Abstract

Although deep learning models have brought tremendous advancements to the field of open-domain dialogue response generation, recent research results have revealed that the trained models have undesirable generation behaviors, such as malicious responses and generic (boring) responses. In this work, we propose a framework named “Negative Training” to minimize such behaviors. Given a trained model, the framework will first find generated samples that exhibit the undesirable behavior, and then use them to feed negative training signals for fine-tuning the model. Our experiments show that negative training can significantly reduce the hit rate of malicious responses (e.g. from 12.6% to 0%), or discourage frequent responses and improve response diversity (e.g. improve response entropy by over 63%).

1. Introduction

End-to-end dialogue response generation can be formulated as a sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) task: given a dialogue context, the model is asked to generate a high-quality response. In recent years, deep learning models, especially seq2seq language generation models (Sutskever et al., 2014; Cho et al., 2014), have brought significant progress to the field of dialogue response generation.

However, recent research has revealed undesirable behaviors of seq2seq models that are side effects of standard maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) training, such as the generic (boring) response problem (Li et al., 2016), vulnerability to adversarial attacks (Cheng et al., 2018; Belinkov & Bisk, 2017), and the malicious (egregious) response problem (He & Glass, 2019).

In this work, we propose and explore the negative training framework to correct unwanted behaviors of a dialogue response generator. During negative training, we first find or identify input-output pairs for a trained seq2seq model that exhibit some undesirable generation behavior, treat them as “bad examples,” and use them to feed negative training signals to the model. Correspondingly, we regard the training data as “good examples” and standard MLE training as “positive training”.

The idea of negative training is inspired from the way parents might teach their children to use language by incorporating both positive and negative training signals. For example, when teaching children how to use “love” and “hate”, in addition to using positive examples like “I love apples but I hate bananas”, they might also point out that saying “I hate you” to someone is considered impolite.

In this work, negative training is used to address the malicious response problem and the frequent response problem (to be described in Section 3.2 and 3.3) in open-domain dialogue response generation. In our experiments, we show that negative training can significantly reduce the hit rate for malicious responses, or discourage frequent responses and greatly improve response diversity.

2. Model Formulation

In this work we adopt recurrent neural network (RNN) based encoder-decoder seq2seq models (Sutskever et al., 2014; Cho et al., 2014; Mikolov et al., 2010), which are widely used in NLP applications like dialogue response generation (Li et al., 2016), machine translation (Luong et al., 2015), etc. We use $x = \{x_1, x_2, ..., x_n\}$ to denote one-hot vector representations of the input sequence, which serves as context or history information (e.g. the previous utterance), $y = \{y_1, y_2, ..., y_m\}$ to denote scalar indices of the corresponding reference target sequence, and $V$ as the vocabulary. We use $\theta$ to represent the parameters for the seq2seq model, and $P_\theta(y|x)$ as the model’s generative distribution. In this work, only one previous sentence is used as input.

On the encoder side, every $x_t$ will be first mapped into its corresponding word embedding $x_t^{emb}$. Since $x_t$ is one-

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hot, this can be implemented by a matrix multiplication operation $x_t^{emb} = E^{enc}x_t$, where the $i$th column of matrix $E^{enc}$ is the word embedding of the $i$th word. Then $\{x_t^{emb}\}$ are input to a long-term memory (LSTM) (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997) RNN to get a sequence of latent representations $\{h_t^{enc}\}$.

For the decoder, at time $t$, similarly $y_t$ is first mapped to $y_t^{emb}$. Then a context vector $c_t$, which is supposed to capture useful latent information of the input sequence, needs to be constructed. We adopt the “attention” mechanism for context vector construction: first an attention mask vector $a_t$ (which is a distribution) on the input sequence is calculated to decide which part to focus on, then the mask is applied to the latent vectors to construct $c_t$: $c_t = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_{t(i)} h_t^{enc}$. We use the formulation of the “general” type of global attention, described in (Luong et al., 2015), to calculate the mask.

During baseline training, standard MLE training with stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is used to minimize the negative log-likelihood (NLL) of the reference target sentence given the input sentence in the data:

$$L_{MLE}(P_{data};\theta) = E_{(x,y)\sim P_{data}}(-\log P_{\theta}(y|x))$$
$$= E_{(x,y)\sim P_{data}}(-\sum_{t=1}^{m} \log P_{\theta}(y_t|y_{<t},x))$$

where $y_{<t}$ refers to $\{y_0, y_1, ..., y_{t-1}\}$, in which $y_0$ is set to a begin-of-sentence token <BOS>.

In this work we take into consideration two popular ways of decoding (generating) a sentence given an input:

1. **Greedy decoding**: greedily select the word that is assigned the biggest probability by the model:

$$y_t = \text{argmax}_j P_{\theta}(j|y_{<t},x)$$

2. **Sampling**: $y_t$ is sampled from the prediction distribution $P_{\theta}(y_t|y_{<t},x)$.

In practice for dialogue response generation, greedy decoding will provide stable and reproducible outputs, but is severely affected by the generic response problem. Sampling will provide more diverse but less predictable responses, and thus give rise to the malicious response problem.

3. The Negative Training Framework

3.1. Overview

The negative training framework is a two-stage process. Given a trained model, we put it under a “debugging” environment $P_{test}$ which provides test input samples, get the model’s decoded samples and decide (using well-defined criteria) whether each input-output pair exhibits some undesirable behavior. Then, these “bad” pairs are used to provide negative training signals.

Negative training can be derived from Empirical Bayes Risk Minimization (Och, 2003). Specifically, the overall objective is to minimize the expected risk that the model exhibits undesirable decoding behavior:

$$L_{NEG}(P_{test};\theta) = E_{x\sim P_{test}} E_{y\sim P_{\theta}(y|x)} c(x,y)$$

where $c(x,y)$ refers to the binary criteria that will be 1 if $(x,y)$ exhibits undesirable behavior, and 0 otherwise.

Then, we take the derivative of $L_{NEG}$ w.r.t. to $\theta$, using the log derivative trick (widely used in Reinforcement Learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998)):

$$\nabla_{\theta} L_{NEG}(P_{test};\theta) = E_{x\sim P_{test}} E_{y\sim P_{\theta}(y|x)} c(x,y) \cdot \nabla_{\theta} \log P_{\theta}(y|x)$$

Compared to $L_{MLE}$ in eq. (1), which maximizes the log-likelihood of training data samples, $L_{NEG}$ minimizes the log-likelihood of undesirable model samples. This is the reason why we call it “Negative Training”.

In our preliminary experiments, we find that negative training needs to be augmented with the standard MLE objective $L_{MLE}$, encouraging the model to retain its original performance:

$$L_{NEG+POS} = L_{NEG} + \lambda_{POS} L_{MLE}$$

In our experiments, we find $\lambda_{POS}$ can be simply set to 0.1 to work well.

In the next two sections, we discuss how the general negative training framework is tailored for the malicious response problem and frequent response problem, respectively.

3.2. Negative Training for Malicious Responses

For the malicious response problem, we follow the methodology proposed by (He & Glass, 2019). First a list of malicious target sentences are created, then the gibbs-enum algorithm\footnote{Here $h$ refers to the output layer of LSTM, not the cell memory layer.} is called to find “trigger input” that will cause the model to assign large probability to the target sequence. The following “hit types” are defined:

$^4$Note that here “test” does not refer to the test data.

$^5$For this paper to be self-contained, we describe the gibbs-enum algorithm in Appendix A.
Negative Training for Malicious Responses

Algorithm 1 Negative Training for Malicious Responses

Input: Target list $Y_{\text{target}}$, model parameter $\theta$, learning rate $\alpha$, criterion for hit $c$, and training data $D_{\text{train}}$

for $y_{\text{target}}$ in $Y_{\text{target}}$ do

Get $x_{\text{trigger}}$ for $y_{\text{target}}$ using the gibbs-enum algorithm.

while $c(x_{\text{trigger}}, y_{\text{target}}) = 1$ do

Negative update $\theta = \theta - \alpha \cdot \nabla_{\theta} \log P(y_{\text{target}} | x_{\text{trigger}})$

Get data sample $(x_{\text{pos}}, y_{\text{pos}})$ from $D_{\text{train}}$

Positive update $\theta = \theta + \alpha \cdot \lambda_{\text{POS}} \cdot \nabla_{\theta} \log P(y_{\text{pos}} | x_{\text{pos}})$

end while

end for

Now we apply the negative training framework, and aim to reduce the hit rate of a trained model for a given list of malicious targets. During each iteration of negative training,

- **o-greedy-hit**: A trigger input sequence is found such that the model generates the target sentence from greedy decoding.
- **o-sample-avg-hit**: A trigger input sequence is found such that the model generates the target sentence with an average word log-probability larger than a given threshold $T_{\text{out}}$.
- **o-sample-min-hit**: A trigger input sequence is found such that the model generates the target sentence with a minimum word log-probability larger than a given threshold $T_{\text{out}}$.
- **io-sample-min/avg-hit**: In addition to the definition of **o-sample-min/avg-hit**, we also require that the average log-likelihood of the trigger input sequence, measured by a LM, is larger than a threshold $T_{\text{in}}$ minus $\log(k)$. This enforces the trigger input to be more likely to be input by real-world users.

$T_{\text{out}}$ is set to the trained seq2seq model’s average word log-likelihood on the test data, and $T_{\text{in}}$ is set to be a reasonable LM’s average word log-likelihood on the test set. The intuition is that the model should not assign larger probabilities to the malicious sentences than the reference sentences in the test set. Note that these hit types act as criteria $c(x, y)$, indicating whether a target sentence is hit by a trigger input.

As shown in (He & Glass, 2019), a typical seq2seq model trained by MLE has around a 10% hit rate for malicious targets w.r.t. **sample-min/avg-hit**, across data-sets. However, very few malicious targets are hit w.r.t. **greedy-hit**, so in this work, we focus on the malicious response problem for sampling during decoding. In Table 3.2 we show pairs of trigger inputs and the malicious target sentences w.r.t **io-sample-min-hit**, for the baseline model on Ubuntu data.

| Trigger Input | Malicious Target |
|---------------|------------------|
| ok give me a minute to see what you have in the first place | no one will help you |
| mic it’s supposed to be <unk> ’ that seems to be the problem | i do n’t think i like you |
| i know about photoshop i use skype too but i ca n’t buy it | you have no money |

Table 1. Examples of trigger inputs for malicious targets.

For each trigger input, multiple iterations of negative updates are usually needed before the hit criterion is no longer met. Note that in each iteration, the gibbs-enum algorithm is called again to find a new trigger input for each target.

In our experiments, we show that negative training effectively reduces the hit rate for malicious targets after each iteration, and eventually, the gibbs-enum algorithm can no longer find trigger inputs for a significant number of targets that were initially hits.

3.3. Negative Training for Frequent Responses

The generic response problem (Li et al., 2016) for end-to-end dialogue response generation refers to the typical behavior of a MLE trained model, whereby the generated responses are mostly safe, boring or uninformative (such as “i don’t know” or “good idea”). However, it is difficult to invent an automatic criterion to determine whether a response is generic or not.

In this work, we focus on the frequent response problem, as a sub-problem of the generic response problem. It refers to the behavior that a trained model generates exactly the same (usually boring) response, with a high frequency. A well-behaved generator should, obviously, generate more diverse responses.

In our experiments, we propose to use a metric called max-ratio to measure how severe the frequent response problem is. Given a test set and a decoding method, the model will generate a set of responses, and max-ratio is defined to be the ratio of the most frequent response. In our experiments, the baseline models have a max-ratio of around 0.3 for response like “I don’t know” across different data-sets.

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6 A LSTM language model (LM) is trained on the same training data (regarding each response as an independent sentence).

7 Note that in actual implementation, the algorithm is mini-batch based.
showing the severity of the frequent response problem.

During negative training for frequent response, first a threshold ratio \( r_{\text{thres}} \) is selected (such as 0.01), and responses with frequency ratio larger than \( r_{\text{thres}} \) will be discouraged. For each iteration, the model’s response to each training data input sentence is monitored and responses with frequency larger than \( r_{\text{thres}} \) will be used as negative examples. The frequency statistics are calculated using the current and the last 200 mini-batches. The procedure is formulated in Algorithm 2. Note that positive training is also needed here for the model to retain its original performance.

### Algorithm 2 Negative Training for Frequent Responses

**Input:** Model parameter \( \theta \), threshold ratio \( r_{\text{thres}} \), learning rate \( \alpha \), and training data set \( D_{\text{train}} \)

**for** \((x_{\text{pos}}, y_{\text{pos}}) \in D_{\text{train}} \) **do**

1. Generate response \( y_{\text{sample}} \) from the model.
2. Compute the frequency \( r_{\text{sample}} \) for \( y_{\text{sample}} \).
3. **if** \( r_{\text{sample}} > r_{\text{thres}} \) **then**
   - **Negative update** \( \theta = \theta - \alpha \cdot \nabla_{\theta} \log P_{\theta}(y_{\text{sample}} | x_{\text{pos}}) \)
   - **Positive update** \( \theta = \theta + \alpha \cdot \lambda_{\text{POS}} \cdot \nabla_{\theta} \log P_{\theta}(y_{\text{pos}} | x_{\text{pos}}) \)

**end if**

**end for**

In our experiments, it is shown that negative training significantly reduces max-ratio for the model on test data, and greatly increases the diversity of the model’s responses.

### 4. Experiments

#### 4.1. Data-set Descriptions

Three publicly available conversational dialogue data-sets are used: Ubuntu, Switchboard, and OpenSubtitles. The Ubuntu Dialogue Corpus (Lowe et al., 2015) consists of two-person conversations extracted from the Ubuntu chat logs, where a user is receiving technical support from a helping agent for various Ubuntu-related problems. To train the baseline model, we select the first 200k dialogues for training (1.2M sentences / 16M words), and the next 5k dialogues for validation and testing respectively. We select the 30k most frequent words in the training data as our vocabulary, and out-of-vocabulary (OOV) words are mapped to the \(<UNK>\) token.

The Switchboard Dialogue Act Corpus \(^8\) is a version of the Switchboard Telephone Speech Corpus, which is a collection of two-sided telephone conversations, annotated with utterance-level dialogue acts. In this work we only use the conversation text part of the data, and select 1.1k dialogues for training (181k sentences / 1.2M words), 25 dialogues for validation and 25 dialogues for testing. We select the 10k most frequent words in the training data as our vocabulary.

We also report experiments on the OpenSubtitles data-set\(^9\) (Tiedemann, 2009). The key difference between the OpenSubtitles data and Ubuntu/Switchboard data is that it contains a large number of malicious sentences, because the data consists of movie subtitles. We randomly select 5k movies for training (each movie is regarded as a big dialogue), which contains 5M sentences and 36M words, and 50 movies for validation and testing respectively. The 30k most frequent words are used as the vocabulary. We show some samples of the three data-sets in Appendix B.

For pre-processing, the text of all three data-sets are lower-cased, and all punctuation are removed. The maximum input sequence length is set to 15, with a maximum output sequence length of 20. Longer input sentences are cropped, and shorter input sentences are padded with \(<PAD>\) tokens.

#### 4.2. Baseline Model Training

For all data-sets, we first train an LSTM based LM and attention based seq2seq models with one hidden layer of size 600, and the embedding size is set to 300\(^10\). For Switchboard a dropout layer with rate 0.3 is added because over-fitting is observed. The mini-batch size is set to 64 and we apply SGD training with a fixed starting learning rate (LR) for 10 iterations, and then another 10 iterations with LR halving. For Ubuntu and Switchboard, the starting LR is 1, while a starting LR of 0.1 is used for OpenSubtitles. The results are shown in Appendix B.

After negative training, in addition to measuring the hit rate for malicious targets or the diversity of the responses, it is also important to check whether the original performance of the baseline model is damaged. Towards that end, the perplexity of the model before and after negative training will be compared, and qualitative analysis of decoding samples will be conducted. We mainly rely on the perplexity measurement for the following reasons: 1) Since the baseline models are trained by MLE, it is natural to use a measurement directly related to the model’s NLL on the test-set, such as perplexity; 2) Other popular measurements, such as the BLEU score, have been found to correspond poorly with human judgements (Liu et al., 2016).

#### 4.3. Experiments on the Malicious Response Problem

Following (He & Glass, 2019), a list of malicious targets are created to test whether negative training can teach the model not to generate sentences in the list. However, in addition to prevent the model from generating targets in a

\(^8\)http://compprag.christopherpotts.net/swda.html

\(^9\)http://www.opensubtitles.org/

\(^10\)The pytorch toolkit is used for all neural network related implementations. In supplementary materials we include our code and the Switchboard data for reference and reproduction, it’s also provided at https://github.mit.edu/tianxing/201903_NegativeTrainingPublicCode.
specific list, it is also important to check whether negative training generalizes to other malicious targets. So, a test target list which contains similar but different targets from the training list are also created to test generalization. The training and test lists each contain 0.5k targets.

It is also interesting to investigate whether using more malicious targets for negative training can lower the hit rate on the test list. Towards that end, we train a seq2seq paraphrase model using the paraNMT data-set (Wieting & Gimpel, 2017), with a model of the same structure as described in Section 2. Then, the paraphrase model is used to generate paraphrases of the malicious targets in the training target list\(^\text{11}\) for augmentation. In our experiments, the training list without augmentation is first used for negative training, then it is augmented with 0.5k or 2k paraphrased targets respectively (1 or 4 paraphrase copies for each training target sentence). Samples of the malicious targets are shown in Table 2. Note that the same training, augmented training and test list are used for all three data-sets, and there is no sequence-level overlap between training lists (augmented or not) and the test list.

In our experiments, we spotted a harmful side effect of negative training where frequent words in the training target list are severely penalized and sometimes receive low probability even in normal perplexity testing, especially for experiments with small \(\lambda_{\text{POS}}\). To alleviate this problem, we use a simple technique called frequent word avoiding (FWA): negative gradients are not applied to the most frequent words in the malicious training target list\(^\text{12}\). For example, when doing negative training against the target “i hate you <EOS>”, only “hate” will get a negative gradient.

For all data-sets, negative training (Algorithm 1) is executed on the (trained) baseline model for 20 iterations over the training target list. A fixed learning rate of 0.01 and a mini-batch size of 100 are used. \(\lambda_{\text{POS}}\) is set to 0.1 for Ubuntu, and to 1 for Switchboard and OpenSubtitles.

\(^{11}\)Note the training and test lists are manually created.

\(^{12}\)The exact avoiding word set used is \{<EOS>, you, i, me, are, to, do\}.

| Train          | Paraphrase of Train          | Test                                             |
|----------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| you are broken | you’re broken                | are you broken                                  |
| i will kill    | i’ll kill myself              | i’m going to kill                               |
| you are bad    | you’re bad                   | you are really bad                              |
| you are stupid | you’re stupid                | you are so stupid                               |
| you shut up    | you shut your mouth          | can you shut up                                 |

Table 2. Examples of malicious targets in the training list, the test list, and paraphrases of the training targets which will be used for augmentation.

The main results are shown in Table 3. For Switchboard we focus on sample-avg-hit because we find very few targets are hit w.r.t. sample-min-hit (Similar results are reported in (He & Glass, 2019)), while for Ubuntu and OpenSubtitles we focus on sample-min-hit. Note that we get very similar results w.r.t. sample-avg-hit for Ubuntu/OpenSubtitles, and we omit those results here.

We first observe that, for all data-sets, negative training can effectively reduce the hit rate on the training target list to less than 5% with little or no degradation on perplexity. Also, significant hit rate reduction is achieved on the test target list, which has no overlap with the training target list. This suggests that negative training, similar to traditional positive training, also generalizes. However, note that all targets in the test list used in this work have a counterpart which is both semantically and syntactically similar to it in the training list. It will be interesting to investigate whether negative training has more powerful generalization ability in future work.

It is also shown that training list augmentation can further reduce the malicious target hit rate consistently for both training and test lists. For example, on Ubuntu data, the hit rate after negative training w.r.t. o-sample-min-hit is 12.6%, and can be reduced to 0% with paraphrase augmentation.

We compare the models behavior before and after negative training in Figure 1. It is shown that negative training effectively reduce probability mass assigned to malicious targets,
Negative Training for Neural Dialogue Response Generation

Figure 1. Negative Log-probability (NLL) the model assigned to the test list malicious targets (when fed with trigger inputs) or test data samples. The data-set is OpenSubtitles and hit type is **io-sample-min-hit**. Sentences are separated by `<EOS>`.

while keeping the behavior on the test-set unchanged. However, almost every word in the malicious target sentences gets lower probability, especially when FWA is not used. Ideally, we believe a “polite” language generator should only assign low probability to the key words in a malicious sentence. For example, in the target “i shall take my revenge”, only the “take my revenge” part should be penalized. Whether negative training has the potential to truly teach “manners” to a language generator is worth further investigation.

### 4.4. Experiments on the Frequent Response Problem

In this section we report results where the negative training framework (Section 3.3) is applied to tackle the frequent response problem. For all data-sets, negative training is executed for 20 iterations on the MLE trained model over the training data, with a selected \( r_{\text{thres}} \). A fixed learning rate of 0.001 is used for all three data-sets, the mini-batch size is set to 64 and \( \lambda_{\text{POS}} \) is set to 1.

In this work, we focus on improving the model’s greedy decoding behavior instead of beam search for the following two reasons: 1) For the baseline models our experiments, we found that beam search gives far worse response diversity than greedy decoding, because it favors short responses (usually only of length one) too much, resulting in a much larger max-ratio; 2) During training, doing beam search is much more time-consuming than greedy decoding.

To measure the diversity of the model’s generated responses, in addition to max-ratio introduced in Section 3.3, which is specially design for the frequent response problem, we also adopt the entropy metric proposed in (Zhang et al., 2018). Given a set of responses from decoding on the test set, \( \text{Ent-n} \) calculates the entropy of the n-gram distribution:

\[
\text{Ent-n} = \sum_{g \in G_n} -r(g) \log r(g)
\]

where \( G_n \) is the set of all n-grams that appeared in the response set, and \( r(g) \) refers to the ratio (frequency) of n-gram \( g \) w.r.t. all n-grams in the responses set.

In our experiments with negative training, a harmful side-effect is spotted: during decoding, the model tends to output long and ungrammatical responses such as “i don’t know if it’s a real valid deterrent crime crime yeah i’m satisfied trying not to”. We believe the reason is that the sentence end token `<EOS>` gets over penalized during negative training (it appears in every negative example). So, we apply the same frequent word avoiding (FWA) technique used in Section 4.3, except that here only the negative gradient for `<EOS>` is scaled by 0.113.

In addition to the baseline model, we compare our proposed negative training framework against a GAN (Goodfellow et al., 2014a) approach, where a discriminator \( D \) is introduced and the generator \( G \) tries to fool the discriminator to

13We find that scal by zero will result in extremely short responses.
Table 4. Main results of negative training with three different $r_{\text{thres}}$, for the frequent response problem. Diversity metrics for the responses in the test data are also shown, “E-"n” refers to the Ent-"n" metric. The experiment with best diversity result and non-degenerate sample quality are shown in bold. For example, although the experiment with $r_{\text{thres}} = 0.01\%$ on Ubuntu gives higher diversity measurements, we find some of its samples are ungrammatical.

| Data Set          | $r_{\text{thres}}$ | PPL    | max-ratio | E-2 | E-3 |
|-------------------|--------------------|--------|-----------|-----|-----|
| Ubuntu            | N/A                | N/A    | 1.1%      | 10.09 | 11.32 |
| Baseline          | N/A                | 59.49  | 4.4%      | 5.53 | 5.92 |
| +GAN              | N/A                | 59.43  | 4.7%      | 5.30 | 5.87 |
| +neg-train        | 1%                 | 59.76  | 1.2%      | 5.74 | 6.52 |
| +neg-train        | 0.1%               | 60.06  | 1.3%      | 6.44 | 7.55 |
| +neg-train        | 0.01%              | 60.96  | 1.3%      | 9.09 | 10.16 |
| Switchboard       | $r_{\text{thres}}$ | PPL    | max-ratio | E-2 | E-3 |
| Test-set          | N/A                | N/A    | 10.0%     | 8.61 | 9.65 |
| Baseline          | N/A                | 42.81  | 37.4%     | 2.71 | 2.42 |
| +GAN              | N/A                | 42.69  | 49%       | 2.66 | 2.35 |
| +neg-train        | 10%                | 42.84  | 12.4%     | 3.86 | 4.00 |
| +neg-train        | 1%                 | 44.32  | 9.8%      | 5.48 | 6.03 |
| +neg-train        | 0.1%               | 76.46  | 21.8%     | 5.55 | 6.10 |
| OpenSubtitles     | $r_{\text{thres}}$ | PPL    | max-ratio | E-2 | E-3 |
| Test-set          | N/A                | N/A    | 0.47%     | 9.66 | 10.98 |
| Baseline          | N/A                | 70.81  | 20%       | 4.22 | 4.59 |
| +GAN              | N/A                | 72.00  | 18.8%     | 4.08 | 4.43 |
| +neg-train        | 1%                 | 72.37  | 3.1%      | 5.68 | 6.60 |
| +neg-train        | 0.1%               | 75.71  | 0.6%      | 6.90 | 8.13 |
| +neg-train        | 0.01%              | 76.82  | 0.8%      | 7.28 | 7.92 |

where the generator $G$ refers to the seq2seq model $P_{\theta}$. The GAN framework is very attractive for tackling the generic response problem (Li et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2018), because the discriminator can act as a critic to judge whether a response sample is boring. We describe the training details and hyper-parameter setting for the GAN approach in Appendix C.

The experimental results are shown in Table 4. We first observe a large gap on the diversity measures between the baseline models and the test set, especially on Switchboard and OpenSubtitles data. That indicates the severity of the frequent/generic response problem. Then, results of negative training with different $r_{\text{thres}}$ show that negative training can significantly increase response diversity, with little or no loss on PPL performance. For example, max-ratio is reduced by 73.7% and Ent-3 is increased by 149% for Switchboard data. Further, consistent improvement is achieved when a smaller $r_{\text{thres}}$ is used. However, sample quality will decrease (becoming too long or ungrammatical) when $r_{\text{thres}}$ is too small. The reason could be that when too much diversity is asked for, the model will go to extremes to provide diversity, resulting in degradation of sample quality.

Somewhat surprisingly, the vanilla GAN approach is not shown to be effective in our experiments. The reason could be that despite its discriminative nature, GAN training still feeds “positive” gradient for samples from the model (eq. (12) and eq. (13) in Appendix C), which is not enough to prevent the model from generating them. We believe additional techniques (Zhang et al., 2018; Li et al., 2017) are needed for the GAN approach to be effective.

We show some model samples before and after negative training in Table 5. It is shown that negative training effectively discourages boring responses, and response diversity is clearly improved. However, one limitation is observed that diversity does not necessarily lead to improvement on the informativeness of the response w.r.t. the input (sometimes the model generates a completely unrelated response). More samples for all three data-sets are included in Appendix D.

To rigorously compare the quality of generated samples before and after negative training, a small-scale human evaluation is conducted and results are shown in Table 6. It is observed that negative training wins by a visible margin for all three data-sets, however, for around half of the samples, the evaluators report a “tie”. This shows that, on one hand, negative training does not damage the quality of the generated samples. On the other hand, our suspicion is confirmed: the improvement on diversity does not lead to equally significant improvement on sample’s informativeness. It’s an exciting future direction to investigate whether negative training can be combined with techniques designed to improve informativeness for language generation (also discussed in Section 5).

5. Related Works

The malicious response problem and the gibbs-enum algorithm to find trigger inputs (He & Glass, 2019) originates from a large body of work on adversarial attacks for deep learning models, with continuous input space (e.g. image classification) (Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Szegedy et al., 2013), or discrete input space (e.g. sentence classification, or seq2seq models) (Papernot et al., 2016; Samanta & Mehta, 2017; Liang et al., 2018; Ebrahimi et al., 2017; Belinkov & Bisk, 2017; Chen et al., 2017). “Adversarial attacks” refer to the phenomenon that when an imperceptible perturbation is applied to the input, the output of the model can change significantly (from correct to incorrect). The trigger inputs
negative training for neural dialogue response generation

| Input: it'll cost about three hundred dollars for a stud for her |
| Baseline: i think that's a good idea |
| Neg-train: i think i would agree with that |
| Input: we want to breed her with a champion |
| Baseline: i do n't know |
| Neg-train: i think it was |
| Input: now these are long haired |
| Baseline: i do n't know |
| Neg-train: i've been in a very very good shape |
| Input: the other two are short hairs |
| Baseline: i do n't know |
| Neg-train: i'm going to try to get it |

| Input: captain you wanted to see me |
| Baseline: i'm sorry |
| Neg-train: i was in the hotel |
| Input: yes mr. brown could i |
| Baseline: i do n't know |
| Neg-train: i'd like to introduce myself |
| Input: leave it to me |
| Baseline: i'm not going to leave you |
| Neg-train: you're taking the first step |
| Input: thank you mr. brown |
| Baseline: i'm sorry |
| Neg-train: i'm happy to see you |

Table 5. Greedy-decoding samples on the test data before and after negative training. The samples are consecutive (input of the next sample is the reference response for the previous one).

| Data-set | Tie | Baseline wins | Neg-train wins |
|----------|-----|---------------|----------------|
| Ubuntu   | 64.6% | 14.0% | 21.3% |
| Switchboard | 45.1% | 18.3% | 36.4% |
| OpenSubtitles | 58.3% | 19.0% | 22.6% |

Table 6. Human Evaluation Results. For each data-set, 300 samples (input-output pairs) from the baseline model and the model after negative training, are evenly distributed to 4 English-speaking human evaluators. The evaluators are asked to pick a preferred sample, or report a tie.

found by the gibbs-enum algorithm, can be regarded as a type of “targeted attack”, in which the attack triggers the model to assign large probability to a specific malicious target sentence.

Motivated by the works on adversarial attacks, various adversarial training strategies (Madry et al., 2017; Belinkov & Bisk, 2017; Miyato et al., 2016) have been proposed to make trained models more robust against those attacks. During adversarial training, the model is fed with adversarial examples and the correct labels. The negative training framework considered in this work differs from adversarial training in that, instead of asking the model to “do the right thing” (referred to as “positive training” in this work), the model is trained to “not do the wrong thing”. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work investigating the concept of negative training for language generation models, and the first proposed solution for the malicious response problem.

The malicious target list used in this work is very similar to the one used in (He & Glass, 2019). We propose to add a test target list to test the generalization of negative training. Further, we show that the training list can be effectively augmented by utilizing a paraphrase model.

In this work, we propose a definition for the frequent response problem (Li et al., 2016). Much research work has devoted to alleviate the generic response problem in end-to-end dialogue response generation, (Li et al., 2016) use the maximal mutual information (MMI) objective, and propose to utilize an auxiliary LM to penalize the generic response during decoding. Closely related to this work, sophisticated training frameworks based on GAN (Zhang et al., 2018; Li et al., 2017) have also been shown to be effective, where techniques such as variational information maximization or reward for every generation step (REGS) are proposed to improve GAN training. However, in our experiments it is shown that a vanilla GAN approach gives unsatisfactory results. Whether negative training is complementary to these frameworks is worth investigating in future work.

6. Conclusion

In this work, we propose the negative training framework to correct undesirable behaviors of a trained neural dialogue response generator. The algorithm involves two major steps, first input-output pairs that exhibit bad behavior are identified, and then are used for fine-tuning the model as negative training examples. We also show that negative training can be derived from an overall objective (eq. (3)) to minimize the expected risk of undesirable behaviors. In our experiments, we apply negative training to the malicious response problem and the frequent response problem and get significant improvement for both problems. We believe the negative training framework has great potential to be used for correcting a language generator’s behavior in various aspects, and can benefit deep generative models for other domains as well.

14Note that negative training is considerably easier to implement than the mentioned frameworks based on GAN.
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A. The Gibbs-enum Algorithm for Finding Trigger Inputs

In this section, we briefly describe the gibbs-enum algorithm, we also refer readers to (He & Glass, 2019) for the intuition and full development of the algorithm. The goal of gibbs-enum is that given a (malicious) target sentence \( y \) of length \( n \), and a trained seq2seq model, we aim to find a trigger input sequence \( x \), which is a sequence of one-hot vectors \( \{x_i\} \) of length \( n \), to minimize the negative log-likelihood (NLL) that the model will generate \( y \). We formulate our objective function \( L(x; y) \) below:

\[
L(x; y) = -\frac{1}{m} \sum_{t=1}^{m} \log P_{\text{seq2seq}}(y_t|y_{<t}, x) + \lambda \text{R}(x) 
\]

A regularization term \( \text{R}(x) \) is applied when looking for io-sample-min/avg-hit, which is the LM score of \( x \):

\[
\text{R}(x) = -\frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^{n} \log P_{\text{LM}}(x_t|x_{<t}) 
\]

In our experiments we set \( \lambda \text{in} \) to 1 when searching for io-sample-min/avg-hit, otherwise 0.

During gibbs-enum, every time we focus on a single index slot \( x_t \), and find the best one-hot \( x_t \) while keeping the other parts of \( x \) fixed:

\[
\arg \min_{x_t} L(x_{<t}, x_t, x_{>t}; y) 
\]

(10)

Since the size of vocabulary \(|V|\) is finite, it is possible to try all of them and get the best local \( x_t \). But it is still costly since each try requires a forwarding call to the neural seq2seq model. To address this, gradient information is utilized to narrow the range of search. We temporarily regard \( x_t \) as a continuous vector and calculate the gradient of the negated loss function with respect to it:

\[
\nabla_{x_t} (-L(x_{<t}, x_t, x_{>t}; y)) 
\]

(11)

Then, we try only the \( G \) indexes that have the highest value on the gradient vector. The procedure is formulated in Algorithm 3.

For hyper-parameters of gibbs-enum, \( T \) (the maximum number of sweeps) is set to 5, \( G \) (size of the set of indices for enumeration during each update) is set to 100, the algorithm is run 5 times with different random initializations and the trigger input with the best loss is returned. Note that larger hyper-parameters can give slightly higher hit rates, but will be more time-consuming.

B. Data Samples and Baseline Perplexity Results

Some data samples for Ubuntu/Switchboard/Opensubtitles are shown in Table 7.
We now describe the model configuration of the discriminator $D(x, y)$ used in our work. The discriminator model configuration is similar to the one used in (Yu et al., 2016). First $x_t$ is converted to $x_t^{emb}$ as described in Section 2. Then a 1D-convolution operation and max-over-time pooling operation (Kim, 2014) is applied, with 300 filters of window size 3/4/5/6, respectively. The resulting representation vector is denoted as $x_{rep}$. 

The same network forward pass is also applied for $y$ to get $y_{rep}$. Finally, $x_{rep}$ and $y_{rep}$ are concatenated and passed to a 3-layer high-way DNN classifier (Srivastava et al., 2015) of hidden size 2000.

Following (Goodfellow et al., 2014a), we alternately train the discriminator and the generator with a ratio of 3:1. The discriminator is trained with a learning rate of 0.01. Similar to negative training, our experiments show that positive training (or “teacher forcing” in some literature) is crucial to aid the model to maintain its original performance, during GAN training.

### D. More Model Samples for Comparison

We show more samples for comparison of different training methods in Table 9, 10 and 11.

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### Table 7. Data samples of Ubuntu/Switchboard/OpenSubtitles Dialogue corpus

| Model       | Ubuntu   | Switchboard | OpenSubtitles |
|-------------|----------|-------------|---------------|
| Ubuntu      |          |             |               |
| A: anyone here got an ati hd 2400 pro card working with ubuntu and compiz ?
| B: i have an hd 3850
| A: is it working with compiz ?
| Switchboard |          |             |               |
| A: what movies have you seen lately
| B: lately i ’ve seen soap dish
| A: oh
| B: which was a
| A: that was a lot of fun
| OpenSubtitles |          |             |               |
| B: you ca n’t do that .
| A: my husband ’s asleep .
| B: your husband know you ’re soliciting ?
| A: give us a f*** ’ break .

### Table 8. Perplexity (PPL) and negative log-likelihood (NLL) of for baseline models on the test set.

| Model       | Ubuntu   | Switchboard | OpenSubtitles |
|-------------|----------|-------------|---------------|
| LM          | 66.29(4.19) | 44.37(3.79) | 74.74(4.31)   |
| Seq2seq     | 59.49(4.08) | 42.81(3.75) | 70.81(4.26)   |

---

Baseline perplexity results are shown Table 8. Note that $T_{in}$ and $T_{out}$ for various types of hit types discussed in Section 3.2 are set accordingly, for example, for $io$-sample-min-hit on the Ubuntu data, $T_{in}$ is set to -4.19, and $T_{out}$ is set to -4.08.

### C. Configurations of the GAN Approach for Dialogue Response Generation

We use the log derivative trick (Wu et al., 2017) for the gradient derivation of the generator:

\[
\nabla_{\theta_G} V(D, G; x) \\
= \nabla_{\theta_G} E_{y \sim G(x)} \log(1 - D(x, y)) \\
= E_{y \sim G(x)} \nabla_{\theta_G} \log G(y|x) \log(1 - D(x, y))
\]

where $x$ is one input data sample. Then the generator is updated by:

\[
\theta_G \leftarrow \theta_G - \alpha_G \cdot \nabla_{\theta_G} V(D, G)
\]

where $\alpha_G$ is the learning rate for the generator. Note that because $\log(1 - D(x, y))$ is negative, $\nabla_{\theta_G} \log G(y|x)$ will be eventually scaled positively and added to $\theta_G$.

In our GAN experiments, different values in the set \{0.01, 0.001, 0.0001\} are tried for $\alpha_G$ and the best result is reported.
Table 9. Consecutive model samples before and after negative training for Switchboard data.

| Switchboard |
|----------------|
| **Input:** people do n’t realize it |
| **Baseline:** i do n’t know |
| **GAN:** i do n’t know |
| **Neg-train:** i think it ’s a very interesting |
| **Input:** they ’re sort of siamese in a way |
| **Baseline:** uh-huh |
| **GAN:** uh-huh |
| **Neg-train:** yeah |
| **Input:** they have the gloves on the paws |
| **Baseline:** i do n’t know |
| **Neg-train:** i ’m really glad that they do n’t have that |
| **Input:** they ’re usually two colored |
| **Baseline:** i think that ’s a good idea |
| **GAN:** i think that ’s a good idea |
| **Neg-train:** yeah |
| **Input:** she ’s predominantly black |
| **Baseline:** i do n’t know |
| **Neg-train:** he ’s a very good actor |
| **Input:** she has chocolate paws chocolate stomach and silver on her hindquarters |
| **Baseline:** uh-huh |
| **Neg-train:** i think they have a great deal of <unk> |
| **Input:** she ’s quite attractive looking |
| **Baseline:** he ’s a good actor |
| **Neg-train:** he ’s a good guy |
| **Input:** hope the stud will find her attractive |
| **Baseline:** i do n’t know |
| **Neg-train:** i ’ve been in a very very good shape |
| **Input:** that she has kittens that look like her |
| **Baseline:** i think that ’s a good idea |
| **Neg-train:** yeah |
| **Input:** that she has a whole bunch of kittens |
| **Baseline:** i think that ’s a good idea |
| **Neg-train:** yeah |
| **Input:** we have to be careful |
| **Baseline:** i ’m not sure |
| **Neg-train:** i ’m in the dallas area |
| **Input:** we have to get a particular color point stud |
| **Baseline:** i do n’t know |
| **Neg-train:** i’m just going to |
| **Input:** you ca n’t just breed them with anything |
| **Baseline:** i do n’t know |
| **Neg-train:** i have n’t been to a lot of the movies lately |
| **Input:** we have to get a silver point himie |
| **Baseline:** i do n’t know |
| **Neg-train:** i ’m going to have to go back to work |

Table 10. Consecutive model samples before and after negative training for Ubuntu data.

| Ubuntu |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| **Input:** just how good ubuntu |
| **Baseline:** i ’m not sure i ’m just a <unk> |
| **GAN:** i ’m not sure if it ’s possible but |
| **Neg-train:** i ’m sure there ’s a way to do it |
| **Input:** i have a server that i want to install on a server |
| **Baseline:** i have a <unk> and i want to install ubuntu on a usb drive |
| **GAN:** i have a <unk> and i want to install ubuntu on a usb drive |
| **Neg-train:** i have a live cd and i want to install it on a hard drive |
| **Input:** but that takes hours |
| **Baseline:** i do n’t know i ’m not sure |
| **GAN:** i do n’t know |
| **Neg-train:** i ’m not sure i think it ’s a hardware problem |
| **Input:** how to i enable tv-out via fglrx |
| **Baseline:** you can use the <unk> driver |
| **GAN:** you can use the nvidia driver from the ubuntu wiki |
| **Neg-train:** you can try the <unk> driver |
| **Input:** they may be able to help you in channel # ati |
| **Baseline:** thanks |
| **GAN:** thanks |
| **Neg-train:** i have a ati radeon mobility radeon hd |
| **Input:** nobody feels like responding in # ati |
| **Baseline:** i have no idea what you ’re talking about |
| **GAN:** i have no idea |
| **Neg-train:** i think i found it |
| **Input:** it ’s always worked perfectly for me why ’s it crap |
| **Baseline:** i do n’t know i ’m not sure |
| **GAN:** i do n’t know i ’m not sure |
| **Neg-train:** i do n’t know i just use it to make it work |
| **Input:** i have seen better performance on an xp vm under parallels |
| **Baseline:** i have a <unk> and i have a <unk> |
| **GAN:** i have a <unk> and a <unk> <unk> |
| **Neg-train:** i have a vm with vmware server running on it |
| **Input:** use 2kpro and no issues whatsoever with 256mb of ram and a 10gig vdrive |
| **Baseline:** i have a <unk> and it ’s not a big deal |
| **GAN:** i have a <unk> and it ’s not a big deal |
| **Neg-train:** i have a p4 with 1gb ram and i have a 1gb swap |
| **Input:** will someone please help me with php config on ubuntu |
| **Baseline:** what ’s the problem |
| **GAN:** what ’s the problem |
| **Neg-train:** what ’s wrong |
| **Input:** you are having trouble with |
| **Baseline:** i ’m trying to get a <unk> to work with ubuntu |
| **GAN:** i ’m not sure i ’m just trying to help you |
| **Neg-train:** i ’m trying to get a <unk> of my <unk> and i want to know if it ’s possible |
Table 11. Consecutive model samples before and after negative training for Opensubtitles data.