Palace of the End is a dense triptych of monologues exploring alternative narratives—albeit based in real facts—behind the events and the headlines surrounding the war in Iraq. Borrowing its title from the former royal palace where Saddam Hussein’s torture chamber was located, Thompson’s docudrama is structured as a chain of monologues telling three real-life stories set in the context of the war in Iraq. The play conveys three unconventional interpretations of the realities of war: that of a young American soldier convicted for her misconduct at Abu Ghraib, the prison that stands as one of the most controversial symbols of the American-led Iraq invasion; a British scientist and weapons inspector who denounces what he understands as the false arguments given by his country’s leaders for engaging in a distant war; and an Iraqi mother whose life was shattered firstly by Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian regime, and later by the American first Gulf War. Each story is an enthralling and gut-wrenching reflection of one of the contemporary world’s most studied and controversial conflicts. The play gives voice to three different kinds of war victims, insofar as their political subjectivities and their moral conundrums are concerned.

The first monologue, titled My Pyramids, depicts the intensely mediatized case of Lynndie England, an American soldier who was judged and convicted in 2005 for the sexual torture of several Iraqi detainees in the prison of Abu Ghraib. The second monologue, Harrowdown Hill, was inspired by the unclear events that surrounded the death of British scientist and UN weapons inspector David Kelly, who, in 2003, denounced his country’s premises for the invasion of Iraq as misleading. The third monologue, Instruments of Yearsing, is based on the life story of Nehrjas Al Saffarh,
repeatedly tortured by Saddam Hussein’s secret police in the 1970s for being a member of the Communist Party of Iraq. Tragically and ironically, Nehrjas Al Saffarh lost her life when American assets bombed her home during the first Gulf War.

In My Pyramids, England, who as a child was diagnosed with selective mutism, is depicted as a lower middle class and under-educated young woman who has to cope with a heavily militarized and masculinized war environment. Pregnant with her soldier-boyfriend’s baby, England claims that her participation in the events at Abu Ghraib derived from her wish to impress him and her commanding officers. She therefore argues that her misconduct should be interpreted as strict obedience to the military chain of command. Displaying a notoriously awkward lack of sensitivity regarding her actions, England justifies her behavior with the violence she witnessed as a child. As a war character, England represents the perfect American scapegoat. Judith Thompson uses England’s monologue to denounce the ugly underbelly of the Iraq invasion, as well as to expose questions the American society must answer in order to come to terms with the war.

Dr. Kelly is a different war character and a different type of victim. The UN arms inspector was harassed and humiliated by the British government for revealing to a BBC journalist that data on Iraq’s weapons availability had been manipulated in order to build a casus belli that could justify the invasion. Subjected to a public and tortuous government inquiry, Kelly allegedly took his own life in the woods surrounding his home. Thompson locates Kelly’s monologue in the hours predating his death. The monologue reveals an anguished man, a victim of his own knowledge, and whose conscience leads him to expose what he saw as a clear securitarian maneuver staged by the British government. Kelly embodies the sacrificial victim of the articulation between knowledge and truth that is frequently manipulated by governments in war contexts.

The play’s most intense ‘testimony’ comes perhaps from Nehrjas Al Saffarh. A spirited woman, Nehrjas sits in her home in Baghdad as she remembers how her sons and herself endured excruciating torture due to their unwillingness to reveal the location of their husband and father, then a communist party leader.

Thompson’s triptych of monologues is a reflection on the formation of subjectivity in contexts that can quite accurately be described as trauma times, and which are, thus, particularly relevant for the disciplines of Political Science and International Relations, in that they concern, as it were, the way individuals construct their political beliefs and reify them under the form of national identity. Trauma times also reveal how the formation of national identity and collective subjectivities occur not in a linear way, but rather involving acute power relations that are rather unique to these moments of exceptional physical violence and psychological upheaval. They often result on the magnification of specific events in the social imaginary, inscribed and reconstructed as basilar stones in the post-trauma-time national consciousness.

According to Jenny Edkins, there are two fundamental elements that characterize contexts of trauma. The first element is the feeling of utter powerlessness that invades all those affected by traumatic events. The second element is the feeling of trust betrayed. In Edkins’ words:
There is an extreme menace but what is special is where the threat of violence comes from. What we call trauma takes place when the very powers that we are convinced will protect us and give us security become our tormentors: when the community of which we consider ourselves members turns against us or when our family is no longer a source of refuge but a site of danger. The betrayal of trust is a fundamental element for the politics of trauma. When the bond that links an individual to his/her family or political community is broken, the feeling of security that is at the core of all socialization processes is also broken. Traumatic events expose, therefore, the articulation between personhood and political community and, above all, they demonstrate in what ways relations of power constitute the core of such articulation. The outstanding interest of the trio of characters featured in Palace of the End is that they represent different forms of trauma that, yet, share a common trait: they all suffered what they might have perceived as the betrayal of their own political community and, as such, had their political subjectivity upset by power relations. In all three cases, what appears to be at stake is the articulation between personhood and political community, but also how the collapse of such articulation is accomplished through a biopolitical reasoning whereby the bodies of the three characters were utterly exposed and subdued to the reality of power politics.

The following section of this paper will develop the idea of Giorgio Agamben’s messianic project as a path to understanding the articulation between power relations, trauma, and subjectivity. While the authors recognize the fragilities of operationalizing Agamben’s work as central to this argument and using a vocabulary derived from political science and philosophy to deconstruct a vocabulary spanning from an analytical tradition, the generation of inter-disciplinary dialogue appears to legitimize the risk of the exercise. Much of the argument, of course, works only on Agamben’s own terms, and not necessarily on the terms set by those he draws from—Aristotle, or Foucault, for instance. For the purpose of this paper, however, the authors have chosen to focus on the concepts put forth by Agamben.

THE MESSIANIC PROJECT OF GIORGIO AGAMBEN

Agamben is particularly known for his analysis and critique of sovereign biopolitical power that has been the subject of a theoretical debate in political and International Relations theory. Throughout his work and from a philosophical standpoint, Agamben constructs human existence as essentially potential and addresses the best ways to guarantee human emancipation regarding the confinement represented by national identity or historical vocation. According to Prozorov, at the heart of Agamben’s appraisal of the Western ontological tradition and his support of a profane messianic politics is his attempt to continue Walter Benjamin’s project of addressing the heritage of Judaeo-Christian messianism for a profane and radical act of ‘arresting the development of history rather than bringing it to its fulfillment’. The impact of the messianic project of Giorgio Agamben for the understanding of modern subjectivities and, in particular, of modern internationalist subjectivities is
profound. Rationalist and structuralist internationalist literature reinforce an understanding of a sovereign political symbolic order that finds its legitimacy in the production of linear time and that addresses personhood as being fixed and above relationality. This kind of belief conducts to the instrumentalization and commodification of personhood in contemporary international politics. Such instrumentalization is explicitly exposed in *Palace of the End*, where the three central characters embody and represent what Edkins designates as the ‘missing persons’ of contemporary politics, whose different degrees and ways of resistance toward the sovereign political order shape their life stories.

The three characters of the play live between two different varieties of time: chronological or linear time that renders them into ‘spectators continually missing themselves’, and messianic or operational time, the ‘time we ourselves are’. Agamben’s call for an understanding of political life through a new conceptualization of the articulation of time and personhood offers us new resources to explore the ways in which political life and, in particular, subjectivity can be reconfigured in reality and refigured in international political theory. Agamben departs from a diagnosis of the contemporary political order—the biopolitical order—and then moves on to the upholding of a very specific vision regarding the unfolding of history. These two aspects will be further addressed in the next sub-section.

**BIOPOLITICS AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION**

Agamben sees contemporary societies as mainly biopolitical. However, he considers the Foucauldian distinction between biopower and sovereign power as non-essential. According to Agamben, sovereign power and biopolitical power are complementary rather than opposite. The point where both kinds of power meet is designated as ‘bare life’, defined as the life of the *homo sacer* exposed to an unconditional threat of death. In Foucault, the foundation of biopower rests in the ‘care of all living’. With Agamben, the same foundation is tied to the exposition of an individual to an unconditional threat of death. Instead of exploring the evolution and distinction between sovereign power and biopower, Agamben aims at exploring in what ways it can be considered that ‘bare life’ is at the core of the biopolitical synthetic notion of life that not only allows the exercise of biopolitics but also permits the emergence of its privileged object: Man. In Agamben’s perspective the *homo sacer* is located at the intersection between the totalizing and the individualizing processes that construct Man as both an object and a subject of modern biopower. When the modern state selects biological life as its prime object, the articulation between sovereign power and bare life becomes visible. Agamben draws from Aristotle the distinction among *zoe* (‘bare life’) and *bios* (the political form of life) in order to argue that the exclusion of ‘bare life’ is the foundation of political communities.

Agamben’s bare life is excluded from normal politics through a relation of exception whereby bare life is taken outside the *bios*, although maintaining with it a very specific relationship. In fact, *zoe* is included in *bios* through its very exclusion.
just like a situation of exception maintains a link to the rule under the form of the rule's suspension, generating a zone of indistinction between chaos and normality: the state of exception. The individual who is reduced to a situation of bare life dwells on a state of exception instituted by the sovereign. Herein lies the key articulation between biopower and sovereignty. To live in a state of exception means to be included in the law through a form of exception, also defined as external to it. The question, as Ojakangas concludes, is that this state of exception equally translates into a situation of total absence of protection from the law. Agamben argues, in that regard, that the person who has been ‘banned’ from the city—in other words, the outlaw—is reduced to ‘bare life’. The homo sacer is, thus, banned and abandoned by the law. Agamben designates this abandonment as the ‘sovereign ban’, which, according to him signifies both the exclusion of the outlaw from the political community and the mark of the sovereign. In his words, ‘the production of the biopolitical body is the founding act of the sovereign power’. In this sense, the ‘sovereign ban’ is both exclusion and a banishing inclusion. In other words, to be an ‘outlaw’ is both to be outside of the law’s protection (thus excluded) and yet subject to the law’s punishment (thus included).

To better illustrate this condition, it might be argued that in the current geopolitical situation different populations find themselves immersed in it. Departing, for instance, from Michael Walzer’s or John Rawls’ debate on supreme emergency, and changes to how it is understood and activated, it could be argued that specific communities living in oppressive states are, through the exclusion of their state among the international community, also themselves excluded from the peer decision-making process that defines the rules by which states relate to each other at any given time. By breaking these international rules, a preemptive invasion, or a military intervention, or a humanitarian intervention of any kind may ensue—perhaps justified by this exceptional state that we came to know as supreme emergency—thus enforcing a second exclusion. War making, we should be reminded, can easily be re-branded as peace building or as the responsibility to intervene on humanitarian grounds (as long as the war is waged by those who set the law—in this case, the West). Simultaneously, the community is included in the sense that it now faces the abandonment of the international polity and the punishment of the international law, which is factually forced upon the country, yet, when enacted, affecting most directly its national citizens. The barrage of controls that now apply to them anywhere outside their occupied territory is both a form of exclusion and of inclusion, rendering them denizens of sorts, and arguably throwing them into ‘bare life’. In practical terms, this situation could easily be suggested to describe the state of exclusion in which citizens of countries currently segregated as ‘pariah states’ live. Thus, in theory—and arguably in practice—citizens of Iran, North Korea, or Sudan may find it increasingly difficult to circulate without obstacle outside the boundaries of their state, merely because they carry a specific passport awarded by a sovereign authority the international community disdains and isolates. In addition to the state of bare life they potentially face in their own country, a new exclusion outside its boundaries descends upon them as a natural extension of their sovereign’s
own exclusion, undeniably linking their fates and their freedoms with their state’s international standing.

Agamben argues that what defines the *homo sacer* is the exposure to the possibility of being killed in the absence of crime, since his death cannot be ruled as a sacrifice neither as a homicide. The condition of *homo sacer* translates, therefore, an absolute threat of death.

Ojakangas notes that in terms of modern jurisprudence the *homo sacer* characterizes the individual who belongs neither to the sphere of positive law nor to that of natural law holding, therefore, neither the rights of a citizen nor human rights. The *homo sacer* embodies, in fact, the original figure of life in the state of exception. As Agamben states ‘[w]hat is captured in the sovereign ban is a human victim who may be killed but not sacrificed: *homo sacer*.‘

Michael Dillon observes that Agamben’s nomological account of biopolitical workings is intended to expose the violent central logic of modern biopolitics. If it is true that Agamben’s distinction between *bios* and *zoe* is hardly sustainable, it is also true that by re-thinking the facticity of corporeality beyond the reduction of the body to pure biology, Agamben resumes Foucault’s belief—as described in *The Order of Things*—that life in general is only possible as a ‘figuration of finitude’, or rather as the historical product of Man’s exposure to the spatiality of the body and the ‘time of language’.

In the words of Judith Butler, ‘each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies’. For Margaroni, Agamben’s ‘bare life’ should be understood as the embodiment of corporeality aware of the finitude of its existence. Such awareness highlights all sovereign biopolitical decisions that rule on the value and preservability of specific forms of life and, consequently, all types of invisible deaths that occur due to abandonment and in parallel to biotechnologies of care. Agamben’s attempts, therefore, to articulate a mode of biopower that is located at the dual threshold of *patria potestas*, the sovereign’s fatherly power over life and death, and *maternus cura*, the biopolitical maternal care for all living. This mode of biopower power targets, manages, and produces different types of precarious life by achieving the derealization of the humanity of certain categories of subjects.

The three real characters portrayed in *Palace of the End*—Lynndie England (whom we might dub the ‘scapegoat soldier’), David Kelly (whom we might dub the ‘self-sacrificial scientist’), and Nehrjas Al Saffarh (the tortured activist)—clearly personify the individual who is reduced to the status of bare life and is forced to dwell on his/her own state of exception as instituted by the sovereign. Interestingly, the precarious biopolitical condition and the tortuous personhood of the three characters derives from the very roles they play as somehow resisting spectators in a context of trauma that forces them to live in the limbo between chronological and messianic time.

It should also be noted that all three characters—regarded here as war victims—were exposed to the unconditional threat of violence and death, metaphorical for England and Kelly, that characterizes the *homo sacer*. Lynndie England represents the figure of the soldier. All soldiers’ deaths are classifiable as belonging to a
zone of indistinction between sacrifice and homicide. Moreover, the detainees at Abu Ghraib also embody the condition of *homo sacer* since their lives and deaths in the state of exception (symbolized by the prison itself) were also caught in a political and juridical void. David Kelly’s suicide also raised questions concerning the accountability of governmental decisionism for the lives (and deaths) of those it targets. Finally, Nehras Al Saffarh’s tragic life story perfectly personifies the unconditional threat of death. The question is: in what ways can we address the overcoming of this biopolitical contemporary order? The answer resides perhaps in a new understanding of time and personhood or what Agamben called the ‘coming community’.46

Agamben argues that the only route to overcome the contradictions and the limitations to subjectivity that derive from sovereign political orders is to replace an ontology founded on the logic of actuality with an ontology sustained by a logic of potentiality, thus reducing the apparatus of sovereignty to a condition of ‘inoperosity’ (*katargeo*) and suspending its efficiency.47 Messianism, in Agamben’s interpretation constitutes the revocation of all forms of actuality and of the logic of possession associated with it. In his own words:

The messianic vocation is not a right, it does not constitutes an identity: it is a general potentiality that we can use without ever possessing it. To live according to messianism means to abandon all sorts of juridical and factual proprieties (circumcised/non-circumcised; free Man/slave; man/woman. However, this form of de-possession does not create a new identity and the ‘new subject’ is only the revival of the messianic vocation of the ‘old subject’.48

From the perspective of personhood, and in particular from the perspective of the articulation of personhood within contexts of trauma, to reduce the apparatus of sovereignty to a condition of ‘inoperosity’ (*katargeo*), thereby suspending its efficiency, is important for three essential reasons.

Firstly, because, in Agamben’s perspective, the paradox of sovereignty is that the sovereign—the only figure that can institute the state of exception—is, at the same time, inside and outside the legal order. In fact, by declaring the state of exception the sovereign places himself outside the law, maintaining however the prerogative of suspending it and thereby touching the conditions of all those who are affected by it.49

Secondly, the state of exception that frequently follows contexts of trauma is located, according to Agamben, in a ‘point of imbalance between public law and political fact’, bringing to light the relationship between personhood, politics, and legality.50 He argues that:

If exceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis and, as such, must be understood on political and not juridico-constitutional grounds, then they find themselves in the paradoxical position of being juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal terms and the state of exception appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal form. On the other hand, if the law employs the exception—that is the suspension of law itself—as its original means of referring to and encompassing life, then a theory of the state of exception is the preliminary condition for any definition of the relation that binds and, at the same time, abandons the living being to law.51
It is in this context that Agamben describes sovereignty as signaling the point of indifference between violence and law.\textsuperscript{52}

Finally, to reduce the apparatus of sovereignty to a condition of ‘inoperosity’ mirrors what Agamben designates as the Paulinian ‘messianic inversion’ of the relation between strength and weakness: ‘strength is accomplished in weakness’ (\textit{dunamis en ashteneia teleitai})\textsuperscript{53}.\textsuperscript{54} This means that through messianism the dialectic relationship between personhood and power can also be transformed and rendered inoperative, thus opening adequate avenues for the retrieval of the ‘missing persons’ of contemporary politics.\textsuperscript{55}

The transformation of the articulation between personhood and time conducts to the delegitimization of ‘future-oriented sacrificial politics’ thus bringing to light the figure of man as \textit{argos}, or workless and inoperative.\textsuperscript{56} Consequently, inoperosity cannot be conflated with a factual inactivity or redundancy on the part of the subject, but with the lack of any \textit{telos} of human \textit{praxis} and the resulting abandonment of all tasks that may conduct to the emancipation of humanity. It is \textit{action} rather than the \textit{subject} that is denied, which leads to the ‘suspension of the historical process’ and to its ‘deactivation’, empowering the subject with ‘the possibility of \textit{praxis} irreducible to a project’.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{TRAUMA TIMES IN PALACE OF THE END: CLOSING REMARKS}

A bitter aftertaste remains upon turning the last page on Judith Thompson’s \textit{Palace of the End}. In a brief triptych of emotionally charged monologues, Thompson achieves the uncomfortable revelation of the intimate, pervasive, and profoundly invasive forms of state violence, exclusion, and subjugation not immediately apparent through the war’s mediatized veneer. The assumption of western public opinion was, after all, that Iraq was a ‘good war’, a just cause, an intervention on humanitarian grounds. Yet, as with other contemporary wars, this too has become a commodified, voyeuristic visual product, a proxy war watched on the screens of television sets half a world away, geographically distant enough for the deeper scars on the Iraqi social fabric to be ignored, yet morally touching every household in Britain or the United States, and even bringing trauma right onto the doorsteps of many. While the medium by which the war is conveyed to the West has changed overtime, the realities of myth-making have not. Wars remain untrue, propagandistic in nature, with David Kelly ‘soap operas’ becoming recurrent, and Harrowdown Hills or Abu Ghraibs becoming expected outcomes. This, too, has turned into a war in which, in the words of Phillip Knightley, ‘truth [is] the first casualty’.\textsuperscript{58}

The truth about the war, unsurprisingly, is multilayered, textured, highly complex, and sometimes admittedly ‘untrue’ facts are spinned as ‘truth’, constructed around and utilized as the justification to an increasingly permanent state of exception. The articulation of personhood in these contexts of trauma becomes limited by the sovereign’s own interest. But perhaps it could be argued that such limitations have now extended well beyond places experiencing the physical trauma times or open war.
In Thompson’s play the reader is invited to regard the three demi-fictional characters as victims of the war itself (at war and at home), victims of the sovereign abandonment, and of a damned political exclusion that cannot always be explained fully. While all three characters attract empathy for their obvious immersion in the worse of trauma times, the reader is simultaneously invited to disdain Lindsay England’s crude delusion; to view Dr. Kelly purely as the sacrificial lamb despite his early acceptance and conniving with the lie; or to justify the responsibility to intervene by looking again at cases such as Nehrjas Al Saffah’s, although intervention ultimately brought about her death. Thompson’s complex web suggests that the truth is what the reader intends it to be. The reader, in reality, could himself/herself be an unknowing subject living in trauma times.

Finally, although trauma is by definition incomparable in its individualizing characteristics, there might be a case to argue that it is now exported as part of the media machinery implemented by the sovereign and distributed more efficiently than ever. Iraq’s state of exception is recognizable as one of extreme virulence, and one in which the moral rules of violence and homicide have become blurred. But, what of divided Cyprus? What of Israel and Palestine? What of post-conflict Rwanda? What of North Korea? And, certainly, what of western nations involved from afar, bereaved, lost in the intricacies of life in peace in a country at war? The extension of this idea to a never-ending array of nations living under extreme circumstances might well justify the question of what are trauma times doing to politics and, most importantly, what are they doing to the polity? Could it be that bare life is becoming normalcy? Could it be that instead of the coming community, the political community is readily accepting the sovereign’s decree of a state of exception as a more-or-less permanent context in which one acquiesces to a reduction of liberties, a change in subjectivities, a willing step or two toward bare life?

This leaves us with a set of troublesome unanswered questions about the kind of politics that emerges when trauma is evoked. There is perhaps the suggestion of a perpetual state of crisis, with the inherent changes forced upon political life. The blurring of the distinction between war times and peace times also hints at a reduction to the quantity and effectiveness of dialogue. Lastly, the conspicuousness of trauma times and the growing frequency and normalcy of states of exception in our day suggest that these and other questions cannot remain unanswered much longer. This, however, is beyond the scope of this paper, and does ultimately leave our characters in Palace of the End lingering in their permanent state of exception, transience, and abandonment.

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Technical University of Lisbon) for their comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.

NOTES

1. Judith Thompson, *Palace of the End*. 2nd ed. (Toronto: Playwrights Canada Press, 2009).

2. See Martin Morrow, ‘Judith Thompson’s New Play Finds Scapegoats and Heroes in Iraq’, *CBC News.ca* (January 16, 2008), http://www.cbc.ca/arts/theatre/thompson.htm (accessed September 1, 2010); Kenneth Jones, ‘Judith Thompson’s *Palace of the End* looks at Iraq War’, *Playbill.com* (January 14, 2008), http://www.playbill.com/news/article/114216-Judith-Thompsons-Palace-of-the-End-Looks-at-Iraq-War (accessed September 1, 2010).

3. Selective mutism is a communicative disorder affecting primarily young children, who are generally capable of speaking but are unable to do so in specific social contexts, or around particular individuals that cause them several social anxieties.

4. Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

5. On trauma and international politics see, for example: Edkins, *Trauma*; or Duncan Bell, *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present*. 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

6. Edkins, *Trauma*, 4.

7. Ibid., 5.

8. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: O Poder Soberano e a Vida Nua* [Homo Sacer: sovereign power and bare life] (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1998).

9. Sergei Prozorov, ‘Giorgio Agamben and the End of History: Inoperative Praxis and the End of the Dialectic’, *European Journal of Social Theory* 12, 4 (2009): 523–42. See also Paul Passavant, ‘The Contradictory State of Giorgio Agamben’, *Political Theory* 35 (2007): 147–74.

10. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*. For an analysis see Passavant, ‘Contradictory State’ and Prozorov, ‘Giorgio Agamben’.

11. Prozorov, ‘Giorgio Agamben’.

12. Ibid., 525.

13. Jenny Edkins, ‘Time, Personhood, Politics’ (Paper prepared for the ISA Conference, San Francisco, March 2008). No pagination.

14. Edkins, ‘Time Personhood’, 2.

15. Giorgio Agamben, *Le Temps Qui Reste: Un Commentaire de l'Epître aux Romains* (Paris: Editions Payot et Rivages, 2004): 112–14. See Edkins, ‘Time Personhood’.

16. Edkins, ‘Time Personhood’.

17. Agamben, *Temps qui Reste*. For an analysis see Prozorov, ‘Giorgio Agamben’.

18. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*.

19. Ibid., 16. For an analysis see Mika Ojakangas, ‘Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power: Agamben and Foucault’, *Foucault Studies* 2 (2005): 5–28.

20. Ibid.

21. Ojakangas, ‘Impossible Dialogue’, 2. See Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

22. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 98. For an analysis see Ojakangas, ‘Impossible Dialogue’. For a more nuanced interpretation, see Maria Margaroni, ‘Care and Abandonment: A Response to Mika Ojakanga’s ‘Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power: Agamben and Foucault’, *Foucault Studies* 2 (2005): 37–42.

23. Ibid.; See Margaroni, ‘Care and Abandonment’, 30.
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24. Ibid.; Agamben, Moyens sans fins. For an analysis see Margaroni, ‘Care and Abandonment’, 30.
25. Ojakagas, ‘Impossible Dialogue’, 7.
26. Ibid., 3. Agamben establishes the distinction among bios and zoe in Agamben, Homo Sacer, 11.
27. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 18. For an analysis see Ojakangas, ‘Impossible Dialogue’, 3.
28. Ibid., 28. For an analysis see Ojakangas, ‘Impossible Dialogue’, 3.
29. Ojakangas, ‘Impossible Dialogue’.
30. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 84.
31. Ibid., 16.
32. Ojakangas, ‘Impossible Dialogue’. See also Agamben. Moyens Sans Fins.
33. John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’. in The Law of Peoples: with ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999): 129–80; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic: Basic, 2006).
34. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 83.
35. Ibid., 83. See also Margaroni, ‘Care and Abandonment’, 2.
36. Ibid. See also Ojakangas, ‘Impossible Dialogue’, 10.
37. Ibid., 84.
38. Ibid., 38
39. Ibid., See also Margaroni, ‘Care and Abandonment’; Ojakangas, ‘Impossible Dialogue’.
40. Margaroni, ‘Care and Abandonment’, 5. Agamben develops this idea through his analysis of the concept of messianic time. See Agamben, Temps Qui Reste.
41. Judith Butler, Precarious Life. The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London and New York: Verso, 2006).
42. Margaroni, ‘Care and Abandonment’.
43. Agamben, Homo Sacer. Agamben, Moyens sans fins. See also Margaroni, ‘Care and Abandonment’, 7.
44. Agamben, Homo Sacer. For a detailed analysis see Margaroni, ‘Care and Abandonment’, 7; and Ojakangas, ‘Impossible Dialogue’.
45. Butler, ‘Precarious Life’.
46. Giorgio Agamben, A Comunidade Que Vem [The coming community]. 1st ed. (Lisbon: Editorial Preseną, 1993).
47. Agamben. Temps qui Reste [The time that remains]. See also Passavant, ‘Contradictory State’; Prozorov, ‘Giorgio Agamben’.
48. Ibid., 50–51.
49. Agamben, Homo Sacer.
50. Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 1.
51. Ibid.
52. Agamben, Moyens Sans Fins, 124.
53. See 2 Cor 12, 9.
54. Agamben, Temps Qui Reste, 165.
55. Edkins, ‘Time Personhood’.
56. Prozorov, ‘Giorgio Agamben’, 530.
57. Ibid., 530.
58. Philipp Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq, Introduction by John Pilger (London: André Deutsch, 2004).