On the Relations Between Diffie-Hellman and ID-Based Key Agreement from Pairings *

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Abstract

This paper studies the relationships between the traditional Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol and the identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol from pairings.

For the Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara (SOK) ID-based key construction, we show that identical to the Diffie-Hellman protocol, the SOK key agreement protocol also has three variants, namely ephemeral, semi-static and static versions. Upon this, we build solid relations between authenticated Diffie-Hellman (Auth-DH) protocols and ID-based authenticated key agreement (IB-AK) protocols, whereby we present two substitution rules for this two types of protocols. The rules enable a conversion between the two types of protocols. In particular, we obtain the real ID-based version of the well-known MQV (and HMQV) protocol.

Similarly, for the Sakai-Kasahara (SK) key construction, we show that the key transport protocol underlining the SK ID-based encryption scheme (which we call the “SK protocol”) has its non-ID counterpart, namely the Hughes protocol. Based on this observation, we establish relations between corresponding ID-based and non-ID-based protocols. In particular, we propose a highly enhanced version of the McCullagh-Barreto protocol.

Key words. Authenticated Diffie-Hellman, SOK protocol, ID-based key agreement, ID-MQV, eMB

1 Introduction

In 2005, Boyd and Choo [7] and Wang et al. [35] noticed that there are some similarities between (pairing-based) ID-based and non-ID-based authenticated key agreement (AK) protocols. This study further investigate this observation. Interestingly, we discover much more than those researchers previously might imagined.

1.1 Proposed Novel Protocols

We discover some important substitution rules (see Table 3, 4) between the two different types of protocols. The rules enable a useful conversion between the authenticated version of the two types of protocols. By applying these rules, we present three novel protocols (namely, the protocols which are highlighted in bold in Table 1 and 2) which possesses remarkable performance and security.

1. The real ID-based version of the MQV (and, HMQV) protocol — ID-MQV. (See Fig. 12)

2. The enhanced MB (McCullagh–Barreto) ID-based protocol — eMB. (See Fig. 16)

3. The non-ID-based version of the SYL protocol — nID-SYL (See Appendix A, Fig. 18).

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Table 1: Corresponding Protocols (non-ID-Based vs. ID-Based)

| Protocol Type | Prot. Message | Auth. DH Protocols | ⇔ | ID-Based Protocols |
|---------------|--------------|------------------|---|-------------------|
| A0 Enhanced A0 | $T_A = xP$ | MTI/A0 | ⇔ | Smart [31] |
|              |              | (H)MQV | ⇔ | ID-MQV (See Fig. 12) |
| A1 Enhanced A1 | $T_A = xQ_A$ | MTI/A1 | ⇔ | Chen–Kudla [11] |
|              |              | (H)MQV-1 | ⇔ | Wang [33], Chow–Choo [10] |
| C0 Enhanced C0 | $T_A = xQ_B$ | MTI/C0 | ⇔ | MB-1 [20] |
| B0            |              | ECKE-1N [37] | ⇔ | eMB (See Fig. 16) |
|              |              | MTI/B0 | ⇔ | MB-2 [21] |
| C1 Enhanced C1 | $T_A = xF_{AB}$ | MTI/C1 | ⇔ | Scott [26] |
|              |              | Enhanced MTI/C1 (See Fig. 19) | ⇔ | Open Problem! |

Table 2: Corresponding Protocols (Broken and Repaired Ones)

| Protocol Type | Protocol Message | Auth. DH Protocols | ⇔ | ID-Based Protocols |
|---------------|------------------|------------------|---|-------------------|
| A0 Variant-1 | $T_A = xP$ | Reduced MQV | ⇔ | Shim [28] |
| Repaired Protocol | nID-SYL (See Fig. 18) | ⇔ | SYL [40] |
| C0 Variant-1 | $T_A = xQ_B$ | $K = (x + y + xy)P$ | ⇔ | Xie [39] |
| Repaired Protocol | $K = (x + y)P||xyP$ | ⇔ | LYL [19] |

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Bilinear Pairings

Let $\mathbb{G}_1$ denotes an additive group of prime order $q$ and $\mathbb{G}_2$ a multiplicative group of the same order. We let $P$ denote a generator of $\mathbb{G}_1$. For us, an admissible pairing is a map $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ with the following properties:

1. The map $e$ is bilinear: given $Q, R \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, we have $e(aQ, bR) = e(Q, R)^{ab}$.
2. The map $e$ is non-degenerate: $e(P, P) \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}_2}$.
3. The map $e$ is efficiently computable.

Typically, the map $e$ will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field.

3 Three Versions of the SOK Protocol and the Substitution Rules

We first focus on the SOK ID-based key setting [32]. We show that the static SOK protocol from [32] has two more variants, i.e., the semi-static and ephemeral SOK protocols.

Note that the figures given in the rest of the paper are all self-explaining.
3.1 Static DH and the SOK-NIKD Protocols

As observed by Boyd, Mao and Paterson [4] and Ryu et al. [25], the two non-interactively shared static secret from the Diffie-Hellman protocol [12] and the SOK non-interactive ID-based key distribution (SOK-NIKD) protocol [32] are $F_{DH} = abP$ and $F_{SOK} = e(Q_A, Q_B)^s$, respectively.

| Alice | Bob |
|-------|-----|
| long-term private/public key pair: $\langle a, Q_A = aP \rangle$ | long-term private/public key pair: $\langle b, Q_B = bP \rangle$ |
| $\text{cert}_A \rightarrow$ | $\leftarrow \text{cert}_B$ |
| $F_{DH} = aQ_B = abP$ | $F_{DH} = bQ_A = abP$ |

Figure 1: The Static DH Protocol [12]

| Alice | Bob |
|-------|-----|
| long-term private/public key pair: $\langle S_A = sQ_A, Q_A = H(ID_A) \rangle$ | long-term private/public key pair: $\langle S_B = sQ_B, Q_B = H(ID_B) \rangle$ |
| $ID_A \rightarrow$ | $\leftarrow ID_B$ |
| $F_{SOK} = e(S_A, Q_B) = e(Q_A, Q_B)^s$ | $F_{SOK} = e(S_B, Q_A) = e(Q_A, Q_B)^s$ |

Figure 2: The SOK-NIKD Protocol [32] — Static SOK

**Important observation #1**: $aQ_B \rightarrow e(S_A, Q_B)$.

3.2 Semi-Static and Ephemeral SOK Protocols

3.2.1 The Semi-Static SOK Protocol

It is well-known that the ElGamal encryption scheme [13] is derived from the semi-static (or half-static, half-ephemeral) Diffie-Hellman protocol [22]. Based on this seemingly obvious relation, we find that the Boneh-Franklin ID-based encryption (IBE) [3, 27] is derived from the semi-static SOK protocol (presented in Fig. 3). Note that Paterson and Srinivasan [24] also, independently, noticed the relation. However, they do not give the term “semi-static SOK protocol” explicitly (let alone the ephemeral SOK) and only uses the static SOK protocol, i.e. the SOK-NIKD protocol. We stress that the explicit classification of the SOK protocol, corresponding to the three version of the Diffie-Hellman protocol, is essential for the main result of this paper.

In the rest of the paper, $P_0$ stands for the public key of the private key generator (PKG), with $P_0 = sP$ and $s$ being the master private key of the PKG.
long-term private/public key pair:

\[ (S_B = sQ_B, Q_B = H(ID_B)) \]

**Figure 3:** The Semi-Static SOK Protocol

### 3.2.2 The Ephemeral SOK Protocol

The protocol is presented in Fig. 4.

**Figure 4:** Ephemeral SOK Protocol

### 3.3 The UM and the RYY Protocols

The RYY protocol [25] is build upon the UM protocol [1, 15]. The two session secrets of the two protocols are

\[ K = F_{DH}(xyP) \]
\[ K = F_{SOK}(xyP) \]

respectively. A common weakness of them is that they do not possess K-CI resilience [7, 35].

\[ \text{Later, however, we will see that in the exact ID-based version of the UM protocol, } xyP \text{ should be replaced by } e(xsP, yp). \] This creates an escrowable RYY protocol.
Alice
long-term private/public key pair:
\( \langle a, Q_A = aP \rangle \)

Bob
long-term private/public key pair:
\( \langle b, Q_B = bP \rangle \)

\[
\begin{align*}
&x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \\
&T_A = xP \\

&y \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \\
&T_B = yP
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&T_A \\
&T_B
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&F_{DH} = aQ_B = abP \\
&k = xT_B = xyP \\
&sk = H_2(A \| B \| F_{DH} \| k)
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 5: The UM Protocol [1]

Alice
long-term private/public key pair:
\( \langle S_A = sQ_A, Q_A = H(ID_A) \rangle \)

Bob
long-term private/public key pair:
\( \langle S_B = sQ_B, Q_B = H(ID_B) \rangle \)

\[
\begin{align*}
&x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \\
&T_A = xP \\

&y \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \\
&T_B = yP
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&T_A \\
&T_B
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&F_{SOK} = e(S_A, Q_B) = e(Q_A, Q_B)^s \\
&k = xT_B = xyP \\
&sk = H_2(A \| B \| F_{SOK} \| k)
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 6: The RYY Protocol [25]

3.4 The MTI/A0 and the Smart Protocols

For those who are unfamiliar with the MTI protocol family, we refer to [22] [4] [8]. The same design idea that produces the MTI/A0 and the Smart protocols was previously noticed, e.g. in [36], the authors used the term “Encrypt–Decrypt method”. Concretely, the MTI/A0 protocol is based on the standard ElGamal encryption, while Smart’s protocol [31] is based on the Boneh–Franklin IBE [3]. However, the relations between the computation of the two session secrets (c.f. the following observation No. 2) has not yet been identified before. The two session secrets of the two protocols are \( K = aT_B + xQ_B \) and \( K = e(S_A, T_B)e(sP, xQ_B) \), respectively. A common weakness of the two protocol is that they do not have perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
Alice long-term private/public key pair: \(a, Q_A = aP\)

Bob long-term private/public key pair: \(b, Q_B = bP\)

\[
\begin{align*}
x &\in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^* \\
T_A &= xP
\end{align*}
\[
\begin{align*}
y &\in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^* \\
T_B &= yP
\end{align*}
\]
\[
T_A \rightarrow T_B
\]

\[
K = aT_B + xQ_B = (ay + bx)P
\]

\[
sk = H_2(A||B||K)
\]

\[
K = bT_A + yQ_A = (ay + bx)P
\]

\[
sk = H_2(A||B||K)
\]

Figure 7: The MTI/A0 Protocol [23]

From our first observation, \(aT_B\) should be changed to \(e(S_A, T_B)\). Here we further notice that \(xQ_B\) is changed to \(e(sP, xQ_B)\), with the help of the master public-key \(P_0\) \(P_0 = sP\) [2]. Therefore, we get our second observation. Here \(Q_i\) \((i = \{1, 2\})\) are any publicly computable elements in group \(\mathbb{G}_1\), such as \(Q_A + Q_B\), \(Q_A + T_B\), with \(Q_A, Q_B\) being public keys and \(T_B\) being the protocol message sent out by Bob.

**Important observation #2**: \(aQ_1 + xQ_2 \rightarrow e(S_A, Q_1)e(R_0, xQ_2)\).

We summarize the above two observations with the following two substitution rules in Table 3.

---

2In [31], it was shown that under the SOK key setting, IBE also exists if the master public-key of the PKG is set to be \(P_0 = s^{-1}P\). We stress that this is also true with ID-based key agreement protocols, namely setting \(P_0 = s^{-1}P\) will not affect the correctness and security of the A0 type ID-based protocols (e.g., Smart’s, the SYL, and our proposed ID-MQV), all that needed is to replace the protocol message \(T_A = xP\) with \(T_A = xP_0\), and then adjust the computation of the session secrets accordingly.
Table 3: Substitution Rules for the SOK Key Construction

| Notations                     | Auth. DH                                                                 | ID-Based Protocols                        |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Static Private-key: \( a \)   | \( S_A = sQ_A \)                                                        | Static Private-key: \( S_A = sQ_A \)       |
| Static Public-key: \( Q_A = aP \) | \( Q_A = H(ID_A) \)                                           | Static Public-key: \( Q_A = H(ID_A) \) |
| Ephemeral Private-key: \( x \) | \( xP \)                                                               | Ephemeral Private-key: \( x \)           |
| Publicly-computable group element: \( Q, Q_1, Q_2 \) | \( Q, Q_1, Q_2 \)                                           | Publicly-computable group element: \( Q, Q_1, Q_2 \) |

Two Rules
Rule 1. \( K = aQ \) \( \iff \) \( K = e(S_A, Q) \)
Rule 2. \( K = aQ_1 + xQ_2 \) \( \iff \) \( K = e(S_A, Q_1)e(P_0, xQ_2) \)

4 Relations between Pairs of Existing Protocols

Applying the above two important substitution rules, we discover some unpublished relations between some pairs of existing protocols.

4.1 The MTI/A1 and the Chen–Kudla Protocols

The Chen–Kudla protocol [11] can be obtained by directly applying the above two substitution rules. In MTI/A1, the session secret is \( K = aT_B + axQ_B \). Therefore in its ID-based counterpart, the session secret is \( K = e(S_A, T_B)e(S_A, xQ_B) = e(S_A, T_B + xQ_B) \). This is exactly the Chen–Kudla [11] protocol!

| Alice                  | Bob                  |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| long-term private/public key pair: \( (a, Q_A = aP) \) | long-term private/public key pair: \( (b, Q_B = bP) \) |

\[
x \in_R Z_q^* \\
T_A = xQ_A \\
\downarrow T_A
\]

\[
y \in_R Z_q^* \\
T_B = yQ_B \\
\downarrow T_B
\]

\[
K = aT_B + axQ_B = a(T_B + xQ_B) \\
sk = H_2(A||B||K)
\]

\[
K = bT_A + byQ_A = b(T_A + yQ_A) \\
sk = H_2(A||B||K)
\]

Figure 9: The MTI/A1 Protocol [23]
4.2 The MQV-1 and Wang’s Protocols

Wang’s protocol \[33\] can be obtained from the so-called MQV-1 protocol by directly applying the above two rules.

We first review the famous MQV \[18\] protocol. Note that the HMQV protocol \[17\] is a hashed variant of the MQV protocol.

The MQV-1 protocol can be obtained by simply changing the protocol message \( T_A = xP \) to be \( T_A = xQ_A \), and then adjust the protocol accordingly. The session secret of the MQV-1 protocol is \( K = (x + ah_A)(T_B + h_BQ_B) \). Therefore in its ID-based counterpart, the session secret is \( K = e((x+h_A)S_A, T_B+h_BQ_B) \), this is exactly the Chow–Choo protocol \[10\] — a hashed variant of Wang’s protocol \[33\].
5 Obtaining the Real ID-Based MQV Protocol

5.1 Our ID-MQV Protocol

The session secret in (H)MQV is as follows:

\[ K = (x + h_Aa)(TB + h_BQB) = x(TB + h_BQB) + h_Aa(TB + h_BQB). \]

We let \( Q_1 = TB + h_BQB \) and \( Q_2 = h_A(TB + h_BQB) = h_AQ_1 \), then

\[ K = xQ_1 + aQ_2, \]

Applying Rule #2, we obtain the ID-based version of this protocol — ID-MQV, its session secret \( K \) is as follows:

\[ K = e(P_0, xQ_1)e(S_A, Q_2) = e(xP_0, Q_1)e(h_A S_A, Q_1) = e(xP_0 + h_A S_A, Q_1), \]

recall that \( Q_1 = TB + h_BQB \), thus we have

\[ K = e(xP_0 + h_A S_A, TB + h_BQB). \]

Alice
long-term private/public key pair:
\( \langle S_A = sQ_A, Q_A = H(ID_A) \rangle \)

Bob
long-term private/public key pair:
\( \langle S_B = sQ_B, Q_B = H(ID_B) \rangle \)

\[ x, y \in \mathcal{Z}^*_q \]
\[ T_A = xP \]
\[ T_B = yP \]

\[ h_A = H_1(Q_B, T_A) \]
\[ h_B = H_1(Q_A, T_B) \]
\[ K = e(xP_0 + h_A S_A, h_B QB + TB) \]
\[ sk = H_2(A||B||TA||TB||K) \]

\[ h_A = H_1(Q_B, T_A) \]
\[ h_B = H_1(Q_A, T_B) \]
\[ K = e(yP_0 + h_B S_B, h_A Q_A + TA) \]
\[ sk = H_2(A||B||TA||TB||K) \]

Figure 12: ID-MQV: ID-Based (H)MQV Protocol

If we wipe off \( h_A \) and \( h_B \), then the above ID-MQV protocol degenerate into the Shim protocol [28] which is given in Fig 13. However, the Shim protocols is totally broken by Sun and Hsie [29]. In 2005, Yuan and Li [40] repaired the Shim protocol using a very simple idea, namely just adding an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman value. The improved protocol is called the Shim-Yuan-Li (SYL) protocol (see Fig. 17) and was proven to be secure by Chen et al. [5]. In Fig. 18 we present the non-ID-based version of the SYL protocol — nID-SYL.
### 5.2 Remarks on the ID-MQV Protocol

| Alice | Bob |
|-------|-----|
| long-term private/public key pair: | long-term private/public key pair: |
| \( (S_A = sQ_A, Q_A = H(ID_A)) \) | \( (S_B = sQ_B, Q_B = H(ID_B)) \) |

| \( x \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^* \) | \( y \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^* \) |
| \( T_A = xP \) | \( T_B = yP \) |

\[ K = e(xP_0 + S_A, Q_B + T_B) \]
\[ K = e(yP_0 + Q_B, S_A + T_A) \]
\[ sk = H_2(A||B||K) \]

Figure 13: The Shim Protocol \[28\]

Our ID-MQV protocol has remarkable superiorities over all the existing ID-based key agreement protocols (from pairings).

1. From the format of the protocol messages, we argue that our ID-MQV is the real ID-based version of the famous (H)MQV protocol. As mentioned above, the Chow–Choo and Wang protocols are ID-based version of the so-called (H)MQV-1 protocols, which have different protocol messages.

2. Separating perfect forward secrecy (PFS) from PKG forward secrecy (PKG-FS). Note that PKG-FS also means escrowless. We argue that in some applications (as also pointed out by McCullagh and Barreto \[20\]) key escrow is a requirement or even, a must. However, if we
remove $K_1 = abP$ from the SYL protocol [40] to open escrow, then it become totally insecure (which is exactly Shim’s protocol [28]), let alone PFS. Our new protocol can be securely used in escrowed model (i.e., w/o $xyP$), providing PFS. When $xyP$ is added, the protocol becomes escrowless (and achieves PKG-FS, see Fig. 14). In a word, $xyP$ separates clearly PFS from PKG-FS, and our new protocol (ID-MQV) can be used with or without escrow.

3. Compared with Wang’s protocol [33] (and the Chow-Choo protocol [10]), our protocol does not need extra message exchange to close escrow, while the latter requires a party to send out an extra point. At the same time, brings extra computation for the party.

4. The new protocol can be further strengthened to achieve stronger security, i.e., to be secure in the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) model which allows ephemeral secret key reveal. (Using the same idea from [6].)

6 Beyond the SOK ID-Based Key Construction

Now we look at the SK key setting. For details on the key setting, please refer to [30] and [20, 38]. Here we note that the master private and public key pair of the PKG is $\langle s, P_0 = sP \rangle$. $u$ is part of a user’s static public key and for Alice $u^A = H'(ID^A) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$.

We discover that the key transport protocol behind the SK-IBE [30] is simply the ID-based version of the Hughes protocol [16]. This is mainly because the static private key of the receivers in the two protocols are both inversion-based. The substitution rules are listed in Table 4.

| Table 4: Substitution Rules for the SK Key Construction |
|---------------------------------------------------------|
| Notations | Auth. DH | ID-Based Protocols |
| Static key pair: | $\langle a, Q_A = aP \rangle$ | $\langle S_A = s + u_A \rangle^{-1}Q_P$, |
| Ephemeral Private-key: | $x$ | $Q_A = P_0 + u_A P = (s + u_A)P$ |
| Publicly-computable element: | $Q$ | Publicly-computable element: $Q$ |
| Two Rules | Rule 1. $K = a^{-1}Q$ | $\iff K = e(S_A, Q)$ |
| | Rule 2. $K = xP$, | $\iff K = e(P, P)^x$ |

Using the above rules, we can establish the relations between the MB protocols [20, 21] and the MTI/C0 and MTI/B0 [23] protocols (c.f. Table 1), the details are omitted here. Next, based on the enhanced MTI/C0 protocol (i.e. the ECKE-1N protocol), we propose a highly efficient ID-based protocol — eMB.

6.1 Review of the ECKE-1N Protocol

This protocol was initially designed using the ideas from MQV. It was later included in a Letter appeared in IEEE Communications Letters entitled “Cryptanalysis and Improvement of an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol” [37]. (Also available at IACR ePrint, report 2007/026.) The protocol is give in Fig. 15.
Alice
long-term private/public key pair:
\( (a, Q_A = aP) \)

Bob
long-term private/public key pair:
\( (b, Q_B = bP) \)

\( x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \)
\( T_A = xQ_B \)

\( y \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \)
\( T_B = yQ_A \)

\( h_A = H(Q_B, T_A) \)
\( h_B = H(Q_A, T_B) \)
\( K = a^{-1}(x + h_A)(T_B + h_BQ_A) \)
\( = (x + h_A)(y + h_B)P \)
\( sk = H_2(A||B||T_A||T_B||K) \)

\( h_B = H(Q_A, T_B) \)
\( h_A = H(Q_B, T_A) \)
\( K = b^{-1}(y + h_B)(T_A + h_AQ_B) \)
\( = (x + h_A)(y + h_B)P \)
\( sk = H_2(A||B||T_A||T_B||K) \)

Figure 15: The Enhanced MTI/C0 Protocol — ECKE-1N

6.2 The eMB Protocol

Applying the substitution rules from Table 3, we converse our ECKE-1N into an ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol which is the enhanced version of the McCullagh-Barreto protocol [20, 21] — eMB.

Alice
long-term private/public key pair:
\( \langle S_A = (s + u_A)^{-1}P, Q_A = P_0 + u_AP = (s + u_A)P \rangle \)

Bob
long-term private/public key pair:
\( \langle S_B = (s + u_B)^{-1}P, Q_B = P_0 + u_BP = (s + u_B)P \rangle \)

\( x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \)
\( Q_B = P_0 + u_BP = (s + u_B)P \)
\( T_A = xQ_B \)

\( y \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \)
\( Q_A = P_0 + u_AP = (s + u_A)P \)
\( T_B = yQ_A \)

\( h_A = H(Q_B, T_A) \)
\( h_B = H(Q_A, T_B) \)
\( K = e((x + h_A)S_A, T_B + h_BQ_A) \)
\( = e(P, P)^{(x+h_A)(y+h_B)} \)
\( sk = H_2(A||B||T_A||T_B||K) \)

\( h_B = H(Q_A, T_B) \)
\( h_A = H(Q_B, T_A) \)
\( K = e((y + h_B)S_B, T_A + h_AQ_B) \)
\( = e(P, P)^{(x+h_A)(y+h_B)} \)
\( sk = H_2(A||B||T_A||T_B||K) \)

Figure 16: The eMB Protocol

We remark that the substitution rules in the SK ID-based key setting can also be applied to the
SK variants, e.g. Gentry’s key setting [14] and the second Boneh-Boyen (BB2) scheme [2].

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A Obtaining an Authenticated DH Protocol from the SYL Protocol

The two protocols are presented in Fig. 17 and 18 respectively.

| Alice | Bob |
|-------|-----|
| long-term private/public key pair:  \( <S_A = sQ_A, Q_A = H(ID_A)> \) | long-term private/public key pair:  \( <S_B = sQ_B, Q_B = H(ID_B)> \) |
| \( x \in_R Z_q^* \) | \( y \in_R Z_q^* \) |
| \( T_A = xP \) | \( T_B = yP \) |
| \( T_A = xP \) | \( T_B = yP \) |
| \( K_1 = xT_B = xyP \) | \( K_1 = yT_A = xyP \) |
| \( K_2 = e(xP_0 + S_A, Q_B + T_B) \) | \( K_2 = e(yP_0 + S_B, Q_A + T_A) \) |
| \( sk = H_2(A||B||T_A||T_B||K_1||K_2) \) | \( sk = H_2(A||B||T_A||T_B||K_1||K_2) \) |

Figure 17: The SYL Protocol [40]
Alice
long-term private/public key pair:
\( \langle a, Q_A = aP \rangle \)

Bob
long-term private/public key pair:
\( \langle b, Q_B = bP \rangle \)

| Alice (long-term private/public key pair) | Bob (long-term private/public key pair) |
|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| \( x \in \mathbb{R} Z_q^* \)             | \( y \in \mathbb{R} Z_q^* \)            |
| \( T_A = xP \)                           | \( T_B = yP \)                          |
| \( K_1 = xT_B = xyP \)                  | \( K_1 = yT_A = xyP \)                  |
| \( K_2 = (x + a)(Q_B + T_B) \)          | \( K_2 = (y + b)(Q_A + T_A) \)          |
| \( = (x + a)(y + b)P \)                 | \( = (x + a)(y + b)P \)                 |
| \( sk = H_2(A||B||T_A||T_B||K_1||K_2) \)| \( sk = H_2(A||B||T_A||T_B||K_1||K_2) \)

Figure 18: nID-SYL: A New Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Protocol

B Enhanced MTI/C1 Protocol

This protocol can be easily derived from our enhanced MTI/C0 protocol (i.e. the ECKE-1N protocol) using the idea from [23].

| Alice (long-term private/public key pair) | Bob (long-term private/public key pair) |
|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| \( x \in \mathbb{R} Z_q^* \)             | \( y \in \mathbb{R} Z_q^* \)            |
| \( T_A = xaQ_B = xF_{DH} \)             | \( T_B = ybQ_A = yF_{DH} \)             |
| \( h_A = H_1(Q_B, T_A) \)               | \( h_B = H_1(Q_A, T_B) \)               |
| \( h_B = H_1(Q_A, T_B) \)               | \( h_A = H_1(Q_B, T_A) \)               |
| \( K = (x + a^{-1}h_A)(T_B + h_BQ_A) \) | \( K = (y + b^{-1}h_B)(T_A + h_AQ_B) \) |
| \( = (ax + h_A)(yb + h_B)P \)           | \( = (by + h_B)(xa + h_A)P \)           |
| \( sk = H_2(A||B||T_A||T_B||K) \)       | \( sk = H_2(A||B||T_A||T_B||K) \)       |

Figure 19: The Enhanced MTI/C1 Protocol