Generic computability, Turing degrees, and asymptotic density

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Abstract
Generic decidability has been extensively studied in group theory, and we now study it in the context of classical computability theory. A set \( A \) of natural numbers is called generically computable if there is a partial computable function that agrees with the characteristic function of \( A \) on its domain \( D \), and furthermore \( D \) has density 1, that is, \( \lim_{n \to \infty} |\{k < n : k \in D\}|/n = 1 \). A set \( A \) is called coarsely computable if there is a computable set \( R \) such that the symmetric difference of \( A \) and \( R \) has density 0. We prove that there is a computably enumerable (c.e.) set that is generically computable but not coarsely computable and vice versa. We show that every nonzero Turing degree contains a set that is neither generically computable nor coarsely computable. We prove that there is a c.e. set of density 1 that has no computable subset of density 1. Finally, we define and study generic reducibility.

1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been a general realization that worst-case complexity measures, such as \( P, NP, \) exponential time, and just being computable, often do not give a good overall picture of the difficulty of a problem. The most famous example of this is the simplex algorithm for linear programming, which runs hundreds of times every day, always very quickly. Klee and Minty [9] constructed examples for which the simplex algorithm takes exponential time, but these examples do not occur in practice.

Gurevich [4] and Levin [10] independently introduced the idea of average-case complexity. Here one has a probability measure on the instances of a problem and one averages the time complexity over all instances. The book by Borgwardt [2] shows that, for some variants of the simplex algorithm and a corresponding probability distribution, the expected number of operations is polynomial. A result in group theory is the result of Blass and Gurevich [1] that the Bounded Product Problem for the modular group, \( \text{PSL}(2, \mathbb{Z}) \), is \( NP \)-complete but has polynomial time average-case complexity. Average-case complexity is, however, difficult to work with because it is highly sensitive to the probability distribution used and one must still consider all cases.

Generic-case complexity was introduced by Kapovich, Miasnikov, Schupp, and Shpilrain [6] as a complexity measure that is much easier to work with. The basic idea is that one considers partial algorithms that give no incorrect answers and fail to converge only on a 'negligible' set of inputs as defined below.

Definition 1.1 (Asymptotic density). Let \( \Sigma \) be a nonempty finite alphabet and let \( \Sigma^* \) denote the set of all finite words on \( \Sigma \). The length, \( \|w\| \), of a word \( w \) is the number of letters in \( w \). Let \( S \) be a subset of \( \Sigma^* \). For every \( n \geq 0 \) let \( S[n] \) denote the set of all words in \( S \) of length at most \( n \). Let

\[
\rho_n(S) = \frac{|S[n]|}{|\Sigma^*[n]|},
\]

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We define the upper density $\bar{\rho}(S)$ of $S$ in $\Sigma^*$ as
\[
\bar{\rho}(S) := \limsup_{n \to \infty} \rho_n(S).
\]

Similarly, we define the lower density $\rho(S)$ of $S$ in $\Sigma^*$ as
\[
\rho(S) := \liminf_{n \to \infty} \rho_n(S).
\]

If the actual limit $\rho(S) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \rho_n(S)$ exists, then $\rho(S)$ is the (asymptotic) density of $S$ in $\Sigma^*$.

**Definition 1.2.** A subset $S$ of $\Sigma^*$ is generic if $\rho(S) = 1$ and $S$ is negligible if $\rho(S) = 0$.

It is clear that $S$ is generic if and only if its complement $\bar{S}$ is negligible. Also, the union and intersection of a finite number of generic (negligible) sets is generic (negligible).

**Definition 1.3.** In the case where the limit
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \rho_n(S) = \rho(S) = 1,
\]
we are sometimes interested in estimating the speed of convergence of the sequence $\{\rho_n(S)\}$. To this end, we say that the convergence is exponentially fast if there are $0 < \sigma < 1$ and $C > 0$ such that, for every $n \geq 1$, we have $1 - \rho_n(S) \leq C\sigma^n$. In this case, we say that $S$ is strongly generic.

**Definition 1.4.** Let $S$ be a subset of $\Sigma^*$ with characteristic function $\chi_S$. A partial function $\Phi$ from $\Sigma^*$ to $\{0, 1\}$ is called a generic description of $S$ if $\Phi(x) = \chi_S(x)$ whenever $\Phi(x)$ is defined (written $\Phi(x) \downarrow$) and the domain of $\Phi$ is generic in $\Sigma^*$. A set $S$ is called generically computable if there exists a partial computable function $\Phi$ that is a generic description of $S$. We stress that all answers given by $\Phi$ must be correct even though $\Phi$ need not be everywhere defined, and, indeed, we do not require the domain of $\Phi$ to be computable.

It turns out that one can prove sharp results about generic-case complexity without even knowing the worst-case complexity of a problem. Magnus [11] proved in the 1930s that one-relator groups have a solvable word problem, but we do not know any precise bound on complexity over the entire class of one-relator groups. However, for any one-relator group with at least three generators, the word problem is strongly generically linear time [6]. Also, we do not even know whether or not the isomorphism problem restricted to one-relator presentations is solvable, but the problem is strongly generically linear time [7, 8]. Even undecidable problems can be generically easy. For example, in Boone’s group with an unsolvable word problem [15], the word problem is strongly generically linear time [6]. Miasnikov and Osin [12] have constructed finitely generated recursively presented groups whose word problem is not generically computable, but it is not known if there is a finitely presented group whose word problem is not generically computable.

The idea of generic computability is very different from that of Turing reducibility, since generic computability depends on how information is distributed in a given set.

**Observation 1.5.** Every Turing degree contains a set that is strongly generically computable in linear time. Let $A$ be an arbitrary subset of $\omega$ and let $S \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$ be the set $\{0^n : n \in A\}$. Now $S$ is Turing equivalent to $A$ and is strongly generically computable in linear time by the algorithm $\Phi$ which, on input $w$, answers ‘No’ if $w$ contains a 1 and does not answer
otherwise. Here all computational difficulty is concentrated in a negligible set, namely, the set of words not containing a 1. Note that since the algorithm given is independent of the set \(A\), the observation shows that one algorithm can generically decide uncountably many sets.

The next observation is a general abstract version of Miasnikov’s and Rybalov’s proof [13, Theorem 6.5], that there is a finitely presented semigroup whose word problem is not generically computable.

Observation 1.6. Every nonzero Turing degree contains a set that is not generically computable. Let \(A\) be any noncomputable subset of \(\omega\) and let \(T \subseteq \{0,1\}^*\) be the set \(\{0^n1w : n \in A, w \in \{0,1\}^*\}\). Clearly, \(A\) and \(T\) are Turing equivalent. For a fixed \(n_0\), \(\rho(\{0^n1w : w \in \{0,1\}^*\}) = 2^{-(n_0+1)} > 0\). A generic algorithm for a set must give an answer on some members of any set of positive density. Thus, \(T\) cannot be generically computable since if \(\Phi\) were a generic algorithm for \(T\), we could just run bounded simulation of \(\Phi\) on the set \(\{0^n1w : w \in \{0,1\}^*\}\) until \(\Phi\) gave an answer, thus deciding whether or not \(n \in A\). Here the idea is that the single bit of information \(\chi_A(n)\) is ‘spread out’ to a set of positive density in the definition of \(T\). Also note that if \(A\) is computably enumerable (c.e.), then \(T\) is also c.e. and thus every nonzero c.e. Turing degree contains a c.e. set that is not generically computable.

In the current paper, we study generic computability for sets of natural numbers using the concepts and techniques of computability theory and the classic notion of asymptotic density for sets of natural numbers. An easy result, analogous to Observation 1.6, is that every nonzero Turing degree contains a set of natural numbers that is not generically computable.

We define the notion of being densely approximable by a class \(C\) of sets and observe that a set \(A\) is generically computable if and only if it is densely approximable by the class of c.e. sets. We prove that there is a c.e. set of density 1 that has no computable subset of density 1. It follows as a corollary that there is a generically computable set \(A\) such that no generic algorithm for \(A\) has a computable domain.

We call a set \(A\) of natural numbers coarsely computable if there is a computable set \(B\) such that the symmetric difference of \(A\) and \(B\) has density 0. We show that there are c.e. sets that are coarsely computable but not generically computable and c.e. sets that are generically computable but not coarsely computable. We also prove that every nonzero Turing degree contains a set that is not coarsely computable.

We consider a relativized notion of generic computability and also introduce a notion of generic reducibility that gives a degree structure and that is related to enumeration reducibility. Almost all of our proofs use the collection of sets \(\{R_n\}\) defined below, which form a partition of \(\mathbb{N} - \{0\}\) into subsets of positive density. We use this collection to define a natural embedding of the Turing degrees into the generic degrees and show that this embedding is proper. We close by describing some related ongoing work with Rod Downey and stating some open questions.

2. Generic computability of subsets of \(\omega\)

We identify the set \(\mathbb{N} = \{0,1,\ldots\}\) of natural numbers with the set \(\omega\) of finite ordinals. In this article, we focus on generic computability properties of subsets of \(\omega\) to see how density interacts with some classic concepts of computability theory. Thus, we are using the 1-element alphabet \(\Sigma = \{1\}\) and identifying \(n \in \omega\) with its unary representation \(1^n \in \{1\}^*\), so that we also identify \(\omega\) with \(\{1\}^*\). In this context, of course, our definition of (upper and lower) density for subsets of \(\{1\}^*\) agrees with the corresponding classical definitions for subsets of \(\omega\). In particular, the density of \(A\), denoted by \(\rho(A)\) is given by \(\lim_n |A[n]/(n+1)|\), provided that this limit exists,
where $A[n] = A \cap [0, n]$. Further, for $A \subseteq B$, the density of $A$ in $B$ is $\lim_n |A[n]|/|B[n]|$, provided that $B$ is nonempty and this limit exists. Corresponding definitions hold for the upper and lower density. It is clear that if $A$ has positive upper density in $B$, and $B$ has positive density, then $A$ has positive upper density.

Our notation for computability is mostly standard, except that we use $\Phi_e$ for the unary partial function computed by the $e$th Turing machine, and we let $\Phi_e,s$ be the part of $\Phi_e$ computed in at most $s$ steps. Let $W_e$ be the domain of $\Phi_e$. We identify a set $A \subseteq \omega$ with its characteristic function $\chi_A$.

**Definition 2.1.** Let $\mathcal{C}$ be a family of subsets of $\omega$. A set $A \subseteq \omega$ is densely $\mathcal{C}$-approximable if there exist sets $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $C_0 \subseteq \bar{A}$, $C_1 \subseteq A$ and $C_0 \cup C_1$ has density 1.

The following proposition corresponds to the basic fact that a set $A$ is computable if and only if both $A$ and its complement $\bar{A}$ are c.e.

**Proposition 2.2.** A set $A$ is generically computable if and only if $A$ is densely $\mathcal{CE}$-approximable where $\mathcal{CE}$ is the class of c.e. sets.

**Proof.** If $A$ is densely $\mathcal{CE}$-approximable, then there exist c.e. sets $C_0 \subseteq \bar{A}$ and $C_1 \subseteq A$ such that $C_0 \cup C_1$ has density 1. For a given $x$ start enumerating both $C_0$ and $C_1$ and if $x$ appears, answer accordingly.

If $A$ is generically computable by a partial computable function $\Phi$, then the sets $C_0$ and $C_1$ on which $\Phi$ respectively answers ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ are the desired c.e. sets.

**Corollary 2.3.** Every c.e. set of density 1 is generically computable.

Recall that a set $A$ is immune if $A$ is infinite and $A$ does not contain any infinite c.e. set, and $A$ is bi-immune if both $A$ and its complement $\bar{A}$ are immune. If the union $C_0 \cup C_1$ of two c.e. sets has density 1, then certainly at least one of them is infinite. Thus, we have the following corollary.

**Corollary 2.4.** No bi-immune set is generically computable.

Now the class of bi-immune sets is both comeager and of measure 1. (This is clear by countable additivity since the family of sets containing a given infinite set is of measure 0 and nowhere dense.) Thus, the family of generically computable sets is both meager and of measure 0. See Cooper [3] for the definition of 1-generic in computability theory and see Nies [14] for the definition of 1-random. (This use of the word ‘generic’ in the term ‘1-generic’ has no relation to our general use of ‘generic’ throughout this paper.) We cite here only the facts that 1-generic sets and 1-random sets are bi-immune, and it thus follows that no generically computable set is 1-generic or 1-random.

The following sets $R_k$ play a crucial role in almost all of our proofs.

**Definition 2.5.**

$$R_k = \{ m : 2^k | m, 2^{(k+1)} \not| m \}.$$
For example, $R_0$ is the set of odd nonnegative integers. Note that $\rho(R_k) = 2^{-(k+1)}$. The collection of sets $\{R_k\}$ forms a partition of unity for $\omega - \{0\}$ since these sets are pairwise disjoint and $\bigcup_{k=0}^{\infty} R_k = \omega - \{0\}$.

From the definition of asymptotic density, it is clear that we have finite additivity for densities: If $S_1, \ldots, S_t$ are pairwise disjoint sets whose densities exist, then

$$\rho \left( \bigcup_{i=1}^{t} S_i \right) = \sum_{i=1}^{t} \rho(S_i).$$

Of course, we do not have general countable additivity for densities, since $\omega$ is a countable union of singletons. However, we do have countable additivity in certain restricted situations, where the ‘tails’ of a sequence contribute vanishingly small density to the union of a sequence of sets.

**Lemma 2.6** (Restricted countable additivity). If $\{S_i\}, i = 0, 1, \ldots$ is a countable collection of pairwise disjoint subsets of $\omega$ such that each $\rho(S_i)$ exists and $\rho(\bigcup_{i \in N} S_i) \to 0$ as $N \to \infty$, then

$$\rho \left( \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} S_i \right) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho(S_i).$$

**Proof.** The sequence of partial sums $\sum_{i=0}^{t} \rho(S_i)$ is a monotone nondecreasing sequence bounded above by 1, and so converges. Let its limit be $r$. Now

$$\frac{|\bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} S_i|}{n+1} = \frac{|\bigcup_{i=0}^{N} S_i|}{n+1} + \frac{|\bigcup_{i=N+1}^{\infty} S_i|}{n+1}.$$ 

We need to show that the term on the left approaches $r$ as $n \to \infty$. For any $N$, as $n \to \infty$ the first term on the right approaches $\sum_{i=0}^{N} \rho(S_i)$ by finite additivity and thus approaches $r$ as $N \to \infty$. We are done because, by hypothesis, the second term on the right can be made arbitrarily close to 0 by choosing $N$ sufficiently large and then $n$ sufficiently large. In more detail, let $\epsilon > 0$ be given. Choose $N_0$ so that, for all $N \geq N_0$, $\rho(\bigcup_{i=0}^{N} S_i) < \epsilon/3$. Choose $N_1$ so that, for all $N \geq N_1$, $|r - \sum_{i=0}^{N} \rho(S_i)| < \epsilon/3$. Fix $N = \max\{N_0, N_1\}$. Rewrite the displayed equation above as $a_n = b_{n,N} + c_{n,N}$, so we are trying to prove that $a_n \to r$ as $n \to \infty$. Choose $n_0$ so large that, for all $n \geq n_0$, $c_{n,N} < \epsilon/3$. Choose $n_1$ so large that, for all $n \geq n_1$, $|\sum_{i=0}^{N} \rho(S_i) - b_{n,N}| < \epsilon/3$. Standard calculations show that if $n \geq \max\{n_0, n_1\}$, then $|a_n - r| < \epsilon$. $\square$

**Definition 2.7.** If $A \subseteq \omega$, then $R(A) = \bigcup_{n \in A} R_n$.

Our sequence $\{R_n\}$ clearly satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 2.6, so we have the following corollary.

**Corollary 2.8.** For $A \subseteq \omega$, $\rho(R(A)) = \sum_{n \in A} 2^{-(n+1)}$.

This gives an explicit construction of sets with preassigned densities.

**Corollary 2.9.** Every real number $r \in [0, 1]$ is a density.
If \( r = b_0 b_1 b_2 \cdots \) is the binary expansion of \( r \), let \( A = \{ i : b_i = 1 \} \) and then \( \rho(\mathcal{R}(A)) = r \). Recall that a real number \( r \) is computable if and only if there is a computable function \( f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{Q} \) such that \( |r - f(n)| \leq 2^{-n} \) for all \( n \geq 0 \).

**Observation 2.10.** The density \( r_A \) of \( \mathcal{R}(A) \), that is, \( \sum_{n \in A} \rho(R_n) \), is a computable real if and only if \( A \) is computable.

**Proof.** If \( A \) is computable, to compute the first \( t \) bits of \( r_A \), check if \( 0, \ldots, t \) are in \( A \), and take the resulting fraction \( .b_0 \ldots b_t \). If \( r_A \) is computable, then there exists an algorithm \( \Phi \) that, when given \( t \), computes the first \( t \) digits of the binary expansion of \( r_A \). To see if \( n \in A \), compute the first \( (n + 1) \) bits of \( r_A \). \( \square \)

We shall later characterize those reals that are densities of computable sets.

It is obvious that every Turing degree contains a generically computable subset of \( \omega \); namely, given a set \( A \), let \( B = \{ 2^n : n \in A \} \). Then \( B \) is generically computable via the algorithm that answers ‘no’ on all arguments that are not powers of 2 and gives no answer otherwise. Now \( A \) and \( B \) are Turing equivalent, and in fact they are many-one equivalent if \( A \neq \omega \).

**Observation 2.11.** The set \( \mathcal{R}(A) \) is Turing equivalent to \( A \) and is generically computable if and only if \( A \) is computable. Hence, every nonzero Turing degree contains a subset of \( \omega \) that is not generically computable.

This is the same argument as in Observation 1.6, namely, any generic algorithm for \( \mathcal{R}(A) \) must converge on an element of each \( R_n \). Note also that \( A \) and \( \mathcal{R}(A) \) are many-one equivalent for \( A \neq \omega \), so that every many-one degree that contains a noncomputable set also contains a set that is not generically computable.

**Definition 2.12.** Two sets \( A \) and \( B \) are generically similar, which we denote by \( A \sim_g B \), if their symmetric difference \( A \Delta B = (A \setminus B) \cup (B \setminus A) \) has density 0.

It is easy to check that \( \sim_g \) is an equivalence relation. Any set of density 1 is generically similar to \( \omega \), and any set of density 0 is generically similar to \( \emptyset \).

**Definition 2.13.** A set \( A \) is coarsely computable if \( A \) is generically similar to a computable set.

From the remarks above, all sets of density 1 or of density 0 are coarsely computable. One can think of coarse computability in the following way: The set \( A \) is coarsely computable if there exists a total algorithm \( \Phi \) that may make mistakes on membership in \( A \) but the mistakes occur only on a negligible set.

**Observation 2.14.** The word problem of any finitely generated group \( G = \langle X : R \rangle \) is coarsely computable.

**Proof.** If \( G \) is finite, then the word problem is computable. Indeed, since computability is independent of the particular presentation as long as it is finitely generated, we can use
the finite multiplication table presentation, which shows that the word problem is even a regular language. Now if $G$ is an infinite group, then the set of words on $(X \cup X^{-1})^*$ that are not equal to the identity in $G$ has density 1 and hence is coarsely computable. (See, for example, [17].)

**Proposition 2.15.** There is a c.e. set that is coarsely computable but not generically computable.

**Proof.** Recall that a c.e. set $A$ is simple if $\bar{A}$ is immune. It suffices to construct a simple set $A$ of density 0, since any such set is coarsely computable but not generically computable by Proposition 2.2. This is done by a slight modification of Post’s simple set construction; namely, for each $e$, enumerate $W_e$ until, if ever, a number greater than $e^2$ appears, and put the first such number into $A$. Then $A$ is simple, and $A$ has density 0 because, for each $e$, it has at most $e$ elements less than $e^2$.

It is easily seen that the family of coarsely computable sets is meager and of measure 0. In fact, if $A$ is coarsely computable, then $A$ is neither 1-generic nor 1-random. To see this, note first that if $A$ is 1-random and $C$ is computable, then the symmetric difference $A \triangle C$ is also 1-random, and the analogous fact also holds for 1-genericity. The result follows because 1-random sets have density $\frac{1}{2}$ (see [14, Proposition 3.2.13]) and 1-generic sets have upper density 1.

**Theorem 2.16.** There exists a c.e. set that is not generically similar to any co-c.e. set and hence is neither coarsely computable nor generically computable.

**Proof.** Let $\{W_e\}$ be a standard enumeration of all c.e. sets. Let

$$A = \bigcup_{e \in \omega} (W_e \cap R_e).$$

Clearly, $A$ is c.e. We first claim that $A$ is not generically similar to any co-c.e. set and hence is not coarsely computable. Note that

$$R_e \subseteq A \triangle \overline{W}_e$$

since if $n \in R_e$ and $n \in A$, then $n \in (A \setminus \overline{W}_e)$, while if $n \in R_e$ and $n \notin A$, then $n \in (\overline{W}_e \setminus A)$. So, for all $e$, $(A \triangle \overline{W}_e)$ has positive lower density, and hence $A$ is not generically similar to $\overline{W}_e$. It follows that $A$ is not coarsely computable. Of course, this construction is simply a diagonal argument, but instead of using a single witness for each requirement, we use a set of witnesses of positive density.

Suppose now for a contradiction that $A$ were generically computable. By Proposition 2.2, let $W_a, W_b$ be c.e. sets such that $W_a \subseteq A$, $W_b \subseteq \bar{A}$, and $W_a \cup W_b$ has density 1. Then $A$ would be generically similar to $\overline{W}_b$ since

$$A \triangle \overline{W}_b \subseteq \overline{W}_a \cup W_b,$$

and $\overline{W}_a \cup W_b$ has density 0. This shows that $A$ is not generically computable.

**Definition 2.17.** If $A \subseteq \omega$ and $\{A_s\}$ is a sequence of finite sets, we write $\lim_s A_s = A$ if, for every $n$, we have, for all sufficiently large $s$, $n \in A$ if and only if $n \in A_s$. 
The Limit Lemma, due to J. Shoenfield, characterizes the sets $A$ computable from the halting problem $0'$ as the limits of uniformly computable sequences of finite sets.

**Lemma 2.18 (The Limit Lemma).** Let $A \subseteq \omega$. Then $A \leq_T 0'$ if and only if there is a uniformly computable sequence of finite sets $\{A_s\}$ such that $\lim_s A_s = A$.

We note that by Post’s Theorem, the sets Turing reducible to $0'$ are precisely the sets that are $\Delta^0_2$ in the arithmetical hierarchy.

**Theorem 2.19.** The set $\mathcal{R}(A) = \bigcup_{n \in A} R_n$ is coarsely computable if and only if $A \leq_T 0'$.

**Proof.** First suppose that $A \leq_T 0'$. Then, by the Limit Lemma, there is a uniformly computable sequence $\{A_s\}$ of finite sets such that $\lim_s A_s = A$. To construct a computable set $C$ generically similar to $\mathcal{R}(A)$, we do the following. Any $n$ is in a unique set $R_k$. Compute this $k$, so $n \in R(A)$ if and only if $k \in A$. We put $n$ into $C$ if and only if $k$ is in the approximating set $A_n$. This condition is computable. Now note that if $n$ is sufficiently large, then $k \in A$ if and only if $k \in A_n$. Hence,

$$ (C \triangle \mathcal{R}(A)) \cap R_k $$

is finite for all $k$. Let $D = (C \triangle \mathcal{R}(A))$. Then $D \cap R_k$ has density 0 for all $k$ and thus $D$ has density 0 by Lemma 2.6 on restricted countable additivity. It follows that $\mathcal{R}(A)$ is coarsely computable.

Now suppose that $\mathcal{R}(A)$ is coarsely computable, that is, it is generically similar to a computable set $C$. We need to show that $A \leq_T 0'$ by finding a uniformly computable sequence of finite sets $\{A_s\}$ with $\lim_s A_s = A$.

Note that $\rho(C) = \rho(\mathcal{R}(A))$, which exists, and $\rho(C \cap R_n) = \rho(\mathcal{R}(A) \cap R_n)$. So if $n \in A$, then $\rho(\mathcal{R}(A) \cap R_n) = \rho(R_n) = 2^{-(n+1)}$, while if $n \notin A$, then $\rho(R_n \cap \mathcal{R}(A)) = 0$. Thus, we can use our ability to approximate $\rho(C \cap R_n)$ to approximate $A$.

At stage $s$, for every $n \leq s$, calculate

$$ \rho_s(C \cap R_n) = \frac{|(C \cap R_n)|[s]}{s + 1}. $$

Put $n$ into $A_s$ if and only if this fraction is at least $\frac{1}{2}(2^{-(n+1)})$. The sequence $\{A_s\}$ is uniformly computable. It converges to $A$ since $\rho_s(C \cap R_n)$ converges to $\rho(C \cap R_n)$ as $s \to \infty$.

In particular, if $A$ is any set Turing reducible to $0'$ but not computable, then $\mathcal{R}(A)$ is coarsely computable but not generically computable.

**Theorem 2.20.** Every nonzero Turing degree contains a set that is neither coarsely computable nor generically computable.

**Proof.** Let $A$ be a noncomputable set. We must construct a set $B \equiv_T A$ such that $B$ is neither coarsely computable nor generically computable. By Theorem 2.19 it does not work in general to simply define $B = \mathcal{R}(A)$, as was done for generic computability in the proof of Observation 2.11. Instead, we use an alternate construction based on coding each bit of $A$ into a large finite interval of $B$. Specifically, for each $n \in \omega$ let $I_n$ be the interval $[n!, (n+1)!)$, and let $B = \bigcup_{n \in A} I_n$. Clearly $B \equiv_T A$, so it suffices to show that $B$ is neither coarsely computable nor generically computable.
We first show that $B$ is not coarsely computable. To do this, we assume that $B$ is coarsely computable and show that $A$ is computable. Since $B$ is coarsely computable, we can choose a computable set $C$ such that $\rho(C \triangle B) = 0$. The idea now is that we can show that $A$ is computable by using ‘majority vote’ to read off from $C$ a set $D$ that differs only finitely much from $A$. Specifically, define

$$D = \{n : |I_n \cap C| \geq \frac{1}{2} |I_n|\}.$$ 

Then $D$ is a computable set and we claim that $A \triangle D$ is finite. To prove the claim, assume for a contradiction that $A \triangle D$ is infinite. If $n \in A \triangle D$, then at least half of the elements of $I_n$ are in $C \triangle B$. It follows that, for $n \in A \triangle D$,

$$\rho_{(n+1)!}(C \triangle B) \geq \frac{1}{2} \frac{|I_n|}{(n+1)!} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{(n+1)! - n!}{(n+1)!} = \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{n+1} \right).$$

As the above inequality holds for infinitely many $n$, it follows that $\bar{\rho}(C \triangle B) \geq \frac{1}{2}$, in contradiction to our assumption that $\rho(C \triangle B) = 0$. It follows that $A \triangle D$ is finite and hence $A$ is computable, as needed to complete the proof that $B$ is not coarsely computable.

We now show that $B$ is not generically computable. To do this, we assume that $B$ is generically computable and show that $A$ is computable. Let $\psi$ be a partial computable function that witnesses that $B$ is generically computable, so $\psi(n) = B(n)$ for all $n$ in the domain $U$ of $\psi$, and $\rho(U) = 1$. Define a partial computable function $\theta$ as follows: On input $n$, search for $k \in I_n$ with $\psi(k) \downarrow$, and set $\theta(n) = \psi(k)$ for the first such $k$ that is found. If $I_n$ is disjoint from the domain of $\psi$, then we leave $\theta(n)$ undefined. Clearly, if $\theta(n) \downarrow$, then $\theta(n) = A(n)$, since $A(n) = B(k)$ for all $k \in I_n$. Further, $\theta$ has cofinite domain, since otherwise $\bigcup \{I_n : \theta(n) \downarrow\}$ would be a set of upper density 1 disjoint from the domain $U$ of $\psi$, by an argument similar to that in the previous paragraph. This contradicts the fact that $U$ has density 1, so $\theta$ has cofinite domain. Hence, $A$ is computable, as needed to complete the proof that $B$ is not generically computable. \)

A real number $r$ that is computable relative to $0'$ is called a $\Delta^0_0$ real, and it is well known that these are the reals whose binary expansion is computable from $0'$. It then follows from the Limit Lemma that a real number $r \in [0, 1]$ is $\Delta^0_0$ if and only if $r = \lim_n q_n$ for some computable sequence of rational numbers in the interval $(0, 1)$.

**Theorem 2.21.** A real number $r \in [0, 1]$ is the density of some computable set if and only if $r$ is a $\Delta^0_2$ real.

**Proof.** If $A$ is computable, then we can compute

$$q_n = \rho_n(A) = \frac{|\{k : k \leq n, k \in A\}|}{n+1},$$

for all $n$. Thus, if $\rho(A) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \rho_n(A)$ exists, its value $r$ is a $\Delta^0_0$ real.

We must now show that if $r = \lim_n q_n$ is the limit of a computable sequence of rationals in the interval $(0, 1)$, then there is a computable set $A$ with $\rho(A) = r$. We define a computable increasing sequence $\{s_n\}$ of positive integers such that

$$\frac{|A[s_n]|}{s_n + 1} - q_n < \frac{1}{n} \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{|A[s_n]|}{s_n + 1} = r.$$

Take $s_1 = 1$ and put 0 in $A$. If $A[s_n]$ is already defined, then there are two cases. If $|A[s_n]| / (s_n + 1) < q_{n+1}$, find the least $k$ such that

$$|A[s_n] + k| / (s_n + k + 1) \geq q_{n+1}.$$
(Such a $k$ exists because $q_{n+1} < 1$.) Let $s_{n+1} = s_n + k$ and let \( A[s_{n+1}] = A[s_n \cup \{s_n + 1, \ldots, s_n + k\} \).

If \( |A[s_n]|/(s_n + 1) \geq q_{n+1} \), find the least $k$ such that
\[
\frac{|A[s_n]|}{s_n + k + 1} < q_{n+1}.
\]
Let $s_{n+1} = s_n + k$ and let $A[s_{n+1}] = A[s_n]$. (We add no new elements to $A$.)

Since $s_n \geq n$, we have $|\rho_{s_n}(A) - q_n| \leq 1/n$ for all $n$. It follows that $\rho_{s_n}(A)$ approaches $\lim_n q_n = r$ as $n \to \infty$. Furthermore, by construction, $\rho_k(A)$ is monotone increasing or decreasing on each interval \( (s_n, s_{n+1}] \), so that $\rho_k(A)$ is between $\rho_{s_n}(A)$ and $\rho_{s_{n+1}}(A)$ whenever $s_n < k < s_{n+1}$. Hence, $\rho_k(A) \to r$ as $k \to \infty$, so $\rho(A) = r$.

It is easily seen that every c.e. set of upper density 1 has a computable subset of upper density 1, and this makes it tempting to conjecture that every c.e. set of density 1 has a computable subset of density 1. Our next result is a refutation of this conjecture. This result has several important corollaries, and the technique of its proof will be used to show in Theorem 2.26 that there is a set that is generically computable but not coarsely computable.

**Theorem 2.22.** There exists a c.e. set $A$ of density 1 that has no computable subset of density 1.

**Proof.** We construct $A$ so that it does not contain any co-c.e. subset of density 1. We heavily use our partition of unity \{\( R_n \}\}. To ensure that $A$ has density 1, we impose the following infinitary positive requirements:
\[
P_n : R_n \subseteq^* A,
\]
where $B \subseteq^* A$ means that $B \setminus A$ is finite. These requirements ensure that $A$ has density 1 because (if $0 \in A$)
\[
\bar{A} = \bar{A} \cap \bigcup_{n \in \omega} R_n = \bigcup_{n \in \omega} (\bar{A} \cap R_n),
\]
and the last union has density 0 by restricted countable additivity (Theorem 2.6).

Let \{\( W_e \)\} be a standard enumeration of all c.e. sets. We must ensure that if $\overline{W_e} \subseteq A$ (that is, $W_e \cup A = \omega$), then $W_e$ does not have density 1 (that is, $W_e$ does not have density 0). Since $R_e$ has positive density, it suffices to meet the following negative requirement $N_e$: If $W_e \cup A = \omega$, then $W_e$ does not have upper density 0 on $R_e$.

The usefulness of the sets $R_e$ here is that the positive requirement $P_e$ puts only elements of $R_e$ into $A$ and the negative requirement $N_e$ keeps only elements of $R_e$ out of $A$. Since the sets $R_e$ are pairwise disjoint, this eliminates the need for the usual combinatorics of infinite injury constructions and indeed allows the construction of $A$ to proceed independently on each $R_e$.

The idea of the proof is that we can make the density of $A$ low on an interval within $R_e$ by restraining $A$ on that interval, and at the same time starting to put the rest of $R_e$ into $A$. If eventually the interval is contained in $W_e \cup A$, then we have found an interval where $W_e$ has high density and can start over with a new interval. Otherwise, $W_e \cup A \neq \omega$, and we meet the requirement vacuously with a finite restraint.

We construct each subset $A_e = A \cap R_e$, the $e$th part of $A$, in stages. Initially, each $A_{e,0}$ is empty and the constraint $r(e,0)$ is the least element of $R_e$.

At stage $s$, check whether or not $W_{e,s+1} \cup A_{e,s}$ fills up $R_e$ below $r(e,s)$, that is, whether or not $A_{e,s} \cup W_{e,s+1} \supseteq R_e[r(e,s)]$. If not, then $A_{e,s+1}$ is $A_{e,s}$ together with the first element of $R_e$ that is greater than $r(e,s)$ and that is not already in $A_{e,s}$. Set $r(e,s+1) = r(e,s)$ in this case.
If $A_{e,s} \cup W_{e,s+1} \supseteq R_e[r(e,s)]$, then $A_{e,s} \cup (R_e[r(e,s)])$. Now choose $r(e,s+1)$ large enough so that $r(e,s+1) > r(e,s)$ and $A_{e,s+1}$ has density less than or equal to $\frac{1}{2}$ on $R_e[r(e,s+1)]$.

For each $e$ there are two possibilities. The first is that $\lim_{s} r(e,s) = \alpha_e \in \omega$. In this case, note that all elements of $R_e$ that are greater than $\alpha_e$ are put into $A_e = A \cap R_e$. Thus, we indeed have $R_e \subseteq^{*} A$. The negative requirement $N_e$ is met vacuously because $W_e \cup A \neq \omega$.

The second possibility is that $\lim_{s} r(e,s) = \infty$. In this case, $W_e \cup A_e$ fills up arbitrary large initial intervals of $R_e$. So $R_e \subseteq A$ by construction and $W_e$ has positive upper density on $R_e$ since it must supply at least $\frac{1}{2}$ of the elements of arbitrarily large initial intervals of $R_e$; namely, when $r(e,s)$ takes on a new value, at most half of the elements of $R_e$ less than or equal to $r(e,s)$ are in $A$, and no elements of $R_e$ less than or equal to $r(e,s)$ enter $A$ until every number in $R_e$ less than or equal to $r(e,s)$ has been enumerated in $W_e \cup A$, so at least half of these numbers have been enumerated in $W_e$. This process occurs for infinitely many values of $r(e,s)$.

This theorem has two immediate corollaries. The first follows from the fact that any c.e. set of density 1 is generically computable.

**Corollary 2.23.** Generically computable sets need not be densely approximable by computable sets.

**Corollary 2.24.** There exists a generically computable set $A$ of density 1 such that no generic algorithm for $A$ has computable domain.

**Proof.** Let $A$ be the c.e. set of the theorem above. If $\Phi$ were a generic algorithm for $A$ with computable domain, then $\{x| \Phi(X) \downarrow = 1\}$ would be a computable subset of $A$ with density 1, which is a contradiction.

**Observation 2.25.** A set $A$ is generically computable by a partial algorithm with computable domain if and only if $A$ is densely approximable by computable sets.

**Theorem 2.26.** There is a generically computable c.e. set $A$ that is not coarsely computable.

**Proof.** The proof is similar to that of the previous theorem. We construct disjoint c.e. sets $A_0, A_1$ such that

$A_0 \cup A_1$ has density 1 and $A_1$ is not coarsely computable.

Note that both $A_0$ and $A_1$ are generically computable since they are disjoint c.e. sets and their union has density 1. So it will follow that $A_1$ is generically computable but not coarsely computable. We now have positive requirements

$P_e : R_e \subseteq^{*} (A_0 \cup A_1),$

and negative requirements

$N_e : \text{If } \Phi_e \text{ is total, then } \Phi_e^{-1}(1) \triangle A_1 \text{ is not of density 0}.$
Satisfaction of the positive requirement suffices to ensure that $A_0 \cup A_1$ has density 1 as in the proof of Theorem 2.26. It is clear that satisfaction of all of the negative requirements implies that $A_1$ is not coarsely computable.

We again have a restraint function $r(e,s)$. Initially, both $A_0$ and $A_1$ are empty and the restraint $r(e,0)$ is the least element of $R_e$. At stage $s$, for each $e \leq s$, check whether

$$\text{Domain} (\Phi_{e,s+1}) \supseteq R_e[r(e,s)].$$

If so, let $F$ be the set of elements of $R_e[r(e,s)]$ that are not already in $A_0 \cup A_1$. Put all elements of $F \cap \Phi_e^{-1}(1)$ into $A_0$ and all other elements of $F$ into $A_1$. Since by construction at least half of the elements of $R_e[r(e,s)]$ are in $F$, and $F \subseteq \Phi_e^{-1}(1)\Delta A_1$, this action ensures that at least half of the elements of $R_e[r(e,s)]$ are in $\Phi_e^{-1}(1)\Delta A_1$. Set $r(e,s+1)$ to be the least element of $R_e$ such that at most half of the elements of $R_e[r(e,s+1)]$ are in $A_{0,s+1} \cup A_{1,s+1}$.

If

$$\text{Domain} (\Phi_{e,s+1}) \not\supseteq R_e[r(e,s)],$$

then put into $A_1$ the least element of $R_e$ which is greater than $r(e,s)$ and which is not already in $A_1$. Set $r(e,s+1) = r(e,s)$.

The proof that the positive requirements $P_e$ are met is exactly as in the proof of Theorem 2.26. Hence, $A_0 \cup A_1$ has density 1.

It remains to show that each negative requirement $N_e$ is met. Suppose that $\Phi_e$ is total. Then by construction, there are infinitely many $s$ with $r(e,s+1) > r(e,s)$, and so $\lim_s r(e,s) = \infty$. For each such $s$, the construction guarantees that at least half of the elements of $R_e[r(e,s)]$ are in $\Phi_e^{-1}(1)\Delta A_1$. Thus, the latter set has upper density at least $\frac{1}{2}$ on $R_e$ and hence has positive upper density on $\omega$.

3. Relative generic computability

As almost always in computability theory, the previous results relativize to generic computability using an arbitrary oracle.

**Definition 3.1.** A set $B$ is generically $A$-computable if there exists a generic description $\Phi$ of $B$ that is a partial computable function relative to $A$. Also, $B$ is coarsely $A$-computable if it is generically similar to a set computable from $A$.

Using Post’s Theorem, we see that a set $A$ is generically $0^{(n)}$-computable if and only if it is densely approximable by $\Sigma_{n+1}^0$ sets and $A$ is coarsely $0^{(n)}$-computable if and only if it is generically similar to a $\Delta_{n+1}^0$ set. Thus, the previous results show that, for every $n \geq 0$, there is a $\Sigma_{n+1}^0$ set of density 1 that is not densely approximable by $\Delta_{n+1}^0$ sets. Also, there are generically $0^{(n)}$-computable sets that are not coarsely $0^{(n)}$-computable and coarsely $0^{(n)}$-computable sets that are not generically $0^{(n)}$-computable.

**Definition 3.2.** Given a set $A$, the generic class $\hat{G}(A)$ of $A$ is the family of all subsets of $\omega$ that are generically $A$-computable, that is, generically computable by oracle Turing machines with an oracle for $A$.

**Observation 3.3.** For all $A, B \subseteq \omega, A \leq_T B$ if and only if $\hat{G}(A) \subseteq \hat{G}(B)$. 
Proof. It is clear that if $A \leq_T B$, then $\hat{G}(A) \subseteq \hat{G}(B)$. On the other hand, if $\hat{G}(A) \subseteq \hat{G}(B)$, then $\mathcal{R}(A)$ is generically computable from $B$, but a generic computation of $\mathcal{R}(A)$ allows one to compute $A$. Hence $A \leq_T B$.

So $A \equiv_T B$ if and only if $\hat{G}(A) = \hat{G}(B)$ and if $a$ is a Turing degree, then $\hat{G}(a)$ is a well-defined generic class. If $A <_T B$, then Observation 3.3 shows that $\hat{G}(A)$ is strictly contained in $\hat{G}(B)$.

Observation 3.4. Let $(\mathcal{D}, \leq_T)$ be the set of all Turing degrees partially ordered by Turing reducibility and let $(\mathcal{G}, \subseteq)$ be the family of all generic classes partially ordered by set inclusion. Then the function $\mathfrak{A}$ from $\mathcal{D}$ to $\mathcal{G}$ defined by $a \mapsto \hat{G}(a)$ is an order isomorphism.

Proof. The remarks above show that $\mathfrak{A}$ is well defined, $1-1$, and order-preserving and it is onto by definition. 

It is important to note that relative generic computability does not give a notion of reducibility because it is not transitive. It is generally false that if $A \in \hat{G}(B)$ and $B \in \hat{G}(C)$, then $A \in \hat{G}(C)$. For example, let $A$ and $B$ be Turing equivalent sets such that $B$ is generically computable and $A$ is not generically computable. (We have observed that every nonzero Turing degree contains such sets $A$ and $B$.) Then $A \in \hat{G}(B)$ and $B \in \hat{G}(\emptyset)$, but $A \notin \hat{G}(\emptyset)$. We introduce a related notion that is transitive in the next section.

4. Generic reducibility

The failure of transitivity just noted for relativized generic computability is not surprising because the definition of $A \in \hat{G}(B)$ involves using a total oracle for $B$ to produce only a generic computation of $A$. This is analogous to the failure of transitivity for the relation ‘c.e. in’, where an oracle for $B$ is used to produce only an enumeration of $A$. The natural way to achieve transitivity is to have the oracle and the output be of a similar nature. The notion of enumeration reducibility ($\leq_e$) has been well studied. The intuitive concept of enumeration reducibility is that $A \leq_e B$ if there is a fixed oracle Turing machine $M$ which, given a listing of $B$ in any order on its oracle tape, produces a listing of $A$. From this point of view, when the machine lists a number $n$ in $A$, it has used the membership of $k$ in $B$ only for a finite set $D$ of values of $k$, and we can effectively list the set of pairs $(n, D)$ for which this occurs. This leads to a more convenient formal definition of enumeration reducibility where we replace oracle Turing machines by c.e. sets of codes of such pairs.

Definition 4.1. An enumeration operator is a c.e. set. If $W$ is an enumeration operator, then the elements of $W$ are viewed as coding pairs $\langle n, D \rangle$, where $n \in \omega$ and $D$ is a finite subset of $\omega$ identified with its canonical index $\sum_{k \in D} 2^k$. We view $W$ as the mapping from sets to sets $X \mapsto W(X) := \{ n : (\exists D)[(n, D) \in W \land D \subseteq X] \}$.

We can now use enumeration operators to formally define enumeration reducibility.

Definition 4.2. A set $Y$ is enumeration reducible to $X$ (written $Y \leq_e X$) if $Y = W(X)$ for some enumeration operator $W$. 

It is well known that the enumeration operators are closed under composition and hence that enumeration reducibility is transitive. Also, each enumeration operator $W$ is obviously monotone in the sense that if $U \subseteq V$, then $W(U) \subseteq W(V)$.

We are now ready to define generic reducibility. Recall that a generic description of a set $A$ is a partial function $\Psi$ that agrees with the characteristic function of $A$ on its domain and that has a domain of density 1. If $\Psi$ is a partial function, let $\gamma(\Psi) = \{(a, b) : \Psi(a) = b\}$, so that $\gamma(\Psi)$ is a set of natural numbers coding the graph of $\Psi$. A listing of the graph of a generic description of a set $A$ is called a generic listing for $A$. Intuitively, the idea is that $A$ is generically reducible to $B$ if there is a fixed oracle Turing machine $M$ that, given any generic listing for $B$ on its oracle tape, generically computes $A$. It is again convenient to use enumeration operators in the formal definition.

**Definition 4.3.** The set $A$ is generically reducible to $B$ (written $A \leq_g B$) if there is an enumeration operator $W$ such that, for every generic description $\Psi$ of $B$, $W(\gamma(\Psi)) = \gamma(\Theta)$ for some generic description $\Theta$ of $A$.

Note that $\leq_g$ is transitive because enumeration operators are closed under composition. (It is also easy to check transitivity from the intuitive definition.) Thus, generic reducibility leads to a degree structure as usual.

**Definition 4.4.** The sets $A$ and $B$ are generically interreducible, written as $A \equiv_g B$, if $A \leq_g B$ and $B \leq_g A$. The generic degree of $A$, written as $\text{deg}_g(A)$, is $\{C : C \equiv_g A\}$. Of course, the generic degrees are partially ordered by the ordering induced by $\leq_g$.

The generic degrees have a least element $0_g$, and the elements of $0_g$ are exactly the generically computable sets. The generic degrees form an upper semi-lattice, with join operation induced by $\oplus$ where $A \oplus B = \{2n : n \in A\} \cup \{2n + 1 : n \in B\}$. The following easy result gives another way in which the generic degrees resemble the Turing degrees.

**Proposition 4.5.** Every countable set of generic degrees has an upper bound.

**Proof.** Let sets $A_0, A_1, \ldots$ be given. We must produce a set $B$ with $A_n \leq_g B$ for all $n$. Let the function $f_n : \omega \rightarrow R_n$ enumerate $R_n$ in increasing order and define $B = \bigcup_n f_n(A_n)$. Note that since $f_n$ is $1 - 1$ and the $R_n$ are disjoint, we have $B(f_n(x)) = A_n(x)$. To see that $A_n \leq_g B$, let $W$ be an enumeration operator such that $W(\gamma(\Psi)) = \gamma(\Psi \circ f_n)$ for every partial function $\Psi$. We must show that if $\Psi$ is a generic description of $B$, then $\Psi \circ f_n$ is a generic description of $A_n$. First, note that if $\Psi(f_n(x)) \downarrow$, then $\Psi(f_n(x)) = B(f_n(x)) = A(x)$, and hence $\Psi \circ f_n$ agrees with the characteristic function of $A_n$ on its domain $D$. It remains to show that $D$ has density 1. Since $\Psi$ is a generic description, its domain $\hat{D}$ has density 1. The increasing bijection $f_n$ from $\omega$ to $R_n$ is also an increasing bijection from $D$ to $\hat{D} \cap R_n$. To show that $D$ has density 1, it thus suffices to show that $\hat{D} \cap R_n$ has density 1 in $R_n$. This follows from the general fact that if $C$ is any generic set and $E$ is any set of positive density, then $C \cap E$ is generic in $E$. (Just check that $E \setminus C$ is negligible in $E$.)

We do not know, however, whether every generic degree bounds only countably many generic degrees.

The Turing degrees can be embedded into the enumeration degrees by the mapping that takes the Turing degree of a set $A$ to the enumeration degree of $\gamma(\chi_A)$. We now give an analogous embedding of the Turing degrees into the generic degrees.
Lemma 4.6. For all sets $A, B \subseteq \omega$, $A \leq_T B$ if and only if $R(A) \leq_g R(B)$.

Proof. If $R(A) \leq_g R(B)$, then $R(A)$ is generically computable from a generic listing of $R(B)$ and thus computable from $B$. But a generic computation of $R(A)$ allows one to compute $A$. Hence $A \leq_T B$. A generic listing of $R(B)$ allows one to compute $B$ uniformly. Hence, if $A \leq_T B$, then $R(A)$ is uniformly computable from any generic listing of $R(B)$ and we have $R(A) \leq_g R(B)$.

So $A \equiv_T B$ if and only if $R(A) \equiv_g R(B)$, and if $a$ is a Turing degree, then $\deg_g(R(a))$, defined as $\deg_g(R(A))$ for $A \in a$, is well defined.

Theorem 4.7. Let $(D, \leq_T)$ be the set of all Turing degrees partially ordered by Turing reducibility and let $(I, \leq_g)$ be the set of all generic degrees partially ordered by generic reducibility. Then the function $\mathfrak{B}$ from $D$ to $I$ defined by $a \mapsto \deg_g(R(a))$ is an order embedding.

Proof. The remarks above show that $\mathfrak{B}$ is well defined, $1 - 1$, and order-preserving.

It follows at once from the above observation and the existence of an antichain of Turing degrees of the size of the continuum [16, Chapter 2] that there is an antichain of generic degrees of the size of the continuum.

Theorem 4.8. The order embedding $\mathfrak{B}$ from the Turing degrees to the generic degrees defined above is not surjective.

We must show that there is a set $A$ such that there is no set $B$ with $A \equiv_g R(B)$. Our first task is to give conditions on $A$ (without mentioning any other sets) that imply that there is no set $B$ with $A \equiv_g R(B)$. These conditions involve enumeration reducibility, for which we follow Cooper [3, Sections 11.1 and 11.3]. An enumeration degree $a$ is called total if there is a total function $f$ such that its graph $\gamma(f)$ has degree $a$. An enumeration degree $a$ is called quasi-minimal if $a$ is non-zero and every non-zero enumeration degree $b \leq_a a$ is not total. Thus, a set $A$ has quasi-minimal enumeration degree if and only if $A$ is not c.e. and every total function $f$ with $\gamma(f) \leq_e A$ is computable. The next lemma gives the desired conditions on $A$.

Lemma 4.9. Suppose that $A$ is a set of density 1 such that $A$ is not generically computable and the enumeration degree of $A$ is quasi-minimal. Then there is no set $B$ such that $A \equiv_g R(B)$.

Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that $A$ satisfies the above hypotheses and $A \equiv_g R(B)$. Let $S_A$ be the semicharacteristic function of $A$, that is, $S_A(n) = 1$ if $n \in A$ and $S_A(n)$ is undefined otherwise. Note that $A \equiv_e \gamma(S_A)$, and $S_A$ is a generic description of $A$ since $A$ has density 1. Since $R(B) \leq_g A$, by the definition of generic reducibility, there is a generic description $\Theta$ of $R(B)$ such that $\gamma(\Theta) \leq_e S_A$. However, as we have noted, $B$ is computable by a fixed oracle machine from any generic description of $R(B)$. Hence, if $\chi_B$ is the characteristic function of $B$, then we have

$$\gamma(\chi_B) \leq_e \gamma(\Theta) \leq_e S_A \leq_e a.$$  

Therefore, $\gamma(\chi_B) \leq_e a$. Since the enumeration degree of $A$ is quasi-minimal and $\chi_B$ is total, it follows that $\chi_B$ and hence $B$ and $R(B)$ are computable. As $A \leq_g R(B)$, we conclude that $A$ is generically computable, which is the desired contradiction.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we must now construct a set $A$ satisfying the hypotheses of the above lemma. We use a modified version of Cooper’s elegant exposition of Medvedev’s proof of the existence of quasi-minimal e-degrees [3, Theorem 11.4.2]. In order to ensure that $A$ has density 1, we meet the following positive requirements ensuring that $A$ has density 1:

$$P_n : R_n \subseteq^* A.$$ 

In order to ensure that $A$ is not generically computable, we satisfy the following requirements:

$$S_n : \Phi_n \text{ does not generically compute } A.$$ 

Note that meeting all the requirements $P_n$ and $S_n$ ensures that $A$ is not c.e. since any c.e. set of density 1 is generically computable.

Hence, in order to ensure that the e-degree of $A$ is quasi-minimal, it suffices to ensure that every total function $f$ with $\gamma(f) \leq_e A$ is computable. Our standard listing $\{W_e\}$ gives us a listing of enumeration operators. We will meet the following requirements:

$$U_n : \text{if } W_n(A) = \gamma(f), \text{ where } f \text{ is a total function, then } f \text{ is computable}.$$ 

We identify partial functions with their graphs. For example, if $\theta$ and $\mu$ are partial functions, then $\theta \supseteq \mu$ means that the graph of $\theta$ contains the graph of $\mu$. We say that $\theta$ and $\mu$ are compatible if they agree on the intersection of their domains, or, equivalently, $\theta \cup \mu$ is a partial function. A string is a $\{0, 1\}$-valued partial function $\sigma$ whose domain is equal to $\{0, 1, \ldots, k - 1\}$ for some $k$ called the length of $\sigma$.

At each stage $s$ in the construction of $A$, we have a partial computable function $\theta_s$ (taking values in $\{0, 1\}$) that represents the part of the characteristic function of $A$ constructed by the beginning of stage $s$. We have $\theta_{s+1} \supseteq \theta_s$ for all $s$, and the characteristic function of $A$ will be $\bigcup_s \theta_s$. The domain of $\theta_s$ will be a computable set having at most finitely many elements not in $\bigcup_{i < s} R_i$. Further, there will be only finitely many $x$ with $\theta_s(x) = 0$. Let $\theta_0$ be the empty partial function.

If $s = 3n$, then define $\theta_{s+1} \supseteq \theta_s$ by setting $\theta_{s+1}(x) = 1$ for all $x \in \bigcup_{i < s} R_i$ such that $\theta_s(x) \neq 0$. These steps will ensure that $\bigcup_s \theta_s$ is total and each $R_s \subseteq^* A$.

If $s = 3n + 1$, then we diagonalize against $\Phi_n$. If there exists an $x \in R_s \setminus \text{dom}(\sigma_s)$ with $\Phi_n(x)$ defined, then let $\sigma_{s+1}(x)$ have a value of 0 or 1 that is different from $\Phi_n(x)$. If no such $x$ exists, let $\sigma_{s+1} = \sigma_s$. This ensures that the requirement $S_n$ is met because $R_s \cap \text{dom}(\theta_s)$ is finite and $R_n$ has positive density.

If $\theta$ is a partial function, let $\theta^{-1}(1) = \{x : \theta(x) = 1\}$.

If $s = 3n + 2$, then there are two cases.

Case 1. There exists a string $\sigma_s$ compatible with $\theta_s$ and numbers $x, y_1$, and $y_2$ such that $y_1 \neq y_2$ and $\langle x, y_1 \rangle, \langle x, y_2 \rangle \in W_n(\sigma_s^{-1}(1))$.

In this case, let $\theta_{s+1} = \theta_s \cup \sigma_s$, ensuring that $W_n(A)$ is not a single-valued function.

Case 2. Otherwise. Let $\theta_{s+1} = \theta_s$. We must show that the requirement $U_n$ is met in this case. Suppose that $W_n(A) = \gamma(f)$ where $f$ is a total function. We must show that $f$ is computable. Note that the set of strings compatible with $\theta_s$ is computable for fixed $s$. Given $x$, to compute $f(x)$ effectively, search effectively for a number $y$ and a string $\sigma$ that is compatible with $\theta_s$ such that $\langle x, y \rangle \in W_n(\sigma^{-1}(1))$. We claim that such $\sigma, y$ exist, and the only possible value for $y$ is $f(x)$, which suffices to show that $f$ is computable. First, observe that there is a string $\sigma$ compatible with $\theta_s$ with $\langle x, f(x) \rangle \in W_n(\sigma^{-1}(1))$ since $\langle x, f(x) \rangle \in W_n(A)$ and $A \supseteq \theta_s$. Thus, the desired $\sigma$ and $y$ exist, in fact, with $y = f(x)$. It remains to show that if $\langle x, y \rangle \in W_n(\tau^{-1}(1))$ where $\tau$ is a string compatible with $\theta_s$, then $y = f(x)$. Let $\mu$ be a string compatible with $\theta_s$ such that $\mu^{-1}(1) \supseteq \sigma^{-1}(1) \cup \tau^{-1}(1)$. (To obtain $\mu$, let $b$ be the greater of the length of $\sigma$ and
the length of \( \tau \), and, for \( x < b \), set \( \mu(x) = \theta_s(x) \) if \( x \) is in the domain of \( \theta_s(x) \), and otherwise let \( \mu(x) = 1. \) Then, by the monotonicity of enumeration operators, \( \langle x, f(x) \rangle \) and \( \langle x, y \rangle \) both belong to \( W_n(\tau^{-1}(1)) \). Since Case 1 does not apply, we conclude that \( y = f(x) \), which completes the proof.

5. Further results and open questions

The authors, in ongoing joint work with Rod Downey, have obtained further results in the area and are working on open questions. This section is a brief update on this project. Full results and proofs will appear in the forthcoming paper ‘Asymptotic density and computably enumerable sets’ by Downey, Jockusch, and Schupp. All the theorems cited below are from that paper and are joint work of the authors with Downey.

One aspect of the project is the study of the connection between computability theory and asymptotic density. Recall that it was shown in Theorem 2.22 that there is a c.e. set \( A \) of density 1 that has no computable subset of density 1. In that proof, the positive requirements \( R_n \subseteq^* A \) had an infinitary nature, and this makes one suspect that no such \( A \) is low. (A set \( A \) is called low if \( A' \leq_T 0' \) or, in other words, every \( A \)-c.e. set is computable from the halting problem.) Indeed this is the case, and we also show that every nonlow c.e. set computes such an \( A \).

**Theorem 5.1.** The following are equivalent for any c.e. degree \( a \).

1. The degree \( a \) is not low.
2. There is a c.e. set \( A \) of degree \( a \) such that \( A \) has density 1 but no computable subset of \( A \) has density 1.
3. There is a c.e. set \( A \) of degree \( a \) such that \( A \) has density 1 but no computable subset of \( A \) has nonzero density.

Another line of results related to Theorem 2.22 involves weakening the requirement that the subsets have density 1. The following result concerns upper densities.

**Theorem 5.2.** Let \( A \) be a c.e. set such that \( \bar{\rho}(A) \) is a \( \Delta^0_2 \) real. Then \( A \) has a computable subset \( B \) such that \( \bar{\rho}(B) = \bar{\rho}(A) \). In particular, every c.e. set of upper density 1 has a computable subset of upper density 1.

We know by Theorem 2.22 that this result fails for lower density even in the case \( r = 1 \), but we show that a slightly weaker version holds for lower density.

**Theorem 5.3.** If \( A \) is a c.e. set and \( r \) is a real number, and the lower density of \( A \) is at least \( r \), then, for each \( \epsilon > 0 \) \( A \) has a computable subset whose lower density is at least \( r - \epsilon \). In particular, every c.e. set of density 1 has computable subsets of lower density arbitrarily close to 1.

In Theorem 2.21, we showed that the densities of computable sets are precisely the \( \Delta^0_2 \) reals in \([0, 1] \). In the forthcoming paper mentioned above, we consider analogous results for upper and lower densities, and for c.e. sets. Call a real number \( r \) left-\( \Pi^0_n \) if \( \{ q \in \mathbb{Q} : q < r \} \) is \( \Pi^0_n \), that is, the lower cut of \( r \) in the rationals is \( \Pi^0_n \). An analogous definition holds for other levels of the arithmetic hierarchy.
Theorem 5.4. Let $r$ be a real number in the interval $[0, 1]$. Then the following conditions are satisfied:

1. $r$ is the lower density of a computable set if and only if $r$ is left $\Sigma^0_2$;
2. $r$ is the upper density of a computable set if and only if $r$ is left $\Pi^0_2$;
3. $r$ is the density of a c.e. set if and only if $r$ is left $\Pi^0_2$;
4. $r$ is the lower density of a c.e. set if and only if $r$ is left $\Sigma^0_3$;
5. $r$ is the upper density of a c.e. set if and only if $r$ is left $\Pi^0_2$.

In our project with Downey, we also considered the structure of the generic degrees and the generic classes. In particular, we considered whether there exist sets $A, B$ that form a minimal pair for generic computability in the sense that:

1. $A$ and $B$ are noncomputable;
2. for all $C \subseteq \omega$, if $C$ is both generically $A$-computable and generically $B$-computable, then $C$ is generically computable, that is, $\hat{G}(A) \cap \hat{G}(B) = \hat{G}(\emptyset)$.

We showed that if $A$ and $B$ are $\Delta^0_2$ sets, then $A, B$ do not form a minimal pair for generic computability, and obtained some other negative results on minimal pairs. Igusa [5] has recently proved the surprising result that there are no minimal pairs for generic computability, thus subsuming all our results on minimal pairs.

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