Abstract A shallow semantical embedding of a dyadic deontic logic by Carmo and Jones in classical higher-order logic is presented. This embedding is proven sound and complete, that is, faithful.

The work presented here provides the theoretical foundation for the implementation and automation of dyadic deontic logic within off-the-shelf higher-order theorem provers and proof assistants.

Keywords Dyadic deontic logic; Classical higher-order logic; Semantic embedding; Faithfulness

1 Introduction

Dyadic deontic logic is the logic for reasoning with dyadic obligations (“it ought to be the case that ... if it is the case that ...”). A particular dyadic deontic logic, tailored to so-called contrary-to-duty conditionals, has been proposed by Carmo and Jones [11]. We shall refer to it as DDL in the remainder. DDL comes with a neighborhood semantics and a weakly complete axiomatization over the class of finite models. The framework is immune to the well-known contrary-to-duty paradoxes, like Chisholm’s paradox, and other related puzzles. However, the question of how to mechanise and automate reasoning tasks in DDL has not been studied yet.
This article addresses this challenge. We essentially devise a faithful semantic embedding of DDL in classical higher-order logic (HOL). The latter logic thereby serves as an universal meta-logic. Analogous to successful, recent work in the area of computational metaphysics (cf. [6] and the references therein), the key motivation is to mechanise and automate DDL on the computer by reusing existing theorem proving technology for meta-logic HOL. The embedding of DDL in HOL as devised in this article enables just this.

Meta-logic HOL [4], as employed in this article, was originally devised by Church [14], and further developed by Henkin [15], Andrews [1,3,2]. It bases both terms and formulas on simply typed \(\lambda\)-terms. The use of the \(\lambda\)-calculus has some major advantages. For example, \(\lambda\)-abstractions over formulas allow the explicit naming of sets and predicates, something that is achieved in set theory via the comprehension axioms. Another advantage is, that the complex rules for quantifier instantiation at first-order and higher-order types is completely explained via the rules of \(\lambda\)-conversion (the so-called rules of \(\alpha\-,\beta\-,\text{and }\eta\)-conversion) which were proposed earlier by Church [12,13]. These two advantages are exploited in our embedding of DDL in HOL.

Different notions of semantics for HOL have been thoroughly studied in the literature [7,16]. In this article we assume HOL with Henkin semantics (cf. the detailed description by Benzmüller et. al. [7]). For this notion of HOL, which does not suffer from Gödel’s incompleteness results, several sound and complete theorem provers have been developed in the past decades [8]. We propose to reuse these systems for the automation of DDL. The semantical embedding as devised in this article provides both the theoretical foundation for the approach and the practical bridging technology that is enabling DDL applications within existing HOL theorem provers.

The article is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the syntax and semantics of DDL, as far as needed for this article. Section 3 provides a comparably detailed introduction into HOL; this is needed to keep the article sufficiently self-contained. The semantical embedding of DDL in HOL is then devised and studied in Sec. 4. This section also presents the respective soundness and completeness proofs. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2 The Dyadic Deontic Logic of Carmo and Jones

This section provides a concise introduction of DDL, the dyadic deontic logic proposed by Carmo and Jones. Definitions as required for the remainder are presented. For further details we refer to the literature [11,10].

To define the formulas of DDL we start with a countable set of propositional symbols \(P\), and we choose \(\neg\) and \(\lor\) as the only primitive connectives.
The set of DDL formulas is given as the smallest set of formulas obeying the following conditions:

- Each $p^i \in P$ is an (atomic) DDL formula.
- Given two arbitrary DDL formulas $\varphi$ and $\psi$, then
  - $\neg \varphi$ — classical negation,
  - $\varphi \lor \psi$ — classical disjunction,
  - $\bigcirc(\psi/\varphi)$ — dyadic deontic obligation: “it ought to be $\psi$, given $\varphi$”,
  - $\Box \varphi$ — in all worlds,
  - $\Box_p \varphi$ — in all actual versions of the current world,
  - $\bigodot_a(\varphi)$ — monadic deontic operator for actual obligation, and
  - $\bigodot_p(\varphi)$ — monadic deontic operator for primary obligation
are also DDL formulas.

Further logical connectives can be defined as usual. For example, we may define $\varphi \land \psi := \neg(\neg \varphi \lor \neg \psi)$, $\varphi \to \psi := \neg \varphi \lor \psi$, $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi := (\varphi \to \psi) \land (\psi \to \varphi)$, $\Diamond \varphi := \neg \Box \neg \varphi$, $\Diamond_a \varphi := \neg \Box_a \neg \varphi$, $\Diamond_p \varphi := \neg \Box_p \neg \varphi$, $\top := \neg \bot$, for some propositional symbol $q$, and $\bot := \neg \top$.

A DDL model is a structure $M = \langle S, av, pv, ob, V \rangle$, where $S$ is a non-empty set of items called possible worlds, $V$ is a function assigning a set of worlds to each atomic formula, that is, $V(p^i) \subseteq S$. $av: S \to P(S)$, where $P(S)$ denotes the power set of $S$, is a function mapping worlds to sets of worlds such that $av(s) \neq \emptyset$. $av(s)$ denotes the set of actual versions of the world $s$. $pv: S \to P(S)$ is another, similar mapping such that $av(s) \subseteq pv(s)$ and $s \in pv(s)$. $pv(s)$ denotes the set of potential versions of the world $s$. $ob: P(S) \to P(P(S))$, which denotes the set of propositions that are obligatory in context $s \subseteq S$, is a function mapping sets of worlds to the sets of sets of worlds. The following conditions hold for $ob$ (where $X, Y, Z$ designate arbitrary subsets of $S$):

1. $\emptyset \notin ob(X)$.
2. If $Y \cap X = Z \cap X$, then $Y \in ob(X)$ if and only if $Z \in ob(X)$.
3. Let $\beta \subseteq ob(X)$ and $\beta \neq \emptyset$. If $(\cap \beta) \cap X \neq \emptyset$ (where $\cap \beta = \{ s \in S \mid \text{for all } \beta \in \beta \text{ we have } s \in \beta \}$), then $(\cap \beta) \in ob(X)$.
4. If $Y \subseteq X$ and $Y \in ob(X)$ and $X \subseteq Z$, then $(Z \setminus X) \cup Y \in ob(Z)$.
5. If $Y \subseteq X$ and $Z \in ob(X)$ and $Y \cap Z \neq \emptyset$, then $Z \in ob(Y)$.

Satisfiability of a formula $\varphi$ for a model $M = \langle S, av, pv, ob, V \rangle$ and a world $s \in S$ is denoted by $M, s \models \varphi$ and we define $V^M(\varphi) = \{ s \in S \mid M, s \models \varphi \}$. In order to simplify the presentation, whenever the model $M$ is obvious from context, we write $V(\varphi)$ instead of $V^M(\varphi)$. Moreover, we often use “iff” as
shorthand for “if and only if”.

\[ M, s \models \varphi \iff s \in V(\varphi) \]
\[ M, s \models \neg \varphi \iff M, s \not\models \varphi \] (that is, not \( M, s \models \varphi \))
\[ M, s \models \varphi \land \psi \iff M, s \models \varphi \text{ or } M, s \models \psi \]
\[ M, s \models \Box \varphi \iff \forall s' \in S, s' \models \varphi \]
\[ M, s \models \Box \alpha \varphi \iff \forall s' \in S, s' \models \varphi \text{ and } \forall \alpha \varphi \in \varphi \text{ and } s' \models \neg \alpha \varphi \neq \emptyset \]
\[ M, s \models \Box \alpha \varphi \iff \forall s' \in S, s' \models \varphi \text{ and } \forall \alpha \varphi \in \varphi \text{ and } s' \models \neg \alpha \varphi \neq \emptyset \]

Our evaluation rule for \( \Box (\varphi/\psi) \) is a simplified version of the one used by Carmo and Jones. Given the constraints placed on \( \text{ob} \), both rules are equivalent (cf. [5, result II-2-2]).

As usual, a DDL formula \( \varphi \) is valid in a DDL model \( M = \langle S, \text{av}, \text{pv}, \text{ob}, V \rangle \), denoted as \( M \models^\text{DDL} \varphi \), if and only if for all worlds \( s \in S \) holds \( M, s \models \varphi \). A formula \( \varphi \) is valid, denoted \( \models^\text{DDL} \varphi \), if and only if it is valid in every DDL model.

3 Classical Higher-order Logic

In this section we introduce classical higher-order logic (HOL). The presentation, which has partly been adapted from [5], is rather detailed in order to keep the article sufficiently self-contained.

3.1 Syntax of HOL

For defining the syntax of HOL, we first introduce the set \( T \) of simple types. We assume that \( T \) is freely generated from a set of basic types \( BT \supseteq \{ o, i \} \) using the function type constructor \( \rightarrow \). \( o \) denotes the (bivalent) set of Booleans, and \( i \) a non-empty set of individuals.

For the definition of HOL, we start out with a family of denumerable sets of typed constant symbols \( (C_\alpha)_{\alpha \in T} \), called signature, and a family of denumerable sets of typed variable symbols \( (V_\alpha)_{\alpha \in T} \). We employ Church-style typing, where each term \( t_\alpha \) explicitly encodes its type information in subscript \( \alpha \).

The language of HOL is given as the smallest set of terms obeying the following conditions.

1. For example in Section 4 we will assume constant symbols \( av, pv \) and \( ob \) with types \( i \rightarrow i \rightarrow o, i \rightarrow i \rightarrow o \) and \( (i \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (i \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o \) as part of the signature.
Every typed constant symbol $c_\alpha \in C_\alpha$ is a HOL term of type $\alpha$.

Every typed variable symbol $X_\alpha \in V_\alpha$ is a HOL term of type $\alpha$.

If $s_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta}$ and $t_\alpha$ are HOL terms of types $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ and $\alpha$, respectively, then $(s_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} t_\alpha)_\beta$, called application, is an HOL term of type $\beta$.

If $X_\alpha \in V_\alpha$ is a typed variable symbol and $s_\beta$ is an HOL term of type $\beta$, then $(\lambda X_\alpha s_\beta)_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta}$, called abstraction, is an HOL term of type $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$.

The above definition encompasses the simply typed $\lambda$-calculus. In order to extend this base framework into logic HOL we simply ensure that the signature $(C_\alpha)_{\alpha \in T}$ provides a sufficient selection of primitive logical connectives. Without loss of generality, we here assume the following primitive logical connectives to be part of the signature: $\neg_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha} \in C_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha}$, $\land_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha} \in C_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha}$, $\lor_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha} \in C_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha}$, $=_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha} \in C_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha}$, abbreviated as $=^\alpha$. The symbols $\Pi_{(\alpha \rightarrow \alpha) \rightarrow \alpha}$ and $=_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha}$ are generally assumed for each type $\alpha \in T$. The denotation of the primitive logical connectives is fixed below according to their intended meaning. Binder notation $\forall X_\alpha s_\alpha$ is used as an abbreviation for $\Pi_{(\alpha \rightarrow \alpha) \rightarrow \alpha} \lambda X_\alpha s_\alpha$. Universal quantification in HOL is thus modeled with the help of the logical constants $\Pi_{(\alpha \rightarrow \alpha) \rightarrow \alpha}$ to be used in combination with lambda-abstraction. That is, the only binding mechanism provided in HOL is lambda-abstraction.

HOL is a logic of terms in the sense that the formulas of HOL are given as the terms of type $\alpha$. In addition to the primitive logical connectives selected above, we could assume choice operators $e_{(\alpha \rightarrow \alpha) \rightarrow \alpha} \in C_{(\alpha \rightarrow \alpha) \rightarrow \alpha}$ (for each type $\alpha$) in the signature. We are not pursuing this here.

Type information as well as brackets may be omitted if obvious from the context, and we may also use infix notion to improve readability. For example, we may write $(s \land t)$ instead of $((s \land t) \rightarrow t)$.

From the selected set of primitive connectives, other logical connectives can be introduced as abbreviations\footnote{As demonstrated by Andrews \cite{Andrews1972}, we could in fact start out with only primitive equality in the signature (for all types $\alpha$) and introduce all other logical connectives as abbreviations based on it. The motivation for the redundant signature as selected here is to stay close to the the choices taken in implemented theorem provers such as LEO-II and Leo-III and also to theory paper \cite{Buchmann2008}, which is recommended for further details.} For example, we may define $s \land t := \neg(\neg s \lor \neg t)$, $s \rightarrow t := \neg s \lor t$, $s \leftrightarrow t := (s \rightarrow t) \land (t \rightarrow s)$, $\top := (\lambda X_i X_i) = (\lambda X_i X_i)$, $\bot := \neg \top$ and $\exists X_\alpha s := \neg \forall X_\alpha \neg s$.

Also equality can be defined in HOL by exploiting Leibniz’ principle, expressing that two objects are equal if they share the same properties. Leibniz equality $\equiv^\alpha$ at type $\alpha$ is thus defined as $s_\alpha \equiv^\alpha t_\alpha := \forall P_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha} (\neg Ps \lor Pt)$. 

Each occurrence of a variable in a term is either bound by a $\lambda$ or free. We use $\text{free}(s)$ to denote the set of variables with a free occurrence in $s$. We consider two terms to be equal if the terms are the same up to the names of bound variables, that is, we consider $\alpha$-conversion implicitly.

**Substitution** of a term $s_\alpha$ for a variable $X_\alpha$ in a term $t_\beta$ is denoted by $[s/X]t$. Since we consider $\alpha$-conversion implicitly, we assume the bound variables of $t$ to avoid variable capture.

Well-known operations and relations on HOL terms include $\beta\eta$-normalization and $\beta\eta$-equality, denoted by $s =_{\beta\eta} t$, $\beta$-reduction and $\eta$-reduction. A $\beta$-redex $(\lambda Xs)t$ $\beta$-reduces to $[t/X]s$. An $\eta$-redex $\lambda X(sX)$, where $X \notin \text{free}(s)$, $\eta$-reduces to $s$. We write $s =_{\beta\eta} t$ to mean $s$ can be converted to $t$ by a series of $\beta$-reductions and expansions. Similarly, $s =_{\beta} t$ means $s$ can be converted to $t$ using both $\beta$ and $\eta$.

### 3.2 Semantics of HOL

The semantics of HOL is well understood and thoroughly documented. The introduction provided next focuses on the aspects as needed for this article. For more details we refer to the previously mentioned literature [7].

The semantics of choice for the remainder is Henkin semantics, i.e., we work with Henkin’s general models. Henkin models (and standard models) are introduced next. We start out with introducing frame structures.

A **frame** $D$ is a collection $\{D_\alpha\}_{\alpha \in T}$ of nonempty sets $D_\alpha$, such that $D_o = \{T, F\}$ (for truth and falsehood). The $D_\alpha \to \beta$ are collections of functions mapping $D_\alpha$ into $D_\beta$.

A **model** for HOL is a tuple $M = \langle D, I \rangle$, where $D$ is a frame, and $I$ is a family of typed interpretation functions mapping constant symbols $p_\alpha \in C_\alpha$ to appropriate elements of $D_\alpha$, called the denotation of $p_\alpha$. The logical connectives $\neg$, $\lor$, $\Pi$ and = are always given their expected, standard denotations:\footnote{Since $=_{\alpha\to\alpha\to\alpha}$ (for all types $\alpha$) is in the signature, it is ensured that the domains $D_{\alpha\to\alpha\to\alpha}$ contain the respective identity relations. This addresses an issue discovered by Andrews [2]: if such identity relations were not existing in the $D_{\alpha\to\alpha\to\alpha}$, then Leibniz equality in Henkin semantics may not denote as intended.}

- $I(\neg_{\alpha\to\alpha}) = \text{not} \in D_{\alpha\to\alpha}$ such that $\text{not}(T) = F$ and $\text{not}(F) = T$.
- $I(\lor_{\alpha\to\alpha\to\alpha}) = \text{or} \in D_{\alpha\to\alpha\to\alpha}$ such that $\text{or}(a, b) = T$ iff $(a = T$ or $b = T)$.
- $I(=_{\alpha\to\alpha\to\alpha}) = \text{id} \in D_{\alpha\to\alpha\to\alpha}$ such that for all $a, b \in D_\alpha$, $\text{id}(a, b) = T$ iff $a$ is identical to $b$.}
Note that this requirement, which is called Denotatpflicht, ensures that the

denotations of the lambda-abstractions as devised above are always contained in them.

Variable assignments are a technical aid for the subsequent definition of an
interpretation function $\| \cdot \|_{M,g}$ for HOL terms. This interpretation function is
parametric over a model $M$ and a variable assignment $g$.

A variable assignment $g$ maps variables $X_\alpha$ to elements in $D_\alpha$. $g[d/W]$
denotes the assignment that is identical to $g$, except for variable $W$, which
is now mapped to $d$.

The denotation $\|s_\alpha\|_{M,g}$ of an HOL term $s_\alpha$ on a model $M = \langle D, I \rangle$ under
assignment $g$ is an element $d \in D_\alpha$ defined in the following way:

$$\| p_\alpha \|_{M,g} = I(p_\alpha)$$

$$\| X_\alpha \|_{M,g} = g(X_\alpha)$$

$$\| (s_\alpha \rightarrow \beta t_\alpha)_{\beta} \|_{M,g} = \| s_\alpha \rightarrow \beta \|_{M,g}(\|t_\alpha\|_{M,g})$$

$$\| (\lambda X_\alpha s_\beta)_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} \|_{M,g} = \text{the function } f \text{ from } D_\alpha \text{ to } D_\beta \text{ such that}$$

$$f(d) = \| s_\beta \|_{M,g[d/X_\alpha]} \text{ for all } d \in D_\alpha$$

A model $M = \langle D, I \rangle$ is called a standard model if and only if for all
$\alpha, \beta \in T$ we have $D_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} = \{ f \mid f : D_\alpha \rightarrow D_\beta \}$. In a Henkin model (general model)
function spaces are not necessarily full. Instead it is only required that
for all $\alpha, \beta \in T$, $D_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} \subseteq \{ f \mid f : D_\alpha \rightarrow D_\beta \}$. However, it is required that
the valuation function $\| \cdot \|_{M,g}$ from above is total, so that every term denotes.
Note that this requirement, which is called Denotatpflicht, ensures that the
function domains $D_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta}$ never become too sparse, that is, the denotations of
the lambda-abstractions as devised above are always contained in them.

**Corollary 1** For any Henkin model $M = \langle D, I \rangle$ and variable assignment $g$
holds:

1. $\| (\neg_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} s_\alpha)_{\alpha} \|_{M,g} = T \iff \| s_\alpha \|_{M,g} = F$.
2. $\| (\forall_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} s_\alpha)_{\alpha} \|_{M,g} = T \iff \| s_\alpha \|_{M,g} = T$ or $\| t_\alpha \|_{M,g} = T$.
3. $\| (\land_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} s_\alpha)_{\alpha} \|_{M,g} = T \iff \| s_\alpha \|_{M,g} = T$ and $\| t_\alpha \|_{M,g} = T$.
4. $\| (\rightarrow_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} s_\alpha)_{\alpha} \|_{M,g} = T \iff \| s_\alpha \|_{M,g} = T$ then $\| t_\alpha \|_{M,g} = T$.
5. $\| (\leftarrow_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} s_\alpha)_{\alpha} \|_{M,g} = T \iff \| s_\alpha \|_{M,g} = T$ if $\| t_\alpha \|_{M,g} = T$.
6. $\| T \|_{M,g} = T$.
7. $\| F \|_{M,g} = F$.
8. $\| (\forall X_\alpha s_\alpha)_{\alpha} \|_{M,g} = \| (\forall_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} (\lambda X_\alpha s_\alpha))_{\alpha} \|_{M,g} = T \iff$ for all $d \in D_\alpha$ we
have $\| s_\alpha \|_{M,g[d/X_\alpha]} = T$. 
9. \(\| (\exists X_\alpha s_\alpha) \|^{M, g} = T\) iff there exists \(d \in D_\alpha\) such that \(\| s_\alpha \|^{M, g[d/X_\alpha]} = T\).

Proof We leave the proof as an exercise to the reader.

An HOL formula \(s_\alpha\) is true in a Henkin model \(M\) under assignment \(g\) if and only if \(\| s_\alpha \|^{M, g} = T\); this is also denoted by \(M, g \models_{\text{HOL}} s_\alpha\). An HOL formula \(s_\alpha\) is called valid in \(M\), which is denoted by \(M \models_{\text{HOL}} s_\alpha\), if and only if \(M, g \models_{\text{HOL}} s_\alpha\) for all assignments \(g\). Moreover, a formula \(s_\alpha\) is called valid, denoted by \(\models_{\text{HOL}} s_\alpha\), if and only if \(s_\alpha\) is valid in all Henkin models \(M\). Finally, we define \(\Sigma \models_{\text{HOL}} s_\alpha\) for a set of HOL formulas \(\Sigma\) if and only if \(M \models_{\text{HOL}} s_\alpha\) for all Henkin models \(M\) with \(M \models_{\text{HOL}} t_o\) for all \(t_o \in \Sigma\).

Note that any standard model is obviously also a Henkin model. Hence, validity of a HOL formula \(s_\alpha\) for all Henkin models, implies validity of \(s_\alpha\) for all standard models.

4 Modeling DDL as a Fragment of HOL

This section, as the core contribution of this article, presents a shallow semantical embedding of DDL in HOL and proves its soundness and completeness.

4.1 Semantical Embedding

DDL formulas are identified in our semantical embedding with certain HOL terms (predicates) of type \(i \to o\). They can be applied to terms of type \(i\), which are assumed to denote possible worlds. That is, the HOL type \(i\) is now identified with a (non-empty) set of worlds. Type \(i \to o\) is abbreviated as \(\tau\) in the remainder. The HOL signature is assumed to contain the constant symbol \(av_{i,\tau}\), \(pv_{i,\tau}\) and \(ob_{\tau\to\tau\to o}\). Moreover, for each propositional symbol \(p_i^k\) of DDL, the HOL signature must contain a respective constant symbols \(p_i^k\).

Without loss of generality, we assume that besides those symbols and the primitive logical connectives of HOL, no other constant symbols are given in the signature of HOL.
The mapping $[\cdot]$ translates DDL formulas $s$ into HOL terms $[s]$ of type $\tau$. The mapping is recursively defined:

\[
\begin{align*}
[p^i] & = p^i_	au \\
[\neg s] & = \neg \tau [s] \\
[s \lor t] & = \lor \tau [s][t] \\
[\Box s] & = \Box_{\tau \tau} [s] \\
[\bigcirc(t/s)] & = \bigcirc_{\tau \tau \tau} [s][t] \\
[\Box a s] & = \Box_{\tau \tau} [s] \\
[\Box p s] & = \Box_{\tau \tau} [s] \\
[\bigcirc a(s)] & = \bigcirc_{\tau \tau \tau} [s] \\
[\bigcirc p(s)] & = \bigcirc_{\tau \tau \tau} [s]
\end{align*}
\]

$\neg \tau \tau$, $\lor \tau \tau \tau$, $\Box_{\tau \tau \tau}$, $\bigcirc_{\tau \tau \tau}$, $\Box_{\tau \tau}$, $\Box_{\tau \tau}$, and $\bigcirc_{\tau \tau \tau}$ thereby abbreviate the following HOL terms:

\[
\begin{align*}
\neg \tau & = \lambda A \tau X \neg (AX) \\
\lor & = \lambda A \tau B \tau X \tau (AX \lor BX) \\
\Box_{\tau \tau} & = \lambda A \tau X \forall Y \tau (AY) \\
\bigcirc_{\tau \tau \tau} & = \lambda A \tau B \tau X \tau (obAB) \\
\Box a_{\tau \tau} & = \lambda A \tau X \forall Y \tau (\neg (avXY) \lor AY) \\
\Box p_{\tau \tau} & = \lambda A \tau X \forall Y \tau (\neg (pvXY) \lor (AY)) \\
\bigcirc a_{\tau \tau \tau} & = \lambda A \tau X \forall (ob(avX)A) \land \exists Y \tau (avXY \land \neg (AY))) \\
\bigcirc p_{\tau \tau \tau} & = \lambda A \tau X \forall (ob(pvX)A) \land \exists Y \tau (pvXY \land \neg (AY)))
\end{align*}
\]

Analyzing the truth of a translated formula $[s]$ in a world represented by term $w_i$ corresponds to evaluating the application $([s] w_i)$. In line with previous work [9], we define \(vld_{\tau \tau} = \lambda A \tau \forall S \tau (AS)\). With this definition, validity of a DDL formula $s$ in DDL corresponds to the validity of formula $vld [s]$ in HOL, and vice versa.

4.2 Soundness and Completeness

To prove the soundness and completeness, that is, faithfulness, of the above embedding, a mapping from DDL models into Henkin models is employed.

**Definition 1 (Henkin model $H^M$ for DDL model $M$)** For any DDL model $M = \langle S, av, pv, ob, V \rangle$, we define corresponding Henkin models $H^M$. Thus, let a DDL model $M = \langle S, av, pv, ob, V \rangle$ be given. Moreover, assume that $p^1, \ldots, p^m \in P$, for $m \geq 1$, are the only propositional symbols of DDL. Remember that our embedding requires the corresponding signature of HOL to provide constant symbols $p^i_{\tau}$ such that $[p^i] = p^i_{\tau}$ for $j = 1, \ldots, m$. 
An Henkin model $H^M = \langle \{D_\alpha\}_{\alpha \in T}, I \rangle$ for $M$ is now defined as follows: $D_i$ is chosen as the set of possible worlds $S$; all other sets $D_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta}$ are chosen as (not necessarily full) sets of functions from $D_\alpha$ to $D_\beta$. For all $D_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta}$ the rule that every term $t_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta}$ must have a denotation in $D_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta}$ must be obeyed (Denotatpflicht). In particular, it is required that $D_\tau$, $D_{I \rightarrow \tau}$ and $D_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}$ contain the elements $Ip^i_\tau$, $Iav_{i \rightarrow \tau}$, $Ipv_{i \rightarrow \tau}$ and $Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}$. The interpretation function $I$ of $H^M$ is defined as follows:

1. For $i = 1, \ldots, m$, $Ip^i_\tau \in D_\tau$ is chosen such that $Ip^i_\tau(s) = T$ iff $s \in V(p^i)$ in $M$.
2. $Iav_{i \rightarrow \tau} \in D_{I \rightarrow \tau}$ is chosen such that $Iav_{i \rightarrow \tau}(s, u) = T$ iff $u \in av(s)$ in $M$.
3. $Ipv_{i \rightarrow \tau} \in D_{I \rightarrow \tau}$ is chosen such that $Ipv_{i \rightarrow \tau}(s, u) = T$ iff $u \in pv(s)$ in $M$.
4. $Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o} \in D_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}$ is chosen such that $Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X}, \bar{Y}) = T$ iff $\bar{Y} \in ob(\bar{X})$ in $M$.
5. For the logical connectives $\neg$, $\lor$, $\land$ and $\equiv$ of HOL the interpretation function $I$ is defined as usual (see the previous section).

Since we assume that there are no other symbols (besides the $p^i_\tau$, $av$, $pv$, $ob$ and $\neg$, $\lor$, $\land$, and $\equiv$) in the signature of HOL, $I$ is a total function. Moreover, the above construction guarantees that $H^M$ is a Henkin model: $\langle D, I \rangle$ is a frame, and the choice of $I$ in combination with the Denotatpflicht ensures that for arbitrary assignments $g$, $\|.\|^{H^M,g}$ is an total evaluation function.

**Lemma 1** Let $H^M$ be a Henkin model for a DDL model $M$. In $H^M$ we have for all $s \in D_i$ and all $\bar{X}, \bar{Y}, \bar{Z} \in D_\tau$ (cf. the conditions DDL models as stated on page 3)

- (av) $Iav_{i \rightarrow \tau}(s) \neq \emptyset$.
- (pv1) $Iav_{i \rightarrow \tau}(s) \subseteq Ipv_{i \rightarrow \tau}(s)$.
- (pv2) $s \in Ipv_{i \rightarrow \tau}(s)$.
- (ob1) $\emptyset \notin Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X})$.
- (ob2) If $\bar{Y} \cap \bar{X} = \bar{Z} \cap \bar{X}$, then $(\bar{Y} \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X})$ iff $\bar{Z} \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X})$).
- (ob3) Let $\beta \subseteq Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X})$ and $\beta \neq \emptyset$.
  If $(\cap \beta) \cap \bar{X} \neq \emptyset$, where $\cap \beta = \{s \in S \mid$ for all $\bar{Z} \in \beta$ we have $s \in \bar{Z}\}$, then $(\cap \beta) \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X})$.
- (ob4) If $\bar{Y} \subseteq \bar{X}$ and $\bar{Y} \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X})$ and $\bar{X} \subseteq \bar{Z}$, then $(\bar{Z} \setminus \bar{X}) \cup \bar{Y} \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{Z})$.
- (ob5) If $\bar{Y} \subseteq \bar{X}$ and $\bar{Z} \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X})$ and $\bar{Y} \cap \bar{Z} \neq \emptyset$, then $\bar{Z} \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{Y})$.

\footnote{In the proof we implicitly employ currying and uncurrying, and we associate sets with their characteristic functions. This analogously applies to the remainder of this article.}
Proof Each statement follows by construction of $H^M$ for $M$.

$(av)$: By definition of $av$ for $s \in S$ in $M$, $av(s) \neq \emptyset$; hence, there is $u \in S$ such that $u \in av(s)$. By definition of $H^M$, $Iav_{i \rightarrow r}(s, u) = T$, so $u \in Iav_{i \rightarrow r}(s)$ and hence $Iav_{i \rightarrow r}(s) \neq \emptyset$ in $H^M$.

$(pv1)$: By definition of $av$ and $pv$ for $s \in S$ in $M$, $av(s) \subseteq pv(s)$; hence, for every $u \in av(s)$ we have $u \in pv(s)$. In $H^M$ this means, if $Iav_{i \rightarrow r}(s, u) = T$, then $Ipv_{i \rightarrow r}(s, u) = T$. So, $Iav_{i \rightarrow r}(s) \subseteq Ipv_{i \rightarrow r}(s)$ in $H^M$.

$(pv2)$: This case is similar to $(av)$.

$(ob1)$: By definition of $ob$, we have $\emptyset \notin ob(\bar{X})$; hence, in $H^M$, $Iob_{\tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X}, \emptyset) = F$, that is $\emptyset \notin Iob_{\tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X})$.

$(ob2)$: Suppose $\bar{Y} \cap \bar{X} = \bar{Z} \cap \bar{X}$. In $M$ we have $\bar{Y} \in ob(\bar{X})$ iff $\bar{Z} \in ob(\bar{X})$. By definition of $H^M$ we have $Iob_{\tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X}, \bar{Y}) = T$ iff $Iob_{\tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X}, \bar{Z}) = T$. Hence, $\bar{Y} \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X})$ iff $\bar{Z} \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X})$ in $H^M$.

$(ob3)$: Suppose $\beta \subseteq Iob_{\tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X})$ and $\beta \neq \emptyset$. If $(\cap \beta) \cap \bar{X} \neq \emptyset$, by definition of $ob$ in $M$ we have $(\cap \beta) \subseteq ob(\bar{X})$. Hence, in $H^M$, $Iob_{\tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X}, (\cap \beta)) = T$ and then $(\cap \beta) \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow o}(\bar{X})$.

$(ob4)$ and $(ob5)$ are similar to $(ob2)$. \hfill \Box

Lemma 2 Let $H^M = \{D_\alpha\}_{\alpha \in \mathcal{E}}, I$ be a Henkin model for a DDL model $M$. We have $H^M \models_{HOL} \Sigma$ for all $\Sigma \in \{AV, PV1, PV2, OB1, ..., OB5\}$, where

$AV$ is $\forall W_i \exists V_i (av_{i \rightarrow r} W_i V_i)$

$PV1$ is $\forall W_i \forall V_i (pv_{i \rightarrow r} W_i V_i) = pv_{i \rightarrow r}$

$PV2$ is $\forall W_i (pv_{i \rightarrow r} W_i)$

$OB1$ is $\forall X_r \exists Y_r \exists Z_r (\lambda X_r \perp) \wedge \exists Z_r (\beta_{\tau \rightarrow o} \forall X_r)$

$OB2$ is $\forall X_r Y_r Z_r (\forall W_i ((\forall X_r W_i \wedge X_r W_i) \leftrightarrow (Z_r W_i \wedge X_r W_i)))$

$OB3$ is $\forall \beta_{\tau \rightarrow o} \forall X_r$

$OB4$ is $\forall X_r Y_r Z_r (\forall W_i ((\forall X_r W_i \wedge X_r W_i) \wedge \exists Y_r (X_r W_i \wedge Z_r W_i)))$

$OB5$ is $\forall X_r Y_r Z_r (\forall W_i ((\forall X_r W_i \wedge X_r W_i) \wedge \exists Y_r (X_r W_i \wedge Z_r W_i)))$

Proof We present detailed arguments for most cases.

$AV$:

For all $s \in D_i$: $Iav_{i \rightarrow r}(s) \neq \emptyset$ (by Lemma 1 $(av)$)

$\Leftrightarrow$ For all $s \in D_i$, there exists $u \in D_i$ such that $Iav_{i \rightarrow r}(s, u) = T$
\( \iff \) for all assignments \( g \), for all \( s \in D_i \), there exists \( u \in D_i \) such that 
\[ \|av W V\|^{H^M.g}[^{s/W_i}][^{u/V_i}] = T \]
\( \iff \) for all \( g \), all \( s \in D_i \) we have \( \exists V (av W V)\|^{H^M.g}[^{s/W_i}] = T \)
\( \iff \) for all \( g \) we have \( \|\forall W \exists V (av W V)\|^{H^M.g} = T \)
\( H^M \vdash_{\text{HOL}} AV \)

**PV1:**

Given an arbitrary assignment \( g \), and arbitrary \( s, u \in D_i \) such that 
\( \|av W V\|^{H^M.g}[^{s/W_i}][^{u/V_i}] = T \)
\( \iff \ iav_{\rightarrow \tau} (s, u) = T \)
\( \iff \ ipv_{\rightarrow \tau} (s, u) = T \quad (iav_{\rightarrow \tau} (s) \subseteq ipv_{\rightarrow \tau} (s), \text{by Lemma 1 (pv1)}) \)
\( \iff \|pv W V\|^{H^M.g}[^{s/W_i}][^{u/V_i}] = T \)

Hence by definition of \( \|\cdot\| \), for all \( g \), for all \( s, u \in D_i \) we have:
\( \|av W V\|^{H^M.g}[^{s/W_i}][^{u/V_i}] = T \) implies \( \|pv W V\|^{H^M.g}[^{s/W_i}][^{u/V_i}] = T \)
\( \iff \) for all \( g \), all \( s, u \in D_i \) we have \( \|av W V \rightarrow pv W V\|^{H^M.g}[^{s/W_i}][^{u/V_i}] = T \)
\( \iff \) for all \( g \), all \( s \in D_i \) we have \( \|\forall V (av W V \rightarrow pv W V)\|^{H^M.g}[^{s/W_i}] = T \)
\( \iff \) for all \( g \) we have \( \|\forall W \forall V (av W V \rightarrow pv W V)\|^{H^M.g} = T \)
\( H^M \vdash_{\text{HOL}} PV1 \)

**PV2:**

This case is analogous to AV.

**OB1:**

For all \( \vec{x} \in D_\tau : \emptyset \notin Iob_{\rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\vec{x}) \) (by Lemma 1 (ob1))
\( \iff \) for all \( g \), all \( \vec{x} \in D_\tau \) we have \( \|\neg ob X (\lambda X.\bot)\|^{H^M.g}[^{\vec{x}/X_\tau}] = T \)
\( \iff \) for all \( g \) we have \( \|\forall X \neg (ob X (\lambda X.\bot))\|^{H^M.g}[^{\vec{x}/X_\tau}] = T \)
\( H^M \vdash_{\text{HOL}} OB1 \)

**OB2:**

Given an arbitrary assignment \( g \), and arbitrary \( \vec{x}, \vec{y}, \vec{z} \in D_\tau \) such that 
\( \|\forall W ((Y W \land X W) \iff (Z W \land X W))\|^{H^M.g}[^{\vec{x}/X_\tau}][^{\vec{y}/Y_\tau}][^{\vec{z}/Z_\tau}] = T \)
\( \iff \) for all \( s \in D_i \) we have 
\( \|(Y W \land X W) \iff (Z W \land X W)\|^{H^M.g}[^{\vec{x}/X_\tau}][^{\vec{y}/Y_\tau}][^{\vec{z}/Z_\tau}] [^{s/W_i}] = T \)
\( \iff \) for all \( s \in D_i \) we have 
\( \|(Y W \land X W)\|^{H^M.g}[^{\vec{x}/X_\tau}][^{\vec{y}/Y_\tau}][^{\vec{z}/Z_\tau}] [^{s/W_i}] = T \) \( \iff \) for all \( s \in D_i \) we have 
\( \|Z W \land X W\|^{H^M.g}[^{\vec{x}/X_\tau}][^{\vec{y}/Y_\tau}][^{\vec{z}/Z_\tau}] [^{s/W_i}] = T \)
\( \iff \) for all \( s \in D_i \) we have \( s \in \vec{y} \cap \vec{x} \) iff \( s \in \vec{z} \cap \vec{x} \)
\( \iff \vec{y} \cap \vec{x} = \vec{z} \cap \vec{x} \)
\( \iff Iob_{\rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\vec{x}, \vec{y}) = T \) iff \( Iob_{\rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o}(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = T \) (by Lemma 1 (ob2))
\( \iff \|ob X Y\|^{H^M.g}[^{\vec{x}/X_\tau}][^{\vec{y}/Y_\tau}][^{\vec{z}/Z_\tau}] = T \) \( \iff \) \( \|ob X Z\|^{H^M.g}[^{\vec{x}/X_\tau}][^{\vec{y}/Y_\tau}][^{\vec{z}/Z_\tau}] = T \)
\[\iff\| ob\ X\ Y \iff ob\ X\ Z \|^{|H^M,g|[X/X_r][\bar{Y}/Y_r][\bar{Z}/Z_r]} = T\]

Hence, by definition of \[\| . \|\], for all \(g\), for all \(\bar{X}, \bar{Y}, \bar{Z} \in D_r\) we have:
\[
\| (\forall W((Y W \land X W) \iff (Z W \land X W))) \rightarrow (ob\ X\ Y \iff ob\ X\ Z) \|^{|H^M,g|[X/X_r][\bar{Y}/Y_r][\bar{Z}/Z_r]} = T
\]
\[\iff\] For all \(g\) we have
\[
\| \forall X Y Z (\forall W((Y W \land X W) \iff (Z W \land X W))) \rightarrow (ob\ X\ Y \iff ob\ X\ Z) \|^{|H^M,g|} = T
\]
\[\iff\ H^M \models_{HOL} OB3\]

**OB3:**

Given an arbitrary assignment \(g\), and arbitrary \(\bar{\beta} \in D_{\tau \rightarrow 0}, \bar{X} \in D_r\) such that
\[
\| \forall Z(\beta Z \rightarrow ob\ X\ Z) \|^{|H^M,g|[\bar{\beta}/\beta_{\tau \rightarrow 0}][X/X_r]} = T \quad \text{and}
\| \exists Z(\beta Z) \|^{|H^M,g|[\bar{\beta}/\beta_{\tau \rightarrow 0}][Z/Z_r]} = T \quad \text{and}
\| \exists Y(((\lambda W \forall Z(\beta Z \rightarrow Z W)) Y) \land X Y) \|^{|H^M,g|[\bar{\beta}/\beta_{\tau \rightarrow 0}][X/X_r]} = T
\]
\[\iff\] For all \(\bar{Z} \in D_r\) we have
\[
\| \beta Z \|^{|H^M,g|[\bar{\beta}/\beta_{\tau \rightarrow 0}][X/X_r][\bar{Z}/Z_r]} = T \quad \text{implies}
\| ob\ X\ Z \|^{|H^M,g|[\bar{\beta}/\beta_{\tau \rightarrow 0}][X/X_r][\bar{Z}/Z_r]} = T \quad \text{and}
\| \exists Y(((\lambda W \forall Z(\beta Z \rightarrow Z W)) Y) \land X Y) \|^{|H^M,g|[\bar{\beta}/\beta_{\tau \rightarrow 0}][X/X_r][\bar{Y}/Y_r]} = T
\]
\[\iff\] For all \(\bar{Z} \in D_r\) we have \(\bar{Z} \in \beta\) implies \(\bar{Z} \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow 0}(\bar{X})\) and there exists \(\bar{Z} \in D_r\) such that \(\bar{Z} \in \bar{\beta}\) and there exists \(s \in D_i\) such that \(\bar{Z} \in s\) and \(s \in \bar{X}\) (see *)
\[\iff\ \bar{\beta} \subseteq Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow 0}(\bar{X}) \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{\beta} \neq \emptyset \quad \text{and} \quad (\cap \bar{\beta}) \cap X \neq \emptyset\]
\[\iff\ Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow 0}(\bar{X}, (\cap \bar{\beta})) = T \quad \text{(by Lemma 1 (ob3))}\]
\[\iff\ |ob\ X ((\lambda W \forall Z(\beta Z \rightarrow Z W))) |^{|H^M,g|[\bar{\beta}/\beta_{\tau \rightarrow 0}][X/X_r]} = T\]

Hence by definition of \[\| . \|\], for all \(g\), all \(\bar{\beta} \in D_{\tau \rightarrow 0}, \bar{X} \in D_r\) we have:
\[
\| ((\forall Z(\beta Z \rightarrow ob\ X\ Z)) \land (\exists Z(\beta Z))) \rightarrow ((\exists Y(((\lambda W \forall Z(\beta Z \rightarrow Z W)) Y) \land X Y)) \rightarrow ob\ X ((\lambda W \forall Z(\beta Z \rightarrow Z W))) |^{|H^M,g|[\bar{\beta}/\beta_{\tau \rightarrow 0}][X/X_r]} = T
\]
\[\iff\] For all \(g\), we have
\[
\| \forall \beta X (((\forall Z(\beta Z \rightarrow ob\ X\ Z)) \land (\exists Z(\beta Z))) \rightarrow ((\exists Y(((\lambda W \forall Z(\beta Z \rightarrow Z W)) Y) \land X Y)) \rightarrow ob\ X ((\lambda W \forall Z(\beta Z \rightarrow Z W))) |^{|H^M,g|} = T
\]
\[\iff\ H^M \models_{HOL} OB3\]
For all $\overline{\vec{\delta}}$ it holds that $\overline{\vec{\delta}}$ is denoting the function $f$ from $D_i$ to $\overline{\vec{\delta}}$ such that for all $d \in D_i$, $f(d) = \|\forall Z, (\overline{\vec{\delta}}_{\tau-o} Z) \rightarrow Z W_i^{\overline{\vec{\delta}}_{\tau-o}}[X/X_i][Y/Y_i][Z/Z_i][d/W_i]| = T$. By definition of $\|\|$, $\|\forall Z, (\overline{\vec{\delta}}_{\tau-o} Z) \rightarrow Z W_i^{\overline{\vec{\delta}}_{\tau-o}}[X/X_i][Y/Y_i][Z/Z_i][d/W_i]| = T$ holds for all $\overline{\vec{\delta}}$. Thus, $f$ is the characteristic function of the set $\overline{\vec{\delta}}$. By the Denotatpflicht, which is obeyed in $H^M$, we know that $f(\overline{\vec{\delta}}) \in D_{\tau}$.

**OB4:**

Given an arbitrary assignment $g$, and arbitrary $\overline{\vec{\delta}}$, $\overline{\vec{\delta}} \in D_{\tau}$ such that

$$\|\forall W[Y \rightarrow X W] \land ob X Y \land \forall W[(X W \rightarrow Z W)| = T$$

$\iff \|\forall W[Y \rightarrow X W]|^{H_M, g}[X/X_i][Y/Y_i][Z/Z_i][d/W_i]| = T$ and

$$\|\forall W(X W \rightarrow Z W)|^{H_M, g}[X/X_i][Y/Y_i][Z/Z_i][d/W_i]| = T$$

$\iff$ for all $s \in D_i$ we have

$(s \in \overline{\vec{\delta}}$ implies $s \in X) \land \overline{\vec{\delta}} \in Iob_{\tau-o}(X)$ and $(s \in X$ implies $s \in \overline{\vec{\delta}}$) $\iff$ $\overline{\vec{\delta}} \subseteq \overline{\vec{\delta}}$ and $\overline{\vec{\delta}} \subseteq \overline{\vec{\delta}}$

$(\overline{\vec{\delta}} \setminus \overline{\vec{\delta}}) \cup \overline{\vec{\delta}} \in Iob_{\tau-o}(\overline{\vec{\delta}})$ (by Lemma 1 (ob4))

$\iff \|ob \overline{\vec{\delta}}(\lambda W((Z W \setminus X W) \lor Y W))|^{H_M, g}[X/X_i][Y/Y_i][Z/Z_i][d/W_i]| = T$ (see **)

Hence by definition of $\|\|$ for all $g$, all $\overline{\vec{\delta}}$, $\overline{\vec{\delta}} \in D_{\tau}$ we have

$$\|\forall W[Y \rightarrow X W] \land ob X Y \land \forall W(X W \rightarrow Z W)| = T$$

$\iff$ for all $g$ we have

$$\|\forall W((Z W \setminus X W) \lor Y W)|^{H_M, g}[X/X_i][Y/Y_i][Z/Z_i][d/W_i]| = T$$

$\iff H^M \vdash^{HOL} OB4$

**Justification **:** Similar to justification *, we can convince ourselves that $\|\forall W((Z W \setminus X W) \lor Y W)|^{H_M, g}[X/X_i][Y/Y_i][Z/Z_i][d/W_i]| = T$ is denoting the characteristic function $f$ of the set $(\overline{\vec{\delta}} \setminus \overline{\vec{\delta}}) \cup \overline{\vec{\delta}}$. By the Denotatpflicht, which is obeyed in $H^M$, we know that $f(\overline{\vec{\delta}}) \in D_{\tau}$.

**OB5:**

This case is analogous to OB4.

\[ \square \]

**Lemma 3** Let $H^M$ be a Henkin model for a DDL model $M$. For all DDL formulas $\overline{\vec{\delta}}$, arbitrary variable assignments $g$ and worlds $s$ it holds: $M, s \models \overline{\vec{\delta}}$ if and only if $\|\overline{\vec{\delta}}|S_i|^{H_M, g}[s/S_i]| = T$. 
Proof The proof of the lemma is by induction on the structure of \( \delta \).
In the base case we have \( \delta = p^j \) for some \( p^j \in P \):
\[
\| [p^j] S \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
\| p^j S \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
I_{p^j}(s) = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
s \in V(p^j) \quad \text{(by definition of } H^M)\]
\( \iff \)
\[
M, s \models p^j
\]

For proving the inductive cases we apply the induction hypothesis, which is formulated as follows: For all \( \delta' \) that are structurally smaller than \( \delta \), for all assignment \( g \) and all \( s \) we have \( \| [\delta'] S \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T \) if and only if \( M, s \models \delta' \).

We consider each inductive case in turn:

\( \delta = \neg \varphi: \)
\[
\| \neg \varphi \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
\| (\neg_{\tau_{\tau \tau}} [\varphi]) S \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
\| \neg (\varphi S) \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T \quad \text{(since } (\neg_{\tau_{\tau \tau}} [\varphi]) S = \beta_\eta \neg (([\varphi] S))\)
\( \iff \)
\[
\| \varphi S \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = F
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
M, s \not\models \varphi \quad \text{(by induction hypothesis)}
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
M, s \models \neg \varphi
\]

\( \delta = \varphi \vee \psi: \)
\[
\| \varphi \vee \psi \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
\| (\varphi \vee_{\tau_{\tau \tau}} [\psi]) S \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
\| (\varphi S) \vee (\psi S) \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T \quad \text{(since } ([\varphi] \vee_{\tau_{\tau \tau}} [\psi]) S = \beta_\eta \beta_\eta (([\varphi] S) \vee ([\psi] S))\)
\( \iff \)
\[
\| \varphi S \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T \quad \text{or } \| \psi S \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
M, s \models \varphi \text{ or } M, s \models \psi \quad \text{(by induction hypothesis)}
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
M, s \models \varphi \vee \psi
\]

\( \delta = \Box \varphi: \)
\[
\| \Box \varphi \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
\| (\lambda X Y (\varphi Y)) S \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
\text{For all } a \in D_i \text{ we have } \| \varphi Y \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i][a/Y_i]} = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
\text{For all } a \in D_i \text{ we have } \| \varphi Y \|_{H^M,g[a/Y_i]} = T \quad (S \not\in \text{free}([\varphi]))
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
\text{For all } a \in S \text{ we have } M, a \models \varphi \quad \text{(by induction hypothesis)}
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
M, s \models \Box \varphi
\]

\( \delta = \Diamond \varphi: \)
\[
\| \Diamond \varphi \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
\| (\lambda X Y (\neg \varphi X Y \vee [\varphi Y])) S \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i]} = T
\]
\( \iff \)
\[
\text{For all } a \in D_i \text{ we have } \| \neg \varphi SY \vee [\varphi Y] \|_{H^M,g[s/S_i][a/Y_i]} = T
\]
For all $a \in D_t$ we have $\|av S Y\|^{H_t g[s/S][a/Y]} = F$ or $\|\varphi\|^{H_t g[s/S][a/Y]} = T$

$\forall a \in D_t$ we have $Iav_{i\to t}(s, a) = F$ or $\|\varphi\|^{H_t g[a/Y]} = T$ ($S \notin \text{free}(\varphi)$)

For all $a \in S$ we have $a \not\in \text{av}(s)$ or $M, a \models \varphi$ (by induction hypothesis)

$\forall a \in \text{av}(s)$.

The argument is analogous to $\delta = \Box_a \varphi$.

$\delta = \Box(\psi/\varphi)$:

$\|\Box(\psi/\varphi)\|^{H_t g[s/S]} = T$

$\forall a \in D_t$ we have $Iav_{i\to t}(s, a) = F$ or $\|\varphi\|^{H_t g[a/Y]} = T$ ($S \notin \text{free}(\varphi)$)

$\forall a \in S$ we have $a \not\in \text{av}(s)$ or $M, a \models \varphi$ (by induction hypothesis)

$\forall a \in \text{av}(s)$.

$\Box(\psi/\varphi)$

**Justification ***:** We need to show that $\|\varphi\|^{H_t g[s/S]}$ is identified with $V(\varphi) = \{s \in S | M, s \models \varphi\}$ (analogous for $\psi$). By induction hypothesis, for all assignment $g$ and world $s$, we have $\|\varphi\|^{H_t g[s/S]} = T$ if and only if $M, s \models \varphi$. We expand the details of this equivalence.

For all assignment $g$ and all worlds $s \in D_t$, we have:

$s \in \|\varphi\|^{H_t g[s/S]}$ (charact. functions are associated with sets)

$\Box(\psi/\varphi)$

Hence, $s \in \|\varphi\|^{H_t g[s/S]}$ if and only if $s \in V(\varphi)$. By extensionalitity we thus know that $\|\varphi\|^{H_t g[s/S]} = V(\varphi)$. Moreover, since $H_t$ obeys the Denotatpflicht we know that $V(\varphi) \in D_t$.

$\delta = \Box_a(\varphi)$:

$\|\Box_a(\varphi)\|^{H_t g[s/S]} = T$

$\forall a \in D_t$ we have $Iav_{i\to t}(s, a) = F$ or $\|\varphi\|^{H_t g[a/Y]} = T$ ($S \notin \text{free}(\varphi)$)

$\forall a \in S$ we have $a \not\in \text{av}(s)$ or $M, a \models \varphi$ (by induction hypothesis)

$\forall a \in \text{av}(s)$.

$\Box_a(\varphi)$
\[
\Leftrightarrow \| \text{ob}(avS)[\varphi] \land \exists Y (avSY \land \neg([\varphi]Y))\|^{H^M,g[s/s_i]} = T
\]
\[
\Leftrightarrow \| \text{ob}(avS)[\varphi]\|^{H^M,g[s/s_i]} = T \quad \text{and}
\]
\[
\| \exists Y (avSY \land \neg([\varphi]Y))\|^{H^M,g[s/s_i]} = T
\]
\[
\Leftrightarrow \| \text{ob}(avS)[\varphi]\|^{H^M,g[s/s_i]} = T \quad \text{and}
\]
there exists \(a \in D_i\) such that \(\|avSY \land \neg([\varphi]Y)\|^{H^M,g[s/s_i][a/Y_i]} = T\)
\[
\Leftrightarrow Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau_0}(\|avS\|^{H^M,g[s/s_i]})(\|\varphi\|^{H^M,g[s/s_i]}) = T \quad \text{and}
\]
there exists \(a \in D_i\) such that
\[
\|avXY\|^{H^M,g[s/s_i][a/Y_i]} = T \quad \text{and} \quad \|\varphi\|^{H^M,g[s/s_i][a/Y_i]} = F
\]
\[
\Leftrightarrow \|\varphi\|^{H^M,g[s/s_i]} \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau_0}(\|avS\|^{H^M,g[s/s_i]}) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{(similar to ***)}
\]
there exists \(a \in D_i\) such that
\[
\|avXY\|^{H^M,g[a/Y_i]} = T \quad \text{and} \quad \|\varphi\|^{H^M,g[a/Y_i]} = F
\]
\[
\Leftrightarrow V(\varphi) \in Iob_{\tau \rightarrow \tau_0}(av(s)) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{(similar to ***)}
\]
there exists \(a \in D_i\) such that
\[
\|avXY\|^{H^M,g[a/Y_i]} = T \quad \text{and} \quad \|\varphi\|^{H^M,g[a/Y_i]} = F \quad (S \notin \text{free}(\varphi))
\]
\[
\Leftrightarrow V(\varphi) \in \text{ob}(av(s)) \quad \text{and}
\]
there exists \(a \in S\) such that
\[
a \in \text{av}(s) \quad \text{and} \quad M, a \not\models \varphi \quad \text{(by induction hypothesis)}
\]
\[
\Leftrightarrow V(\varphi) \in \text{ob}(av(s)) \quad \text{and}
\]
there exists \(a \in S\) such that \(a \in \text{av}(s)\) and \(a \notin V(\varphi)\)
\[
\Leftrightarrow V(\varphi) \in \text{ob}(av(s)) \quad \text{and}
\]
there exists \(a \in S\) such that \(a \in \text{av}(s)\) and \(a \notin V(\varphi)\)
\[
\Leftrightarrow V(\varphi) \in \text{ob}(av(s)) \quad \text{and}
\]
there exists \(a \in S\) such that \(a \in \text{av}(s)\) \(\cap V(\neg \varphi)\)
\[
\Leftrightarrow V(\varphi) \in \text{ob}(av(s)) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{av}(s) \cap V(\neg \varphi) \neq \emptyset
\]
\[
\Leftrightarrow M, s \models \text{ob}(av(s)) \quad \text{and}
\]
there exists \(a \in S\) such that \(a \in \text{av}(s)\) \(\cap V(\neg \varphi)\)
\[
\Leftrightarrow M, s \models \text{ob}(av(s))
\]
\[
\delta = \text{ob}(\varphi):
\]

The argument is analogous to \(\delta = \text{ob}(\varphi)\). \(\square\)

**Lemma 4** For every Henkin model \(H = \langle \{D_\alpha\}_{\alpha \in T}, I \rangle\) such that \(H \models^{\text{HOL}} \Sigma\) for all \(\Sigma \in \{AV, PV1, PV2, OB1,..., OB5\}\), there exists a corresponding DDL model \(M\). Corresponding means that for all DDL formulas \(\delta\) and for all assignment \(g\) and worlds \(s\), \(\|\delta\|S^{H,g[s/S]} = T\) if and only if \(M,s \models \delta\).

**Proof** Suppose that \(H = \langle \{D_\alpha\}_{\alpha \in T}, I \rangle\) is a Henkin model such that \(H \models^{\text{HOL}} \Sigma\) for all \(\Sigma \in \{AV, PV1, PV2, OB1,...,OB5\}\). Without loss of generality, we can assume that the domains of \(H\) are denumerable \([15]\). We construct the corresponding DDL model \(M\) as follows:

- \(S = D_i\).
\[ s \in \text{av}(u) \text{ for } s, u \in S \text{ iff } I_{\text{av}}(s, u) = T. \]
\[ s \in \text{pv}(u) \text{ for } s, u \in S \text{ iff } I_{\text{pv}}(s, u) = T. \]
\[ \bar{X} \in \text{ob}(\bar{Y}) \text{ for } \bar{X}, \bar{Y} \in D_i \rightarrow D_o \text{ iff } I_{\text{ob}}(\bar{X}, \bar{Y}) = T. \]
\[ s \in V(p^i) \text{ iff } I_{p^j}(s) = T \text{ for all } p^j. \]

Since \( H \models_{\text{HOL}} \Sigma \) for all \( \Sigma \in \{ \text{AV}, \text{PV}_1, \text{PV}_2, \text{OB}_1, \ldots, \text{OB}_5 \} \), it is straightforward (but tedious) to verify that \( \text{av}, \text{pv} \) and \( \text{ob} \) satisfy the conditions as required for a DDL model.

Moreover, the above construction ensures that \( H \) is a Henkin model \( H^M \) for DDL model \( M \). Hence, Lemma 3 applies. This ensures that for all DDL formulas \( \delta \), for all assignment \( g \) and all worlds \( s \) we have \( \|\delta\|_{H, g[S]} = T \) if and only if \( M, s \models \delta \).

\[ \|\exists \|_{H, g[S]} = \| \text{vld } [\varphi] \|_{H, g[S]} = T. \]

\[ \|\forall \|_{H, g[S]} = \| \text{vld } [\varphi] \|_{H, g[S]} = F. \]

Thus, \( \{ \text{AV}, \text{PV}_1, \text{PV}_2, \text{OB}_1, \ldots, \text{OB}_5 \} \not\models_{\text{HOL}} \text{vld } [\varphi] \).

\[ \text{Completeness, } \rightarrow \quad \text{The proof is again by contraposition. Assume } \{ \text{AV}, \text{PV}_1, \text{PV}_2, \text{OB}_1, \ldots, \text{OB}_5 \} \not\models_{\text{HOL}} \text{vld } [\varphi], \text{ that is, there is a Henkin model } H = \langle \{ D_a \}_{a \in T}, I \rangle \text{ such that } H \models_{\text{HOL}} \Sigma \text{ for all } \Sigma \in \{ \text{AV}, \text{PV}_1, \text{PV}_2, \text{OB}_1, \ldots, \text{OB}_5 \}, \text{ but } \| \text{vld } [\varphi] \|_{H, g} = F \text{ for some assignment } g. \]

By Lemma 4, there is a DDL model \( M \) such that \( M \not\models \varphi \). Hence, \( \not\models_{\text{DDL}} \varphi. \]

\[ \{ \text{AV}, \text{PV}_1, \text{PV}_2, \text{OB}_1, \ldots, \text{OB}_5 \} \not\models_{\text{HOL}} \text{vld } [\varphi]. \]

Theorem 1 characterises DDL as a natural fragment of HOL.

5 Conclusion

A shallow semantical embedding of Carmo and Jones’s logic of contrary-to-duty conditionals in classical higher-order logic has been presented, and shown to be faithful (sound and complete). In addition, it has meanwhile been implemented in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL (see the appendix). This implementation constitutes the first theorem prover for the logic by
Carmo and Jones that is available to date. The foundational theory for this implementation has been laid in this article.

There is much room for future work. First, experiments could investigate whether the provided implementation already supports non-trivial applications in practical normative reasoning, or whether further emendations and improvements are required. Second, the introduced framework could also be used to systematically analyse the properties of Carmo and Jones’s dyadic deontic logic within Isabelle/HOL. Third, analogous to previous work in modal logic [9], the provided framework could be extended to study and support first-order and higher-order variants of the framework.

References

1. P.B. Andrews. Resolution in type theory. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 36(3):414–432, 1971.
2. P.B. Andrews. General models and extensionality. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 37(2):395–397, 1972.
3. P.B. Andrews. General models, descriptions, and choice in type theory. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 37(2):385–394, 1972.
4. P.B. Andrews. Church’s type theory. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring, 2014.
5. C. Benzmüller. Cut-elimination for quantified conditional logic. *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 46(3):333–353, 2017.
6. C. Benzmüller. Recent successes with a meta-logical approach to universal logical reasoning (extended abstract). In S.A. da Costa Cavalheiro and J.L. Fiadeiro, editors, *Formal Methods: Foundations and Applications - 20th Brazilian Symposium, SBMF 2017, Recife, Brazil, November 29 - December 1, 2017, Proceedings*, volume 10623 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 7–11. Springer, 2017.
7. C. Benzmüller, C. Brown, and M. Kohlhase. Higher-order semantics and extensionality. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 69(4):1027–1088, 2004.
8. C. Benzmüller and D. Miller. Automation of higher-order logic. In D.M. Gabbay, J.H. Siekmann, and J. Woods, editors, *Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 9 — Computational Logic*, pages 215–254. North Holland, Elsevier, 2014.
9. C. Benzmüller and L.C. Paulson. Quantified multimodal logics in simple type theory. *Logica Universalis (Special Issue on Multimodal Logics)*, 7(1):7–20, 2013.
10. J. Carmo and A.J.I. Jones. Deontic logic and contrary-to-duties. In D. M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors, *Handbook of Philosophical Logic: Volume 8*, pages 265–343. Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, 2002.

11. J. Carmo and A.J.I. Jones. Completeness and decidability results for a logic of contrary-to-duty conditionals. *J. Log. Comput.*, 23(3):585–626, 2013.

12. A. Church. A set of postulates for the foundation of logic. *Annals of Mathematics*, 33(3):346–366, 1932.

13. A. Church. An unsolvable problem of elementary number theory. *American Journal of Mathematics*, 58(2):354–363, 1936.

14. A. Church. A formulation of the simple theory of types. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 5(2):56–68, 1940.

15. L. Henkin. Completeness in the theory of types. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 15(2):81–91, 1950.

16. R. Muskens. Intensional models for the theory of types. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 75(1):98–118, 2007.

17. T. Nipkow, L.C. Paulson, and M. Wenzel. *Isabelle/HOL — A Proof Assistant for Higher-Order Logic*, volume 2283 of LNCS. Springer, 2002.
A Implementation in Isabelle/HOL

The semantical embedding as devised in this article has been implemented in the higher-order proof assistant Isabelle/HOL \[17\]. Figure 1 displays the respective encoding. Figures 2 and 3 report on some experiments.
Fig. 2 Experiments (meta-theory) with the embedding of DDL in Isabelle/HOL. In the “sorry” cases proofs can be automatically found by theorem provers integrated via Sledgehammer, but a reconstruction of these proofs in Isabelle/HOL still fails, since the internal provers are too weak.
Fig. 3  Further experiments (lemmata and derived rules) with the embedding of DDL in Isabelle/HOL.