Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine from Minimum Deterrence to Full Spectrum Credible Minimum Deterrence (FSCMD)

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ABSTRACT

In this study, attempt is made to briefly highlight theories and correlates them with Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. Theoretical foundation of this study is based on realist philosophy and the off-shoots of realism. Nuclear doctrines are developed to deter aggression or deal with circumstances involving probable nuclear warfare. Pakistan’s nuclear ability has deterred Indian military from any aggression. Despite having entrenched political differences, the two republics have not aspired for any large-scale military adventure ever since the acquisition of nuclear capability. Sverre Lodgaard framed the term “political advantage,” for exultant deterrent role of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. It is asserted hither efficacious practice of nuclear deterrent to preserve strategic objectives embedded sense of “virtual victory” in the psyche of Islamabad stationed bureaucrats. This doctrine stems from Pakistan’s opposition to Indian declaration that South Asia falls in Indian sphere of influence. Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan is though unwritten/customary yet, it is based on various handouts issued by national command authority (NCA) and Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR). Statements and interviews of civilian strategists, senior serving and retired government armed forces officials serve the purpose of providing policy guidelines for customary nuclear doctrine.

Introduction

Nuclear doctrines are developed to deter aggression or deal with circumstances involving probable nuclear warfare (Lodgaard, 2011). Superpowers
knew nuclear war cannot be won therefore both treated nuclear weapons as weapon of last resort. Mutual annihilation is consequently averted. Since, atom bomb has its deterrent role; nuclear weapons have been politically and psychologically used to get strategic interests. Genesis of India-Pakistan nuclear doctrines are traced back to the times of Cold War. Pakistan relies on nuclear weapons for self-preservation. It does realize that nuclear weapons should be used only as a last resort. Pakistan’s nuclear ability has deterred Indian military from any aggression. Despite having entrenched political differences, the two republics have not aspired for any large-scale military adventure ever since the acquisition of nuclear capability. Sverre Lodgaard framed the term “political advantage,“ for exultant deterrent role of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons (Lodgaard, 2011). It is asserted hither efficacious practice of nuclear deterrent to preserve strategic objectives embedded sense of “virtual victory” in the psyche of Islamabad stationed bureaucrats. This doctrine stems from Pakistan’s opposition to Indian declaration that South Asia falls in Indian sphere of influence (Mohan, 2003). Thirdly, Indian armed forces could not attack Pakistan in the aftermath of various crises. Pakistan opposed Indian coercive policy because Islamabad based bureaucrats firmly regard the radical perspective that tyrant must be resisted by the oppressed and consider it as a rational policy. Pakistan firm resolve to resist India with nuclear deterrent prevent Islamabad from signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS). India-Pakistan nuclear policies, arms race and vertical proliferation undermine universalisation of the NPT.

An Appraisal of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine

Policymakers in Pakistan affirm that atomic weapons deter India from attacking Pakistani territories. Significance of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent incrementally increased following Indian army Chief Bipin Rawat publically acknowledged the existence of the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). General Bipin stated that “weakness can only be overcome if you accept the strategy... if you don’t accept the strategy, then you will let your weakness limit you,” (Shukla, 2017). In succeeding paragraphs effort is made to understand the rationale behind Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. Pakistan concealed nuclear strategy, principle and Command and Control (C2) spectrum for the sake of advancing opaque nuclear posture as it believes that opacity welds deterrent posture.

Significant Features of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine

Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan is though unwritten/customary yet, it is based on various handouts issued by national command authority (NCA) and Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR). Statements and interviews of civilian strategists, senior serving and retired government armed forces officials serve the purpose of providing policy guidelines for customary nuclear doctrine. Second, it is associated with the personalities for example, Dr. Samar Mubarikmand, Naeem Ahmed Salik (Chakma, 2013), Khalid Kidwai (Cotta-Ramusino & Martellini), and Mahmoud
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Ali Durani (Durranni, 2004). Third, Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) posture of Pakistan is India specific. It is reactive rather than proactive. Fourth, Pakistan nuclear weapons deterred India conversely nuclear weapons are viewed both strategic and political weapons. Fifth, despite nuclear first use capability, Pakistan keeps de-mated nuclear forces during peacetime. It simultaneously emphasizes graduated response. Sixth, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine denies advantages to India in crisis situations or in case of the breakdown of deterrence.

Objectives

Pakistan’s nuclear policy focuses on achieving the following objectives (Durranni, 2004),

a. Deter all forms of “external threats” posed to the national frontiers of the mainland.

b. Development of conventional and strategic forces is the prerequisite for enhancing the credibility of nuclear deterrence.

c. Deterring India from launching (pre-emptive) attacks against country’s strategic forces through retaliation with the nuclear strike.

d. Preserving strategic parity within the South Asian belt.

Origins of Nuclear First Use

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Military Committee in December, 1956 approved MC-14/2 Document to authorize nuclear first use strategy against the Soviet Union (Mendelsohn, 1999) Islamabad’s nuclear first use posture (Liebl, 2009) is perhaps based on MC-14/2 for three motives;

i. Firstly, the possession of nuclear weapons by Islamabad knocks down Indian military superiority;

ii. Secondly, residual capacity of nuclear forces creates fear of punishment in Indian policymakers. As a result it deters India and maintains South Asian strategic stability.

iii. Thirdly, India-Pakistan troubled relations, Indian gigantic military, revisionist policy, border proximity and fact of traditional deterrence requires Pakistan to rely on first use since it is prone to breakdown.

Pakistan wants to deny advantages and convince India that war is not an option by adopting deliberate nuclear first use posture. It helps Pakistan to (Ganguly & Kapur, 2010);

a. rely on nuclear deterrent during crisis and accrue its interests,
b. thwart existential threat India poses to Pakistan’s sovereignty;

c. Maintain strategic stability and results in war prevention.

A deliberate nuclear first use is evolved as basis of Pakistan’s customary nuclear doctrine. Nuclear weapons incorporation with traditional weapons and first use policy would continue to dominate Pakistan’s deterrent posture.

**Theoretical Models**

Theory is a set of statements which helps researchers in the understanding of international relations. It also plays a vital role in the evolution, development and completion of research to authenticate or refute existing knowledge (Venable, 2006). In this segment, attempt is made to briefly highlight theories and correlates them with Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. Theoretical foundation of this study is based on realist philosophy and the off-shoots of realism. Theoretical foundation of this study is based on realist philosophy and on the off-shoots of realism.

**First-Use in the Light of Realist Philosophy**

Islamabad’s policy of deliberate first-use is rooted in realist teachings of self-preservation to repel Indian aggression and guarantee Pakistan’s existence. It does not aim at carrying out decapitating first strike. In fact, it is far from nuclear primacy-ability to eliminate enemy’s nuclear forces with first strike (Sauer, 2009). The realist philosophy asserts that conventionally weak states adhere to deliberate first use to deter external threats. Pakistan is situated in a strategically volatile region and has an equally fragile history with East Pakistan dismembered and continuation of threat to remaining Pakistan. Afghanistan is unstable since 1970s. In post 9/11 era, India and Afghanistan have joined hands against Pakistan to destabilize it. It is therefore claimed here that Pakistan’s threat perception stem from Hobbes’ state of nature.

Islamabad’s first use deterrent posture calls for readiness to rapidly assemble, distribute, deploy and if necessary use nuclear weapons against adversary’s conventional or nuclear attack in case deterrence breakdowns. Pakistan’s nuclear posture is known as asymmetric escalation posture (Narang, 2009/10).

On the other hand, Islamabad’s efforts to strengthen military muscles fractures Indian sense of security and creates security dilemma for India. New Delhi relies on two diverse strategies to deal with Pakistan. Firstly, India is constantly modernizing its conventional and nuclear military forces. Secondly, Indian (Joshi, 2013) in association with Western (Hoyt, 2015) and South Asian scholars (Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age, 2006) have launched propaganda to declare Pakistan as an irresponsible nuclear weapon state.
It is asserted that Islamabad relies on pre-delegated control of nuclear weapons and authority to use nuclear weapons lies in the hands of junior ranking military officers. Wherein, delegation of authority serves the purpose to maintain credibility of Islamabad’s nuclear deterrent particularly, in crisis situation. In fact, the notion that Pakistan’s ready status requires nuclear weapons deployment and delegation of authority to junior ranking officers gains strength due to Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth and conventionally weak armed forces. It paves the way for allegations that Pakistan’s deterrent posture inherits risks, vulnerabilities, fosters fear of accidental use of nuclear weapons and deliberate use due to use it or lose it phenomenon in the midst of crisis. Nevertheless, this propaganda is aimed at bringing Islamabad under pressure from international community to roll back its programme of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the propaganda helps to divert the attention of the global community from CSD- Indian hostile preemptive war-fighting strategy. It endeavors to target Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

Pakistan’s deterrent posture, contrary to aforementioned allegations, attempts to deter India. Fear of Indian preemptive strikes occupies Pakistan’s main threat perception. A. H. Nayyer claims that Pakistan therefore keeps its nuclear forces de-mated and away from missiles (Nayyar, 2008). Contrary to Indian propaganda, Pakistan exercises assertive control during crisis and peacetime to avoid inadvertent, emotional or deliberate use of nuclear weapons. An assertive control would ensure that launch codes are not shared with the operators or handlers of nuclear arsenals (Rehman). Deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) thus should not be a cause of concern as prerogative to launch rests with the chief of National Command Authority (NCA) i.e. the premier of Pakistan. Development of TNWs can be a part of deception and ambiguous nuclear doctrine to embed doubts in the minds of the adversary. A hype of the development of TNWs enables Pakistan to keep intermediate range nuclear forces de-mated from delivery vehicles at storage depots to prevent detection from Indian satellites, thwarts fear of theft during transportation, neutralizes use it or lose it phenomenon, enables NCA to maintain tight control over nuclear assets and pacifies threat of deliberate or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Pakistan is under intense pressure from global society owing to Indian propaganda basically to reveal its actual war planning. The efficacy of medium range ballistic missile force structure reaffirms the abovementioned argument further afield. It seems convincing due to Pakistan’s conventional strategy which was devised in the wake of Azm-e-Nau, military exercise.

Rational Deterrence Theory

Pakistan adherence to deliberate first use is application of rational deterrence theory. It aims at persuading the enemy that war will be both costly and unsuccessful. Hence, it should be considered as a futile activity. The prerequisites of rational deterrence theory (Huth, 1999) include maintenance of Balance of Power
(BOP) vis-à-vis the enemy, nuclear signaling, reputation for resolve and interests at stake. Current pace of the development of the nuclear weapons by Pakistan endeavors to fulfill the first prerequisite enshrined in rational deterrence theory to maintain BOP vis-à-vis the enemy. The possession of the nuclear weapons enables Pakistan to inflict intolerable damage to enemy in response to aggression. Pakistani decision makers conveyed categorical nuclear signals to India in the midst of various crises both during opaque era and after nuclearisation. Pakistan communicated nuclear signals by deploying missiles, armed forces, cancelled leaves of security personnel, put security forces on high alert and called on reserve forces to transmit Pakistan will resist denied act through the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear signals were conveyed to augment the credibility of Pakistan’s deterrent posture by expressing Pakistan’s resolve to use nuclear weapons in case India imposes war against the former. Threat of use of nuclear weapons is aimed at reducing the increased potential risk of India-Pakistan confrontation. Fear of punishment deterred Indian adventurism, preserved strategic stability and resulted in decade long peace despite the skirmishes at both Line of Control (LoC) and Working Boundary between the two.

The reputation for resolve based on past behaviour manipulates deterrence outcome. Islamabad’s reliance on nuclear weapons increases during crises because Pakistani decision makers believe that India wants to undo the partition of the subcontinent. Pakistan’s primary interest remains to preserve its sovereignty therefore, its resolve to use nuclear weapons increases.

Minimum Nuclear Deterrence

Pakistan changed its deterrent posture from opacity to minimum nuclear deterrence after May, 1998 nuclear tests. Minimum nuclear deterrence refers to quantified/small number of survivable nuclear forces sufficient to punish the aggressor for carrying out nuclear first strike (Kristensen, M., Norris, & Oelrich, 2009). Pakistan adhered to minimum nuclear deterrent posture owing to;

a. Avoid nuclear arms race with India.

b. Belief, fear of punishment would deter the adversary.

c. Reduce maintenance/overhaul cost.

d. Administer less complex command and control (C2) system.

Government officials for instance in June 1998 Dr. Samar Mubarakmand (The Dawn News, 1998) and later Brig (retired) Dr. Naeem Salik (Salik, 2006) asserted that Pakistan requires sixty to seventy nuclear warheads to deter India from waging war against Pakistan. However, Pakistan soon realized that it cannot quantify its nuclear forces keeping in view Indian military modernization and nuclear force structure developments.
Credible Minimum Deterrence

In 1998, Nawaz Sharif’s administration introduced CMD posture (Tertrais, 2012). It marked the departure from earlier policy of minimum deterrence. CMD preserved the ambiguity in Pakistan’s nuclear policy and it helps avoid limits on the extent of Pakistan’s nuclear force structure (Bast, 2011). Consequently, this dynamic approach enables Pakistan to address country’s security concerns emanating from Indian vertical proliferation. CMD posture is adopted to avoid nuclear arms race with India (Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age, 2006). Changes in CMD posture are directly proportional to Indian (conventional/nuclear) military modernization, increase in the size of Indian nuclear forces and adversary’s war fighting doctrine. It is a reactive rather than a proactive approach. Hence, Islamabad’s efforts to address security concerns cannot be labeled as arms competition or quest for nuclear parity. CMD enables Pakistan to cut economic expenditure required for the maintenance of nuclear forces. Minimum stocks evades fear of inadvertent an unauthorized use of WMDs. CMD posture also highlights that India poses existential threat to Pakistan’s security. The world is also convinced that Pakistan is responsible nuclear weapon state (NWS) if CMD is maintained by Pakistan. Its WMDs programme is India centric alone.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Threshold

Nuclear threshold means a point crossed by the adversary which results in the use of nuclear weapons. This section deals with Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. First threshold was defined by Khalid Kidwai former Director Strategic Plans Division (SPD) followed by Vinnie Liebl and third list is an addition made by this academic research.

Khalid Kidwai’s Definition of Pakistan’s Nuclear Threshold

Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, the former Director SPD, in an interview defined the following as likely situations that can compel Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons (Kidwai K., 2002).

a. India attacks and conquers a major portion of Pakistani territory.

b. India destroys large portion of Pakistani land or air forces.

c. India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan.

d. India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan.

It seems that jargons are deliberately used to preserve ambiguous nuclear posture, to induce caution (Sagan, 2009) and deter India from crossing nuclear
threshold. Islamabad avoids from clearly defining nuclear threshold due to fear of Indian preemptive strike. It also limits Pakistan’s options in case of the breakdown of deterrence. The CSD is a test case for Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent posture and Indian nuclear doctrine based on massive retaliation. CSD and Pakistan’s response is discussed in succeeding chapter.

Critics (Chakma, The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, 2011) assert that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is articulated by Director General (DG) SPD therefore it is personality driven.

**Vinnie Liebl’s Defined Pakistan’s Nuclear Threshold**

Liebl has added following two redlines while quoting anonymous Pakistani security officials (Liebl, 2009).

a. India crosses LoC in an attempt to take control of Kashmir administered by Pakistan.

b. India carries an attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities.

It is evident that the fear of Indian aggression occupies Pakistani security official’s threat perception and anxiety. Gigantic military budget and qualitative improvements by India will obviously acerbate Pakistan’s threat perception.

**Addition Made by this Study to Pakistan’s Pre-Existing Nuclear Threshold**

It is claimed that following are the situations in which Pakistan will possibly resort to the use of nuclear weapons against India.

i) Indian groundforces penetrate into Pakistan or Azad Kashmir to attack counterforce targets in hot pursuit or to destroy alleged insurgent training camps.

ii) Indian air force carries out surgical strikes against counterforce targets across LoC or anywhere in Pakistan.

iii) Indian forces captures thin strip after entering into Pakistan with an intention to permanently hold it or use it as bargaining chip during crisis.

iv) India uses TNW in Pakistan’s deserted areas for instance on mountains, in desert or in Pakistani air space or in waters nears coastal areas.

**Credible Minimum Full Spectrum Deterrence**

On September 5, 2013, NCA, the supreme body to administer nuclear affairs, decided to adhere to Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) to deter all kinds of
external threats (Press Release No. PR133/2013-ISPR, 2013). FSD was introduced in reaction to CSD which suggests that India wants to impose limited conventional war against Pakistan under nuclear umbrella. Pakistan however, believes that CSD enables India to enjoy advantages at tactical and operational level (Kidwai). It therefore, once again poses existential threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty. Pakistan plugged the gap by introducing TNWs Hatf-IX sixty kilometers short range ballistic missile by the name of Nasar. Its posture is based on Hatf IX. Introduction of TNWs deter India from executing CSD. It empowers Pakistan to use mini-nukes at tactical level rather than using strategic weapons. FSD advocates limited nuclear-war or gradual escalation of nuclear-war. It essentially helped lower the nuclear threshold level.

Pakistan’s military leadership reiterated the existence of FSD on September 9, 2015 in a press release (Press Release No. PR280/2015-ISPR, 2015). It was asserted that Islamabad would maintain FSD in line with CMD to thwart aggression and avoid (nuclear) arms race with India. Indian military amalgamation near Pakistani border would embed fear of preemptive strike in the minds of policymakers in Islamabad. The announcement of CSD by India heightens Pakistan’s threat perception. It embeds feelings in the minds of Pakistani policymakers that delayed response by Pakistan would result in devastating enemy surprise attack. Second inaction would endanger Pakistan’s existence. The possibility of first strike or preemptive strike, under the increased threat perceptions would gain thrust. Tit-for-tar strategy yet undoubtedly increases chances of deliberate and inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, Pakistan, as a responsible NWS keeps it nuclear forces de-mated and unassembled to reduce chances of nuclear Armageddon.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control (C2) System

The possession of nuclear weapons has facilitated Pakistan to resist Indian dictation, preserve Pakistan’s existence and restore strategic stability. Policymakers in Islamabad believe that, had Pakistan not developed nuclear weapons India would have undone the partition. Credible deterrence also facilitated Pakistan military in wiping out terrorism from Pakistan. Due to strategic stability is democracy in Pakistan is also gradually being strengthened (Kokoshin, 2011). Nuclear weapons stabilized the region and are a source of national cohesion. Nuclear weapons are viewed as political weapons and a source to acquire emerging power status globally. Indian leadership believes that South Asia is under Indian sphere of influence. India considers Pakistan as a basic hurdle and an obstacle in Indian rise to ensue regional supremacy and great power status.

In 1999, General Musharraf established National Security Council (NSC) including civilian and military leaders (Tertrais, 2012). NSC comprised of National Command Authority (NCA), developmental control by a government body, Strategic Force Command (SFC) and a Secretariat (Munir, 2018). NSC served as a comprehensive mechanism to handle nuclear affairs. In year 2000, Musharraf
overwhelmed NCA by bringing nuclear establishment, missile development complex KRL, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM), and the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) under its control. In April, 2004, Pervez Musharraf got NSC approved by the parliament (Rashid, 2004). Pakistan People’s Party- Parliamentarian (PPP-P) opposed NSC. Replacing NSC with Defence Cabinet Committee was one of the defined interests of PPP-P, in 2008, election manifesto (Manifesto 2008). In February, 2009 (Pakistan to Abolish National Security Council; Gilani, 2009), NSC was abolished. Nevertheless, Musharraf is an architect of Pakistan’s current Nuclear C2 System known as Strategic Command Organization (Tertrais, 2012) based on the SPD, the NCA and SFC (Chawla, 2013). SPD situated in Joint Services Headquarters is the Secretariat of NCA (Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security, 2007). Lieutenant General or Director General (DG) (Lavoy, 2007) leads the SPD. Personnel reliability, material management, special security emphasis, counterintelligence and control physical security on sites (Concerns Over Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Perceptions and Reality- Pakistan’s Nuclear Safety and Security System, 2014). The SPD is responsible to protect nuclear facilities and complexes are the responsibility of the Secretariat. Former DG SPD Khalid Kidwai raised special security wing of 8,000 armed forces personnel to protect nuclear assets. It was SPD’s internal security wing (ISW) answerable to DG SPD. ISW coordinates with other intelligence agencies to thwart threats (Lavoy, 2007). Four sub-directorates of SPD include Operational and Planning Directorate, the Computerized, Command, Control, Communications, Information, Intelligence and Surveillance Directorate (CCCCIISR), Strategic Weapons Development Directorate and Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate (Naeem Salik, 2007).

Members of the NCA include Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), services chiefs, key cabinet ministers and Prime Minister. NCA participants review the developments in the nuclear field (Press Release No. PR133/2013-ISPR, 2013). It controls the development of the nuclear weapons, their deployment and use (Fritz). Prime Minister of Pakistan is the chairman of the NCA. During its meetings members of the NCA review Indian developments and threats posed to Pakistan’s security. NCA proposes future course of action. It reviews global developments that could have implications for Pakistan’s national security i.e. Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), NSG, Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). Employment Control Committee (ECC) and Development Control Committee (DCC) are two significant bodies of NCA. ECC provides policy directions, recommend guidelines for nuclear weapons deployment, make nuclear doctrine and policy for authorizing nuclear weapons use (Kuusisto, 2008). CJCS is the deputy chairman of DCC. It attempts to implement ECC goals. Constitutionally, Article 243.2 and Article 248.1, Pakistan’s political leadership has an upper hand over military bureaucracy (The Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan). In order to have a full control of the nuclear affairs, it however, requires a sustainable maturity of the political leadership as
well as a stable political culture. SFC enjoys prerogative to exercise control of the nuclear weapons, their delivery system, exercise training, technical and administrative control (Naeem Salik, 2007). In 2012, Pakistan started developing Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) (Press Release No. PR122/2012-ISPR, 2012) to expand country’s strategic forces. Development of NSFC could be an outcome of the decision to administer developed naval nuclear forces which is a prerequisite for an effective deterrent and assured second strike capability. Qualitative development was an indication that surrender was out of question. Significantly, India was also denied escalation dominance. From crisis control perspective, residual capacity of nuclear forces ensures the credibility of the deterrent and prevents enemy from imposing demands (Hussain, 2018).

Global society has unfortunately failed to take substantial steps in addressing Pakistan’s genuine concerns. It also lacks interest in resolving Indo-Pakistan contentious issues that have upshot arms race spiral in South Asia. Disarmament activist consequently cannot convince Pakistan to join the NPT as NNWS. NSFC formation is Pakistan’s response to nuclearization of the Indian Ocean by India with Russian support. The NSFC effectuation echo Pakistan’s security dilemma and countermeasures. Superpowers knew nuclear war cannot be won therefore both treated nuclear weapons as weapon of last resort and therefore were able to avert mutual annihilation nuclear weapons were used politically to achieve strategic interests (Jabeen, 2018). Pakistan relies on nuclear weapons for self-preservation. However, Pakistan realizes that nuclear weapons are weapon of last resort and should not be used. Nuclear weapons are politically used against India to resolve crises and deter Indian military aggression. Sverre Lodgaard coined the term “political advantage,” (Lodgaard, 2011) for the successful deterrent role of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. It is claimed as a successful implementation of nuclear deterrent to preserve strategic objectives. It embedded sense of “virtual victory” in the minds of Islamabad based policymakers. This conviction also stems from opposition to Indian claim that South Asia falls in Indian sphere of influence, Indian hegemony, and failure of conventionally powerful and nuclear equipped Indian forces to cross into Pakistani territory. Pakistan believes in radical perspective that oppressor must be resisted by the oppressed.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s nuclear policy is evolved in the light of United States (US) nuclear policy in the Cold War era known as MC 70. US equipped Western allies with atomic weapons to deter the Soviet Union from invading Western Europe. US aimed to deter the Soviet Union from taking control of strategically important areas. Similarly, Pakistan also resorts to the threat of the use of nuclear weapons to thwart the outbreak of war and ensure its survival. War avoidance is the basic theme of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. India-Pakistan decade long peace certifies optimist’s belief that nuclear weapons prevent anxiety of adversary’s disarming strike (Colby, 2013). West disregards the fact that struggle to rollback Pakistan
nuclear weapons programme is contrary to the realist teachings that “nuclear weapons are anti-war vaccine,” (Beaufre, 1972). It would destabilize South Asian strategic stability and increases asymmetry in Indian favour.

The denial of the West for advanced military technology impedes Pakistan’s ability to rise countervailing conventional force (similar to declared by the West in 1952 Lisbon Conference) (Windass, 1985). The failure of the West to understand the provision of military hardware increases asymmetry in Indian favour. It prevents Islamabad from introducing changes in the nuclear policy for instance to adopt flexible response. The substance of the matter is global community’s failure to address Pakistan’s security concerns undermines non-proliferation apparatus based on the NPT. Pakistan as per realist teachings, from deterrence perspective and according to the concept of security dilemma relies on nuclear deterrent for its security. The incorporation of nuclear weapons with the conventional weapons and first use policy would continue to dominate Pakistan’s security policy. Consequently, Islamabad would not rollback nuclear weapons programme and remain an outlier state. The guardians of the NPT are neither ready to accept Pakistan as NWS nor addresses Pakistan’s security concerns. The universalisation of the NPT would therefore remain a distant goal.

Finally, Pakistan’s nuclear First Use strategy is based on Glenn Synder’s deterrence by denial model. Indian philosophy of massive retaliatory nuclear attack is borrowed from Albert Wohlstetter’s writings. India-Pakistan crisis requires assembled and deployed nuclear weapons to deter the opponent from carrying preemptive strikes, by holding enemy cities hostage. It speaks of the notion of existential deterrence as slight prospects of nuclear retaliation outweigh ostensible ascendency of preemptive attack. However, the vertical extended deterrence, ready, super-ready status and short time for nuclear reaction creates fear of inadvertent and accidental nuclear war in South Asia.
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