John Stuart Mill and Fourierism: ‘association’, ‘friendly rivalry’ and distributive justice

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ABSTRACT

John Stuart Mill’s self-description as ‘under the general designation of Socialist’ has been under-explored. It is an important feature of something else often overlooked: the importance of the French context of Mill’s thought. This article focuses on the role of Fourierism in the development of Mill’s ideas, exploring the links to Fourierism in Mill’s writing on profit-sharing; his use of the words ‘association’ and ‘friendly rivalry’; and his views concerning distributive justice. It then reconsiders his assessment of Fourierism as a desirable, workable and immediately implementable form of social reform, ultimately arguing it was Mill’s most-preferred form of ‘utopian’ socialism.

KEYWORDS

John Stuart Mill; socialism; Charles Fourier; Fourierism; utopian socialism; cooperation; Victor Considerant

1. Introduction

John Stuart Mill is mainly known, amongst political philosophers, as a theorist of liberty, with some consideration made of his writings on democracy. Over the years, relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to Mill’s pronouncement, in his Autobiography, that his politics put him ‘under the general designation of Socialist’. In the first two-thirds of the twentieth century what attention there was, was mainly focused on showing how Mill was not really ever a socialist, or was not one for long (with many blaming his wife for this apparent aberration). More recently, although this viewpoint still has its proponents, there have been some attempts to work out more seriously what Mill might have meant, rather than dismissing his self-designation out of hand, as well as some interest in Mill’s writing on distributive justice.

This interest has focused on Mill’s connections to ‘utopian’ socialism, and particularly Owenite communists and co-operators, and the Saint-Simonians. Mill’s relationship with Fourierism, however, has not been studied in much length or depth. Yet Fourierism was an important element in the development in his views regarding socialism, social justice, and the means by which society might undergo an organic, spontaneous, grass-roots-led transformation into socialism. It is one of the three kinds of utopian socialism Mill considers in depth in his Principles of Political Economy and also in Chapters on Socialism (where Mill also considers more Marxist, ‘revolutionary’ socialism), and as such, it deserves scholarly attention at least as much as Owenism and Saint-Simonism. Indeed, it arguably deserves
more, considering the more favourable view Mill took of it as a desirable, workable and immediately implementable form of socialism.8

The links between Mill’s thought and Fourierism throw revealing light on the development and content of his views. Much of this is discernible from Mill’s formal discussion of Fourierism in Principles, but we miss important elements if we only look for illumination there. For this reason, this article takes the following structure. Section 2 briefly describes the development of Mill’s views on Fourierism. Section 3 flags up three instances outside of Mill’s ‘formal’ assessment of Fourierism where Fourierist ideas and language form a part of his considerations on social justice and reform: the word ‘association’; the specific ‘association’ of the Parisian house-painting business described at some length in Principles; and Mill’s notion of ‘friendly rivalry’. Section 4 explores Mill’s formal assessment of Fourierism in Principles and Chapters, particularly the general desirability of Fourierism; its workability if ever set up; and the desirability and feasibility of its immediate implementation, including its claims to be an improvement on not only contemporary capitalism, but other forms of socialism and possible reforms of capitalism. Section 5 concludes with a consideration of the importance of Fourierism to Mill’s socialism and his political theory more generally; and the claim that this oft-overlooked form of contemporary socialism had a more important role in the development of Mill’s ideas than has previously been recognized.

2. The development of Mill’s views regarding (and knowledge of) Fourierism

Mill first became aware of Charles Fourier in 1832, when some of the Saint-Simonians, including Jules Lechavalier and Able Transon, joined his sect.9 Mill had met Henri Saint-Simon himself in 1820, though this was, as Mill notes, when Saint-Simon was ‘not yet the founder either of a philosophy or a religion, and [was] considered only as a clever original’.10 Mill came to know of this ‘philosophy’ and ‘religion’ through reading Saint-Simonian works in 1829 and 1830, and through his friendship, from 1829, with one of the ‘most enthusiastic’ Saint-Simonian ‘disciples’, Gustave d’Eichthal.11 He met the Saint-Simonian leaders, Amand Bazard and Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin, in 1830, and, he says, ‘as long as their public teachings and proselytism continued, I read nearly everything they wrote’.12

When Mill first came to know of him through this Saint-Simonian defection, Fourier was sixty, and Mill twenty-six. Of Fourier’s main works, his Theory of the Four Movements had been published twenty-four years previously (1808); his Traité de l’association domestique-agricole (later republished as Theory of Universal Unity) had been published ten years previously (1822); and his Le Nouveau Monde Industriel et Sociétaire three years previously (1829). Fourier’s ideas, then, had been developed and promulgated earlier than Saint-Simon’s, but Mill came to know of their existence a little later.

Mill’s initial attitude to Fourier was by no means sympathetic.13 He describes Fourier as ‘a sort of … Owen who is to accomplish all things by means of cooperation & of rendering labour agreeable, & under whose system man is to acquire absolute power over the laws of physical nature; among other happy results, the sea is to be changed into lemonade’.14 (Fourier actually only said the sea would taste like (pink) lemonade.15)
This lack of sympathy (and perhaps also a lack of detailed knowledge) may account for Fourierism’s omission from the discussion of socialism in the first iterations of *Principles* (manuscript and first edition written/published in 1848), despite the fact that Mill had known of Fourier for fourteen years. Instead, Mill discusses Owenism as a form of ‘communism’ and Saint-Simonianism as a form of ‘socialism’ in the relevant chapter.16

However, by the time Mill was considering editing and republishing *Principles* in 1849, he was discussing Fourier’s ideas far more seriously in correspondence with Harriet Taylor.17 In the 1849 edition, Mill introduces18 a discussion of Fourierism, which he calls ‘[t]he most skilfully combined, and in every respect the least open to objection, of the forms of Socialism’.19 In 1852, he combined his accounts of Saint-Simonism and Fourierism as exemplars of contemporary socialism, and from that point on continued to call Fourierism ‘[t]he most skilfully combined, and with the greatest foresight of objections, of all the forms of Socialism’, ‘flourishing in the number, talent, and zeal of its adherents’.20

Mill’s more serious consideration of Fourier stems from his reading, in 1849, of Fourier’s disciple Victor Considerant’s 1848 work, *Le Socialisme devant le vieux monde, ou le vivant devant les morts*.21 Mill had also read something else by Considerant, for in February 1849 he refers to *Socialisme* as ‘another volume’ by Considerant (though exactly what he had previously read is hard to pin down: eight of Considerant’s works had been published by this date).22 By the time he came to write *Chapters* Mill was also familiar with Fourier’s *Theory of the Four Movements*, and Considerant’s *La Destinée Sociale* (first published 1834–38), though it is not clear precisely how early Mill read these.23 He also possibly read a translation of Fourier’s work called *The Passions of the Human Soul* in the early eighteen-fifties, as he owned a copy published in 1851.24

Fourierism is also mentioned, and at some length, in the incomplete, posthumously-published, *Chapters*. In this work, Mill quotes extensively from Considerant’s *Destinée Sociale*.25 He describes Considerant’s writing as ‘deft’ and ‘powerful’, and noted Fourier’s ‘unmistakable proofs of genius’ (though ‘mixed … with the wildest and most unscientific fancies respecting the physical world, and much interesting but rash speculation on the past and future history of humanity’).26

Mill knew of Fourierism, then, almost as long as he knew of Saint-Simonism, though his serious engagement with it is almost twenty years shorter. He retained his scepticism of Fourier’s ‘scientific’ views throughout his life, but, through reading both Fourier and Considerant more widely, became much more positive in his views concerning Fourier’s social schemes, as I will now explore in more detail.

### 3. ‘Association’ and ‘friendly rivalry’

*Principles* and *Chapters* both contain formal discussions of Fourierism, which will be considered in Section 4, where Mill explains what he takes Fourierism to be, and assesses its desirability, workability and likelihood of successful implementation. First, I want to consider three places outside of this formal assessment where Fourierist ideas play an often-unrecognised role in the development, and substance, of Mill’s thoughts regarding social and economic reform.
3.1. Fourierism and profit-sharing

In the chapter ‘On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes’, Mill explains how he thinks the working class are unlikely to ‘be permanently contented with the condition of labouring for wages as their ultimate state’.27 The relation of employer-employee cannot be ‘permanently maintained’.28 Instead, ‘the relation of masters and workpeople will be gradually superseded by partnership, in one of two forms: in some cases, association of the labourers with the capitalists; in others, and perhaps finally in all, association of labourers among themselves’.29 In this section I am interested in the former – the next section deals with the latter.

Mill describes in detail several versions of profit-sharing and ‘association’ (producer and/or consumer cooperatives).30 A good deal of time is spent describing the success of Edme-Jean Leclaire’s house-painting business in Paris, whose profits greatly increased when profit-sharing was introduced in 1842.31 Mill had evidently heard of this experiment at least as early as 1845, when an account was published, which he cites, in Chamber’s Edinburgh Journal.32 He had also read Leclaire’s own pamphlets and letters (first published in 1842)33; and the favourable accounts published in Charles Duveyrier’s Lettres Politiques (1843), Michel Chevalier’s Lettres sur l’Organisation du Travail (1848) and Villemé’s Nouveau Traité d’Economie Politique (1857).34 Additionally, Leclaire’s scheme was described and praised at length by Louis Blanc in his Organisation of Labour,35 and Mill may also have come to hear of it from that source.

In England, profit-sharing (including by employers mentioned by Mill in Principles)36 was sometimes embraced as a means of counteracting trade-unionism.37 It was, therefore, not wholly radical nor particularly aligned with socialism (not that all socialism embraced/ was embraced by trade unionism). But Leclaire was evidently a radical, and in Mill’s Principles, the idea of profit-sharing is radical. Moreover, as Wendy Sarvasy rightly points out, profit-sharing is importantly connected to Mill’s socialism, for profit-sharing ‘prefigures’ socialism.38 That is, profit-sharing is a route to, and shows something akin to the potential future organization of, (cooperative) socialism. Schemes involving labourers joining with capitalists render workers, according to Mill, better educated, and more independent, intelligent, and prudent than mere wage-labourers; and had a chance of healing the ‘breach’ and ‘widening and embittering feud’ between capital and labour.39 These schemes could, as Mill describes it in Principles, organically transform themselves into producer cooperatives over time.40 Profit-sharing, therefore, held out hopes for social improvement as well as economic, not only improving the conditions of the working population, but improving the character of everyone in society; making them more capable of acting in the general good; and increasing social harmony as well as the general happiness.

Leclaire himself offers an example of a profit-sharing business eventually being taken over by the workers themselves – with the blessing and consent of the original owner.41 What makes him particularly interesting for this article is the influence on Leclaire of the ideas of Fourier. Even if he was never a self-declared disciple, Leclaire had read Fourier, ‘professed for some of [his] views … the greatest admiration’, and during interviews would ‘sometimes suddenly exclaim: “Ah! Divine Fourier!”’.42 Fourier’s biographer, Charles Pellarin, saw in Leclaire’s profit-sharing scheme an interesting attempt to apply some of Fourier’s ideas about remuneration.43 It is this which makes Mill’s lengthy
discussion of his scheme of particular importance and interest in understanding the relationship between Fourierism and Mill’s thought.

Fourier extolled a four-part division of the profits of labour: firstly, a minimum to be paid to everyone, regardless of whether they laboured, or how hard or well, sufficient to sustain them in life; secondly, division of what was left over between labour, talent and capital. Leclaire paid everyone the market wage for their labour (indeed, a high market wage, in order to attract the best labourers). This corresponds somewhat to Fourier’s idea of a minimum (hopefully, it actually was sufficient to sustain the workers – and even if market wages were not so sufficient, we can still see some sort of correspondence between the ideas) although, of course, it was only paid to workers in the firm, not to everyone in society regardless of whether they had laboured or not. Leclaire took some of the product of the firm for himself (corresponding to the return to capital as well as his own labour), and then distributed the profits according to the wages already being paid (that is, those on higher wages got a greater share of the profits). Although Mill does not detail how Leclaire determined unequal wages in the first place, Leclaire himself speaks of remunerating morality and intelligence more highly, and – in his pamphlet declaring his candidacy for the National Assembly in 1848 – of proportioning remuneration to ‘the material and intellectual services that each person is capable of rendering,’ which matches up interestingly with the Fourierist idea of remunerating labour and talent.

Later, Leclaire adopted a scheme which had even more affinity with Fourier’s ideas. He went into partnership with another man and with a Provident Society made up of all his employees (Leclaire also advanced them the money to buy a third of the shares of the company). Half the profit went to Leclaire and his partner (a return on their capital investment), and half to the Provident Society and the workers. Out of that half, two fifths went to the Provident Society, and the rest was distributed amongst the employees themselves, with Leclaire reserving ‘to himself the right of deciding who shall share in the distribution and to what amount’ with any surplus also going to the Provident Society (‘minimum’, and return to labour, talent and capital). When Leclaire and his partner retired, the idea was the ‘goodwill’ and equipment would become the property of the Society and thus, in the end, of the workers themselves. It is quite a complex system, however, we can clearly see here a payment of some sort of ‘minimum’ to all workers; and then profits distributed in accordance with capital, labour and talent.

It is not clear whether Mill knew that Leclaire was a follower of Fourier’s ideas, or recognized these as Fourierist principles being put into action. It is interesting, though, that the most-lengthy discussion of profit-sharing schemes in Principles concerns someone so-influenced by Fourierism, and shows that the impact of Fourierist ideas on Mill’s political thought was not solely confined to an examination of Fourier’s ideas for intentional communities. This is particularly the case given Mill’s recommendation to employers of adopting profit-sharing along the lines of Leclaire’s scheme, for here we see Fourierism influencing Mill’s preferred form of immediately reforming capitalism for the majority of people. That is, the reforms Mill thinks could be most-immediately implemented in existing society to improve the conditions of the working classes, and to go some way to achieving the more normative goals of social harmony, social and economic justice, and the increasing independence of working people, were influenced by, and involved the adoption of, what can arguably be seen as a species of Fourierism.
3.2. ‘Association’

Mill calls Leclaire’s profit-sharing scheme (and others) ‘examples of the association of labourers with capitalists’, and then goes on to discuss ‘examples of the association of labourers among themselves’.55 ‘Association’ here is not just any word meaning ‘combination’, ‘cooperation’, ‘partnership’ or ‘joint-management’, although it might look like that without knowledge of the French socialist context. Both Fourierists and other French socialists like Louis Blanc used the word ‘association’ to mean something quite specific – and something very akin to what Mill means by the word, thus highlighting the importance in the development of Mill’s thought of the French-socialist context more widely, as well as a specific Fourierist context.

Victor Considerant wrote in Destinée Sociale (and other works) that two ‘principal solutions to the social question’ were being proposed: communism and association.56 Communism ‘involved the forcible creation of community through the expropriation of the property of the rich and the establishment of a society in which most of the resources were collectively owned’, and was something he disagreed with.57 ‘Association’, on the other hand, ‘involved cooperation and a measure of collective ownership, but not the enforced equality of communism’.58 As he puts it in ‘Un Phalanstérien et le premier venu’, ‘individuals associate when they unite their resources, their capital, and their powers to accomplish together a task that they could not undertake or that they would accomplish less successfully in isolation’.59 Thus, associations are voluntary, and members’ ‘claims on the goods produced by the association depended on their contribution in capital, labour and talent’, and yet even the poorest members could sensibly speak of ‘our land, our palace, our castles, our factory’.60 ‘Within an association property was multifaceted – it was both private and collective’ and Considerant spoke in ‘glowing terms about the superiority of this system over both the enforced equality of communism and the competitive struggles of capitalism’.61

Blanc also used ‘association’ in Organisation of Labour to describe his ‘national workshop’ producer cooperatives, the capital to start which could come either from the state or from other capitalists, though these individual capitalists would only be remunerated if they were also labourers.62

Considerant’s use of the term is remarkably similar to Mill’s meaning – associations are voluntary; people pool their talent, labour and savings/capital to form them; the property is interestingly both ‘private’ and ‘collective’. It is also similar to Blanc’s usage, though Mill did not support the state-funding of producer cooperatives, and nor did he stipulate that capitalists had to also be labourers in the association. Similarly, unlike Considerant, remuneration in Mill’s idea of association did not have to be on the basis of talent, effort and capital. Rather, a variety of principles of distribution (including equality of shares, and Blanc’s favoured ‘from each according to his capacities, to each according to his needs’) were permissible, the important thing being that they were agreed upon democratically by the workers themselves.63

The word ‘association’, then, was not unique to Fourierism, but the meaning it had in Fourierism is importantly similar to Mill’s meaning. It is also interesting to compare how Considerant positions ‘association’ vis-à-vis communism, and how Mill differentiates between communism and socialism in Principles.64 As associations between labourers and capitalists were an important means to improving the character and abilities of the
majority of labourers, and as associations of the labourers among themselves were a key element of what Mill calls ‘the nearest approach to social justice, and the most beneficial ordering of industrial affairs for the universal good, which it is possible at present to foresee’, this shows another interesting link between, and possible influence of, Fourierism on Mill’s ideas regarding socialism and desirable social and economic reform.

3.3. ‘Friendly rivalry’

Lastly in this section I want to consider Mill’s use of the phrase ‘friendly rivalry’, which has a very strong similarity to Fourierist phrases concerned with the ‘cabalistic’ passion. Mill writes at the end of ‘Futurity’ that the ‘noble idea’ of cooperation is not just the ‘increase [in] the productiveness of labour’ which arises from the way in which, in cooperative associations, a ‘vast stimulus [is] given to productive energies, by placing labourers, as a mass, in a relation to their work which would make it their principle and their interest – at present it is neither – to do the utmost, instead of the least possible, in exchange for their remuneration’. ‘It is,’ Mill said:

scarcely possible to rate too highly this material benefit, which is yet nothing compared with the moral revolution in society that would accompany it: the healing of the standing feud in between capital and labour; the transformation of human life from a conflict of classes struggling for opposite interests, to a friendly rivalry in the pursuit of a good common to all; the elevation of the dignity of labour; a new sense of security and independence in the labouring class; and the conversion of each human being’s daily occupation into a school of the social sympathies and the practical intelligence.

Earlier (1845), Mill had written of his desire to see ‘employers and employed … have the feelings of friendly allies, not of hostile rivals whose gain is each other’s loss’. This, evidently, was the idea that through profit-sharing, the interests of capitalists and labourers could become aligned, which would also be a means of releasing the ‘productive energies’ as labourers, even if they did not get a very even proportion of the profits, would still gain from putting in more effort (supposing there was, as Mill assumes there to be, some corollary between effort and the general profitability of the firm).

Friendly rivalry seems to be something rather different – there is, after all, quite a difference between the idea of an alliance and a rivalry, even if both are ‘friendly’. Indeed, it seems that in the idea of ‘friendly rivalry’ Mill is suggesting a kind of competition which will still exist between labourers and associations – what he elsewhere calls ‘a contest, who can do most for the common good’ which ‘is not the kind of competition which Socialists repudiate’. Many people have considered Mill’s views on competition to preclude him from socialism – and Mill himself felt he had different views on competition to his socialist contemporaries. Although Mill acknowledged the weight of the moral arguments against competition between labourers put forward by socialists (himself criticizing the ‘trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other’s heels, which form the existing type of social life’ earlier in Principles), he also thought that competition was necessary to promote efficiency and innovation. This kind of competition ‘if association were universal’, would not involve ‘competition between labourer and labourer’. Instead, competition ‘between association and association would be for the benefit of the consumers, that is, of the associations; of the industrious classes generally’.
Mill acknowledged that the economic and moral gains of cooperation were superior to the economic benefits of capitalism, but evidently worried about monopoly, indolence, passivity, habit, stagnation, rust of faculties, and loss of ‘even the energy required to preserve them from deterioration’.77 ‘Competition’, Mill acknowledged, ‘may not be the best conceivable stimulus, but it is at present a necessary one, and no one can foresee the time when it will not be indispensable to progress’.78 Friendly rivalry, however, would overcome some of the moral problems with competition, whilst maintaining its economic, social, and moral advantages.

Fourier emphasizes the need for ‘rivalry’ between groups of workers (‘series’) in his communities (‘phalanxes’).79 Indeed, he says that in a future of ‘attractive labour’, it would be necessary, amongst other things, for labour to be ‘carried on by bands of friends, united spontaneously, interested and stimulated by very active rivalries’.80 This was due to what Fourier called the ‘cabalistic’ passion, which was one of the important human passions he thought would be accommodated and harmonized in his utopia.81 This ‘cabalistic’ passion describes our love of intrigue and factional competition with others (of which many people play competitive sport for fun might be a good example).82 As Considerant explains, the cabalistic passion for ‘rivalité’, would lead to stronger ties between the labourers within that series; and promote the ‘perfection’ of products, and the general good.83 This is because rivalry spurs ‘emulation’ – that is, a desire to do as well as, if not better than, our rivals.84 As Fourier writes, ‘the attraction of the cabals becomes a potent bond of friendship between all the [series]’.85 Carl Guamari has directly translated this idea as one of ‘friendly rivalry’86 and I think we can see strong links between this idea and Mill’s concept of socially-useful and morally-acceptable competition under socialism. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that Mill adopted Fourier’s theory of the ‘passions’ wholesale, nor that he necessarily thought it was something inherent in human psychology or nature which would mean that ‘no one can foresee a time when [competition] will not be indispensable’ as belief in the cabalistic passion would suggest.87 However, this is an interesting similarity of ideas – that people might engage in friendly competition, striving to be better than each other, but not at the expense of the other’s survival; that this would be between groups of workers (either inside an association, or between associations themselves); and that this ‘rivalry’ was a means of bringing about, and could be directed towards, the common good.

Mill’s use of the idea of ‘friendly rivalry’, then, is a potential sign of his reading of Fourier(ists) affecting his lexicon. It is also a sign of his desire for a greater sense of social harmony – no class division or the ‘elbowing, crushing and trampling’ each other (often for survival) which characterized contemporary capitalism. (As Mill described it in Chapters, indeed, capitalism was currently a sadistic race for survival in which the hindermost would be put to death.88) And this desire, in turn, influenced his assessment of, and ideas regarding, socialism and desirable social and economic reform.

Overall, to summarize this section: there are three examples (at least) in Mill’s writing regarding socialism and desirable reform of current institutions in which he either adopts Fourierist ideas and even vocabulary, or speaks of Fourierist experiments, outside of his ‘formal’ assessment of Fourierism itself, and these are worth noting when considering both the influence of Fourierism on the development of Mill’s political philosophy (which is generally overlooked) and the content of his thought itself.
What Mill actually made of Fourierism is also generally misunderstood, with Mill’s view being more positive than is usually allowed. Moreover, his assessment of Fourierism reveals interesting things about Mill’s own ideas regarding socialism, desirable social reform and distributive justice, as I will now go on to explore.

4. Mill’s detailed account of Fourierism

Mill’s assessment of Fourierism changed over time, particularly from 1852 onwards. In this section, I sketch these changes, particularly to Mill’s account of the desirability of Fourierism, which links to Mill’s own ideas concerning distributive justice. I begin with a relatively detailed account of Mill’s description of Fourierism, in part because this makes it easier to see what Mill admired and thought potentially problematic or undesirable about Fourierism (and how this changed) and also because Mill’s description is a pretty accurate one of Fourierist ideas, which may not be familiar to the modern reader (as, indeed, they were not to many of Mill’s contemporaries, which is one reason why he describes the schemes in such detail).

4.1. Mill’s description of Fourierism

Introducing Fourierism in 1849, Mill describes it as a scheme intended for communities of about two thousand members, settled on an area of about ‘a square league’, guided by managers elected by themselves. When it comes to distribution, the combined product of the labour of the community is first used to give a minimum for subsistence to everyone in the community, whether or not they are capable of labouring. After this minimum has been distributed from the combined proceeds of labour, the remainder is shared out in certain proportions, determined beforehand by the community – between ‘Labour, Capital and Talent’. The capital of the community may be owned in unequal shares by members of the community, and they would, therefore, receive proportional dividends, just as in a joint-stock company: the more capital they have invested, the greater their return. The return made to talent is estimated by the rank which an individual holds in the group of labourers to which he or she belongs, these grades being conferred by the choice of his or her co-workers. The remuneration can be spent in any way the individual sees fit; there is no need to live in shared accommodation, apart from the fact that one must reside somewhere in the block of buildings built for the whole community, to save on labour and expense, not only in building costs but ‘in every branch of domestic economy’ (including limiting the amount of domestic labour needing to be done). Having described what he takes Fourierism to be, Mill next moves to an analysis of its desirability as an economic, social and political system.

4.2. Mill’s initial (1849) assessment of Fourierism

One point in Fourierism’s favour, for Mill, was that it did not withdraw the motives to effort which are present in current society, and which are lacking in communism. In fact, such motives would be even stronger, because the better one was at one’s job, the higher the return to one’s talent, or to the capital one had saved and re-invested. In addition, one’s own efforts would make (although perhaps only a small) difference to
the overall total product of the community, so there would be more to be shared out. That is, one's own efforts could increase both one's share of the pot, and the size of the pot to be shared out. In fact, Fourierism could be seen as an improvement to capitalism on this score, for under existing conditions, although the risk of starvation supposedly keeps workers on their toes, there is almost no incentive (apart from on a piece-work scheme) to work harder or be more productive once one is employed: indeed, quite the opposite, as one is paid by the hour, no matter how hard one works in that hour. (This is one of the reasons that Mill recommends capitalists, in their own profit-maximising self-interest, adopt profit-sharing schemes.)

What is more, the Fourierists believe they have solved the problem of making labour attractive – when one enjoys one’s work (especially when one’s basic needs are already met), one will have plenty of motivation to do it, for pleasure. Mill praised the fact that the Fourierists have taken the time to consider motivation – something he thinks lacking in communist thought. However, he thought this argument could be overstretched: although it is clear that many occupations full of discomfort and fatigue are freely entered into for pleasure in contemporary society, they are only entered into because they are entered into freely, and may be discontinued at will. As Mill puts it:

The liberty of quitting a position often makes the whole difference between its being painful and pleasurable. Many a person remains in the same town, street or house from January to December, without a wish or a thought tending towards removal, who, if confined to that same place by the mandate of authority, would find the imprisonment absolutely intolerable.

Mill argues, therefore, that there are some things which people will not do if they have to, even if they might if they did not have to. (It is perhaps interesting here to note that Mill thought Fourierist communities would have to utilize some sort of enforcement mechanism to get necessary but unpleasant labour done, and evidently did not trust to Fourier’s idea that a well-constituted community with enough diverse characters in it would just get the unpleasant labour done naturally, without resorting to forcing anyone to do it except through the ‘force’ of their own will.)

The Fourierists, however, Mill notes, have another plan for getting people to do all the labour which is necessary in a community. They argue that scarcely any kind of useful labour is naturally disagreeable, unless it is regarded as dishonourable, or one is forced to do an excessive amount of it. Thus, the Fourierists determine to bestow marks of honour on any really and naturally unpleasant or disagreeable labour, and to remunerate it on the highest scale. Moreover, no one need toil excessively at anything, as there will be more people doing the necessary labour (and thus each person can do less), since currently such a lot of labour is expended in making useless things, and so many people contribute no labour at all. Furthermore, the Fourierists also insist that no one has to be confined to only one occupation. Thus, all the necessary though disagreeable labour in society will be done as it will almost be a pleasure to do it, given that one need not do it all the time, nor for a very long spell at any one time, and it will be well-respected and remunerated. Not only would this solve the problem of making sure all that was necessary was done, but it would also result in something approximating equality amongst the members of the community, as people would chose to spend some of their time doing highly-remunerated work which they did not enjoy so much, and some of
their time doing less-well-remunerated work which they did enjoy. (We might nowadays think of this as people making trade-offs along indifference curves between disagreeable but well-remunerated – in terms of respect, remuneration and, therefore, ‘bought’ leisure – labour, and labour they found more pleasurable in itself, but which afforded them less income, respect or leisure-time.) Summing up the outcome of the Fourierist schemes, Mill says something approximating equality would ‘practically result’ from this, ‘not, (as in Communism) from the compression, but on the contrary, from the largest possible development, of the various natural superiorities residing in each individual’.109 (The link to Fourier’s language about the natural ‘passions’ and the importance of allowing them all their play is interesting.)

In every edition of Principles (from 1849) this description of Fourierism is identical. Mill consistently argues that it is clear that Fourierism ‘does no violence to any of the general laws by which human action … is influenced’.110 Everyone would have the opportunity to gain an individual advantage from every degree of labour, abstinence, and talent which they possess.111 However, in 1849, although Mill argues that Fourierism is not liable to the problems of industry, invention and lack of individuality that communism can be charged with, he is concerned that its social machinery would not work.112 A great deal of change would have to occur to human beings before they could peacefully live together in such a society.113 This is especially the case when it comes to the likelihood of people honestly, peacefully and unselfishly assessing their relative position as to talent amongst their co-workers.114

Though Mill evidently thought there would be difficulties in implementing Fourierism, he says these are ‘difficulties, not impossibilities’.115 Moreover, Mill thought that the Fourierists were the only socialists who were really alive to the nature of the problems they were trying to solve.116 After all, with every improvement in education, their system becomes less impracticable, and the very attempt to make it succeed would help to cultivate the necessary virtues.117

This said, Mill saw a bigger problem in the fact that each Fourierist community would be in competition with every other community unless they could be centrally managed, possibly on a global scale, and he did not think this would be possible for a very, very long time.118 It is perhaps odd that Mill thinks this would be a problem for Fourierism, as he does not raise it as a problem against producer co-operation, for instance, that there would be competition between the co-operatives. But perhaps this is because producer co-operatives, for Mill at least, are not supposed to be self-sufficient in the same way as Fourierist phalanxes were intended to be. Or perhaps it is merely that economic competition of this kind seems to be precluded by Fourier’s desire for harmony, and so Mill is only saying the phalanxes could not eradicate all competition and exist entirely harmoniously, or at least not for a very long time. (Though, as we have just seen, Fourier did not himself totally eschew ‘rivalry’.) Lastly, it may be that Mill felt there would be some interaction between phalanxes, unexplained or un-described by Fourier, which would either, at least initially, be competitive, or necessarily centrally controlled; and that this lack of description, and thus attention, is a potential flaw in the workability of Fourierism. Whatever the reason, Mill declares (in 1849) that he places his hopes not in Fourierism, or the other socialist and communist schemes he discusses in the same chapter, but in some reformed form of individual property.119 Fourierism, though desirable and not necessarily
unworkable, is not currently implementable; and thus it is not something we ought to be considering seriously regarding contemporary possibilities for social improvement.

4.3. Mill’s later (1852-onwards) assessment of Fourierism

From 1852 onwards, however, Mill does not say this. Rather than identifying the problems he thinks would occur inside a Fourierist society, and giving reasons why humankind is not yet ready for it, he asks for Fourierism to be given its fair chance now, writing ‘the thing to be desired, and to which they have just claim, is an opportunity of trial.’

Mill insists that the only risk in trying Fourierism would be to those who volunteer to try it. Although Mill finishes by declaring, in exactly the same words as he used previously, that for the time being, for the majority of humankind, what is needed is a reformed form of individual property (though it is worth noting this is not an endorsement of existing capitalism), this is an interesting shift in his attitude towards Fourierism, and socialism more generally. Fourierism is now seen as desirable, workable, and implementable by at least some of the population (and one of its advantages, of course, is that it is the sort of ‘experiment in living’ which can be implemented by a few and does not require its wholesale adoption by the entirety of society in order to be attempted by any).

In Chapters (begun in 1869 and published posthumously in 1879), Mill remarks that ‘the practicability’ of Fourier’s schemes ‘admits of no dispute’ (Which is an interesting and remarkable statement in its own right.) Mill repeats his belief that Fourierism has ‘the greatest foresight of objections, of all the forms of Socialism’ by saying ‘[t]here is scarcely an objection or a difficulty which Fourier did not foresee, and against which he did not make provision beforehand by self-acting contrivances.’ Mill’s account does not use precisely identical words, but his description of Fourier’s ideas is essentially the same as it was in Principles, as is his assertion that Fourierism poses a far less great threat to individuality than communism. More clearly than in Principles, though echoing the same thought, Mill makes plain that Fourierism is ‘grounded … upon a less high principle of distributive justice than that of Communism, since [it] … admits inequalities of distribution and individual ownership of capital, but not the arbitrary disposal of it’, for reasons ‘of justice or expediency’.

Mill concludes:

Altogether, the picture of a Fourierist community is both attractive in itself and requires less from common humanity than any other known system of Socialism; and it is much to be desired that the scheme should have that fair trail which alone can test the workableness of any new scheme of social life.

This shows that, from 1852 onwards, Mill considered Fourierism to be desirable as a system of human society; to be workable or practical as a social and economic system; and that it would be not only possible, but desirable, that those who wished to, and were capable of, trying it ought to make experiments in instituting it.

In itself, this is an interesting and relatively-unique (as well as radical) position. Very few, after all, outside of Fourierist campaigners and disciples, have thought this. It gives weight to the thought that we should make more consideration of Mill’s Fourierism, particularly when we consider he did not find Owenite communism as attractive, or
Saint-Simonism as implementable. In part this is because it may help in understanding what Mill meant in calling his own philosophy ‘under the general designation of Socialist’, though this is not to say we ought to read Mill as a Fourierist himself. In part it is because understanding what Mill found attractive in Fourierism; why he thought it workable; where he thought there might be problems of workability; and where, how, and by whom he thought it might prove implementable all cast interesting light on his political theory more widely, with or without applying the label ‘socialist’ to it. It is with the question, in particular, of what in Fourierism, which to the modern, as well as Victorian, reader, can seem outlandish to the point of alienation rather than attractiveness, Mill found desirable with which I am concerned in the following section.

4.4. The desirability of Fourierism

Obviously, much of Mill’s assessment of Fourierism is based on its workability and capability of being implemented, perhaps because so many contemporary criticisms of socialism were on these grounds, perhaps because Mill himself was always wary of implementing change without a plan and some assurance that it would be workable and effective. But it is also worth noting some reasons why Mill thought Fourierism was desirable. One, as noted above, is the way in which Fourierism would heal the current ‘rift’ between capital and labour, and the antagonistic relations between labourers created by capitalism’s differentiation between workers and property-owning employers, and the ensuing wage-market. More-generally, this links to Mill’s desire for social harmony without (particularly-enforced) social homogeneity, and this is also a key element of Fourierism. Mill also evidently admired the feminism (even if not agreeing to all of the content of that feminism) of socialists like Fourier. The other reasons are to do with distributive justice, and the achievement of ‘real’ equality without the compression of individuality, so it is worth spelling out the links between distributive justice in Fourier’s schemes and Mill’s own views. I begin with a brief exploration of Mill’s apposite remarks regarding distributive justice.

4.4.1. Mill and distributive justice

Firstly, then, Mill argues in Principles, that people, once they are born, have a right to subsistence, which ought to be provided by the rest of society if they (or their parents) cannot provide it for themselves (though they also ought to work for it, if they are able). This provision is perfectly feasible, without destroying the ‘springs of industry’ (as some people had argued, against the idea of any form of poor relief). Such provision ought to be ‘less-eligible’ (though not a condition of ‘physical suffering, or the dread of it’), but ‘no member of the community needs to be abandoned to chance’ for ‘society can and therefore ought to insure every individual belonging to it against the extreme of want’.

Secondly, there is a good claim of justice – in fact, it is the only one which will ‘bear the light’ in support of private property – of labourers to the fruits of their own labour and abstinence. But, this does only mean their own labour and abstinence, not the labour and abstinence of others. Individual capitalists, then, whose success can be plausibly argued to come from their own labour and abstinence (although none of that might have much effect without the labour of their employees) might well have a claim to their unequal earnings. Similarly, people who have saved money and invested it from
their own earnings would have a claim to a return on their investment in the form of interest. Labourers, obviously, have a claim to the fruits of their own labour (and thus to unequal divisions of the product of labour, if they put in unequal amounts/qualities of labour). But huge accretions of capital cannot pass between generations. And, perhaps even more importantly, land does not count as this kind of ‘capital’ – one’s labour and abstinence can give one a property right over the *fruits* of land, but not the land itself.\(^{137}\)

Thirdly, Mill says:

> The proportioning of remuneration to work done, is really just, only in so far as the more or less of the work is a matter of choice: when it depends on natural difference of strength or capacity, this principle of remuneration is in itself an injustice: it is giving to those who have; assigning most to those who are already most favoured by nature.\(^{138}\)

That is, there is something unjust in people who are already more-talented, or stronger, or more capable in another way receiving more for their labour when they already have more than others through this naturally improved capacity. Justice, in the abstract, demands that this inequality be eradicated (which is why the principle of equal shares, or from each according to his capacities, to each according to his needs is a ‘higher’ or better principle of justice), but Mill adds that ‘the selfish type of character formed by the present standard of morality, and fostered by the existing social institutions’ makes a ‘compromise’ with ‘higher’ justice necessary, and this means it is most ‘expedient’ to retain a link between the work people do and the remuneration they receive, even where this means giving more to those who already have most through nature.\(^{139}\)

All of this has interesting links with Fourierism and, in part, helps explain why Mill might have found Fourierism ‘attractive’, as the next sub-section will show. Given the chronology of the development of his views, it may also be that it was through *reading* Fourierism – though also other works by other socialists, as well as witnessing the events of 1848, particularly in the National Workshops in Paris – that Mill came to hold these views on distributive justice.

#### 4.4.2. Fourier and distributive justice

As already shown, above, Fourier’s scheme definitely involves an unequal division of remuneration (which is one of the reasons Mill counts it as a form of socialism, not communism), and he retains some link between remuneration and work done. He also allows for some private property, not just in articles of consumption (as all the socialist schemes Mill discusses do) but in capital, too – savings can be reinvested in the community, and though this does not undermine the communal *ownership* of the Fourierist phalanx, it does allow for people to receive a ‘return’ on their invested capital. He also includes a minimal universal income, and this is much more than Mill’s idea of ‘less-eligible’ relief, but it relies on the same thoughts both of people’s right to subsistence, and also that providing people with subsistence will not destroy the ‘springs of industry’ in a community.

In terms of securing subsistence and retaining a link between effort, labour, abstinence and remuneration, then, Fourier’s schemes accord with two elements of Mill’s account of distributive justice as described above.

In addition, Fourier defends inequalities of remuneration based on talent. On the one hand, this might go against what Mill thought of as ‘really’ just – as it gives more to those
who already have most. And, indeed, Mill saw Fourierism was one kind of ‘compromise’ with ‘higher’ justice on this score.\textsuperscript{140} On the other hand, what work people do is an outcome of their free choice – they can choose to do work at which they are most talented (or choose not to, if they happen to enjoy something at which they are not very talented, or feel they have a duty to do something for which they don’t have much talent). Thus, their remuneration is to some extent the outcome of their free choice. If so, that would accord at least in some important respects with Mill’s view that this inequality is only really just if it is the outcome of choice.

Fourierism, then, includes and intertwines elements which Mill thought very important with regard to distributive justice – and also manages to do this without crushing individuality through enforced equality. There would be, in modern parlance, a sufficiency based with unequal remuneration on top of it determined by principles of justice respecting labour, abstinence and choice, rather than (as under capitalism) suffering, want and inequality based upon chance and injustice. Fourier’s base is more generous than Mill’s, but this is a difference of degree, not kind. For reasons of distributive justice, then, as well as individuality, harmony and feminism, we can see why Mill might have found dead Fourierism ‘attractive’, and this realization ought to inform our understanding of Mill’s views of distributive justice beyond the question of whether his egalitarian commitments are sufficient to make him a socialist.

**4.4.3. Mill, Fourierism, and ‘higher’ principles of justice**

Under the third element of Mill’s writing on distributive justice I highlighted above, I mentioned that Mill thought there were ‘higher’ principles of justice, and that some form of compromise had to be found between contemporary human selfishness and what justice ideally demanded. This is worth flagging up and exploring further, as it also casts important light on Mill’s view of Fourierism, socialism and distributive justice and, more widely, his ideas about social reform. Mill’s utilitarianism, and his view of social change and human progress, mean he was not committed to one principle of justice being the one we ought to implement at, and for, all time(s). Principles of justice might be more or less just: they might also be more or less ‘expedient’ – that is, more or less well-suited to a particular stage of social progress.\textsuperscript{141}

Mill thought that as human society improved, ‘higher’ principles of justice became possible – that is, ‘the expedient’ became more (or more-perfectly) just.\textsuperscript{142} The principles of justice which Fourierism embodied were better than those of contemporary capitalism.\textsuperscript{143} They were also expedient only in a slightly better society – I say ‘slightly’ because Mill recognized that Fourierist principles made the right kind of compromise with contemporary selfishness, but on the other hand evidently thought they were not yet implementable by all people. But that better society was not so far removed from his own: indeed, Mill evidently thought it was reachable by at least some people currently living in his society (otherwise it could not be desirable that Fourierism be implemented in the here-and-now). This said, they were not the ‘highest’ conceivable principles of justice.

Like capitalism (or at least the principles of justice upon which capitalism was supposedly based) Fourierism retained, though to a lesser degree, a link between remuneration and labour done. That is, beyond his ‘minimum’, unequal remuneration depends, at least in part, on how much work one does. Of course, the ‘minimum’ mitigates this link somewhat – unlike a pure ‘securing to the labourer the fruits of his own labour and abstinence’
rule, with no safety net, which is the normative underpinning of capitalism. But the link still remains.

Mill calls ‘higher’, principles of justice which get rid of this link altogether: perfect equality of shares or the ‘still higher’ principle ‘that all should work according to their capacity, and receive according to their wants’ (which we might nowadays render as ‘needs’). For this reason, Fourierism does not incorporate the ‘best’ principles of justice, though it might well incorporate the best which are currently expedient.

This balance Mill thinks needs to be found between ‘abstract’ justice and expediency is an important element of his thinking concerning socialism and social reform, as well as his ideas regarding distributive justice. It is also important when considering, as I move on to do in the next section, Mill’s ‘preferred’ forms of social reform and socialism. In terms of justice, however, we can certainly say that Mill thought Fourierism contained ‘higher’ principles of justice than contemporary capitalism; but less ‘high’ principles than the communist schemes of Owen (equal shares) or Blanc (from each according to his capacities; to each according to his needs). Moreover, given that Fourierism contains a ‘minimum’, has some element of potentially basing unequal remuneration on choice as well as natural capacity; but also rewards labour and abstinence (in the form of making a return to capital), it might have a claim to being more just than an improved form of capitalism. If the system of individual property could, as Mill hoped, mitigate inequality to the same extent as contemporary capitalism had exacerbated them; if it could limit inheritance to a ‘moderate independence’; and prevent the passage of large sums of capital between generations (and thus the accretion of capital into a small number of hands); if it could reform land ownership and the unfair benefits accruing from rent; if it involved profit-sharing; and if the principle on which it is based (that of securing for the labourer the fruits of his own labour and abstinence) is compatible with provision of ‘less-eligible’ welfare payments (which, after all, depend on the transfer of some of the fruits of other’s labour); then a perfected form of individual property might be as just as Fourierism. The difference, really, would lie in the extent to which it does seem possible in Fourierism for unequal payments not to be solely due to unequal natural capacity but to choice, whereas this looks more difficult under a system of individual property. But perhaps this is as possible as it is under Fourierism, and this would make a perfected form of capitalism (so long as it definitely did secure people from the fear, and experience of, misery and want when they were unable to labour, which is certain under Fourierism) as just as Fourierism.

Mill says that cooperative socialism is ‘the nearest approach to social justice, and the most beneficial ordering of industrial affairs for the universal good, which it possible at present to foresee’. This implies he might have seen it as more just than Fourierism – or, perhaps, more expedient. One of the elements of cooperative socialism is that each association (on Mill’s conception) distributes its income amongst its members according to principles of justice democratically determined by the members themselves. Moreover, members are free to leave associations whenever they please, and join other associations to which they are more-attracted or better-suited (a determination which might depend, in part, on the principles of distributive justice adopted by the association). Thus, associations might adopt ‘capitalistic’ principles of justice (such as piece work), or they might adopt Fourierist principles; or they might adopt Owenite or Blancian principles; or something else entirely. (Indeed, this was precisely what Blanc’s National Workshop schemes
had tried to do, though as Mill notes, these attempts, when incorporating communist distributive principles, had failed.151) And this flexibility, whereby the highest principles of justice are employed where they are expedient might make cooperative socialism more just, even, than Fourierism. But, of course, in fact only elements of a cooperative socialist society would be more just (or as just), and as cooperative socialism, in itself, espouses no single principle of justice, it is a little hard to categorically state that it is more just, as a scheme, than Fourierism. Certainly, however, it has the possibility of implementing ‘higher’ principles of justice, and where that was done, this would be an improvement on Fourierism, in terms of justice.

To conclude this larger section, it is, of course, hard to tell whether Mill merely found that Fourier’s scheme simply coincided with his own thoughts about distributive justice, or whether his own ideas were influenced by those of Fourier and his followers, as well as by other socialists such as Blanc and the events of 1848. However, it does not seem implausible to say that reading a variety of socialist texts, and witnessing debates and events in 1848, influenced Mill’s thoughts on distributive justice, and that Fourierism formed an important, but sometimes overlooked, element of that.

4.5. Mill’s overall assessment of Fourierism

After closer examination, then, we can say that Mill thought the following regarding Fourierism, at least from 1852-onwards, though he thought some of this even earlier (at least from 1849). Fourierism is desirable (in his words ‘attractive’); workable; and implementable by at least some people, and might become implementable to more people over time, particularly as experiments in Fourierism are part of the necessary education for making more people capable of implementing it. Moreover, it not only is implementable, but ought to be tried in practice. It is the only socialist scheme involving intentional communities which takes seriously the task of making labour attractive, which will be necessary for socialism to work if the current motivations (personal gain and/or fear of starvation) will no longer exist. It does not threaten individuality in the way many other forms of socialism and communism do (though we ought to note Mill thinks this charge is probably exaggerated152). In this regard, Fourierism also compares favourably to capitalism, which impedes individuality amongst working people in a variety of ways. Fourierism is ‘less’ just than communism, as it admits not only of inequalities, but of inequalities based on rewarding labour and talent. However, it is more just than contemporary capitalism, as it distributes the product of labour according to principles of justice mixing sufficienarianism with justifiable inequalities based on labour, talent, capital and – importantly – free choice of occupation and time spent on different kinds of labour. It also compares favourably with cooperative socialism, which Mills calls ‘the nearest approach to social justice … which it is possible at present to foresee’, as, though cooperative socialism can involve ‘higher’ principles of justice than Fourierism, it can also involve ‘lower’ ones.

So far, this summarizes what has been explained above. An outcome of all this, however, is the further thought that Fourierism was Mill’s preferred form of utopian socialism. Owenism’s proposed equality of shares is ‘higher’ as a principle of justice, but the scheme overall is both less attractive (particularly regarding the potential danger to individuality, though Mill says ‘no doubt this has been greatly exaggerated’153), and less possible to implement here and now.154 Saint-Simonism involves the principle of
justice, ‘from each according to his capabilities, to each according to his works’. Although there is some consideration of the social usefulness of one’s works in a Saint-Simonian distribution – which divorces actual effort or talent from remuneration – there still seems to be some link between remuneration and work which would allow the injustice of the people who have already received most from nature receiving more from society in return for their labour. ‘To his works’ is rather different to ‘to his wants’ or ‘needs’. And thus, Saint-Simonian principles of justice are also less ‘high’ than communist ones – indeed, Mill also lists them a scheme which has made the right sort of necessary compromise between contemporary selfishness and ‘abstract’ justice. Saint-Simonianism, too, was much less capable of immediate implementation than Fourierism. Thus, as a balance between desirability, workability and capacity to be implemented – and as the best-expedient compromise between ‘abstract’ justice and the facts of contemporary human society – Fourierism is Mill’s preferred form of ‘utopian’ socialism for immediate implementation.

It is also arguably more than that. As noted, Owenism is less attractive than Fourierism as well as less capable of immediate implementation (despite endorsing ‘higher’ principles of justice). And despite Mill’s youthful enthusiasm for Saint-Simonism (calling it the ‘north star’ by which we ought to guide our thinking about the ‘ideal’ and social reform), Fourierism’s institutions are far less authoritarian (posing a far lesser threat, if any, to individuality) than Saint-Simonism, whose principles of justice (as discussed above) may also be less good. Thus, we can arguably see Fourierism as Mill’s most-preferred form of utopian socialism overall, not just in terms of what would be the best form to try immediately.

As already noted, however, there were problems with Fourierism which prevent it from being Mill’s ‘ideal’, or best-simply blueprint for social improvement. But this is not to say it ought not to form a part of what he thought would be the best approach to social improvement immediately (along with profit-sharing and cooperation), even if, in a higher stage of human improvement, we advanced beyond the circumstances in which Fourierism’s principles of justice were expedient, and its institutions otherwise desirable. Seeing this helps us to understand Mill’s desires for, and ideas regarding the best for of, social reform.

Thus, from 1852 onwards to the very end of Mill’s life, Fourierism emerges as scheme of social/institutional design which is an improvement on contemporary capitalism; is better than other varieties of socialism based on ‘intentional communities’ or the wholesale seizure, change and management of state apparatus (e.g. Saint-Simonism, as well as ‘revolutionary’ socialism); but is less ‘just’ than some other socialist or communist schemes which have divorced the link between remuneration and work done. In contemporary circumstances, then, where social systems which do try to divorce this link are not (yet) feasible, Fourierism emerges as potentially the best option for improved (if not perfected) social design, though certain kinds of cooperative socialism might be even better. Indeed, given that Fourierism was currently only accessible to an ‘elite’ of the working population, whereas profit-sharing was accessible to basically all of them, and worker-cooperation to many if not most of them, we might say a mix of profit-sharing, cooperation and Fourierism are Mill’s preferred institutions for contemporary society right now. This is interesting as regards Mill’s mature, reflective judgement of the desirability and feasibility of ‘utopian’ socialist intentional communities – usually taken to be much
less positive in *Chapters* than in *Principles*. It is also interesting regarding his political philosophy more widely.

Of course, it might here be contended that the thought that Fourierism could be considered to be even a part of Mill’s most-preferred institutional scheme in contemporary circumstances is too strong: it is only his *most-preferred form of utopian socialism*, but he might well have preferred a whole host of forms of capitalism to any kind of socialism, even cooperation. However, other scholars have done excellent work on showing how Mill’s liberal principles, when applied to the economy, led him to cooperative socialism, not capitalism.\(^{161}\) What is more, his prediction that political economists will be concerned with systems ‘of private property and individual competition\(^{162}\) for the foreseeable future is descriptive, not normative. Similarly, his assertion that ‘the object to be principally aimed at in the present stage of human improvement, is not the subversion of the system of individual property, but the improvement of it, and the full participation of every member of the community in its benefits\(^{163}\) is yet more support of profit-sharing, which, as already noted, is valuable not only in its own right but as a route to cooperative socialism.\(^{164}\) When we couple all of this with his endorsement of cooperative socialism as ‘the nearest approach to social justice and the most beneficial ordering of industrial affairs for the universal good, which it is possible at present to foresee’,\(^{165}\) and the fact that the principles of justice capitalism is based upon involve the less ‘high’ link between remuneration and work done, we ought not to assume that Mill preferred capitalism to any (or every) form of socialism.

### 5. Conclusion

My main claim in this article is that the role, and importance of Fourierism in the development of Mill’s political theory, which has been generally overlooked in previous scholarship, repays study. Mill knew of Fourierism almost as long as he knew of the more-studied Saint-Simonism, and engaged in serious evaluation and exploration of Fourierist ideas, reading many works by Fourier and his disciple Considerant, as well as reports of (and by) Fourier’s follower Leclaire. Moreover, this engagement happened at a time when Mill’s views were, as he says in his *Autobiography*, developing into a form of socialism. If we are interested in what the content of Mill’s socialism might have been, therefore, we ought not to overlook Fourierism as a source of ideas and potentially of influence.

What is more, we ought not to look solely at Mill’s chapter ‘On Property’ in *Principles*, and the similar discussion in *Chapters*, for the extent of the relationship. Mill’s recommendation of the development of profit-sharing is in part based on Fourierist experiments. His use of the word ‘association’ to describe profit-sharing and cooperative socialism is also linked to Fourierism, and has interesting affinities with Considerant’s differentiation between socialism and communism. Lastly, Mill’s description of associations interacting competitively in a spirit of ‘friendly rivalry’ has interesting links to how Fourier describes ‘cabalistic’ relations between ‘series’ in his phalanxes. These three examples show interesting links between Mill’s recommendations for social reform, and what he calls ‘the nearest approach to social justice’, and Fourierism.

When we consider Mill’s formal assessment of Fourierism, we can see that, from 1849 onwards, he thought it ‘attractive’ and workable, though he recommended reform of capitalism (which, of course, involved profit-sharing influenced by Fourierism) rather than
implementation of Fourierist socialism. However, from 1852, this changed, and Mill recommends that those who wish to make full-blown Fourierist experiments be allowed to do so – and for more, I contend, than merely anti-paternalist reasons. That Mill thought Fourierism attractive, workable and capable of implementation (indeed, that this would be desirable) is in itself interesting, perhaps even surprising. It casts light on what Mill thought was possible in terms of immediate social reform, and also on what he thought needed reforming, and what reforms would be desirable.

In particular, from Mill’s assessment of Fourierism we can see even more clearly the depth of his commitment to social harmony and ending the class system of property-owners and property-less – and, more importantly, of labouring and non-labouring. We can also see more about exactly what he thought might threaten individuality in socialist and communist schemes, and that he did not think all forms of socialism necessarily threatened individuality. Lastly, we can learn a good deal about Mill’s view of distributive justice; what was unjust about capitalism; and how just different forms of socialism would be. We can see clear links between Mill’s ideas regarding justice in Principles and the principles endorsed by Fourier: a minimum payment to save people from want, and then unequal distribution according to labour, talent and capital. Although this reflects ideas Mill expresses regarding justice, we can also see from Principles that Mill thought these principles non-ideal in that they were the best for a period of human development where it was necessary to retain a link between remuneration and work done, but that even ‘higher’ principles of justice would divorce that link. It is not clear if this is influence or similarity of separately-developed views regarding justice, but either is illuminating and interesting.

This consideration of even ‘higher’ principles shows that, though Mill recommended experimenting with Fourierism, it was not his ‘ideal’ or best-simpliciter. This, in itself, also shows just how far Mill thought reform would have to go for society to be really just, and further adds to our understanding of what Mill’s own socialism involved. As Mill both recommended implementing Fourierism, and advocated reform of capitalism through profit-sharing to cooperative socialism, both of which could in themselves involve elements of Fourierism, it also sheds interesting light on Mill’s hopes for more-immediate reform and, again, the content of his own socialism.

In sum, then, there is much to learn from Mill’s engagement with Fourierism, especially if we are interested in his socialism, his criticisms of capitalism, and his ideas regarding desirable social reform. This form of ‘utopian’ socialism had an important, but overlooked, role to play in the development of Mill’s political philosophy. Though he was not a Fourierist, exploration of his engagement with Fourierism shows he was more radical – and more socialist – than is generally assumed.

Notes
1. Mill, Autobiography, 239.
2. Feuer, “Mill and Marxian Socialism,” 297–304; Flew, “Mill, Socialist or Libertarian?”, 24–85; Fredman and Gordon “Mill and socialism,” 3–7; Hainds, “Mill and the Saint-Simonians,” 103–12; Losman, “Alternative Economic Systems,” 84–104.
3. Anschutz, Philosophy of Mill, 31; Schapiro, “Mill, Pioneer of Liberalism,” 127–60; Robbins, “Introduction,” xxxix and Theory of Economic Policy, 143, 153 and 168; Von Mises, Liberalism, 195; Hayek, “Mill at Twenty-Five” and Mill and Taylor, 297; Schwartz, New Political
Economy, 165–74 and 191; Levy, “Mill’s Stationary State,” 279; Ekelund and Tollison, “New Political Economy,” 215; Kamm, Mill in Love, 83; Packe, Life of Mill, 306 and 448–9; Bladon, “Introduction,” 1.

4. Capaldi, “Mill and Socialism,” 125–44; Thomas, Mill, 190 and 226; Winch, Wealth and Life, 50–54; Légé, “Hayek’s Reading of Mill,” 199 and 202; Rees, Mill’s On Liberty, 7. Reeves does allow that Mill had some independent interest in socialism, but says it was radicalized and ‘sharpened’ by Taylor (Mill: Victorian Firebrand, 213).

5. Claeys, Mill and Paternalism, 123–72 and “Justice, Independence, and Democracy,” 122–47; McCabe, “Mill’s Analysis of Capitalism,” 8–26 and ”Mill and Socialism,” 145–64; Baum, “Mill and Liberal Socialism,” 98–123; Miller, “Mill’s ’Socialism’,” 213–38; Medearis, “Labour, Democracy, Utility,” 135–49; Ashcraft, “Foundations of Democratic Socialism,” 169–90; Kurer, “Mill and Utopian Socialism,” 222–32 and Mill: Politics of Progress; Riley, “Capitalism Versus socialism,” 39–71; Sarvasy, “Reconsideration of Mill’s Socialism,” 312–33; Stafford, “Paradigmatic Liberal,” 325–45.

6. Nathanson, “Mill on Economic Justice,” 161–76; Clark and Elliott, “Mill’s Theory of Justice,” 467–90.

7. Davis, “Mill, Socialism and the Romantics,” 345–58; Pankhurst, Saint-Simonians, Mill and Carlyle; Levin, “Mill Looks at Utopian Socialism,” 68–82; Claeys, Mill and Paternalism, 144–67 and “Justice, Independence, and Democracy,” 122–47; Kurer, “Mill and Utopian Socialism,” 222–32; Stafford, “Paradigmatic Liberal,” 325–45; Baum, “Mill and Liberal Socialism,” 98–123; Riley, “Capitalism Versus Socialism,” 39–71; Miller, “Mill’s ’Socialism’,” 213–38; Sarvasy, “Reconsideration of Mill’s Socialism,” 312–33. These works do not make no mention of Fourierism, but it is not the main focus of their argument.

8. His relationship with Blanc deserves an article of its own, and for reasons of space and singularity of focus, I will not explore it here.

9. Mill, Letter 64, 133; Pellarin, Life of Charles Fourier, 76.

10. Mill, Autobiography, 63.

11. Ibid., 171.

12. Ibid., 173.

13. Mill, Letter 64, 134.

14. Ibid.

15. Fourier, Theory of the Four Movements, 50.

16. Mill, Principles, 975–82. Communism, for Mill, involved the ‘absolute equality in the distribution of the physical means of life and enjoyment’, whereas socialism allows ‘inequality, but grounded on some principle, or supposed principle, of justice or general expediency, and not, like so many of the existing social inequalities, dependent on accident alone’. ’Socialism’, Mill felt, though a word of English origin, was now ‘applied to any system which requires that the land and the instruments of production should be the property, not of individuals, but of communities of associations, or of the government’. Mill, Principles, 202–3.

17. Mill, Letter 5, 9–10; Mill, Principles, 203. Claeys dates Mill’s more serious consideration to 1850, though I think the inclusion of Fourierism in the 1849 edition of Principles, as well as these letters, make 1849 a more plausible date. Claeys, “Justice, Independence, and Democracy,” 131.

18. Or perhaps one ought to say ’they introduced’ given the role Mill ascribes to Taylor in the authorship and revision of Principles. Mill, Autobiography, 255.

19. Mill, Principles, 982.

20. Ibid., 203 and 211–12. Chapters calls Fourierism ‘the principal’ form of non-communist Socialism, ‘a system which … is highly worth of the attention of any student’ and to which ‘there is scarcely any objection or difficulty which Fourier did not foresee, and against which he did not make provision beforehand by self-acting contrivances’. Mill, Chapters, 747.

21. Mill, Letter 5, 10, footnote 5.

22. Mill, Letter 5, 10.

23. Mill, Chapters, 719–26.

24. Currently in the Mill Library, Somerville College, Oxford.
25. Mill, *Chapters*, 719–27. Interestingly, as Mill cites the French edition of *Destinée Sociale*, the translations in *Chapters* are presumably his own.
26. Mill, *Chapters*, 748.
27. Mill, *Principles*, 766.
28. Ibid., 767.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 769–75.
31. Ibid., 770–73.
32. Ibid., 771.
33. Ibid., 1011.
34. Ibid., 771–72.
35. Robert, *Biography of a Good Man*, 45.
36. Mill, *Principles*, 754–5.
37. Church, “Profit-Sharing and Labour,” 6–10.
38. Sarvasy, “Reconsideration of Mill’s Socialism,” 313 and 315.
39. Mill, *Principles*, 769–70, 1006–8 and 1013–14; Mill, *Claims of Labour*, 382.
40. Mill, *Principles*, 793–4.
41. Ibid., 772–3.
42. Leclaire, cited Robert, *Biography of a Good Man*, 43.
43. Pellarin, cited ibid.
44. Fourier, “Attractive Labour,” 163–71.
45. Mill, *Principles*, 771.
46. Ibid.
47. Leclaire, cited Robert, *Biography of a Good Man*, 45.
48. Though it also has interesting links to the Saint-Simonian idea of ‘from each according to his contribution; to each according to his work’, and Leclaire attended speeches by Saint-Simoniens – see Robert, *Biography of a Good Man*, 46.
49. Mill, *Principles*, 772.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 772–3.
53. Ibid.
54. Indeed, what, in 1845 he had called his ‘Utopia’. See Mill, *Claims*, 382.
55. Mill, *Principles*, 769–94.
56. Considerant, cited Beecher, *Victor Considerant*, 136.
57. Ibid. See also Considerant, *Destinée Sociale*, 355–59.
58. Considerant, cited Beecher, *Victor Considerant*, 136. See also Considerant, *Destinée Sociale*, 359–68.
59. Considerant, cited Beecher, *Victor Considerant*, 136.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Blanc, *The Organisation of Labour*, 51–53.
63. Mill, *Principles*, 203.
64. Ibid., 201.
65. Ibid., 794.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., 792.
68. Ibid.
69. Mill, *Claims*, 379.
70. Mill, *Principles*, 205.
71. For instance, Hollander, *Economics of Mill*, 817–18; Fredman and Gordon, “Mill and Socialism,” 6; and Stafford, “Paradigmatic Liberal,” 325–45.
72. Mill, *Principles*, 794–96.
73. Ibid., 754.
74. Ibid., 795–6.
75. Ibid., 796.
76. Ibid. Mill’s use of ‘industrious’ has an interesting link with the Saint-Simonian use of ‘industriels’ to mean those who produced all the wealth of a country, both labourers and capitalist ‘industrialists’.
77. Ibid., 795–6.
78. Ibid., 795.
79. Fourier, “Series and Groups,” 159.
80. Fourier, “Attractive Labour,” 164.
81. Fourier, “Role of the Passions,” 57–59.
82. Fourier’s examples are of campaigning with a party, or smaller group, in an election, or of two lovers planning a clandestine meeting without their parents’ knowledge. Fourier, “Role of the Passions,” 57.
83. Considerant, Exposition abrégée, 36–7 and Destinée Sociale, 378.
84. See Fourier, “Series and Groups,” 158 and “Attractive Labour,” 164–5.
85. Fourier, “Role of the Passions,” 58. Franklin gives ‘sectaries’ or ‘sectaires’ for what I have previously called ‘series’.
86. Guamari, The Utopian Alternative, 126.
87. Mill, Principles, 795.
88. Mill, Chapters, 713.
89. Mill, Principles, 211–12 and 982–83.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., 982–3.
93. Ibid., 983.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., 792.
99. Ibid., 212.
100. Ibid., 213 and 984.
101. Ibid., 213 and 984.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., 213 and 983–4.
104. Ibid., 213 and 984.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid., 985.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.

119. This has been taken by some as a sign that Mill always preferred laissez-faire capitalism to socialism. But it is worth bearing in mind that, in the same edition of Principles, Mill not only encourages profit-sharing (not traditionally a feature of laissez-faire, and, as noted previously, itself, in Mill, influenced by socialist thought and practice), but producer and
consumer cooperation. Though he evidently sees these coming about as part of an organic process within the existing capitalist framework, they are not species of capitalism (never mind traditional laissez-faire capitalism). So his endorsement of capitalism in 'On Property' must be balanced against his endorsement (as 'the nearest approach to social justice') of transformation of capitalism later in Principles.

120. Mill, *Principles*, 213.
121. Ibid., 214.
122. Ibid. Again, some have read this merely as proof of Mill's anti-paternalist laissez-faire attitude: no one who only risks harm to themselves should be prevented from taking their own risks, and so governments should not try to forcibly prevent their subjects from even so something as evidently foolhardy as attempting socialism. Certainly, Mill favoured voluntary socialism, and capitalism. But to read just anti-paternalism here seems a stretch.
123. Taylor, "Preliminary Notice," 705.
124. Mill, *Chapters*, 738.
125. Mill, *Principles*, 211–12.
126. Mill, *Chapters*, 747.
127. Mill, *Chapters*, 747–8; Mill, *Principles*, 212–14.
128. Mill, *Principles*, 747.
129. Ibid., 739.
130. Mill, *Chapters*, 748. There is also an interesting rider about Fourier's 'peculiar' opinions regarding marriage, and an insistence that these are 'quite independent of, and separable from, the principles of his industrial system', which shows something of what Mill feared the attitudes of his readers might be, and how easily they might be swayed from taking any elements of socialism seriously, rather than a sudden change in Mill's own feminist opinions regarding marriage.
131. Mill, *Principles*, 209.
132. Ibid., 359–60.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid., 360.
135. Ibid., 208.
136. Which undermines the claims of aristocrats to land (which cannot be 'owned' through labour, only the produce of it can be) and of subsequent generations to the earned capital of their parents.
137. Ibid., 227.
138. Ibid., 210.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid. See also Mill, *Spirit of the Age*, 257.
142. Mill, *Principles*, 210.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid., 203.
145. Ibid.
146. Ibid., 207–208.
147. Ibid., 225.
148. Ibid., 207–208 and 223–26.
149. Ibid., 229–30.
150. Ibid., 794.
151. Ibid., 210.
152. Ibid., 209.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid., 203–209.
155. Ibid., 210–14.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid.
158. Mill, *Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform*, 321–22; Mill, *Fontana and Prati*, 678.

159. Mill, *Principles*, 210–14.

160. I leave out here consideration of Blanc’s communism, though Blanc is generally seen as a ‘utopian socialist’, because Mill does not deal with it in detail in *Principles* or *Chapters* and may mainly have seen it as a form of ‘association’ which I am treating as something different to ‘utopian’ socialism.

161. See, for instance, Baum, “Mill and Liberal Socialism,” 98–123.

162. Mill, *Principles*, 214.

163. Ibid.

164. Sarvasy, “Reconsideration of Mill’s Socialism,” 313–15.

165. Mill, *Principles*, 794.

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