This study is aimed at studying the policy of US economic sanctions against Iran. The topic became relevant again due to Washington’s withdrawal from the Joint comprehensive action plan (JCAP), which was adopted under Iran’s nuclear program. Such a decision by the US implies a new round of economic sanctions against Iran. The withdrawal from the JCAP raises an important question about the effectiveness of the new sanctions, which will be based on more serious pressure. This situation has given rise to fundamental scientific questions, in particular – what is the reason for the effectiveness of sanctions in some cases and failure in others? In this connection, a certain «target country» makes concessions, and others, despite the huge losses from sanctions, persist in the implementation of its strategic course? In our study, we also take into account the existence of other factors, such as: domestic political consensus, alternative trading partners, etc. In our work we use the case-study method, the main source base are legal and regulatory documents that regulate the policy of introduction and implementation of sanctions.

Key words: sanctions, Iran, USA, JCAP, sanctions coalition, UN Security Council.
Features of The Application of The Sanctions of The United States of America Regarding Iran ...

Кабдыгалиев Д.Б. 1, Жансугурова Ж.А. 2

1 докторант 1 курса, e-mail: dumanshakarim@gmail.com
2 к.п.н, ассоц. профессор, e-mail: jazzira55@gmail.com

Казахский национальный университет имени аль-Фараби, Казахстан, г. Алматы

Особенности применения санкций Соединенных Штатов Америки в отношении Ирана

Настоящее исследование направлено на изучение политики проведения экономических санкций администрацией США против Ирана. Тема вновь стала актуальной вследствие выхода Вашингтона из Совместного всеобъемлющего плана действий (СВПД), который был принят по ядерной программе Ирана. Подобное решение США подразумевает собой новый виток экономических санкций в отношении Ирана. Выход из СВПД ставит важный вопрос об эффективности новых санкций, которые будут основываться на более серьезном давлении. Данная ситуация породила фундаментальные научные вопросы, в частности – что является причиной эффективности санкций в одних случаях и провала в других? В связи с чем определенная «страна- цель» идет на уступки, а «страны-инициаторы», несмотря на огромные потери от санкций, упорствуют на реализации своего стратегического курса? В своем исследовании мы также учтем существование таких факторов, как: внутриполитический консенсус, альтернативные торговые партнеры и др. В качестве инструментов исследования авторы используют метод case-study и историко-критический анализ. Основной источниковой базой стали правовые и нормативные документы, которые регламентируют политику введения и проведения санкций.

Ключевые слова: санкции, Иран, США, СВПД, санкционная коалиция, Совет Безопасности ООН.

Introduction

The United States’ exit policy from the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan (FAPA), which was adopted on Iran’s nuclear program, has once again exacerbated the issue of sanctions against Iran. President D. Trump, who made this decision, returned the right of the United States to renew the complex of economic sanctions that were applied to Tehran before the conclusion of the «nuclear deal». The American demarche is dramatically exacerbating the world situation – there is uncertainty among international business and Iran’s trading partners because of the extraterritorial sanctions of the US administration. The US Treasury has become an authorized administration and congress to impose fines or apply other measures against individuals, organizations and countries that have cooperation with Iran on a series of issues approved by Washington. Certainly, the decision of the President of the United States was not supported to a significant degree, in some cases it was subjected to extreme criticism of all the participants of the FACU, in particular, the supporters of the United States – the European Union countries. This provision has greatly corrected the logic of international relations on the Iranian nuclear program, as well as other issues in which the approaches of the main participants diverged significantly.

The key question, of course, is: what is the reason for the effectiveness of sanctions in some cases and failure in others? In this connection, a certain «target country» is making concessions, and the «initiating countries», despite the enormous losses from the sanctions, persist in implementing their committed strategic course?

In this connection, the authors of the article try to understand the mechanism of the sanction processes and put forward the following factors to study them. The first factor is the damage faced by the «target country» as a result of the imposition of sanctions against it. The higher such damage, the greater the likelihood that the «target country» will make concessions. The second factor is the level of consolidation of the coalition of the initiators of sanctions operating within the framework of international organizations (primarily the UN). The more consolidated the coalition and the more coordinated its decisions and actions, the more likely it is that the «target country» will make concessions. You can see that this relationship is not linear. For example, in some cases minimal consolidation or minimal damage brings good results (from the point of view of countries applying sanctions), and in other cases there are huge losses, and the coordinated policy of sanction initiators becomes unsuccessful. In any case, the direction of dependence and the peculiarities of the causal relationship are important to us.

It should also be borne in mind that in addition to the above factors, there is a whole complex of other independent variables. One of them is the degree of consolidation of the political regime and the internal political stability of the «target country»,
The main research area of our work will be the study of the political history of sanctions against Iran at various stages. Regarding the terminology of the term «sanctions», it should be noted that it has been studied in some detail and there are many publications on it that are also listed in the bibliography for this article. It should only be emphasized that sanctions are similar to such a category as trade wars.

Less studied questions about the effectiveness of the application of sanctions. However, today there are certain approaches to this category of problem. For example, R. Pape cites statistics indicating the ineffectiveness of applying sanctions in achieving key international policy objectives (Pape 1997: 90).

A similar view can be found in the collective monograph «Rethinking economic sanctions: economics and modern politics» (1990), the authors of which conclude that «economic sanctions reached the goal in only one third of 100 analyzed cases» (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott 1990: 298).

American economist D. Baldwin concludes that there is a «paradox of sanctions» («sanctions paradox»). The essence of his theory is that «politicians continue to apply economic sanctions, despite evidence that they do not work, simply because the costs of using military force as a coercive measure would be, other things being equal, too high» (Baldwin 2000: 89).

A number of other researchers refer to the issue of the effectiveness of sanctions more restrained than the above authors, although in some points they point out that the effectiveness of international sanctions may be limited. For example, sanctions aimed at weakening the military potential or, at least, at changing the policy of a country, have rarely been successful, if you leave out the damage to the economy as a whole.

In a political science environment, there are experts who believe that many of the research results cannot be fully objective, since most of them are based on empirical data from the Cold War period, during which the maintenance of multilateral sanctions was difficult (Stephen 2004: 4).

Thus, there is no common understanding among researchers and experts on how to measure the effectiveness of international sanctions if they are carried out simultaneously with other instruments of world politics. At the same time, a review of the extensive scientific literature in a historical context on the subject of sanctions leads the authors of the article to the conclusion that the effect of sanctions began to play an increasingly leading role after World Wars I and II as an opportunity to replace military actions by legal, financial and economic pressure. a particular country or coalition
of countries for specific purposes. The idea of sanctions as a substitute for aggression came to the leadership of Western countries with the expansion of the list of goals set for sanctions, and by 1956 the number of sanctions had doubled. (Hufbauer, Shott, Elliott, Oegg 2007: 233). With the relative warming of international relations in 1966-1970, the number of sanctions measures fell. Then, gradually rising in 1971–1975, the number of sanctions as a tool for influencing countries’ policy increases dramatically and reaches 34 cases by 1995, which is almost 30 times the number of cases of sanctions applied until the end of World War II. (Hufbauer, Shott, Elliott, Oegg 2007: 233).

Our assumption based on historical analysis and the case-study method is that the effect of the sanctions measures is impressive. Their own efficiency increases if they are conducted in a coordinated manner, are long-term and consistent, supported by all politically important institutions of power of the initiating countries and are aimed at a moderate modification of the policy of the «target country». As an argument for the cessation of hostilities, the change of the political regime, the sanctions nature of the impact works the least. We tried to consider this assumption on the example of the application of sanctions by the United States Administration against Iran.

**Initial phase: from unilateral sanctions to coalition exploration**

Sanctions against Iran were initially introduced in order to curb its ambitions in the nuclear field, and then another very wide range of issues. These include deterrence of the missile program and the development of conventional weapons, a number of allegations of human rights violations, naval actions in the Persian Gulf, etc. It is important to emphasize that Washington initially positioned itself as the most severe initiator of sanctions against Iran, introducing serious restrictions and proposing extreme measures in case of disobedience. Traditionally, the United States tried to combine the policy of sanctions with the implementation of military operations, or with the threat of the use of military force. Over time, the US administration began to realize that unilateral actions could be replaced by the effort of coalitions – by a combination of the most developed and stable «initiating countries».

The origins of the sanctions confrontation with Iran go to the beginning of the 50s. last century. In 1951, when Iran nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the governments of the United States and Great Britain officially declared a boycott of Iranian oil and petroleum products. It should be noted that for those times the nationalization of Western companies was a common phenomenon. But in the case of Iran, the two countries rather quickly began to use force escalation.

In 1979, the following precedent of sanctions against Iran occurred. The reason for this was the seizure of US diplomats on the wave of the Islamic revolution. In this regard, the American President J. Carter froze Iranian assets in his country (Decree No. 12170 of 10/14/1979), and in 1980 decided to impose a trade embargo. Decrees No. 12211 and No. 12205 prohibited the export and delivery of goods to Iran (with the exception of humanitarian goods). Iranian imports were blocked, it was forbidden to help Iran with lending. Sanctions especially hit the oil industry. As a result of the introduction of sanctions, oil production fell to zero, although before the revolution it was approximately 500 thousand barrels per day (Graaf 2013: 147). The Americans also tried to free the hostages. However, the operation «Eagle Claw» failed, which resulted in the strengthening of the Iranian position. However, after the death of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Iran surrendered hostages. The unprofitable war with Iraq played a special role in this situation, when US sanctions exacerbated the wartime costs. Washington could take advantage of this in its national interests, but the administration of the country decided to lift the sanctions after the release of the above-mentioned hostages (Decree No. 1282 dated January 23, 1981).

The hostage crisis revealed the following trends. First, the sanctions had a definite impact on Iran, especially against the background of the fiasco of the military operation. For Iran, the American market was lost forever. Sanctions were lifted only formally, and therefore oil supplies were not fully restored, and from the beginning of the 90s. were terminated permanently. In addition, the sanctions were carried out only in combination with another very important factor – the war against Iraq. Iran in the shortest possible time was able to adapt to the trade embargo, directing domestic exports towards other consumers. The costs of losing the US market were offset by trade relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) and Western Europe. Japanese banks continued to cooperate with Tehran, and traders were ready to buy oil and oil products at an inflated cost. Iran was also able to survive due to the situation in the oil market – general instability in the market was on the side of suppliers. Ambition to gain economic advantage outweighed political
loyalty, and Washington’s attempts to pressure its allies against Iran failed.

The presented episode showed that the United States, despite their power, could not get real results from the sanctions without the support of the coalition. This forced the Americans to resort to power tools. And if in 1979-1981, the use of force did not produce effective results, then during the next Iranian-American confrontation, the United States achieved success through military operations. In 1987, during the so-called «tanker war», US President R. Reagan imposed sanctions on Iran because of the support of the authorities of terrorism, attacks on US ships, as well as threats to freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. The next Decree No. 12613 of October 30, 1987, which banned Iranian imports to the United States, was adopted. By this time, as already indicated, the share of Iranian oil supplies was not so significant, therefore, we can talk about the symbolic nature of the imposed sanctions. But the power factor played a paramount role. In 1988, Operation Mantis was carried out, which became the largest naval battle after World War II. American troops inflicted a crushing defeat on Iranian troops in the Persian Gulf. Once again, the sanctions were not the tool, but, as in previous episodes, they became the pretext for military decisions.

After 10 years, the United States more avoided the use of military force, and began to increase the real levers of sanctions policy. This approach was adopted during the presidency of B. Clinton. For the first time, sanctions are imposed for suspicion of attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Here it is necessary to emphasize that at this time at the same time there is a consolidation of the branches of power of the United States. If before the sanctions were initiated by the president, then later the Congress began to join the process. Clinton introduces a number of decrees, under which US citizens were prohibited from participating in the lending and development of the Iranian oil and gas industry. The introduction of the trade embargo has begun again, as well as a ban on investing in Iranian property.

In turn, the Congress voted for the adoption of the Sanctions Act against Libya and Iran (in 2006 some amendments were made to the Act and Libya was deleted). The adopted law was partly a continuation of presidential decrees. According to the Act, the key task was to undermine Iran’s financial and economic capabilities to support «terrorist activities» and develop missile technologies and WMD. The energy sector is again becoming the object of sanctions, but certain innovations have appeared in the law. First, the congress requested the executive to create a mechanism of world pressure on Iran. This reflected the consideration of the American government that Iran would successfully circumvent all sanctions if it did not include other international actors in the war. Secondly, every year the president was obliged to report to Congress on the level of success of the formation of the coalition. Congress considered that the closest allies of the United States – the countries of the European Union, Japan, Israel, South Korea and Australia – should adopt similar laws. Third, the sanctions on the energy sector were supplemented by bans on the supply of vessels, their insurance and the transportation of petroleum products to Iran. Fourthly, the application of the extraterritorial principle started, i.e. sanctions were extended to both citizens and US companies, as well as to foreigners.

Negative coloring among Washington’s allies acquired an extraterritorial principle. Previously, sanctions largely moved along a one-sided line, but now a new direction was laid for further US policy. A stable consensus emerged, which was aimed at creating a powerful international coalition of «initiating countries» of sanctions against Iran. Trade sanctions were supplemented by insurance and financial sanctions. The role of the congress in strengthening the sanctions regime was enormous.

Increase sanctions damage through coalition formation

Important steps in the formation of a sanctions coalition against Iran were taken by the UN Security Council and their resolutions. The scientist M. Brzoska in his research revealed an interesting tendency in this regard. «Most of the UN Security Council sanctions (78%) were initiated after unilateral sanctions were imposed on the« target country ». Often, «initiating countries» seek to complete their own sanctions regime in the UN, actively promoting relevant resolutions (Brzoska 2015: 1342). This pattern clearly describes the US foreign policy towards Iran. The UN Security Council has become a weighty institution / instrument for the internationalization of sanctions. Other members of the UN Security Council also received certain advantages: they began to declare their positions, softening or correcting the proposed solutions, as well as participating in the development of draft resolutions.

In July 2006, the first UN Security Council resolution on Iran’s nuclear missile program was adopted. At first glance, this resolution was of no
significance. The resolution urged Iran to stop all activities related to the enrichment and processing of radioactive materials, including the research part. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was requested to provide comprehensive data on Iranian developments. Sanctions against Iran were not imposed, although warnings were given about the likelihood of their use in accordance with Art. 42 ch. VII of the UN Charter. Anyway, for the American government it was a great success. The question that the US has been seeking for ten years has become internationalized. The rest of the countries of the UN Security Council also considered this a diplomatic success. They became active actors in solving the problem, preventing the United States from monopolizing the situation and maintaining a commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

As expected, Iran did not comply with the points of the resolution, as a result of which the UN Security Council began to impose sanctions and consistently expand them. At the end of 2006, a new resolution was adopted (1737), which banned all countries from supplying materials to Iran that would contribute to the implementation of its nuclear missile program, delivering these materials to Iran and carrying out related financial transactions. The resolution also compiled a specific list with Iranian individuals and legal entities whose movement abroad was restricted and whose assets needed to be frozen. Initially, the list was more compact. However, in the spring of 2007, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1747, which supplemented this list. In addition to individuals and companies associated with the nuclear missile program, the list included various organizations and individual leaders of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Moreover, the resolution prohibited the import of weapons from Iran, put restrictions on the export to Iran of virtually all types of conventional weapons, and also called on the entire international community to refrain from subsidies, financial assistance and loans to Iran with the exception of humanitarian projects. A year later, the sanctions are expanding again. The number of individuals and legal entities on the list, which are subject to visa restrictions, is increasing. These were – Iranian banks and their branches abroad. It was recommended that special vigilance should be exercised when working with these banks, as they could «finance the nuclear missile program». The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) was involved in the work on the development of financial measures against Iran. On top of that, the resolution gave the right to inspect Iranian planes and ships in case of any suspicion that they have links to prohibited shipments.

Anyway, all these measures were not enough to stop the launch of Iran’s nuclear program. For example, by 2010, Iran achieved uranium enrichment of up to 20% and created an enrichment facility in Qom. In this regard, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1929, which significantly tightened the sanctions. Iran was forbidden to invest in overseas development of nuclear and missile technologies and materials. Along with the ban on the supply of main types of conventional weapons, it was also forbidden to train and train Iranian military specialists abroad. The list was increased by individuals, companies, including transport companies (foreign transport companies were included in the list). In addition to inspection of cargo at airports and ports, powers were given to inspect them on the high seas, and it was not allowed to service and refuel Iranian ships that were suspected of carrying prohibited cargo. It is important to note that resolution 1929 differed from the previous ones in that the new one indicated the interrelation of oil revenues and the financing of nuclear development. Subsequently, this clause became the key argument for sanctions of other countries against the Iranian energy industry.

Completion of UN Security Council sanctions: diversification of tools and improvement of extraterritorial sanctions

One of the main characteristics of the US policy was a very tight mix of sectoral and trade sanctions (which can be called «frontal») with financial sanctions (they can also be called «flank» sanctions). Financial sanctions contributed to increased sectoral and trade restrictions. For several years, Washington has established good relations with Iranian companies and banks, which made it possible to quickly and effectively identify violators and apply extraterritorial sanctions. The adoption of various resolutions of the UN Security Council at a qualitative level changed the legitimacy of the extraterritorial sanctions. If at the beginning it was perceived as another whim of the American leadership, after the adoption of the resolutions, the allies of the United States and the countries of the periphery were forced to consider the issue seriously. Large-scale fines held by the US, European banks were not seriously resisted. In addition to «frontal» and «flank» sanctions, they began to introduce «background sanctions», including, for example, restrictions on the movement outside Iran of individual Iranian citizens and government officials.
The practice of tightening sanctions was on the part of the congress and the administration. In 2010, the Congress adopted a law on comprehensive sanctions against Iran, and also established amendments to the 1996 Act, which had a significant impact on the tightening of sanctions. Innovations on Iran seem to be «remembered by everyone»: the missile program, nuclear development, the buildup of conventional weapons, support for Hezbollah, the violation of human rights, the arrest of American citizens, and the rejection of offers of cooperation from Washington and Council members. Traditionally, within the framework of the adopted adjustments, deliveries of petroleum products into the country, supplies of technologies and materials that were necessary for a nuclear missile program and the development of the armed forces came under sanctions. A ban was imposed on the import of Iranian goods to the United States and the export of American goods to Iran. The assets of all Iranian citizens suspected of working on the development of the nuclear program have been frozen. Many structures have been authorized to impose sanctions on any Iranian bank and to limit partnerships with any foreign bank that interacts with suspicious or blocked Iranian financial organizations, institutions or individuals. The president was ordered to compile a list of Iranian officials who were involved in the violation of human rights with the subsequent freezing of assets and visa restrictions.

In 2012, Congress passed another law – «On the reduction of the Iranian threat and human rights in Syria.» First of all, he caused great damage to the energy industry. By that period, it was extremely clear that Iran more than successfully withstands oil and gas sanctions, selling raw materials at preferential prices. By adopting this law, Congress sought to resolve the long-standing issue of control over Iran’s oil exports. As a result, the Americans narrowed the number of consumers to the maximum, supporting alternative producers (especially Saudi Arabia), as well as providing benefits to traditional buyers of Iranian oil, who would suffer losses if they refused. The sanctions also affected shippers transporting oil from Iran, and insurers of oil transportation. Financial sanctions have now begun to extend to the obligations of Iran’s sovereign debt. Practically on all points reflected in previous laws (human rights, opposition to the Corps of Guards of the Islamic Revolution, etc.), more stringent sanctions were imposed, including extraterritorial ones. The American leadership acted in a similar manner. B. Obama from 2010 to 2013 signed a number of decrees that implement the norms of legislation. Thus, Decree No. 13590 provided for the imposition of sanctions against companies selling equipment for the energy industry to Iran (Executive Order No. 13590).

Finally, another decision was a law that was adopted in January 2013 – the Act on Freedom and Nuclear Non-Proliferation of Iran. The law specified the sanctions, for the most part, reflected in previous laws (for example, against financial institutions and shipowners who conducted prohibited activities on behalf of Iranian companies). However, various clarifications were introduced. In particular, companies that pre-assessed the risks of sanctions and determined for themselves the rules for compliance with the sanctions regime could be removed from restrictions. It has also become a significant rule that peripheral countries buying oil from Iran can be removed from extraterritorial sanctions if the purchase of oil was dictated by emergency situations.

This last point was quite important. He made a more flexible policy of extraterritorial sanctions. The leadership could now, in its own way, encourage or punish numerous buyers of Iranian oil. The administration has appeared as a «stick» and «gingerbread.» This measure largely determined their subsequent success.

**Results of coalition diplomacy and extraterritorial sanctions**

One of the first achievements of the sanctions policy was the accession of the European Union to it on the energy issue. In 2012, the Union banned the purchase of Iranian oil, its storage and transportation. Given that the European Union accounted for ¼ of Iranian exports, this clearly had a negative impact on Tehran. The EU decision was supported by certain factors.

First, the failure to comply with UN Security Council resolutions.

Secondly, a number of large fines that were imposed by the United States Department of the Treasury on some European banks that violated the sanctions regime. Compared to previous periods, the United States has demonstrated determination to punish violators, as well as to use extraterritorial sanctions, even with the risk of friction with the allies.

Thirdly, in the European Union, the harsh rhetoric of Iranian President M. Ahmadinejad was perceived negatively.

It was difficult to call the actions of the EU decisive, since the main consumers of Iranian oil...
were, nevertheless, Asian countries, Japan, China, India, South Korea. They could adequately play the role of «black knights» and ignore sanctions, knocking out additional discounts from the Iranian leadership. In those conditions, when oil prices rose – this could be a fairly convenient way out for Tehran. In addition, the pressure of sanctions on large buyers bore political risks for Americans. In a similar pattern of relations, everyone was the winner, except the USA. Consumers from Asian countries received oil with considerable discounts, and Iran still maintained sales markets, compensating for losses due to high prices for oil and oil products.

In 2012, exports of Iranian oil fell significantly compared with the previous year. If at the end of 2011 it was about 2.5 million barrels per day, then at the end of 2012 – around 1.5 million barrels, and at the end of 2013 – less than 1 million barrels / day (Nelson 2013). Moreover, some consumers (for example, India) reduced their purchases to large volumes than the Americans demanded. Financial sanctions also played a role. Banks that participated in oil deals could be «disconnected» from the American financial system. Obviously, when choosing between the Iranian and American markets, banks from third countries preferred to remain in the US. The same mechanism worked with EU sanctions, only here instead of banks, the pressure mechanism was the threat of sanctions against companies insuring oil tankers. At the same time, American diplomats and Ministry of Finance staff conducted extensive outreach work in Europe, Asia and the Gulf countries. A frontal strike against Iranian oil exports found support in the form of flank sanctions in the financial and insurance sectors. At the same time, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria and other oil producers began to increase their production, seizing Iranian market share (Graaf, 2013a: 154-155). Such an approach was able to temporarily stall the Iranian mechanism of adaptation to sanctions through the diversification of oil buyers, the policy of discounts, the search for alternative carriers of oil and the use of «holes» in international finance.

Iran agreed to negotiations on a nuclear issue, and already in November 2013 in Geneva a Joint Action Plan was signed – an interim agreement, according to which Iran agreed to partially curtail the nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of some sanctions. The final deal – the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan (FIPA) – was adopted in Vienna on July 14, 2015, after one and a half years of fierce negotiations; On July 20, it was unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council by Resolution 2231 (UN Security Council Resolution No 2231 2015); And on January 16, 2016, the implementation of the JAPA began after the IAEA confirmed that Iran had brought its nuclear program in line with the action plan. In response, most UN sanctions were lifted (except for temporary restrictions on the supply of weapons, missile technology and nuclear and dual-use goods). Canceled «nuclear» EU sanctions. By the decree of Obama 13716, the worst sanctions for Iran were lifted by the United States (Executive Order No. 13716). As the well-known international expert N. Kassenova writes, «the gap between the agreements and the new phase of tension around Iran also will not benefit all the plans for economic cooperation and the use of Iran as a transit country for access to world markets that have revived in Kazakhstan in connection with the lifting of nuclear sanctions.» (Kassenova, 2016)

**New round of American sanctions**

Even during the negotiations on the UTM, the congress adopted the Act on the Review of the Iranian Nuclear Deal (Iran Nuclear Review Act of 2015). The law imposed obligations on the president to tightly control the fulfillment by Iran of its obligations. The emergence of the law was a domestic political compromise between supporters and opponents of the deal with Iran. One of the requirements of the law was the so-called certification of the transaction, which obliged the president to confirm every 90 days that Iran actually fulfills the CPAP. For Congress, it was a way to increase the personal responsibility of the president and constantly keep the subject of the deal under control.

Congress, for its part, has made efforts to unilaterally tighten US sanctions. August 2, 2017 D. Trump signed the law PL 115-44 (CAATSA), which determined the range of sanctions against Iran. The law made it clear that Iran remains a serious challenge to the United States. He ordered the president to provide a biennial detailed report on Iran’s military capabilities and security actions. Special attention was paid to the Iranian ballistic missile development program. Sanctions were determined against individuals and organizations that contribute to the development of the program, and the president was charged with reporting on the Iranian missile subject once every six months. As in a number of previous laws and presidential decrees, the relevance of the «terrorist» threat from Iran and the corresponding sanctions against those suspected
of supporting Iran were noted. By tradition, the topic of human rights was included in the law. The State Department imposed a duty on the annual report on this topic, defined sanctions against violators of human rights in Iran. In addition, sanctions against violators of the arms embargo, as well as on the issue of the detention of US citizens by Iran, were again registered. CAATSA determines the direction of the internationalization of sanctions, and the reporting parameters of the administration of interaction with the EU.

The European Union also retained some sanctions against Iran, in particular, related to the violation of human rights. However, according to CAATSA, the continuing EU sanctions and restrictions by the UN Security Council were uncritical for Iran. They did not inflict damage on his economy and were rather symbolic. Much more dangerous for Iran was D. Trump’s statement about withdrawing from SVPD and returning to the previously existing sanctions regime.

The main thing in D. Trump’s decision from the point of view of sanctions is to return to the regime of restrictions that existed before the signing of the SVPD. Given the significant scale of sanctions, the time required for their restart, as well as the time for winding up again prohibited activities, the interim period established by the president – 90 and 180 days for various activities, is very tough. In particular, we are talking about the return of the following sanctions: restriction of foreign exchange transactions and trade in precious metals; a ban on the supply of certain types of raw materials (graphite, steel and aluminum, coal); a ban on the supply of software for industry; restrictions on transactions with Iranian sovereign debt obligations; sanctions against the engineering sector. Also, sanctions against the shipbuilding industry and Iran’s maritime transport, a ban on the supply of petroleum products and gasoline, financial sanctions against Iranian banks, insurance sanctions and, of course, sanctions against the energy sector (equipment, investments, etc.) are back to action.

The main danger for Iran is in the perspective of a selective compromise between Brussels and other capitals with Washington. For example, the United States may give the EU the opportunity to save face and turn a blind eye to the non-implementation of sanctions in certain sectors. But they can put a strict condition that restrictions on the purchase of oil will act and a compromise here is the regime of exceptions for countries that have shown a determination to reduce purchases. This may again lead to a reduction in purchases of Iranian oil, with all the ensuing consequences for the country’s economy.

Findings

The Iranian case provides an interesting breakdown of the influence of various factors on the success or failure of sanctions. It is about the following:

The first. These are the foreign policy ambitions of the initiating country, in this case the United States. Today, this huge country is considered the main decision-making center and its ultimate beneficiary. Therefore, it is logical that US foreign policy is aimed at preserving and further strengthening the global economic and political power of America. This course is laid down in many domestic political treaties of the United States, declaring the need to recognize the inseparable link between the influence, security and prosperity of the United States, on the one hand, and their dominance in the «liberal international order» with the other (Tukumov, 2017: 279). Strengthening Iran’s position in the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon) alongside its close allies (Saudi Arabia and Israel) causes great concern in building a foreign policy course. The policy of lifting sanctions against Iran and involving this country in the regional security system «in a multipolar world» during the administration of President Obama is significantly different from the White House plans under President Trump, dominated by the policy of realism, neo-isolationism and restraining Iran through sanctions against the background of long-time US allies.

The second. The Iranian case showed the existence of a relationship between the quantity and quality of sanctions and their effectiveness (that is, an increase in the requirements of the «initiating countries»). However, there are some peculiarities. Iran has suffered losses from sanctions for a long time. But he did not sit at the negotiating table, leading a policy of adaptation to sanctions. Only in 2013, the United States managed to create the conditions that forced Tehran to negotiate. At the same time, Iran managed to reach a profitable deal for itself, although it yielded to the basic requirements. The Iranian case confirms D. Drezner’s hypothesis about the sanction paradox: maximum pressure on political opponents brings minimal damage from sanctions, while minimum pressure on allies often yields maximum results (Drezner, 1999: 231).

Third. The power factor affects or at least is interconnected with the policy of sanctions. The United States used force in combination with sanctions. The
growth of the military power of the «target country» restrains the use of force, but stimulates the use of sanctions as the only remaining opportunity.

Fourth. Sanctions are interrelated with the internal political situation both within the «initiator country» and within the «target country». The American case shows that on the issue of sanctions the role of such a representative political institution as the US Congress has significantly increased. The internal political factors of Iran are a subject of separate study, but their role in response to the sanctions also seems high.

References

Allen S. (2005) The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure. – International Interactions. Vol. 31. no.2. pp. 117-138.
22. Baldwin D.A. (2000) The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice. International Security, Vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 80-107.
Bapat N., Tobias H., Kobayashi Yo., Morgan C. (2013) Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data. International Interactions. Vol. 39. no.1. pp. 79-98.
Bonetti Sh. (1998) Distinguishing Characteristics of Degrees of Success and Failure in Economic Sanctions Episodes. Applied Economics. Vol. 30. no. 6. pp. 805-813.
Brzoska M. (2015) International Sanctions Before and Beyond UN Sanctions. International Affairs. Vol. 96. no. 6. pp. 1339-1349.
Drezner D. (1999) The Sanctions Paradox. Economic Statecraft and International Relations. Cambridge University Press. 364 p.
Drezner D. (2015) Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance. International Interactions. Vol. 41. no. 4. pp. 755-764.
Executive Order No. 13590. [Electronic Resources]. URL: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/13590.pdf. (viewing: 25.04.2019).
Executive Order No. 13716. [Electronic Resources]. URL: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/jcpoa_eo.pdf. (viewing: 26.04.2019).
Gerring J. (2007) Case-Study Research. Principles and Practices. Cambridge University Press. 278 p.
Graaf Th. (2013) Van de. The «Oil Weapon» Reversed? Sanctions Against Iran and US-EU Structural Power. Middle East Policy. Vol. XX. no. 3. pp. 145-163.
Hufbauer G.C., Schott J.J., Elliott K.A. (1990) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 3nd ed., Washington, DC, p.233.
Hufbauer G.C., Schott J.J., Elliott K.A. (1990) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2nd ed., Washington, DC, Peterson Institute for International Economics. 298 p.
Hufbauer G., Shott J., Elliott K., Oegg B. (2009) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Third Edition. Peterson Institute for International Economics. 248 p.
Iran Nuclear Review Act of 2015. PL 114-17. May, 2015. [Electronic Resources]. URL: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-114publ17/pdf/PLAW-114publ17.pdf. (viewing: 27.04.2019).
Kassenova N., Kassenova T. Trump and US Foreign Policy: Possible Consequences for Kazakhstan. https://vlast.kz/politika/2028
Maloney S. (2015) Sanctions and the Iranian Nuclear Deal: Silver Bullet or Blunt Object? – Social Research. vol. 82. no. 4. pp. 887-911.
Nelson W. Oil Exports Stay Low. – Iran Times. 20.12.2013. [Electronic Resources]. URL: http://iran-times.com/oil-exports-stay-low/ (viewing: 25.04.2019).
Pape R.A. (1997) Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security, vol. 22, no. 2. pp. 90-163.
Stephen D.C. (2004) Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? (An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed against Libya). Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 1-18.
Tukumov E. Discovering America: A View from Kazakhstan. Boston Astana.2017, p. 279-281.UN Security Council Resolution No 2231 (2015). [Electronic Resources]. URL: http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-ballistic.shtml – (viewing: 25.04.2019).