time pressures, strategic choice in mediation, emotion in negotiation and the role of values and moral significance in bargaining. In this article, we focus specifically on his research/practice contributions to: (a) time pressures and constituents’ surveillance of negotiators, (b) emotions in negotiation, (c) third-party power and interests and (d) methodological diversity.

Peter’s career spans four decades of prolific research on negotiation, mediation and conflict management. In his first academic position in the College of Business Administration at the University of Iowa, Peter conducted research on third-party roles and public sector labor disputes. He then joined the Department of Psychology at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign where he held an affiliated appointment in the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations. During these 16 years, he continued his work on mediation, but also became one of the first scholars to study the role of emotion in negotiation, specifically positive and negative affect. This early work on emotion not only challenged the “rational” model that dominated the field but also produced important practical findings regarding when and how
to use positive/negative emotions, ones that appear in popular negotiation textbooks (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2016; Thompson, in press). He also engaged in field studies of intractable conflicts, such as the Chiapas dispute in Mexico, and he brought the field to the laboratory through studies of mediator alignment, inspired by the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the next era of his career, Peter moved to the Department of Psychology at New York University and then the Marshall School of Business at the University of Southern California where he is currently a Professor in the Department of Management & Organization. His research in this period ventured into computer simulations, particularly the use of avatars and virtual confederates in studying cooperation and emotional expressions in negotiation. As a scholar in high demand, he has also served as a Visiting Professor at INSEAD Business School in France, University of Western Australia, Chinese University of Hong Kong and Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

Peter is a prolific scholar who has garnered an impressive number of citations and prestigious awards. He is the author or co-author of over 110 publications, including two books, numerous articles, book chapters and research reports. His classic article that synthesizes the psychological research on “Negotiation and Mediation,” published with Dean Pruitt in the Annual Review of Psychology in 1992, was awarded the Most Influential Article by the Conflict Management Division of the Academy of Management Association in 1998. His book, Methods of Negotiation Research (2006), co-edited with Carsten De Dreu, received the IACM Outstanding Book Award in 2008 and has become a reference guide for studies in conflict management across the disciplines. In addition to these accolades, Peter has mentored numerous scholars in conflict management, many who are current leaders in the field.

In recognition of his career, Peter was elected a Fellow of the International Association for Conflict Management in 2018, a Fellow of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology in 2015 and a Fellow of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology in 2009. He has garnered over three million dollars in external funding from such prestigious sources as the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research. These grants have supported both basic and applied research on strategic choice in mediation, culture and negotiation and emotion in human–machine collaborations. Importantly, Peter has brought methodological creativity and precision to negotiation and mediation studies. Guided by provocative questions, his research generates innovative concepts that not only advance theory but have important implications for the practice of conflict management (Figure 1).

In this article, we attempt to synthesize Peter’s innovative scholarship and its implications for practice. First, Linda Putnam revisits Peter’s early research on bargaining strategies, particularly the effects of time pressures and constituent surveillance on negotiator behaviors. Second, Mara Olekalns tracks Peter’s journey through his pioneering studies of affect in negotiation to his current work on opponent’s emotional displays and the use of avatars and embodied agents. Next, Don Conlon overviews Peter’s work on mediation, third-party power and partisan interests, including his experiences in the field and the many bilateral takeaways from the field to the laboratory. Then, Carsten De Dreu highlights Peter’s mastery of a wide range of methodological approaches and his role in a two-volume special issue of International Negotiation and the book, Methods of Negotiation Research, that has become the field’s guide to research methods in conflict studies.

**Bringing in the Real-World: Time Pressures and Surveillance**

— Linda Putnam

Peter and I met in 1988 at the first conference of the International Association for Conflict Management at George Mason University. I had read a number of his articles and knew his early work on negotiation strategies that involved extensive coding of verbal and nonverbal messages (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimmer, 1981). When we met, I recall that we lamented that coding real-time interactions in negotiation was painful, time-consuming and exhausting, but typically led to really important findings about how negotiation worked. Well, I continued for a number of years with the laborious work of training coders, calculating reliabilities and charting bargaining strategies over time, while Peter brilliantly developed a
way to streamline this process through automating lists of messages drawn from live negotiations and tracking them over time across bargaining simulations (Carnevale & Conlon, 1988; Hilty & Carnevale, 1993). I think that I mentioned to him that if I had only thought of this idea, I could have doubled the number of publications that I produced (which he did).

Peter’s early work on negotiation strategies formed the basis for two important arenas of conflict research: time pressures in negotiation and constituent surveillance of bargainers. In each of these arenas, Peter introduced new concepts, created clever experimental designs and challenged the findings of prior research. Moreover, in selecting new concepts, Peter drew on insights from real-world negotiation and mediations.

Real-world practices in negotiation clearly demonstrated that the amount of time that bargainers had to negotiate mattered, but the question was how it mattered. Drawing from the earliest work on this topic (Pruitt & Johnson, 1970), Peter and his colleagues challenged the finding that negotiators who faced tight time pressures engaged in more concession making and reached agreement sooner than did those who did not have time constraints. Unwilling to accept these findings carte blanche, Peter and colleagues wondered if they would hold up under conditions of individual versus collective orientations, especially for multi-issue negotiations. This curiosity led to studies that qualified early findings, namely, time pressures for individualistic negotiators triggered contentious interactions in which bargainers relied on “I” messages, commitment statements, less information exchange and produced poor outcomes (Smith, Pruitt, & Carnevale, 1982); however, the same time constraints for collective-oriented
negotiators produced high joint gains. Time pressures then functioned as a double-edged sword—effective for collective-oriented bargainers but detrimental to individualistic negotiators (Carnevale & Lawler, 1986).

Making another creative shift, Peter brought his work on time pressures to the study of mediation. Drawing on the strategic choice model, he and Don Conlon (Carnevale & Conlon, 1988) tracked the use of mediator approaches over time across six rounds of interactions. This work showed that as deadlines neared (high time pressures), mediators abandoned their traditional reliance on inaction or integrating strategies and increased their use of pressing and compensation tactics. Thus, over time even mediators succumbed to time pressures and pushed parties to reach a settlement.

The idea of time has continued to occupy Peter’s creative energies. Temporality also refers to how recent or distance a negotiator is from a bargaining event. In a series of multiple studies, Peter and colleagues found that negotiators who adopted a distance lens had more multiple-issue offers, made more trade-offs on low-priority items and reach higher individual and joint gains than did bargainers who treated the negotiation as occurring recently. Temporality then, in terms of distance from the event, provided negotiators a big picture perspective rather than concentrating on the incidental details of the deal (Henderson, Trope, & Carnevale, 2006). Overall, Peter and his colleagues have brought complexity to our understanding of the role of time in negotiation and how it functions in relation to bargaining strategies.

Another critical arena in which Peter made significant contributions was the role of accountability in bargaining. In actual negotiations, such as the labor-management context, bargainers were accountable to their constituents and negotiation teams. Drawing from this real-world context, Peter conducted early research on visual access and constituent surveillance of negotiators. In investigations that became textbook classics, Peter showed that when constituents were able to observe bargainers, negotiators adopted tougher, more contentious tactics (Carnevale et al., 1981; Pruitt et al., 1986) than when visibility was low. Specifically, in conditions of high visual access, negotiators used more pressure tactics, including threats and arguments, as well as efforts to raise their own status. Moreover, watching negotiators in action diminished cooperative bargaining even when constituents did not hold their representatives accountable for settlements (Carnevale et al., 1981).

Another very significant contribution of this work stemmed from including gender in studies of surveillance. Moving away from the notion that biological sex was a source of difference, Peter in his work with Ed Lawler conceptualized gender as a complex variable. Under surveillance, males relied on contentious tactics while in the absence of surveillance, females were more contentious than were males (Carnevale & Lawler, 1986). This finding set the stage for future studies that explored the contextual factors of dyad, organizational role and relationships that impinged on gender behaviors in negotiation (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). In effect, Peter’s early work on time pressures, surveillance and gender brought real-world features of negotiation into the laboratory.

Peter’s research also opened new frontiers in negotiation studies. In particular, his work on temporality raised awareness of time sensitivity (that is, how fast or slow the overall bargaining process moved) that was later examined in cross-cultural negotiations (Alon & Brett, 2007; Macduff, 2006). In addition, early investigations on negotiator–constituent surveillance opened up opportunities to focus on agent–principal relationships, specifically, the norms, rules and legitimacy of negotiators as agents (Docherty & Campbell, 2007). Finally, studies on the situational/contextual effects of gender introduced complexity to this construct as evident in recent research on gender saliency and role congruency in negotiation (Olekalns & Kennedy, in press). Overall, Peter’s early work in these three arenas paved the way for new research agendas and the development of innovative constructs in negotiation, including the study of emotion.

**Perspectives on Emotion—Mara Olekalns**

The role of emotion in negotiation, although rapidly gaining research attention, continues to be under-investigated relative to other factors that shape negotiation processes and outcomes. Against this
backdrop, Peter appears as a forerunner of the more recent interest in how negotiations are influenced by felt and expressed emotions. In research with Alice Isen, he demonstrated that positive affect reduced contention and increased negotiators’ joint gains. Hinting at research yet to come on how communication media might shape negotiations, he also showed that positive affect influenced negotiators’ behaviors and outcomes only in face-to-face negotiations (Carnevale & Isen, 1986). Jumping ahead a decade, he continued to focus on positive affect, this time in the context of decision frames. Having replicated the traditional framing effect in a control condition, he showed that it could be reversed if negotiators were happy. Loss-framed negotiators who were happy bargainers made more concessions than did emotionally neutral negotiators (Carnevale, 2008). Between these two experiments, Peter and I collaborated on a research project that reflected his interest in emotion and my interest in how negotiators interpreted their opponents’ messages. In this research, we found that an ambiguous message resulted in more positive emotions when it followed a competitive message than when it followed a cooperative one (Olekalns et al., 2005).

This sequence of experiments, which fits broadly within a decision-making approach to studying emotions in negotiation (Barry, Fulmer, & Goates, 2006), hints at the themes that underpin Peter’s more recent research: communication media and the inferential processes triggered by emotions. But before I turn to that research, I introduce a small digression. A quality that shines through all of Peter’s research is the combination of methodological creativity with experimental precision. As an example, I mention his research on misrepresentation in negotiation. For this research, he created a quantifiable negotiation task that included a compatible issue, one that both parties valued equally, and an indifference issue, that is, an issue worth nothing to one negotiator while having value to the other. These issues created a novel experimental tool for exploring triggers to deception in negotiation. Negotiators could, of course, be honest with each other. But, more often than not, both the compatible and indifference issues paved the way for negotiators to lie by omission, neglecting to reveal zero value, or to lie by commission, claiming that the issue had value for them (Carnevale et al., 2001; O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997). Peter’s creation of the indifference issue seeded my research on deception in negotiation and continues to be central to my investigations of how context shifts negotiators’ moral thresholds.

While on the topic of ethics, we can pause to consider Peter’s investigations of emotion and ethics. In research with Tunguz, he turned his attention to emotional labor, an ethically nuanced requirement for employees to express organizationally prescribed emotions. In this study, Tunguz and Carnevale (2011) explored the conditions under which such emotion display rules were likely to be most effective in shaping how individuals conducted a job interview. Participants in this experiment were either made accountable for the outcome of the interview or the way in which it was conducted. Tunguz and Carnevale (2011) reported that process accountability increased the expression of positive emotions and that a combination of process and outcome accountability resulted in the suppression of positive emotions; further, process accountability suppressed the expression of negative emotions. Shifting to a different direction, Dehghani et al. (2014) explored the impact of emotions when issues had moral significance for negotiators. Displaying that hallmark creativity, Peter and his co-authors developed a web-based task in which participants could claim ownership of—or give away—objects, and had the ability to express their emotional reactions to their opponent’s offers. Objects were considered to have moral significance if participants were unwilling to give them away, irrespective of the benefits of doing so. In a series of experiments, Dehghani et al. (2014) showed that the usual effects of anger and sadness in negotiation are reversed when an issue has moral significance; specifically, under these conditions, a sad opponent elicited more concessions than an angry opponent. Interestingly, they also found that in negotiations with moral significance, negotiators “caught” their opponents’ sadness.

This experiment is part of a series of studies that use avatars and embodied agents to explore the role of emotion in negotiation. It fits within a social–functionalist approach to emotion which focuses on the inferences that negotiators draw from their opponents’ expressed emotions. Two sets of experiments explored the idea of reverse appraisal, that is, the impressions that negotiators form of their opponents...
based on their opponents’ emotional displays. In a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, de Melo, Carnevale and Gratch (2012) used embodied agents to explore how expressed emotions affected negotiators’ cooperativeness. Varying only the facial expressions that the agents displayed, they showed that participants were more cooperative when agents’ emotions signaled cooperation than when agents’ emotions signaled competition. They concluded that this finding stemmed from participants use of emotional expressions to infer agent’s intentions. Continuing to explore reverse appraisal, de Melo et al. (2014) teased out a more nuanced story. They first showed that context affected the impact of expressed emotions; that is, in a mutual cooperation condition, participants predicted more cooperation when the agent expressed joy while expressions of regret lowered expectations of cooperation in a mutual cooperation condition but increased them when the counterpart chose an exploitative strategy. Subsequent experiments in this series showed that inferred goal conduciveness mediated the emotion–cooperation relationship. In the context of mutual cooperation, the belief that the situation was helping (or hindering) an opponent’s goal attainment, mediated relationships between joy and cooperation, whereas the perception that the opponent blamed himself for the situation mediated the relationship between regret and cooperation. By comparison, in the context of mutual defection, self-blame mediated the relationship between expressed emotions and the expectation that an opponent would cooperate. In the final experiment in this sequence, De Melo, Gratch and Carnevale (2015) showed that the impact of emotion expressions was greater when participants interacted with an avatar than when they interacted with an agent.

Peter’s research takes us on a path far from the usual focus on how negotiators’ affect shapes deal-making by showing us that to fully understand the role of emotions necessitates looking beyond their impact on first offers and concession making. Drawing on social inferential models of emotions, his research elucidates the ways in which individuals use their own and others’ emotions to inform negotiations. In particular, the idea of reverse appraisal serves as an important reminder that the inferences that others draw from our emotional expressions play a critical role in how opponents react to our actions at the negotiating table. Moving away from studies of emotion, Peter also focuses on third parties as influencing negotiation and mediation.

A Master of the “Bilateral Takeaway”—Don Conlon

I first met Peter Carnevale in the Fall of 1985 at the University of Illinois. In some ways, our initial connection had less to do with research interests and more to do with habitual routines. Peter’s office, on the 2nd floor of the Psychology Building, was the same office where Allan Lind had worked before Allan left the University of Illinois. I had worked with Allan on third-party/justice research since my undergraduate days. While I was now a doctoral student in the business school at Illinois, I still interacted with many doctoral students in psychology, and so it was still natural to wander over to that office. Once we were introduced to each other, I realized that Peter’s research shared similarities with what I had been working on with Allan. Allan’s research at the time focused on disputants’ reactions to “formal” third parties (usually judges, but sometimes other roles). Peter’s research also developed a focus on third parties, but it centered less on formal roles and more on mediation. In addition, Peter’s work not only examined disputants’ reactions to mediation, but also considered the mediator himself/herself as a person of interest.

I found Peter’s ideas related to mediation to be very interesting. Yet, looking back at his curriculum vita, I noticed that he had not focused on mediation in his training with Dean Pruitt (negotiation was more of the focus then). So, how did Peter end up with an interest in third parties? My (admittedly hazy) recollection is that during his first academic stop as an assistant professor at the University of Iowa, Peter collaborated with Richard Pegnetter on a research project in which they interviewed and surveyed 32 professional mediators involved in public sector labor disputes (Carnevale & Pegnetter, 1985). This would begin a habitual routine for Peter that involved interacting with real-world third parties (and
negotiators) who engaged in conflict resolution, while simultaneously conducting rigorous experiments. His work thus reflected a series of “bilateral takeaways” because Peter could take what he learned in the laboratory and apply it to the field (reality) and vice versa.

Peter’s 16-year stint at Illinois was very productive and produced at least 15 refereed journal publications in the area of mediation or third parties—roughly half of his research output during these years focused on this area. Reviewing this period of his academic life reminds me of just how multitalented and passionate a scholar Peter is, because the work runs the gamut from theory and review pieces (e.g., Carnevale, 1986a; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992) to laboratory and experimental works (e.g., Carnevale & Conlon, 1988; Idaszak & Carnevale, 1989) to field studies (Lim & Carnevale, 1990; McLaughlin, Carnevale, & Lim, 1991). His passion for mediation and its proper seat at the conflict resolution table might best be seen in his occasional spirited defense of his views on mediation versus those of other titans in the conflict management field, such as Evert van de Vliert (Carnevale, 1992) and Keith Murnighan (Carnevale, 1986b). In fact, his philosophical differences with Keith Murnighan regarding the role of third-party power and self-interest relative to disputants led the two of them (along with me—the least powerful third party you could imagine in this context) to design and publish a study on different third-party roles that varied in terms of their power and interest alignment with the disputants (Conlon, Carnevale, & Murnighan, 1994).

This period of Peter’s academic career saw many of his works focus on elements of third-party power and third-party interests. Third-party power was operationalized in many different ways, including the ability (but not the necessity) to impose settlements on disputants (Conlon et al, 1988), the availability to provide disputants with resources or incentives (both positive and negative, Harris & Carnevale, 1990; Idaszak & Carnevale, 1989) or the ability to make proposals that clearly favored one side over the other (overt support, Wittmer, Carnevale, & Walker, 1991). In terms of interests, several of his works unpacked the topic of mediator alignment and challenged the idea that a mediator had to be a disinterested neutral in order to be effective. Carnevale’s work in this area clearly showed that a mediator who had stronger affiliations to one side over the other was not necessarily a bad thing; in fact, such a mediator could effectively elicit concessions and cooperation from both sides under the right conditions (Arad & Carnevale, 1994; Conlon, Carnevale, & Ross, 1994).

What is less well-known is how Peter’s interest and study of “real-world” conflict has been informed by this work and vice versa. For instance, consider the intractable conflict between the government of Mexico and the Zapatista Army of Liberation (colloquially known as the Chiapas conflict). Tensions between the indigenous population in the Mexican state of Chiapas and the Mexican government came to a boil on New Year’s Day 1994 when local militias seized control from the government. The government responded with a show of force (bombs and tanks) and with the help of the Catholic Church (now there’s an interesting mediator!) things returned to a very uneasy peace roughly two weeks later (Grant, 2014). To the Mexican government’s credit, they must have realized that the status quo was untenable, and they needed some conflict management expertise. Peter spent two weeks in March of 1995 in Mexico, making over two dozen presentations on mediation and conflict management to a variety of audiences (including the Ministry of the Interior of Mexico, the Governor and cabinet of Jalisco, nongovernment officials, university faculty and students, union members and members of the legal profession) in a variety of cities (Mexico City, Monterrey, Guadalajara, and Juarez). I suspect that some of what Peter was able to tell them came from the many studies he had conducted on mediation (as well as bilateral negotiation) and that the topics of power and interests were central to improving their understanding of the situation. But, in the spirit of bilateral takeaways, I suspect Peter gained many ideas to pursue in the laboratory from these experiences as well.

Perhaps an even more obvious bilateral takeaway stems from Peter’s work that connects to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Peter had a long-standing interest in this topic, assigning his students a book that highlighted Henry Kissinger’s third-party intervention activities as part of our reading list when I was in his doctoral seminar (Rubin, 1981). This may have been one of the inspirations for his studies on partisan
third parties noted above. Regardless, his most visible example of borrowing from the field to the laboratory might come from the study he did that compared pro-Israeli and nonpartisan (neutral) reactions to third-party proposals for settling the conflict over Jerusalem. Arad and Carnevale (1994) developed two proposals for settlement, one favoring the Israeli preferences and one more even-handed (compromise) in nature. Participants evaluated one of the two proposals and were told that the proposal came from one of three sources that varied in their alignment with Israeli interests: the “President of the American Jewish Congress” (positive alignment), from the “President of the Arab League” (negative alignment) or from “the Swiss prime minister” (neutral alignment). The results document that those with partisan interests used the favorableness of the third party’s proposal to their preferences as indicative of the third party’s trustworthiness, whereas those with nonpartisan interests used the evenhandedness of the proposal in determining their trust judgments.

Of course, the Arad and Carnevale (1994) article makes clear they were comparing the reactions of people (in this case, students) who were pro-Israeli with people who were neutral, not with people who were pro-Arab (who would be partisan in the opposite direction from the first group). It would be much more difficult to reach agreements when both sides are strongly partisan. Such a real-world example presented itself in July of the year 2000, when Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat and U.S. president Bill Clinton gathered at Camp David. For two weeks, these individuals and their respective teams strived to develop a solution that would end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but ultimately, no agreement was reached. Peter studied this more complex situation when he, along with many of the participants from the Summit, participated in a conference at Tel Aviv University in 2003 that focused on the failed dispute resolution attempt made at the July 2000 Camp David Summit. Peter’s take on what might explain the failed mediation effort (Carnevale, 2005) focused on three areas, namely problems of agenda (e.g., sequencing of issues to discuss), problems of time pressure (e.g., was there really enough preparation time to secure a deal in the 2-week summit period?) and problems of mediation (e.g., controlling the communication made by the negotiators, as well as self-control by the mediator). Again, we see Peter using the lessons from the real world in some of his publications post-Camp David, such as his work on message framing (Olekalns et al., 2005) and his work on time perspectives in negotiation (Henderson et al., 2006).

As I hope this section of the paper has made clear, Peter’s career has been one that has moved seamlessly between the laboratory and the field, and his work in one area has helped inform his work in the other. For those of us who practice and study dispute resolution, I hope Peter keeps moving back and forth between these two worlds. This process of moving back and forth between the laboratory and the field and vice versa also led to his development of diverse and creative research methods.

**All Roads Lead to Rome: A Multi-Method Approach to Conflict**

—Carsten De Dreu

Peter Carnevale and I met for the first time at the 1990 meeting of the International Association for Conflict Management in Den Dolder, the Netherlands. My dissertation chair, Evert van de Vliert, had arranged for me to visit Peter in Urbana-Champaign the next semester and IACM provided the venue to meet and discuss possible projects. I was a junior PhD student; Peter was an established scientist in our field with no published paper I had not read. Our encounter and collaborative work in the years that followed have shaped my thinking and scientific approach profoundly in two ways.

First, my dissertation project was concerned with the way that cognitive biases and gain–loss framing, in particular, shape bargaining processes and negotiation behavior (De Dreu et al., 1992a; De Dreu et al., 1992b). Peter was pondering the same question (e.g., McCusker & Carnevale, 1995), adding the idea that cognitive biases may have a motivational grounding; that is, people may be motivated to think in certain ways and that inert cognitive biases may accentuate the goals people pursue. Grounded in his early work with Dean Pruitt (e.g., Carnevale, Sherer & Pruitt, 1979; Pruitt et al., 1983), Peter considered incentive
systems, in particular those that motivate cooperation as key in not only driving negotiation behavior and outcomes, but perhaps also the emergence and influence of cognitive biases and heuristics. His insight, and the subsequent studies we conducted in his research laboratory at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (e.g., De Dreu et al., 1994), became a stepping-stone in my early career studies in motivated information processing in negotiation (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; De Dreu, Weingart & Kwon, 2000), group decision-making (De Dreu, Nijstad & Van Knippenberg, 2008) and team innovation (De Dreu, 2007; De Dreu & West, 2001). Across these context and settings, Peter’s intuition that cooperative (versus competitive) incentives cue decision-makers out of hurtful biases in thinking and reasoning turned out key.

Already early in his career, Peter demonstrated an open mind to methods. Too often, social scientists are single-mindedly focused on the method that brought them success, be it behavioral experiments, in-depth interviews, self-report questionnaires, agent-based simulations or introspective arm-chair philosophy. Peter’s work, in contrast, was methodologically eclectic, relying on behavioral experiments on integrative negotiation (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Carnevale & Lawler, 1986), in-depth interviews with stakeholders in intractable conflict (Carnevale & Pegnetter, 1985) or, more recently, social robotics (e.g., De Melo et al., 2015). Methods were subordinate to the research questions and were instrumental to probing clever observations of actual conflicts, such as the Israel-Palestinian conflict, labor negotiations and third-party interventions.

Peter’s open mind with regard to methods cumulated in our two-volume Special Issue for *International Negotiation* (Carnevale & De Dreu, 2004; Carnevale & De Dreu, 2005a; Carnevale & De Dreu, 2005b; also see Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006). Across the range of quantitative and qualitative methods used and discussed in the contributions to these special issues, we observed substantial convergence in findings—multiple methods can validate each other and inform each other, with the sum significantly exceeding its parts (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2005). It was an insight and lesson that deeply influenced my own work and advocacy. All roads lead to Rome, and social and behavioral science is no different.

Peter’s scholarship and curiosity, along with his mastery of a range of methodological approaches to the study of conflict and negotiation, has shaped my thinking and doing in numerous ways. I pride myself for having had two mentors—Evert van de Vliert and Peter Carnevale—who alone and in combination set the stage for life-long learning and discovery. It is difficult to overestimate the impact of Peter’s hosting of me in Urbana-Champaign, allowing me the freedom to pursue my own thinking and interests with fellow students like Michele Gelfand, Chris McCusker, and Joe Lualhati and, last but not least, teaching me how—and why—to study conflict.

Coda

As the 2002 Jeffrey Z. Rubin Theory-to-Practice recipient, Peter Carnevale has advanced theory and practice in conflict studies through his bilateral takeaways between the laboratory and the field, his development of innovative constructs and his methodological diversity. His research journeys into the role of time pressures in negotiation, constituent–negotiator relationships, emotion and reverse appraisals, third-party power and interests, computer simulated bargaining and multiple methods in conflict studies have laid the groundwork for future scholarship and generated valuable insights for researchers and practitioners. We pay tribute to him, his career and the many contributions he has made to conflict management.

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