The Role of General Musharraf in Pakistan's Political Structure: A Critical Review

1 Asghar Ullah Khan  2 Dr. Zain Ul Abiden Malik*  3 Hani Fatima

1. Ph. D in Mass Communication, Department of communication and Media Studies, Gomal University, Dera Ismail Khan, KP, Pakistan.
2. Visiting Assistant Professor, Pir Mir Ali Arid Agricultural University, Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan.
3. Ph. D Scholar, Center of Experimental Economics in Education, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an, China

ABSTRACT

In the mid-1950s, the position of the military in the political system of Pakistan started and continued several times in terms of nature and extent of control. Its detachment is gradual and sluggish whenever it intervenes directly, following a paradigm of power-sharing, rather than passing power to the civilian elite. This trend of civilization has been expressed in all army regimes, including during General Pervez Musharraf's rule, however, necessary minor modifications. Musharraf demonstrated his determination to revitalize the economy in its early days, His primary aim was to build institutions and conduct free and fair elections through transparency, decentralization and democracy through new mergers. A civilian government, clearly.

Introduction

In Pakistan, the military has directly controlled the regin for many years. Despite this, the Times have saved most civilians in the past few years. After the rise of Pakistan, it posed a solid threat to Pakistan. For many years in Pakistan; the military has directly ruled the area. Nevertheless, in the past few years, the Times have spared most civilians. After the rise of Pakistan, it posed a severe challenge to Pakistan. In 1954 and then in 1958, with the implementation of Martial Law, General Ayub Khan, chief of the armed forces, Forces became a formal collaborator in the corridor of power. In 1969, 1977 and 1999, the military takeover procedure was again revised (Ahmad, 2013: 113-121).The support of world powers, particularly the U.S.A., was another explanation for military intervention in political affairs (Dahl, 1973: 6). Although their argument of supporting democracy, the military rulers in Pakistan have always supported them, from General Ayub to General Pervez Musharraf (Rahman, 2017). The Army's role in political affairs was also triggered by poor civil institutions, inept, inexperienced, and corrupt political leadership. Until now,
it is also clear (Khokhar, 2016: 230). Civil society and other components of popular mobilization, along with state institutions, have also remained poor because of a low literacy rate and a lack of political knowledge. In Pakistan, the military has developed its corporate interests. Consequently, it has become necessary for the military to maintain its involvement in political system for protection of its interests (Siddiqa, 2007: 71). Keeping in mind above reasons of military’s direct intervention and once got the military rule establish, no one can expect its complete separation from the system while giving it a civilian face. Consequently, the military must continue engaging in the political system in order to defend its interests (Siddiqa, 2007: 71). Bearing in mind the above reasons for direct military involvement, no one would expect it to be totally removed from the system and give citizens a civilian face once military rules have been developed.

The military withdrawal from politics:

The army's withdrawal depends on multiple factors. Many situations in which military regimes can return or retain control with civilians have been caused by these factors (Finer, 2002). Therefore, the study of the policy of military withdrawal typically helps to understand the presence and degree of civilization through particular regimes (Maniruzzaman, 1987: 18). The principle components of military withdrawal legislative issues are endogenous factors and exogenous factors. Endogenous factors are identified with the authoritative structure of the military, for example, its polished skill, aptitude, awareness of certain expectations and corporate nature (Huntington, 1957: 84). Exogenous factors are environmental factors that contribute to the removal of soldiers from the outside, influencing the military in this way. In national, regional or international climates, these factors occur (Danopoulos, 1984).

Presume Civilian Law

On 12 October 1999, with no brutal conflict, PM Nawaz Sharif’s unexpected attempt to terminate the Army Chief in his absence allowed the military to assume control over the regular citizen government (Musharraf, 2006). This time, unlike previous interventions, it is a major cause of revolt. It is a conflict between Nawaz Sharif and the army, and a contest of political power between civilian and army leaders (Moskalenko, 2013: 370). General Musharraf placed emergency rule under PCO after taking over the control of Pakistan’s Chief Executive, suspended the Constitution along with assemblies on 13 October 1999 (Mahmood, 2015: 247). On 17 October 1999, in his succinct address to the country, he announced a future programme for the restoration of democracy, the structure of a new government, good governance, economic growth, transparency, and the continuity of foreign policy. In addition, he said that for the saving of the country, the Constitution was temporarily suspended and the military had no intention of staying longer than the requisite need to pave the way for a true democracy. He outlined his seven-point agenda in his address, namely, restoring national confidence and morality. Federation strengthening; the end of inter-provincial instability and the restoration of national unity. Restoring the economy and restoring the confidence of investors. To uphold law and order and to have swift justice. Dismissing state institutions; exchanging power to the lower level; and ensuring rapid and detailed transparency (The Nation, October 18, 1999).
Plan for Decentralization

Under the presidency of General Tanveer Naqvi, General Musharraf set up a National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) to decentralize the structure and divert powers. The NRB formulated a "Decentralization Plan" under which local governments were elected in a non-partisan manner from December 30, 2000 to July 5, 2001, and finally began operations on August 14, 2001 (Musharraf, 2006). Local authorities are interested, according to the 2001 Local Government Legislation. Tehsil District Government / Government of the Town and Government of the Union Council. In all regions, in the districts still heavily affected by the military, there is a model of neighborhood government. The agreement was not carried out by the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Shafqat, 2008: 262).

Accountability Process

Another move towards accountability and transparency has been taken by reorganizing the already functioning Ehtesab committee into the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The NAB’s mission is to investigate the corruption of officials, bureaucrats and businessmen under the auspices of General Amjad. However, after a while, General Amjad was asked to mitigate the fears of the Department of Finance, the Civil Service and other bodies. In October 2005, when General Amjad was not in compromise mode, he was replaced by General Shahid Aziz, who was advised to spare a few politicians before the next election. High-profile cases such as sugar prices, oil prices and their exchequer losses were once again taken up by NAB. Those cases were subsequently dropped under General Musharraf’s direction. So, he had to give up on interference like that (Aziz S, 2012).

The 9/11 Case and its Consequences

As the events of 11 September 2001 changed the world’s political scenario in the USA, it had a profound effect on Pakistan’s and the region’s policies. Pakistan immediately became an ally of the United States against terrorism, leaving the support of the Taliban regime (Ahmad, 2013: 313). Upon changing its policy, the US supported Pakistan’s stability and strengthened Musharraf’s position. The US also offered tremendous economic resources and neglected the nuclear programme of Pakistan (Talbot, 2012: 177). Pakistan has been without a legally legitimate government since then. The entire blame for the decision falls squarely on Musharraf. He thus lost his ability to challenge the Americans and acknowledged all their demands (Khan, 2009: 483). He then decided on the reversal of Afghanistan’s stance, the exchange of intelligence, and the provision of logistical support as well as airbases for American military operations. On the other hand, these events provided an opportunity for Musharraf, with the financial and political help of the US government, to prolong his stay in power. His indefinite tenure, however, was at the cost of sovereignty and constitutional government. He will explain the next steps he took to understand society from this point of view (Mahmood, 2015: 248).

The Referendum

At the same time, a referendum to legalize his status and obtain a legitimate excuse for long-term residency was held on April 30, 2002. Critics and the government
have estimated that the approval rate for Musharraf is between 5 percent and 97 percent. The Supreme Court has confirmed the referendum (Khan, 2009: 484). To some extent, this effort to obtain legitimacy has created more problems. The 2002 referendum was the same in the Zia period as the manipulation in 1984. Musharraf apologized for the apparent intervention of his loyalists and officials after the findings were announced. A newspaper wrote: "The vote did indeed weaken the position of Musharraf" (The Dawn, May 2, 2002). The violations that occurred during the referendum also diminished the positive image that his reforms had created (Talbot, 2012: 183). Similarly, there was focus on certain public corruption. For instance, someone cast a lot of votes, employees were forced to vote, one person could vote at any polling station, and criticism was dismissed by the government and it was declared that the obvious legalization rules of Musharraf had been set (Ahmad, 2013: 319).

Legal Framework Order (LFO) 2002

It enacted the Legal Framework Order (LFO) of 2002 on August 21, 2002, which was approved by the Supreme Court with constitutional permission. The president, headed by the LFO, has the authority to dissolve parliament, appoint governors, commanders of the armed forces, and members of the National Security Council. Parliament's seats were raised to 342 and enabling Musharraf to proceed as President in uniform was the most relevant article of the LFO. On that point, in the 'Watan Party v. Chief Executive' case, the Supreme Court again disposed of the petition challenging LFO, stating that certain amendments should not be considered in the court in the coming parliament (Khan, 2009).

The 2002 General Elections

On October 10, 2002, the General Election was held. The elections and the 272 seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan were challenged by all political parties. The PML-Q emerged as the largest party winning 78 seats, which later rose to 118, including newcomers and reserved seats. The PPP won a total of 87 seats and the MMA won a total of 60 seats compared to the regular results of the last election, while the PML-N's performance remained weak. The average voter turnout was 40.69% (Khan, 2009: 490).

The Seventeenth Amendment Bill

The Seventeenth Amendment Bill was adopted by the National Assembly on 29 December 2003 and the Senate on 30 December, with some modifications to the LFO, and was eventually approved by the President on 31 December 2003, with the opposition boycotting each time. The amendment served the same purpose as an alternative to the 8th amendment. Its approval showed that civil institutions were still weak and submissive to the military's control. Following the approval of the Seventeenth Amendment, on 1 January 2004, Musharraf went ahead with the legalisation of his position by a vote of confidence by Parliament and all Provincial Assemblies. As a result, he won 53 percent of the Electoral College votes (658 out of 1170 votes) (Khan, 2009). Opposition protests, on the other hand, were so widespread in parliament that when Pervez Musharraf addressed a joint sitting of parliament on January 17, 2004, protests by opposition parties erupted at tables (The Dawn, 18 January 2004). Afterwards National Security Council (NSC) Act was approved on 19th April 2004. The National Security Council (NSC) Act was subsequently approved on 19th April 2004. As normal, at the voting stage of the Bill, the opposition boycotted while
MMA abstained from voting. Musharraf took the MMA response as a breach of pledge that was later used as an excuse to evade his engagement until December 2004 to leave the military post (Kronstadt, 2004: 13).

Elections by local authorities in 2005

Preparations for the election of local bodies started in August 2004. The government declared that the election would be held on a non-party basis similar to prior practise, but the official position of the non-party principle was not fully followed. It was noticed that during the election campaign, flags, banners and party symbols were used extensively. The particular identification of the party relations was obvious as the PML (Q) endorsed candidates used the common name of ‘enlightened moderates’ for themselves; the 'friend of the people' was the PPP candidate label; 'real' for MMA; and 'friend of the homeland' for the PML (N) candidates. The ministers and parliamentarians whose party affiliations were apparent during the campaign announced development schemes in order to gain mass favour for specific candidates. On August 18 and 25, 2005, the elections were held in two phases. Candidates supported by the PML (Q) won the leading spot, followed by the PPP. PML (N) and others had low results (Commonwealth, 2005: 09). In the aftermath of the popular outcome of the 2005 local elections, the government gained ample confidence to win the next parliamentary elections and to regain power for the next term. For the pro-Musharraf administration, everything would have been fair if it had not addressed the question of the presidential election. Given the opposition, the government agreed that the presidential election would be held according to the constitutional time frame by the current legislatures (Moskalenko & Nikolaevich, 2013). It is also noteworthy that during the Musharraf era where the judiciary was in power. As a supporter of the government, this was the first time he had disagreed with it military government’s decision in Pakistan Steel Mill Corporation (PSMC) case (PLD, 2006: SC 697). Abuse, suicide bombings and sectarian clashes have been on the rise. Militants have begun attacks against high-profile targets. They attempted more than once to kill Pervez Musharraf, and they even tried to assassinate the prime minister and top military officials. Many scandals, such as sugar hoarding, oil scandals and stock market crashes, also started to emerge one by one. An investigation against the prominent defendants could not be requested. In addition to these, there were other security-related concerns that began to gradually affect the pace of the process of civilianization (Ahmad, 2013).

Conclusion

In reality, however, institutions operated with the aid of military support rather than the support of people. All these civilian institutions were only permissible as long as they were submissive to the military dictator, and as long as they embraced the military government, all kinds of civilian participation were acceptable. Under his leadership, the process of civilianization was introduced in the form of a paradigm of power sharing at the detriment of real democratic institutions. On extensive analysis and deep insight into different measures taken in the direction of civilianization and changes implemented for good governance and open transparency, several other motivations appeared contradictory to his apparent high statements that were bundled in attractive phrases. Despite starting the civilianization process, it was not possible for civil institutions and the democratic process to achieve too much power to support it.
References

Ahmad, I. (2013). *Pakistan the Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences 1947-2011*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Aziz, S. (2012). *YehKhamoshiKahanTak*. Islamabad: Seven Springs Publisher.

Commonwealth, T. (2005). *Pakistan Local Bodies Elections*. London: Commonwealth Secretariat.

Dahl, R. A. (1973). *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. Yale University Press.

Danopoulos, C. P. (1984). From Military to Civilian Rule in Contemporary Greece. *Armed Forces & Society* 10(2), 229-250.

Finer, S. (2002). *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*. Harvard University Press.

Khan, H. (2009). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Khokhar, N. I. (2016). Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: Musharraf's Era (1999–2003): Doctoral dissertation. Islamabad, Pakistan: National Defence University.

Kronstadt, K. A. (2004). *Pakistan's Domestic Political Development*. Washington DC: Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service.

Mahmood, Z. (2015). Political Turmoil And Military Era Of General Musharraf (1988-2007). JPUHS, 239-251.

Maniruzzaman, T. (1987). *Military Withdrawal from Politics: A Comparative Study*. Florida: Ballinger Publishing Company.

Moskalenko, V. B., & Nikolaevich, V. (2013). *A Political History of Pakistan, 1947-2007*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Musharraf, P. (2006). *Sab se pahle Pakistan*. Lahore: Lahore: Ferozsons,.

Rahman, Z. S. (2017). Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in a Pakistan: Some Lessons from. *Journal of Socialomics*, 1-5.

Shafqat, S. (2008). *New Perspectives on Pakistan: Visions for the Future*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Siddiqa, A. (2007). *Military Inc: Incide Pakistan's Military Economy*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
Syed Zafer Ali Shah V. General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan, PLD 2000 SC 869 (Supreme Court of Pakistan 04 27, 2002).

Talbot, I. (2012). *Pakistan: A New History*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.