Reviving a Natural Right: The Freedom of Autonomy Amendment

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Something is wrong in twenty-first century America when it comes to recognizing certain “self-evident truths” of freedom identified in its founding document nearly 23 decades ago. In particular, the United States today fails to uphold the core principle of the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal: that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights: that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” This description was more than just an accidental well-turned phrase – as demonstrated by the historical record, it represented the very foundation of the Revolutionary political theory, and was intended to draw strict boundaries for the proper reach of government. America of the early twenty-first century is a place where oppressive state constitutional amendments discriminate against same-sex couples; where compassionate end-of-life choice is illegal in 49 states and where the one state where it is legal is being sued by the U.S. government; where tens of thousands are in prison for possessing or using marijuana; where a woman’s right to maintain control over her own reproductive decisions hangs by a thread; and where religious freedom is under relentless attack. How is it that Tocqueville’s prediction of a “wholly new species of oppression…, [where] the democratic government, acting in response to the will of the majority, … create[s] a society with a network of … [rules] that none can escape” has indeed come to pass?

This essay explores progressively the nature of the right of “freedom of autonomy,” several present-day applications and the right’s historical foundations, then asserts that nothing short of a constitutional amendment prohibiting federal and state government from abridging any person’s individual freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private concern will suffice in protecting the right as it was envisioned at the time of America’s founding and reaffirmed in the Reconstruction. Now is the time for change.

I. INTRODUCTION

Something is wrong in twenty-first century America when it comes to recognizing certain “self-evident truths” of freedom identified in its founding document nearly 23 decades ago. In particular, the United States today fails to uphold the core principle of the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal: that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights: that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” This description was more than just an accidental well-turned phrase – as demonstrated by the

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1 Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law.
2 “We hold these truths to be self-evident….” Declaration of Independence.
3 Declaration of Independence. Historian Leonard Levy writes, “The pursuit of happiness, a phrase used by Locke for a concept that underlay his political ethics, subsumed the great rights of liberty and property, which were inextricably related. Lockean thought, to which the Framers subscribed, included within the pursuit of happiness that which delighted and contented the mind and a belief that indispensable to it were good health, reputation, and knowledge. There was nothing radical in the idea of the right to the pursuit of happiness. [Even ]the anti-American Tory Dr. Samuel Johnson had used the phrase, and Sir William Blackstone, also a Tory, employed a close equivalent in his Commentaries in 1765 when remarking ‘that man should pursue his own happiness. This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law.” Leonard Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 251 (2001 Yale Nota Bene ed.).
historical record, it represented the very foundation of the Revolutionary political theory, and was intended to draw strict boundaries for the proper reach of government. The radical nature of this statement lies in the fact that no political regime had ever before so clearly and openly placed individual liberties beyond the reach of government.

We’ve come a long way in America since the founding, but in the modern era we’ve come in precisely the wrong direction in honoring the sort of rich individual liberties of equality and of free choice on matters of natural private concern (call it collectively “freedom of autonomy”) demanded in the Declaration of Independence, and memorialized in the Constitution. Although progress has been made to correct some government practices fundamentally inconsistent with the Declaration’s exhortations - slavery was abolished; blacks, women and non-propertied men

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4 According to American revolutionary theory, … natural rights … were possessed by individuals in the state of nature, which existed before people voluntarily contracted with each other to establish a government whose purpose was to secure their rights. In the state of nature, when only the law of nature governed, the theory posited that – as the first section of the Virginia Declaration of Rights stated – “all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” Levy, supra note 3 at 15-16. “Madison, presenting his proposed [Bill of Rights], spoke of ‘the perfect equality of mankind.’” Id. at 254-55.

5 In substance the term “freedom of autonomy” encompasses, but is not completed by, the Supreme Court’s fourteenth amendment privacy and equal protection doctrines. The term “freedom of autonomy” is used to allow a fresh look at, and revival of, the thinking that existed from the pre-Revolutionary and founding eras through the nation’s early decades of a comprehensive, broad-based individual freedom in which government is strictly subordinate to the individual and acts legitimately only insofar as it protects individual liberty and equality on matters of natural private concern; and to urge a repudiation of the current conventional thinking in which government predominate at the expense of the individual and parses out recognition of privacy rights like so many sugar cubes to a cooperative pony.

6 “In the minds of the Framers, many provisions of the Constitution had a libertarian character [of limiting government to promote individual liberty]…. During the controversy over ratification of the Constitution, when the omission of a bill of rights was the major issue, many Framers argued, as did Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 84, ‘that the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, a Bill of Rights.’… The overwhelming majority of the Convention believed … that a bill of rights ‘is unnecessary.’” Levy, supra note 3 at 17-19. In creating a new national government with strictly enumerated limited powers, the Framers could not conceive of the government infringing on rights. “While a new national power system emerged from [the Constitutional ratification] struggle, it does not mark a sudden break in the ideological history of our national origins. [Rather, t]he essential spirit of eighteenth-century reform – its idealism, its determination to free the individual from the power of the state, even a reformed state – lived on, and lives on still.” BAILYN, BERNARD, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION viii (Enl. Ed. 1992 (1967 (winner of Bancroft and Pulitzer Prizes))).

Similarly, “[t]o argue that the Framers had used natural rights as a means of escaping obligations of obedience to the king [Declaration] but did not use natural rights ‘as a source for rules of decision’ [Constitution] is hogwash. One has only to read the state recommendations for a bill of rights to know that the natural rights philosophy seized the minds of the Framers as it had the minds of the rebellious patriots of 1776. One can also read natural rights opinions by members of the early Supreme Court to arrive at the same conclusion….“ Levy, supra note 3 at 255-56. (Point of definition: It is useful to distinguish the “founders” of the Declaration of Independence from the “framers” of the Constitution - only eight of the 55 signers of the Declaration were among the 39 signers of the Constitution. Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution 4-5 (2d ed. 2003 [2002])).

7 Even in the beginning the statement that “all men are created equal” was hypocrical in the extreme, in light of the facts that in 1776 slavery was legal – and would continue to be legal for many more decades; that many adults, including women - fully half of the adult population - could not vote; and that Native
got the vote; and some (but only some) of the inequities experienced by Native Americans have been addressed - the unfortunate fact remains in the early twenty-first century that America, the “Land of the Free” immortalized in story and song, is assuredly no longer – if it ever was - “the freest nation on Earth,” notwithstanding politicians’ and others’ routine proclamations to the contrary.8

One need look no further than the election of 2004, when state constitutional amendments dramatically restricting the liberties of millions of Americans were passed in all thirteen states where they were on the ballot9 - blatant discrimination disguised under the good name of democracy - to get an idea how widespread is the larceny. America is losing ground - is backtracking - on matters of freedom of autonomy. Today, more than ever, majorities are allowed to steal from minorities what are inherent natural rights of individual autonomy, and to impose upon others their own chosen brands of morality and sets of values.10

Americans had only begun to be systematically deprived and cheated of their rights. As stated by the political historian Robert A. Dahl,

The authors of the familiar words about equality … and the fifty-five delegates of the Second Continental Congress who voted to adopt the Declaration in July 1776, were, of course, all men, none of whom had the slightest intention of extending the suffrage or many other basic political and civil rights to women – who by the laws of that time and for a full century after were the legal property of their fathers or husbands. Nor did the worthy supporters of the Declaration mean to include slaves or, for that matter, free persons of African origin, who were a substantial fraction of the population in almost all the colonies…. The principal author of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson, owned several hundred slaves none of whom he freed during his life…. Nor did our noble Declaration mean to include the people who for thousands of years had inhabited the lands that Europeans colonized and came to occupy…."

Dahl, supra note 6 at 124-25. So much for self-evident truths.

8 Other governments such as The Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada, to name just a few, have surpassed the United States in their tolerance of individual freedom of autonomy. Those who cling to the myth of America as the preeminent keeper of the flame of freedom point mainly to two aspects of the U.S. Constitution: one, the requirement of democratic elections to select representatives to the legislative and executive branches of federal and state government; and two, the Bill of Rights’ and fourteenth amendment’s guarantees that certain individual freedoms are beyond the government’s reach. As for the first, free democratic elections do not a free nation make. Elections are a crucial element of free societies, to be sure, but it does not follow as a matter of course that free democratic elections create free societies – in fact, representatives democratically elected by majorities are all-too-capable of systematically oppression a vast assortment of minority freedoms, and they do so all the time right here in America. On the second, there’s no question the Bill of Rights and fourteenth amendment have been instrumental in protecting individual liberties. The problem is that the guarantees are unevenly applied, in large part because the provisions are not explicit in the liberties that they are meant to protect. This ambiguity was largely by design, of course, to allow future generations some degree of interpretive flexibility to respond to changing times, see, generally, e.g., Levy, supra note 3; Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights (Yale 1998), but its downside is that the judiciary may sometimes adopt more restrictive interpretations of individual rights than it should in a nation whose founders held as one of their highest values the preservation of individual liberty.

9 The amendments were ostensibly to ban same-sex marriage, but in fact their intent and scope are far broader than that in curbing the rights of gay Americans. In Michigan, to offer just one example (this is happening others of the thirteen states as well), the state’s Attorney General recently issued an opinion that state actors could no longer extend benefits to same-sex couples.

10 The sort of moral watch-dogging engaged in by these majorities reminds one of an old Dr. Seuss rhyme:

Out west, near Hawth-hawtch, there’s a Hawthet-Hawtcher Bee-Watcher. His job is to watch… Is to keep both his eyes on the lazy town bee. A bee that is watched will work harder, you see. Well… he watched and he watched. But, in spite of his watch, that bee didn’t work any harder. Not mawtch. So then somebody said, ‘our old bee-watching man just isn’t bee-watching as hard
Moreover, even in the areas where America historically has led the way for other nations – protecting religious plurality, for example, as practiced in the pre-Revolutionary colonies and guaranteed by the Establishment Clause requirement that the government shall not favor one religion over another (or, for that matter, religion in general over non-religion) and the free exercise clause – Americans’ basic freedoms are suffering a slow but steady “death by a thousand cuts.”

Who can remember the last time Congress took a principled though unpopular stand for individual freedom of autonomy? In the United States Congress of the twenty-first century, the Senate votes 99-0 to condemn a U.S. Court of Appeals decision protecting an atheist’s right to have his daughter educated free of government coercion to pledge allegiance to one Nation “under God,” and both houses pass legislation (eagerly signed by the president) attempting through procedural maneuvering to prevent a woman in a persistent vegetative state from exercising her right to be free of unwanted medical treatment and remove feeding tubes, even though state courts had determined repeatedly by the evidentiary standard required by state law (clear and convincing evidence), that she would wish not to be maintained in that condition.

Dr. Seuss, Did I Ever Tell You How Lucky You Are? (196_).

11 Levy, supra note 3, at 6 (writing that “Maryland’s Toleration Act of 1649 was far more liberal than England’s Toleration Act forty years later,… [and] was the first to use the phrase ‘the free exercise of religion,’ later embodied in the First Amendment. The act also symbolized the extraordinary fact that for most of the seventeenth century in Maryland, Catholics and Protestants openly worshiped as they chose and lived in peace, if not amity…. [T]he Charter of Rhode Island … made the guarantee of religious liberty a part of the fundamental law. It secured for all inhabitants ‘the free exercise and enjoyment of their civil and religious rights.” At the time of the founding, “nowhere did freedom of religion prosper as it did in America.” Levy, supra at 3.

12 See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.

13 See Michael Anthony Lawrence, Court Misses Chance in Pledge Case, The Detroit News, May _, 2004. See Moving Quickly, Congress Passes Schiavo Measure, NY Times, March 21, 2004. See Lawrence, Michael Anthony, “Actions Show Congress’ Total Disregard for a Citizen’s “Right to be Left Alone,” Detroit Free Press, March 22, 2005. Congress’s action in this case was inappropriate on multiple levels. Indeed, the current House majority leader Tom DeLay, a little man prone to bullying and corruption, see, e.g., _ Wall St. J._, epitomizes the constitutionally clueless attitude held by the United States Congress in his comment responding to the federal courts’ declining to take up Congress’s cause in this case: “[These judges] thumbed their nose at Congress and the president…. [T]he time will come for the men responsible for this to answer for their behavior, but not today.” Editorial, Judges under Attack, International Herald-Tribune, April 6, 2005. As noted by the editors, “Coming so close to the fatal shooting of one judge in his courtroom and the killing of two family members of another, those words were at best an appalling example of irresponsibility in pursuit of political gain. But they wer not an angry, off-the-cuff reaction…. Republicans in Congress and the Bush administration, unhappy with some of the rulings of the judiciary, are trying to write it out of its constitutional role…. [I]f Congress succeeds in curtailing the judiciary’s ability to act as a check on the other two branches, the United States will be far less free.” Id.

Listen to this 1730 description of Parliament and the prime minister as “chief ruler” by a leading opposition writer, Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, (whose writings influenced the Revolutionary generation, see infra notes 144, 148), and query if it doesn’t sound disconcertingly like the U.S. Congress of the twenty first century: “The chief ruler [majority leader], is nominally a minister only … but in reality he is a...
The sort of positions being taken by Congress and the president in these and other cases would have been unthinkable through much of the nation’s history. The most basic concept among the founding generations for what this new nation “America” was to stand for was the lofty principle that government of any sort simply lacks the authority – legal, moral, or otherwise - to interfere with individual liberty on matters of natural private concern. This principle was important enough over which to fight a war of independence, and is memorialized in word and spirit in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. It was a major theme of the Reconstruction which brought wayward states into the fold of personal liberty. The preeminence of the concept was recognized by Justice Louis Brandeis when he stated famously in 1928, “The makers of our Constitution … conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”

Given the bleak present picture, what does the future hold for the cause of freedom of autonomy in America? Do the results of the 2004 election, as only the most recent example of the atrocities being committed against the cause of individual freedom, suggest that it is too late? Is America incorrigible when it comes to making a real commitment to freedom of autonomy – that is, to respecting the right of other people to do what they will even if it horrifies or repulses us?

souverain, as despotic, arbitrary a sovereign as this part of the world affords …. [He] hath unjustly engrossed the whole power of a nation into his own hands … [and] admits no person to any considerable post of trust and power under him who is not either a relation, a creature, or a thorough-paced tool whom he can lead at pleasure into any dirty work without being able to discover his designs or the consequences of them…. Some deputies [Representatives] are tied down with honors, titles, and preferments, of which the [chief ruler][majority leader] engrosses the disposal to himself, and others with bribes which are called pensions in these countries. Some are persuaded to prostitute themselves for the lean reward of hopes and promises; and others, more senseless than all of them, have sacrificed their principles and consciences to a set of party names, without any meaning, or the vanity of appearing in favor at court [before the president].’ Bailyn, supra note 6, at 50 (quoting The Craftsman, nos. 172, October 18, 1729; and 198 April 18, 1730 (in the London, 1731 ed. V, 152-153, 155, 156; VI 138 ff.).

The PATRIOT Act of 2001 itself is worthy of volumes of discussion on its abridgement of civil liberties and, for our purposes, freedom of autonomy.

“...The dominant theory in the United States from the time of the Revolution was that the fundamental law limited all branches of the government, not just the crown as in England, where the great liberty documents did not limit the legislative power.” Levy, supra note 3 at 24.

Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The quote, in full, states:
The protection guaranteed by the amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation.…. Id. As a reminder to Congress, the President, and all other federal, state and local government officials of the axiom that government acts legitimately only insofar as it protects the individual’s “right to be let alone,” Justice Brandeis’ “right to be let alone” opinion should be framed and placed in every federal and state building in the land - perhaps in place of the Ten Commandments.

Is there an alternative to a world where groups of individuals and governments “proclaim, in a variety of accents: “We are the Chosen Ones, let the rest of humanity go to hell”? Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution 23 (Yale 1992)[hereinafter Liberal Revolution]. Yes. On toleration, we can benefit by looking at things from a deontological point of view. Individuals and government alike (government is, after all, composed of individual people) presumably would be more tolerant in their behaviors and policies
From an institutional sense certainly it is not too late – America has the governmental structure, with the Constitution, to effect major change. And certainly America has the legacy of freedom – the stalwart individuals who peopled the continent from pre-Revolutionary days through the early decades of the new nation had it within themselves to stand firmly on principles of liberty. Whether Americans in the twenty-first century have the will to fight the good fight is a much more uncertain question. A good many Americans have proven themselves to be remarkably intolerant on matters involving individual freedom of autonomy - and the necessary changes are going to require a lot of goodwill and tolerance on the part of many millions of people.

Truth be told, America’s current struggles are not entirely unanticipated. Alexis de Tocqueville, while predicting the inevitability of democracy’s appeal worldwide in stating, “The gradual development of the equality of conditions is … a providential fact, and it possesses all the characteristics of a Divine decree: it is universal, it is durable, it constantly eludes all human interference, and all events as well as men contribute to its progress,” wasn’t so sanguine about the long-term effects of democratic political equality on individuals: “[A] wholly new species of oppression will arise. Among citizens equal and alike, the supreme power, the democratic government, acting in response to the will of the majority, will create a society with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, that none can escape. [Sound familiar?] Ultimately, then, the citizens of a democratic country will be reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.”

if operating under a semblance of the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance,” where we imagine ourselves ignorant of particular facts “such as [our] race, gender, intelligence, disabilities or lack of them, [our] particular life plan and proclivities, and all other particular facts about [our] aspirations and circumstances. In this original position [we] would be permitted to have knowledge only of ‘general facts’ about [our] societies, such as that a condition of moderate scarcity obtains, and widely accepted laws of psychology and economics…. It is like being asked to agree on the rules for playing a game before you know whether they will work to your advantage, or a congressman being bound in advance by the findings of a military base-closing commission before knowing whether the commission will recommend closing the base in his district.” IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF POLITICS 116 (2003) (citing John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 113 (2d ed Harvard 1999)). The idea is rather like the old kindergarten maxim to ‘treat others as you would like to be treated yourself.”

In a similar vein, Bruce Ackerman asks us to consider a flesh and blood “stranger”: “Strangers may live next door, but they are not like us. They are doing odd things at odd times for reasons that disturb us in basic ways. How to respond to this unease? By loving the strangers as ourselves? Only a god could do this: there are too many strangers with too many strangenesses. Or should we persuade the strangers to change their actions and beliefs so they agree with ours? I would never give up on this project. But persuasion and reflection take time; I must listen to the strangers’ arguments if I expect them to listen to mine. In the meantime, an abyss lies between us, and we may die before one of us comes to see the other’s truth for what it is. How then are we to conduct our ongoing life together? … You and I may remain strangers, but we may find common ground in a politics that protects our equal right to cultivate our distinctive characters without any one stranger calling the shots…. [If we do this.] we may be something more than strangers, if less than friends…. However odd or perverse our beliefs may seem to one another, perhaps we can find common ground in recognizing this: you and I are both struggling to find meaning in the world.” Ackerman, supra at 22.

19 Dahl, supra note 6, at 126 (quoting Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America vol. 1, p. lxxxi (New York: Schocken Books 1961, Henry Reeve, trans.)).

20 Id. at 133 (closely paraphrasing Tocqueville, supra note 19, at 1: 298, 304, and 2: 380-81.). Before Tocqueville, Benjamin Franklin had similar concerns, commenting upon the finished Constitution to the Constitutional Convention (to which he was not a delegate, serving during that time in France) in 1787. “I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such: because I think a General Government necessary for us, and there is no Form of Government but what may be a Blessing to the People if well-administered; and I believe farther that this is likely to well administered for a Course of Years and can
Tocqueville’s prediction provokes a spirited rebuttal from modern defenders of democracy like Ronald Dahl, who states, “if we read the passages as a forecast of the way in which democratic countries would tend to evolve, I think we are bound to conclude that Tocqueville was just dead wrong. When we examine the course of democratic development over the past two centuries, and particularly over the century just ended, what we find is a pattern of democratic development that stands in total contradiction to such a prediction. We find instead that as democratic institutions become more deeply rooted in a country, so do fundamental political rights, liberties, and opportunities. As a democratic government matures in a country, the likelihood that it will give way to an authoritarian regime approaches zero.”21

To the extent Tocqueville’s passage is read as predicting that democracy leads inevitably to authoritarian government, Dahl undoubtedly is correct – history has shown, at least to date, that mature democratic regimes do not give rise to authoritarianism. Indeed, democracy is the best political alternative so far devised for protecting individual liberty22 – post-Enlightenment23 or

only end in Despotism as other Forms have done before it, when the People shall become so corrupted as to need Despotic Government, being incapable of any other.” Gore Vidal, Inventing a Nation: Washington, Adams, Jefferson 31 (2003). Gore Vidal, the popular author and commentator on American life, offers the following observation: “Now, two centuries and sixteen years later, Franklin’s blunt dark prophecy has come true: popular corruption has indeed given birth to that Despotic Government which he foresaw as inevitable at our birth. Unsurprisingly, a third edition of [an] admirable [biography of Franklin] is now on sale … with, significantly – inevitably?, Franklin’s somber prediction cut out thus silencing our only great ancestral voice to predict Enron et seq., not to mention November 2000, and, following that, despotism whose traditional activity, war, now hedges us all around. No wonder that so many academic histories of our republic and its origins tend to gaze fixedly upon the sunny aspects of a history growing ever darker. No wonder they choose to disregard the wise, eerily prescient voice of the authentic Franklin in favor of the jolly fat ventriloquist of common lore…. It would appear that even to this day Franklin has been censored. In the best of America’s high school history books, The American Pageant, … there is a curious passage about Franklin vis-à-vis the Constitutional Convention: Franklin ‘was inclined to be indiscreetly talkative in his declining years. Concerned for the secrecy of their deliberations, the convention assigned chaperones to accompany Franklin to dinner parties and make sure he held his tongue.’ Thus were we deprived of the wisdom of the only worldly – not to mention perhaps the wisest – of the founders. But then much in our intellectual political life has always been ritually suppressed for secrecy’s sake.” Vidal, supra, at 30-31, 32-33. 

21 Dahl, supra note 6 at 134. Dahl adds, “Democracy can, as we all know, collapse into dictatorship. But breakdowns are extraordinarily rare in mature democracies…. Even mature democratic countries have had to face wars, economic depression, large-scale unemployment, terrorism, and other challenges. But they did not collapse into authoritarian regimes. In the twentieth century, on something like seventy occasions democracies have given way to nondemocratic regimes. Yet with very few exceptions, these breakdowns have occurred in countries where democratic institutions were very new – less than a generation old.” Id. 

22 “The historical record reveals that democracies are better respecters of individual rights and civil liberties than nondemocracies.” Shapiro, supra note 18, at 226. Moreover, “the democratic tradition also does comparatively well when considered alongside” other post-Enlightenment intellectual political traditions like classical utilitarianism, social contract theory, Marxism, and anti-Enlightenment theory. Specifically, classical utilitarianism … [is] indifferent to individual rights, rendering it vulnerable to Rawls’s critique that it fails to take seriously the differences among persons. Neoclassical utilitarianism avoids this charge, but at the price of taking on new difficulties with respect to individual rights. In some formulations it operates with so robust a libertarian conception of individual autonomy that it violates the rights of others once unintended harms and the broader context of resources is taken into account…. The Marxist tradition oscillates between an implausible utopian ideal, according to which the need for rights would be rendered obsolete with the abolition of injustice, and a strong version of Locke’s workmanship ideal. This is incoherently cashed out as the theory of exploitation and it is in any case vulnerable to Rawls’s argument about moral arbitrariness....
otherwise. But given its more natural reading, the passage describes not so much the transformation of government into an authoritarian regime as it does the subtle changes likely to occur after decades and centuries of “majority tyranny” in a democracy. What is the nature of this change? Answer: entrenched bureaucracy, government sclerosis created by generations of majorities seeking to solidify and perpetuate their legacy by institutionalizing their policies.

Nor is there an account of who will decide how, and to what extent, minimizing exploitation should be traded off against other goods such as efficiency, or of who will hold decision-makers accountable for their decisions about these matters…. Certainly the record of nondemocratic socialist and communist states that have existed in the world is scarcely encouraging [on the matter of protecting individual rights]…. [For its part, [the anti-Enlightenment move is profoundly unsatisfactory with respect to individual rights. Burke’s argument is a caution against making things worse by trying to make them better, and he reasonably reminds us that changing our political institutions has an inescapable dimension of rebuilding a ship at sea. Well taken as his admonitions against vanguardism undoubtedly are, ships sometimes rot and decay, and they can sometimes be improved upon. That a system of institutions has endured may create a presumption in favor of its legitimacy, but it is a rebuttable one…. Various postmodern and communitarian schools of thought … may often leave objectionable practices unscathed…. In contrast, the democratic approach creates an impetus to reform inherited practices as they are reproduced into the future: Minimizing the domination they can foster by pressing for decision-making in accordance with the principle of affected interest and opening up avenues for meaningful opposition. When it operates well, democratization leads to a world in which collective practices achieve, and deserve, increasing legitimacy. Last, but by no means least important, the democratic tradition offers fruitful resources to manage the potential tensions between the Enlightenment commitments to the pursuit of truth through science and the centrality of individual rights [e.g., ‘if there are unassailable right answers about political legitimacy that any clearheaded person must affirm, in what sense do people really have the right to decide this for themselves? But if they are free to reject what science reveals on the basis of their own convictions, then what is left of science’s claim to priority over other modes of engaging with the world?’ Id. at 17]… Both values are better served by the structured instability of power relations that proponents of democracy seek to institutionalize. Democracy is a system in which those who are disadvantaged by present arrangements have both the incentive and the resources to point to the defects of those arrangements, show how the truth about them is being obscured, and try to get those arrangements changed. In a world in which those contending for power must appeal to the human interest in knowing and acting on the truth, there will always be those who try to twist the truth to their purposes, thereby taking advantage of others. Democratic competition for power … is the best available response to this state of affairs. It is, however, better thought of as essential medicine for a chronic malady than as a cure that will ever render the treatment redundant.”

Shapiro, supra note 18, at 227-30.

23 The Enlightenment’s attention to individual rights “differentiates its political philosophy from the ancient and medieval commitments to order and hierarchy. This focus brings the freedom of the individual to the center of arguments about politics. This move was signaled in the natural law tradition by a shift in emphasis from the logic of law to the idea of natural right. SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 14. Along with its commitment to individual rights, the Enlightenment is characterized by a preoccupation with science. Id. at 224 (noting that the concerns of science and individual rights “enjoy a lineage that predates the Enlightenment. Plato’s discussion of democracy reminds us that political philosophers had been concerned both with potential tensions between democracy and the truth for over two millennia and with the possibility that, in a democracy, respect for individual freedom might be threatened by mob tyranny.”… There is nothing entirely new under the modern sun.”).

24 James Madison was keenly aware of the threat that majorities pose to individual liberties. In his speech before Congress on June 8, 1789, he stated that “[t]he great objective he had in mind for the Bill of Rights … was to limit the powers of government, thus preventing legislative as well as executive abuse, and above all preventing abuses of power by ‘the body of the people, operating by the majority against the minority.’ Mere ‘paper barriers’ might fail, but they raised a standard that might educate the majority against acts to which they might be inclined.” Levy, supra note 3, at 35.
through picayune rules and regulations that reach into virtually every corner of life - rules and regulations which by their very nature cannot help but infringe on individual liberties including, for purposes of this essay, the individual freedom of autonomy.

And so it is today. Tocqueville’s blunt, remarkably prescient prediction for the mature democracy is an all-too-accurate description of life in twenty-first century America. While it doesn’t contribute to a positive self image to consider oneself as part of a flock of timid animals (even if industrious) beholden to its government shepherd, the description rings uncomfortably true. On a more optimistic note, perhaps some among the flock, if given a ray of hope, would enthusiastically agree that the shepherd needs to be re-directed.

Look again to the inspirational words of the Declaration of Independence, not just as lofty and unattainable rhetoric, but as a realistic – though highly elusive - goal. From the beginning, our forebears knew it would not be easy. When freedom was on the line, “the colonists knew … [w]hat would in fact happen in England and America would be the result … of the degree of vigilance and the strength of purpose the people could exert. For they believed … [t]he preservation of liberty would continue to be what it had been in the past, a bitter struggle with adversity.”

The preservation of liberty continues to be yet today what it has been in the past - a bitter struggle with adversity. Only time will tell how the next stage in freedom’s evolution (or revolution) plays out in America – and whether modern-day Americans have the guts to make the necessary changes to ensure liberty, or instead demonstrate themselves to be mere sheep unworthy of their ancestors’ stalwart legacy.

As a preliminary matter, the arguments advanced in this essay might be described, depending on the taxonomy adopted, at various points as “rights foundationalist,” “liberal,” “liberal republican,” “Lockean,” “Jeffersonian,” “constitutionalist,” “civil libertarian,” “social

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25 Bailyn, supra note 3 at 85.
26 Labels, as academics know, can be useful in organizing taxonomies, although they can also be limiting. We’ve become so committed to roles and labels – and so polarized - in America that we think the roles and labels define us. In the end, it’s not the labels that matter – it’s the substance behind the labels that counts.
27 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-16 (Belknap: Harvard 1991) [hereinafter Foundations] (contrasting “monist” arguments (favoring democratic processes over rights theory) with “foundationalist” arguments (those favoring rights theory over democratic processes), and proposing a middle (“dualist”) ground).
28 See infra notes 63, 67-70 and accompanying text.
29 The arguments line up, at least partially, with Ackerman’s description, writing, “[t]his kind of liberalism[, liberal republicanism,] does not look upon people as abstract individuals, divorced from their social contexts, nor does it embrace the notion of “natural rights” to property and contract…. It insists that the foundation of personal liberty is a certain kind of political life – one requiring the ongoing exertions of a special kind of citizenry. Rather than grounding personal freedom on some putatively prepolitical ‘state of nature,’ this kind of liberalism makes the cultivation of liberal citizenship central to its enterprise.” Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 27, at 30. Agreed – except there are some rights that are special, that are grounded in a ‘prepolitical ‘state of nature’: “privacy” rights, for example, some (but not all) of the rights embraced within the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment assuredly are not subject to “ongoing exertions … of citizenry.” They are absolute natural rights, beyond any actions of the citizenry – nothing the citizenry does or says should be able to alter them. Freedom of autonomy is likewise this sort of absolute, natural right.
contractarian,”^34 “radical,” and/or “revolutionary,”^35 – but will settle just for “thought-provoking.”

It is not surprising that “[w]e will search the Federalist Papers in vain for an elaborate description of a ‘state of nature’ or a penetrating analysis of our ‘natural rights,’ Lockean or otherwise,” as Ackerman points out – after all Madison, Hamilton and Jay were engaged in a fierce debate with the anti-federalists in their efforts to persuade the states that the Constitution was not a betrayal of all that the Revolution had stood for and accomplished, and they understandably countered with their own best arguments in the Federalist Papers. The natural rights argument was a particularly difficult point for them to get around, so better perhaps not to mention it at all. (Moreover, Despite their (justified) currency and stature today, The Federalist Papers themselves were not the only word on the street in 1787. See, generally Bailyn, supra note 6.) So, the fact that the Federalist Papers did not discuss natural rights does not mean that their authors or the rest of the framing generation had abandoned the core idea certain rights are beyond the reach of government – far from it. As outlined by Bernard Bailyn and Leonard Levy in their exhaustive works on the literature of the Revolutionary era, there is an overwhelming abundance of material supporting the point that the post-Revolutionary era did not abandon outright their core belief that certain aspects of individual liberty are beyond the reach of government – state or federal.

^30 See, e.g., Bailyn, supra note 6; Shapiro, supra note 18. John Locke’s theories formed the basis for much of the Revolutionary era’s political theory, espoused once again herein. But this essay does not go all the way to the sort of classic liberal “‘Lockean consensus’ which trivialize[s] politics and glorifie[s] the natural rights of isolated individuals to life, liberty, and the pursuit of property (or is it happiness?)… look[s] upon the state as an unmitigated threat to natural liberty… [believes that the government that governs best governs least… [or the Marxist turn that] the only ‘really important’ use of state power is to serve as a revolutionary mechanism for the long march from feudalism to capitalism to socialism.” Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 27, at 25-26. This essay instead takes the position that effective government plays a vital role in several areas, not the least of which in protecting individual rights like freedom of autonomy. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.

^31 The ideal of liberty and individual freedom of autonomy permeate Jefferson’s political philosophy.

^32 Bruce Ackerman poses an interesting two-stage hypothetical (see Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 27, at 16): First, what should be the approach of a Justice of the United States Supreme Court if confronted with a case challenging a validly ratified constitutional amendment establishing Christianity as the state religion of the American people, and [forbidding] the public worship of other gods”? Should the Justice hold that the amendment is somehow an unconstitutional violation of rights because it acts to repeal the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause? The answer is “no” – fidelity to the constitutional process requires that we accept the Constitution’s primacy, for better or worse – and an amendment properly proposed and ratified through the Article V process is the highest law of the land which the judiciary must respect. The proper responses for dissenters to such an amendment would be to: (a) work within the system to try to repeal the amendment through the Article V process; or (b) separate/secede.

Second, would it be constitutionally appropriate for the Court to invalidate another validly-ratified amendment stating: “Any American advocating the repeal of [the previous Christianity Amendment] is hereby declared guilty of treason and subject to capital punishment upon conviction,” on the reasoning that it unconstitutionally entrenches the amendment against any subsequent reconsideration by the People under Article V? The committed constitutionalist’s answer is again “no” (although it’s tempting to say, like Ackerman, that “such questions are best left to the dark day they arise”) – those proposing and ratifying the amendment did so with full knowledge that the amendment would remove the question from any possible further consideration, and they were even still able to mobilize the support specified by Article V to prevail. The constitutional process should be respected. So what is a “liberal,” “rights foundationalist,” “revolutionary” to do? Answer: As Ackerman says, it might “simply be best for all decent people to quit the regime and struggle to overthrow it[,]” Id.. Agreed – at least with respect to the “quit the regime” part, but perhaps without the “struggle to overthrow it” part; rather, the decent people should seek to separate/secede/divide peacefully without starting a bloody Civil War.

^33 The underlying premise of freedom of autonomy is the protection of civil liberty.

^34 See Shapiro, supra note 18 at 109-10.

^35 This essay asserts that rights must be protected from majority tyranny through judicial review; and when judicial review is inadequate, through constitutional amendment; and when constitutional amendment is
Section II explores progressively the nature of the right of freedom of autonomy, several present-day applications, and the right’s historical foundations, then asserts that nothing short of a constitutional amendment prohibiting federal and state government from abridging any person’s individual freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private concern will suffice in protecting the right as it was envisioned at the time of America’s founding and reaffirmed in the Reconstruction. The essay concludes by asserting that a greater awareness and vigilance by We the People of the natural origins and history of the freedom of autonomy in the founding era is vital if we are to revive this once-prized natural right to a position of prominence in twenty-first century America.

II. THE FREEDOM OF AUTONOMY

The premise of this thought-piece is that government in America has fallen far short of the promise made in the Declaration and Bill of Rights, as reinforced by the fourteenth amendment, for protecting individual liberties of equality and free choice on matters of natural private concern (collectively “freedom of autonomy”) – a right considered throughout the pre-Revolutionary years and at least into the early decades of the United States to be natural and virtually inviolable.36

The individual right of freedom of autonomy exists in a pre-political state of nature, having been granted by one’s own Creator, before and notwithstanding any attempted interference by false government gods. People individually or collectively may choose to cede their own freedom of autonomy (that too is part of the freedom), but under no circumstances may one person or group of persons (e.g., government) make that decision for another or others against their will. Stated another way, nothing – no person, no government - can take away, against one’s will, one’s God-given freedom of autonomy.37 People individually or collectively may decide to condition their inadequate, either through stronger conceptions of state independence or perhaps even through separation or secession if the oppression is serious enough. The latter courses, stronger conceptions of state independence and the possibility of separation/secession, are discussed in forthcoming companion essay, Freedom of Autonomy Evolution or Revolution.

36 Above all, the Revolutionary ideology “was dominated by a … cluster of convictions focused on the effort to free the individual from the oppressive misuse of power, from the tyranny of the state.” BAILYN, supra note 6 at v-vi. See also infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.

37 Alexander Hamilton commented that “the sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the had of the divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.’ Another tough-minded American materialist had led the way to such thinking. John Dickinson, speaking of “the rights essential to happiness,” rhapsodized: “We claim them from a higher source – from the King of kings, and lord of all the earth. They are not annexed to us by parchment and seals. They are created in us by the decrees of Providence, which establish the laws of our nature. They are born with us; exist with us; and cannot be taken from us by any human power without taking our lives.” Id. at 25_. Hence comments like Patrick Henry’s to “give me liberty or give me death.” Patrick Henry, “Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death.”[cite] “In short, [these rights] are founded on the immutable maxims of reason and justice. Such opinions were commonplace.” Levy, supra note 3, at 250 (italics added). “So, too, the directly related views expressed by Jefferson in the preamble of the Declaration of Independence reflected commonly held principles. In 1822 John Adams, who had been a member of the committee of Congress that Jefferson had chaired in 1776, observed that there was ‘not an idea in it [the Declaration] but what had been hackneyed.’ Jefferson asserted that ‘all American whigs thought alike’ on those matters. The purpose of the Declaration, he wrote, was not ‘to find out new principles, or new arguments … but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject.’” Levy, supra note 3, at 250-51.
right of freedom of autonomy, as they do when they consent to be governed, in return for certain benefits from the government. The underlying Agreement memorializing the consent between We the People and the government in America – the Constitution – requires that the government must protect our freedom of autonomy from overbearing government and marauding majorities. If government fails to uphold its part of the bargain in protecting this most basic natural individual liberty, as it has in present-day America, We the People may hold the government in breach and take alternative measures to recover the stolen right.

Lest one form a mistaken first impression about the broader implications of this “freedom of autonomy as natural right” position, it assuredly does not disparage public service or advocate a strict libertarian approach that government should have little or no role in all matters; rather, it suggests that government has an important role, but acts legitimately only insofar as it protects the individual’s “right to be let alone” as it does so. All government activity must be measured

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38 Under this approach, civic republicanism – the participation of an informed, educated populace in the life of the community - is a virtue.
39 We know too well from experience that human beings left entirely to their own devices are capable of oppression and unspeakable cruelty in the name of God, country, or morality. Paraphrasing the old maxim, those who fail to remember the mistakes of history are bound to repeat them. Idealism or utopianism or nihilism aside, some form of government is necessary - people simply incapable of leaving each other alone.
40 Consistent with the freedom of autonomy position, a fair system of taxation is necessary to support responsible government spending in aiding education, supporting scientific research, providing healthcare for all citizens, administering social security, guaranteeing unemployment benefits and yes, building a strong defense – individual liberty is preserved only so long as the nation is safe from its enemies. “This conception of governmental power is broad enough to embrace any conception of the state, from a minimalist, night-watchman state to the contemporary European-style social welfare state. Whatever version of the state a society chooses to adopt, a government must exist and must possess certain powers that enable the polity collectively to achieve the goals that it sets for itself,” James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 Geo. L.J. 1003, 1011 (June, 2003), while at the same time instituting mechanisms to prevent the state from infringing the personal liberties of the polity.

While it is not surprising that the freedom of autonomy position supports the operation of free markets and their attendant freedoms in allowing people to enter easily into mutually beneficial economic arrangements, it also recognizes the important role that government must play to assure a fair game. The position agrees in principle with Bruce Ackerman’s assertion that, “[w]ithout … efforts to approximate undominated equality, talk of a free market degenerates into an ideological apologia for the rich and powerful,” Ackerman, Liberal Revolution, supra note 18, at 10, but keeps a wary eye on how government goes about achieving “undominated equality.” In its efforts to provide equal economic opportunity, government must not dampen individual initiative or remove legitimate private incentive. If a twenty-first century perspective of the communist experiment – with the implosion and utter failure of the Soviet system, together with the capitalist-in-fact activities of the Chinese - tells us anything, it is that the prospect of private gain is a powerful incentive for enterprise and improved individual economic prospects. There are natural consequences of the market, with winners and losers…. People must be allowed to be free to compete free of an overbearing government.

That said, government is justified in involving itself in the operation of the free market, for example, to adjust for market failure - where “real world markets fail to conform to ideal models of perfect competition…. [S]tate interventions [here may range] from environmental control to consumer protection to the subsidized provision of old-age and health insurance.” Ackerman, Liberal Revolution, supra note 18, at 9-10 (citing Weimer & Vining, Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice (1989); Schulze, The Public Use of the Private Interest (1977); Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution (1990)) (concluding that “[t]he challenge … is to achieve structural conditions for the legitimate marketplace, not to destroy the genuine freedom that the marketplace makes possible.”).
by this test: if the government’s action abridges an individual’s freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private concern, presumptively it is not legitimate.41

To begin, as a matter of methodology, how does one determine (1) what rights are sufficiently “natural” or “fundamental” as to merit protection from government interference; and (2) under what circumstances, if ever, government can abridge a fundamental or natural right?

On the first, we look always to the U.S. Constitution. If the claimed right is not clearly defined therein or is so ambiguous as to lead to uncertainty on whether it is constitutionally protected, in the best common-law tradition we look to as many sources as possible – historical, philosophical, theoretical, scientific, religious – and do our best through the power of reason to sift and synthesize these sources into animating principles to help us form educated conclusions of whether, pursuant to the ninth amendment “unenumerated rights” authority,42 the claimed right is sufficiently “fundamental” or “natural” to merit protection under the due process clause, the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, or elsewhere. It’s the best we can do, short of a pipeline to the Almighty - a privilege so far as we know nobody has – fundamentalists’, governments’ and athletes’ “God in my corner” claims notwithstanding. Criticisms of this approach as elitist are

41 Every tradition attempts in its own way to win political legitimacy. Ian Shapiro summarizes five post-Enlightenment political traditions: utilitarianism, social contract, Marxism, anti-Enlightenment, and democracy. See, generally, Shapiro, supra note 18. In the classical utilitarianism tradition, a government’s legitimacy is “tied to their willingness and capacity to maximize happiness.” Shapiro, supra note 18, at 2. Jeremy Bentham’s “happiness principle” “approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question.” Id. at 18 (quoting Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948 [1789]), p.1. Bentham’s principle of utility is founded in the proposition that “pain and pleasure … govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.” Id. Legitimacy in the social contract tradition is “rooted in the idea of agreement …. [that is,] consent of the governed, somehow understood (whether by actual agreement, as conceptualized by seventeenth-century social contractarians John Locke and Thomas Hobbes; or by hypothetical agreement, as suggested by twentieth-century theorists like John Rawls) is the source of the state’s legitimacy.” Shapiro, supra at 2, 110-12. In the Marxist tradition a government’s legitimacy is tied “to the degree that [it does not] underwrite exploitation and … to the degree that [it] promote[s] its antithesis, human freedom,” Id.; in the anti-Enlightenment tradition “to how well [it] embod[ies] communal values that shape, and give meaning to, the lives of individuals,” Id. at 4, where notions of “self” are seen as “rooted in systems of attachment and affiliation that precede and survive individuals.” Id., citing CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY (Harvard 1992); and in the democratic tradition, legitimacy exists “when those who are affected by decisions play an appropriate role in making them and when there are meaningful opportunities to oppose the government of the day, replacing it with an alternative.” Id. at 5. Ultimately, of course, the inquiry of whether a government is legitimate begs the seminal questions of “Who is to judge, and by what criteria, whether the laws and actions of states that claim our allegiance measure up?” Id. at 2 – questions answered in their own distinct ways by the various traditions with their own unique “utility-ometers,” “consent-ometers,” “exploit-ometers,” “community-ometers” or “equal-opportunity-ometers,” as the case may be.

42 Madison said that the ninth amendment was “meant to guard against the possibility that unenumerated rights might be imperiled by the enumeration of particular rights. By excepting many rights from the grant of powers, no implication was intended, and no inference should be drawn, that rights not excepted from the grant of powers fell within those powers.” Levy, supra note 3, at 247. The rights the ninth amendment protected ‘had to be either ‘natural rights’ or ‘positive rights,’ to use the terms Madison employed in the notes for the great speech of June 8 advocating amendments [in which] speech he distinguished ‘the preexistent rights of nature’ from those ‘resulting from a social compact.’” Id. at 250.
anti-intellectual and misplaced (all people, regardless of their station in life, may educate themselves); whereas criticisms of the approach, relying as it does on judicial review, as undemocratic are accurate – democracy is simply inadequate alone to protect individual rights, as demonstrated time and again in America.

Applying this approach to our inquiry, the individual right to freedom of autonomy is encompassed within the terms “liberty” and “property” in the fifth and fourteenth amendment due process clauses - at least as those terms were originally understood during the Revolutionary and Reconstruction eras. Leonard Levy reports, for example, that “[i]n the eighteenth century property did not mean merely the ownership of material things. Locke himself had not used the word to denote merely a right to things; he meant a right to rights… Americans of the founding generation understood property in this general Lockean sense…..” As James Madison said in 1792, a “larger and juster meaning [of the term property] … embraces … every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right…. [A] man has property in his opinions and the free communication of them. He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in the profession and practices dictated by them. He has property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of his person. He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ them. In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.”

Under the Lockean and Madisonian terms, then, a proper definition of “property” would include two aspects: (i) a right to material “things”; and (ii) a right to non-material “thing[s] to which a man may attach a value and have a right.” The first “material” aspect of property has long been

43 Madison wrote, “‘independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive, they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution.’” Levy, supra note 3, at 36 (quoting Madison). For his part, “Jefferson believed that an independent court could withstand oppressive majority impulses by holding unconstitutional any acts violating a bill of rights…” and wrote to Madison that “an advantage of a written bill of rights was ‘the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary.’” Levy, supra at 33 (quoting Jefferson).

44 Freedom of autonomy encompasses, together with the Madison’s “perfect equality of mankind,” see supra note 4, the “right of privacy” liberty interest recognized by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, ___ U.S. ___ (1973). The Court does not recognize the full scope of freedom of autonomy, however.

45 “nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. Am. V; “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. Am. XIV.

46 The “originalism” versus “non-originalism” debate, endlessly discussed by judges, lawyers and academics, has become highly polarizing. We don’t join this discussion right now, except to say that for our purposes it is vitally important to understand the original intent of the framers on concepts of “liberty,” “property,” and “privileges or immunities,” because our very consent to be governed under the Constitution’s terms was based upon the meanings of the terms at the time of ratification. The only way we can know if the government is upholding its end of the bargain is if we know what the bargain was in the first place.

47 Levy, supra note 3, at 252-53 (italics in original). Locke asserted, “[P]eople unite[] for the general preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name – property…. [B]y property I must be understood here as in other places to mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods.” Id. at 252-53 (quoting Locke, John, Second Treatise on Government [cite]). Levy notes, “[A]t least four times in his Second Treatise, Locke used the word property to mean all that belongs to a person, especially the rights he wished to preserve.” Id.

48 Madison, James (1792) (as quoted in Levy, supra note 3, at 252-53) (italics added). This broad view was the Reconstruction interpretation as well. See infra notes 160, 161 and accompanying text.
recognized by the judiciary under several constitutional provisions, the combination of which have been effective in protecting individuals’ material property from an overreaching government.

As for the “non-material” aspect of property, looking again at Madison’s description of property we see that all of the examples he lists as constituting property are freedom of autonomy rights – i.e., all are liberties involving an individual’s rights of equality and freedom of choice on matters of natural private concern. Of those, most, but not all, are adequately protected elsewhere in the Constitution: “opinions and free communication….” are explicitly protected by the first amendment (free speech clause), as are “religious opinions, and … the[ir] profession and practices” (free exercise clause); and “safety and liberty of his person” are also explicitly protected by, for example, the eighth amendment (cruel and unusual punishment, excessive bail clauses), and by the Art. I, section 9 right of writ of habeas corpus. Only “free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ them” – classic “freedom of autonomy” rights - are nowhere else explicitly protected in the constitution – and the fact is courts have never protected this form of property, so “we have lost [it].” This is why we need a constitutional amendment to protect freedom of autonomy.

Continuing with our inquiry, since freedom of autonomy has never been adequately recognized or protected by the U.S. Supreme Court under the (apparently) ambiguous terms “liberty” and “property,” we look to other sources, where we find overwhelming evidence to support a conclusion that freedom of autonomy is a “natural right” entitled to full constitutional protection.

On the second question of when, if ever, government can abridge a fundamental or natural right, we have at least a couple choices: (a) government is absolutely prohibited from infringing the right, under any circumstances, along the lines of Justice Black’s position on government abridgments of speech; or (b) government is prohibited from infringing the right unless it demonstrates a compelling interest for doing so, and its infringement is narrowly-tailored.

49 Specifically, material property is protected by the fifth amendment takings clause (the Court has developed a rich takings clause jurisprudence in which the judiciary will find unconstitutional any government action that works an uncompensated physical or regulatory taking of the individual’s property. see, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, __ U.S. __ (1992)(holding that a government action depriving an owner of virtually all of the property’s value is a taking); the fourth amendment search and seizure clause; the Article I, section 10 contracts clause; and the fifth and fourteenth amendment due process clauses). The fifth amendment takings clause and the fourth amendment search & seizure clause are incorporated to apply to the states through the 14th amendment due process clause. The fifth amendment takings clause and the fourth amendment search & seizure clause are incorporated to apply to the states through the 14th amendment due process clause.

50 Levy, supra note 3, at 252.

51 See supra notes 44-48; infra Section II.A. Amar describes a hierarchy of protection, where the most fundamental “natural” rights are protected regardless of whether there is equal treatment; and where “positive” rights (privileges granted by government) require equal treatment. “Equality” is itself a natural right of freedom of autonomy entitled to full protection.

52 This is the Court’s current strict-scrutiny approach to government intrusions on fundamental rights.
The balance in determining the appropriate involvement of government is delicate – reasonable minds may, and do, differ on this point. It would be easy to say that government should be absolutely prohibited from ever infringing the right, but this essay suggests that the latter strict-scrutiny approach would provide adequate protection for a newly-revived individual right of freedom of autonomy (assuming in the first place that there is no question that the freedom of autonomy is “natural” or “fundamental” – a certainty that can be assured only with constitutional amendment)\textsuperscript{53}, while at the same time recognizing and accommodating the practical complexities of governing in a pluralistic nation of 300 million people.

The first amendment protection of freedom of speech\textsuperscript{54} provides a useful analogue. The Court has made it clear through its first amendment doctrine that absolute abridgements of speech will be upheld only in the very most extreme of circumstances, and partial deprivations only if in line with rigid guidelines.\textsuperscript{55} Generally speaking, strict scrutiny review is applied if the abridgement is content-based, and intermediate scrutiny is applied if it is content-neutral, in which case reasonable content-neutral “time, place and manner restrictions” – \textit{i.e.}, those that provide reasonable alternatives for the speech – may be upheld.\textsuperscript{56} Federal and state policymakers have come to understand these guidelines and so are careful in trying to write laws and regulations that will comply – thus providing a self-regulating mechanism for protecting speech.

The newly-revived freedom of autonomy, as explicitly stated in a constitutional amendment\textsuperscript{57} would have a similar effect on policymakers as they come to understand the following judicial doctrine enforcing the new twenty-eighth amendment: absolute deprivations of freedom of autonomy will be upheld in only the very most extreme of circumstances, and partial deprivations only if in line with rigid guidelines. Again, as with the first amendment approach, strict scrutiny would be applied if the abridgement of the freedom of autonomy is content-based, and intermediate scrutiny if content-neutral, under which reasonable time, place and manner restrictions may be upheld.\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{A. The Nature of the Right}

A natural place to start any discussion of individual liberty (and, for purposes of this essay, freedom of autonomy) is with John Stuart Mill’s famous “harm principle”:

\begin{quote}
[There is but] one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, ... that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{53} See infra Section II.D.

\textsuperscript{54} The first amendment states that “Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,” U.S. Constitution Am. I.

\textsuperscript{55} The judiciary’s 1\textsuperscript{st} amendment speech doctrine holds that any governmenta...abridgment of speech is presumed to be unconstitutional and will be upheld only if the government meets the burden of demonstrating that it meets the appropriate heightened standard of review. \textit{See, e.g.}, Chemerinsky, Erwin, Constitutional Law __. A similar sort of framework could be applied to the freedom of autonomy.

\textsuperscript{56} cite

\textsuperscript{57} Citations we’d like to see: “Neither Congress nor any State shall make or enforce any law abridging any person’s individual freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private concern,” U.S. Const. Am. XXVIII. \textit{See infra} Section II.D.

\textsuperscript{58} See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text for additional discussion.
prevent harm to others…. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.59

The harm principle captures the essence of the freedom of autonomy the framers “conferred, as against the government[,] the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”60 Stated several other ways (it cannot be stated too frequently): government may not prohibit private individual behavior or action causing no harm to another; or on matters of natural private concern, an individual has the full right to behave or act in the manner of his or her choosing free of government interference; or government acts legitimately only insofar as it protects the individual’s right to be left alone on matters of natural private concern.

Freedom of autonomy as conceptualized in this essay might be described as a sharpened version of the Millian harm principle – sharpened, that is, to eliminate “social coercion” from its list of “harms” that must be prohibited.61 When it comes to social coercion, people simply need to

59 J.S. Mill, On Liberty 13 (1859, reprinted in Cambridge 2000). Shapiro writes, “think of the harm principle as operating in two steps. When evaluating a particular action or policy, the first step involves deciding whether the action causes, or has the potential to cause, harm to others. If the answer is no, then the action is in the self-regarding realm and the government would be unjustified in interfering. Indeed, in that case the government has a duty to protect the individual’s freedom of action against interference from others as well. If, however, the answer to the initial query is yes, then different considerations arise. We are then in a world in which harm is being committed willy-nilly, and the question is: What, if anything, should the government do about it? In this regard, a more accurate summation of the harm principle than the more famous formulation already quoted can be found at the start of chapter four: ‘As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such discussion when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself.’” Shapiro, supra note 18, at 61 (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978 [1859], p. 73).

60 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at __ (Brandeis, J. dissenting). See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

61 Jed Rubenfeld argues effectively in Freedom and Time (Yale 2001) that Mill goes too far in adding freedom from social coercion to freedom from legal coercion to the formula for determining “the limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence.” Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time 230 (Yale 2001). Mill states,

As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it…. But … when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no person besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like … there should be a perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.

Id. (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty [1859], in On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government Iviii (R.B. McCallum ed., Oxford 1946)[italics added]. Rubenfeld points out that by so asserting, Mill open[s] himself up to “three “startling internal paradoxes that the old arguments have overlooked.” Id. at 231. Specifically, on one hand Mill asserts that in determining what sort of “harm” is sufficient, there must be “direct harm to others … [and] definite damages, or a definite risk of damage…. [M]inor … inconvenien[ces that do not] … prejudicially affect” others are not enough to justify society’s legitimate interference with individual independence. Id. (quoting and citing Mill, supra at 67-73). On the other hand, though, in criticizing and seeking to forbid the “social tyranny” and “despotism of custom” that would stunt individual freedom, Mill is himself “engaged in the putatively non-regulable conduct that liberalism is supposed to protect. What is floridly called ‘social tyranny,’ what is most threatening to individual autonomy, in fact turns out to be itself an exercise of individual autonomy – by the intolerant.” Id. at 230-31 (quoting and citing Mill, supra at _). According to Rubenfeld, then, “the individualist, Millian liberalism that we admire so much … is itself the source of standardization that liberalism fears.”
develop means other than legal recourse to deal with the problem. It is only when social coercion gives way to official legal coercion, or perhaps when it becomes so oppressive and systematic as to amount to virtual official coercion, that this essay’s freedom of autonomy definition of “harm” is implicated.

This narrower sharpened version of the harm principle does not fear standardization *per se* but rather accepts it as a fact of life, as long as those who would be “standardized” do so of their own will, free of legal coercion. Some degree of standardization is to be expected and, indeed, desired - it’s called community. And as much as Burkean or communitarian critics would have us believe it to be so, individualist liberalism and community are not mutually exclusive concepts. Community provides positive, nurturing social arrangements for human beings, who are, after all, social beings. The value of community diminishes greatly, though, if it loses its elective character.

Id. at 232. The second and third paradoxes in *On Liberty*, according to Rubenfeld, are that (2) Mill, decrying the proliferation of newspapers and their use by Englishmen as a source for ‘taking’ their opinions, ‘rais[es] an alarm at the prospect of all individuals obtaining the ‘same rights and liberties, and the same means of asserting them.’’ Id. at 232 (quoting Mill, *supra* at 4 and/or 59); and (3) “liberal liberty breaks down the ascriptive, status-based distinctions formerly separating class from class, man from woman, man from man, thereby making it possible for ‘the people’ to become ‘a people,’ with a popular will that might be made to govern.” Id. at 234.

Unfortunately people can be mean – that much is evident from a very early age on the playground. Difficult though it is, a person behaving in a way that is in variance with that of the “crowd” on the playground of life needs to develop a thick skin and/or be willing to push back from time to time.

Extending the analogy once more, … when the principal stands by the side of the playground and observes with arms folded while the crowd torments and ridicules the outlier person day in and day out, for example.

“[l]iberalism is distinguished less by the freedom to form groups on the basis of these identities than by the freedom to leave the groups and sometimes even the identities behind. Association is always at risk in a liberal society. The boundaries of the group are not policed; people come and go, or they just fade into the distance without ever quite acknowledging that they have left. At its best, the liberal society is the ‘social union of social unions’ that John Rawls described: a pluralism of groups bonded by shared ideas of toleration and democracy.” Walzer, *Politics and Passion* 161-63 (Yale 2004).

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“The ideal picture of autonomous individuals choosing their connections (and disconnections) without constraints of any sort is an example of bad utopianism. It has never made sense to sociologists, and it ought to inspire skepticism among political theorists and moral philosophers, too. No human society could survive without [some] connections…” True enough, “[i]nvolutionary association is a permanent feature of social existence, and the people who fight for equality, like those who struggle to be free, are inevitably its creatures,” and to be sure, “[d]enial is foolish, and abolition is impossible…. [B]ut aren’t involuntary associations, the sentiments they generate, and the values they inculcate, a threat to the very idea of [freedom of autonomy]?… [N]o[,] [i]t is not pure voluntarism that freedom requires but the possibility of opposition and escape.” Walzer, *supra* note 65, at 1, 2.
It is difficult at first to grasp the full magnitude of the freedom of autonomy concept – that individuals have total freedom on matters of natural private concern. “No, it can’t be,” we say, “there must be a catch.” But the only “catch” is that we have become so conditioned to being told by government – mere people, after all, but acting under the guise and false authority of “government” - how we may behave, that it seems impossible to believe we may really be so free.

We must constantly remind ourselves, and continue to insist in the face of an overbearing government, that this freedom is rightfully ours in the first instance – freedom of autonomy is the rule in nature, not the exception – and it is accordingly the government that has been acting

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Walzer identifies four kinds of involuntary associations faced by all persons from very early in life: (1) familial and social (“We are born members of a kin group, of a nation or country, and of a social class; and we are born male or female. These … attributes go a long way toward determining the people with whom we associate for the rest of our lives....” WALZER, supra note 65, at 4; (2) cultural dictates (“Associates may choose one another, but they rarely have much to say about the structure and style of their association. Marriage is the obvious example.... [T]he meaning and the responsibilities [marriage] entails are accepted by the partners as soon as they acknowledge one another as husband and wife.... Even radically new associational practices are likely to mimic old forms – the way gay unions mimic the modern nuclear family and aim at the same legal recognition.” Walzer, supra note 65, at 6; (3) political (“[W]e are born citizens … and are rarely invited to agree to our citizenship.... The political community is in an important sense a union shop. If you are here, and if you stay here, you are caught up in a set of arrangements that you had no part in designing.... [Like union members, citizens] can choose to vote or not, to join this or that party or movement, to form a caucus or oppositional faction, or to avoid political activity entirely.... [But] there is one thing they can’t do: they can’t work or live someplace and refuse the rights of citizenship – and the burdens, too, such as taxes and union dues.”); and (4) moral – people “hear an internal voice of constraint, telling them that they should do this or that, .... In time of trouble [one’s nation, race or religion, for example, people may feel themselves to be morally] bound to stay and help their fellow citizens.... Even if they have been unenthusiastic, even negligent citizens, never hurrying to public assemblies, never voting, they [may] still [feel] obligated.... Now I must not walk away. Indeed, I am likely to acknowledge the constraint even if I refuse to respect it – by the excuses I offer, the urgent reasons I invent, as I pack my bags.”) Walzer, supra note 65, at 9-10.

68 “What makes any identity or affiliation voluntary is the easy availability of alternative identities and affiliations. What makes a marriage voluntary, [for example,] is the permanent possibility of divorce.” Walzer, supra note 65, at 161-63. In this sense the idea of separation / secession, see infra Section II, is itself a liberal idea – the national association is voluntary.

69 On matters of positive (i.e. having been granted by government), as opposed to natural, private concern, the freedom is not “total,” but rather “relative” in the sense that irrational discrimination is prohibited. See infra note 78 and accompanying text for discussion of two-tier analysis.

Rawlsian concepts are helpful in describing the sort of equality that exists within freedom of autonomy: “Opportunities are thought about differently in the Rawlsian scheme. Ignorant of their religion, race, ethnicity, gender, or social status behind the veil of ignorance, people would resist any caste, apartheid, or gender-biased regimes, as well as systems with religious tests for office. Assuming that they would always be in the group disadvantaged by the denial of equality of access to advancement, they would instead embrace a principle of equality of opportunity.... This would presumably be a sufficiently robust principle to support equal pay for equal work, and rule out the kinds of systematic gender inequalities we see on this front in the contemporary United States.” Shapiro, supra note 18, at 132-33.

70 Friedrich Nietzsche wrote about the dangers of government in his own inimitable fashion:

State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters.... And this lie crawls out of its mouth: ‘I, the state, am the people.’ That is a lie! It was creators who created peoples.... It is annihilators who set traps for the many and call them ‘state’: they hang a sword and a hundred appetites over them.... It has invented its own language of customs and rights.... Behold, how it lures them, the all too-many – and how it devours them, chews them, and ruminates! ‘On earth there is nothing greater than I: the ordering finger of God am I’ – thus roars the monster.... Alas, to you too, you
inappropriately all along in “creat[ing] a society with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, that none can escape…. [leading then to a citizenry] reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.”71 It is OUR individual freedom – and we must reclaim it from government.72 If we continue to accept this status quo, we really are just timid sheep, as Tocqueville predicted.

The founding and framing generations had a deep aversion to the unjust exercise of political “power,” aware as they were of its rapacious nature,73 knowing that the governed must be ever vigilant to keep it at bay within its assigned confines.74 “‘Power’ to them meant the dominion of some men over others, the human control of human life: ultimately, force, compulsion…. Most

N I E T Z S C H E , F R I E D R I C H , T H U S S P O K E Z A R A T H U S T R A : A B O O K F O R O N E A N D A L L 4 8 - 5 1 ( 1 8 8 _ , P u n g i n ed. 1978 Walter Kauff man transl.).

Granted, Nietzsche is over the top, but the point is valid that government will, if allowed to do so, insidiously inject its own “customs and rights” in place of those of the individual. That is precisely the point of this essay – that government has stolen individual freedom of autonomy in America.

71 Dahl, supra note 6, at 233 (quoting Tocqueville, supra note 19).

72 This view of the nature of rights is reflected “ in Ohioan Salmon P. Chase’s famous oral argument in the 1847 fugitive slave case of Jones v. Van Zandt: ‘The provisions of the constitution, contained in the amendments … rather announce restrictions upon legislative power, imposed by the very nature of society and of government, than create restrictions, which, were they erased from the constitution, the Legislature would be at liberty to disregard. No Legislature is … at liberty to disregard…. the fundamental principles of rectitude and justice.” Amar, supra note 8, and accompanying text at 161-62.

73 “Not that power was in itself – in some metaphysical sense – evil. It was natural in its origins, and necessary. It had legitimate foundations ‘in compact and mutual consent’ – in those covenants among men by which, as a result of restrictions voluntarily accepted by all for the good of all, society emerges from a state of nature and creates government to serve as trustee and custodian of the mass of surrendered individual powers.” Power created legitimately by those voluntary compacts which the colonists knew from Lockean theory to be logical and from their own experience to be practical, power in its legitimate form inhered naturally in government and was the possession and interest of those who controlled government, just as liberty, always weak, always defensive, always, as John Adams put it, ‘skulking about in corners … hunted and persecuted in all countries by cruel power,’ inhere naturally in the people and was their peculiar possession and interest.” Bailyn, supra note 6 at 58-59. “[T]he point they hammered home time and again, and agreed on – freethinking Anglican literati no less than neo-Calvinist theologians – was the incapacity of the species, of mankind in general, to withstand the temptations of power. Such is ‘the depravity of mankind,’ Samuel Adams, speaking for the Boston Town Meeting, declared, ‘that ambition and lust of power above the law are … predominant passions in the breasts of most men.’ “Power ‘converts a good man in private life to a tyrant in office.’ It acts upon men like drink: it ‘is known to be intoxicating in its nature’ – ‘too intoxicating and liable to abuse.’ And nothing within man is sufficiently strong to guard against these effects of power – certainly not ‘the united considerations of reason and religion,’ for they have never ‘been sufficiently powerful to restrain these lusts of men.’ ” [citing Eliot, sermon (JHL 15), pp. 10-11, etc. Bailyn, supra note 6, at 60.

74 An influential writing of the day, “Molesworth’s An Account of Denmark (1694)[,] established the general point … that the preservation of liberty rested on the ability of the people to maintain effective checks on the wielders of power, and hence in the last analysis rested on the vigilance and moral stamina of the people.” Bailyn, supra note 6, at 65. Bailyn writes, “The acuteness of the colonists’ sense of this problem is, for the twentieth-century reader, one of the most striking things to be found in this eighteenth-century literature: it serves to link the Revolutionary generation to our own in the most intimate way.” Id. at 57-58.
commonly the discussion of power centered on its essential characteristic of aggressiveness: its endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries….75

Of course we the people understand that we cannot have absolute free reign – we do, after all, live in a nation with three hundred million other souls, and to the extent our behavior harms or concerns others, we accept that we must yield.76 Moreover, we understand that even if our behavior does not harm or concern others, government may in the proper circumscribed exercise of its responsibilities sometimes find it necessary to impose, within strict guidelines, “reasonable content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions” that may affect our activity.77

We also understand we may expect a different level of constitutional protection depending on whether our activity involves a natural right or a positive right. Classic “freedom of autonomy” rights are natural rights, those pre-political liberties existing as a part of the greater Order possessed by every individual from birth that cannot be extinguished by any mere human government, are entitled to full protection; whereas positive rights, those granted through the political process (common-law, state law, federal law, or otherwise) are entitled to relative equality of protection (i.e. the government may not arbitrarily discriminate in granting and enforcing those rights.)78 So, for example, whereas sexual freedom and freedom of association

75 “The essence of what the colonists meant by power was perhaps best revealed by John Adams as he groped for words in drafting his Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law. Twice choosing and then rejecting the word ‘power,’ he finally selected as the specification of the thought he had in mind ‘dominion,’ and in this association of words the whole generation concurred…. All sorts of metaphors, similes, and analogies were used to express this view of power. The image most commonly used was that of the act of trespassing. Power, it was said over and over again, has ‘an encroaching nature’; … ‘if at first it meets with no control [it] creeps by degrees and quick subdues the whole.’ Sometimes the image is of the human hand, ‘the hand of power,’ reaching out to clutch and to seize: power is ‘grasping’ and ‘tenacious’ in its nature; ‘what it seizes it will retain.’ … It is everywhere in public life, and everywhere it is threatening, pushing and grasping; and too often in the end it destroys its benign – necessarily benign – victim. [citing selections “from innumerable discussions of power in the literature before 1776”]. What gave transcendent importance to the aggressiveness of power was the act that its natural prey, its necessary victim, was liberty, or law, or right. The public world these writers saw was divided into distinct, contrasting, and innately antagonistic spheres: the sphere of [government] power and the sphere of liberty or right. The one was brutal, ceaselessly active, and heedless; the other was delicate, passive, and sensitive. The one must be resisted, the other defended, and the two must never be confused. ‘Right and power … have very different meanings, and convey very different ideas’; ‘power abstracted from right cannot give a just title to dominion,’ nor is it possible legitimately, or even logically, to ‘build right upon power.’ When the two are intermingled, when ‘brutal power’ becomes ‘an irresistible argument of boundless right’ as it did, John Dickinson explained, under the Cromwellian dictatorship, ‘innocence and justice can only sigh and quietly submit.’” Bailyn, supra note 6, at 57-58 (citations omitted)(italics added).

76 The devil is in the details of course – in this case, what does it mean to “harm” or “concern” others? To be sure, in a butterfly-effect sense, one’s activity always affects others in some way, however infinitesimally, but for our purposes the terms are strictly defined - to use a tort or criminal law analogue, there must be some cognizable “injury.” One’s actions emphatically do NOT “harm” or “concern” if they “disgust,” “repulse,” “anger,” “upset,” “disappoint,” or otherwise “offend” others. Others’ own opinions on moral and social issues are just that – opinions; and their opinions do not rule us. We don’t presume to tell others how to live their lives – and we especially don’t attempt to add the coercive powers of government to impose our opinions on them - and we expect and demand the same treatment in return.

77 As with the Court’s analogous first amendment doctrine, the key is that the regulation does not work an outright ban on the activity – the activity may still occur at a alternative reasonable time or place, or in an alternative reasonable manner. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.

78 Professor Amar proposes this sort of two-tier system as a tool for assigning the proper level of protection originally contemplated for various “privileges-or-immunities” of Section I of the fourteenth amendment: “Section I is not limited to privileges and immunities specified in the pre-1866 Constitution. Other,
are natural rights and thus entitled to full protection; marriage of any description (same-sex, different-sex) is entitled to equal protection as a positive right. Under similar reasoning, freedom of association (in all circumstances, economic included) is a natural right and thus entitled to full protection; whereas, economically-based associations created by state law or by common-law (e.g., contracts), are positive rights entitled to equal protection.

B. Freedom of Autonomy Applied

Consider five activities: three currently prohibited by government – same-sex marriage (sexual freedom), right to die; and possession/use of soft drugs; one formerly prohibited and currently under heavy attack - abortion; and one protected from the beginning, but becoming less well-protected in the modern era - religion. We could go on, but for our purposes, the point is illustrated by these several examples.

Same-sex Marriage (Sexual Freedom) The institution of marriage, created as it is by common-law and state law, is a positive right entitled to equal constitutional protection; whereas sexual common-law rights were also included.... For those nonconstitutional rights, perhaps only antidiscrimination (“equal”) protection should be accorded, rather than fundamental rights (“full”) protection.” Amar, supra note 8, at 178 (Citing John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385 (1992); “For similar views, see 1 D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme court 347-350 (1985); William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment 115-24 (1988);” also citing Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 Am.J. Legal Hist. 305, 323 (1988) (“similar analysis of two-tiered full-and-equal-protection philosophy in antebellum jurisprudence”).

Amar doesn’t use the terms “natural law” and “positive law” in this passage (perhaps they are implicit), but the same two-tier system is useful in determining the proper level of protection for those rights, not otherwise explicitly “specified and ‘declared’ by We the People [in the Constitution and hence] easy cases for full protection,” Amar, supra note 8, at 179 fn.*, that exist as a matter of natural law (deserving of “full” protection) as opposed to positive law (deserving of “equal” protection). It also bears repeating that the right of equality generally, free of context, is a natural right entitled to full protection. See supra note 51.

80 Amar offers the two-tier approach as a possible solution to the troubling “specter of judges invalidating statutes by invoking nontextually specified fundamental rights and by giving constitutional status to common-law rights like freedom of contract... [a la] Lochner. But [the fact] that the privileges-or-immunities clause applie[s] to various common-law rights may not necessarily lead us to Lochner.” Amar, supra note 8 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

81 Many – perhaps even most - Americans will respond, “Of course these activities are prohibited – what sort of decent society would not do the same?” A literal answer would be, “Decent countries not doing the same include, to varying degrees, The Netherlands, Belgium, and more recently, Canada.” This is where Americans must be reconditioned to reframe the question to one that more accurately reflects the spirit of the modern Enlightenment and of America’s own founding generation, “I may personally disagree with the activities, but what sort of decent government would [deign to] presume to tell individuals how they should and should not behave?”

82 “Life” itself might be said to be the ultimate autonomy freedom, in which event the U.S. Supreme Court’s allowance under the 5th and 14th amendment due process clauses of federal and state governments’ use of the death sentence would violate this freedom. The death sentence is an entirely separate discussion – those convicted of capital crimes in those states allowing the death penalty have caused grievous harm to another. Because this essay’s “freedom of autonomy” is premised on liberty to act in any way that does not harm another, this essay does not include “life” in its definition of freedom of autonomy.

83 See supra note 78 and accompanying text for description of two-tier framework designating “full” protection for natural rights and “equal” protection for positive rights.
freedom, the individual liberty one would exercise within any marriage, is a natural right entitled to full constitutional protection. This much has been recognized (sort of) by the Supreme Court in the 2003 case Lawrence v. Texas, which held that private sexual activity is protected as right of privacy under the fourteenth amendment due process clause. While Lawrence was an important victory for freedom of autonomy, the very narrowness of the margin (6-3 and 5-4) is telling on the point that freedom of autonomy protection, even where it exists, is tenuous at best - demonstrating yet again the need for constitutional amendment to provide more lasting protection.

As noted, marriage is a positive right entitled to equal constitutional protection. This much most assuredly has not been recognized by the Supreme Court, by the thirteen states passing constitutional amendments in 2004 banning same-sex marriage, or by numerous other governmental bodies that discriminate against same-sex couples. Government offers legal recognition to married couples. With legal recognition comes certain benefits; for example, spouses are entitled by law to social security benefits, consideration under intestacy statutes, medical insurance, etc. of their spouse. By electing to extend these benefits to one group of people (heterosexual couples), but not to another (same-sex couples), based on the manner that the two groups exercise an underlying natural right entitled to full constitutional protection, government engages in irrational discrimination and deprives the individuals in the same-sex couples of their freedom of autonomy.

If I decide I want to marry another man, my action does not harm or injure another. Does it disgust some and repulse others? Yes. But the fact that majorities may find the private activities of a disfavored minority distasteful or even repulsive does not give the majority a right, through abusive and illegitimate use of government mechanisms, to impose their own values on the minority. If the majority decides instead to remove legal recognition of marriage for all, it may

To the extent that one might suggest that polygamy should likewise be treated equally under the two-tier framework, I’d respond that freedom of autonomy does not extend to associations where the terms are extremely unfavorable toward one class of people (in this case women) who possess a severe deficit of bargaining power. See, generally, Jon Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven: A Story of Violent Faith (2003) on some of the realities of the institution of polygamy.

84 Freedom of association is another natural right one exercises in making a decision to marry – a right that is on firm footing in the Court’s first amendment speech doctrine.
85 __ U.S. __ (2003).
86 Lawrence, __ U.S. at __. The Court struck down a state law prohibiting certain specified sexual behavior (sodomy) on two separate grounds: (a) substantive due process (privacy); and (b) equal protection. Reversing its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, __ U.S. __ (1986), which had held that government infringements on private sexual activity were entitled to deferential rational-basis review. The Lawrence Court “sort-of” recognized that sexual freedom is entitled to full protection in that it never explicitly called it a “fundamental” right (its code word for a right entitled to strict scrutiny review), instead saying simply that government actions limiting sexual freedom are subject to “heightened review,” and that the government failed here to meet its burden. Lawrence, __ U.S. at __. See Randy Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 21 (writing that “what was most striking about Lawrence was the way the Court justified its ruling. If the approach the Court took in the case is followed in other cases in the future, we have in Lawrence nothing short of a constitutional revolution, with implications reaching far beyond the “personal liberty” at issue here…. [T]he Lawrence majority did not protect a “right of privacy.” Instead, quite simply, they protected “liberty.”).
87 See supra note 9 for comment that the amendments were ostensibly to ban same-sex marriage, but in fact their intent and scope are far broader than that in curbing the rights of gay Americans.
legitimately do so, but it may not disfavor one group by failing to extend the same positive rights to that group as it does to the favored group.

Even if one’s sexual orientation were a matter of choice, arguments suggesting that same-sex marriage threatens the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage ignorantly fail to account for the innate biological drive to perpetuate the species. There are few instincts more powerful - as long as humans continue to walk the face of the earth, a critical mass will enter into associations, such as heterosexual marriage, that lend themselves to the perpetuation of the species. Biology does not need the help of moralistic conservative Christians. Moreover, and perhaps more basically still, how can long-term committed loving relationships be wrong, to the point where government will not support them?

In sum, the fact that the judiciary does not consistently recognize the obvious equal protection problems in such discrimination is ample evidence that judicial review, important as it is, ultimately is inadequate to protect the freedom of autonomy rights of an oppressed minority from majority tyranny.

Right to Die  I may have a terminal physical condition that irreparably impairs my quality of life and elect, after much thought, that I wish to end my suffering by hastening my own death. Does my action harm or injure others? No. Does it upset and offend some others? Yes. But as Bishop John Shelby Spong, an articulate Christian spokesperson favoring choice in end-of-life decisions, puts it, "I believe that if and when a person arrives at that point in human existence when death has become a kinder alternative than hopeless pain … then the basic human right to choose how and when to die should be guaranteed by law and respected by our communities of faith…. My deepest desire is always to choose death with dignity over a life that has become either hopelessly painful and dysfunctional or empty and devoid of all meaning…. That does not seem to me to be too much to ask my faith to give me or my government to guarantee for me."  

88 The Supreme Court has held that the right to marry, as part of the larger right of family autonomy, is fundamental. Loving v. Virginia, __ U.S. __ (19__). In this context, “fundamental” is not analogous to “natural.” Marriage, though described as “fundamental” by the Court for purposes of its substantive due process privacy doctrine, simply is not a natural right. To the extent the Court would suggest otherwise, it misconceives the right. The fact that the state does not endorse a particular institution does not mean that people may not continue to exercise the natural right of association to cohabitate and spend their lives together and consider themselves as “married” for their own purposes, but the state is not required to recognize the institution in the first place.

89 There are many arguments for and against on this point – with the more persuasive that one’s sexual orientation is not a matter of choice; rather, it is innate. It matters not one whit one way or another to the freedom of autonomy principle.

90 Courts are all over the board on this. See infra note 173.

91 Put it this way: If a recount of votes in Florida in the 2000 presidential election, as had been ordered (as required under state law) by the highest court in the sovereign state of Florida, violates the equal protection of voters, see Bush v. Gore, __ U.S. __ (2000), certainly failing to extend the same marriage benefits to a person based on the fact s/he wishes to marry someone of the same gender is also an equal protection violation.

92 Eighth Bishop of Newark of the Episcopal Church. At the time of his retirement in 2000 Bishop Spong was the senior active bishop in the Episcopal Church in the United States.

93 John Shelby Spong, Death: A Friend to be Welcomed Not an Enemy to be Defeated, An address to the national Convention of the Hemlock Society in San Diego California, 1, 11, January 10, 2003. Available at http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005. Bishop Spong, on the credibility of Christian moralizing about the sanctity of life: “If human beings who call themselves Christians have no scruples about endorsing war, killing religious enemies or imposing the sentence of death upon those who
And there are government voices of reason on this issue as well, such as California Assembly member Lloyd Levine commenting in support of the Compassionate Choice Act of 2005, an aid-in-dying bill introduced this year in the California Assembly, “This is a very serious issue.... It is not up to me to substitute my moral views on you, and it’s not up to anyone else to substitute their moral views on anyone else”; and former Vermont governor Phil Hoff, speaking in support of the Vermont Death with Dignity Act of 2005 currently under consideration by the Vermont legislature, “While I respect people making different choices for themselves, a small minority of Vermonters should not be able to impose their views on the vast majority of Vermonters that want more choice and control at the end of our lives.”

Oregon is the only state to date that has enacted legislation (the 1998 Oregon Death with Dignity law) protecting this natural individual right of freedom of choice in end-of-life decisions. All of the current legislative efforts – the Oregon law as well as the proposed legislation in Vermont and California – share several elements that must be met if a person is to self-hasten death in accordance with law: “[i] a person must be a terminally ill adult, [(ii)] two doctors must agree that the person is competent (either doctor may require psychological testing), [(iii)] the request must be made three separate times and may be withdrawn at any time, and [(iv)] the person must acquire the medication and the medication must be self-administered.”

violate either the norms of faith, or the boundaries of prejudice under a particular set of circumstances in the past, is it still appropriate for Christians to suggest that one cannot elect death for himself or herself under a different set of circumstances in the present? It seems to me that a certain irrational inconsistency is operating here, which needs to be pointed out to any faith community that espouses such claims.”

And on the Christian view of death:

Let there be no mistake about what is happening. These stirring achievements [of technology (such as ‘quadruple heart bypasses, chemo and radiation therapy, laparoscopic surgical procedures and organ transplants, PSA tests and pap smears, miracle drugs and incredible life-support systems’) expanding life expectancy] represent human beings taking on the power we once ascribed only to God. We have by our own knowledge and expertise put our hands on the decisions about life and death. We cannot now refuse to engage these decisions at the end of our own lives. We have pushed back the boundaries of death inexorably. We have enabled this generation to live in a way that previous generations could never have imagined. We have watched human life actually evolve to where it must accept God-like responsibilities. The time has come to celebrate that, not to hide from it in the language of piety.

“What I see the religious community doing today is to tremble in the face of our own human audacity and to seek to hide from the responsibility inherent in our own human achievements, none of which we would be willing to surrender. Why else would we hesitate before this final boundary called death? Why would we resist so vigorously the reality that now we must take a hand in our death decisions? When medical science expands the boundary and the quality of life, Christians do not complain. We, rather, rejoice because we believe it affirms our conviction that life is holy.

“It is one thing, however, to expand life and it is quite another to postpone death. When medical science shifts from expanding the length and quality of life and begins simply to postpone the reality of death, why are we not capable of saying that the sacredness of life is no longer being served, and therefore Christians must learn to act responsibly in the final moments of life.”

Id. at 8-9.

94 Quoted in Compassion & Choices, Advocacy Bulletin Vol. II, Issue II (March 14, 2005). Available at http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005.
95 Compassion & Choices, Advocacy Bulletin Vol. II, Issue II (March 14, 2005). Available at http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005.
96 Frequently-Asked-Questions, available at http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005.
As reflected by these state efforts, end-of-life choice is one individual freedom of autonomy interest a solid majority of the People apparently do support\(^7\) - perhaps because they recognize that they themselves, rather than some nameless others, may desire to exercise the right at some future date. Thus it is disappointing, though of course unsurprising and entirely consistent, that Congress and the Bush administration would seek to remove this freedom and impose their own set of moral views on others - and so have sued to have the Oregon law declared unconstitutional.\(^8\) The government’s lawsuit seeking to remove an individual liberty previously protected by state law is grossly inappropriate on two levels: one, for our immediate purposes, it fails to protect individual freedom of autonomy on a matter of natural private concern; two, it violates principles of comity in federal-state relations by interfering with the policy determination of a sovereign state engaged in regulating, under its tenth amendment reservation of authority, a matter reserved to state governments. Just another instance of overbearing federal interference with individual autonomy and with state prerogative… this is why We the People need a constitutional amendment protecting freedom of autonomy.

\(^{\text{Soft Drugs}}\) For close to 400 years – from the time of the first American hemp crop in 1611 near Jamestown, Virginia through the turn of the twentieth-century - marijuana (then known as hemp) was grown in America for its fiber content. Indeed, “King James I of Britain ordered settlers to engage in wide scale farming of the plant. Most of the sails and ropes on colonial ships were made from hemp as were many of the colonists’ bibles, clothing and maps. [And in the most delicious irony of all, according to some historians, George Washington and Thomas Jefferson cultivated marijuana and advocated a hemp-based economy.]\(^9\)

Fast forward to the twenty-first century, when use or possession of marijuana is illegal and aggressively enforced (734,000 criminal arrests per year) and prosecuted by the federal and many state governments, at a cost of anywhere from $7.5 - $10 billion per year. Aside from being crazy policy (crazy or not, policy is ordinarily within the proper realm of a democratically-elected law “show that 37 people ended their lives under the law in 2004, slightly fewer than in 2003. As required by law, all were terminally ill and made repeated and voluntary requests for assistance.” Compassion & Choices, Advocacy Bulletin Vol. II, Issue II (March 14, 2005). Available at http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005.

\(^{7}\) Seventy percent of respondents to a 2005 Field Poll in California “agreed that a mentally competent, terminally ill adult should be able to receive aid from their doctor to die peacefully.” Compassion & Choices, Advocacy Bulletin Vol. II, Issue II (March 14, 2005). Available at http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005 (citing www.caforaidindying.org).

\(^{8}\) In a recent poll conducted by Zogby International in Vermont, “[n]early 80 percent of respondents said they would support a bill allowing terminally ill patients to receive medication from their doctors to hasten their deaths.” \textit{Id.} (citing www.choicesvermont.org). An Episcopalian convention of the Diocese of Newark, consisting of 450 elected lay people and 150 ordained Episcopalian clergy, after a year of open hearings “endorsed by a 2 to 1 majority … physician assisted suicide as a moral option for Christians.” John Shelby Spong, \textit{Death: A Friend to be Welcomed Not an Enemy to be Defeated}, An address to the national Convention of the Hemlock Society in San Diego California, January 10, 2003. Available at http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005 (citing www.dioceseofnewark.org).

\(^{9}\) The Oregon law prevailed at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court has agreed to hear the government’s appeal in Gonzales v. Oregon. The government argues that the federal Controlled Substances Act authorizes the government to preempt state regulations allowing the use of such substances in the end-of-life choice process. [cite]

99 NORML Report on Sixty Years of Marijuana Prohibition in the U.S., available online at http://www.norml.com. Visited April 20, 2005. (citing ____)
the government’s zeal in apprehending and punishing even minor offenders who would use marijuana occasionally is just plain bizarre. The oddness started in the 1920s and in 1930 with the government’s establishment of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN). In response to an FBN-sponsored campaign, reefer-madness hysteria took hold in the 1930s, prompting 27 states to pass laws prohibiting marijuana. For example, “a news bulletin issued by the FBN in the mid-1930s purported that a user of marijuana ‘becomes a fiend with savage or ‘cave-man’ tendencies. His sex desires are aroused and some of the most horrible crimes result. He hears light and sees sound. To get away from it, he suddenly becomes violent and may kill.’”

The “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” criminalizing the possession or use of marijuana, was passed after two Congressional hearings (one House, one Senate) totaling just one hour; after debate in the House lasting 90 seconds, and with similar alacrity in the Senate. In the House Ways and Means Committee hearing two witnesses, the head of the FBN and a Treasury Department Assistant General Counsel, testified in favor of the bill; and a physician representative from the American Medical Association (AMA) testified against. The committee took little interest in the AMA’s views, however, telling the physician, “If you want to advise us on legislation, you ought to come here with some constructive proposals … rather than trying to throw obstacles in the way of something that the federal government is trying to do.” Adding insult to injury, during the 90

100 Objectively, there are numerous policy reasons to decriminalize marijuana: (1) cost of enforcement – “taxpayers annually spend between $7.5 billion and $10 billion arresting and prosecuting individuals for marijuana violations”; “police arrest more American per year on marijuana charges [approximately 734,000] than the total number of arrestees for all violent crime combined, including murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault”; (2) harm caused by criminal prohibition of marijuana is much greater than harm caused by marijuana use itself – As former President Jimmy Carter said, “Penalties against drug use should not be more damaging to an individual than the use of the drug itself. Nowhere is this more clear than in the laws against the possession of marijuana in private for personal use”; “a 1982 National Academy of Sciences report on marijuana reaffirmed that criminal justice approaches were inappropriate and harmful. It recommended not only that marijuana possession be decriminalized, but that lawmakers give serious consideration to creating a system of regulated distribution and sale”; (3) decriminalization does not lead to increased marijuana use – “More than 30 percent of the U.S. population lives under some form of marijuana decriminalization, and according to government and academic studies, these laws have not contributed to an increase in marijuana consumption” (moreover, decriminalization appears to reduce rates of hard drug use in states that have decriminalized); the state legislatures in twelve states (Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio and Oregon) have enacted various forms of decriminalization where users no longer are subject to jail time (or, in most cases, arrest or criminal records) for the possession or use of small amounts of marijuana; (4) medical benefits – “Written references to the use of marijuana as a medicine date back nearly 5,000 years. Western medicine embraced marijuana’s medical properties in the mid-1800s, and by the beginning of the 20th century, physicians had published more than 100 papers in the Western medical literature recommending its use for a variety of disorders.” Twelve states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont and Washington) have legalized marijuana for medical use. http://www.norml.com/ (citing numerous sources), visited April 20, 2005.

101 A visitor to the planet would wonder why government cares so much about a little weed - indeed, if legislatures stopped to think for even half a moment with some clarity on the issue, they would recognize that another little weed, tobacco, has been a major contributor to state economies (as was hemp, see supra text accompanying note __) from the earliest pre-Revolutionary days. Marijuana is no different than other soft drugs like alcohol and tobacco. It may be similarly taxed and regulated. As with alcohol, for example, it becomes a matter of public concern if I operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of marijuana, since chances are increased that I may have an accident and cause physical harm or injury to another; accordingly, government is justified in preventing me from mixing the activities.

102 NORML Report on Sixty Years of Marijuana Prohibition in the U.S., available online at http://www.norml.com. Visited April 20, 2005 (citing _____)
seconds of debate in the House, a member of the committee lied in response to a question\textsuperscript{103} of whether the AMA supported the bill, stating, “Their Doctor … gave this measure his full support … [as well as] the approval [of] the American Medical Association.”\textsuperscript{104}

The point for our purposes is that the government’s prohibition of marijuana by any means (including its current over-the-top approach) violates the individual right of freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private concern.\textsuperscript{105} As James Madison wrote, speaking on behalf of a founding generation overwhelming “focused on the effort to free the individual from the oppressive misuse of power, from the tyranny of the state,”\textsuperscript{106} every person has a “[right] in the free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ them.”\textsuperscript{107}

\textit{Abortion} If we accept for a moment (for purpose of argument only) that life – with its full set of intact constitutional protections - begins at conception,\textsuperscript{108} abortion presents the especially hard case where one person’s exercise of individual freedom of autonomy not only interferes with the autonomy rights of another, but actually causes an absolute deprivation of the other’s rights – the

\textsuperscript{103} The only other question asked for a summary of the bill, to which Speaker Sam Rayburn replied, “I don’t know. It has something to do with a thing called marijuana. I think it’s a narcotic of some kind.” NORML Report on Sixty Years of Marijuana Prohibition in the U.S., available online at \texttt{http://www.norml.com}, Visited April 20, 2005 (citing ____)

\textsuperscript{104} NORML Report on Sixty Years of Marijuana Prohibition in the U.S., available online at \texttt{http://www.norml.com}, Visited April 20, 2005. (citing ____)

\textsuperscript{105} Any “actionable” harm or injury caused by a person using marijuana is to that individual alone, no one else. As with tobacco and alcohol there is an expense to society in the form of healthcare cost and some loss of productivity, but these are costs of freedom – much as military spending is a cost of freedom. And of course society can attempt to reduce or make up for these costs through various means, not the least of which would be the cost savings from freeing thousands of incarcerated drug “offenders.”

What about hard drugs like heroin, crack cocaine, etc.? The freedom of autonomy principle discussed in this essay is open to (but still isn’t entirely convinced by) the argument that there is a point at which the use and possession of those items is so demonstrably harmful to society as a whole that government may legitimately prohibit them, in which case the means of dealing with the issue - whether through punishment, treatment, etc. – is a policy matter for the elected legislative body. On the other hand, whereas governments everywhere have erred on the side of paternalism even with marijuana (with notable exceptions like The Netherlands and, more recently, Canada) the freedom of autonomy principle is also open to – and on balance favors - the argument that hard drugs, though demonstrably harmful, are harmful to the using \textit{individual} - not others, so they should not be prohibited. They may be heavily regulated and controlled under this argument - but not prohibited. Government paternalism is not the answer – rather, education on health dangers, moral approbation and parental and family influence should prevent the vast majority people from using the drugs.

This second argument has several advantages over the first: (1) it need not be concerned with the supremely difficult task in differentiating those substances so harmful as to be absolutely prohibited from those that are not; (2) it allows more creative approaches to dealing with the problems created by the use of drugs, not the least of which is the violence associated with trafficking; (3) it adheres to the guiding principle of resolving questions on the boundary or any close calls in favor of the individual freedom of autonomy, instead of in favor of government prohibition.

\textsuperscript{106} BAILYN, supra note 6, at v-vi.

\textsuperscript{107} Levy, supra note 3, at 252-53. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{108} The contemporary arguments over abortion are well-documented, and we will not re-visit them here. At the core of the debate is a seemingly intractable disagreement: one side says life begins at conception; the other says it begins at birth (or perhaps viability), and never the twain shall meet. Each side is passionate in its views; neither hears what the other is saying - both talk past one another.
classic zero-sum game. Moreover, abortion is the hardest case of all because a choice must be made – indeed, a woman’s postponing or avoiding action is itself an affirmative choice.

For our purposes the question is who will make this decision? Will it be the government as proxy for the nascent life? Or rather will the woman be free to make this most difficult of decisions on her own behalf?

Applying freedom of autonomy principles, the answer is not automatic. To the extent that by prohibiting abortion the government is acting to protect the right of the zygote, embryo or fetus to be left alone on a matter of natural private concern (to live), it is acting legitimately. On the other hand, prohibiting abortion certainly does not leave a woman alone on a matter of private concern, and thus violates her individual freedom of autonomy.

But this assumes that fully-protected life begins at conception – an assumption that a rational approach simply cannot make. The rights of a zygote, embryo or early fetus cannot be equated with those of a late-term fetus or an infant – the latter possess some measure of human consciousness, whereas a zygote, embryo or early fetus does not. The woman’s freedom of autonomy must prevail at this early stage. When the fetus achieves viability – where it can survive on its own independently of the mother - the equation shifts. For freedom of autonomy purposes the fetus is a person at the point of viability, and the state is justified in prohibiting abortion to protect that person’s right to be left alone to live, subject to the usual exceptions for mother’s health and other extenuating circumstances.

This is the proper approach. For a solid five-plus months, before the fetus reaches viability, the woman’s choice prevails. From viability onward, the fetus-person’s choice, as enabled by government, prevails (subject to exceptions). The woman has a choice; once that choice is made she bears a responsibility. On this score, the Supreme Court has done an effective job of attempting to strike a reasoned balance between the competing interests by developing exactly this framework – before viability, government may not impose an “undue burden” on a woman’s ability to have an abortion; after viability, the government is justified in restricting abortion, subject to exceptions.

Jed Rubenfeld offers as incisive a description as any on the inappropriateness of outright government prohibition of abortion: “It is impossible to name a single prohibitory law in our legal system with greater affirmative, [indeed] conscriptive, life-occupying effects than those imposed by a law forcing a woman to bear a child against her will. [‘It compels this woman to bear a child. It forces motherhood upon her.’] This woman is physically taken over for a purpose dictated to her by the state, and this taking-over can be expected to last not merely nine months, but for many years thereafter – indeed, for a lifetime. Her body, her mind, and her time will be substantially occupied by the task that the state has forced upon her. She has been instrumentalized, impressed into state-dictated service. It is no exaggeration to say that a law forcing women to be mothers is a totalitarian intrusion into their lives.”

109 A zygote is the “cell formed [at conception] by the union of two gametes”; an embryo is a “human organism in the first eight weeks from conception”; a fetus is “a human embryo of eight weeks or more.” The American Century Dictionary, Warner Books Paperback Edition (Oxford 1995).
110 “Consciousness” may be determined by measuring, for example, brain function or pain response.
111 Casey v. Pennsylvania, __ U.S. __ (1992). An “undue burden” is defined as a government action that places a “substantial obstacle” in the way of the woman in her efforts to get an abortion.
112 Jed Rubenfeld, supra note 61, at 225-26.
Religion  The freedom of autonomy amendment would also reinforce other fundamental rights, some of which receive short shrift from the judiciary. For example, although the first amendment guarantees the free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court currently allows government to prohibit free exercise with neutral, generally applicable laws that meet the less rigorous intermediate-scrutiny standard of review. Under the freedom of autonomy approach, free exercise may be subject to reasonable content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions, but they may not be prohibited outright except in the most exceptional cases in which the government overcomes the heavy presumption of invalidity and satisfies strict scrutiny standard of review.113

The Court’s intermediate-scrutiny standard for generally applicable, neutral laws affecting free exercise was enunciated in Smith v. Oregon114 in 1990. Smith led to Congress’s passage of the 1994 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), specifying “[any generally applicable, neutral law affecting the free exercise of religion shall be subject to strict scrutiny in the courts].”115 In 1997, the Court in turn struck down RFRA as beyond Congress’s scope of authority in City of Boerne,116 stating that the Act, by telling the Court what standard of review to use in a particular case went beyond the mere enforcement of existing rights and instead created new substantive rights not given in the fourteenth amendment.

For our purposes, the Court misses the boat in Smith and Boerne. Freedom of autonomy principles recognize the legitimate role of government in applying, under firm guidelines, reasonable content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions on individual liberty of free choice on matters of natural private concern,117 but require that any outright prohibition carry a heavy presumption of invalidity and must satisfy strict scrutiny review to survive.118 The Court does not distinguish in Smith and Boerne between government restrictions and prohibitions – it simply applies a blanket rule that any generally applicable, neutral rule gets intermediate scrutiny regardless of its prohibitory effect on free exercise. In Smith, the underlying neutral, generally applicable law created an outright prohibition on one’s free exercise of religion, so it should have been strictly scrutinized; whereas the underlying neutral, generally applicable zoning decision by

113 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
114 ___U.S. ___ (1990). Smith, a Native American who was denied unemployment benefits from the state after being convicted for violating a state law prohibiting the use of hallucinogenic drugs, claimed that resulting denial of benefits constituted a violation of his free exercise rights. The Court upheld Smith’s conviction.
115 ___ U.S.C. ___ (1994). Smith and RFRA represent something of an ironic role-reversal, with the Court taking a less protective view of a freedom of autonomy right than Congress – here Congress seeks to protect the free exercise of religion from government interference (ironically still, it is an Act of Congress itself – i.e., punishing the use of soft drugs – that constitutes the government interference), and it is the Court that is less protective of the right. Congress thereafter amended its law to include an exception for use of peyote by Native Americans in tribal rituals. American Indian Religious Freedom Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2000)).
116 ___ U.S. ___, ___ (1997). In Boerne, parishioners of a Catholic Church claimed that a municipality’s denial of the Church’s application for a zoning variance to build an addition onto its facilities constituted a violation of their free exercise rights.
117 See supra notes 54-58, 77 and accompanying text, discussing the Court’s analogous speech doctrine which allows the limiting regulations only if they offer reasonable content neutral time, place or manner alternatives. These legitimate restrictions, of which there are many examples, are less objectionable precisely because they are limits, not outright prohibitions. The limits on free exercise, by contrast, offer no such alternative – Smith was prohibited outright from practicing his religion free of government recrimination.
118 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
the city of Boerne in applying its local ordinance merely placed a restriction on the church, so was properly reviewed under intermediate scrutiny.

On structural separation of powers grounds, Boerne was correctly decided. The Court was justified in holding that Congress exceeded its fourteenth amendment section 5 powers in attempting to dictate to the Court how it will exercise its power of judicial review. Congress cannot tell the judiciary substantively how to adjudicate cases, whereas the Constitution can. And that’s exactly what the freedom of autonomy amendment would do, and why it is necessary - it would provide guidance, in the Constitution, to the Court on the preeminence it should place on the protection of individual freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private concern.

C. Foundations

To appreciate the American colonists’ view of individual liberty, one must understand their own sense of history. They had come recently out of oppressive circumstances of government tyranny and had a visceral understanding of the dangers posed to individual liberty by unrestrained government. Their native land, England, through the centuries had endured “alternating episodes of royal despotism and commoner anarchy infringing upon liberty,” with liberty most recently only narrowly “emerg[ing] from its trials intact… [in what] had been a close victory which would require the utmost vigilance to maintain.” Elsewhere in the world, liberty had been lost.

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119 The city’s denial of the zoning variance was a non-neutral “place” restriction. Whether it was a reasonable non-neutral time, place or manner restriction is another matter – maybe it was, maybe it wasn’t, but that’s a separate question.

120 The first amendment establishment clause, the structural support holding up Jefferson’s strict wall of separation between church and state (so important in protecting government from the influence of any particular religion, and also, as one colleague, Frank Ravitch, puts it, in “protecting my religion from government”), is under siege as well. As of Spring 2005, the question of whether government may impose the majority’s religious viewpoint on all citizens by allowing placement of religious paraphernalia on government property hangs in the balance of one or two votes on the Supreme Court. As of the date of this writing, the United States Supreme Court had not yet decided The Ten Commandments Cases, but its decision on whether government’s placement of the Ten Commandments on government property constitutes an unconstitutional establishment or promotion of the Christian religion likely will depend on the vote of just one or perhaps two Supreme Court Justices. (For the record I’m going out on a limb and predicting the Court will uphold the lower court and ban placement of 10 Commandments on government property by a bare 5-4 or 6-3 margin. Of course, the Court may uphold the lower court by a wider margin in this case (it’s highly unlikely to be struck down, if at all, by a margin wider than 5-4), in which case I will be delighted to eat my words.) Incidentally, government continues to be unfazed by the fact that such displays are of questionable constitutionality – witness the Michigan House of Representative Committee on Government Operations’ 5-3 vote on March 23, 2005 to place the Ten Commandments on display in the Michigan State Capitol building.

121 See generally, Levy, supra note 3; Bailyn, supra note 6.

122 Bailyn, supra note 6, at 79, 81 (citing, e.g., Otis, Right of the British Colonies (JHL 17). In the minds of the colonists, among the primary reasons liberty was able to prevail in Britain was that “[g]radually safeguards against such evils [threatening liberty] were built up – that great array of documents starting with Magna Carta that outlined the inner boundaries of English liberties – which remained effective until, in the seventeenth century, that ‘execrable race of the Stuarts’ precipitated a ‘formidable, violent, and bloody’ struggle between the people and the confederacy ‘of temporal and spiritual tyranny.’ In the end liberty, as all the world knew, had been re-established in England….” Bailyn, supra note 6, at 81 (citing and quoting, e.g., James Otis, Rights of the British Colonies (JHL 7), p.31; Bland, Inquiry (JHL 17), pp. 7-8; Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, August 13, 1776, papers of Thomas Jefferson (Julian P. Boyd, ed.,
“It had been at this critical juncture in the history of England and of liberty,” Bailyn writes, “that America had been settled. The conjunction had not been accidental. ‘It was this great struggle that peopled America … a love of universal liberty, and a hatred, a dread, a horror, of the infernal confederacy [of temporal and spiritual tyranny] projected, conducted, and accomplished the settlement of America.’ The colonists’ conception of threats to liberty throughout recent history therefore ‘was a matter of great importance … not merely because it illustrated the characteristic dangers liberty faced but also because it made clear their own special role in history.’”

Revolutionary-era Americans themselves were aware that a fortuitous confluence of events had placed them at a unique crossroads in history, to the point where by 1776 “Americans had come to think of themselves as in a special category, uniquely placed by history to capitalize on, to complete and fulfill, the promise of man’s existence….” As John Adams put it in 17__, “The liberties of mankind and the glory of human nature is in their keeping…. America was designed by Providence for the theatre on which man was to make his true figure, on which science, virtue, liberty, happiness, and glory were to exist in peace.”

The view of America as a kind of unique Petri dish in time was shared by others outside of the colonies as well: “European illuminati continued to identify America, as John Locke had done, with something approximating a benign state of nature and to think of the colonies as special preserves of virtue and liberty…. No less a figure than Voltaire stated [in 173_] that America was the refinement of all that was good in England, writing in his *Lettres philosophiques* that Penn and the Quakers had actually brought into existence ‘that golden age of which men talk so much and which probably has never existed anywhere except in Pennsylvania.’”

Princeton, 1950-), I, 492; Hicks, Consideration (JHL 18) p. 2; [James Wilson], *Considerations on the … Authority of the British Parliament* (Philadelphia, 1774: JHL Pamphlet 44), p.12; Adams, *Dissertation*, in *Works*, III, 451).

\[123\] Bailyn, *supra* note 6, at 79-80 (stating that “only in Britain had the battle repeatedly been won”): “The colonists … looked ahead with anxiety rather than with confidence, for they knew, from the whole of their received tradition, of the desperate plight of liberty everywhere: ‘new tyrannies have sprung up, like so many new plagues, within the memory of man, and … [have] engrossed almost the whole earth,’ rendering ‘the world a slaughterhouse.’” Rulers of the East were ‘almost universally absolute tyrants … The states of Africa are scenes of tyranny, barbarity, confusion, and every form of violence. And even in Europe,… [France] has an arbitrary authority…. [Prussia,] an absolute government …; [Sweden and Denmark] have sold or betrayed their liberties …; [Rome] groans under a medley of civil and ecclesiastical bondage…. [Germany] is a hundred-headed hydra…. [and Poland a ruin of] extravagant licentiousness and anarchy … the nobility and gentry arbitrary despotict tyrants, and the populace a race of slaves.’ … [O]nly in Britain had the battle repeatedly been won. Yet even in Britain the margin of victory had been narrow, especially in the last, bitter struggle with sould-be despots of the house of Stuart. And the dangers were known to persist.” Id. at 79-80 (citing “Cato’s Letters, no. 73; *New York Gazette: or, The Weekly Post Boy*, November 1, 1756, quoting at length ‘a survey of the kingdoms of the earth’ that appeared in the eleventh essay by ‘Virginia-Centinel,’ originally published in the *Virginia Gazette* in September or October, 1756….’; see also *New York Mercury*, May 22, 1758.).

\[124\] Bailyn, *supra* note 6, at 80. “[T]he settlers of America had emigrated to create in a new land civil and ecclesiastical governments purer, freer than those they had left behind. The transplantation had been made from an undefiled branch of the nation, strong, healthy, brimming with the juices of liberty, and it had been placed in a soil perfect for its growth [-] [i]n the colonies, ‘sought and settled as an asylum for liberty, civil and religious’…” Id. at 80 or 20

\[125\] Bailyn, *supra* note 6, at 20.

\[126\] Id. (quoting John Adams, *Diary and Autobiography*, I, 282).

\[127\] Bailyn, *supra* note 6, at 83-84.
“Over a period of a century and a half [before the founding], America became accustomed to the idea that government existed by consent of the governed, that the people created the government, that they did so by written compact, that the compact reserved their natural rights, and that it constituted a fundamental law to which the government was subordinate. Constitutionalism, or the theory of limited government, was in part an outgrowth of [this] social compact.”

A half-century before John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, Thomas Hooker of Connecticut expounded the social compact theory, and one hundred years before the Declaration of Independence, the Pennsylvania “Charter of Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey (1677), which was probably the work of William Penn … began with the provision that the ‘common law or fundamental rights’ of the colonists should be ‘the foundation of the government, which is not to be altered by the Legislative authority.” This was a significant expansion over the protections offered in Mother England, where the “liberty documents … limited only the crown, not the legislature.”

"The Virginia constitution of 1776, the first permanent state constitution, began with a Declaration of Rights that restrained all branches of government…. [and further specified that] ‘all men’ are equally free and have inherent rights that cannot be divested even by compact; that among these rights are the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property and the pursuit of happiness; and that all power derives from the people, who retain a right to change the government if it fails to secure its objectives.”

The political philosophy of the pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary generations comes through clearly in their writing, which itself was influenced by a wide range of written sources, from the ancients, to the European Enlightenment, to English common lawyers, to covenant

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128 Levy, supra note 3, at 3-4. “Through their first-hand observation of how ‘Parliament had irrevocably limited itself [in order to protect individual liberties] by reaffirmations of the Magna Carta and passage of the Petition of Right of 1628, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the Bill of Rights of 1689, and the Toleration Act of 1689[,] Americans learned that a free people are those who live under a government so constitutionally checked and controlled that its powers must be reasonably exercised without abridging individual rights.” Id. at 4-5.
129 Id. at 3, 7.
130 Id. at 7.
131 “[T]he leaders of the American Revolution… turned out … a rich literature of theory, argument, opinion and polemic. Every medium of written expression was put to use. The newspapers… were crowded with columns of arguments and counter-arguments appearing as letters, official documents, extracts of speeches, and sermons. Broadsides – single sheets … - appeared everywhere; they could be found posted or passing from hand to hand in the towns of every colony. Almanacs … universally available in the colonies, carried … a considerable freight of political comment. Above all, there were pamphlets: booklets consisting of a few printer’s sheets, folded in various ways so as to make various sizes and numbers of pages, and sold – the pages stitched together loosely, unbound and uncovered….“ Bailyn, supra note 6, at 1-2 (citing Arthur M. Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence (New York, 1958), pp. 215-226, part ii; Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 1941), pp. 216-224). “Explanatory as well as declarative, and expressive of the beliefs, attitudes, and motivations as well as the professed goals of those who led and supported the Revolution, the pamphlets are the distinctive literature of the Revolution. They reveal, more clearly than any other single group of document, the contemporary meaning of that transforming event.” Id. at 8.
132 “Among the most conspicuous, but often somewhat superficial, sources, were the classical authors such as Homer, Sophocles, Plato, Euripides, Herodotus, etc., etc…. “‘It was an obscure pamphleteer indeed who could not muster at least one classical analogy or one ancient precept.’” Bailyn, supra note ___ at 24, quoting Charles F. Mullett, “Classical Influences on the American Revolution,” Classical Journal 35 (1939-40), 93, 94.] Of the classics, “above all Cicero, Sallust, and Tacitus – writers who had lived either when
theology, but “important as all of these clusters of ideas were, they did not in themselves form a coherent intellectual pattern.” “What brought these disparate strands of thought together, what dominated the colonists’ miscellaneous learning and shaped it into a coherent whole, was the influence of … the writings of a group of seventeenth century English opposition theorists.”

the republic was being fundamentally challenged or when its greatest days were already past and its moral and political virtues decayed…. For the colonists, arguing the American cause in the controversies of the 1760s and 1770s, the analogies to their own times were compelling…. The classics of the ancient world are everywhere in the literature of the Revolution, but they are everywhere illustrative, not determinative, of thought.” Id. at 25-26.

More directly influential in shaping the thought of the Revolutionary generation were the ideas and attitudes associated with the writings of Enlightenment rationalism – writings that expressed not simply the rationalism of liberal reform but that of enlightened conservatism as well…. The ideas and writings of the leading secular thinkers of the European Enlightenment – reformers and social critics like Voltaire, Rousseau, and Beccaria as well as conservative analysts like Montesquieu – were quoted everywhere in the colonies, by everyone who claimed a broad awareness. … Alexander Hamilton, for example, seeking to score points against his venerable antagonist, Samuel Seabury, recommended with arch condescension that his adversary get himself at the first opportunity to some of the writings of Pufendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, and Bulamaqui to discover the true principles of politics.” Bailyn, supra note 6, at 26-28. All of that said, “the knowledge they reflect, like that of the ancient classics, is at times superficial...[; moreover, e]veryone, whatever his position on Independence or his judgment of Parliament’s actions, cited them as authoritative; almost no one, Whig or Tory, disputed them or introduced them with apology.... [E]xcept for Locke’s, their influence, though more decisive than that of the authors of classical antiquity, was neither clearly dominant nor wholly determinative.” Id. at 30-31.

“Also prominent and in certain ways powerfully influential was yet another group of writers and ideas ... - the great figures of England’s legal history, especially the seventeenth-century common lawyers” like Sir Edward Coke; Lord Chief Justices Francis Bacon, Sir Matthew Hale, Sir John Vaughan, and Sir John Holt; and William Blackstone. “The common law was manifestly influential in shaping the awareness [and serving as a repository of history and human dealings] of the Revolutionary generation - ... [indeed, it] stood side by side with Enlightenment rationalism in [their] minds.” “But again, it did not in itself determine the kinds of conclusions men would draw in the crisis of the time.” Id., at 30-31.

America as Providence. Another “major source of ideas and attitudes of the Revolutionary generation stemmed ultimately from the political and social theories of New England Puritanism, and particularly from the ideas associate with covenant theology. In one sense this was the most limited and parochial tradition ... [in that it was] restricted in its appeal to those who continued to understand the world, as the original Puritans had, in theological terms. But in another[ ironic] sense it contained the broadest ideas of all, since it offered a context for everyday events nothing less than cosmic in its dimensions.... [It was] found everywhere in the idea that America had a special place, as yet not fully revealed, in the architecture of God’s intent.” Id. at 32-33.

“There were among them, in fact, striking incongruities and contradictions. The English common lawyers the colonists cited, for example, sought to establish right by appeal to precedent and to an unbroken tradition evolving form time immemorial, and they assumed ... inherited custom contained within it a greater wisdom than any man or group of men could devise by the power of reason. Nothing could have been more alien to the Enlightenment rationalists whom the colonists also quoted – and with equal enthusiasm. These theorists felt that it was precisely the heavy crust of custom that was weighing down the spirit of man; they sought to throw it off and to create by the unfettered power of reason a framework of institutions superior to the accidental inheritance of the past.” Id. at 33-34.

Prolific writers, these “‘country’ politicians and publicists... [were] united in criticism of ‘court’ and ministerial power,” ... [and included among their numbers] John Milton, author of Eikonolastes and The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (both 1649) ...; the like-minded Henry Neville; and, above all, ... the doctrines of Algernon Sidney, that ‘martyr to civil liberty,’ whose Discourses Concerning Government (1698) became, in Caroline Robbins’ phrase, a ‘textbook of revolution’ in America. [cites omitted].” Id. at 34-35.
A group of early eighteenth-century writers then “modified and enlarged this earlier body of ideas, fused it into a whole with other contemporary strains of thought, and, above all, applied it to the problems of eighteenth century English politics. These eighteenth-century writers – coffeehouse radicals and opposition politicians, spokesmen for the anti-Court independents within Parliament and the disaffected without … faded subsequently into obscurity and are little known today. But more than any other single group of writers they shaped the mind of the American Revolutionary generation.”

“To the colonists the most important of these publicists and intellectual middlemen were those spokesmen for extreme libertarianism, John Trenchard (1662-1723) and Thomas Gordon (d.1750). Together with the treatises of John Locke, the writings of Trenchard and Gordon

138 Id. at 34-35.
139 Id. at 34-35. Trenchard and Gordon “joined forces to produce, first, the weekly Independent Whig to attack High Church pretensions and, more generally, the establishment of religion, fifty-three papers of which were published in book form in 1721; and Cato’s Letters, a searing indictment of eighteenth-century English politics and society… which appeared first serially in The London Journal and the, beginning in 1720, in book form. [cites omitted] … [T]hese libertarian tracts … left an indelible imprint on the ‘country’ mind everywhere in the English-speaking world. In America, they were republished entire or in part again and again, ‘quoted in every colonial newspaper from Boston to Savannah,’ and referred to repeatedly in the pamphlet literature.” Id.

The ideas forwarded by Trenchard and Gordon – ideas “based on extreme solicitude for the individual and an equal hostility to government, were expressed in a spirit of foreboding and fear for the future…. [They] grounded their thought in pessimism concerning human nature and in the discouraging record of human weakness…. [Government corruption] was their major theme, their obsessive concern, and they hammered away at it week after week, year after year…. So “Cato” warned, again and again, that ‘public corruptions and abuses have grown upon us; fees in most, if not all, offices, are immensely increased; places and employments, which ought not to be sold at all, are sold for treble value; the necessaries of the public have made greater impositions unavoidable, and yet the public has run very much in debt; and as those debts have been increasing, and the people growing poor, salaries have been augmented, and pensions multiplied.’ Id. at 48-50 (quoting Cato’s Letters no. 20, March 11, 1720 (in the London, 1748 ed., I 140. See also, e.g., no. 17, February 18, 1720 (“What Measures Are Actually Taken by Wicked and Desperate Ministers to Ruin and Enslave Their Country”), and no. 98, October 13, 1722.).

140 In Locke’s formulation, natural law dictates that man is subject to divine imperatives to live in certain ways, but, within the limits set by the law of nature, men can act in a godlike fashion. Man as maker has a maker’s knowledge of his intentional actions, and a natural right to dominion over man’s products. Provided we do not violate natural law, we stand in the same relation to the objects we create as God stands to us; we own them just as he owns us.” Id. (citing John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter 27 and Book I, Chapter 30; also citing James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) pp. 108-10, 121); see also Levy, supra note 3, at 3, 7 (stating that for the founders, “the predominance of [Lockean] social compact theory reflected a condition of freedom and, like the experience with charters, contributed to the belief in written bills of rights.”). Shapiro sums up, “Natural law, or God’s natural right, thus sets outer boundaries to a field within which humans have divine authority to act as miniature gods, creating rights and obligations of their own…. [Locke, together with Hobbes,] believed that people are free to act as they choose when natural law is silent, but, when it is not, neither was entirely comfortable with the proposition that free human will must always succumb to natural law’s requirements. This was so despite the fact that both of them believed natural law had the full force of both science and theology behind it…. Although Locke thought natural law as expressed in the Scriptures binding on human beings, he recognized that the Scriptures are sufficiently ambiguous to allow room for interpretive disagreement. … Locke insist[ed] that God speaks directly to every individual who reads the Scriptures, and that no human authority is entitled to declare one interpretation authoritative in the face of a conflicting one. This freedom to comprehend natural law by one’s own lights supplied the basis of Locke’s right to resist that could be invoked against the sovereign, and to which he himself appealed when opposing the English crown during the 1680s. His
“ranked [to the colonists] … as the most authoritative statement of the nature of political liberty and above Locke as an exposition of the social sources of the threats it faced.”141 “Standing with Trenchard and Gordon as early eighteenth-century ‘preceptors of liberty’ was the liberal Anglican bishop, Benjamin Hoadly[. the] ‘best hated clergyman of the century amongst his own order,’ … [who] was widely held to be one of the notable figures in the history of political thought.”142

In short, “[o]pposition thought, in the form it acquired at the turn of the seventeenth century and in the early eighteenth century, was devoured by the colonists. From the earliest years of the century it nourished their political thought and sensibilities…. By 1728, in fact, Cato’s Letters had already been fused with Locke, Coke, Pufendorf, and Grotius to produce a prototypical American treatise in defense of English liberties overseas, a tract indistinguishable from any number of publications that would appear in the Revolutionary crisis fifty years later.”143 “Testimonies to the unique influence of this opposition literature … are everywhere in the writings of eighteenth-century America.”144 “Above all, their influence may be seen in the way conviction that right answers can be discovered about the meaning of the Scriptures, and, hence, what natural law requires, was not understood to obliterate human freedom to disagree even about that very subject.” Shapiro, supra note 18, at 16-17 (citing John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), Chapter 3; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Pelican Books, 1968 [1651]), p. 83).

141 Bailyn, supra note 6, at 34-35.

142 “For illustrations of the way Hoadly’s ideas entered into the mainstream of American Revolutionary thought, see Jonathan Mayhew’s Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission (Boston, 1750: JHL Pamphlet 1)… Similarly, an anonymous English writer at the end of the century attributed the origins of the French Revolution to the fact that ‘every class of Frenchman … became familiarly acquainted with Sidney, Locke, and Hoadly.’ An Historical View of the French Revolution … 18 (Newcastle upon Tyne, 1796).” Bailyn, supra note 37-43. “With Hoadly, among his contemporaries, though below him in importance to the Americans, was the outstanding opponent in Parliament of [Robert] Walpole’s administration, the leader of a coterie of early eighteenth-century freethinking Whigs, Robert Viscount Molesworth, Friend of Trenchard and Gordon, encomiast of Cato’s Letters (they were frequently attributed to him), he was know particularly in the colonies for his Account of Denmark (1694), which detailed the process by which free states succumb to absolutism. [cites omitted] An opposition leader of another sort who contributed in a more complicated way to the colonists’ inheritance of early eighteenth-century thought as the spectacular jacobite politician, writer, and philosopher, Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke. His Craftsman, appearing weekly or semiweekly for a full ten years, from 1726 to 1736, roasted Walpole’s administration in crackling fires of ridicule and denunciation…. and decried the corruption of the age and warned of the dangers of incipient autocracy. [cites omitted].” Others of this generation “the colonists knew and cited in the same general context [include] … that extraordinary one-man propaganda machine in the cause of liberty, the indefatigable Thomas Hollis, whose correspondence in the 1760s first with Mayhew and then with Andrew Eliot illustrates vividly the directness of the influence of this radical and opposition tradition on the ideological origins of the Revolution. In the Revolutionary years proper…. Richard Price Joseph Priestley, and John Cartwright [were foremost]; but the key book of this generation was the three-volume Political Disquisitions published in 1774 by the schoolmaster, political theorist, and moralist, James Burgh. … [A]mong the many Whig historians the Americans knew and referred to … their preference was for the exiled Huguenot, Paul de Rапin-Thoyras, … [whose works,] published in England between 1717[17] and 1731, … provided indisputable proof of the theories of all of the radical and anti-establishment writers by demonstrating their validity through a thousand years of English history.” Gordon was also a very effective translator of Sallust and Tacitus – “Under [Gordon’s] hands [Tacitus] virtually became an apologist for English Whiggery.” Bailyn, supra note 6, at 41-42.

143 Id. at 43 (citing Dulany, Daniel, Sr., The Right of the Inhabitants of Maryland to the Benefit of the English Laws, (Annapolis, 1728: reprinted in St. George L. Sioussat, The English Statutes in Maryland, Baltimore, 1903)).

144 Id. at 44-45. “Sometimes they are explicit, as when Jonathan Mayhew wrote that, having been ‘initiated, in youth, in the doctrines of civil liberty, as they were taught by such men … as Sidney and
the peculiar bent of mind of the writers in this tradition was reflected in the ideas and attitudes of the Americans. … Their key concepts – natural rights, the contractual basis of society and government, the uniqueness of England’s liberty-preserving ‘mixed’ constitution – were commonplaces of the liberal thought of the time.”

But if the elements of their thought were ordinary, the emphasis placed upon them and the use made of them were not.”

Revolutionary-era lawyer John Dickinson epitomized these commonly-held views of the day, writing: ‘“Natural rights’ are created in us by the decrees of Providence, which establish the laws of our nature. They are born with us; exist with us; and cannot be taken from us by any human power without taking our lives. In short, they are founded on the immutable maxims of reason and justice…. The natural personal rights of individuals are … the very basis of all municipal laws of any great value. [Indeed,] Magna Carta itself is in substance but a constrained declaration, or proclamation and promulgation in the name of King, Lords, and Commons of the sense the latter had of their original, inherent, indefeasible, natural rights.”

The mere seven decades between the birth of the federal constitutional democracy in 1789 and the onset of the Civil War in 1861 saw a sea-change in attitude regarding the nature of the threat that government presented to individual liberty. As noted by Professor Amar, in the 1780s the states were regarded as benign; indeed, they were regarded as protectors against a threatening national government. As we have seen, “[i]n light of their experience with imperial arrogance and oppression on the one hand, and the heroic roles played by local governments in resisting oppression on the other, many Americans in the 1780s associated strong central government with tyranny and a strong state government with freedom.” But after the turn of the century, “it would be hard to argue that the central government acted qualitatively more repressively than

Milton, Locke, and Hoadly, among the moderns, I liked them; they seemed rational”; or when John Adams insisted, against what he took to be the massed opinion of informed Englishmen, that the root principles of good government could be found only in ‘Sidney, Harrington, Locke, Milton, Nedham, Nevill, Burnet, and Hoadly’; or again, when he listed the great political thinkers of 1688 as ‘Sidney, Locie, Hoadly, Trenchard, Gordon, Plato Redivivus (Neville] … More often, the evidence is implicit, in the degree to which the pamphleteers quoted from, plagiarized, and modeled their writings on Cato’s Letters and The Independent Whig.”

For example, “John Adams professed to have read through five times [Bolingbroke’s Freeholder’s Political Catechism (1733)].”

The events of the following decade, with the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures (ghostwritten by Madison and Jefferson, respectively) leading the charge against the federal Sedition Act.”
local ones.”  

Add to the slave states’ abuses the Court’s cramped textual interpretation in the 1833 case *Barron v. Baltimore* that the Bill of Rights applies only to Congress, not the states, and you have a ready source of conflict between the prevailing judicial doctrine of the day and the founders’ original position that the Constitution protects natural individual liberties. “To a nineteenth-century believer in natural rights, the Bill was not simply an enactment of We the People as the

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150 *Id.* at 159. No issue “place[d] the libertarian track record of federal versus state governments in stronger light than did slavery. And on this question, states did not shine. Slavery was almost exclusively a creature of state law. . . . [A] major platform of the Free Soil and Republican Parties in the 1840s and 1850s was that the Constitution frowned on federal involvement with slavery. Freedom was national, slavery local—hence the popular slogan, ‘Freedom National,’ a slogan that would have sounded quite odd in the 1780s and 1790s.” *Id.* at 160 (citing, e.g., National Party Platforms, 1840-1968, at 5 (Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson eds., 3rd ed., 1966) (Liberty Platform of 1844, sec. 10, 11); citing also generally Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men* 73-102 (1970); Harold M. Hyman and William M. Wiecek, *Equal Justice Under Law* 17-18, 92-93, 170 (1982)).

151 *Id.* at 160 (citing, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, *No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights* 36 (1986); William Goodell, *The American Slave Code in Theory and Practice* 372-84 (Negro Universities Press, 1968); H. Hyman and W. Wiecek, *supra* note __ at 15, 401-02; J. TenBroek, *supra* note ___ at 38-39, 125-26; W. Wiecek, *supra* note ___ at 182-83, 280-81). “Slavery bred repression.” *Id.* (citing Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st sess. 2595-2602 (1860)(remarks of Sen. Charles Sumner); Michael Kent Curtis, *The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper’s Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment*, 68 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 1113, 1127, 1132 (1993)). “Speech and writing critical of slavery, even if plainly religious or political in inspiration, was incendiary and had to be suppressed in southern states, lest slaves overhear and get ideas.” *Id.* (citing Michael Kent Curtis, *No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights* 23, 30-38 (1986); Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution* 211-12 (1956); Alfred Avins, *Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited*, 6 Harv. J. on Legis. I, 17-26 (1968); citing generally Clement Eaton, *The Freedom of Thought Struggle in the Old South* (1964); Russell B. Nye, *Fettered Freedom* (1963); Curtis, *Curious History*; *supra* note __; Curtis, *1859 Crisis*, *supra* note __). “In 1859 a Virginia postmaster even banned the *New York Tribune*, a leading Republican newspaper, under a sweeping state censorship statute; twenty years earlier, the state had tried to prosecute citizens for circulating an antislavery petition to Congress.” *Id.* at 160-61 (citing Curtis, *1859 Crisis*, *supra* note __, at 1134-35.) Quite a fall indeed in a few short decades for the proud state of Virginia, home of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison…. “Teaching slaves to read (even the Bible) was a criminal offense punished severely in some states.” *Id.* at 161 (citing, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1013 (1866)(remarks of Rep. Tobias Plants); K. Stampp, *supra* note __, at 208, 22; J. TenBroek, *supra* note __ at 124-25). “[I]n at least one state, writing, printing, publishing, or distributing abolitionist literature was punishable by death.” *Id.* (citing Kurt. T. Lash, *The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment*, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1106, 1134 and n.127 (1994)).

152 _U.S._ __ (1833)

153 In failing to honor the founders’ views regarding individual liberties as inviolable natural law, *Barron’s* underlying message was that Bill of Rights provisions such as the first amendment were “merely an interpretation of the positive-law code of the original Constitution, declaring that Congress lacked Article I, section 8 enumerated power to regulate religion in the states or to suppress speech.” *Amar, supra* note 8, __-156. __-147.

154 Following *Barron*, it was left to lawyers practicing “the common-law method in mid-nineteenth-century America … [to find that] even if the federal Bill of Rights did not, strictly speaking, bind the states of its own legislative force, … [it was] at least declaratory of certain fundamental common-law rights….” *Amar, supra* note 8, at 147 (describing “the common-law method of the mid-nineteenth century [as] involve[ing] careful examination of codes, charters, statutes, and the like in an effort to distill their animating
The philosophical debate concerning the constitutional interplay of state and federal government with protection of natural individual liberties that took place in the first half of the nineteenth century set the stage after the Civil War for the fourteenth amendment’s memorialization of the notion that the Constitution incorporates the bill of rights to apply to the states and implicitly protects natural rights. During the debate in the thirty-ninth Congress over the language for what became the fourteenth amendment, Section 1’s principle draftsman John Bingham “made himself abundantly clear. Over and over he described the privileges-or-immunities clause as encompassing ‘the bill of rights’ – a phrase he used more than a dozen times in a key speech on February 28.” Moreover, when asked again several years later after the ratification of the

principles… Judges did not simply make up common law; they found it in authoritative legal sources like Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, the English Bill of Rights of 1689” and last, but not least, the Bill of Rights).

155 Amar, supra note 8, at 148 (citing, e.g., Jacobus Ten Broek, Equal Under Law 90-91, 128 (Collier, 1965))(1951) (“early amendments [were] seen by contrarians as ‘declaratory constitutional safeguards of natural rights’ and ‘a meeting ground of constitutional and natural rights’”); Howard Jay Graham, Our “Declaratory’ Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 3-4 (1954) (“noting centrality of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century conception of various constitutional provisions as ‘declaratory’”); William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment 59 (1988) (“quoting 1867 Pennsylvania legislator who described constitutional amendments as submitted to the people ‘sitting as a jury’ – that is, a judicial body”); and, more generally, 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 42, 53-55, 57-58, 86; Bailyn, supra note 6, at 69, n.13, 78, 187-98 (1967); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 294 (1969); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi L. Rev. 1127, 1132-33 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 171 (1992).

As one advocate of the day put it to the Supreme Court in oral argument in1840, “certain provisions of the bill of rights were merely ‘limitations of power’ (procedural amendments), whereas others ‘are to be understood as declarations of rights….’ Amar, supra note 8, at 153 (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 555-57 (1940) (C.P. VanNess argument)). State courts, through these approaches, saw their way clear to imposing principles distilled from the Bill of Rights within their own jurisdictions. Amar, supra note 8, at 149, 150, 151 (citing, e.g., Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 98 Gray) 329, 340 (1857) (stating, “[T]he amendments of the Constitution of the United States, in the nature of a bill of rights, [should be regarded] as the announcement of great and fundamental principles, to be always held in regard, both morally and legally, by those who make and those who administer the law [rather than as mere] precise and positive directions and rules of action”); Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 165-68 (applying “just compensation” requirement despite absence of state mandate “after canvassing the ‘soundest authorities’ of Grotius, Puffendorf, and Blackstone, and the express language of [several neighboring states’] constitutions, [the judge] proclaimed: ‘But what is of higher authority, and is absolutely decisive of the sense of the people of this country, [the principle] is made a part of the Constitution of the United States…..’”); and numerous other state cases stating similarly).

Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court (ironically, given the antebellum era) was a leader in enunciating natural law: “The Bill of Rights’ purpose ‘was to declare to the world the fixed and unalterable determination of our people, that these invaluable rights … should never be disturbed by any government.’ The Bill was ‘our Magna Charta.’” Id. At 155 (quoting Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 367-68 (1852)).

156 The northern Republicans’ disapproval of the southern states’ practice of disarming of blacks in the South, as discussed in the debates over the Act, “fed the determination of northern Republicans to provide national enforcement of the Bill of Rights.” It is fair to say that “the efforts to disarm the freedmen were in the background when the 39th Congress debated the Fourteenth amendment.” Cottrol and Diamond, __ 346.

157 Amar, supra note 8, at 182 (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088-94 (1866)). In this speech “he also explained why a constitutional amendment was necessary, citing by name and quoting from the
fourteenth amendment, in 1871, to clarify the amendment, “here, too, he immediately linked ‘the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States’ with the Bill of Rights: “[T]he privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Those eight amendments are as follows. [Bingham then proceeded to read the first eight amendments word for word.] These eight articles I have shown never were limitations upon the power of the States, until made so by the fourteenth amendment.”

Supreme Court’s opinions in *Barron* and one of its progeny, *Livingston v. Moore*, [ ___ U.S. ___ (18__)]. The day before, a colleague of Bingham’s, Robert Hale, had suggested that states were already bound by the Bill of Rights, [citing Id. at 1064,] but Bingham set Hale and others straight with the following quotation from *Livingston*: ‘As to the amendments of the Constitution of the United States, they must be put out of the case, since it is now settled that those amendments do not extend to the States…..’ [citing Id. at 1090, (quoting Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S., (7 Pet.) 469, 551-52 (1833))). Six weeks later Bingham again held forth on the need for his amendment, invoking ‘the bill of rights’ six times in a single speech and again reminding his colleagues that it ‘has been solemnly ruled by the Supreme Court of the United States’ that ‘the bill of rights … does not limit the powers of States.’ [Id. citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. At 1291-93 (1866).] In a speech in January 1867, while the amendment was pending in the states, Bingham again reminded his audience that his amendment would overrule *Barron*. [Id. citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 811 (1867)].

Bingham had earlier stated, in 1859, that “whenver the Constitution guaranties to its citizens a right, either natural or conventional, such guarantee is in itself a limitation upon the States.” Amar, supra note 8, at 181 (citing Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 982 (1859)). Moreover, “no state could violate the Constitution’s ‘wise and beneficent guarantees of political rights to the citizens of the United States, as such, and of natural rights to all persons, whether citizens or strangers.’” pu_fn4. “Said Bingham: ‘[N]atural or inherent rights, which belong to all men irrespective of all conventional regulations, are by this constitution guarantied by the broad and comprehensive work ‘person,’ as contradistinguished from the limited term citizen – as in the fifth article of amendments…. that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property but by due process of law, nor shall private property be taken without….’ Bingham’s inclusion of the takings clause in this category explains a passing proposal that he made seven years later in the Joint Reconstruction Committee, a proposal that Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger tried to use against Bingham and incorporation. [cites]

158 Amar, supra note 8, at 183 (quoting Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1s Sess. 84 app. (1871)). Thaddeus Stevens, political leader of the houos and head of the House delegation of the Committee on Reconstruction that officially reported the fourteenth amendment, stated “shortly before the amendment came before the House for final approval,” Id. at 185, “I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not admit that every one of these provisions [in section 1 of the fourteenth amendment] is just…. But the Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the States. This amendment supplies that defect….’” Id. (quoting Id. at 2459). Two years earlier, in 1864, “Representative James Wilson had made clear that he too understood the ‘privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States’ to include the guarantee of the amendments: ‘Freedom of religious opinion, freedom of speech and press, and the right of assemble for the purpose of petition belong to every American citizen …. With these rights no State may interfere… Sir I might enumerate many other constitutional rights of the citizen which slavery has disregarded and practically destroyed, but I have [said] enough to illustrate my proposition: that slavery … denies to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens….’ Id. at 184-85 (citing Cong. Globe, 38th cong., 1st Sess. 1202-03 (1864); quoting Representative Hale: ‘[T]hese amendments to the Constitution, numbered from one to ten, … constitute the bill of rights, a bill of rights for the protection of the citizen, and defining and limiting the power of Federal and State legislation… [There is much force in the reasoning that] there has been from first to last, a violation of the provisions in this bill of rights by the very existence of slavery itself….’) Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064-65 (1866)). In the Senate, head of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction Jacob Howard commented, “The great object of the first section of this [fourteenth] amendment is … to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect else great fundamental [bill of rights] guarantees.” Amar, supra Id. at 186 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866). Amar notes further that “the leading scholarly work counts no fewer than thirty Republican statements in the Thirty-eighth and Thirty-ninth
But the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause encompassed more than just the Bill of Rights – indeed, it was intended to provide constitutional cover for a full range of natural individual liberties, which had been neglected and abused between the time of founding and the Civil War (but this time mostly by state, rather than federal, government). This was in Reconstruction-era Americans’ keeping, much like their Revolutionary-era ancestors, with the core belief in the existence of “absolute rights inherent in the people, … of which no power can legally deprive them, … principles which lie at the very foundation of civil liberty, and are most intimately connected with the dearest rights of the people…. [These p]rinciples … deserve to be diligently taught to our children, and to be written upon the posts of the houses, and upon the gates.”

With the constitutional complement now in place after Reconstruction, fast forward to the America of the early twenty-first century – where oppressive amendments discriminating

Congresses voicing [similar] contrarian sentiments, and not one supporting Barron.” Id. at 186 (citing M. Curtis, No State Shall Abridge, supra note __ at 112. The comments of all of the Congressmen cited received broad media and public attention, yet “not a single person in either house spoke up to deny these men’s interpretation of section I. Surely, if the words of section I meant something different, this was the time to stand up and say so. Consider, finally, that all of these men offered glosses that mesh perfectly with each other and, most importantly, with the plain meaning of the words of section I.” Amar, supra note 8, at 187. As Amar notes, “[I]n light of all of this, it is [indeed] astonishing that some scholars, most notably Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger, have suggested that when Bingham invoked ‘the bill of rights,’ he didn’t mean what he said.” Id. at 183 (citing Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 26, 33-3, 134, 136 (1949); Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary 141-42 (1977); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 Ohio St. L. J. 435, 463 (1981). “For a powerful rebuttal to the general claims of Berger’s article, see Michael Kent Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine-Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 43 Ohio St. L. J. 89 (1982).” Id.

Amar argues that the Bill of Rights in its entirety serves to enumerate only a portion of those fundamental freedoms that the fourteenth amendment framers intended to incorporate to apply to the states. The reason the framers did not simply state clearly that the entire Bill of Rights was incorporated, he says, was because they intended also to include other important freedoms found in the Constitution outside of the Bill of Rights, such as the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus found in Article I, Section 9. Amar, Akhil Reed, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 Harv. J. Law Pub. Pol’y 447 (1996).

Amar, supra note 8, at 153 (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 555-57 (1940) (C.P. VanNess argument)).

Regarding the peoples’ trust in state as opposed to federal government, one commentator suggests, “[t]rust in state governments enjoyed a resurgence during the late Nineteenth Century, particularly after public opinion turned against the northern occupation of the South and the Union programs of Reconstruction. [citing ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 582 (1988); FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776-1876, at 208-21 (2000); MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, 1 A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 477 (2002)]. The Progressive reform movement of the early Twentieth Century, followed quickly by the Great Depression, two world wars, and the Civil Rights Movement, set the nation on a path in which national power was typically far more respected and trusted than state power. [citing Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 500-03 (1998).] By the 1980s, however, resentment against national power seemed to rise once again. [citing id. at 503-522]. Today, we may well live in an age in which the people are as close to true indifference between national and state power as they have ever been, and are willing to contemplate the exercise of power by either level of government, depending upon which level can more persuasively demonstrate that it can do the better job. [citing, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Authority?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at 4:14]. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1009-10.
against same-sex couples are passed in all thirteen states where the question is on the ballot; where compassionate end-of-life choice is illegal in 49 states and where the one state where it is legal is being sued by the U.S. government asking the Supreme Court to declare the state law unlawful; where thousands are in prison for possessing or using soft drugs; where a woman’s right to maintain control over her own reproductive decisions hangs by a thread; and where religious freedom is under relentless attack. How did this happen? That the privileges and immunities clause was strangled in its crib by the Court in the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases opinion, thus withholding from the judiciary a valuable tool for the protection of individual liberties for the following 125 years, certainly did not help matters; but more generally Americans themselves have not been vigilant enough in protecting their natural freedom of autonomy from a “wholly new species of oppression…, [where] the democratic government, acting in response to the will of the majority, … create[s] a society with a network of … [rules] that none can escape.” Now is the time for change.

D. The Freedom of Autonomy Amendment

Professor Elizabeth Price Foley writes, “Instead of a land of individual liberty and … tolerance, America has become a land of public morality and intolerance, all without the benefit of constitutional amendment…. [and] while there is nothing wrong with having an opinion based upon one’s culture or religion, there is something wrong with imposing this opinion upon others in a pluralistic society founded upon individual liberty.”

That’s the problem in a nutshell. It would be one thing had American government undertaken to micro-manage our lives and to infringe upon our natural rights of freedom of autonomy – rights that our forebears identified in the Declaration of Independence and saw fit to guarantee to us in the Constitution - pursuant to the grant of some sort of constitutional authority of its own, but of course there is no such grant. Instead, government, as guided by a moralistic and often intolerant majority, has proceeded to systematically strangle many of our basic constitutionally-guaranteed private freedoms.

Many say this is acceptable. We are, after all, committed monists say, a nation founded on democratic principles - the idea is that government obtains the consent of the governed through an election process in which citizens elect fellow citizens, who presumably then represent the

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162 ___ U.S. ___ (1873) (holding that the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause refers only to the limited rights of “federal” citizenship, not to the more expansive rights of “state” citizenship).
163 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
164 FOLEY, ELIZABETH PRICE, LIBERTY FOR ALL: PRIVACY VERSUS MORALITY IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (forthcoming Yale Press 2006). (Foley manuscript, p.62, 67-68). Foley systematically describes how conventional or traditional governmental approaches to various cultural institutions and customs (for example, marriage, reproductive freedom, religion, etc.) deny specific fundamental liberties, and in so doing proves her point that “Americans have long forgotten the foundational constitutional principles of limited government and residual individual liberty.” (manuscript, p.26)
165 See supra note 27.
166 It is said that obtaining “consent of the governed” is a necessary, basic element for legitimate government: “Coherent, stable – and morally supportable – government is possible only on the basis of consent, and … the secret of consent is the sense of common venture fostered by institutions that reflect and represent us and that we can call to account.” BICKEL, ALEXANDER, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 20 (Yale 1962, 2d ed. 1986)(discussing Judge Learned Hand’s favoring of democratic institutions and principles over the countermajoritarianism inherent in America’s practice of broad judicial review).
interests of all in the process of lawmaking. If it is the majority’s will in the course of its legitimate policymaking on matters involving government taxing and spending, etc., also to impose limits on the behavior and free will of individuals, then so be it. Those who disagree with the policy decisions of the elected representatives have recourse every few years at the polling station, so dissenters among the oppressed minority should stop whining and live within the limits that have been imposed upon their freedom.

Of course to the rights foundationalist this vision is unacceptable in a nation founded on principles of freedom and individual liberty. Government, whether guided by democratically-elected majorities or not, lacks authority to deprive We the People of natural rights of freedom of autonomy on matters of private concern – rights, after all, that had been recognized and guaranteed in the nation’s founding documents - except under the most extreme circumstances. Such rigorous protection of rights assuredly is not the status quo in America.

So, America is at a crossroads. Will Americans continue along their current path of complacency and allow an ever-greater number of government prohibitions and restrictions on matters of natural private concern? Or will they say “Enough!” and take necessary steps to put government back in its proper place?

If Americans are committed to the latter course, nothing short of a constitutional amendment will do. An amendment would make explicit the guarantee that the right of freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private concern – a right contemplated in the Declaration of Independence and guaranteed in the Constitution – shall not be abridged by either federal or state government. The intent in enacting such an amendment would be to offer a scope of protection for matters of private autonomy similar to that guaranteed in the analogous first amendment’s protection of speech, where, in applying the Court’s current doctrine, absolute deprivations of freedom of autonomy are upheld only in the most extreme of circumstances, and partial deprivations only if in line with rigid guidelines. As to the latter, the doctrine would apply strict scrutiny if the abridgement of the freedom of autonomy is content-based, and intermediate

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167 Most assuredly, elections are imperfect proxies for the governed and their interests. As Professor Bickel surmised, “It may be, as Professor Robert A. Dahl has written, that elections themselves, and the political competition that renders them meaningful, ‘do not make for government by majorities in any very significant way,’ for they do not establish a great many policy preferences. However, ‘they are a crucial devices for controlling leaders.’” BICKEL, supra note 166 at 18-19 (quoting DAHL, ROBERT A., A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 125, 132 (Univ. of Chicago 1956). Or, as stated by the eminent jurist Judge Learned Hand, “Of course I know how illusory would be the belief that my vote determined anything; but nevertheless when I go to the polls I have a satisfaction in the sense that we are all engaged in a common venture.” Bickel, supra note 166 (quoting HAND, LEARNED, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (Harvard Press 1958)).

168 See supra note 27.

169 On the importance of memorialization of protections in a written constitution, we may profit by looking back at the original motivations for a constitution at the time of the founding: ‘The American colonial experience, climaxed by the controversy with England leading to the Revolution, honed American sensitivity to the need for written constitutions that protected rights grounded in the ‘immutable laws of nature’ as well as in the British constitution and colonial charters…. Americans had a novel concept of constitution. The word signified to them a supreme law creating government, limiting it, unalterable by it, and paramount to it…. ‘To secure these rights,’ Thomas Jefferson declared, ‘governments are instituted among men.’” pp.8-9

170 The amendment might read, tracking closely the first amendment’s protection of speech, “Neither Congress nor any State shall make or enforce any law abridging the freedom of individual autonomy on matters of natural private concern.” The shift in presumption against would resolve close questions against the government, much like the analogous first amendment.
scrutiny if content-neutral, under which reasonable time, place and manner restrictions may be upheld.

A constitutional amendment is necessary (a) to provide proper guidance to the all-too-fallible government institutions entrusted with protecting individual liberties; and (b) in order to adhere firmly to the principle of fidelity to a written Constitution, where any major change to our understanding of the Constitution must be memorialized through the Article V amendment process. On the first, I argue in these pages that the historical record demonstrates that the right of individual freedom of autonomy, in all of its broad scope, is guaranteed squarely within the terms “liberty” and “property” (in the case of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment) and “privileges or immunities” (in the case of the fourteenth amendment) in the Constitution. The fact is, though, that the judiciary, although it has found some fundamental “privacy” rights within those terms, is inconsistent in its decisionmaking; moreover, it does not recognize the full scope and breadth of the right of freedom of autonomy. An explicit amendment will give the judiciary much-needed guidance in its indispensable judicial review function.

171 See supra note 144-50 and accompanying text.
172 See supra note 160-61 and accompanying text.
173 Judicial opinions themselves are all over the board on matters of individual freedom. It is not at all unusual, for example, that the newspaper in the course of any few days will report on how a court in one jurisdiction has upheld a particular privacy right, while another has struck it down. For example, on one recent day the New York Times had the following headlines on the very same front page: regarding court opinions on same-sex marriage: “Court Upholds Federal Restrictions on Gay Marriage” (describing an opinion of the federal court of appeals); and “New York Gay Marriage Allowed.” (reporting an opinion of the state of New York’s highest court). NY Times A1, Feb. 4, 2005. More recently on this issue, a California court upheld gay marriage in California. (cite ~ March 15, 2004).
174 Some of the judiciary’s cautious response is understandable – courts, under separation of powers principles, give deference to coequal branches of government and are properly hesitant to strike down their actions except in clear cases. As Jed Rubenfeld writes, “constitutionalism as democracy is very broadly opposed to judge-made ‘fundamental rights’ not derivable from any of the nation’s written constitutional commitments. Little room for extra-textual constitutional law exists on the model of writing. But not no room. There are, at the extreme limits of what a democratic government might try to do with or to its citizens, certain unwritten laws of written constitutionalism, and a right of privacy is among them.” Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time 223 (Yale 2001). See supra note 112 and accompanying text for Rubenfeld’s discussion of anti-totalitarian right to privacy.
175 The doctrine of judicial review is regarded by some as nothing short of America’s greatest contribution to constitutional theory. As Professor Bickel puts it, “Marbury v. Madison . . . exerts an enormous magnetic pull. It is, after all, a great historic event, a famous victory; and it constitutes, even more than victories won by arms, one of the foundation stones of the Republic. It is hallowed. It is revered. If it had a physical presence, like the Alamo or Gettysburg, it would be a tourist attraction; and the truth is that it very nearly does have and very nearly is. As any rate, most of us share, as Thayer said, in the moral approval of the lines.....” Bickel, supra note 144, at 74. Commentators are not unanimous in their praise, however: “[N]othing . . . can alter the essential reality that judicial review is a deviant institution in the American democracy.” BICKEL, supra note 166, 1986). Judge Learned Hand, for one, favored democratic institutions and principles over the counter-majoritarianism inherent in America’s practice of broad judicial review: “It would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs.” HAND, LEARNED, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (Harvard Press 1958). Thayer suggested, moreover, over 100 years ago, that the very intrusiveness of judicial review cannot help but lead to a self-fulfilling weakening of the legislature:

The legislatures are growing accustomed to this distrust and more and more readily inclined to justify it, and to shed the considerations of constitutional restraints, . . . turning that subject over to the courts.... The people, all this while, become careless as to whom they send to the legislature;
On the second, even though the historical record does express the framers’ original intent to include the right of freedom of autonomy within the terms “liberty” and “property” and “privileges or immunities,” admittedly those terms are sufficiently ambiguous as to be subject to misunderstanding or misinterpretation. And so they have been. The courts, by failing over time to give those words their full intended effect, have effectually institutionalized (but still not memorialized) their lesser meanings through operation of the common law and the doctrine of stare decisis.176 The Slaughterhouse Cases’ effect on the privileges or immunities clause is the classic case in point, where an erroneous interpretation of a constitutional provision by the Court effectively put the provision out of play for (at least) the following 130-plus years.177

BICKEL, supra note 166, at 21-22 (quoting THAYER, JOHN BRADLEY, JOHN MARSHALL 57, 84 (1901)).

The Supreme Court’s privacy cases “merely reemphasize the embarrassing sense of artifice, of post-hoc rationalization, that has accompanied the right of privacy since the Supreme Court first discerned it in the ‘penumbras’ and ‘emanations’ of the Bill of Rights…. Every time such a right is posited by a judge (or anyone else), there has to be some extra-textual account of its constitutional status — some extra-textual account of why this particular right counts, even though unwritten, as a constitutional right. And such an account has to answer to all the demands of legitimacy imposed by constitutionalism as democracy when unelected judges render constitutional decisions for the nation.” Rubenfeld, supra note 61, at 222-23.

When this “most extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known,” Bickel, supra note 166 at 1, does slip up — and it does from time to time — the effects can be devastating to the individual rights of millions for many years or even decades. For example, Dred Scott v. Sandford, __ U.S. __ (1853) (holding that slaves were considered as “property,” not “citizens,” under the Constitution) played a major role in precipitating the Civil War; Plessy v. Ferguson, __ U.S. __ (1896) (holding that majority-driven “separate but equal” laws in the states did not violate the equal protection rights of the black racial minority) authorized Jim Crow discrimination of racial minorities for another sixty years; and Korematsu v. United States, __ U.S. __ (1944) allowed the forced relocation of many thousands of innocent U.S. citizens of Japanese-American descent into internment camps during World War II.

As an aside, it’s interesting that these three most infamous cases occurred at roughly half-century intervals throughout the nation’s history, so if one believes in such patterns we’re overdue for another. History will tell whether Bush v. Gore, __ U.S. __ (2000), (holding that a state Supreme Court’s determination that state law mandated a recount of votes cast in a presidential election violated equal protection), thus cutting short the election and handing the presidency to George W. Bush, will be similarly classified, but it probably will not. Although the case, with its underlying political cast barely masking an implausible equal protection chimera, deeply wounded the prestige of the U.S. Supreme Court and exposed the Court’s political partisans, apparently in the end it did not change the ultimate outcome of the election (i.e., chances are good George W. Bush would have prevailed even if the Florida Court’s recount had gone forward, see, e.g., __ “Recount __,” The Miami Herald, __, 2001). Since Bush v. Gore did not itself affirmatively change the course of history, it does not fall in the same category as Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu. Bush v. Gore exposes a potential Achilles heel in our constitutional system of checks and balances.

Specifically, the integrity of judicial review relies ultimately on the opinions of nine individuals who have reached that exalted station in no small part because [largely as a result] of their superior ability to negotiate the politics of judicial appointment. As long as the appointment process works well enough to maintain a majority of competent Justices who are truly independent and not ideologically or politically driven toward a particular viewpoint, we’re okay; but with the appointment of one or more additional ideologically-driven hard-right conservative Justices to take the place of retiring Justices in the next several years, this Court has the potential to hand down The Case We Hope Will Not Be Decided that may be judged by history in class together with the earlier three in terms of violence done to individual liberties. Is there any doubt that the addition of one or two more Justices like Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas

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So what’s to be done, besides arguing until we’re blue in the face about original meanings and trying to convince a majority of judges on courts increasingly filled with judges appointed by presidents the likes of George W. Bush on the merits of our viewpoints? Answer: We must memorialize the fact that we are changing the terms of our consent to be governed by adjusting the terms of the “contract” – i.e., the Constitution. If consent of the governed is a necessary element of government legitimacy – and it is, under modern Enlightenment and social contract theory¹⁷⁸ - there is no other way to alter the terms of that consent than to memorialize the change in the underlying Agreement.¹⁷⁹ The difference in this case is that we’re in effect “re-

would make a difference in how the Court decides matters of individual liberty affecting tens of millions of citizens like abortion rights (Roe v. Wade and its progeny, including Casey v. Pennsylvania); gay rights and sexual privacy rights (Lawrence v. Texas) or, for that matter religious freedom (The Ten Commandments Cases)? If those appointments are confirmed and that case is decided, it is also likely that at some date years or decades in the future Americans are going to come around to understanding that government simply has no place interfering in the lives of private individuals when those individuals are cause no harm to another. When that day comes, The Case We Hope Will Not Be Decided would look as odd and off-putting to those Americans as Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu look to us today.

¹⁷⁸ See e.g., supra note 22.

¹⁷⁹ See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 61, at 223 (writing that “[t]he only constitutional law binding on a democracy that seeks to be the author of its own fundamental legal and political commitments is law that derives from the nation’s own acts of memorialization…. [There can be very little] unenumerated constitutional law in [a system of] constitutionalism as democracy…). This principle of memorialization thus requires that we must be skeptical of arguments that the constitution may be altered by extra-constitutional factors, “moments,” or otherwise. See Professor Bruce Ackerman’s theory of a two-track lawmaking system, for example, in which he posits:

The lower lawmaking track is intended to register the successful conclusions of pluralist democratic politics – the mix of interest group pressure, regular electioneering, and practical policymaking that characterizes the democratic polity most of the time. The higher lawmaking track, in contrast, is designed with revolutionaries in mind. It … imposes a rigorous set of institutional tests before allowing a revolutionary movement to transform fundamental political principles….[: (1)] passage of time. Before a revolutionary change is adopted, it should have the sustained support of a substantial majority, not just support at a single moment…[: (2) ] popular debate must be given full play before a final decision is reached…. [This is] more than a mechanical vote-count at a referendum. The higher lawmaking system is intended to determine whether a revolutionary initiative has gained the considered support of a self-conscious and deliberate majority.

Bruce Ackerman, The Future, supra note 18, at 14-15 (1992)(citing Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (back cover dust-jacket) (Harvard: Belknap 1991). This description is well and good, to the extent it is used as the cogent, incisive, elegant description it is of how politics plays out under our constitutional scheme and results occasionally in a “revolutionary movement to transform political principles” in a policymaking sense. But the moment the theory is extended to support a suggestion that there is some sort of “complex process of ‘Publian politics’ where ‘we the people’ become authorized to change the Constitution without ever invoking the procedures laid out in Article V,” as suggested by Sanford Levinson on the dust jacket to Ackerman’s book, we’ve gone beyond what is acceptable under our constitutional scheme. See Sanford Levinson, Review in Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (back cover dust-jacket) (Harvard: Belknap 1991). This theory is just invented, and pulled out of thin air. It simply cannot be that anyone – We the People or otherwise – can change the Constitution without invoking Article V if we are truly committed to a system where the Constitution is elevated above all else as a governing document. To suggest otherwise opens up a Pandora’s box of difficult questions about when, for example, we have reached sufficient passage of time and debate to justify “changing” the Constitution. It cannot be – this dog will not hunt. In terms of adherence to basic principles of constitutional fidelity, conceptually this approach is on a par with erstwhile Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork statement that a particularly disfavored provision of the Constitution may be conveniently ignored and considered as little more than “an ink-blot on the page.”
memorializing” something that was already memorialized in the first place, but that’s okay – if the government didn’t get it or understand it the first time, there’s nothing wrong with We the People going back and making the point again with more pointed emphasis.\textsuperscript{180}

CONCLUSION

America has fallen far short of the promise made in the Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights for protecting individual liberties of equality and free choice on matters of natural private concern – rights considered to be natural and virtually inviolable from early pre-Revolutionary years at least into the early decades of the nation. These principles, representing the very core of the revolutionary-era and founding ideology, have been lost over the decades to an overbearing government and majorities that are allowed to impose their beliefs and morality on others.

If the freedom of autonomy is to be revived from its slumber in modern-day America, Americans must develop a greater understanding of the nature and rich history of this most basic natural right. Greater awareness can lead to a shift in thinking away from the current status quo of government as paternalistic overseer, and back toward the original intent of government subservient to the individual. They may look again to the inspirational words of the Declaration, knowing that from the beginning, our forebears knew it would not be easy. When freedom was on the line, “the colonists knew … [w]hat would in fact happen [next] … would be the result … of the degree of vigilance and the strength of purpose the people could exert. For they believed … [t]he preservation of liberty would continue to be what it had been in the past, a bitter struggle with adversity….”\textsuperscript{181} And so preservation of liberty continues to be what it has been in the past - a bitter struggle with adversity - and only time will tell whether modern-day Americans have what it takes to make the necessary changes to ensure its survival.

\textsuperscript{180} The freedom of autonomy amendment is necessary for all of the reasons we’ve discussed – but… one must concede that it probably is a pipe dream. Mobilizing a citizenry to amend the Constitution is no small feat – the Constitution has only been amended 18 times over the course of 215-plus years. And let’s not fool ourselves. It would be especially difficult to spur Congress to action today, when it is so ideologically polarized, to discuss seriously (much less propose) an amendment that would effectively curtail government’s ability to regulate on matters involving individual choice and morality – precisely the matters that many representatives’ constituents, after all, voted them into office to regulate in the first place. As for mobilizing a majority of states to call for a constitutional convention, the other manner of proposing an amendment under the Article V process, well…, even beyond the fact that no amendment has ever been proposed in this manner, one must be skeptical if it could happen for the first time in this instance, given the results of the 2004 election where state constitutional amendments limiting the individual freedom of autonomy of a certain class of people were passed in all thirteen states where they were on the ballot.

\textsuperscript{181} Bailyn, supra note 3 at 85.