The Indonesian Government's Political Control of the Islamic Ideology Movement in a Country with a Majority of Muslims

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Authors’ contributions

This work was carried out in collaboration among all authors. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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ABSTRACT

Genealogical perspective differences on the Jakarta Charter had become the main cause for some Islamic groups to have an endless struggle in embodying Islamism and Islamic ideology formalism as the basis of their philosophy and ideology. Compromise and radicalism are part of the movement of these groups. This study aims to examine the supporters' movement of the understanding of Islamism and Islamic Ideology formalism in order to get involve in Indonesian political system. The phenomenological constructivism approach is used in understanding the views of New Order Regime and Reforms Regime in dealing with Islamism and Islamic ideology formalism which are taken from interview and document analysis. The results of the study show that the radical issues are far more than the normal level of the Indonesian Islam movement. The concerns of certain groups which are oriented towards the Islamic movement in Indonesia are more co-opted in an anti-Islamic global network sponsored by the United States. The status of the New Order Regime and the Reform Regime do not differ significantly in addressing various state

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issues related to the issues of the Islamic movement. For these two regimes, Islamism is still seen as a movement that must be tightly controlled, radical issues and terrorism are the most effective political instruments for controlling Islamic nationalism groups whose views differ from secular nationalist groups with regard to national philosophy and identity.

Keywords: Indonesian government's; political control; islamic ideology.

1. INTRODUCTION

The events of the September 30, 1965 movement carried out by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, full of controversy as to who was behind the incident, have become an important milestone in the end of Soekarno's power and at the same time the beginning of the birth of the new order regime under Soeharto's leadership [1]. After the killing of six generals at midnight before dawn on October 1, 1965, Soekarno tried to get back up, but through a coup d'etat, Soeharto finally succeeded in ending Soekarno's constitutional power at the special session of the MPRS in 1967 [2,3]

Many political experts and historians explain, such as Roosa [4] Simpson, [5] Van Bruinessen [6] Wieringa [7] that the beginning of Sorkarno's de facto defeat when assigning Soeharto to take action to restore Jakarta's security after the events of the 30th Movement September by Order of March Eleventh 1966. After receiving the controversial 1966 Supersemar, the first step taken was to disband the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). Soeharto then took over the leadership of the Army, which was previously held by General Ahmad Yani. Until General Soeharto was appointed as Acting President on March 12, 1967 based on Provisional People's Consultative Assembly Decree No. XXXIII of 1967 on February 22, 1967 by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly after President Soekarno accountability speech entitled Nawaksara on the Indonesian Communist Party Movement was rejected by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly. One year later, Soeharto became president according to the results of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly General Session (MPRS Decree No XLIV/MPRS/1968) on March 27, 1968 [8-10].

Soeharto efforts to disband the Indonesian Communist Party which is well-known in Indonesian term as PKI was a great success thanks to the assistance of the ulama, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah [11-12]. According to Van Bruinessen [6], muslim groups from NU and Muhammadiyah together with Indonesian Army played a major role in accelerating the end of the existence of the PKI in Indonesia. Islamic groups from NU and Muhammadiyah together with Indonesian Military or in Indonesian term which is so call as ABRI played a major role in accelerating the end of the existence of the PKI in Indonesia. In areas controlled by the PKI, PKI did not give room for NU. Therefore, there is equal retaliation from NU in these areas.

In subsequent developments, Soeharto began to form the foundation of the New Order's power by involving secular nationalism groups and began to put aside the role of Islamic nationalism figures. The events of the 30 September 1965 movement were not only important moments for ABRI but also an opportunity for the majority of Muslims who are anti-communist to try again to take a strategic role politically. This is no exaggeration compared to neighboring Malaysia, which has a Muslim population of only a little over 50%, which makes Islam the official state religion. Meanwhile, Muslims in Indonesia account for 86.39% of the total population (approximately 267 million in 2019), however, Muslims play a much smaller role in political and economic life. Most of economic life is controlled by minority groups e.g. ethnic Chinese, who are mostly Christian and Catholic [13].

History has recorded that Muslims, long before Indonesian independence, had fought through social organizations which later developed into political parties. There are three types of the struggle for movement in Indonesia i.e. movement organization with Islamic ideology, movement organization with national ideology, and movement organization with communist ideology [14,15]. The third form of organization is instrumental in realizing the independence of Indonesia in 1945. In the early period of independence, raised debate about National Principle, a group of Islamic nationalists who insist to maintain the Jakarta Charter revision finally received the first precepts of the Jakarta Charter. This is the beginning of defeat for the majority of Muslims who want to integrate Islamic
sharia in political ideology as the main guideline in Indonesia [16-17].

The dissatisfaction with the agreement on the National Principle or Pancasila, was also part of PKI's agenda [16]. In fact, the PKI became even more radical when Indonesia was fomenting enthusiasm to fight Dutch aggression 1 and 2 by carrying out a PKI rebellion at Madium in 1948. After failing to maintain the Jakarta Charter as the Basis of the State in 1945, important Islamic figures in the Constituent Assembly tried again to put forward the old format of the Jakarta Charter so that it could be agreed upon as the foundation of State Philosophy as a substitute for the Provisional Constitution of the United Republic of Indonesia in 1950 [18]. The debate over the Jakarta Charter, the designation for the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, continued throughout the 1950s until its supporters finally lost the ballot at the 1959 Constituent Assembly [19-20]. The debates in the Constituent Assembly may not be completely free. However, it is clear that the majority of delegates present at this session did not support the implementation of sharia. Nevertheless, the failure of the Constituent Assembly at several sessions had prompted the President to issue a Decree of June 1, 1959 by invalidating the Constituent Assembly and returning to the 1945 Constitution. In this phase, commonly referred to as guided democracy, Soekarno and the PKI had succeeded in blocking the movement of anti-PKI Islamic parties until the dissolution of the Masyumi in 1960 [21,22,23].

The success of Soeharto in taking control of the government after the fall of Soekarno gradually began to play down the importance of the majority Islamic power. Soeharto anti-Islamic attitude was not only influenced by external factors such as America's successful role in making Soeharto a Trojan horse to get rid of Soekarno who was pro-Eastern Bloc (Soviet and Chinese). For America, the Islamic power is important to be involved in getting rid of the PKI but on the other hand it does not want this power to take a big role in the political ideology in Indonesia [24-26]. There is also an assumption that is intentionally developed that Soeharto is a person who is not so concerned with the practice of sharia as a reflection of syncretic Javanese mysticism, which is adopted by Soeharto and many other members of the power elite. Some also suspect that this view was deliberately developed to cover up the efforts of Christians who are considered to be trying to overthrow Islam in Indonesia. Soeharto more firmly stated his view that the Pancasila Philosophy, in its current formulation, gave the same validity to the five religions that were officially recognized and advocated tolerance in religious life [27-29].

The failure of Muslims to take a greater role in the ideological and political aspects was not only disappointing for the majority of Muslims but was very painful for the group of fighters who participated in the fight for Indonesian independence. Even though the state pressure on this group is very strong, a thought movement or ideology that understands Islam as a religion and also makes Islam as the foundation of the country still exists and has a network in Indonesian society. [12,30] state that this movement is called as Islamism movement. Islamists argue that Islam has a complete and final system so that what comes from the West is the thoghut that must be rejected [31-33]. Since the New Order regime until the change of regimes in the reform era in Indonesia, it turns out that Islam as a practice of the Shari'a is still interesting to be used as political consumption with a variety of interesting terms starting from the so-called Jihad Command, Radical Islam, and more tragically is "terrorism" for Islamic community groups who have different views from the government.

2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This paper aims to examine the struggles of supporters of Islamicism and the ideology of Islamic formalism in crossing the Indonesian political storm between the two regimes (the new order and the reform era). The focus of the study is more to compare the attitude of the state in eradicating the ideological Islamic movement between Soeharto leadership and the leadership of the elected president of the reform era. More specifically a comparison of Soeharto attitude towards the jihad command and the attitude of the President of the reformation era towards the issue of radical Islam. Then this study also looks at the future trends of the Islamic formalism-Indeology movement in crossing the Indonesian political storm.

3. METHODOLOGY

This research was conducted with a qualitative method using the phenomenological
constructivism approach. The data in this study are taken from interview in the form of the views of important figures of Muslims and government officials and the experience of religious conflict actors. Then, documents were taken from the articles about Islamism, Islamic formalism, Islamic activism, radical Islam, and terrorism that published in national and international journals. These data were analyzed using a phenomenological approach. This research explores and captures the views of the figures in relation to the scope and problems of research. This research then reconstructs the phenomena that occur with regard to Islamic phobias, Islamism, and Islamic formalism in Indonesia.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Soeharto Practical Way of Stopping New Order Enemies

After General Suharto was appointed President through the General Assembly of the MPRS and stipulated by MPRS Decree No. XLIV/MPRS/1968 on 27 March 1968, in order to strengthen the foundation of his power, all forms of social organization rooted in the Darul Islam movement/Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII) must be wary of [34]. All forms of Islamic movements that contradict the ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are enemies of the state that must be eliminated. The country’s enemies by Soeharto were co-opted in a movement commonly called the “Jihad Command” [35-37]. Islamism thought movements associated with political Islam must be castrated, as well as the left forces that had been exterminated after the 1965 events by Soeharto with the controversial Supersemar [38-39].

Command jihad was a term used by the New Order rulers against a group of people seen as interfering with Suharto’s efforts to maintain his power. Ahmad Prayudi [40] explain the term jihad command which is labeled against the remnants of the Darul Islam (DI) group led by Sekarmaji Marijan Kartosuwirjo, who aspires to establish the Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII). The Darul Islam movement and NII were crushed after Kartosuwirjo was arrested in 1962 [40-41].

Soeharto, who opposed the Old Order political format with a parliamentary system and many parties, tried to build a new political force. The only strategy to counterbalance the political power of Islam after the disbandment of the PKI in 1965 was with ABRI to raise a group commonly known as the work group. This new supra political structure structurally positions Soeharto as Chairperson of the Working Group Development Board, so that in this position Soeharto can control the presidential candidates proposed by the Working Group Faction in the MPR by first consulting with the head of the Golkar Central Board (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Golkar, DPP Golkar) and the chairman of the Golkar DPP must consult with the Chair of the Council The supervisor, in fact, was President Soeharto. Not only that, even the Regional Representative Praction in the MPR which was commanded by the Minister of the Interior as an aide to the President also consulted with the incumbent President. While the Armed Forces faction under the Armed Forces Commander was also controlled directly by Soeharto with his position as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces based on article 10. of the 1945 Constitution. The Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – PDI) which is rooted in Soekarnoism and the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – PPP) which is rooted in the understanding of Islamism is left alive and stopped under political pressure that is full of intrigue and suversive accusations. This political format made Soeharto able to rule from period to period on the basis of a single interpretation verse by verse from the 1945 Constitution which was actually not perfectly formulated by BPUPKI (Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence) at the beginning of independence [42-49].

When the factions supported by Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia-ABRI) came out victorious in the 1971 election, Soeharto began to act massively by sending the military from battalion units and regiments to regions that were the basis of Islamic parties to intimidate political figures and ulama. Acehnese charismatic cleric Daud Beureueh was arrested by First Lieutenant Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, who was instructed by Ali Moertopo at dawn on May 1, 1978 and after being injected with anesthesia was flown to Jakarta. This practice continued until the 1982 election and then was somewhat relaxed in the 1987 election, but was replaced by massive fraud in the implementation of the election. One year before the election took place, thousands of
Islamic activists were arbitrarily arrested, tortured, jailed without procedures and verdicts without a clear legal basis. In general they are released after general, direct, free and secret legislative elections are held. In the face of the 1992 elections, President Soeharto had begun to lower his political tension and began to embrace moderate Islamic figures to sit in parliament and government, and in 1993 appointed Feisal Tanjuang as ABRI Commander of the Islamic group. While the 1997 election was the last election for Soeharto to remain willing to be re-nominated as president over the persuasion of a Golkar figure who came not from the bureaucrats and the military but from someone belonging to the group’s category of father who always assured that the people still wanted the father as president, in reality in society it’s not like that [45-46].

The Security and Order Restoration Operation Command (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban– Kopkamtimb) with intelligence operations through a Special Operation at the central level and the Regional Special Implementers (Pelaksana Khusus Daerah – Laksusda) at the regional level are institutions responsible for castrating the enemies of the new order. As conveyed by Busyro Muqoddas in a promotion exam to obtain a doctorate in law from the Islamic University of Indonesia (Universitas Islam Indonesia, UUI) Yogyakarta, in August 2010, there was an element of political engineering in the case of the Jihad Command in the New Order era with the aim of destroying the political institutions of Muslims and rooted political institutions to Soekarno ism. Busyro Muqoddas explained further that the struggle of Soekarnadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo who aspired to Islamic law in Indonesia had actually been completed in 1962.

The "mastermind" theory in an authoritarian state was used by the new order to crush Muslims and understand Marhenism. The practical step taken by intelligence was under Ali Moertopo’s control by reviving formalist-ideology in the form of the Jihad Command. According to Conboy, one of the Special Forces agents, Sugiyanto, managed to establish relations with Danu Mohammad Hasan, one of the commanders of Darul Islam in West Java who received an amnesty. The relationship was later useful, because the remnants of Darul Islam under the leadership of Dodo Mohammad Darda bin Kartosuwiryo, Kartosuwirjo's son, began to revive Darul Islam under the name of the Jihad Command. Then the group was destroyed again to win the Work Group in the 1971 election.

The New Order regime which stood above American interests in stemming the influence of communism in Southeast Asia, in 1973 began to curb Islamic parties into a new forum called the United Development Party and had to accept Pancasila as the only party ideology [47]. Since then practically the struggle for supporters of Islamization in electoral politics has temporarily stagnated [48]. However, a number of Masyumi exponents who still kept the utopia of the establishment of an Islamic state succeeded in strong contacts with the Middle East. The main character, Mhd. Natsir has held the leadership position of Rabithah Alam Islami, an international Muslim organization, based in Mecca. Through Indonesian Islamic Da’wah Council, the influence of Islamism from the Middle East spread in Indonesia (Bbalo and Fealy, 2007). Books by the Muslim Brotherhood figure, Hasan al-Bana and the Pakistani Islamic figure, Abu A’Ia al-Maudhudi, were translated into Indonesian and gained an important place in the discourse of Indonesian Islamism. Specifically Wahhabism, a version of Islamism that is hard and rooted in the ideas of Muhammad ibn Al-Wahhab which would later be adopted as the official ideology of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, was influenced by the establishment of LIPIA (Islamic and Arabic Institute of Sciences or Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab) which still exists today, the building is located in Pejaten, South Jakarta [48].

After the 1977 elections, people in Soeharto circle were very uncomfortable seeing the results of the 1977 elections, in which the United Development Party won 29.3 percent of the vote. This is the highest achievement of United Development Party in all elections in the New Order era. To face the next election, the ulema were "castrated" socially and politically. One local cleric who experienced repressive actions was Kiai Sarmin from Banten, who often gave lectures that refused or encouraged residents not to take part in the family planning program. Kiai Sarmin used religious arguments, and that should have been legitimate. However, it was considered as resistance to the New Order (Dynamics of the Political and Social Role of Ulama and Jawara in Pandeglang Banten).
Far in South Kalimantan there are at least Safransyah alias Kai Amang and Jamhari Arsyad. Both are employees of the Department of Religion in Amuntai, Hulu Sungai Utara district now who have influence in the religious community of Banjar there. Because they did not want to follow the invitation of the Golkar success team, one of them was fired as a civil servant and the other was transferred to another area. Then according to Ricklefs [49], in Islamizing Java, noted in the late 1960s, Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Baasyir and several other figures established a radio that promoted Islamic reform in Solo. Because it was considered too critical of Soeharto, this radio was arbitrarily closed by the military in 1975. This led to Sunkar and Ba'asyir being arrested and imprisoned by the New Order. After being released, they went to Malaysia.

Of all the silences earlier, the most casualties were of course the Tanjung Priok incident. According to the Kontras report, the incident originated from the actions of Sergeant Hermanu, a member of the Koja Village Trustees (Babinsa) Koja, tasked with cleaning up posters at the Assa'adah Mushala which contained criticism to the government on September 7, 1984. This case triggered information speculation, Hermanu took off pamphlets and poster attached to the sewage water, entered Mushala Assa'adah without taking off his shoes, after being protested instead took out a gun and there was a commotion. Syarifudin Rambe and Sofwan Sulaeman who mediated in this case were even arrested by the military and detained at 050231 Kodim Headquarters. Residents also tried to demand their release through Amir Biki ending in an unequal clash with the armed forces. The number of victims killed also varies. According to the government, in its official report represented by the Armed Forces Commander, General L. B. Moerdani, said only 18 people were killed and 53 injured. According to the results of an investigation by the fact-finding team, SONTIDAK (National Solidarity for Prijek Priek), an estimated 400 people were killed, not to mention those injured and disabled. According to the National Human Rights Commission, 24 people were killed and 55 people were injured, among those killed were also Amir Biki. Afterwards people like AM Fatwa, Tony Ardi, Mawardi Noor, Oesmany Al Hamidy and Abdul Qodir Jaelani were also arrested. They are accused of being the activists of the Tanjung Priok incident. Abdul Qodir Jaelani is a respected Islamic figure in the Betawi community. He became a lecturer at the Islamic Da'wah College. Abdul Qodir would later establish the Crescent Star Party after 1998.

The space for Muslims during the New Order regime was truly restricted, the stamp of communists for the left and the command of jihad for the right were expressions of hatred from high-ranking officials to village officials towards individuals or groups deemed anti-new. It can also affect people who are disliked or political opponents also stamped of communists or Islamic Jihad. Psychologically this action is a practical way to kill character and silence Muslims. As a prominent Indonesian observer once stated, Indonesian Muslims constitute a “majority with a minority mentality” [50]. However, there is another view for secular nationalists and abangan groups, they feel that Pancasila protects them from the pressure of the santri to follow formal Islam. In accordance with American sociological studies in the 1950s and 1960s it had popularized the terms East Java, abangan and santri. For religious abangan groups, one’s personal affairs, and holding the Pancasila as a guarantee for pluralism and religious freedom.

Returning to the actions of the Commando Jihad as religious extremism that emerged in 1976 and 1977, before the election and MPR session, began to carry out various acts of terror. Such radical groups continued to emerge in the following years, often at the right political moment, when approaching the election or there was an important debate in the MPR occurred just before the 1977 election, along with when the Pancasila indoctrination program was announced for the first time. A small group of radicals, which the authorities immediately called the Jihad Command, carried out a blasting action against a nightclub, a cinema, a luxury hotel, and a church in Sumatra. Its core members appear to have a direct relationship with the remnants of the Darul Islam movement. There are strong indications that this movement was actually guided by State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara- BAKIN). BAKIN’s intelligence service, by the direct instruction of Ali Moertopo, BAKIN’s highest official and one of Soeharto’s closest advisers. Many people believe that the Commander of the Jihad Command was intentionally sent to several prominent Islamic politicians so that they could be accused of being involved in terror after the Jihad Command movement was “revealed” –
supposedly to influence the course of the election.

In 1981, leading up to the next election, intelligence services revealed that the Komado Jihad network had been detected in various parts of the archipelago, which again provided an opportunity to intimidate Muslim voters. In the following years, there were also allegations that several similar groups were accused of preparing to form an Islamic state through violence. In 1980, several highly respected Muslim leaders who were previously affiliated with Masyumi together with representatives of other political sects, including former ministers and retired ABRI, filed a protest against Soeharto controversial speech in Pekanbaru. This group came to be known as “Petition 50 – Petisi 50” because fifty people signed a letter of “statement of concern” to the DPR. In that statement, they criticized the President for using Pancasila as a tool to attack his political enemies. The number of figures of international repute, such as Mohamad Natsir, A.H. Nasution and Ali Sadikin gave protection to this group of 50 petitions, thus making this group different from the group of preachers who voiced sharp criticism and were immediately arrested but this group did not.

The courage of the mosque congregation in the Tanjung Periuk neighborhood condemned the government correlating with the Petition 50 of the Generals and important figures, so they felt protected. The preachers delivered hard discourses denouncing the replacement of Islam with Pancasila, as long as they were not arrested, whereas in other places there were arrests of preachers who were even less radical than they were. The sermons that created this climate of defiance ended with the outbreak of a major riot which was famous for the Tanjung Periuk event led by Amir Biki.

Shortly after that event, Jakarta was again rocked by several bombings, which were seen by many as retaliation for the Tanjung Priok incident. The government suspects and links these radical preachers, riots and bombings of members of the “Petition 50” group. Three prominent critics of Soeharto, who signed the “White Book – Buku Putih”, A.M. Fatwa, A.M. Fatwa (co-founder of the Petition 50 group), H.M. Sanusi (a former minister, affiliated with Muhammadiyah and a member of Petition 50) and H.R. Dharsono (a former commander of the Siliwangi Division, former Secretary General of ASEAN, who was not a signatory to the Petition 50 but was close to them) was accused of subversion. The last two were accused of being involved in planning the bombing. Although the evidence presented was based on statements from witnesses who claimed to be tortured failed to convince the observers, they were sentenced to very long prison terms.

After the Tanjung Priok disaster radical sermons were no longer heard in mosques. The Petition 50 group also preferred silence, while NU and Muhammadiyah then mobilized their energy for non-political activities. While student discussion groups emphasize morality and personal piety rather than political involvement. These political dissidents have not completely disappeared, but their numbers seem to have fallen very sharply.

Unlike the situation in Java, the Tanjung Periuk incident did not turn out to be a frightening specter for Warsidi’s group in the villages of Talangsari, Lampuang and the Bima group (East Sumbawa). Both were paralyzed with violence which resulted in bloodshed, resulting in many followers of Warsidi killed. The number of victims according to official reports is 27 people, but local sources say two to three hundred people have been killed. The Warsidi movement was more like a messianic peasant uprising that repeatedly appeared on Java in the 19th century, rather than a modern Islamic-affiliated political protest movement.

The Smiling General, who succeeded in establishing 32 years of power on the political stage of the New Order, from the time he was appointed President of 1967 until entering the fifth election in 1992, none of the political figures, academics, or leaders of the people who dared to talk about succession new order leadership except Amien Rais. In the 1990s Amien Rais, a political doctor and lecturer at Gajah Mada University, for the first time in 1991 spoke in print media about the succession of the New Order leadership, hoping for an alternative candidate in the 1992 presidential election by the MPR. After Amien Rais was elected as Chairman of the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership through the 43rd Mukatamar in Banda Aceh, in July 1995 attended by President Soeharto, his criticism of the new order authorities became more intense and fierce, until after the 1997 Election Amien Rais loudly stated that the MPR results of the 1997 election no longer elect Soeharto as President. However, the MPR led by Harmoko, a
Soeharto loyalist, also succeeded in convincing MPR members to continue to elect Soeharto and be re-installed as President on March 11, 1998 for the seventh time. His cabinet was immediately confronted with the problem of the monetary crisis with a drastic depreciation of the rupiah against the dollar, market prices getting out of control, people losing confidence in banks. The monetary crisis led to a crisis of confidence in President Soeharto, a student movement that no longer wanted Soeharto as President took to the streets to demonstrate to occupy the DPR / MPR building. Finally, Soeharto legally handed over the power of government to Vice President B.J Habibie to be appointed President.

4.2 Radicals in the Vortex of the Political Reform Regime

Habibie, who came to power through a peaceful transition on May 21, 1998, at 09.00 a.m., his reign lasted until 20 October 1999 and was co-opted in an euphoristic democratic atmosphere that almost brought the country back into disintegration [47]. Habibie is not a reform figure, he did and opened the broadest valve of democracy for the birth of political parties is only a historical necessity. Anyone who appeared as president at the time, would certainly submit to political developments in accordance with the demands of reform. The parliament which was elected through the first general election in 1999 which was joined by 48 political parties apparently did not give Habibie a place to extend his term of office as a constitutional President through the MPR's choice, which was elected as K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gusdur) and Megawati Soekarno Putri as President and Vice President for the period 1999-2004.

The failure of Habibie from a transitional President to become the President of the People's Consultative Assembly due to the controversial move taken when he gave a referendum to East Timor, Indonesia's youngest province that was forcibly integrated through a military invasion on 7 December 1975. The referendum ended unanimously (78.50%) the people of East Timor choose to separate from Indonesia. Only 21.50% want special autonomy under Indonesia [51]. The results of the referendum that were beyond Habibie's expectations backfire on the credibility of B.J Habibie himself, as a result the MPR faction faction did not give Habibie the chance to contest the Presidential elections for the 1999-2004 period.

One year of the Habibie government, radical groups who lay down in the New Order era came in very diverse forms. These issues include returning to the Jakarta Charter, the Maluku crisis, the concept of a federal Indonesian state by Amin Rais as a reform figure, where minorities in the Indonesian state system, women's presidents, and political parties only opened their faucets after the collapse of the New [52-53]. The same view was expressed by Hefner [54-55] that after the fall of Soeharto rule, various variants of radical or non-mainstream Islamic movements in Indonesia emerged and became an important part of Indonesian Islam. Time travel shows the existence of radical Islam is increasingly popular in the national public space. Meanwhile according to [56], there are three types of Islamic movements, which are included in the radical category are formalist-ideological types, namely Islamic and national-based Islamic sharia movements which aim to realize an Islamic state. This group has links with fundamentalism in the Middle East. Its transnational nature is reflected in the common goal to be achieved, namely establishing a joint Islamic government (khilafah).

Further stated by Hefner [54] that the initial phases of the reform era were two different forms of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia. First, radical Islamic movements that are still in their habitat. Some of them are, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Tarbiyah-Ikwanul Musliminan and Salafi-Wahhabi Movement. Second, the radical Islamic movement which has metamorphosed, although ideologically it is very in line with the transnational radical Islamic movement in the Middle East [57] Radical Islamic movements that fall into this second category are: for example, the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam – FPI), Laskar Jihad (LJ), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia – MMI). Its transnational nature is reflected in the common goal to be achieved, namely establishing a joint Islamic government (khilafah). The vision and mission of this movement is to make Islam an ideology that must be upheld in Indonesia [57].

According to Hefner [54] Van Bruinessen [6] There are three variants of the radical Islamic movement, first; a movement that is more oriented towards the improvement of the Shari’ a through the proselytizing movement; secondly,
the Islamic activism movement that struggles constitutionally through political channels, such as the PKS, although explicitly this party has no direct connection with the Formalist-Ideological groups, but the methods of the movement have something in common and exist; third, fighting radically, its supporters believe that Islam must be implemented textually as ordered by the Koran and the Hadith, without compromise. They believe that Islam is the only solution to the crisis that afflicts Muslims, because Islam is believed to be a complete religion, which can be applied in every age and place (thanks to the times). This radical group has a view inspired by the ideology and doctrine of the salafi movement that adheres to the understanding of Hakimiyah (God's Sovereignty), has a belief that in the Islamic concept, government is God's property as the meaning of Q.S. 5:47, they are anti-democracy. Ja'far Umar Talib was a combat veteran on the battlefield of Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and the founder of Laskar Jihad said, all authority belongs to Allah and Allah's law must be the basis for all Islamic governments. God is the absolute ruler that all creatures must obey. Talib convinced that Muslims were forbidden to obey the will of the majority of the people because most of them were in error. Democracy for Ja'far Umar Talib is a way of governance whose principles are contrary to Islam. Then their view of jihad, there are four categories of jihad, namely: jihad al-nafs, jihad al-syaithan, jihad al-kuffar wa al-munafiqin, and jihad arbab al-dzulm wa al-bid'ah. Jihad al-nafs means jihad against lust. Jihad al-syaithan is trying to keep away from various whispers of the devil who is accursed to commit immorality. Jihad al-kuffar wa al-munafiqin means jihad against unbelievers and hypocrites which is carried out with heart, speech, physical strength and using material possessions. Jihad arbab al-dzulm wa al-bid'ah means jihad against injustice and heresy [58 & 59].

In harmony with the issue of global-scale terrorism that makes Al-Qaeda a frightening specter, Roy [60] calls the radical salafi movement or Islamic neo-fundamentalism has led to the rise of bomb terror that attacks foreign facilities owned by America and Europe. Terrorist attacks during the first year of the Gusdur government were very frequent, around 20 bomb attacks and most recently the 12 October 2002 bombing attack on a nightclub in Kuta Beach in Bali which resulted in 202 people, mostly foreign tourists killed, and more out of 300 people suffered serious injuries.

Whereas during the reign of President Megawati which took place from July 23, 2001 to October 20, 2004, the problems faced, such as; terrorism, separatist movements in Aceh, Riau and Papua, communal conflicts and disruption of public order will become increasingly complex and move towards unsolved problems if they are not immediately resolved on an appropriate and rapid scale. Surprised by the increasingly widespread demands for independence in Aceh and Papua, the rampant bombings that have been anticipated with the Anti-Terrorist Laws are a fact that must be accepted by the Megawati government. The rise of terrorist bombings, Christmas Eve 2000 bombings, JSX bombings, bombings in Denpasar, Ambon and others - has made the Megawati government's credibility degraded while at the same time discreditting the Indonesian government internationally. Allegations that "Indonesia is a den of terrorists" also gained justification through the Denpasar Event on 13 October [61].

The rise of the terror movement carried out by these hardline Islamic groups in the early phases of the reform government was ideologically caused by their narrow understanding of the relations of Islam and the state. Galamas [61] states that the struggle over the path of terror, supporters of the terror movement believe that Islam must be implemented textually without compromise. As confirmed by Ja'far Umar Thalib the founder of Laskar Jihad that all power belongs only to God and the law of God must be the basis for all Islamic governments. God is the absolute ruler that all creatures must obey. These radical groups are fanatical about their own understanding and opinions, are easily prejudiced and think of others as normative factors.

On the contrary, from the point of view of defense and security, the rise of terrorist movements carried out by radical groups is more to their space that is not well controlled like the New Order era. This condition illustrates the central government leadership that is not strong and the weak law enforcement process is a factor driving the birth of radical groups to resort to violence to replace the existing system and no longer provide a solution to the crisis that occurred in society. As stated by Newman [62] Piazza [63], the leadership crisis, weak law
enforcement processes and social inequality are factors driving the birth of radical groups. The theory of historical motion also explains that resistance by the royal people to the central government is also directly proportional to the crisis of leadership in the center of the kingdom. If the central government is strong, all small kingdoms and areas are immature, obedient and submissive, if the central government is noisy, the regions or kingdoms are ready to replace the central position of the kingdom [64]. This is a typical community in the former kingdom of the archipelago.

4.3 Phobic Radicalism: The Fear of Power-Oriented Elite Circles

The frequency of arrests of terrorists from the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Jamaah Ansharut Khilafah (JAK) in the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla administration was more than the 10-year era of the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government when the National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Teroris - BNPT) was formed. Statistics show that at least 700 suspected terrorists have been arrested and tried during the four years of Jokowi-Kalla's administration (October 20, 2014 - October 22, 2018). Since the suicide bombing in Surabaya in May 2018, the Special Detachment 88 of the Indonesian National Police for combating terrorism has arrested around 242 suspected terrorists, said terrorism observer from the University of Indonesia Ridwan Habib to Medcom.id, Monday, October 22, 2018. The note gives meaning, first; the handling of terrorists during the Jokowi-Kalla administration is better than the previous administration, and secondly; on the contrary, the Jokowi-Kalla government's elite power fears over the threat of Islamic radicalism exceed the conditions that occur in society. LIPI researcher Nostalgianwan Wahyudi confirmed that the handling of terrorism during the Jokowi-Kalla administration was better than the previous government, based on the number of terrorists captured, while from the community's point of view the terrorist issue was an Islamophobic attitude of the power elite and the government's political attitude because Indonesia was the link of the global strategy in countering terrorists. Meanwhile according to Dosch [19], there is no nation or country in Southeast Asia lately has been infected by terrorism as bad as Indonesia and the Indonesian government has reacted violently by fighting terrorism.

The issue of radicalism which blew hard and rife at the end of the Jokowi-Kalla government actually made uncomfortable among the majority of Muslims. According to Azyumardi Azra the issue of radical Islam exhaled by the government is too excessive, the existence of radical Islam is one of the characteristics of Indonesian Islam, which is different from Middle Eastern Islam and European Islam [65]. Even one day after Jokowi - Ma'ruf Amin was appointed as president for the second period, the interesting thing was that President Joko Widodo appointed a former Deputy Military Commander General (Ret) Fachrul Razi to enter the Advanced Indonesia cabinet in the 2019-2024 period. Jokowi asked the 1970 military academy graduate to take care of preventing radicalism in his new position as Minister of Religion, Jokowi said when announcing the cabinet ministerial arrangement while sitting on the steps of the State Palace, Jakarta, Wednesday (10/23/2019). This gives a sign that radicalism is indeed a scourge for the Jokowi government circle which is supported by the PDIP Party which is oriented towards secularism. The second period of government of Jokowi - Ma'ruf Amin as of 20 October 2019 is being attacked by radicalismophobia and believes that there is a movement of community groups that carry out destructive actions, which require socio-political changes that are in accordance with Islamic law and are carried out drastically. This was justified by Fachrul Razi, after the inauguration of the advanced Indonesian cabinet, saying that he was making efforts to counter radicalism in Indonesia, especially at the level of formal education within the Ministry of Religion and overseeing mosques from the material of preaching radicalism.

Muslim leaders who are anti-secularism actually argue that this issue was deliberately exhaled by certain parties to be interpreted in a narrow sense. Emerging labels such as radical Islam, radical mass organizations, radical Salafis, or rather general religious radicalism that almost all connote to the Muslim community are inseparable from the Western global anti-Islamic strategy. While the threat of separatist movements with the aim of separating from the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia – NKRI) is actually ignored by a group of interested parties.
When seven million Muslims, commonly called the 212 people, carried out peaceful actions in the case of blasphemy by Governor Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, commonly called Ahok, ended in an orderly manner, by some people and even Western media officials were considered a movement driven by radical Islamic groups. The Wall Street Journal Media in a review of the article entitled “Hard-Line Strains of Islamic Gains Ground in Indonesia, World's Largest Muslim Country” revealed utterances that had negative connotations by saying the rise of hard-line and radical Islam in the Regional Head Election (Pilkada) Governor Derah Special The capital (DKI) of Jakarta to overthrow Christian governors. Likewise SBS Australia, wrote: “Jakarta election: Radical Islam tested ‘if Ahok wins’ which labeled radical Islam in the Jakarta Election. Reuters news agency intensively reported the rise of Islamic extremism and radicalism in the political events of the Jakarta Election. The same news was also stated by the United States media, USA Today, CNN and the New York Times that the victory of Anis - Sandi in the DKI Jakarta elections held on 15 February 2017 and 19 April 2017 was a victory of radical Islam. Whereas the real problem that was more influenced by the high emotional psychological status when Ahok did blasphemy against the majority religious scriptures in Indonesia.

Due to the excessive assumptions and suspicions by foreign media describing Muslims as the majority religion, it has been countered by several important Muslim figures and even Vice President Jusuf Kalla and Zulkiifi Hasan Zulkifli Hasan as Chair of the National Mandate Party also clarified that Anies-Sandi’s victory in Jakarta Governor election is a victory of democracy. He did not agree if the victory was identified with radical Islam. According to Jusuf Kalla there has been an uneven coverage of the democratic process in Indonesia and in particular in the DKI Jakarta Governor Election. TNI Commander General Gatot Nurmantyo also gave the same view and rejected the relevance of the actions of Muslims and the issue of radicalism with the Jakarta Governor Election.

The fear of anti-Islamic groups over the Islamic movement is not without reason, reforms provide opportunities for the flourishing of Islamic-based social organizations both national and transnational, they again question the Jakarta Charter as the basis of the state. Genealogically this difference is the root of the problem for the Darul Islam group and the Indonesian Islamic Army (DI / TII) to take revolutionary ways to realize their state ideology. Even though the DI / TII group had been able to be paralyzed in the Soekarno era but after Soeharto came to power the remnants of the DI / TII group remained the most effective instrument in controlling Islam as the majority religion in Indonesia. Radical Islamic movements in the new order era were co-opted by Soeharto with the label Islam Jihad as a movement that must be eradicated in Indonesia.

Community groups who are at the poles of political Islam strive to maintain the Jakarta Charter as the basis of the country is not without reason, the majority of the Indonesian people are adherents of Islam who contributed greatly in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Naturally, if they make Islamic law as a guide that must be obeyed in the life of the nation and state. Therefore, the Jakarta Charter again became a contentious issue between the Islamic nationalist pole and the secular nationalist pole in reformulating the Constitution as a replacement for the 1950 Provisional Constitution [14]. The debate has not reached its final goal; President Soekarno took a shortcut by dissolving the constituents and leading the country to a guided democracy system. Guided democracy which lasted briefly and led to the tragedy of the September 30th, 1965 Movement and the emergence of General Soeharto as leader of the new order regime. What are interesting is the change in regime from Soekarno to Soeharto but the movements and actions of Islam as the majority group remain wary of the new order regime by throwing the issue of the Command of Jihad in controlling groups that are trying to re-question Pancasila as the basis of a final state.

From the perspective of the state and democracy, the reform regime with the characteristics of the President is directly elected and the freedom of opinion for all elements of society, should not be allergic to diversity and differences of opinion as long as it does not touch crucial things about the philosophy of the state and the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. But in reality, the standards of the New Order regime and the reform regime did not differ significantly in addressing various state issues related to the issues of the Islamic movement. For these two regimes, Islamism is still seen as a movement that must be tightly controlled, radical issues and terrorism are the most effective political
instruments for controlling Islamic nationalism groups whose views differ from secular nationalist groups with regard to the philosophy and form of the state.

The reform regime still places the power factor at the heart of the problem, so that radical behavior is also often interpreted as a form and mode of power struggles. Power theory does have this view, whether a person is religious or secular, when he holds power tends to follow Machiavelli’s view which says that one of the key aspects of power is radical behavior. Political rulers who are reluctant to use the word “radical” will never gain power, or will lose the power they once achieved. However, excessive use of the word radical will cause popular hatred of the authorities and may be overthrown. Therefore, Machiavelli prefers republican government as a non-monarchical regime. This is because, the republic is a system of government based on an agreement between the people and the authorities, this agreement will strengthen the position of the rulers, thereby limiting the implementation of radicalism.

In reality, Machiavelli’s view of government agreed through the democratic process has not yet been realized in Indonesia because the government elected through the democratic process still prioritizes power. The current condition is that the government still connects Islam with radical issues and terrorism. This radical group was crushed hard and has become a routine work of the Polri Special Detachment 88 as a unit that has been given a special task to eradicate the terror movement. Whereas the Islamic movement which fights through social organizations is tightly controlled by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, if it differs from the government’s view, it will be paralyzed by revoking the right of permission from the social organization.

On July 19, 2017 the Indonesian government through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights officially revoked the status of the Indonesian legal organization Hizb ut-Tahrir (HTI) based on the Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights Number AHU-30.AH.01.08 of 2017 concerning the revocation of the Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights number AHU-0028.60.10.2014 concerning the legalization of the establishment of a legal entity for the association of HTI. The revocation was carried out as a follow-up to Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) Number 2 of 2017 which amended Law Number 17 of 2013 concerning Community Organizations.

The reason for the HTI dissolution principle presented by the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Wiranto was that the activities carried out by HTI were strongly indicated to have been in conflict with the objectives, principles and characteristics based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as stipulated in Law Number 17 of 2013 concerning Mass Organizations. The power elite circles see HTI as an Islamic organization that sponsors the establishment of a khilafah state in Indonesia. Circulating statements from HTI activists who opposed the foundation of the Pancasila state and the 1945 Constitution and stated that the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution were the thaghusn system that had to be abandoned so that eventually it caused unrest in the community. The public unrest eventually led the government to issue a PERPPU on community organizations that led to the dissolution of the Indonesian Hizb ut-Tahrir mass organization.

Next beginning the second period of Jokowi’s government, the government again threatened to revoke the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam – FPI) the only Islamic movement that contributed to the movement to overthrow Ahok. Some of the tactics carried out by the government to ensnare the FPI Chairperson, Habib Rizieq Shihab, most recently snared with the pornographic chat case finally made the FPI Chairperson fled to Saudi Arabia on April 26, 2017 until now he has not returned to Indonesia. Previously the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), known as a mass organization that had a vision of building a khilafah in the country was also dissolved. The Indonesian government has declared this organization a banned organization and was dissolved in 2007 during the reign of Susilo Bambang Yodoyono, through a decision of the South Jakarta District Court. Despite being a banned organization, JI is still recruiting new members to strengthen its organization.

Next, the fundamental problem, is Islamism really a threat to the Republic of Indonesia? Too tendentious if there are still certain groups and elites who are anti-Islam by seeking relevance or clashing Islam with the state. An undeniable historical journey that Islam has become the glue and color of the struggle of the Indonesian nation.
in the struggle for independence, in addition there are also the values of nationalism and communism play a role in coloring the movement of this nation's struggle for independence.

Is there an Islamism and Islamic ideology formalism that tends to be the majority group in government? Historical fact shows, from several times the elections carried out in the old order regime, to the new order regime, and then the election in the reform era, shows that the overall vote acquisition of parties based on Islam has never exceeded the totality of national party votes. Reformation era, if PKS which is identical to represent Islamic movement activism, it turns out that the party's 19-year journey since its establishment in 1999 has never reached 10% nationally. Far different from the Justice and Development Party led by Erdogan, in Turkish called Adalet ve Kalkınma Partition (AKP), within 14 years the AKP party had succeeded in controlling parliament by more than 50%, and it was very natural for the Turkish party to be as congruent as the ideology of the PKS. managed to dominate the government in Turti, even the party's strength was completely unshaken through a coup attempt ridden by military groups in the country. Turkey's past has witnessed history that no civilian or Islamic regime has successfully survived the Turkish military coup.

5. CONCLUSION

The issue of Islamic jihad by the New Order regime and radical Islam by the reform regime are two terms given by the state to the supporters of Islamism and Islamic ideology formalism that exceeds the normal level of the Indonesian Muslim movement. Concerns of certain groups towards Islam are more co-opted in an anti-Islamic global network sponsored by America and the West. Yet according to Azyumardi Azra the existence of radical Islam is to be one of the characteristics of Indonesian Islam, which is different from Islam in Middle East and Europe [60]. Then it was stated that basically Islam in Indonesia did not recognize the experience of a religious state, in the sense that the state was controlled by religious doctrines. Although making Islam as a state religion, the pattern of behavior carried out has similarities with the secular state system, where religion is not a significant enough consideration in determining the course of the government system, structuring the law related to socio-cultural behavior and intellectual norms. Both the New Order regime and the reform regime were not significantly different in addressing various state issues related to the issues of the Islamic movement. For these two regimes, Islamism is still seen as a movement that must be tightly controlled, radical issues and terrorism are the most effective political instruments for controlling Islamic nationalism groups whose views differ from secular nationalist groups with regard to the philosophy and form of the state. But the efforts of Islamic groups to make the teachings of Islam as a guide in social, national and state life will become endless movements.

DISCLAIMER

The products used for this research are commonly and predominantly use products in our area of research and country. There is absolutely no conflict of interest between the authors and producers of the products because we do not intend to use these products as an avenue for any litigation but for the advancement of knowledge. Also, the research was not funded by the producing company rather it was funded by personal efforts of the authors.

CONSENT

In accordance with international standards or university standards, research permits and respondents’ questionnaires have been collected and stored by the authors.

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COMPETING INTERESTS

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