A CCA SECURE CRYPTOSYSTEM USING MATRICES OVER GROUP RINGS

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Abstract. We propose a cryptosystem based on matrices over group rings and claim that it is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.

1. Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem

The Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem is a generalization of ElGamal’s protocol. It is provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA). Moreover, the proof of security relies only on a standard intractability assumption, namely, the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman decision problem in the underlying group (see [2], [3]), and a hash function $H$ whose output can be interpreted as a number in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ (where $q$ is a large prime number). An additional requirement is that it should be hard to find collisions in $H$. In fact, with a fairly minor increase in cost and complexity, one can eliminate $H$ altogether.

1.1. Definition of provable security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.

A formal definition of security against active attacks evolved in a sequence of papers by Naor and Yung, Rackoff and Simon, Dolev, Dwork and Naor. The notion is called chosen ciphertext security or, equivalently, non-malleability. The intuitive thrust of this definition is that even if an adversary can get arbitrary ciphertexts of his choice decrypted, he still gets no partial information about other encrypted messages. For more information see [2], [3].

We define the following game, which is played by the adversary. First, we run the encryption scheme’s key generation algorithm, with the necessary input parameters. (In particular, one can input a binary string in $\{0, 1\}^n$, which describes the group $G$ on which the algorithm is based.) The adversary is then allowed to make arbitrary queries to the decryption oracle, decrypting ciphertexts which he has chosen.

The adversary then chooses two messages, $m_0$ and $m_1$, and submits these to the encryption oracle. The encryption oracle chooses a random bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and encrypts $m_b$. The adversary is then given the ciphertext, without knowledge of $b$.

Upon receipt of the ciphertext from the encryption oracle, the adversary is allowed to continue querying the decryption oracle. Of course the adversary is not allowed to submit the output ciphertext of the encryption oracle.

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Finally, at the end of the game, the adversary must output $b' \in \{0, 1\}$, which is the adversary’s best guess as to the value of $b$. Define the probability that $b' = b$ to be $1/2 + \epsilon(n)$, $\epsilon(n)$ is called the adversary’s advantage, and $n \sim |G|$.

We say the cryptosystem is CCA-2 secure if the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary is negligible. Note that a negligible function is a function that grows slower than any inverse polynomial, $n^{-c}$, for any particular constant $c$ and large enough $n$.

1.2. The Cramer-Shoup Scheme.

**Secret Key:** random $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z \in \mathbb{Z}_q$

**Public Key:**

- $g_1, g_2 \neq 1$ in $G$
- $c = g_1^{x_1}g_2^{x_2}$, $d = g_1^{y_1}g_2^{y_2}$
- $h = g_1^{z}$.

**Encryption of $m \in G$:** $E(m) = (u_1, u_2, e, v)$, where

- $u_1 = g_1^r$, $u_2 = g_2^r$, $e = h^m$, $v = c^d^\alpha$, where $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is random, and
- $\alpha = H(u_1, u_2, e)$.

**Decryption of $(u_1, u_2, e, v)$:**

- If $v = u_1^{x_1+y_1}u_2^{x_2+y_2}$, where $\alpha = H(u_1, u_2, e)$,
  - then $m = e/u_1^z$
  - else “reject”

1. **Theorem:** [2] The Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack assuming that (1) the hash function $H$ is chosen from a universal one-way family, and (2) the Diffie-Hellman decision problem is hard in the group $G$.

2. A CCA-2 secure cryptosystem using matrices over group rings

In [4], the authors proposed a public key exchange using matrices over group rings. They offer a public key exchange protocol in the spirit of Diffie-Hellman, but they use matrices over a group ring of a (rather small) symmetric group as the platform and discuss security of this scheme by addressing the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problems for that platform.

Here we propose to use a similar platform and show that a scheme similar to the Cramer-Shoup scheme is CCA-2 secure. Our protocol is as follows:

**Secret Key:** random $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z \in \mathbb{Z}_n$

**Public Key:**

- $3 \times 3$ non-identity matrices $M_1, M_2 \in M_{3 \times 3}(\mathbb{Z}_7[S_5])$ such that $M_1$ is invertible and $M_1M_2 = M_2M_1$
- $c = M_1^{x_1}M_2^{x_2}$, $d = M_1^{y_1}M_2^{y_2}$
- $h = M_1^{z}$.

**Encryption of a message $N \in M_{3 \times 3}(\mathbb{Z}_7[S_5])$:** $E(N) = (u_1, u_2, e, v)$, where

- $u_1 = M_1^r$, $u_2 = M_2^r$, $e = h^rN$, $v = c^d^\alpha$, $r \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ is random, and
- $\alpha = H(u_1, u_2, e)$. 

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Decryption of \((u_1, u_2, e, v)\):

If \(v = u_1^{x_1 + \alpha y_1} u_2^{x_2 + \alpha y_2}\), where \(\alpha = H(u_1, u_2, e)\),
then \(N = (u_1^z)^{-1} e\) (Note that \(u_1\) is invertible since \(M_1\) is chosen to be invertible.)
else "reject"

Remarks: \(M_1\) must always be chosen to be an invertible matrix, whereas \(M_2\) is just any matrix such that \(M_1 M_2 = M_2 M_1\). One must also decide what group \(\mathbb{Z}_n\) to use, i.e., \(n\) must be specified.

3. Adaptive CCA security for matrices over group rings

We aim to show, by using Theorem 1, that if for invertible matrices over \(M_{3 \times 3} \mathbb{Z}_7[S_5]\) the DDH problem is hard, then the previously mentioned cryptosystem is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. More formally,

2. Theorem: The Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem using the semigroup \(G = M_{3 \times 3} \mathbb{Z}_7[S_5]\) is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack assuming that (1) the hash function \(H\) is chosen from a universal one-way family, and (2) the decision Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in the group \(G\).

Before beginning the proof of the theorem we need the following two experimental facts.

(1) Given an invertible matrix \(M \in G = M_{3 \times 3} \mathbb{Z}_7[S_5]\) and random integers \(a, b\) and \(c \in \mathbb{N}\), it is not possible to distinguish between the distributions generated by \((M^a, M^b, M^{ab})\) and \((M^a, M^b, M^c)\).

(2) Given an invertible matrix \(M \in G = M_{3 \times 3} \mathbb{Z}_7[S_5]\) and a random integer \(a\), it is not possible to extract information about \(a\) from \(M^a\). In other words, the distributions generated by a random matrix \(N\) and \(M^a\) are indistinguishable.

We offer the following two experiments as evidence for the plausibility of the above facts. For these tests we used invertible matrices over the group ring \(M_{3 \times 3} \mathbb{Z}_7[S_5]\). For the first we chose a random invertible matrix \(M\) (see section 3.1.1) and random integers \(a, b\) and \(c \in \mathbb{N}\). We choose \(a\) and \(b\) in the interval \([10^{22}, 10^{27}]\) and \(c\) in the interval \([10^{44}, 10^{54}]\) so that \(ab\) and \(c\) were roughly of the same size. For each pair of resulting matrices \(M^{ab}\) and \(M^c\) we counted the frequency of elements of \(S_5\) appearing in each entry.

Repeating this 500 times for randomly chosen \(a, b\) and \(c\), we obtained a frequency distribution of elements of the group ring in each entry of the two matrices. From this we created the QQ-plots for each of the 9 matrix entries. QQ-plots are a quick and easy way to test for identical distributions, in which case the plots should be straight lines. As we can see from Figure 1, it appears that from the generated distributions it is not possible to distinguish DH pairs from non-DH pairs.

For verification of the second fact, we conducted a similar experiment, except in this case, for each of the 500 draws we varied all parameters \(N, M\) and \(a\). We again generated QQ-plots as shown in Figure 2 and these show that no information about \(a\) is leaked from publishing \(M\) and \(M^a\).

We are now ready to prove Theorem 2. The proof will proceed in a similar fashion as Cramer-Shoup’s original proof. We will begin by constructing an algorithm \(D\) to attack the DDH assumption. This algorithm relies on a probabilistic polynomial time adversary
Figure 1. DDH results for $M^c$ vs. $M^{ab}$

Figure 2. Results for $M^a$ vs. $N$

$A$ attacking our scheme, which succeeds with probability $p$, $\mathbb{P}_A(\text{Success}) = p$. Denote
by DH the set of valid Diffie-Hellman tuples \((M_1, M_2, M'_1, M'_2)\), and by \(R\) the set of all random tuples \((M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4)\). Then the algorithm is constructed as follows:

- \(D\) receives input \((M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4)\) from DH or \(R\)
- Pick \(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z \in \mathbb{Z}_n\) and a universal one-way hash function \(H\)
- The adversary \(A\) receives the public key, PK, which is
  \[
  (M_1, M_2, c = M_1^{z_1} M_2^{z_2}, d = M_1^{y_1} M_2^{y_2}, h = M_1^z, H)
  \]
- The adversary picks two messages \(m_0, m_1\) and publishes them
- \(D\) picks \(b \in \{0, 1\}\) and passes to \(A\)
  \[
  (M_3, M_4, M_3^z \cdot m_b, M_3^{x_1+\alpha x_2} M_4^{y_1+\alpha y_2}),
  \]
  where \(\alpha = H(M_3, M_4, M_3^z \cdot m_b)\)
- With this information \(A\) tries to determine \(b\) and returns its guess \(b'\)
- If \(b = b'\) return “DH”, else “R”

The proof is then verifying that this algorithm cannot attack the DDH problem. It is built from the following three claims.

**Claim 1:** \(|\mathbb{P}(D = DH|DH) - \mathbb{P}(D = DH|R)| < \epsilon\). This claim is trivially true since \(D\) is a PPT algorithm and the DDH assumption holds as verified previously.

**Claim 2:** \(\mathbb{P}(D = DH|DH) = \mathbb{P}_A(Success)\). If we are given a DDH tuple, then all decryption queries succeed for \(A\). Hence the output of \(A\) will match the choice of \(b\) with \(\mathbb{P}_A(Success)\).

**Claim 3:** \(|\mathbb{P}(D = DH|R) - \frac{1}{2}| < \epsilon\). Since \(\mathbb{P}(D = DH) = \mathbb{P}(A = b)\), the proof of this claim relies on the proof of two pieces. We need to show that for all decryption queries where \(u_1 = M_1^{r_1}\) and \(u_2 = M_2^{x_2}\) with \(r_1 \neq r_2\), the decryption verification fails with non-negligible probability. In addition to this, we must also show that assuming all invalid decryptions fail, the adversary \(A\) does not learn any additional information about \(z\).

We first start with the latter piece. If all invalid decryptions fail, then the only additional information \(A\) receives is when valid decryptions are performed. Thus, at the onset of the attack \(A\) only has information available that is given to him from PK, namely \(h = M_1^z\). If \(A\) submits a valid ciphertext \((u_1', u_2', e', v')\), where \(u_1' = M_1^{r'}\), then \(A\) obtains that \(h'^r = M_1^{r'}\). However, based on the results above, if we denote \(M = M_1^r\), then \(h'^r = M^r\) and the distributions of any random matrix \(N\) and \(M^r\) generated by \(r\) are indistinguishable, hence nothing is revealed about \(z\).

Furthermore, from the encryption information passed to \(A\), the only additional information \(A\) has is \(M_3^z \cdot m_b\), which leaves him with obtaining information from \(M_3^z\) and \(M_1^z\), i.e. solving a Diffie-Hellmann problem, which we assumed was difficult in our scheme setup.

We are now left with showing that decryption almost always fails for invalid ciphertexts. Suppose that the adversary submits an invalid ciphertext, \((u_1', u_2', e', v') \neq (u_1, u_2, e, v)\). Then we have the following cases:

**Case 1:** If \((u_1, u_2, e) = (u_1', u_2', e')\) and \(v \neq v'\), then the hash values \(\alpha\) and \(\alpha'\) will be the same, however decryption will certainly be rejected.
Case 2: If \((u_1, u_2, e) \neq (u_1', u_2', e')\) but \(a = a'\), then this means that \(A\) has found a collision in \(H\). But we assumed \(H\) was collision resistant, and since \(A\) runs in polynomial time, this can only happen with negligible probability.

Case 3: If \(H(u_1, u_2, e) \neq H(u_1', u_2', e')\), then we have the following system of equations where we denote by \(\log = \log_M\) and \(w = \log(M)\), and \(u_1 = M^r_1\), \(u_1' = M'^{r'}_1\), \(u_2 = M^r_2\) and \(u_2' = M'^{r'}_2\):

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad & \log c = x_1 + wx_2 \\
(2) \quad & \log d = y_1 + wy_2 \\
(3) \quad & \log v = r_1x_1 + wr_2x_2 + \alpha r_1 y_1 + \alpha wr_2y_2 \\
(4) \quad & \log v' = r'_1x_1 + wr'_2x_2 + \alpha'r'_1 y_1 + \alpha' wr'_2y_2.
\end{align*}
\]

These equations are linearly independent as can be verified by looking at

\[
\det\begin{pmatrix}
1 & w & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & w \\
r_1 & wr_2 & \alpha r_1 & \alpha wr_2 \\
r'_1 & wr'_2 & \alpha' r'_1 & \alpha' wr'_2
\end{pmatrix} = w^2(r_2 - r_1)(r'_2 - r'_1)(\alpha - \alpha').
\]

The above determinant is nonzero since we are considering bad decryptions and hence

\[
r_1 \neq r'_1, r_2 \neq r'_2, \alpha \neq \alpha'.
\]

Therefore, almost surely any bad decryption queries of this form will be rejected.

Thus we have shown from Claim 3 that the adversary \(A\) is unable to correctly determine \(b\) given a random tuple, which we saw is equivalent to our algorithm not being able to distinguish a random tuple from a DH tuple when given a random tuple. This together with Claim 1 shows that our algorithm cannot distinguish between tuples no matter what the input was. And finally, from Claim 2, we get that the adversary is unable to attack our scheme with an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.

\[\square\]

3.1. Parameters for the Cramer-Shoup-like scheme using matrices over group rings. Here we address two problems relevant to key generation in our scheme, namely, (1) how to sample invertible matrices and (2) how to sample commuting matrices.

3.1.1. Invertible matrices. Sampling invertible matrices can be done using various techniques. The first method is to construct a matrix which is a product of elementary matrices,

\[
M = \prod_{i=1}^{n} E_i,
\]

where \(E_i\) is any elementary matrix from \(M_{3 \times 3}(\mathbb{Z}_7[S_5])\). Elementary matrices can be of one of the three types below. In the matrix \(T_i(u)\), the element \(u\) should be invertible in \(\mathbb{Z}_7[S_5]\).
\( T_{i,j} = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 1 \\
\end{pmatrix} \)

\( T_i(u) = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & \ldots & 0 & 1 \\
\ldots & \ddots & \ldots & \ldots \\
0 & \ldots & 1 & 0 \\
1 & \ldots & \ldots & 1 \\
\end{pmatrix} \)

\( T_i, (v) = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & \ldots & 1 \\
\ldots & \ddots \ldots & \ldots \\
1 & \ldots & v & 1 \\
\ldots & \ldots & \ldots & 1 \\
\end{pmatrix} \)

We can then easily compute \( M^{-1} \) as

\[
M^{-1} = \prod_{i=1}^{n} E_{n-i+1}
\]

The drawback of generating an invertible matrix this way is that we do not have a good grasp of the randomness embedded in this process. In particular, how large must \( n \) be to generate a truly random matrix? Given that there are 3 different types of elementary matrices, does it matter in what order they are multiplied in and does the number of elementary matrices of each form matter? These are questions that have not been addressed and may influence the final invertible matrix generated in unknown ways.

Here, instead of the previously mentioned method of sampling random matrices, we propose an alternative solution. We start with an already “somewhat random” matrix, for which it is easy to compute the inverse. An example of such a matrix is a lower/upper triangular matrix, with invertible elements on the diagonal:

\[
M = \begin{pmatrix}
u_1 & g_1 & g_2 \\
0 & u_2 & g_3 \\
0 & 0 & u_3
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

Constructing the inverse of this matrix involves solving a matrix equation,

\[
M \cdot M^{-1} = I
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \begin{pmatrix}
u_1 & g_1 & g_2 \\
0 & u_2 & g_3 \\
0 & 0 & u_3
\end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix}
u_1^{-1} & g_4 & g_5 \\
0 & u_2^{-1} & g_6 \\
0 & 0 & u_3^{-1}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
\Rightarrow g_4 = -u_1^{-1} g_1 u_2^{-1} \\
g_5 = u_1^{-1} g_1 u_2^{-1} g_3 u_3^{-1} - u_1^{-1} g_2 u_3^{-1} \\
g_6 = -u_2^{-1} g_3 u_3^{-1}.
\]

We then propose to take a random product of such invertible upper and lower triangular matrices. Since these matrices are more complex than elementary matrices, it seems reasonable to assume that we arrive at a more uniform distribution sooner than by simply using elementary matrices. In our experiments we used a product of 20 random matrices,
where each term of the product was chosen randomly as either a random invertible upper or lower triangular matrix.

As mentioned previously, the benefits of this method are that inverses are easy to compute and that the chosen matrix already has a large degree of randomness built in. In particular, any element of $\mathbb{Z}_7[S_5]$ can be used off the diagonal, and any invertible elements of the group ring can be used on the diagonal. These of course include elements such as $nu \in \mathbb{Z}_7[S_5]$, where $u \in S_5$ and $n \in \mathbb{Z}_7$.

Finally, we note that the order of the group $GL_3 \mathbb{Z}_7[S_5]$ of invertible $3 \times 3$ matrices over $\mathbb{Z}_7[S_5]$ is at least $10^{313}$. Indeed, if we only count invertible upper and lower triangular matrices that we described above, then we already have $(7 \cdot 120)^3(7^{120})^3 \sim 10^{313}$ matrices.

3.1.2. Commuting matrices. Now that we have sampled an invertible matrix ($M_1$ in our notation – see Section 2), we have to sample an arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily invertible) matrix $M_2$ that would commute with $M_1$.

Given a matrix $M_1 \in G$, define $M_2 = \sum_{i=1}^k a_i M_i^1$, where $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_7$ are selected randomly. Then clearly $M_1 M_2 = M_2 M_1$. A reasonable choice for $k$ is about 100 as this would yield $7^{100} \sim 10^{85}$ choices for $M_2$, which is a sufficiently large key space.

3.1.3. Other parameters. As mentioned in the introduction of the Cramer-Shoup algorithm adapted to our group rings, we need to specify the value of $n$ for $\mathbb{Z}_n$. Based on experiments in our previous paper [4] we suggest $n \sim 10^{100}$. This seemed a reasonable choice of exponent since it both allowed quick computations and ensured that the power a matrix was raised to could not be figured out by brute force methods alone.

We also use a hash function $H$ in our algorithm as did Cramer and Shoup. The only requirement on $H$ is that it is drawn from a family of universal one-way hash functions. This is a less stringent requirement than to be collision resistant. The latter implies that it is infeasible for an adversary to find two different inputs $x$ and $y$ such that $H(x) = H(y)$. A weaker notion of second preimage resistance implies that upon choosing an input $x$, it is infeasible to find a different input $y$ such that $H(x) = H(y)$.

It should be noted that in their paper Cramer and Shoup also give details of their same algorithm without requiring the use of any hash functions. The modified algorithm is only slightly more complicated but relies on the same principles.

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