Combining generic judgments with recursive definitions

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Abstract

Many semantical aspects of programming languages, such as their operational semantics and their type assignment calculi, are specified by describing appropriate proof systems. Recent research has identified two proof-theoretic features that allow direct, logic-based reasoning about such descriptions: the treatment of atomic judgments as fixed points (recursive definitions) and an encoding of binding constructs via generic judgments. However, the logics encompassing these two features have thus far treated them orthogonally: that is, they do not provide the ability to define object-logic properties that themselves depend on an intrinsic treatment of binding. We propose a new and simple integration of these features within an intuitionistic logic enhanced with induction over natural numbers and we show that the resulting logic is consistent. The pivotal benefit of the integration is that it allows recursive definitions to not just encode simple, traditional forms of atomic judgments but also to capture generic properties pertaining to such judgments. The usefulness of this logic is illustrated by showing how it can provide elegant treatments of object-logic contexts that appear in proofs involving typing calculi and of arbitrarily cascading substitutions that play a role in reducibility arguments.

Keywords: generic judgments, higher-order abstract syntax, proof search, reasoning about operational semantics

1. Introduction

An important approach to specifying and reasoning about computations involves proof theory and proof search. We discuss below three kinds of judgments about computational systems that one might want to capture and the proof theoretic techniques that have been used to capture them. We divide this discussion into two parts: the first part deals with judgments over algebraic terms and the second with judgments over terms-with-binders. We then exploit this overview to describe the new features of the logic we are presenting in this paper.

1.1. Judgments involving algebraic terms

We overview features of proof theory that support recursive definitions about first-order (algebraic) terms and, using CCS as an example, we illustrate the judgments about computations that can be encoded through such definitions.

1) Logic programming, may behavior Logic programming languages allow for a natural specification and animation of operational semantics and typing judgments: this observation goes back to at least the Centaur project and its animation of Typol specifications using Prolog [5]. For example, Horn clauses provide a simple and immediate encoding of CCS labeled transition systems and unification and backtracking provide a means for exploring what is reachable from a given process. Traditional logic programming is, however, limited to may behavior judgments: using it, we cannot prove that a given CCS process $P$ cannot make a transition and, since this negative property is logically equivalent to proving that $P$ is bisimilar to $0$ (the null process), such systems cannot capture bisimulation.

2) Model checking, must behavior Proof theoretic techniques for must behaviors (such as bisimulation and many model checking problems) have been developed in the early 1990’s [8] and further extended later [15]. Since these techniques work by unfolding computations until termination, they are applicable to recursive definitions that are noetherian. As an example, bisimulation for finite CCS can be given an immediate and declarative specification [17].

3) Theorem proving, infinite behavior Reasoning about all members of a domain or about possibly infinite executions requires induction and coinduction. Incorporating induction in proof theory goes back to Gentzen. The work in [15] provides induction and coinduction rules associated with the above-mentioned recursive definitions. In such a setting, one can prove, for example, that (strong) bisimulation in CCS is a congruence.
1.2. Judgments involving bindings

The proof theoretic treatment of binding in terms has echoed the three stages of development described above. We switch from CCS to the \( \pi \)-calculus to illustrate the different kinds of judgments that these support.

1. Logic programming, \( \lambda \)-tree syntax

Higher-order generalizations of logic programming, such as higher-order hereditary Harrop formulas [21] and the dependently typed LF [2], adequately capture may behavior for terms containing bindings. In particular, the presence of hypothetical and universal judgments supports the \( \lambda \)-tree syntax [20] approach to higher-order abstract syntax [26]. The logic programming languages \( \lambda \)Prolog [24] and Twelf [27] support such syntax representations and provide simple specifications of, for example, reachability in the \( \pi \)-calculus.

2. Model checking, \( \forall \)-quantification

While the notions of universal quantification and \textit{generic judgment} are often conflated, a satisfactory treatment of must behavior requires splitting apart these concepts. The \( \forall \)-quantifier was introduced to encode generic judgments directly. To illustrate the issues here, consider the formula \( \forall w. \neg (\lambda x. x = \lambda x.w) \). If we think of \( \lambda \)-terms as denoting abstracted syntax (terms modulo \( \alpha \)-conversion), this formula should be provable (variable capture is not allowed in logically sound substitution). If we think of \( \lambda \)-terms as describing functions, then the equation \( \lambda y.t = \lambda y.s \) is equivalent to \( \forall y.t = s \). But then our example formula is equivalent to \( \forall w. \neg \forall x.x = w \), which should not be provable since it is not true in a model with a single element domain. To think of \( \lambda \)-terms syntactically instead, we treat \( \lambda y.t = \lambda y.s \) as equivalent to \( \forall y.t = s \). In this case, our example formula is equivalent to \( \forall w. \neg \forall x.x = w \), which is provable [22]. Using this quantifier, the \( \pi \)-calculus process \([\nu x. [x = w], \bar{w} \cdot x] \) can be encoded such that it is provably bisimilar to \( 0 \). Bedwyr [3] is a model checker that treats such generic judgments.

3. Theorem proving, \( LG^\omega \)

When there is only finite behavior, logics for recursive definitions do not need the cut or initial rules, and, consequently, they do not need to answer the question “When are two generic judgments equal?” On the other hand, induction and coinduction do need an answer to this question: e.g., when doing induction over natural numbers, one must be able to recognize that the case for \( i + 1 \) has been reduced to the case for \( i \). The \( LG^\omega \) proof system [34] provides a natural setting for answering this question. Using \( LG^\omega \) encodings, one can prove that (open) bisimulation is a \( \pi \)-calculus congruence.

1.3. Allowing definitions of generic judgments

In the developments discussed above, recursive definitions are permitted only for \textit{atomic} judgments. In many syntax analysis problems, binding constructs are treated by building up a local context that attributes properties to the objects they bind. In reasoning about such analyses, it is often necessary to be able to associate relevant generic properties with atomic judgments. For example, a typical type assignment calculus for \( \lambda \)-terms treats abstractions by adding assumptions about the type of the bound variables to the context of the typing judgment. To model such a context, we might use a predicate \( cntx \) that encodes the assignment of types to abstracted variables. Thus, an atomic judgment of the form \( cntx [(x_1, t_1), \ldots, (x_n, t_n)] \) would denote the assignment of types \( t_1, \ldots, t_n \) to the variables \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) and can be used as a hypothesis in the course of determining the type of a term. Now, certain “generic” properties hold implicitly of the contexts that are constructed; for example, these assign types only to bound variables and have at most one assignment for each of them. Such properties are not actually used in encoding the rules for type inference but they do have to be made explicit if we want to prove properties, such as the determinacy of type assignment, about the calculus that is encoded. Recursive definitions provide a means for formalizing properties that are needed in these kinds of reasoning tasks. Unfortunately, these definitions are not strong enough in their present form to allow for the convenient statement of generic properties ranging over atomic judgments.

These issues surrounding the specification of contexts are actually endemic to reasoning about many different kinds of specifications that utilize \( \lambda \)-tree syntax. We provide an elegant treatment of it here by extending recursive definitions to apply not only to atomic but also to generic judgments. Using this device, we will, for instance, be able to define a property of the form

\[
\forall x_1 \cdots \forall x_n. cntx [(x_1, t_1), \ldots, (x_n, t_n)].
\]

By stating the property in this way, we ensure that \( cntx \) assigns types only to variables and at most one to each. Now, this property can be used in an inductive proof, provided it can be verified that the contexts that are built up during type analysis recursively satisfy the definition. We present rules that support this style of argument.

1.4. An outline of the paper

Section 2 describes the logic \( G \) that allows for the extended form of definitions and Section 3 establishes its consistency. The extension has significant consequences for writing and reasoning about logical specifications. We provide a hint of this through a few examples in Section 4 as discussed later, many other applications such as solutions to the POPLmark challenge problems [2], cut-elimination for sequent calculi, and an encoding of Tait’s logical relations based proof of normalization for the simply typed
\[\lambda\text{-calculus} \text{ [32]} \text{ have been successfully developed using the Abella system that implements } \mathcal{G}. \text{ We conclude the paper with a comparison to related work and an indication of future directions.}\]

2. A logic with generalized definitions

The logic \( \mathcal{G} \) is obtained by extending an intuitionistic and predicative subset of Church’s Simple Theory of Types with fixed point definitions, natural number induction, and a new quantifier for encoding generic judgments. Its main components are elaborated in the subsections below. It is possible to develop a classical variant of \( \mathcal{G} \) as well: we do not follow that path but just comment that moving from intuitionistic to classical logic can have interesting impacts on specifications. For example, the intuitionistic reading of the specification of bisimulation for the \( \pi \)-calculus yields \textit{open bisimulation} while the classical reading of the same specification yields \textit{late bisimulation} [36].

2.1. The basic syntax

Following Church [6], terms are constructed using abstraction and application from constants and (bound) variables. All terms are typed using a monomorphic typing system; these types also constrain the set of well-formed expressions in the expected way. The provability relation concerns well-formed terms of the distinguished type \( o \) that are also called formulas. Logic is introduced by including special constants representing the propositional connectives \( \top, \bot, \land, \lor, \leftrightarrow \) and, for every type \( \tau \) that does not contain \( o \), the constants \( \forall \tau \) and \( \exists \tau \) of type \( (\tau \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o \). The binary propositional connectives are written as usual in infix form and the expressions \( \forall \tau x.B \) and \( \exists \tau x.B \) abbreviate the formulas \( \forall \tau \lambda x.B \) and \( \exists \tau \lambda x.B \), respectively. Type subscripts will be omitted from quantified formulas when they can be inferred from the context or are not important to the discussion. We also use a shorthand for quantified quantification: if \( Q \) is a quantifier, the expression \( Qx_1, \ldots, x_n.P \) will abbreviate \( Qx_1 \ldots Qx_n.P \).

The usual inference rules for the universal quantifier can be seen as equating it to the conjunction of all of its instances: that is, this quantifier is treated extensionally. There are a number of situations [22] where one wishes to have a generic treatment of a statement like “\( B(x) \) holds for all \( x \)”; in these situations, the \textit{form} of the argument is important and not the argument’s behavior on all its possible instances. To encode such generic judgments, we use the \( \nabla \)-quantifier (nabla) [22]. Syntactically, this quantifier corresponds to including a constant \( \nabla \tau \) of type \( (\tau \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o \) for each type \( \tau \) (not containing \( o \)). As with the other quantifiers, \( \nabla \tau x.B \) abbreviates \( \nabla \tau \lambda x.B \) and the type subscripts are often suppressed for readability.

2.2. Generic judgments and \( \nabla \)-quantification

Sequents in intuitionistic logic are usually written as

\[\Sigma : B_1, \ldots, B_n \vdash B \quad (n \geq 0)\]

where \( \Sigma \) is the “global signature” for the sequent: in particular, it contains the eigenvariables of the sequent proof. We shall think of \( \Sigma \) in this prefix position as being a binding operator for each variable it contains. The \( \text{FO} \lambda^{\Delta \nabla} \) logic [22] introduced “local signatures” for each formula in the sequent: that is, sequents are written instead as

\[\Sigma : \sigma_1 \vdash B_1, \ldots, \sigma_n \vdash B_n, \sigma_0 \vdash B_0,\]

where each \( \sigma_0, \ldots, \sigma_n \) is a list of variables that are bound locally in the formula adjacent to it. Such local signatures within proofs reflect bindings in formulas using the \( \nabla \)-quantifier: in particular, the judgment and formula

\[x_1, \ldots, x_n \vdash B \text{ and } \nabla x_1 \cdots \nabla x_n.B \quad (n \geq 0)\]

have the same proof-theoretic force.

The \( \text{FO} \lambda^{\Delta \nabla} \) logic [22] (and its partial implementation in the Bedwyr logic programming/model checking system [3]) eschewed atomic formulas for explicit fixed point (recursive) definitions, along with inference rules to unfold them. In such a system, both the cut-rule and the initial rule can be eliminated and checking the equality of two generic judgments is not necessary. As we have already mentioned, when one is proving more ambitious theorems involving induction and coinduction, equality of generic judgments becomes important.

2.3. \( \text{LG} \omega \) and structural rules for \( \nabla \)-quantification

There are two equations for \( \nabla \) that we seem forced to include when we consider proofs by induction. In a sense, these equations play the role of structural rules for the local, generic context. Written at the level of formulas, they are the \( \nabla \)-exchange rule \( \nabla x \forall y.F = \forall y \nabla x.F \) and the \( \nabla \)-strengthening rule \( \nabla x.F = F \), provided \( x \) is not free in \( F \). The \( \text{LG} \omega \) proof system of Tiu [34] is essentially \( \text{FO} \lambda^{\Delta \nabla} \) extended with these two structural rules for \( \nabla \).

The move from the weaker \( \text{FO} \lambda^{\Delta \nabla} \) to the stronger \( \text{LG} \omega \) logic has at least two important additional consequences.

First, the strengthening rule implies that every type at which one is willing to use \( \nabla \)-quantification is not only non-empty but contains an unbounded number of members. For example, the formulas \( \exists \tau x.\top \) is always provable, even if there are no closed terms of type \( \tau \) because this formula is equivalent to \( \nabla \tau y \exists \tau x.\top \) which is provable, as will be clear from the proof system given in Figure 1. Similarly, for any given \( n \geq 1 \), the following formula is provable

\[\exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n [\bigwedge_{1 \leq i,j \leq n, i \neq j} x_i \neq x_j].\]
Figure 1. The core rules of $\mathcal{G}$

Second, the validity of the strengthening and exchange rules mean that all local contexts can be made equal. As a result, the local binding can now be considered as an (implicit) global binder. In such a setting, the collection of globally $\forall$-bound variables can be replaced with nominal constants. Of course, in light of the exchange rule, we must consider atomic judgments as being identical if they differ by only permutations of such constants.

We shall follow the $\text{LG}^{\omega}$ approach to treating $\forall$. Thus, for every type we assume an infinite collection of nominal constants. The collection of all nominal constants is denoted by $C$; these constants are to be distinguished from the collection of usual, non-nominal constants that we denote by $K$. We define the support of a term (or formula), written $\text{supp}(t)$, as the set of nominal constants appearing in it. A permutation of nominal constants is a bijection $\pi$ from $C$ to $C$ such that $\{x \mid \pi(x) \neq x\}$ is finite and $\pi$ preserves types. Permutations will be extended to terms (and formulas), written $\pi.t$, as follows:

$\pi.a = \pi(a)$, if $a \in C$
$\pi.c = c$, if $c \notin C$ is atomic
$\pi.(\lambda x.M) = \lambda \pi(x).\pi(M)$
$\pi.(M \ N) = (\pi.M) \ (\pi.N)$

The core fragment of $\mathcal{G}$ is presented in Figure 1. Sequents in this logic have the form $\Sigma : \Gamma \vdash C$ where $\Gamma$ is a multiset and the signature $\Sigma$ contains all the free variables of $\Gamma$ and $C$. In the $\text{\forall L}$ and $\text{\forall R}$ rules, $a$ denotes a nominal constant of an appropriate type. In the $\text{\exists L}$ and $\text{\exists R}$ rule we use raising \[19\] to encode the dependency of the quantified variable on the support of $B$; the expression $(\ell \ c)$ used in these two rules denotes the (curried) application of $h$ to the constants appearing in the sequence $c$. The $\text{\forall L}$ and $\text{\exists R}$ rules make use of judgments of the form $\Sigma, K, C \vdash t : \tau$. These judgments enforce the requirement that the expression $t$ instantiating the quantifier in the rule is a well-formed term of type $\tau$ constructed from the variables in $\Sigma$ and the constants in $K \cup C$. Notice that in contrast the $\text{\forall R}$ and $\text{\exists L}$ rules seem to allow for a dependency on only a restricted set of nominal constants. However, this asymmetry is not significant: the dependency expressed through raising in the latter rules can be extended to any number of nominal constants that are not in the relevant support set without affecting the provability of sequents.

2.4. Recursive definitions

The structure of definitions in $\mathcal{G}$ is, in a sense, its distinguishing characteristic. To motivate their form and also to understand their expressiveness, we consider first the definitions that are permitted in $\text{LG}^{\omega}$. In that setting, a definitional clause has the form $\forall x.H \triangleq B$ where $H$ is an atomic formula all of whose free variables are contained in $\vec{x}$ and $B$ is an arbitrary formula all of whose free variables must also be free in $H$. In a clause of this sort, $H$ is called the head and $B$ is called the body and a (possibly infinite) collection of clauses constitutes a definition. Now, there are two properties of such definitional clauses that should be noted. First, $H$ and $B$ are restricted to not contain occurrences of nominal constants. Second, the interpretation of such a clause permits the variables in $\vec{x}$ to be instantiated with terms containing any nominal constant; intuitively, the quantificational structure at the head of the definition has a $\forall v$ form, with the (implicit) $\forall$ quantification being over arbitrary sequences of nominal constants. These two properties actually limit the power of definitions: (subparts of) terms satisfying the relations they identify cannot be forced to be nominal constants and, similarly, specific (sub)terms...
cannot be stipulated to be independent of such constants.

These shortcomings are addressed in $G$ by allowing definitional clauses to take the form $\forall x.(\forall z.H) \triangleq B$ where all the free variables in $\forall z.H$ must appear in $x$ and all the free variables in $B$ must also be free in $\forall z.H$. The intended interpretation of the $\forall$ quantification over $H$ is that particular terms appearing in the relation being defined must be identified as nominal constants although specific names may still not be assigned to these constants. Moreover, the location of this quantifier changes the prefix over the head from a $\forall\forall$ form to the more general $\forall\forall\forall$ form. Concretely, the explicit $\forall$ quantification over $\vec{z}$ forces the instantiations for the externally $\forall$ quantified variables $\vec{x}$ to be independent of the nominal constants used for $\vec{z}$.

One illustration of the definitions permitted in $G$ is provided by the following clause:

$$(\forall n.\text{name } n) \triangleq T.$$ 

An atomic predicate $\text{name } N$ would satisfy this clause provided that it can be matched with its head. For this to be possible, $N$ must be a nominal constant. Thus, name is a predicate that recognizes such constants. As another example, consider the clause

$$\forall E.(\forall x.\text{fresh } x E) \triangleq T.$$ 

In this case the atomic formula $\text{fresh } N T$ will satisfy the clause just in case $N$ is a nominal constant and $T$ is a term that does not contain this constant (the impossibility of variable capture ensures this constraint). Thus, this clause expresses the property of a name being "fresh" to a given term. Further illustrations of the new form of definitions and their use in reasoning tasks are considered in Section 4.

Definitions impact the logical system through introduction rules for atomic judgments. Formalizing these rules involves the use of substitutions. A substitution $\theta$ is a type-preserving mapping (whose application is written in postfix notation) from variables to terms, such that the set $\{x \mid x \theta \neq x\}$ is finite. Although a substitution is extended to a mapping from terms to terms, formulas to formulas, etc., when we refer to its domain and range, we mean these sets for this most basic function. A substitution is extended to a function from terms to terms in the usual fashion. If $\Gamma$ is a multiset of formulas then $\Gamma \theta$ is the multiset $\{J \theta \mid J \in \Gamma\}$. If $\Sigma$ is a signature then $\Sigma \theta$ is the signature that results from removing from $\Sigma$ the variables in the domain of $\theta$ and adding the variables that are free in the range of $\theta$.

To support the desired interpretation of a definitional clause, when matching the head of $\forall x.(\forall z.H) \triangleq B$ with an atomic judgment, we must permit the instantiations for $\vec{x}$ to contain the nominal constants appearing in that judgment. Likewise, we must consider instantiations for the eigenvariables appearing in the judgment that possibly contain the nominal constants chosen for $\vec{z}$. Both possibilities can be realized via raising. Given a clause $\forall x_1, \ldots, x_n.(\forall z.H) \triangleq B$, we define a version of it raised over the sequence of nominal constants $\vec{a}$ and away from a signature $\Sigma$ as

$$\forall \vec{a}.(\forall z.H[h_1 \vec{a}/x_1, \ldots, h_n \vec{a}/x_n]) \triangleq B[h_1 \vec{a}/x_1, \ldots, h_n \vec{a}/x_n],$$

where $h_1, \ldots, h_n$ are distinct variables of suitable type that do not appear in $\Sigma$. Given the sequent $\Sigma : \Gamma \vdash C$ and a sequence of nominal constants $\vec{c}$ none of which appear in the support of $\Gamma$ or $C$, let $\sigma$ be any substitution of the form

$$\{h'/c' \mid h \in \Sigma \text{ and } h' \text{ is a variable of suitable type that is not in } \Sigma\}.$$ 

Then the sequent $\Sigma \sigma : \Gamma \sigma \vdash C \sigma$ constitutes a version of $\Sigma : \Gamma \vdash C$ raised over $\vec{c}$.

The introduction rules based on definitions are presented in Figure 2. The defL rule has a set of premises that is generated by considering each definitional clause of the form $\forall x.(\forall z.H) \triangleq B$ in the following fashion. Assuming that $\vec{z} = z_1, \ldots, z_n$, let $\vec{c} = c_1, \ldots, c_n$ be a sequence of distinct nominal constants none of which appear in the support of $\Gamma$, $A$ or $C$ and let $\Sigma' : A', \Gamma' \vdash C'$ denote a version of the lower sequent raised over $\vec{c}$. Further, let $H'$ and $B'$ be obtained by taking the head and body of a version of the clause being considered raised over a listing $\vec{a}$ of the constants in the support of $A$ and away from $\Sigma'$ and applying the substitution $\{c_1/z_1, \ldots, c_n/z_n\}$ to them. Then the set of premises arising from this clause are obtained by considering all permutations $\pi$ of $\vec{a} \vec{c}$ and all substitutions $\theta$ such that $$(\pi.H')\theta = A'\theta,$$ with the proviso that the range of $\theta$ may not contain any nominal constants.

The defR rule has exactly one premise that is obtained by using any one definitional clause. The formulas $B'$ and $H'$ are generated from this clause as in the defL rule, but $\pi$ is now taken to be any one permutation of $\vec{a} \vec{c}$ and $\theta$ is taken to be any one substitution such that $$(\pi.H')\theta = A',$$ again with the proviso that the range of $\theta$ may not contain any nominal constants.

In summary, the definition rules are based on raising the sequent over the nominal constants picked for the $\forall$ variables from the definition, raising the definition over nominal constants from the sequent, and then unifying the chosen atomic judgment and the head of the definition under various permutations of the nominal constants. As it is stated, the set of premises in the defL rule arising from any
one definitional clause is potentially infinite because of the need to consider every unifying substitution. It is possible to restrict these substitutions instead to the members of a complete set of unifiers. In the situations where there is a single most general unifier, as is the case when we are dealing with the higher-order pattern fragment \[18\], the number of premises arising from each definition clause is bounded by the number of permutations. In practice, this number can be quite small as illustrated in Section \[4\].

Two restrictions must be placed on definitional clauses to ensure consistency of the logic. The first is that no nominal constants may appear in such a clause; this requirement also enforces an equivariance property for definitions. The second is that such clauses must be stratified so as to guarantee the existence of fixed points. To do this we associate with each predicate \( p \) a natural number \( \text{lvl}(p) \), the level of \( p \). The notion is generalized to formulas as follows.

**Definition 1.** Given a formula \( B \), its level \( \text{lvl}(B) \) is defined as follows:

1. \( \text{lvl}(p \top) = \text{lvl}(p) \)
2. \( \text{lvl}(\bot) = \text{lvl}(\top) = 0 \)
3. \( \text{lvl}(B \land C) = \text{max}(\text{lvl}(B), \text{lvl}(C)) \)
4. \( \text{lvl}(B \lor C) = \text{max}(\text{lvl}(B) + 1, \text{lvl}(C)) \)
5. \( \text{lvl}(\forall \overline{x}.B) = \text{max}(\text{lvl}(\forall \overline{x}.B), \text{lvl}(\exists \overline{x}.B)) = \text{lvl}(B) \)

For every definitional clause \( \forall \overline{x}.(\forall \overline{x}.H) \triangleq B \), we require \( \text{lvl}(B) \leq \text{lvl}(H) \). This stratification condition ensures that a definition cannot depend negatively on itself. More precise stratification conditions which allow such dependency in a controlled fashion are possible, but we choose this condition for simplicity. See \[15, 34\] for a description of why these properties lead to consistency.

### 2.5. Induction over natural numbers

The final component of \( G \) is an encoding of natural numbers and rules for carrying out induction over these numbers. This form of induction is useful in reasoning about specifications of computations because it allows us to induct on the height of object-logic proof trees that encode the lengths of computations. Specifically, we introduce the type \( nt \) and corresponding constructors \( z : nt \) and \( s : nt \rightarrow nt \). Use of induction is controlled by the distinguished predicate \( nat : nt \ightarrow o \). The rules for this predicate are presented in Figure \[3\]. The rule \( \text{natC} \) is actually a rule schema, parameterized by the induction invariant \( I \). Providing induction over only natural numbers is mostly a matter of convenience in studying the meta-theory of \( G \). Extending induction to other algebraic datatypes \[23, 33\] should have little impact on the meta-theory of \( G \), although it would clearly be a useful extension for any system implementing \( G \) (such as Abella \[7\]).

### 3. Cut-elimination and consistency for \( G \)

The consistency of \( G \) is an immediate consequence of the cut-elimination result for this logic. Cut-elimination is proved for \( LG^n \) \[35\] by a generalization of the approach used for \( FO\lambda^N \) \[13\] that is itself based on a technique introduced by Tait \[32\] and refined by Martin-Löf \[12\]. The main aspect of this generalization is recognizing and utilizing the fact that certain transformations of sequents preserve provability and also do not increase (minimum) proof height. The particular transformations that are considered in the case of \( LG^n \) have to do with weakening of hypotheses, permutations of nominal constants, and substitutions for eigenvariables. We can use this framework to show that cut can be eliminated from \( G \) by adding one more transformation to this collection. This transformation pertains to the raising of sequents that is needed in the introduction rules based on the extended form of definitional clauses. We motivate this transformation by sketching the structure of the argument as it concerns the use of such clauses below.

The critical part of the cut-elimination argument is the reduction of what are called the essential cases of the use of the cut rule, i.e., the situations where the last rule in the derivation is a cut and the last rules in the derivations of its premises introduce the cut formula. Now, the only rules of \( G \) that are different from those of \( LG^n \) are \( \text{defL} \) and \( \text{defR} \). Thus, we have to consider a different argument only when these rules are the last ones used in the premise derivations in an essential case of a cut. In this case, the overall derivation has the form

\[
\Sigma : \Gamma \vdash A \quad \Sigma : \Gamma' \vdash (\pi.B')\theta \quad \Sigma': \rho : (\pi'.B'')\rho, \Delta' \vdash C'' \rho
\]

\[
\frac{\Pi_1 \Sigma : \Gamma : A \quad \Pi_2 \Sigma : \Gamma : C \quad \text{cut}}{\Sigma : \Gamma, \Delta \vdash C \quad \text{defR}}
\]

where \( \Pi_1 \) and \( \Pi_2 \) represent derivations of the relevant sequents. Let \( \Sigma' : \Gamma' \vdash A' \) be the raised version of \( \Sigma : \Gamma \vdash A \) and let \( H' \) and \( B' \) be the head and body of the version of the definitional clause raised over \( \text{supp}(A) \) and away from \( \Sigma' \) used in the \( \text{defR} \) rule. From the definition of this rule,
we know that $\theta$ is substitution such that $(\pi.H')\theta = A'$. Let $\theta'$ be the restriction of $\theta$ to the free variables of $H'$. Clearly $(\pi.H')\theta = (\pi.H')\theta'$ and $(\pi.B')\theta = (\pi.B')\theta'$. Further, since the free variables of $H'$ are distinct from the variables in $\Sigma'$, $\theta'$ has no effect on $\Sigma'$, $\Delta'$, $C'$, or $A'$. Thus, it must be the case that $(\pi.H')\theta' = A'\theta'$. From this it follows that

$$\Pi_2^{\theta',\pi,B'} \Sigma' : (\pi,B')\theta', \Delta' \vdash C'$$

is included in the set of derivations above the lower sequent of $\Sigma$. We can therefore reduce the cut in question to the following:

$$\Pi_1 \Sigma' : \Gamma', \Delta' \vdash C'$$

The proof of cut-elimination for $LG^a$ is based on induction over the height of the right premise in a cut, therefore this cut can be further reduced and eliminated. The essential properties we need to complete the proof at this point are that $\Sigma' : \Gamma', \Delta' \vdash C'$ is provable if and only if $\Sigma : \Gamma, \Delta \vdash C$ is provable, and that both proofs have the same height in this case. We formalize these in the lemma below.

**Definition 2 (Proof height).** The height of a derivation $\Pi$, denoted by $ht(\Pi)$, is 1 if $\Pi$ has no premise derivations and is the least upper bound of $\{ht(\Pi_i) + 1\}_{i \in I}$ if $\Pi$ has the premise derivations $\Pi_i, i \in I$ where $I$ is some index set.

**Lemma 3 (Raising).** Let $\Sigma : \Gamma \vdash C$ be a sequent, let $\vec{e}$ be a list of nominal constants not in the support of $\Gamma$ or $C$, and let $\Sigma' : \Gamma', C'$ be a version of $\Sigma : \Gamma \vdash C$ raised over $\vec{e}$. Then $\Sigma : \Gamma \vdash C$ has a proof of height $h$ if and only if $\Sigma' : \Gamma' \vdash C'$ has a proof of height $h$.

With this lemma in place, the following theorem and its corollary follow.

**Theorem 4.** The cut rule can be eliminated from $G$ without affecting the provability relation.

**Corollary 5.** The logic $G$ is consistent, i.e., it is not the case that both $A$ and $A \supset \bot$ are provable.

Cut-elimination is also useful in designing theorem provers and its counterpart, cut-admissibility, allows one to reason richly about the properties of such proof procedures.

### 4. Examples

We will often suppress the outermost universal quantifiers in displayed definitions and will assume that capital letters denote implicitly universally quantified variables.

**member** $B L \triangleq \exists n. \text{nat} n \land \text{element}_n B L$

**element** $B (B :: L) \triangleq \top$

**element** $(x N) B (C :: L) \triangleq \text{element}_N B L$

**Figure 4. List membership**

**Freshness** In Section 2 we showed how the property of freshness could be defined in $G$ by the definitional clause

$$\forall E. (\forall x. \text{fresh} x E) \triangleq \top.$$  

This clause ensures that the atomic judgment ($\text{fresh} X E$) holds if and only if $X$ is a nominal constant which does not appear anywhere in the term $E$. To see the simplicity and directness of this definition, consider how we might define freshness in a system like $LG^*$ which allows for definitions only of atomic judgments. In this situation, we will have to verify that $X$ is a nominal constant by ruling out the possibility that it is a term of one of the other permitted forms. Then, checking that $X$ does not appear in $E$ will require an explicit walking over the structure of $E$. In short, such a definition would have to have the specific structure of terms coded into it and would also use (a mild form of) negative judgments.

To illustrate how the definition in $G$ can be used in a reasoning task, consider proving the following lemma

$$\forall x, e, \ell. (\text{fresh} x \ell \land \text{member} e \ell) \supset \text{fresh} x e$$

where $\text{member}$ is defined in Figure 4. This lemma is useful in constructing arguments such as type uniqueness where one must know that a list does not contain a typing judgment for a particular variable. The proof of this lemma proceeds by induction on the natural number $n$ quantified in the body of $\text{member}$. The base case and the inductive step eventually require showing the following:

$$\forall x, b, \ell. \text{fresh} x (b :: \ell) \supset \text{fresh} x b$$

$$\forall x, b, \ell. \text{fresh} x (b :: \ell) \supset \text{fresh} x \ell$$

We shall consider the proof of only the first statement; the proof of the second has a similar structure.

The first statement follows if we can prove the sequent

$$x, b, \ell : \text{fresh} x (b :: \ell) \vdash \text{fresh} x b.$$  

Consider how $\text{defLC}$ acts on the hypothesis ($\text{fresh} x (b :: \ell)$) in this sequent. First the clause for $\text{fresh}$ is raised over the support of the hypothesis, but this is empty so raising has no effect. Second, the sequent is raised over some new nominal constant $c$ corresponding to the $\forall$ in the head of the definition for $\text{fresh}$. The last step is to consider all permutations $\pi$ of the set $\{c\}$ and all solutions $\theta$ of

$$(\pi.\text{fresh} c c)\theta = (\text{fresh} (x' c)) (\{b' e\} :: (\ell' e)))\theta.$$
\begin{align*}
\text{seq}_N L\langle A \rangle & \triangleq \text{member}\ A\ L \\
\text{seq}(s_N) L\ (B \land C) & \triangleq \text{seq}_N L\ B \land \text{seq}_N L\ C \\
\text{seq}(s_N) L\ (A \supset B) & \triangleq \text{seq}_N (A :: L)\ B \\
\text{seq}(s_N) L\ (\forall B) & \triangleq \forall x.\ \text{seq}_N L\ (B\ x) \\
\text{seq}(s_N) L\ \langle A \rangle & \triangleq \exists b.\ \text{prog}\ A\ b \land \text{seq}_N L\ b
\end{align*}

Figure 5. Second-order hereditary Harrop logic in \(G\)

There is, in fact, a most general unifier here:

\[
\theta = [x' \mapsto (\lambda x. x), b' \mapsto (\lambda x. b''), \\
\ell' \mapsto (\lambda x. \ell''), c \mapsto (b'' :: \ell'')].
\]

The resulting sequent is

\[
b'', \ell'' : \top \vdash \text{fresh}\ c\ b''
\]

The next step in this proof is to apply \(\text{defR}\) to the conclusion. To do this we first raise the clause for \(\text{fresh}\) over the support of the conclusion which is \(\{c\}\). Then we raise the sequent over a new nominal constant \(c'\) corresponding to the \(\forall\) in the head of the definition. Finally we need to find a permutation \(\pi\) of \(\{c, c'\}\) and a solution \(\theta\) to \((\pi.\text{fresh}\ c'\ (c'\ c))\theta = \text{fresh}\ c\ (b''\ c')\). Here we find the permutation which swaps \(c\) and \(c'\) and the solution \(\theta\) which unifies \(c'\) and \(b''\). The resulting sequent is then

\[
b''', \ell''' : \top \vdash \top
\]

which is trivially provable.

Typing contexts We now illustrate an approach to animating and reasoning about the static and dynamic semantics of programming languages. The first step in this approach is that of encoding these two kinds of semantics using the (second-order fragment of the) logic of hereditary Harrop formulas. Specifications provided through these formulas have a natural executable interpretation based on the logic programming paradigm \([21]\). The interesting part from the perspective of this paper is that we can encode provability of this subset of hereditary Harrop formulas as a definition in \(G\). This definition, then, becomes the bridge for reasoning about the (executable) specifications.

To develop these ideas in more detail, we encode provability in the second-order hereditary Harrop logic as a three-place definition \((\text{seq}_N L\ G)\) where \(L\) denotes the context of hypothetical (assumed) atomic formulas and \(G\) denotes the goal formula \([16, 22]\). The argument \(N\) corresponds to the height of the proof tree and is used for inductive arguments; we write this argument as a subscript to downplay its significance. The definition of \(\text{seq}\) is presented in Figure 5. The constructor \(\langle\cdot\rangle\) is used to inject atomic formulas into formulas; as such, it serves as a device for isolating atomic formulas. The object level universal quantifier is reflected into a meta level generic \((i.e., \forall)\) quantifier in the definition of \(\text{seq}\); this treatment turns out to capture the computational semantics of the universal quantifier rather precisely. Backchaining is realized by the last clause of \(\text{seq}\). In giving meaning to this clause, we expect that the specification of interest in a particular situation \((i.e., \text{the logic program} \ \text{that we want to reason about})\) has been encoded through the definition of \(\text{prog}\). In particular, a logic program clause of the form \(\forall x.\ ((G\ x) \supset (A\ x))\) would result, in the reasoning context, in the addition of a definitional clause \(\forall x.\ \text{prog}\ (A\ x) (G\ x) \triangleq \top\) that can be used by the \(\text{seq}\) predicate. To simplify notation, we write \(L \vdash P\) for \(\exists n. (\text{nat} \land \text{seq}_n L\ P)\). When \(L = \text{nil}\) we write just \(\vdash P\).

An example of a specification that we may wish to reason about is that of the typing rules for the simply typed \(\lambda\)-calculus. These rules can be encoded using hereditary Harrop formulas as shown in Figure 6 that, in turn, would be reflected into definitional clauses for \(\text{prog}\) as described above. In these formulas, \(\text{app}\) and \(\text{abs}\) are the usual constructors for application and abstraction in the untyped \(\lambda\)-calculus. Note that no explicit context of typing assumptions is used in these rules: rather the hypothetical judgment of hereditary Harrop formulas is used to keep track of such assumptions. This context is made explicit only when reasoning about this specification via the \(\text{seq}\) definition.

Consider demonstrating the type uniqueness property for the simply typed \(\lambda\)-calculus using the \(\text{seq}\) encoding. We can do this by showing that the formula

\[
\forall m, n, t, u (\vdash (\text{of}\ m\ t) \land \vdash (\text{of}\ m\ s)) \supset t = s,
\]

is a theorem: here, the binary predicate \(=\) is defined by the single clause \(\forall x.\ x = x \triangleq \top\). We can prove this formula using an induction on natural numbers but, to do this, we must generalize it to account for the fact that the rule for typing \(\text{abs}\) that allows us to descend under abstractions enhances the atomic formulas assumed by \(\text{seq}\). A suitably generalized form of the statement, then, is

\[
\forall \ell, m, t, s. (\text{ctx} \ell \land \ell\vdash (\text{of}\ m\ t) \land \ell\vdash (\text{of}\ m\ s)) \supset t = s.
\]

Now, this formula is provable only if the definition of \(\text{ctx}\) ensures that if \(\text{ctx}\ \ell\) holds then \(\ell\) is of the form

\[
(\text{of}\ c_1\ T_1 :: \ldots :: \text{of}\ c_n\ T_n :: \text{nil}),
\]
of such nominal constants is enforced by the quantification of
ments are only made for nominal constants. The uniqueness
tion must ensure that the first arguments to def are distinct from all others.
traversed using member. This definition is evidently complex and the complexity carries over also into the process of reasoning based on it.
In $LG^\omega$, cntx can be defined by explicitly restricting each element of the context as shown in Figure[7]. This definition checks that the first argument to def is a nominal constant by explicitly ruling out all other possibilities for it. Then, to ensure distinctness of arguments, the rest of the list is traversed using member. This definition is evidently complex and the complexity carries over also into the process of reasoning based on it.
In $G$ we can give a direct and concise definition of cntx using $\forall$ quantification in the head of a definition as is done in Figure[8]. The occurrence of the $\forall$-bound variable $x$ in the first argument of def codifies the fact that type assignments are only made for nominal constants. The uniqueness of such nominal constants is enforced by the quantification structure of cntx: the variable $L$ cannot contain any occurrences of $x$. With this definition of cntx, the generalized theorem of type uniqueness is provable. Use of defL on the hypothesis of cntx $\ell$ will allow only the possibility of type assignments for nominal constants, while use of defR will verify that the contexts that are created in treating abstractions align with the requirements imposed by the definition of cntx.

**Arbitrarily cascading substitutions** Reducibility arguments, such as Tait’s proof of normalization for the simply typed $\lambda$-calculus [32], are based on judgments over closed terms. During reasoning, however, one is often working with open terms. To compensate, the closed term judgment is extended to open terms by considering all possible closed instantiations of the open terms. When reasoning with $G$, open terms are denoted by terms with nominal constants representing free variables. The general form of an open term is thus $M c_1 \cdots c_n$, and we want to consider all possible instantiations $M V_1 \cdots V_n$ where the $V_i$ are closed terms. This type of arbitrary cascading substitutions is difficult to realize in reasoning systems based on $\lambda$-tree syntax since $M$ would have an arbitrary number of abstractions.

We can define arbitrary cascading substitutions in $G$ using the unique structure of definitions. In particular, we can define a predicate which holds on a list of pairs $(c_i, V_i)$, a term with the form $M c_1 \cdots c_n$ and a term of the form $M V_1 \cdots V_n$. The idea is to iterate over the list of pairs and for each pair $(c, V)$ use $\forall$ in the head of a definition to abstract $c$ out of the first term and then substitute $V$ before continuing. This is the motivation for subst defined in Figure[9]. Note that we have also added a natural number argument to be used for inductive proofs.

Given the definition of subst one may then show that arbitrary cascading substitutions have many of the same properties as normal higher-order substitutions. For instance, in the domain of the untyped $\lambda$-calculus, we can show that subst acts compositionally via the following lemmas.

\[
\forall n, \ell, t, r, s. (\text{nat } n \land \text{subst}_n \ell (\text{app } t \ r) s) \supset \\
\exists u, v, s = \text{app } u \ v \land \text{subst}_n \ell t u \land \text{subst}_n \ell r v
\]

\[
\forall n, \ell, t, r. (\text{nat } n \land \text{subst}_n \ell (\text{abs } t) r) \supset \\
\exists s, r = \text{abs } s \land \forall z. \text{subst}_n \ell (t z) (s z)
\]

Both of these lemmas have straightforward proofs: induct on $n$, use defL on the assumption of subst, apply the inductive hypothesis and use defR to complete the proof.

**5. Related work**

Mechanized reasoning about structural operational semantic-style specifications of formal systems has received the attention of other researchers. Recent impetus for this kind of reasoning has been provided by a desire for computer verified proofs in the realm of programming language theory [2]. One line of research focuses on developing proofs within the framework provided by an existing and well-developed interactive theorem prover such as Coq [4] and Isabelle/HOL [25]. Many of the contexts
in which machine authenticated reasoning of this kind is needed deal with objects involving binding. Several previous attempts have been characterized by the use of algebraic datatypes, enhanced perhaps by a de Bruijn-like representation of bound variables, in the encoding of binding constructs. While some success has been achieved using this approach to object representation \([10] [11] [39]\), it has also been noted that the real reasoning task is often overwhelmed under such an approach by the proofs of mundane binding and substitution oriented lemmas.

The more natural and more promising approaches to the kind of reasoning of interest are the ones that provide special logic based treatments of binding such as is manifest in λ-tree syntax. We discuss the main lines of research under this rubric below.

**Nominal logic based reasoning** Nominal logic extends first-order syntax with primitives for treating variable names in such a way that α-equivalence classes are recognized \([28]\). This considerably simplifies the treatment of binding in specifications. In contrast to the approach underlying our work, no separate meta-logic has as yet been developed for reasoning about nominal logic descriptions. Reasoning about specifications written in this logic is instead realized by axiomatizing the primitives of the logic in a rich system such as Coq or Isabelle/HOL \([1] [37]\). This approach has proved successful for many applications.

Aside from the absence of a meta-logic, the most prominent difference between the nominal logic based approach and our work is that we use λ-tree syntax and thus obtain a comprehensive treatment of both α-equivalence and substitution within the logic. The nominal logic approach does not provide any direct support for substitution, and instead requires substitution to be defined on a case-by-case basis. In reasoning, this means that various substitution lemmas need to be proved for each syntactic class over which substitution is defined. Another difference worth noting is that we can derive freshness as a consequence of the nesting of the fresh predicate, whereas nominal logic approaches either take freshness as primitive or define it in terms of set membership.

**Two-levels of logic** McDowell & Miller \([13] [14] [16]\) explored using a two-level approach to reasoning about, for example, the operational semantics and the typing of small programming languages. Both levels of logic shared the same λ-tree approach to the treatment of (object-level and meta-level) binding: the object-logic was a simple second-order intuitionistic logic and the meta-logic was called \(FOλ^{\Delta N}\). While \(FOλ^{\Delta N}\) contained inference rules for definitions, it lacked the \(\triangledown\)-quantifier. As a result, the \(\text{seq}\) predicate could not be specified in the same direct fashion as it is in Figure 5.

As we illustrated briefly in Section 4, replacing \(FOλ^{\Delta N}\) with \(G\) strengthens the expressiveness of the meta-logic by allowing more declarative approaches to the specification of invariants for (object-level) contexts. As a result, many of the theorems that have been proved in \(FOλ^{\Delta N}\) \([16]\) can be given much more understandable proofs in \(G\).

**Twelf** Pfenning and Schrümmer \([31]\) also describe a two-level approach in which LF terms and types are used at the object-level and the logic \(M_2\) is used at the meta-level. Schrümmer’s PhD thesis \([30]\) further extended that meta-logic to one called \(M_2^{\Pi}\). This framework is realized in Twelf \([27]\), which also provides a related style of meta-reasoning based on mode, coverage, and termination checking over higher-order judgments in LF. Their approach also makes use of λ-tree syntax at both the object and meta-levels and goes beyond our proposal here in that they handle the complexities of dependent types and proof objects \([9]\).

On the other hand, the kinds of meta-level theorems they can prove are different from what is available in \(G\). For example, implication and negation are not present in \(M_2\) and cannot be encoded in higher-order LF judgments: hence, properties such as bisimulation for CCS or the \(\pi\)-calculus are not provable.

A key component in \(M_2\) and in the higher-order LF judgment approach to meta-reasoning is the ability to specify invariants related to the structure of meta-logical contexts. These invariants are called regular worlds and their analogue in our system is judgments such as \(\text{cntx}\) which explicitly describe the structure of contexts. While the approach to proving properties in Twelf is powerful and convenient for many applications, one might prefer defining explicit invariants, such as \(\text{cntx}\), over the use of regular worlds, since this allows describing more general judgments over contexts, such as in the example of arbitrary cascading substitutions where the \(\text{subst}\) predicate actively manipulates the context of a term.

**Implementation** The first author has implemented a significant portion of \(G\) in a recently released system called Abella \([7]\). This system provides an interactive tactics-based interface to proof construction. The primary focus of Abella is on reasoning about object-level specifications written in hereditary Harrop formulas: provability in that logic is provided by a definition similar to that of \(\text{seq}\) in Figure 5. Through this approach, Abella is able to take advantage of meta-level properties of the logic of hereditary Harrop formulas (\(e.g.,\) cut and instantiation properties) while never having to reason outside of \(G\).

Abella has been used in many applications, including all the examples mentioned in this paper. First-order results include reasoning on structures such as natural numbers and lists. Taking advantage of λ-tree syntax, application domains such as the simply typed λ-calculus are directly accessible. Particular results include equivalence of big-step and small-step evaluation, preservation of typing for both forms of evaluation, and determinacy for both forms of eval-
utation. More advanced results which make use of generic judgments for describing contexts include type uniqueness, disjoint partitioning of $\lambda$-terms into normal and non-normal form, and the Church-Rosser theorem. Larger applications include challenges 1a and 2a of the POPLmark challenge [2], a task which involves reasoning about the contexts of subtyping judgments for $F_{\omega+1}$, a $\lambda$-calculus with bounded subtype polymorphism. Finally, we have formalized a proof of normalization for the simply-typed $\lambda$-calculus based on Tait's reducibility argument [32]. This last example uses the formalization of arbitrarily cascading substitutions described Section 4.

6. Future work

We are presently investigating the extension of $G$ with a general treatment of induction over definitions as in the closely related logic $Linc$ [33]. This extension would simplify many inductive arguments by obviating explicit measures in induction; thus, natural numbers encoding computation lengths would not be needed in the definitions of the element and subst predicates considered in Section 4 if we can induct directly on the unfolding of their definitions. Another benefit of this approach to induction is that it has a naturally dual rule for coinduction over coinductive definitions. This rule has been found useful in Linc, for example, in proving properties of systems such as the $\pi$-calculus.

At a practical level, we are continuing to develop Abella as a theorem proving system and to explore its use in complex reasoning tasks. We expect to use Abella to provide more elegant proofs of the many meta-theoretical theorems found in [16], which include cut-elimination theorems, type preservation, and determinacy of typing and evaluation. Finally, if the previously mentioned work on coinduction is completed, Abella can be used to explore the role of generic definitions in a coinductive setting.

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