What are the true clusters?

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Abstract

Constructivist philosophy and Hasok Chang’s active scientific realism are used to argue that the idea of “truth” in cluster analysis depends on the context and the clustering aims. Different characteristics of clusterings are required in different situations. Researchers should be explicit about on what requirements and what idea of “true clusters” their research is based, because clustering becomes scientific not through uniqueness but through transparent and open communication. The idea of “natural kinds” is a human construct, but it highlights the human experience that the reality outside the observer’s control seems to make certain distinctions between categories inevitable.

Various desirable characteristics of clusterings and various approaches to define a context-dependent truth are listed, and I discuss what impact these ideas can have on the comparison of clustering methods, and the choice of a clustering methods and related decisions in practice.

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1 Introduction

Cluster analysis is about finding groups in a set of objects, which are characterized by data that can take various forms such as values of variables, dissimilarities or weighted edges in a graph. The groups may form a partition of the object set, but they may also be overlapping or non-exhaustive. Group memberships
may be crisp or fuzzy. Some of the discussion here was written with crisp partitions in mind, some apply to Euclidean space or a given dissimilarity measure, but most thoughts are more general. Cluster analysis is used in many different areas with many different aims (see Section 3 for examples). Researchers who apply cluster analysis in practice often want to know whether the clusters that they find are truly meaningful in the sense that they correspond to a real underlying grouping. Researchers in the field of cluster analysis are interested in whether and which methods are better at finding the true clusters correctly. In most cluster analysis literature, however, explanations of what “true” or “real” clusters are, are rather hand-waving. It is widely acknowledged that there is no agreed definition of what a cluster is, and in the majority of papers in which new cluster analysis methods are proposed, the authors do not give a general and formal definition of what the “true clusters” are that their method is supposed to find.

There is a good reason why there is no generally accepted unique definition of true clusters. In different applications, cluster analysis is used with different aims, and the researchers have different ideas of what should make the objects belong together that are in the same cluster. The term “cluster” does not mean the same to all researchers in all situations. This is acknowledged in general overviews and books about cluster analysis, but seems to be ignored by many authors of specialist work who try to convince readers that a certain method is best for finding the “true/natural/real” clusters. Even where it is acknowledged, this often takes the form of a “general health warning”, and consequences regarding the selection and comparison of methods and the interpretation of results are rarely spelled out. Is it possible to escape the alternative to either make the hardly justifiable assumption that there is a unique “true/natural/real” clustering against which the quality of cluster analysis methods can be objectively assessed, or to think that cluster analysis is somehow arbitrary and “more of an art than a science” (von Luxburg et al., 2012)?

My perspective is that of a statistician with expertise in cluster analysis and a strong interest in the philosophical background of statistics and data analysis. The aim of this paper is to offer a philosophically informed attitude toward the problem of choosing, assessing and interpreting cluster analysis methods and clusterings. A key idea is that, given that it depends on the context and clustering aim what a “good” clustering is, researchers need to characterize what kind of clusters are required for a given real clustering problem, and what kind of clusters the different clustering methods are good at finding, or in other words, in what problem-specific “truth” the researchers are interested. Similar ideas have recently been discussed in Ackerman et al., 2010 and von Luxburg et al., 2012. The present paper can be seen as contributing to the research program sketched in those papers, but also as enriching their perspective by adding further philosophical and statistical considerations.

In Section 2 I will sketch the philosophical basis of the present paper, which complements constructivism with Hasok Chang’s pluralist active scientific realism, and I will discuss the concepts of “natural kinds” and “categorization”. Section 3 lists and discusses various context-dependent clustering aims. Section
is about how “true” clusters could be defined so that they can be used for comparing and assessing different clustering methods. Section 5 discusses some practical consequences.

2 Philosophical background

2.1 Constructivism and science

In the present paper I focus on the question what clusters are “true” and/or “real”. Truth and reality, and to what extent they can be observed, are controversial issues in philosophy. My starting point in this respect is my constructivist philosophy of mathematical modeling as outlined in [Hennig, 2010a], which is connected to radical constructivism ([von Glasersfeld, 1995]) and social constructionism ([Shotter, 1993]). Radical constructivism is based on the idea that the perception and world-view of human beings can be interpreted as a construction by the body and the brain of the individual, which is seen as a self-organizing system. Social constructionism focuses on the construction of a common world-view of social systems by means of communication. “Construction” refers to the activity of the body, the brain, and communicative activity within social systems, setting up perceptions and world-views. Construction is largely unconscious or semi-conscious, and is not arbitrary but subject to constraints. It is not claimed that individuals or social systems are free to construct any arbitrary perception or world-view. Experience tells us that perception is rather severely constrained and shaped by what we perceive to be a reality outside of ourselves.

I distinguish observer-independent reality, personal reality and social reality. The observer-independent reality is only accessible to humans by observation, which means that there is no way to make sure which of its features are really observer-independent, but it is usually perceived as the source of constraints for personal and social constructs. The perceptions of individuals, together with their thoughts and feelings, make up their personal reality. Part of most personal and social realities is the belief that much personal perception represents or reflects the observer-independent reality. This belief is normally based on the experience of consistency between different sensory perceptions, at different times and from different positions, and on the confirmation of the existence of many of the perceived items by communication with others. It is therefore the result of active accommodation of perceptions.

Social reality is made up by communication between individuals. It is carried by social systems, which may overlap and may partly lack clear borderlines, although some social systems such as formal mathematics are rather clearly delimited. Personal and social realities influence each other. According to the point of view taken here, science is a social attempt to construct a consensual and stable view of the world, which can be shared by everyone and is open to criticism and scrutiny in free exchange. In this sense, science aims at a view that is as independent as possible of the individual observer, and is therefore
connected to a traditional realist view, according to which science aims at finding out the truth about observer-independent reality. But constructivists are pessimistic regarding an observer-independent access to reality, and assess the success of science based on stability, agreement and pragmatic use instead of referring to objective truth. A scientific world-view with which constructivists can agree needs to acknowledge the existence and legitimacy of diverse personal and social realities and is therefore inherently pluralist. A tension between a drive for unification and general agreement and a necessity to allow space for diverse realities in order to allow for criticism and creative progress is an essential implication of the scientific idea. Central tools of science are mathematics, which aims at setting up and exploring concepts that are clear and well defined independently of the different personal and social points of view and at statements about which absolute agreement is possible, and measurement, which unifies observations of reality in a way that they can be processed by mathematical means.

Constructivism is often accused of denying the existence of the observer-independent reality altogether by calling it “a construct”, but actually, being as stable and ubiquitous a construct as the observer-independent reality seems to be in most personal and social realities, it is as real as anything can get in constructivism.

2.2 Active scientific realism

Although constructivism is often interpreted as anti-realist, I complement my constructivist view here by the “active scientific realism” introduced by Hasok Chang ([Chang, 2012]). In the abstract of his Chapter 4, Chang writes: “I take reality as whatever is not subject to ones will, and knowledge as an ability to act without being frustrated by resistance from reality. This perspective allows an optimistic rendition of the pessimistic induction, which celebrates the fact that we can be successful in science without even knowing the truth. The standard realist argument from success to truth is shown to be ill-defined and flawed. I also reconsider what it means for science to be “mature”, and identify humility rather than hubris as the proper basis of maturity. The active realist ideal is not truth or certainty, but a continual and pluralistic pursuit of knowledge.” Chang’s use of the term “reality” refers to what is vital for the success of the scientific idea, namely to confront scientific work continually with the observed realities that individuals and social systems experience as outside their control. In agreement with my constructivist view, active scientific realism values a plurality of perspectives. The term “truth” is used in both [Chang, 2012] and the constructive literature as a relative concept “internal to systems of practice”. For example, within the mathematical formal system, “truth” is a rather unproblematic concept due to the clear rules by which it can be ensured, whereas the truth-value of the statement “the German Democratic Republic was a democracy” depends on which characteristics of a political system are taken as essential for being a democracy, which differs between social systems.

The emphasis of the strong role of communication and language is an as-
pect that constructivism adds to active scientific realism. In this respect I follow [Fleck, 1979], a pioneer work regarding the role of communication and social systems (“thought collectives”) for scientific knowledge. Fleck showed how scientific facts are shaped by the specific way how collectives of scientists conceptualize their field.

2.3 Natural kinds

“Natural kinds” in philosophy refer to the idea that there are some “naturally” separated classes in observer-independent reality, which, for traditional realists, correspond to “true clusters”. For example, biological species and chemical elements are considered as candidates for being natural kinds ([Bird and Tobin, 2012]). There is much controversy about what constitutes natural kinds (e.g., common properties, behaving homogeneously according to natural laws). The concept runs counter to the constructivist view that what is perceived as “kinds” is constructed by human activity and language and depends on the conditions of observation and practice of living of the observers. For such reasons, for example [Goodman, 1978] rejected the term “natural” for kinds. [Hacking, 1991] argued that “natural kinds” should refer to kinds that are connected to human activity and utility, which allows for non-uniform and more pluralist kinds. According to him, the concept links a nominalist inclination with a traditional realist view of “nature”. He also suggested that many classes that can be seen as natural in some sense are not “natural kinds”, and that this term may be reserved for a few very special kinds.

I agree with Goodman that the term “natural” is not helpful, at least if it is used in order to suggest that some categorizations have a special authority by matching observer-independent reality. What is valuable about the concept of “natural kinds” is that it describes a human experience that certain categorizations seem impossible to escape when confronted with Chang’s “reality outside our control”. Such an experience always has to be framed by the make-up of the personal and social realities that are involved, it may change, and controversy persists even about central candidates for natural kinds such as biological species ([Hausdorf, 2011]) and chemical elements ([Chang, 2012]). Still, it highlights that when following an active scientific realist agenda, phenomena should not be lumped arbitrarily into classes, but that scientific observation should be used to guide classification in a stable way that should aim at general agreement; by which I mean agreement about the legitimacy and use of the classification as opposed to its uniqueness.

2.4 Categorization

From the constructivist point of view, although we experience “reality outside our control”, the categorization of its phenomena is a constructive human activity, and any idea of “true” or “really meaningful” categories is located in personal and social reality. In order to understand such an idea it therefore seems promising to look at work in cognitive science about human catego-
rization. [Van Mechelen et al., 1993] review cognitive theories of categorization with a view to connecting them to inductive data analysis including clustering. Although no explicitly pluralist position is taken in that book, the various presented theories seem to apply to different kinds of categories used by human beings in different circumstances. Many of these theories correspond to formal approaches to cluster analysis, for example that categorization can be based on defining features, prototypes and exemplars, or family resemblance (similarity). From a constructivist perspective, [von Foerster, 1981] saw “objects” in human perception as eigenvalues (fixed points) of recursive coordinations of actions, which has a reflection in self-organizing clustering algorithms. Because of the exchange between cognitive science and artificial intelligence research, this should not be surprising. However, formal and algorithmic views of categories have strong limitations, and it has been pointed out that in order to understand human categorization, context such as the conditions of the human body, a metaphorical or theoretical framework in which a category is embedded ([Lakoff, 1987], Chapter 7 of [Van Mechelen et al., 1993]) and the ever-changing social and communicative environment ([Shotter, 1993]) need to be taken into account.

Another line of research concerns intuitive clustering by humans of two dimensional point clouds, regardless of the meaning of the points, see [Santos and de Sa, 2005, Lewis, 2009], with mixed results in the sense that there are predominant strategies such as looking for high density areas and for shapes of similar kinds (“model fitting”), but there is also considerable variation, although [Lewis et al., 2012] argue that humans and particularly experts are more consistent in assessing clusterings than existing cluster validation indexes.

Overall, categorization seems to work in rather pluralist and context-dependent ways, as is also acknowledged in more recent publications on categorization ([Ashby and Maddox, 2005, Rips et al., 2012]). It may be controversial to what extent cluster analysis methods are meant to reflect human categorization. One could argue that “true clusters” should have a more scientific and well-defined character than the concepts that humans normally use. Furthermore, clustering often aims at finding categories that are thought of as determined by unobserved features, which differs from forming categories from what is observed. The theories discussed in this section are relevant in artificial intelligence applications where the aim is to simulate human categorization, and they can also inspire methodological ideas in clustering, but their potential to define “true clusters” as targets for data analysis is limited.

3 Clustering aims and cluster concepts

3.1 A list of aims of clustering

That there is no generally accepted definition of a cluster is not surprising, given the many different aims for which clusterings are used. Here are some examples:

- delimitation of species of plants or animals in biology,
• medical classification of diseases,
• discovery and segmentation of settlements and periods in archeology,
• image segmentation and object recognition,
• social stratification,
• market segmentation,
• efficient organization of data bases for search queries.

There are also quite general tasks for which clustering is applied in many subject areas:

• exploratory data analysis looking for “interesting patterns” without pre-
scribing any specific interpretation, potentially creating new research ques-
tions and hypotheses,
• information reduction and structuring of sets of entities from any subject
area for simplification, effective communication, or effective access/action
such as complexity reduction for further data analysis, or classification
systems,
• investigating the correspondence of a clustering in specific data with other
groupings or characteristics, either hypothesized or derived from other
data.

Depending on the application, it may differ a lot what is meant by a “cluster”,
and cluster definition and methodology have to be adapted to the specific aim
of clustering in the application of interest.

3.2 Realist and constructive aims of clustering

A key distinction can be made between “realist” and “constructive” aims of
clustering. Realist aims concern the discovery of some meaningful real structure
(referring to what is experienced as “reality outside our control”, see Section
2). Constructive aims refer to the researchers’ intention to split up the data
into clusters for pragmatic reasons, regardless of whether there is some essential
real difference between the resulting groups. The connection between “realist”
and “constructive” clustering aims and realist and constructivist philosophy is
not straightforward. Nothing stops a realist from being interested in data com-
pression and from therefore having a constructive clustering aim. On the other
hand, a constructivist can legitimately be interested in realist clustering aims,
although she would maintain that the idea of clusters that are real and mean-
ingful in the observer-independent reality is a personal and social construct.

The distinction between realist and constructive clustering aims is not clear
cut. As follows from Section 2 researchers with realist clustering aims should
not hope that the data alone reveals real structure; constructive impact of the
researchers is needed to decide what counts as real.
The key issue in realist clustering is how the real structure the researchers are interested in is connected to the available data. This requires subject matter knowledge and decisions by the researchers. “Real structure” is often understood as the existence of an unobserved categorical variable, the values of which define the “true” clusters. But neither can it be taken for granted that the categories of such a variable are the only existing ones that could qualify as “real clusters”, nor do such categories necessarily correspond to data analytic clusters. For example, male/female is a meaningful categorization of human beings, but there may not be a significant difference between men and women regarding the results of a certain attitude survey, let alone separated clusters corresponding to sex. Usually the objects represented in a dataset can be partitioned into real categories in many ways. Also, different cluster analysis methods will produce different clusterings, which may correspond to patterns seen as “real” in potentially different ways. This means that in order to decide about appropriate cluster analysis methodology, researchers need to think about what data analytic characteristics the clusters they are aiming at are supposed to have. I call this the “cluster concept” of interest in a study.

The real patterns of interest may be more or less closely connected to the available data. For example, in biological species delimitation, the concept of a species is often defined in terms of interbreeding (there is some controversy, see [Hausdorf, 2011]). But interbreeding patterns are not usually available as data. Species are nowadays usually delimited by use of genetic data, but in the past, and occasionally in the present in exploratory analyses, species were seen as the source of a grouping in phenotype data. In any case, the researchers need an idea about how true distinctions between species are connected to patterns in the data. Regarding genetic data, knowledge needs to be used about what kind of similarity arises from persistent genetic exchange inside a species, and what kind of separation arises between distinct species. There may be subgroups of individuals in a species between which there is little actual interbreeding (potential interbreeding suffices for forming a species), e.g., geographically separated groups, and consequently not as much genetic similarity as one would naively expect. Furthermore there are various levels of classification in biology, such as families and genii above and subspecies below the level of species, so that data analytic clusters may be found at several levels, and the researchers may need to specify more precisely how much similarity within and separation between clusters is required for species.

Such knowledge needs to be reflected in choice of the cluster analysis method. E.g., species may be very heterogeneous regarding geographical distribution and size, and therefore a clustering method that penalizes large within-cluster distances too heavily such as $k$-means or complete linkage is inappropriate.

In some cases, the data are more directly connected to the cluster definition. In species delimitation, there may be interbreeding data, in which case researchers can specify the requirements of a clustering more directly. This may imply graph theoretic clustering methods and a specification of how much connectedness is required within clusters, although such decisions can often not be made precise because of missing information arising from sampling of individ-
uals, missing data etc. On the other hand, the connection between the cluster definition and the data may be less close, as in the case of phenotype data used for delimiting species, in which case some speculation is needed in order to decide what kind of clustering method may produce something useful.

In many situations different groupings can be interpreted as real, depending on the focus of the researchers. E.g., social classes can be defined in various ways. Marx made ownership of means of production the major defining characteristic of different classes, but social classes can also be defined by looking at patterns of contact, or occupation, or education, or wealth, or by a mixture of these ([Hennig and Liao, 2013]). In this case, a major issue for data clustering is the selection of the appropriate variables and measurements, which implicitly defines what kinds of social classes can be found.

The example of social stratification illustrates that there is a gradual transition rather than a clear cut between realist and constructive clustering aims. According to some views (such as the Marxist one) social classes are an essential and real characteristic of society, but according to other views, in many societies there is no clear delimitation between supposedly “real” social classes, despite the existence of real inequality. Social classes can then still be used as a convenient tool for structuring the inequality.

Regarding constructive clustering aims, it is obvious that researchers need to decide about the desired “cluster concept”, i.e., about the characteristics that their clusters should have. This needs to be connected to the practical use that is intended to be made of the clusters.

Where the primary clustering aim is constructive, realist clustering may still be of interest. If indeed some real grouping structure is manifest in the data, many constructive aims will be served well by having this structure reflected in the clustering. E.g., market segmentation may be useful regardless of whether there are really meaningfully separated groups in the data, but it is relevant to find them if they exist.

### 3.3 Desirable characteristics of clusters

Here is a list of potential characteristics of clusters that may be desired, and that can be checked using the available data. Several of these are related with the “formal categorization principles” listed in Section 14.2.2.1 of [Van Mechelen et al., 1993].

1. Within-cluster dissimilarities should be small.
2. Between-cluster dissimilarities should be large.
3. Clusters should be fitted well by certain homogeneous probability models such as the Gaussian or a uniform distribution on a convex set, or by linear, time series or spatial process models.
4. Members of a cluster should be well represented by its centroid.
5. The dissimilarity matrix of the data should be well represented by the clustering (i.e., by the ultrametric induced by a dendrogram, or by defining a binary metric “in same cluster/in different clusters”).

6. Clusters should be stable.

7. Clusters should correspond to connected areas in data space with high density.

8. The areas in data space corresponding to clusters should have certain characteristics (such as being convex or linear).

9. It should be possible to characterize the clusters using a small number of variables.

10. Clusters should correspond well to an externally given partition or values of one or more variables that were not used for computing the clustering.

11. Features should be approximately independent within clusters.

12. All clusters should have roughly the same size.

13. The number of clusters should be low.

When trying to measure these characteristics, they have to be made more precise, and in some cases it matters a lot how exactly they are defined. Take no. 1, for example. This may mean that all within-cluster dissimilarities should be small (i.e., their maximum, as required by complete linkage clustering), or their average, or a high quantile of them. These requirements may look similar at first sight but are very different, e.g., regarding the integration of outliers in clusters. Having large between-cluster dissimilarities may emphasize gaps by looking at the smallest dissimilarities between two clusters, or it may rather mean that the cluster centroids are well distributed in data space. As another example, stability can refer to sampling other data from the same population (this may play a privileged role in hypothesis driven repeated experiments aiming at reproducible results, which is often identified with the scientific method), to adding “noise”, or to comparing results from different clustering algorithms ([Ben David et al., 2006]).

Some of these characteristics conflict with others in some datasets. E.g., connected areas with high density may include very large distances, and may have shapes that are undesired in specific applications (e.g., non-convex). Representing objects by centroids well may require some clusters with little or no gap between them. Stability is often easier to achieve with fewer clusters than required in situations where clusters need to be very homogeneous.

Deciding about such characteristics is the key to linking the clustering aim to an appropriate clustering method. E.g., if a database of images should be clustered so that users can be shown a single image to represent a cluster, centroid representation is most important. Useful market segments need to be addressed by non-statisticians and should therefore normally be represented by
few variables, on which dissimilarities between members should be low. Section outlines how the listed characteristics can help with the selection of a clustering method in practice.

The idea of listing potentially desirable characteristics of clusterings for helping with the selection of clustering methods is central also to [Ackerman et al., 2010], but the axiomatic characteristics listed there are strikingly different from the present list. As necessary for the theoretical analysis, the characteristics in [Ackerman et al., 2010] are formal. One reason for the differences may be that the aim of the authors was to prove general theorems, and therefore they went for characteristics that make such theorems possible. [Ackerman et al., 2012] and [Ackerman et al., 2013] investigated cluster analysis approaches with respect to further formal characteristics, which are related to some of the characteristics listed above. Ultimately, characteristics need to be formalized to be used in practical analyses, in which case at least some of them (distance to centroids, quality of representation of the data and fit by probability models) also serve to measure information loss through clustering. Similar considerations can be found in [von Luxburg et al., 2012], which are closer to the present approach, but somewhat less detailed. Ultimately, the characteristics listed here need to be formalized, too, to be used in practical analyses.

4 Definitions of true clusters

There is no agreed definition of what true clusters are in reality, but mathematical formalism allows to give a clear definition (a mathematical model) of true clusters based on mathematical objects. In different situations, different kinds of clusters are of interest, and a mathematical definition of true clusters cannot be unique. It is necessarily idealized and abstract, and discrepancies between such a definition and the more complex and informal ideas that researchers have about reality should not be suppressed (see [Hennig, 2010a] for a constructivist view of mathematical models).

Still, an explicit formal definition of true clusters has important benefits. It communicates the cluster concept in a specific setup in a clear way, and it provides a transparent framework for comparing methods. It may also stimulate the development of new methodology. In the literature on clustering methods, clear definitions of the specific clustering problem to be solved are often missing, probably because authors feel that such definitions could not properly cover the clustering problem in general. But this means that a chance is missed to clarify the understanding of what kind of problem a method is good or not so good for.

For every formal definition there need to be arguments why it formalizes a reasonable cluster concept researchers could be interested in, so it needs to be related to desirable characteristics of clusters. Definitions of true clusters can be based on the data, which are measurements that therefore “live” in the system of mathematical formalism. This is only appropriate if what makes a certain subset of the data a true cluster according to the researchers can indeed be defined from the data alone. For realist clustering aims, true clusters need to be
defined based on a certain truth “behind” the data. There are two possibilities for doing this. Firstly, one could assume that in the “mathematical world” there is true clustering information for all observations, which is available in principle but not used by the clustering method. Secondly, one could assume that the data are generated by a true probability model, and then define the truth in terms of this model.

4.1 Definitions based on the data alone

Let \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) be \( n \) observations in \( \mathbb{R}^p \). k-means clustering is defined by choosing \( k \) cluster mean vectors \( a_1, \ldots, a_k \) and a cluster assignment function \( \gamma : \{1, \ldots, n\} \rightarrow \{1, \ldots, k\} \) so that \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} \|x_i - a_{\gamma(i)}\|^2 \) is minimized. The solution of this problem could be called “the true clustering”.

Is this appropriate? It could be, namely if the real aim is to find a clustering with \( k \) clusters in which all observations are represented optimally (in the sense of averaging the squared Euclidean distance) by the centroid of the cluster to which they are assigned. On the other hand, if in the situation of interest clusters should rather correspond to high-density regions, clusters defined as “true” by k-means can be inappropriate, see Figure 2 for an example. Note also that for defining true clusters according to the k-means criterion, \( k \) has to be assumed to be known.

Is such a definition helpful? If the k-means objective function is used to define the true clusters, obviously k-means clustering is the best clustering method, and this may look tautological, although it is still of interest to investigate what extent different algorithms are successful for minimizing the objective function.

In principle, if the objective function that defines a clustering method corresponds exactly to the loss function of the practical problem for which a clustering is required, there is no point to look for other clustering methods. The same holds for methods that are not defined by optimizing an objective function but, e.g., are stable states reached by an algorithm, as long as this is for solving a practical problem properly formalized by the algorithm. In this sense, most clustering methods implicitly define their own truth. A practical implication is that the definition of a clustering method often gives strong information about what kind of clustering problem the method is good for.

However, in most clustering applications the aims of clustering do not directly translate into a specific cluster analysis method, be it through matching the practical “loss” with the method’s objective function or otherwise. In general, the choice of the the practical “loss” and therefore the objective function or more generally the clustering principle needs to be supported by validation techniques and background information.

In some other situations it is possible to define a clustering problem based on the data alone without corresponding directly to any available clustering method. An example for this is the optimal approximation of the distance matrix of the data by an ultrametric induced by a dendrogram produced by a hierarchical clustering method. Another approach would be the definition of an aim-dependent cluster quality index as a weighted mean of appropriately
Figure 1: Density contour of a mixture of five Gaussian distributions (mean vectors are \((0,0), (0,5), (40,2.5), (70,2.5)\); there are two components centered at \((70,2.5)\) with different covariance matrices). Below: optimal 5-means partition and mean vectors (asterisks).

Scaled statistics measuring cluster characteristics as listed in Section 3.3 (in [von Luxburg et al., 2012] there is a related discussion of measuring and optimizing “usefulness” of clusters). In an implicit manner, internal cluster validation indexes ([Xiong and Li, 2014]) such as the average silhouette width attempt to aggregate desirable features of clusterings, and “true clusters” could be defined by optimizing them, although such criteria are usually designed with the aim of defining a too general notion of cluster quality, which does not take into account the differences between clustering aims in practice.

If “truth/quality” is defined in such a way, one could try to optimize the cluster quality index directly. This is often not computationally feasible, and also in some cases desirable characteristics need to be combined in other ways than just averaging them (for example, one may be interested in constrained optima of objective functions, putting an upper bound on within-cluster distances). So there is still a place for clustering methods that do not directly optimize a quality index. Also, clustering applications in which the idea of truth refers to the observed data alone are probably a small minority; particularly it implies that the data cover all objects of interest and are not only a sample from which the researchers want to generalize.

Some other work explores notions of “clusterability” of data ([Balcan et al., 2008; Ackerman and Ben-David, 2009]), revealing that there are several reasonable notions that contradict each other in many situations.

4.2 Definitions based on external information

In comparisons of cluster analysis methods in the literature, authors often use datasets for which there is a given “true classification”. Often these are standard
examples for supervised classification such as Fisher’s famous Iris dataset in which there are measurements on 150 Iris plants from three different subspecies. Clustering methods can generate clusterings ignoring the true classification to which they then can be compared.

This is an artificial situation. In reality cluster analysis is applied to find clusters that are not yet known. The appeal of this approach is that realistic datasets can be used and that it is usually easy to argue that the true given classes are meaningful. But often measuring the performance of clustering methods on datasets with given true classes is not very informative. How informative it is depends on to what extent the true classes in such cases are good models for the true clusters the researcher wants to find in a new dataset with unknown truth. This is hardly ever discussed. Usually, it is not investigated to what extent the true given classes have the desired characteristics of clusters in the situation of interest. There is no guarantee that true classes from supervised classification problems qualify as “data analytic clusters” (in the sense of the previous subsection), and it may not be reasonable to expect a good clustering method to find them. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the given true classes are the only categorical variable that qualifies for defining true classes; there could be further (unobserved) variables defining alternative true classes.

Although such real datasets with given true classes can contribute to the comparison of clustering methods, the approach seems to be overused in the literature, and where it is used, more care is required for exploring what can be learned for other datasets without known classes from the “success” of certain methods to recover known true classes.

The same applies to the presentation of datasets for which authors refer to some “truth” without a formal definition, just appealing to the reader’s (usually Euclidean) intuition. E.g., data distributed on a ball about the origin together with data distributed around a much wider circle about the origin with a hole.

Figure 2: Data generated from model in Figure 1, above: mixture components from which observations were generated, below: 5-means clustering.
in the middle that separates it from the central ball are often presented as an illustration that "k-means does not work", not reproducing the clustering the authors declare to be true by fiat. This clustering is based on separation, but the biggest distances in the dataset occur within a cluster, namely the wider circle, so this qualifies as "true cluster" in some respects but not others. Euclidean intuition is irrelevant in a large number of clustering problems (e.g., with categorical variables or non-Euclidean dissimilarities) and should not be overrated as reliable indicator of "truth" in Euclidean setups either. Again, such data can be used in a constructive way for evaluating clustering methods, but reference to the specific characteristics of the given true clustering needs to be made.

External information can also be used in other ways to define cluster quality (and therefore implicitly the "true clusters" by optimizing quality). In applications where clustering is used instrumentally for some other aims of data analysis, for example for data compression in order to predict an external variable, different clusterings can be compared according to quality measures related to the final aim, e.g., prediction quality.

4.3 Definitions based on probability models

Assuming that data are generated from probability models is the standard technique for defining true underlying but unobserved clusters. It can then be investigated by (asymptotic) theory or systematic simulation whether cluster analysis methods find such clusters. There are various approaches to define true clusters based on probability models. Most straightforward are mixture models of the form \( f(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \pi_j f_{\theta_j}(x) \), where data \( x \) are assumed to be i.i.d. generated from a distribution with density \( f \) with is a mixture of parametric densities \( f_{\theta_j} \). This models that \( x \) is generated from mixture component \( f_{\theta_j} \) with probability \( \pi_j \), and data can be simulated by simulating the true component memberships first. The usual interpretation is that the true clusters correspond to the mixture components. Clusterings computed from the data \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) can be compared to the true component memberships for simulated data.

Although such a definition gives researchers a much clearer idea of the involved cluster concept than using a given true class for real data, there are several issues with this approach.

Firstly, the family of mixtures of distributions of the form \( f_\theta \) needs to be identifiable, i.e., no two sets of parameters \( \{(\pi_1, \theta_1), \ldots, (\pi_k, \theta_k)\} \) should generate the same probability measure. This is fulfilled for most popular mixture models including Gaussian mixtures. If mixtures are considered in full generality of the concept, however, identifiability cannot be taken for granted. Uniform distributions on connected sets can be pieced together from uniform distributions on subsets in different ways. Gaussian mixtures can be written down as mixtures of truncated Gaussians, which are no longer identifiable. This indicates that parametric families that generate identifiable mixtures are chosen rather for technical reasons than because they would be particularly qualified for representing a clustering "truth" in reality.
Secondly, identifying clusters with mixture components may intuitively not be justified. The parametric family needs to be chosen in such a way that the $f_\theta$ can indeed be interpreted as “cluster shaped”, as prototypical models for clusters of interest. But two parameters $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$ may be so close to each other that the mixture of distributions $\pi_1 f_{\theta_1} + \pi_2 f_{\theta_2}$ may be unimodal, and may look so homogeneous that it would be inappropriate to split it up into two clusters in a real application. Figure 1 shows a density contour of a Gaussian mixture with five components but only four modes, two of which are not separated by a deep density valley. Figure 2 shows some data generated from this mixture. It strongly depends on the application whether it is appropriate to interpret this distribution as generating five clusters. Note that there are very large distances within some of the mixture components, and it is hard to argue that the points from component 3 “belong together”. One may wonder whether mixtures of homogeneous distributions such as the Gaussian should be interpreted as single clusters if their mixture is homogeneous enough, which allows for more flexible cluster shapes, but violates identifiability and requires the researcher to define under what conditions mixture components should be merged ([Hennig, 2010b]).

Thirdly, statisticians do not believe that parametric probability models hold precisely in reality, but true clusters as mixture components are only well defined if the mixture model holds precisely. This problem is worse for mixture models than elsewhere in parametric statistics, because if data come from a distribution with a density $g$ that is slightly different than $f = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \pi_j f_{\theta_j}$ with a certain $k$, $g$ can (under weak assumptions) be approximated arbitrarily well by a mixture $f^+$ of distributions of the form $f_{\theta}$ with $k^+ > k$ mixture components, which means that $g$ can be approximated by a distribution with more and potentially quite different true clusters, despite being so close to $f$ that it would require a very large dataset to tell $f$ and $g$ apart.

Despite such problems, defining true clusters as mixture components at least communicates a clear idea of a “cluster prototype model”, and allows tests whether clustering methods recover the true clusters in such mixtures. Such tests can be expected to favor clustering methods that are based on parameter estimators (e.g., maximum likelihood (ML)). A more comprehensive evaluation needs to consider models that are approximately but not precisely equal to such mixtures, and cases in which the interpretation of single mixture components as clusters breaks down, e.g., because mixtures of several components are homogeneous in some sense.

Alternatively, true clusters could be defined as high density level sets or attraction areas of density modes of distributions. This requires only the weaker nonparametric assumption that a density exists. Although this is more general than the mixture approach and allows for more flexible cluster shapes (which may or may not be desired), it does not solve all the problems connected to the mixture approach. For every distribution $P$ with a density and $k$ modes there are distributions without an existing density and distributions with an arbitrarily higher number of density modes that are so similar to $P$ that they cannot be distinguished by an arbitrarily large amount of data ([Donoho, 1988]). As the mixture model approach, the density-based approach does not generalize
to a full neighborhood of $P$.

A third approach is to define true clusters through statistical functionals of distributions. This allows for example to generalize the definition of $k$-means to distributions $P$, defining true underlying (unobserved) $k$-means-type clusters, by defining $a_1, \ldots, a_k$ and $\gamma : \mathbb{R}^p \mapsto \{1, \ldots, k\}$ as minimizers of $\int \|x - a_{\gamma(x)}\|^2 dP(x)$. For some other clustering methods (including ML estimation for mixtures) corresponding notions of truth can be defined in similar ways; see Section 4.1 for comments on adapting the cluster definition to a certain method. The formalization using probability models allows the investigation of the asymptotic properties of the methods. E.g., [Pollard, 1981] proved the consistency of $k$-means applied to data as estimator for the $k$-means functional. Such functionals can in principle be defined for any distribution; a density is not required, but in case of the $k$-means functional existence of second moments is necessary. The $k$-means functional can still vanish or change rapidly in the neighborhood of any distribution $P$. [Davies, 1993] argued (for linear regression) that statisticians should be interested in estimating globally defined and continuous functionals of distributions, because only such functionals cannot change arbitrarily in the neighborhood of a distribution. The clustering problem, though, is inherently discontinuous in borderline situations where a cluster splits, where the number of clusters changes or is misspecified (as far as I know, all currently existing functional-type definitions of true clusters require the number of clusters to be fixed).

These different approaches to define the truth illustrate that the clustering problem does not boil down to estimating the underlying distribution. Genuinely different true clusterings can be defined for the same distribution. The distribution showed in Figure 1 is a mixture of five Gaussian components, has four density modes and (with appropriate level set cutoff is) three high density level-sets. The right side shows the true 5-means-type functional partition of the distribution. This may look counter-intuitive, and it is important to argue that any definition of true clusters based on a distribution formalizes a clustering that has certain desirable characteristics. But in the specific case that researchers want to find cluster centroids so that observations can be represented optimally by the centroids in the $k$-means sense, even such a counter-intuitive partition can be seen as “true”.

4.4 Limitations of formal definitions

All the definitions listed above have shortcomings. Definitions based on the data alone do not reflect the idea of an unobservable underlying truth and of generalization of results to entities that were not observed. An external true clustering is usually not available in reality. Using it for assessment of clustering quality where it exists may not help much to clarify the characteristics of the clustering methods. Known “true” classes in datasets where they exist may deviate systematically from unknown classes of interest in real clustering problems. Definitions based on probability models suffer from instability. Sometimes a researcher may have a loss function in mind that formalizes the practical
problem, but often this involves an unobservable truth and cannot be directly computed on the data alone, in which case it relies on model assumptions and the comments in Section 4.3 apply.

In any case, researchers may have a more complex informal idea of a cluster in mind than what can be captured by a formal definition. The definitions of true clusters should be taken as helpful constructs that support clarification and transparent comparison of methods, but they should not be taken as the ultimate clustering truth. Researchers may also complement formal definitions by less formal descriptions of more general cluster shapes they are interested in, for example “our method should find elliptical clusters with light tails that can reasonably be approximated by Gaussian distributions but are separated well enough that there is a density valley (depth to be defined) between them”. Methods can then be compared by distributions that fit this description. Despite all the shortcomings, it would be a strong progress for scientific communication to accompany the introduction of new clustering methods regularly with an explicit definition of the clustering problem.

5 Implications for cluster analysis research and practice

5.1 Choice of a clustering method in practice

If researchers want to find true or real clusters, they have to specify what kind of truth they are interested in and what should constitute a “real” cluster. An appropriate clustering method can be found by connecting the characteristics of the clustering method to what is desired according to the researchers’ cluster concept. Some methods optimize certain characteristics directly (such as $k$-means for representing cluster members by centroids), and in further cases experience and research suggest typical behavior ($k$-means tends to produce clusters of roughly equal size and spherical shape, whereas methods looking for high-density areas may produce clusters of very variable size and shape). Other characteristics such as stability are not involved in the definition of most clustering methods, but can be used to validate clusterings and to compare clusterings from different methods by use of resampling techniques ([Tibshirani and Walther, 2005]). Realist clustering aims can often be related to desirable characteristics that can be computed from the data. A more direct approach to method choice for realist clustering aims is possible if the researchers can specify a probability model and a formal definition of truth for the problem under study. Methods with good statistical properties for estimating this truth qualify for being chosen, preferably if they can still do a good job if the model assumptions are slightly violated. Even realist clustering is a constructive act in the sense that the researchers need to construct their concept of “real/true” clusters, and in the interest of scientific communication it is desirable to make this explicit.

The task of choosing a clustering method is made harder by the fact that
in many applications more than one of the listed characteristics is relevant. Clusterings may be used for several purposes, and desired characteristics may not be well defined, e.g., in exploratory data analysis, or in cases where the connection between the interpretation of the clusters and the data is rather loose.

The specification of a cluster concept that captures a researcher’s informal idea of true clusters is a hard problem, too. Often researchers only find out that their initial specification was not appropriate if they see what clustering this yields from their data. I have come across such situations often in advisory work. E.g., researchers may realize that the used methodology needs to enforce the connection of their clustering to an external variable to which their clustering should be related, but which they did not specify initially because they believed that this would happen automatically. Or they realize that small clusters are useless for them only after finding out that their initially preferred method produces such small clusters in their data. This illustrates the value of active scientific realism as complement to constructivism (and the value of cluster validation); the researcher’s constructs are required, but the researchers should be open to change them responding to input from the reality outside their control.

5.2 Comparison of clustering methods

Although in reality the choice of a clustering method needs to depend on the context and the clustering aim, research comparing clustering methods independently of specific applications is useful because it adds to the understanding of the characteristics of the clustering methods. However, as mentioned in Section 4.1 already, in most published comparisons of clustering methods the authors seem to be far too keen to produce simple rankings of methods without providing any insight regarding what can be learned about the suitability of different methods for different clustering aims. I have hardly seen any study in which different clusterings of the same data or of data from the same probability model have been treated as legitimate and were used to tell the implicit cluster concepts of different models apart ([Hennig, 2010b] Ackerman et al., 2012 Ackerman et al., 2013 are examples where this is done). Characteristics such as those listed in Section 3.3 could be used to evaluate what clustering methods do best according to various different characteristics datasets without given truth, and they could also be used to characterize the true classes in situations where these classes are given, which could help to understand more precisely what can be learned from the performance in these cases. Mixture models with a range of true parameters and component distributions are occasionally used in comparative studies in a slightly more pluralist way with the result that different methods “win” different mixtures, although usually without questioning the idea that there is only one true clustering for any fixed choice of mixture parameters. Looking at various fixed sets of parameters and distributions is more informative for understanding the methods in detail than aggregating simulations with randomly chosen parameters, as some authors seem to prefer, probably because
this approach can generate a single ranking of methods out of many different models.

5.3 Context-driven vs. data-driven decision making

There are a number of other decisions that have to be made when carrying out a cluster analysis, such as standardization and transformation of variables, definition of a dissimilarity measure etc. Similar considerations as before apply regarding the idea that there is a single “best” way of doing this, and their dependence on the context and the clustering aim. A number of these decisions is discussed in [Hennig and Liao, 2013].

Here is an exemplary remark regarding variable selection and dimension reduction. Many methods are currently advertised for performing this task automatically. Often they are motivated by their performance in probability models with a few truly informative and some further homogeneous “noise” variables (often following a Gaussian or uniform distribution). These models capture the idea that indeed some variables are relevant for clustering and some others are not, abstracted from the meaning of these variables. But in real applications, in which the variables have a meaning that is of substantial importance for the clustering task, choosing different variables changes the meaning of the resulting clustering. E.g., in a dataset of students with marks on a number of courses and some standard socio-demographic information, one may be interested for different reasons in clusterings of the marks from science courses, those from humanities courses, all courses combined, the socio-demographic information, or all information combined. It cannot be decided by automatic techniques in which of these clusterings the researchers should be interested, and whether certain variables “do not cluster” and whether they then should not be involved in the computation of the clustering of interest depends on the context and the clustering aims.

Regarding the choice of a dissimilarity measure, consider again the example of data on a central ball and data on a separated ring around it. In Section 4.2 it was mentioned that 2-means (based on Euclidean data) partitions such a dataset in a way different from ball vs. ring. Assuming that ball vs. ring is the correct partition, one could argue that one should use a different, data driven, dissimilarity (e.g., a path-based distance) for such data. But if both the Euclidean distance and the use of 2-means have a context-driven justification, it is more appropriate to question the intuitive assumption about what the correct partition is.

6 Conclusion

It seems to me that a misguided desire for uniqueness and context-independent objectivity makes many researchers reluctant to specify desired characteristics and choose a clustering method accordingly, because they hope that there is a universally optimal method that will just produce “natural” clusters. Probably
for such reasons there is currently only very little research investigating the characteristics of methods in terms of the various cluster characteristics that could be of interest in different applications of clustering. Also probably many researchers are worried about the fact that too strong subjective impact could bias analyses and conclusions and could violate the principles of science because it will yield results that clearly depend on the observer, see Section 2.1.

As pointed out before, there is a tension between the scientific goal of general agreement and the acknowledgment of individual differences and the unavoidable impact of the individual’s point of view. Indeed it is important that individual decisions and their rationale are made transparent, and that they are made in such a way that the “reality outside our control” still can deliver its message. E.g., variables should be chosen, because they are relevant for the research question of interest, and not because they produce a specific clustering that the researcher wants to promote for some reason. There are a number of reasons to make decisions in a data dependent manner, particularly if the initial analysis of the data reveals that the researchers did not properly formalize their aims (see Section 5.1), in which case a confirmation on new data (or left out validation data) without making data dependent decisions will normally be required to convince the audience that the results are meaningful.

The philosophical perspective presented here tries to explain how cluster analysis can at the same time be strongly dependent on contexts, aims and decisions of the researcher, but also scientific, transparent and clear regarding its underlying concepts and aims, and open to impact from Chang’s reality outside our control.

I think that the general philosophical considerations apply to much wider areas of statistics and data analysis; in cluster analysis the plurality of definitions, approaches and ideas of truth is particularly striking and better visible than elsewhere, but believing in a unique “natural” truth has problematic implications elsewhere as well.

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