Secure and Robust Error Correction for Physical Unclonable Functions

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Editor’s note:
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) offer a promising mechanism that can be used in many security, protection, and digital rights management applications. One key issue is the stability of PUF responses that is often addressed by error correction codes. The authors propose a new syndrome coding scheme that limits the amount of leaked information by the PUF error-correcting codes.

—Farinaz Koushanfar, Rice University

An important aspect of improving the trustworthiness level of semiconductor devices, semiconductor-based systems, and the semiconductor supply chain is enhancing physical security. We want semiconductor devices to be resistant not only to computational attacks but also to physical attacks. Gassend et al. described the use of silicon-based physical random functions,\textsuperscript{1,2} also called physical unclonable functions (PUFs), to generate signatures based on device manufacturing variations that are difficult to control or reproduce. Given a fixed challenge as input, a PUF outputs a response that is unique to the manufacturing instance of the PUF circuit. These responses are similar, but not necessarily bit exact, when regenerated on a given device using a given challenge, and are expected to deviate more in Hamming distance from a reference response to the extent that environmental parameters (e.g., temperature and voltage) vary between provisioning and regeneration. This deviation occurs because circuit delays do not vary uniformly with temperature and voltage.

PUFs have two broad classes of applications.\textsuperscript{1,3-5} In certain classes of authentication applications, the silicon device is authenticated if the regenerated response is close enough in Hamming distance to the provisioned response. To prevent replay attacks, challenges are never repeated. This means the PUF must be resistant to software model-building attacks (e.g., learning attacks like those Lim described\textsuperscript{6}) to be secure. Otherwise, an adversary can create a software model or clone of a particular PUF.

If, instead of Hamming-based authentication as we’ve described, the PUF is to serve as a secret-key generator, only a fixed number of secret bits need to be generated from the PUF. These bits can serve as symmetric key bits or as a random seed to generate a public-private key pair in a secure processor.\textsuperscript{3} However, in order for the PUF outputs to be usable in cryptographic applications, the noisy bits must be error corrected, with the aid of helper bits; these helper bits are commonly referred to as a syndrome.

The greater the environmental variation a PUF is subject to, the greater the possible difference (noise) between a provisioned PUF response and a regenerated response.

Software model-building attacks are not a concern when a fixed number of independent secret bits are generated from the PUF. These bits, if noise-free, need not be exposed (for example, these bits may be one-way hashed prior to being exposed; in this case, model building of the PUF requires inverting the one-way hash), and therefore an adversary cannot construct a model of the PUF.

In perhaps the earliest reference to error correction in silicon PUFs, Gassend cited the use of 2D Hamming codes for error correction.\textsuperscript{1} (For more information on PUFs and error correction, see the “Related Work” sidebar.) Suh et al. had a more realistic view of noisy properties of PUFs and suggested the use of Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghen (BCH) code,
specifically BCH (255, 63, t = 30) code for error correction, where the PUF generates 255 bits, but because 192 syndrome bits are exposed in public storage, the actual key size is no more than 63 bits. This code can be used to correct 30 errors out of 255 bits but is expensive to implement. Maximum error rates for PUFs across environmental variations reflecting variations from real-life deployments can be as high as 25%, making straightforward use of BCH impractical—the codeword sizes required would be too large for practical realizations. For these high error rates, error reduction techniques must be applied prior to error correction. For example, PUF bits that are less likely to be noisy can be selected, and/or repetition coding can be used. Error reduction requires additional helper or syndrome bits to be publicly stored. These bits could leak information. For example, by using these syndrome bits, the adversary might obtain bias information that can be used to reduce the search space required to obtain the secret key. Information leakage via syndrome coding has not received much attention in practical PUF-based key generation systems.

Accordingly, in this article, which focuses on the use of a PUF and error correction techniques to generate cryptographic keys, we propose a new syndrome coding scheme called index-based syndrome coding. IBS differs from conventional syndrome coding methods, such as the code-offset construction using linear codes, in two main respects. First, by its very nature it leaks less information than conventional methods or other variants that use bitwise XOR masking. The key idea is to generate pointers to values in a PUF output sequence so that the syndrome bits no longer need to be a direct linear mathematical function of PUF output bits and parity bits. Under the assumption that PUF outputs are independent and identically distributed (IID), IBS can be shown to be what is known as information-theoretically secure (i.e., security can be derived entirely from information theory) from the standpoint that IBS does not contribute to additional min-entropy loss. In applying National Institute for Science and Technology (NIST) statistical tests for randomness, experimental results of a Xilinx FPGA-based implementation show that IBS has a high pass rate that is consistent with pass rates of NIST-recommended reference random bits, validating the IID assumption.

The second way in which IBS differs from conventional syndrome coding is that IBS coding, when used with certain classes of PUFs (specifically, those with real-valued outputs), has a coding gain associated with the soft-decision encoding and decoding native to IBS. Soft-decision coding yields a higher coding gain than its hard-decision counterpart because the coder takes advantage of the confidence information of the bits presented at its input to make better coding decisions. Experimental results with a Xilinx FPGA-based implementation show that IBS reduces error-correcting code (ECC) complexity by approximately $16 \times$ to $64 \times$, given certain design assumptions, while preserving the ability to correct errors across varied environmental conditions. A Xilinx Virtex-5 implementation showed no error correction failures when provisioned at 25°C and 1.0 V, and regenerated at -55°C and 1.1 V. Based on the number of tests run, the error rate is bounded well below 1 ppm (parts per million). We ran other conditions from -55°C to 125°C, at 1.0 V ± 10% as well, showing consistent results pointing to an error rate below 1 ppm.

**Index-based syndrome coding**

Consider a noisy pseudorandom source (one in which, for a given seed, the bitstream generated is predictable). Here, “noisy” means that the predictable bit stream could have some bit corruptions when regenerated. Examples of noisy pseudorandom sources include PUFs and biometric sources.

**PUF with real-valued output**

Now consider a noisy pseudorandom source with real-valued outputs. Each output value, rather than being a single bit (of 1 or 0), is instead real valued in the sense that the output value contains both polarity information (1 or 0) as well as confidence information (strength or confidence level of 1 or 0). One way to represent a real-valued output is to have each output value in 2s-complement representation. A $+$ sign bit (1'b0) represents a 1-bit PUF output, and a $-$ sign bit (1'b1) represents a 0-bit PUF output. The strength (or confidence level) of the 1 or 0 PUF output is represented by the remaining non-most-significant bits. Another representation of real-valued output is to show the PUF output bit in its native form (0 for a PUF output 0, 1 for a PUF output 1), and have a unary number of 1s representing output strength. Examples of PUFs with real-valued outputs include PUFs producing outputs resulting from oscillator comparisons with possibly selectable paths through each.
Related Work

Several recent papers have cited the use of error correction with physical unclonable functions to generate cryptographic keys. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) Physical one-way functions were implemented using microstructures and coherent radiation, and an authentication application has been described. Gassend et al. coined the term physical unclonable function and showed how PUFs could be implemented in silicon and used for authentication and cryptographic applications. Many other silicon realizations of PUFs have been proposed. It has been shown that some proposed PUFs can be modeled or reverse-engineered, precluding their use in unlimited authentication applications. However, the focus of our work is on generating a fixed number of independent bits from a PUF, which are kept secret, and therefore these modeling attacks are not relevant. The security of the error correction scheme that ensures reliability of these bits is the important consideration and focus of our work.

Efficient and robust error correction

Bosch et al. suggested using two-stage coding to reduce error correction complexity through heavy oscillator ring (see Figure 1 for an example of PUF using an oscillator/arbitrer hybrid approach).

Alternative approaches include synthesizing real-valued outputs from a PUF that outputs single-bit values. An example would be to take multiple readings of single-bit PUF output to obtain confidence information for that output value. The use of IBS with a real-valued PUF (RV-PUF) allows IBS to minimize information leak while increasing coding gain. If an RV-PUF is not used, information leak is still minimized, but coding gain benefits might be more limited.

Soft decision IBS encoder

Now consider a soft-decision encoder as Figure 2 shows. For each secret bit B, the encoder takes RV-PUF outputs \( R_{i} \), \( 0 \leq i \leq q - 1 \) and represents B as an s-bit index (pointer) \( P \) which points to an \( R_{i} \). Each \( R_{i} \) is a w-bit value that contains both polarity and confidence information—for example, a w-bit 2s complement number. \( R_{0}, \ldots, R_{q-1} \) forms a response segment \( R \). So each response segment \( R \) consists of \( q \) \( R_{i} \) values, and each \( R_{i} \) value is w-bits wide. An index \( P \) that is s-bits wide points to one of these \( R_{i} \) values in the response segment to represent B.

For discussion purposes, each B bit is enmapped using nonoverlapping sets of \( R_{0}, \ldots, R_{q-1} \). Output of the IBS enmapper \( P^{(B)}(\cdot) \) depends on RV-PUF outputs \( R_{0}, \ldots, R_{q-1} \), as well as on B. The enmapper applies one of a family of functions, \( P^{(B)}(\cdot) \)—which is indexed by the value B being encoded—to the sequence of device-specific values. For example, a 1-bit input for B has two functions, \( P^{(0)}(\cdot) \) and \( P^{(1)}(\cdot) \). Each function takes as input the sequence of pseudorandom values, \( R = (R_{0}, \ldots, R_{q-1}) \), and provides an s-bit index as an output—for instance, where \( q = 2^{s} \).

One example of an index-based enmapping function is based on the indices of the extreme values in the sequence:

\[
P^{(B)}(R_{0}, \ldots, R_{q-1}) = \begin{cases} 
\arg \min \ R_{i} & \text{if } B = 0 \\
\arg \max \ R_{i} & \text{if } B = 1
\end{cases}
\]
As an example of IBS encoding, let $q = 8$, $B = 1$, $R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1} = -3, -10, 25, 80, -94, -3, 8, -2$. In this example, $P = 3$ (pointing to 80), if the max/min criteria as we’ve described is used for $P^R()$.

$B$ is generated in a manner such that it is independent of $R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1}$. For example, $B$ can be derived from

- the same distribution that generates $R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1}$, with each response values IID. For example, $B = 1$ if $R_j > = 0$, else $B = 0$, with $R_j$ generated independently from $R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1}$ (e.g., $j = -1$, or another value where $j \neq 0, \ldots, q-1$).
- a random number generator (RNG).
- any source independent of the source generating $R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1}$.

We conducted some use cases using the PUF to generate $k$ output values. The polarity bits of these values are used (and magnitudes ignored) to form a $k$-bit secret. This $k$-bit secret is then fed into a conventional ECC encoder to produce $n-k$ bits of parity, where $n$ is the ECC block size.

In one use case, the $n-k$ parity bits serve as the $B$ bits, and additional PUF output bits (treated as real values) along with these $B$ bits are fed into an IBS encoder to generate the indices to represent these $n-k$ parity bits. In a second case, the $k$ bits serve as the $B$ bits, and conventional ECC is not used. Again, additional PUF output bits (treated as real values) along with these $B$ bits are fed into an IBS encoder to generate the indices to represent $k$ bits from the PUF. In a third use case, both the $k$ bits and $n-k$ bits serve as $B$, and additional PUF output bits (treated as real values) along with $B$ are fed into an IBS encoder to generate the indices to represent the entire $n$ bits, of which the first $k$ bits are from the PUF and the last $n-k$ bits are from the parity encoder. [The second and third use cases are described later in “IBS standalone (IBS-S)” and “IBS with additional ECC (IBS-ECC).”] The point is that $B$ can be any value, as long as it is independent of

Information leakage
The work we describe in this article is among the first to explicitly construct syndrome that leaks no information (specifically, syndrome that does not contribute to additional min-entropy loss) from an information-theoretic viewpoint. This work complements the work done by Dodis.\textsuperscript{10} In particular, when IBS is used as a replacement for the code-offset method using XOR masking, it can be shown formally that the syndrome does not leak additional min-entropy. This result, for example, can be used to derive $m'$ in a secure sketch (see Dodis’ work for definition of $m'$ and secure sketch).

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the additional PUF outputs generated that serve as $R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1}$. In fact, B can be derived from an RNG or any other source completely independently of the PUF generating $R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1}$, if an application can benefit from such an arrangement.

Soft-decision IBS decoder

Now consider the soft-decision IBS decoder shown in Figure 3. The RV-PUF regenerates the device-specific values as $R'_b = (R'_0, \ldots, R'_{q-1})$. The values are not exactly equal, but it is expected that the values $R'_b$ and $R'_f$ are at least approximately equal. As a result, the ordering by value is approximately the same, but not necessarily identical, as used in the encoder.
The IBS decoder includes an IBS demapper $B'(\cdot)$, which accepts the index value $P$ and outputs an estimate $B'$, which in normal operation is expected to regenerate the original value $B$. This regeneration is done by first applying a function $B'(P)(\cdot)$ to the sequence of values, $R' = (R'_0, \ldots, R'_{q-1})$, to produce a reconstruction of the value $B$.

One example of the demapping function $B'(\cdot)$ that is compatible with the maximum and minimum encoding function is as follows:

$$B' = B'(P)(R'_0, \ldots, R'_{q-1}) = \text{sign of } (R'_P)$$

and

$$\text{sign of } (R'_P) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } R'_P < 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } R'_P \geq 0 \end{cases}$$

In some examples, the decoding function is

$$B'(P)(R'_0, \ldots, R'_{q-1}) = \text{Pr}(B = 1 | P, R'_0, \ldots, R'_{q-1})$$

based on a probabilistic model of the encoding process, thereby generating a soft-bit regeneration of the original data.

Continuing with the example from the soft-decision IBS encoder, let $q = 8$, $P = 3$, $R'_0, \ldots, R'_{q-1} = -4, -11, 77, 84, -92, -8, 2, -1$. In this example, $B' = \text{sign of } (84) = + = 1$, which equals the original encoded $B$ of 1.

Note that these encoding and decoding functions can be understood to be compatible on the basis of the observation that in encoding, the device-specific maximum value is almost always the most positive (and in some rare cases, if all values are negative, the least negative), and therefore, that value's regeneration is expected to at least remain positive, even if it's not the maximum of the regenerated sequence. Similarly, the minimum value in encoding is expected to remain negative when it is regenerated. If further error correction is required, a conventional error correction codec can be instantiated with the IBS enmapper and demapper. In other applications, errors might be ignored, and comparisons based on a Hamming threshold could be used.

Two IBS configurations

We evaluate two IBS configurations here: IBS in a standalone mode (IBS-S), without other forms of error correction, and IBS with additional error correction (IBS-ECC).

**IBS standalone (IBS-S).** In this use case, the IBS enmapper/demapper is used without other forms of error correction. Secret bits are broken into $B_0, \ldots, B_{k-1}$ where $k$ is the total length of secret bits, each of which is encoded respectively using $P_0, \ldots, P_{k-1}$, by finding the max or min value [assuming max/min criteria is used for $P^B(\cdot)$] in each of the $k$ rows of $R_t$ values, as shown in Figure 4. If the PUF does not output confidence information (e.g., RV-PUF is
not used), a random selection among matching bits in the row of \( R_i \) values is then made, and if none of the bits match, a random selection among all the (non-matching) bits in the row is made. In a simple decoder example, \( R_{b_0}, \ldots, R_{b_{k-1}} \) is used to reconstruct \( B'_{b_0}, \ldots, B'_{b_{k-1}} \) by using each index \( P \) to select the appropriate \( R_i \) in each row and analyzing its sign bit.

As we will explain, IBS in standalone configuration (without additional error correction mechanisms), has error correction and error reduction capabilities that might be sufficient for certain classes of applications.

As an example, assume \( q = 8, k = 2, \) use of max/min criteria, and a simple decoder that looks at the sign bit of a PUF output value being pointed to by \( P \) to extract \( B' \). Suppose that at the encoder input we have

\[
B_0, B_1 = 1, 0
\]

\[
\text{Row}_0 = R_0, \ldots, R_7 = -3, -10, 25, 80, -94, -3, 8, -2
\]

\[
\text{Row}_1 = R_0, \ldots, R_{15} = 12, 8, -21, -3, -9, -30, 85, 34
\]

The output of the encoder will be as follows:

\[
P_0 = 3 \quad \text{(looks up max value of 80)}
\]

\[
P_1 = 5 \quad \text{ (looks up min value of -30)}
\]

Now, suppose that at the decoder input we have

\[
P_0, P_1 = 3, 5
\]

\[
\text{Row}_0 = R'_{b_0}, \ldots, R'_{b_7} = -4, -11, 77, 84, -92, -8, 2, -1
\]

\[
\text{Row}_1 = R'_{b_0}, \ldots, R'_{b_{15}} = 16, 12, -25, -1, -13, -24, 81, 45
\]

The output of the decoder will be

\[
B'_0 = \text{sign}(84) = + = 1
\]

\[
B'_1 = \text{sign}(-24) = - = 0
\]

thus recovering \( B_0, B_1 = 1, 0 \).

**IBS with additional ECC (IBS-ECC).** If additional error correction is required, IBS can be instantiated with one (or more) stages of other ECC (see Figure 5 for an example). A total of \( n \times q \) PUF outputs are generated, to derive \( n \) indices.

Note that the configuration in Figure 5 results in a soft-decision syndrome encoder/decoder system, even if we use a conventional hard-decision ECC encoder/decoder. IBS therefore produces coding gain associated with soft-decision decoders without explicit use (and added complexity) of conventional soft-decision ECC, as Maes et al. proposed.8

As an example, let us assume \( q = 8, k = 4, n = 7 \), the use of max/min criteria, and a simple decoder that looks at the sign bit of the PUF output value being pointed to by \( P \) to extract \( B' \). The BCH \((7, 4, t = 1)\) ECC used has the following generator matrix:

\[
G = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & \text{...} \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & \text{...} \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & \text{...}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Suppose that at the ECC encoder input we have

\[
B_0, B_1, B_2, B_3 = 1, 0, 0, 0
\]

At the ECC encoder output, we then have

\[
1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1
\]

This result is input to the IBS enmapper, along with

\[
\text{Row}_0 = R_0, \ldots, R_7 = -3, -10, 25, 80, -94, -3, 8, -2
\]

\[
\text{Row}_1 = R_0, \ldots, R_{15} = 12, 8, 0, -2, -1, -3, 85, 34
\]

\[
\ldots
\]
Row_6 = R_{48}, \ldots, R_{55}
= 3, 5, 8, -15, -31, 45, -15, 102

The output of the IBS enmapper will be

\[ P_0 = 3 \] (looks up max value of 80)
\[ P_1 = 5 \] (looks up min value of \(-3\))
\[ \cdots \]
\[ P_6 = 7 \] (looks up max value of 102)

Now, suppose that at the IBS demapper input we have the following:

\[ P_0, P_1, \ldots, P_6 = 3, 5, \ldots, 7 \]
\[ \text{Row}_0' = R_{48}', \ldots, R_{55}' \]
\[ = -4, -11, 77, 84, -92, -8, 2, -1 \]
\[ \text{Row}_1' = R_{8}', \ldots, R_{15}' = 16, 12, 1, -1, 2, 3, 81, 45 \]
\[ \cdots \]
\[ \text{Row}_6' = R_{48}', \ldots, R_{55}' \]
\[ = -1, 1, 2, -12, -38, 43, -13, 99 \]

The output of the IBS demapper will be (note the intentional bit error for \(B_1'\)):

\[ B_0' = \text{sign}(84) = + = +1 \]
\[ B_1' = \text{sign}(3) = + = +1 \]
\[ \cdots \]
\[ B_6' = \text{sign}(99) = + = +1 \]

The output of the ECC decoder will be (as a result of error correction):

\[ 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 \]
thus recovering \(B_0, B_1, B_2, B_3 = 1, 0, 0, 0\).

Design implementation

We implemented a design using IBS to derive secure and robust keys from PUFs in Xilinx Virtex-4 LX25/LX60 and Xilinx Virtex-5 LX50 FPGAs. The design consisted of three major components. First was a programmable IBS enmapper/demapper supporting 0th-order to 5th-order indices and built-in repetition-coder supporting 1×, 3×, and 5× repetition coding. The second component was a programmable BCH (63) encoder/decoder supporting BCH codes from \(t = 1\) to \(t = 6\). The third component was a physical unclonable function circuit (Figure 1) with 64 challenge bits.

Also included in the design were various debug facilities, including the ability to obtain raw oscillator frequencies. We used these to collect error statistics at various points in the processing pipeline, and to provide a direct user-chosen stimulus in various parts of the processing pipeline and to observe downstream behavior. The design complexity was dominated by the BCH (63) ECC decoding core, which had on the order of 400 registers plus supporting combinatorial logic. In one fully programmable and fully instrumented version of the design, the combined PUF-based key generator consisting of all three major components and debug facilities used approximately 1,000 slices in a Xilinx-5 LX50 device, or roughly 14% of the slice count.

This design has a large error correction margin. A design that does not require as large an error correction margin, and having fewer debug facilities and less programmability, will be smaller.

Security analysis

Here, we first show the shortcomings of conventional syndrome generation methods. Then we demonstrate how index-based syndrome is superior using information theoretic arguments. The theoretic results are then affirmed by empirical test results using a FPGA implementation and NIST statistical tests for randomness.

Conventional methods using XOR masking

Consider conventional syndrome generation methods, which typically perform logical bitwise XOR of parity information with PUF outputs. Assume the PUF generates \(n\) bits of information. The first \(k\) bits are fed into a conventional ECC encoder to produce \(n-k\) bits of parity. Syndrome bits are then formed by performing a bitwise XOR operation of the \(n-k\) parity bits output by the ECC encoder with the last \(n-k\) bits from the \(n\) PUF bits. If a PUF systematic bias exists, information is leaked via the syndrome. This is especially true if repetition code is used. Published experimental systematic bias values include 46.15% for a ring oscillator PUF, 23% for an early version of an arbiter PUF\(^8\), 49.97% for an SRAM-based PUF\(^9\), and approximately 10% for a flip-flop PUF\(^8\). The percentage represents bias toward 1. The ideal bias value is 50%, meaning 1s and 0s are statistically equally likely.

The simplest example of repetition code is a binary repetition (3, 1, 3) code. It repeats each bit three times, so that a 0 is encoded onto the vector
(000) and a 1 onto the vector (111), using a generator matrix:

\[ G = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \]

To produce a syndrome using XOR masking, a syndrome encoder performs logical bitwise XOR of these three bits with three PUF output bits.

Consider the case in which the PUF has a bias of 51%, meaning that out of 100 PUF output bits, an average of 51 bits are 1s. If a syndrome encoder performs logical bitwise XOR of a secret bit with a single bit of PUF output, and the result is 0, there is a 51% chance that the secret bit is 1 and a 49% chance that the secret bit is 0, and vice versa if the result is 1. Now if a syndrome encoder performs logical bitwise XOR of that same secret bit with a single bit of a PUF output, and generates additional syndrome bits by performing logical bitwise XOR of the same secret bit with an additional 99 PUF output bits, then if the secret bit is 1, the mask would statistically have 49 1s and 51 0s. Alternatively, if the secret bit is 0, the mask would statistically have 51 1s and 49 0s. Clearly, with repetition coding, in which the repetition encoder repeats the secret bit, bitwise XOR masking of the repeated bits with PUF output bits reveals an additive increase in information the longer the repetition code. In a binary repetition (33, 1, 33) code, where a secret bit is repeated 33 times, the resulting 33-bit syndrome produced using bitwise XOR with 33 PUF output bits would statistically leak information every time if, out of 33 bits produced by the PUF, 17 bits are 1s and 16 bits are 0s (51.52% bias) or vice-versa.

In general, if a binary repetition \((r, 1, r)\) code is used, a PUF bias of more than \(\lceil r/2 \rceil / r \) or a PUF bias of less than \(\lfloor r/2 \rfloor / r \) would cause the syndrome (XOR mask) to leak a secret bit each time, statistically speaking. Bits leaked can be calculated as follows, as a function of PUF bias and the repetition code used:

bits leaked per secret bit = \[
\text{abs}(\text{PUF bias} - 0.5) / \text{abs}(\lceil r/2 \rceil / r - 0.5)
\]

where abs is the absolute value operator.

For example, if a PUF has a bias of 0.51 (or a bias of 0.49), a binary repetition \((9, 1, 9)\) code would leak 1 bit out of 5.6 bits encoded. In other words, more than 1/6 of the information would be leaked though the syndrome.

**IBS approach, theoretical result**

Looking again at the IBS enmapper, we want to know whether \(P\) leaks any information about \(B\). \(P\) is assumed to be public information, and \(B\) is a secret bit (which, along with other secret \(B\) bits, is used to derive keys or seeds to generate keys).

\(R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1}\) is assumed to be private information (for example, a biometric reading, or outputs of a silicon PUF inside a chip). We assume that although the reading itself is not known to the adversary, he or she has possible access to other readings from other biometric hosts or other devices (his or her fingerprints and those of his or her cohorts, for instance, or reverse-engineered PUF devices obtained from, say, eBay). Accordingly, systematic (population) statistics (such as systematic DC bias), but not the statistical properties of a particular individual biometric reading or PUF silicon device, can be inferred.

Based on prior research, PUFs have interchip or interclass variations in that cross correlation of outputs from different PUFs are quite different, but possibly with some systematic bias. Therefore, PUF output response bits are often modeled as an IID normal distribution with mean \(\mu\) and standard deviation \(\sigma\). Use of an IID normal distribution to model PUF responses based on empirical data can be found for the arbiter-based PUF\(^6\) and for the SRAM PUF\(^\text{x}\) It is assumed, for the purpose of proof, that each of the \(n \times q R_i\) values generated is independent of one another. For example, each \(R_i\) could be derived from disjoint oscillator pairs, with no oscillator reuse in deriving different \(R_i\) values. We also assume that each chip provisions only one secret key or secret seed, and provisioning is disabled once the secret has been provisioned. Alternatively, the chip can be built with a fixed challenge to generate only one or a few secrets.

Now, consider the case in which IBS is used. It can be proved mathematically under certain assumptions, that there is no reduction in min-entropy even if a progressive application of an otherwise leaky code such as repetition code is used. Similar arguments can be made when IBS coding is applied with other forms of error correction. In this sense, IBS is superior in security compared to conventional XOR masking.

According to results in the “Mathematical Model for IBS Enmapper and Proofs” sidebar, revealing index \(P\) does not lead to a reduction in min-entropy in \(B\). This was proven without any assumptions about the distribution for PUF outputs, except that it is IID, meaning that even if there is a DC bias (or for that
matter, any higher-order bias), the proof still holds true. Furthermore, no assumption about $B$ is made except that it is independent from $R_0, \ldots, R_{n-1}$, implying that $B$ values can be correlated with one another (as is the case when repetition code or other forms of conventional error correction are used), and the proof still holds true.

**IBS approach, empirical data**

Experimental results derived from a Xilinx Virtex-4 implementation affirm the formal mathematical results. We used NIST statistical tests for randomness to analyze the randomness of syndrome encoder outputs ($P$) given certain sequences of input bits ($B$). Three-bit indices were used. For each input sequence, we analyzed 100 million syndrome bits (from $100/3 = 34$ million indices). These syndrome bits were formed by serializing concatenated 3-bit syndrome indices. Four test sequences, each containing 34 million bits, were injected into the $B$ input of an IBS encoder.

Specifically, the 0th-order DC sequences of all 0s and all 1s, and the 1st-order AC sequences of alternating 1010s and 0101s were used for $B$. For each sequence, 34 million indices ($P$ values) were generated. Each $P$ chose either the maximum value from the PUF output values if $B$ was 1, or the minimum value from the PUF output if $B$ was 0. In all, 367 million PUF output bits ($33 \times 8$ million) were generated for each test sequence, all from the same starting 64-bit challenge seed. So, each bit $B$ was encoded as a 3-bit index $P$ choosing the best of nonoverlapping 8 PUF output values.

We performed the analysis explained here before we had completely built the IBS hardware in the FPGAs, as a part of the design derivation and refining process. So, a large part of the design was emulated in software but using PUF information derived across four Xilinx Virtex-4 LX25 FPGAs. Each FPGA was used to derive a single RV-PUF, corresponding to Figure 1. Success rates for each of the 15 NIST tests across the four LX25 chips were comparable with the success rates derived from a NIST-recommended set of random numbers as input (see Table 1).

Results showed that syndrome bits are tested to be random, and thus it is difficult to infer input bits $B$ from indices $P$. More specifically, take note of the results of the 0th-order (DC) sequences:

- an input sequence of $B$ consisting of all 0s produces random syndrome bits, implying $Pr(P|B = 0) = 1/8$.

Furthermore, $Pr(P) = Pr(P|B = 0) \times Pr(B = 0) + Pr(P|B = 1) \times Pr(B = 1) = 1/8 \times (Pr(B = 0) + Pr(B = 1)) = 1/8$

Therefore, $Pr(P|B) = Pr(P)$ showing from empirical results that indices $P$ and input bits $B$ are statistically independent.

From the empirical results, we could also gain a level of confidence in the belief that the PUF output bits can be treated as IID. If they were not, it's highly unlikely that the syndrome produced (e.g., by applying $B$ consisting of all 0s) would be random unless somehow the silicon-based PUF could arrive at a strange distribution to make that the case. The empirical results therefore affirm the assumption (held by, for example, Lim and Maes) that the PUF output can be treated as IID.

Custom-constructed correlation tests analyzing syndrome encoder input $B$ versus output $P$ confirm results from the standardized NIST randomness tests. More than 95% of the correlation results were within two standard errors of the ideal uncorrelated value, and the few outliers that were present did not stray far from two standard errors away from the ideal.

**Coding gain associated with IBS**

Here we present empirical results in applying index-based syndrome coding to PUFs in devices representing two process geometries. Specifically, 90-nm Xilinx Virtex-4 and 65-nm Xilinx Virtex-5 devices were used. The results show that coding gain associated with IBS is significant. This has the effect of reducing total error correcting code logic complexity, and increases stability of regenerated PUF-derived secret bits across varied environmental conditions.

**Results on Xilinx Virtex-4**

Figure 6 shows the coding gain associated with using 3-bit indices and 3 x repetition coding. The PUF was provisioned under a nominal temperature of 20°C but under voltage variations of 1.2 V ± 10%. The left plot shows the error curve, black representing regeneration under nominal voltage and temperature (20°C, 1.2 V), and other curves showing regeneration under the four corners (voltage and...
Mathematical Model for IBS Enmapper and Proofs

We can define several random variables to mathematically represent elementary operations of the IBS enmapper. The mathematical properties for random variables are as follows.

For secret bit \( B \) (underlining denotes a random variable):
\[ B \in \{0, 1\} \text{ is generated such that it is independent of } R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1}. \]

Note: The case where \( B \) takes on the sign of (or is otherwise derived from and therefore not independent from) one of \( R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1} \) values (e.g., one pointed to by \( P \)) can also be proved to be information theoretically secure. For brevity, we do not include this case.

For response segment \( R \):
\[ R \in \text{[signed integer]} \] consists of \( q \) signed integers \( R_i \), 
\[ 0 \leq i < q, \text{where } R \text{ is independent and identically distributed (IID)}. \]

For pointer \( P \):
\[ P \in \{0, 1, \ldots, q - 1\}. \]
If \( B = 1 \), \( P \) is index of \( f_1 \) (\( R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1} = r_{q-1} \))
If \( B = 0 \), \( P \) is index of \( f_0 \) (\( R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1} = r_{q-1} \))

\( f_1(\cdot), f_0(\cdot) \) are functions that output one of the following values: \( r_0, \ldots, r_{q-1} \).
\( f_1, f_0 \) are such that \( f_1(\cdot) \neq f_0(\cdot) \), except in the trivial case when \( r_0 = r_1 = \ldots = r_{q-1} \).

\( f_1, f_0 \) are such that
\[ f_1(R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1} = r_{q-1}) = f_1(r_0, \ldots, r_{q-1}) \]
\[ = f_1(r_w(0), \ldots, r_w(q-1)) \]
\[ = f_1(R_0 = r_w(0), \ldots, R_{q-1} = r_w(q-1)) \]
\[ = f_1(R_0 = R_w(0), \ldots, R_{q-1} = R_w(q-1)), \text{ and similarly} \]
\[ f_0(R_0, \ldots, R_{q-1} = r_{q-1}) = f_0(r_0, \ldots, r_{q-1}) \]
\[ = f_0(r_w(0), \ldots, r_w(q-1)) \]
\[ = f_0(R_0 = r_w(0), \ldots, R_{q-1} = r_w(q-1)) \]
\[ = f_0(R_0 = R_w(0), \ldots, R_{q-1} = R_w(q-1)), \text{ where }\]
\[ \pi \text{ is an index permutation function}. \]

Examples of \( f_1 \) and \( f_0 \) include
- max and min functions;
- 2nd-most max and 2nd-most min functions;
- max deviation from mean and min deviation from mean; and
- max deviation from 0 and min deviation from 0.

For “index of” operator, if multiple indices produce the same \( f_i \) result, a random index among those indices is chosen; likewise, for \( f_0 \).

Now, consider an adversary who has possession of a certain pointer \( P \). The claim, stated simply, is that \( P \) leaks no information about \( B \). That is, \( H(B) = H(B | P) \), where \( H \) is a Shannon entropy measure. However, to be conservative and to allow results to be more readily adapted to the research by Dodis et al. in constructing secure sketches and fuzzy extractors, we also express our results using min-entropy:
\[ H_\infty(.) = -\log_2(Pr_{\text{max}}(.)) \]

Thus, we define average min-entropy per the work of Dodis et al. as
\[ H_\infty(X | Y) = -\log_2(E_{y \sim Y}[2^{-H_\infty(X | y)}]) \]

**Theorem 1:** \( P \) and \( B \) are independent, assuming the PUF has IID outputs and \( B \) is independent of \( R = R_i, 0 \leq i < q \).

**Proof:** To prove that \( B \) and \( P \) are independent, it is equivalent to proving that the probability of \( P = p \) remains the same regardless of the value of \( B \):
\[ Pr(P = p | B = b) = Pr(P = p | B = b'), \] (A)
since Equation A implies that \( B \) and \( P \) are independent.

\[ Pr(P = p) = \sum_{b \in B} Pr(P = p | B = b) \]
\[ = \sum_{b \in B} Pr(P = p | B = b) \cdot Pr(B = b) \]
\[ = Pr(P = p | B = b') \sum_{b \in B} Pr(B = b) \]
\[ \text{(using Equation A)} \]
\[ = Pr(P = p | B = b') \]

We first note that
\[ Pr(P = p | B = b) = \sum_{f \in f} Pr(P = p, R = f(B) | B = b) \] (B)
\[ = \sum_{b \in B} Pr(p = f(b, r), R = r | B = b) \]

Here, \( f \) unifies \( f_1 \) and \( f_0 \) into a single function, with an additional input \( b \) to direct \( f \) to select either \( f_1 \) or \( f_0 \).
As stated in Theorem 1, $\mathcal{B}$ is independent of $\mathcal{B}$; therefore, Equation B becomes
\[
\sum_{\mathcal{B}} \Pr(p = f(b, r), \mathcal{R} = r | \mathcal{B} = b) = \sum_{\mathcal{R} = r} \Pr(p = f(b, r))
\]
= \sum_{r \text{ s.t. } p = f(b, r)} \Pr(\mathcal{R} = r) = \sum_{r \text{ s.t. } p = f(b, r)} \Pr(\mathcal{R} = r)
\]
= \sum_{0, \ldots, q-1, \text{s.t. } p = f_{0}, \ldots, f_{q-1}} \Pr(\mathcal{R} = r_{0}, \ldots, r_{q-1})
\]
(expressing $r$ explicitly as $q$ values) \(\text{(C)}\)

We have now transformed the problem into proving that Equation C is independent of $b$.

Now, let's create a permutation function $\pi$, where the indexed entries for $f_{1}$ and $f_{2}$ are swapped. For example, if $f_{1} = \max$ and $f_{2} = \min$, the max and min entries are swapped. If there are multiple max entries, for example, a random one is chosen to be swapped; this is true also if there are multiple min entries. In the unlikely event that all values in $r_{0}, \ldots, r_{q-1}$ are equal, a random swap is performed.

Therefore,
\[
\bar{p} = f(b, r_{0}, \ldots, r_{q-1}) = f(b', r_{q(0)}, \ldots, r_{q(q-1)}). \quad \text{(D)}
\]

where the substitution of $b$ by $b'$ corresponds to the permutation $\pi$.

Now let $\tau$ be the inverse of permutation $\pi$ (to reverse the index swap).

Recall that Equation B = Equation C. Adding results from Equation D, we get
\[
\Pr(\bar{p} = p | \mathcal{B} = b) = \sum_{r_{0}, \ldots, r_{q-1}, \text{s.t. } p = f_{0}, \ldots, f_{q-1}} \Pr(\mathcal{R} = r_{0}, \ldots, r_{q-1})
\]
= \sum_{r_{0}, \ldots, r_{q-1}, \text{s.t. } p = f_{1}, \ldots, f_{q-1}} \Pr(\mathcal{R} = r_{0}, \ldots, r_{q-1})
\]
= \sum_{r_{0}, \ldots, r_{q-1}, \text{s.t. } p = f_{0}, \ldots, f_{q-1}} \Pr(\mathcal{R} = r_{0}, \ldots, r_{q-1})
\]

(since individual response $r$ are IID)
\[
= \Pr(\bar{p} = p | \mathcal{B} = b')
\]

thus proving Equation A and the independence of $\bar{p}$ and $\mathcal{B}$. Note that the result also holds for $\mathcal{B}$ representing a code word, and $\bar{p}$ representing the sequence of helper information (indices) for each code word bit. In this case, $\mathcal{R}$ represents all the PUF output bits necessary to generate all the indices, and $\pi$ and $\tau$ represent $f_{1}/f_{2}$ swaps corresponding to each code word bit.

Theorem 1 implies the following:

First, additional knowledge of index $\bar{p}$ does not leak additional information about $\mathcal{B}$ (that is, $H(\mathcal{B} | \bar{p}) = H(\mathcal{B})$). This is true even when the adversary is given the knowledge of statistical distribution for PUF output $\mathcal{R}$ and input bit $\bar{p}$. It's also true when $\mathcal{B}$ values are correlated with one another (e.g., as $k$ and parity values in the context of traditional error correction). Finally, this is true even if the PUF output distribution is not perfectly normal (or not normal at all), as long as IID still holds.

Second, given a population of PUFs, and an adversary who has broken those PUFs and gathered systematic (population) information, additional information of $\bar{p}$ on a new PUF does not aid the adversary, from an information-theoretic standpoint, in recovering $\mathcal{B}$ on that new PUF.

Third, $\bar{p}$ does not induce min-entropy loss on $\mathcal{B}$:
\[
\bar{H}_{\infty}(\mathcal{B} | \bar{p}) = H_{\infty}(\mathcal{B})
\]

Proof:

\[
H_{\infty}(\mathcal{B} | \bar{p} = p) = -\log_{2}(Pr_{\max}(\mathcal{B} | \bar{p} = p))
\]
= $-\log_{2}(\max(Pr(\mathcal{B} = 1 | \bar{p} = p), Pr(\mathcal{B} = 0 | \bar{p} = p)))
\]
= $-\log_{2}(\max(Pr(\mathcal{B} = 1), Pr(\mathcal{B} = 0)))
\]
= $H_{\infty}(\mathcal{B})$ (due to Theorem 1) \(\text{(E)}\)

Now, consider how much information about $\mathcal{B}$ in terms of min-entropy is revealed when $\bar{p}$ is revealed, when $\bar{p}$ is taken all possible values of $p$. We use average min-entropy measure as defined by Dodis et al.\footnote{Y. Dodis, L. Reyzin, and A. Smith, “Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data,” Proc. Eurocrypt 2004, LNCS 3027, Springer, 2004, pp. 523-540.}
\[
\bar{H}_{\infty}(X | Y) = -\log_{2}(Ep_{p}[H_{\infty}^{\text{min}}(\mathcal{B} | p)]
\]
In our example, $X = \mathcal{B}$, $Y = \bar{p}$, and $y = p$. Now, we compute the expected value over $\bar{p}$:
\[
2^{-\bar{H}_{\infty}(\mathcal{B} | \bar{p} = 0)} = 2^{-\bar{H}_{\infty}(\mathcal{B})} \text{ since } \bar{p} \text{ is independent of } \mathcal{B}, \text{ as shown in Equation E.}
\]

The same would apply for all other values of $\bar{p}$ (e.g., $\bar{p} = 1, 2, \ldots, q - 1$).

Therefore,
\[
\bar{H}_{\infty}(\mathcal{B} | \bar{p}) = -\log_{2}(Ep_{p}[2^{-\bar{H}_{\infty}(\mathcal{B} | p)]})
\]
= $-\log_{2}([q \times 2^{-\bar{H}_{\infty}(\mathcal{B})}] / q)
\]
= $-\log_{2}(2^{-\bar{H}_{\infty}(\mathcal{B})}) = H_{\infty}(\mathcal{B})$

Reference
1. Y. Dodis, L. Reyzin, and A. Smith, “Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data,” Proc. Eurocrypt 2004, LNCS 3027, Springer, 2004, pp. 523-540.
Table 1. National Institute for Science and Technology (NIST) statistical tests for randomness: success ratio for PUF syndrome indices.

| Statistical test | NIST input parameters | Success ratio (%) | Success ratio (%) | Success ratio (%) | Success ratio (%) | Reference random bits from George Marsaglia's Random Number CDROM** (%) |
|------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Frequency        | —                     | 98                | 100               | 98                | 99                | 98                                                           |
|                  |                       | 97                | 97                | 99                | 97                |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 99                | 98                | 98                | 97                |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 98                | 98                | 97                | 99                |                                                               |
| BlockFrequency   | 128                   | 99                | 98                | 100               | 98                | 97                                                           |
|                  |                       | 97                | 97                | 99                | 97                |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 98                | 100               | 100               | 100               |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 98                | 96                | 99                | 100               |                                                               |
| CumulativeSums   | —                     | 98–99             | 99–100            | 98–99             | 97–99             | 98–99                                                        |
|                  |                       | 97–98             | 97–98             | 99–99             | 97–97             |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 98–98             | 98–98             | 99–99             | 98–99             |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 97–98             | 99–99             | 98–99             | 99–99             |                                                               |
| Runs             | —                     | 98                | 100               | 99                | 98                | 100                                                          |
|                  |                       | 97                | 98                | 98                | 99                |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 98                | 99                | 100               | 88                |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 98                | 99                | 100               | 97                |                                                               |
| LongestRun       | —                     | 100               | 100               | 97                | 96                | 97                                                           |
|                  |                       | 99                | 100               | 99                | 100               |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 99                | 97                | 100               | 100               |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 98                | 100               | 98                | 98                |                                                               |
| Rank             | —                     | 100               | 97                | 96                | 99                | 100                                                          |
|                  |                       | 99                | 99                | 100               | 100               |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 99                | 99                | 98                | 99                |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 99                | 100               | 98                | 100               |                                                               |
| FFT              | —                     | 100               | 100               | 100               | 100               | 100                                                          |
|                  |                       | 100               | 99                | 100               | 100               |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 100               | 100               | 100               | 100               |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 100               | 100               | 100               | 100               |                                                               |
| NonOverlappingTemplate | 9         | 95–100            | 94–100            | 95–100            | 95–100            | 95–100                                                        |
|                  |                       | 97–100            | 97–100            | 97–100            | 97–100            |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 97–100            | 97–100            | 97–100            | 97–100            |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 97–100            | 97–100            | 95–100            | 97–100            |                                                               |
| OverlappingTemplate | 9         | 98                | 99                | 98                | 99                | 97                                                           |
|                  |                       | 99                | 98                | 99                | 98                |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 99                | 98                | 98                | 100               |                                                               |
|                  |                       | 100               | 100               | 100               | 99                |                                                               |

(Continued)
temperature extremes). It’s possible to infer from the data that for a block size of 63, application of IBS with simple $3/C_2$ repetition coding reduces the errors to correct from 23 bits (35.9%) to 6 bits (9.4%) for provisioning at 1.2 V ± 10%, 20°C, generation at four corners. Over 2 million autocorrelation runs were used to compile the right curve, indicating that the probability of seven or more bit errors is less than 0.5 ppm. This means that a BCH (63, 30, $t = 6$) corrects errors across

| Statistical test               | NIST input parameters | Success ratio (%) | Success ratio (%) | Success ratio (%) | Success ratio (%) | Reference random bits from George Marsaglia’s Random Number CDROM** (%) |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| Universal                      | —                     | 99 100 100 100    | 98 99 100 96      | 99 98 99 99       | 100               | 100                                                         |
| ApproximateEntropy             | 10                    | 99 99 98 100      | 100 98 98 98      | 97 99 100 99      | 99 100 99 99      | 100                                                         |
| RandomExcursions               | —                     | 98–100 94–100 96–100 98–100 | 97–100 98–100 99–100 97–100 | 100–100 97–100 96–100 96–100 | 98–100 98–100 96–100 100–100 | 98–100 98–100 96–100 100–100 |
| RandomExcusionVariant          | —                     | 98–100 96–100 97–100 98–100 | 98–100 96–100 97–100 97–100 | 97–100 95–100 96–100 95–100 | 95–100 94–100 95–100 96–100 | 93–100 93–100 97–100 96–100 |
| Serial                         | 16                    | 99–99 97–100 98–100 98–99 | 98–99 97–97 98–99 98–99 | 98–100 97–98 100–100 98–100 | 99–100 98–100 98–99 98–98 | 98–100 98–100 97–100 96–100 |
| LinearComplexity               | 500                   | 100 100 97 98     | 99 98 100 100     | 98 97 96 99       | 99 99 99 100      | 100                                                         |
| Cumulative p-values            |                       | (752/752) 752/752 | (752/752) 752/752 | (750/752) 750/752 | (188/188)         | 100                                                         |
| Cumulative proportions         |                       | (748/752) 747/752 | (749/752) 747/752 | (747/752) 747/752 | (184/188)         | 100                                                         |

*The first line is for the DC all 1s case; the second line is for the DC all 0s case; the third line is for the AC 1010s case; and the last line is for the AC 0101s case.

**http://www.stat.fsu.edu/pub/diehard/
these environmental conditions at an error rate less than 0.5 ppm.

We performed the analysis described here before we completely built the IBS hardware in FPGA as a part of the design derivation and refining process; consequently, much of the design was emulated in software but using PUF information derived across 12 Xilinx Virtex-4 LX25 FPGAs, each with a single PUF. An all-hardware design was then derived, after this analysis, to confirm the results of data obtained from partial software emulation. This (early) all-hardware design contained an IBS enmapper/demapper with fixed 3-bit indices and $3 \times$ repetition coding, a BCH (63) decoder hardwired to $t = 6$ bits of error correction, and a PUF circuit.

This design was tested in extreme temperature conditions and never failed over tens of millions of error correction blocks. We performed more extreme temperature and voltage stressing tests using an even more mature hardware design on Virtex-5 FPGAs.

This scheme, by using IBS with simple $3 \times$ repetition coding and $3 \times$ majority decoding, reduces the BCH complexity requirement. Instead of using a BCH (255) code, for example (as Suh suggested), we used a BCH (63) code, which has a $16 \times$ reduction in complexity. (BCH decoder complexity grows
approximately with the square of the block size.) However, as Suh’s research showed,3 the code does not correct across as extreme temperature conditions, and corrects across smaller voltage variations. If a BCH (511) code is required to produce an equivalent environmental robustness, there’s a $64/C^2$ reduction in complexity using IBS with simple repetition coding.

Results on Xilinx Virtex-5

IBS also reduces error correction requirements in designs implemented for Virtex-5 FPGAs. The design used was more mature than the one used with Virtex-4. Specifically, the Virtex-5 version had a higher degree of programmability and more sophisticated debug and data-gathering facilities.

Table 2 shows representative results obtained from one Virtex-5 device for a 63-bit block size. We performed provisioning at 25°C, at a nominal core voltage of 1.0 V. When regeneration was done at the fast corner (−55°C, 1.1 V), three bit errors occurred at 4.8 ppm, and four bit errors were not observed for more than 1.65 million blocks, indicating that the probability of four bit errors was less than 0.6 ppm. An ECC to correct three bit errors out of 63, based on this data, has a block failure rate less than or equal to 0.6 ppm. Alternatively, retry mechanisms can be used, or errors can be forgiven, depending on the application. Regeneration at the slow corner (125°C, 0.90 V) showed comparable results, but only 47,160 sample blocks were taken, so our results lacked resolution. We can safely say that if a $t=6$ corrector is used, block error rates are likely to be well below 1-ppm levels. Note that the result of applying $3/C^2$ repetition coding with IBS is even more dramatic, with a maximum of a 1-bit error in the data set (see the two rightmost columns in Table 2).

**Table 2. IBS test results for Xilinx Virtex-5.**

| Bit errors | I(3)* | I(3) | I(3) | I(3R3) | I(3R3) |
|------------|-------|------|------|--------|--------|
|            | P(25°C, 1.0 V) | R(25°C, 1.0 V) | P(25°C, 1.1 V) | R(125°C, 0.9 V) | P(25°C, 1.0 V) | R(−55°C, 1.0 V) |
| 0          | 54.0% | 59.5% | 47.0% | 55.5% | 93.3% | 94.8% |
| 1          | 37.0% | 23.9% | 40.0% | 35.6% | 6.7% | 5.2% |
| 2          | 8.9% | 16.6% | 13.0% | 5.3% | <= 0.27 ppm | <= 172 ppm |
| 3          | 133 ppm | <= 6.24 ppm | 4.8 ppm | 3.6% | <= 33.3 ppm | <= 0.6 ppm | <= 21.2 ppm |
| 4          | <= 33.3 ppm | <= 0.6 ppm | <= 21.2 ppm |
| 5          | None | None | None | None | None | None |
| 6          | None | None | None | None | None | None |
| Total samples | 30,015 | 160,185 | 1,650,060 | 47,160 | 3,668,205 | 5,820 |

- *I(3) = 3-bit Index; I(3R3) adds $3/C^2$ Repetition Coding.
- **P(.) = Provisioning conditions
- ***R(.) = Regeneration conditions

**IBS has two** major advantages. First, the technique can be shown formally (and affirmed by NIST test results) to be information-theoretically secure in that the syndrome does not leak additional min-entropy on the hidden secret bits. Second, the index-based coding technique, by its very nature, is robust. Error correction block failure rates can be easily driven below 1 ppm, which was empirically demonstrated in Xilinx Virtex-4 and Virtex-5 FPGAs. Future work
includes characterizing the stability of PUF-derived secret bits across a wider range of environmental parameters, for example, to account for aging and radiation effects, as well as adapting IBS to a wider range of PUF and biometric sources.

Acknowledgment

We thank Marten van Dijk of the Massachusetts Inst. of Tech. for his valuable input to the draft, especially for his contribution to the proofs in the “Mathematical Model for IBS Enmapper and Proofs” sidebar.

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