POWER POLITICS IN THE QURĀN: HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA AND THE CONCEPT OF CALIPHATE IN AL-WĀ'IE BY ROKHMAT S. LABIB

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Abstract:
Power politics is a sovereign entity that aims to protect the interests of individuals and groups. The disharmony of Islamic politics triggered by stigma, discrimination, and persecution of the authorities against the people causes radicalism and intolerance of the concept of the state. Hizbut Tahrir, with textual interpretation dominantly intervened by ideological reasoning, produced controversial sectarian revivalist thoughts, far from the universal message of the verse and its maqāsid meaning. This study examines the concept of power politics in the Quran through the theological analysis of the khilāfah in al-Wā’ie. The method used in this study includes a descriptive-qualitative analysis of mauḍū’ interpretation through a context and content approach. This study concludes that the power politics of scripturalist, textualist, and fundamentalist interpretations in al-Wā’ie is far from authoritative (mu’tabar) scholars’ thoughts or interpreted by jumping to conclusions, such as in solving al-Baqarah[2]: 30, al-Nisā’[4]: 59, and al-Mā’idah[5]: 49. The verses of the power politics clearly state that the khilāfah is an institution of civilization within state sovereignty, not a political conception that is taken for granted that negates Islam or a modern Islamic government system that substantially contains the principles of siyāsah and maqāsid al-syār’ih.

Keywords: Hizbut Tahrir, Khilāfah, Power Politics, the Quran Interpretation, Theological
Abstrak:

Politik kekuasaan merupakan entitas kedaulatan yang bertujuan melindungi kepentingan individu dan kelompok. Disharmoni politik Islam kerap dipicu oleh stigma, diskriminasi dan persekusi penguasa terhadap rakyat hingga menyebabkan radikalisme dan intoleran terhadap konsep negara bangsa. Hizbut Tahrir dengan penafsiran tekstual didominasi intervensi nalar ideologis, melahirkan pemikiran revivalis sektor yang penuh kontroversial jauh dari pesan universal ayat dan makna maqâṣid-nya. Penelitian ini bertujuan mengkaji konsep politik kekuasaan dalam perspektif Al-Qur’an melalui analisis teologis khilâfah dalam tafsir Al-Wa’ie. Metode yang dilakukan dalam penelitian ini meliputi analisis deskriptif kualitatif tafsir mauqûf melalui pendekatan konteks dan konten. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa penafsiran politik kekuasaan (khilâfah) dalam tafsir Al-Wa’ie penafsiran skripturalis, tekstualis, dan fundamentalis jauh dari pemahaman mayoritas ulama yang otoritatif (mu’tabar) atau ditafsiri secara jumping conclusion, seperti Qs. al-Baqarah [2]: 30, Qs. al-Nisâ’ [4]: 59, dan al-Ma’dah [5]: 49. Ayat-ayat politik kekuasaan ini secara jelas bahwa khilâfah merupakan institusi peradaban dalam bingkai kedaulatan negara, bukan konsepsi politik yang taken for granted yang menegasikan keislaman atau sistem pemerintahan Islam modern yang secara substansi memuat prinsip-prinsip siyâsah dan maqâṣid al-syarî‘ah.

Kata kunci: Hizbut Tahrir, Khilâfah, Politik Kekuasaan, Tafsir Al-Quran, Teologis

Introduction

The Quran is a divine revelation and a guide for human life, and its content is full of meanings and miracles that are relevant to every time and place or "sâlih likull zaman wa makan." The existence of the Quran as ḥudân and fûrqân has attracted commentators (mufassir) to study the message of revelation textually and contextually to reveal the meaning and purpose of the Quran (maqâṣid). The interpretation of the Quran related to the verses of the politics of power (khilâfah) is commonly understood rigidly, tendentiously, partially, and dominatingly intervening the interpreter's substantive-infiltrative reasoning through objective and subjective approaches. Fundamentalist interpretation cannot be understood only based on religious texts, but external factors cause dogma's internalization, such as social, economic, and political structures. The objectivist view reacts to religious texts providing social legitimacy and political legality. At the same time, the subjectivist idea puts people on subjects who actively expose themselves to external conditions.

1 Abdul Mustaqim, Pergeseran Epistemologi Tafsir (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2008).
2 Ana Sabhana AZMY, “Fundamentalisme Islam: Telaah Terhadap Pemikiran Politik Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI),” Jurnal Wacana Politik, 2020, 5.
This interpretation causes eternal friction between authoritative interpretation and strict interpretation. In the end, it does not only produce a controversial performance that is far from its maqāṣid meaning message but causes the Quran to be used as an object to seek the truth and justification to legalize the political passions from the text. Resistance and pragmatism of interpretation are not existential if the instruments are correctly understood according to the purpose of the verses. The performance of power politics has historically been a trend of progressive Islamic thought which experienced a shift in meaning and role in its development. The interpretation of products produced by the commentators cannot be separated from the background of the living conditions. Even the interpretation results are separated from the nature of the Quranic verse. Tafsir Al-Wa‘ie by Rokhmat S Labib tends to have a political interpretation of the nuances of da‘wah and harākah by interpreting the caliphate as an absolute and sacred way because it is seen as a part of religious issues that must be enforced and should not be ignored (al-mal‘ūm min al-dīn bi al-darūrah).

Reconstruction of Islamic politics is not absolute and regulating precisely the same as the practice of al-khulāfa‘ al-rasyidūn’s Islamic government and its absolute divides the political area exclusively as dār al-Islām and dār al-kufr. Likewise, the khilāfah should not be understood as a theological necessity that is rigid and seems forced. The khilāfah is a historical product and an open sociological experiment to realize the benefits and morality of state life. The absence of authoritative religious texts on the state format emphasizes that the state format is not bound. Even the state practice exemplified by the Prophet and the companions is a historical necessity in responding to the demands of the dynamics of the times.

The tajdid effort to actualize the power of politics has been initiated by traditionalist and modernist Islam figures. The Traditionalists, such as Ibn Jarir al-Ṭabarî (d. 310 H), presented the concept of a welfare state as a relevant political idea through the tahfīl method based on historical and language elements. Al-Ṭabarî argued that the king was the organizer of the welfare of the people and residents of his country, tasked with managing their affairs, closing roads that led to despotic actions, preventing people from doing wrong, and defending the people from transgressing actions. In addition to a-Ṭabarî, Muḥammad al-Zamakhṣary (d. 538 H), by emphasizing aspects of Arabic literature and supporting Mu’tazilah theology, presented the concept of a moral state. He noted that the existence of the Imāmah was to reject

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3 Willy Aditya., “Restorasi Politik Gagasan,” https://mediaindonesia.com/ read/detail/271929, 2019, https://mediaindonesia.com/opini/271929/restorasi-politik-gagasan.html.
4 Abdul Aziz, Kontroversi Khilāfah (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2019). 1-2.
5 Rokhmat S. Labih, Tafsir Al-Wa‘ie, Tafsir Ayat Pilihan Al-Wa‘ie (Bogor: Al Azhar, Fresh Zone Publishing, 2013).
6 Mabroer Inwan, “Rekonstruksi Khilafah Dalam Al-Qur’an,” Al-Fanar: Jurnal Ilmu Al-Qur’an Dan Tafsir 1, no. 1 (2018): 91–106.
7 Muhammad Majdy KAMIL, M. Ilham; SYATAR, Abdul; AMIRUDDIN, “Caliphate; Is It Theological Inevitability or Sociological Experimentation?,” Jurnal Ushuluddin 29, no. 1 (2021): 60–70.
8 Abu Ja’far Muhammad bin Jarir At-Thabari, Jāmi‘ Al-Bayān an Ta‘wil Ayī Al-Qur’an, 1st ed. (Mesîr: Mustafā al-Bāb al-Halabi wa Awlāduhu, 1954).
injustice, become a role model to enjoin good deeds, establish justice and truth, and forbid what is wrong.  

In contrast to the two commentators above, Muḥammad al-Qurṭūbī (d. 671 H.) and Isma‘īl ibn Kašīr (d. 774 H.) as purist Islam figures presented the legalistic ideas with different methods. Al-Qurṭūbī presented aspects of Islamic law (fiqh) using the rules and understanding of language as well as a comparative analysis of Imāmah following the systematic discussion of fiqh. While Ibn Kašīr wrote his commentary following the al-Ṭabarī method of interpretation by presenting the problem of Imāmah such as the analysis of al-Qurṭūbī by adding important arguments based on rational arguments. Ibn Kašīr has combined two strengths of argumentation in his interpretation which have not done before, the fiqh approach and rational arguments. A modernist Islamic figure also presented different thoughts, Muḥammad Abduh (1849-1905), as shown by Muḥammad Rasyi‘d Rida (1865-1935) in Tafsir al-Manār by using a socio-cultural approach which resulting political conception with sociological style. According to him, humans and politics are two inseparable entities in realizing the noble ideals of universal social benefits.

The term political power (khilāfah) in Indonesia is still limited to the meaning of sultan or king in the period of Islamization of the kings of the archipelago. However, this term emerged into a political discussion in the public sphere when the Sarekat Islam (SI), led by H.O.S Tjokroaminoto (d. 1934 AD) and Haji Agus Salim (d. 1954 AD), initiated the Indies al-Islam congress nine times (1922-1932 AD). The Islamic political debate began to feel fierce when H.O.S Tjokroaminoto was a figure of Islamic puritanism versus Soekarno. With his Nasakom ideology, Soekarno strongly rejected the khilāfah system. He considered it a form of regression and an illusion that was difficult to apply. He argued that religion and the state were two different entities, and there was no consensus that both should unite.

The view of the Nationalist figures above, of course, is contrary to the fundamentalist group of HTI, which argues that the establishment of the khilāfah is an obligation as a form of loyalty to faith, worship, and mu‘āmalah and in line with the syara’ rule “mā lā yatimmu al-wājib illā bihi fahuwa wājib” (Should a duty not be fulfilled except by a matter, that matter becomes a duty). Religion and power have a strong relationship, as evidenced by the character of the Prophet, who united the functions of prophethood and leadership (nubuwwah wa risālah), also by the nature of

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9 Mahmud bin Umar Az-Zamakhsyārī, Al-Kasyā‘f Al-Haqā‘iq Al-Tanzil Wa ‘Uyyūn Al-Aqwāl Fi Wujūh at-Ta’wil, 1st ed. (Mesir: Musthafa al-Bāb al-Halabi wa Awlāduh, 1972).
10 Abū Abdillah Muḥammad bin Ahmad al-Qurṭūbī, Al-Jāmi‘ Li Ahkām Al-Qur‘ān, 1st ed. (Mesir: Dār al-Kāṭib al-‘Arabī, 1967), 263-274.
11 Abd al-Jabbār bin Ahmad, Syarh Ushūl Al-Khamsah (Kairo: Maktabah al-Wahbah, 1965).
12 Abdul Hayyi Al-Farmāwī, Al-Bidāyāt Fi Al-Taṣfīr Al-Maudhū’i, Dirāsah Manhājiyah Maudhū’iyyah Maudhū’iyyah (Mesir: Maktabah Jumhūriyyah, 1977).
13 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam Di Indonesia 1900-1942 (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1998).
14 Muhaemin, “Pemikiran Muhammad Natsir Tentang Pertautan Agama Dengan Negara,” AI FIKR Pemikiran Islam, UIN Alauddin, Makassar Sulawesi Selatan 19, no. 1 (2015): 185.
15 Labīb, Taṣfīr Al-Wā’i‘e, Taṣfīr Ayat Pilihan Al-Wa‘i‘e.
the Islamic religion, which is comprehensive in regulating all aspects of life (al-
Māidah: 5 and al-Naḥl: 16:89).  

The construction of the Khilāfah as a political system does not mean that it is
the ideal representation area of the state in the power system. Changing the perennial
khilāfah into a cultural khilāfah should not impede the tamaddun or civilizational
system in the moderation of political Islam. Political accumulation substantially
becomes a middle way in realizing human duties as khilāfah Allah fī al-Ard (God's
representative on earth) for the realization of khilāfah Allah fī al-Ard (God's power on
earth). Based on the description above, the author tries to analyze the power politics
(khilāfah) in the theological perspective of the HTI interpretation with the
interpretation of the authoritative scholars.

HTI's Authoritarian Interpretation of the Khilāfah in the Quran

The problem with the power model is purely from the interpretation of the
reality of religious movements. From a political and theological perspective, the
essence of the caliphate is not a form of power. Still, it lies in the substantive,
embodied in general Islamic principles, such as the principle of deliberation, justice,
equality, and loyalty. This religiously representative system becomes a system of
tamaddun and civilization that can be affirmed in theoretical and practical contexts
within the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The khilāfah's
power system that had been recorded in the history of Islam should not be understood
as a complete form. It could change with various global forms and formats, as implied
in the Medina Charter. The khilāfah as a system of government can substantially
shift to a theo-democratic system, namely a system of government limited by
administrative and power areas. Even though upholding religious principles or the
spirit of maqāṣid al-syari'ah in power is more important and beneficial than promoting
the formation of Islamic law.

Several things underlie the strict interpretation of HTI, which requires an
Islamic state system. Khilāfah is a religious obligation that must be enforced kāfah,
and it is a big sin for those who refuse to implement it. The khilāfah in Islam is proof
of loyalty and obedience to Allah, the Messenger, and Ull al-Amr. The khilāfah system
in which the sovereignty of the sharia belongs to God, and only the Caliph has the
right to adopt sharia law and establish a constitution. Meanwhile, the democratic
system is an ideological system that is not always identical to the truth values
of sharia, ethics, justice, and honesty.

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16 Nasrul Syarif, Bunga Rampai Politik Intelektual Muslim Seputar Syariah Dan Khilāfah
(Yogyakarta: Deepublish, 2016).
17 Ahmad Atif Ahmad, The Fatigue of the Sharia (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012).
18 Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Manifesto Hizbut Tahrir untuk Indonesia (Indonesia, Khilafah, dan
Penyatuan Kembali Dunia Islam), Jakarta: HTI Press, 2009, hal. 67.
19 Taufiq Muhammad Asy-Syawi, Syuro Bukan Demokrasi (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1997).
Loyalty only to Allah, the Messenger, and Uli al-Amr

According to Rokhmat S. Labib, obedience to Allah, the Messenger, and Uli al-Amr is obligatory (Qs. an-Nisa [4]: 59). This verse explains the pillars of Islamic governance and the obligation to implement Islamic law in the khilafah state. Obedience to Uli al-amr is limited to a leader named khalifah, not to a leader who adheres to a democratic system. Khalifah is an inseparable part of Islamic teachings that must be fought for through an Islamic system, not a democratic system. The commandment of obedience necessitates the source of Islamic law as the final solution to the disputes of the ummah. While a democratic system with sovereignty in the hands of the people, the voice of the people is the voice of God, is born from a kufr secular ideology.

Loyalty only to the Caliph with the khilafah system is based on the following text:

Translation: O you who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger (Muhammad) and those of you who are in authority ..." (al-Nisā' [4]: 59)

The interpretation of the law and the khilafah above is not appropriate to be understood as the text rationally tends to be solipsistic and subjective. The confusion of interpretation can be seen in the following arguments:

Historical Context of Asbabun Nuzûl Ayat.

According to Imām al-Suyūṭī, the verse of uli al-amr (al-Nisā' [4]: 59) was revealed regarding the story of Abdullah bin Huzaifah bin Qais bin 'Adiy, who the Prophet delegated to lead the troops of the sariyah (war). He was angry when some troops did not follow the orders and obey him. This causality should not be understood partially limited to the meaning of the khilafah through the khilafah system. In dalalah, the knowledge of cause produces the effect (reason). The transformation from a special reality to a similar reality must rely on indications of the structure of the text that

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20 Labib, Tafsir Al-Wa‘ie, Tafsir Ayat Pilihan Al-Wa‘ie.
21 M. Ismail Yusanto, Khalifah Jalan Menuju Kaffah, II (Yogyakarta: Irtikaz, 2016).
22 Jalāluddin al-Suyūthi, Lubabun Nuqul Fi Asbābin Nuzūl (Beirut: Muassasah al-Kutub al-Tsaqafah, 2002).
supports the transformation of *dalālah* from the particular to the universal.\(^{23}\) Fulfilling the mandate and upholding justice are the obligations of the authority to the people with the implications are not limited to obedience to the *khali*fah, but also to *al-sultan*, *al-Mālik*, and al-Wafi in general. On the other hand, political sanctions are also applied to *Uli al-amr* if they break the sharia rules (lower kufr) (hadith narrated by Muslims). Obedience to *uli al-amr* is *ijbāriyah*, such as the command of piety and worship, while obedience to infidel authority is *ikhtiyāriyah*.\(^{24}\)

The obedience to the Messenger is unconditional and has the authority to be obeyed. This obedient commandment is by the commandment in Ali 'Imran [3]:35, although with a different redaction – without rephrasing the word "*at'ī'ū* in the word "*al-Rasūl,*" implies that direct obedience is binding and sourced from God, while repeated obedience orders are addressed to the other than the Messenger. In contrast, obedience to *uli al-amr* is not absolute or conditional as long as it does not disobey Allah and His Messenger "*lā tā'ata li makhluq fi ma'siyah al-Khāliq." This verse also limits obedience to *uli al-amr* in society, nation, and state life.\(^{25}\)

The command to obey Allah and His Messenger is contained in ten verses of the Quran, which were revealed after the migration to Medina (*madāniyah* verses). Chronologically, the first five verses are shown in a clause, while the other five verses are ordered to be revealed separately with different clauses. The first and second commands are contained in Ali 'Imran/3:32 and 132, related to the nature of disbelief and God's grace, respectively. It means that turning away from Allah's commandments implies doubt, and obedience becomes mercy for the believers. The command of obedience related to the characteristics of faith and the prohibition of turning away is also found in al-Anfāl/8:1, 20, and 46.\(^{26}\) Thus, adherence to Allah and the Messenger becomes a parameter of faith, intuitive factor, unity, and social order in society.\(^{27}\)

Relating to the verse of the *khali*fah mentioned in Adam (*al-Baqarah*: 2: 30) and the verse of David (*Ṣā'd*:38: 26), both their historical contexts are without *asbâb al-nuzūl* verse. This shows that both were not revealed because of a special cause but as a warning sign and the glory of the human caliphate. The verse of Adam shows that Allah informs the angels about noble creatures as caliphs on earth to substitute the creatures that have been created before. While the verse of David's appointment as *khali*fah is a guide in prospering the world and strengthening faith. The position of the two verses is also different. The verse of Adam is classified as Madaniyah verses, while the verse of David is classified as Makiyah verse. Therefore, according to Ibn Jarir, the interpretation of this verse (أَنِمَا يَجْعَلَ فِي الْأَرْضِ خَلِيفَةً), I am going to place a successive

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\(^{23}\) Nashr Hamid Abū Zayd, *Mathūm Al-Nas; Dirāsa Fī Uлūm Al-Qur'an* (Mesir: Haiah al-Mishriyyah al-Âmmah, 1990).

\(^{24}\) Sāid Hawa, *Al-Asās Fī Al-Tafsīr*, 2nd ed. (Kairo: Dār al-Salam, 2003).

\(^{25}\) M. Quraish Shihab, *Tafsir Al-Misbah, Pesan, Kesan, Dan Keserasian Al-Qur'an* (Jakarta: Lentera Hati, 2011).

\(^{26}\) Abū al-Fidā’ Ismail Ibn Katsīr, *Tafsîr Al-Qur'an Al-Azhīm*, 1st ed. (Singapura: Al-Haramain, n.d.).

\(^{27}\) Abdul Muin Salim, *Fiqh Siyasah Konsepsi Kekuasaan Politik Dalam Al-Qur'an* (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo Persada, 2002).
human authority on earth to represent Me enforce the law fairly among My creatures, punishing with My guidance, namely Adam and whoever follows him in enforcing the guidance of God's revelation truly. Meanwhile, al-Qurtubi argued that this verse is proof of the obligation to appoint khāliṣah, such as the appointment of Abu Bakr and Umar after the Prophet passed away through allegiance. In contrast, Muḥammad Ar-Rifa'i argued that humans are not khāliṣah on earth because either explicitly, implicitly, or the results of inference, there is no evidence from the Quran or Hadīs, because Allah says, "I am going to place a successive human authority on earth". According to the majority of muṭāfassirīn, khāliṣah Allah is a people who substitute other people period after period and generation after generation.

The Interpretation Context of "Uli al-Amr".

The commentators have different opinions about uli al-amr. Some interpret with umara', ahl al-ilm wa al-fiqh, the companions of the Messenger of Allah, and others are limited to Abu Bakr and Umar. Imām al-Māwardi in his interpretation of Nukat al-'Uyūn mentions four opinions of uli al-amr. First, uli al-amr means umara, the leader of worldly problems. It is the opinion of Ibn Abbas, as-Suddi, Ābu Hurairah, and Ibn Zaid, with differences in the historicity of verse revelation. Imam as-Suddi related to Amr bin Yasir and Khalid bin Walid, while Ibn Abbas related to Abdullah bin Huzairah as-Samih when both were delegated to lead the sīriyāh war. Second, uli al-amr is interpreted by 'ulama' and fuqaha' according to Jabir bin Abdullah, al-Hasan, and Abi al-Aliyah. Third, the opinion of the Mujahid, Uli al-amr, is the companion of the Messenger of Allah. Fourth, Uli al-amr is Abu Bakr and Umar RA based on Ikrimah's opinion.

The interpretation above is in line with the opinion of al-Jaṣṣ (d. 981 AD), specifically written in the chapter Fī Ṭa'ah Uli al-Amr by quoting the opinion of Jabir bin Abdullah and Ibn Abbas in the transmission of Hasan, Aṭa', and Mujahid who said that uli al-amr is ulū al-fiqh wa al-ilm or umara. Likewise, Al-Qurtubi interpreted umara' and khulaṣah as general opinions, such as the interpretation of Imams at-Ṭabari, al-Zamakhsyari, al-Ālı, al-Syaikani, al-Baiḍawi, and al-Ajīfī. While Sa'id Hawa interpreted it as 'ulama' and umara. It seems he wanted to combine commensurate cooperation between 'ulama' and umara in government. The view of leadership as part

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28 Ibn Katsir, “Taṣīr Ibn Katsir,” in Jilid 1, n.d., 81.
29 Muhammad Nasib Al-Rifa'i, “Taisir Al-'Aly Al-Qadir Li Ikhtisas Taṣīr Ibn Katsir,” in Cet Baru (Riyadh: Maktabah Ma'arif, n.d.), 104-105.
30 At-Ṭabari, Ṣāni’ Al-Bayān an Ta‘wil Ayi Al-Qur'an.
31 Ali Muhammad bin Habib Al-Māwardī, Taṣīr Al-Māwardi Nukat Wa Al-Uyūn, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub Ilmiyyah, n.d.).
32 Ābu Bakar Ahmad bin Ali Al-Razi Al-Jashshāsh, Ahkām Al-Qur'an (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 2003).
33 Al-Qurtubi, Jamī’ Li Ahkam Al-Qur’an, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub Ilmiyyah, 1993).
34 Said Hawa, Al-Asās Fī Al-Taṣīr (Kairo: Dār al-Salam, 1999).
of a religious obligation, religion will not be established without a state. If both are united, then the benefit of human beings will be created perfectly.

Abdul Karim al-Khatib (d. 2008 AD) emphasized that this *uli al-amr* verse has continuity with the previous verse on law and justice. Obedience to *uli al-amr* is not absolute because they are the ones who enforce the benefit of society. If there is a dispute, it must return to the primary sources of the Quran and sunnah. Through his interpretation, the competence and capability of the authorities become the primary consideration even though the religious factor is not abandoned. Rationally, Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905 AD) also did not limit *uli al-amr* to be a Muslim because *Uli al-amr* conceptually consisted of judges, scholars, and military commanders who provide benefits to the people. Obedience to *ahl al-Ḥall wa al-ʿAqd* in virtue and use is necessary.35

Analyzing the various meanings of *uli al-amr* above is indeed part of a varied and tolerable interpretation (*ikhṭilāf* tanawwâ) not contradicting each other (*ikhṭilāf* taḍāḍ). Although some commentators try to narrow the specific meaning to Abū Bakr and 'Umar, there are also those who try to broaden the meaning to 'ulamāʾ and umaraʾ, even to leaders in general crossing positions or professions. However, what becomes problematic is when *uli al-amr* is understood textually and transformed with the meaning of *khalīfah* requires Muslims to enforce Islamic law in totality in the form of a *khilāfah*, not a democratic system. Whereas the requirements for quality, capability, and credibility of the leader mostly must be considered as the hadīs said: "*When the power or authority comes in the hands of unfit persons, then wait for the destruction*". (Narrated by Bukhari from Abu Hurairah RA).

**Contradictions to the Practice of the Khilāfah**

The concept of the *khilāfah* which is only based on the Quran in *al-Nisāʾ*[4]:59, is quite controversial with the verse of government36 because this verse indirectly causes three legal provisions in *fiqḥ siyāsah* and *fiqḥ* science. First, there is a formulation of Islamic government because the *uli al-amr* is interpreted as the head of government, and it is obliged to obey the leader who follows the law. Second, a leader has the authority to issue fatwas and policies on religion and politics, and it is forbidden to disagree with them even though the product of ijtihād is *ẓanānī*. Third, a leader has absolute authority, and those who reject the legitimate government are considered separatists and *bugāh*.37

The validity of *Uli al-amr* as a legal basis is claimed to come from verses related to decisions and policies in the Quran and hadith. However, the application of the verse impacts the necessity of obeying the leader. It contradicts the obligation to

35 Abdul Karim Al-Khatib, *Al-Tafsîr Al-Qur’ân Li Al-Qur’ân* (Beirut: Dâr al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1999).
36 Hizbut Tahrir, *Aḥizah Al-Daulah Al-Khilāfah Fi Al-Hukm Wa Al-Idarah* (Beirut: Dâr al-Ummah, 2005).
37 Muhammad Mustafa Al-Zuhayli, *Al-Tadarruj Fi Al-Tasyir’ Wa Al-Tathbiq Fi Al-Syari’ah Al-Islāmiyyah* (t.t: Idârah al-Buhûts wa al-Isyârât, 2000).
enforce justice and amr ma'rūf nahī Munkar, in which there is no obedience to leaders who are disobedient to Allah (Ahmad). Of course, substantially, it triggers conflict in a tyrannical government, not only the 'ulamā'-umara' conflict, but even against the government means conducting separatist actions (bughāhā). On the other hand, people can balance power to achieve good governance. The uli al-amr verse is not limited to the context of state leaders. Still, it includes a broad understanding of imām mujtahid and religious leaders who can establish religious laws.

The Necessity of Establishing Khilāfah Government

Establishing a government (Khilāfah) according to HTI is obligatory. HTI's opinion is based on the command in verse of Adam below:

وَأَذَّ قَالَ رَبِّنَا لِمَلَكَتِكَ إِلَى جَعَلْنِي عَلَى ٱلْأَرْضِ خَليْفَةً قَالْتُمْ أَجْعَلُ فِيهَا مِنْ يُقْسِدُ فِيهَا وَتَسْفِكُ ٱلْدِّمَاءَ وَتَخْيَرُنَّ نَسْبَهُ بِمَكْرِدٍ وَتَقْدِسُنَّ لَكَ قَالَ أُلْهَمْتُ أَنْ أَلْعَمَّ مَا لَا تَعْلَمُونَ

Translation: "And when thy Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am about to place a ruler on the earth. They said: Wilt thou place one who will harm therein and shed blood, while we hymn Thy praise and sanctify Thee? He said: Surely I know that which ye know not." (Al-Baqarah [2]: 30)

The word "khilifah" in the Quran in the form of a mufrad (singular) is repeated twice related to the context of the Prophet Adam as. (Adam verse) in Surah Al-Baqarah (2): 30 and verse of David in Surah Sad (38): 26. The Adam verse contains the command to prosper the earth by the broad concept that He has set (macro). Meanwhile, The David verse implies an order to managing a limited area (micro). God as the Giver of the mandate and humans as the executor of the task is ordered to actualize the concept of God in the state's territory.38 The word khilifah shows the meaning of more (mubālagāh), which means representative or substitute. The caliphate (khilāfah) was formed after the death of the Prophet Muhammad when Abu Bakr was elected as his successor. Abū Bakr, 'Umar, Uṣmān, is known as the al-khālifah al-Rāṣiydūn (correctly guided) in Sunni theology. The practices of the Rasyidūn era provided a precedent for theories of the last caliphate.39

The commentators (mutaffasirīn) agreed that the word khalifah in al-Baqarah (2):30 means Adam as. To whom the khālifah Adam is? There are different opinions. Imam Nasafi interprets khalifah for the banū al-Jām (jinn), for angels, for fellow humans, and Allah on earth to enforce His laws and His statutes.40 HTI recognizes this last opinion41 as an essential point in the meaning of khalifah, which is meant by the

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38 Ahmad Thib Raya, Ensiklopedia Al-Qur’an: Kajian Kosakata (Jakarta: Lentera Hati, 2007).
39 Peter. ROSE, Nikolas; MILLER, “Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government,” In: Foucault and Law: Routledge, 2017, 191–224.
40 al-Nasafi, “Madārik A-L-Tanzil Wal Haqāiq Al-Tawīl,” in I (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2001), 33.
41 Labib, Tafsir Al-Wa’ie, Tafsir Ayat Pilihan Al-Wa’ie.
Quran referring to the opinion of Imam al-Bagāwi (d. 1122 AD), al-Alusi (d. 1854 AD), al-Qinuji (w. 1891 AD), Ibn Juzi al-Kalbi (d. 725 AD), and Syanqitji (d. 1972 AD). HTI interprets it as an obligation to enforce the khilāfah system with the legal status of fard kifayah. The interpretation is problematic because the khaliṣah is one of the main prerequisites in the khilāfah system. However, it is recognized in the book Aḥizah Daulah al-Khilāfah that Adam’s verse is not mentioned as the primary argument for the khilāfah as the representative of God or the previous vice-khalifah.

Imam Al-Qurtbi, as quoted by Imam Ibn Kathir, Al-Baqarah (2): 30, is the basis for the obligation to form a government. This argumentation is issued to stop disputes, decide disputes in the community, prosecute wrongdoers for the rights of those who have been wronged, enforce the law, provide sanctions for those who have been wronged, and solve other significant problems that are impossibly conducted without government. This opinion can be seen from the triangular dialogue among Allah, the angels, and the devil, who questions Allah’s prerogative to make Adam a khalifah. This verse is a continuation of the previous verses, which explain the journey of human life globally. This verse of Adam talks about the creation of man and his existence in the world and then assumed by the Angels that humans will always spill blood and cause damage. The word khalifah in verse indicates dispute resolution and law enforcement.

Based on the description above, this verse is purely about the creation of humans as khalifah, not about the government or the Khilāfah system. Justifying that the Khilāfah system of government is contained in the Quran is false because the government system is ijtiḥādīyah siyāsah area, which is dynamic, not static. It is too naive and romantic if the verses of Adam and David are interpreted as an argument for the obligatory khilāfah enforcement. Irrational interpretations are limited to the system, not to the functions and priorities of a just and trustworthy khalifah. The politic of Islam should be understood broadly as a range of legal modern Islamic political movements, from state policies to minimizing ideological conflicts related to Islam as an authoritative position in political life. The politic of Islam must be understood as a legitimate political sphere, not seeing it as a single ideology.

Obligation to Apply Sharia

The obligation foundation to apply sharia is written in the following two verses of al-Māidah [5] verses 48-49:

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42 Taqi al-Din Al-Nabhani, Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyyah (Beirut: Dar al-Islam, 1994).
43 Al-Qurthubi, Al-Jami’ Li Ahkam Al-Qur’an.
44 Shihab, Tafsir Al-Misbah, Pesan, Kesan, Dan Keserasian Al-Qur’an.
45 Andrew F MARCH, “Political Islam: Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science, no. 18 (2015): 103–23.
... So judge between them by what Allah has revealed, and follow not their vain desires, diverging away from the truth that has come to you. To each among you, We have prescribed a law and a clear way…" (al-Ma‘idah [5]: 48)

According to Rokhmat⁴⁶, these two verses imply the regulation of totality even though the Prophet had passed away. The command generally applies to choosing a judge with the Quran’s guidance. The power of this verse is firm because the object is obligatory. The word fā‘hakum in verse indicates that the order is firm (jazm) and mandatory. The hudud law and other obligations will not be realized except by the judge, namely khali‘fah with a government system called khilāfah system, based on the fiqh rules "mā lā yatimu‘ al-wajib illā bihi fahuwa wājib" which must be enforced by a judge (khali‘fah).⁴⁷ Abd reinforces this view. Qadim Zallum in Nizam al-Ḥukm fi al-Islām by writing a similar verse about the obligation to enforce the law by a judge or sultān, such as war orders (al-Tasyrī‘ al-Ḥarbī), politics (al-Tasyrī‘ al-Siyāsī), criminal (al-Tasyrī‘ al-Jinā‘ī), social (al-Tasyrī‘ al-Ittimā‘ī), muamalah (al-Tasyrī‘ al-Mu‘āmalah) and other similar sharia to those practiced by the Prophet, al-khula‘fā‘ al-rasyidūn, and the later Islamic leaders. Furthermore, Zallum stated that Islam could be established only with an Islamic government system because Islam is the only institution of power capable of implementing Islamic laws. Institutions of governance are basyariah, not divine institutions with unique characteristics that are different from any other power system in the world. The institution was named Daulah Islamiyah, headed by a khali‘fah.⁴⁸

The interpretation above is quite problematic, and there is a transformation of meaning that seems forced, both in terms of meaning and munasabah between verses. First, from the meaning of the verse, the word "ḥakama", which has the basic meaning of blocking or controlling, such as hakamtu al-dābbah mana’uḥā or ḥakamah al-

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⁴⁶ Labib, Ta‘ṣīr Al-Wa’ī, Ta‘ṣīr Ayat Pilihan Al-Wa’ī.
⁴⁷ Tahrir, Ahjihah Al-Daulah Al-Khila‘fah Fi Al-Hukm Wa Al-Idarah.
⁴⁸ Abdul Qadim Zallum, Nizhām Al-Hukm Fi Al-Islām (Beirut: Dār al-Ummah, 2002).


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dābbah, is interpreted as "khāliḍah and his system of khilāfah". The word "ḥakama" has a similar meaning to the word "wisdom," which means to prevent stupidity or the judge as an arbiter from the disputes caused by indiscretion (Ṣād/38: 20)⁴⁹ The word ḥākim is an attribute of God that is repeated 97 times has the meaning of an expert who decides cases, and there is no doubt in his actions. Then the diversion meaning from the definitive meaning of ḥākim to the meaning of khalīfah is an ambiguous and problematic interpretation that seems forced, even though it is related to the verse bimā anzal Allāh and ḏanūr hum which was previously addressed to ahl al-kitāb.⁵⁰ Interpreting the judge as khalīfah is a constructive sign of the application of Islamic values, not a justification for the obligation of the khilāfah. Interpretation transformation is separated from the essence of truth by interpreting Allāh's law as a form of government (khalīfah). Allāh's law can mean the Quran, sunnah, ijmā' and qiyās. Likewise, the form of Islamic political government does not have to be a khilāfah.⁵¹ The idea of the caliphate comes from the texts Ibn Taymiyyah doubted and considered as nothing more than an accident, not a representation of life. The Prophet was sent to enforce God's message that social rules must be obeyed. Therefore, the success of the Prophet in politics became an indication of the importance of Islamic leadership.⁵² According to Husain Haikal, there is no standard system of government (nizām sābit) in Islam. Islam only provides a set of values and ethics (al-mabūdī' al-asāsiyyah) as the basic guideline for the principle of monotheism, the focus of sunnattulah, and the direction of equality between humans to regulate human behavior (suluk) in life and association with others (mu'amalalah). This opinion is also the same as Qamaruddin Khan's concept of the state. Although the word khalīfah is found in the Quran, it does not have a political connotation. The absence of the Quran from the concept of khilāfah is acknowledged by khilāfah activists HTI⁵³, who stated that there is no Quranic text that explicitly instructs it. Still, it shows that sharia will only be applied with the establishment of the daulah.

Second, from munāsabah between verses, the above verse strongly correlates with the verses that talk about the previous Torah and the Bible. This verse is generally valid even though the command is addressed explicitly to the Prophet. According to Ibn Abi Hātim (d. 940 AD), Verse 48 relates to Allāh's power to the Prophet to decide the case of the Jews or the scriptures with Allāh's law, as well as the

⁴⁹ Abu al-Fatah Al-Matharazi, Al-Mugharabu Fi Tartib Al-Mu’rab (Mesor: Maktabah al-Tsaqafah al-Diniyah, 2007).
⁵⁰ Burhanuddin Abi al-Hasan Ibrahim bin Umar Al-Baqā‘i, Nazmu Al-Durar Fi Tanāsab Al-Suwar Wa Al-Ayat (Kairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmi, n.d.).
⁵¹ Lufaefi Lufaefi, ‘Jumping Conlusion Tafsir: Penyimpangan Ayat-Ayat Khilafah HTI Dalam Kitab Daulah Islamiyyah,’ SANGKeP: Jurnal Kajian Sosial Keagamaan 2, no. 2 (July 25, 2019): 139–50, https://doi.org/10.20414/sangkep.v2i2.802.
⁵² Qamaruddin Khan, The Political Thought of Ibnu Taimiyah (, Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, n.d.).
⁵³ Fahmi Amhar, “Metode Menangkal Pengahncuran Islam,” Dalam Al-Wa’ıe 58, no. 5 (2005): 13–14.
prohibition of deciding cases based on lust.\textsuperscript{54} This verse was addressed to the Prophet when he faced two groups of Jews in dispute of zinā case, denying the punishment based on the Torah. After the revelation of the verse "\textit{fāhkum bainahum bimā anzal Allāh}”, the Prophet decided it according to the law in the Torah and hoped that hatred or strife would not encourage injustice.\textsuperscript{55}

Verse 48 of \textit{al-Māidah} does not nullify the law of verse 42 but as an explanation before a new legal stipulation is revealed. At-Tabari reinforces the basis of this verse that the Prophet is a judge who decides cases according to the law revealed by Allah, not based on lust as assumed by the Jews.\textsuperscript{56} Whereas verse 49 is an affirmation (\textit{ta'kid}) of the previous verse, the command to enforce Allah's law and the prohibition of disputing it. The repetition form of the verse, according to al-Biqā’i, is to make the command as most robust affirmation (\textit{gāyah al-ta'kid}). Still, some other commentators disagree with the purpose of the repetition because it was revealed to different objects. Verse 48 was related to the law of \textit{rajam} for zinā muḥšan, while verse 49 was related to blood and \textit{diyā}.\textsuperscript{58}

Verse 49 of \textit{al-Māidah} establishes the obligation to decide cases based on Allah's law, and the law's object has a general meaning. The verse \textit{fāhkum bainahum bimā anzal Allāh} assumed to abrogate the verse 42 with the sentence \textit{fāhkum bainahum aw a'rīd 'anhum} is a weak assumption because there is no strong indication (\textit{qarinah}) to prove it, even though it seems contradictory, but it does not automatically show the \textit{nāsiḥ-mansūkh}. According to Ibn' Arabi (d. 1149 AD), if verse 49 is abrogating the previous verse, then the period of \textit{asbāb al-nuzūl} of the last verse can be known certainly and must be determined as it is.\textsuperscript{59} The commentators and jurists, such as Imam al-Syāfi’ī compromise (\textit{al-jam’u baina dali’lain}), these two verses. The first verse relates to \textit{kāfir mu’āhid}, while the second verse describes the \textit{kāfir zimmī}.\textsuperscript{60}

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The interpretation of the word \textit{ha’kim} into the \textit{khilāfah} system is an interpretation without strong legitimacy in the text. The government system always develops dynamically and changes according to the conditions and demands of the times, while the principles and values are contained in the Quran. The two verses above exemplify prioritizing

\textsuperscript{54} Muhammad Abi Hātim bin Idris bin Mundzir bin Dawūd bin Mihran bin al-Handhalī Ar-Rāzī, \textit{Taṣṣīr Al-Qur’ān Al-Azhīm Munṣaddān ‘an Rasūlillah Saw Wa Al-Sahābah Wa Tābi‘Īn} (Riyad: Al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Suudiyah, 1997).

\textsuperscript{55} Muhammad al-Thahir Ibnu Asyur, \textit{Taṣṣīr Al-Tahrīr Wa Tanwīr}, 6th ed. (Tunis: Dâr al-Tunisiyyah li an-Nasyr, 1984).

\textsuperscript{56} Abi Ja‘far Muhammad bin Jarir Al-Thabari, \textit{Jami‘ Al-Bayān ‘an Takwil Al-Qur’ān} (Mesir: Dâr al-Salam, 2007).

\textsuperscript{57} Ibrahim bin Umar bin Hasan ar-Ribat bin Ali bin Abi Bakar asy-Sya’fi’i Al-Biqā’i, \textit{Nahzam Al-Durar, Vol.2, Beirút: Dār Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyyah, 1995, Hal. 479}. (Beirút: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1995).

\textsuperscript{58} Sulaiman Ibnu Umar al-Ajili Asy-Sya’fi’i, \textit{Al-Futuhat Al-Ilahiyyah: Bi Taudhihi Taṣṣīr Al-Jalalain Liddaqaqīqi Al-Khaṣīyyah, J. 4} (Beirút: Dār al-Fikr, 2003).

\textsuperscript{59} Abū Bakar Muhammad bin Abdullah Ibnu ‘Arabi, \textit{Akhām Al-Qur’ān, Vol. 3}. (Beirút: Dār al-Kutub Ilmiyyah, 2003).

\textsuperscript{60} Wahbah Zuhayliy, \textit{Al-Taṣṣīr Al-Munīr Fī Al-Aqīdah Wa Al-Syari’ah Wa Al-Manhaj, J. 5} (Beirút: Dār al-Fikr, 1991).
justice in establishing the law. If these verses are interpreted widely, they are not substantially limited to the *khilafah* system.

**The Implementation of Islamic Law as Evidence of Faith**

The authorities should not ignore the order to implement sharia in the government system. Allah SWT says:

 فلا وَزْيَكَ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ ﻛُتْبَ ﻗَوْى ﺞُرْبُ ﻦَبْيَهُ ﻷَنَّ أَنْفُسِهِمْ

Translation: "But no, by your Lord, they can have no Faith, until they make you (O Muhammad SAW) judge in all disputes between them, and find in themselves no resistance against your decisions, and accept (them) with full submission." (an-Nisâ' [4]: 65)

This verse became the ultimate argument that was very popular for the HTI group who support *khilafah*. To HTI, it refers to the obligation to apply Islamic law as a requirement of faith and Islamic standard in a specific "container" named *khilafah*. A person is called a believer when these three conditions are fulfilled. First, be willing to obey the Messenger of Allah on every matter; second, accept the decision with pleasure, graceful, and undoubtful, and third, be ready to attend to and implement the conclusion of the Prophet. An interpretation inspired by al-Nabhâni and Sayyid al-Qutb about the implementation of Islamic law (*hakîmiyah Allah*) places the *khilafah* which is bound by sharia law, as a legislator. Therefore, the government activities (*al-ḥukm*) must be oriented to Allah's law, not to the direction of *tâgut*, because it causes denying faith (*kafir*).

Through analyzing the interpretation of the verse above, historically (in terms of *asbâb al-nuzuł*), the verse has three interpretive meanings; First, the meaning of this verse was revealed regarding the dispute between a Jew and a hypocrite. A Jew tends to appoint the Prophet as a judge, while the hypocrite chose Ka'ab bin Asyraf and then *al-Nisâ'* [4]: 60 revealed. This verse is not explicitly addressed to Muslims but to the Jews and hypocrites. Second, this verse has a strong correlation of meanings to individuals and should not be transferred to a general-purpose or transformed the meaning generally. This verse was revealed in connection with a dispute between Zubair bin al-Awwam and an *Ansâr* group regarding the garden's irrigation, which made the Prophet angry. This case is closed with the decision to give Zubair rights (HR. al-Jamaah). Third, the appointment of a judge to the Prophet saw. Indicates that a fair decision is a characteristic of the judge or leader.

The difference in *asbâb al-nuzuł* verse by positioning the Prophet as the judge who decides the case should not be understood with theological arrogance and political *fiqh* arrogance or by positioning historical-sociological verses to convict a Muslim or

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61 Labib, *Tafsir Al-Wa’ie, Tafsir Ayat Pilihan Al-Wa’ie.*
judges who do not establish God's law of *kafir*. The issue of *takfir* is not an easy matter without evidence and criteria (*dawabish*) of *takfir* because the strict legal requirements and the procedures must be fulfilled. To convict a Muslim of the infidel (*takfir*) or leaving Islam is the last effort of law enforcement decided collectively by the authorized institutions belonging to the ummah and the state, not the right of individuals or groups who do not have credibility and competence. The scholars emphasized that the verdict of the infidel is determined after the fulfillment of strict conditions, such as words or actions that result in disbelief that is conducted by a *mukallaf* without any element of force (*ikrah*), emotional or mental instability, ignorance, or the absence of clear proof and the evidence, *syubhah* and *tawil* or opinion and lust unless it is clear and certain that the defendant is doing one of the causes of disbelief. First, *i'tiqad* disbelieve (*mukaffirah i'tiqadiyyah*) which is all kinds of beliefs that are contrary to the pillars of faith and deny the *qat'i* teachings of Islam (*ma'ulum fi al-din bi al-darurah*). Second, disbelief in speech (*mukaffirah qauliyah*) is every utterance that contains the proofs of *kufr*, rejection of the Islamic faith, which is a religious blasphemy. Third, disbelief in actions (*mukaffirah 'amaliyyah*) is every act that contains accurate indicators of belief and disbelief.62

Ibn Qayyim explained that judging other than Allah's law includes two kinds of *kufr*, minor and significant, depending on the judge's condition (authoritative). *Kufr al-asgar* is the judge's condition who still believes in the truth of God's law, but he turns away because of his lust. *Kufr al-Akbar* is the condition of the judge who disbelieves the obligation to judge by Allah's law by choosing another rule that is considered to be better. If the judge rejects Allah's decree and replaces it with human law, the judge has left the *millah*.63

The historical context of the obligation to judge by God's law (*fu ulaika hum al-kafirun, al-zalimun, al-fasiquin*) must be analyzed ontologically. The verse, originally related to the criminal law of murder and zinah, cannot be separated from the *jahiliyyah* political system, which tends to ignore the principle of justice and equality. Associating legal verses with the interpretation of the political system is automatically less relevant. Moreover, by leading political opinions of *da'wah salaf al-shalihi*s is an example of carelessness towards *hadi* which tends to text rationality.64

The Democratic System Contradicts the Spirit of Islam

HTI argues that the secular and *kufr* system of democracy is not by Islamic principles. Democracy was born from the secularism ideology that separates religion from life. In contrast, the Islamic system was taken from the faith Allah revealed as a guide for human beings. Determining the law in Islam does not depend on the opinion

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62 Utsman bin Muhammad Al-Khamis, *Al-Baraah Wa Al-Tahdzir Min Khathr Al-Takfîr* (Kuwait: Ghars li al-Nasyr wa al-Tauzi’, 2011).
63 Ibnu Qayyim Al-Jauziyah, *Al-Madârij Al-Sâîkin*, Juz 1 (Beirut: Dâr al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1988).
64 Khalil Abd. Karim, *Li Tathbîq Al-Syarî’ah Lâ Lil Hukm* (Alexandria Mesir: Al-Hay’ah al-‘Ammah li Maktabah al-Iskandariyah, n.d.).
of the majority or minority but the sharia arguments. In contrast, in a democratic system, the law depends on the people's voice or representatives. The democratic system is a system that has been adopted from the West and aimed to destroy the morals of Muslims. In Islam, the democratic system is more identical to worshiping humans than God.65

HTI's view is not entirely correct because democracy is a tradition of Islamic governance that teaches the rights and obligations of the people to control, supervise, advise, and criticize the leaders. Such conditions open space for the establishment of amr ma'ruf nahi al-Munkar as the main pillars of religion, prophetic mission, and faithful characteristics. On the other hand, without amr ma'ruf nahi al-Munkar, the prophetic mission will not be realized and even cause greater mafsadah, such as the appearance of authoritarian leaders, such as Namrud and Pharaoh, due to the weakness of the people to advise the authorities. A democratic system based on justice, equality, freedom, and people's supervision can systematically encourage people to report and criticize the leaders. Through the democratic system, the charged party is obliged to accept constructive critics from the people because it is the characteristic of a healthy country that can provide physical and spiritual welfare to its people. The constructive advice and critics are evidence of early Islamic leadership, and the information comes from the heart and sincerity of the heart in implementing the mandate of God. This kind of openness is in line with the statements of al-Khulafa' al-Rasyidun. Allah SWT said in explaining the principle of democracy:

\[ \text{Translation: } \ldots \text{and consult them in the affairs. Then when you have taken a decision, put your trust in Allah. Certainly, Allah loves those who put their trust} \]

\[ (\text{Ali Imran [3]: 159}) \]

The principles of democracy (syurā) are generically compatible with the universal values of Islam. However, it is still problematic on the implementation level due to sovereignty and guarantees of unrestricted freedom. The meeting point of democracy in Islam lies in the substance of democracy as a filtering tool to produce fair and trustworthy political leaders, even though the reality is still far from al-Khulafa' al-Rasyidun. The principle of leadership is not only loved by the people but owning the characteristics of integrity (siddiq), credibility (amanah), capability (fataanah), and transparency (tablīg). The democratization process occurred in the era of Abū Bakr and 'Umar with the changes in election patterns. 'Umar bin Khattab did ijtihad by dividing power into three parts, namely khalifah, ahl al-hall wa al-'Aqd, and qādi. At the same time, the three powers were previously under the control of the Prophet Muhammad. Does that mean every change and improvement is considered a bid'ah and a kufr system? Of course not, because political reform through a democratic

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65 HTI, Manifesto Hizbut Tahrir Untuk Indonesia (Indonesia, Khilafah, Dan Penyatuan Kembali Dunia Islam) (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2009).
system in the area of *ijtiham*, not the area of *usuli*. Dichotomizing democracy and the *khilafah* is not appropriate. It is more suitable if democracy vis a vis theocracy, while the *khilafah* system is different from the two. The *khilafah* system contains elements of democracy and some elements of theocracy. The scholars agreed to reject the rule of law being handed over to the people because it is God's prerogative.66

Rejecting all elements of democracy is as inappropriate as judging them with Islamic parameters because democracy is a foreign term that needs to be critically studied. It is not considered haram, dirty, kufr, *tasyabbuh bi al-kuffar*, or others. The problem of *khilafah* and democracy needs to be appropriately put. The *khilafah* is a distinctive and unique Islamic political system that needs to be supported by a political strategy to exist and develop. Nevertheless, that does not mean the existence of everything in the *khilafah*. Even though the Caliph had great authority in the *khilafah* system, many historical facts are considered the sources of slander problems for Muslims due to the despotic Caliph. The democratic system is more open to freedom of expression for the *khilafah* da'wah group (HTI) than anti-democratic Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Another inappropriate statement is that if *khilafah* were established, the people's problems would be resolved. It is an absurd dogmatic statement and forced assumption. It is more appropriate to prepare the quality of generation mentally and spiritually.

Islam does not inherit standard rules regarding ready-to-use political issues such as faith aspects. The Prophet saw himself rarely promoting to his companions to establish a state even though it is inseparable because various aspects of law and people's lives are related to the state.67 Likewise, the system of government, whether *khilafah* or the other forms, must follow the current social and political realities. Muslims are obliged to interpret the politics of power as a power of Islamic knowledge and responsibility, even though it triggers an intense political-theological debate that causes internal conflicts and produces the various sects and schools of thought. This debate is a political responsibility as well as the mandate of the Quran to promote what is right and prevent what is wrong or called *hisbah*.68

**Conclusion**

The power politics, based on al-Wa'ie's interpretation of the *khilafah* verses (*al-Baqarah* [2]:30, *Sād* [38]:26, *al-Nisā'* [4]:59, and *al-Mā'idah* [5]:49) as a proposition the validity of the obligation to uphold the Islamic government system, is a scripturalist, textualist, and fundamentalist interpretation that is far from the understanding of the authoritative scholar's majority. From Al-Wa'ie's performance, it is understood that the concept of the *khilafah* is interpreted in a sectarian perspective as a leader or successor,

66 Tohir Bawazir, *Jalan Tengah Demokrasi Antara Fundamentalisme Dan Sekularisme* (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2015).
67 Dhiauddin Rais, *Teori Politik Islam* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2001).
68 MOOSA, Ebrahim; ROBERTS, Nicholas, “Expressions of Political Quietism in Islamic History,” *Political Quietism in Islam: Sunni and Shi’i Practice and Thought*, 2019, 33.
not in a universal perspective as a mandate that closely relates to the territory of power. The framework for interpreting the *khilāfah* by positioning the text of the Qur’an as a legal basis should not be understood as absolute and contradictory to the democratic system. Power politics (*khilāfah*) in the context of the obligation to obey, follow Islamic law, and *amr ma'rūf nahi al-munkār* does not mean that it is obligatory to establish the *khilāfah* form, as long as the substantial Islamic values such as justice, equality, freedom, democracy do not break the values and principles of Islamic teachings.

The political interpretation of HTI has raised radicalism, exclusivism, and authoritarianism. The intervention of ideological reason in interpreting the *khilāfah* tends to cause a revivalist-sectarian arrangement. The conception of the *khilāfah* is normative and far from the validity of absolute truth and representation of the ideal territory of the state. The *khilāfah* is a unique leadership system and civilizational institution. To interpret the *khilāfah* verses to their original meanings (*maqāsid*) is the right step to suppress the *khilāfah*’s ideological political thought in Indonesia. The characteristic of HTI's rigid and literal understanding does not only impact non-parallelism with the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as *Dār al-Miṣāq* but also affects the harmonization of moderate Islamic politics in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, which is substantially *Dār al-'Ahd* (state of agreement) in which state sovereignty is based on the monotheism of the Almighty God One and the leaders and the people believe and fear Allah SWT.

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