He Gives C-Sieves on the CSIDH

Chris Peikert

University of Michigan

Abstract. Recently, Castryck, Lange, Martindale, Panny, and Renes proposed CSIDH (pronounced “sea-side”) as a candidate post-quantum "commutative group action." It has attracted much attention and interest, in part because it enables noninteractive Diffie–Hellman-like key exchange with quite small communication. Subsequently, CSIDH has also been used as a foundation for digital signatures.

In 2003–04, Kuperberg and then Regev gave asymptotically subexponential quantum algorithms for "hidden shift" problems, which can be used to recover the CSIDH secret key from a public key. In late 2011, Kuperberg gave a follow-up quantum algorithm called the collimation sieve ("c-sieve" for short), which improves the prior ones, in particular by using exponentially less quantum memory and offering more parameter tradeoffs. While recent works have analyzed the concrete cost of the original algorithms (and variants) against CSIDH, nothing of this nature was previously available for the c-sieve.

This work fills that gap. Specifically, we generalize Kuperberg’s collimation sieve to work for arbitrary finite cyclic groups, provide some practical efficiency improvements, give a classical (i.e., non-quantum) simulator, run experiments for a wide range of parameters up to the actual CSIDH-512 group order, and concretely quantify the complexity of the c-sieve against CSIDH.

Our main conclusion is that the proposed CSIDH parameters provide relatively little quantum security beyond what is given by the cost of quantumly evaluating the CSIDH group action itself (on a uniform superposition). For example, the cost of CSIDH-512 key recovery is only about $2^{16}$ quantum evaluations using $2^{40}$ bits of quantumly accessible classical memory (plus relatively small other resources). This improves upon a prior estimate of $2^{32.5}$ evaluations and $2^{31}$ qubits of quantum memory, for a variant of Kuperberg’s original sieve.

Under the plausible assumption that quantum evaluation does not cost much more than what is given by a recent “best case” analysis, CSIDH-512 can therefore be broken using significantly less than $2^{64}$ quantum T-gates. This strongly invalidates its claimed NIST level 1 quantum security, especially when accounting for the MAXDEPTH restriction. Moreover, under analogous assumptions for CSIDH-1024 and -1792, which target higher NIST security levels, except near the high end of the MAXDEPTH range even these instantiations fall short of level 1.

* This material is based upon work supported by the Patrick C. Fischer Development Chair and the National Science Foundation under Award CNS-1606362. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the National Science Foundation.
1 Introduction

In 1994, Shor [Sho94] upended cryptography by giving polynomial-time quantum algorithms for the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems, which can be used (on sufficiently large-scale quantum computers) to break all widely deployed public-key cryptography. With the steady progress in engineering quantum computers, there is an increasing need for viable post-quantum cryptosystems, i.e., ones which can be run on today’s classical computers but resist attacks by future quantum ones. Indeed, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has begun a post-quantum standardization effort [NIS], and recently selected the second-round candidates.

1.1 Isogeny-Based Cryptography

One prominent class of candidate post-quantum cryptosystems uses isogenies between elliptic curves over a common finite field. Isogeny-based cryptography began with the proposal of Couveignes in 1997, though it was not widely distributed until 2006 [Cou06]. The approach was independently rediscovered by Stolbunov (in his 2004 Master’s thesis [Sto04]) and by Rostovtsev and Stolbunov [RS06] in 2006. The central object in these proposals is a (free and transitive) group action $\star: G \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ of a finite commutative group $G$ on a set $Z$. Group actions naturally generalize exponentiation in (finite) cyclic multiplicative groups $C$: we take $G = \mathbb{Z}_q^\star$ to be the multiplicative group of integers modulo the order $q = |C|$ and $Z$ to be the set of generators of $C$, and define $a \star z = z^a$.

The Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov (hereafter CRS) proposal very naturally generalizes Diffie–Hellman [DH76] noninteractive key exchange to use a commutative group action: some $z \in Z$ is fixed for use by all parties; Alice chooses a secret $a \in G$ and publishes $p_A = a \star z$; Bob likewise chooses a secret $b \in G$ and publishes $p_B = b \star z$; then each of them can compute their shared key $(ab) \star z = a \star p_B = b \star p_A$. (Note the essential use of commutativity in the second equation, where $b \star (a \star z) = (ba) \star z = (ab) \star z$.)

Security. Of course, for the CRS system to have any hope of being secure, the analogue of the discrete logarithm problem for the group action must be hard, i.e., it must be infeasible to recover $a$ (or some functional equivalent) from $p_A = a \star z$. In 2010, Childs, Jao, and Soukharev [CJS10] observed that, assuming a suitable algorithm for the group action, this problem reduces to the (injective) abelian hidden-shift problem on the group $G$. It happens that Kuperberg [Kup03] in 2003 and then Regev [Reg04] in 2004 had already given asymptotically subexponential quantum “sieve” algorithms for this problem. More specifically, Kuperberg’s algorithm uses $\exp(O(\sqrt{n}))$ quantum time and space, whereas Regev’s uses slightly larger $\exp(O(\sqrt{n \log n}))$ quantum time but only $\text{poly}(n)$ quantum space, where $n = \log N$ is the bit length of the group order $N = |G|$. While these attacks do not necessarily render CRS-type systems insecure asymptotically, one must consider their concrete complexity when setting parameters to obtain a desired level of security.
We mention that these subexponential attacks against CRS motivated Jao and De Feo [JD11] to give a different approach to isogeny-based cryptography using supersingular curves, whose full endomorphism rings are non-commutative, which thwarts the Kuperberg-type attacks. The Jao–De Feo scheme, now known as Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman (SIDH), is also not based on a group action, and is inherently interactive. Most research on isogeny-based cryptography has focused on SIDH and closely related ideas.

**CSIDH.** The noninteractive nature and simplicity of the CRS approach are particularly attractive features, which motivated Castryck, Lange, Martindale, Panny, and Renes [CLM+18] to revisit the method recently. They proposed “Commutative SIDH,” abbreviated CSIDH and pronounced “sea-side.” Like SIDH, it relies on supersingular curves, but it uses a commutative subring of the full endomorphism ring, which naturally leads to a commutative group action. This design choice and other clever optimizations yield an impressive efficiency profile: for the CSIDH-512 parameters that were claimed in [CLM+18] to meet NIST security level 1, a full key exchange takes only about 80 milliseconds (improving upon several minutes for prior CRS prototypes), with key sizes of only 64 bytes (compared to hundreds of bytes for SIDH and derivatives).

In summary, the designers of CSIDH describe it as a primitive “that can serve as a drop-in replacement for the (EC)DH key-exchange protocol while maintaining security against quantum computers.” As such, it has attracted a good deal of attention and interest. (For example, it received the 2019 Dutch Cybersecurity Research Paper Award.) In addition, a series of works [Sto11, DG19, BKV19, KKP20] used CSIDH to develop digital signature schemes having relatively small sizes and reasonable running times. E.g., for the same claimed security levels as above, the CSI-FiSh signature scheme [BKV19] can have a combined public key and signature size of 1468 bytes, which is better than all proposals to the NIST post-quantum cryptography effort.

### 1.2 Attacking the CSIDH

As mentioned above, when setting parameters for CSIDH and arriving at security claims, one must take into account known attacks. The main quantum approach is given by Kuperberg’s abelian hidden-shift algorithm [Kup03] and descendants, where the hidden “shift” corresponds to the secret “discrete log” \( a \in G \) for a given public key \( p_A = a \star z \in Z \). Algorithms of this type have two main components:

1. **a quantum oracle** that, whenever queried, outputs a certain kind of random “labeled” quantum state, in part by evaluating the group action on a uniform superposition over the group;
2. **a sieving procedure** that combines labeled states in some way to generate “more favorable” ones.

By processing many fresh labeled states from the oracle, the sieve eventually creates some “highly favorable” states, which are then measured to reveal useful information about the hidden shift (i.e., the secret key).
The overall complexity of the attack is therefore mainly determined by the complexities of the quantum oracle and the sieve, where the latter includes the number of oracle queries. These can be analyzed independently, and for each there is a line of work with a focus on CRS/CSIDH.

**The oracle.** To produce a labeled state, the oracle mainly needs to prepare a uniform superposition over the group $G$, and apply the group action to a superposition of the “base” $z \in \mathbb{Z}$ and the public key $a \star z$. (It then does a certain measurement, takes a Fourier transform, and measures again to get a label.)

In the context of isogenies, evaluating the group action on the superposition is presently the bottleneck, by a large amount.

The original work of Childs, Jao, and Soukharev [CJS10] implemented the oracle in $\exp(\tilde{O}(n^{1/2}))$ quantum time (assuming GRH) and space. Biasse, Iezzi, and Jacobson [BIJJ18] improved this to an oracle that (under different heuristics) runs in $\exp(\tilde{O}(n^{1/3}))$ quantum time and polynomial space, though they did not analyze the factors hidden by the $\tilde{O}$ notation.

More recently, Bernstein, Lange, Martindale, and Panny [BLMP19] analyzed the concrete cost of quantumly evaluating the CSIDH group action. For the CSIDH-512 parameters, they arrived at an estimate of less than $2^{40}$ nonlinear bit operations (which translates to between $2^{40}$ and $2^{44}$ quantum T-gates), with a failure probability below $2^{-32}$, to evaluate the group action on a non-uniform “best conceivable” (for the attacker) distribution of group elements, namely, the one used in CSIDH key generation. Recent work by Beullens, Kleinjung, and Vercauteren [BKV19] suggests that the cost for a uniform superposition may be quite close to that of the “best conceivable” case; see Section 1.4 for further discussion.

**The sieve.** Kuperberg’s original algorithm [Kup03] has $\exp(O(\sqrt{n}))$ complexity in time, queries, and quantum space. More specifically, he rigorously proved a query bound of $O(2^{3\sqrt{n}})$, and a better time and query bound of $\tilde{O}(3\sqrt{2\log_3 N})$ when $N = r^n$ for some small radix $r$ (though this is very unlikely to be the case for CSIDH). As already mentioned, Regev reduced the quantum space to only polynomial in $n$, but at the cost of increasing the time and query complexity to $\exp(O(\sqrt{n \log n}))$; to our knowledge, precise hidden factors have not been worked out for this approach.

Bonnetain and Schrottenloher [BS18] provided a variant of Kuperberg’s sieve for arbitrary cyclic groups, and gave more precise estimates of its query and quantum-space complexity. Specifically, using simulations up to $n = 100$ they estimate that $2^{1.8\sqrt{n}+2.3}$ queries and nearly the same number of qubits of memory are needed. For the CSIDH-512 parameters, this translates to $2^{32.5}$ queries and $2^{31}$ qubits.

Notably, in late 2011 Kuperberg gave a follow-up algorithm [Kup11], called the collimation sieve (or “c-sieve” for short), which subsumes his original one
and Regev’s variant. Asymptotically, it still uses \( \exp(O(\sqrt{n})) \) quantum time and classical space, but only linear \( O(n) \) quantum space (in addition to the oracle’s). Moreover, it provides other options and tradeoffs, most notably among classical time, quantum time, and \textit{quantumly accessible classical memory} (QRACM, also known as QROM), i.e., classical memory that is readable (but not writeable) in superposition. As argued in \cite{BHT98,Kup11}, QRACM is plausibly much cheaper than fully quantum memory, because it does not need to be preserved in superposition. In particular, Kuperberg describes \cite[Proposition 2.2]{Kup11} how QRACM can be simulated using ordinary classical memory, at the cost of logarithmic quantum memory and quasilinear quantum time in the number of data cells; see \cite[Section III.C]{BGB+18} for a realization of this idea which has modest concrete cost.

Although Kuperberg’s collimation sieve dates to about six years before the CSIDH proposal, and has been briefly cited in some of the prior literature on CSIDH, an analysis for concrete parameters was not previously available. That is the topic we address in this work.

### 1.3 Our Contributions

We analyze the concrete complexity of Kuperberg’s collimation sieve \cite{Kup11}, with a focus on CSIDH and its proposed parameterizations, although our results apply generally to any CRS-style commutative group action, including recent CSIDH variants \cite{CD19,FTLX19}. Our study mainly treats the quantum oracle as a “black box,” and focuses on the precise number of queries and amount of quantumly accessible classical memory (QRACM) the sieve uses. Following a suggestion by Schanck \cite{Sch19}, we also give a rough analysis of how these quantities translate to the quantum complexity of full attacks on proposed CSIDH parameters.

More specifically, we generalize the c-sieve to work for cyclic groups of arbitrary finite order (from power-of-two or other smooth orders, which CSIDH groups typically do not have), provide some practical improvements that extract more secret-key bits per run of the sieve and maintain better control of the memory and time complexities, give a classical simulator and run experiments on a wide range of parameters—including the actual CSIDH-512 group order of \( N \approx 2^{257.1} \)—and concretely quantify the complexity of the c-sieve against proposed CSIDH parameters. As far as we know, ours is the first work to simulate any kind of quantum sieve algorithm for groups as large as the actual CSIDH-512 group; previously, the largest simulations were for group orders \( N \approx 2^{100} \).

---

1. More recently, Kuperberg has given talks highlighting the virtues of the algorithm and its relevance to isogenies.

2. Shortly after the announcement of this work, Bonnetain and Schrottenloher posted an updated version of \cite{BS18}, which had been under private review and which does contain such an analysis. See below for a comparison.

3. Our work has no implications for SIDH \cite{JD11} or the NIST submission SIKE, which do not use commutative group actions.
Conclusions. Our main conclusion is that the proposed CSIDH parameters provide relatively little quantum security beyond what is given by the cost of the quantum oracle. For example, for CSIDH-512 the secret key can be recovered from the public key with only about $2^{16}$ oracle queries and $2^{40}$ bits of QRACM, or about $2^{19.3}$ queries and $2^{32}$ bits of QRACM, plus insignificant other resources. This improves upon a prior estimate [BS18] of $2^{32.5}$ queries and $2^{31}$ qubits of quantum memory, for a variant of Kuperberg’s first sieve algorithm. The key insight underlying our improvements is that when the oracle is expensive, trading oracle queries for QRACM can dramatically reduce the overall quantum time, while keeping the classical costs reasonable. (No such tradeoff is available for the earlier sieve algorithms.) In addition, we find that for the group orders of interest, the cost of implementing even substantial amounts of QRACM using [BGB+18] is dwarfed by that of the oracle queries (under current estimates for the latter). See Section 4 for the full details.

Under the plausible assumption that implementing the oracle does not cost much more than the “best conceivable case” estimate of [BLMPT19], CSIDH-512 can therefore be broken using not much more than $2^{60}$ quantum T-gates, plus relatively small other resources. This strongly invalidates its claimed NIST level 1 quantum security, especially when accounting for the MAXDEPTH restriction, and even under much weaker assumptions about the cost of the oracle.

Similarly, CSIDH-1024 and -1792, which respectively targeted NIST quantum security levels 2 and 3, can be broken with, e.g., about $2^{26}$ and $2^{39}$ oracle queries and $2^{40}$ bits of QRACM (plus insignificant other resources). Under analogous assumptions about the cost of their oracles relative to the “best conceivable case,” CSIDH-1024 therefore falls short of level 1 (and by a large margin for the low end and middle region of the MAXDEPTH range). Moreover, with the possible

---

4 The main security claim in [CLM+18] for CSIDH-512 (which appears in the abstract, introduction, and security evaluation) is NIST level 1. However, in one location the paper also mentions, in a passing reference to CSIDH-512, a “conjectured post-quantum security level of 64 bits.” This would constitute a different, significantly weaker security claim than NIST level 1, in part because the latter accounts for the cost of quantumly evaluating AES, and has a MAXDEPTH restriction. No definition for ‘bits of post-quantum security’ is given in [CLM+18], but the security analysis in Section 7.3 and Table 1 quantifies “costs for the complete attack” in terms of number of logical qubit operations, and targets $2^{64}$ or more for CSIDH-512. Under this implied interpretation of ‘64 bits of post-quantum security,’ and our assumption on the cost of the oracle, our work even falsifies this security claim as well. We point out that other metrics like “depth times width” can be used to quantify security (see, e.g., [JS19]), and at present the complexity of our attack in this metric is unclear, in part because the precise depth and width of the oracle are unknown. However, under any reasonable metric the oracle calls are presently the bottleneck for sieve parameters of interest.

5 We again emphasize that the c-sieve offers a flexible tradeoff among queries, QRACM, and classical time, so all these example query counts can be reduced somewhat by increasing these other resources.
exception of the high region of the MAXDEPTH range, even CSIDH-1792 also fails to reach level 1.

*Comparison with [BS18].* Shortly after the initial announcement of this work, Bonnetain and Schrottenloher posted an update [BS18] to their earlier analysis of Kuperberg’s first sieve algorithm, which now also analyzes variants of the collimation sieve. They arrive at similar conclusions, but their analysis is largely complementary to ours, in the following ways. They give a theoretical analysis that ignores some polynomial terms, whereas ours is fully concrete and supported by experiments (which reveal some unexpected phenomena that significantly affect the polynomial factors). They only consider large collimation arity \( r \) (see below) with correspondingly small fully quantum memory and large classical work and memory, whereas we mainly limit our attention to the binary case \( r = 2 \) with correspondingly larger QRACM and small classical work. Finally, we include optimizations that are not considered in [BS18], like the extraction of many secret-key bits from each run of the sieve. It seems likely that a combination of ideas from these works would yield additional points on the attack spectrum and somewhat improved bounds.

### 1.4 Further Research

A main question that remains to be addressed is the actual concrete cost of the requisite quantum oracle, i.e., evaluation of the CSIDH group action for a uniform superposition over the group. The results of [BS18] and even more so [BKV19] suggest that for CSIDH-512, the cost may be close to the roughly \( 2^{40} \) nonlinear bit operations estimate [BLMP19] for the “best conceivable case”—perhaps even within a factor of two or less. This is because [BKV19] gives a fast method for mapping a uniformly random group element to a short exponent vector, whose norm statistics are very similar to those of the distribution analyzed in [BLMP19]. (In particular, the norm’s expectation is only about 10% larger, and its variance is actually somewhat smaller.) Also, because the sieve requires so few oracle queries (e.g., \( 2^{16} \) or less for CSIDH-512), some improvement should be obtainable simply by increasing the oracle’s error probability, from the \( 2^{-32} \) considered in [BLMP19]. Related questions are whether it is possible to accelerate the oracle computations by amortization, or by directly designing a quantum circuit rather than converting a Boolean one.

Our study is primarily focused on collimation arity \( r = 2 \), which corresponds to a sieve that produces a binary recursion tree. Using an arity \( r > 2 \) can reduce the number of queries and/or the needed amount of QRACM, at the cost of more classical time. In a bit more detail, the main collimation subroutine that for \( r = 2 \) takes quasilinear \( O(L) \) classical time (in the amount \( L \) of QRACM) takes \( O(L^{r-1}) \) classical time in general (or even less time with more memory, using Schroeppel–Shamir [SS79]), but reduces the depth of the recursion tree by about \( r-1 \) factor, which can significantly reduce the number of oracle queries. Our experiments demonstrate that the classical work for \( r = 2 \) is cryptanalytically small (on the order of several core-days), and our model suggests modest improvements in query
complexity for slightly larger arities, so this direction may be worth investigating further, especially if the quantum oracle remains the main bottleneck.

A final interesting question is how many bits of a CSIDH secret are required to break the scheme. Our complexity estimates are for running the c-sieve several times to recover almost all of the secret bits (the remainder can be obtained by brute force). However, if partial information about the secret suffices to break the scheme through other means, then the number of sieve invocations and corresponding query complexity would be reduced.

1.5 Paper Organization

In Section 3 we describe and analyze our generalization of Kuperberg’s collimation sieve to arbitrary cyclic groups. In Section 4 we draw conclusions about the quantum security of various CSIDH parameters. In Section 5 we describe our classical simulator for the collimation sieve, and report on our experiments with it.

Acknowledgments. We thank the organizers of the Oxford Post-Quantum Cryptography Workshop, at which we received our first detailed exposure to CSIDH; Michael Cafarella and J. Alex Halderman for the use of their servers to conduct experiments; Oded Regev and Greg Kuperberg for clarifying comments; Dan Bernstein for pointing out Kuperberg’s recent talks and for comments on [BLMP19]; Léo Ducas for additional references; John Schanck and Sam Jaques for additional references and discussions about the full quantum complexity analysis; and the anonymous EUROCRYPT reviewers for many helpful comments and suggestions.

2 Preliminaries

We let \( \mathbb{N} = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots \} \) denote the set of nonnegative integers, and for a positive integer \( L \) we define \( [L] := \{0, 1, \ldots, L - 1\} \). All logarithms have base 2 unless otherwise specified. Define \( \chi(x) = \exp(2\pi i \cdot x) \) and observe that \( \chi(x)\chi(y) = \chi(x + y) \).

2.1 CSIDH Group Action

Here we recall sufficient background on CSIDH for our purposes; for full details, see [CLM+18]. At its heart is a free and transitive group action \( \star : G \times Z \to Z \), where the group \( G \) is the ideal class group \( \mathrm{Cl}(\mathcal{O}) \) of the order \( \mathcal{O} = \mathbb{Z}[\sqrt{-p}] \) of the imaginary quadratic number field \( \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-p}) \), for a given prime \( p \) of a certain form. (The acted-upon set \( Z \) is a certain collection of elliptic curves over \( \mathbb{F}_p \), each of which can be uniquely represented by a single element of \( \mathbb{F}_p \), but this will not be important for our purposes.) Because \( \mathcal{O} \) is commutative, its class group \( G = \mathrm{Cl}(\mathcal{O}) \) is abelian. Heuristically, \( G \) is cyclic or “almost cyclic” (i.e., it has a cyclic component of order nearly as large as \(|G|\)), and its order \( N = |G| \) is approximately \( \sqrt{p} \).
CSIDH uses $d$ special ideals $l_i$ of the order $O$. Heuristically, these ideals generate the class group or a very large subgroup thereof; for simplicity, assume the former. The ideals $l_i$ define an integer lattice of relations

$$\Lambda = \{ z = (z_1, \ldots, z_d) \in \mathbb{Z}^d : l_1^{z_1} \cdots l_d^{z_d} \text{ is principal} \},$$

so $G$ is isomorphic to $\mathbb{Z}^d/\Lambda$, via (the inverse of) the map $e \in \mathbb{Z}^d \mapsto [\prod_i l_i^{e_i}]$, of which $\Lambda$ is the kernel.

A CSIDH secret key is a vector $e \in \mathbb{Z}^d$ of “small” integer exponents representing a group element; more specifically, the $e_i$ are drawn uniformly from some small interval $[-B, B]$. One evaluates the group action for the associated ideal class $[l_1^{e_1} \cdots l_d^{e_d}]$ by successively applying the action of each $[l_i]$ or its inverse, $|e_i|$ times. Therefore, the $\ell_1$ norm of $e$ largely determines the evaluation time. Note that a group element is not uniquely specified by an exponent vector; any vector in the same coset of $\Lambda$ defines the same group element, but very “long” vectors are not immediately useful for computing the group action. However, if we have a basis of $\Lambda$ made up of very short vectors, then given any exponent representation of a group element, we can efficiently reduce it to a rather short representation of the same element using standard lattice algorithms like Babai’s nearest-plane algorithm [Bab85].

In the CSIDH-512 parameterization, for which $p \approx 2^{512}$, the class group $G = \text{Cl}(O)$ has recently been computed [BKV19]: it is isomorphic to the additive cyclic group $\mathbb{Z}_N = \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ of integers modulo

$$N = 3 \cdot 37 \cdot 1407181 \cdot 51593604295295867744293584889 \cdot 31599414504681995853008278745587832204909 \approx 2^{257.1},$$

and is in fact generated by the class of the ideal $l_1$. In addition, the lattice $\Lambda \subset \mathbb{Z}^{74}$ of relations among the ideals $l_i$ is known, along with a very high-quality (HKZ-reduced) basis. Indeed, the authors of [BKV19] showed that a uniformly random element of $\mathbb{Z}_N$ can be quickly reduced to a short exponent vector having a norm distribution very similar to the CSIDH-512 one. So, in summary, for CSIDH-512 we can efficiently represent the class group as $\mathbb{Z}_N$, and secret keys using the distinguished representatives $\{0, 1, \ldots, N - 1\}$.

### 2.2 Abelian Hidden-Shift Problem

The hidden-shift problem on an additive abelian group $G$ is as follows: given injective functions $f_0, f_1 : G \to X$ (for some arbitrary set $X$) such that $f_1(x) = f_0(x+s)$ for some secret “shift” $s \in G$ and all $x \in G$, the goal is to find $s$. For cyclic groups $G \cong \mathbb{Z}_N$, this hidden-shift problem is equivalent to the hidden-subgroup problem on the $N$th dihedral group (which has order $2N$). Kuperberg [Kup03] gave the first nontrivial quantum algorithm for this problem, which uses subexponential $\exp(O(\sqrt{\log N}))$ quantum time and space.

As observed by Childs, Jao, and Soukharev [CJS10], there is a simple connection between the abelian hidden-shift problem and the key-recovery problem for Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov-type systems: given the “base value”
$z_0 \in Z$ and a public key $z_1 = s \ast z_0$ for some secret key $s \in G$, where $\ast : G \times Z \to Z$ is a free and transitive group action, define $f_b : G \to Z$ as $f_b(g) = g \ast z_b$ for $b = 0, 1$. These $f_b$ are injective because $\ast$ is free and transitive, and $f_1(x) = x \ast z_1 = x \ast (s \ast z_0) = (x + s) \ast z_0 = f_0(x + s)$, as required. So, solving the hidden-shift problem for these $f_b$ immediately yields the secret key.

3 Collimation Sieve for Cyclic Groups

In this section we generalize Kuperberg’s collimation sieve \[\text{Kup11}\] to arbitrary cyclic groups $\mathbb{Z}_N$ of known order $N$. (The algorithm can also be made to work even if we only have a bound on the group order.) The algorithm works very much like Kuperberg’s for power-of-two group orders $N = 2^n$, but with some implementation differences and optimizations inspired by improvements to Kuperberg’s first sieve algorithm \[\text{Kup03}\].

The collimation sieve works with quantum states called phase vectors, each of which has some associated integer (phase) multipliers (see Section 3.1). The ultimate goal of the sieve (see Section 3.2) is to construct a length-$L$ phase vector that is ‘very nice,’ meaning its multipliers come from a desired set of small size $S \lesssim L$, e.g., the interval $[S]$. (Additionally, the phase multipliers should be roughly uniformly distributed, which happens automatically.) From such a nice phase vector one can extract bits of the secret via the quantum Fourier transform and measurement (see Section 3.4). Initially, the sieve will only be able to construct very ‘non-nice’ phase vectors whose multipliers come from the huge set $\{0, 1, \ldots, N-1\}$. It then repeatedly produces progressively ‘nicer’ phase vectors whose multipliers lie in successively smaller sets, by combining less-nice vectors via a process called collimation (see Section 3.3).

The differences between our version of the collimation sieve and Kuperberg’s are summarized as follows:

1. The sieve creates phase vectors with multipliers in progressively smaller intervals of the integers, by collimating on the “most-significant bits” of the multipliers. (By contrast, Kuperberg makes the multipliers divisible by progressively larger powers of two, by collimating on the least-significant bits.)

2. After sieving down to an interval of size $S$, where $S$ can be roughly as large as the amount of quantumly accessible classical memory (QRACM), the algorithm applies a quantum Fourier transform of dimension $S$ and measures, to reveal about $\log S$ of the “most-significant bits” of the secret with good probability. (Kuperberg instead applies a two-dimensional Fourier transform and measures to recover the single least-significant bit of the secret, with certainty.)

3. Alternatively, instead of recovering just $\log(S)$ bits of the secret, the algorithm can perform additional independent sieves down to various “scaled” intervals. By combining the resulting phase vectors, the algorithm can recover about $\log(S)$ different secret bits per sieve, and in particular, it can recover the entire secret using about $\log(N)/\log(S) = \log_S(N)$ sieves. (Kuperberg’s
algorithm, after recovering the least-significant bit of the secret, effectively halves the secret and repeats to recover the remaining bits, using \( \log(N) \) total sieves.

The technique from Item 2 is reminiscent of one used by Levieil and Fouque \[LF06\] to recover several secret bits at once in the Learning Parity with Noise problem. The technique from Item 3 is analogous to one attributed to Høyer in \[Kup03\] for recovering the entire secret from about \( \log(N) \) qubits obtained via Kuperberg’s original sieving algorithm.

### 3.1 Phase Vectors

We first recall from \[Kup11\] the notion of a phase vector and some of its essential properties. Fix some positive integer \( N \) and \( s \in \mathbb{Z}_N \). For a positive integer \( L \), a **phase vector of length** \( L \) is a (pure) quantum state of the form

\[
|\psi\rangle = L^{-1/2} \sum_{j \in [L]} \chi(b(j) \cdot s/N)|j\rangle
\]

for some function \( b: [L] \to \mathbb{Z} \), where the \( b(j) \) are called the **(phase) multipliers**. In all the algorithms considered in this work, the multiplier functions \( b \) will be written down explicitly in a table, in sorted order by \( b(j) \) for efficiency of collimation (see Section 3.3). Note that while this requires classical memory proportional to \( L \), only \( \log L \) qubits of quantum memory are needed for \( |\psi\rangle \). Also observe that the multipliers are implicitly modulo \( N \) (because of the division by \( N \) inside \( \chi \)), so we will use and store their distinguished integer representatives in \( \{0, 1, \ldots, N-1\} \). We say that \( |\psi\rangle \) is **ranged on** (or just **on**) a particular set \( S \subseteq \mathbb{Z} \) if every \( b(j) \in S \).

Looking ahead a bit, the collimation sieve uses collimation to combine and produce phase vectors of roughly equal length \( L \) that are ranged on a sequence of geometrically smaller sets, starting from unrestricted ones on \( \{0, 1, \ldots, N-1\} \) and ultimately yielding one on a set of size \( S \lesssim L \) (e.g., the interval \([S]\)). Measuring the quantum Fourier transform of such a vector then yields part of the secret.

**Creating and combining phase vectors.** Prior (finite) hidden-subgroup and hidden-shift algorithms use a simple quantum procedure (an “oracle”) \( U_f \) that generates a special kind of one-qubit state, i.e., a length-2 phase vector. Given quantum procedures for computing injective functions \( f_0, f_1: \mathbb{Z}_N \to X \) (for an arbitrary set \( X \)) such that \( f_1(x) = f_0(x + s) \) for some secret \( s \) and all \( x \), the procedure \( U_f \) outputs a uniformly random \( b \in \mathbb{Z}_N \) along with a qubit

\[
|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + \chi(b \cdot s/N)|1\rangle),
\]

i.e., a length-2 phase vector with \( b(0) = 0, b(1) = b \). The details of \( U_f \) are not material here; see \[Kup03,Reg04\] for accessible descriptions. However, we note that \( U_f \) evaluates the functions \( f_i \) in superposition, which in our context corresponds to evaluating the CSIDH group action.
Phase vectors can naturally be combined by tensoring: given $r$ phase vectors $|\psi_i\rangle$ respectively having lengths $L_i$ and multiplier functions $b_i$, we can form the following quantum state $|\psi'\rangle$ with index set $L = [L_1] \times \cdots \times [L_r]$:

$$|\psi'\rangle = |\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_r\rangle = |L|^{-1/2} \sum_{j_1 \in [L_1]} \cdots \sum_{j_r \in [L_r]} \chi(b_1(j_1) \cdot s/N) \cdots \chi(b_r(j_r) \cdot s/N)|j_1, \ldots, j_r\rangle$$

(1)

where $b'(j) = \sum_{i=1}^r b_i(j_i)$. Therefore, $|\psi'\rangle$ can be thought of as a kind of phase vector of length $|L| = \prod_{i=1}^r L_i$, except that its index set is not exactly $[|L|]$ (although there is a natural bijection between $L$ and $[|L|]$). We note that in the context of collimation (Section 3.3), we do not explicitly write down the full multiplier function $b'$, but instead first partially measure $|\psi'\rangle$ to lessen its length before storing its multiplier function.

### 3.2 Collimation Sieve

We now formally define the collimation sieve, in Algorithm 1. It constructs a phase vector on a desired interval by recursively constructing and collimating phase vectors on suitably larger intervals. The algorithm is essentially the same as Kuperberg’s from [Kup11] (which incorporates a key insight of Regev’s [Reg04]), except that it uses collimation on “high bits,” along with a few tweaks to make it more practically efficient in simulations (see Section 3.2 below).

**Algorithm 1** Collimation sieve for group $\mathbb{Z}_N$ and collimation arity $r$.

**Input:** Interval sizes $S_0 < S_1 < \cdots < S_d = N$, a desired phase-vector length $L$, and oracle access to $U_f$.

**Output:** A phase vector on $[S_0]$ of length $\approx L$.

**Base case.** If $S_0 = N$, generate $\ell \approx \log L$ length-2 phase vectors $|\psi_1\rangle, |\psi_2\rangle, \ldots, |\psi_\ell\rangle$ using $U_f$ (see Section 3.1). Output the length-$2^\ell$ phase vector $|\psi\rangle = |\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_\ell\rangle$.

**Recursive case.** Otherwise:

1. Using $r$ recursive calls for sizes $S_1 < \cdots < S_d = N$ and appropriate desired lengths, obtain $r$ phase vectors $|\psi_1\rangle, \ldots, |\psi_r\rangle$ on $[S_1]$, the product of whose lengths is $\approx rL \cdot S_1/S_0$.
2. Collimate these phase vectors using Algorithm 2 to produce a phase vector $|\psi\rangle$ on $[S_0]$, and output it. (Or, if its length is much less than $L$, discard it and recompute from Step 1.)

In the base case, when a phase vector of length roughly $L$ on $[N]$ is desired, the algorithm simply invokes the oracle $U_f$ some $\ell \approx \log L$ times to get length-2 phase...
vectors $|\psi_i\rangle \propto |0\rangle + \chi(b_i \cdot s/N)|1\rangle$ for known uniformly random multipliers $b_i \in [N]$, then tensors them all together to get a length-2 phase vector whose multipliers are the mod-$N$ subset-sums of the $b_i$ values. (See Section 3.1) In the recursive case, when a phase vector on $[S_i]$ for some $S_i < N$ is desired, the algorithm recursively obtains $r$ phase vectors on $[S_{i+1}]$ of appropriate lengths, collimates them to interval $[S_i]$, and returns the result. (See Section 3.3 below for the definition and analysis of the collimation procedure.)

The sieve can traverse the recursion tree in any manner, e.g., depth first, breadth first, or some hybrid of the two. The choice offers a tradeoff between the quantum memory cost and parallelism of the sieve. Because each phase vector uses about $\log L$ qubits, a depth-first traversal would require only about $(r-1)d\log L$ qubits of memory, but the collimation steps would need to be done sequentially. On the other extreme, a breadth-first traversal would allow all the oracle calls and collimation steps at each level of the tree to be done in parallel, but at the cost of about $rd\log L$ qubits of memory.

Finally, we can also use the sieve to construct phase vectors on other desired output ranges, like scaled intervals $A \cdot [S]$, simply by tweaking the collimation procedure as described in Section 3.3. Combining phase vectors on different scaled intervals enables recovery of more (or even all) bits of the secret with a single measurement.

**Parameters** Following the analysis of the collimation procedure (see Section 3.3 and Equation (4) below), a top-level call to Algorithm 1 for arity $r \geq 2$ would typically be made on a sequence of interval sizes $S_i$ where:

- $S_0 \approx L$, the desired length of the ultimate phase vector (which can be almost as large as the available amount of QRACM), and
- $S_{i+1} = \min\{\approx S_i \cdot L^{r-1}/r, N\}$, where the final $S_d = N$.

The depth $d$ of the recursion tree is therefore given by

$$S_0(L^{r-1}/r)^d \geq N \implies d = \left\lceil \frac{\log(N/S_0)}{\log(L^{r-1}/r)} \right\rceil \approx \frac{\log_L(N/S_0)}{r-1}. \quad (2)$$

**Practical Improvements** As detailed below in Section 3.3, the length of a phase vector output by collimation is unpredictable, and may be rather longer or shorter than expected. Because the lengths directly affect the required amount of QRACM and other resources required by the rest of the sieve, we would like to keep them under control as much as possible. We do so with two techniques:

1. **being adaptive** about the requested vector lengths in the recursive calls, and
2. **discarding** phase vectors that are unusually short, and recomputing from scratch.

Adaptivity means the following. Recall that to create a phase vector on $[S]$ of length $\approx L$, the algorithm recursively creates $r$ phase vectors on $[S']$ for some given $S' \gg S$, the product of whose lengths we want to be $\approx L' = L \cdot (S'/S)$. So,
on the first recursive call we request a vector of length \((L')^{1/r}\), and obtain a vector of some length \(L\). Following that we want the product of the remaining \(r - 1\) vector lengths to be \(\approx L'/L\), so we request a vector of length \((L'/L)^{1/(r-1)}\), and so on. This immediately compensates for shorter-than-expected vectors, which helps to avoid cascading short vectors higher in the recursion tree and a useless final output. And in the fortunate event that we get a longer-than-expected vector, requesting correspondingly shorter vectors speeds up the remaining computation. In case there is a hard cap on the available amount of QRACM, it is also trivial to shorten a longer-than-expected vector via a partial measurement, which also beneficially shrinks the interval in which the phase multipliers lie.

Vectors that are much shorter than expected present a more significant problem, however. Compensating for them requires corresponding longer and/or more phase vectors for collimation, which require correspondingly more QRACM and computation. Moreover, getting another short vector in that part of the computation subtree further increases the required resources. Therefore, whenever a call to Algorithm 1 produces a candidate output vector that is shorter than the requested length by some fixed threshold factor, it simply discards it and computes a fresh one from scratch.

Empirically, for arity \(r = 2\) threshold factors of 0.25 or 0.4 seem to work well, causing a discard in only about 2% or 4.5% of calls (respectively), and keeping the maximum vector length across the entire sieve to within a factor of about \(2^4 \cdot 2^5\) or \(2^2\cdot 5\) (respectively) of the desired length \(L\); moreover, that factor tends to decrease somewhat as \(L\) grows. (See Figure 2 for details.) This modification was very important for the feasibility of our simulations: without the discard rule, the maximum vector length tended to be several hundreds or even thousands of times larger than \(L\), yet the ultimate phase vector was often still much shorter than desired.

**Oracle Query Complexity** Here we give a model for the number of queries to the oracle \(U_f\) made by the sieve. For the interval sizes \(S_i\) given above in Section 3.2 the recursion depth is given in Equation (2) as

\[
d = \left\lceil \frac{\log(N/S_d)}{\log(L^{r-1}/r)} \right\rceil.
\]

At the base case (leaf level) of the recursion tree, where \(S_d = N\), we typically need to make a phase vector of length about

\[
L' = (rLS_d/S_{d-1})^{1/r} = (rLN/S_{d-1})^{1/r}.
\]

We construct such a vector by making \(\lfloor \log L' \rfloor\) oracle queries and tensoring the results.

---

6 This is roughly analogous to what is done in Kuperberg’s original sieve [Kup03], where combining two qubits has a 50% chance of producing a “useless” output that is then discarded.
Supposing that a random \( \delta \) fraction of recursive calls to Algorithm 1 result in a discard (due to insufficient length), the arity of the recursion tree is effectively \( r/(1 - \delta) \). Therefore, our model for the total number of oracle queries is

\[
Q = (r/(1 - \delta))^d \cdot \log L'.
\] (3)

For arity \( r = 2 \) our experiments turn out to conform very closely to this model, especially for moderate and larger values of \( L \). (For \( r = 2 \) it is slightly more accurate to replace \( r \) with \( 2r/3 \) in the above expressions, but this has a negligible effect on the predictions.) See Section 5 for details.

### 3.3 Collimating Phase Vectors

The heart of the collimation sieve is the collimation procedure, which combines phase vectors to create a new one on a desired smaller interval. Algorithm 2 is our variant of Kuperberg’s collimation procedure; the only significant difference is that it collimates according to “high bits” (or “middle bits”; see Section 3.3) rather than “low bits,” which allows us to deal with arbitrary group orders \( N \).

More precisely, it collimates phase vectors according to the quotients (ignoring remainder) of their multipliers with the desired interval size \( S \), yielding a new phase vector on \([S]\).

#### Algorithm 2 Collimation procedure for arity \( r \).

**Input:** Phase vectors \(|\psi_1\rangle, |\psi_2\rangle, \ldots, |\psi_r\rangle\) of respective lengths \(L_1, \ldots, L_r\), and a desired interval size \( S \).

**Output:** A phase vector \(|\psi\rangle\) on \([S]\).

1. Form the phase vector \(|\psi'\rangle = |\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_r\rangle\) having index set \([L_1] \times \cdots \times [L_r]\) and phase multiplier function \(b'(j) = \sum_{i=1}^r b_i(j_i)\).
2. Measure \(|\psi'\rangle\) according to the value of \(q = \lfloor b'(j)/S \rfloor\) to obtain \(P_q|\psi'\rangle\) for a certain subunitary \(P_q\).
3. Find the set \(J\) of tuples \(j\) that satisfy the above. Let \(L = |J|\) and choose a bijection \(\pi: J \to [L]\).
4. Output phase vector \(|\psi\rangle = U_\pi P_q|\psi'\rangle\) with index set \([L]\) and multiplier function \(b(j) = b'(\pi^{-1}(j))\).

In more detail, given phase vectors \(|\psi_i\rangle\) having lengths \(L_i\) and multiplier functions \(b_i: [L_i] \to \mathbb{Z}\), the algorithm constructs a combined phase vector \(|\psi'\rangle\) having multiplier function \(b'(j) = \sum_{i=1}^r b_i(j_i)\), as shown in Equation (1) above. It then measures the quotient \(q = \lfloor b'(j)/S \rfloor\), so that the “surviving” indices \(j\) are exactly those for which \(b'(j) \equiv qS + [S]\). The common additive \(qS\) term corresponds to a global phase that has no effect, so the surviving phase multipliers can be seen to lie in \([S]\). Let \(J\) be the set of surviving indices \(j\) and suppose that \(|J| = L\). Just as described in [Kup11], the algorithm (classically) constructs a bijection \(\pi: J \to [L]\) and its inverse, then applies a corresponding unitary
permutation operator $U_\pi$ to the post-measurement state, finally yielding a true length-$L$ phase vector on $[S]$.

We briefly summarize the main computational costs; see Section 3.3 for a detailed analysis in the case $r = 2$. Step 2 does a QRACM lookup for each $i = 1, \ldots, r$ to obtain $b_i(j_i)$, then quantumly adds the results and divides by $S$. Step 3 classically performs an $r$-way merge on the sorted lists of phase multipliers, and prepares associated lists for the next step. Finally, Step 4 computes $\pi(j)$ by performing QRACM lookups on the entries of $j$, and uncomputes $j$ and all the scratch work via one or more additional lookups.

**Length Analysis** Collimation is guaranteed to output a phase vector on $[S]$, but the length of the output is a random variable affected by the phase multipliers of the input vectors and the quantum measurement.

Let $r$ be small, with $r = 2$ being the main case of interest. Suppose that the input vectors $|\psi_i\rangle$ have roughly uniformly distributed multipliers on $[S']$ for some $S' \gg S$, and let $L' = \prod_i L_i$ be the product of their lengths. Then the $L'$ phase multipliers $b'(j)$ are also very well distributed on $[rS']$, so we expect $L \approx L' \cdot S / (rS')$ indices to “survive” collimation. Moreover, the surviving multipliers are well distributed on $[S]$, because it is a very narrow subinterval of $[rS']$.

Because we will want all the input and output vectors to have roughly the same lengths $L$, we can therefore take $rS' L' \approx SL'$ where $L' = L^r$, i.e.,

$$S' \approx S \cdot L'^{-1}/r. \quad (4)$$

In other words, with one level of collimation we can narrow the size of the interval in which the multipliers lie by roughly an $L'^{-1}/r$ factor, while expecting to roughly preserve the vector lengths.

**Scaled Intervals** Collimation naturally generalizes to produce phase vectors on other sets, such as scaled intervals $A \cdot [S] = \{0, A, 2A, \ldots, (S-1)A\}$ for positive integers $A$. (We use such sets in Section 3.3 below.) Specifically, if we are given $r$ phase vectors on $A \cdot [S']$, we can get a phase vector on certain scalings of $[S]$ as follows:

1. We can collimate according to $q = \lfloor b'(j)/(AS) \rfloor$, thereby creating a phase vector on $A \cdot [S]$ (ignoring the global-phase term $qAS$), because all the $b'(j)$ are divisible by $A$.
2. Alternatively, we can collimate according to $c = b'(j) \mod (AB)$ for $B = \lfloor rS'/S \rfloor$, thereby creating a phase vector on $AB \cdot [S]$ (ignoring the global-phase term $c$), because all the $b'(j)$ are in $A \cdot [rS']$.

Note that the multipliers $b'(j) \in [rS']$ are not quite uniformly distributed, because they are biased toward their expectation $rS'/2$, and extreme values are less likely. For $r = 2$, an easy calculation shows that due to this bias, $E[L]$ is very close to $\frac{2}{3} L' \cdot S'/S'$. This means that the output of the collimation step is slightly better than the above analysis indicates.
3. Finally, we can interpolate between the above two techniques, collimating according to both \( q = \left\lfloor \frac{b'(j)}{(ABS)} \right\rfloor \) and \( c = b'(j) \mod (AB) \) for an arbitrary positive integer \( B \leq \lceil rS'/S \rceil \), thereby creating a phase vector on \( AB \cdot [S] \).

By appropriately composing these kinds of collimations, we can obtain any needed scaling factor. For all these options, adapting the above analyses yields the same ultimate conclusions, that collimation can decrease the range size by roughly an \( L^{r-1}/r \) factor while keeping the input and output vector lengths roughly equal.

**Complexity of Binary Collimation** We conclude our treatment of collimation by analyzing its complexity for the main arity \( r = 2 \) of interest, focusing especially on precise QRACM bounds. We adapt and refine Kuperberg’s analysis [Kup11, Proposition 4.2] of his “low bits” collimation procedure. Letting \( L_{\text{max}} \) denote the maximum of the lengths of the input and output phase vectors, Kuperberg proved that low-bits collimation can be done with:

- \( \tilde{O}(L_{\text{max}}) \) classical time, where \( \tilde{O} \) hides logarithmic factors in both \( L_{\text{max}} \) and \( N \),
- \( O(L_{\text{max}} \log N) \) classical space,
- \( O(1) \) lookups into \( O(L_{\text{max}} \cdot \log \max\{S'/S, L_{\text{max}}\}) \) bits of QRACM, and
- \( \text{poly}(\log L_{\text{max}}) \) quantum time and \( O(\log L_{\text{max}}) \) quantum space.

The same holds for our high-bits collimation, with one subtlety concerning the amount of QRACM. Naïvely, measuring \( q = \left\lfloor \frac{b(j)}{S} \right\rfloor \) requires storing the entire \( b_i \) vectors in QRACM, which requires up to \( O(L_{\text{max}} \log S') = O(L_{\text{max}} \log N) \) bits. This is in contrast to Kuperberg’s method, which requires only \( O(L_{\text{max}} \log (S'/S)) \) bits, namely, the least-significant bits of the multipliers. We can obtain the latter bound by storing in QRACM only sufficiently many of the “most significant bits” of the \( b_i(j_i) \), namely, \( b_i(j_i) = \lfloor b_i(j_i)/K \rfloor \) for some \( K \) moderately smaller than \( S \). We then measure \( q = \lfloor K \cdot \hat{b}(j)/S \rfloor \), from which it follows that

\[
\hat{b}(j) \in qS/K + [0, S/K] \implies b(j) \in qS + [0, S + rK].
\]

By taking \( K = (S/S')^\alpha \cdot S \) for some small positive \( \alpha \) like \( \alpha = 1 \) or \( \alpha = 1/2 \), each entry of \( b_i(j_i) \) takes at most (the ceiling of) \( \log(S'/K) \leq (1 + \alpha) \log(S'/S) \) bits. By Equation (4), the range size for the collimated output vector is \( S + rK \approx S(1 + r^{1+\alpha}/L^\alpha) \), which is insignificantly larger than \( S \) for the \( L \geq 2^{16} \) of interest.

**Concrete constants for QRACM.** A close inspection of [Kup11, Section 4.3] shows that the constant factor in the QRACM bound, and the associated \( O(1) \) number of QRACM lookups, are small. The entire algorithm can be run with 9 lookups and as little as

\[
R = L_{\text{max}} \cdot \lceil \max\{(1 + \alpha) \log(S'/S), \log L_{\text{max}}\} \rceil
\]

bits of reusable QRACM, or with as few as 4 lookups and \( L_{\text{max}} \cdot (2(1+\alpha) \log(S'/S) + 3 \log L_{\text{max}}) \) bits, or with various intermediate combinations. (For our purposes, minimizing QRACM seems preferable because lookups are much cheaper than CSIDH evaluation.) This can be done as follows:
1. First, in new registers we look up each $\hat{b}_i(j_i)$ for $i = 1, 2$. As described above, arrays representing the functions $\hat{b}_i$ can be stored in QRACM with \(\lceil (1 + \alpha) \log(S'/S) \rceil\) bits per entry. (In all steps, the QRACM can be reused from one lookup to another.)

2. Following the measurement, in new registers we compute $j = \pi(j_1, j_2) \in [L]$ and a scratch value $j'_2$. An array representing the permutation $\pi: J \to [L]$ can be stored as a table mapping each $j_1$ to the smallest value $j'_2$ such that $(j_1, j'_2) \in J$, and the corresponding value of $\pi(j_1, j'_2)$; each value takes $\lceil \log L_{\text{max}} \rceil$ bits per entry. We look up, either sequentially or both at once, the appropriate values of $j'_2, \pi(j_1, j'_2)$ and then (reversibly) add $j_2 - j'_2$ to the latter quantity to get $j = \pi(j_1, j_2)$.

3. Lastly, we uncompute the five values $j'_2$ and $j_i, \hat{b}_i(j_i)$ for $i = 1, 2$, leaving behind just $j$. One or more arrays (each requiring a lookup) mapping each $j$ (or alternatively, $j_1$ or $j_2$) to one or more of these values can be stored in the natural way. We do the appropriate lookup(s) to uncompute all the values.

Finally, we remark that for the $L_{\text{max}}$ of interest in this work, the poly($\log L_{\text{max}}$) quantum time (which consists of just a few additions and subtractions, and one division) and $O(\log L_{\text{max}})$ quantum space needed for collimation are insignificant compared to the estimated complexity of the quantum oracle $U_f$ for CSIDH parameters of interest [BLMP19].

### 3.4 Post-Processing

We now describe how phase vectors output by the collimation sieve can be used to recover information about the secret.

**Regularization** A top-level call to Algorithm 1 outputs a phase vector $|\psi\rangle$ on $[S] = [S_0]$ of length $\tilde{L} \approx L$, which we want to be somewhat larger than $S$. Heuristically, for each $t \in [S]$ we expect about $\tilde{L}/S$ phase multipliers $b(j)$ to equal $t$; however, there is some variation in the number of each multiplier. Ideally, we would like a *regular* state, i.e., one which has exactly the same number of multipliers for each $t \in [S]$.

We can obtain one by generalizing [Kup11]: select a maximal subset $X \subseteq [\tilde{L}]$ for which $b(X)$ has an equal number of every $t \in [S]$. Then measure whether $|\psi\rangle$ is in $C[X]$ (i.e., the Hilbert space with basis $|j\rangle$ for $j \in X$), which holds with probability $|X|/\tilde{L}$. If not, discard it and run the sieve again. If so, the measured form of $|\psi\rangle$ is regular, so it has a factor of the form

$$S^{-1/2} \sum_{j \in [S]} \chi(j \cdot s/N)|j\rangle,$$

which we can extract by reindexing. (This requires almost no work, because the multipliers are sorted.) Observe that the above state essentially corresponds to the dimension-$S$ inverse quantum Fourier transform of a point function at $sS/N$; see Section 3.4 for details.
The probability of obtaining a regular phase vector is $|X|/\tilde{L} = mS/\tilde{L}$, where $m$ is the frequency of the least-frequent phase multiplier $t \in [S]$. In our experiments, a length $\tilde{L} \approx 64S$ typically led to success probabilities in the 40–80% range, and a length $\tilde{L} \approx 128S$ usually led to an 80% or larger success probability.

**Punctured Regularization**

The above procedure is somewhat wasteful, because it loses a factor of $\tilde{L}/S \approx 2^7$ in the number of basis states $|j\rangle$ in the fortunate case (and loses all of them in the unfortunate case). Alternatively, we can use the following method for generating a “punctured” (regular) phase vector, which works for $S$ as large as $\tilde{L}$ (or even a bit more), and which produces a state that is almost as good as a regular one on $[S]$. Empirically, this lets us extract almost $\log S$ bits of the secret.

Again suppose that the sieve produces a phase vector $|\psi\rangle$ on $[S]$ of length $\tilde{L}$. We make a pass over $j \in [\tilde{L}]$, forming a set $X$ of one index $j$ for each distinct value of $b(j)$, and ignoring duplicates. (This is trivial to do, because the multipliers are sorted.) We then measure whether $|\psi\rangle$ is in $\mathbb{C}[X]$, which holds with probability $|X|/\tilde{L}$. If not, we try again with a new choice of $X$ on the leftover phase vector, as long as it remains long enough. If so, the restriction $b: X \to [S]$ is injective, so by a change of variable and reindexing the basis from $j \in X$ to $b(j) \in [S]$, we now have a state of the form

$$|X|^{-1/2} \sum_{j \in X} \chi(b(j) \cdot s/N)|j\rangle \equiv |X|^{-1/2} \sum_{j \in b(X)} \chi(j \cdot s/N)|j\rangle. \quad (6)$$

This state is a length-$|X|$ phase vector, except for the “punctured” index set $b(X) \subseteq [S]$. It is also almost as good as a regular phase vector on $[S]$, in the following sense. Heuristically, each of the multipliers $b(j)$ for $j \in [\tilde{L}]$ is uniformly random, so the multipliers $b(X) \subseteq [S]$ form a random subset of density $1 - (1 - 1/S)^{\tilde{L}} \approx 1 - \exp(-\tilde{L}/S)$.

(For example, this density is approximately 0.632, 0.864, and 0.981 for $\tilde{L} = S$, $2S$, and $4S$, respectively.) Therefore, the state in Equation (6) corresponds to a kind of densely subsampled Fourier transform of a point function encoding the secret. Empirically, such states have enough information to let us extract about $\log S - 2$ bits of the secret in expectation; see Section 3.4 for details.

**Combining (Punctured) Regular Phase Vectors**

By combining $k$ separately generated regular phase vectors for scalings of $[S]$, we can create a regular phase vector on $[T]$ for $T = S^k$, as shown below. In particular, for $k > \log S N$ we can create a regular phase vector for $T > N$, which is large enough to recover $s$ exactly (with good probability). Note that it might not be necessary to recover all of $s$ in this manner; given partial information on $s$ (say, half of its bits) it might be more efficient to use other methods to recover the rest.

We separately create $k$ regular phase vectors

$$|\psi_i\rangle = S^{-1/2} \sum_{j \in [S]} \chi(S^i j \cdot s/N)|j\rangle$$

19
on the scaled intervals \( S^i \cdot [S] = \{0, S^i, 2S^i, \ldots, (S - 1)S^i\} \), for \( i = 0, 1, \ldots, k - 1 \).

Then their tensor product \( |\psi\rangle = |\psi_0, \ldots, \psi_{k-1}\rangle \) is

\[
|\psi\rangle = T^{-1/2} \sum_{j_0 \in [S]} \cdots \sum_{j_{k-1} \in [S]} \chi\left(\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} j_i S^i / N\right) |j_0, \ldots, j_{k-1}\rangle = T^{-1/2} \sum_{j \in [T]} \chi(j \cdot s / N) |j\rangle,
\]

where we have re-indexed using \( j = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} j_i S^i \). Therefore, \(|\psi\rangle\) is a regular phase vector for \([T]\), as desired.

The same technique works for punctured regular states, where the tensored state’s index set is the Cartesian product of the original states’ index sets. To prevent the density from decreasing, we can use a scaling factor slightly smaller than \( s \), e.g., \( \delta S \) where \( \delta \) is the density of the input states. Then the density of the resulting state is about \((\delta S)^k / (\delta S^{k-1})^k = \delta\).

**Measurement** Now suppose we have a regular phase vector \(|\psi\rangle = T^{-1/2} \sum_{j \in [T]} \chi(j \cdot s / N) |j\rangle\) on \([T]\). Then its \( T \)-dimensional quantum Fourier transform is

\[
\text{QFT}_T |\psi\rangle = T^{-1} \sum_{w \in [T]} \sum_{j \in [T]} \chi\left(\frac{j s}{N} - \frac{j w}{T}\right) |w\rangle = T^{-1} \sum_{w} \left( \sum_{j} \chi\left(\frac{j s}{N} - \frac{j w}{T}\right) \right) |w\rangle.
\]

(7)

We compute this state and measure, obtaining some \( w \) that reveals information about \( s \), as analyzed next.

If \( N|(sT) \), then the amplitude associated with \( w = sT / N \in [T] \) is nonzero and the amplitudes associated with all the other \( w \in [T] \) are zero, so measuring the state yields \( w \) with certainty, from which we recover \( s = wN/T \). Otherwise, fix some arbitrary \( w \in [T] \) and let \( \theta = s/N - w/T \notin \mathbb{Z} \). By summing the finite geometric series (over \( j \)), we see that the amplitude associated with \(|w\rangle\) is

\[
T^{-1} \left| 1 - \chi(T\theta) \right| = T^{-1} \left| \chi(T\theta / 2) \cdot (\chi(-T\theta / 2) - \chi(T\theta / 2)) \right| = T^{-1} \left| \sin(\pi T\theta) \right|.
\]

For \(|\theta| \leq 1/(2T)\) this value is at least \((T \sin(\pi/(2T)))^{-1} \geq 2/\pi\). So when measuring the state, we obtain a \( w \) such that \(|s/N - w/T| \leq 1/(2T)\) with probability at least \( 4/\pi^2 \geq 0.4 \). In such a case, we have

\[
s \in w \cdot \frac{N}{T} + \left[ -\frac{N}{2T}, \frac{N}{2T} \right],
\]

i.e., we know the log \( T \) “most-significant bits” of \( s \). In particular, if \( T > N \) then this defines \( s \) uniquely.

**Measuring punctured phase vectors.** Now suppose instead that we have a punctured regular phase vector \(|\psi\rangle = |Y|^{-1/2} \sum_{j \in Y} \chi(j \cdot s / N) |j\rangle\) on \([T]\), for a heuristically random index set \( Y \subseteq [T] \) of significant density. Its QFT is exactly as in Equation (7), but with normalizing factor \((YT)^{-1/2}\) instead of \( T \), and with the
index \( j \) running over \( Y \) instead of \([T]\). As above, when \( w/T \) is very close to \( s/N \), the amplitudes \( \chi(j(s/N - w/T)) \in \mathbb{C} \) all point in roughly the same direction, and accumulate. Otherwise, the amplitudes heuristically point in random directions and mostly cancel out. Therefore, the final measurement is likely to output a \( w \) close to \( sT/N \).

As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the above argument can be made rigorous using the fidelity \( |\langle \rho | \psi \rangle| \) between our punctured vector \( |\psi\rangle \) with index set \( |Y| = \delta |T| \) and a regular phase vector \( |\rho\rangle \) on \([T]\), which by an easy calculation is seen to be \( \sqrt{\delta} \). Because the QFT preserves fidelity, with probability \( \delta \) the outcome of the measurement is the same as measuring a regular vector.

For the values of \( S \) we used in our experiments, it is possible to efficiently compute the probability of obtaining any particular value of \( w \) when measuring (the QFT of) a particular punctured phase vector. Empirically, we usually observe a total probability (over the first several punctured vectors coming from the final sieve output) of about 40% or more in recovering the value of \( w \) closest to \( sT/N \). This corresponds to extracting at least \( \log T - 2 \) bits of the secret in expectation. See Figure 3.

### 4 Quantum (In)security of CSIDH

In this section come to some conclusions about the quantum security levels for various CSIDH parameters proposed in [CLM+18], based on our model from Section 3.2 and our experiments’ close adherence to it (Section 5). See Figure 1 for several representative estimates.

#### 4.1 Oracle Query Complexity for Key Recovery

Our main conclusion is that key recovery for CSIDH-512 can be accomplished with a binary collimateon sieve using, for example, about \( 2^{19} \) oracle queries and about \( 2^{32} \) bits of QRACM, or about \( 2^{16} \) oracle queries and about \( 2^{40} \) bits of QRACM (plus relatively small other resources); see Figure 1. This significantly improves upon the prior estimate [BS18] of about \( 2^{32.7} \) queries plus \( 2^{31} \) quantum bits of memory, for a version of Kuperberg’s original sieve algorithm [Kup03].

Similarly, Figure 1 shows that key recovery for CSIDH-1024 and -1792 (using the same or somewhat more QRACM as above) requires only \( 2^b \) oracle queries, for values of \( b \) in the mid-20s and high-30s, respectively. For example, CSIDH-1024 can be broken using less than \( 2^{24} \) queries and about \( 2^{44} \) bits of QRACM.

According to our model, for arities \( r = 3 \) and \( r = 4 \) (and the same amounts of QRACM) the query complexities decrease modestly, by factors of about \( 2^2 \cdot 2^{3.5} \). Note that these arities require much more classical computation, but still may be cryptanalytically feasible. We stress that all these query complexities are for recovering almost all the bits of the secret. At present it is unclear whether the number of queries can be reduced even further by breaking the scheme using only partial information about the secret.

The estimates in Figure 1 are based on the following:
| log \( p \) | \( \log N \) | \( \log L \) | QRACM | depth | \( \log \tilde{Q}_{\text{total}} \) | \( \log T \) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 512 | 257.1 | 32 | 11 | 18.7 | 63 | 512 |
| 27.4 | 36 | 9 | 17.0 | 61 | 31.3 | 40 | 8 | 15.7 | 60 | 35.1 | 44 | 7 | 14.9 | 59 | 39.0 | 48 | 6 | 14.1 | 58 |
| 1024 | 512 | 27.4 | 36 | 19 | 27.9 | 76 | 31.3 | 40 | 16 | 25.5 | 74 | 35.1 | 44 | 14 | 23.5 | 72 | 39.0 | 48 | 13 | 22.1 | 70 | 42.9 | 52 | 12 | 20.8 | 69 |
| 1792 | 896 | 31.3 | 40 | 29 | 39.2 | 90 | 35.1 | 44 | 25 | 35.8 | 87 | 39.0 | 48 | 23 | 33.2 | 84 | 42.9 | 52 | 21 | 30.9 | 82 | 46.7 | 56 | 19 | 29.2 | 80 |

**Fig. 1.** Example complexity estimates for secret-key recovery against CSIDH-log \( p \) using the collimation sieve with arity \( r = 2 \), for various bit lengths (rounded to the nearest integer) of the CSIDH parameter \( p \). Each missing entry is equal to the one above it. Here \( N \) is the estimated (or known, in the case of CSIDH-512) group order; \( L = S \) are respectively the desired length and range size of the sieve’s final phase vector; “QRACM” is the number of bits of quantumly accessible classical memory, which is given by Equation (5) with \( \alpha = 1/2 \) for \( \tilde{L}_{\text{max}} = 8L \) indexable cells; “depth” is the depth of the sieve’s recursion tree; \( \tilde{Q}_{\text{total}} \) is the total number of queries to the quantum oracle to recover all but 56 bits of the secret; \( T \) is the total T-gate complexity of the attack, assuming the complexity of implementing the oracle is not much more than for evaluating on the “best conceivable” distribution.

- We take \( S = L \) and use punctured regularity to obtain several bits of the secret (see Section 3.4). We assume that each run of the sieve reveals an expected \( \log S - 2 \) bits of the secret, which is consistent with our experiments.
- We quantify the total number \( \tilde{Q}_{\text{total}} \) of oracle queries needed to recover all but 56 bits of the secret; the remainder can be obtained by classical brute force. We assume that the actual number of queries \( \tilde{Q} \) made by a run of the sieve is within a \( 2^{0.3} \) factor of the estimated number \( Q \) from Equation (3), which is consistent with our experiments.
- We impose a maximum phase-vector length of \( \tilde{L}_{\text{max}} = 8L \). This reflects the fact that the generated phase vectors are sometimes longer than the desired length \( L \), but are almost always within a factor of 8, and we can enforce this as a hard bound by doing a partial measurement whenever a phase vector happens to be longer. We use Equation (5) for the number of bits of QRACM as a function of \( \tilde{L}_{\text{max}} \).
4.2 T-Gate Complexity and NIST Security Levels

As shown below in Section 4.3, for all the sieve parameters appearing in Figure 1, the quantum work of the collimation sieve itself—mainly, the QRACM lookups done during each collimation step—can be implemented more cheaply than the oracle calls, under optimistic estimates for the latter. (Moreover, the classical work of the sieve scales with the number of collimations, so as long as the quasilinear classical work of collimation is cheaper than the linear quantum work used to implement the QRACM, the total classical work is not significant.) So, if we assume that the actual cost of the oracle is not much more than what is given by the analysis of [BLMP19] for the “best conceivable” distribution (see Section 1.4 for discussion), we can give T-gate estimates for the full attacks, and compare them to what is needed to achieve the targeted NIST post-quantum security levels.

**CSIDH-512 and level 1.** A CSIDH-512 oracle for the “best conceivable” distribution can be implemented in about \(2^{40}\) nonlinear bit operations [BLMP19], which translates to between \(2^{40}\) and \(2^{44}\) T-gates. Under our assumption, CSIDH-512 key recovery therefore costs between roughly \(2^{56}\) and \(2^{60}\) T-gates with \(2^{40}\) bits of QRACM, plus relatively small other resources. (See Figure 1 for other options.) It would be prudent to expect that something toward the lower end of this range is attainable.

It follows that CSIDH-512 falls far short of its claimed NIST quantum security level 1, especially when accounting for the MAXDEPTH restriction, and even under a substantially weaker assumption about the oracle cost. Specifically, level 1 corresponds to the difficulty of key search for AES-128, and NIST’s estimate for this is \(2^{170}/\text{MAXDEPTH}\) quantum gates, where suggested plausible values of MAXDEPTH range between \(2^{40}\) and \(2^{96}\). As seen in Section 3.2, the sieve can almost perfectly parallelize the oracle calls and collimation steps, so the depth of the full attack can be made quite close to the depth of the oracle, which certainly cannot exceed its gate count. So, the depth of the full attack can be brought close to the low end of the MAXDEPTH range or only somewhat larger, if the sieve works sequentially (which requires fewer qubits). In any case, the attack’s quantum gate complexity of about \(2^{56}\)–\(2^{60}\) is far below the required \(2^{130}\) for the low end of the MAXDEPTH range, and even significantly below the required \(2^{74}\) for the high end.

**Other CSIDH parameters.** For a 1030-bit prime CSIDH parameter (namely, four times the product of the first 130 odd primes and 911, minus 1), using the software from [BLMP19] we determined that an oracle for the “best conceivable” distribution can be implemented in less than \(2^{44}\) nonlinear bit operations, which translates to between \(2^{44}\) and \(2^{58}\) T-gates. Under our assumption, breaking this parameterization of CSIDH therefore takes no more than about \(2^{74}\) T-gates using about \(2^{40}\) bits of QRACM, \(2^{72}\) T-gates using about \(2^{44}\) bits, and so on (see Figure 1). This is also below NIST quantum security level 1, and well below it for small and medium choices of MAXDEPTH.
Similarly, for a 1798-bit prime CSIDH parameter (namely, four times the product of the first 207 odd primes and 2273, minus 1), an oracle for the “best conceivable” distribution can be implemented in about $2^{47}$ nonlinear qubit operations, which translates to between $2^{47}$ and $2^{51}$ T-gates. Under our assumption, the attack therefore takes no more than about $2^{87}$ T-gates using $2^{44}$ bits of QRACM, $2^{84}$ T-gates using $2^{48}$ bits of QRACM, and so on. While [CLM+18] proposed a 1792-bit parameterization for NIST quantum security level 3—corresponding to security against $2^{233}/\text{MAXDEPTH}$ quantum gates—it falls far short of this target (even allowing for a much weaker assumption about the oracle). Indeed, with the possible exception of the high end of the MAXDEPTH range, it does not even reach level 1.

### 4.3 Quantum Complexity of the Sieve

Here we estimate the T-gate complexity of the quantum work of the collimation sieve using the QRACM implementation of [BGB+18], as suggested by Schanck [Sch19]. The main conclusion is that for parameters of interest, the quantum complexity of the sieve and the QRACM is dwarfed by that of the oracle calls (under current estimates for the latter).

Fix the collimation arity $r = 2$. The analysis below shows that the total T-gate complexity of the collimation sieve (apart from the oracle calls) is essentially

$$36\tilde{L} \cdot (2/(1 - \delta))^d,$$

where $\tilde{L}$ is (an upper bound on) the typical phase-vector length, $\delta$ is the discard probability, and $d$ is the depth of the sieve tree. For $\delta \approx 0.02$ and all the sieve parameters (log $\tilde{L}$, $d$) given in Figure 1, this T-gate estimate is comfortably below even the most optimistic T-gate estimates for all the oracle calls, based on [BLMP19]. For example, for the sieve parameters given in Figure 1 for CSIDH-512, the T-gate complexity of the sieve itself is between $2^{38}$ and $2^{47}$, which in all cases is well below the lower bound of about $2^{53}$ for making at least $2^{14}$ calls to an oracle with T-gate complexity at least $2^{39}$.

The estimate from Equation (8) is obtained as follows. The full sieve is a traversal of a binary tree (modulo discards), with one collimation at each non-leaf node, and one or more oracle calls at each leaf node. Therefore, the T-gate complexity of the sieve itself (apart from the oracle calls) is essentially the number of non-leaf nodes times the T-gate complexity of collimation. For sieve tree depth $d$, the number of internal nodes is about $(2/(1 - \delta))^d$ when accounting for discards.

The T-gate complexity of a single collimation step can be bounded as follows. As shown in Section 3.3 for input and output phase vectors having lengths bounded by $D$, the quantum work is dominated by nine lookups into a QRACM of $D$ indexable cells. Because [BGB+18] implements such a QRACM (for cells of any uniform size) using classical memory plus just $4D$ T-gates (and only $\lceil \log D \rceil$ ancillary qubits), the claim follows.
5 Experiments

At present, there are no (publicly available) quantum computers capable of running the full quantum algorithm for nontrivial parameters. But fortunately, as pointed out in [Kup11], the collimation sieve itself (apart from the quantum oracle $U_f$ and the final QFT) is pseudoclassical: it consists entirely of permutations of the computational basis and measurements in that basis, which are trivial to simulate classically. In addition, the needed part of the quantum oracle $U_f$ is easy to simulate, just by generating a uniformly random phase multiplier $b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$ (for the qubit $|\psi\rangle \propto |0\rangle + \chi(b \cdot s/N)|1\rangle$, which we do not need to generate).

5.1 Sieve Simulator

Using the above observations, we implemented a classical simulator for our generalized collimation sieve. The simulator is currently hard-coded for collimation arity $r = 2$, but would be easy to generalize to larger arities. It allows the user to specify:

- a group order $N$ (including an option for the exact CSIDH-512 group order, as computed in [BKV19]);
- a desired typical phase vector length $L$;
- an interval size $S$ for the ultimate phase vector.

The simulator logs its progress in a human-readable form, and finally outputs various statistics for the full sieve, including:

- the total number $\tilde{Q}$ of queries to the quantum oracle $U_f$;
- the number $Q$ of queries predicted by the model of Equation (3) from Section 3.2;
- the length $L_{\text{max}}$ of the longest created phase vector;
- the probability of obtaining a regular phase vector from the final one, and the expected number of bits of the secret that can be recovered from the final phase vector via regularity;
- the probabilities of obtaining punctured regular phase vectors of sufficient length from the final phase vector, and the total probability of measuring a value that yields $\log S$ secret bits.

5.2 Experimental Results

We ran our simulator for a wide range of group orders $N$ (focusing mainly on the exact CSIDH-512 group order), desired phase-vector lengths $L$, and range sizes $S$. Our results for the CSIDH-512 group order are given in Figure 2 and Figure 3.

---

8 The code for the simulator and instructions for running it are at https://github.com/cpeikert/CollimationSieve. The code is written in the author’s favorite functional language Haskell, and has not been especially optimized for performance, but it suffices for the present purposes.
the former concerns full regularization of the final phase vector (Section 3.4),
while the latter concerns punctured regularization (Section 3.4). In summary, the
experiments strongly support the following conclusions:

– For all tested group orders and desired vector lengths \( L \in [2^{16}, 2^{26}] \), the
required classical resources are cryptanalytically insignificant: at most a few
core-days on a commodity server with 128GB or 512GB of RAM, using only
four CPU cores and less than 100GB RAM per experiment.

– The actual number \( \tilde{Q} \) of oracle queries conforms very closely to the model
of Equation (3) from Section 3.2, especially for relatively larger \( L \geq 2^{22} \),
where \( \tilde{Q} \) was almost always within a factor of \( 2^{0.4} \approx 1.32 \) of the predicted \( Q \),
and was usually even closer.

– Taking \( L = 64S \) suffices to obtain a regular phase vector on \( [S] \) with good
probability, usually in the 45–80% range (see Section 3.4). Halving \( S \), and
hence making \( L \approx 128S \), typically results in a regularity probability of 70%
or more, often yielding slightly more expected number of bits of the secret.

– Taking \( L = S \) typically suffices to obtain at least \( \log S - 2 \) bits of the secret in
expectation, via punctured regularization (see Section 3.4). More specifically,
we can create one or more punctured regular phase vectors that collectively
represent a roughly 40% probability of yielding \( \log S \) bits of the secret.
Fig. 2. Statistics from representative runs of our collimation sieve simulator on the actual CSIDH-512 group, as computed by [BKVI19]. Here $\tilde{Q}$ and $Q$ are respectively the actual and predicted (by the model of Section 3.2) number of queries to the quantum oracle; $\tilde{L}_{\text{max}}$ is the maximum length of all created phase vectors, and $L$ is the requested (and typical) vector length; $S$ is the range size for the final phase vector; “Pr[regular]” is the probability of obtaining a regular vector from the final phase vector (see Section 3.4); “bits” is the expected number of bits of the secret that can be recovered from the final phase vector; “threshold” is the threshold factor used for determining whether a phase vector is too short (see Section 3.2); “discard” is the fraction of recursive calls that were discarded for being below the threshold; “depth” is the recursion depth of the sieve. Each missing entry is equal to the one above it. Every experiment ran on at most four CPU cores on a commodity server, and completed in no more than a few core-days.
\begin{tabular}{cccccccccc}
\hline
log $\hat{Q}$ & log $Q$ & log $\hat{L}_{\text{max}}$ & log $L$ & log $S$ & bits & threshold & discard (%) & depth  \\
\hline
17.2          & 17.0          & 25.3          & 20           & 20           & 19.1          & 0.25          & 2.2          & 13            \\
18.1          & 17.1          & 24.3          & 18.1         & 2.2           &               &               &              &               \\
16.7          & 16.4          & 25.1          & 21           & 21           & 20.1          & 0.20          & 2.0          & 12            \\
16.8          & 16.4          & 24.9          & 19.4         & 1.9           &               &               &              &               \\
16.6          & 16.4          & 24.8          & 17.7         & 2.0           &               &               &              &               \\
15.9          & 15.7          & 26.6          & 22           & 22           & 21.2          & 1.9           & 11           &               \\
16.2          & 15.8          & 25.7          & 20.3         & 2.0           &               &               &              &               \\
16.4          & 15.8          & 25.8          & 20.4         & 2.0           &               &               &              &               \\
15.6          & 15.3          & 26.6          & 23           & 23           & 21.2          & 1.7           & 11           &               \\
16.0          & 15.4          & 26.3          & 21.9         & 2.0           &               &               &              &               \\
15.9          & 15.4          & 26.7          & 21.3         & 1.9           &               &               &              &               \\
16.1          & 15.4          & 26.1          & 21.4         & 1.9           &               &               &              &               \\
14.9          & 14.8          & 26.8          & 24           & 24           & 22.5          & 1.8           & 10           &               \\
15.6          & 14.8          & 27.3          & 23.2         & 1.9           &               &               &              &               \\
15.0          & 14.8          & 27.3          & 23.1         & 1.9           &               &               &              &               \\
15.0          & 14.6          & 28.3          & 25           & 25           & 22.4          & 2.3           & 10           &               \\
14.5          & 14.5          & 27.9          & 23.5         & 1.6           &               &               &              &               \\
15.0          & 14.6          & 28.2          & 23.7         & 2.4           &               &               &              &               \\
14.5          & 14.3          & 29.1          & 26           & 26           & 25.2          & 3.0           & 10           &               \\
14.7          & 14.2          & 29.0          & 24.1         & 2.4           &               &               &              &               \\
14.7          & 14.6          & 28.4          & 25.0         & 0.40          &               &               &              &               \\
14.2          & 14.1          & 29.6          & 27           & 27           & 25.7          & 4.1           & 9            &               \\
14.5          & 14.1          & 29.6          & 25.3         & 4.6           &               &               &              &               \\
14.4          & 14.1          & 30.0          & 24.6         & 4.2           &               &               &              &               \\
14.0          & 13.8          & 30.4          & 28           & 28           & 25.6          & 3.9           & 9            &               \\
14.3          & 13.8          & 30.4          & 26.3         & 3.7           &               &               &              &               \\
13.9          & 13.8          & 30.1          & 26.4         & 4.3           &               &               &              &               \\
14.0          & 13.9          & 30.4          & 25.5         & 4.5           &               &               &              &               \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

**Fig. 3.** Statistics from representative runs of our collimation sieve simulator on the actual CSIDH-512 group, as computed by [BKVT19]. The column headers are the same as in **Figure 2** except that “bits” $b$ is the expected number of secret bits obtainable by using punctured phase vectors obtained from the vector output by the sieve; see **Section 3.4** and **Section 3.4**. Each missing entry is equal to the one above it. Every experiment ran on at most four CPU cores on a commodity server, and completed within several core-days.
References

Bab85. L. Babai. On Lovász’ lattice reduction and the nearest lattice point problem. *Combinatorica*, 6(1):1–13, 1986. Preliminary version in STACS 1985.

BGB+18. R. Babbush, C. Gidney, D. W. Berry, N. Wiebe, J. McClean, A. Paler, A. Fowler, and H. Neven. Encoding electronic spectra in quantum circuits with linear T complexity. *Phys. Rev. X*, 8:041015, Oct 2018. [https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.03662.pdf](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.03662.pdf).

BHT98. G. Brassard, P. Høyer, and A. Tapp. Quantum cryptanalysis of hash and claw-free functions. In *LATIN*, pages 163–169. 1998.

BJJ18. J. Biasse, A. Iezzi, and M. J. Jacobson Jr. A note on the security of CSIDH. In *INDOCRYPT*, pages 153–168. 2018.

BKV19. W. Beullens, T. Kleinjung, and F. Vercauteren. CSI-FiSh: Efficient isogeny based signatures through class group computations. In *ASIACRYPT*, pages 227–247. 2019.

BLMP19. D. J. Bernstein, T. Lange, C. Martindale, and L. Panny. Quantum circuits for the CSIDH: Optimizing quantum evaluation of isogenies. In *EUROCRYPT*, pages 409–441. 2019.

BS18. X. Bonnetain and A. Schrottenloher. Quantum security analysis of CSIDH and ordinary isogeny-based schemes. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/537, 2018. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/537](https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/537).

CD19. W. Castryck and T. Decru. CSIDH on the surface. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2019/1404, 2019. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1404](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1404).

CJS10. A. M. Childs, D. Jao, and V. Soukharev. Constructing elliptic curve isogenies in quantum subexponential time. *J. Mathematical Cryptology*, 8(1):1–29, 2014. [https://arxiv.org/abs/1012.4019](https://arxiv.org/abs/1012.4019).

CLM+18. W. Castryck, T. Lange, C. Martindale, L. Panny, and J. Renes. CSIDH: An efficient post-quantum commutative group action. In *ASIACRYPT*, pages 395–427. 2018.

Cou06. J.-M. Couveignes. Hard homogeneous spaces. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/291, 2006. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/291](https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/291).

DG19. L. De Feo and S. D. Galbraith. SeaSign: Compact isogeny signatures from class group actions. In *EUROCRYPT*, pages 759–789. 2019.

DH76. W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory*, IT-22(6):644–654, 1976.

FTLX19. X. Fan, S. Tian, B. Li, and X. Xu. CSIDH on other form of elliptic curves. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2019/1417, 2019. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1417](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1417).

JD11. D. Jao and L. De Feo. Towards quantum-resistant cryptosystems from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. In *Post-Quantum Cryptography*, pages 19–34. 2011.

JS19. S. Jaques and J. M. Schanck. Quantum cryptanalysis in the RAM model: Claw-finding attacks on SIKE. In *CRYPTO*, pages 32–61. 2019.

KKP20. A. E. Kaafarani, S. Katsumata, and F. Pintore. Lossy CSI-FiSh: Efficient signature scheme with tight reduction to decisional CSIDH-512. In *PKC*, page ??, 2020.

Kup03. G. Kuperberg. A subexponential-time quantum algorithm for the dihedral hidden subgroup problem. *SIAM J. Comput.*, 35(1):170–188, 2005. Preliminary version in [https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0302112](https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0302112).
Kup11. G. Kuperberg. Another subexponential-time quantum algorithm for the
dihedral hidden subgroup problem. In 8th Conference on the Theory of
Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography, TQC, pages
20–34. 2013. Preliminary version in https://arxiv.org/abs/1112.3333.

LF06. É. Leveil and P. Fouque. An improved LPN algorithm. In SCN, pages
348–359. 2006.

NIS. NIST post-quantum cryptography project. https://csrc.nist.gov/
Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography.

Reg04. O. Regev. A subexponential time algorithm for the dihedral hidden subgroup
problem with polynomial space. CoRR, quant-ph/0406151, 2004.

RS06. A. Rostovtsev and A. Stolbunov. Public-key cryptosystem based on isogenies.
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/145, 2006. https://eprint.iacr.
org/2006/145.

Sch19. J. Schanck. Personal communication, June 2019.

Sho94. P. W. Shor. Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete
logarithms on a quantum computer. SIAM J. Comput., 26(5):1484–1509,
1997. Preliminary version in FOCS 2004.

SS79. R. Schroeppel and A. Shamir. A t=\(2^{n/2}\), s=\(2^{n/4}\) algorithm for certain
NP-complete problems. SIAM J. Comput., 10(3):456–464, 1981. Preliminary
version in FOCS 1979.

Sto04. A. Stolbunov. Public-key encryption based on cycles of isogenous elliptic
curves. Master’s thesis, Saint-Petersburg State Polytechnical University,
2004. In Russian.

Sto11. A. Stolbunov. Cryptographic Schemes Based on Isogenies. Ph.D. thesis,
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2011.