Breaking a chaos-noise-based secure communication scheme

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This paper studies the security of a secure communication scheme based on two discrete-time intermittently-chaotic systems synchronized via a common random driving signal. Some security defects of the scheme are revealed: 1) the key space can be remarkably reduced; 2) the decryption is insensitive to the mismatch of the secret key; 3) the key-generation process is insecure against known/known-plaintext attacks. The first two defects mean that the scheme is not secure enough against brute-force attacks, and the third one means that an attacker can easily break the cryptosystem by approximately estimating the secret key once he has a chance to access a fragment of the generated keystream. Yet it remains to be clarified if intermittent chaos could be used for designing secure chaotic cryptosystems.

Keywords: secure communication, encryption, cryptanalysis, intermittent chaos, noise, synchronization

In [1], a new method of generating pseudo-random keys from discrete-time chaotic systems using a noise signal was proposed for designing secure communication schemes. In this method, the noise signal serves as a common driving signal to synchronize two dynamical systems and forces them to be intermittently chaotic, ensuring that they generate the same pseudo-random keys for both encryption and decryption. This paper studies the security of the above-referred secure communication scheme and points out its severe security defects, showing that the scheme is insecure against both inexpensive brute-force attacks and known/chosen-plaintext attacks. At present, it is not yet clear whether or not the existence of intermittent periodicity is always an essential defect of this kind of secure chaotic cryptosystems.

I. INTRODUCTION

The idea of using chaos to design analog secure communication systems and digital ciphers has provoked a great deal of research efforts since the early 1990s [2][3][4]. Meanwhile, security analysis of various proposed chaotic cryptosystems also attracts increasing attention, and some chaotic cryptosystems have been found insecure [5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48]. Most analog chaos-based secure communication systems are based on chaos synchronization technique [47], where the receiver (response or slave) chaotic system synchronizes with the transmitter (drive or master) system via a signal transmitted over a public channel. After the chaos synchronization is achieved, the plain-signal can be recovered in different ways corresponding to different structures of the encryption algorithms. According to the method used for encrypting the plain-signal, there are four common types of chaos synchronization-based encryption structures [2][3][4]: 1) chaotic masking, chaotic switching (or chaotic shift keying – CSK), chaotic modulation and inverse system approach. Since many early chaos-based secure communication systems are found insecure against various attacking methods, some countermeasures have been proposed in the hope of enhancing the security: 1) using more complex dynamical systems, such as hyperchaotic systems or multiple cascaded heterogeneous chaotic systems [39]; 2) adding traditional ciphers into the whole cryptosystem [40]; 3) introducing a discrete-time impulsive signal instead of a continuous signal to realize synchronization [2][41]. The first countermeasure has been found not secure enough against some attacks [15][18][22][28], and some security defects of the second have also been reported [22], but the last one has not yet been broken to date.

In [42], as a new way to enhance the security of chaos-based secure communications, a new synchronization method was proposed for multiple discrete-time dynamical systems driven by a common random signal. Dynamical systems synchronized in this way work in intermittent chaotic states, i.e., alternatively switching between chaotic and periodic regimes. In [1], this new synchronization method was used to construct a new secure communication scheme, in which the two synchronized intermittently-chaotic systems generate the same pseudo-random keystream. The pseudo-random keystream is then used for encrypting the plaintext at the transmitter end, and for decrypting the ciphertext at the receiver, via a piecewise linear encryption/decryption function originally used in [15]. The core of this secure communication scheme is the key-generation process based on the two discrete-time intermittently-chaotic systems. In [1], it
was claimed that the key-generation process is very sensitive to the mismatch of the secret key so it is very secure against attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this secure communication scheme is the first and the only one based on intermittent chaos, and it has not been cryptanalyzed before.

This paper analyzes the security of the above-referred secure communication scheme, and reveals some of its security defects: 1) some secret parameters (i.e., subkeys) can be eliminated or directly estimated from the ciphertext, so that the available key-space is drastically reduced; 2) the decryption is largely insensitive to the mismatch of the secret key; 3) the chaos-based key-generation process is insecure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks. The first two defects mean that this communication scheme is not secure enough against brute-force attacks, and the third defect means that an attacker can easily break the cryptosystem by approximately estimating the secret key once he has a chance to get access to a fragment of the generated keystream. It is not clear, at this stage, whether or not intermittent chaos is always unsuitable for designing secure chaotic cryptosystems.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief introduction to the secure communication scheme under study is given. In Sec. III, cryptanalysis is shown in detail along with experimental verification. The last section concludes the paper.

II. THE SECURE COMMUNICATION SCHEME

The secure communication system proposed in [1] is described as follows.

The transmitter system is

\[ z_{t+1}^{(1)} = \tanh(\mu(az_t^{(1)} + u_t)) - \tanh(\mu bz_t^{(1)}), \]

and the receiver system is

\[ z_{t+1}^{(2)} = \tanh(\mu(az_t^{(2)} + u_t)) - \tanh(\mu bz_t^{(2)}), \]

where \( \mu, a, b \) are positive parameters. The synchronization between these two discrete-time dynamical systems is realized via a common driving signal,

\[ u_t = \phi(\hat{r}_t) = \phi(r_t + \mu_t) = \begin{cases} A, & \hat{r}_t < \theta, \\ B, & \hat{r}_t \geq \theta, \end{cases} \]

where \( r_t \) is a random telegraph signal (RTS) given by

\[ r_t = \begin{cases} \alpha, & \text{with probability } p, \\ \beta, & \text{with probability } 1 - p, \end{cases} \]

and \( \mu_t \) is noise introduced by the channel during the transmission of \( r_t \) (note that \( \mu_t \) may be different at the sender and the receiver ends). To facilitate the following descriptions, without loss of generality, assume \( 0 < \alpha < \beta \) and \( 0 < A < B \). Then, a typical value of \( \theta \) is \((\alpha + \beta)/2\), which is the middle value of the interval \([\alpha, \beta]\).

In the above secure communication scheme, the RTS signal \( r_t \) randomly switches the dynamics of the two discrete-time maps \( \Phi^1 \) and \( \Phi^2 \) by changing the value of one control parameter, \( u_t \). According to [1, Sec.II], when \( \mu, a \) and \( b \) are set to make the two maps chaotic for \( u_t = 0 \), increasing \( u_t \) will cause the maps to go into the periodic regime. Thus, by choosing the values of \( A \) and \( B \) properly, the two synchronized systems can be configured to work in the chaotic regime for \( u_t = A \) and in the periodic regime for \( u_t = B \), respectively. That is, the two maps are not fully chaotic, but intermittently chaotic, under the control of the random signal \( u_t \). In this case, the two systems can reach synchronization after a limited number of iterations if \( p \) is not too large [12]. According to our experiments, \( p \leq 0.8 \) is required when \( \mu = 5, a = 1, b = 1, A = \alpha = 0.02, B = \beta = 0.2 \) (the default values used in [1]).

The encryption procedure is composed of two processes: the key-generation process and the encryption process. Similarly, the decryption procedure is composed of the key-generation process and the decryption process. Both procedures can be described as follows.

- **The key-generation process**: the transmitter and the receiver generate two pseudo-random keystreams, \( \{K_t^1 = z_t^{(1)}\} \) and \( \{K_t^2 = z_t^{(2)}\} \), respectively.

\[ \Psi(x,y) = \begin{cases} (x + y) + 2w, & -3w \leq x + y \leq -w, \\ (x + y), & -w \leq x + y \leq w, \\ (x + y) - 2w, & w \leq x + y \leq 3w, \end{cases} \]

As mentioned in [1], \( \Psi^n(x,y) \) can be replaced by other encryption functions.

- **Assuming the received cipher-signal is \( s_t = s_t + \delta_t \), where \( \delta_t \) is the noise introduced in the transmission channel, and the recovered plain-signal is \( \hat{m}_t \), the decryption procedure is \( \hat{m}_t = \Psi^n(\hat{s}_t, K_t^1) \).

The secret key of the key-generation process is \( \{\mu, a, b, A, B, \theta\} \) and the secret key of the encryption function \( \Phi \) is \( \{n, w\} \).

An enhanced key-generation process was also proposed to improve the security of the generated key-stream: use

Note that Eq. (9) in [1], \( \theta = \alpha + (\alpha + \beta)/2 \), is wrong, since \( \alpha + (\alpha + \beta)/2 > \beta \) when \( \alpha < \beta < 2\alpha \). In fact, under the assumption that noise \( \mu_t \) has zero-mean and symmetric distribution [1], the best value of \( \theta \) should naturally be the middle value of \([\alpha, \beta] \).
III. CRYPTOANALYSIS

Before starting to analyze the security of the above-referred secure communication scheme, some security guidelines are reviewed. Following the well-known Kerckhoffs’ principle in cryptology [13], the security of a cryptosystem should rely on the secret key only, which means that an attacker knows all details about the cryptosystem except for the secret key. For this secure communication scheme to be analyzed, the following assumptions are made:

- the attacker does not know the secret keys \( \{\mu, a, b, A, B, \theta\} \) and \( \{n, w\} \).
- the attacker exactly knows Eqs. 11 to 15;
- the attacker has full control on the channel over which the cipher-signals \( s_t, s_i \) and the common driving signals \( r_t, r_i \) are transmitted, where “full control” means that the attacker not only can passively observe the transmitted signals but also can actively change the transmitted signals \( s_t \) and \( r_t \).
- Actually, in some special scenarios, it is possible for an attacker to get some useful information or even intentionally choose some information from the transmitter and/or the receiver. As a result, from the cryptographical point of view, to provide a high level of security, a cryptosystem should be secure enough against all the following four attacks (listed from the hardest to the easiest):

  - the ciphertext-only attack - the attacker can only get ciphertexts and other publicly-transmitted information (such as the common driving signal in the scheme under discussion);
  - the known-plaintext attack - in addition to some basic information, the attacker can get some plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts;
  - the chosen-plaintext attack - in addition to some basic information, the attacker can choose some plaintexts and get the corresponding ciphertexts;
  - the chosen-ciphertext attack - in addition to some basic information, the attacker can choose some ciphertexts and get the corresponding plaintexts.

The last two attacks, which seem to seldom occur in practice, are feasible in some real applications [43 Sec. 1.1] and has become much more common in today’s networked world. In the following, it will be pointed out that the secure communication system under study is not secure enough against the first three attacks.

This paper imposes a simple assumption, \( \mu_t = 0 \) and \( \delta_t = 0 \), to make the discussion of cryptanalysis easier. Note that removing the two noise signals has no influence on the security analysis of the studied scheme. Also, \( \mu_t \) and \( \delta_t \) can be directly removed in some applications, for example, when the whole system is constructed digitally in computers and the transmission channels are digital storage media (such as floppy disks, hard disks, CDs, flash-memory disks, etc.) or networks completely digitized with some error-correction mechanisms. In addition, one generally simulates secure communication schemes via some mathematical softwares, such as Matlab®, where no channel errors occur.

A. Reduction of the key space

The simplest attack to a cryptosystem is known as the brute-force attack consisting of exhaustively searching all possible keys. The complexity of such a simple attack is determined by the size of the key space, i.e., the number of all valid keys. From the cryptographical point of view, the size of the key space should not be smaller than \( 2^{100} \) to provide a high level of security [13]. In this section, it is to point out that the studied communication system is not secure enough since its key space is not sufficiently large, which is caused by the key space reduction and low sensitivity of decryption to the secret key.

The secret key of the key-generation process \( \{\mu, a, b, A, B, \theta\} \) can be immediately reduced to \( \{a_\mu, b_\mu, A_\mu, B_\mu, \theta\} \) by rewriting the chaotic equation as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\mu_t & = \mu + A_s \mu_t + B_s \theta, \\
\theta_t & = \theta + \frac{1}{2} \left( A_s + B_s \right) \mu_t + \frac{1}{2} B_s \theta_t - \frac{1}{2} A_s \theta_t, \\
\mu_{t+1} & = \mu_0 + A \mu_t + B \theta,
\end{align*}
\]

where

\[
\begin{align*}
u_{\mu,t} = & \mu \phi(\hat{r}_t) = \begin{cases} A_\mu, & \hat{r}_t < \theta, \\
B_\mu, & \hat{r}_t \geq \theta. \end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

In addition, as stated in [1], this secure communication scheme is not sensitive to \( \theta \). Actually, \( \theta \) depends only on the distribution of the noise signal \( \mu_t \) and under most conditions \( \theta = (\alpha + \beta)/2 \) can work well. Therefore, from the cryptographical point of view, \( \theta \) should not be included in the secret key. Thus, the secret key of the key-generation process is reduced to \( \{a_\mu, b_\mu, A_\mu, B_\mu\} \).

The secret key of the encryption function [12] was claimed to be \( \{n, w\} \) in [1]. Since the range of the cipher-signal \( s_t \) is \( [-w, w] \), one can set \( w \) as the maximum of \( |s_t| \) in a long period of time. This means that \( w \) can be removed and the secret key is further reduced to \( \{n\} \) only.

In the following, only \( \{a_\mu, b_\mu, A_\mu, B_\mu, n\} \) will be used as the secret parameters of the secure communication scheme for further analysis.
B. The “plausible” sensitivity of the decryption error to parameter mismatch

In [2], some experiments were reported to show that the secure communication scheme is very sensitive to parameter mismatch: even a small difference of order $10^{-8}$ in $\mu$, $\alpha$ or $\beta$ will cause a relatively large decryption error (see Fig. 6 of [2]). Assuming such a sensitivity holds equally for all the four secret parameters \(\{a, b, A, B\}\), one can see that the size of the key space of the key-generation process will not be less than \((10^8)^4 = 10^{32} \approx 2^{106}\), which is cryptographically large. However, our numerical study shows that the data given in Fig. 6 of [2] are wrong, so they reached a false conclusion on the sensitivity to the secret key in decryption. In fact, we found that the sensitivity is mainly dependent on the values of $p$ and $n$, and that this sensitivity is too weak to provide a high level of security when $n$ is not too large ($n$ has to be as large as 256 as discussed below).

At first, let us revisit the case experimentally studied in Sec. III-C of [2], where the key2 is \(\{a = 25, b = 5, A = 0.05, B = 1, n = 71\}\), $w = 1$, and the plain-signal is $m_t = 0.8 \sin(2\pi t/4)$. In [2], it was not explicitly mentioned what the sampling frequency is. Here, we assume that the plain-signal is sampled at a frequency of 100 Hz. When the decryption key is \(\{a' = a(1+\delta), b' = b(1+\delta), A' = A(1+\delta), B' = B(1+\delta)\}\), where $\delta = 0.001$ is the relative parameter mismatch3, the decrypted plain-signal $\hat{m}_t$ and its spectrum are shown in Fig. 1 (for comparison, the waveform and spectrum of $m_t$ are also plotted). One can see that the plain-signal is decrypted with only a little intermittent noise, which means that the sensitivity of the encryption scheme to the parameter mismatch is very weak. Further experiments show that with a larger $\delta$ it is still possible to approximately recover the plain-signal $m_t$, at least in the frequency domain (see Fig. 2 for the decryption plain-signal $\hat{m}_t$ when $\delta = 1$). What does $\delta = 1$ mean? It means that even a secret key satisfying $a' = 2a$, $b' = 2b$, $A' = 2A$, and $B' = 2B$ can be used to approximately recover the sinusoidal signal. To observe the relationship between the recovery errors and the value of $\delta$, defining the decryption error ratio (in power energy) as $\text{DER} = (\sum (m'_t - m_t)^2) / \sum m_t^2$, 17 different values of $\delta$ have been tested and one experimental result4 is shown in Fig. 3. The results imply that any key satisfying $a/2 \leq a' \leq 2a$, $b/2 \leq b' \leq 2b$, $A/2 \leq A' \leq 2A$, and $B/2 \leq B' \leq 2B$ can be used to approximately recover the sinusoidal signal. Roughly speaking, the closer the key to the real key, the smaller the recovery errors will incline to be. Clearly, this will cause fatal collapse of the key space and so dramatically reduce the security of the scheme. Thus, one question arises: how can one explain such an undesirable insensitivity?

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{fig1.png}
\caption{The waveforms of the original plain-signal $m_t = 0.8 \sin(2\pi t/4)$ and the decrypted signal $\hat{m}_t$, and their relative power spectra, when $\delta = 0.001$, $p = 0.3$ and $n = 71$.}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{fig2.png}
\caption{The decrypted plain-signal $\hat{m}_t$ and its relative power spectrum, when $m_t = 0.8 \sin(2\pi t/4)$, $\delta = 1$, $p = 0.3$ and $n = 71$.}
\end{figure}

In our opinion, the reason behind this interesting phenomenon should be attributed to the fact that the involved dynamical systems show chaotic behaviors with a probability less than $p \approx 0.2$. When $p < 0.5$, the periodic behavior will dominate the evolution of $K_t$, therefore $K_t$ will not be so sensitive to parameter mismatch in an average sense, as expected in a fully chaotic regime. Observing the difference between $K_t^2$ and $K_t^4$, shown in Fig. 4, the above explanation can be understood conceptually.

Next, let us find out how the sensitivity changes as $p$ increases. Following the above qualitative explanation on the low sensitivity of the decryption error for $p = 0.3$, it can be expected that the chaotic behavior occurs more

\footnotesize

\begin{enumerate}
\item Note that the value of $b$ shown in the caption of Fig. 5 of [2] should be 1.0, not 5.0. In fact, the default secret parameters used in [2] are always $\mu = 5$, $a = 5$, $b = 1$ (5/5/1-oscillator).
\item Since $A_0$ may be very small in practice, the relative mismatch is more suitable for analysis than its absolute counterpart.
\item All experiments show similar results, so only one is plotted here.
\end{enumerate}
and more frequently as $p$ increases, so that the decryption error will become more and more sensitive to parameter mismatch. Taking $p = 0.7$ as an example, experiments show that the decryption error when $\delta = 0.001$ is similar to the case when $p = 0.3$ and $\delta = 1$ (see Figs. 3 and 4 for the experimental results and compare them with Figs. 3 and 4). Further experiments have been carried out to check on some other values of $p$, and the results are summarized in Table I. Note that the synchronization will become too slow or even impossible when $p > 0.8$ [42]. From the data listed in Table I, it is clear that even for the maximal value of $p$, i.e., $p = 0.8$, the sensitivity of the decryption error to parameter mismatch is not sufficiently high. To avoid such an insensitivity, one has to ensure the dynamical system evolves in the chaotic regime in all time, i.e., to set $p = 1$. However, in this case the synchronization will become absolutely impossible [42]. This seems to imply that the proposed secure communication scheme based on intermittently chaotic systems is always insecure from the cryptographical point of view [43]. Yet, it remains to theoretically clarify whether or not the above claim is right for all cryptosystems based on intermittently chaotic systems.

### Table I: The largest insensitive parameter mismatch $\delta_{\text{max}}$ with respect to $p$

| $p$  | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | $> 0.8$ |
|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------|
| $\delta_{\text{max}}$ | 1   | 1   | $10^{-2}$ | $10^{-2}$ | $10^{-3}$ | $10^{-3}$ | $10^{-4}$ | impractical |

Another fact one can find from Figs. 3 and 4 is that the difference between $K_1^n$ and $K_1^t$ is significantly magnified by the encryption function (4). By rewriting the $n$-fold encryption function as $\Psi^n(x, y) = \Psi^t(x + ny)$, where

$$\Psi^t(x) = \begin{cases} ((x + w) \mod 2w) - w, & ((x/w) \mod 4) \neq 3, \\ w, & ((x/w) \mod 4) = 3 \end{cases}$$

one can easily find that such a magnification is mainly determined by the multiplication factor $n$: the larger the $n$ is, the larger the magnification will be. This suggests that the sensitivity of $K_1$ is improved by using a larger value of $n$. However, $n$ has to be very large to increase the sensitivity to an acceptable level of security since the magnification spreading rate here is linear. For example, when $p = 0.3$, to make the actual sensitivity be in the
order of $10^{-8}$, as reported in [1], $n > 2^{32}$ is required. Figs. 7 and 8 show the decryption results when $n = 2^{31}$ and $n = 2^{32}$, respectively. The sinusoid signal $m_t$ can still be distinguished when $n = 2^{31}$ whereas the spectral peak of $m_t$ at 0.25 Hz is suppressed when $n = 2^{32}$ (but the signal is still partially visible). This result actually implies:

- The decryption is largely insensitive not only to the mismatch of the secret key of the key-generation process, but also to the secret key of the encryption function [5], so brute-force attacks to the whole chaotic cryptosystem are quite easy.

- The security of the studied communication scheme is ensured by the encryption function $\Psi^\mu(x, y)$, not by the chaos-based key-generation process. In other words, if the key-generation process is directly used as a keystream generator to encrypt the plain-signal, the cryptosystem will be rather weak. This means that the chaos-based key-generation process is irrelevant to the security of the studied secure communication scheme.

![FIG. 7: The decrypted plain-signal $\hat{m_t}$ and its relative power spectrum, when $m_t = 0.8 \sin(2\pi t/4), \delta = 10^{-8}, p = 0.3$ and $n = 2^{31}$.](image)

Finally, it should be mentioned that the experimental data given in [1] are actually wrong. When $p = 0.3, n = 71$, our experiments show that the power energy of the decryption error is much smaller than the one shown in Fig. 6 of [1]. For example, when $\delta = 0.001$, the power energy is only 0.093086. It is found that the data for $p = 1 - 0.3 = 0.7$ agree with Fig. 6 of [1]. We guess that the authors of [1] mistook the value of $p$.

C. Breaking the key-generation process by known/chosen-plaintext attacks

In a known/chosen-plaintext attack, the attacker can get the plain-signal $m_t$, so it is possible to find an approximate key $\{a_\mu, b_\mu, A_\mu, B_\mu\}$ by searching the whole key space. Here, we assume that the value of $n$ is known. As discussed above, the decryption error is not sensitive to the mismatch of $\{a_\mu, b_\mu, A_\mu, B_\mu\}$, so the searching complexity will be small practically. Assuming that the range of the four secret parameters are $a_\mu \in [12, 50], b_\mu \in [2.5, 9.5], A_\mu \in [0.02, 0.1], B_\mu \in [0.5, 2]$, respectively, the searching steps are chosen as $\delta_{a_\mu} = \delta_{b_\mu} = 1, \delta_{A_\mu} = 0.01, \delta_{B_\mu} = 0.1$, respectively. Note that the range and the searching step of $b_\mu$ are intentionally chosen to make sure that the real value $b_\mu = 5$ cannot be visited in the current searching precision, which is common in real attacks since the real values of the secret parameters are all unknown. In this case, the number of all searched keys is $44928 \approx 2^{15.8}$, which is very small even for a PC. For each guessed key, the decryption error ratio in power energy (DER, see the previous subsection) is calculated. Using Matlab® 6.1, about 4.37 hours is consumed on a PC with a 1.8GHz Pentium® 4 CPU and 256MB memory to test all 44,928 keys. The minimal DER occurs when the key is $\{a_\mu = 27, b_\mu = 5.5, A_\mu = 0.06, B_\mu = 1\}$. The DER with respect to $\{a_\mu, b_\mu\}$ and $\{A_\mu, B_\mu\}$ are shown in Figs. 9 and 10 respectively, from which one can see that the minimum is sufficiently distinguishable from other values in the current searching precision. Compared with the real key $\{a_\mu = 25, b_\mu = 5, A_\mu = 0.05, B_\mu = 1\}$, such a key is good enough to get an acceptable decryption performance (see Fig. 11). Of course, by doing more rounds of searching in smaller ranges with smaller steps, it is easy to get a more accurate estimation of the secret key. Moreover, since the DER function can be continuous, it may be possible to use some local minimization scheme to hasten the search further.

In the following, we revisit the security problem studied in Sec. III.C of [1]: “how secure is the key generator if the intruder has access to a key fragment, $K_t$, and the corresponding synchronizing signal, $R_{t_1, t_1} \leq t \leq t_2$?” When the $n$-fold encryption function $\Psi^\mu(x, y)$ is replaced by another encryption function that is invertible with respect to $K_t$, such as the XOR operation widely used

5 In [1], these ranges are not explicitly given, so we just choose typical ranges that can ensure the intermittent chaoticity of the sender and receiver maps.
in cryptography [43], the above attacking scenario will be possible in known/chosen-plaintext attacks. In this case, it is obvious that one can immediately construct a return map by plotting the relationship between $K_{t+1}$ and $K_t$. When $\mu = 5, a = 5, b = 1, A = 0.01, B = 0.2$ and $p = 0.3$ (the default parameters used in [1] and also used in the above sensitivity analysis), a return map constructed from 9,000 samples of $K_t$ is shown in Fig. 12a. It is clear that the two branches correspond to the following two maps:

$$K_{t+1} = \tanh(a_\mu K_t + A_\mu) - \tanh(b_\mu K_t), \quad (8)$$

$$K_{t+1} = \tanh(a_\mu K_t + B_\mu) - \tanh(b_\mu K_t), \quad (9)$$

respectively. In fact, with less samples it is still possible to distinguish the two branches if they are not very close. Two return maps constructed from 1,000 and 200 samples of $K_t$ are shown in Figs. 12b and 12c, respectively. Once the two branches are distinguished, one can choose three points on each branch to try to numerically solve the three secret parameters in the corresponding equation.

In [3], it was claimed that numerical solutions of Eqs. (5) and (6) cannot work well due to the high sensitivity of the decryption error to the parameters mismatch. Unfortunately, as pointed out above in this paper, the decryption error is actually not sufficiently sensitive to the parameter mismatch. As a result, rough estimations of the secret parameters can work well to generate a keystream $K'_t \approx K_t$ for most samples. One can directly get estimations of all the four secret parameters with the following simple method discussed in [3]:

- $A_\mu$ and $B_\mu$: the y-intercepts of the two branches are $K_A^0 = \tanh(A_\mu)$ and $K_B^0 = \tanh(B_\mu)$, respectively, so $A_\mu = \tanh^{-1}(K_A^0)$ and $B_\mu = \tanh^{-1}(K_B^0)$;

- $b_\mu$: since $a_\mu \geq 2b_\mu$ [1], Sec. II], the tails of both branches will approach $f(x) = 1 - \tanh(b_\mu x)$ quickly as $x$ increases (see Fig. 12b), thus $b_\mu$ can be approximately derived from a point $(K_t, K_{t+1})$ lying in the tail: $\tilde{b}_\mu \approx \tanh^{-1}(1 - K_{t+1})/K_t$;

- $a_\mu$: once $b_\mu$ is approximately known, it is easy to derive $a_\mu$ from a point $(K_t, K_{t+1})$ lying in the A-branch, as follows: $\tilde{a}_\mu \approx (\tanh^{-1}(K_{t+1} + \tanh(\tilde{b}_\mu K_t)) - \tilde{A}_\mu)/K_t$, or a point $(K_t, K_{t+1})$ lying in the B-branch: $\tilde{a}_\mu \approx (\tanh^{-1}(K_{t+1} + \tanh(\tilde{b}_\mu K_t)) - \tilde{B}_\mu)/K_t$.

Note that $\tilde{b}_\mu, \tilde{A}_\mu$ and $\tilde{B}_\mu$ depend only on the sampling points in the return map, and that $\tilde{a}_\mu$ depends on the estimation of $b_\mu$ and $B_\mu$. This means that the error propagation only occurs for $\tilde{a}_\mu$. Since $a_\mu$ is relatively larger than the other three parameters, it is less sensitive to the estimation errors. Based on the only 200 samples shown in Fig. 12d, the secret parameters are estimated as follows:

- $K_A^0 \approx 0.05 \Rightarrow \tilde{A}_\mu = \tanh^{-1}(K_A^0) \approx 0.05004172927849$, and the relative estimation error is $\delta_{A_\mu} = |\tilde{A}_\mu - A_\mu|/A_\mu \approx 8.346 \times 10^{-4}$;
Recalling the weak sensitivity of the decryption error to parameter mismatch when \( p = 0.3 \), it can be expected that the above estimation will achieve a rather good decryption performance. Figure 12 gives the decryption result when \( m_t = 0.8 \sin(2\pi t/4) \). We have also tested the decryption performance when \( m_t \) is a music file (a PCM-encoded 16-bit wav file with the sampling frequency of 44kHz), where the decrypted plain-signal \( \hat{m}_t \) is further enhanced with a low-pass filter. Figure 13 shows the decryption result, from which one can see that the plain-music is almost perfectly reconstructed.

Note that only tens of samples may already be enough for estimating the four parameters. When the number of samples is too small, the two branches will not be clear. Fortunately, one can still tell on which branch some points \((K_t, K_{t+1})\) lie if \( K_t \leq 0.1 \) since in most cases the two branches separated are sufficiently apart for \( K_t \in [0, 0.1] \).

Recalling the data shown in Table I, the precision of the above estimation is good enough for all values of \( p \). Actually, even when the estimated parameters are not accurate enough to get an acceptable decryption performance, the attacker can still employ a more sophisticated algorithm to numerically derive the parameters with a higher precision. In this case, the estimated values can serve as good initial conditions for the em-
FIG. 14: The decrypted result with the estimated parameters, when \( m_t \) is a music file, \( p = 0.3 \) and \( n = 71 \) (from top to bottom: the waveforms of \( m_t, \hat{m}_t \) and the filtered \( \hat{m}_t \), and the relative power spectra of the three signals).

ployed numerical solving algorithm. This implies that the breaking of the secret parameters from a fragment of \( K_t \) is always possible, independent of the sensitivity of \( K_t \) to the parameter mismatch. In other words, the key-generation process is always insecure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks. One can see that this result agrees with the similar result obtained in the last subsection—the security of the studied secure communication scheme is ensured by the encryption function \( \Psi^m(x, y) \) (not by the chaos-based key-generation process). Once again, it discourages the use of intermittent chaos in cryptography.

D. The security of the enhanced key-generation process against known/chosen-plaintext attacks

In this subsection, we consider the security of the enhanced key-generation process proposed in [1] against known/chosen-plaintext attacks. Assume \( m (m > 1) \) different dynamical systems are used to generate the keystream \( K_t: K_t = \max_{m=1}^m (z^k_{t+1}) \), where

\[
   z^k_{t+1} = \tanh (a^k_{\mu} z^k_{t} + u^k_{\mu}) - \tanh (b^k_{\mu} z^k_{t}) .
\]

Apparently, in the enhanced key-generation process, the number of secret parameters will increase to be \( 4m \) and the return map will be distorted to some extent. Unfortunately, it is found that such an enhancement is not as secure as expected against return-map-based attacks. As an example, let \( m = 4 \) and the parameters be \( \{a^1_{\mu}, a^2_{\mu}, a^3_{\mu}, a^4_{\mu}\} = \{7.5, 22.5, 25, 27.5\} \), \( \{b^1_{\mu}, b^2_{\mu}, b^3_{\mu}, b^4_{\mu}\} = \{2.5, 4.5, 5, 5.5\} \), \( A^1_{\mu} = A^2_{\mu} = A^3_{\mu} = A^4_{\mu} = 0.01 \) and \( B^1_{\mu} = B^2_{\mu} = B^3_{\mu} = B^4_{\mu} = 0.2 \). The return map from 10,000 samples is plotted in Fig. 15a. Compared with Fig. 12a, although one cannot find the shape of all the 8 branches corresponding to 8 different equations, two of them can still be clearly seen, as shown by dotted lines (which are local edges of the return map). Two exposed branches belong to the first dynamical sub-system: \( z_{t+1} = \tanh(a^1_{\mu} z_t + A^1_{\mu}) - \tanh(b^1_{\mu} z_t) \) and \( z_{t+1} = \tanh(a^1_{\mu} z_t + B^1_{\mu}) - \tanh(b^1_{\mu} z_t) \). Using the method discussed above, one can easily get an estimation of the 4 secret parameters \( \{a^1_{\mu}, b^1_{\mu}, A^1_{\mu}, B^1_{\mu}\} \). This method can be further generalized to break even more parameters: the several dots marked by the arrow actually expose another branch, \( z_{t+1} = \tanh(a^2_{\mu} z_t + A^2_{\mu}) - \tanh(b^2_{\mu} z_t) \), which belongs to the second sub-system and is shown by a dotted line in Fig. 15a. Since no point is available near the y-intercept of this branch, the simple estimation method is disabled, but numerical algorithms can still be used to get the values of \( \{a^2_{\mu}, b^2_{\mu}, A^2_{\mu}, B^2_{\mu}\} \) by using only three different points. Now, about half of the secret parameters are broken with the return-map-based cryptanalysis. Although it seems very difficult to break other secret parameters in a similar way, the breaking of partial parameters still reduces the security of the enhanced key-generation process quite significantly.

To frustrate the above partial attack, one may change \( K_t = \max_{k=1}^m (z^k_{t}) \) to other functions. In Fig. 14, the return map corresponding to the mean function \( K_t = (z^1 + z^2 + z^3 + z^4)/4 \) is shown. It can be seen that the return map is further distorted and the edges become much more ambiguous. However, there are still some visible curves (marked with arrows) hidden in the noise-like return map. It is not clear whether or not these visible curves can be used to break some secret parameters. From a conservative point of view, the risk always exists, so a good mixing function has to be found to remove any visible information in the \( K_t - K_{t+1} \) return map. We have tested many simple functions and their combinations, and found that it really is a difficult task. Considering the non-uniform distribution of \( K_t \) over the defining interval (see Fig. 3 of [42]), it is guessed that only iterative chaotic maps with a good mixing property [45] can smooth the distribution of \( K_t \) and then effectively remove the visible curves. In Fig. 15b, the 24-fold skew-tent map is used to generate the keystream: \( K_t = T^{24}(z^1 + z^2 + z^3 + z^4)/4, 0.3) \), where

\[
   T(x, p) = \begin{cases} 
   x/p, & 0 \leq x \leq p, \\
   (1 - x)/(1 - p), & p \leq x \leq 1. 
   \end{cases}
\]

(11)
One can see that the resulting return map becomes much more mixed. Although in such a way the key-generation process can be dramatically enhanced, *the enhancement is caused by the fully-chaotic tent map* $T(x, p)$ *with a good mixing feature, not by the two intermittent chaotic systems themselves*. This, for the third time, makes the use of intermittent chaos in cryptography questionable.

### IV. CONCLUSION

This paper has carefully studied the security of a secure communication scheme published in [1], which is based on intermittent chaotic systems driven by a common random signal. It is found that the key space of the studied scheme can be drastically reduced, and that the decryption is insensitive to the mismatch of the secret key, which means that the scheme can be easily broken by inexpensive brute-force attacks. Furthermore, it has been found that the core of this secure communication scheme – the key-generation process – is not secure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks: if an attacker can get access to a fragment of the generated keystream, he can easily estimate the secret key with sufficient accuracy and thus break the entire cryptosystem. The security of an enhanced key-generation process proposed in [1] has also been discussed. At present, it is still not clear whether or not the existence of periodic regimes in intermittent chaotic systems always brings negative influence on the design of secure chaotic cryptosystems. It is an open problem for future investigations.

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