Design of Identity-Based Blind Signature Scheme Upon Chaotic Maps

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Abstract—Cryptosystems relying on chaotic maps have been presented lately. As a result of inferred and convenient connections amongst the attributes of conventional cryptosystems and chaotic frameworks, the concept of chaotic systems with applications to cryptography has earned much consideration from scientists working in the various domains. Hence, we suggest a novel IDentity-based Blind Signature (ID-BS) based technique in this paper that relies on a pair of hard number theoretic problems, namely, the Chaotic Maps (CM) and Factoring (FAC) problems. The technique is immune to attacks, in addition to its efficiency in application. Relative to other related schemes, it requires fewer module operations. In summary, our proposed technique is superior to similar schemes within the cryptosystems domain.

Keywords—Identity based, blind signature, chaotic map, factoring problem, digital signature.

1 Introduction

As a consequence of the wide spread and fast expansion of computer and communications networks and their numerous applications, it has become imperative to employ authentication and key agreement protocols for remote users [1]-[3]. These protocols should be able to generate secure session key in addition to being immune known-key attacks and insure secure communications [1]-[3].

The blind signature notion was first introduced by Chaum [4], which entails that it is not necessary for signers to have knowledge of the content of the message, to consequently sign the message. The Blind Signature method relies on the principle that a user can take away the signature of a signer on a desired document without revealing internal
information contained with it [5]. The fundamental aim of the Blind Signature scheme is obtaining the signature from an individual without exposing concealed content retained within that document. The virtue of blind signature is that it may be allowed for the requester to acquire the signature, although the signing party may not be able to draw an association to the document from a signature. If a requester issues a signature pair, an association between both of the pairs of requester and signer cannot be established. Also, unforgeability and untraceability are fulfilled by the blind signature scheme in addition to authentication [5-15]. The IDentity-based Blind Signature (IDBS) method is considered of high value due to the fact that an individual’s identity is casually represented by his Public Key (PK). As a practical illustration, in the event that an electronic case disseminated by the bank may be effectively confirmed with the assistance of personal credentials; where this is simply achieved with the assistance of any possible assortment of strings such as bank’s name, city, country, and year of the client or business. It is not necessary to communicate with or obtain a bank’s key from the PK center. It is still an unresolved issue for approaches based on Integer Factorization Problem (IFP) of RivestShamirAdleman (RSA) techniques to insure security against generic parallel attacks.

The ID-BS approach eliminated the demand for a requester to pursue the public key of the recipient ahead of dispatching an encrypted message. Identity-based cryptography offers a viable helpful substitute technique to traditional Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) [5, 9]. Several ID-BS approaches have been suggested subsequent to the year 1984 [4], [14-17], nevertheless, ones arose in 2001, in particular, were able to achieve identity-based encryption [18]. The superiority of the ID-BS approach dwells in simplifying the procedure of key management. In the preceding two years, a few bilinear parings were adapted to different use cases and scenarios in cryptography [19, 20].

A chaotic map-based image encryption algorithm was originally suggested in 1989 [18]. Lately, there has been an expanding activity in this field as a few methods were presented within the research art [22-26]. The chaotic map-based public cryptosystems require least computational complexity in comparison with that is needed by public cryptosystems that rely on modular exponential computing, or scalar multiplication on elliptic curves. Therefore, we will present in this paper a novel ID-BS technique relying on chaotic map and factoring problems. Our proposed scheme is much more efficient than previous ID-BS schemes as a result of the decreased number of operations.

We organize the rest of this paper as follows: we concisely lay-out the ground-work in Section 2. In Section 3, we construe the ID-BS scheme. Section 4 incorporates investigation of the security and computational cost of the presented technique as compared with current schemes. In Section 5, we depict a numerical illustration on our presented ID-BS technique. We finally draw conclusions in Section 6.

2 Preliminaries

We will shortly present the basic notion of Chebyshev chaotic map in addition to its associated mathematical characteristics [22, 26-28].
2.1 Chebyshev chaotic map

Given an integer $m$, and a variable $z$ on the interval $[-1,1]$. Then, a Chebyshev polynomial $T_m(z): [-1,1] \to [-1,1]$ is defined as

$$T_m(z) = \cos(m \cos^{-1}(z)) \tag{2.1}$$

Chebyshev polynomial map $T_m: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ of degree $m$ is defined by the recurrent relation as follows:

$$T_m(z) = 2zT_{m-1}(z) - T_{m-2}(z) \tag{2.2}$$

Where $m \geq 2, T_0(z) = 1, T_1(z) = z$. In addition, a few other Chebyshev polynomials are given as: $T_2(z) = 2z^2 - 1, T_3(z) = 4z^3 - 3z, T_4(z) = 8z^4 - 8z^2 + 1$.

Two intriguing features of a Chebyshev polynomial are the following [19, 24, 33]:

- The semi-group property [30]:

$$T_w(T_t(z)) = \cos(w \cos(t \cos^{-1}(z))) = \cos(wt \cos^{-1}(z)) = T_{wt}(z) = T_t(w(x)) \tag{2.3}$$

In Eq. (2.3), the numbers $w$ and $t$ are positive integers, while $z \in [-1,1]$.

- The chaotic property [30]:

The Chebyshev map $T_m(z) = [-1,1] \to [-1,1]$ of degree $m$ ($m > 1$) represents a chaotic map that has an invariant density $f^*(z) = \frac{1}{\pi \sqrt{1-z^2}}$ in conjunction with a positive Lyapunov exponent $\ln(m) > 0$.

So that to enhance this property, it was shown by Zhang [29] that the semi-group property is fulfilled for Chebyshev polynomials established on the interval $(-\infty, \infty)$ as follows [30]:

$$T_m(z) = 2zT_{m-1}(z) - T_{m-2}(z) \pmod{p} \tag{2.4}$$

Where $m \geq 2, x \in (-\infty, \infty)$, and $p$ is a large prime number. Therefore, the property

$$T_w(T_t(z)) = T_{tw}(z) = T_t(T_w(z)) \pmod{p} \tag{2.5}$$

Also, the semi-group property is fulfilled. The extended Chebyshev polynomials retain the characteristic that they commute under composition.

**Definition 2.** If one is given two elements $m$ and $\gamma$, the role of the discrete logarithm problem is to identify integer $s$, such that $T_s(m) = \gamma$.

**Definition 3.** If one is given three elements, $T_m(z)$, and $T_s(z)$, the role of the Diffie-Hellman problem is to find element $T_{ms}(z)$.  

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2.2 Chaotic map problems

Given the integers $L$ and $K$, and the prime number $p$, then, the general second-order linear recurrence relation is of the form:

$$L \times \mathcal{T}_{m-1}(Z) + K \times \mathcal{T}_{m-2}(Z) \quad (m \geq 2) \tag{2.6}$$

Where $T_m(Z) \in GF(p)$ for all $m$.

The chaotic maps recurrence relation function [30] is defined by Eq.(2.4), accompanied by the initial conditions $T_0(Z) = 1$ and $T_1(Z) = Z$. It can simply be seen that the chaotic maps functions are a particular kind of second-order linear recurrence relation in Eq. (2.6) with $L = 2Z$ and $K = -1$.

**Theorem 1.** Assume that $f(Z) = C^2 - 2ZC + 1$ with the pair of roots $\mu, \delta$. If $Z = \frac{1}{2}(\mu + \delta)$, thus, the number of solutions fulfills [19]

$$T_m(Z) = \frac{(z+\sqrt{z^2-1})^m + (z-\sqrt{z^2-1})^m}{2} \quad (\text{mod } p). \tag{2.7}$$

**Theorem 2.** Given the two positive integers $s$ and $r$ where $s > r$, hence

$$2T_s(Z), T_r(Z) = T_{s+r}(Z) + T_{s-r}(Z) \tag{2.8}$$

**Theorem 3.** If $t = r + s$ and $p$ is a large prime number, thus,

$$(2T_t(Z) T_r(Z) T_s(Z) + 1) \quad (\text{mod } p) = ([T_t(Z)]^2 + [T_r(Z)]^2 + [T_s(Z)]^2) \quad (\text{mod } p) \tag{2.9}$$

**Theorem 4.** If it is possible to employ an algorithm to unravel the chaotic maps problem over $GF(p)$, thus an algorithm may be utilized to solve the discrete logarithm problem over $GF(p)$ in polynomial time [33].

**Lemma 1.** For any $\alpha \in GF(p)$ and $\mu = \alpha^r$, given an integer, we are able to find an integer $Z \in GF(p)$, where hence create a chaotic maps sequence $\{T_m(Z)\}$ corresponding to $\frac{1}{2}(\mu + \mu^{-1}) = T_j(Z) \in T_m(Z)$ in polynomial time.

**Lemma 2.** If we define $p, N$, and $\beta$ as they were previously defined atop, with $G$ be the group generated by $\beta$. In order to identify $w$ according to $c = T_w^{\frac{1}{2}}(\beta) \mod p$, where $c$ is provided, with $c \in G$. One has to find solution for both of the chaotic maps problem in $G$ and the factorization of $n$.

2.3 Computational problems and random oracle models

In order to illustrate the security of our presented technique, we outline in the following a few essential mathematical characteristics of Chebyshev chaotic map:

1. If we are provided with a couple of elements $x$ and $y$, the discrete logarithm problem role is to identify an integer $s$, that satisfies $T_s(x) = y$.
2. If provided with three elements $x, T_r(x)$, and $T_s(x)$, the role of the Diffie-Hellman problem is to calculate elements $T_{rs}(x)$.
3. Random Oracle Model (ROM), where ROM is a security hypothesis, that affords a general framework for the security verification of information. The ROM has a totally a random hash function. If it is assumed that the hash function is able to furnish a wholly random oracle, the model may be treated as the excessive model among the ideal model and instantiation model [30].

3 The Proposed ID-BS Scheme

In the presented ID-based chaotic blind signature technique, ahead of signing of the message \( m \) by its signer, the message is blinded. When the sign procedure is completed, blind reduction procedure of the signed message is executed by provider of the message. Concurrently, we offer identity parameters via the hash combination of ID and private key \( x \). The chaotic signature is computed by utilizing the new hash value. The utilization of chaotic type blind signature is able to successfully avert the difficult procedure of bilinear pairing, and therefore may boost the algorithm effectiveness.

3.1 Requirements

The blind signature normally encompasses measures stated as follows [30]:

1. (Blind Transformation) the message \( m \) is transformed into message \( m' \) by the Message Provider and is then commissioned to the Message Signer.
2. (Sign) the collected message \( m' \) is signed by Message Signer and then the \( \text{Sig} (m') \) will be sent to the Message Provider.
3. (Blind Reduction) the \( \text{Sig} (m') \) will be operated on by the Message Provider to form \( \text{Sig} (m) \).
4. (Verify) to verify the signature, fulfillment of the associated mathematical relationship by the signature is inspected accordingly.

Table 1. Definition of parameters.

| Parameter | Definition |
|-----------|------------|
| \( \bar{p}, \bar{q} \) | a pair of prime random large numbers, where their product will be equal to \( n = \bar{p} \bar{q} \). |
| \( p \) | a prime number that is large, with \( n \) to be a factor of \( p - 1 \). |
| \( \alpha \) | belongs to \( GF(p) \) and it is an element with \( n \) as its order modulo \( p \), and \( \alpha \) generates the multiplicative group \( G \). |
| \( H(\cdot) \) | this is a cryptographic hash function that generates a length \( t \) bit outcome (where, \( t = 128 \) is assumed). |
| \( x, \bar{p}, \bar{q} \) | private keys. |
| \( ID \) | identity information. |
| \( m \) | original message. |
| \( m_h \) | message after blind. |
| \( \alpha, \lambda, k \) | random number. |
| \( y, \alpha, p, n \) | public keys. |
| \( (v, w) \) | original signature. |
| \( (\gamma, \delta) \) | final signature. |
3.2 Initialization phase

We outline the following parameters – see Table 1 – to illustrate our work.

3.3 Generating keys

The private key will be chosen as the result of randomly selecting an integer \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_n \) by the signer. Chose the ID to be used as the user identity. Pick a cryptographic hash function \( H_{\cdot}() \) to compute \( H_{\cdot}(x, ID) \). Then the public key is calculated as \( y \):

\[
y = T_{H_{\cdot}(x, ID)^2}^{\cdot}(\alpha) \mod p
\]

(3.1)

3.4 Signing and extraction

The Signing and extraction steps are as follows:

1. Message signer selects \( k \in \mathbb{Z}_n \), calculates \( v \) then sends it,

\[
v = T_k(\alpha) \pmod{p}
\]

(3.2)

2. (Blind transformation) randomly chosen by the Message Provider, the blind factor \( \lambda \in \mathbb{Z}_n \) is used in calculating,

\[
m' = m^2 T_\lambda^{-2}(v) \mod n
\]

(3.3)

3. (Sign) utilizing (3.4), \( w \) is computed by the Signer to be delivered to Message Provider.

\[
m' = (H_{\cdot}(x, ID)^2 v^4 + k^3 w^4) \pmod{n}
\]

(3.4)

4. (Blind Reduction) Message Provider calculates

\[
\gamma = v^2 T_\lambda^2(v) \pmod{n}
\]

(3.5)

\[
\delta = \lambda^{-1} w^2 T_\lambda(v) \pmod{n}
\]

(3.6)

Then the signature is, \((m, \gamma, \delta)\)

3.5 Signature verification

To authenticate the signature, the verifier inspects equitability of the following identity:

\[
[T_{m^2}(\alpha)]^2 + [T_{\gamma^2}(\gamma)]^2 + [T_{\delta^2}(\gamma)]^2 = 2T_{m^2}(\alpha) T_{\gamma^2}(\gamma) T_{\delta^2}(\gamma) + 1 \pmod{p}
\]

(3.7)

The subsequent theorem may be employed to prove that if a signature \((m, \gamma, \delta)\) of a message \( m \) is indeed formed by the presented partially blind signature technique.
\textbf{Theorem 3.1} Granted that a signature \((m, y, \delta)\) of the message \(m\) formed by the presented ID-BS scheme, then,

\[ [T_m^2(\alpha)]^2 + [T_y^2(y)]^2 + [T_{\delta^2}(\gamma)]^2 = 2T_m^2(\alpha) T_y^2(y) T_{\delta^2}(\gamma) + 1 \pmod{p} \quad (3.8) \]

Proof. We have to show that the signature \((m, y, \delta)\) satisfies:

\[ T_y^2(y) = T_v^4(\tau_{\alpha}(v))^2H_{(\alpha, x(y))}(\alpha) = T_v^4(\tau_{\alpha}(v))^2(H_{(\alpha, x(y))})^2(\alpha) \]

\[ T_{\delta^2}(\gamma) = T_{\delta^2}v^2 T_{\alpha}(v) \]

\[ = T_{\delta^2} T_{k^2}(\alpha) T_{\alpha^2}(\alpha) \]

\[ = T_{\delta^2} T_{k^2}(\alpha^2) (\alpha) \]

\[ = T_{\alpha^2} w^4(\tau_{\alpha}(v))^2k^3 \quad (\alpha) \]

Now,

\[ [T_m^2(\alpha)]^2 + [T_y^2(y)]^2 + [T_{\delta^2}(\gamma)]^2 = \]

\[ [T_m^2(\alpha)]^2 + [T_v^4(\tau_{\alpha}(v))^2(H_{(\alpha, x(y))})^2(\alpha)]^2 + [T_{k^2}(\tau_{\alpha}(v))^2k^3 \quad (\alpha)]^2 \]

Let \( t = m^2 \pmod{n}, r = w^4(\tau_{\alpha}(v))^2k^3 \pmod{n}, \)

\( s = v^4(\tau_{\alpha}(v))^2(H_{(\alpha, x(y))})^2 \mod{n} \) and \( t = r + s \pmod{n} \)

By Theorem (3)

\[ [T_m^2(\alpha)]^2 + [T_y^2(y)]^2 + [T_{\delta^2}(\gamma)]^2 = \]

\[ [T_m^2(\alpha)]^2 + [T_v^4(\tau_{\alpha}(v))^2(H_{(\alpha, x(y))})^2(\alpha)]^2 + [T_{k^2}(\tau_{\alpha}(v))^2k^3 \quad (\alpha)]^2 \]

\[ = 2T_m^2(\alpha) T_v^4(\tau_{\alpha}(v))^2(H_{(\alpha, x(y))})^2(\alpha) T_{k^2}(\tau_{\alpha}(v))^2k^3 \quad (\alpha) + 1 \]

\[ = 2T_m^2(\alpha) T_y^2(y) T_{\delta^2}(\gamma) + 1 \pmod{n} \]

Which means \((m, y, \delta)\) is a legitimate signature of \(m\). Therefore, our presented method yields a partially blind signature scheme.
4 Analysis of Our Proposed Scheme

4.1 Security analysis

We examine in this section a few security characteristics of our proposed ID-BS scheme. In order for an ID-BS scheme to be secure, it must fulfill the subsequent conditions.

Blindness: The property of blindness shared by all signatures composed by the signer embody an unambiguous shared information, which the message provider and the message signer consented upon. Although, the message provider is incapable of changing or eliminating the enclosed information, whereas retaining the feature of successful signature verification possible. Within our suggested scheme, a message provider is obligated to surrender to the signer the blinded data m, where in-turn the signer calculates m = (H(x, ID)\(\delta\)k\(\gamma\)−\(\gamma\)2\(\gamma\)3\(\gamma\)). Then, the recipient accordingly to fulfill, the other. In this scenario, Adv will in random fashion fix through allowing a single integer to be fixed, or fixing two integers, and determining the other. In this scenario, Adv will in random fashion fix either (m, \(\gamma\), \(\delta\)) or (\(\gamma\), \(\delta\)) accordingly to fulfill, as difficult chaotic maps problems and factorization, simultaneously.

\[\left[T_{m}^{2}(\alpha)\right]^{2} + \left[T_{\gamma}^{2}(\gamma)\right]^{2} + \left[T_{\delta}^{2}(\gamma)\right]^{2} = 2T_{m}^{2}(\alpha)T_{\gamma}^{2}(\gamma)T_{\delta}^{2}(\gamma) + 1 \pmod{p}\] (4.1)

Untraceability: Within this technique, it is inconceivable for Message Signer to figure out the connection among (\(\gamma\), \(\delta\)) by computing, where to unravel this problem corresponds to CM and FAC problems [30].

Unforgability: The complexity of unfolding the CM and FAC problems is the basis for the security of our technique. The adversary Adv could attempt to deduce a forged signature employing assorted plans, as depicted subsequently.

Attack 1: For a particular message m, Adv contends to unfold the signature (m, \(\gamma\), \(\delta\)) through allowing a single integer to be fixed, or fixing two integers, and determining the other. In this scenario, Adv will in random fashion fix either (m, \(\gamma\), \(\delta\)) or (\(\gamma\), \(\delta\)) according to fulfill,
Case 1: Assuming that Adv will fix the elements \((m, y)\) and attempts to resolve the value \(\delta\), consequently Adv is required to unravel the ensuing equations that may be obtained by simplifying the equation,

\[
\psi^2 - 2\psi T_{m^2}(\alpha) T_{y^2}(\gamma) + [T_{m^2}(\alpha)]^2 + [T_{y^2}(\gamma)]^2 - 1 \pmod{p}
\]

Thus, \(\psi\) may be retrieved by the subsequent equation:

\[
\psi = \frac{2T_{m^2}(\alpha) T_{y^2}(\gamma)}{2} + \sqrt{\left(2T_{m^2}(\alpha) T_{y^2}(\gamma)\right)^2 - 4\left([T_{m^2}(\alpha)]^2 + [T_{y^2}(\gamma)]^2 - 1\right) \pmod{2}}
\]

Although, it is impractical to determine \(\delta\) using \(\psi = T_{\delta^2}(\gamma)\) despite if s/he is able to find \(\psi\) from Eq. (4.2).

Lemma (2) indicates that this is slightly as burdensome as unraveling the chaotic maps problems and factorization of \(n\).

Case 2: Say Assuming that Adv will fix the elements \((m, \delta)\) and attempts to resolve the value \(\gamma\). At that point, her/his duty is more burdensome than Case 1 due to the fact that s/he should find \(\gamma\) through \(\eta = T_{y^2}(\gamma)\), wherein:

\[
\eta^2 - 2\eta T_{m^2}(\alpha) T_{\delta^2}(\gamma) + [T_{m^2}(\alpha)]^2 + [T_{\delta^2}(\gamma)]^2 - 1 \pmod{p}
\]

Lemma (2) indicates that this is slightly as burdensome as unraveling the chaotic maps problems and factorization of \(n\).

Case 3: Assuming that Adv will fix the elements \((\gamma, \delta)\) and attempts to resolve the value \(m\). Hence, her/his duty is more burdensome than Case 1, since s/he has to find \(\xi = T_{m^2}(\alpha)\) relying on the equation:

\[
\xi^2 - 2\xi T_{y^2}(\gamma) T_{\delta^2}(\gamma) + [T_{y^2}(\gamma)]^2 + [T_{\delta^2}(\gamma)]^2 - 1 \pmod{p}
\]

Lemma (2) indicates that this is slightly as burdensome as unraveling the chaotic maps problems and factorization of \(n\).

Attack 2: If we presume that Ad manages to figure out the chaotic maps problem, at this point, Adv knows \(H^2(x, ID)\). Distressingly, s/he is incapable of computing \(w^4 \equiv (m^2 - H(x, ID)^2 v^2) k^{-3} \pmod{n}\) and \(\delta = \lambda^{-1} w^2 T_{j^2}(v) \pmod{n}\), which will result in failure to create the signature \((m, y, \delta)\).

Attack 3: If we t is assumed that Ad is able to solve factoring problem, which means he knows the prime factorization of \(n\) i.e. p and q: However, he cannot compute since no information on \(H^2(x, ID)\) is available, hence he cannot compute \(w\) and \(\gamma = v^2 T_{\delta^2}(v)\). Thus, fails to produce the signature \((m, y, \delta)\).

Attack 4: Adv can possibly contend gathering \(t\) valid signatures \((m_j, y_j, \delta_j)\) of message \(M_j\), wherein \(j = 1, 2, 3, ..., t\), in order to try to bring about the signature scheme secret keys. At this stage, Adv retains a set of equations conforming to:

\[
m_1^2 = \left(T_{\lambda^2}(v_1)\right)^2 \left[w_1^4 k_1^2 + v_1^4 \left(H(x, ID)^2\right)\right] \pmod{n}
\]
The above set of equations contains a number of variables equals to \((4s + 1)\) i.e., \(\lambda_j, v_j, k_j, w_j,\) and \(x,\) in which \(j = 1, 2, 3, ..., t\), that are all unknown to the Adv. Hence, \(x\) remains hard to be obtained as Adv will generate an infinite number of solutions to the system of equations depicted atop and is incapable of identifying which is factual choice.

### 4.2 Performance comparison

The Chebyshev polynomial computation problem provides a reduced size key when compared to other public key cryptosystems, in addition to rapid computing, along with bandwidth, memory and energy conservation. The Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) has large complexity in terms of computations. When assimilated with the encryption algorithm of the ECC method, the encryption algorithm of chaotic maps evades scalar multiplication and modular exponentiation calculations, dramatically enhancing the efficiency. For the sake of facilitating the cost evaluation process of computational requirements, Table 2 defines the notations and Execution time(s) [21, 32].

Table 3 depicts the computational cost comparison of between the proposed scheme and the scheme in [30,31]. It is apparent that the proposed scheme has better efficiency when assimilated with the techniques proposed in [30,31]. Our scheme requires only \(0.33249s\), while their schemes needs \(37.6456s,\) and \(48.44278s,\) accordingly.

| Notation | Definition | Execution time(s) |
|----------|------------|-------------------|
| \(T_h\)  | Required time to compute hash function | \(T_h \approx 0.005s\) |
| \(T_{exp}\) | Time complexity of an exponentiation | \(T_{exp} \approx 5.37s\) |
| \(T_{ch}\) | Required time to compute extended chaotic function | \(T_{ch} \approx 0.032s\) |
| \(T_{mul}\) | Required time to compute multiplication function | \(T_{mul} \approx 0.00207s\) |
| \(T_{inv}\) | Required time to compute inverse function | \(T_{inv} = 0.0207s\) |
Table 3. Performance comparisons among our scheme and schemes in [30, 31]

| Phases        | Message       | Message Verification | Total signature | provider       | cost                |
|---------------|---------------|----------------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------|
| The proposed scheme | Time complexity cost | $T_{ch} + T_h$ +13$T_{mul}$ | $3T_{ch}$ + $9T_{exp}$ + $2T_{inv}$ | 0.15603 | 0.11256 + 0.33249 |
| Time complexity cost | Execution Time(s) | 0.0639               |                 |                |                     |
| The scheme in [30] | Time complexity cost | $T_{exp}$ + $T_h$ + $2T_{inv}$ | $3T_{exp}$ + $2T_{inv}$ + $T_{mul}$ | 16 1538 | 16.1128 + 37.4656 |
| Time complexity cost | Execution Time(s) | 5.379                |                 |                |                     |
| The Scheme in [31] | Time complexity cost | $2T_{exp}$ + $T_h$ + $2T_{mul}$ | $3T_{exp}$ + $2T_h$ + $11T_{mul}$ + $4T_{inv}$ | 16.2256 | 21.49 + 48.4618 |
| Time complexity cost | Execution Time(s) | 10.749               |                 |                |                     |

5 Numerical Simulation of the ID-BS

Suppose that a signer desires to sign an original message $m = 322$. A signer sets up the scheme with $p = 47$, $q = 59$, $n = 2773$, $p = 11093$, $a = 100$ is an element in $GF(p)$ whose order modulo $p$ is $n$.

5.1 Generating keys

The signer randomly picks an integer $x = 27 \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ to be the private key. ID for user identity, calculates $H_1(27, ID) = 137$. Then calculates $y$, is the public key

$$y = T_{137^2 \mod 2773}(100) = T_{2131}(100) \mod 11093 = 980$$

5.2 Signing and extraction

The results of signing and extraction are as follows:

1. Message signer select $k = 2551 \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ calculates $v$ then sends it

$$v = T_{2551}(100) \mod 11093 = 8875$$

2. (Blind transformation) Message Provider randomly selects $\lambda = 2331 \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ calculate

$$m' = 322^2 T_{2331}^2(8875) \mod 2773 = 1083(1895)^{-2} \mod 2773 = 169$$
3. (Sign) Signer gets $w$ and sends to Message Provider.

$$w^4 \equiv (m' - H_x(x, ID)^2 v^4)k^{-3} \mod n$$

$$\equiv (169 - 2131(2169))135$$

$$w^4 \equiv 947 \mod 2773$$

$$w \equiv 133 \mod 2773$$

(Blind Reduction) Message Provider calculates

$$\gamma = (8875)^2 T_{(2331)^2 \mod 2773}(8875) \mod 2773$$

$$= 1333 (8422) \mod 2773$$

$$= 1422$$

$$\delta = (2331)^{-1}(133)^2 T_{2331}(8875) \mod 2773$$

$$= 1123(1051)(10403) \mod 2773 = 1883$$

Then the signature is $(322, 1422, 1883)$

5.3 Signature verification

To examine the authentic of the signature, the verifier performs a check of fulfilment of the equality of,

$$[T_{m^2}(\alpha)]^2 + [T_{\gamma^2}(\gamma)]^2 + [T_{\delta^2}(\gamma)]^2 = 2T_{m^2}(\alpha) T_{\gamma^2}(\gamma) T_{\delta^2}(\gamma) + 1 \mod p$$

$$[T_{m^2}(\alpha)]^2 + [T_{\gamma^2}(\gamma)]^2 + [T_{\delta^2}(\gamma)]^2 = [1416]^2 + [8074]^2 + [189]^4 \mod 11093$$

$$= 3599$$

$$2T_{m^2}(\alpha) T_{\gamma^2}(\gamma) T_{\delta^2}(\gamma) + 1 = 2(189)(8074)(189) + 1 \mod 11093$$

$$= 3599$$

6 Conclusion

This paper suggested a secure ID-BS technique that relies on the chaotic map and factoring problems. The presented approach utilizes a smaller number of bits and lower computation cost due to the inherence of CM as compared to its ID-BS scheme counterparts presented in the relevant literature. In order to enhance the security of the algorithm under the random oracle model, a hash function was brought-out and employed.
The ability of our scheme to offer superb reliability and security in addition to efficiency renders our presented scheme more suited for rational applications.

7 References

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