Handwriting: Feature Correlation Analysis for Biometric Hashes

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In the application domain of electronic commerce, biometric authentication can provide one possible solution for the key management problem. Besides server-based approaches, methods of deriving digital keys directly from biometric measures appear to be advantageous. In this paper, we analyze one of our recently published specific algorithms of this category based on behavioral biometrics of handwriting, the biometric hash. Our interest is to investigate to which degree each of the underlying feature parameters contributes to the overall intrapersonal stability and interpersonal value space. We will briefly discuss related work in feature evaluation and introduce a new methodology based on three components: the intrapersonal scatter (deviation), the interpersonal entropy, and the correlation between both measures. Evaluation of the technique is presented based on two data sets of different size. The method presented will allow determination of effects of parameterization of the biometric system, estimation of value space boundaries, and comparison with other feature selection approaches.

Keywords and phrases: biometrics, signature verification, feature evaluation, feature correlation, cryptographic key management, handwriting, information entropy.

1. MOTIVATION

Today, a wide spectrum of technologies for user identification and verification exists and a great number of the systems that have been published are based on long-term research. The basic concept behind all biometric systems is the idea to make use of machine-measurable traits to distinguish persons. In order to be adequate for this process, a number of requirements must be fulfilled by a human trait feature, see [1]. For our working context, the following four are of main interest:

(i) uniqueness: the feature must vary to a reasonable extent amongst a wide set of individuals (intervariability);
(ii) constancy (permanence): the feature must vary as little as possible for each individual (intravariability);
(iii) distribution (universality): the feature must be available for as many potential users as possible;
(iv) measurability (collectability): the feature must be electronically measurable.

Biometric characteristics, which fulfill the above requirements, can be classified in a number of ways, for example, see [2, 3]. One common approach is to divide into measures, which are either originating from a physiological or a behavioral trait of subjects, although it has been shown that every process of capturing biometric measures includes behavioral components to some extent [2]. In the context of our work based on handwriting, we use the terminology of passive and active biometric schemes to clearly point out the aspects of the user awareness and cooperation.

Active schemes include all schemes taking into account time-relevant information such as voice and online handwriting recognition, keystroke behavior, and gait analysis. Such biometric features require a specific action from the users and thus can only be obtained with their cooperation. An example for this cooperative approach is the signature-based user authentication, where the user actively triggers the verification process by feeding the system with a writing sample. Passive traits like fingerprint and face recognition, hand geometry analysis or iris scan, as well as the offline
analysis of handwriting are based on visible physiological characteristics, which are retrieved in a time-invariant manner. These biometric features can be obtained from users without their explicit cooperation, thus allowing identification of persons without their agreement or even knowledge. A straightforward paradigm for such an enforced verification is the forensic identification using fingerprints. For potential applications, this basic difference between active and passive biometric schemes has a significant consequence, as each application will have different requirements with respect to the subject’s cooperation. While, for example, in access control applications, one can expect a high degree in user cooperation as the desire of physical or logical access can be anticipated, this is not necessarily the case in forensic applications, for example, for proof of identity.

From the perspective of potential applications, online handwriting as an active biometric scheme appears to be particularly interesting in domains that deal with combined document and user authentication, which today is handled by electronic signatures. Nowadays, legal and design aspects of electronic signature infrastructures are clearly defined, for example, in the European Directive for Electronic Signature [4], and security aspects are handled by cryptographic techniques. However, there still are problems in the area of user authentication because electronic signatures make use of asymmetric cryptographic schemes, requiring management of public and secret (private) keys. Today’s practice of storing private keys of users of electronic signatures on chip cards protected by personal identification number (PIN) has a systematic weakness. The underlying access control mechanism is based on possession and knowledge, both of which can be transferred to other individuals with or without the holder’s intention. Making use of biometrics for key management can fill this security gap. A straightforward approach is to protect the private key by performing biometric user verification prior to release from the secured environment, for example, a smart card [5]. This approach is based on a biometric verification with a binary result set (verified or not verified) as a decision to control access. A physically secure location is still required for the sensitive data.

In this paper, we will present a feature analysis strategy for examination of a biometric system based on online handwriting analysis with a specific system response category, the biometric hash, which has recently been published [6]. The biometric hash is a mathematical fingerprint based on a set of preselected statistical features of the handwritten sample of an individual, which can directly be used for key generation, avoiding the problem of secure storage. Our evaluation strategy for this system is based on three statistical measures:

(a) intrapersonal stability reflecting the degree of scatter within each individual feature;
(b) interpersonal entropy of hash value components as a result of the biometric hash algorithm. This value is an indicator for the potential information density of each feature component;

(c) feature stability and entropy correlation to analyze the dependency between measure (a) and (b) with respect the contribution of each feature parameter to the entire biometric hash.

These three measures are evaluated to analyze the given biometric hash algorithm at a specific operation point, where the contribution of our work is twofold. Firstly, we aim to conceptually prove the concept of biometric hash generation by analyzing the relevance of information carried by each individual feature. Secondly, we present a new feature analysis based on correlation of deviation and entropy along with evaluation results for this method. While typically in feature selection problems, the aim is to reduce the complexity of a given problem by separating features that carry no or little information, there is no requirement for dimension reduction for the evaluated algorithm due to its low complexity. Our aim is to find quantitative terms for the share of the resulting value space for each of the feature components, which can be used as a basis for an estimation of the achievable value space. We will present a strategy for systematic, quantitative analysis of feature relevance for generating a biometric hash value and briefly discuss a limited set of related work in the area of feature analysis and feature selection with respect to this specific biometric application. Further, we will discuss the problem of correlation and entropy of the feature space within the scope of biometric hashes for several semantic classes for handwriting. We will present results of evaluations of the biometric hash using the method presented, which are based on two different test databases. For the first database with limited size, details will be presented and the discussion will be summarized into a feature significance classification. In order to validate the findings of the initial evaluation, the results are reviewed based on results of a second, extended test containing writing samples from a large database consisting of several thousand signatures.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we will give an introduction to feature evaluation and a discussion of the selected work in this domain followed by a discussion on the distinction of handwriting in several domains like handwriting recognition, forensic writer identification, or signature verification in Section 3. Section 4 will briefly describe the state of the art of biometric hash systems and introduce our system concept of biometric hashes based on handwriting. In Section 5, we present an analysis scheme towards intrapersonal deviation of feature values, including test results from our experiments. From the same test database, the information entropy as a measure for the achievable hash value space on an interpersonal scope is introduced and the results are presented in Section 6. Based on the findings in Sections 5 and 6, a correlation analysis is performed in Section 7, including a relevance classification of the features examined. As the initial test data set is too small to justify significant conclusions, Section 8 presents findings of applying this feature analysis method based on an extended data set and compares them with results from the initial test. Finally, we will conclude our work in Section 9 and summarize our contribution and future activities.
2. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK

The task of automated biometric user authentication requires the analysis and comparison of individually stored reference measures against features from an actual test input. Storage of reference templates is a machine learning problem, which requires the determination of adequate feature sets for classification. Feature evaluation or selection describing the process of identifying the most relevant features for a classification task is a research area of broad application. Today, we find a great spectrum of activities and publications in this area. From this variety, we have selected those approaches that appear to show the most relevant basics and are most closely related to our work discussed in the paper. 

In an early work on feature evaluation techniques, which has been presented almost three decades ago, Kittler has discussed methods of feature selection in two categories: measurement and transformed space [7]. It has been shown that methods of the second category are computationally simple, while theoretically, measurement-based approaches lead to superior selection results, but at the time of publication, these methods were computationally too complex to be practically applied to real-world classification problems. In a more recent work, the hypothesis that feature selection for supervised classification tasks can be accomplished on the basis of correlation-based filter selection (CFS) has been explored [8]. Evaluation on twelve natural and six artificial database domains has shown that this selection method increases the classification accuracy of a reduced feature set in many cases and outperforms comparative feature selection algorithms. However, none of the domains in this test set is based on biometric measures related to natural handwriting data. Principal component analysis (PCA) is one of the common approaches for the selection of features, but it has been observed that, for example, data sets having identical variances in each direction are not well represented [9]. Chi and Yan presented an evaluation approach based on an adopted entropy feature measure which has been applied to a large set of handwritten images of numerals [10]. This work has shown good results in the detection of relevant features compared to other selection methods. With respect to the feature analysis for the biometric hash algorithm, it is required to analyze the trade-off between intrapersonal variability of feature measures and the value space, which can be achieved by the resulting hash vectors over a large set of persons. Therefore, we have chosen to evaluate not only the entropy for each feature, but also the degree of intrapersonal variability of feature values. Our evaluation strategy presented in this work is based on application-specific entropy which is determined from the response of the biometric hash function and intrapersonal deviations of feature parameters as measures for scatter. An overview of the algorithm and the initial feature set as presented in the original publication will be given in Section 4.

3. DISTINCTION OF HANDWRITING

Three main categories of handwriting-based biometric approaches can be identified: handwriting recognition, forensic verification, and user authentication. Handwriting recognition denotes the process of automatic retrieval of the ground truth of a handwritten document; it can also be considered as a specialization of optical character recognition (OCR). Here, a wide variety of approaches based on offline and online analysis have been suggested. A comprehensive overview of the state of the art in handwriting recognition can be found in [11]. Determination of the identity of the writer is not the primary aim in handwriting recognition, thus in this category, systems make use of individual writing characteristics in order to improve the overall recognition accuracy. In this kind of systems, user-specific templates are generated during a training phase in order to store information about the writing style along with the writing semantic. Based on this information, handwriting systems can be designed in a way that a writer can be identified while writing arbitrary text. This idea was taken over by researches at a very early point in time [12]. While in handwriting recognition, the primary purpose of storing user-specific templates is the improvement of recognition rates, forensic applications use sets of writing samples of known origin in order to compare them with a handwritten document written by an unknown or suspected person. The aim typically is to find evidence on the originator of a handwritten document in court cases. Expert testimonies-based methods to analyze the individuality of handwriting are generally accepted at court since many decades, for example, since 1923 in the United States, and research towards an automated writer verification system is still an actual topic. For example, a quantitative assessment of the discriminatory power of handwriting was performed in [13]. By nature of forensic applications, the verification does not require the approval or even knowledge of writers. In handwriting verification systems however, users enroll to the system with the intention of a later approval of authenticity within a secured scenario. Typically, handwriting-based biometric verification and identification systems use one specific semantic class: signatures. Signature as proof of authenticity is a socially well-accepted transaction, especially for legal document management and financial transactions. The individual signature serves five main functions [14]: not only authenticity and identity functions, which can be provided by any of the biometric schemes, but also finalization, evidence, and warning functions, which are unique to the signature. Furthermore, handwriting allows the use of additional semantic classes to the signature. Publications on the use of writing semantics like pass phrases or symbols in handwriting verification systems can be found in [15, 16]. For the overall security, this combination of knowledge and traits shows advantages compared to the signature. Firstly, the image of a signature is a public feature which is available to everyone holding a hardcopy of a signed document.
This simplifies attacks by a potential forger, especially on time-invariant features. Secondly, additional semantics can be used to register several different references for one user, allowing the design of challenge-response systems. Another aspect is the possibility to change the content of the reference sample, which is important in case a biometric feature gets compromised.

Handwriting verification systems typically operate in two different modes. In the verification mode, the system is fed with a pretended identity and a writing sample and the response is either a positive or negative match. Identification only requires a writing sample input and the system will either output the most likely identity or a mismatch. Besides these two typical modes, biometric hashes denote an additional class of system responses. The following section will introduce this category of biometric systems.

4. BIOMETRIC HASHES

Information exchange over public networks like the Internet implies a wide number of security requirements. Many of these security demands can be satisfied by cryptographic techniques which generally are based on digital keys. Here, we find two constellations of keys: keys for symmetric systems, where all participants of the secret communication share the same secret key, and public keys, which consist of pairs of a secret key (private) and a publicly available key. While systems of the first category are typically designed for efficient cipher systems, the second type is used mainly in digital signatures or protocols to securely exchange secret session keys. In either category, we have the requirement to protect the keys from unauthorized access. As cryptographically strong keys are rather large, and it is certainly not feasible to let users memorize their personal keys. As a consequence of this, in real-world scenarios today, digital keys are typically stored on smart cards protected by a special kind of password, the PIN. However, there are problems with PINs; for example, they may be lost, passed on to other persons accidentally or purposely, or they may be reverse-engineered by brute force attacks.

These difficulties in using passcode-based storage of cryptographic keys motivate the use of biometric authentication for key management which is based on human traits rather than knowledge. Various methods to apply biometrics to solve key management problems have been presented in the past [17]:

(i) secure server systems which release the key upon successful verification of the biometric features of the owner;
(ii) embedding of the digital key within the biometric reference data by a trusted algorithm, for example, bit-replacement;
(iii) combination of digital key and biometric image into a so-called Bioscrypt[TM] in such a way that neither information can be retrieved independently of the other;
(iv) derivation of the digital key directly from a biometric image or feature.

There are problems with all of these approaches. In the first scenario, a secured environment is required for the server and further, all communication channels need to be secured, which is not possible in all application scenarios. Embedding secret information in a publicly available data set like in the second suggestion will allow an attacker to retrieve secret information for all users once the algorithm is known. The idea of linking both digital key and biometric feature into a Bioscrypt[TM] can result in a good protection of both data sets, but it is rather demanding regarding the infrastructure required. Approaches of the fourth category face problems due to the fact that biometric features typically show a high degree of intrapersonal variability due to natural and physiological reasons. A key that is composed directly from the biometric feature values might not show stability over a large set of verifications. Secondly, if the derivation of the key is based on passive traits like the fingerprint, the key is lost for all times, once compromised.

To overcome the problems of the approaches of the last category, it is desirable to derive a robust key value directly from an active biometric trait, which includes an expression of intention by the user. A voice-based approach for such a system can be found in [18], where cryptographic keys are generated from spoken telephone number sequences. As for all biometric techniques based on voice, there is a security problem in reply attacks, which can easily be performed by audio recording. For key generation based on handwriting, we have presented a new biometric hash function in [6]. By making use of handwriting, an active, behavioral trait, and additional semantic classes like pass phrases and PINs, the system allows to change the biometric reference in case it would get compromised. Instead of providing a positive or a negative verification result, the biometric hash is a vector of ordinal values unique to one individual person within a set of registered users. Originally, the new concept of biometric hash has been presented where the hash vector was calculated by statistical analysis of 24 online and offline features of a handwriting sample. Continuative research has lead to a system implementation based on 50 features, as presented in Section 4.1. A brief description of the algorithm will be given in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.

4.1. System overview

The initial prototype system is implemented on a Palm Vx handheld computer equipped with 8 MB RAM and a MC68EZ328 CPU at a clock rate of 20 MHz. The built-in digitizer has a resolution of 160 × 160 pixels at 16 gray scales and provides binary pen-up/pen-down pen pressure information. Although it is widely observed that writing features based on pressure can show a great significance for writer verification, we limit our system to one-bit pen-up/pen-down signals. This is due to the fact that our superior work context is aimed towards device-independence, and a wide number of digitizer devices do not support pressure signal resolutions above one bit.

Figure 1 illustrates the process of the biometric hash calculation. In the data acquisition phase, the pen position
signals \( x(t)/y(t) \) and the binary pressure signal \( p(t) \) are recorded from the input device. These signals are then made available for the feature extraction both in a normalized \( (x/y \text{ normalization for determination of time variant features}) \) and an unfiltered signal. After feature extraction of 50 statistical parameters, these are mapped to the biometric hash by the interval mapping process, making use of a user-specific interval matrix (IM). The IM is determined during enrollment, and the algorithm for this will be presented in Section 4.3.

### 4.2. Feature parameters

The proceeding of obtaining a hash vector by interval mapping requires the utilization of a fixed number of scalar feature values, which are computed by statistical analysis of the sampled physical signals. A comprehensive overview of relevant features used in publications on signature verification can be found in [19, 20]. Due to the resource and hardware limitations on a PDA platform like the one used in our project, we have based our initial research on biometric hash on 24 statistical features, which have been extended for the work presented in this paper to 50 parameters shown in Table 1. To satisfy the need to have a fixed number of components, these features are either based on a global analysis of signals or on partitioning to a fixed number of subsets, which was chosen intuitively.

### 4.3. Interval matrix determination

The IM is a matrix with a dimension of \( K \times 2 \), where \( K \) denotes the number of feature components that is taken into account, as listed in Table 1. Each of the \( i \in [1, \ldots, K] \) two-dimensional vector components consists of an interval length \( \Delta I_i \) and an offset value \( \Omega_i \). The interval length and offset values are determined for each user during an enrollment process consisting of \( j \in [1, \ldots, N] \) writing samples for each of the nonnegative feature parameters \( n_{i,j} \) in the following min/max strategy:

Initial interval: \( [I_{\text{InitLow}}, \ldots, I_{\text{InitHigh}}] \)

\[
= \left[ \text{MIN} (n_{i,j}), \ldots, \text{MAX} (n_{i,j}) \right];
\]

Initial interval length: \( \Delta I_{\text{Init}} = I_{\text{InitHigh}} - I_{\text{InitLow}} \).

\[ \text{(1)} \]

\[ \text{(2)} \]

### 4.4. Hash value computation

The hash value computation is based on a mapping of each of the feature parameters of a test sample to an integer value scale. Due to the nature of the determination of the interval matrix, all possible values \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \) within the extended interval \( [_i, \ldots, I_{\text{InitHigh}}] \) for each of the \( i \in [1, \ldots, K] \) features \( n_i \) within IM, as defined in the previous Section 4.3, fulfill the following condition:

\[
\frac{v_1 - \Omega_i}{\Delta I_i} = \frac{v_2 - \Omega_i}{\Delta I_i} \quad \forall v_1, v_2 \in [_i, \ldots, I_{\text{InitHigh}}],
\]

\[
\frac{v_1 - \Omega_i}{\Delta I_i} \neq \frac{v_2 - \Omega_i}{\Delta I_i} \quad \forall v_1, v_2 \in [_i, \ldots, I_{\text{InitHigh}}].
\]

\[ \text{(3)} \]

\[ \text{(4)} \]

That is, all given \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \) within the extended interval lead to identical integer quotients, whereas values below or above the interval border lead to different integer values. Thus, we
write the hash function \( h \) for each feature parameter \( f_i \) of a test sample as follows:

\[
h(f_i, \Delta I_i, \Omega_i) = \left[ \frac{(f_i - \Omega_i)}{\Delta I_i} \right].
\]  

(8)

Thus, the resulting hash vector consists of \( K \) components of integer values.

### 5. INTRAPERSONAL SCATTER: FEATURE DEVIATION

One major problem in using biometric features to directly derive hash values is the trade-off between natural intrapersonal variability of feature values between several samples of an individual user and the requirement to have a persistent value in the biometric hash. A trivial example for this dilemma is the total writing time of a signature. This feature is very straightforward to calculate and, therefore, very often used in verification systems with limited resources like digital signal processor chips [21]. Amongst first-order features, it shows a rather stable intrapersonal behavior. If, for example, a natural intrapersonal variance of 5% is observed, the average signature duration of a subject is 5 seconds; all duration values in [4.75, ..., 5.25] seconds should be acceptable to authenticate this particular feature. Depending on the sampling rate of the digitizer device used for the signature capture, this can lead to a great number of acceptable discrete values, a sampling rate of 10 milliseconds would lead to 51 possible values that would lead to a positive result. Thus in order to achieve stable hash values, all features must be mapped into a value space, using, for example, an interval-mapping algorithm, as described in Section 4. The evaluation of intrapersonal deviations of features was performed by measuring the average deviations between enrollment and test sets of enrollments for a given test database, and details of the test procedure are given below.
Table 2: Tolerance values estimation for $N = 6$.

| Parameter name                      | $t_i$ (%) | $n_i$ |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|-------|
| Segment count                       | 565       | $n_1$ |
| Duration                            | 1400      | $n_2$ |
| Sample count                        | 590       | $n_3$ |
| Maximum count                       | 715       | $n_4$ |
| Aspect ratio                        | 635       | $n_5$ |
| Pen-up pen-down ratio               | 625       | $n_6$ |
| $X$-integral                        | 645       | $n_7$ |
| $Y$-integral                        | 505       | $n_8$ |
| $X$-velocity                        | 625       | $n_9$ |
| $Y$-velocity                        | 780       | $n_{10}$ |
| $X$-acceleration                    | 545       | $n_{11}$ |
| $Y$-acceleration                    | 585       | $n_{12}$ |
| $X$-distribution velocity           | 685       | $n_{13}$ |
| $Y$-distribution velocity           | 765       | $n_{14}$ |
| Segmented $x$-area 1                | 1800      | $n_{15}$ |
| Segmented $x$-area 2                | 1085      | $n_{16}$ |
| Segmented $x$-area 3                | 595       | $n_{17}$ |
| Segmented $x$-area 4                | 860       | $n_{18}$ |
| Segmented $x$-area 5                | 1010      | $n_{19}$ |
| Segmented $y$-area 1                | 1060      | $n_{20}$ |
| Segmented $y$-area 2                | 1030      | $n_{21}$ |
| Segmented $y$-area 3                | 820       | $n_{22}$ |
| Segmented $y$-area 4                | 760       | $n_{23}$ |
| Segmented $y$-area 5                | 635       | $n_{24}$ |
| Path length                         | 655       | $n_{25}$ |
| Delta $X$                           | 630       | $n_{26}$ |
| Delta $Y$                           | 710       | $n_{27}$ |
| Effective average speed             | 750       | $n_{28}$ |
| Pixel count segment 1/12            | 1065      | $n_{29}$ |
| Pixel count segment 2/12            | 565       | $n_{30}$ |
| Pixel count segment 3/12            | 1060      | $n_{31}$ |
| Pixel count segment 4/12            | 470       | $n_{32}$ |
| Pixel count segment 5/12            | 460       | $n_{33}$ |
| Pixel count segment 6/12            | 1070      | $n_{34}$ |
| Pixel count segment 7/12            | 495       | $n_{35}$ |
| Pixel count segment 8/12            | 565       | $n_{36}$ |
| Pixel count segment 9/12            | 320       | $n_{37}$ |
| Pixel count segment 10/12           | 825       | $n_{38}$ |
| Pixel count segment 11/12           | 760       | $n_{39}$ |
| Pixel count segment 12/12           | 690       | $n_{40}$ |
| Cumulated integral error $x$        | 615       | $n_{41}$ |
| Cumulated integral error $y$        | 340       | $n_{42}$ |
| Integral error sign $x$             | 0         | $n_{43}$ |
| Integral error sign $y$             | 0         | $n_{44}$ |
| Cumulated radiant                   | 495       | $n_{45}$ |
| Average radiant                     | 395       | $n_{46}$ |
| Cumulated distance                  | 840       | $n_{47}$ |
| Average distance                    | 1010      | $n_{48}$ |
| Average $x$-position                | 915       | $n_{49}$ |
| Average $y$-position                | 1045      | $n_{50}$ |
This initial test was based on 10 users with 10 writing samples of 5 semantic classes. All users are familiar with computer devices and the writing samples were collected during 2 enrollment sessions, where the second recording session was at least two weeks after the first. As mentioned in the motivation, additional evaluations based on extended databases are described in Section 8 and will be concluded with a comparison of test results.

Our tests for evaluation of the intravariability have been performed separately for the following 5 different semantic classes:

(i) **signature**;
(ii) fixed **PIN** (all users were asked to write the same PIN 8710);
(iii) arbitrary **pass phrase** (user may choose any combination of words/numbers);
(iv) the German word “Sauerstoffgefäβ” for all users;
(v) arbitrary specific **symbol** (the user may use a short sketch of his choice).

The tests have been performed based on all 10 users for each feature and each semantic class according to the following instructions:

1. **for each of the semantic classes** $s \in \{\text{signature, PIN, pass phrase, fixed word, and user-defined symbol}\}$,
2. **for each of the** $g \in [1, \ldots, 10]$ **users** $u_g$ **and for each of the** $i \in [1, \ldots, 50]$ **features** $n_i$,
3. **divide** each set of 10 samples into all possible combinations of $e$ enrollment samples and $10 - e$ test samples;
4. **for each of the** $e$ **enrollments and each of the** $10 - e$ **tests**, calculate the following deviation:
   (i) determine **minimum and maximum enrollment values** $v_{e\text{Min}}$ and $v_{e\text{Max}}$ from all $e$ samples;
   (ii) determine **average enrollment value** $v_e = \frac{v_{e\text{Min}} + (v_{e\text{Max}} - v_{e\text{Min}})}{2}$;
   (iii) determine **minimum and maximum values** $t_{\text{Min}}$ and $t_{\text{Max}}$ from the actual test sample;
   (iv) calculate **maximum relative deviation** $d_e$ from average enrollment value $v_e$:
   $$d_e = \text{MAX} \left( \frac{|\mu_e - t_{\text{Min}}|}{|v_e - v_{e\text{Min}}|}, \frac{|\mu_e - t_{\text{Max}}|}{|v_e - v_{e\text{Max}}|} \right);$$
5. **average** $d_e$ of all enrollments of all users and semantic class $s$ into **average feature deviation** $d_{i,s}$.

Figure 2 presents the histogram for the averaged deviations for each of the features numbers $i$ of this test for an enrollment size of $e = 6$ samples and the semantic signature.

The two features $n_{43}$ and $n_{44}$ (integration error sign for $x$ and $y$ signals) resulted in a feature value of 0 for all tests, thus the relative deviation cannot be determined. We observe a relatively strong increase in deviations between feature $n_{15}$ and $n_{42}$. Further, the gradient significantly increases for all features right of $n_{17}$. In order to determine particularly low
and high variance features, we classify features of the first category into low, the second into high, and all remaining into medium intravariance. We get the classification of low intravariance and high intravariance features in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively.

There are two interesting observations. The three features with the lowest intravariability are in the same feature category as \( n_{34} \), being amongst the three features with the highest variability. All these features are calculated by calculating the number of pixels of the writing trace in segmented images, which are obtained by dividing the signature image into \( 4 \times 3 \) equal-sized images according to Figure 3.

While the two upper, leftmost areas show a high stability, the pixel count in area 6 is varying strongly. The other interesting observation is the ranking and \( n_{25} \) (trace path length) and \( n_{2} \) (total writing duration). Both features are time- or sequence-variant and are commonly known as rather reliable features for verification. Apparently these features are not significantly stable in the biometric hash generation and furthermore, it is interesting to see that in amongst the 8 parameters of the low-variability class, only one online feature (\( n_{19}, Y \)-Integral) can be found. An explanation for this observation can be the global nature of features, which is a prerequisite for the calculation of the biometric hash as described in Section 4. Furthermore, the observation that segmented features in the upper left areas show a lower intrapersonal variance can be explained by the natural left-to-right writing orientation in Latin handwriting.

6. FEATURE ENTROPY

In Section 5, we have discussed aspects of intrapersonal variability of biometric features based on handwriting. Intrapersonal variability can be interpreted as a measure of instability of a feature parameter. For biometric systems, feature stability is a fundamental requirement; therefore, relevant features should show a low intrapersonal deviation. Besides the stability, the individuality of features needs to be ensured. For the evaluation of individually, we present an entropy analysis in this section. Both characteristics together will then be combined into an indicator for the suitability of a particular feature for the biometric hash in the Section 7.

Information entropy had been introduced by Shannon more than half a century ago [22, 23], and is a measure for the information density within a set of values with known occurrence probabilities. Knowledge of the information entropy is the basis for design of several efficient data coding and compression techniques like the Huffman code [24] as it describes the effective amount of information contained in a finite set. This question of effective information content is directly related to the uniqueness of a biometric feature, which motivated the authors to perform an entropy analysis for each feature of the biometric hash.

In the biometric hash scenario as described in Section 4, the interpersonal variability has a direct impact on the hash value space. For features with a low interpersonal variability, it can be expected that many users will have similar or identical hash values, whereas a high interpersonal variability indicates a large potential value space. Consequently, we consider the feature entropy of responses of the biometric hash function as a measure to which degree the potential value space of the hashing function is actually occupied by real-world hash values. Our aim is to estimate to which extend

| Feature | Description | Deviation (%) |
|---------|-------------|---------------|
| \( n_{10} \) | \( Y \)-velocity | 153.2 |
| \( n_{11} \) | \( X \)-acceleration | 163.3 |
| \( n_{24} \) | Segmented \( y \)-area 5 | 171.8 |
| \( n_{50} \) | Average \( y \)-position | 179.2 |
| \( n_{28} \) | Effective average speed | 180.9 |
| \( n_{41} \) | Cumulated integral error \( x \) | 182.1 |
| \( n_{44} \) | Maximum count | 193.1 |
| \( n_{26} \) | Delta \( X \) | 204.6 |
| \( n_{13} \) | \( X \)-distribution velocity | 206 |
| \( n_{16} \) | Pen-up pen-down ratio | 215.7 |
| \( n_{25} \) | Path length | 219.1 |
| \( n_{7} \) | \( X \)-integral | 230.2 |
| \( n_{47} \) | Cumulated distance | 238.2 |
| \( n_{48} \) | Average distance | 256.9 |
| \( n_{16} \) | Segmented \( x \)-area 2/5 | 269.7 |
| \( n_{49} \) | Average \( x \)-position | 293.3 |
| \( n_{34} \) | Pixel Count 12-segment 6/12 | 295.2 |
| \( n_{2} \) | Duration | 306.2 |
| \( n_{19} \) | Segmented \( x \)-area 5/5 | 368.8 |

Figure 3: Segmentation of the writing image into 12 equal-sized areas.
each biometric feature is capable of representing individual values to build the biometric hash. For this estimation, we apply the general formula to determine the entropy $H$ of a system $X$ consisting of $k \in [1, \ldots, n]$ states with a respective occurrence probability of $p_k$. In our context, each of the $n$ states represents the occurrence of value $v_k$ in the response of the biometric hash system, being one of the unique values that have been observed over all $T$ test passes for each feature. Thus the occurrence probability for feature value $v_k$ writes to $p_k = \text{count}(v_k)/T$ and the feature entropy can be written to:

$$H(X) = - \sum_{k=1}^{n} p_k \cdot \log_2 p_k. \tag{10}$$

In this part of our analysis, we are mainly interested in a global quantitative comparison of information capacity of each of the features, as described in Section 4. In order to do so, the interpersonal feature entropy for the same test set as described in Section 5 has been determined. For a classification, all entropy values have been normalized to the highest entropy occurrence, which was found for feature $n_1$ with an entropy of $H(n_1) = 1.93$.

Figure 4 shows the result of the entropy test, and it visualizes the information content. For a number of features, the hash value was the same for all users in all verification tests. These cases lead to an entropy of zero, thus $n_{15}$ through $n_{24}$, $n_{28}$ through $n_{40}$, and $n_{42}$ are zero and do not contribute any user-specific information in the biometric hash scenario. Amongst the remaining nonzero entropy features, five show entropy significantly higher than 50%; these are $n_{11}$, $n_{21}$, $n_{26}$, $n_{45}$, and $n_{46}$. The remaining features show relatively low entropy in the range between 7% and slightly above 30%. The clear boundary above 50% motivates our classification into high-entropy (greater than 50%), low-entropy (greater than 0%, equal to 50%), and zero-entropy features. Thus in summary, the entropy test resulted in 5 relevant, high-entropy, 20 low-entropy, and 25 zero-entropy features.

7. FEATURE STABILITY AND ENTROPY CORRELATION

In Sections 6 and 7, we have presented two feature evaluation measures for biometric hashes: intrapersonal deviation as a term of instability and interpersonal entropy as a measurement for information density. In order to have a quantitative measure for the trade-off between deviation and stability, we introduce the feature correlation $C_i$ as the product between the relative feature stability $S_i$ and the feature entropy $H_i = H(n_i)$ for one specific semantic class as per the description of the entropy test in Section 6 as follows:

$$S_i = 1 - \frac{d_i}{\text{MAX}} \left( d_i, i \in [1, \ldots, K] \right), \tag{11}$$

where $d_i$ denotes average feature deviation (see Section 5),

$$C_i = S_i \cdot H_i \mid i \in [1, \ldots, K]. \tag{12}$$

The correlation between feature stability and entropy is a measure for the relevance of individual features in the biometric hash generation because it is a numerical valuation of the uniqueness and constancy that is required for adequate biometric features as pointed out in Section 1. With a total
number of $K = 50$ features for our tests and $d_i$ being the average deviation for feature number $i$ as per the feature variance test in Section 5, $S_i$ is normalized to the maximum feature deviation, thus can have values in the range of $[0, \ldots , 1]$, which is also the case for the feature entropy $H_i$. By calculating the product of both numbers, we receive the feature correlation values $C_{i}$ as shown in the histogram of Figure 5.

In order to determine suitable features for the biometric hash, we classify features according to their significance according to the following scheme:

1. no significance: $C_{i} = 0$,
2. low significance: $0 < C_{i} < 0.25$,
3. medium significance: $0.25 \leq C_{i} < 0.5$,
4. high significance: $0.5 = C_{i}$.

The classification summary in Table 5 displays that there is a clear threshold between the 7 features with high and medium significance ($n_1, n_5, n_{45}, n_{44}, n_{43}, n_{28}$) and the best feature in the low-significance class $n_9$. This leads us to the conclusion that these features are most suitable amongst the 50 tested for our application of biometric hashes. All 7 features are based on time variant information; however, only $n_3$, the sample count, has a linear relation to the writing signal. All other features are second order, based on combined temporal and spatial information.

8. EVALUATION ON EXTENDED DATA SETS

Although the initial evaluation presented in the previous sections confirms the feasibility of feature evaluation in principle, the underlying initial data set is too small to justify significant conclusions. Furthermore, during the initial test, where both signal capturing and data processing were performed on a computationally slow handheld computer, it has turned out that tests on larger data sets could not be performed in reasonable time. Therefore, methods for the biometric hash have been migrated to a PC platform using Object Pascal, and additional tests have been performed on reasonably performant Windows 2000 PC (1.7 GHz, 512 MB RAM).

Data sets used for these extended tests are subsets from a handwriting verification database, which has been collected in an educational environment over a period of three years, containing 5829 signatures from 60 writers obtained from various digitizer tablet devices, as can be seen from Table 6.

The only limitation compared to the initial test set from Section 5 is the number of features that has been implemented on the new platform, which at the time of publication were 36 of the originally 50-dimensional feature set presented in Table 1. The remaining feature set (see Table 7) was considered to be reasonable to evaluate, particularly as for some of the missing features from the original set, it can be assumed that they are highly correlated (e.g., $n_{26}$ and $n_{27}$ with $n_5$, $n_{28}$ with $n_9$ and $n_{10}$) as they are linearly dependent due to the nature of their determination. Additionally, with the extended database, we have the advantage of a first hardware independent analysis of the algorithm, as sample features originating from various different digitizer devices are included.

Based on this extended data set, samples were taken from all devices shown in Table 7 while the evaluation methodology was chosen identically to the initial approach described in Sections 5, 6, and 7 with the following adoptions:
Table 5: Feature significance classification.

| Significance high | Significance medium | Significance low | Significance 0 | Feature number | Correlation | Description |
|-------------------|---------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|
| X                 | X                   |                  |                | n1             | 0.67462039  | Segment count |
| X                 |                     | X                |                | n3             | 0.501734511 | Sample count |
| X                 |                     |                  |                | n46            | 0.499881971 | Average radiant |
| X                 |                     |                  |                | n45            | 0.440496027 | Cumulated radiant |
| X                 |                     |                  |                | n44            | 0.274043819 | Integral error sign y |
| X                 |                     |                  |                | n43            | 0.314424886 | Integral error sign x |
| X                 |                     |                  |                | n26            | 0.286563794 | Delta X |
| X                 | n9                  |                  |                |                | 0.078190808 | X-velocity |
| X                 | n7                  |                  |                |                | 0.027517839 | X-integral |
| X                 | n6                  |                  |                |                | 0.030396689 | Pen-up pen-down ratio |
| X                 | n50                 |                  |                |                | 0.03764345  | Average y-position |
| X                 | n5                  |                  |                |                | 0.061011774 | Aspect ratio |
| X                 | n49                 |                  |                |                | 0.025678147 | Average x-position |
| X                 | n48                 |                  |                |                | 0.038058075 | Average distance |
| X                 | n47                 |                  |                |                | 0.051751071 | Cumulated distance |
| X                 | n41                 |                  |                |                | 0.03706768 | Cumulated integral error x |
| X                 | n4                  |                  |                |                | 0.080758321 | Maximum count |
| X                 | n27                 |                  |                |                | 0.148098756 | Delta Y |
| X                 | n25                 |                  |                |                | 0.068807745 | Path length |
| X                 | n2                 |                  |                |                | 0.012428692 | Duration |
| X                 | n14                 |                  |                |                | 0.046557959 | Y-distribution velocity |
| X                 | n13                 |                  |                |                | 0.074828997 | X-distribution velocity |
| X                 | n12                 |                  |                |                | 0.125008667 | Y-acceleration |
| X                 | n11                 |                  |                |                | 0.040800259 | X-acceleration |
| X                 | n10                 |                  |                |                | 0.085432856 | Y-velocity |
| X                 | n8                  |                  |                |                | 0               | Y-integral |
| X                 | n15                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Segmented x-area 1 |
| X                 | n16                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Segmented x-area 2 |
| X                 | n17                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Segmented x-area 3 |
| X                 | n18                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Segmented x-area 4 |
| X                 | n19                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Segmented x-area 5 |
| X                 | n20                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Segmented y-area 1 |
| X                 | n21                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Segmented y-area 2 |
| X                 | n22                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Segmented y-area 3 |
| X                 | n23                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Segmented y-area 4 |
| X                 | n24                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Segmented y-area 5 |
| X                 | n28                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Effective average speed |
| X                 | n29                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Pixel count segment 1/12 |
| X                 | n30                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Pixel count segment 2/12 |
| X                 | n31                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Pixel count segment 3/12 |
| X                 | n32                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Pixel count segment 4/12 |
| X                 | n33                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Pixel count segment 5/12 |
| X                 | n34                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Pixel count segment 6/12 |
| X                 | n35                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Pixel count segment 7/12 |
| X                 | n36                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Pixel count segment 8/12 |
| X                 | n37                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Pixel count segment 9/12 |
| X                 | n38                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Pixel count segment 10/12 |
| X                 | n39                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Pixel count segment 11/12 |
| X                 | n40                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Pixel count segment 12/12 |
| X                 | n42                 |                  |                |                | 0               | Cumulated integral error y |
Correlation factors from the extended test show a statistically significant increase in the distribution of the extended test as compared to the initial test. This indicates an overall increase of significance over a set of several digitizer devices and users. Furthermore, it can be observed that amongst the five features showing the highest correlation in the extended data set, concentration of segments of equal length 5 being more stable in the extended tests is that aspect ratio) being more stable in the extended tests is that aspect ratio) being more stable in the extended tests is that aspect ratio) being more stable in the extended tests is that aspect ratio) being more stable in the extended tests is that aspect ratio) being more stable in the extended tests is that aspect ratio) being more stable in the extended tests is that aspect ratio) being more stable in the extended tests is that aspect ratio) being more stable in the extended tests is that aspect ratio) being more stable in the extended tests is that aspect ratio) being more stable in the extended tests is that.

(i) semantic class ($s \in \text{[signature]}$);  
(ii) number of users is $g \in \{1, \ldots, 54\}$;  
(iii) the selection of samples was implemented by drawing 10 sets of $e = 6$ enrollment samples and $10 - e = 4$ test samples minus for each user $u_g$ and each tablet type from the database in a pseudorandom manner.

Due to the large number of samples for some users in the extended database, disallowing an exhaustive evaluation of all enrollment/test set pairs, the approach of pseudorandom selection was chosen to reasonably limit the number of trials. Results of deviation and entropy analysis of the extended test are presented in Figures 6a, 6b. Furthermore, Figure 7 visualizes the comparison of correlation between feature entropy and deviation between the initial tests as per Figure 5 and the results of the extended database in ascending order for the later factors.

Correlation factors from the extended test show a statistical characteristics with a means value of $\mu_{\text{Initial}} = 0.048$ and standard deviation of $s_{\text{Initial}} = 0.137$ for the feature set evaluated in the extended test. This indicates an overall increase of significance of the values (note that the standard deviation has changed insignificantly) over a set of several digitizer devices and using signature as writing semantics. Furthermore, it can be observed that amongst the five features showing the highest correlation in the extended data set ($n_{31}, n_{3}, n_{5}, n_{32}, n_{1}$), all except $n_{5}$ have been classified as high or medium significant in Section 7. A plausible explanation for $n_{5}$ (representing the aspect ratio) being more stable in the extended tests is that as compared to the initial test, only signature samples were taken into account, showing a higher stability in image layout as compared to semantics written with a lower degree of routine. Another interesting observation is the ranking of the correlation of segmented pixel count features $n_{31} = 0.32$ and $n_{32} = 0.44$, which are both well noticeable above the standard deviation in the distribution of the extended test, while both features resulted in a correlation value of 0 in the initial test.

### Table 6: Test set size of the extended database by tablet type.

| Tablet name                        | Count (signatures) |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| Aiptek Hyperpen 8000              | 9                  |
| Palm Vx                           | 447                |
| EIZO Flexscan Touchscreen 18”     | 1118               |
| Wacom 1 serial                    | 621                |
| Wacom Cintiq 15                   | 1284               |
| Wacom Intuos 2                    | 547                |
| Wacom Intuos 2 Inkpen             | 31                 |
| Wacom 1 USB                       | 971                |
| Wacom Valito                      | 801                |

### Table 7: Feature parameters evaluated from the extended test set.

| Parameter name                  | Index | Param. | Description                                      |
|---------------------------------|-------|--------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Segment count                   | 1     | $n_1$  | Number of pen-down events                        |
| Duration                        | 2     | $n_2$  | Total writing duration in ms                      |
| Sample count                    | 3     | $n_3$  | Total number of samples                          |
| Aspect ratio                    | 5     | $n_5$  | $x/y$ ratio of the writing image times 1000       |
| Pen-up pen-down ratio           | 6     | $n_6$  | Ratio of total pen-up and total pen-down times by 1000 |
| X-integral                      | 7     | $n_7$  | Total area covered by the absolute $x$ signal     |
| Y-integral                      | 8     | $n_8$  | Total area covered by the absolute $y$ signal     |
| X-velocity                      | 9     | $n_9$  | Average absolute writing velocity in $x$ direction |
| Y-velocity                      | 10    | $n_{10}$ | Average absolute writing velocity in $y$ direction |
| X-distribution velocity         | 13    | $n_{13}$ | Maximum $x$-distribution $\text{Max}(x) - \text{Min}(x)$ over total writing time |
| Y-distribution velocity         | 14    | $n_{14}$ | Maximum $y$-distribution $\text{Max}(y) - \text{Min}(y)$ over total writing time |
| Segmented $x$-areas             | 15–19 | $n_{15}$–$n_{19}$ | $x$-integral of 5 segments of equal length $T_{\text{Total}}/5$ |
| Segmented $y$-areas             | 20–24 | $n_{20}$–$n_{24}$ | $y$-integral of 5 segments of equal length $T_{\text{Total}}/5$ |
| Path length                     | 25    | $n_{25}$ | Total path length of writing trace in pixel       |
| Pixel count 12-segment           | 29–40 | $n_{29}$–$n_{40}$ | Number of pixels in each 4 by 3 sector |
| Average $x$ position             | 49    | $n_{49}$ | Average of all $x$ sample values                 |
| Average $y$ position             | 50    | $n_{50}$ | Average of all $y$ sample values                 |
Figure 6: Sorted feature deviation histogram and relative entropy determined from extended test database. (a) Feature value deviations extended test. (b) Relative feature entropy of initial test based on $H(n19) = 3.61$. 
9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this article, we have presented a new method to evaluate a given biometric authentication algorithm, the biometric hash, by analyzing the features taken into account. We have presented test results from two different data sets of quite different size and origin and introduced three measures for feature evaluation: intrapersonal feature deviation, interpersonal entropy of hash value components, and the correlation between both. Based on this basic idea, we resulted in an initial perception that on a very specific device, a PDA, 7 out of 50 investigated features can be classified as high or medium significant.

As the first results indicated the suitability of our approach, we have performed tests on a significantly extended database in order to get more general and statistically more relevant conclusions. Three main conclusions can be derived from the second test:

(i) with a few exceptions, all of the features showing high significance in the initial test have been reconfirmed;
(ii) entropy of hash values increases over a large set of different tablets as compared to the PDA device; all features have shown nonzero entropy in the extended test;
(iii) feature scattering appears to be rather high on PDA devices as compared to the average over the set of various tablets.

The evaluation data set presented in this work is the largest data set used for a feature analysis of dynamic handwriting based on signature and other semantic classes that could be found in the literature. In [16], a number of 10 different semantic classes for writer verification has been suggested and tested with 20 different users; however, this work limits observations on results in terms of false acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR) and does not analyze variability within feature classes. Due to the total size of our tests, we consider our findings as statistically significant, opening many areas for future work, where we plan to concentrate on three main aspects: algorithm optimization, additional tests including feature benchmarking, and applications.

Our main working direction will aim to optimize the biometric hashing technique under operational conditions for specific applications, including boundary estimates for the theoretically achievable key space and the extension of feature candidate sets. Also, it will be necessary to perform detailed quantitative analysis of additional semantic classes. Especially the classes of pass phrases and numeric codes are of great interest, as they will allow design of applications including user authentication based on knowledge and being. There is also room for improvement in the interval-matching algorithm. The tolerance value introduced in (3) is estimated based on statistical tests over all users and all semantic classes. Here, we are working on adoptive, user-specific
tolerance value determination rather than a global estimation. Although there is no security threat the IM, as it does not allow reverse-engineering of the full biometric template, there still is the problem of enrollment and storing this information for each user individually. To overcome this potential objective for real-world applications, we are working towards mechanisms to determine a biometric hash without any a priori parameters based on the individual.

Based on the introduced three statistical measures, it is also interesting from the discipline of feature selection research to perform feature selection benchmarks by comparing FAR and FRR, based on different feature sets. Here, it will be necessary to determine competing feature sets based on the method presented in this paper and a selection of other published feature evaluation approaches of different nature. A comparison of verification and recognition results for the biometric hash algorithm, parameterized with these different feature sets, will allow conclusions in regard to the impact of feature selection on recognition accuracy.

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