A Strategic Analysis of Conflict in Sudan and South Sudan

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Abstract
Much of the violence in Sudan and South Sudan has been incorrectly labeled as terrorism, and systemic conditions are often cited as the root cause. This article argues that terrorism is the use of violence to coerce political concessions and concludes that the vast majority of violence in Sudan and South Sudan has been employed for other reasons (civil war, insurgency and profit). It begins by discussing the history of Sudan including the civil war that culminated in the independence of South Sudan. Second, it looks at the various militant groups that have appeared in Sudan and South Sudan since independence and analyzes their strategic objectives. Third, the chapter considers the various systemic conditions in Sudan and South Sudan that have traditionally been attributed to terrorism and finds that these factors, while perhaps contributing to the decision to engage in violence, are by no means the root causes of it. Finally, the chapter offers a brief strategic analysis as an alternative to these alleged sources of violence.

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History of Sudan
Although Christianity predates Islam in the region that now comprises Northern Sudan, a long process of Arabization, called ta’rib, spread both the Arabic language and Arab identity among the Northern people. By the early sixteenth century, Arab tribes dominated the Funj Sultanate, and Christianity was eradicated and replaced by Islam. Christianity was later introduced in the Southern part of Sudan by British missionaries (Deng 2001).

The Keira Sultanate ruled Sudan from 1650-1874 and was largely controlled by the non-Arab Fur tribe. Sudan was still primarily pastoralist at this time, but was moving toward a trade economy by capturing slaves in the South and selling them to Egypt. The population was extremely heterogeneous. While non-Arab tribes dominated the Darfur region in the West, Arab tribes dominated Eastern Sudan along the Nile River (O’Fahy 1973).

Beyond this basic division of power among the tribes, individuals shifted identity as need or opportunity demanded. The Western conception of race as a fixed characteristic was not applicable in Sudan. Additionally, the regime tended to downplay ethnic and tribal divisions in an attempt to further consolidate its power (Mamdani 2010).

In 1819, Muhammed Ali (a commander in the Ottoman army who became governor and later viceroy of Egypt and Sudan) invaded Sudan. From this point, Sudan would be governed by an Egyptian khedive (viceroy) of the Ottoman Empire. The Sudanese suffered heavy taxation at the hands of the Egyptians who favored the lighter-skinned Arabs of the Northern Sha’iqiya tribe and appointed them as tax collectors. The Sha’iqiya were known for their brutal collection practices, especially during times of drought when taxes could not be paid. Those who could not pay were killed or enslaved, and many fled to the Western regions of Darfur and Kordofan (Sarkees et al. 2003).

Khedive Ismail (1830-1895) borrowed heavily for various development projects. When he began to run out of funding for the Suez Canal, the British invested heavily in exchange for control of the canal. The new route to India was a strategic asset for Great Britain and the canal was very important both geopolitically and economically. When Ismail’s European debt began to lead to political instability, the British became concerned. In 1873, a joint Anglo-French commission officially assumed control of Egypt’s fiscal affairs. As the British became more involved in Egypt’s financial affairs, they ultimately grew more embroiled in its political and military affairs as well (Hopkins 1986).

In the 1870’s, the Mahdi Revolt led to a temporary retreat of British and Egyptian forces from Sudan, leaving the Islamic Mahdi government in control. However in 1896, the Italians were defeated by the Ethiopians at Adwa, and the Mahdi threatened to attack the Italians while they were weak and retake Kassala which they had lost to the Italians two years earlier. To maintain superiority in the region, the British decided to launch an invasion. In 1898, an Anglo-Egyptian coalition crushed Mahdi forces and regained control of Sudan (Sarkees et al. 2003).

British colonial policy also favored the lighter-skinned Arab elite over the darker-skinned “Sudanese” (or sudani), further exacerbating racial tensions. To make matters worse, when Britain granted Sudan its independence in 1956, it largely ignored actual cultural and political realities and combined several diverse...
populations with little in common into one nation-state. Among those consolidated were the Arabic-speaking tribes in the North (Ja’aliyin, Juwayna, Gezirah, Zibaidiya and the Hawawir Arabs) which constituted 40% of the total population, the non-Arabized tribes in the North (Beja, Dar Fur and the Nuba) which comprised 26% of the total population and the non-Muslim tribes in the South which comprised 34% of the total population (Adar 2001).

Exacerbating tensions was the fact that the country’s natural resources- oil, gold, fertile land and water-were all located in the South while its economic and political power was concentrated in the North. Upon independence, Arab nationalists in the North turned ta’rib (Arabization) into an official policy (Sharkey 2008).

Meanwhile, the South was divided over whether to seek a unified Sudan or separate from the North and form an independent South Sudan. Despite this division, in the three years between 1953 and 1956 after Egypt and Britain had decided to grant Sudan independence, the Sudanese created both a parliament and a constitution. Still within months of independence, civil war broke out and lasted until 1972 (Levine 1997).

Sparked by Khartoum’s policy of national Islamization and Arabization, fighting between the government in the predominantly Muslim North and the rebels in the primarily animist and Christian South claimed the lives of millions (Young 2005). The civil war in Sudan has killed more people than any war since World War II, and more than the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan and Chechnya combined. Additionally, more than 80% of the population in South Sudan has been displaced (Adar 2001).

Sudan’s first civil war was a stalemate with neither side willing to make any concessions whatsoever. In 1969, however, Colonel Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiri seized power in a military coup. Nimeiri’s political party, the Sudanese Socialist Union, rejected Islam in favor of socialism and Pan-Arabism. Nimeiri not only signed peace agreements with Uganda and Ethiopia, he also signed the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 which granted Southern Sudan a measure of self-determination and ended the civil war (Flint and De Waal 2008).

The Addis Ababa Agreement allowed Southern Sudan to be governed by a regional government in Juba. Peace lasted until 1983 when Nimeiri gave in to pressure to return to an Islamist state. New oil discoveries, the loss of socialist support and multiple coup attempts convinced Nimeiri to align himself with the Islamists in the North and impose Shari’a over all of Sudan, including the autonomous South (Johnson 2003).

Six short years of peace ended with the rebels mobilizing against government forces in the Eastern Upper Nile. Rogue soldiers led by John Garang also broke away from the Government of Sudan (Clarke and Gonsende 2003), and with assistance from Ethiopia, they formed the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Renewed violence led to Sudan’s second civil war (Nyaba 1997).

The SPLM/A differed from Anyanya II- the other main rebel force in the South- in two important ways. While both were Southern rebel groups that resented the racial and religious incursions of the North, the two groups had different tribal allegiances and opposing goals for the future of Sudan (Levine 1997).

The SPLM/A was aligned with the Dinka tribe and backed by Ethiopia. It wanted a united Sudan. Anyanya II was aligned with the Nuer tribe and eventually sided with the GoS. It wanted an independent South Sudan. When the two groups inevitably faced each other in armed conflict, SPLM/A proved the stronger. A few Anyanya II fighters joined the SPLM/A. Those who did not join the SPLM/A, aligned themselves with the GoS under General Nimeiri (Young, 2005).

Other tribal militias desiring an independent South Sudan also rose up during this time to resist the SPLM/A. The GoS supplied them with weapons and ammunition. It is important to point out that those who accepted assistance from the GoS did so, not to support the North, but to stop the SPLM/A. Most Southerners hated the jallaba (Northerners) and resisted sharia and Arabism. In this respect, they had much in common with the SPLM/A, except that they rejected John Garang's agenda for a united Sudan (Young 2003).

Nimeiri was forced out of office on April 6, 1985 in a military coup led by Field Marshal Abdel Rahman Suwar al-Dahab. Nimeiri was exiled in Egypt and elections were held the following year. Sadiq al-Mahdi (the great-grandson of Mohamed Ahmed al-Mahdi who led the Mahdi revolt) became Prime Minister in 1986 (Burr and Collins 1995).

Al-Mahdi headed a coalition government comprised of his own National Umma Party, the National Islamic Front led by Hassan al-Turabi (al-Mahdi’s brother-in-law), the Democratic Unionist Party and four small Southern parties. Under this new coalition government, negotiations toward a unified peace were initiated and sharia was lifted for non-Muslims (Warburg 1990).

Even amid negotiations for peace, the civil war in Sudan raged on without any attention from the international community. It was not until the region experienced a severe famine which killed over a quarter of a million people that the world began to take notice. Five years of conflict, combined with a severe drought, produced a humanitarian emergency so deadly that it finally drew the attention of the global community. International pressure led the UN to appoint a Special Envoy for Sudan, James Grant, who brokered a deal between Khartoum and the SPLM/A. The agreement allowed the UN to provide humanitarian assistance to areas controlled by both sides. In March 1989, Operation Lifeline Sudan emerged as the first humanitarian aid effort to legally provide assistance to rebels in a civil war (Rigalo and Morrison 2007).
Still, atrocities abounded with both sides committing human rights abuses and engaging in deliberate war crimes including systematic rape, civilian massacres, slavery, the use of child soldiers, attacks against relief centers and theft of humanitarian aid supplies to feed their armies. Both sides also systematically starved entire populations that were actually or allegedly loyal to the enemy by denying OLS workers access to their area. Between 1983 and 2002 alone, the death toll exceeded 2 million while several international efforts to mediate a peaceful solution failed (Sidahmed and Soderlund 2008).

A military coup led by General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir in 1989 brought an end to the coalition government and initiated negotiations for peace. Al-Bashir aligned himself politically with al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front and imposed sharia on all non-Muslims living in Northern Sudan but exempted non-Muslims in the South (Jok 2011).

Under al-Bashir, the NIF supported Saddam Hussein in August 1990. It also harbored al Qaeda, prompting the United States to designate Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism in August 1993. The regime was also implicated in an assassination attempt on the pro-Western Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarek in June 1995, resulting in UN sanctions in 1996, U.S. sanctions in 1997 and an American missile strike on a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum in 1998 (Burr and Collins 2003).

A power struggle in 1999 between al-Bashir and al-Turabi resulted in a victory for al-Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP), a partial retreat from political Islam and the rise of military power (De Waal 2004). The internal split was likely fueled by al-Bashir’s political and economic pragmatism which flew in the face of al-Turabi’s strict Islamist views (Gallab 2008). For example, al-Bashir was more than happy to accept a Chinese loan with interest despite Sudan’s Islamic banking laws prohibiting usury (Ahmed 2007).

Al-Bashir was re-elected in 2000 and again in 2010. The NCP ruled from the center as the main regions in the periphery suffered economic and political marginalization, thus contributing to a series of protracted interlocking conflicts (Ali 2010).

Throughout the conflict, many groups entered the fray with some resisting sharia and others promoting it. Still, even the rebels were divided between those who wanted a united Sudan and those who envisioned an independent South. The most prominent rebel group, the SPLM/A, was believed to have had as many as 60,000 soldiers at its height and received arms from the international market including Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Israel, the United States and Britain. The conservative Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait also supported the SPLM/A for fear of the rise of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Sudan (Madut-Arop 2006).

Meanwhile, the government in Khartoum received arms from China, Yugoslavia, Russia, Libya, Iraq and Iran. Egypt also supported Khartoum. While it expressed concern over the threat of Islamic fundamentalism spreading across its borders, particularly after the plot to assassinate Mubarek in 1995, it also feared control of the Nile falling into the wrong hands (Adar 2001).

In August 1991, the SPLM/A split after Riek Machar, a top commander in the army (from the Nuer tribe), led a failed coup against Garang—who hailed from the Dinka (Hutchinson 2001). The two factions, which would later become known as the SPLM/A (under Garang) and the SPLM/A United (under Machar and co-leader, Lam Akol) began fighting each other as well as government forces. It wasn't long before SPLM/A-United also split with Machar leaving the group to form the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) and Akol remaining at the helm of SPLM/A-United. Between 1991 and 1993, thousands were killed and hundreds of thousands more were displaced in the conflict (Adar 2001; Vinci 2008).

The SPLM/A was dealt another blow in September 1991 when Ethiopian president and SPLM/A supporter, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was overthrown. The group lost valuable support and its bases in Ethiopia. Over the next several years, the SPLM/A also faced domestic opposition from a variety of factions as Machar and others sought to carve out niches of power for themselves. Meanwhile, the government in Khartoum took advantage of an opportunity to capitalize on the SPLM/A's woes (Levine 1997).

The Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA)

On April 21, 1997, the regime in Khartoum signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA) and thereby committed itself to holding a referendum on Southern self-determination at some unspecified point in the future. The KPA consolidated a number of militias (including SPLM/A’s rival SSIM/A) together under the leadership of

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1 These groups include the Beja Congress Armed Forces, the Sudan Alliance Forces (Braniff and Moghadam), the Patriotic Resistance Movement of Southern Sudan (PRMSS), Nuba Mountains Solidarity (NMS), SPLM/SPLA Nub Mountains, Equatoria Defence Force (EDF), Anya Nya II, and the Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP). The National Democratic Alliance (NDA), an alliance of Muslims and non-Muslims against the government in Khartoum, incorporated the SPLM/A, the Umma Party (UP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP).

2 The SSIM combined with six other factions in 1997 to form the United Salvation Democratic Front (USDF) with the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) as its military arm. Former deputy Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA and deputy chairman of the SPLM, Kerubino Kuonyin Bol from the Dinka tribe, also joined with Machar. When President Basher appointed Machar as the head of the Coordinating Council for the Southern States (CCSS), Kerubino became his deputy. Intra-factional fighting led to Machar’s resignation in 2000.
the SSDF and created an accompanying political wing known as the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF). Also, the agreement established the South Sudan Coordinating Council (SSCC) to govern the areas controlled by the semi-autonomous government in the South (Young et al. 2006).

The KPA offered a win/win for all parties involved except the SPLM/A as it meant a step toward independence for the Southern militias and a weakened SPLM/A for Khartoum. It also allowed for the development of oil fields in the Western Upper Nile, which were controlled by the SSIM/A. One other potential loser in the deal was Sudan’s Military Intelligence (MI) that did not welcome so large a potential competitor for power (Young 2007; Johnson 2011).

MI immediately sought to undermine the SSDF by setting the various militias at odds with one another. The local SSDF commanderies were more than willing to go along as each sought his own territorial control. As a result, the SSDF and its political arm, the USDF, were too fragmented to enforce the referendum on Southern self-determination. Riek Machar left the SSDF and created a new armed faction in Kenya called the Sudanese Popular Defense Force (SPDF). He later rejoined the SPLM/A in 2002 (McEvoy and LeBrun 2010).

Darfur

Reduced rainfall in the 1970s led to desertification in Northern Sudan and the maja’a al-gutala (famine that kills) in Darfur (Prunier 2005). The resulting competition for water and food was exacerbated by the civil war in Chad, which essentially became a proxy war between the United States and Libya. Muammar Gaddafi promoted both socialism and pan-Arabism, and he aided the rebels while the United States backed the non-Arab Chadian government (Flint and De Waal 2008).

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees from the war fled across the border into Southern Darfur. Conditions in Darfur worsened when the Sudanese government gave Libya permission to set up rebel training camps in Darfur in exchange for weapons to fight the rebels in Southern Sudan. Darfur became saturated with weapons, and perhaps even more destructive, Arab supremacy took root as well and sharpened racial distinctions. Clashes followed and ultimately evolved into a rebellion of the non-Arab tribes against the Arab regime in Khartoum. When a rebel group staged an attack against a government air force base in the North Darfur town of al-Fasher, the Sudanese government mobilized Arab veterans of the Chadian civil war, later known as the janjaweed, to put down the rebellion (Prunier 2005). The international community passively looked on as the violence intensified in Darfur. In 2004, the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) concluded that the conflict in Darfur lacked sufficient intent to be labeled genocide and arguably helped to prolong the violence (Flint and De Waal 2008).

The United States did eventually label the violence in Darfur as genocide. With the 2006 Darfur Peace and Accountability Act and George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13412, the U.S. reinforced existing sanctions against Sudan with the added justification of the violence in Darfur. Congress also authorized aid for both UN and AU peacekeeping missions and supported the peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria between 2005 and 2006 (Uscinski et al. 2009).

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

In 2002, Khartoum and the SPLM/A began to hammer out an agreement and in January 2005, the two sides signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Although the escalation of fighting in Darfur led many to doubt the sustainability of a lasting peace (De Waal 2006), others believed that the CPA marked a new beginning for Sudan (Versi 2005).

The CPA between the NCP and the SPLM/A, which formally ended the 22-year civil conflict between the North and the South, instituted two completely separate political systems: the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Khartoum which shared power between the NCP and the SPLM/A, and the semi-autonomous regional Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) under the sole control of the SPLM/A based in Juba- the new Southern capital. The Agreement was set for an interim period of six years with a referendum to be held in 2011 to determine whether the South would secede. The CPA also allowed Southern Sudan to receive a share of the oil profits (Grawert 2010).

While the CPA ended armed conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLM/A, it failed to address the fate of other armed groups in Southern Sudan. Among these was the SSDF which had provided security for the SAF and for oilfields in Southern Sudan in exchange for arms and ammunition. Because of this deficiency on the part of the CPA, rebel leaders continued to call upon civilians to arm themselves against the oppression of the Islamist government and encouraged them to seek independence. President John Garang continued to fight the SSDF until his death in a helicopter crash on July 30, 2005 (Johnson 2008).

1 The militia groups that were absorbed into the SSDF were the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) led by Riek Machar Teny, the Union of Sudan African Parties led by Samuel Aru Bol, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) led by Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, the Equatoria Defense Force led by Thiophous Ochang Loti and the South Sudan Independents Group led by Kawac Makwei.
The Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration

Following the death of Garang, Salva Kiir Mayardit, who was both second-in-command of the SPLM/A and the vice-president of Southern Sudan, became First-Vice-President of Sudan and President of Southern Sudan (Jooma 2005). Kiir followed a more peaceful route of reconciliation with the SSDF, which culminated in the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defense Forces - signed on 8 January 2006 (more commonly known as the Juba Declaration). The declaration absorbed the SSDF into the SPLM/A and made Major General Paulino Matieb of the SSDF deputy commander of the SPLM/A (Young et al. 2006).

Dissent remained, however. Even though the vast majority of SSDF troops joined the SPLM/A, some did not. Soon after the Juba declaration was signed, Brigadier General Gordon Kong emerged as the new, self-appointed leader of the SSDF and proclaimed loyalty to Khartoum. Matieb also began to grumble that his troops were being passed over for promotions in favor of SPLM/A regulars. Overall dissatisfaction led many former SSDF troops, who had joined the SPLM/A, to follow General Peter Gadet who left the SPLM/A in April 2011 to form the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) and demand a more equitable government (Young et al. 2006).

South Sudan

On July 9, 2011, after a referendum, Southern Sudan seceded, and South Sudan officially became the 193rd member of the international community. The vote was nearly unanimous in favor of succession, and even President al-Bashir publically supported the secession and expressed his full support for his new neighbor (Salman 2013).

Still, South Sudan’s problems are myriad. Returning refugees from the North and the Diaspora are alienated and targeted as competition for jobs, food and water skyscrapers. Malaria is rampant. In 2012, violence in Abyei territory, conflict in Southern Kordofan and fighting in the Blue Nile produced fresh reports that Khartoum continues to commit crimes against humanity (Fick and Staziuso 2011).

South Sudan faces its own rebel forces, and alleges that Khartoum is supporting both Sudanese rebel forces and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda which conducts regular raids into South Sudan to abduct youth. South Sudanese Government officials offered amnesty to rebel groups, and the UN authorized more than 7,000 peacekeeping troops for the region. Still, armed conflict between warring factions continues to kill and displace many (Sommers and Schwartz 2011). Fresh allegations emerged in July 2015 that South Sudanese forces are systematically killing, raping and robbing civilians. Human Rights Watch reports that the army has attacked civilians and burned down their homes and fields in more than two dozen towns in Unity State, a region rich in oil and infested with rebel forces (Bariyo 2015).

Oil is another contentious issue. Sudan is the third largest oil producer in Africa, and 75 percent of its oil reserves are located in South Sudan while the refineries and pipelines are in the North. Beyond these problems, South Sudan lacks basic health services and educational facilities. More than half of the population subsists below poverty level, 14 percent of the children die before reaching their fifth birthday and nine out of ten women are illiterate. School enrollment is low with only 4 percent of males ages fourteen to seventeen and 2 percent of females attending. Vocational and technical schools in South Sudan were closed for most or all of the civil war. The country also lacks roads and airstrips, yet without development of its infrastructure it can never attract the much-needed foreign investment it requires (Sudan 2014).

Origins of Violence in Sudan and South Sudan

Similar to Somalia, both Sudan and South Sudan have experienced tremendous political instability and intrastate war. Various political factions, including the government, armed rebels and even oil companies have all committed egregious human rights violations. In light of these abuses, al Qaeda’s brief stay in Sudan was the least of its worries. This section addresses the various groups that have participated in Sudan’s history of armed conflict, including the central government in Khartoum, the SPLM/A, the SSDF and several oil companies that have been implicated in human rights violations (Dagne 2002).

The Government of Sudan (GoS)

From the days of the Ottomans, and probably much earlier, violence has been a common tactic of coercion in Sudan. As with all governments that engage in state-sponsored terrorism, the GoS not only committed horrific acts of violence itself, but also sponsored other armed groups to act on its behalf. Whether by its own forces, Sha'iqiyya tax collectors or the janjawiid, the GoS is guilty of egregious crimes against humanity.

Ironically, while the international community has largely condemned Sudan for its crimes, the GoS could never have accomplished such widespread devastation on its own. The government in Khartoum received arms from the United States, Great Britain, China, Yugoslavia, Russia, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Egypt. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States alone sent more than $1 billion worth of arms to Sudan. Between 2001 and 2003, the United Kingdom sold over $1 million in weapons to Sudan. Most of these consisted of light arms such as...
ammunition, grenades, bombs and land mines that were easily transported and often lost to opposing sides in battle (Milmo and Holt 2006). Meanwhile the GoS supplied weapons to other armed forces including the LRA, the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and many others (Bevan et. al. 2006).

The very same can be said of Khartoum’s enemy, the SPLM/A, which received arms from Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Israel, the United States and Great Britain. In addition to arms, Uganda also sent soldiers to fight the SAF, allowed the SPLM/A to train in Uganda and receive arms shipped across its borders. The SPLM/A also acquired weapons from battles with the SAF, the PDF and other government-backed militias fighting in the South. Weapons taken from the SAF included a myriad of arms and even Soviet tanks (Connell et al. 1998). As stated earlier, the conservative Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait also supported the SPLM/A for fear of the rise of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Sudan (Bevan et. al. 2006).

The GoS was condemned for aiding and abetting bin Laden. Perhaps an equally important question is when will the nations that have aided and abetted Sudanese violence also be held responsible?

**The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)**

John Garang de Mabior, who founded the SPLA, served as its commander-in-chief and also as the chairman of its political arm, the SPLM until his death in July 2006. Garang came from the Dinka tribe and fought in the first civil war as a member of the rebel group, Anyanya. In 1972, he joined the Sudanese army, where he attained the rank of colonel before he mutinied in 1983 (Wells and Dilla 1993).

Garang gathered the remaining Anyanya members and formed the SPLM/A in Ethiopia, from where he began to demand the end of the imposition of shari'a on non-Muslims. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, Garang was appointed Sudan’s vice-president. His entire career, Garang openly sought the unification of Sudan and stubbornly refused to compromise his position (IRIN 2004).

Salva Kiir Mayardit, also a member of the Dinka tribe, was originally a major in Anyanya II before joining the SPLM/A. In 1994, Garang appointed him as deputy chief of staff for operations and security. He later succeeded Garang as president of the government of South Sudan and the vice-president of Sudan in 2006. Kiir, who openly favored South Sudanese independence over autonomy within a federal Sudan, followed a more peaceful route of reconciliation with the SSDF. On January 8, 2006, He signed the Juba Declaration, which absorbed the SSDF into the SPLM/A and made Major General Paulino Matieb of the SSDF deputy commander of the SPLM/A (Young 2007).

Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, a member of the Nuer tribe, was third in command of the SPLM/A. He split from the SPLM/A in 1991 to form the SPLM/A-United. This faction was dominated by members of the Nuer tribe and favored Southern succession. Machar led the SPLM/A-United until 1995 when he left the group to lead the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A). Following Machar’s departure, fellow SPLM/A-United member, Lam Akol, used the group’s name for his own armed faction in the West-central Upper Nile region (Rone 2003).

Machar agreed to merge the SSIM/A with the other rebel factions and became one of the signatories of the Khartoum Peace Agreement in April 1997, which created the SSDF. Machar was made commander-in-chief of the SSDF, assistant to the president of the Republic of Sudan and president of the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council (the administrative body established to govern the Southern areas controlled by the government). Machar also led the United Democratic Salvation Front political party. After stepping down from government service in 2000, Machar established the Sudan People’s Democratic Front, an armed militia that he later merged with the SPLM/A in January 2002 (Young 2003; Metelits 2004).

Paulino Matieb Nhial, a member of the Nuer tribe, started a militia in Bentiu called the South Sudan Unity Movement/Army (SSUM/A). Matieb joined his forces with SPLM/A-United in 1991 and later with the SSDF in 1997 where his forces largely provided security for the oil fields. Matieb was appointed chief of staff in 2002, but he left the SSDF after the Juba Declaration to join the SPLM/A as a lieutenant general (Young et al. 2006).

Lam Akol Ajawin, a member of the Shilluk tribe, had been a senior member of the SPLM/A before joining Machar’s SPLM/A-United as the group’s chairman. After signing the Khartoum Peace Agreement, Akol was appointed as Transport Minister for the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). He resigned from that position in 2002 for a leading position in the opposition Justice Party. In October 2003, Akol merged his militia with the SPLM/A and became the Foreign Minister of Sudan in September 2005 (Warburg 2010).

The five men mentioned above are by no means a comprehensive list of the key players involved in the many factions aligning and realigning with one another for power. Even within the SPLM/A itself (assuming that it can be regarded as a single entity), members jockeyed for key positions, entered and left the group and changed alliances constantly. Amidst all of this turmoil, however, one thing remained constant under Garang's leadership: the SPLM/A remained singularly committed to a unified Sudan.

There are instances where the SPLM/A supported groups outside of Sudan as well. The Rassemblement
Congolais pour la Démocratie or Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) ruled North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as a proxy of the Rwandan Government from 1998-2003. The RCD’s main objective was to overthrow DRC President, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. In 1998, the RCD persuaded the SPLM/A to join its fight and for the next several years the SPLM/A looted towns along the Eastern border of the DRC. Over 17,000 Sudanese refugees, who had fled to the DRC to escape the second Sudanese civil war, were driven back to South Sudan at this time (Campbell et al. 1999).

Subsequent battles between the Sudan Armed Forces and the SPLM/A forced more than 70,000 Sudanese to flee back to the DRC to live in the refugee camps or with relatives. By mid-2006 the number of Sudanese refugees living in camps had dropped down to 1,200–1,500 (Gourou 2007). However, the migration of IDPs back and forth across the border led to increased hostilities as the Congolese accused the SPLM/A of paying Sudanese refugees to identify wealthy Congolese homes for the SPLM/A to attack and plunder. Angry Congolese formed militias, fought back and often stole arms from attacking SPLM/A forces (Marks and Mash 2007).

The South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF)
The majority of SSDF operatives joined the group after the SPLM/A split in 1991. SPLM/A-Mainstream, led by Garang, continued to labor for a united Sudan, while SPLM/A-United, led by Riek Machar and Lam Akol, agitated for an independent South Sudan. The two groups fought a bloody contest, and within a year of the split, Garang’s faction secured the upper hand. SPLM/A-United enlisted the support of the GoS and signed a cooperative agreement in 1992. It was not long before SPLM/A-United also split with Machar leaving the group to form the SSIM/A and Akol remaining at the head of SPLM/A-United. In 1997, SSIM/A and SPLM/A-United signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement, creating the SSDF (Warner 2013).

The GoS and the SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005. The CPA officially ended the second civil war. However, it did little to quiet the conflicts in South Sudan. The biggest challenge remained the question of what to do with the many Other Armed Groups (OAGs), who were so designated because they had not signed the CPA. Among them, the SSDF was of primary concern because of the threat it posed to the SPLM/A, to overall peace in South Sudan and to the success of the peace process. There was perpetual conflict between the SPLM/A and the SSDF until Garang’s successor, Salva Kiir, initiated dialogue between the two groups. The official outcome is known as The Juba Declaration which absorbed the SSDF into the the SPLM/A (Young et al. 2006).¹

Oil Companies
Sudan has over 12.5 billion barrels of untapped oil, attracting the world’s largest international energy suppliers. Oil companies and the government have both been accused of systematically displacing and killing thousands of Sudanese in oil prospecting areas. Furthermore, both Lundeen Oil (Sweden) and Talisman Energy (Canada) have been the subject of human rights investigations (Rone 2003).

Moreover, the SPLM/A had opposed Chinese interest in Sudan since the late 1990s because Beijing supported the GoS. In March 2004, two Chinese oil workers were kidnapped and later released. This was the first recorded incidence of hostility toward Chinese oil interests in Sudan (Goodman 2004).

In October 2007, the Justice and Equality Movement in Darfur attacked a Chinese oil facility in Defra, Kordofan and demanded that Beijing remove all Chinese oil operations from Sudan within one week. A year later, in October 2008, the same group took nine Chinese oil workers hostage near the Abyei region in Southern Kordofan: an area of dispute between Sudan and South Sudan. The group executed five of the hostages and let the others go free, citing social and economic inequality as the reason (Large 2009).

Systemic Factors in Sudan
This section examines the various structural, cultural and institutional factors that have traditionally been held culpable for the high levels of violence in Sudan and South Sudan.² Systemically, the two states share many similarities. In the pages that follow, we will demonstrate that it is not systemic factors that cause the ongoing violence in Sudan and South Sudan—although they no doubt contribute to it.³ Rather, it is the strategic use of violence that continues to cause turmoil in this troubled region.

Structural Factors
Sudan is located in Northeastern Africa. Like Somalia, Sudan occupies a strategic location due to its proximity to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The region also produces oil and severely lacks water. Also like Somalia,
Sudan’s agricultural production is hindered by flooding during monsoons and highly arid conditions between monsoons that lead to recurring droughts and frequent dust storms. Only .07 percent of Sudan’s agricultural production is comprised of permanent crops (Trading Economics 2018).

South Sudan is located in East-central Africa. While it does not occupy a strategic location, the state is rich in fertile land, oil, gold and minerals. Hydropower is also a natural resource. In contrast to Sudan, South Sudan has an abundance of water. In fact, the Sudd, a large swamp in the Southern part of the state, is one of the largest wetlands in the world.

Sudan faces a number of the same environmental issues that plague Somalia, including famine, drought, a lack of potable water which contributes to public health problems, soil erosion and desertification. South Sudan has been spared a number of these natural environmental hazards, but it faces many of the same man-made hazards.

With a population of just under 35 million, and a land area roughly one fifth the size of the United States, Sudan’s population is the 37th largest in the world. Sudan’s fertility rate is 3.9 children born per woman, nearly half that of Somalia and roughly two thirds that of South Sudan. Sudan’s birth rate is the forty-second highest in the world and slightly lower than South Sudan’s. Sudan’s population growth rate ranks 68th globally. South Sudan’s growth rate is more than double that of Sudan’s. Sudan’s infant mortality rate is roughly half that of Somalia and nearly two thirds that of South Sudan.

At 64.1 years of age, life expectancy in Sudan is low. Life expectancy in South Sudan is even lower: 55 years of age (World Health Organization 2014). The risk of contracting diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and Rift Valley fever are very high in Sudan. Contagious disease is an even greater problem in South Sudan. Low life expectancy and a high birth rate drive down the median age in both countries. The median age in Sudan is 19.1 years, while the median age in South Sudan is 16.8 years. Over forty percent of the total population of Sudan is under fifteen years of age, and nearly fifty percent of the total population of South Sudan falls within this demographic. Sudan has the ninth highest maternal mortality rate in the world, but South Sudan has the highest maternal mortality rate in the world.

The urban population in Sudan is 33.2% of the total population and growing slowly. The urbanization rate is offset by the net migration rate and the high number of internally displaced persons. For South Sudan the situation is reversed. The high number of refugees returning to South Sudan drives the net migration rate up, while the bulk of these move to urban areas. South Sudan also has an alarming number of displaced persons. At least 1.3 million people were displaced in South Sudan between May 2014 and May 2015 alone (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2015).

The current GDP per capita in Sudan is estimated at $2,600 (valued in 2013 U.S. dollars). The current GDP per capita in South Sudan is estimated at $1,400 (valued in 2013 U.S. dollars). Roughly one fifth of Sudan’s total labor force works in industry and services while the remainder of the labor force is concentrated in agriculture. Sudan’s unemployment rate is 20% and nearly half of the entire population lives below the poverty line. The economy in South Sudan is closely connected to oil production, which has been extremely volatile in recent years due to protracted violence. While accurate employment statistics are not currently available, it is estimated that unemployment is extremely high and over 50% of the population lives below the poverty line.

As is evident from the statistics referenced above, the quality of life in South Sudan is considerably lower than that enjoyed in Sudan.

Cultural Factors

Seventy percent of the population of Sudan is comprised of Sudanese Arabs, with the Fur, Beja, Nuba and Fallata tribes constituting the remaining thirty percent. South Sudan is more diverse with the Dinka comprising

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1 With a population of just under 12 million, and a land area slightly smaller than Texas, South Sudan ranks 75th highest in the world for population.
2 Somalia’s total fertility rate is 6.17 children born/woman. South Sudan’s total fertility rate is 5.43 children born/woman.
3 Sudan’s birth rate is 30.01 births/1,000 population. South Sudan’s birth rate is 37.68 births/1,000 population.
4 Sudan’s population growth rate is 4.1% per year. South Sudan’s population growth rate is 6.6% per year.
5 Sudan’s marital mortality rate is 730 deaths/100,000 live births. South Sudan’s marital mortality rate is 1,068 deaths/100,000 live births.
6 Sudan’s infant mortality rate is 133 deaths/1,000 live births. South Sudan’s infant mortality rate is 140 deaths/1,000 live births.
7 Sudan’s maternal mortality rate is 730 deaths/100,000 live births. South Sudan’s maternal mortality rate is 1,068 deaths/100,000 live births.
8 Sudan’s rate of urbanization is 10.2%. South Sudan’s rate of urbanization is 13.2%.
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35.8%, the Nuer comprising 15.6%, and the remaining comprised of the Shilluk, Azande, Bari, Kakwa, Kuku, Murle, Mandari, Didinga, Ndomo, Bviri, Lendi, Anuak, Bongo, Lango, Dungotona and Achol tribes. The official languages in Sudan are Arabic and English. Other languages include Nubian, Ta Bedawie and Fur. The official languages in South Sudan are English and Arabic. Other languages include Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Zande and Shilluk.

The official religion in Sudan is Islam (Sunni). There is no official religion in South Sudan. However, most are either animist or Christian.

Institutional Factors
From an institutional standpoint, Sudan and South Sudan are very similar. Both are presidential republics, although neither can be considered a stable democracy. While Sudan has a number of political parties, South Sudan only has two. Both states have instituted quotas for female representatives, with 25 legislative seats mandated to be occupied by women (Ravi and Sandhu 2014). The democratic process is far from free, fair or transparent in either state, however. Sudan officially participates in 50 international organizations and South Sudan participates in 17. Sudan’s human capital is quite high with a literacy rate of 71.9 percent. Literacy in South Sudan, however, is quite low with only 27% of the population able to read and write.1

Analysis
Other than bin Laden’s brief stay in Sudan during the early 1990s as the guest of al Turabi’s National Islamic Front, there has not been any international terrorism in either state. Sudan has engaged in state-sponsored terrorism such as when it supplied safe haven to Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and smuggled weapons through its embassy in Ethiopia to assist in EIJ’s attempted assassination of Hosni Mubarak. Sudan also offered safe haven to al Qaeda and sponsored the janjaweed, to put down the rebellion in Darfur (Prunier 2005). Although the violence in Darfur escalated into what many considered genocide, it began as an act of state-sponsored terrorism as the strategic objective of the Sudanese government was to put down the rebellion.

Similar to Somalia, horrific violence in Sudan and South Sudan continues to be a tactic used by local groups in a localized struggle for power. The violence in Sudan and South Sudan may have fallen along religious cleavages, or Arab/non-Arab cleavages, but the heart of the struggle was always over control for resources. That the conflict was not religious in nature is evident by the fact that intrastate violence continues in both states post-independence of South Sudan, despite nearly complete segregation of Muslims and Christians.

Religion played no part in the many splits and fractures that took place in and among the various rebel groups in the South, nor did it prevent Southern rebel leaders from allying with and even joining the regime in Khartoum. Furthermore, so-called democratic institutions played no more of a role in Khartoum’s decision to impose sharia and Arabization than religion played in its decision to reject Islam in favor of socialism and Pan-Arabism under Nimeiri.

The regime in Khartoum vacillated between Islam, Socialism and Pan-Arabism while the rebels in the South fought a long protracted conflict with the North, battled one another, joined the regime in the North and finally seceded to form a new state of their own. However, the conflicts have always been, and continue to be, localized struggles for power.

While the conflict in Sudan spilled over into the territory of other states and vice versa, such as when tens of thousands of Sudanese crossed into the DRC to escape the civil war and when refugees fled the civil war in Chad and crossed into Darfur, neither can be considered global jihad by any stretch of the imagination. And while SPLM/A supported other groups outside of Sudan, as with the RCD in DRC, SPLM/A is perhaps the closest example we can find in Africa of a purely nationalist cause. And there can be no doubt regarding the rationality of this cause.

Take Garang, for example. Garang absolutely refused to compromise on the issue of a united Sudan. Because of his stubborn determination regarding this issue, SPLM/A engaged in equally bloody battles with other Southern rebels as it did with the North. The SPLM/A became so hated among the majority of other Southern rebels that they joined forces with the equally hated Arab regime in Khartoum just to defeat the SPLM/A. Even after the NCP and the SPLM/A signed the CPA, Garang cooperated with Khartoum but continued to fight the SSDF. This conflict was neither fueled by economics nor religion—nor was it fought over political ideology. It was in many ways Garang’s personal crusade to unite the homeland.

After Garang’s death, Kiir strategically altered course by signing the Juba Declaration and merging the

1 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Muslim Brotherhood (MB), National Congress Party (NCP), National Umma Party (UP), Popular Congress Party (PCP), Reform Now Party (RNP), Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), Sudanese Congress Party (SCP) and Unionist Movement Party (UMP).
2 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement for Democratic Change (SPLM-DC).
3 Sudan’s literacy rate is 80.7 percent for males and 63.2 percent for females. South Sudan’s literacy rate is 40% for men and 16% for women. Literacy is determined by the percentage of the population age 15 and over that can read and write.
SPLM/A with the SSDF. Even then, however, splits and power struggles emerged as rational actors vied for control. At every turn, rational actors acted and reacted to preserve their own relevance in a political atmosphere of mistrust and betrayal—always calculating their every move based upon their perception of political opponents and a cost-benefit analysis of the most efficient way to achieve their goals.

At the organizational level, groups such as the NIF, the NCP, SPLM/A, and the SSDF repeatedly transformed themselves and their mission—not only in response to systemic forces and precipitating factors—but also according to cost-benefit calculations in order to maintain their own powerbase in light of constantly shifting political alliances.

Some progress has occurred. Agreements such as the CPA and the Juba Declaration demonstrate a somewhat more cooperative spirit. The willingness of belligerents to enter into a reciprocal relationship with their enemy requires a foundation of trust, no matter how flimsy it may be in the beginning. Similar reciprocal relationships have developed social capital in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and even in Somaliland and Puntland.

This brief analysis demonstrates that the vast majority of violence in Sudan and South Sudan has been employed, not to coerce political concessions, but rather to gain control over territory and resources or for sheer profit. The few cases of terrorism that have occurred have been state sponsored terrorism at the hands of the Sudanese government. Given that systemic factors alone are insufficient to fully explain the violence in Sudan and South Sudan, the strategic objective of each organization involved is key to truly understand the ongoing conflict in this troubled region.

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