Addressing Strategic Manipulation Disparities in Fair Classification

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ABSTRACT

In real-world classification settings, such as loan application evaluation or content moderation on online platforms, individuals respond to classifier predictions by strategically updating their features to increase their likelihood of receiving a particular (positive) decision (at a certain cost). Yet, when different demographic groups have different feature distributions or pay different update costs, prior work has shown that individuals from minority groups often pay a higher cost to update their features. Fair classification aims to address such classifier performance disparities by constraining the classifiers to satisfy statistical fairness properties. However, we show that standard fairness constraints do not guarantee that the constrained classifier reduces the disparity in strategic manipulation cost. To address such biases in strategic settings and provide equal opportunities for strategic manipulation, we propose a constrained optimization framework that constructs classifiers that lower the strategic manipulation cost for minority groups. We develop our framework by studying theoretical connections between group-specific strategic cost disparity and standard selection rate fairness metrics (e.g., statistical rate and true positive rate). Empirically, we show the efficacy of this approach over multiple real-world datasets.

CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies → Learning paradigms.

KEYWORDS
fair classification, strategic manipulations, social burden gap

1 INTRODUCTION

In prediction/classification settings, the goal is to develop automated models that accurately predict class labels using the available demographic and task-specific features of individuals. The use of predictive models in many real-world applications, however, impacts the features of the underlying population. One direct way this happens is when individuals take steps to update their features to potentially obtain a different prediction in the future. In binary classification, where positive class labels can denote success for a given task, individuals who have been negatively classified will attempt to update their features in a manner that increases their likelihood of receiving a positive decision in the future.

There are numerous examples of such individual behavior in response to institutional decisions. Consider the setting of loan applications, where the features are individuals’ demographics, annual income, credit history, number of dependents, the number of open credit lines, etc. The class label to be predicted is whether an individual will default on a loan or not. The number of open credit lines is a feature that is often positively correlated with the class label and individuals can increase their likelihood of positive loan application (or increase their credit score) by opening more credit lines1. However, opening credit lines requires additional investment on the part of the individuals [8]. Another example is social media websites and online platforms. Even without a complete understanding of a platform’s recommendation system, users nevertheless attempt to intervene in different ways to exercise control over the platform’s algorithms [40]. For example, content moderation tools used in social media platforms flag objectionable posts, which are then suppressed by the recommendation system to ensure low visibility [17] (often unfairly targeting minority voices [20, 48]). Users, in this case, curate and modify their content to work around the platform’s decision [5, 40]. Beyond content moderation, strategic manipulation can allow users to avoid harassment, as seen in the case of Twitter [5]. Evidence of users’ attempts to exercise control over an online platform’s algorithms has similarly been observed in ride-hailing apps like Uber and Lyft [36]. A final example is the setting of college admissions, where the features are individuals’ demographics, school academic records, extra-curricular records, and scores from standardized tests like GRE. The class label to be predicted is the likelihood of academic “success" to determine college admissions. In this case, while higher scores for standardized tests increase the chances of a successful college application, students

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1For the sake of simplicity, assume all the other features are unchanged; in real-world scenarios, there will be simultaneous dependence on other variables as well here, e.g. whether the individual has been regular with their payments or not.
can take these tests multiple times and submit only the highest scores. Nevertheless, there is an additional investment required as every additional test attempt involves monetary and time expenses [42]. Feature manipulations of these kinds can also take the form of positive steps taken by individuals to improve their features (e.g., investing additional time in test preparation) [2, 30] and/or provide individuals with the agency to address model decisions [39, 41].

The above-described process involves two main players: the institution constructing a classifier and the individuals reacting to the classifier. While the institution’s goal is to minimize prediction error (or maximize a certain measure of utility), individuals react to the classifier predictions by strategically manipulating their features to achieve a positive classification. In these strategic settings, often due to historical biases, the classifier employed by the institution can pose relatively higher costs for strategic manipulation (i.e., increased costs to improve their feature values) for individuals from minority groups (e.g., race and gender minorities). Prior work has observed such disparities in settings where the datasets used for training the classifier encode social biases or when minority groups pay larger costs to update their features [26, 34]. For example, in the case of loan applications, historical discrimination against African Americans in financial aspects often deters them from seeking new credit lines [46]. In the case of social media platforms, content moderation tools exhibit bias against minority groups, for example, by reducing the visibility of posts by advocates from minority groups [3, 20, 24] or by using biased sentiment analysis tools [10, 29]; these biases lead to greater hurdles for these groups to make their voices heard. Similarly, for graduate school admissions, Wilson [45] revealed limitations of GRE and UGPA scores in predicting graduate school success for Black students. Using these scores without considering the racial disparities can create a higher admission barrier for Black students. These biases are a result of negative stereotypes and/or historical lack of opportunities for minority groups and classifiers that inherit such biases can further propagate them. In the presence of these biases in the predictions of trained classifiers, one can ask whether an institution can construct classifiers that provide equal opportunities for strategic manipulation to all groups and address the systemic disparities in investment required to improve their outcomes. Strategic manipulation opportunities often serve as mechanisms to provide individuals with recourse or agency against biased institutional decisions [41]. As such, equalizing manipulation opportunities will ensure that majority groups do not solely take advantage of effective strategic manipulations and provide similar power to minority groups to address classifier decisions.

Fairness-constrained classification attempts to address such disparities in classifier performance by constraining the classifier to satisfy certain statistical fairness properties. For example, when constraining with respect to statistical rate, the classifiers are constrained to have an almost-equal selection rate for all groups [1, 6, 13, 38, 47]. Similarly, when constraining with respect to equalized odds, the classifiers are constrained to have equal false positive and true positive rates for all groups [6, 22, 38]. However, these fairness metrics and constraints operate in a static manner and do not take into account the response of the individuals to the classifier predictions or the disparity in costs that different groups pay for updating their features. Even though fairness constraints encourage the increased selection of minority group individuals, existing dataset biases or update cost disparities can still disproportionately affect the negatively-classified individuals in the minority group. Correspondingly, the primary question we investigate is the following: Do constraints that use standard static fairness metrics lead to classifiers that reduce strategic manipulation costs for minority groups?

Our Contributions. We first theoretically study the relationship between standard selection rate fairness metrics (like statistical rate and true positive rate disparity) and the disparity in strategic manipulation costs between majority and minority groups when only one-dimensional features and group membership of individuals are provided (Section 3). Our analysis shows that threshold-based classifiers that have an equal selection rate for all groups can still have higher strategic manipulation costs for the disadvantaged groups when feature distributions or cost functions differ across groups. (Theorem 3.3, 3.4). Prior works on strategic cost disparities only demonstrated that this disparity can be large in unconstrained settings [26, 34]. Our analysis demonstrates that even “fair” classifiers that are constrained using selection rate fairness metrics can still have large strategic cost disparities. To address this bias, we bound the strategic cost disparity using the statistical properties of the classifier and the cost function. Using these bounds as constraints, we construct classifiers that have both low selection rate disparity and low strategic cost disparity. We also extend the results to multi-dimensional settings when the classifier is linear and the cost function is linear or quadratic (Section 4). The primary technical challenge we face in proving our results is accounting for all factors that result in strategic cost disparity. As we discuss in Section 3, this disparity can arise due to multiple reasons, such as unequal group selection rates, variation in cost functions across groups, and “distance” of negatively-classified individuals from classifier thresholds. Correspondingly, our results quantify the relationship between the strategic cost incurred by each group and the group’s selection rate using all relevant factors, including bounds on the cost function gradient and other related empirical properties of the classifier. Using these bounds, we can construct appropriate classifiers that minimize strategic cost disparity. Our theoretical results are complemented by empirical analysis on two real-world financial datasets: the FICO credit dataset [22] and the Adult income dataset [11] (Section 5). For both datasets, we show that fair classification with our proposed constraints leads to lower manipulation costs for the minority group.

Related Work. Studies by Milli et al. [34] and Hu et al. [26] first analyzed strategic manipulation cost disparities when feature distributions or cost functions are biased against minority groups. However, their analysis is limited to classifiers that optimize institution utility; in contrast, we also study classifiers that optimize utility subject to standard fairness constraints. Estornell et al. [14] and Braverman and Garg [4], on the other hand, assess classifier fairness in strategic settings using only selection rate fairness metrics. Estornell et al. [14] observed that statistical parity or equalized odds constrained classifiers become less “fair” (with respect to the same metrics) than unconstrained classifiers due to strategic manipulations. Braverman and Garg [4] study the impact of randomness on classifiers trained in strategic settings and propose the use of noisy...
features to address selection rate disparities in the outputs of these classifiers. Like our work, both these papers evaluate the impact of fair classification in strategic settings; however, they analyze the fairness of final individual outcomes using only selection rate metrics and do not consider the costs disparity across groups. Similar to strategic updates, Ustun et al. [39] consider the notion of action-able recourse and provide tools to minimize recourse cost for linear classifiers. However, their work does not aim to address recourse cost disparities. Gupta et al. [19], von Kügelgen et al. [43] extend this line of work to study recourse disparities in classification; however, their models only handle settings where cost functions are the same for all groups. As noted in multiple prior studies [9, 41], minority group individuals often pay larger costs to update their features, which then leads to recourse disparities. Our framework is, hence, more generic (than [19, 43]) as it tackles both cost and feature disparities.

Static fairness constraints in non-strategic settings, that compare the selection rate of majority and minority groups, have been extensively studied in the context of constructing fair classifiers [1, 6, 13, 28, 31, 38, 47, 49, 50]. For non-strategic settings, Hu and Chen [25] show that selection rate-constrained classifiers may not improve the average quality of predictions received by the disadvantaged groups. We extend this direction to analyze the impact of fair classification in strategic settings. Recent work on strategic settings has also studied classifiers that are robust to strategic updates [7, 12, 21, 23, 27, 30]. The analysis in these papers is primarily from the viewpoint of an institution maximizing its utility given information about individuals’ behavior and these papers do not consider the fairness goal of reducing manipulation costs disparities with respect to protected attributes. Our paper, instead, considers the individuals’ perspective and addresses the cost disparities arising from group memberships. While we look at the one-step feedback models, performative prediction algorithms model multi-step feedback settings to construct classifiers that are stable over induced distributions [33, 37]. For ease of analysis, we limit our study to one-step feedback settings.

2 MODEL FORMALIZATION

Let \( x \in X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d \) denote the features of an individual in the population, \( y \in \{0, 1\} \) denote the true class label to be predicted and \( z \in \mathcal{Z} \) denote the protected attribute (assumed to be binary for our current analysis). We will use \( \mathcal{D} \) to denote the underlying joint distribution of features, class labels, and protected attributes, and let \( X, Y, Z \) denote the respective random variables. We will work with threshold-based classifiers \( f : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \) which set a threshold on the likelihood of any point achieving a positive class label.

Strategic manipulations and individual cost functions. As mentioned earlier, individuals can update or manipulate their features at a certain cost after observing a classifier prediction. Let \( c : X \times X' \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) denote the cost function such that \( c(x, x') \) is the cost paid by an individual to update their feature from \( x \) to \( x' \). The subsequent utility gained by the individual from this update can be quantified as \( u_\epsilon(f, x') := f(x') - c(x, x') \). In this setting, the optimal feature update for an individual (in response to a classifier \( f \)) is captured by \( \Delta_f(x) := \arg \max_{x' \in \mathcal{Z}} u_\epsilon(f, x') \). Since we only aim to model updates that lead to improved classifier prediction, we will study cost functions that have no feature update cost if the individual is already positively classified. In other words, individuals are rational and aim to maximize their utility (this assumption is consistent with prior work on strategic settings [21, 26]).

The institution’s aim, in the unconstrained setting, is to minimize error w.r.t. a given loss function \( L \), i.e., find the classifier \( f \) that minimizes \( \mathbb{E}_\mathcal{D}[L(f; X, Y)] \). When using unmanipulated data, this loss will be a proxy measure for \( \mathbb{P}_\mathcal{D}[f(X) = Y] \), while for manipulated data, this loss will be a surrogate for \( \mathbb{P}_\mathcal{D}[f(\Delta_f(X)) = Y] \) (i.e., the standard accuracy measure in strategic classification [21, 32, 33]). Any common classification loss function can be used for \( L \); e.g., we use the log-loss function in some of our simulations. Other common loss functions, such as mean square loss, hinge loss, or regularized versions of these functions, can also be used with our framework. However, to incorporate fairness in this optimization program, we need additional fairness constraints.

Ground truth label \( y \). Feature manipulations represent actions or changes that are under individual-level control, such that positively manipulating the relevant features can potentially lead to a change in the classifier decision for this individual. In a variety of real-world settings, individual actions to update features \( x \) can either change their ground truth label \( y \) or not affect their ground truth label depending on the nature of the update and the context. In all cases, it is important to ensure that equal opportunities for manipulations are available across demographic groups. However, in this paper, we primarily consider the settings where strategic manipulations are used as a recourse option to address unfair institutional decisions. While our model and theoretical analysis can handle both settings (i.e., when manipulations change ground truth and when they don’t affect ground truth), our empirical analysis will primarily focus on cases where ground truth remains unchanged due to strategic updates, as these updates capture recourse strategies. This assumption is also consistent with other works on strategic or adversarial manipulations [14, 18, 21].

To see why it is important to study strategic manipulations as a recourse option we present a few examples where feature updates do not lead to a change in ground truth label \( y \) but still provide valuable agency to individuals.

- **Example (1):** On online platforms, costs associated with individuals’ actions can be seen to depend on a variety of factors. Many studies have reported that Black activists face higher levels of censorship on social media platforms simply due to mentions of race-associated terms [20]. To counter this, such activists have to manipulate their posts (e.g., by changing certain words or using screenshots) to get around the automated moderation tools, paying a cost in terms of time and resources required for such manipulation. Note that, these actions do not change the ground truth label \( y \) of the post (i.e., the post continues to remain non-offensive), yet the censored individuals have to take action and pay associated costs so that the automated system aligns with their ground truth label.

- **Example (2):** In a lending situation, an individual’s credit score is an important factor when evaluating their loan application. However, many studies have shown that changes in credit scores are related

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2Any hypothesis class where the classifier output is a distribution over the labels (e.g., logistic regression, Naive Bayes and MLPs) can be represented using threshold-based classifiers and correspondingly used in our framework.
to factors beyond an individual’s financial credibility. Take the following example from a CNBC article:\footnote{https://www.cnbc.com/select/paying-off-credit-card-debt-boosts-credit-score/} two people with equal annual income, equal credit card debt, and equal credit limit got the $1200 stimulus check. The first one used the entire amount to pay off the credit card debt while the second one used $600 towards paying off their debt and used $600 for their savings. However, due to different credit utilization rates, the first person’s credit score will be higher than the second person’s score. Both individuals in this case have the same income/resources and, if they both applied for a loan, they arguably would have a similar likelihood to pay back the loan (implying no significant changes in ground truth for default risk $y$). Yet, because the first person has a higher credit score, any decision-making policy that uses credit scores would prefer the first person for the loan. Hence, individual actions affect classifier decisions, sometimes independent of ground truth.

The above examples are settings where individuals can use strategic manipulations as a recourse option when they believe that the institution’s decision is not correct. These examples also make it clear that addressing incorrect decisions can require monetary or time investments by individuals. In these examples and numerous other settings explored in prior work\cite{1, 10, 24, 45}, strategic manipulations are used by individuals to exercise control over institutional decisions. We primarily analyze strategic manipulations in these recourse contexts because our analysis considers the perspective of the individuals and the agency provided to them to address unfair institutional decisions. The institution can use a classifier that either simply maximizes their utility/accuracy or they can use one that is fair with respect to standard selection rate fairness metrics. We evaluate the impact of such classifiers on individuals from different groups and the average cost they have to pay to positively manipulate their features based on their group membership.

**Selection rate fairness metrics.** The protected attribute $z \in Z$ is the focus of our analysis of fairness. Standard fair classification algorithms measure fairness using group-specific selection rates, either over the entire population or over certain subpopulations\cite{6, 35}. For any sub-population condition $\psi: X \times Y \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, the (conditional) selection rate of a classifier $f$ with respect to protected attribute group $z$ can be defined as $H_z(f, \psi) = \mathbb{P}_{D}[f(X) = 1 \mid \psi(X, Y) = 1, Z = z]$. With respect to this definition, the conditional selection rate fairness of $f$ can be quantified as $H(f, \psi) = H_0(f, \psi) - H_1(f, \psi)$.

If the condition is identity, i.e. $\psi(x, y) = 1$, then $H_z(f, \psi)$ simply measures the fraction of elements in group $z$ that are positively classified and $H(f, \psi)$ in this case is the standard statistical rate metric\cite{13}. If the condition is $\psi(x, y) = 1(y=1)$, then $H_z(f, \psi)$ measures the true positive rate for group $z$, and $H(f, \psi)$ is the true positive rate disparity across the protected attribute groups\cite{22, 47}. Using the above definition of $H$, all standard linear fairness metrics considered in Celis et al.\cite{6} can be represented in additive form. When clear from context, we will use shorthand $\psi$ to denote $\psi(\cdot, \cdot)$.

**Strategic cost disparity.** The power of strategic manipulation can be different for different demographic groups, which is the primary kind of bias we tackle in this paper. As mentioned earlier, these biases can occur when the underlying distributions vary across groups due to possibly different historical evolution trajectories followed by group-specific distributions\cite{46}, or when one group pays larger update costs than others for similar updates\cite{15}.

For a classifier $f$, the expected cost incurred by individuals from group $Z = z$ can be measured using $\mathbb{E}_{D}[c(X, \Delta_f(X)) \mid Z = z]$, a quantity referred to as the social burden for the group $z$ by Milli et al.\cite{34}. Therefore, one measure of fairness we can look at in this strategic setting is the following gap: $\mathbb{E}[c(X, \Delta_f(X)) \mid Z = 0] - \mathbb{E}[c(X, \Delta_f(X)) \mid Z = 1]$. Higher values ($> 0$) of this quantity imply that individuals from group 0, on average, pay a larger cost to strategically manipulate their features than individuals from group 1. While the above measure evaluates the cost for all individuals in each group, different contexts might require focusing on different sub-populations of individuals from each group. E.g., in the recidivism risk assessment setting\cite{44}, we may want to analyze the average cost paid by a low-risk individual from the minority group who has been deemed high-risk to overturn the classifier decision. In this case, the expected cost $\mathbb{E}[c(X, \Delta_f(X)) \mid Y = 1, Z = z]$ is more relevant ($Y = 1$ denotes low-risk). Hence, in general, for any classifier $f$, we can define the social burden for any group $z$ with respect a given sub-population condition $\psi: X \times Y \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ as $G_z(f, \psi) = \mathbb{E}[c(X, \Delta_f(X)) \mid \psi(X, Y) = 1, Z = z]$ and, correspondingly, define the social burden gap as $G(f, \psi) = G_0(f, \psi) - G_1(f, \psi)$.

Classifiers that equalize manipulation costs ($G(f, \cdot) = 0$) ensure that all groups have similar manipulation power. In certain cases, we might even require $G(f, \cdot) < 0$ to counter historical inequalities faced by disadvantaged groups. Hence, our goal is to provide an optimization framework to construct classifiers with a desired social burden gap.

### 3 Linking Selection-Rate Fairness and Social Burden Gap in One-Dimensional Setting

We first look at the case when the features are one-dimensional and positive, i.e., $X \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}$. This setting models several real-world scenarios such as the use of credit scores for loan applications or exam scores for school admissions. Furthermore, when the likelihood of positive classification $\mathbb{P}[Y = 1 \mid X = x]$ can be computed (even approximately), one can use the likelihood as the feature for classification (similar to the model of Milli et al.\cite{34}).

Secondly, we will assume outcome monotonicity of the cost function with respect to the feature: if $x_1 > x_2$, then $c(x_2, r) > c(x_1, r)$. In this case, threshold-based classifiers will classify all individuals with feature values greater than a specific threshold as positive and all individuals with feature values less than the threshold as negative. As mentioned before, we study cost functions that only have non-zero costs for the individuals classified as negative. Hence, we assume that the cost function $c$ has the following property: $c(x_1, x_2)$ is non-zero (and positive) only when $x_1 < x_2$; i.e., for a continuous and differentiable function $d: \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, we can say that $c(x_1, x_2) = d(x_1, x_2) \cdot (1 x_2 > x_1)$. Due to outcome monotonicity, the gradient of $c(x_1, x_2)$ with respect to $x_1$ will be negative. We note that these assumptions are similar to those considered in\cite{26, 34}.
Prior work has shown that two kinds of biases can lead to manipulation cost disparities: feature biases and cost function biases. For the first part of the analysis, we focus on feature biases and we analyze the impact of cost function biases later in this section. Feature biases refer to settings where disadvantaged group individuals have scores concentrated in sub-spaces that have a lower likelihood of positive classification; e.g., credit score datasets exhibit these biases for African-Americans [22]. They can be formally defined as follows. For a sub-population condition $\psi$, there is feature bias against group $Z = 0$ in distribution $\mathcal{D}$ if, for all $x \in X, z \in \{0, 1\}$ s.t. \[ Pr\{X < x \mid Z = z, \psi(X, Y) = 1\} \in (0, 1), \] we have that \[ \mathbb{P}_\mathcal{D}\{X < x \mid Z = 0, \psi(X, Y) = 1\} > \mathbb{P}_\mathcal{D}\{X < x \mid Z = 1, \psi(X, Y) = 1\}. \]

With respect to feature biases, we restate the result of Milli et al. [34] respectively.

**Proposition 3.1.** Suppose we have a sub-population condition $\psi$ and a cost function $c(\cdot, \cdot)$. For a classifier $f_\tau$, characterized by a single threshold $\tau$, if there is feature bias against group 0 as defined in (1) then for all $x \in X$, $G(f_\tau, \psi) > 0$.

Proposition 3.1 states that if there is feature bias against group 0 then using $f_\tau$ leads to higher expected strategic cost for group 0 than group 1. For the one-dimensional setting, the above result shows that a single threshold-based classifier can be discriminatory. Classifiers that use group-specific thresholds, on the other hand, can achieve low social burden gaps as we show below. For $\tau_0, \tau_1 \in X$, let $f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}$ denote the classifier that uses threshold $\tau_0, \tau_1$ for group 0, 1 respectively.

**Proposition 3.2.** Suppose we are given a sub-population condition $\psi$ and a cost function $c(x_1, x_2)$. Say there is feature bias against group 0 in distribution $\mathcal{D}$ as defined in (1). Then there exist $\tau_0, \tau_1 \in X^S$ such that $G(f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}, \psi) < 0$.

Proposition 3.2 shows that appropriately selected group-specific thresholds can lead to a relatively lower social burden for disadvantaged groups; strategies for efficiently searching for these appropriate thresholds are discussed later in this section. The proofs of both propositions are presented in Appendix A. We next study whether group-specific classifiers that are fair with respect to selection rate fairness metric $H(f, \psi)$ also have low social burden gap $G(f, \psi)$.

As mentioned earlier, one of the goals of fair classification is to provide equal opportunities for all demographic groups. By equalizing selection rates across groups, prior work forces the classifier to select more disadvantaged group individuals who otherwise would not be selected in the unconstrained case due to dataset biases. However, we show below that achieving fairness w.r.t. selection rate-based metrics (like statistical rate) may not lead to reduced strategic manipulation costs for the disadvantaged group. This is because the average strategic cost incurred by a group depends on the distance between the classifier’s threshold for the group and the features of negatively classified individuals from this group; the greater this distance, the greater the strategic cost. Even when a classifier $f$ with fair w.r.t. selection rate fairness metric $H(f, \cdot)$, it may not be fair w.r.t. social burden gap $G(f, \cdot)$ since the distance between classifier threshold and features of negatively-classified individuals of a minority group can still be large (Section 5.1 presents simulations on this point). The following theorem quantifies this issue and shows that the social burden gap depends not just on selection rate disparity, but also on cost function and classifier properties.

**Theorem 3.3.** Suppose we are given group-specific thresholds $\tau_0, \tau_1$ and a sub-population condition $\psi$, and the cost function $c(x_1, x_2) = d(x_1, x_2))1(x_2 > x_1)$. For a fixed $x_2$, suppose that the gradient of $d$ with respect to $x_1$ at any point in $(0, x_2)$ is in the range $\{g_1, g_2\}$, for some $g_1 \leq g_2 \leq 0$. Let $\mathbb{P}_Z(\tau) = \mathbb{P}\{X \in (0, \tau) \mid Z = z, \psi\}$ and $\mathbb{E}_{XZ} = \mathbb{E}\{X \mid X \in [0, \tau], Z = z, \psi\}P(\tau)$. Then, we can bound the social burden gap of classifier $f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}$ as follows

\[ G(f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}, \psi) \leq g_2\mathbb{E}_{\tau_0}H(f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}, \psi) + (g_2r_0 - g_1r_0)P(\tau_0) - g_2E_{\tau_1} + g_1E_{\tau_0}. \]

\[ G(f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}, \psi) \geq g_1\mathbb{E}_{\tau_1}H(f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}, \psi) + (g_1r_1 - g_2r_0)P(\tau_0) - g_1E_{\tau_1} + g_2E_{\tau_0}. \]

In this case, the upper and lower bounds are equal to the selection rate gap for group 0 and group 1. Consider the setting when $d$ is linear, i.e., $d(x_1, x_2) = x_2 - x_1$. In this case, the upper and lower bounds are equal and the social burden gap is $(\tau_0 - \tau_1)P(\tau_0) - E_{\tau_1} + E_{\tau_0}$. Since $H(f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}, \psi) = 0$, we can simplify $G(f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}, \psi)$ to be $(\tau_0 - E[X \mid X \in [0, \tau_0], Z = 0] + E[X \mid X \in [0, \tau_1], Z = 1] - E[P(\tau_0))]$.

In this equation, $\tau_z - E[X \mid X \in [0, \tau_z], Z = z]$ is the average distance of feature values of negatively-classified individuals of group $z$ from the decision boundary. The difference between these distances for group 0 and group 1 depends on the choice of $\tau_0, \tau_1$ and group distributions. To intuitively understand this dependence, we provide simulations over datasets generated using Gaussian distributions in Section 5.1. The simulations show that as the distribution variance increases, the social burden gap of classifiers, constrained to have $H(f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}, \psi) = 0$, can also dramatically increase. This is why simply constraining $H(f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}, \psi)$ is not sufficient to obtain a classifier with a low social burden gap. However, when $H(f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}, \psi) < 0$, the difference between the above distances is unlikely to be small since (a) low $H$ implies that $\tau_0$ is higher or similar to $\tau_1$ and (b) due to feature bias the feature values of group 0 are lower than group 1. Hence, $H(f_{\tau_0, \tau_1}, \psi)$ being greater than or equal to 0 is necessary (but not sufficient) to have low social burden gap.

**Extension to group-specific cost functions.** In many settings, strategic cost disparity can arise due to cost function biases, i.e., from different groups having different cost functions. Due to these biases, for the same unit of a feature update, the disadvantaged group would pay a larger cost than the advantaged group; e.g., African Americans face larger access barriers to credit than White Americans [9]. To account for group-specific costs, Theorem 3.3 can be extended to use group-specific gradient bounds for the cost function; incorporating them leads to the following bounds.

**Theorem 3.4.** Suppose we are given group-specific thresholds $\tau_0, \tau_1$ and a sub-population condition $\psi$. Let $c_\psi(x_1, x_2) = d_\psi(x_1, x_2))1(x_2 > x_1)$ denote the cost for group $z$ individuals. For a fixed $x_2$, suppose that the gradient of $d_\psi$ with respect to $x_1$ at any point in $(0, x_2)$ is in the range $\{g_1z, g_2z\}$, for some $g_1z \leq g_2z \leq 0$ for all $z \in \{0, 1\}$. Let
$P_z(\tau) := P[X \in (0, \tau) \mid Z = z, \psi]$ and $E_{x,\tau} = E[X \mid X \in [0, \tau], Z = z, \psi]P_z(\tau)$. Then, the social burden gap $G(f_{n, \tau_1}, \psi)$ is upper-bounded by

$$g_{x_1, \tau_1} H(f_{n, \tau_1}, \psi) + (g_{x_1, \tau_1} - g_{1, \tau_0}) P_0(\tau_0) - g_{1, \tau_1} E_{1, \tau_1} + g_{1, \tau_0} E_{0, \tau_0},$$

and lower bounded by

$$g_{1, \tau_1} H(f_{n, \tau_1}, \psi) + (g_{1, \tau_1} - g_{1, \tau_0}) P_0(\tau_0) - g_{1, \tau_1} E_{1, \tau_1} + g_{1, \tau_0} E_{0, \tau_0}.$$
American individuals and threshold \( c \). We use the linear cost function

\[
H(g, \psi_{\text{fr}}) = \sum_{x \in S} (g(x) - c)^2 \cdot (1 - t_{\text{fr}}(x)) + \gamma \cdot \sum_{x \in S} g(x) \cdot t_{\text{fr}}(x)
\]


for the individual's group. Since the credit scores lie in the range \((200, 900)\), we evaluate all possible classifiers, with two thresholds \( \tau_0 \) and \( \tau_1 \), for around 20k random samples from the dataset. However, almost equal group selection rates do not imply parity with respect to social burden. For classifiers with statistical rate close to 0, the social burden gap ranges from \([-12, 30]\).

**5.2 FICO Credit Dataset**

**Dataset.** We use the FICO credit data [22] for preliminary real-world data analysis of classifiers that are fair with respect to standard fairness metrics and classifiers that are fair with respect to the social burden gap. This dataset contains 116k credit scores corresponding to White individuals and 16k credit scores corresponding to Black/African-American individuals and a binary class label for loan default for each individual (pre-processing details are provided in Appendix B). As shown by prior work [34], this dataset exhibits feature bias against African-American individuals.

**Methodology.** Around 20k random samples from the dataset are removed to create a test partition. Each classifier is composed of two thresholds \((\tau_0, \tau_1)\). Threshold \( \tau_0 \) is for credit scores of African-American individuals and threshold \( \tau_1 \) is for credit scores of White individuals. A classifier assigns a positive class label to an individual if the individual's credit score is larger than the classifier's threshold for the individual's group. Since the credit scores lie in the range from 1 to 100, we evaluate all possible classifiers, with \( \tau_0, \tau_1 \) in the set \( \{1, 2, \ldots, 100\} \times \{1, 2, \ldots, 100\} \), and record their properties.

We use the linear cost function \( c(x, y) = 1(x > x') \cdot (x - x') \) for this section and provide results for the quadratic separable cost function in Appendix C. We analyze classifier performance for two sub-population conditions: (a) \( \psi_{\text{fr}} \), which is always 1, i.e., \( \psi_{\text{fr}}(x, y) = 1 \), for all \( x, y \), and (b) \( \psi_{\text{fr}} \), which is 1 if true class label is 1, i.e., \( \psi_{\text{fr}}(x, y) = 1(y = 1) \). \( H(f, \psi_{\text{fr}}) \) measures statistical rate and \( H(f, \psi_{\text{fr}}) \) measures true positive rate disparity.

**Results.** Statistical rate \( H(\cdot, \psi_{\text{fr}}) \) vs social burden gap \( G(\cdot, \psi_{\text{fr}}) \). Plot 2a presents the results for classifiers that use the same threshold for both groups. As discussed in Proposition 3.1, these classifiers always have social burden gap \( \geq 0 \) and lead to higher strategic manipulation cost for African-American individuals. Furthermore, even the statistical rate of these classifiers is low implying that all classifiers using single thresholds select White individuals at a higher rate. Plot 2b presents fairness metrics for classifiers that use group-specific thresholds. Here, we observe that the range of values achieved for statistical rate and low social burden gap is much larger. A classifier with a high statistical rate favoring the disadvantaged group \((>0.5)\) also has a low social burden gap \((-10)\) for this dataset. However, almost equal group selection rates do not imply parity with respect to social burden. For classifiers with statistical rate close to 0, the social burden gap ranges from \([-12, 30]\).

**True positive rate** \( H(\cdot, \psi_{\text{fpr}}) \) vs social burden gap \( G(\cdot, \psi_{\text{fpr}}) \). With \( \psi_{\text{fpr}} \), we compute costs for individuals who are incorrectly negatively classified. From Plot 3a, we again see that single-threshold classifiers have social burden gap \( \geq 0 \). Plot 3b, however, shows that there exist group-specific thresholds that result in low social burden gap and high true positive rate for African-American individuals. Plots 2c, d, 3c, d present the relationship between group thresholds and fairness metrics. Increasing group 0 threshold increases the social burden for group 0 and decreases the statistical/true positive rate as positive classifications decrease.

**Constructing classifiers with low social burden gap.** We next empirically analyze the inequalities in Theorem 3.3. Suppose the goal of the institution is to maximize accuracy subject to the constraint that social burden gap is \( \leq g \). Since group 0 is the marginalized one, the institution aims to achieve a non-positive social burden gap to address the manipulation cost disparities. As shown in 3.3, social burden gap is upper bounded by \( g_u \tau_1 H(f, \psi) + (g_u \tau_1 - g \tau_0) P_0(\tau_0) - g_0 E_1\tau_1 + g_0 E_0\tau_0 \). For the linear cost function, \( g_u = g_l = 1 \). Hence, we use the burden gap constraint

\[
\tau_1 H(f, \psi) - (\tau_0 - \tau_0) P_0(\tau_0) + E_1\tau_1 - E_0\tau_0 \leq g.
\]

For \( g = 0 \), Figure 4 plots the accuracy and social burden gap of all classifiers that satisfy the above conditions for \( \psi_{\text{fr}} \) and \( \psi_{\text{fpr}} \). The
an individual is above $50k or not. The strategic features available
around 251k individuals from the state of California surveyed in
2019. The classification task is to predict whether the income of
Income dataset. We use the new version of this dataset developed
accuracy due to the constraints.

Furthermore, even in this case, the classifier that optimizes this
plots show that all classifiers that satisfy the constraint on the up-
er bound from Theorem 3.3 satisfy the condition \(G(f, \psi_{\tau_1}) < 0\).
For \(\psi_{\tau_1}\) the accuracy of the optimal constrained classifier is 0.86 and \(G(f_{\tau_1}, \psi_{\tau_1}) = -0.21\) and for \(\psi_{\tau_1}\) the accuracy of the optimal constrained classifier is 0.86 and \(G(f_{\tau_1}, \psi_{\tau_1}) = -0.03\) in comparison, the accuracy of the optimal unconstrained classifier is 0.88, showing minimal loss in accuracy due to the constraints.

5.3 Adult Income Dataset

Dataset. For analysis of multi-dimensional data, we use the Adult Income dataset. We use the new version of this dataset developed and preprocessed by Ding et al. \cite{ding2018}. It contains information on around 251k individuals from the state of California surveyed in 2019. The classification task is to predict whether the income of an individual is above $50k or not. The strategic features available are “class of worker”, “occupation”, and “hours worked per week” (the other five features are listed in Appendix B). We use race as the protected attribute, limiting the dataset to White (93% of the dataset; \(z = 1\)) and Black/African-American (7% of the dataset; \(z = 0\)) individuals.

Methodology. The cost function used is linear and group-specific. Let \(d^* \in \mathbb{R}^d\) be the underlying cost vector such that \(d^* = \text{cost}\) for other non-strategic features. \(d^*\) assigns a higher cost factor depending on the difficulty of updating a feature value. The cost function for group 1 assigns a higher cost factor depending on the difficulty of updating a feature value. The cost function for group 1 is \(c_1(x, x') := 2d^T(x' - x)\) and cost function for group 1 is \(c_1(x, x') := d^T(x' - x)\). In this case, African-American individuals pay twice the cost that White individuals pay for the same feature update. The dataset is partitioned into 80-20 random train-test splits. Once again, suppose \(\psi_{\tau} = 1\) for all \((x, y)\).
We will restrict the classifiers to be from the linear family and use the logistic log-loss function $L(f; x, y) := -y \log \sigma(f(x)) - (1-y) \log (1-\sigma(f(x)))$ to measure prediction error of $f$ (here $\sigma(\cdot)$ is the standard sigmoid function). We analyze the following different classifiers. Classifier $f_{\text{uncons}} := \arg \min_f E[L(f; X, Y)]$ will denote the unconstrained classifier. For pre-specified desired statistical rate $\epsilon \in [-1, 1]$, classifier $f_{\text{strat}} := \arg \min_f E[L(f; X, Y)]$ subject to $H(f, \psi_r) \geq \epsilon$. Finally, for a pre-specified $g \in \mathbb{R}$, we construct classifiers with social burden gap $G(f, \psi_r) \leq g$. To do so, we use the result from Section 4 and construct classifier $f_{\text{strat}} := \arg \min_f E[L(f; X, Y)]$ subject to $-\frac{1}{S} \sum_{i=1}^S (v_i H(f, \psi^i)) - \delta \leq g$ (quantities $w^*_i, v_i, \delta$ are defined in Theorem 4.1). We will set $\epsilon = 0$ and $g = 0$ to analyze classifiers with equal selection rate and zero social burden gap in this section, and present variation of performance with these parameters in Appendix D. To compare with another fair classification baseline, we also implement the fair logistic regression algorithm of Rezaei et al. [38] with statistical rate constraints; for pre-specified desired statistical rate $\epsilon \in [-1, 1]$, classifier $f_{\text{strat}} := \arg \min_f E[L(f; X, Y)]$ subject to $H(f, \psi_r) \geq \epsilon$. In this section, and present variation of performance with these parameters in Appendix D. To compare with another fair classification baseline, we also implement the fair logistic regression algorithm of Rezaei et al. [38] with statistical rate constraints; for pre-specified desired statistical rate $\epsilon \in [-1, 1]$, classifier $f_{\text{strat}} := \arg \min_f E[L(f; X, Y)]$ subject to $H(f, \psi_r) \geq \epsilon$. In this section, and present variation of performance with these parameters in Appendix D. To compare with another fair classification baseline, we also implement the fair logistic regression algorithm of Rezaei et al. [38] with statistical rate constraints; for pre-specified desired statistical rate $\epsilon \in [-1, 1]$, classifier $f_{\text{strat}} := \arg \min_f E[L(f; X, Y)]$ subject to $H(f, \psi_r) \geq \epsilon$. In this section, and present variation of performance with these parameters in Appendix D. To compare with another fair classification baseline, we also implement the fair logistic regression algorithm of Rezaei et al. [38] with statistical rate constraints; for pre-specified desired statistical rate $\epsilon \in [-1, 1]$, classifier $f_{\text{strat}} := \arg \min_f E[L(f; X, Y)]$ subject to $H(f, \psi_r) \geq \epsilon$.
to improve individuals’ task-related qualities [30]; using our framework with these classifiers can ensure that all groups have equal opportunities for improvement.

**Model limitations.** For multi-dimensional settings, our framework considers linear and quadratic cost functions. Extensions of our framework for generic cost functions in multi-dimensional settings can be further studied as part of future work. Secondly, while we consider binary protected attributes in our analysis, our results can be extended to non-binary attributes. This is because the non-binary setting can be reduced to the binary setting by considering the pairwise comparison of measures for different protected attribute values. However, due to multiple comparisons, the bounds for $G(\cdot, \cdot)$ will be weaker, and future work can explore ways to improve these bounds for non-binary attributes.

Additional limitations of our framework are related to the accuracy of information about the individuals available to the institution. As mentioned earlier, if the institution does not have accurate information about the costs associated with feature updates, then our proposed framework might not be completely effective in addressing manipulation disparities. Another information-based limitation is the assumption that the classifier used by the institution is known. This may not be true in real-world settings and only partial information about decision rules may be publicly available. Recent work by Ghalmie et al. [16] aims to address this problem in general strategic classification settings and our framework can potentially be extended in the future along similar lines.

7 **CONCLUSION**

We study the impact of fair classifiers on individuals’ ability to positively manipulate their features based on their group membership. In settings where feature distributions or cost functions are biased against minority groups, we observe that classifiers can have (almost) equal selection rates for all groups but can still have relatively higher strategic manipulation costs for individuals from minority groups. We propose modified fairness constraints to construct classifiers that reduce this disparity and show its efficacy over the FICO Credit and Adult Income datasets. Our work demonstrates the necessity of analyzing the impact of fair classifiers in dynamic settings and developing approaches that provide recourse opportunities that are independent of their group memberships.

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