Evidential Analysis of Terrorism and I-VEO Knowledge Matrix in the Context of Security as Pure Public Good: The Case of Pakistan from 1990 to 2010

Abstract

The case of Pakistan has presented if security provision is a pure public good in the light of the I-VEO Knowledge Matrix hypotheses. Evidential analysis of the data from 1990 to 2010 from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) suggests that terrorism incidents are not reduced with the increase of public expenditure on defence, and instead, more fatalities and injuries are witnessed during the years. The analysis is based in isolation to terrorist attacks, defence expenditure and relating hypotheses of Influential Violent Extremists Organization Knowledge Matrix (I-VEO Knowledge Matrix) and counterterrorism operations, at ceteris paribus. The I-VEO Knowledge Matrix shows there is a lack of a comprehensive set of strategy based on the collection of relevant hypotheses more productive than the existing and likely less effective counterterrorism strategies to ensure security provision as a pure public good in the case of Pakistan.

Key Words: Pure Public Good, I-VEO Knowledge Matrix, Incidents

Introduction

Governments throughout the world provide different kinds of services to their citizens. General education, Public health, upkeeping of law and order, security, public TV channels, Water, to name among many, are considered to be provided by the government, at least, in most of the developed and developing economies on the surface of this global village. The facilities of such and many more public services, and also goods, are highly demanded by common public irrespective of their status in most of the countries. The responsibility of these publically provided goods and services requires citizens to pay in the shape of taxes or service charges, or what to name, to the exchequer of their economies. This is the most practical principle experiencing in the world today, and acceptable alike in almost all kinds of economic systems range from free-market ones to mixed economies to command ones in the spheres of their respective economic decision-making services. The provision of public goods to common people in any country is the most demanding activity after the absolute political activity is undertaken once. The reliability and credibility of a political economy are totally based upon the optimum and comfortable provision of public goods and services to its citizens. Most of the political and election manifestoes of political parties in any country are replete with the promises of providing public facilities of goods and services to their voters after gaining election and coming into political powers.

Terrorism has always been the most graves man manifested menace on the surface of the earth. But, the last two decades proved
devastating as intimidation augments by leaps and bounds. Thousands of lives have perished from the surface of the planet, and several countries turned into mounds and debrides. Particularly in the context of Pakistan, the insurgency has left catastrophic consequences in socioeconomic and cultural aspects. It has erupted a character of chaos and fear, which produce hundreds of people lives and limbs losses. Incumbently, foreign investors, pay a cold shoulder towards the country.

Political studies define a nation-state to be an entity having a population, geography, political & economic system, a constitution, a well & capable security system for defence, and many more internal & external ingredients of the state. Security/defence provision is the foremost attribute necessary for the smoothly running of a political economy. The population of a country neither be excluded nor be made rival in providing them with tight security. The state of fear from aggression, internal or external alike, potentially sabotage every economic and non-economic activity of the citizens of a particular economy under such threats. The smooth running of ordinary business activities by citizens of an economy may lead to development and political harmony. Defence providing agencies of a country are dying hard to preserve the law and order situation intact in peace to common citizens so that they could work without any fear of terrorism.

Terrorism, today, is a widely used phenomenon that is mostly responsible for challenging the law and order situation inside an economy. It has multifaceted effects. It damages economic activities both at the micro and macro levels. A person once affected by any terrorist incident becomes totally ineffective at economic fronts to take part in economic activity. Not terrorism only brings micro consequences but also spoils macroeconomic variables to damage the economic growth of a country. Similarly, businesses at each level are affected by it. Labours get fewer opportunities to be on the job on a daily basis. The stock exchange is badly hit to crush. Monetary and fiscal reforms get disturbed. Public sector development and economic targets are hard to gain. According to one approximation, the economy of Pakistan has faced a cost of $ 40 billion combating the war on terror for the last ten years.

Highly hit areas under the terrorist incidents have resulted in the local people displacing them to other places. Displaced people lost almost everything from job fire off to social status to degraded levels of living in Pakistan. This kind of huge impact on the lives of people persuades policymakers & researchers alike to question if security provision is a kind of public good for the terrorist affecter. Law and order situations increased to unsatisfactorily levels in premises of their daily activities. Social evils are reported to have incremental trends in circles of these displaced people. Political and other social impacts of terrorism are also evaluated by newspapers on a daily basis. Researchers also documented in the light of the evidence the negative impacts of terrorism on almost every economic, social, political and psychological variable in their research projects.

This paper examines the common trends of incidents at national and provincial levels. It also gives space to see if the defence expenditure is so increasing in this line. This exercise is then assessed to compare the expenditure and terrorist incidents to go in parallel for the case of justifying whether security to common Pakistanis is pure public good or not. Lastly, the Influential Violent Extremists Organization Knowledge Matrix (I-VEO Knowledge Matrix) is introduced with its 183 hypotheses. The literature in this regard is summarized to show which tactics (hypotheses) are more effective at the global level for combating terrorism. The case of Pakistan is examined, again, to know if security provision is proved or disproved as a pure public good for Pakistanis.

The scheme of this paper comprises eight chapters. This chapter is about the introduction. The second one encompasses a brief literature review based on selected research articles. Chapter third introduces the hypothesis and research questions. It is followed by mentioning
methodology and data sources. Evidential analysis at national and provincial levels is given next to the methodology chapter. This chapter is based on tables and graphs to depict the real trends of terrorists’ incidents and other variables highlight in this paper. I-VEO Knowledge Matrix is given in a separate section in this paper. The second last chapter discusses the results derived from this study. The last chapter is about the conclusion and recommendation.

Objectives of the Study

The following study is concerned about the position of Pakistan in giving security and defending its citizens from the threat of internal and external terrorism. We will analyze if the state is providing security as a public good to Pakistanis. This analysis is also compared with I-VEO knowledge Matrix and its specific hypotheses to test the hypothesis of this paper and answer some of the questions based on the hypothesis of this paper.

Hypothesis

Null Hypothesis

(H₀): Security provision is a public good in the light of the I-VEO Knowledge Matrix.

The Alternative Hypothesis

(H₁): Security provision is not a public good in the light of the I-VEO Knowledge Matrix.

Research Questions

Q1: Why should individuals pay taxes for security gaining if the government fails to provide so?
Q2: Why are mostly hit areas the dwelling places of those people who preserve most of the ideology of Pakistan?
Q3: Why does the most accepted hypothesis of the I-VEO Knowledge Matrix not support in the case of Pakistan?
Q4: Is there any evidence between reduction in incidences and increases in taxes generation in the case of capital cities?

Literature Review

“Terrorism is a crime” (LaFree, Gary and Laura Dugan, 2009). It is characterized as the brutality of groups like guerilla and other groups of insurgency in nature to influence the existing socio-political diaspora, change the existing democratic system, give ways of hopes to local people to acquire their own political regime and all these revolts like insurgents like activities and functionalities are termed as illegal intimidation by the states’ security laws. Another group of researchers define the term “terrorism” as a sort of rough, tough, not bearable, not ordinary exercise by the violent pressure groups in a society or a country. These researchers also give hints to define terrorism as potentially fears and violent additional typical exercises to change a political force or a regime. (Reid, 1997). Terrorism is an action to destroy and at least disturb ordinary businesses of an individual or an economy, all in all. These are coercive sorts of acts that are not sustained and upheld by the larger part of the general population in a country or a region. It is illegal by any documents related to the great Constitutions and other sources of knowledge to human life.

On the other hand of the spectrum and save common citizens of a country, it is the prime duty of the states to provide safety and security to protect the lives and limbs of citizens from terror of any kind, coercive acts, insurgency and terrorism. Laws of a country or a region must provide conducive circumstances that possess inherent agreement to the demands and wishes of peace, harmony, settlements, preserving ordinary business of life and peacefulness so that individuals could practice living their lives and typical daily schedule of life, politics, economy, society, the executives, household, office, business, and other living standards of life. That is the reason security arrangement is viewed as the most important public good and secured its preamble in the Constitutions of countries across the globe.

In recent reports about Pakistan, it seems that security as a pure public good is compromised in the light of damages to the lives and limbs of
hundreds of thousands of people across the country. From the source of Global Terrorism Database (GTD) that Pakistan has witnessed to loss of more than 10000 lives in 2012 and twice the numbers of limbs. As this huge number of life and injuries question that security provision is a public good in Pakistan or not by the researchers.  

Zakaria et al., (2019) study show the relationship between FDI, investment and government spending. His finding reveals that a 1% increase in terrorism will decrease foreign investment by 0.104 and economic growth by 0.002. Terrorism should be countered to attract investments and enhance economic growth in Pakistan. Aslam et al. (2018) have worked to empirically relate a number of terrorist attacks with the stock market fluctuations in five Asian economies. It is showed that a total number of 414 terrorist attacks and targeting an individual in terrorist attacks gave empirically proved negative shocks to Asian stock exchanges and increase curbing the business activities in the regions of selected Asian countries. Cervellati et al., (2011) affirm empirically that democratic regimes and countries have positive relationships to enhance economic growth via the stability channels of fewer terrorist attacks, conflicts and violence across the regions.  

Hyder et al. (2015) show that Pakistan’s hand in hand with the USA to counterterrorism faced huge and tantamount effects in negative directions to hit Pakistani economy, disturbed society, enhance regional conflicts, reduced foreign investment and economic growth for more than 7 consecutive years. The series of internal and externally related waves of violence are still in spells to negatively socioeconomic, strategic and security affairs and economic growth since 9/11. Greenbaum et al. (2007) are of the beliefs that terrorism attacks reduce the employment opportunities for labor force in terror hit regions of the world. Businesses are contained to not get profits as per their earning potentials in peaceful days of economic activities. The Italian data on terrorism, employment and business activities support that terrorism, despite the increase of defence expenditures from 1985 to 1097 give hints supporting that terrorism may compromise the status of security as pure public good in countries.  

Similarly, the Pakistan economy has also faced multi-billion costs of economic loss, damages to lives and lives of thousands of thousands, the promulgation of extremism and fundamentalism, Talibination, regional mistrust, the eruption of insurgency, production of anti-state political movements, disturbance of society psychologically and disturbance of the law and order situations due to terrorism and its variants the last 10 years to the approximation of some 5022 billion of Pakistani rupees, that is near to some $ 40 in billion (Finance Division, GoP, 2008). The counterterrorism set of strategies and different operation series has curbed to much extent the multiple and complex nature of terrorism in Pakistan but not on the costs of fewer damages to lives and limbs of the people. Thus, the questions arise for researchers to highlight the proposed hypotheses of the I-VEO Knowledge Matrix for checking security as a pure public good in the case of Pakistan. Only defence expenditure is taken in relation to terror attacks and damages to lives and limbs and the objectives of different series of counterterrorism operations in Pakistan. Both the theory and practice are chasing to find terrorism and its dimensions in correlation and/or relation to social, political, economic, and other disciplines of the existing body of knowledge. Empirics give practice to the theoretical body of knowledge of terrorism and its widespread impacts on the global village at all.  

(LaFree, Gary and Laura Dugan, 2009), shows the trends of terrorist attacks in the shape of a valley (peak, declining, bottom, and then increased substantially) from 1990 to 2010 in the case of Pakistan. Yound et al. (2001) have worked upon the phenomena of terrorism and its different variants with the types of democratic and non-democratic governments by using Tsbelis’s veto player theory. The data of GTD show that democracy may not reduce the incidences of terrorism in most of the countries studied in this study. In the case of Greece,
Kollias et al. (2009) have empirically shown that the relationship between government spending and the security provision for a period of 30 years to prove the status of announced legislation to coercively curb terrorism, efficient use of budget expenditures and counterterrorism. Kis-Katos et al. (2010) have used data from a panel data study of 159 countries from the year 1070 to 2007. This study has shown a positive relationship between per capita income and terrorism attacks for the panel of these countries across the globe. The case of open and democratic economies was not proved to get the leverage of fewer terror attacks during the years. Both the national and international sorts of terrorism and insurgent movements give empirics to affect the per capita income and give diversified nature of socioeconomic losses to the studied economies across the globe, thus criticizing the hypothesis of security as a pure public good in the case of a panel of a huge number of countries of the globe.

The prime duty of a state is to provide full provision of security to all its citizens irrespective of the fact of who pays for it and who not. If the case is not so, the security provision seems to be not termed as a pure public good to the citizens concerned. The studies of Piazza 2008, Wade & Reiter 2007, Eubank and Weinberg 1994 give the answer in node to the question of security provision as a pure public good in the presence of terrorism.

**Methodology & Data Sources**

The data of terror incidents, fatalities, and injuries are taken from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from the website from the year 1990 to the year 2010 for Pakistan. Data of military expenditure are taken from the World Bank Data set. Data for drone attacks, the number of Taliban killed, and innocent people killed are taken from several local and international databases of good repute for this study. In methodology, data are arranged in meaningful tables of frequency distributions. National, provincial, cities levels are identified in these tables. Simple bar graphs and curve graphs are also inserted to give clear pictures of the aims and objectives of this study. The I-VEO Knowledge Matrix is introduced with its hypotheses of all categories to show the level of intensity of supporting (negating) by empirical evidences of quantitative and qualitative studies. The trends shown by the graphs of data about Pakistan are compared with the most accepted/supported hypothesis of the I-VEO Knowledge Matrix to accept or reject the proposed hypothesis of this paper. The methodology adoption is justified, with modified and variation for the purpose of this study, and tallied with the methodologies applied by the studies of LaFree et al. (2007) and Webb et al. (2009).

**Evidential Analysis of Terrorist Attacks & Defense Expenditure**

So it was really difficult to how to arrange data and infer the impacts of terrorism on the aspect of public goods. The constraints associated with the data to the topic concern of the investigation compelled me to present data in table forms in detail for national, provincial, and city levels and then graphs should be inserted in such a way to either accept or reject the proposed hypothesis. Thus data are given in tables first and followed by graphs in the pages to follow.

Graph 1: Curve based on data of Def Exp, Fatalities, Injuries and Incidents
Graph 2: Curve based on Data of No Drone Strikes, Taliban Killed and Civilian Killed

Table 1. Province Wise Distribution of Attacks

| Province                     | No of incidents |
|------------------------------|-----------------|
| Khyber Pakhtunkhwa           | 1220            |
| Sindh                        | 1464            |
| Punjab                       | 446             |
| Balochistan                  | 608             |
| Gilgit Baltistan             | 189             |
| Islamabad                   | 72              |

Table 2. District Wise Distribution of Incidents in KPK & Tribal Areas

| Cities            | No of Incidents |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| Mirnsha           | 46              |
| Mangwara          | 35              |
| Matta             | 38              |
| Landi Kotal       | 34              |
| Bara              | 41              |
| Wana              | 33              |
| Bannu             | 43              |
| Swat              | 111             |
| Kohat             | 41              |
| Waziristan        | 54              |
| Khyber            | 60              |
| D I Khan          | 53              |
| Muhmand           | 96              |
| Peshawar          | 213             |

Table 3. District Wise Distribution of Incidents in Sindh

| Cities     | No of Incidents |
|------------|-----------------|
| Hyderabad  | 56              |
| Karachi    | 1246            |
Table 4. District Wise Distribution of Incidents in Punjab

| Punjab     | No of Incidents |
|------------|-----------------|
| Lahore     | 160             |
| Rawalpindi | 41              |

Table 5. District Wise Distribution of Incidents in Baluchistan

| Balochistan | No of Incidents |
|-------------|-----------------|
| Sui         | 34              |
| Khuzdar     | 43              |
| Dera Bugti  | 21              |
| Quetta      | 15              |

Table 6. District Wise Distribution of Incidents in Gilgit Baltistan

| Gilgit Baltistan | No of Incidents |
|------------------|-----------------|
| Hunza            | 43              |
| Khar             | 31              |
| Kurm             | 12              |
| Gilgit           | 15              |

Table 7. Number of Displace Person due to Terrorism Incidents from KPK & Tribal Areas

| Years | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Displaced persons | 3000 | 45000 | 45000 | 30000 | 20000 | 24000 | 255000 | 480000 | 1230000 | 980000 |

Graph 3: Based on above data

VEO Knowledge Matrix

The I-VEO Knowledge Matrix, as a tool, is meant to be investigated and interacted with by users. However, in order to introduce the I-VEO Knowledge Matrix as a whole, we present summary characteristics of some of the main Matrix variables below. Each hypothesis is categorized based on the amount of empirical support available in the open literature. Fifty of the 183 hypotheses did not have any relevant empirical evidence to support or contradict the assertion. Fifty-seven of the hypotheses had multiple qualitative and/or quantitative studies with contradictory conclusions (represented by empirical support scores 2 and 3). The default
sorting of the matrix is a VEO influence typology developed by Jeffrey Knopf. The paragraph below shows the breakdown of hypotheses in each facet of the typology.

I-VEO knowledge Matrix Hypotheses

The I-VEO knowledge matrix hypotheses typology developed by Jeffery Knopf. The Knopf influence operation typologies have 7 major typologies to counterterrorism. These typologies have 183 counts of hypothesis

The first typology is about bargaining / Negotiations which terrorist organization. This typology has 14 points which mean to deal with the extremist organization by dialogue, no use of military power rather than by negotiations. The second typology is about military deterrence, which means war against VEO. It has (58) points to influence VEO. The third typology is non-military deterrence with VEO. Which means to stop financial support to extremist organizations. It has 29 counts of hypotheses. The fourth typology is about denial. This means to deals with VEO by non-military operations as well as tactics to slow down the extremist activities. It has 21 counts of hypotheses. The fifth typology is about persuasion and counter-narrative with VEO. It means to attack the heart and minds of extremist organizations as well as target the esteem. It has 33 counts of hypothesis. The sixth typology is about positive incentives. It means to have economic growth and an incentive to provide opportunities to depressed people. There should be political stability for a peaceful society. It has 16 points to influence VEO. The seven typologies are about the rest of influencing VEO by several measures, which is strong institutions etc. It has 33 counts of hypotheses.

| Military operations | Periods of operation | Knopfa’s operation typology | Count of hypotheses |
|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| Operation Enduring Freedom | (2001-2002) | Military coercion \ direct punishment | 25 |
| Operation Al Mizan | (2002-2006) | Military coercion | 25 |
| Operation Zalzala | (2008) | Military coercion | 25 |
| Operation Sher Dil,Rah-e-haq | (2007-2009) | Military coercion | 25 |
| Operation Rah-e-Rast | (2007-2009) | Military coercion | 25 |
| Operation Rah-e-Nijat | (2009-2010) | Military coercion | 25 |
| Operation Zarb-e-Azb | (2014-2016) | Military coercion | 25 |
| Operation Radd-ul-fasaad | (2017) | Military coercion | 25 |
| Security rules/laws | National counter terrorism act(NACTA) | (1997) | Non military coercion | 29 |
| Security rules/laws | Antiterrorism act (ATA) | (2014) | Non military coercion | 29 |
| Security rules/laws | APG member (FATF) | (2018) | Financial sanctions | 3 |

Evidences of Optimal Security Provision (Defense) to Pakistani & Hypotheses of I-VEO Knowledge

Evidences are described one by one on the basis of trends shown by each graph based on respective tables of data. Graph 1 shows four variables going in the same direction. Incidents are not moving in opposition to the military expenditure increases. The same is the case of the number of fatalities and injuries increased with the rapid growth of defence expenditure. It may not be wrong to comment that only increasing military expenditure may not an effective way to combat terrorism, ceteris paribus, in the case of Pakistan. Graph 2 highlights the effects of drone strikes on Pakistan. Innocent civilian people are
This result, here, shows that civilians hit by such strikes are deprived of their lives as collateral damage, thus negating security provision as a pure public good to save their lives and limbs in hit areas of Pakistan. No policy seems to be yet devised by the law and security enforcement apparatus to save civilian people from the expected damages of such coercive attacks and strikes by unmanned drones of the USA on the soil of Pakistan. UN assembly also considered drone strikes as a physical violation of the territorial and geographic rule necessary for a nation-state to be independent.

Table 1 summarizes province wise incidents of terrorists’ incidents. KPK and Tribal regions are the most hit province of Pakistan if the Karachi factor is excluded from the province of Sindh. Karachi alone experienced more than 1200 incidents. KPK and tribal regions are the worst luck areas of Pakistan facing the menaces of every kind of terrorist attacks range from drone strikes, bomb explosions, firing, kidnapping, murder of tribal chiefs at mass level, political murder, and many more one can think of. Millions of people migrated from their paternal soil to get the safety of their lives and families in other parts of the country. Such a miserable situation to the people of KPK and tribal region suggest no clue that the government is providing defence to their lives and business activities with political liberty.

Tables from 2 to 7 are about to show wise city distribution of terrorist incidents in different provinces and other regions of Pakistan. Again, here, KPK and tribal regions get widespread terrorist incidents. Most of the region of KPK is encompassed by such cruel terrorist incidents. Schools, madrassas, mosques, theatres, bazaars, political centers and figures, assemblies, village centers, tribal chiefs, “Jirga” places, and many more in every districts and agency are badly hit by terrorist organizations. Karachi is the most vulnerable city of Pakistan to cash for more than 1200 terrorist incidents. This city has witnessed the longest history of such kinds of terrorist incidents. Government security provisioning instructions seem totally failed in this regard to calm down the insurgency in the business capital of Pakistan. Baluchistan is in the third position to face the danger of terrorism. Backwardness and a huge area of this province are always problematic in combating terrorism here. Punjab is a relatively less hit province of the country due to its activeness and exercising lion share of power in business, agriculture, industry, and politics at the national level of decision making. Like other capital cities, Lahore possessed the same position of a high number of incidents in Pakistan. Gilgit Baltistan witnessed attacks mostly on a sectarian basis. Islamabad, the capital city, witnessed 72 incidents showing a potential threat as this city encompasses all the foreign embassies in its diplomatic enclave.

Table 7 and Graph 3 show the number of displaced people since 2001. The curve in this regard shows an increasing trend to strikingly show that terrorism has compelled people to the extent that they could not live on their paternal pieces of land. This shows the extreme cost of terrorism people are facing, and no security agency of the government of Pakistan could survive their lands, lives, homes, etc., to these displaced people.

Hypotheses of I-VEO show that there is a wide range of policy options to combat and influence the terrorist organization to stop terrorism. Our defence strategy is lacking in having a set of strategies taken both from a coercive and non-coercive set of hypotheses of the I-VEO Knowledge Matrix. There is likely absence of an explicit priority is given in the circles of defence policy decision making to compose a mixture of strategy based on the hypotheses of the I-VEO Knowledge Matrix on an empirical basis before starting an operation or a set of counterterrorism strategies so that people of Pakistan get an adequate level of security provision and Pakistan face fewer damages to lives and limbs, and security provision is not questioned as a pure public good by the academia. Unfortunately, no such set of strategy is yet available to security agencies for the best interest of security to Pakistanis, other things being equal. Graph by graphs analysis and trends
evidences shows increasing trends in number of incidents, fatalities, and injuries despite the fact of increasing defence expenditure. The lack of a strategy based on the I-VEO Knowledge Matrix in Pakistan from the research paper of Piazza et al. (2010); tells that Pakistan is yet directionless in combating security from terrorism to common Pakistanis. Thus, defence provision has the likelihood to be not a public good.

Pakistan has not yet a visible set of strategy like that opted by the USA to reduce terrorism from her soil. The most accepted hypothesis of the coercive nature in Pakistan is not supported by the data shown in tables and graphs to give reduction to calamities to civilian lives and limbs of Pakistani citizens and give chances to the academicians not to question security provision as a pure public good in Pakistan. Hypotheses to show positive/opening alternative options and other influence measures as policy options of I-VEO Knowledge Matrix are absent in the set of seemingly not ineffective strategy to reduce terrorism by Pakistani security agencies and its civilian law enforcement agencies in major cities of Pakistan. On the one side, absence of positive incentives and on the other side, opting coercive methods of influencing extremism/terrorism in Pakistan got a reaction at multiplier effects in response to USA drone attacks and Pak-Army operations in KPK, tribal regions, and Baluchistan and foreign propaganda fueled these types of fake news through global means of social and formal media. 5.

Results & Discussions

The above findings reveal that the following results strikingly

1. Civilian people are not safe enough by the prevailing provision of defence in cities, and it questions the existing aspects of security provision as a pure public good in Pakistan.

2. Capital cities are hit a lot, in spite of the fact that these urban cities contribute and collect more taxes from their people to the national exchequer for law and order and defense expenditure of the country.

3. Karachi is the economic backbone of Pakistan, and it is hit more since it is the capital hub of Pakistan, yet not safe from metropolitan types of terrorism.

4. There is widespread insurgency created by internal and external terrorists extended to every village of the province; thus, every kind of political, tribal, social, and economic activity is hard to undertake.

5. Karachi is a business hub and a strong believer of two-nation theory, on the one hand, and KPK and the tribal region are practical pioneers of getting Kashmir and active participants of two-nation theory and practical jihadi in the case to the disintegration of USSR into Russia, on the other hand. Now both the regions are badly hit by terrorism activities. Pakistan, as an ideological state based on the two-nation theory, should be more concerned about people/areas preserving and depending ideology of Pakistan.

6. The displaced people from FATA regions due to military operations and terrorist attacks have fled in millions to other parts of Pakistan and have lost every socio-cultural, economic and political endowment, but yet not provided with safe shelters and social services in camps and are prone to security threats in host areas or camping areas. Inefficient camping facilities are not enough provided to them to save them from their proneness to prey to be taken/used for insurgency in Pakistan.

7. The coercive methods of I-VEO Knowledge Matrix influencing terrorism/extremism in Pakistan got a reaction at multiplier effects in response to USA drone attacks and Pak-Army operations in KPK, tribal regions, and Baluchistan. The international media highlighted these types of propaganda more explicitly to increase threats to Pakistan internal security and thus further make the security provision as pure public good more weaken in the case of Pakistan.
8. I-VEO Knowledge Matrix covers a scientific and more comprehensive set of 183 hypotheses to combat terrorism anywhere in the world, but our defense policy apparatus seems not to cover all the set of these hypotheses to combat and influence terrorism effectively and ensure security provision as a pure public good for citizens of Pakistan.

**Conclusion**

Terrorism is a crime and the cruell'est menace of its nature to disturb almost every sphere of life. Governments devise defence strategies to influence such kind of incidents to provide safe heaven to its people in respective countries. So, security provision, as pure public good, is the responsibility of governments to save the lives and limbs of their citizens. In the case of Pakistan, the case is seemed not effective in the context of security provision as a pure public good in the light of increasing terror attacks. People are paying taxes to contribute also as an increase in defence expenditure over the years, but security provision is getting deteriorated in the same way due to internal and external factors related to terrorism. Injuries and deaths throughout the country are increasing year by year. The economic, political, social, psychological, and ordinary business of life of people is disturbing progressively due to the increased momentum of terrorist incidents from the start of the 1990s. The comprehensive set of I-VEO Knowledge Matrix and its hypotheses to influence extremists and terrorist organizations provides many viable policy options for Pakistan to devise security policy apparatus and options to increase the status of security as a pure public good for its own citizens. The analysis in the case of Pakistan shows that there seems an effective collection of an ideal and local based set of strategies to reduce terrorism and influence extremist organizations for the sake of providing security as a pure public good to Pakistanis.
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