Abstract

This paper studies the role of social networks in spatial mobility across India. Using aggregated and de-identified data from the world’s largest online social network, we (i) document new descriptive findings on the structure of social networks and spatial mobility in India; (ii) quantify the effects of social networks on annual migration choice; and (iii) embed these estimates in a spatial equilibrium model to study the wage implications of increasing social connectedness. Across millions of individuals, we find that multiple measures of social capital are concentrated among the rich and educated and among migrants. Across destinations, both mobility patterns and social networks are concentrated toward richer areas. A model of migration suggests individuals are indifferent between a 10% increase in destination wages and a 12-16% increase in destination social networks. Accounting for networks reduces the migration-distance relationship by 19%. In equilibrium, equalizing social networks across locations improves average wages by 3% (24% for the bottom wage-quartile), a larger impact than removing the marginal cost of distance. We find evidence of an economic support mechanism, with destination economic improvements reducing the migration-network elasticity. We also find suggestive evidence for an emotional support mechanism from qualitative surveys among Facebook users. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest college attendance delivers a 20% increase in network size and diversity. Taken together, our data suggest that – by reducing effective moving costs – increasing social connectedness across space may have considerable economic gains.
1 Introduction

There is growing evidence on the importance of social networks and social connectedness on a variety of economic outcomes, including education, employment, and location decisions.\(^1\) So-called “gravity” models of migration have documented large mobility frictions that increase with distance – reductions in such frictions may have substantial impacts to aggregate productivity.\(^2\) These barriers to migration can be explained by a variety of phenomena, such as physical moving costs, culture and language differences, skill transferability, limited information, and social networks.\(^3\) While theory and evidence suggests social networks are particularly important determinants of location choice, little work has quantified what portion of moving costs are explained by networks, especially so in low-income settings where data is relatively scarce and informal networks may be relatively more important.\(^4\) In this paper, we provide new evidence on this question within the world’s largest online social network, Facebook, in its largest consumer market, India. Using aggregated and de-identified data on nearly 20 million individuals, we (i) document new descriptive findings on the structure of social networks and spatial mobility in India; (ii) quantify the effects of social networks on annual migration choice; and (iii) embed these estimates in a spatial equilibrium model to study the wage implications of increasing social connectedness.

New data on individual social networks and mobility in India reveal two empirical patterns: (i) across individuals, social capital – as defined by the number of Facebook Friends and the average income of where they live – is concentrated among the rich and educated and among migrants; and (ii) across destinations, both mobility patterns and social capital are concentrated toward richer areas.\(^5\) These facts suggest that social networks and spatial mobility are strongly linked.

We then develop a gravity model of location choice that includes preferences for city-specific social networks, which is estimated using microdata on individual location decisions and social networks over four years. Across three

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1. See Jackson, Rogers, and Zenou 2017 for a review.
2. See, for example, Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak 2014, Bryan and Morten 2019, Desmet, Nagy, and Rossi-Hansberg 2018, and Tombe and Zhu 2019.
3. See, for example, Anderson 2011, Munshi and Rosenzweig 2016, and Schwartz 1973.
4. In the sociology literature see Banerjee 1983, Boyd 1989, and MacDonald and MacDonald 1964. In economics, see Munshi 2020 for a review.
5. Meta, Facebook’s parent company, has a home prediction model that determines home regions based on self-reported hometowns and device and connection information. Similar profile information has been used to estimate migration in Herdağdelen et al. 2016 and Chi et al. 2020.
different identification strategies, we find evidence of large network effects: individuals are indifferent between a 10% increase in destination wages and a 12-16% increase in destination social networks. In our preferred specification, accounting for networks in the model reduces the migration-distance relationship by 19%.

Finally, we incorporate our model of migration into a simple, static spatial equilibrium model of local labor markets with endogenous wages and amenities. In equilibrium, removing the marginal cost of distance can improve average wages by 3% (17% for the bottom wage-quartile). We find that even larger gains can be achieved by equalizing or reallocating social networks across cities, with a 3-7% increase in average wages (24-28% for the bottom wage-quartile).

Social networks may improve spatial mobility through multiple forces including economic support (credit, insurance, job referrals, housing) and emotional support (leisure, socialization). We find that economic improvements in the destination (such as formal banking, higher wages, or migrant-friendly policy) deliver reductions in the migration-network elasticity, pointing to an economic support mechanism. We also find suggestive evidence for an emotional support mechanism from qualitative surveys among Facebook users. While the effect of networks may persist, social networks themselves can grow. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest college attendance delivers a 20% increase in the size and diversity of social networks. This suggests education may have additional economic returns through its impact on network expansion, and thus the reduction in effective moving costs.

This paper contributes to several strands of the development and labor economics literature. First, there is a rich theoretical and empirical literature which studies the potential role of social networks in influencing migration decisions. For example, prior work has studied how immigrant communities influence immigration patterns in the US (Beaman 2011, Munshi 2003); and how caste networks influence village out-migration in India (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2016). However, due to extremely limited data linking migration decisions with social networks, little work has directly quantified the magnitude of these network effects. A recent exception is Blumenstock, Chi, and Tan 2019, which uses cell phone location and call data in Rwanda to estimate the relationship between region-specific monthly migration and phone contacts, identified off restrictive fixed effects. We add to this literature in several ways: (i) we estimate effects on an order-of-magnitude larger, more granular sample, across nearly 20 million individuals and more than 5,000 cities; (ii) we improve identification.
by estimating effects across three approaches, including restrictive fixed effects, instruments that exploit individual network structure, and hypothetical survey questions that separately estimate amenities; and (iii) we incorporate the migration model into a simple spatial equilibrium model of local markets that allows us to study the wage implications of network counterfactuals.

Second, there is a separate literature on the spatial misallocation of labor and the economic implications of reducing mobility frictions. For example, Bryan and Morten 2019 uses microdata in Indonesia to measure moving costs in a gravity model with costly migration, and assesses the aggregate productivity implications of reducing these costs in static spatial equilibrium. Desmet, Nagy, and Rossi-Hansberg 2018 shows that in a dynamic spatial framework with costly trade and migration, fully removing moving costs would increase welfare threefold. While these moving costs may be large and economically meaningful, what is less known is their composition. Understanding the source of these moving costs has clear policy relevance. For example, Morten and Oliveira 2018 finds that improvements in transport infrastructure in Brazil have only modest impacts to aggregate productivity via migration. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has estimated models of spatial equilibrium that account for social networks. We therefore contribute by providing the first such study, and showing that a substantial portion of the gravity relationship in India can be explained by social networks.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data; Section 3 presents descriptive findings of migration and social networks in India; Section 4 develops a model of location choice with social networks and discusses identification; Section 5 reports model estimates on the effects of social networks; Section 6 presents a simple model of spatial equilibrium and simulates various policy counterfactuals; Section 7 provides suggestive evidence on mechanisms; and Section 8 concludes.

2 Data description

This paper uses three main sources of data: (i) aggregated and de-identified data on individual social networks and home city predictions in India from Facebook.com, the world’s largest online social network; (ii) administrative data from the Government of India on local labor markets; and (iii) supplemental data from qualitative surveys among Facebook users in India.
2.1 Facebook data in India

Facebook.com is the world’s largest online social network, with nearly 3 billion monthly active users around the world (Meta 2022). The website allows users to connect and communicate with friends and family. India is Facebook’s largest consumer market, with nearly 400 million users, roughly 30% of the population (Statista 2021). When restricting to young, working-age men in India (between 18 and 34 years old), more than 90% of these individuals have a Facebook account. In this paper, we use data from Facebook to construct an individual panel across nearly 20 million individuals over 4 years of (i) the complete social graph across individuals and (ii) annual migration decisions across cities for each individual.

On the platform, users can request Facebook connections (or “friends”) from any other individual on the platform at any time. By accepting these requests (or others accepting a sent request), users social networks may grow over time. These connections may capture a large set of potential social networks: friends, family, coworkers, acquaintances, etc. Because connections require consent of both individuals, they are primarily between individuals who interact in person and therefore resemble real-world social networks (Jones et al. 2013). We observe pairwise connections between all users at the end of each year. Similar Facebook data has been used to study the role of social networks in housing markets and international trade, among other topics (e.g. Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel, and Wong 2018, Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, and Stroebel 2018).

Meta, Facebook’s parent company, has a home prediction model that determines home regions based on self-reported hometowns and device and connection information. Similar profile information has been used to estimate migration in Herdağdelen et al. 2016 and Chi et al. 2020. This allows us to observe individual migration patterns to different cities over time (“home city predictions”) as well as origin locations from which initial migration would take place (self-reported “hometowns”).

We restrict our data to a subset of all Facebook users due to data limitations as well as relevance to our focus on labor migration. We first restrict to working

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6. These are estimated based off author calculations using age and gender distributions of Facebook users from Statista 2020 and age-specific India population estimates from the World Bank in 2020.

7. Users may also self-report age, gender, and education history (e.g. high school, college, graduate school). We also observe what device model is used to access the platform. This device data has been shown in prior research to correlate strongly with wealth (Chi et al. 2021). We exploit these individual characteristics in our descriptive analysis and sample restrictions.
age men in India, between 18 and 65 years old, the demographic that dominates labor migration in India. Then, we observe home city predictions for each user for each day from 2014 to 2017; we collapse this to an annual panel by choosing the modal city across all days in each year for which the user was active on Facebook within a 7 day interval. We restrict to a 7-day active window to ensure consistent city predictions. We limit our analysis to users who satisfy the following criteria: (i) have a valid city prediction for all years between 2014 and 2017 and (ii) live in their self-reported hometown in 2014, the initial period. We construct pair-wise connections between any two users in this sample at the end of each year. This ensures that growth in social networks is not due to entry and exit of users on Facebook, but changes in ties between existing users only. This results in a panel of 17 million individuals over 4 years from 2014-2017, with city locations and pairwise social networks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the largest, most granular data ever compiled on both social networks and migration in India.

2.1.1 Representativeness

We benchmark our constructed sample from Facebook against available statistics from Indian administrative data on local population and aggregate migration patterns. We validate our data in three ways: first, we compare the population distribution across Indian districts to home city predictions in our Facebook sample; second, we compare the distribution of average wages across Indian districts with the average manufacturer price of the phone device used by individuals in our Facebook sample; and third, we compare net migration rates across Indian states against those computed using changes in city locations in our Facebook sample.

Figure 1 reports data from our Facebook sample compared to Indian administrative data. Panel A shows that population across more than 600 districts in India is highly correlated with the number of users in our Facebook sample as predicted using city predictions ($\rho = 0.8$). Panel B shows that by district the average wage is correlated with the Average Selling Price (ASP) of devices used by individuals in our sample ($\rho = 0.4$). Lastly, Panel C reports net in-migration rates for each state in India, comparing 5-year rates from Indian government data (black) to 4-year rates from our Facebook sample (blue). While differences
exist (potentially reflecting differences in sample or time span), the correlation is strong ($\rho = 0.8$). The Facebook data replicates large in-flow states like Delhi as well as large out-flow states like Uttar Pradesh. We conclude that our Facebook sample accurately captures aggregate, long-term migration patterns in India.
Figure 1: Benchmarking Facebook Data in India

(a) Population by district

(b) Wages and device prices

(c) Net migration rates

Notes: This figure benchmarks data from our Facebook sample against Indian government statistics. Panel A plots a binned scatter across Indian districts of the (log) population according to the 2011 Indian census (y-axis) and the population in our sample (x-axis). Panel A plots a binned scatter across Indian districts of the (log) average wage according to the 2017-18 Periodic Labour Force Survey by the Government of India (y-axis) and the Average Selling Price (ASP) of the device used by individuals in our sample who reside in that district (x-axis). Panel C reports net-in-migration rates across Indian states (number of individuals moving into the state from another state over the total population) from the Government of India railway data between 2011 and 2016 (black) and those computed from our Facebook sample between 2014 and 2017 (blue).
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our Facebook sample in comparison to available data in India. The average individual in our Facebook sample is young, roughly 28 years old, and lives in a district with average wages of $9,300 per year, though considerable variation exists. On average, individual social networks span over 100 friends and 25 cities. Each year, roughly 11% of individuals move out of their residence city, 8% out of district, and 2% out of state. Conditional on migration, the average migrant moves roughly 230 kilometers away from their previous residence, to a city with an average wage that is roughly $2,200 higher. Migrants move with 85% probability to destinations where they have at least 1 Facebook friend. On average, migrants choose destinations with nearly 23 friends, roughly 20% of individuals’ entire social network.

While our data captures a large section of India’s population, this sample is selected in two ways. First, we restrict to a consistent sample of users for which we observe locations and social networks over 4 years. Second, although Facebook is free to use, internet access, device ownership, and personal preferences limit the reach of online social networks like Facebook. On net, we expect that relatively poorer individuals would be underrepresented in our data. Indeed, we find that, compared to the Indian average, the average Facebook user in our sample lives in an area with a 41% higher mean wage, owns a mobile phone with a 38% higher price, and has twice the probability of migrating out of their district or state.
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Facebook Sample vs. India

|                      | Facebook Sample |          | India          |          |
|----------------------|-----------------|----------|----------------|----------|
|                      | Mean            | St. Dev. | Mean           | St. Dev. |
| **Demographics**     |                 |          |                |          |
| Age                  | 27.8            | 8.1      | 36.2           | 10.9     |
| Avg. Wage of Residence (USD) | 9,281.2 | 4,235.8 | 6,579.4 | 3,807.2 |
| Device Price (USD)   | 256.4           | 186.4    | 153            |          |
| **Networks**         |                 |          |                |          |
| Network Size         | 105.0           | 156.2    |                |          |
| No. Cities           | 25.1            | 23.8     |                |          |
| **One Year Migration** |              |          |                |          |
| Migrated City        | 0.11            | 0.31     |                |          |
| Migrated District    | 0.08            | 0.27     | 0.04           |          |
| Migrated State >200KM | 0.02         | 0.13     | 0.01           |          |
| **If Migrated**      |                 |          |                |          |
| Distance Migrated (KM) | 227.4     | 359.3    |                |          |
| Annual Wage Gain (USD) | 2,204.2  | 4,758.6  |                |          |
| Destination Has Friend | 0.85     | 0.36     |                |          |
| Destination Network Size | 22.5     | 53.3     |                |          |
| **Observations**     | 17M             |          | –              |          |

Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations for individual variables across our Facebook sample (left) and available Indian government statistics (right). Facebook statistics come from author calculations for individuals in our Facebook sample in 2017. India statistics on age and residence wage comes from the 2017-18 round of the Periodic Labour Force Survey by the Government of India, restricted to males between 18 and 65 years old to align with the Facebook sample. Indian statistics on device price and migration come from estimates from a 2017 Nielson survey and the 2011 Census of India, respectively.

2.2 Indian administrative data

While data from Facebook captures migration and social networks, we require data on local labor markets to study wage implications. To this end, we use additional microdata from the 2017-18 round of the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), administered by the Government of India. This large-scale government data collection effort captures a representative sample of nearly half a million people in the country, including outcomes such as employment
status, industry, occupation, and wages.

India is composed of more than 600 “districts” spread across 27 states. The PLFS can be aggregated to the district-level to capture spatial wage heterogeneity, and ultimately, to what extent wages drive migration patterns in India. To the best of our knowledge, this is the finest spatial granularity for which wage data exists in India.

In Figure 2, we plot district-level average wages against urbanization rates. We see a strong relationship between urbanization and wages, highlighting the degree of wage dispersion in India, with more than a 5x wage premium of being fully urban versus fully rural. For example, the urbanized, capital city of Delhi boasts an average wage of nearly $15,000 per year, while a rural district 100 kilometers away earns less than $2,500 per year on average. Despite these differences, the population remains concentrated among the lower-wage and lower-urbanized districts. Indeed, compared to other less-developed countries, India has one of the lowest rates of urbanization despite this spatial dispersion in wages.9

9. India’s population is 32% urbanized (UN, 2016). In contrast, urbanization rates are substantially higher in other economically-comparable areas such as China (60%), Indonesia (55%), Nigeria (50%), and UN defined “less developed regions” (52%).
Figure 2: Wages and Urbanization in India

Notes: The top panel of this figure presents a scatter-plot at the district-level of average annual wages (x-axis) and fraction urbanized (y-axis); the size of each bubble is proportional to the population of the district. The bottom panel shows the population distribution across average wages. Data come from the 2017-18 round of the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) by the Government of India, averaged to the district-level using survey weights. “% urbanized” is defined as the fraction of the district population living in a town with population density exceeding 10,000 persons per square kilometer, as in the 2011 Census of India. The distribution of average wages is computed using (survey-weighted) counts from the PLFS.

We also employ historical labor market data from the 1999-2000 round of the National Sample Survey (NSS), administered by the Government of India. This survey is also a large-scale, representative sample of the Indian population, which can then be aggregated to the district level. Using unique district and industry codes, this can be merged with the 2017-2018 PLFS data to estimate the growth and composition of wages and employment across industries in India. We use this data to construct Bartik instruments for spatial wage heterogeneity in our model of migration below.
2.3 Supplemental survey data

Finally, we administer a survey on Facebook among a random sample of users in India (above age 18). The survey is implemented on the platform: users opt-in to the survey when prompted upon login (either through the web-based or mobile application) and give consent to share responses for research purposes. Our questionnaire captures attitudes and beliefs regarding the determinants of migration decisions and the benefits of social networks.

We use the survey for two main purposes. First, we use hypothetical questions to capture preferences for migrating across India that are orthogonal to wages or social networks. These are used as an alternative identification approach to estimating network and wage effects in a model of migration below. Second, we capture self-reported beliefs regarding migration and social networks to provide suggestive evidence of mechanisms behind the effect of social networks in the migration decision.

3 Descriptive findings

We present new descriptive findings on the structure of social networks and migration using our Facebook sample in India. Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of networks across cities in India and how they change over time, with black line segments depicting ties between any two cities with more than 1,000 connections in our Facebook sample. Between 2014 and 2017, we see that cities become increasingly more connected and particularly so in large, urban cities (depicted in red). Importantly, due to our sample construction, this reflects changes in ties between two individuals among a fixed set only, so as not to capture entry or exit of users onto the platform. Changes in this spatial network structure combine both migration patterns and social network growth. Together, these empirical patterns are consistent with three forces: (i) migration patterns are concentrated toward larger, higher-wage cities, where individuals bring their networks (wage preferences); (ii) increased networks in large cities drive further migration into them (network preferences); and (iii) social interactions at the destination expand social networks (social interactions).
Figure 3: Social Network Growth, 2014-2017

Notes: The figure shows ties (black line segments) between any two cities (black dots) with more than 1,000 connections in our Facebook sample, at the end of each year from 2014 to 2017. Red dots depict the six most populous cities in India: Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Calcutta, Hyderabad, and Pune. Due to our sample construction, this reflects changes in ties between two individuals among a fixed set only, so as to not capture entry or exit of users onto the platform.

What determines these migration and social network patterns? Figure 4 reports transition probabilities of migration and social ties by quartile of average wages across locations. We see that individuals have the highest probability of living in the same wage quartile from 2014 to 2017, and have the highest concentration of social ties in the same wage quartile in 2014. Further, compared to poorer locations, individuals are both more likely to migrate to richer locations and more likely to have friends in richer locations ex-ante. This suggests that
choices of migration across destinations may correlate with both destination wages and social ties.

Figure 4: Migration, Social Networks, and Wages

Notes: This figure shows transition matrices of migration and social ties by average wages across locations. Panel A reports the probability of migration from a home location in 2014 in a given percentile bin of average wages (y-axis) to a destination location in 2017 in a given percentile bin of average wages (x-axis). Panel B reports the fraction of social ties from a home location in 2014 in a given percentile bin of average wages (y-axis) to a friend location in 2014 in a given percentile bin of average wages (x-axis). Darker colors reflect higher probabilities. Wage data come from the 2017-18 round of the Periodic Labour Force Survey and all other data come from author calculations from our Facebook sample.

On average, roughly 4% of our sample migrates out of their origin district each year. How do these migrants compare to non-migrants? Table 2 presents estimates from an OLS regression of migration status on individual characteristics. We see in column (1) that wealthier (proxied by device price), more educated, and younger individuals are more likely to migrate out of their city. However, migrants come from origin locations with lower average wages. In column (2), we include a vector of network-related observables, including the average residence wage across all connections, the size of the network in the origin city, and the total network size across all cities. We find that individuals with richer friends, fewer friends at origin, but more friends overall, have a higher likelihood of migration. After including these network variables, the coefficients on device price and college attendance fall by half and two-thirds, respectively, and the $R^2$ increases by a factor of 10. This suggests that (i) "social
capital” (the size and average wage of social networks) is a strong predictor of whether or not individuals migrate; and (ii) networks explain a substantial share of the explanatory power of wealth and human capital on migration.

Table 2: Migration and Individual Characteristics

| Dependent Variable: | Migrated, Model: | (1)  | (2)  |
|---------------------|-----------------|------|------|
| Log(Device Price)\_1 | 0.006*** | 0.003** |       |
|                     | (0.001) | (0.001) |       |
| 1\{Attended College\} | 0.015*** | 0.005* |       |
|                     | (0.003) | (0.003) |       |
| Log(Age)\_1         | -0.043*** | -0.053*** |       |
|                     | (0.003) | (0.003) |       |
| Log(Orig. Wage)\_1  | -0.038*** | -0.072*** |       |
|                     | (0.002) | (0.003) |       |
| Log(Network Wage)\_1| 0.107*** |         |       |
|                     | (0.004) |       |       |
| Log(Orig. Network Size)\_1 | -0.088*** |         |       |
|                     | (0.001) |       |       |
| Log(Network Size)\_1 | 0.090*** |         |       |
|                     | (0.001) |       |       |

Observations: 130K 130K
R\^2: 0.006 0.066

Notes: This table presents estimates from an OLS regression of a binary indicator of whether than individual migrates out of their residence city in 2017 on a vector of individual characteristics. This is restricted to a 1% random sample of our Facebook sample, for which we have data on all covariates. Wage data come from the 2017-18 round of the Periodic Labour Force Survey and all other data come from author calculations from our Facebook sample. Standard errors are in parentheses.

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

These figures suggest social capital may be an important driver of individual migration. Which individuals hold the most social capital? Table 3 presents estimations from OLS regressions of social capital variables on individual characteristics. We find evidence that both total and non-origin social capital is concentrated among the rich, the educated, and among migrants: a 100% increase in wealth (proxied by device price) is associated with a 35-47% increase in network size and a 4.5-5.2% increase in average network wages; college attendance increases network sizes by 34-37% and network wages by 0.8-0.9%; compared to non-migrants, migrants have 27-66% larger network sizes and 4.1-5.2% larger network wages.
Table 3: Networks and Individual Characteristics

| Dependent Variables | Model: Log(Network Size)_{t-1} | Log(Non-Origin Network Size)_{t-1} | Log(Network Wage)_{t-1} | Log(Non-Origin Network Wage)_{t-1} |
|---------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Log(Device Price)_{t-1} | 0.474*** (0.005) | 0.347*** (0.006) | 0.032*** (0.0008) | 0.052*** (0.001) |
| 1 {Attended College} | 0.338*** (0.011) | 0.371*** (0.012) | 0.009*** (0.002) | 0.008*** (0.003) |
| Log(Age)_{t-1} | -0.323*** (0.013) | 0.050*** (0.014) | 0.045*** (0.002) | 0.052*** (0.003) |
| Log(Orig. Wage)_{t-1} | 0.148*** (0.006) | 0.256*** (0.007) | 0.489*** (0.0010) | 0.112*** (0.001) |
| Migrated_{t} | 0.273*** (0.011) | 0.662*** (0.012) | 0.041*** (0.002) | 0.052*** (0.003) |

| Observations | 130K | 130K | 130K | 130K |
| R^2 | 0.079 | 0.063 | 0.675 | 0.077 |

Notes: This table presents estimates from OLS regressions of individual social capital in 2017 on a vector of individual characteristics. This is restricted to a 1% random sample of our Facebook sample, for which we have data on all covariates. Wage data come from the 2017-18 round of the Periodic Labour Force Survey and all other data come from author calculations from our Facebook sample. Standard errors are in parentheses.

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
To complement our observed data on migration and networks, we also administered a survey to capture beliefs regarding migration decisions. Figure 5 reports the distribution of responses across categories to the following question:

*Imagine you are moving out of your city into a new city in India. What is the most important thing when choosing which new city to move to?*

As their most important consideration, we find that 20% of respondents list earning and expenses; 15% list environment or sanitation quality; and 14% list friends and family, the third most common response. Though self-reported, this suggests an important role for social networks in individual location decisions.

Figure 5: Survey Evidence on Determinants of Migration Choice

Notes: This figure reports survey frequencies across categories for the question “What is the most important thing when choosing which new city to move to?” The survey was administered among a random sample of Indian Facebook users in 2020.

Together, these descriptive findings suggest a strong relationship between migration, social networks, and wages across locations. This motivates a model of location choice that accounts for region-specific wages, amenities, and social networks. In the next section we specify and estimate such a model that allows us the quantify the role of social networks in driving migration decisions.
4 A model of migration choice

We model migration as a typical discrete choice problem faced by workers. Individual \( i \) maximizes utility \( V_{ij} \) from living in city \( j \):

\[
V_{ij} = \xi_j - \tau_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}.
\]

(1)

The term \( \xi_j \) captures city-specific preferences, which can be decomposed into wage and non-wage components:

\[
\xi_j = \beta Y_j + \xi_j^A,
\]

(2)

where \( Y_j \) are expected real wages in the city and \( \xi_j^A \) are non-wage components of city preferences, typically unobserved (commonly referred to as “amenities” such as weather, environmental quality, or entertainment).

The term \( \tau_{ij} \) captures so-called “moving costs” that are specific to individual \( i \) and destination \( j \). These may include factors such as physical distance, cultural and language differences, or social networks. We parametrize these moving costs to account for both distance and social network forces:

\[
-\tau_{ij} = \gamma N_{ij} - \delta(D_{ij}),
\]

(3)

where \( N_{ij} \) is the (log) number of individual \( i \)'s social ties in city \( j \), and \( \delta(D_{ij}) \) is some function \( \delta \) of the physical distance \( D_{ij} \) between individual \( i \)'s origin city and destination city \( j \).

Finally, \( \epsilon_{ij} \) captures idiosyncratic or “match” preferences that are specific to individual \( i \) and city \( j \) but are not captured in city-specific preferences \( \xi_j \) or moving costs \( \tau_{ij} \). For example, individuals that enjoy watching sports may particularly prefer Calcutta due to its famous cricket stadium.

The parameter \( \beta \) captures the labor supply elasticity of wages – the extent to which expected wages in the destination drive migration. The parameter \( \gamma \) captures the labor supply elasticity of social networks – the extent to which social ties in the destination drive migration. Therefore, the term \( \gamma / \beta \) captures the marginal rate of substitution between changes in destination wages and destination social networks – or in other words, the private marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for social networks. More broadly, estimating these structural param-

10. We adapt similar models of migration (labor supply) as in Bryan and Morten 2019 to incorporate region-specific social networks.
eters allow us to quantify the role of social networks in driving migration, in comparison to other tangible characteristics such as wages or distance.

Traditional “gravity” models of migration assume moving costs increase with distance and often impose \(-\tau_{ij} = -g(D_{ij})\). In these models, \(g\) captures the gravity relationship and subsumes all migrations frictions that may increase with distance including physical moving expenses, language and cultural differences, or social networks. By incorporating social networks directly into moving costs, we can compare the non-network gravity relationship \(\delta\) and total gravity relationship \(\gamma\) to estimate the fraction that is explained by social networks. In addition, by allowing moving costs to depend on individual- and destination-specific networks, moving costs \(\tau_{ij}\) have dramatically larger heterogeneity than what would be achieved by considering only distance (or an origin-destination pair).

It follows from the model that location choices \(L_{ij}\) can be expressed as a discrete-choice problem:

\[
L_i = \arg \max_j V_{ij}. \tag{4}
\]

Given observed location choices, wages, and networks, we can estimate this model with maximum likelihood in a traditional Logistic regression with the typical Type-1 Extreme Value distributional assumption on \(\epsilon_{ij}\).

### 4.1 Identification of network effects

There are two main threats to identification of networks effects in this model. The first is a simultaneity problem, where location decisions are determined by geographic networks, but geographic networks are themselves determined by location decisions. We address simultaneity by exploiting the panel structure of our data to estimate the effect of networks at \(t-1\) on location decisions at \(t\).

The second concern is networks may be endogenous. In particular, networks \(N_{ij}\) may not be orthogonal to unobserved preferences \(\epsilon_{ij}\). One may assume that \(N_{ij}\) is orthogonal to \(\epsilon_{ij}\) conditional on \(\xi_j\). However, \(\xi_j\) is unobserved and if \(\xi_j\) and \(N_{ij}\) are positively correlated, typical estimates of \(\gamma\) would be biased downward. For example, networks may be large in Delhi because Delhi has high wages, or networks large in Goa because the weather in Goa is nice.

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11. For tractability, we estimate models on a 1% sample of our Facebook sample. Individual-year specific choice sets include all cities with at least 1 friend in period \(t\) and a random sample of 10 additional cities in India. Sampling probabilities are included as a control as in McFadden 1977.

12. Similarly, Blumenstock, Chi, and Tan 2019 include a model with lagged networks as a robustness check for this simultaneity concern.
We use three different identification approaches to address the endogeneity of networks. First, we include “restrictive fixed effects” as in Blumenstock, Chi, and Tan 2019 to account for fixed preferences in narrowly-defined bins (as fine as origin-by-destination-by-year). Second, we develop an instrumental variables (IV) approach, by exploiting weather shocks interacted with individual network structure to deliver plausibly random variation in geographic networks. Third, we administer a survey on Facebook where we ask hypothetical questions to capture individuals’ preferences for cities – we then use these “offline” estimates of $\xi_j^A$ to estimate model parameters.

Below we describe (i) how we use panel data to address simultaneity when estimating the model and (ii) each identification approach we use to address network endogeneity.

### 4.1.1 Estimation with panel data

We first amend the general model above to exploit the panel dimension of our data and make specific functional form assumptions. In particular, we assume decisions to migrate are made for period $t$ with information at period $t-1$. Individuals $i$ receive utility for living in city $j$ at year $t$, depending on networks and distances at year $t-1$:

$$V_{ijt} = \xi_j + \gamma N_{ij,t-1} - \delta(D_{ij,t-1}) + \epsilon_{ijt}. \quad (5)$$

We interpret this assumption as limited information on others’ preferences $e_{-i,j,t}$, so that individuals form expectations of networks at $t$ using current networks at $t-1$: $E[N_{ijt}] = N_{ij,t-1}$. For tractability, this model is essentially static: individuals use only current draws of $\epsilon_{ijt}$ and information at $t-1$ to form migration decisions – we do not attempt to model dynamic network effects.\(^{13}\)

The panel structure is used to ensure that there is no simultaneity problem: network effects on location choices at $t$ exploit variation in networks at $t-1$ only.

Finally, we model the distance-related moving cost $\delta(.)$ with fixed and vari-

\(^{13}\) An alternative model could form expectations of $N_{ijt}$ with more sophistication, by computing expected location decisions of others $L_{-i,t}$ using the distribution of others' shocks $e_{-i,t}$ and own shock $\epsilon_{ijt}$. We anticipate, because of strong gravity forces in our data, this procedure would result in expectations of future networks equal to current networks. We discuss potential implications of a dynamic model in the final section.
able components:

\[
d(D_{ij}) = \delta_f \{D_{ij} \neq 0\} + \delta_v \log(D_{ij}) + \delta_{vs} \log(D_{ij}) \times 1\{s(i) \neq s(j)\},
\]

where \(s(i)\) and \(s(j)\) are the administrative states of individual \(i\)'s origin city and destination city \(j\), respectively. With this functional form, \(\delta_f\) captures the fixed cost of moving outside the city (any positive distance), \(\delta_v\) captures the variable cost of moving that increases with the log of distance, and \(\delta_{vs}\) captures the additional variable cost for out-of-state moves.

This structure accounts for typical fixed and variable costs associated with moving, and also includes cultural, linguistic, and policy differences that change discontinuously across state borders in India (Kone et al. 2018). We use this panel structure and parametrization of distance across all identification strategies discussed below.

### 4.1.2 Approach 1: Restrictive fixed effects

The specification of \(V_{ijt}\) in equation 5 includes destination fixed effects \(\xi_j\) to account for preferences that are fixed across individuals and time periods for each city. To address endogeneity of networks, we may model utility with even more restrictive fixed effects. For example, in the extreme case,

\[
V_{ijt} = \gamma n_{ij,t-1} + a_{o(i,t-1)j,t} + \varepsilon_{ijt},
\]

where \(o(i, t - 1)\) is the origin city of individual \(i\) in year \(t - 1\). Thus, \(\alpha\) captures fixed effects that are specific to each origin-destination-year tuple, and captures preferences that are specific to that cell. For example, \(a_{\text{Delhi,Bombay,2017}}\) captures preferences that are common between all individuals that live in Delhi in 2016 and are considering moving to Bombay in 2017. Thus, estimates of \(\gamma\) exploit leftover, plausibly random variation in networks after controlling for these common origin-destination-year effects.

This approach, used by Blumenstock, Chi, and Tan 2019 to identify network effects in Rwanda, has particularly relevant properties for location preferences. Importantly, \(\alpha\) subsumes both preferences specific to each destination city \(\xi_j\) (by summing over \(o\)) and moving costs that are specific to each origin-destination pair \(\tau_{oj}\) such as physical distance (by summing over \(t\)). For comparison, we estimate the model under a variety of fixed effect specifications: no fixed effects, only destination effects \(\xi_j\), destination-by-year effects \(\xi_{jt}\), and origin-by-
destination-by-year effects $a_{ijt}$.\textsuperscript{14}

While this approach exploits the richness of data to limit the variation in networks used to identify effects, this leftover variation may still be correlated with idiosyncratic city preferences. In the next section, we develop an instrument for networks to address endogeneity more directly.

### 4.1.3 Approach 2: Instruments using weather shocks and network structure

We seek to develop an instrument for geographic social networks that is uncorrelated with other preferences for cities. Weather shocks have been shown to cause internal migration within developing countries.\textsuperscript{15} India’s economy is roughly 60% agricultural, and local productivity shocks such as droughts or heat spells may cause individuals to seek employment elsewhere. If moving costs are sufficiently high, these temporary moves may end up being permanent. While weather shocks may move individuals to other cities, they only change subsequent social networks to the extent existing individual networks overlap with these shocks. We develop an instrument for geographic social networks by exploiting quasi-random weather shocks across space and how they interact with individuals’ existing network structure.

Figure 6 shows a visual representation of such an instrument. In example 1, we show individual $i$’s network across cities, with some connected (black lines) and some unconnected. Weather shocks are experienced by connected city $j_4$ and unconnected city $j_9$ (red circles). These shocks cause individuals to migrate to cities nearby (red arrows), $j_1$ and $j_2$ and $j_6$ and $j_7$, respectively. However, with respect to $i$’s network, migration spillovers from the connected city $j_4$ are larger (dark red arrows) compared to spillovers from the unconnected city $j_9$ (light red arrows). Thus, we expect $i$’s networks to increase more in $j_1$ and $j_2$ than $j_6$ and $j_7$. Comparing migration decisions and networks between these two pairs of destination cities allows us to isolate the effect of networks. Similarly, in example 2, we compare larger spillovers to cities $j_2$ and $j_4$ compared to city $j_8$. In example 3, because of the panel structure, we can compare migration decisions to the same city $j_8$, but between periods when shocks hit the connected nearby city $j_8$ ($t = 1$) and the unconnected nearby city $j_5$ ($t = 2$).

\textsuperscript{14} All specifications implicitly include individual-by-year fixed effects as choices are made within each individual and year across destinations. For the model with origin-by-destination-by-year effects, we include only individual fixed effects to replicate Blumenstock, Chi, and Tan 2019.

\textsuperscript{15} For example, see Bohra-Mishra, Oppenheimer, and Hsiang 2014 and Mueller, Gray, and Kosec 2014.
Figure 6: Weather Shocks, Migration, and Networks

Notes: This figure depicts visual intuition for the instrument. Each panel is one example of how weather shocks interact with individual networks. Each bubble is a city $j_1, \ldots, j_{12}$. The central bubble denoted by $i$ is individual $i$’s origin city. Lines indicate whether or not individual $i$ is connected to the respective city. Red bubbles denote cities that experience weather shocks, and arrows indicate the migration spillovers from those cities. Darker (lighter) arrows indicate larger (smaller) migration spillovers of $i$’s friends, given that shocked cities are connected (not connected) to $i$. The variation we exploit is comparing cities that receive these larger versus smaller spillovers from connected versus unconnected shocked cities. Panels A and B provide examples across cities for a given time period, and Panel B shows an example across time periods for a given city.

In order to construct an instrument for networks at $t - 1$, we use weather shocks at $t - 2$ which, given the model in equation 5, affect location decisions one period later. Because location choices are a function of distance, we expect those that experience weather shocks to migrate nearby rather than far away.
We define \( w(j, t) \) as the city closest to city \( j \) that experiences a weather shock at time \( t \):

\[
    w(j, t) = \arg\min_{j' \in j_{\text{Shock}}^t} D_{j'j},
\]

where \( j_{\text{Shock}}^t \) is the set of cities in period \( t \) that are hit by a weather shock. Thus, networks \( N_{ij,t-1} \) depend on prior weather shocks nearby \( w(j, t - 2) \). In particular, shocks impact networks in \( j \) depending on \( j \)'s distance to the shocked city \( D_{j,w(j,t-2)} \) and the number of connections in the shocked city \( N_{i,w(j,t-2),j,t-2} \). This suggests the following first-stage regression:

\[
    N_{ij,t-1} = \theta_1 N_{i,w(j,t-2),j,t-2} + \delta(D_{j,w(j,t-2)}) + g(X_{ij,t-1}) + \tilde{e}_{ij,t-1},
\]

where \( \delta(D_{j,w(j,t-2)}) \) controls for distance to the nearest shocked city as in equation 6, \( h(X_{ij,t-1}) \) includes controls from the main model in equation 5, and \( \tilde{e}_{ij,t-1} \) is a residual.\(^{16}\) Our instrument is therefore \( N_{i,w(j,t-2),j,t-2} \), which captures the extent to which individual \( i \) is connected to a city near to \( j \) that experienced a weather shock in period \( t - 2 \).

We argue that the instrument \( N_{i,w(j,t-2),j,t-2} \) – the number of connections to the nearest shocked city – satisfies classic IV assumptions. For exogeneity, conditional on destination and individual-by-year fixed effects, city-level shocks to weather are quasi-random and orthogonal to unobserved determinants of individual social networks or migration patterns. Thus, because the set of shocked cities \( j_{\text{Shock}}^t \) is conditionally quasi-random, the nearest shocked city \( w(j, t) \) as well as the number of connections to \( w(j, t) \) is also quasi-random. For exclusion, nearby weather shocks alone may impact migration in ways other than through social networks, including local economic spillovers and locally correlated weather. However, we argue that controlling for distance to the shock, the extent to which individuals are connected to nearby shocked cities – and not the shock to the city itself – only impacts migration patterns through subsequent social networks.

Given the literature on climate-induced migration, we construct instruments based on two types of weather shocks: low rainfall (drought) and high temperature (heat shock). In particular, we define a city-year as experiencing a “drought” if annual rainfall for that city is below the 15th percentile in the long-run distribution of annual rainfall for that city (1980 to 2017). Similarly, we denote a “heat shock” if the number of days per year exceeding 95°F falls

\(^{16}\) Controls in \( h \) include \( \delta(D_{ij,t-1}) \) and destination and individual-by-year fixed effects.
above the 85th percentile in the long-run distribution.\textsuperscript{17}

For intuition, we can estimate simplified version of the first-stage regression in equation 9:

\begin{equation}
N_{ij,t-1} = \theta_1 1\{N_{i,w(j,t-2),t-2} > 0\} + \delta_f^w 1\{D_{j,w(j,t-2)} = 0\} + \delta_v^w \log(D_{j,w(j,t-2)}) \\
+ \delta_{vn}^w 1\{N_{i,w(j,t-2),t-2} > 0\} \times \log(D_{j,w(j,t-2)}) + g(X_{ij,t-1}) + \tilde{e}_{ij,t-1}.
\end{equation}

Here, $\theta_1$ captures the first-stage effect: the additional spillover to $i$’s network in city $j$ in period $t-1$ if $i$ has at least 1 friend in the closest shocked city to $j$ in period $t-2$. The term $\delta_f^w$ captures the effect of a weather shock in city $j$ in period $t-2$ (if the distance to the shocked city is zero) on friends in $j$ in period $t-1$. The term $\delta_v^w$ captures the spillover effect that changes with distance to the shocked city. Finally, the term $\delta_{vn}^w$ captures how the spillover additionally changes with distance if $i$ has at least 1 friend in the shocked city in period $t-2$.

Figure 7 plots predicted friends in city $j$ in period $t-1$ as a function of distance to the weather shock in period $t-2$ using estimates from the simplified first-stage, for both droughts (top) and heat shocks (bottom). The bars on the left show that droughts and heat shocks in city $j$ deliver roughly a 1 and 1.5 friend decline in $i$’s networks in $j$ in the subsequent year ($\delta_f^w < 0$).\textsuperscript{18} As shown in the red and blue lines, spillovers from these shocks then decline with distance to the shocks ($\delta_v^w < 0$). Importantly, at all distances, spillovers are larger when $i$ has at least 1 friend in the closest shocked city. This vertical difference between the red and blue curves depicts the variation in networks delivered by our instrument ($\theta_1 > 0$). Lastly, the declines in distance are steeper if $i$ has at least 1 friend in the closest shocked city ($\delta_{vn}^w < 0$).

\textsuperscript{17} Historical, grid-level weather data come from the commonly used University of Delaware (U-DEL) database. Grids are matched to cities using city centroids.

\textsuperscript{18} We find that these weather-shock migration effects fall with urbanity at the destination, consistent with a local productivity shock mechanism.
Notes: This figure plots results from the simplified first stage specification in equation 10, across two weather-based instruments: droughts (top) and heat shocks (bottom). Lines plot predicted number of friends in city $j$ in period $t - 1$ as a function of the distance from city $j$ to the nearest city that experienced a weather shock in period $t - 2$. Blue lines show estimates the effect for shocked cities with no friends in period $t - 2$ and red lines show the effect for socked cities with at least 1 friend. Bars on the left depict the effect of zero distance: the effect of city $j$ experiencing a weather shock in period $t - 2$ on number of friends in city $j$ in period $t - 1$. Effects on networks in $j$ are relative to having zero friends in the shocked city, which is just outside city $j$.

We estimate the effect of networks on migration $\gamma$ by employing a control function approach to IV estimation as in Train 2009, where residuals from the first-stage in equation 9 are included as controls in the main model in equation 5. We interpret these estimates of $\gamma$ as Local Average Treatment Effects (LATEs) for specific groups of compliers: those whose networks change as a result of local spillovers from weather shocks, that would not change otherwise. In particular, networks that are changing are driven by weather-based migration, presumably by individuals that are fleeing from local negative productivity shocks. These individuals are thus not a random sample of social networks, and so in the presence of network effect heterogeneity, effects for the average friend may differ. For example, the networks that are impacted by the instrument may
be relatively more rural (employed by agriculture) and have lower incomes. In this case, if networks favor higher income individuals, we can interpret these LATE estimates of \( \gamma \) as a lower bound.

### 4.1.4 Approach 3: Eliciting preferences from hypothetical survey questions

The main threat to identification of networks effects is endogeneity: in particular, that networks \( N_{ij} \) are correlated with unobserved, non-wage city preferences \( \xi_j^A \) ("amenities"). We may assume that conditional on \( \xi_j^A \), networks \( N_{ij} \) are exogenous. However, because \( \xi_j^A \) is unobserved, joint estimation with \( \gamma \) may produce biased estimates.

In our third identification approach, we tackle this by estimating \( \xi_j^A \) directly, holding \( N_{ij} \) fixed. We do so by administering hypothetical survey questions among Facebook users and asking where they would want to live if networks or wages were not a concern. In particular, we ask individuals:

*Suppose you had the same friends, family, earnings, and expenses no matter where you lived. In this case, where in India would you want to live?*

Given the hypothetical question, we assume individuals choose locations to maximize the adjusted utility without network and wage effects (\( \gamma = 0, \beta = 0 \)):

\[
\tilde{V}_{ij} = \xi_j^A + \delta(D_{ij}) + \epsilon_{ij}.
\]  (11)

Thus, using choices of “dream” cities from the survey, we can estimate \( \xi_j^A \) using a typical Logit estimation. We then include these first-step estimates \( \hat{\xi}_j^A \) into the main model of migration choice to estimate \( \gamma \). Conditional on \( \xi_j^A \), we assume variation in \( N_{ij} \) is now exogenous, removing the need for instruments.

Figure 8 plots hypothetical net migration across states if individuals moved from their current city to their “dream” city if networks and wages were not a concern. Roughly 60% of respondents would choose to live outside their residence city if these constraints were lifted. Intuitively, locations with large hypothetical net migrations would have large \( \xi_j^A \). Individuals would leave states like West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh and move to states like Goa and Chandigarh. The modal dream city is in Goa, a state on India’s western coast, a

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19. This is similar to other identification approaches in the empirical industrial organization literature. For example, Dinerstein, Neilson, and Otero 2020 administer hypothetical questions on preferences for private schools holding prices fixed, to estimate school-specific unobservables and identify price elasticities.
popular vacation destination known for good weather and beaches. Goa would thus have a high estimated $\xi_A$ from the model, consistent with intuition. While we caution that this survey data is hypothetical and self-reported, compared to revealed-preference data using in the main migration model, we conclude that amenity estimates from the survey are reasonable and in line with intuition.

**Figure 8: Net Differences: Dream vs. Current**

Notes: This figure presents data from hypothetical survey questions. Users were asked their current city of residence as well as their “dream” city: where they would live if social networks or wages were not a concern. For any given state (y-axis), the bar denotes the difference in frequency between listing the dream city in the state and listing the current city in the state (x-axis). The survey was administered among a random sample of Indian Facebook users in 2020.
4.2 Identification of wage effects

While the literature on network effects in migration is limited, we borrow from the spatial economics literature to estimate the effects of wages $\beta$ in the migration decision (labor supply) in equation 2. The typical endogeneity concern is that wages $Y_j$ are correlated with unobserved amenities $\xi_j^A$, such that estimates of the wage effect $\beta$ are biased. In spatial models, we may expect low-wage locations to have high amenities to compensate workers for living there and ensure equilibrium. In this case, $\beta$ would be downward biased absent an instrument.

We use historical data on local labor markets in India to develop traditional Bartik instruments for spatial wage heterogeneity. Consistent with past work, we exploit heterogeneity in historical local industry composition (shares) together with industry-specific long-run national trends (shocks). We construct two such instruments using changes in wages from 1999 to 2016 weighted by labor shares or changes in labor weighted by wage shares:

$$B_{j}^{\text{Wage}} = \sum_k \frac{L_{jk}^{1999}}{L_{jk}^{1999}} \Delta Y_k^{1999-2016},$$

$$B_{j}^{\text{Labor}} = \sum_k \frac{Y_{jk}^{1999}}{Y_{jk}^{1999}} \Delta L_k^{1999-2016},$$

where, for workers in city $j$ in industry $k$ in year $t$, $L_{jk}^t$ is the number of workers and $Y_{jk}^t$ is the average wage; $L_{jk}^t = \sum_k L_{jk}^t$ and $Y_{jk}^t = \sum_k Y_{jk}^t$. $\Delta Y_k^{t_1-t_0} = Y_k^{t_1} - Y_k^{t_0}$ and $\Delta L_k^{t_1-t_0} = L_k^{t_1} - L_k^{t_0}$; and $\bar{Y}_k = \sum_j Y_{jk}^t / |J|$ and $\bar{L}_k = \sum_j L_{jk}^t / |J|$.

To estimate $\beta$, we perform a two-step procedure: first, we estimate $\hat{\xi}_j$ from the main migration model in equation 5, which includes both wage and non-wage components; second, we estimate $\hat{\beta}$ from a 2SLS specification using the first-step estimates $\hat{\xi}_j$, wages $Y_j$, and instruments $B_j \in \{B_{j}^{\text{Wage}}, B_{j}^{\text{Labor}}\}$:

$$\hat{\xi}_j = \beta Y_j + \xi_j^A,$$

$$Y_j = \beta^{FS} B_j + e_j^{FS}.$$  

20. Past work uses similar Bartik instruments to identify wage effects in the labor supply decision in spatial equilibrium models. See, for example, Beaudry, Green, and Sand 2018, Khanna et al. 2021, Monte, Redding, and Rossi-Hansberg 2018, Morten and Oliveira 2018, and Piyapromdee 2020.

21. While location choices in the main migration model are at the city level, wages are only observed at the district-level. Nonetheless, wage heterogeneity is large with over 300 district boundaries across 13 industry codes consistently linked from 1999 to 2016.
Here, we assume that our instruments $B_j$ are exogenous and excluded, impacting fixed city preferences only through wages. This assumption comes from the fact that instruments exploit the historical (nearly two decades prior) labor market composition across industries and industry-specific growth at the national level, presumably orthogonal to current, city-specific preferences. We estimate effects across both instruments and include city-specific controls for robustness.

5 The effects of networks on migration

Table 4 reports model estimates across identification strategies. Columns (1-4) report estimates from restrictive fixed effects, with increasingly granular fixed effect bins. Columns (5-6) report estimates using instruments constructed from drought and heat shocks, respectively. Column 7 reports estimates using the hypothetical survey approach, with amenities estimated in the first step and included in the main migration model along with wages in the second step.

First, we find that, across specifications, migration exhibits strong gravity forces ($\delta_f > 0, \delta_d < 0, \delta_vs > 0$). Across destinations, individuals prefer moving to cities that are closer (or not moving at all), and the distance effect is roughly 10% smaller for in- vs. out-of-state migrations (for almost every specification). This suggests moving costs change discontinuously at state borders, suggestive of policy, linguistic, or cultural differences in the migration decision.

Second, we find that destination social networks are important determinants of migration choice. We estimate a large marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for networks in terms of distance: individuals are indifferent between a 1% increase in destination social networks and a 0.70-1.33% decrease in total distance. Importantly, while changing the granularity of fixed effects has only a modest impact on network effects, the IV approach reduces the MWTP for networks by 24-47% compared to restrictive fixed effects. The survey approach also reduces MWTP by 16-26%. This suggests that network effects may be upward biased, consistent with the idea that the geographic composition of social networks are positively correlated with city-specific preferences. Correcting for this endogeneity (with either network instruments or separately estimated amenities) reduces the effect of networks. For the remaining analysis, we use the specification with the smallest network effect (the heat shock IV approach in column 6, MWTP=0.7), and interpret resulting estimates as a lower bound.
Table 4: Model Estimates Across Specifications

| Dependent Variable: | Model: Same City \(_t-1\) | Choice \(_t\) | \(\log(\text{Distance})_{t-1}\) | \(\log(\text{Distance})_{t-1} \times \text{Same State}_{t-1}\) | \(\log(\text{Dest. Friends})_{t-1}\) | \(\log(\text{Dest. Wage})\) | MWTP for Networks (Distance) |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                     | No \(\xi\) \((1)\) | Baseline \((2)\) | Time Varying \(\xi\) \((3)\) | Choice \((4)\) | Drought IV \((5)\) | Heat IV \((6)\) | Survey Moments \((7)\) |
| Same City \(_t-1\)  | 2.10**\(^{***}\) | 3.69**\(^{***}\) | 4.33**\(^{***}\) | 3.88**\(^{***}\) | 4.05**\(^{***}\) | 1.93**\(^{***}\) |
|                     | (0.054) | (0.093) | (0.096) | (0.098) | (0.099) | (0.057) |
| \(\log(\text{Distance})_{t-1}\) | -0.430**\(^{***}\) | -0.246**\(^{***}\) | -0.171**\(^{***}\) | -0.322**\(^{***}\) | -0.364**\(^{***}\) | -0.565**\(^{***}\) |
|                     | (0.009) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.009) |
| \(\log(\text{Distance})_{t-1} \times \text{Same State}_{t-1}\) | 0.006 | 0.018**\(^{**}\) | 0.030**\(^{**}\) | 0.032**\(^{**}\) | 0.042**\(^{**}\) | -0.016**\(^{**}\) |
|                     | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.006) |
| \(\log(\text{Dest. Friends})_{t-1}\) | 0.857**\(^{***}\) | 0.997**\(^{***}\) | 1.02**\(^{***}\) | 1.02**\(^{***}\) | 0.786**\(^{***}\) | 0.651**\(^{***}\) | 0.837**\(^{***}\) |
|                     | (0.010) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.033) | (0.037) | (0.039) | (0.011) |
| \(\log(\text{Dest. Wage})\) | & & & & & & & 0.720**\(^{***}\) |
|                     | & & & & & (0.032) |

MWTP for Networks (Distance) | 1.18 | 1.30 | 1.33 | 1.24 | 0.910 | 0.700 | 0.990 |

Fixed-effects
Y Y Y Y Y Y

Indiv. \(\times\) Year
Y Y Y Y Y Y

Dest.
Y

Dest. \(\times\) Year
Y

Orig. \(\times\) Dest. \(\times\) Year
Y

Individual
Y

Observations
750K 750K 750K 750K 750K 750K 750K 750K

Notes: This table reports parameter estimates across specifications and identification strategies of a discrete-choice model of migration across destination cities in period \(t\) on distance and networks in period \(t - 1\) as in equation 5. Columns (1-4) report estimates from the “restrictive fixed effects” approach in equation 7, with increasingly granular fixed effects. Column 4 replicates the specification in Blumenstock, Chi, and Tan 2019 (“BCT”) with origin-by-destination-by-year effects. Columns (5-6) report estimates from the instrument approach, using drought and extreme heat shocks, respectively. We employ a control function approach to IV estimation as in Train 2009, where residuals from the first-stage in equation 9 are included as controls in the main model in equation 5. Column 7 reports estimates from the hypothetical survey question approach, where we (1) estimate amenities \(\hat{\alpha}_j\) using survey choices and (2) include these estimated \(\hat{\alpha}_j\) and wages in the main migration model in equation 5. Estimates of “MWTP for Networks” across specifications come from dividing the coefficient on Log(Dest. Friends) (\(\gamma\)) by the implied coefficient on Log(Distance) (\(\delta\)). We estimate \(\delta\) by regressing moving costs from each model (predicted utility using only distance terms or origin-by-destination-by-year effects) on Log(Distance) only. Estimates are restricted to a 1% sample of users from 2014 to 2017 over which all specifications can be estimated, and individual-year specific choice sets include all cities with at least 1 friend in period \(t\) and a random sample of 10 additional cities. Sampling probabilities are included as a control as in McFadden 1977. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the individual-by-year level.

*\(p < 0.10\), **\(p < 0.05\), ***\(p < 0.01\)
5.1 The effects of wages

Table 5 reports results from our two-step approach to estimating the wage elasticity. First, we estimate unobserved, city-specific preferences $\xi_j$ from our preferred specification using the heat shock instrument for network effects. Then, we estimate the effect of destination wages on these estimated city-specific preferences $\hat{\xi}_j$. For comparison, we estimate $\beta$ across OLS and IV approaches using our bartik instruments in equations 12-13.

We find first that individuals strongly prefer moving to cities with high average wages. This allows us to quantify network effects in terms of wages, suggesting individuals are trading off potential wage gains for larger networks in equilibrium. We find that individuals are indifferent between a 1% increase in destination networks and a 0.5-0.8% increase in destination wages, suggesting that while the wage effect is larger (in percentage terms) than either distance or networks, networks effects are also strong in monetary terms.

We also find that this wage elasticity is downward biased: moving from column (1) to (5), after including controls or constructed instruments, the effect of wages rises and the MWTP for networks falls. This suggests a negative relationship between wages and non-wage city-specific preferences (“amenities”). This is consistent with a model in which cities have larger amenities to compensate workers for low wages or larger wages to compensate for lower amenities. For the remaining analysis, we use both instruments as our preferred specification for the wage elasticity (column 5).
Table 5: The Wage Elasticity of Migration

| Dependent Variable: | OLS | Dest. $\hat{\xi}$ | IV |
|---------------------|-----|-------------------|----|
| Model:              | (1) | (2)               | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Log(Dest. Wage)     | 0.789*** | 0.820*** | 1.20*** | 1.13*** | 1.17*** |
|                     | (0.094) | (0.090) | (0.149) | (0.111) | (0.137) |
| Additional Controls | N   | Y                | Y   | Y   | Y   |
| MWTP for Networks (Wages) | -0.810 | -0.780 | -0.530 | -0.570 | -0.550 |
| Bartik Instruments  | ΔWage | ΔLabor | Both |
| Fixed-effects       |     |                   |     |
| Indiv. × Year       | Y   | Y                | Y   | Y   | Y   |
| Observations        | 7.5M | 7.5M             | 7.5M | 7.5M | 7.5M |
| Adjusted R²         | 0.185 | 0.228 | 0.201 | 0.209 | 0.204 |
| F-test (1st stage)  | 7.5M | 2.7M            | 4.4M |

Notes: This table reports parameter estimates across specifications of the effect of destination wages and estimated amenities from the preferred specification (Column 6 of Table 4). Columns (1-2) report estimates from OLS, with and without additional destination controls. Columns (3-4) report IV estimates using the constructed bartik instruments $B^{ΔWage}$ and $B^{ΔLabor}$ in equations 12-13. Finally, column (5) reports IV estimates using both bartik instruments. Estimates of “MWTP for Networks” across specifications come from dividing the coefficient on Log(Dest. Friends) ($\xi$) by the coefficient on Log(Dest. Wage) ($\beta$). Estimates are restricted to a 1% sample of users from 2014 to 2017 over which all specifications can be estimated, and individual-year specific choice sets include all cities with at least 1 friend in period $t$ and a random sample of 10 additional cities. Sampling probabilities are included as a control as in McFadden 1977. Individual-by-year fixed effects are included for all specifications and standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the individual-by-year level.

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

5.2 Gravity heterogeneity by networks

We find that, in general, the marginal cost of distance is smaller for in-state destinations, suggesting heterogeneity in the gravity relationship. We extend our simple model of migration to account for heterogeneity in preferences for distance by networks – are gravity forces weaker in destinations with strong networks? To this end, we can parametrize $\delta(.)$ to include interactions between
networks and distance terms:

\[
\delta(D_{ij}, N_{ij}) = \delta_f 1\{D_{ij} \neq 0\} + \delta_v \log(D_{ij}) + \delta_{vn} \log(D_{ij}) \times 1\{s(i) \neq s(j)\}
+ \delta_{fn} 1\{D_{ij} \neq 0\} \times N_{ij} + \delta_{vn} \log(D_{ij}) \times N_{ij} + \delta_{vsn} \log(D_{ij}) \times 1\{s(i) \neq s(j)\} \times N_{ij},
\]

(16)

where the \(\delta_{\cdot n}\) terms describe the additional moving cost that varies with destination networks. The “net” marginal effects of distance terms are thus \(\delta + \delta_{\cdot n} N_{ij}\), which depend on destination network size. In our preferred estimation, these \(\delta_{\cdot n}\) terms can be estimated by including additional instruments that interact our heat shock instrument with the distance terms.

Figure 9 plots the net marginal effect of distance terms as a function of destination social networks. The dark red curves show that as destination networks increase, gravity forces weaken: the marginal effects of all distance terms (in Log wage units) get closer to zero (\(\delta_{fn} < 0, \delta_{vn} > 0, \delta_{vsn} < 0\)). For example, in the left panel, increasing networks in the origin from 0 to 300 friends reduces the fixed cost of migrating outside the origin from roughly 6 times wages to 2 times wages. This suggests that in addition to providing level shifts in utility through \(\gamma\), networks also reduce distance-related moving costs through \(\delta_{\cdot n}\).

How does accounting for networks change the gravity relationship? To this end, we first compute “true” moving costs \(m_{c_{ij}}\) from our preferred specification – the sum of all distance and network terms:

\[
m_{c_{ij}} \equiv \gamma N_{ij} + \delta(D_{ij}, N_{ij}).
\]

(17)

Then, we compute alternative distance effects by regressing true moving costs \(m_{c_{ij}}\) on alternative specifications:

\[
m_{c_{ij}} = \gamma N_{ij} + \delta^N(D_{ij}) + \epsilon^N_{ij} \quad \text{or} \quad m_{c_{ij}} = \delta^{NN}(D_{ij}) + \epsilon^{NN}_{ij},
\]

(18)

where \(\gamma^N\) and \(\delta^N(.)\) capture network and distance effects under a model with no distance-network interactions; and \(\delta^{NN}(.)\) capture distance effects under a model without networks entirely. By comparing \(\delta(.)\) and \(\delta^N(.)\) to \(\delta^{NN}(.)\) we can compute how gravity forces would change if we account for networks in the migration model.

In Figure 9, we find that accounting for networks dramatically reduces gravity forces, moving from a model without networks (blue) to a model with networks (red). In particular, the fixed cost of migration falls by 42% (left), the
marginal cost of distance falls by 19% (middle), and the additional marginal
cost of distance for out-of-state moves falls by 39% (right). Taken together,
these estimates suggest that a large portion of the gravity relationship can
be explained by social networks. Previous estimates of gravity (that do not
incorporate networks) may thus overestimate moving costs associated with
physical distance.

Figure 9: Effects of Distance by Destination Social Networks

Notes: This figure plots the net marginal effect of distance as a function of destination social
networks, across distance terms (left, middle, right) and model specifications (blue, red, dark
red). We first estimate our preferred specification (column 6 of Table 4) with interactions between
distance and networks as in equation 16. The dark red curve plots the estimated distance effects as
a function of networks, scaled by the wage elasticity: $\delta(D_{ij}, N_{ij})/\beta$. The blue and red curves plot
distance coefficients from a regression of true moving costs $m_{ci} = \gamma N_{ij} + \delta(D_{ij}, N_{ij})$ on distance
and network terms with no interactions (red) and distance terms only (blue) as in equations 17-
18. The bottom panels plot the distribution of social networks across origins (left), non-origins
(middle), and in-state cities (right).

6 General equilibrium

Our model of migration above shows that social networks are an important de-
terminant of migration choice, and explain a substantial portion of the gravity
relationship in India. While this suggests expanding social networks may in-
crease migration, the aggregate implications of this counterfactual are unclear. In addition to a labor supply response through migration, general equilibrium forces such as labor demand responses, agglomeration, and congestion would impact the distribution of wages, amenities, and welfare. To study the effects of network counterfactuals, we thus develop a simple, static spatial equilibrium framework to account for these forces.

We borrow elements from prior work on tractable spatial equilibrium models as in Bryan and Morten 2019 and Moretti 2011. Individuals choose locations to maximize utility (governed by our migration model above). Firms hire workers to maximize profit and set wages equal to the marginal product of labor, which itself depends on agglomeration. Land markets determine local prices which depend on congestion forces. Amenities also adjust depending on amenity congestion forces. Finally, markets clear in equilibrium so that individuals are maximizing utility over locations (migration/labor supply), firms are maximizing profits, and land markets and amenities obey congestion.

Representative firms from each city \( j \) choose quantities of labor \( L_j \) to maximize profit, setting (real) wages equal to marginal product:

\[
Y_j = L_j^{\phi - \psi},
\]

where \( \phi \) captures agglomeration forces that increase productivity and \( \psi \) captures congestion forces that increase local prices (e.g. housing). 22

City amenities \( \xi^A_j \) are also endogenous as a function of local labor supply:

\[
\xi^A_j = L_j^{-\theta},
\]

where \( \theta \) captures amenity congestion forces that increase with population size (e.g. pollution, sanitation, crime, density.)

Finally, individuals maximize utility over locations determining labor supply:

\[
L_j = \sum_i 1\{j = \text{argmax}_j V_i (Y_j, \xi^A_j)\}.
\]

The spatial equilibrium is a set of local labor markets and amenities \( \{L_j, Y_j, \xi^A_j\} \) such that equations 19-21 are satisfied.

---

22. Prices are normalized to unity. This is consistent with separately adding a land market clearing condition as in Moretti 2011.
6.1 Parametrization

Table 6 reports parameters used in our spatial equilibrium framework. Labor supply parameters that govern individual location decisions are estimated using our preferred specification of the migration model above. Due to data availability, we borrow equilibrium parameters from Bryan and Morten 2019, which studies migration in a developing country (Indonesia) and itself borrows from prior estimates in the literature where unavailable.

Table 6: Spatial Equilibrium Parameters

| Parameter | Description | Value |
|-----------|-------------|-------|
| Panel A: Labor Supply Parameters |
| $\beta$ | Wage elasticity | 1.11 |
| $\xi^A_j$ | City amenities (initial) | 0.0-6.4 |
| $\gamma$ | Network elasticity | 0.71 |
| $\delta_f, \delta_v, \delta_{vs}$ | Distance elasticities | 6.3,-0.55,0.05 |
| $\delta_{fn}, \delta_{vn}, \delta_{vsn}$ | Distance $\times$ Network elasticities | -0.57,0.08,-0.02 |
| Panel B: Equilibrium Parameters |
| $\phi$ | Wage agglomeration | 0.10 |
| $\psi$ | Price congestion | 0.02 |
| $\theta$ | Amenity congestion | 0.02 |

Notes: This table reports parameter estimates used to specify the spatial equilibrium model. Panel A reports labor supply parameters estimated using our preferred specification of the migration model (column 6 of Table 4) with interactions between distance and networks as in equation 16. Panel B reports equilibrium parameters borrowed from Bryan and Morten 2019.

6.2 Counterfactuals

We wish to study the implications of social network expansion on equilibrium wages. Figure 10 shows various changes to the geographic social network structure compared to an example baseline network and other counterfactuals (e.g. reducing distance or increasing wages). Panel B depicts a scenario in which the variable cost of distance is zero (setting $\delta_v, \delta_{vn} = 0$), which shrinks the effective distance from $i$ to each destination city $j$ compared to the baseline in Panel A. Panel C equalizes networks across cities to the same number of
connections as the origin. Panel D fixes the total number of connections, but reallocates them to cities in the top 10% of average wages. Panel E simply doubles the wages of cities in the top 10% of average wages, while Panel F doubles both wages and networks in those cities.
Notes: This figure depicts visual intuition for network counterfactuals. Each panel an example of a modified individual networks across cities. Panel A shows an example network at baseline, while Panels (B-F) show modified networks. Each bubble is a city $j_1, \ldots, j_{12}$. The central bubble denoted by $i$ is individual $i$’s origin city. Lines indicate whether or not individual $i$ is connected to the respective city. The size of the bubble denote the size of $i$’s network in the given city. Darker (lighter) bubbles denote cities with higher (lower) average wages. In Panel B, we set the variable cost of distance to zero ($\beta_{v, E} = 0$). In Panel C, we set network sizes in all cities equal to that of the origin. In Panel D, assign all friends equally to cities in the top 10% of average wages. In Panel E, we double the wages of cities in the top 10% of average wages. In Panel F, we both double network size and wages of cities in the top 10% of average wages.
These counterfactuals are shocks to initial values of \( \{N_{ij}, Y_i\} \) or parameters \( \delta(\cdot) \), which results in a new distribution of population, wages, and amenities \( \{L_{ij}, Y_i, \xi_{ij}\} \) that satisfy equilibrium conditions in equations 19-21 given equilibrium parameters. We can compare these new equilibria against baseline (initial values from observed data) to study the aggregate impacts of these counterfactuals.

Table 7 reports the impacts of these counterfactual scenarios on equilibrium outcomes relative to the baseline (Panel A). In Panel B, we find that eliminating the variable costs associated with distance (akin to improving transport infrastructure) increases rates of migration by 2.6 times and distance from origin by 5.7 times. This increase in migration results in a 3% increase in average wages, a 10% increase in amenities, and a 9% increase in welfare. We find that wage gains are concentrated among individuals who live in cities in the bottom-quartile of the average wage distribution, with a 17% increase in wages and 12% increase in welfare. By construction, individuals who live in cities at the top-quartile \textit{ex-ante} have the lowest to gain in terms of wages from reducing moving costs.

In Panel C, we test the counterfactual of equalizing networks across cities, such that individuals have the same number of connections in each destination city as they do in their origin city. This increases the total number of connections by 20 times, given how few connections individuals have outside their origin city, which increases migration rates by 4.7 times and distances by 12 times. This network-driven increase in migration is due to two forces: (1) destinations becoming relatively more attractive due to main network effects via \( \gamma \); and (2) distance-related moving costs become smaller via \( \delta_n \), which makes destinations effectively “closer”. This increase in migration results in a 3% increase in average wages, a 22% increase in amenities, and a 21% increase in welfare. For the bottom-quartile wage group, average wages increase by 24%. In Panel D, we find that the network reallocation counterfactual delivers large returns as well, while keeping total networks fixed for each individual. Relative to the zero variable distance cost counterfactual, equalizing or reallocating networks across cities delivers even larger gains, especially so for those in the bottom-quartile.

Finally, in Panel E we see that doubling the average wages of top-quartile cities (akin to local productivity shocks) increases wages by 52% and welfare by 22% overall. However, gains are concentrated among those who live in top-quartile cities \textit{ex-ante} as opposed to new migrants from bottom-quartile cities. In Panel F, we find that doubling networks as well as wages for the top-quartile cities leads to twice the wage gain for bottom-quartile cities.
Table 7: Equilibrium Impacts of Counterfactuals

**Panel A: Baseline**

|                  | Network Size | Migration Rate | Distance From Origin (KM) | Level at Baseline |
|------------------|--------------|----------------|---------------------------|-------------------|
|                  |              |                |                           | Mean Wage (USD)   |
|                  |              |                |                           | SD Wage (USD)     |
|                  |              |                |                           | Amenities (%Wages) |
|                  |              |                |                           | Total Welfare (%Wages) |
| All              | 83.24        | 0.04           | 8.60                      | 9328.19           |
| Bottom Quartile Wage | 67.57        | 0.05           | 18.56                     | 4226.46           |
| Top Quartile Wage | 101.81       | 0.03           | 5.09                      | 14831.11          |

**Notes:** This table reports estimates of the impacts of various counterfactuals on equilibrium outcomes from the parametrized spatial equilibrium model. Panel A reports baseline levels of each outcome, split by income group: all individuals, those who live in a city in the bottom quartile of the average wage distribution across cities, and those who live in the top quartile. Panels B-F report equilibrium outcomes from various counterfactuals described in Figure 10. For these panels, outcomes are reported as a multiple of the baseline level for comparison. For each scenario, we find values of variables that satisfy equilibrium conditions in equations 19-21 using model parameters in Table 6. We simulate draws of $e_{ij}$ in the location choice and keep those that satisfy utility maximization of individuals. Estimates are reported as averages over the empirical distribution of kept draws. Estimates come from a 0.1% sample of users.
7 Mechanisms

Our models and data suggest social networks are an important determinant of migration, and that expansions to these networks may deliver aggregate economic returns. The mechanisms behind these network effects themselves are unclear: individuals may prefer moving to cities with large networks because of economic support, such as housing, job referrals, informal insurance or credit; or emotional support such as socialization and pleasure (Boyd 1989). The implications may be policy relevant. If social support is entirely economic, governments may consider expanding social insurance, credit markets, or reducing job-search frictions in order to combat the reliance on social networks. If it is emotional, governments may consider investing in community-building programs and other policies that may expand social networks themselves.

While we do not observe these mechanisms directly, we attempt to study them in two ways: first, we study heterogeneity in networks effects along economic characteristics at the destination – that is, if network effects are smaller when destinations have higher wages, migrant-friendly policies, or better access to formal credit; and second, we administer a qualitative survey among Facebook users to understand which components of social support are used most frequently.

Lastly, in contrast to studying what drives the effects of networks, we study what drives the expansion of networks themselves. We exploit data on social networks of individuals over time to provide suggestive evidence on the effects of college attendance on social capital outcomes.

7.1 Heterogeneity by destination economic characteristics

We augment our migration model by including observed heterogeneity in the network effect $\gamma$ that varies by destination characteristics $X_{kj}$:

$$
\gamma_j = \gamma_0 + \sum_k \gamma_k X_{kj}.
$$

We focus on three destination characteristics that capture potential sources of economic support for migrants: the average wage, the number of bank branches, and an index for migrant-friendly policy. Data on bank branches from the 2017 Reserve Bank of India (RBI) database, geocoded to the district level. The migrant-friendly policy index is constructed by assessing state-level
policies across government sectors as in Aggarwal et al. 2020.23

To address network endogeneity in the interaction terms, we estimate parameters \( \gamma_k \) by including additional interacted instruments as we do for estimating the distance interactions \( \delta_{pp} \). However, we note that characteristics \( X_{kj} \) are not exogenous, so we interpret estimates as “conditional” network effects.

Table 8 reports estimates of network effects by destination characteristics. We find that improvements to economic outcomes of the destination lead to statistically-significant reductions in the network effect. The negative signs are consistent with an economic mechanism of social support, where if formal economic conditions improve, there is less reliance on informal social networks to supplement them. Magnitudes are economically meaningful: at the mean of other variables, moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of wages, bank branches, and migrant-friendly policy reduces the network effect by 6%, 11%, and 26%, respectively.

23. The index is a composite measure across sector-specific indexes including children’s rights, education, health, housing, identity and registration, labor market integration, political participation, and social benefits.
Table 8: Network Effects by Destination Characteristics

| Dependent Variable: | Choice; Heat IV |
|---------------------|----------------|
| Model:              | (1)            |
| \(\text{Log(Dest. Friends)}_{t-1}\)       | 2.8***         |
|                     | (0.39)         |
| \(\text{Log(Dest. Friends)}_{t-1} \times \text{Log(Dest. Wage)}\) | -0.03*         |
|                     | (0.02)         |
| \(\text{Log(Dest. Friends)}_{t-1} \times \text{Log(Dest. Bank Branches)}\) | -0.07***       |
|                     | (0.01)         |
| \(\text{Log(Dest. Friends)}_{t-1} \times \text{Log(Dest. Migrant-Friendly Index)}\) | -0.44***       |
|                     | (0.09)         |
| Distance Controls   | Y              |
| Distance \times Network Controls | Y              |

**Fixed-effects**
- Indiv. \times Year: Y
- Dest.: Y

**Observations**: 4M

**Notes**: This table reports estimates of model coefficients using our preferred specification of the migration model (column 6 of Table 4) with interactions between distance and networks and between networks and three destination characteristics. Government data on wages and bank branches by district come from the 2017-18 round of the Periodic Labour Force Survey and the 2017 Reserve Bank of India database, respectively. The migrant-friendly index by state comes from Aggarwal et al. 2020. Standard errors are in paranthesis and clustered at the individual-by-year level.

* \(p < 0.10\), ** \(p < 0.05\), *** \(p < 0.01\)

### 7.1.1 Natural experiment: the expansion of bank branches

Because destination characteristics \(X_{ij}\) are not randomly assigned, these effects may capture other components of destinations that are correlated with \(X_{ij}\), potentially biasing estimates of interaction terms. To assess, this we exploit a natural experiment in India that expanded credit access in some districts and not in others. In particular, India implemented the 2005 Banking Regulation Act, which incentivized the private sector to open bank branches in “unbanked”
districts and not in “banked” districts. This categorization was decided using a cutoff based on the population-per-branch in each district in 2005, which resulted in a discontinuous increase in bank branches a decade later in “unbanked” districts above this cutoff. This policy variation has been used to study the impacts of formal credit access in Young 2017 and Khanna and Mukherjee 2020.

We can exploit this variation using a similar regression discontinuity design to study the effects of formal credit expansion on the network effect of migration. In particular, we can interact the network effect γ with whether or not a district was marginally “unbanked” – just above vs. just below the cutoff. In particular, we include network interactions with the running variable (population-per-branch in 2005) and an indicator for being above the cutoff (unbanked in 2005), restricting to districts within a narrow bandwidth of the cutoff:

\[ \gamma_j = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{Population-per-branch}_j + \gamma_2 \text{Unbanked}_j. \] (23)

The term \( \gamma_2 \) captures the additional network effect of being above the cutoff (unbanked) and therefore being exposed to a greater expansion of formal credit.

Table 9 reports estimates from this natural experiment. Column (1) reports the first-stage: we find that in a narrow interval around the cutoff, there is a statistically significant increase in private bank branches in 2017 (roughly 25 more branches) for districts that are marginally unbanked in 2005. Column (2) reports the reduced-form: we find that being marginally unbanked (and thus an increase in the number of private bank branches) results in negative but statistically insignificant impact to the network effect of migration. While we cannot reject a zero effect size, scaling this point estimate by the first-stage effect suggests moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of private banks reduces the network effect by 18%.

Taken together, our estimates of heterogeneity suggest economic improvements in the destination may reduce the reliance on informal social networks in migration choice. This suggests the importance of economic support in network effects, and the potential role for governments to reduce network-related moving costs through credit expansion and migrant-friendly policy.
Table 9: Network Effects and Banking Expansion

| Dependent Variables: | Dest. Pvt. Branches | Choice/Heat IV |
|----------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| Model:               | (1) OLS             | (2) Logit      |
| Log(Dest. Friends)\_(t-1) | -0.30 (0.47)       |                |
| Log(Dest. Friends)\_(t-1) \times Dest. Pop. Per Branch | 0.08** (0.04)      |                |
| Log(Dest. Friends)\_(t-1) \times 1\{Dest. Unbanked\} | -0.08 (0.12)        |                |
| Dest. Pop. Per Branch | -12.2*** (3.7)      |                |
| 1\{Dest. Unbanked\} | 24.7* (14.2)        |                |
| Bandwidth            | 3.3                 | 3.3            |
| Distance Controls    | Y                   |                |
| Distance × Network Controls | Y               |                |
| Fixed-effects        |                     |                |
| Indiv. × Year        | Y                   |                |
| Dest.                | Y                   |                |
| Observations         | 185                 | 1M             |

Notes: This table reports estimates of the effects of India’s 2005 Bank Regulation Act on private bank branches and network effects in migration choice. Column (1) reports estimates from an OLS regression at the district-level of private bank branches in 2017 on the running variable (population-per-branch in 2005) and a treatment indicator for being above the cutoff (unbanked in 2005). Column (2) reports estimates of network effects interacted with these terms, using our preferred specification of the migration model (column 6 of Table 4) with interactions between distance and networks and between networks and destination banking variables in Column 1. Estimates are restricted to districts within a bandwidth of 3.3 persons-per-branch above and below the cutoff. Bank branch data come from the Reserve Bank of India database. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the district level.

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
7.2 Qualitative survey responses

While they are significant, economic characteristics cannot explain the entire heterogeneity in network effects across destinations. To complement this, we administered a survey to capture beliefs regarding social support. Figure 11 reports the distribution of responses across categories to the following question:

What is the most often way you find support from your friends and family?

As their most frequent support mechanism, we find that 60% of respondents list emotional support such as happiness from spending time together or talking during stressful times; and 40% of respondents list economic support such as information or assistance (with education, employment, or marriage opportunities), informal loans (for common expenses or during emergencies), or access to housing during unexpected shocks. This suggests an important role for emotional support – in addition to economic support – in driving preferences for social networks.

Figure 11: Survey Evidence on Social Support

Notes: This figure reports survey frequencies across categories for the question “what is the most often way you find support from your friends in the following categories?” The survey was administered among a random sample of Indian Facebook users in 2020.
7.3 Education and social capital formation

Our survey evidence suggests emotional support may be important, consistent with persistent networks effects even for destinations that are economically advanced (high wages, access to formal banks, and migrant-friendly policy). One conclusion may be that, due to the emotional support provided by social networks, economic policy alone may not fully eliminate the reliance on informal networks in migration choice. Given the existence (and importance) of network effects in migration, as well as the economic returns to network expansion, a related policy question is therefore: what policies can expand social networks?

In our descriptive findings, we show that individuals that attended college have larger and richer networks compared to those that did not. Indeed, much work suggests education is an important dimension of social capital formation. However, the effects of education access on network formation remain largely unquantified, especially so in developing countries where informal social networks may be more important.\textsuperscript{24}

To quantify these effects, we compare the growth of social capital outcomes between college-attendees and non-college-attendees throughout their lifecycle. We estimate the effects of college attendance using a “panel difference-in-differences” specification for individual $i$ with age $a$ in year $t$:

$$Y_{iat} = \sum_{a'=15}^{30} \beta_{a'} 1\{\text{College Attended}\}_i \times 1\{a = a'\} + \eta_i + \delta_{a} + \omega_t + \epsilon_{iat}, \quad (24)$$

where $Y_{iat}$ is an individual outcome of interest and $1\{\text{College Attended}\}_i$ is whether individual $i$ ever attended college. The parameter $\beta_{a}$ captures the additional effect of college attendance on $Y$ at age $a$. We expect that these additional effects should be close to zero before age 17, the typical age of college attendance in India, and increase thereafter.

Figure 12 reports estimates of $\beta_{a}$ across four individual outcomes. We find that by age 30 college attendance increases total network size, the number of connected cities, and the average phone price of friends by 20%, 15%, and 6%, respectively. We also find that by age 30 the distance to home increases by 25%, consistent with both human and social capital gains driving out-migration. Education may thus have additional returns in the labor market through its impact on network expansion and the resulting reduction in moving costs.

\textsuperscript{24} An exception is Overgoor, State, and Adamic 2020, which uses similar data from Facebook to study network formation among U.S. college students.
Figure 12: Social Capital and College Attendance

Notes: This figure reports estimates of $\beta_x$, the effect of college-attendance on four individual outcomes (y-axis) by age (x-axis), as in the difference-in-differences specification in equation 24. Black intervals denote 95% confidence intervals of the estimate, clustered at the individual level. Dashed vertical lines denote typical ages of college entry and exit. Estimates are pooled across cohorts (age of college entry) and come from a 1% sample users in our Facebook sample.
8 Discussion

In this paper, we use aggregated and de-identified data from Facebook to show that social networks are an important dimension of spatial mobility. We find that a substantial portion of the gravity relationship in India can be explained by networks. A simple spatial equilibrium framework suggests expanding or reallocating social networks across space may deliver significant economic gains, especially so for low-income populations. Our data and surveys suggest both economic and emotional support are important mechanisms for this reliance on social networks. Finally, we find that college attendance leads to significant gains in social capital.

Our conclusions are limited in several ways. We use aggregated and de-identified microdata from Facebook that allows us to observe both migration and social networks with fine granularity, at the individual level. To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive and detailed data on either individual migration patterns or social networks in India. However, our sample differs from India’s broader population, and is generally located in higher income regions and has a higher propensity to migrate. In addition, we use a restricted sample of Facebook users for which we observe consistent migration data over four years. In that sense, parameter estimates are conditional on this selected sample. When re-weighting our data to match India’s income distribution across regions, we find that resulting estimates are comparable. However, there remains unobserved differences even within region and income groups between our sample and that of India’s population, which we cannot adjust for and may further impact estimates.

In addition to these data considerations, our model is limited in two key ways. First, we do not account for selection on skill in our model of migration. In particular, individuals choose locations based on average wages and not expected wages conditional on their skill. In general, migrants come from the right tail of the income and education distribution of their hometown, and thus may face expected wages that differ from average wages. Indeed, Bryan and Morten 2019 find that selection explains a substantial portion of the observed wage heterogeneity in Indonesia and therefore reduces the potential gains from lowering moving costs. In this paper, we thus interpret our wage elasticity as capturing labor supply responses to (and resulting estimates of WTP as relative to) average wages and not individual wages. In equilibrium, we anticipate selection forces would decrease the potential gains of social network expansion.
Second, we do not account for dynamics or endogenous network formation in our spatial equilibrium framework. Under various counterfactuals in period $t$, we solve for a new equilibrium by finding the distribution of wages and population that satisfy equilibrium conditions in period $t + 1$. We do not attempt to model how and at what rate that economy moves to the new equilibrium. In particular, as individuals change location decisions in period $t + 1$, this impacts the distribution of networks in $t + 1$, which may cause further migration in period $t + 2$. In addition, social interactions between individuals may expand social networks, particularly so in areas with more migration and high population density. As Munshi 2020 points out, dynamic models of migration with social networks suggest substantially larger network effects due to dynamic complementarities. We anticipate these dynamic and network formation forces would increase the potential gains of social network expansion. Incorporating both selection and dynamics into this framework would therefore be a fruitful avenue for further research.
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