Horizontalism in the implementation of land redistribution program in Cipari Cilacap Indonesia

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Abstract. This study explains the dynamics of non-state actors’ involvement in implementing a land redistribution program in Cipari, Cilacap, Indonesia. The urgency of this study is the massive involvement of non-state actors in the implementation of land redistribution programs while lacking an analysis found for the dimension of horizontalism in the implementation of public policies, especially related to the land redistribution program as a part of land reform policy programs in Indonesia. This study focuses on the involvement of non-state actors, the role of Street-Level Bureaucrats (SLBs), and the relationship between SLBs and Local Farmers Organizations (LFO). This study implemented a qualitative approach with a case study strategy. The key informants consisted of village heads, village officials, LFO administrators, and administrators of LFO advocate organizations. We performed observation, in-depth interviews, and documentation reviews for data collection and implemented thematic data analysis. Three main findings include the non-state actors’ involvements since the colonial era (pre-independence), the old order, the new order, to post-reformation, the role of SLBs as state actors dominating the implementation of the land redistribution program, and the negotiation relationship between SLBs and LFO showing the SLBs as the winner.

1. Introduction
The topic of this research is horizontalism in implementing public policies, in this case, the implementation of a land redistribution program in Cipari, Cilacap. The two main considerations of this study are empirical and theoretical concerns. Empirically, this research’s urgency is that non-state actors are increasingly involved in various public policy implementations in Indonesia. This is consistent with Pratikno’s [1, 2] assertion that Indonesian public policy processes have been in a horizontal environment since the 1998 reform era, with numerous opportunities for non-state actors to participate in policy work. A public policy is not easy to implement in this horizontal scenario [3]. One of the key factors is the state’s limited resources for accommodating all of the interests entwined in public policy implementation dynamics. Theoretically, this research is important due to the limited analysis related to horizontalism in the policy process, especially in Indonesia’s implementation of a land redistribution program. In the last ten years, the unit of study analysis for land reform program spans from perceptions of land rights [4–7], target group behavior [8], the interaction of the state and society [9–12], legal framework [13–
In general, this research questions how the description of the dimensions of horizontalism in implementing the land redistribution program in Cipari, Cilacap, Indonesia. Three focused questions appointed are how the involvement of non-state actors was, the role of SLBs as state actors, and the relationship between state and non-state actors in implementing the land redistribution program in Cipari, Cilacap, Indonesia.

2. Methods
This study implements a qualitative approach relying on the constructivism paradigm to explore and understand the practice of land redistribution programs in Cipari, Cilacap, Central Java. The researcher applied a case study strategy to allow an in-depth analysis of the study focus. The primary data consisted of all field notes, audio, and visual documentation derived from the interviews and observation during the study. The secondary data consists of all related documents examined and reviewed to support the data collection and analysis. The key informants consisted of village heads, village officials, LFO administrators, and administrators of LFO advocate organizations. A resource triangulation to compare and confirm all related data derived is performed for data validation and quality. The data analysis of this study implements the thematic analysis.

3. Results and discussion
3.1. The involvement of non-state actors
This section describes the involvement of non-state actors in implementing the land redistribution program in Cipari Cilacap. These non-state actors are involved in making decisions when program implementation begins to take place against their will. The actors involved in the Cipari Cilacap land redistribution program are villagers whose lands have been affected by the nationalization project. As time went on and their relationship with outside parties, the villagers who had been fighting for a long time began to organize themselves and create farmer organizations in their village. In this case, the non-state actors involved are farmers whose lands are involved in the nationalization project who then join local farmer organizations (LFO). At the same time, they are advocated by other parties from outside the village.

The growth of non-state actors in the land redistribution policy in Cipari Cilacap is inseparable from the history of their land tenure. At that time, the residents of the Cipari sub-district generally controlled very narrow land. This land tenure comes from forest clearing (trukali). Then, the farmers who control the land resulting from this lorry get the government’s legitimacy of their land ownership. At that time, the legitimacy of land ownership was known as the “yellow letter”. However, this comfortable condition did not last long. In 1962, for the nationalization of former Japanese government plantations, the lands controlled by the truck farmers were taken over by the plantations supported by the Indonesian National Army (TNI) [16].

The process does not stop after the land acquisition. The urgent basic need for life underlies the farmers to continue fighting back taking over the land. These continuous actions received support, especially from the Indonesian Farmers Front or Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI) led by the trusted figure (the village head at the time). At the same time, however, they had to face consideration as a part of the communist party or Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and confronted with the national army. A common form of reacquisition efforts carried out is demonstrations at plantations [16].

Since the New Order regime began to lead until around 1992, many movements were broken. Therefore, several years later, they were silent. Then, in 1993, driven by student activists, the movement for land rights started again. External support this time is different from the previous external support. This support was concreted with the formation of more organized struggle groups. From this activity, various local farmer organizations (LFO) were formed per village. There were LFO Ketanbanci (Farmers Group for Victims of Cisuru Plantation), Tapungan Bangkit (Caruy Village), Mangkubumi

14]; community movements [15–16]; legal and economic instruments [17,18], supporting policies [19], policy performance [20], policy impact [21-28], community ownership [29], to policy concepts [30].
(Karangreja Village), Tri Manunggal Sari (Kutasari Village), Singa Tani (Mekarsari Village), and Margorukun (Sidadadi Village) [16]. Then, because the struggle had not been successful, external advocacy continued. The result of this process was a farmer organization consisting of existing LFOs members. The name of this organization is the Independent Farmers Union (SeTam). The purpose of this formation is so that the struggle can be more massive and more extensive [16, 31]. If citizens' participation in the policy process includes following decisions, expressing demands, and mass mobilization [32,33], then the horizontal nature of public decision-making in the agrarian policy sector has been going on for a long time and is gaining momentum when the era of rolling reform. Cipari farmers have been participating in public decision-making since the previous order, and their involvement grew even more under the reform order. This condition backs up Pratikno's [2] claim that the growth of horizontal interactions in Indonesia has been resonating since 1998.

What is the purpose of horizontal decision-making situations? Jonathan Fox [32] claims that peasant resistance to rulers is due to their weak position in the larger community. Horizontalism in public decision-making in the agrarian sector might be seen as the state's disregard for the agrarian sector's existence. In the states' perspective, the farmers' position was ignored. We can assume that the state did not observe these farmers based on a few reports concerning the nationalization initiative of the old Japanese colonial government plantations, which also destroyed peasant farms. Those who have possessed land for a long time are forced to relinquish it simply because it is next to a government project. Who are they? This question is about individuals who have the potential to create a horizontal atmosphere. According to Keban [32], the moral economy perspective, rational choice, and class conflict are three views that can be utilized to identify persons who are possibly participating in a horizontal atmosphere. Farmers who no longer own land can establish a horizontal decision-making culture if viewed through the lens of class struggle. Using the rational choice perspective, the farmers who have lost their land have come up with the most sensible calculation: building a horizontal atmosphere. People who are not assured of subsistence will present a horizontal atmosphere, provided you apply the perspective of moral economy.

Horizontalism becomes more intensive with the involvement of other non-state actors who support actors who have been previously involved. Why do they behave like that? Klandermans [32] explained the willingness to change the environment, perform the same as their predecessors, and give meaning to life. A horizontal atmosphere was born in decision-making because there are parties who have certain ideals on whom at the same time want to realize these ideals in a moment of public decision-making. What they have done is very useful for the struggle of the actors they support. What they did was build a higher and broader resonance in the struggles of the actors they support.

3.2. The involvement of the state actors

The state actors for the land redistribution program implementation in Cipari Cilacap are the village heads and the village apparatus. They called the Street-Level Bureaucrats (SLBs) of the land redistribution program. Apart from being assisted by the apparatus, the village heads and the apparatus have the same opportunity to interact with the residents due to the small area coverage. They are entrusted with the task of distributing land ownership rights to each of its citizens. They have a hierarchical mandate from the regent. In practice, these are the bureaucratic actors at the end of the bureaucratic chain of command. Since they are very far from being monitored, they gained great discretion. This section will explain the actions of the SLBs in the land redistribution program.

State actors have a significant role in the process of redistributing former plantation land. Apart from giving land ownership rights, these players are also tasked with carrying out numerous administrative tasks related to land redistribution, such as socialization, inventory, and verification. This activity includes tasks such as introducing the program to the community, particularly potential beneficiaries, compiling a list of possible beneficiaries, and evaluating the correctness of potential beneficiary data. Furthermore, because it was decided that the former right owner would be compensated, another administrative responsibility was imposed on this actor: collecting or receiving compensation money from the beneficiary community [34].
The role of SLBS is the Land Redistribuition Program in Cipari Cilacap Indonesia, which became bigger when problems arose in the redistribution activity. Certain decisions have to be made by this actor. In the case of redistribution in Cipari, there are two categories of problems: crucial issues and non-critical problems. It is called a crucial issue because there are two different interests and must be resolved through negotiation. The non-critical problems are problems that SLBs can solve without any polemics with LFO. These issues are compensation, target groups, location priorities, bailout costs, demands from outsiders. Compensation is a crucial issue in the implementation of Cipari's land redistribution. There are two perspectives in this situation: the requirement and the lack to pay compensatory charges. SLBs eventually concluded that the target group had to pay compensation in the amount asked by the plantation party after a negotiation meeting with the plantation party. This issue is crucial.

Another crucial issue that arises is about the target group. In addition to the COTs themselves, OTL has an interest in the number of target groups. After a long negotiation, finally, the number of target groups that were accommodated was the number of target groups according to the wishes of the BLB. Then, the issue of location priority. The struggle for strategic locations is an unavoidable situation. To overcome this problem, BLB makes mutually agreed regulations. This issue is not crucial—next, the issue of bailout costs. Because the land recipient community at the time of receiving ownership rights to the land did not have money to compensate for the company’s losses so that the activities could continue, bailout costs were issued using either the village treasury or the BLB’s treasury. This issue is not crucial—finally, the issue of external demands. What is meant by outsiders are sharecroppers who come from outside the village. They were also involved in fighting for land rights. However, they are not domiciled in villages whose areas are affected by the redistribution program. This issue is not crucial.

All activities performed by the SLBs of the land redistribution program show that their role in land redistribution activities in Cipari Cilacap is huge. In addition to being the implementor, the SLBs of the land redistribution program in Cipari Cilacap is also the decision-maker. This is in line with the claims of Michael Lipsky and several scholars studying the behavior of SLBs. Due to their autonomy and discretion, these actors become the primary players in the implementation process. Due to their discretion and autonomy, SLBs can control the situation at hand and eventually change policies. Therefore, SLBs are not only policy implementers but also policymakers. Lipsky called him the ‘ultimate policy maker’ and Maynard-Moody and Portillo ‘the last policy maker’.

3.3. Horizontalism: The non-state actor is “giving up”
Public decisions made by state institutions are often not easy to implement. Various rejections from various parties that do not match the interests come and go. At present, the management of this situation is better than in the past four or five decades. Currently, situational management that leads to a mutual agreement is a wise choice. This section explained the practice of horizontalism, consisting of the practice of negotiation in the process of the land redistribution program implementation in Cipari Cilacap. Negotiation is a process where two parties with differences that they need to resolve are trying to reach an agreement by exploring options and exchanging offers and an agreement.

As a negotiation process, the practice of horizontalism in the Cipari Cilacap land redistribution program presents at least two parties involved, namely the SLBs and the LFO. The parties behind these two parties are numerous. The parties behind the SLBs are, among others, village heads (Heads of Caruy, Karangreja, Mekarsari, Sidasari, and Kutasar village), Cipari District Government, Cilacap Regional Government, Regional Office of the National Land Agency of Central Java Province, Land Office of Cilacap Regency, and villagers. Meanwhile, the opponents of SLBs included the Independent Farmers Union (SeTam), local farmer organizations (Singatani, Margorukun, Mangkubumi, and Tri Manunggal Sari), the poor, and cultivators.

As a social process in policy-making, the importance of the negotiation process is the negotiation strategy and tactics used by the parties involved. Strategy is a plan to achieve goals, and tactics use all abilities to achieve these goals. The distributive negotiation technique is the strategy adopted by
both parties. Each party wants to win their interests, yet the SLBs came out on top in this negotiation. Each of these parties employs a distributive negotiation tactic. Both of these parties are interested in advancing their respective goals. Meanwhile, the use of facilities, threats, the slowing down of activity, and third parties have all been employed to attain this goal. The SLBs employed the first two tactics.

SLBs are given the authority to form implementing organizations as state actors. This facility is used to weaken the LFO party. The executive redistribution committee hired some LFO members, which weakened the organization. Threatening methods are also used by the SLBs. One sort of threat communication is sayings like "if you don't want to, that's great; there are still many individuals who want to receive land." The LFO employs the following two strategies. LFO works to slow down activities by omitting some duties. LFO also uses the strategy of inviting additional parties. We call it assistance because it aids in transforming one of the parties involved in the negotiation's thoughts or opinions. In this example, this party's actions, recommendations, and opinions pushed the other parties to change their minds. Other parties' help results from their efforts, which are also linked to the successful execution of land redistribution. The Camat, Budiman Sudjatmiko, and Joyo Winoto are the other parties assisting in this situation.

Another situation of involvement of non-state actors in public policy that is interesting to observe is the power possessed by both state and non-state actors. These two parties can negotiate because they both have power. The negotiating power of the SLBs is the authority as a bureaucrat who must complete the tasks assigned by the state. Meanwhile, the strengths of the LFO are the strength of their network and the strength of their knowledge. They negotiated the cost of compensation as well as the number of target groups. The negotiation approach used in the horizontal relationship still uses a distributive approach. The SLBs believe that their interests, both as individuals and as village leaders, are worth defending. On the other hand, the LFO also felt that their interests deserved to be accommodated because they had been fighting hard to get the ownership rights to the land to come to them. In the end, the negotiations ended with the decision of the SLB's desire to be accommodated.

Fells [38] stated that an agreement has a positive meaning in a negotiation, and the outcome of the negotiation process for the Cipari Cilacap land redistribution scheme is the same. This was done by the LFO, the chairman of the board of directors of the SeTam farmer association. In the end, the negotiation process culminated in an agreement that one of the parties would leave the negotiation area. This is what we refer to as "the non-state actor is giving up" in this scenario. The negotiation process concluded due to this condition and scenario, and land redistribution could be carried out according to the SLBs’ preferences.

Finally, the practice of horizontalism that occurs shows that SLBs' land redistribution programs can solve the problems they face. At this stage, the study findings agree with the thoughts expressed by Tummers et al. [39], who said that frontline workers have ways to cope with the stress they experience as a result of their work. However, what was conveyed by Tummer et al. [39] did not include the behavior carried out by the SLBs for the Cipari Cilacap land redistribution program. If Tummer et al. [39] mention the problem-solving mechanisms that have been recognized so far are the use of personal resources, rationalization, and strict adherence to rules, this study finds something new about the behavior of COTs. That behavior is negotiating behavior. This study adds to the opinion of Tummer et al [39].

4. Conclusion
The engagement of non-state actors in land redistribution schemes in Cipari Cilacap Indonesia, as represented by LFO and LFO advocate organizations, is one of the study's three primary results, found in the old order new order, and post-reformation eras. Second, although being in a horizontal position, SLBs as state actors continue to play a significant role in implementing the land redistribution program in Cipari, Cilacap, Indonesia. Finally, because of the distributive negotiation relationships that SLBs have developed, they can continue to play a permanent role in the land redistribution initiative in Cipari Cilacap, which is still vast. Referring to the three research findings, to the research question, "What is the description of the dimensions of horizontalism in the implementation of land redistribution program
In Cipari Cilacap Indonesia," it can be concluded that the dimension of horizontalism in the policy process said has strengthened since the reform era, in the land policy sector it has been going on for quite a long time.

In terms of policy success, this horizontal situation has given success to the implementation of the policy. However, on the other hand, because the success of distributive negotiations led to parties who coincidentally were not in line with the policy concept, then the implementation of the policy could be said to have failed the policy because the goal of structuring inequality in land tenure ownership was not achieved. In light of the three research findings and the research question, "What is the description of the dimensions of horizontalism in the implementation of land redistribution program in Cipari Cilacap Indonesia," it can be concluded that the dimension of horizontalism in the policy process has strengthened since the reform era, in the land policy sector, and has been going on for quite some time.

In terms of policy execution, this horizontal situation has aided the policy's success.

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