Abstract. An offline OpenPGP user might want to forward part or all of their email messages to third parties. Given that messages are encrypted, this requires transforming them into ciphertexts decryptable by the intended forwarded parties, while maintaining confidentiality and authentication. It is shown in recent lines of work that this can be achieved by means of proxy-re-encryption schemes, however, while encrypted email forwarding is the most mentioned application of proxy-re-encryption, it has not been implemented in the OpenPGP context, to the best of our knowledge. In this paper, we adapt the seminal technique introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss in EUROCRYPT’98, allowing a Mail Transfer Agent to transform and forward OpenPGP messages without access to decryption keys or plaintexts. We also provide implementation details and a security analysis.

Keywords: Proxy Re-Encryption · Forwarding · Elliptic Curve Cryptography · OpenPGP

1 Introduction

Proxy re-encryption is the process of transforming a ciphertext so that it can be decrypted by a different party than was originally intended. This transformation is carried out without access to decryption secrets, plaintexts, or interactive communication with secret-key holders. First defined and designed by M. Blaze, G. Bleumer, and M. Strauss [8], some forms of proxy-re-encryption have already been applied to ElGamal PGP-encrypted mailing lists [10] in the context of encrypted email. In fact, the most highlighted application scenario is email redirection (see e.g. [6,3,4]), however, the current OpenPGP protocol specification does not include support for this functionality and, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been implemented in well-known encrypted email service providers.

A straightforward way to achieve delivery of forwarded encrypted email is to simply transfer private keys, but there are several drawbacks to this practice. On one hand, if keys are transferred to forwarded parties, an attacker controlling them would gain decryption rights to unforwarded emails, which is not the case in unencrypted forwarding. On the other hand, private keys could be given to a trusted Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) so that they can decrypt and re-encrypt to forwarded parties, but this would contradict the trust model of end-to-end encrypted email services. The technique we describe aligns with these trust models, proposing to distribute trust among forwarded parties and the MTA. Security is provided as long as there is no collusion involving the MTA, i.e. we consider that the MTA that takes care of the forwarding is a semi-trusted proxy that is not able to decrypt.

Using two widely used OpenPGP implementations [1,2], we verify the correctness of the technique in the case where the MTA is also a Mail Delivery Agent (MDA), allowing automatic forwarding between addresses entrusted to this MDA. However, in order to enable interoperability with other agents, a certain key fingerprint consideration needs to be ensured by those services, requiring the modification of a specific OpenPGP packet to indicate forwarding support.

In this paper, we adapt the technique presented in [8] based on diverted Diffie-Hellman key exchanges, which allows to emulate proxy re-encryption abilities in the context of symmetrically encrypted communications following current implementations of the OpenPGP protocol [11] and involving no additional trust hypotheses, other than those expected naturally of any email forwarding. We provide a security analysis and a simple simulation-based proof of the semi-honest security of the forwarding protocol.

1.1 Forwarding PGP messages

The scenario we address is the following: Bob wants to allow Charles to decrypt email that was originally encrypted to Bob’s public key without having access to Bob’s private key or any online interac-
tion. Naturally, MTAs should not have the ability to read the contents of such messages. We achieve this by proposing a protocol that requires one-time communications between Bob, Charles, and a trusted MTA: Bob generates two specific secret elements (a regular secret key, and a proxy factor), securely transfers one to Charles, and the other to the trusted MTA.

With the proxy factor, the MTA gains the ability to transform any PGP message encrypted to Bob’s public key into another PGP message that can be decrypted with the newly generated private key, which is now held by Charles. At the same time, the MTA cannot decrypt the message, nor transform it to another public key. The ciphertext transformation is also efficient; upon participating in ECDH key exchanges, proxies need to store one random field element and two 16-byte key identifiers per forwarding, and compute a single scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve per forwarded ciphertext.

A BBS-like transformation in OpenPGP

The ciphertext transformation technique we describe here is an instance of the ElGamal-based proxy-re-encryption scheme presented in the seminal paper by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss [8], and as such, is bidirectional, meaning that if a proxy can transform ciphertexts from Alice to Bob, they also have the inverse ability. While this property may be undesirable in most contexts, this is not an issue in this OpenPGP application. If Bob forwards encrypted email to Charles with this technique, Charles’s forwarded private key is used exclusively to decrypt Bob’s forwarded messages and he has no incentive to receive messages encrypted to the corresponding forwarded public key, since they could be potentially forwarded to Bob.

As indicated in [5], these schemes are also transitive, meaning that if Alice forwards an email to Bob and Bob forwards it to Charles, nothing prevents proxies from forwarding Alice’s emails directly to Charles and not to Bob. More generally, any malicious forwarding MTA could compose re-encryptions and selectively deliver messages to some recipients, ignoring the rest. While transitivity appears to be unavoidable here, such an MTA would be driving against its deliverability incentives and may be detected by end parties.

The reason why this scheme was chosen over more modern re-encryption schemes is that an important objective is to maintain backwards compatibility with incoming messages. Furthermore, the sender is often oblivious to automatic mail forwarding happening on the recipient’s side, so the chosen scheme must be transparent from the sender’s perspective. The BBS technique provides a fast and secure scheme that is compatible with this constraint.

An undesirable property that is partially mitigated by the use of the OpenPGP protocol, also pointed out in [5], is the fact that any collusion between a forwarded party and the proxy results in the knowledge of the forwarding party’s private key. Fortunately, OpenPGP’s structure prevents impersonation attacks: If Charles above steals Bob’s private key with the help of a rogue MTA, he could not sign messages in the name of Bob or authenticate as Bob. The forwarding key is derived from an
encryption-only sub-key and does not serve for signing or authentication purposes, because it will not be recognised as a signing or authenticating key by any compliant OpenPGP implementation. Nevertheless, in this case, Charles and the rogue MTA can decrypt every message encrypted to Bob they can obtain, even old or unforwarded. As a mitigation against collusion attacks we advice to: use short lived keys, avoid the use of filters, generate new keys upon forwarding set-up, and finally to deprecate these keys when discontinuing the forwarding. In other words, we assume that either no collusion with MTAs is possible, or that forwarded parties are trusted with unforwarded messages.

2 The forwarding scheme

While we describe the forwarding technique in terms of large subgroups of elliptic curves (given the well-known implementation advantages e.g. [7]), the same technique and security proof can be applied to any large subgroup where the Discrete Logarithm and Diffie-Hellman problems are hard, and subgroup membership testing is efficient. In the remaining sections, let $E$ be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_p$, and $G \in E$ be a generator of a large subgroup of $E$ of prime order $n$.

2.1 Asynchronous ECDH Exchanges

In existing implementations of OpenPGP, asynchronous Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman exchanges are performed to address encrypted email messages (see figure 2), and work as follows. Let $d_B \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ be Bob’s private key and $Q_B := d_B G \in E$ be Bob’s public key. Alice uses $Q_B$ to generate an ephemeral challenge $P$ and a shared secret $S := d_A d_b G$, that is known only to the two of them, as described in figure 2.

Our purpose is to show that a selected proxy transmitting a message encrypted to Bob can grant access to the Alice-Bob shared secret $S$ defined above to selected third parties, without the proxy knowing $S$ or leaking information about the forwarding to Alice or other involved proxies.

2.2 Diverting the secret

Let us now describe the BBS-like proxy transformation. Suppose Bob, whose long-term key pair is $(d_B, Q_B)$, wants to forward incoming messages sent with the protocol defined in 2.1 to Charles. First, Bob generates a new key pair $(d_C, Q_C)$ for Charles and computes the proxy factor

$$k_{BC} := d_B / d_C \mod n$$

for the proxy.

Note that it is not possible to guess $d_B$ from the sole knowledge of $d_C$ or $k_{BC}$, since the mapping of $\mathbb{F}_n$ onto itself given by $\phi_y : x \mapsto xy^{-1}$ is bijective for every $y \in \mathbb{F}_n^*$ and both $d_B$ and $d_C$ are sampled uniformly from a subset of $\mathbb{F}_n$ (in other words, they are indistinguishable from random elements of a subset of $\mathbb{F}_n$, depending on the chosen curve). This means that unless the MTA and the forwarded party collude, they cannot access the secret $d_B$. 

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Fig. 2. Alice sends an encrypted message to Bob with the Deferred ECDH exchange. $P$: Ephemeral exchange value, $S$: Shared secret, $m$: Plaintext, $(P, c)$: Ciphertext
Now, given a plaintext \( m \), an ephemeral DH shared secret between Alice and Bob \( S = d_A d_B G \) (also, \( S = d_A Q_B \)), and a ciphertext \((P_B, c)\) where \( c = \text{Enc}_S(m) \) encrypts \( m \), the MTA’s objective is to transfer the knowledge of \( S \) to Charles, such that he can decrypt \( c \). To achieve this, upon接收 of \((P_B, c)\), the MTA first verifies that \( P_B \) is not in a small subgroup of the curve, and then computes \( P_C := k_{BC} P_B \). Why is verifying \( P_B \) necessary? Note that \( k_{BC} = d_B / d_C \) is not necessarily a private key of the scheme. In particular, when interpreted as an integer, \( k_{BC} \) may not be a multiple of \( h \), the cofactor of the curve, and therefore the above computation is vulnerable to small subgroup attacks. Namely, if \( P_B \) belongs to a small subgroup of the curve, then \( P_C \) is not necessarily 0, as it would be \( d_C P_B \) for any private key \( d_I \). An implementation must abort if \( hP_B \neq 0 \) (for Curve25519 and Curve448, \( h \) is 8 and 4 respectively). According to [12], “a large number of existing implementations do not [check the all-zero output]”, but in this case, this is mandatory in order to avoid leakage of information about the proxy factors.

Once \( P_B \) is verified, \( P_C = k_{BC} P_B \) is computed, the MTA transfers \((P_C, c)\) to Charles, who in turn computes \( d_C P_C = d_C d_C^{-1} d_B P_B = d_A d_B G = S \), allowing him to decrypt.

In other words, the following equation is computed by involved parties:

\[
S = d_A d_B G \\
= d_B d_A G \\
= d_B d_C^{-1} d_C d_A G
\]

(Computed by Alice)

(Computed by Bob)

(Computed by Charles)

This procedure is described in figure 3. Note that Bob is able to set more than one forwarding address by generating several valid private keys \( d_I \) and corresponding proxy factors. Given that the forwarding MTA could be selectively forwarding mail to different users, e.g., using filters, or that the user might want to interrupt the forwardings at different times, it is compulsory to use unique \( d_I \) values for every different forwarded party.

The scheme is transitive. In fact, Charles can also forward emails further by repeating the same procedure. Namely, he could generate a new key pair \((Q_F, d_F)\) that he shares with Frank, and compute \( k_{CF} \) to share with the MTA.

![Fig. 3. Forwarded ECDH exchange. Dotted exchanges are done over an existing secure channel. \( P_B, P_C \): Ephemeral exchange values, \( m \): Plaintext, \( c \): Ciphertext.](image)

### 2.3 Transformation Proxy as a multiplication oracle

In the procedure described above, Charles could gain access to an arbitrary stream of forwarded ciphertexts by sending messages to Bob using the same protocol, and use the forwarded message to obtain information. In this case, the proxy acts as a multiplication oracle by the secret factor \( k_{BC} \): Charles can choose any \( \bar{P} \in E \) and any valid ciphertext \( \bar{c} \), and submit \((\bar{P}, \bar{c})\) to the proxy as a message.
OpenPGP Forwarding via Diverted ECDH

The proxy verifies and transforms the ciphertext, returning \((k_{BC} \tilde{P}, \tilde{c})\). Note that guessing the secret factor is exactly solving ECDLP, thus Charles is not able to obtain any information about \(k_{BC}\), or ultimately \(d_B\), since \(k_{BC} \tilde{P}\) is indistinguishable from random. This is described in figure 4.

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. 4.** The proxy acts as a scalar multiplication oracle when receiving messages from Charles.

We assume that malicious parties have complete freedom in submitting encrypted messages to Bob, but note that this activity may be detected by Bob or other forwarded parties (since they also receive these messages).

3 OpenPGP implementation

In this section, we describe some considerations regarding OpenPGP implementations for parties willing to achieve the encrypted forwarding procedure described above.

3.1 Clients tasks

Assume Bob holds the following long-term keys in order to ensure deferred ECDH exchanges:

- An EdDSA long-term primary key, signing-only;
- An ECDH sub-key \((Q_B, d_B)\), encryption-only.

**Setting up the forwarding** In order to allow forwarding to Charles, Bob generates another key using the same curve and parameters as his existing OpenPGP key, with both the EdDSA and ECDH parts. Let \((Q_C, d_C)\) be the parameters of the encryption-only ECDH part, that Bob transfers securely to Charles. Finally, Bob computes \(k_{BC} = d_B / d_C \mod n\) and sends it to the MTA.

**Fingerprint selection for KDF** As mandated in the OpenPGP specification [11], §13.5, a key-derivation function is called in order to obtain the decryption key for a given message; in particular, the original recipient fingerprint is needed as an input to this KDF. Therefore, if a message was originally encrypted to Bob and forwarded to Charles, the decrypting implementation needs to use Bob’s fingerprint when decrypting a forwarded message, instead of Charles’ fingerprint. In other words, Bob must specify that the fingerprint associated to \(Q_B\) must be used when decrypting instead of \(Q_C\) in the key-derivation function; otherwise, a fingerprint mismatch will not allow decryption, since \(Q_B\) was used to originally encrypt this particular message.

This feature prevents tampering with the recipient, but since we need Charles to decrypt the ciphertext, we propose to change the decryption by altering the field containing the KDF parameters in the algorithm specific part for ECDH keys. By adding the original fingerprint and specifying a new version 2, whose field is already defined and “reserved for future extensions”, we emulate Bob’s fingerprint in Charles’ decryption procedure. This would not reduce the tampering protection’s effectiveness, since this information is embedded in Charle’s key, and at the same time backwards compatibility for the sender. Concretely, we propose to alter **variable-length field containing KDF parameters** defined in [11], §13.5 as follows:

- *(Unchanged)* a one-octet size of the following fields; values 0 and 0xff are reserved for future extensions;
- (Upgraded) a one-octet value 02, indicating forwarding support;
- (Unchanged) a one-octet hash function ID used with the KD;
- (Unchanged) a one-octet algorithm ID for the symmetric algorithm used to wrap the symmetric key for message encryption;
- (Added) one-octet of flags with value 0x01, indicating to expect a key fingerprint;
- (Added) a 20-octet fingerprint to be used in the KDF function; for version 5 keys, the 20 leftmost bytes of the fingerprint.

The forwarded parties’ OpenPGP implementation will use this value in the key wrapping instead of the original fingerprint in order to obtain the right session key. Note that with this key pair, only forwarded ciphertexts can be decrypted, and it does not allow anyone to decrypt messages encrypted to $Q_B$ that were not transformed by the MTA.

### 3.2 Server tasks

The MTA acts as the re-encryption proxy; it safely stores the factors $k_{ij}$ along with the key IDs to replace them in the ciphertext metadata. When a matching incoming email arrives, it alters the asymmetric key packet corresponding to the correct key ID.

An incoming message from Alice to Bob has a **Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packets**, that wraps a symmetric key to decrypt the data packet. This packet contains:

- the curve OID, identifying the correct field;
- the ephemeral value $P_B$;
- the key ID of Bob’s public key;
- the encrypted session key.

The first step is to parse the ephemeral exchange value $P_B$ and verify that it belongs to the subgroup generated by $G$ and not other small subgroup of the curve, as mentioned in section 2.2. This can be achieved by generating any private key $s$ and checking $sP_B \equiv 0$, or equivalently, checking that $hP_B \equiv 0$, where $h$ is the cofactor of the curve ($h = 8$ for Curve25519). If $P_B$ does not belong to the large subgroup, the MTA must refuse to process this ciphertext, as the transformation would leak information about the proxy factors.

Once $P_B$ is verified, the MTA replaces the ephemeral value of the above packet with $k_cP_B$. Also, it replaces the key ID with Charles’s key ID to ensure that his OpenPGP implementation will accept the packet for decryption (in OpenPGP terminology, the MTA eventually un-armors the message, replaces both values, and armors the result).

The MTA can also implement filters based on the unencrypted fields, e.g., sender and recipient addresses, or headers. These, of course, rely purely on trust, e.g., a misbehaving MTA could forward every mail to Charles.

### 3.3 Implementation details

Using the widely-adopted GopenPGP [1] and OpenPGP.js [2], we emulated the forwarding and verified decryption correctness using those implementation APIs. Note that the setting up the forwarding is essentially generating two private scalars, and ciphertext transformation is essentially one scalar multiplication on the curve, therefore, there is negligible extra cost when supporting this feature.

Our curve of choice was Curve25519 [7,12], defined in the finite field of $2^{255} - 19$ elements, and whose base point $G : x = 9$ generates a large subgroup of prime order

$$n = 2^{252} + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493.$$  

Secret keys are sampled randomly from $2^{254} + 8\{0, 1, 2, \ldots, 2^{251} - 1\}$, and proxy factors are interpreted in $\mathbb{F}_n$ where $n$ is the prime number displayed above. The design properties of Curve25519 makes it stand at a comfortable security level against all known attacks. It is worth noting that scalar multiplication is implemented in constant time, since double and adding use the same formulae. This
consideration is important since any forwarded party can submit ciphertexts for transformation and measure the time of the MTA’s reaction, with the objective of learning about proxy factors. Note also that some modern OpenPGP implementations are not implemented in constant time for other curves.

The verification of small subgroup points in this particular curve is simply checking if \( 8^2 \mod 2^{256} \) is 0, in which case the proxy must refuse to transform the ciphertext.

4 Security Analysis

This section describes how the forwarding protocol is secure against eavesdroppers, semi-honest and malicious adversaries, except for collusions between the proxy and any forwarded party (since they can trivially recover Bob’s secret).

A simulation-based proof using the standard techniques from [13] is provided, and works as follows. We first define an ideal functionality \( \mathcal{F} \) associated to the forwarding protocol \( \Pi \). Given a set of participants of \( \Pi \), we describe their views and construct simulators that produce random corresponding views. Finally, we show that the simulated views and the output of \( \mathcal{F} \) (i.e., the ideal world) are computationally indistinguishable from the execution of the protocol and its output (the real world).

This proof can be found in appendix A. We provide here an overall analysis of the security provided by the forwarding protocol.

4.1 Threat model

The threat model we consider is an expanded version of the deferred Diffie-Hellman exchange:

- Bob, the original receiver, is always honest: he follows the protocol and samples from the correct distributions.
- External eavesdroppers, who do not participate but may collect all values exchanged in the protocol except for private keys and proxy factors (i.e., they know all elements in paths defined by bold arrows in figure 3).
- \( F \), the set of forwarded parties, may contain a subset of colluded parties that may also send messages to Bob and eavesdrop the protocol.
- Alice, the original sender, may collude with forwarded parties.
- \( T \), the transformation proxy, could misbehave and/or collude with other parties.

We show that the only collusion that succeeds in attacking is when \( T \) colludes with a forwarded party. This is expected, since they have multiplicative shares of Bob’s secret \( d_B \). To ease notation, for each forwarded party \( F_i \in F \), let \( k_i := k_{BF_i} \) be the proxy factor held by \( T \), \( d_i := d_{F_i} \) the secret scalar held by \( F_i \) (generated by Bob), and \( P_i := P_{F_i} \) the transformed shares (generated by the proxy).

4.2 Semi-honest parties

We discuss the semantic security of the execution of the protocol, establishing that no party can extract information about the plaintext or secrets from the elements collected throughout the execution, assuming that other parties are honest (this includes ciphertexts and messages received during the protocol).

External eavesdroppers Let us first discuss security against an adversary that is not participating in the protocol nor controlling any party, but who intercepts all communications except for private scalars and proxy factors (these communications are denoted by dashed paths in figure 3). Additionally, they could send messages to Bob and eavesdrop the forwarding as described in section 2.3. Namely, they could choose any ciphertext \( \tilde{c} \) and a point \( \tilde{X} \) of the large subgroup and eavesdrop \( k_i \tilde{X} \). Such a party holds

\[
\begin{align*}
Q_B &= d_B G \\
P_B &= d_A G \\
\{ P_{F_i} = d_{A} k_i G : i = 1, \ldots, |F| \} & \text{set of transformed shares,} \\
\{ k_i \tilde{X} : i = 1, \ldots, |F| \} & \text{for chosen } \tilde{X} \in E,
\end{align*}
\]
and is interested in extracting \(d_A d_B G\) (the session secret), any proxy factor \(k_i = d_B d_i^{-1}\), or any named scalar. Since proxy factors and secret scalars were generated honestly, note that this party holds values that are indistinguishable from uniformly random elements of the large subgroup. Obtaining any named scalar solves instances of the ECDL problem, and producing the session secret \(d_A d_B G\) solves the computational ECDH problem. This proves that the protocol is semantically secure against passive eavesdroppers.

**Transformation proxy** The proxy collects the following elements throughout the protocol

\[
Q_B = d_B G \\
P_B = d_A G \\
\{k_i : i = 1, \ldots, |F|\} \text{ proxy factors,} \\
\hat{X}_1, \hat{X}_2, \ldots \text{ shares submitted by other parties (2.3)}.
\]

It is clear that all these elements are uniformly random, provided by honest parties. Also, again by the ECDH assumption, the proxy alone cannot produce the session secret \(d_A d_B G\). Naturally, if the proxy and Alice collude (and Alice is not a forwarded party), they can produce the session secret but cannot extract Bob’s secret \(d_B\). In addition, the proxy cannot compute \(d_B\) from the list of proxy factors: recall that \(k_i = d_B d_i^{-1} \mod n\), but since these integers are interpreted in \(\mathbb{F}_n\), there is no notion of GCD (namely, for every \(x, y, z \in \mathbb{F}_n\) there exist \(u, v\) such that \(x = uz, y = vz\)).

**Colluded forwarded parties** Any forwarded party \(F_i\) that also submits a stream of points \(\hat{X}_1, \hat{X}_2, \ldots\) (as in sec. 2.3) collects

\[
Q_B = d_B G \\
d_i \text{ the decryption share,} \\
P_i = d_A d_B d_i^{-1}G \text{ the transformed DH share,} \\
k_i \hat{X}_1, k_i \hat{X}_2, \ldots \text{ transformed DH shares of submitted messages.}
\]

Assume further that this party eavesdrop \(P_B = d_A G\) from the communication between Alice and the proxy (or, equivalently, it is colluded with Alice). Note that, multiplying all DH shares by \(d_i\), this party holds exactly a DH triplet \((d_A G, d_B G, d_A d_B G)\) and a set of ECDL samples \((\hat{X}, d_B \hat{X})\) for chosen \(X\). A collusion between forwarded parties will only extend the list of ECDL samples, thus, security follows from both the ECDL and ECDH assumptions.

### 4.3 Malicious parties

**Malicious proxy** Consider a rogue transformation proxy. It follows from the ECDH and ECDL assumptions that a malicious proxy cannot extract secrets \(d_A, d_B, d_F, d_A d_B\) or \(d_A d_B G\) from its view only. However, there are other possible misbehaviors of a malicious proxy: restrict the forwarding to selected parties, alter proxy factors (sabotaging ciphertexts) or forward messages even if instructed not to. We consider these actions as unavoidable for the forwarding functionality, probably detectable in the context of MTAs, and not part of our trust assumptions.

**Malicious forwarded parties** Note that forwarded parties do not control any value in the protocol, with the exception described in 2.3 where they send messages to Bob themselves and wait for the proxy’s reaction. In this case, they only learn samples of the form \(k_i X\) for chosen \(X \in E\) and proxy factors \(k_i\) (these are uniform elements of the large subgroup). Since this is not a deviation from the protocol, we include these samples in the semi-honest security proof, therefore, security against malicious forwarded parties follows.

**Collusion between the proxy and forwarded parties** Any forwarded party that colludes with the proxy can recover Bob’s key:

\[
d_i k_i = d_i d_i^{-1} d_B = d_B \mod n.
\]

We point out that, while recovering this private key may allow to decrypt other messages, it does not allow to impersonate Bob and generate valid signatures, since compliant OpenPGP implementations consider this key as encryption-only.
5 Conclusions

In this article, we adapted the DH diverting techniques presented in [8] to provide the forwarding functionality to an encrypted email service compatible with the OpenPGP protocol. This allows encrypted emails to be securely forwarded with small modifications to an MTA server and the forwarded parties’ clients. In this context, the scheme we propose

- is **transitive**: Bob can forward his encrypted messages to Charles, Charles can forward them to Daniel, and so forth;
- is **non-interactive**: Bob keys’ are sufficient to derive the proxy transformation factors without any further exchange;
- is **transparent**: Transformed messages are indistinguishable from regular PGP messages;
- and **distributes trust**: We proved that the only way of gaining access to unforwarded emails is for at least one forwarded party to collude with the MTA. In addition, we showed that any set of forwarded parties cannot gain access to the private key without collusion with the proxy, since they confront several independent instances of ECDL and/or ECDH problems.

We verified correctness of the forwarded decryption using two well-known OpenPGP implementations. While this can already be implemented to allow forwarding within users of the same mail provider, we described a concrete proposal to the OpenPGP specification that would imply forwarding compatibility between different implementations.

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A Simulation-based proof

Using the simulation techniques from [9,13], we present a security analysis of the forwarding protocol. This proof addresses the security against semi-honest adversaries, i.e., parties that correctly follow the protocol and sample from the correct distributions, but use all available information to steal secret. Also, a set of semi-honest adversaries can collude.

The idea of simulation-based proofs is to emulate any set of colluded participants by a random simulator residing in an ideal world in which a trusted party exists and the protocol is secure by definition. The rationale behind this proof is that if it was possible to extract secrets from the views of colluded parties, then it would be trivial to distinguish them from the simulator (just select the view that allows to extract secrets). Conversely, if one cannot distinguish between the views, colluded parties cannot extract secrets. Therefore, the objective is to show that the set of elements held by the semi-honest parties (their view of the protocol) are indistinguishable from the elements held by the simulator.

A.1 Security definitions

Ideal functionalities A functionality is a process that maps tuples of inputs to tuples of outputs of a protocol \( \Pi \), one for each party involved. More precisely, for a fixed set \( P = \{P_1, \ldots, P_k\} \) of \( k \) parties participating in the protocol, functionalities are \( k \)-ary functions \( F : (\{0,1\}^*)^k \rightarrow (\{0,1\}^*)^k \) mapping inputs to outputs of \( \Pi \). We write \( F = (f_1, \ldots, f_k) \) where each \( f_i \) is a \( k \)-ary function that outputs a string. In addition, if \( F \) computes the desired outcome by means of a trusted party in an ideal world that can communicate over perfectly secure channels with all participants, we say that \( F \) is an ideal functionality.

Views Given an execution of a protocol \( \Pi \) on inputs \( \mathcal{X} = (x_1, \ldots, x_k) \), the view of party \( P_i \) consists in all elements accessible to \( P_i \) throughout the protocol:

\[
\text{view}_{P_i}(\mathcal{X}) = (x_i, r_i, m_i^1, \ldots, m_i^j),
\]

where \( x_i \) is \( P_i \)'s input, \( r_i \) is the content of its internal random tape used to sample elements, and \( m_i^j \) is the \( j \)-th message it received. Given a set of colluded parties, their joint view is defined as the tuple consisting in the concatenation of their views. Also, let output\(_P(\mathcal{X}) \) be the elements held by party \( P_i \) identified as the output of the protocol (note that the inputs or outputs may be empty for some parties).

Simulators Let \( \Pi \) be a protocol with inputs \( \mathcal{X} = (x_1, \ldots, x_k) \). A simulator is a PPT algorithm that, given an input \( x_i \) corresponding to a party of the protocol, produces a tuple \( \text{sim}_i(x_i) \) similar to the view of this party. A joint simulator takes a set of inputs and produces a tuple similar to the concatenation of the corresponding parties’ views.

Simulation-based proof Following [13], our notion of security is based on emulating ideal functionalities defined by the forwarding protocol. This means that, given a protocol \( \Pi \) with inputs \( \mathcal{X} \), an ideal functionality \( F \) computing the output of \( \Pi(\mathcal{X}) \), and a set of semi-honest colluded parties, we construct a simulator that takes the inputs of these parties and produces a random joint view. We then show that these views along with the output of the protocol (i.e., the real world) and the simulator along with the ideal functionality result of these parties (i.e., the ideal world) are computationally indistinguishable. For instance, when simulating party \( i \), we show that

\[
(\text{view}_{P_i}(\mathcal{X}), \text{output}_{P_i}(\mathcal{X})) \approx (\text{sim}_i(x_i), f_i(\mathcal{X}))
\]

and similarly for joint views of colluded parties, achieving the proof.
A.2 Forwarding ideal functionality

Consider parties Alice, Bob, T (the proxy) and Charlie (the forwarded party). As before, let χ be the distribution that samples private keys uniformly from a subset of \( \mathbb{Z} \), according to the security requirements of E (for instance, in Curve25519 [7], private keys are random samples of the form \( 2^{254} + 8m \) for some \( m < 2^{252} \)). Assume Alice sends a message \((P_B, c)\) to Bob, and Bob’s public key is \( Q_B = d_BG \).

A basic forwarding ideal functionality could be given by

\[
(P_B, c), (Q_B, k_{BC}, d_C), \rightarrow (\cdot, \cdot, (P_C, c))
\]

such that \( d_C P_C = d_B P_B \). This works since Charlie receives \( d_C \) at some point in the protocol, and can decrypt \( c \) given \( S' = d_C P_C \). However, note that this functionality does not take into account multiple forwarded parties, nor the fact that those parties can also submit messages to Bob (as in section 2.3). Recall also that, for each forwarded party \( F_j \in F \), we note by \( k_i := k_{BF_j} \) the proxy factor held by \( T \) and \( d_i := d_{F_j} \) the secret scalar held by \( F_j \).

**Definition 1.** Consider parties Alice, Bob, T (the proxy) and \( F = \{ F_1, \ldots, F_m \} \) (the forwarded parties). Let

\[
\chi := (\chi_A, \chi_B, \chi_T, \chi_{F_1}, \ldots, \chi_{F_m})
\]

be the input of the protocol where:

\[
\begin{align*}
\chi_A & := P_B, c & \text{Alice’s message}, \\
\chi_B & := Q_B, (k_i, d_i)_{i=1}^m & \text{Bob’s public key, proxy factors, and secret shares}, \\
\chi_T & := \cdot \\
\chi_{F_1} & := (X_{ij})_{j=1}^{n_1} & F_1 \text{ sends } n_1 \text{ messages to Bob as in 2.3}, \\
\vdots & & \vdots \\
\chi_{F_m} & := (X_{mj})_{j=1}^{n_m} & F_m \text{ sends } n_m \text{ messages to Bob as in 2.3}.
\end{align*}
\]

The forwarding functionality is \( F = (F_A, F_B, F_T, F_{F_1}, \ldots, F_{F_m}) \) where:

\[
\begin{align*}
F_A & : \chi \mapsto \cdot \\
F_B & : \chi \mapsto c, d_B, P_B, ((X_{ij})_{j=1}^{n_1})_{i=1}^m \\
F_T & : \chi \mapsto \cdot \\
F_{F_1} & : \chi \mapsto c, d_{i_1}, P_{i_1}, ((k_i X_{ij})_{j=1}^{n_1})_{i=1}^m \\
\vdots & & \vdots \\
F_{F_m} & : \chi \mapsto c, d_{i_m}, P_{i_m}, ((k_m X_{ij})_{j=1}^{n_1})_{i=1}^m
\end{align*}
\]

such that \( d_{i_1} P_{i_1} = d_{i_2} P_{i_2} = \cdots = d_{i_m} P_{i_m} = d_B P_B \).

Note that for every message \( X_{ij} \) sent as in 2.3, forwarded parties also receive an encryption \( c_{ij} \) of some message. Without loss of generality, we omit these encryptions from the ideal functionality, since these are trivial to simulate and provide no information to attackers (as they are simply transmitted unaltered throughout the protocol).

More precisely, following section 2.3, forwarded parties pick any message \( \tilde{m} \) and a secret key \( \tilde{d} \leftarrow \chi \), set \( S' = \tilde{d} Q_B \) where \( Q_B \) is Bob’s public key, and let \( X_{ij} = \tilde{d} G, c_{ij} = \text{Enc}_S(m) \). Instead, without loss of generality, we let forwarded parties freely choose \( X_{ij} \) as an input to the protocol.

A.3 Security against colluded, eavesdropper semi-honest parties

**Simulating the semi-honest proxy** According to the protocol described in section 2.2, we have the following view of the proxy throughout the protocol:

\[
\text{view}_T(\chi) = (\cdot, c, P_B, k_1, \ldots, k_m, (X_{ij}))
\]
Recall that (i) there is no input or output for \( \sim_1 \) honestly in this case (in particular, forwarded parties, in definition 1). Indeed, for each where each \( i \) and sent it is straightforward to see that view \( \sim_1 \) access the input and output of a forwarded party can simulate it trivially. In this case, we have simply for chosen ciphertexts).

**Simulating forwarded parties** As described in section 2.3, each forwarded party \( F_i \) computes the session secret \( S = d_i P_i \) from the output, and also has a stream of pairs of the form \( (X_{ij}, k_i X_{ij}) \in E^2 \) for chosen \( X_{ij} \) (this is the result of sending messages encrypted to Bob and parsing the forwarded ciphertexts).

\[
\text{view}_{F_i}(\mathcal{X}) = ((X_{ij})_{j=1}^{n_i}; \cdot, d_i, P_i, (k_i X_{ij})_{j=1}^{n_i})
\]

Note that, since there are no intermediate values computed by forwarded parties, a simulator that can access the input and output of a forwarded party can simulate it trivially. In this case, we have simply

\[
\left( \text{sim}_{F_i}(\mathcal{X}_{F_i}), P_i(\mathcal{X}) \right) \equiv \left( \text{view}_{F_i}(\mathcal{X}), \text{output}_{F_i}(\mathcal{X}) \right).
\]

Naturally, the joint view of colluded forwarded parties is also trivially simulated by the joint simulators.

**Simulating colluded, eavesdropper forwarded parties** Additionally, let us assume further that this party eavesdropped the share \( P_B = d_A G \) from the communication between Alice and the proxy, and recall that they also have the public key \( Q_B = d_B G \). Such party has the following view and output:

\[
\text{view}_{F_i}(\mathcal{X}) = ((X_{ij})_{j=1}^{n_i}; d_A G, d_B G; \cdot, d_i, P_i, (k_i X_{ij})_{j=1}^{n_i})
\]

Consider the simulator that samples \( x, y \sim \chi \) and sets

\[
\left( \text{sim}_{F_i}(\mathcal{X}_{F_i}), P_i(\mathcal{X}) \right) = ((X_{ij})_{j=1}^{n_i}; xG, yG; \cdot, d_i, P_i, (k_i X_{ij})_{j=1}^{n_i}).
\]

The only distinct elements are \( d_A G, d_B G \) and \( xG, yG \). Note that, since \( d_i P_i = d_A d_B G \), a DH triplet \((d_A G, d_B G, d_A d_B G)\) can be composed in the view. The simulator, on the other hand, can compose the tuple \((xG, yG, d_A d_B G)\). However, since \( d_A d_B G \) is uniformly random, this tuple is indistinguishable from a proper DH triplet \((xG, yG, xyG)\) by the ECDH assumption. It follows that the view and the simulator are computationally indistinguishable. It is straightforward to extend the simulator and address the case where multiple semi-honest forwarded parties collude: The joint view and output will only have more independent ECDL samples of the form \((X, k_i X)\) and parties can compose the same ECDH triplet (also, note that the additional samples \( d_i, P_i \) of the form are also accessible by the simulator, and the same argument holds).

Putting all these cases together, it follows that the protocol securely computes \( F \) in presence of semi-honest, colluded adversaries.