The So-called Person Restriction of Internal State Predicates in Japanese in Contrast with Thai

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Abstract

Internal state predicates or ISPs refer to internal states of sentient beings, such as emotions, sensations and thought processes. Japanese ISPs with zero pronouns exhibit the “person restriction” in that the zero form of their subjects must be first person at the utterance time. This paper examines the person restriction of ISPs in Japanese in contrast with those in Thai, which is a zero pronominal language like Japanese. It is found that the person restriction is applicable to Japanese ISPs but not to Thai ones. This paper argues that the person restriction is not adequate to account for Japanese and Thai ISPs. We propose a new constraint to account for this phenomenon, i.e., the Experiencer-Conceptualizer Identity (ECI) Constraint, which states that “The experiencer of the situation/event must be identical with the conceptualizer of that situation/event.” It is argued that both languages conventionalize the ECI constraint in ISP expressions but differ in how the ECI constraint is conventionalized.

1 Introduction

Japanese is typologically known as a zero pronominal language, in which pronominal elements can take the zero form, unlike those in English. Japanese shares this characteristic with Thai even though the two languages differ drastically in morphological structure and in constituent order. Japanese is an agglutinating and head-final whereas Thai is isolating and head-initial.

Zero pronouns, or unexpressed referents, in zero pronominal languages differ from the so-called pro-drop phenomena present in languages such as Italian and Spanish, where subject arguments can be omitted, and the verbal inflections will continue to reflect the person, number and gender of the dropped arguments. Covert referents in East and Southeast Asian languages can occupy various grammatical roles and can be identified through discourse-pragmatic inference rather than through verbal morphology. Interestingly, however, internal state predicates in Japanese are known to have the so-called “person restriction”, which serves to identify the person of the experiencer-subject in a way similar to the pro-drop phenomena, as we see in the following discussion. This paper closely examines the
internal state predicates (ISPs, henceforth) of Japanese from a contrastive perspective with those of Thai, another zero pronominal language, and makes a typological characterization of ISPs in Japanese and the “person restriction” phenomena exhibited by them.

2 Internal state predicates and the person restriction

ISPs are those predicates denoting internal states such as emotions, sensations, thought processes, etc. of sentient beings (Iwasaki 1993). It is well known that ISPs in Japanese exhibit the so-called “person restriction” when they refer to an experiencer’s internal state at the time of the utterance (Kuroda 1973, Kuno 1973, Ohye 1975, Iwasaki 1993, inter alia). Kuroda was among the first researchers to discuss this restriction: he examined ISPs of Japanese, such as atui ‘hot’, kanasii ‘sad’ and sabisii ‘lonely’ and noted that the subjects of such adjectives “must be first person” (Kuroda 1973: 378). His examples are reproduced below in (1) – (3).

(1) *Watasi-wa atui ‘I am hot.’
(2) *Anata-wa atui ‘You are hot.’
(3) *John-wa atui ‘John is hot.’

Some clarifications of possible complications in the grammatical behavior of ISPs in Japanese are in order. Firstly, as Kuroda himself notes, those Japanese sentences with ISPs in (1) – (3), as well as their English translations, are ambiguous between the experiencer subject interpretation (i.e., ‘I feel hot.’) and the stimulus subject interpretation that the subject nominal is ascribed to have a certain property which stimulates one to have a certain feeling (i.e., ‘I am a hot person.’). Furthermore, ordinary uses of sensation adjectives like atui ‘hot’ without their overt subjects includes ones in which their referents are indeterminate, rather than ambiguous (Nakamura, forthcoming). (See also Shibatani’s (1990: 361) treatment of atui and samui as “zero-argument” predicates which express ambient conditions.)

Secondly, the person restriction in question holds in ordinary communicative situations, but it is often lifted in what Kuroda (1973) calls “non-reportive” style situations, such as literary work in which a story is told by a narrator who is omniscient. This makes sense: because the narrator is omniscient, she can be the “first person” in describing the internal state of any character in the story. (See Kuroda 1973 for more details, and see also Iwasaki’s (1993) “literary mode” and “colloquial mode” for a similar distinction.

Thirdly, although the use of ISPs with the second person subject is rendered unacceptable by Kuroda in (2), we should point out that its unacceptability arises, at least in part, from the pragmatic infelicity of the speaker making an assertion as to the internal state of the hearer, which is readily accessible for the hearer herself, but not for the speaker. This is in fact evidenced by the fact that their use with the second person subject is rendered acceptable in interrogatives: Anata wa atui? ‘Are you hot?’, but not in declaratives as in (2). Another more relevant piece of evidence for the pragmatic factor which explains the ill-formedness of ISPs in (2) comes from the fact that the same acceptability pattern with the second person subjects holds for ISPs in Thai as well as shown in (4). However, we will demonstrate in the next section that Thai ISPs do not exhibit the “person restriction” pointed out for Japanese ISPs.

(4) a. khun rɔ̀ɔn
    you hot
    ‘You are hot.’

b. khun rɔ̀ɔn māi̯? ¹
    you hot QP
    ‘Are you hot?’

In other words, the pattern observed for the second person in (2) is not a property of the “person restriction” per se. Therefore, in order to focus on the person restriction in our discussions below, we will mainly examine the contrast in grammatical behaviors between first person and third person experiencer patterns. We shall get back to this point later in Section 3.

Lastly, let us repeat a caveat from Uehara (2006): the person restriction of ISPs is different from, and is not to be confused with, the non-canonical case-marking patterns cross-

¹ The following abbreviations are used for glosses in this paper: NOM = nominative particle, PFV = perfective aspect, POL = politeness marker, PRG = progressive aspect, QP = question particle, RES = resultative aspect, sg = singular, TOP = topic particle.
linguistically attested for ISPs as well as other predicates denoting non-canonical types of events (e.g., Croft 1991). The latter case is illustrated with Spanish examples in (5), where the experiencer role noun takes the object case, but does not exhibit the person restriction of our concern.

(5) a. Me gusta Maria.
   ‘I (OBJ.) like Maria.’

b. Le gusta Maria.
   ‘He/She (OBJ.) likes Maria.’

Similarly, according to Iwasaki (2002), ISPs (his “propiroceptive-state” predicates) in Thai employ the “non-canonical” [VN] order (e.g. Pùat hu&a. (lit. ‘aches head’), which both experiencer- and stimulus-role nouns take nominative case-marking when both are overt: watasi-ga mizu-ga hosii (I-NOM water-NOM want) ‘I want water.’ Interesting though these phenomena are, they do not directly concern us here in our discussions on the person restriction.

3 Person restriction of ISPs in Japanese

This section examines the structure and range of the “person restriction” of ISPs in Japanese and compares them with corresponding ISPs in Thai. Let us discuss emotion predicates, such as uresii ‘glad’, kanasii ‘sad’ and sabisii ‘lonely’ in Japanese first. Such emotional lexical items belong to the lexical category of “adjectives” of the language, which, unlike adjectives in English, do not take the copula to constitute a predicate. An emotion adjective, uresii ‘glad’, in (6) below illustrates the structure and person restriction of ISPs in Japanese [parentheses indicate those constituents that can be implicit.]

(6) (watasi-wa / *kare-wa)  uresii.
    I-TOP / he-TOP glad
    ‘I am/ he is glad.’

(7) a. (kare-wa)  uresi-soo-da, / uresi-gat-teiru.
    he-TOP glad-seem / glad-show.the.
    signs.of-PRG
    ‘He seems glad/is showing the signs of being glad.’

b. (kare-wa)  uresii yoo-da.
    he-TOP glad it.appears.that
    ‘It appears that he is glad.’

c. (kare-wa)  uresii no-da.3
    he-TOP glad it.is.that
    ‘(It is that) He is glad.’

As noted earlier and illustrated again in (6), ISPs in Japanese in their default/unmarked forms can take the first person, but not the third person, for their subject. To indicate the third person experiencer’s internal states, their predicate forms must be marked with some morphemes of evidentiality. Four such morphemes are exemplified in a.-c. in (7) and they differ from one another in several ways. Structurally, for instance, soo-da ‘seem’ and gat-teiru ‘showing the signs of’ in (7a) are attached to the stem forms of the emotion adjectives and thus replace the –i inflectional ending of these adjectives. In contrast, yoo-da ‘it appears that’ in (7b) and no-da ‘it is that’ in (7c) are attached to the finite forms of emotion adjectives. Thus, they can be attached to the –katta past tense forms of emotion adjectives as well: (kare-wa)  uresi-katta
    yoo-da/no-da.  ‘It appears that/It is that he was glad.’

Among such morphemes in (7), however, one important distinction in terms of the person restriction in question is the one between soo-da, gat-teiru, and yoo-da in (7a) and (7b), on the one hand, and no-da in (7c), on the other. As Kuroda 1973 and Ohye 1975 note, the attachment of the of as in watasi-wa/kare-wa Hanako-ga suki da ‘I like/He likes Hanako.’). However, some (e.g. Ohye 1975: 200) report some (e.g. huan ‘worried’) exhibit the same pattern as emotion adjectives, as in watasi-wa??kare-wa huan da. ‘I am/??He is worried.’. 3 In colloquial speech, the no of no-da ‘it is that’ (and of its polite variant no-desu) is almost always reduced to the so-called “mora nasal” n to render n-da (and n-desu). Thus, in conversational discourse, the natural and more frequently attested sentence form of (c) in (7) is: (kare wa)  uresii n-da.
former set of evidentiality morphemes to ISPs makes the third person subject possible, but in turn makes the first person subject unacceptable as in ??watasi-wa uresi-oo-da. ‘I seem glad.’ In contrast, the latter, no-da ‘it is that’, simply lifts the person restriction, thus making the third person subject, in addition to the first person subject, possible as shown in (8) (cf. (6) above).

(8) (watasi-wa / kare-wa) uresii no-da. 
I-TOP / he-TOP glad it.is.that
‘(It is that) I am/He is glad.’

It is beyond the scope of the current study to fully characterize semantic effects of no-da in Japanese, which is glossed here as ‘it is that’ for the lack of a better translation. Regarding its use with ISPs with the third person subject, however, Kuroda’s description is worth noting here. Using the sentence Mary-wa sabissii no-da, where no-da is attached to an emotion adjective sabissii ‘lonely’ with the third person subject Mary, Kuroda (1973:381) gives a simple sentence ‘Mary is lonely’ for its English translation and describes the semantic effects of no-da as follows:

“The speaker asserts that he knows that Mary is lonely but his knowledge is not solely or perhaps even not at all based on what he perceives of Mary. The sentence does not tell how he knows what he knows, and it can sound just like an a priori declaration—‘Mary must be lonely.’ He might perhaps be able to judge from past experience that Mary is lonely, using circumstantial evidence of a kind that would not allow a neutral party to draw such a conclusion. Or he might even have been told by Mary that she was lonely.” (Kuroda 1973:381) [underlining added by the authors]

The grammatical behavior as represented in (8) and the semantic effects in the above quote of emotion adjectives in the no-da construction in Japanese are interesting from the contrastive perspective between ISPs in Japanese and those in Thai. In terms of grammatical behaviors and functions, Japanese ISPs in the no-da construction, rather than those by themselves, resemble Thai ISPs.

Emotion predicates in Thai, such as dii-cai ‘glad’, sīa-cai ‘sad’ and rōn-cai ‘worried’ (See more examples in Iwasaki 2002), do share the structure with emotion adjectives in Japanese in that they do not take the copula in predication, unlike their counterpart adjectives in English. The use of emotion predicates in Thai is illustrated with dii-cai ‘glad’ in (9).

(9) (chān / khāw) dii-cai
I / he glad
‘I am/He is glad.’

As noted earlier, Thai and Japanese share the zero anaphoric nature (indicated with parentheses above), again departing from English. Since emotion predicates of the two languages structurally resemble each other on these two accounts, comparison of the patterns of emotion predicates in (9) and (6) brings to the fore a characteristically structural contrast between Thai and Japanese, i.e., the person restriction. Both first and third person subjects are possible for Thai emotion predicates. In contrast, Japanese emotion predicates allow only the overt and covert forms of the first person subject. Emotion predicates in Thai in (9) rather pattern with those in the no-da construction in (8) on all the three accounts. We will get back to these points later.

The remainder of this section examines ISPs other than emotion predicates in the two languages, namely, predicates of desire, sensation and thought processes. We will focus on the range as well as

4 Notice here that Thai emotion predicates share a common form of [V-cay]. This study basically follows Iwasaki’s treatment of “the [V-cay] expressions as [V-Suffix]” in Iwasaki (2002:49-51). See his discussion of the evidence for it. He notes that it is “a unit consisting of a verb and a suffix, the latter of which has been grammaticalized from the lexical noun meaning ‘heart’” (p. 60).

5 In neutral contexts, the first person is the preferred interpretation for the covert subject of ISPs in Thai, and the third person is a possible interpretation only in marked contexts such as below:

A: thammay khāw hūarɔ? daaŋ yàaŋ nān
    Why he laugh loudly kind
    ‘Why did he laugh so loudly? ’

B: dii-cai
    glad
    ‘(He) is glad’

However, even in such marked contexts, ISPs in Japanese cannot be used for the third person subject and require morphemes such as no-da, as in (8).
the types of the “person restriction” phenomena exhibited by ISPs in Japanese and find out whether the structural contrast between the two languages in terms of the person restriction prevails throughout the whole range.

Predicates of desire, which are adjectives hosii ‘want’ and –tai ‘want to’, like emotion predicates in Japanese, also exhibit the same person restriction as in (10). This is contrasted with Thai predicates of desire, which allows both the first and the third person subjects as in (11).

Japanese
(10) (watasi-wa / *kare-wa) biiru-ga
I-TOP / he-TOP beer-NOM
hosii. /nomi-tai.
want /drink-want.to
‘I want/want to drink beer.’

Thai
(11) (chăn / khăw) yâak düüm bia
I / he want drink beer
‘I/he want(s) to drink beer.’

Iwasaki (2002) reports that Thai has a wide range of pain terms, e.g. cèp ‘pain, a general cover-term’, piat ‘deep-seated aching, usually felt to be hot and diffuse’, and siat ‘focused abdominal pain’ (these examples and glosses are originally from Diller’s 1980 list of 15 Thai pain terms), while Japanese has only one general adjective itai used with an array of onomatopoetic expressions, e.g. sikusiku itai for gripping pain, zukizuki itai for throbbing pain, and hirihiri itai for tingling pain (examples and descriptions are from Iwasaki 2002: 61, footnote 4). The relevant and important point for the current study is that this general adjective itai in Japanese has the person restriction, so that all the pain expressions with itai exhibit the person restriction, as exemplified in (12), while their Thai counterpart expressions do not have the restriction, as in (13).

Japanese
(12) (watasi-wa / *kare-wa) itai.
I-TOP / he-TOP ache
‘I have a headache.’

Thai
(13) (chăn / khăw) piat hũa
I / he painful head
‘I have/ He has a headache.’

Japanese ISPs with the person restriction include the expressions of thought processes as well, such as omou ‘think’, nozomu ‘hope’, and negau ‘wish’ (see Ohye 1975). Unlike emotion adjectives, these words are verbs and denote a change of state (e.g., ‘come to think’, rather than a state ‘think’, in the case of omou). Therefore, the internal state of a person at the speech time, first person or third person, can be expressed as the resulting state of that thought process using the resultative aspect marker te-iru. For the first person subject only, however, default forms of such verbs can be used to the same effect as the person restriction exhibited by emotion adjectives (Uehara 2011). The examples with omou ‘think’ below in (14) illustrate the situation in Japanese. In contrast, the Thai word khît ‘think’ exhibits no such constraint, as in (15):

Japanese
(14) a. (watasi-wa / *kare-wa) yotoo-ga
I-TOP / he-TOP ruling-party-NOM
makeru to omou.
lose that think
‘I think that the ruling party will lose (in the next election).’
b. (watasi-wa/kare-wa) yotoo-ga
I-TOP / he-TOP ruling-party-NOM
makeru to omot-teiru.
lose that think-RES
‘I/He think(s) that the ruling party will lose (in the next election).’

Thai
(15) (chăn / khăw) khít wâa phâk
I / he think that party
ráthhabaan câʔ phêe
government will lose
‘I/he think(s) that the government party will lose (in the next election).’

It should be noted furthermore that Japanese has some other verbal expressions of internal states that exhibit the person restriction in a way similar to, but still different from, the verbs of the thought processes above. These include verbs such as tukareru ‘get tired’, odoroku ‘be surprised’, komaru ‘feel troubled’ and verbal idioms such as onaka-ga suku (stomach-NOM get.empty) ‘get hungry’ and nodo-ga kawaku (throat-NOM get.dry) ‘get thirsty’ (Ohye 1975). These verbal
expressions also denote the internal states of human beings, to which only the experiencer in principle has direct access. The perfect/past –ta forms of these verbs can indicate the internal states of the speaker only, while their resultative aspect – te-iru forms, just like verbs of thought processes discussed just above, can take third- as well as first-person subjects. The sentences with tukareru ‘get tired’ in (16) illustrate the situation in Japanese. In contrast, its translation equivalent in Thai, môt phalan (exhaust strength) ‘feel physically exhausted’ (as well as môt kamlañcay (exhaust mental-energy) ‘feel mentally exhausted/discouraged’) exhibits no such constraint, as in (17) [slightly modified from Iwasaki 2002:43].

Japanese
(16) a. (watasi-wa / ??kare-wa) tukare-ta.
   I-TOP   / he-TOP  get.tired.PFV
   ‘I have got tired.’
b. (watasi-wa / kare-wa) tukare-te-iru.
   I-TOP   / he-TOP  get.tired.RES
   ‘I/He feel(s) tired.’

Thai
(17) (chäñ / khäw) môt    phalan
   I   / he  exhaust  physical.strength
   ‘I/he feel(s) physically exhausted.’

In summary, all the data above indicate the following: 1) both languages, as zero pronominal languages, allow the experiencer subjects of ISPs to be implicit and lack person-indicating copula verbs, which are required in English and pro-drop languages such as Spanish; 2) only ISPs in Japanese exhibit the person restriction and such a restriction is not observed for corresponding ISPs in Thai; 3) All ISPs in Japanese have some parallel, but structurally more-marked, patterns that behave and function exactly like their corresponding Thai ISPs.

4. Proposed characterization of the so-called “person restriction”

Thus far the term “(first) person restriction” has been used in this study to refer to the phenomena exhibited by ISPs in Japanese. This term comes from Kuroda’s characterization of the phenomena as one in which the subject of ISPs “must be first person” (Kuroda 1973: 378) and from the observations of their use in assertions as in (1) - (3). However, such characterizations of the phenomena prove to be incorrect considering the fact that, in interrogative sentences, their subjects can be second person, as noted earlier. In fact, Kuroda (ibid.) himself notes in a footnote to his characterization above that “This restriction, however, applies to declarative sentences. In interrogative sentences it is reversed” and gives a pair of examples, which are reproduced in (18) below for comparison with (1) and (2).

(18) a. ???watasi-wa atui desu ka
   I-TOP   hot   POL   QP
   ‘Am I hot?’
b. anata-wa atui desu ka
   You-TOP hot   POL   QP
   ‘Are you hot?’

Faced with this set of data, and taking some others to be discussed later into consideration, this study proposes to modify this popular characterization of the constraint known as the “(first) person restriction” and to term it instead as the “Experiencer-Conceptualizer Identity Constraint”, which is stated below.

The Experiencer-Conceptualizer Identity (ECI) Constraint:

The experiencer of the situation/event must be identical with the conceptualizer of that situation/event.

The term “conceptualizer” is taken from the cognitive linguistic literature (e.g. Langacker 1985⁶) and is defined here as the person who conceives of a situation/event for and before making an assertion/statement about it. Thus, the conceptualizer is different from the speaker in that the latter is person-based while the former is not. The speaker can be equated with the conceptualizer only by default, i.e., in declarative sentences. Accordingly, in the interrogative sentences in (18) above, the conceptualizer is the addressee, not the speaker, because it is the addressee who takes the role of conceiving and making an assertion/judgement about the situation.

⁶ More recently, Langacker (2008: Sec. 13.2.3) describes in detail the conceptualizer role in a question scenario as well as in other basic speech act scenarios.
described. Thus, the sentence in (18a) is infelicitous because it violates the ECI constraint: the experiencer is the speaker while the conceptualizer is the hearer (E≠C). In contrast, the sentence in (18b) does not violate the constraint and is considered felicitous: the experiencer is the addressee and so is the conceptualizer (E=C).

This new characterization of the constraint that ISPs in Japanese exhibit has some merits over the previous, person-based one. Firstly, it clearly indicates that neither the phenomena nor the formal distinction is person-based, and that the bare/marked formal distinction of ISPs in Japanese differs in essence from the person-marking distinction of inflectional forms in the so-called pro-drop languages, such as Spanish. In Spanish, internal states are expressed with adjectives (e.g. *feliz* ‘happy’) + the copula verb *estar*, which inflects for person and number: *estoy* for the first person singular and *estás* for the second person singular. Obviously, the morphological person distinction persists whether the sentence is assertive or interrogative, as in (19).

(19) a. *(Yo)* *estoy* feliz.
   (I) be.1sg happy
   ‘I am happy.’

   b. ¿*Estás* (tú) *feliz*?
   be.2sg (you) happy
   ‘Are (you) happy?’

Secondly, this definition of the constraint can obviate other, rather ad-hoc, parenthetical statements/explanations to the previous person-based definition. For example, as noted and quoted above in (18), Kuroda gives an explanation for the person restriction that it is “reversed” in interrogative sentences. However, for the third person subject, it is not reversed and still applies even in interrogative sentences in Japanese, as shown in (20) [cf. (18) and (3)].

(20) *kare-wa* *atui desu* ka
   He-TOP hot POL QP
   ‘Is he hot?’

The new characterization of the constraint correctly renders the use of ISPs in the interrogative sentence in (20) ungrammatical, where the third person experiencer is not identical with the second person conceptualizer, without recourse to any additional qualification on the constraint.

Thirdly, the new characterization of the grammatical phenomena of ISPs in Japanese correctly captures their behavior in the embedded clauses as well. As noted in the previous section, the attachment of evidentiality morphemes such as *soo-da* ‘seem’ to ISPs makes the third person subject possible, but in turn makes the first person subject unacceptable as in (21) below.

(21) a. *(watasi-wa / *kare-wa)* *uresii.* (=6)
   I-TOP / he-TOP glad
   ‘I am/he is glad.’

   b. *(kare-wa / ???watasi-wa)* *uresi-soo-da.*
   he-TOP / I-TOP glad-seem
   ‘He seems/I seem glad.’

However, when the sentence (21b) above is embedded in a sentence with the third person subject, it becomes apparent that what *soo-da* precludes is not the first person, but the conceptualizer, which corresponds to the upper/main clause subject as shown in (22) below (modified from Ohye 1975:202).

(22) *Taro-wa* *(???zibun-i/kare-i/watasi-ga)*
   Taro-TOP self- / he- / I-NOM
   *uresi-soo-da* to Hanako-ni itta.
   glad-seem that Hanako-to said
   ‘Taro told Hanako that he/he/I seemed glad.’

In the same vein, when the sentence (21a) is embedded as a reported speech in a sentence with the third person subject, the grammaticality is reversed: the subject of ISPs cannot be the speaker, but the third person, who is the upper clause subject, as in (23) below.

(23) *Taro-wa* *(zibun-i/kare-i/watasi-ga)*
   Taro-TOP self- / he- / I-NOM
   *uresii* to Hanako-ni itta.
   glad that Hanako-to said
   ‘Taro told Hanako that he/he/I was glad.’

What is at issue here is not the (first) person, but the conceptualizer, who conceives and describes the internal states of some sentient being.

Finally, the ECI constraint gives natural accounts of why the phenomena in question cannot be found in the non-reportive style, but in the reportive style only, and even of exceptions to this
stylistic rule as well. As noted earlier (where the default-case term “first-person” was used instead of “conceptualizer”), in omniscient narrator stories, one of the non-reportive contexts, ISPs can be used freely with third person subjects. This is because, under our new characterization of the constraint, the omniscient narrator as the conceptualizer knows the experiences of any character in the story to the effect that she can be identical with the experiencer of these internal states. In other words, it is not that the restriction is “lifted” under some condition, but rather that the ECI constraint takes effect in the case of an omniscient narrator in the literary mode. Furthermore, it should be noted that the ECI constraint takes effect (i.e., bare ISP forms can be used only when the experiencer of the internal state is identical with the conceptualizer and otherwise ISPs have to be marked with no-da or the like) in Japanese even in soliloquy and in writing personal diaries—contexts not in the least “reportive”.

5. The ECI constraint in Japanese and Thai

We have seen that the ECI constraint is conventionalized lexically in a lot of ISPs in Japanese, whereas Thai ISPs have no such constraint. 7 Japanese also possesses a grammatical construction, namely, the no-da construction, which, when used with ISPs, serves to lift the ECI constraint and make them behave like their counterpart ISPs in Thai. In other words, this no-da morpheme has the ECI constraint-lifting function.

It should be added here that Thai also possesses a constructional expression, namely, the caŋ construction, which combines ISPs with the morpheme caŋ ‘truly’ and does just the opposite of the no-da construction in Japanese. This morpheme functions to IMPOSE the ECI constraint on ISPs which it is attached to in Thai, and make them behave exactly like bare ISPs in Japanese, as in (24).

(24) a. (chān/khāw) dīi-cai (= (9) )
   I / he glad
   ‘I am/He is glad.’

   b. (chān /*khāw) dīi-cai caŋ
   I / he glad really
   ‘I am so glad.’

The above fact gives us the overall picture of the ECI constraint phenomena in Japanese and Thai as summarized in Table 1 below with ISPs, uresii ‘glad’ in Japanese and dīi-cai ‘glad’ in Thai:

|                      | Japanese | Thai |
|----------------------|----------|------|
| The ECI constraint   | uresii   | dīi-cai caŋ |
| No constraint        | uresii no-da | dīi-cai |

Table 1: The ECI in Japanese and Thai

Table 1 clearly shows the contrast between Japanese and Thai regarding the ECI constraint phenomena involving ISPs. Both languages have conventionalized the ECI constraint in their expressions of internal states of sentient beings. The difference lies in which level of linguistic structure it is conventionalized. In Japanese the ECI constraint is conventionalized at the lexical level, whereas in Thai it is conventionalized at the grammatical level. That is, the two languages differ in how the ECI constraint is linguistically conventionalized.

6. Conclusion

ISPs in Japanese and the so-called “person restriction” they exhibit have been formerly examined in comparison to ISPs in languages like English, which have explicit person systems developed and/or disallow omission of personal pronouns. This paper has contrasted ISPs in Japanese with those in Thai, which belongs together with Japanese to the zero pronominal language type (with no person marking). It has thus brought to the fore typological characteristics of ISPs in Japanese, as well as the range and structural variations of the phenomena exhibited by them.

We have shown that the so-called “person restriction” is not person-based, but is based rather
on the identity of the experiencer of internal states with the conceptualizer of the events, so that it should rather be termed as the Experiencer-Conceptualizer Identity Constraint. Since it is not person-based, the ECI constraint reasonably accounts for the use of ISPs in Japanese in wider contexts than the traditional “reportive” context, such as one where no interlocutor is present. We have argued that the difference between ISPs in Japanese and those in Thai lies in the patterns of lexicalization. Both languages possess expressions with the ECI constraint conventionalized. It is conventionalized or lexicalized into ISPs in Japanese, whereas Thai ISPs take a grammatical marking caŋ to have the similar effects. It is hoped that future studies will further reveal cross-linguistic patterns of variation in this aspect of language for a more holistic typology.

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