FIQH FOR ACTION: JIHADI SALAFIST AND RETHINKING IN SALAFI JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS

Abstract

Albeit sharing “Salafism” in name, Jihadi Salafist movement is different from the mainstream Salafism in multiple respects. Among others, it’s Fiqh (jurisprudence) distinguishes it from other Salfi strands, since Jihadi Salafist established their own underlying fiqh principles. To put it into perspective, their understanding of Salafist jurisprudence principles is characterized by three main features: firstly, it serves collective actions and social agitation; secondly, it excuses its proponents’ autonomous actions; and finally, it theorizes individual instead of institutionalized actions. This study hypothesizes that the Jihadi Salafist movement tends to advance these actions in the light of revisiting the all-important principles of *ijtihad*, *tawhid*, *iman*, and *tazkya*. While complying with official institutes issuing *fatwa* (religious edict) and dominant social and political order and its gradual amendment is prescribed by Salafism *fiqh*, Jihadi Salafism demands abiding by *Quran* and *Sunna*, and encourages abolishing official institutes in favor of collective and violent actions. The current paper aims to explore Salafists’ atypical understanding of main Salafist theoretical principles and its impact on proceedings and violence in Jihadi Salafist movement.

**Keywords:** Jihadi Salafism, Fiqh, autonomous subjects, collective actions, institutes

Introduction

Over the past decade, the world has witnessed an increase in religious violence particularly in the Muslim world. Such religious violence has ties with an influential Sunni Islam known as Salafi movement. The Salafism is not a single and consistent movement and has its own plurality. Salafism is characteristically...
different from the mainstream Sunni Islam in terms of its jurisprudence (fiqh) and understanding of underlying Sunni principles with direct impacts on their agendas in public and political sphere. Not surprisingly, there have been various sub-movements within the Salafist discourse. Salafist discourse can be divided into three major tendencies of institutionalized traditional Salafi, institutionalized moderate Salafi, and anti-institutionalized Islamic Jihadi Salafists. The classification is based on two indicators of Salafists’ interpretation of the basic principles of Salafi jurisprudence, and practical or, institutionalized agenda. In this study, it is argued that these criteria can be conceived as a window to understand Salafi Jihadists’ inclination to violence and to figure out how to confront them.

Over the past two decades, Politology of religion paid little attention to the Salafist currents of Islam. In Islam, all personal actions and collective actions are prescribed through jurisprudential knowledge. Hence, any change in the behavior of a Muslim needs justification in jurisprudence. The change in the behavior of the Salafists from actors adopting refraining policies to active involvement in politics, as well as the use of violence in the political arena, was not possible without the development of jurisprudence. It follows then that for a politological grasp of contemporary Salafi currents, Salafi jurisprudential system is supposed to be probed in depth.

The current study is mainly concerned with the question of: what changes have been effected in Salafi jurisprudence and how such changes might have led to more violence of Jihadi Salafist? This article claims that the critical social-political-context of Islamic societies has brought up certain serious questions for both Commons and elites of Islamic societies. Islamic movements have given different responses to the fundamental question of how to resolve the crisis in Islamic societies. Similar to other Islamic religious movements, the Salafi movement addressed the question through drawing on its own jurisprudence and religious foundations. Although all Salafi movements are fed epistemologically by the same key sources of The Quran and Sunnah, the inability of institutionalizing Salafi movements in response to the growing crises of Islamic societies led to the discrepancy in interpreting Salafist principles and emergence of radical jihadi jurisprudence. Jihadi Salafists, then, as a social movement established a new approach in interpreting religious foundations which initiated dynamic social movements confronting the ruling order through collective actions beyond the regular institutions for their common goals and interests. Such situations,
however, entailed a particular interpretation of Salafist thought foundations. Re-thinking in the meaning of such concepts has helped to maintain the movement status of Salafi-jihadist flow and has justified its violence.

**Emergence of the Salafi-jihadist discourse in the Arab world**

Structural grounds have played an essential role in the formation of Jihadist Salafists as a social movement. Social movements arise when a society faces serious problems. Structural pressure refers to tensions, contradictions, and ambiguities that create conflicting interests within the community.

The structural conditions are a set of political, economic, and cultural factors that, on the one hand, have emerged gradually, and on the other hand, their resolutions are beyond the will of individual actors. Roel Meijer considers the existence of autocratic regimes in the Arab world and their lack of flexibility and rigor against the Islamist opponents, and as a result of the political atmosphere in the Arab world⁴ as one of the structural grounds for the emergence of jihadist movements. Some researchers maintain that Islamic radicalism is a response to the “domination” of foreign forces and their internal agents and consequently it is more of an identity mobilization with its root in society⁵.

The inception and development of social movements are also profoundly influenced by social restrictions as another part of the structural conditions. Attempts might be made by rulers respond to the movement by intervening and modifying the structural agitations and pressure inspiring the emergence. Armed forces are influential in social control as clearly indicated in the conflict between the Jihadi Salafists and the Arab and Western regimes. It gave rise, accordingly, to jihadist Salafists’ more violence and persistence.

“Defeated governments” have also been one of the main factors behind the development of Jihadi Salafists discourse and its affiliated groups. Somalia, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and parts of Lebanon, and Palestine, which are the main sources of the discourse, with certain exceptions, have defeated governments. “Defeated and weak governments have difficulty establishing law and order, which permits militant groups and other sub-state actors to fill the vacuum”⁶. It should be noted that these situations are the outcomes and consequences of corrupt authoritarian regimes and “expected product of the current Arab social and political reality”⁷. Besides, moderate Islamic discourses inclined to participate in political games in

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⁴ Roel Meijer, *From al-da’wa to al-hizbiyya: Mainstream Islamic Movements in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine in the 1990s*, 1997, p. 1.
⁵ Ibid, p. 36.
⁶ See Seth. G. Jones, Back to the Future, the Resurgence of Salafi-Jihadists.https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400.2014 Hirsi Ali Ayaan, Challenge of Dawa. Political Islam as Ideology and Movement and How to Counter It, Hoover Institution Press. Stanford, 2017. Ann Hironaka, *Never ending wars: The international community, weak states, and the perpetuation of civil war*, Harvard University Press, 2005; *James J. F Forest, Terrorism & Political Islam, Origins, Ideologies and Methods, Counterterrorism Textbook for the New Agent Training Program, 2007.*
⁷ Hassan Abu Hanieh, and Mohammad Abu-Rumman, *The ‘Islamic State’ Organization*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Amman, 2015, p. 18.
order to reform, and thus to improve the political and economic status of people, could not accomplish their stated goals and slogans. Concerns about westernization and globalization, and the destruction of local cultural values and religious beliefs, have also induced the jihadists to seek control of power and Islamization of society from the top. Their riot was not only against the current secular state that assumed them ignorant (jahiliyyah); but, also it also involved their critique of the traditional religious institution. Traditional Salafist could not create an enlightening and up-to-date discourse for the integration of religious “youth” in line with new social and political developments and continued to insist on their “obedience to the rulers” that were corrupt and hated by the religious youth. Hence, the “Traditional Salafists” lost its appeal and “political credibility” for the youth in a highly educated society.

Many researchers take into account only these structural reasons, while the religious and jurisprudential interpretation of the Jihadi Salafists flows are of significance. Social movements are shaped by the influence certain ideologies that crystallize discontents and point to practical ways to eliminate them. The spread of generalized beliefs can boost dissatisfactions, and lead people to find their own practical ways to terminate them. Jihadi Salafism needs to preserve kinetic circumstances to further stimulate mobility and action through bringing to the fore the structural crises in the society. Hence, it has reconstructed legal foundations and reproduced new beliefs. The legitimacy that jihadi Salafist gain from the interpretation of holy texts along with social and political grounds give them soft power and motivates Jihadi-Salafists to take actions.

The Salafist discourse and the issue of governing institutions

The Salafist discourse is not uniform in terms of confronting the current state of affairs in the world. In order to understand the Salafist discourse concerning the type of encounter with the dominant order, one has to take into consideration the thoughts of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab dating back to the 12th century, AH but since then has persisted in Wahhabi Essence. The Wahhabi Salafist discourse guided all the subsequent Salafist flow developed over the past centuries by the scholars of the official religious institution of Saudi Arabia, the heirs of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab. It emphasizes the necessity to support the government on the ground that it is the guardian of Sheikh Wahhab’s call and in effect Salafist religion. Consequently, it legitimizes and defends both the ruling religious and political institutions. As such, the Saudi government is supposed to be legitimate and must be obeyed even though it may commit vices.

8 Mohammad Abu-Rumman, Hassan Abu Hanieh, The Islamic Solution in Jordan: Islamists, the State and the Ventures of Democracy and Security, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Amman, 2013, p. 417.

9 Abdulaziz H Fahad, From exclusivism to accommodation: Doctrinal and legal evolution of Wahhabism, NYUL Rev, Vol. 79, 2004, pp. 485-491.
and sins (\textit{al-monkar}). Hence, the mother Wahhabism and its related flows such as \textit{al-Salafiya al-Jamiyah} and \textit{al-Salafiya al-Tablighiah} can be recognized as institutionalized movements\textsuperscript{10} in the sense that they emphasize the need for obedience to ruling religious and political institutions in order to “safeguarding the souls of its followers against the misguided Islam of others”\textsuperscript{11}. This closeness of the official \textit{Ulama} (scholars) to the rulers and their unconditional support of government policies have impacted on opposing Salafist discourses to a large extent particularly since the 1990s. Alongside mother Wahhabism, two other flows have been created from the traditional Salafi mainstream. An important flow is that of Muhammad Aman al Jami which is a conservative flow in alliance with Saudi Arabia government, and absolute obedience to the rulers and reluctant to expose any political views.

Another strand, with distinctive differences from the traditional Wahhabi discourse, is the Albany Salafi which seeks to reform Wahhabism by the noble \textit{hadith} (Prophetic traditions). Al-Albani criticized the relation of Wahhabism to Hanbali religion, and more extremely complained that Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab was Salafi in belief but not in jurisprudence\textsuperscript{12}. In addition, in Al-Albani’s view, Abdul Wahhab was fairly familiar with \textit{hadith}. Hence, Al-Albani viewed himself as the one inviting people to a new Wahhabism devoid of elements in contradiction to \textit{al-Salaf al-Salih} (the righteous predecessors) beliefs. Hence, Al-Albani’s students chose to be named “\textit{Ahl al-Hadith} (the People of Hadith)”.\textsuperscript{13} Another important flow in Salafist discourse is moderate Salafists. It may be dived into two main branches of Sahwa (awakening) and reformist Salafists. Sahwa with a focus on politics and the society’s problems was generated from Wahhabi Salafi and Muslim brotherhood discourses in Saudi Arabia’s social context. The Sahwa authorities strive to revisit Salafist Thoughts Bridge the divide between the thought and modernity.

As it was mentioned above another important flow born from the Sahwa was is the reformist Salafist movement. Common between this discourse and by political reformers is a call for a peaceful change toward a constitutional monarchy. It also advocates respect for the law, public freedoms, and the nation’s participation in political decision-making. This moderate Salafi maintains that the historical experience of various nations and societies taught us that supervising rulers and institutions will ensure the benefit of Islamic society. Accordingly, whereas there is no verse or hadith rejecting monitoring and supervising rulers and, there are texts that encourage denouncing and rejecting ruthless rulers as

\textsuperscript{10} Hani Nseirah, \textit{Al-harakat al-islamiyyah fi al- saudia} (the Islamic Movement in saudia), in: \textit{Ahameya al-Jihad fi Nashr al- da’wa al-Islamiya wa al-Rad Ala al-Tawaef Zale Fih}, Al-Olyani, Emad Bin Ali Nafei, (ed.), Dar a-Tayyebah, Ryadh, 2013, p. 98.

\textsuperscript{11} Madawi Al-Rasheed, \textit{Contesting the Saudi state: Islamic voices from a new generation}, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{12} See: Stéphane Lacroix, \textit{Awakening Islam}, Harvard University Press, 2011.

\textsuperscript{13} Imad Abd al-Ghani, \textit{Mausu’ah Al-harakat al-islamiyyah fi al-dlam al- Arabiyax}, Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabiya, Beirut, 2013, p. 978.
an act of merit. In their view, a Favorite type of government is based on election and councils with rulers being monitored and constrained in order not rule individualistically and cruelly.

In this discourse, Islam has not spread through the sword force. The legitimacy of jihad also lies in letting people opt for their own religion and fighting with anyone preventing them from making their choice\(^\text{14}\). Therefore, the shariah law emphasizes that Muslims can retaliate only if they face enmity or are attacked by the disbelievers\(^\text{15}\).

Jihadi Salafist opposes traditional and moderate Salafism. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, such flows are not similar in terms of their perceptions and understanding of jurisduripendial foundations and there have been bones of contention. Attempts have been made by Jihadi Salafist to exploit the current structural conditions and to intensify the dynamic social forces. Therefore, having redefined the basic concepts of Salafist discourse such as taqlid (imitation) and ijtihad, tawhid (monotheism), iman (faith), tazkya (purification) they accentuated their particular jurisprudence in order to create essential spiritual space for the Salafist movement and to advance through the current structural status.

**Jihadi Salafists and reconstructing the understanding of the foundations**

To understand the issue of violence and justify disregard the present governing bodies of the world in Salafi-Jihadi discourse, one cannot simply resort to political, social, and economic backgrounds, rather, there must a close look at Salafi jurisprudence to grasp a better apprehension of the interpretative mechanism of its interpretative system and their perception of Islam. These interpretations lie behind the epistemological foundations of the discourse and justify the actions of their Followers.

*Ijtihad*

*Ijtihad* has always been a jurisprudential issue for the Sunnis and hence, has sparked discussion through decades. Salafist jurisprudence, however, has undergone a fundamental breakdown of common approaches in traditional Sunni jurisprudence over the past decades and has witnessed a new birth. Unlike multiple evaluations, it can be argued that Salafi jurisprudence has tended to critique the past Sunni jurisprudence with in the face of its new internal conflicts. In a sense, Salafi jurisprudence is the most broad-minded Sunni jurisprudence as it doesn’t subscribe to the traditional fourfold schools, Hanafi, Hanbali, Ma-

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14 Nawaf Al-Qadimi, *Ashwaq al-horeya, moqarebat al-mugaffa al-Salafi al-Demoqratya*, al-Shabaka al-‘Arabiya lil Abhath wal Nashr, Beirut, 2012, p. 64.

15 Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Maktabah Wahbah, Cairo, 2010, p. 65.
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liki, Shafi’i schools and criticizes them. The contention concerns how to exploit epistemological resources, that is, the Quran and the Sunnah. Jurisprudential debates of second to fourth centuries of the middle Islamic period, consequently, restricted the legitimacy and scope of al-Aql (reason) and dalil (proof). They were even divorced from knowledge domain in some jurisprudential religions such as Hanbali or were marginalized in other jurisprudential religions\(^{16}\). However, in subsequent periods, streaks of reason regained prominence in jurisprudential and interpretive sources owing to the efforts of some scholars and jurists\(^{17}\). More specifically, Ahl al-Hadith and Ahl al-Ray originated in the following centuries. Ahl al-hadith elevated the hadith to the exclusive and most comprehensive reserve of the Sunnis and the only way of perfection. Ahl al-Ray believed in the role of reason and proof in interpreting the Islamic tradition. As such, Salafism can be viewed as the Ahl al-hadith method. For Salafists, taqlid of madhahib (schools of jurisprudence) out of the question and their principle doesn’t imply submission to God. They likewise reject ijma (consensus), and qiyas (analogical deduction) claiming that all religious issues have to be resolved in the light of prophetic traditions or ahadith”\(^{18}\). Opposition to traditional Salafi discourse That “Refusal of innovations, including the jurisprudence made on the basis of ijtihad (interpretation), is the center of this doctrine”\(^{19}\).

Salafi jihadi discourse has theorized a radical and popular ijtihad for its followers, in order to pass the institutionalism conditions of traditional Islamic jurisprudence. This is the subtle epistemological point that distinguishes Salafist jurisprudence from other Sunni jurisprudential flows. Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab made the ijtihad personal and vulgar. In his point of view, people must be self-educated and trained in order to extract correct practices and behaviors from religious texts, and thus, they won’t be trapped by scholars’ mistakes\(^{20}\). Too Many of Salafi students, based on such justifications, prefer to study for a year or less, to rid themselves of the labor of chewing over the books of jurisprudence; and then, according to ijtihad method, they issue statements and write books, while they lack scientifically appropriate tools for such a critical matter\(^{21}\).

In contrast to institutional ijtihad, jihadi Salafist have highlighted the concept of ittaba’\(^{a}\). The homonym is derived from the word tabaiyat (Following) and denotes immediate and with no intermediate means obedience to Quran and sun-

\(^{16}\) See: Wael B. Hallaq, The origins and evolution of Islamic law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 42-57.

\(^{17}\) Adis Duderija, Adis, Neo-Traditional Salafi Qur'an-Sunna Hermeneutics and Its Interpretational Implications, Religion Compass, Vol. 5, 2011, pp. 314-325.

\(^{18}\) Ahmad Moussalli, Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is the enemy?, In: A Conflict Forum Monograph, 2009, p. 14.

\(^{19}\) Daniel Ungureanu, Wahhabism, Salafism and the Expansion of Islamic Fundamentalist Ideology, Journal of the Seminar of Discursive Logic, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, 2011, p. 141.

\(^{20}\) Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, Fatawa wa-Masa'il, In: Moallafat Al-Imam Al-Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahha, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab (ed.), Jamiat al-Imam Muhammad bin Saud al Islamiyah, Riyadh, 1978, p. 33.

\(^{21}\) Ahmad Salem, and Omar Basyuni, Ma Baad al-Salafi, Qaraah al-Naqdye Fi al-Khatab al-Salafi al-Moasis, Markaz Nama Le-Bohuth wa-al-Dirasat, Beirut, 2015, p. 348.
nah. However, to Salafists, it is a Special word. By *ittaba`a*, it is meant to imitate only the Text. The text has also two parts: one of them is the *Quran* and the other is the prophet’s *Sunnah*\(^{22}\). In regard to *ittaba`a* a couple of points are noteworthy; first, by way of eliminating elitist *ijtihad* flows in effect they opt out of the four-fold schools in order to refer directly to *Quran* and *Sunnah*. Therefore, unlike the Sunni and Shia jurisprudence flows, people are not supposed imitate anyone. Second, jihadi Salafists believe that revelation is not limited to the worshiping god but it is concerned with the government and public affairs, and hence, one have to resort to the text (*Quran* and *sunnah* in all human affairs. Third, unlike some Sunni theories that posit that the prophet was not innocent in his personal life, they believe in absolute obedience to the prophet. In the shadow of the rejection of imitation, they state that most of *fatwas* (religious edicts) are devoid of “knowledge and reason”\(^{23}\). In the Salafi jihadi’s point of view, the reference to the text has been neglected in many of the *fatwas which* lead to a gap between people and obedience to the *Quran as* the Wahhabi scholars were far removed from the method of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab, who encouraged personal *ijtihad*. They enclosed *fatwa* in institutions such as *dar al-ifta*. Therefore, in their understanding, imitation is forbidden, and it is imperative for Muslims to seek reasons from the *Quran* and *Sunnah*. The Salafi discourse asks all its subjects to follow the reason as “proof” of the *Quran* and prophet’s *Sunnah*. Muhammad al-Shawkani (d.1834), calls this questioning of reason *ittaba`a* instead of *taqlid*. Muhammad Sultan Masomi Khojandi, in a treatise titled “is it permissible for a Muslim to follow a certain religion of the fourfold religions?” concludes that anyone who insists on adhering to a certain religion of the fourfold religions, is a *kafir* (disbeliever). Referring to the verse “of those who have divided their religion” he accuses the followers of the fourfold Imams of Sunnis of jahiliyya (pre-Islamic paganism).

More strict jihadists such as al-Wad’e, view imitation as forbidden (*haram*) and imitators as innovators (*ahl al-bid’a*). Al-Wad’e asserts that it is a *fiaridah* (religious duty) for every Muslim to learn all that God has obligated; and the pursuit of science is obligatory for them. The verse “[O mankind], what has been revealed to you from your Lord and do not follow other than Him any allies”\(^{24}\). He argues, addresses everyone, and all people have to seek the proof (*dalil*) like the companions (*Sahabah*)\(^{25}\).

Al-Wade’s outlook on imitation rests on Al-Shawkani’s viewpoint. Al-shokani contended that to follow anything other than what Allah laid down leads to divisions and disunion. Therefore, Salafists reject *ijtihad* on one hand, and on the other, they create a kind of *ijtihad* anarchy stressing *ittaba`a*. In other words, groups are subdivided which is technically called “Jamarat al-Arz” in the sense of that

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\(^{22}\) Davod Firahi, *Fiqhe Salafi Wa Khushunah*, http://fahimco.com/Post/Details/3145, (Accessed, 28.8. 2017).

\(^{23}\) Ibid.

\(^{24}\) Quran, al-A`raf , 7:3.

\(^{25}\) Muqbil Bin Hadi Al-Wad’e, *Ijabah al-Saeil Ala Aham al-Masaeil*, Dar al-Harameyn, Cairo, 1999, p. 474.
uncontrollable spitfires. In effect, The Salafist flow puts an end to the institutional *ijtihad* when anyone can directly refer to the text. As such, institutional and social cohesion are prone to collapse.

The reconstruction of the concept of *ittaba’a* in Salafi jurisprudence boils down a kind of negative individualism, and unexpectedly brings about a radical *ijtihad*, a state “every Muslim is his own muftis”. As a result, unlike the jurisprudence of other Salafists flows, which has been institutionalized and centralized under the influence governments and power, the Salafist jihadist jurisprudence prescribes a kind of personal and decentralized *ijtihad*. The course of changes turned out to maximize the potentials for violence in Salafi jurisprudence, and when it comes to action, it manifests itself blatantly. What increases the tendency toward Jihadi Salafists, is exactly such personal *ijtihad* against the imitation hidden in other institutionalized Salafist and even Sunni flows. The hierarchical system of issuing *fatawa* and decrees in the hand of *muftis*, religious experts, and rulers, dominant in Muslim intellectual and political tradition in the last century, now has become personal, non-structural and, in turn, reproduced discrepancies, division, and violence. This might account why in the Jihadist discourse the subjects enjoy autonomy in taking actions, violence erupts, and the subjects do not wait for a *fatwa*. In fact, simplification of *sharia* and assuming the possibility of its comprehending in the absence of any specific education is equated with *ijtihad* in jihadi Salafist jurisprudence. Such an interpretation is premised on public comprehension of sharia and, of course, democratized jurisprudential knowledge assumed to be in the realm of elites in other jurisprudential flows.

**Iman**

Another important basis that has inspired a kind of rethinking in Jihadi Salafist discourse, is the concept and exemplar of *iman* (faith) with disputes about it dating back to theological and jurisprudential discussions in the first AH century. Its definition, then, was one of the characteristics features making a distinction among *Mutazilah*, *Murji’a* (those who separate belief and action), *Shia*, and *Kharijites*. Kharijites’ view was that action plays a basic role in shaping the nature of *iman*, and hence, if a believer does even one sin, then he is completely excluded from the circle of *iman*, and entered into *kufr* (disbelief). The Mu’tazilites believed that all of a person’s faith is his actions.

In contrast, *Murji’a* and *Asharites* presented a different interpretation of the relationship between faith and action. *Murji’a* achieved an amazing result between the two areas of faith and action and that commission of any sin whether minor or great, does not affect the people’s faith. A faithful person can commit the worst sins and still remain a faithful person. The Ash’ari’s point of view was

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26 Davod Firahi, *Fiqhe Salafi*, http://fahimco.com/Post/Details/3145, (Accessed, 28.8.2017).
27 Abu al-Hasan Al-Ash’ari, *Maqalat alislamiyyin wa ikhtilaf al-musallín*, al-Maktabah, al-`Asriyyah, Beirut, 1995, pp. 63-69.
close to Murji’a, and they thought that there is only a pillar of faith, and confession and action are the second grade of importance.

Iman in Jihadi-Salafist discourse is construed as returning to holding to the belief in action. Jihadi Salafist discourse accuses traditional Salafists of being stuck in Erja dubiousness by way of preferring faith to action. Hence, the traditional Salafists are called “Murji’a” (those who procrastinate acting) by their counterparts. Traditional Salafist and Muslim brotherhood approaches, in this regard, hold that one must excommunicate (takfir) those who do not rule in accordance with Allah’s, but, it has to be evident that they believe in that what they do is kufr. Hence, for the Jihadists the relation of action and faith is fundamental rather than secondary.

Other Salafist flows, however, state that there is no word or action – apart from praying- that makes a person an infidel unless it relates to beliefs. Accordingly, the main issue of contention between the Jihadi Salafists and traditional Salafists pertains to the issue of “rulers” in particular. In other words, if a ruler commits a sin, not because of unfaithfulness, he is not excommunicated in traditional Salafi discourse, but in Jihadist-Salafists view, the action takes precedence over faith, and thus, infidel actions entitle them to excommunicate the ruler. Interpretations of faith, as such, have different practical implications. The interpretation of Jihadists reinforces strongly violence and prescribes agitation against foundations and established procedures. The Salafist interpretation results in less tolerance and more violence toward the “others”.

Tawhid

The interpretation of tawhid (the unity of God) is another gap between Jihadi-Salafists and the traditional Salafist flows. The Jihadist-Salafists’ interpretation lends itself to many of their actions and violent measures. Tawhid in Salafist thoughts is divided into three parts: tawhid al-Rububiyya (unity of lordship), or believing in Allah’s unity in his acts and in that Allah is the only creator and provider. Tawhid al-Uluhiyyah (Oneness of Worship) is the manifestation of divine monotheism in the actions of people. It requires that a true servant of Allah must serve only Allah in all acts of worship and He alone should be worshiped with complete and utter loyalty. But tawhid al-Asma Wa al-Sifati (monotheism of names and attributes) means a faithful Muslim believes in Allah’s names and attributes as stated by Allah His Messenger. 

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28 Emad Bin Ali Nafei Al-Olyani, Ahameya al-Jihad fi Nashr al-da’wa al-Islamiya wa al-Rad Ala al-Tawaef Zale Fih, in: Ahameya al-Jihad fi Nashr al-da’wa al-Islamiya wa al-Rad Ala al-Tawaef Zale Fih, Emad Bin Ali Nafei Al-Olyani (ed.), Dar a-Tayyebah, Riyadh, pp. 445-465.

29 Hasan Noorhaidi, Laskar Jihad-Islam: Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, Cornell University Press, New York, 2006, p. 133.
discourses agree with the division\(^{30}\). But there is another kind of *tawhid* added to is the classification with significant impact on and implications for what Jihadi salafists do, that is, *Tawhid al-Hakimiya* (monothemism in sovereignty). Governance is an issues at stake in politological study of religious trends\(^{31}\). Basically, it one of distinctive characters identifying various Salafi currents in contemporary Islamic thought. Salafist jihadi leaders are also cognizant the main difference between this discourse and other Salafist discourses in the area of sovereignty.

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi as the most prominent theorist of this discourse, maintains that Jihadi-Salafists is a flow which bridges between universal calling (*da’wa*) to *tawhid* and Jihad for its fulfillment\(^{32}\). He also points out that some Salafist movements have reduced the calling to monotheism to avoid the polytheism of tombs and have disregarded the polytheism of rulers and legislators, they might even reinforce their throne and sovereignty\(^{33}\). Therefore, it is of import to understand the Jihadi-Salafists’ grasp of monotheism impacting their violent approach.

Abu Qatada another famous Jihadi Salafi says: “it is necessary to know that the government, jurisdiction, and legislation are only belonged to God”. In defining *tawhid*, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, calls for telling people about this kind of monothemism and in order to turn people from worshiping other humans to pure worshiping of God when legislative right is has been given to non-gods through conventional rules different from divine commands. In his own words it is currently known as “sovereignty”. Sovereignty is assumed to be an essential part of monotheism\(^{34}\). Maqdisi believes that it is “the monotheism of sovereignty that distinguishes Jihadi-Salafism from other discourses. In it, also lies the secret of hostility of Arab governments to the discourse”\(^{35}\).

Therefore, any kind of government except that of Allah is rejected and fought against (armed jihad). This is exactly the turning point for Salafi-Jihadi discourse to speak of the blasphemy of modern institutions like democracy and congresses for being in direct opposition to legislative right of Allah. Maqdisi deems that democracy is a new religion that against the basis of *tawhid*. He wrote a book entitled “democracy is a religion” where he argued that democracy, contrary to Islam, giving the right of governing and legislation to humans\(^{36}\). In Salafi-Jihadi

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30 Imad Abd al-Ghani, *Mausu’ah Al-harakat al-islamiyyah fi al-alam al- Arabiyax*, Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabiya, Beirut, 2013, p. 94.
31 See: Miroljub Jevtic, Political Science and Religion, *Politics and Religion Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2007, pp. 59-69.
32 Abu Muhammad Maqdisi, *Al-Hiwar Maa Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi*, Minbar al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_19743.html, (Accessed 11.11.2017).
33 Ibid.
34 Abu Muhammad Maqdisi, *Melah Ibrahim wa Dawla al-Anbiya wa al-Mursalin*, Minbar al-Tawhid Va al-Jihad, www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_20383.html, (Accessed 23.4.2017).
35 Marwan Shahadah, *Tahawwulat al-khitob al-salafi, al-harakat al-jihadiyah, halat dirasah, 1990-2007*, al-shabake alArabiya le-Abahes wa al-Nashr, Beirut, 2010, pp. 83-84.
36 Abu Muhammad Maqdisi, *Al-Demoqratiya Deen*, Minbar al-tawhid wa al-Jihad, http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_26238.html, (Accessed 16.4.2017).
discourse, all foundations and western governments are considered as infidel systems\textsuperscript{37}.

\textit{al-Walaa Wa al-Baraa}

Redefinition of \textit{al-Walaa Wa al-Baraa} (Allegiance and Disavowal) concepts is another source understanding how Jihadi Salafists divides from traditional and moderate Salafi discourses. That is concept which was also a controversial issue in the classical Salafi discourse, has been widely exploited by the Jihadi flows. Hanbali scholars, in the past, conceived \textit{al-Walaa Wa al-Baraa} as religious innovation (\textit{Beda}) fundamental in Shiite beliefs\textsuperscript{38}. Similar to former Hanbali scholars, Ibn Taymiyya drew on \textit{al-Walaa Wa al-Baraa} concepts to fight against \textit{beda} and to encourage Muslims to do away with the Jewish and Christian, albeit he never used the terms. Suleiman Bin Abdullah al-Sheikh (d.1786) extended the concept and assumed it as a yardstick for true faith so as to break friendship between Muslims and non-Muslims\textsuperscript{39}. More recently, however, owing to the association between Wahhabism and ruling power, a new interpretation of \textit{al-Baraa} was made. As a result, the traditional Salafist scholars use \textit{al-Baraa} only for social life issues like following infidels in “dressing”, “speaking”, or “choosing names”, but they voice no objection to friendship of rulers with infidels and tried to even justify it. As a case in point, Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz (d. 1999) does not condemn the peace with Israel as a form of friendship with infidels, but he excuses it for reasons of security, commercial, and normal political exchanges with the Jewish government not relevant to the essential understanding of the concept\textsuperscript{40}.

In other words, as traditional Salafists’ interpretation is not extensive, it comes to terms with the ruling systems. Even the moderate Salafists of Sahwa do not extend the scope of \textit{al-Baraa}, and hence, can tolerate the ruling regimes.

Jihadi-Salafists’ construction of \textit{al-Walaa wa al-Baraa} “uses to oppose the institutions of state power”\textsuperscript{41} and justifies any of their violent encounters with others. They believe “that \textit{al-Walaa wa al-Baraa} required affirmative action”\textsuperscript{42}.

Maqdisi, one of their theorists, posited \textit{al-Baraa} as one of the underpinning theoretical principles Jihadi Salfism against traditional Salafi discourses. What is evident in Maqdisi discourse “principle of \textit{al-Walaa wa al-Baraa}’ is that both utilize it for the purpose of arousing and mobilizing individuals in the movement, and for stressing and reinforcing their link to the ideology of Jihadi Salaf-

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Abu al-Hassan Muhammad bin Muhammad Abi yaala, \textit{Tabaqat al- Hanabele}, Maktab al-Sunnah al-Muhammad, Cairo, 1952.
\textsuperscript{39} Bin Abdullah, al-Sheikh Suleiman Bin Abdullah, \textit{Owsaq Ara al-Iman}, Unpublished.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibrahim, Youssef, Muslims Argue the Theology of Peace with Israel, \textit{New York Times}, 31 January 1995, p. A00009 of the National edition.
\textsuperscript{41} Shiraz Maher, \textit{Salafi-Jihadism: The history of an idea}, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, p. 132.
ism as the only true and proper doctrine in the face of those who violate the true faith. Having a radical interpretation of the concept, he denounced all human-made rules as a kind of shirk (associating others in worshipping God). In such extremist view, there cannot be any infidels in Arabian Peninsula when the prophet demanded to throw out Infidels from the Arabian Peninsula (throw the dis-believers out of the Arabian Peninsula). In their view, “the ruling systems have good relations with infidels and prosecute and imprison Muslim soldiers” and thereby, breach al-Baraa.

**Tazkiyya**

*Tazkiyya* (purification) is generally construed as contemplating oneself and one’s deeds to decide according to one’s evaluation. While the Salafists take it otherwise. They believe that Islamic *Ummah* has taken it the wrong way due to the influence of various religious movements; therefore, *tazkiyya* means returning the whole society to the right way. In fact, *tazkiyya* refers to the purification of society, not individuals. Basically, in the Salafist discourse either there aren’t any concepts of individual purification, Sufism, or they are of secondary importance. The Salafists reject such concepts on the ground that they are heresies and polytheism originated from Sufi doctrine. The axis of Salafist education is the proper training of monotheism, purifying the society from polytheism, dismissing superstitions, controverting pagans through *Quran*, learning from and following the prophetic deeds, and rejecting the heresies of the *Shiites*, *Mutazilites*, *Jahms*, and *Kharijittes*. In traditional Salafi education, preserving appearance takes priority over the discovery of inside. Therefore, wearing a beard, getting dressed appropriately, wearing a veil, and reading *Quran* are enough for spiritual sublimity. In sum, any Salafist who avoids polytheism and follows a pure Salafist, observes the appearances of Sharia, has reached eminence, is rescued and has joined the saved sects (*firqa al-najiyya*). In other words, they believe they have achieved the status.

The traditional Al-Albani Salafists emerged, basically, from the mother Wahhabi Salafism in response to this interpretation of *tazkiyya* and *tarbiya*. However, Al-Albani posited a different meaning of purification (*tazkiyya*) and religious education or cultivation (*tarbiya*). He approached them through “cleansing hadith” of counterfeits. Al-Albani saw himself as the one calling for new Wahhabism, devoid of elements in contradiction with the Prophet’s (*the salaf’s*) beliefs. The cleans-
ing involved removing the pollution of innovation (beda) in Islam. Then comes educating the youth in accordance with purified Islam and based on unequivocal principles.

But, having a different conception, Salafi-Jihadi discourse approached education and purification otherwise through Jihad, as expected, resulting in escalating violence and more excommunication. In the Salafist-Jihadi discourse, mere training and promulgation for the “reform” under the shadow authoritative, tyrant, and false deities (al-Taghout) is neither sufficient nor successful. As a result, Jihad is the only training method that can create a competent generation to take the responsibility their religion, to encourage the nation to stand up, and to train true leaders for the Ummah.

In a similar vein, Salafi-jihadists consider the educational institutions in Muslim countries as imported from the West, operating in contrast to Islamic education of morality and religion, and thus they prevent students to go to such schools. As a case in point, ISIS has recently reconstructed the educational system in Raqqa province in Syria. In the new system, the nationalism courses, music, social sciences, history, organizational education, sports, philosophy, art and national education, and national anthem of Syria were removed. Religious classes, instead, were mandatory for all male and female managers and teachers.

### The results and practical agendas of reconstruction of Salafi jihadi’s understanding

The output of the epistemological understanding of Jihadist-Salafists’ construction of concepts of ittaba’ā, tawhid, tawalla wa tabarra and iman, is practical recommendations.

### Development of Dar al-kufr domain

Rethinking of the tawhid and iman concepts has had an important consequence in interpreting and determining the Dar al-Islam (the domain of Islam) and Dar al-kufr (the domain of unbelief) and the geographical expansion of violence in Jihadi discourse. In jurisprudential resources of Sunnis, Dar al-Islam is where its people are Muslim, and Dar al-kufr is where its residents are infidels. But, in Salafi-Jihadist discourse, Dar al-Islam can be turned into Dar al-kufr. Al-Maqdisi states that “if the precepts of disbelief (kufr) dominate in a territory and infidels and their beliefs prevail, there, will be a Dar al-kufr even if its residents are Muslim”. Therefore, in Maqdisi’s view, all countries are considered as the dar

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48 Yousef Dini, Ramaeh al-sahaef: al-ehterab ala tamsil al-salafie beyn al-albania va khosumeha, markaz al-mesbar li al-dersat al-bohus, Dubai, 2011, p. 13.
49 Ahmad Al-Arabi, Tanzim al-Dowla Yafroz Manahij Dirasiya Jadidah Fi al-Reqqeh, Mowqe al-Jazira, (Accessed 31.08.2017).
50 Hannah Stuart and Ali Rashad, A guide to refuting jihadism: critiquing radical Islamist claims to theological authenticity, The Henry
Like Maqdisi, Abu Qatada believes that a land can be converted into a \textit{dar al-kufr} in two ways; if the main foreign enemy defeats it, or if an internal infidel (\textit{murtad}) enemy over run it. Therefore, he emphasized the necessity of rising against the ruler and states that “if the ruler becomes apostate, all the Muslims should revolt in order to remove him”\textsuperscript{52}. In Salafi jihadi’s point of view, even an Islamic land can be considered as \textit{dar al-Taghout}. \textit{Al-Taghout} means someone who has revolted and is beyond reach. \textit{Al-Taghout} is mainly used for rulers of Islamic territories who have made friendship with infidels and dualists and suppressed nations and appropriated their resources and wealth. Relying on infidels these rulers break all \textit{hudood} (Islamic penal code) and have become such absolute rulers who govern on the basis of non-God’s laws (\textit{Sharia}). They have been accorded a status as if they are God who are worshiped instead of Allah\textsuperscript{53}. \textit{Al -Walaa wa al-Baraa} is exploited to justify and clarify the Salafist understanding of the meaning of \textit{dar al-Islam} and \textit{dar al-Iman} and to recommend how to treat their residents. So according to \textit{al-Walaa wa al-Baraa}, Ibrahim’s religion and the invitation of prophets have made the declaration of blasphemy and expression of hostility to evils (be idols or human laws) and devaluing them and their positions mandatory, as worshiping is only for God\textsuperscript{54}.

In the Salafi-Jihadists understanding, any form of participation in these regimes’ political or military institutions – whether it be in the form of participating in legislative or municipal elections or accepting a post in the government or in its military or security services is supposed to be in opposition to \textit{Sharia}. In conservative and traditional Salafist discourses, and even modernist Salafists such as Sahwa, jihad is permissible only outside in Iraq, Chechen, Syria, and Yemen but not in the Saudi Arabia. It was in revolt, of course, but the revolt was against an abstract reality\textsuperscript{55}. But, in Salafi-Jihadi discourse, there are no differences among these lands. Abu Yahya al-Libi (2007) held that there is no religious reason to distinguish among these territories. In all these territories the apostate Arab governments are ruling. They have provided the background for occupying Islamic territories by foreign infidels, therefore, there are all the same.

\textit{Jama’ah} and the concept of \textit{Wahda}

The concept of \textit{wahda} (unity) is of particular import in Salafist discourse.

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\textsuperscript{51} Abu Muhammad Maqdisi, Risalea al-Salasineya Fi al-Tahzir Men al-Gholow Fi al-Takfir, Minbar al-tawhid wa al-Jihad, http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_14491.html, (Accessed 19.6.2017).
\textsuperscript{52} Abu Qatada Al-Filistini, Maalim al-Taefa al-Mansurah, Minbar al-tawhid wa al-Jihad, http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_35527.html, (Accessed 15.4.2017).
\textsuperscript{53} Abu Yahya Libi, Tawhid al-Saudia Wa Tawhid al-Haq, https://archive.org/details/AL-salol0002, (Accessed 15.2.2018)
\textsuperscript{54} Abu Muhammad Maqdisi, Melah Ibrahim wa Dawla al-Anbiya wa al-Mursalin, Minbar al-Tawhid Va al-Jihad, www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_20383.html, (Accessed 23.4.2017).
\textsuperscript{55} Stéphane Lacroix, \textit{Awakening Islam}… p. 62.
wahda (Unity) in Islamic thoughts is opposite to tafraqa (Partition). Words like fitna (sedition) are associated with those who have disturbed the unity of the society. The concept of unity is often construed as an absolute obedience of all groups of society to the ruler, and most recently to the government. Jihadi Salafist discourse, unlike traditional Salafis discourses including Jami and Albani, believes in revolution and rising up against rulers. Jihadists rely on revisiting concepts of ittaba’a, tazkiyya, and hakimiya to denounce institutions in Islamic countries as illegitimate systems and to do away from common traditional Salafists’ discourses. Instead, they exploit the concept of jama’ah (community) with its roots in Sayid Qutb’s underpinnings. From his point of view, the process of Islamic resurrection is only achieved through an “organically dynamic movement”, “a faithful group”, or “an unequaled Quranic generation” preceded by the first generation of companions (Salaf). Qutb asserts that this organized group is devoted to Sharia, reject the foundations, seeks to establish the religion, and defends the nation (Ummah) against the enemies striving to set up ignorance ((jahiliyyah). Abu Qatada also argues that jihad is possible only through a collective action. Additionally, He deems this community “fard al-‘ayn (essential) for Muslims heralded by the prophet as a saved sect” (firqa al-najiyya).

Traditional Salafist movements, Wahhabi and Jamiyah Salafists in particular, regard such collective actions as attempts to reduce the ruler’s Supremacy and to split the Islamic society, and thus, are unacceptable. But the Jihadi-Salafists encourage group and collective actions even under secular governments to the extent that it is supposed to be a necessity, since “nothing scares al-Taghout as much as collective goal-oriented activities because they know that it is the only thing that can be effective”. In other words, Therefore, they set up resistance against the settled system, both and nationally and internationally, by setting forth the concept of jama’ah. Implicit in the concept is illegitimacy of the ruling system warranting its change anyway exploiting anything. Implicit in the concept is illegitimacy of the ruling system warranting its change anyway exploiting anything. Then, comes in the significance of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ to establish such jama’ah as a provision to survive in tightly-knit communities. “On the basis of the doctrine of al-Wala’ wa al-Bara’, firm distinctions are drawn between the members of the community and outsiders”. So there is an approach concealed in the community concept that de-legitimizes the settled system and seeks to change it. A group that forms the community can take any actions in order to realize their desired actions.

56 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, ed. by AB al-Mehri, Birmingham, Maktabah booksellers and publishers, 2006, p. 20.
57 Abu Qatada Al-Filastini, Al-Jihad wa al-Ijtihad: Ta‘amulaat fi al-Manhaj, Dar al-Bayariq, Amman, 1999, p. 19.
58 Abu Basir Al-Tartusi, Hukm al-Islam Fi Dimoqratiye Wa al-Taadod al-Al-Hizbiya, Moqe al-Tartusi, http://www.abubaseer.bizland.com/books.htm, (Accessed 3.9.2017).
59 Ahmad Moussalli, Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is the enemy?, A Conflict Forum Monograph, 2009, p. 19.
Jihad

Jihad is one of the important results of understanding the concepts of monotheism in sovereignty, disavowal, and purification. In Salafi jihadi manifest the best way to disavowal (al-Baraa) of kuffar (infidels) is jihad\(^\text{60}\). Maqadisi sees jihad as the natural result of al-Baraa and tazkya. Whereas the moderate Salafist discourses such as Sahwa and reformist Salafists confront governments peacefully and Al-Albani-Salafist discourse seeks to adopt a gradual and bottom-up approach, the Jihadi-Salafist approaches the ruling systems belligerently through armed forces. Salafist-Jihadists reproach Islamic rival discourses for degrading jihad to propagation (da’wa). In their point of view, the greatest training (tarbeya) provision for Muslims is jihad, involving both armed Jihad and struggling against the Self (Jihad an-Nafs) are fard al-‘ayn (individual obligation) for Muslims. Not only have never these two been separated, but also the armed jihad was viewed as the best method institutionalizing Islamic sublime beliefs and ideas and educating Muslims. Despite being formidable, this training is the only method conceivable to raise a powerful force to protect the existence, property, and honor of the Islamic community and to lead the world. Among the educational outcomes of Jihad is that sacrifice is made easy selfishness and its effects are eradicated\(^\text{61}\). Critiquing Albania Salafi, al-Zawahiri (2009) writes a book entitled “rejection on the Sheikh Albania’s perilous doubt about silence against the apostate rulers” and emphasized the jihad against the rulers (khoroj) of the Islamic lands as the best way to reform the Islamic society. In his book al-Farida al-ghaiba (the absent obligation), Muhammad Abdus Salam Faraj (d. 1982) also jihad against the al-Taghot systems as fard al-‘ayn (individual obligation). He emphasized that Jihad has educational outcomes and has been developed in order to spread, help and support tawhid\(^\text{62}\).

Therefore, Jihadi-Salafists reject all peaceful methods of change and the establishment of an Islamic government such as entering parliaments, education, and people’s peaceful revolution or raising awareness of Islam, rather, they opt for aggressive methods.

Jihad in their understanding is also associated with faith and action. Unlike the traditional Salafist discourse which puts action aside and accentuates faith (irja), jihadists’ grasp of jihad is the greatest manifestation of action. So, while traditional Salafists stress the nature of “collective” and “defensive” jihads, jihad is conceived of as an “individual” and “aggressive” duty in Salafi-Jihadi and Salafi-Takfiris discourses. As such, jihad becomes fard al-‘ayn (individual obligation) in

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\(^{60}\) Abu Muhammad Maqdisi, Tabsir al-Oqala Bi-Talbisate Ahl al-Tajahom Wa al-Eirja, http://www.tawhed.ws/r/?i=2mianrha, (Accessed 19.3. 2017).

\(^{61}\) Muhammad Amin Misri, Sabil al-Dawat al-Islamiya, Dar al-Arqam, Kuwait, 1980.

\(^{62}\) Mohammad Abdus Salam Faraj, Jihad, The Absent Obligation, Maktabah Al Ansaar, Birmingham, 2000.
order to defend their religion.

*Jihad* is also the result of understanding the concept of *ittaba`a*. There is no need for any institution or anybody to comment on one’s actions. So, whereas in traditional Salafist discourses the ruler’s permission is required[^63^], in Salafi-Jihadi discourses the necessity of Imam’s permission is in keeping with Shiite principles, and thus in their view, *jihad* is incumbent on everyone without the permission of the ruler. Jihad is an individual obligation which independent of one’s parent’s permission. In jihadist discourse, *jihad* is not merely defensive but the main jihad is offensive. Jihad, says Abu Jandal Al-Azadi, is “fighting with infidels is compulsory and it is not, as some intellectually bankrupt people think, to defend Islam’s appearance but it is intended to attack”[^64^].

Yahya Ghamdi further questions the claims that “Muslims’ *jihad* is dependent on the permission of a ruler” and knows jihad as a personal and religious duty of all Muslims and not a particular group. He endorses the Personalization of jihad in the globalization era. In addition, he contends that jihad without Imam is the manifestation of the individual duty against the lassitude and laziness of Muslim rulers[^65^]. Jihadist Salafists think that the current systems brought *jihad* to a halt[^66^].

The *jihadi Fatwa* must be taken from the jihadist scholars. But, if there is no access to them, the jihadists can issue a *Fatwa* on their own and act accordingly. In Jihadist outlook, members are autonomous and can act themselves. Then, violence can be individual and collective at the same time. Therefore, violence becomes pervasive and jihadist basically knows violence as the true jihad.

**Conclusion**

Many factors especially violence distinguishes the Jihadist Salafist discourse from the other competing Salafi and Islamic discourses such as traditional Salafists, Sahwa, and Brotherhood. Traditional Salafists, Sahwa, and Muslim Brotherhood try to set up institutions step-by-step, to extend them, and ultimately to taking the control of governments instead of following an armed jihad program. However, from the Jihadi Salafist discourse, their program will be caught in a vicious circle doomed to end in failure. In discourses such as Muslim Brotherhood and Sahwa overthrowing governments must be undertaken peacefully and long-term training. This entails creating political, economic, scientific, religious and technological institutions. Subsequently, a quick blow is delivered through these institutions. But, in Salafi-Jihadi discourse, it is impossible to establish powerful institutions for the training of the youth when *al- Taghout* do not even ac-

[^63^]: Hannah Stuart and Ali Rashad, *A guide to refuting jihadism: critiquing radical Islamist claims to theological authenticit...* p. 49.
[^64^]: Yahya bin Musa Zahrani, *Al-Shia Wa al-Azab*’, Mowqe al-said al-Fawaed, http://www.saaid.net/Doat/yahia/292.htm, (Accessed 19.5.2017).
[^65^]: Madawi Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi state: Islamic voices from a new generation*, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[^66^]: Khalid Abdallah Moshawah, *al-Tayyarat al-Dinie Fi al-Saudi*, Dar al-Entesar al- Arabiya, Beirut, 2012, p. 43.
cept a few representatives in their parliaments. Hence, those charities are active under the control of *al-Taghout*, or that several thousand religious people are living complacently in a calm society is only stifling the passion and flame of faith in Muslims’ hearts. Therefore, in the Salafi-Jihadist discourse, resolutions like institutionalization and avoiding violence is not recommended, and instead, violence is endorsed as an inevitable necessity to change the ruling political and social structure. In strictly religious Arab societies, in order to exploit the kinetic power and to persuade the followers to take actions reference must be made to religious texts themselves. Thus, in Salafi-Jihadist discourse major religious principles including *ijtihad*, *tawhid*, *tawalla Wa tabarra* and *tazkya* have been reconstructed to theorize individual and unorganized violence to be implanted into the micro-organisms of the community. The movement has formulated a doctrine to invoke passion for and commitment to ongoing political and social activities. It does not accept the traditional understanding of religion and set forth a new interpretation of the Salafist principles which expounds the main issues, clarifies the goals and how they can be achieved and sketches the structure of the desired society. Therefore, although structural problems have created the necessary grounds for public discontent, what has made the Jihadist Salafi discourse appealing to many people is redefining and updating Salafi jurisprudence advocating violence in its various forms. Accordingly, putting an end to it entails taking well-thought-out steps, Avoiding supporting undemocratic and repressive governments in the Middle East breaking human rights, broadening institutional participation of various political flows in government and power, and expanding real democratic institutions, are part of the solution to the problem of Jihadism. But, most importantly, supporting more moderate and institutionalized Salafists, together with religious and legal reference bodies in Islamic societies in order to confront personal issuing of *fatwa* are essential to control extremist flows.
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ФИХ ЗА АКЦИЈУ: ЏИХАДИСТИЧКИ САЛАФИСТИ И ПРОМИШЉАЊА У САЛАФИСТИЧКИМ ПРАВНИМ ОСНОВАМА

Сажетак

Иако садрже реч салафизам у свом имену, џихадистички салафисти се разликују од мејнстрим салафизма у много области. Између осталог, фикх (правна основа) их разликује од осталих салафистичких група из разлога што џихадистички салафисти имају своје разумевање фикха. То значи да је њихово разумевање правних принципа салафизма окарактерисано са три главне особине: прво, служи колективним акцијама и друштвеној агитацији, друго, оправдава независне акције појединаца и треће, бави се индивидуалним а не институционалним активностима. Ова студија полази од претпоставке да џихадистички салафисти имају тенденцију да искорите ове акције у циљу ревизије свих централних принципа, и то ijtihad, tawhid, iman tazkya.

Кључне речи: џихадистички салафисти, фикх, независни субјекти, колективне акције, институти.

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