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Submitted on 30 June 2021 | Accepted on 6 September 2021 | Published on 10 January 2022

ABSTRACT
The influential Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BCE) is almost unanimously acclaimed as the founder of zoology. There is a consensus that he was interested in attributes of animals, but whether or not he tried to develop a zoological taxonomy remains controversial. Fürst von Lieven and Humar compiled a data matrix from Aristotle’s Historia animalium and showed, through a parsimony analysis published in 2008, that these data produced a hierarchy that matched several taxa recognized by Aristotle. However, their analysis leaves some questions unanswered because random data can sometimes yield fairly resolved trees. In this study, we update the scores of many cells and add four new characters to the data matrix (147 taxa scored for 161 characters) and quote passages from Aristotle’s Historia animalium to justify these changes. We confirm the presence of a phylogenetic signal in these data through a test using skewness in length distribution of a million random trees, which shows that many of the characters discussed by Aristotle were systematically relevant. Our parsimony analyses on the updated matrix recover far more trees than reported by Fürst von Lieven and Humar, but their consensus includes many taxa that Aristotle recognized and apparently named for the first time, such as selachē (selachians) and dithyra (Bivalvia Linnaeus, 1758). This study suggests that even though taxonomy was obviously not Aristotle’s chief interest in Historia animalium, it was probably among his secondary interests. These results may pave the way for further taxonomic studies in Aristotle’s zoological writings in general. Despite being almost peripheral to Aristotle’s writings, his taxonomic contributions are clearly major achievements.

KEY WORDS
Greek philosophy, history of zoology, biological nomenclature, systematics, metazoans, genus, species, Linnaean categories.

Laurin M. & Humar M. 2022. — Phylogenetic signal in characters from Aristotle’s History of Animals. Comptes Rendus Palevol 21 (1): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.5852/cr-palevo2022v21a1
RÉSUMÉ
Signal phyléthétique dans les caractères de l’Histoire des Animaux d’Aristote.
L’influente philosophe grec Aristote (384-322 avant notre ère) est presque unanimement reconnu comme le fondateur de la zoologie. On s’accorde à dire qu’il s’intéressait aux attributs des animaux, mais le fait qu’il ait ou non essayé de développer une taxonomie zoologique reste controversé. Fürst von Lieven et Humar ont compilé une matrice de données à partir de l’Histoire des Animaux d’Aristote et ont montré, par une analyse de parcimonie publiée en 2008, que ces données produisaient une hiérarchie qui correspondait à plusieurs taxons reconnus par Aristote. Cependant, leur analyse laisse certaines questions en suspens car des données aléatoires peuvent parfois aboutir à des arbres assez résolus. Dans cette étude, nous mettons à jour les scores de nombreuses cellules et ajoutons quatre nouveaux caractères à la matrice de données (147 taxons notés pour 161 caractères) et citons des passages de l’Histoire animalium d’Aristote pour justifier ces changements. Nous confirmons la présence d’un signal phyléthétique dans ces données par un test utilisant l’asymétrie dans la distribution de longueur d’un million d’arbres aléatoires, qui montre que de nombreux caractères discutés par Aristote étaient systématiquement pertinents. Nos analyses de parcimonie sur la matrice mise à jour retrouvent beaucoup plus d’arbres que ceux rapportés par Fürst von Lieven et Humar, mais leur consensus inclut de nombreux taxons qu’Aristote a reconnus et apparemment nommés pour la première fois, comme les selaché (sélaciens) et les dityna (Bivalvia Linnaeus, 1758). Cette étude suggère que même si la taxonomie n’était visiblement pas le principal intérêt d’Aristote dans Historia animalium, elle faisait probablement partie de ses intérêts secondaires. Ces résultats peuvent ouvrir la voie à d’autres études taxonomiques dans les écrits zoologiques d’Aristote en général. Bien qu’elles soient presque périphériques dans les écrits d’Aristote, ses contributions taxonomiques sont clairement des réalisations majeures.

INTRODUCTION
APPRECIATION OF ARISTOTLE AMONG SYSTEMATISTS
Aristotle (384-322 BC) was one of the most prolific Greek philosophers and is almost unanimously acclaimed as the founder of zoology. Mayr (1982: 149) even stated that “The history of taxonomy starts with Aristotle (384-322 BC)”, and also that:

“On the whole, in spite of some incongruous combinations and unclassified residues, Aristotle’s higher taxa of animals were distinctly superior to those of Linnaeus, whose primary interest was in plants.” (Mayr 1982: 152)

Similarly, Darwin stated, in a letter (Gotthelf 1999) to the physician and classicist William Ogle who had sent Darwin a copy of his translation of Aristotle’s works on the parts of animals, that “Linnaeus and Cuvier have been my two gods, though in very different ways, but they were mere school-boys to old Aristotle.” Cuvier also praised Aristotle’s achievements in zoology:

“Aristote, dès son introduction, expose aussi une classification zoologique qui n’a laissé que bien peu de choses à faire aux siècles qui sont venus après lui. Ses grandes divisions et subdivisions du règne animal sont étonnantes de précision, et ont presque toutes résisté aux acquisitions postérieures de la science.” (Cuvier 1841: 148-149)

(Aristotle, from his introduction [in History of Animals], also exposes a zoological classification which left very little to do in the subsequent centuries. His great divisions and subdivisions of the animal kingdom are astonishingly precise, and almost all of them have withstood the test of time.) (Our translation)

All ancient works that are cited in this paper are listed here with their usual abbreviations.

ABBREVIATIONS
Arist., Cat. Aristotle, Categoriar;
Arist., de An. Aristotle, de Animalia;
Arist., GA Aristotle, Generatione Animalium;
Arist., HA Aristotle, Historia Animalium;
Arist., PA Aristotle, de Partibus Animalium;
Hom., Od. Homer, Odyssey;
Plin., HN Pliny, Historia Naturalis.

CONTROVERSIES ABOUT ARISTOTLE’S WORK
Much of Aristotle’s zoological work describes biodiversity in the broad sense: organs of animals, their habits, and groups of organisms and their characteristics. Especially regarding the last aspect of his writings there has been an extensive discussion. Most authors agree that Aristotle’s zoological work was not meant to be primarily taxonomic (Pellegrin 1986; Gotthelf 1988; Lemnox 2001a; Sandford 2019, but see Lloyd 1961 and Carraro 2019), which would explain why he never summarized his classification in a compact form, contrary to most more recent systematists. But did he classify animals as a taxonomist would, or according to logical principles?

In systematics, a taxonomy is a hierarchical classification with no partial overlap between the sets, except in cases created by
hybridization; for instance, Primates Linnaeus, 1758 currently includes Strepsirhini Geoffroy, 1812 (lemurs) and Haplorhini Pocock, 1918 (Tarsius Storr, 1780, monkeys and apes), and no member of Strepsirhini can be a member of Haplorhini, and vice versa, and there is no other way of dividing Primates in the context of a taxonomy (note that in conformity with most rank-based codes of biological nomenclature, except for the Zoological Code, and as also recommended by the PhyloCode [Cantino & de Queiroz 2020], we italicize all taxon names; we capitalize taxon names, except for specific epithets and names used by Aristotle, given that modern editions of ancient texts do not capitalize these names). On the contrary, there are many alternative non-taxonomic (not strictly hierarchical) classifications of primates, for instance by habitat (arboreal vs terrestrial), diet (insectivorous, frugivorous, folivorous), daily activity pattern (diurnal vs nocturnal), and the sets created by these classifications can overlap (e.g. some arboreal primates are diurnal, whereas others are nocturnal). Note that Linnaeus placed bats (specifically, the genus Vespertilio Linnaeus, 1758) among primates, but bats were removed from primates and placed in their own order, Chiroptera Blumenbach, 1779, long ago. Aristotle discussed both logical, not strictly hierarchical classifications, and hierarchical classifications reminiscent of taxonomies, so the main question is: did Aristotle view these as different but equally valid and interesting ways of classifying animals, in which case he should be considered a pluralist realist, as argued by Henry (2011: 206), or did he have a preferred classification scheme for animals that is akin to a taxonomy, in which case he should be considered a monistic realist?

Assessing Aristotle’s intentions in animal classification is complicated by the fact that the texts explaining this topic or containing an overall view might be lost (Pellegrin 1986; Hall 1991: 111, 112). Aristotle’s focus was apparently on explaining animals’ design (structure), which was supplemented by illustrations obtained from dissections in his lost work Anatomai (Fürst von Lieven et al. 2020), and lifestyle (Pratt 1984: 272) and showing character linkage (Fürst von Lieven & Humar 2008: 244). Lennox (2006) discussed the debate about whether Aristotle’s aim was more at defining taxa or only their attributes; in any case, both are linked because Aristotle found groups of animals that were produced by grouping according to several correlated characters.

The usefulness of classification in Aristotle’s work can be illustrated by the following example. Aristotle noticed that a small group of ichthyes (the paraplythetic group that became Pisces Linnaeus, 1758 or “fishes” later on) do not possess a covering of the gills (Arist., HA II 13, 504b35), which we interpret as referring to the bony operculum of actinopterygians; furthermore, the taxa in this group that Aristotle knew about are viviparous (contrary to teleosts, which included the greatest biodiversity in Aristotle’s ichthyes) and have a cartilaginous endoskeleton (on the last two features, see Arist., P4 II 9, 655a24; IV 1, 676b1-3). These ichthyes are known as selachê (σελαχη). Recognizing this taxon obviates the need to list all attributes of selachê separately for all species included in that group. Note that many selachians are oviparous (Dulvy & Reynolds 1997), but Aristotle apparently was unaware of this, although in one passage he wrote about the fishing-frog, which he wrongly classified as a selachian, that “one alone lays a complete egg outside” (Arist., GA III, 754a23-26).

Aristotle apparently coined new terms referring to animal groups. One of such terms is selachê (σελαχη) mentioned above (here, and in the following, we use an overbar over some letters to specify Greek letters in our transcription which facilitates the detection of names; therefore, the letter è indicates the ë, while ô stands for ó). This term probably has been coined by Aristotle because it is undocumented in earlier sources and Aristotle does not indicate that it had previously been recognized; Pliny in Historia Naturalis 9, 90 also assumes that Aristotle invented the term.

The group called dithyra (from the adjective διθυρας = with two doors or entrances) referring to the Bivalvia is not mentioned before Aristotle; the same holds true for the term strombôde (στρομβοδη, snails; sometimes spelled στρομβοσθη) which occurs the first time in the writings of Aristotle (e.g. in Arist., HA IV 4, 528b8; P4 IV 9, 684b34). In other cases, Aristotle re-delimited previously-named groups, such as kêtê (κητη), which originally referred to any huge sea-creature like seals (Hom., Od. 4, 446) and sharks (Hom., Od. 12, 96-97). Aristotle, presumably for systematic reasons, confines it exclusively to the spouting whales and dolphins (the Cetacea).

A caveat about these taxonomic and nomenclatural innovations is that previous knowledge on animal systematics that Aristotle could have relied on is poorly documented. Thus, Byl (1980: 331; see also Mayr 1982: 149) argued that previous works on animals and the experience of professionals (“gens de métier”) influenced or facilitated Aristotle’s work on animal classification. Similarly, Meyer (2015: 36-58) mentioned previous classifications of animals in Homer and Hesiodus, which might have had an impact on Aristotle’s work. Perhaps, folk taxonomies (attested in Homer and other authors) were Aristotle’s starting point. But given Aristotle’s extensive work on animal anatomy, he probably improved substantially previous taxonomies, which becomes evident in several taxa that he apparently named first to fill a taxonomic (and nomenclatural) gap. A perhaps less likely alternative is that several names attested for the first time in Aristotle’s works were already evoked in now-lost previous works by earlier Greeks, or even, scholars from Mesopotamia or Egypt whose writings Aristotle may have had access to. The following quote from Aristotle suggests both that he was interested in developing or improving (pre-existing) systematics, and that relevant previous sources existed. He wrote:

“I mean the question of whether one should study things in common according to kind [genos] first, and then later their distinctive characteristics, or whether one should study them one by one straight away. At present this matter has not been determined […]” (Arist., P4 I 1, 639b4-6).

Systematists now consider that the best classification, the one that best explains how characters are distributed
in biological organisms and why they appear to be correlated, is a taxonomy reflecting the phylogeny (Hennig 1965). Aristotle’s zoological classification, at its most basic level, apparently used genealogical criteria by recognizing that parents give birth to offspring of the same kind. Note that this is not a phylogenetic criterion because Aristotle was not evolutionist, and he used the genealogical criterion only for the trivial task of assigning organisms to low-level taxa. At a higher level, he used similarity and functional criteria because structure and function of organs were both important for him (Pratt 1984: 274).

What is the relationship between the principles that Aristotle used to classify animals and Platonic (logical) division? Aristotle’s writing de Partibus Animalium, which can be treated as the first introduction into the method of biological research (Düring 1943: 31 speaks of it as “a general introduction to the biological course”), includes in book I a lengthy attack on the Platonic division method and Aristotle explained that each animal kind should be defined by several characters, none of which is sufficient to provide an essential definition (Sloan 1972: 6; Mayr 1982: 151). While collecting characters of certain species, it is also important to take characters which are peculiar of a certain *genos* (*koinē kατα genos*) into account (Aristotle also states that one should not include characters which are only accidentally found in animals such as sleep; on this, see Arist., *PA* I 1, 639a20-21; *Cat.* V, 2b30-33).

All this suggests that for Aristotle, animals could not simply be grouped according to the then-prevailing logical principles. According to Balme (1987: 70), this is logical because the main purpose of Platonic division is to define entities, rather than to classify. Instead, Aristotle grouped animals based on several co-occurring characters (Mayr 1982: 151; Carraro 2019: 157). Thus, we avoid the term “division”, even though Falcon (1997: 136) considered that this is a second form of division. The problems which arise when using dichotomy in classification are exemplified by Aristotle:

“...it is either altogether impossible to grasp something (since the same thing falls into many divisions and opposed things into the same division), or there will be only one difference, and this one, whether it is simple or the result of interweaving, will be the final form.” (Arist., *PA* I 3, 463b13-16, translation after Lennox 2001b).

On Aristotle’s method of division in biology, see Balme (1987), Falcon (1997) and Kullmann (2014: 145-147). Similarly, Stoyles (2013: 5) argued that Aristotle's classification aimed at finding “the widest classes possessing the various animal features”, and that this avoided repetition in Aristotle’s descriptions.

These considerations are compatible with current concepts of taxa; given that they evolve, any character may in theory be lost, so no intrinsic character should be considered essential. Winsor argued that Popper and Hull’s portrayal of Aristotle’s method influenced the development of systematics. This concerns especially the following claim:

“Aristotle considered the term to be defined as a name of the essence of the thing, and the defining formula as the description of the essence. And he insists that the defining formula must give an exhaustive description of the essence or the essential properties of the thing in question.” (Winsor 2003: 390)

More recent studies by biologists (rather than by philosophers) seriously question this last claim (e.g. Carraro 2019: 155, 156). By concentrating for the first time on characters and their taxonomic distribution rather than only on the taxa and their names, Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008) convincingly argued that Aristotle’s work produced a hierarchy, which can be a taxonomy without absolute ranks (also see Moser 2013: 56). Like modern taxonomists, Aristotle often grouped animals using several characters (many of which refer to “parts”, in his terminology) for each taxon, rather than dividing them using single characters, as some of his predecessors had done, and he indicated that each taxon could occur only once in a classification (Fürst von Lieven & Humar 2008: 243).

In this context, we can wonder if within Aristotle’s classification, all individuals or more inclusive groups of a given group necessarily possess all features of the higher-ranking group that includes them. Aristotle states that if one determines a group on the basis of many characters, missing characters can sometimes be informative, which is an advantage over the Platonic method of division:

“Accordingly, one should divide the one kind straight away into many, as we say. In addition, in this way privations will produce a difference, while in the method of dichotomy they will not.” (Arist., *PA* I 3, 643b23-26, translation after Lennox 2001b)

Carraro (2019: 161) cites the example of the mole, which is exceptional among mammals in being blind. Aristotle’s treatment of the viper is also revealing. He placed the viper (*echis*) among the snakes, even though he knew that it is viviparous (and that many snakes are oviparous) since this snake has eggs inside of the body but is live-bearing (see Arist., *HA* III 1, 511a16; V 34, 558a25). Thus, clearly, for Aristotle, not all individuals of a group (i.e., species of a genus) needed to possess all their characters of that genus.

Other passages in Aristotle’s writings suggest that he understood the hierarchy (relative importance) of characters. Thus, he wrote:

“It is necessary first to divide the attributes associated with each kind [*genos*] that belong in themselves [essential attributes] to all the animals, and next to try to divide their causes.” (Arist., *PA* I 5, 645b1-3, translation after Lennox 2001b)

This passage hints at the distinction between essential and accidental attributes. Furthermore, he stated that “there are certain kinds [*genē*] to which both differences belong and that are flyers and wingless, just like the ant kind [*genos*].”
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(Arist., *Pa* I 3, 643b1–2), which is a way to accommodate variability in groups of biological organisms.

These facts suggest that Aristotle had a clear idea of the hierarchy of characters, and this answers a question raised above: clearly, not all members of a taxon had to display all characters of this taxon. In Aristotle’s terminology, some characters were not essential. Much later, the concept of Homeostatis Property Clusters (HPCs) was proposed to deal with the fact that taxa lack defining, eternal, necessary and sufficient intrinsic properties (Boyd 1999). Aristotle adopted a different solution in his zoological practice. He clearly anticipated, through his distinction between essential and accidental characters, the notion of hierarchy of characters (weighting, in more modern terminology), although this was formulated in a different conceptual framework. His method appears to be designed to yield a taxonomy, and below, we present analyses that shed new light on this subject.

Aristotle already might have distinguished between analogy and homology, which are important evolutionary concepts (Balme 1962: 89; Fürst von Lieven & Humar 2008). His concept of “the more and the less” (μᾶκκον/ηππίσσον) in organs reflects the concept of homology (Balme 1962: 89; Lennox 1987). In Aristotle, this concept refers to the findings that organs in different groups or species of animals are the same but differ in shape and extent of the organ (see Arist., *Pa* I 4, 644b11–15). This means that many animals often have the same organs and structures but they diverge in structure and size; for example, a bird’s beak, one of the central features of this group, may be long and narrow or short and stout, depending on food preference. The two forms differ only by a “more or less”. In the same passage (Arist., *Pa* I 4, 644b11–15) Aristotle states that some parts of various animals differ from each other only in bodily affections (large/small, soft/hard and the like). This suggests that Aristotle may have had a concept of homology (Balme 1962: 89) of organs pretty close to this concept in modern biology. However, he uses this concept even in comparison between animals and plants. For instance, the analogy between the mouth of animals and the roots of plants is also found in several passages, since both serve to absorb nutritive substances (see Arist., *Pa* IV 10, 686b34-678a1; *de An.* 412b3–4).

Pellegrin (1986; cited in Romeyer-Dherbey 1986) argued strongly that Aristotle did not do taxonomy as we intend it, as shown by the fact that the words *genos* and *eidos* are used at various levels in Aristotle’s work. Pellegrin (1985: 95) even commented: “[... the Aristotelian concepts of γένος and ἔιδος, far from being prefigurations of our notions of genus and species, do not have a biological sense”, which seems a little excessive to the extent that Aristotle clearly designated animal groups by these terms, and that he did not use the Platonic division method to define them (Mayr 1982: 151). Furthermore, we can hardly criticize Aristotle for not having expressed a clear definition of biological species, given that this concept is still vague, with 146 meanings or characterizations of “biological species” documented in a recent compilation (Lherminier & Solignac 2005: 111–123). In an *eidos-genos* relationship of two groups of animals, the former is included in the latter (Carraro 2019). Thus, the *eidos* of a given level can, according to Pellegrin, become *genos* at a lower level and be subdivided into *eidos*. Nevertheless, the different terms suggest that *genos* and *eidos* imply a hierarchy, as is found in modern taxonomy, but that they cannot be equated with the fixed levels in this hierarchy that genus and species represent in rank-based (Linnaean) nomenclature. This flexible use of the words *genos* and *eidos* and the absence of Linnaean (absolute) categories in Aristotle’s classification has sometimes been used to argue that the latter does not represent a taxonomy (Pellegrin 1986 cited in Romeyer-Dherbey 1986). However, this does not follow because starting with Hennig (1969, 1981), an increasing number of authors has argued that Linnaean categories should be abandoned (de Queiroz & Gauthier 1990; Cantino et al. 1997; Laurin 2005a), and the word “taxon” can be used at any hierarchical level, just like Aristotle’s *genos* and *eidos*. Indeed, Henry already noted:

“I defend the claim that Aristotle’s biology should remain of interest to philosophers and biologists alike insofar as it combines pluralism and realism with a rank-free approach to classification, which some philosophers and many systematists see as the way forward in systematics.” (Henry 2011: 200)

This apparently extends to the taxa that appear to be single species (in the modern connotation of the word):

“Aristotle was clearly aware that what are, prima facie, single species may in fact be divisible into more than one, as he points out in several instances.” (Hall 1991: 132).

The apparent absence of absolute ranks in Aristotle’s animal classification also raises interesting questions about the relationships between the latter and folk taxonomies. Several influential studies have argued that absolute ranks are present in folk taxonomies (Berlin et al. 1973; Atran 1998; Berlin 2014). The ranks include, in Atran’s (1998) terminology, folk-kingdom, life-form (e.g. bush, tree, bird, mammal), intermediate (which is not always present), generic or genericic-species (e.g. oak, shark, dog), folk-specific (e.g. white oak, poodle), and folk-varietal (i.e., swamp white oak, toy poodle).

However, the indigenous peoples who developed and use these folk taxonomies never explicitly name these ranks (only the taxa themselves), which raises the possibility that these absolute ranks are artificial construct by anthropologist that help them sort folk taxa. Thus, these claims remain controversial; some systematists (e.g. Mishler & Wilkins 2018), cognitive scientists (e.g. Hatano 1998), and anthropologists (e.g. Ellen 1998; Hunn 1998) doubt the existence of absolute ranks in folk taxonomies. Nevertheless, given the attention that has been given to cryptic ranks in folk taxonomies, why have no such ranks been detected (so far) in Aristotle’s animal classification? Several hypotheses can be formulated:

– these categories in Aristotle’s animal classification may be as cryptic (if not more) than those of folk classifications;
— these categories may have remained undetected because they were not actively sought in Aristotle’s animal classification (this may simply reflect a lack of communication between academic communities);
— Aristotle may have deliberately left such ranks out of his animal classification;
— folk taxonomies may lack such ranks, which may be artificial constructs, as maintained by several scientists.

Given that the idea that such cryptic ranks existed in folk taxonomies developed in the 1970s, it is in any case clear that Aristotle could not have discussed this issue explicitly. Determining which (if any) of these four hypotheses is correct is beyond the scope of this study, but we suggest that study of Aristotle’s animal classification by folk taxonomists could perhaps shed new light on this question.

Pellegrin’s (1986) claim that Aristotle’s biological classification reflected only partly what we would now call phylogeny is unsurprising because the idea of biological evolution came much later, and the idea that evolutionary relationships could be depicted by trees originated with Lamarck, de Barbanteois and Darwin in the 19th century (Tassy 2011). Balme (1962: 85) even stated that “there is no classification scheme in the background, and all attempts to construct one for Aristotle have failed”. As we will argue below, this statement no longer seems tenable.

A previous phylogenetic (parsimony) analysis of 147 terminal taxa included in Aristotle’s Historia Animalium, books II-V, scored from these same works for 157 characters attributed to various taxa by Aristotle, produced 58 groups, 29 of which have equivalents (similarly delimited) in Aristotle’s work, and a further 12 have equivalents in modern works but not in Aristotle’s (Fürst von Lieven & Humar 2008). Of 47 groups recognized by Aristotle and considered in their study, Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008: 249) stated that 25 were still valid (see also the discussion below). The tree resulting from a parsimony analysis of these data matches only partly the currently accepted phylogeny (Fürst von Lieven & Humar 2008: fig. 4). Thus, insects, crustaceans and teleosts form mutually exclusive clades as they should, but tunicates are located very far from vertebrates, and echi- noderms form a clade with gastropods and bivalves, rather than with chordates, to mention only two of the many unorthodox results contained in the tree.

The results of Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008) suggest that Aristotle’s work reflects an underlying taxonomy (which was never neatly summarized by Aristotle, contrary to what would be done two thousand years later by his successors), but doubts remain, partly because no statistical assessment of the similarities between the tree and Aristotle’s classification was made. Are the similarities between the tree obtained by Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008) from Aristotle’s data and the current taxonomy merely coincidental? A visual inspection of their tree suggests that this is not very likely but assessing this in a statistical framework would greatly improve our confidence on the conclusions that can be drawn from there results.

The doubts raised above are reinforced by the fact that our preliminary search based on the same data matrix hit the limit of 200,000 trees (rather than the 1000 trees reported by Fürst von Lieven & Humar 2008) and that their strict consensus (a tree that includes only the clades found in all the source trees; Day 1985) includes several large polytomies. Furthermore, it has been reported that:

“Analysis of random data often yields a single most-parsimonious tree, especially if the number of characters examined is large [which is the case in the matrix of Fürst von Lieven & Humar 2008] and the number of taxa examined is small [which is not the case here]”. (Hillis & Huelsenbeck 1992: 189)

One might wonder if the similarities between that consensus tree (and the groups recognized by Aristotle found on that tree) and the currently accepted phylogeny are merely coincidental, or if these data include a reliable phylogenetic signal. The notion of phylogenetic signal, which is of course foreign to Aristotle, can be defined as the tendency for closely related taxa to resemble each other more than distantly-related taxa (these relationships have to be established on the basis of other evidence, to avoid circularity); in other words, phylogenetic signal is inherited resemblance (Revell et al. 2008). Below, we perform a statistical test to assess the phylogenetic signal in the data matrix extracted from Historia Animalium.

METHODS

To reassess the implications of the taxonomic data included in Aristotle’s works, we first updated the data matrix compiled by Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008), using Mesquite (Maddison & Maddison 2019) to visually scan all characters for anomalous distributions, which were then checked again in Aristotle's writings to verify if these justified the current scores. Several mismatches were detected that way, and we report below many passages in Aristotle’s Historia Animalium that justify updating scores.

For the ordered analysis, we ordered seven characters: 27, 33, 39, 42, 64, 131, and 159 (a new character). For some characters, such as 27, we had to reorder the states first because the initial order (Eyelashes: 0, upper eyelashes; 1, upper and lower eyelashes; 2, no eyelashes) did not reflect the possible cline. The new state order (0, no eyelashes; 1, upper eyelashes; 2, upper and lower eyelashes) reflects the logical hypothesis that it is easier for a taxon that already has upper eyelashes to acquire lower ones, than for a form without any eyelashes to acquire upper and lower eyelashes. It also reflects the highly probable hypothesis that the primitive condition is the absence of eyelashes (which occur only in some tetrapods). The primitive condition has conventionally been designated by the first symbol of a logical series, such a, a', a’’ at least since Henning (1965), but later, with the advent of computer-assisted phylogenetic analysis, numerical symbols became the norm and the state 0 has been most frequently used for the primitive state of phenotypic characters (e.g. Swofford & Maddison 1987).
We split the character for the number of gills (character 64) into two because the states were initially: 0, one (simple); 1, two (one duplicate, one simple); 2, four (simple); 3, four (three duplicate, one simple); 4, five (duplicate); 5, eight (duplicate); 6, no gills. States 0 to 5 seem to form a cline with an increasing number of gills, assuming that the word “simple” designates a hemibranch (a gill arch covered by gills only on one side) and that “duplicate” designates a holobranch (gill arch covered by gills on both sides), in standard anatomical nomenclature (Romer & Parsons 1977). However, state 6 (no gills) is at the wrong end of the cline. It would have been possible to reorder the states by moving “no gills” to state 0 and shifting all other states upward by one position. However, this would have implied that when gills appeared, there was initially a single one, and that the number increased over time. On the contrary, the presence of numerous gill slits in urochordates, cephalochordates, cyclostomes (Romer & Parsons 1977) and early jawless vertebrates (Janvier 1996a) suggests that gills were numerous when they first appeared and that their number became subsequently reduced. Thus, we preferred removing state 6 (no gills) and making a new character (158, presence of gills), with the states absent (0) and present (1). Note that the four new characters recognized in this study (158-161) have been added after the 157 characters included in Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008) to facilitate comparisons between both studies. In character 64, we rescored the taxa that had state 6 (no gills) to inapplicable (–). This solution has the benefit of allowing the primitive condition to be anywhere in the cline (including in the middle), even though gills (the kind present in vertebrates) were obviously primitively absent in animals (as Aristotle called them; this taxon is now called Metazoa). For character 95 we redefined the states to better capture variations in the position of the embryos in the wombs of viviparous animals.

For character 39 (breasts), the initial states were: 0, two; 1, four; 2, many; 3, none. Again, there seems to be a cline (two, four, many), but the state “none” is at the wrong end of it, and we did not wish to assume how many breasts were present when they first appeared. We could have split the character as we did for number 64, but given the smaller number of states, we developed a step matrix (Maddison & Maddison 1992: 58) instead. It allows transitions between absence of breasts and any number of breasts in a single step but going from two to many breasts requires two steps because we assume that “four breasts” must be an intermediate state. This step matrix was also used for two other characters presenting a similar configuration (42, testicles; and 131, shell surfaces of bivalves).

We also changed the scores of several cells in the matrix. For character 33 (set of teeth) we corrected the matrix because a passage in Aristotle (HA II 1, 501a23-24) states clearly that most of the ichthyes have curved teeth. Regarding character 60 (number of fins), we changed the scores for the myrina (no fins) and the gongros (two fins) as well as the scores for the sting-rays (leiobatis and marke; no fins) after a revision of the relevant passage in Arist., HA1 5, 489b26-32. For character 86 (gut-appendages or caeca), we corrected the scores to account for the fact that perdix and alektroyn have gut-appendages as stated in Arist., HA II 17, 509a17-22. For character 107 (body-size and length of feet), we revised the crucial passage in Arist., HA IV 1, 524a20-24 and changed scores for all poly-poda named there (polypous, heledoné, natylon). For character 121 (number of fins on the tail = uropods) we changed the score for the karkinion (no fins on tail) because Arist., HA IV 4, 529b20-26 states that the karkinion resembles spiders in shape. For character 138, we changed the score in all mussels named lepas (lepas and lepas agria), which have the quasi-liver (mekon) deep in the shell (see Arist., HA IV 4, 529a29-31).

We also erected a new character (159: possession of sinewys and their relative development) that we found in Aristotle’s texts that we studied to improve the scores in the data matrix. We split up a character into new characters (54, initially “way of closing the eyes, with four states, into three binary characters: new 54, possession of lower eyelid; 160, presence of a medial corner eyelid; and 161, possession of upper eyelid) and changed the scores for several animals. Aristotle states that “[the ape] has very thin eyelashes [on both eyelids] while all other quadrupeds do not have them on both [eyelids]” (Arist., HA II 4, 502a31-32), which led us to state for the quadrupeds that they have both eyelids (a lower and a upper eyelid); they were initially scored as unknown (?).

For a single character, the presence of lungs (character 70), we had to widen the search because the lungs of the dolphin are described shortly in Arist., HA VII (VIII) 2, 589a31-b6 but are not mentioned in the books II-IV (our main corpus). Hence, we scored the dolphin as having lungs.

We then assess the phylogenetic signal in the data, which Aristotle must have interpreted simply as similarity between groups of organisms. This allows us to determine if the characters that Aristotle used to describe his taxa contain a phylogenetic signal in the context of a classification of the taxa included in our data matrix, which are discussed extensively in Historia Animalium. The presence of such a phylogenetic signal would imply that Aristotle discussed relevant diagnostic characters and, hence, that he had a good eye for systematic characters. This is a minimal requirement to suggest that Aristotle’s groups were formed using good characters, but the presence of such a signal yields no unambiguous clues about Aristotle’s intentions. However, it would support Wiener’s (2015) hypothesis that Aristotle’s tried to “divide Nature by the joints” (which implies that some divisions are better or more natural than others) to produce taxa that could be described while minimizing repetition in the description of their attributes.

To study the phylogenetic signal in Aristotle’s data (as first compiled by Fürst von Lieven & Humar 2008 and updated here), we use a method based on tree length distribution skewness, a method that has been shown to yield reliable clues about the presence of phylogenetic signal (Le Quesne 1989; Hillis 1991; Huelsenbeck 1991; Hillis & Huelsenbeck 1992). This statistic is based on the fact that random data generates trees that have an approximately normal length distribution. This has been checked by examination of all possible trees for datasets of a few taxa, and examination of a population of random trees for larger datasets. On the contrary, datasets
that contain a phylogenetic signal produce tree length distributions that are skewed to the left because there are few optimal trees, but many trees are much longer. Tables have been produced to determine significance thresholds for trees containing variable numbers of taxa and characters (Hillis 1991; Hillis & Huelsenbeck 1992: table 1 extended). We thus examined skewness in the length of samples of 1 000 000 trees in PAUP* (Swofford 2002): one sample with all characters unordered, and three samples with some characters ordered, to determine if this number of trees was sufficient to obtain a reliable estimate of skewness.

The fact that Aristotle did not summarize his taxonomy (possibly, the texts are now lost or he explained orally a detailed taxonomy in his lectures) excludes the use of tests that rely on comparisons between a reference tree (which should reflect Aristotle’s hypothetical taxonomy) and a population of random trees (e.g. Laurin 2005b) using a tree statistic (typically, parsimony character steps, for discrete morphological data). Similarly, it would be inappropriate to compare the length of the most parsimonious tree with the length of trees derived from randomized data (Archie 1989) because Aristotle produced no such tree and his classification matched the strict consensus of the most parsimonious trees only partly (Fürst von Lieven & Humar 2008).

We also re-analyzed the resulting matrix in PAUP* (Swofford 2002) to find the most parsimonious trees and their strict and majority-rule consensus (the latter is a tree that includes the clades most frequently encountered in the source trees; Day 1985). We performed this both with all characters unordered, as done by Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008), and with characters that form clines ordered, given that mathematical principles and simulations show that this gives better results (Rineau et al. 2015, 2018). To increase the probability of finding consensus trees that correctly reflect the data, we performed a search with Maxtrees set to 200 000, with all characters unordered. With some characters ordered (see above for details), we performed two such searches. In addition, still with some ordered characters, we performed ten additional searches with maxtrees set to 10 000. In all cases, random addition sequences were used, holding two trees at each step, and varying the random seed number for every search. Other search settings are: tree-bisection-reconnection (TBR) with reconnection limit = 8 number for every search. Other search settings are: tree-bisection-reconnection (TBR) with reconnection limit = 8.

RESULTS

With all characters unordered, we obtain 200 000 trees (there were undoubtedly many more, but this limit was set because of memory limitations) of 301 steps. These have a consistency index of 0.7076, a homoplasly index of 0.2924; when excluding uninformative characters, these stats become 0.6966 and 0.3034, respectively. The retention index is 0.9697 and the rescaled consistency index is 0.6862.

With some characters ordered, we still obtain 200 000 trees (again, there were certainly many more) of 306 steps. The fact that 8 out of the 10 searches with maxtrees set at 10 000 recovered trees with identical scores and yielded identical strict consensus and very similar majority-rule consensus trees suggests that we have recovered many of the most parsimonious trees and that our consensus trees adequately summarize the phylogenetic information. The most parsimonious trees have a consistency index of 0.6961, a homoplasly index of 0.3039; when excluding uninformative characters, these stats become 0.6847 and 0.3153, respectively. The retention index is 0.9685 and the rescaled consistency index is 0.6742.

Skewness of a population of one million random trees was obtained from PAUP 4 (Swofford 2002) with all characters unordered. Its skewness index (g1) is smaller (g1 = –0.253218; p < 0.01) than the threshold value (–0.12) for 25 taxa and 100 characters established (Hillis & Huelsenbeck 1992), which indicates significant skew (Fig. 1). With some characters ordered, the skewness index (g1) varied slightly between three samples of 1 000 000 trees (from –0.258032 in run 2 to –0.248034 in run 3), although it was always strongly negative. Given that these values increase (but decrease in absolute value, given that left skewness is indicated by negative numbers) with number of taxa and characters, our test is conservative, and the close values obtained in the three samples with some characters ordered indicates that our sample is large enough to provide a reliable estimate of tree length distribution skewness. Most importantly, these results show that the data drawn from Aristotle’s Historia Animalium contain a strong phylogenetic signal, which shows that Aristotle was a great observer of animals.

The majority-rule consensus of the most parsimonious trees with ordered characters will be described briefly, to highlight similarities and differences between groups recognized by Aristotle and recovered as clades here, and the current consensus.

Our tree, like the one obtained by Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008), contains many clades still recognized today: a clade equivalent to modern Arthropoda (not named by Aristotle), malakostraka (Malacostraca Latreille, 1802), karkinoi (Brachyura Linnaeus, 1758), karides (Natantia Boas, 1880 and Stomatopoda Latreille, 1817), entoma (land arthropods, which form a clade only under some hypotheses of arthropod phylogeny), two mutually exclusive clades of Polypoda (Myriapoda Latreille, 1802 and Octopoda Leach, 1818), Hexapoda Latreille, 1825 (not named by Aristotle), diptera (Diptera Linnaeus, 1758), echinini (Echinodermata Bruguier, 1791), monothyla (Arcoeogastropoda Thiele, 1925), strombidae (Caenogastropoda Cox, 1960), kochloi (sea snails), dihydro (Bivalvia Linnaeus, 1758), malakia (Cephalopoda Cuvier, 1797), enhaima (Gnathostomata Gegenbaur, 1874), selachē (Euselachii Hay, 1902), platea selachōn (batoids), kalymmata [sc. echonta] (Téléutier Müller, 1845), a clade equivalent to modern Tetrapoda Fischer, 1808 (not named by Aristotle), opheis (Serpentes Linnaeus, 1758), ornithes (Aves Linnaeus, 1758), bareis (Galliformes Temminck, 1820), gampisōnyches (Accipitriformes Vieillot, 1816), Mammalia Linnaeus, 1758 (not named by Aristotle), pithekhos (Catarhini Geoffroy, 1812), mōnyches (Equidae Gray, 1821), dichala (Artiodactyla Owen, 1848), and keratophora (Ruminantia Scopoli, 1777).
Phylogenetic signal in Aristotle’s History of Animals

Fig. 1. — Phylogenetic signal in our updated version of the matrix produced by Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008) from books II–V of Aristotle’s Historia Animalium. This is assessed by tree length distribution skewness on a population of one million random trees obtained from PAUP 4 (Swoford 2002) with some characters ordered. Skewness (g1 = –0.248034; we here illustrate the least skewed of the tree samples that we evaluated) is smaller than the threshold value (–0.12; p < 0.01) for 25 taxa and 100 characters (these values increase with number of taxa and characters; see Hillis & Huelsenbeck 1992). Note that the lowermost and uppermost of the 40 bins of the histograms contains one and two tree each, respectively. To better visualize the skewness, the middle of the range (Mi = 2720 steps) of the random trees is shown. Note the noticeable shift to the right of the mode (Mo = 2800 steps) compared to the middle of the length range (Ml), which is narrowly excluded from the 1 sd (standard deviation) interval (±70,50) from the mode. The shortest of these random trees (2375 steps; much longer than the shortest trees of 306 steps) is farther from the mean length (2788.74 steps) than the longest tree (3065 steps); these distances are 413.74 and 276.26 steps, respectively.

All these clades were also identified by Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008). Note that some animal’s names (including some mentioned in this paragraph) are used homonymously in Aristotle’s writing. One case is the name polypous (“many-footed”) which refers to the octopus on one hand, and on the other to the centipede. Similar cases can be found in the terms echinos (the sea-urchin and the hedgehog), the batrachos (literally frog) which refers to the common frog (Lophius piscatorius Linnaeus, 1758; a teleost), and the karabos (crawfish and a kind of beetle). To avoid confusion we numbered such homonyms in Figure 2 (“polypoda 1” and 2).

Other taxa recognized by Aristotle are still used by many scientists, like ostrakoderma, ototka tetrapoda (oviparous tetrapods, including frogs and most squamates, but not snakes), and amphodonta (solenodont mammals) as well as the taxon named anaptykta (not identified in Fürst von Lieven & Humar 2008) which refers to the mussels that can open (on the crucial passage, see below), which is a curiosity because all bivalves (Aristotle’s dithyrys) can open their shells but Aristotle allegedly identified mussels which are not able to open (the so-called synkekleismena, see below).

DISCUSSION

Our results indicate the presence of a phylogenetic signal in the data. This suggests that similarities between the strict
consensus of the most parsimonious trees (which includes many taxa recognized by Aristotle) and the currently-accepted taxonomy established by systematists in the 20th and 21st centuries are not merely coincidental. This reinforces either Fürst von Lieven & Humar’s (2008) suggestion that Aristotle’s work rested on an underlying taxonomy, or more likely that using the characters that he had selected, Aristotle was able to discover many valid animal groups while describing characters of animals. Aristotle appears to “divide Nature by the joints”, as suggested by Wiener (2015). Obviously, this activity led him to propose new names for some of the taxa that he discovered (like selaché, distyra, and strombôdê), or to re-delimit some taxa, like kêtê, and all this suggests that Aristotle was interested in taxonomy, even though this was obviously not his primary focus in zoology.

An important question regarding Aristotle’s sources arises when one compares his observations with the zoological facts now known to us: in some cases, where the score is surprising, one could suggest that Aristotle never saw the animals he describes in his works. For example, his description of the indikos onos, which is the rhinoceros, is false (Ireland - 1816 as having one horn (it is not clear what animal Aristotle’s Oryx actually is); this idea might have its origin in people looking at some representations of antelopes in side view where the two horns seem to be only one horn; such illustrations are illustrated in pharaonic art, some of which Aristotle, or one of his assistants (see below), might have seen (Lones 1907). Classical scholarship includes discussions of what authors Aristotle consulted albeit he rarely named his sources by name (with few exceptions such as Cresias and Herodotus). Kullmann (2014: 129-134) also suggested that Aristotle gave a kind of a “checklist” to other students who should collect data for him in foreign regions he did not visit (Aristotelianly never was in Africa, for instance, to see the Oryx). It is likely that the students made mistakes during their studies. Further, it is commonly accepted that Aristotle mingled facts acquired by dissections with second-hand reports from other sources. It is unclear what Aristotle did to verify reports about animals. All these points should be kept in mind when readers encounter sometimes surprising facts. The data matrix reflect these interpretations of Aristotle’s characters and of their taxonomic distribution. This means that we decided to score some remarks on structures as intentional, and ignored other remarks because they were clearly metaphorical and obviously referring to analogous structures at best.

Another problem regarding Aristotle’s terminology can be found in the term phrênon (ψφρέν), in plural phrenes. This term probably refers to the midriff or diaphragm (diazôma) in some animals (Fritts 1976). In some passages Aristotle introduces this term as a synonym; e.g. in Arist., HA II 15, 506a5-6: “All animals which have blood, have the heart and the diazôma, which is called phrenes”; see also HA I 15, 496b11; and IV 10, 672b11. But it is not clear what the phrenes actually is. It can’t be the diaphragm or midriff because ichthytes do not have this organ (but Aristotle in the passage quoted above clearly states that all animals with blood have this structure). To interpret the phrenes as the pericardium would make sense because a true heart is unique to vertebrates. And this is much more plausible than the interpretation of phrenes as a diaphragm. The interpretation of phrenes as the pericardium has been, to our knowledge, introduced by Körner (1929) for the use of phrenes in Homer. It is also possible to interpret this structure as simply the set of membranes that cover the organs in the thorax and that divide it from the abdomen (Ireland 1975). As such, it would include diaphragm, pericardium, and also the pulmonary pleurae (and possibly more). Since we are primarily interested in the taxonomic implications of Aristotle’s characters with the taxonomic distribution that
Our analyses, like those of Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008), suggest that Aristotle recognized more than two ranks of named taxa; this interpretation is also explicit in Voultsiadou et al. (2017: fig. 1), which shows a classification of animals with three main levels and a fourth one for a few taxa. From most to least inclusive, these taxa of four levels include e.g. en haima, ichthyes, selaché, and the last level includes galeōdeis and platea. This is coherent with Pellegrin’s (1986) interpretations of the multi-level (i.e., no correspondence with fixed ranks) taxonomic usage of genos and eidos in Aristotle’s zoological works. However, Hall (1991: 133) wrote:
“The crucial question for my enquiry is, did Aristotle recognize gene intermediate between the major genos, Birds, and individual bird species? He obviously did not have a scheme of intermediate genē already worked out, which he does not happen to expound in any surviving work: his references to groups of birds are too haphazard and inconsistent.” [Emphasis ours.]

On the contrary, we find evidence, in for several cases, of taxa of intermediate ranks between Aristotle’s most inclusive and least inclusive taxa. For example, in his writings, Aristotle’s ankaima (bloodless animals) designates a group that includes ostrakoderma (hard-shelled bloodless animals), which itself includes strombōde (roughly Caenogastropoda Cox, 1960), which includes kochloai (sea snails), which itself includes four taxa (Fig. 2), as far as we can tell. Part of this hierarchy was already noticed by Voultsiadou et al. (2017: fig. 1). Our analyses provide several more such examples (Fig. 2), especially among arthropods, malakia (cephalopods) and enhaima (vertebrates or gnathostomes; see above). That Aristotle’s classification of animals includes more than two ranks can also be seen at the beginning of book four:

“We now treat the animals devoid of blood [ankaima], [...] There are several groups [gene], one consists of the so-called ‘softs’ [malakia], [...] Another [genus] is that of the malacostraca. [...] An [other genus] is that of the ostracoderms. [...] The fourth [genus] is that of insects, [...]” (Arist., HA IV 1, 523a31-12).

After reporting about the peculiar structures of the some insects and cephalopods, in chapter four Aristotle turns to the ostracoderms:

“Of other [ostracoderms] some are bivalved [dithyna] and some univalved [monothyra]; and by ‘bivalves’ I mean such as are enclosed within two shells, and by ‘univalved’ such as are enclosed within a single shell [...] Of the bivalves, some can open out [anaptykta], like the scallop and the mussel; [...] Other bivalves are closed on both sides together [synkekleismena], like the sōlēn.” (Arist., HA IV 4, 528a11-18).

This hierarchy with several taxonomic levels is obvious despite the fact that Aristotle’s taxa do not match perfectly those that we recognize today. Aristotle’s ostrakoderma is such an example. It includes all animals that have a hard outer shell. The sub-groups of ostrakoderma match fairly well taxa still recognized today, but they are not all closely related. These groups include the dithyna, which are equivalent to the modern taxon of Bivalvia and the monothyra, which refer to “mussels” with only one shell. Aristotle obviously has the limpets in mind, and those animals belong to the Gastropoda Cuvier, 1795. All his monothyra are aquatic snails with a conical shell that often live on stones on the shore. Hence, Aristotle wrongly considered them as mussels (or had a much broader concept of mussel than us). The bivalves that “can open out” are mussels whose two shells are articulated via a hinge; hence, Aristotle describes them as “the one that can open out” (all common mussels we know today). The other group mentioned (mussels with two shells “closed on both sides alike”) within the dithyna, are, on the contrary, mussels that allegedly do not open via a single juncture and, hence, seem to be closed. These animals are probably mussels from the genus Phidaiate. Another group within the ostrakoderma are the strombōde (roughly Caenogastropoda Cox, 1960), which are characterized and differentiated from all other members of the ostrakoderma by having a spiral-shell (Arist., HA IV 4, 528b6-7). The most obvious anomaly in ostrakoderma for modern zoologists is the inclusion of echinoi (our echinoids, sea urchins), which are echinoderms, hence deuterostomians very distantly related to mollusks; the starfish is only mentioned once in the Historia Animalium (V 15, 548a7) and Aristotle never specifies to what group it belongs. Nevertheless, the subgroups of ostrakoderma defined by Aristotle have an equivalent in modern taxonomy. To sum up, Aristotle’s writings show that the words genos and eidos are used as relative (rather than absolute) ranks, that in the context of his zoological writings, they refer (at least often) to taxa rather than purely logical categories, and that he recognized a fairly complex hierarchy of taxa that included several relative (unnamed) ranks, vaguely analogous to the “rankless” nomenclature formalized by the PhyloCode (Cantino & de Queiroz 2020), rather than rank-based nomenclature (for a comparison of both approaches, see Laurin 2005a).

Our tree reveals a few more striking mismatches compared to contemporary taxonomies. Thus, snakes (ophei) are placed as the sister-group of other tetrapods, which probably reflects the absence of limbs. Similarly, the dolphin (delphis) is the sister-group of zōtōka tetrapoda (viviparous quadrupeds), which include all other mammals. Their absence of digitized limbs, along with their aquatic lifestyle, may explain this position, following the description of Aristotle. The position of pithekoi (catarrhine primates), including anthrops (Man) as the sister-group of all other terrestrial mammals in our tree is more surprising: it reflects mostly the presence of a narrow chest in other mammals (chap. 13), four legs (Aristotle did not consider primate arms as legs), and other similar limb characters, in addition to the presence of two (upper and lower) eyelids (chap. 27).

Many of the taxa that Aristotle recognized and that have been refuted by recent phylogenetic studies have long been accepted by other zoologists. Thus, ankaima (bloodless animals, now called invertebrates) has long been known to be paraphyletic because invertebrates do not include all descendants of their last common ancestor; in this case, some invertebrates, such as echinoderms, are now known to be more closely related to vertebrates than to arthropods, annelids and mollusks, among others. Yet, this group was accepted by zoologists well into the 20th century as Invertebrata Lamarck, 1806, and many textbooks still include “invertebrate zoology” in their title. In fact, a Google Scholar search (performed on December 27, 2020) found 15 700 results for “invertebrate zoology” for publications dating from 2001 to the present.
Thus, Aristotle’s *anhaima* is still with us, under another name, and it is still defined by an absence, but a different one: no vertebrae, rather than no blood. For the taxon *Invertebrata*, the absence of vertebrae has always been thought to be primary (not to result from a loss). Aristotle could not have reasoned in such terms, and it is even difficult to determine if he thought that the absence of blood defined a good group, or if he considered *anhaima* like a “wastebasket taxon”, to use a modern analogy. Our data matrix does not allow testing whether Aristotle’s data would recover this taxon as a clade because the outgroup used to root the tree is *akalēphē*, interestingly introduced by Aristotle as “own group” (*idion genos*) in *HA IV* 6, 531a31, (a sea anemone; a cnidarian; on the anatomical description of the *akalēphē*, see *HA IV* 6, 531a31-b17), which is part of *anhaima*. Thus, paraphyly of *anhaima* is constrained by this choice of outgroup. However, there is no better alternative among the taxa described by Aristotle because sponges are too different to meaningfully polarize the characters and only briefly described by Aristotle, and ctenophorans were not described by Aristotle as far as we know. Furthermore, this choice has the advantage of being the correct outgroup, among the taxa included in our matrix, according to recent phylogenies (Pandey & Braun 2020).

Aristotle’s *ichthyes* is another noteworthy example. It has been accepted well into the 20th century as *Pisces* Linnaeus, 1758 and indeed, there are still many ichthyology departments in contemporary academic institutions, but contrary to Pliny the Elder (Moser 2013: 30) and many of his successors, Aristotle did not include other marine metazoans in this taxon (a tradition that explains the names of animals such as starfish, cuttlefish, and jellyfish, among others).

The taxa that Aristotle recognized but that were subsequently dismantled also include, most notably, the *ostrakoderma* (see above). This taxon long remained in use, though under the name *Testacea* Linnaeus. This term was implicitly coined by Pliny who speaks of animals “enclosed by hard shells” (*testis conclusa duris*, Plin., *HN* 9, 83) or “stony shells” (*silicea testa*, Plin., *HN* 1, 19); it was dismantled by Cuvier (1795), who transferred much of its contents to the mollusks. Of course, many taxa now considered in ostrakoderma/*Testacea* all along (the bivalves and gastropods), but Cuvier (1817) also included (correctly) among mollusks organisms without an outer shell, such as the cephalopods (Aristotle’s *malakia*).

But, interestingly, the taxon *Ostracodermi* Cope, 1889 was erected for a group of Paleozoic armored jawless vertebrates. Given that the paraphyly of this taxon was suspected long ago and demonstrated by phylogenetic analyses (e.g. Janvier 1996b), it is no longer used formally, but the vernacular form “ostracoderm” still appears in recent scientific papers.

Other important mismatches compared to recent taxonomies include the position of bivalves and gastropods in *ostrakoderma* and the distant placement of cephalopods as *malakia*, which we recovered (Fig. 2).

The relationships between the large clades found in our tree largely agree with Aristotle’s *Scala naturae*, with the sole notable exception of the position of *ostrakoderma*. This suggests that Aristotle had a relatively good intuition for the relationships between taxa that were implied by the characters that he recognized. Of course, he must have conceptualized these relationships in terms of similarity rather than kinship (phylogeny).

Voultsiadou et al. (2017) similarly argued that Aristotle made tremendous progress in taxonomy and that his attempts at classifying animals according to other (i.e., not phylogenetic) criteria, such as reproductive mode and lifestyle, were misinterpreted by subsequent authors. These were not combined into a fuzzy taxonomy with overlapping taxa because Aristotle distinguished groups of animals that take a certain name, which we call taxa, from groups based on other criteria, such as lifestyle, which he arguably did not intend to be considered as taxa (Voultsiadou et al. 2017: 477). He called many of these groups “anonymous” or “nameless”, but some of these groups may have been considered valid by Aristotle because they include the blooded and bloodless animals (Wiener 2015).

Thus, even though Aristotle’s primary goal in his biological work does not appear to have been to produce a taxonomy, he may have relied on a taxonomy to organize his zoological knowledge and present it to his readers. Alternatively, he may have written and classified simultaneously, in which case what looks like a taxonomy arose spontaneously and coincidentally. Our analyses cannot discriminate between these alternatives, though they do show that Aristotle’s classification was remarkably good, given the tools and data available to him.

The works by Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008) and Voultsiadou et al. (2017) could thus be used to support the view that in his classification of animals, Aristotle was, to an extent, a monistic realist, because some ways of separating animals into sets appeared to be more valid than others to Aristotle (Henry 2011: 205), even though the works cited here make no claim about monism in Aristotle. On the contrary, Henry (2011: 206) argued that Aristotle was a pluralist realist because, in his view, Aristotle’s “Great Kinds” (major taxa, such as birds and fish) “do not enjoy a privileged status as ontological groupings”, but this question deserves to be re-examined in light of these recent analyses. For instance, Henry (2011: 207) pointed out that “For Aristotle, natural kinds are limited to those groups whose shared similarities are underwritten by common causes.” The main common cause of shared similarities between taxa in biological systematics is now considered (Hennig 1965; O’Hara 1997) to be the phylogeny (though convergence, often reflecting a similar ecology, can also play a role), which is a concept alien to Aristotle’s work. Nevertheless, our results, along with the evidence provided by Fürst von Lieven & Humar (2008) and Voultsiadou et al. (2017), logically leads to the conclusion that Aristotle thought that there was indeed one best way to classify biodiversity (Wiener 2015), which is compatible with monistic realism.

Modern taxonomic practice is also inherently monistic, given that we seek to uncover the Tree of Life (TOL).

This leaves several questions unanswered. Do Aristotle’s writings, taken globally and accounting for their inconsistencies, suggest that Aristotle had in mind a classification akin to a taxonomy? Or was trying to discover one? Or did the
taxonomy that is palpable in his writings, and which we recovered to a large extent through our analyses of his data, emerge spontaneously (and perhaps unintentionally) as he wrote the Historia Animalium? We hope to have made some progress on this front, but it would be worth re-reading Aristotle to determine if his writings were globally consistent with the idea that he had a rankless taxonomy in mind (without the equivalent of Linnaean categories, such as genera, families and orders, which were introduced much later), as we suspect is the case. On the contrary, most recent philosophers and historians of science who studied this topic seem to have assumed, after Pellegrin (1985, 1986), that a taxonomy has to feature such fixed ranks. Yet, recent developments in biological nomenclature show that such absolute ranks are not necessary, and indeed, that it might even be better to drop them (Hennig 1969, 1981; de Queiroz & Gauthier 1990; Cantino et al. 1997; Laurin 2005a). At least some zoologists who recently studied Aristotle concluded that his works suggest an underlying taxonomy (Voultsiadou & Vafidis 2007; Gariás et al. 2017; Voultsiadou et al. 2017), and our findings add support to this hypothesis.

Intention is usually difficult to assess, and we may never know what Aristotle’s intentions were. This is unfortunate because it has been argued that “nothing is more important than intentions” (Hodge 1972: 129). However, Aristotle’s search for coherent sets of characters that yield appropriate divisions between animal classes simultaneously yields a classification of animals that looks like a taxonomy, as our results show. Of course, our data are derived from Aristotle’s work, but our analytical treatment (computer-assisted parsimony analysis) is very different. Despite this, our tree is remarkably congruent with Aristotle’s classification which demonstrates the accuracy of his descriptions of animals. The highest-ranking taxon recovered by our search that is currently thought to be valid and that was not named by Aristotle is Arthropoda. The many similarities between the clades that we recovered and animal groups recognized by Aristotle are suggestive of a taxonomy. How did Aristotle uncover so many groups that have been validated by recent phylogenetic investigations, despite being fixist (i.e., not evolutionist)? We can offer only a tentative answer: Aristotle’s Scala naturae, which may reflect to an extent an anthropocentric view, with humans at the pinnacle of biodiversity, and sponges at the bottom of animals (he considered them similar in some ways to plants, which were lower still), may have worked a bit like a pre-evolutionary polarization principle for characters present in humans, mammals, and vertebrates, among other taxa. For instance, we have blood, hence Aristotle would have considered this reflecting a higher state in his Scala naturae (analogous to being derived, in cladistic terminology), and the absence of blood must be primitive. Furthermore, higher taxa are distinguished by more complex activities, and actions they can perform (see Arist., HA VIII 1), while lower taxa have perception but do not move (sponges show perception according to Aristotle). This would not work for all characters (for instance, with the characters that pertain to arthropods or mollusks), and it would not always have prevented Aristotle from forming groups based on primitive characters (a systematic principle that Hennig was the first to formally reject in the 1950s), especially when the alternative states of a character did not fit neatly into his Scala naturae. Nevertheless, this could explain to an extent why Aristotle’s treatment of the “parts” or “attributes” (which are close to the modern concept of character) converged on a set of taxa reasonably similar to those that we recovered through a parsimony analysis of his data. Other questions remain unanswered. For instance, to what extent does Aristotle’s zoological classification reflect previous folk taxonomies? To what extent do his taxonomic innovations (which remain to be more thoroughly documented) reflect his choice of relevant systematic characters? These points deserve further investigation.

Author contributions

Both authors contributed to the study conception and design. Data collection, mostly through searches in Aristotle’s original writings, were performed by Marcel Humar. Data analyses were performed by Michel Laurin, who also drafted the figures. The first draft (much shorter than this version) of the manuscript was written by Michel Laurin and both authors commented on previous versions of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Acknowledgements

We thank Sylvain Charbonnier (CR2P, Paris) for information about crustacean morphology. This paper was improved by comments from Alexander Fürst von Lieven (Institut für Zoologie, Freie Universität, Berlin) and Pascal Tassy (Muséum national d’Histoire naturelle, Paris) on an earlier draft and by discussions with Philippe Lherminier (Fontenil Castle, Orne) on Aristotle’s works. This research was funded by the CR2P’s recurring grant (ML). We also thank the associate editor, Philippe Janvier, for his efficient handling of the draft.

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