Theory to Practice: Reflections on a Consulting Life

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Abstract
In this essay, I recount my career experiences as a research consultant in Washington DC. These experiences, over the course of 23 years, provide examples of how theory and research can be used to guide practice. The account is chronological, beginning with my first consulting assignment in 1975, where I worked with a US delegation on resolving a negotiation impasse, to the 1990s where I directed study groups on a variety of human performance and international conflict resolution topics. These projects consisted both of applications of research-based knowledge and the generation of research ideas for new projects. By immersing myself in both theory and practice, I could transform basic research into applied insights and induce research ideas from practice. This was the kind of career that Jeff Rubin aspired to having. The IACM Rubin award recognizes the way that his aspiration was fulfilled by one of his colleagues.

Introduction
I was a full-time social scientist consultant from 1975 to 1997 (see Druckman, 2000). During this 23-year period, I worked for two consulting firms in Bethesda Maryland and for the National Research Council in Washington DC. This was a new career. I had been at a research institute in Chicago for nine years (September 1966–June 1975) following graduate school at Northwestern. I transitioned to academia in 1997, teaching at several universities in Virginia and Australia. My scholarly career is discussed in the legacy article by Beriker, Allen, Larson, and Wagner (2018) and in the Lifetime Achievement Award article by Druckman (2003a). In this article, I focus on the contributions made at the intersection between theory and practice.

I met Jeff Rubin in the 1970s around the time when we both published books on the social psychology of negotiation (Druckman, 1977a; Rubin & Brown, 1975). We remained friends and colleagues until his untimely death in 1995. We corresponded frequently about our shared research interests. But I also worked closely with him on the International Relations Committee of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) and at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg near Vienna Austria during the early 1990s. I contributed to his “Kissinger book” (Rubin, 1995). This article is based on a talk presented at the International Association for Conflict Management in conjunction with receiving the 2018 Rubin Theory to Practice Award. Special appreciation to all of my collaborators on this journey and to Marj, Kathy, and Jamie for sharing this complex life with me. Thanks also to Bill Donohue and Jamie Druckman for their valuable suggestions on earlier versions.

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1981) and happily accepted his recommendation to write a chapter for the Advances in Applied Social Psychology volume (Druckman, 1983). Most memorable perhaps was our participation, with Dean Pruitt and William Smith, on a 1982 panel at the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP) held in Washington DC. This experience is where my stories begin.

Jeff Rubin and the Consulting Life

Following the ISPP panel, I invited Jeff and Dean to my office and then to dinner at our house. During conversation at the office, Jeff seemed to covet the life of a DC consultant. I offered to exchange careers; I told Jeff that I would gladly take his tenured academic position in return for my consulting life. Since we did not have the benefit of reading “The Art of the Deal,” we could not pull off the exchange. Jeff stayed an academic, I eventually became one fifteen years later: sometimes you get what you wish for and then wish that you didn’t get it.

The conversation moved on to other things at dinner. As we were wrapping up, Jeff cleared the dishes and, lo and behold, proceeded to scrape and put them in the dishwasher. Astonished, we asked why he felt compelled as a guest to take on these tasks. His answer: to show my appreciation for your hospitality and dinner. This was a side of Jeff that I did not know but came to appreciate during the remaining years of his life. I hope that he is smiling now.

So then, let’s continue the story telling with experiences that Jeff missed having. Little did I know that I would be entering a world of “Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Consultant” (from the title of Gary Brewer’s 1973 book). Nor did I realize that I was embarking on adventures in the spirit of the movie, “The Secret Life of Walter Mitty.”

The “adventures” are discussed in a rough chronological sequence. I begin with my earliest consulting assignments at Mathematica in the 1970s, continue with projects conducted in the 1980s at Booz Allen, and conclude with a discussion of several projects during my twelve years at the National Research Council. This consulting career was bounded by nine years at a research institute in Chicago (1966–1975) and by academic positions at universities in Virginia and Australia (1997–2016). (See Table 1 for a listing of the consulting organizations, time, and key projects.) A theme that runs through the discussion is the nexus between theory and practice. Each of the projects, performed in an applied context, benefitted from my earlier academic training and from the basic research done during my time at the institute in Chicago. But I also show how ideas from the consulting projects stimulated new research. Important takeaways from this career are discussed as six challenges to the conflict management community. These challenges are highlighted before concluding the essay.

| Consulting firm or organization | Years   | Key projects                                                                 |
|---------------------------------|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Mathtech/Mathematica            | 1975–1982 | Base-rights negotiations                                                       |
|                                 |         | MBFR: NATO and the Warsaw Pact                                                |
|                                 |         | Nonverbal communication, indications of deception                             |
| Booz Allen & Hamilton           | 1982–1986 | START: US-Soviet arms control                                                 |
|                                 |         | Political Stability in the Philippines                                        |
| National Research Council       | 1986–1997 | Peacekeeping evaluation and training                                          |
|                                 |         | International conflict resolution after the Cold War                          |
|                                 |         | Human dimensions of Environmental Change                                      |
| United States Institute of Research grants | 1993–1997 | Screen mediation                                                              |
|                                 |         | Research to application/design                                                |
Base Rights, Human Rights, and Turning Points: The Mathematica Years I

The year was 1975 when our family moved to the DC area for my new job at Mathematica, an analytical consulting firm in Bethesda Maryland founded by a group of Princeton University game theorists. My first assignment was to develop a framework for analyzing intergovernmental negotiations. The application was a Cold War negotiation in progress between Spain and the United States over base rights (Druckman, 1986).

What appeared to be a quick renewal of four bases turned out to be a rancorous negotiation that lasted for a year and a half. Spain expanded the agenda from bases to broader geopolitical designs. They had a stranglehold over their powerful Cold War ally, using their territory to demand concessions on other fronts such as admission to the NATO alliance. I became embroiled in this dilemma as an analyst. Working from my office in Bethesda, I read the daily cable traffic on the conversations in Madrid or downtown in DC. Standing out in the maelstrom of messages was the way crises produced progress. The final crisis was the confusion caused by Franco’s death in 1976 leading to a treaty, not only on military bases but also on the broader idea of “Friendship and Cooperation.”

This was the beginning of my research program on turning points. The base-rights article appeared in 1986, nearly ten years after it was drafted, due to the need to clear classification hurdles at the State Department. Shortly thereafter, our Foreign Service Institute (FSI) panel, with considerable help from Bill Zartman, published a revealing book on base rights, adding Greece and the Philippines to the coverage (McDonald 1990). Prior to this book, the FSI panel produced a book that reported analyses of four difficult international cases (Bendamane & McDonald 1986). I wrote the theory-to-practice lessons learned chapter for both the 1986 and 1990 books. And, that is another dramatic story to be told at another time.

More broadly, this case opened my eyes to a textured world where choices are not binary. The careful balance of security and human rights was evident in the ratification hearings where the head of delegation, Bob McCloskey, responded to Congresswoman Bella Abzug’s pleas to void the agreement by saying to her: “I would move heaven and earth if necessary to get this treaty ratified.” It was ratified.

This balance is also evident in many other negotiating contexts including the current attempts to find peace with North Korea. While espousing a belief in universal human rights and supporting the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights, the United States has generously supported a rash of authoritarian regimes noted for their anti-Communist record and for their human rights abuses. In the years following the end of the Cold War, they have been supporting 22 authoritarian governments. Reasons given by US presidents are based on politics (protect against Communism, security, terrorism) and economics (markets for our products). All of these interests come into play during summit meetings between national leaders (Druckman & Wallensteen, 2016). They highlight the importance of interests while diminishing the relevance of such values as respect for human rights.

Research on Values and Interests

A broader research question asks about the interplay between values and interests. This question sprung from my reading of the literature on the sociology of conflict (Aubert, 1963; Coser, 1956) and was addressed in earlier research conducted during the 1970s and 1980s. My colleagues and I showed that conflicts over interests escalated when they were linked to ideologies and that ideological conflicts became more polarized when interest conflicts were more intense (Druckman, Broome, & Korper, 1988; Druckman & Zechmeister, 1973). A related question is the relative importance of interests and values. Our research from the 1970s showed that decisions were motivated more by interests than values, even when the values were the basis for religious beliefs (Druckman & Rozelle, 1974).

Returning to the dilemma of balancing human rights values against security interests, several research questions are suggested: Are security rationales for foreign policy decisions weakened when human rights
violations lead to significant loss of citizens’ lives? Are human rights violations less important as a basis for decisions when threats to security occur? and How do leaders react to human rights violations committed by allies when pressured by domestic constituencies? Each of these questions can be addressed with scenarios designed to ascertain the relative importance of values and interests in various decision-making contexts.

Research on Turning Points

The base-rights study also demonstrated that turning points (TPs) is a useful concept for understanding progress in negotiation. Impasses during that negotiation were resolved when particular events occurred: These included a willingness by the U.S. delegation to promote NATO membership for Spain, the signing of a framework agreement, and reactions in Spain to the death of Franco. Often a negotiating crisis, such as abruptly leaving the table, precipitated a turn toward progress. Crises are also effective tactics to force decisions that may turn a process in a different direction.1

A second case study on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks provided further evidence for the value of the TP concept in negotiating process analysis (Druckman, Husbands, & Johnston, 1991). These case analyses led to a larger comparative analysis of turning points.

The comparative study was an analysis of 34 cases divided into three issue areas—security, trade, and political negotiations. The analysis consisted of tracing the process in each case by coding precipitants, departures (TPs) and consequences. The findings indicated that progress in security negotiations depended on outside interventions while internal precipitants drove the process in both the trade and political talks. In many of the cases, a key precipitating factor was a negotiating crisis. A more important contribution made by this study perhaps was the development of a framework for analyzing many different types of cases. The study was also the basis for a three-year project on critical moments conducted by the Program on Negotiation (PON) at Harvard.

The PON project produced a 2004 special issue of the Negotiation Journal on “Critical Moments in Negotiation.” My article in the issue was on the concept of departures. This was an attempt to develop a theoretical basis for TPs by examining processes at the individual, interactional, and collective levels of analysis. This was a probe of the psychological and social processes that occur before, during, and after departures. These insights call attention to the underlying impetus for change. That impetus emerges from an interplay among the three levels of analysis.

These publications set the stage for further projects including experiments and case studies. A question that arose from the case studies was whether we can know TPs only in retrospect: Can TPs be known also in prospect? This question spurred a set of experiments conducted over the course of a decade with Mara Olekalns at the Melbourne Business School. An example was our simulation study of motivational primes (Druckman & Olekalns, 2013a).

Building on the earlier crisis-TP findings, we investigated decisions made following the sudden death of one party’s head-of-state. The scenario allowed four decisions: reach an agreement, continue negotiating without an agreement, withdraw from the talks, or reframe the issues. We found that mutual dependence (unattractive alternatives) led to reframing decisions while high transaction costs (costs of negotiating) led to a preference for continuing the talks. The reframing decision was taken by negotiators who disparaged of reaching an immediate agreement or persisting with the same process. They also evinced low trust in each other.

A similar pattern occurred for the earlier base rights and INF cases, indicating validity for the experimental results. The experimental thread was developed further by Griessmair and Druckman (2018).

1An example is the sudden emergence of sexual abuse allegations just before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee was about to meet on the Kavanaugh Supreme Court nomination.
They showed that cooperative or competitive negotiating atmospheres and attentiveness influenced how negotiators responded to departures from expected patterns of concession matching.

Parallel sets of TP case studies were conducted by Hall (2014) and by Crump and Druckman (2012, 2016). Hall’s research included a comparison between patterns shown in his 29 domestic environmental cases and the 11 international cases analyzed earlier by Chasek (1997). The domestic cases demonstrated the importance of procedures initiated by third parties during the early stages of the talks. In the international cases, substantive precipitants occurred early and frequently without the help of third parties. Procedures came into play in the ratification processes following the negotiations.

Crump and Druckman analyzed the long chronologies of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Outside interventions were effective in deescalating tensions and moving the GATT process toward agreement. In contrast, the new ideas that surfaced in the stalled WTO process led to escalation. Of interest in these analyses is the usefulness of the TP framework for capturing long, multilateral negotiations. (See Druckman & Olekalns, 2013b, for a summary of the TP research.)

This stream of TP research developed from a consulting assignment. The idea of TPs was discovered during reading transcripts of an ongoing negotiation with consequences for the world during the heyday of the Cold War. It provides an example of how research ideas are induced from participation in policy environments.

MBFR and START: The Mathematica Years II

The next consulting assignment at Mathematica was a bigger challenge: finding an agreement to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks between the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances. Conventional force reductions in central Europe were negotiated without resolution for thirteen years. Terry Hopmann and I entered at a later stage to save the day! We provided analytical support to the US delegation. Untold hours were spent by us studying the history, issues, and motivations of the alliances, leading to a proposed agreement on reductions, limitations, and timing. We presented our proposal to John Dean, the head of the US delegation, who showed interest but little else was done. Indeed, nothing was ever done as the troops issues were marginalized to broader questions of security and cooperation in Europe.

We were not privy to all of the machinations behind the scenes—a higher security clearance may have helped. Nonetheless, it did not take long to realize that these talks were designed to accomplish “side effects.” Both alliances cooperated in sustaining the talks without agreement in order to prevent their legislators from authorizing unilateral reductions. But we also learned about how the superpowers dominated their own alliances, strangely colluding with each other as captured by the concept of a “bilateral condominium.” This concept also seems to capture the current Trump–Putin infatuation. And, the within-alliance bargaining brought to life the concept of the two (or multiple) level game, an idea that I wrote about just before working on the MBFR project (Druckman, 1977b).

Research on Multilateral Negotiations

The MBFR experience provided an opportunity to elaborate on differences between bilateral and multilateral negotiations. One is a difference in the complexity of coordination among diverse constituencies and stakeholders. When two parties negotiate, each needs to balance preferences expressed by agents within its own governing structure. They also need to monitor the exchanges of offers and demands, insuring a rough equivalence over time (Druckman & Harris, 1990; Larson, 1998). Walton and McKersie (1965) depicted this as a boundary role dilemma. Druckman (1977b) applied the concept to the international domain by constructing two formal models, one based on concessions, the other on position preferences. Multilateral negotiations involve a substantial increase in the number of “balls in the air.” A
modeling challenge is to find an equilibrium among many preferences and concessions. Further complications of multilateral talks are more turnover of delegates, firmer deadlines, more publicity, and less chance for treaties in multilateral talks (Druckman, 1997).

Other interesting ideas from the MBFR experiences are collusion among leaders and negotiating for side effects. The “collusion effect,” shown in Druckman and Hopmann (2002), consists of imitating moves made by the opposing leader (either the Soviet or U.S. delegation) and reactions by the weaker members of the alliance (either the Warsaw Pact or NATO). This pattern suggests that the leaders are motivated by control of their alliances and the allies are driven by suspicions of sellout by their leaders. The collusion idea is evident as well in Ikłé’s (1964) concept of negotiating for side effects. As I noted above, both the Soviet and American leaders used MBFR to prevent their respective legislators from making unilateral troop reductions. Research with colleagues into types of negotiations revealed that only two of the thirty cases analyzed were located in the side effects category (Druckman, Martin, Allen Nan, & Yagcioglu, 1999). A question to be addressed is as follows: What are the conditions or policy goals that impel negotiating delegations to continue negotiating without an agreement.

Consulting on START

I suppose we were on a roll. I changed consulting firms but not the thread of arms control advising. The next challenge was to help the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency figure out how to get the Soviets back to the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) table after their 1983 walkout. I spent two months in the State Department reading and analyzing transcripts of the discussions to the point of walkout. A content analysis provided some useful insights. Most evident was a duel between the Soviet penchant for big-picture thinking and American pragmatism. The Soviets emphasized an overall strategic and tactical balance, while the Americans preferred a compartmentalized approach where strategic and tactical systems were negotiated by different delegations in different venues. Neither country viewed their differences as cultural predilections. Rather, they framed the difference as tactical maneuvering to get an advantage. The issue was a lack of trust. Repair was needed; too bad Roy Lewicki was not part of this consultation. I advised a reframing of the issues that would feature discussions of the meaning of an overall balance. (See above for a discussion of the TP research on reframing.) My report was sent to the director and briefed to the staff.

Well, the Soviets did return to the table in 1985. Based on the principle of causation by proximity, we claimed a consulting victory. Our reward (in addition to our fees) was lunch in the State Department dining room where we were introduced to Paul Nitze who took the famous “Walk in the Woods,” which became a Broadway show. An agreement was reached but the treaty was not ratified until 2008.

Culture and Strategy

The START consulting experience raises an interesting question about motivation: Was the difference in approach between the Soviet and US delegations due to cultural predilections or was it a matter of strategy? The cultural argument is central in Young’s (1968) treatment of the PRC negotiating style and in Whelen’s (1979) analysis of Soviet diplomacy. Young invokes a cultural explanation for Chinese diplomatic patience. They view time as infinite rather than segmented by deadlines for decisions. Whelen characterizes Soviet negotiating behavior as reflecting enduring cultural traditions that may be regarded also as imperatives of their political system. Similarly, Spain’s preference to argue in terms of broad generalities may be regarded as a cultural predilection. It contrasted with a U.S. focus on specifics in the 1975–1976 base-rights talks (Druckman, 1986).

Yet, despite the plausibility of cultural explanations for negotiating behavior, there is a strategic element that is likely to come into play as well. The Soviet START walkout was based on a calculation of relative advantage. Reductions taken in one category of weapons would put them at a disadvantage in the
overall balance. This is consistent also with their cultural preference to focus on a larger picture rather than one piece of the picture at a time. In this example, their strategy comports with an apparent cultural explanation.

Several research questions are suggested by these analyses. One is about the relative impacts of strategic thinking and cultural prerogatives. Another is how negotiators balance these considerations when they conflict: for example, how does a national delegation—such as the PRC, Soviet Union, or Spain—deal with pressures to concede on a specific item when disposed toward more general considerations? A third is how do culturally-influenced preferences constrain flexibility in a dynamic negotiating environment? This research thread is on the interplay between culture and negotiating situations.

Middle Powers and Negotiation

Another experience with delegations was at the IIASA near Vienna Austria. We consulted with Austrian diplomats on how middle powers navigate multilateral negotiations. We discovered both similarities and dissimilarities between the negotiating approaches taken by Austrian and other middle-power nations. An important insight is that these nations prefer bilateral rather than multilateral forums. This preference derives from instrumental motives: They are likely to be ignored in the larger settings dominated by more powerful countries. Results from a simulation study by Beriker and Druckman (1996) support this observation. They found that bilateral negotiations between symmetric, low power dyads were more successful (faster resolutions, more satisfaction, fewer competitive statements) than multilateral talks that include both smaller and larger powers. The bilateral talks are also more likely to conclude with a treaty (Druckman, 1997). Building on these findings, a research stream on middle powers negotiating behavior can be developed.

Modeling Regime Change: The Booz Allen Years

My large project during the Booz Allen years was on modeling political stability with a case application to Marcos’ Philippines. Focusing our attention on regime change, we analyzed group politics, particularly how contending political groups jockeyed for power and legitimacy during a period of authoritarian rule. We identified the necessary conditions for regime change: This would entail a grand coalition of opposition groups and defection by at least a third of the military. Much to our surprise, these conditions occurred when the Peoples’ Revolution installed Corazon Aquino as president. Our analysis pointed to Imelda Marcos as the more likely successor. Our book was in press at the time of change. We urged a halt in production to allow us to rewrite the Preface where we explained the difference between prediction (which we missed) and “what-if” scenario analysis.

One of the more poignant experiences stemming from this project was a meeting fifteen years later (in 2002) with Imelda Marcos in Manila. At the time, I was there on a Fulbright Fellowship and asked the American Embassy to organize the meeting. The day-long meeting was fascinating: It featured Imelda’s oration about her global political philosophy, a taping of the Libya Agreement that she orchestrated with Gaddafi, “proof” that she and her husband did not embezzle government funds (“no skeletons in her closet, only shoes”), her “bad karma” story about why she turned down an opportunity to buy the World Trade Center, and a duet of “Mares Eat Oats and Does Eat Oats and Little Lambs Eat Ivy,” written by my cousin. As our time drew to an end, I asked the big question: Were you preparing to lead a successor regime? She answered: Yes, I was the next Marcos regime! Thankfully, this expectation was not realized.

Scenario-Generation Methodologies

The regime-modeling project demonstrated the value of evaluating alternative futures. In that project, the four scenarios were as follows: the impact of economic degradation in the country; an erosion of the
regime’s coercive assets; military opposition to the regime; and a split between the Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos political factions. Using our indicators, we evaluated the impacts of each scenario on the margin of regime stability. Increased regime vulnerability was a result of the combination of a Ferdinand–Imelda split and a loss of coercive assets for both factions. Indeed, a husband–wife split was imminent as were defections by portions of the Marcos-controlled military. The coup de grace came with an Aquino-led Peoples Revolution, toppling both Marcos factions but helped by military defections. An advantage of this approach is that, unlike prediction, it hedges bets on likely futures. Rather, it only explores implications of possible futures.

This is a promising approach for other conflict-research applications. One example is the challenge of deciding on entering or exiting from a peacekeeping mission. Planners would benefit from evaluating alternative scenarios of conditions on the ground and host country support before committing or removing resources from a war zone. Another example is the timing of third-party intervention. At what stage in a conflict is mediation likely to be effective: Before or after the conflict has escalated? Evaluating alternative intervention scenarios could aid these decisions. The alternatives would include creating conditions that escalate and deescalate the conflict following intervention.

A third example is from the realm of conflict resolution workshops. A desire to preserve the anonymity of participants has inhibited evaluation research. Scenario generation may provide insights long sought by these scholar–practitioners. Key insights are about the influence of workshop interactions on changes in the societies represented by the participants. One type of societal impact is changes in public opinion about the conflict. Alternative scenarios that reflect both workshop outcomes (agree or not agree to engage in cooperative activities with members of the other group) and polling results (positive or negative changes in perceptions of the conflict) can be compared. A relevant outcome would be attempts to work together to change public opinion in both societies. A third variable in the scenarios may be contacts with opinion leaders. The question of interest is whether public opinion is sensitive to willingness to work together and the number of contacts with opinion leaders.

**Enhancing Human Performance, International Conflict, and the Planet: The NRC Years**

Moving to the National Research Council (NRC), where I spent 12 years, I confronted the challenge of directing committees that recommended policies based on social science research. We did this with regard to techniques for enhancing performance, international conflict resolution, and global environmental change. Many of the techniques were exotic, bizarre, and controversial. The work on extrasensory perception got national attention, notably with Tom Brokaw’s announcement on NBC that the National Research Council released a report today proving that “men cannot walk through walls.” We almost lost our funding. In later years, the NRC project turned toward more mainstream topics, one of which was peacekeeping. Working as a team with Jim Wall and Paul Diehl, we developed an integrative concept that included peacemaking and peacebuilding activities. We also developed training approaches that emphasized contact skills that could be used by a nation skeptical about involvement in UN-led peacekeeping operations (PKOs).

**Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution**

An important contribution of the work on PKOs was tailoring training approaches to types of missions. Our analysis distinguished between distributive and integrative missions and between primary and third-party roles. When peacekeepers experience competitive situations in their missions, they would benefit from a tactical approach to bargaining. A large empirical literature on bargaining offers a variety of tactics for securing favorable settlements. When they experience more cooperative situations, their approach is oriented toward problem solving. This approach requires a set of skills more conducive to lasting
agreements. Similarly, the primary/third-party role distinction suggests different skills. These differences turn on six aspects of strategy development: goal setting, situation analysis, strategy, tactics, maneuvers, and implementation. We provided two templates—one for primary, the other for third-party roles—each of which guides the process of managing conflicts that occur during peacekeeping missions. More broadly, the project altered a traditional conception of peacekeeping as an extension of military activities (Diehl, Druckman, & Wall, 1998).

We also realized that skill training was limited by the impact of macrolevel factors on mission effectiveness. Foremost among these factors are culture, social structure, and norms: Dealing with culture shock, different perceptions of the conflict, different ways of organizing social relations and norms that govern reciprocal exchanges and the status accorded to outsiders. These considerations raise challenges often overlooked in training workshops and manuals. They are also factors at play when evaluating overall mission effectiveness. Both on-the-ground skills and the larger environment in which a mission is embedded contribute to outcomes. Both were part of our ambitious effort to construct frameworks for evaluating PKOs. That effort produced the IACM award-winning book by Diehl and Druckman (2010) as well as the follow-up comparative case study edited by Druckman and Diehl (2013).

Micro- and Macrolevels of Analysis

The work at the NRC on international conflict resolution included an attempt to bring international relations (IR) and negotiation theory closer to the world of practice, particularly with regard to mutual security negotiations (Druckman & Hopmann, 1989). We conducted an analysis of turning points in the INF talks (Druckman et al., 1991) and addressed the challenges and pitfalls of evaluating conflict-resolving interventions by public and private organizations through the course of history (Stern & Druckman, 2000). It also included an attempt to bring social-psychological research on ingroup bias into contact with theories of nationalism in the IR literature (Druckman, 1994).

During this period at the NRC, I had an opportunity to explore connections between micro- and macrolevels of analysis. I learned to appreciate the way conversations among national delegates are shaped by events, structures, institutions, and cultures as well as historical relationships and contemporary policies. I also learned how sentiments expressed by citizens are mobilized by social movements and governments for collective action.

The broader international environment adds dimensions of complexity to negotiation. These include parallel negotiations within alliances and shifting alliances, power symmetries and asymmetries, and the constraints imposed by international organizations and regimes. (See Irmer & Druckman, 2009, for an analysis of the relative impacts of negotiating process and context.) They also include the enduring and changing aspects of culture and the distinction between national and professional diplomatic cultures. But the influences also go in the opposite direction. Negotiation processes may “bubble up” to influence context. For example, changed appraisals of the other negotiating parties, including optimism and trust, may influence relationships among their nations. Micro- and macroeffects may be cyclical in the sense of influences going in both directions as captured by models that incorporate feedback loops (Druckman, 2003b).

Earlier writing on ethnocentrism (Druckman, 1968) and nationalism (Druckman, 1994) emphasized the prevalence of an ingroup-favoring bias and explanations for the bias as well as the distinction between patriotic and nationalistic attachments. More recent writing examined the connection between these sentiments and collective action (Druckman, 2006a). This connection is understood in terms of the following path:

National loyalties → Public opinion → Political representation → Policy-making groups → Policies → Norms → Collective actions →

The path highlights the role of domestic political processes as drivers of mobilizing citizens to action. The action can be in support of war or peace, peacekeeping missions, foreign aid, environmental
disasters, or electoral change. More broadly, I have come to appreciate the importance of political epochs. In a very recent paper, I discuss historical cycles that alternate between preferences for internationalism and nationalism. The post-WWII trend toward international institutions evolved, with the advent of computer technologies, toward a globalized economic system. Casualties of these changes in many countries rebelled leading to a return to nationalism as reflected in Brexit, the election of Trump, and right-wing governments in many other countries (Druckman, 2019). Thus, the path from loyalties to collective action, shown above, is embedded in larger historical trends that alternate from one epoch to another. A challenge for scholars is to understand why and how these shifts occur.

Thinking even more broadly about the planet, our 1992 book (with Paul Stern and Oren Young) on the human dimensions of global environmental change was a landmark effort to establish a framework for a new field of study about how our actions influence the global environment and how changes in our environment influence us.

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP): Skills and Screens

Two USIP grants provided other opportunities to work at the intersection between theory and practice. One of these projects emphasized negotiation skill development, the other was on electronic mediation.

Learning Concepts through Design

Four skills were highlighted in this project: analysis, strategy, negotiation performance, and design. Marathon workshops consisted of applying research knowledge in the form of narratives to a set of case and simulation exercises. The earlier workshops were conducted with United Nations civil servants and evaluated for impacts with control groups (Druckman & Robinson, 1998). Later workshops were conducted with a variety of other populations around the world over the course of a decade (Druckman, 2006b). An important spin off was my research with Noam Ebner on the value of design for concept learning.

This research stream has been illuminating. Our first article appeared in a 2008 issue of Simulation & Gaming (Druckman & Ebner, 2008). Results of two experiments, one conducted in Israel, the other in Australia, demonstrated the power of design over role-plays and lectures in concept learning: 86% of our learning and motivational measures across the two experiments favored the design experience. These results confirmed early intuitions about advantages of simulation design as a method of active learning (Druckman, 1971). Searching for explanations of these findings, we discovered that a key to design learning is concept synthesis, which is further strengthened when primed in experiments (Druckman & Ebner, 2013). On the practical side of this research, we developed implementation guidelines including how to combine design with role-playing exercises.

More recently, we had an opportunity to evaluate design learning in a business management setting. In addition to examining the generality of design effects, we found ourselves in the middle of a debate on the extent to which guidance is needed for effective learning. Our findings straddle this debate by showing that both guidance and learner independence are valuable. Referred to by us as guided invention, design incorporates features of assisted learning and creativity. Students in the design condition learned the concepts—four types of cognitive biases—better than those in corresponding case study and lecture conditions (Druckman & Ebner, 2018). Our findings from the earlier and recent experiments on design suggest both a theoretical and practical question: How does guided intervention, as a form of discovery learning, facilitate concept synthesis?

Resolving Impasses

The other USIP-sponsored project focused on resolving impasses by analyzing the sources of conflict and presented third-party advice in an electronic platform. Experimental findings reported by Druckman,
Druckman, and Arai (2004) showed that more agreements—but not more integrative agreements—occurred with screen than with human mediators. Interestingly, the screen mediator was effective but not embraced. Negotiators preferred the services provided by a human more than a screen.

Further experimentation with an asynchronous version of the system (opposing bargainers made decisions at different times from different locations) showed that the electronic mediator induced more flexibility and satisfaction with the process and outcome than a nonmediation condition. We also found that early resort to e-mediation produced better outcomes (Druckman, Mitterhofer, Filzmoser, & Koeszegi, 2014). The various experiments provided an affirmative answer to the question: Does e-mediation work?

With colleagues in Denmark and Vienna, we have been experimenting with robot mediators, comparing their performance with that of electronic screens and humans. Spurred in part by the earlier finding about perceived (dis)liking, we constructed a condition in which stymied bargainers could consult with a human-like telenoid robot. A robot mediation condition was compared to human and screen mediators. The three conditions were also compared to a no-mediation control, which provided baseline data.

All of the conditions were implemented with a pharmaceutical case in which the principals were negotiating a separation. Although not irreconcilable, the issues were difficult, virtually insuring the needed impasse at the end of the first round. This paved the way for a mediation intervention. Although most issues were distributive, an integrative solution loomed by engaging in a log-rolling process that entailed trades across the set of issues.

One of many challenges was to program the robot with near-identical scripting to the human and screen conditions. Intermittent technical breakdowns played havoc with our schedule. Repair work was done in Japan. We hobbled along to the point where the humans and machines were working well.

We are addressing three questions in this study: Are robots credible mediators? Do they mediate in similar or different ways than humans or screens? and What are the comparative strengths and weaknesses of robot mediators? One area where robots could come in handy is mediating with dangerous negotiators such as hostage-takers or ruthless dictators. They could be part of a mediation team that is orchestrated to provide cameo appearances in a planned sequence, for example, with a robot getting a call to relieve the person as the talks escalate to a crisis. These futuristic scenarios connect to my discussion above about scenario-generation methodologies. A difference is that we will be informed by the findings produced by our Denmark experiment. We have come a long way from the initial prototype of e-mediation funded by the USIP in the early 1990s.

Another project on mediation was done as a field experiment in the DC Small Claims court. We compared tables as the format for traditional mediation with chairs as an unusual configuration of disputants and mediator. Although this manipulation made little difference on settlement, we learned about effects of emotional flooding, where disputant feelings about their claims overwhelmed their sensitivity to the situational cues.

**Emotions**

Emotions have been a centerpiece in my research career. My masters thesis was on ethnocentrism in international relations, an interest that has continued with the studies on nationalism discussed earlier. My doctoral dissertation dealt with the effects of emotional attachments to groups on negotiation. More recent work on emotions with Mara Olekalns includes an edited special issue of *Group Decision and Negotiation* (Druckman & Olekalns, 2008) and a review article in *Negotiation Journal* (NJ) (Olekalns & Druckman, 2014). The special issue included contributions on anger in social conflict, positive affect, cultural variation in strategic emotions, and a state of the art review on negotiator affect. The NJ article elucidated four perspectives on the way that emotions are studied in negotiation. The perspectives were referred to as behavioral, cognitive, interactive, and contextual.

Emotions have consequences for the way negotiators behave during the process and the outcomes they achieve. This perspective has focused primarily on two emotions, anger and happiness. But emotions also...
have consequences for the way that negotiators process information. Research guided by this perspective has concentrated on strategies for diagnosing the other’s intentions (decoding) and for conveying impressions (encoding). Questions of coordination loom large in research on the interaction process. Of particular interest in this research is Goffman’s (1969) idea of an expression game which captures the way negotiators switch between subject and observer roles during the process. Issues of synchronization, emotional contagion, and socially induced affect are also highlighted by this interactive perspective. But emotional expression is also shaped by the broader contexts in which negotiations occur. These include the roles played by differences in power, culture, and gender as well as the conflict environment.

Together, the four perspectives present a wider lens to view impacts of and influences on emotional expression. For example, a question raised is as follows: How is the connection between emotions and social relationships mediated by contextual variables? More generally, the research on emotions has come a long way from my early work on the way that group and national attachments impact on flexibility in negotiation.

**Insights from a Spiral Career**

This spiral career—thematic coherence with variation on the way the themes have been pursued (see Driver, 1982)—provided experiences that shed light on several conflict management issues. The experiences were sources for discovering key challenges to the research and practice communities. Each is discussed in turn.

One challenge is to manage the historical dilemma of balancing security with human rights concerns. During the Cold War, the United States was confronted with the choice of supporting a rash of authoritarian regimes in the interest of thwarting the spread of Soviet Communism. This choice was clear in the base-rights study that I discussed above. But it is also clear in the way the Soviets and Americans competed for nondemocratic allies in virtually every continent. The most recent example is the way the Trump administration teeters on the brink of either continuing or withdrawing support from Saudi Arabia following the death of a journalist in their Istanbul embassy. It would be interesting to learn about the conditions that encourage one or another choice, favoring security or human rights considerations. A scenario-based approach can be used to vary the incentives for emphasizing the importance of security or human rights: for example, the severity of security threats or the extent of human rights abuses. Role players would make a choice among such alternatives as end support, impose sanctions, issue rebukes, negotiate conditions for support, or continue the relationship.

Another challenge is to understand the connections between intra- and interalliance dynamics in multilateral negotiation as discussed in my work on the MBFR talks. This is a problem of managing complexity in large-scale negotiations. It can be approached at each of three levels of analysis. At the level of the individual negotiator, the focus is on information processing. My article on the boundary role dilemma (Druckman, 1977b) proposed two complementary models with different information-processing requirements: the negotiator as bargainer and as representative. At the level of organizations, the focus is on coordinating interests among actors in three tiers, between alliances, within alliances, and within national agencies that have a stake in the talks. At the level of the multilateral system, the challenge is to design a system that organizes the interactions that occur at each of the tiers with a goal of moving the process forward toward solutions. I have discussed micro–macro dynamics in work on turning points (Druckman, 2004) and on the role of justice in peace agreements (Druckman & Wagner, 2019).

A third challenge is to understand the clash that often occurs between broad and compartmentalized perspectives as discussed above in my work with the START negotiations. This clash was considered to be a problem of national perspective rooted perhaps in culture. Whelen’s (1979) treatment of the pull between tradition and change in Soviet diplomacy captures the issue. It is also treated in the literature on culture and negotiation (Gelfand & Brett, 2004). Yet there has been a paucity of research on the
conditions where situational exigencies overtake culture predilections as influences on negotiating behavior and decisions. Nor do we have a body of research that directs attention to the distinction between broad systemic and narrower specialized approaches to solving negotiation problems.

A fourth challenge, highlighted by my involvement with issues of peace, is how to balance short-term gains with long-term societal change. The distinction between settlements and resolutions is relevant. My work with Paul Diehl on peacekeeping taught me that monitored cease-fires are valuable. They reduce violence. My work with Lynn Wagner on durable peace taught me that cease-fire agreements may be only a first step to achieving lasting peace in the aftermath of civil wars or international conflicts. A key question is how to take the next step where a transition occurs from ending a war to reducing the fear of new wars. Insights into this transition come from our research on peace agreements that terminate civil wars (Druckman & Wagner, 2019). A stable settlement, where peacekeepers leave the former combat zone within two years, sets the stage for lasting peace when justice principles are adhered to during implementation and for the years to follow. The most important principles are those related to social conduct, namely, fair treatment and transparency. (For an historical treatment of the role of these principles in negotiation, see Wagner & Druckman, 2012.) These principles gird citizens to adapt to the institutional reforms needed for peaceful societies. Connecting social behavior to institutional change is a substantial research and applied challenge.

The research on electronic mediation alerted us to the value of probing into the sources of conflict for resolving negotiation impasses. We found that a mediator’s advice was more effective when it included an analysis of the sources of conflict: Such analyses produced more concessions, higher joint gains, and more satisfaction with the agreements obtained. These results may not be surprising to conflict researchers. However, other research raises questions about the value of deep probes in negotiation, particularly when they reveal incompatibilities unknown before the talks began (Johnson, 1967). Two research questions are suggested: How does knowledge about sources encourage or discourage cooperation? and What forums—formal or informal discussions—are best suited for explorations of sensitive issues concerning underlying causes of the conflict being negotiated?

Finally, there is much yet to be learned about how an appeal to emotions fuels divisions and encourage people to mobilize on behalf of a cause. Long ago Guetzkow noted: “Groups in general are organized to meet human needs, their structures and processes are molded by these needs” (Guetzkow, 1957:47). The question of interest is how these needs are channeled to meet a group’s objectives. People can identify with a variety of types of groups and take actions on behalf of them. These groups may foster cooperation and peace or divisions and violence. We yearn to discover the conditions that lead people to identify with one or another type of group, particularly with groups that espouse extreme ideologies.

Insights come from several literatures and disciplines. A key for me has been the research on flexibility in negotiation (Druckman, 1993; Druckman & Mitchell, 1995). A question is as follows: When does flexibility threaten group identity? This question is raised frequently in the literature on conflict resolution workshops (Rouhana, 2000). Another source for insights is writing on altruism, particularly the portion of this literature on sacrifice for group causes (Campbell, 1972). The ultimate sacrifice is dying for the cause, a phenomenon evident in terrorist attacks. Rather than to regard altruism as helping behavior, it is construed as pernicious in the sense of lost lives including that of the altruist. These are among the most important research questions of our time, indeed of all time.

**Conclusion**

The spiral career discussed in this article reveals some of the insights that Jeff Rubin may have acquired had he been, by choice or serendipity, a career consultant traveling on the Washington DC beltway. They are learnings that depend on immersion in both theory and practice. A key is keeping active in both camps, which I did. [I wrote reports for my clients, but I also wrote articles for the journals.] This is how...
one can meld and transform basic research into applied insights and to induce research ideas from practice.

Before embarking on this second career in 1975, I wrote that “my current concern is the interface between behavioral science and political (including intergovernmental) decision-making.” The opportunity to pursue this mission came with a phone call about an opening with a consulting firm in Bethesda Maryland. Several decades later, I can say “Mission Accomplished!”

I very much appreciate this second career honor from an organization that I love.2 I will gladly wait another 15 years for a third career honor!

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2The first IACM career honor was a Lifetime Achievement Award presented at the Melbourne Australia meeting in 2003 (Druckman, 2003a).
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