Brazilian think tanks and the rise of austerity discourse

Stella Ladi\textsuperscript{a,b}, Elena Lazarou\textsuperscript{c} and Juliana Hauck\textsuperscript{d}

\textsuperscript{a}School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK; \textsuperscript{b}Politics and History Department, Panteion University, Athens, Greece; \textsuperscript{c}Center of International Relations, School of Social Sciences – CPDOC, Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; \textsuperscript{d}Political Science, Federal University of Minas Gerais – UFMG, Belo Horizonte, Brazil

ABSTRACT
This article discusses the role of think tanks in the production of ideas guiding recent change in Brazil's economic policy. It claims that think tanks are significant policy-making agents preparing the society for change – via their communicative discourse – but also attempting to influence the interaction between political elites – via their coordinative discourse. The polarization of think tanks' communicative discourse in regard to austerity during two critical junctures for Brazil is analysed. Discursive institutionalism is applied in order to interpret data from four Brazilian think tanks: the Institute of Applied Economic Research, the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies, the Fernand Braudel Institute and the Brazilian Institute of Economy. These think tanks have very different organizational and ideological characteristics but a polarization of the discussion around austerity can be observed in the discourse of all four of them. The scale ranges from an active defence of the Brazilian development model to a full-scale endorsement of austerity.

Highlights

- During critical junctures think tanks increase their visibility as carriers of communicative and coordinative discourse.
- Brazilian fiscal policy has undergone two critical junctures in the past decade, one coinciding with its economic rise accentuated by its resilience during the global financial crisis (2008–2009) and the other with economic contraction (2014–2015).
- A polarization of think tanks communicative discourse in favour or against austerity can be observed during the second critical juncture. Polarization is a characteristic of intense historical moments when capturing public opinion by dismantling the opposition's arguments and is often perceived as the most successful communicative strategy.

CONTACT Stella Ladi s.ladi@qmul.ac.uk

© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Introduction

Over the past 20 years, Brazil has made important advances in the political, economic and social realms. It has a consolidated political democracy and until recently its economy was growing, inflation was low and poverty was gradually being reduced (Weisbrot, Johnston, & Lefebvre, 2014). The global financial crisis initially served as an opportunity for the Brazilian economy to project stability and maturity, but as of 2014 the economy started contracting and a discussion of a need to change its development model and to introduce austerity measures has been enhanced (Barbosa Filho, 2017). Nevertheless, the country has increased its presence on the international stage, and is widely considered an important emerging power (Hurrel, 2013). Brazil’s so-called ‘rise’ has been observed closely by analysts, media and policy-makers since 2001, when Goldman Sachs included the country in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) group of rising economies which would dominate the world in the future. Initially treated with scepticism, the emerging power label endured for over a decade, becoming a determining factor in the identity of twenty-first century Brazil (Stuenkel, 2015).

The starting point of our argument is that two critical junctures for Brazil exist: first, being labelled as a BRIC and a rising global power (2008–2009), and second, the economic recession eruption (2014–2015). Critical junctures refer to particular historical moments that have lasting consequences and can be either ‘big’ events or less significant incidents that happen at the right time and have an enduring impact (Pierson, 2000). Consequently, critical junctures are likely to mark significant transformations in the modes and content of policy-making in the regions where they take place: they are the moments when public policy shifts can more easily occur. Historical institutionalists (HI) and – to a lesser extent – discursive institutionalists (DI) have thus engaged with the analysis of critical junctures. In this article, it is shown that during critical junctures think tanks can increase their visibility as carriers of new coordinative and communicative discourse (Ladi, 2011). Additionally, a polarization of think tanks’ communicative discourse in favour or against austerity can be observed during the second critical juncture.

This article aims to explore the role of think tanks in the strengthening of austerity discourse and policies. Four think tanks with very different organizational and ideological characteristics are discussed: the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipea), the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (Dieese), the Fernand Braudel Institute (IFB) and the Brazilian Institute of Economy (IBRE). More specifically, following Schmidt’s (2008) propositions on discursive institutionalism, these think tanks’ participation in the generation of coordinative and communicative discourse in support of or against austerity is analysed. The first part of the paper introduces the theoretical argument and justification for the research design, while the second focuses on the coordinative and communicative discourses of the four think tanks and contextualizes it within the current global and Brazilian environment.

Think tanks and critical junctures: a discursive institutionalist approach

The analysis of critical junctures has been developed in the historical institutionalism strand (e.g. Pierson, 2000). This article claims this concept can also be useful for discursive institutionalism, because if combined with the latter’s focus on agency, critical junctures become
much more than unexplainable moments when change can be triggered (see Schmidt, 2008). Critical junctures are important because they are the moments in time when changes such as economic policy shifts can more easily occur. Focusing on the way discourse changes during these moments in time can shed light on parameters of the critical juncture (e.g. persistence or not of discourse on austerity) which could have been otherwise omitted. At the same time it is methodologically significant for discursive institutionalism to analyse discourse during critical junctures since these are the signposts where the most interesting discursive shifts can be observed. It has been shown that it is during these critical junctures that think tanks increase their visibility as carriers of new discourse (Ladi, 2011).

Following Schmidt (2008, p. 305), discourse has ideas about policies, programmes and philosophies as its substance but is not confined by them. Discourse as developed in discursive institutionalism describes the substantive content of ideas but also the interactive process by which ideas are spread. Discourse is not just about ideas or ‘text’ but also about the context in which ideas are developed and promoted. Schmidt (2008) distinguishes between coordinative and communicative discourse. Coordinative discourse refers to the ‘creation, elaboration, and justification of policy and programmatic ideas’ by policy actors and the way they exchange views and persuade each other (Schmidt, 2002, p. 171). It is concerned with the formation of a common language by policy groups in their attempt to construct a coherent policy programme. Communicative discourse, on the other hand, is concerned with the relationship between policy-makers and the public. It refers to ‘the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of political ideas to the general public’ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 310).

According to Schmidt and Radaelli (2004, p. 193), the study of discourse should coexist with the awareness that interests also matter, as well as the material conditions and hard economic variables. Discourse in this sense is the glue between structure and agency. This means that structural conditions (e.g. institutional framework, economic crises) influence the actions of agents such as think tanks. These actions are expressed and can be pinpointed by discourse. Empirically, what is interesting is to outline cases where discourse proves to be central in the development of events and to pick the agents that are responsible for its coordination and communication. Brazil is such a case. The study of the four selected Brazilian think tanks and their changing discourse can be seen as a barometer of government policy as it predates and then accompanies the eventual transition of the Brazilian Government to austerity measures in 2015. In this article it is shown that a polarization of think tanks’ communicative discourse in favour or against austerity can be observed during the second critical juncture. Polarization is a characteristic of intense historical moments when capturing public opinion by dismantling the opposition’s arguments is often perceived as the most successful communicative strategy. This is why polarization is more evident in the communicative rather than the coordinative discourse of think tanks.

Wallace (1994) argues that policy-makers need advisers when they need to rethink the dominant assumptions of policy. Think tanks are there to provide this rethink when necessary. Their aim is to make academic findings more palatable for busy politicians and policy-makers (Stone, 2007). This gives think tanks the opportunity to set the policy agenda and to prioritize some topics over others and thus play an important role in public policy design. The idea that think tanks offer an independent bridge between academia and policy-makers is problematic because it assumes that there are two parts (academia and politics) that need to be linked. In many countries, including Brazil, directors and experts of think tanks are closely related to politicians and bureaucrats (Stone, 2007; Stone & Ladi, 2017).
Academics themselves are not distant from think tanks or from politics as they move in and out of official posts. It can be argued that they all belong to the same elite, they have similar word views and their affiliation often changes (Newsom, 1995–1996). In the case of Brazil, the relationship between academics, bureaucrats and policy-makers has at times fluctuated alongside political and economic development, but has become closer as policy decisions become increasingly technical (Kluger, 2015). Think tanks in this article are thus not considered to act as neutral bridges between academia and politics nor to function with public good as their compass (for a detailed discussion see Stone & Ladi, 2017). Think tanks are seen here as part of the elite structure (see also Parmar, 2004). They act as carriers of coordinative and communicative discourse, a role at the heart of political debate. What is illustrated in the next section as well as in Zimmerman and Stone (this issue) is that think tanks increase their opportunities to participate in public policy at critical junctures when both coordinative and communicative discourses are urgently in need. Additionally, in times of crisis the polarization of communicative discourse is evident.

**Methodological note**

To assess performance of think tanks during critical junctures in Brazil we use Abelson’s categories as proxies of coordinative and communicative discourses. Abelson (2009) points out that, although some strategies of think tanks to exert influence are hidden from the public, others can be easily identified. Thus, he differentiates public strategies from private marketing ideas. Private strategies relate to direct, privately held approaches to policy-makers and can be related to coordinative discourse. The public strategies, on the other hand, refer to the broader approaches addressed to the general public through the media, or to focused, but not individual, audiences through events, publications and other activities and can be related to communicative discourse. Indicators of public strategies include: public forums and conferences; public lectures and consultancies; testimonies before congressional committees and subcommittees; books, opinion magazines, newsletters, policy briefs in widely distributed newspapers; mailings and posting of think tanks’ studies on internet sites; exposure in the media. Indicators of the private strategy consist of: integration into government positions (in offices, sub-offices and bureaucratic positions in administrations); serving on policy task forces and transition teams during presidential elections and on presidential advisory committees; maintaining liaison offices with policy-making scopes; invitations to selected policy-makers to attend conferences, seminars and workshops; permission for bureaucrats to work in think tanks in a limited period of time; policy-makers working in think tanks; preparation of policy briefs and briefs for policy-makers (Abelson, 2009, pp. 78–82) Accordingly, the public and private strategies of think tanks are assessed to identify the production of communicative and coordinative discourses, respectively.

Different kinds of primary data are used in order to understand the identity of the selected think tanks, their approach to austerity and their production of communicative and coordinative discourse. All data collected are internet based (official websites, blogs, social media, online publications, online mass media publications). The collection of budget, staff specialization and size, affiliations and managerial structure information aims to map their profile and institutional capacity. Publications on macroeconomic issues (2006–2015) constitute the main source for exploring discursive shifts. Think tanks’ communication strategies, public visibility strategies and strategies of interaction with policy-makers have been used
as proxies of communicative and coordinative discourses, respectively. More specifically, the previous careers of board members of think tanks are explored and closed meeting and seminars with policy-makers are identified in order to reveal think tanks’ private strategies. The content of think tanks’ web pages and documents, their media appearances and the organization of public events provide evidence of their public strategies. Combined, these different sets of data lead to conclusions on whether and how their discourses changed or not during the examined critical junctures and which audiences were prioritized.

One of the main obstacles of assessing Brazilian think tanks, specially searching for data before 2015, is that these organizations have only recently became organized to provide systematized accountability about their performance. Therefore, not only the case selection, but also the research design possibilities get compromised, particularly since the approach relies on internet-based data collection.

**Brazil’s economic policy and the global financial crisis: resistance and austerity**

The analysis of the role of think tanks in the transformation of economic and fiscal policy in Brazil during the global financial crisis within a HI and DI framework necessitates an understanding of the trajectory of Brazilian economy and politics in the past decades. Unlike Western powers, Brazil experienced the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 relatively unscathed. Brazil entered a temporary recession in 2009, but recovered strongly by 2010 with GDP increasing by 7.5%; it was, at the time, referred to as one of the less affected and most resilient economies (Ferrari Filho, 2011). According to the World Bank, between 2006 and 2010 Brazil demonstrated an average annual GDP growth of 4.5%. This period, coincided with the high point of the country’s growing relevance as an ‘emerging power’ and marked a critical juncture in the transformation of its economic policy towards the stimulation of investment, trade and social growth. The effects of the global crisis were felt more strongly six years later. Following the rapid macroeconomic deterioration which began in 2014, with GDP falling by 3.8% in 2015 (World Bank, 2017), the government introduced a shift towards austerity and spending cuts in a second critical juncture.

The global financial crisis overlaps with the first critical juncture for Brazil, which at the outset served as an opportunity for the economy to project stability and maturity: initially, the recession only hit the country for five months in 2008–2009, largely due to the panic spurred in financial markets. The commodities’ boom and the growing affluence of Brazil’s domestic consumer market at the time, contributed to the fiscal authorities’ ability to delay the immediate effects of the external shock and maintain their spending priorities. The speedy recovery was highlighted in the global financial and political circles and in the media as an indication of Brazil’s consolidation as an economic power (Economist, 12/11/2009). In 2012, Brazil surpassed the UK and became the world’s sixth largest economy (Telegraph, 12/05/2012).

The contrast was striking in comparison to the 1980s and 1990s when inflation, fiscal instability and growing public expenditures and public debt had ravaged the Brazilian economy (Giambagi, 2011). This experience generated the political capital needed to push through market-orientated economic reforms initiated under President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–1992) and strengthened under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002). Under Cardoso, privatization helped decrease public debt (Giambagi, 2011)
but fiscal decentralization continued to affect Brazilian primary deficits negatively (Abrúcio, 1998). Nevertheless, the debt continued causing structural problems making the Brazilian economy susceptible to external liquidity crises (Samuels, 2003).

The Cardoso government (Brazilian Social Democratic Party, PSDB) implemented strong fiscal adjustments in 1999 setting rigorous targets that represented effective restrictions to public spending and focused on the fight against corruption (Samuels, 2003). In 2000, the Fiscal Responsibility Law was approved, establishing fiscal discipline and ceilings for expenditures for central government, states and municipalities, and a number of controls on public finances. In the same year, the government adopted an inflation-targeting regime and a flexible exchange rate. These two measures coupled promoted the necessary monetary austerity to keep inflation under control without unwanted consequences on prices. These reforms were combined with the reduction of public spending through the privatization of inefficient public services. Debt was gradually reduced and Brazil became more attractive to foreign investors.

Dissatisfaction with fiscal austerity, as well as growing income and social inequality, led to increasing support for the Workers’ Party (PT), and eventually to the victory of its presidential candidate Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, in 2002 and 2006, and his successor Dilma Vana Rousseff in 2010 and 2014. The first PT government under Lula marked a departure from Cardoso’s plan, in that it focused strongly on the expansion of social policies (Pero, 2012), but maintained a number of his macroeconomic policies. The main focus of policy-making then was to improve the national institutional environment to create a fertile ground for sustainable growth (Ministerio da Fazenda, 2004). Inaugurating what would come to be known as a ‘responsible left’ policy-making was characterized by a more centrist and pragmatic view than the radical left of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Under Lula, the PT government pursued domestic reforms and economic growth through a trade-oriented foreign policy. It also combined social policy with free market approaches, leading some to retrospectively refer to its economic policy as ‘liberal neo-developmentalist’ (Ban, 2013).

Rousseff took over under a rapidly deteriorating global economic environment. Her government attempted to stimulate the economy twice in response to the 2009 crisis, by introducing two investment boosting plans: the second Growth Acceleration Plan (PAC) in 2010, and the Bigger Brazil (Brasil Maior) plan in 2011. These sought to encourage domestic investment in key industries such as petroleum and gas exploration, electric power generation, agribusiness, nano and biotechnology, sanitation and housing, through soft loans, electricity rates subsidies, payroll reductions, and other tax incentives. Other initiatives aimed at stimulating investment included a simplification of the tax system, the introduction of tax-advantaged bonds for infrastructure and research and development investment, as well as labour skilling/upgrading.

In spite of economic stimulus measures, the toll of the protracted recovery of global markets and of falling global commodity prices, was felt increasingly after 2012. The economy entered into recession in 2014 (ECB, 2016). This, we argue here, was the beginning of the second critical juncture for Brazil. In the second quarter of 2015, the country fell into a technical recession, with Standard & Poor’s downgrading it to BB plus ‘junk’ status. Public debt and current account deficit grew rapidly, while the trade balance declined. Inflation rose steadily and Brazil recorded an annual primary deficit for the first time since 1997. The Brazilian currency (Real) hit its weakest point since its introduction in 1994, losing over 35% of its value against the dollar.
The rapid increase of the real effects of the financial crisis in 2014–2015 triggered a distinct economic policy shift. In response, the Brazilian Government and the Central Bank introduced a tighter monetary stance and a fiscal adjustment to contain inflation and stabilize public debt (Banco Central do Brasil, 2015). Three constitutional reforms aiming to address the crisis were debated in Congress: the reform of Social Security in order to reduce costs; the re-imposition of a financial transactions tax (CPMF); and the need for more flexibility in budgetary management. In September 2015, Finance Minister, Joaquim Levy announced a new fiscal austerity package in order to reduce expenditure by $USD 6.8 billion. The package included measures such as freezing public sector salaries and curtailing social programmes, cutting back access to subsidized loans, scaling back tax breaks and subsidies, increasing social security and other taxes.

Brazilian think tanks during the two critical junctures

Brazilian think tanks have been progressively playing a significant role in national politics, but is still an arising phenomenon in the country. A historically highly insulated governing model during the twentieth century, combined with a disorganized civil society, resulted in the dominance of governmental or government-affiliated policy consultancy organizations. By the end of 1980s, the re-democratization led to the emergence of a larger number of think tanks, however, still relying considerably on governmental financial resources due to a weak philanthropy culture (Hauck, 2015).

Historically, we can observe episodes of think tank-like organizations standing out and considerably intervening in political processes during the twentieth century. The most prominent examples are think tanks organized to oppose government in the 50s and 60s democratic interregnums as well as in the neoliberal diffusion wave of the 80s and 90s (Birkner, 2002; Correa, 2005; Durand, 1997; Gros, 2004; Lopes, 1991; Ramírez, 2005). In the past 15 years, similarly to those moments, funding from enterprises mainly affiliated to conservative forces, has nurtured Brazilian think tank’s proliferation as an alternative path to the political scene that has been extremely government centred. While ‘progressive’ think tanks have been strengthened by successive presidential terms led by the PT, a network of conservative think tanks has been evolving sharing funders’ values and a growing conservative public opinion.

Four think tanks are selected in this article in order to illustrate think tanks’ capacity of carrying communicative and coordinative discourse. The main concern in the case selection, thus, is their role as providers of political economy knowledge through a distinctive set of strategies (Hauck, 2017). Therefore, all four are mainly dedicated to economic issues; they are representative of diverse perspectives, and they have a systematic online publication production as well as an academic profile.

The Ipea is a governmental think tank. Despite the stability and supposed independence provided to its research staff as civil servants, its survival and decision-making depends on its relationship with political agents (Rigolin & Hayashi, 2013, p. 414). The Inter-union Department of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies (Dieese) is representative of the progressive think tanks. It was created during the democratic period (1955) and has been

---

1The case selection adopts a think tank definition approach that includes governmental public policy research institutes because of the centralized nature of the Brazilian political system (Fieschi & Gaffney, 2004; Freres, Seabra, & Moraes, 2002; Garcé & Uha, 2010; McGann & Johnson, 2005; Thunert, 2011).
significantly nourished under the recent PT administrations. The Institute of Brazilian Economy (IBRE) is a consolidated conservative think tank, affiliated to a private independent university, but with a long history of receiving government funding, especially grants destined to the production of economic information of public interest. The IFB is mainly financed by private companies and represents the conservative think tanks’ reaction to successive left-wing presidential governments, aiming to push for a shift in political economic thinking. Although it is relatively small institute, its choice serves the purposes of this article since it has a significant production of academic papers and it does not produce only policy briefs. Additionally, it has an excellent internet presence which facilitates the collection of comparable data.

The organizational characteristics of the think tanks analysed differ significantly, which implies that, a priori, they have different capacities to carry communicative and coordinative discourses and to affect political debate. Notably, Ipea has the most robust organizational structure financed by an USD 106 million budget in 2015 and managed by more than 1000 staff of which around half is directly dedicated to research. As a governmental agency, the organization holds close ties to policy-makers and, as its administration changes with presidential terms, that can have an impact on their discourses. Their studies are widely disseminated by several public opinion strategies, through press conferences, internet channels (social media, blogs), a non-academic journal and a TV programme (Panorama Ipea). Ipea, therefore, focuses on the production of both communicative and coordinative discourses.

Dieese is an initiative of the trade union movement tasked to conduct research in support of workers claims. Accordingly, the organization survives mainly because of union contributions, accounting for an USD 12.2 million budget in 2015 and around 270 employees. They have close relations and share ideological alignment with PT governments. They also have a specialized communications team to organize press conferences (1200 interviews in 2015). Daily presence in a radio station and in specialized labour union communication channels are additional strategies. Like Ipea, Dieese is organized to disseminate ideas both to the public and to policy-makers and specialists.

IBRE, on the other hand, is part of Brazil’s most prominent think tank cluster (Truitt, 2002) – Fundação Getúlio Vargas (McGann, 2016). IBRE produces a highly referenced temporal series of economic indicators to supply both the government and the private sector. Charging for part of the data and information produced and for consultancy contracts – 600 in 2015 (IBRE, 2014) – they are a significantly autonomous think tank. Around 40 researchers work permanently and exclusively for IBRE. Its main communication channels are newsletters and press conferences that take place on a daily basis. Nevertheless, IBRE does not seem to have a deliberate and strategically organized front for delivering communicative discourses even though its website has the most intensive traffic because of FGV’s prominence – it is between the 350 most accessed websites in Brazil and has more than 5500 external linkages to it.²

IFB has financial support from foundations, private companies and international agencies. The permanent staff only accounts for 7 researchers; however, 97 external members collaborate in articles and papers. The organization’s most fruitful channel to spread their ideas is its ‘Brazil Economy and Government’ (BEG) blog with 60 articles per year, mostly

²These websites assessments were provided by http://www.alexa.com/. All think tanks’ media data were collected on 31 August 2016.
written by economists. BEG is the IFB’s main instrument for communicative discourse by providing ‘explanations on economic issues that would help voters understand the choices made by the public sector in the management of the economy’ (BEG, 2016). Newsfeed mechanisms and social media fan pages are used as well as mass media publication, gaining massive idea spread results. IFB seems to be primarily dedicated to communicate its discourse to the general public, hoping to influence public opinion.

Three of the four organizations were founded in the 1950s/1960s – IBRE (1951), Dieese (1955) and Ipea (1964). This longevity has transformed them into reference organizations in macroeconomic matters. Dieese is considered the main reliable source for economic indexes and rates, which are used for macroeconomic analyses, including those produced by the government (Portal Brasil, 29/01/2014). Similarly, IBRE has become a reference in indicators for market prices and several economic indexes that are widely used by the private and public sectors. As a governmental agency, Ipea’s studies have also been extensively used as a basis for economic planning. Cross-referencing shows that Dieese’s and IBRE’s indicators are profusely used by all four think tanks, attesting to their mutual recognition of credibility. Ipea’s studies also appear as a recurrent reference in all think tanks publications, including IFB’s (Conceição, 2014; Dieese, 2014b; Nery, 2015; Rocha & Lopes, 2015). Their interaction is also shaped by ideological factors. Even though IBRE frequently uses Dieese’s products and some of Ipea’s research, it leans towards a more orthodox macroeconomic position. The same holds for IFB. These ideological alignments are clearer in the first critical juncture. In the second, however, subtle shifts take place in their discourse strategies and consequently in their interactions.

In the following sections, the analysis of the think tanks’ main ideas and strategies regarding macroeconomic policies is structured around the communicative and coordinative discourse produced during the two aforementioned critical junctures.

**From 2008–2009 to 2014–2015: a march towards polarization**

The 2008–2009 critical juncture, which combined the outbreak of a world economic crisis with a growing confidence in Brazil’s economy, had diverse effects in think tanks discourse. On the one hand, Ipea and Dieese, strongly affiliated to the government, progressively intensified their support of counter-cyclical measures, advising for an increase in governmental expenditures. Ipea focused on income transfer policies and credit expansion through public banks. However, some of their studies combined Keynesian assumptions with ones that remain under the aegis of the neoliberal tripod regime of inflation targeting, floating exchange rate and fiscal surpluses (Sicsú, 2008). Dieese’s initial main concern was to maintain employment levels without diminishing workers’ rights. That protection would come through increased financial market regulation and government incentives (Dieese, 2008, 2009).

On the other hand, IBRE argued that austerity measures should be progressively applied, focusing on specific public investments in infrastructure and productivity. IBRE advised heavily on the need for fiscal reform combined with a reduction in public consumption, especially through pension and social security reform. At that time, IFB evaluated Brazil’s position in the crisis in a very punctual way, yet, aligned with IBRE’s critique about government’s strong fiscal and credit stimuli, seizing Brazil’s emergence as an economic power (Afonso, 2011; Afonso & Mussi, 2009; Bonelli, 2010). Until 2011, IFB had weak channels of
discourse delivery. In that year, the creation of the BEG blog aimed to enhance its dissemination capacity. Therefore, the focus on communicative discourses became pronounced. Even though BEG’s editors maintained connections from their past and present careers in governmental institutions (Federal Revenue, Central Bank, Ipea), IFB’s board of directors was and remains, mainly formed by business executives. The linkages to the political realm are restricted to its president, a former politician, and a few members of the Board. Their right-wing affiliations provided them with less political access to the Executive Branch in the period. In addition, IFB had almost no traceable interaction with the other analysed think tanks.

IBRE’s strong trajectory as a national supplier of economic indexes provides for considerably more opportunities to carry coordinative discourses, regardless of which government is in power. Like IFB, IBRE also includes former politicians in its Board. However, their actual capacity to articulate coordinative discourse is enhanced by several contracts with the government through which they can deliver their main ideas. They do not seem to have the general public as a target audience. This is evidenced by their scarce use of channels that provide communicative discourse. For example, IBRE has considerably less followers than any of the four think tanks on Facebook and a low average of shares to its posts – Ipea, Dieese and IFB had in average 17, 26 and 04 shares per post in 2015, respectively, while IBRE had a .5 average of posts shares.

As a governmental institution, Ipea is naturally a carrier of coordinative discourse. The various technical cooperation agreements for joint research between Ipea and ministries, Senate and other governmental institutions during this period, attest to that. Moreover, the frequency of seminars and meetings on fiscal issues with government members is significant. Ipea has also continuously used numerous channels for the dissemination of its publications to the general public. Its official Youtube Channel has 88 uploads on average per year, 510 only in 2015 (Agência Ipea).

Due to its role in the conduct of labour union movement negotiations with the government, Dieese has gained considerable political access in the PT, enabling its role in coordinative discourse production. DIESE holds meetings with governmental institutions on a regular basis, on labour union negotiations – on average 850 meetings a year during the analysed period – but also technical cooperation meetings – on average more than 70 per year. In the 2008–2009 period, Dieese did not have a social media strategy, but used the website and press conferences as a channel for communicative discourses – 680 thousand website accesses and 1322 press conferences per year, according to the organizations’ Annual Reports (Dieese, 2016).

Between the 2008–2009 critical juncture and 2013, Ipea and Dieese progressively enhanced their support for counter-cyclical measures, which translated into increased governmental expenditures. Even before the effects of the crisis became noticeable in Brazil’s economy, Ipea adopted an even more active position, arguing in favour of public spending expansion through an income transfer programme. For the Institute, the fiscal and monetary counter-cyclical actions taken in 2008–2009 had been too frugal and the low levels of public spending were responsible for low economic growth (Ipea, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Araujo & Gentil, 2011). Panorama Ipea broadcasted several publications defending the institute’s policy proposals and disseminated them in its social media channels. Ipea also organized numerous seminars for governmental and international organization members on this topic (Ipea Agenda, 2016). In that same path, Dieese’s advice on fiscal adjustment inflection,
resumption of credit extension policies and public spending, and an explicit neoliberal critique started appearing in 2011 (Dieese, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). An example of Dieese's coordinative discourse in the matter is its participation in the Fiscal Policy Sustainability Work Group (led by Economic Issues Commission in Senate).

It is worth noticing that these two institutions developed intensive joint actions during that period, geared predominantly towards the production of coordinative discourse pushing for the adoption of their policy advice. They co-hosted events and courses (CUT Notícias, 10/11/2009), produced joint publications (Ipea Notícias, 09/04/2012) demonstrating alignment regarding the economic crisis until 2013. They jointly defended a constitutional amendment to reduce working hours regardless of the fiscal critique (Câmara Notícias, 19/05/2009). No such cooperation beyond cross-referencing was identified between any other combinations of the think tanks studied.

From 2009 onward, IBRE's publications focused on pro-fiscal adjustment recommendations. The core argument was the limit reached by the model that favoured Brazil's growth performance from 2006 to 2011 (Pinheiro & Bonelli, 2012; Barros, 2013). IBRE maintained its usual way of discourse channelling: coordinative through consultancy contracts and communicative in a less engaged fashion, primarily through press conferences.

IFB's strategy, on the other hand, became more focused on communicative discourse with the creation of BEG, in which several publications argued that, despite the BRIC brand, austerity measures should be progressively applied – infrastructure public investment and the neoliberal tripod to correct imbalances caused by the crisis (Mendes, 2011a, 2011b; Rocha & Alvares, 2011). The credit for expansion of demand, tariff barriers, special tax exemptions and excessive labour market regulation were the main targets of critics to Keynesian measures (Kohler, 2012). To create more opportunity for coordinative discourse, IFB often held open events for small audiences predominantly formed by business executives, regional politicians and students. Frequently mid-level technical members of government led the debates that became progressively more critical of the heterodox governmental policies (IFB, 2016) (Table 1).

As the delayed effects of the crisis hit Brazil's economy in 2014–2015 and swept away its emerging economic power promise, an enhancement of strategies and discourse content already in place from 2011 has taken place in all think tanks, except Ipea. Dieese's publications maintained the concern about the recovery of socio-economic development without significantly changing public investment and incentives for private investment and credit supply (Dieese, 2014a, 2014b). Their discourse grew progressively more politicized (Dieese Comunica, 03/12/2015) against austerity by the time the political situation became critical. Dieese in this period intensified its effort in directing its communicative discourse beyond workers' fora and towards the general public. To illustrate, the activity on Dieese's Facebook page in the month of December 2015 increased by 54% in 2015 compared to 2014 which was 600% higher than 2013. In order to preserve its access to policy-makers, Dieese also maintains its relationships with several governmental institutions and ministries (e.g. Ministry of Cities, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Work, Ministry of Science and Technology). In 2015, Dieese organized a special programme targeting legislative institutions aiming to discuss the public debt and the centrality of workers to economic development (Dieese, 2015).

The necessity of regulating the Fiscal Responsibility Law, amplify austerity and reestablish realism in fiscal goals in order to regain credibility became common ground for IBRE and IFB (Appy, Lisboa, Mendes, & Lazzarini, 2015; Barros & Afonso, 2013). 'Mistakes from
Table 1. Summary of think tanks’ discourse during the 2008–2009 critical juncture.

| Think tank | IPEA | DIEESE | IFB | IBRE |
|------------|------|--------|-----|------|
| **Communicative discourse** | | | | |
| Public forums, lectures and conferences | x* | x | x | x |
| Testimonies before congressional committees and subcommittees | x | | | |
| Books, newsletters, policy briefs | x | x | x | x |
| Exposure in the mass media (TV, newspapers and magazines) | x | | | |
| Presence on digital media channels | x | | | |
| **Coordinative discourse** | | | | |
| Consultancies to governments | x | x | | x |
| Integration into government positions (elections or advisory committees) | x | | | |
| Liaison offices | x | x | | x |
| Policy-makers attending think tanks’ conferences | x | x | | x |
| Bureaucrats or policy-makers working in think tanks | x | | | |
| Policy briefs for policy-makers | | | | |
| Main positions about economic policies | Considerable majority of studies, briefs and media exposure and events take a pro-Keynesian orientation to economic policies. The position is enhanced until 2013, defending an income transfer programme as a counter-cyclical measure | No study, brief, media exposure or event defending austerity could be found. The main focus is on the benefits of high employment rates and minimum wage valorization to overcome economic turmoil | Some studies, briefs and events focus on fiscal adjustment and defend the adoption of neoliberal tripod recommendations. Seminars discussing those issues with the participation of former politicians | Studies, briefs, media exposure and events constantly discuss the necessity of controlling public spending, and fiscal reforms. But the incentives of public spending on infrastructure and productivity is strongly present |

*The Xs mark the strategies explicitly used by think tanks in that period as a clear and extensive part of their discourse agenda. The absence of marking doesn’t mean think tanks have never used that strategy but only that our analysis showed it was only occasional.*
the past: how to get out of fiscal meltdown’ (2015) and a series of symposiums promoted by IFB had a common agenda: the fiscal adjustment, proposing a limit fixation to federal government debt and, therefore, spending. In 2015, IBRE took part for the first time in at least three meetings of the Economic Assessment Committee in Senate promoting the same ideas. One of them was about re-opening a legislative amendment, which would bring changes in fiscal limits including a ceiling to the consolidated gross debt (Senado, 2016).

Consequently, Dieese, IFB and IBRE displayed a deeper commitment to spreading their ideas more aggressively and through communicative and coordinative fora. For Ipea, however, 2014 marked the moment when it adopted a more moderate position and the traditional alignment with Dieese diminishes significantly. Their interaction remains, but also begins involving IBRE (Ipea Notícias, 15 September 2015; Dieese Comunica, 26 May 2014). From 2014 on, Ipea’s and IBRE’s interaction to discuss fiscal balance, fiscal rules, productivity and minimum wage increased considerably (Ipea Notícias, 30 September 2015; Ipea Notícias, 11 December 2015; Ipea Notícias, 17 December 2015; Ipea Notícias, 27 August 2015). These discussions were backed up by studies posing the problem of fiscal adjustment in the existence of structural rules of public spending, as compulsory expenditures (Gobetti, 2015; Gobetti & Orair, 2015). Some relevant IFB publications were aligned to that argument therefore advising for reforms in taxation (Gall, 2014). IFB’s publications indicated a structural problem in relation to public spending growth, to fiscal sustainability and to stagnant productivity, which went beyond short-term fiscal problems (Barros, 2014; Salto, Afonso, JR Biasoto, & Kohler, 2015).

Ipea’s discourse during this period focused on the mix of a macroeconomic tripod restoration combined with government spending on infrastructure and productivity, but became progressively moderate and leaned towards an austerity design, resembling the discourse of the first critical juncture (Bahia, 2015; Camarano, 2014; Ipea, 2014). As usual, the publications were launched in open events and broadcasted by Ipea’s TV programme, seeking for public repercussion. It is interesting to note a decrease of almost 65% in the average number of events where coordinative and communicative discourse could be promoted in 2014–2015, compared to the 2008–2013 average, such as meetings and audiences with policy-makers and decision-makers and lectures and seminars open to public.

In summary, from the first to the second critical juncture a polarization can be observed in terms of discourse. IBRE and IFB present progressively more austerity-aligned discourses. To the contrary, Dieese strengthens its position against austerity and increases its creation of communicative discourse channels. Interestingly, given its necessity to align with the government’s response to the economic and political crisis, Ipea shifts its position towards a more austerity-friendly perspective, even though during all the period analysed the administration of IPEA is subordinated to a left-wing presidential government. A clear indicator of that is its approximation to IBRE from 2014 on. During this period, IBRE, Ipea and Dieese enhance their communicative discourse while continuing their coordinative efforts which also include inter-think tanks cooperation. IFB attempted to reach public opinion by promoting right-wing prescriptions but remained isolated from the rest of the think tank community. It primarily focused on social and mass media (Table 2).
| Critical juncture                                                                 | 2014-2015 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| **Think tank**                                                                  | IPEA      | DIEESE | IFB | IBRE |
| **Communicative discourse**                                                      |           |        |     |      |
| Public forums, lectures and conferences                                          | x         | x      | x   | x    |
| Testimonies before congressional committees and subcommittees                    | x         | x      |     |      |
| Books, newsletters, policy briefs                                                | x         | x      | x   |      |
| Mailings and posting on internet sites                                            | x         | x      |     |      |
| Exposure in the mass media (TV, newspapers and magazines)                        | x         | x      |     |      |
| Presence on digital media channels                                               | x         | x      | x   |      |
| **Coordinative discourse**                                                       |           |        |     |      |
| Consultancies to governments                                                     | x         | x      |     |      |
| Integration into government positions (elections or advisory committees)         | x         |        | x   |      |
| Liaison offices                                                                  | x         | x      |     |      |
| Policy-makers attending think tanks’ conferences                                 | x         | x      |     |      |
| Bureaucrats or policy-makers working in think tanks                              | x         | x      |     |      |
| Policy briefs for policy-makers                                                  | x         |        |     |      |
| Main positions about economic policies                                           | x         |        |     |      |
| Studies, briefs and events avoiding taking a more moderate position towards Keynesian economic measures. Collaborations with DIEESE diminish | x         |        |     |      |
| The position against austerity, especially in regard to the reduction of the minimum wage and the dismantling of employment policies gets stronger | x         |        |     |      |
| The number of seminars with the participation of former politicians from neoliberal governments gets higher. The amount of policy briefs and analysis on the blog also increases | x         |        |     |      |
| The position towards austerity gets stronger advocating strongly for fiscal, social security and tax reforms to constrain public spending and enhance public revenue | x         |        |     |      |
Conclusions

The four think tanks in Brazil changed their discourse in relation to austerity during two critical junctures for Brazil (2008–2009 and 2014–2015). Two organizations are ideologically and institutionally, respectively, linked to government (Ipea) and to the trade unions movement (Dieese) and two institutions are linked to business circles and can be characterized as conservative (IFB and IBRE). All four think tanks have been carriers of coordinative and communicative discourse for or against austerity during the two critical junctures for Brazil. The divisions in the discourse intensified and the debate became more polarized during the second critical juncture which was when the economic situation worsened and austerity measures were actually introduced. No major differences can be found between the substance of the coordinative and communicative discourse of the four think tanks. What changes, is the tone and the style of their discourse. Communicative discourse which has as its main audience the general public is characterized by simpler language and stronger messages and thus is more polarized especially in times of crisis while coordinative discourse which mainly targets the political and business elites is more technical and often evidence-based.

Our main argument is that think tanks neither act as neutral bridges between academia and politics nor always function having public good as a compass. Think tanks are carriers of discourse which reflects their institutional affiliation and their political and ideological preferences. During critical junctures think tanks not only increase their visibility but they also, when the circumstances demand it, produce more polarized discourse in order to more clearly convey their message and differentiate themselves from other think tanks and policy actors. It is during critical junctures that interaction among think tanks and between think tanks and policy-makers increases. This is a significant finding because it proves think tanks can be significant agents of policy change which act as mediators between society and governments – via their communicative discourse – but also between political elites – via their coordinative discourse. This finding confirms that the study of discourse during critical junctures can reveal the background of policy shifts which could have otherwise remained unnoticed.

The ‘revolving doors’ phenomenon is quite pronounced in Brazil and provides think tanks with access to political and business elites and allows them to act as carriers of coordinative discourse via the creation, elaboration and justification of policy and programmatic ideas. They often provide the framing of policy issues and the arguments for the debate. They also act as carriers of communicative discourse via multiple means especially during critical junctures by presenting and legitimizing political ideas such as austerity to the general public when decisions have already been taken. Investigating whether this is also true in other parts of the world and whether the way austerity discourse is diffused is any different to how other types of discourse are diffused could lead to interesting generalizations.

To conclude, think tanks are agents that should be closely studied especially during critical junctures since their role as carriers of discourse gives them the power to articulate and thus influence the content of ideas and arguments. Studying shifts in the discourse of think tanks cannot answer questions about their overall influence upon policy but it can provide information on how the climate of ideas changes (Stone, 2001). Comparative research of think tanks and their role across their world can shed light on the actual mechanisms used by them but can also give us a better picture of their organizational nature and the interests they represent.
Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Stella Ladi is a senior lecturer at Queen Mary University of London and an assistant professor at Panteion University in Athens. She previously worked as a lecturer at University of Sheffield and University of Exeter. She has also been a research fellow at the Barcelona Institute of International Studies (IBEI). She has acted as a public policy expert at the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Aegean, Greece. In July 2002, she completed her PhD thesis at the University of York. Her research interests include the Eurozone crisis, public policy and public administration reforms, Europeanization, global governance and the role of experts in public policy. She has published in journals such as Regulation & Governance, Public Administration, West European Politics, New Political Economy, Comparative European Politics and Political Studies Review. She is co-convenor of the Greek Politics Specialist Group (GPSG) of the Political Studies Association (PSA).

Elena Lazarou is an assistant professor at the Centre for International Relations at the School of Social Sciences (CPDOC) of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV). She received her PhD in International Relations from the University of Cambridge in 2008. Her research interests include regional integration in Europe and South America, EU-Brazil relations, global governance and foreign policy analysis. She has held post-doctoral research positions at POLIS/University of Cambridge and at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and is a research associate of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). She has published in journals such as Global Society, the Brazilian Review of International Politics and Insight Turkey.

Juliana Hauck is a political science PhD candidate in Federal University of Minas Gerais. Her research focuses on the role of ideas in public processes, with a special emphasis on the function and strategies of think tanks. Her published articles discuss the conceptual definition of think tanks and their actions in Brazil. She also acts as a consultant to research institutes in Brazil in the private and governmental sector.

References

Abelson, D. (2009). Do think tanks matter? Montreal and Kingston. London: McGill – Queen’s University Press.
Abrúcio, F. L. (1998). Os barreiras da federação: Os governadores e a redemocratização brasileira [Governors and the redemocratization of Brazil]. Departamento de Ciencia Politica, USP [Universidade de São Paulo]. São Paulo: Editora Hucitec.
Afonso, J. R. (2011). As Intricadas Relações entre Política Fiscal e Creditecia no Brasil Pos-2008 [The intricate relationship between fiscal policy and credit in Brazil post- 2008]. Revista Economica, Niteroi, 13(2), 125–154.
Afonso, J. R., & Mussi, C. (2009, September, 15). O Brasil e o Governo no Pos-Crise [Brazil and the post-crisis government]. Revista Interesse Nacional. Ano 2 – numero 7. São Paulo.
Appy, B., Lisboa, M. de B., Mendes, M., & Lazzarini, S. (2015, September, 15). Os desafios para sair da crise [The challenges of exiting the crisis]. O Estado de São Paulo. Retrieved July 25, 2016, from https://goo.gl/Lg4mOk
Araujo, V. L., & Gentil, D. L. (2011). Avanços, recuos, acertos e erros: Uma análise da resposta da política econômica brasileira à crise financeira internacional [Advances, retrogress, successes and errors: An analysis of the response of Brazilian political economy to the international financial crisis]. Retrieved July 12, 2016, from hdl.handle.net/11058/1690
Bahia, L. D. (2015). Determinantes de evolução da produtividade do trabalho no brasil: 1990–2009 [Determinants of the evolution of work productivity in Brazil: 1990–2009]. Retrieved July 20, 2016, from hdl.handle.net/11058/6012
Ban, C. (2013). Brazil's liberal neo-developmentalism: New paradigm or edited orthodoxy? Review of International Political Economy, 20(2), 299.

Barbosa Filho, F. (2017). A crise econômica de 2014/2017 [The economic crisis of 2014/2017]. Estudos Avançados, 31(89), 31-56.

Barros, G. L. (2013). Quadro fiscal recente: uma leitura estendida [The recent fiscal framework: An extended analysis]. Revista Economia Aplicada. Retrieved July 12, 2016, from https://goo.gl/Z4pSlJ

Barros, G. L., & Afonso, J. R. (2013). Texto de discussão nº 30 – Sobre “façar o cumprimento” da meta de superavit primario de 2012 [Discussion text 30 - On “how to fulfill” the 2012 goals of primary surplus]. Retrieved July 25, 2016, from https://goo.gl/BXEfqk

Bonelli, R. (2010). Strengthening long-term growth in Brazil. Retrieve July 25, 2016, from https://goo.gl/Z8Mcne

Brazilian Central Bank. (2015). Economic indicators. Retrieved June 10, 2016, from http://www.bcb.gov.br/en/#!/home

Brazil takes off. The Economist, November 12, 2009. Retrieved May 25, 2012, from http://www.economist.com/node/14845197

Birkner, W. M. K. (2002). O realismo de Golbery [The realism of Golbery]. Itajai: Editora Univali.

Camarano, A. A. (2014). Novo regime demográfico: uma nova relação entre população e desenvolvimento? [A new demographic regime: A new relationship between population and development] Rio de Janeiro: Editora Ipea.

Conceição, C. (2014). Nota do Editor [Editor’s note]. Conjuntura Econômica Vol 68 nº 06 Junho.

Correa, M. (2005). O discurso golpista nos documentários de Jean Manzon para o IPES (1962/1963) [The discourse of “coup” in the documentaries of Jean Manzon for IPES] (Master’s dissertation). São Paulo: Universidade Estadual de Campinas.

Dieese. (2008). A crise financeira recente: fim de um padrão de funcionamento da economia mundial [The recent financial crisis: The end of a pattern for the functioning of the global economy]. Retrieved July 25, 2016, from https://goo.gl/jkrKdG

Dieese. (2009). A negociação de reajustes salariais em meio crise internacional [The negotiation of salary adjustments amidst the international crisis]. Retrieved July 25, 2016, from https://goo.gl/kli2MP4

Dieese. (2011a). Analise dos atuais componentes da inflação no Brasil [Analysis of the current components of inflation in Brazil]. Retrieved July 20, 2016, from https://goo.gl/21wdb9

Dieese. (2011a). A crise econômica mundial e as turbulências recentes [The global economic crisis and recent turbulence]. Retrieved July 25, 2016, from https://goo.gl/q2YSAQ

Dieese. (2012). Copa do Mundo 2014: Algumas considerações sobre a realização do evento no Brasil [World cup 2014: Some considerations about the realization of the event in Brazil]. Retrieved July 25, 2016, https://goo.gl/vmtSnp

Dieese. (2014a). O avanço das desigualdades nos países desenvolvidos: limites para o Brasil [The advancement of inequalities in developing countries: limits for Brazil]. Retrieved July 25, 2016, from https://goo.gl/WfM1VR

Dieese. (2014b). A evolução do crédito na economia brasileira 2008–2013 [The evolution of credit in the Brazilian economy]. Retrieved August 2, 2016, from http://goo.gl/RSViyx

Dieese. (2015). Compromisso pelo desenvolvimento [Compromise for development]. Retrieved July 25, 2016, https://goo.gl/1nZ0Yx

Durand, M. R. G. L. (1997). Formação das elites político-administrativas no Brasil: as instituições de pesquisa econômica aplicada [Formation of political-administrative elite in Brazil: The institutes of applied economic research]. Revista do Serviço Público, 4(2), 100–122.

ECB. (2016). What is driving Brazil's economic downturn? ECB Economic Bulletin. Retrieved November 10, 2016, from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eb201601_focus01.en.pdf

Ferrari Filho, F. (2011). Brazil's response: How did financial regulation and monetary policy influence recovery? Revista de Economia Política, 31(5), 880–888.
Fieschi, C., & Gaffney, J. (2004). French think tanks in comparative perspective. In D. Stone and A. Denham (Eds.), *Think tank traditions* (pp. 105–120). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Freres, C., Seabra, M. J., & Moraes, M. do R. de. (2002). Think tanks in Spain and Portugal: Searching for relevance. In J. G. McGann, & R. K. Weaver (Eds.), *Think tanks and civil societies: Catalysts for ideas and action* (pp. 187–220). London: Transactions Publishers.

Gall, N. (2014). *Braudel Papers – Quem somos? Para onde vamos? Tudo bem? [Who are we? Where are we going? Everything ok?] N. 49*. Retrieved July 20, 2016, from https://goo.gl/cbGEym

Garcé, A., & Uña, G. (2010). *Think tanks and public policies in Latin America* (pp. 1–319). Buenos Aires: Fundación Siena and CIPPEC.

Giambagi, F. (2011). *Estabilização, Reformas e Desequilibrio Macroeconomicos: Os Anos FHC [Stabilization, reforms and macroeconomic imbalance: The FHC years]*. In F. Giambagi, A. Villela, L. B. de Castro, & J. Hermann (Eds.), *Economia Brasileira Contemporanea [Contemporary Brazilian economy]* (pp. 167–192). Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus.

Gobetti, S. W. (2015). *Texto para discussão 2137 – Ajuste fiscal no Brasil: Os limites do possvel [Fiscal adjustment in Brazil. The limits of the possible]*. Retrieved July 25, 2016, from hdl.handle.net/11058/3438

Gobetti, S. W., & Orair, R. O. (2015). *Texto para discussão 2132 – flexibilização fiscal: novas evidencias e desafios [Discussion text 2132 - fiscal flexibilization: New evidence and challenges]*. Retrieved July 25, 2016, from hdl.handle.net/11058/5395

Gros, D. (2004). *Institutos liberais, Neoliberalismo e políticas Públicas na nova república [Neoliberalism and public policies in the new republic]*. *RBCS, 19*(54), 143–159.

Hauck, J. C. R. (2015). *Think tanks: quem são, como atuam e qual seu panorama de ação no Brasil [Think tanks: Who are they, how do they act and what is the panorama of their activity in Brazil] (Masters degree dissertation). Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.*

Hauck, J. C. R. (2017). What are ‘Think Tanks’? Revisiting the dilemma of the definition. *Brazilian Political Science Review, 11*(2).

Hurrel, A. (2013). Narratives of emergence: Rising powers and the end of the third world? *Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 33*(2), 203–221.

IBRE. (2014). *Annual report*. Retrieved July 25, 2016, from https://goo.gl/MzBLwB

Ipea. (2010a). *Respostas progressistas à crise [Progressive responses to the crisis]*. Retrieved July 20, 2016, from hdl.handle.net/11058/3180

Ipea. (2010b). *Brasil em Desenvolvimento: Estado, planejamento e políticas públicas [Developing Brazil: State, planning and public policies]*. Brasília: Editora Ipea.

Ipea. (2010c). *Macroeconomia para o desenvolvimento: crescimento, estabilidade e emprego [Macroeconomics for development: Growth, stability and employment]*. Brasília: Editora Ipea.

Ipea. (2014). *Brasil em desenvolvimento 2014: estado, planejamento e políticas públicas [Developing Brazil 2014: State, planning and public policies]* [editores: Leonardo Monteiro Monsterio, Marcelo Cortes Neri, Sergei Suarez Dillon Soares]. Brasília: Editora Ipea.

Kohler, M. (2012). Aonde nos levará a redução do IPI dos automóveis? [Where will the reduction of automobile IPI lead us?] Retrieved July 20, 2016, from https://goo.gl/bNZCl6

Kluger, E. (2015). A contraposição das noções de técnica e política nos discursos de uma elite burocrática [The juxtaposition of the technical and political notions of discourse of a bureaucratic elite]. *Revista de Sociologia e Política, 23*(55), 75–96.

Ladi, S. (2011). Think-tanks, discursive institutionalism and policy change. In G. Papanagnou (Ed.), *Social science and policy challenges* (pp. 205–220). Paris: UNESCO.

Lopes, L. (1991). *Memorias do desenvolvimento [Memories of development]* (p. 346). Rio de Janeiro: Centro da Memória da Eletricidade no Brasil. Retrieved July 17, from http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/handle/10438/6807/1129.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

McGann, J. (2016). *Global go to think tanks report*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. Retrieved February 23, 2016, from http://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/10

McGann, J., & Johnson, E. (2005). *Comparative think tanks, politics and public policy* (p. 304). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Mendes, M. (2011a). Como o gasto público elevado desequilibra a economia brasileira? [How elevated public spending creates imbalance in the Brazilian economy]. Retrieved July 22, 2016, from https://goo.gl/kWURgb

Mendes, M. (2011b). Por que é importante controlar o gasto público? [Why it is important to control public spending]. Retrieved July 20, 2016, from https://goo.gl/sSAzxf

Ministerio da Fazenda. (2004). Reformas Microeconomicas e Crescimento de Longo Prazo, Fazenda, Brasília [Microeconomic reforms and long term growth]. Retrieved May 25, 2012, from https://goo.gl/hR2EPK

Nery, P. F. (2015). Política de valorização do salário mínimo: que valorização? [The policy of appreciation of minimum salary: What appreciation?]. Retrieved August 2, 2016, from https://goo.gl/027q4j

Newson, D. D. (1995–1996). Foreign policy and academia. Foreign Policy, 101(Winter), 54.

Parmar, I. (2004). Think tanks and power in foreign policy. Hampshire: Palgrave.

Pero, V. (2012). Une nouvelle generation de programmes sociaux au Bresil [A new generation of social programs in Brazil]. Ceriscope Pauvrete. Retrieved August 10, 2014, from http://ceriscope.sciences-po.fr

Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. The American Political Science Review, 94(2), 251–267.

Pinheiro, A., & Bonelli, R. (2012). Texto para discussão no. 27 – O novo modelo de desenvolvimento brasileiro: Realizações, ameaças e limites de política econômica [Discussion text no. 27 - The new Brazilian development model: Achievements, threats and limits of the economic policy]. Retrieved July 20, 2016, from goo.gl/kvyLZD

Ramírez, H. R. (2005). Os institutos econômicos de organizações empresarias e sua relação com o Estado em perspectiva comparada: Argentina e Brasil, 1961–1996 [The economic institutes of business associations and their relations with the state in a comparative perspective: Argentina and Brazil 1961–1996] (PhD thesis). Porto Alegre: Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul.

Rigolin, C. C. D., & Hayashi M. C. P. I. (2013). A produção de conhecimento institucionalizado nos think tanks brasileiros: ciência, tecnologia e inovação segundo o Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas Aplicadas (1995–2010) [The production of institutionalized knowledge in Brazilian think tanks: Science, technology and innovation according to the Institute of Applied Economic Policies]. Universitas Humanística, 76, 393–418.

Rocha, A., & Alvares, F. (2011). O que é e para que serve o Resultado Primário? [What is the primary result and what purpose does it serve] Retrieved July 23, 2016, from https://goo.gl/Ms5qFH

Rocha, D., & Lopes, I. V. (2015). O campo concentra a pobreza extrema [Extreme poverty concentrated in the field]. Estudos Agrícolas. Retrieved August 2, 2016, from http://goo.gl/dAjsmh

Salto, F., Afonso, J. R., JR Biasoto, G., & Kohler, M. (2015). Texto de discussão 262 – As duas dimensões do ajuste fiscal [Discussion text 262 - The two dimensions of fiscal adjustment]. Instituto de Economia da UNICAMP. Retrieved July 20, 2016, from www.eco.unicamp.br/docprod/downarq.php?id=3439&t=ap

Samuels, D. (2003). Fiscal Straightjacket: The political economy of macroeconomic reform in Brazil, 1995–2002. Journal of Latin American Studies, 35(3), 1–25.

Schmidt, V. A. (2008). Discursive institutionalism: The explanatory power of ideas and discourse. Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 303–326.

Schmidt, V. A. (2002). Does discourse matter in the politics of welfare state adjustment? Comparative Political Studies, 35, 168–193.

Schmidt, V. A., & Radaelli, C. M. (2004). Policy change and discourse in Europe: Conceptual and methodological issues. West European Politics, 27, 183–210.

Sicsú, J. (2008). Texto para discussão no. 1346 – Planejamento estrategico do desenvolvimento e as políticas macroeconomicas [Discussion text 1346 - Strategic planning of development and macroeconomic policies]. Retrieved July 11, 2016, from https://goo.gl/VhFV9w

Stone, D. (2001). Think tanks, global lesson drawing and networking social policy ideas. Global Social Policy, 1(3), 338–360.

Stone, D. (2007, June). Recycling bins, garbage cans or think tanks? Three myths regarding policy analysis institutes. Public Administration, 85(2), 259–278.
Stone, D., & Ladi, S. (2017). Policy analysis and think tanks in comparative perspective. In M. Brans, I. Geva-May, & M. Howlett (Eds.), Routledge handbook of comparative policy analysis. London: Routledge.

Stuenkel, O. (2015). The BRICS and the future of global order. MD: Lexington Books.

Telegraph. Brazil's samba economy will keep on dancing. May 12, 2012. Retrieved June 13, 2012, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/globalbusiness/9261508/Brazils-samba-economy-will-keep-on-dancing.html

Thunert, M. (2011). Think tanks in Germany. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Briefing Paper Special Issue.

Xhanghai. Retrieved June 30, 2016, from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/china/08564.pdf

Weisbrot, M., Johnston, J., & Lefebvre, S. (2014). The Brazilian economy in transition: Macroeconomic policy, labor and inequality. Center for Economic and Policy Research. Retrieved from http://cepr.net/documents/brazil-2014-09.pdf

World Bank. (2017). Brazil overview. Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/brazil/overview

Web references

Accessed on 25.07.2016

Agência Ipea. Retrieved from www.youtube.com/user/agenciaipea

BEG. (2016). Quem somos [Who we are]. Retrieved from www.brasil-economia-governo.org.br/quem-somos

Dieese Comunica. (26/05/2014). Política de Salário Mínimo para 2015–2018 [Minimum salary policy 2015–2018]. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/2zytlt

Ipea Agenda. (2016). Eventos realizados 2008–2016 [Past events 2008–2016]. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/FzshNW

Ipea Noticias. (27/08/2015). Diretora do Ipea participou de oficina sobre politica industrial [Ipea director participated in the workshop on industrial policy]. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/OrTtWm

Ipea Noticias. (17/12/2015). Flexibilização do regime fiscal foi destaque em seminário [The flexibilization of the fiscal regime is the focus of a seminar]. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/Qhjtk7

Ipea Noticias. (18/03/2013). Ipea realiza terceira edição da Code [Ipea organizes the third edition of the code]. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/3Q034z

Ipea Noticias. (09/04/2012). Ipea, Sindifisco e Dieese debatem sobre tributacao [Ipea, Sindifisco and Dieese debate taxation]. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/EfAjrF

Ipea Noticias. (15/09/2015). Presidente Jessé Souza participa de forum em Sao Paulo [President Jesse Souza participates in forum in Sao Paulo]. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/It1tft

Ipea Noticias. (11/12/2015). Regras fiscais no Brasil e no mundo sao tema de seminario [Fiscal rules in Brazil and in the world are the subject of a seminar]. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/pZx77L

Ipea Noticias. (30/09/2015). Sessao debateu propostas para equilibrio fiscal no Brasil [Session debates proposals for fiscal balance in Brazil]. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/W6wDb6

Senado. (2016). Legislative Activity Search for “IBRE”. Retrieved from www.goo.gl/IxlrAK

Accessed on 02.08.2016

Câmara Noticias. (19/05/2009). Ipea e Dieese defendem reducao da jornada para 40 horas [Ipea and Dieese defend the reduction of the working week to forty hours]. Retrieved from http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/134882.html

CUT Noticias. (10/11/2009). Sao Paulo: Ipea realiza curso em parceria com Dieese, Diap e Seesp [Sao Paulo: Ipea organizes a course in partnership with Dieese, Diap and Seesp]. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/wHW4lh
Dieese Comunica. (03/12/2015). *Compromisso pelo Desenvolvimento* [Compromise and development]. Retrieved from [http://www.dieese.org.br/documentossindicais/2015/manifestoCentrais.pdf](http://www.dieese.org.br/documentossindicais/2015/manifestoCentrais.pdf)

Dieese. (2016). *Relatórios Anuais 2008–2015* [Annual Reports 2008–2015]. Retrieved from [https://goo.gl/HkDIIy](https://goo.gl/HkDIIy)

Facebook. BEG. Retrieved from [https://www.facebook.com/BR.econGoverno/posts/](https://www.facebook.com/BR.econGoverno/posts/)

Facebook. Dieese. Retrieved from [https://www.facebook.com/dieese/posts](https://www.facebook.com/dieese/posts)

Facebook. IBRE. Retrieved from [https://www.facebook.com/FGV.IBRE/posts/](https://www.facebook.com/FGV.IBRE/posts/)

Facebook. Ipea. Retrieved from [https://www.facebook.com/Ipea1964/posts/](https://www.facebook.com/Ipea1964/posts/)

IFB. (2016). *Eventos 2007–2016*. Retrieved from [http://pt.braudel.org.br/eventos/arquivos/](http://pt.braudel.org.br/eventos/arquivos/)

Portal Brasil. (29/01/2014). *Taxa de desemprego cai a 9,3% em dezembro nas seis regiões pesquisadas pelo Dieese* [Unemployment falls to 9,3% in December in the six regions in which Dieese carried out research]. Retrieved from [https://goo.gl/xuFVyc](https://goo.gl/xuFVyc)