A secure key-exchange protocol with an absence of injective functions

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The security of neural cryptography is investigated. A key-exchange protocol over a public channel is studied where the parties exchanging secret messages use multilayer neural networks which are trained by their mutual output bits and synchronize to a time dependent secret key. The weights of the networks have integer values between \(\pm L\). Recently an algorithm for an eavesdropper which could break the key was introduced by Shamir et al.\textsuperscript{1}. We show that the synchronization time increases with \(L^2\) while the probability to find a successful attacker decreases exponentially with \(L\). Hence for large \(L\) we find a secure key-exchange protocol which depends neither on number theory nor on injective trapdoor functions used in conventional cryptography.

The ability to build a secure channel is one of the most challenging fields of research in modern communication \textsuperscript{2}. One of the fundamental tasks of cryptography is to generate a key-exchange protocol. Both partners start with private keys and transmit – using a public protocol – their encrypted private keys which, after some transformations, leads to a common secret key. A prototypical protocol for the generation of a common secret key is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol \textsuperscript{2}.

All known secure key-exchange protocols use one-way functions, which are usually based on number theory and in particular on the difficulty in factorizing a product of long prime numbers \textsuperscript{1}. Typically, \(N\) bits – the length of the key – are transmitted between the two partners and transformed by an injective function to the common key. This function usually can be inverted by a secret trapdoor. One of the fundamental questions in the theory of cryptography is firstly whether it is possible to build a secure cryptosystem which does not rely on number theory, secondly, whether one can transmit less than \(N\) bits and thirdly, whether one can generate very long keys which can be directly used for one-time stream ciphers \textsuperscript{1}.

In our recent paper \textsuperscript{4} we presented a novel principle of a key-exchange protocol based on a new phenomenon which we observed for artificial neural networks. The protocol is based on the synchronization of feedforward neural networks by mutual learning. It was shown by simulations and by the analytical solution of the dynamics that synchronization is faster than the learning of a naive attacker that is trying to reveal the weights of one of the parties \textsuperscript{4,5}. Our new approach does not rely on previous agreement on public information, and the only secret of each one of the parties is the initial conditions of the weights. The protocol generates permanently new keys and can be generalized to include the scenario of a key-exchange protocol among more than two partners \textsuperscript{4}. Hence, we suggest a symmetric key-exchange protocol over a public channel which simplifies the task of key management. The parties exchange a finite number of bits less than \(N\) and can generate very long keys by fast calculations.\textsuperscript{4}

This protocol for the given parameters in \textsuperscript{4} \((K = L = 3)\) was recently shown to be breakable by an ensemble of advanced flipping attackers \textsuperscript{1}. In such an ensemble, there is a probability that a low percentage of the attackers will find the key. Someone reading all the decrypted messages will determine the original plaintext from the message which has a meaning. This result raises the question of the existence of a secure key-exchange protocol based on the synchronization of neural networks.

In this Letter we demonstrate that the security of our key-exchange protocol against the flipping attack increases as the synchronization time increases. The mechanism used to vary the synchronization time is the depth of the weights, i.e. the number of values for each component of the synaptic weights. The main result in this Letter is that with increasing depth the probability of an attacker finding the key decreases exponentially with the depth. Hence we conjecture that a key-exchange protocol exists in the limit where the synchronization time diverges. We also present a variant of our original scheme which includes a permutation of a fraction of the weights.

In our original scheme each party of the secure channel, \(A\) and \(B\), is represented by a two-layered perceptron, exemplified here by a parity machine (PM) with \(K\) hidden units. More precisely, the size of the input is \(KN\) and its components are denoted by \(x_{kj}\), \(k = 1, 2, ..., K\) and \(j = 1, ..., N\). For simplicity, each input unit takes binary values, \(x_{kj} = \pm 1\). The \(K\) binary hidden units are denoted by \(y_1, y_2, ..., y_K\). Our architecture is characterized by non-overlapping receptive fields (a tree), where the weight from the \(j\)th input unit to the \(k\)th hidden unit is denoted by \(w_{kj}\), and the output bit \(O\) is the product of the state of the hidden units. The weights can take integer values bounded by \(|L|\), i.e., \(w_{kj}\) can take the values \(-L, -L + 1, ..., L\).

The secret information of each of the parties is the initial value for the \(2KN\) weights, \(w_{kj}^A\) and \(w_{kj}^B\). The parties do not know the initial weights of the other party.
which are used to construct the common secret key.

Each network is then trained with the output of its partner. At each training step a new common public input vector \((x_{kj})\) is needed for both parties. For a given input, the output is calculated in the following two steps. In the first step, the state of the \(K\) hidden units, \(y_{k}^{A/B}\), of the two parties, are determined from the corresponding fields

\[
y_{k}^{A/B} = \text{sign}(\sum_{j=1}^{N} w_{kj}^{A/B} x_{kj}) \quad (1)
\]

In the case of zero field, \(\sum_{k}^{A/B} w_{kj}^{A/B} x_{kj} = 0\), \(A/B\) sets the hidden unit to \(1/−1\). In the next step the output \(O^{A/B}\) is determined by the product of the hidden units, \(O^{A/B} = \prod_{m=1}^{K} y_{m}^{A/B}\). The output bit of each party is transmitted to its partner. In the event of disagreement, \(O^{A} \neq O^{B}\), the weights of the parties are updated according to the following Hebbian learning rule

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{if } (O^{A/B} y_{k}^{A/B} > 0) & \text{ then } w_{kj}^{A/B} = w_{kj}^{A/B} + O^{A/B} x_{kj} \\
\text{if } (|w_{kj}^{A/B}| > L) & \text{ then } w_{kj}^{A/B} = \text{sign}(w_{kj}^{A/B}) L \quad (2)
\end{align*}
\]

Only weights belonging to hidden units which are in the same state as their output unit are updated. Note that from the knowledge of the output, the internal representation of the hidden units is not uniquely determined because there is a \(2^{K−1}\) fold degeneracy. As a consequence, an attacker cannot know which weight vectors are updated according to equation (2). Nevertheless, although parties A and B do not have more information than an attacker, they still can synchronize.

The synchronization time is finite even in the thermodynamic limit \(K \gg 1\). For \(K = L = 3\), for instance, the synchronization time \(t_{av}\) converges to \(\approx 400\) for large networks. This observation was recently confirmed by an analytical solution of the presented model \(\mathbb{R}\). Surprisingly, in the limit of large \(N\) one needs to exchange only a few hundred bits to obtain agreement between \(3N\) components. \(\mathbb{R}\)

An attacker eavesdropping on the channel knows the algorithm as well as the actual mutual outputs, hence he knows in which time steps the weights are changed. In addition, an attacker knows the input \(x_{kj}\) as well. However, the attacker does not know the initial conditions of the weights of the parties and as a consequence, even for the synchronized state, the internal representations of the hidden units of the parties are hidden from the attacker. As a result he does not know which are the weights participating in the learning step. Note that for random inputs all \(2^{K−1}\) internal representations appear with equal probability at any stage of the dynamical process. The strategy of a naive attacker which has the same architecture as the parties is defined as follows \(\mathbb{R}\). The attacker tries to imitate the moves of one of the parties, \(A\) for instance. The attacker is trained using its internal representation, the input vector and the output bit of \(A\), and the training step is performed only if \(A\) moves (disagreement between the parties). Note that the trained weights of a naive attacker are only weights belonging to hidden units that are in agreement with \(O^{A}\). Simulations as well as analytical solution of the dynamics indicate that the learning time of a naive attacker is much longer than the synchronization time \(\mathbb{R}\). Hence our key-exchange protocol is robust against a large ensemble of naive attackers.

Recently, an efficient flipping attack was presented \(\mathbb{R}\). The strategy of a flipping attacker, \(C\) is as follows. In the event of a disagreement between the parties, \(O^{A} \neq O^{B}\) and \(O^{C} = O^{A}\), the attacker moves as for the naive attack following its internal presentation, the common input and \(O^{A}\). In the case where the parties move but the attacker does not agree with \(A\), \(O^{A} \neq O^{B}\) and \(O^{C} \neq O^{A}\), the move consists of the following two steps. In the first step the attacker flips the sign of one of its \(K\) hidden units \textit{without altering the weights}. The selected hidden unit is \(K_{0}\) with the minimal absolute local field

\[
K_{0} = \text{min}_{m}(h_{m}^{C}) \quad (3)
\]

where \(h_{m}^{C}\) is the local field on the \(m\)th hidden units of the attacker (see eq. (1) for the definition of the local field). After flipping one hidden unit the new output of the attacker agrees with that of \(A\). The learning step is then performed with the new internal presentation and with the strategy of the naive attacker. The flipping attack is based on the strategy that a flipping attacker develops some similarity with the parties. This similarity can be measured by the fraction of equal weights which is greater than \(1/(2L + 1)\), a result for a random attacker, or by a positive overlap between the weights of \(C\) and \(A\). \(\mathbb{R}\) The minimal change in the weights which preserves the already produced similarity with \(A\) and which is also consistent with the current input/output relation is most probable by changing the weights of the hidden units with the minimal absolute local field. Simulations as well as the analytical solution of the dynamics of the flipping attackers \(\mathbb{R}\) indicate that there is a high probability that there is a successful attacker among a few dozen attackers. By a successful attacker we mean an attacker with a learning time smaller than the synchronization time between the parties. This attacker achieves the same weights as for \(A\) before the synchronization process terminates. In Fig. 1 the average synchronization time, \(t_{av}\), as well as its standard deviation as a function of \(L\) for \(K = 3\) and \(N = 10^{3}\) are presented. Results were averaged over \(\sim 10^{4}\) different runs, where each run is characterized by different initial conditions for the parties and a different set of inputs. Results indicate that the synchronization time increases as \(L^{2}\), for \(L < O(\sqrt{N})\).
This scaling is consistent with the analytical solution of ref \[12\] where for \( L = \sqrt{N} \), \( t_{av} \propto N \). For \( L = O(\sqrt{N}) \) we observe in simulations a crossover to the scaling behavior \( t_{av} \propto \sqrt{NL} \). This crossover explains the deviation of \( t_{av} \propto L^\sigma, \sigma = 1.91 < 2 \) (see Fig. 3), and furthermore \( \sigma \) is expected to increase with \( N \) (see Fig. 4).

In Figure 2 the fraction of successful flipping attackers, \( P_{flip} \), is presented as a function of \( L \). In order to reduce fluctuations in our simulations we define a successful attacker as one which has 0.98 fraction of correct values for the weights at the synchronization time between the parties. Fig. 2 indicates that the success rate drops exponentially with \( L \). To conclude, for \( 1 \ll L \ll \sqrt{N} \) the synchronization time diverges polynomially while the probability of a successful attacker drops exponentially. Hence for large \( L \) our construction is robust against the flipping attack (Practically, for \( L \approx 85 \) and \( N \approx 2 \cdot 10^4 \), the complexity of an effective flipping attack is greater than \( 2^{80} \)).

Finally we note that the complexity of the synchronization process for \( 1 \ll L \ll \sqrt{N} \) is \( O(L^2 N \log(N)) \). The factor \( \log(N) \) is a result of a typical scenario of an exponential decay of the overlap in the case of discrete weights \( \mathbb{F}_N \). Hence, the complexity for the generation of a large common key, \( N \to \infty \), scales as \( O(\log N) \) operations per weight.

Let us compare now the complexity of an exhaustive attack with the complexity of the flipping attack. For each input/output pair there are 4 possible configurations of the hidden units. Hence to cover all possible training processes over a period \( t \) one has to deal with an ensemble of \( 4^t \) scenarios. The crucial question is the scaling of the minimal necessary period \( t_0 \) with \( L \) which ensures a convergence with the weights of party \( A \). Since one of the attackers among \( 4^t \) has an identical series of internal representations to party \( A \), the problem is reduced to calculating the weight vector of a single perceptron. The learning time as a function of \( L \) for a perceptron attacker \( K = 1 \) is presented in Fig. 3, indicating that for large \( N \), \( t_0 \approx L^2 \), as expected from similar analytically solvable models \[12\]. Hence the complexity of an exhaustive attack scales exponentially with \( L^2 \) while for the flipping attack the complexity is reduced to scale exponentially only with \( L \).

In the following we show that one can increase the security of our key-exchange protocol by the following variant of our dynamical rules. The new ingredient is a permutation of a fraction \( f \) of the weights, and the protocol is defined by the following steps. In the case where the parties move, we assign for each hidden unit a permutation consisting of \( F = fN \) pairs. Each pair
consists of a random selection of two indices among $N$ of the trained hidden unit \[1\]. The three permutations for the three hidden units (which differ from step to step) are part of the public protocol. In the case where a hidden unit is trained we apply the assigned permutation for this hidden unit. Note that the permutations is an ingredient that prevents an attack where one may assign for each weight (among $3N$) a probability equal to one of the $2L+1$ possible values. During the dynamics one may try to sharpen this probability around one of the possible values \[1\]. The permutations are responsible for mixing these probabilities as a function of time.

Results indicate that there are two different scaling behaviors for $t_{av}(L)$ and $P_{\text{flip}}(L)$ as a function of the total number of permuted pairs, $M$, during the synchronization process. As long as $M < \phi KN$ where $\phi \sim 1$, the permutations do not affect the synchronization time, $t_{av}(L) = AL^2$; $A \sim 60$ is independent of the permutations ($A$ increases slightly with $N$ and is asymptotically expected to scale with $\log(N)$ \[3\]). This scaling behavior can be observed for \( L < \sqrt{3\phi N/(60f)} \). Hence in order to observe the scaling, $t_{av} \sim 60L^2$ over a decade of $L$ one has to choose a large $N$ and a very small $F$. In Fig. 4 the average synchronization time, $t_{av}$, and its standard deviations as a function of $L$ are presented for $K = 3$, $N = 10^3$ and $F = 0$, $3$ (number of permuted pairs is $3$ per hidden unit). An insignificant deviation from the scaling behavior is observed only for $L \geq 32$. In the inset of Fig. 4, similar results are presented for $N = 10^3$ with $F = 3$, and $N = 10^4$ with $F = 3$ and $20$. The deviation from the scaling behavior is observed for a larger $L$ as we increase $N$ or as we decrease $F$ ($L < \sqrt{3\phi N/(60f)}$). We also measured $P_{\text{flip}}(L) L < 10$ for $N = 10^4$, $10^5$ with $F = 3$ or $F = 0$. We realized that $P_{\text{flip}}$ is independent of $F$ and it decreases exponentially with $L$. The permutations do not affect the exponential drop, $P_{\text{flip}} \propto e^{-BL}$, where $B$ appears to increase with $N$. Note that although the permutations do not affect $t_{av}$ and $P_{\text{flip}}$, the accumulated affect of the permutations over all the synchronization process is significant. In the event that the flipping attacker does not use the permutation, a dramatic drops in $P_{\text{flip}}$ is observed \[13\]. The analysis of the scaling behavior of $t_{av}$ and $P_{\text{flip}}$ in the second regime $L > \sqrt{3\phi N/(60f)}$ is beyond our computational ability, where huge fluctuations are observed.

The scaling of $P_{\text{flip}}$ may be examined against other classes of attacks including a genetic attack, a majority attack and a flipping attack where the weights of the selected hidden unit are modified to actually flip the sign of the hidden unit \[1\]. Our results indicate that all such types of attacks are less efficient than the flipping attack presented. Hence, for all known attacks neural cryptography is secure in the limit of large values of $L$.

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FIG. 4. The synchronization times, $t_{av}$, and their standard deviations as a function of $L$ for $K = 3$, $N = 10^3$ with $F = 0$ ($\triangle$) and $F = 3$ ($\square$). The regression fit for $2 \leq L \leq 25$, dotted line, is $\sim 57.3 L^{2.02}$. Inset: $t_{av}$ as a function of $L$, $N = 10^3$, $F = 3$ (dashed line), $N = 10^4$ $F = 0$, $3$, $20$ ($\triangle$, $\square$, $\bigcirc$).

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\[6\] However, one should keep in mind that the two partners do not learn the initial weights of each other, they are just attracted to a dynamical state with opposite weights.

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\[8\] A stationary synchronization state of antiparallel weights for the parties can be modified to the dynamical rules where weights are updated only in the case of an agreement between the parties. The stationary solution in this case is parallel weights for the parties.

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\[10\] I. Kanter and W. Kinzel, to appear in the Proceeding of the XXII Solvay Conference in Physics.

\[11\] Note that from the synchronized weights it is difficult to determine initial set of weights consistent with the sequence of transmitted bits. This property may serve for other tasks of the secure channel such a one-time pad signature.

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\[13\] M. Rosen-Zvi, E. Klein, I. Kanter and W. Kinzel (unpublished).

\[14\] Similar results were also obtained for global permutations, where the second index of each pair was randomly selected from the other two hidden units.