TOPICAL REVIEW

Statistical mechanics of socio-economic systems with heterogeneous agents

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Abstract.
We review the statistical mechanics approach to the study of the emerging collective behavior of systems of heterogeneous interacting agents. The general framework is presented through examples in such contexts as ecosystem dynamics and traffic modeling. We then focus on the analysis of the optimal properties of large random resource-allocation problems and on Minority Games and related models of speculative trading in financial markets, discussing a number of extensions including multi-asset models, Majority Games and models with asymmetric information. Finally, we summarize the main conclusions and outline the major open problems and limitations of the approach.

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1. Introduction

Collective phenomena in economics, social sciences and ecology are very attractive for statistical physicists, especially in view of the empirical abundance of non-trivial fluctuation patterns and statistical regularities – think of returns in financial markets or of allometric scaling in ecosystems – which pose intriguing theoretical challenges. On an abstract level, the problems at stake are indeed not too different from, say, understanding how spontaneous magnetization may arise in a magnetic system, since what one wants in both cases is to understand how the effects of interactions at the microscopic scale can build up to the macroscopic scale. Clearly, ecologies or financial markets are quite more complex systems than magnets, being composed of units which themselves follow complex (and far from understood) behavioral rules. Still, in many cases it may be reasonable to assume that the collective behavior of a crowd of individuals presents aspects of a purely statistical nature which might be appreciated already in highly stylized models of such systems. This is ultimately the rationale for applying statistical mechanics to such problems.

In general, statistical physics offers a set of concepts (e.g. order parameters and scaling laws) and tools (both analytical and numerical) allowing for a characterization in terms of phases and phase transitions which might be useful in shaping the way we think about such complex systems. The considerable progress achieved in the last decades in the statistical mechanics of non-equilibrium processes and of disordered systems, thanks to which it is now possible to deal effectively with fluctuations and heterogeneity (respectively) in systems with many interacting degrees of freedom, is particularly important for socio-economic applications. In fact, while equilibrium and homogeneity are important in physics, non-equilibrium and heterogeneity are the rule in economics, as each individual is different both in his/her characteristics and in the way he/she interacts with the environment. Deriving general macroscopic laws taking the specific details of each and every individual’s behavior into account is a desperate task. However, as long as one is interested in collective properties, a system with complicated heterogeneous interactions can be reasonably well represented as one with random couplings [1]. In the limit of infinite system size, some of the relevant macroscopic observables will be subject to laws of large numbers, i.e. some quantities will be self-averaging, and, if the microscopic dynamics follows sufficiently simple rules, one may hope to be able to calculate them explicitly. It is with these properties – which we call typical – that the statistical mechanics approach is concerned.

In what follows, we shall mostly concentrate on problems arising in economics and finance. When modeling these systems one must be aware that their microscopic behavior is very different from that governing particles or atoms in physics. Economic agents typically respond to incentives and act in a selfish way. This is usually modeled assuming that individuals strive to maximize their private utility functions, with no regard for social welfare. Not only agents might have conflicting goals, as their utility functions will in general be different, but their selfish behavior may lead to globally
inefficient outcomes – e.g. to a coordination failure or to a lack of cooperation. Such outcomes, called Nash equilibria in Game Theory, are in general different from socially optimal states where the total utility is maximized. Hence, generally, in a system of interacting agents there is no global energy function to be minimized.

Another important difference between the dynamics of a physical system, such as a magnetic material, and that of an economic system is that, while in the former spins at a particular time depend at most on the past states of the system, in the latter the agents’ choices also depend on the expectations which they harbor about the future states. This suggests that the collective dynamics may have a non-causal component (indeed, backward induction in time plays a big role in the strategic reasoning of rational agents [2]). In many cases, however, it is reasonable to assume that agents are boundedly rational or ‘inductive’, i.e. that their behavior as well as their expectations adjust as a result of experience. We shall concentrate our analysis to these cases of adaptive agents following a learning dynamics. We shall see that the lack of a global Hamiltonian is reflected in the fact that such a dynamics, in general, violates detailed balance.

Actually, in many cases it is realistic to assume that agents behave as if they were interacting with a system as a whole – be it a market or the crowd – rather than directly with a number of other individuals. In economics, this is termed a price-taking assumption, because it amounts to stating that agents act as if prices do not depend on what they actually decide to buy or sell (i.e. they take prices as given), and it is usually justified by saying that the contribution of a single agent to the total demand is negligible when the number of agents is large. The equilibria of systems where agents behave as price-takers are called competitive equilibria. However, prices depend on the aggregate demand and supply and hence on the choice of each agent, and the statistical physics approach provides a very transparent description of how price-taking behavior modifies the global properties of a system.

This review gives a survey of some recent quantitative developments on the statistical mechanics of systems of many interacting adaptive agents. This is a subject that has been shaped over the past few years around a few basic models (like the El Farol problem) and a few analytical techniques, mostly borrowed from the mean-field theory of spin glasses (like the replica method). The models, though highly stylized to an economist’s eyes, possess a strong physical content and in many cases provide important indications as to whether the phenomenology of real systems is specific of each of their particular natures or rather it is generic of large systems of adaptive units interacting competitively. Ultimately, it is not too unfair to say that separating system-specific features from general features can be seen as the main contribution statistical physics can provide to this field (besides techniques).

Our choice of arguments is clearly biased, and the reader may dispose of several recent books that cover some of the important issues (especially finance-inspired) we merely touch here [3–7]. Along with a core of problems related to the emergence of non-trivial fluctuation phenomena, cooperation and efficiency (understanding which has been the original goal of these studies), other issues such as the impact of different information
structures or the interaction between different multi-agent systems have just started to be analyzed and are likely to attract a great deal of attention in the near future. On the physical side, precisely because of the differences in the microscopic modeling of economics and physics, these systems pose a number of fascinating questions that open several directions for further work, some of which will be outlined here.

The review is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we present a general discussion of resource allocation by complex adaptive systems and a few exemplary models from different contexts like ecology and traffic dynamics, including the El Farol problem. Sec. 3 is devoted to the statistical analysis of optimal properties of large random economies, that is, more precisely, to a survey of the macroscopic properties of classical economic optimization problems. Most of our attention will be on the model of competitive equilibrium for linear production economies and on Von Neumann’s model of economic growth. In Sec. 4 we review the basic properties of the Minority Game, a minimal and yet highly non-trivial model of speculative trading derived from the El Farol problem, and discuss the role of the different parameters involved in its definition. Besides its physical richness, the Minority Game provides a simple adaptable framework where a number of important issues related to financial markets (such as the emergence of ‘stylized facts’, the role of different types of traders and the effect of information asymmetries) can be analyzed in great detail. Some of them are discussed in Sec. 5. Finally, some concluding remarks are expounded in Sec. 6. The main analytical techniques employed for these studies will be discussed in some detail only for cases where details are not available in the published literature: the replica technique for a model of a competitive ecosystem in Sec. 2; the continuous-time limit approach for the El Farol problem, also in Sec. 2; the dynamical generating functional for the canonical multi-asset Minority Game in Section 5.

2. Statistical mechanics of resource allocation: some examples

We start our discussion by introducing a general class of problems where a population of heterogeneous agents competes for the exploitation of a number of resources. Then we will discuss a few examples – ranging from ecosystems to urban traffic – where this generic framework can be formalized in specific models where the nature of resources and the laws governing the behavior of agents are completely specified.

2.1. General considerations

In a nutshell, the models we consider address the decentralized allocation of scarce resources by $N$ heterogeneous selfish agents subject to public and/or private information. The word ‘allocation’ is to be intended here in a broad sense that includes the exchange of resources (for example, commodities) among agents, the production of resources by means of other resources and the consumption of resources. Agents take decisions on the basis of some type of information aiming at some pre-determined goals, like maximizing
a certain utility function, and are to various degrees adaptive entities. We shall consider cases in which they are perfect optimizers (or ‘deductive’) as well as cases in which their decision-making is governed by a learning process (‘inductive’). Heterogeneity may reside in a number of factors, like the agents’ initial endowments, their learning abilities or in how differently they react to the receipt of certain information patterns.

In general, the allocation is a stochastic dynamical process, where the noise may be present in both the information sources and the agent’s learning process. We shall mostly be concerned with the steady-state properties and, more than on individual performances, we shall focus on the resulting distribution of resource loads and in particular on

a. how evenly are resources exploited on average (i.e. whether the allocation process leads typically to over- or under-exploitation of some resources)

b. the fluctuations of resource loads (i.e. how large the deviations from the average can be)

In such contexts as production economies, ecosystems or traffic the meaning and the relevance of the above observables is immediately clear. In toy models of financial markets, where, as we shall see, the role of resources is played by information bits, the former quantity plays the role of a ‘predictability’ while the latter measures the ‘volatility’.

It is implicitly assumed that optimal allocations are those where resources are exploited as evenly as possible and where fluctuations are minimal. In an economic setting, this corresponds to allocations with minimal waste whereas in financial markets, optimality implies information being correctly incorporated into prices with minimal volatility.

In what follows, we shall denote by $\langle \cdots \rangle$ time averages performed in the steady state:

$$\langle X \rangle = \lim_{T,T_{\text{eq}} \to \infty} \frac{1}{T - T_{\text{eq}}} \sum_{t=T_{\text{eq}}}^{T} X(t)$$

where $T_{\text{eq}}$ is an equilibration time. Moreover, we shall label agents by the index $i \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$ and resources by the index $\mu \in \{1, \ldots, P\}$. In the statistical mechanics approach, the relevant limit is ultimately that where $N \to \infty$ and $P$ scales linearly with $N$, so that $\alpha = P/N$ remains finite as $N$ diverges. To give a loose name, we shall call the relative number of information patterns $\alpha$, which will be our typical control parameter, the ‘complexity’ of the system.

Denoting by $Q^\mu(t)$ the load of resource $\mu$ at time $t$, which is determined by the aggregate action of all agents (for instance, $\mu$ may be a certain commodity and $Q^\mu(t)$ the demand for it at time $t$), one easily understands that the relevant macroscopic quantities are given respectively by

$$H = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu} \langle A^\mu \rangle^2, \quad A^\mu(t) = Q^\mu(t) - \langle Q \rangle,$$

(2)
\[ \langle Q \rangle = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu} \langle Q^{\mu} \rangle \] which measures the deviation of the distribution of resource loads from uniformity (if \( H \neq 0 \) at least one resource is overexploited or underexploited with respect to the average load) and by

\[
\sigma^2 = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu} \left[ \langle (A^{\mu})^2 \rangle - \langle A^{\mu} \rangle^2 \right] = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu} \left[ \langle (Q^{\mu})^2 \rangle - \langle Q^{\mu} \rangle^2 \right]
\]

which measures the magnitude of fluctuations. Efficient steady states have \( H = 0 \) and \( \sigma^2 \) “small” in a sense that will be specified from case to case. To fix ideas, whenever fluctuations are smaller than those which would be obtained by zero-intelligence agents who act randomly and independently at every time step one can infer that agents are to some degree cooperating to reduce fluctuations.

An important question we shall typically ask is how efficient are the steady-state resource loads distributions generated by a particular group of agents with a given information stream. Besides this, we shall also look at the inverse problem, namely under which conditions can a steady state satisfy criteria for efficiency. For example, what type of information should one inject into the system in order to facilitate the reach of a steady state in which \( H \) and \( \sigma^2 \) are as small as possible? Indeed the structure of the information agents have access to may drastically affect global efficiency in many cases (e.g. traffic models).

\[ \text{2.2. A simple model of ecological resource competition} \]

Ecosystems constitute a foremost example of the class of problems we outlined above [8]. The following can be seen as a minimal model of a competitive ecology with limited resources. Such a model will be taken as a prototype to illustrate the statistical mechanics (static) approach. The statistical mechanics approach to ecosystems has been pioneered in [9] based on the generating functional approach. The central issue is that of the May’s biodiversity paradox [10], which shows that, contrary to expectations, increases in biodiversity in a random ecosystem enhance its instability. We shall indeed find the same result.

\[ \text{2.2.1. Definition} \]

Let us consider a system with \( N \) species whose populations \( n_i(t) \) \((i \in \{1, \ldots, N\})\) are governed by Lotka-Volterra type of equations:

\[
\frac{\dot{n}_i(t)}{n_i(t)} = f_i + \sum_{\mu=1}^{P} Q^{\mu}(t)q^{\mu}_i
\]

\( Q^{\mu} \) denotes the abundance of resource \( \mu \in \{1, \ldots, P\} \) (be it a mineral, a particular habitat, water...) while \( q^{\mu}_i \) is a coefficient saying how much species \( i \) benefits from that resource. The constant \( f_i \) is the population’s decay rate ‘in absence of resources’. To simplify things, we mimic the complex interdependence between species and resources by assuming that the \( q^{\mu}_i \)'s are independent, identically distributed quenched random variables.
The abundance of resource $\mu$ depends on the population of each species, i.e.

$$Q^\mu(t) = Q^\mu_0 - \sum_{j=1}^{N} q^\mu_j n_j(t)$$

(5)

where $Q^\mu_0$ is the amount of resource $\mu$ that would be present in the system if no species fed on it. To fix ideas, let us suppose that

$$Q^\mu_0 = P + s \sqrt{P} \ x^\mu$$

(6)

where $s > 0$ is a constant and $x^\mu$ is a quenched Gaussian random variable with zero average and $\langle x^\mu x^\nu \rangle = \delta_{\mu\nu}$. (The $P$-scaling is introduced in order to obtain a well-defined limit $N \to \infty$, or $P \to \infty$) Loosely speaking, the parameter $s$ is related to the variability of resources: for small $s$, the resource level is roughly the same for all resources, while increasing $s$ the distribution of resource levels gets less and less uniform. Clearly, the number of species that survive (i.e. such that $n_i(t) > 0$) in the steady state will depend on a number of factors, like the distribution of available resources and how similar the species are among themselves, that is on the distribution of $q^\mu_i$’s, which we take to have first moments

$$\langle q^\mu_i \rangle = q, \quad \langle (q^\mu_i - q)^2 \rangle = 1$$

(7)

(here and in what follows we denote averages over the quenched disorder by $\langle \langle \cdots \rangle \rangle$) Along with the questions concerning the resulting resource loads distribution, an interesting problem to raise is the following: what is the typical maximum number of species that can be supported asymptotically when the number of resources $P$ is large ($P \to \infty$) as a function of $s$?

This issue can be tackled by noting that

$$H(t) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\mu} Q^\mu(t)^2 - \sum_{i=1}^{N_s} f_i n_i(t)$$

(8)

is a Lyapunov function of the dynamics (i.e. $\dot{H}(t) \leq 0$; this can be easily shown by a direct calculation). This implies that the steady state properties are described by the minima of $H$ over $\{n_i \geq 0\}$. Note that in the steady state

$$H \simeq \sum_{\mu} \left( \langle Q^\mu \rangle - \langle Q \rangle \right)^2, \quad \langle Q \rangle = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu} \langle Q^\mu \rangle$$

(9)

In the rest of this section we shall first work out in detail the minimization of $H$ and then discuss the resulting scenario.
2.2.2. Statics (replica approach) The task of minimizing $H$ can be carried out by introducing a ‘partition sum’

$$Z = \text{Tr}_n e^{-\beta H}, \quad n = \{n_i\}$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

and applying the replica trick:

$$\lim_{N \to \infty} \left\langle \min_n \frac{H}{N} \right\rangle = -\lim_{\beta \to \infty} \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{1}{\beta N} \left\langle \log Z \right\rangle = -\lim_{\beta \to \infty} \lim_{r \to 0} \frac{1}{\beta r N} \log \left\langle Z^r \right\rangle$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

The calculations are relatively straightforward. Using the Hubbard-Stratonovich trick we can write

$$Z = \text{Tr}_n \left[ \prod_{\mu=1}^{P} e^{-\frac{\beta}{2N}(Q^\mu)^2} \right] e^{-\frac{\beta}{N} \sum_i f_i n_i} = \text{Tr}_n \left\langle \prod_{\mu=1}^{P} e^{i\sqrt{\frac{\beta}{N}} z^\mu Q^\mu} \right\rangle e^{-\frac{\beta}{N} \sum_i f_i n_i}$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

where $\langle \ldots \rangle_z$ is an average over the Gaussian variables $z^\mu$ with $\langle z^\mu \rangle_z = 0$ and $\langle z^\mu z^\nu \rangle_z = \delta_{\mu\nu}$. So we have

$$\left\langle Z^r \right\rangle = \text{Tr}_{\{n_a\}} \left\langle \prod_{\mu=1}^{P} \left\langle e^{i\sqrt{\frac{\beta}{N}} (\sum_a z^\mu_a) Q^\mu_a} \right\rangle \prod_{i=1}^{N} \left\langle e^{-i\sqrt{\frac{\beta}{N}} (\sum_a z^\mu_{ia} n_{ia}) q^\mu_i} \right\rangle \right\rangle e^{-\frac{\beta}{N} \sum_i f_i \sum_a n_{ia}}$$

where the index $a$ runs over replicas ($a = 1, \ldots, r$). The first disorder average is done over $Q^\mu_a$ as given by (6) (thus more properly over $z^\mu$), while the second is done over the $q^\mu_i$’s. The former is easily performed. As for the latter we note that if $\beta/N \ll 1$ (which is the case since we first take the limit $N \to \infty$ and then the limit $\beta \to \infty$), then

$$\left\langle e^{-i\sqrt{\frac{\beta}{N}} (\sum_a z^\mu_{ia} n_{ia}) q^\mu_i} \right\rangle \sim e^{-i\sqrt{\frac{\beta}{N}} \langle (q^\mu_i) \rangle (\sum_a z^\mu_{ia} n_{ia}) - \frac{\beta}{2N} (\sum_a z^\mu_{ia} n_{ia})^2 \langle (q^\mu_i)^2 \rangle}$$

We thus find

$$\left\langle Z^r \right\rangle = \text{Tr}_{\{n_a\}} \left\langle \prod_{\mu=1}^{P} e^{i\sqrt{\frac{\beta}{N}} \sum_a z^\mu_a (a - \frac{N}{q} \sum_i n_{ia})} e^{-\frac{\beta}{2N} \sum_{a,b} z^\mu_a z^\nu_b (\alpha s^2 + \frac{N}{q} \sum_i n_{ia} n_{ib})} \right\rangle e^{-\frac{\beta}{N} \sum_i f_i \sum_a n_{ia}}$$

The leading term in the above exponential is the first one. However, it corresponds to an undesirable super-extensive term in the free energy unless

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_i n_{ia} = \frac{\alpha}{q}$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

If so, the annoying term acts as a $\delta$-distribution that ensures the above condition:

$$e^{i\sqrt{\frac{\beta}{N}} \sum_a z^\mu_a (a - \frac{N}{q} \sum_i n_{ia})} \propto \prod_a \delta \left( N\alpha/q - \sum_i n_{ia} \right) \propto \int d\omega e^{\beta \sum_a \omega_a (N\alpha/q - \sum_i n_{ia})}$$

Furthermore one sees that the relevant macroscopic order parameter is the overlap

$$G_{ab} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_i n_{ia} n_{ib}$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)
which can be introduced in the replicated partition sum with the identities
\[ 1 = \int \delta \left( G_{ab} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_i n_{ia} n_{ib} \right) dG_{ab} \propto \int dR_{ab} dG_{ab} e^{-\frac{N\rho^2}{2} R_{ab} \left( G_{ab} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_i n_{ia} n_{ib} \right)} \]
for all \( a \geq b \). Noting that when \( \beta \to \infty \) only the minima of \( H \) contribute to the partition sum, it is easy to understand that \( G_{ab} \) measures how similar different minima \( a \) and \( b \) are to each other. We may now factorize over resources to obtain
\[ \left< \prod_{\mu} e^{-\frac{\beta}{2} \sum_{a,b} z_{\mu}^a G_{ab} \left( \alpha s^2 + 1 \right) (G_{ab} - 1 \sum_i n_{ia} n_{ib})} \right>_{z,f} = e^{-\frac{1}{2} \text{tr} \log \left[ I + \beta \left( \alpha s^2 + G \right) \right]} \]
so that, finally, factorizing over species, we arrive at
\[ \left\langle \langle Z^r \rangle \right\rangle = \int e^{-\beta r N f(w,G,R)} dwdGdR \]
with
\[ f(w, G, R) = \frac{\alpha}{2r\beta} \text{tr} \log \left[ I + \beta \left( \alpha s^2 + G \right) \right] + \frac{\alpha \beta}{2r} \sum_{a \geq b} R_{ab} G_{ab} - \frac{\alpha}{rq} \sum_a w_a - \frac{1}{r \beta} \log \left< \text{tr} \sum_{a \geq b} R_{ab} n_a n_b - \beta \sum_a w_a n_a - \frac{\beta}{r} \sum_a n_a \right>_{f} \]
where now \( \langle \cdots \rangle_f \) stands for an average over the distribution of decay rates. By the principle of steepest descent, when \( N \to \infty \), \( \left\langle \langle Z^r \rangle \right\rangle \) is dominated by the saddle point values of the order parameters \( G, R \) and \( w \) (which we shall denote by a \( ^* \)) so
\[ \lim_{N \to \infty} \min_n \frac{H}{N} = \lim_{\beta \to \infty, r \to 0} f(w^*, G^*, R^*) \]
To proceed further, we assume that \( G^*, R^* \) and \( w^* \) take the replica-symmetric (RS) form
\[ G_{ab}^* = g + (G - g)\delta_{ab} \quad R_{ab}^* = 2r - (r + \rho/\beta)\delta_{ab} \quad w_a^* = w \]
which leads, in the limit \( r \to 0 \), to the free energy density
\[ f_{\text{RS}}(g, G, r, \rho, w) = \frac{\alpha}{2\beta} \log \left[ 1 + \beta(G - g) \right] + \frac{\alpha}{2} \frac{\alpha s^2 + g}{1 + \beta(G - g)} + \frac{\alpha r}{2} \beta(G - g) - \frac{\alpha}{2r} G \rho - \frac{\rho}{q} w - \frac{1}{\beta} \log \left< \int_{0}^{\infty} dn e^{-\beta V(n|z,f)} \right>_{z,f} \]
where the “potential” \( V \) is given by
\[ V(n|z,f) = \frac{1}{2} \alpha \rho n^2 + (w + f/N - \sqrt{\alpha r z}) n \]
and the average \( \langle \cdots \rangle_{z,f} \) is over both the unit Gaussian variable \( z \) and the decay rate \( f \), whose distribution we left unspecified up to now. It is clear that if this distribution

\[ \dagger \] This assumption gives the exact results in almost all the cases we shall discuss in this review because the functions to be minimized have a unique minimum. Should this condition fail, one must resort to more complicated Ansätze known as replica-symmetry breaking.
has finite moments and does not get broader with $N$, we can drop the term $f/N$ above. Now let us take the remaining limit $\beta \to \infty$, where minima are selected, assuming that $H$ has a unique minimum. In this case, clearly, $G \to g$ (there is only one minimum by assumption!) and we may look for solutions with

$$\lim_{\beta \to \infty} \beta (G - g) = \chi$$ (22)

finite. Moreover, the last integral in (20) in the limit $\beta \to \infty$ is dominated by the minimum of $V$. Therefore we end up with

$$\lim_{\beta \to \infty} f_{\text{RS}}(g, G, r, \rho, w) = \frac{\alpha \alpha s^2 + G}{2} \frac{1 + \chi}{1 + \chi}$$

\begin{align*}
+ \frac{\alpha r}{2} - \frac{\alpha}{2} G \rho - \frac{\alpha}{q} w + \frac{1}{2} \alpha \rho \langle n^2 \rangle_* + w \langle n \rangle_* - \sqrt{\alpha r} \langle zn \rangle_*
\end{align*}

(23)

where $\langle \cdots \rangle_*$ are averages over the normal variable $z$, with the $n = n^*(z)$ which minimizes $V$:

$$n^*(z) = \frac{\sqrt{\alpha r}}{\alpha \rho} (z - z_0) \theta(z - z_0), \quad z_0 = w/\sqrt{\alpha r}.$$  

Notice that this operation corresponds to an ‘effective species’ problem whose solution describes the collective behavior of the original $N$-species system.

The saddle point equations are

\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial f_{\text{RS}}}{\partial w} &= 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \langle n \rangle_* = \frac{\alpha}{q} \\
\frac{\partial f_{\text{RS}}}{\partial \rho} &= 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \langle n^2 \rangle_* = G \\
\frac{\partial f_{\text{RS}}}{\partial r} &= 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \langle nz \rangle_* = \sqrt{\alpha r} \chi \\
\frac{\partial f_{\text{RS}}}{\partial G} &= 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \rho = \frac{1}{1 + \chi} \\
\frac{\partial f_{\text{RS}}}{\partial \chi} &= 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad r = \frac{\alpha s^2 + G}{(1 + \chi)^2}
\end{align*}

(24)

It is easier to find a parametric solution in terms of $z_0$: let us define

\begin{align*}
I_1(z_0) &= \int_{z_0}^{\infty} \frac{dz}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-z^2/2} (z - z_0) = \frac{e^{-z_0^2/2}}{\sqrt{2\pi}} - z_0 \text{erfc} \left( \frac{z_0}{\sqrt{2}} \right) \\
I_2(z_0) &= \int_{z_0}^{\infty} \frac{dz}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-z^2/2} (z - z_0)^2 = \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 + z_0^2 \right) \text{erfc} \left( \frac{z_0}{\sqrt{2}} \right) - \frac{z_0 e^{-z_0^2/2}}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \\
I_z(z_0) &= \int_{z_0}^{\infty} \frac{dz}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-z^2/2} z (z - z_0) = \frac{1}{2} \text{erfc} \left( \frac{z_0}{\sqrt{2}} \right)
\end{align*}

(25)

After some manipulations we find

$$\alpha = \frac{1}{2} \left[ I_2 + \sqrt{I_2^2 + 4s^2 q^2 I_1^2} \right]$$
Figure 1. Behavior of $\alpha_c$ as a function of $sq$.

$$G = \frac{\alpha^2 I_2}{q^2 I_1^2}$$

$$\chi = \frac{I_z}{\alpha - I_z}$$

The assumed scaling of parameters with $\beta$, and hence the above equations, are valid only for $z_0 < z_0^*$ where $z_0^*$ is the solution of

$$I_z(z_0^*) [I_z(z_0^*) - I_2(z_0^*)] = s^2 q^2 I_1^2(z_0^*).$$

Indeed $\chi \to \infty$ as $z_0 \to z_0^*$. This singularity marks a phase transition at a point $\alpha_c = I_z(z_0^*)$ between a phase $\alpha > \alpha_c$ which is described by the equations above, and one where $\chi = \infty$. The critical point $\alpha_c$ is a decreasing function of $sq$ (from a value $\alpha_c = 1/2$ for $sq = 0$) which rapidly vanishes as $sq$ increases (it’s already $10^{-5}$ for $sq = 4$). It is reported in Fig. 1. At the transition, the susceptibility $\chi \sim |\alpha - \alpha_c|^{-1}$ diverges and the free energy, which as we said is proportional to the variance of the resource loads distribution, vanishes. This means that below $\alpha_c$ all resources are exploited to the same extent, while above $\alpha_c$ the resource load distribution is not uniform. For the fraction of surviving species (with $n_i > 0$) we get

$$\phi = \langle \theta(z - z_0) \rangle_z = \int_{z_0}^{\infty} \frac{dz}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-z^2/2} = \frac{1}{2} \text{erfc} \left( z_0 / \sqrt{2} \right) = I_z(z_0)$$

so $\phi < \alpha$ for $\alpha > \alpha_c$ and $\phi \to \alpha$ at $\alpha_c$. This means that below $\alpha_c$ the number of surviving species equals that of resources while for $\alpha > \alpha_c$ there is on average less than one species per resource (or $\phi/\alpha < 1$). The behavior of $H$, $G$ and of the fraction of surviving species per resource $\phi/\alpha$ is displayed in Fig. 2 as a function of $\alpha$ for fixed $sq$.

2.2.3. Stability  Note that at fixed $q$ the maximal number $P/\alpha_c$ of species that can be sustained in an ecosystem with $P$ resources is an increasing function of $s$, so that by increasing the variability of resources the ecosystem gets more stable. The threshold of
stability also increases if \( q \) increases. Having fixed the variance of \( q_i^\mu \) to 1, increasing \( q \) means that species get more and more similar. This seems at first sight a contradictory scenario. To sort out this issue, let us analyze the linear stability of the system. Let 
\[ n_i(t) = n_i(\infty) + \sqrt{n_i(\infty)} \eta_i(t) \]  
where \( n_i(\infty) \) is the asymptotic value of the population of species \( i \) and \( \eta_i(t) \) is a small perturbation. To leading order, the dynamics is given by
\[ \dot{\eta}_i(t) = - \sum_{j=1}^{N} \Delta_{ij} \eta_j(t) \]  
with
\[ \Delta_{ij} = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu=1}^{P} \sqrt{n_i(\infty)} (q_i^\mu - q) (q_j^\mu - q) \sqrt{n_j(\infty)}. \]
The stability is related to the smallest eigenvalue \( \lambda_- \) of \( \Delta_{ij} \). This can be computed explicitly [11] and it is given by:
\[ \lambda_- = \frac{1}{q} \left( \sqrt{\alpha} - \sqrt{\phi} \right) \]  
This shows that the phase transition point, where \( \alpha_c = \phi(\alpha_c) \), is the onset of dynamical instability of the system. The presence of the factor \( 1/q \) in \( \lambda_- \) causes an interplay of the effects of increasing \( s \) and increasing \( q \) (since \( \lambda_- \to 0 \) as \( q \to \infty \)), ultimately leading to a maximal stability for intermediate values of \( q \), as can be seen by the behavior of \( \lambda_- \) versus \( q \), Fig. 3. It is also easy to show that \( \lambda_- \) is an increasing function of \( \alpha \), for all values of \( s \) and \( q \). Hence the introduction of new species always decreases the stability of the ecosystem, in agreement with May’s classical result [10].

**Figure 2.** Behavior of \( H \), \( G \) and of the fraction of surviving species \( \phi \) as a function of \( \alpha \) for \( sq = 1 \).
2.3. The El Farol problem

The El Farol problem is the paradigm of resource allocation games with inductive agents. It can be stated as follows [12]. \( N \) customers labeled \( i \) have to decide independently on each night \( t \) whether to attend \((a_i(t) = 1)\) or not \((a_i(t) = 0)\) the El Farol bar, which has a capacity of \( L < N \) seats. The place is enjoyable only if it’s not overcrowded, that is only if the attendance \( A(t) = \sum_i a_i(t) \) doesn’t exceed the number of seats. In order to make their decisions, customers aim at predicting whether the bar will be crowded or not on any given night based on the past attendances.

In his seminal work, Arthur has pointed out the frustration inherent in such a situation. If everybody expects that the bar will be crowded, no one will go and the bar will be empty. Conversely all agents may attend the bar at the same time, if they all expect it to be empty. Hence he argued that this is a situation which forces expectations of different agents to diverge. It is reasonable to think that, if agents start with different expectation models and revise them according to the history of the attendance, their expectations will never converge and agents’ heterogeneity will be preserved forever. He then showed by computer experiments with \( N = 100 \) and \( L = 60 \) that inductive agents endowed with fixed ‘predictors’ (namely look-up tables associating to each series of past attendances a binary decision like go/don’t go) are able to self-organize so that the attendance \( A(t) \) fluctuates around the comfort level \( L \).

Note that the El Farol problem can be regarded as an embryonic market where \( L \) units of an asset or a commodity must be allocated on any given day \( t \). They are offered to \( N \) agents who may decide to invest \( 1 \) to buy it \((a_i(t) = 1)\) or not \((a_i(t) = 0)\). The attendance \( A(t) \) is then the demand of the asset (the number of available units, or supply, is fixed at \( L \)). Each unit of asset delivers a return of \( 1 \) to its owner at the end of the period. Imagine that the price at which the asset is sold is determined at each period by a market clearing condition (demand = supply): \( A(t) = Lp(t) \). Then an
agent who invests $a_i(t)$ in the asset, receives $a_i(t)/p(t)$ units of it. These will be worth $a_i(t)/p(t)$ at the end of the period. If $p(t) > 1$, which occurs if $A(t) > L$ (crowded bar), it is not convenient to invest (attend). If $p(t) < 1$ it is instead worthwhile to invest (attend).

2.3.1. Definition In what follows, we focus on a tractable version of the model that differs from Arthur’s original work in the form of the predictors but preserves all the main qualitative features of the model [13]. In order to formalize the problem it is reasonable to assume that (i) customers have a finite memory, that is, their analyzing power is limited and they must base their prediction on the attendances of a finite number (say, $m$) of past nights, and that (ii) they are insensitive to the actual size of the attendance (perhaps simply because they don’t have access to it) and rather only know whether the bar was overcrowded or not on a given night. This means that the information available to customers on night $t$ is encoded in the string

$$
\mu(t) = \{\theta(L - A(t - 1)), \ldots, \theta(L - A(t - m))\} \in \{0, 1\}^m
$$

(32)

where $\theta(\cdot)$ is the Heaviside function: $\theta(L - A(t)) = 1$ if the bar is enjoyable ($A(t) < L$) while $\theta(L - A(t)) = 0$ if the bar is overcrowded ($A(t) > L$). The time evolution of the string $\mu(t)$ is governed in time by the map

$$
\mu(t + 1) = [2\mu(t) + \theta(L - A(t))] \mod(2^m)
$$

(33)

The above equation completely defines the structure of the information available to agents in the case in which they base themselves on the past attendances. Graphically, the evolution of history strings is constrained to occur on a de Bruijn graph [14] of order $m$, Fig. 4.

We shall consider, for comparison, another possibility, namely that the information supplied to customers is a random binary string of length $m$ or equivalently a random integer (‘information pattern’) drawn from $\{1, \ldots, 2^m \equiv P\}$ with equal probability at each time step. We shall refer to the latter as the case of exogenous random information, as opposed to the former of endogenous information. The obvious difference between the two choices is that while in the latter case the space of informations is sampled uniformly by construction, in the former this is in principle not true. There is however a deeper difference that has serious consequences on the analytical solubility of the model: in the case of random information the dynamics is Markovian.
Having defined the information source, let us specify the agents’ behavior. Even in a simplified context, making the optimal decision for each given string requires an unrealistic computational capacity that should be shared by all agents. Inductive reasoning requires that customers stick instead to simple decision rules. In particular, we assume that they have at their disposal a small number \( S \) of \( 2^m \)-dimensional vectors called ‘strategies’ (analog to Arthur’s predictors) that map information strings into binary actions (go/don’t go):

\[
a_{ig} : \{0, 1\}^m \ni \mu \rightarrow a_{ig}^\mu \in \{0, 1\} \quad (i = 1, \ldots, N; g = 1, \ldots, S)
\] (34)

In the table below one such possible strategy is shown for \( m = 3 \) (or \( P = 8 \)).

| past attendance string | pattern \( \mu \) | decision \( a^\mu \) |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 000                     | 1               | 1               |
| 001                     | 2               | 0               |
| 010                     | 3               | 0               |
| 011                     | 4               | 1               |
| 100                     | 5               | 1               |
| 101                     | 6               | 0               |
| 110                     | 7               | 1               |
| 111                     | 8               | 0               |

Customers are heterogeneous as of course different agents have different strategies. This is modeled by assuming that each component \( a_{ig}^\mu \) of every strategy \( a_{ig} \) is drawn independently for all \( i, \mu \) and \( g \) with probability distribution

\[
P(a) = \bar{\alpha}\delta(a - 1) + (1 - \bar{\alpha})\delta(a)
\] (35)

where \( \bar{\alpha} \) is the average attendance frequency of agents. Strategies are assigned to agents at time \( t = 0 \) and are kept fixed throughout the game. In order to decide which strategy to adopt on every night, agents keep tracks of their performance via a score function that is updated according to the following rule:

\[
U_{ig}(t + 1) - U_{ig}(t) = \left(1 - 2a_{ig}^\mu(t)\right)\left[A(t) - L\right]
\] (36)

with the rationale that strategies suggesting not to go \( (a_{ig}^\mu(t) = 0) \) are rewarded when the attendance is higher than \( L \) and punished when it is lower than \( L \) (and vice versa when \( a_{ig}^\mu(t) = 1 \)). Then on each night every agent selects the strategy with the highest cumulated score:

\[
g_i(t) = \arg \max_g U_{ig}(t)
\] (37)

and acts accordingly: \( a_i(t) = a_{ig_i(t)}^\mu \). In short, the model’s rules can be summarized as follows:

\[
g_i(t) = \arg \max_g U_{ig}(t)
\]
1. \( A(t) = \sum_i a_{ig(t)}^{\mu(t)} \) (38)

\[ U_{ig}(t+1) - U_{ig}(t) = \left(1 - 2a_{ig(t)}^{\mu(t)}\right) [A(t) - L] \]
(from top to bottom: strategy selection; aggregation; updating). It is understood that scores are initialized at time \( t = 0 \) at certain values \( U_{ig}(0) \).

2.3.2. Macroscopic properties

After a transient, the dynamics defined by (38) will reach a steady state whose global efficiency can be conveniently characterized by two parameters: the average deviation of the attendance from the comfort level \( L \), \( \langle A - L \rangle \) and its fluctuations \( \sigma^2 = \langle (A - L)^2 \rangle \). The former measures the degree to which agents coordinate to generate attendances around the comfort level. The latter measures the waste of resources: the larger \( \sigma^2 \) the bigger the deviations of the attendance from the comfort level (in either direction). In a nutshell, it quantifies the quality of the coordination. The behavior of the two quantities (properly normalized with \( N \)) at fixed \( L = 60 \), \( \bar{a} = 1/2 \) and \( m = 2, 3, 6 \) and varying \( N \) is displayed in Fig. 5 for endogenous (solid lines) and random (dashed lines) information. In the former case, a general feature that emerges is that the average attendance settles at the comfort level in a window of values of \( \bar{a} \) centered around \( L/N \) whose size shrinks as \( m \) increases. Out of this window, sensible deviations may occur. In parallel, fluctuations are maximal at \( \bar{a} = L/N \) for \( m = 2 \) and the height of the maximum decreases with increasing \( m \) until it disappears. This implies that the waste of resources is comparatively larger when \( m \) is smaller, so that for instance the fraction of losers is larger for small \( m \). Thus one can say that global efficiency increases when \( m \) increases. The behavior in the case of random information

Figure 5. Average deviation of the attendance from the comfort level (top) and fluctuations (bottom) versus \( \bar{a} N/L \) for endogenous (solid lines) and exogenous (dashed lines) information (from [13]).
Based on this, one expects that with endogenous information the information space is sampled uniformly around $\bar{\sigma} \simeq L/N$. This is indeed so. To see it, one can measure the frequency with which histories are sampled in the steady state, $\rho(\mu)$, and calculate the entropy

$$S(m) = -\sum_{\mu} \rho(\mu) \log_2 \rho(\mu)$$

such that $S(m) = m$ when the information space is sampled uniformly (the ‘effective’ number of information patterns visited by the dynamics is $2^{S(m)}$). As shown in Fig. 6, $S(m)/m \simeq 1$ only for when $\bar{\sigma} \simeq L/N$. Outside this phase, the entropy decreases, signaling that the information dynamics is biased.

These findings indicate that the degree to which inductive agents are able to coordinate the exploitation of the limited resource in a way that is collectively efficient depends on the size of the information space they base themselves on. While the average level of activity always settles at the resource level, fluctuations get smaller and smaller as the information space grows. When the average attendance frequency is close to $L/N$, then, the particular nature of the information provided to agents doesn’t affect the stationary macroscopic properties. The relevant requirement is that all agents possess the same information, independently of whether it’s the true attendance history or a random string.

2.3.3. Dynamics (continuous-time limit approach) The mathematical analysis of this model can be carried out in the case of exogenous information by studying the continuous-time limit of (38) along the lines of [16]. A few simplifications are necessary to this aim. First note that the dynamics (38) is non-linear in a way that doesn’t allow
to write it in the form of a gradient descent, that is physically the model is defined by a set of $N$ globally coupled Markov processes that violate detailed balance and it is not clear that a Lyapunov function exists. It is however possible to regularize the dynamics by smoothing the choice rule $g_i(t) = \arg\max g_i U_{ig}(t)$ to

$$\text{Prob}\{g_i(t) = g\} = C(t) e^{\Gamma U_{ig}(t)}$$

with $\Gamma > 0$ the ‘learning rate’ of agents (the original choice is recovered for $\Gamma \to \infty$). This modification is not without consequences and $\Gamma$ indeed turns out to play a rather non-trivial role in the macroscopic properties. With (40), it is possible to construct the continuous-time limit of (38).

The crucial observation is that there is a ‘natural’ characteristic time scale for the dynamics given by $P$ (intuitively, agents have to check the efficiency of their strategies against all information patterns before they can evaluate their performance meaningfully). This implies that if one is interested in steady state properties, time should be re-scaled as $t \to \tau = t/P$. Iterating (38) from time $t = P \tau$ to time $t = P(\tau + d\tau)$ and setting $u_{ig}(\tau) = U_{ig}(P \tau)$ one obtains

$$u_{ig}(\tau + d\tau) - u_{ig}(\tau) = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{t = P \tau}^{P(\tau + d\tau)} (1 - 2a_{ig}^{(t)}) [A(t) - L]$$

The arguments of the sum on the right-hand side can be separated into a deterministic and a fluctuating term:

$$(1 - 2a_{ig}^{(t)}) [A(t) - L] = (1 - 2a_{ig}) \langle [A(t) - L] \rangle_\pi + X_{ig}(t)$$

where we used the fact that information is exogenous and random and we denoted by $\langle \cdots \rangle_\pi$ an average over the distributions

$$\pi_{is}(\tau) = \frac{1}{P d\tau} \sum_{t = P \tau}^{P(\tau + d\tau)} C(t) e^{\Gamma U_{ig}(t)}$$

We have therefore

$$u_{ig}(\tau + d\tau) - u_{ig}(\tau) = (1 - 2a_{ig}) \langle [A(t) - L] \rangle_\pi d\tau + dW_{ig}(\tau)$$

where $dW_{ig}(\tau) = (1/P) \sum_{t = P \tau}^{P(\tau + d\tau)} X_{ig}(t)$ is a noise term whose statistics (average and correlations) can be derived by noting that $X_{ig}(t)$ are independent identically-distributed zero-average random variables, so $\langle dW_{ig}(\tau) \rangle = 0$ and

$$\langle dW_{ig}(\tau) dW_{jg'}(\tau') \rangle = \left\langle \frac{1}{P^2} \sum_{t = P \tau}^{P(\tau + d\tau)} \sum_{t' = P \tau'}^{P(\tau + d\tau)} X_{ig}(t) X_{jg'}(t') \right\rangle$$

$$= \frac{\delta(\tau - \tau')}{P} \langle X_{ig}(t) X_{jg'}(t) \rangle_\pi d\tau$$

The remaining term, $\langle X_{ig}(t) X_{jg'}(t) \rangle_\pi$ can be evaluated from the statistics of disorder and of $A(t)$. Finally, taking the limit $d\tau \to 0$ one arrives at the following Langevin
Contents

\[
\dot{u}_{ig}(\tau) = (1 - 2a_{ig}) \langle [A(t) - L] \rangle_\pi + \eta_{ig}(\tau)
\]

\[
\langle \eta_{ig}(\tau) \rangle = 0
\tag{46}
\]

\[
\langle \eta_{ig}(\tau) \eta_{jg}(\tau') \rangle \approx \frac{\langle (A - L)^2 \rangle_\pi}{P} (2a_{ig} - 1)(2a_{jg} - 1) \delta(\tau - \tau')
\]

where in the last relation we have factorized the average over \(\mu\)'s. Note also that the averages on the right-hand side of Eq. (46) are taken at fixed \(\pi_{ig}(\tau) = C(\tau) \exp[\Gamma u_{ig}(\tau)]\) so they are themselves time-dependent. Therefore (46) is a set of complex, non-linear stochastic differential equations in which the noise correlation is also time-dependent. At the same time, the probability to choose a predictor \(g, \pi_{ig}(\tau)\), is easily seen to satisfy, in the re-scaled time \(\Gamma \tau = \tilde{\tau}\) the stochastic equation

\[
\dot{\pi}_{ig}(\tilde{\tau}) = \pi_{ig}(\tilde{\tau}) F[\pi] + \sqrt{\Gamma} G[\pi, \eta]
\tag{47}
\]

where \(F\) and \(G\) are \(\Gamma\)-independent functions whose form is not relevant for our scopes. This tells us that agents’ preferences are subject to stochastic fluctuations of strength proportional to \(\sqrt{\Gamma}\) around their average. The larger \(\Gamma\) the longer it takes to average fluctuations out. Moreover only in the limit \(\Gamma \to 0\), in which the dynamics if the \(\pi_{ig}\)'s (and consequently of the \(u_{ig}\)'s) becomes deterministic, the system performs a gradient descent with the Lyapunov function

\[
H = \frac{1}{P} \sum_\mu (\langle A|\mu \rangle - L)^2, \quad \langle A|\mu \rangle = \sum_{i,g} f_{ig} a_{ig}^\mu
\tag{48}
\]

where \(\langle \cdots |\mu \rangle\) denotes a time-average in the steady state conditioned on the occurrence of pattern \(\mu\):

\[
\langle X|\mu \rangle = \lim_{T, T_{eq} \to \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=T_{eq}}^T X(t) \delta_{\mu(t),\mu}, \quad T_t = \sum_{t=T_{eq}}^T \delta_{\mu(t),\mu}
\tag{49}
\]

and \(f_{ig} = \langle \pi_{ig} \rangle\).

Thus the minima of \(H\) over \(f_{ig}\) (subject to \(\sum g f_{ig} = 1\) for all \(i\)) describe the steady state. From a physical viewpoint, \(H\) measures the amount of exploitable information produced in the system, or the ‘predictability’: if e.g. \(\langle A|\nu \rangle \neq L\), the signal \(\mu(t)\) carries information which is useful to predict whether one should attend or not to the bar when \(\mu(t) = \nu\). The fact that the stationary state corresponds to minimal \(H\) means that agents exploit to their best the system’s predictability. We shall term phases with \(H = 0\) ‘unpredictable’ or ‘symmetric’, while phases with \(H > 0\) will be called ‘predictable’ or ‘asymmetric’.

Notice also that the noise correlations are proportional to the volatility \(\sigma^2 = \langle (A - L)^2 \rangle\) which in turn depends on the set of all \(u_{ig}\)'s. Hence calculating the volatility requires solving a much more complex self-consistent problem.

The minimization can be carried out analytically resorting again to the replica trick. The thermodynamic limit to be considered in this case is \(N \to \infty\) with \(\ell = L/N\) and \(\alpha = P/N\) finite. The interesting case is that where the average attendance frequency \(\bar{a}\)
fluctuates around $\ell$ so that $\bar{a} - \ell = O(1/\sqrt{N})$. Indeed, if $\bar{a} - \ell = O(1)$ then each agent will always use the strategy that prescribes him to go more (resp. less) often if $\bar{a} < \ell$ (resp. $\bar{a} > \ell$). A convenient parametrization is given by

$$\bar{a} - \ell = \gamma \sqrt{\frac{\ell(1-\ell)}{P}}$$

with $\gamma$ finite and independent of $N$. The resulting phase diagram in the $(\alpha, \gamma)$ plane is reported in Fig. 7. We see a region for small $\alpha$ and small $\gamma$ where $H = 0$, i.e. $\langle A \rangle = L$. In this ‘unpredictable’ phase the average attendance converges to the comfort level but fluctuations are large. On the other hand, the typical attendance differs from $L$ outside this phase. Looking at the $m$-dependence, we see that as $N$ varies with $L$ and $\bar{a}$ and $m$ fixed, the system follows the trajectories shown in dashed lines. For small values of $m$ these cross the symmetric phase in the region $\bar{a}N \simeq L$.

This rich phenomenology, and specifically the non-trivial interplay between predictability and fluctuations, is characteristic of the complexity of many other resource-allocation models, two of which we shall now discuss.

2.4. Buyers and sellers in the ‘fish market’

Market organization, namely the establishment of stable relationships between buyers and sellers, is one of the basic mechanisms that determine the efficiency of commodity markets. An important question concerns the effects that organization has on prices and their fluctuations. This issue has been investigated in detail in [17] in the context of an empirical study of the Marseille fish market. This is the sense in which this section refers to a model of a ‘fish market’. Loosely speaking, one can think that a
seller with loyal buyers has an incentive to take advantage of the situation by raising prices, thus removing the incentive of buyers to be loyal to him. Once the relationship is broken, buyers will seek cheaper sellers thus driving a reduction of the average price. This mechanism however is expected to cause an increase of fluctuations (and thus a decrease of cost certainty), since in the ‘disorganized’ phase buyers will be switching from one seller to another. This elementary scenario, from which it is clear that efficiency is a two-sided concept, is worthy of a deeper investigation. A highly stylized yet non-trivial model addressing this issue was introduced in [18].

One considers a system with \( N \) buyers and \( P \) sellers, which for simplicity may be assumed to sell different commodities each (say each seller supplies a different type of fish). Ultimately, the limit \( N \to \infty \) with \( n = N/P \) finite shall be considered. On each day \( t = 1, 2, \ldots \), every consumer \( i \) has to acquire one of \( S \) possible bundles of commodities, for instance for his or her subsistence. A bundle is a vector \( q_{ig} = \{q_{\mu ig}\} \) such that \( q_{\mu ig} \) denotes the amount of goods buyer \( i \) demands from seller \( \mu \) (\( \mu \in \{1, \ldots, P\} \)). \( g \in \{1, \ldots, S\} \) labels the different feasible bundles. We are interested to model the case in which buyers are heterogeneous, in the sense that different buyers have different needs and thus different possible bundles. We therefore assume that bundles \( q_{ig} \) are quenched random vectors with probability distribution

\[
P(q_{ig}) = \prod_{\mu} \left[ (1 - q) \delta(1 - q_{\mu ig}) + q \delta(q_{\mu ig}) \right],
\]

(0 < \( q < 1 \) being the probability that any given commodity is part of a bundle) that are assigned to consumers independently on \( i \) and \( g \) on day \( t = 0 \) and are kept fixed. In this way, we introduce a further simplification in that each seller is either visited or not by a buyer, and the purchased quantities play no role. Moreover, we are implicitly assuming that the different commodities are equivalent to consumers, that is there is no commodity that all buyers will need to buy. Coming to sellers, we assume that they set the daily price of their commodity according to the demand they receive, denoted by \( D^\mu(t) \), so that the higher the demand the higher the price. Each buyer, on the other hand, aims at purchasing, on each day, the bundle he or she finds more convenient, labeled by \( g_i(t) \), with the limitation that when the choice is made the price at which the purchase will take place is not known yet (it is determined by the collective decision of all consumers, which form the demands). Hence they try to learn the convenience of different bundles from experience in order to be able to predict which bundle will have the highest marginal utility on any given day. The events taking place on each day \( t \) can be summarized by the following scheme:

\[
\begin{align*}
g_i(t) & = \arg \max_g U_{ig}(t) \\
D^\mu(t) & = \sum_i q_{\mu ig_i(t)} \\
U_{ig}(t + 1) - U_{ig}(t) & = \frac{1}{P} \sum_\mu q_{\mu ig} [k - D^\mu(t)]
\end{align*}
\]

At the decision stage, each buyer chooses the bundle which carries the highest
(cumulated) utility $U_{ig}(t)$. The different choices are then aggregated and the demands are formed. Finally utilities are updated with the following rationale: if the demand of a commodity $\mu$ is above a certain threshold $k$, consumers perceive that commodity as too costly and the utility of all of his feasible bundles that include it will tend to be reduced. Similarly, if the demand has been lower than $k$ the commodity will be seen as ‘cheap’ and will tend to increase the utility of the bundles that contain it. The utility of a bundle is determined by the demands of all commodities in it. Finally, we assume that the score updating is initialized at values $U_{ig}(0)$.

It is clear that $k$ plays in this model the role of the comfort level $L$ of the El Farol problem. Based on the discussion of the previous section, we concentrate on the case $k = N(1 - q)$. The relevant macroscopic observables are given by

$$H = \frac{1}{P} \sum_\mu \langle D^\mu - N(1 - q) \rangle^2$$

(53)

$$\Delta = \frac{1}{P} \sum_\mu \left[ \langle (D^\mu)^2 \rangle - \langle D^\mu \rangle^2 \right]$$

(54)

$H$ measures of how evenly buyers are distributed over sellers. Indeed if $H = 0$, each seller receives on average the same demand so that none of them is perceived as more convenient by buyers. In this case, consumers are distributed uniformly over producers. If $H > 0$, instead, the distribution of demands is not uniform and some producers are seen as more or less convenient than others. $\Delta$ represents instead the magnitude of demand fluctuations. Note that because of our assumptions on the relation between prices and demands, $H$ is a proxy for the average price whereas $\Delta$ quantifies the typical spread of prices in the economy. Note also that when $H > 0$ an external agent who watches the economy from the outside trying to identify the best bargain would manage to find more convenient sellers and make a profit. When $H = 0$, instead, this would not be possible. So transitions from regimes with $H > 0$ to regimes with $H = 0$ can be seen as transitions between inefficient and efficient states of the economy, where by efficient state we mean one where goods flow from sellers to buyers in such a way that no information exploitable by an external agent is generated. States that are optimal from a collective perspective have both $H = 0$ and $\Delta$ small, because on one hand a uniform demand distribution is desirable and on the other price fluctuations should be such that agents have as much cost certainty as possible on a day by day basis. Hence $H$ and $\Delta$ describe intertwined properties, and it is on their mutual dependence that we shall focus in what follows.

Results are shown in Fig. 8. The behavior of $H$ indicates that as the number of buyers increases they tend to distribute more and more uniformly over sellers until, for $n = n_c$, $H$ vanishes and the distribution becomes uniform. For $n < n_c$ the economy is inefficient as the uneven distribution of demands generates exploitable profit opportunities. For $n > n_c$ the economy is instead efficient. Notice that results are indeed independent of initial conditions $U_{ig}(0)$ in the inefficient phase, while for $n < n_c$ ergodicity is broken and the steady state depends on initial conditions. Furthermore,
we see that in the inefficient phase fluctuations are small whereas when the economy becomes efficient the dependence on initial conditions may drive the system to both states with large price fluctuations where \( \Delta \sim n \), which are rather undesirable, and states with small fluctuations (where \( \Delta \sim 1/n \)). This can be interpreted with the following mechanism. When there are few buyers, many sellers receive small demands and thus the economy presents many profitable opportunities. As more and more buyers join the opportunity window shrinks and players may be forced to switch bundles repeatedly in the attempt to identify convenient commodities. This leads to the increase of fluctuations and ultimately to a loss of day-by-day cost certainty.

Like the models described before, this one can also be studied analytically by resorting to a replica minimization. It is not difficult to see that the Lyapunov function in this case is precisely \( H \), so buyers collectively act so as to exploit profitable opportunities as much as possible. In [18] a different solution method, based on dynamical generating functionals, is employed. We defer a discussion of this technique to Sec. 5.3.

### 2.5. Route choice behavior and urban traffic

A most striking example of the influence of different information structures on the stationary properties of these systems has been given in the experimental literature on behavioral aspects of route-choice dynamics in vehicular traffic [19, 20]. Experiments dealt with groups of people having to choose at each time step (day) between two alternatives (routes), having at their disposal a certain externally provided information about the aggregate daily result, a sort of tunable traffic bulletin. The payoff for each choice depends on the number of agents making that choice in such a way that the larger this number the smaller the payoff. Experiments have shown that while agents were able to adapt rather well and reach states that were efficient on average, the overreaction,
namely the fluctuations or the difference between the optimal rate of decision change by agents and the actual rate of change, displayed a strong dependence on the type of information supplied, for instance with or without impact correction, time-dependent, user-dependent etc. In particular, the overall best states (smallest overreaction) were attained when the information is user-specific (see however [19,20] for additional details and more results).

The issue of how the information structure affects macroscopic properties has been tackled in a traffic-inspired resource allocation game which can be seen, roughly speaking, as a lattice version of the previous ‘fish-market’ model [21]. Let us consider the following situation. A road network, which for simplicity is taken to be a square lattice with $L^2$ sites, is given. On each day, each one of $N$ drivers has to travel from location A to location B (say, work/home) following one of $S$ possible routes. The points A and B are different for different drivers while the routes at their disposal are taken to be $S$ quenched random self-avoiding walks of length $\ell$ going from A to B (see Fig. 9).

Routes play here the role of the predictors of the El Farol problem and of the feasible bundles of the fish market: indexing lattice edges by $\mu$, each route $g$ of every driver $i$ can be written as a vector $q_{ig} = \{q_{ig}^\mu\}$, where $q_{ig}^\mu = 1$ if driver $i$ passes through edge $\mu$ in route $g$, and $q_{ig}^\mu = 0$ otherwise. Drivers are assumed to be inductive and their behavior is governed by the following rules:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Prob}\{g_i(t) = g\} &= C(t) \exp [\Gamma U_{ig}(t)] \\
Q^\mu(t) &= \sum_i q_{ig_i(t)}^\mu \\
U_{ig}(t+1) - U_{ig}(t) &= -\frac{1}{P} \sum_\mu q_{ig}^\mu Q^\mu(t) + \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \delta_{g,g_i(t)}\right) \zeta_{ig}(t)
\end{align*}
\]

Let us discuss them in some detail. The first one says that agents choose their preferred route on day $t$, $g_i(t)$, using a probabilistic model with learning rate $\Gamma > 0$. $Q^\mu(t)$ denotes the traffic load on street $\mu$ on day $t$. The score updating process is composed of two parts:

- the first term, $-\frac{1}{P} \sum_\mu q_{ig}^\mu Q^\mu(t)$, says that agents prefer less crowded routes;
• the second term, $\frac{1}{2} (1 - \delta_{g,g_i(t)}) \zeta_{ig}(t)$ is non-zero only for routes the driver has not taken on any given day and represents the information noise, or the inaccuracy with which he knows the traffic load on network edges he hasn’t visited. $\zeta_{ig}(t)$ is a Gaussian noise with mean $\eta$ and correlations

$$\langle \zeta_{ig}(t) \zeta_{jh}(t') \rangle = \Delta \delta_{ij} \delta_{gh} \delta_{tt'}$$

(56)

Different information structures correspond to different values of $\eta$ and $\Delta$:

• the case $\eta = \Delta = 0$ (no information noise) corresponds to the case in which all drivers possess complete knowledge of the traffic load on each network edge on every day

• for $\Delta > 0$ the information about unvisited edges is user-specific and noisy. In particular
  – for $\eta = 0$ the noise is unbiased
  – for $\eta > 0$ the driver overestimates the performance of routes not taken
  – for $\eta < 0$ the driver underestimates the performance of routes not taken

Let us notice, en passant, that smart drivers should be aware of the fact that the traffic load on a given route would have been larger had they chosen it and therefore they should underestimate the efficiency of unused routes. In other words, drivers account for their impact on the traffic loads when they are able to disentangle their contribution to it (their ‘impact’) before updating their scores. In this model, drivers completely account for their contribution to the traffic for $\eta = -2$. We shall see however that any small $\eta < 0$ is sufficient to alter significantly the collective properties. We shall distinguish between two types of drivers: ‘random drivers’ with $\Gamma = 0$, who choose their route every day at random with equal probability, and ‘optimizers’ with $\Gamma = \infty$, who every day choose the route they expect to be faster.

As usual, one is interested in the collective properties in the steady state. We have several control parameters, namely $\eta$, $\Delta$, $\Gamma$ and the vehicle density $c = N/P$. The observables we focus on are

$$H = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu} \langle Q_\mu^2 - \langle Q \rangle \rangle^2 , \quad \langle Q \rangle = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu} \langle Q_\mu \rangle$$

(57)

$$\sigma^2 = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu} \langle (Q_\mu - \langle Q \rangle)^2 \rangle$$

(58)

where as usual $\langle \cdots \rangle$ stands for a time average over the stationary state of the learning dynamics. Just as in the fish-market model, $H$ describes the distribution of drivers over the street network in the stationary state. If $H = 0$, the distribution is uniform ($\langle Q_\mu \rangle = \langle Q \rangle$ for all $\mu$) and it is not possible to find less crowded streets on the grid. If $H > 0$, instead, the distribution is not uniform and fast pathways do exist. Notice that if transit times are assumed to be proportional to the street loads $Q_\mu$, then $\sigma^2$ measures the total traveling time of drivers. Then, the optimal road usage is achieved when $\sigma^2$ is minimal. Note that since all routes have the same total length $\ell$ (i.e. $\sum_{\mu} q_{ig}^\mu = \ell$ for all $i$ and $g$), $\langle Q \rangle = c\ell$ is a constant.
Figure 10. Left panel: $\sigma^2/N$ (top) and $H/N$ (bottom) for random drivers (open symbols) and optimizers (closed symbols). Simulation parameters: $S = 2$, $P = 200$, $\ell = 50$, $U_{ig}(0) = 0$ for all $i$ and $g$. Averages are taken over at least 50 disorder samples for each point. The solid line in the graphs is the analytic estimate of $H$ and $\sigma^2$ (for $\Gamma = 0^+$) for the model with uncorrelated disorder. Right panel: behavior of $\sigma^2/N$ for a city of $P = 200$ streets with $N = 1024$ drivers ($c = 5.12$, in the inefficient phase) as a function of the parameter $\Delta$ with $\eta = 0$. The horizontal lines correspond to drivers with $\Gamma = 0$ (dashed) and $\Gamma = 0^+$ (dotted). Results for optimizers with $\Gamma = \infty$ are shown for equilibration times $t_{eq} = 100$ (full line), 400 (open circles) and 1600 (full diamonds). In the inset, data are plotted versus $\Delta t_{eq}^{1/4}$ (from [21]).

Numerical simulations for $\eta = \Delta = 0$ reveal the picture displayed in Fig. 10). We see that random drivers lead to a stationary state where a uniform distribution of vehicles is never achieved, as $H > 0$ for all $c$. Optimizers, instead, behave in a similar way only for small vehicle densities. As $c$ is increased, the traffic load becomes more and more uniform ($H$ decreases) and fluctuations ($\sigma^2$) decrease, indicating that inductive drivers manage to behave better than random ones. At a critical point $c_c \simeq 3$ the distribution becomes uniform (i.e. $H = 0$) and vehicles fill the available streets uniformly. Now drivers can’t find a convenient way and are forced to change route very frequently. As a consequence, global fluctuations increase dramatically. Notice that above the critical point traffic fluctuations are significantly smaller for random drivers than for optimizers. Finally, the stationary state depends on the initial conditions $U_{ig}(0)$ for $c > c_c$: the larger the initial spread, the smaller the value of $\sigma^2$. The conclusion is that random drivers lead to an overall more efficient state in conditions of heavy traffic while optimizers perform better when the car density is low.

Unfortunately, the analytical side of this model is much harder than the previous examples because the quenched disorder (the feasible routes) is in this case spatially correlated. It is possible however to solve analytically a milder version with uncorrelated disorder. Results (shown in the Fig. 10) reproduce the qualitative behavior described above fairly well, and predict a critical density of $c_c = 2.97 \ldots$).

For $\eta = 0$ and $\Delta > 0$, the dependence on initial conditions disappears and is replaced by a non-trivial dynamical behavior (see again Fig. 10). In the high density
phase, where drivers would behave worse than random with $\Delta = 0$, global efficiency can improve beyond the random threshold if $\Delta > 0$. Taking averages after a fixed equilibration time $t_{eq}$, we find that $\sigma^2$ reaches, for $\Delta \approx 40$, a minimum that is well below the value of $\sigma^2$ for $\Gamma = 0^+$ with the same homogeneous initial conditions $y_i(0) = 0$. For $\Delta \to \infty$ we recover the behavior of random drivers. However, when we increase $t_{eq}$, the curve shifts to the left, showing that the system is not in a steady state. Rescaling $\Delta$ by $t_{eq}^{-1/4}$, the decreasing part of the plot collapses, while the rest of the curve flattens. This suggests that the equilibrium value of $\sigma^2$ drops suddenly as soon as $\Delta > 0$. Loosely speaking: noise-corrupted user-specific information can avoid crowd effects when the vehicle density is very high.

We finally come to the case $\eta \neq 0$ and $\Delta = 0$, Fig. 11. While one observes no qualitative changes for $\eta > 0$, for $\eta < 0$ fluctuations are drastically reduced in the supercritical phase. In particular, for $\eta = -2$ (when, as we said above, drivers completely account for their contribution to the traffic) the dynamics converges to a state characterized by no traffic fluctuations ($\sigma^2 = H$) because each driver selects one route and sticks to it.

Hence this setup allows to address the impact of different information structures, and thus of different types of information broadcasting, on the collective properties of urban traffic. This is perhaps one of the most promising research lines with respect to applications opened by resource allocation games so far.

3. Optimal properties of large random economies

3.1. Introduction

The standard tenet of microeconomics is that economic activity is aimed at the efficient allocation of scarce resources [22]. As we said before, ‘allocation’ includes exchange,
production and consumption of commodities. The concept of ‘efficiency’ is instead usually connected to the solutions of constrained maximum and/or minimum problems, as for instance firms strive to maximize profits at minimum costs while the goal of consumers is to maximize their utility subject to their budget constraints. The fundamental concept by which mathematical economists explain the emergence of efficient states from the disparate choices of individual agents in economic systems is that of ‘equilibrium’, that is a state where all agents maximize their objective functions and the waste of resources – in the form of imbalance between demand and supply – is minimum (actually, zero). Typical results concern the existence and stability of equilibria for different types of economies (see below for a precise definition). In such settings it is however extremely difficult to extract meaningful macroscopic laws (comparable with empirical data) from the mathematical results, in great part because of the difficulties in handling agents’ heterogeneity effectively. In what follows, we will show that when heterogeneity is taken properly into account the structure of equilibria of model economies (as well as of other related optimization problems of microeconomics) proves to be rich and non-trivial. We shall review the collective properties of a few exemplary linear optimization problems of microeconomics, whose setting will be borrowed from the economic literature [23]. We will see that the emerging scenario presents in all cases two distinct regimes: an expanding phase where technological innovations lead to an overall economic growth, and a saturated regime where growth is not achieved by technological innovation but rather by a diversification of the production. The key technical role in our analysis is played by the replica method and the transitions between expanding and contracting states can be completely characterized by a few macroscopic order parameters. Remarkably, it will turn out that the physical order parameters that arise bear an immediate economic interpretation.

3.2. Meeting demands at minimum costs

To begin with, we consider the simple linear model of production to meet demand satisfying an optimality criterion [24, 25]. This illustrates the general two-phase phenomenology described above in an extremely simplified setting. Let there be $N$ processes (or technologies) labeled by $i$ and $P$ commodities labeled by $\mu$. Each process allows the transformation of some commodities (inputs) into others (outputs) and is characterized by an input-output vector $\xi_i = \{\xi_i^\mu\}$ where negative (positive) components represent inputs (outputs). Each process can be operated at any scale $s_i \geq 0$. The scales $s_i$ must be chosen so that the total amount of commodity $\mu$ that is produced (consumed) matches a fixed demand (availability): $\sum_i s_i \xi_i^\mu = \kappa^\mu$ for all $\mu$, where the thresholds $\kappa^\mu$ may be positive (for goods one wants to be produced) or negative (for goods to be consumed). Among all feasible states $\{s_i\}$, one may select the one which minimizes a particular function of the $s_i$. Here we take the simplest choice of a linear combination $\sum_i s_i p_i$, which can be thought of as the total operating cost, if $p_i$ is seen as the operation cost at unit scale.
We ask the following question: how does the operation pattern (e.g. the fraction of active processes such that $s_i > 0$) change when $N$ increases, i.e. as more technologies become available? Indeed, the macroscopic structure of the efficient state must be expected to depend on the ratio $N/P$: for $N \ll P$ a technology will be more likely to be active ($s_i > 0$) than for $N \gg P$, when selection will be stronger and processes performing the required conversions more efficiently will be favored. This problem can be tackled by methods of statistical mechanics in the limit $N \to \infty$ with $n = N/P$ finite upon assuming that the $\xi^\mu_i$'s are quenched random variables (similarly to what has been done for other linear optimization problems such as the knapsack problem [26–28]). A further important requirement is that $\sum_\mu \xi^\mu_i < 0$ for all $i$, which ensures that processes cannot be combined to yield a technology with only outputs. We refer the reader to [25] for details and focus on the emerging picture (see Fig. 12). One sees that for small $n$ roughly a half of the processes are active. This means that as $n$ increases, that is as more and more technologies become available, the number of active processes per good increases (see inset) i.e. the arrival of new technologies favors existing ones. The picture changes radically for $n \gtrsim 2$, as $\phi$ starts to decrease and $n\phi = 1$. Now the number of active processes equals that of commodities and technologies undergo a much stronger selection which reduces the probability that a randomly drawn input-output vector is active. This simple model describes in a nutshell a transition to a highly competitive state where all possible productions are saturated by existing technologies and an increase in activity levels can be achieved only by increasing $P$. We shall see below that a similar picture extends to the more complicated case of general equilibrium.

**Figure 12.** Fraction $\phi$ of active processes vs $n$ for $p_i = 1$. Inset: $\phi n$ vs $n$ for the same parameter values. $\xi^\mu_i$'s are taken to be Gaussian variables with variance $1/P$ such that $\sum_\mu \xi^\mu_i = -0.001$ for all $i$. $\kappa^\mu$'s are sampled from the bimodal distribution $q(\kappa) = \frac{1-m}{2}\delta(\kappa + 1) + \frac{1+m}{2}\delta(\kappa - 1)$ with $m = 0.1$ (from [25]).
3.3. Competitive equilibria of linear economies

An economy can be seen as a complex system of interacting agents (consumers, firms, banks etc.) with conflicting goals and complementarities. It is indeed the heterogeneity of the agents which drives the economic process. Surely, if all agents were identical with identical endowments, there would be no trade. Modeling an economy as a system of heterogeneous agents is however a quite complex task [29]. In this section we review how statistical mechanics may be helpful in deriving the macroscopic properties of large random economies. Specifically this approach allows one to derive statistical laws that provide a picture of how structural properties are affected by changes of macroscopic parameters. This is the same type of information than random matrix theory provides about the structure of heavy nuclei [1, 30].

3.3.1. Definition

We stick to the standard microeconomic setup (see e.g. [23]). An economy is defined as a system of \( N \) firms labeled by \( i \), \( P \) commodities labeled by \( \mu \) and \( L \) consumers labeled by \( \ell \). Each firm is endowed with a technology that allows the transformation of some commodities, called ‘inputs’, into others, called ‘outputs’. Every technology is completely characterized by its ‘input-output vector’ \( \xi_i = \{ \xi_i^\mu \} \), where negative (respectively positive) components represent quantities of inputs (respectively outputs), and can be operated at any scale \( s_i \geq 0 \), meaning that when run at scale \( s_i \) it produces or consumes a quantity \( s_i \xi_i^\mu \) of commodity \( \mu \). The price of commodities is given by the ‘price vector’ \( p = \{ p^\mu \geq 0 \} \). Each consumer is characterized by his/her initial endowment of commodities \( y_\ell = \{ y_\ell^\mu \geq 0 \} \) and by his/her utility function \( U_\ell \), associating to every bundle of goods \( x = \{ x^\mu \geq 0 \} \) a real number \( U_\ell(x) \) representing his/her degree of satisfaction.

It is assumed that firms choose their activity levels \( s_i \) so as to maximize their profits \( \pi_i \) for a fixed price vector \( p \):

\[
\max_{s_i \geq 0} \pi_i \quad \text{with} \quad \pi_i = s_i (p \cdot \xi_i) \tag{59}
\]

On the other hand, consumers choose their consumptions \( x_\ell \) so as to maximize their utilities within their budget constraints for a fixed price vector \( p \):

\[
\max_{x_\ell \in B_\ell} U_\ell(x) \quad \text{with} \quad B_\ell = \{ x \geq 0 \text{ s.t. } p \cdot y_\ell \geq p \cdot x \} \tag{60}
\]

Equilibria are states \(( \{ s_i^* \}, \{ x_\ell^* \}, p^* \) for which (i) the above problems (59) and (60) are simultaneously solved for all \( i \) and \( \ell \) and (ii) the aggregate demand of each commodity matches the aggregate supply:

\[
\sum_{\ell} (x_\ell^* - y_\ell) = \sum_i s_i^* \xi_i \tag{61}
\]

The ‘market clearing’ condition (61) implies zero waste of resources and ultimately determines the optimal price vector \( p^* \).

In order to connect the microscopic efficiency to macroscopic laws, one would like to assess the typical values, relative fluctuations and distributions of consumptions,
operation scales and prices at equilibrium in a large heterogeneous economy, that is, when agents have different technologies, endowments etc. This problem can be tackled in its most general form by applying techniques of spin-glass physics. However, a rich qualitative description can be obtained already at a less general level, obtained by introducing the following assumptions [31, 32]:

a. **Consumers**: there is only one consumer (the ‘society’) whose utility function is separable: \( U(x) = \sum_\mu u(x\mu) \); the functions \( u \) are such that \( u' > 0 \) and \( u'' < 0 \)

b. **Initial endowments**: the initial bundle \( y \) is a quenched random vector whose components \( y\mu \) are sampled independently for each \( \mu \) from a distribution \( \rho(y) \)

c. **Technologies**: the input-output vectors \( \xi_i \) have quenched random components \( \xi_i\mu \) that are identically distributed Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance \( \Delta_i/P \) satisfying \( \sum_\mu \xi_i\mu = -\epsilon_i \) with \( \epsilon_i > 0 \); the quantities \( \Delta_i \) are themselves quenched random numbers drawn from a distribution \( g(\Delta) \) independently for each \( i \) and \( \epsilon_i = \eta \sqrt{\Delta_i} \)

Let us discuss them briefly. The assumption \( L = 1 \) simplifies the thermodynamic limit considerably (in the most general setting, the latter corresponds to diverging \( N \), \( P \) and \( L \)). The separability of \( U \) implies that commodities are a priori equivalent. Hence the society can increase its utility only by acquiring scarce commodities (ones with low \( y\mu \)) at the expense of abundant commodities (with high \( y\mu \)). Reaching non-trivial optimal states then requires that (i) some commodities are initially more abundant than others (one can see that no activity takes place in the case \( \rho(y) = \delta(y - \bar{y}) \)) and (ii) the productive sector is able to provide scarce goods using abundant goods as inputs. We will see that this last point constitutes a strong selection criterion for technologies. The convexity assumptions on \( u \) follow the economic literature and are convenient from an analytic viewpoint, as will become clear later. Finally, the assumptions on technologies guarantee, as in the previous case, that it is impossible to produce all commodities without consuming any by simply constructing a suitable combination of technologies (if this were possible, operation scales and consumptions would diverge while prices would vanish, a situation that is often described as the ‘Land of Cockaigne’). We shall refer to the case \( \eta \to 0 \), which turns out to have special physical properties, as the limit of ‘marginally efficient technologies’.

We therefore have a deal of control parameters: \( N \), \( P \), \( \eta \), \( g(\Delta) \), \( u(x) \) and \( \rho(y) \). In what follows we shall concentrate mostly on the role of \( \eta \) and of the relative number of technologies \( N/P \). In particular, we shall consider the ‘thermodynamic limit’ \( N \to \infty \) with \( n = N/P \) finite.

### 3.3.2. Statistical mechanics with a single consumer

The problem of finding the equilibrium can easily be seen to be equivalent to calculating

\[
\max_{\{s_i \geq 0\}} U \left( y + \sum_i s_i \xi_i \right)
\]  

\( (62) \)
In fact, first, if (62) is solved then the society evidently maximizes its utility. On the other hand, producers also maximize profits since

$$
\partial s_i U = \sum_\mu \xi_\mu \partial x_\mu u = \lambda \partial s_i \pi_i,
$$

where the last equality follows from the fact that, by virtue of the budget constraint, \( \partial x_\mu U = \lambda p^\mu \) with \( \lambda > 0 \) a Lagrange multiplier. Thus prices disappear from the problem in explicit form. However a remarkable outcome of the statistical mechanics approach is that average prices and price fluctuations, like other relevant macroscopic observables, turn out to be directly connected to or easily derived from the spin-glass order parameters that emerge from the calculation, as we shall see later on.

The statistical mechanics approach starts with the observation that if \( U \) is a sufficiently regular function one expects a self-averaging condition to hold, i.e.

$$
\lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{1}{N} \max_{\{s_i \geq 0\}} U \left( y + \sum_i s_i \xi_i \right) = \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{1}{N} \left\langle \max_{\{s_i \geq 0\}} U \left( y + \sum_i s_i \xi_i \right) \right\rangle
$$

(63)

where \( \langle \cdots \rangle \) stands for an average over the quenched disorder \( \{ \xi_i \} \):

$$
\langle \cdots \rangle = \frac{\langle \cdots \prod_i \delta(\sum_\mu \xi_\mu^\mu + \epsilon) \rangle_\xi}{\langle \prod_i \delta(\sum_\mu \xi_\mu^\mu + \epsilon) \rangle_\xi}
$$

(64)

Now the right-hand side of the above expression can be evaluated by introducing the ‘partition function’

$$
Z = \int_0^\infty dx \ e^{\beta U(x)} \int_0^\infty ds \ \delta \left( x - y - \sum_i s_i \xi_i \right)
$$

(65)

and defining the ‘free energy’

$$
f(\beta) = \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{1}{\beta N} \langle \log Z \rangle.
$$

(66)

As usual

$$
\lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{1}{N} \left\langle \max_{\{s_i \geq 0\}} U \left( y + \sum_i s_i \xi_i \right) \right\rangle = \lim_{\beta \to \infty} f(\beta)
$$

(67)

since in the limit \( \beta \to \infty \) configurations that maximize \( U \) give the dominant contribution to the partition function. The evaluation of \( f \) ultimately leads to the identification of a function \( G \) of a vector \( \omega \) of macroscopic order parameters such that

$$
\lim_{\beta \to \infty} f(\beta) = \text{extr}_\omega G(\omega)
$$

(68)

where extr means that the solution is provided by the saddle-point of \( G \), that is by the vector \( \omega^* \) solving \( \partial_\omega G = 0 \). The convexity assumptions made on \( u \) ensure that the relevant saddle point is of replica-symmetric form (as in (19)). Under this condition, \( \omega \) turns out to be a six-component vector \( \omega = \{ Q, \gamma, \chi, \hat{\chi}, \kappa, \hat{\kappa} \} \) and \( G \) takes the form

$$
G(\omega) = \frac{1}{2} Q \hat{\chi} - \frac{\gamma \chi}{2n} + \frac{1}{n} \kappa \hat{\kappa} + \left\langle \max_{s \geq 0} \left[ -\frac{1}{2} \Delta \hat{\chi} s^2 + st \sqrt{\Delta (\gamma - \hat{\kappa})^2} - \eta \hat{\kappa} s \sqrt{\Delta} \right] \right\rangle_{t,\Delta} + \frac{1}{n} \left\langle u(x) - \frac{1}{2\chi} (x - y + t \sqrt{nQ + \kappa})^2 \right\rangle_{t,y}
$$

(69)
where \( \langle \cdots \rangle_{x} \) denotes an average over the random variable \( x \), \( t \) is a unit Gaussian random variable and averages over \( \Delta \) and \( y \) are performed with distributions \( g(\Delta) \) and \( \rho(y) \). Before discussing the economic interpretation of the order parameters let us notice that \( G \) is composed of two “representative agent” problems:

- an ‘effective profit’ maximization by a representative firm, whose solution reads
  \[
  s^* \equiv s^*(t, \Delta) = \begin{cases} 
  \frac{t \sigma - \eta \hat{\kappa}}{\chi \sqrt{\Delta}} & \text{for } t \geq \eta \hat{\kappa}/\sigma \\
  0 & \text{otherwise}
  \end{cases}
  \tag{70}
  \]
  where we defined \( \sigma = \sqrt{\gamma - \hat{\kappa}^2} \)

- an ‘effective utility’ maximization by the society with respect to the consumption of an effective commodity, whose solution, namely
  \[
  x^* \equiv x^*(t, y) \quad \text{such that} \quad \chi u'(x^*) = x^* - y + t\sqrt{nQ} + \kappa
  \tag{71}
  \]
  is always positive provided the assumptions on \( u \) are satisfied

These two ‘effective’ problems – which have been derived and not postulated a priori – are interconnected by the remaining terms.

The saddle-point equations \( \partial_{\omega} G = 0 \) for (69) have the following form:

\[
Q = \langle (s^*)^2 \rangle_{t, \Delta} \tag{72}
\]

\[
\chi = \frac{n}{\sigma} \langle ts^* \sqrt{\Delta} \rangle_{t, \Delta} \tag{73}
\]

\[
\kappa = \chi \hat{\kappa} + n\eta \langle s^* \sqrt{\Delta} \rangle_{t, \Delta} \tag{74}
\]

\[
\hat{\kappa} = \langle u'(x^*) \rangle_{t, y} \tag{75}
\]

\[
\sigma = \sqrt{\langle u'(x^*)^2 \rangle_{t, y} - \langle u'(x^*) \rangle_{t, y}^2} \tag{76}
\]

\[
\hat{\chi} = \frac{\langle tu'(x^*) \rangle_{t, y}}{\sqrt{nQ}} \tag{77}
\]

One sees immediately that \( \hat{\kappa} \) represents the optimal average (relative) price. In fact, utility maximization under budget constraint gives \( \partial_{x^*} U = \lambda \rho' \), with \( \lambda > 0 \) a Lagrange multiplier that can be set to 1 without any loss of generality. It then follows that \( \sigma \) yields price fluctuations. It is remarkable that the macroscopic order parameters introduced with a purely ‘physical’ method can be seen to possess such clear economic meanings. It is also remarkable that the following laws can be derived, with minimal manipulations, from the above set of equations:

\[
\langle x^* - y \rangle_{t, y} = -n\eta \langle s^* \sqrt{\Delta} \rangle_{t, \Delta} \tag{78}
\]

\[
\langle u'(x^*) (x^* - y) \rangle_{t, y} = 0 \tag{79}
\]

The former expresses the fact that at the relevant saddle point the market-clearing condition is satisfied (to compare, just average (61) for \( L = 1 \) over \( \mu \) taking the constraint on technologies into account). The latter expresses the fact that at the relevant saddle
point the consumer saturates his/her budget when choosing his consumption, a condition known in economics as Walras’ law [22].

It is possible to obtain a more precise characterization of the macroscopic properties by calculating the distribution of operation scales, consumptions and prices at equilibrium. These quantities are given respectively by

\[ P(s) = \langle \delta(s - s^*) \rangle_{t, \Delta} = \int_0^\infty g(\Delta) P(s | \Delta) d\Delta \]  
\[ P(x) = \langle \delta(x - x^*) \rangle_{t,y} = \int_0^\infty \rho(y) P(x | y) dy \]  
\[ P(p) = \langle \delta(p - u'(x^*)) \rangle_{t,y} \]

where \( P(s | \Delta) \) and \( P(x | y) \) denote respectively the probability distributions of operation scales at fixed \( \Delta \) and of consumptions at fixed \( y \). These can be calculated easily from (70) and (71). One finds

\[ P(s | \Delta) = (1 - \phi) \delta(s) + \frac{\chi}{\sqrt{2\pi} \sigma^2} e^{-\left(\frac{\hat{\chi}s + \eta \hat{\kappa}}{\sigma\sqrt{2}}\right)^2} \theta(s) \]  
\[ P(x | y) = \frac{1 - \chi u''(x)}{\sqrt{2\pi n Q}} e^{-\left(\frac{x - y - \chi u'(x) + \eta \hat{\kappa}}{2nQ}\right)^2} \]

where \( \phi = \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 - \text{erf} \left( \frac{\sigma \hat{\chi}}{\sqrt{2}} \right) \right] \) is the fraction of active firms (i.e. firms such that \( s_i > 0 \)). Moreover, notice that \( P(s | \Delta) = \sqrt{\Delta} P(s \sqrt{\Delta} | 1) \), which implies that

\[ P(s) = \frac{2}{s^4} \int_0^\infty k^2 g(k^2/s^2) P(k | 1) dk \]

Thus, power-law distributed operation scales are found for broad classes of distributions \( g(\Delta) \), as \( P(s) \propto s^{-3-2\gamma} \) when \( g(\Delta) \approx \Delta^\gamma \) for \( \Delta \ll 1 \). Recently, some empirical evidence has been found that distributions of firm sizes (defined by the number of employees, profits etc.) have scaling forms [33].

Numerical solution of the saddle-point equations for a generic choice of the parameters yields the picture illustrated in Figures 13 and 14. The quantity \( \phi \) is shown in Fig. 13 against numerical simulations. One sees that there are two regimes: one where \( \phi \approx 1/2 \) for small \( n \), and a second one for large \( n \) where \( n\phi \approx 1 \), so that the number of active firms equals that of commodities, signaling a saturated market. Fig.14, instead, shows that the average scale of production increases when \( n \) grows as long as \( n \) is sufficiently small. This means that the introduction of new technologies (i.e. from an increase of \( n \)) leads to an increased production activity of existing firms if the number of competitors is low. In parallel, relative price fluctuations decrease, as does the average level of consumption, signaling that firms are managing to transform abundant goods into scarce ones. When \( n \) is close to 2, operation scales become larger and larger as \( \eta \) decreases (i.e. as technologies become more and more efficient) and ultimately develop a singularity at \( n_c \) in the marginally efficient limit \( \eta \to 0 \) (see below for more details about this limit). The fluctuations of relative consumptions start to drop (the sharper the lower is \( \eta \)), as the distribution of consumptions becomes more and more peaked around the mean value. Identifying abundant (or scarce) goods becomes increasingly hard. In
Figure 13. Behavior of $n\phi$ ($\phi =$ fraction of active companies) at equilibrium as a function of $n$ for $\eta = 0.05$: analytical prediction (continuous line), computer experiments with $P = 16$ (dotted line) and for $P = 32$ (dashed line) averaged over 100 disorder samples. Dots represent results of a single realization of the technologies. Inset: $\phi$ vs $n$ for $\eta = 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5$ (top to bottom). From [31].

Figure 14. Typical macroscopic properties of competitive equilibria for $g(\Delta) = \delta(\Delta - 1)$, $u(x) = \log x$ and $\rho(y) = e^{-y}$. Left panels: typical operation scale (top) and relative price fluctuations at equilibrium for different values of $\eta$. Right panels: typical consumption and relative consumption fluctuations for different values of $\eta$ (from [31]).

In the high $n$ regime, the introduction of new technologies, by e.g. technological innovation ($N \rightarrow N + 1$), leads to a decrease in the average operation scale, i.e. new profitable technologies punish existing ones. The economy becomes strongly selective as firms cannot take advantage of the spread between scarce and abundant goods any longer. On the other hand, the average consumption starts growing with $n$, as is expected in a competitive economy that selects highly efficient technologies. In this phase the introduction of new commodities (an increase in $P$) leads to an increase in the scale of operations.
The above results confirm rather clearly that the collective properties of competitive equilibria display a marked qualitative change when $n$ increases, as one passes from an expanding to a saturated regime around $n \simeq 2$. Such a change is a smooth crossover for any finite $\eta > 0$. However, in the limit $\eta \to 0$ in which technologies are ‘marginally efficient’ the crossover becomes a sharp second-order phase transition characterized by the fact that $\phi = 1/2$ for $n < n_c$ and $\phi < 1/2$ otherwise, whereas

$$
\langle s^* \rangle \simeq |n - n_c|^{-1/2} \quad |n - n_c| \ll 1
$$

(see [31] for analytical details). This can be explained intuitively by a simple geometric argument. Let us write the initial endowments as $y^\mu = \overline{y} + \delta y^\mu$, separating a constant part ($\overline{y}$) from a fluctuating part ($\delta y^\mu$) such that $\sum_\mu \delta y^\mu = 0$. Now market clearing with $\eta = 0$ implies that $\xi_i \cdot y = \xi_i \cdot \delta y$, so that all the transformations take place in the space orthogonal to the constant vector. This means that those technologies with $\xi_i \cdot \delta y < 0$ which reduce the initial spread of endowments $\delta x_0$ lead to an increase in wealth and hence will be run at a positive scale. Those with a positive component along $\delta x_0$ will have $s_i = 0$. Given that the probability to generate randomly a vector in the half-space $\xi_i \cdot \delta y < 0$ is $1/2$, when $N$ is large we expect $N/2$ active firms. Still the number of possible active firms is bounded above by $P$, hence when $n = N/P = 2$ the space of technologies becomes complete and $x^\mu = \overline{y}$ for all $\mu$. There is no possibility to increase welfare further.

3.3.3. Case of many consumers  
In the model just described, there are $N$ firms running linear activities $\xi^\mu_i$, which are vectors in a $P$-dimensional commodity space, at a scale $s_i \geq 0$. These firms face a demand function $Q^\mu(p)$ from consumers, which is the quantity that consumers will buy at prices $p^\mu$. The profit of firm $i$ is given by $\pi_i = s_i \sum_{\mu=1}^P p^{\mu} q^\mu_i$.

Let us consider a more general case. Let us assume there are $L$ consumers, each with an initial endowment $y_\ell^\mu$ of commodity $\mu$ and each taking a share $\theta_{i\ell}$ in the profit of firm $i$. We assume that consumers face fixed prices $p^\mu$. So the initial wealth of consumer $\ell = 1, \ldots, L$ is

$$
w_\ell = \sum_{\mu=1}^P p^\mu y_\ell^\mu + \sum_{i=1}^N \theta_{i\ell} \pi_i
$$

(87)

If consumers are identical, apart from the initial endowments, and aim at maximizing a utility function $U(x) = \sum_{\mu=1}^P \log x^\mu$ as before, the solution is relatively straightforward: the problem of consumer $\ell$ is solved by

$$
x_\ell^\mu = \frac{w_\ell}{p^{\mu}}
$$

(88)

(i.e. each consumer distributes his wealth uniformly over commodities, taking prices into account). Now the total demand function will be

$$
Q^\mu = \sum_{\ell=1}^L x_\ell^\mu = \frac{W}{P} \frac{1}{p^\mu}, \quad W = \sum_{\ell=1}^L w_\ell
$$

(89)
In a pure exchange economy (without production: \( s_i = 0 \ \forall i \)) the above quantity will equal to total initial endowment of each commodity, i.e.

\[
Q^\mu = y^\mu \equiv \sum_{\ell=1}^{L} y^\mu_\ell \quad (90)
\]

If \( y^\mu_\ell \) are drawn independently at random with mean \( \overline{y} \) and variance \( D \), then \( y^\mu \) will have mean \( L\overline{y} \) and variance \( LD \) and the relative fluctuations of the total initial endowments will be \( \delta y/\overline{y} = \sqrt{D}/(\sqrt{L}y) \), which decreases as \( L \) increases. When we allow firms to operate \( (s_i > 0) \), relative fluctuations in the demand must be expected to be of the same order

\[
\frac{Q^\mu - \overline{Q}}{\overline{Q}} \sim \frac{1}{\sqrt{L}}, \quad \overline{Q} = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu=1}^{P} Q^\mu. \quad (91)
\]

Therefore, by equation (89), relative price fluctuations will also be of the order \( 1/\sqrt{L} \). This simple argument explains how the different macroscopic quantities re-scale in the presence of \( L \) consumers when \( L \to \infty \). We remark that Ref. [31] shows that the scales of production have a non-trivial behavior in the limit of extremely uniform initial endowments, which suggest an essential singularity \( \langle s \rangle \sim \exp(-c/\sqrt{L}) \) as \( L \to \infty \).

The case of consumers with different utility functions requires a more involved approach, because the heterogeneity of consumer utility is likely to imply a non-symmetric demand function (even when prices \( p^\mu \) are all equal). Apart from this, it is reasonable to expect that the basic insights gained from the above analysis, such as the presence of a cross-over between two structurally different phases of the economy, will remain valid.

### 3.4. Economic growth: the Von Neumann problem

Von Neumann’s expanding model addresses the issue of computing the maximum achievable growth rate of a linear production economy [34]. Economic growth is seen basically as an autocatalytic chemical process in which technologies play the role of reactions and commodities of reactants. In spite of its extremely simple setup, the model has played a key role in the mathematical theory of economic growth, particularly in view of its connection to dynamical growth via the so-called turnpike theorems [35].

The time-dependent model is defined as follows. One considers an economy with \( P \) commodities (labeled \( \mu \)) and \( N \) linear technologies (labeled \( i \)), each of which can be operated at a non-negative scale \( S_i \geq 0 \) and is characterized by an output vector \( \mathbf{a}_i = \{a^\mu_i\} \) and by an input vector \( \mathbf{b}_i = \{b^\mu_i\} \), such that \( S_i a^\mu_i \) (respectively \( S_i b^\mu_i \)) denotes the units of commodity \( \mu \) produced (respectively used) by process \( i \) when run at scale \( S_i \). It is assumed that input/output vectors are fixed in time and that operation scales are the degrees of freedom to be set, for instance, by firms. At time \( t \), the economy is characterized by an aggregate input vector \( \mathbf{I}(t) = \sum_i S_i(t)\mathbf{b}_i \) and output vector
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\[ O(t) = \sum_i S_i(t) a_i. \] Part of the latter will be used as the input at period \( t + 1 \) whereas the rest, namely

\[ C(t) \equiv O(t) - I(t + 1) \tag{92} \]

is consumed. In absence of external sources, in order to ensure stability it is reasonable to require that inputs at any time do not exceed the outputs at the previous time, i.e. one must have \( C^\mu(t) \geq 0 \) for all \( \mu \) at all times. Let us focus on solutions in which input vectors grow in time at a constant rate, i.e. of the form \( I(t + 1) = \rho I(t) \) with \( \rho > 0 \) a constant (the growth rate). For these solution, the scales of production have the form \( S_i(t) = s_i \rho^t \), and likewise \( C(t) = c \rho^t \). Therefore the stability condition can be re-cast in the form

\[ c^\mu \equiv \sum_i s_i (a_i^\mu - \rho b_i^\mu) \geq 0 \quad \forall \mu \tag{93} \]

The (technological) expansion problem amounts to calculating the maximum \( \rho > 0 \) such that a configuration \( s = \{s_i \geq 0\} \) satisfying the above condition exists (it is easy to show that such an optimal growth rate exists [24]). In such a configuration the aggregate output of each commodity is at least \( \rho \) times its aggregate input. If the maximum \( \rho \), which we denote by \( \rho^* \), is larger than 1 the economy is ‘expanding’, whereas it is ‘contracting’ for \( \rho^* < 1 \). On the other hand, the actual value of \( \rho^* \) is expected to depend on the input and output matrices. Intuitively, \( \rho^* \) should increase with the number \( N \) of technologies and decrease when the economy is required to produce a larger number \( P \) of goods.

In [36] this problem was tacked in the limit \( N \to \infty \) with \( n = N/P \) finite under the assumption that \((a_i^\mu, b_i^\mu)\) are independent and identically distributed quenched random variables for each \( i \) and \( \mu \), with the aim of uncovering the emerging collective properties that are typical of large random realizations of a complex wiring of input-output relationship. To begin with, let us write \( a_i^\mu = \overline{a}(1+\alpha_i^\mu) \) and \( b_i^\mu = \overline{b}(1+\beta_i^\mu) \), where \( \overline{a} \) and \( \overline{b} \) are positive constants while \( \alpha_i^\mu \), \( \beta_i^\mu \) are zero-average quenched random variables. Inserting these into (93) one easily sees that, to leading order in \( N \), the optimal growth rate \( \rho^* \) is given by the ratio \( \overline{a}/\overline{b} \) of the average output and average input coefficients, hence it is independent of the specific input-output network. The non trivial aspects of the problem are related to the corrections to the leading part. We therefore write the growth rate as

\[ \rho = \frac{\overline{a}}{\overline{b}} \left(1 + \frac{g}{\sqrt{N}}\right) \tag{94} \]

so that, assuming \( \overline{a} = \overline{b} \) for simplicity, (93) becomes

\[ \frac{c^\mu}{\overline{a}} = \sum_i s_i \left[ \alpha_i^\mu - \frac{g}{\sqrt{N}} - \left(1 + \frac{g}{\sqrt{N}}\right) \beta_i^\mu\right] \geq 0 \quad \forall \mu \tag{95} \]

The problem thus reduces to that of finding the largest value \( g^* \) of \( g \) for which it is possible to find coefficients \( \{s_i \geq 0\} \) satisfying (95). In the limit \( N \to \infty \) one may
resort to a Gardner-type calculus [37]. Defining the characteristic function
\[
\chi(s) = \prod_{\mu} \theta \left[ \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \sum_i s_i \left[ \alpha_i^\mu - \frac{g}{\sqrt{N}} - \left(1 + \frac{g}{\sqrt{N}}\right) \beta_i^\mu \right] \right]
\]
one can write the typical volume of configuration space occupied by micro-states satisfying (93) for \( N \to \infty \) at fixed \( g \) is given by
\[
V_{\text{typ}}(g) = \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{1}{N} \langle \langle \log V(g) \rangle \rangle
\]
where \( V(g) \) is the volume of solutions at fixed disorder:
\[
V(g) = \int_0^\infty \chi(s) \delta \left( \sum_i s_i - N \right) ds
\]
(without affecting the optimal growth rate, we introduced a linear constraint \( \sum_i s_i = N \)). It is reasonable to expect that, when \( g \) increases, \( V_{\text{typ}}(g) \) shrinks, and in particular that \( V_{\text{typ}}(g) \to 0 \) for \( g \to g^* \). Now after carrying out the disorder average (see [36] for details), which only depends on
\[
k = \left\langle \left( \beta_i^\mu - \alpha_i^\mu \right)^2 \right\rangle
\]
the key macroscopic order parameters turns out to be the overlap \( q_{\ell \ell'} = (1/N) \sum_i s_i s_{i \ell} \) between different optimal configurations \( \ell \) and \( \ell' \). Because the space of solutions \( \{s_i\} \) is a convex set (by construction), the replica-symmetric approximation, for which \( q_{\ell \ell'} = q + \chi \delta_{\ell \ell'} \) is in this case exact. Note that \( \chi \), which describes the fluctuations of \( s_i \) among feasible solutions, should also vanish as \( g \to g^* \), hence the conditions \( g = g^* \) and \( \chi = 0 \) are equivalent and the analysis of optimal states coincides with the study of the \( \chi \to 0 \) limit of the replica-symmetric solution.

Results for the re-scaled quantity \( g^*/\sqrt{nk} \) are shown in Fig. 15. The line separates the region of feasible solutions with \( g \leq g^* \) from the region of unfeasible solutions. \( g^* \)
crosses the line $g = 0$ (i.e. passes from a regime with growth rate $\rho < \frac{a}{b}$ to one with growth rate $\rho > \frac{a}{b}$) at $n_c = 1$. In the inset we show the fraction of inactive processes $\psi_0$ (i.e. such that $s_i = 0$) and that of intermediate commodities $\phi_0$ (i.e. such that $c^\mu = 0$) at $g = g^*$, as a function of $n$. These are found to be universal functions of $n$ independent of the details of the disorder distribution, related by

$$\phi_0 = n(1 - \psi_0)$$

Both $\phi_0$ and $\psi_0$ tend to one when $n$ increases, meaning that the ‘expanding phase’ at $n > n_c$ is highly selective. The condition (100) has a simple geometrical interpretation: it implies that the number of active processes equals that of intermediate commodities at $g^*$. Noting that for any $\mu$ such that $c^\mu = 0$ we have a linear equation for the scales $s_i > 0$, we see also that (100) simply corresponds to the requirement that the number of equations should match the number of variables.

Based on these results one can speculate on how long term growth will be affected by technological innovation. The latter, defined as the introduction of new processes, i.e. new feasible ways of combining inputs to produce desirable outputs [38] would just correspond to an increase in the number $N$ of transformation processes which the economy has at its disposal. Now the change in the growth rate is related to the change in $g^*/\sqrt{n}$, which is given by

$$\delta\rho \simeq -\frac{a}{b} \frac{g}{n^{3/2}} \sqrt{P} \delta n,$$

(101)

Therefore an increase in $N$ can have a large positive impact on long term growth when $n$ is small. For technologically mature economies ($n \gg 1$) instead, $g^*/\sqrt{n}$ increases much more slowly, hence technological innovation has much smaller effect on long term growth.

4. Toy models of financial markets: Minority Games

4.1. Introduction

The Minority Game (MG for short) [39] is a strict relative of the El Farol problem (it corresponds roughly to the case $L = N/2$) that has been proposed to model speculative trading in financial markets, that is systems where agents buy and sell asset shares with the only goal of profiting from price fluctuations. The basic idea is that when most traders are buying it is profitable to sell and vice-versa, so that it is always convenient to be in the minority group. Abstracting, one considers the following situation. We have $N$ agents, each of which has to formulate at every time step $t$ a binary bid $b_i(t) \in \{-1, 1\}$ (buy/sell). The payoff received at time $t$ by each agent depends both on his/her action and on the aggregate action $A(t) = \sum_i b_i(t)$ (the ‘excess demand’) and it is given by $\pi_i(t) = -b_i(t)A(t)$. Thus, agents in the minority group win. The minimal measures of efficiency to be employed are the average excess demand and fluctuations in the steady
state:
\[
\langle A \rangle = \lim_{T, T_{\text{eq}} \to \infty} \frac{1}{T - T_{\text{eq}}} \sum_{t=T_{\text{eq}}}^{T} A(t) \quad \text{and} \quad \sigma^2 = \langle A^2 \rangle
\]  
(102)

where \( T_{\text{eq}} \) is an equilibration time. An efficient state is one where \( \langle A \rangle = 0 \) and \( \sigma^2 \) is small. Notice that the number of people which could have been accommodated in the minority is \( |A|/2 \), hence \( \sigma \) is a measure of the waste of resource. What remains to be specified is how agents make their decisions. Agents who buy or sell at random with equal probability at every time step lead to a state where \( \langle A \rangle = 0 \) and \( \sigma^2 = N \). Of course, it is the way in which agents take their decisions (which needs to be specified) and their interactions that gives rise to the complex collective behavior.

The MG is a useful toy model that allows to elucidate the collective behavior of systems of heterogeneous interacting agents by addressing directly the interplay between microscopic behavior and macroscopic properties (fluctuations, predictability, efficiency, etc.). From a purely theoretical viewpoint, the detailed study of the emergence of cooperation in competitive systems makes the Minority Game a benchmark model of interacting agents. It has however also turned out to be able to reproduce, to some extent, the rich statistical phenomenology of financial markets, that are well known (and at least since [40]) to be characterized by clear statistical regularities, often referred to as “stylized facts”.

There are at present a few comprehensive books that cover many aspects of the MG, from both the theoretical viewpoint and the financial market viewpoint [42, 43]. Here we shall consider some basic and extended aspects of the model that are only marginally treated elsewhere. In this section we shall concentrate mainly on the original model, first presenting a more thorough derivation of the minority rule, then a simple version of the MG and finally discussing the standard model. The next section is instead devoted to some extensions that have a particularly interesting physical content.

4.2. From agents’ expectations to the minority (and majority) rule

The connection between MGs and financial markets can be established naïvely by observing that markets are instruments for allocating goods. This, combined with the no arbitrage hypothesis according to which no purchase or sale by itself may result in a riskless profit, suggests that markets should in principle be zero-sum games. Transaction costs make it a game that is unfavorable on average, i.e. a Minority Game. It would however be important to understand whether the minority mechanism can be derived from a particular microscopic scheme. This is indeed possible [44].

§ An ever increasing number of such facts are documented in the literature. The best known of these are the following: (a) asset returns are approximately uncorrelated beyond a time scale or the order of tens of minutes; (b) the unconditional distribution of returns displays a power-law tail with an exponent ranging from 2 to 4 for different stocks and markets; (c) the distribution of returns over a time scale \( \tau \) becomes more and more Gaussian as \( \tau \) increases; (d) volatility is positively autocorrelated over time scales as long as several days, implying that periods of high volatility cluster in time (‘volatility clustering’). See [41] for details.
Let us imagine a market in which $N$ agents submit their orders $a_i(t)$ for a certain asset simultaneously at every time step $t = 1, 2, \ldots$. Let $a_i(t) > 0$ mean that agent $i$ contributes $a_i(t)\mathbb{E}$ to the demand for the asset while $a_i(t) < 0$ means that $i$ sells $-a_i(t)/p(t-1)$ units of asset, which is the current equivalent (i.e. at price $p(t-1)$) of $|a_i(t)|\mathbb{E}$. With $a_i(t) = \pm 1$ and $A(t) = \sum_i a_i(t)$, the demand is given by $D(t) = \frac{N + A(t)}{2p(t-1)}$, whereas the supply is $S(t) = \frac{N - A(t)}{2p(t-1)}$. Finally, assume that the price is fixed by the market clearing condition, $p(t) = D(t)/S(t)$, i.e. 

$$p(t) = p(t-1)\frac{N + A(t)}{N - A(t)}. \quad (103)$$

Taking the logarithm of both sides and expanding to the leading order one gets 

$$\log p(t) - \log p(t-1) \simeq \frac{A(t)}{\lambda} \quad (104)$$

with $\lambda = N$. The quantity on the left-hand side is normally called the ‘return’ of the asset. $A(t)$ is instead the excess demand, namely the difference between demand and supply. This equation expresses the dynamics of prices in terms of an aggregate quantity $A(t)$ that all agents contribute to form [45]. $A(t)$ may thus be considered a proxy for the return.

Now take agent $i$ and assume he must decide whether to buy or sell at time $t$. To do this, he should compare the expected profit (or utility) of the two actions, which depends on what the price will be at time $t+1$. For instance the utility he would face at time $t+1$ if he buys $1\mathbb{E}$ of asset at time $t$ (i.e. $a_i(t) = 1$) is given by 

$$u_i(t) = \frac{p(t+1)}{p(t)} - 1 \quad (105)$$

($u_i(t) > 0$ if $p(t+1) > p(t)$). At this stage the price $p(t+1)$ is unknown to him (and presumably to everybody else). Therefore if our agent $i$ wants to use Eq. (105) to make his choice at time $t$, he has to replace $p(t+1)$ by the expectation he has at time $t$ of what the price will be at time $t+1$, denoted by $\mathbb{E}_t^{(i)}[p(t+1)]$. Let us assume that that [44] 

$$\mathbb{E}_t^{(i)}[p(t+1)] = (1 - \psi_i)p(t) + \psi_i p(t-1) \quad (106)$$

The parameter $\psi_i$ allows to distinguish two types of traders, depending on whether $\psi_i$ is positive or negative. Agents with $\psi_i > 0$ believe that market prices fluctuate around a fixed value (the ‘fundamental’), so that the future price is an average of past prices. For this reason these agents are called ‘fundamentalists’. They may also be called contrarians since they believe that the future price increment $\Delta p(t+1) = p(t+1) - p(t)$ is negatively correlated with the last one 

$$E_t^{(i)}[\Delta p(t+1)] = -\psi_i \Delta p(t). \quad (107)$$

On the other hand, if $\psi_i < 0$ the agent believes that the future price increment will occur in the direction of the trend defined by the last two prices, so that future price increments $\Delta p(t+1)$ are positively correlated with the past ones, as if the price were following a monotonic trend. This type of agents are called ‘trend followers’.
The expected utility for buying at time $t$ will be $E_t^{(i)}[u_i(t)|a_i(t) = +1] = -\psi_i[p(t) - p(t-1)]/p(t)$ which, using (103), becomes

$$E_t^{(i)}[u_i(t)|a_i(t) = +1] = -2\psi_iA(t)/[N + A(t)]$$

(108)

A similar calculation can be carried out for the expected utility for selling at time $t$. The net result is that the expected utility for action $a_i(t)$ at time $t$ can be written as

$$E_t^{(i)}[u_i(t)] = -2\psi_i a_i(t)A(t)/[N + a_i(t)A(t)].$$

(109)

Notice that agents who took the majority action $a_i(t) = \text{sign}[A(t)]$ expect to receive a payoff $-2\psi_i|A(t)|/[N + |A(t)|]$ whereas agents in the minority group expect to get $2\psi_i|A(t)|/[N - |A(t)|]$. It is clear that the expected payoff of fundamentalists (resp. trend-followers) is positive when they are in the minority (resp. majority) group. Therefore Minority Games are simple schemes for describing the behavior of contrarians whereas Majority Games are appropriate for trend-followers.

In real markets, both groups are present and the resulting price dynamics stems from a competition between the two groups [46]. Which group dominates and shapes the price dynamics depends on the evolution of traders’ expectations, which in turn depends on the behavior of price itself. Common sense suggests that when everybody is going to buy the price will rise and it will be convenient to buy. Accordingly, speculative markets in certain regimes (e.g. bubbles) should look more like Majority Games rather than Minority Games (and vice-versa in other regimes). If all traders base themselves on the same price history, expectations should converge and traders would end up playing either a Majority or a Minority Game. But of course agents revise and calibrate their expectations according to the real price history so fundamentalists and trend-followers coexist symbiotically in real markets. The problems with arguments in support of either the Minority or the Majority Game essentially arise from the fact that the objective assessment of the validity of a trading strategy is a complex inter-temporal problem that cannot be based on the result of a single transaction: whether buying today is profitable or not depends on what the price will be when one sells. Hence the payoff of a single transaction is hardly a meaningful concept unless one considers round-trip (buy/sell or sell/buy) transactions. From this point of view the MG is a rather crude approximation.

Yet, we shall see below that it provides a remarkably rich and realistic picture of financial markets as complex adaptive systems. Models of interacting fundamentalists and trend-followers will be addressed in the following section.

### 4.3. The simplest Minority Game

Before considering the model in its full complexity, it is instructive to take a glimpse at a minimal version with inductive agents in which the collective behavior can be easily understood with simple mathematics [44]. Let us suppose that traders employ a probabilistic rule of the form

$$\text{Prob}\{b_i(t) = b\} = C(t) \exp[b\Delta_i(t)] \quad b \in \{-1, 1\}$$

(110)
where \( C(t) \) is a normalization factor and \( \Delta_i(t) \) accounts for the agent’s expectations about what will be the winning action (if \( \Delta_i(t) > 0 \) then he/she will choose \( b_i(t) = 1 \) with higher probability). The ‘score function’ \( \Delta_i \) is updated according to

\[
\Delta_i(t+1) - \Delta_i(t) = -\Gamma A(t)/N
\]

with \( \Gamma > 0 \) a constant, so that if \( A(t) < 0 \) agents increase \( \Delta_i \) and the probability of choosing action 1. Let us finally assume that the initial conditions \( \Delta_i(0) \) are drawn from a distribution \( p_0(\Delta) \) with standard deviation \( s \). How does the collective behavior depend on the parameters \( \Gamma \) and \( s \)?

Notice that \( y(t) = \Delta_i(t) - \Delta_i(0) \) does not depend on \( i \), for all times. For \( N \gg 1 \), the law of large numbers allows us to approximate \( A(t) \) by its average with probability distribution (110). This yields an approximate dynamical equation for \( y(t) \):

\[
y(t+1) \simeq y(t) - \Gamma \langle \tanh[y(t) + \Delta(0)] \rangle_0
\]

where the average \( \langle \ldots \rangle_0 \) is on the distribution \( p_0 \) of initial conditions. Eq. (112) admits a fixed point \( y(t) = y^* \), with \( y^* \) the solution of \( \langle \tanh[y^* + \Delta(0)] \rangle_0 \equiv \langle A \rangle = 0 \). Let us assume that this solution is stable. This describes a stationary state where the relative scores \( \Delta_i(t) \) are displaced by a quantity \( y^* \) from the initial conditions. This gives

\[
\sigma^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( 1 - \langle a_i \rangle^2 \right) = N \left[ 1 - \langle \tanh[y^* + \Delta(0)] \rangle_0^2 \right]
\]

Notice that \( \sigma^2 \propto N \) and it decreases with the spread of the distribution of initial conditions. A linear stability analysis of Eq. (112) shows that these solutions are stable only when

\[
\Gamma < \Gamma_c = \frac{2}{1 - \langle \tanh[y^* + \Delta(0)] \rangle_0^2} \equiv \frac{2N}{\sigma^2}.
\]

When \( \Gamma > \Gamma_c \) one finds periodic solutions of the form \( y(t) = y^* + z^*(-1)^t \) where \( y^* \) and \( z^* \) satisfy certain prescribed conditions. The parameter \( z^* \) plays the role of an order parameter of the transition at \( \Gamma_c \) (\( z^* = 0 \) for \( \Gamma < \Gamma_c \)). Again we have \( \langle A \rangle = 0 \), but now

\[
\sigma^2 \simeq N^2 \left( \frac{\langle \tanh[y^* + z^* + \Delta(0)] \rangle_0^2 + \langle \tanh[y^* - z^* + \Delta(0)] \rangle_0^2}{2} \right)
\]

i.e. fluctuations are proportional to \( N^2 \). Hence this is a much less efficient state. The orbits of the dynamics of \( y(t) \) for \( \Gamma < \Gamma_c \) and \( \Gamma > \Gamma_c \) are shown in Fig. 16 together with the behavior of \( \sigma^2/N^2 \). We conclude that the more heterogeneous the initial condition is, the more efficient is the final state and the more the fixed point \( y^* \) is stable. The transition from a state where \( \sigma^2 \propto N \) to a state with \( \sigma^2 \propto N^2 \) will turn out to be a generic feature of MGs.

### 4.4. The Minority Game

In the simple case discussed above, agents base their choice only on their past experience. The standard Minority Game describes a more general situation in which traders use
both their past experience and some (endogenous or exogenous) information pattern. The model is defined as follows [47]. There are \( N \) agents labeled \( i \). At each time step \( t \) agents receive one of \( P \) possible information patterns \( \mu(t) \) (whose precise nature will be discussed below) based on which each trader must formulate a binary bid \( b_i(t) \in \{-1, 1\} \). To this aim, each of them is endowed with \( S \) strategies \( a_{ig} = \{a^\mu_{ig}\} \) \((g = 1, \ldots, S)\) that map informations \( \mu \in \{1, \ldots, P\} \) into actions \( a^\mu_{ig} \in \{-1, 1\} \). Each component \( a^\mu_{ig} \) of every strategy is selected randomly and independently from \( \{-1, 1\} \) with equal probability for every \( i, g \) and \( \mu \) at time \( t = 0 \) and is kept fixed throughout the game. Agents keep tracks of the performance of their strategies by means of valuations functions or scores \( U_{ig} \) that are initialized at some value \( U_{ig}(0) \) and whose dynamics reads

\[
U_{ig}(t+1) - U_{ig}(t) = -a^\mu_{ig}(t) A(t)/N
\]  

(116)

where \( A(t) = \sum_i b_i(t) \) is the excess demand at time \( t \). At each round, every agent picks the strategy \( g_i(t) = \arg \max_g U_{ig}(t) \) carrying the highest valuation and formulates the corresponding bid: \( b_i(t) = a^\mu_{ig}(t) \). In this way, agents adopt at each time the strategy they expect to deliver the highest profit (the score of strategies forecasting the correct minority action increase in time).

The nature of the information patterns \( \mu(t) \) is still to be specified. In principle, the natural choice corresponds to taking the string of the past \( m \) minority actions (hence \( P = 2^m \)) as the information fed to agents at every time step, with the idea to describe a closed system where agents process and react to an information they produce themselves collectively. We refer to this choice as the case of endogenous information. On the other hand, one may think of replacing for the sake of simplicity the above information (which

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**Figure 16.** Left panels: the map \( y(t) \) for \( \Gamma = 1.8 < \Gamma_c \) and \( \Gamma = 2.5 > \Gamma_c \) for \( s = 0 \). Right panel: global efficiency \( \sigma^2/N^2 \) as a function of \( \Gamma \) for two different sets of initial conditions: \( \Delta_i(0) \) is drawn from a Gaussian distribution with variance \( s^2 \). The full line corresponds to \( s = 1/2 \) whereas the dashed line is the result for \( s = 1 \). The inset reports the critical learning rate \( \Gamma_c \) as a function of the spread \( s \) of initial conditions.
has a non-trivial dynamics itself) with an integer drawn at random at each time step from \( \{1, \ldots, P\} \) with uniform probability. This corresponds to the case of random exogenous information \([48]\). Again, this replacement induces a major simplification in the structure of the model by turning a complex non-Markovian system with feedback into a Markovian one. In addition and at odds with the El Farol problem, it was shown that collective properties are roughly unaffected when real information is substituted with random information. These results suggest that, to some extent, the feedback is irrelevant as far as collective properties are concerned. We shall hence focus on the case of exogenous information for the following sections. A more careful discussion of the subtle case of endogenous information will be deferred to Sec. 4.8. In summary, the Minority Game is completely defined by the following rules:

\[
\begin{align*}
g_i(t) &= \arg \max_g U_{ig}(t) \\
A(t) &= \sum_i a_i^\mu(t) \\
U_{ig}(t + 1) - U_{ig}(t) &= -a_i^\mu(t) A(t)/N
\end{align*}
\]

Let us now discuss the macroscopic properties of the model. Early works focused on the cooperative properties of the system in the stationary state. The central quantity of interest is the numerical difference between buyers and sellers at each time step, \( A(t) \). It is easy to anticipate that none of the two actions \(-1\) and \(1\) will systematically be the minority one, i.e. that \(A(t)\) will fluctuate around zero. Were it not so, agents could easily improve their scores by adopting that strategy which visits most often that side. The size of fluctuations of \(A(t)\), instead, displays a remarkable non-trivial behavior. The variance \(\sigma^2 = \langle A^2 \rangle\) of \(A(t)\) in the stationary state measures the efficiency with which resources are distributed, since the smaller \(\sigma^2\), the larger a typical minority group is. In other words \(\sigma^2\) is a reciprocal measure of the global efficiency of the system. Early numerical studies have shown that the relevant control parameter of the model is the relative number of information patterns \(\alpha = P/N\). The behavior \(\sigma^2\) is illustrated in Fig. 17. With \(\alpha\) fixed, one typically observes that \(A(t) \simeq \sqrt{N}\) or equivalently that \(\sigma^2 = O(N)\). When \(\alpha \gg 1\) the information space is too wide to allow for a coordination and agents essentially behave randomly as \(\sigma^2/N \approx 1\), the value corresponding to random traders. As \(\alpha\) decreases, that is as more and more agents join the game or as the possible number of information patterns decreases, \(\sigma^2/N\) decreases suggesting that agents manage to exploit the information in order to coordinate to a state with better-than-random fluctuations. It turns out that these steady states are ergodic, that is they are reached independently of the initial conditions \(U_{ig}(0)\). Lowering \(\alpha\) further, ergodicity is lost and the steady state depends on \(U_{ig}(0)\). For the so-called flat initial conditions, \(U_{ig}(0) = 0\) for all \(i\) and \(g\), which describe agents with no a priori bias toward one of their strategies, one is driven into highly inefficient steady states where \(\sigma^2\) diverges as \(\alpha\) decreases approximately as \(\sigma^2 \approx 1/\alpha\). Notice that this implies \(\sigma^2 \approx N^2\). This behavior for has been attributed to the occurrence of “crowd effects”. Remarkably this ergodicity breaking transition is related to a phase transition with symmetry breaking that was first discovered by Savit
and coworkers [49] for the case of endogenous information. Reporting the frequency with which the minority action was 1 conditional on the value of \( \mu \), they observed that for \( \alpha \ll 1 \) the minority was falling on either side with equal probability irrespective of \( \mu \). But when \( \alpha \gg 1 \) the minority happened to be more likely on one side, depending on the value of \( \mu \). These observations have been sharpened in a study that allowed to locate the phase transition at the point \( \alpha_c \simeq 0.34 \) for \( S = 2 \) where \( \sigma^2 \) attains its minimum (see next section for details). The transition separates a symmetric \( (\alpha < \alpha_c) \) from an asymmetric phase \( (\alpha > \alpha_c) \). The symmetry which is broken is that of the average of \( A(t) \) conditional on the history \( \mu \), \( \langle A|\mu \rangle \). The idea is that if \( \langle A|\mu \rangle \neq 0 \) for a certain \( \mu \) then the knowledge of \( \mu \) alone suffices for a non-trivial statistical prediction of the sign of \( A(t) \). In the asymmetric phase, \( \langle A|\mu \rangle \neq 0 \) for at least one \( \mu \). Thus the sign of \( A(t) \) is predictable, to some extent, on the basis of \( \mu \) alone. A measure of the degree of predictability is given by the function

\[
H = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu=1}^{P} \langle A|\mu \rangle^2.
\]

(118)

In the symmetric phase \( \langle A|\mu \rangle = 0 \) for all \( \mu \) and hence \( H = 0 \). \( H \) is a decreasing function of the number \( N \) of agents (at fixed \( P \)): newcomers exploit the predictability of \( A(t) \) and hence reduce it. The behavior of \( H \) is also reported in Fig. 17. Notice that it acts like a ‘physical’ order parameter.

4.5. Statistical mechanics of the MG: static approach

We shall discuss in this review two lines along which the statistical mechanics of the Minority Game with random external information can be studied. The first one is
a static theory whose crucial steps are (a) finding a (random) Lyapunov function of
the dynamics that allows one to identify the steady states of the learning process
with its minima; (b) calculating the latter via the replica method. The second one
consists in constructing a dynamical mean-field theory using the learning dynamics
as a starting point. The two approaches are essentially complementary: the statics
gives more information about the predictability and allows to interpret the collective
properties in terms of a minimized quantity; the dynamics focuses on ergodicity and
is a more appropriate setting to discuss fluctuations. Below we will outline the static
approach to the standard MG for the case \( S = 2 \), deferring a discussion of the dynamical
method to Sec. 5.3. Other possibilities, like the ‘crowd-anticrowd’ theory [50] will not
be discussed here (an account can be found in [6]).

It is helpful for a start to introduce the auxiliary variables [47]

\[
\xi_i = \frac{a_{i1} - a_{i2}}{2}, \quad \omega_i = \frac{a_{i1} + a_{i2}}{2}, \quad y_i(t) = \frac{U_{i1}(t) - U_{i2}(t)}{2}
\]

in terms of which (116) can be re-cast as

\[
y_i(t + 1) - y_i(t) = -\frac{1}{N} \xi_i \Omega(t)
\]

The advantage lies in the fact that the dependence of \( a_{ig_i(t)} \) on the strategy valuation
can be made explicit by noticing that \( g_i(t) = 1 \) if \( y_i(t) > 0 \) and \( g_i(t) = 2 \) if \( y_i(t) < 0 \) (we
shall therefore refer to \( y_i \) as the ‘preference’ of agent \( i \)). As a consequence, the relevant
microscopic dynamical variable is the Ising spin \( s_i(t) = \text{sign}[y_i(t)] \). On has in particular

\[
a_{ig_i(t)} = \omega_i + s_i(t) \xi_i \quad A(t) = \sum_i \left[ \omega_i^\mu(t) + s_i(t) \xi_i^\mu(t) \right] \equiv \Omega^\mu(t) + \sum_i s_i(t) \xi_i^\mu(t)
\]

The dynamics (120) is non-linear in a way that doesn’t allow to write it in the form of a
gradient descent. However, as in the El Farol problem, one may regularize the dynamics
via a learning rate \( \Gamma > 0 \) such that [51]

\[
\text{Prob}\{g_i(t) = g\} = C(t) \ e^{\Gamma U_{ig}(t)} \quad C(t) = \text{normalization}
\]

It is then possible to construct the continuous-time limit of (120) in view of the fact
that the dynamics possesses a ‘natural’ characteristic time scale given by \( P \). Proceeding
as shown for the El Farol case, one arrives at the following continuous-time Langevin
process [16]:

\[
\dot{y}_i(\tau) = -\xi_i \Omega + \sum_j \xi_i \xi_j \tanh[y_j(\tau)] + z_i(\tau)
\]

\[
\langle z_i(\tau) z_j(\tau') \rangle \simeq \frac{\Gamma \sigma^2}{\alpha N} \xi_i \xi_j \delta(\tau - \tau')
\]

where \( \tau = \Gamma t/P \) is a re-scaled time and \( \sigma^2 \) is the volatility\( \| \) and the over-line denotes
an average over \( \mu \). One sees that in the limit \( \Gamma \to 0 \), in which the dynamics becomes

\(| Eq. (125) is based on a time-independent volatility approximation which happens to be very well satisfied away from the critical line. We refer the interested reader to [16] for further details.\)
deterministic, the system performs a gradient descent with a well-defined Hamiltonian. Indeed, in order to extract the steady state from the above process, one may take its time average:

\[ \langle y_i \rangle = -\xi_i \Omega - \sum_j \xi_i \xi_j m_j, \quad m_i = \langle \tanh(y_i) \rangle \in [-1, 1] \]  

(126)

It is now clear that the stationary values of the variables \( m_i \) can be obtained from the minimization of

\[ H = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu} \left[ \Omega^{\mu} + \sum_i \xi_i^{\mu} m_i \right]^2 \]  

(127)

which coincides with the predictability in the steady state. Hence agents coordinate so as to make the market as unpredictable as possible. This conclusion remains correct even for \( \Gamma > 0 \): indeed \( m_i \) are still given by the minima of \( H \), though the dynamics is no more deterministic (see [16]). Actually, within the approximation of Eq. (125), it can be shown (see Sec. 4.6) that for \( \alpha > \alpha_c \) the steady state is independent of \( \Gamma \).

As usual, minimization of \( H \) is achieved through the replica trick as

\[ \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{1}{N} \left\langle \min_m H \right\rangle = \lim_{\beta \to \infty} \lim_{r \to 0} \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{1}{\beta r N} \log \left\langle \left[ \text{Tr}_m e^{-\beta H} \right]^r \right\rangle \]  

(128)

The calculation is detailed at length in the literature (see e.g. [52]). The resulting phase structure is as follows:

- for \( \alpha \) larger than a critical value \( \alpha_c = 0.3374 \ldots \) there is a unique (\( \Gamma \)-independent) minimum with \( H > 0 \)
- for \( \alpha < \alpha_c \), there is a continuous of minima where \( H \) vanishes. The minimum selected by the dynamics depends on initial conditions (and on \( \Gamma \))

Hence the system at \( \alpha_c \) undergoes a phase transition from a predictable to an unpredictable phase. Such a static transition corresponds to a dynamical instability in the dynamics of preferences for \( \Gamma = 0 \). To see this, let us first mention that in numerical simulations one observes that \( y_i \) either grows linearly with time or stays finite. Based on this, one can conclude that solutions of (126) are of the form \( \langle y_i \rangle = v_i t \), with

\[ v_i = -\xi_i \Omega - \sum_j \xi_i \xi_j m_j \]  

(129)

and that there are two possibilities:

- either \( v_i \neq 0 \) and \( y_i(t) \) diverges as \( t \to \infty \), in which case \( m_i = \text{sign}(v_i) \) the agent ends up using just one of his strategies (we call these agents ‘frozen’)
- or \( v_i = 0 \) and \( \langle y_i \rangle \) stays finite, in which case \(-1 < m_i < 1\) and the agent keeps flipping between his strategies (we call these agents ‘fickle’)

Let us consider the dynamics of preferences for fickle agents. Setting \( y_i(\tau) = \langle y_i \rangle + \epsilon_i(\tau) \) where \( \epsilon_i(\tau) \) describes small fluctuations about the average, one can expand (124) to first order in \( \epsilon_i(t) \):

\[ \dot{\epsilon}_i(\tau) = -\sum_j \text{fickle} \xi_i \xi_j (1 - m_j^2) \epsilon_j(t) \equiv -\sum_j \text{fickle} T_{ij} \epsilon_j(t) \]  

(130)
where \( T_{ij} = \xi_i \xi_j (1 - m^2_i) \). As long as the matrix \( T = (T_{ij}) \) is positive definite, the above dynamical system will be linearly stable. Now \( T = UV \) with \( U_{ij} = \xi_i \xi_j \) and \( V_{ij} = (1 - m^2_i) \delta_{ij} \). But for fickle agents \(|m_i| < 1\) all eigenvalues of \( V \) are positive definite, so that \( \det(T) \) vanishes together with \( \det(U) \). The spectrum of the random matrix \( U \) can be evaluated using random matrix theory. For our purposes it suffices to calculate the minimum eigenvalue, which turns out to be \( \lambda_0 = \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{1 - \phi}{\alpha}} \right)^2 \). The instability sets in when \( \lambda_0 = 0 \), that is when

\[
1 - \phi = \alpha \tag{131}
\]

This equation and the distinction between fickle and frozen agents only depend on \( m_i \), which are determined for \( \alpha \geq \alpha_c \) by the unique minimum of \( H \), independently of \( \Gamma \). Hence Eq. (131) and the location \( \alpha_c \) of the phase transition, are independent of \( \Gamma \).

### 4.6. The role of learning rates and decision noise

It is interesting to consider briefly the impact that the introduction of a finite learning rate \( \Gamma \) has on the properties of the model. Let us begin by noting that \( \Gamma \), which at the level of agents plays a role similar to an ‘inverse temperature’, at the collective level acts instead as an effective ‘temperature’, since it tunes the fluctuating random component in agent’s dynamics (see (125)). The larger \( \Gamma \) or, equivalently, the smaller the minimum score difference agents can appreciate (this quantity is roughly of order \( 1/\Gamma \)), the more the response fluctuates and the longer it takes to average fluctuations out and reach a steady state.

We have anticipated above that \( \Gamma \) affects the steady state only in the sub-critical phase. Its effect is particularly strong on the volatility, which can be written as

\[
\sigma^2 = H + \sum_i \xi^2_i (1 - m^2_i) + \sum_{i \neq j} \xi_i \xi_j \langle (\tanh y_i - m_i)(\tanh y_j - m_j) \rangle \tag{132}
\]

The dependence on \( \Gamma \) is only present in the last term on the right-hand side, which measures fluctuations of \( \tanh y_i \) around its mean. The average is over the distribution of \( y_i \) (which in turn depends on \( \sigma^2 \) via the noise). The latter can be computed from the Fokker-Planck equation associated to (124), which itself depends on \( \sigma^2 \) (see 125). Hence \( \sigma^2 \) is determined by the solution of a self-consistent problem [16]. For \( \alpha > \alpha_c \), fluctuations of \( y_i \) are independent and hence the third term of (132) is identically zero. As a result, \( \sigma^2 \) is independent of \( \Gamma \), as confirmed to a remarkable degree of accuracy by numerical simulations [16]. When \( \alpha < \alpha_c \) a correlation arises from the fact that the dynamics is constrained to the subspace of \( \mathbf{y} \) which is spanned by the \( P \) vectors \( \xi^\mu \), and which contains the initial condition \( \mathbf{y}(0) \). The dependence on initial conditions and the dependence on \( \Gamma \) both arise as a consequence of this fact. Again, numerical simulations fully confirm this picture [16].

It is worth remarking that, the smoothed choice rule (123) can also be written as

\[
s_i(t) = \text{sign} [y_i(t) + \zeta_i(t)/\Gamma] \tag{133}
\]
where \( \zeta_i(t) \) are independent identically distributed random variables with probability density \( p(\zeta) = \frac{1}{2} [1 - (\tanh \zeta)^2] \). Indeed, for \( \Gamma = 0 \) the noisy part of the argument of the sign dominates and the agent selects his strategy at random with equal probability at each time step, while for \( \Gamma \to \infty \) one recovers the original deterministic rule \( s_i(t) = \text{sign}[y_i(t)] \).

On the basis of this observation, Coolen et al. [53] introduce a different type of decision noise, called ‘multiplicative noise’, defined as

\[
s_i(t) = \text{sign} [y_i(t) \left(1 + \frac{\zeta_i(t)}{\Gamma}\right)]
\]

which corresponds to

\[
\text{Prob}\{s_i(t) = \pm 1\} = C(t) \left( e^{\pm \Gamma \text{sign}[y_i(t)]} \right) \quad C(t) = \text{normalization}
\]

It is evident that in this case frozen agents are affected as well. Indeed, the critical point \( \alpha_c \) turns out to depend rather strongly on \( \Gamma \): when \( \Gamma \) gets smaller the informationally efficient phase shrinks as the critical point shifts to smaller values of \( \alpha \).

### 4.7. The role of market impact

Ever since J. Nash’s pioneering work in game theory, that of Nash equilibrium (NE) has been a reference concept in socio-economic systems of interacting agents. A NE is in some sense an optimal state of strategic situations, one in which no agent has incentives to deviate from his behavior unilaterally. It is easy to see that, a priori, the Minority Game possesses a huge number of such states when \( N \gg 1 \). In fact, there is one symmetric NE in mixed strategies, where agents draw their bid \( b_i \) at random at every time step with \( \text{Prob}\{b_i = +1\} = 1/2 \) for all \( i \). This state has \( \sigma^2 = N \) and \( H = 0 \). If \( N \) is even, there are also \( \left(\frac{N}{N/2}\right) \) pure strategy NE where half of the players take \( b_i = +1 \) and the other half takes \( b_i = -1 \). Moreover, states where \( N - 2k \) agents play mixed strategies and the remaining \( 2k \) play pure strategies \( b_i = +1 \) and \( b_i = -1 \), are also NE. Thus the game possesses an exponentially large number of Nash equilibria. One can then ask whether the steady state of the model is one of them. The answer is a resounding no. In this section we will study this issue and discuss the important question of why it is so. Why are inductive agents playing sub-optimally? We shall see that at the heart of the matter lies the consideration which agents have of their *market impact*, i.e. of their impact on the aggregate quantity \( A(t) \). In fact, the inability to coordinate on a NE follows from the naïve idea that in a system of \( N \) agents every single agent ‘weights’ \( 1/N \) and is thus negligible in the statistical limit \( N \to \infty \). Once this assumption is dropped and agents account for their own impact, the resulting steady state improves dramatically and eventually a NE may be reached.

To begin with, it is instructive to study the role of market impact in the simplest MG with \( P = 1 \) discussed in Sec. 4.3, in which agents must choose at each time step between the two actions \( a_i \in \{-1, 1\} \). Let us consider the following modification of the learning dynamics (111):

\[
\Delta_i(t + 1) - \Delta_i(t) = -\frac{\Gamma}{N} [A(t) - \eta a_i(t)].
\]
The term proportional to $\eta$ in (136) describes the fact that agent $i$ accounts for his own contribution to $A(t)$. One indeed sees that (136) reduces to (111) for $\eta = 0$, whereas for $\eta = 1$ agent $i$ considers only the aggregate action of other agents, $A(t) - a_i(t) = \sum_{j \neq i} a_j(t)$, and does not react to his own action $a_i(t)$. Values of $\eta$ between 0 and 1 tune the extent to which agents account for their “market impact”.

It is easy to see that the dynamics for $\eta = 1$ behaves in the long run in a radically different way than for $\eta = 0$. Let us take the average of (136) in the steady state and define $m_i = \langle a_i \rangle$. We note that

$$\langle \Delta_i(t + 1) \rangle - \langle \Delta_i(t) \rangle = -\frac{\Gamma}{N} \left[ \sum_j m_j - \eta m_i \right] = -\frac{\Gamma}{N} \frac{\partial H_\eta}{\partial \eta} \quad (137)$$

where

$$H_\eta = \frac{1}{2} \left( \sum_i m_i \right)^2 - \frac{\eta}{2} \sum_i m_i^2. \quad (138)$$

This implies that the stationary values of the $m_i$’s are given by the minima of $H_\eta$. Notice that $H_1$ is a harmonic function of the $m_i$’s. Hence it attains its minima on the boundary of the hypercube $[-1, 1]^N$. So for $\eta = 1$ all agents always take the same actions $a_i(t) = m_i = +1$ or $a_i(t) = m_i = -1$ and the waste of resources is as small as possible, as $\sigma^2 = 0$ or 1 if $N$ is even or odd, which is a tremendous improvement with respect to the case $\eta = 0$ (where $\sigma^2 \sim N$ or $N^2$). These states are indeed Nash equilibria of the associated $N$ persons minority game. This argument can be extended with some work to all $\eta > 0$, and one can show that the stationary states of the learning process for any $\eta > 0$ are Nash equilibria. Hence as soon as agents start to account for their market impact ($\eta > 0$) the collective behavior of the system changes abruptly and inefficiencies are drastically reduced. Furthermore, the asymptotic state is not unique ($H_\eta$ possesses more than one minimum!) and the one in which the system settles is selected by the initial conditions. The set of equilibria is discrete and the system jumps discontinuously from an equilibrium to another, as the initial conditions $\Delta_i(0)$ vary. This also contrasts with the $\eta = 0$ case, where the equilibrium shifts continuously as a function of the initial conditions.

Let us now consider the full MG with market impact correction with public information [52] (the above picture is representative of the situation in the MG in the limit $\alpha \rightarrow 0$), whose learning dynamics reads

$$U_{ig}(t + 1) - U_{ig}(t) = -\frac{a_{ig}^{\mu(t)}}{N} \left[ A(t) - \eta \left( a_{ig}^{\mu(t)} - a_{ig}^\eta(t) \right) \right] \quad (139)$$

As before, $\eta$ allows to interpolate between the naive ‘price-taking’ behavior of the standard MG in which agents are unaware of their market impact ($\eta = 0$) and a more sophisticated behavior where agents account for it. Note indeed that with $\eta = 1$ the reinforcement $U_{ig}(t + 1) - U_{ig}(t)$ is proportional to the actual payoff that agent $i$ would have got had he actually played strategy $g$ at time $t$. Hence in a way the above learning process assumes that agents are able to disentangle their contribution from the aggregate
$A(t)$. This may not be realistic in practical situations. For example imagine that, as in the original version of the MG, agents only observe the sign of $A(t)$ and not its value. This information is not enough to infer the sign of $A(t) - a_{ig}(t) + a_{ig}(t)$ and hence the payoff they would have received if they had played strategy $g$ instead of $g_i(t)$. However, agents can approximately account for the market impact by rewarding the strategy they have played by a reinforcement factor $\eta$, i.e.

$$U_{ig}(t+1) - U_{ig}(t) = -a_{ig}(t) \frac{A(t)}{N} + \frac{\eta}{N} \delta_{gg_i(t)}$$

In fact, the collective behavior of the learning dynamics above is identical to that obtained with (139). This is because what matters in the long run is the time average of the processes, which is the same because $\langle a_{ig}a_{ig'} \rangle \simeq \delta_{g,g'}$.

At first sight, the term proportional to $\eta$ looks negligible with respect to $A(t)$ because it is of order one whereas $A(t) = O(\sqrt{N})$. However while $A(t)$ fluctuates around zero, $\delta_{s,s_i(t)}$ has always the same sign. When the term proportional to $A(t)$ is averaged over the $P = \alpha N$ states $\mu$ it also becomes of order one. Hence the effect of the two terms is comparable in the long run. (A similar phenomenon occurs in spin glasses where the naive mean filed theory has to be corrected by the Onsager reaction term to eliminate self-interaction effects.). For generic $\eta (0 \leq \eta \leq 1)$ the steady state is described by the minima of

$$H_{\eta} = H - \eta \sum_i \xi_i^2 (1 - m_i^2)$$

where $H = \langle A|\mu \rangle^2$ is the predictability. Note that $H_1 = \sigma^2$, so players who fully account for their impact effectively minimize fluctuations.

Unfortunately, the study of the ground state properties of $H_{\eta}$ requires techniques which are more sophisticated than those used for the MG. Indeed for $\eta > 0$ the simple replica-symmetric solution that we have discussed so far becomes unstable against perturbations that break replica permutation symmetry (this is related to the fact that $H_{\eta}$ has more than one minimum) and one needs to study more complicated solution types [54]. The ensuing phase structure is shown in Fig. 18 The critical line (analog to the de Almeida-Thouless line of spin-glass theory) can be calculated straightforwardly using the dynamical stability argument mentioned at the end of Sec. 4.5. It suffices to replace $U_{ij} = \xi_i \xi_j$ with $U_{ij} = \xi_i \xi_j - \eta \delta_{ij} \xi_i^2$. The resulting condition reads $1 - \phi = \alpha(1 - \sqrt{\eta})^2$ and coincides with the critical line for replica-symmetry breaking.

The MG behavior ($\eta = 0$) is separated from the Nash equilibrium behavior ($\eta = 1$) by a phase transition which is continuous for $\alpha > \alpha_c$. Remarkably for $\alpha < \alpha_c$ the transition occurs at $\eta = 0$ and it becomes discontinuous. As shown in Fig. 19, nothing dramatic happens when crossing the transition for $\alpha > \alpha_c$. For $\alpha < \alpha_c$ instead $\sigma^2/N$ features a discontinuous jump across the transition line at $\eta = 0$. The origin of the discontinuity lies in the dynamic degeneracy of the system for $\alpha < \alpha_c$ and $\eta = 0$. Even an infinitesimal change in $\eta$ can dramatically alter the nature of the minima of
Figure 18. Phase diagram of the Minority Game in the $(\alpha, \eta)$ plane. The RS region corresponds to the replica-symmetric phase and the RSB region to the replica symmetry broken phase (from [54]). The mark corresponds to the critical point $\alpha_c \simeq 0.3374$. Above it, the RSB $\rightarrow$ RS transition is second order; below it, it is discontinuous.

Figure 19. $\sigma^2/N$ as a function of $\eta$ for $S = 2$ and $\alpha \simeq 0.079 < \alpha_c \simeq 0.3374$ and $\alpha \simeq 0.63 > \alpha_c$. Results both of numerical simulations of the minority game and of the numerical minimization of $H_{\eta}$ are shown. In both cases the replica symmetry breaks at $\eta = 0$ (from [52]).

$H_{\eta}$: for negative $\eta$ there is only one minimum which becomes shallower and shallower as $\eta \to 0^-$. At $\eta = 0$ the minimum is always unique but it is no more point-like. Rather it is a connected set. An infinitesimal positive value of $\eta$ is enough to lift this degeneracy. The set of minima becomes suddenly disconnected. At fixed $\alpha < \alpha_c$, varying $\eta$ across the transition $H_{\eta}$ changes continuously – with a discontinuity in its first derivative – whereas the remaining fluctuation terms in $\sigma^2/N$ change discontinuously with a jump. The potential implications of this result are quite striking: rewarding the
strategy played more than those which have not been played by a small amount is always advantageous. In particular, \textit{an infinitesimal reward is sufficient to reduce fluctuations by a finite amount, for }\alpha < \alpha_c.\)

Let us finally come to the case \(\eta = 1\), corresponding to NE, in which, as we said, steady states coincide with the states of minimum \(\sigma^2\). One understands that these minima occur when agents play only one of their available strategies \(P\), since \(\sigma^2\) attains minima in the corners of the configuration space \([-1, 1]^N\). The statistical properties of the minima of \(\sigma^2\) can again be analyzed with tools of statistical mechanics. As is clear from Fig. 18, for \(\eta = 1\) one is always in the phase with broken replica symmetry because \(\sigma^2\) attains its minima on a disconnected set of points. For \(S = 2\) strategies per agent it has been shown analytically via the so-called annealed approximation that the number of NE (i.e. of minima of \(\sigma^2\)) is exponentially large in \(N\) (see Fig. 20). It is clear that the global efficiency of NE is better than in the standard MG, since fluctuations are smaller. Furthermore, increasing the number \(S\) of strategies the efficiency of NE increases (i.e. \(\sigma^2\) decreases) as shown in [52]. This contrasts with what happens in the MG, where the efficiency generally decreases when \(S\) increases. Therefore, not only agents in the MG play sub-optimally, but the more resources they have the larger is the deviation of their behavior from an optimum.

We are still left with the question: why do agents in the MG play sub-optimally? In order to answer, let us consider the case of an \textit{external} agent with \(S\) strategies, \(P\) There may also be other NE, which correspond to saddle points of \(\sigma^2\) and are hence stationary points of the multi-population replicator dynamics. Agents do not play evolutionarily stable strategies in these NE and as we shall see the dynamics of learning never converges to these states. Hence we do not consider these NE further.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\columnwidth]{figure20.png}
\caption{Logarithm of the average number of NE divided by \(N\) as a function of \(\alpha\) (from [54]).}
\end{figure}
an agent who does not take part in the game but just observes its outcome from the outside. From this position, each of his strategies delivers an average virtual gain
\[ \pi_{\text{vir}}^g = -a_g \langle A \rangle \ (g = 1, \ldots, S). \]
Given that the strategies \( a^\mu_g \) are drawn randomly, the \( \pi_{\text{vir}}^g \)'s are independent random variables. Moreover, since \( \pi_{\text{vir}}^g \) is the sum of \( P \gg 1 \) independent variables \( a^\mu_g \langle A^\mu \rangle / P \), their distribution is Gaussian with zero mean and variance
\[
\text{Var}(\pi_{\text{vir}}^g) = \frac{1}{P^2} \sum_{\mu=1}^P \text{Var}(a^\mu_g) \langle A | \mu \rangle^2 = \frac{H}{P}.
\] (142)

Clearly, the strategy \( g^* \) bearing the highest expected profit \( \pi_{\text{vir}}^{g^*} \) is superior to all others. It would be most reasonable for this agent to just stick to this strategy.

However, the same agent inside the game will typically use not only strategy \( g^* \) since every strategy, when used, delivers a real gain which is reduced with respect to the virtual one by the “market impact”. Imagine the “experiment” of injecting the new agent in a MG. Then, neglecting the reaction of other agents to the newcomer, one would have that \( \langle A | \mu \rangle \to \langle A | \mu \rangle + a^\mu_g \). Then the real gain of the newcomer is:
\[
\pi_{\text{real}}^g \simeq -a_g \langle A \rangle - \langle a_g a_g \rangle = \pi_{\text{vir}}^g - 1.
\] (143)
The agent will then update the score of the strategy he uses (say \( g \)) with the real gain \( \pi_{\text{real}}^g \) and those of the strategies he does not use (say \( g' \)) with the virtual one, so that \( U_{g'} = \pi_{\text{real}}^{g'} + 1 - a_g a_g \simeq \pi_{\text{real}}^{g'} + 1 \). Therefore agents in the MG over-estimate the performance of the strategies they do not play. Then if strategy \( g \) is played with a frequency \( f_g \), the virtual score increases on average by
\[
v_g = U_g(t + 1) - U_g(t) = \pi_{\text{real}}^g - f_g + 1
\] (144)
The fact that a good strategy \( g \) is used frequently reduces its perceived success\(^+\) and leads agents to mix their best strategy with less performing ones. This is a consequence of the fact that agents neglect their impact on the market. It is now clear why, given that the market impact reduces the perceived performance \( v_g \) of strategies by an amount which equals the frequency \( f_g \) with which strategies are played, agents can improve their performance if they reward the strategy which they have played by some extra points (the \( \eta \) factor). This contributes a term \( \eta f_g \) to the rate of growth of strategy \( g \) so (144) becomes \( v_g = \pi_{\text{real}}^g - (1 - \eta)f_g + 1 \). Any \( \eta > 0 \) reduces the market impact and improves agent’s performance. In particular for \( \eta = 1 \) agents properly account for the market impact and indeed in this case the growth rate \( v_s \) of their strategies do not depend on the way they play.

\(^+\) More precisely the frequency \( f_g \) with which the agent plays strategy \( g \) will be such that the rate of increase of the scores is the same \( v_g = v^* \) for all strategies with \( f_g > 0 \). Strategies which are not played (\( f_g = 0 \)) have \( \pi_{\text{real}}^g + 1 < v^* \). Considering the reaction of other agents does not modify these conclusions.
4.8. Exogenous vs endogenous information

In the El Farol problem and in the MG the state $\mu(t)$ is determined by the outcome of past games, as in (32). In other words $\mu(t)$ is an endogenous information which encodes information on the game itself: agents record which has been the winning action in the last $m = \log_2 P$ games and store this information in the binary representation of the integer $\mu$. How do the results which we derived for exogenous information, i.e. when $\mu$ is just randomly drawn at each time, change if we go back to endogenous information?

This issue has been the subject of much debate and considerable analytical and numerical work was required to settle it. We will limit ourselves here to a sketch of the line of reasoning and of the results. As we said, it was at first believed, based on computer simulation, that the MGs with exogenous and endogenous information yield the same macroscopic pictures. However the situation turned out to be more subtle. In fact, (32) implies that the dynamics of $\mu(t)$ depends on the collective behavior of the game outcome $A(t)$. The key quantity to understand the dynamics of information patterns is the stationary state distribution of the process $\mu(t)$ which is induced by the dynamics of $A(t)$. As in the El Farol model, this process is a diffusion on a De Bruijn graph, where the transition probabilities depend on the statistics of $A(t)$ conditional on a particular site $\mu$ of the graph. When the dynamics of $A(t)$ has a strong stochastic component, which occurs when many agents play in a probabilistic fashion (i.e. when $|m_i| = |\langle s_i \rangle| < 1$), all possible transition $\mu \to \mu'$ occur with a positive, finite probability. Hence the stationary state distribution has a support on all the states $\mu \in \{1, \ldots, P\}$. At odd with the case of exogenous information, some state may be visited more often than some other state, but all states are visited. This leads ultimately to the same qualitative scenario as in the completely random case and explains the early numerical finding on the irrelevance of the origin of the information in the MG*. Roughly speaking, one can say that this scenario holds whenever

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} m_i^2 < 1,$$

(145)

which is sufficient to ensure that agents behave in a probabilistic way.

To be more precise, one can analyze the steady-state distribution of history frequencies $\rho(\mu)$ relative to the uniform case, which is given by

$$Q(f) = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu} \delta[f - P\rho(\mu)]$$

(146)

(if $\rho(\mu) = 1/P$ for all $\mu$, $Q(f)$ is a delta-distribution at $f = 1$) as was done e.g. in [55]. This quantity is reported in Fig. 21. One sees that in the supercritical regime the distribution is indeed not uniform. This explains why, from a quantitative viewpoint it turns out that macroscopic observables actually depend on the type of information in the asymmetric regime $\alpha > \alpha_c$ where the deviations of the history frequency

* Rather than the origin of information, Ref. [48] speaks of irrelevance of memory. The term “memory” is used in an improper way. Actually the memory of agents is stored into their scores $U_{i\mu}(t)$. 
distribution from uniformity are more significant. The arguments just described, though approximate, are able to account for these deviations rather well. Recently, the dynamics of the MG with endogenous information was solved exactly by the generating functional method [56], confirming the general picture outlined above.

Clearly, the situation changes drastically when one considers the MG corrected for the market impact with $\eta = 1$. We know that all agents ultimately freeze in this case, so that the learning dynamics converges to a state with $Q = 1$, i.e. with no stochastic fluctuations; therefore in the long run $A(t)$ becomes a function of $\mu(t)$ alone. This means that the dynamics of $\mu(t)$ becomes deterministic: it locks into periodic orbits of the order of $\sqrt{P}$ values of $\mu$. As a consequence, only a tiny fraction of information patterns are generated by the dynamics of $A(t)$ and these few on the periodic orbit are visited uniformly (one after the other). This dynamic reduction of the size information space from $P$ to a number of order $\sqrt{P}$ implies a similar reduction of the effective value of $\alpha$ to something close to 0. Given that $\sigma^2/N$ decreases with $\alpha$, we conclude that the performance of the system with endogenous information improves with respect to the case of exogenous information. For intermediate values of $\eta$ and endogenous information the system interpolates between the two extreme behaviors of the standard MG ($\eta = 0$) – where the origin of information is to some extent irrelevant – and of the sophisticated agents ($\eta = 1$) case – where a dynamic selection of a small subset of states $\mu$ occurs.

5. Extensions and generalizations

We shall discuss now a few variations on the MG theme, mostly inspired by problems related to financial markets, in particular by the origin of the peculiar intermittent and non-Gaussian (‘fat tailed’) fluctuation patterns they generate. In the reference model
of price dynamics, which is the simplest one accounting for no-arbitrage hypothesis and market’s efficiency, the logarithm of prices performs a random walk and hence returns are gaussian. On the other hand, several complex agent-based models are able to reproduce a realistic phenomenology to a high degree but with little analytic control. In the context of MGs we shall see that heavy tails in the distribution of returns and clustering in time emerge close to the phase transition, which suggests that markets operate close to criticality. Realistic behaviour persists also when agents have a finite score memory, but it disappears as soon as agents account for their market impact. We shall also briefly discuss MGs with many assets, in which agents have to choose among several assets with different information content. Then we shall move on to Majority Games and review the properties of mixed models in which fundamentalists and trend-followers interact. A discussion of a model with asymmetric (private) information closes the section.

5.1. Grand-canonical Minority Game and stylized facts

The following model introduces volume fluctuations in the MG, as the number of agents involved in the game varies from one time step to the next. In the grand-canonical MG [57], each agent $i$ has at his disposal only one quenched random trading strategy $a_i = \{a_i^\mu\}$ and has to choose whether to join the market ($\phi_i(t) = 1$) or not ($\phi_i(t) = 0$) at every time step. In order to make this decision the agent compares the expected profit from joining the market to a fixed standard. The model is completely defined by the following scheme:

$$
\phi_i(t) = \theta[U_i(t)] \\
A(t) = \sum_i \phi_i(t)a_i^\mu(t) \\
U_i(t + 1) - U_i(t) = -a_i^\mu(t)A(t) - \epsilon_i
$$

(147)

The quantity $\epsilon_i$ represents the benchmark: $\epsilon_i < 0$ means that agents have an incentive to take part in the market because, for instance, they are urged to sell or exchange assets; $\epsilon_i > 0$ implies that agents receive a fixed positive payoff by staying away from the market, like a fixed interest from a bank. Alternatively, $\epsilon_i$ can be seen as the a priori incentive of agent $i$ to enter the market: if $\epsilon_i < 0$ (resp. $\epsilon_i > 0$) the agent has a small incentive to enter (resp. stay out). One can consider two different types of agents: producers, who always enter the market and are characterized by $\epsilon_i = -\infty$; and speculators, who instead aim at taking profit of fluctuations and are characterized by a finite $\epsilon_i$. We set

$$
\epsilon_i = \epsilon \quad \text{for } 1 \leq i \leq N_s \\
\epsilon_i = -\infty \quad \text{for } N_s + 1 \leq i \leq N_s + N_p \equiv N
$$

where $N_s$ and $N_p$ stand for the number of speculators and producers, respectively. Speculators act on the market only if they expect to receive a payoff higher than the benchmark; producers act no matter what.
Figure 22. Left panel: relative number of active agents (top), volatility and predictability per pattern (bottom) as a function of $n_s$ for $\epsilon = 0.1$ (open markers) and $\epsilon = -0.01$ (full markers). Right panel: cumulative probability distribution $P_{>}(A) = \text{Prob}\{ |A(t)| > x \}$ versus $x$ in the steady state. Inset: time series $A(t)$ versus $t$ for $n_s = 20$ (top) and $n_s = 200$ (bottom). From [57].

The relevant control parameters are the relative number of speculators and producers, respectively: $n_s = N_s/P$ and $n_p = N_p/P$. As usual, one is interested in the behavior of the volatility $\sigma^2$ and of the predictability $H$. Besides, it is interesting to analyze also the relative number of active speculators, defined as

$$n_{\text{act}} = \frac{1}{P} \sum_i \langle \phi_i \rangle$$

(148)

Results are shown in Fig. 22. One sees that with a fixed number $n_p$ of producers, the market becomes more and more unpredictable, i.e. $H$ decreases, as the number $n_s$ of speculators increases, independently of the value of $\epsilon$. At the same time also the volatility $\sigma^2$ decreases as agents play in an increasingly coordinated way. In a market with few speculators ($n_s < 1$ in Fig.), most of the fluctuations in $A(t)$ are due to the random choice of $\mu(t)$ (i.e. $\sigma^2 \simeq H$) and the number $n_{\text{act}}$ of active speculators grows approximately linearly with $n_s$. When $n_s$ increases further, the market reaches a point where it is barely predictable. Now the collective behavior becomes $\epsilon$-dependent:

- for $\epsilon < 0$ the relative number of active speculators continues growing with $n_s$ even if the market is unpredictable $H \simeq 0$. The volatility $\sigma^2$ has a minimum and then it increases with $n_s$
- for $\epsilon > 0$, instead, the relative number of active traders decreases and finally converges to a constant. This means that the market becomes highly selective: only a negligible fraction of speculators trade ($\phi_i(t) = 1$) whereas the majority is inactive ($\phi_i(t) = 0$). The volatility $\sigma^2$ also remains roughly constant in this limit.

In other words, $\epsilon = 0$ for $n_s \geq n_s^*(n_p)$ ($n_s^*(1) = 4.15\ldots$) is the locus of a first order phase transition across which $N_{\text{act}}$ and $\sigma^2$ exhibit a discontinuity.
So far for collective properties; what about stylized facts? Numerical simulations reproduce anomalous fluctuations similar to those of real financial markets close to the phase transition line. As shown in Fig. 22, the distribution of $A(t)$ is roughly Gaussian for small enough $n_s$ (it must tend to a Gaussian when $n_s \to 0$), and has fatter and fatter tails as $n_s$ increases. The same behavior is seen for decreasing $\epsilon$: fat tails emerge in the vicinity of the critical point. In particular the distribution of $A(t)$ shows a power law behavior $P(|A| > x) \sim x^{-\beta}$ with an exponent which can be estimated to be $\beta \simeq 2.8, 1.4$ for $n_s = 20, 200$ respectively and $\epsilon = 0.01$. With $n_s = 100$ the exponent takes values $\beta \simeq 1.4, 2.3, 3.1$ for $\epsilon = 0.01, 0.1, 0.5$. Note that empirical values of $\beta$ typically range from 2 to 4. Finally: volatility clustering is observed in conjunction with the power-law tails (see inset).

Let us analyze more closely the emergence of power-law tails in the distribution of $A(t)$ and of volatility clustering. In Fig. 23 the kurtosis excess (if $x$ is a generic random variable with zero mean, $K$ is defined as $K = \frac{\langle x^4 \rangle}{\langle x^2 \rangle^2} - 3$; loosely speaking, it is a convenient proxy for the distance of a certain distribution from a Gaussian, for which $K = 0$) $K$ of the distribution is shown as a function of the system size and of the learning rate $\Gamma$ for a ‘regularized’ model with choice rule

$$\text{Prob}\{\phi_i(t) = 1\} = 1/[1 + e^{-\Gamma U_i(t)}] \quad (149)$$

One sees that as the system size increases (or if one introduces a small enough learning rate $\Gamma$, see below) the distribution tends to a Gaussian as $K$ decreases with $P$. Moreover we see that for a rage of parameters the appearance of fat tails is sample-dependent, as both samples with and without fat tails may occur.

This behaviour is reminiscent of well-known finite-size effects in the theory of critical phenomena: in the $d$-dimensional Ising model, for example, at temperature $T = T_c + \gamma$ critical fluctuations (e.g. in the magnetization) occur as long as the system size $N$ is smaller than the correlation volume $\sim \gamma^{-d\nu}$. But for $N \gg \gamma^{-d\nu}$ the system shows
the normal fluctuations of a paramagnet. Some light on the finite-size effects in our case can be shed by studying the continuous-time limit of the score updating dynamics. Regularizing the choice rule to

$$\text{prob}\{\phi_i(t) = 1\} = 1/[1 + e^{-\Gamma U_i(t)}]$$ (150)

with learning rate $\Gamma$, and applying the machinery described in Sec. 4.5, one can transform the discrete-time learning dynamics into the continuous-time Langevin process

$$\dot{U}_i(t) = -a_i \langle A \rangle_y - \epsilon + \eta_i(t)$$ (151)

$$\langle \eta_i(t) \eta_j(t') \rangle = \frac{\sigma^2}{N} a_i a_j \delta(t - t')$$ (152)

Notice that the noise strength is proportional to the time dependent volatility $\sigma^2 = \langle A^2 \rangle$. The noise term is a source of correlated fluctuations because $a_i a_j \langle A^2 \rangle_y/N \approx 1/\sqrt{N}$ is small but non zero, for $i \neq j$ if $N$ is finite. This noise competes with the deterministic part of (151): if the former outweighs the latter, then one expects that the dynamics will sustain collective correlated fluctuations in the $U_i(t)$ which otherwise would be washed away. In order to obtain an approximate analytic condition for the onset of volatility clustering one may then compare the noise correlation term, which is of order $a_i a_j \langle A^2 \rangle_y/N \approx \sigma^2/P^{3/2}$ for $i \neq j$, with the square of the deterministic term of (151), which is given by $\left[ a_i \langle A \rangle_y + \epsilon \right]^2 \approx \left[ \sqrt{H/P} + \epsilon \right]^2$. Rearranging terms, one finds that volatility clustering can be expected to set in when

$$\frac{H}{\sigma^2} + 2\epsilon \sqrt{\frac{H P}{P \sigma^2}} + \epsilon^2 \frac{P}{\sigma^2} \approx \frac{B}{\sqrt{P}}$$ (153)

where $B$ is a constant. This prediction finds remarkable confirmations in numerical experiments [57]. Recalling the analogy with magnetic systems made at the beginning of this section, one understands that (153) and $H/P \approx \epsilon^2$ imply that the same occurs in the GCMG with $d \nu = 4$. In other words, the critical window shrinks as $N^{-1/4}$ when $N \to \infty$. However, because of the long range nature of the interaction, anomalous fluctuations either concern the whole system or do not affect it at all. In the critical region the Gaussian phase coexists probabilistically with a phase characterized by anomalous fluctuations. This, like the discontinuous nature of the transition at $\epsilon = 0$, is typical of first order phase transitions.

5.2. Market ecology

One of the first modifications of the MG has investigated the effects of introducing an explicit asymmetry in the two possible actions [58]. This is the case of the El Farol bar problem: the actions ‘go’ or ‘don’t go’ to the bar are not symmetric because (i) if one takes the wrong action there is still a difference between going to a crowded bar and not going to an uncrowded bar and (ii) the comfort level corresponds to a share of 60% of agents attending. If each agent takes the opposite choice one ends up in an inefficient
attendance of 40%. The outcomes of the MG are instead symmetric: If every agent switches to the opposite choice, all the payoffs remain unchanged. Quite generally this leads to study games where the payoffs to agent \( i \) at time \( t \) is given by

\[
\pi_i(t) = -a_{i\mu(t)} A_0^\mu(t) + \sum_j a_{j\mu(t)} g_j(t)
\]

(154)

where \( A_0 = \{ A_0^\mu \} \) is some fixed vector. In particular, [58] investigated the case where \( A_0^\mu = L \) independently of \( \mu \), as in the El Farol bar, and where information is endogenous. Interestingly, because of the fact that due to (32) some values of \( \mu \) occur more often than others, the conclusion that the collective behavior is independent of whether the information \( \mu \) is endogenously generated or is exogenous (i.e. random), which was roughly correct for the standard MG, is not true in this case.

There is however a second motivation for considering a model based on (154) which was explored in [59,60]. Considering the MG as a model of a financial market, it can be argued that there are different types of market participants with different goals. Some trade to gain money from transactions with no particular interest in the asset they buy and sell. Only price fluctuations matter for this kind of traders, which one usually calls ‘speculators’. Another type of market participants are those who use the market for exchanging goods. This is indeed the reason why markets exist. This type of agents is interested in the asset itself: they will buy it or sell it irrespective of the history of recent fluctuations: this type of agents can be called producers. While speculators have a range of behavioral rules which process the available information in search of arbitrage opportunities, producers use a trading rule which is constant in time. Producers are part of the financial world and their behavior is correlated with the state of the world \( \mu \) which is thought to capture all relevant economic information: in other words, they only have one strategy at their disposal. This type of traders play a role similar to that of hedgers\(^\#\): they inject information into the market. Their trading activity is completely predictable given the state of the world \( \mu \) and the term \( A_0^\mu \) represents their aggregate contribution to the market.

It is easy to understand that in a market composed of producers only the distribution of price changes would be nearly Gaussian: in fact, \( A_0^\mu \) can be regarded as the sum of \( N_p \) random terms, where \( N_p \) is the number of producers. The process associated to producers can be considered as the fundamentals, i.e. the price process which reflects the economic performance of the asset. Roughly speaking, one may expect that speculative trading will color this process and transform its statistical properties. Actually the discussion may be extended to a further type of agents, the so-called noise traders. These persons totally disregard the state of the world \( \mu \) or have no information at all on it. They rather follow rules of behavior which are statistically uncorrelated with \( \mu \) (such as the moon phases) and with the behavior of other agents. The presence of these agents does not introduce any new qualitative features. The question is: how do all these “species” of traders interact?

\(^\#\) A hedge is an action (e.g. buy/sell) done with the aim of reducing the risk of another action.
Figure 24. Average gains of producers and speculators as a function of the (reduced) number $N/P$ of adaptive agents (speculators). The plot refers to a system with $N_p = P$ passive agents (producers). The gain of speculators is positive only when they are few and it decreases when new speculators join the market. Producers losses are reduced by speculators. The predictability $H$ is also plotted. Inset: Phase diagram in the space of the reduced numbers of speculators and producers. The shaded region to the right of the solid line is the symmetric phase where $H = 0$. The gain of speculators vanishes on dashed line and it is positive in the region to the left.

An intuitive argument runs more or less as follows. First, note that in a market composed of producers price changes would depend only on $\mu$. Such a highly predictable market is very favorable for speculators who may derive considerable gains. However when more and more speculators join the market, its predictability decreases and the profit of speculators gets more and more meager. This effect is illustrated in Fig. 24, which also shows that producers instead benefit from the presence of speculators because their losses are reduced. When the number of speculators increases beyond a critical value, which depends on the relative number $N_p/P$ of producers, the market enters the symmetric phase where $H = 0$ and the outcome $A(t)$ becomes unpredictable from $\mu$. This shows that the relation between these two species is more similar to symbiosis than to competition: producers feed speculators by injecting information in the market and benefit, in their turn, of the liquidity provided by speculators.

5.3. Multi-asset Minority Games

5.3.1. Definitions and results Minority Games with many assets have been introduced in order to investigate how speculative trading affects the different assets in a market [61, 62]. A tractable version of these models has been considered in [63], with the aim of studying how agents modify the composition of their portfolios depending on the ‘complexities’ or information contents of the different assets. The model consists essentially of two coupled MGs with one strategy each. Let us
consider the case of a market with two assets \( \gamma \in \{-1, 1\} \) and \( N \) agents. At each time step \( \ell \), agents receive two information patterns \( \mu_\gamma \in \{1, \ldots, P_\gamma\} \), chosen at random and independently with uniform probability. As always, \( P_\gamma \) is taken to scale linearly with \( N \), and their ratio is denoted by \( \alpha_\gamma = P_\gamma / N \). Every agent \( i \) disposes of one trading strategy per asset, \( a_{i\gamma} = \{a_{i\mu_\gamma}\} \), that prescribe an action \( a_{i\mu_\gamma} \in \{-1, 1\} \) (buy/sell) for each possible information pattern of asset \( \gamma \). Each component \( a_{i\mu_\gamma} \) is selected randomly and independently with uniform probability and is kept fixed throughout the game. Traders keep tracks of their performance in the different markets through a score function \( U_{i\gamma}(\ell) \).

The behavior of agents is summarized by the following rules:

\[
\begin{align*}
    s_i(t) &= \text{sign}[y_i(t)] \\
    A_\gamma(t) &= \sum_{j=1}^{N} a_{j\gamma}(t) \delta_{s_j(t), \gamma} \\
    U_{i\gamma}(t+1) - U_{i\gamma}(t) &= -a_{i\gamma}(t) A_\gamma(t) / \sqrt{N}
\end{align*}
\]  

(155)

where \( A_\gamma(t) \) represents the ‘excess demand’ or the total bid of asset \( \gamma \), while \( y_i(t) = \sum_\gamma \gamma U_{i\gamma}(t) \). The Ising variable \( s_i \) indicates the asset in which player \( i \) invests at time \( t \), which is simply the one with the largest cumulated score. As usual, it is the minus sign on the right-hand side of (155) that enforces the minority-wins rule in both markets. It is possible to characterize the asymptotic behaviour of the multi-agent system (155) with a few macroscopic observables. In the present case, besides traditional observables such as the predictability \( H \) and the volatility \( \sigma^2 \), defined respectively as

\[
    H = \sum_{\gamma\in\{-1,1\}} \frac{1}{NP_\gamma} \sum_{\mu_\gamma=1}^{P_\gamma} (A_\gamma|\mu_\gamma|^2 = H_+ + H_- \\
    \sigma^2 = \frac{1}{N} \sum_\gamma \langle A_\gamma^2 \rangle = \sigma^2_+ + \sigma^2_-
\]  

(156) (157)

it is important to analyze the relative propensity of traders to invest in a given market, namely

\[
    m = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \langle s_i \rangle
\]  

(158)

A positive (resp. negative) \( m \) indicates that agents invest preferentially in asset +1 (resp. -1).

The phase structure of the model is displayed in Fig. 25. The \((\alpha_+, \alpha_-)\) plane is divided in two regions separated by a critical line. In the ergodic regime, the system produces exploitable information, i.e. \( H > 0 \), and the dynamics is ergodic, that is the steady state turns out to be independent of the initialization \( U_{i\gamma}(0) \) of (155). Below the critical line, instead, different initial conditions lead to steady states with different macroscopic properties (e.g. different volatility), but traders manage to wash out the information and the system is unpredictable \( H = 0 \). This scenario essentially reproduces the standard MG phase transition picture.
Figure 25. Left panel: analytical phase diagram of the canonical two-asset Minority Game in the \((\alpha_+,\alpha_-)\) plane. Right panel: behavior of \(m\) (top), \(H\) (middle) and \(\sigma^2\) (bottom) versus \(\alpha_+-\alpha_-\) for \(\alpha_++\alpha_-= 0.5\). Markers correspond to simulations with \(N=256\) agents, averaged over 200 disorder samples per point. Lines are analytical results (from [63]).

The behavior of the macroscopic observables \(m\), \(H\) and \(\sigma^2\) along the cut \(\alpha_++\alpha_-= 1/2\) (in the ergodic phase) is also reported in Fig. 25. One sees that agents play preferentially in the market with smaller information complexity, which is particularly inconvenient as it coincides with the one with less exploitable information. This is a somewhat paradoxical result since a naïve argument would suggest that agents are attracted by information rich markets. It actually turns out that this simple argument is incorrect and the observed behavior is due to the fact that agents are constrained to trade in one of the two markets. Rather than seeking the most profitable asset, agents simply escape the asset where their loss is largest. The conclusion is indeed reversed when traders may stay out of the market and have negative incentives to trade (that is, when they have an incentive not to trade). In this case, which corresponds to a grand-canonical multi-asset MG, the information-rich asset is chosen preferentially [63], though the phase structure becomes more complex than usual as new phases (with broken ergodicity and global predictability) arise. Note however that in this framework no correlations among the assets emerge, i.e. \(\langle A_+A_-\rangle = 0\). Indeed

\[
\langle A_+A_-\rangle = \sum_{i,j} \left\langle a_{i+}^{\mu_+}a_{j-}^{\mu_-} \frac{1+s_i}{2} \frac{1-s_j}{2} \right\rangle
\]

(159)

Now, the dynamical variables \(U_{i\gamma}(t)\) evolve on timescales much longer (of order \(P_\gamma\)) than those over which the \(\mu_\gamma\) evolve. Hence we can safely assume that the distribution of \(s_i\) is independent of \(\mu_\gamma\) and factorize the average \(\langle a_{i+}^{\mu_+}a_{j-}^{\mu_-}\rangle = \langle a_{i+}^{\mu_+}\rangle\langle a_{j-}^{\mu_-}\rangle\) over the independent information arrival processes \(\mu_\pm(t)\). Given that \(\langle a_{i+}^{\mu_+}\rangle \approx 0\) the conclusion \(\langle A_+A_-\rangle \approx 0\) follows immediately. The reason for this is that traders’ behavior is aimed
at detecting excess returns in the market with no consideration about the correlation among assets. This conclusion is against the empirical evidence, as in real financial markets correlation between stocks are overwhelmingly positive (if it wasn’t so, making money in a financial market would be much easier!). The microscopic origin of this phenomenon is a rather difficult issue, which will surely receive much attention in the near future.

Below we describe the dynamical solution of this model, as an example of the application of the path-integral formalism to this type of problems.

5.3.2. Dynamics (path-integral approach) The dynamical approach to the stationary macroscopic properties of Minority Games is based on the use of dynamical generating functionals à la Martin-Siggia-Rose [64] to turn the original multi-agent process into a single stochastic equation for the behavior of a single ‘effective agent’, similarly to what is done to study the dynamics of spin systems with quenched disorder after [65]. This procedure, which was first applied to Minority Games in [66], allows ultimately to derive closed equations for correlation functions, response functions, and all other relevant time-dependent macroscopic parameters. Typically, the resulting equations are too complicated to be solved at all times. However, with suitable Ansätze one may restrict the analysis to specific solvable regimes (in this case, we shall focus on ergodic steady states). Dynamical phase transitions can then be identified from the breakdown of the assumed behavior. The method is very general, it doesn’t rely on the existence of a Hamiltonian nor on the validity of detailed balance, but requires an analytical tour de force for solving the most general MGs. Luckily, some reasonable starting simplification help to make it less cumbersome. One is Markovianness, which in MGs corresponds to models with random external information. Another is changing the updating rule from the usual ‘on-line’ learning, in which agents modify their preferences at each time step, to a ‘batch’ learning, in which agents update their preferences only after they have seen all possible information patterns. Strictly speaking, the batch process is not equivalent to the on-line process but in many cases, including that which we consider here, the two are qualitatively identical. Both simplifications will be made in this section, where we expound the dynamical solution of the canonical multi-asset MG. The method is described in detail for other models and more general cases in [43].

So we consider two coupled GCMGs, interpreted as a system with two assets characterized by different sizes of information sets and, on the agents’ side, by different strategies and valuation functions. From (155), one sees that the preferences evolve according to

\[
y_i(t + 1) - y_i(t) = - \sum_{\gamma \in \{-1, 1\}} \gamma a_{\gamma i}(t) A_\gamma(t) / \sqrt{N}
\]

The ‘batch’ approximation is obtained by averaging the right-hand side over the \(\mu_e\)’s. This leads, after a time re-scaling (for simplicity, we denote the re-scaled time again by
\[ y_i(t+1) - y_i(t) = - \sum_{\gamma \in \{-1,1\}} n_\gamma \sum_{j=1}^{N} J_{ij}^\gamma \phi_j \gamma(t) \]  

where \( n_\gamma = 1/\alpha_\gamma \) and \( J_{ij}^\gamma = (1/N) \sum_{\mu} a_{\mu}^\gamma a_{\mu}^{\gamma*} \) are quenched random couplings of Hebbian type. We also introduced the variable

\[ \phi_{i\gamma}(t) = \gamma \delta_{s_i(t), \gamma} = \frac{1}{2} [\gamma + s_i(t)] \]

All moments like \( m_i(t) = \langle s_i(t) \rangle \) and \( c_{ij}(t,t') = \langle s_i(t)s_j(t') \rangle \) – the brackets standing for an average over all possible time evolutions of the system – and in turn macroscopic quantities like the magnetization \( m = \langle \sum_i m_i(t) / N \rangle \) or the autocorrelation function \( C(t,t') = \langle \sum_i c_{ii}(t,t') / N \rangle \) can be derived formally from the generating functional

\[ Z[\psi] = \langle e^{i \sum_t \psi(t) \cdot \mathbf{s}(t)} \rangle \]

by taking suitable derivatives with respect to the auxiliary generating fields \( \psi = \{ \psi_i \} \); for instance

\[ C(t,t') = - \frac{i}{N} \sum_i \lim_{\psi \to 0} \frac{\partial^2 \langle Z[\psi] \rangle}{\partial \psi_i(t) \partial \psi_i(t')} \]

The \( \langle \cdots \rangle \) average is performed by imposing that the \( s_i \) satisfy (161) at each time step:

\[ \langle Z[\psi] \rangle = \int p[\mathbf{y}(0)] e^{i \sum_t \psi(t) \cdot \mathbf{s}(t)} \left\langle \prod_t W[\mathbf{y}(t) \to \mathbf{y}(t+1)] \right\rangle d\mathbf{y}(t) \]

with transition matrix fixed by (161):

\[ W[\mathbf{y}(t) \to \mathbf{y}(t+1)] = \prod_i \delta \left[ y_i(t+1) - y_i(t) - h_i(t) + \sum_{\gamma \in \{-1,1\}} n_\gamma \sum_{j=1}^{N} J_{ij}^\gamma \phi_j \gamma(t) \right] \]

The fields \( h_i(t) \) will be used to generate response functions. At this point the following steps need to be taken:

a. Introduce the order parameters

\[ Q(t,t') = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_i(t)s_i(t') \]

\[ L(t,t') = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{y}_i(t)\hat{y}_i(t') \]

\[ K(t,t') = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_i(t)\hat{y}_i(t') \]

\[ a(t) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_i(t) \]

\[ k(t) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{y}_i(t) \]

\[ m = \langle \sum_i m_i(t) / N \rangle \]

\[ C(t,t') = \langle \sum_i c_{ii}(t,t') / N \rangle \]
in (165) via such identities as

\[ 1 = \int dQ(t, t') \delta \left[ NQ(t, t') - \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_i(t)s_i(t') \right]; \quad (168) \]

b. Use the integral representation for the \( \delta \)-distributions;
c. Average over the quenched disorder after isolating the relevant terms with the help of the variables

\[ x_{\gamma}^{\mu r}(t) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{P_\gamma}} \sum_i \phi_{\gamma i}(t) a_{\gamma r}^{\mu} \quad (169) \]

\[ w_{\gamma}^{\mu r}(t) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{P_\gamma}} \sum_i \hat{y}_i(t) a_{\gamma r}^{\mu} \quad (170) \]

These steps require standard manipulations at most. After a factorization over \( i \) and \( \mu \), one arrives at

\[ \langle Z[\psi] \rangle = \int D\Theta D\hat{\Theta} e^{N[\Psi(\Theta, \hat{\Theta}) + \Omega(\Theta) + \Phi(\Theta) - H(\Theta)]} \quad (171) \]

where \( \Theta(t, t') = \{ Q(t, t'), L(t, t'), K(t, t'), a(t), k(t) \} \) is the vector of order parameters, \( \hat{\Theta}(t, t') = \{ \hat{Q}(t, t'), \hat{L}(t, t'), \hat{K}(t, t'), \hat{a}(t), \hat{k}(t) \} \) is the conjugate vector of Lagrange multipliers, while the functions \( \Psi, \Phi \) and \( \Omega \) are given by

\[ \Psi = i \sum_t \left[ a(t)\hat{a}(t) + \ell(t)\hat{\ell}(t) + \right] \]

\[ + i \sum_{t, t'} \left[ Q(t, t')\hat{Q}(t, t') + L(t, t')\hat{L}(t, t') + K(t, t')\hat{K}(t, t') \right] \quad (172) \]

\[ \Omega = \frac{1}{N} \sum_i \log \int \prod_t \int d\hat{y}(t) dy(t) p[y(0)] \ e^{-\frac{1}{\Sigma_t} [\hat{a}(t) - a(t)] + \hat{\ell}(t) - \ell(t) - i} \sum_{t, t'} [Q(t, t') a(t, t') + \hat{L}(t, t') \hat{y}(t) + K(t, t') a(t, t')] \]

\[ \Phi = \sum_{\gamma} \left\{ - \alpha \gamma \log \left[ n_{\gamma} D_{\gamma} \right] \right\} \]

\[ + \alpha \gamma \log \int d\hat{w} e^{-\frac{\alpha}{2} \sum_{t, t'} L(t, t') a_{\gamma} (t) a_{\gamma} (t') - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{t, t'} \left[ A_{\gamma}^T (n_{\gamma} D_{\gamma})^{-1} A_{\gamma} \right] [t, t'] a_{\gamma} (t) a_{\gamma} (t')] \quad (173) \]

where

\[ D_{\gamma}(t, t') = \frac{1}{4} [1 + \gamma a(t) + \gamma a(t') + Q(t, t')] \quad (175) \]

\[ A_{\gamma}(t, t') = \delta_{t, t'} - \frac{in_{\gamma}}{2} [\gamma k(t') + K(t, t')] \quad (176) \]

In the limit \( N \to \infty \) the integral (171) is dominated by the saddle-point where the order parameters take the values

\[ C(t, t') = \langle s(t) s(t') \rangle, \quad L(t, t') = \langle \hat{y}(t) \hat{y}(t') \rangle, \]

\[ K(t, t') = \langle s(t) \hat{y}(t') \rangle, \quad a(t) = \langle s(t) \rangle, \]

\[ k(t) = \langle \hat{y}(t) \rangle, \quad \widetilde{C}(t, t') = i \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial C(t, t')} \quad (177) \]
\[ \tilde{L}(t, t') = i \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial L(t, t')} \quad \tilde{K}(t, t') = i \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial K(t, t')} \]
\[ \hat{a}(t) = i \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial a(t)} \quad \hat{k}(t) = i \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial k(t)} \]

where
\[ \langle \cdots \rangle_* = \frac{1}{N} \sum_i \frac{\int \cdots M(\{y(t)\}, \{\tilde{y}(t)\}) \prod_t dy(t) d\tilde{y}(t)}{\int M(\{y(t)\}, \{\tilde{y}(t)\}) \prod_t dy(t) d\tilde{y}(t)} \]

denotes an average performed with the measure
\[ M(\{y(t)\}, \{\tilde{y}(t)\}) = p[y(0)] e^{i \sum_r \tilde{y}(t)y(t+1) - y(t) - h_i(t)} - i \sum_t [\tilde{a}(t)s(t) + \tilde{y}(t)\tilde{y}(t)] \]
\[ \times e^{-i \sum_{r,r'} [\tilde{C}(t, t')s(t)s(t') + \tilde{L}(t, t')\tilde{y}(t)\tilde{y}(t') + \tilde{K}(t, t')s(t)\tilde{y}(t')] } \]

Now comparing the above averages with the derivatives of \( \langle Z \rangle \) with respect to \( \psi \) and \( h \) one easily sees that, in the limit \( N \to \infty \), \( Q(t, t') \) may be identified with the autocorrelation function \( C(t, t') \), \( a(t) \) turns out to coincide with the magnetization \( m(t) \), whereas \( K(t, t') \) may be related to the response function
\[ G(t, t') = \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_i \frac{\partial \langle \langle s_i(t) \rangle \rangle}{\partial h_i(t')} \]
through \( K(t, t') = i G(t, t') \). Working out the remaining equations, and in particular the expression of \( \Phi \), one finds in addition that
\[ L = k = \tilde{C} = \hat{a} = 0 \]
\[ \tilde{K}^T = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_{\gamma} A_{\gamma}^{-1} \quad \hat{k} = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_{\gamma} \gamma A_{\gamma}^{-1} \]
\[ \tilde{L} = -\frac{i}{2} \sum_{\gamma} \left[ A_{\gamma}^{-1} (n_{\gamma} D_{\gamma}) A_{\gamma}^{-1} \right] \]

Therefore \( M \) can be seen as describing the single-agent process with noise \( z(t) \) given by
\[ y(t + 1) - y(t) = -\sum_{\gamma, t'} \left[ 1 + \frac{n_{\gamma}}{2} G \right]^{-1} (t, t') \phi_{\gamma}(t') + z(t) \]
\[ \langle z(t)z(t') \rangle = \sum_{\gamma} \left[ \left( 1 + \frac{n_{\gamma}}{2} G \right)^{-1} (n_{\gamma} D_{\gamma}) \left( 1 + \frac{n_{\gamma}}{2} G \right)^{-1} \right] (t, t') \]
which is completely equivalent to the original multi-agent system in the limit \( N \to \infty \).

Let us now focus on the asymptotic properties of the stationary state, considering the simplest possibility. Making for the asymptotic behavior of \( C \) and \( G \) the assumptions of time-translation invariance,
\[ \lim_{t \to \infty} C(t + \tau, t) = C(\tau) \]
\[ \lim_{t \to \infty} G(t + \tau, t) = G(\tau) \]
finite susceptibility,
\[ \lim_{t \to \infty} \sum_{t' \leq t} G(t, t') < \infty \]
and weak long-term memory,

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} G(t, t') = 0 \quad \forall t' \text{ finite}$$

(187)

ergodic stationary states of the dynamics can be fully characterized in terms of a few parameters. These are, in particular, the persistent autocorrelation

$$c = \lim_{\tau \to \infty} \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t<\tau} C(t)$$

(188)

the magnetization

$$m = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \sum_{t'} m(t')$$

(189)

and the susceptibility (or integrated response)

$$\chi = \lim_{\tau \to \infty} \sum_{t \leq \tau} G(t)$$

(190)

In this regime, the quantities

$$\tilde{y} = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{y(t)}{t} \quad s = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \sum_{t'} s(t') \quad z = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \sum_{t'} z(t')$$

(191)

are easily seen to be related by

$$\tilde{y} = -\sum_{\gamma} \kappa_{\gamma} \frac{s + \gamma}{2} + z$$

(192)

where

$$\kappa_{\gamma} = \frac{2}{2 + n_{\gamma} \chi}$$

(193)

$$\langle z^2 \rangle = \sum_{\gamma} \frac{\alpha_{\gamma} (1 + 2 \gamma m + c)}{(2 \alpha_{\gamma} + \chi)^2}$$

(194)

We have the following scenarios:

(i) if $\tilde{y} > 0$, then $s = 1$ (the agent is frozen on asset 1): this occurs if $z > \kappa_+$

(ii) if $\tilde{y} < 0$, then $s = -1$ (the agent is frozen on asset $-1$): this occurs if $z < -\kappa_-$

(iii) if $\tilde{y} = 0$, then $s = s^* \equiv 2z - \sum_{\gamma} \frac{\kappa_{\gamma}}{\kappa_{\gamma}}$ (the agent is fickle): this occurs if $-\kappa_- < z < \kappa_+$

Separating the contributions of different cases we end up with the following equations for $m$, $c$ and $\chi$:

$$m = \left\langle \theta(z - \kappa_+) \right\rangle_z + \left\langle s^* \theta(z + \kappa_-) \theta(\kappa_+ - z) \right\rangle_z - \left\langle \theta(-\kappa_- - z) \right\rangle_z$$

$$c = \left\langle \theta(z - \kappa_+) \right\rangle_z + \left\langle (s^*)^2 \theta(z + \kappa_-) \theta(\kappa_+ - z) \right\rangle_z + \left\langle \theta(-\kappa_- - z) \right\rangle_z$$

(195)

$$\sum_{\gamma} \frac{\alpha_{\gamma} \chi}{2 \alpha_{\gamma} + \chi} = \left\langle \theta(z + \kappa_-) \theta(\kappa_+ - z) \right\rangle_z$$

where $\langle \cdots \rangle_z$ is an average over the static Gaussian noise $z$. The Gaussian integrals can be easily computed and these equations can be solved numerically for $c$, $m$ and $\chi$. Notice that $n_+ > n_-$ (or $\alpha_+ < \alpha_-)$ implies $\kappa_+ < \kappa_-$ so that the probability that an
agents ‘freezes’ on asset $\gamma$ is larger for $\gamma = +1$, i.e. for the asset with less information. This conclusion is immediately clear from the above equations. A little more work is required to see that $H$ is given (apart from factors $\alpha_\gamma$) by the persistent part of the noise variance (183):

$$H = \sum_\gamma \frac{\alpha_\gamma^2 (1 + 2\gamma m + c)}{(2\alpha_\gamma + \chi)^2}$$  \hspace{1cm} (196)

These expressions finally yield the analytical curves shown in Fig. 25.

5.4. The Majority Game

The simplest way to get a glimpse on the macroscopic properties of the Majority Game is to consider the simplified information-free context of Sec. 4.3, where the model is described by the rules

$$\text{Prob}\{b_i(t) = b\} = C \exp[b\Delta_i(t)]$$  \hspace{1cm} (197)
$$\Delta_i(t + 1) - \Delta_i(t) = \Gamma A(t)/N$$  \hspace{1cm} (198)

by which agents reward the action taken by the majority and increase the probability of choosing $b_i(t + 1) = \text{sign}[A(t)]$. An analysis similar to that outlined in the case of the Minority Game easily leads to the conclusion that the dynamics of $y_i(t) = \Delta_i(t) - \Delta_i(0)$ (which is $i$-independent) admits the solution $y_i(t) = y_0 + vt$ where $v = \pm \Gamma$. In this state, agents behave coherently ($b_i(t) = b$ for all $i$). Consequently, $\langle A \rangle$ is either $N$ or $-N$ and $\sigma^2 = O(N^2)$ independently of $\Gamma$.

The above conclusion that Majority Games generate huge fluctuations is rather intuitive. However the full Majority Game turns out to be a surprisingly rich model [67]. It is defined by the following setup:

$$g_i(t) = \text{arg max } U_{ig}(t)$$
$$A(t) = \sum_i a_{ig_i}(t)$$  \hspace{1cm} (199)

$$U_{ig}(t + 1) - U_{ig}(t) = a_{ig_i(t)}^\mu \left[A(t) - \eta \left(a_{ig_i(t)}^\mu - a_{ig_i}^\mu\right)\right]$$

where $\mu(t) \in \{1, \ldots, P\}$ stands for the information pattern presented to agents at time $t$ (taken to be external and random) and $\eta$ tunes the agents’ ability to learn to respond to the action of all other agents by disentangling their own contribution to the game’s outcome.

Using the notation introduced in Sec. 4.5, it is easy to see that

$$v_i \equiv \langle y_i(t + 1) - y_i(t) \rangle = \xi_i \Omega + \sum_j \xi_i \xi_j m_j - \eta \xi_i^2 m_i$$  \hspace{1cm} (200)

where $m_i = \langle \text{sign}(y_i) \rangle$. Hence the dynamics minimizes the function

$$H_\eta = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i,j} \xi_i \xi_j m_i m_j - \sum_i \xi_i \Omega m_i + \frac{\eta}{2} \sum_i \xi_i^2 m_i^2$$  \hspace{1cm} (201)
Adding the constant \(-\frac{\Omega^2}{2}\) to complete a square with the first two terms above, one sees that \(H_\eta\) is a downward concave function of the \(m_i\)'s, which implies that minima occur on the corners of the definition domain \([-1,1]^N\). Thus the solution with \(v_i = 0\) corresponding to fickle agents is ruled out in this case and the only remaining solutions are those with \(v_i \neq 0\) (and \(y_i(t)/t\) finite as \(t \to \infty\)), corresponding to frozen agents. For these,

\[
m_i = \text{sign}(v_i) = \text{sign}\left(\xi_i \Omega + \sum_j \xi_j m_j - \eta \xi_i^2 m_i\right)
\]

Notice that since the relevant steady states have \(m_i = \pm 1\) the last term in \(H_\eta\) plays the role of a mere constant. Hence impact factors do not alter the steady state properties of the Majority Game. (Also due to agents' freezing, the 'batch' and 'on-line' version yield the same stationary properties as fluctuations play no role in this case.) Furthermore, it is clear that any configuration \(\{m_i\}\) which is a solution of these equations for some value of \(\eta \in [0,1]\) will also be a solution for all \(\eta' < \eta\). Hence the set \(S_\eta\) of stationary states is such that \(S_\eta \subset S_{\eta'}\) for \(\eta' < \eta\) and, in particular, \(S_1 \subset S_\eta\) for all \(\eta < 1\). It is also easy to see that the state with minimal value of \(H_\eta\) lies in \(S_1\) for all \(\eta \in [0,1]\). This shows that Nash equilibria are stationary states of the majority game for all values of \(\eta\), but the converse is not true (except for \(\eta = 1\) of course).

It is possible to draw a complete picture of the model's behavior by studying the minima of \(H_\eta\) explicitly via the replica method. The calculation has been carried out in [67] under the assumption that the two strategies of the same agent can be to some degree correlated, which is allowed if one takes the disorder distribution

\[
P(a_1, a_2) = \frac{w}{2} (\delta_{a_1,1} \delta_{a_2,1} + \delta_{a_1,-1} \delta_{a_2,-1}) + \frac{1-w}{2} (\delta_{a_1,1} \delta_{a_2,-1} + \delta_{a_1,-1} \delta_{a_2,1})
\]

Notice that \(w = \text{Prob}\{a_1^\mu = a_2^\mu\}\). It turns out that, depending on the parameters, the system can be in one of two phases: a 'retrieval' phase characterised by attractors with a macroscopic overlap \(A^1 = O(N)\) with a given pattern (say, \(\mu = 1\)) and a spin glass phase with no retrieval \((A^\mu = O(\sqrt{N}))\). The occurrence of 'retrieval' may be thought of as the emergence of crowd effects such as fashions and trends, when a large fraction of agents behave similarly in some respect, or to economic concentration, when, for example, one particular place is arbitrarily selected for large scale investments. Interestingly, one finds that the development of these crowd effects requires: (i) that the number of agents is large compared to the number of resources (\(\alpha\) small), (ii) a sufficient differentiation between strategies of agents \((w < 2/3)\) and (iii) a large enough initial bias (i.e. an initial macroscopic overlap) towards a particular resource, fashion or place. Finally crowd effects can be sustained under more general conditions (i.e. in the spin glass phase) if agents do not behave strategically, i.e. if they neglect their impact on the aggregate (\(\eta\) small). This phenomenon can be attributed to the self-reinforcing term \((1 - \eta)\xi_i^2 s_i\) in the dynamics which causes a dramatic increase in the number of stationary states as \(\eta\) decreases (which can be seen quantitatively by analyzing the entropy).
5.5. Models with interacting trend-followers and contrarians

It is rather easy to understand that the two main groups of traders, that is fundamentalists and trend-followers, contribute opposite forces to the price dynamics. Fundamentalists believe that the market is close to a stationary state and buy (sell) when they repute the stock to be underpriced (overpriced), thus inducing anti-correlation in market returns and holding the price close to its ‘fundamental’ value. Trend-followers, instead, extrapolate trends from recent price increments and buy or sell assuming that the next increment will occur in the direction of the trend, thus creating positive return correlations and large price drifts (‘bubbles’). Chartist behavior, which can also be driven by imitation, is known to cause market instability. Fundamentalists act instead as a restoring force that dumps market inefficiencies and excess volatility. The next question we address concerns the macroscopic properties of models in which contrarians and trend-followers interact.

As usual, we start from the simple model with no information. Let us assume that a fraction \( f \) of agents are trend followers whereas the remaining \((1 - f)N\) are fundamentalists. The dynamics is governed by the following scheme:

\[
\text{Prob}\{b_i(t) = b\} = C \exp[b \Delta_i(t)]
\]

\[
\Delta_i(t + 1) - \Delta_i(t) = \epsilon_i \Gamma A(t)/N
\]

where \( \epsilon_i = 1 \) for trend-followers (say for \( i \in \{1, \ldots, fN\} \)) and \( \epsilon_i = -1 \) for fundamentalists (say \( i \in \{fN + 1, \ldots, N\} \)). Assuming that \( \Delta_i(0) = 0 \) for simplicity, we can approximate \( A(t)/N \) with its average and see that the dynamics of \( y(t) = \Delta_i(t) - \Delta_i(0) \equiv \Delta_i(t) \) is given by

\[
y(t + 1) - y(t) = (2f - 1) \Gamma \tanh[y(t)]
\]

Linear stability analysis of (206) leads to the following scenario. For \( f < 1/2 \) we have two regimes:

- for \( \Gamma < \frac{1}{2f-1} \) the fixed point \( y^* = 0 \) is stable. One has \( \langle A \rangle = 0 \) and \( \sigma^2 = O(N) \) as in the information-free Minority Game with subcritical \( \Gamma \)
- for \( \Gamma > \frac{1}{2f-1} \) the fixed point \( y^* = 0 \) is unstable. One has \( \langle A \rangle = 0 \) and \( \sigma^2 = O(N^2) \) as in the information-free Majority Game with supercritical \( \Gamma \)

For \( f > 1/2 \) instead the fixed point \( y^* = 0 \) is unstable and the solution \( y(t) = y_0 + vt \) with \( v = \pm(2f - 1)\Gamma \) appears. Here, both trend-followers and contrarians behave coherently: \( b_i(t) = b \) for all \( i \in \{1, \ldots, fN\} \) and \( b_i(t) = -b \) for all \( i \in \{fN + 1, \ldots, N\} \). As a result, \( \langle A \rangle \) is either \( (2f - 1)N \) or \( (2f - 1)N \) and \( \sigma^2 = O(N^2) \) as in the information-free Majority Game. The conclusion we draw is that the expectations of the majority group (be it fundamentalists or trend-followers) are fulfilled in the steady state. This is confirmed by studying the autocorrelation of returns as a function of \( f \) in the steady state, see Fig. 26.

This conclusion extends to the full model, whose properties have been analyzed in [68]. The mixed Majority-Minority Game is defined by

\[ g_i(t) = \text{arg max} U_{ig}(t) \]
Figure 26. (from Ref. [44]) Autocorrelation of returns as a function of the fraction \( f \) of fundamentalists in the market. Autocorrelation is taken in the stationary state of a system of \( N = 10^4 \) agents with \( \Gamma = 2.5 \). Arrows mark the transitions between the three regimes described in the text, which occur at \( f = 0.5 \) and at \( f = 0.9 \). The inset shows a detail of the central part of the graph.

\[
A(t) = \sum_i a_{i\mu}^{\mu(t)}
\]

\[
U_{1g}(t+1) - U_{1g}(t) = \epsilon_i a_{i\mu}^{\mu(t)} A(t)/N
\]

where as before \( \epsilon_i = 1 \) for trend-followers (or \( i \in \{1, \ldots, fN\} \)) and \( \epsilon_i = -1 \) for fundamentalists (or \( i \in \{fN+1, \ldots, N\} \)). The statistical mechanics of this model is slightly more involved than previous cases. As before, one finds that the steady state can be characterized in terms of the microscopic variables \( m_i = \langle \text{sign}(y_i) \rangle \) where \( y_i(t) = \frac{1}{2}[U_{11}(t) - U_{12}(t)] \). In particular, the stationary \( m_i \)'s for can be obtained by solving the following problem:

\[
\max_{m_2} \min_{m_1} H(m_1, m_2)
\]

where

\[
H(m_1, m_2) = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu} \left[ \Omega^\mu + \sum_i \xi_i^\mu m_i \right]^2
\]

and \( m_1 \) (resp. \( m_2 \)) denote collectively the \( m_i \) variables of Minority (resp. Majority) game players. Hence the mixed game where both minority and majority players are present at the same time requires a minimization of the predictability in certain directions (the minority ones) and a maximization in others (the majority ones). It is possible to tackle this type of problem by a replica theory [69]. The idea is to introduce two ‘inverse temperatures’ \( \beta_1 \) and \( \beta_2 \) for minority and majority players respectively, such that [68]

\[
\max_{m_2} \min_{m_1} H(m_1, m_2) = \lim_{\beta_1, \beta_2 \to \infty} \frac{1}{\beta_2} \langle \log Z(\beta_1, \beta_2) \rangle
\]
with the following generalized partition function:

\[ Z(\beta_1, \beta_2) = \int dm_2 e^{\beta_2 \left( -\frac{1}{\beta_1} \log \int dm_1 e^{-\beta_1 H} \right)} = \int dm_2 \left[ \int dm_1 e^{-\beta_1 H} \right]^{-\gamma} \]  

(211)

where \( \gamma = \beta_2 / \beta_1 > 0 \). In physical jargon, this describes a system where: first, the \( m_1 \) variables are thermalized at a positive temperature \( 1/\beta_1 \) with Hamiltonian \( H \) at fixed \( m_2 \); then, the \( m_2 \) variables are thermalized at a negative temperature \( -1/\beta_2 \) with an effective Hamiltonian \( H_{\text{eff}} \) defined by \( -\beta_1 H_{\text{eff}}(m_2) = \log \int dm_1 e^{-\beta_1 H} \). The disorder average can be carried out with the help of a ‘nested’ replica trick. First, one replicates the minority variables by treating the exponent \( -\gamma \) as a positive integer \( R \) (in the end, the limit \( R \to -\gamma < 0 \) must be taken). (211) thus becomes

\[ Z = \int dm_2 \left[ \int dm_1 e^{-\beta_1 H} \right]^R = \int dm_2 \left[ \int e^{-\beta_1 \sum_r H(\{m_r^a\},m_2)} \prod_{r=1,R} dm_r^a \right] \]  

(212)

Then a second replication is needed, this time on the \( m_2 \) variables:

\[ Z^R' = \int e^{-\beta_1 \sum_{a,r} H(\{m_a^r\},\{m_1^r\})} \prod_{a=1,R'} \prod_{r=1,R} dm_a^r dm_1^r \]  

(213)

At this point we have two replica indexes with different roles: the replicas labeled \( a \) have been introduced to deal with the disorder, and their number \( R' \) will eventually go to zero, as usual; the replicas labeled \( r \) have been introduced to deal with the negative temperature, and their number \( R \) must be set to a negative value. Majority variables bear just one index, while minority ones have two. We can interpret this fact by saying that \( m_2^a \) indicates a particular configuration of the majority variables, i.e. a given manifold in the whole \( m \) space; and \( m_1^ar \) indicates the minority coordinates in that particular manifold. Notice that the min and max operations and hence the meaning of coordinates in the above interpretation can be interchanged. In general, this leads to different solutions. In our case, however, one can verify that the main results would not change, though the intermediate steps (e.g. the definition of \( \gamma \)) would vary.

Following the procedure outlined above it is possible to calculate the phase diagram of the model (Fig. 27), namely the line of critical points \( \alpha_c(f) \) for different values of \( f \) separating the asymmetric, information-rich phase \( (\alpha > \alpha_c(f)) \) from the symmetric, unpredictable regime \( (\alpha < \alpha_c(f)) \). One sees that the efficient regime shrinks as the fraction of trend-followers increases until, for \( f = 1/2 \) it disappears. Now trend-followers are the majority group and the market becomes completely predictable. The dynamical calculation clarifies the phase transition further by relating the critical line to the onset of ergodicity breaking.

While this model captures one of the basic effects of the presence of trend-followers in the market, namely a decrease in efficiency, it is clear that the properties of mixed games are to some extent a linear combination of those of pure games and thus a gross simplification with respect to a realistic case. Now it is reasonable to think that real traders may revise their expectations if they prove wrong or simply may want to weigh their decisions against other factors than the expected profit. For instance, in
certain market regimes (e.g. bubbles) a trader could perceive the market as a Majority rather than Minority Game and consequently switch from a fundamentalist to a trend-following behavior. Similarly, in situations of high volatility traders would likely take into account the risk factor when choosing a trading strategy over another. How would the macroscopic properties of the Minority Game change if agents were allowed to modify their behavior and expectations according to the market conditions they perceive?

This issue may be tackled through the introduction of a more general MG setting with the rationale that traders prefer to adopt a trend-following attitude, and thus perceive the market as a Majority Game, when fluctuations are small while they revert to fundamentals, and hence perceive the market as a Minority Game, when the price dynamics becomes more chaotic [70, 71]. This mechanism leads to a surprisingly rich phenomenology which includes the formation and disruption of trends and the emergence of ‘heavy tails’ in the returns distribution. The model is defined through

$$ g_i(t) = \arg \max \ U_{ig}(t) $$
$$ A(t) = \sum_i a_{ig_i(t)}^\mu(t) $$
$$ U_{ig}(t + 1) - U_{ig}(t) = a_{ig_i(t)}^\mu(t) F_i[A(t)] $$

where the function $F_i$ embodies the way in which agent $i$ perceives the performance of his/her $g$-th trading strategy in the market. For simplicity we shall henceforth assume that $F_i = F$ for all $i$. Clearly, $F(A) = -A$ for a Minority Game whereas $F(A) = A$ for a Majority Game. The case we consider is

$$ F(A) = A - \epsilon A^3 $$

with $\epsilon \geq 0$. For $\epsilon = 0$ one has a pure Majority Game. Upon increasing $\epsilon$, the non-linear gains importance, and for $\epsilon \to \infty$ one obtains a Minority Game with $F(A) \propto -A^3$. A couple of remarks are in order.
(i) This mechanism is expected to induce a feed-back in the dynamics of the excess demand: when it is small, trend-followers dominate and drive it to larger values until fundamentalists eventually take over and drive it back to smaller values.

(ii) It is reasonable to think that $\epsilon$ should fluctuate in time and possibly be coupled to the system’s performance. A possible microscopic mechanism is the following. When $\epsilon$ is large a high volatility is to be expected as agents are more likely to behave as trend-followers. As a consequence, they should likely reduce their threshold since the market is risky; however, for small $\epsilon$ fundamentalists are expected to dominate and the game should acquire a Minority character. Hence the predictability will be smaller and there will be less profit opportunities. Agents may then decide to adopt a larger threshold to seek for convenient speculations on a wider scale. If these two competing effects are appropriately described by an evolution equation for $\epsilon$, the system should self-organize around an ‘optimal’ value of the parameter. However such a time evolution should take place on time-scales much longer than those which the model addresses (intra-day/daily trading) and hence it is reasonable to study the case of fixed $\epsilon$.

It turns out (see Fig. 28) that while for low enough (resp. high enough) $\epsilon$ the behavior of a pure Majority (resp. Minority) game is recovered (with some qualitative differences due to the unconventional nature of the MG in this case), there exists a range of values of $\epsilon$ for which the two tendencies coexist and one can cross over from one to the other by changing $\alpha$ and/or $\epsilon$. This can be seen from the behavior of the (normalized) autocorrelation $D = \langle A(t)A(t+1) \rangle / \sigma^2$ as a function of $\alpha$. The crossover gets sharper and sharper as $\alpha$ increases and turns into a sharp threshold for $\alpha \gg 1$. In this case, the threshold can be estimated analytically. Indeed one has

$$v_i \equiv \langle y_i(t+1) - y_i(t) \rangle = \xi^\mu_i \langle F(A)|\mu \rangle$$

(216)

As usual, if $v_i \neq 0$, then $y_i(t) \sim v_i t$ and $s_i(t)$ tends asymptotically to $\text{sign}(v_i)$: there is a well defined preference towards one of the two strategies and the agent becomes frozen.

**Figure 28.** Normalized return autocorrelation function $D$ as a function of $\alpha = P/N$ for different values of $\epsilon$ (left) and probability distributions $P(A)$ of $A > 0$ for different values of $\epsilon$ for $\alpha = 0.05$ (top right) and $\alpha = 2$ (bottom right). From [70].
For large $\alpha$, we can approximate $A(t)$ with a Gaussian random variable with variance $H$. By virtue of Wick’s theorem, this implies that $\langle A^3|\mu\rangle \simeq 3H \langle A|\mu\rangle$, so

$$v_i \simeq (1 - 3\epsilon H)\xi_i^\mu \langle A|\mu\rangle$$

(217)

If $1 - 3\epsilon H > 0$, the agents’ spins will freeze on the Majority-type solution $s_i = \text{sign}(\xi_i^\mu \langle A|\mu\rangle)$, which is unstable for $1 - 3\epsilon H \leq 0$. Given that $H = 1$ for large $\alpha$, we see that the crossover from the Majority- to the Minority-regime takes place at $\epsilon \simeq 1/3$ for $\alpha \gg 1$, which is significantly close to the numerical value of $\epsilon_c \simeq 0.37$.

For small $\alpha$, when the contribution of frozen agents is small, we expect the system to self-organize around a value of $A$ such that $F(A) = 0$: indeed one can see from Fig. 28 that the peak of the distribution moves as $1/\sqrt{\epsilon}$. Besides, as $\epsilon$ increases, large excess demands occur with a finite probability. The emergence of such ‘tails’ in $P(A)$, while not power-law, is a clear non-Gaussian signature. The dynamics in this regime is particularly interesting: while the market is mostly chaotic and dominated by contrarians, ‘ordered’ periods can arise where the excess demand is small and trends are formed, signaling that chartists have taken over the market. These trends, that can be arbitrarily long, eventually eventually die out restoring the fundamentalist regime.

In order to understand the full impact of trend-followers it is however necessary to employ endogenous information [71]. Indeed, one identifies two regimes in an intermittent market dynamics. Phases with small fluctuations, dominated by contrarians and in which the information dynamics is roughly ergodic over the possible patterns, are followed by phases with large fluctuations dominated by trend-followers, where the information dynamics is strongly non-ergodic (actually a single information pattern is dynamically selected).

5.6. Markets with asymmetric information

A crucial assumption in all models we have been dealing with so far is that all agents possess the same information, be it the real price time series or the bar attendance sequence or a random integer. As long as all agents process the same information pattern the system can reach some level of coordination and a more or less complicated phase structure arises. Unfortunately, it is hard to believe that all agents in real systems possess the same information. This brings us to the question: how are the coordination properties affected when the information is private, i.e. agent-dependent?

This question is indeed of fundamental theoretical importance. A substantial part of economic theory is based on the assumption that markets are informationally efficient. Roughly speaking, a market is efficient with respect to an information set if the public revelation of that information would not change the prices of the assets. In other words, this means that all the relevant information is incorporated into prices. This includes both public and private information. However, it has been understood [Akerlof] that asymmetric information may cause inefficiency of the equilibrium, given the strategic incentive of each agent not to reveal the information he has. The salvation comes from the system size: in fact this nefarious effect may vanish in large markets, since the
single bits of information possessed by an individual agent become less significant the larger is the number of agents. Hence, the common understanding is that prices reflect information more accurately in large systems.

To conclude our review, we shall now discuss a model in which the above scenario emerges as a phase transition between an informationally efficient phase and an informationally inefficient one [72]. The control parameter is, as in the MG, the ratio between the size of the information space and the number of traders.

We consider a market with one asset. The market can find itself in any of $P$ states of the world, labeled $\mu$. The return of the asset depends on the state of the world only, and is denoted by $R^\mu$. We assume that each $R^\mu$ is given by

$$R^\mu = \bar{R} + \frac{r^\mu}{\sqrt{N}}$$

(218)

where the $r^\mu$ are independent samples of a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance $s$ drawn at time $t = 0$ and fixed (quenched disorder). We further assume that at each time step the state of the market is drawn randomly and independently from $\{1, \ldots, P\}$ with equal probability. This process determines the time series of returns $\{R^\mu(t)\}_{t\geq 0}$ completely.

$N$ traders act in this market. They have no information concerning the state of the world but rather they observe a coarse-grained signal on the information space $\{1, \ldots, P\}$. We denote it as a vector

$$k_i : \{1, \ldots, P\} \ni \mu \rightarrow k_\mu^i \in \{-1, 1\}$$

(219)

in which every state of the market is associated to a particular value of a binary variable (in other words, an agent cannot tell which state the market is in but only knows whether it is an “up state” or a “down state”). Different agents receive different signals, as each component $k_\mu^i$ of every vector $k_i$ is taken to be drawn randomly and independently from $\{-1, 1\}$ with equal probability for all $i$ and $\mu$. This defines the private information structure. Note that if an agent knew simultaneously the partial information of all agents he would be able to know the state $\mu$, with probability one, for $N \rightarrow \infty$.

At each time step, traders $i$ has to decide an investment. Let $z_i(t)$ denote the amount of money he decides to invest (buying or selling) at time $t$. We assume that the price at time $t$, $p(t)$ is fixed by a market clearing condition, in which the demand of the asset is determined by the aggregate money invested and the supply is fixed at $N$:

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_i z_i(t) = p(t)$$

(220)

We further assume that $z_i(t)$ depends on whether his information $k_\mu^i(t)$ about the state is “up” or “down”: $z_i(t) = \sum_{m \in \{-1, 1\}} z_i^m(t) \delta_{k_\mu^i(t), m}$. In this way the price depends on the state since the amount invested by each agent depends on the state: $p(t) = p^\mu(t)$.

At the end of each period $t$, each unit of asset pays a monetary amount $R^{\mu(t)}$. If agent $i$ has invested $z_i(t)$ units of money, he will hold $z_i(t)/p(t)$ units of asset, so his
payoff will be \( z_i(t) \left( \frac{R^\mu(t)}{p(t)} - 1 \right) \). It follows that the expected payoff is given by

\[
\pi_i = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{\mu} \sum_{m \in \{-1, 1\}} \delta_{k^\mu_i, m} z^m_i \left( \frac{R^\mu}{p^\mu} - 1 \right) = \sum_{m \in \{-1, 1\}} \delta_{k_i, m} z^m_i \left( \frac{R}{p} - 1 \right)
\] (221)

Every agent aims at choosing the \( z^m_i \)'s so as to maximize their expected payoff. We consider inductive agents who repeatedly trade in the market. Each agent \( i \) has a propensity to invest \( U^m_i(t) \) for each of the signals \( m \in \{-1, 1\} \). His investment \( z^m_i = \chi_i(U^m_i) \) at time \( t \) is an increasing function of \( U^m_i(t) \) (\( \chi_i : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+ \) with \( \chi_i(x) \rightarrow 0 \) if \( x \rightarrow -\infty \) and \( \chi_i(x) \rightarrow \infty \) if \( x \rightarrow \infty \) (a convenient choice for numerical experiments is \( z^m_i = U^m_i \theta(U^m_i) \)). After each period agents update \( U^m_i(t) \) according to the marginal success of the investment:

\[
U^m_i(t+1) = U^m_i(t) + \Gamma \delta_{k^\mu_i(t), m} \left[ R(t) - p(t) - \eta z_i(t) \right]
\] (222)

The idea is that if the return is larger than the price, the agent’s propensity to invest in that signal increases, otherwise it decreases. The \( \eta \) term provides the distinction between na"ıve (or price-taking) agents (\( \eta = 0 \), who are unaware of their market impact, and “sophisticated” traders (\( \eta = 1 \)) who instead are able to disentangle their contribution to the price exactly. \( \Gamma > 0 \) is a parameter (In [72] the dynamics (222) is obtained from a more properly justified process involving the marginal utility of a certain investment.).

As a measure of coordination we employ the distance between prices and returns in the steady state:

\[
H = |R - p|^2 \equiv \sum_{\mu} (R^\mu - p^\mu)^2
\] (223)

Clearly, if \( H = 0 \) prices follow returns and hence incorporate the information about the states of the world, so that the market is informationally efficient.

Numerical results for the stationary \( H \) as a function of \( \alpha = P/N \) for \( \eta = 0 \) and \( \eta = 1 \) (and \( \Gamma \) small enough) are given in Fig. 29.

Let us start from na"ıve traders (\( \eta = 0 \)). As the number of agents increases, i.e. as \( \alpha = P/N \) decreases, agents are collectively more efficient in driving prices close to returns. Indeed the distance \( H \) decreases as \( \alpha \) decreases. The price-return distance vanishes at a critical point \( \alpha_c \) which turns out to mark a second order phase transition in the statistical mechanics approach. The value of \( \alpha_c \) depends on the intensity \( s \) of fluctuations of returns. The region \( \alpha < \alpha_c \) is characterized by the condition \( H = 0 \), which means \( p^\mu = R^\mu \) for all \( \mu \). This means that the market efficiently aggregates the information dispersed across agents into the price. It can be shown that the efficient phase, where \( H = 0 \), shrinks as \( s \) increases. This is reasonable because as the fluctuations in \( R^\mu \) increase, it becomes harder and harder for the agents to incorporate them into prices. This behavior can be understood analytically as usual by constructing the continuous-time limit of (222). It turns out that \( H \) is a Lyapunov function of the dynamics: price takers cooperate to make the market as informationally efficient as possible. From the agent’s point of view the steady states in the efficient phase
$u(0)$ is the initial bias in the score functions) and various $\eta > 0$ (right: $\eta = 0.05$ (circles), $\eta = 0.25$ (squares), $\eta = 0.5$ (diamonds) and $\eta = 0.75$ (triangles). From [73].

(\alpha < \alpha_c) are not unique and the state in which agents will end up depends on the initial conditions $\{U_i^m(t=0)\}$ (prices, of course, do not depend on the initial condition, because $p^\mu = R^\mu$ for all $\mu$). It can also be shown that these steady states in which $H$ is minimum correspond to competitive equilibria, namely configurations obtained when agents choose their investments $z^m_i$ a priori by solving

$$\max_{x \geq 0} x \delta_{k_i,m} \left( \frac{R}{p} - 1 \right)$$

for $m \in \{-1, 1\}$, namely by maximizing their expected profits.

Turning to sophisticated agents ($\eta = 1$), one sees that the phase transition disappears: the distance between prices and returns smoothly decreases as $\alpha$ decreases and it vanishes only in the limit $\alpha \to 0$. Moreover, the steady state is unique in both prices and investment for all $\alpha > 0$: the asymptotic behavior of learning dynamics does not depend on initial conditions. It can be shown that the steady state in this case is a Nash equilibrium, that is it corresponds to all agents choosing their investments by solving

$$\max_{x \geq 0} x \sum_{\mu} \delta_{k_i^\mu,m} \left( \frac{R^\omega}{p^\omega_i + x/N} - 1 \right)$$

for $m \in \{-1, 1\}$, where $p^\omega_i = p^\omega - \sum_{m \in \{-1, 1\}} \delta_{k_i^\mu,m} z^m_i/N$ is the contribution of all other agents to the price (in other words, each trader disentangles his contribution from the price and optimizes the response to all other traders).

These findings defy the intuition that Nash equilibria behave similarly to competitive equilibria when $N \to \infty$. Another striking proof of the difference between the two equilibrium concepts is given by the quantity

$$q = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{z_i^+ - z_i^-}{2} \right)^2$$

(226)
Figure 30. Behaviour of $q$ versus $\alpha$ for $\eta = 0$ (left; $u(0)$ is the initial bias in the score functions) and various $\eta > 0$ (right: $\eta = 0.05$ (circles), $\eta = 0.25$ (squares), $\eta = 0.5$ (diamonds) and $\eta = 0.75$ (triangles). From [73].

which measures how differently agents invest under the two signals, i.e. how much they use the information they possess (Fig. 30). Price takers exploit their signals much more than sophisticated traders, who invest very similar amounts of money in the two states they distinguish. Note that for $\eta = 0$ the steady state depends on initial conditions below $\alpha_c$. The efficient/inefficient transition may then be characterized also dynamically throug transition via path-integral methods [73].

There are several other aspects of the model that deserve attention, starting with the dependence of fluctuations on $\Gamma$. We refer the interested reader to [72,73] for a more detailed discussion.

6. Conclusions

Compared to reality, the models discussed in this review have a marked theoretical nature. The aim of these models is not that of providing quantitative predictions but rather to understand under what conditions the rich variety of behaviors, ranging from anomalous fluctuations to spontaneous coordination, may emerge in a simplified controllable setting. This is a complementary approach to that of empirical analysis, which has been dominating the scene of interdisciplinary ventures of statistical physicists into economics and finance. Indeed, a proper understanding of how interaction propagates from the micro to the macro scale, is crucial in many cases in order to infer what empirical analysis should focus on.

Here we have reviewed a number of models with $N$ heterogeneous interacting agents – be they firms, species, drivers or traders – who compete for the exploitations of a number $P$ of resources. The collective behavior of all these systems belongs to the same generic phenomenology, as discussed in Secion 2.1. A key parameter is the ratio ($\alpha = P/N$) between the number of resources and the number of agents, and the
central quantities of interest are the (in)efficiency $\sigma^2$, which is related to the amount of unexploited resources, and the unevenness $H$ with which resources are exploited.

The collective behavior depends strongly on whether agents account or not for their impact on the resources. This is somewhat surprising, as one would expect that in the limit $N \to \infty$, the contribution of each agent to the exploitation of each resource is vanishing. For the ease of exposition, we distinguish between the two extreme case of competitive equilibria (CE) and Nash equilibria (NE), where agents fully neglect or account exactly for their impact, respectively. The stationary state of the learning dynamics which converges to these equilibria, in Minority Game type models markedly differ in the following respects:

**Equilibrium condition** In CE resources are exploited, on average, as evenly as possible, i.e. $H$ is minimal. In NE fluctuations or wastes are as small as possible (i.e. $\sigma^2$ is minimal).

**Phase transition** A phase transition occurs in CE when the number of agents exceeds a critical one, i.e. when $\alpha < \alpha_c$. This separates an asymmetric ($H > 0$ for $\alpha > \alpha_c$) from a symmetric ($H = 0$ for $\alpha \leq \alpha_c$) phase. No phase transition takes place in NE (i.e. $H > 0$ for all $\alpha > 0$).

**Degeneracy** The stationary state is unique in CE for $\alpha > \alpha_c$ and it is degenerate on a continuous set for $\alpha \leq \alpha_c$. There is an exponential number of disjoint NE.

**Initial conditions** The stationary state does not depend on initial conditions for CE and $\alpha > \alpha_c$ and it depends continuously on initial conditions for $\alpha \leq \alpha_c$. The NE to which the system converges depends discontinuously on initial conditions.

**Fluctuations** Agents’ behavior is stochastic in CE (i.e. $\sigma^2 > H$) whereas it is deterministic ($\sigma^2 = H$) in NE. Put differently, in NE agents always play a single strategy, whereas in CE agents switch between different strategies.

**Number of choices** Giving more strategies to agents improves coordination in NE but it can make agents worse off in CE (typically when $\alpha$ is small).

**Convergence** Agents converge fast to CE whereas agents may fail to learn to coordinate on NE [74].

Not all these conclusions apply to the asset market model with private information of Sec. 5.6, though even there CE and NE differ substantially [72].

There still remain interesting theoretical challenges in this field. Some of these are:

- The MG is a prototype model of a systems where the collective fluctuations which agents produce feed back into their dynamics. Still, there are no analytical tools which allows us to characterize this feedback in precise terms in the symmetric phase of the MG, i.e. to compute the volatility $\sigma^2$ as a function of $\Gamma$.
- MG based models of financial markets show that anomalous fluctuations similar to the stylized facts observed in real markets arise close to the phase transition line. Still the critical properties at this phase transition have not yet been characterized. Detailed numerical studies of critical properties or analytic approaches based on
renormalization group techniques would be very important to shed light on this issue.

- The MG suggests that real markets operate close to a phase transition but it does not explicitly describe a mechanism of how markets would “self-organize” to such a state. Though some arguments have been put forward [57], these have not yet been formalized in a definite model.

- The extensions to cases where firms behave strategically, as in Cournot games [2], of the model of economic equilibria may prove interesting. The conjecture is that, even in the limit $N \to \infty$ if the number of commodities (or markets) also diverges, the NE may be markedly different from a CE.

As a concluding remark, we observe that socio-economic phenomena have features which are markedly different from those addressed in natural sciences. Above all, the economy and society change at a rate which is probably much faster than that at which we understand them. For example, many of the things which are traded nowadays in financial markets did not exist few decades ago, not to speak of internet communities. In addition, we face a situation in which the density and range of interactions are steadily increasing, thus making theoretical concepts based on effective non-interacting theories inadequate.

Definitely, socio-economic systems provide several interesting theoretical challenges. Our hope is that these effort will help refine our understanding of how individual behavior, interaction and randomness may conspire in shaping collective phenomena, which, broadly speaking, is the aim of statistical physics.

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