Portfolio analysis of contributions to World Food Programme of Korea and France: focusing on Korean multi-bi aid

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ABSTRACT
The multi-bi aid from donor governments has been increasing due to its unique attributes. It allows the donors to control their aid spending and potentially influence the multilateral activities. Of the current members of the Development Assistance Committee, this study focuses on Korea and its multi-bi contribution to the World Food Programme (WFP). The contribution portfolio of Korea is analyzed and compared with that of France. The two countries are comparable for their similar size of the total contribution to WFP during the study period. This analysis observes differences in Korean and French approaches to their WFP multi-bi and the results indicate Korea spread its multi-bi across various aid types, sectors, and regions through a multi-agency implementing channel. Korea showed little preferential aid towards its bilateral priority countries with its WFP multi-bi. On the other hand, France focused on a specific aid type, sector, and region through a unified implementing channel. France indicated its preference towards its bilateral priority countries with its WFP multi-bi. Given the current contribution size, Korea can be more efficient with its WFP multi-bi by prioritizing aid types, sectors and regions and unifying its implementing channel.

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Introduction and background
The flow of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) can be largely differentiated as bilateral and multilateral. The bilateral aid is provided by a donor country directly to a recipient country whereas the multilateral aid is channeled through an international organization active in development, including the multilateral development banks, United Nations (UN) agencies, and regional groupings such as the European Union (OECD 2020a). The multilateral aid is also referred to as un-earmarked or core since it is pooled with other contributions and disbursed at the discretion of the multilateral agency (Gulrajani 2016; Muttukumaru 2016). The current study uses the term, the core aid, instead of the multilateral aid, to avoid a confusion.

In general, the core aid provides the multilateral agencies with greater flexibility on how the funds can be used. It is considered more effective to address global issues due to their perceived legitimacy, neutrality, technical expertise, extensive resources, and broad geographical presence. However, the donor governments may consider the core a less effective ODA channel when facing public demands to justify their ODA spending; the core contribution is pooled into the multilateral asset, and conceals the donor identity, and the governments have little control over the spending decisions (Gulrajani 2016; OECD DAC 2012). Therefore, the donor governments probably choose the bilateral channel when the control over their ODA is more important (Gulrajani 2016).

The donor governments, alternatively, may opt for the multi-bi, a combination of the bilateral and core (Gulrajani 2016). The multi-bi, also referred to as earmarked or non-core, is the voluntary donor contribution to the multilateral agency, earmarked for specific geography, themes, and purposes (OECD 2015). Thus, the multi-bi allows the donors to pre-determine the purpose and usage of their ODA and have an additional ODA channel other than the bilateral and core. Moreover, the donors can utilize expertise of the multilateral agencies and potentially influence the multilateral activities by earmarking their funds (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017; Gulrajani 2016; Reinsberg 2017). Although the multi-bi provides essential or supplementary budgets to the multilateral agencies, various donors with different ODA interests can diminish the agencies’ operational flexibility, coordination, and coherent approaches to achieve their overall goals. Additionally,
the potential donor influence over the multilateral activities may raise a question on their neutrality. Despite criticism on the multi-bi as bilateralization of the multilateral agencies, the donors may unlikely reduce their multi-bi, given its advantages from their perspectives (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017; Gulrajani 2016; Reinsberg 2017).

The members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are the major ODA donors. Collectively, the DAC group has increased its multi-bi share against the core in their total ODA; the ratio between the two changed from 1.2 (multi-bi):8.8 (core) in 2005 to 3.5:6.5 in 2016 (Jung and Jung 2018). However, the share of multi-bi varies among the DAC members, depending on their ODA goals. For instance, the share of the Canadian multi-bi was 26% of its total ODA in 2013 whereas that of the German multi-bi was 5% in the same year (Gulrajani 2016).

Of the current DAC members, this study focuses on Republic of Korea (Korea). The country is a unique case to be transformed from an ODA recipient to a DAC donor. Korea has rapidly expanded its ODA volume since it joined the DAC in 2010 (CIDC 2017). Against this background, the main objectives of the study are to examine the Korean multi-bi portfolio of one of its five priority multilateral agencies, compare its portfolio with that of a select DAC member and identify differences in their multi-bi approaches. Subsequently, the portfolio analysis and comparison should contribute to a better understanding on how the Korean multi-bi was carried out during the study period and offer policy suggestions for its multi-bi forward. To achieve these objectives, the study selects French Republic (France) to be compared among the DAC members, and World Food Programme (WFP) to be examined among Korea’s priority multilateral agencies.

As the DAC members, Korea and France are distinctively different. Korea is an emerging DAC member, ranked 15th in the total ODA volume with the ODA-GNI ratio 0.15 in 2019. On the other hand, France has been a DAC member since 1961, ranked fifth in the total ODA volume with the ODA-GNI ratio 0.44 in 2019 and constantly recognized as one of the top five ODA donors (OECD 2020b). Despite these differences, the total ODA contributions disbursed to WFP during the recent eight years are very similar: USD 233.9 million for Korea and USD 224.7 million for France, measured in the 2018 constant USD (OECD Stat).

WFP, established in 1961 by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UN General Assembly as an autonomous joint subsidiary program, is the largest humanitarian agency and food arm of the UN system (WFP 2020a). It is a voluntarily funded agency and relies mainly on the donor governments. In 2019, its top ten donors contributed 87% to its total revenue and 95% of the total contribution was the multi-bi or earmarked (WFP 2020a, 2020b). Korea designated WFP as one of its priority multilateral agencies for the multilateral ODA. Others included the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and World Health Organization (WHO) (CIDC 2017). WFP is also a prioritized UN agency of France with others including FAO, the International Labour Organization (ILO), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNICEF, and WHO (MOFA 2020).

In Addition, Korea in 2018 and France in 2017 became members of the Food Assistance Convention (FAC), the international treaty that governs food aid allocations and instrumentalizes WFP as its main aid channel (FAC 2020; Gabbert and Weikard 2000). Both countries have started fulfilling their annual FAC commitment since 2018, partly or completely through WFP. Korea pledged 46 billion KRW (approximately over USD 40 million) in 2018, 2019 and 2020 respectively whereas France did 33 million Euro (approximately USD 40 million) in 2018, then increased its pledge to 50 million Euro (approximately USD 60 million) in 2020 (FAC 2020). Overall, the two DAC members are reasonably comparable in terms of their WFP contribution, despite their substantial differences in the ODA history and volume. The study organizes as follows. The first section briefly reviews the total and multilateral ODA of Korea and France, the second section analyses and compares their WFP portfolios, and the last section summarizes the results and discusses policy implications for the Korean WFP multi-bi forward.

**Methods**

Data were extracted from the OECD Statistics website (https://stats.oecd.org/) to examine the WFP contribution portfolio of Korea and France (OECD Stat). The ODA disbursements (actual donor payment) and commitments (indication of future flow) were measured in the 2018 constant USD million, and the numbers were rounded off to the first decimal place. The study covers from 2011 to 2018; the OECD cautions multilateral data are not complete for the earlier years than 2011 in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), and the year 2018 was the latest year available (OECD Stat). Yet, the year 2011 was a reasonable starting year as Korea has been active as a DAC member since 2010.

The data during the study period were pooled together for each Korea and France since an individual
year did not provide sufficient data for an annual analysis. For a sectoral analysis, the first three-digit of a five-digit CRS code was adopted. The five-digit code is assigned to an aid to record information about the purpose of the aid activities. Of the five digits, the first three refers to the corresponding sector while the last two to the sub-sector. For example, with the CRS codes 72040 and 72050, the first three-digit 720 refers to the emergency response whereas the five-digit 72040 does to the emergency food assistance and 72050 the relief coordination and support services (OECD 2019).

**Results**

**Overview of Korean and French official development assistance**

This section briefly reviews the total and multilateral ODA of Korea and France. It should be noted that the multilateral total in the study refers to the core and multi-bi combined. First for the total ODA volume, France disbursed approximately five times larger than Korea did (Table 1). Yet Korea continually increased its ODA volume whereas France showed a decreasing trend between 2011 and 2014 then an increasing trend between 2015 and 2018. This trend was also reflected on the French ODA-GNI ratio. For the multilateral total, France disbursed about seven times larger with the greater share of the multilateral than Korea did (Table 1). On average, France allocated approximately 45% of its ODA to the multilateral whereas Korea did 35%. Notably, in 2014, the French share of the multilateral reached to 56.2%, which may be due to both the decreased total ODA and increased multilateral. In 2016, Korea reached its highest multilateral share or 40.1%. It was attributable mainly to a large increase in its contribution to the regional development banks (USD 390.1 million in 2016 compared to 120.2 in 2015) despite the total ODA increase.

Within the multilateral total, the share of the core and multi-bi differs between the two countries (Table 2). First, Korea allocated 73.4% of its multilateral total to the core and 26.6% to the multi-bi. The two main sources, accounting for 90.8% of the Korean multilateral total, were the multilateral development banks (the World Bank and Regional Banks combined) and UN agencies. For the core and multi-bi separately, the two multilateral sources contrast (Table 2). The multilateral banks were the main contributor to the core, or 72% of the core total while the UN was the main source to the multi-bi total, or 80.4%. Second, France allocated most of its multilateral total to the core or 96.3% (Table 2). The three major contributors to its multilateral total were the EU, multilateral development banks and other multilateral organizations such as Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, and Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Collectively, the three accounted for 91.6% of the French multilateral total. For the core and multi-bi separately, over half of the core was allocated to the EU while the UN received the largest share of the multi-bi or 31.2% (Table 2). However, the absolute amount allocated to the UN multi-bi was insignificant compared to the amount of the French multilateral total.

**WFP contribution of Korea and France**

Despite the considerable differences in ODA between Korea and France, their total contributions to WFP are very similar (Table 3). Yet, details of their WFP contribution profiles indicate notable differences in the allocation. First, Korea showed discrepancies between the multi-bi disbursement and commitment in all years except 2011 while France did not (Table 3). This is

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Table 1. Contributions to official development assistance of Korea and France.

| Year | Korea Total ODA USD milliona | Multi totalb | Multi total %c | ODA/GNI d | France Total ODA (USD million) | Multi total | Multi total % | ODA/GNI |
|------|-----------------------------|-------------|---------------|----------|--------------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------|
| 2011 | 1487.2                      | 466.6       | 31.4          | 0.12     | 11,644.6                       | 4507        | 38.7         | 0.46   |
| 2012 | 1801.1                      | 613.2       | 34            | 0.14     | 11,522.3                       | 4563.3      | 39.6         | 0.45   |
| 2013 | 1904.8                      | 662.1       | 34.8          | 0.13     | 10,435.9                       | 3537.4      | 33.9         | 0.41   |
| 2014 | 1920.8                      | 649.6       | 33.8          | 0.13     | 9724.9                         | 5469        | 56.2         | 0.37   |
| 2015 | 2063                        | 677.4       | 32.8          | 0.14     | 9788.5                         | 4774.9      | 48.8         | 0.37   |
| 2016 | 2433.6                      | 975.5       | 40.1          | 0.16     | 10,197.6                       | 4632.2      | 44.6         | 0.38   |
| 2017 | 2272.9                      | 832.2       | 36.6          | 0.14     | 11,956.9                       | 6605.3      | 55.2         | 0.43   |
| 2018 | 2423.4                      | 937.5       | 38.7          | 0.14     | 12,839.7                       | 5446.3      | 42.4         | 0.43   |
| Total| 16,306.8                    | 5814.2      | N/A           | 0.14     | 88,311.4                       | 39,535.4    | N/A          | N/A    |
| Average| 2038.4                     | 726.8       | 35.3          | 0.14     | 11,038.9                       | 4941.9      | 44.9         | 0.41   |

aMeasured in 2018 constant USD.

bMultilateral total as core and multi-bi combined (multi-bi termed as ‘Through’ in OECD statistics).

c% of multilateral total in total net ODA.

dODA as % GNI (Gross National Income).

eNot applicable (Data source) OECD Stat. https://stats.oecd.org/.
mainly due to the DAC reporting system for the multi-year commitments. In the DAC system, multi-year commitments are recorded in whole in the year they are signed. But subsequent disbursements of the earlier commitment are annually recorded, in the year they are transferred from a donor to a recipient. Therefore, the disbursement can come from the commitment initially reported in a different year (OECD 2020c).

Korea had 13 multi-year commitments in its profile whereas France did all single-year commitments. This is the source of the yearly discrepancy of Korea between its annual disbursement and commitment. The two countries fulfilled their commitments, and this indicates strong and stable engagement of the two countries in their contribution to WFP. It is also important to WFP since shortfalls or windfalls in donor contributions likely reduce its prediction in revenue and therefore its operational planning.

Second, Korea primarily utilized the multi-bi channel to support WFP; 99.7% of the total disbursement was made through the multi-bi (Table 3). But France utilized the core channel (or flexible in the current WFP term) significantly more than Korea did. France disbursed 19.5% of its total as the core through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Korea did the rest 0.3% through the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MOAFR). From the perspective of WFP, the un-earmarked core contribution is more flexible to operationalize its budget. However, most of its donor governments intensely utilize the multi-bi channel because of the advantages of the multi-bi discussed earlier. Compared to France, Korea appears to maintain tighter control over its contribution to WFP with the dominant share of the multi-bi. Korea’s preference to use the multi-bi for the UN agencies is similarly reflected in its ODA multi-bi total

| Table 3. Contributions to World Food Programme of Korea and France. |
|---|---|---|
| **Type** | **Korea (in 2018 constant USD million)** | **France (in 2018 constant USD million)** |
| **Disbursement** | **Commitment** | **Disbursement** | **Commitment** |
| **Year** | **Core** | **Multi-bi** | **Core** | **Multi-bi** | **Core** | **Multi-bi** | **Core** | **Multi-bi** |
| 2011 | 0.1 | 7.9 | 0.1 | 7.9 | .. | 30.8 | .. | 30.8 |
| 2012 | 0.1 | 6.6 | 0.1 | 7.6 | .. | 25.6 | .. | 25.6 |
| 2013 | .. | 26.1 | .. | 35 | 0.4 | 21.2 | 0.4 | 21.2 |
| 2014 | .. | 35.1 | 0.1 | 24.9 | 0.1 | 20.3 | 0.1 | 20.3 |
| 2015 | 0.1 | 40.6 | 0.1 | 25.2 | 20.5 | 20.7 | 20.5 | 20.7 |
| 2016 | .. | 31.4 | .. | 36.7 | 13.3 | 18.1 | 13.3 | 18.1 |
| 2017 | 0.1 | 68 | 0.1 | 63 | 9.3 | 23.5 | 9.3 | 23.5 |
| **Total** | 0.7 | 233.3 | 0.6 | 234.1 | 43.8 | 181 | 43.8 | 181 |
| **Combined** | 233.9 (99.7% of commitment total) | 234.7 | 224.7 (100% of commitment total) | 224.7 |
| **% of total combined** | 0.3 | 99.7 | 0.3 | 99.7 | 19.5 | 80.5 | 19.5 | 80.5 |

*Due to rounding-off (Data source) OECD Stat. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MULTISYSTEM.
(Table 2). Furthermore, the distinctive utilizations of the core resulted in different WFP multi-bi totals of the two countries: USD 233.3 million for Korea and 181 million for France.

**Details of WFP multi-bi portfolio of Korea and France**

This section examines details of the Korean and French WFP multi-bi portfolio with the disbursement. Research on aid allocation may be carried out with either commitment or disbursement, depending on the research objectives. The commitment expresses donor’s full intention or ODA pledge while the disbursement is an actual action to the pledge of the donor (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017). The present study is set out to identify the latter, thus focuses on the disbursement. However, it would make little difference in the portfolio analysis as the two met their commitment. Overall, the most noticeable difference in their WFP multi-bi disbursement was a degree of concentration in their multi-bi implementing channel, aid type, sector, and region (Tables 4 and 5).

First, for the WFP multi-bi implementing channel, Korea used three channels, MOFA as a main channel followed by Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and MOAFR reported as miscellaneous. On the other hand, France used a one-agency channel with

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**Table 4. Details of multi-bi contribution to World Food Programme of Korea.**

| Type of aid⁴,⁶ | No. of aids (% of total No.) | Amount (% of total amount) |
|---------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| B03           | 90 (52.9)                  | 147.6 (63.3)              |
| C01           | 73 (42.9)                  | 83.5 (35.8)               |
| C01           | 73 (42.9)                  | 83.5 (35.8)               |
| B03           | 90 (52.9)                  | 147.6 (63.3)              |
| a: Type of aid with smaller than 5% of total amount is not shown-D01 | |
| (donor country personnel 1%), b: B03-contributions to specific purpose programs and funds managed by implementing partners, C01-project-type interventions |
| Sector⁴,⁶     | No. of aids (% of total No.) | Amount (% of total amount) |
| 311           | 28 (16.5)                  | 68.5 (29.4)               |
| 520           | 27 (15.9)                  | 46.1 (19.8)               |
| 720           | 102 (60)                   | 99.6 (42.7)               |
| d: Sectors with smaller than 5% of total amount are not shown, including 113-secondary education (4.6%), 130-population policies/programs and reproductive health (0.1%), 231-energy policy (0.2%), 430-other multisector (2.3%), 998-unallocated/unspecified (1%), e: 311-agriculture, 520-developmental food assistance/food security assistance, 720-emergency response |
| Funding size  | No. of aids (% of total No.) | Amount (% of total amount) |
| Smaller than 1 million | 94 (55.3) | 37.2 (15.9) |
| Equal or larger than 1 million | 76 (44.7) | 196.1 (84.1) |

**Table 5. Details of multi-bi contribution to World Food Programme of France.**

| Type of Aid⁴,⁶ | No. of aids (% of total No.) | Amount (% of total amount) |
|---------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| C01           | 216 (99.1)                 | 180.7 (99.8)              |
| a: Types of aid with smaller than 5% of total amount are not shown-B03 (contributions to specific purpose programs and funds managed by implementing partners 0.1%), b: C01-project-type interventions, |
| Sector⁴,⁶     | No. of aids (% of total No.) | Amount (% of total amount) |
| 520           | 206 (94.5)                 | 164.5 (90.9)              |
| 720           | 10 (4.6)                   | 16.2 (8.9)                |
| Funding size  | No. of aids (% of total No.) | Amount (% of total amount) |
| Smaller than 1 million | 174 (79.8) | 86.3 (47.7) |
| Equal or larger than 1 million | 44 (20.2) | 94.6 (52.3) |

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MOFA. Second, for the aid type, Korea allocated its multi-bi mainly to the two aid types, B03 (contributions to specific-purpose programs and funds managed by implementing agency, 63.3% in total amount) and C01 (project-type interventions, 35.8%) while France focused exclusively on C01 (99.8% in total amount). Third, for the aid sectors, Korea prioritized the 720 (CRS first three-digit code: emergency response), 311 (agriculture), and 520 (developmental food assistance/food security assistance) in the descending order whereas France primarily supported the 520. Fourth, for the recipient regions, Korea focused on South & Central Asia, South of Sahara, and to a lesser degree Middle East whereas France did on South of Sahara and Middle East.

Also distinguishable was the funding size across the individual aids. On average, the aids supported by Korea received larger funding compared to the ones by France (Tables 4 and 5; and Figure 1). The mean and median of Korea were USD 1.4 million and 0.7, respectively whereas those of France were USD 0.8 million and 0.6. With the one-million threshold to differentiate the funding size, Korea supported 55% of the total number of aids with smaller than USD 1 million whereas France did 80% with it. The indication from the mean, median and funding size is that France tended to allocate a small yet even-sized funding across the individual aids. This might be feasible as France exclusively supported the same aid type and sector on an annual basis: the project-type for the developmental food assistance/food security assistance. In contrast, Korea disbursed a wider range of funds across its aids, likely due to the different nature and needs of each aid type and sector. For upper outliers with over USD 10 million, Korea supported three such aids, specifically earmarked for Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen. France had two such aids earmarked as ‘developing countries, unspecified’ and ‘South of Sahara, regional’ (Figure 1). Overall, France allocated total 4 aids to ‘developing countries, unspecified’ with 10% of its multi-bi total while Korea did 1% (Tables 4 and 5). France’s greater utilization of the core and looser regional earmarking indicates its lesser stress on control over the WFP contribution than Korea.

Top recipient countries and preference for bilateral priority countries

First, no recipient country was overlapping as the top five recipient countries of Korea and France (Table 6). Korea allocated 54.4% of the multi-bi total to its top five recipients while France did 32.6%. In the absolute amount, Korea allocated approximately a 2.2 times larger amount to the recipients compared to France. Korea markedly supported one country, Afghanistan with 32.5% of its multi-bi total. On the other hand, France supported its top five recipients with similar amounts ranging from USD 10.5 million for Madagascar to USD 13 million for Lebanon. The top recipients of

![Figure 1. Funding distributions of Korea and France.](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MULTISYSTEM)

Notes: Mean and median were calculated by pooling all data from 2011 to 2018, measured in 2018 constant USD million (Data source) OECD Stat. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MULTISYSTEM.
France received similar numbers in aid as well, ranging from 11 to 15 whereas those of Korea received from 1 to 22.

Second, for the two countries’ preference towards their bilateral priority countries, it was estimated by examining the WFP multi-bi allocation across their respective bilateral priority countries (Table 7). Korea designates its bilateral priority countries every five years. Before 2010, the list of its priority countries was released separately for grants and concessional loans, with little clarification on the selection criteria (Park, Lee, and Koo 2013). In 2010, Korea released its first integrated list of the priority countries with a four-step selection process. The first step factored in the income level for aid needs. The second considered three elements: relationships to Korea, international aid criteria and aid effectiveness, each with different weights. The third and fourth evaluated qualitative factors for Korea’s final decision on its priority countries. Although not specified, the qualitative factors in the third and fourth steps highly considered the political and economic interests of Korea such as geopolitical alliances and export markets (Lee 2019; Park, Lee, and Koo 2013). For the period of 2011–2015, 26 countries were selected, and the next round for 2016–2020 selected 24 countries (CIDC 2017). The fact that 21 countries stayed as the priority countries over the past decade implies that little change was made in Korea’s focus region for its bilateral ODA. France created in 1998 the Priority Solidarity Zone (ZSP) in order to focus French aid more closely on a limited number of countries. The ZSP comprised 55 countries, primarily the former French African colonies. France further designated 14 priority poor countries across its most prioritized region, South of Sahara. In 2012, the number increased to 17 by newly adding Burundi, Djibouti, and Rwanda. Subsequently, France updated its priority countries with 19 countries (Library of Congress 2015; MOFA 2020).

Korea supported 14 bilateral priority countries with the WFP multi-bi, accounting for 23.2% of the multi-bi total (Table 8). On the other hand, France supported 16 bilateral priority (poor) countries with 45.4% in the multi-bi total, and 11 of the 16 countries are the formal French colonies. On average, the priority countries of Korea received 2.7 aids with USD 3.9 million whereas France allocated averaged 6.7 aids with USD 5.1 million. Of the top five recipient countries, Ethiopia was the only bilateral priority country of Korea while the three countries, Chad, Madagascar, and Niger were those of France (Tables 6 and 7). These results suggest France leaned more towards its bilateral priority countries with the WFP multi-bi, compared to Korea.

### Discussion and conclusions

Korea as a new emerging donor and France as a traditional leading donor are considerably different in terms of their ODA history, volume, and allocation. However, the two countries became comparable in meaningful manners with their contributions to WFP from 2011 through 2018. In summary, Korea utilized exclusively the multi-bi channel and spread its disbursement across the multiple aid types, sectors, and regions. Also, the multi-bi implementing channel was shared by the three agencies, MOFA, KOICA and MOAFR while the core was disbursed by MOAFR. The country supported its individual aids with a wider range of the fund size. Korea did not show particular preference towards its bilateral priority countries with the WFP.
multi-bi yet seemed to retain tighter control over its funding. France, on the other hand, disbursed almost 20% of its total contribution as the core and focused on the specific aid type, sector, and region. Also, both the multi-bi and core were disbursed solely through MOAF. The range of the fund size was narrower with smaller funding across the individual aids. France indicated preference towards its bilateral priority countries yet appeared to put lesser emphasis on control over its funding.

It may be argued that the fragmented WFP multi-bi of Korea is due to the agencies’ specific mandates or responsibilities. However, there seemed no particular criterion for responsible areas in the WFP multi-bi of MOFA and KOICA while MOAFRA was clearly in charge of the FAC-related aids (reported as miscellaneous) and the core contribution. In a broader sense, the fragmented WFP multi-bi of Korea may resonate part of its current ODA architecture: separate channels for the grants by MOFA and the concessional loans by Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF), and hierarchical structure from ODA policy formulation to implementation. Moreover, approximately 40 other government entities were expected to carry out their own ODA programs in 2020. This fragmented ODA architecture of Korea has long been debated in policy papers and literature for more effective ODA (CIDC 2017; Kim, Kim, and Lee 2014). However, France also has a complex institutional set-up to implement its ODA with the chief coordinating body (Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement) and three main entities including MOFA, MOEF, and the French Development Agency. Similarly, there are approximately ten other entities involved in French ODA (OECD 2020b).

More likely though, the fragmented WFP multi-bi of Korea could come from a lack of (or indecisive) strategic directions and long-term goals with its WFP contribution. Korea stated in its multilateral strategy document that the multi-bi is to complement its bilateral ODA (CIDC 2016). In some sense, the WFP multi-bi fulfilled this objective, evidenced by the two observations; first, its top five recipients are mostly the fragile and least developed countries that do not belong to Korea’s bilateral priority countries; second, a relatively small share of the multi-bi total was allocated to its priority countries. France showed preference towards its priority countries with the WFP multi-bi although it could be due in part to that these countries are also among the most vulnerable for food security.

Korea appeared to maintain tighter control over its contribution to WFP, compared to France. This attribute was indirectly reflected on how they met their respective FAC commitment as well. Korea exclusively instrumentalized WFP with specific earmarking: the country contributed Korea-grown rice to Ethiopia, Kenya, Syria, Uganda, and Yemen to meet its 2018 FAC commitment through WFP. France, however, allocated only half of its FAC contribution to WFP and over a third of the total contribution was linked to cash-based interventions to meet its 2018 FAC commitment (FAC2018). From the perspective of WFP, the two donors may provide each upside and downside. First, Korea may be more interested in multi-year projects with larger funding than France. This can help WFP engage in longer-term

### Table 8. World Food Programme multi-bi allocation to bilateral priority countries.

| Priority country | Total No. of aids | Total amounts (USD million) | Priority country | Total No. of aids | Total amounts (USD million) |
|-----------------|------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------------|
| Bangladesh      | 5                | 4.7                        | Nigeria         | 2                | 1                          |
| Cameroon        | 1                | 0.2                        | Pakistan        | 1                | 0.2                        |
| DR Congo        | 4                | 1.5                        | Philippines     | 3                | 1.9                        |
| Ethiopia        | 1                | 10.9                       | Rwanda           | 4                | 10.4                       |
| Laos            | 1                | 0.3                        | Sri Lanka       | 3                | 4.2                        |
| Myanmar         | 3                | 1.6                        | Tanzania        | 3                | 5.1                        |
| Nepal           | 3                | 5.3                        | Uganda          | 4                | 6.7                        |
| **Total**       | **38 (22.4%)**   | **54.1 (23.2%)**           |                 |                  |                            |

**Korea’s WFP multi-bi allocation to its bilateral priority countries**

| Priority country | Total No. of aids | Total amounts (USD million) | Priority country | Total No. of aids | Total amounts (USD million) |
|-----------------|------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------------|
| Burkina Faso*   | 11               | 10.5                       | Guinea*         | 4                | 2.5                        |
| Burundi         | 4                | 1.8                        | Haiti           | 1                | 0.6                        |
| Central African Republic* | 8 | 5.1 | Liberia | 1 | 0.6 |
| Chad            | 12               | 11.5                       | Madagascar*     | 11               | 10.5                       |
| DR Congo*       | 5                | 4.2                        | Mali*           | 10               | 8.9                        |
| Djibouti*       | 2                | 0.4                        | Mauritania*     | 9                | 6.9                        |
| Ethiopia        | 8                | 4.3                        | Niger*          | 15               | 12                         |
| Gabon*          | 1                | 0.2                        | Senegal*        | 5                | 2.1                        |
| **Total**       | **107 (49.1%)**  | **81.5 (45.4%)**           |                 |                  |                            |

**France’s WFP multi-bi allocation to its bilateral priority countries**

| Priority country | Total No. of aids | Total amounts (USD million) | Priority country | Total No. of aids | Total amounts (USD million) |
|-----------------|------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------------|
| Bangladesh      | 5                | 4.7                        | Nigeria         | 2                | 1                          |
| Cameroon        | 1                | 0.2                        | Pakistan        | 1                | 0.2                        |
| DR Congo        | 4                | 1.5                        | Philippines     | 3                | 1.9                        |
| Ethiopia        | 1                | 10.9                       | Rwanda           | 4                | 10.4                       |
| Laos            | 1                | 0.3                        | Sri Lanka       | 3                | 4.2                        |
| Myanmar         | 3                | 1.6                        | Tanzania        | 3                | 5.1                        |
| Nepal           | 3                | 5.3                        | Uganda          | 4                | 6.7                        |
| **Total**       | **38 (22.4%)**   | **54.1 (23.2%)**           |                 |                  |                            |

*Korea’s WFP multi-bi allocation to its bilateral priority countries*

| Priority country | Total No. of aids | Total amounts (USD million) | Priority country | Total No. of aids | Total amounts (USD million) |
|-----------------|------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------------|
| Burkina Faso*   | 11               | 10.5                       | Guinea*         | 4                | 2.5                        |
| Burundi         | 4                | 1.8                        | Haiti           | 1                | 0.6                        |
| Central African Republic* | 8 | 5.1 | Liberia | 1 | 0.6 |
| Chad            | 12               | 11.5                       | Madagascar*     | 11               | 10.5                       |
| DR Congo*       | 5                | 4.2                        | Mali*           | 10               | 8.9                        |
| Djibouti*       | 2                | 0.4                        | Mauritania*     | 9                | 6.9                        |
| Ethiopia        | 8                | 4.3                        | Niger*          | 15               | 12                         |
| Gabon*          | 1                | 0.2                        | Senegal*        | 5                | 2.1                        |
| **Total**       | **107 (49.1%)**  | **81.5 (45.4%)**           |                 |                  |                            |

France’s WFP multi-bi allocation to its bilateral priority countries

*Formal French colonies (Data source) OECD Stat. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MULTISYSTEM.
projects that might produce larger impacts. However, Korea disbursed its funding mostly as the multi-bi, restricting WFP’s financial and operational flexibility. In comparison, France’s larger share of the core could provide more flexibility to WFP’s budget planning. Second, Korea might increase transaction burdens as the country supported the multiple aid types/sectors through the multi-agency channel. Yet the annual-basis support with a larger number of small aids of France could raise the similar issue. Nevertheless, WFP can take advantage of the current characteristics of each donor’s contribution. For instance, WFP may nudge Korea to further focus on longer-term projects in the emergency response. Or it can negotiate with France to increase its core disbursement for more budgetary flexibility.

Assuming that Korea would keep its current stance with its future contribution to WFP, the country could be more efficient by prioritizing a specific aid type, sector, and countries and by unifying the implementing channel. The concentrated multi-bi may increase implementing efficiency, impact, and visibility in the select sector and countries. This option, however, can be criticized in that Korean WFP multi-bi is intensely earmarked, increasing its control over WFP’s activities. Such criticism may be softened if Korea supports WFP with predictable consistency and aligns to the core strategic plans of WFP. During the channel unifying process, a political power game may be unavoidable among the line ministries and agencies. However, MOFA as the current dominating channel and supervising ministry of KOICA should play a leading role for a necessary institutional arrangement to unify the WFP channel. In addition, MOFA is the responsible ministry for Korean grant-based and UN-multilateral ODA, including humanitarian aid. Another very unlikely option for the Korean multi-bi would be to noticeably increase the core contribution. Even though this option offers WFP greater financial flexibility, the government may not consider this option as it loses control over its fund and visibility, the very reasons for utilizing the multi-bi.

This study started to explore part of the Korean multi-bi approach by examining one of its priority multilateral agencies and comparing its profile to that of France with the similar contribution size. While it offers useful perspectives to better understand the Korean multi-bi approach, other four multilateral priority agencies should be examined for a more comprehensive understanding of Korea’s overall multi-bi approach. Also limited is the depth of the analysis with the WFP contribution portfolio of Korea and France, individually. A deeper portfolio analysis of each could reveal more nuanced approaches.

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