Fighting Fake News: Image Splice Detection via Learned Self-Consistency

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Abstract. Advances in photo editing and manipulation tools have made it significantly easier to create fake imagery. Learning to detect such manipulations, however, remains a challenging problem due to the lack of sufficient training data. In this paper, we propose a model that learns to detect visual manipulations from unlabeled data through self-supervision. Given a large collection of real photographs with automatically recorded EXIF metadata, we train a model to determine whether an image is self-consistent — that is, whether its content could have been produced by a single imaging pipeline. We apply this self-supervised learning method to the task of detecting and localizing image splices. Although the proposed model obtains state-of-the-art performance on several benchmarks, we see it as merely a step in the long quest for a truly general-purpose visual forensics tool.

Keywords: Visual forensics, image splicing, self-supervised learning, EXIF

1 Introduction

Malicious image manipulation, long the domain of dictators and spy agencies, has now become accessible to legions of common Internet trolls and Facebook con-men [2].

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Code and additional results can be found on our website.
Fig. 2: **Anatomy of a splice**: a fake image is created by splicing together content from two source images. The insight explored in this paper is that patches from spliced images are typically produced by different imaging pipelines, as indicated by the EXIF meta-data of the two source images. The problem is that in practice, we never have access to these source images.\(^1\)

With only rudimentary editing skills, it is now possible to create realistic image composites [3, 4], fill in large image regions [1, 5, 6], generate plausible video from speech [7, 8], etc. One might have hoped that these new methods for creating synthetic visual content would be met with commensurately powerful techniques for detecting fakes, but this has not been the case so far.

One problem is that standard supervised learning approaches, which have been very successful for many types of detection problems, are not well-suited for image forensics. This is because the space of manipulated images is so vast and diverse, that it is rather unlikely we will ever have enough manipulated training data for a supervised method to fully succeed. Indeed, detecting visual manipulation can be thought of as an anomaly detection problem — we want to flag anything that is “out of the ordinary,” even though we might not have a good model of what that might be. In other words, we would like a method that does not require any manipulated training data at all, but can work in an unsupervised/self-supervised regime.

In this work, we turn to a vast and previously underutilized source of data, image EXIF metadata. EXIF tags are camera specifications that are digitally engraved into an image file at the moment of capture and are ubiquitously available. Consider the photo shown in Figure 2. While at first glance it might seem authentic, we see on closer inspection that a car has been inserted into the scene. The content for this spliced region came from a different photo, shown on the right. Such a manipulation is called an **image splice**, and it is one of the most common ways of creating visual fakes. If we had access to the two source photographs, we would see from their EXIF metadata that there are a number of differences in the imaging pipelines: one photo was taken with an *Nikon* camera, the other with a *Kodak* camera; they were shot using different focal lengths, and saved with different JPEG quality settings, etc. Our insight is that one might be able to detect spliced images because they are composed of regions that were captured with different imaging pipelines. Of course, in forensics applications, we do not have access

\(^1\)Photo credits: NIMBLE dataset [9] and *Flickr* user James Stave.
to the original source images nor, in general, do we even have access to the fraudulent photo’s metadata. This poses a challenge when trying to design methods that use EXIF cues.

We propose a self-supervised method for identifying and localizing image splices by predicting the consistency of EXIF attributes between pairs of patches to determine whether they came from a single coherent image. We validate our approach using several benchmark datasets and show that the model performs better than the state-of-the-art — despite never seeing annotated splices or using handcrafted detection cues.

2 Related work

Over the years, researchers have proposed a variety of visual forensics methods for identifying various manipulations [2]. The earliest and most thoroughly studied approach is to use domain knowledge to isolate physical cues within an image. Drawing upon techniques from signal processing, previous methods focused on cues such as misaligned JPEG blocks [10], compression quantization artifacts [11], resampling artifacts [12], color filtering array discrepancies [13], and camera-hardware “fingerprints” [14]. We take particular inspiration from the recent work of Agarwal and Farid [15] which exploits a seemingly insignificant difference between imaging pipelines to detect spliced image regions — namely, the way that different cameras truncate numbers during JPEG quantization. While these domain-specific approaches have proven to be extremely useful due to their easy interpretability, we believe that the use of machine learning will open the door to discovering many more useful cues while also producing more adaptable algorithms.

Indeed, recent work has moved away from using a priori knowledge and toward applying end-to-end learning methods for solving specific forensics tasks using labeled training data. For example, Salloum et al. [16] propose learning to detect splices by training a fully convolutional network on labeled training data. Bondi et al. [17] train a model to identify a photo’s source camera model and apply their predictions to detecting manipulations [18]. There has also been work that estimates whether a photo’s semantic content (e.g., weather) matches its metadata [19]. Moreover, there have been a variety of learning methods for detecting physical cues, such as double-JPEG compression [20, 21] and contrast enhancement [22].

In our work, we seek to further reduce the amount of information we provide to the algorithm by having it learn to detect manipulations without ground-truth annotations. For this, we take inspiration from recent works in self-supervision [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28] which train models by solving tasks solely defined using unlabeled data. Of these, the most closely related approach is that of Doersch et al. [24], in which they trained a model to predict the relative position of pairs of patches within an image. Surprisingly, the authors found that their method learned to utilize very subtle artifacts like chromatic lens aberration as a shortcut for learning the task. While imaging noise was a nuisance in their work, it is a useful signal for us — our self-supervised algorithm is designed to learn about properties of the imaging pipeline while ignoring semantics. Our technical approach is also similar to [29], which trains a segmentation model using self-supervision to predict whether pairs of patches co-occur in space or time.
Individual image metadata tags, such as focal length, GPS, hashtags, etc. have long been employed in computer vision as free supervisory signal. A particularly creative use of EXIF metadata was demonstrated by Kuthirummal et al. [30], who used the CameraModel tag of a very large image collection to compute per-camera priors such as their non-linear response functions. In contrast, our approach uses almost the entire list of EXIF tags simultaneously.

Our work is also related to the anomaly detection problem. Unlike traditional visual anomaly detection work, which is largely concerned with detecting unusual semantic events like the presence of rare objects and actions [31, 32], our work needs to find anomalies in photos whose content is designed to be plausible enough to fool humans. Therefore the anomalous cues we search for should be imperceptible to humans and invariant to the semantics of the scene.

### 3 Learning Photographic Self-consistency

Our model works by predicting whether a pair of image patches are consistent with each other. Given two patches, $P_i$ and $P_j$, we estimate the probabilities $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n$ that they share the same value for each of $n$ metadata attributes. We then estimate the patches’ overall consistency, $c_{ij}$, by combining our $n$ observations of metadata consistency. At evaluation time, our model takes a potentially manipulated test image and measures the consistency between many different pairs of patches. A low consistency score indicates that the patches were likely produced by two distinct imaging systems, suggesting that they originate from different images. Although the consistency score for any single pair of patches will be noisy, aggregating many observations provides a reasonably stable estimate of overall image self-consistency.
3.1 Predicting EXIF Attribute Consistency

We use a Siamese network to predict the probability that a pair of $128 \times 128$ image patches shares the same value for each EXIF metadata attribute. We train this network with image patches randomly sampled from 400,000 Flickr photos, making predictions on all EXIF attributes that appear in more than 50,000 photos ($n = 80$, the full list of attributes can be found in Section A1). For a given EXIF attribute, we discard EXIF values that occur less than 100 times.

We observe that training with a typical random sampling procedure will not be successful because: 1) there are some rare EXIF values that will be very difficult to learn, and 2) randomly selected pairs of images are unlikely to have consistent EXIF values just by chance. Therefore, we introduce two types of re-balancing during training: unary and pairwise. For unary re-balancing, we oversample rare EXIF attribute values (e.g. rare camera models). When constructing a mini-batch, we first choose an EXIF attribute and uniformly sample an EXIF value from all possible values of this attribute. For pairwise re-balancing, we make sure that pairs of training images within a mini-batch are selected such that for a given EXIF attribute, half the batch share that value and half do not.

**Analysis** Although we train on all available EXIF attributes, we expect the model to excel at distinguishing ones that directly correlate to properties of the imaging pipeline such as `LensMake` [24, 17]. In contrast, arbitrary attributes like the exact date an image was taken (`DateTimeOriginal`) leave no informative cues in an image. In order to identify predictive metadata, we evaluated our EXIF-consistency model on a dataset of 50K held-out photos and report the individual EXIF attribute accuracy in Figure 4. Because the accuracy is computed on pairwise-balanced batches, chance performance is 50%.

Our model obtains high accuracy when predicting the consistency of attributes closely associated with the image formation process such as `LensMake`, which contains values such as `Apple` and `FUJIFILM`. But more surprisingly, we found that the most predictable attribute is `UserComment`. Upon further inspection, we found that `UserComment` is a generic field that can be populated with arbitrary data. We found that the most frequent values were either binary strings embedded by camera manufacturers or logs left by image processing software. For example, one of the common `UserComment` values, `Processed with VSCOcam`, is added by a popular photo-filtering application. In Section A1, we show the full list of EXIF attributes and their corresponding definitions.

3.2 Post-processing Consistency

Many image manipulations are performed with the intent of making the resulting image look plausible to the human eye: spliced regions are resized, edge artifacts are smoothed, and the resulting image is re-JPEGed. If our network could predict whether two patches are post-processed differently, then this would be compelling evidence for photographic inconsistency. To model post-processing consistency, we add three augmentation operations during training: re-JPEGing, Gaussian blur, and image resizing. Half of the time, we apply the same operations to both patches; the other half of the
time, we apply different operations. The parameters of each operation are randomly chosen from an evenly discretized set of numbers. We introduce three additional classification tasks (one per augmentation type) that are used to train the model to predict whether a pair of patches received the same parameterized augmentation. This increases our 80-way classification to 83-way. Since the order of the post-processing operations matters, we apply them in a random order each time.

3.3 Predicting Patch Consistency

Once we have predicted the consistency of a pair of patches for each of our EXIF (plus post-processing) attributes, we would like to estimate the pairs’ overall consistency $c_{i,j}$. If we were solving a supervised task, then a natural choice would be to use spliced regions as supervision to predict, from the $n$ EXIF-consistency predictions, the probability that the two patches belong to different regions. Unfortunately, we do not have spliced images to train on. Instead, we use a self-supervised proxy task. Given the 83 consistency predictions, we train a two-layer classifier to predict whether the two patches come from the same image or not. Because we only see natural images during training, we know for certain that image consistency is equivalent to photographic consistency.

3.4 Directly Predicting Image Consistency

One might ask whether a model can learn a measure of consistency by directly predicting whether two image patches come from the same image. The main problem is that
such a model, which is trained on arbitrary image pairs, will be tempted to focus on easy cues because they are sufficient to solve the vast majority of cases. For example, the network might simply learn to compare color histograms, which is a surprisingly powerful cue for same/different image classification task [33, 29]. Of course, given infinite training data and training time, we would expect this model to eventually learn the same cues as the metadata model. To study this further, we also train a Siamese network with the similar structure to the metadata model (Section 3.1) to solve this same-or-different image consistency task.

3.5 From Patch Consistency to Image Self-Consistency

So far we have introduced models that can measure some form of consistency between pairs of patches. In order to transform this into something usable for detecting splices, we need to aggregate these pairwise consistency probabilities into a global self-consistency score for the entire image.

Given an image, we sample approximately 500 patches in a grid, selecting a stride dependent on the size of the image, and construct an affinity matrix by computing consistencies between every pair of patches. That is, for a given patch, we can visualize a response map corresponding to its consistency with every other patch in the image. To increase the spatial resolution of each response map, we average the predictions of overlapping patches. If there is a splice, then the majority of patches from the untampered portion of the image will ideally have low consistency with patches from the tampered region (see Figure 6c).

To produce a single response map for an input image, we want to find the most consistent mode among all 500 patch response maps. We do this mode-seeking using Mean Shift [34]. The resulting response map naturally segments the image into consistent and inconsistent regions (see Figure 6d). We call the merged response map a consistency
Fig. 7: **Consistency map from different EXIF tags:** We compute consistency maps for each metadata attribute independently (response maps sorted by localization accuracy). The merged consistency map accurately localizes the spliced car.

map. We can also qualitatively visualize the tampered image region by clustering the affinity matrix, e.g. with Normalized Cuts [35].

To help understand how different EXIF attributes vary in their consistency predictions, we created response maps for each tag for an example image (Figure 7). While the individual tags provide a noisy consistency signal, the merged response map accurately localizes the spliced region.

4 Results

We evaluate our self-consistency model on two closely related tasks: splice detection and splice localization. In the former, our goal is to simply classify images as being spliced vs. authentic. In the latter, the goal is to localize the spliced regions within an image.

4.1 Benchmarks

We evaluate our method on five different datasets. This includes three existing datasets: the widely used Columbia dataset [36], which consists of 180 relatively simple splices, and two more challenging datasets, Carvalho et al. [37] (94 images) and Realistic Tampering [38] (220 images), which combine splicing with post-processing operations.

One potential shortcoming of these existing datasets is that they were created by a small number of artists and may not be representative of the variety of forgeries encountered online. To address this issue, we introduce a new In-the-Wild forensics dataset that consists of 201 images scraped from The Onion, a parody news website (i.e. fake news), and Reddit Photoshop Battles, an online community of users who create and share manipulated images. Since ground truth labels are not available for internet
Table 1: **Splice Detection:** We compare our splice detection accuracy on 3 different datasets. For each one, we measure the mean average precision (mAP) of detecting whether an image has been spliced. The numbers were computed on the validation set.

| Dataset          | Columbia [36] | Carvalho [37] | RT [38] |
|------------------|---------------|---------------|---------|
| CFA [39]         | 0.83          | 0.64          | 0.54    |
| DCT [40]         | 0.58          | 0.63          | 0.52    |
| NOI [41]         | 0.73          | 0.66          | 0.52    |
| Supervised FCN   | 0.57          | 0.56          | 0.56    |
| Camera Classification | 0.70          | 0.73          | 0.15    |
| Image-Consistency | 0.96          | 0.65          | 0.35    |
| EXIF-Consistency  | **0.98**      | **0.87**      | 0.55    |

Finally, we also want to evaluate our method on automatically-generated splices. For this, we used the scene completion data from Hays and Efros [1], which comes with inpainting results, masks, and source images for a total of 55 splices. We note that the ground-truth masks are only approximate, since the scene completion algorithm may alter a small region of pixels outside the mask in order to produce seamless splices.

### 4.2 Comparisons

We compared three baseline algorithms, all of which use classic image processing techniques to explicitly model and exploit imaging artifacts: Color Filter Array (CFA) [39] detects artifacts in color pattern interpolation; JPEG DCT [40] detects inconsistencies over JPEG coefficients; and Noise Variance (NOI) [41] detects anomalous noise patterns using wavelets. We used implementations of these algorithms provided by [42].

Since we also wanted to compare our unsupervised method with approaches that were trained on labeled data, we report results from a learning-based method: E-MFCN [16]. Given a dataset of spliced images and masks as training data, they use a supervised fully convolutional network (FCN) [43] to predict splice masks and boundaries in test images. As a supervised method, their model requires a large training set of splices. Since their model and data are not publicly available, we implemented a simplified version of their algorithm using a standard FCN that was trained with a training split of the Columbia, Carvalho, and Realistic Tampering datasets. We split every dataset in half to construct train/validation sets.

Finally, we present two simplified versions of our full EXIF-Consistency model. The first, Camera-Classification, was trained to directly predict which camera model produced a given image patch. We evaluate the output of the camera classification model by sampling image patches from a test image and assigning the most frequently predicted camera as the natural image and everything else as the spliced region. We consider an image to be untampered when every patch’s predicted camera model is the same.

The second model, Image-Consistency, is a network that directly predicts whether two patches are sampled from the same image (Section 3.4). An image is considered likely to have been tampered if its constituent patches are predicted to have come from
Table 2: **Splice Localization:** We evaluate our model on 5 datasets using a mean average precision-based metric (p-mAP). We also include MCC and F1 metrics, following [16]. For these two metrics, we obtain a binary mask by thresholding our consistency maps at 0.5.

| Model                  | Columbia [36] | Carvalho [37] | RT [38] | In-the-Wild | Hays [1] |
|------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------|-------------|----------|
|                        | MCC | F1  | p-mAP | MCC | F1  | p-mAP | p-mAP | p-mAP | p-mAP |
| CFA [39]               | 0.23 | 0.47 | 0.84 | 0.16 | 0.29 | 0.58 | 0.69 | 0.56 | 0.58 |
| DCT [40]               | 0.33 | 0.52 | 0.58 | 0.19 | 0.31 | 0.60 | 0.53 | 0.55 | 0.52 |
| NOI [41]               | 0.41 | 0.57 | 0.69 | 0.25 | 0.34 | 0.66 | 0.58 | 0.65 | 0.60 |
| Supervised FCN         | 0.37 | 0.57 | 0.80 | 0.07 | 0.57 | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.55 | 0.57 |
| Camera Classification  | 0.29 | 0.51 | 0.59 | 0.15 | 0.55 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.54 | 0.55 |
| Image-Consistency      | 0.55 | 0.59 | 0.91 | 0.20 | 0.76 | 0.67 | 0.58 | 0.72 | 0.69 |
| EXIF-Consistency       | **0.69** | **0.71** | **0.97** | **0.37** | **0.91** | **0.75** | 0.59 | 0.72 | 0.75 |

Table 3: **Comparison against Salloum et. al:** We compare against numbers reported by [16] for splice localization. We note that they compute their numbers after finding individual threshold that optimizes their score per image, while we threshold our probabilities at 0.5.

| Model                  | Columbia [36] | Carvalho [37] |
|------------------------|---------------|---------------|
|                        | MCC | F1  | MCC | F1  |
| E-MFCN [16]            | 0.48 | 0.61 | **0.41** | 0.48 |
| Image-Consistency      | 0.58 | 0.62 | 0.17 | 0.71 |
| EXIF-Consistency       | **0.70** | **0.72** | 0.32 | **0.86** |

4.3 Splice Detection

We evaluate splice detection using the three datasets that contain both untampered and manipulated images: Columbia, Carvalho, and Realistic Tampering. For each algorithm, we extract the localization map and obtain an overall score by averaging the output pixels. The images are ranked based on their overall scores, and we compute the mean average precision (mAP) for the whole dataset. We chose to use mAP as it is a condensed representation of the precision-recall curves previously used by [42, 39, 40, 41].

Table 1 shows the mAP for detecting manipulated images. Our EXIF-Consistency model achieves state-of-the-art performance on Columbia and Carvalho while producing results comparable to supervised FCN on Realistic Tampering.
Fig. 8: Detecting Fakes: EXIF Consistency successfully localizes manipulations across many different datasets. We show qualitative results on images from Carvalho, In-the-Wild, Hays and Realistic Tampering.
Fig. 9: **Response on real images:** Our algorithm’s response map contains fewer inconsistencies when given an untampered images.

Fig. 10: **Failure Cases:** We present typical failure modes of our model. As we can see with outdoor images, overexposure frequently leads to false positives in the sky. In addition some splices are too small that we cannot effectively locate them using consistency. Finally the flower copy-move confuses **EXIF Consistency** because inconsistent post-processing augmentation will disagree with consistent EXIF values.

### 4.4 Splice Localization

Having seen that our model can distinguish spliced and authentic images, we next ask whether it can also localize spliced regions within images. For each image in our dataset, our algorithm produces an unnormalized probability that each pixel is part of a splice.

Since it is sometimes ill-defined which of the two segments is spliced (e.g. when the splice is approximately half of the image), we evaluate our performance using a metric that is invariant to permutations of the two regions. We use a metric similar to mAP, but with symmetry and permutation invariance built in (we denote it $p$-mAP). Given
Fig. 11: **Comparing Methods:** We visualize the qualitative difference between *Self-Consistency* and baselines. Our model can correctly localize image splices from *In-the-Wild*, *Columbia* and *Carvalho* that other methods make mistakes on.

an image’s ground-truth binary mask $m$ and unnormalized splice probabilities $p$, we compute $\max(s(m, p), s(1 - m, p))$, where $s(m, p)$ is symmetrized average precision: $\frac{1}{2}(AP(m, p) + AP(1 - m, 1 - p))$. We also evaluated our results using MCC and F1 measures, so that we could directly compare with previous forensics work [16]. However, these metrics evaluate a binary segmentation, and hence require thresholding the predicted probabilities. We threshold our predictions at $p = 0.5$ for all images. Since [16] reported their numbers on the full Columbia and Carvalho, we evaluated our methods on the full dataset and report the comparison in Table 3.

The quantitative results on Table 2 show that our *Self-Consistency* model achieves the best performance across all datasets with the exception of the *Realistic Tampering (RT)* dataset. Notably, the model generally outperformed the supervised baselines, which was trained with actual manipulated images, despite the fact that our model never saw a tampered image during training. We suspect that the supervised models’ poor performance may be due to the difficulty in generalizing to manipulations made by artists whose works were not present at training time.

We also observed that *EXIF-Consistency* consistently outperformed *Image-Consistency* across different datasets. We suspect that this may be due to “shortcuts” *Image-Consistency* learns during training (3.4). For example, during training it often suffices to analyze the similarity of the content of the patches (e.g., their color histograms). At test time, however, these shortcuts are not maladaptive since a forger will have intentionally concealed such obvious cues.

It is also instructive to look at the qualitative results of our method, which we show in Figure 8. We see that our method can localize manipulations on a wide range of different splices. Furthermore, in Figure 9, we show that our method produces highly consistent predictions when tested on real images. We can also look at the qualitative differences between our method and the baselines in Figure 11.

Finally, we ask which EXIF tags were useful for performing the splice localization task. To study this, we computed a response map for individual tags on the Columbia
dataset, which we show in Figure 7. We see that the most successful tags tend to be associated with the dimensions of the camera and the camera model.

**Failure cases** In Figure 10 we show some common failure cases. Our performance on *Realistic Tampering* illustrates some shortcomings with *EXIF-Consistency*. First, our model is not well-suited to finding small splices that are common in *RT*. When spliced regions are small, the model’s large stride will completely skip over spliced regions, mistakenly suggesting that no manipulations exist. Second, over- and under-exposed regions are sometimes flagged by our model to be inconsistent because they lack any meta-data signal (e.g. because they are nearly uniformly black or white). Finally, *RT* contains a significant number of additional manipulations, such as copy-move, that cannot be consistently detected via meta-data consistency since the manipulated content comes from exactly the same photo.

5 Discussion

In this paper, we have proposed a self-supervised method for detecting image manipulations. Our experiments show that the proposed method obtains state-of-the-art results on several datasets, even though it does not use labeled data during training. However, our work also raises a number of questions. In contrast to physically motivated forensics methods [2], our model’s results are not easily interpretable, and in particular, it is not clear which visual cues it uses to solve the task. It also remains an open question how best to fuse consistency measurements across an image for localizing manipulations. Finally, while our model is trained without any human annotations, it is still affected in complex ways by design decisions that went into the self-supervision task, such as the ways that EXIF tags were balanced during training.

Self-supervised approaches to visual forensics hold the promise of generalizing to a wide range of manipulations — potentially beyond those that can feasibly be learned through supervised training. However, for a forensics algorithm to be truly general, it must also model the actions of intelligent forgers that adapt to the detection algorithms. Work in adversarial machine learning [47, 48] suggests that having a self-learning forger in the loop will make the forgery detection problem much more difficult to solve, requiring new technical advances to solve.

As new advances in computer vision and image-editing emerge, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective visual forensics methods. We see our approach, which successfully detects manipulations without seeing examples of manipulated images, as being an initial step toward building general-purpose forensics tools.

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# A1 Appendix

## EXIF attribute definitions

We have abbreviated the definitions that were originally sourced from [http://www.exiv2.org/tags.html](http://www.exiv2.org/tags.html). Please visit our website for additional EXIF information such as: distributions, common values, and prediction rankings.

| EXIF Attribute                        | Definition                                                                 |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| EXIF BrightnessValue                  | The value of brightness.                                                   |
| EXIF ColorSpace                       | The color space information tag is always recorded as the color space speci-fier. Normally sRGB is used to define the color space based on the PC monitor conditions and environment. If a color space other than sRGB is used, Uncalibrated is set. Image data recorded as Uncalibrated can be treated as sRGB when it is converted to FlashPix. |
| EXIF ComponentsConfiguration         | Information specific to compressed data. The channels of each component are arranged in order from the 1st component to the 4th. For uncompressed data the data arrangement is given in the tag. However, since can only express the order of Y, Cb and Cr, this tag is provided for cases when compressed data uses components other than Y, Cb, and Cr and to enable support of other sequences. |
| EXIF CompressedBitsPerPixel           | Specific to compressed data: states the compressed bits per pixel.         |
| EXIF Contrast                         | This tag indicates the direction of contrast processing applied by the camera when the image was shot. |
| EXIF CustomRendered                   | This tag indicates the use of special processing on image data, such as rendering geared to output. When special processing is performed, the reader is expected to disable or minimize any further processing. |
| EXIF DateTimeDigitized                | The date and time when the image was stored as digital data.               |
| EXIF DateTimeOriginal                 | The date and time when the original image data was generated.              |
| EXIF DigitalZoomRatio                 | This tag indicates the digital zoom ratio when the image was shot. If the numerator of the recorded value is 0, this indicates that digital zoom was not used. |
| EXIF ExifImageLength                  | The number of rows of image data. In JPEG compressed data a JPEG marker is used instead of this tag. |
| EXIF ExifImageWidth                   | The number of columns of image data, equal to the number of pixels per row. In JPEG compressed data a JPEG marker is used instead of this tag. |
| EXIF ExifVersion                      | The version of this standard supported. Nonexistence of this field is taken to mean nonconformance to the standard |
| EXIF ExposureBiasValue                | The exposure bias.                                                       |
| EXIF ExposureMode                     | This tag indicates the exposure mode set when the image was shot. In auto-bracketing mode, the camera shoots a series of frames of the same scene at different exposure settings. |
| EXIF ExposureProgram                  | The class of the program used by the camera to set exposure when the picture is taken. |
| EXIF ExposureTime                     | Exposure time, given in seconds.                                          |
| EXIF FileSource                      | Indicates the image source. If a DSC recorded the image, this tag value of this tag always be set to 3, indicating that the image was recorded on a DSC. |
| EXIF Flash                            | Indicates the status of flash when the image was shot.                     |
| EXIF FlashPixVersion                  | The FlashPix format version supported by a FPXR file.                      |
| EXIF FNumber                          | The F number.                                                             |
| EXIF FocalLength                      | The actual focal length of the lens, in mm.                               |
| EXIF FocalLengthIn35mmFilm            | This tag indicates the equivalent focal length assuming a 35mm film camera, in mm. A value of 0 means the focal length is unknown. Note that this tag differs from the tag. |
| EXIF FocalPlaneResolutionUnit         | Unit of measurement for FocalPlaneXResolution and FocalPlaneYResolution. |
| EXIF FocalPlaneXResolution            | Number of pixels per FocalPlaneResolutionUnit in ImageWidth direction for main image. |
| EXIF FocalPlaneYResolution            | Number of pixels per FocalPlaneResolutionUnit in ImageLength direction for main image. |
| EXIF GainControl                      | This tag indicates the degree of overall image gain adjustment.            |
| EXIF InteroperabilityOffset           | Unknown                                                                   |
| EXIF ISOSpeedRatings                  | Indicates the ISO Speed and ISO Latitude of the camera or input device as specified in ISO 12232. |
| EXIF LensMake                         | This tag records the lens manufacturer as an ASCII string.                |
| EXIF LensModel                        | This tag records the lens’s model name and model number as an ASCII string. |
| EXIF LensSpecification                | This tag notes minimum focal length, maximum focal length, minimum F number in the minimum focal length, and minimum F number in the maximum focal length, which are specification information for the lens that was used in photography. When the minimum F number is unknown, the notation is 0/0 |
| EXIF LightSource                      | The kind of light source.                                                 |
| EXIF Field                        | Description                                                                 |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| MaxApertureValue                 | The smallest F number of the lens.                                          |
| MeteringMode                     | The metering mode.                                                          |
| OffsetSchema                     | Unknown                                                                     |
| Saturation                       | This tag indicates the direction of saturation processing applied by the camera when the image was shot. |
| SceneCaptureType                 | This tag indicates the type of scene that was shot. It can also be used to record the mode in which the image was shot. Note that this differs from the tag. |
| SceneType                        | Indicates the type of scene. If a DSC recorded the image, this tag value must always be set to 1, indicating that the image was directly photographed. |
| SensingMethod                    | Type of image sensor.                                                       |
| SensitivityType                  | The SensitivityType tag indicates which one of the parameters of ISO12232 is the PhotographicSensitivity tag. |
| Sharpness                        | This tag indicates the direction of sharpness processing applied by the camera when the image was shot. |
| ShutterSpeedValue                | Shutter speed.                                                              |
| SubjectArea                      | This tag indicates the location and area of the main subject in the overall scene. |
| SubjectDistanceRange             | This tag indicates the distance to the subject.                             |
| SubSecTime                       | A tag used to record fractions of seconds for the tag.                     |
| SubSecTimeDigitized              | A tag used to record fractions of seconds for the tag.                     |
| SubSecTimeOriginal               | A tag used to record fractions of seconds for the tag.                     |
| UserComment                      | A tag for Exif users to write keywords or comments.                        |
| WhiteBalance                     | This tag indicates the white balance mode set when the image was shot.     |
| Altitude                         | Indicates the altitude based on the reference in GPSAltitudeRef.            |
| AltitudeRef                      | Indicates the altitude used as the reference altitude.                     |
| GPS Date                         | A character string recording date and time information relative to UTC (Coordinated Universal Time). |
| ImgDirection                     | Indicates the direction of the image when it was captured.                 |
| ImgDirectionRef                  | Indicates the reference for giving the direction of the image when it is captured. |
| Latitude                         | Indicates the latitude.                                                     |
| LatitudeRef                      | Indicates whether the latitude is north or south latitude.                  |
| Longitude                        | Indicates the longitude.                                                   |
| LongitudeRef                     | Indicates whether the longitude is east or west longitude.                  |
| TimeStamp                        | Indicates the time as UTC (Coordinated Universal Time).                    |
| VersionID                        | Indicates the version of GPS.                                               |
| Artist                           | This tag records the name of the camera owner, photographer or image creator. |
| Copyright                        | Copyright information.                                                     |
| ExifOffset                       | Image ExifOffset.                                                          |
| Info                              | A pointer to the GPS Info IFD.                                              |
| ImageDescription                 | A character string giving the title of the image.                          |
| Make                             | The manufacturer of the recording equipment.                               |
| Model                            | The model name or model number of the equipment.                           |
| Orientation                      | The image orientation viewed in terms of rows and columns.                |
| PrintImageMatching               | Print Image Matching, description needed.                                  |
| ResolutionUnit                   | The unit for measuring YResolution and XResolution. The same unit is used for both. |
| Software                         | This tag records the name and version of the software or firmware of the camera or image input device used to generate the image. |
| XResolution                      | Number of pixels per FocalPlaneResolutionUnit in ImageWidth direction for main image. |
| YCbCrPositioning                 | The position of chrominance components in relation to the luminance component. |
| YResolution                      | Number of pixels per FocalPlaneResolutionUnit in ImageLength direction for main image. |
| InteroperabilityIndex            | Indicates the identification of the Interoperability rule.                |
| InteroperabilityVersion          | Interoperability version.                                                  |
| RelatedImageLength               | Image height.                                                              |
| RelatedImageWidth                | Image width.                                                               |