The Future of Cities in a Post-national Urban Age in Asia

– Corporate Globopolis versus Vernacular Cosmopolis –

Mike Douglass1)

〈Abstract〉

The long held idea of the city as theater of social life is being replaced by a historically new paradigm of the city as an “urban sector” posed as an “engine of growth” with government in service of a globalizing corporate economy. In Asia support for this new paradigm is coming from the neo-developmental state that is facilitating the emergence of a corporate managed “mixed assemblage” of denationalized spaces that are part of emerging intercity networks rising out of the nation–state to articulate global flows of capital. Millions of international migrant workers in Asia add to a new era of post-national urbanization. However, democratic reforms, devolution of government, and the rise of civil society are rising to challenge corporatization by championing issues of social justice, the right to the city, and the vernacular neighborhood. As the dynamics continue to interplay, a contest over the future of the city is emerging between the city as an inclusive cosmopolis of diversity versus the city as a corporate globopolis of networked privatized spaces for elites. Of particular interest are the ways in which transborder intercity networks based on social cooperation rather than competitive corporate relations can create new synergies for economic resilience for secondary city regions.

Key Words: Cosmopolis, globopolis, corporatization, public city, intercity networks

1) Asia Research Institute and Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, arimike@nus.edu.sg

■ Date of submission: March, 3, 2013
■ Date of confirmation: May, 6, 2013
I. The Advent of the Corporate Globopolis

The idea of the city to the 1980s

The city is a theater of social action, and an aesthetic symbol of collective unity. Its social facts are primary, and the physical organization of a city, its industries and its markets, its lines of communication and traffic, must be subservient to its social needs. (Mumford 1937:3).

The city is a form of the collective life with a common interest (Friedmann 1962:73).

From the 1980s

Cities everywhere are makers of wealth, magnets for the industrious, motors of invention. The city is an engine of growth (World Bank 1996:1).

Although not a non-negotiable condition for competitiveness, the social and cultural character of a city plays an important role in shaping its attractiveness for talent and visitors. This category has been weighted at 5% (EIU 2012).

From its origins in antiquity the city in both East and West was a polis of state-building that was idealized as a public realm (Abu–Lughod 1991; Short 1996). Whether the Greek agora, China’s cities under the Mandate from Heaven, the temple city of Angkor or Thomas More’s Utopia, the image of the city was one of a social collectivity that included public gathering places (Friedmann 1962; Heng 2010). This idea of a public city was carried forward into the decolonized world of newly independent nation-states, many of which in Asia mounted a “developmental state” as conveyor of
progress for all (Douglass 1994; Woo-Cummings 1998). Public squares were built or reclaimed to glorify government actions in the public interest. Public works programs were set in motion to create public spaces such as parks and plazas to give credence to government as being engaged with the public at large, as limited as it might have been in practice.

When by the 1990s authoritarian regimes were overthrown and democratically elected governments were put in place in many countries, the chances for the idea of the city as a public realm to truly become one that is governed with an active civil society seemed to reachable. Public spaces became alive with citizen activism and civil engagements. These spaces were crucial in fostering associational life necessary for the everyday practices of making the city a collective social and political experience. Where non-government organizations were virtually non-existent before, they began to flower in the emergent public cities of democratically reformed Asia. Devolution of state power to municipal levels allowed for the emergence of local spheres of participatory governance. The long legacy of the idea of the city as a public sphere was moving toward fruition.

However, other countervailing forces were also emerging, and from the early 1980s onward an inversion of the idea of the city was in ascendance with the rise of neoliberal ideology and the rapid globalization of capital. The long held idea of the city as a form of collective social life with government, industries and markets in service of social needs (Mumford 1937) was actively being displaced by a new ideology and vocabulary. The city became a
functional “urban sector” imagined as an “engine of growth” with government in service of a corporate economy as “a maker of wealth” (World Bank 2011) generated by a footloose “creative class” (Florida 2002) and a “technocratic–functional–managerial elite” Castells’ (1996:415).

The drivers of this change include ideological, political, technological and social dimensions that together are resulting in seismic upheavals of the city and city life, transforming vernacular (pre-)colonial landscapes into a corporate archipelago of privatized spaces that form a globopolis, a fragmented, unequal city that redefines citizen participation as engagement in hyper-consumption of globalized urban space, commodities and services. Ideologically and politically, the main story follows the shift from Keynesian pragmatism to neoliberal orthodoxy extolling the virtues of endless competitiveness (Harvey 2005; Steger and Roy 2010; EIU 2011; Sager 2011). As elaborated by Harvey (2000), neoliberal ideology also rests on a utopian vision enshrining the belief that capitalism is self-regulating and, when free of government regulation, will deliver ever-increasing economic welfare for those who are pulled into its logic.

Government, however, is critically needed to assist in creating and securing globopolis. A common pattern in carrying out this task is state assistance in condemning and removing middle and lower class neighborhoods and shops to create platforms for global flows of capital to touch down for an always potentially limited duration should a city’s competitiveness flag. Large-scale privatization of city spaces and institutions, dismantling of social
programs, erosion of the state in a developmentalist role, and the demise of idea of the public interest have all become part of this assault on the city.

The advent of the corporate city occurred in the mid-1980s when a new era of private megaprojects were made possible by advances in engineering and global financial consortia capable of launching multi-billion dollar projects with previously unimaginably huge footprints of several square kilometers or more in a single project (Flyvbjerg, et al, 2003; Altshuler and Luberoff 2004). Socially, the demand for new landscapes came in part with the rise of a substantial urban middle class that could be convinced of the high status of global consumption – with the irony that most global commodities were being made by cheap labor in their own countries – and potentially make fortunes in rounds of land speculation disguised as exclusive luxury housing massively produced by global architecture and engineering partnerships.

Instead of being governed by public institutions as a public sphere, the emerging corporate city is to be managed by private enterprises. The imagery is one of a city as a hotel that is built, owned and managed by a corporation for people who are simply transients in spaces of consumption unattached to places. Instead of the public at large being the constituency, the responsibility of the corporate city is to distant shareholders. It is a city run for profit that advances through commodification of all aspects of city life. In the words of the director of U-Town (U for Ubiquitous), completely private corporate cities being constructed in Korea, there are only 2 purposes in making a city: profit and customers to spend
money (*The Korea Times* 2007).

Rather than tallying the many peoples from many cultures or neighborhoods varied by their vernacular architecture, the meaning of diversity in globopolis is how many Fortune 500 companies are represented in it:

We studied the attractiveness of each city by considering the presence of globally renowned institutions (Fortune 500 companies, world-renowned think-tanks, top universities and colleges) headquartered in the city, and its international orientation. This mix is an indication of diversity, global attractiveness and civil society strength in each city, factors which arguably add to a city’s competitiveness (EIU 2012:34).

The corporate city is not the company mining or plantation town of the past. It is the contemporary metropolis of diverse activities, each tending to be dominated by a handful of (global) corporations (Douglass 2009a). Its power is not only in the direct ownership of land, production or service activity. Increasingly, it operates through franchises, contracting rather than corporate-owned subsidiaries, exclusive sales contracts, patent and licensing fees, real estate speculation disguised as luxury housing, finance consortia, commercial concessions in public spaces, billboards and signage throughout the city, and public–private partnerships in building and operating public services. Whether or not these provide profitable services is not the question here; rather, it is the outcomes of corporatization on the social and cultural life – the collective experiences – of the city. As explained by the Vancouver Public
Space Network (2012:1), corporatization begins to control the public sphere by remaking cities around private corporate spaces at the expense of public spaces:

Corporatization refers to the influence of corporations on shaping the material design of cities and, by extension, the public realm. In the more specific sense that we use the term, refers to the process (and material components) of the privatization of public space by corporate entities.

The corporate globopolis can be summarized by a few key words: private, commodified, global, corporate, mega, fortified, fragmented, simulated, socially divided and unequal. Missing from this city are unscripted public and civic spaces, place-making by residents and their neighborhoods, vernacular architecture, lower income populations with decent housing and neighborhoods, participatory planning, and socially just distribution of the fruits of the economy.

Chang and Huang (2008) call this change toward globopolis one of “unworldment”: “When residents feel their ties to place are severed and are unable to turn the tide of development.” It is a process in which “traditional symbolic systems regulating societies are being quickly replaced by a powerful globalizing technocratic symbolic regime” (Conley 2002:128). No activity is exempted from its global pursuits to appropriate culture for its uses:

This year Montreal’s infamous countercultural event is declaring all out war against the corporate powers that are transforming the city.
Over the past year Montreal has seen a proliferation of abusive advertising practices, attempts by corporations to destroy authentic culture, and the ongoing corporatization of the city’s festivals (Montreal Infringement Festival 2011).

In addition to remaking the core of cities into privatized zones of corporate control, another geographical dimension of globopolis is the suburbs where vast gated housing enclaves and new towns are saturating peri-urban areas in almost all countries of the world. Called “Vulgaria” by Knox (2005:33):

They are landscapes of bigness and spectacle, characterized by packaged developments, simulated settings, and conspicuous consumption, and they have naturalized an ideology of competitive consumption, moral minimalism, and disengagement from notions of social justice and civil society.

In enhancing the lives of a privileged few, the private authority over the various components of globopolis together form “interdictory spaces” designed and constructed to systematically exclude the citizenry who do not fit the targeted market profile desired by developers, owners and managers of the newly created spaces (Flusty 2001). Where they cannot be excluded, such as in shopping malls, their behavior can be limited to functions, such as shopping, through architectural design, ominous signs forbidding all kinds of spontaneous social activity (including photography) and private policing. Through this manner of exclusion and control, each of the sites in its own way depoliticizes space through
extrication from the public sphere of purview.

Social and economic dimensions of the corporate city parallel its spatial dimensions. Extreme inequalities in wealth and power prevail (WTO, 2012). To the extent that it existed, state–provided social welfare is steadily being downsized as part of the implementation of neoliberal ideas of economic efficiency (Sassen, 2003). Global competitiveness is again invoked with regard to wages and job security. Inequality is now at a historical high in the highest income economies in the world where neoliberal policies have been most heavily adopted and corporatization most advanced (Fisher 2012). Both spatially and socially, the advent of globopolis has been one of the most prevailing transformations of daily life in cities throughout the world, including Pacific (East and Southeast) Asia.

II. Globopolis in Asia

We have all intentions to develop MTT [Muang Thong Thani, Bangkok] as a complete city run by private-sector people. (Kristof & Sanger 1999:1).

A somewhat distressing observation of the impact of the rapid economic development is that Asia is on its merry way to becoming a giant shopping mall (Katsu 2011:358).

Of the 2,162 minimarts across the capital [Jakarta], only 67 have official licenses to operate. Most are franchises of three corporations. Demonstrations against the illegal operations have failed. According to a local shop owner, ‘We’ve lost heart because we’re fighting against a big shot’ in government. (Jakarta Post 2011, Zubaidah 2011).
'Korea has been a laboratory for neoliberalism' (Ha and Lee (2007:913) and it 'represents perhaps the most sweeping triumph of IMF-sponsored neo-liberalism among the Asia Finance Crisis-affected economies' (Ditmer 2007:832).

Until the 1980s, the developmental city in Pacific (East and Southeast) Asia left much of the urban core intact as a reservoir of (pre-)colonial buildings and vernacular architecture. Governments and enterprises focused their attention on constructing infrastructure - container ports, new airports, and trunk road linkages - needed for export-processing industries that were mostly located outside of the urban core. From the mid-1980s onward, however, a steady dismantling of the core as well as fringe of the city began in earnest as the neoliberal age of mega-projects took center stage in public policy and the city turned from export production toward global consumption and intentional world city creation through huge land development and city marketing schemes (Douglass 2009a; Sager 2011).

The driving forces of these changes were the same as elsewhere, but being backed by strong states they came in much larger scales and pervasiveness. Global finance capital that began to breach nationally protected banking systems in Asia in the mid-1980s was a particularly important contribution in launching Pacific Asia's mega-project era. Little or no defense was made to protect pre-existing urban neighborhoods, traditional architecture, or local shops as mega-projects began to sweep across urban landscapes. Public space became a frequent target of privatization and
commercialization as well.

Corporatization of urban space began reaching even higher peak after governments were chastened by the IMF and allied institutions such as the World Bank and the Asia Development Bank that enforced neoliberal structural adjustments as conditions for receiving bailout loans following the 1997/98 Asia financial crisis. Giant corporations were also consolidated to become even more powerful than before the crisis. In the name of global competition, governments joined in to assist corporatization of the built environment in the form of vast new towns/cities, the world’s tallest buildings, globally symbolic entertainment and amenity areas, and real estate market driven gentrification of lower-income neighborhoods and their economic spaces (Shin 2009).

South Korea is a showcase for all of these trends. Among the more spectacular are:

- As of 2008 Korea had 12 skyscrapers of more than 100 stories under construction, making it the country with the most buildings of these heights after China (Kim 2008a).

- Riverfront Development District, a $20-$30 billion project, is part of the Han River Renaissance to be remade into an “iconic landmark, which will allow the city to have competitiveness” in the world (Kim 2008b). The center is a 150-story building with offices, a hotel, residential units and entertainment and cultural centers.

- COEX Mall, a vast underground warren of franchises with no natural sunlight and no public spaces that is “the size of a small English town” (Galilee 2008:1).
• Seoul World Design Park and Plaza in Dongdaemun constructed on the former site of Seoul’s famous twin sports stadia built in 1925 that continued to host a large flea market of more than 1,000 merchants until its dismantling for the Plaza (Park 2008). The Korean architecture community criticizes it for having no historical relevance to the area or to Korea (Seoul Global Center 2008; Donigan 2008; The Korea Times 2007).

• “U(biquitous)-Town”: a gigantic building complex with wireless networks embedded in the infrastructure to create a “ubiquitous life” of self-contained, autonomous living, work, shopping, entertainment and leisure complexes that will supply residents with “everything in a single building complex”, creating a seamless life of sleep and consumption so complete that journeys to the city beyond were predicted to be completely unnecessary (Shin 2009). U-Town planning requires complete destruction and removal of all pre-existing buildings and infrastructure and has no citizen involvement.

• Songdo. Occupying 6 km2 of reclaimed land Songdo is billed as the largest project of its kind in the world. Its developers have recently recast it as a “green city” for environmental sustainability (Kim 2010). It is a totally pre-planned city that is subsidized by government but has no citizen participation in planning or implementation.

Similar projects can be found in principal cities throughout Asia, almost all of which are competing for global capital by erasing their urban histories in favor of simulated mega-project thematics and
city branding such as “Happy Suwon” and “Colorful Daegu”, which follow directly from corporate product branding and might have nothing to do with a city’s history, culture or most socially relevant assets.

As income inequalities begin to widen around land ownership, the corporatized city in Asia is also losing its architectural diversity and the convivial spontaneity in the uses of its spaces (Ha and Lee 2007; Zin 2005; ILO 2008). While governments are taking great care to preserve sites of important dynastic histories – palaces, temples, royal tombs, city gates – the neighborhoods built over scores of years or even centuries have all but disappeared under the footprints of corporate megaprojects, most of which have been built only in the least 20–30 years.

At the same time that urban space is being transformed under the name of global competition, labor is also witnessing demotions and lower standards of living under the same banner. In Korea, approximately 8–10 million people hold only temporary jobs at low wages with very limited benefits (Kim 2003, KNSO 2008; KILF 2008). Younger workers have lost the prospects of lifetime employment and the idea of owning a house – even in a situation of housing gluts. As the number and share of temporary employees increases, the income disparities between regular and temporary workers widen (Kim and Park 2006, Lee 2008). Likewise, in Japan and Taiwan average wages have declined, and thus household incomes have also fallen (Japan Echo 2008; Taiwan News 2008). The same corporations that were moving offshore from higher income economies to take advantage of lower wages in other
countries, notably China, were also reducing their own home country labor force to precarious employment status all in the name of global competition.

In sum, the corporate globopolis that has emerged in Asia over the past 3 decades under a neoliberal policy banner has not only changed the idea of the city but also its physical and social environment as well. The voices of diversity are muted as monotonous chain stores, franchises and shopping malls replace the myriad small-scale enterprises individually created and built by their owners. The open market of community conversations and storekeepers sitting and chatting while selling their wares is replaced by the supermarket of all-day standing and no talking among low wage employees. The political discourses that intermingle with neighborly chats are also eliminated in the privatized spaces of globopolis, and thus so are the prospects for “transformative politics” (Harvey 2007:47).

III. Post-national Urbanization and Intercity Networks

The territorial “fixity” of the nation state has dissolved since the 1980s. The boundaries of regions have become open, fuzzy or elastic, leading to the emergence of cross-border regions across state borders. The dramatic spatial restructuring spurs the emergence of new forms of regional governance, such as urban networks and cross-border partnership, in response to challenges posed by globalization (Luo and Shen 2012:126).

Decentralization is shifting political and economic power to the local
level and globalization links cities together, both in threatening and helpful ways. (World Bank 2008:1).

The term “post-national urbanization” is used here to incorporate three main dimensions of globalization: the increasing cultural diversity that is rapidly unbundling the linkage between nation (culture and national identity) and state (apparatus of government); second, the rise of intercity networks as new levels of policymaking that transcend national borders; and, third, the selective denationalization of urban and regional spaces by corporate investors. The term is not intended to imply the demise of the nation–state, although it is worth pointing out that as a world political system it is historically very new (post–World War II) and incomplete. Rather, it is used to indicate that society, economy and politics are no longer integrated within the nation–state, and that new forms of spatial organization, namely, intercity networks, are emerging to articulate the global economy and make policies concerning social and economic relations beyond the nation–state.

1. Cultural diversity through migration and global householding

Concerning the first dimension, cultural diversity, as global corporatization opens economies ever further to flows of all forms of capital, including the labor process, millions of low wage workers from other Asian countries are being brought into higher income economies to fill shortages supposedly due to shrinking
domestic supplies of labor. Where there had been virtually no foreign workers before, by the early 21st century, millions were circulating among Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. They came as workers in all major sectors: manufacturing, construction, services and as domestic workers as well.

In the case of Korea, approximately 600,000 foreign workers were legally in the country as of 2011. Two-thirds were in the Seoul Capital Region (Migration News 2012). Some estimates claim that an additional quarter of million are in the country illegally (Woo 2008; Asian Journal 2008). In the same year Japan had more than 900,000 foreign workers, 700,000 of whom received wages lower than those of their Japanese counterparts. Foreign workers in Taiwan reached a record 426,000 in 2011. With population decline now chronic, the numbers of foreign workers are likely to become more numerous over time, signaling the advent of multicultural societies in countries that have imagined themselves to be ethnically homogeneous.

For the longer-term transformation of East Asia into culturally diverse societies, the globalization of households is likely to be much more important than foreign workers, who are limited to a few years of work and have no rights of residents in host countries throughout Asia (Douglass 2006, 2010). Cultural diversity need not involve a foreigner in the household. It can arise from within a family through extended living abroad, including the phenomenon common in Korea and Taiwan of mothers and children establishing residences abroad while the father remains in the home country to
work and support them (Lee and Koo 2006; Huang 2006, 2007; Douglass 2010).

Another aspect of global householding is taking the form of rapidly rise in the numbers and shares of marriages with foreign-born spouses (Asia Pacific Post 2006). In Korea, these marriages average around 10–15 percent of all new marriages annually, with the annual number of marriages involving a foreign spouse tripling from 2000 to 2010 to reach more than 35,000 per year (Lee and Koo 2006; Song 2008). By 2007 foreign spouses of Koreans living in Korea totaled 144,000, with 58,000 children in Korea from these marriages. Two-thirds of these couples live in the greater Seoul region (The Chosun Ilbo 2006). Taiwan’s trends are similar to those of Korea, and while Japan is at a lower percentage, its numbers of so-called international marriages are also increasing (Douglass 2010). Evidence shows, too, that these couples have higher fertility rates than do those from within Japan, Korea or Taiwan.

Households are also globalizing and becoming culturally diverse by including members from other societies who are not related by blood or through marriage. The principal addition in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and to a lesser extent in Korea, is foreign domestic workers who through time not infrequently become a stand-in mother to children and constant companion for elderly household members. Dependence on these workers is so great that

2) In 2008 at least 40,000 Korean children were living abroad with their mothers for the purposes of schooling and learning English (Onishi 2008). More than 100,000 Koreans are studying in the U.S. (2007).
in the case of Taiwan more than half of all foreign workers are in domestic service. These workers have households in their own countries of origin as well, which also brings cultural diversity back to those households after experiences in living abroad.

Unless the discourse changes from workers’ rights in the factory to their right to the city, foreign labor is likely to remain marginalized and, in terms of the use of unskilled foreign labor, super-exploited in terms of incomes, labor conditions and social rights. Even if one day given residence rights, they are likely to remain at the lower ends of wage and income scales. Global householding faces similar challenges, but is more likely to have access to rights of residence and possibly even citizenship.

2. Denationalizing urban space

The era of the corporate city represents a fundamental reordering of the global space economy that includes reformulations of the meanings and uses of national territories internally and at their borders. As the world’s most dynamic region, Pacific Asia has been a major locus of these transformations. The hyper-mobility capital – the ability to geographical redeploy capital in real time to any place in the world at a given moment – is made possible not only by technological advances in communications, transportation and infrastructure. It is equally enabled by the growing number of governments around the world that are eager to host DGI (Direct Global Investment) by selectively denationalizing urban and regional spaces. The spatial mobility of capital is able to play one
location against another until the territorial friction of capital mobility is no longer a significant factor in costs of production, distribution or sales. This is the essence of “competitiveness”, which has less to do with local economies and their potential than it has to do with lowering costs to corporate investors through tax holidays, relaxing labor and environmental protection laws, free infrastructure, assisting in clearing people off and assembling land sufficient for mega-projects, selling land below market prices and direct subsidies (UNCTAD 2011).

Special economic, export, free trade and other zones are examples of denationalized spaces that are prevalent throughout the Global South. Similarly, gated new towns, as totally private areas with no public spaces or facilities, are also effectively removed from local government oversight. The world’s tallest buildings that now include residences, shopping and business within guarded private enclosures, and global business hubs also insulate spaces from public inquiry and uses. The result is what Sassen (2006) summarizes as “mixed assemblages” of “denationalized spaces” within and across national borders (Sassen, 2003, 2006; Axford, 2007).

In other terms, these spaces form “secessionist” networks of corporate sites linked together by “premium networked infrastructure” that allows globally-connected elites to traverse urban space without having to endure the “chaos” of the city (Graham & Marvin 2001; Park 2005; Elliott 2011). Governments around the world contribute to corporate production of these spaces by selling off vital public spaces and facilitating the construction of
ever larger privatized zones for business complexes, exclusionary living and consumption. Vernacular architecture, historic sites, lower and middle-class neighborhoods and local commercial spaces are lost in this process. Open markets are displaced by supermarkets, mom & pop stores are pushed out by corporate mini-marts, public parks are converted to private theme parks charging high fees for entry, and public streets and sidewalks along shop fronts are being supplanted by enclosed shopping malls. All of these shifts serve to sequester urban spaces into private domains of accumulation with limited state interference. It is in this sense that urban spaces are shifting from the public to the corporate domain.

Borders, too, have changed in meaning from national defense perimeters and economic protection lines, and in Asia they have become increasingly important in regulating flows of people. While capital in the form of investment, production inputs, and commodities flows ever more freely across national borders under the watchful eye of the World Trade Organization and other neoliberal institutions, almost all governments in Asia use the border to discipline foreign workers by tying them to specific employers, disallowing long term stays, resident or citizenship, right to own land, and in some instance with regard to women doing household work, prohibitions against marrying or having children in the host country.

3. Global intercity networks

An equally great challenge to an international system based on
The nation-state is the advent of the world’s urban age marked by the reconfiguration of national economies around a few mega-urban regions. These city regions form intercity networks that transcend the bounds of the nation-state to articulate flows of capital, information and decision-making in a globalized economy. Scholars have focused attention on a small number of global (or world) cities that are said to sit atop a worldwide intercity hierarchy as command centers for transnational corporations, with clusters of lesser regional, sub-regional and local cities forming an emerging world urban system (Friedmann 2002, Knox and Taylor 1995; Sassen 1991, 2008).

The realization that the nation-state could not hold urbanization was recognized by national governments in Asia from the late 1970s when many began to promote “growth triangles” that hived off subnational regions to be linked with similar regions in neighboring countries that would together form transborder regions. Each region had at least one core city that was to be the focus of the transborder linkages. However, with the important exception of the Singapore–Johor–Riau (Sijori) triangle, this first round of integration of city regions into transborder regions did not have significant results, due in part to a lack of complementarities and the absence of involvement of local governments (Douglass 2009b).

From 1992 transborder urban networks gained a new life in East Asia prompted by the full-scale opening of China to global trade and investment. In a very short space of time cities and provinces in Japan, Korea and Taiwan promoted transborder linkages with
China as a means of moving their low-wage labor processes offshore. Two major aspects of this new round of transborder urban network show how limited they have been. First, these networks are principally inter-firm rather than inter-city. Municipal governments are not the main players, and to the extent that government has been involved, national governments take the lead. As such, these regions tend to be contentious in terms of the unequal relations they rest on and short-lived in terms of lack of deepening of strong bonds of trust across borders.

Second, the inter-firm linkages also tend to be managed and controlled by corporate headquarters located in the capital city rather than branch managers in the provinces or secondary cities. The result is that networks tend to be privately pursued within corporate silos that take the form of downward flows of authority originating from corporations headquartered in capital cities and often supported by central governments (Elliott 2011, Rosenau 2002). Horizontal relations among cities either within a country or across a border are exceptional.

The formation of global urban networks is thus notoriously uneven in its patterns. In general, capital city regions are favored over other city regions, and spatial polarization of urbanization continues and is even accentuated in most countries experiencing redeployment of branch plant operations abroad. In the higher income economies of Asia, this unevenness is currently marked by the deindustrialization of secondary cities that were important manufacturing centers just a few decades ago.

Of potentially greatest importance to transborder intercity
resilience are long-term social and cultural networks within civil society. Such lateral networks can become the foundations of hospitality, conviviality, and inclusiveness that build upon trust, mutual understanding and cooperation needed to overcome the potential of borders to be used as lines of distrust and antagonistic relations. Consideration of these possibilities leads to an exploration of recapturing the public city with a view toward shifting from the corporate globopolis to a participatory grassroots cosmopolis.

IV. The Vernacular Cosmopolis as a Public City

The ambience and attractiveness of a city is a collective product of its citizens... Through their daily activities and struggles, individuals and social groups create the social world of the city, and thereby create something common as a framework within which all can dwell (Harvey 2012:74).

Table 1 contrasts cosmopolis, a public city, with globopolis, a corporate city. Cosmopolis focuses on connections with history and with neighborhood and community through place-making in the form of vernacular architecture and identity. It calls for human-scale urban design rather than heroic architectural feats that make them feel insignificant. It takes care to consider what the city is at risk of losing, such as open markets and older buildings. It champions popular participation in planning, with people initiating rather than merely being given information about urban projects.
<Table 1> Globopolis, the Corporate City Versus Cosmopolis, a Public City

| Dimension         | Globopolis, Corporate City                                                                 | Cosmopolis, Public City                                                                 |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Idea of the City** | City as hyper-competitive engine of growth and creator of wealth led by a creative class and corporate economy | City as a shared social experience, with government and economy in service of the public interest, diverse localized economy |
| **Drivers**       | Economic profit, raising material production and consumption                               | Associational life, identity, place-making, tolerance, accommodation.                      |
| **Urban Space**   | Composed of exclusive private spheres of production and consumption: fragmented, guarded; fixed, functional rather than social. | Civitas: a public sphere, with an active civil society; heteropolis, flexible, negotiable meanings and uses: social. |
| **Architecture**  | Global, simulacra themes, absence of local meanings, place-breaking at all scales.         | Vernacular, locally creative, place-making at all scales.                                  |
| **Foreigners/non-citizens** | Disposable labor: never to become residents or citizens                                   | Full human beings with the right to the city, family life and equivalents of citizenship |
| **Public/common space** | Limited, pseudo-public, controlled, ornamental, monumental, iconic global "starchitecture" | Plentiful, inclusive, flexible, site of local place-making                                 |
| **Scale of projects** | Mega                                                                                   | Human                                                                                     |
| **Urban Planning** | Government–corporate partnerships                                                       | Participatory/citizen-government/local business                                           |
| **Governance**    | Corporate management of privatized urban spaces with state as facilitator and enforcer   | Citizen–government engagement in policy making, planning, implementation, monitoring       |
| **Citizenship**   | Reserved for majority ethnic group and contained by the nation–state                     | Open to all who live in the city, multiple levels of citizenship                           |

Source: author.
The potential for cosmopolis rests substantially on civic engagement as it is manifested in non-violent organizations and translated into a public realm that celebrates diversity and social life. Public life is seen as emerging in a city's streets and public spaces that “encouraging all to linger, share observations and perspectives, and thereby humanizes all who participate” (IMCL 2008). Among its measurements of success would be the degree to which the city reduces economic disparities, allows for diversity among social identities, and provides spaces for associational life.

Cosmopolis is not just about foreigners in the city. The idea and its practices include all people in all of their differences. Further, differences based on income, region of origin, sexual orientation, and many other attributes show Asian societies to be much more heterogeneous than national narratives portray (Lie 1998). Taken together, the diversity among citizens as well as among growing numbers of non-citizen populations suggests a manifest need for a more meaningful cosmopolitan orientation of city making.

For these reasons, recent reformulations of the cosmopolitan ideal have steered it away from its earlier attachments to modernity and its view of creating a universal citizen and a harmonious world through agreements among nation-states. An alternative grassroots cosmopolis focuses on the city as a realm in need of new ways of not only of mutual accommodation (Tooling 1990) but also of revitalization through participatory planning processes. This reformulation recognizes the decreasing capacities of the nation-state to deal with many aspects of the global system, including transborder flows of people. From this perspective,
advocates of rethinking cosmopolis argue in favor of reconstituting the city as an extension of welcome and provider of rights to those who flee intolerable circumstances (Conley 2002). A cosmopolitan culture, they argue, helps produce citizens of tolerance who accept a notion of citizenship beyond that of a narrowly defined nation-state (Kristeva 1993).

Rethinking cosmopolis calls for a reconsideration of whose values are to be privileged in urban policy and planning. The idea of the expert thinker or planner who has special knowledge about social values no longer holds in a multicultural world of competing ways of knowing and contested ideologies. In this context, rather than asserting a universal set of values linked to one form of rational thought, the need is to create or recapture popular sovereignty from the “simulacrum in the ‘international community’ today” (Archibugi 2002). The problematic in repairing the idea of cosmopolis as a multicultural polity is how to combine the terms “democracy” and “cosmopolis” in the contemporary world. To accomplish this requires a decentering of politics to the urban scale in a manner that incorporates all people in a locality in governing the city. Planning for the city could then be based on “genuine acceptance of, connection with, and respect and space for ‘the stranger’ (outsider, foreigner), in which there exists the possibility of working together on matters of common destiny” (Sandercock 1998:xiv). It is also about addressing differences, marginalization and oppression within a given society as well (Young 1990).

As Asia’s economies continue to shift from manufacturing to services, the conviviality of the city will increase in importance.
Contrary to the suppositions of the competitiveness of cities index cited previously, culture and social life not only matter more than 5 percent, they can become an economic base of a city region, much like Europe’s most frequented cities that consistently rank among the most livable cities in the world. Studies consistently show that an economy based only on simulacra and world architecture becomes a one-time visit city, but a city that has its own unique living culture and built environment will see people returning again and again to engage in its life. First-hand encounters with local people through such activities as eating in uniquely local restaurants, visiting open markets and other spaces that encourage social encounters are much more compelling than returning to a city to shop at a mega mall or in a tall building unless the city also has more authentically local social and cultural spaces as anchors.

Even the Disneyland effects of expensive amusement parks are soon seen for what they are, namely, highly artificial and controlled spaces (Zukin 1998). The replication of the same architecture and functions creates “non-lieu” (no place) landscapes (Augé 1992). Park (2005:4) summarizes the way globopolis tries to simulate cultural spaces as city governments sponsor urban ‘festivals’ and themed shopping districts, sanitize public spaces and institute surveillance and control by turning over the management of these spaces to private organizations. The result is “urban space standardization” complete with identical franchised retail shops and multiplexes everywhere.” Further, “this standardization applies not only to component shops in such spaces, but we can also notice even urban strategy itself becoming “standardized” from one city to
another". Kunstler (1994) referred to these cities as “geographies of nowhere”.

A cosmopolitan mode of public city-making would entail at least four types of actions. One covers the initiatives needed to put in place the institutional mechanisms for inclusion of all residents, citizen and non-citizen, in the city to intermingle, accommodate, and “to work toward mutual tolerance, understanding and well-being, while knowing that there is no center; no finality, and that every configuration is in constant change” (Conley 2002: 129). This would entail freedoms of assembly and speech to enable citizens and residents alike to give voice to their concerns in the public sphere.

Second, fundamental change would be required to fully open urban policy and planning processes to citizens and non-governmental organizations in decisionmaking and monitoring urban programs and projects. City planning continues to be lodged in government planning bureaucracies and, increasingly, in large-scale private enterprises. Citizen protest becomes the only form of participation in such circumstances. A participatory planning process would have at its foundation the capacity and legal right of people to organize autonomously from government as well as business to allow urban residents to present, openly discuss, and work together to make agreements on how to plan for neighborhood and city in collaboration with government and private interests. As summarized by Lefebvre (1991), this right to the city is the right to make the city (Harvey 2012).

Third, as an inclusive activity, planning for cosmopolis requires
universal access to spaces in which people can inscribe into the built environment their own cultural meanings, histories, and collective memories, particularly at the neighborhood level. Such place-making most frequently occurs in public, civic and other common spaces (Ho and Douglass 2008; Daniere and Douglass 2008; Douglass, Ho and Ooi 2010).

Fourth, the goals of urban planning requires an orientation toward what Peattie (1998:248) calls “conviviality”, the enjoyment of the “pure socialability” of city life (Peattie, 1998:248). Again, public space is a crucial element of such a city. It is “an essential counterpart to the more settled places and routines of work and home life, providing the channels for movement, the modes of communication, and the common grounds for play and relaxation (Carr, et al. 1992:3).3)

The imperatives to actively move toward a cosmopolis mode of planning are readily apparent. The social diversity of the cities in Asia is increasing in manifold ways. The future value of supporting diversity in the built environment through participatory processes of place-making and preservation of the mundane and vernacular is great. To give explicit considerations of everyday lifeworlds, associational life and the value of spontaneous encounters instead of simply material conditions and commodity consumption alone is worthy in and of itself. In this context, changing geopolitical

3) “Public space” is here defined as spaces “in which people of different origins and walks of life can co-mingle without overt control by government, commercial or other private interests, or de facto dominance by one group over another” (Douglass et al., 2002:345, Douglass et al., 2010).
conditions that are now witnessing the emergence of cities as sites of governance over such matters citizenship are also making a reformulation of the cosmopolitan ideal as an urban question all the more relevant to the tasks of localizing the globalization of cities through more inclusionary modes of urban planning.

V. Creating Cosmopolis through Intercity Networks

Major cities have emerged as a strategic site not only for global capital but also for the transnationalization of labor and the formation of translocal politics, communities and identities or subjectivities. In this regard, cities are a site for new types of political operations. The centrality of place in a context of global processes makes possible a transnational economic and political opening for the formation of new claims and hence for the constitution of entitlements, notably rights to place. At the limit, this could be an opening for new forms “citizenship” The emphasis on the transnational and hypermobile character of capital has contributed to a sense of powerlessness among local actors, a sense of the futility of resistance. But an analysis that emphasizes place suggests that the new global grid of strategic sites is a terrain for politics and engagement. (Sassen 2007:483).

The quote from Sassen above argues for the possibility of an alternative to the corporate form of transborder intercity networks, “which has led to socially and ethnically polarized cities where planning is primarily capital-led” (Davey 2000:149). The alternative would be a collective experience arising from the interactions of local place-based politics and transborder social networks. From
this perspective, city planning becomes part of a larger transborder social project of people learning to live with each other. The accommodation of multiple publics calls for new forms of governance capable of mediating and negotiating among people of different national and ethnic origins and cultural values (Sandercock 1998, 2003). Governance must also be capable of overcoming the divisiveness of cultural and national identities while working toward socially just economies (Appadurai 2006).

Moving in these directions requires basic advanced in three areas—democratization, devolution, and transborder cooperation. Trends in all are encouraging and daunting. Democratization has made major advances in Asia over the past 3 decades; yet more than half of the countries in the region remain on the lowest rungs in the world, with just four countries—Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and India—among the top fifty (World Audit 2011). Since 2001 curtailment of public assembly has also been occurring under the guise of anti-terrorism (Gomez 2004, Lutfia 2011). As a result, government accountability has not made significant gains over the past decade, and corruption remains a serious government deficit (World Bank 2010; Katsu 2011).

Concerning devolution, progress has occurred in some countries, such as Indonesia and South Korea, but local autonomy remains very limited in most (World Bank, 2008, Langran, 2011). Even where mayors are elected and authority has been transferred to cities, financing still relies on central governments, which decreases local autonomy.

Transborder social interaction in Asia is equally restrained.
National borders continue to be used to insulate nation-states from international flows of people, to enforce international divisions of labor, and discipline foreign workers. Cross-border inter-government agreements are thus fraught with contention and insufficient levels of trust needed for cooperative governance (Long 2011). In the Pearl River Delta, for example, social relations among Hong Kong, Shenzhen and Guangdong have not been able to flourish due to “differences and gaps in values of residents, political institutions, culture and economic regulation” related to strict border controls (Luo & Shen, 2012:134).

However, movements to advance participatory governance are on the rise throughout Asia (Mayhew, 2005). Transborder relations are embedded in many of these movements. In several countries citizens have organized to support rights of foreign workers and spouses (Douglass and Roberts 2003; Courville and Piper 2004). Some, such as the Bangkok based Asia Coalition for Housing Rights, have formed long-term transborder coalitions around poverty and human rights issues (ACHR 2012, Loh 2008; Tan 2005). The rapid increase in transnational marriages and the use of foreign domestic workers also involve social networks that build intergenerational social bonds across borders (Douglass, 2010). As an example, Kanagawa Prefecture in Japan has adopted the slogan, “foreigners are citizens, too” (Tegtmeyer–Pak, 2003), showing how in many cases local governments are leading the push for new forms of “post-national citizenship” (Sassen, 2003, p. 20).

Where devolution has moved forward, governments have also become more engaged in forming innovative intercity networks
across borders that can be seen as moving toward a cosmopolis formulation of society and economy. Research in Japan, in showing that prefectures with higher degrees of fiscal autonomy from the central government show higher capacities of policy innovations suggests that as local autonomy continues to strengthen, so will alternatives to globopolis. If transborder intercity networks are to be used to create resilient and just economies, they must arise from social interactions and exchanges that develop trust and mutual respect across as well as within national borders.

VI. Conclusions

‘Cosmopolis’ refers to cities and the world as city where inhabitants can assert their differences and negotiate them in a productive and affirmative way. It differs from the homogenizing global city that silences many of its citizens (Conley 2002:129).

The purpose of the foregoing discussion is to underscore tendencies concerning alternative pathways into Asia’s urban future. One possibility is that elements of both globopolis and cosmopolis could co-exist. However, the overall assessment suggests that throughout Asia the emerging corporate city is debilitating chances for a public city to thrive. A public city requires spaces in which people can freely meet, have spontaneous social encounters at arms distance from commerce and the state, and build social capital through everyday forms of civil engagement. As in most of the corporatizing world, in Asia these
spaces of public life — open markets, public streets and lanes, sidewalks, parks and public squares, and walkable cityscapes in general — are massively disappearing (Douglass, *et al.*, 2010). Skyscrapers that absorb the public street life of commercial areas, condos integrated with shopping malls and gated housing enclaves creating insular living spheres dedicated to consumption, mega-projects that erase entire middle and lower class neighborhoods, and the selling off of public land are all happening at breakneck pace in Asia’s cities (Douglass, 2009a). Without spaces of associational life, participatory governance is without a social foundation.

The ideology and substance of globopolis, the corporate city, rest on a false imagery and highly incomplete understanding of the historic processes of city making and its human purposes, which is taken here to include the vitality of social and cultural life, the right to participate in city building, and socially just economies. A more desirable urban trajectory is one based on an understanding of the city as a reflection of and provider for human flourishing that furthers the idea of the city as a social experience in a polis of public decisionmaking. Private spaces and private business are crucial to city life, but the idea of the city is one of a publically governed sphere for everyone’s benefit, not a privately managed one for shareholder profits.

The case has also been made that global governance based on a system of nation-states, which was globally instituted only with decolonization following World War II, is becoming one of many scales, rather than the only scale, of political decisionmaking.
Increasingly, *de facto* policies extending over national boundaries are being made by corporations using transborder intercity networks to direct flows of capital. Governments are also deeply involved in denationalizing territorial spaces (Sassen 2008). In many instances, the motive for doing this is to obtain loans for development projects from, e.g., the World Bank, that require privatization as a condition for receiving preferential loans. In others, chronic fiscal crises are met by selling public land and other assets to corporate interests, which creates a downward spiral of public participation in governance.

In other words, globalization as a process of denationalizing world geography is not extraneous to the state, but is now embedded in it. The embedding is ideologically driven by the primacy given to hyper-competition for GDI, which has served only to further denationalize the territorial organization of space through privatization, deregulation and special dispensations from national laws given to global capital. From this perspective, the nation-state is not disappearing but is instead changing its role from guiding national development to enabler of the corporate globopolis. The question to consider is not whether something called a nation-state will prevail, but rather whether a public realm of decisionmaking can hold in the face of such contrary forces.

A positive answer to this question can be drawn from on-going democratization and enhancement of local autonomy through devolution of state power to the city region scale. The record shows that when having a high degree of autonomy, local governments can and will devise policies that depart from the
globopolis mode and move toward a more socially inclusive one, particularly with regard to questions of citizenship related to foreign workers and residents. Reactionary localities also exist, and there are no guarantees that devolution would always worked toward a more participatory form of governance. Yet opportunities to create a cross-border cosmopolis do exist and are being pursued by at least some local governments.

In East and Southeast Asia, the tensions between the corporate and the public city are exceptionally striking. This is due, in part, to this world region’s condensed historical time frame in its urban transition in, the powerful presence of developmentalist and neo-developmentalist (neoliberal) states, and the seeming imperative to wipe away urban history as quickly and thoroughly as possible with corporate intrusions ranging from mega-projects to mini-marts. This process is highly uneven over space, and in the contemporary moment in especially the higher income economies of the region, it continues to favor capital city regions over secondary cities, which have entered into a precarious era of economic malaise and possible decline.

In addition to the expansion of corporate and central government driven transborder intercity networks, other dynamics of labor recruitment, global householding and experience economy growth based on the visitor industry all suggest that a locally-engaged but translocationally linked cosmopolis approach to city policymaking is the most appropriate path to follow. Growing cultural diversity is one of the most pronounced trends of recent decades in Asia’s cities. Further, demographic shifts indicate that the portent of aging
The Future of Cities in a Post-national Urban Age in Asia

and declining populations in some locales can be best met by building economies on the richness of social and cultural exchanges, including those involving children from other countries as in the case of Fukuoka, rather than on the promise of creating a high tech “Silicon Valley” or yet another free trade zone in every city and region.

Where devolution and democratization have moved forward, some secondary cities in East Asia have discovered new potential to counter economic malaise based on local transborder agreements. Busan and Fukuoka, for example, are now attempting to create a transborder “living sphere” based on cultural exchanges and interpersonal face-to-face encounters among Korean and Japanese people (Takaki 2009, Douglass 2009b). Of crucial importance in contrasting this approach to the prevailing globopolis invective of competition is that it is based on cooperation and complementarities that are mutually supportive rather than on an adversarial zero sum game. This approach requires local government participation but cannot be made by governments alone. It will instead necessarily involve parents, parent-teacher associations, and other civic groups to support. Creating centers for learning languages of other countries to embrace the diversity and uniqueness of local events is a projects in need of civil society as well as to government.4) A genuine post-national sphere of cultural as well as economic exchange is needed to create a joint “living sphere” that can avoid

4) According to a recent survey (Takaki 2009), the principal barriers to improved business relations are differences in languages, lack of information about differences in business customs, and passive attitude of government.
the passive tourism syndrome that rises and dies in a short period of time in many tourist destinations throughout the world.

The demographic transition now underway throughout Asia will inevitably entail transitions to multi-cultural societies the come with the recruitment of labor, the formation of families, and cultural exchanges that sink roots in host countries. This adds what might be considered the final frontier of cross-border economic integration, namely, the question of residence and citizenship rights for all people who are directly contributing to the prosperity of the cross-border region. Steps are already underway to relax visa requirements between Japan and Korea. But nothing is yet being said about people from other countries who are now coming into both countries by the hundreds of thousands as foreign workers, spouses, and students. This is playing out in unexpected ways. As school age children in both countries rapidly decrease in number, many schools, especially universities, have become dependent upon foreign students to survive. In all of these ways, moving toward more inclusive policies for people from other countries is not only socially just, it is crucial for the future of city regions.5)

The nation unbound is also the city unbound from a single culture, ethnic group or idea about why humanity is building cities. A central task for cosmopolis is one of creating new types of cultural spaces through the interactions among people coming

5) Devolution is fundamental to setting the conditions for a more progressive governance process, though progressive outcomes are not automatic (Fisman and Gatti 2002, Relly and Sabharwal 2009, Lessmann and Markwardt 2010, Thun 2004).
together from distant places (Sandercock 1998). Rights to place-making are necessary to allow everyone to join in the creation of cultural spaces (Sassen 2008). This in turn rests on the flexibility in the concept of citizenship to allow for a “resident-driven” urban planning (Lepofsky and Fraser 2003; Turner 2000; Schattle 2005). Recognizing that at least 200 million people now reside outside of their place of birth and are mostly living in cities, the future of cities is decidedly one of social diversity. Whether this diversity will be channeled into the socially fragmented globopolis or a socially inclusive cosmopolis is likely to be one of the most important questions for cities in this century. The hopeful answer is to be found in sustaining the city as a public sphere with spaces for everyday forms of social engagement that welcome the stranger to participate in reproducing cosmopolis from the grassroots.
References

Abu-Lughod, Janet (1991), Changing Cities (Harper Collins).

ACHR (Asian Coalition for Housing Rights) (2012). ACHR Home. http://www.achr.net.

Altshuler, A. And D. Luberoff (2004), Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment (Wash., D.C.: The Brookings Institution and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy).

Appadurai, A. (2006). Fear of Small Numbers. An Essay on the Geography of Anger. (Durham, GA: Duke University Press).

Asia Pacific Post (2006), “Koreans Marry International Soulmates.” http://www.asianpacificpost.com/portal2/ff8080810d223.Thu. August 10.

Asian Journal (2008), “Foreign Workers Can Now Stay up to 5 years in South Korea.” August 1. http://www.asianjournal.com/.

Augé, Marc, (1992), Non-lieux: Introduction à une Anthropologie de la Surmodernité, (Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity). Paris, Ed. Seuil.

Axford, B. (2007). Editorial. Globalizations 4(3): 321~326.

Castells, Manuel (1996) The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

Chang, T.C. and Shirlena Huang (2008), “Geographies of Everywhere and Nowhere: Place (Un)Making in Singapore’s Waterfront,” International Development Planning Review, 30:4.
Chosun Ilbo (2006), “More Koreans Marry Foreigners or Tie the Knot Again.” 22 October. http://english.chosun.com/cgi-bin/printNews?id=200603300034.

Conley, Verena Andermatt (2002), “Chaosmopolis,” Theory, Culture & Society 19:1–2, 127–138.

Courville, S. & N. Piper (2004). Harnessing hope through NGO activism. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 592, 39–61.

Daniere, Amrita and Mike Douglass, eds. (2008), Building Urban Communities: The Politics of Civic Space in Asia (London: Routledge).

Davey, Andrew (2000), “Towards Cosmopolis,” City, 4:1, 149–151.

Donigan, Kelli (2008), “Ambitious Design Projects to Transform Seoul’s Urban Landscape,” Seoul Today, 10 Jan.

Douglass, Mike (1994), “The ‘Developmental State’ and the Asian Newly Industrialized Economies,” Environment and Planning A, 26, 543–566.

Douglass, Mike (2006), “Global Householding in Pacific Asia,” International Development Planning Review, 28:4, 421–445.

Douglass, Mike (2009a). Globopolis or Cosmopolis? -- alternative futures of city life in East Asia. Studies in Urban Humanities, 2, 67–115.

Douglass, Mike (2009b). Transborder Intercity Networks in East Asia: Regionalizing Globalization for Economic Resilience (Anyang: Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements Monograph). Douglass, Mike (2010b). Globalizing the household in East Asia. Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy, XI:1, 63–77.
Douglass, Mike (2010c), “Civil Society for Itself and in the Public Sphere: Comparative Research on Globalization, Cities and Civic Space in Pacific Asia,” M. Douglass, K.C. Ho, O.G. Ling, *The City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia* (London: Routledge), 27–49.

Douglass, Mike and Glenda Roberts (2003). *Japan and Global Migration*. Honolulu: Univ. Hawaii Press.

Douglass, Mike, Kong Chong Ho, and Giok-Ling Ooi (2002), “Civic Spaces, Globalisation and Pacific Asia Cities,” *International Development and Planning Review*, 24:4, 345–361.

Douglass, Mike, Kong Chong Ho, and Giok-Ling Ooi (2010), *Globalization, the Rise of Civil Society and Civic Spaces in Pacific Asia Cities* (London: Routledge).

EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit) (2012), *Benchmarking Global City Competitiveness* (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, Inc.).

Elliott, L. (2011). ASEAN and environmental governance: rethinking networked regionalism in Southeast Asia. *Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 14, 61–64.

Fisher, Max (2012). “Map: U.S. Ranks Near Bottom on Income Inequality.” *The Atlantic*. 24 May. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/map-us-ranks-near-bottom-on-income-inequality/245315/.

Fisman, Raymond and Roberta Gatti (2002), “Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries,” *Journal of Public Economics*. 83, 325–345.

Florida, R. (2002) *The Rise of the Creative Class* (New York: Basic Books).

Flusty, S. 2001. The banality of interdiction: Surveillance, control
and the displacement of diversity. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 25(3): 658–664.

Flyvbjerg, B., Nils, B., and Werner, R. 2003. *Megaprojects and risk: An anatomy of ambition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Friedmann, John (1962). The city in history. *The Town Planning Review*, 33(1), 73–80.

Friedmann, John (2002), *The Prospect of Cities* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).

Galilee, Beatrice (2008), “Seoul,” *Iconeye*, 057, March. http://www.iconeye.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3292:seoul.

Graham, S., & Marvin, S. (2001). *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition*. London: Routledge.

Ha, Yong-Chool and Wang Hwi Lee (2007) “The Politics Of Economic Reform In South Korea – Crony Capitalism after Ten Years,” *Asian Survey*, 47:6, 894–914

Harvey, David (2005), *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press.

Harvey, David (2112), Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (NY: Verso).

Heng, Chye Kiang (2010) Chinese Public Space: A Brief Account. In Mike Douglass, K.C. Ho and Giok–ling Ooi, *Globalization, the Rise of Civil Society and Civic Spaces in Pacific Asia Cities* (London: Routledge).

Ho, Kong Chong and Mike Douglass (2008), ‘Editors’ Introduction: Globalisation and Livable Cities: Experiences in Place-Making
in Pacific Asia”, *International Development Planning Review*, November (forthcoming).

ILO (International Labour Organization) (2008) *World of Work Report 2008 -- Income Inequalities in the Age of Financial Globalization* (Geneva: ILO).

IMCL (International Making Cities Livable) (2008), “Making Cities Livable.” http://www.livablecities.org/.

*Japan Echo* (2008), “Problems with Employment,” 35:3, June. http://www.japanecho.co.jp/sum/2008/b3503.html. (Sourced 14 Nov 2008).

Katsu, S. (2011). The challenge of governance and institutions for Asia. *Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies*, 3(3), 335–371.

KILF (Korea International Labour Foundation) (2008), “Wage gap between regular and irregular workers appears average 15.2%.” (Seoul: KILF).

Kim, Dong–Choon (2006), Growth and Crisis of the Korean Citizens’ Movement,” *Korea Journal*, Summer, 99–128.

Kim, Young Vae (2003), *Changing Employment Structure and Industrial Relations in Korea* (Seoul: Korea Employers Federation).

Kim, Andrew Eungi and Innwon Park (2006), Changing Trends of Work in South Korea,” *Asian Survey*, 46:3, 437–456.

Kim, Chigon (2010), “Place Promotion and Symbolic Characterization of New Songdo City, South Korea,” *Cities*, 27, 13–19.

Kim, Tae-jong (2008a), “Korea To Become No.1 in Global Skyscraper Race,” *Korea Times*, 14 April.

Kim, Tae-jong (2008b), “Mayor Eyes Second Miracle on Han
River,” Korea Times, 22 July. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2008/07/229_12815.

Knox, P. 2005. Vulgaria: The re–enchantment of suburbia. Opolis 1(2): 33–46.

Knox, Paul and Peter J. Taylor (1995) World cities in a world–system. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

KNSO (Korea National Statistical Office) (2008), Labor Force Survey, July. (Seoul: KNSO).

Korea Herald (2008), “Korea grappling with multicultural society,” June 23.

Korea Times (2007), “U–City,” September 11. http://www.kdcsstaffs.com/it/main_view.php?nNum=4384&page=&part=U–City. Date accessed: Aug 18, 2008.

Kristeva, Julia (1993) Nations without Nationalism, trans. Léon Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kunstler, James H. (1994), The Geography of Nowhere. (New York, Touchstone).

Langran, I. (2011). Decentralization, democratization, and health: the Philippine experiment. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 46(4), 361–374.

Lee, Hyo–sik (2008), “Korea Fails to Create Jobs Despite Favorable Growth,” Korea Times, 9 August. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2008/09/123_30769.html

Lee, Yean–Ju and Hagen Koo (2006) “Wild Geese Fathers’ and a Globalised Family Strategy for Education in Korea,” International Development Planning Review; 8:4, 533–554.

Lee, Yean–Ju, Dong–hoon Seol, Sung–nam Cho (2006), “International Marriages In South Korea: The Significance Of Nationality
And Ethnicity,” *Journal of Population Research*, 23:2, 165–182.

Lepofsky, Jonathan and James C. Fraser (2003), “Building Community Citizens: Claiming the Right to Place-making in the City,” *Urban Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 127–142.

Loh, F. (2008). “Procedural democracy, participatory democracy and regional networking: the multi-terrain struggle for democracy in Southeast Asia” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 9(1), 127–141.

Long, N. (2011). “Bordering on immoral: piracy, education, and the ethics of cross-border cooperation in the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle” *Anthropological Theory*, 11, 441–464.

Luo, X. & J. Shen (2012). The making of new regionalism in the cross-boundary metropolis of Hong Kong–Shenzhen, China. *Habitat International*, 36, 126–135.

Lutfia, I. (2011). More democracy in SE Asia, but free speech doesn’t always follow. *Jakarta globe*. http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/more-democracy-in-se-asia-but-free-speech-doesnt-always-follow/456704

Mayhew, S. (2005). Hegemony, politics and ideology: the role of legislation in NGO–government relations in Asia. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 41(5), 727–758.

McNeill, Donald (2008), The Hotel and the City. *Progress in Human Geography* 32(3) (2008) pp. 383–398.

*Migration News* (2008), Asia – Korea,” 15:3, July.

*Migration News* (2012) “Asia”, 19:2.

Mumford, L. (1937). “What is the city?” *Architectural Record*, LXXXII, 3–8.

OECD (2009), *Trans-border Urban Co-operation in the Pan Yellow*
The Future of Cities in a Post-national Urban Age in Asia

Sea Region (Paris: OECD Territorial Reviews).

Onishi, Norimitsu (2008) “For English Studies, Koreans Say Goodbye to Dad,” The New York Times, June 8.

Park, Bae-Gyoon (2005), “Spatially Selective Liberalization and Graduated Sovereignty: Politics of Neo-liberalism and ‘Special Economic Zones’ in South Korea,” Political Geography, 24, 850–873.

Park, Jungyoon (2005), Role of the Culture and Tourism Development in the Strategic Planning for City Attractiveness.” Laboratory Creteil, IUP. University XII of Paris.

Park, Soo-mee (2008), “Local Architects Lash Out as Bulldozers Raze Dongdaemun,” JoongAng Daily, 25 January.

Peattie, Lisa (1998), “Convivial Cities,” in Mike Douglass and John Friedmann, eds. (1998), Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age (London: John Wiley), 247–253.

Relly, Jeannine E. and Meghna Sabharwal (2009), “Perceptions of Transparency of Government Policymaking: A Cross-national Study,” Government Information Quarterly, 26, 148–157.

Sandercock, Leonie (1998), Towards Cosmopolis—Planning for Multicultural Cities. London: John Wiley and Sons.

Sandercock, Leonie (2003): Cosmopolis II: Mongrel Cities of the 21st Century (London: Continuum).

Sassen, S. (2003). The participation of states and citizens in global governance. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 10(1), 5–28.

Sassen, S. (2006). Territory; authority; rights: From Medieval to global assemblages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sassen, Saskia (1991) *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Sassen, Saskia (2007), *A Sociology of Globalization* (Norton).

Sassen, Saskia (2008), *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Princeton University Press 2008).

Schattle, Hans (2005), “Communicating Global Citizenship: Multiple Discourses Beyond the Academy,” Citizenship Studies, 9:2, 119–133.

Seoul Global Center (2008), *Master Plan.* http://global.seoul.go.kr/global/view/business/bus05_03.jsp.

Shin, Dong-Hee (2009), “Ubiquitous City: Urban Technologies, Urban Infrastructure and Urban Informatics,” *Journal of Information Science,* 35:5, 515–526.

Short, John (1996) *The Urban Order* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell).

Song, Sang-ho (2008), “Korea grappling with multicultural society,” *Korea Herald,* June 24.

Steger, Manfred B. and Ravi K. Roy (2010), *Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction.* Oxford University Press.

Taiwan News (2008), “Taiwan’s Jobless Rate Highest of the Four Little Tigers.” 24 November. http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=795744&lang=eng_news&cate_img=35.jpg&cate_rss=news_Business_TAIWAN

Tan, S. S. (2005). NGOs in conflict management in Southeast Asia. *International Peacekeeping,* 12(1), 49–66.

Takaki, Naoto (2009), “Building an Integrated Transborder Economic Region between Fukuoka and Busan”. International Workshop on Transnational Regional Development and Urban Strategy. Anyang, Korea, KRIHS. 20–21 August.
Tegtmeyer-Pak, Katherine (2003), 'Foreigners are local citizens, too: Local governments respond to international migration in Japan,' in M. Douglass and G. S. Roberts (eds), Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), 242–269.

Thun, Eric (2004), "'Keeping Up with the Jones': Decentralization, Policy Imitation, and Industrial Development in China," World Development, 32: 8, 1289–1308.

Turner, B. S. (2000) Liberalism, Citizenship and Cosmopolitan Virtue, in A. Vandenberg, ed., Citizenship and Democracy in a Global Era, New York: St Martin's Press, 18–32.

Woo-Cumings, Meredith, ed. (1999), The Developmental State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

World Audit (2011). World audit democracy. http://www.worldaudit.org/democracy.htm

World Bank (1996). Livable cities for the, 21st Century: Wash. D.C.

World Bank (2008). Social analysis in the urban sector. Wash. D.C.

World Bank (2010). Decentralization & Subnational Regional Economics. Wash. D.C.

WTO (World Trade Organization) (2012). Trade liberalisation statistics: Poverty. Paris: WTO. http://www.gatt.org/trastat_e.html.

Young, Iris M. (1990), Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press).

Zin, Ragayah Haji Mat (2005), "Income Distribution in East Asian Developing Countries: Recent Trends," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 19:2, 36–54.