Generic Unpacking of Self-modifying, Aggressive, Packed Binary Programs

Piotr Bania
bania.piotr@gmail.com
March 2009

Abstract

Nowadays most of the malware applications are either packed or protected. This techniques are applied especially to evade signature based detectors and also to complicate the job of reverse engineers or security analysts. The time one must spend on unpacking or decrypting malware layers is often very long and in fact remains the most complicated task in the overall process of malware analysis. In this report author proposes MmmBop as a relatively new concept of using dynamic binary instrumentation techniques for unpacking and by-passing detection by self-modifying and highly aggressive packed binary code. MmmBop is able to deal with most of the known and unknown packing algorithms and it is also suitable to successfully bypass most of currently used anti-reversing tricks. This framework does not depend on any other 3rd party software and it is developed entirely in user mode (ring3). MmmBop supports the IA-32 architecture and it is targeted for Microsoft Windows XP; some of the further deliberations will be referring directly to this operating system.

1 Introduction

Most of the currently popular malware is runtime packed, encrypted or obfuscated. However not only malware is packed\footnote{Author uses the term packed and its variations to refer to the techniques of compressing, encrypting (armoring) and obfuscating binary code.}, packers are also successfully used in other popular software applications mostly to defend against cracking and illegal copying. Therefore solutions limited only to packer detection cannot typify whether a packed application is really a malware or not, because such assumption leads to large number of false-positives alerts. In other words this means that in most of cases detecting, analysing of packed binary code can be only performed after the payload is unpacked. Appending to various external sources [11, 6] about 79% of malware is packed, where the most popular packers are UPX (more then 50% of malware files), PECompact, Upack, tElock, Yoda's Crypter, FSG, PESpin, ASPack. Using packing programs causes a transform of original program into a packed program (the original code is compressed, encrypted or both). Each packed program is equipped with so called loader stub (restoration routine) which works before original analysis. The restoration routine task is to unpack (restore) original packed binary code and throw the execution to original entry point. Each packer typically provide its own loader stub which relies on usage of specific algorithms and because of that it's hard to create one ultimate unpacker which could handle different loader stubs. Furthermore some of the packers like tElock, PESpin, Yoda's Crypt are creating an armored loader stub, which takes an advantage of massive amounts of anti-debugging, anti-reversing tricks and self-modifying code techniques. Such protection techniques often cause a major inconvenience in the malware unpacking and analysis process.

This paper will present the method for by-passing packed, obfuscated, armored layers and a couple of methods for finding original entry point (OEP). Author will also try to present unpacking mechanism used in MmmBop, its main goals, limitations and also other related work.
2 Main Goals

Like most of the currently known unpackers MmmBop was developed to fulfill specific objectives, which are:

- finding original entry point (OEP) and stopping the execution at its place (instrument only the loader stub)
- bypassing the protection layers equipped with anti-reversing tricks, obfuscated and self-modifying code, keeping high level of transparency (avoiding interferences)

As it was previously stated MmmBop is completely userland application and it does not interfere with the stability of operating system. It also does not use debugging API, virtual machine or emulation which significantly decrease the risk of being detected. MmmBop uses dynamic binary instrumentation for tracing the execution flow, next section presents its general architecture.

3 Architecture

MmmBop consist of two separate modules: Injector and DBI Engine. Each of the modules will be presented in the next subsections.

3.1 Injector module

The main tasks of the Injector module are:

1. creating a suspended process of the target application (application to be unpacked)
2. loading DBI Engine into the process space
3. informing DBI Engine about current program entry point
4. throwing execution to the DBI generated block

It is important to notice that the entire injection process is done virtually without physical file modification. It especially prominent when the loader stub of the packer is aggressive and computes checksums from the originally packed file. Injector module consist of an own position independent stub, which performs the DBI Engine loading in the target process space. When the Injector work is done it terminates itself and resumes the target process.

3.2 DBI Engine

This module is in fact the heart of MmmBop. It is completely independent and does not rely on any other known dynamic binary instrumentation frameworks like DynamoRIO [1] or Pin [2]. Even though those two mentioned DBI frameworks are far more advanced when it comes to instrumenting normal applications (not packed), they were not designed to work with self-modifying, aggressive binary code. Pin authors claim that it supports self-modifying code, unfortunately the tests show that it is still unable to instrument many loader stubs - like the one produced by tElock or PESpin. Furthermore it also contains some other logic errors which often make the instrumentation impossible and because of that it cannot be used in unpacking process directed for aggressive loaders (this will be discussed further in subsection 4.3). It appears that Saffron [14] (an unpacking approach using Pin) is also unable to work with aggressive packers like tElock. Pin’s engine is not open source so it is hard to locate potential errors and address a proper fix. Keeping in mind the DBI limits presented above author managed to create own instrumentation framework, which was developed specifically to instrument the loader stub.

General DBI Engine architecture is presented below (Figure 1):

![General composition of MmmBop Dynamic Binary Instrumentation engine.](image)

Figure 1: General composition of MmmBop Dynamic Binary Instrumentation engine.
In current implementation MmmBop supports only single threaded loader stubs (restoration routines) which is enough to handle most of the known packers.

### 3.2.1 Code cache

Code cache is responsible for enabling native code execution instead of performing emulation. Such solution significantly decreases the slowdown rate (pure emulation is typically about few hundreds times slower than native code execution). Unlike the mechanisms used in DynamoRIO [5], MmmBop code cache stores only one block at a time and also it does not apply any other optimizations like direct/indirect branches linking\(^2\) or building traces. This is one of the main assumptions of MmmBop, even if such optimizations considerably increase the speed of instrumented applications they are hard to implement in self-modifying, aggressive code, like packers restoration routines. That's why MmmBop limits such optimizations to minimum and performs them only for indisputable situations (ie. when the basic block is not considered self-modifying). Cached code contains the same logic as the original application code, the only valuable changes are made to the control transfer instructions, which are modified to ensure that MmmBop will always retain control before the code will execute new basic block. Additionally some other instrumentation is injected to the cached code as well, this will be presented more deeply in next sections of this article.

### 3.2.2 Basic Block Builder

Basic Block Builder like the name says is responsible for creating basic blocks. Basic blocks are a sets of instructions finalized with a single control transfer instruction (in other words basic block contains set of instructions which have a single point of entry and a single point of exit for program control flow). General algorithm for creating a single basic block from original application code is defined as follows (Algorithm 1).

**Algorithm 1**: Basic block generation

```plaintext
input : org_va
output : A cached basic block
begin
  done ← false
  current_va ← org_va
  while !done do
    instr = disassemble(current_va)
    switch instr.type do
      case Control Transfer Instruction
        AddRetainControlInstrumentation()
        done ← true
      otherwise
        StoreInstruction()
        break
    current_va += instr.len
  end
end
```

taken because sometimes the input memory address \(org_va\) or any particular instruction following it may be invalid. Therefore entire basic block generation process must be protected by exception handler, which will break the process if the source instruction is unavailable and additionally it will not cause a fatal fault in the DBI engine.

### 3.2.3 Context switch

Context switch is essential for separating original program CPU state from MmmBop internal mechanisms. In other words all original registers, flags, stack space are completely separated from the MmmBop. In this case full stack transparency is achieved. There is one interesting (bonus) detail: when working with completely pure stack space (used for switching with the original stack space), it is important to update the top of stack and bottom of stack values in the Thread Information Block (TIB) because otherwise the exception handlers (like the one used in basic block builder) will not get executed (and this should be considered as fatal).

### 3.2.4 Dispatcher

As it was previously stated special instrumentation is used for control transfer instructions to make sure MmmBop will retain control before executing new basic block. In fact in such situations the
control retains to the Dispatcher element, which decides what to do next. Typically Dispatcher executes Basic Block Builder to create new basic block pointed by the original destination of control transfer instruction. After this is done execution is transferred to the newly generated cached code (of course after performing the context switch).

Besides the presented dispatcher, MmmBop uses few more to follow the original execution process correctly. Those dispatchers will be presented in next sections.

3.2.5 Exception Dispatcher

Causing (generating) exceptions is a very popular trick among PE file protectors. Typical scenario works as follows:

1. Setup Structured Exception Handler

2. Generate Exception (execution is thrown to SEH frame)

3. In SEH frame: check the EXCEPTION_RECORD [8] and CONTEXT [7] structures, basing on the values decide what to do next.

When the exception is generated the EXCEPTION_RECORD and CONTEXT structures are filled respectively. Whenever the exception will happen in the cached code, the ExceptionAddress and Context.Eip fields will be filled too, however they will point to the cached code not to the original address. Whenever loader stub makes use of those two values it is almost certain that the instrumentation process will fail. To address this issue MmmBop hooks theKiUserExceptionDispatcher [9] function, which is called before the execution of the actual structured exception handler. This gives MmmBop the opportunity to filter and fix the ExceptionAddress entry from EXCEPTION_RECORD and Eip entry from CONTEXT structure. If the exception happened in cached code, MmmBop will calculate the corresponding location and update both of mentioned entries with pointer to original exception address (since both structures are located in writeable memory this is a fairly easy step). Unlike Saffron no kernel module is developed to filter generated exceptions, this solution has it good and bad sides. Special care should be taken with hiding the hook more deeply since loader stub may look for it. However this solution worked perfectly with all tested packers.

3.2.6 Continue Dispatcher

Some packers use NtContinue [13] function to transfer the execution to other location (for example Yoda’s Crypter uses this method to return the execution to the original entry point (OEP)). This function is also executed when exception handler returns EXCEPTION_CONTINUE status. Since this function will change the thread context indirectly, MmmBop will lose the track of the execution chain. To resolve this issue MmmBop hooks NtContinue, saves old Context.Eip and updates it with its own handler. After executing NtContinue the control is thrown to MmmBop handler which continues the instrumentation from previously saved Context.Eip.

4 Unpacking Issues

In this section author will try to describe some of the most important issues that were necessary to solve to make MmmBop effective. Sometimes to illustrate specific issue more deeply additional real world examples will be provided as well.

4.1 Instrumenting CALL

The CALL instruction saves procedure linking information on the stack (return address) and calls defined procedure. Besides the normal usage, self-modifying code uses this instruction to address relatively to the return address placed on the stack, this is often referred as GetPC code (the variant of {CALL/PUSH reg/SUB reg, IMM32} instructions is sometimes named as delta handling). Following code (Listing 1) presents how PESpin uses CALL instruction for relative addressing.

```assembly
0040400B CALL 2.00404063
00404063 MOV EBX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP]
0040406E ADD EBX, 12
00404073 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[EBX], 6B1E6
```

Listing 1: Fragment of PESpin code, that illustrates using CALL return address as a operand for relative addressing and self code modification.
CALL instruction at 0x004040D8 transfers the execution to 0x004040DD and simultaneously pushes the return address (0x004040DD) on the stack. This address is then loaded into EBX (instruction at 0x004040DD) and increased with 0x12 (instruction at 0x004040E0). The EBX register (now containing 0x004040EF value) is used via the SUB instruction at 0x004040E3 to decode (self-modify) instruction bytes located at 0x004040EF. Therefore the return address must point to original code location, not the corresponding location in code cache, because even though the cached code does keep the same program logic it is extended with instrumentation instructions and it is limited to one basic block. In other words the same decoding process in reference to cached code may provide other (unstable) results, so executing the instruction located at 0x004040E3 may be fatal in this case. MmmBop takes care of this situation and points the return address to the original location.

While working with self-modifying code it is good to not assume that like in normal application after every CALL instruction, RET instruction will be used to retain control. In such situations it is quite possible that the execution will never land to the return address stored by CALL in fact this is a pretty known trick for disabling the functionality of STEP OVER in debuggers.

### 4.2 Handling self-modifying code

Since MmmBop only processes one basic block at a time, instruction which modifies memory corresponding to different basic block is simply ignored. However the problems start when an instruction modify memory in range of current basic block. This means that the basic block located in code cache does not correspond to the original one any longer (since it was modified) - and the general logic is probably changed. Most of aggressive protectors make use of this technique like PESpin (see Listing 2 - extended previous listing).

```plaintext
004040D7 PUSHA D
004040D8 CALL 2.004040DD
004040DD MOV EBX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP]
004040E0 ADD EBX,12
004040E3 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[EBX],6B1E8
004040E9 DEC BYTE PTR DS:[EBX-3]
004040EC SUB BYTE PTR SS:[ESP],17
004040F0 UNT 46,AL
004040F2 ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EBX],CL
004040F4 IN AL,7A
004040F6 SAHF
004040F7 JNZ SHORT 2.004040FA
```

Listing 2: STAGE1: Fragment of PESpin code, illustrating code before self-modification.

As it was previously explained instruction at 0x004040E3 will cause a memory modification pointed by EBX register 0x004040EF. Next instruction located at 0x004040E9 will also cause a memory modification to the area 0x004040EC. This will cause the modification of the basic block logic, now it presents following instructions (Listing 3).

```plaintext
004040EC SUB DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],2.0040342F
004040FF3 OR ESP,ESP
004040F5 JE SHORT 2.00404095
004040F7 JNZ SHORT 2.004040FA
```

Listing 3: STAGE2: Fragment of PESpin code, illustrating code after self-modification.

Instruction located at 0x004040EC is completely different then the one before performing decoding process. In addition to subsection 4.1, if the return address placed by CALL instruction would not faked properly, PESpin stub would use the wrong value for further unpacking process (this would result in fault).

To resolve such situations additional instrumentation was used. Typically there are two ways of facing such problems both rely on instrumenting instruction which refers to memory in write mode:

1. monitor memory writes and check if the destination memory is located in the range of original basic block
2. monitor memory writes and check if the original basic block checksum has changed

Both of the listed mechanisms are implemented in MmmBop and both are comparable in the terms of speed. First mechanism requires some additional code instrumentation since generally the requested memory address can not be statically calculated. After the execution of ‘memory write instruction'
MmmBop dispatcher checks if it affected current basic block. When MmmBop detects such action, it breaks the current basic block and creates new one (starting after the last executed instruction). Second solution does not require additional instrumentation code for calculating the destination memory address. So after every creation of basic block, a checksum is generated from original code (here the partial Adler-32\[^2\][20] is used as a checksum algorithm). Every time memory write occurs in the basic block, the checksum is calculated one more time from the original basic block code and then it is compared with the previously calculated one. If there is a difference the currently cached basic block is destroyed and next one is generated from the beginning of last instruction that caused the memory write. Current MmmBop implementation enables using one of the two presented methods. The speed comparison between those two mechanisms will be presented in Testimonials section (section 6).

On the side note it’s obvious that Prefetch Input Queue (PIQ) [19] tricks like the one used in PESpin (REPS STOSB instruction used to overwrite itself) have no influence on MmmBop.

### 4.3 Prefixes

Special care should be taken while instrumenting control transfer instructions which are encoded together with IA-32 prefixes. Some of the prefixes encoded together with control transfer instruction are used deliberately to cause exceptions (like for example LOCK (0xF0) or OPERAND-SIZE (0x66) prefix). On the side note Pin tends to ignore such prefixes, such assumption makes it vulnerable to such attacks.

### 4.4 Hardware breakpoints

The IA-32 architecture provides special sets of registers called debug registers, used by the processor for debugging purposes. Those registers allow setting various debug conditions associated with four debug addresses written in DR0-DR3 registers where the breakpoint condition is stored in the DR7 register. Unlike software breakpoints, hardware breakpoint (often called as debug breakpoints) do not require changing the original code. The tElock protector makes a pretty nasty usage of this feature, following code illustrates how tElock restoration routine setups hardware breakpoints (Listing 4).

```plaintext
Listing 4: Fragment of tElock restoration routine, which setups debug breakpoints.

Instructions at 0x00404120 0x00404120 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B4]
00404126 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+24]
00404129 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+4], EAX
0040412C MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+B4]
00404132 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+1F]
00404135 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+8], EAX
00404138 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+B4]
0040413E LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+1A]
00404141 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+C], EAX
00404144 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+B4]
00404144 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+11]
0040414D MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+10], EAX
00404150 XOR EAX, EAX
00404152 AND DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+14], FFFFFFFF
00404159 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+18], 155
```

Listing 5: Fragment of tElock restoration routine, which handles single step exceptions.

Whenever tElock handles single step exception, it increases the byte variable located at 0x00404118 (which is in fact a counter) and it resumes the execution afterwards. This counter value is used in

---

\[^2\]Author is aware of Adler-32 checksum algorithm weaknesses (ie. forging), however they don’t represent a important issue in this case.
the further parts of the unpacking process. Therefore whenever hardware breakpoints will not be hit the file will not be unpacked correctly. In this case when the cached code is executed instead of the original one it's obvious that the breakpoints will not be detected and the unpacking process will fail. To correctly handle such situations MmmBop monitors the context passed to NtContinue function and writes down all the enabled hardware breakpoints locations. Whenever the basic block builder meets the specified breakpoint location MmmBop simply links current instruction to the original breakpoint address. Because of this mechanism breakpoints are correctly handled and MmmBop retains the program control immediately after the exception is thrown.

5 OEP Finding

MmmBop may use different approaches directed for finding original entry point of the packed program. Since it is able to instrument all the instructions which cause memory writes, techniques that rely on this approach (detecting the execution of previously written area) may be applied as well. Currently MmmBop focus on control transfer checks, so whenever the control is returned to a basic block located at specified memory range, MmmBop assumes the original entry points was reached. The memory range used in this process generally corresponds to the borders of first section of the packed file. Since most of the packers do not erase such information this solution plays out quite well. From the other hand packers like uPack merge all of the original sections into one\(^4\), this requires some manual guessing of the down border of the original executable section. In the more hard situations it seems to be possible to deliver another assumption, like every unpacked program tends to use API functions delivered by the operating system or by additional libraries. Therefore the first control transfer to outside library may be used for further manual analysis (since typically the API call is located just after original entry point), however this should be treated as an alternative technique because it is not always reliable. Additionally some other techniques may be applied to solve the extra cases (ie. the dual-mappings [17] problem), for example like intercepting the mapping file API\(^6\) (MapViewOfFile and related functions) or using the technique similar to the one from PolyUnpack [16].

6 Testimonials

Following section will present sample results obtained in the process of unpacking (original entry point finding) custom executable by MmmBop. In the tests a sample, 8 192 byte application was used. The packers tested were: UPX ver. 3.03w, WinUpackRY ver. 0.39 final, Yoda’s Crypter ver. 1.3 (options: CRC check, anti dumping, clear import information, API redirect), tElock ver. 0.98 (options: debugger detection, IAT-redirect), PESpin ver. 1.32 (options: debugger detection, API redirection, antidump protection, code redirection). For each packing tools file was unpacked 10 times (5 times within the usage Adler checksum algorithm, 5 times within the usage of normal instrumentation) and the average value was calculated. The results are written in Table 1 and also illustrated on the chart below (Figure 2). The number of basic block transfers required by specified packer is presented in Table 2.

| Packer Name | \(U_{\text{ACRC}}\) [s] | \(U_{\text{Instr}}\) [s] |
|-------------|----------------|-----------------|
| PESpin      | 4.6084         | 4.5795          |
| tElock      | 1.2804         | 1.3159          |
| yC          | 0.7611         | 0.9472          |
| UPX         | 0.0759         | 0.0789          |
| WinUpackRY  | 0.5930         | 0.5964          |

Table 1: Time required by MmmBop to unpack a single file in reference to different packers and methods.

Where:

- \(U_{\text{ACRC}}\) is the time required to unpack a file while using Adler-32 checksum approach

\(^4\) On the side note similar mechanism is used in the JollyRoger virus.

\(^6\) Of course this may require developing a kernel module because native API [12, 4] may be used instead.
- $U_{Instr}$ is the time required to unpack a file while using normal instrumentation (without the Adler-32 checksum).

Figure 2: Chart illustrating time required by MmmBop to unpack a single file in reference to different packers and methods.

| Packer Name | Basic Block Transfers |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| PESpin      | 2364189               |
| tBlock      | 311614                |
| yC          | 180234                |
| UPX         | 15909                 |
| WinUpackRY  | 131424                |

Table 2: Number of basic block transfers in reference to specified packer.

The results show that both methods used for detecting basic block modification (Adler-32 checksum or the instrumentation approach) produced comparable results. PESpin required the highest amount of time because it uses a lot of control transfers between the basic blocks. It should be obvious that time required for the unpacking process will increase proportionally to the size of packed code (since more iterations will be required to complete the restoration routine). Generally as for the initial MmmBop implementation the results are enough satisfying.

7 Limitations

Most of the dynamic binary instrumentation solutions need to modify target process address space. Unfortunately this is unavoidable. Some more sophisticated packers may use this fact for detection purposes. However this may be not so easy to implement, because other software products (like antivirus solutions, firewalls) typically interfere with the target process address space as well (by injecting additional libraries and so on). Packers, especially commercial solutions must work on such machines too, so it is very unlikely such risky solution will be implemented for MmmBop detection. From the other hand packers based on Virtual Machines (VM) approach will not be affected by MmmBop solution. However, in such cases MmmBop may be used for recording the execution trace, which is often very helpful in the further unpacking process.

8 Related Work

There are a number of unpackers available nowadays, this section will try to describe most of the related ones:

- OllyBonE [18] is a plugin for OllyDbg [21] which relies on similar mechanism like PaX or Shadow Walker does. It changes the page memory protection of selected region (typically first section) and waits until exception happens.
at that range. If the exception address (exception EIP) points somewhere inside the protected region then original entry point is found. On the side note similar approach for unpacking purposes was created before by author of this article. The engine was called dEPACKiT and was developed and announced earlier [3] - unfortunately it was not released to public. Unlike OllyBonE it was a completely ring3 application.

- Renovo [10] uses an emulated environment to monitor program execution and memory writes. As the emulated environment TEMU is used. Renovo tries to find original entry point by detecting code execution from previously written memory.

- Paradyn Project [15] is a very similar approach to MmmBop. Paradyn uses dynamic binary instrumentation for analyzing packed binary code (it uses Dyninst for this purpose). However it appears to be directed for Unix operating systems and currently it cannot handle self-modifying code.

- Saffron [14] also uses dynamic binary instrumentation technique (it uses Pin framework as the dynamic binary instrumentation framework) to monitor program execution together with memory writes. Additionally it uses hardware paging features in a similar way like OllyBonE and related mechanisms do. Because Saffron relies on Pin framework it is unable to handle such aggressive packers like tElock, PESpin etc.

9 Future Work

MmmBop is an initial concept of generic unpacker, together with the evolution of the evading and anti-debugging techniques MmmBop must be constantly extended as well. Future MmmBop version should consider handling multi-threading loader stubs and cover more of the aggressive packers. It is quite possible that MmmBop can be quite more optimized the initial version was build without any additional optimizations.

10 Acknowledges

Author would like to thank Matt "skape" Miller and Julien Vanegue for helping with writing this article.

References

[1] DynamoRIO. http://www.cag.lcs.mit.edu/dynamorio/.
[2] Pin. http://rogue.colorado.edu/pin/.
[3] Piotr Bania. dEPACKiT. http://www.security-express.com/archives/dailydave/2005-q4/0188.html.
[4] Piotr Bania. Windows Syscall Shellcode. http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1844/1.
[5] Derek L. Bruening. Efficient, Transparent, and Comprehensive Runtime Code Manipulation. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004.
[6] Pedro Bustamante. Mal(ware)formation statistics. http://research.pandasecurity.com/archive/Malware_formation-statistics.aspx, 2007.
[7] Microsoft Corporation. Context structure. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679284(VS.85).aspx.
[8] Microsoft Corporation. Exception_record structure. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa363082(VS.85).aspx.
[9] Ken Johnson. A catalog of NTDLL kernel mode to user mode callbacks, part 2: KiUserExceptionDispatcher. http://www.nynaeve.net/?p=201.
[10] Min Gyung Kang, Pongsin Poosankam, and Heng Yin. Renovo: A Hidden Code Extractor for Packed Executables. http://bitblaze.cs.berkeley.edu/papers/renovo.pdf.
[11] Maik Morgenstern and Andreas Marx. Runtime Packer Testing Experiences. 2nd International CARO Workshop, May 2008.
[12] Gary Nebbett. *Windows NT/2000 Native API Reference*. Sams - PEARSON, 2000.

[13] Tomasz Nowak. NtContinue. [http://undocumented.ntinternals.net/](http://undocumented.ntinternals.net/)\%UserName\%Undocumented\%20Functions/NT\%20Objects/Thread/NtContinue.html.

[14] Danny Quist and Valsmith. Covert Debugging Circumventing Software Armoring Techniques. [http://www.offensivecomputing.net/bhusa2007/quist-valssmith-covert-debugging-paper.pdf](http://www.offensivecomputing.net/bhusa2007/quist-valssmith-covert-debugging-paper.pdf).

[15] Kevin Roundy. Analysis and Instrumentation of Packed Binary Code. Paradyln Project. *Condor Week University of Wisconsin Madison*, April 29 – May 2, 2008.

[16] Paul Royal, Mitch Halpin, David Dagon, Robert Edmonds, and Wenke Lee. Polyunpack: Automating the hidden-code extraction of unpack-executing malware. *College of Computing Georgia Institute of Technology*.

[17] Matt "skape" Miller. Using dual-mappings to evade automated unpackers. *Uninformed Journal*, 2008.

[18] Joe Stewart. OllyBone v0.1. Break-on-Execute for OllyDbg. [http://www.joestewart.org/ollybone](http://www.joestewart.org/ollybone).

[19] Wikipedia. Prefetch input queue. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prefetch_input_queue](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prefetch_input_queue).

[20] Mark Adler Wikipedia. Adler-32 Checksum Algorithm. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adler-32](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adler-32).

[21] Oleh Yuschuk. OllyDbg. [http://ollydbg.de/](http://ollydbg.de/).