Shedding New Light on the Language of the Dark Web

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Abstract

The hidden nature and the limited accessibility of the Dark Web, combined with the lack of public datasets in this domain, make it difficult to study its inherent characteristics such as linguistic properties. Previous works on text classification of Dark Web domain have suggested that the use of deep neural models may be ineffective, potentially due to the linguistic differences between the Dark and Surface Webs. However, not much work has been done to uncover the linguistic characteristics of the Dark Web. This paper introduces CoDA, a publicly available Dark Web dataset consisting of 10000 web documents tailored towards text-based Dark Web analysis. By leveraging CoDA, we conduct a thorough linguistic analysis of the Dark Web and examine the textual differences between the Dark Web and the Surface Web. We also assess the performance of various methods of Dark Web page classification. Finally, we compare CoDA with an existing public Dark Web dataset and evaluate their suitability for various use cases.

1 Introduction

The World Wide Web contains a vast, non-indexed part of the Internet (known as the Deep Web) which is hidden from traditional web search engines. The Dark Web, which refers to the small portion of the non-indexed pages that require specific routing protocols such as Tor¹ for access, has become a safe haven for users wanting to conceal their identity and preserve their anonymity.

A consequence of the properties of the Dark Web (limited methods of access and the volatility of its onion services) is that it is difficult to grasp the general topology and the overall content of the Dark Web. A number of past academic studies have tried to unravel the Dark Web through methods such as page classification (Al Nabki et al., 2017; Ghosh et al., 2017; He et al., 2019; Choshen et al., 2019) and content analysis (Biryukov et al., 2014; Avarikioti et al., 2018). However, not much work has been done on the linguistic analysis of the Dark Web (Choshen et al., 2019).

In addition, the Dark Web has been studied and analyzed in the security research community to uncover malicious activities including phishing (Yoon et al., 2019), illicit online marketplace activity (Soska and Christin, 2015), terrorism (Chen, 2011), cryptocurrency abuse (Lee et al., 2019), and ransomware ecosystems (Meland et al., 2020). We believe that the lack of a comprehensive work on the language of the Dark Web from the NLP community mainly stems from the lack of Dark Web datasets publicly available for research. Therefore, a new dataset on the Dark Web may prove to be very useful not only for the NLP community, but also for other research communities devoted to cybersecurity and cybercrime investigation through methods such as page classification and malicious activity detection.

To the best our knowledge, the only currently publicly available Dark Web dataset is DUTA (Al Nabki et al., 2017), which has been extended to hold over ten-thousand unique onion addresses as DUTA-10K (Al-Nabki et al., 2019). DUTA has become a baseline dataset for many Dark Web related works such as Choshen et al. (2019), which investigates the characteristics of language used in various illegal and legal onion services.

Nevertheless, DUTA has its shortcomings. For example, the category distribution of DUTA is highly skewed, with some categories such as human trafficking accounting for only 3 out of 10367 total onion services. In addition, the use of DUTA as a means of language analysis may not be ideal as it contains many duplicate data, with only 51% of the texts being unique (Al-Nabki et al., 2019).

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¹Tor Project: https://www.torproject.org/

We will refer to the DUTA-10K dataset from here on as DUTA, unless otherwise specified.
To provide a better understanding of the Dark Web (and thus motivate more research on the Dark Web), we introduce CoDA \(^3\) (Comprehensive Darkweb Annotations), a text corpus of 10,000 web documents from the Dark Web (primarily in English) which have been manually classified according to their topic into ten categories. To ensure that the quality of the classification is not overlooked, we develop detailed annotation / tagging guidelines (Section 3) to guide our annotators. Using CoDA, we conduct a thorough text-based data analysis (Section 4) to uncover some of the linguistic properties of the Dark Web, and gain insight into differences in how language is used in the Surface Web and the Dark Web. We build several text classifier models and train them using CoDA, and verify which classification methods perform particularly well with the Dark Web (Section 5). Finally, to evaluate the use of CoDA compared to DUTA, we introduce use cases and compare the performances of classifiers trained on each dataset (Section 6).

2 Related Work

The Dark Web is commonly crawled using Tor, which relies on onion routing to enable encrypted communications over a computer network (McCoy et al., 2008). Several works use Dark Web search engines such as Ahmia\(^4\) and web directories such as The Hidden Wiki to recursively search for content on the Dark Web (Guitton, 2013; Al Nabki et al., 2017; He et al., 2019). This method of crawling works surprisingly well as the visible part of the Dark Web is suggested to be well-connected via hyperlinks (Sanchez-Rola et al., 2017; Avarikioti et al., 2018).

To facilitate the research on Dark Web content analysis, a text-based, manually labeled dataset collected from the active domains in the Tor network called DUTA was made publicly available by Al Nabki et al. (2017). In a subsequent work, the original DUTA dataset was extended to 10367 unique domains with minor changes to the labeling procedure (Al-Nabki et al., 2019). To the best of our knowledge, DUTA is the first and only publicly available Dark Web text dataset.

Past works have analyzed the Dark Web through topical classification of texts in onion services. Many have approached text-based page classification with machine learning methods such as SVM (Support Vector Machine), NB (Naive Bayes), and LR (Logistic Regression) (Moore and Rid, 2016; Al Nabki et al., 2017; Ghosh et al., 2017; Avarikioti et al., 2018; He et al., 2019) using various information retrieval weighting schemes like TF-IDF (Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency) and BOW (Bag-of-Words) (Al Nabki et al., 2017; Ghosh et al., 2017; Choshen et al., 2019; He et al., 2019).

Choshen et al. (2019) have suggested that deep neural models may fare poorly with Dark Web classification as language in the Dark Web is lexically and syntactically different compared to that of the Surface Web. Their work demonstrated that representation methods such as GloVe (Pennington et al., 2014) and contextualized pre-trained language representations such as ELMo (Peters et al., 2018) resulted in a subpar performance compared to traditional machine learning methods, suggesting that the small size of training data and the specialized vocabulary in the Dark Web domain may not be suitable with such methods. Nevertheless, transformer-based pre-trained language models like BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) showed promising results in text classification tasks, although it is not often the case that such models adapt with ease in the Dark Web domain (Ranaldi et al., 2022).

3 The CoDA Corpus

In this section, we introduce our categorization approach and the methods used to construct our Dark Web dataset, CoDA.

3.1 CoDA Category Set

CoDA is comprised of ten categories (described in detail in Section 3.5) as shown in Table 1. We arrive at our ten categories through an extended discussion with the dataset annotators (see Section 3.4) on a suitable method to categorize the various activities in the Dark Web and refer to the high-level taxonomy from Moore and Rid (2016). Unlike DUTA, we do not subdivide each category into legal and illegal (or normal and suspicious as labeled in DUTA) activities because in many cases it is difficult to clearly distinguish between categories using only the surface information available from websites. For example, while human annotators easily agreed that most ‘counterfeit money’ services are highly likely to be illegal, they found it difficult to determine the legality of ‘bitcoin wallet’

\(^3\)CoDA is available upon request at https://s2w.linc/resources/coda.
\(^4\)https://ahmia.fi/
services. This also applies to the *drugs* category, as the sale of certain drugs may be illegal in some countries, but can be legal in others. Moreover, unlike DUTA, we exclude non-topical categories such as *forum* and *marketplace* as they are orthogonal to topical categories; e.g., hacking forums, which frequently appear in the Dark Web, can be categorized as both *forum* and *hacking*. We argue that such categories are more relevant to the structure of webpages rather than topics, and thus need to be annotated independently of topical categories. We leave this for future work, and do not further split our ten categories into sub-categories. Nonetheless, our category set still covers a wide range of activities on the Dark Web.

Finally, we point out that about 30% of data is categorized into *others*. During data collection, we observed that many webpage documents contain various pages not related to the categorized activities (such as blogs, news sites, search engines, wiki pages, etc.). Since the content of such pages is not necessarily attributed to a specific activity, we categorize them into *others*.

### 3.2 Data Collection

We collected onion addresses from Ahmia and repositories of onion domain lists\(^5\). Starting from these seed addresses, we crawled the Dark Web and extracted unseen onion addresses from crawled webpage documents to gradually expand our onion address list.

The Dark Web contains large amounts of nearly identical websites since no expense is required for maintenance due to free hosting services such as “Freedom Hosting” (now defunct) (Al-Nabki et al., 2019). These cloned website farms serve to provide stable services for illegal activities (Al-Nabki et al., 2019), or to attract users and deceive them into disclosing sensitive information (Yoon et al., 2019). In order to construct a quality corpus, we analyze the content of each document and refrain from collecting redundant webpages (i.e., keeping only one copy of such pages), using the document similarity measure described in Section 4.2.3.

### 3.3 Data Size and Language Distribution

Using the crawled HTML webpage documents, we compiled a Dark Web corpus consisting of exactly 10K web documents from a total of 7101 onion services. The user statistics for Tor shows that clients connect to the Dark Web from various countries\(^6\), which is reflected in the language distribution of CoDA (as seen in Table 2). We observe that about 88% of documents in CoDA is in English. This is

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\(^5\)Including but not limited to [https://github.com/alecmuffett/real-world-onion-sites](https://github.com/alecmuffett/real-world-onion-sites)

\(^6\)[https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-table.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-table.html)
in line with the language distribution of DUTA in which 84% of the samples are in English (Al-Nabki et al., 2019). We argue that the dataset reflects the various biases of the Dark Web, which should be taken into account for future research.

3.4 Annotation

We recruited 10 annotators from a cyber threat analytics company specializing in the Dark Web for manual page-level annotation, i.e., assigning a single category to each webpage document from one of the ten categories achieving an inter-annotator agreement Fleiss’ Kappa of 0.887. This is in contrast to DUTA, which concatenates multiple pages from a single onion domain into one document to assign a category (Al Nabki et al., 2017). Since onion services such as wikis and forums usually contain discussions on a wide range of topics across different pages, page-level annotation was deemed to be the most suitable choice for our category set. We leveraged Prodigy8 for an efficient annotation process.

3.5 Annotation Guidelines

A set of comprehensive annotation guidelines was constructed for the annotators to consult when labeling each document to ensure the quality of labels. While the annotation guidelines are extensive with illustrative examples and methods to deal with borderline cases, we present a brief summary of our guidelines in Table 1. Each category is determined based solely on the topic of page content, and not by its type (marketplaces, services, forums, news, blogs, wikis, search results, etc.).

Note that webpages sometimes cover more than one specific topic on a single page (such as a marketplace selling drugs and weapons at the same time). We exclude such multi-topic pages from our corpus and leave multi-label datasets and classification for future work. Finally, we also exclude webpages that contain malicious information on personally identifiable individuals.9

| No | Mask ID | Description (example) |
|----|---------|-----------------------|
| 1  | ID_IP_ADDRESS | IPv4 address (xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx) |
| 2  | ID_EMAIL  | Email address (xxx@yyy.zzz) |
| 3  | ID_ONION_URL | Onion URL |
| 4  | ID_NORMAL_URL| Non-onion URL |
| 5  | ID_BTC_ADDRESS | Bitcoin address |
| 6  | ID_ETH_ADDRESS | Ethereum address |
| 7  | ID_LTC_ADDRESS | Litecoin address |
| 8  | ID_GENERAL_MONEY | Fiat money (10 USD, 500) |
| 9  | ID_CRYPTO_MONEY | Cryptocurrency (0.01 BTC, 10 mBTC) |
| 10 | ID_WEIGHT  | Weight (10kg, 10lbs) |
| 11 | ID_LENGTH  | Length (10cm, 10mm) |
| 12 | ID_VOLUME  | Volume (10ml, 5L) |
| 13 | ID_TIME  | Widely used date/time format (2000-01-01 09:00:00, 01-Jan-2020) |
| 14 | ID_PERCENTAGE | Percentage (50%) |
| 15 | ID_FILENAME | File names with popular extensions (xxx.zip, yyy.pdf) |
| 16 | ID_FILESIZE | File size (10MB, 16GB) |
| 17 | ID_VERSION | Version names (version 5.0, v1.0.0) |
| 18 | ID_NUMBER | All the other number tokens |

Table 3: Mask identifiers in CoDA

3.6 Additional Processing & Text Masking

As the Dark Web contains webpages in various languages, we label each of the documents in CoDA with the language of its content using fastText (Joulin et al., 2016a; Joulin et al., 2016b). To generalize unnecessary details and anonymize sensitive information in the Dark Web, we process each document by masking appropriate information with mask identifiers. A total of 18 types of mask identifiers are used to mask each document, as shown in Table 3. We utilize simple keywords, regular expressions, and a cryptocurrency address detection library10 to detect such phrases for masking. This prevents personal information such as email addresses from being included in our public dataset. Finally, to filter out noisy data and optimize text for linguistic analysis, we remove punctuations and words that are over 50 letters long, lemmatize words, and convert all text to lowercase.

4 Data Analysis

To assess the linguistic properties of the Dark Web, illustrate the characteristics of textual content in each category, and better understand the differences in the use of language in the Dark / Surface Web, we conduct an in-depth exploratory data analysis. We analyze the text data of CoDA and compare measurements with that of the other datasets (see Section 4.1) as shown in Table 4.11

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7 All annotators participated in a training session to reach agreement with a small set of documents and annotation guidelines. The detailed process is described in Appendix A. 
8 https://prodi.gy/ 
9 Ransomware and extortionware cybercriminals deliberately publish private and harmful information of victims to demand a ransom for its removal. We did not find such content in our dataset, possibly because our data only collects texts without downloading files or media. 
10 https://pypi.org/project/cryptoaddress/ 
11 Some detailed methods and results obtained from our analyses are provided in Appendix D.
Table 4: List of data analysis methods/statistics and comparisons between datasets. Some analyses are presented in the Appendix.

4.1 Datasets for Comparison

We compare CoDA with DUTA to look for any significant differences between the two Dark Web corpora, and use documents labeled as English for our analysis. We also aggregate three existing text datasets in English with Surface Web content (we consider each of these datasets as a single sub-category within the aggregate Surface Web data) from here on to compare between the Dark / Surface Web domains. These categories are chosen to encompass the various topics and language styles (formal / informal) used throughout the Surface Web.

The aggregate Surface Web dataset consists of the following categories: the IMDb Large Movie Review Dataset (Maas et al., 2011), the Wikitext-2 Dataset (Merity et al., 2016), and the Reddit Corpus (Chang et al., 2020), to represent review texts, wiki articles, and online forum discussions, respectively. To match the size of the dataset with its Dark Web counterparts, the aggregate Surface Web dataset is trimmed by randomly sampling a portion of documents from each category. The total raw word count of each dataset is shown in Table 5.

It is worth noting that we use raw text data instead of the masked data for some analyses to reduce bias; for example, the Surface Web aggregate dataset is not masked, so we use the non-masked versions of the Dark Web datasets for some comparisons.

4.2 Analysis Methods & Results

4.2.1 In-vocab / Out-of-vocab Word Analysis

It is known that Dark Web users intentionally use obscure slangs and words to refer to specific items (Harviainen et al., 2020; Zhang and Zou, 2020). To verify if this behavior affects the types of words seen in the Dark Web, we analyze the in-vocabulary and out-of-vocabulary words by building a list of unique words in each dataset and determining the presence of each word in a spellchecker library. Words not listed in the library’s dictionary are defined to be out-of-vocabulary. Note out-of-vocab words do not necessarily correspond to incorrect or nonexistent words; for example, there are many abbreviations that are out-of-vocab but are widely used online.

The results are shown in Table 5. Due to the limited number of in-vocab words in the dictionary, it follows that in-vocab word ratio decreases with higher total word counts. Therefore, not much can be said about the lexical characteristics of the Dark Web from the ratios. To see which out-of_vocab words frequently appear in each corpus, we rank them by their frequency. In the Surface Web, common abbreviations, well-known companies, and celebrity names rank high in the list, while explicit slangs, malicious activity-specific abbreviations, and misspellings (cannibalism, pedophilia, school) manifest the Dark Web. A sample comparison of abbreviations found in each web domain is shown in Table 6. The Surface Web mainly exhibits commonly used abbreviations such as measurement units, household products, and colloquial Internet language, while the Dark Web exhibits abbreviations related to financial services, drugs, and pornography.

4.2.2 Word Frequency Distribution

It is well known that large text corpora tend to follow Zipf’s law (Piantadosi, 2014), which states that the word frequency distribution is proportional to a power law of the form:

\[ f(r) \propto r^{-\alpha} \]

12https://github.com/barrust/pyspellchecker
Table 6: Some common abbreviation examples of CoDA and Surface Web Aggregate. These abbreviations do not show up on pyspellchecker’s dictionary and are marked as out-of-vocab words.

| CoDA (Dark Web) | Surface Web |
|----------------|-------------|
| btc cp cvc | btw dwd idk |
| cvv hd irc | imo km lmao |
| lsd mg pthc | mph pc st |
| ssn vpn xxx | tv vs wtf |

for $\alpha \approx 1$, where $r$ is the frequency rank of the word (most frequent word has $r = 1$ and so on) and $f(r)$ is the frequency of a word with rank $r$. To verify whether the characteristics of language used in the Dark Web affect the power law distribution of words, we compare the word frequency distribution between Dark and Surface Web corpora. We aggregate all texts in each category into a single file, lemmatize each word using spaCy\(^{13}\), and use scikit-learn\(^{14}\) (Pedregosa et al., 2011) to retrieve the word frequency per category.

We find that, as far as word frequency distribution is concerned, there is no significant difference between the Dark Web and the Surface Web\(^{15}\). As the Dark Web contains many phishing sites which are near identical copies of each other (Yoon et al., 2019), we believed that some words may have abnormally high frequencies, which would affect the overall distribution. However, the results suggest that word frequency distribution is largely domain-invariant.

4.2.3 Document Similarity

As mentioned in Section 1, about half of DUTA’s documents contain duplicate data. CoDA addresses this problem by crawling web pages whose textual content is less similar to one another. To this end, we measure the document similarity between the two Dark Web corpora to validate the uniqueness of documents in CoDA. Through manual inspection, we find that some pages share the same exact content but with slight variations in details such as numbers. To prevent such differences from affecting the document similarity, we mask and preprocess documents in DUTA in the same manner as CoDA and convert each document into a bag of lowercase words. The similarity is measured by taking the Jaccard distance on the bags of words, with distance of 1 indicating complete similarity between two documents.

To illustrate the amount of overlapping content in CoDA and DUTA, we compare each document with all other documents from the same corpus, and denote the maximum Jaccard distance as its maximum similarity. As shown in Figure 1, more than half of the documents in DUTA share almost completely overlapping content, whereas CoDA exhibits much lower similarities overall. Although DUTA consists of data from 10367 onion services which is larger than the number of onion services collected for use in CoDA, this shows that the data in CoDA is more uniquely varied and thus has higher information density.

4.2.4 Mask ID Distribution and TF-IDF

To gain insight into some of the lexical characteristics of each category in the Dark Web, we evaluate the mask ID distribution and TF-IDF (term frequency-inverse document frequency) for CoDA. The mask ID distribution is calculated by dividing the frequency of a particular mask ID (listed in Table 3) in a document by the number of all mask IDs in that document (we exclude ID_NUMBER in our data for this analysis as it accounts for the majority of all masks in every category). This is done for every document, and we take the average distribution by category. Similar methods are used for TF-IDF using scikit-learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011). We exclude English stopwords as defined in NLTK (Bird et al., 2009), but preserve the mask IDs to capture

\(^{13}\)https://spacy.io/

\(^{14}\)https://scikit-learn.org/stable/

\(^{15}\)Word frequency distribution is shown in Figure 4.
important mask IDs in each category.

We find that some mask IDs are particularly representative in some categories. For example, the drugs category has a high proportion of ID_WEIGHT, which is reasonable as webpages in drugs usually specify the weight of the drug in their listings. The TF-IDF measurements also show some interesting results\(^1\); for example, the majority of terms with the highest TF-IDF in the electronics category are related to Apple products (iPhones, iPads, MacBooks, etc.) which may suggest a high popularity of these products in the Dark Web.

5 Classification Experiments

5.1 Setup

We build several classifiers to investigate the performance of existing classification models on Dark Web text. Although deep neural network models are widely used today (Minaee et al., 2021), simple machine learning models such as SVM and naïve Bayes (NB) have been reported to perform reasonably well on Dark Web texts, often outperforming deep models (Choshen et al., 2019). Therefore, we evaluate both types of models to see which is adequate for Dark Web text classification. We split CoDA into training and test sets (7:3 ratio) after stratified random shuffling with the same random seed for all experiments. The preprocessing method used for document similarity (Section 4.2.3) is applied here as it empirically works best across models.\(^2\)

Multi-class SVM: We train a multi-class SVM classifier with TF-IDF features, and tune its hyperparameters by grid search. We build our classifier using TfidfVectorizer, LinearSVC, and GridSearchCV classes in scikit-learn.

CNN: Convolutional Neural Networks have been established as one of the popular choices for text classification for the ability to recognize position-invariant patterns such as text phrases (Minaee et al., 2021). Using PyTorch, we build a CNN model with a GloVe embedding layer (6B.300d), 2D convolution layers, and a fully-connected layer (Pennington et al., 2014).

BERT: To benefit from contextual representations and transfer learning, we use BERT (Devlin et al., 2019), a state-of-the-art language model widely adopted across many NLP and machine learning tasks. We use the pretrained bert-base-uncased model in the PyTorch version of the HuggingFace library (Wolf et al., 2020) with a fully-connected classification layer on top of the [CLS] token.

5.2 Results

Table 7 summarizes the performance of the three classifiers on CoDA. BERT exhibits the best results possibly due to its capability to model unknown words and utilize contextual information, despite the lexical differences of the Dark Web as shown in Section 4.2. SVM produces comparable results, suggesting that the relatively simple bag-of-words approach is still very effective at modeling topics of such domain-specific text. In contrast, CNN fares relatively worse, which is likely due to the specialized vocabulary of the Dark Web being poorly covered by the pretrained word embedding as seen in Choshen et al. (2019).

Table 8 shows the detailed results of classification using BERT. The classifier works relatively well for categories that exhibit a smaller specialized vocabulary such as arms, electronics, and gambling, whereas it performs worse for categories that cover diverse subtopics such as cryptocurrency and financial. We also observe that the classifier often confuses hacking with cryptocurrency or financial especially when documents contain phrases such as “hacked PayPal” or “hacked Bitcoin wallets”, which are not categorized in the hacking category by our guidelines (the hacking category relates to hacking services and professional hacking techniques).

6 Use Cases

In this section, we elaborate on the use cases of our corpus and the classifiers trained on CoDA and DUTA.

(1) Synonym Inference: Dark Web users tend to use words differently from their original meaning to conceal or disguise their intents. For example, we observed that car company names (e.g., Tesla, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Audi) are replaced with synonyms such as “Tesla Motors,” “Mercedes Benz,” “BMW,” etc. To handle this, we use synonym sets obtained from WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998) and replace these synonyms with their respective original names in order to improve the classification accuracy.

\(^{16}\)Detailed measurements are provided in Appendix E.

\(^{17}\)Detailed training configurations of each classifier are provided in Appendix B.
Table 8: Per-category performance of BERT on CoDA

| Category          | Precision | Recall | F1-score |
|-------------------|-----------|--------|----------|
| Arms / Weapons    | 96.70     | 97.78  | 97.24    |
| Cryptocurrency    | 90.45     | 87.28  | 88.84    |
| Drugs             | 93.90     | 92.29  | 93.08    |
| Electronics       | 94.66     | 96.88  | 95.75    |
| Financial         | 90.71     | 94.02  | 92.33    |
| Gambling          | 99.15     | 98.31  | 98.72    |
| Hacking           | 87.50     | 89.74  | 88.61    |
| Pornography       | 94.20     | 94.46  | 94.33    |
| Violence          | 93.15     | 93.79  | 93.47    |
| Others            | 90.45     | 89.73  | 90.09    |

Weighted avg. 92.51 92.50 92.49

Table 9: Classification performance of the BERT-based classifier on the benchmark dataset

| Model  | Category | # pages | Precision | Recall | F1-score |
|--------|----------|---------|-----------|--------|----------|
| CoDA   | Drugs    | 936     | 99.87     | 83.44  | 90.92    |
|        | Weapons  | 674     | 100.00    | 98.37  | 99.18    |
|        | Finance  | 626     | 96.96     | 76.36  | 85.43    |
|        | All      | 2236    | 99.09     | 85.96  | 91.87    |
| DUTA   | Drugs    | 936     | 99.46     | 78.74  | 87.90    |
|        | Weapons  | 674     | 99.84     | 94.96  | 97.34    |
|        | Finance  | 626     | 98.89     | 71.09  | 82.71    |
|        | All      | 2236    | 99.42     | 81.48  | 89.29    |

(2) Topic Classification: We assess the efficacy of CoDA and DUTA in classifying document categories in the Dark Web. For this scenario, we manually compile a list of 34 forum / marketplace websites on the Dark Web across three different topics: drugs, weapons, and finance, and create an extra benchmark dataset consisting of 2236 webpages from the list. To remove possible overlap between the CoDA / DUTA corpora and the benchmark dataset, we exclude any documents crawled from the same URL as those from the benchmark dataset, or documents that mention any of the names from the benchmark websites in their content. This excludes 246 and 220 documents from CoDA and DUTA, respectively. We then train a BERT-based classifier for each Dark Web corpus on the remaining documents with the same configuration used in the classification experiments, and evaluate them on the benchmark dataset.19

Table 9 shows the classification performance measured on the benchmark dataset, in which the CoDA-trained classifier consistently outperforms the DUTA-trained classifier. We conjecture that this is because CoDA contains less duplicate text with more diverse domain-specific words in the same number of documents, allowing the trained classifier to generalize better to unseen documents.

7 Conclusion

In this work, we introduced CoDA, a Dark Web text corpus collected from various onion services divided into topical categories. Using CoDA, we conducted a thorough analysis of the linguistic properties of the Dark Web and found that there are clear lexical differences from the Surface Web including abbreviations and lexical structure such as PoS distribution. We also found lexical characteristics of categories through mask ID distribution and TF-IDF.

Our text classification results showed that SVM and BERT perform well in the Dark Web domain, even with the language differences that the Dark Web exhibits compared to that of the Surface Web. Finally, we have demonstrated the practicality of CoDA through two use cases with NLP methods. We speculate that the lack of duplicate content in

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19Since DUTA uses a different category set, we employ the following category mapping: counterfeit-credit-cards, counterfeit-money, and counterfeit-personal-identification to finance, and drugs and violence to drugs and weapons categories, respectively.
CoDA compared to DUTA may aid in the performance of such applications. We hope that our dataset and our work motivates further research in the field of language-based Dark Web analysis.

Ethical Considerations

Masking Sensitive Information
Due to the nature of anonymous networks such as Tor, raw data posted on the Dark Web may contain private or illegal information. Such information includes (but is not limited to) Bitcoin addresses, credit card information, and social security numbers. Since CoDA was compiled by randomly selecting web documents from the Dark Web, the dataset may contain such information. Therefore, it is important that a public Dark Web dataset such as CoDA addresses ethical issues regarding sensitive information.

To prevent the use of CoDA for malicious purposes such as the extraction of sensitive information, we identify types of potentially sensitive data (such as email, IP, URL, crypto addresses, and social security numbers) which are subsequently masked (refer to Section 3.6 for the detailed description on mask identifiers used). These identifiers are matched using regular expressions and each page has been manually double-checked on whether such content has been properly masked by the authors. During this time, the authors did not find sensitive content outside of the masked information.

As mentioned in Section 4, some data analysis methods are conducted with unmasked versions of the Dark Web to prevent bias. However, we only use the unmasked version of CoDA for a fair analysis between the Dark and the Surface Web data, and do not utilize or disclose information found in the unmasked data in any way.

Handling Illegal Content
A significant portion of the Dark Web deals with explicit, pornographic content (violence, child pornography, torture, etc.). The act of accessing or viewing such media is illegal by law in many parts of the world. To prevent the access of such media, we collect crawled Dark Web pages in the form of HTML and parse HTML tags to retrieve only the text data. In addition, URL addresses and onion addresses that may link to such illegal media are also masked as previously mentioned (note that all URL addresses and onion addresses have been masked, regardless of their content). Consequently, the authors and the annotators do not have access to media that are illegal by law.

It is worth noting that CoDA still contains texts of various activities that occur in the Dark Web, some of which are illegal in nature (drug trade, counterfeit products, etc.). However, the inclusion of text in the dataset that describes potentially illegal activities is not of ethical concern. Therefore, we do not censor text data that correspond to illegal activities.

Ethics on Annotation
Dark Web content often contains sensitive and illicit activities. Dealing with such content during the annotation process may be unsettling for some people, so we chose annotators who are experienced with the Dark Web and has given consent to being exposed to such content. The annotators recruited for classifying CoDA were specialists who work at a cyber threat data analytics & intelligence company specializing in Dark Web data. To ensure that the annotation process is fair, each of the ten annotators handled the same number of pages and were given equal compensations.

Preventative Measures to Discourage Non-Academic Use of CoDA
The content of CoDA includes text descriptions of various Dark Web activities. A potential harm of releasing this dataset is bringing increased attention to these activities. We strongly believe that our research should be used for scientific purposes only and discourage non-academic use of CoDA. We take a preventative approach by only permitting access to CoDA to researchers with research purposes that abide by the ACL Code of Ethics. The terms of use agreement can be found at https://s2w.inc/resources/coda.

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A Inter-Annotator Agreement

To obtain high-quality annotations, we ran a training session with the first 150 documents in three 50-document intervals. Each stage, we asked 10 annotators to annotate the same documents with the guidelines, and measured inter-annotator agreements using Fleiss’ Kappa coefficient (Landis and Koch, 1977; Artstein, 2017). After each interval, we held a discussion session to resolve disagreements and revised the guidelines to accommodate feedback from the annotators. For each interval, the agreement coefficients were 0.67, 0.72, and 0.88. Note that the coefficients greater than 0.60 and 0.80 can be interpreted as “substantial” and “almost perfect” agreements, respectively (Landis and Koch, 1977). This suggests that the training sessions helped the annotators gradually reach a common consensus and familiarize themselves with the guidelines. We then assigned the remaining documents so that each document is assigned to a single annotator to speed up the annotation. The whole process took about three months, including one month of the training session.

B Experimental Details

The data analysis experiments were performed on a machine with Intel Xeon E5-2630 v4 CPU @ 2.2 GHz (with no GPU usage), and the classification experiments were performed on a machine with Intel Xeon Gold 6258R CPU @ 2.70 GHz and Nvidia GeForce RTX 3090.

SVM: To fine-tune the parameters, we exhaustively generated all the candidate combinations of the two parameter pairs: tolerance and regularization. From a grid of their values, we applied 10-fold cross validation and found that the model with tolerance of 0.1 and regularization of 1.0 work best when we used ‘balanced_accuracy’ as the scoring strategy. Since this model is a multi-class classifier, we used the OVR (one-versus-rest) multi-class strategy.

CNN: The model consists of one GloVe embedding layer (6B.300d), three 2-dimensional convolutions (Conv2d), and one fully-connected layer. The kernel sizes of the three convolution layers are 3, 4, and 5, respectively. We applied the ReLU activation function and 1-dimensional max pooling after each convolution layer. We also used the SGD optimizer and ran 10 training epochs with cross-entropy loss; the learning rate was 1.5, and the batch size was set to 32.

BERT: We used the Adam optimizer and ran 10 training epochs with cross-entropy loss, a learning rate of 2e-5, a linear schedule with no warmup step, a batch size of 32, and gradient norm clipping of 1.0. We also limited the maximum sequence length to 256 tokens, assuming that the leading part of text is indicative of topics. All the other settings are the same as those used in the original BERT paper.

C Language Distribution

We present the language distribution of CoDA in the following table:

| Language   | Document count | Language   | Document count | Language   | Document count |
|------------|----------------|------------|----------------|------------|----------------|
| English    | 8855           | Persian    | 7              | Basque     | 1              |
| Russian    | 542            | Swedish    | 7              | Egyptian Arabic | 1          |
| German     | 129            | Ukrainian | 7              | Georgian   | 1              |
| French     | 100            | Turkish    | 6              | Greek      | 1              |
| Spanish    | 61             | Catalan    | 5              | Gujarati   | 1              |
| Portuguese | 54             | Hungarian | 5              | Hindi      | 1              |
| Chinese    | 38             | Cebuano    | 3              | Ido        | 1              |
| Italian    | 28             | Esperanto  | 3              | IlokO      | 1              |
| Japanese   | 27             | Indonesian | 3              | Kurdish    | 1              |
| Dutch      | 14             | Latin      | 3              | Marathi    | 1              |
| Finnish    | 14             | Lithuanian | 3              | Punjabi    | 1              |
| Korean     | 12             | Norwegian | 3              | Slovak     | 1              |
| Czech      | 11             | Bengali    | 2              | Tamil      | 1              |
| Polish     | 10             | Galician   | 2              | Thai       | 1              |
| Bulgarian  | 9              | Romanian   | 2              | Urdu       | 1              |
| Arabic     | 7              | Serbian    | 2              | Vietnamese | 1              |
| Hebrew     | 7              | Slovenian  | 2              | Welsh      | 1              |

Table 10: Language distribution of documents in CoDA
D Additional Data Analysis Methods & Results

Some additional details and figures of results collected from various data analyses methods in Section 4 are presented here.

D.1 PoS Distribution & Content Word / Function Word Ratio

Choshen et al. (2019) demonstrated that legal and illegal texts in the Dark Web can be distinguishable through their lexical structure, that is, through part-of-speech (PoS) tags and distribution of content and function words. We analyze the PoS distribution and the distribution of content and function words in each dataset to see if there is a meaningful difference in the lexical structures of Dark / Surface Web contents. To obtain the universal PoS of words in the dataset, we utilize the PoS tagger in spaCy. Following Choshen et al. (2019), we define content words as words tagged by spaCy into one of the following PoS tags:

\[
\{\text{ADJ}, \text{ADV}, \text{NOUN}, \text{PROPN}, \text{VERB}, \text{X}, \text{NUM}\}
\]

and define all other words as function words. Since text length varies widely for each document in the Dark Web, we analyze the mean PoS ratio and the mean content word / function word ratio (CF ratio) for each category for both Dark and Surface Webs. The mean CF ratio \(\bar{r}_{cf}(C)\) for some category \(C\) is given by

\[
\bar{r}_{cf}(C) = \frac{1}{|C|} \sum_{d \in C} \frac{N_c(d)}{N_f(d)}
\]

where \(|C|\) denotes the number of documents (text files) in category \(C\), and \(N_c(d)\), \(N_f(d)\) denote the total number of content words and function words in some document \(d\), respectively.

The results for the PoS distribution and CF ratio are shown in Figures 2 and 3. It is evident that Dark Web categories generally have a much higher CF ratio compared to that of the Surface Web. From our PoS distribution analysis, we find that the Dark Web documents have a very high ratio of proper nouns (PROPN) and numerals (NUM) compared to the Surface Web documents, both of which are PoS tags of content words. Moreover, the Surface Web documents have a higher ratio of determiners (DET) compared to that of the Dark Web. Since function words serve as critical components of sentence structures, this result implies that language used in the Dark Web may contain a higher proportion of non-sentence structures. For example, texts in the drugs category mostly consist of a list of drugs with their price and weight.

D.2 Discussion

The use of spaCy for the comparison of PoS distribution and CF ratios may raise questions as spaCy has not been pretrained on Dark Web content, which may yield a higher error rate on the Dark Web results. However, this is not an issue for our work as the main purpose of this analysis is to show that there are linguistic differences between the Dark Web and the Surface Web. If the result of the analysis is heavily skewed by the presence of Dark Web content and additional training is necessary for the pretrained spaCy model, then this implies that there are meaningful lexical differences in the Dark Web. On the other hand, if the result is not particularly affected by the Dark Web content, then it shows that there are clear differences between the two domains. In either case, it is observable that the results suggest the existence of lexical differences between the Dark Web and the Surface Web.

However, there is one possible limitation in our analysis in that the aggregate Surface Web dataset may not encompass the complete representation of the Surface Web. This is evident from observing that a significant portion of the aggregate dataset (IMDb, Wikitext) consists of text content that is comprised of complete sentences. For example, the inclusion of marketplace content such as eBay or Amazon could affect the PoS distribution and the CF ratio of the aggregate Surface Web data. For future work, we may attempt additional analysis through boilerplate removal of noisy, non-structural texts in CoDA and the aggregate Surface Web data along with the augmentation of a broader diversity of Surface Web content and examine if this approach significantly affects the results obtained in Section D.1.

\[^{20}\text{Words that modify nouns or noun phrases such as articles}\]
Figure 2: PoS distribution of categories in CoDA and Surface Web aggregate data

Figure 3: Mean content word / function word (CF) ratio ($\bar{r}_{cf}$) of categories in CoDA and Surface Web aggregate data
Figure 4: Log-log plot of word frequency distribution of CoDA and Surface Web aggregate data by category. We exclude DUTA as it contains too many categories to be presented in the figure.

Figure 5: Mask token distribution by category (excluding ID_NUMBER)
# E TF-IDF Measurements

A table of TF-IDF measurements (as mentioned in Section 4.2.4) showing the relevant words and phrases of selected categories in CoDA is listed here.

### Crypto

| Rank | Term                  | Financial TF-IDF |
|------|-----------------------|------------------|
| 1    | ID_NUMBER             | 0.684            |
| 2    | ID_CRYPTO_MONEY       | 0.418            |
| 3    | bitcoin               | 0.354            |
| 4    | ID_TIME               | 0.233            |
| 5    | ID_BTC_ADDRESS        | 0.227            |
| 6    | btc                   | 0.110            |
| 7    | use                   | 0.071            |
| 8    | wallet                | 0.069            |
| 9    | address               | 0.068            |
| 10   | buy                   | 0.068            |
| 11   | transaction           | 0.061            |
| 12   | get                   | 0.060            |
| 13   | blockchain            | 0.057            |
| 14   | invest                | 0.049            |
| 15   | ID_GENERAL_MONEY      | 0.048            |
| 16   | coin                  | 0.046            |
| 17   | service               | 0.046            |
| 18   | make                  | 0.045            |
| 19   | ID_PERCENTAGE         | 0.042            |
| 20   | double                | 0.041            |

### Drugs

| Rank | Term                  | Financial TF-IDF |
|------|-----------------------|------------------|
| 1    | ID_NUMBER             | 0.883            |
| 2    | ID_WEIGHT             | 0.255            |
| 3    | ID_GENERAL_MONEY      | 0.249            |
| 4    | id_filesize           | 0.184            |
| 5    | weed                  | 0.101            |
| 6    | pot                   | 0.089            |
| 7    | pill                  | 0.084            |
| 8    | online                | 0.080            |
| 9    | coke                  | 0.073            |
| 10   | cannabis              | 0.068            |
| 11   | lsd                   | 0.057            |
| 12   | buy                   | 0.051            |
| 13   | drug                  | 0.050            |
| 14   | watch                 | 0.050            |
| 15   | id_general_money      | 0.049            |
| 16   | case                  | 0.049            |
| 17   | id_general_money      | 0.046            |
| 18   | card                  | 0.046            |
| 19   | id_filename           | 0.046            |
| 20   | id_normal_url         | 0.045            |

### Electronics

| Rank | Term                  | Financial TF-IDF |
|------|-----------------------|------------------|
| 1    | ID_NUMBER             | 0.799            |
| 2    | ID/general_money      | 0.291            |
| 3    | id_phone              | 0.279            |
| 4    | id_filesize           | 0.184            |
| 5    | apple                 | 0.142            |
| 6    | pro                   | 0.111            |
| 7    | spad                  | 0.110            |
| 8    | macbook               | 0.092            |
| 9    | credit                | 0.089            |
| 10   | buy                   | 0.086            |
| 11   | order                 | 0.079            |
| 12   | get                   | 0.073            |
| 13   | id_time               | 0.071            |
| 14   | id_number             | 0.057            |
| 15   | id_time               | 0.057            |
| 16   | id_general_money      | 0.055            |
| 17   | id_general_money      | 0.052            |
| 18   | change                | 0.051            |
| 19   | id_normal_url         | 0.050            |
| 20   | id_number             | 0.049            |

### Gambling

| Rank | Term                  | Financial TF-IDF |
|------|-----------------------|------------------|
| 1    | ID_NUMBER             | 0.593            |
| 2    | casino                | 0.396            |
| 3    | game                  | 0.256            |
| 4    | br                    | 0.190            |
| 5    | online                | 0.177            |
| 6    | slot                  | 0.173            |
| 7    | play                  | 0.161            |
| 8    | ID_TIME               | 0.103            |
| 9    | bet                   | 0.098            |
| 10   | win                   | 0.096            |
| 11   | poker                 | 0.094            |
| 12   | page                  | 0.094            |
| 13   | get                   | 0.093            |
| 14   | free                  | 0.089            |
| 15   | money                 | 0.087            |
| 16   | time                  | 0.087            |
| 17   | card                  | 0.083            |
| 18   | player                | 0.081            |
| 19   | good                  | 0.077            |
| 20   | roulette              | 0.075            |

### Hacking

| Rank | Term                  | Financial TF-IDF |
|------|-----------------------|------------------|
| 1    | ID_NUMBER             | 0.792            |
| 2    | hack                  | 0.364            |
| 3    | facebook              | 0.262            |
| 4    | id_time               | 0.167            |
| 5    | account               | 0.162            |
| 6    | hacker                | 0.092            |
| 7    | password              | 0.087            |
| 8    | use                   | 0.070            |
| 9    | id_general_money      | 0.068            |
| 10   | service               | 0.059            |
| 11   | email                 | 0.058            |
| 12   | software              | 0.052            |
| 13   | Cock                  | 0.050            |
| 14   | cp                    | 0.070            |
| 15   | young                 | 0.045            |
| 16   | get                   | 0.044            |
| 17   | free                  | 0.040            |
| 18   | instagram             | 0.039            |
| 19   | attack                | 0.039            |
| 20   | app                   | 0.038            |

### Pornography

| Rank | Term                  | Financial TF-IDF |
|------|-----------------------|------------------|
| 1    | ID_NUMBER             | 0.605            |
| 2    | porn                  | 0.557            |
| 3    | porn                  | 0.272            |
| 4    | free                  | 0.220            |
| 5    | anonymous             | 0.154            |
| 6    | girl                  | 0.125            |
| 7    | teen                  | 0.123            |
| 8    | murder                | 0.109            |
| 9    | like                  | 0.099            |
| 10   | one                   | 0.091            |
| 11   | get                   | 0.083            |
| 12   | get                   | 0.073            |
| 13   | kill                  | 0.071            |
| 14   | hitman                | 0.057            |
| 15   | id_filename           | 0.051            |
| 16   | use                   | 0.050            |
| 17   | use                   | 0.049            |
| 18   | one                   | 0.047            |
| 19   | canadian              | 0.040            |
| 20   | get                   | 0.040            |

### Violence

| Rank | Term                  | Financial TF-IDF |
|------|-----------------------|------------------|
| 1    | ID_NUMBER             | 0.915            |
| 2    | ID_TIME               | 0.173            |
| 3    | kill                  | 0.074            |
| 4    | anonymous             | 0.066            |
| 5    | hitman                | 0.066            |
| 6    | id_filename           | 0.065            |
| 7    | murder                | 0.064            |
| 8    | like                  | 0.063            |
| 9    | one                   | 0.056            |
| 10   | get                   | 0.052            |
| 11   | get                   | 0.052            |
| 12   | one                   | 0.051            |
| 13   | one                   | 0.054            |
| 14   | one                   | 0.052            |
| 15   | site                  | 0.043            |
| 16   | comment               | 0.043            |
| 17   | get                   | 0.042            |
| 18   | get                   | 0.041            |
| 19   | say                   | 0.040            |
| 20   | get                   | 0.040            |

---

Table 11: Terms with the highest TF-IDF for selected categories in CoDA
## F Forum & Marketplace Benchmark Dataset

| Category | Website title | Onion URL | # of pages |
|----------|---------------|-----------|------------|
| Drugs   | Ang********** | ang**********.onion | 377 |
| Drugs   | Glo********** | ny4**********.onion | 307 |
| Drugs   | Opi********** | opi**********.onion | 215 |
| Drugs   | Pot****       | pot**********.onion | 19 |
| Drugs   | Eu****        | wge**********.onion | 13 |
| Drugs   | Kam********** | bey**********.onion | 5 |
| Financial | Wal********* | z2h**********.onion | 241 |
| Financial | Tor*****     | tor**********.onion | 71 |
| Financial | Cov*********  | cov**********.onion | 62 |
| Financial | Fin********** | fin**********.onion | 51 |
| Financial | Cas******    | hsj**********.onion | 35 |
| Financial | Cat******    | cat**********.onion | 25 |
| Financial | Imp********** | srv**********.onion | 16 |
| Financial | Lig******    | sw**********.onion | 14 |
| Financial | Kin********** | kin**********.onion | 13 |
| Financial | Cou********** | cou**********.onion | 12 |
| Financial | Cas********** | maf**********.onion | 11 |
| Financial | Kry********** | kry**********.onion | 10 |
| Financial | Th*********** | nap**********.onion | 9 |
| Financial | Pru********** | hbl**********.onion | 8 |
| Financial | Hor********** | hor**********.onion | 8 |
| Financial | Ban***       | bap**********.onion | 7 |
| Financial | Tor***********| vrm**********.onion | 7 |
| Financial | net***       | net**********.onion | 6 |
| Financial | Bla**********| bla**********.onion | 6 |
| Financial | LAR**********| fiw**********.onion | 5 |
| Financial | eax**********| eax**********.onion | 3 |
| Financial | CHE**********| o6k**********.onion | 3 |
| Financial | PAY**********| ity**********.onion | 3 |
| Weapons | Glo**********| glo**********.onion | 266 |
| Weapons | Alp**********| alp**********.onion | 219 |
| Weapons | Exc**********| 5zk**********.onion | 181 |
| Weapons | Eur******    | hy**********.onion | 4 |
| Weapons | UK***********| tun**********.onion | 4 |

| Total Drugs | 936 |
| Total Financial | 626 |
| Total Weapons | 674 |
| All | 2236 |

Table 12: Source of our forum & marketplace benchmark dataset as described in Section 6. To follow ethical guidelines, we mask the website titles and onion addresses.