Abstract

After the end of the Second World War, Mao Zedong managed to drive Chiang Kai-Shek to Taiwan in October 1949. Mao decided to annex Tibet, a soft under-belly of China, by exercising the Chinese suzerain rights. On 17 March 1959, after the 14th Dalai Lama fled to India, Tibet was incorporated into the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The erstwhile Nepal-Tibet border remained open and abandoned from the Nepali security perspective as thousands of Tibetans sought refuge in Nepal during the annexation of Tibet. Ultimately, the Tibetan refugees (Khampas) were militarily trained and financially assisted by the foreign powers to establish operational bases in the remote stretches of Northern Nepal and wage the protracted war against the PLA to regain their lost motherland. Nepal still maintains a non-aligned foreign policy and is staunchly against harboring elements that engage against the security interests of its two neighbors. Hence, the Government of Nepal had to stop such detrimental activities resolutely thereby as it is inferred to eliminate the entire Khampa guerrilla movement and their hideouts. Therefore, the main objective of this study is to explore contributions of Nepali government and its politico-historical perspectives, leading to disarming of the Khampa guerrillas. To address this objective, this study has conducted an elaborate reconnaissance of various forward operational and logistics bases up to Kora-La pass as part of the field work.

Keywords: Khampa guerrillas, refugee, Tibet, Dalai Lama, bilateral treaty, disarmament
Disarming Khampa Guerrillas by the Nepal Government

Introduction

Till 1912 the Qing Dynasty of China ruled Tibet as an integral part of the State. After the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, most of the area comprising the present-day Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) became a de-facto independent polity-independent from the rest of the Republic of China. In November 1949 Tibet had sent a letter to Mao Zedong, USA, and UK declaring its intent to defend itself “by all possible means” against troop incursions by PRC into Tibet. After the Communist takeover, the PRC like the Kuomintang maintained Tibet as a part of China (Goldstein, 1997).

To the south was Nepal which had fought three wars against Tibet. The Chinese Army had to fight against Nepal to save and rescue Tibet. The Nepal-Tibet border area was rugged, remote and marked by the sheer Himalayan ranges with limited passes to cross over the watershed. Moreover, the Nepali territory also extends north of the Himalayan watershed as the southern edges of the Tibetan plateau, which is sparsely populated by people of Tibetan origin. The area is remote, harsh, ungoverned effectively, and sparsely populated. It was attractive for fugitives of Tibet to seek asylum in Nepal. Subsequently, foreign tourists, trekkers and climbers were prohibited from entering Mustang and sealed beyond Kagbeni for political reasons (Carla, 1995, p. 6)

Therefore, to avoid Chinese persecution, the fleeing Tibetans established guerrilla bases in northern portions of Nepal and sought external military and financial assistance to liberate their motherland. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA and the Indian Pioneers of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) that were deployed in the Indian Military Check Posts along the Himalayan passes in Nepal were actively supplying military and financial assistance to the Khampa guerrillas. The Indian Government was fearful and hesitant to permit armed Tibetans in India (Conboy & Morrison, 2002).

In Nepal, the unequal Nepal-India Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1950 was framed and signed by the outgoing Rana regime to appease India and prolong its longevity. Ultimately, the oligarchic regime was displaced by an Indian inspired and assisted democratic revolutionary government in 1950. Rather than reviewing the content of the treaty and rejecting it as unequal, the democratic government with euphoric obligations approved it neglectfully. While the PLA was aggressively active in Tibet, on the recommendation of India, the Nepali Army was down-sized from 24,000 to 8,000 at the same time, Indian troops were permitted to establish their Check Posts along the Nepal-China border (Devkota, 1980).

Having signed in 20 September 1960 the Sino-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, it was totally against the commitment and international norms for Nepal to harbor armed Khampas. Now, turning a deaf ear to this situation would certainly compel China to forcefully enter Nepal and indulge in retaliatory strikes. Whereas disarming Khampas would maintain assertive governance in North Nepal and intensify better bilateral relationship. Hence, it was extremely prudent of the Nepali leadership to disarm the Khampas and
Disarming Khampa Guerrillas by the Nepal Government

provide them a peaceful life option. This research article will explore inferences that led to disarming of the Khampas.

Methodology

The researcher has applied descriptive and explanatory methods to conduct this study. The details have been obtained from formal primary and secondary sources, war diaries, recorded interrogation summaries and extensive field reconnaissance of the Khampa operational bases. Moreover, significant details have been collected from the Army Archives, retired administrators and military commanders who participated in the operation and family members of the victims of Khampa atrocities.

Khampas were specially selected and trained in Hale, Colorado, USA and kept refreshed in Chakrata, Uttarakhand, India. Kenneth Conboy, a former policy analyst in the Asian Study Center, Washington DC and late James Morrison, a thirty-year US Army veteran and the last training officer for the CIA sponsored ‘Unity Project’ have provided substantial details about the Khampa covert missions. Their noteworthy evidences of US-India collaboration to sponsor Khampa operations have been written by them in their co-written book ‘CIA’s Secret War in Tibet.’

Tibet Foray

On 16 September 1950, the Ambassador of PRC to India, General Yuan Zhongxian communicated a three-point Chinese proposal to an official Tibetan delegation in Delhi. The proposal stated that Tibet be regarded as a part of China; that China be responsible for the defense of Tibet and lastly, that China be responsible for trade and foreign relations of Tibet (Goldstein et al., 2009).

After a couple of failed negotiations and attempts by Tibet to secure support and military assistance externally, on the night of 6/7 October 1950, the PLA crossed the Jinsha River at five places and advanced into the eastern Tibet. The purpose was not to invade Tibet per se but to capture the Tibetan Army at Chamdo; demoralize the Lhasa Government and exert immense pressure to send a negotiation team to Beijing to sign the terms of agreement for a handover of Tibet or face an immediate ruthless armed invasion (Babayeva, 2006).

Initially, the PLA entered Tibet dressed in khaki attire as farmers, small-time businessmen, shopkeepers and shoemakers under the pretext of serving and modernizing the Tibetans as long-lost brothers of the great motherland (Dunham, 2004, p. 119). They promised to return home after the completion of Tibetan modernization. The Tibetans perceived the Chinese as enemies of Buddhism personified by the Dalai Lama rather than invaders against their independence and territorial integrity. The Chinese in return started co-opting the Tibetan ruling class and doling out generous payments to rich and poor. They abstained from mentioning Marxism. In November 1950, after China invaded Tibet, El Salvador sponsored a complaint by the Tibetan Government at the UN, but the United Kingdom and India for reasons unknown prevented it from being debated (Claude, 2013).
Disarming Khampa Guerrillas by the Nepal Government

Later, according to Dunham, the Tibetan negotiators were sent to Beijing and were compelled to sign the “Seventeen Points Document.” There were no negotiations extended. Assurances were expressed that Tibetans would be permitted to reform at their own pace and manner; maintain self-governing internal affairs; allow religious freedom and lastly, agree to be a part of China. On 23 May 1951, the Tibetan Government accepted the Chinese position and in October 1951, the 14th Dalai Lama, who had ascended the throne, decided to accept the above agreement. Shortly afterward, Tibet became a part of the PRC and the “Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” as envisioned by the PRC became a reality (Jian, 2006).

In 1956 the Tibetan militias in the eastern Kham region vehemently opposed the land reform program introduced by the government of the PRC. Initially, the experiment was opposed by the people peacefully, but later the militias fought against the PLA. Gradually, the true motive of the Chinese was discerned in March 1959 when the anti-religious legislation was introduced and prominent monks were imprisoned with charges of treason against China (Dunham, 2004, p. 279).

The Tibetan Nationalist Resistance Movement started to be overtly operational. The Khampas of the ‘Four Rivers, Six Ranges’ zone of Kham Province, who are reputed warriors and renowned for their horsemanship and marksmanship were motivated to wage the resistance movement employing guerrilla warfare against the invading PLA.

The Dalai Lama repudiated the 17 points agreement and on 17 March 1959 fled via Khenzimanapass and established the Tibetan Government in exile in India. The Chinese Government immediately dissolved the Tibetan social structures and ruled directly. Nepal was also forced to accept Tibetan refuge influx. At this crucial time, Nepal signed a Sino-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship on 28 April 1960 and finalized the bilateral boundary with deft diplomacy (Shrestha, 2015, p. 171; Jian, 2006).

Impending Fear

The third war between Nepal and Tibet fought was in April 1856 and the Chinese Army intervened to save the Tibetans had principal roles during truce negotiation. In March 1856, the Treaty of Thapathali was signed between Nepal and China (Upaety, 1980, p. 74). Since then, the Nepal-Tibet border was demarcated and left at the mercy of the Himalaya Range to protect.

After the 1950 Revolution of Nepal, the democratic government headed by Prime Minister Matrika Prasad Koirala agreed to down-size the 24,000 strong Second World War experienced Nepal Army to 8,000; deployment of 20 Check Posts manned by Indian troops with communication sets coupled the Indian Intelligence Bureau agents and a section of the Nepali Army along the Nepal-China border by 9 June 1952 (Devkota, 1980).

The fear portrayed by India was that the PLA may enter and annex Nepal and therefore monitoring and maintaining surveillance over the unmanned remote northern border was a necessity. The other fear spread around was that a sizable strength of the Nepal Army may
Disarming Khampa Guerrillas by the Nepal Government

usurp power and re-establish the Rana regime. Moreover, an Indian Military Liaison Group with a training detachment was located in Narayan Bhawan, Jawalakhel to command those Check Posts and also upgrade the training of the Nepali Army. The question remains, why did the Indians fear a Chinese entry into Nepal and at the same time, down-size the national army so drastically?

The alarm was sounded as the Tibetans started to flee and enter Nepal through the passes. On the one side, the Indians feared the PLA may invade Nepal and expose the Indian hinterland; on the other side, they anticipated the PLA may enter Nepal to eliminate the Tibetan refugees. After the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959 and established their Headquarters in Dharmsala of India, the trickling of the Tibetan refugees into Nepal and India carried on. Automatically a grudge took root in the Chinese mind against India for hospitably sheltering the Tibetans in India.

In 1960, PLA once sent a fighting patrol into Nepal and stormed Lo-Manthang thinking the Tibetans Khampas were there and killed Subedar Bom Prasad Karki of the Nepali Army. The Nepali Government protested and an enquiry proved that there was a mistake committed from the Chinese side. Till today compensation for the collateral fatality is being paid generously (Cowan, 2014). The important point to be taken into cognizance is that China was not satisfied with our effort to maintain Chinese security interests.

Mao Zedong commented, “A person sleeping in a comfortable bed is not easily roused by someone else’s snoring.” He then told India, “We’ll stand face-to-face and practice our courage.” It can be interpreted as “armed co-existence.” Finally, on 20 October 1962, the PLA launched two attacks to expel the Indian forces in Aksai Chin in Ladakh and the Towang Valley in the East (Alastair, et al., 2006). The USA rushed military supplies to India and the erstwhile Soviet Union remained inclined to support India. Fearing with possible collaboration of China and erstwhile USSR, Washington designed covert mission branding Khampas as Buddha’s warrior (Bansal, 2017). These confrontations had created a very sensitive wound and a fear psychosis in India till today. The strong Chinese influence in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan is pretty worrisome for India. The present situation depicting a more complex situation with the growing economic and military might of China.

Geopolitical Milieu

In 1959, a military skirmish took place between the Chinese and Indian troops. Mao Zedong ordered the PLA to withdraw 20 kilometers behind. Considering the PLA as a guerrilla army out-stretched to its limits in Tibet, Prime Minister Nehru adopted the “Forward Policy” and ordered the Indian troops to open fire at their discretion if the Chinese troops intrude in the future. The Indians were now confident that the Chinese troops would not resist and hereby ordered Indian troops to dominate the Chinese military posts.

Mao Zedong commented, “A person sleeping in a comfortable bed is not easily roused by someone else’s snoring.” He then told India, “We’ll stand face-to-face and can each practice
Disarming Khampa Guerrillas by the Nepal Government

our courage.” It can be interpreted as “armed co-existence.” Finally, on 20 October 1962, the PLA launched two attacks to expel the Indian forces in Aksai Chin in Ladakh and the Towang Valley in the East (Graver et al., 2006). The USA rushed military supplies to India and the erstwhile Soviet Union remained inclined to support India. Fearing with possible collaboration of China and erstwhile USSR, Washington designed covert mission branding Khampas as Buddha’s warrior (Bansal, 2017). These confrontations had created a very sensitive wound and a fear psychosis in India till today. The strong Chinese influence in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan is pretty worrisome for India. The present situation depicting a more complex situation with the growing economic and military might of China.

Fundamentals of External Support to the Khampa Guerrillas

In 1947, President Harry Truman introduced the US Doctrine to provide political, military and economic assistance to all democracies threatened by the autocratic regime. Initially, the Tibetans sought assistance from powerful nations to fight against the Chinese occupation, but the request was ignored. Hence, the resistance movement was being handled by the monastic elites. After the Dalai Lama fled Tibet and reached Dharmasala in India, the USA started to be a bit concerned (Baru & Sharma, 2014).

Baba Yeshi, the main Khampa guerilla commander who successfully managed to assist in the exfiltration of the Dalai Lama, was initially capable to command the Tibetan resistance movement. When the CIA contacted Baba Yeshi for a viable plan, he proposed a force of 2100 well-armed resistance fighters. Initially, the CIA authorized only 400 fighters. Nevertheless, Tibetan refugees living in Nepal and those working in the road-building projects along the Sikkim border were concentrated totaling to 2,000 and were prepared to be based in eight operational bases in Mustang, Nepal. The CIA selected and trained 27 Khampa trainer groups in Hale, Colorado to train and lead the guerrilla band at Mustang (Conboy & Morrison, 2002).

Two parachute supply drops were executed 10 kilometers inside the Tibetan territory from April to December 1961. The guerrillas had to infiltrate into Tibet from Nepal to recover the supplies air dropped. The first raid from Mustang was in September 1961 when a PLA regiment commander was killed. By the end of 1961, Khampas had started raiding and ambushing the PLA outposts south of the Brahmaputra River confidently. Khampas used to strip the bodies of PLA soldiers and carry the dress as proof. The CIA activities concerning the Khampa operations were kept secret from the Indian ears, too. On 2 April 1964, four out of twenty-seven Trainer Groups trained in Colorado jumped from the C-130 Hercules with pallets in Tibet but suffered heavy casualties. Twenty-three Trainer Groups were taken to East Pakistan and then made to infiltrate by land to Mustang, Nepal. By the end of August, eight companies of hundred guerrillas each armed with American weapons were harbored in Yara-Gara base (Conboy & Morison, 2002).
Disarming Khampa Guerrillas by the Nepal Government

For much of 1960s, the CIA provided the Tibetan exile movement with $1.7 million a year for operation against China including an annual subsidy of $180,000 for the Dalai Lama. The CIA’s program encompassed the support of 2000 Tibetan guerrillas in Nepal, a covert military training site in Colorado. “Tibet Houses” established to promote the Tibetan cause in New York and Geneva and then finances for reconnaissance teams. In principle, the assistance was for a worldwide effort to undermine China and maintain an autonomous Tibet and not to liberate Tibet (Babayeva, 2006; Mann, 1998).

Inferences Leading to Disarm Khampa Guerrillas

Nepal was always very concerned about the presence of the armed Khampas operating against the Chinese Security Forces from the remote northern territories of Nepal. The Khampas were not only being assisted by the West, especially the USA, but also by India. Additionally, military check posts manned by the Indian Army were surreptitiously deployed along the Nepal-China border. Later, feeling the pressure against Nepali sovereignty and independence from the south, King Mahendra adopted the non-aligned foreign policy unequivocally declared that Nepal maintains “dynamic neutrality.”

As the Tibetan refugees started to enter into Nepal, while the Chinese branded the fugitives as illegal immigrants that need to be repatriated, the West and India insisted Nepal to permit the Khampas to reside on humanitarian grounds. The armed Khampas harassed and dominated the Nepali people in Mustang. Two Nepalis, trader Lok Bahadur Thakali at Nechung in October 1960 and Dawa Dorje Gurung at Lete in January 1968 were killed by the Khampas (Thakali, personal communication, December 18, 2016). Then, in 1970, King Mahendra established the Durgam Chhetra Bikas Samiti [Development Committee for Remote Areas] under the chairmanship of General (Retired) Surendra Bahadur Shah to bolster governance in northern Nepal.

Simultaneously, King Mahendra decided to convince India to withdraw its military check posts and the military training mission from Nepal. As soon as the issue was raised, India threatened to impose an economic blockade on Nepal. The Nepali Government stated, “Nepal cannot compromise its sovereignty for India’s so-called security.” Hesitantly, the 20 Indian military check posts that were established on 9 June 1952 were withdrawn in two phases by August 1970 at a time when the US, considered Chinese rapprochement as a necessity.

King Birendra ascended the throne on 31 January 1972 at the age of twenty-seven and visited China in December 1973. During his visit, it is speculated that Chou-Enlai requested the King to control the armed Khampas residing in the Northern Nepal. Then, based on the recommendations of the Durgam Chhetra Bikas Samiti, the first step taken was the establishment of the Northern Administration Control Center with four offices located in Olangchungola in Taplejung, Namche in Solukhumbu, Jomsom in Mustang and Soru in Humla to exhibit government presence (Ukyab, personal communication, December 20, 2021).
Disarming Khampa Guerrillas by the Nepal Government

The Khampas were overtly operating against the PLA from the Nepali soil. Rumors were also rife that Nepal was a fertile land to foster the vested interests of foreign intelligence agencies and their clandestine activities. Should this situation stagnate, one could logically anticipate that China may opt to order the PLA to forcefully enter into Nepal to eliminate the armed Khampas. On the contrary, disarming the Khampas would reflect as an assertive government in Nepal to enhance better bilateral relationship between Nepal and China as both the countries were obligated to honor the Sino-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on 20 April 1960 (Shrestha, 2015).

Ground Work for Military Operation

The Chinese leader Chou Enlai’s remarks about the Khampa activities was comprehended as a strong hint to the King to either disarm the Khampas or facilitate the PLA to neutralize them (Shrestha, 2015). According to the Nepali foreign policy, then we were supposed to adopt “dynamic neutrality” as envisaged by Late King Mahendra and also prevent Nepali soil from being used against the security of its neighbors. The following preparations were executed:

1. In March 1974, Lieutenant Colonel Satchit Shumshe JBR conducted a detailed reconnaissance of the Khampa bases on foot to determine the feasibility of the operation to disarm the Khampas. He provided the required details for the operation to commence and recommended that the mission could be successfully achieved by the Nepali Army (Basnyat, 2008).

2. The Northern Administration Control Centers which were established in 2022 BS at four locations: Olangchungola, Namche, Jomsom and Humla commenced to mobilize the Nepali people and gain real-time information (Ukyab, personal communication, December 20, 2021).

3. At the onset of military operation, the Home Secretary, Sher Bahadur Shahi contacted Baba Yeshi, a former Khampa commander who had been at odds with Ge-Wandu, a CIA trained and supported member. Baba Yeshi had left the resistance movement as he was unfairly accused of financial embezzlement and was living in Kathmandu. Through Baba Yeshi detailed information about the Khampa activities were derived and nearly 300 Khampas defectors especially form Rasuwa were concentrated to assist the RNA in its operation. They were armed with Second World War vintage weapons and quartered at Meen Bhawan, Kathmandu and prepared for the military operation (Ukyab, personal communication, December 20, 2021).

4. The Home Secretary also managed to obtain a letter signed by the Dalai Lama instructing Ge-Wandu and his followers to hand over weapons to the Nepali Army and settle down peacefully. Also, a tape-recorded message by the Dalai Lama to surrender weapons to the RNA was circulated amidst the Khampas in Mustang.

5. The Khampas were guaranteed permission to reside as Nepali citizens, free education would be provided to the Tibetan children, land would distribute and their health and religious requirements would be fulfilled.
Disarming Khampa Guerrillas by the Nepal Government

Execution of Military Operations to Disarm Khampa Guerrillas

The Nepali Army Headquarter ordered No. 3 Brigade Headquarter to shift its location from Bhairawa to Jomsom in Mustang. Brigadier General Singha Pratap Shah was appointed the Brigade Commander. Lieutenant Colonel Satchit Shumshere SJB Rana was appointed the Task Force Commander. Shree Nath Battalion, Indradhoj Company under Major Sushil Raj Karki, Narayan Dal Company under Major Lok Bahadur Thapa, a troop of 75/24 Mountain Pack Howitzers, a platoon of Combat Engineers, a Signal Communication troop and a platoon of Chandi Prasad Company were included in the Task Force (Nepali Army war diary, Mustang operation; 1976).

An Airhead for supply drop under Captain Ratna Bahadur Gurung, two Sky Van planes and two Alouette helicopters were allotted to fulfill the logistics and reconnaissance requirements. There were no airstrips available in Mustang, but a small flat stretch of land at Jomsom that could be used to construct a Short Take-off and Landing (STOL) airfield was used as a supply drop zone. The entire rations, ammunition, fuel, clothing and controlled stores supply were looked after from Pokhara by means of supply parachute drop (I.P. Thakali, personal communication, January 17, 2016).

On 15 June 1974, the troops trekked from Pokhara to Jomsom via Naudanda, Ghorepani, Ghasa, Dana and Lete concentrated at Jomsom by the end of the month. It served as an effective acclimatizing march for the troops.

The operation was planned to commence in mid-July. Therefore, D Company of Shree Nath Battalion under Captain Hari Bahadur Karki was deployed at Charkabhot as a blocking force. Similarly, a strong platoon of Bhairabi Dal Company commanded by Captain Bajra Gurung was deployed at Larkebhot in Gorkha as another blocking force. A strong platoon of Chandi Prasad Company together with the 300 Khampas under Baba Yeshi was concentrated at Tukche as the reserve force. Lastly, a company of Para Commandos of Bhairabnath Nath Battalion was located at Pokhara as additional reserve force (Nepal Army War Diary, Mustang Operation; 1976).

The Chief District Officer and the Deputy Superintendent of Nepal Police were in close touch with Ge Wandu’s assistants. They were operating as interlocutors for the operation. The rules of engagement were clear to convince the Khampas to handover weapons peacefully and surrender, then use lethal force during violation of orders or when under effective fire.

It was decided upon bilaterally after consultations that the Khampas would handover weapons and surrender peacefully at Keisang Camp on 20 July 1974. When the date was near another extension was requested and 26 July 1974 was decided. Again another extension was requested and the date proposed as 31 July 1974. With suspicion looming, Indradhoj Company was ordered to cordon Keisang camp after midnight of 31/1 July 1974. The news arrived that Ge-Wandu with two companies out of the six had escaped via Vrapsa, Lupra Camp and then to Tsele. The remaining Khampas in Keisang camp
Disarming Khampa Guerrillas by the Nepal Government

handed their weapons and surrendered peacefully. The weapons and ammunition recovered was substantial (Basnyat, 2013).

No. 3 Brigade continued with the searches of the other operational bases where armed Khampas with arms were still residing. The other eight camps searched were: Lupra, Kagbeni, Samar, Ghani, Ghiling, Tyangya, Yara Gara and Chairo. In the process of searching, two Khampas jumped in the ice-cold Kali Gandaki River and one shot himself. The substantial American weapons of Second World War vintage and ammunition were seized at the Keisang camp. Two Nepali soldiers of C Company Shree Nath Battalion died due to high altitude sickness while crossing the Thorang La pass to go to Manang (Nepali Army war diary, Mustang operation; 1976).

The PLA was heavily deployed along the Nepal-China border and were monitoring the progress of the disarming operation. As soon as it was confirmed that Ge Wandu had absconded, it was certain that the escape route would never be through Tibet. Army Headquarter informed No. 4 Brigade Commander Brigadier General Aditya Shumshere JB Rana to activate appropriate blocking positions. Reconnaissance by helicopter was being conducted to track the fugitives. Unfortunately, since 1 August to till 6 September 1974, no traces could be found.

On 7 September 1974, the luck of Ge Wandu ran out when they vandalized the Nepal Police Post at Munchu. Luckily the Police in Munchu was able to inform the Nepal Police Headquarter in time about the contact with the escaping Khampas. Immediately, Army Headquarter instructed No. 4 Brigade to establish ambush sites west of Munchu. A platoon size force of Aridaman Company and Chandan Nath Company were deployed to lay ambush sites at: LipuLekh under Jemadar Dan Bahadur Chand; Tinker Pass under Captain Bhakta Bahadur Rawat; Kambala Area; and Chhangru. A section of 81 mm medium mortars and a demolition team from Bhairabnath Battalion were also attached (Basnyat, 2008).

On 9 September 1974, an advance scout team of three Khampas appeared in the ambush site at LipuLekh. The ambush party commander arrested the three and interrogated. After interrogation, it was declared that the Khampas with Ge-Wandu were arriving at the site in two to three hours. In the early afternoon a group of 45 to 50 armed Khampas arrived at the ambush site with Ge Wandu leading the column on a white horse. The ambush party opened automatic fire instantly. The Khampa column immediately occupied a higher ground and returned fire with their recoilless rifle and machine guns. A total of nine to ten Khampas including Ge-Wandu were killed and about 15 Khampas were wounded.

Later the captured Khampas disclosed that they escaped via Kagbeni, Phindabas, Se-Phoksundo, Nishant, Munchu Pass, Yari and to Tinker LipuLekh. The Members of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) of India received the remaining fugitives at the bridge and a medium range helicopter was seen hovering around indicating that Ge-Wandu was in contact with the Indian SFF. The PLA Commander at Taklakot was watching the activities.
Disarming Khampa Guerrillas by the Nepal Government

of the Khampas at the ambush site and their commander sent a letter of appreciation to the Nepali troop commander for the brave deed performed.

Later, the Khampas with Baba Yeshi were rewarded with the Nepali citizenship certificate, cash, home, land and educational facility. Moreover, Baba Yeshi was granted forgiveness from the Dalai Lama in 1991 for having parted with the Khampa Resistance Movement (Hirachan, personal communication, July 19, 2016). The people of Mustang requested the government for a permanent stationing of a sizable military force in Jomsom, too.

After having resolved the issue of armed Khampas in Nepal, the Chinese were appreciative of our commitment to the Sino-Nepal Treaty commitments. If India wishes to carry on with the Tibetan liberation issue, it could continue along the Sino-Indian border, but not at the cost of the bilateral relationship between Nepal and China. The highlight of the disarming operation was the opportunity provided to King Birendra to propose Nepal be declared a ‘Zone of Peace’ on 24 February 1975 during his coronation an agenda endorsed by 117 countries except India and still appreciated as very pertinent by intellectuals till today (Sangraula, 2016).

Conclusion

After the Tibetan uprising, the Nepali authorities had permitted the Tibetan refugees to enter on humanitarian grounds. Unfortunately, loaded with foreign assistance, the Tibetan resistance movement established the guerrilla bases in the remote northern areas of Nepal and indulged in activities against Chinese security interests. Nepal still maintains a non-aligned foreign policy and is staunchly against harboring elements that engage against the security interests of its two neighbors. Hence, the Government of Nepal had to prevent such activities decisively.

The Khampa resistance movement itself suffered from certain drawbacks. Initially, the foreign nations neither recognized nor assisted the Tibetans in the early stages of Chinese annexation. The CIA achieved limited success in their endeavor. The UN hesitated to discuss the Tibetan situation even when El Salvador raised the issue. The Indian Army used the Tibetan guerrillas for the liberation of Bangladesh and suffered heavy casualties for an unconnected cause. The personality clash and the ensuing rivalry between Khampa commanders, Ge-Yeshi and Ge-Wandu, visibly disappointed the guerrilla cadres and hampered the unity in effort to attain the main goal.

Hence, today USA together with the EU is keenly preparing to launch the dying movement for the Tibetan cause when there are no Tibetan refugees prepared to go back to Tibet and settle down. Therefore, geo-strategically located Nepal with its international linkages, compulsions and open common border with the Peoples Republic of China as well as India, has a very demanding role to maintain its non-aligned foreign policy and amplify its status in international power relations.
Disarming Khampa Guerrillas by the Nepal Government

The prime and salient point to be noted is that under the disguise of foreign Aid, the outsiders did manage to enter the corridors of Nepali power center and surreptitiously arm the Khampas. Powerful nations come with lucrative deals to accomplish their vested interests. It is very crucial for the Nepali to assess the motive of each special offers and grants before deciding its acceptance at face value or else another Khampa–like issue detrimental to the national security of Nepal and its people.

References

Babayeva, Y. (2006, August 2). The Khampa uprising: Tibetan resistance against the Chinese invasion. https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/honorscollege_theses/31/

Bansal, A. (2017). Meet the Khampa warriors, who even the Chinese feared. WION.

Barnett, R. (2009). [Review of the book A history of modern Tibet, by M.C. Goldstein]. China Perspectives, 1-4.

Basnyat, P. (2016). A general’s brief on Indian military strategy on Nepal. https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/a-generals-brief-on-indian-military-strategy-on-nepal/

Basnyat, P. (April, 2013). Disarmament of Khampa-1974. https://www.facebook.com/notices/nepal-army/disarmament-of-the-khampas-1974-ad/688537864505811/

Basnyat, P. (2008). Nepalma Tibetti Sannarthiharuko Prabesh Tatha Khampa Bidhroha [Entry of Tibetan Refugees in Nepal and Khampa Rebellion]. Pragati Pustak Sadan.

Clara, M. (1995). The Last Forbidden Kingdom. C.E. Tuttle Company.

Sperling, E. Conboy, K. & Morrison, J. (2002). [Review of the book The CIA's Secret War in Tibet, by E. Sperling]. The Journal of Asian Studies, 63(1), 183-186.

Cowan, S. (2014, December 14). The Indian Check Posts, LipuLekh and Kalapani. https://www.recordnepal.com/wire/indian-checkposts-lipu-lekh-and-kalapani/

Cowan, S. (2016, January 17). The curious case of the Mustang incident. https://www.recordnepal.com/wire/curious-case-mustang-incident/

Claude, A. (2013). Tibet: The Lost Frontier. Lancer.

Devkota, G.B. (1980). Nepalko Raja nitik Darpan [Political History of Nepal] (Vol. 2). https://thuprai.com/book/nepalko-rajanitik-darpan-vol-2/

Garver, J. W. (2006). New direction in the study of China’s foreign policy. In A.J. Johnston & R.S. Ross (Eds.), China’s Decision for War with India (pp. 86-130). Stanford University Press.
Disarming Khampa Guerrillas by the Nepal Government

Goldstein, C. (2009). A history of modern Tibet (Vol. 2). In C. Melvyn, Rimpoche & Gelek (Eds.), The Claim before the Storm. University of California Press.

Goldstein, C. (1997). The Snow Lion and the Dragon. China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama. University of California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520923256

Hirachan, N.B. (2016, July 19). Personal communication [Interview] by Arjun Basnet. Jomsom, Mustang. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-sep-15-mn-22993-story.html

Jian, C. (2006). The Tibetan rebellion of 1959 and China’s changing relations with India and the Soviet Union. Journal of Cold War Studies, 8(3), 54-101. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26925942

Mann, J. (Sept 15, 1998). CIA gave aid to Tibetan exiles in 60s, files show.

Mikel, D. (2005). Buddha’s Warriors. Penguin.

Nepal Army. (1976). War Diary Mustang Operation. Army Headquarters.

Sangroula, Y.R. (1989). Zone of Peace: An Emerging Theme of International Law. Council of Lawyers.

Sherchan, B.B. (2016, January 17). Personal communication [Interview] by Arjun Basnet. Jomsom, Mustang.

Shrestha, H. (2015). Sixty Years of Dynamic Partnership. Nepal-China Society.

Tamla, U. (1918). ‘Establishment of northern administration to monitor Khampa activities.’ Nepal Weekly, 15(2), 25-26.

Thakali, C.B. (2016, December 25). Personal communication [Interview] by Arjun Basnet. Jomsom, Mustang.

Thakali, I.P. (2016, January 17). Personal communication [Interview] by Arjun Basnet. Jomsom, Mustang.

Ukyab, T. (2021, December 20). Personal communication [Interview] by Arjun Basnet. Jomsom, Mustang.

Uprety, P. (1980). Nepal-Tibet relations. Ratna Pustak Bhandar.