An efficient and secure data sharing scheme for mobile devices in cloud computing

Xiuqing Lu¹,², Zhenkuan Pan¹* and Hequn Xian¹

Abstract

With the development of big data and cloud computing, more and more enterprises prefer to store their data in cloud and share the data among their authorized employees efficiently and securely. So far, many different data sharing schemes in different fields have been proposed. However, sharing sensitive data in cloud still faces some challenges such as achieving data privacy and lightweight operations at resource constrained mobile terminals. Furthermore, most data sharing schemes have no integrity verification mechanism, which would result in wrong computation results for users. To solve the problems, we propose an efficient and secure data sharing scheme for mobile devices in cloud computing. Firstly, the scheme guarantees security and authorized access of shared sensitive data. Secondly, the scheme realizes efficient integrity verification before users share the data to avoid incorrect computation. Finally, the scheme achieves lightweight operations of mobile terminals on both data owner and data requester sides.

Keywords: Big data, Security, Integrity, Cloud computing

Introduction

With the rapid development of information technology and Internet of Things (IoT), enterprises generate more and more big data, which needs to be stored and processed efficiently and securely. Cloud computing is a developed storage platform and has many advantages including low cost and scalability [1–3]. Therefore, many enterprises and individuals are apt to outsource their data to cloud for storage and sharing with authorized data requesters. For example, in a cloud based health information system, patients upload their health information to cloud for sharing with medical experts to diagnose diseases. Similarly, the manager of an enterprise not only want to store the big data in cloud, but also want to share the data among their authorized employees wherever needed. Outsourcing data for sharing in cloud not only saves local storage space, but also greatly reduces the cost of enterprises in software purchase and hardware maintenance [4–6]. Although people take advantages of this new technology and service, their concerns about data security arises as well. Security problem in cloud is the most critical issue because of the valuable information that data owners share. Cloud providers should address privacy and security issues as a matter of high and urgent priority [7–9]. One of the prominent security concerns in data sharing is data privacy. In addition, terminals of users are usually resource-constrained mobile devices with small storage space and low processing speed. Therefore, it is essential to propose an efficient and secure data sharing scheme for mobile devices in cloud computing.

Main contributions

We propose a lightweight and secure sensitive data sharing scheme for mobile devices in cloud computing. The main contributions of the paper are as follows.
1) We design an efficient integrity mechanism based on algebraic signature for sensitive data before data sharing.

2) We guarantee privacy preserving of sensitive data in sharing process and access authorization control for data requesters.

3) We achieve lightweight computation operations on data owner and data requester sides with mobile devices.

Organization
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the related works in secure data sharing. Section III describes architecture and security requirements. Section IV presents the definitions and preliminaries. In section V, we describe the implementations of the efficient data sharing scheme. We analyze security in section VI and evaluate the scheme performance in Section VII. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VIII.

The related works
With more and more sensitive information sharing among enterprise employees, preserving data integrity and guaranteeing access control for only authorized users to access the data has become the core security problem. Therefore, security problems of data sharing in cloud mainly focus on access control and data integrity [10–14].

At present, data sharing schemes mainly employ access control mechanism to achieve authorized access. Akl and Taylor [15] proposed use of cryptography to realize access control in hierarchical structures. As data owner and the data center are not in the same trusted domain in cloud storage system, access control schemes employing Attributed Based Encryption (ABE) [16] are put forward. ABE commonly comes in Key Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Cipher text Policy ABE (CP-ABE). KP-ABE uses attributes to describe the encryption data and builds policies into user’s key [17]. CP-ABE uses attributes to describe user’s credentials and the user encrypting the data determines a policy on who can decrypt the data [18]. Lewko [19] proposed the first unbounded KP-ABE scheme. Waters [20] firstly put forward a fully expressed CP-ABE scheme in the standard model. Cheung and Newport [21] proposed another CP-ABE scheme and proved its security in the standard model. To ensure data security in smart health, Zhang and Zhen [22] realize the fine-grained access control, cipher text-policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE). To achieve privacy and authorized access, many other schemes [23–33] are proposed in diverse fields and applications.

To verify integrity of data in cloud, many integrity verification schemes [26, 34–42] have been proposed in recent years. Ateniese [34] proposed the first public auditing scheme, which allows any public verifier to check the data integrity. Later, to prove the integrity of dynamic data, Ateniese [26] proposed another scheme based on the symmetric key provable data possession (PDP) scheme. To support dynamic operation of data, Erway et al. [35] proposed a dynamic provable data possession (DPDP) scheme by introducing an authenticated skip list. Later many auditing schemes are proposed by using the authenticated data structure to support dynamic data update. Zhu et al. [36] introduced an index-hash table (IHT) for dynamic verification. Yang et al. [37] proposed another authenticated data structure called index table (ITable) to store the abstract information of blocks. Tian [38] proposed a data structure named Dynamic-Hash-Table (DHT). Wang et al. [39] and Liu et al. [40] respectively proposed dynamic public auditing schemes based on Merkle Hash Tree (MHT). The two schemes can achieve both public verification and dynamic data operations. However, block signatures are generated by users, which would incur multitude computation and communication overhead on the user side. In 2018, Gan [41] proposed an auditing scheme on algebraic signatures that can achieve lower computation and communication costs. The properties of algebraic signature allows cloud to return a sum of the selected blocks in the proof instead of the original data file, which saves the bandwidth between the cloud and the verifier and make the algebraic signature suited for cloud computing [42]. Nowadays, more and more schemes [23, 43–52] on cloud computing security are put forward to achieve great advantages.

Architecture and security requirement
System model
The system model consists of four entities named Key Generator Center (KGC), Data Owner (DO), Cloud Servers (CS) and Data Requester (DR) as depicted in Fig. 1.

Key generation center (KGC)
It is responsible for generating public parameters and master key for the system and issuing private key for other entities.

Data owner (DO)
It is responsible to generate and encrypt the shared data, define access structures, and divide encrypted data into blocks.

Cloud servers (CS)
Cloud servers comes in Cloud Storage Servers (CSS) and Cloud Manage Servers (CMS) based on their roles. CSS is responsible for storing shared data, block tags and
supply the data integrity proof. To save computation and communication costs of mobile terminals of DO and DR, CMS is employed to manipulate complex computations including generating algebraic signatures of blocks, verifying data integrity of shared data and computing the intermediate data for encryption and decryption.

Data Requester (DR): It is responsible to download and decrypt the shared data for utilization. In the scheme, only the authorized DR is able to download shared data from CSS and decrypt the data.

In our secure data sharing scheme for mobile terminal devices, DO has large sensitive data to share with legitimate DR. Before sharing, DO encrypts the data with his private key and outsources the data to CSS. If a DR wants to access the data, he must register his identity to KGC and obtain his private key for decryption. To achieve authorized access, only legitimate DRs with correct attributes can download and utilize the shared data. To ensure cloud data intact and decrease computation burden of requesters, CMS helps DR to verify the integrity of data before sharing. Only when data is undamaged, DR downloads and decrypts shared data with his private key.

Security requirement

In the scheme, we suppose CSS and CMS are both semi-trusted. CSS is responsible to store data and block tags for data sharing. However, once data is corrupt or lost, it might launch forge attack or replace attack for economic reasons. Similarly, CMS is curious about the content of sensitive data, so the data should preserve secret to CMS. In the scheme, we assume KGC is a fully trusted authority and can honestly generate private key for the system and other entity. Therefore, the following security requirements of the scheme should be satisfied.

**Data confidentiality**

The shared data must keep confidential to CSS, CMS and any unauthorized DRs for privacy and security. Any disclosure of shared data is undoubtedly harmful to enterprise benefits. Consequently, it is important to ensure the confidentiality of shared data.

**Data integrity**

The data should keep intact before shared by DR. It means that the data is undamaged in an unauthorized manner during storage and sharing process.

**Authorized access**

To achieve authorization, only DR with correct attributes can access shared data stored in CSS.

**User revocation**

The membership of DR must be revoked to stop his access to shared data when he leaves the organization. To achieve security of the scheme, user revocation should be required in the data sharing scheme.

**Design goals**

The data sharing scheme for mobile devices is designed to achieve data privacy preservation, data security and lightweight operations.

**Privacy preservation**

The scheme should satisfy data privacy during data sharing process. As sensitive data is encrypted by data owner before outsourcing to cloud and only authorized data requesters can access the encrypted data, the shared data is private to CSS, CMS and any unauthorized DRs.


**Data security**
The scheme should achieve sensitive data security during the whole sharing process. The security requirement can be guaranteed by data confidentiality, data integrity, authorized access and user revocation in the scheme.

**Lightweight operations**
The scheme should decrease computation operations of DO and DR for efficiency. In our scheme, CMS is responsible to divide encrypted data into blocks and computes block tags. Furtherly, when DR wants to access shared data, CMS compute intermediate data of decryption to less DR’s computation burden.

**Definitions and preliminaries**

**Definitions**

1) Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption. Suppose $g$ is a generator of multiplicative cyclic group $G$ with prime order $q$. On input $y \in G$, there does not exist probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that outputs a value $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ such that $g^x = y$ with non-negligible probability.

2) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption. Suppose $g$ is a generator of multiplicative cyclic group $G$ with prime order $q$. On input $g^x, g^y \in G$, there does not exist probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that outputs $g^{xy} \in G$ with non-negligible probability.

3) Access Structure. Suppose $P = \{P_1, P_2, ..., P_n\}$ is a set of parties. A collection of $W \subseteq 2^P$ is monotone if $\forall B, C : B \in W$ and $B \subseteq C$ then $C \in W$. An access structure is the collection $W$ with non-empty subsets of $P$, i.e., $W \subseteq 2^P \setminus \emptyset$. The sets in $W$ are named as authorized sets, and the sets not in $W$ are named as the unauthorized sets.

**Preliminaries**

1. Linear secret-sharing schemes (LSSS). LSSS is a share-generating matrix $A$ with rows labeled by attributes. Assume $S \in A$ is an authorized set and $I$ is defined as $I = \{i \mid p(i) \in S\}$. Then there exists constants $\omega_e \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ satisfying $\sum_{i \in I} \omega_i \lambda_i = s$ where $\lambda_i$ is valid share of secret share $s$. Suppose $A_i$ is the $i^{th}$ row of $A$, the equation $\sum_{i \in I} \omega_i A_i = (1, 0, ..., 0)$ also satisfies.

2. Algebraic signature. The algebraic signature of a file block composed of strings $s_0, s_1, ..., s_{n-1}$ is defined as $\text{sig}_g(s_0, s_1, ..., s_{n-1}) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} s_i \cdot g^1$. The algebraic signature has the following two properties: i) the algebraic signature of a combination of file $F_1$ and file $F_2$ is defined as $\text{sig}_g(F_1 \oplus F_2) = \text{sig}_g(F_1) \oplus \text{sig}_g(F_2)$. ii) the algebraic signature of a combination of $n$ blocks in file $F$ is equal to the combination of algebraic signatures of each block named $m_i \in G$, which is described as $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{sig}_g(m_i) = \text{sig}_g(\sum_{i=1}^{n} m_i)$.

3. XOR-homomorphic function. A XOR-homomorphic function $h$ is a pseudo-random function that can ensure data privacy. Its properties is as follows. For any inputs $x, y$, there exists $h(x \oplus y) = h(x) \oplus h(y)$.

4. Bilinear maps. Suppose $G_1, G_2$ are two multiplicative groups with same large prime order $q$, and $g$ is a generator of $G_1$. A bilinear map $e$ is a map function $e : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_1$ with the following properties: i) computability. $\forall u, v \in G_1$, an efficient algorithm exists to compute $e(u, v)$. ii) Bilinearity. $\forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q, \exists e(u^a, v^b) = e(u, v)^{ab}$. iii) nondegeneracy. $e(g, g) \neq 1$. iv) security. It is hard to compute discrete logarithm (DL) in $G_1$.

**Table 1**

| Notation | Meaning |
|----------|---------|
| $\lambda$ | Security parameter |
| A | Attribute universe |
| $G_1, G_2$ | Multiplicative groups |
| $q$ | Prime order of group |
| $\text{sig}_g$ | Algebra signature |
| PK, MK | Public and master keys |
| S | Attribute of DR |
| SK | Private key of DR |
| $F, F'$ | Plain text of file and encrypted file |
| $T_i$ | Block tag |
| DP, TP | Data proof and tag proof |
| AS | Access policy |
| $m_i$ | Data block |
| $\text{Uid}$ | Identity of user |
| $\text{Usk, Upk}$ | Private and public key of user |
Initial phase
This phase consists of three algorithms named *Para-Setup*, *KeyGen*, *IdReg*. Algorithm *ParaSetup* is mainly responsible to generate system parameters before data sharing. Algorithm *KeyGen* is mainly used to obtain the private key for DR to decrypt the cipher-text of shared data. Algorithm *IdReg* is responsible for registering DR’s identity information in a table for checking the validity of DR. Figure 2 describes the data flow of the phase.

1) **ParaSetup**($\lambda, A$) → (PK, MK): It is run by KGC. Given system security parameter $\lambda$, KGC constructs the bilinear map group system $\Theta = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, q, e)$ where $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ are multiplicative groups with prime order $q$, and $e$ is a bilinear map $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$. Suppose $A$ is the attribute universe $A$ whose attribute number is $|A|$. KGC picks random $\alpha, \beta, s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_{|A|} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and computes $\theta = e(g, g)^{\alpha}$, $\sigma = g^\beta$. Then KGC defines heteromorphic function $h : \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ and algebraic signature $\text{sig}_g(m_i) = m'_i, g'$, where $m_i \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and $g$ is a generator of $\mathbb{G}_1$. Next, KGC selects three secure hash function $H_1 : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$, $H_2 : \{0,1\}^{\text{len}} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$, $H_3 : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. KGC publishes public parameters $PK = (e, g, H_1, H_2, H_3, \text{sig}_g, \theta, \sigma, f_i = g^{s_i}, 1 \leq i \leq |A|)$ and keeps master key $MK = (\alpha, \beta)$ secretly.

![Fig. 2 Dataflow of Initial Phase](image-url)
2) \textbf{KeyGen}(MK, S) \rightarrow (Usk): It is run by \textit{KGC}. Before \textit{DR} with attribute \textit{S} share the data, he should get the private key to decrypt the cipher text of shared data. \textit{DR} first sends key generation request \textit{requestKeyGen}(S) to \textit{KGC}. After receiving the request, \textit{KGC} computes \( Uid = H_3(S) \) as the \textit{DR} identity and computes \( Upk = g^{|Uid|} \) as \textit{DR}'s public key. Next \textit{KGC} selects \( t \in Z_q, V, V_x \in \mathbb{G}_1, \forall x \in \mathit{S} \) and computes the private key \( Usk \) for \textit{DR} as follows: \( K = g^{\alpha t V}, K_x = f_x^t V_x, \forall x \in \mathit{S} \). \textit{KGC} randomly selects \( b \in Z_q \) and computes \( Ub = Uid \cdot b \) and sends \( \{Ub, g^b\} \) to CMS for later integrity verification. Then, \textit{KGC} sends \( \{Uid, Usk\} \) to \textit{DR} and \( \{S, Uid, Upk\} \) to \textit{CSS}.

3) \textbf{IdReg}(S, Uid) \rightarrow \text{DRTable}. It is run by \textit{CSS}. To verify the validity of \textit{DR} before transferring the shared data, \textit{CSS} stores \textit{DR}'s information including identity \textit{Uid}, attribute set \textit{S} and public key \textit{Upk} in a table named \textit{DRTable}. If identity of \textit{DR} is valid, \textit{CSS} transfers shared data to him. Otherwise, \textit{CSS} refuses the download request of \textit{DR}.

\textbf{Data processing phase}

The phase includes two algorithms named \textbf{DataEnc}, \textbf{TagGen} and \textbf{InterEnc}. To achieve confidentiality, algorithm \textbf{DataEnc} encrypts shared data and divides the data into blocks. To ensure the data is intact, algorithm \textbf{TagGen} generates block tag for each block. To decrease \textit{DO}'s computation burden, algorithm \textbf{InterEnc} helps \textit{DO} compute the intermediate value for encryption. Fig. \(3\) describes the data flow of the phase.

1) \textbf{DataEnc}(F) \rightarrow (F\prime): It is run by \textit{DO}. To ensure only authorized \textit{DR} have access to shared data, \textit{DO}
defines access policy $AS = (M, \rho)$, where $M$ is a $l \times n$ matrix and $\rho$ is the function that maps each row of the matrix to an associated attribute. That is, for $i \in [1, l]$, the value $\rho(i)$ is the attribute associated with row $i$. Suppose the shared data is $F \in \{0, 1\}^{len}$, where $len$ is the max length of $F$ and the identity is $Fid$. $DO$ selects key $SK \in \mathbb{G}_1$, $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, and a random column vector $\hat{y} = (s, y_2, \ldots, y_n)^T \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Next, he encrypts $F$ as $F' = H_2(SK) \cdot F$ and computes $C = SK \cdot \theta^s$, $C = g^s \cdot \lambda_i = M_i \cdot \hat{y}_{1 \leq i \leq l}$. Finally, $DO$ sends $(F', \lambda_i)$ to CMS and $(C, C')$ sends to CSS.

2) $\text{TagGen}(F) \rightarrow (T_i)$: It is run by CMS. CMS computes $F^* = H_1(F')$ and divides $F^*$ into $N$ data blocks named $m_i$. Suppose $t_i, v_i$ represent the recent timestamp and version of each block $m_i$. CMS computes block tags as follows

$$
T_i = \text{sig}_g(m_i \cdot \theta^s \cdot H_1(t_i \parallel v_i))
$$

and sends $\{(m_i, T_i) \in [1, N]\}$ to CSS.

3) $\text{InterEnc}(M) \rightarrow (C_i, E_i)$. It is run by CMS. To decrease the computation burden of mobile devices at $DO$ side, CMS helps to compute the intermediate encryption data. He selects $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{len} \in [1, l]$ and computes $C_i = g^s \cdot f_{\rho(i)} / r_i$, $E_i = g^n$. For later integrity verification, CMS stores the intermediate data $C_i$, $E_i$ locally.

**Integrity verification phase**

When $DR$ wants to access shared data, he first sends integrity request to CMS for verifying whether the
data is intact. Then CMS generates integrity challenge $c_h$ and sends it to CSS. After getting the challenge, CSS computes data proof $P$ and sends it to CMS to verify the integrity. This phase consists of the following three algorithms and Fig. 4 describes the data flow of the phase.

1) $ChalGen( Fid) \rightarrow (c_h)$: Before downloading shared data, DR first sends request $request_{challeng}(Fid, Uid)$ to CMS for integrity verification. After receiving the request, CMS verifies the validity of DR’s identity with equation $e(Upk, g^h) = e(g, g)^{Upk}$. If the equation does not hold, CMS rejects the request. Otherwise, CMS randomly selects $c$ blocks and corresponding random numbers $R_i \in Z_q^*$. Then CMS sends challenge $ch = (i, R_i) \in [1, c]$ to CSS.

2) $ProfGen( T_i, F') \rightarrow (P)$: After receiving $ch$ from CMS, CSS computes data proof and tag proof

$$DP = \text{sig}_g \left( \sum_{i=1}^{c} (m_i \oplus h(R_i)) \right)$$

$$TP = \sum_{i=1}^{c} T_i.$$ \hspace{1cm} (3)

Then he sends proof $P = (DP, TP)$ to CMS.

3) $IntegityVer( P) \rightarrow (true, false)$. After getting the proof $P$, CMS computes $L = \sum_{i=1}^{c} \text{sig}_g(h(R_i) \oplus H_1(t_i || v_i))$ and verifies whether the following equation holds.

$$DP = TP \oplus L.$$ \hspace{1cm} (4)

If the equation holds, it indicates that the data is intact and outputs $true$, Otherwise, CMS outputs $false$.

**Data sharing phase**

If the shared data is intact, DR downloads and decrypts $F'$. This phase consists of the following four algorithms and Fig. 5 describes the data flow of the phase.

1) $InvalidyCheck( S, Uid) \rightarrow (true, false)$. It is run by CSS. Before downloading shared data $F'$, DR sends

**Fig. 5 Data Flow of Sharing Phase**
request \textit{request\_download}(\textit{Fid}, \textit{S}, \textit{Uid}) to \textit{CSS}. Then \textit{CSS} scans \textit{DRTTable} to verify whether \textit{DR} is legitimate. If \textit{DR} is in \textit{DRTTable}, \textit{CSS} transfers \{\textit{C}, \textit{F}\} to \textit{DR}. Otherwise, \textit{CSS} refuses the request.

2) \textit{InterDec}( \textit{C}, \textit{Ei}, \textit{K}, \textit{Kp(i)}) \rightarrow (\textit{W}). If the shared data is intact, \textit{CMS} computes the intermediate value for \textit{DR} to decrease the computation burden of \textit{DR} side. Let \( i \in I \) and \( S = [1, l] \), where \( S \) is the attribute of \textit{DR}. Suppose \( \omega_i \in Z_q \), \( i \) is constant and satisfies the equation \( e(C_i, K)\omega_i = (1, 0, \ldots, 0) \). \textit{CMS} computes \( W = \prod_{i \in I} (e(C_i, K)\omega_i) \) and sends \( W \) to \textit{DR} securely.

3) \textit{Decryption}(\textit{F}) \rightarrow (\textit{F}'): If \textit{DR} is legitimate, he downloads \( F' \) and computes the follows.

\[
\text{CK}' = \frac{e(C', K)}{W} = \theta
\]  

Then \textit{DR} computes \( SK = C/CK' \), \( F' = H_2(SK) \oplus F' \) and recovers the plaintext of shared data.

4) \textit{Revocation}(\textit{Uid}) \rightarrow (\textit{DRTTable}). \textit{DR} can be revoked after leaving the organization. After revocation of \textit{DR}, \textit{DSS} deletes \textit{DR}'s information from \textit{DRTTable} and \textit{DR} cannot download the shared file later.

\textbf{Security analysis}

In this section, we analyze the security of the scheme, including correctness, unforgeability and privacy.

\textbf{Theorem 1.} Authorized \textit{DR} can correctly verify the integrity of the data stored in \textit{CSS}.

Proof. Theorem 1 can be proved by verifying the correctness of eq. (5). The proof is as follows.

\[
CK' = \frac{e(C', K)}{W} = \theta
\]

Then \textit{DR} computes \( SK = C/CK' \), \( F' = H_2(SK) \oplus F' \) and recovers the plaintext of shared data.

\textbf{Theorem 2.} Authorized \textit{DR} can correctly recover the shared data if he owns the legal attributes.

Proof. Theorem 2 can be proved by verifying the correctness of eq. (5). The proof is as follows.

\[
CK' = \frac{e(C', K)}{W} = \frac{e(C', K)}{\prod_{i \in I} (e(C_i, K)\omega_i)}
\]

\[
= \frac{e(C', K)}{e(C_i, K)}
\]

\[
= \frac{e(g^e, g^\sigma^iV)}{e(C_i, g^iV)}
\]

\[
= e(g, g)^{\omega_i}
\]

Then \textit{DR} computes \( SK = C/CK', F = H_2(SK) \oplus F' \) to recover the plaintext of shared data.

\textbf{Theorem 3.} It is computationally infeasible for \textit{CSS}, \textit{CMS} and unauthorized \textit{DR} to get the plaintext of health data in the scheme.

Proof. In data processing phase, \textit{DO} encrypts file \( F \) to \( F' \) with \( F' = H_2(SK) \oplus F \), where \( SK \) is only secret to \textit{DO}. Therefore, the file is confidential to both \textit{CSS} and \textit{CMS}. The confidentiality guarantee depends on the security of hash function \( H_2 \). As \( H_2 \) is a secure one-way hash function, the data is private to \textit{CSS} and \textit{CMS}. In data sharing phase, \textit{CSS} sends \{\textit{C}, \textit{F}\} to \textit{DR}, where \( C = SK' \oplus \theta \) and \( F \) is the cipher text of shared data. \textit{CMS} computes the intermediate value for \textit{DR} to decrypt the shared data \( F' \) only if \textit{DR}'s attributes satisfy the access structure. Therefore, any unauthorized \textit{DR} cannot get any information on the sensitive data.

\textbf{Theorem 4.} It is computationally impossible for \textit{CSS} to forge an integrity proof to pass the public verification, if XOR-homomorphic function is secure.

Proof. We can prove the theorem with the following games. In the games, we suppose the adversary is the party who forge an integrity proof to pass the public verification.

Game 1 is the challenge game. The challenger generates public-private key pair (PK, MK) and provides PK to the adversary. The adversary is able to interact with the challenger and query some data blocks. Then the
challenger computes corresponding block tags and returns the tags to the adversary. When challenger launches challenge to the adversary, he can respond to the challenger with data proof and tag proof.

Game 2 is another challenge game in which the challenger keeps all the tags ever issued as part of the queries. If the challenger detects the aggregated block tags \( TP = \sum_{i=1}^{k} T_i \) is not equal to \( TP = \sum_{i=1}^{k} T_i \), he declares the game fails.

Game 3 is the same as game 2 with one difference that the challenger keeps all response sequences to the adversary’s queries. Suppose the challenger sends \( ch = (i, R_i) \) to the adversary, the adversary’s reply to the query is \( P = (DP, TP) \) where \( T = \sum_{i=1}^{k} T_i \). In the scheme, \( P \) is the correct proof and equation \( DP = TP \oplus L \) holds. Suppose the
adversary’s proof is $P' = (DP', TP')$, where $TP' = \sum_{i=1}^{c} T'_i$, then the equation $DP = TP \oplus L$ also holds. We define $\triangle DP = DP \oplus DP$, $\triangle TP = TP \oplus TP$. We make the XOR operation on the above two verification equations and get $\triangle DP = \triangle DP$. The above equation holds with the probability is $\frac{1}{q}$. The probability can be negligible.

Performance evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the computation costs of DO and DR in the scheme and compare it with scheme [22].

Performance analysis of mobile terminals
To analyze computation overhead of the scheme, we define the following notations to denote the corresponding operations: Let $Pair$ denote a pairing operation, $Hash$ denote a hash operation and $Exp$ denote an exponentiation operation. Similarly, $Mul$ represents a multiplication operation. $Xor$ and $Sig$ respectively denote XOR and algebraic signature operation of the scheme.

1) Computation overhead of DO side
The computation overhead of DO is mainly in encryption phase. DO first computes $F' = H_2(K) \oplus F, C = K \cdot \theta'$, $C' = g^a \cdot A_i \cdot \overline{y}_{\lambda_{i + 1}}$. Therefore, the computation overhead of DO side is $(1 + l) \text{Mul} + 2 \text{Exp} + \text{Hash} + \text{Xor}$.

2) Computation overhead of DR side

The computation overhead of DR is mainly in data sharing phase. DR downloads $F$ and computes $CK' = e(C, K) = \theta'$. Then DR gets $K = C/CK'$ and recovers the plaintext $F = H_2(K) \oplus F$. Therefore, the computation overhead of DR side is $\text{Pair} + \text{Xor} + 2 \text{Div}$.

Table 2 illustrates the computation overhead of mobile terminals on both sides.

### Experimental results

We simulate our scheme with the Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) library of version 0.5.14. We compare the computation time of DO and DU with scheme [22] by utilizing an MNT d159 curve with 160-bit group order. All the experiment results represent the average of 20 trials.

1) Computation time of DO in processing phase

The computation time of DO mainly generates in algorithm $\text{DataEnc}$ of data processing phase. We first test the relation between DO’s computation time and the size of attribute universe $A$ as described in Fig. 6. We can see that when size of attribute universe $A$ varies from 1 to 100, the computation time of DO increases slowly and costs less time than Zhang’s. Then we test the relation between DO’s computation time and the size of shared data as described in Fig. 7. From Fig. 7, we can conclude that DO’s computation time in our scheme is lower than that of Zhang’s scheme when shared data varies from 1 M to 10 M.

2) Computation time of DR in data sharing phase

In data sharing phase, we first test the relationship between DR’s computation time and the size of attribute universe $A$ as described in Fig. 8. Because CMS help DR to computes the intermediate data of decryption, DR’s computation time is constant when the size of attribute universe $A$ increases. We also test the relationship between DR’s computation time and the size of shared data as described in Fig. 9. We can see that with the size of shared data growing, the computation time of DR increases slowly. From Figs. 8 and 9, we can conclude that DR’s computation time in our scheme is less than that in Zhang’s scheme.

### Conclusion

In this paper, we propose an efficient and secure data sharing scheme for mobile devices. The scheme guarantees security and authorized access of shared sensitive data. Furthermore, the scheme realizes efficient integrity verification before DR shares the data to avoid incorrect computation. Finally, the scheme achieves lightweight operations of mobile terminals on both DO and DR sides.

### Abbreviations

KGC: Key Generator Center; DO: Data Owner; CS: Cloud Servers; DR: Data Requester; CSP: Cloud Storage Servers; CMS: Cloud Manage Servers; KP-ABE: Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption; CP-ABE: Cipher Text Policy Attribute Based Encryption

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### Authors’ contributions

Xiuqing Lu, Zhenkuan Pan, Hequn Xian designed the study and write the paper. Hequn Xian performed the simulations. Xiuqing Lu, Zhenkuan Pan wrote the paper. All authors reviewed and edited the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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### Availability of data and materials

The data used to support the findings of this study is available from the corresponding author upon request.

### Competing interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

### Author details

1. College of Computer Science and Technology, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China. 2. Department of management science and Engineering, College of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China.

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