Analog Chaos-based Secure Communications and Cryptanalysis: A Brief Survey

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Abstract—A large number of analog chaos-based secure communication systems have been proposed since the early 1990s exploiting the technique of chaos synchronization. A brief survey of these chaos-based cryptosystems and of related cryptanalytic results is given. Some recently proposed countermeasures against known attacks are also introduced.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1980s, chaos-based cryptography has attracted more and more attention from researchers in many different areas. It has been found that chaotic systems and cryptosystems share many similar properties. For instance, chaotic systems are sensitive to the initial conditions, which corresponds to the diffusion property of good cryptosystems (for a comparison of chaos and cryptography, see Table 1 in [1]). Basically, there are two major types of chaos-based cryptosystems: analog chaos-based secure communication systems and digital chaos-based ciphers, which are designed employing completely different principles.

Almost all analog chaos-based secure communication systems are designed based on the technique for chaos synchronization, which was first discovered in the 1980s and then well developed in the 1990s [2]. The establishment of chaos synchronization between two remote chaotic systems actually means that some information has successfully been transmitted from one end to the other. This fact naturally leads to the foundation of a chaos-based communication system. Then, by keeping some part of the involved chaotic systems secret, a third party not knowing the secret key will not be able to reconstruct the information transmitted. Thus, a chaos-based secure communication system is created.

Following this basic idea, a large number of analog chaos-based secure communication systems have been proposed since the 1990s. Meanwhile, related cryptanalytic work has also been developed to evaluate performance (mainly the security) of various analog chaos-based secure communication systems. Though a number of surveys have been published to introduce progress in this area, they become relatively obsolete due to the rapid growth of new research work in recent years.

The purpose of this paper is to give a brief survey of analog chaos-based secure communications and related cryptanalytic work, especially focusing on latest work reported since the year 2000. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we first introduce some preliminary knowledge about the underlying chaos synchronization technique. Then, we classify most early chaos-based secure communication systems into three basic types. Next, different kinds of cryptanalysis are discussed with some concrete examples. Finally, we enumerate some new countermeasures that have been proposed to resist known attacks. A few concluding remarks are given at the end of the paper to express our opinion on future trends in this area.

II. CHAOS SYNCHRONIZATION

Just as its name implies, synchronization of chaos denotes a process in which two (or many) chaotic systems achieve a common dynamical behavior after a period of transient period. Here, the common behavior may be a complete coincidence of the chaotic trajectories, or just a phase locking. To achieve synchronization, one or more driving signals have to be sent from a source to the chaotic systems to be synchronized. According to the source of the driving signal and the mode of coupling, there are mainly four types of driving modes:

- directional (internal) driving: one chaotic system serves as the source of driving and one or more driving signals are sent from this systems to the others;
- bidirectional (internal) driving: two chaotic systems are coupled with each other and are driven by each other in a mutual way;
- network-like coupling: many (more than two) chaotic systems are coupled with others in some way to form a complex dynamic network;
- external driving: one or more external signals drive all the chaotic systems involved towards a synchronized behavior.

Owing to the nature of secure communications (which means secret information transmitted from one end to the other), directional driving between two chaotic systems is employed for almost all chaos-based secure communication systems. Therefore, in this section we focus only on this kind of chaos synchronization.

For chaos synchronization of two chaotic systems with directional driving, one of the chaotic systems serves as the master (or drive) system, and the other is the slave (or response) system. From the communication point of view, the master and slave system may also be called sender
and receiver system, respectively. For purpose of chaos synchronization, one or more driving signals have to be transmitted from the master system to the slave system as external force to influence the slave system’s dynamics. As a result of the driving force, the slave system may be able to follow the master system’s dynamics exactly or in some other forms, thus leading to different kinds of chaos synchronization like the following ones that are widely used in chaos-based secure communications:

- complete synchronization (CS, also called identical synchronization): the simplest form of chaos synchronization, corresponding to a complete agreement of the trajectories of the master and slave systems;
- generalized synchronization (GS): a generalized form of complete synchronization for which the trajectory of the slave system’s trajectory converges to the master’s one in the sense of a one-to-one mapping \( f \);
- projective synchronization: a special case of GS with the one-to-one mapping involved being a simple linear function \( f(x) = \alpha x \);
- phase synchronization: the slave system matches its phase with that of the master system, though their trajectories are not the same;
- lag synchronization: a time-delayed version of complete synchronization for which the slave system coincides with the time-delayed dynamics of the master system.

Due to other aspects of generating the driving signal, there are also some other types of chaos synchronization. One of them is called impulsive (or sporadic) synchronization, which means that the driving signal is not transmitted to the slave system continuously, but in an impulsive manner controlled by a fixed or time-varying time interval \( \tau \).

Another related concept called adaptive synchronization is a technique that can help the slave system synchronize with the master system in an adaptive way. This concept is useful not only for the design of analog chaos-based secure communications, but also for the cryptanalysis, because the adaption mechanism often implies that a third-party can also drive its slave system to the sender and then extract some secret information transmitted from the sender to the legal receiver.

III. ANALOG CHAOS-BASED SECURE COMMUNICATIONS

Most traditional analog chaos-based secure communications can be classified into three basic types: chaotic masking, chaotic switching (also called chaotic shift keying – CSK) and chaotic modulation. Although many new designs have been proposed in recent years, most of them are actually modified or generalized implementations of these three basic schemes. In this section, we focus on the three basic schemes and give a brief summary of their security. More details about related cryptanalytic results will be the subject of the next section.

A. Chaotic Masking

The earliest and simplest form of analog chaos-based secure communication is chaotic masking, in which a plaintext message signal \( m(t) \) is embedded into a carrier signal \( x(t) \) to form a combined driving signal \( s(t) = x(t) + m(t) \), where the addition operation “+” can also be replaced by similar ones such as multiplication. After chaos synchronization is established at the receiver side, an estimation of \( x(t) \) can be obtained and, then, subtracted from \( s(t) \) to recover the plaintext signal. Figure 1 shows the basic structure of a typical chaotic masking system.

![Fig. 1. Basic structure of a typical chaotic masking system.](image)

To avoid the negative influence of the hidden plaintext signal on chaos synchronization at the receiver side, the energy of the plaintext message signal \( m(t) \) should be much smaller than that of the driving signal \( s(t) \), i.e., much smaller than the power of \( x(t) \). Since the message signal disturbs the driving signal, chaos synchronization cannot be achieved exactly and, therefore, the message signal cannot be recovered exactly. Another obvious feature of the chaotic masking scheme is that the message signal does not influence the dynamics of the master system at all.

The security of chaotic masking is questionable against various attacks, mainly due to the fact that an attacker can always obtain some information from the driving signal to construct (at least part of) the dynamics of the master system. As the power energy of the plaintext message must be much smaller than that of the driving signal, it seems impossible to essentially eliminate this security defect without changing the encryption structure.

B. Chaotic Switching (Chaotic Shift Keying)

This scheme is mainly used to transmit digital signals. At the sender side, two different chaotic systems are used for 0-bits and 1-bits of the plaintext message, respectively. That is, the employed chaotic system is switched from time to time by the plaintext message. At the receiver side, only one of the two chaotic systems is needed, and the plaintext bits are recovered according to whether or not the slave system can achieve chaos synchronization with the master. Figure 2 shows how a typical chaotic switching system works to recover the plaintext message. Note that the two chaotic systems at the sender side may be either homogeneous or inhomogeneous. If two homogeneous ones are used, one chaotic system with adjustable parameters suffices, which makes the realization of chaotic switching systems more practical.

To ensure the establishment of chaos synchronization between the master and slave systems, the transmission time...
of each plaintext bit should be long enough. Therefore, the transmission rate of a chaotic switching system is generally much slower than that of a chaotic masking system. The main advantage of chaotic switching is that the plaintext signal can exactly be recovered as long as the level of the signal-to-noise ratio is not too low.

It has been known that the above simple chaotic switching system is not secure against many different kinds of attacks. To enhance the security, some modified chaotic switching systems have been proposed in recent years, which will be discussed later in Sec. IV.

C. Chaotic Modulation

Different from chaotic masking and chaotic switching schemes, in a chaotic modulation scheme the plaintext message \( m(t) \) is injected into the sender system so that its dynamics is changed by the plaintext message continuously. In this case, generally an adaptive controller (which can also be considered as an extra dynamical system bidirectionally coupled with the sender system) is added at the slave system according to some rule such that its output \( m'(t) \) asymptotically converges to \( m(t) \). To follow the master system’s dynamics, generally the controller’s output (i.e., \( m(t) \)) should be injected into the slave system in the same way as in the master. See Fig. 3 for the basic structure of a typical chaotic modulation system. Note that in some chaotic modulation systems there may be no feedback of \( s(t) \) back into the master system.

There are two different types of chaotic modulation: (1) parameter modulation, in which the plaintext message signal \( m(t) \) modulates the values of one or more control parameters; (2) direct modulation, in which \( m(t) \) is injected into one or more variables of the master system without changing the value of any control parameter. In some chaotic modulation schemes, the plaintext signal is also embedded into the driving signal, which can be regarded as a modified version of chaotic masking (via feedback of the driving signal and some other necessary modifications).

Compared with chaotic masking schemes, chaotic modulation schemes can exactly recover the plaintext signal (in an asymptotical manner) if some conditions are satisfied. Considering that chaotic switching systems can only transmit digital signals, chaotic modulation also has a better performance than chaotic switching. In fact, carefully designed, the chaotic modulation technique can even be used to transmit more than one plaintext message signal. One possible way for this is to modulate \( n \) control parameters of the master system with \( n \) plaintext message signals, respectively.

The main disadvantage of chaotic modulation is that the controller depends on the master and slave systems’ structure, which means that different controllers needs to be designed for different master systems. Controllers may not even exist in certain cases for essential defects of the master/slave chaotic systems.

IV. CRYPTANALYTIC RESULTS

Many chaos-based secure communication systems were proposed without much security analysis. The security of these cryptosystems was simply “ensured” by the underlying chaotic systems’ complexity. From a cryptographer’s point of view, however, the complexity of chaos does not necessarily mean that a chaos-based cryptosystem is secure. To evaluate the security of a cryptosystem, all known cryptanalytic methods (i.e., attacks) have to be investigated specifically for the target cryptosystem.

As a basic rule in cryptography, it is always assumed that all details about the target encryption algorithm are known to the attacker [3, p. 5]. The secret key should be the only component unknown to the attacker and used to guarantee the cryptosystem’s security.

The first step of cryptanalysis is to estimate the size of the key space, i.e., to see if the complexity of exhaustively searching all possible keys of a cryptosystem is not cryptographically high. According to the computational power of today’s computers, a key space of size \( O(2^{100}) \) is generally required.

In the case that the key space is large enough, one needs to further investigate the security of the cryptosystem against all known attacks, which include the following four kinds of attacks (classified according to the resources that an attacker can access):

- ciphertext-only attack: only the ciphertexts can be observed by the attacker;
- known-plaintext attack: some plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts can be observed by the attacker;
- chosen-plaintext attack: some plaintexts can be freely chosen by the attacker and the corresponding ciphertexts...
can be observed;
- chosen-ciphertext attack: some ciphertexts can be freely chosen by the attacker and the corresponding plaintexts can be observed.

The chosen-ciphertext attack generally works only when the attacker has temporary access to a legal decipher (receiver), which is a mirror version of the chosen-plaintext attack at the encipher (sender) side.

Since the mid-1990s, a large number of cryptanalytic results have been reported on chaos-based secure communications. It has been shown that most traditional schemes are not sufficiently secure from a cryptographical point of view. In this section, we classify these cryptanalytic results into several different categories.

A. Low Sensitivity to Secret Key

The most common (and maybe also the most serious) problem about chaos-based secure communications is the low sensitivity to the secret key (i.e., the control parameters of the master chaotic system). The low sensitivity is a necessary requirement for real implementations of any analog chaos-based cryptosystem, because it is impossible to ensure exact matching of the master and slave systems. Unavoidable noise and manufactural component deviation involved in chaotic circuits are the two main factors causing this security problem. According to recent results reported in [4], [5], it has been verified that most analog chaos-based secure communication systems suffer from this defect.

As a direct result of this low-sensitivity problem, the size of the key space becomes much smaller than expected. Therefore, a brute-force attack can be mounted to approximately guess the secret key, and the estimated key can be used later to approximately decrypt the plaintext message signals.

B. Parameter Estimation

For most analog chaos-based secure communication systems, the low sensitivity to the secret key is actually caused by a very simple relationship between synchronization error and key mismatch: the larger the key mismatch is, the larger the synchronization error will be, and vice versa. This means that an iterative algorithm can be used to determine the value of the secret parameters, which corresponds to the concept of “adaptive synchronization”. A lot of work has been reported about adaptive synchronization when the master system’s parameters are unknown to the receiver. Some of the work can directly be used or easily extended to break analog chaos-based secure communication systems [6]–[8].

Besides the method based on adaptive synchronization, there are also other ways one can use to estimate the secret parameters (i.e., the key) of the chaos-based cryptosystems. For instance, due to the nature of Lorenz and Chua chaotic systems, the secret parameters can be determined from the driving signal and its derivative (mainly differentials of different orders) [9]–[11]. For some specific schemes, it is also possible to derive part of the secret parameters by analyzing the return maps of the master systems [12].

When chosen-ciphertext attacks are possible, i.e., when the attacker can access a legal receiver for some time, the attacker can set the driving signal to a fixed constant $C$ in order to obtain the values of all secret parameters [13].

C. Estimating Carrier Signal

When the plaintext message signal $m(t)$ is hidden in the driving signal $s(t) = x(t) + m(t)$, it may be possible to recover the approximate dynamics of the master system and, then, obtain an estimation of the carrier signal $x(t)$, thus leading to an approximate recovery of $m(t)$. This idea works for chaotic masking and some chaotic modulation systems.

The first report about this cryptanalytic method was proposed by Short et al. in [14], by employing the NLD (nonlinear dynamics) forecasting technique to estimate the master system’s dynamics from the driving signal $s(t)$ of chaotic masking systems. Later he refined this technique and extended it for chaotic modulation systems [15], [16]. The NLD technique has been widely employed to break many simple chaos-based secure communication systems.

D. Direct Extraction of Plaintext

For some chaos-based secure communication schemes, it is also possible to directly estimate the plaintext message signals from the driving signals without estimating the secret key or the carrier signals. Many different methods have been reported in recent years, mostly for chaotic masking and chaotic switching schemes. In this subsection, we introduce some of these specific methods.

1) Return-map Analysis: By constructing some return maps of the master system, one may be able to estimate the plaintext message signal from the fluctuation (for chaotic masking) and the splitting (for chaotic switching) of the return maps. This method was first proposed in [17] and further developed in [12], [18] for other more advanced systems.

2) Power-spectral (Filtering) Analysis: Though the dynamics of chaotic systems are rather complex, the power spectra of their variables are not so complex as expected. As investigated in [19], [20], even when the power spectra of some chaotic systems seem to be good, significant spectrum peaks can still be founded in the spectra by removing the symmetries of the chaotic attractors. For instance, the spectrum of $x(t)$ in the Lorenz system is relatively good, but that of $|x(t)|$ has a significant peak. When the plaintext message signal is hidden in the driving signal, the narrow-band spectrum means that the driving signal can be directly filtered to recover the message signal [21], [22].

3) Power Energy Analysis: For some parameter modulation systems, the power energy of the driving signal varies according to the value of the transmitted signal. This makes it possible to obtain a smoothed version of the message signal by observing the average power energy of the driving signal in a sliding time-window [23]. Exact recovery of the plaintext message signal is possible for chaotic switching systems, because each bit has to be held for some time to ensure that chaos synchronization is established.
4) Generalized Synchronization-based Method: For chaotic switching systems and some parameter modulation systems, there is a simple relationship between the synchronization error and the value of the transmitted signal. This fact can be exploited to extract the plaintext message signal directly [22], [24].

5) Short-time Period analysis: When the spectrum of the driving signal (or its derivative of some form) involved has a significant peak (recall Section IV-D.2), generally there exists a simple relationship between the peak frequency and the values of the control parameters (see Fig. 9 in [20]). In this case, one can try to extract the short-time period as a measurement of the peak frequency modulated by the plaintext message signal. According to the change of the extracted short-time periods, the plaintext message signal can be extracted exactly (for chaotic switching systems) or approximately (for some parameter modulation systems) [25], [26].

6) Switching-event Detection: For chaotic switching and parameter modulation systems, the dynamics of the master systems will change significantly when the value of the modulating signal (i.e., the plaintext message signal) changes. By detecting and tracking these switching events, it may be possible to recover the modulating signal [27].

V. NEW COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST KNOWN ATTACKS

To overcome the security problems of most traditional chaos-based secure communication schemes, a number of new countermeasures have been proposed in recent years. Among all the known attacks, the ones based on the NLD forecasting technique have received most attention, while little work has done on the low sensitivity to the secret key and the security problem of parameter estimation. This section lists some of these new countermeasures and known cryptanalytic results.

A. Using More Complex Chaotic Systems

One widely suggested measure is to use more complex chaotic systems rather than three-dimensional systems like the Lorenz and Chua systems. Hyperchaotic systems and time-delay chaotic systems have been adopted for some newly designed chaos-based secure communication systems. Unfortunately, a number of recent cryptanalytic results have shown that the introduction of hyperchaos or time-delay chaos cannot essentially enhance security [7], [22], [28]–[30].

B. Using More Complicated Synchronization Modes

Another widely suggested measure is to use more complicated synchronization modes, such as impulsive, projective, phase, or lag synchronization, and so on. Although definitive results have not been obtained for the overall performance of each new synchronization mode, some security problems have been reported for specific schemes [22], [31]. It seems that impulsive synchronization is most promising as candidate base of designing new chaos-based secure communication systems.

C. Additional Encryption Functions

In [32], Yang et al. suggested adding an additional encryption function (actually the n-fold composition of a piecewise linear mapping) to chaos-based secure communication systems to enhance the security. This idea was later employed by some other researchers. Although there is not too much cryptanalytic work about this kind of combined chaos-based secure communication systems, a recent result about NLD [33] implies that the additional encryption function may be circumvented.

D. Combining Heterogeneous Chaos-based Cryptosystems

By combining different types of chaos-based cryptosystems, the security of the resulting system may be higher than the security of each constituent. The simplest way of combination is to cascade two or more heterogeneous chaos-based cryptosystems together, e.g., a chaotic masking subsystem plus a chaotic modulation subsystem as proposed in [34], or a chaotic switching subsystem plus a chaotic modulation subsystem as proposed in [35]. Unfortunately, this simple combination has been proved to be insecure [7]. So, more complicated approaches of combination should be further investigated.

E. Two-channel Approach

In [36], two separate channels were suggested to enhance the security: one channel only for chaos synchronization and the other one for complicated encryption of the plaintext message signal. This scheme has been found insecure [37], because parameter estimation is still possible by analyzing the chaos synchronization channel.

F. Remodulating the Driving Signal

In [38] a countermeasure was proposed in form of remodulating the driving signal before sending it to the receiver side. This approach was soon broken [39]–[41], however, and one improved version [40] has also proved to be insecure [12] as well.

G. Modified Chaotic Switching Schemes

To enhance security against the return map attack, it is possible to extend a chaotic switching system to include $2n > 2$ chaotic systems [42], in which $n$ systems correspond to the plaintext bit 0 and the other $n$ systems to the plaintext bit 1. For each plaintext bit, the sender randomly chooses a system from the $n$ candidates and the receiver checks all $2n$ chaotic systems to find out the correct one. In [42] another measure is also adopted to further enhance the security, viz., to frequently change the driving signal from one variable to another. A recent cryptanalytic report has shown that both countermeasures are still not secure against the return map attack [18].

In [43], pseudo-random false switching events are introduced to enhance security against various known attacks. No cryptanalytic result has been reported on this countermeasure so far.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

As most traditional chaos-based secure communication systems and many new-generation ones have been known to be insecure, novel ideas need to be created to improve security. Combining more than two countermeasures may be a promising way to get more secure cryptosystem. The low sensitivity to the secret key and the potential possibility to mount attacks based on parameter estimation are regarded as the two greatest problems in almost all analog chaos-based secure communication systems, thus deserving more attention in future research.

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