Network error correction with unequal link capacities

Sukwon Kim, Tracey Ho, Member, IEEE, Michelle Effros, Fellow, IEEE, Amir Salman Avestimehr, Member, IEEE

Abstract

This paper studies the capacity of single-source single-sink noiseless networks under adversarial or arbitrary errors on no more than $z$ edges. Unlike prior papers, which assume equal capacities on all links, arbitrary link capacities are considered. Results include new upper bounds, network error correction coding strategies, and examples of network families where our bounds are tight. An example is provided of a network where the capacity is 50% greater than the best rate that can be achieved with linear coding. While coding at the source and sink suffices in networks with equal link capacities, in networks with unequal link capacities, it is shown that intermediate nodes may have to do coding, nonlinear error detection, or error correction in order to achieve the network error correction capacity.

Index Terms

Adversarial errors, Byzantine adversary, network coding, network error correction, nonlinear coding

I. INTRODUCTION

Network coding allows intermediate nodes in a network to mix the information content from different packets. This mixing can increase throughput and reliability in networks of error-free or stochastically failing channels [1], [2]. Unfortunately, it can also potentially increase the impact of malicious links or nodes that wish to corrupt data transmissions. A single corrupted packet, mixed with other packets in the network, can potentially corrupt all of the information reaching a particular destination. To combat this problem, network error correction was first
studied by Yeung and Cai [3], [4] who investigated correction of errors in multicast network coding [1], [2], [5] on networks with unit-capacity links. In that work, the authors showed that for any network of unit-capacity links, the Singleton bound is tight and linear network error-correcting codes suffice to achieve the capacity, which equals $C - 2z$ where $C$ is the min-cut of the network and $z$ is a bound on the number of corrupted links [4, Theorem 4]. The problem of network coding under Byzantine attack was also investigated in [6], which gave an approach for detecting adversarial errors under random network coding. Construction of codes that can correct errors up to the full error-correction capability specified by the Singleton bound was presented in [7]. A variety of alternative models of adversarial attack and strategies for detecting and correcting such errors appear in the literature. Examples include [8]–[15].

Specifically, the network error correction problem concerns reliable information transmission in a network with an adversary who arbitrarily corrupts the packets sent on some set of $z$ links. The location of the adversarial links is fixed for all time but unknown to the network user. We define a $z$-error correcting code for a single-source and single-sink network to be a code that can recover the source message at the sink node if there are at most $z$ adversarial links in the network. The $z$-error correcting network capacity, henceforth simply called the capacity, is the supremum over all rates achievable by $z$-error correcting codes.

In this work, we consider network error correction when links in the network may have unequal link capacities. (A related model, where adversaries control a fixed number of nodes rather than a fixed number of edges was studied in [16], independently and concurrently with our initial conference paper [17].) The unequal link capacity problem is substantially different from the equal link capacity problem studied by Yeung and Cai in [3], [4] since the rate controlled by the adversary varies with his edge choice. In the error-free case, any link $l$ in the network with capacity $r$ can be represented by $r$ edges of capacity one without loss of generality. However, in the case with errors there is a loss of generality in using a similar representation and assuming that errors have uniform rate, since this does not capture potential trade-offs that the adversary faces in choosing whether to attack strategically positioned or larger capacity links. The error-correction capacity in the equal link capacity case has a simple cut-set characterization since the adversary always finds it optimal to attack links on a minimum cut; as a result, coding only at the source and forwarding at intermediate nodes suffices to achieve the capacity for any single-source and single-sink network. In contrast, for networks with unequal link capacities, we show that network error correction coding operations at intermediate nodes are needed even in the single-source single-sink case.

The cut-set approach is a simple yet powerful tool for bounding the capacity of a large network. This approach partitions the nodes into two subsets, say $S$ and $S^c$, and then bounds the rate that can be transmitted from nodes in $S$ to nodes in $S^c$. (See, for example, [18, Section 15.10].) The maximum information transmission across the “cut” occurs when the nodes within $S$ can collaborate perfectly among themselves and the nodes within $S^c$ can collaborate perfectly among themselves. In this case, $S$ and $S^c$ each act as “super-nodes” in a simple point-to-point network. All that is needed for collaboration is sufficient information exchange among the nodes on each side of the cut. Thus, the “cut-set bound” equals that rate that would be achieved in transmitting information from $S$ to
Fig. 1. The traditional cut set bound for a cut $S$ between source $s$ and sink $t$ in the network shown in (a) equals the maximal rate that can be transmitted from $S$ to $S^c$ when the nodes within $S$ are allowed unlimited information exchange and the nodes within $S^c$ are allowed unlimited information exchange, as indicated by the thick bidirectional lines in (b). In the cut-set bounds employed here, we create infinite capacity connections only from each node to nodes of higher topological order on the same side of the cut, as shown by the thick unidirectional lines in (c). Restricting attention to nodes with input or output edges that cross the cut, gives a “zig-zag” network, as shown in (d).

If we added reliable, infinite-capacity links between each pair of nodes in $S$ and reliable, infinite-capacity links between each pair of nodes in $S^c$, as shown in Figure [1] Given a network of capacitated error-free links with a source node $s$ and a sink node $t$, minimizing over all choices of $S$ that contain $s$ but exclude $t$ gives a tight bound on the unicast capacity from $s$ to $t$ [19].

In contrast, this traditional cut-set bounding approach is not tight in general when it comes to the error-correction capacity of networks with unequal link capacities, even in the case of unicast demands. In this case, two new issues arise. We next describe each of these issues in turn.

The first issue concerns the role of feedback across $S$ – i.e. links from $S^c$ to $S$. While feedback never increases the capacity across a cut in a network of reliable links, it can increase the error-correction capacity. Intuitively, this is because feedback allows us to inform nodes in $S$ about what was received by nodes in $S^c$, thereby aiding in the discovery of adversarial links. Treating all nodes in $S$ as one super-node and all nodes in $S^c$ as another super-node, as in the traditional cut-set bounding approach, makes all feedback information available to all nodes in $S$ and all feedforward information available to all nodes in $S^c$. This may give them considerably more insight into the adversary’s location than is available to them in the original network.

We can obtain tighter bounds by taking into account limitations on which nodes in $S^c$ can influence the values on each feedback edge and which nodes in $S$ have access to the feedback information. This is important in the unequal link capacity case, because it captures trade-offs faced by the adversary in choosing whether to attack links based on their capacity or whether they are upstream of feedback links that may give clues about the adversary’s actions. Specifically, given an acyclic network $G$, we construct an acyclic network $G'$ by adding a reliable infinite capacity connection from a node $v \in S$ to a node $w \in S$ only if $G$ contains a directed path from node $v$ to node $w$ via nodes in $S$, and adding a reliable infinite capacity connection from a node $v \in S^c$ to a node $w \in S^c$ only

This process of discovery is complicated by the fact that the feedback links themselves may be corrupted, but feedback is, nonetheless, clearly useful.
if \( G \) contains a directed path from node \( v \) to node \( w \) via nodes in \( S^c \). Figure 1(c) shows an example. Limiting the added connections in this way creates what we call a “zig-zag” network, as shown in Figure 1. We draw only those nodes in \( S \) and \( S^c \) with incoming or outgoing edges that cross between \( S \) and \( S^c \), and draw the nodes on each side of the cut in topologically increasing order. The “forward” edges across the cut point downwards in the diagram, while “feedback” edges point upwards. By studying the capacity of these zig-zag networks, we develop upper bounds on error-correction capacity that apply to general acyclic networks. We also illustrate the usefulness of these bounds by giving examples where they improve upon previously known bounds and showing that they are tight for families of networks that are special cases of zig-zag networks.

However, the second issue with the cut-set approach to bounding network capacities is the notion of a cut itself. Reference [20] shows, for the more general case where only a subset of links are potentially adversarial, the existence of networks for which no partition \((S, S^c)\) yields a tight bound on the error-correction capacity. This is proven by example using a network whose minimal cut (which has no feedback links) yields a capacity bound that is proven to be unachievable. As a result, knowledge of the the capacity of the network’s minimal cut is insufficient to determine the capacity of all possible networks, and we cannot hope to derive cut-set bounds that are tight in general. Nonetheless, given the complexity of taking into account the full network topology, we proceed to study the cut-set approach, deriving general bounds and demonstrating that those bounds are tight in some cases.

Specifically, in Section III we begin with the cut-set upper bound given by the capacity of the two-node network shown in Fig. 2, which is the only cyclic network we consider in this paper. In this network, the source node can transmit packets to the sink node along the forward links and the sink node can send information back to the source node along the feedback links. As mentioned above, this cut-set bound can be quite loose since it assumes that all feedback is available to the source node and all information crossing the cut in the forward direction is available to the sink. We therefore develop a new cut-set upper bound for general acyclic networks by taking into account more details of the topological relationships among links on the cut, as in the zig-zag network construction shown in Figure 1.

In Section IV, we consider a variety of linear and nonlinear coding strategies useful for achieving the capacity of various example networks. We prove the insufficiency of linear network codes to achieve the capacity by providing an example of a network where the capacity is 50% greater than the linear coding capacity and is achieved using a nonlinear error detection strategy. A similar example for the problem with Byzantine attack on nodes rather than edges appears in [16]. We also give examples of single-source and single-sink networks for which intermediate nodes must perform coding, nonlinear error detection or error correction in order to achieve the network capacity. We describe a simple greedy algorithm for error correction at intermediate nodes. We then introduce a new coding strategy called “guess-and-forward.” In this strategy, an intermediate node which receives some redundant information from multiple paths guesses which of its upstream links controlled by the adversary. The intermediate node forwards its guess to the sink which tests the hypothesis of the guessing node. In Section V, we show that guess-and-forward achieves network capacity on the two-node network with feedback links of Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Two-node network composed of $n$ forward links and $m$ feedback links.

Fig. 3. Four node acyclic networks: Given the cut $Q = \text{cut}(\{s, B\}, \{A, t\})$, unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source $s$ to its neighbor $B$ on one side of the cut and from node $A$ to sink $t$ on the other side of the cut, respectively. There are feedback links from $A$ to $B$.

as well as the family of four-node acyclic networks in Fig. 3 when the capacity of each feedback link is not too small (i.e. above a value given by a linear optimization). Finally, we apply guess-and-forward strategy to zig-zag networks, deriving achievable rates and presenting conditions under which our upper bound is tight. We conclude in Section VI with a discussion of future work.

Portions of this work have appeared in our earlier work [17], [21], which introduced the network error correction problem with unequal link capacities and presented a subset of the results.

2After the submission of this paper, we obtained a new result that improves upon the bound in Section III for the special case of small-capacity feedback links. We mention the idea briefly as a footnote in Section III and will present it formally in an upcoming paper.
Consider a directed acyclic communication network \( G = (V, E) \) with unequal link capacities. Let \( r(l) \) denote the capacity of edge \( l \in E \). A source node \( s \in V \) transmits information to a sink node \( t \in V \) over the network \( G \). Transmissions occur on the links according to their topological order, i.e. a link \( l \) transmits after all its incident incoming links, and we regard a link error as being applied upon transmission. A link (or node) is said to be upstream of another link (or node) iff there is a directed path starting from the former and ending with the latter. A link (or node) is said to be downstream of another link (or node) iff there is a directed path starting from the latter and ending with the former.

In this paper, we consider the problem of correcting arbitrary adversarial errors on up to \( z \) links. The location of error links is fixed for all time but unknown to the network user.

**Definition 1**: A network code is \( z \)-error link-correcting if the source message can be recovered by the sink node provided that the adversary controls at most \( z \) links. Thus a \( z \)-error link-correcting network code can correct any \( \tau \) adversarial links for \( \tau \leq z \).

Let \((S, S^c)\) be a partition of \( V \), and define the cut for the partition \((S, S^c)\) by
\[
cut(S, S^c) = \{(a, b) \in E : a \in S, b \in S^c\}.
\]

The cut \( \cut(S, S^c) \) separates nodes \( a \) and \( b \) if \( a \in S \) and \( b \in S^c \). We use \( CS(a, b) \) to denote the set of cuts between \( a \) and \( b \). Given a cut \( Q = \cut(S, S^c) \), we call any link in \( Q \) a forward link, and we call any link from \( S^c \) to \( S \) a feedback link.

For the achievable strategies in Sections IV and V, we assume that coding occurs in the finite field \( \mathbb{F}_q \) for some prime power \( q \). An error on any link \( l \in E \) is specified by a vector \( e_l \) containing \( r(l) \) symbols in \( \mathbb{F}_q \). The output \( y_l \) of link \( l \) equals the sum in \( \mathbb{F}_q \) of the input \( x_l \) to link \( l \) and the error \( e_l \) applied to link \( l \), i.e., \( y_l = x_l + e_l \). We say that an error occurs on the link \( l \) if \( e_l \neq 0 \).

As in [3, 4], we can consider a linear network code \( V \) that assigns a set of \( r(l) \) vectors \( \{v(l)_1, v(l)_2, ..., v(l)_{r(l)}\} \), called global coding vectors, to each link \( l \in E \) in the network. Let
\[
\tilde{\phi}_l(w) = \{\langle w, v(l)_i \rangle : 1 \leq i \leq r(l)\}
\]
denote the error-free output of link \( l \) when the network input is \( w \) where \( \langle a, b \rangle \) denotes the inner product of row vectors \( a \) and \( b \). We use \( e = (e_l : l \in E) \) to denote the vector of errors on the entire network. The output of a link \( l \) is a function of both the network input \( w \) and the error vector \( e \), which we denote by \( \psi_l(w, e) \). For each node \( v \in V \), we use \( \Gamma_+(v) = \{(c, v) : (c, v) \in E\} \) and \( \Gamma_-(v) = \{(v, e) : (v, e) \in E\} \) to denote the sets of incoming and outgoing edges respectively for node \( v \). With this notation, a sink node \( t \) cannot distinguish between the case where \( w \) is the network input and error \( e \) occurs and the case where \( w' \) is the network input and error \( e' \) occurs if and only if
\[
(\psi_l(w, e) : l \in \Gamma_+(t)) = (\psi_l(w', e') : l \in \Gamma_+(t)).
\]
Let \( N(e) = |\{ l \in E : e_l \neq 0 \}| \) denote the number of links in which an error occurs. We say that any pair of input vectors \( w \) and \( w' \) are \( z \)-links separable at sink node \( t \) if (1) does not hold for any pair of error vectors \( e \) and \( e' \) such that \( N(e) \leq z \) and \( N(e') \leq z \). Lemma 1 of [4] establishes the linear properties of \( \psi_l(w, e) \) for networks with unit link capacities. This result extends directly to networks with arbitrary link capacities.

Lemma 1: For all \( l \in E \), all network inputs \( w \) and \( w' \), error vectors \( e \) and \( e' \), and \( \mu \in \mathbb{F}_q \),

\[
\psi_l(w + w', e + e') = \psi_l(w, e) + \psi_l(w', e')
\]

and

\[
\psi_l(\mu w) = \mu \psi_l(w).
\]

From Lemma 1,

\[
\psi_l(w, e) = \psi_l(w, 0) + \psi_l(0, e) = \tilde{\phi}_l(w) + \theta_l(e),
\]

where \( \theta_l(e) = \psi_l(0, e) \) for any link \( l \). Thus \( \psi_l(w, e) \) can be written as the sum of a linear function of \( w \) and a linear function of \( e \).

### III. Upper bounds

In this section, we consider upper bounds on network error correction capacity. Let \( X \) denote the source alphabet and \( q \) the size of the (arbitrary) link alphabet. The corresponding network transmission rate is given by \( \frac{\log |X|}{\log q} \).

We first derive the cut-set upper bound obtained from coalescing all nodes on each side of the cut into a super-node, resulting in a two-node network as shown in Fig. 2.

**Lemma 2:** Consider the two-node network shown in Fig. 2 with arbitrary link capacities. Let \( D_p \) denote the sum of the \( p \) smallest forward link capacities. The network error correction capacity of this network is upper bounded by

\[
\begin{cases}
0 & \text{if } n \leq 2z \\
\min\{D_{n-z}, D_{n-2(z-m)^+}\} & \text{if } n > 2z
\end{cases}
\]

**Proof:** Case 1) \( n \leq 2z \).

Suppose that \( C > 0 \) and we show a contradiction. Since \( C > 0 \), there are two codewords \( x \) and \( y \) in \( X \) that can be sent reliably. When \( x \) is sent along the forward links and the leftmost \( z \) links are adversarial, the adversary changes \( x \) to \( x' \) so that the outputs of the \( \lfloor n/2 \rfloor \) leftmost links of \( x' \) are the same as that of \( y \). Similarly, when \( y \) is sent along the forward links and the rightmost \( z \) links are adversarial, the adversary changes \( y \) to \( y' \) so that the outputs of the rightmost \( \lceil n/2 \rceil \) links of \( y' \) are the same as that of \( x \). Then the two codewords cannot be distinguished and this contradicts \( C > 0 \).

Case 2) \( n \geq 2z \).

When the sink knows \( z \) adversarial links are the \( z \) largest capacities forward links, the maximum achievable capacity is \( D_{n-z} \). When \( m \leq z \) and all \( m \) feedback links are adversarial, there are \( z - m \) adversarial forward links whose locations are unknown. In this scenario, we show that the best achievable rate is \( D_{n-2(z-m)} \), which is the
sum of $n - 2(z - m)$ smallest forward link capacities. We assume that $|X| > q^{D_{n-2(z-m)}}$, and show that this leads to a contradiction. $F = \{l_1, \ldots, l_n\}$ denotes the set of forward links such that the links indexed in increasing capacity order, i.e., $r(l_1) \leq \ldots \leq r(l_n)$. Since $|X| > q^{D_{n-2(z-m)}}$ and $D_{n-2(z-m)}$ is sum of the $n - 2(z - m)$ smallest forward link capacities, there exist two distinct codewords $x, x' \in X$ such that $\tilde{\phi}_{l_i}(x) = \tilde{\phi}_{l_i}(x') \forall i = 1, \ldots, n - 2z$. So we can write

$$O(x) = \{y_1, \ldots, y_{n-2z}, p_1, \ldots, p_z, w_1, \ldots, w_z\},$$

$$O(x') = \{y_1, \ldots, y_{n-2z}, p'_1, \ldots, p'_z, w'_1, \ldots, w'_z\},$$

where $O(x)$ denotes the error-free vector of symbols on $Q$ when codeword $x$ is transmitted.

We can construct $z$-error links that changes $O(x)$ to the value $\{y_1, \ldots, y_{n-2z}, p'_1, \ldots, p'_z, w_1, \ldots, w_z\}$ as follows. We apply an error of value $(p'_i - p_i) \pmod q$ on links $l_{n-2z+i}$ for $1 \leq i \leq z$. Since this does not change the output value of other $n - z$ links, we obtain $\{y_1, \ldots, y_{n-2z}, p'_1, \ldots, p'_z, w_1, \ldots, w_z\}$. For $x'$, we can follow a similar procedure to construct $z$ error links that change the value of $O(x')$ to $\{y_1, \ldots, y_{n-2z}, p'_1, \ldots, p'_z, w_1, \ldots, w_z\}$. Thus, sink node $u$ cannot reliably distinguish between the source symbol $x$ and $x'$, which gives a contradiction.

Therefore, the upper bound on achievable capacity is $\min\{D_{n-z}, D_{n-2(z-m)}\}$.

In Section V we show that this bound is the actual capacity of the two-node network. Thus, the super-node construction gives the following cut-set upper bound for general acyclic networks.

**Lemma 3:** Given any cut $Q \in CS(s, t)$ with $k$ forward links and $r$ feedback links, let $D_{ps}$ denote the sum of the $k$ smallest forward link capacities. The network error correction capacity is upper bounded by

$$\begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } k \leq 2z \\ \min\{D_{k-z}, D_{k-2(z-r)}\} & \text{if } k > 2z \end{cases}$$

However, we can show that the above upper bound is not tight using the following generalized Singleton bound, which was presented in our conference paper [17]. A similar upper bound for the problem of adversarial attack on nodes rather than edges was given in independent work [16].

**Definition 2:** Any set of links $S$ on a cut $Q \in CS(s, t)$ is said to satisfy the downstream condition on $Q$ if none of the links in $Q \setminus S$ are downstream of any link in $S$.

**Lemma 4:** (A generalized Singleton bound) Consider any $z$-error correcting network code with source alphabet $X$ in an acyclic network $G$. Consider any set $S$ consisting of $2z$ links on a source-sink cut $Q \in CS(s, t)$ that satisfies the downstream condition on $Q$. Let $M = \sum_{(a,b) \in Q\setminus S} r(a,b)$ be the total capacity of the links in $Q \setminus S$. Then

$$\log |X| \leq M \cdot \log q.$$

**Proof:** The proof is similar to that of the network Singleton bound for the equal link capacity case in [3]. We assume that $|X| > q^M$, and show that this leads to a contradiction.

Given a cut $Q$, $K(Q)$ denotes the number of links in $Q$. For brevity, let $Q = \{l_1, \ldots, l_{K(Q)}\}$ where $S = \{l_{K(Q) - 2z + 1}, \ldots, l_{K(Q)}\}$ and links in $S$ are ordered topologically, i.e., $l_{K(Q) - 2z + i}$ is not downstream of $l_{K(Q) - 2z + j}$.
Thus, sink node injects errors on finishes injecting errors on \( p \) when errors occur on at most \( O \) where 

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Assume that the true network input is } x, \text{ and from node } A \text{ to sink } t \text{ on the other side of the cut, respectively. There are 2 forward links of capacity 1 from } s \text{ to } A, 4 \text{ forward links of capacity 10 from } B \text{ to } t, \text{ and 3 feedback links from } A \text{ to } B. 
\end{align*}
\]

for any \( i < j \). Since \( |X| > q^M \) and \( M \) is the capacity of \( Q \setminus S \), there exist two distinct codewords \( x, x' \in X \) such that \( \hat{\phi}_l(x) = \hat{\phi}_l(x') \) \( \forall i = 1, \ldots, K(Q) - 2z \). So we can write

\[
\begin{align*}
O(x) &= \{y_1, \ldots, y_{K(Q) - 2z}, p_1, \ldots, p_z, w_1, \ldots, w_z\}, \\
O(x') &= \{y_1, \ldots, y_{K(Q) - 2z}, p_1', \ldots, p_z', w_1', \ldots, w_z'\},
\end{align*}
\]

where \( O(x) \) denotes the error-free vector of symbols on \( Q \) when codeword \( x \) is transmitted.

We will show that it is possible for the adversary to produce exactly the same outputs on all the channels in \( Q \) when errors occur on at most \( z \) links in \( Q \).

Assume that the true network input is \( x \). The adversary will inject errors on \( z \) links \( l_{K(Q) - 2z+1}, \ldots, l_{K(Q) - z} \) in this order as follows. First the adversary applies an error on link \( l_{K(Q) - 2z+1} \) to change the output from \( p_1 \) to \( p_1' \). The output of links \( (l_{K(Q) - 2z+2}, \ldots, l_{K(Q)}) \) may be affected by this change, but the outputs of links \( (l_1, \ldots, l_{K(Q) - 2z}) \) will not. Let \( p_i'(j) \) and \( w_i'(j) \) denote the outputs of links \( l_{K(Q) - 2z+i} \) and \( l_{K(Q) - z+i} \), respectively after the adversary has injected errors on link \( l_{K(Q) - 2z+j} \), where \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, z \) with \( p_1'(1) = p_1' \). Then the adversary injects errors on link \( l_{K(Q) - 2z+2} \) to change its output from \( p_2'(1) \) to \( p_2' \). This process continues until the adversary finishes injecting errors on \( z \) links \( l_{K(Q) - 2z+1}, \ldots, l_{K(Q) - z} \) and the output of this channel changes from \( O(x) \) to \( \{y_1, \ldots, y_{K(Q) - 2z}, p_1', \ldots, p_z', w_1'(z), \ldots, w_z'(z)\} \). Now suppose the input is \( x' \). We can follow a similar procedure by injecting errors on \( z \) links \( l_{K(Q) - z+1}, \ldots, l_{K(Q)} \). Then the adversary can produce the outputs

\[
\{y_1, \ldots, y_{K(Q) - 2z}, p_1', \ldots, p_z', w_1'(z), \ldots, w_z'(z)\}.
\]

Thus, sink node \( t \) cannot reliably distinguish between the source symbol \( x \) and \( x' \), which gives a contradiction.
Consider the example four-node network shown in Fig. 4. When \( z = 2 \), the two-node bound lemma \( \textup{[5]} \) gives the upper bound 22. The generalized Singleton bound gives upper bound 2.

However, the generalized Singleton bound is also not tight. Building on ideas from the above bounds, we proceed to derive tighter bounds.

Let \( Q^R \) denote the set of feedback links across cut \( Q \). Given a set of \( m \leq z \) feedback links \( W \subset Q^R \) and a set of \( k \leq z - m \) forward links \( F \subset Q \), we use \( N_{z,m,k}^{F,W}(Q) \) to denote the upper bound obtained from lemma \( \textup{[4]} \) (generalized Singleton bound) when evaluated for \( z - m - k \) adversarial links on the cut \( Q \) after erasing \( W \) and \( F \) from the graph \( G \). Let

\[
N_{z,k,m}(Q) = \min_{\{F \subset Q, |F| = k \leq z - m\}} \min_{\{W \subset Q^R, |W| = m \leq z\}} N_{z,m,k}^{F,W}(Q).
\]

Then we define \( N_z(Q) \) as follows.

\[
N_z(Q) = \min_{0 \leq m \leq z} \min_{0 \leq k \leq z - m} N_{z,k,m}(Q).
\]

For instance, consider the 2-layer zig-zag network in Fig. 5. If \( z = 4 \), \( k = 1 \) and \( m = 1 \), \( N_{z,k,m}(Q) = 19 \) by choosing \( F = \{l_1\} \), \( W = \{l_6\} \), and removing \( \{l_2, l_3, l_4, l_5\} \) in the application of the Singleton bound after erasing \( F \) and \( W \). By taking the minimum over \( k \) and \( m \), we can show that \( N_z(Q) = 19 \).

Lemma 5: (Cut-set upper bound 1) Consider any \( z \)-error correcting network code with source alphabet \( X \) in an acyclic network.

\[
\log |X| \leq \min_{Q \in CS(s,t)} \{N_z(Q)\} \cdot \log q
\]

Proof: For any cut \( Q \in CS(s,t) \), the adversary can erase a set \( W \subset Q^R \) of feedback links and a set \( F \subset Q \) of forward links where \( |W| = m \leq z \) and \( |F| = k \leq z - m \). Applying Lemma \( \textup{[4]} \) on \( Q \) after erasing \( W \) and \( F \) gives the upper bound \( N_{z,m,k}^{F,W}(Q) \). By taking the minimum over all cuts \( Q \), we obtain the above bound.

The following examples illustrate how the bound in Lemma \( \textup{[5]} \) tightens the generalized Singleton bound. We first consider a four-node acyclic network as shown in Fig. 5. In each example, unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source \( s \) to its neighbor \( B \) on one side of the cut and from node \( A \) to sink \( t \) on the other side of the cut. There are feedback links with arbitrary capacities from \( A \) to \( B \).

When we compute the generalized Singleton bound, for any cut \( Q \), we choose and erase \( 2z \) links in the cut such that none of the remaining links in the cut are downstream of the chosen \( 2z \) links. Then we sum the remaining link capacities and take the minimum over all cuts. Because of the downstream condition, when the link capacities between \( s \) and \( A \) are much larger than the link capacities between \( B \) and \( t \), the Singleton bound may not be tight. For example, in the network in Fig. 5 (a), if \( z = 2 \), then the generalized Singleton bound gives upper bound 20. However, when the adversary declares that he will use two forward links between \( s \) and \( A \), we obtain the erasure bound 4.

As another example, consider the network in Fig. 5 (b) when \( z = 2 \). Applying the generalized Singleton bound gives upper bound 16. If the adversary erases one of the forward links between \( s \) and \( A \) and we apply the generalized
Fig. 5. Four-node acyclic network: unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source \( s \) to its neighbor \( B \) on one side of the cut and from node \( A \) to sink \( t \) on the other side of the cut, respectively. (a) There are 2 links of capacity 10 from \( s \) to \( A \) and 4 unit-capacity links from \( B \) to \( t \). (b) There are 5 links of capacity 3 from \( s \) to \( A \). There are 2 links of capacity 2 and 3 links of capacity 1 from \( B \) to \( t \).

Fig. 6. 2-layer zig-zag network: unbounded reliable communication is allowed from \( s \) to \( B \), from \( B \) to \( D \), from \( A \) to \( C \), and from \( C \) to \( t \) respectively. There are sufficiently large number of feedback links from \( A \) to \( B \). There is one feedback link from \( C \) to \( D \).

Singleton bound on the remaining network, then our upper bound is improved to 15. The intuition behind this example is that when the adversary erases \( k \leq z \) large capacities links which do not satisfy the downstream condition, applying the generalized Singleton bound on remaining network with \((z - k)\) adversarial links can give a tighter bound.

For the 2-layer zig-zag network in Fig. 6 when \( z = 4 \), the min-cut is 37 and the generalized Singleton bound gives upper bound 27. Suppose that the adversary declares that he will use the feedback link between \( C \) and \( D \) and the forward link with capacity 6 between \( s \) and \( A \). By applying the generalized Singleton bound on the remaining
network with two adversarial links, we obtain $37-6-(3+3+3+3)=19$. The intuition behind this example is that the links between $B$ and $C$ and the links between $D$ and $t$ have the same topological order once the single feedback link between $C$ and $D$ is erased. Since the generalized Singleton bound is obtained by erasing $2z$ links on the cut such that none of the remaining links on the cut is downstream of any erased links, erasing the single feedback link between $C$ and $D$ yields a tighter Singleton bound even with fewer adversarial links. Moreover, before applying the Singleton bound, we first erase the link with capacity 6, which is the largest link between $s$ and $A$ as we did in example in Fig. 5(b).

Next, we introduce another upper bounding approach which considers confusion between two possible sets of $z$ adversarial links, each containing some forward links as well as the corresponding downstream feedback links required to prevent error propagation. Consider any cut $Q = \text{cut}(P, V \setminus P)$ and sets $Z_1, Z_2 \subset Q$. We say that a feedback link $l \in Q^R$ is directly downstream of a forward link $l' \in Q$ (and that $l'$ is directly upstream of $l$) if there is a directed path starting from $l'$ and ending with $l$ that does not include other links in $Q$ or $Q^R$. Let $W_1$ be the set of links in $Q^R$ which are directly downstream of a link in $Z_1$ and upstream of a link in $(Q \setminus Z_1) \setminus Z_2$. Let $W_2$ be the set of links in $Q^R$ which are directly downstream of a link in $Z_2$ and upstream of a link in $Q \setminus Z_2$.

Lemma 6: (Cut-set upper bound 2) Let $M = \sum_{(a,b) \in (Q \setminus Z_1) \setminus Z_2} r(a, b)$ denote the total capacity of the remaining links on $(Q \setminus Z_1) \setminus Z_2$. If $|Z_i \cup W_i| \leq z$ for $i = 1, 2$, then

$$\log |X| \leq M \cdot \log q.$$ 

Proof: We assume that $|X| > q^M$, and show that this leads to a contradiction. Let $K(Q)$ denote the number of links on the cut $Q$. Since $|X| > q^M$, from the definition of $M$, there exist two distinct codewords $x, x' \in X$ such that error-free outputs on the links in $(Q \setminus Z_1) \setminus Z_2$ are the same. Let $c = |Z_1|$ and $d = |Z_2|$. Then we can write

$$O(x) = \{y_1, \ldots, y_{K(Q)-c-d}, u_1, \ldots, u_c, w_1, \ldots, w_d\},$$

$$O(x') = \{y_1, \ldots, y_{K(Q)-c-d}, u'_1, \ldots, u'_c, w'_1, \ldots, w'_d\},$$

where $(y_1, \ldots, y_{K(Q)-c-d})$ denotes the error-free outputs on the links in $(Q \setminus Z_1) \setminus Z_2$ for $x$ and $x'$; $(u_1, \ldots, u_c)$ and $(u'_1, \ldots, u'_c)$ denote the error-free outputs on the links in $Z_1$ for $x$ and $x'$ respectively; and $(w_1, \ldots, w_d)$ and $(w'_1, \ldots, w'_d)$ denote the error-free outputs on the links in $Z_2$ for $x$ and $x'$ respectively. We will show that it is possible for the adversary to produce exactly the same outputs on all the channels in $Q$ under $x$ and $x'$ when errors occur on at most $z$ links. When codeword $x$ is sent, we use $B_l(x)$ to denote the error-free symbols on feedback link $l$.

Assume the input of network is $x$. The adversary chooses feedback links set $W_1$ and forward links set $Z_1$ as its $z$ adversarial links. First the adversary applies errors on $Z_1$ to change the output from $u_i$ to $u'_i$ for $\forall 1 \leq i \leq c$ and to cause each feedback link $l \in W_1$ to transmit $B_l(x)$. Since all feedback links which are directly downstream of a link in $Z_1$ and upstream of a link in $(Q \setminus Z_1) \setminus Z_2$ transmit the error-free symbols, the outputs on links in $(Q \setminus Z_1) \setminus Z_2$ are not affected. The outputs on links in $Z_2$ may be affected, and we denote their new values by $\{w''_1, \ldots, w''_d\}$. Thus, the sink observes $\{y_1, \ldots, y_{K(Q)-c-d}, u'_1, \ldots, u'_c, w''_1, \ldots, w''_d\}$.
When codeword $x'$ is transmitted, the adversary chooses feedback links set $W_2$ and forward links set $Z_2$ as its $z$ adversarial links. The adversary applies errors on them to change $(w_1, \ldots, w_d)$ to $(w'_1, \ldots, w'_d)$ and to cause each feedback link $l \in W_2$ to transmit $B_l(x')$. Since all feedback links which are directly downstream of a link in $Z_2$ and upstream of a link in $Q \setminus Z_2$ transmit the error-free symbols, the outputs on any other links are not affected. Therefore, the output is changed from $O(x')$ to $\{y_1, \ldots, y_{K(Q)-c-d}, u'_1, \ldots, u'_{c}, w''_1, \ldots, w''_d\}$. Thus, the sink node $t$ cannot reliably distinguish between the codewords $x$ and $x'$, which gives a contradiction. □

Given a cut $Q$, we consider all possible sets $(Z_1, Z_2)$ on $Q$ satisfying the condition of Lemma 6. We choose sets $(Z^*_1, Z^*_2)$ among them that have the maximum total link capacities and define $M_z(Q)$ to be the sum of the capacities of the links in $(Q \setminus Z_1^*) \setminus Z_2^*$. This gives the upper bound

$$\log |X| \leq \min_{Q \in \text{cut}(s,t)} M_z(Q) \cdot \log q.$$ 

The following example shows that we can obtain a tighter upper bound using Lemma 6. For the example network in Fig. 7 when $z = 3$, Lemma 5 gives upper bound 9. However, Lemma 6 gives a tighter upper bound 8 when $Z_1^* = \{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$, and $Z_2^* = \{l_6, l_7, l_8\}$.

Now we derive a generalized cut-set upper bound that unifies Lemma 5 and Lemma 6. Given a cut $Q$, consider a set $F \subset Q$ of forward links and a set $W \subset Q^R$ of feedback links such that $|F| + |W| \leq z$. Let $C_{z,F,W}^z(Q)$ denote the upper bound obtained from Lemma 6 when evaluated for $z - m - k$ adversarial links on the cut $Q$ after erasing $F$ and $W$ from the original graph $\mathcal{G}$. Then

$$\min_{\{F \subset Q, W \subset Q^R, |F| + |W| \leq z\}} C_{z,F,W}^z(Q)$$

is an upper bound on the error correction capacity of $\mathcal{G}$. This includes the bound $N_z(Q)$ of Lemma 5 as a special case, since the generalized Singleton bound is a special case of the upper bound in Lemma 6 corresponding to
the case where $Z_1 \cup Z_2$ is a set of 2\( z \) links satisfying the downstream condition. It is also clear that $C_{Z_1}^{F,W}(Q)$ is the same as the bound in Lemma 6 when $F = W = \emptyset$. Note however that any bound $C_{Z_1}^{F,W}(Q)$ obtainable with a nonempty set $W$ of erased feedback links is also obtainable by including those links in the sets $W_1$ and $W_2$ of Lemma 6 instead of erasing them. Thus, we define

$$C_{Z_1}(Q) = \min_{\{F \subseteq Q : |F| \leq z\}} C_{Z_1}^{F,\emptyset}(Q)$$

and state our upper bound as follows.\(^3\)

**Theorem 1:** (A generalized cut-set upper bound) Consider any \( z \)-error correcting network code with source alphabet $X$ in an acyclic network. Then

$$\log |X| \leq \min_{Q \in CS(s,t)} C_{Z_1}(Q) \cdot \log q.$$ 

### IV. Coding Strategies

We consider a variety of linear and nonlinear coding strategies useful for achieving the capacity of various example networks. We show the insufficiency of linear network codes for achieving the capacity in general. We also demonstrate examples of networks with a single source and a single sink where, unlike the equal link capacity case, it is necessary for intermediate nodes to do coding, nonlinear error detection or error correction in order to achieve the capacity. We then introduce a new coding strategy, guess-and-forward.

#### A. Error detection at intermediate nodes and insufficiency of linear codes

Here we show that there exists a network where the capacity is 50% greater than the best rate that can be achieved with linear coding. We consider the single source and the single sink network in Fig. 8 where source $s$ aims to transmit the information to a sink node $t$. We index the links and assume the capacities of links as shown in Fig. 8. For a single adversarial link, our upper bound from Theorem 1 is 2.

**Lemma 7:** Given a network in Fig. 8 for a single adversarial link, rate 2 is asymptotically achievable with a nonlinear error detection strategy, whereas scalar linear network coding achieves at most 4/3.

**Proof:** We first illustrate the nonlinear error detection strategy as follows. Source wants to transmit two packets $(P_1, P_2)$. We send them in $n$ channel uses, but each packet has only $n - 1$ bits. We use one bit as a signaling bit. We send $(P_1, P_2)$ down all links in the top layer. In the middle layer, we do the following operations:

1. Send the linear combination of $P_1$ and $P_2$, $aP_1 + bP_2$, down link $l_4$.
2. Send $P_1$ down both links $l_5$ and $l_6$.

\(^3\) After submitting this paper, we found a way to tighten the above bound for the case of small feedback link capacity. Briefly, the key idea is to note that instead of choosing all the links in $W_i$ as adversarial links as in the proof of Lemma 6, another possibility is to choose only a subset $Y_i \subseteq W_i$ as adversarial links, as long as the values on links in $W_i \setminus Y_i$ and links in $Q \setminus Z_i$ that are directly upstream of links in $W_i \setminus Y_i$ are the same under the two confusable codewords $x$ and $x'$. The capacities of these links then appear as part of the upper bound; thus, this bound is useful for cases where feedback links have small capacity. This result will be presented formally in an upcoming paper.
3. Send $P_2$ down both links $l_7$ and $l_8$.

4. Send a different linear combination of $P_1$ and $P_2$, $cP_1 + dP_2$, down link $l_9$.

At the bottom layer, we do the following operations:

1. Forward the received packet on link $l_{10}$.

2. Send a 1 followed by $P_1$ on link $l_{11}$ if the two copies of $P_1$ match, send a 0 otherwise.

3. Send a 1 followed by $P_2$ on link $l_{12}$ if the two copies of $P_2$ match, send a 0 otherwise.

4. Forward the received packet on link $l_{13}$.

We can show that above nonlinear error detection strategy allows a sink node to decode $(P_1, P_2)$. Suppose that $(a, b)$ and $(c, d)$ are independent. Then coding vectors on any two links on the bottom layer are independent and they satisfy with MDS (maximum distance separable) properties. If nothing was sent down both $l_{11}$ and $l_{12}$, the decoder can recover $(P_1, P_2)$ from the information received on links $l_{10}$ and $l_{13}$. If nothing was sent down only on $l_{11}$, then the outputs of $l_{12}$ and $l_{13}$ should not be corrupted and the decoder can recover $(P_1, P_2)$. Similarly, the decoder can decode correctly when nothing was sent down only on $l_{12}$. If all the links in the bottom layer received symbols, there is at most one erroneous link on the bottom layer, which has MDS code. Thus we can achieve rate $2 - \frac{2}{n}$ with this error detection strategy.

Now we show that scalar linear network code can achieve at most rate $4/3$. Suppose that we want to achieve the linear coding capacity $k/n$ by transmitting $k$ symbols reliably by using a scalar linear network code $\phi$ over the finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$ in $n$ rounds. To show the insufficiency of linear coding for achieving this capacity, from (1), it is sufficient to prove that there exist pairs $(w, e)$ and $(w', e')$ for linear network code $\phi$ such that

$$(\psi_l(w, e) : l \in \Gamma_+(t)) = (\psi_l(w', e') : l \in \Gamma_+(t)),$$
and \( N(e), N(e') \leq 1 \). Since the above equation is equivalent to
\[
\left( \hat{\omega}_l (w - w') : l \in \Gamma_+ (t) \right) = \left( \theta_l (-e + e') : l \in \Gamma_+ (t) \right),
\]
by linearity, it suffices to find a source vector \( x \in X \) and error vector \( e'' \) such that \( N(e'') \leq 2 \) and
\[
\left( \hat{\omega}_l (x) : l \in \Gamma_+ (t) \right) = \left( \theta_l (e'') : l \in \Gamma_+ (t) \right),
\]
where \( X = \mathbb{F}_q^k \) is the source alphabet. We will show that there exists \((x, e'')\) satisfying the above equation when errors occur on the links \( l_1 \) and \( l_3 \) in error vector \( e'' \).

Let \( G_t \) denote the \( 4n \times k \) transfer matrix between \( s \) and \( t \) in the \( n \) rounds. Its rows are the global coding vectors assigned on \( l_{10}, l_{11}, l_{12}, \) and \( l_{13} \) in the \( n \) rounds. Note that to transmit \( k \) symbols reliably, \( G_t \) should have rank \( k \).

Let \( M_1 \) and \( M_2 \) denote the transfer matrices between \( l_1 \) and \( t \), and between \( l_3 \) and \( t \) during \( n \) rounds respectively. To transmit \( k \) symbols reliably, both \( M_1 \) and \( M_2 \) should have rank at least \( k \), i.e., \( \text{rank}(M_1) \geq k \) and \( \text{rank}(M_2) \geq k \). Otherwise, when the adversarial link is on the top layer, the maximum achievable rate is at most \( \min\{\text{rank}(M_1), \text{rank}(M_2)\} \) from the data processing inequality, which gives a contradiction.

Let \( e_1 \) and \( e_2 \) denote the errors occurring on links \( l_1 \) and \( l_3 \), respectively. Error \( e_1 \) propagates to \( l_{10} \) and \( l_{11} \), and error \( e_2 \) propagates to \( l_{12} \) and \( l_{13} \).

From (2), we have the following set of equations
\[
G_t x = \begin{pmatrix} M_1 & 0 \\ 0 & M_2 \end{pmatrix} (e_1, e_2)^T = M \cdot e''.
\]

Since \( \text{rank}(M_1) \geq k \) and \( \text{rank}(M_2) \geq k \), \( \text{rank}(M) \geq 2k \). Then \( A = \{G_t x : x \in X\} \) and \( B = \{Me'' : e'' \in \mathbb{F}_q^{4n}\} \) are both linear subspaces of \( \mathbb{F}_q^{4n} \), and \( \dim(A) = k \) and \( \dim(B) \geq 2k \).

Let \( \{x_1, ..., x_k\} \) denote a basis of \( X \). Then \( \{G_t x_1, ..., G_t x_k\} \) is a basis of \( A \). Similarly, since \( \text{rank}(M) \geq 2k \), there exist \( 2k \) vectors \( \{y_1, ..., y_{2k}\} \) such that \( \{My_1, ..., My_{2k}\} \) is a subset of basis of \( B \).

If \( 3k > 4n \), since both \( A \) and \( B \) are linear subspaces of \( \mathbb{F}_q^{4n} \), there exists \( (a_1, ..., a_k, b_1, ..., b_{2k}) \neq (0, ..., 0) \) such that
\[
\sum_{i=1}^{k} a_i (G_t x_i) + \sum_{j=1}^{2k} b_j (My_j) = 0.
\]
If \( (a_1, ..., a_k) = (0, ..., 0) \) or \( (b_1, ..., b_{2k}) = (0, ..., 0) \), then it contradicts the linear independence of basis. Thus, \( (a_1, ..., a_k) \neq (0, ..., 0) \) and \( (b_1, ..., b_{2k}) \neq 0 \). Then,
\[
\sum_{i=1}^{k} a_i (G_t x_i) + \sum_{j=1}^{2k} b_j (My_j)
\]
\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{k} G_t (a_i x_i) + \sum_{j=1}^{2k} M(b_j y_j)
\]
\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{k} G_t (a_i x_i) - \sum_{j=1}^{2k} M(-b_j y_j)
\]
\[
= 0.
\]
Fig. 9. A single source and a single sink network: The link capacity in this network is as follows: \( r(l_1) = r(l_2) = r(l_3) = r(l_4) = 4, r(l_5) = \ldots = r(l_{10}) = 2 \). All the links in the middle layer have capacity 1. Error correction at \( Y_3 \) and \( Y_4 \) is necessary for achieving the capacity.

Therefore, we have found nonzero \( x = \sum_{i=1}^{k} a_i x_i \) and \((e_1, e_2)^T = -\sum_{j=1}^{2k} (-b_j y_j)\) such that \( G_t x = M e'' \).

It completes the proof.

The following corollary shows that vector linear codes \(^4\) (see e.g. [22]) also achieve at most rate 4/3.

**Corollary 1:** For the network in Fig. 8 with a single adversarial link, a vector linear network code can achieve at most rate 4/3.

**Proof:** For a vector linear code, the outgoing edges of each node carries vectors of alphabet symbols which are function of the vectors carried on the incoming edges to the node. We consider a vector linear code that groups \( m \) symbols into a vector. As in lemma 7 we define the \((4n)m \times km\) transfer matrix \( G_t \) between \( s \) and \( t \). Transfer matrices \( M_1 \) and \( M_2 \) are also defined in the same way, and \( \text{rank}(M_1) \geq km \) and \( \text{rank}(M_2) \geq km \). As in the proof of lemma 7 when \( k > \frac{4n^2}{m} \), we can show that there exists vectors \((x, e_1, e_2)\) \((x \neq 0)\) satisfying

\[ G_t x = (M_1 \cdot e_1, M_2 \cdot e_2). \]

**B. Error correction at intermediate nodes**

We next give an example in which error correction at intermediate nodes is used for achieving the capacity. The intuition behind our approach is that error correction at intermediate nodes can reduce the error propagation to the links in the bottom layer and MDS code assigned on the bottom layer gives the correct output. We consider a

\(^4\)A vector linear code is a linear code operating over a vector of symbols.
single source-destination network in Fig. 9. For a single adversarial link, upper bound from Theorem 1 is 8. From Sec. IV-A, the upper bound on the linear coding capacity is \( \sum_{i=5}^{10} r(l_i)/(m + 1) = 6 \).

**Lemma 8:** Given the network in Fig. 9 for a single adversarial link, rate 8 is achievable using error correction at intermediate nodes.

**Proof:** Without loss of generality, all nodes except \( Y_3 \) and \( Y_4 \) forward their received information. We first assign a \((12, 8)\) MDS code \((a, b, \ldots, l)\) on the bottom layer links and apply a \((4, 2)\) MDS code at each decision node, e.g., we assign \((e, f, e + f, e + 2f)\) and \((g, h, g + h, g + 2h)\) on incoming links to \( Y_3 \) and \( Y_4 \) respectively. Then we can assign codewords on all links in the network since all nodes except \( Y_3 \) and \( Y_4 \) are forwarding nodes. If the adversarial link is on the middle or bottom layer, at most two errors are propagated to the sink node and the MDS code assigned on the bottom layer gives the correct output. If the adversarial link is on the top layer, at most two errors are propagated to the sink node through forwarding nodes \( Y_1, Y_2, Y_5, \) and \( Y_6 \). Since at most one error is incoming to \( Y_3 \) and \( Y_4 \) respectively, the \((4, 2)\) MDS code applied at each decision node gives error-free output \((e, f)\) and \((g, h)\). Therefore, when the adversarial link is on the top layer, at most two errors are propagated to the sink and the \((12, 8)\) MDS code returns the correct output.

**Algorithm 1** Algorithm for error correction at intermediate nodes

\[
\begin{align*}
M & \leftarrow N \\
CS & \leftarrow \emptyset \\
G' & = G \\
\text{While } |M| \geq 1 \text{ and } \exists i \text{ s.t. } d(G', i) > 0, i \in M \\
& \quad M' = M - I(G', M) \\
& \quad CS' = CS \cup S_I(G', M) \\
& \quad G' = G' - S_I(G', M) \\
& \quad M = M', CS = CS' \\
\text{endwhile} \\
\text{return } CS
\end{align*}
\]

One possible generalization of the above intermediate node error correction is as follows. Given an acyclic network \( G = (V, E) \), we use \( c_G(s, i) \) and \( c_G(i, t) \) denote the min-cut between the source \( s \) and \( i \), and the min-cut between \( i \) and the sink \( t \) in \( G \), respectively. We assume that there is a fixed set of nodes \( N \subset V \) such that \( c_G(s, i) \geq c_G(i, t) \) for \( \forall i \in N \) and error correction can be applied only at nodes in \( N \). For instance, in Fig. 9, \( N = \{Y_3, Y_4\} \). Let \( d(G, i) = c_G(s, i) - c_G(i, t) \) denote the difference between the max-flow from \( s \) to \( i \) and the max-flow from \( i \) to \( t \).

The selection function \( I(G, N) \) chooses a node \( i \in N \) on \( G \) which maximizes \( d(G, i) \). Precisely,

\[
I(G, N) = \arg \max_{i \in N} \{d(G, i)\}.
\]
Here is the outline of our greedy algorithm with error correction at intermediate nodes. Given an acyclic network $G$ and the set of error correction nodes $N$, we choose a node $i = I(G, N)$ that maximizes $d(G, i)$ on $G$. Since $c_G(s, i)$ is the max-flow from $s$ to $i$, we can find $c_G(s, i)$ paths so that each path carries one symbol from $s$ to $i$. Likewise, we also find $c_G(i, t)$ paths from $i$ to $t$. Let $S_{I(G,M)}$ denote the subgraph composed of above paths. We assign a $(c_G(s, i), c_G(i, t))$ MDS code on $S_{I(G,M)}$. We remove $S_{I(G',M)}$ from $G$ and add it to $CS$ which denotes the union of subgraphs for which codewords are already assigned. We also remove $i$ from $N$. We repeat the above procedure until $N = \emptyset$ or there is no node $i \in N$ such that $d(G, i) > 0$. A precise description of the algorithm is shown in algorithm 1. Since max-flow can be computed in polynomial-time, this algorithm is a polynomial-time greedy algorithm.

C. Coding at intermediate nodes

Here we consider an example of a single-source and single-sink network, shown in Fig. 10 whose capacity is achieved using linear coding at intermediate nodes rather than nonlinear error correction or detection. For a single adversarial link, the upper bound obtained from Theorem 1 is 4.

**Lemma 9:** Given the network in Fig. 10 for a single adversarial link, coding at intermediate nodes achieves the rate 4.

**Proof:** To achieve rate 4, any four links on the top layer should carry 4 independent packets. Otherwise, when the adversarial link is on the top layer, source cannot transmit 4 packets reliably. Then the data processing inequality gives a contradiction. Similarly, any two links on the bottom layer should carry 4 independent packets. Since $Y_i$ is connected to at most four different nodes among $(X_1, \ldots, X_6)$ for $1 \leq i \leq 4$ and all links in the middle layer have capacity 1, each of $Y_1, Y_2, Y_3$, and $Y_4$ receives all independent information. Thus we cannot apply...
simple error-detection or correction at $Y_1$, $Y_2$, $Y_3$, and $Y_4$. Suppose that only forwarding strategy is used on this network. Then we show that rate 4 is not achievable. There are six symbols on the top layer. Since we use only forwarding, these are forwarded to the bottom layer. Since bottom layer links have total capacity 8, there are at least two same symbols on the bottom layer links. This contradicts that any two links on the bottom layer should carry four independent information to achieve rate 4. Therefore forwarding is insufficient for achieving the rate 4 in this network.

Now we show that a generic linear network code, where intermediate nodes do coding, achieves rate 4. From [22, Ch 19], a generic network code can be constructed with high probability by randomly choosing the global encoding kernels provided that the base field is sufficiently large. So a random linear network code is generic with high probability when $q$ is very large. If the adversarial link is on the top or middle layer, then each capacity 2 on the bottom layer is equivalent to two unit capacity links. Then all links in the network have capacity one and this problem is reduced to the equal link capacities problem. From [4], rate $6 - 2 \times 1 = 4$ is achievable. From [22, Theorem 19.32], since the min-cut between $s$ and $(Y_i, Y_j)$ is at least 4 for $\forall 1 \leq i \neq j \leq 4$, in a generic network code the global encoding kernels on any two links on the bottom layer are linearly independent and they satisfy the MDS property. Thus an error on the last layer can be corrected.

D. Guess-and-forward

Here we introduce a new achievable coding strategy, guess-and-forward. In this strategy, a node receives some redundant information from multiple paths. If this information is inconsistent, the node guesses which of its upstream links controlled by the adversary and forwards its guess to the sink. The sink receives additional information allowing it to test the hypothesis of the guessing node and correctly identify one or more adversarial links. Altogether a finite number of guesses are forwarded, so the average overhead of forwarding guesses goes to zero asymptotically with the total amount of information communicated.

To provide intuition, we first describe a simple version of the guess-and-forward scheme on a particular four-node network example shown in Fig. [11]. From Theorem [1] when $z = 2$, the capacity is upper bounded by 7. We will show that rate 7 is achievable in this network using the guess-and-forward scheme.

In this scheme, node $A$ forwards its received information to node $B$ and on multiple links to the sink node $t$. This information is received reliably by the sink, but not necessarily by $B$ since the single feedback link from $A$ to $B$ may be adversarial. Node $B$ also receives reliably from the source node $s$ the information that was sent from $s$ to $A$, and compares this with the information forwarded by $A$. A mismatch indicates that either the feedback link $(A, B)$ is adversarial or that one or more links from $s$ to $A$ are adversarial. $B$ sends this guess to the sink along with the information received on link $(A, B)$, which allows the sink to distinguish between the two possibilities. Note that decoding at the sink relies on knowledge of the network and code, while the guessing node simply has to compare the feedback with the corresponding information forwarded from the source node.
Fig. 11. Four node acyclic networks: this network consists of 3 links of capacity 2 from s to A, 5 links of capacity 1 from B to t, 1 links of capacity 6 from A to B. Given the cut ((s, B), {A, t}), unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source s to its neighbor B on one side of the cut and from node A to sink t on the other side of the cut, respectively.

To be precise, let $W$ and $\hat{W}$ denote the symbols sent by s and received by A respectively on the links from s to A. $W$ is sent reliably from s to B, and $\hat{W}$ is sent reliably from A to t.

In each round, s and B together send a (11, 7) MDS code to A and t across the cut $\text{cut}((s, B), {A, t})$. Since the feedback link has capacity 6, A sends its codeword symbols $\hat{W}$ to B along feedback link $l$. For feedback link $l$, let $P_l$ denote the information received by B on $l$. B compares $P_l$ with $W$ which is received from s. If $P_l \neq W$, then B obtains a guess $X_l$ identifying the locations of adversarial links between s and A assuming $P_l$ is reliable. B sends the claim $(X_l, P_l)$ to t along each link between B and t using repetition code. If $P_l = W$, B does not send any claim. B sends claims only when it guesses at least one adversarial forward link which is different from those guessed in previous rounds. Thus B sends claims in 3 rounds, which is equal to the number of links between s and A. Note that on a result the number of channel uses is not constant in each round. Since the total number of channel uses required to send claims is finite, the overhead amortized over a large number of rounds goes to zero asymptotically with the number of rounds.

**Lemma 10:** Given the network in Fig. 11, rate 7 is achievable.

**Proof:** Since there are $5 \geq 2z + 1$ links from B to t, any claim $(X_l, P_l)$ can be sent reliably from B to t using a repetition code.

Case 1) the sink receives some claim $(X_l, P_l)$.

The sink compares $P_l$ with $\hat{W}$ which is received from A reliably. If $P_l \neq \hat{W}$, then the feedback link transmitting $P_l$ is adversarial and the sink ignores it. Otherwise, $P_l$ is reliable. Since the claim is sent, the sink knows that $P_l = \hat{W} \neq W$ and that guess $X_l$ is correct. Thus the sink identifies the forward links in $X_l$ as adversarial, which are subsequently ignored.
Case 2) no claims are sent.

In this case, we show that the correct output is achieved. No claims are sent only if either

- $B$ receives $W$ on the feedback link, or
- the guessed set $X_l$ only contains forward links that have been guessed by $l$ in previous rounds. From these previous rounds, by case 1, the sink has already identified as adversarial either $l$ or the guessed forward links, and is concerned only with the remaining network.

Either way, there are the following two possibilities for the overall remaining network (recall that $A$ transmits $\hat{W}$ to $B$):

(I) all links between $s$ and $A$ and the feedback link are uncorrupted.

(II) some links between $s$ and $A$ are corrupted and feedback link is corrupted such that feedback link transmits error-free output.

In possibility (I), the feedback link transmits $W$ to $B$. In (II), $A$ sends $\hat{W} \neq W$ but the feedback link changes it to $W$ so that $B$ does not send any claims. We first consider all sets of 7 forward links on the cut. There are \( \binom{8}{7} = 8 \) such sets of links. Each set has total capacity at least 9. For each such set $L$, the sink checks the consistency of the output of rate 7 obtained from $L$. We also consider all sets of 6 links such that each set includes all 3 links between $s$ and $A$ and any 3 links between $B$ and $t$. There are \( \binom{5}{3} \) such sets. The sink also checks the consistency of the output of rate 7 for each set.

Case 2 - a) there is no set of 7 links giving consistent output.

In this case, there are more than 1 forward adversarial link on the cut. Since $z = 2$, all two adversarial links are forward links and thus possibility (II) cannot hold. Then possibility (I) is true and there are at most two forward adversarial links with capacity 1 on the cut. We obtain the correct answer from our (11,7) MDS code.

Case 2 - b) there is no set of 6 links that includes all 3 links from $s$ to $A$ and gives consistent output.

In this case, possibility (II) is true. Then there is at most one forward adversarial link on the cut. We obtain the correct answer from our (11,7) MDS code.

Case 2 - c) There exist both a 7-link set $L_1$ giving consistent output and a 6-link set $L_2$ that includes all 3 links between $s$ and $A$ and give consistent output.

It is clear that $\sum_{L_1 \in L_1 \cap L_2} r(l_1) \geq 7$ for any $L_1$ and $L_2$. Thus $L_1$ and $L_2$ give the same consistent output. Since at least one of (I) and (II) is true, this output is correct.

From cases 1-2, since $z = 2$, $B$ needs to send claims at most 2 times to obtain the correct output.

V. GUESS-AND-FORWARD ON SOME FAMILIES OF NETWORKS

In this section, we employ the guess-and-forward strategy on a sequence of increasingly complex network families. The first is a two-node network with multiple feedback links. The second is a four-node acyclic network. The third is a family of ‘zig-zag’ networks. In the first two cases, the guess-and-forward strategy achieves the capacity. For
zig-zag networks, we derive the achievable rate of guess-and-forward strategy and present conditions under which this bound is tight.

A. Two-node network

We achieve the error-correction capacity of the two-node network with multiple feedback links by using guess-and-forward strategy. A two-node network shown in Fig. 12 is composed of \( n \) forward links with arbitrary capacity and \( m \) feedback links with arbitrary capacity. In Lemma 11 we first characterize the capacity of this network when each forward link has capacity 1. We extend this result to Theorem 2 when each forward link has arbitrary capacity.

**Lemma 11:** Consider the two-node network shown in Fig. 12 such that each forward link has capacity 1. Let \( C \) denote the error-correction capacity with \( z \) adversarial links. If \( n \leq 2z \), \( C = 0 \). Otherwise, \( C = \min\{n - z, n - 2(z - m)\} \).

**Proof:**

From lemma 2 in Section III upper bound of the capacity is \( \min\{n - z, n - 2(z - m)\} \) when \( n > 2z \), and 0 otherwise. So it is sufficient to prove the achievability of this upper bound by applying our guess-and-forward strategy when \( n > 2z \).

Case 1) \( m \leq \frac{z}{2} \).

Step 1) In each round, the source \( s \) sends an \( (n, n - 2(z - m)) \) MDS code on the \( n \) forward links. Since \( m \leq z/2, n - 2(z - m) \leq n - z \). Thus for any received \( n \) signals, there exist \( n - 2(z - m) \) uncorrupted signals. If all \( \binom{n}{n - 2(z - m)} \) subsets of received symbols decode to the same message, this message is correct. Otherwise, the sink sends the \( n \) received signals to the source \( s \) on each feedback link using a repetition code.

Step 2) Based on the received information on each feedback link, the source tries to identify the bad forward links. Thus, for each feedback link, the source obtains a claim regarding the location of forward adversarial links.
which is correct if that feedback link is not adversarial.

Step 3) This step consists of \( m \) phases, each composed of a finite number of rounds. In the \( i \)th phase, the source sends the claim obtained from the \( i \)th feedback link together with what it received on that feedback link to the sink. This information can be sent reliably to the sink using a repetition code because \( n - 2z > 0 \). If what the source received matches what the sink sent, the \( i \)th feedback link was not corrupted and the associated claim is correct. Using this claim, the sink can decode the message as well as identify at least one of the forward adversarial links.

If all \( m \) feedback links were corrupted, the sink knows that there are only \( z - m \) forward adversarial links and since we are using a \((n,n - 2(z - m))\) MDS code the message is correctly decodable at the sink.

Note that we only need to use the above scheme during the first \( 2m \) times the sink sees inconsistency at step 1. The reason is that from steps 1-3, the sink either figures out that all feedback links are adversarial or identifies at least one forward adversarial link. If all feedback links are bad, they are ignored and the \((n,n - 2(z - m))\) MDS code gives us the correct output. If there are \( k \leq 2m \) forward adversarial links, after the first \( k \) times the sink sees inconsistency at step 1, all forward adversarial links are identified subsequently and no further inconsistency is seen among the remaining forward links. Otherwise, when there are more than \( 2m \) adversarial links, the sink finds \( 2m \) forward adversarial links and ignores them. Then from [4], the rate \( n - 2m - 2(z - 2m) = n - 2(z - m) \) can be achieved using the remaining forward links only.

Case 2) \( m > \frac{z}{2} \).

In each round, the source \( s \) sends an \((n,n - z)\) MDS code on the \( n \) forward links. For any received \( n \) signals, there exist \( n - z \) uncorrupted signals. If all \( \binom{n}{n-z} \) subsets of received symbols decode to the same message, this message is correct. As in the case 2-a, from steps 2-3, the sink either concludes that all feedback links are adversarial or identifies at least one forward adversarial link. If all \( m \) feedback links were corrupted, there are only \( z - m < z/2 \) bad forward links and subsequently only the forward links are used to achieve the rate \( n - z \). Otherwise, the above scheme is used at most \( z \) times inconsistency is seen at step 1, after which the sink has identified all bad forward links and the remaining forward links suffice to achieve rate \( n - z \).

Now we generalize above result to the general case when each forward link has also arbitrary capacity.

**Theorem 2:** Consider the two-node network shown in Fig. 12 with arbitrary link capacities. Let \( D_p \) denote the sum of the \( p \) smallest forward link capacities. The error-correction capacity is

\[
C = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } n \leq 2z \\
\min\{D_{n-z}, D_{n-2(z-m)}\} & \text{if } n > 2z 
\end{cases}
\]

**Proof:** From lemma 2, achievable capacity is 0 when \( n \leq 2z \). When \( n > 2z \), we use \( D \) to denote the sum of all \( n \) forward link capacities. For achievability, when \( m \leq z/2 \), the source sends \((D,D_{n-z})\) MDS code to the sink. When \( m > z/2 \), the source sends \((D,D_{n-2(z-m)})\) MDS code to the sink. By using the same strategy as in the proof of Lemma 11, we can achieve the rate \( C \).
A. B. Four-node acyclic network

In this section, we use the guess-and-forward strategy on a four-node acyclic network, the simplest case of a zigzag network. In this acyclic network, source node $s$ and its neighbor node $B$ lie on one side of a cut that separates them from sink node $t$ an its neighbor $A$. As in the cut-set model, we allow unbounded reliable communication from source $s$ to its neighbor $B$ on one side of the cut and from node $A$ to the sink $t$ on the other side of the cut; this allows node $B$ to compare information from feedback links with uncorrupted information from the source to obtain the guess. Similarly, by comparing claims with information reliably transmitted from node $A$, the sink can identify the corrupted link.

This network is composed of a set of $a$ forward links $\{l_1, \ldots, l_a\}$ with arbitrary capacities from $s$ to $A$, a set of $b$ forward links $\{l_{a+1}, \ldots, l_{a+b}\}$ with arbitrary capacities from $B$ to sink $t$, and a set of $m$ feedback links from $A$ to $B$. Each feedback link has capacity $h$ whose value will be derived in following Section V-B1. $C_1 = \sum_{l \in \{l_1, \ldots, l_a\}} r(l)$ and $C_2 = \sum_{l \in \{l_{a+1}, \ldots, l_{a+b}\}} r(l)$ denotes the sum of forward link capacities from $s$ to $A$, and from $B$ to $t$, respectively. Let $C = C_1 + C_2$. $C_z$ is the upper bound on this network obtained from Theorem [1].

In [21], we have shown that rate $C_z$ is asymptotically achievable on this four-node acyclic network when each feedback link has capacity at least $C_1$. Here we show that rate $C_z$ is achievable even when each feedback link has smaller capacity than $C_1$. In Section V-B1, we first consider a coding strategy at node $A$ and formulate a linear optimization problem which gives the minimum capacity of each feedback link that guarantees the success of our strategy. Then, in Section V-B2, we show that rate $C_z$ is asymptotically achievable this smaller feedback link capacity using our guess-and-forward strategy.
matrix at links from $A$ transmits feedback link. For instance, given a network in Fig. 14(a), and $B$ combination of link each of which is a linear combination of codewords received on a single link from $A$. We first assume that node $A$ transmits on each feedback link to $B$, the same set of codewords each of which is a linear combination of codewords received on a single link from $s$ to $A$. Precisely, for any forward link $l_i$, node $A$ transmits on each feedback link $g(\hat{W}_{l_i}) = (g_{l_i}^1(\hat{W}_{l_i}), \ldots, g_{l_i}^{k'}(\hat{W}_{l_i}))$ where $g_{l_i}^j(\hat{W}_{l_i})$ is a single linear combination of $\hat{W}_{l_i} = (p_{l_i}^1, \ldots, p_{l_i}^{r(l_i)})$. Thus, the same value $g(\hat{W}) = (g(\hat{W}_{l_1}), \ldots, g(\hat{W}_{l_a}))$ is transmitted on each feedback link. For instance, given a network in Fig. 14(a), $A$ transmits $g(\hat{W}) = (g(\hat{W}_{l_1}), g(\hat{W}_{l_2}), g(\hat{W}_{l_3}))$ where $g(\hat{W}_{l_1}) = a_1 + a_2$, $g(\hat{W}_{l_2}) = b_1 + b_2$, and $g(\hat{W}_{l_3}) = c_1 + c_2$.

Here, we define the degree of freedom of forward link $l$ between $s$ and $A$ as follows.

**Definition 3:** Consider the vector of symbols $\hat{W}_l$ received on forward link $l$ from $s$ to $A$ and assume that node $A$ transmits $k$ linear combinations of $\hat{W}_l$, $g(\hat{W}_l) = (g_1^l(\hat{W}_l), \ldots, g_k^l(\hat{W}_l))$. Let $M_l$ denote the $r(l) \times k$ encoding matrix at $A$ for link $l$ such that $\hat{W}_l \cdot M_l = g(\hat{W}_l)$. Then the degree of freedom of link $l$, $f(l)$, is defined as the capacity of link $l$ minus the rank of the matrix $M_l$, i.e., $f(l) = r(l) - \text{rank}(M_l)$. For any forward link $l$ between $B$ and $t$, we simply define the degree of freedom $f(l)$ as the link capacity, i.e., $f(l) = r(l)$.

For example, in Fig. 14(a), since feedback link transmits $(a_1 + a_2, b_1 + b_2, c_1 + c_2)$, $f(l) = 1$ for all forward links from $s$ to $A$. In Fig. 14(b), since feedback link transmits $(\sum_{i=1}^6 a_i, \sum_{i=1}^6 b_i, \sum_{i=1}^4 c_i, \sum_{i=1}^4 d_i, \sum_{i=1}^3 e_i)$, $f(l_1) = f(l_2) = 5$, $f(l_3) = f(l_4) = 3$, and $f(l_5) = 2$. 

**Fig. 14.** Four node acyclic networks: (a) $z = 2$ and feedback link transmits $(a_1 + a_2, b_1 + b_2, c_1 + c_2)$. (b) $z = 3$. Assume that $(a_1, \ldots, a_6)$, $(b_1, \ldots, b_6)$, $(c_1, \ldots, c_4)$, $(d_1, \ldots, d_4)$, and $(e_1, e_2, e_3)$ are transmitted on forward links $(l_1, \ldots, l_5)$ from $s$ to $A$, respectively. Feedback link transmits $(\sum_{i=1}^6 a_i, \sum_{i=1}^6 b_i, \sum_{i=1}^4 c_i, \sum_{i=1}^4 d_i, \sum_{i=1}^3 e_i)$. 

1) **Coding strategy at node $A$:** Suppose that $(s, B)$ sends $(C, C_2)$ MDS code across the cut to $(A, t)$. We consider the encoding strategy at node $A$ and derive the minimum capacity of each feedback link. Suppose that node $A$ receives the vector of symbols $\hat{W} = (\hat{W}_{l_1}, \ldots, \hat{W}_{l_a})$ from $s$ where $\hat{W}_l = (p_1^l, \ldots, p_{r(l)}^l)$ denotes the codewords on link $l \in \{l_1, \ldots, l_a\}$. We first assume that node $A$ transmits, on each feedback link to $B$, the same set of codewords each of which is a linear combination of codewords received on a single link from $s$ to $A$. Here, we define the degree of freedom of forward link $l$ between $s$ and $A$ as follows.
From the definition of degree of freedom, node $A$ sends
\[
    h = \sum_{l \in \{l_1, \ldots, l_a\}} (r(l) - f(l)) = C_1 - \sum_{l \in \{l_1, \ldots, l_a\}} f(l)
\]  
(3)
codewords to $B$ along each feedback link.

Now we introduce our coding strategy at node $A$ as follows.

Node $A$ can choose any $g(\hat{W})$ which satisfies the following two conditions on the degree of freedom of links.

**Condition 1:** Given any set $A_1$ composed of $2z$ forward links, $\sum_{l \in A_1} f(l) \leq C - C_z$.

**Condition 2:** Given any set $A_2$ composed of $z$ forward links and $A_3$ composed of $z - m$ forward links such that $A_2 \cap A_3 = \emptyset$, $\sum_{l \in A_2} f(l) + \sum_{l \in A_3} r(l) \leq C - C_z$.

Condition 1 means that the sum of the degree of freedom of any $2z$ forward links are less than or equal to $C - C_z$.

Condition 2 means that the sum of the degree of freedom of any $z$ links plus the sum of any $z - m$ link capacities is less than or equal to $C - C_z$. In the proof of Lemma 13 and 14, we show that these two conditions are necessary to prove the tightness of our upper bound in Theorem 1. For example network in Fig. 14(a), $z = 2$ and the upper bound $C_z = 6$. 3 codewords sent by $A$ satisfies above two conditions, and feedback capacity 3 is sufficient. Likewise, when $z = 3$ and the upper bound $C_z = 9$ in the network Fig. 14(b), 5 codewords sent by $A$ also satisfies above two conditions. In [21], the minimum required capacity for each feedback link to achieve rate $C_z$ is the sum of all forward link capacities between $s$ and $A$, which is 6 and 23 for the networks in Fig. 14(a) and (b), respectively.

Finally, we formulate a linear optimization problem which gives the minimum capacity of each feedback link, based on conditions 1 and 2.

\[
    \min h = C_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{a} f(l_i)
\]
\[
f(l_i) \leq r(l_i), \quad \forall 1 \leq i \leq a + b
\]
\[
\sum_{l \in M} f(l) \leq C - C_z, \quad M \subset \mathcal{E}, |M| \leq 2z
\]
\[
\sum_{l \in N_1} r(l) + \sum_{l \in N_2} f(l) \leq C - C_z,
\]
\[
N_1, N_2 \subset \mathcal{E}, |N_1| \leq z - m, |N_2| \leq z, N_1 \cap N_2 = \emptyset
\]  
(4)

Objective function $h$ is defined in equation (3). The first inequality constraint is the link capacity constraint. The second and third constraints come from condition 1 and 2 respectively. We can check that solving the above optimization problem for the networks in Fig. 14(a) and (b) gives the feedback link capacities 3 and 5, respectively.

2) **Guess-and-forward strategy:** In this section, we show the tightness of the upper bound using our guess-and-forward strategy. Our proof of decoding success requires each feedback link’s capacity to satisfy the lower bound obtained in (4), so that node $B$ receives sufficient feedback information to guess the corrupted links by comparing with information reliably received from the source. This feedback link capacity can in general be smaller than that
in the simple example of Section V-B1 so the details and proof of correctness of the scheme are slightly more involved.

The guess-and-forward strategy achieving the rate \( C_z \) for the four-node acyclic network shown in Fig. 13 is as follows. In each round, \( s \) and \( B \) together send a \( (C, C_z) \) MDS code obtained from Lemma 12 below, to \( A \) and \( t \) across the cut \( \text{cut} \{ \{s, B\}, \{A, t\} \} \). Let \( W \) and \( \hat{W} \) denote the codewords \( s \) sends to \( A \), and \( A \) received from \( s \), respectively. Using the coding strategy in Section V-B1, \( A \) sends \( g(\hat{W}) \) to \( B \) along each feedback link using a repetition code. For each feedback link \( l \), let \( P_l \) denote the information received by \( B \) on \( l \). \( B \) compares \( P_l \) with \( g(W) \). If \( P_l \neq g(W) \), then \( B \) obtains a guess \( X_l \) identifying the locations of adversarial links between \( s \) and \( A \) assuming \( P_l \) is reliable. \( B \) does not send any claim if \( P_l = g(W) \), or if the guessed set \( X_l \) only contains forward links that have been guessed by \( l \) in previous rounds.

We next show that this strategy achieves rate \( C_z \) asymptotically, via the following series of lemmas.

**Lemma 12:** Given the four-node acyclic network in Fig. 13 let \( u \) denote the sum of \( 2z \) largest degree of freedom of links in the network. Suppose the adversary introduces errors on \( z \) forward links subject to the constraint that the values sent along the feedback links are unaffected. There exists a \( (C, C - u) \) generic linear code for the forward links that corrects these \( z \) error links.

**Proof:** See the appendix.

Since the sum of \( 2z \) largest degree of freedom is at most \( C - C_z \) from the condition 1, we obtain \( C - u \geq C_z \).

**Definition 4:** Given a set of any \( k \) forward links \( L = \{l_1, \ldots, l_k\} \) in the four-node acyclic network, we say \( L \) gives consistent output if \( \sum_{l \in L} r(l) \geq C_z \) and the decoded output from any \( C_z \) code symbols on \( L \) is the same.

**Lemma 13:** Given the four-node network in Fig. 13 such that \( b \geq 2z + 1 \), rate \( C_z \) is achievable.

**Proof:** Since \( b \geq 2z + 1 \), any claim \( (X_l, P_l) \) can be sent reliably from \( B \) to \( t \) using a repetition code. The details of proof is presented in the appendix.

**Lemma 14:** Given the four-node network in Fig. 13 such that \( b \leq 2z \), rate \( C_z \) is achievable.

**Proof:** When \( b \leq 2z \), reliable transmission of claims from \( B \) to \( t \) is not guaranteed. Thus we cannot use the same technique used in the proof of Lemma 13. The proof is presented in the appendix.

**C. zig-zag network**

In this section, we consider a special case of the zig-zag network, the non-overlapping zig-zag network. We present conditions under which our upper bound is tight and derive a general achievable bound for non-overlapping zig-zag network.

We call the network shown in Fig. 15 a \( k \)-layer non-overlapping zig-zag network. Unlike the general zig-zag network, feedback transmission is only possible from \( A_i \) to \( B_i \). \( A_i \) and \( B_i \) can communicate reliably with unbounded rate to \( A_{i+1} \) and \( B_{i+1} \), respectively. \( (s = B_0, t = A_{k+1}) \). Thus, reliable transmission with unbounded rate is possible from \( A_i \) to \( A_j \), and from \( B_i \) to \( B_j \) for \( \forall i < j \). We use \( F_i \) and \( W_i \) to denote the set of forward links and feedback

\(^5\)A generic linear code is MDS.
Fig. 15. $k$-layer non-overlapping zig-zag network: Given the cut $\text{cut}(\{s, B_1, \ldots, B_k\}, \{A_1, \ldots, A_k, t\})$, $A_i$ and $B_i$ can communicate reliably with unbounded rate to $A_{i+1}$ and $B_{i+1}$, respectively. $(s = B_0, t = A_{k+1})$. The links from $A_i$ to $B_i$ represent feedback across the cut. This model more accurately captures the behavior of any cut with $k$ feedback links across the cut.

links from $B_{i-1}$ to $A_i$, and from $A_i$ to $B_i$, respectively. Let $|F_i| = b_i$ and $|W_i| = m_i$. In this network, we assume that each feedback link from $A_i$ to $B_i$ has a sufficient capacity to forward all the information $A_i$ received from $B_{i-1}$. It is clear that the four-node network is $1$-layer non-overlapping zig-zag network. Given a $k$-layer zig-zag network $G$, we use $C_z$ to denote the upper bound on $G$ obtained from Theorem 1.

Now we consider the following strategy for non-overlapping zig-zag network which is similar to that for a four-node network. We use $C$ to denote the sum of all forward link capacities.

In each round, $s$ and $(B_1, \ldots, B_k)$ together send a $(C, C_z)$ MDS code to $(A_1, \ldots, A_k)$ and $t$ across the cut $\text{cut}(\{s, B_1, \ldots, B_k\}, \{A_1, \ldots, A_k, t\})$. For $1 \leq i \leq k$, $A_i$ sends its codeword symbols $\hat{W}$ to $B_i$ along each feedback link using a repetition code. For each feedback link $l$, let $P_l$ denote the information received by $B_i$ on $l$. $B_i$ compares $P_l$ with $W$ which is received from $s$. If $P_l \neq W$, then $B_i$ obtains a guess $X_l$ identifying the locations of adversarial links between $B_{i-1}$ and $A_i$ assuming $P_l$ is reliable. $B_i$ sends claim $(X_l, P_l)$ to $A_{i+1}$ along each link using repetition code. If $P_l = W$, $B_i$ does not obtain any claim. For all $2 \leq j \leq k$, $A_j$ sends any received claim from $B_{j-1}$ to the sink reliably. The above strategy is applied in each round. $B_i$ sends claims only when $X_l$ guesses at least one adversarial forward link which is different from forward links guessed by $l$ at previous rounds.

For a four-node acyclic network in Fig. 13 Lemma 13 shows that our bound is tight when claims are sent reliably from node $B$ to the sink $t$, i.e., $b \geq 2z + 1$. Using our strategy, we simply extend this result for the non-overlapping zig-zag network as follows.

**Lemma 15:** Given a family of $k$-layer non-overlapping zig-zag networks such that $b_i \geq 2z + 1$ for $2 \leq i \leq k + 1$, rate $C_z$ is achievable.

**Proof:** Since $b_i \geq 2z + 1$ for $2 \leq i \leq k + 1$, any claim $(X_l, P_l)$ can be sent reliably from $B_{i-1}$ to $A_i$ using
a repetition code. Then $A_i$ sends this claim reliably to sink $t$. As in the proof of Lemma 13 we first show that at least one adversarial link is removed whenever sink receives some claim, in case 1. We also show that correct output is always achievable when no claims are sent in case 2.

Case 1) sink receives some claim $(X_i, P_i)$.

Assume that feedback link $l$ is between $A_j$ and $B_j$, and $B_j$ sends this claim to $A_{j+1}$. In this case, we use the same strategy as in the case 1 in Lemma 13. Then we show that the sink removes at least one bad link whenever it receives claim.

Case 2) no claims are sent to the sink.

Similar to the case 2 in the proof of Lemma 13, the case that no claims are sent to the sink occurs only when for each feedback link $l$ between $A_j$ and $B_j$ either of the following holds:

- the information $B_j$ receives on $l$ is equal to $W$ where $W$ is the uncorrupted codeword sent by $s$ to $B_j$
- the guessed set $X_i$ only contains forward links that have been guessed by $l$ in previous rounds. From these previous rounds, by case 1, the sink has already identified as adversarial either $l$ or the guessed forward links, and is concerned only with the remaining network.

Either way, there are the following two possibilities for the overall remaining network (recall that $A_j$ transmits $\hat{W}$ to $B_j$).

- a) All forward links in $(F_1,..,F_k)$ and feedback links in $(W_1,...,W_k)$ are not corrupted.
- b) For some $\{i_1,..,i_p\} \subseteq \{1,2,..,k\}$ such that $m_{i_1} +.. + m_{i_p} \leq z$, all feedback links in $(W_{i_1},..,W_{i_p})$ are corrupted and some forward links in $(F_{i_1},..,F_{i_p})$ are corrupted. The furthest downstream forward links in $F_{k+1}$ can be also corrupted. For $\forall j \notin \{i_1,..,i_p,k+1\}$, links in $F_j$ and $W_j$ are not corrupted.

Let $N = \{(i_1,..,i_p)|1 \leq i_1 <.. < i_p \leq k, m_{i_1} +.. + m_{i_p} \leq z\} \cup \{\emptyset\}$. (Note that $\{\emptyset\}$ corresponds to the possibility in a)). From a) and b), there are total $|N|$ possibilities. Exactly only one of them is true. Now we describe how the correct solution with rate $C_z$ can be obtained. We check the consistency of the output for each possibility. For each $(i_1,..,i_p) \in N$, we first remove $m_{i_1} +.. + m_{i_p}$ corresponding feedback links and check whether there are $K - (z - (m_{i_1} +.. + m_{i_p}))$ forward links giving consistent output such that remaining $(z - (m_{i_1} +.. + m_{i_p}))$ forward links are elements of $F_{i_1} \cup.. \cup F_{i_p} \cup F_{k+1}$. If such a set exists, we denote it by $G(i_1,..,i_p)$. If there is no such set of $K - (z - (m_{i_1} +.. + m_{i_p}))$ forward links giving consistency, we remove $(i_1,..,i_p)$ from $N$ and ignore corresponding possibilities.

Now we show that only tuples $(i_1,..,i_p)$ such that $G(i_1,..,i_p)$ gives the correct output remain in $N$. Since at least one remaining tuple gives the correct output, it is sufficient to prove that for any remaining $(i_1,..,i_p) \in N$ and $(j_1,..,j_r) \in N$, $G(i_1,..,i_p)$ and $G(j_1,..,j_r)$ gives the same output. This is equivalent to showing that the sum of capacities of forward links which are contained in both $G(i_1,..,i_p)$ and $G(j_1,..,j_r)$ is at least $C_z$, i.e.,

$$\sum_{l \in G(i_1,..,i_p) \cap G(j_1,..,j_r)} r(l) \geq C_z.$$
Fig. 16. Reduced non-overlapping zig-zag network $G'$ such that $m_u > z$ and $b_{u+1} \geq 2z + 1, \ldots, b_{k+1} \geq 2z + 1$. This graph is obtained from $G$ by erasing all feedback links in $W_1 \cup W_2 \ldots \cup W_{u-1}$.

$G(i_1, \ldots, i_p)$ gives $K - (z - (m_{i_1} + \ldots + m_{i_p}))$ forward links giving consistent output such that remaining $(z - (m_{i_1} + \ldots + m_{i_p}))$ forward links are in $F_{i_1} \cup \ldots \cup F_{i_p} \cup F_{k+1}$. Similarly, $G(j_1, \ldots, j_r)$ gives $K - (z - (m_{j_1} + \ldots + m_{j_r}))$ forward links giving consistent output such that remaining $(z - (m_{j_1} + \ldots + m_{j_r}))$ forward links are in $F_{j_1} \cup \ldots \cup F_{j_r} \cup F_{k+1}$. In this case, from the definition of cut-set upper bound in Lemma 6, the sum of the capacities of forward links assumed to be correct by both $G(i_1, \ldots, i_p)$ and $G(j_1, \ldots, j_r)$ is at least $C_z$. Since each guess gives consistent output, these two guesses gives the same output. Since any two remaining guesses in $N$ give the same consistent output, all remaining guesses give the same output.

We derive another condition under which our bound is tight.

**Lemma 16:** Given a family of $k$-layer non-overlapping zig-zag networks such that $m_u > z$ and $b_j \geq 2z + 1 \forall j \geq u + 1$ for any $1 \leq u \leq k$, rate $C_z$ is achievable.

**Proof:** We consider a reduced non-overlapping zig-zag network $G'$ shown in Fig. 16 which is obtained from a given $k$-layer non-overlapping zig-zag network by erasing $m_1 + \ldots + m_{u-1}$ feedback links $W_1 \cup \ldots \cup W_{u-1}$. We use $C'_z$ to denote the upper bound on $G'$ from Theorem 1. Since $G'$ is weaker than $G$, it is sufficient to show that $C'_z \geq C_z$ and $C'_z$ is achievable on $G'$.

Step 1) We show that $C_z \leq C'_z$.

We first compute $C'_z$ on $G'$ from Theorem 1. Suppose that $C'_z$ is obtained by choosing and $A^* = \{A_{i_1}, \ldots, A_{i_p}\} \subseteq \{A_{u+1}, \ldots, A_k\}$ and $B^* = \{A_{j_1}, \ldots, A_{j_r}\} \subseteq \{A_{u+1}, \ldots, A_k\} - A^*$ and applying Lemma 6 after erasing $k$ forward links set $F^*$, $m$ feedback links set $W^*$. It is sufficient to prove that choosing the same $F^*$, $W^*$, $A^*$, and $B^*$ on original graph $G$ gives the same upper bound $C'_z$.

Since $m_u > z$, $A_u \notin A^*$ and $A_u \notin B^*$ from the definition of upper bound in Lemma 6. Then $P_{A^*} \subseteq F_{A_{i_1}} \cup \ldots \cup F_{A_{i_p}} \subseteq F_{u+1} \cup \ldots \cup F_k$, $P_{B^*} \subseteq F_{A_{j_1}} \cup \ldots \cup F_{A_{j_r}} \subseteq F_{u+1} \cup \ldots \cup F_k$. 


Since \( m_u > z \) and \( b_{k+1} > z \), no matter what \( W^* \) is erased on \( G' \), chosen downstream links \( R_A^* \) and \( R_B^* \) are in \( F_{u+1} \cup \ldots \cup F_{k} \), i.e., \( R_A^*, R_B^* \in F_{u+1} \cup \ldots \cup F_{k} \).

Thus, \( Z_A^* = P_A^* \cup R_A^* \subset F_{u+1} \cup \ldots \cup F_{k} \) and \( Z_B^* = P_B^* \cup R_B^* \subset F_{u+1} \cup \ldots \cup F_{k} \).

Since all erased forward links in \( Z_A^* \cup Z_B^* \) are in \( F_{u+1} \cup \ldots \cup F_{k} \) for \( G' \), erasing the same \( F^*, W^*, Z_A^*, \) and \( Z_B^* \) on original graph \( G \) also gives the same upper bound \( C_z' \) for \( G \). Since \( C_z \) is the minimal upper bound for \( G \), \( C_z \leq C_z' \).

Step 2) We show that rate \( C_z \) is achievable.

From Lemma [15] since \( b_{u+1} \geq 2z + 1, \ldots, b_{k+1} \geq 2z + 1 \) and \( C_z \leq C_z' \), rate \( C_z \) is achievable on \( G' \). Thus, given a non-overlapping zig-zag network \( G \), we first ignore all feedback links between \( A_i \) and \( B_i \) \( (1 \leq i \leq u - 1) \) and apply the same achievable strategy for four-node acyclic network.

From steps 1) and 2), we complete the proof.

Now we derive an achievable rate of guess-and-forward strategy for any non-overlapping zig-zag network.

We use \( G_I \) to denote the non-overlapping zig-zag network obtained from original \( G \) by erasing all feedback links in \( W_i \) such that \( i \notin I \). Let \( b(i, j) = \sum_{u=i+1}^{j} b_i \) denote the number of forward links between \( i \) th layer and \( j \)th layer. Supersets \( P, Q, \) and \( R \) are defined as follows.

\[
P = \{\{i\}|1 \leq i \leq k\},
\]

\[
Q = \{\{i_1,..,i_u\}|\{i_1,..,i_u\} \subset \{1,..,k\}, b(1,i_1) \geq 2z + 1, b(i_1,i_2) \geq 2z + 1, \ldots, b(i_u,k + 1) \geq 2z + 1\},
\]

\[
R = \{\{i_1,..,i_u\}|\{i_1,..,i_u\} \subset \{1,..,k\}, m_{i_1} > z, b(i_1,i_2) \geq 2z + 1, \ldots, b(i_u,k + 1) \geq 2z + 1\}.
\]

**Lemma 17:** Given the network in Fig. [15] rate \( \max_{I \in P \cup Q \cup R} C_I \) is achievable.

**Proof:** We first show that rate \( C_{\{i\}} \) is achievable for \( 1 \leq i \leq k \). We ignore all feedback links except the feedback links in \( W_i \). Then applying the same achievability strategy for four-node acyclic network gives the rate \( C_{\{i\}} \) from Lemma [12] and [14].

For any subset \( I \in Q \), we ignore all feedback links except the feedback links in \( W_i \) such that \( i \in I \). Then from Lemma [15] rate \( C_I \) is achievable. Similarly, for any subset \( I \in R \), rate \( C_I \) is achievable from Lemma [16]. This completes the proof.

**VI. Conclusion**

We have studied the capacity of single-source single-sink noiseless networks under adversarial attack on no more than \( z \) edges. In this work, we have allowed arbitrary link capacities, unlike prior papers. We have proposed a new
cut-set upper bound for the error-correction capacity for general acyclic networks. This bound tightens previous cut-set upper bounds. For example networks where the bounds are tight, we have employed both linear and nonlinear coding strategies to achieve the capacity. We have proved the insufficiency of linear network codes to achieve the capacity in general. We also have shown by examples that there exist single-source and single-sink networks for which intermediate nodes must perform coding, nonlinear error detection or error correction in order to achieve the network capacity. This is unlike the equal link capacity case, where coding only at the source suffices to achieve the capacity of any single-source and single-sink network. We have introduced a new achievable strategy, guess-and-forward, which is used to show the capacity of the two-node network and a family of four-node acyclic networks. Finally, for a class of so called non-overlapping zig-zag networks, we have derived the rate achieved by guess-and-forward and presented conditions under which that bound is tight.

Further work includes characterizing the capacity region of a four-node acyclic network when the capacity of feedback links is small. When the lower bound on the feedback link capacity is not satisfied, we can investigate also the tightness of our bound or find an achievable capacity region. It would also be interesting to find new achievable strategies and upper bounds for more general zig-zag and other networks, particularly since cut-set approaches are not sufficient in general [20]. Investigating networks for which there exists a gap between known upper and lower bounds may provide further insights. Another related problem, which we treat briefly in our conference paper [17], considers high-probability correction of errors in a causal adversary model as in [15].

**APPENDIX**

*Proof of Lemma 12:* Since the adversary controls forward links such that codewords on feedback links are unchanged, from the definition the degree of freedom of errors that the adversary can control for any forward link \( l \) is at most \( f(l) \). We prove this lemma by simply extending [4, Theorem 4] which is for the equal link capacities case to the unequal link capacities case.

Let \( M \) denote the transfer matrix whose columns are the coding vectors assigned to links. Then, the difference set is

\[
\Delta(V,z) = \{(\theta_l(e) - \theta_l(e')) \cdot M^{-1} : l \in \Gamma_+ (t), N(e) \leq z, N(e') \leq z\}
\]

\[
= \{\theta_l(e - e') \cdot M^{-1} : l \in \Gamma_+ (t), N(e) \leq z, N(e') \leq z\}
\]

\[
= \{\theta_l(d) \cdot M^{-1} : l \in \Gamma_+ (t), N(d) \leq 2z\},
\]

where \( N(e) \) denotes the number of links error \( e \) occurs and \( \theta_l(e) \) denotes the output of error vector \( e \) at the sink with zero-input.

Last equality comes from \( \{e - e' : N(e) \leq z, N(e') \leq z\} = \{d : N(d) \leq 2z\} \).
We use $p$ to denote the maximum number of different error vectors when the adversary controls $2z$ links. Since $\Delta(V,z) = \{\theta_l(d) \cdot M^{-1} : l \in \Gamma_+(t), N(d) \leq 2z\}$,

$$|\Delta(V,z)| \leq p \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{2z} \binom{a + b}{i}.$$  

Since $u$ is the sum of $2z$ largest degree of freedom, $p \leq (q - 1)^u$. Thus,

$$|\Delta(V,z)| \leq (q - 1)^u \sum_{i=0}^{2z} \binom{a + b}{i} \leq 2^C(q - 1)^u,$$

where $C$ is the sum of all forward link capacities.

After computing the size of the difference set $\Delta(V,z)$, we apply exactly the same argument as in [4, Theorem 4]. From the argument in the proof of [4, Theorem 4], it is sufficient to show the existence of $u \times C$ parity check matrix $H$ such that for all $w \in \Delta^*(V,z)$, $Hw^\tau \neq 0$ where $\Delta^*(V,z) = \Delta(V,z) - \{0\}$. By using the same technique in [4, Theorem 4], the number of matrices $H$ such that there exists $w \in \Delta^*(V,z)$ satisfying $Hw^\tau = 0$ is upper bounded by

$$q^{u(n-1)}(q - 1)^{-1}(\Delta(V,z) - 1) < 2^Cq^{u(n-1)}(q - 1)^{-1}(q - 1)^u,$$

$$= \frac{2^Cq^{un}}{q}.$$  

Thus, if $q$ is a prime power such that $q > 2^C$, then there must exist a $u \times C$ matrix such that $Hw^\tau \neq 0$ for all $w \in \Delta^*(V,z)$ and the result follows.

**Proof of Lemma 13:**

Since $b \geq 2z + 1$, any claim $(X_l, P_l)$ can be sent reliably from $B$ to $t$ using a repetition code. In case 1, we first show that at least one adversarial link is removed whenever sink receives some claim. In case 2, we show that rate $C_z$ is achievable even when no claims are sent from $B$.

Case 1) sink receives some claim $(X_l, P_l)$.

The sink compares $P_l$ with $g(\hat{W})$ which is received from $A$ reliably. If $P_l \neq g(\hat{W})$, then feedback link transmitting $P_l$ is adversarial and the sink ignores it. Otherwise, $P_l$ is reliable. Since the claim is sent, the sink knows that $P_l = g(\hat{W}) \neq g(W)$ and that guess $X_l$ is correct. Thus the sink identifies as adversarial the links in $X_l$, which are subsequently ignored. Therefore, in this case, the sink removes at least one bad link whenever $B$ sends claims.

Case 2) no claims are sent.

From our strategy, the case that no claims are sent from $B$ occurs only when for each feedback link $l$ either of the following holds:

- the information $B$ receives on $l$ is equal to $g(W)$ where $W$ is the uncorrupted codeword sent by $s$ to $B$
• the guessed set $X_l$ only contains forward links that have been guessed by $l$ in previous rounds. From these previous rounds, by case 1, the sink has already identified as adversarial either $l$ or the guessed forward links, and is concerned only with the remaining network.

Either way, there are the following three possibilities for the overall remaining network (recall that $A$ transmits $\hat{W}$ to $B$).

(I) All links between $s$ and $A$ and all feedback links are uncorrupted. Then $\hat{W} = W$ and $g(\hat{W})$ is reliably transmitted.

(II) Some links between $s$ and $A$ are corrupted so that $A$ receives $g(\hat{W}) \neq g(W)$ from $s$, but the adversary controls all feedback links such that each feedback link changes $g(\hat{W})$ to $g(W)$.

(III) Some links between $s$ and $A$ are corrupted such that codewords $A$ sends along each feedback link are unchanged, i.e., $\hat{W} \neq W$ and $g(\hat{W}) = g(W)$. All feedback links are reliable and $B$ receives $g(W)$.

If possibility (I) is true, all links between $s$ and $A$ and all feedback links are uncorrupted. Then there exists a set of $(a + b - z)$ forward links on the cut such that this set includes all $a$ links between $s$ and $A$ and some $b - z$ links between $B$ and $t$, and gives consistent output with rate $C_z$. (Note that the sum of capacities of any $(a + b - z)$ forward links is larger than or equal to $C_z$ from the definition of our bound in Theorem 1) If possibility (II) is true, all $m$ feedback links are corrupted. Then there exist a set of $(a + b - z + m)$ forward links on the cut that gives consistent output with rate $C_z$. If possibility (III) is true, then we obtain the correct output from $(C, C_z)$ MDS code in Lemma 12.

Based on the above analysis, we give the following simple decoding algorithm and prove the correctness of this algorithm as follows.

\textbf{Algorithm 2} Decoding algorithm for achieving rate $C_z$ when no claims are sent.

\begin{algorithmic}
\IF there is a set $L_1$ which is composed of $a + b - z + m$ forward links and gives consistent output,
\THEN the output with rate $C_z$ from $L_1$ is correct.
\ELSE IF there is a set $L_2$ which is composed of all $a$ forward links from $s$ to $A$ and some $b - z$ forward links from $B$ to $t$, and gives consistent output,
\THEN the output with rate $C_z$ from $L_2$ is correct.
\ELSE the output with rate $C_z$ obtained from $(C, C_z)$ MDS code is correct.
\ENDIF
\end{algorithmic}

Case 2 - a) there is a set $L_1$ composed of $(a + b - z + m)$ forward links giving consistent output.

In this case, we show that output with rate $C_z$ obtained from $L_1$ is correct. First we prove that output from $L_1$ is correct when (II) or (III) is true. If (II) is true, all $m$ feedback links are corrupted and thus $L_1$ contains at least $(a + b - z + m) - (z - m) = a + b - 2(z - m)$ uncorrupted links. From the definition of our upper bound in Lemma 5 the sum of capacities of any $a + b - 2(z - m)$ forward links is larger than or equal to $C_z$. Since $L_1$ gives consistent output, the output is correct. If (III) is true, $L_1$ contains at most $z$ corrupted links. In this case, we can
show that $L_1$ gives correct output using condition[2]. Since (III) is true and the values on feedback links remain the same, when adversary controls a set of $z$ forward links, $A_1$, the degree of freedom adversary can control is at most $\sum_{l \in A_1} f(l) (|A_1| = z)$. From condition[2] the sum of degree of freedom of $z$ links in $A_1$ plus the sum of capacities of $z - m$ forward links not included in $L_1$ is less than or equal to $C_z$, i.e., $\sum_{l \in A_1} f(l) + \sum_{l \in E - L_1} r(l) \leq C - C_z$. Therefore, $L_1$ contains at least rate $C - (C - C_z) = C_z$ uncorrupted output and the output is correct. As shown above, using condition[2] we have shown that $L_1$ contains at least one correct output if (III) is true and complete the proof from the consistency of $L_1$.

Case 2 - a - i) there is no set of $(a + b - z)$ links that includes all $a$ forward links from $s$ to $A$ and gives consistent output.

In this case, possibility (I) cannot hold and thus (II) or (III) is true. Thus output from $L_1$ is correct.

Case 2 - a - ii) there exists a set $L_2$ composed of $(a + b - z)$ forward links that includes all $a$ links from $s$ to $A$ and gives consistent output.

We first show that $L_1$ and $L_2$ gives the same consistent output. $L_1 \cap L_2$ is obtained from the cut by erasing $z$ forward links from $B$ to $t$ that $L_2$ does not include and $z - m$ forward links $L_1$ does not include. From the definition of our bound in Lemma[6] $\sum_{l \in L_1 \cap L_2} r(l) \geq C_z$. Thus $L_1$ and $L_2$ give the same consistent output. Since $L_2$ gives the correct output when (I) is true, and $L_1$ and $L_2$ give the same consistent output in this case, output from $L_1$ is correct when (I) is true. Moreover, we have already shown that $L_1$ gives the correct output if (II) or (III) is true. Therefore, $L_1$ always gives correct output.

Case 2 - b) there is no set of $(a + b - z + m)$ forward links giving consistent output.

In this case, there are more than $z - m$ adversarial forward links on the cut. Thus (II) cannot hold and (I) or (III) is true. If there is no set of $(a + b - z)$ forward links that includes all $a$ links from $s$ to $A$ and gives consistent output, then (III) is true. From Lemma[12] output obtained from $(C, C_z)$ MDS code is correct. Otherwise, suppose that there exists a set $L_2$ composed of $(a + b - z)$ forward links that includes all $a$ links from $s$ to $A$ and gives consistent output. We show that output obtained from $L_2$ is correct.

If possibility (I) is true, since all links between $s$ and $A$ and all feedback links are uncorrupted, $L_2$ contains at most $z$ corrupted forward links between $B$ and $t$. From the definition of the Singleton bound, the sum of capacities of $a$ links between $s$ and $A$ plus the sum of any $b - 2z$ forward links between $B$ and $t$ is larger than or equal to $C_z$. Thus, from uncorrupted $a$ links between $s$ and $A$ and some $b - 2z$ links between $B$ and $t$ which are not corrupted, we obtain the correct output rate $C_z$. Since $L_2$ gives consistent output, the decoded output is correct.

If possibility (III) is true, the adversary controls some forward links from $s$ to $A$ such that each feedback link transmits $g(W)$, and $L_2$ contains at most $z$ unknown corrupted links. Using condition[1] we will show that the output obtained from $L_2$ is correct. If $A_2$ is a set of truly corrupted forward links, the degree of freedom adversary can control is at most $\sum_{l \in A_2} f(l) (|A_2| \leq z)$. From the definition, the degree of freedom of any forward link from $B$ to $t$ is equal to the link capacity. From the condition[1] the sum of degree of freedom of truly corrupted links in $A_2$ and the sum of $z$ forward links between $B$ and $t$ which are not included in $L_2$ is less than or equal
to \( C - C_z \). Therefore, \( L_2 \) contains at least \( C - (C - C_z) = C_z \) uncorrupted symbols. Since \( L_2 \) gives consistent output, the decoded output from \( L_2 \) is correct. As shown above, when (III) is true, we can obtain correct output using condition 1.

Therefore, either (I) or (III) is true, \( L_2 \) gives the correct output.

Proof of Lemma \[14\]:

Since \( b \leq 2z \), a claim \((X_i, P_i)\) for any feedback link \( l \) is not reliably transmitted to the sink and adversarial links between \( B \) and \( t \) can corrupt this claim arbitrarily. Thus, the sink can receive different claims on different incoming links. Let \( G(l) \) be the set of distinct claims \( G(l) = \{(X_{i1}, P_{l1}), \ldots, (X_{ik}, P_{lk}), Y\} \) where \( Y \) denotes that no claims received. Here is the outline of the proof. We first show that at least one adversarial link is removed except when \( b > z \) and the sink receives no claim on all \( b \) links for all feedback links. When \( b > z \) and the sink receives no claim on all \( b \) links, since all \( b \) links cannot be corrupted at the same time, the sink knows that \( B \) does not send any claim. This case exactly corresponds to the case 2 in the proof of Lemma \[13\] and we achieve the correct output. This completes the proof. Note that the same guess-and-forward strategy in Section \[V-B2\] is used.

First we show that any uncorrupted \((a + b - 2z)\) forward links between \( s \) and \( A \) give the correct decoded output with rate \( C_z \). From the definition of Singleton bound, after erasing \( b \leq 2z \) links between \( B \) and \( t \) and any set of \( 2z - b \) links between \( s \) and \( A \), the sum of the remaining link capacities are larger than or equal to \( C_z \). Thus any uncorrupted \((a + b - 2z)\) links between \( s \) and \( A \) give the correct message.

Now we assume that \((X_{li}, P_{li})\) is received on \( n_i \) links and \( Y \) is received on \( n_{k+1} \) links \((n_1 + \ldots + n_{k+1} = b)\). First we ignore any \((X_{li}, P_{li})\) claiming that there are more than \( z - (b - n_i) \) adversarial links between \( s \) and \( A \). Since \( X_{li} \) is shown on \( n_i \) links, believing \( X_{li} \) implies more than \( z \) adversarial links on the cut which is a contradiction. Thus, each of remaining claim \((X_{lj}, P_{lj})\) specifies a set \( L_j \) which is composed of at least \((a - (z - (b - n_i))) = a + b - z - n_i \) links between \( s \) and \( A \) claimed to be correct by \((X_{lj}, P_{lj})\). For each such claim, we check the consistency of the decoded outputs of \( L_j \). We show that if there exist two different claims \((X_{li}, P_{li})\) and \((X_{lj}, P_{lj})\) both corresponding to consistent outputs, then those two outputs should be the same. Since \(|L_i| = a + b - z - n_i|, |L_j| = a + b - z - n_j, and |L_i \cup L_j| \leq a,

\[
|L_i \cap L_j| \geq (a + b - z - n_i) + (a + b - z - n_j) - a \geq a + b - 2z.
\]

As we mentioned at the beginning of the proof, the sum of capacities of any \((a + b - 2z)\) link between \( s \) and \( A \) is larger than or equal to \( C_z \). Therefore \( L_i \) and \( L_j \) give the same consistent output.

Suppose that we have figured out that a set of links \( L \) gives the correct consistent decoded output. In this case, we add remaining links not included in \( L \) sequentially to \( L \), and check the consistency of any decoded output with rate \( C_z \). If outputs are no more consistent, the added link is adversarial (*).
Now we show that at least one adversarial link is removed except when \( b > z \) and the sink receives no claim on all \( b \) links for all feedback links.

Case 1) all claims are ignored or none of the remaining claims gives consistent output or all claims \((X_{li}, P_{li})\) that give consistent output satisfy that \( P_{li} \neq \hat{W} \).

In this case, there are only two possibilities.

(I) feedback link \( l \) is adversarial.

(II) feedback link \( l \) is reliable and all \( b \) links between \( B \) and \( t \) are adversarial.

If \( b > z \), then possibility (II) cannot hold and feedback link \( l \) is adversarial. We remove it. If \( b \leq z \), the sink checks the consistency of outputs from each set of \((a + b - z)\) links between \( s \) and \( A \). If no \((a + b - z)\) links set give consistency, then there are more than \( z - b \) adversarial links between \( s \) and \( A \). Thus possibility (I) is true and we remove feedback link \( l \). Otherwise, there exists a set \( L \) of \((a + b - z)\) links giving consistency. Since this set contains at most \( z \) corrupted links, and thus includes at least \((a + b - 2z)\) uncorrupted links between \( s \) and \( A \). Then the sum of capacities of uncorrupted links are larger than or equal to \( C_z \). Thus \( L \) gives correct output rate \( C_z \). From (*) we can detect forward adversarial links in this case.

Case 2) there exists a claim \((X_{li}, P_{li})\) giving consistent output and \( P_{li} = \hat{W} \).

We show that the output obtained from claim \((X_{li}, P_{li})\) should be correct. If there is at least one uncorrupted link showing \((X_{li}, P_{li})\), then feedback link \( l \) is also not corrupted since \( P_{li} = \hat{W} \), and this claim gives correct output rate \( C_z \). Otherwise, if all \( n_i \) links showing this claim are adversarial, then there are at most \( z - n_i \) adversarial links between \( s \) and \( A \). Then \( L_i \) includes at least \((a + b - z - n_i) - (z - n_i) = a + b - 2z \) uncorrupted links, and thus gives correct consistent output. From (*) we can also detect adversarial links in this case.

Case 3) only \( Y \) gives consistent output and \( b < z \).

In this case, the set of all \( a \) forward links from \( s \) to \( A \) gives consistent output. The \( a \) links between \( s \) and \( A \) include at least \( a - z \geq a + b - 2z \) uncorrupted links since \( b < z \). Thus we obtain correct consistent output from \( a \) links and detect adversarial links from (*).

Case 4) only \( Y \) gives consistent output, \( b > z \), and at least one of \( b \) links between \( B \) and \( t \) show claim different from \( Y \), i.e., \( n_{k+1} < b \).

Case 4 - a) \( n_{k+1} < b - z \).

If feedback link \( l \) is reliable, the links showing claims different from \( Y \) are adversarial. Thus there are more than \( b - n_{k+1} > z \) adversarial links and this is a contradiction. Thus feedback link \( l \) is adversarial and we remove it.

Case 4 - b) \( b - z \leq n_{k+1} \leq z \).

\( Y \) is shown on \( n_{k+1} \geq b - z \) links and \( b - n_{k+1} \geq b - z \) links show claims different from \( Y \). Thus there are at least \( b - z \) adversarial links between \( B \) and \( t \). Then there are at most \( 2z - b \) adversarial links between \( s \) and \( A \) and at least \( a + b - 2z \) uncorrupted links. Thus we also obtain correct output from \( a \) links and use (*) to detect the adversarial links.

Case 4 - c) \( z < n_{k+1} < b \).
Since $n_{k+1} > z$, feedback link $l$ transmits $g(\hat{W}) = g(W)$ to $B$ and $B$ does not send any claim. Thus, the links showing claims different from $Y$ are all adversarial.

For cases 1-4, we have shown that at least one adversarial link is removed when $b > z$ and the sink receives some claim different from $Y$ for any feedback link.

To complete the proof it is now sufficient to show that correct output can be achieved when $b > z$ and the sink receives no claim for all feedback links $l$. Since $b > z$, at least one link between $B$ and $t$ is uncorrupted. Since all $b$ links show $Y$, this means that each feedback link transmits $g(\hat{W}) = g(W)$ and $B$ does not send any claim. This case corresponds to the case 2 in Lemma 13. Therefore, we can obtain the correct output.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We thank the reviewers for their very insightful and detailed suggestions that were most helpful in improving this paper.

REFERENCES

[1] R. Ahlswede, N. Cai, S. Li, and R. Yeung, “Network information flow,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 1204–1216, 2000.
[2] S. Li, R. Yeung, and N. Cai, “Linear network coding,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 371–381, 2003.
[3] R. Yeung and N. Cai, “Network error correction, part I: Basic concepts and upper bounds,” Communications in Information and Systems, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 19–36, 2006.
[4] N. Cai and R. Yeung, “Network error correction, part II: Lower bounds,” Communications in Information and Systems, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 37–54, 2006.
[5] R. Koetter and M. Médard, “An algebraic approach to network coding,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON), vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 782–795, 2003.
[6] T. Ho, B. Leong, R. Koetter, M. Médard, M. Effros, and D. Karger, “Byzantine modification detection in multicast networks using randomized network coding,” in IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, 2004, pp. 144–144.
[7] Z. Zhang, “Linear network error correction codes in packet networks,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 209–218, 2008.
[8] C. Gkantsidis and P. Rodriguez, “Cooperative security for network coding file distribution,” in IEEE INFOCOM. IEEE, 2006, pp. 2004–137.
[9] M. Krohn, M. Freedman, and D. Mazieres, “On-the-fly verification of rateless erasure codes for efficient content distribution,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE, 2004, pp. 226–240.
[10] S. Jaggi, M. Langberg, S. Katti, T. Ho, D. Katabi, and M. Medard, “Resilient network coding in the presence of byzantine adversaries,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Special Issue on Information Theoretic Security, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2596–2603, June 2008.
[11] G. Liang, R. Agarwal, and N. Vaidya, “Capacity of Byzantine Agreement: Complete Characterization of Four-Node Networks,” in Technical Report, April 2010.
[12] ———, “When watchdog meets coding,” in IEEE INFOCOM, 2010, pp. 1–9.
[13] R. Koetter and F. Kschischang, “Coding for errors and erasures in random network coding,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 3579–3591, 2008.
[14] D. Silva, F. Kschischang, and R. Koetter, “A rank-metric approach to error control in random network coding,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 54, no. 9, pp. 3951–3967, 2008.
[15] M. Langberg, S. Jaggi, and B. Dey, “Binary causal-adversary channels,” in *IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory*. IEEE, 2009, pp. 2723–2727.

[16] O. Kosut, L. Tong, and D. Tse, “Nonlinear network coding is necessary to combat general byzantine attacks,” in *47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing*, 2009.

[17] S. Kim, T. Ho, M. Effros, and S. Avestimehr, “Network error correction with unequal link capacities,” in *47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing*, 2009.

[18] T. Cover, J. Thomas, and J. Wiley, *Elements of information theory*. Wiley Online Library, 1991.

[19] R. Ahuja, T. Magnanti, and J. Orlin, *Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications*. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1993.

[20] O. Kosut, L. Tong, and D. Tse, “Polytope codes against adversaries in networks,” in *IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory*. IEEE, 2010, pp. 2423–2427.

[21] S. Kim, T. Ho, M. Effros, and S. Avestimehr, “New results on network error correction: capacities and upper bounds,” in *Information Theory and Applications Workshop (ITA), 2010*. IEEE, 2010, pp. 1–10.

[22] R. Yeung, *Information theory and network coding*. Springer Verlag, 2008.

**Sukwon Kim** is currently an Senior research engineer at the Digital Media and Communication research center at Samsung Electronics. He received his Ph.D. in 2010 and M.S. degree in 2007 in Electrical Engineering, both from the California Institute of Technology (Caltech). Prior to that, he obtained his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Seoul National University in 2005. He has received a Samsung Lee Kun Hee Scholarship from Samsung Scholarship Foundation during his Ph.D study.

**Tracey Ho** (M’06) is an Assistant Professor in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at the California Institute of Technology. She received a Ph.D. (2004) and B.S. and M.Eng degrees (1999) in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS) from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). She was a co-recipient of the 2009 Communications & Information Theory Society Joint Paper Award for the paper “A Random Linear Network Coding Approach to Multicast.” Her primary research interests are in information theory, network coding and communication networks.

**Michelle Effros** (S’93-M’95-SM’03-F’09) received the B.S. degree with distinction in 1989, the M.S. degree in 1990, and the Ph.D. degree in 1994, all in electrical engineering from Stanford University, Stanford, CA.

During the summers of 1988 and 1989, she worked at Hughes Aircraft Company. She joined the faculty at the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, in 1994 and is currently a Professor of Electrical Engineering. Her research interests include information theory, network coding, data compression, and communications.
Dr. Effros received Stanford’s Frederick Emmons Terman Engineering Scholastic Award (for excellence in engineering) in 1989, the Hughes Masters Full-Study Fellowship in 1989, the National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship in 1990, the AT&T Ph.D. Scholarship in 1993, the NSF CAREER Award in 1995, the Charles Lee Powell Foundation Award in 1997, the Richard Feynman-Hughes Fellowship in 1997, an Okawa Research Grant in 2000, and was cited by Technology Review as one of the world’s top 100 young innovators in 2002. She and her coauthors received the 2009 Communications & Information Theory Society Joint Paper Award for the paper “A Random Linear Network Coding Approach to Multicast,” which appeared in the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY in October 2006. She is a member of Tau Beta Pi, Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, and a fellow of the IEEE. She served as the Editor of the IEEE Information Theory Society Newsletter from 1995 to 1998 and as a Member of the Board of Governors of the IEEE Information Theory Society from 1998-2003 and 2008-present and has been a member of the Advisory Committee for the Computer and Information Science and Engineering (CISE) Directorate at the National Science Foundation from 2009 to the present. She served on the IEEE Signal Processing Society Image and Multi-Dimensional Signal Processing (IMDSP) Technical Committee from 2001 to 2007 and on ISAT from 2006 to 2009. She was an Associate Editor for the joint special issue on Networking and Information Theory in the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY and the IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING and as an Associate Editor for Source Coding for the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY from 2004 to 2007. She is an Associate Editor for the special issue of the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY honoring Prof. R. Koetter. She has served on numerous technical program committees and review boards, including serving as general cochair for the 2009 Network Coding Workshop. She will serve as cochair of the Technical Program Committee for the International Symposium on Information Theory in 2012.

Salman Avestimehr is an assistant Professor at the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Cornell University. He received his Ph.D. in 2008 and M.S. degree in 2005 in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, both from the University of California, Berkeley. Prior to that, he obtained his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Sharif University of Technology in 2003. He was also a postdoctoral scholar at the Center for the Mathematics of Information (CMI) at Caltech in 2008. He has received a number of awards including the 2011 Young Faculty Program (YIP) award from the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), the NSF CAREER award (2010), the David J. Sakrison Memorial Prize from the U.C. Berkeley EECS Department (2008), and the Vodafone U.S. Foundation Fellows Initiative Research Merit Award (2005). His research interests include information theory, communications, and networking.