Repeated games have provided an explanation how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favorable in a one-shot game in prisoner’s dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant strategies have substantially been investigated in evolutionary game theory. The original memory-one zero-determinant strategies unilaterally enforce linear relations between average payoffs of players. Here, we extend the concept of zero-determinant strategies to memory-two strategies in repeated games. Memory-two zero-determinant strategies unilaterally enforce linear relations between correlation functions of payoffs and payoffs at the previous round. Examples of memory-two zero-determinant strategy in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game are provided, some of which generalize the Tit-for-Tat strategy to memory-two case. Extension of zero-determinant strategies to memory-$n$ case with $n \geq 2$ is also straightforward.
1. Introduction

Repeated games offer a framework explaining forward-looking behaviors and reciprocity of rational agents [1,2]. Since it was pointed out that game theory of rational agents can be applied to evolutionary behavior of populations of biological systems [3], evolutionary game theory has investigated the condition where mutualism is maintained in conflicts [4–11]. In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, it was found that, although there are many equilibria, none of them are evolutionary stable due to neutral drift [12]. Because rationality of each biological individual is bounded, evolutionary stability of strategies whose length of memory is one has mainly been focused on in evolutionary game theory. However, memory-one strategies contain several useful strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma game, such as the Grim trigger strategy [13], the Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy [14–17], and the Win-stay Lose-shift (WSLS) strategy [5], which can form cooperative Nash equilibria.

In 2012, Press and Dyson discovered a novel class of memory-one strategies called zero-determinant (ZD) strategies [18]. ZD strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between average payoffs of players. ZD strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma game contain the equalizer strategy which unilaterally sets the average payoff of the opponent, and the extortionate strategy by which the player can gain the greater average payoff than the opponent. After their work, evolutionary stability of ZD strategies in prisoner’s dilemma game has been investigated by several authors [19–24]. Furthermore, the concept of ZD strategies has been extended to multiplayer multi-action games [25–29]. Linear algebraic properties of ZD strategies in general multi-player multi-action games with many ZD players were also investigated in Ref. [30], which found that possible ZD strategies are constrained by the consistency of the linear payoff relations. Another extension is ZD strategies in repeated games with imperfect monitoring [30–32], where possible ZD strategies are more restricted than ones in perfect monitoring case. Furthermore, ZD strategies were also extended to repeated games with discounting factor [28,33–35] and asymmetric games [36]. Performance of ZD strategies such as the extortionate strategy and the generous ZD strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma game has also been investigated in human experiments [37–39]. Moreover, behavior of the extortionate strategy in structured populations was found to be quite different from that in well-mixed populations [40,41]. Although ZD strategies are not necessarily rational strategy, they contain the TFT strategy in prisoner’s dilemma game [18], which returns the opponent’s previous action, and accordingly ZD strategies form a significant class of memory-one strategies.

Recently, properties of longer memory strategies have been investigated in the context of repeated games with implementation errors [42–45]. In general, longer memory enables complicated behavior [46]. Especially, it has been shown that, in prisoner’s dilemma game, a memory-two strategy called Tit-for-Tat-Anti-Tit-for-Tat (TFT-A TFT) is successful under implementation errors [42]. Although TFT-A TFT normally behaves as TFT, it switches to anti-TFT (ATFT) when it recognizes an error, and then returns to TFT when mutual cooperation is achieved or when the opponent unilaterally defects twice. In Ref. [45], a successful strategy in memory-three class which can easily be interpreted has also been proposed. Recall that original memory-one TFT strategy, which is also successful but is not robust against errors, is a special case of memory-one ZD strategies. Therefore, discussion of longer-memory strategies in the context of ZD strategies would be useful. However, the concept of ZD strategies has not been extended to longer-memory strategies.

In this paper, we extend the concept of ZD strategies to memory-two strategies in repeated games. Memory-two ZD strategies unilaterally enforce linear relations between correlation functions of payoffs at present round and payoffs at the previous round. We provide examples of memory-two ZD strategy in repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. Particularly, one of the examples can be regarded as an extension of TFT strategy to memory-two case.

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a model of repeated game with memory-two strategies. In section 3, we extend ZD strategies to memory-two strategy class. In
section 4, we provide examples of memory-two ZD strategies in repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. In section 5, extension of ZD strategies to memory-n case with n ≥ 2 is discussed. Section 6 is devoted to concluding remarks.

2. Model

We consider N-player repeated game. Action of player a ∈ {1, · · · , N} is described as σa ∈ {1, · · · , M}. We collectively denote state σ := (σ1, · · · , σN). We consider the situation that the length of memory of strategies of all players are at most two. (We will see in section 6 that this assumption can be weakened to memory-n with n ≥ 2.) Strategy of player a is described as the conditional probability Ta (σa|σ′, σ′′) of taking action σa when states at last round and second-to-last round are σ′ and σ′′, respectively. Let sa(σ) be payoffs of player a when state is σ. The time evolution of this system is described by the Markov chain

\[ P(σ, σ’, t + 1) = \sum_{σ''} T(σ|σ’, σ'') P(σ', σ'', t) , \]  

(2.1)

where P(σ, σ’, t) is joint distribution of the present state σ and the last state σ’ at time t, and we have defined the transition probability

\[ T(σ|σ’, σ'') := \prod_{a=1}^{N} T_a (σ_a|σ', σ'') . \]  

(2.2)

Initial condition is described as P0(σ, σ’). We consider the situation that the discounting factor is δ = 1 [1].

3. Memory-two zero-determinant strategies

We consider the situation that the Markov chain (2.1) has a stationary probability distribution:

\[ P^{(st)}(σ, σ’) = \sum_{σ''} T(σ|σ’, σ'') P^{(st)}(σ', σ'') . \]  

(3.1)

By taking summation of the both sides with respect to σ−a := σ\{σa with an arbitrary a, we obtain

\[ 0 = \sum_{σ'} T_a (σ_a|σ', σ'') P^{(st)}(σ', σ'') - \sum_{σ''} δ_{σ_a, σ_a'} P^{(st)}(σ'', σ') . \]  

(3.2)

Furthermore, by taking summation of the both sides with respective to σ’, we obtain

\[ 0 = \sum_{σ'} \sum_{σ''} [T_a (σ_a|σ', σ'') − δ_{σ_a, σ_a'}] P^{(st)}(σ', σ'') . \]  

(3.3)

Therefore, the quantity

\[ \tilde{T}_a (σ_a|σ', σ'') := T_a (σ_a|σ', σ'') - δ_{σ_a, σ_a'} \]  

(3.4)

is mean-zero with respective to the stationary distribution P^{(st)}(σ’, σ’’):

\[ 0 = \sum_{σ'} \sum_{σ''} \tilde{T}_a (σ_a|σ', σ'') P^{(st)}(σ', σ'') . \]  

(3.5)

for arbitrary σa. This is the extension of Akin’s lemma [25,28,30,47,48] to memory-two case. (We remark that the term δσa,σa’ is regarded as memory-one strategy “Repeat”, which repeats the action at the previous round.) We call \( \tilde{T}_a (σ_a) := (\tilde{T}_a (σ_a|σ', σ'')) \) as a Press-Dyson (PD) matrix. It should be noted that \( \tilde{T}_a (σ_a) \) is controlled only by player a.
When player \(a\) chooses her strategies as her PD matrices satisfy
\[
\sum_{\sigma_a} c_{\sigma_a} \hat{T}_a (\sigma_a | \sigma', \sigma'') = \sum_{b=0}^{N} \sum_{c=0}^{N} \alpha_{b,c} s_b (\sigma') s_c (\sigma'')
\]
with some coefficients \(\{c_{\sigma_a}\}\) and \(\{\alpha_{b,c}\}\), where we have introduced \(s_0 (\sigma) \equiv 1\), we obtain
\[
0 = \sum_{\sigma'} \sum_{\sigma''} \left[ \sum_{b=0}^{N} \sum_{c=0}^{N} \alpha_{b,c} s_b (\sigma') s_c (\sigma'') \right] P^{(st)} (\sigma', \sigma'')
\]
\[
= \sum_{b=0}^{N} \sum_{c=0}^{N} \alpha_{b,c} \langle s_b (\sigma (t + 1)) s_c (\sigma (t)) \rangle^{(st)},
\]
where \(\langle \cdots \rangle^{(st)}\) represents average with respect to the stationary distribution \(P^{(st)}\). This is the extension of the concept of zero-determinant strategies to memory-two case. We remark that the original (memory-one) ZD strategies unilaterally enforce linear relations between average payoffs of players at the stationary state. Here, memory-two ZD strategies unilaterally enforce linear relations between correlation functions of payoffs at present round and payoffs at the previous round at the stationary state. (It should be noted that the quantity \(\langle s_b (\sigma (t + 1)) s_c (\sigma (t)) \rangle^{(st)}\) does not depend on \(t\) in the stationary state.) We note that because the number of the components of a PD matrix is \(M^{2N}\) and the number of payoff tensors \(s_b \otimes s_c\) in Eq. (3.6) is \((N + 1)^2\), the space of memory-two ZD strategies is small even for the prisoner’s dilemma game \((N = 2\) and \(M = 2\)), and most of memory-two strategies are not memory-two ZD strategies. In addition, although we choose \(s_b \otimes s_c\) as a basis in the right-hand side of Eq. (3.6), such choice is not necessary and we can choose another functions [49].

We remark that, when we take summation of the both sides of Eq. (3.1) with respect to \(\sigma\), we obtain
\[
\sum_{\sigma} P^{(st)} (\sigma, \sigma') = \sum_{\sigma''} P^{(st)} (\sigma', \sigma'').
\]
This uniquely determines the stationary distribution of a single state \(\sigma'\).

We also remark that, because of the normalization condition of the conditional probability \(T_a (\sigma_a | \sigma', \sigma'')\), PD matrices satisfy
\[
\sum_{\sigma_a} T_a (\sigma_a | \sigma', \sigma'') = 0
\]
for arbitrary \((\sigma', \sigma'')\).

4. Examples: Repeated prisoner’s dilemma

Here, we consider two-player two-action prisoner’s dilemma game [18]. Actions of two players are 1 (cooperation) or 2 (defection). Payoffs of two players \(s_a := (s_a (\sigma))\) are \(s_1 = (R, S, T, P)\) and \(s_2 = (R, T, S, P)\) with \(T > R > P > S\). We provide three examples of memory-two ZD strategies.
(a) Example 1: Relating correlation function with average payoffs

We consider the situation that player 1 takes the following memory-two strategy:

\[
T_1(1) := \begin{pmatrix}
T_1(1|1, 1, 1, 1) & T_1(1|1, 1, 1, 2) & T_1(1|1, 1, 2, 1) & T_1(1|1, 1, 2, 2) \\
T_1(1|2, 1, 1, 1) & T_1(1|2, 1, 1, 2) & T_1(1|2, 1, 2, 1) & T_1(1|2, 1, 2, 2) \\
T_1(1|2, 2, 1, 1) & T_1(1|2, 2, 1, 2) & T_1(1|2, 2, 2, 1) & T_1(1|2, 2, 2, 2) \\
\end{pmatrix}
\]

We have assumed that \( T - P \geq P - S \). For the case \( T - P < P - S \), a slight modification is needed.) Then, we find that her Press-Dyson matrix is

\[
\hat{T}_1(1) = \begin{pmatrix}
T_1(1|1, 1, 1, 1) - 1 & T_1(1|1, 1, 1, 2) - 1 & T_1(1|1, 1, 2, 1) - 1 & T_1(1|1, 1, 2, 2) - 1 \\
T_1(1|2, 1, 1, 1) - 1 & T_1(1|2, 1, 1, 2) - 1 & T_1(1|2, 1, 2, 1) - 1 & T_1(1|2, 1, 2, 2) - 1 \\
T_1(1|2, 2, 1, 1) - 1 & T_1(1|2, 2, 1, 2) - 1 & T_1(1|2, 2, 2, 1) - 1 & T_1(1|2, 2, 2, 2) - 1 \\
\end{pmatrix}
\]

which means

\[
\hat{T}_1(1|\sigma', \sigma'') = -\frac{1}{(T - P)(T - S)} [s_2(\sigma') - P] [s_1(\sigma'') - S],
\]

and that this strategy is memory-two ZD strategy which unilaterally enforces

\[
0 = \langle s_2 (\sigma(t + 1)) s_1 (\sigma(t)) \rangle^{(st)} - S \langle s_2^{(at)} \rangle - P \langle s_1^{(at)} \rangle + PS. \tag{4.4}
\]

Therefore, the correlation function \( \langle s_2 (\sigma(t + 1)) s_1 (\sigma(t)) \rangle^{(st)} \) is related to the average payoffs \( \langle s_1 \rangle^{(at)} \) and \( \langle s_2 \rangle^{(at)} \) by the ZD strategy.

We provide numerical results about this linear relation. We set parameters \( (R, S, T, P) = (3, 0, 5, 1) \). Strategy of player 2 is set to

\[
T_2(1) := \begin{pmatrix}
T_2(1|1, 1, 1, 1) & T_2(1|1, 1, 1, 2) & T_2(1|1, 1, 2, 1) & T_2(1|1, 1, 2, 2) \\
T_2(1|2, 1, 1, 1) & T_2(1|2, 1, 1, 2) & T_2(1|2, 1, 2, 1) & T_2(1|2, 1, 2, 2) \\
T_2(1|2, 2, 1, 1) & T_2(1|2, 2, 1, 2) & T_2(1|2, 2, 2, 1) & T_2(1|2, 2, 2, 2) \\
\end{pmatrix}
\]

and we change \( q \) in the range \([0, 1]\). (Note that the strategy of player 2 is essentially memory-one.) Actions of both players at \( t = 0 \) and \( t = 1 \) are sampled from uniform distribution. In Fig. 1, we display the result of numerical simulation of one sample, where average is calculated by time average at \( t = 100000 \). We can see that the linear relation (4.4) indeed holds for all \( q \).
Figure 1. Time-averaged payoffs of two players $\sum_{t'=1}^t s_a(\sigma(t'))/t$ and correlation functions $\sum_{t'=1}^t s_a(\sigma(t')) s_b(\sigma(t'-1))/t$ with $t=100000$ for various $q$ when strategy of player 1 is given by Eq. (4.1). The red line corresponds to the right-hand side of Eq. (4.4).

(b) Example 2: Extended Tit-for-Tat strategy

Here, we introduce a memory-two ZD strategy which can be called as extended Tit-for-Tat (ETFT) strategy. We consider the situation that player 1 takes the following memory-two strategy:

$$ T_1(1) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ \frac{1}{q} & 0 & 1 & \frac{1}{q} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}. $$ (4.6)

Note that this does not depend on the concrete values of payoffs $(R, S, T, P)$. Then, we find that her PD matrix is

$$ \hat{T}_1(1) = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -\frac{1}{q} & 1 & 0 & -\frac{1}{q} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}. $$ (4.7)

and it satisfies

$$ \hat{T}_1(1|\sigma', \sigma'') = \frac{1}{2(T-S)^2} \left[ \{s_1(\sigma') - s_2(\sigma')\} \{s_2(\sigma'') - s_1(\sigma'')\} + (T-S) \{s_1(\sigma') - s_2(\sigma')\} \right]. $$ (4.8)

Therefore, it is memory-two ZD strategy, which enforces

$$ 0 = \langle s_1(\sigma(t+1)) s_2(\sigma(t)) \rangle^{(st)} + \langle s_2(\sigma(t+1)) s_1(\sigma(t)) \rangle^{(st)} \\ - \langle s_1(\sigma(t+1)) s_1(\sigma(t)) \rangle^{(st)} - \langle s_2(\sigma(t+1)) s_2(\sigma(t)) \rangle^{(st)} \\ + (T-S) \left\{\langle s_1(\sigma) \rangle^{(st)} - \langle s_2(\sigma) \rangle^{(st)}\right\}. $$ (4.9)

This linear relation can be seen as some fairness condition between two players. Because the original Tit-for-Tat strategy

$$ T_1(1) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}. $$ (4.10)
enforces $\langle s_1 \rangle_{(st)} = \langle s_2 \rangle_{(st)}$ [18]. Eq. (4.6) can be regarded as an extension of Tit-for-Tat strategy.

We provide numerical results about the ETFT strategy. Parameters and strategies of player 2 are set to the same values as those in the previous subsection. In Fig. 2, we display the result of numerical simulation of one sample. We can check that the linear relation (4.9) seems to hold for all $q$.

We can understand feelings of ETFT player as follows. We find that, when the previous state is (1, 1) or (2, 2), ETFT behaves as TFT. When the previous state and the second-to-last state are $(\sigma', \sigma'') = ((1, 2), (1, 1))$ or $((2, 1), (1, 1))$, ETFT regards that one of the players mistakes his/her action, and returns action 1 (cooperation) or 2 (defection) at random. Similarly, when the previous state and the second-to-last state are $((1, 2), (2, 2))$ or $((2, 1), (2, 2))$, ETFT also regards that one of the players mistakes his/her action, and returns action 1 or 2 at random. When the previous state and the second-to-last state are $((1, 2), (1, 2))$, ETFT ceases to cooperate and returns action 2. When the previous state and the second-to-last state are $((2, 1), (2, 1))$, ETFT continues to exploit and returns action 2. Finally, when the previous state and the second-to-last state are $((1, 2), (2, 1))$ or $((2, 1), (1, 2))$, ETFT generously cooperates. Although this strategy is different from TFT-ATFT [42]

$$T_1 (1) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix},$$

(4.11)

which is deterministic, ETFT may be successful because ETFT has several properties in common with TFT-ATFT. Furthermore, since ETFT is stochastic, it may be robust against implementation errors. Evolutionary stability of ETFT must be investigated in future.

It should be noted that a slightly modified version of ETFT

$$T_1 (1) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix},$$

(4.12)
Figure 3. Time-averaged payoffs of two players $\sum_{t'=1}^t s_a(\sigma(t'))/t$ and correlation functions $\sum_{t'=1}^t s_a(\sigma(t'))s_b(\sigma(t' - 1))/t$ with $t = 100000$ for various $q$ when strategy of player 1 is given by Eq. (4.12). The red line corresponds to the right-hand side of Eq. (4.14).

is also a memory-two ZD strategy. We call this strategy as type-2 extended Tit-for-Tat (ETFT-2) strategy. The PD matrix of ETFT-2 is described as

$$
\hat{T}_1 (1|\sigma', \sigma'') = -\frac{1}{2(T - S)^2} \left[ \{s_1(\sigma') - s_2(\sigma')\} \{s_2(\sigma'') - s_1(\sigma'')\} - (T - S) \{s_1(\sigma') - s_2(\sigma')\} \right],
$$

(4.13)

which enforces a linear relation

$$
0 = \langle s_1(\sigma(t + 1))s_2(\sigma(t)) \rangle^{(st)} + \langle s_2(\sigma(t + 1))s_1(\sigma(t)) \rangle^{(st)} \\
- \langle s_1(\sigma(t + 1))s_1(\sigma(t)) \rangle^{(st)} - \langle s_2(\sigma(t + 1))s_2(\sigma(t)) \rangle^{(st)} \\
- (T - S) \left\{ \langle s_1(\sigma(t)) \rangle^{(st)} - \langle s_2(\sigma(t)) \rangle^{(st)} \right\}.
$$

(4.14)

That is, the sign of the last term is different from that of ETFT. In Fig. 3, we also display the result of numerical simulation of one sample, where parameters are set to the same values as before. We can check that Eq. (4.14) holds for all $q$. Although ETFT-2 is similar to ETFT, it will be exploited by All-D strategy (which always defects), because $T_1(1, 2, 1, 2) = 1$. Therefore, it is expected that ETFT-2 is less successful than ETFT.

(c) Example 3: Fickle Tit-for-Tat strategy

Here, we introduce another memory-two ZD strategy which can be called as fickle Tit-for-Tat (FTFT) strategy. In this subsection, we assume $2R > T + S$, which corresponds to the condition that mutual cooperation is favorable than the period-two sequence $(1, 2) \rightarrow (2, 1) \rightarrow (1, 2) \rightarrow \cdots$ [18]. We consider the situation that player 1 takes the following memory-two strategy:

$$
T_1 (1) = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 1 - \frac{T + S}{2\pi} & 1 - \frac{T + S}{2\pi} & 1 - \frac{P}{\pi} \\
1 & \frac{T + S}{2\pi} & \frac{T + S}{2\pi} & \frac{P}{\pi} \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix}.
$$

(4.15)
Then, we find that her PD matrix is

\[
\hat{T}_1 (1) = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -1 & -T + S & T + S & -P \\ 1 & T + S & 2T & -S \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}
\] (4.16)

and it satisfies

\[
\hat{T}_1 (1|\sigma', \sigma'') = \frac{1}{2R(T - S)} \left[ s_1(\sigma')s_2(\sigma'') - s_2(\sigma')s_1(\sigma'') + s_1(\sigma')s_1(\sigma'') - s_2(\sigma')s_2(\sigma'') \right].
\] (4.17)

Therefore, it is also memory-two ZD strategy, which enforces

\[
0 = \langle s_1(\sigma(t + 1))s_2(\sigma(t))\rangle^{(at)} - \langle s_2(\sigma(t + 1))s_1(\sigma(t))\rangle^{(at)} + \langle s_1(\sigma(t + 1))s_1(\sigma(t))\rangle^{(st)} - \langle s_2(\sigma(t + 1))s_2(\sigma(t))\rangle^{(st)}. \tag{4.18}
\]

This linear relation can be regarded as another type of fairness condition between two players. One can compare the strategy matrix of FTFT (4.15) with that of TFT (4.10). FTFT can take a different action from TFT with finite probability when the previous state is (1, 2) or (2, 1).

We provide numerical results about the FTFT strategy. Parameters and strategies of player 2 are set to the same values as those in the previous subsections. In Fig. 4, we display the result of numerical simulation of one sample. We confirm that the linear relation (4.18) holds for all \( q \).

(d) Example 4: Extended zero-sum strategy

Here we assume that \( 2R > T + S \) and \( 2P < T + S \). In memory-one strategies, there exists the following memory-one ZD strategy:

\[
T_1 (1) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{1 - 2R - (T + S)}{A} & \frac{1 - 2R - (T + S)}{A} & \frac{1 - 2R - (T + S)}{A} & \frac{1 - 2R - (T + S)}{A} \\ \frac{1}{(T + S) - 2P} & \frac{1}{(T + S) - 2P} & \frac{1}{(T + S) - 2P} & \frac{1}{(T + S) - 2P} \end{pmatrix}
\] (4.19)

where we have introduced

\[
A := \max \{2R - (T + S), (T + S) - 2P\}. \tag{4.20}
\]
Figure 5. Time-averaged payoffs of two players $\sum_{t'=1}^t s_a(\sigma(t'))/t$ and correlation functions $\sum_{t'=1}^t s_a(\sigma(t')) s_b(\sigma(t'-1))/t$ with $t=100000$ for various $q$ when strategy of player 1 is given by Eq. (4.23). The red line corresponds to the right-hand side of Eq. (4.25).

Because this strategy satisfies

$$T_1(1|\sigma',\sigma'') = -\frac{1}{A} \left\{ s_1(\sigma') + s_2(\sigma') - (T + S) \right\},$$

it unilaterally enforces

$$0 = \langle s_1 \rangle_{(st)} + \langle s_2 \rangle_{(st)} - (T + S).$$

Since this relation means that the sum of average payoffs of two players is fixed, this ZD strategy can be called as Zero-sum Strategy (ZSS).

As an extension of ZSS, we can consider the following memory-two strategy:

$$T_1(1) = \begin{pmatrix}
1 - \frac{2R}{A} & 1 - \frac{T+S}{2R} & 1 - \frac{T+S}{2R} & 1 - \frac{P}{R} \\
1 - \frac{2R}{A} & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\frac{T+S}{2R} & (T+S) - 2P & (T+S) - 2P & \frac{P}{R} (T+S) - 2P
\end{pmatrix}$$

(4.23)

Then, we find that a PD matrix of the player can be rewritten as

$$\tilde{T}_1(1|\sigma',\sigma'') = -\frac{1}{2RA} \left\{ s_1(\sigma') + s_2(\sigma') - (T + S) \right\} \left\{ s_1(\sigma'') + s_2(\sigma'') \right\}.$$  

(4.24)

Therefore, this strategy is a memory-two ZD strategy enforcing

$$0 = \langle s_1(\sigma(t+1)) s_1(\sigma(t)) \rangle_{(st)} + \langle s_2(\sigma(t+1)) s_2(\sigma(t)) \rangle_{(st)}$$

$$+ \langle s_1(\sigma(t+1)) s_2(\sigma(t)) \rangle_{(st)} + \langle s_2(\sigma(t+1)) s_1(\sigma(t)) \rangle_{(st)}$$

$$- (T + S) \left\{ \langle s_1 \rangle_{(st)} + \langle s_2 \rangle_{(st)} \right\}.$$  

(4.25)

Because this strategy can be regarded as an extension of ZSS, we call this strategy as extended Zero-sum Strategy (EZSS).

In Fig. 5, we display the result of numerical simulation of one sample, where parameters are set to the same values as before. We can check that Eq. (4.25) indeed holds for all $q$. 
(e) Remark

As in memory-one cases [18], possible memory-two ZD strategies are restricted by the sign of each component of matrix $T^1(1)$, because $T^1(1|\sigma', \sigma'')$ is probability for all $(\sigma', \sigma'')$ and must be $0 \leq T^1(1|\sigma', \sigma'') \leq 1$. For example, memory-two ZD strategy of player 1 satisfying
\[
\hat{T}^1(1|\sigma', \sigma'') = -\frac{1}{(T - P)(T - S)} [s_1(\sigma') - P] [s_2(\sigma'') - S],
\]
does not exist.

5. Extension to memory-$n$ case

In this section, we discuss that extension of ZD strategies to memory-$n$ ($n \geq 2$) case. By using technique of this paper, extension of Akin’s lemma (3.5) to longer-memory case is straightforward. Therefore, extension of the concept of ZD strategies to longer-memory case is also straightforward. For memory-$n$ case, the time evolution is described by the Markov chain
\[
P\left(\sigma, \sigma^{(-1)}, \ldots, \sigma^{(-n+1)}, t + 1\right) = \sum_{\sigma^{(-n)}} T\left(\sigma|\sigma^{(-1)}, \ldots, \sigma^{(-n)}\right) P\left(\sigma^{(-1)}, \ldots, \sigma^{(-n)}, t\right)
\]
with the transition probability
\[
T\left(\sigma|\sigma^{(-1)}, \ldots, \sigma^{(-n)}\right) := \prod_{a=1}^{N} T_a\left(\sigma_a|\sigma^{(-1)}, \ldots, \sigma^{(-n)}\right).
\]
Then, by taking summation of the both sides of the stationary condition with respect to $\sigma_{-a}$, $\sigma^{(-1)}, \ldots, \sigma^{(-n+1)}$, we obtain the extended Akin’s lemma:
\[
0 = \sum_{\sigma^{(-1)}} \cdots \sum_{\sigma^{(-n)}} \hat{T}_a\left(\sigma_a|\sigma^{(-1)}, \ldots, \sigma^{(-n)}\right) P^{(st)}\left(\sigma^{(-1)}, \ldots, \sigma^{(-n)}\right)
\]
with
\[
\hat{T}_a\left(\sigma_a|\sigma^{(-1)}, \ldots, \sigma^{(-n)}\right) := T_a\left(\sigma_a|\sigma^{(-1)}, \ldots, \sigma^{(-n)}\right) - \delta_{\sigma_a, \sigma^{(-1)}},
\]
which can be called a Press-Dyson tensor. When player $a$ chooses her strategy as her Press-Dyson tensors satisfy
\[
\sum_{\sigma_a} c_{\sigma_a} \hat{T}_a\left(\sigma_a|\sigma^{(-1)}, \ldots, \sigma^{(-n)}\right)
\]
\[
= \sum_{b^{(-1)}=0}^{N} \cdots \sum_{b^{(-n)}=0}^{N} \alpha_{b^{(-1)}, \ldots, b^{(-n)}} s_{b^{(-1)}} \left(\sigma^{(-1)}\right) \cdots s_{b^{(-n)}} \left(\sigma^{(-n)}\right)
\]
with some coefficients $\{c_{\sigma_a}\}$ and $\{\alpha_{b^{(-1)}, \ldots, b^{(-n)}}\}$, she unilaterally enforces a linear relation
\[
0 = \sum_{b^{(-1)}=0}^{N} \cdots \sum_{b^{(-n)}=0}^{N} \alpha_{b^{(-1)}, \ldots, b^{(-n)}} \left(s_{b^{(-1)}} \left(\sigma(t + n - 1)\right) \cdots s_{b^{(-n)}} \left(\sigma(t)\right)\right)^{(st)}.
\]
This is memory-$n$ ZD strategy. In other words, in memory-$n$ ZD strategies, linear relations between correlation functions of payoffs during time span $n$ are unilaterally enforced. Constructing useful examples of memory-$n$ ZD strategies with $n \geq 2$ in the prisoner’s dilemma game is a subject of future work.
6. Concluding remarks

In this paper, we extended the concept of zero-determinant strategies in repeated games to memory-two strategies. Memory-two ZD strategies unilaterally enforce linear relations between correlation functions of payoffs and payoffs at the previous round. We provided examples of memory-two ZD strategies in prisoner’s dilemma game. Some of them can be regarded as variants of TFT strategy. We also discussed that extension of ZD strategies to memory-$n$ ($n \geq 2$) case is straightforward.

Before ending this paper, we make two remarks. First, in our numerical simulations, we investigated only simple situations which correspond to well-mixed populations and without evolutionary behavior. It has been known that evolutionary behavior can drastically change when populations are structured [50–52]. Therefore, investigating performance of our variants of the TFT strategy in evolutionary game theory in well-mixed populations and structured populations is an important future problem.

Second remark is related to the length of memory. Recently, it has been found that long memory can promote cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game [53,54]. Our variants of the TFT strategy may promote cooperation because they are constructed based on TFT. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 4, ETFT has several properties in common with TFT-A TFT [42], which is successful under implementation errors. Investigating which extension of TFT is the most successful is a significant problem. Additionally, whether TFT-A TFT is memory-two ZD strategy or not should be studied.

Ethics. Nothing to declare

Data Accessibility. This article has no additional data.

Authors’ Contributions.

Competing Interests. The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

Funding. This study was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP20K19884.

Acknowledgements.

Disclaimer. Insert disclaimer text here.
References

1. Fudenberg D, Tirole J. 1991 Game Theory. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
2. Osborne MJ, Rubinstein A. 1994 A Course in Game Theory. Massachusetts: MIT press.
3. Smith JM, Price GR. 1973 The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246, 15.
4. Nowak MA, Sigmund K. 1992 Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature 355, 250–253.
5. Nowak M, Sigmund K. 1993 A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Nature 364, 56–58.
6. Bergstrom CT, Lachmann M. 2003 The Red King effect: when the slowest runner wins the coevolutionary race. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100, 593–598.
7. Imhof LA, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA. 2005 Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102, 10797–10800.
8. Nowak MA. 2006 Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314, 1560–1563.
9. Imhof LA, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA. 2007 Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?. Journal of theoretical biology 247, 574–580.
10. Imhof LA, Nowak MA. 2010 Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 277, 463–468.
11. Szolnoki A, Chen X. 2020 Strategy dependent learning activity in cyclic dominant systems. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 138, 109935.
12. Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. 2018 Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour 2, 469.
13. Friedman JW. 1971 A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. The Review of Economic Studies 38, 1–12.
14. Rapoport A, Chammah AM, Orwant CJ. 1965 Prisoner’s dilemma: A study in conflict and cooperation vol. 165. University of Michigan press.
15. Axelrod R, Hamilton WD. 1981 The evolution of cooperation. Science 211, 1390–1396.
16. Szolnoki A, Perc M, Szabó G. 2009 Phase diagrams for three-strategy evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games on regular graphs. Physical Review E 80, 056104.
17. Duersch P, Oechssler J, Schipper BC. 2014 When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?. International Journal of Game Theory 43, 25–36.
18. Press WH, Dyson FJ. 2012 Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109, 10409–10413.
19. Hilbe C, Nowak MA, Sigmund K. 2013 Evolution of extortion in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, 6913–6918.
20. Adami C, Hintze A. 2013 Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything. Nature Communications 4, 1–8.
21. Stewart AJ, Plotkin JB. 2013 From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, 15348–15353.
22. Hilbe C, Nowak MA, Traulsen A. 2013 Adaptive Dynamics of Extortion and Compliance. PLOS ONE 8, 1–9.
23. Stewart AJ, Plotkin JB. 2012 Extortion and cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109, 10134–10135.
24. Szolnoki A, Perc M. 2014 Evolution of extortion in structured populations. Physical Review E 89, 022804.
25. Hilbe C, Wu B, Traulsen A, Nowak MA. 2014 Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, 16425–16430.
26. Pan L, Hao D, Rong Z, Zhou T. 2015 Zero-determinant strategies in iterated public goods game. Scientific reports 5, 13096.
27. Guo JL. 2014 Zero-determinant strategies in iterated multi-strategy games. arXiv preprint arXiv:1409.1786.
28. McAvoy A, Hauert C. 2016 Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spaces. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, 3573–3578.
29. He X, Dai H, Ning P, Dutta R. 2016 Zero-determinant strategies for multi-player multi-action iterated games. IEEE Signal Processing Letters 23, 311–315.
30. Ueda M, Tanaka T. 2020 Linear algebraic structure of zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. *PLOS ONE* 15, e0230973.
31. Hao D, Rong Z, Zhou T. 2015 Extortion under uncertainty: Zero-determinant strategies in noisy games. *Phys. Rev. E* 91, 052803.
32. Mamiya A, Ichinose G. 2019 Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. *Journal of Theoretical Biology* 477, 63–76.
33. Hilbe C, Traulsen A, Sigmund K. 2015 Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. *Games and Economic Behavior* 92, 41–52.
34. Ichinose G, Masuda N. 2018 Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games. *Journal of Theoretical Biology* 438, 61–77.
35. Mamiya A, Ichinose G. 2020 Zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games. *Phys. Rev. E* 102, 032115.
36. Taha MA, Ghoneim A. 2020 Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games. *Applied Mathematics and Computation* 369, 124862.
37. Hilbe C, Röhl T, Milinski M. 2014 Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner’s dilemma. *Nature Communications* 5, 3976.
38. Wang Z, Zhou Y, Lien JW, Zheng J, Xu B. 2016 Extortion can outperform generosity in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. *Nature Communications* 7, 11125.
39. Becks L, Milinski M. 2019 Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain. *Nature Communications* 10, 1–9.
40. Szolnoki A, Perc M. 2014 Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations. *Scientific reports* 4, 1–6.
41. He Z, Geng Y, Shen C, Shi L. 2020 Evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game with extortion strategy under win-stay-lose-move rule. *Chaos, Solitons & Fractals* 141, 110421.
42. Do Yi S, Baek SK, Choi JK. 2017 Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat. *Journal of theoretical biology* 412, 1–7.
43. Hilbe C, Martinez-Vaquero LA, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. 2017 Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 114, 4715–4720.
44. Murase Y, Baek SK. 2018 Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons. *Journal of theoretical biology* 449, 94–102.
45. Murase Y, Baek SK. 2020 Five rules for friendly rivalry in direct reciprocity. *Scientific reports* 10, 16904.
46. Li J, Kendall G. 2013 The effect of memory size on the evolutionary stability of strategies in iterated prisoner’s dilemma. *IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation* 18, 819–826.
47. Akin E. 2016 The iterated prisoner’s dilemma: good strategies and their dynamics. *Ergodic Theory, Advances in Dynamical Systems* pp. 77–107.
48. Akin E. 2015 What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. *Games* 6, 175–190.
49. Ueda M. 2021 Tit-for-Tat Strategy as a Deformed Zero-Determinant Strategy in Repeated Games. *Journal of the Physical Society of Japan* 90, 025002.
50. Perc M, Gómez-Gardenes J, Szolnoki A, Floria LM, Moreno Y. 2013 Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review. *Journal of the Royal Society Interface* 10, 20120997.
51. Szolnoki A, de Oliveira B, Bazeia D. 2020 Pattern formations driven by cyclic interactions: A brief review of recent developments. *EPL (Europhysics Letters)* 131, 68001.
52. Szolnoki A, Chen X. 2020 Gradual learning supports cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. *Chaos, Solitons & Fractals* 130, 109447.
53. Liu Y, Li Z, Chen X, Wang L. 2010 Memory-based prisoner’s dilemma on square lattices. *Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications* 389, 2390–2396.
54. Danku Z, Perc M, Szolnoki A. 2019 Knowing the past improves cooperation in the future. *Scientific Reports* 9, 1–9.