COLLUSION BW HOLE ATTACK

Abstract- In this world of technology, it is important to provide security and to find the loopholes present in the network. There are two types of networks – wired network and wireless network. Wireless network is more vulnerable to attacks as compared to the wired networks as a number of nodes are never fixed in wireless network. Any node can come and join the network as well as any node can leave the network. This paper includes conclusions of some Denial of Service attacks and their effect on the MANETs, How they attack and which methodology they adopt. This paper mainly focuses on proposing a new attack which can cause severe harm to the network. This attack inhibits the strategy of two main attacks – BlackHole and Wormhole attack. This attack actually works in collaboration with some internal nodes which will work for a malicious node and will help that node in causing disruption to the network. In particular, this paper describes all the weak areas of a network that can be targeted by this new attack.

Keywords: MANET; DOS; Security Attacks

1. INTRODUCTION

As already mentioned, this paper proposes a new attack, a type of a Denial of Service attack which can not only slow down the network but can also result in defaming as it is hard to find out the actual intruder in the network. The name of this attack is Collusion BW Hole Attack. As in MANET, the communication starts when there is a node that has a data or a message packet that is to be sent to some other node. For the transmission of this packet the source node will choose a path which is both secure and less time consuming. For selection of this path the source node will look for the routing tables of other nodes and will find a suitable path to transmit the packet. Here, in Collusion BW attack, the intruder will take advantage of this demand of source node to hack the network and will eventually steal or drop the data. The intruder node will work with two or more internal nodes, who will form a tunnel and simultaneously send data to the intruder node rather than sending it to the desired node. The whole methodology and strategy of this new proposed attack is described further in the paper. This paper includes only the description of this attack, the methodology that can be used by these intruding nodes and the weaknesses of a network that can be targeted by this attack.

2. MANET

Mobile Ad-Hoc Network is a cluster of mobile nodes which can communicate with one another without a specified and predefined topology or central administration. MANETs are dynamic in nature, which means any node which wants to communicate can join the network and similarly any node can leave the network after the completion of its work at any time. It provides flexibility as there is an absence of centralized system and it follows a decentralized system which means there are no server and client. Thus, it offers a peer-to-peer network in which any node can act as a host and as a router at the same time.[1] It is very easy to form a MANET network at cheap prices as it does not follow the predefined and centralized infrastructure, this property is the reason why MANET is widely used and becoming popular nowadays. But due to its flexible and dynamic nature, it is becoming vulnerable to many severe attacks. These attacks are mainly intended to steal the information that is transferred among communicating parties.[2,3] As in MANET no restriction is applied on the nodes, any node can join the network, this can lead to severe consequences like eavesdropping, stealing of information, denial of services, response delay etc.

As compared to wired network A MANET is more prone to attacks due to the following factors:
- The Nodes have limited energy due to which security solutions that are complex cannot be used in MANET.
- Transmission of data packets and routing is done using wireless medium. Wireless medium being a shared network and generally unreliable and makes eavesdropping more likely. Even if we make the channel reliable, the communication might be unreliable due to the broadcasting nature of the MANETs.
- MANET does not have any central management point or node, which makes it hard to ensure that all the nodes that are taking part in the network are benign.
- Routing is very challenging because the network topology of network keeps on changing and the mobility of nodes plays a very important role in the network.[4-6]

3. AODV

An Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector routing protocol is tailored particularly for the mobile nodes, where the time span for the establishment of new network and the termination of previous one is not fixed. Thus, this protocol seeks to provide less processing time, memory consumption and network utilization as well as fast adaption to dynamic forming links. It works on destination sequence numbers and gives loop freedom[9][13-15]

3.1 Security Flaws in AODV

AODV is vulnerable to routing attacks due to lack of security features; some more secure protocols are generally...
In AODV there is black hole and wormhole attack. In wormhole attack the attacking node capture the packet from one location and transmits that to the other node which is located at distant. A wormhole attack can be exploited very easily by attacker without compromising with the legitimate node and without having the knowledge of that. Whereas in black hole attack, when the source node attempts to send some data packets to a destination node, and starts the routing discovery process then malicious node, MN1 shows that it has the route for the destination node every time it receives RREQ packets. Then it sends the response to source node at once. If the reply from a normal node for example (N1, N2, ..., N14) etc. reaches the source node of the RREQ first, everything works well but when the packet is received by MN1 node then it makes the source node think that the routing discovery process is completed and ignores all other reply messages, and starts to send data packets. A forged routing has been created. As a result of which all the packets through MN1 are simply lost or consumed and never received by its desired destination.

Collusion BW Hole Attack is different from these attack because in this attack the packets are dropped once received by the malicious node where as in Collusion BW Hole Attack there is no packet drop by first malicious node and in worm hole attack after tunnelling the broadcast of packet occur while in Colliding Collusion BW hole attack uni cast occur and the packet is dropped by the malicious node but at the same time the RREP and RREQ route request and reply of the neighbour legitimate node are managed such a way that the dropped packet node(malicious node) can never be identified.

4.4 Proposed Attack Model

Collusion BW Hole Attack: An ordered set of attackers {MN1, MN2, MN3, ...}, MN is the malicious node. MN1 is first malicious node that receives packet from the source by attacker without compromising with the legitimate node and without having the knowledge of that. Whereas in black hole attack, when the source node attempts to send some data packets to a destination node, and starts the routing discovery process thena malicious node, MN1 shows that it has the route for the destination node every time it receives RREQ packets. Then it sends the response to source node at once. If the reply from a normal node for example (N1, N2, ..., N14) etc. reaches the source node of the RREQ first, everything works well but when the packet is received by MN1 node then it makes the source node think that the routing discovery process is completed and ignores all other reply messages, and starts to send data packets. A forged routing has been created. As a result of which all the packets through MN1 are simply lost or consumed and never received by its desired destination.

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that node is a malicious node which means A must belong to malicious node \(A \rightarrow N_M(MN1, MN2, MN3\ldots)\). Collision BW Hole Attack is executed then \(N \rightarrow N_M\) which means that all the nodes taking part must be malicious node, and also \(N_MN\) this happens when a route request of high sequence number Seq_no. to the source node when it sends the route request to the neighbouring node.

4.3 How Is It More Dangerous Than Other Attacks

The Collision BW Hole Attack defined in this paper can result in more disastrous effects as it posses the pros of two types of attacks with diminished cons. The following key points describe its harmful consequences.

- In this attack two or more nodes will work in a collaboration to form a tunnel and the information they are stealing from the network will be sent to a node which is an intruder who wants to slow down the network. Now, identifying this third node which is not displaying any suspicious activity is a tough row to hoe.
- Secondly, the nodes which are working for the main intruder node will sometimes show their illegitimate nature and other times they will behave as normal genuine nodes. Thus, confusing the network handler and making it hard for him to be found at once.
- Third key factor in this attack is that even if the tunnel making nodes are identified by the network handler but still the identity of the main intruder node will be hidden as while being in the network the tunnel making node will never show any suspicious activity.
- The main intruder node is not bounded to be in the network, it may happen to be some external node which just wants to eavesdrop to the communication that is taking place between the nodes that are present in the network. Every algorithm can be applied to the nodes communicating in the network, but for outsiders it is impossible to predict which node is genuine.
- Also, if the main intruder node is disguising in the network, then it will properly hide its identity and won’t display any suspicious activity. It will be completely dependent on the tunnel which is formed by the two disguised malicious nodes in the network.

Thus, these points’ sums up the whole idea of Collision BW Hole Attack and how it can be more harmful to a network then other Denial of Services attacks in MANETs like Blackhole attack, Wormhole Attack, etc. The tunnel formed in this attack plays a vital role in hiding the identity of the main intruder node.

5. SIMULATION & RESULTS

| Parameter          | Value       |
|--------------------|-------------|
| Simulator          | NS3         |
| Area               | 1000 x1000  |
| Simulation time    | 500 sec     |
| MAC                | 802.11      |
| Application traffic| CBR         |
| Routing protocols  | AODV        |
| No. of S-D pairs   | 8           |
| Pause time         | 10 sec      |
| No. of malicious nodes | 2 – 10    |
| Bandwidth          | 2 Mbps      |
| Data payload       | 512Bytes/Packet |
| Maximum speed      | 10 – 50 m/s |
| No. of nodes       | 100         |

5.1 Effect of number of attackers in network

![Average PDR with increasing number of attackers.]

Since the ratio of source-destination pair is fixed while the effect of attackers on various network parameters increases due to the ever increasing number of attackers. As shown in figure the average End to End Delay increases as the number of attackers increases this is because the attackers either drop the packet or keep on rotating the packet in a single loop. Here Collision BW hole Attacks have the highest Average ETE Delay as in this case the packet is tunnelled and rotated in its own loop for IP table updation so
that it works as a legitimate node and cannot be identified. Average PDR increases with increasing number of attackers as the packet starts dropping with increase in attacker effect. The effect of NOR increases with increase in the attacker as it broadcasts the messages used for route discovery which will be large in number and since the number of attacker increases the route will include various attacker node for the destination but in Collusion BW hole attack it will be maximum as no broadcast occur, here unicast occur so very less chance that the broadcast message is received by any legitimate node.

![Figure 4: Average ETE Delay with increasing number of attackers.](image)

**5.2 Effect of Network Size**

The effect of Attacker node is very less in low dense network and vice versa because of the lesser number of nodes, the probability that the attacker becomes a part of the discovery route is very less. The PDR decreases with an increase in the network size as the number of packets transmitted by the source will be always less than the packets that are received by the destination node. The packet drop increases as number of nodes increases so the PDR decreases the Collusion BW Hole attack has the minimum PDR in this case. Normalize Routing Overhead increases if number of nodes increases as with an increasing number of nodes the broadcast messages which are used for the route discovery also increases gradually so average End to End Delay also increases if the network size increases.

![Figure 5: Average ETE Delay with increase in network size](image)

![Figure 6: Average PDR with increase in network size](image)

![Figure 7: NOR with increase in network size](image)

**6. CONCLUSION**

As per the simulation result it can be concluded that in previously purposed attacks when a Malicious node receives a packet from the source node by generating the route reply of high sequence number and a large amount of route request is generated which increases the amount of traffic in the network which alarms the network that a packet has been hijacked by the attacker, also when a malicious node tunnel the packet to other malicious node then the broadcast occurs which helps in identification of the malicious node and the attack.

In our Collusion BW Hole Attack as each node sends the route reply to the source node so there is very less time gap between the reply of the Malicious node and the legitimate node and also the packet is not dropped by the malicious node at the beginning, after tunneling of the packet to other malicious node the unicast occur which also keep the malicious node safe from being detected and the packet is dropped somewhere near the destination node which assures the network that the packet transmission was going in the legitimate route so no detection technique works to detect this attack.
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