Behavioural Models for Group Communications

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Group communication is becoming a more and more popular infrastructure for efficient distributed applications. It consists in representing locally a group of remote objects as a single object accessed in a single step; communications are then broadcasted to all members. This paper provides models for automatic verification of group-based applications, typically for detecting deadlocks or checking message ordering. We show how to encode group communication, together with different forms of synchronisation for group results. The proposed models are parametric such that, for example, different group sizes or group members could be experimented with the minimum modification of the original model.

1 Introduction

Group communication is a communication pattern allowing a single process to perform a communication to many clients in a single instruction, this operation can be synchronized or optimized accordingly. Nowadays group communication is widely used in distributed computing particularly in grid technologies [27]. Objects can register to a group and receive communications handled in a collective way. Group membership is transparent to the receiver that simply handles requests it receives. Group communications are also easy to handle on the sender side because a simple invocation can trigger several communications. Communication parameters are sent according to a distribution policy; they can be for example broadcasted or split between the members of the group. Several middleware platforms and toolkits for building distributed applications implement one-to-many communication mechanisms [1, 6, 23].

This paper addresses the crucial point of reliability of distributed applications using group communications. The most frequent reliability issue for distributed application is to be able to detect deadlocks, in the case of group, a deadlock can occur for example when a member of the group does not answer to its requests while the request sender is waiting for all the results. Such an absence of response might be due to an issue in message ordering for example. In order to enhance reliability of group applications we develop methods for the analysis and verification of behavioural properties of such applications, our method can be applied with automatic tools.

A first contribution of this paper is to provide a model allowing the verification of the behaviour of group-based applications, in other words, we provide a verifiable model for group communication. We also illustrate our approach by specifying an application example, instantiating the verifiable model, and proving a few properties.

To precisely define the semantics of group communications, we focus on a specific middleware called ProActive [2]. ProActive provides a high-level programming API for building distributed applications, ranging from Grid computing to mobile applications. ProActive offers advanced communication...
strategies, including group communication [31, 6]. In ProActive, remote communication relies on asynchronous requests with futures: upon a call on a remote entity, a request is created at the receiver side, and a future is created on the sender side that will be filled when the remote entity provides an answer. What make the handling of groups particular in ProActive is the necessity to also gather and manage replies for requests sent to the group. Synchronisation on futures is generally transparent: an access to a future blocks until the result is computed and returned. However, synchronisation on group of futures, that represent the result of a group invocation, features more specific and complex synchronization primitives. Consequently, our model also encodes different synchronisation policies.

In [8] we have defined a parameterized and hierarchical model for synchronised networks of labelled transition systems. We have shown how this model can be used as an intermediate format to represent the behaviour of distributed applications, and to check their temporal properties. In this paper, we present a method for building parameterized models capturing the behavioural semantics of group communication systems; models are the networks of labelled transition systems, whose labels represent method invocations. The language we chose is pNets; it is an intermediate language: the models we present here should be generated, either from source code or from a higher-level specification. pNets themselves are then used to generate a model in a lower-level language that will be used for verification of the program properties. In this paper the advantage of choosing such an intermediate language are the following: compared to a higher-level language, pNets are precise enough to define a behavioural semantics, and compared to lower level languages, they provide parameterized processes and synchronization which allow the expression of the models in a generic manner.

Our approach aims at combining compositional description with automatic model generation. The formal specification consists in a labelled transition system and synchronisation networks, in which both events (messages) and processes (group members) can be parameterized and built from a graphical language. On one hand, having a well-defined semantics made the specification sound; on the other hand, having a framework based on process algebras and bisimulation semantics made possible to benefit from compositionality for specification and verification [10]. Parametric synchronisation vectors also allow us to envision the modelling of dynamic groups with members joining or leaving the group.

Related Work Some work has been done to formally verify properties in group-based applications. Some of these verifications deal with safety properties, while others remain limited to a case study. In [22] the formal verification of cryptographic protocols is proposed. It used model-checking tool to verify confidentiality and confidentiality properties. Model-checking was also used to verify behavioural and dependability properties [28]. The authors adopted Markov chains to specify the studied protocols. By using a combination of inductive proofs and probabilistic model checking [24] verified a randomized protocols. In the same way, [25] used a combination PVS theorem prover and model-checker based on timed-automata for formal verification of an intrusion-tolerant protocol. [7] presented a simple deadlock detection mechanism caused by circular synchronous group remote procedure calls. In contrast with all these, we limit ourselves to apply finite model-checking techniques to abstract semantic models. Our pNets semantic model is very helpful in this matter, providing us with a very expressive and compact formalism, but where the usage of parameters is limited in a way that can be easily abstracted to finite instances.

Group-based systems as well as parameterized systems are particular infinite systems in the sense that each of their instances are finite but the number of states of the system depends on one or several parameters. Among these parameters we can distinguish: data structures or variables (e.g., queues, counters), number of components involved in the system, ... Automatic verification of such systems has
to face state explosion problem. A variety of techniques to alleviate state explosion has been investigated. We can cite: techniques based on abstraction [26, 16]; techniques based on finding network invariants [20, 32, 15, 30], which can (possibly-over) approximate the system with an infinite family of processes. Others [18, 19] based on finding an appropriate cut-off value of the parameters to bound the system model. For automatic verification of infinite-state systems [13, 3] propose regular model checking. The approach is based on the idea of giving symbolic representation in term of regular languages. Our work tries to take the best of these approaches: whenever possible, we use property-preserving abstractions to build very small (abstract) data domains for the parameters of the basic processes of our systems; but for parameterized topologies such abstractions are not generally complete, so we have to use cut-off strategies as in bounded model-checking.

In the following of the paper, Section 2 overviews ProActive communication model and group concepts, and introduces a running example. Section 3 presents our theoretical model and its graphical syntax. Section 4 provides a behavioural model for group communication and synchronisation. Section 5 shows our verification methodology, with experimental results on state-space generation and verification of properties.

2 The ProActive communication model

ProActive is an LGPL Java library [2] for parallel, distributed, concurrent applications. It is based on an active object model, where active objects communicate by asynchronous method invocation (called requests) with futures: upon a method invocation on an active object, a request is enqueued at the remote object's side, and a future is automatically created to represent the result of the request while the caller continues its execution. Active objects are mono-threaded and treat the incoming invocations one after the other, returning a value for the request at the caller as soon as a request is finished. As remote invocations and future creation are handled transparently, the programmer can write distributed applications in a much similar manner to standard sequential ones. In ProActive there is no shared memory between active objects to prevent data race-conditions; consequently, a copy of the request arguments are transmitted to the remote active objects.

2.1 ProActive Groups

In this paper, we focus on the group communication mechanism offered by ProActive [6]. Groups in ProActive work as follows: a group of active objects is a set of active objects that behaves as follows. First, a method invocation on the group results in a remote invocation to all the members of the group in parallel. Second, a list of futures is automatically created to receive the results returned by the group members. Groups are typed as usual objects, and thus invocations to a group are made transparently, as any object invocation. This way, specific primitives for groups are only group creation and management, and thus code modification to handle group communication is minimal. In ProActive, groups are dynamic in the sense that objects can join or leave the group at runtime. The main ProActive primitives for handling groups are the following:

- \texttt{Group ProActive.newActiveGroup(String Type)} creates a new group of the type “Type”.
- \texttt{void Group.add(Object o)} adds an object to a group.
- \texttt{void Group.remove(int index)} Remove the object at the specified index.
2.2 Synchronisation for ProActive Groups

For classical active objects, synchronisation occurs as follows: a simple access to the future representing the result of a request automatically blocks until the result is computed, and the future is filled. For a group invocation, there is one result by group member, those results are stored in a group of futures. Synchronizing on a group of futures is more complex, here are 3 synchronization primitives of ProActive:

- void ProActiveGroup.waitAll(Object FutureGroup) blocks until all the futures of the group return.
- void ProActiveGroup.waitN(Object FutureGroup, int n) waits until n futures are returned.
- Object FutureListGroup.waitAndGetTheNth(Object FutureGroup, int n) waits for the result from the n-th member and returns it.

2.3 Example

To illustrate group communication, we consider an application synchronising meetings, it consists of a master initiator and several clients that contain the agendas of the participants. The initiator suggests a date to all participants that reply whether they are available or not. For this, we define a class Participant:

```
public class Participant {
    Boolean suggestDate(Date d) { ... }
    Boolean validate() { ... }
    void cancel() { ... }
}
```

The following code can be implemented by the initiator to coordinate the meeting:

```
public static void main(...) {
    ...
    // group creation
    Participant participants = ProActive.newActiveGroup("Participant");
    ...
    // we populate the group by adding one or several element
    participant = ProActive.newActive("Participant", null);
    participants.add(participant);
    ...
    while (true) {
        // then we suggest a date to all members simply by:
        Object answers = participants.suggestDate(date);
        ...
        // collateResults gets the result and provides an overall result,
        // e.g. returns true if all futures are true
        if (collateResults(answers, ProActiveGroup.size(participants))) {
            Object f = participants.validate(); // validate the meeting
            waitAll(f); // waits until everybody acknowledged validation
        }
        else {
            participants.cancel(); // cancel the meeting
            ...
        }
    }
```

This example illustrates well the different mechanisms of group management and communication: first an empty group is created (newActiveGroup), then it is populated by several Participant objects.
Thus when the initiator invokes suggestDate on the group, this broadcasts a meeting request to all the members. Then the members reply, which fills the futures contained in the group of futures answers. The local method collateResults synchronises the returns from all these invocations. Validate or cancel is broadcasted to all the group members depending on the result of the preceding step. To illustrate more synchronization mechanisms, the initiator waits until all participants acknowledge the validation. A possible implementation of the collateResults method is the following:

```java
boolean collateResults(Object ans, int size) {
    boolean result = true;
    for (int i = 0; i < size; i++) {
        if (!ProActiveGroup.waitAndGetTheNth(ans, i)) result = false;
    }
    return result;
}
```

Fig. 1 illustrates the mechanism of group communication as implemented in ProActive. A method call to a remote activity goes through a proxy, that locally creates “future” objects, while the request goes to the remote request queues.

Figure 1: Asynchronous and remote method call on group

### 3 Theoretical Model

In [8] we have proposed a formalism to represent the behavior of distributed applications. Behavior of complex systems can be represented hierarchically by composition of classical LTSs [29]. Those LTSs are composed using synchronisation Networks (Net) [4, 5] so that the synchronisation product generates a LTS which can be used at the higher level of hierarchy. Finally the behavior of the system can be expressed by a global LTS. We have also shown that this model can be used as an intermediate format to check behavioral properties like temporal ones.

To encode both families of processes and data value passing communication LTSs and Nets are enriched with parameters [14]. Parameters can be used as communication arguments, in state definitions, and in synchronisation operators. This enables compact and generic description of parameterized and
dynamic topologies. In the following we recall definitions of the parameterized Networks of synchronised automatas (pNets) as given in [8]. We start by giving the notion of parameterized actions.

**Definition 1 Parameterized Actions.** Let $P$ be a set of names, $L_{A,P}$ a term algebra built over $P$, including at least a distinguished sort $A$ for actions, and a constant action $\tau$. We call $v \in P$ a parameter, and $a \in L_{A,P}$ a parameterized action, $B_{A,P}$ is the set of boolean expressions (guards) over $L_{A,P}$.

A describes the possible actions representing interactions between processes. Main actions of our system are illustrated in bold fonts in Figure 2. The typical shape of an action is $\text{!Participant}([i], \text{Q_Suggest}(f, \text{Date})$ for a message $Q_{\text{Suggest}}$ sent to the member number $i$ of the process family Participant. $f$ and $\text{Date}$ are the message parameters, here $f$ is the future for the request, and $\text{Date}$ the request parameter. $!$ indicates an emission, and $?$ a reception. In most cases the destination of the message can be inferred by the context, and in the figure by the destination of the arrows, in that case, the actions look like $?Q_{\text{Cancel}}$.

**Definition 2 pLTS.** A parameterized LTS is a tuple $\langle P, S, s_0, L, \rightarrow \rangle$ where:

- $P$ is a finite set of parameters, from which we construct the term algebra $L_{A,P}$.
- $S$ is a set of states; each state $s \in S$ is associated to a finite indexed set of free variables $fv(s) = \tilde{x}_{I_s} \subseteq P$.
- $s_0 \in S$ is the initial state,
- $L$ is the set of labels, $\rightarrow$ the transition relation $\rightarrow \subseteq S \times L \times S$.
- Labels have the form $l = (\alpha, e_b, \tilde{x}_{I_s} := \tilde{\alpha}_{I_s})$ such that if $s \xrightarrow{l} s'$, then:
  - $\alpha$ is a parameterized action, expressing a combination of inputs $iv(\alpha) \subseteq P$ (defining new variables) and outputs $oe(\alpha)$ (using action expressions).
  - $e_b \in B_{A,P}$ is the optional guard,
  - the variables $\tilde{x}_{I_s}$ are assigned during the transition by the optional expressions $\tilde{\alpha}_{I_s}$, with the constraints: $fv(oe(\alpha)) \subseteq iv(\alpha) \cup \tilde{x}_{I_s}$ and $fv(e_b) \cup fv(\tilde{\alpha}_{I_s}) \subseteq iv(\alpha) \cup \tilde{x}_{I_s} \cup \tilde{\alpha}_{I_s}$.

We defined Networks of LTSs called Nets in a form inspired by the synchronisation vectors of Arnold and Nivat [4], that we use to synchronise a (potentially infinite) number of processes. The Nets are extended to pNets such that the holes can be indexed by a parameter, to represent (potentially unbounded) families of similar arguments.

**Definition 3 pNet.** A pNet is a tuple $\langle P, pA_G, J, \tilde{p}_J, \tilde{O}_J, \vec{V} \rangle$ where: $P$ is a set of parameters, $pA_G \subseteq L_{A,P}$ is its set of (parameterized) external actions, $J$ is a finite set of holes, each hole $j$ being associated with (at most) a parameter $p_j \in P$ and with a sort $O_j \subseteq L_{A,P}$. $\vec{V} = \{ \vec{v} \}$ is a set of synchronisation vectors of the form: $\vec{v} = (a_t, \{ \alpha_{t,h} \}_{t \in I \subseteq B_I})$ such that: $I \subseteq J \land B_I \subseteq \text{Dom}(p_I) \land \alpha_{t,h} \in O_I \land fv(\alpha_{t,h}) \subseteq P$.

Each hole in the pNet has a parameter $p_{J_i}$, expressing that this “parameterized hole” corresponds to as many actual processes as necessary in a given instantiation of its parameter. In other words, the parameterized holes express parameterized topologies of processes synchronised by a given Net. Each parameterized synchronisation vector in the pNet expresses a synchronisation between some instances $(\{I_t\}_{t \in B_I})$ of some of the pNet holes ($I \subseteq J$). The hole parameters being part of the variables of the action algebra, they can be used in communication and synchronisation between the processes.

Figure 2 gives an illustration of a graphical representation of a parametrized system in our intermediate language. It shows a meeting system with a single initiator and an arbitrary number of participants.
The parameterized network is represented by a set of three boxes, INITIATOR and PARTICIPANT boxes inside MEETING box (hierarchy). Each box is surrounded by labelled ports encoding a particular Sort (sort constraint $pA_G$) of the corresponding pNet. The box will be filled with a pLTS or another pNet (see Fig. 4) satisfying the Sort inclusion condition ($L \subseteq pA_G$). The ports are interconnected through edges for synchronization. Edges are translated to synchronisation vectors. In previous works we only had single edges with simple arrows having one source and one destinations, which were translated into synchronisation vectors of the form $(!R_{Validate}(), ?R_{Validate}(), ?R_{Validate}())$ expressing a rendez-vous between actions $!R_{Validate}()$ and $?R_{Validate}()$, visible as a global action $R_{Validate}()$. Next section details synchronisation vectors for the multiple arrows we use in our example.

4 Behavioural Model for ProActive Groups

In [9] we presented a methodology for generating behavioural model for ProActive distributed applications, based on static analysis of the Java/ProActive code. This method is composed of two steps: first the source code is analysed by classical compilation techniques, with a special attention to tracking references to remote objects in the code, and identifying remote method calls. This analysis produces a graph including the method call graph and some data-flow information. The second step consists in applying a set of structured operational semantics (SOS) rules to the graph, computing the states and transitions of the behavioural model.

The contribution of this paper is to extend our previous with support for group communication and complex synchronizations related to group communication.

The behavioural model is given as a pNets, which we use as an intermediate language. We express
here the semantics of group communication in this intermediate language and show how behaviour of application including group communications with various synchronisation policies can be expressed.

4.1 Modeling complex synchronisations

In order to encode the simultaneity of several message reception/sending, we use a particular kind of proxy and N-ary synchronisation vectors. In Fig. 3 we give a graphical notation for two operators, the ellipse on the left shows a broadcasting operation, and the one on the right show a collection operation.

The first operator that is in charge of broadcasting requests to multiple processes. It is represented by an ellipse with one link arriving from a process, and a set of links departing from the ellipse. The incoming action is triggered as the same time as all the outgoing ones: in the example the output of the client is triggered at the same time as the input in the service on the left, and the input in all the services on the right (the dotted arrow denotes a multiple link). We extend parameterized vectors to support the multicasting communication.

For broadcasting, we introduce the BC operator to encode a family of synchronized processes. The vector <Q_suggest, !Q_suggest(date), BC i ∈ D, ?services[i], Q_suggest(date), ?service.Q_suggest(date)> indicates the synchronisation between one instance of the network 1 (client), a given number of network 2 (services), and another service process. The synchronisation is an observable action labeled Q_suggest. The parameter i ranges in the domain D. For instance, if D = [0..1], then the vector is expanded to:

< Q_suggest, !Q_suggest(date), ?services[0], Q_suggest(date), ?services[1], Q_suggest(date), ?service.Q_suggest(date) >.

The operator on the right side collects communications: it synchronizes one of its input with its single output. For encoding such a synchronisation, we introduce the CO operator to encode a set of synchronization vectors. The vector < R_suggest(val), !R_suggest(i, val), COi ∈ D, !services[i], R_suggest(val) > indicates the synchronisation between an R_suggest action in the network 1 (client) and an output of one of the network 2 (services). For instance, with D = [0..1], this vector is expanded to several vectors:

< R_suggest(val), !R_suggest(0, val), !services[0], R_suggest(val), * >
< R_suggest(val), !R_suggest(1, val), *, !services[1], R_suggest(val) >

Those two synchronisation mechanisms will be further illustrated in the encoding of the example.

4.2 Modeling the Example

We describe now the behavioural model for our example application, especially focusing on the modeling of group proxies, and the communications involving groups. The full model for our example is shown in
The model is split into two parts interconnected by parameterized synchronization vectors.

- **The initiator** encodes a client side behaviour. The Initiator contains a body encoding an abstraction of the functional code, and the group proxies. For each remote method call in the Initiator code there is a parameterized group proxy, representing an unbounded number of future proxy instances. The body repeatedly suggest a date and either cancel or validate depending on the answers.

- **The participants** encodes the server side behaviour. They are modelled by an indexed family of processes, each representing the behaviour of one element of the group, with its request queue, its body serving requests one after the other in a FIFO order, and the code of its local methods.

A **Proxy** pNet (box) is created for each remote method invocation. The Proxy is indexed by the program point \( (c) \) where the method is called. The **Proxy** pNet models the creating and the management of the group of futures: Once the group of future is created, futures can be received one after the other, and each already received future can be accessed. It is also possible to wait until \( N \) answers are received.

For each remote method call of the Initiator, a broadcast node, synchronizes the sending of the method call by the initiator body, the initialisation of the corresponding future, and the reception of the request message in the queues of each of the participants in the group.

Concerning the user code, the **Body** boxes in Fig. 4 represent the behaviour of the main method of each active object, again on the form of a pLTS. The code for each method (e.g. Validate) is also expressed by a pLTS, and triggered when serving the corresponding request, or by direct invocation like `collateResult`. Each of them is either obtained by source code analysis, or provided by the user.

As it is the only object to act as a server, the participant has a **Queue** box. The corresponding pLTS encodes a FIFO queue of request that is accessed by the participant’s body, and filled when the initiator sends a request. The queue can be given a maximum length and raise an error if it is overflowed.

### 4.3 Variations on group synchronisations

**ProActive** provides various primitives (see Section 2.2) allowing the programmer to control explicitly the synchronization of asynchronous methods calls by waiting the incoming replies. The network **Proxy_suggest** in Fig. 4 specifies three kinds of these primitives: `waitAll`, `waitN` and `waitAndGetTheNth`. Those three primitives show the different synchronisations that our group proxies can express: counting the number of returned objects, or returning a specific result. They are encoded very naturally using a table of received results, and the number \( N \) of results already returned. Those information are updated when receiving messages from a collection (CO) of different results as explained in Section 4.1. Additionally to those primitives, one could also use a `waitOne` primitive waiting for one result, no matter of which it is; this primitive could be encoded with a little more effort by our proxy, but we do not present it because it is not used in our example and we believe it is less crucial than the others. `waitOne` is useful in the case several workers perform the same task, and only one result is necessary.

### 5 Verification and Results

In principle, the steps for designing and validating a distributed application with our approach are:

1. Specify the structure and the behaviour of the application, in terms of active objects (or components). We provide editors for distributed components in the Vercors platform; specific component interfaces exist for group communication. Alternatively one could imagine tools for static analysis of Java/ProActive code, that would provide a similar abstraction of the system.
Figure 4: Model of a communication by broadcasting
Abstract data domains: Group index: $G \in [0..2]$, $Q_{\text{Suggest}}$ argument: $data \in \{D1,D2\}$, $Q_{\text{Suggest}}$ result: bool

Observed sorts:
Initiator sort: $\{Q_{\text{Suggest}}(data), Q_{\text{Validate}}(), Q_{\text{Cancel}}(), R_{\text{Suggest}}(index, bool), R_{\text{Validate}}(index), T_{\text{CollateResults}}(bool)\}$
Participant sort: $\{Q_{\text{Suggest}}(data), Q_{\text{Validate}}(), Q_{\text{Cancel}}(), R_{\text{Suggest}}(bool), R_{\text{Validate}}(), Error()\}$
ParticipantGroup sort: $\{Q_{\text{Suggest}}(data), Q_{\text{Validate}}(), Q_{\text{Cancel}}(), R_{\text{Suggest}}(index, bool), R_{\text{Validate}}(index), Error()\}$
System sort: $\{Q_{\text{Suggest}}(data), Q_{\text{Validate}}(), Q_{\text{Cancel}}(), R_{\text{Suggest}}(index, bool), Error(), T_{\text{CollateResults}}(bool)\}$

| Subsystem                           | brute force | minimized |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|-----------|
|                                     | nb states   | nb transitions | nb states | nb transitions | gen. + min. (seconds) |
| Single Participant                  | 1 801       | 5 338     | 90        | 376        | 8.2                   |
| Initiator                           | 3 163       | 152 081   | 54        | 1 489      | 11.3                  |
| Full system:                        |             |           |           |            |                       |
| with 3 participants, queue[1]       | 85 213      | 839 188   | 178       | 489        | 17.9                  |
| with 3 participants, queue[2]       | 170 349     | 1 646 368 | 458       | 1 284      | 406.0                 |
| With Distributed generation         |             |           |           |            |                       |
|                                     | generation algorithm | Total Time | States/Transitions | States/Transitions (minimized) |
| Full system with 3 participants      | brute force | 6'45''    | 170 349 / 1 646 368 | 458 / 1 284 |
| (8x4 cores)                         | tauconfluence | 30'      | 5591 / 14 236 | 458 / 1 284 |
|                                     | brute force | 11'32''   | 13 327 161 / 48 569 764 | 4 811 / 24 588 |
| Group of 2 participants              | tauconfluence | 1150'55'' | 392 961 / 1 354 948 | 4 811 / 24 588 |
| (15x8 cores)                        |             |           |           |            |                       |
| Group of 3 participants              | tauconfluence | - | Out of memory estimate $\geq 10^{11}$ states | - |
| (15x8 cores)                        |             |           |           |            |                       |

Figure 5: Size of the generated state spaces for different sub-systems of our example

2. Generate a pNet model, following the approach in the previous section. We plan to have tools automatizing this step in a near future, integrated in the Vercors platform.

3. Write user requirements, in the form of logical formulas in some temporal logic dialect (most action-based logics will be suitable).

4. Use a model-checker to check the validity of these formulas on the generated model. Currently only finite-state model-checkers are capable to analyse our models. This means that the parameterized pNets have to be instantiated first to a finite system, and that the formulas have to be instantiated accordingly.

The reader acquainted with model-checkers will have guessed that such models are severely exposed to state explosion. It is very important here to observe two facts: First we only work with an abstraction of the system. We use finite abstractions of data-values in the description of data domains, and we only expose (and observe) the events that are useful for the properties. Secondly, we make use as much as possible of the congruence properties of our semantic model: we build the state-space in a hierarchical manner, often minimizing partial models using branching bisimulation before building their products. But this strategy has limits, and sometimes it is better to build the state-space of a subsystem under the constraints of its environment, avoiding unnecessary complexity; this is illustrated in our case-study by the “Participant group” that has by itself a very high state complexity, of which only a small part is used by the “Initiator” client.
In Figure 5, we give figures obtained on our example. The systems in the first 4 lines of the table have been computed on a Fedora 10 box, with 2 dual-core Intel processors at 2.40 GHz, with a total of 3.8 Gbytes of RAM. The source specification was written in the intermediate format Fiacre \cite{12, 11}, and the state space generated using CADP version 2008-h. The systems in the last part of the table have been computed on a cluster with 15 nodes, each having 8 cores and 32 Gbytes of RAM. We have been using the Distributor tool of CADP for distributed state-space generation, with or without on-the-fly reduction by tauconfluence \cite{21}; the distributed state space has to be merged into a single state space before minimization and model-checking. The execution times in this part include the deployment of the application, the distributed generation, the merging and the minimization of the resulting state-space. A cell with a “-” means that the computation did not terminate.

The main lesson from this experiment is that intermediate systems will often cause the main bottle-necks in the system construction. Here, an unconstrained model for a group of 3 participants is already too big to be computed on a single desktop machine. By contrast, computing the behavior of such a group in the context of a specific client is feasible (here the model of the full system with 3 participants remains reasonably small). Generating the state-space in a distributed fashion gives us the capability of handling significantly larger models. On-the-fly reduction strategies are useful too, but to a certain point only, because it may involve local computations that require large local memory space themselves. In our tests the generation of the model of a group with 3 participants failed: we estimated that the brute force model has approximately 125 billiards of states (this would require some 12 Terabytes of distributed RAM, 25 times more than our full cluster). But even using on-the-fly reduction by tauconfluence, local computations caused an out-of-memory failure.

**Proving properties** We give here examples of functional behavioural properties that we checked on various scenarios. For this, we have built the global synchronisation product of the system, with 3 Participants in the group (the number of participants does not change the results), and with the size of requests queues instantiated to 1 or 2 depending of the cases.

For expressing the properties, we could use any of the logical languages provided within the CADP tool suite, including LTL, CTL, or specification patterns \cite{17}. In general, we use the regular alternative-free $\mu$-calculus formalism, which is a powerful modal logic, nicely expressing action sequences as regular expressions; it is the native logics of the model-checker. We have checked the following formulas:

1. $<\text{True} \times .\text{Error}>\text{True}$: in the system with queue of length 1, the queues can signal an Error.
2. $[\text{True} \times .\text{Error}]/\text{False}$: in the system with queue of length 2, the queues never signal an Error.
3. $<\text{True} \times .\text{R\_suggest}(i, b)>\text{True}$: some paths lead to a response to the $\text{suggest}$ request.
4. $<\text{True} \times .\text{T\_CollateResult}(\text{false})>\text{True}$: the collection of results by the Initiator can return false.
5. After $!\text{Q\_Suggest}(id)$ Eventually $!\text{Q\_Cancel}()\lor !\text{Q\_validate}()$: inevitable reachability of either a validation or a cancellation after a date has been suggested. This formula is written in the specification patterns formalism, and expresses correct progress of the system.

Properties 1. and 2. are checked on two different models, with different size of the queue. They prove that a bounded queue of length 2 is required and sufficient to ensure the correct operation of the system. The Error action in the queue of a participant signals that a request is received in a state where the Queue is already full.

Properties 3. and 4. check the reachability of some possible events; technically, property 3 has to be checked for each possible values of parameters $i$ and $b$, because the $\mu$-calculus logic is not parameterized.
Property 5. expresses the correction of the (first iteration of the) behaviour of the system: in response to a suggest request, we guarantee that the initiator sends either a validation or a cancellation message.

It is interesting to discuss the tools available for exploring and debugging the generated systems. In addition to the model-checking and minimization engines, we have used tools for:

- exploring interactively the generated behaviour at the level of its Lotos representation (OCIS)
- displaying graphically the generated LTS (BCG_EDIT)

Consider formula 1 that checks reachability of action Error. In addition to a “True” result, the model-checker produces a trace illustrating the reachability from the initial state, as shown in Figure 6. The trace consists in a full cycle through the system behaviour, from the initial state to state 6 and action “Q_cancel()”. Then, because we do not wait for the return of the Cancel requests, one of the Participants can still have a Cancel request pending in its queue when the Initiator sends the next Suggest request, which leads to an Error. The BCG_EDIT tool can display the sequence of Figure 6. A finer trace showing internal interactions and allowing user-driven guidance of the system can be obtained with the OCIS tool.

![Figure 6: Path containing the Error action](image)

### 6 Conclusion

In this paper we have sketched models for specifying and verifying the correct behaviour of group-based applications. Our parameterized models enable the finite representation of groups of arbitrary size, and express the communication with such groups, together with the associated synchronizations. For our modelling, we focused on the ProActive library; nevertheless these models can be applied to other middlewares involving collective communications. Our parameterized models are supported by model checking tool. Besides they are hierarchical labelled transition systems, therefore suitable for analysis with verification tools based on bisimulation semantics.

Our main contribution is to provide a behavioural semantic model for group communication applications. It allows the application programmer to prove the correctness of his/her behavioral properties, and for instance detect deadlocks. We have illustrated our approach on an example application, generated the corresponding model, and proved several properties ensuring the correct behaviour of the example. The size of the generated system and the proven properties show that, if the system is entirely known at instantiation time, we are able to prove non-trivial properties on examples of a reasonable size.

Towards dynamic groups A nice perspective of this work is the verification of groups with dynamic membership. The ProActive middleware allow active objects to join and leave a group during execution. This way the application can adapt dynamically in the case new group members are necessary to perform a complex computation, or systematically when new machines join the network. The use of pNets will facilitate the specification of dynamic groups thanks to the support for parameterized processes and synchronisation vectors.
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