Empowering Inclusion? The Two Sides of Party-Society Linkages in Latin America

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Abstract
This article investigates why, in two different political and institutional contexts, leftist governing parties became agents of empowered inclusion, boosting the capacity of subordinate social actors to shape the agenda of politics and allowing them to push social policy in an inclusionary direction. To explain how and why this happened, it highlights the ambiguous nature of party-society linkages. While societal ties are necessary for sustained significant progress in social and political inclusion, they can also block the later consolidation of achievements. This happens as some groups, once included, block further inclusion. We build our theoretical argument about the two-sided nature of party-society linkages using comparative evidence from Bolivia and Uruguay—two countries where progress toward empowered inclusion has been especially notable in the past two decades. The article contributes to existing scholarship on social and political inclusion by calling for greater attention to the critical but, at times, ambiguous role that the social bases of parties play.

Keywords Party-society linkages · Leftist parties · Social movements · Inclusion · Latin American politics

Over the past three decades, Latin America has experienced a “new inclusionary turn.” Although this turn has been marked by expanding recognition, access, and resources for popular sectors (Kapiszewski et al. 2021), lower-class exclusion remains the Achilles heel of Latin American democracies (Benza and Kessler 2020). “Outsiders” are increasingly included in social policy (Garay 2016), but equality in outcomes remains elusive. More elusive still is what Warren (2017, 44) calls

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“empowered inclusion:” inclusion of the kind that gives subordinate groups, or other groups with claims of inclusion, real decision-making power in the national political arena.

This paper argues that strong party-society linkages are a vital driver of empowered inclusion. Analyzing two rare cases of significant progress toward empowered inclusion—the Frente Amplio (FA) in Uruguay and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia—we show that the parties’ connections with labor unions and with indigenous and peasant groups, respectively, enabled these groups to shape inclusion-enhancing policy powerfully. We use a paired comparison to demonstrate, on the one hand, the vital role of party-society linkages in facilitating these groups over the actual shape of social policies. On the other hand, we recognize pitfalls of these linkages—for example, groups with strong ties to parties may, under certain circumstances, block access of competing groups, as the literature on corporatism has long recognized—but we argue that the salutary effects of party-society connections outweigh these costs. In Uruguay and Bolivia, popular sectors were not merely beneficiaries of social policy or passive, grateful recipients of opportunities for local participation; instead, they actively shaped critical policies at the highest national levels.

In Latin America, the rise to power of leftist parties and leaders since the late 1990s led to several analyses of their origins, their performance in office, and the sources of their diverging policy orientations in power—leading to several different typologies (Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Weyland et al. 2010). Existing classifications, however, are insufficient to explain important outcomes, including patterns of accountability, responsiveness, and policymaking. For example, why did some supposedly different leftist governments, such as Uruguay under the “moderate” FA and Bolivia under the “radical” MAS share so many similarities in their aggressive pursuit of political and social inclusion? Under consecutive leftist presidencies, both countries experienced “empowered inclusion.” This idea entails not just social inclusion or the degree to which “outsiders” are included in social policy, which is the focus of Garay (2016); it is also not limited to the lowering of inequalities via social policy, which is the focus of Huber and Stephens (2012) and Pribble (2013), among others.

Empowered inclusion entails political inclusion via party linkages in the policy process—the increased empowerment of subordinate groups, or other groups with claims of inclusion, as makers and shapers of policy. While social inclusion does not necessarily come with democratic empowerments, political inclusion does. Empowered inclusion, then, implies citizenship and not clientelism or the “incorporation” of organized social actors into top-down corporatist structures as functionalist groups, as is described in classic works on corporatism (Collier and Collier 1977; Stepan 1978). That type of corporatist inclusion often extended significant

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1 According to Warren (2017: 44), empowered inclusion requires that “those who have claims for inclusion by virtue of being affected by collective decisions possess the powers of speaking, voting, representing, and dissenting.” This idea goes beyond consultation; people who are affected, or potentially affected by collective decisions, must have a voice and veto power in policymaking.
benefits for popular groups, but mostly as beneficiaries of clientelistic factors and at the expense of their autonomy, leading to segmental social inclusion and political co-optation. Empowered inclusion, by contrast, is about “bringing them inside,” in equal terms, as constitutive parts of governing coalitions—through representation in governments. Improvements in the representation of subordinate social groups address significant deficits in societies marked by entrenched inequalities and the durable legacies of historical patterns of political exclusion. And as we show in this paper, they also contribute to legislative outcomes that favor broader societal bases. This distinction between social and empowered forms of inclusion is not just limited to our case studies; it is also immediately apparent in countries as different as Canada and China, where forms of social inclusion through social policy coexist with top-down and paternalistic forms of political inclusion. Empirically and theoretically, then, this distinction between social and empowered forms of inclusion can help clarify normatively important features of other cases.

A strand of scholarship looks at the proliferation of participatory institutions at the local level (Wampler et al. 2019). However, these mechanisms tend to bypass parties and do not always allow subordinate groups to shape the agenda of politics at the national level (Cameron, Hershberg, and Sharpe 2012). The literature on deliberative democracy, by contrast, looks at political inclusion as a matter of creating citizens’ juries and pays insufficient attention to parties. We address this analytical blind spot directly and look at how organized constituencies are connected to left parties in power and, through those linkages, connected to the national political arena and able to shape it. In this regard, similarities between Uruguay’s FA and Bolivia’ MAS as high-performing agents of empowered inclusion are puzzling given that both parties wielded power in strikingly different contexts. Both cases stand out because of the relevance that party-societal linkages had during the period when the MAS and FA held office (Anria et al. 2021). Why were these processes and outcomes of inclusion similar to each other? Our goal is to generate new theoretical insights and explain how sometimes party-society linkages enable inclusion and sometimes not. In so doing, we highlight ambiguity and contradiction in the operation of party-society linkages and contribute to the scholarship on the relationships between movements and parties (Luna 2014; Roberts 2002) and their mutual effects (Pavlic 2018).

Starting in the 1990s, but especially in the first decade of the twenty-first century with the so-called “left turn,” Latin American countries experienced the extension of social policy to outsiders—major progress in the direction of social inclusion. Poverty and economic inequality declined in most countries (Cornia 2014; López-Calva and Lustig 2010). What sets Bolivia and Uruguay apart, however, is not only the magnitude of these trends; it is also the way in which the power of subordinate groups was a constitutive part of the parties’ governing coalitions that pushed for greater social inclusivity. In other words, political inclusion expanded as well. In both countries, the representation of subordinate groups in representative institutions and state bureaucracies gave indigenous groups (in Bolivia) and labor unions

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2 For a review, see Speer (2012).

3 See Warren (2017).
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(in Uruguay) greater voice, influence, and veto powers in policymaking. These actors, in turn, preserved the autonomy and capacity necessary to shape the public agenda. In our assessment, these linkages brought popular organizations in as makers of policy and encouraged the kind of “empowered inclusion” lacking in other leftist cases, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (Table 1).

While progress in Uruguay is not puzzling given the country’s long-standing history of direct democracy and popular sovereignty, Bolivia is a least likely case. It is indeed surprising that a country like Bolivia—with a remarkably weak state, a strong reactionary right, and deep ethnic and regional divisions—should experience this kind of empowered inclusion. We concentrate on the countries that made the most progress, not only in the social arena but also in terms of political inclusion, because we are interested in explaining how and why they were able to make this progress.

We argue the relative success of these two cases can be explained by the strong connections between the leftist parties in power and the social bases and social partners that provide them with mobilization capacity. But as we further claim these party-society linkages are two-sided in nature. On the one hand, strong ties are a necessary condition for sustained progress in empowered inclusion. On the other hand, strong party-society ties can potentially have a negative impact for furthering progress and for the consolidation of achievements; they can at times become a major roadblock to some types of inclusive reforms, especially to the extent that one party-linked group or a coalition of allied groups feels that its vital interests are at stake.

Not every group or coalition can block inclusionary reforms that are not in their interest, however. Groups organized based on economic activity, as opposed to movements with identity claims, are generally stronger and can constrain allied parties more effectively if the interests of party and movement leaders’ clash. As we further argue, success in blocking policy change is contingent on the breath of the veto coalition that party-linked groups manage to configure, and on their autonomous

| Table 1 Empowered inclusion under left-wing governments |
|-------------------------------------------------------|
| High political inclusion                               |
| High social inclusion                                  |
| Uruguay, Bolivia, Argentina                            |
| Low social inclusion                                   |
| Venezuela                                              |
| Low political inclusion                                |
| Chile, Brazil, Ecuador                                 |
| Nicaragua                                              |

Authors’ elaboration

(One might disagree with our placement of cases in this typological space, given that no case is static. But we think it helps to situate our comparison. Venezuela, for example, attained high levels of social and political inclusion at least in the early days of its left turn; however, it became unquestionably non-democratic and less inclusionary over time. Argentina had high levels of social and political inclusion. However, strong top-down control over the governing party by the executive weakened political inclusion (Schipani 2019, 20). Brazil had features similar to Uruguay and Bolivia, at least in the early days of its left turn and certainly at the municipal level. However, in our framework, Brazil should still be classified as “low political inclusion.” While the spread of non-electoral modes of participation involved political inclusion, as the work of Mayka (2019) shows, the inclusion of subordinate actors other than labor through party linkages remained comparatively low or declined over time, as the work of Hochstetler (2008) and Schipani (2019) have demonstrated. The obverse is what sets Bolivia and Uruguay apart.)
capacity to mobilize. In general, if a party-linked actor opposed to a policy decision builds a broad-based coalition with multiple sectors of society, then the veto coalition is more likely to succeed. At the other extreme, if a party-linked actor acts alone and cannot build a strong veto coalition, it is more likely that the party in power will defeat attempts from below to block policy change (unless the actor is too powerful or central within the coalition). In short, the broader and better coordinated the pressures, the greater the chances of ensuring responsiveness.

**Basis for Comparison**

Bolivia and Uruguay are different in several respects. However, we propose to highlight meaningful parallels between them through a “paired comparison” approach with theory-building purposes (Tarrow 2010). To be sure, broader cross-country comparisons can help illustrate that it is possible to achieve high social inclusion without political inclusion. The challenges, however, are different from the ones we are interested in studying. Low political inclusion means no strong societal vetoes over legislation and weaker constraints from society over what governments can do, leading to more segmental social inclusion (Chile) or to political co-optation (Venezuela, Ecuador). Conversely, matching Uruguay under the FA and Bolivia under the MAS reveals much about empowered inclusion. This is for several reasons. First, we are interested in explaining how and why they were able to make that progress and the conditions that might hinder the consolidation of gains or further progress.

Second, in Bolivia and Uruguay, we observe similar mechanisms—party-society linkages—operating in remarkably different settings. Uruguay is a most likely case given its status as a welfare state pioneer, high levels of development, and state capacity. The kind of progress that Bolivia experienced is far more puzzling given its comparatively lower levels of economic and welfare development, and its notoriously weak state. Because of their remarkable differences, we use a “most-different systems” comparative design to demonstrate causal homogeneity in the two cases. While this case selection method is sometimes criticized as a weaker tool for causal inference than the most-similar method—a critique addressed by Gerring (2007)—most-different systems are particularly well-suited for identifying causal mechanisms, explaining the reasons behind an observed outcome, and theorizing about how key hypothesized variables work (Przeworski and Teune 1970).

The FA and the MAS were formed as mass-mobilizing opposition parties and they followed a bottom-up logic of party genesis; they both developed since early on strong “organic connections” with organized constituencies that enhanced their mobilizational power (Anria et al. 2021). Both parties also started out as socialist parties and yet adapted programmatically as a response to electoral imperatives; they both moved toward the center in terms of their macroeconomic orientation and their core programmatic agenda as they pursued and exercised state power, and both were also the longest-lasting democratic leftist governments in the region.

Both stand out in the region as high performers in social and political inclusion. Between 2000 and 2014, Latin America witnessed important increases in economic activity rates and concomitant decreases in unemployment, as well as a decrease
in the number of people engaged in the informal economy. But both Bolivia and Uruguay stand out as high performers in social inclusion. In the two cases, this was driven by a move from segmented contributory-based programs toward broad-based programs with aspirations of universalism—through a combination of the aggressive expansion of health-care coverage, formalization-oriented policies in the labor market, and the expansion of non-contributory cash transfers. The two countries coupled economic growth with macro-economic stability and invested strongly in policies that extend substantive citizenship rights.

While the “commodity boom” after 2003 offered the opportunity for expansive fiscal policy, the FA and the MAS maintained a strong commitment to inclusive social policy and to reducing inequality and social exclusion—the kinds of commitments to inclusion that brought those parties to power, to begin with—even after the boom turned to bust in 2014–15. As with most other instances of the region’s turn to the left, leftist governments in Uruguay and Bolivia made tremendous efforts in increasing social expenditure on health, education, and social security. However, other leftist governments made comparable efforts without necessary advancing empowered inclusion. These fiscal efforts were not capitalized with accompanying inclusionary reforms in every front in Bolivia and Uruguay. Bolivia stands out in the realm of education. The Morales government produced a highly innovative and successful cash transfer, the Bono Juancito Pinto, which was successful at reducing dropout rates. By contrast, Uruguay was not able to fully capitalize on the investment effort in terms of access to education because of internal conflicts between the FA and teachers’ unions. In terms of public health expenditure, the FA governments created a single-payer health care system, which approximates equality of access to health care and stimulates employment formalization. In Bolivia, important efforts were also made to promote universalism and the inclusion of informal workers into the health care system, but major labor reforms remained mostly elusive.4

What really set these parties apart from in the region, however, was the relevance that party-societal linkages had during the period when the MAS and FA held office. While in power, both parties boosted the power of subordinate groups as constitutive parts of the governing coalition. This gave party-linked actors capacities to shape governmental action, sometimes in inclusionary directions (contributing to passing inclusionary reforms, like the reinstatement of wage councils in Uruguay) and other times in exclusionary directions (obstructing important reforms, like tax and labor market reforms in Bolivia). This element of empowerment—voice and veto over policymaking—makes the cases distinctive. Tellingly, the two parties remain highly competitive at the national and subnational levels at least partially because of their deep roots in and strong connections with vibrant and well-organized social movements.5 Studying the cases in parallel with one another is therefore warranted as an

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4 Morales introduced an important policy innovation in 2019 as an effort to reduce healthcare inequality: The Unified Healthcare System (Sistema Único de Salud, SUS). Because the country then experienced a political crisis that put the implementation of that program on hold, we cannot assess its impact.

5 The MAS returned to power in 2020—a year after losing it in a civil society coup. The FA won the municipality of Montevideo in 2020 the subnational elections.
empirical exercise. It allows us to trace how similar parties with strong connections with social movements and other organized popular constituencies shaped similar social and political inclusion processes in starkly different structural settings.

To be sure, we could compare Uruguay with Chile rather than with Bolivia (and by same token Bolivia with Venezuela rather than with Uruguay). However, such comparisons would miss our theoretical point on the relevance of the two-sided nature of party-society linkages and how they matter in the politics of inclusion. Consider the following examples. On the one hand, like Uruguay and Bolivia, Chile also experienced a steady reduction of poverty amidst sustained economic growth—and it even experienced a decline in income inequality. In the case of Chile, however, this was achieved despite the lack of strong party-societal linkages; progress was based on highly progressive social policy and increases in the minimum wage. Since the country’s transition to democracy in 1990, moreover, Chile has had a technocratic logic of policymaking that provided little impetus for social mobilization from below (Luna 2014). Unlike Uruguay and Bolivia, Chile did not experience the expanded influence of subordinate groups in the political arena, meaning that political inclusion remained low. The wave of large-scale social protests that started in Chile in 2011 and continued through 2019 provided clear evidence that governments, led by the left and right, did not move aggressively enough to empower subordinate groups since the country transitioned to democracy in 1990. On the other hand, Venezuela, unlike Bolivia, took a decidedly authoritarian turn and is currently experiencing a humanitarian crisis—hardly an example of sustained progress in the lowering of social and political exclusion. Therefore, Chile/Uruguay and Venezuela/Bolivia are misleading comparisons for our argument about the two-sided nature of party linkages. Comparisons between Uruguay and Bolivia are scarce and, as we show below, there is much that we miss by not undertaking such comparisons.

**Empowering Inclusion**

Strong party-societal linkages shape the inclusion of the parties’ social bases as decision-makers and are crucial for explaining empowered inclusion—both its scope and limitations. The party-society linkages of Uruguay’s FA and Bolivia’s MAS largely explain these countries’ recent progress toward political inclusiveness and the expansion of social policies that universalize social rights to subordinate social actors. Underlying this argument is a feedback mechanism between the leftist party in power and its organized social bases. According to Pavlic (2018, 449–451), strong links between movements and governing parties have demobilizing effects on the former because movements “trust governments to advance their demands institutionally” and because parties can use these connections to co-opt movement leaders. An implication is that solid linkages might demobilize movements and give them

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6 Protestors demanded, among other things, greater participation in collective decision-making—a greater voice in policymaking.
greater capacity to penetrate institutional arenas and shape politics from within formal institutional channels.

Our argument is consistent with this theoretical claim. When civil society organizations with claims for inclusion gain access to effective representation and decision-making through their connections with a leftist party in power—that is, when their power is constitutive of the governing coalition—this boosts their power and capacity to shape the agenda of politics. Party-society linkages give party-linked groups a voice and veto in policymaking and legislation, helping to facilitate the continued responsiveness of the government to organized constituencies (Rhodes-Purdy and Rosenblatt 2021; Rosenblatt 2018). Autonomous pressure from below, in turn, can help to maintain those channels open and promote a strong sense of accountability to demands from below.

Social movements, unions, and other grass-roots organizations representing the under-privileged help leftist parties win elections and may serve as crucial support groups for leftist governments (Roberts 2002). At times, these groups can counteract the power of traditional elites or established insiders. As the literature has firmly established, strong ties with popular sector organizations can help leftist parties push policy in a more progressive, universalistic, and redistributive direction, even if there is significant cross-case and historical variation (Huber and Stephens 2012).

What matters most for understanding empowered inclusion, in short, is the nature and strength of party-society linkages, which could emerge either in those mentioned above radical or moderate strands of left. They can also emerge in weak or strong states and in contexts of varying degrees of development. Pribble (2013), in studying social policy expansion in Uruguay and Chile, stresses the importance of party-society linkages, arguing that the strong societal linkages in Uruguay helped expand social policy in a bolder and more universalistic direction. Her focus, however, is on high-capacity states. A recent contribution by Piñeiro and Rosenblatt (2018) emphasizes the importance of party-society linkages as an under-theorized dimension in studying parties and policy responsiveness. This is consistent with our theoretical argument about the importance of party linkages for explaining inclusion. We build upon this literature and take it a step further by theorizing about the conditions under which party-linked social actors are more or less likely to succeed at enabling and also blocking inclusionary reforms.

Although strong ties are necessary for sustained empowered inclusion, they can also generate obstacles to some kinds of inclusion-enhancing reforms. This is especially the case in policy areas that directly and visibly affect large numbers of people who are organized based on their productive roles or economic activity. Those groups may mobilize and challenge their partisan allies if some of their vital issues, claims, or objectives are threatened or not adequately considered by those in power. This mobilization takes place at least partially outside the electoral arena. Social allies may be able to block reform with various degrees of success, however, depending mainly on their power resources and their capacity to sustain autonomous collective action. Groups organized based on economic activity that make program claims on authorities, instead of movements with identity claims, are generally stronger and can constrain allied parties more effectively. As we further argue, success in blocking policy change is contingent on the breadth of the veto coalition that party-linked groups manage to configure and on their autonomous capacity to mobilize.
In general, if a party-linked actor opposed to a policy decision builds a broad-based coalition with multiple sectors of society, then the veto coalition is more likely to succeed. At the other extreme, if a party-linked actor acts alone and cannot build a strong veto coalition, it is more likely that the party in power will defeat attempts from below to block policy change (unless the actor is too powerful or central within the coalition). In short, the broader and better coordinated the pressures, the greater the chances of ensuring responsiveness.

Strong societal linkages create incentives for left parties in power to negotiate with insiders for the expansion of benefits toward outsider groups. Strong societal linkages also encourage left parties in power to deal with social partners that have access to institutionalized decision-making to advance critical institutional changes in key policy areas. This cooperation between parties and their social partners may prove difficult when governments promote universalizing social policies or when the redistribution of resources is at stake. Bolivia and Uruguay provide examples of both types of dynamics that expanded and inhibited inclusion. Our analysis privileges the agency of societal actors over structural constraints. It also confirms that an alliance of leftist parties with strongly organized subordinate groups is an important factor in explaining empowered inclusion.

The Two Sides of Party-Society Linkages in Bolivia

Since 2006 Bolivia has experienced huge progress toward greater empowered inclusion. This was driven from the bottom-up via a movement-based party, the MAS. Ties between the party and movements take different forms. The sponsoring movements that spawned the party, including the cocaleros in the Chapare region and three national-level peasant organizations, form the core organizational pillars of the party. Other movements are formally affiliated with the party and integrated into the formal party structures, and through those links, members of those movements become party members (Zuazo 2010). Yet other movements form pragmatic political alliances where movement leadership mobilizes members to mobilize for the party and movement leaders are included in the party’s electoral roster.

A major advance in political inclusiveness relates to the composition of representative institutions. While reforms in the 1990s had created opportunities for popular inclusion in municipal governments, the formation of the MAS, and its subsequent ascendance to national power, served as a vehicle for expanding inclusion. Growing electoral strength enabled the arrival of representatives from previously excluded groups, particularly indigenous peoples, into Congress. Since 2002, actors of more diverse ethnic, class, and ideological composition have gradually displaced Bolivia’s hitherto dominant political actors.

Inclusionary trends accelerated when the MAS gained national power. Changes became evident in the increased power and access to the state of indigenous peoples, in their massive inclusion in governing and, particularly, in their penetration of representative institutions at all levels (national, departmental, and municipal). Table 2 illustrates the significant trends. While the percentage of middle-class professionals decreased from 48.7% in the 1993–97 legislative period to 17.7 in 2010–14, the percentage of
peasants, artisans, and formal and informal sector workers—groups strongly linked with the MAS—grew from 3.9 to 26.3% in the same period. Similar trends can be observed in core state institutions and state bureaucracies (Wolff 2018, 699).

With the rise to power of the MAS in 2006, traditionally excluded and subordinate groups increased access to the state. They thus became better able to shape decision-making around issues, claims, and objectives of concern to them—especially in policy areas that affect them directly and visibly in their productive roles. This is not to say that newly included groups gained complete control over the national agenda (Silva 2017); however, the priorities of subordinate groups became increasingly harder to ignore. Their increased political participation boosted their capacity to shape policy in a more redistributive direction.

However, as Wolff (2018, 700) notes, the more significant political inclusion in Bolivia had “far from egalitarian or universal” characteristics. For one thing, the national peasant groups that founded the MAS, all rooted in production or economic activity, enjoyed privileged access to and direct participation in policymaking under the MAS presidencies. In contrast, more identity-oriented indigenous movements were comparatively sidelined from the policy process (Silva 2017). At the same time, some policy spheres, such as economic policy, offered little opportunity for grassroots actors to exert meaningful influence (Anria 2018, 144). Regardless, people from socio-economic groups long subordinated gained a far greater say in shaping national policy—far greater than Bolivia had seen in the past.7

Bolivia stood out for its macroeconomic performance, and Evo Morales and the MAS directed an economy that managed the improbable feat of registering South America’s highest average growth rate (4.9%) from 2010 to 2018 and the steepest drop (-7.3) in the Gini index of income inequality.8 Since 2006, remarkable gains

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7 The scholarship on prior consultation does show that these processes tend to favor identity-oriented indigenous groups versus groups more closely tied to the MAS (Falleti and Riofrancos 2018). However, the emphasis on local-level participatory institutions leaves the national political arena—our focus—largely under-explored or less systematically studied.

8 Calculated from the Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2019 (Santiago: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 2020), Tables 1.6.9 and 2.1.1.1.
have also been made in poverty reduction, with an estimated one million people escaping poverty (about 10% of the country’s population) and the formation of new social actors, such as an incipient Aymara middle-class (Shakow 2014). The result has been a generally more prosperous society, with the proliferation of new businesses, unprecedentedly high patterns of consumption, feelings of prosperity, and aspirations of upward mobility. The Morales administration, however, was unable to reduce underemployment significantly. Progress toward political inclusiveness thus coexisted with the inability of the MAS to achieve social inclusion via the creation of high-quality, formal sector jobs. This can be partially explained by the inability of the MAS to sharply move away from a development strategy based on extractive industries. And this inability, in turn, had two major hindering factors. A first hindering factor was the power of business and economic elites in the lowland hydrocarbon-producing regions (Eaton 2017). A second hindering factor was a political obstacle rooted in the nature of party-society connections, as movements with an “extractivist” agenda wielded overwhelming power within the party, and the party was primarily responsive to those groups (Anria 2018; Brewer-Osorio 2021; Farthing 2019).

While strong economic performance helped the MAS maintain a commitment to inclusive social policy, pressure from below helped to pass key inclusion-enhancing policies. Early on, a central policy involved increasing the capacity of the state to secure tax revenue, particularly from domestic elites and hydrocarbon multinationals. Higher taxes on the hydrocarbon sector in the context of booming international prices generated an extraordinary increase in state revenues. They enabled a substantial acceleration of redistributive spending initiatives to expand social inclusion without the need for new progressive taxes (Fairfield 2015, 245). These initiatives included a mix of cash transfers, old-age pensions, and subsidies to help low-income households pay for utilities and gasoline. As a reflection of the government’s broader agenda of social inclusion, public spending on health, education, and, to a lesser extent, social security accelerated substantially when compared to the 1990s—and, also, when compared to Latin America’s “top performers,” according to Huber and Stephens (2012, p. 123).

Some of the resultant social policy reforms became promising advances toward social inclusion, as they extended or universalized fundamental social rights to disadvantaged groups. These include the universal noncontributory pension, the Renta Dignidad, a modest transfer that covers 100% of the population over 60—most of whom with no prior formal coverage.9 Other initiatives include conditional cash transfers to elementary school children—the Bono Juancito Pinto—and pregnant women—the Bono Juana Azurduy. These transfers reached over 3.5 million people in 2020—about 30% of the country’s population.10 Due to its universalistic character, the Renta Dignidad stands out as a good candidate for creating favorable policy

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9 https://repositorio.economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/documentos/2018/UAEF/Memorias/MEB_2020.pdf
10 Although the payment these transfers was compromised during the interim presidency of Jeanine Áñez (2019–2020), they remain in place under the presidency of Luis Arce (2020-present).
legacies for further moves toward greater universalism. Mobilization from below by the party’s social bases was an essential factor in securing the passage of this policy. Because *Renta Dignidad* required a decrease in the percentage of national transfers to hydrocarbon-producing regional governments, it generated militant opposition from economic elites in those regions. A wide array of MAS-allied movements, in turn, mobilized in favor of the legislation and counterbalanced the power of elites (Niedzwiecki and Anria 2019, 128).

Following the adoption of *Renta Dignidad*, the Morales government also engaged in a broader reform of the pension system. The government took control of the management of the pension funds, lowered the retirement age from sixty-five to sixty (and even lower for hazardous jobs such as miners and the armed forces), and increased benefits. Most importantly, the reform extended benefits to workers in the informal labor sector—a broad category that includes street traders, artisans, transport workers, and others. The MAS introduced the reform in response to the Bolivian Workers’ Central (COB) demands, a militant labor confederation strategically allied with the MAS (Trujillo and Spronk 2018, 146). Without becoming formally integrated into the party, the COB placed labor leaders as MAS candidates and occupied high-ranking positions in the government (such as in the Ministry of Labor), becoming a strategic ally with privileged access to agenda-setting while retaining autonomy and strategic capacity.

MAS legislators directly connected with the COB facilitated a greater substantive representation of the latter’s interests. The COB was able to sponsor the pension reform from within, putting it on the agenda and shaping its design, as interviews with labor leaders and former labor ministries suggest. The process entailed four years of negotiation, contestation, and compromise. During this time, the COB mobilized against the MAS government, mainly demanding minimum wage increases or protesting perceived attacks on labor (Silva 2017; Trujillo and Spronk 2018). At the same time, the more significant presence of strong economic groups linked to the COB in core state bureaucracies and Congress gave them a more substantial opportunity to shape the reform process. For example, transportation unions, one of the strongest groups that gained representation through their linkages with the MAS, as described above, also played a leading role in the passage of this reform. They helped negotiate a Solidarity Fund that would allow the government to extend pension benefits to workers in the informal sector, who were left out of the existing pension scheme. A broad-based coalition of peasant workers, street traders, coca growers, cooperative mine workers, and other well-organized groups connected with the MAS also participated by providing mobilizational power in defense of this fund at a time when the COB leadership seemed most reluctant to accept it.

11 Interviews Montes and Delgadillo: Delgadillo, Walter. Bolivia’s Minister of Labor (2009–2011), Cochabamba, Bolivia, April 1, 2013; Montes, Pedro. Former Executive Secretary, Bolivian Workers’ Central (COB). La Paz, Bolivia, April 21, 2013.

12 Interview Durán: Durán, Franklin. President, Confederation of Transport Drivers (Transportation Workers Union). La Paz, Bolivia, April 17, 2013.

13 Interview Machaca: Machaca, Rodolfo. Executive Secretary, CSUTCB. La Paz, Bolivia, January 17, 2013.
In sum, social movements that were politically included and empowered under the MAS presidencies served as pressure and support groups for a leftist party in government and contributed to advancing an agenda of social inclusion. Although the MAS and its social-movement base were occasionally in conflict, support from allies in civil society helped the MAS win consecutive elections and acted as a counterweight to the power of business elites at critical moments—a point also theorized by Fairfield (2015) both in general and for the Bolivian case. Support from civil society also enabled the MAS to pass its signature redistributive policies.

Despite this progress in terms of inclusion and egalitarianism, Bolivia exhibits at least two eminently political problems: First, in Bolivia, the strength of the connections between the MAS and its social base limited progress in advancing a badly needed and long-delayed tax reform, which is key to sustaining progress toward lessening inequality and widening inclusion. As has been established in the literature of advanced capitalist societies, larger welfare states tend to redistribute more; and to have a more significant welfare state, higher taxes are required (Flores-Macías 2018; Huber and Stephens 2001). The need to carry out revenue-increasing tax reforms became apparent after 2014 when the Bolivian economy began to experience a slowdown linked to the decline in commodity prices. By that time, it had become evident that tension between political inclusiveness and social inclusion had emerged and that maximizing both simultaneously had become politically challenging.

A strong economy fueled by booming commodity prices gave rise to a new middle class of “indigenous entrepreneurs, owners of cooperative mines, land speculators, truckers, and traders of contraband and legal goods” (Farthing and Kohl 2014, 156–57). Many in this group belonged to Bolivia’s sizable and highly profitable informal sector, and many were politically included through their strong linkages to the MAS, as described above. During Morales’ first years in office, the government was able to increase taxation only modestly on transport operatives and cooperative miners (Fairfield 2015, 264). Over time, these groups, which formed a core base of support for the MAS, were able to obstruct tax, mining legislation, and labor market reform initiatives via congressional oversight and direct pressure in the streets. Some of these newly included groups, in short, became new veto players alongside older ones, such as the business sector, and blocked reforms that sought to increase taxation. The failure to expand the tax base called into question the fiscal

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14 See Fairfield (2015), especially Chapters 2 and 8.
15 In an interview, Bolivia’s former Vice-President Álvaro García Linera (2006–2019) commented: “When we decided to tax the transport sector, we went ahead and did it; we encountered resistance and strikes against this; there was no transportation for some time, and we used planes. But we went ahead and did it. We needed to do it.”.
16 Interviews with representatives of the transportation sector and cooperative miners—two of the most powerful groups that gained representation through the MAS—reveal that their presence in representative institutions provided them with a channel to keep an eye on legislation that can negatively impact their sector. Given their strength in numbers, they became veto players who can generate paralyzing conflicts if they do not agree with a given legislative piece.
sustainability of Morales’ agenda of social inclusion, especially considering changing economic and political circumstances.17

Second, the strength of support from civil society enabled Morales and the MAS to ignore the need to plan for democratic succession, which made the logic of continued re-elections at once more apparent and more troubling. When asked about his decision to run for a fourth term, even after losing a referendum that would remove term limits, Morales claimed that the decision had come from MAS-affiliated movements—a demand from below.18 Paradoxically, the strength of support from civil society paved the way for Morales’ political demise and, in so doing, compromised the preservation of previous gains. That support pushed his party beyond what was politically feasible, strengthened opposition coalitions, and ultimately weakened connections with politically relevant segments of the party’s social bases. As a result, in the wake of the contested 2019 elections, important former allies, such as the COB moved into opposition. While some segments of the party’s social bases took to the street in the post-election protests to “defend” their government (Díaz-Cuellar 2019, 8), they only offered weak counter-mobilization. Military pressure was then the death knell for Morales, enabling a far-right figure to take office that attempted to roll back the clock to the pre-Morales’ era and reverse inclusionary trends.

The Two Sides of Party-Society Linkages in Uruguay

Uruguay ranks high in its capacity to redistribute societal and state power and income in regional comparative terms.19 In contrast to Bolivia, Uruguay attained high levels of empowered inclusion since the early twentieth century with the onset of mass politics. However, similarly to what happened in Bolivia, the rise to power of the FA in 2004 represented a significant change in the development of party-society linkages—a change that, in turn, brought about a stronger labor-left party coalition to power than anything Uruguay had seen in the past (Roberts 2002; Rosenblatt 2018). The increased representation of workers in the party and the government boosted their political inclusion and expanded their voice and influence in decision-making processes, helping to transform legislative outcomes. For example, in the area of labor legislation, the re-centralization of wage bargaining—a demand from labor—was a significant break-through. This reform also empowered two historically excluded groups, rural and domestic workers, including them in wages and labor rights bargaining rounds. This was very successful and led to a growth in union density (Rodríguez et al. 2015).

17 Incorporating evaders and avoiders into the tax structure is clearly not the only tax reform problem. Ties between the MAS and its social base also limited progress on the creation of a personal income tax that would target elites (Fairfield 2015, 244). According to Farthing and Becker (2021, 149), “cooperative miners,” a group aligned with the MAS, “repeatedly blocked passage of a mining law promised by the MAS since 2006 that sought to increase the state’s share of royalties, and their taxes.”

18 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y6lw6QjQdsM

19 See Bogliaccini and Filgueira (2011); Luna (2014); Pribble (2013).
But changes were not limited to labor legislation. The following pages examine changes in labor legislation and in other policy areas that, taken together, allow us to see the two-sided nature of party-society linkages. For the latter, we especially focus on education, where the FA governments doubled the educational budget, improved teachers’ salaries, and launched a breakthrough one-laptop-per-child policy, the Ceibal Plan, which universalized technology access for education. While these trends toward inclusivity in the area of education were apparent during the three consecutive presidencies of the FA (2005–2020), the COVID pandemic allowed us to observe the magnitude of this inclusionary educational and technology-incorporating program. At the same time, the relationship between the FA and teachers’ unions blocked progress in education reform, particularly regarding the attempts to curve down dropouts at the secondary level. The failure in this area cannot be overstated; it may have long-lasting effects on inclusion in a country where only half of the population aged 20–24 finishes secondary school (Bogliaccini 2018).

A renewed impulse toward empowering inclusion under the FA administrations began in 2005, during the party’s first term in office—under the presidency of Tabaré Vázquez (2005–2010). The most salient issue about this impulse was the general orientation in Vázquez’s flagship reforms toward increasing collective decision-making capacity, which enabled people to provide collective goods and securities for themselves. This, in turn, can be explained by the strong mobilization capacity stemming from strong party-societal linkages. Since its origins in the early 1970s, the FA’s organizational power itself had derived from two sources: its strong ties with grassroots activist bases, which provide electoral and mobilization power (Pérez et al. 2019), and the labor movement as an organizational pillar (Lanzaro 1986; Luna 2007).

The FA developed since early on well-defined internal mechanisms for assuring strong grassroots control over decision-making, including candidate selection and programmatic definitions. Consider, for example, that the party electoral program is defined before pre-candidacies are admitted. Party structures at the national level—the Congress, the National Plenary, and the Representative Table—are formed by representatives of the political sectors within the party and its grassroots bases; the latter is organized territorially in committees (comités de base). Coordination bodies at the local and regional levels include diverse activists from varied base organizations with different origins and ideologies.20

In addition to the party linkages with its grassroots base, the party developed close ties with the labor movement.21 The closeness between organized labor and the FA was a consequence of a slow but sustained process that began in the 1960s with the unification of the labor movement and the related process of coalition-formation among small leftist groups and parties—Socialists, Communists,

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20 Frente Amplio Bylaws, 2011. Section IV, Chapter 1, Article 27; Section V, Chapter 1, Article 75; Section V, Chapter 4, Article 93; Section V, Chapter 4, Article 102. Also Section V, Chapter 1, Article 76; Section V, Chapter 2, Article 89; Section V, Chapter 4, Article 99.

21 Several authors have argued that there is a neocorporatist character to the relationship between the FA and the labor movement in Uruguay. See Lanzaro (1986), Bogliaccini (2012), Luna (2007, 2014), Etchemendy (2019), Schipani (2019), Palmer-Rubin (2021).
Christian Democrats, and splinter groups from traditional parties. This party-labor alliance solidified in opposition to an authoritarian regime (1973–84), when the party’s activist bases were forced to operate clandestinely due to political repression. It became even stronger during their joint opposition to market reforms in the 1990s (Luna 2007, 4).

The backbone of this alliance is the PIT-CNT (Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores, Convención Nacional de Trabajadores by its Spanish acronym). The PIT-CNT is the country’s only and uncontested trade union movement and has been an asset to the FA both in terms of providing autonomous mobilization capacity and as a means of moderating of labor demands when necessary. While leftist legislators with union backgrounds already consisted of around 40% of the FA representatives during the 2000–2004 legislative period, even before the party gained national power, the political representation of subordinate groups in legislative and executive branches increased substantially under successive FA governments (Bogliaccini 2012; Schipani 2019). For example, during the FA’s entire tenure in office (2005–2020), former labor leaders occupied prominent positions in the executive branch and Congress. Every Labor Secretary was a former labor leader. Eduardo Bonomi (2005–2009), for example, was a fishing sector leader; Julio Baraibar (2009) was a pharmaceutical industry labor leader and a transport labor leader in Sweden while in exile; Eduardo Brenta (2010–2014) was a textile sector leader; and Ernesto Murro (2015–2020) was a wood sector labor leader.

The PIT-CNT is not only a social partner and an organizational pillar for the party but also significant synergies exist between the party and organized labor at the level of the rank-and-file and the leadership (Bogliaccini 2012). As recently as 2021, for example, the FA elected former PIT-CNT president Fernando Pereira as the party president. Although the FA has been open and internally responsive to organized labor, the inclusion of women and ethnic minorities into the party’s internal structures—and thereby into organized politics—lagged in regional comparative terms (Morgan and Hinojosa 2018, 82). The growing presence of workers in party structures and representative institutions, however, certainly ensured a more substantive representation of their interests in national politics.

The reintroduction of centralized wage bargaining illustrates this point. Reintroduced in 2006 in response to labor demands, it led to a steep increase in unionization rates from 14 to 37% (Rodríguez et al. 2015). The FA not only re-centralized wage bargaining and thus empowered labor, but it also successfully incorporated two historically excluded groups into the wage bargaining scheme: rural and domestic workers. To understand the magnitude of this measure in terms of empowerment, it should be noted that the discussion about setting minimum wage and collective bargaining for these two groups dates back to the early 1920s (Barbagelata 1965). This policy empowered workers to a point where jobs without contracts steadily declined among domestic workers. As shown in Fig. 1, the share of informal work in the lower-income quintiles dropped. Significantly, the effort to increase contracted domestic service helped to dramatically close the informality gap between men and women. The reform and expansion of a cash transfer program, grounded in a long-existing well-functioning scheme for family allowances, further empowered inclusion in the poorest sectors. The FA expanded
the program coverage from 74,000 households in 2007 to 122,000 households in 2008—a 65% increase in coverage.\textsuperscript{22}

The area of education provides an empirical illustration of the two-sided nature of party-society linkages, or how they can help to expand and at times hinder inclusion. The FA’s first administration fulfilled its electoral promise of increasing an agonizing education budget—from 2% of the GDP in 2005 to 4.5% by 2009. This administration also created a One-Laptop-per-Child program that attained universal reach by 2009—the \textit{Plan Ceibal}. This program greatly expanded access to the internet, including granting access to every household to 1 gigabyte for free and extending the public free network to most public buildings and squares. The importance of this program for social inclusion was fully unveiled during the COVID-19 pandemic, where schools worldwide had to close doors and move toward virtual education. Progress made during the Vázquez and subsequent FA administrations enabled Uruguay’s new government—inaugurated in 2020 and of a different political sign—to lower the impacts of the pandemic on schooling by using and improving an already extant platform for virtual learning.

However, in line with our argument about the two-sided nature of party-society linkages, it bears noting that the incorporation of instructional technology, as mandated by the \textit{Plan Ceibal}, generated a conflict with teachers’ unions. These were not enthusiastic about the use of technology and claimed that it affected teaching roles, methods, and opportunities for teaching evaluation. Similarly, other initiatives oriented toward reducing high dropout rates and improving attainment levels at the age of 18 faced strong opposition from teachers’ unions (Bogliaccini and Madariaga 2020, 25).\textsuperscript{23} Teachers’ unions had opposed attempts to reform the education system

\textsuperscript{22} Data available at the ECLAC Non-Contributive Programs Database (URL accessed on February 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2022: https://dds.cepal.org/bpsnc/programa?id=32).

\textsuperscript{23} Uruguay is only second to Guatemala in the region in terms of its low attainment rates at secondary level (ECLAC 2020).
since 1996 when the Colorado Party carried out a controversial but inclusive reform. While in opposition, the FA also opposed the 1996 educational reform. This is significant because it happened when strong ties were forged between those unions and the FA. Over time, when the FA rose to power, pressing educational problems—related to dropouts, educational attainment, and high inequality in learning outcomes—weakened the relationship between teachers’ unions and the party.

At the core of these conflicts was the organization of the teaching profession—the process by which teachers are assigned to schools in the public system and the incorporation of technology in the classroom. The first issue directly affects education quality at the lower end of the income distribution. How teachers are assigned to schools consequently affects levels of inequality: experienced teachers select schools in affluent neighborhoods and stay at those schools for many years, while inexperienced teachers may only choose schools in poor communities and remain in those schools for only one or few years as they attempt to climb the “school ladder.” This directly impacts the regressive distribution of experienced teachers between affluent and poor neighborhoods.

The FA faced a trade-off between advancing necessary education reforms and accommodating the political interests of the teachers’ unions. This trade-off was best illustrated in the institutional choices made by President Vázquez in 2005 for the actual implementation of the Plan Ceibal. The program was implemented outside the National Public Education Administration (ANEP). Early opposition to technology incorporation by the teachers’ unions led President Vázquez to locate the program within the Planning and Budget Office—a direct dependency of the Presidency. Laptops were distributed to students without any intermediation by the governing institutions of the education system. This effort to circumvent the teachers’ unions slowed down the use of laptop computers for instructional purposes, as teachers often decided not to use them in class.

Another open confrontation between the Vázquez administration and teachers’ unions occurred in 2015. It originated from voting the 5-year budget allocation for education in the national budget. It bears emphasizing that this conflict occurred despite the doubling of resources allocated to education during the previous Vázquez administration. The conflict escalated when President Vázquez attempted to break teachers’ strikes that the government saw as an unjustified disruption of education activities. The dispute was ultimately resolved when the government suspended its attempt to declare education an essential service for a 30-day period. A second significant conflict occurred during the parliamentary discussion of the education budget in 2017. Unions blamed the government for not fulfilling its electoral promise to increase the education budget by one percentage point of GDP—from 5 to 6%.

The PIT-CNT played a critical mediating role in these conflicts. As soon as the unions took to the streets during the 2015 conflict, the PIT-CNT leadership met with the Labor Minister and even tried to mediate directly with President Vázquez (el País 2015). Teachers’ unions sharply criticized the Labor Minister and Labor Director, 24

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24 Strikes are not permitted when services are declared essential by governments in Uruguay (Law 13,720 of 1968, and law 18437 of 2008).
both of whom were former union leaders. Nevertheless, the role of the PIT-CNT in managing tensions related to the education conflict—or any conflict—was key to maintaining unity in the labor movement and autonomy vis-a-vis the FA. The PIT-CNT helped bring about a negotiated solution to the conflict in the short run, but education reforms were not carried out. Taken together, then, these conflicts illustrate the dual nature of party-society linkages, especially how they can work in inclusionary and exclusionary directions. They also reveal the extent to which party-linked groups may at times pose constraints to the social agenda of leftist parties in power.

Conclusion

Strong societal ties are necessary for left parties to enable progress in the direction of social and political inclusion. But party-society linkages are often ambiguous in nature—while they enable sustained progress, these ties can also have blocking effects on further progress and the consolidation of achievements. We built our theoretical argument about the two-sided nature of party society linkages using evidence from Bolivia and Uruguay—two cases where progress toward inclusion has been notable. It may be too early to fully assess the long-term effects of the trajectories of inclusion discussed above, particularly considering the strengthening of conservative forces in much of the region—including, most recently, our two cases. But sustained efforts to build more inclusive societies are as important and infrequent enough to merit deep analysis to understand the conditions that support and inhibit progress. Such an analysis can yield important theoretical insights.

Three theoretical implications stem from our argument. First, in contexts of high inequality, social inclusion is rarely secured from above. For example, recent political developments in Chile, where the growing disassociation of political elites from the larger society culminated in a social and political crisis, can be interpreted in our argument regarding party-society linkages. This detachment affected all parties, including those on the left such as the Chilean Socialist Party (PSCh), which governed as a junior and then as a senior partner in a coalition called the Concertación (between 1990 and 2010) then Nueva Mayoría (between 2014 and 2018). The center-left Concertación and Nueva Mayoría governments employed distributive strategies mostly based on post tax and transfer redistribution that fell short of promoting political inclusion, even if they attained high levels of social inclusion. In Brazil, the governments led by the Workers’ Party (PT) made significant efforts to boost participation in the political arena, especially at the local level. While those participatory experiences opened policy access to previously excluded groups, the results in terms of inclusion of those groups and their demands were mixed at best (Mayka 2019, 261–63). Brazil did become a more participatory democracy—far more than Chile—but in the process of exercising power, the PT became increasingly professionalized, distanced from its social movement bases, and encountered significant challenges in sustaining grassroots linkages (Handlin and Collier 2011, 149–51). This detachment became a source of frustration for popular constituencies, and it left the PT, as well as the Chilean center-left coalitions, vulnerable to new forms of social protest. Although no parallel detachment took place in Argentina under left Peronism and the country attained high levels of social and political inclusion, top-down control over the
governing party by the executive weakened political inclusion and party-society ties over time. By contrast, the comparative experiences of Bolivia and Uruguay suggest that cooperation between governments and organized social bases is a productive avenue for social integration.

A second theoretical implication is that leftist governments with strong ties with subordinate groups often encounter limits to redistributive state action when narrow or short-term corporative claims from these organizations gain strength and veto power within the government. These coalitional dynamics are essential irrespective of a country’s economic or political development level. A third theoretical implication derives from the two-sided nature of party-societal linkages: social and political integration are long-term processes that depend, on the one hand, on the continuous negotiation between a party in government advancing an inclusive agenda and its social partners, and on the other hand on the capacity of the latter to enable key reforms even if they represent significant costs in the short-term.

Our comparison also contributes to the emerging literature on the legacies of the left turn in Latin America and debates about Latin America’s new “inclusionary turn” (Balán and Montambeault 2020; Kapiszewski et al. 2021). An examination of Uruguay and Bolivia supports the idea that if one analyzes the nature of party-society linkages, including the ambiguities and dynamic interactions among collective actors, there here are striking similarities in the forces that explain performance between cases usually classified in different typological boxes—and striking differences between cases usually grouped as belonging to the same camp. To understand the legacies and long-term trajectories of leftist governments in the region, we need to move beyond leftist parties’ existing typologies and further explore their similarities. Taking a step back and looking more closely at the factors shaping party-society linkages can help us better understand diverging patterns of representation, popular participation, and political accountability in Latin American democracies.

The explanation provided here is a first step in that direction. It is a first step in theory building with insights that might apply well beyond Latin America. Our account underscores a tension that often emerges in societies marked by entrenched inequalities and historical patterns of exclusion—namely, how difficult it is to reconcile and jointly maximize social and political forms of inclusion. For example, indigenous peoples are often included through social policy in countries like Canada and even invited to the political decision-making table, but often in unequal terms. In other words, social inclusion does not necessarily come with democratic empowerment. On the other hand, in authoritarian contexts like China, participatory channels exist and help shape social policy. However, they are generally top-down, co-optative, and non-inclusive in form (He and Warren 2011). Similarly, in Venezuela, participatory channels at the local level provide genuine opportunities for popular empowerment, but mostly tend to reinforce the hegemony of a dominant national leader (Rhodes-Purdy 2015). Expanding our analysis to a broader set of comparative cases can offer insight into the conditions that can help jointly maximize both forms of inclusions, the trade-offs and dilemmas they presuppose, and the more significant impact these challenges pose on contemporary political regimes. These and similar questions are urgent today and require further attention and more systematic analysis.
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