The Yuktidīpikā on the Origin of the Vedas

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Abstract In this article, I reconstruct the view of the Yuktidīpikā, the most detailed and profound commentary of classical Sāṃkhya, on the origin of the Vedas. A close reading of the text reveals that its unknown author wavered between at least two different views on this issue. The first view is that the authorless but noneternal Vedas evolve from prakṛti (primordial matter) at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world (kalpa) and merge into prakṛti during a cosmic dissolution (pralaya). The Yuktidīpikā is the first text in classical Sāṃkhya to state directly that the Vedas have no author. The second and opposite view is that Kapila is the author of the highest teaching of the Vedas. This view is expressed only indirectly. Besides reconstructing the above-mentioned views, I attempt to answer the question of whether by quoting Nirukta 1.20 the Yuktidīpikā communicates something about the origin of the Vedas. Illustrating Sāṃkhya thought by quoting this passage of the Nirukta, as well as proclaiming the idea that the Vedas are authorless, which became the “official” standpoint of the Sāṃkhya darśana, can be interpreted as elements of the Yuktidīpikā’s pioneering project to show that Sāṃkhya is not in conflict with the Vedas.

Keywords Yuktidīpikā · classical Sāṃkhya · the Vedas · authorless (apauruṣeya) · Kapila · Nirukta

Notes

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Introduction

In this article, I reconstruct and critically explain the view of the Yuktidīpikā (ca. 600–700 CE), the most detailed, profound, and polemical commentary of classical Sāṁkhya, on the origin of the Vedas. The problem of the origin of the Vedas, vividly discussed in Indian philosophy, encompasses the following questions: Are the Vedas eternal? Do they have an author? How do they come into existence? The main contributors to this discussion are Mīmāṃsā and its rival schools Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. For Mīmāṃsā, the Vedas are authorless and eternal; they were never created and will never be destroyed. According to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the Vedas are created (in fact, recreated) by the primeval rṣis or Īśvara at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world. What is the Sāṁkhya view presented in the Yuktidīpikā, one of the most important commentaries of this darśana?

The issue of the origin of the Vedas according to the Yuktidīpikā was touched upon by Ołena Łucyszyna in “Classical Sāṁkhya on the Authorship of the Vedas” (2012: 460–61). In that article, she quoted and considered the Yuktidīpikā definition of authoritative verbal testimony (āpta-vacana) in which the Yuktidīpikā proclaims the idea that the Vedas are authorless. All passages of the Yuktidīpikā in which its still unidentified composer expresses his view that the Vedas have no author are cited in Hayato Kondo¯’s article, “Reinterpretation of Tradition and Transmission: Āptavacana in the Yuktidīpikā” (2012–13: 142–43). In another article, entitled “Classical Sāṁkhya on the Relationship Between a Word and Its Meaning,” Łucyszyna (2016: 310–15) analyzes two Yuktidīpikā passages from which we learn that the relationship between a word and its meaning is established by convention. In fact, these two passages provide indirect evidence that the Yuktidīpikākāra accepted the opposite view, namely, that the Vedas have an author. However, I have not discovered a separate and comprehensive study of the Yuktidīpikā view on the origin of the Vedas which takes into account all Yuktidīpikā evidence on the issue. In this article, I will undertake such a systematic study.

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1 The extant classical Sāṁkhya texts comprise the Sāṁkhya-kārikā (ca. 350–450 CE) by Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the following eight commentaries on it: the commentary that survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha (composed around 500 CE; translated into Chinese by Paramārtha between 557 CE and 569 CE); the Śāṅkhyavṛtti (ca. 500–600 CE); the Śāṅkhyasaptavṛtti (ca. 500–600 CE); the Śāṅkhya-kārikābhasya (or the Gaudapādabhāṣya; ca. 500–600 CE) by Gaudapāda; the Yuktidīpikā (ca. 600–700 CE); the Jayamāṅgalā (ca. 700 CE or later); the Mātharavṛtti (ca. 800 CE or later) by Māthara; and the Śāṅkhya-tattvakāmuṇḍi (ca. 841 CE or ca. 976 CE) by Vācaspati Miśra. The dates and chronological order of Sāṁkhya texts mentioned in this article are given according to Larson (1987: 15–18, 19–22). On the date of the Yuktidīpikā, see also the valuable observations of Mejor (2004). According to the recent and thorough research of Acharya (2006: xxviii), Vācaspati Miśra, the author of the last commentary of classical Sāṁkhya, flourished between 950 and 1000 CE.

2 In the earlier texts. See Nyāyasūtras together with Vaiśeṣika’s Nyāyabhāṣya 1.1.7–8 and 2.1.68; Vaiśeṣikasūtras, 6.1.1–2.

3 In the later texts. See, for example, Candrānanda’s Vaiśeṣikasūtras 6.1.2; Vyomaśīva’s Vyomavatī (Varadacari 1977a: 429, 447); Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāyavrāttikatātparyavatīkā 2.1.68; Udayana’s Āmatatattvaviveka (Varadacari 1977b: 555–56; Udayana’s Nyāyakusumāṇjali (Potter and Bhattacharya 1977: 569, 588); Śāṅkara Miśra’s Upaskāra 1.1.3; and Annambhaṭṭa’s Tarkasamgraha and its auto commentary Tarkadīpikā 62.
Two Opposite Views on the Origin of the Vedas

View One

The first of these opposite views on the origin of the Vedas is that the authorless but noneternal Vedas evolve from prakṛti (primordial matter) at the beginning of a kalpa (a cycle of existence of the world). The evidence that the Yuktidīpikā supported the idea that the Vedas are authorless is provided in Yuktidīpikā 2 and 5. In the commentary on the fifth verse (kārikā) of the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, while explaining Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s definition of authoritative verbal testimony (āpta-vacana), the Yuktidīpikā says the Vedas are “not preceded by the intellect/thought of a puruṣa” (a-puruṣa-buddhi-pūrvaka), which means that the Vedas were not consciously composed by an author, either human or divine. In this passage, the Yuktidīpikā draws a distinction between the Vedas, being independent of any author and thus having an unquestionable authority, and the verbal testimony whose validity is based on the authority of its authors. It is worth noting that in the same sentence in which the Vedas are called a-puruṣa-buddhi-pūrvaka, they are also characterized as “independent” (sva-tantra), “conducing to the highest good of a man” (puruṣa-niḥśreyasa-arthaṃ pravartamāna), and “pramāṇa which cannot be put into doubt” (niḥsaṃśayaṃ pramāṇam). In this context, the Vedas being “independent” (sva-tantra) can mean that they are independent of any author or that their scope of validity is independent (of the scopes of the two other Sāṃkhya pramāṇas—perception and inference), or both. All of these characteristics of the Vedas, appearing together in one sentence of the Yuktidīpikā, were applied to the Vedas by Mīmāṃsā and express ideas developed first of all by this darśana. These characteristics are indicative of the influence of Mīmāṃsā.

There is one more passage in the Yuktidīpikā in which the idea that the Vedas are authorless is formulated directly by the Sāṃkhya proponent. In the commentary on the second kārikā, the Sāṃkhya proponent describes the Vedas in exactly the same manner as the passage of the commentary on the fifth kārikā that I mentioned above. He characterizes them as “not preceded by the intellect of a puruṣa” (a-puruṣa-buddhi-pūrvaka), “independent” (sva-tantra), and “conducing to the highest good of a man” (puruṣa-niḥśreyasa-arthaṃ pravartamāna). In the same passage, the Sāṃkhya proponent also expresses the idea that the Vedas are authorless in an indirect way. He contrasts “the sentences of the Vedas” (veda-vākyā), which cannot be put into doubt, with the “sentences composed by men” (pauruṣeya-vākyā), which

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4 Compare Vaiśeṣikasūtras 6.1.1: “In the Veda, composing sentences is preceded by the intellect/thought” (buddhipūrvā vākyakṛti vede ||).
5 Yuktidīpikā1998: 87.3–13. (Numbers refer to Wezler and Motegi’s 1998 critical edition, which is cited by page(s) and line(s); thus, 40.10–12 means page 40, lines 10–12.) For the translation and analysis of the Yuktidīpikā commentary on the definition of authoritative verbal testimony, see Łucyszyna 2012: 460–61.
6 Yuktidīpikā1998: 39.18–19.
can convey not only truth but also untruth, thus suggesting that the Vedas have no author.7

The Yuktidipika is the first text in classical Sâmkhya to state directly that the Vedas have no author. In most of the classical Sâmkhya commentaries that preceded the Yuktidipika, that is, the Sâmkhyaavṛtti, Sâmkhyaasaptatīvṛtti, and Gauḍapâdabhâṣya, as well as in the Mātharavṛtti, which was composed later than the Yuktidipika, it is suggested that the Vedas are authorless, but this idea was not explicitly formulated in these commentaries.8 In classical Sâmkhya, the idea of the authorless Vedas, which has become the “official” Sâmkhya standpoint on the authorship of the Vedas, is directly stated also in Vâcaspati Miśra’s Sâmkhyaatattvakaumudī, the last classical Sâmkhya commentary.9 It is worth mentioning that the Sâmkhyaâtras (ca. 1400–1500 CE) and Aniruddha’s commentary on them called Sâmkhyaâtravrîtti (ca. 1400–1500 CE), important postclassical Sâmkhya texts that aimed to revive Sâmkhya after a long period of stagnation, not only proclaim that the Vedas have no author, but also present a polemic defending the conception of the authorless Vedas.10

If the Vedas are not composed by any author, then how do they come into existence? The Yuktidipika does not explain how this may happen. Since, according to Sâmkhya, every entity except puruṣa and prakṛti is a noneternal product of prakṛti, which merges into it during a pralaya (a cosmic dissolution), losing its own identity and distinction from prakṛti, the Vedas, too, must be a noneternal product of prakṛti. The authorless Vedas must evolve from prakṛti at the beginning of a kalpa and be destroyed at its end. Such a conception of the origin of the Vedas is formulated explicitly in the Sâmkhyaâtras and Sâmkhyaâtravrîtti. According to these key postclassical Sâmkhya texts, the authorless but noneternal Vedas evolve from prakṛti without the conscious effort of any author at the beginning of each cycle of the world’s existence.11

View Two

The second Yuktidipika view on the origin of the Vedas is that Kapila is the author of the highest teaching of the Vedas. This view, unlike the view that the Vedas have no author, is expressed only indirectly. It is evidenced by the introduction to the Yuktidipika, where it is said that Kapila, whom Sâmkhya regards as its founder, creates names for the Sâmkhya tattvas (“entities,” the basic structural principles of

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7 Yuktidipika1998: 40.10–12. The Vedas are described in the same manner in the statement of the opponent, an adherer of Mimâmsâ: in the commentary on the second kârikâ, he says that the Vedas, which are “not preceded by the intellect of a puruṣa” (a-puruṣa-buddhi-pârvaka) and “independent” (svatantra), “conduce to the highest good of a man” (puruṣa-nîshreyasa-artham pravartate) (Yuktidipika1998: 32.13–14).
8 See Sâmkhyaâtrîtti, Sâmkhyaasaptatīvṛtti, Gauḍapâdabhâṣya, and Mâtharavṛtti 5.
9 See Sâmkhyaatattvakaumudī 2 and 5. The relevant passages of the Sâmkhyaâtrîtti, Sâmkhyaasaptatīvṛtti, Gauḍapâdabhâṣya, Mâtharavṛtti, and Sâmkhyaatattvakaumudī are considered in Łucyszyna 2012.
10 See Sâmkhyaâtras and Sâmkhyaâtravrîtti 5.41–50.
11 See Sâmkhyaâtras and Sâmkhyaâtravrîtti 5.45–50.
reality) on the basis of direct insight into the nature of all of them.\textsuperscript{12} According to the commentary on the second kārikā, the Sāmkhya teaching of liberation through knowledge is identical with the highest teaching of the Vedas presented in the Upaniṣads. Therefore, the Sāmkhya terms created by Kapila are the basic Vedic terms. The twenty-five tattvas of the Sāmkhya system, whose own nature (svarūpa) is grasped by Kapila through the seer’s cognition (ārṣena jñānena),\textsuperscript{13} constitute everything that exists. Kapila’s perfect knowledge of the path of liberation and the distinction between prakṛti with its products and puruṣa, is, unlike the knowledge possessed by other creatures, inborn (sāṃsiddhika), not acquired (Yuktiḍīpikā 4,\textsuperscript{14} 43,\textsuperscript{15} and 69\textsuperscript{16}). He is also described as “born at the beginning of the world” (viṣva-aṃga-ja) (Yuktiḍīpikā 1\textsuperscript{17} and 69\textsuperscript{18}).\textsuperscript{19} From all this it follows that the omniscient Kapila, appearing at the beginning of a kalpa, creates the primary linguistic convention and Sāmkhya doctrine, the latter being identical with the quintessence of the Vedas set forth in the Upaniṣads. In the introduction to the Yuktiḍīpikā, Kapila’s role is similar to the role ofĪśvara in Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika, who creates names and the Vedas at the beginning of a kalpa.

The view that the Vedas have an author is confirmed by the commentary on the sixth kārikā, where the Sāmkhya proponent argues that the relationship between a word and its meaning is not natural but is established by convention. The assumption that the origin of all words is conventional leads to the conclusion that no text can arise in any other way than by the conscious effort of some author who knows the convention.

The passage of Yuktiḍīpikā 6 in which the author rejects the view that words have a natural and inseparable connection with their meanings is a part of the Yuktiḍīpikā’s extensive polemics in which the author argues that authoritative verbal testimony (āpta-vacana, śabda) cannot be reduced to inference (anumāna).\textsuperscript{20} I shall cite the whole passage:\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{12} Yuktiḍīpikā1998: 7.16–27. This passage drew the attention of Bronkhorst (2011: 5–6) and Kimball (2011: 177). For the translation and a detailed analysis of the whole passage, see Łucyszyna 2016: 310–14.

\textsuperscript{13} Yuktiḍīpikā1998: 7.23.

\textsuperscript{14} Yuktiḍīpikā1998: 67.20–68.2, 75.19–24.

\textsuperscript{15} Yuktiḍīpikā1998: 233.31–234.9.

\textsuperscript{16} Yuktiḍīpikā1998: 267.13.

\textsuperscript{17} Yuktiḍīpikā1998: 8.20.

\textsuperscript{18} Yuktiḍīpikā1998: 267.14.

\textsuperscript{19} According to the classical Sāmkhya commentaries, Kapila appears at the beginning of a kalpa, endowed with the perfect knowledge of the twenty-five tattvas (see the commentary that survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha, Sāmkhyaavṛtti, Sāmkhyasaptavṛtti, Gauḍapādabhāṣya, Mātharavṛtti 1, and all the extant classical commentaries on kārikā 43). This knowledge is an inseparable part of his nature, which distinguishes Kapila from other creatures (see the commentaries on Sāmkhyaakārikā 43).

\textsuperscript{20} Yuktiḍīpikā1998: 100.10–105.9.

\textsuperscript{21} This passage was briefly analyzed in Łucyszyna 2016: 315.
Moreover, [a word (śabda) is not an inferential sign (liṅga)] because of the change. An [inferential] sign does not change [its connection to a particular sign bearer (liṅgin)] at some other place, but the change is observed in the case of a word. The very same word at some other place [or some other time] does not convey its meaning, but expresses other meaning. [You can argue], “It is because of not knowing the relationship [between the word and its meaning]. It may be so: other [that is, the genuine] relationship [between the word and its meaning] is not comprehended at another place; that is why there is the [seeming] change of the word meaning.” This is irrelevant because of the difference of an [inferential] sign [from a word]. [It is] not [the case] that when a perceptible (pratyakṣābhima) [inferential] sign bearer (liṅgin), such as cow, is perceived, [its inferential] sign (liṅga) [such as dewlap located on it] is not perceived. But the word [“cow”] is not perceived on the cow which is being perceived.

Moreover, because of the restriction to a [particular] place. It is not observed that an [inferential] sign has a restriction to a [particular] place, but in the case of a word, there is a restriction to a [particular] place. For instance, [the verb] śavati is used [in the sense of] “action of going” only among the people of Kāmboja; ramhati [is used in the same sense] among easterners. In a like manner, [the word] dāti is used for a sickle <among easterners>, [but] dātra [is used for it] among northerners (cf. Mahābhāṣya 1.9.25ff.) [and] not anywhere else. Therefore, a word is not an [inferential] sign.

Moreover, because of the use in accordance with the wish (iṣṭa) [of a speaker]. An [inferential] sign is natural (svabhāvika): it is not possible to draw smoke away from fire and place it in water, air, sky, or anywhere else. But a word is used wherever a speaker intends (abhiprāya) [to use it].

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22 Boldface type is used by the editors Wezler and Motegi to highlight vārttikas. They distinguish two levels of the text of the Yuktidipikā, which function as integral parts of the same whole and probably belong to the same author: that of the vārttika and that of the bhāṣya.

23 According to the editors Wezler and Motegi, the text [kālāntare tu], bracketed by them and translated by me as “[or some other time],” is to be deleted.

24 Instead of sambandhāntaram deśāntare 'nupalakṣitam, one of the manuscripts used by Wezler and Motegi has sambandho deśāntare 'nupalakṣitas (“[the genuine] relationship [between the word and its meaning] is not comprehended at another place”), which is probably a better reading (Yuktidipikā1998: 101n15–16).

25 According to the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, Sāṃkhya inference (anumāṇa) has two terms: an inferential sign (liṅga) and an inferential sign bearer (liṅgin). Liṅgin is an object to be proved by inference (see Sāṃkhya-kārikā 5). This inference is different from the standard Indian inference (developed by the Buddhist and Nyāya logicians) with three terms: (1) inferential sign (liṅga)reason (hetu)—the property being an inferential sign; (2) subject of inference (pakṣa)—a bearer of two properties: the inferential sign (liṅga) and the property to be proved (sādhya); and (3) that which is to be proved (sādhya)—the property to be proved by inference. The Yuktidipikā does not draw a distinction between pakṣa and sādhya. Harzer rightly observes, “[T]he cow as a liṅgin may refer to both, the pakṣa and the sādhya. From the discussion one may presume that the term liṅgin refers to the pakṣa” (2006: 119n122). The author of the Yuktidipikā holds that the word “cow,” unlike a dewlap, is not a property of a cow. The word “cow” and an empirical cow, unlike a dewlap and a cow, are perceived separately; therefore, they exist separately and there is no inseparable relationship (which is the ground of any inference) between them.

26 Compare the passage of Mahābhāṣya 1.1.1. The editors of the Yuktidipikā (Wezler and Motegi) refer to Kielhorn’s edition of the Mahābhāṣya revised by Abhyankar: Mahābhāṣya1962: 9.25ff. The editors use ‹ › to mark the text they added.
example, the words like vrddhi, commonly known [in the sense of] “growth of one’s own body” (svāṅgāḥyuccayā), etc., are [also] used [in the sense of] ā, ai, and au,
etc. (cf. Pāṇini 1.1.1). Therefore, these [words] are not an [inferential] sign. [You can argue], “There is no fault [in identifying a word with an inferential sign] because a word has the capacity (sāktitva) for denoting everything.” The [opponent’s] view may be [as follows]: “A word has the capacity for denoting everything, and an object (artha) has the capability to be denoted by every [word]. Their capacity is limited through the act of man (puruṣa-vyāpāra).” How? ‘Let this very word express this object. And let this very object be denoted by this word.’ Such is the act of man. Therefore, the natural relationship (svābhāvikā sambandha) of a word [with its meaning] is manifested by the speaker’s intention (apekṣa).”

This [objection] is irrelevant. Why? Because of the undesirable conclusion [that is, the conclusion which is undesirable for the opponent] (prasāṅga) that [a word] is completely (sutarām) different from inference. If [you] state it, it follows that a word is completely different [from inference]. For [it is] not the case that as the capacity of a word denoting every object is limited through the act of the speaker, in the same manner an [inferential] sign proving every object is separated from [any] other object through the intention of the speaker. It is not so that just as one word uttered in the world, depending on [its] use by man (puruṣa-vinivyogapekṣa), is capable of denoting every object, in the same manner one [inferential] sign is capable of making known

27 Vṛddhi is a grammatical term for the vowels ā, ai, and au constituting the third grade of vowel gradation.

28 Nakada’s explanation of the opponent’s view is worth quoting: “So not only the characteristic (liṅga)...is inherently connected (svābhāvika) with the thing (artha) which has the characteristic but also the word (śabdā) is inherently connected with its meaning (artha), therefore the word (āpta-vacana, śabda) is inference (anumāṇa) too” (1970–71: 995). I supplemented the quotation with the Sanskrit terms in parentheses.

29 kim cānayaḥ | viparyayāḥ na hi liṅgāṃ desāntare viparyetī | śabdasya tu drṣṭo viparyayā | sa eva hi śabdo desāntare [kālāntare tu] svārtham na pratyaśayaty arthāntaram ca praśaṃsatī | sambandhānuṇpapalabdhī iṣ ti cat | svādh etat | sambandhāntaram desāntare ‘nupalakṣitam | tasmāc chabdārthaviparyayā iti | etad anupapannāṃ lingavādharṃyāḥ | na hi pratyaśayānāśīna liṅgāṃ upalabdhaī gavāder liṅgāṃ nopalabhyaḥ | śabdas tāpapalabhāyaṃ gavādau nopalabhyaḥ | tasmān na liṅgāṃ |

kim cānayaḥ | desāniyamāḥ | na hi liṅgāṃ desāniyamo drṣṭaḥ | asīt tu śabdasya desāniyamāḥ | tadv yatāḥ śavatīr gati-karmā kāmbhojesya eva bhāyate | rathātiḥ prācyeṣu tathā dāitur lavanārtho prācyeṣu dātṛam udiṣṭeṣu (Mbhāṣya 1.9.25[f]) nānyatra | tasmān na śabdo liṅgāṃ |

kim cānayaḥ | itṣato vinivyogāḥ | svābhāvikām liṅgāṃ | na hi dhūmo 'ng śratā akṣaryāvah samarthaḥ ‘psv vāyav ākāṣe nyatra vā vinivesayeitum | śabdas tu yatra yatra vaktur abhiprayas tatra tatra vinivesye yathā vṛdhya北约ḥ śabdaḥ svāṅgāḥyuccayacādiṣu prasiddhā ādaikṣu (cf. Pāṇi 1.1.1) vinivesye | tasmān na te liṅgāṃ sarvābhāvāṅkāyaśātivacchātvaḥ chabdāśāṣāṣāḥ iti cat | svaḥ matam | sarvābhāvāṅkāyaśātivaḥ śabdas sarvābhāvāṅkāyaśātivaḥ cārtāḥ | tayoḥ puruṣāvāpārēṇa śaktyavacchedaḥ kriyate | kathām | ayam eva śabdo śārtṛṣayaḥ pratyākko bhavatu | ayam eva cārtāḥ ’nena sabaṇēϑāḥkāyaḥam itē taśtvai puruṣāvāpārēḥ | tasmāc chabdāsya svābhāvikām sambandho vaktrepkeṣāya vajrayeta iti | etad āpy anupapannāṃ |

kasmāt | sutarām anumāṇad arthaḥāntaraprasāṅgaḥ | evam api kalpayītāṃmahāt sutarāṃ śabdasyārthāntaratvam āpadyate | kasmāt | na hi yatāḥ vaktreṣāya sarvārthasya sarvārthasaḥ śabdasya śaktya-vaccheddāḥ tathā sarvārthaṃ liṅgāṃ vaktreṣāyaśāρthāntaratāvavacchāyate | yatāḥ caikāḥ śabdo jaṅgaty evam uḍitāḥ puruṣāvivivyogapekṣaḥ sarvam artham abhidhānām samartho na tathākāra liṅgāṃ kayacya ākṣita sarvārthapratīṣyānaśamartham | tasmān na śabdo liṅgāṃ | (Yuktidīpikā 1998: 101.12–103.7.)
every object through some reasoning. Therefore, a word is not an [inferential] sign.  

In this passage, the author of the Yuktidīpikā contrasts a word (śabda) with an inferential sign (liṅga). An inferential sign, which he characterizes as “natural” (svābhāvika), is naturally (inherently, by its nature) and inseparably connected to the sign bearer (liṅgin), that is, to the object to be proved by this sign. In illustrating the relationship between an inferential sign and the object to be proved by it, the author of the Yuktidīpikā gives the example of smoke and fire. Smoke, which is an inferential sign of fire, is inseparably connected to fire: it is impossible to pull smoke out of fire and locate it in water, air, sky, or any other place.

Unlike the relationship between liṅga and liṅgin, the relationship between a word (śabda) and its meaning (artha), that is, the object denoted by it, is not inseparable. The Śāmkhya proponent, substantiating the difference between a word and an inferential sign, gives three arguments to demonstrate that the relationship between a word and its meaning is not inseparable: (1) viparyayāt (“because of the change”); (2) deśa-niyamāt (“because of the restriction to a [particular] place”); and (3) iṣṭato viniyogāt (“because of the use in accordance with the wish [of a speaker]”).

The first argument—viparyayāt (“because of the change”)—is that a word can change its meaning in some other place. The Śāmkhya proponent rightly points out that the same word can have different meanings in different geographical areas. The author of the Yuktidīpikā adduces the following possible objection from opponents: the meaning of a word does not change, but only seems to change; a word seems to change its meaning because people inhabiting other regions do not know its genuine meaning. The Śāmkhya proponent replies to this objection by referring to perception (pratyakṣa): a word and the object denoted by it, for example, the word “cow” and an empirical cow, are often perceived separately from each other. The inseparable relationship between two things, which is the ground of inference, is always established by perception. In the case of a word and its meaning, perception proves that there is no inseparable relationship between them. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that a word does not change its meaning.

The second argument—deśa-niyamāt (“because of the restriction to a [particular] place”)—is that a word, unlike an inferential sign, is local. The inseparable relationship between liṅga and liṅgin is a universal relationship: smoke is connected to fire in every geographical region and in every historical period. The author of the Yuktidīpikā gives concrete examples illustrating the local character of different words. For example, the word śavati denotes the action of going only among the people of Kamboja, and the word dātra is used for a sickle only by northerners. In some regions, these words are not related to their meanings; therefore, the relationship between a word and its meaning is not inseparable.

The third argument—iṣṭato viniyogāt (“because of the use in accordance with the wish [of a speaker]”)—is that a word can denote every object, and its relationship with this very meaning (object) is established through its use by the speaker. To illustrate this, the author of the Yuktidīpikā considers the meanings of the word vrddhi. The word vrddhi, commonly known in the sense of “growth of one’s own body,” is also used as a grammatical term for the vowels constituting the third
(strongest) grade of vowel gradation. It seems very probable to me that the Yuktidipikākāra chooses the technical term from Sanskrit grammar to illustrate his thought because the conventional character of many technical terms, that is, their being created by certain authors, was a well-known fact established by perception. If the conventional character of the relationship between many words and their meanings is obvious and it has always been possible to create new word-meaning relationships, then all words must be conventional in their origin.

According to the author of the Yuktidipikā, the relationship between a word and its meaning is not natural and inseparable. The Yuktidipikākāra holds that this relationship depends on the wish (iṣṭa)/intention (abhiprāya) of the speaker. It follows from this that the Vedas, which consist of words, cannot be a naturally occurring entity, that is, an entity evolving from prakṛti without the conscious effort of any author. In this passage, the Yuktidipikākāra accepts the view that all words are conventional in their origin, though he does not use the word “convention” (samaya, samketa). If all words are conventional in their origin, the Vedas, like any other text, can arise in no other way than by the conscious effort of some author (or authors) who knows the convention.

**Nirukta in the context of the Yuktidipikā**

Having presented the two opposite views on the origin of the Vedas, I shall now consider the Yuktidipikā passage containing the famous quotation from Yāśka’s (fifth century BCE) Nirukta (1.20),31 also cited in the Vṛtti on Bhartrhari’s (between 450 and 510 CE) Vākyapadīya (1.5).32 It may seem that by means of this quotation the author of the Yuktidipikā says something about the origin of the Vedas. The quotation has drawn the special attention of many scholars, such as Wilhelm Halbfass (1991: 48n69), Albrecht Wezler (2001), Ashok Aklujkar (2009), Madhav M. Deshpande (2009: 164), and James Kimball (2016: 548), who have discussed its meaning in the context of the Nirukta, the Vākyapadīya together with its Vṛtti,34 or the Yuktidipikā. Detailed studies were undertaken by Aklujkar and Wezler. The

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31 sāksātkṛtadharmaṇa ṛṣayo babhūvah | te 'varebhya sāksātkṛtadharmabhya upadesena mantrān samprāduḥ | upadesāya glāyanto vare bilmagrohaṇāyemaṁ grantham saṁāmnāsiṣṭur vedaṁ ca vedāṇgāni ca | bilnam bhilmam bhāsanam iti vā | (Nirukta1998: 41–42). The Yuktidipikā cites this excerpt, save for the last sentence. The last sentence (explaining bilma), as Wezler (2001: 241) rightly observes, forms the basis of the statement that follows the quotation in the Yuktidipikā. The quotation found in the Yuktidipikā deviates slightly from the text of the Nirukta: in the Yuktidipikā, aparebhyaḥ and apare (which are the forms of aparā, meaning “posterior,” “later,” “following,” “inferior,” “lower,” “other”) appear in place of avarebhyaḥ and bare (the forms of avara, meaning “inferior,” “lower,” “posterior,” “later”). The same deviation occurs in the quotation appearing in the Vṛtti on Bhartrhari’s Vākyapadīya (see below).

32 The dates of Yāśka and Bhartrhari are given according to Coward and Raja (2001: 107, 121).

33 “sāksātkṛtadharmaṇa ṛṣayo babhūvas te 'parebhya sāksātkṛtadharmabhya upadesaṁ mantrān samprāduḥ upadesāya glāyanto 'pare bilmagrohaṇāyemaṁ grantham saṁāmnāsiṣṭur vedaṁ vedāṇgāni ca | bilnam bhilmam bhāsanam vā” iti | (Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari1966: 24–25).

34 It looks like the question of the authorship of the Vṛtti on Bhartrhari’s Vākyapadīya is still open. In the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, we read, “It seems likely that Bhartrhari also composed the commentary called vṛtti on at least the first two chapters of the Trikāṇḍī” (Coward and Raja 2001: 121).
Nirukta is quoted in the commentary on Sāṃkhya-kārikā 51 in the context of defining the eight attainments (siddhi, “attainment,” “perfection”), after characterizing the nature of the first three of them: īha (“reflection,” “reasoning,” “consideration,” “comprehension”), sabda (“word,” “utterance,” “speech,” “communication”), and adhyayana (“study”).

The passage in which the author of the Yuktidīpikā explains the first three siddhis and cites the Nirukta reads as follows:

Of these [the attainment] named “comprehension” (īha) [takes place] when one attains the desired aim by the power of discernment (vicāraṇa) only, without perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and authoritative verbal testimony (āgama). This is the first attainment (siddhi) called “causing to cross [the ocean of samsāra]” (tāraka). It is called tāraka, for it causes one to cross (tārayati) the ocean of samsāra.

But when one who is obstructed in attaining [the desired aim] by himself attains [it] through the teaching (upadeśa) of a guru, this is the second attainment called “carrying across easily” (sutāra). Whence [is it called so]? Because through this they [that is, the disciples] easily cross the straits of worldly existence (bhava-saṃkṣāta) even now (adyatve īpī).

But when one who is unable to attain [the desired aim] even through another’s teaching attains [it] through study (adhyayana), this is the third attainment called “causing crossing [of the ocean of samsāra]” (tārayant). It is called tārayant because the act of crossing (tāraṇa-kriyā) [takes place] even now (adyatve īpī), because it is unceasing (avyāvṛttatva), and because it has a large scope (mahā-viśayatva). These are the three means by which living beings beginning with Brahmā attain the desired aim. And it is said: “There were seers having a direct insight into the nature [of things which is imperceptible to ordinary people] (sākṣāt-kṛta-dharman). They handed down

35 The meaning of the term īha in the Yuktidīpikā is not clear. In the context of the passage cited below, it refers to an insight lying beyond the pramāṇas by which ordinary people acquire valid knowledge (pramāṇa). In Yuktidīpikā 23, on the contrary, the commentator interprets knowledge achieved through īha as knowledge of the distinction between guṇas and puruṣa obtained through pramāṇa(s). He distinguishes between this kind of knowledge and liberating knowledge of the distinction between guṇas and prakṛti which is “produced through practice” (abhyāsa-ja). The latter kind of knowledge is the liberating direct insight described in Sāṃkhya-kārikā 64 (Yuktidīpikā1998: 192.7–14). For the translation and analysis of this passage, see Łucyszyna 2010: 324–28. Kimball (2016: 552–54) gives a different interpretation of this passage of Yuktidīpikā 23, but these interpretative differences need not be discussed here.

In the commentary that survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha, the Gaudapādabhāṣya, Māṭharavṛtti, and Sāṃkhya-tattvavakamudrī, īha means “reasoning,” “reflection,” “consideration” (in the Sāṃkhya-tattvavakamudrī, it means reflection on the basis of authoritative texts). In the Jayamaṅgalā, this term probably has the same meaning (the Jayamaṅgalā passage describing īha is difficult to understand). As it follows from the editions of the Sāṃkhya-vṛtti and Sāṃkhya-saptavatītāvṛtti prepared by Solomon, an explanation of īha is missing in the extant manuscripts. For the meaning of īha in the Gaudapādabhāṣya and Māṭharavṛtti, see Kimball 2016: 541–42.

36 The eight attainments are: īha, sabda, adhyayana, duḥkha-vighātās trayāḥ (“three kinds of destruction of suffering”), suhṛt-prāpti (“gaining friends,” “gaining [knowledge] from friend(s)”), and dāna (“giving,” “donation,” “charity”) (Sāṃkhya-kārikā 51).

37 Vicāraṇa—in the context of the cited passage, this term can also be translated as “mental grasp” or “contemplation.”
mantras by teaching (upadeśa) to the later ones (apara), destitute of a direct insight into the nature [of things] (a-sāksāt-kṛta-dharma). The later ones, tired of [disinclined toward] teaching, compiled this work, the Veda, and the Vedāṅgas for grasping a bilma (bilma-grahaṇāya)” [Nirukta 1.20]. Bilma [means] “understanding” (bhāsana); [thus] a special designation of a thorough understanding (samyak-pratibhāsa) is presented.38

My translation of this passage is for the purposes of this study, and I shall not go into its terminological intricacies or all the richness and subtleties of its meaning. I would also like to emphasize that I interpret the quotation from the Nirukta as an integral part of this Yuktidīpikā passage describing the attainments.

In the quotation from the Nirukta, it is said that seers (ṛṣi), “having a direct insight into the nature [of things]” (sāksāt-kṛta-dharmā), transmitted mantras by teaching (upadeśa) to “the later ones” (apara), “destitute of a direct insight into the nature [of things]” (a-sāksāt-kṛta-dharma),39 and that these “later ones” compiled “this work” (imam grantham), the Veda, and the Veda ancillaries (vedāṅga). By “this work,” Yāska meant the Nighaṇṭu, the collection of Vedic words explained in his Nirukta.

In the context of the Yuktidīpikā, scholars interpret this quotation as an illustration of either the third attainment, or the second and third attainments, or all of the first three attainments. According to Aklujkar (2009: 85), the Nirukta is cited to explain the third (adhyayana) siddhi. Wezler writes that the Nirukta is “quite evidently quoted in order to give a particularly significant example for the operation of the second and third of the siddhis” (2001: 240). Kimball holds that the Nirukta is cited “apparently to illustrate the nature of these three siddhis by relating ūha to the knowledge of the Vedic ṛṣis who have ‘the qualities [of things] placed [directly] before the eyes’ (sāksāt-kṛta-dharmā), and relating śabda and adhyayana to the transmission of Vedic knowledge through the guru-śiṣya relationship and through composed texts, respectively” (2016: 548).

The point on which the three scholars agree is that the quotation from the Nirukta functions in the Yuktidīpikā as an illustration of some of the siddhis, and I subscribe to their opinion. As to the question of which siddhis are exemplified by this

38 tatroho nāma yadā pratyāksānumānāgamavatyirekānihimpitam arthaṃ vicāraṇabalenaiva pratipadyate sādyā siddhis tārakam ity apādiśaṭe | tārayati sansārārnavād iti tārakam | yadā tu svayaṁ pratipattau pratihāryamānānā gurūprapadeśāt pratipadyate sā dvītyā siddhiḥ satāram ity apādiśaṭe | katham | sikhah amanādyate ‘pi bhavasaṃkṣātē tariṇī | yadā tv anyopadeśād apruy asamarthah pratipattum adhyayanena sādhyati sā tvitvā siddhis tārayantam ity apādiśaṭe | tad etat tārayakriyāyā adavyate ‘py avyāvyuttvan mahāvīṣayantāv tārayantam ity apādiṣat | ta ete tayak sādhanopācyā yair ā brahmaṇāḥ prānino bhīṣpita arthaṃ prāṇupavantā āḥ ca “sāksāt-kṛtadharmaḥ ṛṣyas tābhaḥvaḥ | te parebhyo sāksāt-kṛtadharmaḥ bilmaḥ paripravastuḥ | pare bilma-praṇaḥyāyamam grantham samāmnāśyut vedaḥ ca vedāṅga ca” (Nir. 1.20) iti | bilmaḥ bhāṣānaḥ samyakprasūdhāsya viśiṣṭāḥ smākta uktah | (Yuktidīpikā1998: 251.12–252.2).

39 It is not clear why the Yuktidīpikā reads asāksāt-kṛta-dharmābhya instead of asāksāt-kṛtadharmaḥbhya, deviating thus from the Nirukta (cited in footnote 31) and the Vākyapadīya’s Vṛtti (cited in footnote 33). Can it be a mistake that should be corrected in a critical edition? This deviation probably does not influence the meaning. For the meaning and possible translations of sāksāt-kṛta-dharmā, see Ruegg 1994; Wezler 2001: 223–30; Aklujkar 2009: 12–28.
quotation, I agree with Kimball that it illustrates all of the first three siddhis. The first attainment—ūha—takes place when one achieves liberating knowledge (that is, the “seeing” [darsana] of the distinction between puruṣa and prakṛti with its products) by the power of mental discernment (vicāraṇa) which is beyond the pramāṇas applied by ordinary people, and this discernment corresponds to the seers’ direct insight into the imperceptible reality. The second attainment—śabda—occurs when one who is unable to come to liberating knowledge through such extraordinary mental discernment (vicāraṇa) achieves this knowledge through the upadeśa of a guru, and in the quotation from the Nirukta, “the later ones” (apara), destitute of the direct insight into the imperceptible reality, attain liberating knowledge in this very way, that is, through the upadeśa (of the seers). The third attainment—adhyayana—takes place when one who is unable to achieve liberating knowledge through another’s teaching (upadeśa) achieves it through study (adhyayana), and in the Nirukta quotation, “the later ones” (apara), “tired of teaching,” probably because of the limited learning capacity of those they tried to teach, compile for them the texts to study.

Hence, the first attainment characterizes the seers; the second characterizes “the later ones” taught by the seers; and the third characterizes all those for whom “the later ones” compiled the texts. In addition to these correspondences, the assumption that the Nirukta quotation illustrates all of the first three siddhis is confirmed by the following fact. The Yuktidīpikā author cites the Nirukta not immediately after the description of the third attainment, but after the summarizing sentence (coming after this description) in which he states that by the above three means, living beings attain their aim.

In my opinion, it is rather unlikely that by quoting the Nirukta, the Yuktidīpikā author aims to communicate something about the origin of the Vedas. Even if he touches on this issue (indirectly), it is not clear whether the primeval Veda was merely perceived by the rśis, and thus has no author, or, as in earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, was created by them on the basis of their direct insight into the reality imperceptible to ordinary people.

Why does the author of the Yuktidīpikā choose this citation to illustrate Sāmkhya thought? I think that the inclusion of this quotation in the text of the Yuktidīpikā is an element of an important project of the Yuktidīpikākāra which Shujun Motegi calls an attempt at “reconciliation with the Vedas” (2006: 54). This project is realized by the Yuktidīpikā author mainly in the commentary on the second kārikā, in the vast polemics with Mīmāṃśa on the highest goal of man and the means of achieving it. The Yuktidīpikā is the first classical Sāmkhya text that endeavors to substantiate that the Vedas comprise not only ritual parts, but also the highest science of liberation through knowledge.

40 Yuktidīpikā1998: 253.11.

41 By this aim, liberation (kaivalya, literally “isolation [of puruṣa from prakṛti]”) is meant; see the end of the commentary on this kārikā (Yuktidīpikā1998: 253.12–13).

42 Such reconciliation was badly needed. It is difficult not to agree with Ham who writes, “The Sāmkhyas, with their critique of the Vedic cultural norm, went to an extreme and, by doing so, risked their membership in the loose association of Brahmanical intellectual circles, collectively termed ‘āstika’” (2016: 137).
Iśvarakṛṣṇa, in the first two kārikās of his Sāmkhyakārikā, along with all classical Sāṁkhya commentators explaining these kārikās, claims that the Sāṁkhya means of eliminating suffering (duḥkha) through the discriminative knowledge (vijñāna) of prakṛti, its products, and puruṣa is superior to the Vedic (ānuśravika) means because the Sāṁkhya means lead to the complete and final elimination of suffering, whereas by performing a Vedic ritual, a human being will continue to remain in samsāra and experience suffering. This distinction between the Sāṁkhya means and the Vedic means suggests that Sāṁkhya and śruti conflict with one another, for none of the classical Sāṁkhya authors before the author of the Yuktidīpikā observed that the Vedas contain more than just ritual parts. The author of the Yuktidīpikā—for the first time in classical Sāṁkhya history—attempts to show that the Vedas comprise not only ritual parts, but also those parts that teach the path of liberation through knowledge; that according to śruti, the science of liberation through knowledge is the highest science, for it leads to the complete and final elimination of suffering; and that Sāṁkhya is identical with this highest science of the Vedas set forth in the Upaniṣads (Yuktidīpikā 2).

The first view on the origin of the Vedas presented above, according to which the Vedas have no author, and thus possess an unquestionable authority, differing in this respect from all other kinds of authoritative verbal testimony, is, too, an integral part of this project to reconcile Sāṁkhya with the Vedas.

What characterizes the Yuktidīpikā passage quoting the Nirukta as a part of this project to reconcile Sāṁkhya with the Vedas? The passage contains the following implications which indicate that it is a part of this project. The Vedic seers achieved liberating knowledge (of the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa) in the most perfect way— their attainment (siddhi) called āha is the first, that is, the most excellent among the attainments. The Vedic seers transmitted their knowledge to other people, destitute of the capacity to achieve it through āha, and the latter ones achieved liberating knowledge thanks to the seers’ upadeśa. The people taught by the Vedic seers compiled the Vedas, encompassing the science of liberation, as well as the texts explaining them, and it is now possible to achieve liberating knowledge through study of the Vedas. It follows from this passage that the Vedas contain the highest science of liberation through the discriminative knowledge of prakṛti and puruṣa, and therefore should be respected, and that Sāṁkhya is a Vedic doctrine.

When Yaśka, cited in the Yuktidīpikā, referred to “this work” (imaṃ grantham), he meant the Nighaṇṭu commented on in his Nirukta, but the author of the Yuktidīpikā could have alluded to the Sāṁkhya-kārikā commented on in his Yuktidīpikā and suggested in this way that both the Sāṁkhya-kārikā and Yuktidīpikā were works explaining the Vedas.

I consider the passage quoting the Nirukta to be a part of the Yuktidīpikā’s project to reconcile Sāṁkhya with the Vedas, for this passage implies that the Vedas teach the highest science of liberation through knowledge. It is worth noting, however,

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43 Yuktidīpikā1998: 35.9–54.16.
44 To quote Motegi’s opinion about the Yuktidīpikā interpretation of the Sāṁkhya-kārikā (5) definition of authoritative verbal testimony (āpta-vacana): “It is to be surmised that by means of this interpretation the author of the Yuktidīpikā sought to differentiate the Vedas from all other reliable sources and show that they are exceptional in their reliability” (2006: 53).
that Kapila’s status in the Yuktidipikā is higher than the status of the Vedic ṛṣis mentioned in this passage. The seers attain liberating knowledge (through āha), whereas Kapila does not need to acquire it, for it is inborn (sāṃsiddhi) to him (Yuktidipikā 445, 43, 46, and 69). In the commentary on Sāmkhyakārikā 43, the Yuktidipikākāra says directly that āha does not take place in the case of Kapila, as his perfect knowledge originates together with his subtle and physical body.48

Conclusion

The author of the Yuktidipikā wavers between at least two different views on the origin of the Vedas. The first view is that the authorless but noneternal Vedas evolve from prakṛti at the beginning of a kalpa and merge into prakṛti during a pralaya. The Yuktidipikā is the first classical Sāmkhya text to state directly that the Vedas have no author and to distinguish clearly between the Vedas, being independent of any author, and thus having the highest, unquestionable authority, and verbal testimony whose authority depends on the authority of its author. The ideas and terminology of the passages in which the Yuktidipikākāra affirms the authorlessness of the Vedas confirm that he was influenced by Mīmāṃsā.

The second and opposite Yuktidipikā view on the origin of the Vedas is that Kapila is the author of the highest teaching of the Vedas set forth in the Upaniṣads. This view is expressed only indirectly. Omniscient Kapila, appearing at the beginning of a kalpa, creates the primary linguistic convention and Sāmkhya doctrine, the latter being identical with the highest teaching of the Vedas, and his role is similar to the role of Īśvara in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who creates names and the Vedas at the beginning of creation.

The Yuktidipikā contains the famous citation from Yāśka’s Nirukta (1.20), and it may seem that by means of this quotation, the author of the Yuktidipikā communicates ideas about the origin of the Vedas. The Nirukta is cited in the context of defining the eight attainments (siddhi), and the citation functions as an illustration of the first three of them. It is rather unlikely that by quoting the Nirukta, the Yuktidipikākāra intends to say something about the origin of the Vedas. Even if he touches on this issue indirectly, it is not clear from this passage whether the primeval Veda was perceived by the seers, and thus has no author, or, as in the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, was created by them on the basis of their insight into imperceptible reality. The Yuktidipikā passage containing the quotation from the Nirukta can hardly be regarded as supporting either of the two views presented above.

Why does the Yuktidipikākāra select this quotation to illustrate Sāmkhya thought? The inclusion of this citation in the text of the Yuktidipikā can be explained as a part of his important and pioneering (that is, new to Sāmkhya) project to

45 Yuktidipikā 1998: 67.20–68.2, 75.19–24.
46 Yuktidipikā 1998: 233.31–234.9.
47 Yuktidipikā 1998: 267.13
48 Yuktidipikā 1998: 233.31–234.4. On this passage, see Kimball 2016: 550.
reconcile Śāṃkhya with the Vedas. The passage quoting the *Nirukta* implies that the Vedas teach the highest science of liberation through the discriminative knowledge of *prakṛti* with its products and *puruṣa*, and therefore should be revered, and that Śāṃkhya is a Vedic doctrine. The first view on the origin of the Vedas considered above, too, is a part of this project to reconcile Śāṃkhya with the Vedas.

Which of these opposite views on the origin of the Vedas accords with Śāṃkhya doctrine? The first view, based on the idea of the authorless Vedas and influenced by Mīmāṃsā, presupposes that not only the Vedas, but also the words and linguistic sounds that constitute the Vedas evolve from *prakṛti* at the beginning of a *kalpa* and exist (actually, not potentially) until the next *pralaya*. This view is not in agreement with the Śāṃkhya system. For Śāṃkhya, each particular sound (linguistic as well as nonlinguistic) is a unique and transient modification (*vikāra*) or manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of *prakṛti* that comes into actual existence only once; it is not something that can be manifested many times—by different speakers (or other causes), at different times, and in different places.\(^4^9\) The second view, according to which the Vedas have an author, is grounded on the assumption that the origin of all words is conventional. I think that this view is compatible with the Śāṃkhya system. However, in accepting it, Śāṃkhya had to develop a theory of universals—not only of universals of things, but also of universals of words and linguistic sounds—to explain how language learning and communication are possible. It is difficult to find a place for a universal as a separate ontological category in the Śāṃkhya system, but Śāṃkhya could admit universals as general notions.\(^5^0\)

Why does the *Yuktidīpikā*—and Śāṃkhya in general—accept as its “official” standpoint that view on the origin of the Vedas which is in conflict with the Śāṃkhya doctrine, namely, the first view, which holds that the Vedas have no author, evolving from *prakṛti* spontaneously? The second *Yuktidīpikā* view, which holds that Kapila is the author of the highest teaching of the Vedas, implies that the status of Śāṃkhya is not lower and may even be higher than the status of the Vedas. Such a view, if stated directly, could hardly enhance the reputation of Śāṃkhya as a school of philosophy that recognizes the authority of the Vedas. The first view, on the contrary, maintains the highest and most distinguished status of the Vedas, and therefore is the proper choice to secure a place for Śāṃkhya in Indian intellectual history. This is why the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* affirms the first view as the

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\(^{4^9}\) See Łucyszyna 2016: 304–5, 316–19.

\(^{5^0}\) Indian philosophers were aware that the word-meaning relationship making language learning and communication possible cannot be based on word and meaning understood as unique and transient entities. For this reason, the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, rejecting the Mīmāṃsā conception of everlasting words, introduced the conception of universals of words. Pind (1991) holds that the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga, too, was aware of the problem. Pind shows that according to Dignāga, the relationship between a word and its meaning is the relationship between a word universal (*śabda-sāmānya*) and a meaning universal (*artha-sāmānya*), that is, the relationship between types, not between “their individual realizations (*artha-sābda-viśeṣa*),” which “are claimed not to constitute such a relation because they have not previously been observed together” (1991: 270). For Dignāga, unlike for the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, a universal is not something existing independently of our minds. Classical Śāṃkhya did not develop a theory of universals. It also did not develop a theory of word meaning. On word meaning and universals in classical Śāṃkhya, see Łucyszyna 2016: 305–9.
“official” standpoint of the Sāṃkhya darśana, including it in his pioneering project to reconcile Sāṃkhya with the Vedas.

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