Vicious circle of Ethiopian politics: Prospects and challenges of current political reform
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Abstract: In Ethiopia, different political reforms have taken place. Following this, the country circled viciously into wars at many times. The Derg regime deposed Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. And the Derg was defeated by the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition party in 1991. Albeit the coalition party ruled Ethiopia for more than 27 years, it obliged to make political reform because of high protest from Oromo youths. However, there are debates among scholars regarding the success of current political reforms in Ethiopia. It needs the attention of scholars and political scientists to examine the vicious circle of Ethiopian political reforms. This study addresses the knowledge gaps concerning the prospects and challenges of current political reform in Ethiopia. The finding of this research reveals that the beginning of the political reforms was hopeful because of released political prisoners, returned an exiled political opponents, Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement, and empowerment of women. Later, the constitutional crisis, detentions of many people and opponents, violations of fundamental rights, and war between the central government and the Tigray Region challenged the reforms. It concluded that the Ethiopian political reform circled viciously and could not realize the intended goals because there is mass detention, killing, and eviction like previous governments. The researcher recommended that the detained people and opposition political parties

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PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT
In 2018, the Ethiopian People Revolution Democratic Front (EPRDF) elected Abiy Ahmed as party leader and prime minister of Ethiopia following the mass protest of Oromo youths, which has gotten mass supports internally and externally. However, there are debates among scholars regarding the success of the current political reform in Ethiopia. This research examines the success and failure of political reforms since 2018. Focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews were employed for different political parties to collect the primary data. Secondary data include books, articles, reports, and minutes used to enrich the data. The findings of this research show that the Ethiopian political reforms circled viciously similar to previous regimes—a violation of fundamental rights, the war between Tigray Region and central government, Addis Ababa administrative dispute, and death and detention of many people continued.
need to be released and come to the table discussion and debate to realize the reform and ensure democratization.

Subjects: Introductory Politics; Political Research Methods; Political Behavior and Participation; Government

Keywords: Challenge; Ethiopia; politics; prospect; vicious circle

1. Introduction
In Ethiopia, different political reforms have taken place many times. In the historical continuum of the making and remaking of modern Ethiopia, the second half of the nineteenth century was shaped by the wars of incorporation and state formation on unequal terms (Gudina, 2007). Emperor Tewodros began modernization in politics by unifying the fragmented polities in Ethiopia (Atnafu, 2017, p. 45). Confronted by local and regional kings, his support collapsed as he became more authoritarian. Then, Kassa Mircha crowned himself as Emperor Yohannes IV in 1872. Yohannes IV decentralized power to monarchs and subordinates who recognized his claims to overall the regional chiefs. But he was killed by the Mahdist of Sudan at the Metemma battle in 1889. Following his death in 1889, Menelik II came into power. He pursued a policy of expansion to win new territories in the south, southeast, and southwest. The organized Abyssinian army, equipped with modern firearms, met resistance from local and regional Oromo chiefs, Kaffa, Sidama, and Wolaita. The military of the Abyssinian State defeated and surrendered those peoples. A conquest was similar to that of the European colonizers elsewhere on the African continent (Tronvoll, 2000, p. 14).

After 14 years of dual administration, Haile Selassie-I became Emperor in 1930 (Minority at Risk, 2004). The feudal system continued during his reign. The local peasantry in the south, southeast, and southwest was subjected to serfdom and tied to its land by an elaborate mechanism of taxes and services. Local elites were either suppressed or co-opted into the existing feudal Amharan hierarchy (Veen, 2016). Between 1935 and 1941, Italian Fascist Mussolini conquered Ethiopia, but Haile Selassie was exiled (Minority at Risk, 2004). Ethiopia was joined in a federation with Eritrea by the United Nations in 1952. However, Haile Selassie repealed the confederations and attempted to unify Ethiopia and Eritrea under his control within the next 10 years (Minority at Risk, 2004).

In 1974, Derg military regime deposed Emperor Haile Selassie (Minority at Risk, 2004). The Derg officially adopted Marxist socialism as its ideology in 1975 and created the Popular Democratic Republic of Ethiopia with a due constitution in 1984 (Abbink, 2009, p. 8). But the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overthrew the Derg regime and captured Addis Ababa in 1991 (Minority at Risk, 2004). EPRDF is composed of Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO), and Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement (SEPDM) (Temin & Badwaza, 2019). The transition began with a military victory in Ethiopia, not a negotiated peace settlement (Lyons, 2019). The EPRDF was committed to achieving state and power decentralization, political democratization, and economic liberalization (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003, p. 28). In 1995, the EPRDF adopted a federal constitution that divides Ethiopia into nine regional states (Temin & Badwaza, 2019, p. 140). Generally, the twentieth century featured class and national struggles intended to end the asymmetrical relations that arose in the historical process of the multi-ethnic polity creation in Ethiopia (Gudina, 2007).

Despite political reforms in Ethiopia in 1991, the political process is rigid and close to space for representative democracy (Abbink, 2009). The capacity of political opposition remains limited though reforms were made to liberalize Ethiopia’s economy, decentralize its state, and democratize its politics to reverse a history of centralized autocracy (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003, p. 1). The first historical factor that influences the evolution of Ethiopia’s political settlement is the centralization, control, and coercion (Veen, 2016, p. 13). As a result, Ethiopia’s domestic politics have
produced violence and continuing tension over the years. The political tensions and deeps inex-
perience of democratization and state-building processes remain unresolved in the Ethiopian
political reforms (Smith, 2007). Following the 2005 national election, the Ethiopian government
began to control opposition political parties by declaring a state of emergency for 10 months (Lie &
Mesfin, 2018). Generally, both Derg and EPRDF leaders devote their time and energy to elevate
deceptive democracy through manipulation at best and the use of state terror at worst (Merera,
1994).

Barely months after Ethiopia's 2015 elections, which saw the ruling EPRDF party sweep the
board in all federal and regional political institutions, anti-government protests erupted in the
Oromia Region opposing the Addis Ababa Master Plan (Temin & Badwaza, 2019; Van Der, 2018).
Also, protesters opposed the pliant and corrupt OPDO, which they accused of selling off Oromo’s
resources in general and land in specific. But OPDO bluntly denied any such allegations at the time
(International Crisis Group, 2020). Gradually, protests also exposed the internal EPRDF divisions
into two of its constituent parties—ANDM and OPDO—publicly siding with the protestors’
demands. Albeit people who publicly asked questions about land sales were detained and
tortured, the chair of EPRDF and Prime Minister (PM) of Ethiopia, Haile Mariam Dessalegn, resigned
in February 2018. Following this, EPRDF elected Abiy Ahmed as a PM on 2 April 2018 (Van Der,
2018).

Abiy took his overarching vision of national reconciliation and forgiveness to the public. He
acknowledged the government’s acts of torture and other human rights abuses publicly. He also
conducted town hall meetings, discussed with community leaders and local politicians. Further, he
released thousands of political prisoners and lifted the draconian state of emergency.
Furthermore, he announced plans to amend the constitution to institute term limits on the tenure
of the PM, invited exiled opposition politicians to return home and participate in politics, and
moved to lift the terrorist designation of opposition political parties (Badwaza, 2018; Temin &
Badwaza, 2019). Similarly, Abiy has made peace with Ethiopia’s old enemy, Eritrea, overhauled the
cabinet and other top posts, and committed to economic liberalization and democratic elections
(Temin & Badwaza, 2019).

However, amid the exciting changes, insecurity proliferates, the number of internally displaced
people mounts, and the economy struggles (International Crisis Group, 2020). Though the border
between Ethiopia and Eritrea reopened and families long split by the international conflict could
reunite in September 2018, it has been closed again (Temin & Badwaza, 2019, p. 140). Protests
have erupted in Oromia Region following the assassination of Oromo singer Hachalu Hundessa on
29 June 2020, which led to the detention of thousands of people (The African Report, 2020).
Although Abiy has come to power through EPRDF internal reform, he began to intimidate the TPLF
leaders. He tried to eliminate strong political oppositions such as Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and
Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) like the previous government. The current political reform in
Ethiopia circled viciously as similar to “coup d’état against emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, and the
defeat of Derg regime in 1991” (Tronvoll, 2009). This research explored the success and failure of the
vicious circle of Ethiopian politics since 2018.

2. Theoretical framework
Political scientists used different theories to study political reforms. Strategic choice theory, pro-
spect theory, political party theory, and input–output theory are accustomed among political
scientists. The strategic choice theory provides a systematic framework for analyzing the give-
and-take of practical politics. Compared with other research traditions, it places distinctive empha-
sis on opportunities for choice and change. The strategic choice analysis is not, however, a radical
departure. It converges with other traditions occasionally (Collier & Norden, 1991). The continued
success of strategic choice lies in the indigenous development in confronting concerns specific to
international politics (Stein, 1999).
Prospect theory is the most influential behavioral theory of choice in the social sciences (Mercer, 2005). Political science can indeed gain from applying prospect theory (Vis, 2011). It suggests that the individual attitude towards risk depends on whether they face losses or gains. It extends to collective decision-making and allows for the application of political decision-making. The hypothesis derived from prospect theory is that by influencing the risk of attitude, and thereby the willingness to pursue risky reform, gains and losses drive the government behavior in welfare state reform. If the challenges are not resolved in the current political reforms, the widely heralded success could rapidly turn into a monumental fiasco and jeopardize the stability of an entire region (Vis, 2009). Prospect theory is an alternative theory of choice under conditions of risk that deviates from expected utility theory by positing that people evaluate the choice concerning gains and losses from a reference point (Levy, 2003). Its first characteristic is reference dependence, meaning that people make decisions not based on the outcome but relative to a reference point, usually the status quo (Vis & Kuijpers, 2018). Generally, prospect theory emerged as a theory of individual decision-making (Vis, 2011).

Theory of political parties in which interest groups and activists are the key actors and coalitions of groups develop common agendas and screen candidates for party nominations based on loyalty to their policy. This theoretical stance contrasts with currently dominant theories, which view parties as controlled by election-minded politicians. The difference is normatively useful because parties dominated by interest groups and activists are less responsive to voter preferences, even to the point of taking advantage of lapses in voter attention to politics (Bawn et al., 2012). In this theory, group interests have a crucial impact on party behavior in politics (McCarty & Schickler, 2018).

On the other hand, the input–output model emphasizes the system behavior regarding incoming demands and supports and the effects of these inputs as political outputs. It copies up dynamically with a challenging environment (Crozier, 2011). It also indicates the quantity and scope of the political community, regime, and government support and demand, which is supported by the wise decision of the authoritative (Easton, 1957). The input–output model has become indispensable for rational policy formulation when inputs, outputs, enter community’s objective function directly and the economy in question is open (Baumol & Wolff, 1994).

For this research, the researcher used the input–output model because it shows the continuous interactions between the environment and political systems. It unifies politics theory and a general theory capable of analyzing all the issues (Mokaddem, 2019). The input–output model encompasses a dynamic political system, an extra societal and intra societal environment, response of the political system to society, and feedback by linking obtained information and reality. The hegemonic aspirations of the EPRDF are confirmed and reinforced by the legacy of an inherited authoritarian political culture (Gudina, 2011). The political reforms of Abiy did not bring the intended societal expectation. The questions of Oromo youths, for instance, concerning Addis Ababa administration ownership and unemployment problems are not addressed by the new PM. However, the PM has come up with his ideology, Medemer, which means coming together. This trend caused the vicious circle of Ethiopian politics that the previous regime did for many years but failed in the end.

3. Methodology of the study
This research employed a qualitative approach. Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions are used to gather data from representatives of political parties. Prosperity Party (PP), Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF), National Movement of Amhara (NAMA), and Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA) parties are participated to elicit their views and enrich the research. The parties are selected purposively because of their active and dominant roles in the current Ethiopian political reform. The interview and focus group discussions were held through Webinar meetings due to the pandemic COVID-19. The interviews were held with six participants (one participant from each party). For focus group discussion, 12 participants (two participants from each party) were selected purposively. Hence, an equal chance of representation was given for all selected parties during the
interview and focus group discussion. Secondary data include books, articles, magazines, reports, and archives that are applied to triangulate with primary data. David Easton's input–output analysis model was used to explain the demand people need from the government and how they support the government, and how the decision of government influences the mob of community. Finally, the collected data were analyzed by the content and thematic data analysis.

4. Findings and discussions

4.1. Prospects of the current political reforms

As soon as Abiy Ahmed was elected as PM of Ethiopia by EPRDF, he made different political reforms. Following this, all people supported him irrespective of political differences.

4.1.1 Restructure of ministers and empowerment of women

Before Abiy came into power, the number of appointee women at the ministry level was minimal. Hence, there was a disproportional relationship between the number of ministers and empowered women. In contrast, Abiy restructured the ministers and empowered women. “PM Abiy has downsized the number of ministers from 28 to 20 and equalized the gender composition to 50% women and 50% men. He gave key positions such as minister of peace and defense to women ministers” (Addis Standard, 2018; Temin & Badwaza, 2019). That trend was made for the first time in Ethiopian history, in which women share 50% of ministers. Ethiopia was ranked 2nd in Africa next to Rwanda in terms of empowering women into ministerial offices. Similarly, Birutukan Mideksa was appointed to lead the national election authority, and Meaza Ashenafi has become president of the Federal Supreme Court (Temin & Badwaza, 2019).

All opponent political parties also appreciated the political reform of Abiy and supported the change initially. However, the representative of OFC argued the trend does not solve the fundamental problems of the country. The PM could not answer the core questions of the youths.

4.1.2 Establishment of Peace ministry

In Ethiopian history, the Ministry of Peace has not been established so far. Nonetheless, the country faced different challenges—civil wars, ethnic tension and conflict, religious conflict, identity conflict, and historical conflict. Interview results with NAMA representative showed that Amhara is the heart of Ethiopia. Further, they preached that the 1995 Constitution never represents the Amhara people. Thus, they urged for constitutional change and vowed for unitary state structure—one language, one identity, one nation, and one religion. Interview results with OLF and OFC, on the other hand, revealed the Oromo are marginalized politically and economically for many years. But they contributed to the development of Ethiopia. They also argued that the Oromo nearly constitutes half the population of the country. As a result, Afaan Oromoo should become the additional working languages of the country. This habit is realized through the practical use of federal structure. The Ethiopian nations and nationalities include TPLF vows for real federalism except for Amhara opponent political parties. To solve differences among ethnic groups of the country, Abiy has established the Peace ministry for the first time, but it is dysfunctional.

By the same token, administrative border conflicts have become common in the country recently. There are border conflicts between regional states of the country. All zones of Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region face the same challenges. These situations have caused the displacement of many peoples in the country. For instance, more than two million Oromos were evicted from Somalia Regional State due to administrative border conflict between Oromia and Somalia regions in 2018. The PP representative suggested that the PM has established the ministry of Peace to resettle all displaced people in the country.

Additionally, there are religious tensions and conflicts in Ethiopia. Specifically, religious tensions and conflicts rose between Christians and Muslims. The conflict’s history went back to the medieval
period in Ethiopia. The two religions conflicted on the expansion directions. Christian Religion expanded to the southern, whereas Islam Religion expanded to the northern. Foreigners sponsored both religions on their expansion. When the Portuguese supported Christians, the Ottoman Turkey supported Muslims. During medieval times, many mosques and churches were destroyed on both sides. Orthodox Christianity has been used as a state religion for many years in the country. Nevertheless, the Derg regime abolished it in 1974. Still, there is a sense of such superiority among Christians that frustrates the Muslims. Interview results with all opponent political parties revealed that the government also uses religion as machinery though the Constitution declares secularism—no state religion. To solve the difference between the two religions and lasting peace, the ministry of Peace has gotten due attention from Abiy under his new ministerial restructure. Focus group discussants explained the Reconciliation Commission was established to realize the peace in Ethiopia, but they are dysfunctional.

Generally, the ministry of Peace oversees the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), Information Network Security Agency (INSA), Federal Police Commission, Finance Security and Information Center, National Disaster Risk Management Commission, the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs, Ethiopian Foreign Relations Strategic Studies Institute, and the Main Department for Immigration and Nationality Affairs. Ministry of Peace will also assume the roles and responsibilities of former Federal and Pastoralist Development Affairs (“Proclamation No. 1097/2018,” 2018).

### 4.1.3 Release of political prisoners

Different political parties are established in Ethiopia to fight against the corrupt Neftegna and dictator regimes. Accordingly, EPL, OLF, and TPLF were established in 1958, 1973, and 1975, respectively (Gudina, 2007). “In 1991, all political parties entered into Addis Ababa following the victory they achieved over the Derg regime,” OFC, OLF, and TPLF representatives explained. After the fall of the Derg regime, EPLF questioned for independent Eritrea and realized it in 1993. But there was a tactical relationship between OLF and TPLF. TPLF forced OLF to exile by disrupting its forces. Interview results with OLF and OFC showed that TPLF formed OPDO to control the Oromo. Then Oromos have been jailed under EPRDF alleged to OLF. Also, EPRDF defamed Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) as a secessionist of the Somalia Region. Focus group discussants posited Arbagnoch Ginbot-7 left the country and began to fight against the ruling party in 2005. The reason behind this was following the disagreement on the result of the national election. Then, Oromo, Amhara, and Somali are jailed alleging to OLF, Ginbot-7, and ONLF correspondingly. Other nations and nationalities of the countries were imprisoned by EPRDF leaders when they raised the core questions.

Focus group discussants remarked,

Following an attempt to implement Addis Ababa’s new master plan in 2014, the Oromo people began to protest the ruling government, EPRDF. As the protest has become intensified, the government declared a draconian state of emergency and detained many people. Leaders and members of opponent political parties were jailed. Merera Gudina, the OFC leader, was jailed alleging violating the state of the emergency rule as being seen and contacted by the groups of terrorists. The groups of political parties the government declared as terrorists are OLF, ONLF, Arbagnoch Ginbot-7. Andergachew Tsige, the secretary of the Ginbot-7 was caught in Yemen and put into jail. Many protesters, journalists, bloggers, artists, singers, activists, and civil fighters were detained.

As Abiy replaced Haile Mariam Dessalegn, he released many political prisoners that include journalists. The government announced that Maeklawi, the big prison site found in Addis Ababa, was closed and turned into a museum. But this did not last many years because Abiy’s government jailed many opponent politicians in Maeklawi as EPRDF agreed upon (Badwaza, 2018; Temin & Badwaza, 2019). Numerically, Abiy released 60,000 political leaders (Temin & Badwaza, 2019).
The government allowed the return of opposition politicians from exile. The government allowed the registration of their political parties in the country. The repeal of repressive laws such as the Charities and Societies Proclamation and Anti-terrorism Proclamation that had been used by past governments since 2009 to paralyze local media, civil society, and opposition political parties were revisited (Amnesty International, 2020). Human Rights Watch (2020b) asserts the government released thousands of political prisoners from detention, admitted that security forces relied on torture, committed to legal reforms of repressive laws, and introduced numerous other reforms. But, there has been a significant breakdown in law and order in parts of Ethiopia amidst escalating ethnic tensions that have resulted in several numbers of internally displaced persons.

4.1.4 The rapport of Eritrea and Ethiopia

The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea seems like a puzzle game. Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia by the negotiation made by the UN in 1952 (Minority at Risk, 2004). The federation of Eritrea also continued during the Derg regime, but forcefully. Interview results with PP representative showed that Eritrea had gotten independence, and Isaias Afwerki had become president in 1993. However, Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bloody war over border disputes, Badime, between the mid-1998 and 2000.

Focus group discussants presented,

Although Eritrea had begun the war, it was concluded by the victory of Ethiopia. Indeed, the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea was seen as a period of “No Peace No War” for the last two decades because the late PM of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, refused to accept the Algiers Agreement later on. The Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission sponsored by the UN favored Badime for Eritrea on the Algiers Agreement in 2000. During the Ethiopia-Eritrean war, many people had displaced and forced to return to their home state in both countries. The governments of both sides confiscated the resources of those people.

Following elected as PM, Abiy delivered a reconciliation speech on the first speech he made for the parliament. He accelerated nascent EPRDF efforts to make peace with Eritrea by accepting the Algiers Agreement of 2000. Eritrea’s reclusive and long-ruling authoritarian president, Isaias Afwerki, traveled to Ethiopia in July 2018 after 20 years (Temin & Badwaza, 2019). People of the two countries crossed the border and met their former families and relatives who had left during the Ethiopia-Eritrea war. The world applauds Abiy and Isaias for the restoration of peace between the two countries. In September, the border reopened, and families long split by the international conflict could reunite, but the border has been closed again (Temin & Badwaza, 2019). The Embassies of Ethiopia and Eritrea were reopened publicly. Besides, air flights between Addis Ababa and Asmara began to work publicly. The former ports of Ethiopia, Asseb and Mitsawa, are forecasted to give services to Ethiopia.

4.1.5 Economic reforms

The other measure Abiy has taken is economic reform. But it has not been fully implemented yet. The representative of PP explained that “Abiy decided to privatize megal projects which were in the hand of the government. Before Abiy, the Ethiopian government had monopoly power on tele-communication, electricity, and airways. Thus, he works to expand the base of privatization”. The government amended privatization proclamations, policies, and different respective laws to realize it. Homegrown economic reform was designed to attract 6 USD billion in new soft loans and 4 USD billion in debt reduction from multilateral and bilateral institutions to combat the country’s financial constraints. Interview results with EZEMA representatives showed that Ethiopian people get more advantage if the megaprojects are in the hands of the government. They also argued that the more privatization of the economy, the more economic gaps between poor and rich.

The economic reforms attracted international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank initially. Interview results with opponent political parties indicated that the appreciation
Ethiopia received from World Bank and IMF did not last due to Abiy's authoritarian. The war between the central government and Tigray region, violation of human and democratic rights, detention of many civilians and opponent political parties leaders and members, use of the military against civilians, the assassination of many civilians, and narrow political space which are witnessed under Abiy administration are key challenges to homegrown economic policy. Consequently, the IMF canceled the 500 USD million it decided to give to the Ethiopian government. Although the Ethiopian government amended privatization policies, regulations, and proclamations, no company has been privatized yet.

4.2. Challenges of the current political reforms
The initial coming of Abiy into power was hopeful, and the majority of the people supported him. As a result, Abiy has awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace prize and other national and regional awards. The success of Abiy lasted only for 1 year because he turned into an authoritarian gradually. Following this, he faced challenges, especially from Tigray and Oromo people.

4.2.1 Unsolved grievance of Oromo people and youths
The root cause of the protest during 2016 was an attempt to implement the new Addis Ababa Master Plan. Gradually, the Oromos raised questions of justice, equality, identity, language, and development. The Oromo people are the largest politically oppressed ethnic group in Ethiopia. As a distinct group, they have historically had little influence and representation within the Ethiopian/Abyssinian State in proportion to their size and the vast area of Oromia (Tronvoll, 2000). They were dominated and subjugated by the Neftegna System—a system where gun holders manipulated the mob of the community and confiscated their property. Addis Ababa City expanded by the expenses of surrounding communities. Following this, all Oromo people opposed the new master plan of Addis Ababa, which aimed to extend Addis Ababa City 100kms in all directions. Furthermore, Addis Ababa City constructed some condominium houses in Oromo administration lands—Koye Fache, Bole Bulbula, Bole Arabsa, Goro, Tulu Dimtu, Lebu, Akaki sites are notable.

OLF and OFC focus group discussants remarked,

After Abiy had come into power, Oromo believed that Addis Ababa demarcated from Oromia Regional State administration. And the master plan was presumed to be canceled. The PM established the ad-hoc committee in 2019 to investigate the case and report to him. The established pseudo committee was to appease people who protested the transfer of the condominium houses that Addis Ababa City built in the Oromia Region to the owners. Indeed, Abiy neither created an administrative border between the two nor stopped the illegal expansion of Addis Ababa City into the Oromia Region, practically. This area has remained unresolved issues yet.

In the same vein, the Oromo struggled to make Afaan Oromoo an additional federal working language next to Amharic. Even though Abiy promised to implement it when he came into power, he could not make Afaan Oromoo the Federal working language. Instead, he proposed a language policy that might implement within 15 coming years to appease people. Accordingly, the PM proposed Afaan Oromoo, Somali, Afar, and Tigrigna languages as working languages of the PP. That means those languages are languages of the party, not the additional working languages of the country. Hence, the Oromo people continued to oppose Abiy as they lost confidence in him.

Another unanswered question is the unemployment of youths. Ethiopia is a country where unemployed people are high. Abiy has come to power because of Oromo youths protest—Qeerroo (who played lion share for the change) and then Fano. “Abiy promised to create a wide job opportunity for youths, but his speech and promise remained on the paper,” opponent political party representatives stated. This scene is another challenge for Abiy
Ahmed because the economy has declined and could not create job opportunities for youths. The PM focused on extending his power by deepening and inculcating the PP and Medemer ideology but failed.

4.2.2 Addis Ababa administrative ownership dispute

Constitutionally, Addis Ababa is dual administration of the federal state and Oromia Regional State. The FDRE Constitution declares that Addis Ababa shall be the capital city of the Federal State. Article 49(5) of the Constitution states,

The special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as a joint administrative matter arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia, shall be respected.

Here, the joint administration means Addis Ababa shall be the dual administration of the Federal government and Oromia Regional State. The Oromia Regional State Constitution No.1/1995 article 6 specifies that Finfinnee shall be the capital city of Oromia Regional States. Where is Finfinnee? Finfinnee is the original name of Addis Ababa and we can use it interchangeably. Both the FDRE Constitution and 1995 Oromia Regional State Constitution explain that Addis Ababa is the dual administration of the Federal and Oromia Regional State. Though the Finfinnee is the capital city of the Oromia Region constitutionally, the Oromia Region government does not use it as equal as the federal government. There is no specific agreement between the Federal government and Oromia Regional State on dual administration yet.

As Abiy Ahmed came into power, there was a cold war between Oromo and Amhara elites on the administration ownership of Addis Ababa. Interview results with NAMA and EZEMA representatives indicated that Addis Ababa’s administration ownership should be only for the Federal government. They argued Oromo has no special interest in Addis Ababa, which in contrast to FDRE Constitution article 49(5). They also defended that Addis Ababa belongs to the Amhara people historically. This argument is a blind and weak argument that has no legal and historical grounds. However, the OFC, OLF, PP, and TPLF representatives argued against that Addis Ababa is the capital city of both the Federal government and the Oromia Regional State. Also, it is the headquarters of the African Union (AU). The special interest that Oromos have from Addis Ababa has to be respected and practiced as it has been already stated in the Constitution. Oromo claimed that there must be specific and clear laws related to the dual administration of Addis Ababa, the use of resources, and the exercise of languages.

Since Afaan Oromoo is the working language of Oromia Regional State and Addis Ababa is the capital city of Oromia too, it has to be used equally with Amharic (the Federal working language) and enjoy equal status. Indeed, the immediate cause for the reform and come of Abiy into power was the Addis Ababa master plan in which Oromo youths protested the expansion of Addis Ababa into Oromo land illegally. Interview results with OFC, OLF, and PP representatives showed that before Addis Ababa was established, the Oromo clans such as Gulalle, Eekka, Galan, Gumbichu, and Abbichuu lived there. But the expansion of Addis Ababa cleansed those clans by expanding into their lands, which was responsible for the immigration of those clans into different areas. Consequently, Oromo claimed the abovementioned rights and equity administrative structures of Oromia Regional State in Addis Ababa equally with the Federal government.

Generally, different ethnic groups live in Addis Ababa. Nevertheless, only Amhara elites oppose the question of Oromo people on administration ownership of Addis Ababa purposively. Similar to the previous regime, the Abiy government also did not answer those questions, especially on administrative border demarcation between Addis Ababa and the Oromia Regional State that remains an elusive argument and the quest of the Oromo people yet.
4.2.3 The imposition of new political ideology

Abiy imposed “Medemer Ideology” on the people. Nonetheless, he came into power by the protests made by Oromo youths for several years. The PM tried to impose the unilateral view of Medemer, which means come together. The majority of focus group discussants stated that Abiy speaks many times as the power is given to him by supernatural law—divine power. And his mother had told him as he would be King Seven of Ethiopia during his childhood. Interview result with TPLF representative exhibited PM Abiy disintegrated the EPRDF and created the PP to distance the ruling party from ethnic politics. But the former EPRDF coalition partner, the TPLF, refused to join the new party (US Department of State, 2019).

The TPLF representative explained,

The PM presumed himself as the cause of all things, and no one is above him. He never listens to others. By this process, it is difficult to rule a country. He undermined the previous achievements and assumed himself as a father of all things. The secret behind Medemer is to demis the federal system and restore the unitary state, which violates the right to self-administration of nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia. Thus, the TPLF and other federalists did not accept the ideas. Attempting to impose Medemer ideology on the people is impossible. The end of such a unilateral Medemer view will be destructive.

Indeed, the PM is much ambitious leader. Rather than answering the questions of people who were the root cause of the protest. The PM tried to impose his ideology without considering the diverse opinions of Ethiopian peoples. The interview results with OFC, OLF, and TPLF representatives exhibited Medemer ideology was imposed on the Ethiopian people without considering the existing practical situations and conducting hot discussion and debate among government officials and members. Hence, TPLF, the founder of EPRDF, did not support the ideas of Medemer. The TPLF also opposed the demise of the EPRDF and the formation of the PP from the beginning. Later on, individuals who did not accept the Medemer views and support PP were fired from their positions. Lemma Megersa, who presumed the right hands of Abiy and the father of reform, was sacked from the central committee of the party and Ministry of National Defense. Similarly, Milkessa Midega and Teyiba Hassein were sacked from the Oromia division central committee of PP. From the beginning of the PP establishment, those people were not members of the party.

The OFC and OLF representatives stated,

The Medemer is a utopia. Imposing utopia on Ethiopian people is impossible because the people, especially, the Oromo have gotten aware of it. Demising the EPRDF and replacing it with a PP is to appease the people. But the people know to curtail behind the party from the beginning. Thus the people opposed it. The name PP replaced EPRDF. But the people and members are still the same. Now, the country is at crossroads. Unless different political parties are involved and forward solutions, the fate of this country is in danger. Abiy, a fresh politician, has taken this country in the wrong. No one builds the country and realizes the transition alone.

On the other hand, the representative of the PP defended that Medemer is the real implementation of federalism. He further explained that federalism has not been practiced for the last 27 years. Also, regional states have never elected their presidents. Thus, Medemer and the PP are introduced to realize federalism. But interview results with opponent political parties’ representatives indicated that there is no difference between EPRDF and PP practically. As EPRDF, the presidents of regional states are assigned centrally by the PM except for the Tigray Region. “To control the Tigray Region, the PM has opened the war on TPLF alleging to military hostilities, that cause the death and migration of many civilians,” opponent political parties’ focus group discussants complained. The presidents of regional states who refused to accept the Medemer ideology would be expelled from power automatically. Abiy also preaches about the restoration of former Great Ethiopia.
However, interview results with OLF and OFC representatives questioned that when did Ethiopia Great? And which Ethiopia was?

Medemer reforms are central to building a variant democracy, boost economic development, and enhance regional integration (Mokaddem, 2019). However, the findings of this research showed the Medemer ideology was seen as a threat to democracy. It was imposed on the Ethiopian people by the PM without identifying the interest of the community.

4.2.4 Postponed of national election and constitutional crisis
The Ethiopian government decided to postpone the scheduled elections for an unlimited time because of the COVID-19. But this extension comes with a unique problem, what the authorities are now calling a constitutional crisis (Berhe, 2020). From the beginning, Ethiopia's government plans to hold national elections in August, which is the rainy season in the country. Now, with the polls postponed indefinitely alleging to COVID-19, Ethiopia faced a constitutional crisis (The Berhe, 2020; The Economist, 2020).

By law, Ethiopia's parliament will reach the end of its constitutional five-year term on 5 October 2020. That could leave the country without a legitimate parliament or government. According to the PM, his government will stay in charge until the election is held safely (The Economist, 2020). The ruling party presented four possible scenarios to circumvent the constitutional crisis: dissolving the parliaments, declaring a state of emergency, amending the constitution, and seeking a constitutional interpretation. Then, the Parliament endorsed this on 5 May 2020, and they have asked the House of Federation to issue an interpretation within a month (Ibid) without arriving at a political consensus with opponent political parties. Following this, the Speaker of the House of Federation resigned by opposing the illegal act of the government. The speaker is also a member of TPLF. Finally, interpretation is the option adopted by the government (Ethiopia Observer, 2020) by neglecting the options of the opposition political parties.

The opponents argued that the government asked the Council of Constitutional Inquiry, which is not an independent constitutional court, merely an advisory body to the upper house of parliament, and controlled by the ruling party, for an opinion on the postponement (The Economist, 2020). FDRE Constitution article 84(1) declares that the Council of Constitutional Inquiry shall have powers to investigate constitutional disputes. Based on the Constitution, opponents opposed the governmental option, and they came up with one counterargument. They argued interpretation is applicable only where there is conflict or contradiction between clauses of the Constitution or lack of clarity in the answer it gives to a specific question. At any rate, it is not used to extend the determined time that the Constitution allots to an elected government (Ethiopia Observer, 2020). As a result, most opposition parties with significant constituencies have rejected the decision (Berhe, 2020; Ethiopia Observer, 2020). The ruling party was partial to constitutional interpretation since all the House of People Representatives and the House of Federation are members of the ruling party. Interview results with opponent political parties’ representatives disclosed that the members of both houses worked to extend their tenures by themselves that caused a constitutional crisis. Mbondenyi and Ojienda (2013) present consistent culture of compliance will be critical to the future of constitutional government in Nigeria. Similarly, the finding of this research indicated that consistent culture of biased decision and favor to the ruling party is the most critical to the democratization process in Ethiopia.

4.2.5 The tension then war between central government and Tigray region
The TPLF ruled Ethiopia under the umbrella of the EPRDF coalition for the last 27 years. ODPO, ANDM, and SEPDP were the pseudo parties and messengers of TPLF. Abiy also admitted that his party (OPDO) was a messenger and servant of TPLF. “The PM declared war with the help of Eritrea troops on the TPLF alleging to warring North military camp,” Interview results with OFC and OLF representatives. They also remarked curtail behind the war was to demise TPLF and control the
Tigray Region. But the interview result of PP, NAMA, and EZEMA disclosed that the Federal government declared the war for military operation purposes to prevail rule of laws. To get curtail behind the war, the researcher argued that the independent international institutions need to interfere and investigate it.

Focus group discussants explained,

Four coalition parties of EPRDF discussed, debated, and arrived at a consensus after 14 days of hot discussion. Four people were set for election—Abiy Ahmed from ODP, Demek Mekele Mekonin from ADP, Sheferew Shugute from SEPDM, and Debretsiion Gebremickael from TPLF. During the vote, Demek resigned, and finally, Abiy Ahmed was elected as PM by party, not by the people.

Nonetheless, Abiy began to take measures against members of TPLF—expelling, jailing, sanctioning, and suing representatives of TPLF immediately. “The former METEC general director General Kinfe Dagnewew was jailed alleging corruption. The other 60 members of TPLF and officials were jailed within a day because of the same reasons,” TPLF focus group discussants complained. They also claimed the former INSA director Getachew Assefa wanted for jail. Yet, Abiy kept silent when Amhara youths closed the main road that connects Addis Ababa and Mekele for 2 years. The PM continues to sanction TPLF to separate from the Tigray people. The PP interviewee encountered the TPLF representatives by stating that “The TPLF officials who escaped from Abiy’s jail returned to Mekele, the capital city of Tigray, and reorganized the people against Abiy’s administration”. Initially, the Tigray people supported Abiy as he made a speech in the Tigirigna language at Mekele. Gradually, the relationship between Abiy’s administration and TPLF turned to the cold war, later the real warring. PM produced different fake documentaries against the TPLF by using public media—EBC, FBC, and Walta media. TPLF also did the same thing.

Scapegoating COVID-19, Abiy decided to postpone the 2020 national elections, which caused a constitutional crisis in the country. The TPLF claimed that the pseudo, biased and unconcerned constitutional inquiry committee led by federal Supreme Court President, Meaza Ashenafi, was established to interpret the constitution, not for Ethiopians. Indeed, politicians like Jawar Mohammed, Lidatu Ayalew, Bekele Gerba, Merera Gudina, and most opposition political parties opposed the constitutional interpretation to elongate the PM power. But the PM declared a state of emergency by controlling the pandemic and began to jail different political oppositions. These trends, which viciously circled the Ethiopian political reforms, have been practiced in Ethiopian politics for many years. The established committee extended the election for an undefined date. Finally, the tenure of the House of People and House of Federation was elongated as well.

Contrarily, TPLF vowed to defend the Constitution under the umbrella of the Federalist Group. Indeed, the Constitution does not give any room for postponing the election under any circumstance. Following this, TPLF conducted an election at the regional level. To fulfill the legal procedure, the Tigray Region requested the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE); yet, NEBE rejected conducting the election is prohibited until the COVID-19 is re-evaluated and a guarantee for election is assured. TPLF representative focus group discussants explained,

The federal government, ordered by Abiy, warned the Tigray Region not to conduct elections many times. In return, the TPLF defended that Abiy has become a dictator and had no power to interfere in the Regional State. The PM sent a group of religious and elderly leaders to arbitrate the case; nevertheless, the TPLF refused and complained that the problem was a national problem and needed national reconciliation.

The FDRE Constitution article 39(1) declares nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia have the right to self-determination up to secession. Contrarily, the central government banned all media of the Tigray Region. Tigray TV, Dimgtis Woyane TV, and FM radio of Tigray were banned without legal procedure. The members of TPLF who work in Addis Ababa were jailed. But within a few days, the
Tigray Region re-opened the media. TPLF has amended the regional electoral law—reframed from the first past the post to proportional representation to allow and include opponent political parties. They also established a regional electoral commission. Finally, TPLF won the election; but the Baytona party entered the state council with one seat. However, TPLF decided to give 15% of seats to parties that did not win the election peacefully.

Generally, the relationship between the central government and Tigray Regional State is paradoxical. Abiy tried to weaken the Tigray Region and TPLF in different ways. He mobilized conflicts between Tigray Region and neighbor states such as Amhara Region and Afar Region, closed the roads between Eritrea and Tigray, banned the regional media, sanctioned economically, and warned and kidnapped foreigners not to go to Tigray, especially the journalists. But the Tigray Regional State smashed the record of PP by conducting a regional election on 9 September 2020 that remained a cold war between the central government and Tigray Region. Finally, the war has opened between the central government and TPLF caused the death, eviction, and migration of many people in the Tigray Region.

4.2.6 Detention of many civilians, leaders, and members of opposition parties

One time, Abiy delivered that the political space widened, and no one was jailed without sufficient evidence. But his words are not supported by actions. The opponent political party representatives argued the regime detained different political parties and many citizens due to having different opinions. Members of the NAMA party challenged Abiy as soon as he came to power. Thus Abiy detained many members of the NAMA party following the assassination of Amhara Regional State leaders and army leaders in June 2019.

US Department of State (2019) remarks,

Following the assassination of Amhara Regional State leaders at Bahir Dar and national army leaders at Addis Ababa, authorities detained persons arbitrarily. The detainees include around 300 activists, journalists, and opposition party members. There were hundreds of reports of arbitrary arrest by security forces. Police called detainees for nightly interrogations where they were forced to stand for long periods. Prison and pretrial detention center conditions remained harsh and life-threatening. There is also unlawful interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence.

The OLF interviewee claimed that many members of the party were detained many times without any charges. Abdi Regassao and Colonel Gemechu Ayana, prominent of OLF, were put into custody for several months without any accusation. The government works hard to disregard OLF from the heart of the Oromo people via different propaganda. Hitherto it could not succeed. Many offices of OLF were attacked and closed. Also, the government made a political conspiracy against OLF because of having many supporters.

The PM jailed many members of the OFC party following the joining of Jawar Mohammed to the party. Jawar, Merera (chairman of OFC), Bekele, and other members moved into different areas such as North Shewa, Arsi, and Bale zones and campaigned. Surprisingly, millions of communities welcomed and discussed with them about future directions. That act annoyed Abiy Ahmed because he never thought that people prefer other political parties to his party. The government officials banned the leaders of OFC when they planned to move to the Jimma Zone. The Jimma is the birthplace of Abiy. Abiy mobilized the people to understand their feeling and got support. Still, only some people and only his cabinets rallied to support him. Meanwhile incident had happened to his supporters in Ambo. A bomb attack during the rally wounded about 30 people. The act irritated him and turned to jail many supporters of OFC in different areas. The police detained many people by the scapegoat of COVID-19. Interview results with OLF and OFC party representatives revealed that some of their members were killed by armies; then the bodies were eaten by
Oromo federal law position repeatedly groups homes Abiy’s began). Abiy’s violation and OLF and OFC focus group discussants claimed all prisons are full. The schools, warehouses, and individuals’ houses have become the center of detention in Ethiopia. This situation dangers the democratization process in the country. Generally, mass detention, torture, intimidation, eviction, and killing of civilians continued as similar to the previous government that viciously circled the Ethiopian political reforms.

4.2.7 Violation of fundamental rights
Abiy promised to protect fundamental rights when he came to power. Meanwhile, his regime began to violate the human and democratic rights of citizens. Abiy admitted the violation of human rights under EPRDF, but it took only one year when his government has become a violator of fundamental rights. Opponent political parties’ focus group discussants argued that Abiy’s government has turned to a dictator government although they expect him to transition the country to a democratic state. “He crowned as Nigus or King Seven by himself though EPRDF coalition party elected him,” opponent political party representatives claimed.

Ethiopian security forces committed horrendous human rights violations including burning homes to the ground, extrajudicial executions, torture, rape, forced evictions, arbitrary arrests, and detentions, sometimes of entire families, in Oromia. The regional police units and local administration militia complicated inter-communal violence between the Amhara and Qimant ethnic communities in West and Central Gondar, the Amhara region (Amnesty International, 2020). Amnesty International also found that members of the Ethiopian Defense Forces, regional police Special Forces, local administration officials, and allied militia armed youths. The vigilante groups carried out serious human rights violations in Guji and West Guji zones in Oromia Regional State and the West Gondar and Central Gondar zones of Amhara Regional State.

Over the past decade, Human Rights Watch has documented the Ethiopian governments repeatedly use broad and ill-conceived laws, including a now-amended 2009 anti-terrorism proclamation and 2008 mass media law, to crackdown on free speech and peaceful dissent. The authorities have arbitrarily arrested, detained, and prosecuted scores of journalists, political opposition members, and activists under that law. The newly enacted hate speech and disinformation law similarly risk being used as a tool of repression (Human Rights Watch, 2020a). On 5 August, federal police similarly ignored a bail to release journalists Melesse (who is still in jail) and Yassin
(released later). On 11 August, Federal Police transferred Yassin to Addis Ababa police custody, where they accused him of the same allegations (Human Rights Watch, 2020b).

Generally, many youths are killed, jailed, and transported from one custody to another like commodity when courts ordered the right to bail. Judges were beaten and imprisoned by police and security forces. The soldiers and police raped many females. The houses of detainees were searched without a court order and burnt. Elders, children, artists, members of political opponents, and women were frustrated and beaten by security forces and police. This activity violates the right to privacy, accused persons, persons in custody, opinion expression, association, peaceful demonstration, and thought, which are explained in the FDRE Constitution.

4.2.8 Zero-sum game of Oromara relations
For more than a century, there were/are backlash narrations between Oromo and Amhara people. However, the two nations are not enemies. The population of the two shares more than 75% of the whole population of Ethiopia. PP interviewee alleged the TPLF as it has been working to clash the two nations to elongate their powers. The two shared many histories commonly. For instance, Bale and Gojjam's resistances against the feudal system, Emperor Haile Selassie, were the noticeable a dominant common history. Opponent political parties argued that for the last three decades, TPLF divided the two nations and elongated its power. However, Lemma Megersa, the former Oromia Regional State president and defense minister attempted to approach them by the name of the Oromara. Oromara was a name given to show the unity of Oromo and Amhara. Gedu Andargachew, the former president of the Amhara Region, and the foreign minister did the same thing. Oromo youths led by President Lemma went to Tana and remove the weed from the lake. The NAMA and EZEMA representatives focus group discussants stated Amhara youths (Fano) joined the Oromo youths (Qeerroo) protest at the end. Lastly, the unity of Oromara helped OPDO and ANDM to kick out TPLF from Addis Ababa and sent them to Mekele.

The opponent political parties commonly argued that aside from Lemma and Gedu, who worked to reunite Oromo and Amhara, most cadres of the two regions diverted the unity of Oromara to tactical relations. The speech of Shemalis Abdisa, president of the Oromia Region, annoyed the Amhara cadres because he said that the OPDO won TPLF either by convincing or confusing others. Both regions used Oromara as means of a zero-sum game. The opponent political parties further claimed that Amhara cadres work for instability of the Oromia region and vice versa secretly. Indeed, this draconian is witnessed during Amhara regional leaders' assassination and following the death of artist Hachalu Hundessa in Oromia.

In a nutshell, uniting people toward common interest and development plays a significant role in mutual understanding and boost development. But the Oromara relation is used for the political puzzle. This conspiracy provoked a cold war between Oromo and Amhara ethnics many times. Majority of opponent political parties' focus group discussants addressed,

Abiy by himself also uses Oromara as a means to elongate his power. Yet, he does not work for the people-to-people relations. To realize it, he removed both Lemma and Gedu from regions. The reality is that he cannot order and manipulate both of them if they were the presidents. To achieve his dream and control the two nations as he liked, he removed the two tactically and assigned pseudo presidents in both regions.

Generally, there is a tactical relation between Amhara and Oromo elites (Dibu & Ahadu, 2020). The findings of this research are consistent with Dibu and Ahadu because the zero-sum game between Oromara elites causes the deaths and evictions of many people.

5. Conclusion
Ethiopia witnessed different political reforms since the formation of modern Ethiopia in the nineteenth century. So far, many political reforms have taken place forcefully. Until Emperor Haile
Sellassie was overthrown in 1974 by Derg, feudalism was practiced in Ethiopia for many years. Further, Orthodox Christianity was used as a state religion. The Derg came into power in 1974 by the slogan “Ethiopia Tikdem or Ethiopia First” and imposed socialism to reduce economic inequality between the poor and rich. The Derg also answered the question of “Land for Tiller” by distributing lands to peasants. The Derg attempted to ensure economic equality, but it could not ensure political equality among different nations. Hence it was defeated by the EPRDF coalition force in 1991. The EPRDF demised socialism and adopted capitalism, albeit not last more. The EPRDF focused on nations’ equality. Federalism replaced the unitary. Nine regional states were formed based on the willingness, language, and settlement patterns of the people. EPRDF ruled the country for 27 years. But the Oromo youths began to protest the government in 2014. The immediate cause of the protest was the new Addis Ababa Master Plan. Also, violation of fundamental rights, detentions, tortures, deaths, economic inequalities, and corruption contributed to protest. In 2018, the PM, Haile Mariam Dessalegn, resigned. Following this, EPRDF elected Abiy Ahmed as leader of the party and PM.

The initial coming of Abiy was hopeful. He took different measures such as restructures of ministries and women empowerment, rapprochement of Ethio-Eritrea, the release of political prisoners, return of exiled opponents political parties, and economic reforms to wide political spaces. Gradually the reform could not realize the intended goals and returned to the previous old system because of different challenges. Those are constitutional crisis due to postponing of the election, detention of the mass people and members and leaders of opposition political parties without charges and some charged with terrorism like the previous government, violation of fundamental rights, the assassination of many people, displacement of many people due to internal conflicts, the imposition of new ideology (Medemen and prosperity party), tactical relations of Oromara, the war between Tigray region and the central government, and quarrel on administration ownership of Addis Ababa. The EPRDF coalition party transferred power to Abiy Ahmed peacefully. However, his tenure resulted in the war between the central government and Tigray Region. The interwar is usual before and after the political change in Ethiopia. It concluded that Ethiopian politics circled viciously into old paths, which practiced for many years to scramble power. It is also viciously circumnavigated into the war as a cause of political reforms or following political reforms. The current government is unable to ensure democratization and boost development through mutual consensus among different political parties. Finally, the researcher recommended that the government should release the detainees and host for table discussion and national consensus.

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