CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this study is to assess the main challenges of democratization in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In order to enrich the basic information and achieve the intended specific objectives, the study relied upon secondary data sources. Democracy matters for human security in DRC because well-designed and inclusive political institutions and processes are the key to both preventing violence and managing conflict constructively. It is believed that acting for democracy is acting for peace and security. The DRC, which lies in the heart of Africa, is one of the largest and richest mineral resource countries of the continent and has strategic importance for the stability of the Great Lakes region. This study shows that challenges related to a long period of dictatorship, internal conflicts, communal violence, corruption, weak monitoring of weapons, poor leadership, and globalization have affected the democratization processes and indicators of good governance in the DRC. This study recommends that the government of DRC should consolidate democratization and enhance good governance so as to reduce the crises of democracy in the country and thereby collaborative governance with all the local, national, regional and international stakeholders should be established to avoid the long-suffering of the Congolese people.

Keywords: Authoritarian, Challenges, Corruption, Democratization, DRC, Governance

ABSTRAK

Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menilai tantangan utama demokratisasi di Republik Demokratik Kongo (DRC). Demokrasi penting bagi keamanan manusia di DRC karena institusi dan proses politik yang dirancang dengan baik dan inklusif yang menjadi kunci untuk mencegah kekerasan dan mengelola konflik secara konstruktif. Diyakini bahwa bertindak demokrasi berarti bertindak untuk perdamaian dan keamanan. DRC, yang terletak di jantung Afrika, yaitu salah satu negara dengan sumber daya mineral terbesar dan terkaya di benua ini dan memiliki kepentingan strategis untuk stabilitas kawasan Danau Besar. Studi ini menunjukkan bahwa tantangan yang terkait dengan periode panjang kediktatoran, konflik internal, kekerasan komunal, korupsi, kepemimpinan yang buruk, dan globalisasi telah mempengaruhi proses demokratisasi dan indikator tata pemerintahan yang baik di DRC. Studi ini merekomendasikan bahwa semangat demokrasi, anti senjata, pemerintahan DRC yang kuat dan perbaikan dalam tata kelola harus menjadi fokus utama dari semua aktor lokal, regional, dan internasional dalam upaya mereka untuk membantu penderitaan panjang rakyat Kongo.
INTRODUCTION

One of the most serious challenges to our shared security emerges from human desperation in societies that lack respect for human rights and democracy. Acting for democracy is acting for peace and security. The only way democracy will prove itself is through a living relationship between people and their governments based on trust, accountability and the determination to deliver practical results (Jan Ellison, 2006).

Democracy matters for human security because well-designed and inclusive political institutions and processes are the key to both preventing violence and managing conflict constructively because respect for human rights and public participation are essential for meeting human development objectives (Häusler et al., 2016).

Africa is termed as the cradle of humanity, the land of enormous ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity, the continent that is rich in numerous natural resources and different climates and ecosystems, but it is also known for the continuous stage for misery, underdevelopment, extreme poverty, civil and political unrest, instability, wars and undemocratic government structures. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which lies in the heart of Africa is one of the largest and richest (i.e. in mineral resources) countries of the continent and has strategic importance for the stability of the Great Lakes region (Vlassenroot & Verweijen, 2017).

With an area of 2.3m sq/km, it is a giant of sub-Saharan Africa, bordering nine other countries. It is surrounded by Angola, the Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania across Lake Tanganyika and Zambia. DRC was formerly referred to as Congo Free State, Belgian Congo, Congo-Leopoldville, Congo-Kinshasa and Zaire. The country has enormous mineral wealth such as copper, diamond, gold, cobalt, and potentially large reserves of oil and natural gas, among others. In contrary, this resource-rich country is also the site of one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises (UNDP, 2014).

The conflicts of 1996 and 1998 have resulted in massive disruption of the social, political and economic fabric of the country. For over a decade, the country has been mired in conflict with devastating effects on its civilian population. The conflict in the DRC is one of the most staggering conflicts in international politics as well. The country emerged from what has been called ‘Africa’s First World War’, due to the indulgence of many neighbouring countries in the conflict, in 2003 with the establishment of a transitional government. The war has come to a halt but has given way to several local conflicts. The current situation continues to be miserable with the rising cost of the violent conflict; in terms of death and destruction, disease, malnutrition and mass displacement ever rising. The humanitarian crisis in the DRC is among the most complex, deadly and prolonged as the numbers of displaced persons, sexual crimes, mutilations and summary executions have been of staggering magnitude (UN, 2018).
As a result, the conflict in the DRC can largely be attributed to bad governance and the consequent lack of democracy since its independence. The bad governance resulted in inequitable distribution of resources, corruption, human rights violations under authoritarian regimes and, thus, strengthened discontent among the Congolese people. That is why; the crisis in Congo is essentially seen as an outcome of authoritarianism, foreign interference, misgovernance and lack of democracy. Since independence in 1960, continuous inter-ethnic and civil strife, authoritarian rule, and foreign interference have destroyed the country’s democratization process. The main objective of this study is to investigate the challenges of democratization process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It is fact that the general, otherwise called broad objective, has to be broken down into specific, measurable and attainable objectives. Thus, this study has attempted to address the following specific objectives:

❖ To assess the history of democratization process in the DRC.
❖ To identify factors contributing to crisis of democracy in DRC at the domestic level.
❖ To assess external challenges affecting the democratization processes in DRC.

**REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

**Political Crisis and its Consequences in DRC**

The Democratic Republic of Congo faces a worsening humanitarian, human rights, and security crisis. The consequences have been devastating for the Congolese people, with some 4.5 million people displaced from their homes more than in any other country in Africa and 2 million children are at risk of starvation. Tens of thousands of refugees have fled into Uganda, Angola, Tanzania, and Zambia in recent months (Sawyer, 2018).

The 2006 general elections, culminating in the electoral victory of incumbent president Joseph Kabila, heralded a formal end to the transition period and entrenched the hold of a now democratically elected president and his patronage network over the national institutions. As this confirmation of Kabila’s power limited the prospects for substantial changes in the national level balance of powers, several of the factions that had already been discontent with the transitional process continued to refuse to integrate their troops into the national army (Verweijen & Vlanssenroot, 2017).

Congo is Africa’s biggest copper producer and the world’s largest source of cobalt; a metal that has tripled in value in the past 18 months, given the surge in demand for electric cars. Congo is home to immense biodiversity and the world’s second largest rainforest, which serves as a significant carbon sink for greenhouse gases. Congo’s rivers have the hydropower potential that could one day power half of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, poor governance and large scale abuses by armed groups and members of the Congolese security forces fueled by widespread impunity and struggles for control over the country’s vast resources have stunted the country’s development and left countless victims (Sawyer, 2018).
Much of the violence that plagues Congo today is linked to the country’s broader political crisis, as President Joseph Kabila has stayed in power beyond his constitutionally mandated two-term limit by delaying elections and quashing dissent. Security forces have killed over 300 people during largely peaceful protests since 2015. Hundreds of opposition supporters and democracy activists have been thrown in jail. As a result, since August 2016, an outbreak of violence in the country’s central Kasi region, involving Congolese security forces, government-backed militias, and local armed groups, has left up to 5,000 people dead. In December 2016, the deadline for new elections passed. This followed failed attempts by the Kabila regime to change the constitution to allow him to run for a third term, a tactic that has proven successful for neighboring Rwanda’s Paul Kagame and Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza. Even if elections take place in 2018, they are unlikely to bring fundamental changes to the Congo (Beurden, 2018).

Moreover, throughout 2018, government officials and security forces carried out widespread repression and serious human rights violations against political opposition leaders and supporters, pro-democracy and human rights activists, journalists, and peaceful protesters. The December 30 elections were spoiled by widespread irregularities, voter suppression, and violence. More than a million Congolese were unable to vote when voting was postponed until March 2019 in three pro-opposition areas (World Report, 2019).

In central and eastern Congo, numerous armed groups, and in some cases government security forces, attacked civilians, killing and wounding many innocent people. Much of the violence appeared linked to the country’s broader political crisis. The humanitarian situation remained alarming, with 4.5 million people displaced from their homes, and more than 130,000 refugees who fled to neighboring countries (World Report).

**Corruption: A Devastating Challenge in DRC**

The government of the DRC is putting its own short-term interests over the well-being of the Congolese people. Corruption in the DRC is an endemic problem, and seriously hinders businesses operating in the country. It permeates all levels of government and all sectors of the economy, rendering the country’s investment climate as one of the least competitive in the world.

Clientelism, rent-seeking, and patronage have decimated fair competition, particularly in the sectors of public procurement and extractive industries. It floods all levels of the state apparatus, involving a wide range of state officials, ranging from low ranking civil servants to the highest members of government in the DRC. Besides, corruption has also impeded efforts to increase the transparency of government institutions. The ruling elites have a direct stake in the country’s economy, and steer economic activities in accordance with their own personal opportunities (Business Anti-corruption Portal, 2018). In 2016, the country ranked in the 8th percentile (with 0 being the worst score) (Cimetta et al., 2018).
Furthermore, several studies indicated that the DRC is widely considered to be among the most corrupt countries in the world. The country ranks low on several governance-related indices, coming in nearly last on the 2014 version of the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (listed 47 out of 52 countries) and ranked 154 out of 177 (with a very low score of 22 out of 100) on Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index. This current state of pervasive and systemic corruption is the result of years of poor governance in DRC (Mvondo, 2015).

Accordingly, deep-rooted corruption led to the gradual erosion of the state’s authority over the years until the state completely collapsed in the 1990s. Corruption was further ingrained in Congolese political circles during the civil war led by Laurent Kabila as well as during the post-conflict transition period, such that the office of the presidency of the republic was perceived as the country’s most corrupt institution. In general, as the DRC emerges from a long period of violence and instability, the country continues to struggle with repeated political crises, weak governance, mismanagement of natural resources and severe corruption.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology in this study examines the contextual scenario of challenges of democratization in the DRC. This study purely employed secondary sources of data, such as books, journal articles, media news, international reports and internet sources. The research approach followed throughout this paper is qualitative and the research method is descriptive in nature because the study has attempted to describe the existing phenomena of democratization in DRC, and its main internal and external factors contributing to the crisis of democracy in DRC. Content analysis as a method of data analysis was mainly used and description was also applied.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The History of Democratization Process in the DRC

The DRC gained independence from Belgium in 1960 under the leadership of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Immediately after independence, the country was plunged into a political quagmire that was characterized by military uprisings, attempted secession by two provinces, and the eventual military overthrow of the government in 1965 by Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, who at the time was chief of the Congolese armed forces. Mobutu ruled the country from 1965 to 1997 until he was ousted by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. However, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards in 2001 and was succeeded a few days later by his son, Joseph Kabila, who remains the president of the DRC to this day (Mbaku, 2018).

According to Mbaku, Joseph Kabila was elected president in 2006 and re-elected in 2011. However, it was claimed that he had won the 2011 presidential election through fraud and election irregularities.
Kabila’s reign has been characterized by high levels of sectarian violence, increased poverty, high levels of corruption, and the increasing use of violence by the government to suppress citizen dissent.

The Mobutiste regime largely squandered the wealth of the country and progressively isolated it at international level. In 1997, a coalition led by Laurent Désiré Kabila of the AFDL party (Alliance of Democratic Liberation Forces) overthrew this regime with the assistance of outside allies. However, Laurent Désiré Kabila soon demonstrated his independence from his Eastern allies of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. This latter used the inability of Kinshasa to bring the Interhame Hutu rebels exiled in DRC after the Rwanda genocide of 1994 under control as an excuse to intervene militarily in the Congolese territory. Congo was divided by this long period of war until 2003. The conflict cost the lives of more than 3 million people and saw the assassination of Laurent Désiré Kabila in January 2001 (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2019).

After five years of the bloody conflict ended, the government and key rebel groups signed the so-called Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement, otherwise called the Sun City Accord, in December 2002. The Global and All-Inclusive agreement ratified in Sun City in 2003 marked the official end of the war years and committed DRC to a process of political transition. The peace settlement paved the way for the formation of a transitional government of national unity headed by Joseph Kabila, the son of Laurent Désiré Kabila, who had been serving as interim president since his rebel-turned-president father was assassinated in January 2001. The transitional constitution adopted in 2003 required power sharing between the president and four vice presidents, two from the former rebel groups, mainly the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba and the Congolese Rally for Democracy of Azarias, one from the political opposition, and one from Kabila’s political movement (Sawyer, 2018).

During the first two years of the Transition, the ‘1+4’ system (which means that Joseph Kabila would remain in power as the president, but he had to share power with four vice-presidents who were the leaders of main rebel groups and political opposition) institutions were hampered by their internal contradictions. They proved incapable of reaching decisions on the various issues and were held back by a number of events, including the confrontations in the east, the attempted coup of June 2004, the withdrawal of DRC from the institutions in August 2004, the rise in tension with Rwanda at the end of 2004, and the threat by the MLC to withdraw from the institutions at the start of 2005 (Vahtras, 2008).

Each time, the tensions abated due to the intervention of the international community, whose role in DRC was officially acknowledged in the texts of the Sun City agreement, which set up an International Committee for the Support of the Transition with powers of intervention. A number of events have demonstrated that the consolidation of peace and democracy in DRC will be a long process. However, the constitutional referendum held on the basis of universal suffrage in December 2005 was a decisive step on the way to pluralist democratic elections (UN, 2014).
In spite of an electoral campaign tainted by a proliferation of hate-filled speeches and the uneven distribution of the resources, the people demonstrated with dignity and determination that it favored a democratic, non-violent way of selecting its leaders during the elections organized in the second half of 2006. These elections were the culmination of a long and difficult process of restoration of peace and the stabilization of the political institutions of the DRC. They made it possible to achieve a decisive step towards the consolidation of democracy and a policy of appeasement involving all the political actors in Congo. After the approval of the new Constitution on a referendum in 2005 and the first democratic elections at the first time since 1960 held in 2006, the DRC currently enjoys its first democratic period ever. The first democratic elections (presidential, legislative and provincial) were held on July 30, 2006 and democratically elected government, parliament and other state institutions were sworn in the beginning of 2007 (World Report, 2019).

**Election and DRC’s Fragile Democracy as a Historic Event**

A successful election would be a springboard for the DRC’s fragile democracy. The United Nations adapted standards to better encompass both the elections and the governing processes; the right of all voters to participate in the electoral process without hindrance, freedom to campaign for all political parties, secrecy of the ballot, reasonable speed in the counting of ballots, accountability and openness of the electoral process to the competing parties and an acceptable electoral law are identified as the guiding criteria and governing processes for the country of the world. However, when we measure these governing principles in the context of DRC, almost all are failed in practice.

The 2006 Congolese constitution was created in the aftermath of thirty-two years of dictatorship, during which President Mobutu Sese Seko used public funds to enrich himself and his allies, and sets up safeguards to prevent the abuse of public office for personal enrichment (Congo Research Group, 2017). In 2006, Joseph Kabila became president when his father Laurent was assassinated in 2001. His presidency secured controversial elections in 2011. The electoral calendar should be fixed early in the electoral cycle to allow the electoral institution to effectively plan for elections. The DRC constitution fixed the end term of office for President Joseph Kabila’s leadership, and second and final term in office was terminated on December 20, 2016. The constitution also requires elections by November 27, 2016. However, the Kabila’s leadership has been post-pond the election of November 2016 due to very silly reasons. Article 70 limits the presidential term to five years which is renewable once and states that the President shall stay in power until the effective installation of the new president. But it does not mention any electoral procedures that the outgoing president should stay in power until elections are held to select his or her successor.

The constitution of this article and the electoral post-pond has brought many contentions and violence in the DRC. The Kabila’s administration has adopted the attitude of the Congolese people that will lead them to conflict and violence instead of election due to poor implementation of formal electoral
calendar, weak political consensus, political greediness, lost confidence in the DRC’s governing and electoral institutions and in general political uncertainty. Thus, one can conclude that the criterion for evaluating capability of holding successful elections in DRC has failed.

In line with this finding, CEPPS assessment (2016) found that lack of political consensus and low credibility of electoral commission on a path towards elections are the biggest obstacles to the organization of elections in the DRC. The assessment team stated that an increasing number of cases of human rights abuses targeting the political opposition, civic activists and media professionals hinder the electoral process by reducing transparency and trust in the government and the electoral process, and constitute a further vulnerability in the electoral process. These lead the country to have a failed democracy in which both human and democratic rights of the people have been repeatedly violated.

In order to install domestic stability, to enhance the quality of governance and to establish the democratization process in the DRC, several studies are recommending the post conflict election as an important solution.

Post-conflict elections are expected to establish domestic and international legitimacy, institute a process of democratization, promote reconciliation, and lay the groundwork for lasting peace. This is expected to take place in an environment where violence and civil war have critically damaged infrastructure and national security, and undermined social economic and political institutions (Dutton, 2014, p1).

Nevertheless, the two giant Congo’s institutions; Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and the Constitutional Court have been accused of their biases into Kabila’s administration due to politicization. These accusations together with lack of consensus within the political class and the popular protests brought risks firing the DRC into a new cycle of conflict and thereby lead to fragile process of peace consolidation in the country (Stearns, 2018).

CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Democratization is a crucial element of post-conflict peacebuilding in the DRC. It is the process of gradually introducing more participatory politics, including elections and the creation of a civil society supportive of tolerant pluralistic politics through adherence to the constitutionally enshrined rules of the game. It involves bringing about the end of an undemocratic régime, the inauguration of a democratic régime, and then the consolidation of a democratic system. A democratic transition, therefore, is one phase in the process of change from one State to another along a democracy continuum (Ngwube, 2013).

Democratic Consolidation describes the challenges of making new democracies secure, expectancy beyond the short-term, protecting them against regression to authoritarian governance, and building dams against eventual reverse waves. A democracy is consolidated when it is made stable, vibrant, efficient and accountable. For that reason, the process is complex and iterative and takes into
account the national conditions which rely upon power sharing (Jones & Taussig, 2019). However, the culture of democratic consolidation in which the democratic principles are consistently applied and the system of democratic transition in the DRC in almost non-existent due to multiple internal and external influences.

The challenges of democratic consolidation in the DRC cannot be dissociated from the country’s long history of authoritarian rule and two civil wars. This entrenched a political culture and moulded a political class that has succeeded in outliving that epoch. Mobutu’s patrimonial rule after 1965 evolved under political leadership, which neither shared a shared vision nor was able to articulate a substantive political agenda for its development. This allowed the individual interests and aspirations of the ruling class to define the political game, while corruption opportunism and materialism flourished (Ngwube, 2013).

The DRC suffers from multiple crises, which are interlinked, and are preventing the emergence of a stable and capable State, and the consolidation of democracy. These crises have destroyed all determinants of State power, and they are never clearly identified in a manner that allows for the application of suitable solutions.

For the purpose of this study, we can assess two sets of crises; crises related to domestic affairs and crises related to external affairs. The DRC will need to deal with both if it is to rebuild a viable State and consolidate democracy. Even if it is abundantly clear that external factors have always played a role in undermining State reconstruction and democratization process in the DRC, the main ground for the continuing dis-functionality is also constituted by internal crises. The DRC’s democratic election of 2006 marked the country’s entry into what Huntington (1991) has termed as, the third wave of democracy but still, the State remains in a very fragile situation (Kabemba, 2011).

**Domestic Challenges Facing Democratization Process in DRC**

Crises produced by internal or domestic factors include the crises of formal or electoral democracy, the crisis of governance, crisis of poor control of the instruments of power, and crisis of leadership.

**The Crisis Of Electoral Democracy**

The crisis of formal democracy arises when elections fail to translate into a real democracy. The 2006 democratic elections, to some extent, resolved the crisis of legitimacy by producing a legitimate government and installing democratic institutions (International Crisis Group, 2006; Shonzza, 2008 & Kabemba, 2011). In the DRC, elections are solutions to the problem of political legitimacy, but they do not provide answers to other problems of State malfunction. Similarly, the mere establishment of a democratic electoral process is not sufficient to ensure that a regime is democratic or will remain
democratic over time. There are four levels on which the classification can be contested in relation to the DRC.

First, the elections were not accepted by all political parties or by all the Congolese people. This does not fulfil the requirement proposed, for example, by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) that a country is held to have installed a democratic regime if, in a context of civil liberties, a competitive election is freely and fairly conducted and the results of the election are accepted by all the contestants. Equally speaking, if we follow the logic of David Betham (1994) who has argued that the experience of transition plays a key role in democratic consolidation, it is possible to argue that democracy in the DRC has not entered the consolidation phase because the inter-Congolese dialogue and the transition failed to reconcile Congolese leaders and factions to institute good governance and to restore peace and stability in the country. In the DRC, the transition will continue to be an ill-defined phenomenon, with no agreement on its point of ending. The transition in DRC delivered the elections, but the conflicts that the Congolese were trying to resolve have continued well beyond (Kabemba, 2011).

Second, it is not assured that electoral democracy will be sustained in the DRC. After seven years (2006-2013) of democratic governance, democracy is not improving; instead, it is deteriorating. There have been many human rights cases of abuse, the killing of human rights activists, political unrest, conflicts and changes to the constitution that did not receive the approval of many people. The ruling party continues to change the rules of the game. It changed the electoral system from a system of two rounds to a one-round system. This system was introduced to diminish the chance of the opposition forming a coalition if no presidential candidate gets a majority of the votes in the first round. This kind of change to the constitution without wider consultation and in less than seven years of democracy is proof of the instability of the political system. It is clear that formal political institutions do not solely determine the rules of the game. Political actors use all kinds of opportunities to renegotiate the rules of the political game while the game is being played. In the DRC, peoples are still far of entering the period of consolidation of democracy; it might be more prudent to speak of consolidation of the transition. In the absence of a credible and reliable opposition, it is doubtful that democracy will be consolidated in the DRC.

Third, the perception that as soon as democratic elections are organized the problem of State dysfunctionality will be resolved was misleading. While the country successfully organized democratic elections in 2006, these elections do not constitute change. Elections have not changed the way power and privileges are organized in Congolese society. Elections have not changed the character of the State as a failed or dysfunctional State. Elections were simply a catalyst for State formation because they have provided interlocutors who have the mandate from the people to engage other crises that the State might be faced with. These representatives must be accountable to citizens. In the DRC, democratic institutions
have been put in place, but the behaviour of those who run them has not changed (Shonza, 2008). The reputation of the State has not increased under the democratic government. The DRC continues to manifest the characteristics of a colonial State even after democratic elections, and it remains in the essence of corrupt and repressive.

Fourth, the legitimacy of the government and its leaders is not solely based on elections. Electoral democracy must be accompanied by economic and social benefits to citizens, or what is called substantive democracy. Electoral democracy cannot be consolidated without substantive democracy. Failure to achieve this can slowly start to undermine the legitimacy of leaders and government. The DRC faces the double and interlinked challenges of stabilizing politics and ensuring economic growth and development. The political economy of State-building in the DRC will have to combine both. The current process of State-building is taking place outside a meaningful debate on the possible economic policies. There will not be political stability and the consolidation of democracy if a minimum level of consensus is not reached on how to respond to socio-economic questions of its citizens. When we put this differently, ensuring human security cannot be postponed in favour of electoral democracy. It is reasonable to expect people at a certain stage to start and to turn their backs on the current democratic process if their social and economic needs are not satisfied. The social and economic context provides an enabling environment within which grievances accumulate, entrepreneurs of violence emerge, and the incentives and resources that facilitate the recruitment of combatants are shaped. The challenge for the DRC is how to generate approaches with the potential to address poverty while sustaining the democratic process.

Hence, democratization in the DRC should include efforts to alleviate poverty, redress inequalities in income and gender, and facilitate access of the large majority to essential social services (particularly education, health, electricity and clean water). Empowered citizens are those who do not fear State repression. Unless citizens improve their capacity for interaction, bargaining and competition with the holders of State power, it is doubtful that democracy will consolidate (Häusler et al, 2016).

**Crisis Related With Bad Governance**

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is entering a critical period in its democratic transition, which began in 2006 with a new constitution. The 2011 elections were fraught with charges of fraud, and the upcoming elections face numerous political and logistical hurdles. Poor governance is deeply rooted in nearly every sector and at all levels of society (USID, 2018). The crisis of governance occurs when power is not adequately defined. It is when power is used by those who control the State to oppress society. Those who capture the State tend to monopolize it to serve their private interests. Because of this, democracy in the DRC is a minimalist democracy. Kabemba (2011) puts it in his PhD
dissertation that the crisis of governance in the DRC occurs because men continue to suppress institutions, and institutions are not able to impose themselves on society.

In the DRC, the permanent failure to reform the State is due to the undermining of institutions and the violation of the country’s laws with impunity. Those in power design mechanisms to allow them to control power for a very long time. This is influenced by the fact that the State is the only provider of services and jobs. This situation creates tensions between individuals and groups as they attempt to capture the State. The ruling elite relies on an intricate web of personal, family, clientelist and ethnic ties and on the military to monopolize the State, even within a democratic system. This situation undermines State-society relations, increases conditions for corruption, and reduces accountability and transparency.

Weak and unaccountable government (even if it is democratically elected) cannot contribute to State-building. Lack of accountability undermines government legitimacy. When legitimacy is weak, States have difficulty in functioning (USID, 2018).

This means that democratic elections (transparent and credible as they might have been) do not contribute to State-building if they bring into power governments that refuse to be accountable and responsive to the needs of the people. The most critical failure in the DRC has been the incapacity of citizens to organize and to hold leaders to account, even when they violate the constitution and are involved in corruption. In this way, the crisis of governance raises the critical issue of participatory democracy in the DRC.

In a liberal democracy, people must be able to participate in policy formulation and implementation. The freedom of people to associate and organize, to influence the collective decisions of the State, goes beyond the ability to form and join political parties and vote for political representatives (McMurchy, 2018). As citizen participation in governance increases, the State strengthens internally through reduced corruption, zero tolerance for impunity, and increased respect for the rule of law. This, in turn, builds social cohesion and strengthens State capacity to face social challenges in a coordinated and collective fashion.

In post-election of DRC, there has not been space for public participation. Government has no strategy to engage civil society to participate in national policy development. A country that is doing well on this issue is South Africa. Today, the South African government probably invites and allows a higher level of civil society participation in national policy development than any other government in Africa (McMurchy, 2018). The growing blockade that separates State and society will continue to undermine State-building and nation-building projects in the DRC.

**Good governance: The Challenge of Development**

The decades of dictatorship have cancelled out the elementary principles of good public management, and the situation further deteriorated during the war years. All the indicators of
governance are at their lowest level since 2017, and DRC is below the average for the other countries in the region. In 2015, 2016 and 2017, DRC obtained a score of 12.32, 9.85 and 8.75 out of 100 in the World Bank’s Voice and Accountability index respectively (World Bank, n.d; CIA, 2016). This shows that the voice and accountability score has shown decline within 3 years.

All the indicators were in the red zone in the 2006 Global Integrity Report, which measures the level of governance, and DRC is 144th in a list of 158 countries in the report by Transparency International (Transparency International index, 2005; CIA, 2016), which measures the degree of corruption. While in a context of this kind, it is necessary to bring about such an important reform and administrative decentralization at the same time, the detrimental effects of this poor governance could multiply and considerably compromise every effort to improve the destiny of the people of Congo for some time to come.

We can make country comparison with Ethiopia and Indonesia in terms of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism based on indicators of the year 2017. Thus, DRC has faced instable political situation than Ethiopia even if both countries have relative similarities. Ethiopia has been twice more stable with percentile score of 7.62 than DRC with score of 3.81.

Another country from Asia, Indonesia is the most successful Southeast Asian country in terms of presence of better governance than the DRC. Indonesia has scored -0.51/2.5 (the level of political stability or absence of violence) and DRC has scored -2.30/2.5 in 2017 measurement index (see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports). This implies that Indonesia has better level of governance score than the DRC. The following table 1 shows the effectiveness of good governance in the DRC based on the World Bank report.

| Governance Indicators                  | Year | Number of sources | Governance score (-2.5 to + 2.5) | Percentile Rank (0 to 100) | Standard Error |
|----------------------------------------|------|-------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|
| Voice and Accountability               | 2015 | 12                | -1.30                        | 12.32                    | 0.13           |
|                                        | 2016 | 12                | -1.39                        | 9.85                     | 0.13           |
|                                        | 2017 | 12                | -1.44                        | 8.87                     | 0.13           |
| Political Stability and Absence of     | 2015 | 6                 | -2.15                        | 4.76                     | 0.21           |
| violence/terrorism                     | 2016 | 6                 | -2.23                        | 4.29                     | 0.22           |
|                                        | 2017 | 6                 | -2.30                        | 3.81                     | 0.22           |
| Government Effectiveness               | 2015 | 10                | -1.63                        | 2.88                     | 0.18           |
|                                        | 2016 | 10                | -1.51                        | 5.77                     | 0.18           |
In the text, the new constitution of DRC also gives governance as a central priority. It asserts the following factors as fundamental basis: the creation of good governance as one of the priorities in the fight against poverty, the dividing up of the territory with the creation of new provinces, decentralization and the unity of the country. But, the creation of good governance and a minimum of macroeconomic stability will only be possible if the main national development actors; government, citizens, private sector and civil society organizations agree to play a concerted role in the reconstruction of the DRC over a long term period.

**The Crisis of Poor Control of the Instruments of Power**

This crisis manifests itself when the State does not control the determinants of State power properly. It is when the State suffers a profound crisis of authority because it cannot deliver goods to people or regulate society—people, therefore, move beyond the reach of the State (UN, 2018). State powers emanate from its capacity to project its presence across its territory and to protect and provide services to citizens. The determinants of State powers will include the public administration and its capacity to collect taxes, security agents and the justice system.
Public administration and Taxation

Administrative structures are at the core of the infrastructural power of the State. The administration system provides for the collection of revenue, the delivery of services related to public goods (including health, education, infrastructure, water, energy, and identity documents, among others), ensuring the circulation of information and the drafting and implementation of regulations. It manages international relations, and it ensures the coordination between different departments to ensure capital formation and investment. It involves bureaucratic organization at the national, regional and local levels, and monitors both formal laws and informal norms that determine behaviour.

The main structural component of public administration is the civil service. How to reform and render the civil service efficient and capable of providing services to citizens is the biggest challenge confronting State-building efforts in the DRC. It is the role of politicians to build an efficient administration. Differently, a dysfunctional administration is a reflection of the politics of the country. Where the administration is functional and apolitical, it matters little if there is no order at the political level; the administration will continue to perform its duties. The Congolese administration faces three main challenges: human resources (and especially management), the legal framework, and financial and material resources. First, human resources pose a significant organizational and competency challenge. In the DRC, appointment in the public sector does not follow competency or qualification criteria. The administration has been ethnicized, and control is absent. Nobody can say with certainty how many civil servants there are in the public administration or what skills they have. This is true for each ministry and department, including the police force and the army. If it is difficult to determine the number of civil servants, it is even more difficult to list the State properties under their control (Sawyer, 2018).

The biggest challenge remains the lack of competent and skilled personnel to run the administration. The DRC skills shortage reflects the weakness of an education system which is not aligned to the needs of the country. The DRC has very few qualified managers, and universities and colleges do not produce the necessary skills. Congolese leaders do not invest much in education; the State does not believe in investing in intelligence creation. This might be the missing link in the entire State reform project.

Second, financial and material resources are an important determinant of State power. A bankrupt State cannot fulfill its mandate. The Congolese State is not currently in a position to meet people’s needs even if it wanted to as it is functioning with inadequate financial support. The national budget is ridiculously small (7 billion American dollars) in 2011. This does not mean that the DRC cannot raise sufficient resources. The problem has to do with the lack of capacity of public administration to collect taxes.
The DRC administration is unable to mobilize the internal finances that the State needs to function (UNDP, 2014). Domestic revenue should be one of the main sources for fiscal space expansion because of its sustainability, thereby reducing dependence on donor assistance. Revenue mobilization is central to the goal of State-building. Building a strong internal economy provided a base for building a strong army and political ideology. European States, to survive external assaults had to have strong economies to support militarization. In this environment, taxation became the main source of State funding. This required a professional and effective public administration to mobilize revenues. This was also necessary for accountability and effective resource management. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the collection of taxes is fragile not only because of the collapsed administrative infrastructure and inadequate skills but also because of corrupt customs officials and tax administrators in the DRC (Mvondo, 2015).

**Poor Security Agents**

Democracy cannot be consolidated in an atmosphere of disorder, instability, war and insecurity. The Congolese State obligation to maintain order and provide security to citizens and property is a critical component of State building. The crisis of poor control of instruments of power refers to the fact that the DRC has no competent security agents (police, army and the intelligence services) to maintain order or to defend the integrity and sovereignty of the State and ensure justice. As many studies indicated that the police, the army and the intelligence services had not defined their role. They are ill-equipped, ill-disciplined, poorly trained, badly paid, and they are politicized. For this reason, there is a need to rediscover the proper roles of the police and the army in the DRC. The army has for an extended period played the role of the police, through continual harassment of citizens (Business Anti-corruption portal, 2016).

The protection of the integrity of the national territory has never been its role. It is not surprising that when the integrity of the DRC territory has been under threat, it has been external forces which have come to its rescue (Berdal & Wennmann, 2010). The Congolese army is an amalgamation of many armies, militias and rebel groups. For the DRC, the reform of the army will not come from the rhetoric of creating a disciplined and professional army. These armed men and women need to be put into army barracks and undergo sustained training on the role of the army. The task of producing a new and professional Congolese army has failed so far because recruitment has been ethicized, politicized, and has never been based on competencies and qualification. This has resulted in a propensity to intervene in politics (Freedom House, 2015). The State's ability to rely on coercion by using the military to guarantee its survival has been kept intact, and this is delaying the creation of a professional national army. At the same time, the police force is incapable of instilling law and order.
The democratic reforms introduced with the country's new constitution and its first democratic elections in 2006 have barely taken hold, with national institutions continuing to function in a way that is predatory and patrimonial, showing scant regard for the rights of Congolese citizens. Presidential and legislative elections held during November 2011, described by most observers as lacking credibility, provided a very clear indication of this dysfunctionality. This context also undermines any hopes of implementing the decentralization process which is outlined in the 2005 constitution. Hence, throughout 2012, the political and security situation has been critical (Bouvy & Lange, 2012).

The country's army started a rebellion against the rebels, but it is weak. Due to this, 800,000 people were exiled into Rwanda in October 2013 (BBC News, November 2013). In mid-2013, in collaboration with Kabila's army, the UN secured a regional agreement to end the M23 rebellion in eastern areas, and the group's alleged founder or high ranking officer, Bosco Ntaganda surrendered to the International Criminal Court to face war-crimes charges. However, now, the M23 rebels group ended its insurgency and wants to participate in the politics of DRC peacefully. On November 10, 2013, the government of the DRC and M23 rebel group signed a cease-hostilities political agreement in Uganda, Kampala. After signing this political agreement, the Congolese people were celebrating for the peaceful settlement of the twenty years of conflict in DRC. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that this will pave the way for the spread head of democratization in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

**Flawed Security Apparatus and Sources of Arms, Weapons and Military Equipments**

Congolese security institutions are characterized by a marked lack of control and transparency over weapons, munitions and related equipment. The climate of widespread corruption and impunity make theft and diversion of weapons and ammunition very easier. Such a situation results in the persistent misuse of such arms by soldiers, police and armed groups to commit and facilitate severe violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. A major weakness of the current framework for the management of weapons, munitions and related equipment in the DRC is the lack of institutional controls (Amnesty International report, 2015). While impunity fuels further violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, the ready availability of weapons and ammunition also contribute to such violations. This is particularly the case in eastern DRC.

**The Crisis of Leadership**

Weak political leadership and the deaths of accountable institutions have prevented the country’s resources and wealth from benefiting its people (ACSS, 2017). Attempts to truncate democracy, to defend the territorial integrity, to reform the administration and to design appropriate economic policies requires an appropriate leadership, a leadership that can turn opportunities into successes. The free and fair elections were supposed to bring into the system a new crop of leadership with the responsibility of
driving a democratic transformational agenda for a better life for all Congolese people. It is a leadership that was expected to transcend personal and ethnic interests and privileges in favour of the interest of the majority.

In his Republic, Plato counsels that:

“Then among the guardians we must select those men who we think, on enquiry, have excelled their lifelong in doing passionately whatever they thought was for the city’s interests, and in refusing decisively to do what they thought was to its harm.”

It is this kind of leadership that the DRC was expected to bring into office after the 2006 and 2011 elections. The consolidation of democracy and peace-building were not expected to be easy, and most thinking Congolese do not expect to see the fruits of democracy overnight, but as puts it, “unless a new ideologically articulate, intellectually fit, morally perfect leadership emerges, it will not be possible to build a State that advances and protects the interest of the majority.”

The leadership that emerged from Sun City agreement in 2002 and which ultimately won the elections in 2006 has turned out to be not the appropriate one. Poor selection of leaders has long been the source of problems in the DRC. The post-2006 elections leadership has excelled in mediocrity (or poorness) and arrogance. It is the presence, for a long time, of a mediocre leadership at the summit of the State that has destroyed the State and continues to hinder efforts for change. This leadership has pursued voluntary strategies to undermine State consolidation, and in the process, it has destroyed all the social forces and institutions that are necessary for the consolidation of democracy (USID, 2018). Therefore, the DRC will need people who have both intelligence and moral standing.

According to studies, the Congolese leadership prioritizes money (the handiwork of people) over people (the handiwork of God). For them, money is the master and people are the servants. The maxim of Jefferson, “equal rights to all and special privileges to none”, and the doctrine of Abraham Lincoln that this should be a government “of the people, by the people and for the people” are absent in the Congolese leadership. The principle of hit and run is well utilized in the DRC. They actively maintain dysfunctional institutions which they use to freely rob the state and the Congolese people.

As a result, the Congolese dissatisfaction comes from the lack of effective leadership within and outside the State. Most leaders have a legacy of corruption, nepotism and embezzlement of funds. The Congolese leadership problem goes far beyond individual leaders. Corruption, lack of honesty and laziness has infested the entire society, including institutions of learning, the heart of any transformation (CIA, 2016).

Hence, the DRC needs a visionary and morally fit leadership to deal with such challenges. The DRC needs a collective leadership driven by a shared vision for the country. This is why, it is imperative for Congolese to fashion for themselves a leadership that is self-aware (the ability to stand apart from
your own life and observe it), conscious (with the moral, ethical sense or inner voice which enables one to evaluate what one observes), imaginative (having the ability to envisage something entirely different from the past) and has an independent will (the power to take action to transform or change the entire society). In 2014, the country ranked 154th of the 174 countries assessed by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index due to poor leadership created by corruption (Haider & Rohwerder, 2015). It is also argued that corruption in the DRC is fuelled by insufficient government salaries. From this, one can conclude that transformational leadership and establishing strong anti-corruption institutions are imperative for the DRC to change the entire society.

External Factors: External Involvement in the Congolese Domestic Affairs

A balance of power beyond a country’s borders determines the chances of the democratization of this country. It is, therefore, evident to acknowledge the role of external actors in either favouring or impeding the democratization of a given country. The impact of external forces may affect the results of the process of democratization. The African case in general, and the DRC’s, in particular, should considerably contribute to one’s understanding on how, when, and why democratic systems have been inflicted, facilitated, obstructed, or handled with benign neglect by external actors. At the beginning of the 1990s, as local citizens consistently opted for a democratic transition, they evenly seldom decided to initiate political reforms independently. However, there was a dynamic interplay between external and local forces that determined particular results along a range from renewed authoritarianism to different degrees of liberalization and democratization in DRC.

The Influence of Western Countries

The colonial legacy initiated by the European scramble for Africa has established a dissident African politics and continues to shape the future of Africa (Gordon, 2007). The indirect effects of colonialism on African political institutions like democracy still linger on. Coradetti (2012) explains that Africa’s main challenge to a successful transition to democracy must be seen as a side effect of colonialism. He emphasizes that colonial power left many African States with a system of authoritarian values and norms, which has weakened the public administration that would have been essential for effective democracy-building. These sequels have been spotted both under Mobutu and Kabila’s authoritarian leadership, whereby people had insignificant power in the ruling process of the DRC (Joseph, 1991).

Western competition in the new State was mostly over the control of Katanga’s mineral resources. During colonization, Congo’s resources were exploited for many decades by British and Belgian capital. The capitalist bloc, though united in its willingness to see the Congo stay under its control, was divided regarding access to the resources. There were competing interests over the control of Katanga’s mineral
resources. The US competed with Belgium, France and Britain. They competed fiercely for the control of Congolese minerals in the early years of the country’s independence. This competition sustained and prolonged the Congolese conflict. It is not the Congolese that is divided; it is the world that is divided. Therefore, the post-independence instability was caused more by western attempts to control Congo’s minerals then by ethnic conflict (BTI, 2014).

At the end of the Cold War, international financial agencies demonstrated a great impact in the early stage of the democratization of the DRC. These influential donors aimed at redesigning their policy in order to restructure the ruling systems in the Third World, and promote democracy. Illogically, that seemed to have led to some machinations and manipulation by local political actors.

Several studies claims that most of the foreign interventions in the domestic political reforms of the DRC have been hypocritical in nature. Foreign actors pretended to promote democracy in the DRC, but in the real sense, they fuel civil unrest so as to create conducive environments that open rooms and facilities for them to exploit massive natural resources of the DRC. This has been seen by many Western countries’ Multinational Corporations, mainly from the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. The climate of hostilities created by these foreign forces had weakened the political stability and created an unbalanced structure in the good governance of the DRC. This has evidently distorted the process of democratization in the DRC under the leadership of Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Hence, international and African actors have at some times been a moderating influence, and at others enabled further escalation of democratic crises in DRC (ACSS, 2017).

The Impact Emerging from the African Great Lakes Region

The political map that Africa inherited from the Berlin conference has created huge differences among various African countries in their potentials for nation-building, economic development, ethnicity, and political stability (Gordon, 2007). Some countries were too big and too disproportional for their, and some ethnicity which is intolerable to each other was a constraint to cohabit. This has, in the long term, led to remarkable unrest and political instability both within and around these particular countries. Peace and development in the DRC is closely linked to peace and development in the Great Lakes region and on the continent. The war has highlighted the importance of viewing the political economy of State reforms in their regional context. There is no region of the world more in need of a stable order for peace, democracy and economic growth and development, but no region in which the prerequisites for that order; economic prosperity, law-abiding governance, ethnic and regional tolerance, shared values for pacific settlement of differences, and strong inter-State institutions – are more lacking than the Great Lakes region.
The political instability in the Great Lakes region of Africa has negatively influenced the democratization of the DRC. Involvement of neighboring countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Angola in the DRC’s internal system, have certainly weakened significant attempt to the democratization of the DRC. The Rwanda genocide is perhaps the genocide of the century. This calamity had had a lot of impacts on the democratization of the DRC. The role of Western countries and Great Lakes region to consolidate democracy in DRC is minimal (ACSS, 2017).

Neighbouring Uganda got also involved with all the needed support in terms of troops and military bases. Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s AFDL received the full backing of President Museveni of Uganda. Even Burundi, Tanzania, and Angola melted in it. During the reign of Mobutu, Angola was undergoing civil unrest characterized by a clash between the Angolan governments led by president Eduardo Dos Santos against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola led by Jonas Savimbi. Hence, the Angolan regime found a prejudice of fuelling hostilities in the DRC in order to overthrow Mobutu’s regime. This external affluence deactivated and destroyed any possible path leading to the democratization of the DRC (ACSS, 2017).

Globalization

The success or the failure of State-building in the DRC will not only be determined by internal and regional factors, but also by the nature of its integration into the world economy. Attempts at State-building in the DRC are taking place in the context of an international system that is characterized by ever-increasing globalization. The present wave (since the post-Cold War period in 1991) presents the following characteristics: more significant communication revolution, a push towards market liberalization and privatization, deregulation, re-ordering of global manufacturing and service industries, a scramble for natural resources, imposition of structural adjustment programmes on developing countries, and the spread of supra-national policy-making process. These factors have an impact on State behaviour, especially weak States like DRC. Globalization continues to challenge African States, and there are signs that it is contributing to new forms of conflict and political instability (Kabemba, 2011).

Some have argued that the expansion of globalization, instead of opening up opportunities for African countries that would ameliorate the crisis of the State, has simultaneously globalized ethnicity and localized citizenship, creating conditions for conflicts (ACSS, 2017). Because of the limited capacity of most States on the continent, globalization may severely restrict the room for manoeuvre of individual States in such a way as to make the notion of a developmental State difficult to realize and achieve.

It is that fact that globalization has increased the intensification and interconnectivity of flows of goods, services, capital and people between countries and regions in all parts of the world. Currently, the integration of the DRC into the global economy is through the extractive industries. The DRC is one...
of the wealthiest countries in strategic minerals. These resources are needed for the modernization and sustainability of developed countries. Accordingly, the DRC must respond to the competitive forces in the global market that are interested in extracting its resources.

The DRC continues to be a source of cheap raw materials and a market for cheap manufacturing products for developed and newly emerging countries. From Leopold II to Joseph Kabila, the pattern of exploitation of these resources has remained the same. The DRC in the international division of labour has been kept as a provider of raw materials to developed countries. This invariably vertical integration has reinforced economic dependence and undermined political autonomy. Minerals have been exploited to serve foreign interests and small Congolese political elite. The Congolese elite has used the country’s mineral resources as a bargaining tool for regime security. Colonial control has now been replaced by globalization, which helps to maintain and sustain a neo-patrimonial State in the DRC.

The DRC must put in place a transparent and accountable system of resource management, and it must have an extensive and comprehensive bureaucratic system intended to collect, verify and disclose the benefit streams from its extractive industries, and to compel companies to disclose their payments to government (and government to disclose what it receives from companies). Resources can only be a blessing under governance systems that are able to mediate competing claims and provide a suitable enabling environment for their profitable extraction, processing and use.

CONCLUSION

The former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, had stated that one of the biggest challenges currently facing Africa and the UN is the challenge of bringing peace and stability to the DRC. Since the beginning of the conflict in 1996, millions of people have been killed, unaccounted injured and millions of others have been displaced. The conflict had shattered the economy and virtually destroyed infrastructure with decades of mismanagement, authoritarian and corrupt rule. The DRC is generally regarded as a bad example in terms of governance. The governance problems have an immediate impact on the humanitarian situation. This study found that the long period of dictatorship, armed hostilities of international origins, internal violence, severe corruption, crisis of election, poor control of weapons, undisciplined army and poor leadership of have brought the destruction of good governance indicators, such as voice of accountability, political stability, control of corruption, transparency and respect for human rights in DRC. As a result, the democratization process in the DRC has been affected by both challenges rooted from domestic and international politics. Therefore, the continued and genuine efforts by local, national and international stakeholders that work in collaboration through collective action can be suggested as a strategy for the country to experience genuine democracy and build peace in the future.
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