Fast Local Attack: Generating Local Adversarial Examples for Object Detectors

Quanyu Liao¹, Xin Wang* Member, IEEE², Bin Kong², Siwei Lyu Senior Member, IEEE³, Youbing Yin², Qi Song², and Xi Wu*¹

¹Chengdu University of Information Technology, Chengdu, China
²CuraCloud Corporation, Seattle, USA
³SUNY Albany, NY, USA

Abstract—The deep neural network is vulnerable to adversarial examples. Adding imperceptible adversarial perturbations to images is enough to make them fail. Most existing research focuses on attacking image classifiers or anchor-based object detectors, but they generate globally perturbation on the whole image, which is unnecessary. In our work, we leverage higher-level semantic information to generate high aggressive local perturbations for anchor-free object detectors. As a result, it is less computationally intensive and achieves a higher black-box attack as well as transferring attack performance. The adversarial examples generated by our method are not only capable of attacking anchor-free object detectors, but also able to be transferred to attack anchor-based object detector.

Index Terms—adversarial attack, object detection, fast local attack

I. INTRODUCTION

The development of deep neural networks (DNNs) supports researchers to achieve unprecedented high performance in various computer vision problems. Nevertheless, these deep learning-based algorithms are notoriously vulnerable to adversarial examples [14]: adding some imperceptible adversarial perturbations is enough to make them fail. This phenomenon can be found in different applications [2], [4], [10], [18], [20], [24], [36], [41], including classification, object detection, etc. In this paper, we specifically focus on the adversarial attack of object detectors.

Existing object detectors can be broadly categorized into two groups: anchor-based or anchor-free detectors. Recent anchor-free object detectors [17], [19], [43], [44] achieve competitive performance with traditional anchor-base detectors. Additionally, anchor-free detectors are structurally simpler and more computationally efficient than anchor-based detectors. Anchor-based detectors have dominated object detection due to their superior performance. However, adversarial perturbations to this type of detectors have not been explored.

All the existing research focus on the adversarial attack of anchor-based detectors, such as DAG [39] and UEA [37]. However, Existing methods suffer from three major shortcomings: 1) Most of the attack methods [14], [23], [27], [39] generate global perturbations, including the background. However, most of the pixels of these perturbations are useless to fool the detectors. On the contrary, they increase the perceptibility of the perturbations. 2) The generated adversarial examples have the poor transferring ability, e.g., the adversarial examples generated by DAG on Faster-RCNN can only attack Faster-RCNN models and the generated examples can hardly be transferred to attack other object detectors. 3) They only attack one proposal at one time or relies on training, which is extremely computational consumption. Thus, it is desired to investigate a special attacking scheme for anchor-free detectors that have more local perturbations.

* Xin Wang (xinw@curacloudcorp.com) and Xi Wu (xi.wu@cuit.edu.cn) are corresponding authors.
In this paper, inspired by the fact that the key information lies in or around objects, we propose a new method, Fast Locally Attack (FLA), to generate locally adversarial perturbation for anchor-free object detectors. "Fast" denotes that our method generates adversarial examples with lower time consumption than previous work. For this purpose, we focus on high-level semantic information to generate adversarial examples. We attack all objects in each iteration instead of a single object in each iteration, which can reduce the amount of iteration and improve the transferring attack performance of our method. As for "Locally", which means our method generates locally perturbation that only changes little-scale pixels around the detected objects. Locally perturbation can increase the imperceptible of perturbation without reducing attack performance. Examples in Fig. I demonstrates the adversarial examples from our method and compare with DAG's examples. Experimental results show that FLA improves the performance over the published state-of-the-art on both white and black box attack tasks.

In comparison with the previous works, the main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:

- **FLA** generates locally perturbations only around target objects, which increases the imperceptibility of the generated perturbations.
- **FLA** is efficiently on attacking the SOTA object detectors. It achieves higher white-box attack performance than previous methods with lower computational consumption.
- The adversarial examples generated by FLA achieve higher black-box attack performance than previous methods. They are not only capable of attacking anchor-free detectors but also can be transferred to attack anchor-based detectors.

This paper is organized as follows. We first discuss the related work in section IV. Then, we provide the details of FLA in section III. The detailed setup and results of our experiment are described in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper in section V.

## II. RELATED WORK

### A. Object Detection

There are some great progress has been made in object detection. With the deep convolutional neural network's development, many valuable approaches have been proposed. One of the most popular object detection categories is the RCNN [12] family, such as Faster-RCNN [32]. The first process of RCNN's pipeline is generating a large number of proposals which is base on the anchor. Then use a different classifier to classifying the proposals. At last, use post-processing algorithms, such as NMS, to reduce redundancy proposals.

There are also other object detectors that rely on the anchor, like YOLOv2 [31], SSD [22]. Anchor-base detector has high detected accuracy but also has three shortcomings. Slow, hard to apply a new dataset and more difficult to training. Such as Faster-RCNN.

To solve these shortcomings, some new object detectors have been proposed. Such as CornerNet [19] and CenterNet [43]. These new object detectors detect the objects by detecting the keypoints of objects. CornerNet detects the objects by detecting the two corners of the objects. CenterNet relies on find the center points of objects to detect objects. These two methods can complete the training without preset anchor, which we call as the anchor-free detector. These two detectors are not only faster and simpler to training than anchor-base detectors, but they also achieve SOTA detect performance. Both CornerNet and CenterNet can use multiple convolutional neural networks as the backbone network to extract the semantic features of the input image. Then locate the keypoint of the object through these features. Normally, the keypoint include the size and category information of the object. At last, use some post-processing algorithms to remove the redundancy key-point.

### B. Adversarial Example for object detection

Goodfellow [14] first showed the adversarial example problem of the deep neural network. The adversarial example means deliberately generate imperceptibly perturbation to add on the original input dataset.

The adversarial example is aimed to make the deep neural network output the wrong result. Almost existing adversarial attack methods are focus on minimizing the $L_p$ norm of the adversarial perturbation. In the most attack methods $p = 2$ or $\infty$ that can generate imperceptible perturbation.

The most classical attack methods are the FGSM family, such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [14], Project Gradient Descent (PGD) [23]. The first of the pipeline of the FGSM is to get the loss value of the deep neural network, then compute the gradient of the input image. At last, use the gradient and the sign function to generate the adversarial perturbation. The principle can be summarized as follows:

$$x' = x + \epsilon \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_x f(x, y))$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where $f$ is the classifier, $x$ is the input image for the classifier, $\epsilon$ is to constrain the $L_\infty$ of the perturbation.

The difference of the PGD is to add the iterative module to the FGSM. Use many small and accurate perturbation instead of one big perturbation. The PGD achieve higher attack success rate and generate smaller $L_p$ norm perturbation. The principle can be summarized as follows:

$$x_{t+1} = \Pi_{x+s}(x_t + \epsilon \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_x f(x, y)))$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

There is another attack method can generate lower $L_2$ perturbation than FGSM family, Deepfool [27]. Deepfool uses the generated hyperplane to approximate the decision boundary, and compute the lowest Euclidean distance between the input image and the hyperplane iterative. Then use the distance to generate the adversarial perturbation. Deepfool achieve state-of-art attack performance while has a lower $L_2$ norm of perturbation than the FGSM-base attack method.
The above attack methods are mainly to attack the classifier, there are only a few research for attack object detector. Such as DAG and UEA. Both DAG and UEA attack anchor-base object detectors, such as Faster-RCNN and the SSD. Both DAG and UEA generate globally adversarial perturbation. The main shortcoming of DAG is slow, average consume $10 - 20s$ to complete ones attack, and weakness on transferring attack. UEA is base on the Generate Adversarial Network [13], it also achieves high attack performance and better transferring attack performance than DAG. But UEA need retraining to attack new dataset or new detector, which is more complex than the optimization-based methods.

III. METHOD

The Fast Locally Attack (FLA) consists of three parts (as shown in Fig. 2), i.e., (a) Local Target Region Selection (b) Compute Adversarial Gradient and (c) Local Perturbation Generation. We first formulate the FLA as a constraint optimization problem in Section III-A, then introduce each part in Sections III-B III-C and III-D respectively.

A. Problem Definition

The problem of generating adversarial perturbation for object detection can be formulated to the following constraint optimization problem:

$$\begin{align*}
\min_r & \quad ||r||_p \\
\text{subject} & \quad \hat{t}(x + r) \cap \hat{t}(x) = \emptyset \\
& \quad \min \leq x + r \leq \max
\end{align*}$$

where $x$ is the origin input image, $r$ is the adversarial perturbation. $\hat{t}(x)$ denotes the object set that detected by the object detector. $\max$, $\min \in \mathbb{R}^n$ denote the maximum and minimum pixel intensity to constraint the pixel of the $x + r$.

There are two ways to satisfy that the intersection of $\hat{t}(x+r)$ and $\hat{t}(x)$ is empty. The first one is attacking each object of $\hat{t}(x)$ individually, the second one is attacking the whole image to make all object categories incorrect. We found the second way is more efficient, thus constraint in the Eq. (3) can be reformatted as follows:

$$\forall t_n \in \hat{t}(x), f(x + r, t_n) \neq f(x, t_n)$$

where $t_n$ denotes the $n$-th object of the object set $\hat{t}(x)$ that detected by the detector, and the $f(x, t_n)$ denotes the category of the object $t_n$.

B. Local Target Region Selection

We select the local target region using an anchor-free objection method, i.e. CenterNet [43]. In the CenterNet, the detector removes the classifier module and use the keypoint heatmap $\hat{Y} \in [0, 1]^{\frac{H}{4} \times \frac{W}{4} \times C}$ to predict the category of the object directly. Where $W$ and $H$ represents the width and height of the heatmap. $C$ means the number of channels. $R$ represents the multiple of downsampling from image to heatmap.

The CenterNet use several different CNN networks as the backbone to construct the complete object detector, and output $\hat{Y}$ of the input image $x$. The $\hat{Y}_{w,h,c} = 1$ indicates the point $\hat{Y}_{w,h}$ is a detected keypoint which belonging category $c$, in contrast, the $\hat{Y}_{w,h,c} = 0$ indicates the point do not belonging $c$, where $w$ and $h$ denotes the absissa and ordinate of the point. The CenterNet is base on the keypoints detection which regards the center point of the object as the keypoint. Each detected keypoint $\hat{Y}_{w,h,c}$ denotes the center point of the object. The keypoints include the information of the object’s category, it also includes the scale and the offset of the detection box of the object.

Due to the CenterNet relies on the detected keypoints, the attack method can directly attack the detected keypoints to fail the detector. The constraint in Eq. (4) can be written as the following functions.
\[ \hat{Y} = \text{Centernet}(x) \]
\[ P = \{ p_n = \hat{Y}_{w,h} \mid \hat{Y}_{w,h,c} = 1, \hat{Y}_{w,h,c} \in \hat{Y} \} \]
\[ \forall n, f(x + r, p_n) \neq f(x, p_n), p_n \in P \] (5)

where \( p_n \) denotes the \( n \)-th detected keypoints, all detected keypoints construct the target point set \( P \).

After attacked all detected keypoints, the CenterNet should fail to detect any object on the adversarial example. But we find it still detects some same object after all the keypoints are attacked. We check the heatmap where all the keypoints are changed to the incorrect category, but the neighbor points around the attacked keypoints are also modified. Some neighbor background points’ confidence level is increased that makes them belong to the correct category. Due to the new neighbor keypoints location is near to the old keypoints, the newly detected object is in the same category as the old one and the position and the size of the detected bounding box just change little. These two problems make the CenterNet capable to detect the correct object on the adversarial example. To solve those two problems, we can directly add the neighbor keypoints into the target point set. Then the Eq. (5) is further extended to the following function.

\[ \hat{Y} = \text{Centernet}(x) \]
\[ P = \{ p_n = \hat{Y}_{w,h} \mid \hat{Y}_{w,h,c} = 1, \hat{Y}_{w,h,c} \in \hat{Y} \} \]
\[ P_{\text{neighbor}} = \{ p_k \mid p_k \in N(p_n), p_n \in P \} \]
\[ P = P \cup P_{\text{neighbor}} \]
\[ \forall n, f(x + r, p_n) \neq f(x, p_n), p_n \in P \] (6)

where \( N(p_n) \) indicates the point set which constructed by the neighbor points around the detected keypoint \( p_n \).

After selecting \( P \) composed of detected points and neighbor points, we divide \( P \) into different \( P_j \) according to different categories \( j \) which has detected object.

\[ P_j = \{ p_n \mid f(x, p_n) = j, p_n \in P \} \] (7)

We generate the adversarial gradient on each \( P_j \), the process of computing adversarial gradient is summarized in the next section.

C. Adversarial Gradient Computation

Our method is base on the PGD [23], which generates perturbation iteratively. In each iteration, the perturbation is generated from the adversarial gradient. Unlike DAG, which only computes gradient on a single object and generates perturbation for a single object in each iteration, our method computes gradient on each \( P_{\text{target}} \) and add up all the gradients to generate perturbation that can reduce the time consumption and increase the transferring attack performance.

As shown in Algorithm 1 during each iteration, we first generate target points set \( P_j \) for each detected category \( j \) which has detected objects. Then, we compute \( \text{loss}_{\text{sum}} \) of \( P_j \) of each detected category \( j \) and compute adversarial gradient information \( r_j \) for each category \( j \). Each \( r_j \) is normalized by \( L_\infty \) and obtain adversarial gradient information \( r'_j \). After all, we add up all \( r'_j \) to obtain total gradient \( r_i \). (An example is shown in Fig. 2.) After obtaining \( r_i \), we generate local perturbation in the next section.

D. Local Perturbation Generation

To generate locally perturbation, we use attack mask \( \text{mask}_i \) to keep perturbation that around detected objects and remove perturbation in the background. The attack mask \( \text{mask}_i \) is generated from the \( P_j \) by \( \text{GenerateMask} \) step which is demonstrated in Fig. 2. At first, we generate a zero matrix \( \text{mask}_i \) that has the same size as the input image. We relocated all points \( p_i \) of \( P_j \) on the input image. Then get the location of each \( p_i \) and set the same location points of \( \text{mask}_i \) as 1. After relocate all \( p_i \), then set all points in the box with the size of attack radius \( R^* \) and centered on \( p_i \)’s location of \( \text{mask}_i \) as 1. After that, we obtain a locally attack mask. In the final of each attack, we use \( \text{mask}_i \) and global perturbation to obtain locally perturbation. Different \( R^* \) will lead to different attack performance, we will quantitative analysis of this relation in Section IV-E.

In Algorithm 1, we generate globally perturbation by applying \( \text{sign} \) operation to the \( r_i \). After obtaining global perturbation we generate locally perturbation by the dot product of global perturbation and \( \text{mask}_i \). After generating perturba-

\begin{algorithm}
\caption{Fast Locally Attack (FLA)}
\textbf{Input:} image \( x \), target points set \( P \), number of category \( C \), attack radius \( R^* \)
\textbf{Output:} perturbation \( r \)

Initialize: \( x^0 \leftarrow x, i \leftarrow 0, j \leftarrow 0, P_0 \leftarrow P, r_{\text{adv}} \leftarrow 0 \)

while \( P_i \cap P \neq \emptyset \) and \( i < M_D \) do

\quad \text{mask}_i \leftarrow \text{GenerateMask}(x, P_i, R^*)

\quad \text{while } j < C \text{ do}

\qquad \text{loss}_{\text{sum}} \leftarrow \sum_{p_n \in P_j} \text{CrossEntropy}(x(i), p_n)

\qquad r_j = \nabla_{x(i)} \text{loss}_{\text{sum}}

\qquad r'_j = \frac{r_j}{\|r_j\|_\infty}

\qquad r_i \leftarrow r_i + r'_j

\quad \text{end if}

\quad j \leftarrow j + 1

\text{end while}

\quad x^{i+1} \leftarrow x^i + \frac{c}{M_D} \cdot \text{sign}(r_i) \cdot \text{mask}_i

\quad P_{i+1} \leftarrow \text{RefreshPoints} \ (x^{i+1}, P_i)

\quad i \leftarrow i + 1

\text{end while}

\text{return } r = x^i - x^0
\end{algorithm}
tion, we refresh the $P$ by RefreshPoints, which remove the points $p_n$ which has been attacked successfully.

Normally, the DAG needs 150 – 200 iterations to generate perturbation and the FLA only needs 10 – 50 iterations.

**IV. Experiment**

In this section, we first introduce the detailed setup of the experiment. Then, we report both the white-box and black-box attack results. Finally, we evaluate the perceptibility of the generated adversarial examples and the attack radius $R^*$.

**A. Experimental Details**

1) **Attacked Object Detectors**: All adversarial examples are generated on CenterNet with two different backbones: ResNet-18 [16] and DLA-34 [42]. CenterNet with backbone ResNet-18 is highly efficient. In contrast, CenterNet with backbone DLA-34 is more computationally intensive but more accurate.

2) **Dataset**: The above two networks are trained on the training set of PascalVOC [9] and MS-COCO [21]. The training set of PascalVOC includes the trainval sets of PascalVOC-2007 and PascalVOC-2012. In this paper, both the white-box and black-box attack performance are reported on the testing set of PascalVOC and MS-COCO.

3) **Metrics**: We compare the white-box attack performance with the DAG and the UEA. It is evaluated by computing the decreased percentage of mean average precision ($mAP$), which is referred to as **Attack Success Ratio** (ASR) in this paper:

$$ASR = 1 - \frac{mAP_{attack}}{mAP_{clean}}$$

where $mAP_{attack}$ denotes the $mAP$ of the targeted object detector on adversarial examples. $mAP_{clean}$ denotes the $mAP$ of clean input. Higher ASR means better white-box attack performance.

The black-box attack signifies the transferability of the generated adversarial examples to other object detectors. In this paper, black-box adversarial examples are generated on CenterNet with DLA-34 [42] backbone and tested on CenterNet with different backbones (Resdcn18 and Resdcn101). We also test these adversarial examples on other object detectors, including anchor-free (CornerNet) and anchor-based detectors (Faster-RCNN and SSD300). In this paper, the performance of the black-box attack is evaluated by the ASR ratio between the targeted detector and the original detector on which the adversarial examples are generated. It’s referred to as **Attack Transfer Ratio** (ATR) in this paper:

$$ATR = \frac{ASR_{target}}{ASR_{origin}}$$

where $ASR_{target}$ represents the ASR of the targeted detector and $ASR_{origin}$ denotes the ASR of the detector on which the adversarial examples are generated. Higher ATR denotes better transferability.

4) **Perceptibility Metric**: The adversarial perturbation’s perceptibility is quantified by its $L_p$ norms. Specifically, $P_{L_2}$ and $P_{L_0}$ are used, which are defined as follows.

**i)** $P_{L_2}$: $L_2$ norm of the perturbation. A lower $L_2$ value usually signifies that the perturbation is more imperceptible for the human. Formally,

$$P_{L_2} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{k}\sum r_k^2}$$

where the $k$ is the number of the pixels. We also normalized the $P_{L_2}$ in $[0, 1]$.

**ii)** $P_{L_0}$: $L_0$ norm of the perturbation. A lower $L_0$ value means that less less images images are changed during the attack. We compute $P_{L_0}$ by measuring the proportion of changed pixels. The whole experiment is conducted with a Intel Core i7-7700k CPU and an Nvidia GeForce GTX-1080ti GPU.

**B. White-Box Attack Results**

In this subsection, we show the white-box attack result on PascalVOC and MS-COCO. The overall attack results are shown in Table 7. It is obvious that the mAPs of different Centernet have dropped dramatically after adversarial attack. In PascalVOC, the ASR of FLA is 0.90 and 0.93 respectively when the backbone is Resdcn18 and DLA-34, outperforming DAG and UEA. Besides, FLA is almost ten times faster than DAG. Regarding UEA, we set the attack time to N/A, as they don’t provide the source code. Note that UEA requires additional training time. In MS-COCO, the FLA achieves 0.98 ASR on Resdcn18 and DLA34. On Resdcn18, the average attack time required by FLA is 2.7s. On DLA34, the average attack time required by FLA is 4.7s.

**C. Black-Box Attack Results**

We report the black-box attack results in this subsection. The black-box attack measures the transferability of adversarial examples. All adversarial examples generated for black-box attack experiment are generated on Centernet with backbone DLA34-1x and DLA34-2x.

At first in the experiment, we use the FLA to generate the adversarial example on the CenterNet and save the adversarial example in a common image format, JPG. Then reload the saved adversarial example to compute the mAP. We want to simulate a real transferring attack scenario, so we are abandoning the use of lossless photo formats and use the JPG format to save. Most of transferring test use the lossless float format to test, but most of normal image input is $8-bit$ int matrix. So we save the adversarial example in JPG format, this process will better simulate a real transferring attack scenario. Compare with directly compute mAP with lossless adversarial example, save the adversarial example in JPG will lose a small amount of aggressiveness [8], because save in JPG will lose some details of the adversarial example. But in this way we can further guarantee the attack ability of our method. We test the transferability of adversarial examples by generated on one model and compute mAP on other models.

As the previous experiment, we evaluate the black-box attack performance of the adversarial example on PascalVOC and MS-COCO. On the PascalVOC, we generate adversarial example on DLA34-1x and DLA34-2x backbone centernet. As
compare, we generate adversarial example on Faster-RCNN by DAG and also save as JPG to transferring to other detector. On the COCO, we also generate adversarial example on DLA34-1x and DLA34-2x backbone centernet, and transferring to other backbone centernet and CornerNet.

The results of black-box attack are summarize in the Table II and Table III. As the shown on Table III. On the PascalVOC, adversarial example that generated by our method is imperceptible to human eyes. Although the adversarial example that generated by DAG is valid to attack anchor-free detector, Faster-RCNN and SSD300. Meanwhile, the adversarial example generated by DAG is invalid to attack anchor-free detector.

On the Table II compare with test on PascalVOC, FLA achieve higher ATR on COCO. The average ATR is over 90%. The adversarial example that generated by FLA is valid to different backbone centernet. It is also achieve high black-box attack performance when transferring to CornerNet.

**D. Evaluation of Perceptibility**

The $P_{L_2}$ and $P_{L_0}$ values of the generated adversarial examples by FLA are summarized in Table IV. Higher $P_{L_2}$ and $P_{L_0}$ values generally mean that the generated adversarial examples are more perceptible to human eyes. Although $P_{L_2}$ of our method is slightly higher than DAG, the perturbation is almost imperceptible to human eyes (see Fig. 3). The $P_{L_0}$ value of FLA is significantly lower than DAG, meaning that the adversarial example that generated by FLA keep its aggressiveness after JPG compression, hard to attack the faster-rcnn. The adversarial example that generated by FLA lose its aggressiveness after JPG compression, hard to attack the faster-rcnn. The adversarial example that generated by FLA keep its aggressiveness after JPG compression, and achieve higher ATR than the DAG. The adversarial example that generated by FLA is also valid to transferring attacking anchor-base detector, Faster-RCNN and SSD300. Meanwhile, the adversarial example generated by DAG is invalid to attack anchor-free detector.

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generated perturbations of FLA are much locally constrained than DAG.

E. Evaluation of Attack Radius $R^*$

$R^*$ correlates with the attack performance, time consumption, and the perceptibility of adversarial examples. We summarize the relation between $R^*$ and adversarial perturbation in Fig. 4. In this experiment, all adversarial examples are generated by attacking centernet with backbone Resden18 on MS-COCO. Based on Fig. 4, we can draw three conclusions. First, the $ASR$ of FLA correlates positively with $R^*$ when $R^*$ is less than 16. However, $ASR$ is stable or slightly decreased afterwards. Second, $P_{L_0}$ of the perturbation correlates positively with $R^*$. This is because higher $R^*$ means bigger attack masks. Finally, the mean attack time of FLA correlates negatively with $R^*$ when $R^*$ is lower than 48. However, the mean attack time of FLA become stable afterwards.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we propose Fast Locally Attack to generate transferable adversarial example for attacking SOTA anchor-free object detectors. Our method leverages higher-level semantic information to generate locally adversarial perturbation. FLA computes adversarial gradient information for all detected categories and generate locally perturbation, which can improve the attack performance of adversarial example. FLA also achieved SOTA white-box attack performance for attacking Centernet, while being dozens of times faster than DAG. Additionally, it only changes $30\% - 40\%$ image pixels during the attack process. Finally, our method achieved better black-box attack performance and are more robust to JPEG compression.
Fig. 4. Correlation between the attack radius $R^*$ and the attack performance, time consumption, and the perceptibility of adversarial examples. The ASR of FLA correlates positively with $R^*$ when $R^*$ is less 16. However, ASR is stable or slightly decreased afterwards. $P_{L_0}$ of the perturbation correlates positively with $R^*$. This is because higher $R^*$ means bigger attack masks. The mean attack time of FLA correlates negatively with $R^*$ when $R^*$ is lower than 48. However, the mean attack time of FLA become stable afterwards.

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