FROM NATIONAL TO INTERNATIONAL – KONRAD ZILLIACUS AND THE FINNISH CAUSE

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In October 1904, while the Russian Empire fought against Japan in the Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905), representatives of the Russian revolutionary parties and national minorities of the Russian Empire gathered in Paris. Their aim was to build a common strategy for overthrowing the Tsarist regime. For this, the Paris Conference tried to unite the opposition forces from right to left. A Finnish journalist, writer and political activist, Konrad (Konni) Zilliacus (1855–1924) played an important role in organising this international event. Zilliacus’s attempts to unite the opposition forces of the Tsarist regime, as well as his cooperation with the Japanese military attaché Motojiro Akashi, have been discussed in several studies, especially in Finland. However, Zilliacus’s thoughts on nationalism and international cooperation are less discussed. The paper analyses the concepts of nationalism and internationalism in the context of Swedish-speaking elite in Finland, as well as in Konrad Zilliacus’s writings and political activism. As a journalist, writer and political activist, Zilliacus represented the younger generation of the Finnish elite, which did not accept the Tsarist regime’s unification attempts. Passive resistance, which was the Constitutionalists’ means of resisting Russification, was not enough for Zilliacus, who became radicalised as the Tsarist regime introduced new unifying decrees. Konrad Zilliacus, who decided to seek support from the Russian revolutionaries. He believed that the Russo-Japanese war would lead to a revolutionary upheaval in the Empire, and this would help Finland in its struggle for autonomy. Zilliacus creates an interesting case in the discussion of national and political radicalism. Analysing his writings in the newspapers and his memoirs, the paper investigates what kind of nationalist and internationalist Konrad Zilliacus was.

Key words: Grand Duchy of Finland, nationalism, internationalism, activism, Russo-Japanese war, revolutionary parties, Russification, elites, minorities.

Introduction

Konrad (Konni) Zilliacus (1855–1924) was a journalist, writer and activist who played an interesting role in the history of Finnish activism during the first period of Russification (1899–1905) in the Grand Duchy of Finland.

He began his political activism as part of the group known as the Constitutionalists, who argued that the Finnish Constitution formed the basis of the relationship between the Finnish Grand Duchy and Russia [Seitkari, 1960, p. 19–29; Stubb, 2012]. Passive resistance, which was the Constitutionalists’ means of resisting Russification, was not enough for Zilliacus, who became radicalised as the Tsarist regime introduced new unifying decrees. Konrad Zilliacus started to advocate for active resistance, with the aim of not only resisting the unification process but also of overthrowing the Tsarist regime.

The turn of the 19th and 20th century brought the questions of nationalism and internationalism into the fore. Bound with modernity that introduced both internationalism and political nationalism, the relationship of these concepts has often seen as antithetical or even antagonistic. Despite that the end of the 19th century was an apogee for nationalism, it also marked an increasing activity of international organisations and significance of internationalism [Sluga, 2013, p. 11–14]. The relationship between nationalism and internationalism is more complex, which the case of Zilliacus illuminates well.

Zilliacus’ attempts to bring the enemies of the Tsar together in the international conference in Paris in 1904 and negotiations with the Japanese military attaché, Motojiro Akashi, during the Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905), as well as the case of John Crafton, have been mentioned in several prior
studies, which discuss the first period of Russification and Finnish nationalism and activism [Kujala, 1989; Kujala 1992]. Zilliacus’ views on nationalism and internationalism, however, have received less attention in the history of Finnish activism.

Zilliacus is an interesting paradox. He was an active agent for the Finnish opposition party, the Constitutionalists, and one of the founders of the Activist party, both of which were aligned at the right wing of the political spectrum. Despite this fact, Zilliacus created close connections with Russian revolutionaries. To aid the Finnish cause, Zilliacus was ready to unite with far-left radicals as well as Finnish and Polish nationalists.

The Finnish researcher Antti Kujala has analysed the Finnish activists’ relationship with the Russian revolutionary parties. This well-documented study explores the connections by using accounts and correspondence of the different actors, which are also published from the archives (Akashi et al., 1988). Zilliacus himself wrote about these relationships in two books: Det revolutionära Ryssland (Revolutionary Russia), which was published in 1903 (Zilliacus, 1903), and Från ofärdstid och oroliga år: politiska minnen (Memories from the Russification period), which was translated into Finnish and published in 1920 (Zilliacus, 1920)1.

This paper is a micro-level study of Konrad Zilliacus and his understanding of the Finnish state and international cooperation and how changes in the political landscape in Russia and Finland influenced his views. How did a well-educated representative of the Swedish-speaking elite, a writer, a journalist and a nationalist become connected with the Russian revolutionaries and socialists? To understand the nature of Zilliacus’ relationship with the Russian revolutionaries, this study utilises Halliday’s concepts on internationalism [Halliday, 1988].

This article analyses Zilliacus’ writings — his memoirs, books and articles. Zilliacus wrote many articles for the newspaper Fria Ord and published several books concerning Finnish history and Revolutionary Russia between 1901 and 1905 [Zilliacus 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904]. His personal history and strong international ties can be analysed via the concepts of nationalism and internationalism. Was Zilliacus a nationalist or an internationalist?

**Zilliacus as a nationalist and a Constitutionalist**

Konrad Zilliacus offers an interesting case of the radicalisation of the Russian Empire’s national elites’ younger generation in the late 19th century. Although there are many examples of national radicalisation during this time, as for example the cases of Mykhailo Hrushevsky [Plokhy, 2005, p. 25–91] in Ukraine, Noe Zhordania [Suny, 1994, p. 157–144–145, 157–164] in Georgia and Joseph Piłsudski [Chernov, 1935, p. 147–150] in Poland shows, Zilliacus’ case highlights the question of internationalism in this process.

The national elite’s radicalisation in the Russian empire had similar trends. However, Zilliacus’ nationalism and internationalism can be understood best in the context of Finnish nationalism at the end of the 19th century, and in this way it illustrates how the path towards Finnish independence was created. Finnish nationalism, which was developed by the Swedish-speaking elite, tried to unite the elite and the Finnish-speaking peasants by nurturing the Finnish language and culture and by proposing the idea of a Finnish state [Alapuro, 1979, p. 25–28]. For the Swedish-speaking elite, however, the emphasis was especially on Finnish statehood. Zilliacus was part of this elite, since his farther was Senator Henrik Zilliacus [Gummerus, 1933, p. 9–10]. Konrad Zilliacus also had German roots, which was typical of the multinational elite in the Russian Empire, including Finland.

Zilliacus’ nationalist awakening occurred while he was abroad, after he had been forced to leave Finland in 1889. He escaped bankruptcy after an unfortunate business venture and subsequent scandal, leaving his wife Louise Ehrmrooth, whom he had married ten years earlier [Hilpinen, 2017, 167–168]. He took a job as a correspondent for several Finnish newspapers and wrote about Finnish immigrants in the United States. Zilliacus’ years as a correspondent in the United States gave him a different understanding of Finns and their culture, since many of the immigrants did not share his social status. Zilliacus’ friend and biographer, Herman Gummerus, describes vividly how the problems of immigration and nationalism became more concrete for Zilliacus during his years in the United States [Gummerus, 1933, p. 19–20]. As with many of his fellow countrymen, Zilliacus suffered from a constant lack of money, which put him into the same position with other immigrants in the United States. Eventually, he had to turn to manual labour in order to survive [Gummerus, 1933, p. 38].
It seems that Zilliacus’ nationalism grew during his time in the United States. Most of the Finns he met spoke Finnish, and the question of how to maintain their native language in this environment became of great importance to Zilliacus. At the same time, news from Finland became more worrisome.

As a part of the Russian Empire, Finland managed to create many political and governmental institutions, including its own legislature, postal services and customs, finance and credit systems. Finland was also freed from providing recruits for military service, and it had its own system of national self-governance with Finnish civil servants. These institutions came under threat when unification processes were intensified within the Russian Empire [Kappeler, Clayton, 2013, p. 260]. In February of 1899, Tsar Nikolai II issued a manifesto stating that the Tsar had a right to issue laws in Finland without consulting the representative organs of the Finnish Grand Duchy. The reasons for this unification process had much more to do with the foreign and security policy of the Russian Empire than with the exceptional status of Finland. Finns, however, viewed the unification process as direct threat to their autonomy and desires for nationhood.

The so-called first Russification period divided the Finnish elite over the question of how to defend their autonomy. The Fennoman Party (suomettarelaiset) was a conservative party whose strategy was to strengthen the Finnish language and its status in the process of creating Finnish nationhood [Liikanen, 1995]. At the beginning of the Russification period, its leadership chose as its tactic not to resist the new decrees. It estimated that by avoiding conflicts and strengthening the Finnish language, the Finnish nation would have better chances to survive [Rommi, 1960]. The younger generation (nuorsuomalaiset) challenged this tactic by relying on a legal argument. The Swedish-speaking elite perceived Finland as a constituent state. This perception was based on the Finnish Constitution, which guaranteed Finland’s autonomy within the Russian Empire and which the Finnish elite considered intact. Together with the Swedish Party, which opposed the policies of the Fennoman Party, they formed a group known as the Constitutionalists (perustuslailliset) [Mickelsson, 2006; Alapuro (ed.), 1987; Jussila, 2004]. This group, which was led by Senator Leo Mechelin, adopted the strategy of passive resistance [Hyvämäki, 1960]. The Constitutionalists urged the Finnish people to ignore the new Russian laws and to resist being drafted into the Russian army.

Zilliacus, who had received legal training, shared the perception of Finland as a constituent state. For him, any changes to this status were unjust. In his memoirs, entitled Sortovuosilta (Years of Oppression), Zilliacus acknowledges that his experiences in the United States and the news from home had influenced him greatly. He reacted emotionally when the case of Finland was discussed and whether Russian demands for the unification process were justified or should be challenged (Zilliacus, 1920, p. 7). Zilliacus describes vividly how the Finnish elite was bewildered about how to react to the February Manifesto and the feeling of betrayal that the manifesto caused.

The Constitutionalists’ passive resistance, which included international networking and publicity, provided the perfect platform for Konrad Zilliacus to act upon. His career as writer, novelist and journalist began to flourish in the beginning of the 1890s. He published several books, such as Mariquita och andra historier från verldens utkanter (1890), Utvandrarehistorier (1892), Nägra landsmän jag träffat (1895), Nya utvandrarehistorier (1897) and Indiankriet : amerikanska gränsmarkshistorier (1898). In 1893, he managed to reach an agreement on a new book, the research for which took him all over the world, and eventually, after witnessing many events, he landed in Japan. After spending two years in Japan, Zilliacus arrived in Paris in 1897 together with his new family. Finally, in 1898 he returned to Finland, where he started to work for a journal called Nya Pressen. His political and national writings immediately received the Russian regime’s attention (“Skriftsällaren Konni Zilliacus”, 1900, p. 1–2). When the paper was closed in the summer of 1900, the Constitutionalists, many of whom now lived in Stockholm, started to publish a new journal called Fria Ord (Free Word), where Zilliacus continued his writing career.

His first writings in Fria Ord were reports of recent developments in Helsinki. The topics he discussed in the paper included censorship and the unjust decisions by the new Governor-General of Finland, Nikolay Bobrikov. For Zilliacus, Finnishness meant obeying the law, and consequently, Russianness came to mean the opposite:

“The new police chief has started his work, as has the new governor, and the consequences of this has become evident in the recent house searches. That the police chief has been willing to impose
such a thing could be understood [as meaning] that he is ignorant of the laws and legality in Finland. But this would be childish to believe from the Russian governor. His view is probably no more than typically Russian: that laws and regulations are to be broken or circumvented if obeying the law would come with obvious risk.” (“Helsingforsbref”, 1901, p. 2–3.)

For Zilliacus and the other Constitutionalists, the law and legality had different meanings depending on whether they were Finnish or Russian laws. The need to obey the law was restricted only to Finnish law. Passive resistance meant that the laws and statutes issued by Russians were to be neglected since they had not been discussed and prepared by the Finnish Senate. To put a stop to such resistance, Governor-General Bobrikov received a special mandate in 1903. His mandate included the power to exile any disobedient Finnish elite, which he also used in the case of many of the Constitutionalists. Instead of putting a stop to Finnish resistance, this manoeuvre by the Tsar radicalised many of the younger members of the Constitutionalists, many of whom also belonged to the cultural elite in Finland.

The Finnish historian Matti Lauerma has discussed how the passive resistance of the Constitutionalists changed into active resistance – into the idea that violence needs to be met with violence [Lauerma, 1960, p. 138]. In the case of Zilliacus, this process had started already in 1901. Zilliacus urged the readers of Fria Ord to take action, which appealed to the younger generation of Constitutionalists. The older generation was, however, reluctant to start an open conflict with the Tsarist regime because they thought it would be devastating for the party. Governor-General Bobrikov’s actions and the conservatism of the older Constitutionalists caused the younger generation to demand taking more severe actions against Russification.

Konrad Zilliacus was close to the Kagal organisation, which was founded to resist Russification as an underground movement. His brother and many of his friends were part of the organisation. Although he was not part of the Kagal’s leadership, Zilliacus actively helped out in many ways. Minutes from a Kagal meeting held in April 1903 emphasised the need to involve a large stratum of Finnish society in the resistance movement. Information spread by the newspapers played a significant role in this resistance movement:

“Papers like Fria Ord and Vapaat lehdet have been valued by several speakers. People have largely acknowledged that this is the only way to follow state-level developments in our country.” (“Kagalin” arkisto, 1939, p. 252.)

Fria Ord was printed in Stockholm and the Constitutionalists needed to smuggle it into Finland. Here, Zilliacus became an important actor because he smuggled copies the paper to Finland using a boat built for such a purpose. His smuggling activities expanded also to become part of a larger network, which moved publications of all kind as well as people between the Russian Empire and Sweden. In his memoirs, Zilliacus describes in detail how he had organised the operations and what kind of game had gone on between the Tsarist authorities and Finnish activists (Zilliacus, 1920, p. 92–93). It was also at this time that Zilliacus came into contact with Russian revolutionaries. He rented his boat to them and helped them smuggle revolutionary publications and other revolutionaries across the border.

Zilliacus as an activist and an internationalist

The 1848 Communist Manifesto urged workers (the proletariat) to unite and look past national boundaries. Many of the Russian revolutionaries advocated for internationalism and, in line with this, sought greater international cooperation. For the Finnish Constitutionalists and activists, internationalism meant something different.

Fred Halliday has identified three different concepts of internationalism: liberal, hegemonic and revolutionary internationalism [Halliday, 1988]. By liberal internationalism Halliday refers to interaction and cooperation of the societies and individuals, which purpose is often to encourage the emergence of sovereign nation-states, which then can work together in the international level. This is often conducted in the context of empires, which practices Halliday calls as hegemonic internationalism. To the opposite of liberal internationalism, revolutionary internationalism downplays the efficacy of divisions between the states and of national ideologies and identifications. Conflicts within societies are determined also by international factors [Halliday, 1988, p. 7–11].

Zilliacus’ internationalism was first a liberal kind of internationalism, in which he tried through cooperation and common goals to fight against hegemonic internationalism – against imperialism as
well as cultural and linguistic pressure. When Zilliacus moved to Stockholm in the autumn 1902, he started to cooperate with Leo Mechelin, who now lived there with the other exiled Constitutionalists. Mechelin sought international support for the Finnish cause, and Zilliacus helped him to establish the networks. One of the projects was to collect the addresses of international cultural activists who had expressed their support for Finland, which the Constitutionalists then tried to deliver to the Tsar.

However, the International Address did not have the impact that Zilliacus and others had hoped, and Zilliacus became frustrated:

“We must seek help, other help than before, to be able to operate our defence more vigorously than hitherto against the intrusive power of the autocracy. Our own efforts have not been fulfilled, despite the civilised world’s opinion and support, which has been expressed by leading cultural figures. Because of practical political reasons, Europe will never give material support to us despite its perception that what has happened to us is unjust. … Now the time has come to approach our brothers in destiny, to get to know their aspirations, their goals and their means of achieving them. It should be time for us and everyone else in the same position to agree to fight for everyone’s common cause, to combine forces and, in this way, have far greater prospects of success than when fighting as separate nationalities, groups and individuals. … In other words, we no longer have any valid reason to keep us from cooperating with the Russian opposition, with the Russians who are officially called revolutionaries, although they only want through regime change to receive a life worthy of living — the kind of life that is being robbed from us.” (“Den ryska oppositionen och Finlands framtid”, 1902, p. 3.)

To describe in more detail who the Russian revolutionaries were, he published in 1903 a book entitled *Det revolutionära Ryssland*, which described the activities of the Russian revolutionary movement starting from the Decembrists, to the assassination of Alexander II, and continuing all the way to the most recent revolutionary activities at the beginning of the 20th century [Zilliacus, 1904].

The Russian revolutionaries were also now more open to cooperation. The Russian revolutionary parties’ attitudes towards the Constitutionalists were positive, but cautious, and only when Zilliacus and other activists joined with the Finnish Social Democrats on the political scene did cooperation become possible [Kujala, 1992, p. 179]. Those involved expressed different viewpoints regarding what would be the status of national minorities in the Russian Empire after the regime change. The Finns as well as the other minority nationalities thought the Russian Social Democrats’ views were too centralised and therefore, the national oppositional parties usually preferred the Socialist Revolutionaries’ model, which was based on the federative model with autonomous status for these regions [Kujala, 1992, p. 180–181]. Zilliacus’ idea was to unite all the forces that were resisting the Tsarist regime, including the Russian revolutionaries and Polish nationalists.

The First Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895 and the question over influence in Korea provoked tension between Russia, Japan, Britain and Germany [Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, 2006, p. 24–33]. Zilliacus actively followed world politics and kept thinking about Finland’s case within the framework of the great power politics of empires in Asia. Disputes over Korea and Manchuria continued for several years between Japan and Russia [Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, 2006, p. 39–43]. In these disputes, Zilliacus saw momentum for Finland’s cause. According to his 1901 analysis of tensions in Asia, Finland had a chance of regaining its autonomy if Russia went to war and would be weaker internally (Storpolitik, 1901, p. 5–6). In 1901, he wrote the following:

“War is a game where the winning side must be subject to heavy losses, sometimes so large that this win turns into a negative, into a final loss. This was the case, for example, with Russia after its last war against Turkey, when extreme disorder in the [state’s] finances led to reorganisation of the army, internal discontent and revolutionary movements that tied Russia’s hands in the [arena of] great power politics. Similar circumstances could make these powers even weaker but could benefit those who have nothing to lose but everything to gain. For them, in certain political conjugations, there is a chance, if they have been observant and patient, to react immediately and make the last effort at the great game of freedom and human rights.” (“Storpolitik”, 1901, p. 6.)

When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in February 1904, Zilliacus already had a functioning network of national opposition parties and Russian revolutionary parties.
Liberal or revolutionary internationalist?

Zilliacus’s attempt to benefit from the conflict and to collaborate with the oppositional and revolutionary parties resembles Halliday’s concept of revolutionary internationalism, which sees international conflicts emerge as a result of the unjust systems and calls for cooperation to change the situation.

“For many years I had tried to follow the development of the Russian revolutionary movement and had contacts with most of the leaders of this movement, both with the radicals and moderates. And judging from my experience, it was clear that this war has created turbulence in Russia, which grew every day and reached new groups in society.” (Zilliacus, 1920, p. 101.)

Zilliacus saw an opportunity for the Finns in the upcoming war; for the Finns to be successful, collaboration between the Revolutionaries and Polish nationalists would be needed.

Zilliacus began to unite different opposition forces within the Russian Empire. In this project, Zilliacus received help from the Japanese military attaché, Motojiro Akashi. Akashi’s reports illuminate the other side of this story, telling how Zilliacus’ ideas and attempts were received by Japanese and Russian actors (Akashi et al., 1989). By comparing Zilliacus’ memoirs and Motojiro Akashi’s reports, it is possible to understand how Zilliacus understood international cooperation between the different parties.

According to Akashi’s report, he and Zilliacus had met in Stockholm in 1903, when Akashi tried to establish contacts with the Constitutionalists, whom he considered to be an opposition party. The leaders of the Constitutionalists quickly declined his request for discussions; instead, Zilliacus was sent to meet with Akashi. Zilliacus seemed to understand Akashi’s needs, and they began to exchange information. Zilliacus, on the other hand, claims in his memoirs that he took the initiative in contacting Akashi in order to promote his idea of convincing Polish soldiers to abandon the Russian army. According to his account, he gained Akashi’s trust because of the book on Japan that Zilliacus had written (Zilliacus, 1920, p. 98–99). It is difficult to establish which account is closer to the truth, but both accounts address Zilliacus’ ability to understand and engage with the Japanese government’s representative. The idea of uniting the oppositional forces suited both Zilliacus and Akashi.

Zilliacus describes in his memoirs how he had established contacts with the Russian opposition parties, especially with Socialist Revolutionaries and the group of Russian liberals which he calls in his memoirs the Kadet-party, when he had smuggled copies of Fria Ord and other written materials from Stockholm to Finland. During such trips, Zilliacus had also helped the parties smuggle their writings from Europe into Russia (Zilliacus, 1920, p. 102). Zilliacus acknowledged that he discussed the idea of uniting these different oppositional parties with Akashi, who supported the idea. The discussions needed to be kept secret, though, since both Zilliacus and Akashi were not sure “how sensitive and patriotic even the reddest revolutionaries could be” (Zilliacus, 1920, p. 106).

When Zilliacus was in Europe to negotiate the organisation of the Paris Conference, Japan attacked Port Arthur and war broke out on 8 February 1904, forcing Zilliacus to return home. According to Akashi, Zilliacus had been in correspondence with Nikolai Vasilyevich Chaikovskii, and he seemed to be building a network around the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Akashi reported that Zilliacus had an idea about how to organise the conference:

"I quite agree with him (Chaikovskii) that the opposition parties should unite with the Socialist Revolutionary Party as the focal point. You would doubtless feel it disgraceful that patriots who have their own political opinions and hope to promote the public welfare make plans for disruption at home during a national crisis, but this is not the correct way to understand Russian domestic affairs. On the one hand, no one needs to be convinced that the Russo-Japanese War will lead to the overthrow of the imperial regime. On the other, the so-called Nihilists, who call both the Emperor and government officials devils for pillaging the country and causing distress, believe that they are destined to destroy those devils and let people live peacefully. So, it is appropriate that activist parties like Chaikovskii’s group should consider the outbreak of the war as a favourable opportunity for their activities." (Akashi et al., 1988, p. 37.)

It was in Akashi’s interests to advance Zilliacus’s attempts to unite the oppositional forces against the Russian Tsar. They both had the same goal – to overthrow the Tsar. However, whereas Akashi’s goal was to win the war, Zilliacus’s goal was to increase Finnish autonomy. Therefore, Zilliacus’s aim was to collaborate with those who were prone to increase autonomy for Finland.
Despite these different goals, they travelled to meet Russian revolutionary parties in Europe. In June 1904, both Zilliacus and Akashi consulted the Georgian and Armenian opposition parties, and in June in Switzerland they met with different Russian opposition parties, including the Social Democrats and Jewish Labour Bund. Akashi described Zilliacus' role in this as follows:

"The greatest obstacle to making a plan for uniting the opposition parties was the frictions and jealousies among these parties. Even though they had the same goal of creating unity among themselves, it was always impossible for them to stop suspecting each other: the Socialist Revolutionary Party competed with the Social Democratic Party; enmity between the Polish Nationalist Party and the Polish Socialist Party was unavoidable as a matter of principle; and it was impossible to circumvent the influence of history on relations between nations, as in the case of the Russians and Poles. The mediator among these parties was Zilliacus. As a Finn, he had not been involved in conflicts over principles and over territory and had also had many friends among members of the former Nihilist Party; he not only maintained good relations with both the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats, but had some friends among the Finnish Constitutionalists and the Russian Liberal Party."

(Akashi et al., 1988, p. 39.)

Zilliacus saw his own role also as that of a mediator. He was proud that he had contacts with these parties, either through the Constitutionalists, as in the case of the Russian liberals, or through his personal contacts made during the time of smuggling literature, as in the case of the Russian revolutionaries:

"And as the person who delivered their journals and other literature, I, if anyone, had a chance to get support (for this idea)." (Zilliacus, 1920, p. 104).

Still, not everyone trusted Zilliacus, even if he had helped them to smuggle their political material from Europe into Russia. The Russian revolutionary parties were well aware that Zilliacus' money came from Japan. (Akashi et al., 1988, p. 119). According to Zilliacus, the Social Democrats, who were in conflict with the Socialist Revolutionaries, were suspicious of everyone, and they did not want to cooperate with others. Even though Zilliacus met with Plekhanov, he did not receive a positive reply from the party.

Zilliacus acknowledged that his enterprise was difficult. The parties had different agendas, and in many cases they were in conflict with each other. Zilliacus made it clear that his goal was to overthrow the Tsar, but he did not offer any political programme that would follow this event. It was evident, however, that Zilliacus was not a socialist:

"The only party that was left was the Jewish Bund, which I decided to leave alone for now, because, first, it was a pure labour party and, as such, was interested only in this issue and only after this in great power politics, and second, it was so ultra-theoretically socialist that there was hardly any place and meaning for anything other than socialist views. This is true also of the Socialist Revolutionaries, but in their case, there is still hope that they could include also other demands than purely socialist ones, since general revolution would create for them great opportunities." (Zilliacus, 1920, 106.)

According to Antti Kujala, both the Finnish Constitutionalists and Zilliacus were much less separatist and Russophobic than a considerable part of the Polish opposition movement, which made it easier for the Russian revolutionary parties to approach the Constitutionalists and Zilliacus. [Kujala, 1992, p. 182] While the Constitutionalists found their counterparts in the Russian liberals, Zilliacus' closest comrades came from the Social Revolutionary Party.

Although in many cases Zilliacus' relations with the Russian revolutionaries had only an instrumental value, it seems that he genuinely liked most Socialist Revolutionaries and especially one of their leaders, Nikolai Chaikovskii. He describes him as a veteran of the movement along with Kropotkin and as "a nice man". Zilliacus' positive attitude towards Chaikovskii can be explained by the fact that Chaikovskii supported his idea and in many ways tried to make the conference possible (Zilliacus, 1920, p. 107). Moreover, Chaikovskii's story was similar to Zilliacus' own personal history. As with Zilliacus, he had spent years in the United States and, despite his social origins, also had experience with manual labour. He also represented the moderate wing of the Socialist Revolutionaries [Golodin, 2001, p. 22–41].

In October 1904, the All-Russian Congress for oppositional and revolutionary parties was finally organised in Paris. Zilliacus served as chairman of this congress, in which all the larger opposi-
tion parties except for the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks took part. The resolution of this conference demanded autonomy for all Russian minority nationalities. At this conference, Zilliacus agreed with the Russian revolutionaries and with the Polish nationalists that cooperation against the Tsarist regime would continue and develop. The resolution of this conference and the plan for resistance were published for all to read.

Despite all of Zilliacus’ efforts, the Paris Conference was in many ways a disappointment for him. He had hoped that the view of a common enemy would form among the participants an understanding about the goals and measures as to how to achieve them. According to Zilliacus, the result of the conference — the resolution — was so weak that it had no practical meaning. The resolution did however contain two important provisions for Zilliacus. One was the clause on the autonomy of the national minorities and the other the idea of tactics, the latter of which would lead to the revolution.

Another disappointment for Zilliacus was that the Constitutionalists, led by Leo Mechelin, refused to sign the resolution (Zilliacus, 1920, p. 132, 136–138). Despite the fact that the resolution condemned autocracy and the violations against the Finnish Constitution, the Constitutionalists were afraid that their cause would be suffer from perceived cooperation with the Russian revolutionaries. Moreover, most of the Finnish Constitutionalists were conservative social reformists, who were ideologically far from the radicals of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party and the Social Revolutionary Party. Furthermore, the case of Finland was to be discussed at the level of the international community, since the case was about the Finnish state and Finnish nationhood. Therefore, Leo Mechelin chose to continue putting pressure on the Tsar with the help of international scientific and cultural elites. Instead of active resistance, most of the Constitutionalists wanted to continue their political activities within the framework of parliamentary activities.

Zilliacus continued to coordinate cooperation between the parties. His attempts were also known to the Russian secret police. On 7 March 1905 the head of Finnish gendarmerie received a letter from the police department informing them that “Finnish socialist Konni Zilliacus is organising a second conference, which will discuss the question of armed mutiny” (Kansallisarkisto S3:16, N. 799). Zilliacus, however, was not responsible for the actual activities of the conference. The Geneva Conference was conducted without his participation and the result of it had no meaning for the Finnish activists.

**Return to national goals: The Finnish Party of Active Resistance and the Union of Force**

Disappointed, Zilliacus organised a new party, the Finnish Party of Active Resistance (Suomen aktiivinen vastustuspuolue), whose aim was armed mutiny and terrorist attacks against Russian authorities. At its founding conference on 17 November 1904, Johannes Gummerus was chosen as the leader of this party. However, in the eyes of Russian authorities in Finland, the initiator and the real leader of the Party was Zilliacus (Kansallisarkisto S3:16, N. 190/115). The internationalism that Zilliacus had promoted at the Paris Conference developed now into more national-level activism, which still had links with the revolutionaries in Russia and Finland. The party had its own military wing, which worked together with worker activists, especially in Eastern Finland. The programme of the party stated its aims and the measures it would take to achieve them accordingly (Kansallisarkisto, S124409, 5):

§ 1. The party wants to wake up the Finnish people and to make them realise that there is no law in Finland and how the country is dependent on Russian autocracy, and how an active, severe and ruthless fight against despotism and its henchmen is needed and justified.

The party cooperates with other parties of resistance in other parts of Russia and sees the benefits of this cooperation. The party wants to abolish the feeling of loyalty of the people to the Tsar and strengthen its sense of freedom:

a) by publishing and spreading writings on these issues;

b) by delivering weapons among the people;

c) by supporting the military wing of the party;

d) by other means which are appropriate for the cause.

§ 2 The party supports the work that individual people have already conducted in order to help the revolution in Russia.

The Finnish Active Resistance Party was ready to cooperate with different parties both in Finland and in Russia insofar as their goals to overthrow the Tsarist regime coincided. The general
strike in October and November of 1905 (30.10.–5.11.1905) reflected the growing popularity of active resistance. The activists took part in planning and conducting the strike, cooperating closely with the labour movement [Lauervo, 1960, p. 150–151]. The military wing of the party — the Union of Force (Voimallititto) — formed guards that, together with the Red Guards, took care of ensuring public order during the restless days of the strike [Kujala, 1992, p. 187].

The result of the general strike, the November Manifesto, drove Finnish activists into the political margins. The Constitutionalist claimed that it was their tactics that had led to the victory of the law and to the Finnish Constitution. For them, the goal was to overrule the demands of the February Manifesto, which they achieved by means of passive resistance.

After the 1905 general strike, cooperation between the Russian revolutionaries and Finnish radicals became less important, especially for the Finnish Constitutionists [Kujala, 1992, p. 175]. Konrad Zilliacus and his supporters did not believe that the situation with the Tsarist regime had significantly changed. Therefore, he and a group of political and cultural elites in Finland started to plan military resistance in order to free Finland. It seems that difficulties in organising the Paris and Geneva conferences also caused Zilliacus to realise that the goals had become somewhat different for the activists and the Russian revolutionaries, since the ultimate goal for the activists was now Finnish independence from Russia [Kujala, 1992, p. 179–180]. When Zilliacus’ links with Japan were discovered, he had to escape to Sweden again in 1909. On the eve of WWI, he was actively supporting the Finnish volunteers (jääkäärit) who had gone to Germany to be trained as an elite group of light infantry. After Finnish independence and the ensuing Civil War, this made Konrad Zilliacus one of the heroes of the White Guard, despite his prior collaboration with the Russian revolutionaries.

**Situational nationalism and internationalism**

Zilliacus’s nationalism was first and foremost engaged in the idea of a Finnish state and Finnish laws. Being part of the Swedish-speaking elite, his emotional ties with the Finnish language and culture emerged only during his stay in the United States. In the United States, Zilliacus became more aware of the question of nationalism and of social hierarchies. The question of Finnish migration, which he studied systematically during those years, made him constantly return to the situation in the Finnish Grand Duchy. The Russification process provoked his nationalism and activism, both of which developed in an international environment.

Zilliacus’s networks were formed during his youth within the Swedish-speaking elite, the same group that most of the Constitutionals belonged to. He shared their view on Finnish nationhood, which was based on the idea of Finland as a constituent state. He joined his relatives, friends and peers in opposing the Russification process both by legal and underground means. The Kagal organisation offered an example of how to organise underground activities. The Constitutionalist newspapers Nya Pressen and Fria Ord offered Zilliacus a chance to continue his activities as a writer and journalist.

However, Zilliacus’ understanding of how to oppose Russification differed from that of the leaders of the Constitutionalist Party. This was partly because of his personality as a “man of action”, but also because of his experiences and contacts with different immigrant and political networks abroad. Zilliacus was ready to cooperate with different parties on the opposite site of the political spectrum in order to achieve his goals.

Zilliacus’ nationalism developed towards liberal and revolutionary internationalism when he started to seek out how to benefit from the tensions in world politics. His understanding of the nature of international conflicts and their consequences for domestic politics led him to actively monitor developments in revolutionary Russia and in Asia and eventually to establish contact with Russian revolutionary parties and with the Japanese military attaché Motojiro Akashi.

Akashi’s reports describe Zilliacus’s relations with different oppositional and revolutionary parties. They also tell about his personal relationship with Zilliacus. Zilliacus seemed to base his operations on some level of trust and friendship, which could characterise both Akashi’s and Zilliacus’ relationship but also the relationship between Nikolai Chaikovskii and Zilliacus. The fact that both men had experience with immigrant communities in the United States seemed to create a bond between them, which made their ideological differences easier to overlook.

The Russo-Japanese War changed the nature of these contacts, since the war meant for Zilliacus a real chance to increase Finnish autonomy. Liberal internationalism became close to revolutionary internationalism for Zilliacus, which meant the sharing of common goals with Russian revolutionary
parties – to overthrow the Tsarist regime and to renegotiate the status of Finland. However, the process of organising the Paris Conference also revealed that even the revolutionary parties, despite their professed internationalism, exhibited nationalistic traits at the time of the war. This frustrated Zilliacus and made him more active in the Finnish political landscape; he organised the Party of Active Resistance and the Union of Force. Cooperation became possible at the national level between the right-wing nationalists and the Finnish socialists thanks to Zilliacus.

Zilliacus’ goals, first active resistance to the Russification process and later independence for Finland, which became important after the Paris Conference and the general strike, highlighted nationalism as it was perceived within the younger generation of Swedish-speaking elite in Finland during the first decade of the 20th century. However, Zilliacus’s means of achieving these goals – uniting all opponents of the Tsarist regime — could be associated both with liberal and revolutionary internationalism. The opponents of the Tsar, Finnish and Polish nationalists and the Russian revolutionary parties, had nothing to lose and everything to gain by trying to seek ways to overthrow the Tsarist regime together.

Notes

1 Zilliacus K. Det Revolutionära Ryssland: En Skildring Af Den Revolutionära Rörelsens I Ryssland Uppkomst Och Utveckling. 2. uppl. Stockholm: Boström, 1903; Zilliacus K. Från Ofärdstid Och Oroliga år: Politiska Minnen. II. Helsingfors: Söderström, 1920. I use in this paper the Finnish translation Zilliacus K, Sortovuosilta: Poliittisia Muistelmia. Porvoo: WSOY, 1920.

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В октябре 1904 г., в разгар Русско-японской войны, представители революционных партий и национальных меньшинств Российской империи встретились в Париже. Их целью была разработка общей стратегии свержения самодержавия, которая позволяла бы объединить и правые, и левые оппозиционные политические силы. Финляндский журналист, писатель и политический активист Конрад (Конни) Циллиакус (1855–1924) сыграл ключевую роль в подготовке этого международного мероприятия. Попытки Циллиакуса объединить противостоящие царизму силы, а также его сотрудничество с японским военным атташе Мотодзио Акаси неоднократно привлекали внимание исследователей, прежде всего в Финляндии. Однако мысли Циллиакуса о национализме и интернациональном сотрудничестве обсуждались не так часто. Исходя из этого рассматриваются понятия национализма и интернационализма в текстах и политическом активизме К. Циллиакуса в контексте шведскоязычной элиты в Финляндии. Он представлял младшее поколение финляндской элиты, которое не приняло попытки самодержавного режима ликвидировать своеобразие государственного устройства Финляндии. В первый период русификации (1899–1905) произошла радикализация взглядов Циллиакуса, решившего обратиться за поддержкой к русским революционерам. Он считал, что Русско-японская война приведёт к революционному перевороту в Российской империи, что поможет Финляндии в её борьбе за автономию. Взгляды Циллиакуса представляют интерес в плане обсуждения национального и политического радикализма. Анализ его газетных статей и мемуаров позволяет понять, каким националистом и каким интернационалистом был Конрад Циллиакус.

Ключевые слова: Великое княжество Финляндское, национализм, интернационализм, Русско-японская война, революционные партии, русификация, элиты, меньшинства.