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A Philosophical Reexamination of Durkheim’s Socio-political Deviation

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Abstract

Durkheim’s theory of deviation has powerfully influenced the scholars of sociology. His idea is still one of the fundamental theories in sociology. Durkheim’s whole investigation is threefold: first, to establish a framework of theory; second, to solidify it once established; and third, to promote its greater perfection. In general, Durkheim’s establishment of this framework was fruitful. This paper attempts: 1) to re-formalize the rules of socio-political deviation; 2) to re-correlate socio-political deviation and other socio-political phenomena; 3) to re-justify the necessity and causality of socio-political deviation. We can concede that Durkheim was an original deviser of a blueprint for a new theoretical mansion, but at the same time, one should realize that he was also a failure as a builder of this construction.

Keywords

socio-political deviation, anomie, institutional change

1. Introduction

David Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) accepted deviance/deviation as a legitimate concept in Sociology (Note 1). According to him, the notion of deviation is implicit in the very idea of society. Significantly, for Durkheim, the deviation will occur regardless of the measure of moral rectitude. When specific deviations are brought under control and reduced or obliterated, the category of deviation nonetheless survives. The demise of the specific deviation is coincidental with the general elevation of the standards it violates. Consequently, phenomena that are more refined violations of the same general standards will emerge as new deviations. Durkheim’s point here is not merely the thesis of relativism. It is more subtle and universal: the lifting of standards and the survival of categories of deviation are universal tendencies.

Interestingly enough, Durkheim discusses the inevitability or normalcy of deviance and illuminates deviance’s positive functions (Durkheim, 1966; Adler & Adler, 2015, p. 38). Nonetheless, “since
deviation is a common feature of society, since it is implicit in social and moral organization, it needs no extraordinary accounting. Straying from a path need be regarded as no less comprehensible nor more bewildering than walking on it.” (Matza, 1969, pp. 14-15). Generally, “social solidarity” was always the focus of Durkheim’s attention which serves as “a synonym for the normal state of society, while the absence of it is a deviation from that normal state, or social pathology.” (Gofman, 2014, p. 45). In The Deviance: Theories on Behaviors That Defy Social Norms, one of the authors discloses that Durkheim made clear the idea that behavioral theory cannot identify individuals but rather only groups. “This one of his many contributions showed us the value of those groups as they relate to classification. Durkheim also identified the reality that in order to understand deviant we need to understand the norm.” (Dobbert & Mackey, 2015, Introduction). On the whole, Durkheim disagrees with Aristotle regarding certain principles of the deviation theory we have mentioned, such as the first principle, which is “constitutions which do not conform to the absolute ideal form are ‘deviant’ constitutions,” the second which is “constitutions which depart from the practical best form are ‘deviant’ constitutions.” The third is “constitutions which do not aim at the common good are ‘deviant’ constitutions.” In Constructions of Deviance: Social Power, Context, and Interaction, P. A. Adler and P. Adler claim that Durkheim noted the seeds of social changes in deviance. New developments are often initially regarded skeptically or fearfully and have to go through a process of moral passage to become accepted. For instance, although Socrates was considered a political heretic in his time, he paved the way for intellectual freedom. Without deviance, Durkheim suggested, society might stagnate (Adler & Adler, 2015, p. 6) Durkheim criticizes the fact that Aristotle aimed to discover the best form of society rather than the law of social existence because Aristotle began by assuming that the sole objective of society should be to make its members happy through the practice of virtue, and that virtue lies in contemplation. Aristotle did not establish this principle as a law that societies follow, but as one which they should act upon in order for human beings to fulfill their specific nature. However, unfortunately, after that, political thinkers, on the whole, followed his example. Durkheim points out that whether or not these thinkers pay a certain amount of attention to reality, they all have a single purpose: to correct or transform it entirely rather than to know it. These followers of Aristotle take virtually no interest in the past and the present but look to the future. For his purpose, Durkheim built a new framework for the study of deviation. We will discuss his theory in the following pages.

2. The Re-formalization of Socio-political Deviation

Durkheim attempted to find the rules for distinguishing between the normal and the pathological in his re-formalization of socio-political deviation.

2.1 The Ontological Rule of Deviation

According to Durkheim, the normality of a phenomenon is grounded like things; in other words, it is bound up with the conditions of existence for the species under consideration. For example, a typical situation must be implied, like being. Durkheim seems to claim that the normality of the phenomenon

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depends on the normality of facts. For him, the facts can be classified as normal and abnormal. Similarly, the phenomenon can also be classified as normal and abnormal. We may find two types of facts: one that conforms to given standards is normal; the other that “ought” to be different is pathological (Note 2). However, the alleged normality of the phenomenon is not real because “It is then normal only in appearance. Its universality is now an illusion, since its persistence, due only to the blind force of habit, can no longer be accepted as an index of a close connection with the general conditions of its collective existence.” (Durkheim, 1966, pp. 60-61) So far, we may find three levels in the ontological structure of normality and abnormality as follows: 1. Level 1 “Normal Being or Normal Nature of Being” vs. “Abnormal Being or Abnormal Nature of Being”; 2. Level 2: “Normal Fact or Normality of Fact” vs. “Abnormal Fact or Abnormality of Fact”; and 3. Level 3 “Normal Phenomenon or Normality of Phenomenon” vs. “Abnormal Phenomenon or Abnormality of Phenomenon.”

Those three levels indicate: 1) Normal or abnormal being is regarded as a final reality which determines or underlies the full manifestation of normality or deviation; 2) Normal or abnormal fact is regarded as the actual performance of normal or abnormal being in the practical world; 3) Normal or abnormal phenomenon is regarded as a superficial manifestation of normal or abnormal being in the empirical world. Durkheim attempts to adopt an ontological argument for the reality of deviation. He recognizes certain distinctions between deviant being, deviant nature, deviant existence, deviant facts, and deviant phenomena in a very abstract description: 1) He discovers the non-reliability of deviant phenomena but cannot find a practical approach to handling deviant essence which underlies all outward deviant manifestations through the phenomena; 2) he discovers a subjective demand for the justification of deviant fact and normal fact, but cannot identify an objective standard for them; 3) he discovers material deviation—tangible deviant substance or existence, but cannot comprehend its relationship to spiritual deviation—consciousness; 4) he discovers the ontological gradations in deviation, but cannot describe the interactions between the three levels.

| Table 1. Ontological Rule |
|---------------------------|
| Level 1 | Normal Being or Normal Nature of Being | Abnormal Being or Abnormal Nature of Being |
| Level 2 | Normal Fact or Normality of Fact | Abnormal Fact or Abnormality of Fact |
| Level 3 | Normal Phenomenon or Normality of Phenomenon | Abnormal Phenomenon or Abnormality of Phenomenon |
2.2 The Epistemological Rule of Deviation

Very significantly, A. W. Rawls asserts that it is an attempt by Durkheim to establish a unique epistemological basis for the study of sociology and moral relations. According to Rawls, Durkheim’s epistemology is a type of dualism: an anti-Kantian/anti-rationalist position, and he stresses “sociology of knowledge: idealism versus concrete practice.”

Durkheim had, throughout his career, been a proponent of science. He believed that many social problems were exacerbated by unscientific “solutions.” His task, as he saw it, was to establish valid empirical grounds for the study of social relations, and in particular those social relations that were properly moral relations, which determined the possibility of rational, stable and equitable social life. For this he needed to ground his studies on an epistemology that would establish social and moral relations as possible subject of valid empirical study. Durkheim situated his argument within the context of the epistemological debates between empiricism (including Pragmatism) and what he called apriorism: that is, between Hume and James on one hand, and Kant on the other. (Rawls, 2009, p. 9)

Durkheim’s sociological framework can be considered an extension of Kant’s ideas of moral duty and autonomy. By following Charles Bernard Renouvier’s rationalism, Durkheim develops his rational morality and maintains that ethical and moral considerations are central in philosophy that should guide social action. He regards national consciousness as a scientific fact and studies the rational foundations of other social facts through a positivist method. He promotes his rationalist ideas in opposition to intuitionism and mysticism. According to Robert Alun Jones, “With Hamelin and Rodier, in particular, Durkheim formed a celebrated ‘trio’ of rationalist opposition to those forms of mysticism and intuitionism which were increasingly denounced under the epithet Bergsonism… Durkheim arrived in Paris with a reputation as a powerful intellect pursuing an aggressively scientific approach to all problems (everything else was mysticism, dilettantism, and irrationalism).” (Jones 1985, pp. 12-20) In the Scientia article Durkheim argues that there are two aspects of each human being: a pre-rational animal being; and a rational social, or human, being. These two aspects of the person conflict with one another, producing the internal tension that philosophers across the ages have referred to as dualism. In Durkheim’s regard: “It is this disagreement, this perpetual division against ourselves, that produces both our grandeur and our misery; our misery because we are thus condemned to live in suffering; and our grandeur because it is this division that distinguishes us from all other beings. The animal proceeds to his pleasure in a single and exclusive movement; man alone is normally obliged to make a place for suffering in his life.” (Durkheim, 1974, p. 329)

Max Weber is much more interested in deviation from these ideals than the ideals themselves. However, Durkheim believes “in theories (social facts), but he says that sociologists understand what’s going on with these theories better than ‘lay’ people—i.e., not sociologists, but the people that we study.” (Lukyanova, 2016)

On what basis are normal and abnormal distinguished? Is it objective or subjective? In Durkheim’s view, our practical reasoning must be based on the norm; the normal phenomenon can be established
by observation. Therefore, it can be explained. Generally, we may regard Durkheim as a rationalist, conceptualist, and realist.

For this reason, it is easy to establish a norm since it can be observed in a great many cases. For instance, the normal state can be known at each moment and even in periods of crisis, and the same is also true in sociology for societies belonging to a lower culture, such as uncivilized culture. However, for the highest and most contemporary societies, the law of evolution for normal states is by definition unknown. Concerning such societies, people are used to deciding whether or not a phenomenon is normal just from an objective standpoint as approved and accepted without any point of reference. Interestingly enough, in the first case, the sociologist may properly designate the phenomenon as normal; and, in the second, refuse this designation. Durkheim adopted an example to explain this point. When we want to determine whether the present economic state of Europe is normal or not, we shall investigate the causes which brought it about.

If these conditions still exist in our present-day society, this situation is normal in spite of the dissent it arouses. But if, on the contrary, it is found to be related to the old social structure which we have elsewhere qualified as segmental and which, after having been the essential framework of societies, progressively disappears, we shall have to conclude that the present situation, however universal, is pathological. By the same method should be settled all converse questions of this kind, such as those concerning the normality of the decline in religious beliefs or of the development of state power. (Durkheim, 1966, p. 62)

It is, essentially, a teleological argument. If it continues to exist, that is because it serves a necessary or desirable function. Durkheim aims to tell us that for societies as for individuals, health is good and desirable; disease, on the contrary, is bad and to be avoided. So, it is necessary to find an objective criterion (inherent in the facts themselves) to distinguish scientifically between health and morbidity in the various orders of social phenomena. Clearly, without the objective criterion (Note 3), anybody might interpret the normal and the abnormal at will. Durkheim criticizes relativism in deviation theory and considers subjective effect to be the basis of this position. The diversity of human behavior and the relativity of morals show us that it is impossible to declare that some offense is a violation of “social health” or that it is universally immoral concerning a set of standards. Taking a historical example, according to Athenian law, Socrates was a criminal. However, his crime, namely, the independence of his thought, rendered a service not only to humanity but to his country. We may also take several other examples. For the modern Christian, plural marriage is evil; for the ancient patriarch of the Old Testament, such marriage was both necessary and good. Commonly, the same events might be characterized either as beneficial or disastrous by the personal sentiment of the scholar. Irreligious people may describe theism as an abnormal social phenomenon: but religious writers might consider agnosticism the great social malady of today.

Similarly, a socialist may view the western economic system as a monstrosity, but the capitalist theorist might contend that socialist tendencies are pathological par excellence. On the whole, Durkheim’s
epistemological method of deviation is based on traditional empiricism, although his theory is teleological. For him, 1). “Normal Phenomenon & Abnormal Phenomenon” is through “Observation at a Lower Level,” and the result is “Probability of Truth is Lower”; 2). “Normal Fact & Abnormal Fact” is through “Observation at a Higher Level,” the result is “Probability of Truth is Higher”; and 3). “Normal Being & Abnormal Being” is through “Reasoning,” the result is “Must be Unknown.” However, he creates a severe dilemma for his epistemological argument for deviation. Like Rant, he believes that we may know deviant phenomena by observation, but we cannot know deviant being and its essence-- deviations- in themselves; furthermore, we may know deviant phenomena only on a lower level, not a higher level. Durkheim correctly finds that deviant phenomena are unreliable; therefore, he argues that we may reach higher truth by observing deviant facts, but he overlooks that deviant facts still appear as certain kinds of phenomena. Durkheim viewed the social world as constituted by material and nonmaterial social facts; the latter (beliefs, values, and norms) were more important. In the final analysis, the fact itself is one kind of phenomenon. Durkheim correctly claims that we cannot know deviant beings by observation, but he reaches an agnostic conclusion in the analysis. Durkheim dislikes subjective criteria for the interpretation of deviation; however, he seems to overemphasize the relativistic character of deviation. Most importantly, Durkheim fails to provide a clear explanation and an adequate adjustment for the tension between the objective and relativistic justifications for deviation.

### Table 2. Epistemological Rule

| Classification                  | Approaches          | Results                          |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| Normal Phenomenon & Abnormal Phenomenon | By Observation at a Lower Level | Probability of Truth at a Lower Level |
| Normal Fact & Abnormal Fact        | By Observation at a Higher Level | Probability of Truth at a Higher Level |
| Normal Being & Abnormal Being    | By Reasoning        | Must be Unknown                  |

#### 2.3 The Pragmatic Rule of Deviation

Durkheim believes that an essential prerequisite for determining the normal or abnormal type is the usage or utility of the normal or abnormal fact. Both the biologist and the sociologist must determine the normal or abnormal character of the organism with sufficient exactness for practical purposes. For example, as an apparent abnormal type, the crime itself may play a beneficial role in social development. Durkheim puts forward five key points: 1) crime may remain open to necessary changes and even pave the way for these changes; 2) it may help to determine the new form that collective sentiments will take; 3) it may be useful as a prelude to reforms which becomes more necessary on a daily level; 4) it might play a definite role in social life; 5) it might no longer be conceived as an evil. Furthermore, Durkheim proposes a
fascinating view: some social disorder is associated with apparent progress in which the crime rate drops noticeably below the average level. For him, the increase of criminality in the nineteenth century was a normal phenomenon. In general, a certain amount of increase of certain forms of criminality would be normal, for each civilization has its criminality. Indeed, the crime itself will have abnormal forms when its rate is unusually high. However, if it does not exceed a certain level, we may consider it a normal type. We classify specific social deviation, such as crime, among the phenomena of normal sociology because it is a factor in public health, an integral part of all healthy societies. In other words, social deviation, such as crime, is valuable and necessary; it is bound up with the fundamental conditions of all social life, which are themselves indispensable to the normal evolution of morality and law.

We may indicate the source and the purpose of a pragmatic rule of deviation: 1). Classification: Normal Type or Form vs. Abnormal Type or Form; 2). Source: Usage or Utility of Normal Fact vs. Usage or Utility of Abnormal Fact; 3). Purpose: To Maintain the Conventional State vs. To Change the Conventional State; 4). Negative Purpose: To Stereotype or Ossify the Decaying Factors of the Conventional State vs. To Deform or Misshape the Valuable Factors of the Conventional State; 5). Positive Purpose: To Solidify or Strengthen the Valuable Factors of the Conventional State vs. To Reform or Remold the Decaying Factors of the Conventional State.

Durkheim seems to have been influenced by utilitarianism (Note 4) and American pragmatism. For him, the most important criterion for socio-political deviation is “useful and useless,” or “necessary or unnecessary,” rather than “true and false,” “good and bad,” or “right and wrong.” In contrast with Aristotle, he emphasizes the positivity of deviation. However, Durkheim only stresses the positive function of certain “negative deviations,” such as criminality. He does not pay much attention to the positive function of “positive deviation,” such as social reform. In a sense, Durkheim’s pragmatic argument for deviation is apt to be employed as a purely subjective justification for self-interests because anybody, any group, any force, even any state can have an excuse to emphasize the usage and utility of their activities and behaviors (Note 5). Besides, another possible result of this argument is to be led to immorality. Since the “good and bad” or the “right and wrong” are not the essential criteria for socio-political deviation, it is easy to justify deviant egoism--any deviant activities just for a selfish goal.

Table 3. Pragmatic Rule

| Classification | Normal Type or Form | Abnormal Type or Form |
|----------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Source         | Usage or Utility of Normal Fact | Usage or Utility of Abnormal Fact |
| Purpose        | To Maintain the Conventional State | To Change the Conventional State |
| Negative       | To Stereotype or Ossify the Decaying | To Deform or Misshape the |
| Purpose | Valuable Factors of the Conventional State |
|---------|------------------------------------------|
| Positive Purpose | To Solidify or Strengthen the Valuable Factors of the Conventional State |
|          | To Reform or Remold the Decaying Factors of the Conventional State |

2.4 The Social Rules of Deviation

Durkheim emphasizes the functions of societal reactions to deviance. His theory of deviance rests upon social, not individual, or psychological foundations. He formulates a critical rule: a social fact is normal, about “a given social type at a given phase of its development when it is present in the average society of that species at the corresponding phase of its evolution.” Logically, we may by inference formulate a complementary rule for abnormal social facts. In brief, a social fact can be construed as normal or abnormal only relative to a given social species. Durkheim summons us to carry out the following three tasks: maintain the normal state; re-establish the normal state if it is threatened; rediscover the conditions of the normal state if they have changed. As a result, the duty of statesmen is no longer to be seen as that of guiding society toward an ideal. Instead, the purpose of their rule is to cure the illnesses of society. For example, socialists want to cure the illnesses of the capitalist system on the ground that it constitutes a deviation from the normal state. Spencer maintains that administrative centralization and the extension of governmental powers are the radical vices of our societies. However, Durkheim does not believe that scholars have systematically endeavored to distinguish the normal or abnormal character of the social phenomenon with any degree of generality. Durkheim thinks that one social reason for the deviation is that traditions and conventional beliefs are shaken, become more indeterminate and more unsteady, and reflective powers are developed. He also recognizes the need for adopting to changing external conditions.

To some extent, the statesman himself is advised not to plan for a better—an “ideal”—future society, but to maintain the general = average = normal = healthy state of society. Durkheim emphasizes deviant socialization. For him, both normal and abnormal social species cannot be caused by isolated individuals and personal psychological foundations; instead, they occur as social facts and social phenomena. In his analyses: 1). Level 1: Normal Social Species (Not Based on Isolated individuals and Not Based on Psychological Foundations) vs. Abnormal Social Species (Not Based on Isolated Individuals and Not Based on Psychological Foundations); 2). Level 2: Normal Social Fact vs. Abnormal Social Fact; 3). Level 3 Normal Social Phenomenon vs. Abnormal Social Phenomenon.
Table 4. Social Rule

| Level  | Normal Social Species (Not Based on Isolated individuals and Not Based on Psychological Foundations) | Abnormal Social Species (Not Based on Isolated individual and Not Based on Psychological Foundations) |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Level 2 | Normal Social Fact                                                                               | Abnormal Social Fact                                                                               |
| Level 3 | Normal Social Phenomenon                                                                         | Abnormal Social Phenomenon                                                                         |

Durkheim’s deviant socialization is a significant point in his theory because many scholars have devoted themselves only to certain isolated cases. However, he is unable to examine the relationship between deviant sociality and deviant individuality because he ignores the fact that deviant sociality itself is a socialized deviant individuality, and deviant individuality is an individualized deviant sociality. Deviant socialization is realized by socializing individual deviation; in other words, it is a kind of deviant de-individualization. Any individual deviation cannot be isolated from society; it must be an outcome of social changes, transitions, reforms, crises, disasters, conflicts, or developments. Unlike many other scholars, Durkheim makes a sober estimate of social situations; he attempts to return social studies from “utopian fiction” to the actual condition. He also affirms that deviation cannot be considered a motive force for social development. Unfortunately, Durkheim failed to base his social analysis of deviation on the social ensemble--economic, political, and other cultural factors considered a unified whole (Note 6). For our purposes, we will probe into the social importance of deviation in detail in the next section.

3. The Re-correlation of Socio-political Deviation

Like Aristotle, Durkheim explains his theory of deviation through an organic approach. Furthermore, he intends to combine the physiological approach with the sociological approach. However, to a certain extent, he still oversimplifies social theory and reduces complex social phenomena to simple physiological phenomena. Durkheim reviewed the social importance of deviation in its relationship with other phenomena of society. In other words, he attempts to examine the matter from various social angles and the re-correlation of socio-political deviation.

3.1 Deviation and Normality

One of Durkheim’s meaningful inquiries is to distinguish social “normality” from “pathology.” In his eyes, an initial criterion of normality can be derived from the “external” characteristic of the degree of “generality” of the phenomenon in question. The real test of the normality of a social phenomenon is whether or not it is found in the conditions of existence of the societal type in question. We may notice that some survivals from the previous phase of its development are no longer “normal” in a society changing. The goal of humanity recedes into infinity, discouraging some by its very remoteness and, by contrast, arousing others who, in order to draw a little nearer to it, quicken the pace and plunge into relation. This practical dilemma may be escaped if the desire is defined in the same way as its health
and if health is defined as inherent in things. For then, the object of our efforts is both given and defined at one stroke. It is no longer a matter of pursuing desperately an objective that retreats as one advance but of working with steady perseverance to maintain the normal state and re-establish it if threatened. The statesman’s duty is no longer to violently push society toward an ideal that seems attractive to him, but his role is that of physician: he prevents the outbreak of illnesses by good hygiene and seeks to cure them when they have appeared. (Durkheim, 1972, p. 105) In order to define the concept of deviation, Durkheim put forward two specific terms: one is “average organism,” the other is “average circumstances.” The former, perhaps, is to be taken in a physiological sense, the latter, in a sociological sense. For instance, morbidity is merely an outgrowth of an afflicted organism; in other words, it does not maintain its proper relation to average circumstances, from which everyone deviates more or less. Durkheim gives us the following account of deviation. First, the normal type merges with the average type, and every deviation from this standard of health is a morbid phenomenon; second, this deviation or morbidity is judged to harm society or to disturb the normal functioning of society; third, the deviation or anomaly appears disconnected from the conditions of all collective life, and if the collective conscience has enough authority practically to suppress divergences, it will react to the slightest deviations; fourth, a deviation, such as a crime, in a sense tends to lose the character of normality; fifth, there seems to be a range within which a thing would still be normal after some quantitative change, but if it exceeds a certain limit, it becomes a deviant or abnormal type; sixth, a social fact can be called abnormal or deviant only when it goes beyond a given phase of its development; finally, the normality of a thing can inspire sentiments of aversion, so that, for example, if the crime is normal, it is nonetheless undesirable.

Durkheim seems to apply a quantitative measurement and a qualitative evaluation for justifying social deviation. Despite his efforts, it is still impossible to find an exact or precise criterion for what is considered “averageness” of the social organism, social circumstances, social types, and collective social life. He also cannot define the size of the range or the limit in which a quantitative change may become a deviant type (Note 7). This paper now turns to Durkheim’s examination of “norms.” In his view, differentiated norms, as part of a cultural pattern, are derived from the evaluative judgments that have been institutionalized in the value system in a society. Norms are generalized patterns of expectation that define differentiated patterns of expectation for differentiated units within a system. Values can legitimize norms, but not vice versa. In his study of suicide, Durkheim seems to postulate an “average man” as one kind of norm that can explain the regularity of specific modes of behavior associated with each society—a personality type characteristic of each society and reproduced by the majority of its members. For him, if the behavior of the average individual had been the standard of generality and social health, then crimes and suicides would have been classified as exceptional concerning their frequency of occurrence and as morbid for “normality.” However, even these extraordinary or morbid things are still kinds of social facts that are normal and general for a social type when they occur in the average society of that type or at a corresponding stage of its evolution.
There is a hierarchy of allocative mechanisms whose relations to each other are ordered by institutionalized norms. The available reference of norms at the level of the collectivity is no longer general but is made specific to the particular goals, situations, and resources of the collectivity. “Institutionalized norms” is a significant concept in Durkheim’s deviation theory. Indeed, he contributed to the specification and conceptualization of institutional norms. For him, 1) the people’s freedom, rights, and obligations must be defined in terms of complex sets of institutionalized norms in the market sphere; 2) one primary institutionalized norm has to do with the institutionalization, limitation, and legitimate use of the monetary mechanism; another lays stress on the institutionalization of conditions under which market transactions involving different subcategories of resources may be entered into; 3) a whole complex of institutionalized norms is a condition of the stability of a functionally differentiated system; 4) values must be brought to bear on the legitimization of the differentiated and institutionalized norms which are necessary to regulate behavior in the area of that function; 5) the structure of a society must consist in patterns of normative culture, as a norm, which are institutionalized in the social system; 6) the institutionalization of norms is a matter of degree; 7) institutional norms may be treated as being independent of the goals of the individual; 8) institutionalized norms may be more or less formal—“legal and moral rules, religious, financial system, etc.”—established beliefs and practices which have their origin or “substratum” either in the political society as a whole, or in one of the partial groups which comprise it. Clearly enough, from the above eight key points, it follows that deviation will occur with departure from these institutionalized norms.

Durkheim seems to ignore legalization and institutionalization of deviation or abnormality. In the last analysis, normalization can be regarded as a process from a potential “norm” to an actualized or realized norm. A potential “norm” might be a deviation that departs from a previous norm. Through legalization and institutionalization, a previous deviation may be normalized quantitatively and qualitatively. In a sense, the institutionalization and legalization of deviation would be much more significant than normality. Durkheim subjectively creates two types of criterion and sources for normality and abnormality or deviation. Durkheim has ontological and epistemological difficulties with these criteria and sources. Ontologically, he cannot indicate the relationship between external characteristics and internal conditions of existence. Epistemologically, he cannot indicate the relationship between the superficial criterion and the essential criterion. Significantly, Durkheim discloses the following four sources: 1) External Characteristic of Normal Phenomenon; 2) External Characteristic of Abnormal Phenomenon; 3) Internal Condition of Existence of Normal Type; and 4) Internal Condition of Existence of Abnormal Type. He also distinguishes four Criteria for Normality and Abnormality: 1) Superficial Criterion of Normality; 2) Superficial Criterion of Abnormality; 3) Essential Criterion of Normality; and 4) Essential Criterion of Abnormality. However, all of those terms are expressed in a very abstract and ambiguous way.
Table 5. Sources and Criteria for Normality and Abnormality

| Criteria                        | Sources                                      |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| Superficial Criterion of Normality | External Characteristic of Normal Phenomenon |
| Superficial Criterion of Abnormality | External Characteristic of Abnormal Phenomenon |
| Essential Criterion of Normality   | Internal Condition of Existence of Normal Type |
| Essential Criterion of Abnormality   | Internal Condition of Existence of Abnormal Type |

3.2 Deviation and Anomie

Durkheim, as the founder of the anomie theory, defined the term “anomie” as a state of society characterized by a lack of regulation or adjustment over the relations between functions. In Deviance and Social Control: A Sociological Perspective (2017), the authors attempt to reexamine one of the first sociological theories of deviance and traces the development of anomie and strain theory from Durkheim’s, Merton’s, and Cloward and Ohlin’s macrolevel ideas on how the very structure of society contributes to deviant behavior to Agnew’s general strain theory and Messner and Rosenfeld’s institutional strain theory, which offer contemporary views on the individual and institutional strain and the resulting deviance. As Marx and Weber, Durkheim discusses the central problem of modernity with their ideas about anomie, alienation, and the iron cage of bureaucracy. For him, anomie was only an “abnormal” phenomenon in exceptional circumstances, not problematic but necessary for modern society. Social anomie, as one kind of deviation, is probably inevitable in social transition. Anomie among old functions occurs as a result of the development of new functions. As some form of social change, transition, or development, positive anomie can lead the society from functional disorganization or disintegration to a higher form of integration or organization. Significantly, the anomie theory can be applied to a more specific institutional setting in which the conflict between functions may be most intense because of the possibility of interaction and close contact. Any conflict between organizations, interest groups, occupations, roles, or other “actors” in a larger social system must cause anomie. For instance, there must be a conflict between staff and line in an industrial organization, or between administration and personnel in a university.

What is so-called anomie? Accordingly, it is the effect of mal-adjustment, disorganization, or any denormalized social phenomena. In contemporary societies, economic anomie is one of the decisive anomies, chronic in the industrial and commercial world. Durkheim created the anomie theory and accentuated the so-called “deviant or abnormal” forms of social organization. He argued that the causes of deviation are: 1) anomie division of labor, 2) social transition, 3) lack of regulation over the relations between functions which are vital parts of the large organic whole-society, 4) social disorganization, which can be measured as a variable apart from the disruption of a previous organization, 5) functional
disintegration which can be considered as a universal characteristic of society, 6) “over-organization,” which can be regarded as a possible “abnormal form of society,” 7) mal-adjustment in various functions with changes in social conditions: such as changes in population, urbanization, transportation, etc.

It is important to note that Durkheim never discussed anomie and deviation in only a negative sense. At this point in his argument, Durkheim asserts that social disorganization cannot be denounced as a bad thing, but it can beget a better organization through periodic anomie. Anomie is likely to be functional for social change. For Durkheim, anomalies and conflicts can be regarded as results of the development of new functions. Periodic anomie is probably inevitable in the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity, as “functions must emerge before they can be regulated or before they can adjust mutually.” Thus, social change and division of labor result in functional disorganization or disintegration, which leads to a higher form of social organization. Periodic anomie, as a deviation, probably occurs in any ongoing developing social group. Durkheim’s theory seems to imply three ways: the negative, the neutral, and the positive, for defining anomie as indicated in the following table. The three types of definitions sound very interesting and significant, but Durkheim cannot provide a solid ground or an exact criterion for these subjective conjectures. Unlike the studies of natural phenomena, it is difficult, sometimes even impossible, to justify, test, or evaluate social phenomena—social functions, interactions, transitions reforms, or institutionalizations by using these three terms. Before considering such justifications, tests, and evaluations, perhaps Durkheim should have made more effort to define the following terms as Negative, Neutral, and Positive Definitions of Anomie: (1. Negative Definition: 1) Maladjustment between Functions; 2) Conflict in Social Interaction; and 3) Harmful Human Behaviors. 2. Neutral Definition: 1) Divergence in Social Transition; 2) Degree of Social Organization, Integration, and Institutionalization; 3) Anomic Result of the Division of Labor. (3). Positive Definition: 1) Motivating Force of Social Development; 2) Evolutionary Trend in Social Conditions: and 3) Proper Behaviors of Social Reformers.

Table 6. Negative, Neutral, and Positive Definitions of Anomie

| Negative Definition | 1). Maladjustment between Functions |
|---------------------|------------------------------------|
|                     | 2). Conflict in Social Interaction  |
|                     | 3). Harmful Human Behaviors        |
| Neutral Definition  | 1). Divergence in Social Transition |
|                     | 2). Degree of Social Organization, Integration, and Institutionalization |
|                     | 3). Anomic Result of the Division of Labor |
| Positive Definition | 1). Motivating Force of Social Development |
|                     | 2). Evolutionary Trend in Social Conditions |
|                     | 3). Proper Behaviors of Social Reformers |

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3.3 Deviation and Anomic Division of Labor

In his *The Division of Labor in Society*, Durkheim intends to find out what divides labor deviate from its natural course better to determine the conditions of existence of the normal state. As for the social norms corresponding to organic solidarity, some legal rights corresponding to the division of labor can determine the nature and the relations between divided functions, “but their violation only entails restitutive measures without any expiatory character.” Generally speaking, Durkheim defines “the division of labor” as a “normal phenomenon” and claims that “normally, the division of labor produces social solidarity.” However, he also regularly admits that it sometimes has different and even opposite consequences—“abnormal forms, such as anomie and class exploitation.” For this reason, Durkheim devotes attention to an examination of “abnormal forms.” He lists three abnormal cases in modern economic life: 1) industrial or commercial crises become more frequent as labor is divided; 2) the conflict between capital and labor is violent; 3) the unity of science is lost as scientific labor becomes specialized. Durkheim conjectures that if the division of labor does not produce solidarity, it is because the relations of the organs are not regulated—they are in a state of anomie. If the organs are not sufficiently in contact or their relations are not sufficiently prolonged, the state of anomie is possible. In the state of anomie, functional activity does not develop along with the division of labor.

All growth of activity in a function, implying a corresponding growth in solitary functions, implies a new growth in the former. This is possible only if it becomes more continuous. Carefully considered, moreover, these counter-blows are not indefinitely produced, but a time comes when equilibrium is established anew. (Durkheim, 1966, pp. 391-392)

Durkheim emphasizes four roles of the division of labor: 1). Legal Role: To Give some Legal Measures for Determining the Nature and Relations between Divided Functions; 2). Economic Role: To Create Effective Approaches for Developing Social Construction; 3). Polymerizing Role: To Produce Social Solidarity for Organizing People; and 4). Fissioning Role: To Beget Social Conflict within Disintegrating Classes. However, the four roles indicate the actively negative and actively positive aspects of the division of labor in a very abstract description. Some critics of Durkheim have put forth specific interesting arguments. For example, Steven Lukes writes in his a critical study of Durkheim’s theory of abnormal form:

Here, as elsewhere, Durkheim focused on identifying the ways in which the realities of his time deviated from a future, ideal state of “normality,” rather than applying his mind to the study of ‘the concrete facts of industry, administration and commerce’! He preferred to see them as transitional and remediable phenomena. However, as we have seen, he was soon to move toward a more activist view of the remedy, and would no longer count on the naturally emergent consequences of the division of labor. This change was crucial to the development of his ideas about moral education and his move towards socialism. (Lukes, 1972, p. 178)

We may find the following four main drawbacks in Durkheim’s theory of the division of labor and abnormal forms: 1) he seems to be conceiving utopian fiction rather than investigating the real social
situation; 2) he is haranguing abstract concepts rather than attempting to understand the concrete facts; 3) he is observing only the appearance of things rather than probing into the essence of things; 4) he is inquiring only about certain isolated cases rather than viewing the situation as a whole. Properly speaking, some of these drawbacks are to be found only in the early stages of Durkheim’s studies and were overcome by him later; again, some of them are only partially true about the whole framework of his theory. Generally speaking, Durkheim did not provide very profound or creative ideas for the theory of division of labor because 1) his theory, at least most parts, does not go too much beyond the scope of what his predecessors, such as Marx, have already discussed; in other words, it does not provide significant progress in this field; 2) his theory was useful, correct, or effective during a certain period of historical time (such as the nineteenth century and the first half of this century), but it is debatable, questionable, and changeable in our time. For example, as we have discussed in the contemporary Western developed countries, society has confronted the expansion of the white-collar class. The so-called anomie division of labor has been changed into a new form: on the one hand, the social contradiction or class conflict is retarded; on the other hand, some higher-level negative deviations, such as organized crime or white-collar crime, have occurred rapidly.

**Table 7. The Role of Division of Labor**

| Role                  | Function                                                                 |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Legal Role            | To Give some Legal Measures for Determining the Nature and Relations between Divided Functions |
| Economic Role         | To Create Effective Approaches for Developing Social Construction         |
| Polymerizing Role     | To Produce Social Solidarity for Organizing People                        |
| Fissioning Role       | To Beget Social Conflict within Disintegrating Classes                    |

### 3.4 Deviation and Institutional Change

Durkheim considers society as a dynamic system, or in other words, a developmental chain. Comte and Marx influenced this viewpoint of Durkheim. Durkheim attempted to solve social problems by Comtean terminology—“statics and dynamics in society”—and by Marxist methodology—“dialectic development”. J. G. Peristiany, in his introduction to Durkheim’s book *Sociology and Philosophy*, claims the connecting thread is the dialectical demonstration that a phenomenon is relatively independent of its matrix; society is neither a mechanical robot nor an organism limited by the structure and function of its organs and the possibilities of its environment. Significantly, Durkheim tried to bridge the gap between Marxism and Communism. A. W. Gouldner, in his introduction to Durkheim’s book *Socialism and Saint-Simon*, points out that some of Durkheim’s statements are quite consistent with the Marxian formula, “social being determines social consciousness”; for instance, he emphasizes that social (not merely economic) relations influence the development of beliefs. But a key implication of Durkheim’s work is that real social change is evolutionary, not revolutionary. Revolution retards
change; only evolution can make real change. Here, Durkheim contradicts himself vis-a-vis his other statements. He appraises the moral significance of the French Revolution by providing a sociological interpretation. According to him, the revolution offered a moral lesson to this society in a state of “anomie”; therefore, he holds that it is necessary to search for new moral— for a society whose structure had been shattered. (Durkheim, 1973, pp. 34-42)

Durkheim wants to cure the injured society by specific “anomic changes”—industrial, social, scientific, and so on. In a sense, to use the criteria of normality and pathology is to place reliable limits upon the anomic boundlessness of aspirations for change. Durkheim recognizes that the abolition of the forced division of labor demands a significant process of institutional reorganization centering upon the interrelationship between the state and occupational associations. At one point, he says that “sociology” can then be defined as the science of institutions, their genesis, and functioning. Logically, in a sociological perspective, any deviation, such as anomic division of labor, maybe a process and a function of institutional change. A fundamental issue in his major works is to discuss the nature of the institutional change from mechanical to organic solidarity. For Durkheim, an important task is to disclose the confrontation between the dissolving “traditional” society and the

Of course the individual plays a role in their genesis. But for a social fact to exist several individuals, at the very least, must have contributed their action, and it is this combined action which has created a new product. Since this synthesis takes place outside each one of us..., its necessary effect is to fix, to institute outside us, certain ways of acting and certain judgments which do not depend on each particular will be taken separately. Thus it has been pointed out that there is a form, which, provided that one extends the ordinary meaning somewhat, expresses this mode of reality quite well: this is “institution.” One can, indeed, without distorting the meaning of this expression, call institutions all the beliefs and modes of conduct instituted by the collectivity (Durkheim, 1972, p. 71)

Durkheim stresses a notion of institutionalized anomie that is considered to have invariably damaging consequences for society. In L’Allemaqne au-dessus de tout (Durkheim, 2015), Durkheim employs an institutional analysis in applying his theory of anomie to problems of imperialism. According to him, imperialism was a form of anomie fostered by dominant institutions like the state and military, and a thinker like Treitschke attempted to legitimate institutionalized anomie in the form of a national will to power. The limitless expansion of the power of a state at the expense of other states was for Durkheim “a morbid hypotrophy of the will; a kind of will mania.” Durkheim realized that anomie might be furthered by dominant institutions, instilled into citizens’ personalities through education, and legitimated by intellectuals. (Lacapra, 1972, pp. 77-78) Durkheim cannot study imperialism further because he ignores the fact that any dominant institution is only an effect of social, political, and economic conditions. Durkheim provides the following description of institutionalized and ideological anomie.

Governmental power, instead of being the regulator of economic life, has become its instrument and servant. The most opposite schools—orthodox economists and extreme socialists—agree that it should
be reduced to the role of a more or less passive intermediary between different social functions. One side wishes it to be simply the guardian of individual contracts. The other side delegates to it the task of collective bookkeeping, i.e., to chalk up the demands of consumers, to transmit them to producers, to inventory aggregate income, and to distribute it according to a set formula. But both sides refuse government the right to subordinate other social organs and have them converge toward a higher goal. On all sides, men declare that nations ought to have as their sole or principal objective the achievement of industrial prosperity. Thus the dogma of economic materialism serves as the basis of these seemingly opposed systems. And since these theories merely express the state of opinion, industry, instead of being viewed as a means to an end which transcends, has become the supreme end of individuals and societies. (Durkheim, 1951, pp. 283-284)

Like Marx, Durkheim believes that the institution of classes or castes constitutes a strictly regulated organization of the division of labor that can be considered a source of conflict. For example, the lower classes, not being, or no longer being, satisfied with their role by custom or law, aspire to functions that have been closed to them and seek to dispossess those who are exercising them. Furthermore, suppose the institution of classes or castes sometimes gives rise to unfortunate frictions instead of producing solidarity. In that case, the distribution of social functions on which it rests does not correspond, or rather no longer corresponds to the distribution of natural talents. Here, Durkheim does not offer much more new insight than Marx or Lenin offered because Marx and Lenin devoted their attention to the social causes (such as the economic) of class struggle or political conflicts rather than the non-social or natural reasons. The concept of “social transition” is an essential insight into Durkheim’s theory of social change. He creatively maintains that so-called social deviation is an essential aspect of the social transition from mechanical to organic solidarity. For Durkheim, as in folk society, mechanical solidarity is a society at a low level, but organic solidarity, as in urban society, is a society at a higher level.

It is clear that during periods of transition, the normal type does not correspond to the actual state of one or more societies of this type but to a state which has already been superseded. We may distinguish six fundamental questions to be asked in analyzing the two types of social solidarity: 1) the scope of the division of labor, 2) the functions of two primary forms of law—the repressive and the restitutive, 3) the degree of influence in two kinds of conscience—the strongly collective and the individual, 4) the adaptability of society to the crisis, 5) the nature of government 6) the typical reaction towards deviation. James Invevarity seeks to provide an approach to definitions of deviance based on the theoretical conceptions of law and society developed by Marx and Durkheim. The synthesis of Marx’s contrast between feudal and bourgeois law and Durkheim’s analysis of repressive and restitutive law begins to spell out the social-organizational conditions under which certain types of reactions to and definitions of deviance will occur. He emphasizes the similarities between Marx and Durkheim more than the differences.
If this paper is not mistaken, the last is the most profound one because it directly indicates the relationship and interaction between deviation and social transition. In the final analysis, the sixth and the first five are related to “deviation.” Perhaps the following table may be helpful to clarify and understand Durkheim’s notion of social transition (the transition from one type of social solidarity to another one) and its relation to social deviation. From this table, we may infer: 1) mechanical solidarity, as a lower social form, should be replaced by a higher social form; and 2) organic solidity, as a higher social form, should be developed continuously. However, Durkheim does not show us whether there would be post-organic solidarity or whether there would be different stages in organic solidarity.

3.5 Deviation and Political Society

Durkheim narrowly defines a “political society” as one of the formed social groups, which is subject to one joint authority, where this is not itself subject to any other permanently constituted authority. For our purposes, the word “state” can be used to indicate the particular group of officials entrusted with representing this authority. Imprecisely speaking, the term “state” means the agency of the sovereign authority or a specialized agency whose responsibility is to work out specific ideas that apply to the collectivity; the term “political society,” the complex group state is the highest organ. According to circumstances, the same society may pass from being an absolute government into an entirely different form; a single society can change its type during its evolution. For example, although the regulative agency was transformed, France of the seventeenth century and France of the nineteenth century belong to the same type. In other words, the change of political form or governmental type does not mean the change of social type, because the specific form of political organization does not depend upon the fundamental constitution of society, but upon the nature of the social type and contingent circumstances: “The nature of the social type and that of the government type must be carefully distinguished, since as they are independent, they act independently of one another, and sometimes even in opposite ways.” (Durkheim, 1972, p. 194)

We may provide the “Comparison of Two Types of Social Solidarity”: a. Classification: Mechanical solidarity or folk society vs. Organic solidarity or urban society; b. Scope of Division of Labor: Little division of labor vs. Highly complex well-developed division of labor; c. The function of the Basic Form of law: Repressive or punitive law toward inflicting suffering on the offender vs. Restitutive law toward restoring things as they were or bringing about completion; d. Degree of Influence in Two Kinds of Conscience: Strong collective conscience as a basis for organization vs. Weak collective or individual conscience; e. The adaptability of Society to Change and Crisis: 1) Easily breached by the entry of foreign elements into the division of labor vs. Hardly breached by the entry of foreign elements into the division; 2) Little or no conflict between individual and society vs. Serious conflict between individual and society; 3) Collective representations not changing from generation to generation vs. Based upon a certain degree of tolerance of difference and the principle of inter-dependence of self-interests; 4) Relatively inflexible social change, cannot meet extraordinary demands vs. Based upon a certain degree of tolerance of difference and the principle of inter-dependence of self-interests;
5) Cultural integration, narrower universality, and less stability vs. Relatively flexible and capable of defining new goals for the society, of developing new rules, of allocating new roles and functions. f. Nature of Government: 1) little or none apart from the kinship rule vs. Emerges as a specialized agency and comes; 2) Equated with society Leadership and regulation as the central vs. to symbolize the collective conscience, by being relegated to the roles of the moderator of divergent group interests, and so on Contract, property, and occupation are central. g. Typical Reaction toward Deviation: Almost all deviance as unacceptable to repress the deviant vs. Some deviance as acceptable to restore the deviant. Although Durkheim does not suggest a difference in nature between the various forms of government, he still believes that they lie between two opposite poles. The demarcation between them is how the governmental consciousness is isolated from the rest of society. If the state is to be the liberator of the individual, it needs some counter-balance; in other words, it must be restrained by other collective forces—the secondary groups. In his review of F. Giner’s book Studies on the Social Person, Durkheim seems to appreciate the author’s point. Giner approaches the problem of the individual and the state and examines two opposed conceptions—individualistic democracy and authoritarian statism, and opts for a mixed solution. (Durkheim, 1980, p. 65)

Here, Durkheim repeats the principle of checks and balance, but his statement implies that political deviation will occur without this principle. Durkheim correctly classifies two types, the social and the governmental, but he overlooks that the two types cannot be separated. The two types may have only relative independence. In many cases, the nature of the social type can determine the governmental type, and the latter type can react to the former. Expanding its power and adding luster to its fame was the fundamental nature of aims pursued by the state in many societies. We confront a severe dilemma.

Table 8. Comparison of Two Types of Social Solidarity

| Classification | Mechanical solidarity or folk society | Organic solidarity or urban society |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Scope of Division of Labor | Little division of labor | Highly complex well-developed division of labor |
| The Function of the Basic Form of Law | Repressive or punitive law toward inflicting suffering on the offender | Restitutive law toward restoring things as they were or bringing about the completion |
| Degree of Influence in Two Kinds of Conscience | Strong collective conscience as a basis for the organization | Weak collective or individual conscience |
| The Adaptability of Society to Change and Crisis | Easily breached by the entry of foreign elements into the | Hardly breached by the entry of foreign elements |

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| division of labor | into the division |
|------------------|------------------|
| Little or no conflict between individual and society | Serious conflict between individual and society |
| Collective representations not changing from generation to generation | Based upon a certain degree of tolerance of difference and the principle of inter-dependence of self-interests |
| Relatively inflexible social change cannot meet extraordinary demands | Relatively flexible and capable of defining new goals for the society, of developing new rules, of allocating new roles and functions |
| Cultural integration, narrower universality and less stability | Cultural dispersion, broader universality, and greater stability |
| Nature of Government | Little or none apart from the kinship rule |
| | Emerges as a specialized agency and comes |
| | Equated with society leadership and regulation are central |
| | To symbolize the collective conscience, by being relegated to the roles of the moderator of divergent group interests, and so on, contract, property, and occupation are central |
| Typical Reaction toward Deviation | Almost all deviance as unacceptable to repress the deviant |
| | Some deviance as acceptable to restore the deviant |

On the one hand, we find that the state develops more and more; on the other hand, the rights of the individual have a parallel development. For Durkheim, an implied claim in his theory is that a good
society must try to keep an equilibrium between the powers of government and the individual’s rights; otherwise, socio-political anomaly and deviation may occur immediately. No society can keep this equilibrium without any change. There are two possibilities. A rapid or sudden socio-political deviation may occur if the equilibrium is fundamentally broken; the other is that socio-political evolution may continue if the equilibrium needs some adjustment. Only in the second situation is the appearance of anomaly and deviation normal for society.

In Durkheim’s analysis, the contact between the particular agency and other social organs may vary in its degree of closeness and constancy. These differences of degree can be significant: they vary depending on the presence or absence of definite institutions designed to establish this contact and whether they are developed or merely rudimentary. Therefore, neither extreme, where the government has absolute power, nor the people have an absolute right, is beneficial to the society. For instance, “democracy,” understood as the absolute right of the people, can only exist in the early phases of the development of society. If everyone attempted to govern, it means there would be no government at all. Collective sentiments may sway the people. The societies of this description are like individuals whose actions are directed solely by routine and prejudice. Deliberative politics in no way guide the life of such people. However, here, Durkheim seems never to delineate a clear distinction between democracy and anarchy. Durkheim argues that the state has a much stronger influence today than in other times because the sphere of this clarified consciousness has widened. The more the depths of social life become illuminated, the more changes can be introduced. Durkheim demarcates two different kinds of democratic societies: the real ones and the pseudo-ones. The real ones are more malleable and flexible, and this advantage they owe to the fact that the government consciousness has expanded in such a way as to include a much broader range of objects; by contrast, the pseudo-ones have been unorganized from the start, and have wholly yielded to the yoke of tradition.

Durkheim was unable to give us a clear definition of the difference between so-called actual and pseudo-democracy. He did not provide any more creative points than his predecessors did; some scholars before him had discussed “real” and “pseudo” democracy more deeply and broadly. Finally, concerning this aspect of his analysis, Durkheim creatively divides structural deviation in a political society into three levels: the top, the middle, and the bottom. In brief, we may describe them by a model (as Structural Deviation of Political Society) as follows: a. The Top: Specialized Formed Group—Government: 1) Nature: The Sovereign Agency, The Highest Organ, and The Regulative Institution; 2) Purposes: Representing Authority, Responsibility to Collective, Sentiments, and Ambition to Get More Power; 3) Negative Deviation: Absolute Power to Oppress the People; 4) Positive Deviation: Relative Power to Manage the People. b. The Middle: Ordinary Formed Groups—Organized Individuals: 1) Nature: Integrating Elements; 2) Purposes: Protecting Individuals’ Interests, Subordinating Authority, Responsibility to Individual Sentiments, and Ambition to Get More Rights; 3) Negative Deviation: Absolute Power to Oppress the People; and 4) Positive Deviation: Relative Power to Manage the People. c. The Bottom: Final Social Element--Isolated Individuals: 1)
Nature: Sole Active Elements (Note 8); 2) Purposes: Striving for Self-Interests and Joining different Social Groups; 3) Negative Deviation: Harmful Behavior to Destroy the Social Order; 4) Positive Deviation: Creative Behavior to Improve the Social Situation.

This model indicates the nature, purposes, and the negative and the positive deviations in the three levels of political society. According to Durkheim’s whole thought, the middle level—organized individuals or ordinarily formed groups—is the crux of the matter because (1) it forms a connecting link between the government as the specialized formed group and the isolated individuals as the final social element; and (2) it can determine, influence, or change the social and governmental types from the normal to the deviant, or from the deviant to the normal.

Table 9. Structural Deviation of Political Society

| 1) THE TOP: Specialized Formed Group—Government |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| Nature | The Sovereign Agency |
|        | The Highest Organ |
|        | The Regulative Institution |
| Purposes | Representing Authority |
|         | Responsibility to Collective Sentiments |
|         | Ambition to Get More Power |
| Negative Deviation | Absolute Power to Oppress the People |
| Positive Deviation | Relative Power to Manage the People |

| 2) THE MIDDLE: Ordinary Formed Groups—Organized Individuals |
|----------------------------------------------------------|
| Nature | Integrating Elements |
| Purposes | Protecting Individuals’ Interests |
|         | Subordinating Authority |
|         | Responsibility to Individual Sentiments |
|         | Ambition to Get More Rights |
| Negative Deviation | Absolute Right to Be a Pseudo-democracy |
| Positive Deviation | Relative Right to Be a Real Democracy |

| 3) THE BOTTOM: Final Social Element—Isolated Individuals |
|--------------------------------------------------------|
| Nature | Sole Active Elements |
| Purposes | Striving for Self-Interests |
|         | Joining different Social Groups |
| Negative Deviation | Harmful Behavior to Destroy the Social Order |
| Positive Deviation | Creative Behavior to Improve the Social Situation |
4. Re-justification of Socio-political Deviation

Durkheim offers a bold challenge to the traditional views, given that no society has been discovered, in history or travel, without crime. He maintains that some types of crime are a sound indication of general well-being in the social order and can often result in the attention of society being called to conditions that are deserving in themselves of reform. Durkheim affirms that we must study crime among the “phenomena of normal sociology”; in other words, deviant behavior must be seen in terms of the same processes that are operative in behavior that is not declared deviant. Durkheim presumes that in the first place, crime is normal, because a society exempt from it is utterly impossible. He points out: 1) criminal acts must be found to exist with the same degree as sentiments contrary to them; 2) crime will not disappear; 3) crime constantly changes its form. The necessity or inevitability of deviant behavior arises not from abnormal or evil circumstances but from those we are obliged to regard as normal and vital for any society. In Durkheim’s conviction, crime is necessary, it is bound up with the fundamental conditions of all social life, and by that very fact, it is useful because those conditions of which it is a part are indispensable to the normal evolution of morality and law. Robert Nisbet maintains that, for Durkheim, the extent of differentiation of behavior among individuals, the inevitable variations in correspondence between acts and norms, and, above all, the normative character of the socially formed human mind—a normative character by which making pronouncements about right and wrong is constitutive—all combine to make deviance necessary in some proportion. Durkheim profoundly classifies two kinds of deviance—the creative and the destructive. The former can promote social development; the latter can hinder social development. For example, some great deviants, such as Buddha, Moses, Jesus, Mohammed, Luther, the American heroes of Independence, Gandhi, had a creative function in history. Doubtless, with some of the great moral innovators, a legitimate need for change has degenerated into something like anarchy. Because the rules prevailing in their time offended them deeply, their sense of evil led them to blame, not this or that particular and transient form of moral discipline, but the principle itself of discipline. (Nisbot, 1974, p. 220)

Regrettably, Durkheim did not contribute a more persuasive examination of the necessity of socio-political deviation. In general, he confines his justification within a limited pragmatic or utilitarian perspective because he seems to believe that emotional needs can judge the usage or utility of deviation. What is the causality of deviation? Durkheim’s analysis suggests the following points: 1) Moral equilibrium is breakable. If rules of morality lose their authority, people’s emotions and appetites will be unrestricted and uncontained in the moral sector. If man no longer feels the moral forces that restrain him and limit his horizon, it is because they no longer carry their normal degree of authority. 2) The nature of things is transformable. Today, old forces no longer exercise their regulative function in the same manner or spirit as formerly. For instance, an industry that is now more highly developed and important to the social organism can no longer be contained within the same narrow bounds, subjected to a heavily repressive system, and kept by regulations in such a subordinate position. 3) Social crisis or anomie is constant and normal. A society that was made up only of average...
individuals would be essentially abnormal. No society does not contain a profusion of individual anomalies, and such a universal phenomenon cannot exist without reason. “It is therefore socially normal that there should be psychologically abnormal individuals in every society.” (Durkheim, 1972, p. 106) For example, the pervasiveness of crime is only a particular case of this general proposition. A specifiable level of crime is a normal condition of functioning of every type of society. 4) The tendency towards infinity is inevitable. It is continually repeated that man’s nature is eternally dissatisfied and to advance constantly without rest or respite toward an indefinite goal. 5) The gulf between the hereditary disposition of an individual and the social functions he or she will fill is unsurmountable. The field is also subject to many factors which can make an individual nature deviate from its normal direction and create a pathological condition. 6) The division of labor and the ideal of spontaneity in organized societies are often not harmonious. The “forced division of labor” provokes abnormal phenomena in society. 7) Religious life is variable. Religious changes can cause significant social changes.

Durkheim’s seven causes are questionable; some of them are even untenable. First, Durkheim overestimated the role of morality in social change and social deviation. On the one hand, he correctly indicates that contemporary society must develop a new moral code corresponding to changed modern conditions, while at the same time moral norms may play a positive role in generating disorganization or in keeping organization within the changing circumstances of life; on the other hand, in his book The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, he proclaims the very famous formula—“society exists exclusively within the minds of individuals.” (Durheim, 2008, p. 38) In his final analysis, man’s nature as a moral agent seems to be treated as the ultimate cause for social change and social deviation. Second, Durkheim overemphasized spontaneous deviation, automatic deviation, or deviation-in-itself, distinguished from rational deviation, conscious deviation, or deviation-for-itself. The socio-political deviation is only a blind and dehumanized force because the human being is unaware and determined by a mysterious cause of deviation. Accordingly, active, rational choices may not be essential for deviant activities. Third, Durkheim overlooked the deep source of social crisis and anomie. He adopted a teleological and subjective attitude to describe, generalize, or explain specific superficial facts or appearances about deviation without grasping the essence (the necessary or defining characteristics or properties of deviation). Fourth, Durkheim overestimated the role of abstract human nature. In his opinion, like Hume, irrational or emotional passion is the ultimate motivation for deviant activities. Fifth, Durkheim overstressed man’s conflict with society. It seems that relations among people are just like “the war of all against all,” as Hobbes says. Therefore, class, racial, religious, political, economic, or other social hatreds and struggles are the primary “dynamics” for deviant socio-political activities. Sixth, as we have discussed in section II, Durkheim did not give us any new ideas concerning the division of labor. Seventh, Durkheim improperly considered religious life a significant cause of social deviation. Undoubtedly, religion is still one of the important social forces in the world (Note 9). However, on the whole, it is no longer a significant cause for social change.
It is worth reminding the reader that, for Durkheim, it is impossible to provide an exact or “correct” analysis of the nature of the deviation and resolve all difficulties caused by this analysis. Nevertheless, he opened up a new path to explaining social and political phenomena and set up a creative methodology to deal with the problems confronted in social and political studies.

5. Conclusion
Durkheim’s whole investigation is threefold: first, to establish a framework of theory; second, to solidify it once established; and third, to promote its greater perfection. In general, his establishment of this framework was fruitful: 1) to re-formalize the rules of socio-political deviation; 2) to re-correlate socio-political deviation and other socio-political phenomena; 3) to re-justify the necessity and causality of socio-political. Perhaps Durkheim’s whole framework might be outlined as follows: 1) Extensional Typology of Social Deviation including Moral Deviation, Religious Deviation, Political Deviation, Cultural Deviation, Ideological Deviation, Economic Deviation, and Legal Deviation; 2) Intensional Typology of Social Deviation including, Revolutionary Deviation, Evolutionary Deviation, Reformational Deviation; 3) Metaphysical Typology of Social Deviation including Specific Deviation, Universal Deviation, Phenomenal Deviation, Essential Deviation; 4) Epistemological Typology of Social Deviation including Observable Deviation, Inferable Deviation, Unknown Deviation; 5) Quantitative Typology of Social Deviation including Monadic Deviation, Partial Deviation, Overall Deviation; 6) Geographical Typology of Social Deviation including Local Deviation, National Deviation; 7) Utilitarian Typology of Social Deviation including Positively helpful Deviation, Neutral Deviation, Negative Deviation; and 8) Dimensional Typology of Social Deviation including Individual Deviation, Organizational Deviation, Governmental Deviation. It was unfortunate that his solidification of this framework was not very successful because, in a theoretical sense, his views could not effectively explain what he discussed, such as the facts we have mentioned above. In a practical sense, it is still doubtful whether or not his methodology can be regarded, as a workable and valuable tool, to resolve real social problems. His many points are only subjective “prescriptions” which cannot be tested or verified by social practice.

For this reason, his framework is far from attaining the perfection he intended. Despite the above serious shortcomings, undoubtedly, Durkheim’s theory of deviation has powerfully influenced the scholars of sociology. His idea is still one of the fundamental theories in sociology. So, one can concede that Durkheim was an original deviser of a blueprint for a new theoretical mansion, but at the same time, one should realize that he was also a failure as a builder of this construction.
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Notes

Note 1. Deviation from a central tendency is “variance”—which is what we generally analyze. “Deviance” generally refers to individual behavior that violates norms, laws, or (in one of Durkheim’s definitions) collectively defended community sentiments. In a sense, “deviation” is “deviance” as a general social phenomenon in a macro-perspective, and “deviance” is part of the discussion of “deviation” as a particular phenomenon in a micro-perspective. We will examine Durkheim’s views in the first perspective.

Note 2. It seems that Durkheim can be considered a moral realist.

Note 3. Durkheim himself could not offer such an “objective criterion,” and he even discussed the notion of “objective criterion” in a very subjective way.

Note 4. Although he rejected the principles of utilitarianism in the introduction to Division of Labor in Society and criticized Mill’s views in The Rules of Sociological Method, he was still influenced by utilitarianism to some extent.

Note 5. It is a standard critique of functionalism that has been rebutted by, among others, Robert Merton.

Note 6. For example, a social deviation cannot be treated as only an outcome of a purely economic phenomenon or pure political phenomenon. It would be an outcome of synthesized social phenomena.

Note 7. From in modern mathematical perspective, perhaps, the “averageness,” “range,” or “limit” can be regarded as a “fuzzy model.”
Note 8. According to Durkheim, there are integrating elements of society apart from individuals; but it is also true that individuals are the only active elements. (See *The Rules of Sociological Method*).

Note 9. For instance, in the past few years, in Poland, the Philippines, and Haiti, the Catholic Church has played an essential role in the people’s movements or revolutions. Besides, in many countries, especially in the Islamic world, religion still has an essential function in socio-political life (perhaps Iran is an extreme example). Even in the United States, religious forces can more or less influence social life and politics.