Supplementary Material:
A Self-supervised Approach for Adversarial Robustness

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We first explore why Self-supervised Perturbation (SSP) attack works in Appendix A. In Appendix B, we compare NRP with conventional adversarial training (AT) method known as feature denoising [17] in terms of adversarial robustness and defense training time. Differences of our proposed attack and defense from feature scattering [19] method are discussed in Appendix C. Ability of SSP to fool object detectors is compared against CDA [14] in Appendix D. We show that different transformation based defenses, JPEG, total variation minimization (TVM) and median filtering (MF) are not effective against SSP in Appendix E. Attack parameters against which our defense is evaluated are provided in Appendix F. Finally, we visually demonstrate NRP’s ability to remove different kinds of adversarial perturbations in Appendix G.

Appendix A. Why Self-supervision Works?

Here, we highlight our intuition to create adversarial examples using feature space of VGG model [15].

• Neural Style Transfer: [5, 13] observed that the ability to transfer styles improves with AT, a phenomenon often related to VGG models [15]. On the other hand, VGG networks are more vulnerable to adversarial attacks [5]. A hypothesis was presented in [5] that perhaps VGG initial layers are as robust as adversarially trained models which allows better style transfer without AT.

• Transferability of Natural vs. Robust Layers: In addition to style transfer hypothesis [5], we explore the connection between layers of VGG and adversarially trained models in the context of adversarial attacks:

  – Maximum Distortion of Non-Robust Features: Datasets containing natural images contain both robust and non-robust features [9]. Robust features can be described by high level concepts like shape e.g. ear or noise etc., while non-robust features can arise from background or texture [7]. Ilyas et al. [9] argues that neural networks can pick-up on non-robust features to minimize the empirical risk over the given the data distribution and the transferability of adversarial examples can be explained by these non-robust features in different networks.

  – Transferability: VGG’s ability to destroy non-robust features translates to better transferability even without any AT as compared to ResNet models (see Figures 1 and 2).
Adversarial: ResNet50-NT  Adversarial: VGG16-NT  Adversarial: ResNet50-AT

Figure 2: A visual demonstration of adversaries found by SSP in the feature space of different networks. Perturbation budget is set to $l_\infty \leq 16$. NT and AT represent naturally and adversarially trained models, respectively.

Indigo Bunting
Terrapin
King Snake
Crane
Golden Retriever
Ear

(b) Logits

Indigo Bunting
Terrapin
King Snake
Crane
Golden Retriever
Ear

(b) Features

Figure 3: t-SNE [11] visualization of logits vs. feature representation of randomly selected classes from ImageNet validation set. Logits are computed from VGG16 [15] last layer while features are extracted from "Block3-Conv3" of the same model. Our intuition is based on the observation that features space is shared among input samples rather than the logit space. Attacking such shared representation space removes task dependency constraint during adversary generation optimization and produces generalizable adversarial examples.

• Shared Representation Space: Our objective is to find adversarial patterns that can generalize across different network architectures trained for different tasks (e.g. classification, objection detection or segmentation). These are diverse tasks that do not share loss functions, dataset or training mechanism. Decision-boundary based attacks use model final response (e.g. logits in the case of classification) that is specific to input sample which leads to taskspecific perturbations. A network’s feature space, however, is shared regardless the input category. Therefore, perturbations found in such a space are highly generalizable (see Figure 3).

Appendix B. Comparison with AT

Conventional AT methods, such as [17], lose clean accuracy to gain adversarial robustness. Take an example of ResNet152 adversarially trained by [17]. In order to gain 55.7% robustness ($\epsilon \leq 16$) against targeted PGD attacks with ten number of iterations, the model clean accuracy drops from 78% to 65.3% which is even lower than VGG11. In contrast, our approach does not suffer from performance degradation on clean samples.

Appendix B.1. Defense Results

To compare against [17], we ran ten number of PGD attack iterations. Labels for this targeted attack were chosen randomly as suggested by [17]. It is important to note that NRP can be turned into a dynamic defense, for example by first taking a random step in the input space and then projecting the modified input sample onto the perceptual space using our NRP. This way, NRP can be used to defend against attacks that try to incorporate NRP during attack optimization (a white box setting). We demonstrate this behavior in Table 1 by incorporating NRP in PGD attack using backpass approach introduced in [1]. Even for this challenging scenario, NRP shows significantly higher robustness than [17] while maintaining a higher clean accuracy. This highlights the benefit of self-supervision in AT.
### Appendix B.2. Training Cost

Conventional AT methods like [17] depend on number of classes, dataset and task. In contrast, our defense is independent of such constraints. We describe the computational benefits of our defense with feature denoising based AT [17] in Table 2. Training time of our defense remains the same regardless of the backbone model while training time for [17] increases with the model size. In conclusion, conventional AT requires large amount of labelled data (e.g., [17] is trained on 1.3 million images of ImageNet), while our defense can be trained on small unlabelled data (e.g., 25k unlabelled MS-COCO images).

| Method          | No. of GPUs | Training Time | Task/Label Dependency Specific |
|-----------------|-------------|---------------|-------------------------------|
| [17]            | 128         | 52            | Yes                           |
| NRP             | 4           | 28            | No                            |

Table 2: Comparison of training time (hours) between NRP and AT on ResNet152 model [17].

### Appendix C. Comparison with [19]

**Defense comparison:** Feature Scattering (FS) [19] based AT remains model and task-specific. Instead, our defense is independent to the target model and task, thereby providing better generalizability.

**Attack comparison:** The proposed attack FSA [19] operates in logit space in an unsupervised way by maximizing Optimal Transport distance, as compared to our SSP which operates in perceptual feature space (e.g., VGG features). we compare the transferability of their attack with our SSP. As demonstrated in Table 3, SSP performs favorably well against FSA.

### Appendix D. SSP vs. CDA

We compare our SSP with a recent transferable attack [14] in Table 4 on MS-COCO validation set using Mask-RCNN. mAP is reported with IoU = 0.5.

### Appendix E. Effect of Input Transformations on SSP Attack

Different input transformations have been proposed to mitigate the adversarial effect. We have tested strength of SSP attack against well studied transformations including:

- **JPEG:** This transformation reduces adversarial effect by removing high frequency components in the input image.

- **Total Variation Minimization (TVM):** TVM measures small variations thus it can be effective against relatively smaller adversarial perturbations.

- **Median Filtering (MF):** This transformation filters out the input image by replacing each pixel with the median of its neighboring pixels.

We report our experimental results on segmentation and object detection tasks.

**Segmentation:** SSP attack created on CAMVID [2] was able to bring down per pixel accuracy of Segnet-Basic by 47.11% within $l_\infty \leq 16$ (see Table 6 and Figure 4). JPEG and TVM transformations are slightly effective but only at the cost of drop in accuracy on benign examples.

**Object Detection:** RetinaNet [10] collapses in the presence of adversaries found by SSP on MS-COCO validation set. Its mean average precision (mAP) with 0.5 intersection over union (IOU) drops from 53.78% to 5.16% under perturbation budget $l_\infty \leq 16$ (see Table 7 and Figure 5). TVM is relatively more effective compared to other transforms against the SSP.

### Appendix F. Attack Parameters

For FGSM, we use a step size of 16. For R-FGSM, we take a step of size $\alpha=16/3$ in a random direction and then a gradient step of size $16-\alpha$ to maximize model loss. The attack methods, I-FGSM, MI-FGSM and DIM, are run for 10 iterations. The step size for these attacks is set to 1.6, as per the standard practice. The momentum decay factor for MI-FGSM is set to 1. This means that attack accumulates...
Figure 4: Segnet-Basic output is shown for different images. (a) is the original image, while (b) shows predictions for the original image. (c) is the adversary found by SSP attack, while (d) shows predictions for the adversarial image. Perturbation budget is $l_\infty \leq 16$.

Figure 5: RetinaNet detection results are shown for different images. (a) and (c) show detection for the original images, while (b) and (d) show detection for adversaries found using SSP attack.

Figure 6: Accuracy of Inc-v3 for adversaries created on VGG-16 by different attacks. SSP’s strength increases with number of iterations, in contrast to MI-FGSM and DIM.

Appendix G. Generalization to Unseen Attacks

We show visual demonstration (see Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10) of how our defense, NRP, trained using SSP attack is able to generalize on the variety of unseen perturbations created by different attack algorithms. NRP successfully removes the perturbations that it never saw during training.

• Figure 7 shows adversaries coming from adversarially robust model. It’s the most difficult case as perturbations does not resemble to a noisy patter rather represent meaningful structured pattern that are in-painted into the clean image. NRP’s ability to remove such difficult patterns shows that our defense can separate the original signal from the adversarial one.

• NRP has no difficulty in removing thick patterns introduced by DIM or smooth perturbations of DIM-TI attacks (Figure 8).
Table 5: Model accuracies are reported on original data set ImageNet-NIPS containing benign examples only. T-1: top-1 and T-5: top-5 accuracies. Best performances are shown in bold.

| Accuracy | Naturally Trained | Adv. Trained |
|----------|------------------|--------------|
|          | Inc-v3 | Inc-v4 | Res-152 | IncRes-v2 | VGG-19 | Adv-v3 | Inc-v3,ens3 | IncRes-v2,ens3 |
| T-1      | 95.3   | 97.7   | 96.1    | 100.0     | 85.5   | 95.1   | 93.9   | 97.8     |
| T-5      | 99.8   | 99.8   | 99.9    | 100.0     | 96.7   | 99.4   | 98.1   | 99.8     |

Table 6: Segnet-Basic accuracies on CAMVID test set with and without input transformations against SSP. Best performances are shown in bold.

| Method                  | No Attack | SSP $l_\infty \leq 8$ | SSP $l_\infty \leq 16$ |
|-------------------------|-----------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| No Defense              | 79.70     | 52.48                  | 32.59                   |
| JPEG (quality=75)       | 77.25     | 51.76                  | 32.44                   |
| JPEG (quality=50)       | 75.27     | 52.45                  | 33.16                   |
| JPEG (quality=20)       | 68.82     | 53.08                  | 35.54                   |
| TVM (weights=30)        | 73.70     | 55.54                  | 34.21                   |
| TVM (weights=10)        | 70.38     | **59.52**              | **34.57**               |
| MF (window=3)           | 75.65     | 49.18                  | 30.52                   |

Table 7: mAP (with IoU = 0.5) of RetinaNet is reported on MS-COCO validation set with and without input transformations against SSP. Best performances are shown in bold.

| Method                  | No Attack | SSP $l_\infty \leq 8$ | SSP $l_\infty \leq 16$ |
|-------------------------|-----------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| No Defense              | 53.78     | 22.75                  | 5.16                    |
| JPEG (quality=75)       | 49.57     | 20.73                  | 4.7                     |
| JPEG (quality=50)       | 46.36     | 19.89                  | 4.33                    |
| JPEG (quality=20)       | 40.04     | 19.13                  | 4.58                    |
| TVM (weights=30)        | 47.06     | 27.63                  | 6.36                    |
| TVM (weights=10)        | 42.79     | **32.21**              | **9.56**                |
| MF (window=3)           | 43.48     | 19.59                  | 5.05                    |

Adversaries produced by SSP using adversarilly robust features [6].

Purified adversaries by NRP.

Figure 7: NRP is capable to remove these difficult adversaries where adversarial image is in-painted into the clean image. Untargetted adversaries are created by applying SSP to feature space of adversarially trained ResNet50 [6]. Perturbation budget is set to $l_\infty \leq 16$. 
Figure 8: NRP removes diverse patterns produced by DIM [18] and translation-invariant attacks [4] to a great extent. Untargeted adversaries are created by ensemble of ensemble of Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-152. Perturbation budget is set to $l_\infty \leq 16$. 
Figure 9: Our defense successfully able to recover original samples from unseen adversarial patterns. These are untargeted adversaries produced by CDA [14] trained against Inc-v3 on ImageNet and Paintings. Perturbation budget is set to $l_\infty \leq 16$. 
Figure 10: Adversaries generated by CDA [14] reduce Mask-RCNN [8] performance. NRP successfully removes adversarial perturbations and greatly stabilizes Mask-RCNN predictions.
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