FOR THEMISTOCLES OF PHREARRHIOI, ON ACCOUNT OF HONOUR*: OSTRACISM, HONOUR AND THE NATURE OF ATHENIAN POLITICS*

ABSTRACT
This article offers a new interpretation of the Athenian institution of ostracism and explores its significance for our understanding of democratic politics. A popular scholarly trend interprets ostracism as an instrument for pursuing (or regulating) conflict among aristocratic politicians, in accordance with a view of Athenian democracy as dominated by a restricted elite competing for power and prestige. This article aims to reassess this picture by investigating ostracism in the light of recent studies of honour, which have stressed honour’s potential for balancing competition and cooperation within communities. By using the ostracism of Themistocles as a case study, it argues that ostracism was a manifestation of an institutionalized concern for honour in Athenian democracy. On the one hand, ostracism could punish politically active citizens who, in excessively enhancing their own honour, failed to respect democratic equality. On the other, it could be employed for tackling shameful behaviour which placed the agent below the community’s standards of honour. The article then sets ostracism against Athens’ broader institutional framework and argues that Athenian democracy was not so much concerned with policing intra-elite conflict as much as it was designed to foster a balance between competitive and cooperative values and ensure broad participation in the political domain.

Keywords: Athenian democracy; ostracism; honour; shame; equality; elite competition; institutions; Themistocles

Around 470 B.C. the Athenians ostracized Themistocles, son of Neocles, of the deme of Phrearrhioi.2 Themistocles went into exile to Argos, and ended his days in the Persian empire to escape a later conviction for treason (Thuc. 1.135–8; Diod. Sic. 11.54–60; Plut. Them. 21–9). Among the ostraka against Themistocles discovered in Athens, * This research has been generously funded by the Leverhulme Trust. I would like to thank the outstanding scholars who offered encouragement and feedback: Douglas Cairns, Mirko Canevaro, Alberto Esu, Edward Harris and Matteo Zaccarini, as well as Will Mack and my colleagues at Birmingham. I am also grateful to Stefan Brenne for sharing parts of his work otherwise inaccessible under lockdown and to CQ’s editor and anonymous reader for providing invaluable comments.

1 The following works are cited repeatedly throughout this article: S. Brenne, Die Ostraka vom Kerameikos (Wiesbaden, 2018); D.L. Cairns, ‘Honour and shame: modern controversies and ancient values’, Critical Quarterly 53 (2011), 23–41; S. Forsdyke, Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece (Princeton, 2005); P. Liddel, Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens (Oxford, 2007); P.J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiou Politeia (Oxford, 1981); P. Siewert (ed.), Ostrakismos-Testimonien I (Stuttgart, 2002).

2 Proposed datings of Themistocles’ ostracism range from 472 to 470 B.C.: A. Podlecki, The Life of Themistocles: A Critical Survey of the Literary and Archæological Evidence (Montreal, 1975), 194; H.B. Mattingly, ‘The practice of ostracism at Athens’, Antichthon 25 (1991), 1–26, at 10; S. Brenne in P. Siewert (ed.), Ostrakismos-Testimonien I (Stuttgart, 2002), 249; J.P. Sickinger, ‘New ostraka from the Athenian Agora’, Hesperia 86 (2017), 443–508, at 448; Brenne (n. 1), 485.

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one is inscribed with an interesting comment: ‘this ostrakon is for Themistocles of Phrearrhioi, on account of honour (Θεμισθοκλείς τόδε ὀστράκον [Φ]ρεαρρίου [τ]μις ἡγεί[κ]όν)’ (Kerameikos 8463). This comment is paralleled in several sources which suggest that Themistocles’ ostracism was intimately connected with Athenian attitudes towards honour (Kerameikos 7262; Hdt. 8.124–5; Dem. 23.205; Plut. Them. 22). The significance of this evidence, however, has mostly been overlooked. Instead, Themistocles’ ostracism is usually interpreted as the outcome of factionalism between Themistocles and the Alcmeonids, in accordance with a picture of Athenian democracy as dominated by a restricted group of elite politicians competing for power and prestige. This article uses the case study of Themistocles to argue that ostracism as an institution aimed to enforce appropriate behaviour in matters of honour on the part of politically active citizens. By reassessing the role of competition in the rationale of ostracism in accordance with recent studies of honour, it will shed new light on the nature of democratic politics in Classical Athens.

The procedure of ostracism is well known. During the sixth prytany of each year, the Assembly voted on whether to hold an ostracism. The Athenians would then carry out the ostracism in the eighth prytany. Each voter would write the name of a fellow citizen on a potsherd (ostrakon). If a quorum of 6,000 votes was met, the man with most votes would be exiled for ten years while being allowed to keep his property. The rationale of the institution, on the other hand, has long been debated. A popular scholarly trend connects ostracism with aristocratic politics and elite competition. Ostracism would have been an instrument for elite politicians to get rid of their rivals and for the polis to prevent divergences over policy. This interpretation, however, cannot account for the extreme variety of explanations of ostracism found in ancient sources, which include references to tyranny, Medism or luxurious lifestyle. An influential version of this view has been offered by Sara Forsdyke, who interprets ostracism as a ritualized form of democratic control over the politics of exile typical of archaic elite competition. Ostracism would have been deployed in periods of intense elite conflict in order to act as a symbolic reminder of the power of the people over exile. While Forsdyke convincingly stresses the existence of a ritual element in ostracism, her argument

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3 Texts and numberings of the Ceramicus and the Agora ostraka follow, respectively, Brenne (n. 1) and M. Lang, Ostraka. The Athenian Agora XXV (Princeton, 1990).
4 Mattingly (n. 2), 10–13; Forsdyke (n. 1), 176–7.
5 W.R. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens (Princeton, 1971); J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People (Princeton, 1989); D. Cohen, Law, Violence, and Community in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 1995); Forsdyke (n. 1).
6 On the procedure of ostracism, see Rhodes (n. 1), 270–1; Lang (n. 3), 1–2. On the quorum, see page 517 below.
7 R. Develin, ‘Cleisthenes and ostracism: precedents and intentions’, Antichthon 11 (1977), 10–21; M. Ostwald, ‘The reform of the Athenian state by Cleisthenes’, in J. Boardman, N.G.L. Hammond, D.M. Lewis and M. Ostwald (edd.), The Cambridge Ancient History IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean c.525–479 B.C. (Cambridge, 1988), 303–46, at 344–6; D. Rosenbloom, ‘Ponêroi vs. chrêstoi: the ostracism of Hyperbolos and the struggle for hegemony in Athens after the death of Perikles’, TAphA 134 (2004), 55–105, 323–58.
8 Forsdyke (n. 1).
9 See also P.J. Kosmin, ‘A phenomenology of democracy: ostracism as political ritual’, CLAnt 34 (2015), 121–61, who stresses the ritual function of ostracism in creating civic unity by relieving popular anxieties over a plurality of issues, such as tyranny, treason or polluting offences. While this view is compatible with my focus on honour, Kosmin unconvincingly argues that the function of ostracism evolved over the fifth century, culminating in the ‘unorthodox’ ostracism of Hyperbolus: for a critique of such evolutionary views of ostracism, see pages 514–16 below.
necessarily depends on the acceptance of the controversial Cleisthenic origin of the institution.10 The conflicts thought to have led to individual ostracisms are also dubiously attested. A prominent example is Cimon’s ostracism, which is interpreted as the outcome of his struggle with Ephialtes.11 Yet the existence of such a struggle is seriously undermined by recent studies which have compellingly challenged Ephialtes’ centrality in Athenian politics and the historicity of his divisive reform.12

Older views of ostracism ignored elite competition but were equally unsatisfactory. Scholars once regarded ostracism as a weapon against traitors and Medizers,13 or as an instrument to prevent tyranny.14 These views conflict with the fact that traitors and people suspected of aiming at tyranny could face much harsher penalties than ostracism, such as disenfranchisement and death.15 Such interpretations are also not entirely supported by the evidence. Accusations of treason and Medism feature on a series of ostraka but are never found in the literary sources, and are contradicted by the comments on several other ostraka which are unrelated to these crimes. The connection of ostracism and tyranny is supported by Aristotle and the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians. However, while the aforementioned ostraka against Medizers might amount to allusions to tyrannical aspirations,16 tyranny is never explicitly linked to ostracism in the fifth-century sources.17 This is not to suggest that this evidence is unreliable. Suspicions of treason, Medism or tyrannical aspirations may well have played a role in ostracism, but, as we shall see, they were manifestations of the institution’s broader concern with honour.18

The most convincing interpretations of ostracism have been put forward by Christian Mann and by Peter Siewert. Their studies have successfully considered several contradictory explanations of ostracism found in the evidence, which encompass both the political and the social domains. Mann has argued that the dēmos viewed ostracism as a means to exert control over influential individuals and maintain equality, and has rightly noted how this institution was often interpreted by the elite as a sign of envy

10 See H. Taeuber in P. Siewert (ed.), Ostrakismos-Testimonien I (Stuttgart, 2002), 401–12. Whether ostracism was instituted by Cleisthenes in 508/7 ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22) or at the time of its first use in 488/7 (FGrHist 324 F 6) is inconsequential to my argument.
11 Forsdyke (n. 1), 167–8.
12 M. Zaccarini, ‘The fate of the lawgiver: the invention of the reforms of Ephialtes and the patrios politeia’, Historia 67 (2018), 495–512; E.M. Harris, ‘Aeschylus’ Eumenides: the role of Areopagus, the rule of law and political discourse in Attic tragedy’, in A. Markantonatos and E. Volonaki (edd.), Poet and Orator: A Symbiotic Relationship in Democratic Athens (Berlin, 2019), 389–420.
13 J. Carcopino, L’ostracisme athénien (Paris, 1935); V. Ehrenberg, ‘Origins of democracy’, Historia 1 (1950), 515–48.
14 See Forsdyke (n. 1), 153–5; C. Mann, ‘Potere del popolo – disciplinamento dell’aristocrazia. Sulla funzione dell’ostracismo ateniese’, in A. de Benedictis, G. Corini, B. Mazohl and L. Schorn-Schütte (edd.), Die Sprache des Politischen in actu. Zum Verhältnis von politischem Handeln und politischer Sprache von der Antike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 2009), 51–70, at 56–7.
15 On Persians and tyranny, see R.M. McMullin, ‘Aspects of Medizing: Themistocles, Simonides, and Timoecron of Rhodes’, CJ 97 (2001), 55–67, at 63–4.
16 Tyranny is mentioned explicitly in [Andoc.] 4.24, 4.27, but the speech is a fourth-century forgery: see page 515 below. One may argue that the epithet ‘Cylonian’ attached to Megacles on an ostrakon (Kerameikos 3984) likened Megacles to the aspiring tyrant Cylon. However, the existence of two ostraka addressing Megacles as ‘the accursed’ (Kerameikos 2028 and 2126) suggests that ‘Cylonian’ alluded to the curse against the Alcmeonids for killing Cylon: Brenne (n. 1), 289.
17 See below, pages 509–12 and 513–14.
Siewert has similarly proposed to view ostracism as an extrajudicial means to pressure the elite into abiding by the political, social, moral and religious norms of the community. Yet both interpretations are problematic because they presuppose a clear-cut distinction between the values of the dēmos and those of the elite and underestimate democracy’s capacity to produce ideas and values shared by the whole community.

I agree that ostracism compelled politically active Athenians to abide by the social and political norms of the community, including democratic equality. However, I argue that these norms (and the φθόνος against those believed to infringe them) belonged to the broader domain of honour, which was shared by the mass and the elite. Scholars have traditionally understood honour exclusively as a scarce resource pursued through zero-sum competition. Recent studies across various fields, however, have been increasingly stressing how honour can equally foster cooperative values and social cohesion. The model elaborated by anthropologist Frank Stewart is particularly appropriate for the Greek world. Stewart defines honour as ‘the right to be treated as having a certain worth’; in other words, a right to respect. He distinguishes between two interconnected kinds of honour. Horizontal honour is the right to respect owing to all members of the peer group qua equals, irrespective of their individual merits. Vertical honour is ‘the right to special respect enjoyed by those who are superior’, for example the competitive honour enjoyed by virtue of individual merits.

In the Greek world, the dynamics described by Stewart belonged to the domains of τιμή and αἰδός. Of these, τιμή referred both to the value one is attributed by oneself or others and to the esteem one is conferred by others; as an expression of one’s status and esteem, it could also indicate a right, prerogative or public office. αἰδός denoted both the shame one feels in connection with actions and situations which compromise one’s own honour and the respect one is expected to show for the honour of others. The notions of τιμή and αἰδός (as well as related notions such as hybris and φθόνος) expressed relations of horizontal and vertical honour. Horizontal honour is at work among peers in the Iliad, as attested by Poseidon’s claim to equal honour (μ᾽ ὁμότιμον ἐόντα) with Zeus and Hades (15.184–9). Horizontal honour within the citizen community is implied in the Mynians’ request to share in the Spartans’
prerogatives (μοίραν τε τιμέων μετέχοντες); the Mynians mention no personal merits but recall their Peloponnesian origins, and the Spartans grant them citizenship because of their connections with the Dioscuri (Hdt. 4.145.4–5). Vertical honour is most evident in the Homeric heroes’ desire to increase their status through prowess in war. 29 Glaucus, for example, declares that his father sent him to Troy to be the best of all heroes and so that he would not bring shame upon his ancestors (μηδὲ γένος πατέρων αἰσχυνόμεν, Hom. II. 6.206–10). The same is true of Athenian honorific practices. These granted honours to public benefactors through inscribed decrees and several kinds of gifts, from crowns and exemptions to the μέγισται τιμαί, which included the erection of a statue and the permanent right to be fed at public expense in the Prytaneion. 30

Unlike other themes, honour recurs throughout both fifth-century and later evidence on ostracism and provides a tool for constructing a comprehensive view of this institution which encompasses the conflicting explanations raised in the ancient sources. I argue that ostracism was one of several manifestations of an institutionalized concern for honour in Athenian democracy. On the one hand, ostracism could punish those who, in pursuit of vertical honour, failed to respect democratic equality. On the other, it could be employed for tackling shameful behaviour which placed the agent below the community’s standards of horizontal honour. The ostracism of Themistocles provides a perfect illustration of these dynamics. Section 1 analyses the evidence connecting Themistocles’ ostracism with vertical honour and compares it with the case of Megacles. It then sets this evidence against the discussion of ostracism in Aristotle and the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians and shows how ostracism’s regulation of the pursuit of vertical honour related to democratic equality. Section 2 focusses on ostracism as an instrument to prevent politicians from engaging in shameful behaviour and to enable them to maintain their horizontal honour as citizens. 31 An ostrakon faulting Themistocles for dishonourable sexual behaviour is analysed alongside a series of ostraka against traitors and Medizers as well as Thucydides’ description of the ostracism of Hyperbolus. Section 3 investigates the centrality of honour in the formal procedure of ostracism and its significance for our understanding of Athenian politics. It sets ostracism against Athens’ broader institutional framework and shows that Athenian democracy was designed to foster a balance between competitive and cooperative values and ensure broad participation in the political domain.

1. OSTRACISM, VERTICAL HONOUR AND DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY

An analysis of ostracism and vertical honour cannot but start with the ostrakon against Themistocles’ on account of honour ([τ]ιμής ἐνεκα) (Kerameikos 8463). Literary parallels for the expression τιμής ἐνεκα suggest that the ostrakon related to Themistocles’ pursuit of honour. 32 The expression usually refers to the honour one could acquire for oneself or grant to others. Herodotus, for example, states that the Spartans chose the Tegeans as their neighbours in the Greek army at Plataea on account

29 Cairns (n. 1), 31–2.
30 See Liddel (n. 1), 174–9; M. Canevaro, Demostene, Contro Leptine. Introduzione, traduzione e commento storico (Berlin, 2016), 77–97.
31 Vertical and horizontal honour are treated separately for the sake of analysis, but were in practice indistinguishable for the Greeks.
32 A similar construction features on three ostraka against Megacles (Kerameikos 2019: Δρυμὸ δένεις; 5126: περος δένεις; 5453: τὲς πέρας | ἡ[ε][ε]υ[ε][κ][α], but their meaning is unclear: Brenne (n. 1), 151, 361.
of their honour and valour (τιμής ἔνεκα καὶ ἀρετής) (Hdt. 9.28.3). Xenophon recounts a banquet at which Greek guests were expected to bring gifts for the Thracian king Seuthes. Among them was a humble Athenian, who stated that the wealthy should give to the king for the sake of honour (τιμήν) but the king should give to the poor so that they too may honour him (τιμᾷ) with gifts (An. 7.3.28). Accordingly, two interpretations of our ostrakon are possible. Its author may have cast his vote on account of the honour Themistocles had already gained, or he may have ironically conferred on the ambitious politician an honour in the form of an ostrakon. Either way, the ostrakon attacks Themistocles for his behaviour in the realm of vertical honour.

The impression that Themistocles may have been excessively eager for honour is confirmed by Herodotus. The historian recalls how Themistocles, after the Greeks at Salamis failed to honour him, immediately went to Sparta because he wanted to be honoured (ὅτι δὲ νικῶν οὐκ ἐτιμήθη πρὸς τῶν ἐν Σαλαμίνι νικηφόρων, αὐτίκα μετὰ ταύτα ἐς Λακεδαιμόνα ἀπίκετο θέλων τιμηθῆναι). The Spartans honoured him greatly (μεγάλως δὲ ἐτίμησαν), and this irritated Timodemus of Aphidnae, who became crazed with envy (μθόνω κοτιμαργέοιν). To Timodemus’ remark that the credit for his honours belonged to Athens, Themistocles replied that he would not have been honoured if he had been from Belbina but that Timodemus had not been honoured despite being an Athenian (οὐτ᾽ ἄν ἔγὼ ἐὼν Βελβινίτης ἐτιμήθην οὕτω πρὸς Σπαρτιητέων, οὐτ᾽ ἄν σώ, ἀνθρώπε, ἐὼν Ἀθηναῖος). Herodotus thus provides evidence for Themistocles’ inappropriate attitude towards vertical honour and shows that this could cause resentment in his fellow citizens.

The picture drawn in the contemporary evidence lends credibility to two later accounts where Themistocles’ ostracism is linked with vertical honour. The first is an allusion in Demosthenes’ Against Aristocrates. The speech belonged to a γραφή παρανόμων against an honorific decree that conferred inviolability on the mercenary Charidemus. Demosthenes recalls Charidemus’ actions against Athens to show that he deserves punishment rather than public honours (23.144–214). The orator compares the ancestors’ moderate and righteous honorific policies with the excessive and inappropriate honours the Athenians now grant to benefactors (23.196–210). Among other examples, he mentions the case of Themistocles. Despite his services to the city, the ancestors expelled (ἐξῆλθαν) Themistocles when they caught him presumptuously believing to be superior to them (λαβόντες μείζων ἐκστάσεως υἱῶν τὰ δικαιώντα φρονεῖν). Demosthenes concludes that the ancestors rightly honoured Themistocles and other benefactors when they behaved worthily (χρηστοὺς μὲν ὄντας ἐτίμους) but did not yield to them when they tried to do wrong (205).

When discussing the cause of his ostracism, Demosthenes characterizes Themistocles as guilty of ὕβρις. This was a disposition to overvalue one’s own

33 Cf. Isoc. 15.217; Xen. Vect. 3.4; Pl. Resp. 347b.
34 See S. Brenne in P. Siewert (ed.), Ostrakismos-Testimonien I (Stuttgart, 2002), 130–1. The ironic nature of the comment is suggested by its resemblance with motivation clauses in honorific decrees, which typically feature the construction ‘abstract noun in the genitive + ἔνεκα’: cf. IG II 1.306.6–7, 1.418.9–12. For a comparable parody of the language of honorific decrees, cf. Hyp. fr. 76.27–35 Jensen.
35 Demosthenes uses the generic ἐξελεύσοντα for the technical ἐξοστρακίζοντα, but the sources on ostracism do not adopt a consistent vocabulary: see B. Eder in P. Siewert (ed.), Ostrakismos-Testimonien I (Stuttgart, 2002), 370.
36 One may object that Demosthenes may have distorted Themistocles’ ostracism to produce a fitting parallel for Charidemus. Even if that were the case, Demosthenes must be adopting a view of ostracism acceptable to an Athenian audience.
honour in a way that potentially impinging upon the honour of others. The expression μείζον φρονείν faults Themistocles with ‘thinking big’ (μέγα φρονείν), which was a regular component of hybris. The best example comes in Herodotus. In Book 7, Xerxes declares his wish to invade Greece so as not to appear inferior in honour (μὴ λειτήσασθαι … ἐν τιμῇ τίθε) to his predecessors (7.8a.2) and make Persian territory coextensive with the sky of Zeus (7.8c.1–2). Xerxes’ excessive pursuit of honour troubles Artabanus, who warns the king that the god does not allow anyone but himself to think big (φρονείν μέγα, 7.10e), and worries that Xerxes’ plan would increase hybris (τῆς μὲν ὑβρίν συζητούσας, 7.16a.2). As a sign of hybris, Themistocles’ tendency to μέγα φρονείν is an indication of an inappropriate attitude towards vertical honour, and Demosthenes’ allusion to the honours the ancestors conferred on deserving benefactors (χρηστοτάς μὲν ὄντας ἐτίμων) may even imply that Themistocles’ hubristic behaviour arose as a result of his honours.

The second account connecting the ostracism of Themistocles to his attitude towards vertical honour appears in Plutarch’s Life of Themistocles. According to Plutarch, when the Athenians were led by their envy (τὸ φθονεῖν) to believe the slanders against him, Themistocles repeatedly recalled his achievements to the Assembly and made himself unpopular. Themistocles also angered the people when he built a temple to Artemis Aristoboule near his house, implying that he was the best advisor of the city (22.1). The Athenians thus ostracized him to curtail his dignity and prominence (κολονούντες τὸ ἐξίσωμα καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχήν), as they did against all those believed to be overbearing in power and disproportionate with democratic equality. Plutarch even provides a general interpretation of ostracism. This he saw as a relief of the envy that takes pleasure in humbling those who are prominent (παραμυθήθα φθόνου καὶ κοινοσιμίδος) and as a form of disenfranchisement (παύσει τὴν ἀτέμιαν, 22.3).

Plutarch’s insistence on φθόνος as the cause of ostracism is noteworthy. The Greek notion of φθόνος has no univocal equivalent in English but was often related to honour. A common meaning was ‘envy’. Aristotle defines the envious man (ὁ δὲ φθονερός) as someone who feels pain at the (deserved or undeserved) good fortune of others (Eth. Nic. 1108a35–b6; cf. Rh. 1386b11–12). As such, φθόνος can be felt

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37 See D.L. Cairns, ‘Hybris, dishonour, and thinking big’, JHS 116 (1996), 1–32 and M. Canevaro, ‘The public charge for hybris against slaves: the honour of the victim and the honour of the hubristês’, JHS 138 (2018), 100–26, who advance the view of N.R.E. Fisher, Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece (Warminster, 1992).

38 Cf. e.g. Aesch. Pers. 800–30; Soph. Aj. 1087–92; Eur. Hipp. 443–6, 473–6 with Cairns (n. 37), 10–17.

39 I do not mean to suggest that ostracism was specifically directed against hybris, but merely that the hubristic characterization of victims of ostracism is evidence of the relevance of vertical honour to ostracism.

40 As shown by E.M. Harris, ‘Alcibiades, the ancestors, liturgies, and the etiquette of addressing the Athenian Assembly’, in V. Liotakis and S. Farrington (edd.), The Art of History: Literary Perspectives on Greek and Roman Historiography (Berlin and Boston, 2016), 145–55, alluding to one’s own achievements was inappropriate to the etiquette of the Assembly.

41 See E. Sanders, Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens: A Socio-Psychological Approach (Oxford and New York, 2014), 33–46.

42 Unlike the English ‘envy’, however, φθόνος denotes both a bottom-up and a top-down emotion. It can refer to one’s resentment against those who have more but also to a person’s jealousy for what that person him/herself possesses and wishes others not to have: cf. Arist. Rh. 1387b29; D.L. Cairns, ‘The politics of envy: envy and equality in ancient Greece’, in D. Konstan and K. Rutter (edd.), Envy, Spite, and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece (Edinburgh, 2003), 235–52, at 238.

43 N.R.E. Fisher, ‘Let envy be absent: envy, liturgies and reciprocity in Athens’, in D. Konstan and K. Rutter (edd.), Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece (Edinburgh, 2003), 181–215, at 185–8; Cairns (n. 42), 242–4.
against those who are honoured. Herodotus recalls how some Persian allies were envious of Artemisia because she was held in the highest honours by the King (φθονέοντες αὐτῇ, ἄτε ἐν πρώτοις τετυμημένης διὰ πάντων τῶν συμμάχων, 8.69.1). Demosthenes’ Against Leptines warns the Athenians that they would appear envious (φθονερούς) if they abolished the honours due to public benefactors (Dem. 20.10).\(^\text{44}\) Another common meaning of φθόνος was ‘indignation’.\(^\text{45}\) This emotion was often (though not exclusively) felt against those guilty of hybris. The most notable example is Demosthenes’ Against Meidias, a case of public action for hybris, where Demosthenes invites the judges to feel indignation towards Meidias’ hubristic actions (μίσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ ὀργή· τούτον γὰρ ὤξησι ποιεῖς, 21.196).\(^\text{46}\) In Euripides’ Electra, the heroine is ashamed of committing hybris against the dead Aegisthus because this could cause indignation (αἰσχύνομαι … | νεκροὺς ὑβρίζειν, μή μὲ τις φθόνον βάλῃ, 900–2).

Plutarch’s reference to φθόνος, therefore, connects the ostracism of Themistocles with his pursuit of vertical honour.\(^\text{47}\) But is Plutarch’s account trustworthy? The biographer may have inferred the cause of Themistocles’ ostracism from Herodotus, whom he acknowledges as his source several times throughout the Life.\(^\text{48}\) Plutarch’s account, however, is supported by a passage in Aristophanes’ Knights. The Sausage-Seller claims that his rival demagogue, the Paphlagonian, would organize a revolt if Demos were to try to ostracize him (847–57). Significantly, ostracism is suggested after the Paphlagonian has been braggling to the Assembly about his honours (763–6), his victory at Pylos (843–6) and his services to the city (773–6) and has been reproached for boasting to be greater than Themistocles (810–19). While we cannot completely rule out the possibility that Plutarch may have modelled his account on this passage,\(^\text{49}\) Aristophanes provides further fifth-century evidence that indignation against a boastful politician was perceived as an appropriate reason for ostracism.

Themistocles was not the only Athenian whose ostracism can be connected with φθόνος and vertical honour. A notable parallel is provided by Megacles, son of Hippocrates, an Alcmaeonid ostracized in 487/6 B.C. ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.5) and possibly a second time around 470 (Lys. 14.39).\(^\text{50}\) φθόνος figures prominently in an allusion to Megacles’ ostracism in Pindar’s Seventh Pythian, which celebrates Megacles’ victory in the four-horse chariot race at the Pythian Games in 486 B.C., shortly after his first ostracism. After listing Megacles’ victory alongside the Panhellenic victories of his ancestors, Pindar laments that their beautiful deeds are repaid with envy (φθόνον ᾧειβόμενον τὰ καλὰ ἔργα, 7.14–19).\(^\text{51}\) The poet implicitly

\(^{44}\) See Cairns (n. 42), 244–5; Sanders (n. 41), 89–91; Canevaro (n. 30), 89–90.

\(^{45}\) Fisher (n. 43), 185 n. 16, 198–202; Cairns (n. 42), 246–8.

\(^{46}\) Cairns (n. 42), 246–7; Sanders (n. 41), 91–3.

\(^{47}\) Themistocles’ excessive love of honour (φιλοτιμία) is a recurring theme in his Life: cf. Plut. Them. 3, 5, 17, 18. On φιλοτιμία, see n. 70 below.

\(^{48}\) Plut. Them. 7.5, 17.1, 21.1. Plutarch does recall the story of Themistocles and Timodemus, but uses a version which features a man of Seriphus in place of Timodemus (18.3; cf. Pl. Resp. 329e–330a).

\(^{49}\) Plutarch must have known this passage, because he quotes Ar. Eq. 815 when discussing Themistocles’ policies regarding the Piraeus (Them. 19.3).

\(^{50}\) The date and the historicity of Megacles’ second ostracism are debated: S. Brenne, Ostrakismos und Prominenz in Athen: attische Bürger des 5. Jhs. v. Chr. auf den Ostraka (Wien, 2001), 38; M. Berti, ‘L’antroponimo Megakles sugli ostraka di Atene: considerazioni prosopografiche, storiche e istituzionali’, MEP 4 (2001), 8–69.

\(^{51}\) L. Kurke, The Traffic in Praise. Pindar and the Poetics of Social Economy (Ithaca, NY and London, 1991), 195–6.
connects the ostracism of Megacles with the Athenians’ φθόνος for his family’s successes in horse-racing. In adopting Megacles’ point of view, he employs φθόνος with the meaning of envy. In other words, he accuses the Athenians of failing to grant Megacles the honour he and his family had rightfully acquired through their agonistic merits.

From the Athenians’ point of view, the same φθόνος could refer to their indignation provoked by Megacles’ inappropriate pursuit of vertical honour. This is illustrated by a series of ostraka dating to 471 B.C. where Megacles is criticized for his practice of horse-breeding. In addition to reinforcing Pindar’s connection of Megacles’ ostracism with his family’s involvement in horse-racing, these ostraka express indignation towards luxury and conspicuous consumption. Horse-breeding was a typical elite activity and was often associated with inappropriate attitudes towards honour. In Thucydides, Alcibiades brags to the Assembly about his Olympic victory in 416 B.C., when he entered the extraordinary amount of seven chariots, and claims the honour deriving from such deeds (νόμω μὲν γὰρ τιμὴ τὰ τουαύτα; he expects the envy of his fellow-citizens (τοῖς μὲν ἄστοις φθονεῖται φύσει) and states that it is fair for one who thinks big not to be equal with his peers (οὐδὲ γε ἄδικον ἔρ’ ἐκατὼ μέγα φρονοῦντα μὴ ἔσον εἶναι, 6.16). Strypiades, the rustic protagonist of Aristophanes’ Clouds, associates horse-breeding and luxury with the arrogance of the elites. He complains that his son, Pheidippides, is squandering his money on horses, and blames this passion on Pheidippides’ mother (59–74). A descendant of Megacles, she is described as ‘haughty, luxurious, and Coesyrafied’ (σεμνήν τρυφώσαν ἐγκεκουσφρωμένην, 39–55). ἐγκεκουσφρωμένη is a neologism based on the name of Megacles’ rich and haughty mother, Coesyr, and alludes to her hubristic disposition to think big (κοισυρεσθαι τὸ μέγα φρονεῖν, Schol. Ar. Nub. 46a Holwerda).

The fact that Pindar and several ostraka conceptualized ostracism in terms of, respectively, unjustified and justified φθόνος against Megacles for his involvement in horse-riding shows that ostracism was concerned with regulating the pursuit of vertical honour. This view is confirmed by the theoretical analyses of ostracism in Aristotle’s Politics and in the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians. Aristotle’s Politics first mentions ostracism in Book 3 when discussing the circumstances when it is admissible for an individual or a group to hold absolute power (1283a42–1284b34). Aristotle examines an abstract scenario in which several political actors each claim access to

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52 Scholars unanimously interpret the passage as an allusion to Megacles’ recent ostracism: P. Sievert in id. (ed.), Ostrakismos-Testimonien I (Stuttgart, 2002), 168–9, with bibliography.

53 Mann (n. 15), 66–9.

54 Two ostraka read ‘Megacles, son of Hippocrates, horse-breeder’ (Kerameikos 3221 and 4213). Another is directed ‘against Megacles, son of Hippocrates, and his horses’ (Kerameikos 5186b), while two are ‘against Megacles, the horseman’ (Kerameikos 5462 and 5463). Whether they belonged to Megacles’ second ostracism (Brenne [n. 1], 43–4) or were directed against a relative of our Megacles (Berti [n. 50], 61–2), these ostraka attest indignation towards Megacles’ family owing to their involvement with horse-racing and perceived arrogance.

55 Mann (n. 15), 66–9; also J. Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge, 1999), 187–9.

56 See Harris (n. 40).

57 Megacles is often associated with luxury and arrogance on ostraka. Some ostraka mention his haughty mother, Coesyr (Kerameikos 2623, 3161, 4946, 4970b, 5156, 5458), while one other ostrakon calls him ‘money-grubbing’ (Kerameikos 5916). The epithet ΤΡΟΦΟΝΟΣ on yet another ostrakon (Kerameikos 1827) has been connected to the verb τρυφώ (‘to live luxuriously’), but the reading is far from certain: Brenne (n. 1), 138.

58 P. Accattino and M. Curnis (edd.), Aristotele. La Politica, Libro III (Rome, 2013), 207.
power on account of different qualities, such as virtue, nobility of birth, wealth or free status. If a claimant possesses a quality to an extent superior, yet comparable, to those of other claimants, then it would not be right for him to exercise absolute rule. If instead there is one person or group who completely surpasses everyone else in virtue, this person or group will be as a ‘god amongst men’; they would suffer injustice if they were deemed equal (ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἐξιώμενοι τῶν ἰσων) and it would be right for them to hold absolute power (1284a4–34).59

It is at this stage that Aristotle introduces a digression on ostracism. The philosopher states that the purpose of ostracism is to preserve the democratic principle of equality (τὴν ἴσωτα) against the threat of powerful individuals (τοὺς δοκοῦντας ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει) (Arist. Pol. 1284a18–24), and explains that ‘ostracism has in a way the same effect as docking off the outstanding men (τῶν ἐξιώμενον ὑπερέχουντας) by exile’ (1284a36–8; transl. Rackham).60 If we look at this passage with an eye to Aristotle’s ethical theory, it is evident that his combination of ostracism with equality implicitly connects this institution with honour. 61 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains that the equal (τὸ ἵσον) is, together with the lawful, a fundamental component of the just (1129a31–1129b). Equality is involved in a specific kind of justice, which Aristotle labels ‘distributive justice’ (τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκειον). This is the kind of justice which distributes honour, wealth and all other goods that can be divided among the members of the state (τυμίας ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μερισθαί τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας), and the philosopher specifies that this distribution can be unequal or equal (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἵσον ἐτερον ἐτέρου, 1130b31–2).

In understanding ostracism as a democratic instrument to preserve equality, Aristotle implicitly characterizes this institution as concerned with the distribution of honour within the community. Any individual who pursues vertical honour, in other words, needs to be respectful of the horizontal honour of the other members of the community.62 This is confirmed in Book 5 of the Politics, where Aristotle mentions ostracism in his discussion of στάσις and constitutional change. The philosopher first analyses the origin of στάσις, which lies in people’s feelings about equality and inequality. While some people enter στάσις because they desire equality, others do so because they want to be unequal and superior (1302a24–32). Aristotle then investigates the objects for which political actors wage στάσις. These are gain and honour (κέρδος καὶ τιμή), because people engage in factional strife to acquire them or avoid their opposites (1302a32–4).63 Finally, he examines the particular causes of στάσις. These are the specific circumstances that lead στάσις to arise, and include, among others, honour (τιμή) and excessive predominance (ὑπεροχήν, 1302a35–b6).64 The discussion of ὑπεροχή prompts a short digression on ostracism (Arist. Pol. 1302b16–20; transl. Rackham):

Excessive predominance (δι’ ὑπεροχήν) causes faction, when some individual or body of men is greater and more powerful than is suitable to the state and the power of the government; for

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59 Accattino and Curnis (n. 58), 208–16.
60 Forsdyke (n. 1), 274–6.
61 B. Eder in P. Siewert (ed.), Ostrakismos-Testimonien I (Stuttgart, 2002), 423–4.
62 See Cairns (n. 1) for similar honour dynamics among peers in Homer.
63 M.E. De Luna, C. Zizza and M. Curnis (edd.), Aristotele. La Politica, Libri V–VI (Rome, 2016), 263–81.
64 De Luna et al. (n. 63), 282–340.
such are the conditions that usually result in the rise of a monarchy or dynasty (μοναρχία ἢ δυναστεία). Owing to this in some places they have the custom of temporary banishment (διστροφίας), as at Argos and Athens.

Just as in Book 3, Aristotle connects ostracism with ύπεροχή. Here, however, ostracism is not only an instrument to preserve equality but also a tool to prevent στάσις and constitutional change, as superior people could try to give rise to a monarchy or to an extreme oligarchy. ύπεροχή, as a cause of στάσις, is distinguished from τιμή, which causes faction when people ‘see other men in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share (τούς μὲν δικαίους τούς δ᾽ ὀδίκους πλεονεκτοῦντας) of [honour]’ (1302a39–b3; transl. Rackham). Superiority is again discussed alongside honour as one of the causes of ostracism later in Book 5. There, Aristotle restates ostracism’s function as an instrument to prevent στάσις (Arist. Pol. 1308b11–21; transl. Rackham, adapted):

But it is a policy common to democracy and oligarchy and to monarchy, and every form of constitution not to raise up any man too much beyond due proportion (μη’ αὐξάνειν λίους μηθένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν), but rather to try to assign small honours and of long tenure or great ones quickly (μικρὸς καὶ πολυχρονός διδόναι τιμὰς ἢ ταχοῖς μεγάλας) (for officials grow corrupt, and not every man can bear good fortune), or if not, at all events not to bestow honours in clusters and take them away again in clusters, but by a gradual process; and best of all to try so to regulate people by the law that there may be nobody among them specially superior in power (ὡς μηθένα ἐγγίνεσθαι πολλὶ ύπερέχοντα δυνάμει) due to friends or wealth, or, failing this, to arrange for their expulsion abroad.

Aristotle here associates ύπεροχή and excessive τιμαὶ as factors that ‘raise up any man beyond due proportion’ (μη’ αὐξάνειν λίους μηθένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν). The philosopher treats ύπεροχή and τιμή as two related, yet distinct, causes of στάσις, and only associates ύπεροχή with ostracism. However, there are several reasons to think that honour is central to Aristotle’s view of ostracism in both passages from Book 5. Aristotle believes that the origin of στάσις lies in people’s feelings about equality and inequality (Pol. 1302a24–32). Issues of equality, as we have seen, belong to the domain of distributive justice, which deals with the distribution of honour within the community. Moreover, στάσις, even when caused by ύπεροχή, involves τιμή as its possible object, because, as Aristotle had previously explained, people engage in faction to obtain honour or avoid dishonour. As an instrument to prevent στάσις, ostracism is thus implicitly connected with the distribution of honour within the community.

Aristotle’s remarks on ostracism and constitutional change are echoed in the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians and suggest that its author too connected ostracism with the distribution of honour within the community.65 According to that work, ostracism had been instituted owing to the suspicion against those in positions of power (διὰ τὴν ὑπωφίστην τῶν ἐν τάξις δυνάμειν), because Pisistratus had made

65 As shown by Rhodes (n. 1), 51–8, 61–3, the Constitution of the Athenians was probably the work of a student of Aristotle in the late 330s and early 320s. According to J.H. Day and M.H. Chambers, Aristotle’s History of Athenian Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), the historical section of the treatise was programmatically modelled on Aristotle’s Politics to the extent of distorting the facts to fit the theory; this view has been rightly refuted by Rhodes (n. 1), 10–13, but L. Bertelli, ‘The Athenaion Politeia and Aristotle’s political theory’, in C. Bearzot, M. Canevaro, T. Gargiulo and E. Poddighe (edds.), Athenaios Politeiai tra storia, politica e sociologia: Aristotele e Pseudo-Senofonte (Milan, 2018), 71–86 has convincingly shown that the author at least drew from Aristotle’s political theory ‘to understand the logic of events’.
himself tyrant when he was a popular leader and a general (δημαρχιαγός καὶ στρατηγός ὁ ὁ ὄν τυραννὸς κατέστη, 22.3). The author of the Constitution of the Athenians adds that for three years the Athenians kept ostracizing the friends of the tyrants but then started to ostracize ‘any other person who seemed to be too great’ (τῶν ἄλλων εἰ τις δοκοί μείζον ών εἶναι, 22.6; transl. Rackham). The passage is reminiscent of the Politics, where Aristotle connected ostracism with the need of democracies to prevent the rise of a monarchy or an extreme oligarchy (μοναρχία ἢ δυναστεία) owing to the superior power of an individual or a group (ὑπὲρ τις ἢ τῇ δυνάμει μείζον ἢ ἐῖς ἢ πλείους, 1302b16–20). Aristotle’s influence is even more evident from another passage in the Politics which argues that tyrannies once used to arise when the same person became both a popular leader and a general (ὁτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτός δημαρχιαγός καὶ στρατηγός, 1305a8–10). The author of the Constitution of the Athenians thus plausibly shares Aristotle’s view that the establishment of a tyranny, just as any cases of constitutional change, is motivated by a desire to pursue vertical honour (as well as wealth).

This view is reinforced by the fact that the Greeks commonly associated tyrants with inappropriate attitudes towards vertical honour. Tyrants are often characterized as hubristic. In Herodotus’ constitutional debate, Otanes, who endorses democracy, complains that tyrants perform wicked actions out of hybris and jealousy (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑβρὶ κεκορημένον ἔρει πολλὰ καὶ ἡπτάσθαλα, τὰ δὲ φθόνῳ, 3.80.4). The Chorus in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King states that ‘hybris breeds the tyrant’ (ὑβρίς φυτεύει τύραννον, 873), while in Euripides’ Helen the heroine is suffering hybris (ὑβρίν θ’ ὑβρίζειν) from the Egyptian tyrant Theoclymenus (785–8). Akin to the tyrant’s hybris are his love for honour (φιλοτιμία) and his desire for a larger share of material or non-material goods (πλεονεξία), including honour. Both are problematic in the context of democratic equality. In Euripides’ Phoenician Women, for example, Jocasta tries to dissuade Eteocles from his pursuit of tyranny (499–525) by warning him against the dangers of love of honour (τι τῆς κακίστης δαμαμόν ἐρήσσει φιλοτιμίας, παῖς) and by advising him to pursue equality instead (κείνο κάλλος, τέκνον, τις ἄνδρας τιμάν, 531–53). In Xenophon’s Hiero, Simonides states that people

66 Cf. [Arist. ] Ath. Pol. 22.4, where the author adds that Cleisthenes instituted ostracism to expel Hipparchus, son of Charmus, a relative of Pisistratus and first victim of ostracism in 488/7 B.C.

67 The source of the passage is usually identified with a fragment of Androtion (FGrHist/BNj 324 F 6) quoted in Harpocration’s entry on Hipparchus, son of Rhodes: (n. 1), 21. This does not rule out the possibility that our passage was influenced by Aristotle’s Politics. Harpocrate may have only quoted Androtion regarding Hipparchus’ kinship with Pisistratus, while the section on ostracism may have been derived from the Constitution of the Athenians: K.H. Kinzl, ‘AP 22.4: the sole source of Harpocrate on the ostrakismos of Hipparkhos son of Kharmos’, Klio 73 (1991), 28–45. Alternatively, both the Constitution of the Athenians and Aristotle’s Politics drew their information from Androtion.

68 V.J. Rosivach, ‘The tyrant in Athenian democracy’, QUCC 30 (1988), 43–57; at 53–6; Fisher (n. 37), 128–9. See also E.M. Harris, ‘The stereotype of tyranny and the tyranny of stereotypes: Demosthenes on Philip II of Macedon’, in M. Kalaitzi, P. Paschidis, C. Antonetti and A.-M. Guimer-Sorbets (edd.), Boreioelladika. Tales from the Lands of the Ethne (Athens, 2018), 167–78.

69 For honour as an object of πλεονεξία, cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1130b2–4 with D.L. Cairns, ‘Aristotle on hybris and injustice’, in D. El Murr, O. Renaut and C. Veillard (edd.), Les philosophes face au vice, de Socrate à Augustin (Leiden, 2020), 147–74.

70 φιλοτιμία was not an exclusive prerogative of tyrants, nor was it absolutely incompatible with democratic equality. φιλοτιμία was publicly endorsed in Athenian honorific decrees during the fourth century, but its excess was problematic in Athenian democratic ideology: D. Whitehead, ‘Competitive outlay and community profit: φιλοτιμία in democratic Athens’, C&M 34 (1983), 55–74; P.J. Wilson, The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia (Cambridge, 2000), 187–94; S. Ferrucci, ‘L’ambigua virtú. Philotimia nell’Atene degli oratori’, in M. Mari and J. Thornton (edd.), Parole in movimento. Linguaggio politico e lessico storiografico nel mondo ellenistico (Pisa, 2013), 123–35.
pursue tyranny to acquire honour (ὅμως προπετῶς φέρεσθε εἰς [τυραννίδα], ὡς τιμήσθε, 7.1–2), while Hiero complains that citizens resent the tyrant for hiring mercenary troops because they believe that these are kept for the tyrant’s acquisitiveness (πλεονεξίας ἐνεκχεί) rather than for the sake of equality of rights (ἰσοτιμίας, 8.10). One’s desire to set himself up as a tyrant could be perceived as an infringement of his fellow-citizens’ honour. This is implicit in Aristotle’s Politics, where it is said that the monopolization of political offices by the good or even the most virtuous individuals deprives all other citizens of honour (ἀρχόντων δ’ αἰεί τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαζόν εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτύμους, 1281a30–5).

The ostracisms of Themistocles and Megacles as well as the theoretical discussions in Aristotle and in the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians have shown that one aim of ostracism was to regulate the pursuit of vertical honour. The Athenians were not hostile to the enhancement of one’s own honour through virtuous performance. Their eagerness to honour victorious generals and χορηγοί as well as office-holders is a clear sign of the opposite. Yet the Athenians were expected to pursue vertical honour while respecting the horizontal honour of their fellow citizens. During the fifth century, ostracism provided a powerful instrument to enforce this notion. On a political level, it worked as a deterrent against those who appeared to be pursuing honours and offices to an extent incompatible with democratic equality. This is why the Constitution of the Athenians, within the context of Aristotle’s reflection on constitutional change, could interpret ostracism as a weapon against tyranny. On a social level, ostracism policed the behaviour of the elites in pursuing their vertical honour through luxury and conspicuous consumption. Ostracism, therefore, allowed the Athenians to implement behavioural rules meant to reconcile potentially incompatible dynamics of vertical honour and democratic equality both in the political and in the social spheres.

2. OSTRACISM, HORIZONTAL HONOUR AND SHAMEFUL BEHAVIOUR

The case of Themistocles also illustrates a second function of ostracism as an instrument against individuals who engaged in shameful behaviour and fell short of the standards of horizontal honour demanded from any Athenian. This is suggested by an ostrakon from the Ceramicus which reads: ‘Themistocles, the arsehole, son of Neocles’ (Θεμισθοκλῆς καταπύγον Νεοκλέος) (Kerameikos 7262). Themistocles is here called a καταπύγων, which literally translates to ‘down to arse’. Despite being often used as a generic insult, the word originated as a term of abuse against people believed to indulge excessively in sexual pleasures, often with an emphasis on passive homosexuality. As a result, the

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71 Rosivach (n. 68), 55–6.
72 Accattino and Curnis (n. 58), 194.
73 Liddel (n. 1), 174–9, 266–52. Victorious χορηγοί were honoured with tribe (rather than polis) decrees, but an honorary list of victors at the Great Dionysia was inscribed by the polis in the second half of the fourth century (IG II2 3218): Liddel (n. 1), 192–4.
74 On the expectation that citizens maintain a certain level of honour, see J. Blok, Citizenship in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 2017), 200–5, 225–5; Cairns (n. 26), 78.
75 Cf. Ar. Ach. 79, Nub. 528, Vesp. 83.
76 N.R.E. Fisher (ed.), Aeschines. Against Timarchos (Oxford, 2001), 45–8. According to an influential view proposed by K.J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (Cambridge, MA, 1978), Greek sexuality was based on a distinction between the superior penetrator and the inferior penetrated;
καταπύγων (and his fourth-century equivalent, the κίνασίδος) was commonly associated with dishonour. The Sausage-Seller in Aristophanes’ *Knights*, for example, recalls how, while he was praying for a shameless voice (φονήν τ’ ἀναξαδίην) to rival the lies of the Paphlagonian in the Council, he received an omen in the form of a καταπύγων farting on his right (μου ἐκ δεξίους ἐπέπαγε καταπύγων ἀνῆρ). The Sausage-Seller bent over in obeisance, shattered the gate of the Council House with his buttocks, and addressed the Council with the most demagogic speech (632–45). Aristophanes thus associates the behaviour inspired by the καταπύγων with the lack of shame the Sausage-Seller wished to possess.77

One could argue that Themistocles’ characterization as καταπύγων need not be taken literally and may have been a generic insult without any sexual or dishonourable overtones.78 Yet an excessive pursuit of sexual pleasures compatible with the literally and may have been a generic insult without any sexual or dishonourable

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also D.M. Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality and Other Essays on Greek Love* (New York, 1990); J.J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire: The Anthropology of Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece* (London, 1990). Accordingly, the καταπύγων was the passive homosexual, whose regular submission to penetration assimilated him to a woman. This view has been challenged by J. Davidson, *Courtesans and Fishcakes: The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens* (Chicago, 1997), 167–82, who has questioned the centrality of penetration in Greek homosexuality and argued that the καταπύγων was the man who suffered from insatiable physical, though not strictly sexual, desires; see also J. Davidson, *The Greeks and Greek Love* (London, 2007), 101–68. While the traditional view may indeed have placed excessive emphasis on penetration, one should not go as far as Davidson in detaching the καταπύγων from sexuality.

77 Cf. Ar. *Nab.* 907; Pl. *Grg.* 493d–494e.

78 Since the word καταπύγων could refer to the middle finger (Poll. *Onom.* 2.184), Brenne (n. 1), 62 with n. 78 has suggested that our ostrakon may have been the equivalent of giving Themistocles the finger.

79 Plutarch’s testimony on Themistocles’ rivalry with Aristides over a boy (Them. 3.1) may be another indicator that Themistocles was perceived as excessively eager for sexual pleasures.

80 A non-Athenian parallel is attested in the Tauric Chersonese, if one accepts the restoration καταπύγων on *ostrakon* n. III 11: J. Vinogradov and M. Zolotarev, ‘L’ostracismo e la storia della fondazione di Chersonesos Taurica: analisi comparata con gli ostraka dal Kerameikos di Atene’, *MEP* 2 (1999), 110–31, at 118.

81 Siewert (n. 20), 12; Brenne (n. 1), 92, 104. Cf. also Kerameikos 3773, where Megacles is addressed as ‘the adulterer’ (μοιγός).

82 Cf. also Kerameikos 1624, against ‘Cleippides, son of Deinias, the Byzantine’, which S. Brenne in P. Siewert (ed.), *Ostrakismos-Testimonien I* (Stuttgart, 2002), 93–4 interprets as a possible allusion to treason. An *ostrakon* against Megacles which seemingly demands that Megacles go away but not to Eretria ([3] ἀκλέκει [4] οὐκράτος [3] ἡλέχει [3] ἔρροσ [3] ἐλθέις [3] : μ’ Ἐρετρία: [3] οὐ [3] ) (Kerameikos 2529) may also imply an accusation of treason, as argued by S. Brenne in P. Siewert (ed.),
ostraka against Callias, son of Cratius, similarly accuse the candidate of being a Mede (Kerameikos 321, 351, 363–4, 373, 405, 1062, 1065–73).83 and are paralleled by accusations of Medism against Habronics of Lamptrai (μεδίζωντι, Kerameikos 249) as well as against an individual, tentatively identified as Aristides, possibly addressed as ‘the brother of Datis’ (Ἀριστείδειν | τὸν Δατίδος | ἀδελφόν, Agora 56).84

Treason and Medism were inextricably linked to shame in the eyes of the Athenians.85 The most significant example is Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates. The speech belonged to a case of εἰςησαγγελία, a procedure against individuals accused, among other things, of treason.86 Lycurgus insists on the shameful character of treason throughout the whole speech. He defines treason as ‘the most shameful action’ (τὸ ἁπαθικὸν, 1.68), accuses Leocrates of feeling no shame at the walls of his fatherland (οὔτε τὰ τείχη τῆς πατρίδος ἀφησόμενος) while he was deserting it at the moment of need (1.17),87 and exhorts the Athenians to punish those who dishonour and betray their country just as they honour their benefactors (ὅσπερ τοῖν τοῖς ἐνεργήτοις μεγίστας τιμάς ἀπονέμετε, οὔτω δίκαιον καὶ τούς τῇ πατρίδα κατασχύνοντας καὶ προδιδόντας ταῖς ἐσχάταις τιμωρίας κολάζειν, 1.51).88 In Euripides’ Phoenician Women, Menoeces sacrifices himself to save Thebes because he feels that it would be shameful to betray his father, brother and city (αἰσχρὸν γὰρ … | ἐγὼ δέ, πατέρα καὶ καστίγνητον προδοὺς | πόλιν τ’ ἐμαυτοῦ, δειλὸς ὃς ἐξω χθονὸς | ἀπεμι, 994–1005). Isocrates’ Plataicus similarly stresses how the trophies of the Persian Wars bring shame upon the Thebans (τὰ γὰρ μνημεία τότε γενομένου ἀφησόμεν τούτως ἐστίν, 14.59) because they act as reminders of their Medism. It is, therefore, clear that accusations of treason or Medism against candidates for ostracism can be taken as an indication of the centrality of horizontal honour in the rationale of ostracism.

The connection of ostracism and shameful behaviour features also in the last ostracism in Athenian history: that of Hyperbolus.89 As noted by Thucydides, Hyperbolus was ostracized not out of fear of his power and status (ὡστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξίωματος φόβον) but because of his wickedness and the shame he brought upon the city (διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως, 8.73.3).90 Yet a series of passages in Plutarch have led scholars to dismiss the importance of shame in the ostracism of Hyperbolus and interpret the event as somewhat exceptional.91 According to Plutarch, Hyperbolus persuaded the Athenians to hold an

Ostrakismos-Testimonien I (Stuttgart, 2002), 106–8, but the reading of the inscription is debated: M. Berti, ‘Megakles, non eretizzare! Una nuova proposta di lettura e d’interpretazione di un ostrakon attico’, Sungraphe 3 (2001), 41–57.

83 Kerameikos 405 even includes a graffito portraying Callias with a bow and Persian clothing.
84 S. Brenne in P. Siewert (edd.), Ostrakismos-Testimonien I (Stuttgart, 2002), 81–3.
85 Generally on treason and Medism, see A. Queyrel, Prosodia: La notion et l’acte de trahison dans l’Athènes du Ve siècle (Pessac, 2010).
86 On εἰςησαγγελία, see M.H. Hansen, Eisangelia. The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century b.c. and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians (Odense, 1975).
87 Cf. Lycurg, Leoc. 1.21.
88 Cf. Lycurg, Leoc. 1.82, 110.
89 The date of the ostracism of Hyperbolus is debated but usually placed around 415 b.c.: P.J. Rhodes, ‘The ostracism of Hyperbolus’, in R. Osborne and S. Hornblower (edd.), Ritual, Finance, Politics: Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to David Lewis (Oxford, 1994), 85–98, at 86–91; H. Heftner, ‘Der Ostrakismos des Hyperbolos: Plutarch, Pseudo-Andokides und die Ostraka’, RhM 143 (2000), 32–59, at 34 n. 10.
90 Cf. Androtion, FGrHist/BNJ 324 F 42.
91 Mattingly (n. 2); Rhodes (n. 89); Kosmin (n. 9), 150–2. Rosenbloom (n. 7) sees the ostracism of Hyperbolus as the culmination of a struggle between traditional politicians belonging to the
ostracism because he hoped to get rid of one person among Alcibiades, Nicias and Phaeax (Nic. 11.3–5, 11.10). In response, Alcibiades and Nicias (Nic. 11.1–8; Arist. 7.3; Alc. 13.1–7) or, alternatively, Alcibiades and Phaeax (Nic. 11.10; Alc. 13.8) made a secret pact and ostracized Hyperbolus with the help of their respective ἔτωρκειοι. Hyperbolus, because of his lesser social standing, would not have been the intended victim of this ostracism, and this departure from the rule supposedly outraged the Athenians and led them to abandon ostracism (Arist. 7.3–4; Nic. 11.6–8).92

Plutarch’s interpretation of the ostracism of Hyperbolus as a misuse of the institution cannot be trusted.93 His inconsistent accounts derive from the combination of several sources, which Plutarch supplements with his own views to explain the disappearance of ostracism as an institution.94 In addition to Thucydides’ aforementioned passage, which says nothing of Alcibiades’, Nicias’ or Phaeax’s role in the ostracism of Hyperbolus, Plutarch mainly relies on Athenian comedians (Plut. Alc. 13.4), Ps.-Andocides’ Against Alcibiades (Plut. Alc. 13.3) and Theophrastus (Plut. Nic. 11.10; Alc. 13.8). Yet comedians tell us nothing about the circumstances of Hyperbolus’ ostracism. Ps.-Andocides’ Against Alcibiades, which dates from the fourth century, purports to be a speech delivered before the vote which resulted in the ostracism of Hyperbolus.95 Its speaker, usually identified with Phaeax, never mentions Hyperbolus or a pact against him but only a choice among Alcibiades, Nicias and himself as possible candidates for ostracism ([Andoc.] 4.2). The scheme against Hyperbolus was mentioned by Theophrastus, who stated that Alcibiades made a deal with Phaeax (fr. 139 Wimmer). Theophrastus, however, was active in the early Hellenistic period, when Athenian politics were more elite-centred than in the fifth century.96 It is, therefore, safe to conclude that his interpretation of the ostracism of Hyperbolus as the outcome of a pact between two major elite politicians was influenced by the political dynamics of his time.

Alcibiades’ framing of Hyperbolus was not a fifth-century tradition but a late fourth-century invention. If one looks at the contemporary evidence without Plutarch’s filter, it appears clear that the case of Hyperbolus was not an exception but fitted perfectly within the honour dynamics governing ostracism. In a fragment quoted by Plutarch (Plut. Nic. 11.6–7; Alc. 13.9), Plato Comicus claimed that Hyperbolus suffered a fate appropriate to his ways of life (τῶν τρόπων μὲν ἀξια ἄνωτον) but inappropriate to his slave brands (τῶν στιγμάτων ἄναξια), because ostracism had not

land-holding elite and ‘new politicians’ whose wealth was based on slave-owning industry. But the existence of such ‘new politicians’ (on which see Connor [n. 5]) has been refuted by C. Mann, Die Demagogen und das Volk: zur politischen Kommunikation im Athen des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. (Berlin, 2007) and E.M. Harris, The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens (Oxford, 2013), 305–44.

92 Cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 43.4–5, which attests that in the late fourth century the Assembly was still required to cast the annual vote on whether to hold an ostracism. This suggests that ostracism was never formally abolished but simply fell into disuse.

93 As rightly noted by Forsdyke (n. 1), 170–5, who, however, interprets the event as a regular deployment of ostracism for defusing intra-elite conflict.

94 Heftner (n. 89); also Forsdyke (n. 1), 170–1.

95 D. Gribble, ‘Rhetoric and history in [Andocides] 4, Against Alcibiades’, CQ 47 (1997), 367–91, with references.

96 Despite some level of institutional continuity with Classical democracy (C. Habicht, Athens from Alexander to Antony [Cambridge, MA, 1997]), the Hellenistic democracy allowed Athenian elites a larger political influence: S.D. Lambert, Inscribed Athenian Laws and Decrees in the Age of Demosthenes (Leiden and Boston, 2018), 257–68.
been devised for men of his stamp (οὐ γὰρ τοιούτων εἶνεκ’ ὀστραχ’ εὑρέθη, fr. 203 K.–A.). The playwright does make a comparison, exaggerated for comical purposes, between the alleged slave Hyperbolus and the higher social standing of previous ostracized citizens. Yet the fragment also suggests that ostracism was expected to tackle exactly the kind of behaviour displayed by Hyperbolus. That this behaviour belonged to the domain of honour is clarified by Thucydides. The historian’s assertion that Hyperbolus had been ostracized not out of fear of his power and status (ἀξιώματος) but because of his wickedness and the shame (αἰσχύνης) he brought upon the city does not imply that the motivations of Hyperbolus’ ostracism were unusual.97 It illustrates two possible causes for ostracizing an individual, both of which belonged within the domain of honour, namely exceptionally prominent status and shameful behaviour, and specifies that Hyperbolus had been ostracized for the latter reason.

Thucydides’ characterization of Hyperbolus as shameful is confirmed in other contemporary sources. Andocides claimed to be ashamed to even talk about Hyperbolus (περὶ ὤμερος λέγειν αἰσχύνομαι) because of his alleged servile and barbarian origins and his job as a lamp-maker (Andoc. fr. 6 Blass). In a fragment of Eupolis’ Maricas, the Semi-Chorus asks Maricas, a comic alter ego of Hyperbolus (Ar. Nub. 551–9), why he is hanging his head (τί κέκυφας; fr. 192.120–1 K.–A.). We do not know the context of the fragment, but Eupolis employs the verb κύπτω (‘to bend over’), which in comedies often implies shameful behaviour on the part of the agent (Ar. Eq. 1350–5, Thesm. 929–42).98 The Chorus in Aristophanes’ Women at the Thesmophoria similarly states that the mothers of useful citizens should receive honours (λαμβάνειν τιμήν), while the mothers of worthless men, such as Hyperbolus’ mother, should be made to sit with their head shaved in order to shame them for begetting such children (830–46). Thucydides’ view of Hyperbolus was thus shared by his contemporaries, and suggests that the Athenians’ perception of Hyperbolus as a dishonourable politician was a significant factor in his ostracism.99

The ostracism of Hyperbolus, seen in conjunction with the evidence of the ostraka against Themistocles and those against traitors and Medizers, shows that an important function of ostracism was to punish those politicians who, because of their shameful behaviour, fell short of the standards of horizontal honour to which all Athenian citizens, as equal members of the community, had to abide. If they were suspected (or persistently accused) of engaging in dishonourable sexual behaviour or of betraying the polis, or, like Hyperbolus, were considered shameful and dishonest, Athenian politicians risked being ostracized as a result of the dishonour they had brought upon themselves and, by lessening their own horizontal honour as citizens, upon their community and their fellow citizens.100

97 Pace Rhodes (n. 89); S. Brenne in P. Siewert (ed.), Ostrakismos-Testimonien I (Stuttgart, 2002), 261.
98 S.D. Olsen, Eupolis, frr. 147–325 (Heidelberg, 2016), 159–60. The name Maricas, which Hesychius glosses as ‘catamite’ (κίναιδοι) (Hsch. μ 283), is itself suggestive of shameful behaviour.
99 D. Kamen, Insults in Classical Athens (Madison, 2020), 59 even suggests that the allegations of comic playwrights against Hyperbolus played a role in his ostracism.
100 This view may be strengthened by an ostrakon which reads [---]ς ἀτιμος[ς] (Agora 1071). The voter is either using ἀτιμος in its moral sense of ‘dishonourable’ or wishing the candidate to be disenfranchised; based on parallel usages in ostraka, the first option is more plausible: S. Brenne in P. Siewert (ed.), Ostrakismos-Testimonien I (Stuttgart, 2002), 140–1.
My analysis has shown that honour was central to the Athenians’ conceptualization of ostracism both during the lifetime of the institution and after the last instance of its use in the late fifth century. On the one hand, ostracism punished excessive pursuit of vertical honour, both on the political and on the social levels. It could target those who, like Themistocles, were seen as overly driven by φιλοτιμία in their political career, or those who, like Megacles, were believed of making an excessive display of their superior social status. Both kinds of behaviour were perceived as incompatible with the equality and the horizontal honour of the democratic community. On the other hand, ostracism could discipline Athenian politicians who were believed to indulge in shameful behaviour, such as dishonourable sexual attitudes, treason or Medism, and fall short of the standard of horizontal honour expected of any Athenian citizen.101

Not only was honour central in how the Athenians understood ostracism, but it was embedded in the institution itself. This is suggested by a singular aspect of the procedure of ostracism: the quorum. After a vote of ostracism had taken place, the archons counted the total number of ostraka that had been cast. If this number was smaller than 6,000, they would declare the ostracism invalid.102 Only two other Athenian procedures required the quorum.103 One was the law about naturalization, which stated that grants of citizenship were not valid unless they were confirmed by at least 6,000 votes in the Assembly ([Dem.] 59.89). The other procedure was the law on ἀδεία for the ἀτιμία. As reported in a document in Demosthenes’ Against Timocrates, this forbade proposing motions regarding the restoration of rights to disenfranchised citizens (μηδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων, ὅπως χρὴ ἐπιτίμους αὐτῶν εἶναι) unless an immunity had been voted by at least 6,000 Athenians (Dem. 24.45).104 It is significant that both procedures were concerned with honour. The grant of citizenship was among the greatest honours the Athenians could confer on foreign benefactors, while ἀτιμία consisted in the partial or total loss of one’s citizen rights, in other words, the loss of one’s share of honour. The quorum was thus characteristic of procedures which empowered the Athenians to take important decisions on matters related to honour, and the symbolic value of 6,000 votes as representative of the consensus of the community sits well with the ritual elements of the ὀστρακοφορία.105

101 Ostracism can be likened to the procedure of δοκιμασία, and particularly to the δοκιμασία ῥητόρων. This could be (though it rarely was) used for prosecuting orators for similar types of shameful behaviour, including treason and inappropriate sexual behaviour: C. Feyel, Dokimasia: la place et le rôle de l’examen préliminaire dans les institutions des cités grecques (Nancy, 2009).
102 There is disagreement in the sources about whether 6,000 was a quorum (Plut. Arist. 7.5) or the amount of votes that had to be cast against an individual for his ostracism to be valid (Philochorus, FGrHist/BNU 328 F 30; Diod. Sic. 11.55). Similarities with other Athenian procedures and the fragmentation of voter preferences attested by the ostraka confirm the quorum hypothesis: see Rhodes (n. 1), 270; S. Brenne in P. Sievert (ed.), Ostrakismos-Testimonien I (Stuttgart, 2002), 23.
103 A. Esu, ‘Adeia in fifth-century Athens’, JHS 141 (forthcoming). The quorum is also attested for the procedure of the νόμος ἐπ’ ἀνδρί in two documents (Andoc. 1.87; Dem. 23.59), but these are considered forgeries: M. Canevaaro and E.M. Harris, ‘The documents in Andocides’ On the Mysteries’, CQ 62 (2012), 98–129, at 116–19; M. Canevaaro, The Documents in the Attic Orators. Laws and Decrees in the Public Speeches of the Demostenic Corpus (Oxford and New York, 2013), 145–50.
104 The authenticity of the document is accepted even in the conservative study of Canevaaro (n. 103), 127–32.
105 On the symbolic meaning of the quorum, see P. Gauthier, ‘Quorum et participation civique
Recognizing the significance of honour for ostracism brings about a new picture of Athenian politics. The coexistence of cooperative and competitive aspects within honour dynamics poses a significant challenge to the popular view of Athenian democracy as dominated (and destabilized) by an elite constantly competing for power and influence. Several Athenian laws and institutions attested throughout the fifth and fourth centuries were designed for policing individuals’ pursuit of honour while granting appropriate honours to those who deserved them. The Assembly and the Council granted several kinds of honours to Athenians and to foreigners who had benefitted the city, and were eager to display their gratitude through the inscription of honorific decrees. The State funeral for the war dead similarly honoured the Athenians who had fallen in defence of the city through the erection of inscribed casualty lists and the delivery of a funeral speech. The Athenians, however, also instituted the γραφὴ ὑβρεως. Despite being rarely attested in court speeches, this procedure was meant to prosecute anyone who displayed a hubristic disposition and disrespected the honour of others. Ostracism, therefore, was part of a broader institutional framework which fostered a balance between competitive and cooperative values in the name of democratic equality.

The potential of honour for providing mass and elite with a shared tool for understanding ostracism suggests that we should shift our gaze from elite competition to collective democratic politics. Ostracism regulated the pursuit of vertical honour vis-à-vis the horizontal honour of the entire community. The institution was not concerned with competition within the elite as much as it aimed at creating a broad, equal platform for political participation and social recognition. This impression is even stronger if one considers the quantitative data provided by the ostraka. These show that the Athenians tended to target members of the economic elite who were active in politics, most often archons and elected officials such as the στρατηγοί. Ostracism can, therefore, be interpreted as one of the institutional features of Athenian democracy which discouraged the establishment of a narrow political class. These included, for example, the limit of two non-consecutive terms for Councillors and, at least during the fourth century, the dispersal of political initiative to a large pool of decree proposers not limited to the elite. This is not to say that the elite played no role in Athenian
politics, or that competition was absent from the political realm in democratic Athens. Detaching ostracism from elite competition and appreciating the centrality of complex honour dynamics in its rationale, however, is fundamental for painting a picture of Athenian democracy which grants cooperative values an appropriate weight and envisions the ὁδός not as an arbiter in the internal struggles of the elite but as a political actor in its own right.

University of Birmingham

MATTEO BARBATO
m.barbato@bham.ac.uk

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112 See C. Taylor, ‘A new political world’, in R. Osborne (ed.), Debating the Athenian Cultural Revolution: Art, Literature, Philosophy, and Politics 430–380 B.C. (Cambridge, 2007), 72–90, whose prosopographical analysis shows that, at least compared to the fourth century, a city-based elite played a relatively prominent role in politics during the fifth century.

113 See Liddel (n. 1), 165–7, who shows that Athenian honorific decrees fostered φιλοτιμία and competitive emulation in order to encourage public-spirited behaviour; but see n. 70 above on Athenian suspicions towards excessive φιλοτιμία.