Google’s Cloud Vision API Is Not Robust To Noise

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Abstract—Google has recently introduced the Cloud Vision API for image analysis. According to the demonstration website, the API “quickly classifies images into thousands of categories, detects individual objects and faces within images, and finds and reads printed words contained within images.” It can be also used to “detect different types of inappropriate content from adult to violent content.”

In this paper, we evaluate the robustness of Google Cloud Vision API to input perturbation. In particular, we show that by adding sufficient noise to the image, the API generates completely different outputs for the noisy image, while a human observer would perceive its original content. We show that the attack is consistently successful, by performing extensive experiments on different image types, including natural images, images containing faces and images with texts. For instance, using images from ImageNet dataset, we found that adding an average of 14.25% impulse noise is enough to deceive the API. Our findings indicate the vulnerability of the API in adversarial environments. For example, an adversary can bypass an image filtering system by adding noise to inappropriate images. We then show that when a noise filter is applied on input images, the API generates mostly the same outputs for restored images as for original images. This observation suggests that cloud vision API can readily benefit from noise filtering, without the need for updating image analysis algorithms.

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Machine Learning (ML) techniques have been extensively deployed for computer vision tasks, particularly visual classification problems, where new algorithms reported to achieve or even surpass the human performance [1]–[3]. Success of ML algorithms has led to an explosion in demand. To further broaden and simplify the use of ML algorithms, cloud-based services offered by Amazon, Google, Microsoft, BigML, and others have developed ML-as-a-service tools. Thus, users and companies can readily benefit from ML applications without having to train or host their own models.

Recently, Google introduced the Cloud Vision API for image analysis [4]. A demonstration website has been also launched, where for any selected image, the API outputs the image labels, identifies and reads the texts contained in the image and detects the faces within the image. It also determines how likely is that the image contains inappropriate contents, including adult, spoof, medical, or violence contents.

The implicit assumption in designing and developing ML models is that they will be deployed in noise-free and benign settings. Real-world sensors, however, suffer from noise, blur, and other imperfections. Hence, designing computer vision models to be robust is imperative for real-world applications, such as banking, medical diagnosis, and autonomous driving. Moreover, recent research have pointed out the vulnerability of ML models in adversarial environments [5]–[7]. Security evaluation of ML systems is an emerging field of study. Several papers have presented attacks on various ML systems, such as voice interfaces [8], face-recognition systems [9], toxic comment detectors [10], and video annotation systems [11].
In this paper, we evaluate the robustness of Google Cloud Vision API to input perturbations. In particular, we investigate whether we can modify an image in such a way that a human observer would perceive its original content, but the API generates different outputs for it. For modifying the images, we add either impulse noise or Gaussian noise to them. Due to the inherent low-pass filtering characteristic of the humans vision system, humans are capable of perceiving image contents from images slightly corrupted by noise [12].

Our experimental results show that by adding sufficient noise to the image, the API is deceived into returning labels which are not related to the original image. Figure 1 illustrates the attack by showing original and noisy images along with the most confident labels returned by the API. We show that the attack is consistently successful, by performing extensive experiments on different image types, including natural images, images containing faces and images with texts. Our findings indicate the vulnerability of Google cloud vision API in real-world applications. For example, a driveless car may wrongly identify the objects in rainy weather. Moreover, the API can be subject to attacks in adversarial environments. For example, a search engine may suggest irrelevant images to users, or an image filtering system can be bypassed by adding noise to inappropriate images.

We then evaluate different methods for improving the robustness of the API. Since we only have a black-box access to the API, we assess whether noise filtering can improve the API performance on noisy inputs, while maintaining the accuracy on clean images. Our experimental results show that when a noise filter is applied on input images, the API generates mostly the same outputs for restored images as for original images. This observation suggests that the cloud vision API can readily benefit from noise filtering, without the need for updating the image analysis algorithms.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related literature and Section III presents noise models. The proposed attack on Google cloud vision API is given in Section IV. Section V describes some countermeasures to the attack and Section VI concludes the paper.

II. RELATED WORK

Several papers have recently showed that the performance of deep convolutional neural networks drops when the model is tested on distorted inputs, such as noisy or blurred images [13]–[15]. For improving the robustness of machine learning models to input perturbations, an end-to-end architecture is proposed in [16] for joint denoising, deblurring, and classification. In [17], the authors presented a training method to stabilize deep networks against small input distortions. It has been also observed that augmenting training data with perturbed images can enhance the model robustness [13], [18]. In contrast, in this paper we demonstrate the vulnerability of a real-world image classifier system to input perturbations.

We also show that the model robustness can be improved by applying a noise filter on input images, thus without the need for fine-tuning the model.

The noisy images used in our attack can be viewed as a form of adversarial examples [19]. An adversarial example is defined as a modified input, which causes the classifier to output a different label, while a human observer would recognize its original content. Note that we could deceive the could vision API without having any knowledge about the learning algorithm. Also, unlike the existing black-box attacks on learning systems [20], [21], we have no information about the training data or even the set of output labels of the model. Moreover, unlike the current methods for generating adversarial examples [22], we perturb the input completely randomly, which results in a more serious attack vector in real-world applications.

III. IMAGE NOISE

A color image $x$ is a three-dimensional array of pixels $x_{i,j,k}$, where $(i,j)$ is the image coordinate and $k \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ denotes the coordinate in color space. In this paper, we encode the images in RGB color space. Most image file formats use 24 bits per pixel (8 bits per color channel), which results in 256 different colors for each color space. Therefore, the minimum and maximum values of each pixel are 0 and 255, respectively, which correspond to the darkest and brightest colors.

For modifying the images, we add either impulse noise or Gaussian noise to them. These noise types often occur during image acquisition and transmission [23]. Impulse Noise, also known as Salt-and-Pepper Noise, is commonly modeled by [24]:

$$\tilde{x}_{i,j,k} = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{with probability } \frac{p}{2} \\
x_{i,j,k} & \text{with probability } 1 - p \\
255 & \text{with probability } \frac{p}{2}
\end{cases}$$

where $x$, $\tilde{x}$ and $p$ are the original and noisy images and the noise density, respectively. Impulse noise can be removed using spatial filters which exploit the correlation of adjacent pixels. We use the weighted-average filtering method, proposed in [24], for restoring images corrupted by impulse noise.

A noisy image corrupted by Gaussian noise is obtained as $\tilde{x}_{i,j,k} = x_{i,j,k} + z$, where $z$ is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable. The pixel values of the noisy image should be clipped, so that they remain in the range of 0 to 255. Gaussian noise can be reduced by filtering the input with low-pass kernels [23].

For assessing the quality of the restored image $x^*$ compared to original image $x$, we use the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR). For images of size $d_1 \times d_2 \times 3$, PSNR value is computed as follows [25]:

$$PSNR = 10 \cdot \log_{10} \left( \frac{255^2}{\frac{1}{d_1 \cdot d_2} \sum_{i,j,k} (x_{i,j,k} - x^*_{i,j,k})^2} \right).$$

PSNR value is measured in dB. Typical values for the PSNR are usually considered to be between 20 and 40 dB, where higher is better [26].
IV. THE PROPOSED ATTACK ON CLOUD VISION API

In this section, we describe the attack on Google Cloud Vision API. The goal of the attack is to modify a given image in such a way that the API returns completely different outputs than the ones for original image, while a human observer would perceive its original content. We perform the experiments on different image types, including natural images from the ImageNet dataset [27], images containing faces from the Faces94 dataset [28], and images with text. When selecting an image for analysis, the API outputs the image labels, detects the faces within the image, and identifies and reads the texts contained in the image.

The attack procedure is as follows. We first test the API with the original image and record the outputs. We then test the API with a modified image, generated by adding very low-density impulse noise. If we can force the API to output completely different labels, or to fail to detect faces or identify the texts within the image, we declare the noisy image as the adversary’s image. Otherwise, we increase the noise density and retry the attack. We continue to increase the noise density until we can successfully force the API to output wrong labels. In experiments, we start the attack with 5% impulse noise and increase the noise density each time by 5%.

Figure 1 shows the API’s output label with the highest confidence score, for the original and noisy images. As can be seen, unlike the original images, the API wrongly labels the noisy images, despite that the objects in noisy images are easily recognizable. Trying on 100 images of the ImageNet dataset, we needed on average 14.25% impulse noise density to deceive the cloud vision API. Figure 2 shows the adversary’s success rate versus the impulse noise density. As can be seen, by adding 35% impulse noise, the attack always succeeded on the samples from ImageNet dataset.

![Fig. 1: The API’s output label with the highest confidence score for the original and noisy images.](image)

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Figure 3 shows sample images from the Faces94 dataset and the corresponding noisy images. Unlike the original images, the API fails to detect the face in noisy ones. Trying on the first 20 images of each female and male categories, we needed on average 23.8% impulse noise density to deceive the cloud vision API. Similarly, figure 4 shows an image with text and the corresponding noisy image. The API correctly reads the text within the original image, but fails to identify any texts in the noisy one, despite that the text within the noisy image is easily readable.

![Fig. 3: Images of faces, chosen from the Faces94 dataset, and their noisy versions.](image)

**Fig. 3:** Images of faces, chosen from the Faces94 dataset, and their noisy versions. Unlike the original images, cloud vision API fails to detect the face in noisy images.

![Fig. 4: An images with text and its noisy version.](image)

**Fig. 4:** An images with text and its noisy version. Unlike the original image, cloud vision API fails to identify any texts in noisy image.

V. COUNTERMEASURES

The success of our attack indicates the importance of designing the learning system to be robust to input perturbations. It has been shown that the robustness of ML algorithms can be improved by using regularization or data augmentation during training [29]. In [30], the authors proposed adversarial training,
which iteratively creates a supply of adversarial examples and includes them into the training data. Approaches based on robust optimization however may not be practical, since the model needs to be retrained.

For image recognition algorithms, a more viable approach is preprocessing the inputs. Natural images have special properties, such as high correlation among adjacent pixels, sparsity in transform domain or having low energy in high frequencies [23]. Noisy inputs typically do not lie in the same space as natural images. Therefore, by projecting the input image down to the space of natural images, which is often done by passing the image through a filter, we can reverse the effect of the noise or adversarial perturbation.

We assess the performance of the cloud vision API when a noise filter is applied before the image analysis algorithms. We did the experiments on all the sample images from ImageNet and Faces94 datasets, corrupted by either impulse or Gaussian noise. Restored images are generated by applying the weighted-average filter [24] for impulse noise and a low-pass filter for Gaussian noise. In all cases, when testing on the restored image, the API generates mostly the same outputs as for the original image.

Figure 5 shows the screenshots of the API’s output labels for original, noisy and restored images of a sample image from ImageNet dataset. As can be seen, none of the labels returned for the noisy image are related to labels of the original image, while labels of the restored image are mostly the same as the ones for original image.

Fig. 6: The restored images, generated by applying the weighted-average filter [24] on the noisy images of figures 3 and 4. Captions show the PSNR values with respect to the original images. Although the API fails to detect the face in the noisy face images, it correctly detects the same face attributes for restored images as the original images. Also, unlike the noisy version of the text image, the API correctly reads the text within the restored image.

for the noisy image are related to labels of the original image. However, the labels of the restored image are mostly the same as the ones for original image.

Similarly, figure 6 shows restored images of the images with faces from figure 3 and the image with text from figure 4. Unlike the noisy images, the API correctly detects the same face attributes for restored face images as original images, and...
can read the text within the restored text image. The results suggest that the cloud vision API can readily benefit from noise filtering prior to applying image analysis algorithms.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we showed that Google Cloud Vision API can be easily deceived by an adversary without compromising the system or having any knowledge about the specific details of the algorithms used. In essence, we found that by adding noise, we can always force the API to output irrelevant labels or to fail to detect any face or text within the image. We also showed that when testing with the restored images, the API generates mostly the same outputs as for the original images. This suggests that the system’s robustness can be readily improved by applying a noise filter on the inputs, without the need for updating the image analysis algorithms.

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