Three-party quantum secure direct communication based on GHZ states

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Abstract

We present a three-party simultaneous quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) scheme by using Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) states. This scheme can be directly generalized to N-party QSDC by using n-particle GHZ states. We show that the many-party simultaneous QSDC scheme is secure not only against the intercept-and-resend attack but also against the disturbance attack.

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an ingenious application of quantum mechanics, in which two remote legitimate users (Alice and Bob) establish a shared secret key through the transmission of quantum signals and use this key to encrypt (decrypt) the secret messages. Since Bennett and Brassard presented the pioneer QKD protocol in 1984 [1], a lot of QKD protocols have been advanced [2–5]. On the other hand, a novel concept, QSDC has been proposed [6–12]. Different from QKD whose object is to distribute a common key between the two remote legitimate users, QSDC can transmit the secret messages directly without creating a key to encrypt them beforehand.

Recently, Beige et al. [6] presented a QSDC scheme based on single photon. Boström and Felbinger [7] put forward a ping-pong QSDC scheme by using Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) pairs and Deng et al. [12] proposed a QSDC scheme based on single photon four states. In their schemes, QSDC is only one-way communication. Based on the idea of a ping-pong QSDC scheme, Nguyen [13] proposed a quantum dialogue scheme (the quantum dialogue is actually two-way communication) by using EPR pairs. However, an eavesdropper who adopts the intercept-and-resend attack strategy can steal the secret messages without being detected. More recently, Gao et al. [14] presented a simultaneous QSDC scheme between the central party and other many parties based on entanglement swapping. The scheme shows how the many parties transmit secret message to one party.

In this Letter, we propose a three-party (Alice, Bob and Charlie) simultaneous QSDC scheme by using three-particle GHZ states. In our scheme, Alice can obtain the secret messages of Bob and Charlie. Also, Bob (or Charlie) can obtain the secret messages of Alice and Charlie (or Bob). Their secret messages exchange is secure and simultaneous. Indeed, this scheme can be directly generalized to N-party QSDC by using n-particle GHZ states.

Now we propose the three-party simultaneous QSDC scheme. First, we write the eight GHZ entangled states in two different ways.
four unitary operations as follows:
\[ |\psi_{000}\rangle_{abc} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|000\rangle + |111\rangle)_{abc} \]
\[ = \frac{1}{2} [(+)_a (+)_b (-)_c + (-)_b (+)_c)
+ (-)_a (+)_b (-)_c + (+)_b (+)_c)], \tag{1} \]
\[ |\psi_{001}\rangle_{abc} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|000\rangle - |111\rangle)_{abc} \]
\[ = \frac{1}{2} [(+)_a (+)_b (-)_c + (-)_b (+)_c)
- (-)_a (+)_b (-)_c + (+)_b (+)_c)], \tag{2} \]
\[ |\psi_{010}\rangle_{abc} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|100\rangle + |011\rangle)_{abc} \]
\[ = \frac{1}{2} [(+)_a (+)_b (-)_c + (-)_b (-)_c)
+ (-)_a (+)_b (-)_c + (+)_b (+)_c)], \tag{3} \]
\[ |\psi_{011}\rangle_{abc} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|100\rangle - |011\rangle)_{abc} \]
\[ = \frac{1}{2} [(+)_a (+)_b (-)_c + (-)_b (-)_c)
- (-)_a (+)_b (-)_c + (+)_b (+)_c)], \tag{4} \]
\[ |\psi_{100}\rangle_{abc} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|010\rangle + |101\rangle)_{abc} \]
\[ = \frac{1}{2} [(+)_a (+)_b (+)_c + (-)_b (-)_c)
+ (-)_a (+)_b (+)_c + (+)_b (+)_c)], \tag{5} \]
\[ |\psi_{101}\rangle_{abc} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|010\rangle - |101\rangle)_{abc} \]
\[ = \frac{1}{2} [(+)_a (+)_b (+)_c + (-)_b (-)_c)
+ (-)_a (+)_b (+)_c + (+)_b (+)_c)], \tag{6} \]
\[ |\psi_{110}\rangle_{abc} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|110\rangle + |001\rangle)_{abc} \]
\[ = \frac{1}{2} [(+)_a (+)_b (+)_c + (-)_b (-)_c)
+ (+)_a (+)_b (+)_c + (-)_b (+)_c)], \tag{7} \]
\[ |\psi_{111}\rangle_{abc} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|110\rangle - |001\rangle)_{abc} \]
\[ = \frac{1}{2} [(+)_a (+)_b (+)_c + (-)_b (-)_c)
+ (-)_a (+)_b (+)_c + (-)_b (+)_c)], \tag{8} \]
where
\[ |+\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle + |1\rangle), \tag{9} \]
\[ |−\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle - |1\rangle). \tag{10} \]

Alice, Bob and Charlie agree on that Alice can perform the four unitary operations
\[ I = |0\rangle\langle 0| + |1\rangle\langle 1|, \quad \sigma_x = |0\rangle\langle 1| + |1\rangle\langle 0|, \quad i\sigma_y = |0\rangle\langle 1| - |1\rangle\langle 0|, \quad \sigma_z = |0\rangle\langle 0| - |1\rangle\langle 1|, \tag{11} \]
and encode two bits classical information as
\[ I \rightarrow 00, \quad \sigma_x \rightarrow 01, \quad i\sigma_y \rightarrow 10, \quad \sigma_z \rightarrow 11. \tag{12} \]
Bob and Charlie can only perform the two unitary operations
\[ I = |0\rangle\langle 0| + |1\rangle\langle 1|, \quad i\sigma_y = |0\rangle\langle 1| - |1\rangle\langle 0|, \tag{13} \]
respectively, and encode one bit classical information as \[ I \rightarrow 0, \quad i\sigma_y \rightarrow 1. \]

The three-party simultaneous QSDC scheme can be achieved with three steps.

**Step I.** Suppose Alice, Bob and Charlie want to exchange their messages simultaneously. At first, Alice prepares a set of \( N \) groups three-particle GHZ states randomly in one of the eight three-particle GHZ states \( (|\psi_{ijk}\rangle_{abc}, i, j, k = 0, 1) \). Then Alice sends \( N \) groups \( b \) particles to Bob and \( c \) particles to Charlie, respectively. Here, since Bob and Charlie cannot distinguish the particles \( a, b \) and \( c \), Alice must let them know which one they have received.

**Step II.** Bob and Charlie confirm Alice that they have received all the particles \( b \) and \( c \), respectively. Then Bob (any-one of the two parties Bob and Charlie, we say, Bob) selects randomly a sufficiently large subset of particles from the \( N \) groups \( b \) particles, which we call the \( M \) groups \( b \) particles and measures each of them using one of the two measuring bases \((|0\rangle, |1\rangle) \) or \((|+\rangle, |−\rangle) \) randomly. And Bob tells Charlie and Alice the position, the measurement result and the unitary operation result for each of the \( M \) groups \( b \) particles via classical channel. Then Alice and Charlie measure on the corresponding \( M \) groups \( a \) particles and \( M \) groups \( c \) particles using the same measuring bases, respectively. Then Charlie tells Alice the measurement result for each of the \( M \) groups \( c \) particles. According to the measurement results of Bob, Charlie by herself, Alice can determine, through the error rate, whether there is any eavesdropping in the channel. If the error rate is high, Alice concludes that the channel is not secure, and halts the communication. Otherwise, Alice, Bob and Charlie continue to the next step.

**Step III.** The particles leftover are called the \( K \) groups \( (K = N - M) \) after checking the eavesdropping. After determining the security of quantum channel, Bob and Charlie encode each of the \( K \) groups \( b \) particles and \( c \) particles with one of the two unitary operations \( I \) and \( i\sigma_y \), respectively, according to their secret messages. Then they return the \( K \) groups \( b \) particles and \( c \) particles to Alice, and Alice encodes each of the \( K \) groups \( a \) particles with one of the four unitary operations \( I, \sigma_x, i\sigma_y \), and \( \sigma_z \) according to her secret message. Then she performs a three-particle GHZ-basis measurement on \( K \) groups \( a, b \) and \( c \) particles and publicly announces her measurement result and initial three-particle GHZ states. According to her measurement result, initial three-particle GHZ states and the unitary operation performed by herself, Alice can read out the secret messages of Bob and Charlie. Also, Bob (or Charlie) can read out the secret messages of Alice and Charlie (or Bob) according to Alice’s measurement result, initial three-particle GHZ states and the unitary operation performed by themselves.
For example, if Alice initially prepares a GHZ state in $|\psi_{000}\rangle_{abc}$, she performs the unitary operation $\sigma_z$ on particle $a$. Bob and Charlie perform the unitary operation $I$ and $i\sigma_y$ on particles $b$ and $c$, respectively. So the state $|\psi_{000}\rangle_{abc}$ becomes $|\psi_{101}\rangle_{abc}$, namely, $\sigma_z \otimes I^b \otimes i\sigma_y^c |\psi_{000}\rangle_{abc} = |\psi_{101}\rangle_{abc}$. According to the unitary operation $\sigma_z$ performed by herself and the measurement result $|\psi_{100}\rangle_{abc}$ of three-particle GHZ state, Alice can read out Bob’s and Charlie’s secret messages 0 and 1, respectively. Similarly, Bob (or Charlie) can also read out Alice’s and Charlie’s (or Bob’s) secret messages 01 and 1 (or 0), respectively. So the three-party simultaneous QSDC has been successfully completed.

Then we continue to discuss how the current scheme resist the intercept-and-resend attack and disturbance attack, respectively.

(1) The intercept-and-resend attack: We suppose that Eve (eavesdropper) prepares some the single particles $B$ and $C$ in the state $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$ or $|+\rangle$, $|−\rangle$ randomly. When Alice sends particles $b$ and $c$ to Bob and Charlie, Eve intercepts the particles $b$ and $c$ and keeps them with her, and sends the particles $B$ and $C$ to Bob and Charlie, respectively. Bob and Charlie, will take $B$ and $C$ for $b$ and $c$, encode their secret messages on particles $B$ and $C$ and send them back to Alice. Eve intercepts the encoded particles $B$ and $C$, and performs single particles measurements on them. Since the particles $B$ and $C$ are prepared by Eve, Eve can obtain Bob’s and Charlie’s encoding messages according to the original states of particles $B$ and $C$ and the measurement results performed by herself. Then Eve encodes the same messages on the particles $b$ and $c$ and sends them back to Alice. According to Alice’s measurement result, initial three-particle GHZ states, Eve can read out Alice’s secret messages. Clearly, Alice, Bob and Charlie not only exchange their messages simultaneously but also leak to Eve. This is the intercept-and-resend attack. However, the method described in Step II can resist the attack, namely, Alice, Bob and Charlie collaborate to select randomly a sufficiently large subset of particles from the $N$ groups to check whether there is any eavesdropping in the channel through analyzing the error rate. If there are no attacks, the measurement result of Alice, Bob and Charlie should have deterministic correlation according to Eqs. (1)–(8). For example, we suppose that the initial GHZ state is prepared in $|\psi_{000}\rangle_{abc}$, if there is no Eve in the line, the measurement result of Alice, Bob and Charlie is in $|000\rangle$ or $|111\rangle$ or $|+++\rangle$, $|−−−\rangle$ or $|−++\rangle$ or $|−−+\rangle$ or $|−−−\rangle$. If Eve intercepts the particles $b$ and $c$ and keeps them with her, and sends the particles $B$ and $C$ to Bob and Charlie. If the particles $B$ and $C$ are prepared in states $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$, respectively, Alice, Bob and Charlie select the measuring bases $|0\rangle$, $|1\rangle$, $|+\rangle$, $|−\rangle$, $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$, $|0\rangle$, $|1\rangle$, $|+\rangle$ and $|−\rangle$, respectively. Alice, Bob and Charlie measure the particles $b$ and $c$ in the measuring bases $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$ or $|+\rangle$ or $|−\rangle$, respectively. According to Eq. (1) Eve’s eavesdropping will be detected, because her eavesdropping introduces a error rate with 1 (1/2). If the particles $B$ and $C$ are prepared in state $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$, respectively. Eve’s eavesdropping introduces an error rate with 1/2 (1/2). Thus our scheme is secure against the intercept-and-resend attack. In Nguyen’s quantum dialogue scheme [13], the secret information can be completely leaked to an eavesdropper who adopts the intercept-and-resend attack strategy by using EPR pairs without being detected at all.

(2) Disturbance attack: Eve can intercept the particles $b$ and $c$ when the particles are transmitted from Bob and Charlie to Alice. Eve may either measure on the particles $b$ and $c$ or perform one of the unitary operations $I$ and $i\sigma_y$ on them. By doing so, the entanglement between particles $b$ and $c$ is destroyed or the phase of the entanglement is changed. In this case, Eve can only remain undetected and the information encoded by Bob and Charlie are nothing but a random sequence of bits that contains no information. To resist the disturbance attack, Bob and Charlie collaborate to announce publicly the positions of their particles and a part of their secret messages to Alice to check whether the particles traveling from Bob’s and Charlie’s sites have been attacked. If the particles are attacked, the eavesdropper Eve cannot get any useful information but interrupt the transmissions.

Therefore, our three-party simultaneous QSDC scheme is secure not only against the intercept-and-resend attack but also against disturbance attack. Our scheme improves Nguyen’s quantum dialogue scheme [13] to realize a three-party simultaneous QSDC. Comparing with Gao’s scheme [14] in which only two parties (Alice and Bob) transmit the secret messages to one party (Charlie) based on entanglement swapping, respectively, our scheme makes the three parties (Alice, Bob and Charlie) simultaneously exchange their secret messages.

Now let us generalize the three-party simultaneous QSDC scheme to $N$-party case. Alice, Bob, Charlie, ..., and Zach agree on that Alice can perform one of the four unitary operations $I$, $\sigma_z$, $i\sigma_x$, and $i\sigma_y$ and Bob, Charlie, ..., and Zach can perform one of the two unitary operations $I$ and $i\sigma_y$. The $N$-party simultaneous QSDC scheme can be achieved with three steps:

Step I. Suppose Alice, Bob, Charlie, ..., and Zach want to exchange their messages simultaneously. Alice prepares a set of $N$ groups of $n$-particle GHZ states randomly in one of the $2^nN$ possible GHZ states $|\psi_{i,j,k,y}\rangle_{abc...z}$, $i,j,k,...,y = 0, 1$. Then Alice sends $N$ groups of $b$ particles to Bob, $c$ particles to Charlie, ..., $z$ particles to Zach. Here, since Bob, Charlie, ..., and Zach cannot distinguish the particles $a$, $b$, $c$, ..., and $z$, Alice must let them know which particles they have received.

Step II. Bob, Charlie, ..., and Zach confirm Alice that they have received all the particles $b$, particles $c$, ..., and particles $z$, respectively. Then Bob (anyone of the $N−1$ parties Bob, Charlie, ..., Zach, we say, Bob) selects randomly a sufficiently large subset of particles from the $N$ groups of $b$ particles, which we call the $M$ groups of $b$ particles, and measures each of them using one of the two measuring bases $|0\rangle$, $|1\rangle$ or $|+\rangle$, $|−\rangle$ randomly. Bob tells Alice, Charlie, ..., and Zach the position, the measuring basis and the measurement result for each of the $M$ groups of $b$ particles via classical channel. Then Alice, Charlie, ..., and Zach measure $M$ groups of $a$ particles, $c$ particles, ..., $z$ particles using the same measuring bases, respectively. Then they tell Alice their measurement results for each of the particles. According to the measurement results of Bob, Charlie, ..., Zach and herself, Alice can determine whether there
is any eavesdropping. If the error rate is high, Alice concludes that the channel is not secure, and halts the communication. Otherwise, Alice, Bob, Charlie, ..., and Zach continue the next step.

**Step III.** The particles leftover are called the \( K \) groups particles \((K = N - M)\) after the checking eavesdropping. After the security checking of the quantum channel, Bob, Charlie, ..., and Zach encode each of the \( K \) groups \( b \) particles, \( c \) particles, ..., \( z \) particles with one of the two unitary operations \( I \) and \( i\sigma_y \), respectively, according to their secret messages. After receiving the \( K \) groups \( b \) particles, \( c \) particles, ..., and \( z \) particles, Alice encodes each of the \( K \) groups \( a \) particles with one of the four unitary operations \( I, \sigma_x, i\sigma_y \) and \( \sigma_z \) according to her secret message. Then Alice performs a \( n \)-particle GHZ-basis measurement on \( K \) groups \( a, b, c, \ldots, \) and \( z \) particles and publicly announces her measurement result and initial \( n \)-particle GHZ states. According to her measurement result, initial \( n \)-particle GHZ state and the unitary operation performed by herself, Alice can read out the secret messages of Bob, Charlie, ..., and Zach. Also, Bob (Charlie, ..., Zach) can read out the secret message of the others. So the \( N \)-party simultaneous QSDC has been successfully completed.

In conclusion, we have proposed a three-party simultaneous QSDC scheme by using three-particle GHZ states. We also generalize this scheme to \( N \)-party simultaneous QSDC by using \( n \)-particle GHZ states. In our scheme an eavesdropper Eve’s action can be detected efficiently. Therefore, the simultaneous QSDC scheme is secure not only against the intercept-and-resend attack but also against disturbance attack.

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