Robust Algorithmic Collusion

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Abstract
This paper develops a formal framework to assess policies of learning algorithms in economic games. We investigate whether reinforcement-learning agents with collusive pricing policies can successfully extrapolate collusive behavior from training to the market. We find that in testing environments collusion consistently breaks down. Instead, we observe static Nash play. We then show that restricting algorithms’ strategy space can make algorithmic collusion robust, because it limits overfitting to rival strategies. Our findings suggest that policy-makers should focus on firm behavior aimed at coordinating algorithm design in order to make collusive policies robust.

1 Introduction
Software systems that take over pricing decisions are becoming widespread. Pricing algorithms can allow firms to monitor and process large amounts of data and adjust prices quickly to changing circumstances. The ascent of such systems poses a potential challenge for the current regulatory landscape: pricing algorithms based on artificial intelligence (AI) may learn to autonomously collude without any previous intentional agreement or explicit instruction to do so.

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A growing literature has shown algorithmic collusion to be possible in principle. The results documented so far are a clear warning sign: Even simple algorithms learn to tacitly collude and thereby harm consumers. However, existing analyses have studied the behavior of algorithms in their training environment. It is well-known that algorithms tend to overfit to the training environment, and results cannot easily be extrapolated to other environments (e.g. Lanctot et al., 2017). In practice, firms train their algorithms offline before using them and face substantial uncertainty about important parameters of the market and their competitors, as well as potentially significant cost from randomized learning in the marketplace. Conclusions drawn from existing work therefore implicitly assume that the training environment and market environment are symmetric and identical, and that results can be extrapolated from one environment to the other.

This paper develops a framework to guide the analysis of learning algorithms in economic games. We provide a formal representation of the environments that algorithms face that is parameterized by a “context”. Evaluating policies in their training context compared to a (suitably chosen) testing context allows for an assessment of the behavior of algorithms in markets. We apply our framework to Q-learning algorithms in repeated Bertrand games. We show that algorithms overfit to rival strategies from training and cannot successfully extrapolate their collusive policies to other counterparts, or differently parameterized environments. In testing contexts algorithmic collusion vanishes, and does not recover with further iterations. Instead, we observe evidence of Nash play of the underlying stage game, in particular with (nearly) identically parameterized environments. Continued policy updating allows algorithms to overcome this breakdown in collusion, but requires many iterations and is unlikely to be feasible in market environments. We then show that restricting algorithms’ strategy space by only allowing them to condition on their own past price, but not competitors’ prices, can make algorithmic collusion robust for a set of parameterizations, because it forces them to learn collusive policies based on simpler patterns that are not too specific to the training context and can thus be successfully extrapolated.

Our findings illustrate a key challenge with the current setup of the analysis of algorithmic collusion: results are reported based on the outcomes in the training environment. In practice however, algorithms are trained and deployed in separate environments. The tendency of machine learning algorithms to overfit to the training environment (or data), and that therefore a separate testing environment is required to assess their behavior is well-established (see e.g. Lanctot et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2018b,a; Song et al., 2019). But this testing

\[1\] For example, Calvano et al. (2020b, 2021); Klein (2021); Kastius and Schlosser (2021).
environment is not readily available with reinforcement learners. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide a formal framework to overcome this limitation for algorithms in economic games and develop a consistent approach to assessing behavior.

Our findings highlight the relevance of coordination at the level of algorithm design. The tendency of algorithms to jointly learn to collude appears generally insufficient for firms to be able to achieve collusive outcomes in the market. However, they may still be able to successfully achieve algorithmic (tacit) collusion by coordinating on high-level approaches to the implementation of pricing algorithms. Each firm implements and trains its algorithm independently, yet by having coordinated parts of the parameterization and the strategy space appropriately, collusive policies robust to deployment in the market can be consistently learnt. Intuitively, because the extent of coordination among competing firms is (legally) restricted, and algorithms may need to work in a range of environments, the policies employed must rely on simpler patterns.

This paper contributes to a growing literature on algorithmic collusion (for a recent survey of the economic literature on AI see Abrardi et al. (2021)). We employ simple Q-learning algorithms in line with related work in e.g. Calvano et al. (2020b, 2021); Klein (2021). Our baseline scenario and parameterization is built on the environment studied in Calvano et al. (2020b). There is also a related and growing literature on reinforcement learning in revenue management practice, demonstrating the relevance of assessing reinforcement learners in economic games (e.g. Kastius and Schlosser, 2021; Acuna-Agost et al., 2021; Bondoux et al., 2020).

Our paper is related to the computer science literature that studies the overfitting of reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms. Lanctot et al. (2017) show that the overfitting to rival agents’ policies we observe is a common problem in RL. Zhang et al. (2018b) examine different ways how deep RL algorithms overfit to the environment and show that attempted solutions in the literature of adding stochasticity to the environment do not necessarily prevent overfitting. The difficulty for algorithms to extrapolate policies to new environments is known as the “zero-shot coordination problem” (e.g. Treutlein et al., 2021; Hu et al., 2020). Our framework builds on Kirk et al. (2021). Related to our approach is a strand of literature that assumes there exists a distribution of Markov-decision-problems of the scenario of interest, and then trains algorithms on a finite set of samples from this distribution before testing the behavior on the entire distribution (e.g. Zhang et al., 2018a; Nichol et al., 2018; Justesen et al., 2018).

Lastly, our paper contributes to the literature on competition policy and regulatory responses to algorithmic collusion. The potential challenge to policy has been previously discussed both by the European Commissioner for Com-
petition (Vestager, 2017) and Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission (Ohlhausen, 2017), and potential solutions have been suggested (e.g. Calvano et al., 2020a; Harrington, 2018; Beneke and Mackenrodt, 2021). Our results provide some novel perspectives and qualify existing results. When learning in the market itself is feasible and not too costly, algorithmic collusion appears very likely to arise. In any other case, our findings suggest that the main policy challenge is to detect or prevent coordination of algorithm design, implying that the actual danger of algorithmic collusion may not necessarily be in the market interaction itself, but in coordinative moves beforehand. For instance, pricing specialists at rival firms may be well-informed about the work of their counterparts and there may be an industry-level understanding of the best specification of pricing algorithms.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop a formal framework for the analysis of learners in testing environments. Section 3 introduces the specific setting of algorithmic collusion that we study, and in Section 3.6 details how we apply our framework in this setting. Section 4 presents and discusses our results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2 Training vs. Testing: A General Framework

The evidence accumulated on the behavior of reinforcement learners in economic games is based on scenarios where the agents learn together in the same environment. In the simplest scenario, two learners are interacting iteratively until either convergence or a fixed number of iterations is reached. The assessment of pricing behavior is then based on the last rounds of these interactions. In practice however, firms train their algorithms offline first before deploying them to the market. Algorithms must therefore successfully extrapolate collusive policies from training to the market, and evidence of collusion during training does not imply that firms can actually employ learning systems that tacitly collude. Instead, an assessment of the behavior of algorithms requires a separation between “training” and “testing” environments.

In this section, we develop a general framework to guide the analysis of learners in testing environments. We provide a formal representation of the interactive environments that learning agents face. We consider these environments to be parameterized by some “context”. This context describes how

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2One particular case of this, where competing firms buy pricing-services from the same upstream supplier, has been noted before in the literature. For instance, Harrington Jr (2021) develops a model of sellers that outsource their pricing algorithms to a third-party.

3This is a general challenge in the reinforcement learning literature, and is also known as the “zero-shot coordination problem” (see e.g. Treutlein et al., 2021; Hu et al., 2020).
the environment varies with a change in exogenous conditions. Evaluating the
difference in behavior between the training and testing environment is then
equivalent to comparing the performance of an algorithm between two contexts,
one for training and one for testing.

We begin by defining the dynamic system in which interactive reinforcement
learning takes place. Scenarios of interest for economists can be cast in terms of
a Partially Observable Markov Game. Formally:

**Definition 2.1 (Partially Observable Markov Game (POMG)).** A Partially Observable Markov Game is formalized by the tuple \((N, S, A, O, T, R, s_0, o_0, \delta)\). Where:
- \(N = \{1, ..., N\}\) is the set of agents.
- \(S\) is the set of unobservable states, and \(s_0 \in S\) the initial state.
- \(A\) is the joint action space \(A = A_1 \times ... \times A_N\).
- \(O\) is the joint set of observations \(O = O_1 \times ... \times O_N\), and \(o_0 \in O\) the initial observation.
- \(\tau\) is the transition probability \(\tau: S \times A \rightarrow \Delta(S, O)\).
- \(R_i\) is the reward function of a player \(i \in 1, ..., N\), \(R_i: S \times A \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\).
- \(\delta\) is the common discount factor.

In a partially observable game, the players may not be able to observe the
underlying state of the game. We model this by introducing a joint set of
observations \(O\) and observation profiles \(o = (o_1, ..., o_N) \in O\), with the initial
observation being \(o_0 \in O\). Each period \(t \in 0, ..., T\), the players choose actions
\(a = (a_1, ..., a_N)\) and subsequently transition to the next state. The probability
that joint action \(a\) in state \(s\) leads to a transition to state \(s'\) and observation \(o'\) is
\(\tau(s', o'|s, a)\).

The goal in reinforcement learning is for each agent \(i\) to learn a policy \(b_i(a_i|o_i)\)
which produces a probability distribution over actions given an observation,
such that the cumulative, discounted reward of the policy is maximized.

In order to distinguish different environments, we follow the ideas in Kirk
et al. (2021) and consider a Contextual Partially Observable Markov Game, where
we introduce a set of contexts \(K\). For each context \(k \in K\) we have a Partially
Observable Markov Game (POMG) with the property that the state of the game
can be decomposed into two parts, \(s = (k, s') \in S^k\), where \(s' \in S\) is the state and
\(k \in K\) is the context. Formally:

**Definition 2.2 (Contextual Partially Observable Markov Game (CPOMG)).** A Contextual Partially Observable Markov Game is formalized by the tuple \((N, S, A, O, \tau, R, s_0, o_0, \delta, K)\) where \(K\) is a set of contexts. \(K\) introduces a collection of POMGs.

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\(^4\)In the economic literature, these games are typically referred to as Stochastic Games. Here,
we follow the terminology that is standard in the machine learning literature.

\(^5\)Note that Kirk et al. (2021) focus on a single agent and not interactions of players. Their
formalization is therefore based on Partially Observable Markov Decision Problems.
That is, for each \( k \in K \) we have a POMG with \((N, S^k, A, O, \tau, R, s_0^k, o_0^k, \delta)\) with the property that the state of that game can be decomposed into two parts: \( s = (k, s') \in S^k \). \( s' \in S \) is the state and \( k \in K \) is the context.

In contrast to the state \( s \), which evolves over the course of the game, we assume that \( k \) is fixed throughout. Thus, each \( k \in K \) yields a different POMG. The context can capture a variety of aspects. In our application, we will consider two types of different contexts: the initial seeds of a game, and the parameters of the reward function.

As each context induces a separate POMG, we consider separate learning scenarios for each one of these. For each scenario in turn, a learning algorithm will return a policy for each player. We therefore index the policy for a player \( i \) by its context \( k \), i.e. \( b^k_i(a_i|o_i) \). We can then use these learned policies to evaluate their performance in a specific context \( k \) of the CPOMG \( G \), which may be different from the context in which the policy was learned. We denote the performance for player \( i \) as \( \mathcal{M}_i(b^k_i(\cdot), b^{k_{-i}}_i(\cdot), G_k) \), where \( b^{k_{-i}}_i(\cdot) \) denotes the policies of all players other than player \( i \). The evaluation for player \( i \) hinges on the policy he learned in context \( k \), the policies of his opponents learned in their contexts \( k_{-i} \) and on the context of the environment \( k \).

Consider the following example (a version of which we analyze later in detail) with two contexts, \( k' \) and \( k'' \). After letting two algorithms jointly learn in each specific context, we observe the rewards of the induced policies for a fixed number of periods. Denote these policies by \( b^k_1(\cdot) \) and \( b^k_2(\cdot) \) for a context \( k' \), and by \( b^{k''}_1(\cdot) \) and \( b^{k''}_2(\cdot) \) for a context \( k'' \). We can then evaluate the rewards for player 1 in the context in which he learned the policy, \( \mathcal{M}_1(b^k_1(\cdot), b^{k_2}_2(\cdot), G_{k'}) \), and equally in the context in which he did not learn, \( \mathcal{M}_1(b^{k'}_1(\cdot), b^{k''}_2(\cdot), G_{k''}) \).

Thus, by comparing the performance in different contexts, we can assess the extent to which algorithms are able to extrapolate policies learned in one context to a different context. Selecting contexts appropriately in order to match the decision-making problem firms face in practice then allows us to obtain an assessment of the ability of algorithms to lead to algorithmic collusion in the market. In Section 3.6 we give details on the specific comparisons we consider in this paper.

We conclude this section with a remark on the definitions above. In this paper, we are comparing “fixed” policies across given contexts. But in principle the framework we introduce can be extended so that the learning algorithms themselves could condition on the different scenarios. To see this, note that if we added a probability distribution on the contexts \( k \), the CPOMG itself becomes a well defined POMG. The learners then engage in a “meta-learning” problem with awareness of the contexts. This is the background of the framework introduced
in Kirk et al. (2021). Similarly, we will consider a discrete set of contexts in our analysis here. Instead, one could consider a distribution of contexts. It is straightforward to extend our framework in this direction.

3 Model Specification

We now introduce the specific setting we study in our application to algorithmic collusion.

3.1 Players, Reward Function, and Economic Model

We model the game-theoretic environment as a standard repeated Bertrand setting. The specification of the demand function and baseline parameterizations are in line with the setup employed in Calvano et al. (2020b). This provides a benchmark of existing findings of algorithmic collusion that our results can be directly compared to.

We consider a Bertrand game with two players in our baseline setup, $N = 2$. Players choose prices as actions in each period $t \in 0, \ldots, T$. We let $p_{i,t}, p_{j,t}$ denote the period-$t$ prices of players $i$ and $j$ respectively, where $i \neq j, i, j \in \{1, 2\}$. The corresponding quantities are denoted by $q_{i,t}, q_{j,t}$, and marginal cost of players by $c_i, c_j$. The demand function is given by a classic logit-demand specification of

$$q_{i,t} = \frac{\gamma_i - p_{i,t}}{\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} e^{\gamma_j - p_{j,t}} + e^{\gamma_0}},$$

where $\gamma_i$ denotes the quality parameter of the good supplied by firm $i$ (vertical differentiation) with $\gamma_0 = 0$ being the product quality of the outside good, and $\mu$ the index of horizontal differentiation, so that the goods are perfect substitutes in the limit when $\mu \to \infty$. For our baseline parameterization we set $\gamma_i - c_i = 1$ and $\mu = 1/4$

The per-period reward of each player is equal to the per-period profit obtained,

$$R_{i,t} = \pi_{i,t} = (p_{i,t} - c_i)q_{i,t}.$$
Let the set of one-shot Nash equilibrium prices corresponding to all parameterizations we consider be $p^N$ and similarly let the set of joint profit maximizing prices be $p^C$. Then the grid of prices available, $A_i$, is given by $k \in \mathbb{N}$ equally spaced points in the interval $[p^N - \xi(\bar{p}^C - p^N), \bar{p}^C + \xi(\bar{p}^C - p^N)]$ with $\xi > 0$, where $p^N = \min\{p \in p^N\}^2$ and $\bar{p}^C = \max\{p \in p^C\}^2$. For our main specifications we set $k = 20$ and $\xi = 0.1$. Note, the choice of demand parameters discussed in Section 3.1 and Section 3.6 imply $p^N \approx (1.47, 1.47)$ and $\bar{p}^C \approx (2.62, 2.62)$.

3.3 States, Transitions, and Observations

The set of states $S$ of the game is given by the set of price profiles $(p_{1,t}, p_{2,t})$ and the context, $S = A_1 \times A_2 \times K = A \times K$. In this paper, we consider a deterministic transition function. As $k \in K$ is fixed, at any time $t$, the next state $s_{t+1}$ is deterministically given by the actions of players at time $t$, $(p_{1,t}, p_{2,t}, k)$.

For our baseline parametization, players have the same set of observations $O_i$. While they cannot observe $k$, they observe the last period’s prices. $O = O_1 \times O_2 = (A_1 \times A_2) \times (A_1 \times A_2)$. The observation profile at any time $t$ is therefore $o_t = (o_{1,t} = (p_{1,t-1}, p_{2,t-1}), o_{2,t} = (p_{1,t-1}, p_{2,t-1}))$. In other words, players have a one-period long memory.

3.4 Learning Model

We employ Q-learning as our learning model, a standard model-free reinforcement learning algorithm. The algorithm computes a so-called Q-function of expected rewards for an action taken for a given observation $- Q : O \times A \to \mathbb{R}$. Q-learning stores the (current) computed Q-value of each observation-action pair in a table and hence requires the action and observation space to be discrete. In each period, the cell in this Q-matrix corresponding to the current period’s observation-action combination, $Q_i(t(o_{i,t}, a_{i,t}))$, is updated based on the observed reward in the current period, $R_{i,t}(a_{i,t}, a_{j,t})$, and a learning rate $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, according to the following Bellman equation

$$Q_{i,t+1}(o_{i,t}, a_{i,t}) = (1 - \alpha)Q_{i,t}(o_{i,t}, a_{i,t}) + \alpha(R_i(t + \delta \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} Q_{i,t+1}(o_{i,t+1}, a)))$$

where $\delta$ is the discount factor.

The initial state and the initial Q-matrix must be specified by the programmer at the start of the learning process. We initialize the Q-matrix with the Q-values that would arise if both agents randomized uniformly. We also choose the initial state at random.

In each period, the algorithm chooses an action (a price) either in order to explore the environment or to exploit its current state of knowledge. When
exploring, the agent chooses an action at random. When exploiting, it chooses the action with the highest Q-value in the current state. We employ standard \( \varepsilon_t \)-greedy exploration in which the agent explores with probability \( \varepsilon_t \) and exploits with probability \( 1 - \varepsilon_t \). We let \( \varepsilon_t \) vary according to \( \varepsilon_t = e^{-\beta t} \) where \( \beta = 4 \times 10^{-6} \), implying that agents explore relatively often at the start and focus on exploiting over time. We focus on a learning rate of \( \alpha = 0.15 \).

We stop the learning process when we observe that the algorithms have converged. Specifically, a given run is stopped if for each player \( i \) the action \( a_{i,t} = \arg\max Q_{i,t}(a,o_t) \) does not change for 100000 consecutive periods, or after one billion total repetitions. We obtain convergence for over 99 percent of runs.

### 3.5 Outcome Measures

To assess the propensity of algorithms to collude, we focus on two measures of rewards (or profits): the collusion index \( M \) and the profit gain \( \Delta \). Both express the realized reward in relation to the static Nash equilibrium and joint profit maximizing profits. Specifically, the two metrics are defined as

\[
M = \frac{\bar{\pi} - \pi^N}{\pi^C - \pi^N},
\]

\[
\Delta_i = \frac{\bar{\pi}_i - \pi_i^N}{\pi_i^C - \pi_i^N},
\]

where \( \bar{\pi}_i \) denotes the average reward (profit) of agent \( i \), \( \pi_i^N \) the profit of agent \( i \) in the one-shot Nash equilibrium of the game, and \( \pi_i^C \) the profit of agent \( i \) in the joint profit maximizing outcome of the one-shot game. \( \bar{\pi}, \pi^N, \) and \( \pi^C \) are defined analogously, but always represent the (average of the) sum of profits of players \( i \) and \( j \), \( i,j \in \{1,2\} \).

Thus, for both the collusion index and an individual player’s profit gain, when the respective measure is zero the average profit is equal to the Nash profit, while a value of one implies that the average profit is equal to the joint profit maximizing profits. Note that by definition, the collusion index is equal to the average of the profit gains of the two players.

In addition, we investigate the actions played by agents in more detail. We classify outcomes based on the unique convergence to specific actions. If both agents choose the same price in more than 90% of rounds, we classify the outcome as symmetric convergence. If both agents choose a unique but different price in more than 90% of rounds, we classify the outcome as asymmetric convergence. Finally, if at least one agent plays the same sequence of prices repeatedly
in over 90% of rounds, we classify the outcome as a price cycle. If we cannot identify either unique convergence or a price cycle, we classify the outcome as other. The vast majority of our learning runs converge to unique symmetric or asymmetric prices and we barely observe any longer price cycles.

3.6 The Context, and Training vs. Testing Environments

We study a set of fixed contexts for the setting described above. We consider the context to define two aspects of the resulting POMG: the seed used to initialize the learning process, and the parameters of the reward function. We focus on these two aspects to capture the underlying decision-making problem of the firm. When training offline before deploying the algorithm to the market, it is necessarily the case that the rival player changes from training to testing environment. Thus, by comparing the policies learned in two different POMGs, in which only initial seeds differed, we can analyze the behavior of an algorithm when faced with a previously unseen competitor in the market, but all else remains constant. Similarly, firms face uncertainty over important parameters of rival firms or the demand function, and by comparing policies from two POMGs in which parameters of the reward function are different, we can similarly observe whether players are able to extrapolate potentially collusive policies to the market environment, which might differ in some aspects to the training environment.

We proceed as described in the example before, and always contrast two contexts. For example, let $k'$ and $k''$ be two contexts that yield the same POMG, except for the initial seed. We initialize both learning processes and let two pairs of algorithms learn in their respective context. Denote the policies these algorithms converge to by $b_{1}^{k'}(\cdot)$ and $b_{2}^{k'}(\cdot)$ for context $k'$, and by $b_{1}^{k''}(\cdot)$ and $b_{2}^{k''}(\cdot)$ for context $k''$. To evaluate the policies, we consider a third context $k'''$ with the same parameterization as contexts $k'$ and $k''$, and a random initial state and new random seed. We then evaluate the outcome measures described in Section 3.5 for the policy of each player $i \in \{1, 2\}$ in their respective training contexts, $M_{i}(b_{1}^{k'}(\cdot), b_{2}^{k'}(\cdot), G_{k'})$, and when two learnt policies from two different training contexts are placed in the new, third context, $M_{i}(b_{1}^{k'}(\cdot), b_{2}^{k''}(\cdot), G_{k''})$. We further study the policies learnt in more detail to understand the underlying

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6In principle, we can search for price cycles of any length. However, in practice we limit ourselves to a search for cycles with a maximum length of 15 to avoid costly computations.

7Note that in general we must introduce a third context, as the two initial contexts may have different seeds (requiring us to pick a seed when matching the two resulting policies), and may have converged to different states (requiring us to choose an initial state). However, we will study an environment in Section 4.4 in which no new initial state is required.
strategies that yield the outcomes we observe.

The different parameterizations of the reward function that the set of contexts we consider defines vary in the marginal cost level $c$. This mimicks the uncertainty firms may face regarding rival parameters, even when they are perfectly informed about the demand environment. We consider variation in constant marginal cost levels in the range $c_i, c_j \in [1, 1.7]$. We stop at 1.7 to ensure that either players’ cost remain below the monopoly price of a seller with the lowest cost $c = 1$, so that it is never optimal for the market to be served by only one firm. Our specification of demand is particularly well-suited for contexts that yield variation across cost levels. It implies that both the Nash equilibrium profits and the joint profit maximizing profits are constant across all cost levels and all combinations of cost, since $\gamma_i - c_i = 1$. Only the associated optimal prices change. Thus, when algorithms are placed in a new context with a different-cost competitor than previously, no change in the equilibrium price is required by the agent. Only a strategy to support high, supra-competitive profits will require a different set of prices, but can be obtained by appropriately ‘shifting’ the prices along the grid in line with the change in cost of the competitor. Hence, the challenge the algorithm faces in the new context is particularly simple and the profits that can be obtained remain constant, ensuring that differences in the outcome observed are not due to a change in possible payoffs for the players.

In the new context (i.e. testing environments), no learning takes place initially and algorithms are only exploiting, i.e. choosing the optimal action given their Q-matrix. They are thus employing their “fixed” strategy learnt during training. We further investigate the outcome when agents may continue to learn ‘in the market’, and thus can converge to a new policy. We ensure that the number of sessions in testing contexts is equal to the number of sessions in training contexts by always pairing policies from the same respective session number.

4 Results

4.1 Algorithms in Training

We begin with an examination of learnt policies in their training context. The contexts vary in two dimensions, as detailed before. We aggregate our results across the variation in initial seeds for each parameterization of the environment. Thus, this is essentially an extension of previous work by Calvano et al. (2020b) across a range of parameterizations.

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8Note that the sessions per context run independently of one another. The session number has no further implications, but since there are an exponential number of possible player-context-session-number matches, using it is a straightforward way to limit computations.
We provide summary statistics for the training contexts in the Appendix in Table B1. Across all parameterizations, we observe a high collusion index between 0.70 and 0.87 and predominantly convergence to unique prices for each player. Profit gains are similarly high and symmetric. The average collusion index for the low and intermediate cost contexts in particular is in line with previous estimates, while for high cost contexts we observe slightly lower values.

The definition of the price grid that we consider implies that the high profits we observe for low cost contexts is somewhat unsurprising. For low cost contexts almost all available prices lie above the static Nash equilibrium price and on average these yield a higher profit than the Nash equilibrium. For high cost contexts this is not the case, since the Nash price already lies in the upper part of the price grid and thus most prices in the grid yield below-Nash profits. For intermediate and high cost contexts our setup thus captures the trade-off that firms face: employing pricing algorithms may be costly in the short run due to exploration, but may pay off in the long run due to above-Nash (and potentially collusive) play when exploiting. These short-term costs can be avoided by training offline first. For low cost contexts instead, costs of exploration are much less of an issue and we would therefore expect that in these contexts agents may learn to converge to above-Nash prices when employing a reinforcement learning algorithm.\textsuperscript{9}

To illustrate this, Table B2 in the Appendix shows the profit loss relative to Nash play across the grid of cost levels when both players randomize. Players in contexts with a high cost level consistently lose from randomizing, compared to playing the unique Nash equilibrium. But they also lose if the opponent randomizes and the agent itself plays Nash or the best-response to random play. Players in low cost contexts on the other hand benefit from randomized play and achieve above-Nash profits. The results we observe for high cost contexts thus show that findings of algorithmic collusion extend to and are stable in environments in which exploration is costly, and short-run costs from learning must be balanced by long-term benefits from algorithmic collusion.

To confirm that these high, seemingly-collusive outcomes we observe are indeed evidence of algorithmic collusion, we investigate the policies algorithms converged to. Figure 1 shows for the case of an intermediate cost context the average prices played following a forced deviation to the price nearest to the Nash price on the grid. In line with the literature, we observe a path of play in which the deviating algorithm is punished for the deviation and a gradual return to the stable pre-deviation prices. We observe very similar patterns across the different training contexts.

\textsuperscript{9}The importance of exploration cost in practice have been noted before by revenue management practitioners, e.g. Kastius and Schlosser (2021).


Notes: The figure shows the average actions played prior to and following a manual deviation of one player (in blue) to the price closest to the Nash price on the grid for training contexts with intermediate parameterization. The horizontal dashed lines indicate the static Nash and joint profit maximizing prices.

Lastly, Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the time to convergence. Algorithms consistently require more than 1 million rounds of play and on average over 2 million rounds to achieve convergence. Thus, learning online is likely infeasible in practice. In light of the potential high per-period cost for the firm from exploration, there may be hundreds of thousands of periods of significant losses before the algorithm begins achieving supra-Nash profits. Thus, a separation between training and testing is economically relevant.

4.2 Algorithms in New Contexts

We now assess the performance of learnt policies in contexts that are different to the training context. We begin by assessing policies that were learnt in two contexts which only differed in their initial seed in a new context with the same parameterization.

Recall (and as explained in more detail in Section 3.6): We consider converged
policies from two contexts, $k'$ and $k''$, denoted by $b_{1}^{k'}(\cdot), b_{2}^{k'}(\cdot)$, and $b_{1}^{k''}(\cdot), b_{2}^{k''}(\cdot)$ respectively. To evaluate the policies, we consider a third context $k'''$ with the same parameterization as contexts $k'$ and $k''$, and a random initial state and new random seed. We then evaluate when two learnt policies from two different training contexts are placed in the new, third context, $M_{i}(b_{1}^{k'}, b_{2}^{k''}, G_{k'''}).$ The sole difference for algorithms is therefore that they are facing a so far unseen competitor and employ their “fixed”, previously learnt policy.

**Figure 2:** Collusion index in training and testing contexts

![Collusion index graph](image)

**Notes:** The figure shows the collusion index averaged across seeds in the (i) training contexts following convergence, (ii) first 1000 iterations in the new testing contexts, and (iii) after convergence in the new contexts.

Figure 2 shows the average collusion index for each parameterization. In contrast to the outcome during training (in red), which shows the high collusion index detailed before, in the new context collusion breaks down. Instead, we observe Nash play on average. In order to exclude the possibility that collusion only vanishes due to the initial condition and it might simply take some iterations to restore it, we also let the algorithm run until policies converge again. This is captured by the lighter blue line ("Re-Convergence"). The result is the same: Irrespective of the number of periods of play, algorithmic collusion vanishes
This finding shows that algorithmic collusion is not robust to changes in the environment, and performance during training is clearly no indication of outcome in the market. However, it seems likely that firms would not stop the learning process entirely in practice. As new information arrives while the algorithm is active, the policy can be updated further. Figure 3 displays the result when further reinforcing of the algorithms policy is enabled but exploration is not.

**Figure 3:** Collusion index in training and testing contexts with policy updating

Notes: The figure shows the collusion index averaged across seeds when policies continue to be updated in the (i) training contexts following convergence, (ii) first 1000 iterations in the new testing contexts, and (iii) after convergence in the new contexts.

As before, in the new context collusion breaks down. However, we already observe profits on average that exceed Nash play. Once the algorithms have fully converged again, a relatively high level of collusion can be restored. This is in line with the literature that appears to find that algorithms achieve collusive outcomes in a large range of different environments and parameterizations (Calvano et al., 2020b, 2021; Klein, 2021). Our analysis shows that this can

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10We document the time to convergence during training and re-convergence, as well as the frequency of convergence types in Figure A1 and Figure A2 in the Appendix.
potentially be achieved without exploration, if algorithms have been trained before in the “correct” environment. But it continues to take a long time for algorithms to converge, making it likely infeasible in practice (see Figure A3 in the Appendix).

We further study a policies’ performance in a new context when the context differs in the parameterization of the environment. Suppose two pairs of algorithms train in contexts that differ in the marginal cost level. We assess their performance in a third context that is parameterized such that the parameters of each algorithm remain the same compared to their respective training context, but the parameters of the competing player are different in the testing context.

**Figure 4:** Collusion index in new contexts with different parameterization

![Collusion index matrix]

**Notes:** The figure shows the collusion index averaged across seeds in the training contexts following convergence (on-diagonal), and first 1000 iterations in the new contexts (off-diagonal).

**Figure 4** shows the result. Along the diagonal, we observe the training outcome (identical parameterization) documented before. Off-diagonal, we document the performance in asymmetric, differently-parameterized environments. We observe a breakdown of collusion and near-Nash play in particular for smaller parameter differences. We further quantify the effect of policies being employed in the new, asymmetric context (off-diagonal) by computing the average proportional loss $R_\tau$, which is given by $R_\tau = (\bar{D} - \bar{O})/\bar{D}$, where $\bar{D}$ is the
mean value of the diagonal and $\bar{O}$ is the mean value of the off-diagonal entries. The average proportional loss for Figure 4 is $R_\pi = 0.72$. Thus, in testing contexts in which only the rivals’ marginal cost level is different compared to the training context, the collusion index drops by 72% on average. Figure A5 documents the average profit gain by player, showing that the higher values of the collusion index are driven by the relatively low-cost player achieving high profit gains. As before, collusion can be restored by continued learning (see Figure A6 and Figure A7 in the Appendix).

### 4.3 Overfitting of Policies

The breakdown of collusion we document is most severe for a change in context in which parameterization remains identical, or changes only marginally. We now examine the policies learnt during training to show that the driving force is overfitting to rival policies, and variation in “off-equilibrium” play.

While we consistently observe “reward-punishment” patterns in converged play (see Figure 1), the specific strategies differ greatly. For example, Figure 5 shows the punishment following a deviation to the price nearest to the Nash price on the grid for two specific pairs of algorithms in two training contexts that solely differ in the seed used to initialize the learning process, and that converged to the same high, symmetric price pair.

**Figure 5:** Two paths of play following deviation to Nash for intermediate parameterization with identical context except for the seed and identical convergence outcome during training

![Price vs. Iterations to Deviation](image)

**Notes:** The figure shows the actions played prior to and following a manual deviation of one player (in blue) to the price closest to the Nash price on the grid for training contexts with intermediate cost parameterization for two different runs. Except for the initial seeds both runs use identical parameterizations and converged to identical outcomes during training.
To fully examine the variation in strategies played, we consider the transitive closure of strategy-pairs. Consider that once algorithms have converged, they are playing a pure-strategy that assigns one (optimal) action for each possible observation of the game for each player. We examine for a pair of jointly-converged policies during training and for each observation profile $o = (o_1, o_2)$ of the game the actions played according to the largest Q-value among all observation-action pairs for each player (i.e. the strategy-pair), and thus which new state they transition to.

Figure 6 illustrates the result for one pair of strategies of a training context in which algorithms converged to a symmetric, high price level. Each node is an observation profile and thus a state in the setting we consider, and the edges indicate the transitions that occur with this specific strategy-pair. Blue nodes are stable end-nodes, that is, once algorithms reach this action-pair, they will play it repeatedly forever. Green nodes are unstable end-nodes, meaning that a collection of neighboring green nodes are a cycle among action-pairs that will be played forever once algorithms reach it.

Figure 6: Example strategy pair with multiple stable and unstable end-nodes

Notes: The figure shows the transitive closure of one pair of converged policies in their training context. Blue nodes are stable end-nodes, green nodes are unstable end-nodes.

In the example shown, algorithms converged to a high, symmetric price,
collusive outcome during training. This is the stable end-node at the center of Figure 6. Yet, depending on the state they find themselves in (i.e. actions played), the strategies do not necessarily lead back to this collusive outcome. That is, the outcome is not robust to perturbations. Moreover, when comparing strategy-pairs that each converged to the same collusive outcome and the respective context differed solely in the seed used, we see significant variation. For example, Figure A9 in the Appendix shows a strategy-pair that converged to the same collusive outcome as the one shown in Figure 6, but that in fact is robust to any perturbation: there is only one stable outcome.

When one strategy of each strategy pair is then placed in a third context (with identical parameterization), it is unsurprising that the collusive results from training cannot be extrapolated. Figure 7 shows this for the specific strategy-pairs shown in Figure 6 and Figure A9. In both panels, we place the strategy of one player from the first training context and one from the second jointly into a new, third context. We observe in both cases multiple possible outcomes, and none of them are the collusive outcome that both strategy-pairs played in their training context. The collusive policies that successfully established coordination in the training context are thus overfit to the specific policy of the competitor from training.

**Figure 7:** Two example strategy-pairs in testing context

Notes: The figure shows the transitive closure of two pairs of policies with identical outcome in training contexts evaluated in testing contexts. Blue nodes are stable end-nodes, green nodes are unstable end-nodes.

Viewed through the lens of standard game theory, the large variation in strategies that we observe is not necessarily surprising. When it comes to infinitely repeated games, the strategies which support an equilibrium different from the static stage game Nash equilibrium are not unique (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006). Moreover, there is no guarantee that the learning agents in our setting
learn equilibrium strategies perfectly. After all, they are only approximations.

### 4.4 Robust Collusion

The overfitting to rival policies that we document and the resulting instability of algorithmic collusion raises an important question: Is there a way for companies to design their learning algorithms so that they are more robust and achieve collusion in settings they have not been exposed to before? Our analysis shows that algorithms essentially learn to coordinate on highly specific, overfit policies, which is only possible due to the large policy/strategy space. Hence, an obvious starting point is to restrict the algorithms’ state space.\(^{11}\)

**Figure 8:** Collusion index in training and testing contexts with restricted observation space

![Graph showing collusion index](image)

**Notes:** The figure shows the collusion index averaged across seeds in the (i) training contexts following convergence, (ii) first 1000 iterations in training contexts with a random initial state, (iii) first 1000 iterations in the new testing contexts, and (iv) after convergence in the new contexts, in the setting with a restricted observation space.

We augment the setting introduced in Section 3 by changing players’ set of

\(^{11}\) This is in line with research demonstrating that policies learnt via self-play can be exploited by adversarial policies particularly in high-dimensional environments, e.g. Gleave et al. (2021).
observations $O_i$. Specifically, algorithms now only observe their own price in the last period, so that $O = O_1 \times O_2 = (A_1 \times A_2)$ and $o_i = (o_{1,t} = p_{1,t-1}, o_{2,t} = p_{2,t-1})$.

**Figure 8** shows the collusion index averaged across contexts varying solely in their seed. We observe a high, seemingly-collusive outcome for parts of the differently-parameterized training contexts, specifically in higher cost contexts. Most importantly however, we observe that irrespective of the parameterization or level of the collusion index, when placed in a new context the outcome is virtually identical to the training outcome. This does not change when we let algorithms play until converging again in the new context.

We provide an additional estimate in which we do not place algorithms in a new context, but place them in their training context with a random initial state. We do so to test explicitly that strategies are now robust to perturbations and generally yield a unique, stable outcome. **Figure 8** confirms this (“Random Re-Start”). Algorithms are now consistently able to extrapolate play from the training to the testing context.

**Figure 9:** Example strategy pair in new context

Notes: The figure shows the transitive closure of one pair of policies evaluated in the testing context for the setting with a restricted observation space. Blue nodes are stable end-nodes, green nodes are unstable end-nodes.

**Figure 9** shows an example of a strategy-pair in the new (testing) context, that
is typical for the strategy-pairs we observe. We now generally observe a unique, stable outcome even when playing against a previously unseen competitor. However, we also observe more short cycles compared to the baseline estimates from Section 4.1 (we detail the frequency of convergence types in Figure A10 in the Appendix).

Figure 10 shows the outcomes when algorithms continue to update their policies in the new context. Interestingly, because policies from training are already robust to being placed in a new context, continuing to update policies is strictly worse than simply using the “fixed” policies from training.

**Figure 10:** Collusion index in training and testing contexts with restricted observation space and continued updating

![Figure 10: Collusion index in training and testing contexts with restricted observation space and continued updating](image)

**Notes:** The figure shows the collusion index averaged across seeds when policies continue to be updated in the (i) training contexts following convergence, (ii) first 1000 iterations in training contexts with a random initial state, (iii) first 1000 iterations in the new testing contexts, and (iv) after convergence in the new contexts, in the setting with a restricted observation space.

Our analysis suggests that a key driving force of algorithmic collusion in practice is coordination of algorithm design. Firms in practice may be able to successfully achieve algorithmic (tacit) collusion by coordinating on high-level ideas for the implementation of learning algorithms. Each firm then implements and trains its algorithm independently. Yet by choosing the parameterization
of the environment, and the observation and thus policy space appropriately, collusive policies can be made sufficiently robust to extrapolate to the market. Intuitively, precisely because the degree of coordination among competing firms is (legally) restricted, and algorithms must potentially work in a range of environments, the policy employed must rely on simpler patterns and cannot be too specific.\footnote{Treutlein et al. (2021) study the “zero-shot coordination problem” in a multiple settings and similarly note the importance for algorithms to “only rely on general principles for coordination” (p. 10).}

5 Conclusion

Companies worldwide increasingly make use of reinforcement learning (RL) and other machine learning techniques for their pricing decisions. The application of such tools and the resulting automation of pricing decisions has gained the attention of policy-makers and researchers. One major concern is that self-learning pricing algorithms may lead to collusion without any explicit instruction to do so by firms. A nascent literature that studies the behavior of RL in economic games indicates that concerns about algorithmic collusion are not unfounded and algorithms can indeed learn sophisticated strategies supporting supra-competitive pricing. However, existing analyses have studied the behavior of algorithms in their training environment, but in practice the offline training environment is not identical to the market environment in which an algorithm is subsequently deployed.

This paper develops a framework to guide the analysis of learning algorithms in economic games. We consider a formal, general representation of the environment that is parameterized by a context. Evaluating policies learnt by algorithms in their training context in a suitably chosen testing context allows inference over the ability of policies to be extrapolated successfully to the market. We show that Q-learning algorithms in repeated Bertrand games overfit to rival strategies, and are unable to successfully use their collusive policies outside their training environment. In testing contexts, algorithmic collusion vanishes and does not recover with further iterations. Instead, we observe evidence of static Nash play, in particular with (nearly) identically parameterized contexts. We show that this is due to an overfit of policies to the rival training policy, and as a consequence we find that restricting algorithms’ strategy space can make algorithmic collusion robust.

Our results provide a novel perspective on the existing findings of algorithmic collusion, and highlight the relevance of coordination at the level of algorithm design. While jointly learning algorithms appear prone to collusion, our analysis
shows that this does not imply that collusive outcomes can be achieved in the market. Yet, by appropriately coordinating on aspects of the parameterization and strategy space, independently trained algorithms from rival firms may be designed to learn collusive policies that are robust to deployment in the market. Intuitively, because the extent of coordination among competing firms is (legally) restricted, and algorithms must work in a range of environments, the collusive policies employed must rely on simpler patterns and be fit to one another.
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Appendices

A Figures

Figure A1: Time to convergence without continued policy updating

(a) Training

(b) Re-convergence

Notes: The figure shows a histogram of the number of iterations until policies converged in the training contexts (panel (a)) and testing contexts with identical parameterization (panel (b)).
Figure A2: Convergence types without continued policy updating

(a) Training

(b) Re-convergence

Notes: The figure shows a histogram of the frequency of convergence types in training contexts (panel (a)) and testing contexts with identical parameterization (panel (b)).
**Figure A3:** Time to re-convergence with continued policy updating

**Notes:** The figure shows a histogram of the number of iterations until policies converged in the training contexts (panel (a)) and testing contexts with identical parameterization (panel (b)) when policies continue to be updated.
**Figure A4:** Convergence types with continued updating

(a) Training

(b) Re-convergence

**Notes:** The figure shows a histogram of the frequency of convergence types in training contexts (panel (a)) and testing contexts with identical parameterization (panel (b)) when policies continue to be updated.

**Figure A5:** Profit gain by player

**Notes:** The figure shows the profit gain by player averaged across seeds for all testing contexts with asymmetric parameterizations.
**Figure A6:** Collusion index after re-convergence in testing contexts

| Cost level of player 1 | Cost level of player 2 |
|------------------------|------------------------|
| 0.8                    | 0.79                   |
| 0.78                   | 0.76                   |
| 0.73                   | 0.73                   |
| 0.76                   | 0.66                   |
| 0.65                   |                        |

**Notes:** The figure shows the collusion index averaged across seeds for all testing contexts with asymmetric parameterizations following re-convergence.

**Figure A7:** Profit gain by player after re-convergence

| Cost level of player 1 | Cost level of player 2 |
|------------------------|------------------------|
|                        |                        |
| 0.75                   | 0.76                   |
| 0.78                   | 0.79                   |
| 0.72                   | 0.72                   |
| 0.69                   | 0.69                   |
| 0.67                   | 0.67                   |
| 0.65                   | 0.65                   |

**Notes:** The figure shows the profit gain by player averaged across seeds for all testing contexts with asymmetric parameterizations following re-convergence.
**Figure A8:** Convergence types with asymmetric parameterized testing contexts

(a) On-diagonal training context

(b) Off-diagonal testing context

(c) On-diagonal after re-convergence

(d) Off-diagonal after re-convergence

**Notes:** The figure shows a histogram of the frequency of convergence types in training contexts (left column) and testing contexts with asymmetric parameterization (right column) in the first 1000 iterations and after re-convergence.
Figure A9: Example strategy pair with one stable point and collusive outcome

Notes: The figure shows the transitive closure of one pair of policies evaluated in the training context. Blue nodes are stable end-nodes, green nodes are unstable end-nodes.
Figure A10: Convergence types with restricted observation space and no updating

Notes: The figure shows a histogram of the frequency of convergence types in training contexts (panel (a)) and testing contexts after re-convergence (panel (b)) in the setting with a restricted observation space.
**Figure A11:** Convergence types with restricted observation space and updating

(a) Training

(b) Re-convergence

**Notes:** The figure shows a histogram of the frequency of convergence types in training contexts (panel (a)) and testing contexts after re-convergence (panel (b)) in the setting with a restricted observation space when policies continue to be updated.
Figure A12: Average path of play following deviation to Nash with restricted observation space

Notes: The figure shows the average actions played prior to and following a manual deviation of one player (in blue) to the price closest to the Nash price on the grid for training contexts with high cost parameterization with a restricted observation space.
# Tables

**Table B1: Summary Statistics Training**

| Cost Level | Collusion Index | Convergence Type | Cycle |
|------------|-----------------|------------------|-------|
|            | Mean  | SD   | Symmetric | Asymmetric | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5+ |
| 1.00       | 0.79  | 0.16 | 79        | 52        | 59 | 27 | 23 | 10 |
| 1.10       | 0.81  | 0.13 | 89        | 51        | 65 | 26 | 12 | 7  |
| 1.20       | 0.87  | 0.11 | 159       | 20        | 39 | 15 | 9  | 8  |
| 1.30       | 0.87  | 0.10 | 171       | 23        | 36 | 9  | 4  | 7  |
| 1.40       | 0.84  | 0.10 | 168       | 36        | 42 | 3  | 0  | 1  |
| 1.50       | 0.75  | 0.12 | 164       | 49        | 32 | 5  | 0  | 0  |
| 1.60       | 0.70  | 0.13 | 156       | 50        | 38 | 5  | 1  | 0  |
| 1.70       | 0.73  | 0.15 | 154       | 52        | 40 | 3  | 1  | 0  |

**Notes:** The table shows the mean and standard deviation of the collusion index averaged over training contexts per parameterization, as well as the frequency of convergence types in training contexts.
### Table B2: Profit gain or loss in percentage of Nash-equilibrium profit

| Cost Level | Both Randomize | Opponent Randomizes | Nash | Best-response |
|------------|----------------|---------------------|------|---------------|
| 1.00       | 0.13%          | 0.63%               | 0.80%|
| 1.10       | 0.09%          | 0.50%               | 0.67%|
| 1.20       | 0.02%          | 0.36%               | 0.53%|
| 1.30       | -0.08%         | 0.32%               | 0.39%|
| 1.40       | -0.21%         | 0.17%               | 0.25%|
| 1.50       | -0.36%         | 0.04%               | 0.11%|
| 1.60       | -0.54%         | -0.04%              | -0.02%|
| 1.70       | -0.73%         | -0.17%              | -0.15%|

**Notes:** The table shows the difference in profit relative to the static Nash equilibrium profit per parameterization for three cases.