Finding Model-Checkable Needles in Large Source Code Haystacks: Modular Bug-Finding via Static Analysis and Dynamic Invariant Discovery

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Abstract—In this paper, we present a novel marriage of static and dynamic analysis. Given a large code base with many functions and a mature test suite, we propose using static analysis to find functions 1) with assertions or other evident correctness properties (e.g., array bounds requirements or pointer access) and 2) with simple enough control flow and data use to be amenable to predicate-abstraction based or bounded model checking without human intervention. Because most such functions in realistic software systems in fact rely on many input preconditions not specified by the language’s type system (or annotated in any way), we propose using dynamically discovered invariants based on a program’s test suite to characterize likely preconditions, in order to reduce the problem of false positives. While providing little in the way of verification, this approach may provide an additional quick and highly scalable bug-finding method for programs that are usually considered “too large to model check.” We present a simple example showing that the technique can be useful for a more typically “model-checkable” code base, even in the presence of a poorly designed test suite and bad invariants.

While new tools and techniques are being devised to conquer software verification problems, software systems themselves are becoming more complicated, with multiple layers of software/hardware interactions, functioning in dynamic, uncertain environments. Even where teams of model checking experts are in place, and formal verification is acknowledged as a valuable practice, model checking is seldom applied to complete modern code bases for realistic-scaled systems. For example, while model checking was applied to small portions (typically 10,000 lines or less) of the code base for NASA/JPL’s Curiosity rover [12], even the Laboratory for Reliable Software did not attempt to apply model checking to the full approximately 2 million lines of Curiosity software.

Static analysis methods, on the other hand, are expected to scale to real-world code bases. Even the popular technical press [14] has noted the use of Coverity and other tools on huge code bases for the Curiosity rover, the CERN particle accelerator, and other big mission-critical systems.

While model checking can be applied to whole systems when a research team drives the system design and real-world deadlines and constraints are removed, its role in most critical system development efforts is typically relegated to verifying (or finding bugs in) small components. One approach to escaping this limitation is to enhance the fundamental scalability of model checking by using abstraction or other techniques to manage huge state spaces, and especially by using compositional reasoning [4], [6], [9], [10] to handle large code bases. Such efforts are an important contribution, but thus far have yet to crack anything like the 1 million LOC mark in an automated fashion.

Beyond the fundamental problem of the state space explosion, there is a second scalability problem with most current model checking tools: they are far less “industrially hardened” than commercial static analysis tools, and fail for a variety of essentially engineering reasons for very large code bases — partly because they are seldom tested on more than a few thousand lines of code at a time. Model checking tools work best, and most automatically, when given code fragments only the size of a few small functions, in which case both predicate abstraction [4] and bounded model checking [3], [5] can be used even by upper-level undergraduate students to verify properties and find subtle bugs. This fact may lie behind the success of model checkers for finding bugs in container classes [15].

This paper proposes and presents very preliminary results for a novel “modular” method for applying model checking automatically to real-world code bases that does not require conquering the state-space explosion problem, or automatically decomposing such a system into components in the traditional fashion for verification. We propose to exploit precisely the current strengths of model checking by mining a large code base for small, self-contained, portions of code suitable for push-button model checking. The core idea is to use static analysis to identify functions (or small sets of functions) without recursion or recursive datatypes, overly complex pointer
manipulations, or whatever other features typically frustrate model checking efforts. Additionally, such code fragments should contain assertions or other statements (e.g. array or pointer accesses, system calls) that make it easy to generate properties to check without human intervention. We call our search verification task triage: our contribution is to propose that one effective way to apply model checking to large systems is to simply cherry pick the parts of the system that can be model checked. This turns on its head the usual effort to apply human effort to verifying the components of most interest in a large system, which can proceed independently. Our approach to “modular verification” works more like many static analysis algorithms, which “give up” on pointers when alias analysis fails, and abandon overly complex paths. A more fanciful way to understand the idea is to consider the not infrequent occasion of a graduate student or model checking researcher combing a large, critical system (e.g. OpenSSL) for some functions suitable for specification and verification. We aim to replace such a human with a static analysis algorithm that is less intelligent, but much faster and able to generate many likely candidates rather than being satisfied after finding one or two functions.

Unfortunately, naive verification task triage plus model checking is unlikely to yield effective results, even for the purpose of bug finding. We believe that most functions in complex code bases rely on preconditions over inputs and data values accessed that are not represented by the language's type system or by other annotations. Model checking without these preconditions will probably lead to an unmanageable number of uninteresting bug reports — the false positives that have always plagued static analysis efforts.

We propose to mitigate this problem by using dynamic invariant detection [7] in a (to our knowledge) novel way: as a tool for generating approximations of preconditions needed to avoid false positives in large code bases. The idea, shown in Figure [1], involves a two-stage workflow. First, we perform verification task triage to identify suitable small pieces of code to model checking a large code base. Then, the test suite for the large system is run, with instrumentation inserted to extract trace information over the suitable functions. Dynamic invariant generation takes program traces and identifies, via “empirical” rather than static means, invariants — propositions that are true for all observed executions of the system. These invariants are then used to annotate the triage-identified functions with “preconditions” generalizing the data values seen during execution of the test suite. The annotated pieces of code are model checked, with the expectation that any bugs detected are likely to be real faults since the invariants ensure that data ranges and relationships are like those observed over the test suite. As a simple example, consider the case of a function \( f \) that takes as one input a value \( \text{int} \ m \). In typical world-world C code, \( m \) may in fact represent a highly constrained quantity, such as the number of minutes since midnight, but the type system will not express this constraint. Model checking \( f \) without this information may produce a counterexample involving, for example, integer overflow due to multiplying \( m \) by 60. Even if a real off-by-one bug exists when \( m = 1 \), the overflow bug may be much easier for a SAT solver in a bounded model checker to detect. Model checking the code with the added assumption that \( 0 \leq m < 3600 \), however, the model checker will report the real bug. Even though 1 did not appear in the test suite, the generalization algorithms in the invariant detector generalized the actual input range to include it. Extremely large values of \( m \) also did not appear during test suite execution, of course, but the range observed was sufficiently small that invariant detection proposed that the range was likely restricted.

An obvious objection to this approach is that the invariants from a test suite will often over-constrain the behavior of many small components, unless the test suite is very high quality. We hope that even highly inaccurate invariants may allow a model checker to find a real bug. For example, in the case of \( f \), if the test suite falsely suggests that \( 0 \leq m < 60 \) because tests only run for 1 hour, the model checker can still find the real bug. Our claim is that our use of dynamic invariants relies on their ability to crudely “carve away” the data values that a function is not expected to work rather than on their
strict accuracy. A gross underapproximation of behavior can still lead to the discovery of real bugs, while an overapproximation buries a user in false positives. We provide suggestive evidence for the possibility that poor invariants can still be useful by applying our technique to a simple container class and a radically non-representative test suite. A more complex example with hand-generated “invariants” shows that even simple triage can discover useful targets for verification and avoid false positives using invariants.

In the remainder of the paper, we first discuss key related work in Section I to place our core idea in context, elaborate our proof-of-concept example in Section II, demonstrate verification triage in Section III and discuss the challenges in bringing the full vision of a “static analysis-like” approach to modularity for model checking in Section IV.

I. RELATED WORK

To our knowledge, the idea of mining large code bases for arbitrary sub-components suitable for model checking has not been previously explored. The most closely related ideas are efforts to scale model checking by approximating the weakest precondition under which a sub-component satisfies its correctness properties \[2\], \[6\], \[11\]. The primary difference is that where these methods aim to learn or iterate to a “good” assumption that is as weak as possible, we simply want a precondition that removes false positives, even if it is too strong, and, of course, that such methods have no concept of mining a code base for possible targets for model checking.

II. EXAMPLE: BINARY TREES

As a simple example of how our approach might work in practice, assuming that an effective verification task triage can be designed, we apply our method to a frequently studied binary tree implementation \[8\], \[15\]. We use a RepOK function to test the validity of the tree structure, and have implemented a simple random testing system to test it, shown in Figure 3. We choose to verify the remove function, and instrument the code for the binary tree with extended invariants \[1\], as shown in Figure 2/footnoteInstrumentation for add, not remove is shown as it is easier to follow, to help us limit the behavior of the code to valid trees only. We use Daikon \[7\] to infer invariants from all traces generated during random testing. Extended invariants introduce history variables that allow Daikon to provide “invariants” in the form of code coverage facts as well as more traditional data invariants, to capture relationships such as, e.g., that a loop always executes a number of times equal to twice the value of a certain input. Unfortunately, when running the random tester for 5,000 tests, we choose to use tests with a maximum length of only 4 steps, which leads to extended invariants that radically underapproximate the behavior of the class:

```java
public void add(int x) {
    Node current = root;
    if (root == null) {
        br0 = br0 + 1;
        root = new Node(x);
        return;
    }
    while (current.value != x) {
        if (x < current.value) {
            if (current.left == null) {
                br1 = br1 + 1;
                current.left = new Node(x);
            } else {
                br2 = br2 + 1;
                current = current.left;
            }
        } else {
            if (current.right == null) {
                br3 = br3 + 1;
                current.right = new Node(x);
            } else {
                br4 = br4 + 1;
                current = current.right;
            }
        }
    }
}
```

Figure 2: Function add after instrumentation for branch count.

Using these invariants (which restrict the structure to up to two right children or up to two left children), we generate a simple CBMC harness, knowing (thanks to our triage and invariant examination) that a shallow loop unwinding will suffice, and that no types encountered are likely to make verification difficult, as shown in Figure 4. With this extremely restricted harness, CBMC was able to find the bug in binary tree \[8\], despite the fact that the shallow random testing did not discover the bug.

III. SIMPLE VERIFICATION TASK TRIAGE

Given that using even poor tests to generate potentially incorrect invariants for model checking can still lead to fast, effective bug discovery, the core of our modular verification approach becomes finding functions where this can be applied to large, real-world code bases. Figure 5 shows a function from the source code for version 1.6 of Mozilla’s SpiderMonkey JavaScript engine. This function was automatically identified using a very simple 100-line Python script that crawls through a set of C source files and identifies functions that:

- do contain at least some assert statement or potentially crashing memory dereference (i.e., functions
Random rand = new Rand(20);
for(i = 0; i < N; i ++){
    BinTree SUT = new BinTree();
    for(int j = 0; j < M; j ++){
        int op = rand.nextInt(3);
        int value = rand.nextInt(20);
        switch(op){
            case 0:
                SUT.add(value);
                break;
            case 1:
                SUT.remove(value);
                break;
            case 2:
                SUT.find(value);
                break;
        }
        assert(SUT.RepOK());
    }
}

Figure 3: A simple random tester for the BinTree.

void main(){
    int v1,v2,v3,v4; // symbolic inputs
    /* Using calls for simplicity;
        in practice would encode structure
        from Daikon invariants as a series
        of assumptions. */
    add(v1);
    add(v2);
    add(v3);

    /* Invariant */
    assume(0<=br1 && br1<=2 &&
        0<=br2 && br2<=2);

    remove(v4);
    assert(repOK);
}

Figure 4: CBMC Harness for BinTree.

The triage approach is both over-restrictive (in many cases functions taking structures or arrays as input can be handled easily) and not restrictive enough (it does not filter out functions with recursion or references to global values of “bad” types). In practice, we expect triage to require a deeper static analysis that includes more types and uses summaries of functions called by a function.

Calling a “bad” function is not necessarily a problem, because the return value may be replaced by a value generated by our invariant generator in many cases.

Even using this simplistic version of triage, however, we can obtain results. Reading through the roughly 40K lines of non-comment C code in SpiderMonkey 1.6 would be a time-consuming task for a human, even ignoring the need to resolve typedefs. The 11 functions chosen as possible verification targets by the simple algorithm include some unsuitable targets (including one case where the textual type analysis fails to notice a complex compiler state structure parameter). A few functions are simple bit-twiddling or offset-computing code that can be trivially verified without invariants. The code in Figure 5 however is of considerably more interest. It implements the Boyer-Moore-Horspool substring-finding algorithm [3]. After resolving the types to ground C types and choosing string sizes based on jsfunfuzz tests, we were able to incrementally increase loop bounds to not only verify memory safety for chosen strings, but to “discover” the worst case complexity of the algorithm, the point where unwinding assertions held. When we introduce an off-by-one error into the code (a case that should not be found by our testing due to the values chosen for start, we believe), CBMC instantly detects the error.

On the one hand, because the size of strings analyzed is relatively small, this is not a complete verification of the Boyer-Moore-Horspool implementation in SpiderMonkey. On the other hand, in practice for bug finding, an informal “small model” assumption suggests that most code that works for all small inputs works for large inputs, at least short of integer overflow problems. Note that the small input size bounds in our verification are used to also generate small array sizes, so we can detect memory safety problems with small inputs, because our memory bounds are also artificially small due to the way we translate the code into a verification problem. One problem with this approach is that when small inputs can lead to larger outputs, and this invariant is not detected, our approach might result in false positives. It remains to be seen how important this is in practice.

That a Boyer-Moore-Horspool implementation is the most interesting verification target detected by our initial triage system is fitting. The problem of finding a substring often discussed (as in the Wikipedia entry for the algorithm) as the “needle in a haystack” problem with the pattern to find called the “needle.” Our approach is essentially the search for model-checkable needles in the haystacks of large, complex software systems not otherwise amenable to formal verification without large investments of expert effort.

IV. CORE CHALLENGES AND FUTURE WORK

We speculate that while model checking cannot apply to as many functions as static analysis, our method may be of considerable value for bug detection because of the
precision and complete exploration of model checking. However, the critical question is whether dynamic invariants can actually produce accurate enough preconditions to reduce the false positive rate to a manageable level. Determining whether dynamic invariants over even poor test suites can still find bugs for realistic systems requires the development of a tool for automatic verification task triage. Our initial efforts suggest that this task is complex, though not infeasible. In particular, our early efforts to triage C programs have shown that the first steps are identifying code patterns that frustrate a particular model checker, and this requires a complete analysis of the accessed data types and call graphs from each function for “bad” patterns, like complex recursive data structures or system calls. We have identified some likely candidate functions in the Mozilla JavaScript engine and SQLite, and plan to use these modest sized code bases to tune a method for handling larger programs with more complex build environments. The next steps are continued development of the triage tools and experimentation with actual invariants from the test suites for our subject programs.

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