Russian and European Union’s Quest for the formation of a European security system after the cold war

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Abstract: The need for an understanding of the problem of creating a modern system for resolving European security problems and developing new reliable mechanisms for intraregional security with the participation of the EU and Russia has become an important issue in Europe. The current European security system is no longer based on traditional great power balancing. This article firstly examines how the transformation of the European security system has taken place in the post-confrontational period and secondly analyses how this process has influenced the role and place of Russia in the post-cold war European security architecture. This article shows that the place of Russia within the system of pan-European security since 1991 fits into the logic of keeping Russia outside of Europe. The new strategic nuances of Western policy are only modernized tools that regulate the degree of distance between the US, NATO and the EU from Russia.

Subjects: International Relations; European Politics; Russian & Soviet Politics

Keywords: European security architecture; Russian security strategy; NATO and Russia; Post-cold War Europe; EU

1. Introduction

In recent years, it has not only been Europe, but also Russia which has radically changed. With the collapse of the USSR, the geopolitical status of Russia changed from the great empire that it was in the Soviet period to a power that makes considerable efforts to prevent the withdrawal of those countries that declare their allied relations with Russia. Undoubtedly, Russia’s relations with the former Soviet republics cannot be viewed in isolation from the influence that other geopolitical

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PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT
The disintegration of the Soviet Union created a new situation in Europe. In this new situation, Russia and the EU tried to develop policies to develop new and reliable mechanisms to solve the security problems in Europe. However, the current European security system no longer relies on the balancing of the traditional great powers. This article first examines how the transformation of the European security system took place in the post-1990 period. On the other hand, it analyzes how Russia and the European Union play a role in this new transformation. This article shows that the place of Russia within the system of pan-European security since 1991 fits into the logic of keeping Russia outside of Europe.
players have on world politics. Among them, the European Union plays a special role in Russia's foreign policy. Since some CIS countries show interest in the EU as a priority for them, it should be emphasized that building long-term and productive relations between Russia and the countries of the European Union is one of the key factors not only of a pan-European, but of the world security system.

In this study, the main goal is to examine how the transformation of the European security system took place after the Collapse of the USSR period and how this process influenced the role and place of Russia in the new architecture of European security after the end of the Cold War. The need for a scientific understanding of the problem of creating a modern security system for resolving European security problems, developing new reliable mechanisms for intraregional security with the participation of the European Union and Russia has become an important study case in Europe in the decades after the Cold War.

The relevance of the analysis of the problems of European security is explained by a number of global events that took place at the end of the 20th century: the end of the cold war, the disintegration of the USSR and the Soviet bloc, and the growth of globalization processes; the unification of the countries of Western and Eastern Europe into a single regional civilizational bloc, its transformation into one of the influential poles of the system of international relations. An important scientific relevance is the analysis of the type of integration that the EU demonstrates. The following questions arise: the status and prospects of relations between the EU member states and Russia, the possibility of creating a new European security system that will include the Euro-Atlantic space and Russia, as well as factors that contribute to and prevent the integration processes in the sphere of security in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century.

The studies on this topic are general works in which the theoretical and methodological aspects of the problem are touched upon. These include works on the problems of geopolitics, national security, the theory of international relations and foreign policy, and world politics. These studies contribute to a qualitative study of the main trends in the development of the modern world political process, enable us to understand what the modern world architecture is, on the basis of which world politics and international relations are built.

Political scientists such as H. Mackinder, G. Morgenthau, F. Fukuyama, S. Huntington, Z. Brzezinski et al. have devoted their research to historical, theoretical, geopolitical, sociological issues, as well as the study of the evolution of the system of international relations. Their works provide a better understanding of the views on the problems of the history of international relations and foreign policy.

S. Huntington in his work “The Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington, 1993, pp. 22–49) formed a conceptual approach based on comparative-civilizational and empirical methods. This methodological landmark helps to assess the ability of civilizations to interact and identify the limits of this interaction. In other words, S. Huntington’s approach helps to clarify the ability of a particular civilization to rationalize its foreign policy actions, borders and forms of this rationalization. With regard to the analysis of the relationship between the EU and Russia, this opens up scope for analytical procedures related to understanding the specifics of the behavioral strategies of both civilizational blocs and the prospects for their mutual understanding. However, his political analysis considerably misses the changes in the geopolitical situation in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century.

On the other hand, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his book, “The grand chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives”, analyzes the geopolitical situation in the world at the end of the 21st century, describes countries with a serious political and economic weight, regional economic and political alliances and military blocs, and models their likely foreign policy in the future. According to Brzezinski, the United States is interested in further promoting the institutional
structures of the EU, as well as NATO to the East. Such a Europe would be a springboard for America on the European continent (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 72), but he ignores that Russian participation in a unified security system in Europe would be beneficial for the whole of Europe.

The methodology of this research is based on the historicism and system analysis. The principle of historicism allowed us to analyze the main events of processes of Russia-EU security relations after the end of the Cold War, thereby contributing to the determination of cause and effect relations of various political events, thus this principle allows us to identify the emerging trends and patterns in the relations between Russia and the EU in the context of the formation of European security. The system analysis paves the way to understand the actor’s behaviors in the international system. The collapse of the USSR made changes within the international system. For instance, the changes in polarity (bipolar system) affect how states provide for their security (Waltz, 2000, p. 5).

This article mainly focuses on the European security system in the context of changing geopolitical situation in the European region after the end of the Cold War and examines the Russia-EU relations in the context of the transformation of the European security system from 1991 to present. Furthermore, Russia’s place in the European security system after the dissolution of the bipolar world order is studied. Finally, the prospect for creating a European security system with the participation of Russia was discussed.

2. The European security system in the context of changing geopolitical situation in the European region after the cold war

This period is characterized by the onset of a unilateral world led by the United States and the NATO-centered model in the European security system. Russia, with the collapse of the USSR and the formation of the CIS, has found itself in a more vulnerable geopolitical position than before. The weakening of its geopolitical resource affected its role in the system of European security.

The collapse of the USSR in 1991, the fall of the iron curtain and the democratic transformations in the countries of Eastern Europe for many have become proof of the superiority of one single model of social order—the market economy and the liberal democratic political system based on it. The well-known American political scientist F. Fukuyama in his work “The End of History” (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 3-18) claimed that “history ended in the victory of the Western liberal democracy”.

In fact, such an interpretation of the disintegration of the USSR turned out to be far from single-valued. On the contrary, a significant number of countries opposed the domination of one power and one system of political, social and cultural values. Gradually new centers of power formed, the world changed from the era of competition between the two superpowers to understand the existence of several world centers of power. The US for only a certain historical period was far ahead of the rest of the country in terms of its political influence and economic potential. It became clear that the dream of the total and eternal domination of one country is utopian.

1991 was another point of bifurcation in the development of international relations. The conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, which initiated the emergence of the European Union (EU), brought a new geopolitical player to the stage of international politics.

The new world configuration of foreign policy forces after the cold war was determined by three factors. The first is the power and influence of the United States. The second is the strengthening of China and its transformation into the “factory” of the world. The third is the transformation of Europe into a global economic force. Meanwhile, Russia, which became the main successor to the USSR, was engaged in domestic politics.

A breach in the European security system appeared in the central and eastern parts of the European continent in the early 1990s. The formation of a new European security system, however,
was limited by the fact that, despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, NATO continued to exist, and American troops were not withdrawn from Europe. The 
collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations led to a change in the former 
balance of power on the European continent itself. (Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 5–6).

For some Soviet officials the collapse of Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe had
“shifted the military balance on the European continent in favor of the West, which was “fundamental” and “decisive”, especially with the prospect of a unified Germany in NATO. Other Soviet 
officials hoped that the Soviet Union could ‘minimize [its] “losses” by “promoting the formation of 
an all-European security system” that would replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, it 
soon became clear that no such system would ever actually materialize. (Kramer, 2011, p. 847).

In 1989, the reform movements that began in Eastern Europe gave a glimmer of hope for the 
unification of divided Germany. Although the German people pushed for immediate reunification, 
Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union expressed deep concern about the security implications 
of a return of a strong, unified German Republic to Europe, and all three states required reassur-
ances that a reunited and remilitarized Germany would not pose a threat. To address all these 
concerns, the six countries engaged in a series of negotiations known as the “2 + 4 Talks,” involving 
the two Germanys plus the four occupying powers USA, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. 
One of the most difficult questions facing the negotiators was the question of the German 
relationship to the NATO after reunification. At first, Gorbachev opposed German membership in 
NATO. However, this was achieved by generous financial aid, and by the “2 + 4 Treaty” ruling out 
the stationing of foreign NATO forces on the territory of the former East Germany. However, it was 
also achieved through countless personal conversations in which Gorbachev and other Soviet 
leaders were assured that the West would not take advantage of the Soviet Union’s weakness 
and willingness to withdraw militarily from Central and Eastern Europe.

With the unification of the GDR and the FRG, Germany began to play a key role in Europe. After 
the end of the Cold War, NATO leaders appeared to conceive the future NATO as a means for 
ensuring German security, thereby removing possible German motives for aggressive policies; and 
as a means to protect other NATO states against German aggression. However, the Germans, who 
now provide the largest portion of the Alliance’s standing forces, are likely to resist such a role for 
NATO (Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 5–6). Germany’s strategy was aimed at the economic, political and 
military consolidation of Europe within the EU, WEU. France was the second locomotive of the 
European integration project. While Germany had economic power, France had political advan-
tages such as primarily the possession of its nuclear status and a permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council. The reunification of Germany also reinforced the Germany’s power in Europe. 
Germany sought maximum involvement in common integration structures in Europe. For French 
diplomacy, the main instrument of engaging the FRG in the European project was precisely the 
conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty. With respect to the United States, France kept its distance. 
Paris remained outside the framework of the NATO military organization. At the outset, Russian 
officials believed that Gorbachev received a ‘clear commitment that if Germany united, and stayed 
in NATO, the borders of NATO would not move eastward. Similar claims made by Anatolii 
Adaminshin, who was the Soviet deputy foreign minister in 1990, and other former Soviet officials, 
including Mikhail Gorbachev that “they were told during the German reunification process that 
NATO would not expand eastward. Pointing to comments recorded by the journalists Michael 
Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, former U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara stated that “the 
United States pledged never to expand NATO eastward if Moscow would agree to the unification of 
Germany.’” (Kramer, 2009, p. 1–2). However, there were signs that NATO would expand eastward. 
These claims still stand out as a tool that can be used by Russian leaders. For instance, ‘in his 
address to the Russian Parliament on 18 April 2014, in which President Putin justified the annexa-
tion of the Crimea, he stressed the humiliation Russia had suffered due to many broken promises 
by the West, including the alleged promise not to enlarge NATO beyond the borders of a reunited 
Germany’



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Great Britain remained the main strategic ally of the United States in Europe. Unlike Bonn and Paris, London was reserved about deepening European integration. In this regard, the British government proposed the concept of “Europe of different speeds”, the essence of which was that some members of the EU can move ahead by integration more than others. In the field of security, London strictly followed the Atlantic regulations. The UK insisted that the WEU should remain an autonomous organization, and not be absorbed by the European Union. The government of J. Major in this regard sought to distinguish the areas of NATO and WEU, assigning the first organization the role of ensuring territorial integrity and security in Europe, and the second—a subordinate first role in crisis management and participation in peacekeeping operations, where no intervention by the US and Canada was required. Thus, the Great Britain tried to skillfully maneuver between “Atlanticism” and “Europeanism”. London distanced itself from the most ambitious European projects and, at the same time, strengthened its “special relations” with the United States.

For Russia, the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations set a negative developmental axis. Although Russia was recognized as the heir of the USSR, the potentials of the two states are difficult to compare. It became obvious that due to subjective and objective factors, the external policy of a new, democratic Russia should have a fundamentally different character. The priority direction of Russia’s foreign policy was the building of new relations with the West. The Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe (1990) were two important developments in architecture of European Security since the USSR was one of the signatory states. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which was established to implement the vision of the Charter of Paris. The USSR’s commitments were assumed by Russia upon its dissolution in 1991 (Rumer, 2016, p. 4). However, there have been no institutional steps to meet Russia towards rapprochement with the EU and NATO after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, Russia was practically excluded from the security system on the European continent and she did not have a place in the new security architecture.

Thus, the architecture of European security at the turn of the 1980s-1990s underwent serious geopolitical changes. This was caused by the disintegration of one of the poles of the bipolar world—the USSR and the military-political block of the Warsaw Pact. Such a conclusion was brought about by internal political changes in the USSR (glasnost and perestroika), initiated by the Soviet leadership headed by Mikhail Gorbachev. The successor of the USSR—Russia—was in a completely different geopolitical situation, which was characterized by the transformation of the European security system into a NATO-centered model led by the United States. Violation of the balance of forces on the European continent opened up new opportunities for the creation of a European security system in the interests of the West. Although Europe has ceased to be the arena of confrontation between the two great powers—the USSR and the US, and the threat of nuclear war has significantly decreased, the continent entered a period of domination of the Euro-Atlantic security system, including the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Russia was beyond the new European security system, and the prospects for its accession to it were unclear. Moreover, the system of European security in the post-confrontational period by no means became a continuation of the policy of peaceful coexistence. The US actively took advantage of Russia’s weakness and the inability of the EU to pursue a unified foreign and defense policy and began to strengthen its positions throughout the European continent.

On the other hand, it is also worthwhile to examine the viewpoints expressed by selected ex-Soviet Republics at Russian attempts of the European Security System. Firstly, the entire fifteen sister republics automatically became members of the OSCE once the USSR dissolved. In this respect the ex-Soviet Republics became de facto part of European security alongside the Russian Federation. Within the OSCE the most notable ex-Soviet contribution toward this theme came during the Kazakh presidency of 2010. At the Astana Summit President Nazarbayev noted that “We have reconfirmed our support to the comprehensive approach to security based on trust and transparency in the politico-military field, on rational economic and environmental policy and on
the full-fledged observation of human rights, basic freedoms and the rule of law ... We intend to raise the level and quality of security and understanding between our states and peoples." Nazarbayev, further described the two-day Summit as “an historic event for the entire OSCE community” that had been characterized by the spirit of Astana adding that “We realize that the way to a true Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian community with united and indivisible security will be long and thorny,” thus only through implementing the commitments made in Astana, participating States would prove the vitality of the Organization.

In 2012 Kyrgyzstan adopted its National Security Concept, whereby in the first section the role of international multilateral security organizations was noted, and reference made to the CIS, CSTO, the Eurasian Economic Community, the UN, EU, NATO, and the OSCE. The concept was over-reaching as it encompassed Eurasia and stressed the need for balancing its relations among these with the CSTO singled out as the most important multilateral security organization for Kyrgyzstan which foresaw the enhancement of its effectiveness and capabilities to respond to or pre-empt potential threats as well as support the collective security of its members.

External threats were also identified within this context but as can be seen related to the immediate vicinity:

- global and regional power rivalry in Central Asia;
- international terrorism and religious extremism;
- international drug trafficking in Central Asia;
- water and energy problems in Central Asia;
- the lack of consensus concerning international borders;
- demographic problems in the Ferghana Valley.

There was no explicit mention of Russia’s involvement within the Eurasian sphere except for the reference to rivalry in Central Asia alongside the conclusion which identified as “a key factor of the domestic stability of each Central Asian nation is therefore willingness to take into consideration the divergent interests of Russia, the US and China, each of which regards Central Asia as a zone of its strategic interests.”

Concerning Belarus, despite close relations stemming from the immediate aftermath of the Soviet break-up notions of European security and the role Russia plays within it suffered greatly after the Ukraine crisis. Belarus had been encouraging a nationalist stance to create a distinct sense of identity separate from Russia. During this crisis a “situational neutrality” was announced by Minsk which permitted business as usual with all other parties, including Ukraine. It rejected the sanctions that Russia imposed in response to western actions and allowed various western countries fruits to enter Russia by labelling them as Belarus produce (Zogg, 2018). Furthermore, it did not warm relations with Russia in 2017 by initiating a visa regime, which permitted Western nationals to stay for short periods without a visa. In response, Moscow reintroduced border controls.

Therefore, there is a variety of viewpoints with regard to ex-Soviet Republics stances concerning the Russian attempts of a European Security System. The Central Asian states being geographically far removed from the European theatre focus more on their region and express general conceptual arguments with regard to this theme. Concerning other states located to the west of Russia one can observe a change in stance after the annexation of the Crimea.

In conclusion, the new European security system that emerged after the end of the Cold War is significantly different from the previous one. If the old system of European security was built on the balance of power, then the new system is based on their imbalance. Neither the USSR nor...
Russia, as its successor, managed to move from the principle of balance of power to the balance of interests in the formation of a new system of European security. Therefore, in the European house, in the formation of a new image of which Russia took active part in its time, it never found a place.

3. The Russia-EU relations in the context of the transformation of the European security system after the end of the cold war

Since the collapse of the bipolar world and the collapse of the USSR, the European security system has undergone significant changes. However, the institutions that shape European security require a partial change. At the beginning of the 21st century the US and the EU were on the verge of a change in the Euro-Atlantic security system. Soon after the end of the Cold War, the inclusion of post-communist countries in the Euro-Atlantic institutions with the aim of creating a new European security system with strong transatlantic ties based on shared values has become a phenomenal project to expand the membership and restructuring of these institutions. What existed first in the form of goals and plans in various NATO documents, the EU and the OSCE, the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union quickly implemented in practice. In the historically short time, the expansion of Europe, unprecedented since the post-war years, took place at the expense of the Eastern European countries. Moreover, under US President Bill Clinton, America’s transition from a "containment strategy" to an "expansion strategy" has begun. The US leadership decided to use the period of Russia’s weakness to expand its sphere of influence in Europe. The United States made a bet on building a NATO-centric security system in Europe. They were not attracted to the prospect of NATO replacement, where they had a decisive vote, at an amorphous forum, which was the CSCE. The CSCE, which was created in 1990 to ensure pan-European security, "possesses no credible military or political capacity for the implementation of the agreed policies when the Yugoslav crises blew up" (Both, 2010, p. 88). The key aspects of this course were Washington’s active position in resolving the Yugoslav crisis through NATO and the policy of expanding the alliance to the East. At the same time, an intensive process of expansion and deepening of European integration began in December 1991. By Maastricht Treaty, the European Union was established, and hence the European Integration, in addition to pursuing a single economic and monetary policy with the European Communities (EC), has a single foreign and defense policy. This was an inevitable course of action for the EC. European failure in managing the Yugoslav crisis on his own security capabilities forced it to create a new and affective defense policy within EC’s institutional framework.

In May 1992, Germany and France announced the creation of the European Corps. But on this independent European initiatives outside the framework of NATO ceased. Only the creation of separate European armed forces from NATO, and hence, independent from the US, was an indispensable attribute of the EU’s acquisition of an independent role in the security system. But this was not achieved. As Kaufman has pointed out, “different domestic priorities affected NATO as an alliance, which was deeply divided as to what its role should be after the Cold War” (Kaufman, 2002, p. 84). It took years for NATO-EU to be involved in resolving crisis in Yugoslavia.

In the late 1993, Russia’s foreign policy began to change gradually, primarily because of the process of NATO expansion to the East. Moscow advocated that the central role in the European security system belong to the CSCE (Rotfeld, 1995, p. 298).

The dissolution of the WAPA and CMEA gave impetus to the process of folding the new organizational security architecture in the region. In the current situation in the early 1990s there were two possible potential models of the new European security system. The first model was that the creation of a single pan-European security system. In practice, this required strengthening the role of the UN and the CSCE and the dismantling of Western military-political organizations—NATO and WEU—following the dissolution of the WAPA. In this case, the CSCE became the key element of the regional security system for Russia. This model was primarily in the interests of Russia. Russia, which lost its sphere of influence in CEE after the end of the Cold War, foresaw the strengthening of the UN Security Council and the CSCE would continue to play a key role in Europe.
The second model assumed the preservation of Western military-political organizations—NATO and WEU, despite the fact that they lost their opponent, WAPA, in the East. The refusal to include Russia in these Western structures actually meant the preservation of dividing lines in the European security system. One question remained unresolved: where will the new border between the West and the East take place, since it was obvious that the reconstruction of the eastern bloc in the previous borders is impossible, since the change in foreign policy courses in the countries of Eastern Europe has become irreversible.

In the early 1990s, conditions were developing for the realization of the second model of the security system in Europe, the main elements of which were NATO and Russia with a number of CIS countries that signed the Tashkent agreement. The UN maintained the status of the main international organization. Its activity after the end of the Cold War has increased dramatically. But its functions in Europe actually amounted to legitimizing the actions of Russia and NATO. While Russia and the NATO alliance did not interfere in each other’s affairs, the system remained stable. The increased weight and influence of Washington after the end of the Cold War allowed the US to impose the implementation of the draft world order, consistent with her strategy and interests. At the same time, Washington’s policy met the aspirations of Western European countries, also interested in pushing Russia out of the European security system. Studying the changed balance of forces on the continent, the European “NATO-centric” model was inevitable in Europe. In other words, Moscow’s belief that the existing NATO-centric model remains focused on containment of Russia, and prevents Moscow from playing a constructive role in European security (Mankoff, 2012, p. 343). NATO managed to realize its concept of mutually reinforcing institutions. The concept formally recognized institutional pluralism in Europe. But, as practice showed, the concept presupposed the creation of a conglomerate of Western organizations, where there was no place for Russia, and a key role was assigned to them by NATO. In fact, the OSCE, WEU were built into the architecture of European security on secondary roles in relation to NATO. NATO’s expansion to the East and the alliance’s security policy in the Balkans have shown a tendency to build a NATO-centric security system in Europe in the west of the CIS.

In the late 1990s it was possible to state the following points of American policy in the process of ensuring European security: the preservation and expansion of NATO as the main lever of influence on the continent, the soft opposition to EU integration in the field of foreign and security policy, the transformation of the EU into an independent pole of force—Influence in Europe through reliance on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. Since most of the members of the NATO were the members of the EU, this made them natural allies of the United States. Europe shares the same values; the same religious views, adherence to the ideology of human rights and democratic politics. The European Union is the most important geopolitical base of the United States on the European continent.

Unlike America’s relations with Japan, the North Atlantic alliance strengthens American political influence and military power on the Eurasian continent. At this stage of US-European relations, when the allied European states are still largely dependent on the security provided by the Americans, any expansion of the limits of Europe automatically becomes, in the Russian point of view, also an extension of the borders of direct American influence. And vice versa, without close transatlantic ties, the US leadership in Eurasia will immediately disappear. US control of the Atlantic Ocean and the ability to spread influence and power deep into Eurasia can be significantly limited.

However, in the 1990’s, the US pursued a foreign policy strategy on the European continent without taking into account the interests of the EU. The US-NATO military operation against Yugoslavia in 1999 without the authorization of the UN Security Council only confirmed Washington’s desire to unilaterally resolve the conflict situations and crises in Europe without parity with the EU to participate in European security.
As Brzezinski has pointed out (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 75):

It is conceivable that at some point a truly united and powerful European Union could become a global political rival to the United States. It could certainly become a difficult economic-technological competitor, while its geopolitical interests in the Middle East and elsewhere could significantly diverge from those of America ... But, in fact, such a powerful and politically single-minded Europe is not likely in the foreseeable future.

That will inevitably become a challenge to US hegemony. Therefore, NATO is an important tool to the US in order to be able to control the European military power. A politically powerful Europe, capable of competing economically and at the same time independent of the US military, would inevitably challenge the American supremacy. Brzezinski’s following remark below is an instance of how NATO is vital to the US interests for keeping Europe in her hand by using the NATO (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 76):

Without NATO, Europe not only would become vulnerable but almost immediately would become politically fragmented as well. NATO ensures European security and provides a stable framework for the pursuit of European unity. That is what makes NATO historically so vital to Europe ...

Despite the hyperglobalization of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s fears, the United States has become more attentive to the issue of ensuring European security and accentuating the growing military initiative of the EU. This fact was facilitated by the fact that out of 15 EU members engaged in their own military construction, 11 eventually were NATO members. Washington was forced to shift from neglect to new problems that arose in the European corner of the Atlantic community, to the need to develop a realistic approach to them.

Thus, at the NATO Washington Summit in 1999, the US tried to quickly drive European security initiatives into the concept of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDP), that is, the construction of a European security system within the NATO structure itself. The European Union did not like such a policy, it wanted to develop its institutions for ensuring European security. And in the end Washington was forced to accept reality and call the new European security and defense policy right, recognizing the right of the EU to its own course. This was greatly facilitated by the external conjuncture, in particular the growing threat of international terrorism.

On the terrorist attack on America on 11 September 2001, the Europe reacted violently and emotionally. On 7 October 2001, the United States and its allies began military operations against the Taliban regime and the terrorist organization Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. A few months later, Washington begins to prepare for a massive military operation against Iraq S. Hussein. All this required the mobilization of forces, including their transfer to priority areas. Under such conditions, it was natural for the US to transfer a number of peacekeeping operations in the Balkans to the European Union, which subsequently happened.

The US strategy in the period of George W. Bush’s presidency presumed the right to carry out preventive strikes, and not preemptive. Pre-emptive military measures are within the framework of international law. At the same time, the conceptual provisions of the Bush Doctrine were a natural reaction to the victory in the Cold War. In the early 1990s, it really seemed universal, and its adoption was an unavoidable prospect of all humanity.

The American global strategy is aimed at ensuring the security of the country and favorable economic conditions by maintaining its own superiority over all other states and their groupings, consolidating the leading positions in global economic regulation, and reforming the international system in accordance with American perceptions and interests. In the opinion of the republican establishment, the implementation of these tasks called for a serious revision of the principles of
foreign policy and the foundations of relations with the outside world that emerged after the Second World War.

The dilemmas of global security in the first decades of the 21st century are qualitatively different from the dilemmas of the twentieth century. The traditional connection between national sovereignty and national security is broken. However, traditional strategic considerations, of course, remain fundamental to the security of America, because in the situation of the collapse of the system of international security, such large states as Russia and China could still inflict tremendous losses on the United States. Moreover, since the leading states will not improve their armaments and develop new types of weapons, maintaining technological excellence over them will continue to remain an important task for the national security of the United States.

However, in the second half of the 2000s, the tendency to reduce the US influence on the allies accelerated. The reason for this is fears over the new poles of power—China, India and Russia. In the EU countries, the alarm began to grow that, without US support and transatlantic integration; they could lose in global economic and political competition with new economic centers. In favor of strengthening transatlantic relations, the cooling between the EU and Russia also plays.

At the same time, the reluctance of the Jr. Bush administration, taking into account the interests of the allies, the attempt to use the European disunity, interest in the use of multilateral institutions, including NATO, weakened not only the willingness, but also the ability of US partners to support them in the international arena. In particular, one of the consequences of the war in Iraq was the weakening of the EU and the erosion of its external political opportunities. The US emphasis on unilateralism and power politics has significantly weakened the ability of the US to be an authoritative leader in international affairs and to assume the role of a soft power. All this directly affects the security in Europe. At the height of Russian-American tensions under George W. Bush, Europe was confronted with gas cuts, cyber-attacks, the resumption of patrolling Russian strategic bombers along the Norwegian coast and, of course, the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 and Russian military intervention in Ukraine (2014–present). The 2008 Georgia war was the definitive wake-up call when, for the first time, two OSCE states went to war against each other and one state recognized the independence of two entities, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, even though the other 55 OSCE states do not recognize them (Zellner, 2009).

In general, American policy in the matter of ensuring European security has undergone significant changes in the period of 1991–20017. From unilateral power actions of the 1990s in the Balkans, without directly taking into account European interests, the United States since the early 2000s, since the counter-terrorist operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan, which were jointly with NATO, recognized the right of Europeans to establish their own military institutions and their participation in providing European security, as well as the EU’s right to an independent security and defense policy.

NATO is at present the main institution for ensuring European security even though there is a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), by which the NATO structure and assets could be made available for future military operations commanded by the WELI. Her role after the end of the Cold War has undergone significant changes. So, the strategic concept of NATO of 1991, adopted at the summit in Rome, radically differed from the previous strategic documents. First, it was not aimed at confrontation and was open to wide access; secondly, ensuring the security of member states, that is, collective defense, remained the fundamental goal of the concept, but it was aimed at strengthening the security of Europe as a whole through partnership and cooperation with former adversaries. In the Concept, the possibility of using nuclear weapons was reduced to a minimum level, remaining a condition for preserving peace and stability. An important milestone of the document can be considered the conceptual end of the Cold War, the reduction of confrontation with the USSR, the
dissolution of the Internal Affairs Directorate, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and the end of the division of Europe into two opposing camps.

The main stumbling block in the interaction between NATO and the EU was the formula “Berlin plus” for a long time. A long, controversial sub-controversy continued to struggle around her, continually breaking out on the surface of the relations between the two organizations. The history of this conception dates back to the mid-1990s, when, in the absence of its military structures, the EU engaged in NATO’s development of the system of its relations with the West-European Union, which is subordinate to it as a whole. At the session of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin on 3 June 1996, it was decided that NATO would grant the WEU the right to use the capabilities of NATO command structures: communication systems, reconnaissance, etc., as well as other elements of NATO’s military infrastructure. NATO under various pretexts evaded the adoption of the concept of “Berlin Plus”. There were high fears that the adoption of this formula would shake NATO and give too much independence to European co-workers, would call into question the US leadership in the alliance (Cornish, 1996, p. 753). The full independence of the EU’s defense activities can potentially reduce NATO’s ability to engage in political and military effectiveness.

The 1999 Strategic Concept of NATO notes that, in view of the disappearance of the danger of the Cold War, the process of the emergence of a new Euro-Atlantic security system based on greater integration of Europe, in which NATO plays the main role, is underway. The Alliance is focused on developing new forms of cooperation and mutual understanding in the Euro-Atlantic region, devoting itself to the solution of new important tasks in the interests of strengthening stability, including the adoption of the Berlin Plus concept.

The official document on the adoption of the “Berlin plus” was the Declaration of the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership. Following the political decision of December 2002, the “Berlin Plus” arrangements, adopted on 17 March 2003, provide the basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management by allowing EU access to NATO’s collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. It, along with the words about the strategic partnership, the determination to give a joint response to “the challenges of the new century” contained confirmation that the EU and NATO are organizations of “different nature” and that the EU and NATO will build relations based on the principles of equality and due respect for the autonomy of the decision-making process of the interests of both organizations. The most important point of the document is that NATO supports the European security and defense policy in accordance with the relevant decisions of the Washington summit of NATO in 1999 and provides the EU, among other things, guaranteed access to NATO planning tools. The EU called the Declaration a landmark and success, in NATO—a true breakthrough. NATO has significantly expanded its activities since the end of the Cold War in accordance with the new broad concept of security and a comprehensive approach to crisis management.

NATO’s relations with the EU, the OSCE and other partners are at the threshold of a new phase—more structured, better coordinated and more integrated, which promises the emergence of a network of international institutions.

The creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, its evolution and transformation in the wake of the end of the cold war, and the subsequent institutionalization and expansion of the spheres of activity were in many ways conditioned and closely linked to the development and transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance itself. The London Declaration of NATO (July 1990) anticipated many changes to the CSCE recorded in November of the same year in the Paris Charter for a New Europe.

The OSCE is a regional pan-European organization, a kind of collective security system. It proceeds from recognition of the leading role in the world affairs of the United Nations, acts on the basis of its Charter, in particular Article 51, as well as resolutions of the Security Council and other UN decisions as an international legal framework and mandates for its activities. The OSCE is
based on common principles and norms of international cooperation, the principles of universality,
the comprehensive nature and indivisibility of security, and institutions.

The OSCE is guided by a broad concept of ensuring security. The OSCE Strategy to Address the
Threat to Security and Stability in the Twentieth Century, adopted in Maastricht in December 2003,
declared that the OSCE would meet such challenges on the basis of important strengths, namely
its broad membership, from North America to Europe and parts of Asia, and its multidimensional
concept of common, comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security. While significant differences remain between the two institutions, functional convergence is
observed. The OSCE has a large number of member countries and is a more multifaceted organi-
zation than, for example, NATO. However, it is much weaker than NATO in terms of military force
potential, since it has not only military but also practically other instruments which have influence
other than military force.

The OSCE solves military-political, economic, environmental and humanitarian issues, dealing
with early warning, preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, as
well as observation of elections and problems of environmental security. The OSCE faces the task
of overcoming the legitimacy and internal contradictions that have engulfed its crisis, which
cannot but affect the effectiveness of the further functioning of this organization.

A contractual consolidation of the specialization of each involved international organization with
the provision of pan-European security could make a decisive contribution to the establishment of
a new security system in Europe that meets the interests of all OSCE participating States.

Several key problems remain to be solved. First of all, the nature of the existing threats to
common European security should be reconsidered. The specific functions of the various interna-
tional organizations could be agreed upon in the course of negotiations between them and
enshrined in the text of the international legal constituent instrument. An important step along
this path could be taken by making an agreement between Russia and NATO countries to
determine the list of common threats they face. In the course of the negotiations, the creation
of pan-European bodies for managing the interaction between the organizations involved should
be an important place, so that each of them can maintain its character and obligations to its
members.

The new conditions that have arisen in Europe and in the world dictate a real need to move
away from the technology of fighting against one or another countries to the processes that allow
them to unite their efforts to counter common threats to peace, stability and security on the
European continent.

After the end of the cold war, the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the USSR,
NATO became the main actor in the European security system. The European Union has continued
to the process of forming the European Union Common Security and Defense Policy (CFSP), and the
Western European Union was incorporated into the EU in 2011. As a result, the system of
European security in the post-confrontation period was drawn along the line of the EU-WEU-
NATO. The WEU finally became a part of the EU. However, EU and NATO’s relations couldn’t go
beyond a coordinated cooperation in the process of forming the European security system.

Thus, the institutional structure of the European security system that emerged after the disintegra-
tion of the bipolar world has been still vulnerable. The effectiveness of the functioning of
existing organizations to ensure European security, such as NATO and the OSCE, leaves much to be
desired. Until now, the limits of NATO expansion and the format of its relationship with the Russian
Federation are unclear. The OSCE is an extremely archaic organization in a multipolar world, its
inability to develop practical solutions to conflict resolution (by the example of the Minsk Group in
the situation with Nagorno-Karabakh) shows that the possibility of its soonest transformation is extremely low. The EU is not yet able to conduct a coordinated foreign policy and implement an independent policy in the field of security and defense. Only the United States preserves the status quo in Europe, which will predetermine, most likely, how the European security system will develop in the early 21st century.

4. Russia’s place in the European security system after the dissolution of the bipolar world order

NATO became the main partner for dialogue and interaction in the sphere of European security for Russia. The search and self-identification of Russia’s role in the new system of European security are very difficult. Russia’s desire to participate in the European security system on the European continent as one of the key geopolitical players is one of the main foreign policy objectives of Russia. As for Russia, unlike the bloc confrontation, it did not have an alternative agenda for the formation of a new European security system and was forced to observe or try to enter the new European security system that the EU and NATO had built up after the dissolution of the bipolar world order. Since the collapse of the USSR, the relations between Russia and NATO have at times been characterized by a profitable, pragmatic cooperation, and then they represent open contradictions and even pronounced hostility. The roots of Russia-NATO relations go back to the Cold War, when each side was on different sides of the bloc confrontation.

The transformation of NATO, which began after the end of the Cold War, almost doubled the number of member countries of the alliance. It became obvious to the Russian political elite that the only new political mission of NATO is its expansion directed toward the borders of Russia. After the collapse of the USSR and the WAPA, NATO tried to redefine its mission conceptually due to the changing geopolitical situation in Europe. Since the previous task of this organization—the opposition of the USSR—has lost its meaning, NATO is now engaged in promoting democracy and ensuring stability as very stated in the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept of 1991. However, in the post-bipolar era, there is a need to find ways of cooperation between Russia and NATO. With all the differences in tactical and geopolitical priorities, Russia and NATO have common interests in such areas as combating international terrorism, preventing regional crises, natural and human-made disasters, and peacekeeping. The documents of the alliance repeatedly stated that the Russia-NATO partnership is a strategic element of strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic space. But the differences between Russia and NATO in the principles and approaches to ensuring European security are significant.

The United States and the EU are building a European security system based on the collective security of all its members in the Euro-Atlantic area, and NATO is playing the role of an organization entrusted with the main military and political functions and responsibilities. Russia seeks to cooperate with NATO, but on equal terms on the basis of creating a single security space in which the security of one participant would not be at the expense of the harmlessness of another. In this regard, Russia is critical of the expansion of NATO, especially the accession of the countries of the former USSR.

Russia understands that the process of NATO expansion to the East creates new dividing lines between Russia and Europe. The Russian elite have the impression that Russia is being pushed out of the Greater Europe, of which it is a part. According to S. Karaganov (Karaganov, 2015):

There is no quick solution anywhere in sight, even though a number of good ideas were proposed before: turning the OSCE into a union of security; establishing a European Security Council; admitting Russia to NATO to automatically make the latter pan-European alliance (Russia never received a positive reply); signing a new European security treaty (the project was emasculated by the so-called OSCE Corfu Process); and starting to form a Union of Europe, a common economic, human, and energy space (no reply again). ... Most members of the Russian elite have lost all faith in Western politics and seem to be determined to use
force to teach their partners to respect Russia’s interests. Distrust for also remains too high in the Wes, and anti-Russian rhetoric has reached the level of the late 1940s-1950s, when the Soviet Union was threatening the vital interests of Western elites that wanted to preserve capitalism and democracy.

That is, Russia’s role in the process of creating a new system of Euro-Atlantic security is becoming uncertain. Here it is appropriate to recall the words of the first secretary general of NATO, Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, who at that time briefly and surprisingly precisely formulated the essence and purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance at the time of its creation: “to keep the US in (Europe), Germany under (control), Russia—outside (Europe)” (Treverton, 2014, p. 153; Hanrieder, 1989).

Thus, Russia’s foreign policy position seems ambiguous, because, on the one hand, it seeks to create a common security space in Europe with the participation of NATO countries, and on the other hand, sees in this organization not only a threat but also a challenge to its geopolitical interests. This duality is based on real historical factors that limit the implementation of political tasks to create a common security space in Europe. This is affected by the fact that Russia is fresh in memory of the recent confrontation with NATO. This factor can be called a geopolitical trauma of Russia, associated with the destruction of the USSR. In this connection, some actions of the NATO countries are interpreted by the Russian leadership as a deviation from the tasks of creating a joint security space. This includes the bombing of South-Slavia by NATO countries, the recognition by almost all NATO countries of Kosovo’s independence, the expansion of NATO to the East, the South Ossetian conflict and NATO’s desire to include Ukraine and Georgia in its membership. All of the above forms serious limitations for constructive cooperation between Russia and NATO countries, which will be difficult to overcome without mutual trust and practical steps, confirming the intention of both sides to create a common space for Euro-Atlantic security.

To assess the potential of Russia’s real integration into the Euro-Atlantic security system, it is necessary to trace the main stages of cooperation between the NATO countries and Russia.

Official relations between Russia and NATO began in 1991, when Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), established within NATO to cooperate with the NATO’s former Warsaw Pact adversaries. Then Russia’s accession to the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) in 1994 followed, which aimed to develop security contacts between NATO member countries and their partners.

In 1997, Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security with NATO. In accordance with this document, the NATO—Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) is established, although it has consultative functions. However, the decisions of the alliance are optional for Russia. In 1997, Russia became a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which succeeded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Russia and NATO do not view each other as adversaries. The common goal of Russia and NATO is to overcome the remnants of the previous confrontation and co-operation and to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation.

According to the Act, Russia and NATO intend to create a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. Adopting this commitment at the highest political level is the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between Russia and NATO. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership. After that NATO carried out a profound internal transformation and revised its Strategic Concept in 1999. Russia in that Concept has an exclusive role in ensuring Euro-Atlantic security. According to the Concept:

Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security. Within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, NATO and Russia have committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic
area based on the principles of democracy and co-operative security. NATO and Russia have agreed to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. A strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

However, NATO’s further actions and the course of events in Europe were at variance with Russia’s position and vision of the creation of a joint European security system. NATO has taken steps to integrate the countries of Eastern Europe and their further inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic security system. The result of this course was the accession of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic to the NATO in 1999, and the destruction of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the bombing of the Yugoslavia by the alliance and the Kosovo crisis of 1999 seriously undermined the relations between NATO and Russia. Moscow did not recognize the separation and the independence of Kosovo from Serbia.

Thus, Russia’s behaviour in the Balkans remains a traditional concern of the West. Russia’s historical ties, cultural proximity and popularity among a significant portion of the local population are seen as a powerful and unpredictable force that can at any time reverse the situation in the region. During the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s, they feared that in the West, Russia could intervene in the military conflict on the side of the Slobodan Milosevic regime. As a matter of fact, in the 2000s, Russia tried to prevent the integration of Balkan states into the EU and NATO. The Ukrainian crisis aroused concerns that the Balkans might be another area in the field of foreign policy activity in a new conflict with the West. Moscow publicly condemned NATO’s enlargement in the Balkans, and there are loud accusations of subversive activity—most often in Montenegro, but also in Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Samorukov, 2017, p. 1). For Samorukov, the EU and NATO see the Western Balkans as a vulnerable flank of the West, where unresolved regional problems, historical sympathies for Russia and the poor quality of local elites create opportunities for the return of Russian influence. Nevertheless, the Western Balkans has not yet become a priority area of Russian foreign policy, but remains the subject of interest for Moscow and is occasionally used for propaganda purpose and diplomatic maneuver.

In this context when analysing Russian documents defining the national security policy of the country it can be noted that it has concerns about a unilateral decision by NATO to ensure European security. For example, the Russian National Security Concept of 1997 states that the threat to Russia’s national security is the expansion of NATO to the East and the transition to the practice of military operations outside the zone of the Washington Treaty without the sanction of the UN Security Council (Godzimirski, 2000, pp. 78, 82, 85).

In the Concept of National Security of Russia in 2000, Russia’s relations with NATO have a serious role in the process of ensuring European security. Russia proceeds from the importance of cooperation with it in the interests of maintaining security and stability on the continent and is open to constructive interaction.

The intensity of cooperation with NATO will depend on the fulfillment of the key provisions of this document, especially those relating to the non-use of force and the threat of force, the non-deployment of new members of conventional armed forces, nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in the territories. The Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 and also the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy of 2015 noted that for a number of parameters, NATO’s political and military installations do not coincide with the security interests of the Russian Federation, and sometimes directly contradict them (González, 2013, pp. 14–15). First of all, this concerns the provisions of the NATO strategic concept of 1999, which do not exclude the conduct of military operations outside the zone of the Washington Treaty without the sanction of the UN Security Council.

Russia also maintains a negative attitude towards the regional security system in the Euro-Atlantic Region based on NATO and the European Union. According to Russia as stated in the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy of 2015 Article 16.
The persisting bloc approach to solving international problems is not helping to counter the entire range of present-day challenges and threats. The increase in migration flows from African and Near Eastern countries to Europe has demonstrated the non-viability of the regional security system in the Euro-Atlantic Region based on NATO and the European Union ...

Russia also see the West’s stance aimed at countering integration processes and creating seats of tension in the Eurasian region as is exerting a negative influence on the realization of Russian national interests. For instance, the US and the EU’s support in the Ukrainian revolution of 2014 are mentioned as a “support for the anti-constitutional coup d'état in Ukraine led to a deep split in Ukrainian society and the emergence of an armed conflict.” The crisis in Ukraine, has also caused an upsurge of mutual distrust and hostile rhetoric, crushed all hopes entertained before (Karaganov, 2016).

The events of 11 September 2001 and the growing activity of international terrorism brought Russia, the US and NATO closer together. Russian President Vladimir Putin said the need to revise relations with NATO in a spirit of pragmatism. Russia officially opened its airspace for NATO aviation with a view to bombing Afghanistan, which allowed the two sides to gradually reach a new level of relations. The result of this rapprochement between Russia and NATO was the signing of the 2002 Rome Declaration on “NATO-Russia Relations: a New Quality”, by which the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), was established. It replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC).

The NRC has become an instrument for cooperation between Russia and the West in the sphere of international security. This to some extent determined and consoled the vector of cooperation in the areas of mutual interest between Russia and NATO.

The NRC has become in effect the first institution of business cooperation between Russia and NATO in the field of security. Russia has a platform where it could express its position and defend its interests. After the establishment of the NRC, cooperation with NATO was translated into permanent daily work. Within the framework of the NRC, dozens of committees and working groups have begun to work, which have engaged in coordinating joint positions on the issues of interaction in the security sphere.

Cooperation between NATO and Russia in the fight against terrorism is carried out in the form of regular information exchange, in-depth consultations, joint threat assessment, planning of civilian services in case of terrorist attacks, high-level dialogue on the role of the armed forces in the fight against terrorism, scientific and technical cooperation. NATO member states and Russia also cooperate in other areas related to the fight against terrorism, such as border control, nonproliferation, airspace management and nuclear safety. In December 2004, a comprehensive NRC Action Plan on Terrorism was approved at a meeting of the NRC at the level of ministers of foreign affairs aimed at raising the level of overall coordination and strategic cooperation within the framework of the NRC. Thus, one of the joint results of successful cooperation between the parties is the connection of the Russian Navy to the NATO antiterrorist operation in the Mediterranean “Active Endeavor” (Active Force) since December 2004. The first ship took part in this operation in September 2006. A year later in September 2007, the second patrol ship of the Russian Navy, Ladny, began to participate in the operation.

But the deepest cooperation between Russia and NATO has progressed over Afghanistan. The leadership of Russia constantly emphasizes that the interaction of Russia and NATO in solving the Afghan problem, which includes rapidly growing drug trafficking and international terrorism, is in line with its national interests. Initiatives taken in the field of defense reform are aimed at developing the armed forces, managing human and financial resources, reforming the defense industry, managing the consequences of defense reform, and also touching on the defense aspects of the fight against terrorism. These initiatives include the development of military and
political guidance on improving the level of interoperability of troops in Russia and NATO countries, which was adopted at a meeting of the NRC at the level of defense ministers in June 2007. The directive is intended to facilitate the training of the Russian and NATO forces to participate in possible joint operations.

A forward-looking dialogue with NATO was noted in the 2008 Russian Foreign Policy Concept. Assessing the role of NATO in the Euro-Atlantic security system, Russia proceeds from the importance of the progressive development of interoperability in the format of the Russia-NATO Council in the interests of ensuring predictability and stability in Euro-Atlantic region, maximize the potential of political dialogue and practical cooperation in addressing issues related to responding to common threats—terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction regional crises, drug trafficking, natural and man-made disasters.

Russia still maintains a negative attitude towards NATO enlargement, in particular, to the plans for admission to the alliance of Ukraine and Georgia, as well as to bring NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russian borders in general, which violates the principle of equal security, leads to the emergence of new disconnecting lines in Europe and contradicts the tasks of increasing the effectiveness of joint work to find answers to realities of modernity.

And a year later, in July 2009, an agreement was signed with the US during the visit of the US president Obama to Moscow on the transit of military equipment, weapons, military equipment and personnel through the territory of the Russian Federation in connection with the participation of the US armed forces in ensuring security and stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. In addition, Russia has agreed with NATO to provide Russian military transport aircraft for the peacekeeping forces operating in Afghanistan (Baker, 2009).

The growth of drug trafficking after the US and NATO invasion has increased dramatically and rapidly several times. Russia and the EU are the main victims of the heroin coming from Afghanistan. The rapid increase in drug use in Russia over the past 14 years is associated with an increase in drug production in Afghanistan. “Over the past 14 years, since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghan heroin has killed more than one million people in Eurasia, including at least half a million Russian citizens” V. Ivanov, the director of the Federal Service for Control of Drug Trafficking (FSKN) said at an international counter-drug conference in Moscow. According to Ivanov “Drugs production in Afghanistan has been serving as a fundamental factor of instability for the whole of Eurasia and the guaranteed destruction of the future of Russia and Europe in terms of both security, demography, gene fund and economic development”25.

In 2008, the work of the NRC was frozen due to the Russia’s intervention in Georgia, but the cooperation between Russia and NATO to combat terrorism and drug trafficking was continued. This shows the fundamentally deep interest of both sides in cooperation that goes beyond regional conflicts and clashes of interests. In December 2008, at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, it was decided to apply a step-by-step approach to the resumption of relations between NATO and Russia. And in March 2009 the NRC was restored and practical cooperation was resumed.26

The central aspect of the interaction between Russia and NATO was the desire of the alliance to connect Russia to expanded cooperation in the military sphere. Through the NRC, NATO began to actively involve Russia in the Corfu Process at the level of the Foreign Ministry.

Ukraine and Georgia was put on a slow path to NATO membership at the Bucharest summit of NATO in 200827 after the Russia’s intervention in Georgia. This decision was made by the US efforts28. However, despite the results of the Bucharest NATO summit, the US and NATO representatives constantly emphasize that the doors of the North Atlantic alliance are open to any European country ready to fulfill the necessary procedure for joining it and the more they will never give up NATO’s eastward expansion.
The NRC countries agree that the Russia-NATO Council is a valuable tool for developing practical cooperation and political dialogue on all issues—on those where their opinions converge and on those where their opinions differ. The driving force behind the pragmatic spirit of cooperation in the NRC is the understanding that NATO and Russia share common strategic priorities and face common problems.

Russia’s relations with NATO, which has been extremely controversial and inconsistent in the past two decades, should be based on pragmatism and political expediency. The alliance remains the main geopolitical and force factor affecting the situation in the sphere of security in Europe.

An analysis of the factors contributing to and hindering the development of NATO-EU-Russia relations in the field of security suggests that these relations are not yet sufficiently formalized to allow an optimistic forecast for their development in the foreseeable future. It can be assumed that, on the one hand, a system of common Euro-Atlantic security without Russia’s participation is possible, but on the other hand, each of the participating countries should maintain minimal interest in each other.

5. Prospects for the creation of a European security system with the participation of Russia

At the present stage of the development of the European security system, the US and the European Union are not inclined to review the defense and security policy in Europe, but are trying to maintain the current status quo, that is, the pre-possession of the NATO-centric model without including Russia in the European collective security system. However, they are ready to introduce some correctives that help expand the field of dialogue with Russia. In fact, it is not a matter of reviewing the outcome of the Cold War, but of rethinking the notion of “European security” in accordance with the realities of the 21st century.

As for the relations between Russia and NATO, it is important to note the new strategic concept of NATO, adopted in November 2010, which underlines the commitment of NATO to the principles of the UN Charter. The strategy says that the main responsibility for maintaining international peace belongs to the UN Security Council.

The new NATO functional security strategy—the strategy of engaging in the globalization of threats and the need for their neutralization in the place of origin, as well as the adoption of preventive counter-terrorism measures in the context of improving NATO’s fight against terrorism—entailed the strengthening of the alliance’s mechanisms for the early detection and prevention of security calls. In this area, there is a convergence of the functions of the two organizations.

On 29 November 2009, Russia formally introduced the draft European Security Treaty, which speaks of Russia’s desire, together with NATO, the United States, the EU, the CSTO, the CIS, to create a common space for collective security in Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok for legal support on a long-term basis peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic space with all its members.

In 2012, an agreement was reached between NATO and Russia on the creation of a NATO transit point in Ulyanovsk (the logistics base of NATO). The public inside the country and, in particular, the population of Ulyanovsk criticized the decision of the leadership of Russia to take such a step. However, it is a competently built Russian policy on pragmatic cooperation with NATO and the United States that will reduce international tensions, combat international terrorism and drug trafficking from Afghanistan more effectively.

The transition from bloc confrontation to the principles of multi-vector diplomacy, as well as Russia’s resource potential and pragmatic policy of its use, has expanded the Russian Federation’s ability to strengthen its influence in the world arena. To ensure national interests of the Russian Federation, the likely repercussions of unilateral power approaches in international relations, the
contradictions between the main participants in world politics, the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its falling into the hands of terrorists, as well as the improvement of forms illegal activities in cybernetic and biological fields, in the sphere of high technologies.

Thus, the Russian Federation stands for strengthening the mechanisms of interaction with the European Union, including the consistent formation of common spaces in the spheres of economy, external and internal security, education, science, culture.

The defining factor in relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will remain unacceptability for Russia of plans to advance the military infrastructure of the alliance to its borders and attempts to impart to it global functions that run counter to the norms of international law. Russia is ready to develop relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the basis of equality and in the interests of strengthening universal security in the Euro-Atlantic area, the depth and content of which will be determined by the Alliance’s readiness to take into account Russia’s legitimate interests in implementing military and political planning, respect for international law, and also to their further transformation and the search for new tasks and functions of a humanistic orientation. Russia will seek to build an equal and full-fledged strategic partnership with the United States on the basis of coinciding interests and taking into account the key influence of Russian-American relations on the state of the international situation as a whole. The priorities will remain the achievement of new agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control, the strengthening of confidence-building measures, as well as addressing the issues of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, enhancing counter-terrorism cooperation, and resolving regional conflicts.

At the summit in Chicago in May 2012, the leaders of the NATO member countries welcomed the significant progress in cooperation over the past years and reiterated their desire to continue the strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, which was agreed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. The 2013 Concept of Russia’s Foreign Policy (Monaghan, 2013) refers to the priority nature of the development of relations with the states of the Euro-Atlantic region, with which Russia is connected, in addition to geography, economy and history, with deep civilizational roots. Taking into account the growing demand for collective efforts of states in the face of transnational challenges and threats, Russia stands for achieving unity of the region without dividing lines, by ensuring truly partnership between Russia, the European Union and the United States. Therefore, Russian foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic area is focused on the formation of a common space of peace, security and stability based on the principles of indivisibility of security, equal-right cooperation and mutual trust. Russia consistently advocates for a legally binding form of political declarations on the indivisibility of security, regardless of the membership of states in any military-political alliances. Russia wants to build relations with NATO, taking into account the degree of the alliance’s readiness for equal partnership, strict adherence to the principles and norms of international law, real steps to move towards a common space of peace, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region on the basis of mutual trust, transparency and predictability, the fulfillment by all of its members of the obligation assumed under the Russia-NATO Council to fail to secure their own security at the expense of the security of others. Russia at the same time maintains a negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO and the approach of the military infrastructure of NATO to the Russian borders as a whole as actions that violate the principle of equal security and lead to the emergence of new disconnected lines in Europe.

In its attitude towards the states of the Euro-Atlantic region, including NATO member countries, Russia directly moves forth from general strategic goals. They are, first, the maintenance of peace and stability, and secondly, countering common threats to security: international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, maritime piracy, drug trafficking, natural and man-made catastrophes.

As for the EU, despite ESDP, Europeans are still oriented towards NATO and the United States in terms of providing for a European security system. The military operation in Libya in 2011 was an
important example for that. N. Sarkozy was one of the main supporters for the forceful solution of the Libyan problem, but the European Union did not even consider the issue of conducting its own military operations despite the UN Security Council resolution, signifying once again de facto reliance on the implementation of such tasks of the US and NATO.

The Arab Spring had a highly controversial impact on the new EU Lisbon mechanisms. The EU was institutionally prepared for a regional crisis in North Africa. Gradually, the foreign policy mechanism was adjusted and the EU developed a fairly clear political algorithm, including political and diplomatic efforts, humanitarian actions and assistance to economic development, as well as a range of sanctions. The European Union has successfully combined a crisis response with long-term political planning and programs. The Arab Spring has become not only an external but also a serious internal challenge for the EU, which in turn has intensified the conflict of interests between the national states and European institutions, including the EU institutions themselves. Quite clearly there were significant shortcomings and limitations of the EU’s foreign policy, which in many ways are systemic in nature and therefore can only partially be compensated for by optimizing the institutional mechanisms of the EU.

Conflicts of interest are typical for the modern world. Hence, the principle of existence of all pluralistic societies is based on the balance of interests, on the system of checks and balances. So, it is necessary to emphasize once again the importance of the European direction in Russia’s foreign policy, its approaches to global and regional security. Moreover, the main concept papers on these issues were recently adopted and updated: the Concept of Russia’s Foreign Policy (2013), the Russian National Security Strategy (2014), Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014). Despite the fact that all three important documents take into account Russia’s main interests in the European direction, just like G. Morgenthau made clear the main driving force in the sphere of international relations is the national interest (Morgenthau, 1949, p. 208, 1952, pp. 961–88).

6. Conclusion
In the course of the work, the authors managed to demonstrate that the new system of European security, which developed after the end of the Cold War, has been quite different from the previous system. If the old system of European security was built on the balance of power, then the new system is based on their imbalance. Neither the USSR nor Russia, as its successor, has managed to move on from the principle of balance of power to the balance of interests in the formation of a new system of European security. Therefore, in this realm Russia tried to take an active part in its formation, but it never found a place.

In the past two decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the system of European security has changed radically. There has certainly been a consolidation of the European Community as a geopolitical actor of the European security system. Throughout the post-confrontation period, there was an expansion of EU and NATO and, as a result, a NATO-centered model of European security was established. As a result of this peaceful expansion, the borders of the Euro-Atlantic bloc have come right up to the borders of the Russian Federation. The construction of a European security system on the principle of such a balance of interests, which excludes the possibility of using military force, is a central idea for Russia. For the first time from the centuries old relations both between European countries as well as between Europe and Russia, force was excluded. The exception to this is the Balkan conflict of the 1990s, during which NATO used military force to overthrow the regime of S. Milosevic. However, this case did not lead to the spread of foci of military conflicts to other European states. Therefore, we can conclude that the force-in-pressure of the painful points of the Balkan crisis served as one of the links in the process of forming a new system of European security on the basis of voluntary accession of new actors to it.

On the other hand, the experience of relations between the EU and Russia shows that their interactions in the sphere of security are constrained by the bilateral relations of the US-Russia, EU-US-NATO format. The EU and Russia both understand that they cannot do without each other,
but at the same time they also know and accept what separates them. The novelty of the situation is the fact that relations between Russia and Europe for the first time exclude the balance of power and elements of intimidation of their geopolitical adversary. The experience of the last two decades has demonstrated the possibility of the functioning of a system of European security without an arms race on the European continent in particular and generally throughout the world. However, the danger of a confrontational scenario is preserved due to the continual-dichotomous structuring of the space of the European continent. The continual aspect of this structuring refers to the space of relations between the countries of the EU. It is the dichotomous aspect that characterizes the space of relations between Russia and the EU. Dichotomousness in this context means that in the nature of the relations between Europe and Russia there is a confrontational type of confrontation that can oppose the European Union and Russia as two different ways of geopolitical self-identification. In its turn, continuity in the considered aspect does not mean the absence of conflict in relations, both between the states of the Constitutional Court and within them. So, for example, Catalonia tries to separate from Spain, and Scotland—from the UK. While at the same time, European self-identification does not disappear. Thus, the conflict of interests in one case does not call into question European self-identification. In the first case, we have the continuity of the geopolitical space (relations between the EU countries and within it), the second—its dichotomy (relations between the EU and Russia).

It can be asserted that the place of Russia within the system of pan-European security since 1991 fits into the logic of Lord Ismay, the first secretary general of NATO; of keeping Russia outside of Europe. Those innovations which marked the strategic course of the West for a new type of interaction with Russia can create the perception of approaching or even accepting Russia into the “European family”. However, on closer examination, it turns out that the new strategic nuances of Western policy are only modernized tools that regulate the degree of distance between the US, NATO and the EU from Russia. At the right moment, these tools set up relations with Russia for some convergence, in other cases they give way to the process of distance.

As can be seen from the approaches the ex-Soviet Republics have taken with regard to Russia and European Security, it is the OSCE which has received the greatest attention. Though within this organisation there has been precious little consensus concerning threat perceptions and a functioning security system. Furthermore, the Ukraine crisis and annexation of Crimea have heightened the concerns of the ex-Soviet states, in particular those who harbour Russian-speaking citizens, of destabilization and increased their fears for territorial integrity and freedom of manoeuvre. The meaning of this geopolitical game then, is to determine the safe distance at which it is possible to keep Russia away from Europe and at the same time not to expose itself to danger from the side of Russian claims. Whilst Russia understands the geopolitical peculiarity of its situation, it is unable to change it.

Funding
The author received no direct funding for this research.

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Citation information
Cite this article as: Russian and European Union’s Quest for the formation of a European security system after the cold war, Kaan Diyarbakirlioglu, Cogent Social Sciences (2019), 5: 1683928.

Notes
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16. Following the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, all functions of the WEU have effectively been incorporated into the EU, and the WEU was closed down in 2011.

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