Platonic metaphysics and the ontology of international relations: a sketch

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Abstract
This article offers a reading of Plato in light of the recent debates concerning the unique ‘ontology’ of International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline. In particular, this article suggests that Plato’s metaphysical account of the integral connection between human individual, the domestic state and world order can offer IR an alternative outlook to the ‘political scientific’ schema of ‘levels of analysis’. This article argues that Plato’s metaphysical conception of world order can not only provide IR theory with a way to re-imagine the relation between the human, the state and world order. Moreover, Plato’s outlook can highlight or even call into question the post-metaphysical presuppositions of contemporary IR theory in its ‘borrowed ontology’ from modern social science, which can in turn facilitate IR’s re-interpretation of its own ‘ontology’ as well as its distinct contributions to the understanding of the various aspects of the social world and human life.

Keywords
international relations, international theory, metaphysics, ontology, Plato, political philosophy

In an important and much-debated 2016 article, Justin Rosenberg calls for the study of International Relations (IR) to stop relying on ‘an ontology borrowed from Political Science’, and to identify (and develop) its own unique ‘ontological premise’ of ‘the international’ as to ‘reground’ itself in its ‘own ontology’. In Rosenberg’s view, the most promising candidate for IR’s own unique ‘ontological premise’ is what he calls ‘societal multiplicity’: ‘the multiplicity of coexisting societies’. While Rosenberg’s account of IR’s ontology of ‘societal multiplicity’ has generated much debate and discussion, the question of the ‘ontology’ of IR is, of course, not new to IR theory. Since the turn of the
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century, IR theory has witnessed a series of interesting and important works that reflect on the ontological and epistemological foundations of IR. Indeed, one may even trace this quest for ontology back to one of the foundational texts of IR as a discipline: Martin Wight’s ‘Why is there no International Theory?’, first published in this journal in 1960.

In this classic essay, Wight argues that although the study of the order and nature of the political state known as ‘political theory’ has existed ‘from Plato onwards’, there have been scarcely any accounts of ‘international theory’ which concern the relation between states in the western intellectual tradition let alone the classical world. For according to Wight, ‘while the acknowledged classics of political study are the political philosophers, the only acknowledged counterpart in the study of international relations is Thucydides’. There is undoubtedly much truth in this picture of the history of thought. However, against Wight’s claim, this article seeks to derive or even uncover an ‘international theory’ or what Wight’s fellow ‘English School’ colleague Charles Manning would call a ‘social cosmology’ from Plato’s philosophy. Instead of (re)reading Plato as a ‘political theorist’ of the domestic state along the lines of conventional reception, this article presents an experimental if speculative interpretation of Plato as an ‘international theorist’ or even a ‘social cosmologist’, whose insights are particularly of interest for IR’s reflections on its own ontology for two reasons.

First, as Rosenberg notes in his aforementioned article on the unique ontology of IR, the post-Enlightenment idea of the international system – ‘the nation-state, let alone a global sovereign state system’ – is ‘a very recent development in world history’. As opposed to modern (post-)Enlightenment ‘disenchanted’ accounts of the global order, the pre-modern world often assumed there is a metaphysical connection between the order of the cosmos and the order of polities – what Jens Bartelson describes as ‘a very intimate relationship between cosmology and the nature of human community’. As a thinker whose work postulates – or indeed exemplifies – such a conjunction between cosmology and ethics, Plato can give us a sense of the pre-modern and indeed metaphysical conception of world order as an alternative to the ‘post-metaphysical’ presumptions about the international order that we find in contemporary IR theory.

Second, following the metaphysical conjunction he posits between cosmology and ethics, Plato’s understanding of the world or cosmos may be said to be first and foremost philosophical (or metaphysical) and only then secondarily political. In Plato’s pre-modern outlook, what we have is an ontological account of the ‘world’ or cosmos which grounds one’s ethical or indeed ‘political’ conception of the state or polis. As opposed to an ‘ontology of political power’ which defines the ‘international’ in terms of the ‘political’, Plato’s philosophy presents us with a directly opposite theoretical framework: Formally speaking, the ‘political’ is not that which grounds the ‘international’ or ‘supra-national’; to the contrary, it is precisely the ontology of the ‘world’ or the ‘cosmic’ which grounds our understanding of the ‘political’. In this regard, for Plato, the ‘international’ or ‘supra-national’ world order may be said to be ‘supra-political’ both in the sense that it exists at a level above the domestic political state (polis) and in the sense that such an order is not one that is confined to the analysis of politics.

This article begins with a review of Richard Ned Lebow’s engagement with Plato in his endeavour to construct ‘a new ontology’ to ‘develop a theory of international relations’ in A Cultural Theory of International Relations. While Lebow’s impressive book
provides an insightful interpretation of Plato’s famous soul-city analogy in the Republic to develop a framework for IR theory, the first section of this article suggests that Lebow’s focus on the two levels of the individual soul and the domestic state does not fully capture Plato’s metaphysical vision. Drawing on other dialogues such as the Timaeus and the Laws in addition to the Republic, this section argues that Plato in fact extends his soul-city analogy to the level of the cosmos: that instead of just the human individual and the domestic state, Plato’s analogical outlook in fact consists of three levels (the human, the state and the cosmos). After engaging with Lebow’s ambitious work, section two then puts Plato into conversation with Kenneth Waltz. By comparing Plato’s metaphysical conception of the three levels of the human, state and cosmos to Waltz’s influential three-fold ‘levels of analysis’, this section suggests that Plato’s ‘macro-microcosmic’ analogical outlook can be understood as an alternative framework for IR to conceive of the relation between three ‘images’ of human, state and world. Lastly, this article concludes by drawing on some insights from the late Nick Rengger to highlight how Plato’s metaphysical outlook can offer perspectives for IR to re-imagine not only its ‘ontological premise’ but also its unique contributions to the study of social reality or indeed what Rosenberg calls ‘human life in general’.

The soul-city analogy and beyond

Whereas Thucydides has received much attention in recent IR scholarship, there has been relatively little literature on Plato and IR theory. One of the few notable exceptions is Richard Ned Lebow’s treatment of Plato as a philosophical resource for IR in his 2008 book, A Cultural Theory of International Relations. In this impressive treatise, Lebow seeks to develop a theory of IR grounded in an ancient ‘Greek’ understanding of human nature – or more accurately, the human psyche. According to Lebow, what ‘the Greeks’ offer is a triadic understanding of the human psyche as consisting of three ‘fundamental’ drives: appetite, reason and spirit. These three psychological drives provide for Lebow a useful framework to develop models of ‘ideal-type worlds’ as expressions of these different drives – appetite-based worlds, reason-based worlds and spirit-based worlds – for the analysis of political order. According to Lebow’s critical diagnosis of contemporary IR theory, whereas realism overemphasises ‘reason’ and sees the political world as driven by reason and fear, liberalism overplays the role of ‘appetite’ and understands the world in terms of human appetite and interest. What has been forgotten in modern political thought and IR theory is the third psychic drive of ‘spirit’ which Lebow associates with honour. As such, Lebow sees post-Enlightenment political science and political theory as impoverished with the lack of a ‘spirit-based paradigm’ of analysis that sufficiently accounts for honour – that which human ‘spirit’ strives for – as a key factor and motive for political action.

While Lebow does not focus on Plato alone but discusses Plato’s insights alongside those of Thucydides and Aristotle, there are two notable reasons why Plato may be regarded as the most important Greek thinker for Lebow’s thesis in A Cultural Theory. First, as Lebow explicitly acknowledges, the triadic classification of human psychic drives he derives from ancient Greek thought is most directly found in and inspired by Plato’s well-known tripartite account of the human psyche – the human ‘soul’ (psuché)
– in the *Republic*. Second, Plato’s well-known soul-city or *psyche-polis* analogy in the *Republic* is also the main theoretical model that underlies the connection that Lebow draws between the understanding of the human psyche and of the political world as expressions of the three fundamental psychic drives.

This second point is particularly important for Lebow’s deployment of ancient Greek thought as a resource for developing a theory of IR. For Lebow, Plato’s soul-city analogy provides an alternative theoretical approach to the isolated analysis of different ‘levels’ of political units and structures in the contemporary framework and ethos of “levels of analysis”:

Plato and Aristotle explicitly, and Thucydides implicitly, use the traditional Greek three-fold division of the psyche to develop proto-theories of change that bridge levels of analysis. Their core insight is that balance or imbalance at any level of analysis – but especially imbalance – are likely to produce similar changes at adjacent levels of analysis.

‘None of these thinkers’, Lebow contends, ‘frames problems in terms of levels of analysis’ – as we often find in IR theory after the field-changing or indeed field-defining work of Kenneth Waltz (as further discussed in the next section).

While Lebow’s reading of Plato and other ancient Greek thinkers provides IR theory with many powerful and compelling theoretical insights, his exposition of Plato’s soul-city analogy in the *Republic* could be extended beyond the levels of the individual psyche and the domestic state and further onto the ‘higher’ level of the cosmos. This expansion of the soul-city analogy onto the structure of the cosmos is found in the interpretation of the *Republic*’s concluding ‘myth of Er’ in the commentarial tradition of Neo-Platonism. In the reading of prominent Neo-Platonists spanning from Plotinus through Iamblichus to Proclus ‘the Successor’ (as the head of the Platonic Academy in Athens in the fifth century), Plato’s final ‘myth of Er’ about the fate of souls in the afterlife in the *Republic* is in fact concerned with ‘a principle of order in the cosmos, whereby to each soul is assigned its due, its proper place, above or below, in the order of being’.

Just as the individual soul is depicted as a well-ordered community and the *polis* as the structure of the soul on an enlarged scale throughout the *Republic*, what the dialogue’s final myth does is to repeat the structure of the soul and city on an even larger scale – in Proclus’ words, ‘the same thought on a still larger scale’ (*tà auta meizónos*). Plato’s famous soul-analogy is thereby extended to the entire cosmos: What we find in the traditional neo-Platonic reading of the *Republic* is a full-scale theory of the soul and city as microcosmic orders.

Although at first glance this reading of the Neo-Platonic commentarial tradition may appear to go far beyond Plato’s written text, the correlation between the structure of the cosmos and the order of the individual soul and city is clear when one reads the *Republic* alongside other Platonic dialogues such as the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*. While the *Timaeus* is most commonly known as Plato’s treatise of cosmology, the dialogue not only begins with a discussion of the composition of the *polis* as a preamble to its detailed main account of the structure of the cosmos. Moreover, Plato’s account of the cosmos in the *Timaeus* also concludes with a remark that it belongs to the nature of the human soul to know and assimilate itself to the harmonies and motions of the cosmic order – and
for the soul to assimilate itself ‘according to the original nature’ (*kata tēn archaian phy-sin*). To the extent that the *Timaeus* – Plato’s so-called ‘treatise of cosmology’ – is bookended by discussions about the *polis* and the psyche, one can certainly make a strong case that Plato’s conception of the cosmos is intrinsically bound up with his understanding of the political state as well as the human individual.

Indeed, the twentieth-century Plato scholar Paul Friedländer goes so far as to argue that one can only truly understand the myth of Er and indeed the ‘entire construction’ of the *Republic* when it is read through the ‘cosmological’ lens of the *Timaeus*:

As soon as we look forward to the *Timaeus*. . . the symmetry between individual soul and cosmos is perfectly clear. The structure of the *Republic* rests entirely upon the homology between soul and state. And it must be a reading in Plato’s sense when we see the final myth as the fulfilment of the entire construction: human soul, state, and cosmos conceived as three forms symmetrically placed around the same centre. . . as man, according to his nature, belongs to the state, so he also seems to belong, according to the same nature, to the cosmos.

Now, even if one finds this cosmological if Neo-Platonic interpretation of the *Republic* and its final myth of Er overly speculative, the intrinsic relation Plato sees between the human soul, state and cosmos is (even more) evident in his other major dialogue on the issue of politics and social order: the *Laws*.

As the title given to the dialogue suggests, the principal theme examined in Plato’s last and longest dialogue is nothing other than ‘laws’. However, ‘laws’ in this dialogue do not simply refer exclusively to written laws of a city-state: Plato notably draws an etymological connection between ‘law’ (*nomos*) and ‘reason’ (*nous*, sometimes translated as ‘mind’ or ‘intelligence’) at various points in the dialogue, arguing that the *written* laws of polities are nothing more than mimetic representations of the *unwritten* laws of nature of the cosmos. As Glenn Morrow remarks his landmark commentary on the *Laws*:

Nous then, is the source of law. . . As a cosmic factor, Nous is the source of the orderliness of the heavenly bodies. . . But nous is also a constituent of human nature. . . the highest of various manifestations of intelligence in man.

For Plato, to properly follow the law and constitutional order of the ideal city envisioned in the *Laws* is thus to follow something that is *immaterial* or indeed *unwritten*: It is to imitate (*mimeisthai*) the ideal philosophic life of pure reason. With this understanding of the written law of the *polis* as an imitation or mimesis of the unwritten *cosmic* laws of reason, Plato’s notion of ‘law’ does not simply refer to the legal regulations of the state or polis, but *also* to the human being’s individual ‘reason’ *as well as* the ‘laws of nature’ that belongs to the cosmos.

As such, for Plato, *nomos* is something that brings together three levels of order: the human, the political and the cosmic. Plato’s famous soul-city analogy in the *Republic* is thus further developed and expanded in the *Laws* to the cosmic level. As John Gunnell puts it: ‘From the *Republic* to the *Laws*, the correspondence between city and psyche is maintained, but now the analogy extends to the cosmos. . . In the *Republic* only the individual soul was integrated with the cosmos, but [in the *Laws*] it is a question of the state
Just as the Republic speaks of the ordered individual human soul is a kind of image that imitates the political order of the polis, in the Laws, Plato envisions the political order of the domestic state to be one which imitates the ‘supra-political’ structure of the cosmos. Both the soul and the polis are literally microcosms that are brought together by the order of the cosmos.43

There is thus for Plato an intrinsic macro-microcosmic correlation between soul, city and cosmos: the legal order is at once that which ‘knits together’ (syndésas) different individual citizens within Plato’s ideal city,44 as well as that which aligns the individual citizen beyond the domestic political state with the supra-domestic or indeed supra-political order of the cosmos.45 Underlying Plato’s structural assimilation of the political order to the cosmic order is what Gunnell calls ‘the integration of man, state and cosmos’.46 Just as the ideal political order or constitution (politeia) is said to be the imitation (mimesis) of the ‘most beautiful and best way of life’ in the Laws,47 for Plato, the ‘well-ordered’ macro-microcosmic inter-relation between the human, the political state and the supra-political cosmic order is to be realised through mimesis: the human soul, the polis and the cosmos are to imitate each other – to become ‘images’ of one another.48

Levels of mimesis

If the western intellectual tradition has been a series of footnotes on Plato, then one may be tempted to (mimetically) say that much of the theoretical ‘tradition’ of IR has been ‘a series of footnotes on Waltz’.49 While Kenneth Waltz’s classic work Man, the State, and War (1959) is arguably now slightly dated, as Rosenberg points out in his aforementioned article, its account of ‘levels of analysis’ is unrivalled in terms of its enduring influence on IR theory with its conception of ‘the international as separate from, and counterposed to, the domestic realm’.50 However, as Rosenberg also notes, although Waltz ‘certainly did assert the distinctiveness of the international’, his influential framework for IR theory ‘emphatically did not embrace a wider condition of internationality with implications beyond Political Science’ as it insisted that IR theory ‘had nothing to say [about the domestic social world], except to note how different it was from the world of international politics that existed alongside it’.51

While Plato’s ancient account of the world or indeed cosmos cannot be directly equated with Waltz’s third image of the ‘international’ which is generally regarded as the primary or even exclusive subject of study in contemporary IR, some parallels can nonetheless be drawn between Plato’s and Waltz’s respective ‘three-storied’ outlooks.52 In a not dissimilar fashion to the schema of three separate levels of the human individual, the sovereign state and the international system as three distinct ‘images’ in Waltz’s influential ‘levels of analysis’, one can also find in Plato’s macro-microcosmic outlook three levels of the human soul (psyche), the state (polis) and the world (cosmos).53

However, unlike Waltz’s ‘levels of analysis’ which isolates the different images from each other for independent analysis,54 at the heart of Plato’s macro-microcosmic outlook is what Gunnell calls ‘the integration of man, state and cosmos’, in which the three ‘levels’ of the human, the polis and the cosmos are envisioned to ‘image’ each other in harmonic mimetic pattern.55 For Plato, the ‘third-image’ cosmic order is not to be analysed or understood in isolation from the two other ‘levels’: Contrary to Waltz’s isolation of the
third-image of the international, for Plato, it is none other than the ‘third image’ of the cosmic order that provides the ideal theoretical framework for understanding – or even ordering – of the constitution of the ideal polis and human psyche. After all, in the Platonic outlook, the ‘first-image’ human agent as an intellectual being can only come to know and reflect on the various levels by participating in the cosmos in the first place.\footnote{56} The cosmos is the ontological order, so to speak, that ‘knits together’ the human individual’s relations with other entities – whether they are other humans, non-human agents or indeed the political state.\footnote{57}

However, while the politeiai of Plato’s various ideal cities are to imitate the same universal cosmic order, they are nevertheless explicitly said to have different social structures: although both of the cities envisioned in the Republic and Laws may be said to be idealised societies, they have notably different laws and constitutions. As Morrow points out:

[As] an ‘imitation’ of the ideal. . . Plato’s construction [of model city-states] does not preclude the possibility of other constructions, for the ideal can be imitated in many ways and under varying conditions.\footnote{58}

To this extent, what we find in Plato’s ideal depictions of various city-states or social structures across (and within) his dialogues is an overarching metaphysical account of a ‘societal multiplicity’ not dissimilar to that which Rosenberg posits as the unique ‘ontological premise’.\footnote{59} But unlike Rosenberg’s conception of ‘societal multiplicity’, what we find in Plato’s metaphysical outlook is an alternative ‘macro-microcosmic multiplicity’: Plato’s macro-microcosmic account of multiplicity is one which seeks to find the ‘cosmos’ at multiple levels of structures and entities – not just the ‘third-image’ level international or intersocietal order, but also the levels of states and of individual citizens.\footnote{60} To quote Friedländer:

The vision to which Plato himself progressed was as follows: he saw the small cosmos included in the large cosmos, and both of them as ‘living souls’, again in necessary mutual relation. . . [as] the perfect human soul reflects the ordered movement of the universe. . . Cosmos is the structure of the world as it is of the state and of the [individual human] soul.\footnote{61}

Not only are the three levels or ‘images’ of the human, the state and the world intrinsically interrelated and bound together in Plato’s metaphysical vision, Plato’s conception of the ‘cosmos’ is a structure or order which is in some sense mimetically found at every level of existence across his macro-microcosmic vision.\footnote{62} Thus, for Plato, the cosmic is not a reified ‘third-image’ level that exists above – and in theoretical isolation from – a ‘second-image’ level of domestic politics. Plato’s theory of the cosmos or indeed of ‘cosmic integration’ is what Friedländer calls ‘frame of reference’ that unifies and underscores the ‘mutual relation’ between the (microcosmic) human individual, the state and the world. As if anticipating Waltz’s remark that international theory offers us a way of ‘viewing the first and second images in the perspective of the third’,\footnote{63} Plato’s cosmic ‘third image’ is a framework which sees the world or cosmos not an object of analysis, but as a way or perspective of analysis which brings together different ‘levels’ or ‘images’.\footnote{64}
While one may of course question whether such a metaphysical conceptual framework of the cosmic order can sufficiently explain or account for developments and changes in the international order, it is perhaps not unreasonable to see some kind of correlation between one’s ontological conception of the cosmos and one’s account of human community, as Jens Bartelson has shown in his important study of pre-modern accounts of world order. Although Plato’s metaphysical account of the world or cosmos is indeed not directly translatable or convertible with the notion of ‘the international’ in contemporary IR theory, the way in which Plato conceives of the interrelation between the three levels of the individual, the state and the world can perhaps still provide IR with some insights as it seeks to reconceptualise its distinct ‘ontological premise’ and its relation to other academic disciplines. The ideal integration of human, state and cosmos envisioned in Plato’s macro-microcosmic vision not only highlights the ‘methodological’ conjunction between cosmology and ethics paradigmatic to pre-modern accounts of the world, a comparison with Plato’s metaphysical outlook can moreover bring to light or even call into question some of the meta-theoretical presuppositions that – implicitly or explicitly – underlie the academic study of IR, such as the ‘post-metaphysical’ framework which largely dominates contemporary IR theory and modern social sciences more broadly.

**Conclusion**

In a review of Rosenberg’s earlier work, the late Nick Rengger argues that although ‘Rosenberg stand[s] outside this “mainstream” of contemporary “International Relations” scholarship’, he nonetheless remains ‘firmly in the mainstream of Enlightenment social science’ which is part of the broader ‘post-metaphysical turn’ in contemporary thought. Not unlike Rosenberg’s recent portrayal of the ‘imprisoned’ state of IR scholarship, in this review Rengger alludes to Plato’s famous allegory of the cave (and its prisoners) in the *Republic* to describe the ‘post-metaphysical’ condition of IR scholarship. Rengger notes:

> Some [prisoners] insist that the cave is all there is, but others claim that there is light outside the cave and that, perhaps, it is only because of this light that we see in the cave at all. In our current context, let us suggest that most ‘International Relations’ scholarship either assumes that the ‘cave’ – international society, the international system or what you will – is all there is (that is relevant), or is agnostic (and uninterested) concerning the possibility that there might be anything outside.

While Rosenberg sees IR as being ‘trapped within a borrowed ontology’ from political science, Rengger argues that IR theory – including (early) Rosenberg’s – is often held captive in the ‘cave’ of the dominant ‘post-metaphysical’ ontological outlook of Enlightenment social science. But whereas Rosenberg argues that the way IR scholarship can escape the ‘prison’ is by identifying a unique or even exclusive ‘ontology’ of its own, Rengger suggests that the way for IR to transcend the ‘cave’ of modern Enlightenment post-metaphysical thinking is by going ‘outside’ and become more engaged with other intellectual disciplines.
and modes of thinking. In particular, Rengger holds that one specifically fruitful way to look ‘outside’ the post-metaphysical cave of Enlightenment social science – and, by extension, the ‘prison’ of political science – is by seeking inspiration from ‘older’ ideas of thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle, who ‘see politics and ethics as integrally connected with one another, and indeed with questions in metaphysics and even wider areas of the human sciences’.

However, according to Rengger, such an emphasis on the integral connection between these different intellectual disciplines does not necessarily entail the collapse of the distinction between ‘domestic’ politics and ‘international’ theory. Indeed, as we saw with the possibility of variances between different ideal political structures in Plato’s conception of domestic political order, while there is an intrinsic connection between the orders of the ideal polis and of the cosmos in the Platonic outlook, Plato’s macro-microcosmic vision is by no means advocates a monolithic ideal order to be imposed on all domestic states which would eradicate any meaningful distinctions between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’. Nonetheless, if the ‘international’ is, as Rosenberg submits, fundamentally ‘a feature of human existence’, then the study of IR must always already be connected to the questions of (‘domestic’) politics, ethics and metaphysics, insofar as they all pertain to a concern with what Rosenberg calls ‘the human world’.

Of course, one does not need to draw on Plato or classical metaphysics to come to such conclusions or make such observations. However, as alluded to above, Plato’s metaphysical account of the human, state and cosmos can bring to light or even at times challenge the (implicit) meta-theoretical presuppositions of different theories within IR scholarship, such as the dominant ‘post-metaphysical’ outlook highlighted by Rengger. Such critical attention on the meta-theoretical assumptions of IR theory would obviously be key to the search for IR’s unique ‘ontology’ insofar it would reveal what kind of theories or even theorists are presumed to be off limits for the theorisation of IR. Undoubtedly, some ‘post-metaphysical’ IR theorists would deem Platonic metaphysics too speculative or indeed too ‘unscientific’ for IR theory. However, as we saw with Lebow’s turn to Plato in his search for ‘a new ontology’ to ‘develop a theory of international relations’ (in section one), Platonic thought has much to offer contemporary IR theory in its quest for its own ‘ontology’. For Plato’s micro-macrocosmic outlook not only presents a three-storied metaphysical picture which parallels Waltz’s influential ‘levels of analysis’ (as we saw in section two). Moreover, insofar as much of the intellectual tradition may be regarded as a series of footnotes on Plato – just as the theoretical ‘tradition’ of IR has been said to be ‘a series of footnotes on Waltz’, taking inspiration from Plato would give IR theory a useful common ground in its conversation with other academic disciplines and schools of thought. Indeed, such conversations and dialogues with other subjects are crucial for IR in its reflection on its ‘ontology’ in terms of both its similarities with and differences from the ‘ontological premises’ of other intellectual disciplines as well as the unique contributions IR can make to our understanding of ‘social reality’ or indeed the ‘human world’.

In his response to commentators on his aforementioned article on the unique ontology of IR, Rosenberg speaks of three levels of theory: (1) theories which generate specific hypotheses about actual historical events and international phenomena, (2) ‘grand theories’ like realism or Rosenberg’s own preferred theory of uneven and combined development
which offer models of how various international phenomena may be connected in a systematic way and (3) some even ‘grander’ theory at a ‘third, “ontological”, level’ which ‘specifies IR’s distinctive contribution to social theory’ and makes ‘a “grander” IR claim about human life in general’. However, according to Rosenberg’s reading, such a ‘crucial, discipline-defining moment of “grander theory” has ‘never happened in IR’.86 Although Plato’s metaphysical account of the cosmic order is obviously not a theory that can produce specific hypothesis about the international arena in the twenty-first century (like Rosenberg’s level-one theories) or give a systematic account of how different contemporary international phenomena are connected (like Rosenberg’s level-two ‘grand theories’), it is without a doubt one that is intimately concerned with the ‘grander’ claims about what Rosenberg would call ‘human life in general’.87

Indeed, as this article has sought to show, Plato’s reflections on ‘human life in general’ are not limited to the levels of the individual psyche and the political state but extend to a supra-political or supra-statist level of the cosmos. While Plato’s account of the cosmic order is not, as noted above, directly translatable or applicable to the contemporary realm of ‘the international’ as we know it, his account of the integral connection between the human, the state and the world provides us with a theoretical model where the world or the cosmic – or even, if you will, the ‘international’ – order plays the role of a unifying ‘frame of reference’ which highlights aspects of ‘human existence’ that are not reducible to the levels of the individual psyche or the domestic state.88 If IR is indeed – as Rosenberg contends – concerned with ‘the international’ as a fundamental feature of human existence per se, then an engagement with Plato’s philosophical reflections can not only highlight the unique contributions which IR as the study of ‘the international’ can make to our understanding of ‘human life in general’.89 Even if Plato’s account of the cosmic order may not be able directly provide IR with the ‘crucial, discipline-defining moment of “grander theory”’ that has simply never happened in IR,90 perhaps the grandiose scope and imaginative vision of Plato’s macro-microcosmic outlook can at the very least provide contemporary IR scholarship some inspiration and illuminating ideas to develop the ‘grander’ theoretical endeavours envisioned by Rosenberg and his fellow-travellers in the quest for IR’s unique ontology.91

Acknowledgements
In Memory of Nick Rengger’ (1959–2018).

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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Notes
1. Justin Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison of Political Science’, *International Relations*, 30(2), 2016, pp. 127–153, quote pp. 131, 140.
2. Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, p. 128.
3. See the special issue Forum on Rosenberg’s thesis in International Relations, 31(1), 2017, as well as the discussions in the further special issue Debate on Rosenberg’s article in International Relations, 32(2), 2018.
4. See, among others, Colin Wight, Agents and Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Jens Bartelson, Visions of World Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); R. B. J. Walker, After the Globe, Before the World (London: Routledge, 2009); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics (New York: Routledge, 2011); Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (London: Routledge, 2013); Sergei Prozorov, Ontology and World Politics: Void Universalism I (London: Routledge, 2014); Alexander Wendt, Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). However, as Vassilios Paipais points out, these theorists ‘do not always agree with each other on the definition, scope, meaning and usage of the word “ontology”.’ Vassilios Paipais, Political Ontology and International Political Thought: Voiding a Pluralist World (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 27, note 13.
5. Martin Wight, ‘Why is there no International Theory?’, International Relations, 2(1), 1960, pp. 35–48. Reprinted in Herbert Butterfield and Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 17–34. The following references refer to this later reprint.
6. Wight, ‘Why is there no International Theory?’, pp. 17, 32.
7. C. A. W. Manning, The Nature of International Society (London: MacMillan, 1975). Throughout this programmatic book, Manning speaks of the study of IR as a ‘social cosmology’ that is concerned ‘with life, life in its concrete complexity, its multi-dimensional variety. . . It is not just a partial, or superficial, but a total view that International Relations, as a subject, has to strive for’ (pp. 200–1).
8. A recent ‘international’ reading of Plato can be found in Mark Zelcer, ‘Plato on International Relations’, The Philosophical Forum, 48(3), 2017, pp. 325–39. But as opposed to attempting at Zelcer’s ‘Waltzian’ reconstruction of Plato’s view on the explanation of the causes of war between states from Plato’s political thought, this article seeks to put ‘international theory’ into conversation with Platonic metaphysics broadly in line with the (Christian Neo-) Platonic metaphysical outlooks on the international order of John Milbank and Stephen R. L. Clarke as sketched by Nicholas Rengger in ‘A Postsecular Global Order: Metaphysical Not Political?’, in Luca Mavelli and Fabio Petito (eds.), Towards a Postsecular International Politics (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 65–80. An earlier version of this essay (although without the discussion of Clarke) also appeared in this journal: Nicholas Rengger, ‘On Theology and International Relations: World Politics Beyond the Empty Sky’, International Relations 27(2), 2013, pp. 141–57.
9. Cf. Manning’s comparison of the ‘social cosmologist’ to ‘Plato’s sage’ in The Nature of International Society, p. 87.
10. See also the additional points made below in the conclusion.
11. Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, p. 143, see also p. 135.
12. Bartelson, Visions of World Community, p. 12.
13. For a critical discussion of Plato’s metaphysical conjunction between cosmology and ethics and its impact on subsequent philosophy, see Raymond Geuss, A World Without Why (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), especially pp. 15–6.
14. It may be argued that what Rosenberg calls the ‘ontology of political power’ (which he defines as ‘operating in the absence of central authority’) which currently defines the discipline of IR is
fundamentally a modern construction that is historically contingent (Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, p. 131). Cf. C. J. C. Pickstock, ‘Metaphysics and the Problem of International Relations’, in William Bain (ed.), Medieval Foundations of International Relations (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 53–4: ‘[The emergence of the modern order of international anarchy] is not simply the result of the breakup of medieval Christendom’, but ‘a practical translation of a particular metaphysical framework’.

15. Or even what Rosenberg calls ‘the prison of Political Science’. See Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, passim.

16. Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. ix.

17. Justin Rosenberg, ‘The Elusive International’, International Relations, 31(1), 2017, p. 92.

18. On reasons why the international dimension of Plato’s (and Aristotle’s) political thought and philosophy has been neglected, see Thomas L. Pangle, ‘Justice Among Nations in Platonic and Aristotelian Political Philosophy’, American Journal of Political Science, 42(2), 1998, pp. 379–81.

19. Plato continues to be a main theoretical resource and reference for Lebow in his sequel to A Cultural Theory: Lebow, The Rise and Fall of Political Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). Indeed, Plato’s Republic is cited in all the theoretical chapters (chapters 1–4) in this later work. See Lebow, The Rise and Fall of Political Orders, pp. 30–1, 34, 52, 76, 79, 116, 133, 149, 155.

20. Lebow, A Cultural Theory, passim. In a follow-up work, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Lebow applies this theory of psychological drives he derives from Plato and other ancient Greek thinkers to analyse the causes of war (see Lebow’s reading of the ancient Greeks in Why Nations Fight, pp. 15–6, 65–91). However, while Lebow uses an ‘ancient Greek’ account of political psychology, to the extent that Why Nations Fight is an analysis of ‘war-initiation in terms of motive and relative power of states’ which ‘classifies states in terms of their power’ (Lebow, Why Nations Fight, pp. 18, 16), it may be argued that Lebow’s innovative theory of IR fundamentally assumes ‘an ontology of political power (operating in the absence of central authority)’ which Rosenberg argues is ultimately borrowed from modern political science (Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, p. 131).

21. For a critical discussion of Lebow’s reading of the Greeks in A Cultural Theory, see Nicholas Rengger, The Anti-Pelagian Imagination in Political Theory and International Relations: Dealing in Darkness (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 35–41.

22. Lebow, A Cultural Theory, pp. 14–5, 125–8. While a tripartite account of the human soul could also be found in Plato’s famous account of the chariot in the Phaedrus, Lebow focuses almost exclusively on the Republic instead of the Phaedrus (which is not mentioned in A Cultural Theory).

23. Lebow, A Cultural Theory, pp. 6, 50–2, 116. See also Lebow, The Rise and Fall of Political Orders, p. 34.

24. See Lebow, A Cultural Theory, p. 6: ‘International relations is the hardest, if in many ways the most interesting, case for any theory of political orders. Given the thinness of order at the international level, does it make sense to start here? Why not approach the problem of order at the levels of the individual or the group? Plato opts for this strategy; he develops a theory of individual order in the Republic, which he then extends to society’.

25. Lebow, A Cultural Theory, p. 96.

26. Lebow, A Cultural Theory, p. 52.

27. On Neo-Platonism and its theoretical significance for IR, see N. J. Rengger, ‘From Königsberg to Alexandria (and Back): Classical Thought, Global Ethics and World Politics’, Paradigms, 8(1), 1994, pp. 36–58.
28. Dominic O’Meara, *Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 110.

29. Proclus, *Procli Diadochi in Platonis Rem publicam commentarii*, Vol. II, ed. Wilhelm Kroll (Lipsiae: In aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 1901), p. 99, line 23.

30. Cf. Paul Friedländer, *Plato: An Introduction*, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 188–189.

31. This is perhaps the reason why the *Timaeus* is not discussed at all in Lebow’s *A Cultural Theory*. Although the *Timaeus* is mentioned once later in his sequel to *A Cultural Theory*, The Rise and Fall of Political Orders (p. 34), where Lebow seems to interpret the dialogue simply as a cosmological myth of creation: ‘In his *Timaeus*, Plato describes order as the product of a demiurge who arranges pre-existing matter in accord with eternal and unchanging forms.’

32. Plato, *Timaeus*, 17c–19a.

33. Plato, *Timaeus*, 90b–d.

34. See also Plato, *Timaeus*, 47b–c.

35. Friedländer, *Plato*, p. 188, see also pp. 27–8, 30–1. Cf. Eric Voegelin, *Order and History*, vol. III: *Plato and Aristotle* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1999), p. 253: ‘The systematic place of the *Timaeus* in Plato’s philosophy of politics has become clear. The order of the soul, in the *Republic*, was authenticated well enough through the ascent from the Cave to the intelligible realm of the Idea. The *Republic* had not, however, authenticated the paradigm of the good polis as the form of society in history. That second step required the insight into the consubstantiality of soul and society, and ultimately of the cosmos. The myth of the soul can be the myth of the polis only if both individual soul and the polis in history can be embraced in the psyche of the cosmos.’

36. Although Lebow focuses primarily on the *Republic*, Plato’s *Laws* is also mentioned in passing in *A Cultural Theory*, pp. 76, 169, 194, 513.

37. Plato, *Laws*, 714a, 957c. See Christopher Bobonich, *Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 94. Cf. Julia Annas, ‘Virtue and Law in Plato’, in Christopher Bobonich (ed.), *Plato’s Laws: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 72, 78; Robert Mayhew, ‘The Theology of the Laws’, in Bobonich (ed.), *Plato’s Laws: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 200.

38. See Plato, *Laws*, 890d.

39. Glenn R. Morrow, *Plato’s Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the Laws* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 564.

40. Plato, *Laws*, 713e, cf. 817b.

41. Cf. Robert W. Hall, *Plato* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 77: ‘Plato’s discussion did not distinguish clearly between a written code of law and unwritten laws since *nomos* could refer to both kind of laws. Unwritten laws, however, for Plato, as well as for the Greeks of his time, were as important as written law.’

42. John G. Gunnell, *Political Philosophy and Time: Plato and the Origins of Political Vision* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1987), pp. 197, 203.

43. Cf. Adrian Pabst, *Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), p. 49: ‘The unity of the *polis* and of a virtuous good life is secured by the unity of the Good which informs the knowledge of forms and sustains the action to make the ideal of the Good real in the cosmos.’

44. Plato, *Laws*, 632c.

45. See Plato, *Laws*, 896e–899b; cf. 967b–c.

46. Gunnell, *Political Philosophy and Time*, p. 193.

47. Plato, *Laws*, 817b, cf. 713e.

48. See the use of the notion ‘image’ in Charles L. Griswold, ‘Platonic Liberalism: Self-perfection
as a Foundation of Political Theory’, in J. M. Van Ophuijsen (ed.), Plato and Platonism (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1999), p. 127: ‘The philosopher will see images of Justice in poleis, and therefore take an interest in these poleis in the course of trying to understand what Justice itself is. A polis that embodies or, in its institutions, “images” Justice in a higher degree would be particularly promising in his eyes.’ See also pp. 119–23, where Griswold offers an account of Plato’s politeia as a mimetic copy of ‘the current cycle of the cosmos’. Cf. Zelcer, ‘Plato on International Relations’, p. 339, emphasis added: ‘Plato recognised a unified explanatory schema that governs relations between the levels within his social ontology where the explanations on the international level mirror the corresponding explanations on the domestic and individual psychological levels.’

49. Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wight, ‘The End of International Relations Theory?’, European Journal of International Relations, 19(3), 2013, p. 413; as discussed in Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, p. 133.

50. Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, p. 133. See also Rosenberg’s critical assessment of Waltz’s understanding of IR theory in Justin Rosenberg, ‘Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky: Anarchy in the Mirror of “Uneven and Combined Development”’, International Politics, 50(2), 2013, pp. 183–230.

51. Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, p. 133.

52. This description is borrowed from the notion of ‘three-storied universe’ in Manning, The Nature of International Society, pp. 34–5.

53. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001), especially p. ix, where Waltz remarks in his preface to the new 2001 edition: ‘The word “image” suggests that one forms a picture in the mind; it suggests that one views the world in a certain way. “Image” is an apt term both because one cannot “see” international politics directly, no matter how hard one looks, and because developing a theory requires one to depict a pertinent realm of activity.’

54. See Waltz, Man, the State, and War, p. ix: ‘To say “image” also suggests that in order to explain international outcomes one has to filter some elements out of one’s view in order to concentrate on the presumably fundamental ones.’ See also the more post-structuralist – if anti-Platonic – account of mimesis and IR theory in Necati Polat, International Relations, Meaning and Mimesis (London: Routledge, 2012), especially pp. 1–12 for a discussion of Plato in relation to Waltz’s Man, the State, and War. Cf. Zelcer, ‘Plato on International Relations’, especially p. 339.

55. Gunnell, Political Philosophy and Time, p. 193. While Plato famously critiques mimesis in Book X of the Republic, insofar as Plato’s very own written dialogues are an imitation of real life dialogues, it may be argued that Plato’s critique of mimesis does not apply to all types of mimetic representation. For ways of reconciling the apparent tension between Plato’s critique of mimesis and his own deployment of mimesis, see Francisco J. Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998), especially pp. 129–49; cf. Friedländer, Plato, pp. 108–25; Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 63–72.

56. Eric Voegelin, Order and History, vol. V: In Search of Order (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2000), pp. 116–7.

57. C. J. C. Pickstock, ‘Justice and Prudence: Principles of Order in the Platonic City’, Telos, 119, 2001, pp. 14–16.

58. Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, p. 12, emphasis added.

59. Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, p. 130.

60. Indeed, just as laws (nomoi) and constitutions (politeiai) produce a political order which
'horizontally' knits together (syndésas) different individual citizens within the city-state and ‘vertically’ aligns individual citizens beyond the domestic political state with the supra-political order of the cosmos, Plato’s ‘macro-microcosmic multiplicity’ is not just an ‘intersocietal space’ which ‘horizontally’ accounts for a third-image multiplicity of second-image state-actors, but an all-encompassing multiplicity which accounts for the ‘vertical’ inter-level multiplicity between the different ‘images’ (from human individuals to different city-states to the entire ‘world order’ itself) as well as the ‘horizontal’ intra-level multiplicities between actors of various levels. See Pickstock, ‘Principles of Order in the Platonic City’.

61. Friedländer, Plato, pp. 31, 27, emphasis added.
62. Voegelin suggests that insofar as one can find some ‘order’ (or even ‘disorder’) in an entity, it may be said that such an entity participates in Plato’s ‘cosmic order of things’. See Voegelin, In Search of Order, p. 116: ‘In Plato’s Cosmos we live in an order of things that is flawed by the disorder of the accidental and the random. . . The Cosmos is luminous for the paradox of imperfection-perfection, of an order in movement toward order. . . [Humanity] partakes of it inasmuch as the bodily located psyche called man is one of the “things” in the cosmic order of things. He participates in the disorder of things as much as in their order. The paradox of order-disorder, thus, seems to attach to existence in the mode of thingness.’
63. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, p. 236.
64. Friedländer, Plato, p. 192: ‘The frame of reference is the cosmos, [for Plato] life in this world is seen from the perspective of the great body of the universe.’
65. Bartelson, Visions of World Community; cf. Pickstock, ‘Metaphysics and the Problem of International Order’, p. 53: ‘We can expect that the largest structures of human existence, which are international relations, will be in parallel with the largest structures of human thought in any given period. These structures are ontological or metaphysical.’
66. Cf. Hedley Bull’s classic discussion of the distinction between ‘world’ and ‘international’ order in The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), especially p. 21.
67. Cf. Justin Rosenberg, ‘IR 101’, International Relations, 32(2), 2018, p. 250: ‘IR’s vocation is thus not only to study the “delimited field” of international structures; it is also to solve the “methodological nationalism” of other disciplines.’
68. See N. J. Rengger, ‘A Postsecular Global Order: Metaphysical Not Political?’, pp. 65–6, 73–4; cf. Adrian Pabst, ‘Post-Secularity: Religion, Realism, and the Revival of Grand Theory in IR’, Review of International Studies, 38(5), 2012, pp. 995–1017.
69. Rengger, ‘Clio’s Cave: Historical Materialism and the Claims of “Substantive Social Theory” in World Politics’, Review of International Studies, 22(2), 1996, pp. 228–9.
70. Plato, Republic, 514a–540c.
71. Rengger, ‘Clio’s Cave’, p. 229; cf. N. J. Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 164–6.
72. Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, p. 128.
73. See also the further remarks on the relationship between metaphysics and IR theory in Rengger, ‘A Postsecular Global Order: Metaphysical Not Political?’. On Rengger’s views on (and practice of) the scholarly engagement between IR theory and other disciplines, see Anthony F. Lang, ‘Introduction: Forum on Nicholas J. Rengger’, International Relations, 34(4), 2020, pp. 611–5.
75. See especially N. J. Rengger, Political Theory, Modernity and Postmodernity: Beyond Enlightenment and Critique (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 220–4, quote from p. 2211 cf. Rengger, ‘From Königsberg to Alexandria’.
76. Rengger, Political Theory, p. 223.
77. Or indeed, in Plato’s terminology, between the polis and the cosmos.
78. Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, p. 136, emphasis added.

79. See Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, especially pp. 128–37. Cf. Rengger, Political Theory, p. 223: ‘Thus, there can be no difference, in this sense, between “political theory” and “international political theory”, since in both cases the fundamental questions are the same.’ See also Rengger, International Relations, pp. 201–3.

80. See, however, the emphasis on how metaphysical frameworks underlie and impact conceptions of the international order in Pickstock, ‘Metaphysics and the Problem of International Order’; cf. Pabst, ‘Post-secularity’.

81. Lebow, A Cultural Theory, p. ix.

82. See footnote 49 above.

83. Although Plato is sometimes assumed to be associated solely with the culture and history of the Christian West, in light of the emerging interest in so-called ‘Global IR’ (as opposed to ‘Western IR’), one must not forget the influence and reception of Platonic philosophy in the Islamic and Arabic intellectual traditions. For an overview of this, see Cristina D’Ancona, ‘Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in Translation’, in Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 10–31; see also Peter Adamson, ‘Al-Kindī and the Reception of Greek Philosophy’, in Adamson and Taylor (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 32–51.

84. See the discussion of the ‘ontological premises’ of ‘neighbouring subjects’ of IR, such as Geography, Sociology, History, and Comparative Literature, in Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, pp. 131–6.

85. Rosenberg, ‘The Elusive International’, pp. 91–2.

86. Rosenberg, ‘The Elusive International’, p. 92.

87. Indeed, as Nick Rengger points out (and emphasises) the Socratic famous question of ‘how should we live?’ (in book one of the Republic) lies at the very heart of Plato’s philosophical – and indeed theoretical – reflections. See Rengger, International Relations, pp. 201–2; Plato, Republic, 352d.

88. Cf. Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, pp. 135–6. See also note 64 above.

89. Rosenberg, ‘The Elusive International’, pp. 91–2; Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison’, p. 136.

90. Rosenberg, ‘The Elusive International’, p. 92.

91. Cf. Rengger, International Relations, p. 230; Rengger, ‘Clio’s Cave’, p. 167.

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