1. Introduction

In this paper, the authors use compliance-gaining theory to analyze how the U.S. supports the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in their fight against the current Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad. Over the past few years, the U.S. has been persuaded by the FSA to provide them support through weaponry and military advising. By and large, compliance-gaining theory describes how one party is able to get another party to comply with specific demands. It employs persuasive tactics to obtain such compliance (Marwell, Schmidt, 1967). When looking for compliance, a message source directly or indirectly claims that the rules for directives are worthwhile and portray the true nature of reality (Wilson et al, 1998).

The particular compliance-gaining tactics explored in this analysis are ingratiation, debt, guilt, and compromise. Through ingratiation, a party can make itself more appealing to the other so as to
manipulate the other for subsequent exploitation. When using debt, one party can evoke obligations and responsibilities that the other party owes as a method of inducing compliance. When using guilt, one party tries to win arguments over the other party by making the latter feel guilty (i.e., shifting blame). And compromise refers to an agreement between different parties whereby each side gives up parts of its demands so as to reach mutual goals.

Thanks to these tactics, we can better understand how a rebel group like the FSA has managed to convince a superpower like the U.S. to support it, in spite of the historical implications of supporting rebel groups in the past. To make its compliance-gaining stronger, the FSA has played up ideas or concepts like oil, trust, blame, obligation, and past U.S. military interventions to collaborate with the U.S. so as to bring down the Syrian government and, by the same token, resist Russian influence in Syria.

An important conclusion of this paper is that compliance-gaining goes beyond that of close relationships and business transactions; it can also deal with the complexities of war, insurgency, and international relations. This paper begins with a brief discussion of compliance-gaining theory, with a particular focus on the origins of the theory. Then, the authors proceed to describe the FSA. What comes subsequently is the heart of this analysis: the application of the theory to the FSA's support provided by the U.S. This paper ends with a discussion that also includes an explanation of the theory's weaknesses.

2. Compliance-Gaining Theory: A Description

Developed by G. Marwell and D.R. Schmidt (1967), compliance-gaining theory describes how an individual or group is able to get another individual or group to comply with demands. When asking for compliance, a message source directly or indirectly claims that the rules for directives are worthwhile and portray the true nature of reality (Wilson et al., 1998). W.J. Schenck-Hamlin et al. (1982, p. 99) suggest that “a correspondence between delineation of compliance-gaining properties and subjects’ recognition of them” is important in the compliance-gaining process. In order for a tactic to be effective in compliance-gaining, the target has to be relatively unaware of the fact that the actor (or person partaking in the act of using a compliance-gaining strategy) is trying to use a compliance-gaining move on them. This keeps the target from suspecting foul play and further moves him or her toward trusting the actor depending on the tactic used. The specific tactics used in this analysis will be those of ingratiating, debt, guilt, and compromise.

3. Ingratiation

Ingratiation is a tactic that a party employs to make itself more attractive to the other so as to manipulate the other for subsequent exploitation. The efficacy of ingratiating is based on the other’s very ignorance of the party’s ultimate intentions (Ralston, 1985). By using ingratiating, one party does the other party favors and, in so doing, causes that party to lower its guard. Certain ingratiating practices include flattery and praising, pretending to agree with the other party’s views, and doing courtesies (Gordon, 1996). Ingratiating tactics are used to convince the other party that they are held in high esteem. Ultimately, ingratiating makes the other feel more confident. Doing whatever the other party wants is useful in that, now, the latter looks at new ideas more favorably. Ingratiation can easily open channels of communication, foster relationships, make others feel in high spirits (i.e., especially prior to making a request), get into “opinion conformity,” and act in a friendly way (Gass, Seiter, 1990).

4. Debt and Guilt

Debt is a type of compliance-gaining tactic whereby one party recalls obligations and responsibilities that the other party owes as a method of inducing compliance (Burgoon et al., 1987). Guilt is a type of persuasive argumentation whereby one party tries to win arguments over the other party by making the latter feel guilty. This is usually done by using unfounded reasoning and logical appeals (Brinson, Benoit, 1999). Here, the rhetor tries to shift the blame on others. Shifting blame is effective when one makes the other feel blameworthy or responsible for the failure or loss of something (Blaney et al., 2002).

5. Compromise

Compromise refers to an agreement between different parties whereby each side gives up parts of its demands so as to reach mutual goals. In argumentation studies, compromise occurs when one finds agreement through communication, through a mutual exchange of terms – often entailing variations from an initial goal or desires (Thompson, Hastie, 1990). In the context of this analysis, compromise alludes to the methods by which opposing sides commit to an
agreement – either temporary or permanent – with each other. In international politics, most compromises are those usually seen as reprehensible deals with dictatorships or insurgent groups. It is almost like a necessary evil (Margalit, 2009).

6. The Free Syrian Army (FSA)

Founded during the Syrian Civil War in July 2011, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) is an insurgent group consisting of former officers and soldiers of the Syrian Armed Forces. During the Arab Spring in 2011, thousands of Syrian protesters across Syria demanded the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad, who assumed office in 2000. The Assad regime responded violently, which led to the Syrian Civil War and, ultimately, the creation of the FSA (Hehir, Pattison, 2015). Most of the Syrian Armed Forces refused to open fire on the protesters. In fact, some of the officers and soldiers deserted the Syrian Armed Forces to jointly form the FSA with the protesters. Accordingly, the peaceful protests amounted to an armed insurgency bent on overthrowing the Assad regime (Skålén et al., 2015).

7. The FSA Today

Since February 2014, Abdul-Ilah al-Bashir has been the designated Chief of Staff and frontrunner of the FSA (Karam, Surk, 2014). In September 2014, a league of moderate Islamic insurgent factions – fighting for the Supreme Military Council of Syria (including the FSA) – joined forces with a predominantly Christian alliance called Syriac Military Council. The objective was to enhance their capabilities against both the Assad regime and ISIS (Spencer, 2015). Today, the former Syrian Armed Forces officers and soldiers still believe that their prime objective is to protect the opposition neighborhoods and rallies from the Assad-led regime snipers (Littell, 2015).

By January 2016, the FSA already consisted of “about 27 larger factions, each comprised of an average of 1,000 fighters as well as some smaller units or localized militias” (Alami, 2016, p. A1), including “thousands” of the latter types of brigades of various proportions. Nevertheless, “the opposition movement in Syria has been fragmented from its inception, a direct reflection of Syria’s social complexity and the decentralized grassroots origin of the uprising” (O’Bagy, 2013, p. 9). The precarious condition of the FSA demonstrates the chaotic nature of Syria at the present time and “this condition has plagued Syria’s armed opposition since peaceful protestors took up arms and began forming rebel groups under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army” (O’Bagy, 2013, p. 9).

Although the FSA was created in an effort to better coordinate its efforts, the insurgent group continues to show how disorganized and uncooperative the rebel groups have been toward each other. The problem is that, due to the random and chaotic nature of the FSA, the need for adequate troops, weaponry, and logistics is significant (Zuhur, 2015).

8. The FSA’s Support from the U.S.

In June 2012, the CIA was purportedly active in covert operations along the Turkish-Syrian border, where operatives examined insurgent groups, recommending weapons providers which groups they should assist. CIA operatives also helped opposition forces build supply routes, and gave them communications training (Solomon, Malas, 2012). CIA agents delivered assault rifles, anti-tank rocket launchers, and other ammo to Syrian rebels. By late 2012, the U.S. Department of State allegedly provided $15 million for insurgent groups in Syria (Schmitt, 2012). In April 2013, the Obama administration pledged to increase non-lethal aid to Syrian rebels (including the FSA) – $250 million to be more precise (DeYoung, 2013).

In regards to the last statement, E. O’Bagy (2013, p. 9) stated that “the U.S. provide[d] non-lethal aid, including food, medicine, and training assistance, through the Supreme Military Command of the Free Syrian Army”. Though this event may seem insignificant to some detractors, the ramifications of such a public act of support can be massive. For instance, through this support, the U.S. has further turned the Syrian regime against itself. Although the U.S. and Syrian governments were already enemies, aiding the FSA so directly has made the U.S. an even bigger target.

One of the most important facts to remember is that the U.S. helped support Osama bin Laden during the Soviet-Afghan War and Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. With these failed attempts at support in the past, using radical insurgents to defeat the opposition may be a blowback for the U.S. One must wonder why the U.S. is so set on repeating the same course of action with the FSA. Though never mentioning Osama bin Laden by name, S. Coll (1992, p. A1) of the Washington Post stated that,

The Reagan administration decided to go for victory in the Afghan war between 1984 and 1988 has been shrouded in secrecy and clouded by the sharply divergent political agendas of those involved. But
with the triumph of the mujaheddin rebels over Afghanistan’s leftist government in April and the demise of the Soviet Union, some intelligence officials involved have decided to reveal how the covert escalation was carried out.

This article from 1992 proves that the U.S. supported opposition in Afghanistan, which may have contributed to the rise of the Taliban, in an effort to defeat Russia’s influence and control of an increasingly radical country (Coll, 1992). Hence, this begs the question: After witnessing the damage that our political/military involvement – in part – has caused in the past, why support another potentially dangerous opposition?

The U.S. has increasingly shown support for the FSA – moving from non-lethal support to sending out weapons and guns for free use by them. According to E. Schmitt (2012, p. A1), “a small number of C.I.A. Officers are operating secretly in southern Turkey, helping allies decide which Syrian opposition fighters across the border will receive arms to fight the Syrian government”. Despite the Obama administration claiming no involvement in sending weapons across borders (Schmitt, 2012), there is no doubt that the U.S. has increased its support of the FSA from basic non-lethal support to full-on support of weapons and the like. In fact, “as of September 2014, the U.S. had allocated more than $287 million in support of the non-armed opposition (including the SOC and local activists), more than half of which had been delivered as of late March” (Blanchard et al., 2014, p. 24). This was just for non-lethal support alone.

C.M. Blanchard et al. (2014) seem to believe that, by supporting the FSA, the U.S. has a strategy in mind. This strategy may have to do with covertly opposing Russia and the Syrian government, but the support has become more open. As C.M. Blanchard et al. (2014, p. 24) state,

The implementation of U.S. strategy in Syria to date has included the provision of both nonlethal and lethal assistance to select Syrian opposition groups, a sustained international diplomatic effort to establish a negotiated transition, and the provision of humanitarian assistance in Syria and neighboring countries.

This type of support is hard to miss and is shown to be accommodating. The support shown, then, further solidifies the U.S. stake in Syria.

In October 2015, the U.S. officially proclaimed to stop the Pentagon’s $500 million pledge to train and arm Syrian rebels in an admission that the program had not met its ostensible goals (Barnard, Shoumali, 2015). However, other undercover but significantly larger programs to equip rebel fighters in Syria are still run by the CIA (Black, 2015; Miller, DeYoung, 2015).

9. Compliance-Gaining Theory Applied to the U.S. Support of the Free Syrian Army

Compliance-gaining theory describes how one party is able to get another party to comply with demands (Marwell, Schmidt, 1967). With compliance-gaining theory come a number of different tactics that can be used to gain compliance in a situation. The specific tactics used in this analysis are those of ingratiation, debt, guilt, and compromise.

There are multiple strategies that fit into the current situation of the U.S. supporting the FSA. E.C. Onyekwere (1991, p. 77) claims that “communication of positive work attitude involves compliance gaining in non-interpersonal situation which may or may not be different from strategies used in gaining compliance in interpersonal situations such as the family”. The goal of analyzing the current U.S. support of the FSA is to identify the everyday compliance-gaining tactics used in a much larger scale for a variety of influential decisions. Thanks to those tactics, we can better understand how a rebel group like the FSA has convinced a giant power like the U.S. to support it, despite the historical implications of supporting rebel groups in the past.

The FSA is a decentralized, unorganized rebel group that has not gained support from large nations like the U.S. through status alone (O’Bagy, 2013). Rather, acts of compliance-gaining were used by the Syrian rebel leaders. For instance, one tactic of compliance-gaining is ingratiation.

10. Ingratiation

Ingratiation is a strategy in which a party tries to make itself more appealing to the other in order to set up the other for subsequent exploitation. The usefulness of ingratiation comes from the other’s very unawareness of the party’s ultimate intentions (Ralston, 1985). It is a process by which “the persuader offers goods, services, and sentiments before making a request for compliance” (Onyekwere, 1991, p. 78). The U.S. has a number of advantages to gain from Syria if the FSA becomes successful in overthrowing the current regime and if it remains loyal to the U.S. One of the most important resources for the U.S. is oil, which is often found all over the Middle East (Le Billon, El Khatib, 2004). By extension, if the current leadership is taken out, Russia may lose
its ties in the Middle East and weaken its influence, which is another goal of the U.S.

It is interesting to take into account the effects of having oil. In fact, the U.S. has often referenced oil as delivering “freedom” to local populations (Le Billon, Khatib, 2004). After 9/11, the U.S. went from wanting free access of oil for the world market to this overly patriotic reference (Le Billon, Khatib, 2004). Ingratiation is a political process whereby one party seeks one’s own self-interest (Ralston, 1985). To make itself more appealing to the U.S., the FSA has offered the U.S. access to oil with “no strings attached,” which has made the U.S. more likely to cooperate with them. As confirmed by T. Arango et al., (2012), Syrian rebels have captured oil fields so as to increase their leverage with the U.S. and, thereby, asking for more support from the superpower.

In line with these contentions, in May 2014, Ahmed Jarba, the leader of Syria’s main political opposition group, paid a visit to the Obama administration and asked the U.S. to arm the FSA with shoulder-fired antiaircraft weapons (called Manpads) (Entous, 2014). As Mr. Jarba explained, “our mission is to convince the U.S. to give us those weapons, or to convince them to allow our friends to provide us with those weapons.” The ingratiation element of Jarba’s request was obvious in his constant emphasis on the necessity to collaborate so as to build “trust.” Indeed, during his visit, he mentioned the word “trust” many times. For example, he alluded to a recent U.S.-Saudi program that sought to equip the FSA, which was an experiment “designed to build trust” (Entous, 2014, p. A1). In reality, Syrian rebel leaders have always described the U.S. government with words that are antithetical to “trust.” For instance, two years before Jarba’s visit to the U.S., Syrian rebel leaders were already saying that trusting the U.S. was impossible because they felt “abandoned” and “betrayed” by the U.S. (Sly, 2012, p. A1).

11. Debt and Guilt

Two other compliance-gaining tactics that seem to work in accordance with each other are debt and guilt. Debt occurs when “the persuader bases his message by recalling obligations owed him or her by the target and using this to induce the target to comply (Onyekwere, 1991, p. 78) and guilt is “a situation where the actor tells the target that failure to comply will lead to automatic cessation of self-worth. This may include professional incompetence to ethical transgressions” (Onyekwere, 1991, p. 78).

Using both tactics, the FSA has been the persuader trying to convince the U.S. to back them up. Recalling a past debt has been an effective method of shifting blame on the U.S. for causing many of the issues currently happening in the Middle East, thereby convincing the U.S. that they owe the Syrian rebels a favor for such distress. In this case, it was the U.S. obligation to support the FSA in an attempt to overthrow the current Syrian government. Guilt works in a similar way: the FSA has convinced the U.S. that if they do not get involved in the Syrian conflict, then everything they tell the world about valuing the lives of others and finishing what they started would be a lie. As explained by A. Newman (2013), immediately after the selection of Syrian rebel leaders, the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood requested that the U.S. “fulfill its obligations” and give additional weapons to the FSA.

The FSA has positioned itself as a victimized group entitled to U.S. aid and support, particularly in light of past U.S. actions in the Muslim world. Already before 9/11, the U.S. had been getting involved in Middle-Eastern affairs in an attempt to gain control over crucial territories (Le Billon, Khatib, 2004). In fact, this was the initial push that got the U.S. so strongly prominent throughout the Middle-Eastern world. According to T.G. Carpenter (2013, p. 10),

“The United States has implicitly embraced the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine. That doctrine asserts that when a regime brutalizes its population in a systematic way, the “international community” has not only a right but also an obligation to intervene to protect vulnerable civilians and, if necessary, to depose an offending regime.

Hence, the U.S. should feel “guilty” for getting involved in the Middle East and now has a moral obligation to support the FSA. In a similar vein, as Wittebols (1991, p. 13) contends,

“...The net effect of the media’s reliance on government sources for what constitutes terrorism is twofold: the government as the primary source means that media will give less attention to institutional terror which is in some way linked to U.S. government policies and practices. For Wittebols, the U.S. has strong ties to terrorist conflicts and, thus, has engendered terrorism on other parts of the world because of the need to become involved. This, too, adds fuel to the fire and justifies the compliance-gaining methods that the FSA has foisted upon the U.S.

12. Compromise

Compromise refers to an agreement between different parties whereby each side gives up parts of its demands so as to reach mutual goals. As E.C.
Onyekwere (1991, p. 78) explains, compromise “includes those situations where both actors and targets give and take in order to achieve success. Accordingly, gains and losses are perceived in relative terms”. In international politics, compromises most often discussed are usually regarded as nefarious deals with dictatorships or insurgent groups (Margalit, 2009). In the context of this analysis, critics of the Obama administration may have valid reasons to refuse any compromise with the FSA. A case in point is the report of FSA atrocities – such as arbitrary executions of Syrian civilians – that has reached global audiences (Leenders, 2013). Likewise, as of 2015, the FSA has collaborated with the al-Nusra Front. The al-Nusra Front is no other than Al Qaeda in Syria or Al Qaeda in the Levant (Cragin, 2015).

No matter what, both the U.S. and FSA have something to gain from their stake in Syria. For the U.S., there is ample opportunity for oil that is otherwise hard to come by (Le Billion, Le Khatib, 2004); a chance to decrease Russian influence in Syria thus releasing some control over the Middle East (Carpenter, 2013; Katz, 2006); and, as a result, extending further its own power and control over the world. In regards to the FSA, the group, too, may have plenty to gain. For instance, the FSA will have the ability to overthrow the current regime and government in Syria; take over the current state of affairs and people on Syrian land; and gain plenty of influence with a big nation like the U.S. backing them (among this influence includes guns and other aid) (Carpenter, 2013).

This all seems like a highly probable compliance-gaining method on account of how both sides most likely feel that the other’s benefits will not interfere with their own. The only problem, then, is not whether these two will support each other through the current war, but instead, whether or not betrayal is in the cards at the end. As history has shown, the U.S. has often thrown in itself with a rogue nation, only to be turned on after they get what they want. For now, only time will tell how Syrian rebels will treat the U.S. after they obtain what they want. Trust is not easy to earn, but compliance-gaining is the first step toward cooperation. Whether or not that cooperation turns into real trust remains to be seen.

13. Compromise to Fight a Proxy War against Russia

Currently, Russia is supporting Syria, considered a terrorist state by the U.S. Department of State. Russian support was initiated in 2005 when Russia agreed to cut 73% of Syria’s debt to Russia and sell Syria air defense missile systems (Katz, 2006). Despite Israel’s attempts at dissolving Russia-Syria relations, their relationship continues to grow. Due to Russian support in Syria, the U.S. has covertly supported the opposition to reduce Russian influence in Syria. In late 2015, Senator John McCain asked Congress to send the FSA surface-to-air missiles so as to knock down Russian planes (Buchanan, 2015).

As T.G. Carpenter (2013, p. 7) explains, “the Syrian civil war also has potential negative global implications. It already has had a corrosive effect on the West’s relations with both Russia and China”. This further contributes to the U.S. reasoning in supporting the FSA. T.G. Carpenter (2013) also goes into the major developments between the U.S. government and that of both Russia and China, describing the resulting interactions as bitter. It would seem that the events in Syria have wedged the already loosely associated countries further apart, resulting in growing problems such as wavering allied powers and lack of negotiation ability on either side. Instead, the countries have resorted to an indirect war with each other through Syria.

T.G. Carpenter (2013) contends that U.S. support of the FSA extends beyond simply wanting to help the Syrians. The U.S. is actually waging a proxy war against Russia. The main reason lies in the relationships that Russia has forged with the Syrian government. Now, instead of merely wanting to save a country, the U.S. is crossing farther into enemy lines for self-serving reasons. This gives the FSA room to negotiate its relationship with the U.S. while the U.S. remains focused on its own geopolitical agenda. Not only is the U.S. trying to promote its self-interests, but it may also be susceptible to manipulation from other sources in its proxy war against Russia.

14. Discussion

What this analysis has demonstrated is that compliance-gaining goes beyond that of close relationships and business transactions; it can also deal with the complexities of war, insurgency, and international relations. The FSA has successfully relayed messages that beget compliance from a giant power like the U.S. so as to gain support. Typically, support needed from the U.S. is not so easily earned. Yet, through the use of four compliance-gaining tactics, the Syrian opposition forces have managed to persuade the U.S. that they can be trusted in fighting the current Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad.

As we have seen, to make its compliance-gaining stronger, the FSA has exploited ideas or concepts like oil, trust, blame, obligation, and past U.S. military
interventions to collaborate with the U.S. so as to bring down the Syrian government and, by the same token, resist Russian influence in Syria. The fact that the U.S. has supported the FSA through both lethal and non-lethal means is of utmost importance when examining current world affairs and matters related to terrorism. Nevertheless, although the FSA has become the largest opposition to the Syrian government, it still leaves a lot of room to be distrustful. If history is a strong indicator to predict the future, supporting rebel groups can do more harm than good – as was the case with support of Osama bin Laden during the Soviet-Afghan War and Saddam Hussein during the Iraq-Iran War. Not only does this put the U.S. in the crosshairs of the enemy; it may also provide an even fiercer or more radical foe in the near future if things do not pan out the way they were meant to be.

This is what makes understanding compliance-gaining theory so important. Compliance-gaining is a method of convincing a second party of agreeing to a specific demand. If compliance-gaining tactics can be identified when negotiating with another group, then one can be more prepared in how effective the argument is, whether or not the group can be trusted, and identify key moves that were made similarly across other situations. In the case of the U.S., understanding compliance-gaining theory will lead to more informed decisions and fewer problems with supposed allies and/or rebels. This would also help increase the effectiveness of the U.S. government and military, allowing resources to be used effectively and when absolutely needed (rather than going off of a group or person’s word alone).

Compliance-gaining theory has a few shortcomings. To begin, the theory can be difficult to identify, as the main goal of the theory is to apply tactics to unknowing targets. In order for compliance to be gained, the target must be unaware of the messages and tactics being communicated. These ideas not only make it difficult to identify when the theory is being used; they also make it difficult to use compliance-gaining tactics, because the instant the target is aware of what is happening, the progress made is lost. When examining U.S. support of the FSA, this theory could be considered somewhat weak because the U.S. government rarely reveals how communication between the FSA and the U.S. takes place, which can lead to holes in analysis without actual perception and first-hand experience in the communication.

Second, vis-à-vis ingratiation itself, there are weaknesses that need to be discussed as well. For instance, the use of ingratiation would make the FSA appear weak or exploitable to the U.S. Though this is a weakness for a more business-like setting, it may be exactly what the FSA wants to appear to be: weak. If history were to be re-examined, one could see that, in the past, the U.S. has supported a number of rebel groups that initially appeared to be under our control until they came to power. By appearing weak or exploitable, the FSA can easily get the U.S. to be caught off-guard in a moment of victory (even though each side appears to be allied with each other).

As the U.S. makes more allies with unknown parties, compliance-gaining will always be present. It is important to be able to identify the tactics of compliance-gaining to help the U.S. make better decisions when aligning itself with other groups or nations. This will also help uncover the motives and underlying reasons for terrorist attacks. Terrorism is about changing the world by sending a message; in this way, it becomes clear that terrorists are trying to get the world to comply. By understanding this theory, one may more easily identify the motives of a terrorist organization.

It is the authors’ hope that this analysis has enlightened readers on a theory often used in situations outside the geopolitical realm. The idea of the U.S. supporting the FSA was an important topic to be discussed because of how that relationship has developed in just a few years.

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