SocialFilter: Collaborative Spam Mitigation Using Social Networks

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Abstract—Spam mitigation can be broadly classified into two main approaches: a) centralized security infrastructures that rely on a limited number of trusted monitors to detect and report malicious traffic; and b) highly distributed systems that leverage the experiences of multiple nodes within distinct trust domains. The first approach offers limited threat coverage and slow response times, and it is often proprietary. The second approach is not widely adopted, partly due to the lack of guarantees regarding the trustworthiness of nodes that comprise the system.

Our proposal, SocialFilter, aims to achieve the trustworthiness of centralized security services and the wide coverage, responsiveness and inexpensiveness of large-scale collaborative spam mitigation. We propose a large-scale distributed system that enables clients with no email classification functionality to query the network on the behavior of a host. A SocialFilter node builds trust for its peers by auditing their behavioral reports and by leveraging the social network of SocialFilter administrators. The node combines the confidence its peers have in their own reports and the trust it places on its peers to derive the likelihood that a host is spamming.

The simulation-based evaluation of our approach indicates its potential under a real-world deployment: during a simulated spam campaign, SocialFilter nodes characterized 92% of spam bot connections with confidence greater than 50%, while yielding no false positives.

I. INTRODUCTION

The majority of the currently deployed spam email mitigation techniques rely on centralized infrastructures and place trust on a small number of security authorities. For instance, email systems and browsers rely heavily on a few centralized IP reputation services (e.g., [5], [6], [30]).

Unfortunately, centralized services often maintain out-dated blacklists [28], offering a rather large window of opportunity to spammers. Moreover, the vantage points of centralized services are limited in numbers, but attacks launched using large botnets are becoming increasingly surreptitious. In those attacks, one malicious host may attack multiple domains, each for a short period of time [20], [27], reducing the effectiveness of spam traffic detection with a small number of vantage points. Finally, the use of such email blacklisting services requires subscribing for a nominal fee when the service is proprietary (e.g., Cloudmark [1] or TrustedSource [5]).

Motivated by this problem, researchers have proposed collaborative peer-to-peer spam filtering platforms [37], [38] to achieve rapid and reliable detection and suppression of unwanted traffic. These early systems assumed compliant behavior from all participating reporters of spam, which is hardly true given the heterogeneity of the Internet and the fact that reporters may belong to distinct trust domains. Compromised hosts controlled by attackers may join the system, polluting the detection mechanisms. In addition, honest reporters may become compromised after they join the system.

To this end, we propose a collaborative spam filtering system (SocialFilter) that uses social trust embedded in Online Social Networks (OSN) to evaluate the trustworthiness of spam reporters. It relies upon the observation that adjacent users in a social network tend to trust each other more than random pairs of users in the network. SocialFilter aims at aggregating the experiences of multiple security authorities, democratizing spam mitigation. It is a trust layer that exports spam reporter assessments, and then employs a lightweight reputation system to warrant action by their receivers. Each node associates a trust score to its peers and uses this score to assess the trustworthiness of the reports originated by them.

SocialFilter uses social trust to bootstrap direct trust assessments, and then employs a lightweight reputation system [16], [22] to evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes and their spammer reports (Section III-B). Our insight is that each node will be administered by human administrators (admins), and nodes maintained by trusted admins are likely to disseminate trustworthy reports. Therefore, a SocialFilter node may obtain a direct trust assessment with a number of nodes with whom its admin has social relationships. Social relationships between admins can be obtained from massive OSN providers, such as Facebook and LinkedIn.

However, reputation systems are known to be vulnerable to the Sybil attack [10]. Sybil attacks subvert distributed systems by introducing numerous malicious identities under the control of an adversary. By using these identities the adversary acquires disproportional influence over the system. To mitigate this attack, SocialFilter again uses the social network to assess the probability that a node is a Sybil attacker, i.e. its identity uniqueness (Section III-A). Each node’s identity is associated
with its admin’s identity. The latter is verified through the social network using a SybilLimit-like technique [34], which can effectively identify Sybils among social network users.

SocialFilter nodes use both the identity uniqueness and the reputation of another node to assess the overall trustworthiness of that node’s report. The originator of a spammer report itself also assigns a confidence level to the report, as traffic classification has a level of uncertainty. The trustworthiness of a node and its confidence level in a report determines whether a node should trust a report or ignore it. Trusted reports can be used for diverse purposes, depending on the node’s function. For example, email servers can use them to automatically filter out email messages that originate from IPs that have been designated as spammers with high confidence. IDS systems can use them to block SMTP packets that originate from suspicious IPs.

A recent unwanted traffic mitigation system, Ostra [23], combat unwanted traffic by forcing it to traverse social links the capacity of which imposes a rate-limit over the communication. Unlike Ostra, SocialFilter does not use social links to rate-limit unwanted traffic. Instead it utilizes social links to bootstrap trust between nodes and to suppress Sybil attacks. However, Ostra can result in legitimate email being blocked (false positives), which is highly undesirable.

We evaluate our design (Section IV) using a 50K-node sample of the Facebook social network. We demonstrate through simulation that collaborating SocialFilter nodes are able to suppress common types of unwanted traffic in a reliable and responsive manner. Our simulations show that in a 50K-node SocialFilter network with only 10% of nodes having spam classification capability, nodes with no local spam detection capability are able to identify 92% of connections from spammers with greater than 50% confidence. Our experimental comparison with Ostra shows that our approach is slightly less effective in suppressing spam, while in contrast to Ostra, it yields no false positives. Given the severity of the problem of false spam positives, we believe that SocialFilter can be a better alternative under many scenarios.

II. System Overview

In this section, we provide a high-level description of our system and the security challenges it addresses.

A. SocialFilter Components

Figure 1 depicts SocialFilter’s architecture. At a high-level, the SocialFilter system comprises the following components: 1) human users that administer networked devices/networks (admins) and join a social network; 2) end systems (SocialFilter nodes) that are administered by specific admins and participate in monitoring and reporting the behavior of email senders; 3) spammer reports submitted by SocialFilter nodes concerning email senders they observe; 4) direct trust updates made available by SocialFilter nodes reporting their perceived trustworthiness of their peers; and 5) a centralized repository that receives and stores spammer reports and trust updates.

The same admin that administers a SocialFilter node also administers a group of applications that interface with the node to report spamming behavior. Interfacing applications can either be SMTP servers or IDS systems [25] that register with the SocialFilter repository or users of a webmail service. In the first case SMTP servers can classify spam by using their email characterization functionality (host reputation services such as TrustedSource [5], CloudMark [1] and DShield [36], or content-based filters). In the second case, the interfacing application is essentially a human user who reports an email (and consequently its originating email server) as spam.

B. Spammer Reports

An email characterization application uses the ReportSpammer(hostIP, confidence) call of the SocialFilter node RPC API to feedback its observed behavior for an email sender. The first argument identifies the source, i.e., an IP address. The second argument is the confidence with which the application is reporting that the specified entity is a spammer. The latter takes values in 0% to 100% and reflects the fact that in many occasions traffic classification has a level of uncertainty. For example, a mail server that sends both spam and legitimate email may or may not be a spamming host.

In turn, the SocialFilter node submits a corresponding spammer report to the repository to share its experience with its peers. For example, if a node i’s spam analysis indicates that half of the emails received from host with IP I are spam, i reports:

\[
\text{[spammer report]} I, 50\%
\]

In addition, SocialFilter nodes are able to revoke spammer reports by updating them. If for example at a latter time, i determines that no spam originates from I, it sends a new report in which it updates the confidence value from 50% to 0%. Nodes can authenticate with both the repository and the OSN provider using standard single-sign-on authentication techniques, e.g., [11], [31] or Facebook Connect [4].
C. Determining whether a Host is Spamming

Each node assigns a peer trust value to each of its peers in the network. This trust value determines the trustworthiness of the peer’s spammer reports. The peer trust is determined using two dimensions of trust: a) reporter trust; and b) identity uniqueness. We describe these two dimensions below. The receiver of a spammer report derives its confidence in the correctness of the received report from the report’s confidence and the peer trust.

Nodes collectively compute reporter trust values by employing a reputation management mechanism. This mechanism relies on SocialFilter nodes verifying each other’s spammer reports to derive individual direct trust values (Section III-B). If a node i is able to verify the spammer reports of node j it can determine a direct trust value $d_{ij}$. The SocialFilter nodes share these values with other nodes by exchanging direct trust updates. For reasons of scalability and efficiency, a node i considers the spammer reports of only a (possibly random) subset $V_i$ (including itself) of all the nodes in the SocialFilter network. Consequently, nodes submit and retrieve direct trust updates only for nodes in $V_i$. We refer to $V_i$ as node’s i view.

Our system also relies on the fact that nodes comprising Internet systems such as email servers, honeypots, IDS etc are administered by human admins. These human users maintain accounts in online social networks (OSN). SocialFilter leverages OSNs in the following two ways: a) it defends against Sybil attacks [10] by exploiting the fact that OSNs can be used for resource testing, where the test in question is a Sybil attacker’s ability to create and sustain acquaintances. Depending on the result of the test, the OSN provider assigns an identity uniqueness value to the admin; and b) It initializes the direct trust values in the absence of prior interactions between SocialFilter nodes, by considering the trust that is inferred by associations in the social network of administrators.

Finally, an application can use the IsSpammer(hostIP) call of the SocialFilter node RPC API to obtain a value that corresponds to the likelihood of the hostIP being spamming. The node derives this value by aggregating spammings reports regarding hostIP. These reports are weighted by the reporting node’s peer trust.

D. Security Challenges

SocialFilter is a collaborative platform aiming at suppressing malicious traffic. In addition, it is an open system, meaning that any admin with a social network account and a device can join. As such, it is reasonable to assume that SocialFilter itself will be targeted to disrupt its operation. Our system faces the following security challenges:

**False Spammer Reports.** Malicious SocialFilter nodes may issue false or forged reports aiming at reducing the system’s ability to detect spam or disrupting legitimate email traffic.

**False Direct Trust Updates.** To address false spammer reports, SocialFilter employs a reporter reputation system to determine the amount of trust that should be placed on each user’s reports. However, the reputation system itself is vulnerable to false reporting as malicious nodes may send false or forged direct trust updates.

**Sybil Attack.** An adversary may attempt to create multiple SocialFilter identities aiming at increasing its ability to subvert the system using false spammer reports and direct trust updates. Defending against Sybil attacks without a trusted central authority is hard. Many decentralized systems try to cope with Sybil attacks by binding an identity to an IP address. However, malicious users can readily harvest IP addresses through BGP hijacking [27] or by commanding a large botnet.

III. SOCIALFILTER DESIGN

We now present in more detail the design of our system.

A. OSN Providers as Sybil Mitigating Authorities

For an open system such as SocialFilter to operate reliably, node accountability in the form of node authentication and prevention of Sybil attacks is of the utmost importance. We propose to leverage existing OSN repositories as inexpensive, Sybil-mitigating authorities. OSNs are ideally positioned to perform such function: Using SybilLimit-like [34] techniques (see Section III-A1) to perform inexpensive resource tests on the social graph, OSNs can determine the amount of confidence one can place on a node’s identity. We refer to this confidence as identity uniqueness.

Each node that participates in SocialFilter is administered by human users that have accounts with OSN providers. The system needs to ensure that each user’s social network identity is closely coupled with its SocialFilter node. To this end, SocialFilter single sign-on authentication mechanisms, such as Facebook Connect, to associate the OSN account with the spammer report and direct trust update repository account.

1) Determining the Identity Uniqueness: When malicious users create numerous fake online personas, SocialFilter’s host trust metric can be subverted. Specifically, a malicious user $a$ with high reporter trust with another user $u$ may create Sybils and assign high direct trust to them. As a result, all the Sybils of the attacker would gain high reporter trust with user $u$.

There is typically one-to-one correspondence between a real user’s social network identity and its real identity. Although, malicious users can create many identities, they can establish only a limited number of trust relationships with real humans. Thus, groups of Sybil attackers are connected to the rest of the social graph with a disproportionally small number of edges. The first works to exploit this property was SybilGuard and SybilLimit [34], [35], which bound the number of Sybil identities using a fully distributed protocol.

Based on a similar concept, SocialFilter’s Sybil detection algorithm determines the uniqueness of a SocialFilter user’s identity. This algorithm is executed solely by the OSN provider over its centrally maintained social graph. An admin’s $i$ identity is considered weak if it has not established a sufficient number of real relationship’s over the social network. Upon being queried by an admin $v$, the OSN provider returns a value in $[0.0, 1.0]$, which specifies the confidence of the provider that
a specific node \( s \) is not participating in a Sybil attack, i.e. the probability that \( s \) is not part of a network of Sybils.

First, we provide some informal background on the theoretical justification of SybilGuard and SybilLimit. It is known that randomly-grown topologies such as social networks and the web are fast mixing small-world topologies \([7], [18], [33]\). Thus in the social graph \( \mathcal{I} \) with \( n \) nodes, a walk of \( \Theta(\sqrt{n \log n}) \) steps contains \( \Theta(\sqrt{n}) \) independent samples approximately drawn from the stationary distribution. When we draw random walks from a verifier node \( v \) and the suspect \( s \), if these walks remain in a region of the network that honest nodes reside, both walks draw \( \Theta(\sqrt{n}) \) independent samples from roughly the same distribution. It follows from the generalized Birthday Paradox \([35]\) that they intersect with high probability. The opposite holds if the suspect resides in a region of Sybil attackers that is not well-connected to the region of honest nodes.

SybilGuard replaces random walks with “random routing” and a verifier node accepts the suspect if random routes originating from both nodes intersect. In random routes, each node uses a pre-computed random permutation as a one-to-one mapping from incoming edges to outgoing edges. Each random permutation generates a unique routing table at each node. As a result, two random routes entering an honest node along the same edge will always exit along the same edge (“convergence property”). This property guarantees that random routes from a Sybil region that is connected to the honest region through a single edge will traverse only one distinct path, further reducing the probability that a Sybil’s random routes will intersect with a verifier’s random routes. SybilLimit \([34]\) is a near-optimal improvement over the Sybil-Guard algorithm. In SybilLimit, a node accepts another node only if random routes originating from both nodes intersect at their last edge. For two honest nodes to have at least one intersected last edge with high probability, the required number of the random routes from each node should be approximately \( r = \Theta(\sqrt{m}) \), where \( m \) is the number of edges in \( \mathcal{I} \). The length of the random routes should be \( w = O(\log n) \).

With SocialFilter’s SybilLimit-like technique the OSN provider computes an identity uniqueness score for each node \( s \) in the social graph \( \mathcal{I} \). At initialization time, the OSN provider selects \( l \) random verifier nodes. It also creates \( 2r \) independent instances of pre-computed random permutation as a one-to-one mapping from incoming edges to outgoing edges (routing table). The first \( r \) routing tables are used to draw random routes from suspect nodes \( s \) and the rest \( r \) routing tables are used to draw random routes from the verifier nodes \( v \). SybilLimit uses distinct routing tables for verifiers and suspects in order to avoid undesirable correlation between the verifiers’ random routes and the suspects’ random routes. For each \( s \), the OSN provider runs the SybilLimit-like algorithm is as follows:

1) For each of the \( l \) verifiers \( v \), it picks a random neighbor of \( v \). It draws along the random neighbors \( r \) random routes of length \( w = O(\log n) \), for each instance of the \( r \) routing tables, where \( n \) is the number of nodes in \( \mathcal{I} \). It stores the last edge (tail) of each verifier random route.

2) It picks a random neighbor of \( s \) and draws along it \( r \) random routes of length \( w = O(\log n) \), for each instance of the nodes’ routing tables. It stores the last edge (tail) of each suspect random route. We refer to steps (1) and (2) of the algorithm as random routing.

3) For each verifier \( v \), if one tail from \( s \) intersects one tail from \( v \), that verifier \( v \) is considered to “accept” \( s \). We refer to this step as verification.

4) It computes the ratio of the number of verifiers that accept \( s \) over the total number of verifiers \( l \). That ratio is the computed identity uniqueness score \( id_s \).

Nodes query the OSN provider for the identity uniqueness of their peers. The OSN provider performs the above computations periodically and off-line to accommodate for topology changes. The OSN provider stores the result of this computation for each node as a separate attribute.

B. Determining the Reporter Trust

Malicious nodes may issue false spammer reports to manipulate the trust towards entities. In addition, misconfigured nodes may also issue erroneous reports. SocialFilter can mitigate the negative impact of incorrect reports by assigning higher weights to reports obtained from more trustworthy SocialFilter nodes.

Conceptually, each SocialFilter node \( i \) maintains a reporter trust value \( rt_{ij} \) to every other node \( j \) in its view, \( j \in \mathcal{V}_i \setminus i \). This trust score corresponds to node \( i \)’s estimation of the probability that node \( j \)’s reports are accurate. It is obtained from three sources: trust attainable from online social networks, direct spammer report verification, and transitive trust.

First, SocialFilter relies on the fact that SocialFilter nodes are administered by human users. Competent and benign users are likely to maintain their nodes secure, and provide honest and truthful reports. The trust on the competency and honesty of human users could be obtained via social networks. SocialFilter admins maintain accounts in online social networks. An admin \( i \) tags her acquaintance admin \( j \) with a social trust score \( st_{ij} \) in \([0, 1]\) based on her belief on \( j \)’s ability to manage her node(s). This value is used to initialize a direct trust score between two nodes \( i \) and \( j \): \( d_{ij} = st_{ij} \).

Second, a SocialFilter node \( i \) dynamically updates the direct trust \( d_{ij} \) by comparing spammer reports submitted by the node \( j \) with its own submitted reports. A node \( i \) may verify a report from a node \( j \) for an entity \( e \), if \( i \) has also recently interacted with the same entity. \( i \) may also probabilistically choose to observe \( e \) solely for the purpose of verifying reports of another node \( j \). The portion of the received spammer reports that the SocialFilter nodes verify is a tunable parameter. Intuitively, if \( i \) and \( j \) share similar opinions on \( e \), \( i \) should have a high trust in \( j \)’s reports. Let \( v_{ij}^{k} \) be a measure of similarity in \([0, 1]\) between \( i \) and \( j \)’s \( k_{th} \) report. A node \( i \) updates its direct trust to \( j \) using an exponential moving average:

\[
d_{ij}^{k+1} = \alpha * d_{ij}^{k} + (1 - \alpha) * v_{ij}^{k+1}
\] (1)

As \( i \) verifies a large number of reports from \( j \), the direct trust metric \( d_{ij}^{k} \) gradually converges to the similarity of reports.
from \(i\) and \(j\).

By updating \(d_{ij}\) and making it available for retrieval to other nodes, \(i\) enables its peers \(j \in V_i\) to build their reporter trust graph \(T_j(V_j, E_j)\). The reporter trust graph of a node \(i\) consists of only the nodes in its view \(V_i\), and its directed edge set \(E_i\) consists of the direct trust \(d_{uv}\) for each \(u, v \in V_i\). If a node \(u\) has not released a direct trust update for a node \(v\), \(d_{uv}\) is treated as being equal to 0.0.

Third, a node \(i\) incorporates direct trust and transitive trust [13], [14] to obtain \(i\)'s overall trust to \(j\): \(rt_{ij}\). We use transitive trust for the following main reasons: a) due to the large number of nodes, the admin of a node \(i\) may not assign a social trust \(s_{ij}\) to the admin of a node \(j\), as they may not be acquainted; b) due to the large number of email-sending hosts, nodes \(i\) and \(j\) may not have encountered the same hosts and are therefore unable to directly verify each other’s reports; and c) \(i\) can further improve the accuracy of its trust metric for \(j\) by learning the opinions of other SocialFilter nodes about \(j\).

The overall reporter trust \(rt_{ij}\) can be obtained as the maximum trust path in node \(i\)'s reporter trust graph \(T_i(V_i, E_i)\), in which each edge \(u \rightarrow v\) is annotated by the direct trust \(d_{uv}\). That is, for each path \(p \in P\), where \(P\) is the set of all paths between nodes \(i\) and \(j\):

\[
rt_{ij} = \max_{p \in P} (\Pi_{u \rightarrow v \in p} d_{uv}) \tag{2}
\]

We use the maximum trust path because it can be efficiently computed with Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm in \(O(|E| \log |V|)\) time for a sparse \(T\). In addition, it yields larger trust values than the minimum or average trust path, resulting in faster convergence to high confidence regarding the actions entities perform. Finally, it mitigates the effect of misbehaving nodes under-reporting their trust towards honest nodes. Messages that appear spamming to a node may not appear so to all other nodes in the system. For example a compromised host may send spam to certain hosts, but at the same time may send legitimate emails to others. Therefore the subjective local trust metric we use is more appropriate than a global trust metric, such as Eigentrust’s [19].

The false direct trust update attack mentioned in Section II.D may manifest in two ways. First, a misbehaving reporter \(x\) in a node’s \(w\) view sends false direct trust updates regarding another node \(y\) in \(w\)'s view. Second, a source of spam \(s\) sends good traffic to node \(x\) and spam traffic to node \(y\), while node \(x\) verifies \(y\)'s reports. As a result \(x\) will perceive \(y\) as not being trustworthy. Thus, a node \(w\) that has both \(x\) and \(y\) in its view would incur the false direct trust update attack. If for example node \(w\) trusts \(x\) by \(1.0\) and node \(x\) trusts \(y\) by \(0.0\), \(w\) would trust \(y\) by \(0.0\) and would no longer consider its reports valid, although \(y\)'s reports are correct. However, our design is inherently resilient to this attack as we demonstrate in Section IV.D (Figure 5(a)): if the node \(w\) has many neighbors and possibly alternative trust paths to \(y\) or receives spammer reports from a large number of nodes in its view, this attack is mitigated. Also this attack would have an effect only against nodes that have both \(x\) and \(y\) in their view. In addition, the attacker should have a legitimate reason to send traffic to \(x\).

### C. Determining the Likelihood of a Host being Spammer

As mentioned above, a SocialFilter node \(i\) may receive multiple spammer reports originating from multiple nodes \(j \in V_i\) and concerning the same host \(h\) for the same action \(a\). Each report concerning \(h\) is marked with the level of confidence \(c_j(h)\) of the reporter \(j\). For example, this confidence may be equal to the portion of emails received by host \(h\) that are spam (\([30]\)). Subsequently, \(i\) needs to aggregate the spammer reports to determine an overall likelihood \(IsSpammer(h)\) that \(h\) is a spam bot.

When a node \(i\) that does not have entity classification functionality receives multiple reports concerning the same host \(h\), it derives the overall likelihood \(IsSpammer(h)\) weighing the spammer reports’ confidence by the peer trust of their reports:

\[
IsSpammer(h) = \frac{\sum_{j \in V \setminus i} rt_{ij} id_j c_j(h)}{\sum_{j \in V \setminus i} rt_{ij} id_j} \tag{3}
\]

If applications interfacing with node \(i\) have entity classification functionality, and sent to \(i\) spammer reports through the ReportSpammer() interface, \(i\) considers only these reports in calculating the trust for an entity. When \(i\) receives spammer reports by more than one applications for the same \(h\), the confidence that the node has in \(h\) is the average (possibly weighted) of these applications’ reports. Node \(i\) uses this average confidence to compute the similarity of its reports with the reports its peers. When a node \(i\) receives a new spammer report for \(h\), this new report preempts an older report, which is thereafter ignored.

Each spammer report carries a timestamp. The time interval \(T\) during which a spammer report is valid is a tunable system parameter. Reports for which \(current - time - timestamp > T\) are not considered in the calculation of the likelihood of a host being spamming. We assume lose synchronization between SocialFilter nodes.

### D. SocialFilter Repository

A node can exchange spammer reports and direct trust updates with any other node in the SocialFilter network regardless of whether the admins of the nodes are acquaintances in the social network. With this design choice, we ensure that spammer reports and direct trust updates reach the interested nodes on time, improving the threat coverage of our system. We also enable users that are not well-connected in the social network to peer with other trustworthy nodes.

Our centralized repository consists of two parts, one for spammer reports and one for direct trust updates. The portion of the repository tasked with maintaining spammer reports is implemented as a hash table. Nodes store and retrieve spammer reports concerning nodes in their view. When a node queries for spammer reports, it is interested on the reports for a single entity/action pair. These reports are sent by multiple nodes, thus for efficiency it is reasonable to index(key) them based on the hash of the concatenation of the entity’s ID (e.g., IP) and the action description.
When a node $i$ encounters a specific entity, it queries the repository for all the spammer reports that involve the entity and the action. Once it locates the node that stores those reports it asks the node for those reports that originate from nodes in $V_i \setminus i$.

On the other hand, a node needs to retrieve all the direct trust updates involving all the nodes in its view. Thus, it is reasonable to also implement the direct trust update repository as a hash table indexed by the ID of the node that issues the update. A node $i$ needs to explicitly query for the existence of an update involving all node pairs in its view. Thus every time interval $D$, a node $i$ requests from the repository for each node $j \in V_i \setminus i$ for the current non-zero direct trust values $d_{jv}$ for $v \in V_i$. Using these direct trust values $i$ can build the trust graph of its view $V_i$, $T_i(V_i, E_i)$. If the difference between the current direct trust metric $d_{jv}$ and the last $d_{jv}$ $i$ retrieved from repository is greater than $\epsilon$, the repository includes this update in his reply to $i$’s request for direct trust updates. The constant $\epsilon$ is used to ensure that the repository does not incur the overhead of communicating the update if it is not sufficiently large.

E. SocialFilter Operation Example

Figure 2 depicts an example of the operation of a small SocialFilter network. The network includes an IDS node tasked with checking incoming TCP connections for whether they originate from spamming hosts, SocialFilter node 3. That node has no inherent email classification functionality, thus it relies on the other two nodes, 1 and 2, for early warning about spam bots. Node 1 relies on human users to classify emails as spam. In this example, the human user has classified half of the emails originating from host with IP=128.195.169.1 as spamming, therefore it reports that this host is spamming with confidence $c_1(IP) = 50\%$. Node 2 is an email server that has subscription to a proprietary blacklisting service. In this example Node 2 received a connection request from the host with IP=128.195.169.1, it queried the reputation service and got a response that this host is spamming. Thereby, node 2 reports with confidence $c_2(IP) = 100\%$ confidence that the host is a spam bot.

Node 3 maintains the depicted reporter trust graph, derived from its 5-node view. This view includes nodes 1 and 2, which sent the depicted spammer reports. It also includes nodes 4 and 5, which did not sent any reports in this example. The weighted directed edges in the graph correspond to the direct trust between the peers in node 3’s view. From the reporter trust graph and Equation 2 the maximum trust path between nodes 3 and 1 traverses nodes 5, 4 and 2 yielding $rt_{31} = 0.4$. The maximum trust path between 3 and 2 traverses nodes 5, 4 and 2 and yields reporter trust $rt_{32} = 0.648$. The identity uniqueness of nodes 1 and 2 has been computed by the OSN provider to be $id_1 = 0.9$ and $id_2 = 0.8$, respectively. We can now use Equation 3 to compute the confidence $IsSpammer(IP)$ that the IDS interfacing with node 3 has that the host is spamming:

$$\frac{rt_{31}id_1c_1(IP) + rt_{32}id_2c_2(IP)}{rt_{31}id_1 + rt_{32}id_2} = 0.795$$

IV. Evaluation

We evaluate SocialFilter’s ability to block spam traffic and compare it to Ostra [23]. Ostra represents a different approach to spam mitigation using social links, and the main goal of this evaluation is to shed light on the benefits and drawbacks of the two approaches.
A. Ostra Primer

Before we proceed with the comparative evaluation, we first provide an overview of Ostra. Ostra bounds the total amount of unwanted communication a user can send based on the number of trust relationships the user has and the amount of communication that has been flagged as wanted by its receivers. Similar to SocialFilter in Ostra, an OSN repository maintains the social network. When a sender wishes to send email to a receiver, it first has to obtain a cryptographic token from the OSN repository. The OSN repository uses the credit balances along the social links connecting the sender and the receiver to determine whether a token can be issued. Each user adjacent to a social link is assigned a credit balance, $B$, which is unique for the link. $B$ has an initial value of 0. Ostra also maintains a per-link balance range $[L, U]$, with $L \leq 0 \leq U$, which limits the range of the user’s credit balance (i.e., always $L \leq B \leq U$). The balance and balance range for a user is denoted as $B^U_L$. For instance, the link’s adjacent user’s state $2{-4}$ denotes that the user’s current credit balance is 2, and it can range between $-4$ and 5.

When a communication token is issued, Ostra requires that there is a path between the sender and the receiver in the social network. It then requires that for each link along the social path the first adjacent nodes credit limit $L$ is increased by one, and the second adjacent nodes credit limit $U$ is decreased by one. This process propagates recursively from the sender to the receiver along the social links. If this process results in any of the links in the path to have adjacent nodes of which the credit balances exceed the balance range, Ostra refuses to issue the token. When the communication is classified by the receiver, the credit limits $L$ and $U$ are restored to their previous state. If the communication is marked as unwanted, one credit is transferred from the balance of the first node of the link to the balance of the second one. Eventually, the links that connect spammers to their receivers have balance beyond the allowed range and a spammer is prevented from sending email.

B. Evaluation Settings

For our evaluation, we use a large strongly connected component sampled from Facebook, consisting of 50,000 nodes and 442,772 symmetric links.

We use the SimPy 1.9.1 [24] simulation package to simulate SocialFilter and Ostra under a scenario where the social network is formed among the admins of email servers. We assume that legitimate users usually send 3 emails per day. 80% and 13% of the legitimate emails are sent to sender’s friends and sender’s friends’ friends of friends respectively, and the destination of the rest 7% emails are randomly chosen by the sender. There are some spammers, which also participate, in the Ostra and SocialFilter network, sending 500 spam emails per day each to random users in the network. In this evaluation we set Ostra’s credit bounds equal to 5 ($|L| = |U| = 5$). These settings are obtained from Ostra’s evaluation [23].

Several nodes can automatically classify spam emails. These instant classifiers correspond to systems that detect spam by subscribing to commercial blacklists, employ content-based filters etc. These nodes can block spam email instantly. On the other hand, normal users can classify an email only after receiving/reading it. That is, the normal classification can be delayed based on the behavior of the users (how frequently they check their email). In our evaluation, 10% of users have the ability of instant classification and the average delay of the normal classification is 2 hours [23].

In SocialFilter, when a receiver classifies the email from a sender as spam, it issues a behavioral report as

\[ [\text{spammer report}] \; I, \; X\% \]

where $I$ is the IP of the sender and $X$ is the confidence of this spammer report. The issued spammer reports are gathered in the repository, and they are used when normal users with no capability of instant classification receive connections from previously unencountered hosts. Each node has a view which is a subset of the SocialFilter network, and it only considers the spammer reports issued by nodes in its view. In addition, each view has pre-trusted users who have the capability of the instant classification, and the behavior reports issued by them are highly trustable. Therefore, classifier nodes share their experiences by issuing spammer reports, and normal nodes use the reports to block spam from senders which they have not encountered before. In this evaluation, the size of the view is 500 and the size of the pre-trusted set is 20.

The reporter trust that a SocialFilter node place on others is computed based on the direct trust value between each member of the view. This direct trust is in turn computed based on the similarity of the spammer reports by the two members of the view. Based on this direct trust value, each member of view gets the reporter trust value by using Dijkstra’s algorithm. Then, if the overall trust metric calculated by the equation is over 0.5, a user blocks the SMTP connection.

C. Spam Mitigation Effectiveness

Before comparing SocialFilter and Ostra, we investigate the effectiveness of SocialFilter according to the size of view. Figure 3(a) shows the spam mitigation capacity of SocialFilter as a function of view size. Figure 3(b) shows the computation time of reporter trust as a function of the size of view.
hours. When the size of view is 100, SocialFilter blocks only around 50% of spam email connections. On the other hand, when the size of view is 1000, SocialFilter blocks about 95% spam emails. Because spammers send spam emails to random targets, as the size of a node’s view increases, the probability that a member in the view encounters the spammer before the spammer contacts the node increases. Additionally, once a user can get the spammer report from members of its view, it can block all the further spam emails from the detected spammers. In order for a node to compute trustworthiness of email senders by using spammer reports, it requires the reporter trust for all the members in its view. The reporter trust is computed each time a node checks the likelihood of an email sender being spammer. The reporter trust is computed by using Dijkstra’s algorithm and the complexity of this computation on direct trust-annotated graph $T(V, E)$ is $O(|V|^2 log |V|)$. In Figure 3(b), we show the computation time of the reporter trust with varying view size. For the measurement, we use an Intel Core Duo P8600, 2.4GHz CPU, 3MB L2 cache, 4GB RAM machine, and use reporter trust computation code written in Python 2.5.2. As the size of view increases, the computation time increase significantly, even though the performance of spam mitigation has already saturated with small size of view. This result justifies our design choice to perform the reporter trust computation at the nodes and not the centralized repository. Because the reporter trust is computed each time a node checks the trustworthiness of an email sender, a too large view size may becomes a performance bottleneck for nodes. Based on this results, we use 500 as the size of view hereafter.

Figure 4(a) presents the spam mitigation effectiveness comparison between SocialFilter and Ostra under a varying number of spammers. We make two notes. The first one is that Ostra suffers from a non-negligible false positive rate, and the second one is that SocialFilter allows more spam emails when there are small number of spammers.

In SocialFilter, a node only blocks an email sender only if it has been explicitly reported as spammer by a member of its view. In these results, we assume that there is no false reporter, and there is no fake spammer report incriminating legitimate users. This is the reason why SocialFilter does not suffer from false positive. On the other hand, Ostra blocks all the links on the path used by a spammer, and some legitimate users can not send email because there is no available path in the social network. When the number of spammers are 1% of nodes, which is 500 spammers, around 0.6% of total normal emails, which are about 6000 legitimate emails, can not be sent.

Ostra blocks about 94% of spam connections regardless of the number of spammers. Even though SocialFilter performs well for large number of spammers, it only blocks about 80% of spam when the number of spammers is small, e.g., 0.1% or 0.01%. The main reason is the pre-trusted users which are included in every view. Once, a pre-trusted node detects a spammer, every user can share the spammer report generated by it. As the number of spammers increases, the probability that pre-trusted users early detect some of them increases. Because of this early detection, SocialFilter can block more spam emails when the number of spammers are bigger. Conversely, when the number of spammers is smaller, it is hard to detect them early, and SocialFilter allows proportionally more spam emails.

SocialFilter requires some time for a node to detect spammers and during that time it allows some spam connections to go through. But, once a user detects spammers via either referring to its view or classifying email senders itself, it will not allow any further spam emails. To illustrate this characteristic, we show the performance with varying lengths of simulated time in Figure 4(b). In Ostra, after the spam blocking ratio becomes around 94%, it will not change any more. On the other hand, in SocialFilter, despite the spam blocking ratio being only 85% at 85 hours, it increases along with the simulated time and finally it blocks around 96% spam email on 680 hours. Eventually, unlike Ostra which suffers from the false positive as well as allows a portion of spam, almost all nodes in SocialFilter can block all the spam emails without any false positives.
D. SocialFilter’s Resilience to Attacks

Spammers can collude for their spam emails to evade SocialFilter. First each spammer may not issue reports about colluding spammers. Also each spammer falsely generates behavior reports about legitimate users to induce SocialFilter to block their emails. To cheat Ostra, each spammer classifies a legitimate email and a spam email as unwanted email and legitimate, respectively. Figure S(a) shows the effectiveness of SocialFilter and Ostra as a function of the number of colluding spammers that reports falsely.

Although Ostra achieves the same effectiveness in blocking spam connections as in the absence of false reporters, the ratio of the false positives increases. Since Ostra does not have any method to recognize false classifications, Ostra is more adversely affected by the false reports. On the other hand, SocialFilter achieves similar performance of blocking spam emails, and the false positive rate due to false reports is very limited. This is because false reporters obtain very low direct trust to other legitimate users as their spammer reports are different to reports of other legitimate users. Eventually, the spammer reports issued by the false reporters are mostly ignored by legitimate users.

Spammers may also create Sybil nodes to attack SocialFilter. However, in SocialFilter, Sybil users gets very low identity uniqueness, which becomes even lower as the number of Sybil users increases. Thus, despite spammers using Sybils that report falsely as well as send spam emails, SocialFilter is resilient to this attack. We performed simulation with various number of Sybil users and derived that the performance of the system is not substantially affected negatively (Figure S(b)). In Ostra, Sybil spammers are blocked easily because the social links from the Sybils’ creators have already been blocked. Although Ostra can block more spam emails, Ostra still suffers from false positives.

V. RELATED WORK

We now discuss prior work that is pertinent to SocialFilter’s design and is not discussed in the main body of the paper.

SocialFilter is inspired by prior work on reputation and trust management systems [8], [16], [22]. Well-known trust and reputation management systems include the rating scheme used by the eBay on-line auction site, object reputation systems for P2P file sharing networks [19], [32] and PageRank [9]. In contrary to the above systems, our system incorporates social trust to mitigate false reporting and Sybil attacks. In addition, SocialFilter’s view-based reporter trust scales better than eigenvector-based trust metrics such as EigenTrust [19], PageRank [9] and TrustRank [15] because direct trust values between nodes change frequently and it would be expensive to consider the complete trust graph. In addition, eigenvector-based trust metrics do not provide an explicit confidence metric for a node, but they only allow ranking the nodes instead.

SocialFilter is similar to SpamHaus [6], DShield [2] and TrustedSource [5] in that it has a centralized repository. It differs in that it automates the process of evaluating reports and assigning reputations to reporters. Thus it does not incur the management overhead of traditional services, and can therefore scale to millions of reporters.

Prior work also includes proposals for collaborative spam filtering [3], [37], [38]. CloudMark [1], as does SocialFilter, explicitly addresses the issue of trustworthiness of the collaborating spam reporters through a distributed reporter reputation management system based on history of past interactions. However, they do not leverage the social network to derive trust information. Kong et al. [21] also consider untrustworthy reporters, using Eigentrust for deriving their reputation. The aforementioned solutions only enable classifying the contents of emails and not the source of spam. This requires email servers to waste resources on email reception and filtering. SocialFilter can assign trust metrics to sources, thereby rejecting unwanted email traffic on the outset.

Similar to SocialFilter, RepuScore [30] is also a collaborative reputation management framework, which allows participating organizations to establish sender accountability on the basis of senders past actions. However, it does not exploit the social network of RepuScore server admins.

SocialFilter’s identity uniqueness is based on SybilGuard and SybilLimit [34], [35], where the resource test in question is a Sybil attacker’s ability to create and sustain social acquaintances. SybilGuard/Limit were designed to operate in a decentralized setting in which nodes are not aware of the complete social graph. We use a stripped-down centralized version of SybilLimit, because in our setting the OSN provider has complete knowledge of the social graph’s topology.

Prior work has also exploited trust in social networks to reliably assess the trustworthiness of entities [12], [17], [26], [29], [39]. Unlike SocialFilter, they do not use social links to both bootstrap trust values between socially acquainted nodes and defend against Sybil attacks.

VI. CONCLUSION

We have presented SocialFilter, a large scale distributed system for the rapid propagation of reports concerning the behavior of email senders. SocialFilter nodes use each other’s reports and the social network of their human users to provide applications a quantitative measure of an email sender’s trustworthiness: the likelihood that the sender is spamming. Applications can in turn use this measure to make informed decisions on how to handle traffic associated with the host in question.

Our simulation-based comparative evaluation demonstrated our design’s potential for the suppression of spam email. SocialFilter was able to identify 92% of spam connections with greater than 50% confidence. Furthermore, in contrast to a competing social-network-based spam mitigation technique, Ostra [23], SocialFilter exhibited no false positives.

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