Bayesian deterministic decision making: a normative account of the operant matching law and heavy-tailed reward history dependency of choices

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The decision making behaviors of humans and animals adapt and then satisfy an “operant matching law” in certain type of tasks. This was first pointed out by Herrnstein in his foraging experiments on pigeons. The matching law has been one landmark for elucidating the underlying processes of decision making and its learning in the brain. An interesting question is whether decisions are made deterministically or probabilistically. Conventional learning models of the matching law are based on the latter idea; they assume that subjects learn choice probabilities of respective alternatives and decide stochastically with the probabilities. However, it is unknown whether the matching law can be accounted for by a deterministic strategy or not. To answer this question, we propose several deterministic Bayesian decision making models that have certain incorrect beliefs about an environment. We claim that a simple model produces behavior satisfying the matching law in static settings of a foraging task but not in dynamic settings. We found that the model that has a belief that the environment is volatile works well in the dynamic foraging task and exhibits undermatching, which is a slight deviation from the matching law observed in many experiments. This model also demonstrates the double-exponential reward history dependency of a choice and a heavier-tailed run-length distribution, as has recently been reported in experiments on monkeys.

Keywords: decision making, operant matching law, Bayesian inference, dynamic foraging task, heavy-tailed reward history dependency

1. INTRODUCTION

Does the brain play dice? This is a controversial question about the underlying processes of the brain in making a choice from several alternatives: Does the brain decide deterministically with some internal decision variables? Or does it calculate the probability of choosing individual alternatives and cast a “biased die” (Sugrue et al., 2005)? The former strategy is suggested according to our everyday experience. However, it is possible to think that choices emerge probabilistically by observing a sequence of decisions in a repetitive task. Herrnstein conducted a foraging experiment where a pigeon was placed into a box that was equipped with two keys and when a key was pressed it was rewarded with concurrent variable-interval schedules. He found a relationship between rewards and choices known as the “operant matching law” (Herrnstein, 1961). The law states that the fraction of the number of times one alternative is chosen against the total number of choices matches the fraction of the cumulative reward obtained from the alternative against the total reward. Behaviors satisfying the law have been observed in a variety of task paradigms and across species (de Villiers and Herrnstein, 1976; Gallistel, 1994; Anderson et al., 2002). Several learning models have been proposed to account for matching behavior (Corrado et al., 2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Loewenstein and Seung, 2006; Soltani and Wang, 2006; Sakai and Fukai, 2008a; Simen and Cohen, 2009). These models have a commonality in that a model learns the probabilities of choosing each alternative directly, and then a choice is made stochastically. However, it is yet unknown whether matching behaviors can be accounted for by a deterministic model.

Here, we propose deterministic Bayesian decision making models for a two-alternative choice task. Our models stand on the incorrect but conceivable postulate that animals have a belief that the choice made in one trial does not affect a reward in subsequent trials. The models estimate the unknown reward probabilities for each alternative and deterministically choose the alternative that has the highest reward probability according to the winner-take-all principle. We first study a model with belief that the environment does not change. Note that this is an extension of the fixed belief model (FBM) (Yu and Cohen, 2009) for the two-alternative choice task. We demonstrate that this model satisfies the matching law in a steady state in static foraging tasks, in which reward baiting probabilities are fixed, but not in dynamic foraging tasks, in which the reward baiting probabilities change abruptly. Then, we devise two models that forget past experience
and exhibit matching behaviors even in dynamic tasks. Moreover, these models can explain undermatching, which is a phenomenon observed across different species (Baum, 1974; de Villiers and Herrnstein, 1976; Baum, 1979; Gallistel, 1994; Anderson et al., 2002; Sugrue et al., 2004; Lau and Glimcher, 2005). We test these models by comparing their predicted reward history dependencies and run-length distributions to those seen in a monkey experiment.

2. RESULTS
We studied deterministic Bayesian decision making models that demonstrated matching behaviors in a foraging task. The foraging task is a decision making task that simulates a foraging environment where an animal chooses one out of several foraging alternatives. There are two alternatives in this study although the choice can affect the reward probabilities of alternatives in states that

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This reward schedule is known as a “concurrent variable-interval schedule” (Baum and Rachlin, 1969). Suppose that a subject makes a decision simply

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for the foraging alternative that has the highest baiting probability. A behavioral strategy obeying the matching law is known as a winner-take-all (WTA) strategy, i.e., it chooses the alternative that has the highest \( P_t^i \). The model requires an assumption about a reward assignment mechanism to estimate \( P_t^{i+1} \). One simple and conceivable assumption is that a choice is rewarded according to hidden reward probability \( \mu_i^t \) that is irrelevant to the past reward and choice history, i.e., \( p(r_t^i = 1) = \mu_i^t \). This assumption is incorrect for our tasks but we have assumed that the model employs it and predicts \( \mu_i^t \) by Bayesian inference.

Hence, \( P_t^{i+1} \) is given by the predictive distribution over \( \mu_i^t \):

\[
P_t^{i+1} = \int_0^1 \mu \ p(\mu_t^{i+1} = \mu | R^t, C^t).
\]

Note that \( p(\mu_t^{i+1} = \mu | R^t, C^t) \) can include a model’s belief about the change of \( \mu_i^t \) in between trials. Our first model assumes that \( \mu_i^t \) is time invariant, i.e., \( p(\mu_t^{i+1} = \mu | R^t, C^t) = p(\mu_t^i = \mu | R^t, C^t) \). The posterior distribution for an alternative is not updated if the alternative is not chosen. If it is chosen, the posterior distribution is updated

\[
p(\mu_t^i = \mu | R^t, C^t) \propto p(r_t^i | \mu_t^i = \mu) p(\mu_t^{i-1} = \mu | R^{t-1}, C^{t-1}) = \mu_r^i (1 - \mu)^{1-r} p(\mu_t^{i-1} = \mu | R^{t-1}, C^{t-1}).
\]

We employ the Beta prior, \( p(\mu_i^0 = \mu) = \text{Beta}(\mu | a, b) \), which is a conjugate for the likelihood. Note that we set the hyperparameters, \( a = b = 1 \), to make the prior non-informative in all simulations. Therefore, the posterior becomes a Beta distribution:

\[
p(\mu_t^i = \mu | R_t^i, C_t^i) = \text{Beta}(\mu | R_t^i + a, C_t^i - R_t^i + b).
\]

From Equations (4) and (6), we obtain

\[
P_t^{i+1} = \frac{R_t^i + a}{C_t^i + a + b}.
\]

This model is a natural extension of FBM (Yu and Cohen, 2009) to the two-alternative choice task (for this reason, we will refer to our model as FBM). An alternative is repeatedly chosen while its predictive distribution is higher than those of the other due to the WTA strategy. Because the empirical probability of reward for an alternative converges to its baiting probability in repeated choices, \( P_t^i \) gradually approaches to \( \lambda_i \) and the variance of \( P_t^i \) decreases. As a result, FBM tends to choose exclusively the high payoff alternative after a large number of observations. Hence, the matching law [Equation (1)] is satisfied in \( t \to \infty \) because such a exclusive choice unboundedly increases both \( R_t^i \) and \( C_t^i \) of the high payoff alternative.

2.1. SIMPLE BERNOULLI ESTIMATORS
First, we studied a simple normative Bayesian decision making model to clarify the underlying feasible computation for matching behaviors. Suppose that a subject makes a decision simply depending on its estimates of the reward probabilities for the alternatives. The estimate can be formally described as

\[
P_t^{i+1} = p(r_t^{i+1} = 1 | R^t, C^t),
\]

where \( R^t \) is a list of reward vectors \( r^i_t = (r_1^t, r_2^t) \) from trials 1 to \( t \) and \( C^t \) is a list of choice vectors \( c^i_t = (c_1^t, c_2^t) \) from trials 1 to \( t \). The model employs a winner-take-all (WTA) strategy, i.e., it chooses the alternative that has the highest \( P_t^i \).
We simulated FBM in static and dynamic foraging tasks. The time course for the predictive distributions is shown in Figure 1A. As can be expected, both predictive distributions approach the respective baiting probabilities and FBM behavior converges to exclusive choice of the high payoff alternative in static foraging tasks. However, the steady-state choice behavior of animals in static concurrent VI schedules has not been thought to be exclusive (Baum, 1982; Davison and McCarthy, 1988; Baum et al., 1999). It might be that there are not enough trials for choice behavior to actually reach a steady state. Figures 1B,C plot the log ratios of rewards and choices in both tasks. The marginal histograms indicate the FBM’s strong preference for the alternative that has the highest baiting probability, because most pairs of log ratios lie near the endpoints of the matching line. We found that bias is nearly zero and sensitivity is nearly one in the static foraging tasks (Figure 1B) by least-square fitting the generalized matching law [Equation (2)] to the data. Therefore, the model exhibits matching behavior in the static foraging tasks. However, the model no longer exhibits matching behavior in dynamic foraging tasks, a result that is inconsistent with the behavior of monkeys (Corrado et al., 2005) (Figure 1C). This can be because the model adheres to past experience and cannot adapt rapidly to changes in the environment.

2.2. EXTENDED BERNOULLI ESTIMATORS

One possible way of improving the model to enable it to rapidly adapt to changes in the environment is to introduce a forgetting mechanism for past rewards and choice history. We therefore assume a simple extended model, which utilizes only the $L$ most recent rewards and choices for the estimates. Hence, the predictive distribution becomes

$$P_{i}^{t+1} = \frac{\left(\sum_{l=0}^{L-1} r_{i}^{-l}\right) + a}{\left(\sum_{l=0}^{L-1} r_{i}^{-l}\right) + a + b}.$$  (8)

We refer to this model as windowed FBM (WFBM).

Another possibility may be derived from the idea that humans and animals may innately believe their environment is volatile. Here, we propose a model that estimates time-varying reward probabilities. Although there are several ways to model a belief of a volatile environment, we assume our model believes that $\mu_{i}$ remains unchanged with probability $\alpha$, or else (with probability $1 - \alpha$) changes completely. This idea is derived from the dynamic belief model (DBM), proposed by Yu and Cohen as a model of sequential effect (Yu and Cohen, 2009). Our model is a natural extension of DBM to a two-alternative choice task. Thus, we refer to our model as DBM. The transition of $\mu_{i}$ is modeled as a mixture of the posterior and prior distributions

$$p(\mu_{i}^{t+1} = \mu | R^{t}, C^{t}) = \alpha p(\mu_{i}^{t} = \mu | R^{t}, C^{t}) + (1 - \alpha) \text{Beta}(\mu|a,b),$$  (9)

where $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$ represents the model’s expectations of the stability of the environment. However, the posterior distribution is no longer a Beta distribution:

$$p(\mu_{i}^{t} = \mu | R^{t}, C^{t}) = p(\mu_{i}^{t} = \mu | r_{i}^{t}, c_{i}^{t} = 1, R^{t-1}, C^{t-1}) \beta p(\mu_{i}^{t} = \mu | R^{t-1}, C^{t-1})^{1 - c_{i}^{t}}
= \left[ \left( \frac{p(r_{i}^{t} = 1 | \mu_{i}^{t} = \mu) \mu}{p(r_{i}^{t} = 1 | R^{t-1}, C^{t-1})} \right) \left( \frac{p(r_{i}^{t} = 0 | \mu_{i}^{t} = \mu) \mu}{p(r_{i}^{t} = 0 | R^{t-1}, C^{t-1})} \right) \right]^{c_{i}^{t}} \beta p(\mu_{i}^{t} = \mu | R^{t-1}, C^{t-1})
= \left[ \left( \frac{\mu}{\beta} \right)^{c_{i}^{t}} \left( 1 - \frac{\mu}{\beta} \right)^{1 - c_{i}^{t}} \right] \beta p(\mu_{i}^{t} = \mu | R^{t-1}, C^{t-1}),$$  (10)

where we use Equation (3). Then, predictive distribution $P_{i}^{t}$ is calculated with Equations (4), (10), and (11). Note that these models are equivalent to FBM when $L \to \infty$ and $\alpha = 1$.

Figure 2 has the time courses for the predictive distributions of WFBM and DBM, and the posterior distributions of DBM in the dynamic foraging task. Neither model is stuck on one alternative and can follow the changes in schedules as expected. There is a clear difference in the predictive distribution trajectories. Because WFBM exploits recent samples, its predictive distribution for the unchosen alternative can approach the true baiting probability. DBM’s predictive distribution for the unchosen alternative, on the other hand, is only retracted to the mean of the prior, i.e., 0.5. Both models demonstrate matching behaviors even in the dynamic foraging task (Figure 3). More precisely, the behaviors slightly deviate from the matching law toward an unbiased choice. This phenomenon is known as undermatching (Baum,
Because the models’ parameters $L$ and $\alpha$ control the effect of past experience, the degree of undermatching is controlled by the parameters. The sensitivities that were fitted in the experiments were in a range of about 0.44 to 0.91 (Hinson and Staddon, 1983; Corrado et al., 2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2005). Hence, we basically focused on parameter regions $10 \leq L$ and $0.9 \leq \alpha$.

The dependence of choices on reward history has been studied in several monkey experiments. An exponential shaped dependency was first reported (Sugrue et al., 2004) and then heavier-tailed dependencies were reported (Corrado et al., 2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2005). We tested our models by calculating the dependence of choices on reward history (Figure 4A). Suppose that dependency is expressed with a linear filter kernel $\kappa(i)$ as in previous studies. The kernel is calculated by minimizing the following Wiener-Hopf equation,

$$
\frac{1}{2} \sum_i \left[ (c_i^1 - c_i^2) - \sum_{i=1}^{K} \kappa(i)(r_i^1 - r_i^2) \right]^2.
$$

(11)

Then, we fit the exponential filter and double-exponential filter that were introduced by Corrado et al. (2005) to the normalized kernel:

$$
\epsilon_1(i) = \frac{\exp(-i/\tau_0)}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} \exp(-k/\tau_0)},
$$

$$
\epsilon_2(i) = \rho \frac{\exp(-i/\tau_1)}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} \exp(-k/\tau_1)} + (1 - \rho) \frac{\exp(-i/\tau_2)}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} \exp(-k/\tau_2)},
$$

(12)

where $\tau_0$ and $\tau_1 \leq \tau_2$ are time constants and $0 < \rho < 1$ is the combining rate. Note that $\epsilon_2$ is identical to $\epsilon_1$ when $\tau_1 = \tau_2$. The double-exponential filter is rather more well-fitted than the single one for WFBM and DBM (likelihood ratio test, $p \ll 0.001$; adjusted $r^2$ for double and single exponential filters are 0.99 and 0.98 for WFBM, and 0.94 and 0.85 for DBM). The kernel for WFBM has a negative value around 0 but it disappears if $L$ is much longer than $K$. The kernel for DBM drops sharply and decays slowly. The sharp drop probably arose from the exponential decay of reward history, which is embedded in the posterior distributions [Equation (10)]. Because a decision is made due to the difference in two predictive distributions and both distributions decay at the same rate, the effect of one predictive distribution would have persisted slightly longer and hence the kernel included a longer exponential component. This characteristic is qualitatively consistent with the experimental results Corrado et al. (2005).

The fitting parameters for the two monkeys in Corrado et al. (2005) were $\rho = 0.4$, $\tau_1 = 2.2$, and $\tau_2 = 17.0$ (monkey F), and $\rho = 0.25$, $\tau_1 = 0.9$, and $\tau_2 = 12.6$ (monkey G). Although there were no suitable WFBM and DBM parameters that exactly matched their fitting parameters to those of the monkeys, similar values were obtained for smaller $L$ and larger $\alpha$ (Figure 4B).

It is known that the probability of switching alternatives is nearly constant against the number of consecutive choices for one
alternative (run length) in the concurrent VI schedule (Heyman and Luce, 1979). Hence, run lengths are distributed exponentially but, in a dynamic foraging task, the distribution seems to be a mixture of exponentials (Corrado et al., 2005). The distribution of WFBM does not monotonically decrease and there is a peak where the run length is nearly equal to \( L \). Therefore, the distribution is neither an exponential nor a mixture of exponentials. This nature is consistent on different values of \( L \). However, DBM demonstrates an exponential like distribution.

The run-length distribution in monkey experiments has a few frequencies of a very short run length; however our models have the largest frequency at the run length of 1 (Figures 5A, B). This difference can be due to the absence of change-over-delay (COD) in our schedule. If our model had and exploited prior knowledge about COD as well as the proposed model for the previous experiment (Corrado et al., 2005), the frequency at a run length of 1 could disappear. We simulated linear-nonlinear-Poisson (LNP) models that were fitted to the monkeys’ experimental data in Corrado et al. (2005). Double-exponential function is fitted better than single one (likelihood ratio test, \( p < 0.001 \)).

The run-length distributions of DBM. Double-exponential function is fitted better than single one (likelihood ratio test, \( p < 0.001 \)). The log probability densities of run-length distribution of DBM (black line) and linear-nonlinear Poisson models (red and green lines) which are fitted to monkeys’ experimental data in Corrado et al. (2005). Double-exponential function is fitted better than single one (likelihood ratio test, \( p < 0.001 \)).

2.2.1. Harvesting performance

Figure 6A compares the harvesting performance of the models, which is normalized by the performance of a near-optimal probabilistic decision making model. The near-optimal model knows the details of the schedules, i.e., both the baiting probabilities and the change points. It distributes its choices according to the choice probabilities that on average maximize the total reward (Sakai and Fukai, 2008a). Due to such given knowledge, none of
the other models can exceed the performance of the near-optimal model. We carried out paired t-tests between the models, in which the means of total reward for an identical schedule were paired. The FBM and WFBM ($L = 60$) are more inferior than the random choice model that chooses by tossing an unbiased coin. The DBM ($\alpha = 0.99$) outperforms FBM, WFBM, and LNP models ($p \ll 0.001$) but the differences from the LNP models are very small. Harvesting performance is less when a model memorizes a more distant past (Figure 6B).

### 3. DISCUSSION

We demonstrated that deterministic Bayesian decision making models can account for the matching law. We confirmed that a simple Bernoulli estimator with a deterministic decision policy demonstrated matching behavior in a static foraging task. We also studied an extended model that includes a belief about a changing environment. The belief effectively works to wipe out the past experience of the model and hence the model can capture three characteristics of behaviors observed in the experiments. First, our model accounts for undermatching, which is a well-known phenomenon in which choices deviate slightly from the matching law (Baum, 1974, 1979; Sugrue et al., 2004). Several studies have addressed possible causes of undermatching, i.e., limitations in the learning rule (Soltani and Wang, 2006), mistuning of parameters (Loewenstein, 2008), and diffusion of synaptic weights (Katahira et al., 2012). This study suggested the cause from a computational perspective, i.e., undermatching was the consequence of a belief in environmental volatility. Second, our model exhibits double-exponential shaped reward history dependency. This is consistent with recent monkey experiments (Corrado et al., 2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2005). Third, the run-length distribution of our model is better fitted by a double-exponential function than a single exponential function. This is also consistent with the previous study (Corrado et al., 2005) although our task did not include changeover delay, which can strongly affect the frequency of shorter run lengths. Quantitatively validating our model such as checking its goodness of fit to raw experimental data would be worthwhile.

The previous models implicitly or explicitly use the strategy of probabilistic choice selection and they learn the choice probability of respective alternatives that satisfy the matching law (Corrado et al., 2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Loewenstein and Seung, 2006; Soltani and Wang, 2006; Sakai and Fukai, 2008a; Simen and Cohen, 2009). Such probabilistic models use a scaling parameter that maps internal decision variables to appropriate choice probabilities and the parameter generally requires fine-tuning (Soltani and Wang, 2006; Fusi et al., 2007). In contrast, as our models act deterministically according to decision variables, no tuning is required for a parameter at the decision stage.

We argued that matching behavior can be explained by a deterministic choice strategy at the computational level. Loewenstein and Seung (2006) proposed biologically inspired synaptic learning rules for neural networks at the neural implementation level. They proved that neural networks developed by covariance-based learning with the assumption of a low learning rate demonstrated matching behaviors. However, this assumption causes the choice to be affected by relatively distant past rewards and the kernel for reward history dependency consequently flattens. A more microscopic spiking neural network model, in which double-exponential dependency in foraging tasks is demonstrated, has been proposed (Soltani and Wang, 2006). However, there is a huge gap between the computational principles of our deterministic macroscopic models and their stochastic microscopic model. This gap can be filled by using a method of reducing spiking neuron models to the diffusion equation (Roxin and Ledberg, 2008). There have been some other neural network models that can show heavy-tailed dependency of choices on past experience. A reservoir network (Jaeger et al., 2007), which can reproduce neural activity in the monkey prefrontal cortex, preserves the memory trace of a reward with one or two time constants (Bernacchia et al., 2011). The composite learning system of faster and slower components is flexible to abrupt changes in the environment (Fusi et al., 2007). These models could be a possible neural implementation for our model. Furthermore, our models are an extension of that by Yu & Cohen who argued that decision variables of their model can be approximated by a linear exponential filter, and that there are neural implementations for that operation (Yu and Cohen, 2009).

Because matching behavior often deviates from optimal behavior in the sense of total reward maximization (Vaughan, 1981), it is not likely to be a consequence of optimization. However, our model acts optimally in terms of Bayesian decision making with an incorrect assumption about the environment, indicating that matching behavior is a bounded optimal behavior. This idea is consistent with the theory of Sakai and Fukai (2008b).
who found any learning method neglecting the effect of a choice on future rewards displays matching behavior if choice probabilities are differentiable with respect to parameters (Sakai and Fukai, 2008b). Note that the choice probabilities of our model are not differentiable. Hence, we confirmed that their theory could be correct in such extreme cases.

4. MATERIALS AND METHODS
4.1. DETAILS OF SIMULATION
The reward schedule is analogous to the experiment by Corrado et al. (2005). We randomly set the baiting probabilities that satisfied \( \lambda_1 + \lambda_2 = 0.3 \) and their ratios were 1:8, 1:6, 1:3, 1:2, 1:1, 2:1, 3:1, 6:1, and 8:1 in a static setting. There were 10,000 trials in the simulations. The baiting schedule in the dynamic setting was divided into blocks, in which the baiting probabilities were fixed, and their sum and ratios were the same as those in the static setting. The block length was uniformly sampled from [50, 300] and there were 300 blocks in the simulations. We did not include change-over-delay (COD), i.e., the cost to switch from one alternative to another, which was different from Corrado et al. (2005). The hyper-parameters were set to \( a = 1 \) and \( b = 1 \) in all the simulations.

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