On Information Hiding in Natural Language Systems

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Abstract
With data privacy becoming more of a necessity than a luxury in today's digital world, research on more robust models of privacy preservation and information security is on the rise. In this paper, we take a look at Natural Language Steganography (NLS) methods, which perform information hiding in natural language systems, as a means to achieve data security as well as confidentiality. We summarize primary challenges regarding the secrecy and imperceptibility requirements of these systems and propose potential directions of improvement, specifically targeting steganographic text quality. We believe that this study will act as an appropriate framework to build more resilient models of Natural Language Steganography, working towards instilling security within natural language-based neural models.

Introduction
General purpose neural language models have shown to learn spurious patterns existing within natural language text. Language variety within the training corpora may contain cues that lead to inference-based attacks, increasing the risk of exposure of any private information that has been unintentionally encoded within a given model (Nguyen, Rosseel, and Grieve 2021). The sole reliance on word form and statistical distribution of word tokens within a given training corpora results in lack of comprehension and common-sense reasoning within such models (Bender and Koller 2020). Consequently, the risks that arise from these models can be exploited by adversaries to uncover private attributes of entities mentioned within the text used to train these models, leading to potential fraud and misuse by third parties. To prevent training data related privacy leaks, current privacy-preservation techniques focus on training-time updates that utilize adversarial learning, differential privacy-based noise addition or cryptographic enhancements (Li, Baldwin, and Cohn 2018; Huang et al. 2020a). Non-cryptographic models preserve privacy through the irreversible removal of rich social signals from the input data (Nguyen, Rosseel, and Grieve 2021). Yet, these models are prone to privacy leakages pertaining to the training data, which can be implicit or explicit in nature (Huang et al. 2020b). On the other hand, while current models of cryptographic-enhancements to the training setup can deal with such leakages, their vulnerability to reconstruction attacks deems them inefficient (Carlini et al. 2021).

Apart from distorting or locking the private information through DP-noise addition or cryptographic enhancements respectively, the existence of private information itself can be hidden from the adversaries. Such information hiding techniques have existed parallel to the field of cryptography, within the domain of cybersecurity. Broadly referred to as Steganography, these techniques hide secret information within a given cover medium, and add the component of secrecy on top privacy, leading to broad applications in covert communication, data provenance, etc. (Taleby Ahvanooey et al. 2019). Although steganographic models utilizing natural language have been researched extensively in the past, their application towards training data privacy has not been explored.

In this paper, we present a comprehensive review of steganography techniques that use natural language text as a cover medium, i.e. hide data within natural language. These works come under the umbrella of linguistic steganography (LS) and Natural Language Watermarking (NLW) techniques that aim to hide information within the structure and/or meaning of natural language (Atallah et al. 2001; Abdelnabi and Fritz 2021). We discuss the limitations of existing approaches and define concrete directions of future research. Our work does not intersect with prior reviews on text steganography approaches because while they focus on methods that alter character level properties of text documents (e.g. character spacing, white spaces, etc.), we specifically focus on steganography methods that employ the modification or generation of natural language. Overall, we make two primary contributions. (1) We summarize approaches towards NLS under a unified framework to facilitate future discussions. (2) We critically analyze current approaches and identify potential directions of future research towards privacy and secrecy improvements in NLS.

Natural Language Stegosystem
In this section, we define various components of a natural language stegosystem, associated attack models, standards for privacy guarantees and NL stegosystem requirements. Formally, the problem statement of steganography is defined through the modified Simmon’s Prisoner Problem (Simmons...
We consider a steganographic system (stegosystem), where two entities Alice and Bob aim to communicate secret information, without arousing the suspicion of the eavesdropper Eve. The overall stegosystem describing the aforementioned scenario is shown in Figure 1 and described below.

**Embedding/Encoding** ($Emb$) This task is employed by Alice ($A$) to encode a secret ($m$) into a natural language text carrier ($y$). The secret ($m$) is first converted into a binary string ($m_{bin}$) and encoded with a secret key ($k$) to secure the contents of $m$, forming ($m_{bin,k}$). Finally, ($m_{bin,k}$) is embedded within the form, syntax and/or semantics of the carrier $y$, using an invertible function $f$, forming the stego-text $f(m_{bin,k}, y)$.

**Extraction/Decoding** ($Ext$) This task is employed by Bob ($B$) to decode the secret ($m$) from the carrier ($y$). Since Bob has knowledge of the secret key and the encoding function, they can extract the secret $m$ by applying the key $k$ and inverting the function yielding $f^{-1}(m_{bin,k}, y)$.

**Attack** ($Att$) This task is employed by Eve ($E$) to break the security of the steganographic protocol using steganalysis techniques. This process comprises of active and passive attacks, where an active attacker aims to destroy the secret while a passive attacker aims to detect the presence of the secret. The attacker is assumed to have no knowledge of the key $k$ used in the embedding procedure as well as limited knowledge regarding the invertible function $f$.

**Stegosystem Requirements**

Written text contains less redundant information as compared to other media such as images (Atallah et al. 2001). This renders the task of hiding information using natural language more challenging because minor changes within the carrier text might result in drastic changes in word meaning, grammatical correctness and language style. Thus, a Natural Language Stegosystem should aim to achieve the following requirements:

**Meaning preservation** This requirement focuses on preserving the meaning of the actual carrier text, while encoding secret information within. Meaning preservation is important in cases where the carrier is also an important component, e.g. NL watermarking.

**Grammaticality** Any stego-text must be grammatically correct in order to attract minimal attention from adversaries. If the adversary can identify gaps in lexical, sentential or text semantics, they might be able to detect the location of the secret within a given text, rendering the stegosystem susceptible to attacks.

**Style Preservation** Language style is an important characteristic of natural language employed by different individuals. Thus, if an NL stegosystem outputs stego-text which doesn’t align with the language style employed in the rest of the text, the adversary can easily detect and point towards the location where the stego-secret is embedded, rendering the stegosystem susceptible to attacks.

**Attack Models**

Different types of adversarial attacks can be conducted on steganographic models of privacy including (i) **White-box attacks**: The attacker has white-box access to the stegosystem, apart from the key, and can misuse these privileges to uncover the secret. (ii) **Black-box attacks**: The attacker has no knowledge of the stegosystem and performs various transformations to break down the stegosystem. (iii) **Grey-box attacks**: The attacker has partial knowledge regarding the stegosystem components and uses this information to strategically attack the stegosystem.

Recent developments in NLS utilize general purpose language models (Ueoka, Murawaki, and Kurohashi 2021; Ziegler, Deng, and Rush 2019), which can be easily accessed by an adversary, and increase the risk of grey-box attacks. The robustness of an NLS system, against the aforementioned attacks is measured using the imperceptibility metrics. These metrics are divided into two types, i.e. statistical imperceptibility and human imperceptibility. These imperceptibility metrics measure the risk of detection by human or statistical adversaries respectively.

**A Comprehensive Review of NLS**

In this section, we summarize different types of NLS techniques, specifically methods that modify or generate natural language text to encode secrets. These techniques can primarily be divided into two types, i.e. Carrier Modification and Carrier Generation techniques. The difference between these methods lies in their treatment of the carrier text used as a medium to encode the secret message $m$. While carrier modification based approaches need to optimize over two goals, i.e. meaning retention and capacity improvement, carrier generation approaches only require optimization over one goal i.e. fine-tuning the carrier generation scheme to generate human-like natural language sequences. Moreover, carrier generation based methods yield higher capacity than carrier modification based approaches. These methods are explained in further detail in the following sections.

**Carrier Modification**

Carrier modification techniques modify an existing carrier text written in a given natural language, to encode a secret message. These methods were primarily utilized in many of the initial attempts at NLS that hid secrets either through word substitution or modification of the semantic/syntactic structure of a given cover text.
Substitution-based Methods Early substitution based methods for carrier modification used synonyms, chosen to minimize meaning distortion while maximizing ambiguity within the text. The amount of meaning preserved and ambiguity achieved was measured using lexical and sentence level characteristics of the text (Topkara, Topkara, and Atallah 2006). The resilience was claimed to be rooted in the adversary’s lack of knowledge regarding where the changes were made and the inefficiency of word sense disambiguation techniques during that time.

The use of typographical errors as substitutions for original words has also been explored for hiding information (Topkara, Topkara, and Atallah 2007). The original words are replaced with their typographic error replacements, e.g. party → patty. Hiding secrets within abbreviations have also been proposed (Shirali-Shahreza and Shirali-Shahreza 2007). Usually, these schemes lack adaptation to language evolution. Since, old abbreviations might not be used as language evolves over time, these schemes end up being redundant and inefficient.

Recent developments in language models have eliminated the need for rule construction and allow quick access to alternative word choices for substitutions. General purpose language models have been utilized to perform word substitution using various masking-based encoding schemes (Ueoka, Murawaki, and Kurohashi 2021) as well as adversarial training (Abdelnabi and Fritz 2021). By training an adversarial model that performs classification between input and modified text, the model aims to bring stego-text as close to natural language text, while embedding the secret.

Language Structure-based Methods Early research towards carrier modification based NLS also utilized the structure of natural language itself to hide information. These methods encode the secret message within the syntactic choices or text meaning representations of a given carrier text (Atallah et al. 2001). Proposed as an alternative to the primarily researched substitution techniques, these methods showed immunity against substitution-based attacks. Concurrent methods of semantic transformations to encode secret message/watermark in texts have also been researched (Atallah et al. 2003). Thus, even if the adversary knows the steganography scheme itself, they would not be able to identify the specific modifications in sentence structure where the secrets have been encoded, wherein lies the resilience of these methods.

Carrier Generation

Carrier Generation techniques aim to generate natural language carrier texts that encode secret messages. These techniques range from carrier generation using Context-Free Grammars (CFGs) (Wayner 1992), Conditional Probability based Frameworks (ConProc) (Chapman and Davida 1997), Markov chains (Shinperov and Nikitina 2016) and neural networks (Ziegler, Deng, and Rush 2019) to statistical language models (Yang et al. 2021). The increased computational prowess and improved language modeling capabilities have resulted in major improvements in carrier generation models of NLS. Here, we divide carrier generation based NLS approaches into three categories, i.e. (CFG) based methods, Conditional Probability based methods and latent space semantics based methods.

Context-Free Grammars One of the earliest attempts towards generating natural language texts for NLS was proposed using context-free-grammars (CFGs) (Wayner 1992). A CFG is a set of production rules, forming the formal grammar for a given language, which can universally describe any combination of valid text sequences in that language. Thus, assuming that the CFG encompasses all possible text sequence permutations present within a given natural language, it can be used to generate syntactically legitimate text sequences. In order to hide information within the text generated using CFGs, Wayner developed a custom-made CFG where the choice of the CFG branch portrayed the bit(s) encoded (Wayner 1992). While these grammars can yield syntactically correct outputs, they can lead to repeated sentences, unless huge grammars are designed (Chapman and Davida 1997). Towards generating semantically correct outputs, Chapman and Davida (1997) combined a dictionary table containing a large list of POS tags, word synset and word pairs, and style templates to generate cover texts. But these methods have mostly been overtaken by conditional probability based frameworks.

Conditional Probability based Frameworks (ConProc) Statistical models of language usually consider sentences as a sequence of words or a sequence signal. This can be modeled by considering the conditional distribution probability of each word in the text corpora (Bengio et al. 2003), shown in the following equation:

\[ P(S) = \prod_{t=1}^{n} P(w_t | w_{t-1}) \]

\[ P(w_t | \text{context}) \forall t \in V \]

Here, \( S \) denotes the sentence of length \( n \), \( w_t \) is the \( t \)-th word in the sentence and \( w_t = (w_i, w_{i+1}, \ldots, w_{j-1}, w_j) \). Once this distribution is learnt by a statistical language model for all the training instances, the model can be used to generate word sequences based on the previous words encountered. Prior works have utilized this conditional probability (ConProc) framework to generate carrier text that encodes secret messages within the conditional distribution of words in language. These methods include works done using Markov models as well as neural networks.

- **Markov Models**: Initial attempts towards carrier generation using statistical language models involved the use of markov chain models (Shinperov and Nikitina 2016). Markov chain models are stochastic models that describes a sequence of possible events, where the probability of each event solely depends on the previous event state. For carrier generation, the Markov chain model is used to calculate the transition probability, based on the number of occurrences of different text sequences. This transition probability is then used to encode words and therefore secret bits during the process of carrier generation.
Latent Space Steganography

Apart from utilizing the ConProc framework to generate steganographic text, a recent work proposed utilizing a latent semantic space to encode secrets (Zhang et al. 2020). The model maps the secret message to a discrete semantic space, defined by natural language semantics (themes/topics), and the corresponding semantic vector \( \alpha \) is fed to a conditional text generation model, where the model generates stegotext \( x \) conditioned on \( \alpha \). The generated stego-text is relevant to the semanteme and sent to the receiver, who can use a semantic classifier to decode the stegotext. This work is one of the first approaches towards latent space steganography, where the secret message is encoded with a latent space and mapped to the symbolic space. The authors propose that hiding secrets in an implicit manner can lead to better concealment, as long as the prior distribution of the latent space remains unchanged (Zhang et al. 2020).

Challenges in NL Steganography

Natural language steganography has evolved over time, from CFG-based text constructions (Wayner 1992; Chapman and Davida 1997) to neural language models for text generation and modification (Yang et al. 2019; Yang et al. 2021a; Ziegler, Deng, and Rush 2019; Ueoka, Murawaki, and Kurohashi 2021). Although these developments have pushed the field further in terms of steganographic quality improvements, many gaps remain to be addressed. In this section, we describe some of the primary challenges faced by the field of natural language steganography in the recent years.

Lack of anti-steganalysis capabilities

Over the last few decades, linguistic steganalysis approaches have been developed alongside NL steganography models. These approaches aim to differentiate between steganographic and non-steganographic carrier texts. Recent methods extract and compare differences across steganographic and natural texts using neural networks (Bao et al. 2020; Yang, Huang, and Zhang 2019). Current NL steganography works do not account for resilience against the aforementioned steganalysis approaches. These works ignore the prerequisite of defining the anti-steganalysis abilities of their proposed models, and reduce model evaluation to statistical or human imperceptibility metrics such as KL-divergence and BLEU. Moreover, the works that do perform anti-steganalysis tests (Yang et al. 2021a; Zhang et al. 2021), exhibit a higher than chance probability of the steganographic text being detected by anti-steganalysis methods.

Data dependent models lack grounding

Recent developments in neural architectures, easy access to large text corpora and improved computational capabilities have led to the rise of neural language modeling techniques. Although these language models have portrayed state-of-the-art performance on various language generation tasks, their sole reliance on word form to learn the properties of language has been criticized (Bender and Koller 2020). Unlike knowledge-based approaches, where entity relations are explicitly defined, neural models fail to recognize knowledge relations present within the given text, be it conceptual categories or linguistic relations (Bihani and Rayz 2021). These limitations have already been delineated in several recent works that explore the definition of the ‘meaning’ learnt by neural and statistical language models (Bender and Koller 2020). Yet, current carrier modification and generation based NL steganography works do not account for these developments in linguistic semantics and language grounding. As a result, neural network based carrier generation has shown to produce inconsistent text in terms of factual accuracy (Ziegler, Deng, and Rush 2019), increasing the risk of adversarial attacks.

Latex space steganography

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by the neighbouring non-steganographic texts, it leads to a higher chance of detection by statistical as well as human adversaries. Unfortunately, current NL steganography approaches limit themselves to the optimization of sentence-level semantic coherence, and do not account for document level semantic coherence (Ziegler, Deng, and Rush 2019; Yang et al. 2021a). This results in production of text where each sentence seems valid in isolation, but lacks fluency when viewed as a part of a document.

Lack of standardization

Although there exists a large body of research on NL stenographic techniques, these methods do not establish benchmarks regarding model evaluation, with works varying drastically in terms of datasets used to train and validate the models and metrics used to perform evaluation. Creating steganographic text that is imperceptible to adversaries is the key goal in the field of NL steganography. Given that the adversary can be human or statistical, the steganographic protocols need to produce outputs that are imperceptible to both. Solely focusing on the improvement of one imperceptibility criterion is not enough. Recent research points towards the existence of PSIC effect (Yang et al. 2021a), portraying an inverse relationship between human and statistical imperceptibility. Given these priors and towards the goal of overall imperceptibility improvements in NL steganography, we enlist gaps in the evaluation of steganographic text imperceptibility in NL steganography.

**Human Imperceptibility Evaluation** Human imperceptibility evaluation metrics are highly scattered across works in NL steganography. These metrics include several MT evaluation metrics such as ROUGE and METEOR (Yang et al. 2021a; Yang et al. 2021b), etc. The use of MT evaluation metrics for human imperceptibility evaluation cannot be justified because such metrics prefer that the transformed text sequences match the length of the original text sequence, which is not a rigid requirement for NL steganography (Chang and Clark 2012). Moreover, there exist no studies that confirm that MT evaluation metrics are highly correlated with high human imperceptibility judgements on steganographic texts. Additionally, there is a lack of consensus regarding the details of the human annotation tasks, where some papers ask the annotators to evaluate whether the stego-text was written by an actual human being (Luo et al. 2016), while others require the annotators to judge whether a generated text is contextually relevant (Ziegler, Deng, and Rush 2019). These differences make it difficult to compare existing approaches, and demand more research on developing standardized metrics that should be used to optimize carrier generation. Thus, there needs to be better standardization of the human imperceptibility evaluation tasks, including the development of a standard definition of human imperceptibility, theoretically and empirically grounded metrics and methods for measuring it, and studies regarding whether there exists a correlation between MT evaluation metrics and human imperceptibility of steganographic texts.

**Statistical Imperceptibility Evaluation** Unlike human imperceptibility evaluation, statistical imperceptibility evaluation has undergone a more consistent development, in terms of the metrics and methods used to measure imperceptibility. While some recent papers entirely ignore to report any statistical imperceptibility results (Yang et al. 2021b), others have largely been limited themselves to KL divergence and classification based attacks (Ziegler, Deng, and Rush 2019; Yang et al. 2021a). Current literature deals with each metric in isolation, and to our knowledge, works performing evaluations on both the criteria do not exist.

**Conclusion**

In this work, we systematize existing Natural Language Steganography approaches and outline several challenges. These challenges pertain to the lack of benchmarking, minimal iterative testing and lack of steganographic carrier quality as compared to human-generated texts in current NLS approaches. Unlike steganography in other media, NLS needs to account for the additional requirement of artificially creating legitimate natural language sequences, a task that yet to be completely solved. We hope that this review on utilizing language as a medium to hide private information can facilitate future research on privacy preservation in language models.

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