Intelligence Gathering Imperative: A Tool for Successful Security Outfits’ Operation

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Abstract: This study examines the recent security challenges Nigerians and non-Nigerians encounters in their daily existence to eke a living. These threats are orchestrated by the activities of one of the deadliest terrorist group in the world (Boko Haram), and herdsmen notorious killers, armed banditry, cow rustling by rustlers, incessant kidnapping especially students in schools and unsuspecting Nigerians and non-Nigerians alike; which has made Nigeria federating states unsafe for any meaningful socio-economic development to thrive. To achieve this, two objectives were stated to include, underscore the overarching relevance of intelligent gathering in preventing crime and understand the elaborateness of intelligence gathering that can be utilized to mitigate crimes outcomes. The study found that intelligence gathering is the disconnect that has precipitated this state of affairs in Nigeria. Equally responsible is the people’s loyalty which is first and foremost skewed to ethnoreligious and political considerations instead of the country. It was recommended among other appeals to include: The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) of Nigeria which is the coordinating security agency should be properly funded and personnel trained in modern intelligence gathering techniques, the unnecessary bickering, in-fighting for superiority between and among security agencies in Nigeria should be discouraged because this itself is a big challenge in security equation of Nigeria; and serious effort should be made to stop the politicization of security intelligence gathering matters based on tribe, ethnic group, religious and political affiliations.

Keywords: Intelligence, Tool, Security outfits, Gathering, Operation, Terrorist.

1. BACKGROUND

What cannot be discountenanced in achieving success efficiently by policing in terms of maintaining law and order, preventing crimes is the narrative of intelligence gathering. In all climes that have recorded unquestionable victories over crime, have done so with robust intelligent gathering architecture that without ambiguity is reassuring and apt. The high successes gained in curbing crime in the developed world (USA, UK Germany, etc.) has been the act of uncovering criminal plots before they occur; which has, in the cursory discussion, been opined as the best practice and tagged “prevention is better than cure”. For instance, in the US, after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, it was revealed that to forestall this from happening, intelligent gathering should be pivotal, hence tremendous attention was focused on the need for constructive changes in law enforcement on grounds of reorganizing intelligence infrastructures at both the federal and local levels- which made it propitious for collaboration for states local law enforcement agencies to play a role in homeland security to respond to the threat of crimes more effectively (Merilyn, 2005).

Unlike Nigeria and other developing countries of Africa, issues of intelligence gathering are treated with levity and resources needed for this purpose oftentimes, are out rightly embezzled, strategies incoherently formulated and personnel not motivated patriotically to give their all to protect the citizens and country: which no doubt has led to intelligence and security failure to effectively respond to the crime before they occur and after they occur- and according to Lasisi and Ene (2019), Nigeria should take a cue in what these developed nations are doing proactively in intelligence gathering which has significantly addressed insecurity and criminal consequences. They further commented that, if Nigeria learns and live the examples of the US, the heinous attacks of book haram and all the myriads of security challenges besieging the country would be squarely taken off. The aims therefore among others, is to create a detailed skilled and knowledge-based reservoir to stop the threat and build in capacity investigative to facilitate plans and actions that will prevent a breakdown in security vis-à-vis habitual way of life of citizens.

The mere lack or absence of it (intelligence gathering) would occasion devastating security catastrophe. Accordingly, even contemplating pseudo practice akin to intelligence gathering in any setting, in the same manner, is inviting crime and disorderliness subtly, as intelligence gathering cannot be substituted.
Many have argued that it is the best way and trajectory to fight crime and related insecurities that may arise to cause system breakdown. Intelligence gathering is less physically tasking, but intellectually and strategically demanding, and the outcomes as it were, saves lives, property and security conundrum (Ayuk, 2020).

Evidence abounds around the world, where the intelligence gathering has been employed with little or no casualties, to have aborted crimes that would have cost many lives and property to a scale unimaginable. For instance, intelligence gathering helped the American Navy Seals in 2011 to dislodge a haven hibernating Osama Bin laden and served instant justice (killed). Recently also, the Americans surgically took out the Iranian General (Qasem Soleiman) in Iraq after thorough underground and investigative military/security profiling, that no American soldier was killed. In this 21st century, the advancement in technology has strengthened criminality and emboldened wittingly or unwittingly misconducts and the imminent threat their activities represents (Hersh, 2015 and Ayuk, 2020). It would be a serious disservice to any nation and government to deemphasize intelligence gathering in its quest of securing the society from crime (banditry, terrorism, kidnapping, hostage-taking, cultism and the Nigeria herdsmen mayhem as the case with Nigeria).

The fact that this important aspect of security is defective and lacking in Nigeria security outfits (police, military, customs, immigration, civil defence, state security service), which of course has informed their abysmal performance in the fight against criminality in Nigeria, gives this work the impetus to seek to unravel why there is a yawning gap in intelligence gathering in security structures of Nigeria; the consequences of lack of it and the positives of its presence in tackling the menace of criminality to secure the society vis-à-vis humanity, which is the gap the work is poised to fill.

1.1. The Purpose and Relevance of the Study

All information is necessary but some information for the intent for which they are meant is more impactful and felt based on the immediate goal it seeks to achieve. Besides the urgent concern to underscore the merits of intelligence gathering and to a large extent understand the processes, methods, resources and personnel to do surveillance and access information uncommonly in Nigeria by security agents, this work will be of great benefit to both the local community (Nigeria) and the international community (developed world), especially their respective militaries to address some of the logistics and operational challenges that if not nibbed- in- the bud would represent human and property risk. Furthermore, this piece can be used by the government as a useful policy and a legislative tool to help legally in the administration of criminal justice and finally serves as a knowledge pool for researchers in this area.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Intelligence Gathering Overview

Intelligence gathering is a clear-cut strategy deliberately designed and developed by security apparatus to access and exhume privileged information from the opposite camp via infiltration, espionage, planting cameras, hacking, etc. with the overriding purpose to outsmart and forestall security glitches which would affect negatively the health, welfare and socio-economic development of a nation. Operations Security Intelligence Threat Handbook (OSITH) refers to intelligence gathering as intelligence collection, a product resulting from the collation, evaluation, analysis, interpretation of collected information product that provides a country with a good standing about an adversary and usually this information is circled around military capabilities or other matters that directly or indirectly threatens the national security of a country.

Security here should not only be seen as militaristic, it includes but not limited to trade, culture, diplomacy and proprietary from a national corporation. This information gathered, as espoused in OSITH provides an edge over the adversary and allows implementation of a well-developed strategy to end any security threat from the beginning. Worthy of note is that intelligence Gathering starts from assembling fragmented information from different sources about an enemy’s security plans, operations, logistics, personnel, etc. and disseminate it to be analysed, verified and confirmed to be used in intelligence processes for or against it. OSITH further maintained that for intelligence gathering to be efficient, it must oscillate a circle process through which intelligence is obtained and made available to users and accordingly it has five steps as used in USA intelligence community. These steps are:

Planning and Direction

This step involves the management of the entire intelligence effort, from the identification of a need for data to the final delivery of the intelligence product to the consumers. The process deals with identifying,
prioritizing and confirming intelligence requirements, translating requirements into observables, preparing collection plans, issuing requests for information collection, production and dissemination, and continuously monitoring the availability of collected data.

**Collection**

This includes receiving relevant security information and making it available to be processed to form a template that can be used to achieve a goal. It covers the management of various activities, including advancing guidelines that ensure maximum utilization of available intelligence resources to meet the needs of the security target.

**Processing**

This forms the third step of the circle and involves the conversion of information so gathered and received into an intelligence tool. It encompasses translation and reduction of intercepted messages, detailed and comparing with others.

**Production**

This stage basically analyzes, evaluates and finally explains in concrete terms the information gotten for the benefits of the security community and a nation’s safety. Here, the production source involves general collation of information from the database, individuals, country etc. to enable the relevant bodies to act proactively, timely and objectively.

**Dissemination**

This forms the final stage of the circle, and it presupposes conveying importantly the finished information gathered and authenticated to be used by the agency or body concerned to act in the interest of the organisation, institution, country, etc.

2.2. **Typologies of Intelligence Assemblage**

Types of intelligence collection as adduced by Mark and Robert (2016), include the following:

**Human Intelligence**

As the name implies, it is simply a collection of information from human sources and like in Nigeria agencies such as the Directorate of Secret Service (DSS), Police, National Security and Civil Defence Corps, and the likes through interrogations, interview, etc. from criminal suspects – could also be done through covert means of spying, espionage and the likes.

**Signal Intelligence**

This method to a larger extent employs more electronic devices to collect and transmit information using aeroplanes, ships, satellites; and through these means, communication can be intercepted between suspecting parties and primarily to gain a security advantage over the other.

**Imagery Intelligence**

This is referred to as photo intelligence and as alluded to, is one of the oldest forms that took place during the American Civil War, World War I and II – when soldiers were sent up in balloons to gather information about their surroundings.

**Measurement and Signature Intelligence**

This is not so popular means of collecting information, but it concerns collating the efficacies of weapon capabilities and industrial activities to be processed and used for data gathering from the airborne collection system.

**Open Source Intelligence**

This method is multi-dimensional because it employs a wide array of information sources that are accessible, available and usable including newspapers, radio, television, academic records, conference papers, government reports, speeches, professional association briefs, etc.

Generally, intelligence seeks to accomplish the following and as captured by Karolls (2013), it sought to:

- support and advance measures to forestall attack as against a country’s foreign mission which represents that country in a foreign land by providing needful information to policy drafters to frame a template for diplomatic engagement.

- Assisting to monitor treaties and other agreements and invoke instruments of punishment on whoever work against a country’s interests – and could take the form of economic sanctions, armed embargo and outright disbandment of an enemy country’s personnel from visiting.

- Supporting military operations. This is the most crucial and one of the most rational intelligence gathering that exists. It provides a broad base of
the necessary information to plan a military operation either covertly or otherwise. It includes a specific warning of an impending security breach, attack and targets, spelling the location, size, nature, etc.

- Supporting defence planning. Generally, intelligence gathering gives a nation a great advantage in all ramification. At this instance, it entails a detailed preparation of information on the adversary’s military and economic capabilities and to super-counter it if it endangers, for instance, Nigeria’s security, economic, political and cultural interests.

- Economic intelligence. This hinges on those areas that dwell on economic trends and resources that can further strengthen exports to one’s favour and restrict access to other concerns to avail one a perpetual trade advantage.

2.3. Nigeria’s Intelligence Gathering Stance and Security

Given the failure in the security, economic and political architecture of Nigeria recently, one can be right to state that there is a serious disconnect in intelligence gathering element is not only the security apparatus of Nigeria but the institutions of government that defines us as a nation. According to David (2012), Nigeria, with a large population that is so diverse, inevitably cannot rule out security challenges. But it has been argued that it is incorrect to attribute security failure to population size, after all, there are countries (China) profiting using population advantage to surmount their security shortcomings.

The Nigerian security agencies in conjunction with National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the arm saddled with international security, are touted to have lost their intellectual prowess, and this is informed by inter-security agencies’ flagrant refusal to share intelligence, each claiming superiority, relevance and mastery over intelligence expertise over the other. This has further compounded the security lapses and what you see daily in Nigeria, according to Niyi (2013) is rapacious and deadly ethnorenligious conflict, communal clashes, kidnapping, murder, cultism, militancy and incomprehensible wave of terrorism and the resultant effects of these is loss of lives and property of Nigerians and foreigners alike residing in the country.

Instances in Nigeria are available where rag-tagged splinter groups armed with bows and arrows, locally fabricated guns (Dane guns), run by uneducated and untrained Nigerian renegades, had invaded police stations and sacked military in their barracks, killing scores of personnel. This happens because of the lack of or absence of intelligence gathering dynamics that characterize Nigeria security and intelligence communities, in spite of the huge resources budgeted every year for the said purpose. Over time, this has threatened and, seriously so, compromised the base of our national security and existence as a nation. Supporting this postulation, Achumba, Ighomerheo and Akpan-Robaro (2013) attest that huge allocation of the national budget has gone into security and yet several security low points are manifestly on a phenomenal dimension still occur. The system cannot categorically track the trend, types and location of a crime before it occurs – it has always been reactive instead of proactive. No wonder less challenging security glitches like cult clashes, youth restiveness, protests etc. cannot be nipped in the bud before they escalate. These pockets of insecurity facilitated crimes could have been mitigated if the efficacy of intelligence gathering was employed.

It is obvious that the challenges that stem from intelligence gathering are emboldened by corruption and unfit mediocrical appointees who only salve on what selfishly they can get criminally. As adumbrated by Nyi (2013) citing the American Heritage Dictionary (2002), intelligence is a very general mental capability that among other things involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience, that is the ability to learn the facts and the skills and apply them when the need arises. In relating to intelligence gathering, he opined that information that meets the stated, understood needs of policymakers collected, refined and narrowed the accomplished goal; i.e. to keep track of internal and external threats militarily, economically, politically, culturally and religiously (Luwenthal, 2000).

In Nigeria, intelligence gathering as a critical tool of state-craft provides the necessary warning about imminent threats (Niyi, 2020), is grossly lacking and as corroborated by Luwenthal (2000), cited in Niyi (2013), there is no link between and amongst the producers and users of intelligence, and that is why constantly our quest to defeat Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria remains elusive and described as “darkness groping”. Ngboawaji (2013) had argued that our security comatose over the years emerges from inadequate intelligence sharing among its security and law
enforcement agencies informed on an unnecessary rivalry that does no one any good. It is surprising that in Nigeria, a terrorist group (Boko Haram) can infiltrate effortlessly the security outfits, access operational information and plans, and then attack first without incurring any casualties. More ludicous is the fact that the bandits and terrorists and other renegade groups unleashing this carnage are not as trained as Nigerian security operatives. In short and factually so, most Nigerian military men are trained in the best military establishments of USA, UK, Germany, Israel, France, etc., and to be woefully outsmarted by these irredentists is unfathomable.

The former president of Nigeria (Goodluck Jonathan) had once admitted that Boko Haramists (terrorist group) have infiltrated his government and the military in particular. Otherwise, the terrorists wouldn’t have been ahead of the military, because military tactics, routes and methodologies of operation are even known to the terrorist group before even engaging them, and as evidence, the Nigerian military always, as it were, loses more personnel and outrightly defeated.

2.4. Why Intelligence Gathering Failure in Nigeria Security Establishment?

It is saddening to see highly placed Nigerians contribute negatively to the worsening security situation. Right now, no part of Nigeria is safe from one form of security challenges or the other. Ironically, some individuals who are profiting from the debased security conundrum would stop at nothing to seeing that the tempo of security uncertainty is sustained. In other words, there is a deliberate effort to strengthen conflicts, banditry, terrorism, insurgency, kidnapping etc., in Nigeria by some Nigerians. This do by an act of massive corruption among the top echelon of the military who colludes with politicians to embezzle funds meant for security paraphernalia. For instance, in 2014, the former National Security Adviser Col. Sambo Dasuki, was alleged to have stolen $2billion meant to procure arms. The illegal deal was revealed following an interim report of the presidential investigations committee on arms procurement under the Goodluck Jonathan administration. Dasuki was arrested on 1 December 2015 by the Department of State Security Services and handed over to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission for further interrogation. He mentioned notable Nigerians who partook in the theft to include: Chief Raymond Dokpesi, a top politician in Nigeria, Attahiru Bafawara, former governor of Sokoto State and Bashir Yuguda the then former Junior Minister of State (Google news, retrieved 6 September 2020). With this kind of malfeasance, it would be practically impossible for any meaningful intelligence gathering to be successful.

More worrisome is the fact that the few procured military wares are sub-standard and cannot in any modicum of serious warfare, sustain and guarantee victory. This has been confirmed by some of the military personnel who of their own volition have left the military basically because of the anachronistic and unscientific approach of security matters. The retired personnel who spoke on condition of anonymity lamented how handicapped the service is compared to the adversary. In concrete terms, he decried, “how can you successfully fight in this modern era without employing 21st-century technology?”. Nigeria does not have modern gadgets to track these criminals: the advance team sent, always get caught, tortured, and after information extracted, get killed. This would have been averted if the Nigeria security possesses the necessary modern technological wares to gather intelligence before attacking the enemies’.

On daily basis, and increasingly irrational, the handlers of Nigeria security architecture have seen no need to change the operational security methods to comply with intelligence gathering imperatives of the 21st century. This will be done by constant training and retraining, planting CCTV cameras, sharing intelligence, aerial imaging and the likes. Besides the above mentioned, the levity and inconsiderate posture of government disposition toward the welfare of security personnel is so appalling. The truth be told, security personnel are not motivated to give their all; you see a situation where a soldier’s entitlements in terms of salaries and allowances are owed for months for a man on a battlefront. Often, injured personnel are allowed to treat themselves and on several occasions, they die and their families neglected, driven out of their accommodations with no entitlements paid. Hence, no individual is ready to risk his/her life to infiltrate an enemy camp to collect information.

Another serious factor that has hampered intelligence gathering in Nigeria is the ethnonational appeal. As presently constituted, Nigeria has over 250 ethnic nationalities with about 500 languages, a variety of customs and traditions giving the country a diverse cultural entity (Akinwumi, Isiugo-Abanihe, 2014). It would therefore seem to be easy for the dislocation of loyalty from the country to ethnic and religious loyalty. The implication therefore would be, people who are from a particular ethnic and religious extraction, in this
circumstance, will protect their own at the expense of the country, even if their kinsmen are hardened, criminal terrorists. In other words, vital information of security threat concerning his/her people on the nation’s risk will not be divulged; rather, such a person might even shield them and secure a safe haven for their protection.

Politicians and politicking play a larger role in stampeding intelligence gathering in Nigeria. An average Nigerian politician is daring, violent, cruel and criminally oriented. They fan embers of war, clashes, chaos, etc. all in an attempt to perpetuate their stay in office; they groom boys (thugs), buy guns, machetes, cudgel, etc. to unleash mayhem on citizens who do not support them. These boys later, after the elections are over, the politicians cease servicing them and the ensuing lack would seamlessly transit their brutality to unsuspecting Nigerians. They become kidnappers, cultists, armed robbers and regrettably, these masters (politicians) of theirs will not volunteer information to the security agencies for fear that the boys will expose them (Ayuk, 2020).

2.5. Importance and Consequences of Lack of Security Intelligence Gathering in Nigeria’s Security Setting

The benefits that accrue from gathering intelligence cannot be taken for granted, and according to David (2012), intelligence gathering is one of the sophisticated methods that law enforcement employees to address security challenges which in strictest terms can help them to prevent crime that is yet to occur, intervene in one that has already been committed, forestall and mitigate, if not total stoppage of attacks on lives and property, but also the government, public communication, transportation, financial institutions etc. Intelligence gathering helps proper, proactive and timely planning to ward off potential and real threats that have the capacity to minimally and substantially fracture the peace, order and tranquillity and socio-economic advancement of a nation. Furthermore, it saves time to engage in a needless physical confrontation like wars that would end in bloodletting and annihilatory effect on the polity’s growth and development. Also to Karolis (2013), it shed more light on what is simple information and spy stories necessarily to avoid operations that can lead to an accidental war of unintended consequences, but that does not infer that intelligence is not fallible (Iraq 2003 and the 7/7 bombings of London).

Intelligence gathering can relatively save cost, i.e. the cost of putting troops on the ground is far assuaged in gathering and collecting real and useful information. This method has averted consequential negative happenings and operations, simply because the right intelligence was gotten, accessed and produced to form an alternative position of an event that, before the intelligence, had been seen and thought of differently and warrant an attack. The logistics equally involved in planning an outright confrontation which in some situations appears to be incorrect if there weren’t intelligence, will be rechanneled to human capital development. With intelligence gathering, fewer enemies are made and rebuilding trust and friendship amongst nations can be easily facilitated than where open and full-fledged wars ensue. This is so because traces or imprints of physical destructions and attacks are not left and seen as evidence to serve as a pointer for future generations to consider a retaliatory posture. On the whole, intelligence gathering notwithstanding its challenges remains the best approach to tackling insecurity and other related criminal activities (Iwarimie-Jaja, 2010).

That said, the absence of intelligence gathering evokes to a large degree unpleasant security consequences. When and where intelligence gathering is lacking, it affects negatively the core value, mission of our security agencies – and the effective vision for what constitutes honour, common sense and diversity, and how we judge intelligence officers and their activities will be disdainfully biased (Dan, 2016). Also, security operations will be made less cumbersome with proper and verified intelligence. Instead of guess and conjecture work, intelligence gathering oscillates conciseness and precision. Very importantly, the element of fear will seem to dominate the polity and the uncertainty that ensues therefrom would obfuscate socio-economic activities in that country; by extension, confidence is eroded, people become apprehensive and in most cases, self-help is resorted to, which can lead to anarchy. Lack or absence of it connotes a recipe for trouble, unnecessary disclosures of unauthorized information that eventually will compromise the sensitive security disposition of a country. Equally, policy formulators and government generally will find it rather difficult in making decisions because, without intelligence to guide, there is every likelihood that some policy decisions might be opined in error which is unacceptable in the security circle. Moreso, avoidable political, economic and security mistakes will be repeated with more costs and in some
situations can lead to loss of lives and property because of defective and absence of information. This is so because planning for engagement will not be carried out from an informed pedestal but rather speculative, usually not circumspect.

3. METHODOLOGY

This paper adopted an exploratory design to guide the enquirer, the reason being that it helped the enquirer to provide insight on intelligence gathering as a tool for security operatives. Moreso, this research design gives the inquirer early familiarization for further studies or analysis. It helps the investigator to establish how best to handle the problem and sharpen understanding of the subject matter. It is a preliminary research design aimed at providing clarification about the actual nature of the problem which a researcher is studying to provide a solution (Robert, 2001).

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

From the result of findings, it was revealed that there is a general and palpable frustration among Nigerians about the defective and seemingly non-existence of intelligence gathering structure between and among security agencies. This assertion buttresses what Davis (2012) opined as “it is incorrect to attribute security failure to lack of capacity from security personnel but the inherent corruption and lack of political will of the leadership in Nigeria”. He further stressed that the loss of intellectual prowess is occasioned by inter-security agencies’ flagrant refusal to cooperate and share intelligence, each claiming superiority, relevance and mastery over intelligence expertise to the detriment of the country.

In a related development, Mr X (not real), who pleaded anonymity and presently serving military personnel in Theatre of War in the Northeast of Nigeria where Boko Haram is rampaging, killing, kidnappings, raping and indiscriminately burning schools, hospitals, communication installations, etc., bemoaned the situation and responded thus during the oral interview session:

This government is playing with security matters... in short, they are very unserious, paying lip service and Nigerians bear the brunt of their illogical, unreasonable and corrupt behaviour. My colleagues have died avoidable deaths because of poor and incoherent intelligence informed by a lack of modern security equipment. Monies meant to purchase these items are outrightly stolen by politicians and very senior personnel in the military. How can you function optimally in this kind of situation? So sad that I weep for Nigeria.

Also, the findings confirmed that misappropriation and mismanagement is the bane of intelligence gathering and the resultant security failure in Nigeria. This is in line with the argument of Achumba et al. (2013) that if the huge budgetary allocation has been properly channelled into security as proposed, several security challenges would have been addressed.

The research found out that ethno-nepotistic and clannish loyalty has contributed negatively to not only intelligence gathering but the institutional architecture of the Nigerian state. This explains why Niyi (2013), in reacting on how a rag-tagged, untrained and uneducated splinter group can easily defeat flawlessly trained, educated Nigeria military in a battle. More so, an interviewee stated categorically thus:

My loyalty is with my religion, tribesmen, my state before Nigeria. This country is not working! How can I report my own brother or kinsman to the authority if he or she commits a crime? I cannot do that, that is betrayal – the interest and loyalty are to my community and anything therefrom.

The study concluded that intelligence gathering is still the best approach to tackle myriads of security hiatus and admonished that all security outfits should operate harmoniously and regularly share intelligence to defeat terrorism, kidnapping, cow rustling as the case in Nigeria, hostage-taking, secret cult killings, etc.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It would be in the strictest term reckless to downplay intelligence gathering in the scheme of things in Nigeria and indeed the world. The increasingly complex and sophisticated criminal activities in Nigeria calls for, undoubtedly, a robust, strategic and proactive intelligence template that will in all circumstances and situations tackle the security challenges that seem insurmountable. Hence the recommendations:

- The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) of Nigeria which is the coordinating security agency
in Nigeria should be properly funded and personnel trained in modern intelligence gathering techniques.

- The unnecessary bickering, in-fighting for superiority between and among security agencies in Nigeria should be discouraged because this itself is a big challenge in the security equation of Nigeria.

- Sister agencies should as a matter of urgent national importance, share intelligence. This will facilitate action to be taken uniformly and proactively in stemming the tide of a criminal and violent occurrence.

- Serious effort should be made to stop the politicization of security intelligence gathering matters in Nigeria on the basis of tribe, ethnic group, religious and political affiliations.

- Welfare and related remunerations of personnel who put their lives on the line should be timeously paid accurately because undue delay as the case with Nigeria, tend to slacken and demotivates these fantastic patriots.

- Saboteurs amongst the ranks of the intelligence should be dealt with and according to the laws of the land, to serve as deterrent to would-be infractors.

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