Secrecy in Cooperative Relay Broadcast Channels*

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Abstract

We investigate the effects of user cooperation on the secrecy of broadcast channels by considering a cooperative relay broadcast channel. We show that user cooperation can increase the achievable secrecy region. We propose an achievable scheme that combines Marton’s coding scheme for broadcast channels and Cover and El Gamal’s compress-and-forward scheme for relay channels. We derive outer bounds for the rate-equivocation region using auxiliary random variables for single-letterization. Finally, we consider a Gaussian channel and show that both users can have positive secrecy rates, which is not possible for scalar Gaussian broadcast channels without cooperation.

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1 Introduction

The open nature of wireless communications facilitates cooperation by allowing users to exploit the over-heard information to increase achievable rates. However, the same open nature of wireless communications makes it vulnerable to security attacks such as eavesdropping and jamming. In this paper, we investigate the interaction of these two phenomena, namely cooperation and secrecy. In particular, we investigate the effects of cooperation on secrecy.

The eavesdropping attack was first studied from an information theoretic point of view by Wyner in [2], where he established the secrecy capacity for a single-user degraded wiretap channel. Later, Csiszar and Korner [3] studied the general, not necessarily degraded, single-user eavesdropping channel, and found the secrecy capacity. More recently multi-user versions of the secrecy problem have been considered for various channel models. References [4–8] consider multiple access channels (MAC), where in [4, 5] the eavesdropper is an external entity, while in [6–8] the users in the MAC act as eavesdroppers on each other. References [9, 10] consider broadcast channels (BC) where both receivers want to have secure communication with the transmitter; in here as well, each receiver of the BC is an eavesdropper for the other user. References [11–16] consider secrecy in relay channels, where in [11–13], the relay is the eavesdropper, while in [14, 15] there is an external eavesdropper. In [16], the relay helps the transmitter to improve its rate while it receives confidential messages that should be kept hidden from the main receiver.

In a wireless medium, since all users receive a version of all signals transmitted, they can cooperate to improve their communication rates. The simplest example of a cooperative system is the relay channel [17] where the relay helps increase the communication rate of a single-user channel using its over-heard information. Multi-user versions of cooperative communication have been studied more recently. In [18], a MAC is considered where both users over-hear a noisy version of the signal transmitted by the other user, and transmit in such a way to increase their achievable rates. In [19–21], cooperation is done on the receiver side, where in a BC, one or both of the receivers transmit cooperative signals to improve the achievable rates of both users.

Our goal is to study the effects cooperation on the secrecy of multiple users where secrecy refers to simultaneous individual confidentiality of all users. One of the simplest models to study this interaction is the cooperative relay broadcast channel (CRBC), where there is a single transmitter and two receivers, and each receiver would like to keep its message secret from the other user; see Figures 1 and 2. In this model, in order to incorporate the effects of cooperation, there is either a single-sided (Figure 1) or double-sided (Figure 2) cooperative link between the users. For clarity of ideas and simplicity of presentation, for a major part of this paper, we will assume a CRBC with a single-sided cooperation link from the first user to the second user. We will investigate the effects of two-sided cooperation in Section 8. Focusing on the single-sided CRBC, we note that if we remove the cooperation link, our model reduces to the BC with confidential messages in [9, 10], and if we set the rate of the
first user to zero, our model reduces to the relay channel with confidential messages in [11–13], and if we both set the rate of the first user to zero and remove the cooperation link between the users, our model reduces to the single-user eavesdropper channel in [2, 3]. Our model is the simplest model (except perhaps for the “dual” model of cooperating transmitters in a MAC with per-user secrecy constraints [8]) that allows us to study the effects of cooperation (or lack there of) of the first user (the transmitting end of the cooperative link) on its own equivocation rate as well as on the equivocation rate of the other user (receiving end of the cooperative link).

Our motivation to study this problem can be best explained in a Gaussian example. Imagine a two-user Gaussian BC. This BC is degraded in one direction, hence both users cannot have positive secrecy rates simultaneously [2, 9, 10]. This has motivated [10] to use multiple antennas at the transmitter in order to remove this degradedness in either of the directions and provide positive secrecy rates to both users simultaneously. We wish to achieve a similar effect with a single transmitter antenna, by introducing cooperation from one user to the other. Imagine now a Gaussian CRBC [19, 20] as in Figure 1, where user 1 acts as a relay for user 2’s message, i.e., that there is a cooperative link from user 1 to user 2. Let us assume that in the underlying BC, user 1 has a better channel. Without the cooperative link, user 2 cannot have secure communication with the transmitter. We show that user 1 can transmit cooperative signals and improve the secrecy rate of user 2. Our main idea is that user 1 can use a compress-and-forward (CAF) based relaying scheme for the message of user 2, and increase user 2’s rate to a level which is not decodable by user 1. This improves user 2’s secrecy. Now, let us assume that in the underlying BC, user 1 has the worse channel. Without cooperation, user 1 cannot have secure communication with the transmitter. We show that user 1 can transmit a jamming signal in the cooperative channel first to guarantee a positive secrecy rate for itself assuming it has enough power. This essentially brings the system to the setting described in the previous case, and now user 1 can send a cooperative signal to user 2 to help it achieve a positive secrecy rate as well.

In this paper, we propose an achievable scheme that combines Marton’s coding scheme for BCs [22] and Cover and ElGamal’s CAF scheme for relay channels [17]. A similar achievable
scheme has appeared in [23] which does not consider any secrecy constraints, hence ours can be viewed as a generalization of [23] to a secrecy context. A similar achievable scheme also appeared in [11, 13], where CAF is applied to a relay channel to provide improved secrecy for the main transmitter. A relay channel can be considered as a special case of the single-sided CRBC where the rate of the first user is set to zero.

In this paper, we also develop a single-letter outer bound on the rate-equivocation region; we accomplish single-letterization by using tools proposed in [3], namely by determining suitable auxiliary random variables. Besides this outer bound, for the second user, that is being helped in the single-sided CRBC, we develop another single-letter outer bound which depends only on the channel inputs and outputs.

To visualize the effects of cooperation on secrecy, we consider a Gaussian CRBC and show that both users can have positive secrecy rates through user cooperation. To obtain positive secrecy rates for both users, we provide different assignments for the auxiliary random variables appearing in the achievable rates. These auxiliary random variable assignments have dirty paper coding (DPC) interpretations [24]. In addition, we combine jamming and relaying to provide secrecy for both users when the relaying user is weak. Finally, we consider the CRBC with a two-sided cooperation link and provide an achievable scheme for this channel.

2 The Channel Model and Definitions

From here until the beginning of Section 8, we will focus on a single-sided CRBC, and refer to it simply as CRBC. The CRBC can be viewed as a relay channel where the transmitter sends messages both to the relay node and the destination. Therefore, one of the users, user 1 in our case, in a CRBC both decodes its own message and also helps the other user. A CRBC consists of two message sets $w_1 \in \mathcal{W}_1$, $w_2 \in \mathcal{W}_2$, two input alphabets, one at the transmitter $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and one at user 1 $x_1 \in \mathcal{X}_1$, and two output alphabets $y_1 \in \mathcal{Y}_1$, $y_2 \in \mathcal{Y}_2$, where the former is for user 1 and the latter is for user 2. The channel is assumed to be memoryless and its transition probability distribution is $p(y_1, y_2|x, x_1)$.

A $(2^{nR_1}, 2^{nR_2}, n)$ code for this channel consists of two message sets as $\mathcal{W}_1 = \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR_1}\}$

![Figure 2: Cooperative relay broadcast channel (CRBC) with a two-sided cooperation link.]
and $\mathcal{W}_2 = \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR_2}\}$, an encoder at the transmitter with mapping $\mathcal{W}_1 \times \mathcal{W}_2 \rightarrow X^n$, a set of relay functions at user 1, $x_{1,i} = f_i(y_{1,1}, \ldots, y_{1,i-1})$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$, two decoders, one at each user with the mappings $g_1 : \mathcal{Y}_1^n \rightarrow \mathcal{W}_1$ and $g_2 : \mathcal{Y}_2^n \rightarrow \mathcal{W}_2$. The probability of error is defined as $P^m_e = \max \{P^m_{e,1}, P^m_{e,2}\}$ where $P^m_{e,1} = \Pr(g_1(Y_1^n) \neq W_1)$, $P^m_{e,2} = \Pr(g_2(Y_2^n) \neq W_2)$. The secrecy of the users is measured by the equivocation rates which are $\frac{1}{n}H(W_1|Y_2^n)$ and $\frac{1}{n}H(W_2|Y_1^n, X_1^n)$. Since user 1 has its own channel input, we condition the entropy rate of user 2’s messages on this channel input.

A rate tuple $(R_1, R_2, R_{e,1}, R_{e,2})$ is said to be achievable if there exists a $(2^{nR_1}, 2^{nR_2}, n)$ code with $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} P^m_e = 0$ and

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n}H(W_1|Y_2^n) \geq R_{e,1}, \quad \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n}H(W_2|Y_1^n, X_1^n) \geq R_{e,2}$$

(1)

### 3 An Achievable Scheme

We now provide an achievable scheme which combines Marton’s coding scheme for BCs [22] and Cover and El Gamal’s CAF scheme for relay channels [17]. A similar achievable scheme has appeared in [23] without any secrecy considerations. In this scheme, user 1 sends a quantized version of its observation to user 2, which uses this information to decode its own message. The corresponding achievable rate-equivocation region is given by the following theorem.

**Theorem 1** The rate tuples $(R_1, R_2, R_{e,1}, R_{e,2})$ satisfying

$$R_1 \leq I(V_1; Y_1 | X_1)$$

(2)

$$R_2 \leq I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1 | X_1)$$

(3)

$$R_1 + R_2 \leq I(V_1; Y_1 | X_1) + I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1 | X_1) - I(V_1; V_2)$$

(4)

$$R_{e,1} \leq R_1$$

(5)

$$R_{e,1} \leq \left[I(V_1; Y_1 | X_1) - I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1 | V_2, X_1) - I(V_1; V_2)\right]^+$$

(6)

$$R_{e,2} \leq R_2$$

(7)

$$R_{e,2} \leq \left[I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1 | X_1) - I(V_2; Y_1 | V_1, X_1) - I(V_1; V_2)\right]^+$$

(8)

are achievable for any distribution of the form

$$p(v_1, v_2)p(x|v_1, v_2)p(x_1)p(\hat{y}_1|x_1, v_1, y_1)p(y_1, y_2|x, x_1)$$

(9)

subject to the constraint

$$I(\hat{Y}_1; Y_1 | X_1, V_1) \leq I(\hat{Y}_1; X_1 | Y_2)$$

(10)

This theorem is a special case of Theorem [4] and obtained from the latter by setting $U = X_1$. Therefore, we will omit the proof of Theorem [4] here and will provide the proof of Theorem [4].


in Appendix D. In (6) and (8), \((x)^+\) is the positivity operator, i.e., \((x)^+ = \max(0, x)\).

**Remark 1** We note that both the form of the probability distribution in (9) and the constraint in (10) in Theorem 1 are somewhat different than those of the classical CAF scheme in [17]. First, we condition the distribution of \(\hat{Y}_1\) on \(V_1\) to prevent the compressed version of \(Y_1\) to leak any additional information regarding user 1’s message on top of what user 2 already has through its own observation. The constraint in (10) also reflects this concern. Similar constraints on the distribution of \(\hat{Y}_1\) and on the compression rate have appeared in [23], where these modifications are not due to secrecy constraints contrary to here. In [23], these are imposed to obtain higher rates for user 2 by removing user 1’s private message from the compressed signal, whereas here, they are imposed not to let \(\hat{Y}_1\) leak any additional information regarding user 1’s message. Moreover, if we let user 1 compress its observation without erasing its own message from the observation, i.e., if we change the conditional distribution of \(\hat{Y}_1\) to \(p(\hat{y}_1|x_1, y_1)\), we can recover the constraint in [17] (see equations (29)-(31) in [23]).

**Remark 2** If we disable the assistance of user 1 to user 2 by setting \(X_1 = \hat{Y}_1 = \phi\), the channel model reduces to the BC with secrecy constraints, and the achievable equivocation region becomes

\[
R_{e,1}^{BC} \leq I(V_1; Y_1) - I(V_1; Y_2|V_2) - I(V_1; V_2) \tag{11}
\]

\[
R_{e,2}^{BC} \leq I(V_2; Y_2) - I(V_2; Y_1|V_1) - I(V_1; V_2) \tag{12}
\]

where we require the Markov chain \((V_1, V_2) \rightarrow X \rightarrow (Y_1, Y_2)\). This result was derived in [10].

**Remark 3** If we disable both cooperation between receivers by setting \(X_1 = \hat{Y}_1 = \phi\), and also the confidential messages sent to user 1 by setting \(V_1 = \phi\), the channel model reduces to the single-user eavesdropper channel, and the achievable equivocation rate for the second user becomes

\[
R_{e,2} \leq I(V_2; Y_2) - I(V_2; Y_1) \tag{13}
\]

and the Markov chain \(V_2 \rightarrow X \rightarrow (Y_1, Y_2)\) is required by the probability distribution in (9). This is exactly the secrecy capacity of the single-user eavesdropper channel given in [3].

**Remark 4** If we disable the confidential messages sent to user 1 by setting \(V_1 = \phi\), the channel model reduces to a relay channel with secrecy constraints, and the achievable equivocation rate for the second user becomes

\[
R_{e,2} \leq I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|X_1) - I(V_2; Y_1|X_1) \tag{14}
\]

subject to

\[
I(\hat{Y}_1; Y_1|X_1) \leq I(\hat{Y}_1, X_1; Y_2) \tag{15}
\]
and the corresponding joint distribution reduces to \( p(v_2, x)p(x_1)p(\hat{y}_1|x_1, y_1)p(y_1, y_2|x, x_1) \). Further, if we make the potentially suboptimal selection of \( V_2 = X \), the corresponding achievable secrecy rate and the constraint coincide with their counterparts found in [11] for the relay channel.

**Remark 5** By comparing the equivocation rates of the users in (6) and (8) and the equivocation rates of the users in the corresponding BC given in (11) and (12), we observe that the equivocation rate of user 1 may decrease depending on the information contained in \( \hat{Y}_1 \) and the equivocation rate of user 2 may increase depending on the channel conditions.

**Remark 6** We will show in the next section, where we develop outer bounds for the rate-equivocation region, that if the channel of user 2 is degraded with respect to the channel of user 1 then \( R_{e,2} = 0 \) (see Remark 5), where degradedness is defined through the Markov chain \( X \rightarrow (X_1, Y_1) \rightarrow Y_2 \). Here, we show, as an interesting evaluation, that this achievable scheme cannot yield any positive secrecy rates in this case, as expected.

\[
I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1, X_1) - I(V_2; Y_1|V_1, X_1) - I(1; V_2) \\
\leq I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1, V_1|X_1) - I(1; V_2) \\
= I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1, V_1|X_1) - I(V_2; Y_1|V_1, X_1) - I(1; V_2) \\
= I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1, V_1|X_1) - I(V_2; Y_1|V_1, X_1) \\
\leq I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1, V_1|X_1) - I(V_2; Y_1|V_1, X_1) \\
= I(V_2; Y_2, Y_1|X_1) + I(V_2; \hat{Y}_1|V_1, X_1, Y_1, Y_2) - I(V_2; Y_1|V_1, X_1) \\
= I(V_2; Y_2, Y_1|X_1) - I(V_2; Y_1|V_1, X_1) \\
= I(V_2; Y_2|V_1, X_1, Y_1) \\
= 0
\]

where in (18), we used the fact that \( X_1 \) and \( (V_1, V_2) \) are independent, i.e., \( I(V_1; V_2|X_1) = I(V_1; V_2) \), in (21), we used the Markov chain \( (V_2, Y_2) \rightarrow (V_1, X_1) \rightarrow \hat{Y}_1 \) which implies \( I(V_2; \hat{Y}_1|V_1, X_1, Y_1, Y_2) = 0 \), and in (23), we used the Markov chain \( (V_1, V_2) \rightarrow X \rightarrow (X_1, Y_1) \rightarrow Y_2 \) which is due to the assumed degradedness.

### 4 An Outer Bound

We now provide an outer bound for the rate-equivocation region. Our first outer bound in Theorem 2 uses auxiliary random variables. Next, in Theorem 3, we provide a simpler outer bound for user 2 using only the channel inputs and outputs, without employing any auxiliary random variables.
Theorem 2  The rate-equivocation region of the CRBC lies in the union of the following rate tuples:

\[ R_1 \leq I(V_1; Y_1 | X_1) \]
\[ R_2 \leq I(V_2; Y_2) \]
\[ R_{e,1} \leq \min \left\{ \tilde{R}_{e,1}, \bar{R}_{e,1}, R_1 \right\} \]
\[ R_{e,2} \leq \min \left\{ \tilde{R}_{e,2}, \bar{R}_{e,2}, R_2 \right\} \]

where

\[ \tilde{R}_{e,1} = I(V_1; Y_1 | U) - I(V_1; Y_2 | U) \]
\[ \tilde{R}_{e,2} = I(V_2; Y_2 | U) - I(V_2; Y_1 | U) \]
\[ \bar{R}_{e,1} = I(V_1; Y_1 | V_2) - I(V_1; Y_2 | V_2) \]
\[ \bar{R}_{e,2} = I(V_2; Y_2 | V_1) - I(V_2; Y_1 | V_1) \]

where the union is taken over all joint distributions satisfying the Markov chain

\[ U \rightarrow (V_1, V_2) \rightarrow (X, X_1, Y_1) \rightarrow Y_2 \]

The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.

Remark 7  The bounds on the equivocation rates in Theorem 2 and those in [10], where the outer bounds are for the equivocation rates in a two-user BC with per-user secrecy constraints as in here, have the same expressions. The only difference between the two outer bounds is in the Markov chain over which the union is taken. The Markov chain in (32) contains the one in [10], which is

\[ U \rightarrow (V_1, V_2) \rightarrow X \rightarrow (Y_1, Y_2) \]

which means that our outer bound here evaluates to a larger region than the one in [10]. This should be expected since the achievable rate-equivocation region here in our CRBC contains the achievable region in the BC.

We also provide a simpler outer bound for the equivocation rate of user 2 which does not involve any auxiliary random variables.

Theorem 3  The equivocation rate of user 2 is bounded as follows

\[ R_{e,2} \leq \max_{p(x,x_1)} I(X; Y_2 | X_1, Y_1) \]

\[ \text{Unfortunately, in the conference version [1] of this paper, the outer bound appeared with some typos.} \]
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix B.

**Remark 8** If the channel is degraded, then the equivocation rate of user 2 is zero, since

\[ I(X; Y_2|X_1, Y_1) = 0 \] (35)

which follows from the Markov chain \( X \rightarrow (X_1, Y_1) \rightarrow Y_2 \) which is a consequence of the degradedness.

**Remark 9** We generally expect the outer bound in Theorem 3 to be loose because it essentially assumes that user 2 has a complete access to user 1’s observation \( Y_1 \) whereas, in reality, user 2 has only limited information about user 1’s observation, which it obtains through the cooperative link. However, if the link from user 1 to user 2 is strong enough, user 1 may be able to convey its observation to user 2 precisely in which case the outer bound in Theorem 3 can be close to the achievable rate obtained via the CAF scheme. For example, such a situation arises if the channel satisfies the following Markov chain

\[ X \rightarrow (X_1, Y_2) \rightarrow Y_1 \] (36)

For such channels, by selecting \( V_2 = X, V_1 = \hat{Y}_1 = \phi \) in the achievable scheme, we get the following equivocation rate for user 2

\[ I(X; Y_2|X_1) - I(X; Y_1|X_1) = I(X; Y_2, Y_1|X_1) - I(X; Y_1|X_1) = I(X; Y_2|X_1, Y_1) \] (37)

where the first equality is due to the Markov chain in (36). Hence, the outer bound in (34) gives the secrecy capacity for channels satisfying (36).

**Remark 10** Although we are able to provide a simple outer bound for the equivocation rate of user 2, that depends only on the channel inputs and outputs, finding such a simple outer bound for the equivocation rate of user 1 does not seem to be possible. One reason for this is that, user 1 can use its observation, i.e., \( Y_1 \), for encoding its input, i.e., \( X_1 \), and create correlation between its channel inputs and outputs across time. Consequently, this correlation cannot be accounted for without using auxiliary random variables. Another reason will be discussed in Remark 13.

\[ ^2 \text{In fact, this Sato-type [25] upper-bounding technique is used as a first step (before introducing noise correlation to tighten the upper bound) in finding the secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel [26–29].} \]
5 An Example: Gaussian CRBC

We now provide an example to show how the proposed achievable scheme can enlarge the secrecy region for a Gaussian BC. The channel outputs of a Gaussian CRBC are

\[ Y_1 = X + Z_1 \]
\[ Y_2 = X + X_1 + Z_2 \]

where \( Z_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, N_1) \), \( Z_2 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, N_2) \) and are independent, \( E[X^2] \leq P, E[X_1^2] \leq aP \). In this section, we assume that \( N_2 > N_1 \), i.e., user 1 has a stronger channel in the corresponding BC. Note that, in this case, if user 1 does not help user 2, e.g., in the corresponding BC, \( R_{e,2} = 0 \).

We present two different achievable schemes for this channel where each one corresponds to a particular selection of the underlying random variables in Theorem 1 satisfying the probability distribution condition in (9). Proposition 1 assigns independent channel inputs for each user, whereas Proposition 2 uses a DPC scheme. For simplicity, we provide only the achievable equivocation region in the following propositions.

**Proposition 1** The following equivocation rates are achievable for all \( \alpha \in [0, 1] \)

\[
R_{e,1} \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha P}{\alpha P + N_1} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha P}{N_2} \right) \quad (40)
\]

\[
R_{e,2} \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \bar{\alpha} P \left( \frac{1}{\alpha P + N_2} + \frac{1}{N_1 + N_c} \right) \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\bar{\alpha} P}{N_1} \right) \quad (41)
\]

where \( \bar{\alpha} = 1 - \alpha \) and \( N_c \) is subject to

\[
N_c \geq \frac{N_2(\bar{\alpha} P + N_1) + P(\alpha \bar{\alpha} P + N_1)}{\alpha P} \quad (42)
\]

**Proof:** This achievable region can be obtained by selecting \( V_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \alpha P), V_2 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \bar{\alpha} P), X = V_1 + V_2, X_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, aP), \hat{Y}_1 = Y_1 - V_1 + Z_c = V_2 + Z_1 + Z_c \) and \( Z_c \sim \mathcal{N}(0, N_c) \), where \( V_1, V_2, X_1 \) and \( Z_c \) are independent. The rates are found by direct calculation of the expressions in Theorem 1 using the above selection of random variables. 

This achievable region can be enlarged by introducing correlation between \( V_1, V_2 \). Since a joint encoding is performed at the transmitter, one of the users’ signals can be treated as a non-causally known interference, and DPC [24] can be used. In the following proposition, the transmitter treats user 2’s signal as a non-causally known interference.
Proposition 2 The following equivocation rates are achievable for any $\gamma$ and all $\alpha \in [0, 1]$

\[ R_{e,1} \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{(\bar{\alpha} \gamma + \alpha)^2 P}{(\alpha + \gamma^2 \alpha)N_1 + (\gamma - 1)^2 \alpha \alpha^2 P} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha P}{N_2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \gamma^2 \frac{\bar{\alpha}}{\alpha} \right) \]

\[ R_{e,2} \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\bar{\alpha} P(N_1 + N_c) + \bar{\alpha}(1 - \gamma)^2 P(\alpha P + N_2)}{(\alpha P + N_2)(N_1 + N_c)} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha \bar{\alpha}(\gamma - 1)^2 P}{(\alpha + \gamma^2 \bar{\alpha})N_1} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \gamma^2 \frac{\bar{\alpha}}{\alpha} \right) \]

(43)

where $\bar{\alpha} = 1 - \alpha$ and $N_c$ is subject to

\[ N_c \geq \frac{-\eta + \sqrt{\eta^2 + 4\theta \omega}}{2\theta} \]

(45)

where

\[ \theta = a(\alpha + \bar{\alpha} \gamma) P \]
\[ \eta = (\alpha + \gamma^2 \bar{\alpha}) P[aN_1 + (1 - \gamma)^2 \bar{\alpha} P(a + \bar{\alpha})] - (P + N_2) [N_1 (\alpha + \gamma^2 \bar{\alpha}) + \alpha \bar{\alpha}(\gamma - 1)^2 P] \]
\[ \omega = \{(P + N_2)[(1 - \gamma)^2 \bar{\alpha} P + N_1] - (1 - \gamma)^2 \bar{\alpha}^2 P^2\} \{N_1 (\alpha + \gamma^2 \bar{\alpha}) + P \alpha \bar{\alpha}(\gamma - 1)^2\} \]

(47)

Proof: These equivocation rates are obtained by applying DPC for user 1. Let the channel input of the transmitter be $X = U_1 + U_2$ where $U_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \alpha P), U_2 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \bar{\alpha} P)$ and are independent. The auxiliary random variables are selected as $V_2 = U_2, V_1 = U_1 + \gamma U_2, \text{ where for user 1, the signal of user 2 is treated as non-casually known interference at the transmitter.}$

The channel output of user 1 is compressed as $\hat{Y}_1 = Y_1 - V_1 + Z_c = (1 - \gamma)U_2 + Z_1 + Z_c$ where $Z_c \sim \mathcal{N}(0, N_c)$ is the compression noise. The channel input of user 1 is selected as $X_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, aP)$. Here, again, $U_1, U_2, Z_c$ and $X_1$ are all independent. The rates are then found by direct calculation of the expressions in Theorem 1 using the above selection of random variables. 

We note that, in both of the propositions above, $R_{e,2}$ is a monotonically decreasing function of $N_c$. Consequently, achievable $R_{e,2}$ depends on the quality of the cooperative link between the users. If this link gets better allowing user 1 to convey its observation in a finer form, user 2’s secrecy increases. For illustrative purposes, the rate regions given by Propositions 1 and 2 are evaluated for the parameters $P = 8, N_1 = 1, N_2 = 2,$ and the corresponding plots are given in Figures 3 and 4. Note that since $N_2 > N_1$, if there was no cooperation between the users, user 2 could not have a positive secrecy rate. We observe from these figures that, thanks to the cooperation of the users, both users enjoy positive secrecy rates. However, we observe that a positive secrecy for user 2 comes at the expense of a decrease in the secrecy of user 1.
Figure 3: Achievable equivocation rate region for single-sided CRBC using Proposition 1 where $V_1$ and $V_2$ are independent. $P = 8, N_1 = 1, N_2 = 2$, i.e., user 2 has no secrecy rate in the underlying BC.

Figure 4: Achievable equivocation region for single-sided CRBC using Proposition 2 where $V_1, V_2$ are correlated, admitting a DPC interpretation. $P = 8, N_1 = 1, N_2 = 2$, i.e., user 2 has no secrecy rate in the underlying BC.
In particular, for both propositions, maximum secrecy rate for user 2 is achieved when user 1 does not have any message itself and acts as a pure relay for user 2. Similarly, user 1 achieves the maximum secrecy rate when user 2 does not have any message. Furthermore, we note that, for both achievable schemes, as $a \to \infty$, the equivocation rate of user 2 approaches a limit. This is due to the fact that, as $a \to \infty$, the achievable equivocation rates are limited by the link between the transmitter and user 1. Moreover, as $a \to \infty$, user 1 can send its observation to user 2 perfectly. Thus, in this case, user 2 can be assumed to have a channel output of $(Y_1, Y_2)$, which makes the channel of user 1 degraded with respect to the channel of user 2. Consequently, following the analysis carried out in Remark 9, we expect the outer bound in Theorem 3 to become tight as $a \to \infty$, which is stated in the next corollary.

**Corollary 1** As $a \to \infty$, the maximum achievable equivocation rate for user 2 becomes

$$R_{e,2} = \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + P \left( \frac{1}{N_1} + \frac{1}{N_2} \right) \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{P}{N_1} \right)$$

(49)

The proof of this corollary is given in Appendix C.

6 Joint Jamming and Relaying

The proposed achievability scheme and its application to Gaussian CRBC show us that user cooperation can enlarge the secrecy region. However, this achievability scheme and the Gaussian example provide us with only a limited picture of what can be achieved. In particular, the achievability scheme proposed in Section 3 is designed with the cooperating user (user 1) being the stronger of the two users in mind. Next, we want to explore what can be done when the cooperating user (user 1) is the weaker of the two users. In this case, without the cooperative link, user 1 cannot have a positive secrecy rate. Therefore, the first question to ask is, whether user 1 can have a positive secrecy rate by utilizing the cooperative link. The answer to this question is positive if user 1 uses the cooperative link to send a jamming signal to user 2. However, a more interesting question is whether both users can achieve positive secrecy simultaneously. The following theorem provides an achievable scheme, where user 1 performs a combination of jamming and relaying, to provide both users with positive secrecy rates.
Theorem 4 The rate quadruples \((R_1, R_2, R_{e,1}, R_{e,2})\) satisfying

\[
\begin{align*}
R_1 &\leq I(V_1; Y_1 | X_1) \\ R_2 &\leq I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1 | U) \\
R_1 + R_2 &\leq I(V_1; Y_1 | X_1) + I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1 | U) - I(V_1; V_2) \\
R_{e,1} &\leq R_1 \\
R_{e,1} &\leq \left[ I(V_1; Y_1 | X_1) - I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1 | V_2, U) - I(V_1; V_2) \right]^{+} \\
R_{e,2} &\leq R_2 \\
R_{e,2} &\leq \left[ I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1 | U) - I(V_2; Y_1 | V_1, X_1) - I(V_1; V_2) \right]^{+}
\end{align*}
\]

are achievable for any distribution of the form

\[
p(v_1, v_2)p(x|v_1, v_2)p(u)p(x_1|u)p(\hat{y}_1|u, v_1, y_1)p(y_1, y_2|x, x_1)
\]

subject to the following constraint

\[
I(\hat{Y}_1; Y_1 | X_1, V_1, U) \leq I(\hat{Y}_1, U; Y_2)
\]

The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix D.

Remark 11 In Theorem 4, \(U\) denotes the actual help signal, while the channel input \(X_1\), which is correlated with \(U\), may include an additional jamming attack. The intuition behind this achievable scheme is that, although user 2 should be able to decode \(U\), it cannot decode the entire \(X_1\). Therefore, since user 2 cannot decode and eliminate \(X_1\) from \(Y_2\), its channel becomes an attacked one, where decoding \(V_1\) may be impossible. Therefore, in this scheme, user 1 first attacks user 2 to make its channel worse by associating \(U\) with many \(X_1\)s (hence, it confuses user 2), and then helps it to improve its secrecy rate.

Remark 12 We note that this achievable scheme is reminiscent of “cooperative jamming” [30]. In [30], the focus is on a two user MAC with an external eavesdropper, where one of the users attacks both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, with the hope that it hurts the eavesdropper more than it hurts the legitimate receiver, and improves the secrecy of the legitimate receiver. In contrast, in our work, the relay (user 1) attacks user 2 to improve its own secrecy.

7 Gaussian Example Revisited

Consider again the Gaussian CRBC, now with \(N_1 > N_2\). The scheme proposed in Theorem 4 works as follows: user 1 divides \(X_1\) into two parts. The first part carries the noise and the second part carries the bin index of \(\hat{Y}_1\). Although Theorem 4 is valid for all cases, assume here
that user 1 has large enough power. Then, the first part makes user 2’s channel noisier than user 1’s channel. This brings the situation to the case studied in Section 5. Consequently, we can now have a positive secrecy rate for user 1, and also provide a positive secrecy rate to user 2, by sending a compressed version of $Y_1$ to it, as in Section 5.

**Proposition 3** The following equivocation rates are achievable for all $(\alpha, \beta) \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$

\[
R_{e,1} \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha P}{\bar{\alpha} P + N_1} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha P}{a\beta P + N_2} \right) \quad (59)
\]

\[
R_{e,2} \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{1}{N_1 + N_c} + \frac{1}{\alpha P + N_2 + a\beta P} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\bar{\alpha} P}{N_1} \right) \quad (60)
\]

where $\bar{\alpha} = 1 - \alpha, \bar{\beta} = 1 - \beta$, and $N_c$ is subject to

\[
N_c \geq \frac{\bar{\alpha} P(\alpha P + N_2 + a\bar{\beta} P) + N_1(P + N_2 + a\bar{\beta} P)}{a\bar{\beta} P} \quad (61)
\]

**Proof:** This achievable region is obtained by selecting the random variables in Theorem 4 as $X = V_1 + V_2$ where $V_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \alpha P), V_2 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \bar{\alpha} P), X_1 = U + Z_j$ where $U \sim \mathcal{N}(0, a\bar{\beta} P), Z_j \sim \mathcal{N}(0, a\bar{\beta} P), \hat{Y}_1 = Y_1 - V_1 + Z_c = V_2 + Z_1 + Z_c$ where $Z_c \sim \mathcal{N}(0, N_c)$. Moreover, $V_1, V_2, U, Z_j, Z_c$ are all independent. Here, $Z_j$ serves as the jamming signal, and $U$ serves as the helper signal. User 1 first jams user 2 and makes its channel noisier than its own by using $Z_j$ and then helps user 2 through sending a compressed version of its observation by using $U$. The rates are then found by direct calculation of the expressions in Theorem 4 using the above selection of random variables. ■

Moreover, as in Section 5 we can use DPC based schemes in this case also. The following proposition characterizes the DPC scheme for Theorem 4.

**Proposition 4** The following equivocation rates are achievable for any $\gamma$ and for all $(\alpha, \beta) \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$

\[
R_{e,1} \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha P}{\bar{\alpha} P + N_1} + \frac{(\bar{\alpha} + \gamma) \alpha^2 P}{(\alpha + \gamma^2 \bar{\alpha}) N_1 + (\gamma - 1)^2 \alpha \bar{\alpha} P} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha P}{a\beta P + N_2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \gamma^2 \frac{\bar{\alpha}}{\alpha} \right) \quad (62)
\]

\[
R_{e,2} \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha P}{(\alpha \beta P + N_1 + N_c)(N_1 + N_c)} + \frac{(1 - \gamma) \alpha P}{(\alpha P + a\bar{\beta} P + N_2)(N_1 + N_c)} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha \bar{\alpha} (\gamma - 1)^2 P}{(\alpha + \gamma^2 \bar{\alpha}) N_1} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \gamma^2 \frac{\bar{\alpha}}{\alpha} \right) \quad (63)
\]

where $\bar{\alpha} = 1 - \alpha, \bar{\beta} = 1 - \beta$ and $N_c$ is subject to

\[
N_c \geq \frac{-\eta + \sqrt{\eta^2 + 4\theta \omega}}{2\theta} \quad (64)
\]
where

\[
\theta = a\beta(\alpha + \bar{\alpha}\gamma^2)P \tag{65}
\]

\[
\eta = \left(\alpha + \gamma^2\bar{\alpha}\right)P\left[a\beta N_1 + (1 - \gamma)^2\bar{\alpha}P(a\beta + \bar{\alpha})\right] - (P + a\bar{\beta}P + N_2)\left[N_1(\alpha + \gamma^2\bar{\alpha}) + \alpha\bar{\alpha}(\gamma - 1)^2P\right] \tag{66}
\]

\[
\omega = \left[(P + a\bar{\beta} + N_2)\left[(1 - \gamma)^2\bar{\alpha}P + N_1\right] - (1 - \gamma)^2\bar{\alpha}^2P^2\right]\left[N_1(\alpha + \gamma^2\bar{\alpha}) + P\alpha\bar{\alpha}(\gamma - 1)^2\right] \tag{67}
\]

**Proof:** All random variable selections are the same as in Proposition 2 except for \(X_1, U\). Here, we choose \(X_1 = Z_j + U\) and \(U \sim \mathcal{N}(0, a\beta P), Z_j \sim \mathcal{N}(0, a\bar{\beta}P)\). \(U, Z_j\) are independent.

We first note that Propositions 3, 4 reduce to Propositions 1, 2, respectively, by simply selecting \(\beta = 0\), i.e., no jamming. We provide a numerical example in Figures 5, 6 for \(P = 8, N_1 = 2, N_2 = 1\). Since \(N_1 > N_2\), a positive secrecy rate for user 1 would not be possible if the cooperative link did not exist. However, if user 1 has enough power to make user 2’s channel noisier by injecting Gaussian noise to it, user 1 can provide secrecy for itself. For user 1 to have positive secrecy, we need

\[
a \geq \frac{N_1 - N_2}{P} \tag{68}
\]

Otherwise, user 1 cannot have positive secrecy by using strategies employed in Propositions 3, 4. In addition, contrary to Section 5, we observe from Figures 5 and 6 that here DPC based schemes do not provide any gain with respect to the independent selection of \(V_1, V_2\). Furthermore, we also apply Propositions 3 and 4 to the case where user 1 is stronger than user 2 by selecting the noise variances as \(N_1 = 1, N_2 = 2\) as in Section 5 to show that propositions presented in this section cover the ones in Section 5. We provide the corresponding graphs in Figures 7 and 8. Comparing Figures 3 (resp. 4) and 7 (resp. 8), we observe that even though the maximum secrecy rate of user 2 remains the same, the maximum secrecy rate of user 1 is improved significantly. This improvement comes, because through Propositions 3 and 4 user 1 jams the receiver of user 2.

Next, we examine Figures 3 and 7 in more detail. In Figure 3, for instance when \(a = 100\), the largest \(R_{e,2}\), which is about 0.25 bits/channel use, is obtained when \(R_{e,1} = 0\). This corresponds to the case where user 1’s rate and secrecy rate are set to zero. In this case, user 1 serves as a pure relay for user 2. The secrecy rate we obtain at this extreme is the same as [11, 13]. At the other extreme, the largest \(R_{e,1}\), which is about 0.42 bits/channel use, is obtained when \(R_{e,2} = 0\). In this case, user 2 is just an eavesdropper in a single-user channel from the transmitter to user 1. The secrecy rate we obtain at this extreme is the same as [2, 3, 31]. Moreover, as we see from Figure 3 whenever user 1 helps user 2 to have positive secrecy, it needs to deviate from this extreme point. Thus, user 2’s positive secrecy rates
Figure 5: Achievable equivocation rate region using Proposition 3 where user 1 jams and relays, and $V_1, V_2$ are independent. $P = 8, N_1 = 2, N_2 = 1$, i.e., user 1 cannot have any positive secrecy in the underlying BC.

Figure 6: Achievable equivocation rate region using Proposition 4 where user 1 jams and relays, and $V_1, V_2$ are correlated, admitting a DPC interpretation. $P = 8, N_1 = 2, N_2 = 1$, i.e., user 1 cannot have any positive secrecy in the underlying BC.
Figure 7: Achievable equivocation rate region using Proposition 3 where user 1 jams and relays, and $V_1, V_2$ are independent. $P = 8, N_1 = 1, N_2 = 2$, i.e., user 1’s channel is stronger than user 2.

Figure 8: Achievable equivocation rate region using Proposition 4 where user 1 jams and relays, and $V_1, V_2$ are correlated, admitting a DPC interpretation. $P = 8, N_1 = 1, N_2 = 2$, i.e., user 1’s channel is stronger than user 2.
come at the expense of a decrease in user 1’s secrecy rate. If we consider Figure 7, the largest $R_{e,2}$ is the same as that in Figure 3, which is again achieved when $R_{e,1} = 0$, i.e., when user 1 acts as a pure relay for user 2. However, in Figure 7, user 1’s maximum secrecy rate increases dramatically due to its jamming capabilities in Proposition 3. In Figure 7, user 1 achieves its maximum secrecy rate, which is about 1.58 bits/channel use, when it uses all of its power for jamming user 2’s receiver and when the rate of user 2 is set to zero. We note that this rate is larger than that is achievable in the corresponding single-user eavesdropper channel from the transmitter to user 1, while user 2 is an eavesdropper. We observe from Figure 7 that when user 1 is able to jam and relay jointly, it can provide secrecy for user 2 while its own secrecy rate is still larger than that of the corresponding single-user eavesdropper channel. Thus, as opposed to the case where it can only relay, i.e., Proposition 1, both users enjoy secrecy in Proposition 3 while user 1 does not have to compromise from its own secrecy rate that is achievable in the underlying eavesdropper channel.

Remark 13 We are now ready to discuss why we could not find an outer bound for the equivocation rate of user 1 that relies only on the channel inputs and outputs. To understand this, we first examine the outer bound we found on the equivocation rate of user 2 in Theorem 3. This outer bound is obtained by giving the entire observation of user 1 to user 2 (i.e., $N_c = 0$). Hence, this is the best possible scenario as far as the channel of user 2 is concerned, and thus, it yields an outer bound. However, a similar approach cannot work for user 1, because although user 1 can have access to the observation of user 2, user 1 still has additional freedom (and opportunities) to increase its own secrecy rate by sending jamming signals over the cooperative link, as shown in this section. This is the main reason why we could not find a simple outer bound for user 1’s secrecy rate using only the channel inputs/outputs.

8 Two-sided Cooperation

In this section, we provide an achievable scheme for CRBC with two-sided cooperation. In this case, each user can act as a relay for the other one; see Figure 2. The corresponding channel consists of two message sets $w_1 \in W_1, w_2 \in W_2$, three input alphabets, one at the transmitter $x \in X$, one at user 1 $x_1 \in X_1$ and one at user 2 $x_2 \in X_2$. The channel consists of two output alphabets denoted by $y_1 \in Y_1, y_2 \in Y_2$ at the two users. The channel is assumed to be memoryless and its transition probability distribution is $p(y_1, y_2 | x, x_1, x_2)$.

A $(2^{nR_1}, 2^{nR_2}, n)$ code for this channel consists of two message set as $W_1 = \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR_1}\}$ and $W_2 = \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR_2}\}$, an encoder at the transmitter which maps each pair $(w_1, w_2) \in (W_1 \times W_2)$ to a codeword $x^n \in X^n$, a set of relay functions at user 1, $x_{1,i} = f_{1,i}(y_{1,1}, \ldots, y_{1,i-1})$, $1 \leq i \leq n$, a set of relay functions at user 2, $x_{2,i} = f_{2,i}(y_{2,1}, \ldots, y_{2,i-1})$, $1 \leq i \leq n$, two decoders, one at user 1 and one at user 2 with the mappings $g_1 : Y_1^n \to W_1$, $g_2 : Y_2^n \to W_2$. 19
Definitions for the error probability for this two-sided case are the same as in the single-sided case. The secrecy of the users is again measured by the equivocation rates which are $\frac{1}{n}H(W_1|Y^n_1, X^n_2)$ and $\frac{1}{n}H(W_2|Y^n_2, X^n_1)$. In this case, since user 2 has a channel input also, we condition the entropy rate of user 1’s messages on this channel input.

A rate tuple $(R_1, R_2, R_{e,1}, R_{e,2})$ is said to be achievable if there exists a $(2^{nR_1}, 2^{nR_2}, n)$ code with $\lim_{n \to \infty} P_e^n = 0$, and

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n}H(W_1|Y^n_2, X^n_2) \geq R_{e,1}, \quad \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n}H(W_2|Y^n_1, X^n_1) \geq R_{e,2} \quad (69)$$

The following theorem characterizes an achievable region for this channel model.

**Theorem 5** The rate tuples $(R_1, R_2, R_{e,1}, R_{e,2})$ satisfying

$$R_1 \leq I(V_1; Y_1, \hat{Y}_2|X_1, U_2) \quad (70)$$
$$R_2 \leq I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|X_2, U_1) \quad (71)$$
$$R_1 + R_2 \leq I(V_1; Y_1, \hat{Y}_2|X_1, U_2) + I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|X_2, U_1) - I(V_1; V_2) \quad (72)$$
$$R_{e,1} \leq R_1 \quad (73)$$
$$R_{e,1} \leq \left[ I(V_1; Y_1, \hat{Y}_2|X_1, U_2) - I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|V_2, X_2, U_1) - I(V_1; V_2) \right]^+ \quad (74)$$
$$R_{e,2} \leq R_2 \quad (75)$$
$$R_{e,2} \leq \left[ I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|X_2, U_1) - I(V_2; Y_1, \hat{Y}_2|V_1, X_1, U_2) - I(V_1; V_2) \right]^+ \quad (76)$$

are achievable for any distribution of the form

$$p(v_1, v_2)p(x|v_1, v_2)p(u_1, x_1)p(\hat{y}_1|u_1, y_1)p(u_2, x_2)p(\hat{y}_2|u_2, y_2)p(y_1, y_2|x, x_1, x_2) \quad (77)$$

subject to the following constraints

$$I(\hat{Y}_1; Y_1|U_1, X_1, U_2) \leq I(\hat{Y}_1, U_1; Y_2|X_2) \quad (78)$$
$$I(\hat{Y}_2; Y_2|U_2, X_2, U_1) \leq I(\hat{Y}_2, U_2; Y_1|X_1) \quad (79)$$

The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix E.

Contrary to the previous achievable schemes given in Theorem 1 and 4, here users do not compress their observations after erasing their codewords from the observations; this is why we did not condition $\hat{Y}_1$ (resp. $\hat{Y}_2$) on $V_1$ (resp. $V_2$) in (77). In fact, they cannot remove their own codewords from their observations because each user employs a sliding-window type decoding scheme, i.e., they should wait until the next block to decode their own codewords, whereas compression should be performed right after the reception of the previous block, at which time they have not yet decoded their own messages. However, we note that this achievable scheme also provides opportunities for jamming as did the achievable scheme provided in Section E.
9 Gaussian Example for Two-sided Cooperation

The channel outputs of a Gaussian CRBC with two-sided cooperation are

\[ Y_1 = X + X_2 + Z_1 \]
\[ Y_2 = X + X_1 + Z_2 \]

where \( Z_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, N_1) \), \( Z_2 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, N_2) \) and are independent, \( E[X^2] \leq P \), \( E[X_1^2] \leq a_1P \), \( E[X_2^2] \leq a_2P \).

We present the following proposition which characterizes an achievable equivocation region.

**Proposition 5** The following equivocation rates are achievable for all \((\alpha, \beta_1, \beta_2) \in [0, 1]^3\)

\[
R_{c,1} \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha P(N_1 + a_2\bar{\beta}_2 P + N_2 + N_{c,2})}{\bar{\alpha}P(N_1 + a_2\beta_2 P + N_2 + N_{c,2}) + (N_1 + a_2\beta_2 P)(N_2 + N_{c,2})} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \alpha P \left( \frac{1}{a_1\beta_1 P + N_2} + \frac{1}{N_1 + N_{c,1}} \right) \right)
\]
\[
R_{c,2} \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\bar{\alpha}P(N_2 + a_1\beta_1 P + N_2 + N_{c,1})}{\alpha P(N_2 + a_1\beta_1 P + N_1 + N_{c,1}) + (N_2 + a_1\beta_1 P)(N_1 + N_{c,1})} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \alpha P \left( \frac{1}{a_2\beta_2 P + N_1} + \frac{1}{N_2 + N_{c,2}} \right) \right)
\]

where \( \bar{\alpha} = 1 - \alpha, \bar{\beta}_1 = 1 - \beta_1, \bar{\beta}_2 = 1 - \beta_2 \), and \( N_{c,1}, N_{c,2} \) are subject to

\[
N_{c,1} \geq \frac{-b_{11} + \sqrt{b_{11}^2 + 4a_{11}c_{11}}}{2a_{11}}
\]
\[
N_{c,2} \geq \frac{-b_{22} + \sqrt{b_{22}^2 + 4a_{22}c_{22}}}{2a_{22}}
\]

and

\[
a_{11} = a_1\beta_1 P
\]
\[
b_{11} = P(P + a_1\beta_1(P + N_1)) - (P + N_1 + a_2\bar{\beta}_2 P)(P + N_2 + a_1\bar{\beta}_1 P)
\]
\[
c_{11} = (P + N_1 + a_2\bar{\beta}_2 P)(PN_1 + (P + N_1)(N_2 + a_1\bar{\beta}_1 P))
\]
\[
a_{22} = a_2\beta_2 P
\]
\[
b_{22} = P(P + a_2\beta_2(P + N_2)) - (P + N_1 + a_2\bar{\beta}_2 P)(P + N_2 + a_1\bar{\beta}_1 P)
\]
\[
c_{22} = (P + N_2 + a_1\bar{\beta}_1 P)(PN_2 + (P + N_2)(N_1 + a_2\bar{\beta}_2 P))
\]

**Proof:** This achievable region is obtained by selecting \( X = V_1 + V_2 \) where \( V_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \alpha P) \), \( V_2 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \bar{\alpha} P) \) and are independent, \( X_i = U_i + \tilde{Z}_i \) where \( U_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, a_i\beta_i P) \), \( \tilde{Z}_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, a_i\bar{\beta}_i P) \),
Figure 9: Achievable equivocation rate region using Proposition 5 where each user can jointly jam and relay. $P = 8, N_1 = 1, N_2 = 2$, i.e., user 2 cannot have any positive secrecy in the underlying BC.

$i = 1, 2$ and independent, and $\hat{Y}_i = Y_i + Z_{c,i}$ where $Z_{c,i} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, N_{c,i}), i = 1, 2$ and are independent of all other random variables. Direct calculation of rates in Theorem 5 with these random variable selections yields the achievable region.

A numerical example is given in Figure 9 for the case $P = 8, N_1 = 1, N_2 = 2$. Comparing Figure 9 with Figures 7 and 8, we observe that user 2’s secrecy rate improves significantly because now user 2 can jam user 1 to improve its own secrecy rate. We also observe that user 1’s secrecy rate improves as well, compared to Section 7. The increase in user 1’s secrecy in this two-sided case is due to the fact that user 2 now acts as a relay for user 1. However, when user 1 jams user 2 using all of its power, it limits the help that comes from user 2, hence Theorem 5 provides only a modest secrecy rate increase for user 1 on top of what Theorem 4 already provides.

10 Conclusions

In this paper, we investigated the effects of cooperation on secrecy. We showed that user cooperation can increase secrecy, i.e., even an untrusted party can help. An important point to observe though is that whether cooperation can improve secrecy or not depends on the cooperation method employed. For instance, even though a decode-and-forward (DAF) based cooperation scheme can increase the rate, it cannot improve secrecy, because in this case the cooperating party, which is also the eavesdropper, needs to decode the message it forwards.
However, in CAF, we do not require the cooperating party to decode the message. In fact, in CAF, the cooperating party helps increase the rate of the main transmitter to levels which it itself cannot decode, hence improving the secrecy of the main transmitter-receiver pair against itself.

Appendices

A Proof of Theorem 2

Here we prove the outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region of the CRBC given in Theorem 2, which closely follows the converse given in [3] and the outer bound in [10]. First, define the following random variables

\[ U_i = Y_1^{i-1}Y_2^{n+1} \]  
\[ V_{1,i} = W_1U_i \]  
\[ V_{2,i} = W_2U_i \]

which satisfy the following Markov chain

\[ U_i \rightarrow (V_{1,i}, V_{2,i}) \rightarrow (X_i, X_{1,i}, Y_{1,i}) \rightarrow Y_{2,i} \]  

(95)

but do not satisfy the following one

\[ U_i \rightarrow (V_{1,i}, V_{2,i}) \rightarrow (X_i, X_{1,i}) \rightarrow (X_{1,i}, Y_{2,i}) \]

(96)

because of the encoding function employed at user 1 which can generate correlation between \( Y_{1,i} \) and \( (Y_{1,i+1}^n, Y_{2,i+1}^n) \) through \( X_{1,i+1} \) that cannot be resolved by conditioning on \( (X_i, X_{1,i}) \). For a similar discussion, the reader can refer to [19].
We start with the achievable rate of user 1.

\[ nR_1 = H(W_1) = I(W_1; Y_1^n) + H(W_1 | Y_1^n) \] (97)
\[ \leq I(W_1; Y_1^n) + \epsilon_n \] (98)
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; Y_{1,i} | Y_{1,i-1}) + \epsilon_n \] (99)
\[ \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(W_1 | Y_{1,i-1}) - H(W_1 | Y_{1,i-1}, Y_{1,i}) + \epsilon_n \] (100)
\[ \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(W_1 | Y_{1,i-1}, X_{1,i}) - H(W_1 | Y_{1,i-1}, Y_{1,i}, X_{1,i}) + \epsilon_n \] (101)
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; Y_{1,i} | Y_{1,i-1}, X_{1,i}) + \epsilon_n \] (102)
\[ \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(Y_{1,i} | X_{1,i}) - H(Y_{1,i} | Y_{1,i-1}, X_{1,i}, W_1) + \epsilon_n \] (103)
\[ \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(Y_{1,i} | X_{1,i}) - H(Y_{1,i} | Y_{1,i-1}, X_{1,i}, W_1, Y_{2,i+1}^n) + \epsilon_n \] (104)
\[ \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(V_{1,i}; Y_{1,i} | X_{1,i}) + \epsilon_n \] (105)

where (98) is due to Fano’s lemma, (101) follows from the Markov chain \( W_1 \rightarrow Y_{1,i-1} \rightarrow X_{1,i} \), (102), (104) and (105) are due to the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, and (106) follows from the definition of \( V_{1,i} \) in (93). Similarly, for the achievable rate of user 2, we have

\[ nR_2 \leq I(W_2; Y_2^n) + \epsilon_n \] (107)
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_2; Y_{2,i} | Y_{2,i+1}^n) + \epsilon_n \] (108)
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(Y_{2,i} | Y_{2,i+1}^n) - H(Y_{2,i} | Y_{2,i+1}^n, W_2) + \epsilon_n \] (109)
\[ \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(Y_{2,i}) - H(Y_{2,i} | Y_{2,i+1}^n, W_2, Y_{1,i-1}) + \epsilon_n \] (110)
\[ \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(V_{2,i}; Y_{2,i}) + \epsilon_n \] (111)

where (107) is due to Fano’s lemma, (110) is due to the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, and (111) follows from the definition of \( V_{2,i} \) given in (94).
We now derive the outer bounds on the equivocation rates. We start with user 1.

\[ \begin{align*}
nR_{e,1} &= H(W_1|Y_2^n) - I(W_1; Y_2^n) \quad \tag{112} \\
&= I(W_1; Y_1^n) - I(W_1; Y_2^n) + H(W_1|Y_1^n) \quad \tag{113} \\
&\leq I(W_1; Y_1^n) - I(W_1; Y_2^n) + \varepsilon_n \quad \tag{114} \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; Y_1,i|Y_1^{i-1}) - I(W_1; Y_{2,i}Y_{2,i+1}^n) + \varepsilon_n \quad \tag{115} \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; Y_2^n_{2,i+1}; Y_1,i|Y_1^{i-1}, W_1) - I(W_1; Y_1^{i-1}; Y_2,i|Y_{2,i+1}^n) + I(Y_1^{i-1}; Y_2,i|Y_{2,i+1}^n, W_1) + \varepsilon_n \quad \tag{116}
\end{align*} \]

where (114) is due to Fano’s lemma. Using [3]

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(Y_2^n_{2,i+1}; Y_1,i|Y_1^{i-1}, W_1) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(Y_1^{i-1}; Y_2,i|Y_{2,i+1}^n, W_1) \quad \tag{117} \]

in (116), we obtain

\[ \begin{align*}
nR_{e,1} &\leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; Y_2^n_{2,i+1}; Y_1,i|Y_1^{i-1}) - I(W_1; Y_1^{i-1}; Y_2,i|Y_{2,i+1}^n) + \varepsilon_n \quad \tag{118} \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; Y_1,i|Y_1^{i-1}, Y_2^n_{2,i+1}) + I(Y_2^n_{2,i+1}; Y_1,i|Y_1^{i-1}) - I(W_1; Y_2,i|Y_{2,i+1}^n, Y_1^{i-1}) \\
&\quad - I(Y_1^{i-1}; Y_2,i|Y_{2,i+1}^n) + \varepsilon_n \quad \tag{119}
\end{align*} \]

Now, using [3]

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(Y_2^n_{2,i+1}; Y_1,i|Y_1^{i-1}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(Y_1^{i-1}; Y_2,i|Y_{2,i+1}^n) \quad \tag{120} \]

in (119), we obtain

\[ \begin{align*}
nR_{e,1} &\leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; Y_1,i|Y_1^{i-1}, Y_2^n_{2,i+1}) - I(W_1; Y_2,i|Y_{2,i+1}^n, Y_1^{i-1}) + \varepsilon_n \quad \tag{121} \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; Y_1,i|U_i) - I(W_1; Y_2,i|U_i) + \varepsilon_n \quad \tag{122} \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; U_i; Y_1,i|U_i) - I(W_1; U_i; Y_2,i|U_i) + \varepsilon_n \quad \tag{123} \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(V_1,i; Y_1,i|U_i) - I(V_1,i; Y_2,i|U_i) + \varepsilon_n \quad \tag{124}
\end{align*} \]

where (122) and (124) follow from the definitions of \( U_i \) and \( V_{1,i} \) given in (92) and (93),
respectively. Similarly, we can use the preceding technique for user 2’s equivocation rate as well after noting that

\[ nR_{e,2} \leq H(W_2|Y_1^n, X_1^n) \leq H(W_2|Y_1^n) \]  

(125)

which leads to

\[ nR_{e,2} \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(V_{2,i}; Y_{2,i}|U_i) - I(V_{2,i}; Y_{1,i}|U_i) + \epsilon_n \]  

(126)

The other bounds on the equivocation rates can be derived as follows.

\[ nR_{e,1} = H(W_1|Y_2^n) \leq H(W_1, W_2|Y_2^n) \]

(127)

\[ = H(W_1|W_2, Y_2^n) + H(W_2|Y_2^n) \]

(128)

\[ \leq H(W_1|W_2, Y_2^n) + \epsilon_n \]

(129)

\[ = I(W_1; Y_1^n|W_2) - I(W_1; Y_2^n|W_2) + H(W_1|W_2, Y_2^n) + \epsilon_n \]

(130)

\[ \leq I(W_1; Y_1^n|W_2) - I(W_1; Y_2^n|W_2) + \epsilon'_n \]

(131)

\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; Y_{1,i}|W_2, Y_{1,i}^{i-1}) - I(W_1; Y_{2,i}|W_2, Y_{2,i+1}^n) + \epsilon'_n \]

(132)

\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; Y_{2,i+1}^n; Y_{1,i}|W_2, Y_{1,i}^{i-1}) - I(W_1; Y_{2,i+1}^n; Y_{2,i}|W_2, Y_{2,i+1}^n) + \epsilon'_n \]

(133)

\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; Y_{1,i}|W_2, Y_{1,i}^{i-1}, Y_{2,i+1}^n) - I(W_1; Y_{2,i}|W_2, Y_{2,i+1}^n, Y_{1,i}^{i-1}) + \epsilon'_n \]

(134)

\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1; Y_{1,i}|W_2, U_i) - I(W_1; Y_{2,i}|W_2, U_i) + \epsilon'_n \]

(135)

\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_1, U_i; Y_{1,i}|W_2, U_i) - I(W_1, U_i; Y_{2,i}|W_2, U_i) + \epsilon'_n \]

(136)

\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(V_{1,i}; Y_{1,i}|V_{2,i}) - I(V_{1,i}; Y_{2,i}|V_{2,i}) + \epsilon'_n \]

(137)

where (129) and (131) are due to Fano’s lemma, and (133) and (134) are due to the following identities [3]

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(Y_{2,i+1}^n; Y_{1,i}|W_1, W_2, Y_{1,i}^{i-1}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(Y_{1,i}^{i-1}; Y_{2,i}|W_1, W_2, Y_{2,i+1}^n) \]

(138)

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(Y_{2,i+1}^n; Y_{1,i}|W_2, Y_{1,i}^{i-1}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(Y_{1,i}^{i-1}; Y_{2,i}|W_2, Y_{2,i+1}^n) \]

(139)

respectively. Finally, (135) and (137) follow from the definitions of \( U_i, V_{1,i} \) and \( V_{2,i} \) given
in (92), (93) and (94), respectively. Similarly, we can use this technique to bound user 2’s equivocation rate after noting that \( H(W_2|Y_1^n, X_1^n) \leq H(W_2|Y_1^n) \), which leads to

\[
R_{e,2} \leq H(W_2|Y_1^n, X_1^n) \leq H(W_2|Y_1^n) \leq nR_{e,2} \leq H(W_2|Y_1^n, X_1^n) \leq H(W_2|Y_1^n) \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(V_2,i;Y_2,i|V_1,i) - I(V_2,i;Y_2,i|V_1,i) + \epsilon_n
\]

(140)

To express the outer bounds obtained above in a single-letter form, we define \( U = JU_J, V_1 = V_{1,J}, V_2 = V_{2,J}, X = X_J, X_1 = X_{1,J}, Y_1 = Y_{1,J}, Y_2 = Y_{2,J} \) where \( J \) is a random variable which is uniformly distributed over \( \{1, \ldots, n\} \). Using these new definitions, we can reach the single-letter expressions given in Theorem 2 hence completing the proof.

**B Proof of Theorem 3**

The proof is as follows.

\[
R_{e,2} \leq H(W_2|Y_1^n, X_1^n) \leq I(W_2;Y_2^n|X_1^n) - I(W_2;Y_2^n|X_1^n) + H(W_2|Y_2^n, X_1^n)
\]

(141)

\[
\leq I(W_2;Y_2^n|X_1^n) - I(W_2;Y_2^n|X_1^n) + \epsilon_n
\]

(142)

\[
\leq I(W_2;Y_2^n|X_1^n, Y_1^n) + \epsilon_n
\]

(143)

\[
\leq I(X^n, W_2;Y_2^n|X_1^n, Y_1^n) + \epsilon_n
\]

(144)

\[
= I(X^n, Y_2^n|X_1^n, Y_1^n) + \epsilon_n
\]

(145)

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(X^n, Y_2,i|X_1^n, Y_1^n, Y_2^{i-1}) + \epsilon_n
\]

(146)

\[
\leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(Y_2,i|X_1,i, Y_1,i) - H(Y_2,i|X_1^n, Y_1^n, Y_2^{i-1}, X^n) + \epsilon_n
\]

(147)

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(Y_2,i|X_1,i, Y_1,i) - H(Y_2,i|X_1,i, Y_1,i, X_i) + \epsilon_n
\]

(148)

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(X_i;Y_2,i|X_1,i, Y_1,i) + \epsilon_n
\]

(149)

where (142) is due to Fano’s lemma, (145) follows from the fact that given \( X^n, W_2 \) is independent of all other random variables, (147) is due to the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, and (148) follows from the Markov chains

\[
(Y_{1,i}, Y_{2,i}) \rightarrow (X_i, X_{1,i}) \rightarrow (Y_1^{i-1}, Y_2^{i-1}, X_1^{i-1}, X_{1,i-1})
\]

(150)

\[
Y_{2,i} \rightarrow (X_i, X_{1,i}, Y_{1,i}) \rightarrow (Y_2^{n_{i+1}}, Y_1^{n_{i+1}}, X_{1,i+1})
\]

(151)

Thus, after defining an independent random variable \( J \), that is uniformly distributed over \( \{1, \ldots, n\} \), and \( X = X_J, X_1 = X_{1,J}, Y_1 = Y_{1,J}, Y_2 = Y_{2,J} \), we can obtain the single-letter expression in Theorem 3 completing the proof.
C Proof of Corollary 1

In Propositions 1 and 2, if we take $a \to \infty$, then the secrecy rate in (49) can be shown to be achievable. As a notational remark, $H(\cdot)$ denotes the differential entropy in this section.

We now compute an outer bound for $R_{e,2}$ using Theorem 3:

$$R_{e,2} \leq I(X;Y_2|X_1,Y_1)$$
$$= H(Y_2|X_1,Y_1) - H(Z_2|Z_1)$$
$$\leq H(X + Z_2|Y_1) - H(Z_2)$$
$$\leq H(X + Z_2 - \alpha Y_1) - \frac{1}{2} \log(2\pi e N_2)$$
$$\leq \frac{1}{2} \log(2\pi e) E \left[ (X + Z_2 - \alpha Y_1)^2 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \log(2\pi e N_2)$$
$$\leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( (1 - \alpha)^2 P + \alpha^2 N_1 + N_2 \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log(N_2)$$

where in (154), we used the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy and that $H(Z_2|Z_1) = H(Z_2)$ due to the independence of $Z_1$ and $Z_2$. Equation (155) is again due to the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, (156) comes from the fact that Gaussian distribution maximizes entropy subject to a power constraint, and (157) is obtained by using the power constraint on $X$. Finally, we note that (157) is a valid outer bound for every $\alpha$ and if we select $\alpha$ as

$$\alpha = \frac{P}{P + N_1}$$

we get (49), completing the proof.

D Proof of Theorem 4

The transmitter uses the joint encoding scheme of Marton [22] and user 1 uses a CAF scheme [17]. User 2 employs list decoding to find which $\hat{Y}_1$ is sent. Let $A^n_e(V_1)$ and $A^n_e(V_2)$ denote the sets of strongly typical i.i.d. length-$n$ sequences of $v_1$ and $v_2$, respectively. Let $A^n_e(V_1|v_2)$ (resp. $A^n_e(V_2|v_1)$) denote the set of length-$n$ sequences $V_1$ (resp. $V_2$) that are jointly typical with $v_2$ (resp. $v_1$). Furthermore, let $S^n_e(v_1)$ (resp. $S^n_e(v_2)$) denote the set of $v_1$ (resp. $v_2$) sequences for which $A^n_e(V_2|v_1)$ (resp. $A^n_e(V_1|v_2)$) are non-empty. Fix the probability distribution as

$$p(v_1,v_2)p(x|v_1,v_2)p(u,x_1)p(\hat{y}_1|u,v_1,y_1)$$

Codebook structure:
1. Select $2^{nR(V_i)}$ $v_i$ sequences through

$$p(v_i) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{\|S'_{i}(v_i)\|} & \text{if } v_i \in S'_{i}(v_i) \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (160)$$

in an i.i.d. manner and index them as $v_i(w_i, \tilde{w}_i, l_i)$ where $w_i \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR_i}\}$, $\tilde{w}_i \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{\hat{R}_i}\}$ and $l_i \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{nL_i}\}$ for $i = 1, 2$. $R_i, \hat{R}_i, L_i$ and $R(V_i)$ are related through

$$R(V_i) = R_i + \hat{R}_i + L_i, \quad i = 1, 2 \quad (161)$$

Furthermore, we set

$$L_1 + L_2 = I(V_1; V_2) + \epsilon \quad (162)$$

to ensure that for given pairs $(w_1, \tilde{w}_1)$ and $(w_2, \tilde{w}_2)$, we can find a jointly typical pair $(v_1(w_1, \tilde{w}_1, l_1), v_2(w_2, \tilde{w}_2, l_2))$ for some $l_1, l_2$.

2. For each $(w_1, w_2)$, the transmitter randomly picks $(\tilde{w}_1, \tilde{w}_2)$ and finds a pair $(v_1(w_1, \tilde{w}_1, l_1), v_2(w_2, \tilde{w}_2, l_2))$ that is jointly typical. Such a pair exists with high probability due to (162). Then, given this pair of $(v_1, v_2)$, the transmitter generates its channel inputs through $\prod_{i=1}^{n} p(x_{i|v_1,i,v_2,i})$.

3. User 1 generates $2^{nR_0}$ length-$n$ sequences $u$ through $p(u) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p(u_i)$ and labels them as $u(s_i)$ where $s_i \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR_0}\}$.

4. For each $u(s_i)$, user 1 generates $2^{n\hat{R}}$ length-$n$ sequences $\hat{y}_1$ through $p(\hat{y}_1 | u) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p(\hat{y}_{1,i} | u_i)$ and indexes them as $\hat{y}_1(z_i | s_i)$ where $z_i \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{n\hat{R}}\}$.

5. For each $u(s_i)$, user 1 generates $2^{nR'_0}$ length-$n$ sequences $x_1$ through $p(x_1 | u) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p(x_{1,i} | u_i)$ and indexes them as $x_1(t_i | s_i)$ where $t_i \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR'_0}\}$.

**Partitioning:**

- Partition $2^{n\hat{R}}$ into cells $S_{s_i}$ where $s_i \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR_0}\}$.

**Encoding:**

The transmitter sends $x$ corresponding to the pair $(w_1, w_2)$. User 1 (relay) sends $x_1(t_i | s_i)$ if the estimate of $y_1(i-1)$, i.e., $\hat{z}_{i-1}$, falls into $S_{s_i}$ and $t_i$ is chosen randomly from $\{1, \ldots, 2^{nR'_0}\}$. The use of many $x_1(t_i | s_i)$ for actual help signal $u(s_i)$ aims to confuse user 2 and to decrease its decoding capability.

**Decoding:**


a. Decoding at user 1:

1. User 1 seeks a unique typical pair of \( (y_1(i), v_1(w_{1,i}, \tilde{w}_{1,i}, l_i), x_1(t_i | s_i)) \) which can be achieved with vanishingly small error probability if

\[
R(V_1) \leq I(V_1; Y_1 | X_1) \tag{163}
\]

2. User 1 decides that \( z_i \) is received if there exists a jointly typical pair \( (\hat{y}_1(z_i | s_i), y_1(i), v_1(w_{1,i}, \hat{w}_{1,i}, l_i), x_1(t_i | s_i)) \) which can be guaranteed to occur if

\[
\hat{R} \geq I(\hat{Y}_1; Y_1 | U, X_1, V_1) \tag{164}
\]

b. Decoding at user 2:

1. User 2 seeks a unique jointly typical pair of \( (y_2(i), u(s_i)) \) which can be found with vanishingly small error probability if

\[
R_0 \leq I(U; Y_2) \tag{165}
\]

2. User 2 employs list decoding to decode \( \hat{y}_1(z_{i-1} | \hat{s}_{i-1}) \). It first calculates its ambiguity set as

\[
\mathcal{L}(\hat{y}_1(z_{i-1} | \hat{s}_{i-1})) = \{\hat{y}_1(z_{i-1} | \hat{s}_{i-1}) : (\hat{y}_1(z_{i-1} | \hat{s}_{i-1}), y_2(i - 1)) \text{ is jointly typical}\} \tag{166}
\]

and takes its intersection with \( S_{\hat{s}_i} \) which results in a unique and correct intersection point if

\[
\hat{R} \leq I(\hat{Y}_1; Y_2 | U) + R_0 \leq I(\hat{Y}_1, U; Y_2) \tag{167}
\]

Equations (163) and (167) lead to the compression constraint in (58).

3. User 2 decides that \( v_2(w_{2,i-1}, \tilde{w}_{2,i-1}, l_{2,i-1}) \) is received if there exists a unique jointly typical pair \( (v_2(w_{2,i-1}, \tilde{w}_{2,i-1}, l_{2,i-1}), y_2(i - 1), \hat{y}_1(z_{i-1} | \hat{s}_{i-1})) \), which can be found with vanishingly small error probability if

\[
R(V_2) \leq I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1 | U) \tag{168}
\]

Equivocation computation:

We now show that \( R_{e,1} \) and \( R_{e,2} \) satisfying (53)-(54) and (55)-(56) are achievable with the coding scheme presented. To this end, we treat several possible cases separately. First,
assume that
\[
R_1 \geq I(V_1; Y_1|X_1) - I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|V_2, U) - I(V_1; V_2)
\]  
(169)
\[
R_2 \geq I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|U) - I(V_2; Y_1|V_1, X_1) - I(V_1; V_2)
\]  
(170)

For this case, we select the total number of codewords, i.e., \(R\), assume that \(n\) less than \(2\) with this selection, we have

\[
R(V_1) = I(V_1; Y_1|X_1)
\]  
(171)
\[
R(V_2) = I(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|U)
\]  
(172)

With this selection, we have

\[
\hat{R}_1 + L_1 \leq I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|V_2, U) + I(V_1; V_2)
\]  
(173)
\[
\hat{R}_2 + L_2 \leq I(V_2; Y_1|V_1, X_1) + I(V_1; V_2)
\]  
(174)

We start with user 1’s equivocation rate,

\[
H(W_1|Y_2^n) \geq H(W_1|Y_2^n, V_2^n, U^n, \hat{Y}_1^n)
\]
\[
= H(W_1, Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n|U^n) - H(Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n|U^n)
\]  
(175)
\[
= H(V_1^n, W_1, Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n|U^n) - H(V_1^n|W_1, Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, U^n)
\]  
(176)
\[
- H(Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n|U^n)
\]
\[
= H(V_1^n|U^n) + H(W_1, Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n|U^n, V_1^n) - H(V_1^n|W_1, Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, U^n)
\]  
(177)
\[
- H(Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n|U^n)
\]  
(178)
\[
\geq H(V_1^n|U^n) - I(V_1^n; Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n|U^n) - H(V_1^n|W_1, Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, U^n)
\]  
(179)

where each term will be treated separately. First term is

\[
H(V_1^n|U^n) = H(V_1^n) = nR(V_1) = nI(V_1; Y_1|X_1)
\]  
(180)

where the first equality is due to the independence of \(U^n\) and \(V_1^n\). The second equality follows from the fact that \(V_1^n\) can take \(2^{nR(V_1)}\) values with equal probability. The third equality comes from our selection in (171). The second term of (179) can be bounded as

\[
I(V_1^n; Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n|U^n) \leq nI(V_1; Y_2, V_2, \hat{Y}_1|U) + n\epsilon_n
\]  
(181)

using the approach devised in Lemma 3 of [10]. To bound the last term in (179), we assume that user 2 is trying to decode \(V_1^n\) given the side information \(W_1 = w_1\). Since \(V_1^n\) can take less than \(2^{n(R(V_1; Y_1|U, V_2) + I(V_1; V_2))}\) values (see (173)) given \(W_1 = w_1\), user 2 can decode \(V_1^n\) with vanishingly small error probability as long as \(W_1 = w_1\) is given. Consequently, the use
of Fano’s lemma yields
\[ H(V_1^n | W_1, Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, U^n) \leq \epsilon_n \] (182)

Plugging (180), (181) and (182) into (179), we get
\[ H(W_1 | Y_2^n) \geq nI(V_1; Y_1|X_1) - nI(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1, V_2|U) - n\epsilon_n \] (183)
\[ = nI(V_1; Y_1|X_1) - nI(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|V_2, U) - nI(V_1; V_2) - n\epsilon_n \] (184)

where (184) follows from the independence of \((V_1, V_2)\) and \(U\), i.e., \(I(V_1; V_2|U) = I(V_1; V_2)\).

Similarly, we can bound equivocation of user 2 as follows,
\[ H(W_2 | Y_1^n, X_1^n) \geq H(W_2 | Y_1^n, X_1^n, V_1^n) \] (185)
\[ = H(W_2, Y_1^n, V_1^n | X_1^n) - H(Y_1^n, V_1^n | X_1^n) \] (186)
\[ = H(W_2, V_2^n, Y_1^n, V_1^n | X_1^n) - H(V_2^n | W_2, Y_1^n, V_1^n, X_1^n) - H(Y_1^n, V_1^n | X_1^n) \] (187)
\[ = H(V_2^n | X_1^n) + H(W_2, Y_1^n, V_1^n | X_1^n, V_2^n) - H(V_2^n | W_2, Y_1^n, V_1^n, X_1^n) \]
\[ - H(Y_1^n, V_1^n | X_1^n) \] (188)
\[ \geq H(V_2^n | X_1^n) - I(V_2^n; Y_1^n, V_1^n | X_1^n) - H(V_2^n | W_2, Y_1^n, V_1^n, X_1^n) \] (189)

where the first term is
\[ H(V_2^n | X_1^n) = H(V_2^n) = nR(V_2) = nI(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|U) \] (190)

where the first equality is due to the independence of \(V_2^n\) and \(X_1^n\), the second equality comes from the fact that \(V_2^n\) can take \(2^{nR(V_2)}\) values with equal probability and the last equality is a consequence of our choice in (172). The second term of (189) can be bounded as
\[ I(V_2^n; Y_1^n, V_1^n | X_1^n) \leq nI(V_2; Y_1, V_1 | X_1) + n\epsilon_n \] (191)

following the approach of Lemma 3 of [10]. To bound the last term of (189), we assume that user 1 is trying to decode \(V_2^n\) given the side information \(W_2 = w_2\). Since \(V_2^n\) can take at most \(2^{n(I(V_2; Y_1, V_1) + I(V_2; V_1))}\) values (see (174)) given \(W_2 = w_2\), user 1 can decode \(V_2^n\) with vanishingly small error probability as long as this side information is available. Consequently, the use of Fano’s lemma yields
\[ H(V_2^n | W_2, Y_1^n, V_1^n, X_1^n) \leq \epsilon_n \] (192)
Plugging (190), (191) and (192) into (189), we get
\[
H(W_2|Y_1^n, X_1^n) \geq nI(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|U) - nI(V_2; Y_1, V_1|X_1) - n\epsilon_n
\]
\[
= nI(V_2; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|U) - nI(V_2; Y_1|V_1, X_1) - nI(V_1; V_2) - n\epsilon_n
\]
(193) (194)
where (194) follows from the independence of \((V_1, V_2)\) and \(X_1\), i.e., \(I(V_1; V_2|X_1) = I(V_1; V_2)\).

We have completed the equivocation calculation for the case described by (169)-(170). The proofs of other cases involve no different arguments besides decreasing the total number codewords in (171)-(172). For example, if
\[
R_1 \leq I(V_1; Y_1|X_1) - I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|V_2, U) - I(V_1; V_2)
\]
(195)
then we select the total number of codewords for user 1 as
\[
R(V_1) = R_1 + I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|V_2, U) + I(V_1; V_2)
\]
(196)
which is equivalent to saying that
\[
\tilde{R}_1 + L_1 = I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|V_2, U) + I(V_1; V_2)
\]
(197)
In this case, following the steps from (175) to (179), we can bound the equivocation of user 1 as follows,
\[
H(W_1|Y_2^n) \geq H(V_1^n|U^n) - I(V_1^n; Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n|U^n) - H(V_1^n|W_1, Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, U^n)
\]
(198)
where the first term is now
\[
H(V_1^n|U^n) = H(V_1^n) = nR(V_1) = n(R_1 + I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|V_2, U) + I(V_1; V_2))
\]
(199)
where the first equality is due to the independence of \(V_1^n\) and \(U^n\), the second equality is due to the fact that \(V_1^n\) can take at most \(2^{nR(V_1)}\) values with equal probability and the last equality is a consequence of our choice in (196). An upper bound on the second term was already obtained in (181). The third term can also be shown to decay to zero as \(n\) goes to infinity considering the case that user 2 is decoding \(V_1^n\) using side information \(W_1 = w_1\). Since \(V_1^n\) can take \(2^{n(I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|V_2, U) + I(V_1; V_2))}\) values given \(W_1 = w_1\), user 2 can decode \(V_2^n\) with vanishingly small error probability as long as this side information is available. Therefore, the use of Fano’s lemma implies
\[
H(V_1^n|W_1, Y_2^n, V_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, U^n) \leq \epsilon_n
\]
(200)
Plugging (181), (199), (200) into (198), we get

\[
H(W_1|Y^n_2) \geq n(R_1 + I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|V_2, U) + I(V_1; V_2)) - I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|U) - n\epsilon_n
\]

(201)

\[
= nR_1 - n\epsilon_n
\]

(202)

where we used the fact that \(U\) and \((V_1, V_2)\) are independent, i.e., \(I(V_1; V_2|U) = I(V_1; V_2)\). The other cases leading to different equivocation rates can be proved similarly, hence omitted.

E Proof of Theorem 5

Fix the probability distribution as

\[
p(v_1, v_2)p(x|v_1, v_2)p(u_1, x_1)p(\hat{y}_1|u_1, y_1)p(u_2, x_2)p(\hat{y}_2|u_2, y_2)
\]

(203)

**Codebook structure:**

1. Select \(2^{nR(V_i)}\) \(v_i\) sequences through

\[
p(v_i) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{|S^n_i(v_i)|}, & \text{if } v_i \in S^n_i(v_i) \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

(204)

in an i.i.d. manner and index them as \(v_i(w_i, \tilde{v}_i, l_i)\) where \(w_i \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR_i}\}\), \(\tilde{v}_i \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{n\tilde{R}_i}\}\) and \(l_i \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{nL_i}\}\) for \(i = 1, 2\). \(R_i, \tilde{R}_i, L_i\) and \(R(V_i)\) are related through

\[
R(V_i) = R_i + \tilde{R}_i + L_i, \quad i = 1, 2
\]

(205)

Furthermore, we set

\[
L_1 + L_2 = I(V_1; V_2) + \epsilon
\]

(206)

to ensure that for given pairs \((w_1, \tilde{w}_1)\) and \((w_2, \tilde{w}_2)\), we can find a jointly typical pair \((v_1(w_1, \tilde{w}_1, l_1), v_2(w_2, \tilde{w}_2, l_2))\) for some \(l_1, l_2\).

2. For each \((w_1, w_2)\), the transmitter randomly picks \((\tilde{w}_1, \tilde{w}_2)\) and finds a pair \((v_1(w_1, \tilde{w}_1, l_1), v_2(w_2, \tilde{w}_2, l_2))\) that is jointly typical. Such a pair exists with high probability due to (206). Then, given this pair of \((v_1, v_2)\), the transmitter generates its channel inputs through \(\prod_{i=1}^n p(x_i|v_{1,i}, v_{2,i})\).

3. User \(j\) generates \(2^{nR_{0,j}}\) length-\(n\) sequences \(u_j\) through \(p(u_j) = \prod_{i=1}^n p(u_{j,i})\) and labels them as \(u_j(s_{j,i})\) where \(s_{j,i} \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR_{0,j}}\}\) where \(j = 1, 2\).
4. For each \( u_j(s_{j,i}) \), user \( j \) generates \( 2^{n \hat{R}_j} \) length-\( n \) sequences \( \hat{y}_j \) through \( p(\hat{y}_j|u_j) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p(\hat{y}_{j,i}|u_{j,i}) \) and indexes them as \( \hat{y}_j(z_{j,i}|s_{j,i}) \) where \( z_{j,i} \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{n \hat{R}_j} \}, j = 1, 2 \).

5. For each \( u_j(s_{j,i}) \), user \( j \) generates \( 2^{n R_{0,j}} \) length-\( n \) sequences \( x_j \) through \( p(x_j|u_j) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p(x_{j,i}|u_{j,i}) \) and indexes them as \( x_j(t_{j,i}|s_{j,i}) \) where \( t_{j,i} \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{n R_{0,j}} \}, j = 1, 2 \).

**Partitioning:**
- Partition \( 2^{n \hat{R}_j} \) into cells \( S_{s_{j,i}} \) where \( s_{j,i} \in \{1, \ldots, 2^{n R_{0,j}} \}, j = 1, 2 \).

**Encoding:**

The transmitter sends \( x \) corresponding to the pair \((w_1, w_2)\). User \( j \) sends \( x_j(t_{j,i}|s_{j,i}) \) if the estimate of \( y_j(i-1) \), i.e., \( \hat{z}_{j,i-1} \), falls into \( S_{s_{j,i}} \) and \( t_{j,i} \) is chosen randomly from \( \{1, \ldots, 2^{n R_{0,j}} \} \).

The use of many \( x_j(t_{j,i}|s_{j,i}) \) for actual help signal \( u_j(s_{j,i}) \) aims to confuse the other user and to decrease its decoding capability.

**Decoding:**

We only consider decoding at user 1. Final expressions regarding user 2 will follow due to symmetry.

1. User 1 seeks a unique jointly typical pair of \((y_1(i), u_2(s_{2,i}))\) which can be found with vanishingly small error probability if

\[
R_{0,2} \leq I(U_2; Y_1|X_1) \tag{207}
\]

2. User 1 decides on \( \hat{y}_1(z_{1,i}|s_{1,i}) \) by looking for a jointly typical pair \((\hat{y}_1(z_{1,i}|s_{1,i}), y_1(i), u_2(s_{2,i}), x_1(t_{1,i}|s_{1,i}))\) which can be ensured to exist if

\[
\hat{R}_1 \geq I(\hat{Y}_1; Y_1|U_1, U_2, X_1) \tag{208}
\]

3. User 1 employs list decoding to decode \( \hat{y}_2(z_{2,i-1}|s_{2,i-1}) \). It first calculates its ambiguity set as

\[
\mathcal{L}(\hat{y}_2(z_{2,i-1}|s_{2,i-1})) = \{\hat{y}_2(z_{2,i-1}|s_{2,i-1}) : (\hat{y}_2(z_{2,i-1}|s_{2,i-1}), y_1(i-1)) \text{ is jointly typical}\} \tag{209}
\]

and then takes its intersection with \( S_{s_{2,i}} \) which results in a unique and correct intersection point if

\[
\hat{R}_2 \leq I(\hat{Y}_2; Y_1|U_2, X_1) + R_{0,2} \leq I(\hat{Y}_2, U_2; Y_1|X_1) \tag{210}
\]

4. User 1 decides that \( v_1(w_{1,i-1}, \hat{w}_{1,i-1}, l_{1,i-1}) \) is received if there exists a unique jointly typical pair \((v_1(w_{1,i-1}, \hat{w}_{1,i-1}, l_{1,i-1}), y_1(i-1), \hat{y}_2(\hat{z}_{2,i-1}|s_{2,i-1}))\) which can be found with vanishingly small error probability if

\[
R(V_1) \leq I(V_1; Y_1, \hat{Y}_2|X_1, U_2) \tag{211}
\]
Equivocation computation:

Similar to the previous proofs, we treat each case separately. Due to symmetry, we only consider user 1. If the rate of user 1 is such that

\[ R_1 \geq I(V_1; Y_1, \hat{Y}_2 | X_1, U_2) - I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1 | X_2, V_2, U_1) - I(V_1; V_2) \]  \tag{212}

then we select the total number of codewords as

\[ R(V_1) = I(V_1; Y_1, \hat{Y}_2 | X_1, U_2) \]  \tag{213}

which implies that

\[ \hat{R}_1 + L_1 \leq I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1 | X_2, V_2, U_1) + I(V_1; V_2) \]  \tag{214}

The equivocation rate can be bounded as follows,

\[
H(W_1|Y_2^n, X_2^n) \geq H(W_1|Y_2^n, X_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n, U_1^n)
\]

\[
= H(W_1, Y_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n | X_2^n, U_1^n) - H(Y_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n | X_2^n, U_1^n)
\]

\[
= H(W_1, V_1^n, Y_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n | X_2^n, U_1^n) - H(V_1^n | W_1, Y_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n, X_2^n, U_1^n)
\]

\[
- H(Y_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n | X_2^n, U_1^n)
\]

\[
= H(V_1^n | X_2^n, U_1^n) + H(W_1, Y_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n | X_2^n, U_1^n, V_1^n)
\]

\[
- H(V_1^n | W_1, Y_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n, X_2^n, U_1^n)
\]

\[
- H(V_1^n | W_1, Y_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n, X_2^n, U_1^n)
\]

\[
\geq H(V_1^n | X_2^n, U_1^n) - I(V_1^n; Y_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n | X_2^n, U_1^n)
\]

\[
- H(V_1^n | W_1, Y_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n, X_2^n, U_1^n)
\]

We treat each term in (219) separately. The first term is

\[
H(V_1^n | X_2^n, U_1^n) = H(V_1^n) = nR(V_1) = nI(V_1; Y_1, \hat{Y}_2 | X_1, U_2)
\]  \tag{220}

where the first equality is due to the independence of \( V_1^n \) and \( (X_2^n, U_1^n) \), the second equality follows from the fact that \( V_1^n \) can take \( 2^{nR(V_1)} \) values with equal probability and the last equality is due to our choice in (213). The second term of (219) can be bounded as

\[
I(V_1^n; Y_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n | X_2^n, U_1^n) \leq nI(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1, V_2 | X_2, U_1) + n\epsilon_n
\]  \tag{221}

following Lemma 3 of [10]. To bound the last term of (219), we consider the case that user 2 is trying to decode \( V_1^n \) given the side information \( W_1 = w_1 \). Since \( V_1^n \) can take \( 2^{n(I(V_1; Y_2, Y_1 | X_2, V_2, U_1) + I(V_1; V_2))} \) values at most, user 2 can decode \( V_1^n \) with vanishingly small error probability as long as this side information is available. Hence, the use of Fano’s
lemma yields
\[ H(V_1^n|W_1^n, Y_2^n, \hat{Y}_1^n, V_2^n, X_2^n, U_1^n) \leq \epsilon_n \] (222)

Plugging (220), (221), (222) into (219), we get
\[ H(W_1^n|X_2^n, U_2^n) \geq nI(V_1; Y_1, \hat{Y}_2|X_1, U_2) - nI(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1, V_2|X_2, U_1) - n\epsilon_n \] (223)

where (224) follows from the independence of \((X_2, U_1)\) and \((V_1, V_2)\), i.e., \(I(V_1; V_2|X_2, U_1) = I(V_1; V_2)\).

For the other case, i.e., if the rate of user 1 is such that
\[ R_1 \leq I(V_1; Y_1, \hat{Y}_2|X_1, U_2) - I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1, X_2, V_2, U_1) - I(V_1; V_2) \] (225)

we select the total number of codewords as
\[ R(V_1) = R_1 + I(V_1; Y_2, \hat{Y}_1|X_2, V_2, U_1) + I(V_1; V_2) \] (226)

and following the same lines of computation, we can show that
\[ H(W_1^n|X_2^n, U_2^n) \geq nR_1 - n\epsilon_n \] (227)

completing the proof.

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