Pamela H. Smith: *The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution*. Chicago (Ill.): University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 408, $35.00 (hb.)

This ‘intellectual history of practice’ (p. 18) nicely points to the attitudes shared by practitioners of different disciplines (art, crafts, alchemy and natural philosophy) situated in different locations and at different moments from the fifteenth century to the seventeenth century. As in *The Business of Alchemy* (Smith 1994) Pamela H. Smith argues for the importance of an ‘artisanal epistemology’. The artisanal culture ‘embodied an understanding of production, creation, and working with hands, as well as a set of skills and techniques by which this knowledge was employed to manipulate material things’ (Smith 1994: 7). This do-culture had special significance for the intellectual transformation that took place in the early-modern period. *The Body of the Artisan* nicely helps to concretize Antonio Pérez-Ramos’s analysis of the ‘maker’s tradition’ of (scientific) knowledge, according to which our ability of ‘(re)producing Nature’s ‘effects’ was perceived as the epistemological guarantee of man’s knowledge of natural processes in the external world’ (Pérez-Ramos 1988: 59; see also Pérez-Ramos 1996). Smith’s work seeks to (partially) explain how such an active science was formed (p. 19). In contrast to Pérez-Ramos’s approach, which focused on Francis Bacon, Pamela H. Smith’s examination takes up a broad myriad of different sources, figures and geographical locations. This is what makes the book so overtly ambitious, but also more vulnerable to possible objections concerning specific details.

The book consists of three parts, each focusing on a different region, moment, and milieu: the first part deals with fifteenth-century Flanders (chap. 1), the second with sixteenth-century South Germany (chaps 2–4), and the third with the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, especially Amsterdam and Leiden (chaps 5–6). In chapter 1, Smith discusses how Flemish painters such as Robert Campin, Jan van Eyck, and Rogier van der Weyden, perceived naturalism ‘as a means by which they could make claims about the primacy of nature and the certainty of knowledge that comes out of imitating nature’ (p. 25). In the following chapter, Smith argues that, increasingly, these artisans began to narrate their views on nature in an epistemology. This epistemology was articulated by German artists such as Martin Schongauer, Albrecht Dürer and Wenzel Jamnitzer. Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim, better known as Paracelsus (1493–1541), was the first to give a scholarly voice to the artisanal understanding of nature. In chapter 4, Smith shows that Bernard Palissy, Benvenuto Cellini, Adriaen de
Vries and Albrecht Altdorfer illustrate the significance of bodily labour to the artisan (pp. 25–6). The following chapter is dedicated to an exploration of the overlap between the artisanal epistemology and alchemy. Smith argues that there are four elements in the artisanal epistemology: (a) nature is primary, and a certain knowledge resides in nature, (b) matter is active and one must struggle bodily with it to arrive at knowledge from it, (c) this struggle is called experience, and is learnt by replication, and (d) imitating nature produces an effect that displays the artisan’s knowledge of nature (p. 149). The background assumption underlying all this is that knowledge is active and that knowing is doing (ibid.). In the fifth and sixth chapters, Smith further examines Paracelsus’ legacy by focusing on Johann Rudolf Glaubner and Franciscus dele Boë (Sylvius).

To my mind, the main message is that the idea of an active science (‘scientia active’) goes back not to Bacon, but to the writings and of work of art of Albrecht Dürer, Leonardo Da Vinci, Bernard Palissy, to the makers of the works of art, and Paracelsus (p. 239). Bacon was codifying what was already around him. These artisans and practitioners appealed to nature as the basis of their science. Their practices belie the distinction between theoretical and craft knowledge: their know-how was carefully thought through (p. 7). The traditional differentiation between, \textit{epistēmē}, \textit{praxis} and \textit{technē} evaporated and an intimate link between them emerged (p. 18). This transformation involved a whole new set of beliefs about and practices involving nature. One of the most important components was the idea that ‘the pursuit of natural knowledge became active and began to involve the body; that is, one had to observe, record, and engage bodily with nature’ (p. 18). This new way of looking at nature was essential for the birth of modernity.

The author certainly has succeeded in portraying some relevant aspects of the evolution of the active science between the fifteenth and the seventeenth century. This book provides a cornucopia of detailed information based on primary texts. It ravishes in its details, and enlightens with its insights written in a provocative and clear style. However, because of the multitude of material dealt with, the level of detail of the discussion is not always equally thorough (especially in chapters 1 and 4). To my mind, these shortcomings are compensated for by the book’s overt ambition. The abundant illustrations vivify the text and make the book not only a thought-provoking intellectual activity, but also a visual and sometimes an aesthetic experience. The book will appeal to a wide audience: historians and philosophers of science, art and technology. I am quite convinced that this book will be an important influence for our understanding of the scientific revolution and the interaction between science, technology and the arts. One of the merits of Smith’s work is that she has produced a broad study and escapes from the often Anglo-Saxon focus on the emergence of the Scientific Revolution. Smith places the Scientific Revolution in a broad perspective ‘in terms of its practitioners, its places, and practices’ (p. 240). This sociologically multilayered and spatiotemporally distinct contextualization
needs to be applauded. Smith has made a much-needed but decisive case for the maker’s tradition of knowledge. It is my deep hope that Smith’s ‘artisanal epistemology’ will be further contextualized, fleshed out and studied. Someone had to write a book like this and the good news is that Pamela H. Smith has just done so. Now it is up to us to flesh out, amend and help concretize the main thesis.

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Steffen Ducheyne
University of Ghent

Thomas Holden: The Architecture of Matter: Galileo to Kant, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 305 + x. £40.00 $74.00. ISBN0-19-926326-4

Thomas Holden’s The Architecture of Matter: Galileo to Kant offers a detailed analysis of the controversies surrounding the notions of the continuum and its parts that exercised philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It will likely gain a small but devoted following among historians interested in early modern atomism and in the prehistory of field theories of matter.

The paradoxes of divisibility Holden discusses did not reflect an inadequate understanding of limits and infinite series in mathematics, as is sometimes claimed of Zeno’s paradoxes, but rather a difficulty in seeing how to apply mathematics to matter theory, or how to justify a disconnection of one from the other. As far as our thought is concerned, bodies seem to be divisible ad infinitum; any extended thing can be cut into parts, and its extended parts cut into more parts in turn. Aristotle maintained in his Physics and On Generation and Corruption that all quantities are infinitely divisible and that there are no physical minima. The terminus of a line can be considered a point, but a line is not in any sense made up of points, and Aristotle thought that this insight applied generally.

The Aristotelian position conflicts, however, with the intuition that at least bodies, and possibly temporal and spatial intervals, are composed of
actual parts that, as Holden expresses it, each ‘enjoy a distinct existence independently of the whole and prior to any act of division’(3). The ‘actual parts’ doctrine is difficult to reconcile with infinite divisibility in thought. If each body is composed of an unlimited number of pre-existing parts of some size, then all bodies should be infinitely large. If, on the other hand, each body resolves into an infinity of unextended parts, how can these parts sum up to an extended object? Many modern philosophers were drawn to physical atomism, which represented each body as composed of some finite number of unsplittable in practice though divisible in thought atoms, but they could not reconcile this view with the properties of the geometrical continuum.

As Kant asked in his Physical Monadology, ‘How, in this business, can metaphysics be married to geometry, when it seems easier to mate griffins with horses than to unite transcendental philosophy with geometry?’ (4) The vague notion that reality was mathematical (Pythagoreanism) was productive for the emergence of modern science, beginning with Galileo’s contributions to a quantitative physics. Few natural philosophers were prepared to insist that mathematics was completely irrelevant to the question of the ultimate structure of matter. This led to considerable confusion. Their preoccupation with the paradoxes was the common concern, Holden notes in his introduction, of philosophers as diverse in their metaphysical and physical commitments as Descartes, Arnauld, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz, Berkeley, Bayle, Newton, Clarke, Hume, Euler, Boskovich and Reid as well as Galileo and Kant. John Wyclif had already been denounced at the Council of Constance in 1414 for his heretical views on infinite divisibility, and the issue was still profoundly divisive in 1746, when, according to Holden, it created a kind of crisis in German letters.

Holden introduces his historical account by distinguishing among various notions of divisibility, including physical (an entity that is physically divisible can be divided into distinct parts by natural processes or human effort); metaphysical (a metaphysically divisible entity has spatially distinct parts that logically could exist apart from one another – God or some omnipotent being could separate them); formal (a formally divisible entity has parts that can be distinguished by their spatial properties even if they cannot be separated either by God or in nature); and intellectual (an intellectually-divisible entity is one that a mind can represent as containing diverse parts, whether or not these are separable by God or in nature, and whether or not the parts are spatially distinct. The remainder of the book is devoted to explaining and assessing the different solutions proposed to the paradoxes by philosophers struggling to articulate both a coherent theory of matter and a coherent account of the relationship between mathematics and physics. Some held to the Aristotelian position and denied actual parts (Digby, Hobbes); some adhered strictly to the actual parts doctrine and denied that the mathematical continuum is an image of matter, time or space, (Charleton, Newton, Hume); still others denied physical atoms, but
promoted metaphysically indivisible minima (Leibniz, the precritical Kant, Boscovich). Another group bravely maintained that the infinite divisibility of a material continuum was compatible with the actual parts doctrine and insisted that bodies are constructed of ‘actual infinities of ultimate parts’ (Galileo, More, Leibniz, (though in Leibniz’s case only with respect to the ‘phenomenal’ world)). And a final group regarded the actual parts metaphysic and the existence of physical continua as both true and irreconcilable, or exploited the antinomy to argue that matter does not exist (Berkeley), or that human reason is powerless to fathom the ultimate nature of things – at least of some things (Bayle, the critical Kant).

There are some difficult aspects to this book. Historians of science should not be discouraged by the opening sections, in which a variety of purely abstract mereological positions is laid out. Though it would have been easier on the reader to introduce these categories as part of a developmental story, the categories do all make their appearances later – though the distinction between ‘intellectual’ and ‘formal’ divisibility is hard to grasp, as Holden himself admits, and remains elusive. But it would have been helpful to explain at the start why the problems of the continuum and minima aroused such passion and called forth so much philosophical ingenuity. While it seems right to say that ‘The classical paradoxes of infinite divisibility – the ones that occur over and over in the Enlightenment literature, and also the ones that prove the most difficult to disarm – all derive from the attempt to square the infinite m-divisibility of matter with the actual parts doctrine concerning its parts’ (36–7), the crisis developed only when classical atomism was reborn as a physico-chemical doctrine that made numerous phenomena – chemical change, diffusion and ‘occult’ effects – easier to visualize and understand. Holden notes that the paradoxes of divisibility presented themselves in connection with neo-Epicurean matter theory, but he has little to say about the broader context of the debates, which included the struggle of Aristotelians to maintain control of university curricula and the anxiety aroused by the revival of Epicurean atomism, according to which there is only body and void, and no souls, forms or gods. The alleged incoherence of the physical atom was seen by metaphysicians like Leibniz and Berkeley as a decisive argument against a range of doctrines merely contingently associated with physical atomism, such as contractualism in politics, and atheism, or antiprovidential deism.

A related difficulty is that some corpuscularians who rejected substantial forms in matter like Kenelm Digby and Thomas Hobbes endorsed the Aristotelian doctrine of potential parts. To ascribe to Hobbes the view that ‘particular, determinate material beings are in this sense mind-dependent’ is curious, for surely a salient fact about Hobbes is that he was a mechanical philosopher who believed that matter was all that was real and that matter produced ideas. The assimilation of theorists of physical minima like Walter Charleton, the best English representative of classical, materialistic atomism, with advocates of psychological minima like Berkeley and Hume
makes for an unfamiliar system of classification. It is strange to see the antimaternalist Bishop Berkeley characterized as an Epicurean, even an idealist Epicurean (54), and again as an Epicurean apologist (216).

Despite these idiosyncracies – another is that the term ‘Enlightenment’ is used without its usual connotations of scepticism, anti-clericalism, optimism, and so forth, so that Gassendi, More and Cudworth all qualify as Enlightenment philosophers – Holden has made an important contribution. His aim of locating every major natural philosopher of the period within the gridwork of an original classificatory system is fully realized. The book is an unqualified success in showing how Kant’s problems in the late eighteenth century are continuous with Galileo’s problems in the early seventeenth. Further, Holden’s discussion of the relationship between the paradoxes of divisibility and the critique of the a priori and of metaphysics in general which followed unsuccessful efforts to resolve them (71–4) is brief but valuable. And his treatment of the evolution of Kant’s thought, from his endorsement of a physical monadology to his doctrine of the force-shell atom, is especially clear and interesting (252–4). Kant and Boscovich, he maintains, in equating the space-filling properties of matter with attractive and repulsive forces conceived as powers acting at a distance exercised from extensionless points, laid the groundwork for modern field theories.

Holden concludes that modern physics has not fully resolved the conflict between the actual parts metaphysic and the doctrine of the continuum. Those who were determined to drive the physical atom out of ontology still faced the problem of what entities make up the world. Field theories face the ‘hollow world’ objection that if there are no things but only localized powers, the world loses its substantiality. ‘I think we have reached a serious difficulty in our understanding of the physical here’, Holden comments. ‘Scientific investigation into the nature of matter can only ever lead us to powers: to relational and dispositional properties. It cannot lead us to categorical or intrinsic properties, still less to their equally inscrutable ancestor, a quality-less substratum that stands behind all qualities whatsoever’ (271–2).

Catherine Wilson
The Graduate Centre,
City University of New York

G. A. J. Rogers, J. M. Vienne and Y. C. Zarka (eds): *The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context. Politics, Metaphysics and Religion*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1997. ISBN 0-7923-4530-4

Politics, metaphysics and religion: these are the themes of this rather disparate collection that includes a high proportion of essays in the French
language. In other Kluwer volumes the same authors have had their papers published in English but not here. Politics is not the first word which springs to mind when considering the Cambridge group; they mostly remained in the university town and in an academic world with occasional forays for Henry More to Warwickshire and the home of Lady Conway (and More remained a royalist in politics) and for Ralph Cudworth to London where he advised Cromwell’s secretary on appointments to the ‘secret service’ and had meetings in 1655 with Menasseh ben Israel and, later, Rabbi Abendana on the possibility of the readmission of the Jews to England. There was also his famous visit in 1647 to preach a Fast Day sermon before the House of Commons, a landmark in the history of religious toleration. This public side to the Platonists is developed in John Rogers’ paper. Correspondence between Cudworth, More and van Limborch showed a link with Dutch thought and the political struggles of the Remonstrants. Yet there were clear political implications in their theology: in opposition to the arbitrary divine decrees of predestination they found so repellent in Calvinism, they could see a clear line from a voluntarist belief in God’s will to the state absolutism as endorsed by Hobbes. Theological and political convictions combined to keep man free from all determinisms except those founded on God’s goodness.

The Cambridge school stressed that only the mind can order reality. Beings endowed with intelligence must precede material beings; knowledge precedes sensation as final causation precedes mechanism. God is Intelligence; the idea of all things comes before creating: emanationism, the scale of being and the Stoic themes of the world soul and divine fire running through the creation all made for a vital world. The Platonists’ thought might be clotted with quotation in the seventeenth-century manner but, whatever the borrowings, they wanted to show, in Whichcote’s words, that ‘Christian religion is not Mystical, Symbolical, Enigmatical, Emblematical, but unclothed, unbodied, intellectual, rational, spiritual’. In opposition to the relativizing tendencies of Hobbes, for whom there is ‘no common Rule of Good and Evil to be taken from the Nature of the Objects themselves’, the Platonists insisted on uniting their epistemology and their ethics; knowledge is ‘the Active Energy of an Unpassionate Power of the Soul’. Only the mind can order reality and matter is not dead and inert but infused with a pan-psychic vitalism. Much of this impetus, as Coleridge noted long ago, was more Plotinian than Platonist.

Luisa Simonutti explores the correspondence between More and Limborch and their mutual rejection of voluntarism: ‘the bare will of God himself could not beget an obligation upon any to Do what he Willed and Commanded, because the Natures of things do not depend upon Will, being not things that are arbitrarily Made but things that Are.’ Nevertheless, argues Y. C. Zarka, there is no simple opposition of Hobbes and Cudworth but rather ‘une relation paradoxale de proximité et de distance’. Man is self-constructed but as he recognizes his place in the celestial hierarchy, so he
builds a state to control the world: what Hobbes sees man as creating, Cudworth sees man as recognizing:

Ainsi à l’homme prométhéen de Hobbes qui se construit lui-même et construit l’État en s’arrachant à une nature déserte, reduite à de la matière en mouvement, pour construire le monde de l’artifice, Cudworth oppose une figure de l’homme qui ne se fait lui-même qu’en reconnaissant sa place dans l’échelle des êtres et la hiérarchie des valeurs naturelles.

Another European link is traced by A. Robinet, who comments on Leibniz’s notes on Cudworth and their influence on his theory of monads, together with his connection with Cudworth’s daughter, Lady Masham.

Several papers explore Platonic ideas of the soul. J. L. Breteau provides a valuable transcript of, and brief commentary on, British Library Add Ms 4981 ‘On The Nature of Liberum Arbitrium’, one of the less inchoate and impenetrable of the Cudworth papers. Here is a flavour of the exotic style in expressing the soul’s idealizing tendencies: ‘Liberum Arbitrium is not Indifferency but Self-power, a Power which the soul as redoubled and self-active hath of exerting a Vigorous Conatus towards the Higher Principle of Honesty and Reason.’

A more developed argument is in D. W. Dockerill’s essay on the heritage of patristic Platonism, in particular the problems of transcendence. If God is so beyond, what is the point of religious language? To Cudworth and More, no one simple monad can contain, in the simplicity of the One, the Distinct Ideas of all things within itself. More’s Spirit of Nature and Cudworth’s plastic nature were attempts to include more, to keep mental and consequently divine causality in the world. The soul is enlightened by the divine Logos and becomes part of the divine order with its own pattern of growth. There are two ways of knowing for the soul: innate knowledge that lies latent or unexpressed, and explicit knowledge when the mind appropriates what lies within it. Original sin has clouded apprehension, hence the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence. As it is perfected, the soul contemplates the eternal truths manifested by the divine Logos. This was a theme taken up by John Norris in an alternative development of Platonism; the archetypal eternal word of truth exists in God and is made known to us by divine light. Innate ideas were of course attacked by Locke, who saw no need for the soul to be immaterial; even matter could think. More’s belief in the pre-existence of the soul went too far for moderate Latitudinarians like Stillingfleet who had their feet more firmly earthed than those who

have understood the worth of their Souls, and asserted it, if they have not us’d too high that is Platonical expressions of it, making it a Particle not of Matter but of the Divine Nature itself, a little Deity in a Cottage, that stays here a-while, and returns to that upper Region from whence it came.

(Origines Sacrae)
Nevertheless, the Cambridge influence reaches down to Berkeley in his wish to establish the true existence of mind, soul and spirit, bodies existing only in a secondary and dependent sense.

There is a difference of emphasis between J. Lagree and Sarah Hutton on the Stoic influences on the Cambridge school. Lagree’s reading of John Smith suggests it is a metaphorical borrowing only, used only for imagery, for example, light flowing from the fountain and father of lights, to establish ‘the hegemonial powers of the soul’ and claim reason as a participation in similitudo rationis aeternae. Hutton, however, sees a profounder use by Cudworth of Stoic prolepsis and Platonic anamnesis in developing his noemata or conceptions of the mind. She traces comparisons with Boethius especially on the scale or ladder of being: ‘There is unquestionably a Scale or Ladder of Nature and Degrees of Perfection and Entity, one above another, as of Life, Sense and Cognition, above Dead, Senseless and Unthinking.’ Knowledge is not derived from sense impressions but the product of the mind. The chain of being and the Stoic theme of the world soul and a divine fire running through it are part of the Neoplatonism christianized by the fathers of the church like Origen; as already noted, the Cambridge school were more Plotinists than Platonists.

This theme is also taken up in J. M. Vienne’s paper on a new empiricism represented by More and especially Cudworth: following Democritus, only mind can order disparate materials. The judgement of sense is invalidated concerning bodies themselves; there is a higher faculty of reason in us to determine what is absolutely true and false:

the Intellect, besides Figure, Colour, Magnitude and Motions, raises and excites the Intelligible Ideas of Cause, Effect, Means, End, Priory and Posterity, Equality and Inequality, Order and Proportion, Symmetry and Asymmetry...Whole and Part, in a manner all the Logical and Relative Notions that are

In a minor Platonist from another place, Richard Burthogge, we see an empirical spirit too: ‘the more sensible notions are, and the nearer to their Grounds, the more effective, more impressive, and consequently clearer and more evident they be.’

Robert Crocker’s paper on illuminism in More acknowledges how much of a mystical way it was for More from his Psychozoia of 1642 onwards but it was a path which could include empiricism. Bodies are the temporal and spatial compounds of certain minute particles but they could still be moved and ordered by neoplatonic spiritual forces. Even Descartes’s metaphysics could be platonized, with difficulty admittedly since diametrically opposed to him is More’s conviction that ‘The Primordials of the World are not Mechanical but Spermatical or Vital.’ J. Cottingham and M. Baldi both take up the Descartes–More relationship. Descartes’s mechanistic atomism was an antidote to materialism but it needed infusing with life; a purely
mathematical physics cannot provide a convincing account of our intuitive notions of impulse, energy and force. A body to More does not just receive motion; it throws itself into motion. Awakened bodies have their energy as matter reflects the power of the creator. Influx was More's name for this spiritual force infusing the material world.

Alain Petit's paper on plastic nature explores similarity and difference between Cudworth and his Plotinian source:

une via media entre le mécanisme et l’hyper-volontarisme, entre un Dieu qui ne fait rien et un Dieu qui fait tout. Sa nature plastique est une médiation, à legal du logos plotinien, mais elle ne l'est pas au même sens: chez Plotin, la médiation du logos est l’expression la plus claire de la nécessité de la procession, tandis que le médiateur cudworthien obéit a son créateur, en participant confusément de son plan. Ni Plotin perpétué, ni Plotin travesti:

Plotin déplacé

S. Brown explores Platonisms other than the Cambridge school, through a new interest in Malebranche following translation of his works in 1694, and writers like Norris, Berkeley and Arthur Collier. While not vitalists, they were idealists in tendency. Collier denied, like Berkeley, the external material world and, like Norris, supported the notion of an intellectual sensible world, one true substance as the common substratum to all particulars. The ripostes of Locke to all this and to Platonic innatism hardly need spelling out.

Neil Fairlamb
Beaumaris

Yaffe, Gideon: Manifest Activity: Thomas Reid’s Theory of Action, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 167, $39.95 (hb.). ISBN 019926855X

In contemporary discussions of free will, support for libertarianism is given by way of an ‘agent-causal’ theory according to which persons themselves have irreducible causal powers. The thesis is regarded both as incompatible with a naturalistic account of human persons and their place in a material world, and, by many, as beholden to an aberrant doctrine of causation that rests upon substance dualism. Thomas Reid is a principal Early Modern exponent of this theory. Gideon Yaffe, in Manifest Activity, interprets and critically develops Reid’s arguments on behalf of the theory of agency underlying many forms of libertarian free will.

The book’s organization and its argumentation are models of their kind. Yaffe explores Reid’s theory of agency by identifying and enumerating the premises in Reid’s successive arguments. The result is a book in the history
of philosophy bearing an uncommon unity in the execution of its goals. The sheer complexity of the material, the interlocking sequence of arguments, and the uncompromisingly trenchant thinking present on every page make this a demanding book for anyone not familiar with current debates in action theory. However, the reader’s efforts are repaid because Yaffe successfully develops Reid’s theory of agency in unparalleled scope and depth.

Reid’s theory of agent action is developed out of a controversy surrounding the proper interpretation of Newton. For the ‘Necessitarians’ in Reid’s milieu, Newton’s mechanistic story of bodily impacts prompts a corollary interpretation of human action as the result of blind, uncontrolled forces operating in accordance with mathematically rigorous laws. Reid, in contrast, emphasizes Newton’s reticence to speculate upon the efficient causes in the natural world that give rise to observed phenomena. This sets the stage for Reid’s unusual theory that agents are the only efficient causes. An efficient cause of effect E is the agent whose exertion of active power resulted in E.

In the proper sense of ‘cause’, Yaffe states the lynchpin of Reid’s theory as being the thesis that ‘The actions of an agent are all and only those events of which the agent is the efficient cause’ (8). The book can almost be taken as an extended attempt to explain and provide Reid’s justification for this assertion. We can fruitfully understand the plan of the book as answering certain questions posed of this thesis and its presuppositions. Why must efficient causes have wills and understandings? The response to this question is given in chapters 1 and 2, where the teleological basis of Reid’s explanation of action is developed. Why believe that all events are efficiently caused, or end-directed? See chapter 3. Reid fends off a temptation to endorse occasionalism by arguing that human beings are the causes of their own actions, which is explained in chapter 4. Reid’s account of the connection between agent and action invokes the concept of a motive, which embroils Reid in disputes about the relation between motives, agents and actions. Yaffe attempts to give Reid’s response to those issues in chapters 5 and 6. The conclusion of the book returns us to the present by briefly discussing whether, and if so, in what way, Reid’s theory of agent action is similar to that of contemporary supporters of agent-causalism.

Reid argues that the possession of causal power requires will and understanding via a chain-like sequence of necessary conditions. On Yaffe’s reading, this is because Reid holds that possessing a causal power requires that an agent have the ability to exert the power, which in turn requires the agent to have a will. And having a will requires having a faculty of understanding. The most interesting challenge to this argument is voiced by Hobbes, and is directed at the argument’s first step. Hobbes affirms that an agent S has a power if and only if, if S desires to A, then S As. For Hobbes the choice itself need not be within S’s power. Reid objects to Hobbes’s condition with what Yaffe calls the ‘Means–End Power Transference’
principle. This principle amounts to the claim that having the power to A presupposes that S has the power to fulfil the necessary conditions of A-ing. On one interpretation, Reid’s reply to Hobbes’s claim is implausible. After all, to shoot my neighbour, it is necessary that gunpowder ignite. But I do not have the power to make gunpowder the kind of compound that expands rapidly when heated. Yaffe proposes another interpretation of Reid’s reply. In doing so he disambiguates the concepts of ‘necessary means’ and ‘necessary conditions’, and clarifies Reid’s claim that exertions of power are actions.

It is not difficult to miss the broad significance of this claim. Whereas for Hobbes, we have powers even though we merely have passive dispositions to choose, for Reid the activity of agency includes both the exertion of powers and choices, choices being themselves produced by exertions of active powers. For Reid, the very idea of power derives from reflection upon our own choice-making.

In chapter 2, Yaffe presents a second argument for the same conclusion; namely, that if S has a power, S has a will. The thrust of this reasoning is more familiar, and begins with a discussion of Locke’s ‘locked room’ case. The locked room example serves as a counterexample to a premise of Reid’s, namely, to the statement that if S has a power to A, S has the power not to A. Yaffe argues that Reid’s response to the locked room case is to deny that the man in the room has the power to stay there voluntarily. This odd claim is unpacked delicately (43ff) and shown to rest on a privileged understanding of ‘efficient cause’. Reid is interpreted to endorse the claim that ‘every event that has an efficient cause has one, and only one, efficient cause’ (44). In the locked room, the man inside is not the efficient cause of his inability to exit, even though he has exerted himself by entering and remaining within the room. Since the efficient cause is the person who has locked the door, that person has usurped the power of the man in the room.

A thesis that emerges from the first few chapters is that power is a teleological concept. Reid claims that every event is caused by someone who wills it. Yaffe reconstructs Reid’s unusual case for this thesis (59ff) and shows that Reid’s justification for it does not rest on an argument; rather, Reid treats this as a first principle – a naturally formed, nearly universally believed principle incapable of demonstration. Yaffe’s discussion embarks on a digression upon Reid’s interpretation of Hume, which then involves reconstructing an involved argument of Hobbes’s creation, to which Hume had objected. Yaffe’s keen eye for this argument and his eagerness to convey all its angles may leave readers solely interested in Reid’s views briefly uninterested. Readers without knowledge of contemporary action theory will find this discussion challenging.

Next Yaffe develops an intriguing argument in Reid having to do with planning. Reid’s intuition is that mentally orchestrating a sequence of actions directed to achieve an end implies that an agent is wise, which in turn is used to show that an agent is the efficient cause of actions in that sequence
Yaffe argues that end-directed states are expressive of wisdom, for Reid, on the basis of some key passages from the *Essays on the Active Powers* (see 88–9). He does not let these remarks pass without extensive critical discussion. Yaffe focuses upon two problems. First, end-directed conduct can accord with a number of different types of rule, but Reid does not clearly develop the type of rule wisdom aims to exemplify. Second, one might aim at an end without being ‘fixedly committed’ to that end. The ensuing discussion leaves no stone unturned in an effulgent attempt to clarify Reid’s notion of wisdom.

If agents are to be efficient causes of end-directed action, then how are we to construe the influence of motives on action? The dilemma facing Reid is that he cannot claim motives are efficient causes, but he must allow for their influence upon the exertion of powers by agents in some way. So, motives must have causeless influence. Yaffe embraces the challenge to clarify and substantiate this position with characteristic alacrity. The answer, he says, lies hidden in Reid’s discussion of ontology; specifically, the ontology of fictional objects. ‘Reid grants precisely the same status to non-existent objects of thought as he does to motives; and he draws the very same conclusion through reflection on their status: since they are conceived but non-existent, they cannot be efficient causes’ (101). Yaffe stops short of arguing that Reid asserts this connection. The vicissitudes of Reid’s unusual theory of fictional objects include the facts that they can be objects of attention and reflection, and that our thoughts about them can have content, despite the fact that such thoughts do not predicate anything of those objects. Considered without any context, drawing a parallel between a theory of motives and a theory of fictional objects is odd. (Though Yaffe does not say, I suspect this move is unique to Reid in the history of philosophy.) But Yaffe’s application of Reid’s discussion of fictional objects to Reid’s discussion of motives is inventive, but not so creative as to strain plausibility. Despite this, Yaffe presents no evidence to think that Reid himself intended this.

In conclusion, Yaffe turns to an application of the interpretation of Reid he has offered thus far to contemporary accounts of agent-causation, according to which the relation between an agent and her action is basic, irreducible and causal. Whether Reid endorses such a view depends upon whether being an efficient cause is basic and irreducible. This is a surprisingly knotty point because other contributors to our understanding of Reid have attributed to him inconsistent uses of the term ‘efficient cause’. According to Rowe, an efficient causal relation obtains only if some basic relation between agent and event obtains as well. The problem lies in characterizing the relation between an agent and an event since ‘event’ may refer to a physical action or more generally to an exertion of power.

Yaffe deftly clarifies the conceptual confusion with an extended analogy with the concept of ‘trying’. Unique about trying is that, if S tries and succeeds in doing A, we say only that S As, not that S performed two
actions: trying to A and A. Trying is an action in the case of failure, but is not in the case of success (155). Likewise, Reid should not be taken to hold that there are two actions that S performs when S exerts his power to A and As. In the end, this prompts Yaffe to say that Reid is a mysterian since efficient causation is incapable of analysis and is basic.

Yaffe’s method rests squarely within the analytic tradition of the history of philosophy. The argumentative twists and turns, the conceptual possibilities identified and evaluated, the numerous thought-experiments and enumerated premises and conclusions are all used to structure Reid’s set of sometimes inchoate arguments about agency and active power as clearly as possible. Given this and the robust apparatus carried over from contemporary action theory, this is a challenging book. But it is a brilliant book that will repay close study and repeated reading by those interested in Reid or action theory.

Ryan Nichols
Calvin College

Saba Bahar: *Mary Wollstonecraft’s Social and Aesthetic Philosophy: ‘An Eve to Please Me’*. Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York, New York: Palgrave, 2002, pp. viii + 220

Saba Bahar begins *Mary Wollstonecraft’s Social and Aesthetic Philosophy: ‘An Eve to Please Me’* with a review of the scholarship on the eighteenth-century thinker. As might be expected of a work partly based on a PhD thesis, this takes the form of a perfunctory castigation of nearly all previous scholarship, especially of the last twenty or thirty years, although notable exceptions are made, for example, for Gary Kelly’s *Revolutionary Feminism: the Mind and Career of Mary Wollstonecraft* (1992), Virginia Shapiro’s *Vindication of Political Virtue* and, above all, Barbara Taylor’s writings. What many feminist studies of Mary Wollstonecraft lack, Bahar argues, is historical sensibility or, in her words, ‘an ear more attuned to the vocabulary and discursive constructs available to her, to the literary public and the generic forms at hand as well as to her creative appropriations of them’ (p. 5). The less specifically feminist interest in Wollstonecraft, on the other hand, has been overly biographical in nature, according to Bahar. She seeks neither to make another contribution to our knowledge of the life and times of Mary Wollstonecraft, nor to provide another thematic study. Her focus is primarily literary and her concern is to examine Wollstonecraft’s efforts to produce new and ‘more convincing aesthetic representations of women’ (p. 7). Bahar describes her own approach to this subject as interdisciplinary and contextual. As, much to my surprise, and I say this by way of declaring an interest, I found myself placed within the biographical camp (and, one presumes, excluded from the interdisciplinary and contextual one) the
preamble left me, and will leave others similarly oddly type-cast, somewhat bewildered.

Bahar, it needs to be said, does not restrict her critical outlook to interpretative works. A ‘historically sensitive approach’ will not, she warns us,

exonerate [Wollstonecraft] from the accusations made against her (she is suspicious of female sexuality; she is insufficiently critical of the Enlightenment’s belief in reason; she is trapped by the presumption of women’s ‘natural’ role as mothers; she is far too committed to England’s role as the vanguard of global progress; and – perhaps worse of all – her circumlocutory prose is a pain to read!). However, while Wollstonecraft will remain guilty as charged, the historically sensitive approach will allow us to appreciate the full force of [Wollstonecraft’s] arguments [Moreover, it will provide] us latter-day feminists [with] a more complete assessment of the challenges that women have had to face, as well as the unfinished battles we have yet to confront.

What Wollstonecraft herself had to face was, in the first instance, Eve, Milton’s Eve, in particular, Fuseli’s representation of her, and more generally woman as seen through such eyes as those of the poet, Anna Laetitia Barbauld, as well as the real aristocratic and middle-class women of her day. Dissatisfied with all the images of femininity, fictional or embodied, that her culture presented, Bahar rightly argues, Wollstonecraft wanted women to live, or be perceived to be living, through the kinds of struggle that enable men to accede to the sublime and experience the grandeur of heroism. Hers was not a vision of virtuous, but dull, submissive and instinctive domesticity. Faced with the various women of merit held up as models in the eighteenth century, worthy to be sure, but mediocre by the standards males set themselves, at least imaginatively, Wollstonecraft felt a moral and aesthetic revulsion. She wanted to change the manner in which women were seen as well as to create, Bahar contends, ‘an entirely new woman’ (25), a new public woman, and be one of its first incarnations.

This led Wollstonecraft to redefine the relationship between the private and the public. To help make her case Bahar briefly follows the public and private life of the historian, Catherine Macaulay, and, although to a lesser extent, later in the book that of Queen Matilda of Denmark. These were the kinds of women of whom Wollstonecraft approved. She was not generally lavish in her praise of women and they stand out as strong representatives of their sex in her eyes. As both sought to enlighten their compatriots and usher in social and political change, they were true patriots. The Queen had sought to introduce liberal reforms; Macaulay had demonstrated public spiritedness both as a historian and in her calls for the education of women. She was a woman of learning and courage in the face of social disapproval. While this could be argued of the Queen as well, Macaulay had made herself in a more obvious sense and shaped her own destiny, and thus was a brave
exemplar of the liberty and education she preached; this interdependence between theory and practice is an important theme in Bahar’s analysis.

The kind of self-creation exhibited by Macaulay (and to an extent Queen Matilda) is what Wollstonecraft, Bahar suggests, wanted for women generally. Not all could, of course, be great historians (or indeed queens) as many, including Diderot, recognized Macaulay to be, pace Bahar who presents her as more marginalized than she actually was. Nor did Wollstonecraft need them to be. Her desire, Bahar rightly contends, was for ‘recognition for women’s heroic gestures in their lives as ordinary women and citizens’; indeed on this view ‘heroism cannot always be a highly visible act but may be a silent deliberation taking place within isolated and internal consciences’ (48). ‘The ‘public woman’ that Wollstonecraft vindicates is, then, not necessarily in the public sphere, although she is clearly committed to civic action and participation’ (49). Her heroism consists partly in assuming intellectual independence, in rejecting authority and in thinking for herself. It requires fulfilling one’s duties, but as self-imposed, and thus not externally determined, moral constraints. According to Bahar, ‘Wollstonecraft’s public-spirited woman...struggles to contribute to the public good without selling her private soul’ (ibid). Although it is not entirely clear what ‘selling’ one’s ‘private soul’ means in this, or any other, context, some light may be cast by noting that Bahar believes Wollstonecraft to be condemning what is presented as Rousseau, Adam Smith, and others’ encouragements to women to follow the dictates of social opinion rather than those of their consciences.

As for Wollstonecraft herself, Bahar depicts her predominantly in the garb of a self-made female combatant against a variety of male philosophers. Given her interpretation of the author’s hopes for the intellectual independence of women, the emphasis in this interpretation has to be very much on the author’s criticisms of her mostly male contemporaries. Thus, while much of the book’s argument rests on Wollstonecraft’s alleged dispute with Adam Smith, relatively little is said of the degree to which they were of one mind. It would be awkward for Bahar’s thesis to spell out the extent to which Wollstonecraft used his very language, not least about our fascination with the rich and powerful. Bahar is, however, not only interested in Wollstonecraft’s critique of the philosophers of her time. She seeks to determine her conception of philosophy itself. ‘Although committed to viewing things “philosophically”,’ she is said to refuse ‘to embody the abstract but dead voice of philosophy and returns instead to the common stream of mankind’ (78). The difference between her and Rousseau, Smith and other ‘male philosophers she attacks lies...in the continual reconstitution of her position’. This Bahar explains as a kind of see-sawing process in which Wollstonecraft ‘moves up to examine the importance of reflection, moves down to experience in order to test the truth of this affirmation only to ascend even higher into abstraction’ (ibid). That Wollstonecraft never lost sight of the practical
implication of any moral prescription is incontestable; that she drew on experience to verify or indeed falsify statements is also undeniable; but that she would have presented herself as in any meaningful sense unique in this respect is untenable. Wollstonecraft derided her opponents using all available argumentative means. Like any commentator involved in pamphlet warfare, Wollstonecraft presented herself as the calm, rational, pragmatic, independent protagonist, with experience and theory on her side, and her opponents as passionate, airy-fairy, biased, compromised, deluded, incoherent and so forth. Bahar takes the rhetorician for the theorist. Challenging as it may be, it is important to endeavour to tease out the one from the other. Such a project can only be undertaken if a vital possibility is left open, namely, that as Wollstonecraft taught herself much of western philosophy from Plato onwards she became a genuine product of it; and, I would argue, was not only proud of it, but proud to be often (although importantly not always) better at it than most (although importantly not all) of the philosophers with whom she engaged. This did not entail ‘selling out her soul’, whatever that might mean.

Bahar is at her most convincing when she argues that Wollstonecraft sought ‘to recognize the conscious effort required by typically female activities, such as mothering and chastity, that eighteenth-century philosophy deems instinctive, natural and hence having little moral worth’ (103). Her footing is less assured when venturing further afield philosophically.

Sylvana Tomaselli
St. John’s College, Cambridge

Lorenz Jäger: Adorno. A Political Biography, trans. by Stewart Spencer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004, pp. xii. + 235
Tom Huhn (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Adorno. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. xiv + 428

Adorno. A Political Biography and The Cambridge Companion to Adorno are surprising: the first because of its lack of complexity and the second because of its abundance of it. Adorno is not so much an examination of Adorno’s political thinking as it is an introduction to the person, and The Cambridge Companion is not so much an introduction to Adorno’s thinking as it is a collection of mostly well-thought out and intellectually challenging articles on him.

Lorenz Jäger’s Adorno may be seen as having three main parts, each corresponding to the three main periods of Adorno’s life. Chapters one to seven treat his early years to 1934. Chapters eight to twelve deal with Adorno’s time in exile. Chapters thirteen to sixteen concern his return to Germany and his remaining life there. In the short Prologue, Jäger sets out the historical context and focuses primarily on 1903, the year Adorno was
born. Here Jäger emphasizes three aspects: he writes of the important works of art that were performed or unveiled as well as of key scientific discoveries; that of Curie’s Noble Prize on radiation and the Wright brothers’ flight. He notes crucial political changes: the Russian Social Democrats split into the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks and the German Social Democrats’ repudiation of evolutionary change in favour of revolution. And he maintains that German sociology ‘acquired a distinctive profile as an independent science’ (X). He justifies this by citing one of Georg Simmel’s essays and Max Weber’s methodological writings: however, the dating seems arbitrary because Simmel published his crucial Soziologie in 1908 and Weber did not take up sociology per se until 1909. The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie was founded by Weber, Simmel, and Ferdinand Tönnies that year to help make sociology an independent and reputable science.

Chapter one describes how drama and psychology played large roles in Adorno’s formative years: however, in citing his mother’s career in opera and his aunt’s role as a pianist Jäger correctly maintains that ‘Music formed the family’s cultural center’ (3). Because he emphasizes music throughout one is tempted to suggest that music is the centre of Jäger’s Adorno biography. The title of chapter three is ‘Philosophy and Music’ and here Jäger discusses both of Adorno’s interests. He was heavily influenced by the Marxists Siegfried Kracauer, Ernst Bloch and Georg Lukács but his doctoral thesis at Frankfurt was the attempt to show inconsistencies in Husserl’s writings (27–8). Adorno could never choose between philosophy and music, as Thomas Mann pointed out (31). In c. 1924 Adorno moved to Vienna in order to study music with Alban Berg. He stayed until August 1925 but even after his departure he still continued to compose music. Jäger critically notes that neither in his thinking nor in his music was Adorno really independent. Instead, he made use of Marxism and psychoanalysis in his philosophy and he used the music of his youth to create his ‘modern music’ (41).

Adorno seems to have replaced his focus on music with a focus on philosophy, but with an emphasis on not simply to understand the world but to change it (Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach, no. 11). Jäger stresses the large Jewish presence in revolutionary circles and he documents the large influence of Jews at the Institute for Social Research (42–4). These included the psychoanalyst Erich Fromm as well as the Institute’s Director, Max Horkheimer. Jäger postpones discussing Horkheimer and concentrates on Fromm, stressing his idealized view of society. Fromm was not content to study society; he wished to ‘promote truth, love, and justice’ and Jäger hints that thoughts like these encouraged Adorno’s own ‘strict demand for justice’ (51). Jäger also emphasizes Adorno’s sense of being an ‘outsider’, something he had in common with Walter Benjamin. Being outside the mainstream philosophy departments, they were freer to develop their own philosophical and literary analyses. However, Adorno
wrote his post-doctoral thesis on Kierkegaard under the Protestant theologian Paul Tillich. In it Adorno could focus on the connection between philosophy and art and still diminish the role of Christianity in his writings (68–73).

In chapter seven Jäger tells of Adorno’s removal from teaching and his move from Frankfurt to Berlin. But, the emphasis is not on the political events of 1933 and their impact on Adorno’s life, but rather, on Adorno’s renewal of interest in music with his writings on contemporary music (80–6).

In the Spring of 1934 Adorno left for England where, at Oxford under Gilbert Ryle, he intended to write a second dissertation on Husserl. This was never completed. Adorno appeared more interested in music and politics. In particular he was concerned with Stalinism; along with Horkheimer he ‘cautiously distanced himself’ from it (98).

Chapter nine, entitled ‘Brave New World’, chronicles Adorno’s move to America in 1938. Jäger discusses Adorno’s Princeton work on music and the masses. Not only did Adorno seem not to like the masses and their music, he also missed the German countryside. But his move to the West Coast to work with Horkheimer temporarily lifted his spirits (104–8). Jäger’s title not only conjures up America but also Aldous Huxley’s famous novel. Horkheimer vacationed in California where he, Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and others ran a seminar in which Huxley’s ‘negative utopia’ was discussed (111–12).

Adorno’s criticism of authority is continued in Dialectic of Enlightenment, written with Horkheimer. Jäger points to two types of enlightenment: that of emancipation and that of science (119–20). For Adorno and Horkheimer, culture had been undermined by Fascism in Europe and by technology in the United States. Instead of being emancipated by technology, technology was enslaving people. Dialectic of Enlightenment is not a response to technology; in Jäger’s view it is both a response to Spengler’s Decline of the West as well as an attempt to ‘present a comprehensive interpretation of history’ (121). Like the theme of dictatorship in Huxley’s novel, the theme here is domination. In Jäger’s view, Dialectic of Enlightenment is a ‘settling of scores’ with Christianity and a discussion of the Greeks with the tension between myth and enlightenment as exhibited by Odysseus (125–6). Jäger considers it ‘a bundle of theories’.

Chapters twelve and thirteen focus on Adorno’s sociology and political thinking. Jäger notes repeatedly that for Adorno, they are sciences to be used to further political ends (140, 145, and 153–5). The final chapters cover Adorno’s life back in Germany. While there are hints of optimism, the overall colouring is of resistance and resignation. For many Germans and for most Jews, Auschwitz represented that which was the darkest about the Holocaust, and it lurks in the background of Adorno’s thinking. For him, if reconciliation is possible, it is only through art (177–86, 190). There was no reconciliation with the students of 1938; they had learned resistance from Adorno and in the end they resisted him (192, 198–200, 208).
Jäger’s portrayal of Adorno is that of the permanent outsider. Adorno seemed not to feel at home in England or America, not even in Germany, but it seems to have been mostly his own choosing (88, 168). Parts of Jäger’s picture are disappointing: the book is more of a superficial sketch than a detailed portrait. A quotation from Adorno about two people who meet and talk but part knowing nothing about each other is somewhat appropriate about Jäger’s book: we really have not learned what we wanted about Adorno, even if it remains a ‘pleasant memory’ (60). This lack is evident in two important aspects: despite the shared belief in the power of the German language, Jäger provides only a brief tantalizing account of the relationship between Adorno and Heidegger. And, despite the subtitle politics, it seems to be only a sub-theme. Anyone seeking ‘A Political Biography’ will likely be disappointed in Jäger’s Adorno, but for those looking for a well-written and intriguing account of Adorno’s music and philosophy will be sufficiently satisfied.

The Cambridge Companion to Adorno is a collection of sixteen essays on many important aspects of Adorno’s thinking. Five of them are devoted to some facet of Adorno’s music. Rolf Tiedemann offers hints on ‘how to read’ Adorno’s opera ‘Treasures of Indian Joe’ in ‘Adorno’s Tom Sawyer Opera Singspiel’ (379). Tiedemann reminds us that this opera is not set in either real America nor in Twain’s America; but rather, takes place in a dreamlike America similar to Kafka’s (386). Like Kafka’s Amerika Adorno’s opera appears to be critical of the United States; but also like Kafka’s work it is critical of the US writ large. There is falseness in society, justice seems to be lacking, and there is no safety for the two children who witness Indian Joe’s murder of a man. Nor is there any refuge in the flight into nature – even the forest seems ‘only painted. Not a real forest at all’ (386–9, 391). Things seem wrong, things seem odd, things seem dissonant. Lydia Goehr takes up this theme and the difficulty of listening in ‘Dissonant Works and the Listening Public’. She notes that Adorno and Schoenberg share the traits of being pessimistic, of being lonely, of being demanding of their readers and listeners (222, 224, and 227). They both take the goal of music not to be soothing and comforting; rather, its purpose is to be challenging and shocking (233, 243). ‘New music’ demands ‘active and concentrated participation’ (229). Robert Hullot-Kentor takes up this notion of correct listening in his ‘Right Listening and a New Type of Human Being’. He claims that all of Adorno’s philosophy is ‘inimical to us’ and ‘rubs us the wrong way’ (181). This is not only because Adorno rejected everything popular, hence easy. It is also because Adorno disliked many difficult and challenging composers (181). Instead, Hullot-Kentor generalizes Adorno’s response, insisting that Aesthetic Theory ‘is written in utter opposition to what we are’ (195). He does not spell out what this means, but he hints that Adorno hoped for a ‘New Type of Human Being’ – one who courageously fights all cultural evils (see 193–4). The reader senses that Hullot-Kentor believes in Adorno’s practice of confrontation, he takes the eminent
American Kant scholar, Robert Paul Wolff, to task for having proudly
claimed that he had never read Kant’s third *Critique* and blasting him for
‘lying on the sofa watching James Bond movies’ (189).

Max Paddison addresses the notion of authenticity in ‘Authenticity and
Failure in Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music’. In Paddison’s view, the notion of
‘authenticity’ plays a central role in all of Adorno’s thinking and
particularly in his thinking on music (200). A piece is authentic for Adorno
if it is ‘consistent’ and this, Paddison explains, means structurally allowing
the full realization of ‘its dominating idea’ (205). And, through history it
gains its truth value (206). This leads to the connection between untruth and
inauthenticity. Something is inauthentic if it is not true to itself, if it is not
ture to its roots (201). Paddison only hints at the difference between
Adorno’s use of authenticity (‘Authentizität’) and Heidegger’s use of
authenticity (‘Eigentlichkeit’) (201–2).

In ‘Adorno’s Social Lyric, and Literary Criticism Today’ (sic) Robert
Kaufman takes up the theme of alienating that was also found in the essays
by Goehr and Hullot-Kentor, but turns it around. Rather than Adorno
causining us to shudder, Kaufman wonders whether contemporary inter-
pretations of Adorno would cause him to shudder (354). This arises from
the two objectives that, according to Kaufman, Adorno set for himself in
‘On Lyrical Poetry and Society’. The first was to challenge German
formalism that tried to divorce aesthetics from socio-political concerns and
the second was to confront left-wing ideologies that tried to marry the two
(357). It arises from Adorno’s essays being ‘uncritically pressed into service
for projects inimical’ to them (356). For Kaufman, one key question is ‘how
does lyric *give us* the social?’ which seems to mean that it provides the ‘form’
for the specific content (362). While this formalism seems Kantian,
Kaufman suggests that Benjamin looms large as well. Adorno wishes to
shake and ‘break down the hardening of subjectivity’ (365).

Kant appears in ‘Weighty Objects-On Adorno’s Kant-Freud Interpreta-
tion’ where Joel Whitebook attempts to deal with Adorno’s ‘confrontation
between Kant and Freud’. It is an attempt because Ego psychology has little
if nothing in common with transcendental psychology. Kant also appears in
Martin Jay’s ‘Is Experience Still in Crisis?’. But the notion of ‘experience’ is
not Kant’s ‘Erfahrung’ but rather the ‘Lebensphilosophie’ of ‘Erlebnis’
(131). It is unfortunate that Jay seems to assume that the reader is familiar
with these terms and with names like Friedrich Gundolf and Stefan Georg
because his points are highly interesting. Max Weber argued that the
western world has become ‘disencharched’ and myths have been replaced by
rationality. Gundolf and Georg were on friendly terms with Weber but held
widely differing views of the world. Whereas Weber appears to have
accepted the inevitability of this advancement, Gundolf, Georg and others
wanted to ‘re-enchant’ the world and wished to do this making use of
Dilthey’s notion of ‘Erlebnis’ that is found in the ‘Life Philosophy’ of people
like Dilthey and Simmel. Jay turns to Heidegger and Benjamin and their
shared rejection of the notion of ‘experience’ found in ‘Lebensphilosophie’ or in Kant, or in ‘the tradition of disenchanted secular humanism’ (134). Like Heidegger and Benjamin, Adorno wanted to return to ‘more fundamental levels of truth’ (134).

Karl Marx dominates ‘Adorno, Marx, Materialism’ but Simon Jarvis emphasizes that while Adorno was a materialist he was no Marxist. Adorno was trained as a Kantian and although he wrote on Kant and Hegel he wrote relatively little on Marx – but Marx is continuously present in Adorno’s work (82, 86–7). Jarvis explains that Adorno’s Marx is paradoxical; *Capital* is both a system and not a system and that materialism is often metaphysical (89 and 79). What Adorno appreciated about Marx was his insistence on the connection between philosophy and social theory and his demand for ending human suffering (96 and 80, 84). Adorno’s ‘undogmatic reading’ of Marx allowed him to avoid the problem of either accepting or rejecting him (81 and 92).

J. M. Bernstein takes a similar approach to Adorno’s Hegelianism. In Bernstein’s ‘hyperbolic claim’ Adorno could not be an ‘orthodox Hegelian (if anyone could) after Marx, Nietzsche, and Weber, not to mention Auschwitz (20, 21, and 47, note 10). Enlightenment has not come; instead domination has – politically, socially, and culturally. And, with dialectical thinking come pain and negativity, guilt and responsibility (36–7). Gerhard Schweppenhaüser rejects the claim that Adorno was in any sense a Hegelian. In ‘Adorno’s Negative Moral Philosophy’, he insists Adorno ‘remained a staunch critic of Hegel’ as well as being a critic of modernity (343, 340). His objections to both appear to stem from his objection to domination. Furthermore, his objection to Kantian universal morality grows out of his recognition of the importance of the historical. It is Auschwitz that demands a new categorical imperative, one that will ensure that the ‘unbearable physical agony’ of the concentration camp can never be repeated (*Negative Dialectics*, quoted at 344). Adorno’s morality is not merely negative; its positive goal is ‘humanity at peace’ (345). This notion is opposite to Nietzsche’s notion of struggle. But Christoph Menke shows that Adorno shares with Nietzsche the position of critiquing morality from ‘outside’ (302, 314). ‘Genealogy and Critique’ also stresses the differences between them. Nietzsche wishes to overcome morality, Adorno wishes to transcend it; Nietzsche stresses individuality; Adorno emphasizes solidarity (315, 320). After Auschwitz, solidarity trumps individuality.

Stefan Müller-Doohm discusses Adorno’s philosophical sociology in ‘The Critical Theory of Society as Reflexive Sociology’. Adorno’s philosophical training prompts him to demand that sociology reflect on society but also to confront facticity (284). He rejects sociological systems but looks to the facts of suffering (287, 292). Adorno draws the conclusion that one can never be ‘at home’ whereas Heidegger thinks that it is possible. In ‘Leaving Home’, Samir Gandesha asserts that after Auschwitz the Romantic notion of homelessness and the Hegelian notion of being at home have been lost (102).
Both Adorno and Heidegger appreciate the German language, but for the latter there is ‘estrangement from it’ (121). Heidegger wishes to return to the comfort of primordial Being, for Adorno the comfort of being at home leads to indifference to others (110, 122). James Schmidt underscores Adorno’s rejection of comfort in ‘Mephistopheles in Hollywood’. Where others found it a ‘garden of earthly delights’, Adorno saw Los Angeles as an ‘amusement-arcade world’ (148–50).

Art as amusement can be seen as a related theme in Tom Huhn’s ‘Introduction’. It is often a flaw of art in that it often masks truth, but the tragic flaw of philosophy is the type of thinking that is ‘tied too tightly to concepts’ (16, 5). Huhn observes that art does not mask truth but ‘reflects’ it. Further, art both emancipates us as well as enthralls us (14–17).

Andrew Bowies’ ‘Adorno, Heidegger, and the Meaning of Music’ raises the question of how close are the two ‘radical questions of music’ (250) and answers: both close and far apart. They are close in that Adorno and Heidegger see the connection between music and language and that music need not have only verbal meanings but also gestures (257–8, 267). However, they are apart in that Adorno prefers to be linked with what Bowie calls the ‘Hegelian-Marxist-Weberian’ idea of rationalized modernity (253, 268 and 272). This prevents Adorno from appreciating specific historical contexts as well as Heidegger’s hermeneutics (254, 265 and 273–4).

The Cambridge Companion to Adorno offers the reader a rich and full collection of essays. If there is an omission, it is an examination of Adorno’s political and philosophical claims about ‘after Auschwitz’. The essays challenge the reader by their great interest and high calibre. But, many of them, like Jay’s and Bowies’, are often challenging because of their considerable difficulty. One aim of the Cambridge Companion Series is to offer an ‘accessible guide’, one intended to ‘dispel intimidation’ that readers often feel when faced with the work of difficult thinkers. In this, this volume fails; but it does succeed admirably in its other aim: to offer a ‘conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Adorno’ (i).

Christopher Adair-Toteff
Charlottesville/Übersee am Chiemsee

Peter Munz: Beyond Wittgenstein’s Poker: New Light on Popper and Wittgenstein, Ashgate, 2004. pp. viii + 221. £50 (hb.), £19.95 (pb.). ISBN 0754640159 (hb.), 0754640167 (pb.)

David Stern and Bela Szabados (eds): Wittgenstein Reads Weninger, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. vii + 197. £40 (hb.) £15.99 (pb.) ISBN 0521825539 (hb.) 0521532604 (pb.)

The title of Peter Munz’s book Beyond Wittgenstein’s Poker: New Light on Popper and Wittgenstein reflects its intended status as a sequel to David
Edmonds and John Eidinow's *Wittgenstein's Poker* (Faber & Faber: London, 2001). Munz employs the confrontation between Popper and Wittgenstein over the existence of genuine philosophical problems at a 1946 meeting of the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club as a basis for his exploration of the connections between them. It is commonly thought that Popper and Wittgenstein embody such fundamentally differing philosophical approaches that they cannot profitably be related. In contrast to this widely held position, Munz returns to the interest in associating the two that he manifested in *Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge: Popper or Wittgenstein?* (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1985). *Beyond Wittgenstein's Poker* seeks to explain why Popper and Wittgenstein should have been allies instead of adversaries and how their individual philosophies could have been enriched by taking ideas from the other.

The introduction to part one outlines major themes in the book followed by personal and intellectual recollections that primarily focus on Popper but also include Wittgenstein. Sections I, II and IV continue in a similar fashion in that they supply further information about Popper’s life, most notably the move from the University of New Zealand to the London School of Economics (50f.), and the development of his philosophical views. A good insight into his personality and preoccupations is provided. The impact of Popper’s methods on Munz’s approach to research in history is discussed in section III. The treatment of Wittgenstein’s views occurs in sections V (along with some personal memoirs), VII and VIII. More detail is provided about him than Popper. Section VI describes the celebrated clash at the Moral Sciences Club. Munz clearly regards Popper as having greater philosophical merit than Wittgenstein and is fairly unsympathetic to the latter. Examples of both attitudes are replete throughout the book. For instance, when comparing the two, he remarks (95): ‘But the relationship was not symmetrical. Popper’s thinking went to the heart of the matter. Wittgenstein’s thinking did not’. Munz’s perspective on Wittgenstein is exemplified by his comments that: ‘I confess I was not impressed [with his seminars] and, in so far as there was any teaching at all, I kept wondering how we can use our current language to correct our current language’ (55), and ‘After I left Cambridge, and when Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* were published in 1953, my initial emotional antagonism took more deliberate, intellectual forms’ (57).

Munz seeks to establish two main claims about how Popper and Wittgenstein should have interacted profitably. The first of these is that Popper’s philosophy of knowledge requires augmentation by Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in order to solve a difficulty about how meaning may be attributed to propositions when it cannot be ascribed by ostensive definition. In sections I, II and IV, Munz explains how this problem arises from Popper’s ideas about the postulation and falsification of theories. The proposal of a theory is a linguistic act that occurs prior to observations and therefore it is impossible to determine its meaning by employing
observations. Munz argues that Popper did not fully appreciate problems of meaning because he was committed to the separation of the concepts of meaning and truth as well as regarding questions about meaning as just being constituted by issues about definitions (34). He thought a consequence of his demonstration that the verifiability criterion was fatally flawed was that there were no difficulties about whether a proposition is meaningful (35). In section VII, Popper’s problem about the ascription of meaning in the absence of ostensive definition is given a wider formulation in terms of how non-evidential and non-referring propositions can still be meaningful and comprehensible. Munz offers a detailed solution to this wider difficulty that utilizes various ideas from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language. He claims that Wittgenstein thought that it is not possible to learn the meaning of words through ostensive definition (80) and that members of a community understand what their language means since they follow rules (82). Munz’s account of how Wittgenstein’s ideas can be employed to remedy a defect in Popper’s philosophy of knowledge is actually a particular instance of a far more general point. This point is that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language provides explanations about the ascription of meaning that do not invoke the primacy of ostensive definition. The expression of a theory is just one kind of language use and is thus catered for by these explanations. Arguably, Munz’s view that Wittgenstein can be used advantageously to rectify a deficiency in Popper’s position is reached by an unnecessarily long and complex route.

Munz propounds a second principal claim concerning the value of the connection that ought to have occurred between Popper and Wittgenstein. This is that Wittgenstein’s explanations of how meaning is ascribed have a lacuna that should be remedied by the employment of Popper’s political philosophy so that the problem of the socio-political structure of a community having no bearing whatsoever on the attribution of meaning can be resolved. Munz argues that Wittgenstein held that forms of life were the necessary prerequisites of language but had no interest in the various manifestations they took (89). Using Popper’s distinction between open and closed societies, Munz proceeds to assert that what Wittgenstein termed ‘forms of life’ are mostly societies of the latter kind (94). He develops this position by maintaining that Wittgenstein’s lack of concern about differentiating societies that are open from those that are closed resulted from a combination of deficient historical knowledge and disinterest in the acquisition of knowledge (95). Munz’s solution to the problem of Wittgenstein’s indifference to distinguishing diverse socio-political forms employs Popper’s differentiation of open and closed societies in conjunction with his views about the truth of propositions generated by each type of society. It may be thought that this solution is unnecessary because the difficulty that it aims to resolve is one that need not arise. Arguably, Munz misinterprets Wittgenstein’s notion of forms of life and misunderstands the implications of his conception of philosophy. The issue of what sort of
socio-political structures facilitate or hinder the growth and acquisition of knowledge is important but it is not a matter that his conception of philosophy seeks to address. The lacuna which Munz identifies in Wittgenstein’s explanations about the ascription of meaning is effectively an expression of the position that Wittgenstein should have held a different conception of philosophy to the one he actually did. The first part of the book concludes with the section IX reconstruction of what ought to have happened when Popper and Wittgenstein met at the Moral Sciences Club.

Part two of the book is devoted to what Munz regards as the problem created by the combination of Popper and Wittgenstein in the ways argued for previously, namely that of the existence of the ‘general purpose mind’. An objection to Munz’s account is that there is very little explanation of why their amalgamation only produces this problem and no others, since it certainly seems possible that there could be other difficulties. He characterizes the general purpose mind as one that functions even in the absence of a direct stimulus in response to which functioning occurs (115). He argues that the postulation of theories that are freely invented requires this mind and that its existence is vital to Popper’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophies. However, it may be thought that Munz provides insufficient justification for both these assertions about the particular relevance of the general purpose mind. This mind could be seen as being of significance for many cases of intelligent behaviour of which the formulation of theories is just one instance. For Munz the principal difficulty is that of explaining the evolution of the general purpose mind as it appears that there are no evolutionary grounds for its existence. Sections I to XII are dedicated to a detailed and interesting exposition and criticism of the claims of evolutionary psychology to explain the evolution of this mind. He argues that evolutionary psychology is ‘nothing more than refurbished positivism’ (193) and that its ‘insistence that cultural explanations of thought and behaviour are superfluous’ (204) is completely unfounded.

Munz’s work contains a good many digressions and incidental comments that sometimes make it difficult to identify the precise order of his arguments. Placing more digressions in the footnotes would have ameliorated this problem. The attempt to combine Popper and Wittgenstein, and relate them in turn to a criticism of evolutionary psychology makes the book into an uneasy hybrid. However, Beyond Wittgenstein’s Poker provides much interesting detail as it utilizes a wide and diverse range of historical, philosophical and scientific literature.

Wittgenstein reads Weninger is a collection of newly commissioned essays edited by David Stern and Bela Szabados. The premise of the anthology is that the range and character of Weninger’s influence on Wittgenstein has not been accorded its due importance. In the introductory chapter, Stern and Szabados challenge the position that Weninger’s significance to Wittgenstein was either as a source of major mistakes or as a positive stimulus for non-philosophical ideas. They argue that previous work on the
relationship between the two was devoted to the former’s impact on the latter’s personal attitudes and to the attribution of ideas that could be recognized as the basis of a small number of particular Tractatus views. Stern and Szabados claim that differing attitudes to Weninger’s influence partially result from increased awareness that his extreme essentialism is present alongside a firm contention that the vast disparities and specific features of individual cases must be respected. The anthology seeks to provide a perspective on how Weninger’s import for Wittgenstein ranged beyond the personal and selected Tractatus doctrines, and amounted to a significant positive influence on his philosophy. In the essays, the predominant view is that Wittgenstein’s entire philosophy manifests it. In addition to questioning existing scholarship on the connections between the two, Stern and Szabados also aim to probe widely accepted assumptions about what influence is deemed to consist in. The standard for influence that is operative in the collection is that of the existence of parallels between Weninger’s and Wittgenstein’s notions. This is not the only way of construing the concept of influence and the standard adopted is clearly conducive to the aim of attributing greater significance to Weninger.

Szabados, Janik and Burns highlight groups of shared concerns for Weninger and Wittgenstein, such as the roots of philosophical mistakes. In ‘Eggshells or Nourishing Yolk? A Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Weningerian’, Szabados suggests that Wittgenstein deemed Weninger’s greatest error to be his essentialism (35) but regarded him as a key source during the middle period (38). The exegetical evidence for Weninger’s influence is taken to encompass more than Wittgenstein’s occasional explicit mentions. Comparisons between passages from Sex and Character and On Last Things with Wittgenstein’s later writings, especially the Blue and Brown Books and Philosophical Investigations, are used to argue for the claim that his philosophical methodology and general philosophical orientation display Weningerian characteristics (41). Weninger’s ideas about the process of clarification, use of metaphors and similes, anti-essentialism, attention to particulars, role of ideal types, and diagnosis of philosophical error are presented as being the basis of Wittgenstein’s own views (41–57).

Allan Janik’s essay ‘Weninger and the Two Wittgensteins’ considers the former’s impact on the latter’s early and later philosophies. The significance of Weninger for Wittgenstein’s 1916 conception of the mystical and meaning of life is carefully examined (66–76). His influence takes the form of providing Wittgenstein with an arresting perspective on the connection between the self and the world (72). According to Janik, there are affinities between Weninger’s and Wittgenstein’s ideas about the linkage of limits with the notion of the ethical (73 and 76), and the limits of language itself (74ff.). He argues that the import of Weninger’s efforts to show that human nature contains sources of self-deception is manifested in the later Wittgenstein’s emphasis on language as a source of philosophical error (77). It is suggested that Wittgenstein changed Weninger’s criticism of
typical attitudes to sex and character, race, and gender into scepticism about established philosophical conceptions of language (80). In opposition to Weninger, he thought that the animal in human nature should not be surmounted but recognized (81ff.). Janik claims that Wittgenstein’s position about philosophizing depending more on the will than the intellect is derived from Weninger (83ff.).

In ‘Sex and Solipsism: Weninger’s On Last Things’, Steven Burns examines major ideas in that work and their interrelationships with Wittgenstein’s philosophy. He argues that connections with this philosophy can be discerned in Weninger’s notions of the empirical and transcendental ego (91–3), the unidirectional nature of time in relation to ethical conduct (96), of culture being superior to contemporary science (97), and the individual subjectivity and absoluteness of moral value (100ff.). The links between Weninger’s solipsistic attitude to love (101), and his simultaneous attraction and repulsion to solipsism (103–6) are considered. Burns maintains that the Tractatus’s treatment of solipsism, which aims neither to establish nor disprove it, becomes more intelligible when set in the context of Weninger’s outlook on solipsism (107ff.).

Daniel Steuer’s piece ‘Uncanny Differences: Wittgenstein and Weninger as Doppelgänger’ applies the ‘Doppelgänger’ concept to their relationship (139) to support the claim that Wittgenstein perceived philosophical and personal commitments in Weninger which required renunciation (141). Focusing on the essays ‘Science and Culture’, ‘Metaphysics’ and ‘Characterology’ in On Last Things, Steuer argues that his theory of judgement (142ff.), conceptions of the self (143–5), and tragedy (145–7) were repudiated by Wittgenstein. He states that the latter transformed Weninger’s conceptions into a form that was radically different (148ff.). Steuer considers what he terms Wittgenstein’s aesthetic theory of judgement (150–2) and the role that the philosopher as transgressor of limits has in his middle period views about the foundations of logic and mathematics (153). It is suggested that Wittgenstein is a relativist about ethics with respect to individual difference but a fundamentalist about personal commitment to ideals (155).

In ‘Weninger and Wittgenstein on “Animal Psychology”’, Stern examines the place which animals occupy in the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. He expressed approval for Weninger’s essay ‘Metaphysics’ in On Last Things (170). The essay aims to stipulate the fundamental symbolic significance of each sort of thing in the world by interpreting it through human psychological categories, and thus stating what everything symbolizes ultimately amounts to discussion of human attributes (173–5). The most carefully worked-out instance is the idea of the dog as the symbol of the criminal (174f.). Stern seeks to contrast Weninger’s treatment of dogs with Wittgenstein’s emphasis at the start of both parts of the Philosophical Investigations upon the dissimilarities between humans and animals, and dogs in particular (180–7). He relates these concerns to Wittgenstein’s interest in the connection between thought and language.
The majority of Joachim Schulte’s essay ‘Wittgenstein and Weninger: Time, Life, World’ proffers a wide-ranging argument in support of the position that Weninger’s general influence may have been through his style and methodology, such as his employment of other people’s ideas. Schulte claims that ‘Weningerian thought’ as such does not exist (122–4). He maintains, if Wittgenstein utilized a particular view in Weninger, it is that of the unidirectional nature of time in relation to ethical conduct and that it is possible to regard this view as the origin of the notion in the *Tractatus* that agreement with the world is fundamental to an ethical standpoint (129–32).

Schulte’s fine grasp of the subtleties of Weninger’s language and the cultural context of his work augment the persuasiveness of his contentions in the essay. His piece is the best in the collection as it provides a plausible explanation for Wittgenstein’s interest in Weninger without attributing substantial philosophical influence to him as the other contributors seek to do.

There is insufficient material about Weninger in Wittgenstein’s writings to draw convincing conclusions of the kind that the collection aspires to. Any attempts to demonstrate Weninger’s influence are severely hampered by the four brief and exegetically problematic mentions of him by Wittgenstein. For example, the most quoted justification for his significance is the 1931 remark: ‘That is how Boltzmann Hertz Schopenhauer Frege Russell Kraus Loos Weninger Spengler Sraffa have influenced me’ (*Culture and Value*, revised edition, 16). However, this comment occurs in the context of Wittgenstein’s writings about his Jewishness that have several well-attested puzzling and peculiar features that could affect the exegetical authority attributable to this remark. With the notable exception of Schulte, all the essays pursue the claim that Weninger philosophically influenced Wittgenstein by adducing parallels between their ideas. Arguably, this standard for influence discards serious inquiry into the history of ideas by favouring the comparison of philosophical beliefs instead. The parallels are so broadly construed that it is difficult to conclude that the ascription of Weninger’s influence is the most persuasive explanation of the origin of particular philosophical themes in Wittgenstein. Schulte’s comment that there are a surprising ‘number of parallels between Weninger’s and Wittgenstein’s writings that on closer inspection should be regarded as purely coincidental’ (127) is clearly germane here. The difficulty is exacerbated by the existence of clearly established alternative explanations of these specific views in Wittgenstein. Weninger’s significance for Wittgenstein is perhaps most realistically elucidated through the recognition of personal influence, and the appreciation of the perspective presented in Schulte’s essay. The anthology has a good deal of information about Weninger and is certainly worth consulting for greater insight into his ideas.

Dr Mark Addis
School of English, University of Central England