ACCOUNTING ACCRUALS AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN EUROPE

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Abstract:
We investigate whether the positive relation between accounting accruals and information asymmetry documented for U.S. stock markets also holds for European markets, considered as a whole and at the country level. This research is relevant because this relation is likely to be affected by differences in accounting standards used by companies for financial reporting, in the traditional use of the banking system or capital markets for firm financing, in legal systems and cultural environment. We find that in European stock markets discretionary accruals are positively related with the Corwin and Schultz high-low spread estimator used as a proxy for information asymmetry. Our results suggest that the earnings management component of accruals outweighs the informational component, but the significance of the relation varies across countries. Further, such association tends to be stronger for firms with the highest levels of positive discretionary accruals. Consistent with the evidence provided by the authors, our results also suggest that the high-low spread estimator is more efficient than the closing bid-ask spread when analysing the impact of information quality on information asymmetry.

Keywords: Information quality, information asymmetry, discretionary accruals, high-low spread estimator
JEL Classification: G14, M41, D80

1. Introduction

There is a widespread consensus among academics, practitioners, regulators, managers, investors and other agents on the importance of regulating the publication of information by public companies in order to improve financial reporting quality. Several works analyse potential implications of information quality, for example on the cost of capital and information asymmetry. In this paper, we investigate the association between information quality and information asymmetry for a large sample of European stock markets, using the Corwin and Schultz (2012) high-low spread estimator.

While based on different methodologies, proxies and samples, there are some studies on the relation between earnings quality and information asymmetry. In the case of the U.S. markets, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) find that poor earnings quality exacerbates information asymmetry.

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asymmetry suggesting that poor earnings quality offers an informational advantage for informed traders and Jayaraman (2008) also finds evidence of a negative relation between information quality and information asymmetry. The relevance of this study stems from the interest in investigating the pervasiveness across markets and time of the relation between accruals as an indicator of information quality and information asymmetry despite differences in factors that are expected to affect this relation. Given that IFRS, which are mandatory in the European Union, are based on principles and U.S. GAAP are based on rules, different accounting procedures are likely to affect the quality of disclosed information and thus the impact on information asymmetry. Once the relation holds in U.S. markets we analyse European markets as a whole and differences across European countries. There are a number of factors that are expected to affect the level of accounting accruals used by firms and its relation with information asymmetry. Traditionally, U.S. companies tend to rely more on capital markets for financing and European companies on the banking system. Even in Europe, companies are subject to different legal systems, operate in specific cultural environments and their securities are traded in markets with their own microstructure characteristics.

Prior research documents several links between earnings quality and information asymmetry. For example Brown and Hillegeist (2007) find that better information quality reduces information asymmetry by increasing uninformed trading and reducing the likelihood that investors trade on private information. Bhattacharya et al. (2012) analyse the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity mediated by information asymmetry. Both studies suggest that poor earnings quality produces higher information asymmetry. These findings are consistent with the results of Easley and O’Hara (2004) that poor public information implies an informational advantage for informed investors because of their private information, which increases the risk to uniformed investors of holding the stock and they demand a higher stock return.

At first we may think that information asymmetry is only a theoretical concept without practical implications. However, information asymmetry is widely used in many economic and financial areas. Information asymmetry is expected to increase the cost of capital because in microstructure models, asymmetric information between buyers and sellers tends to reduce liquidity in the market for firm shares, implying that firms must issue capital at a discount (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). In addition, recent research suggests that, except for perfect capital markets, information asymmetry is positively related to the cost of capital (Armstrong et al., 2011; Lambert et al., 2012; Bhattacharya et al., 2012).

Standard setters choose accounting standards taking into account the quality of financial information and its impact on information asymmetry. In a sample of German firms that switch from German Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to either IAS or U.S. GAAP, which is thought to represent a change in financial reporting quality, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find evidence of a reduction in the level of information asymmetry.

Information asymmetry is also a concern because of the decision about the optimal level of market transparency. Market transparency is related to the ability of market participants to observe information about the trading process. Prior literature suggests that informed investors prefer less transparent trading systems while uninformed investors prefer more market transparency (Madhavan, 2000). In a less transparent market uninformed investors require a higher return because of the adverse selection problem that arises from trading with informed traders, but informed trading makes prices more informative, reducing the risk premium required by uninformed investors (Easley and O’Hara, 2004).
Trading costs are also affected by information asymmetry because with more informed trading market makers increase the adverse selection costs component of spread to recover the losses suffered in trading with informed investors (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985).

The quality of public information is expected to affect information asymmetry. Market microstructure models posit that investors differ on the quantity and quality of the information they possess and that information asymmetry among market participants and consequent adverse selection arises when some investors have better information than others about a firm.

Abnormal accruals have been used to assess information quality. If abnormal accruals are the outcome of managerial discretionary choices, which are expected to affect negatively the quality of public information, then high abnormal accruals imply that informed investors get an informational advantage because of their private information or superior ability to process public information, thus increasing information asymmetry among market participants. Prior studies found evidence that sophisticated investors profit from trading in the stock of firms with high accruals, which is considered to reflect poor public information (Hirshleifer et al., 2011). However, we must emphasize that abnormal accruals can also be used by managers to communicate their private information about firm performance (Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2011).

Several proxies have been used to assess earnings quality (Schipper and Vincent, 2003; Dechow et al., 2010; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2011 provide an analysis of a number of those measures). One set of those measures is based on time-series properties of earnings such as earnings persistence and predictability. Another set of measures relies on the volatility of earnings or accruals relative to the volatility of cash flows. Two additional measures are abnormal accruals and accruals quality. The relevance of each measure must be evaluated in the context of a specific decision model (Dechow et al., 2010). For example earnings persistence and earnings predictability should be applied when forecasting earnings based on current earnings. In this study we use a metric measure that is expected to assess earnings management activities, following the prevailing research trend that associates high abnormal accruals with more managerial discretionary choices. Discretionary accruals have been widely employed to assess earnings management activities, thus in our study we use a version of the modified Jones model, Dechow et al. (1995), with lagged return-on-assets proposed by Kothari et al. (2005).

Regarding the proxies for information asymmetry, the adverse selection component of spread is used by Bhattacharya et al. (2012) to measure information asymmetry, following the estimation procedure proposed by Huang and Stoll (1996). Another proxy for information asymmetry is the probability of informed-based trading (PIN) (Easley et al., 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2012). We had to overcome an additional difficulty in choosing the approach to measure information asymmetry because recent research uses intraday data based measures that are not available for most of the companies in our sample. The Corwin and Schultz (2012) high-low spread estimator was applied because these authors found empirical evidence of a similar performance of the spread estimator as compared to alternative measures based on high-frequency data for U.S. markets.

Based on a sample that includes firms from 18 European countries, 17 European and Monetary Union countries and the United Kingdom for the period from 2003 to 2011, we find that information quality affects information asymmetry among market participants. Our results are consistent with the prediction that poor or less public information implies
more information asymmetry. In our tests information quality is measured by discretionary accruals and the high-low spread estimator is applied as a proxy for information asymmetry. We find evidence of a positive relation between discretionary accruals and the spread and that such relation holds even after controlling for factors that are considered to affect the spread. In addition, we find that the impact on information asymmetry is stronger for the lower levels of information quality which is consistent with the results of Bhattacharya et al. (2013) for U.S. firms. These results highlight the importance of improving financial reporting quality in order to reduce information asymmetry in European stock markets. In a robustness test, we find weaker results when the closing bid-ask spread is used instead of the high-low spread estimator as a proxy for information asymmetry.

This work adds to extensive research on financial reporting quality and information asymmetry in several ways. Bhattacharya et al. (2013) and Jayaraman (2008) analyse this association in U.S. markets, while we use information in European stock markets, more specifically for 18 European countries, 17 European Monetary Union countries and the United Kingdom. We find evidence of a positive relation between information quality and information asymmetry after controlling for variables that influence information asymmetry.

Our second contribution consists in suggesting that accruals may not be a good information quality indicator when analysing the specific relation with information asymmetry because managers can use abnormal accruals for earnings management or as a mean to communicate private information.

Our third contribution is the innovation in applying a methodology based on the Corwin and Schultz (2012) high-low spread estimator to test the impact of information quality on information asymmetry. Our results suggest that the high-low spread estimator can be a valuable alternative to the closing bid-ask spread for markets where intraday data is not available.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 exhibits a brief literature review and develops the hypotheses analysed in the study. Section 3 describes the proxies for information quality, information asymmetry and the specifications of the empirical model. Section 4 presents sample selection procedures and sample characteristics. Section 5 documents some descriptive statistics and reports the results of the empirical tests. Concluding remarks and suggestions for future work are provided in Section 6.

2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

Our research is motivated by the debate about whether earnings quality affects information asymmetry in European stock markets. Using data on U.S. firms, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) and Jayaraman (2008) provide empirical evidence on the association between measures of earnings quality and measures of information asymmetry, reporting a positive association between poor earnings quality and high levels of information asymmetry. In European markets, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) use a sample of German firms to investigate the impact of changes in regulatory environment on information asymmetry. They find a reduction in the level of information asymmetry for firms switching from German GAAP to either IAS or U.S. GAAP.

The association between earnings quality and information asymmetry can be explained by market microstructure theory where poor or less public information is considered to increase information risk (Aslan et al., 2011) and implies an informational advantage.
of informed investors relative to liquidity traders. Such advantage arises because informed traders have access to private information or because of their superior ability to process information. The consequences of this informational advantage are empirically documented in Hirshleifer et al. (2011), where sophisticated investors trade actively on the stock of firms with poor earnings quality in order to profit from their informational advantage. Moreover, given that market makers must be rewarded from their expected losses when trading with informed investors, if the fraction of informed investors on the market increases, then market makers increase the adverse selection component of spread. Thus, this component of the spread is considered as an indicator of the level of information asymmetry among market participants.

Recent studies measure information asymmetry using the closing bid-ask spread (Chae, 2005; Jayaraman, 2008) intraday data bid-ask spread (Armstrong et al., 2011) and trade data based constructs, namely the price impact of trade (Bhattacharya et al., 2013) and the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) (Jayaraman, 2008; Mohanram and Rajgopal, 2009; Aslan et al., 2011). The price impact of trade measures the magnitude of quote revisions made by the market maker after a trade. The Probability of Informed Trading is positively related to the portion of informed investors present in the market.

As regards earnings quality, several proxies have been employed. We must emphasize that earnings quality is a latent variable that is not directly observable, but it is rather inferred from a number of measures or proxies, including earnings persistence (Dechow et al., 2010); earnings predictability (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2011); smoothness (Jayaraman, 2008); abnormal accruals (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005); and accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). See, for example (Schipper and Vincent, 2003; Dechow et al., 2010; Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2011) for a detailed description of several of these measures.

In our study we use abnormal accruals as a proxy for information quality. We employ the expression abnormal accruals and discretionary accruals interchangeably even if discretionary accruals seem more associated with earnings management. Discretionary accruals have been employed as an indicator of earnings quality to study the relation between the quality of financial reporting and information asymmetry (Bhattacharya et al., 2013; Bhattacharya et al., 2012). Another study that uses discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings quality in a different context is Francis et al. (2005) that investigate the impact of earnings quality on the cost of capital.

While for most of prior research higher abnormal accruals indicate poor earnings quality resulting from earnings management activities there is an alternative view where abnormal accruals are used by managers to communicate their private information about firm performance (Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2011; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2011). Assuming that for a group of firms the earnings management component outweighs the informational component this implies poor public information and higher information asymmetry among market participants, resulting in a positive association between abnormal accruals and information asymmetry. If the inverse relation holds we expect to observe a negative relation between abnormal accruals and information asymmetry. Assuming a sample with both types of firms, the statistical relation between abnormal accruals and information asymmetry may be negligible.

In short, given the theoretical insights presented above and the prevailing empirical evidence, both relating poor information quality with higher levels of information asymmetry, we formalize the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Information quality is negatively related to the level of information asymmetry in European stock markets.

In addition, we investigate if the relation between discretionary accruals and high-low spread is linear or non-linear. Bhattacharya et al. (2013) document a u-shaped association between discretionary accruals and information asymmetry where both large positive and large negative discretionary accruals are associated with higher levels of information asymmetry. While using a different proxy for earnings quality, Jayaraman (2008) also find a u-shaped association between earnings quality and information asymmetry. Thus, we posit the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: The positive relation between discretionary accruals and information asymmetry is stronger for larger positive discretionary accruals.

Hypothesis 3: The positive relation between absolute values of discretionary accruals and information asymmetry is stronger for larger negative discretionary accruals.

3. Proxies and Empirical Model

3.1 Proxies for information quality

In our model discretionary accruals are considered an indicator of information quality. We obtain discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model with lagged return-on-assets proposed by Kothari et al. 2005.

To estimate discretionary accruals we begin with total accruals for firm \( i \) in year \( t \) defined as,

\[
TA_{i,t} = \Delta CA_{i,t} - \Delta CL_{i,t} - \Delta Cash_{i,t} + \Delta STDEBT_{i,t} - DEPN_{i,t}
\]  

(1)

Where \( \Delta CA \) is the change in current assets, \( \Delta CL \) is the change in current liabilities, \( \Delta Cash \) is the change in cash, \( \Delta STDEBT \) represents the change in short term debt and \( DEPN \) is the depreciation and amortization expense.

Using firm-year observations on total accruals we estimated cross-sectional regressions at the industry level.

\[
TAcc_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \left( \frac{1}{\text{Assets}_{i,t-1}} \right) + \alpha_2 \left( \Delta Sales_{i,t} - \Delta AR_{i,t} \right) + \alpha_3 PPE_{i,t} + \alpha_4 ROA_{i,t-1} + e_{i,t}
\]  

(2)

Where \( TAcc_{i,t} \) is total accruals scaled by lagged total assets, \( \Delta Sales \) is the change in sales scaled by lagged total assets (\( \text{Assets}_{i,t-1} \)), \( \Delta AR \) is the change in accounts receivable scaled by lagged total assets, \( PPE \) is net property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets and \( ROA \) represents return on assets in period \( t-1 \).

As in the modified Jones model with the Kothari contribution, discretionary accruals are defined as the residuals of Equation 2. These residuals represent the component of accruals left after controlling for firm performance, firm economic activity and investment in Plant, Property and Equipment. Such component of accruals is likely to be associated with manager’s discretionary choices.
3.2 Proxies for information asymmetry

We measure information asymmetry using the spread estimator developed by Corwin and Schultz (2012) that is based on daily high and low prices.

Recent research on market microstructure uses information asymmetry measures estimated at the transaction level, using high frequency data. For example, Bhattacharya et al. (2012) use intraday information on trades to capture the adverse selection component of spread. However, for most of the European firms in our sample databases with such type of data are not available, thus the Corwin and Schultz (2012) high-low spread estimator was applied. These authors argue that the estimator can be used both with daily or intraday data and found empirical evidence of a similar performance of the spread estimator as compared to alternative measures based on high-frequency data for U.S. markets. Additionally, they suggest that this estimator can be a valuable alternative to the closing bid-ask spread for markets where intraday data is not available.

We measure information asymmetry as the adverse selection component of the spread. In a robustness test we also use the closing relative bid-ask spread. In order to obtain the adverse selection component of spread we perform a regression approach with control variables that capture the order processing costs and the inventory costs components of the spread.

The spread estimator is based on the insight that the sum of the price ranges over two consecutive single days reflects two day’s volatility and twice the spread, while the price range over one two-day period reflects two day’s volatility and one spread.

The spread estimator uses the high-to-low ratio for a single two-day period and the high-to-low ratios for two consecutive single days, \( \frac{H_{12}}{L_{12}}, \frac{H_1}{L_1}, \frac{H_2}{L_2} \).

The high-low spread estimator is given by,

\[
S = \frac{2(e^\alpha - 1)}{1 + e^\alpha}, \quad \text{where } S \text{ is the relative spread}, \quad \alpha = \sqrt{\frac{3\beta - \sqrt{\beta}}{3 - 2\sqrt{\beta}}} - \sqrt{\frac{\gamma}{3 - 2\sqrt{\beta}}},
\]

\[
\gamma = \left[ \ln \left( \frac{H_{t,t+1}^0}{L_{t,t+1}^0} \right) \right]^2, \quad \beta = \left[ \ln \left( \frac{H_{t,t}^0}{L_{t,t}^0} \right) \right]^2 + \left[ \ln \left( \frac{H_{t,t+1}^0}{L_{t,t+1}^0} \right) \right]^2,
\]

\( H_t^0 \) and \( L_t^0 \) are the observed high and low stock prices for day \( t \),

\[
H_t^0 = H_t^A \left( 1 + \frac{S}{2} \right), \quad L_t^0 = L_t^A \left( 1 - \frac{S}{2} \right)
\]

\( H_t^A \) (\( L_t^A \)) denoting the actual high (low) stock price on day \( t \).

Further adjustments are proposed for overnight price changes, infrequently traded stocks and negative high-low spread estimates. We take into account these adjustments in our empirical tests.
3.3 Model specification

In order to ensure comparability with U.S. empirical results, we follow as close as possible the methodology and variables used in those studies. However, there is a major difference regarding the proxy for information asymmetry, because there are no databases with intraday data for most of our sample. In this section we develop the empirical model used to investigate the impact of information quality on information asymmetry. We use discretionary accruals (DISC_ACC) to assess information quality and the high-low spread estimator for information asymmetry. Prior studies on information asymmetry propose a number of well known variables to explain the spread which leads us to the following equation,

\[
HL_{-S_{it}} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{DISC} \_ \text{ACC}_{it} + \alpha_2 \text{TURN}_{it} + \alpha_3 \text{ILLIQ}_{it} + \alpha_4 \text{SIZE}_{it} + \alpha_5 \text{ANALYSTS}_{it} + \alpha_6 \text{INV} \_ \text{PRI}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}
\]

\[
\text{DISC} \_ \text{ACC}_{it} = |\text{DISC} \_ \text{ACC}_{it}|
\]

\[
\text{HL}_{-S_{it}} \text{ is obtained from the daily high-low spread estimator } S, \text{ defined above. We compute the annual average of the estimator by,}
\]

\[
H_{-S_{it}} = \frac{1}{n_{it}} \sum_{day=1}^{n_{it}} S_{i,day}
\]

Where \( n_{it} \) is the number of days in year \( t \) and \( i \) refers to the firm for which the spread estimator is available.

\( \text{DISC} \_ \text{ACC}_{it} \) is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, previously defined.

Prior empirical studies find higher levels of information asymmetry for firms with poor informational environment (Bhattacharya et al., 2013). If higher discretionary accruals indicate poor public information then a positive sign is expected for the \( \text{DISC} \_ \text{ACC} \) (absolute values) regression coefficient.

Equation 3 includes several control variables. Market microstructure models propose three components of the spread: order processing costs, inventory costs and adverse selection. As we intend to use the adverse selection component to represent information asymmetry, we must remove the remaining components. To take into account the order processing costs component we include turnover, \( \text{TURN}_{it} \), following Bollen et al. (2004), Acker et al. (2002). Turnover is defined as the ratio of shares traded over year \( t \), divided by the total number of shares outstanding. It is expected that these costs decrease with turnover, implying an expected negative regression coefficient.

To account for the inventory holding component we follow Amihud (2002) and Hasbrouck (2009) that propose a measure for illiquidity defined as daily unsigned stock return divided by trading volume. This measure is highly related to the inventory component of spread, because more illiquidity increases the risk of losses in the stock inventory position (Jayaraman, 2008), so it is expected that more illiquidity means higher spread, leading to a predicted positive regression coefficient. In the model the measure of illiquidity is given by the following annual average,

\[
\text{ILLIQ}_{i,t} = \frac{1}{n_{i,t}} \sum_{day=1}^{n_{i,t}} \left| \frac{R_{i,day}}{Vol_{i,day}} \right|
\]
Where \( |R_{i,\text{day}}| \) is the absolute value of daily stock return for firm \( i \) and \( Vol_{i,\text{day}} \) is the firm \( i \) daily trading volume in euros.

\( SIZE_{i,t} \) and \( ANALYSTS_{i,t} \) denote respectively the logarithm of market capitalization and analyst coverage, measured by total number of annual analyst estimates. These indicators have been included in several works as proxies for information asymmetry. Chae (2005) argues that larger firms and firms followed by more analysts tend to produce more information and to disclose such information faster, then reducing information asymmetry. Moreover, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) suggest that size and analyst coverage are associated with both quantity and quality of information production in financial markets. In short, larger firms and firms with more analyst estimates tend to exhibit lower levels of information asymmetry, resulting in an expected negative regression coefficient for both variables.

\( INV_{PRI_{i,t}} \) which represents the inverse of stock price is used by Jayaraman (2008) as an explanatory variable for spread. This variable is used in microstructure models to take into account the effect of the minimum tick in percentage spreads. Firms with lower stock prices tend to have larger relative bid-ask spreads, implying an expected positive regression coefficient for the inverse of stock price.

4. Data and Sample Selection

Our sample includes firms from 18 European countries, 17 EMU countries and the UK for the period from 2003 to 2011. While the main database is Thomson Datastream we collect the number of analysts providing earnings per share estimates for the next financial year from I/B/E/S.

We include in our sample firm-year observations if their financial reports are based on IFRS accounting standards. There is a broad consensus in favour of the benefits of IFRS adoption and thus many firms voluntary adopt these standards. For example Albu et al. (2013) and Damian et al. (2013) provide evidence on such stakeholders’ preferences in several European countries. Therefore, we do not include in our sample years before 2003 because most of firms’ financial reports were prepared under local standards. While the mandatory IFRS adoption for listed firms in the European Union was made effective from 2005, many firms voluntary adopt IFRS few years before. Thus, in order to ensure that only firm-year observations following IFRS were included in estimations we use a filter when running our empirical tests. This filter relies on the Thomson Reuters Datastream key item Accounting Standards Followed where IFRS has the code 23.

The total number of firms in the initial sample is 14,411, but the distribution by country is highly variable, with a maximum of 5,732 firms for the UK and the minimum number of 21 firms for Malta.

For most companies in the initial sample many variables needed to perform the empirical study are not available in the Thomson Datastream database. We define as a minimum criterion that companies have at least three full years of data. This restriction led to a considerable reduction in the number of firms in the sample. The total number of firms fell from 14,411 to 1,999 and for example from 5,732 to 882 in the UK. Another result of this restriction is that four countries are excluded from the sample: Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia.

After applying of the procedure mentioned above the sample includes 17,991 firm-year observations. Additionally, we exclude financial firms (two-digit SIC code 60 to 69) and
utilities (two-digit SIC code 49) because they are subject to specific regulations, reducing firm-year observations to 14,553.

Each firm must have all the necessary variables for estimating spread regressions, resulting in a final sample including 11,652 firm observations, as reported in Table 1. It is worth noting that in the final sample the most representative country is the UK with 41.2% of the observations, followed by France with 16.9% and Germany with 12.4%.

Table 1  |  Sample Firms and Firm-Observations by Country

| Country       | Number of firms | Firm-year observations |
|---------------|-----------------|------------------------|
| Austria       | 26              | 199                    |
| Belgium       | 49              | 387                    |
| Estonia       | 5               | 26                     |
| Finland       | 81              | 655                    |
| France        | 249             | 1,972                  |
| Germany       | 210             | 1,443                  |
| Greece        | 5               | 45                     |
| Ireland       | 23              | 191                    |
| Italy         | 83              | 637                    |
| Netherlands   | 72              | 598                    |
| Portugal      | 29              | 220                    |
| Slovenia      | 12              | 72                     |
| Spain         | 52              | 411                    |
| United Kingdom| 721             | 4,796                  |
| Total         | 1,617           | 11,652                 |

Notes: This table provides the number of firms and firm-year observations by country included in the study. The sample contains the European Monetary Union and the United Kingdom firms with accounting and market data available on the Thomson Datastream. Financial firms (two-digit SIC codes 60 to 69) and utilities (two-digit SIC code 49) are excluded from the sample. In order to be considered a firm must have at least three years of full data over the sampling period. Firm-year observations with missing regression variables are also eliminated.
Source: authors’ calculations

Our full sample is also categorized into various subsamples. A subsample consists of firm-year observations with positive discretionary accruals. Firms are also ranked each year based on discretionary accruals and assigned to quintiles, creating the large positive discretionary accruals group (top quintile) and the large negative discretionary accruals group (bottom quintile).
5. **Empirical Results**

5.1 **Descriptive statistics**

Table 2 details the distribution of the variables used to measure information asymmetry, information quality and other explanatory variables for information asymmetry. To mitigate the problem of extreme outliers, the variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentile.

| Variable   | Mean    | Median  | Standard deviation | Minimum  | Maximum  |
|------------|---------|---------|--------------------|----------|----------|
| HL_S       | 0.014399| 0.012087| 0.008540           | 0.003474 | 0.071859 |
| BA_S       | 0.026017| 0.012351| 0.038236           | 0.000410 | 0.298223 |
| DISC_ACC   | 0.000312| 0.000706| 0.076124           | -0.355496| 0.383541 |
| SIZE (103 €)| 2,339,897| 264,136 | 7,518,510          | 2,226.55 | 67,171,795|
| ILLIQ      | 0.000883| 1.28E-05| 0.003733           | 7.7E-10  | 0.056706 |
| TURN       | 0.685468| 0.433652| 0.731090           | 0.000392 | 4.711282 |
| ANALYSTS   | 7.996567| 5.0     | 7.549299           | 1.0      | 54.0     |
| INV_PRI    | 0.103291| 0.027973| 0.241783           | 0.000479 | 3.039438 |

Notes: Variable definitions: HL_S = annual variable defined as the average of Corwin and Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread estimator, based on high and low daily prices. BA_S = closing bid-ask spread. DISC_ACC = discretionary accruals given by the Kothari *et al.* (2005) version of the Jones Model. TURN = ratio of shares traded over the year divided by the total number of shares outstanding. ILLIQ = annual average of daily unsigned stock return divided by trading volume. SIZE = market capitalization in € thousands. ANALYSTS = number of analysts for each firm. INV_PRI = inverse of stock price.

Source: authors’ calculations

In our results, the mean HL spread estimator for European markets and for the period from 2003 to 2011 is 0.014399 when negative spread estimates are set to zero. Using a similar adjustment, Corwin and Schultz (2012) report a mean HL spread estimator 0.0210 for the U.S. markets and for the period from 1993 to 2006.

Table 3 describes mean and standard deviation of the main variables by country. The analysis of the mean values by country shows some degree of variability in these distribution parameters. For example, the maximum value of the mean spread estimator (0.019302 - Estonia) is approximately twice the mean spread estimator for Slovenia (0.009594). In the case of the variable DISC_ACC the mean value of positive discretionary accruals is 0.050983 and it is -0.051756 for negative discretionary accruals. These means have similar absolute values resulting in a negligible mean discretionary accruals of 0.000312.
### Table 3 | Descriptive Statistics by Country

| Country     | HL_S Mean (Stand.Dev.) | BA_S Mean (Stand.Dev.) | ABS(DISC_ACC) Mean (Stand.Dev.) | ASSETS (10^3 €) Mean (Stand.Dev.) |
|-------------|------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Austria     | 0.012365 (0.006278)    | 0.014170 (0.025695)    | 0.051994 (0.051374)             | 2,554,796 (4,452,267)           |
| Belgium     | 0.012098 (0.006047)    | 0.011969 (0.012950)    | 0.046590 (0.050959)             | 2,591,756 (8,595,257)           |
| Estonia     | 0.019302 (0.010421)    | 0.025401 (0.024364)    | 0.045857 (0.054741)             | 343,007 (612,497)               |
| Finland     | 0.013042 (0.007658)    | 0.016851 (0.025867)    | 0.045901 (0.047826)             | 1,843,504 (4,407,964)           |
| France      | 0.012896 (0.007392)    | 0.016763 (0.026750)    | 0.044418 (0.049177)             | 5,233,559 (13,900,263)          |
| Germany     | 0.014597 (0.006259)    | 0.021826 (0.039015)    | 0.057468 (0.059904)             | 6,353,251 (23,546,918)          |
| Greece      | 0.013641 (0.004310)    | 0.010164 (0.006495)    | 0.033290 (0.032334)             | 2,173,534 (2,304,248)           |
| Ireland     | 0.016183 (0.010594)    | 0.022289 (0.029035)    | 0.044204 (0.043503)             | 1,443,695 (1,934,641)           |
| Italy       | 0.012449 (0.004211)    | 0.013936 (0.017368)    | 0.039003 (0.040458)             | 4,123,863 (12,501,847)          |
| Netherlands | 0.013017 (0.008108)    | 0.015211 (0.030178)    | 0.048506 (0.045821)             | 7,115,506 (25,401,515)          |
| Portugal    | 0.013293 (0.008164)    | 0.015846 (0.027866)    | 0.044548 (0.044760)             | 2,281,362 (3,130,706)           |
| Slovenia    | 0.009594 (0.005227)    | 0.023081 (0.022130)    | 0.036049 (0.037294)             | 804,948 (633,057)               |
| Spain       | 0.012696 (0.005232)    | 0.010167 (0.020933)    | 0.048802 (0.050759)             | 6,060,023 (15,741,372)          |
| United Kingdom | 0.015867 (0.010012) | 0.037883 (0.045142) | 0.056533 (0.062481) | 2,104,148 (11,061,922) |

Notes: Variable definitions: HL_S = annual variable defined as the average of Corwin and Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread estimator, based on high and low daily prices. BA_S = closing bid-ask spread. DISC_ACC = discretionary accruals given by the Kothari et al. (2005) version of the Jones Model. ASSETS = total assets.

Source: authors' calculations

Table 4 contains the correlations between the variables included in our model. Our dependent variable is the high-low spread estimator that is negatively correlated with firm size, meaning that larger firms exhibit lower levels of spread. Illiquidity and inverse of stock price are positively correlated with spread, consistent with higher spreads for illiquid stocks.
and stocks with low prices. We also find a significant correlation between the independent variables firm size, turnover and the number of analysts which may influence the explanatory power of the variables in the regression model.

Table 4 | Correlation of Variables

| Variable         | HL_S   | ABS (DISC_ACC) | TURN   | ILLIQ  | LOG (SIZE) | ANALYSTS | INV_PRI  |
|------------------|--------|----------------|--------|--------|------------|----------|----------|
| HL_S             | 1.0000 | 0.0918         | 0.0104 | 0.2462 | -0.3541    | -0.1389  | 0.2089   |
| ABS (DISC_ACC)   | 0.0918 | 1.0000         | 0.0015 | 0.0453 | -0.1528    | -0.1494  | 0.0213   |
| TURN             | 0.0104 | 0.0015         | 1.0000 | -0.1584| 0.4222     | 0.4811   | -0.1069  |
| ILLIQ            | 0.2462 | 0.0453         | -0.1584| 1.0000 | -0.2002    | -0.1539  | 0.3426   |
| LOG (SIZE)       | -0.3541| -0.1528        | 0.4222 | 1.0000 | -0.2002    | -0.1539  | 0.3426   |
| ANALYSTS         | -0.1389| -0.1494        | 0.4811 | -0.1539| 0.7752     | 1.0000   | -0.1478  |
| INV_PRI          | 0.2089 | 0.0213         | -0.1069| 0.3426 | -0.1641    | -0.1478  | 1.0000   |

Notes: Variable definitions: HL_S = annual variable defined as the average of Corwin and Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread estimator, based on high and low daily prices. ABS (DISC_ACC) = absolute value of discretionary accruals given by the Kothari et al. (2005) version of the Jones Model. TURN = ratio of shares traded over the year divided by the total number of shares outstanding. ILLIQ = annual average of daily unsigned stock return divided by trading volume. SIZE = logarithm of market capitalization. ANALYSTS = number of analysts for each firm. INV_PRI = inverse of stock price.

Source: authors’ calculations

5.2 Regression analysis using the high-low spread estimator

In the empirical tests we use panel data because combining time series of cross-sections increases the number of observations may offer a solution to the problem of bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity and reveal dynamics that are difficult to analyse with cross-sectional data.

In our panel data estimation we use both fixed time and cross-section effects at the firm level. To decide between fixed and random effects we run a Hausman test where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is the random effects. Since the null hypothesis is rejected, the random effects model is not appropriate and instead the fixed effects model must be used.

Based on Market Microstructure insights both the spread and the proxy for illiquidity are affected by a number of unobserved variables such as market organization, trading mechanisms, type of market agent and fraction of informed traders. This might originate an endogeneity issue and produce biased OLS estimates because of the possibility of violation of the assumption of non-correlation (serial-correlation) between the error term and explanatory variables. A model that is usually employed to address endogeneity issues consists in adding the unobserved effect due to omitted variables with the original error term, which is assumed non-correlated with explanatory variables. Assuming that the unobserved effect is constant, consistent with the results of the Hausman test, using fixed effects panel data this unobserved effect is removed.
In addition, we also applied a common procedure to address endogeneity issues consisting of using the lagged values of potential endogenous variables. We regressed the spread in year (t+1) on our explanatory variables for year (t). While we got weaker statistical significance results, the main conclusions still held.

Table 5 reports the results of the regression of the high-low spread on discretionary accruals and other determinants of information asymmetry. In the table we can find the estimated regression coefficients for the explanatory variables, t-statistics, predicted signs for the coefficients, number of observations and the adjusted R2.

Four regressions are estimated based on the following groups of discretionary accruals: all values, positive discretionary accruals, large positive discretionary accruals (top quintile) and large negative discretionary accruals (bottom quintile).

Panel A presents the results for the full sample. As expected, the estimated coefficient for discretionary accruals (absolute value) is always positive meaning that better information quality reduces information asymmetry among market participants. All the coefficients are statistically significant except for firms in the bottom accruals quintile, corresponding to large negative discretionary accruals. This finding does not support the hypothesis that high negative discretionary accruals are associated with high levels of information asymmetry, in opposition to Jayarman (2008) for the U.S. markets.

The positive association between discretionary accruals and the spread tends to be stronger for firms with high levels of positive discretionary accruals, as we can see by comparing the estimated coefficients in the positive and large positive discretionary accruals groups: the estimated coefficient for firms with positive discretionary accruals is 0.003541, while the estimated coefficient for firms in the top quintile, which have large positive discretionary accruals, is 0.007886 representing more than twice the mean value for firms with positive discretionary accruals. This suggests that financial statements including high levels of discretionary accruals are less informative to market participants.
Table 5 | Regression of the High-Low Spread on Discretionary Accruals and Control Variable

**PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE**

| Variable      | DISC_ACC All values | DISC_ACC Positive | DISC_ACC Large positive | DISC_ACC Large negative |
|---------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| INTERCEPT     | 0.044161             | 0.042439          | 0.048030                | 0.048821                |
| t-statistic  | 34.30479***          | 21.62135***       | 12.35882***             | 12.94712***             |
| DISC_ACC (+) | 0.002924             | 0.003541          | 0.007886                | 0.001059                |
| t-statistic  | 3.054544***          | 2.356385**        | 2.635935***             | 0.363935                |
| SIZE (-)     | -0.002603            | -0.002484         | -0.003065               | -0.003025               |
| t-statistic  | -26.19068***         | -16.30183***      | -9.762939***            | -10.10357***            |
| ILLIQ (+)    | 0.562675             | 0.520615          | 0.417997                | 0.565841                |
| t-statistic  | 18.72520***          | 12.20514***       | 6.618973***             | 6.757924***             |
| TURN (-)     | 0.001861             | 0.001780          | 0.001962                | 0.002547                |
| t-statistic  | 16.52665***          | 10.2185***        | 5.087193***             | 7.369786***             |
| ANALYSTS (-) | 9.74E-05             | 0.000127          | 0.000227                | 0.000126                |
| t-statistic  | 6.148664***          | 5.303946***       | 3.900393***             | 2.303706***             |
| INV_PRI (+)  | 0.002194             | 0.001909          | 0.002664                | 0.000671                |
| t-statistic  | 4.580260***          | 2.733902***       | 1.936412***             | 0.549996                |
| Num.Observ.  | 9,779                | 4,928             | 1,893                   | 1,929                   |
| Adj.R-squa.  | 0.64                 | 0.64              | 0.60                    | 0.61                    |

**PANEL B: UNITED KINGDOM**

| Variable      | DISC_ACC All values | DISC_ACC Positive | DISC_ACC Large positive | DISC_ACC Large negative |
|---------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| INTERCEPT     | 0.045595             | 0.044456          | 0.040513                | 0.062438                |
| t-statistic  | 21.63629***          | 14.56048***       | 5.786390***             | 9.051013***             |
| DISC_ACC (+) | 0.001435             | 0.001359          | -0.000760               | 0.002125                |
| t-statistic  | 0.906920             | 0.524005          | -0.143213               | 0.455334                |
| SIZE (-)     | -0.002919            | -0.002830         | -0.002564               | -0.004539               |
| t-statistic  | -17.19092***         | -11.46027***      | -4.391791***            | -7.971423***            |
| ILLIQ (+)    | 16.55116             | 20.87659          | 19.35120                | 55.26983                |
| t-statistic  | 7.372623***          | 5.769846***       | 2.287911***             | 5.192171***             |
| TURN (-)     | 0.002346             | 0.002402          | 0.002076                | 0.003083                |
| t-statistic  | 12.69564***          | 8.362130***       | 3.300551***             | 5.081809***             |
| ANALYSTS (-) | 0.000213             | 0.000230          | 0.000344                | 0.000429                |
| t-statistic  | 6.419494***          | 4.674773***       | 2.931934***             | 4.082688***             |
| INV_PRI (+)  | 0.075636             | 0.060689          | 0.083397                | 0.088126                |
| t-statistic  | 12.04663***          | 6.779069***       | 3.853191***             | 3.887332***             |
| Num.Observ.  | 4,026                | 2,036             | 750                     | 790                     |
| Adj.R-squa.  | 0.67                 | 0.69              | 0.64                    | 0.64                    |
Table 5 | Continuation

PANEL C: FRANCE

| Variable     | DISC_ACC All values | DISC_ACC Positive | DISC_ACC Large positive | DISC_ACC Large negative |
|--------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| INTERCEPT    | 0.018296            | 0.017637          | 0.026884                | 0.014222               |
| t-statistic  | 6.592658***         | 4.302510***       | 4.07043***              | 1.759580*              |
| DISC_ACC (+) | 0.002748            | 0.000406          | 0.002182                | 0.002380               |
| t-statistic  | 1.508835            | 0.162742          | 0.510645                | 0.403747               |
| SIZE (-)     | -0.000704           | -0.000611         | -0.001555               | -0.000477              |
| t-statistic  | -3.398331***        | -1.990403**       | -3.074737***            | -0.753689              |
| ILLIQ (+)    | 0.785683            | 0.961710          | 0.958248                | 0.431189               |
| t-statistic  | 13.88574***         | 10.05148***       | 6.879445***             | 2.013060**             |
| TURN (-)     | 0.003091            | 0.003094          | 0.004198                | 0.004580               |
| t-statistic  | 11.82297***         | 7.487197***       | 4.284906***             | 6.436852***            |
| ANALYSTS (-) | -5.46E-06           | -1.61E-05         | 0.000204                | 4.496-06               |
| t-statistic  | -0.168523           | -0.335298         | 1.923684**              | 0.039771               |
| INV_PRI (+)  | 0.007367            | 6.83E-05          | 0.006168                | 0.012297               |
| t-statistic  | 5.900856***         | 0.031514          | 1.841654*               | 4.854373***            |
| Num.Observ.  | 1,606               | 858               | 327                     | 304                    |
| Adj.R-squa.  | 0.69                | 0.66              | 0.75                    | 0.70                   |

PANEL D: GERMANY

| Variable     | DISC_ACC All values | DISC_ACC Positive | DISC_ACC Large positive | DISC_ACC Large negative |
|--------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| INTERCEPT    | 0.015590            | 0.028895          | -0.002403               | 0.000193               |
| t-statistic  | 4.294961***         | 4.273493***       | -0.155647               | 0.026082               |
| DISC_ACC (+) | 0.006782            | 0.004136          | 0.019422                | 0.009154               |
| t-statistic  | 3.474337***         | 1.240434          | 2.673345***             | 1.761598*              |
| SIZE (-)     | -0.000384           | -0.001406         | 0.000974                | 0.000725               |
| t-statistic  | -1.417314           | -2.774570***      | 0.916651                | 1.291597               |
| ILLIQ (+)    | 0.287938            | 0.290022          | 0.778790                | 0.799740               |
| t-statistic  | 6.149485***         | 4.178989***       | 6.409410***             | 5.313364***            |
| TURN (-)     | 0.002543            | 0.003029          | 0.001739                | 0.002507               |
| t-statistic  | 10.20063***         | 6.607525***       | 1.560666                | 3.891125***            |
| ANALYSTS (-) | 1.20E-05            | 5.46E-05          | -7.72E-05               | 8.64E-05               |
| t-statistic  | 0.396626            | 1.043286          | -0.614916               | 0.897373               |
| INV_PRI (+)  | 0.007171            | 0.002651          | 0.009014                | 0.007949               |
| t-statistic  | 4.660389***         | 1.019724          | 1.559983                | 2.262433**             |
| Num.Observ.  | 1,299               | 658               | 260                     | 259                    |
| Adj.R-squa.  | 0.64                | 0.60              | 0.57                    | 0.72                   |
Notes: *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

This table reports the results of the regression of the high-low spread estimator on discretionary accruals (DISC_ACC). The high-low spread estimator measures information asymmetry, while information quality is assessed by discretionary accruals. Four regressions are estimated based on the following DISC_ACC groups: all values, positive, top quintile and bottom quintile.

Variable definitions: HL_S = annual variable defined as the average of Corwin and Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread estimator, based on high and low daily prices. DISC_ACC = absolute value of discretionary accruals given by the Kothari et al. (2005) version of the Jones Model. TURN = ratio of shares traded over the year divided by the total number of shares outstanding. ILLIQ = annual average of daily unsigned stock return divided by trading volume. SIZE = logarithm of market capitalization. ANALYSTS = number of analysts for each firm. INV_PRI = inverse of stock price.

Source: authors’ calculations

The estimation results regarding the variable size confirm that large firms, which tend to produce more information, exhibit lower levels of information asymmetry, consistent with the negative and statistically significant (1% level) estimated coefficients for all the four discretionary accruals based sub-samples. The sign of the illiquidity coefficient is positive and statistically significant (1% level) for all the sub-samples indicating that more liquid stocks have lower levels of information asymmetry. As predicted the sign of the coefficient for the inverse of stock price is positive and statistically significant for all but the sub-sample of large negative discretionary accruals because firms with lower stock prices tend to have larger relative spreads. The signs of the coefficients for turnover and number of analysts are positive in opposition to expected. One likely explanation for those signs is the significant correlation between size and turnover (0.42) and size and the number of analysts (0.78). However, such explanation is not sustainable because those signs do not change even after excluding size from the regression estimation. Another reason that can explain such signs is the spread estimator used in our study, considering that those signs change from positive to negative when the bid-ask spread is used as the dependent variable instead of the high-low spread estimator.

We also run similar regressions for the three European countries with the higher number of firm-year observations which together represent close to 72% of the full sample. The corresponding estimation results are in panel B, C and D of Table 5, respectively for the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The estimation results at the country level are different from those of the full sample. A likely explanation is the reduction in sample size, as we can confirm by noting that the lower the number of observations the lower is the statistical significance of the estimation results. This evidence can be found both at the country level and at the subsample level within each country.

In the case of the United Kingdom the major difference from the full sample is the lack of statistical significance of the discretionary accruals coefficients. This finding may provide evidence that in the UK stock market the informational component of accruals outweighs the earnings management component. The signs of the coefficients for turnover and number of analysts are positive and statistically significant in opposition to expected, while the coefficients for the remainder variables are equal to expected values and statistically significant.

As regards France, the number of estimated coefficients that are not statistically significant increases considerably. As for the United Kingdom the Discretionary Accruals coefficients are not statistically significant. Size has always the predicted sign and is statistically significant except for the bottom accruals quintile subsample. The illiquidity
coefficients are positive according to predicted and statistically significant. The signs of the coefficients for turnover are positive in opposition to expected and statistically significant.

For Germany the estimated coefficients for discretionary accruals are always positive. The coefficients are statistically significant at the one per cent level, except for firms in the positive accruals subsample and bottom quintile. The positive association between discretionary accruals and the spread tends to be much stronger for firms with high levels of positive discretionary accruals, as in the case of the full sample. The illiquidity variable holds its explanatory power and remains statistically significant, while the size variable loses much of its explanatory power.

Overall, our results confirm that better information quality is associated with lower information asymmetry among market participants in European stock markets. Our results show that the positive association between discretionary accruals and spread tends to be stronger for firms with high levels of positive discretionary accruals. This relation is obtained using firm-year observations for all the countries in the sample and for all discretionary accruals based subsamples, except for large negative discretionary accruals group. However, the estimated coefficients have no statistical significance when considering individually firm-year observations for the UK and France. Size, illiquidity and the inverse of stock price appear to be the main factors explaining the spread, while the estimated coefficients for turnover and number of analysts have the opposite sign to that expected.

5.3 Regression analysis using the relative bid-ask spread

In addition, we perform a robustness test based on a different proxy for information asymmetry. The relative bid-ask spread is the alternative proxy for information asymmetry and the predicted positive association, documented in Jayaraman (2008), between the relative bid-ask spread and discretionary accruals is analysed. As in the case of the high-low spread estimator, multivariate regressions are estimated for the following subsamples of discretionary accruals: all values, positive, large positive (top quintile) and large negative (bottom quintile).

Panel A, Table 6 shows the estimation results for the full sample. The coefficients for discretionary accruals are always positive, except for the bottom quintile. However, the coefficient estimators are not statistically significant. These results are different from those obtained above when the high-low spread estimator is applied as a variable for information asymmetry that confirm the influence of information quality on information asymmetry. Thus, our finding seems to provide evidence on the relevance of the Corwin and Schultz (2012) high-low spread as an alternative to the relative bid-ask spread when analysing the relation between discretionary accruals and information asymmetry. This is consistent with the evidence provided by Corwin and Schultz (2012) on the performance of the high-low spread estimator at capturing the effective spread as measured by intraday data. Their results suggest that the estimator produces daily spreads that are very accurate in comparison with effective spreads estimated using intraday data.

The estimated coefficients for the variables size and illiquidity have the predicted signs (negative for size and positive for illiquidity) and are statistically significant at the one percent level, for all discretionary accruals groups. These results are consistent with large firms exhibiting lower levels of information asymmetry and in the case of illiquidity the results indicate that more liquid stocks tend to have lower levels of information asymmetry.
The estimated coefficients with respect to the turnover variable have the expected sign for all discretionary accruals groups, confirming that firms with higher turnover tend to exhibit lower levels of information asymmetry. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant (5%) for groups including all firms and firms with positive discretionary accruals.

As regards the variables Analysts and the Inverse of Stock Price the results show no evidence of statistical significance.

Table 6 | Results of the Regression of the Relative Bid-Ask Spread on Discretionary Accruals and Other Explanatory Variables for Information Asymmetry

| PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE |
|-----------------------|
| Variable             | DISC_ACCAbs. value | DISC_ACCPositive | DISC_ACCLarge positive | DISC_ACCLarge negativeAbs. value |
| INTERCEPT             | 0.134275           | 0.134178          | 0.159767                | 0.125370                        |
| t-statistic          | 33.23482***        | 22.13945***       | 13.36149***             | 10.42615***                     |
| DISC_ACC (+)         | 0.003023           | 0.006706          | 0.006898                | -0.008508                       |
| t-statistic          | 1.006593           | 1.446755          | 0.749591                | -0.918277                       |
| SIZE (-)             | -0.008952          | -0.008913         | -0.011037               | -0.008232                       |
| t-statistic          | -28.69665***       | -18.94061***      | -11.42968***            | -8.625824***                    |
| ILLIQ (+)            | 2.051756           | 1.536150          | 0.789499                | 2.932537                        |
| t-statistic          | 22.35356***        | 11.84470***       | 4.064293***             | 11.34747***                     |
| TURN (-)             | -0.000875          | -0.001166         | -0.000780               | -0.001037                       |
| t-statistic          | -2.476107**        | -2.127852**       | -0.657448               | -0.941510                       |
| ANALYSTS (-)         | -8.57E-05          | -8.17E-05         | -4.13E-05               | -0.000144                       |
| t-statistic          | -1.721637*         | -1.101974         | -0.235945               | -0.825433                       |
| INV_PRI (+)          | -0.001589          | -0.003418         | -0.000368               | -0.001141                       |
| t-statistic          | -1.059041          | -1.587984         | -0.086898               | -0.293942                       |
| Num.Observ.          | 9,800              | 4,937             | 1,900                   | 1,936                           |
| Adj.R-squa.          | 0.77               | 0.78              | 0.77                    | 0.75                            |
Table 6 | Continuation

**PANEL B: UNITED KINGDOM**

| Variable       | DISC_ACCAbs. value | DISC_ACCPositive | DISC_ACCLarge positive | DISC_ACCLarge negative |
|----------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| INTERCEPT      | 0.0107193          | 0.105201          | 0.109015               | 0.107954               |
| t-statistic    | 15.82218***        | 10.586839***      | 4.682155***            | 4.726604***            |
| DISC_ACC (+)   | 0.000111           | 0.003558          | 0.002928               | -0.002415              |
| t-statistic    | 0.021890           | 0.433536          | 0.165977               | -0.156243              |
| SIZE (-)       | -0.006903          | -0.006746         | -0.006882              | -0.007242              |
| t-statistic    | -12.64349***       | -8.63076***       | -3.544766***           | -3.840179***           |
| ILLIQ (+)      | 133.9174           | 163.7111          | 217.9064               | 286.4073               |
| t-statistic    | 18.55362***        | 14.30086***       | 7.747280***            | 8.123419***            |
| TURN (-)       | -0.001021          | -0.000602         | 9.12E-05               | 0.000626               |
| t-statistic    | -1.718379*         | -0.662246         | 0.043593               | 0.311459               |
| ANALYSTS (-)   | 6.32E-05           | 0.000147          | 0.000115               | 2.14E-05               |
| t-statistic    | 0.592108           | 0.945205          | 0.293698               | 0.061357               |
| INV_PRI (+)    | 0.365806           | 0.285899          | 0.202845               | 0.415128               |
| t-statistic    | 18.12116***        | 10.9374***        | 2.818280***            | 5.528717***            |
| Num. Observ.   | 4,027              | 2,036             | 750                    | 791                    |
| Adj. R-squa.   | 0.82               | 0.84              | 0.81                   | 0.79                   |

**PANEL C: FRANCE**

| Variable       | DISC_ACCAbs. value | DISC_ACCPositive | DISC_ACCLarge positive | DISC_ACCLarge negative |
|----------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| INTERCEPT      | 0.031392           | 0.044626          | 0.065995               | 0.020828               |
| t-statistic    | 6.223378***        | 5.497562***       | 3.459246***            | 1.680387*              |
| DISC_ACC (+)   | 0.002253           | -0.004266         | -0.019896              | 0.011891               |
| t-statistic    | 0.680590           | -0.864504         | -1.612107*             | 1.315480               |
| SIZE (-)       | -0.001676          | -0.002443         | -0.003914              | -0.001358              |
| t-statistic    | -4.448850***       | -4.021150***      | -2.679481***           | -1.399280              |
| ILLIQ (+)      | 2.833137           | 3.570961          | 2.311601               | 2.330713               |
| t-statistic    | 27.54830***        | 18.84754***       | 5.745302***            | 7.095614***            |
| TURN (-)       | -0.000553          | -0.002436         | -0.003892              | 0.004211               |
| t-statistic    | -1.164397          | -2.976702***      | -1.375155              | 3.859130***            |
| ANALYSTS (-)   | -7.76E-05          | -0.000195         | -0.000314              | 0.000170               |
| t-statistic    | -1.317264          | -2.045681**       | -1.024643              | 0.980531               |
| INV_PRI (+)    | 0.003986           | -0.010466         | 0.000960               | 0.015384               |
| t-statistic    | 1.756754*          | -2.440498**       | 0.099210               | 3.960209***            |
| Num. Observ.   | 1,606              | 858               | 327                    | 304                    |
| Adj. R-squa.   | 0.79               | 0.77              | 0.57                   | 0.83                   |
### Table 6 | Continuation

**PANEL D: GERMANY**

| Variable         | DISC_ACCAbs. value | DISC_ACCPositive | DISC_ACCLarge positive | DISC_ACCLarge negative | Abs. value |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------|
| **INTERCEPT**    | 0.031133          | 0.037091         | -0.037865              | 0.038375               | 0.038375   |
| **t-statistic**  | 3.351579***       | 2.085085**       | 1.027311               | 2.388254**             |            |
| **DISC_ACC (+)** | 0.006792          | 0.010139         | -0.001511              | 0.005794               | -0.001511  |
| **t-statistic**  | 1.351548          | 1.151014         | -0.086998              | 0.516687               |            |
| **SIZE (-)**     | -0.001409         | -0.001847        | -0.001896              | -0.001872              | -0.001872  |
| **t-statistic**  | -2.028943**       | -1.383113        | -0.666998              | -1.533805              |            |
| **ILLIQ (+)**    | 1.656600          | 1.307774         | 1.439928               | 2.765388               | 2.765388   |
| **t-statistic**  | 14.79633***       | 7.379921***      | 4.931710***            | 8.692034***            |            |
| **TURN (-)**     | -0.0002099        | -0.002846        | -0.000207              | -0.002743              | -0.002743  |
| **t-statistic**  | -3.263499**       | -2.349750**      | -0.777184              | -1.961192**            |            |
| **ANALYSTS (-)** | -5.64E-05         | 1.10E-05         | -0.000188              | -0.000206              | -0.000206  |
| **t-statistic**  | -0.721358         | 0.079136         | -0.624688              | -0.990474              |            |
| **INV_PRI (+)**  | 3.18E-05          | 0.000450         | 0.018443               | -0.009755              | -0.009755  |
| **t-statistic**  | 0.008167          | 0.066002         | 1.328744               | -1.286600**            |            |
| Num.Observ.      | 1,331             | 675              | 267                    | 263                    |            |
| Adj.R-squa.      | 0.79              | 0.74             | 0.79                   | 0.84                   |            |

Notes: *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

This table reports the results of the regression of the bid-ask spread on discretionary accruals (DISC_ACC). The bid-ask spread measures information asymmetry, while information quality is assessed by discretionary accruals.

Four regressions are estimated based on the following DISC_ACC groups: all values, positive, top quintile and bottom quintile.

**Variable definitions:**
- **BA_S** = annual relative bid-ask spread using daily closing bid and ask spreads.
- **DISC_ACC** = discretionary accruals given by the Kothari et al. (2005) version of the Jones Model.
- **TURN** = ratio of shares traded over the year divided by the total number of shares outstanding.
- **ILLIQ** = annual average of daily unsigned stock return divided by trading volume.
- **SIZE** = logarithm of market capitalization.
- **ANALYSTS** = number of analysts for each firm.
- **INV_PRI** = inverse of stock price.

**Source:** Authors’ calculations

Panels B, C and D report the estimation results for the subsamples organized by the three European countries with the higher number of firm-year observation. The results show that discretionary accruals coefficients are not statistically significant as in the case of the full sample.

In the case of the United Kingdom as regards the variables size, illiquidity and inverse of stock price, estimated coefficients have the predicted sign and are statistically significant at the one percent level. The sign of the estimated coefficient for turnover is equal to the expected and statistically significant (10%) only in the case of the subsample including all firm-year observations. The coefficient of the variable representing the number of analysts has no statistical significance.
As regards France, size has always the predicted sign and it is statistically significant at the one per cent level, except for the bottom accruals quintile subsample. The illiquidity coefficients are positive according to predicted and statistically significant at the one per cent level for all the subsamples. The results for the variables turnover, analysts and inverse of stock price are inconclusive.

For Germany, size has always the predicted sign but it is only statistically significant (5%) for the subsample including all firm-year observations. The illiquidity coefficients are positive according to predicted and statistically significant at the one per cent level for all the subsamples. The results for the variable turnover have always the expected sign and they are always statistically significant, except for the large positive discretionary accruals subsample. The coefficients of the variables number of analysts and inverse of stock price have no statistical significance.

Overall, our results based on the closing bid-ask spread do not provide statistical significant evidence of the relation between information quality and information asymmetry, in contrast to the results when the high-low spread estimator is applied as a variable for information asymmetry. Size and illiquidity appear to be the main factors explaining the spread, while the estimated coefficients for turnover have the predicted sign and are statistically significant for the subsample including all firm-year observations and the positive discretionary accruals subsample.

6. Conclusions and Future Research

Information asymmetry is a concern for several market participants because it increases the adverse selection risk and lowers liquidity. Poor financial reporting quality affects negatively the quality of public information implying that informed investors get an informational advantage over other market participants because of their private information or superior ability to process public information, thus increasing information asymmetry.

This paper provides evidence on the association between information quality and information asymmetry in Europe, using discretionary accruals as a proxy for information quality and the Corwin and Schultz (2012) high-low spread estimator to measure information asymmetry.

Our work documents a positive relation between the discretionary accruals and the high-low spread estimator. Further, such association is not linear and tends to be stronger for firms with the highest levels of positive discretionary accruals. Therefore, our results suggest that in European stock markets the earnings management component of accruals outweighs the informational component. However, such superiority is not observable for all the subsamples, namely for the UK firms and large negative discretionary accruals subsample.

In addition, our results suggest that the high-low spread estimator is more efficient than the closing bid-ask spread when analysing the impact of information quality on information asymmetry. This is consistent with the evidence provided by Corwin and Schultz (2012) suggesting that their estimator produces daily spreads that are very accurate in comparison with effective spreads estimated using intraday data.

Another conclusion refers to the main determinants of the spread. In agreement with prior literature we find that larger firms tend to exhibit lower levels of information asymmetry. Illiquidity appears to have a high explanatory power with more liquid stocks showing lower levels of information asymmetry. The inverse of stock price is positive.
and statistically significant for all sub-samples except for the large negative discretionary accruals, consistent with lower stock prices being associated with larger relative spreads. The estimated coefficients for turnover and number of analysts have the opposite sign to that expected.

This research project can proceed with a number of developments. Given the different motivations for the use of accruals they may not be an appropriate proxy to analyse the specific relation with information asymmetry. In order to overcome this problem a different proxy for information quality should be used. A second attempt to overcome this problem is to use accruals but finding a way to separate firms by the motivation for using accruals.

Finally, further research is needed to understand why the use of the HL spread estimator seems to change the sign of the regression coefficient for the control variable turnover.

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