Collectives for the Optimal Combination of Imperfect Objects

Kagan Tumer and David Wolpert
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, 94035, USA
ktumer@mail.arc.nasa.gov dhw@email.arc.nasa.gov

In this letter we summarize some recent theoretical work on the design of collectives, i.e., of systems containing many agents, each of which can be viewed as trying to maximize an associated private utility, where there is also a world utility rating the behavior of that overall system that the designer of the collective wishes to optimize. We then apply algorithms based on that work on a recently suggested testbed for such optimization problems. This is the problem of finding the combination of imperfect nano-scale objects that results in the best aggregate object. We present experimental results showing that these algorithms outperform conventional methods by more than an order of magnitude in this domain.

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I. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND

The optimization problem of finding the subset of a set of imperfect devices that results in the best aggregate device was recently introduced by Challet and Johnson. It is an abstraction of what will likely be a major difficulty in the construction of systems using nano-scale components, arising when a large fraction of those components may be faulty, so that we cannot use a scheme fixed ahead of time for interconnecting them. This abstraction is a computationally hard optimization problem; brute force approaches cannot be used for large instances of it. It is also particularly well-suited to testing distributed optimization algorithms.

We propose addressing this problem by associating each device with an adaptive reinforcement-learning (RL) agent that decides whether or not its device will be a member of the subset. It makes this decision based on its estimate of which choice will give a larger value of its associated private utility function which maps the joint choice of all agents into the reals. For such an approach to work, we must both ensure that the agents do not work at cross-purposes, and that each one has a tractable learning problem to solve. Typically these two desiderata conflict with one another (utilities that account for whether your action is at cross-purposes to any other agents’ actions are very complex and therefore difficult to optimize). So we must find the best way to trade them off each other.

A collective is any such system containing utility-maximizing agents, together with an overall world utility function that rates the possible configurations of the overall system. The associated design problem is how to configure the collective — and in particular how to set the private utility functions — to best optimize the world utility. This design problem is related to work in many other fields, including multi-agent systems (MAS’s), computational economics, mechanism design, reinforcement learning, statistical mechanics, computational ecologies, (partially observable) Markov decision processes and game theory. However none of these fields is both applicable in large problems, and directly addresses the general design problem, rather than a special instance of it. (See [9] for a detailed discussion of the relationship between these fields, involving hundreds of references.) In particular, since detailed modeling of extremely large real-world systems is usually impossible, it is crucial to use design algorithms that do not employ such modeling. We need to make our design leveraging only the simple assumption that the agents’ learning algorithms are individually reasonably behaved. Recently some advances have been made in doing just that [6, 9, 11]. It is those advances that we propose to apply to the problem of Challet and Johnson.

II. THE MATHEMATICS OF DESIGNING COLLECTIVES

Let $ζ$ be an arbitrary space whose elements $z$ give the joint move of all agents in the collective system. We wish to search for the $z$ that maximizes the provided world utility $G(z)$. In addition to $G$ we are concerned with private utility functions $\{g_η\}$, one such function for each agent $η$ controlling $z_η$. We use the notation $\hat{η}$ to refer to all agents other than $η$.

Our uncertainty concerning the state of the system is reflected in a probability distribution over $ζ$. Our ability to control the system consists of setting the value of some characteristic of the collective, e.g., setting the private utility functions of the agents. Indicating that value of the global coordinate by $s$, our analysis revolves around the following central equation for $P(G \mid s)$, which follows from Bayes’ theorem:

$$P(G \mid s) = \int d\hat{N}_G P(G \mid \hat{N}_G, s) \int dN_g P(\hat{N}_G \mid N_g, s)P(N_g \mid s), \quad (1)$$

where $N_g$ and $\hat{N}_G$ are the intelligence vectors of the agents with respect to $g_η$ and $G$, respectively.
tions so that the numeric value they assign to a \( z \) only reflects their ranking of \( z \) relative to certain other elements of \( \zeta \), is given by:

\[
N_{\eta,U}(z) \equiv \int d\mu_{z',\eta}(z')\Theta[U(z) - U(z')], \tag{2}
\]

where \( \Theta \) is the Heaviside function, and where the subscript on the (normalized) measure \( d\mu \) indicates it is restricted to \( z' \) sharing the same non-\( \eta \) components as \( z \).

Note that \( N_{\eta,g}(z) = 1 \) means that agent \( \eta \) is fully rational at \( z \), in that its move maximizes the value of its utility, given the moves of the agents. In other words, a point \( z \) where \( N_{\eta,g}(z) = 1 \) for all agents \( \eta \) is one that meets the definition of a game-theory Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, a \( z \) at which all components of \( \vec{N}_G = 1 \) is a maximum \( G \) along all coordinates of \( z \) (which of course does not mean it is a maximum along an off-axis direction). So if we can get these two points to be identical, then if the agents do well enough at maximizing their private utilities we are assured we will be near an axis-maximizing point for \( G \).

To formalize this, consider our decomposition of \( P(G \mid s) \). If we can choose \( s \) so that the third conditional probability in the integrand is peaked around vectors \( \vec{N}_g \) all of whose components are close to 1, then we have likely induced large (private utility function) intelligences. Intuitively, this ensures that the private utility functions have high “signal-to-noise”. If we can also have the second term be peaked about \( \vec{N}_G \) equal to \( \vec{N}_g \), then \( \vec{N}_G \) will also be large. It is in the second term that the requirement that the private utility functions be “aligned with \( G \)” arises. Note that our desired form for the second term in Equation 2 is assured if we have chosen private utilities such that \( \vec{N}_g \) equals \( \vec{N}_G \) exactly for all \( z \). Such a system is said to be factored. Finally, if the first term in the integrand is peaked about high \( G \) when \( \vec{N}_G \) is large, then our choice of \( s \) will likely result in high \( G \), as desired. In this letter we concentrate on the second and third terms, and show how to simultaneously set them to have the desired form.

As an example, any “team game” in which all private utility functions equal \( G \) is factored. However team games often have very poor forms for term 3 in Equation 2, forms which get progressively worse as the size of the collective grows. This is because for such private utility functions each agent \( \eta \) will usually confront a very poor “signal-to-noise” ratio in trying to discern how its actions affect its utility \( g_\eta = G \), since so many other agent’s actions also affect \( G \) and therefore dilute \( \eta \)’s effect on its own private utility function.

We now focus on algorithms based on private utility functions \( \{g_\eta\} \) that optimize the signal/noise ratio reflected in the third term, subject to the requirement that the system be factored. To understand how these algorithms work, say we are given an arbitrary function \( f(z_\eta) \) over agent \( \eta \)’s moves, two such moves \( z_\eta^1 \) and \( z_\eta^2 \), a utility \( U \), a value \( s \) of the global coordinate, and a move by all agents other than \( \eta \), \( z^{-\eta} \). Define the associated learnability by

\[
\Lambda_f(U; z^{-\eta}, s, z_\eta^1, z_\eta^2) \equiv \sqrt{\frac{\mathbb{E}(U; z^{-\eta}, z_\eta^1) - \mathbb{E}(U; z^{-\eta}, z_\eta^2)^2}{\int dz_\eta[f(z_\eta)\text{Var}(U; z^{-\eta}, z_\eta)]}}. \tag{3}
\]

The expectation values in the numerator are formed by averaging over the training set of the learning algorithm used by agent \( \eta \), \( n_\eta \). Those two averages are evaluated according to the two distributions \( P(U|n_\eta)P(n_\eta|z^{-\eta}, z_\eta^1) \) and \( P(U|n_\eta)P(n_\eta|z^{-\eta}, z_\eta^2) \), respectively. (That is the meaning of the semicolon notation.) Similarly the variance being averaged in the denominator is over \( n_\eta \) according to the distribution \( P(U|n_\eta)P(n_\eta|z^{-\eta}, z_\eta) \).

The denominator in Equation 4 reflects how sensitive \( U(z) \) is to changing \( z^{-\eta} \). In contrast, the numerator reflects how sensitive \( U(z) \) is to changing \( z_\eta \). So the greater the learnability of a private utility function \( g_\eta \), the more \( g_\eta(z) \) depends only on the move of agent \( \eta \), i.e., the better the associated signal-to-noise ratio for \( \eta \). Intuitively then, so long as it does not come at the expense of decreasing the signal, increasing the signal-to-noise ratio specified in the learnability will make it easier for \( \eta \) to achieve a large value of its intelligence. This can be established formally: if appropriately scaled, \( g_\eta^* \) will result in better expected intelligence for agent \( \eta \) than will \( g_\eta \) whenever \( \Lambda_f(g_\eta^*; z^{-\eta}, s, z_\eta^1, z_\eta^2) > \Lambda_f(g_\eta; z^{-\eta}, s, z_\eta^1, z_\eta^2) \) for all pairs of moves \( z_\eta^1, z_\eta^2 \).

One can solve for the set of all private utilities that are factored with respect to a particular world utility. Unfortunately though, in general a collective cannot both be factored and have infinite learnability for all of its agents. However consider difference utilities, of the form

\[
U(z) = \beta[G(z) - D(z^{-\eta})] \tag{4}
\]

Any difference utility is factored. In addition, for all pairs \( z_\eta^1, z_\eta^2 \), under benign approximations the difference utility maximizing \( \Lambda_f(U; z^{-\eta}, s, z_\eta^1, z_\eta^2) \) by

\[
D(z^{-\eta}) = E_f(G(z) \mid z^{-\eta}, s), \tag{5}
\]

up to an overall additive constant, where the expectation value is over \( z_\eta \). We call the resultant difference utility the Aristocrat utility \( AU \), loosely reflecting the fact that it measures the difference between a agent’s actual action and the average action. If each agent \( \eta \) uses an appropriately rescaled version of the associated \( AU \) as its private utility function, then we have ensured good form for both terms 2 and 3 in Equation 2.

Using \( AU \) in practice is sometimes difficult, due to the need to evaluate the expectation value. Fortunately there are other utility functions that, while being easier to evaluate than \( AU \), still are both factored and possess superior learnability to the team game utility, \( g_\eta = G \). One such private utility function is the Wonderful Life...
Utility (WLU). The WLU for agent $\eta$ is parameterized by a pre-fixed clamping parameter $CL_\eta$ chosen from among $\eta$’s possible moves:

$$WLU_\eta \equiv G(z) - G(z, \eta, CL_\eta).$$

WLU is factored no matter what the choice of clamping parameter. Furthermore, while not matching the high learnability of AU, WLU usually has far better learnability than does a team game, and therefore (when appropriately scaled) results in better expected intelligence.

III. COMBINATION OF IMPERFECT OBJECTS

We now explore the use of collective-based techniques for the problem of combining imperfect objects of Challet and Johnson. The canonical version of this problem arises when the objects are all noisy observational devices producing a single real number by sampling a Gaussian of fixed width centered on the true value of the number. The problem is to choose the subset of a fixed collection of such devices to have the average (over the members of the subset) distortion as close to zero as possible.

Formally, the problem is to minimize

$$\epsilon \equiv \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{m} n_j a_j}{\sum_{k=1}^{m} n_k},$$

where $n_j \in \{0,1\}$ is whether device $j$ is or is not selected, and there are $m$ devices in the collection, having associated distortions $\{a_j\}$. We identify $\epsilon$ with the world utility, $G$ (so that for these experiments, the goal is to minimize $G$, not maximize it). There are $m$ individual agents, each setting one of the $n_j$. The goal is to give those agents private utilities so that, as they learn to maximize their private utilities, the maximizer of $G$ is found.

Because we wished to concentrate on the effects of the utilities rather than on the RL algorithms that use them, the agents all used the same (very) simple RL algorithm. (We would expect that even marginally more sophisticated RL algorithms would give better performance.) At each timestep each agent runs its algorithm on a data set it maintains of action-utility pairs to choose what action to take. This gives a joint action, which in turn sets the private utility value for each agent. Combined with what action it took at that timestep, that utility value for agent $j$ then gets added to the data set maintained by agent $j$. This is done for all agents and then the process repeats.

The agents used their data sets to choose moves by maintaining a 2-dimensional vector whose components at a given timestep are the agent’s estimates of the utility it would receive for taking each of its two possible move. Each agent $j$ picks its action at a timestep by sampling a Boltzmann distribution whose over the “energy spectrum” of $j$’s two utility estimates at that time.

For simplicity, given how short our runs were, the temperature in the Boltzmann distribution did not decay in time. However to reflect the fact that the environment in which an agent is operating changes with time (as the other agents change their moves), and therefore the optimal action changes in time, the two utility estimates are formed using exponentially aged data: for any time step $t$, the utility estimate $j$ uses for setting either of the two actions $n_j$ is a weighted average of all the utility values it has received at previous times $t'$ that it chose that action, with the weights in the average given by an exponential of the values $t - t'$. Finally, to form the agents’ initial data sets, there is an initialization period in which all actions by all agents are chosen uniformly randomly, with no learning used. It is after this initialization period ends that the agents choose their actions according to the associated Boltzmann distributions.

For all learning algorithms, the first 20 time steps constitute the data set initialization period (note that all learning algorithms must “perform” the same during that period, since none are actually in use then). Starting at $t = 20$, with each consecutive timestep a fixed fraction of the agents still choosing their actions randomly switch to using their learner algorithms instead, while others continue to take random actions. This gradual introduction of the learning algorithms is intended to soften the “discontinuity” in each agent’s environment when the behavior of the other agents start using their learning algorithms and therefore change their moves. For $m = 100$, four agents turned on their learning algorithms at each time step (i.e., by $t = 26$, all agents were using their learners).

![Figure 1: Combination of Imperfect Objects Problem, $m = 100$.](image-url)
spectively. $S$ shows the performance of greedy search where new $n_j$’s are generated at each step and selected if the solution is better than the current best solution. Because the runs are only 200 timesteps long, algorithms such as simulated annealing do not outperform simple search: there is simply no time for an annealing schedule.

Note that because of the discontinuity in the environment experienced by each agent as the other agents turn on their learning algorithms, the performance of the system as a whole as the agents turn on their learning may degrade initially, before settling down (e.g., WLU). Qualitatively, systems in which agents use the $G$ utility have a difficult time learning, while systems in which agents use $AU$ perform best and the search algorithm falls between the performance of the two.

We also investigated the scaling properties of each algorithm. Figure 2 shows these results (the $t = 200$ average performance over 1000 runs) along with the associated error bars. As $m$ grows two competing factors come into play. On the one hand, there are more degrees of freedom to use to minimize $G$. On the other hand, the problem becomes more difficult: the search space gets larger for $S$, and there is more noise in the system for the learning algorithms. To account for these effects and calibrate the performance values as $m$ varies, in the figure we also provide the performance of the algorithm that randomly selects its action (“Ran”). Note that the difference between the performances of $S$ and $AU$ increases when the system size increases, up to a factor of twenty for $m = 1000$.

All algorithms but $AU$ have slopes similar to that of “Ran”, demonstrating that they cannot use the additional degrees of freedom provided by the larger $m$. Only $AU$ effectively uses the new degrees of freedom, providing gains that are proportionally higher than the other algorithms (i.e., the rate at which $AU$’s performance improves outpaces what is “expected” based on the random algorithm’s performance).

Finally, note that many search algorithms (e.g., gradient ascent, simulated annealing, genetic algorithms) can be viewed as collectives. However conventionally such algorithms use very “dumb” agents. In particular, in exploration-exploitation algorithms, the agents typically make random moves in the exploration step rather than RL to choose the best move. Preliminary results indicate that using RL-based agents to determine the moves in such exploration steps — intuitively, “agentizing” the individual variables of a search problem by providing them with adaptive intelligence — can lead to significantly better solutions than are achieved with conventional “dumb variable” exploration steps in a myriad of optimization problems.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{scaling.pdf}
\caption{Scaling in the Combination of Imperfect Objects Problem.}
\end{figure}

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