CRYPTANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF A PROXY SIGNATURE WITH MESSAGE RECOVERY USING SELF-CERTIFIED PUBLIC KEY

MANOJ KUMAR CHANDE AND CHENG-CHI LEE

Abstract. Combining the concept of self-certified public key and message recovery, Li-Zhang-Zhu (LZZ) gives the proxy signature scheme with message recovery using self-certified public key. The security of the proposed scheme is based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and one-way hash function (OWHF). Their scheme accomplishes the tasks of public key verification, proxy signature verification, and message recovery in a logically single step. In addition, their scheme satisfies all properties of strong proxy signature and does not use secure channel in the communication between the original signer and the proxy signer. In this paper, it is shown that in their signature scheme a malicious signer can cheat the system authority (SA), by obtaining a proxy signature key without the permission of the original signer. At the same time malicious original signer can also cheat the SA, he can also obtain a proxy signature key without the permission of the proxy signer. An improved signature scheme is being proposed, which involves the remedial measures to get rid of security flaws of the LZZ et al.'s. The security and performance analysis shows that the proposed signature scheme is maintaining higher level of security, with little bit of computational complexity.

1. Introduction

The public key cryptosystem (PKC), is synonymously known as asymmetric key cryptosystem. In this a pair of keys are used, one for encryption known as public key, which encrypts data, and the other one is a private key for decryption. The first important contribution in the development of PKC was given by Diffie and Hellman [2]. They defined PKC and it’s associated components like, OWHF and trapdoor information. The other popular PKC’s are RSA [15], ElGamal [3], and ECC [6, 10]. In the traditional PKC, a certification is required by the certification authority (CA), to bind a user’s identity and its public key. In real time scenario, if the number of user increases, then it...
is difficult to manage this certification process. To overcome with this situation, Shamir [17], proposed an identity-based (ID-based) PKC. His approach employs the user’s identity as his/her public key, therefore the certification of public key is not required, which reduces the amount of storage, communication and computation. This ID-based approach effectively solves the problem of public key verification, but the disadvantage is that CA knows secret keys of all users after registration. Therefore, CA may masquerade as any legitimate user by generating a valid key pair for the user without being detected. This creates a problem for public key verification process.

The problem of public key verification stands until, Girault [4], gives solution in form of self-certified public keys. In this system each user’s public key is signed by CA using private key of CA himself. This key system has the following features: First the secret key can be determined by the user himself/herself or jointly by the user and CA, and does not known to CA. Secondly the user can use his/her own secret key to verify the authenticity of the self-certified public key issued by CA, and thus no other certification is required. Another important feature is the task of public key verification can be further accomplished with subsequent cryptographic application in a logically single step. This is the reason for the self-certified approach to be more cost efficient as compared to the certificate-based and the ID-based approaches. This approach also helps to resists the active attacks on public keys, in which an adversary (Adv) looking to replace or modify an original public key by a fake public key of his choice.

The security objectives of PKC like, confidentiality, integrity, message authentication and non-repudiation, can be achieve through one of the most important cryptographic tool known as digital signature. Applications for digital signatures range from secure electronic communication, legal signing of contracts to licensed software updates. Digital signature provide a method to assure that, a message is in fact originates from the person who claims to have generated the message. The commonly used digital signatures are RSA [15], ElGamal [3], DSA [11], and ECDSA [1]. These signature schemes do not have the message recovery feature. In 1994, Nyberg and Rueppel [12], gave digital signature schemes allowing message recovery. In this kind of schemes the message can be conveyed within the signature and can be recovered at the verifier’s site. The message need not be hashed or sent along with the signature which saves storage space and communication bandwidth. The security of their signature scheme is based DLP.

Suppose a top official, of any workplace needs to move out of station. In this circumstances he/she is not able to sign routine official documents. So, he/she delegate his/her authority to some subordinate (known as proxy signer), who perform this task in his/her behalf. To help out in this circumstances, Mambo [9], introduced the concept of proxy signature. This variant of signature scheme allows an original signer to delegate his/her signing power to a different
signer, called proxy signer. The proxy signer can stand proxy for the original signer to generate signatures, referred to as proxy signatures.

There arises a natural question that, is it possible to design a signature scheme with the merits of self-certified public key system, proxy signature and message recovery signature scheme. In the year 2004 Hsu and Wu [5], gives efficient proxy signature scheme using self-certified public keys. Shao [18], shows that the Hsu and Wu [5], scheme is not secure. In their scheme it is possible that a malicious signer or dishonest original signer can cheat the CA. An attacker can do attack with the CA, to obtain a proxy signature key without the permission of the original signer. In the year 2005, LZZ [7], has given a new design of proxy signature scheme with message recovery using self-certified public key. The security of the proposed scheme is based on well-known, DLP and OWHF. Their scheme accomplishes the tasks of public key verification, proxy signature verification, and message recovery in a logically single step. In addition they claim that their scheme satisfies all properties of strong proxy signature and does not use secure channel in the communication between the original signer and the proxy signature signer.

In succession variants of the proxy signature with message recovery feature are proposed by different researcher’s. In the same year 2005 Lu and Cao [8], proposed a designated verifier proxy signature scheme and its security is based on ECDLP. Another variant is given in the year 2009, by Wu and Hsu [21], they give the first multi-proxy signature schemes, their schemes are based on DLP and ECDLP respectively. In the year 2012, Xie [22], shows that Wu et al’s scheme is not secure against proxy warrant revision attack. In the same year, the first identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery using bilinear pairing is proposed by Singh and Verma [19]. Tian, Huang and Yang [20], via two concrete attacks showed that Singh’s scheme is not secure. Padhey and Tiwari [13], claim that they proposed the first certificateless proxy signature with message recovery, whose security is based on ECDLP. They also claim that their signature scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message, ID attacks, and furthermore, it is more efficient than Singh and Verma [19], scheme for practical applications.

In this paper, we focus on the signature scheme given by LZZ [7]. It is shown that their signature scheme is not secure. A malicious signer can cheat the system authority (SA), during proxy key extraction. Without the permission of the original signer, the malicious signer is able to extract proxy key. On the other hand, a malicious original signer can cheat the SA, into extracting a proxy signature key without the permission of the proxy signer. To overcome this security flaw, an improved signature scheme is proposed. This paper organized as follows: In Section 2, preliminaries are given. Section 3, gives the brief review of LZZ et al.’s signature scheme. In Section 4, an attack on LZZ scheme is given and an improved scheme is given in Section 5. The detailed analysis of computation and performance of the scheme is being done in Section 6. The
security analysis of the proposed signature scheme is given in Section 7. Last section concludes the work done in this paper.

2. Preliminaries

This section has two subsection, one is about the intractable mathematical problem on which the security of the proposed signature rely and the other is about syntax and security requirements.

2.1. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)

Let \( g \) be an element of a finite group \( G \), and order of \( g \) is \( n \). The discrete logarithm problem is to find the smallest non-negative integer \( x \) such that \( g^x = y \). It is easy to compute discrete exponentiation \( y = g^x \mod n \), for given \( g, x \) and \( n \), but it is infeasible to determine \( x \), for given \( y, g \) and \( n \), when \( n \) is large.

2.2. Syntax and security requirements for the proposed signature scheme

(1) Setup
   In this phase SA generates the system parameters \((p, q, g, \beta)\), chooses a one-way hash function \( h() \), which are public and keeps his private key as a secret.

(2) User Registration
   Each user should get registered who wants to participate in this signature process. For this the user sends some parameters with his identity information to SA, then SA sends him partial secret and a parameter. The user checks the validity of these parameters and finally accepts \((x_i, y_i)\), as his private and public key pair.

(3) Proxy Key Generation
   In this phase all the three parties, the original signer \( U_o \), the proxy signer \( U_p \) and SA exchange a pair of parameter and identity with other two. After this they all compute proxy public key and \( U_p \) computes his proxy secret key \( X_P \).

(4) Proxy Signature Generation
   The proxy signer \( U_p \), using his secret key generates the proxy signature \((r, s, \Psi, m_w, ID_o, Y_P, ID_P)\).

(5) Message Recovery And Signature Verification
   The receiver of the signature or signature verifier, using the available public parameters verifies the signature and recovers the signed message in a single step.

The security requirement for proxy signature, that it should satisfy the following properties:

(i) Distinguishability: The proxy signature must be distinguished from the regularly used normal signature.
(ii) Identifiability: One can determine the identity of the original signer \(U_o\) and authorized proxy signer \(U_P\) from a proxy signature.

(iii) Non-repudiation: The signer in signature generation cannot deny after having the signature.

(iv) Prevention of misuse: It can be assured that the only purpose of proxy key pair is to produce proxy signature, which conforms to delegation information. The proxy signer is responsible for any kind of misuse of proxy key pair.

(v) Unforgeability: \(U_P\), the proxy signer can only able to produce a valid proxy signature for the original signer. Even the original signer \(U_o\) cannot produce it.

(vi) Verifiability: The verifier/receiver of the signature should be able to verify the proxy signature in the same manner as the original signature did verification.

3. Brief review of LZZ signature scheme

In this section the review of LZZ [7], signature scheme is given. Their scheme divided into five steps namely: (1) System Setup (2) User Registration (3) Proxy Key Generation (4) Proxy Signature Generation and (5) Message Recovery And Verification.

(1) System Setup

The SA, randomly selects two large prime numbers \(p, q\) such that \(q \mid p - 1\), a generator \(g\), with order \(q\) over \(GF(p)\), and a secure OWHF \(h()\). SA generates a pair of secret and public key \((\gamma \in Z_q^*, \beta = g^\gamma \mod p)\). After this, SA publishes, \(p, q, g, \beta\) and \(h()\), while keeping \(\gamma\) secret. Let \(U_o\), be the original signer, with an identity \(ID_o\), who wants to delegate his/her signing power to some proxy signer \(U_P\) with an identity \(ID_P\).

(2) User Registration

Suppose that \(U_o\) and \(U_P\) want to register with SA. The procedure for user registration is as follows:

(i) \(U_o\), randomly selects an integer, \(t_o \in Z_q^*\) and \(U_P\) also randomly selects an integer, \(t_P \in Z_q^*\), as their master key and computes

\[
v_o = g^{h(t_o \| ID_o)} \mod p,
\]

\[
v_p = g^{h(t_P \| ID_P)} \mod p,
\]

then sends \((ID_o, v_o)\) and \((ID_P, v_p)\) to SA. Then SA, saves the identity of all the users in a log file.

(ii) Upon receiving \((ID_o, v_o)\) and \((ID_P, v_p)\), SA randomly selects time-variant integers \(z_o, z_P \in Z_q^*\) and computes public key’s

\[
y_o = v_o \cdot g^{z_o} - h(ID_o) \mod p,
\]

\[
y_p = v_p \cdot g^{z_P} - h(ID_P) \mod p,
\]
and their witness’s
\[ w_o = z_o + \gamma \cdot (y_o + h(ID_o)) \mod q, \]
\[ w_P = z_P + \gamma \cdot (y_P + h(ID_P)) \mod q, \]
then sends \((y_o, w_o)\) and \((y_P, w_P)\), to \(U_o\) and \(U_P\) respectively.

(iii) Upon receiving \((y_o, w_o)\) and \((y_P, w_P)\), \(U_o\) and \(U_P\) respectively computes their secret key’s
\[ x_o = w_o + h(t_o||ID_o) \mod q, \]
\[ x_P = w_P + h(t_P||ID_P) \mod q, \]
and verifies the authenticity of the public key’s \(y_o\) and \(y_P\), by checking
\[ g^{x_o} = (y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot \beta^{y_o+h(ID_o)} \mod p, \]
\[ g^{x_P} = (y_P + h(ID_P)) \cdot \beta^{y_P+h(ID_P)} \mod p. \]

**Theorem 3.1.** The secret key’s \(x_o, x_P\) and the corresponding public key’s \(y_o, y_P\) satisfies equations (3.3), and (3.4) respectively.

*Proof.* Substituting value of \(w_i\), into \(x_i\), where \(i = o, P\). We have
\[ x_i = z_i + \gamma \cdot (y_i + h(ID_i)) + h(t_i||ID_i) \mod q \]
raising both sides of the equation (3.5), to exponent to base \(g\), using equation (3.1) and (3.2), for \(i = o, P\), it gives
\[ g^{x_i} = g^{z_i+\gamma \cdot (y_i + h(ID_i)) + h(t_i||ID_i)} \mod p \\
= g^{z_i} \cdot g^{\gamma \cdot (y_i + h(ID_i)) + h(t_i||ID_i)} \mod p \\
= (y_i + h(ID_i)) \cdot \beta^{y_i+h(ID_i)} \mod p \]
which implies theorem holds. \(\square\)

(3) Proxy Key Generation

\(U_o\) randomly selects \(k \in Z_q^*\) and computes
\[ K = g^k \mod p, \]
\[ \sigma = x_o \cdot h(K) + k \mod q, \]
and sends \((ID_o, K, \sigma)\) to \(U_P\). Then \(U_P\) accepts \((ID_o, K, \sigma)\), if the equation
\[ g^\sigma = [(y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot \beta^{y_o+h(ID_o)}]^{h(K)} \cdot K \mod p \]
holds. Then \(U_P\) computes the proxy signature key
\[ \sigma' = \sigma + x_P \mod q. \]
(4) Proxy Signature Generation
Suppose $U_P$ wants to sign a message $m$, where $m$ contains redundancy for later verification, when it is recovered. $U_P$ randomly selects $w \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and computes

$$r = m \cdot g^{-w} \mod p,$$

$$s = w - \sigma' \cdot h(r) \mod q,$$

then send proxy signature $(r, s, K, ID_o, ID_P)$ to a verifier $V$.

(5) Message Recovery And Signature Verification
Upon receiving proxy signature $(r, s, K, ID_o, ID_P)$, the verifier $V$ can recover message $m$ by the equation

$$m = r g^w \left[ \left( y_o + h(ID_o) \right) \beta^{y_o + h(ID_o)} \right] h(K) h(r) \mod p.$$

The verifier $V$, verifies the validity of the recovered message by the embedded redundancy information. The correctness of the scheme is shown below.

**Theorem 3.2.** The message $m$ can be recovered correctly from the proxy signature $(r, s, K, ID_o, ID_P)$, at the same time, the public key $y_o$ and $y_P$ are also verified indirectly.

**Proof.** From the equation (3.6) and (3.7), we have

$$g^w = g^s \cdot g^{w' \cdot h(r)} \mod p$$

$$= g^s \cdot g^{(\sigma + x_P) \cdot h(r)} \mod p$$

$$= g^s \cdot g^{x_o \cdot h(K) + k + x_P \cdot h(r)} \mod p$$

$$= g^s \cdot \left[ \left( y_o + h(ID_o) \right) \beta^{y_o + h(ID_o)} \right] h(K) \cdot \left( y_P + h(ID_P) \right) \beta^{y_P + h(ID_P) K} \mod p.$$

Thus message $m$ can be recovered from $(r, s, K, ID_o, ID_P)$ and verified by checking redundancy information, which implies for $i = o, P$

$$g^{x_i} = (y_i + h(ID_i)) \cdot \beta^{y_i + h(ID_i)} \mod p$$

this equation holds and the public keys $y_o, y_P$, are also verified simultaneously. \(\square\)

4. Cryptanalysis of LZZ signature scheme
Let a malicious user $U_P$, with identity $ID_P$, wants to cheat the SA, into extracting a proxy signature key without the permission of the original signer $U_o$. According to the registration stage $U_o$ has the private and public keys $(x_o, y_o)$, such that $U_o$ should be responsible for the self-certified public key $y_o$, as per equation (3.3).

The malicious user $U_P$ chooses an integer $t_P \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ randomly and computes

$$v_P = g^{h(t_P || ID_P)} \cdot \left[ \left( y_o + h(ID_o) \right) \beta^{y_o + h(ID_o)} \right]^{-1} \mod p$$
User Registration

\[ t_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \]
\[ v_i = g^{h(t_i||ID_i)} \mod p \]
\[ x_i = w_i + h(t_i||ID_i) \mod p \]
\[ z_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \]
\[ y_i = v_i \cdot g^{z_i} - h(ID_i) \mod p \]
\[ w_i = z_i + \gamma \cdot (y_i + h(ID_i)) \mod q \]

Check
\[ g^{vi} = (y_i + h(ID_i)) \cdot \beta^{h(ID_i)} \mod p \]

Proxy Key Generation

\[ K = g^r \mod p \]
\[ (ID_o, K, \sigma) \]
\[ \sigma = x_o \cdot h(K) + k \mod q \]
\[ \sigma^r = \sigma + x_P \cdot h(r) \mod q \]

Proxy Signature Generation By Up

\[ \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \]

Compute
\[ r = m \cdot g^{-u} \mod p \]
\[ s = w - \sigma^r \cdot h(r) \mod q \]

Send Proxy Signature \((r, s, K, ID_o, ID_P)\) To Verifier V

Message Recovery And Signature Verification By Verifier / Receiver

\[ m = r \cdot g^{\left[(y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot \beta^{h(ID_o)} \cdot \left((y_P + h(ID_P)) \cdot \beta^{h(ID_P) \cdot K}\right)^{h(r)}\right]} \mod p \]

Figure 1. Process flow diagram for LZZ signature scheme

and sends \((v_P, ID_P)\) to the SA. Then SA chooses \(z_P \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*\) and computes

\[ y_P = v_P \cdot g^{z_P} - h(ID_P) \mod p, \tag{4.2} \]
\[ w_P = z_P + (y_P + h(ID_P)) \cdot \gamma \mod q, \tag{4.3} \]
then sends \((y_P, w_P)\) to \(U_P\), then \(U_P\) computes
\[
(4.4) \quad x_P = w_P + h(t_P || ID_P) \mod q
\]
and verifies its authenticity by the equation
\[
(4.5) \quad \left\{ \beta y_o + h(ID_o), (y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot \left\{ \beta y_P + h(ID_P) \cdot (y_P + h(ID_P)) \right\} \right\} = g^{x_P} \mod p.
\]
If this equation holds, the \(U_P\) accepts \((x_P, y_P)\) as his private and public key. After the completion of registration phase, SA publishes \(y_P\) the public key of \(U_P\).
Now \(U_P\) randomly chooses an integer \(k \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*\) and computes
\[
(4.6) \quad K = g^k \mod p,
(4.7) \quad \sigma' = x_P \cdot h(K) + k \mod p.
\]
\(U_P\) checks its validity as
\[
(4.8) \quad g^\sigma' = [\beta y_o + h(ID_o) \cdot (y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot \beta y_P + h(ID_P) \cdot (y_P + h(ID_P))]^{h(K)} K \mod p
\]
thereafter \(U_P\) can use \(\sigma'\) to sign message on behalf of \(U_o\).
For signing message \(m\) on behalf of the original signer \(U_o\), \(U_P\) randomly chooses an integer \(w \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*\) and computes \((r, s)\) as follows
\[
(4.9) \quad r = m \cdot g^{-w} \mod p,
(4.10) \quad s = w - \sigma' \cdot h(r) \mod q,
\]
the proxy signature of \(m\) is \((r, s, K, ID_o, ID_P)\) and on receiving this signature any verifier \(V\) can recover message \(m\) by the equation
\[
(4.11) \quad m = r g^s [\{(y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot \beta y_P + h(ID_P)\}^{h(K)} \cdot \{(y_p + h(ID_P)) \cdot \beta y_P + h(ID_P)\}]^{h(K)} \mod p.
\]

**Theorem 4.1.** The malicious user \(U_P\), can attack and forge the signature \((r, s, K, ID_o, ID_P)\), by following the procedure mentioned above, which always verifies the equation (4.11).

**Proof.** It is sufficient to show that the proxy signature key satisfies the equation (4.8).
\[
g^\sigma' = g^{x_P \cdot h(K) + k} \mod p
\]
\[
= g^{\{y_P + \gamma h(ID_P) \cdot h(ID_P) \} \cdot h(K) + k} \mod p
\]
\[
= g^{\{y_P + \gamma + h(ID_P) \cdot h(ID_P) \cdot h(K) + k} \mod p
\]
\[
= \left\{ g^{x_P} \cdot g^{\{y_P + h(ID_P) \} \cdot \gamma} \cdot g^{h(ID_P) \cdot h(K)} \right\} \cdot K \mod p
\]
\[
= \left\{ \left\{ (y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot \beta y_P + h(ID_P) \right\} \cdot (y_P + h(ID_P)) \cdot \beta y_P + h(ID_P) \right\} \cdot h(K) \cdot K \mod p
\]
\[
= \left\{ \left\{ (y_P + h(ID_P)) \cdot \beta y_P + h(ID_P) \right\} \cdot (y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot \beta y_P + h(ID_P) \right\} \cdot h(K) \cdot K \mod p.
\]
So in this way the forge signature key has the same property as that of the proxy signature key generated by the cooperation between the original signer and the proxy signer.

5. Improvement of LZZ signature scheme

The following notations are used to demonstrate the proposed signature scheme.

| Notation | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| p,q      | Large prime numbers, such that \( q \mid p - 1 \). |
| m        | Message to be signed. |
| mw       | Message warrant. |
| g        | Generator of order q, over a finite field. |
| h()      | One way hash function. |
| γ        | Private key of SA. |
| β        | Public key of SA, where \( β = g^γ \mod p \). |
| Ui       | Original and proxy signer, for \( i = o,P \). |
| IDi      | Identity of original signer and proxy signer, for \( i = o,P \). |
| xi       | Private key of original signer and proxy signer, for \( i = o,P \). |
| yi       | Public key of original signer and proxy signer, for \( i = o,P \). |
| V        | The signature verifier. |

This improved signature scheme also has the same stages as LZZ scheme.

1. System Setup

The SA, randomly selects two large prime numbers \( p,q \) such that \( q \mid p - 1 \), a generator \( g \) with order \( q \), over a finite field and a secure OWHF \( h() : \{0,1\}^* \to Z_q \). SA generates a pair of secret and public key \( (γ \in Z_q^*, β = g^γ \mod p) \). After this, SA publishes \( p,q,g,β \), while keeping \( γ \) secret. Let \( U_o \), be the original signer, with an identity \( ID_o \), who wants to delegate his/her signing power to some proxy signer \( U_P \) with an identity \( ID_P \).

2. User Registration

Let the user \( U_o \), randomly chooses a master key \( t_o \in Z_q^* \) and computes

\[
(5.1) \quad v_o = g^{h(t_o || ID_o)} \mod p
\]

then sends \((v_o,ID_o)\) to SA. After receiving \((v_o,ID_o)\), SA chooses \( z_o \in Z_q^* \) and computes

\[
(5.2) \quad y_o = v_o \cdot g^{z_o} - h(ID_o) \mod p,
\]

\[
(5.3) \quad w_o = z_o + (\{y_o + h(ID_o)\}\gamma) \mod q,
\]
then sends \((y_o, w_o)\) to \(U_o\). After this, \(U_o\) computes

\[(5.4) \quad x_o = w_o + h(t_o \parallel ID_o) \mod q\]

and checks its validity as

\[
g^{x_o} = g^{w_o + h(t_o \parallel ID_o)} \mod p = g^{w_o} \cdot g^{(t_o \parallel ID_o) \cdot \gamma} \cdot (y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot g^{-z_o} \mod p = (y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot g^{(y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot \gamma} \mod p = (y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot g^{z_o} \mod p
\]

if it holds, then \(U_o\) accepts \((x_o, y_o)\) as his private and public key. After the registration process is over, SA publishes \(y_o\) as the public key of \(U_o\). In the similar way the proxy signer is also registered and his key pair is \((x_P, y_P)\). For the future use, SA saves triplet \((v_i, ID_i, z_i)\), where \(i = o, P\), so that he can check the authenticity of the registered user.

(3) Proxy Key Generation

Let \(U_o\) wants to delegate his signing authority to the designated \(U_P\). \(U_o\) randomly selects an integer \(s_P\) and computes

\[(5.5) \quad u_P = g^{s_P \parallel ID_o} \mod p\]

after this sending \((u_P, m_w)\) to SA and \(U_P\). The message warrant \(m_w\), contains the original signer’s identity, the proxy signer’s identity and the delegation period, etc., which also authenticates the designated proxy signer. Then \(U_P\) randomly chooses \(k_P \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*\), and computes

\[(5.6) \quad v_P = g^{k_P \parallel ID_P} \mod p\]

and sends \((v_P, ID_P)\) to SA and \(U_o\). Then SA randomly selects an integer \(r_P \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*\) and computes

\[(5.7) \quad w_P = g^{r_P \parallel m_w} \mod p\]

after this sending \(w_P\) to \(U_P\) and \(U_o\).

As \(U_o, U_P\) and SA respectively receives \((u_P, v_P, w_P, m_w)\), they all compute the proxy public key of \(U_P\) as

\[(5.8) \quad Y_P = v_P \cdot u_P \cdot w_P \mod p.\]

After this \(U_o\) computes

\[(5.9) \quad \phi = h(y_o \parallel Y_P \parallel m_w) \cdot x_o + h(y_o \parallel Y_P \parallel ID_P \parallel ID_o) \cdot h(s_P \parallel ID_o) \mod q\]

and then sends it to \(U_P\) via a secure channel. As \(U_P\) receives \(\phi\), he checks its authenticity as

\[(5.10) \quad g^\phi = g^{(y_o + h(ID_o)) \cdot h(Y_P \parallel m_w) \cdot (y_o + h(ID_o))} \cdot u_P^{h(y_o \parallel Y_P \parallel ID_P)} \mod q\]
The steps for signature verification are as follows:

Proof. (Theorem 5.1.) The message \( m \), can be recovered correctly from the proxy signature \((r, s, \Psi, \mu, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta, \eta)\), at the same time, the public key's and identities are also verified indirectly.

To verify the proxy signature, the verifier \( V \) does the following computation:

\[
m \| h(m) = r \cdot g^s \cdot [\beta^{h(\mu, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta, \eta)} \cdot \delta^{h(\mu, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta, \eta)} \cdot \gamma^{h(\mu, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta, \eta)}] \mod p
\]

and verifies whether \( \Psi = h(m \| r) \), holds or not.

\section{Message Recovery And Signature Verification}

To sign the message \( m \), \( U_P \) selects randomly \( \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q^\ast \) and does the following computation:

\[
r = \{m \| h(m)\} \cdot g^{-\alpha} \mod p,
\]

\[
\Psi = h(m \| r),
\]

\[
s = \alpha - \Psi \cdot X_P \mod q.
\]

So ultimately the proxy signature for the message \( m \), is \((r, s, \Psi, \mu, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta, \eta)\).

\section{Proxy Signature Generation}

To sign the message \( m \), \( U_P \) selects randomly \( \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q^\ast \) and does the following computation:

\[
r = \{m \| h(m)\} \cdot g^{-\alpha} \mod p,
\]

\[
\Psi = h(m \| r),
\]

\[
s = \alpha - \Psi \cdot X_P \mod q.
\]

To verify the proxy signature, the verifier \( V \) does the following computation:

\[
m \| h(m) = r \cdot g^s \cdot [\beta^{h(\mu, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta, \eta)} \cdot \delta^{h(\mu, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta, \eta)} \cdot \gamma^{h(\mu, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta, \eta)}] \mod p
\]

and verifies whether \( \Psi = h(m \| r) \), holds or not.

\section{Theorem 5.1.}

The message \( m \), can be recovered correctly from the proxy signature \((r, s, \Psi, \mu, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta, \eta)\), at the same time, the public key's and identities are also verified indirectly.

Proof. The steps for signature verification are as follows:

\[
m \| h(m) = r \cdot g^s \cdot [\beta^{h(\mu, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta, \eta)} \cdot \delta^{h(\mu, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta, \eta)} \cdot \gamma^{h(\mu, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta, \eta)}] \mod p
\]

by (5.18)

\[
= r \cdot g^s \cdot [g^{X_P}] \mod p
\]

by (5.17)
\[
\phi = h(yo \parallel IDo \parallel YP \parallel IDP) \cdot (yo + h(IDo)) \cdot (yo + h(YP)) \cdot Yh(yo \parallel YP \parallel IDP)^r \mod p
\]

\[
\Psi = \left( [h(yo \parallel IDo \parallel YP \parallel IDP) \cdot (yo + h(IDo)) \cdot (yo + h(YP)) \cdot Yh(yo \parallel YP \parallel IDP)]^r \right)^s \mod p
\]

**Figure 2.** Our improved scheme
6. Performance and computational analysis

The notations used to elaborate computational load and performance of the proposed scheme are as follows:

- h – Hashing of some value.
- e – Exponentiation operation.
- m – Multiplication of two quantity.
- i – Inversion under modulo operation.
- a – Simple addition or subtraction.

On the basis of time estimates given in [14], we roughly estimate the time taken for different phases of the proposed signature scheme. The computational load for addition/subtraction is not taken into consideration because it takes negligible CPU time.

First we give the computational detail of the LZZ [7], scheme. This scheme is not too much complex as far as mathematical calculations are concern. Table 1 given below shows that the computational load and timings is not that much huge for this scheme.

| Phase   | User | Proxy Gen | Proxy Sig | Verifier | Total Operations | Timing |
|---------|------|-----------|-----------|----------|------------------|--------|
| Reg.    | 2h + 3e + m + 2a | h + e + 2m + 3a | h + e + 2m + i + a | 6h + 5e + 4m + a | 17.684214 |
| Proxy Gen | h + e + m + a | 3h + 4e + 3m + 3a | 3h + 5e + 6m + a | 15h + 13e + 19m + i + 6a | 82.174803 |
| Proxy Sig | 2h + e + 2m + i + a | 2h + e + 2m + i + a | 09.330075 |
| Ver.    | 4h + 5e + 6m + 2a | 4h + 5e + 6m + 2a | 25.921546 |
| Total   | 5h + 4e + 5m + 3a | 9h + 12e + 12m + i + 4a | 26h + 23e + 28m + 2i + 13a | 136.595952 |

In next Table 2, the computational load and roughly estimated timings are given for the proposed scheme. This scheme is little bit complex than LZZ [7], due to improvements regarding security concern. In our scheme the proxy signer UP, is having maximum load of computation.

| Phase   | User | Proxy Gen | Proxy Sig | Verifier | Total Operations | Timing |
|---------|------|-----------|-----------|----------|------------------|--------|
| Reg.    | 2h + 3e + m + 2a | h + e + 2m + 3a | h + e + 2m + i + a | 6h + 5e + 4m + a | 17.684214 |
| Proxy Gen | h + e + m + a | 3h + 4e + 3m + 3a | 3h + 5e + 6m + a | 15h + 13e + 19m + i + 6a | 82.174803 |
| Proxy Sig | 2h + e + 2m + i + a | 2h + e + 2m + i + a | 10.843801 |
| Ver.    | 6h + 5e + 4m + a | 6h + 5e + 4m + a | 25.893134 |
| Total   | 5h + 4e + 5m + 3a | 9h + 12e + 12m + i + 4a | 26h + 23e + 28m + 2i + 13a | 136.595952 |

From Table 1 and Table 2, it can be observed that the computational load and their timings for user registration, proxy signature generation and verification phases are approximately, 50.00%, 116.00% and almost equal to the counterparts of LZZ [7], respectively. But the calculation of the proxy key generation, shows the complexity of the proposed scheme. In this phase the load is roughly 4.6 times, than the LZZ [7], scheme. This computation contributes the major portion of overall computational timings. Overall the proposed scheme
has an extra computational load due to higher level of security, which exceeds roughly 55.00%, than the previous scheme. The next section is about the security analysis, which shows the advantage of our scheme as far as the cryptographic security is concerned.

7. Security analysis of the proposed signature scheme

This section has two subsection. One shows that how all the fundamental properties are fulfilled by the proposed signature. The other is about the strength of the proposed signature, that how it is secure from different threats and attacks.

7.1. Security properties

(1) Distinguishability: The proxy signature \((r, s, \Psi, m_w, y_o, ID_o, Y_P, ID_P)\), consists of message warrant \(m_w\) and proxy signer’s public key \(Y_P\). This proxy public key is generated by contribution of \(U_o, U_P\) and \(SA\), through the equation \((5.8)\). In this way the signature is distinguished by the normal signature.

(2) Identifiability: The proxy signature contains \(ID_o\) and \(ID_P\), which are identities of original signer \(U_o\) and \(U_P\), so anyone can identify them. Proxy signer’s public key involves \(v_P, u_P\), which can be calculated respectively using, \(ID_o\) and \(ID_P\). So in this way anyone can identify original and proxy signer.

(3) Nonrepudiation: In the verification step \(s\), is used, which involves proxy private key \(X_P\). Proxy public key \(Y_P\) and identity \(ID_P\), is also used so the proxy signer cannot deny that he has signed the message. \(X_P\) involves \(\phi\) and \(\Phi\), which are calculated only by \(U_o\) and \(SA\) respectively, so they are also not in a position of denial.

(4) Prevention of Misuse: The proxy key pair misuse is prevented through message warrant \(m_w\), because, it contains identifiers of original and proxy signer, message type to be signed by the proxy signer, delegation period, etc. So proxy key pair cannot be used for any other purpose or to sign some other message.

(5) Unforgeability: Original signer or some attacker pretend to be as proxy signer to sign illegally the message \(m\). For this they need private key \(X_P\) of \(U_P\) and to get this \(X_P\), is infeasible, because of the unknown parameter \(t_P \in Z_2^*\), which is known to \(U_P\) only. So it difficult to forge the proxy signature.

(6) Verifiability: Verifier or any user can make sure from the proxy signature \((r, s, \Psi, m_w, y_o, ID_o, Y_P, ID_P)\), that \(U_o\) agrees with the signed message, since the proxy public key \(Y_P\) has a component \(u_P\). This \(u_P\), is calculated by original signer using a random number \(s_p\), and which is known to him only.
7.2. Security strength

(1) Security Measures To Resist Forgery Attacks on Private Key’s.

(i) Security of Private Key ($\gamma$) of SA.

To obtain private key $\gamma$, of SA from his public key $\beta$, is difficult due to DLP, since $\beta = g^\gamma \mod p$. $\gamma$, is used to produce the public information $w_o$. This $w_o$, involves random number $z_o \in Z_q^*$ selected by SA, so again, it is infeasible to get $\gamma$, from $w_o$. In all, it is difficult to obtain $\gamma$ from all available public parameters.

(ii) Security of The Master Key ($t_o$), of The Authorized Original Signer.

Description of the registration stage, shows that the secret key of the legitimate original signer $U_o$ is computed from the equation (5.4). This secret key is secure through the random value $h(t_o||ID_o)$, and this random value can be obtained by equation (5.1), if the solution of DLP is possible. Even if the secret key ($x_o$), is revealed to someone, still the master key ($t_o$) will remain safe due to irreversible OWHF.

(iii) Security of Secret Key ($x_o$), of A Legitimate Original Signer.

The safety of the secret key $x_o$, is mainly due to $t_o$. Safety of $t_o$, is already discussed perviously.

(iv) Security of Proxy Secret Key ($X_P$), of a Proxy Signer.

Suppose an adversary wants to expose proxy private key $X_P$, using an intercepted proxy signature $(r, s, \Psi, m_w, y_o, ID_o, Y_P, ID_P)$ generated by proxy signer. The proxy secret key $X_P$ is calculated through equation (5.13), and due to unknown values $\phi$, $\Phi$ and $t_P$, it is not feasible to calculate $X_P$ from the information available in public domain. So an adversary don’t have enough information regarding secure parameters to calculate proxy secret key $X_P$.

(2) Security Against Some Possible Attacks.

(i) Active Attack Through Re-registration of An Existing Authorized User.

Let an adversary tries to re-register the identity information which is already registered with SA for $U_o$ and $U_P$, in such a way that, SA will provide another valid self-certified public key to masqueraded as $U_o$ and $U_P$. If the adversary succeeds in this attack, then he can universally impersonate $U_o$ and $U_P$. The subsequent proxy signature is also valid without being detected the forgery, because the adversary has corresponding secret key associated to the reproduced public key. The best way to prevent from this attack is that save all information regarding identities of the registered users in a log file. SA should be careful and check if the information regarding identity, submitted by the original signer and
the proxy signer already exists in the log file then SA stops the proceedings and avoids this kind of attack.

(ii) Active Attack Through Generating Key Pair For Non-existing Users.
An adversary may attempt to generate a valid pair of secret and public key, by its own, through supplying fake information regarding identity, without taking the assistance of SA. So the pseudo key pair \((x_i, y_i)\) and identity information \(ID_i\), must satisfy the equation

\[ g^{x_i} = \{y_i + h(ID_i)\} \cdot \beta^{(y_i + h(ID_i))} \]

otherwise they are of no use to produce proxy signature. To validate the above equation with \((x_i, y_i)\) and \(ID_i\), the adversary has to encounter difficulty of DLP and OWHF.

(iii) Security Against Signature Forgery Attack.
From the different phases of the proposed signature scheme, it is clear that it combines the two well know signature schemes [12] and [16]. To sign some message, without having knowledge of proxy signer’s private key, an adversary has to encounter DLP and OWHF. So it not possible to forge proxy signature scheme.

(iv) Security Against Public Key substitution Attack.
A dishonest original signer, attempts a public key substitution attack by modifying his public key using randomly selecting necessary parameters. But it is again difficult for him to find such substitution of his public key, which satisfies equation (5.18), and it is obviously due to DLP.

8. Conclusion

In this paper, it is shown that the LZZ et al.’s signature scheme is vulnerable to the cheat attacks. In addition, an improved scheme is also proposed. The proposed scheme has merit that the original signer and the proxy signer’s public key can simultaneously be authenticated in verifying proxy signature process, which make the proposed scheme withstand the cheat attacks. Computational load and complexity of the signature scheme is little bit increased, but ultimately security matters.

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Manoj Kumar Chande
School of Studies in Mathematics
Pt. Ravishankar Shukla University
Raipur, 492010, Chhattisgarh, India
and
Shri Shankaracharya Institute of Professional Management & Technology
Raipur, 492015, Chhattisgarh, India
E-mail address: manojkumarchande@gmail.com
Cheng-Chi Lee
Department of Library and Information Science
Fu Jen Catholic University
510 Jhongjieng Road, Taipei 24205, Taiwan, R.O.C.
and
Department of Photonics and Communication Engineering
Asia University
No. 500, Lioufeng Road, Taichung City 41354, Taiwan, R.O.C.
E-mail address: cclee@mail.fju.edu.tw