ABSTRACT: The article introduces a discursive-interactive approach in the analysis of political leaders’ communication during the 2015 ‘European migration crisis’ in Hungary. We argue that a leader is successful in a popularity race if s/he constructs a situation and handles it in a specific way, in a style which voters prefer. Neither the situation, nor the citizens’ requirements, not even the leader’s communication style is pre-given: they are parts and products of constitutive interactions. In the main part of the article, we examine the constructions of the crisis about migration and, in parallel, the self-constructions by Viktor Orbán, Ferenc Gyurcsány and Gábor Vona as the CIP model of leadership indicates. Then, we present the opinion poll results on the popularity of the three politicians’ parties and also on the issue of migration. Our findings suggest that the more diverse leadership a politician constructs, the more support s/he gains from the citizens.

KEYWORDS: CIP model of leadership, discursive-interactive approach, political situation, European migration crisis, Hungary.

INTRODUCTION

There is a general agreement that situations shape political leadership (Skowronek, 2008; Sjoberg, 2009; Hermann, 2014). Little attention has been paid, however, to cases when political leaders shape situations. In this article we claim that a key factor of success in political leadership is the capacity to influence the meaning of seemingly external situations by specific communication styles and carefully selected rhetorical tools, by styles and tools perceived favorably by citizens.

In this article, we present the results of a qualitative study on political leadership in Hungary. Contrary to the Situational Leadership Model (Hersey & Blanchard, 1969) and to the Contingency theory of leadership (Fiedler, 1967), our premise is that the ‘European migration crisis’ of 2015, just like political situations in general, was not an ‘objectively’ given fact but a product of political constructions in Hun-
gary. Certainly hundreds, sometimes thousands of asylum seekers crossed Hungary’s borders, the perception of the events, whether they amounted to a crisis, was shaped by constructions unfolding in interactions between politicians and citizens. We argue that there is always an interplay between the leadership’s communication, the perception of the situation, and the reception by the electorate. Such a complex communicative construct will be studied here with the help of the analytical framework of the Charismatic, Ideological, and Pragmatic (CIP) model of leadership.

In 2015, the governing center-right coalition had a two-thirds majority in the Parliament. Viktor Orbán had been the unquestioned leader of Fidesz practically since the birth of the party in 1988. Next in the popularity race was Jobbik, a radical rightist movement led by Gábor Vona. Finally, Ferenc Gyurcsány, Prime Minister as a socialist from 2004 to 2009, in 2015 was also a member of Parliament and led his own new party, ‘called Democratic Coalition’, with a liberal leftist stance. The charisma of the political leaders has come under recent scrutiny by emphasizing the importance of contingency (Körösényi et al., 2016) and by contracting the style, the objective and the outcome of the leadership (Körösényi & Patkós, 2017). The majority of studies reflects mostly to the stylistic aspects by discussing the personality of the leaders, especially Viktor Orbán’s and Gábor Vona’s, in connection with populism (Bozóki, 2008; Pappas, 2014; Moffitt, 2017). What missing from previous studies is the systematic analysis of the interactive nature of leadership.

The main aim of the article is to expand the CIP model toward a discursive-interactive approach of leadership. Firstly, we examine the communications processes by which three outstanding Hungarian politicians were constructing the situation of crisis and, in parallel, were reinventing themselves as leaders. Secondly, we present the opinion poll results on the popularity of the three politicians’ parties and also on the issue of migration. From a theoretical point of view, the Hungarian case demonstrates the processes of communicative co-production and co-constitution of political leadership. A comparative examination of the leadership performance of the three prominent political characters in Hungary is presented to comprehend the similarities and differences between the charismatic, the ideological, and the pragmatic types of leaders in promoting their visions and applying tactics to form relationships with followers to gain popularity. From an empirical point of view, we explain the exceptionally high popularity of Fidesz, the party led by Viktor Orbán, prime minister since 2010. Our findings suggest that the more components of the three leadership styles a politician used in handling the ‘European migration crisis’ of 2015, the better position his party had in the opinion polls.

THE CIP MODEL

Michael Mumford and his colleagues (Mumford, 2006; Mumford et al., 2008) elaborated the model by suggesting that leaders are not only either administrators/executives or visionaries as previous studies had claimed. Instead of two, they de-
fined three types of leaders: charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic. The model is attractive for political communication scholars because it focuses on the interactions between the leaders, the followers, and the situations. Regarding their mental models and behaviors, outstanding political leaders may be classified as enacting charismatic, ideological, or pragmatic leadership. The political process has three interdependent components: the leadership communication style, the expectations of the followers and the partly given, partly constructed situation in which the leader should act possibly according to the followers’ expectations regarding the perceived situation and the necessary way of handling it. A leader will be successful and outstanding if, in a specific situation, (s)he communicates in the way that has usually been favorably received by the followers under similar conditions. The three components are interdependent in the sense that the leader may want to create a situation and/or recreate a given situation in the way that suits his/her style; the followers, in turn, may be diverse in their expectations regarding the leader’s acceptable or desirable rhetoric in the given or constructed situation.

Inspired by Mumford’s concept (Mumford et al., 2008), we define the elements of the leadership types in the CIP model as follows.

**Charismatic leader**

The main distinctive feature of a charismatic leader is the future-oriented vision. The politician paints an attractive picture of the future, which radically differs from the present. The vision is unspecified enough to let followers interpret the future on their own and find their places and happiness within. Charismatic politicians always give a vision of the better future of the whole country or, at least, their own political community. They do not go into the details through what steps and stages to get there because they suggest that each person should personally participate in the realization of the vision.

The vision fires the audience with emotions and converts them into the community of followers. Since the charismatic leader uses goals to have influence and to integrate, (s)he has to create personal belonging and trust. The follower should be able to believe that the goal, the destination is reachable. The leader radiates optimism and self-confidence. The charismatic leader calls an in-group into being, that is, (s)he offers followers an identity, a sense of belongingness. The belonging connects them to the person of the leader, because the vision also belongs to him/her. The charismatic leader is hardly willing to share leadership and power with fellow leaders, on the contrary, (s)he will emphasize the importance of the individual decision-making competence and his/her competence in particular. Regarding the interpretation of situations, a charismatic leader will probably emerge when the tendencies are unfavorable or threatening, and, in turn, the politician prefers to construct the situation that way. No grave crises are necessary for the charismatic leader to appear on the scene, but the perspectives should be perceived bleak.
Ideological leader

The ideological leader also sets goals for the followers but the goals are coming from the common past and not from the future. According to the politician’s discourse, the goals and values inherited from the past would prevail and be reached if no obstacles hindered their realization. The task is, therefore, to remove, to destroy the obstacles. The ideological leader is attractive for those who share his/her values. The common values are pointedly the personal values of the leader, which is demonstrated by mentioning anchoring events in the personal past. Anchoring events are happenings that confirmed and justified the values, showed their worth and abilities to help get through difficult, even chaotic times. The ideological leader strives to create and maintain conformity to the group values. With citizens engaged in the mission of the party or group hardly tolerating the breach of the values, the ideological leader should avoid any signs of any corruption within the community, or at least, should seem to be strict about it. Corruption outside, in the other political communities, is favorable because it underlines the message that our camp and our leader is the authentic champion of the standard values.

Crisis situations are advantageous for ideological leaders particularly if the crises are so deep that not only do present operations fail but there are no common perspectives, rather grave divisions prevailing in society. Under such conditions, it does not seem possible to put forward a plan of a widely acceptable future rearrangement. The only plausible option is to appeal to past values, the realization of which would bring a brighter future. Also favorable for the ideological leader are the situations where larger social groupings can be represented as victims of the developments. The logic is the same: a part of the people suffers as victims because specific values, e.g., fairness, equality, are not respected.

The ideological leader needs social skills because s/he also leans on personal commitments. The commitments should be confirmed time to time; hence the leaders of both types prefer and initiate close encounters with the followers: rallies, blogging, Facebook postings etc.

Pragmatic leader

The pragmatic leader underlines innovative practical solutions and, definitely, not future goals or past values. Tasks and goals are coming from the present, they are determined by the circumstances, and the pragmatic leader will focus on the improvement of everyday operations and not on goal setting. Still, the pragmatic leader is not a sheer administrator or executive but an outstanding leader because s/he invents and applies solutions no one has come up with before. The pragmatic leader leans on an alliance with the elites, and tries to have an influence on them because the elites are in the position to recognize practical needs and to set wider actions into motion. The pragmatic leader and the elites are linked by common interests and not by personal belonging or attraction.
Rationality and not emotions is a characteristic of the pragmatic leader’s communication, and that distinguishes this type from the other two. S/he suggests that s/he starts from real conditions and not from past values or from an attractive vision of the future. Expertise is a dominant component of the pragmatic leader’s image. Regarding values, his/her main task is to guarantee procedural and distributional justice, or its perception, otherwise cooperation based on mutual interests is hardly possible.

There is no one single winning type of leadership. A gifted politician is able to apply different communications according to the situation s/he happens to be in. Some leaders do it with ease, others with difficulty, while some leaders are very convincing in one single style but unable to change. The latter are at the mercy of changing situations, but in specific periods they can achieve huge success.

The audience, the citizens, always vary as regards their expectations concerning leadership because their perceptions of the situation vary too. A leader is probably the most successful if his/her communication can be perceived as belonging to all the three styles because then s/he can obtain the support of the followers who demand a charismatic, ideological or pragmatic leader. To put it another way: some citizens may always expect the charismatic or ideological or pragmatic management of situations respectively, and, therefore, usually perceive different situations according to the preferred communication style.

**METHOD**

Qualitative content analysis is applied to categorize the politicians’ statements (see Hermann, 2008) whether they fit the charismatic, ideological, or pragmatic type. The classification of the three Hungarian politicians was carried out by searching for the components listed above in their speeches during the ‘European migration crisis’ of 2015. The timeframe of the data collection is 365 days of the year 2015. The presence and the lack of specific components also mattered, otherwise the research could not have defined the prevailing style and the missing styles if there were such. We scrutinized the ways the three politicians interpreted the crisis in Hungary, what kind of solution or ways out of difficulties they recommended or what opportunities they saw open for their political communities.

We investigated the discourses of the politicians and also the reactions by the citizens in general. Concerning the data collection, we used various sources. Firstly we did advanced searches with keywords such as ‘migrants’, ‘migration’, ‘refugees’, ‘illegal border crossing’, ‘illegal immigrants’ on the official online collections of the speeches and communication of Viktor Orbán (miniszterelnok.hu), Ferenc Gyurcsány (Facebook profile) and Gábor Vona (Facebook profile). In order to make comparative investigation possible, we focused on texts and events of the same genres. All three politicians give speeches early every year on the state of the country. Two of them, Vona and Orbán, give interviews every week: Orbán to the public
broadcasting radio station (Kossuth Radió), Vona to an online television channel belonging to the radical right media universe (N1TV.hu). From time to time both Orbán and Vona visit Transylvania in order to give lengthy lectures on the developments in Hungary to the Hungarian minority living in Romania. Such talks are also included in the research. In sum, 47 items were involved into the qualitative study. In the case of Viktor Orbán it was 26 communications, 8 items from Ferenc Gyurcsány and 13 talks from Gábor Vona. In addition, we followed the opinion polls conducted by the Nézőpont and Tárki companies during the year; they measured both the popularity of the parties and the views of the citizens on issues connected with migration.

RESULTS

Although the crisis about migration seems to be an exogenous situation, according to our approach, the situation is constructed mostly by the leaders themselves and is only partly given from outside. In the next session, we will provide the empirical investigation on the ways Viktor Orbán, Ferenc Gyurcsány, and Gábor Vona handled the issue and the changing political situation in Hungary in 2015.

VIKTOR ORBÁN

Charismatic leader

Vision on the future and personal trust. The Prime Minister promised that he would fight the bureaucrats of Brussels and the European political elite for a future that would not be disturbed by strangers coming from a different and alien culture and unable to integrate; he hinted at the many serious conflicts between immigrants and the rest in Western Europe. When more and more governments were previously harshly critical regarding the Hungarian measures, started to fail in managing the migration flow and to introduce similar measures, PM Orbán proved to be a charismatic politician in the traditional sense too. He appeared capable of seeing the future better than others. That shift convinced more and more citizens that he deserved trust because he knew what to do and could make decisions in spite of heavy attacks he had to suffer from fellow politicians in Europe and from the media. Moreover, seeing the failure of the European solution focusing on the quotas, and the impotence of European decision-makers, Orbán’s old insistence on national sovereignty also turned out to be useful and timely.

Personal example: The Prime Minister distinguished between individual obligations and political responsibility. His wife visited refugee camps twice and gave some help to the people there demonstrating that, on the individual level, the Orbán family did not reject suffering people, whereas the Prime Minister also said that widespread help was morally questionable because, misunderstanding it as invitation, would-be asylum seekers may leave for Europe and risk their lives
and the lives of their children crossing the sea and wandering at the mercy of traffickers.

Direct communication with the masses: The government launched a national consultation by direct mail on the issue of migration, ran a poster campaign in the spring, and started a petition against the obligatory quota solution recommended by the Commission. These are channels for direct communication with the citizens.

Individual decision making competence: PM Orbán condemned Western partners for not being able to make decisions. From January on, the Prime Minister made several consecutive decisions concerning the issue such as the launching of a national consultation and a poster campaign, unhesitant decisions on the European proposals, the start of the fence building on the Serbian and Croatian borders.

Threatening tendencies: Migration was depicted as vitally dangerous the very first time PM Orbán spoke about it in January. If he wanted to avoid the impression that he was just taking over an extreme rightist issue, he had to make the situation very urgent and dangerous so that the government should intervene.

Identity: PM Orbán claimed that Europe’s identity was weak, that is the reason it could not manage the crisis efficiently. In contradistinction to that, supported by a strengthened Hungarian identity, his government was able to operate and alleviate the crisis. Since the country was an organic part of the Union, thereby Hungary was strengthening the European identity as well. Hungary was often referred to as the protector of Europe in the Prime Minister’s speeches.

**Ideological leader**

Values from the past: Orbán linked migration with freedom of speech in the middle of May as a reaction to the criticism raised by the European Parliament concerning the tendentious questions of national consultation on migration. He said that freedom of speech was an important European value, and accordingly public debate on any topics, like anti-migration policy must not be forbidden by anyone. Later the protection of further liberties and values was connected to anti-migration policy: equality of men and women, freedom of religion, right to a safe life, etc. In July, he said in his lecture in Transylvania:

> for us what is at stake today is Europe, the life style of the European citizen, European values and the survival or disappearance of European nations, more precisely: their becoming unrecognizable. (Victor Orban speech at Bálványos Summer University, 2015).

He put it even more bluntly later:

> Europe does not accept itself. (…) Yes, Europe today believes in secondary things, but does not believe in the spring where they are coming from. It does not believe in Christianity, does not believe in common sense, does not believe in military virtues, and does not believe in national pride. Europe does not believe in what created itself, (…) does not argue for it, does not fight, and, finally, does not make sacrifice for it (Victor Orban speech at Bálványos Summer University, 2015).
Destroying the obstacles. From time to time Orbán urged to demolish the obstacles erected by ‘Brusselism’ and political correctness, and, practically, the legal hindrances that prevented the implementation of the tried and tested sound methods of frontier defense. Strong ingroup–outgroup distinction. Brussels, the Hungarian and the international left, specific but rarely named European governments, the centrally commanded Western media and the non-governmental organizations financed by George Soros and others were referred to as the outgroup in this struggle. Once the Prime Minister said:

A bizarre coalition has been established, which consists of human traffickers, human rights activists, and the bureaucrats of Brussels (Viktor Orbán’s speech at the congress of Fidesz, 2015).

Pragmatic leader

Practical solutions: Even if a couple of the solutions Orbán implemented, like the fence, the sealing of the frontier, the use of the armed forces at the border, had been recommended by Jobbik, he linked them to himself, thereby he appeared a leader full of innovation to solve the crisis. The great number of criticisms by the opposition and from abroad even confirmed the impression nurtured by the supporters of the Prime Minister that they were outstanding innovations.

Establishment of institutions. The strengthening of frontier defense needed several new institutions, mainly legal ones and also new organizational solutions to the management of the increased number of asylum seekers.

Alliance with the elites: The Prime Minister attempted to make alliances with various elites but with changing success. He talked to the parliamentary parties in opposition in February but, with the exception of Jobbik, they did not agree with his approach, just the opposite: until late summer they claimed that migration was a non-issue in Hungary because migrants did not want to stay in the country, and only walk through. He was very successful, in turn, with the leaders of the Visegrád countries, and relatively successful with the governments of the countries along the migration route. He found a supportive partner in the prime minister of Bavaria, but otherwise European leaders were very critical rather than neutral.

Rationality, expertise: The rationality of the anti-migration measures appeared only rather late, till then most of the domestic opposition, the European elite and media found sheer irrational xenophobia behind the steps, and considered the measures irrational in their outcome as well. They predicted the failure of the frontier defense in general and of the fence in particular and also said that Hungary should give shelter to as many refugees as possible to counterbalance the unfavorable demographic trends in the country. By the autumn, the attitude had gradually changed as it turned out that the fence did stop the inflow and the hardly tolerable conditions on some country roads and in the city streets vanished; the measures proved rational in the final analysis.
GÁBOR VONA

Charismatic leader

One of the periods of the charismatic attempts was early 2015. The popularity of Fidesz had been shrinking since the late summer of 2014. The decrease speeded up in the autumn and did not stop until the beginning of 2015. Vona interpreted and constructed this political situation as a great opportunity for Jobbik to catch up with Fidesz and gain strategic momentum before the national elections in 2018. After a previous trial with charismatic leadership in 2013 under similar conditions, this was the second occasion to widen the community of the party’s supporters, also because the left had got into an even worse condition than in 2013.

Construction of the situation: In January 2015, Vona spoke about the situation in the following way:

The most important political development of last autumn is the sudden weakening of Fidesz. A new situation has unfolded by the collapse of the myths of the infallibility and invincibility of the two-thirds. Not a modification but a total change has happened in the direction of the wind (Gábor Vona’s speech, 2015).

Later he drew a parallel between the present decreasing support behind Orbán and the trends in late 2006 which led to the eventual fall of Gyurcsány. Thereby the diagnosis foresaw not a present catastrophe but threatening tendencies, which opened windows for Jobbik.

Future-oriented vision. The main part of the speech was about the future. The party leader put forward the vision of a better Hungary, both in statements and in questions suggesting obvious answers. Never before had the leader given such a detailed description of a future Hungary, which shows his move towards a charismatic position.

Personal participation: He finished the speech this way:

I know there are the sick, the unsuccessful, the poor, the lonely, there are unhappy among you, and, unfortunately, the political community cannot really give help in that. But there is something where it can help. (…) To participate in a great adventure, in the realization of a dream of the Carpathian basin, to be a part, even if a small part and locomotive of a grand struggle. Anyone can experience being important (Gábor Vona’s speech, 2015).

Everybody has a place and role in public life and in the realization of the future envisioned by Jobbik, and that makes personal lives valuable.

Direct communication with the citizens: In order to communicate with the supporters and possibly reach beyond the party’s traditional electorate, in the same January speech, he launched a national petition consisting of four points. Although anti-migration policy was a traditional attribute of Jobbik, and Vona may have heard about the coming wave of migration, still, the issue is only the third among the four points. The leader put it on the list because he certainly foresaw
that it would be important in the months to come, but did not make it the first probably because that might have scared away the potential supporters whose sympathy Jobbik wanted to gain. This initiative is a careful opening toward new social groupings.

**Ideological leader**

The February speech proved to be exceptional as regards the charismatic use of migration, when, in a situation constructed as an open window for Jobbik, Vona took on the role of the charismatic leader. He was quick to foresee, however, that Fidesz would increase its popularity by starting an anti-migration policy and he went back to the former state, to the ideological leader’s posture. The most obvious signs of this resignation were a text and a speech. In summer 2015, by the time when Fidesz and PM Orbán had taken advantage of the migration crisis, Vona participated in an open forum in Transylvania (Gábor Vona’s speech, 2015). Still, he did not put forward any action plan or description about the future, instead: he claimed that there was no vision in Hungary about what to do. This is all the more surprising because, as we saw, in January he had gone into detail about a better future for the country. We may explain this discrepancy by his probable new interpretation of the political situation, which might discourage the leader from a charismatic leadership as not entirely opportune.

Conformity to group values: Since for a rightist nationalist party the national interest comes above all other considerations, and because of the traditional anti-migration standpoint of Jobbik, in 2015 Gábor Vona was not in a position to criticize Orbán’s measures on, or rather against, migration. Time and again, he underlined Jobbik’s consistence which overwrote the party’s position in opposition. National interest first, political struggle second.

Under the conditions of the political situation influenced heavily by the issue of migration, Gábor Vona indeed communicated as an ideological leader: he was proud that they had not changed the goals set by the Founding Charter; he did not define the future; how the future would look like, probably the way they had foreseen the realization of values since the very beginning; the greatest chance was built on their own fidelity and purity in contradistinction to the corruptness of others.

**FERENC GYURCSÁNY**

**Ideological leader**

Being the hardest politician in opposition, until August Ferenc Gyurcsány referred to the topic as a non-issue, at least as far as Hungary was concerned. He claimed that no one wanted to immigrate into the country but only to walk through; the government had made migration a hot topic in order to divert public attention and debates from the really important problems which would be inconvenient for
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the center right. He added that, on seeing the dwindling support in the polls, Fidesz wanted to recruit sympathizers from the camp of the extreme right; that is why Viktor Orbán had taken over the issue from Jobbik (Aréna, 2015). If migration is a non-issue, one should not deal with it, in order not to play into the hands of the government.

In May 2015, Gyurcsány talked about the issue of the reallocation plans of refugees. During the interview, he expressed his belief that a ‘European’, ‘Christian’ and ‘Humanist’ country which Hungary was supposed to be, had to welcome and integrate a ‘couple of hundred refugees’. This time, he agreed with the question that migration is ‘amongst the serious problems of the EU’ (Gyurcsány egy, 2015).

At the end of August 2015, however, he admitted that he and his party perceived the fears of the people in Hungary, and started to search for a solution that would not fall into the trap of ‘governmental populism’ (Gyurcsány Ferenc — A DK, 2015). From then on, Gyurcsány claimed that a common European solution was needed in the way Jean-Claude Juncker recommended. The pace of immigration should be slowed but generosity should be maintained. The maritime and land frontiers should be protected but the physical barriers would not be appropriate for European societies. He quoted Pope Francis on compassion and on the general obligation to recognize the refugees as human beings because they are people like us.

Ferenc Gyurcsány did not show the features of the charismatic leader in this situation, one can rather see components of the ideological leader instead. It is easy to explain why: recognizing the negative attitude of the massive majority of the citizens toward migration in Hungary, it did not look opportune to advance a positive vision on the international flow of migration. He retired into an uncharacteristic ideological leadership. In fact, on September 21st 2015, DK, the party of Gyurcsány, formed a human chain around the Parliament building in order to protest against the legal changes passed, which had made possible to deploy the military on the borders. Ferenc Gyurcsány gave a lengthy statement to the media on the sense and goals of the demonstration. We hear the components of ideological leadership.

Values from the past: The party leader underlined that we are firstly human beings and only second Hungarians, Christians or anything else. That is a latent criticism against the discourse by PM Orbán, which rejected migration, hinting at the differing religious backgrounds. The ‘European’ as an adjective was also reconstructed as a set of values which would mean solidarity with those who were from ‘poorer countries’ and ‘unity in decisions of the EU’. In that argument, he offered an imagination of Hungary as a country which belonged to the wealthiest part of the world, consequently the country had to be responsible for those persons who were coming from less fortunate regions (Gyurcsány egy, 2015).

In-group-outgroup distinction: Lengthy comparison was used to separate the in-group from the government. Gyurcsány put it in the following way:
[By the demonstration] ‘We want to show that this government is not our government. Our government does not build on the fears inside us. (…) Our government would ask the Hungarians to open their hearts and to understand that, when they look into the eyes of the many thousands and hundred thousand outlaws, then we could see ourselves in those eyes: our families, our children, our parents. (…) there is a European Hungary, which does not face east, does not look towards a tribal, an introverted world, but knows what the western world means, with antiquity, with the Enlightenment, what all that means that we have put together for the past two thousand years since antiquity. That party is the Democratic Coalition [DK], whose supporters have drawn a cordon around the Parliament, the cordon of integrity, humanism and European values (Gyurcsány Ferenc, 2015).

Characteristically enough, Gyurcsány applied the same motives, but in a different context (Political program, 2016). There the issue was inserted in the announcement of a political program, and became an example to show why a more united Europe would bring a happier future for its citizens. In this context, the crisis was expected to clarify the wider relationship that European people will meet the challenge of the other developing continents only if they are ready to cooperate more closely. In short: he performed as the ideological leader.

**PUBLIC OPINION**

By the characterization of the three leaders’ communications, we outlined a possible reason of the changing support they had in 2015. Now, we present and discuss the changes in the popularity of the three examined leaders’ parties and in public attitudes toward the issue of migration.

**Popularity**

Regarding the popularity of Fidesz, Jobbik, and DK, we rely on the surveys of Nézőpont, the only company that published monthly polls in Hungary. In 2015, the ruling government parties were on the lowest level in January and February, scoring 26 percent. Afterwards their popularity grew a little, but as late as May, it was still at only 27 percent. In June, they reached 30 percent and, from September until December, 34 percent of the whole population would have voted for a party alliance. In the same period, Jobbik’s popularity reached its highest point in April with 19 percent, and then it started to decline. We see a new peak at 17 percent in September, when the migration crisis was at its most serious, and there were clashes between police and thousands of asylum seekers on Hungary’s southern border. From then on, there was a gradual fall to the level of 10 percent by the end of the year. DK, Gyurcsány’s party, spent the year on the level of 5 to 6 per cent, never moving above or below.

**Public opinion on migration and refugees**

Nézőpont conducted a survey on the issue in the second half of June 2015. The questions referred to asylum seekers as ‘illegal migrants’, the discursive construct
favored also by the ruling government party. Almost half of the people considered it ‘a serious problem’ and a further 29 percent ‘a problem’. Party preferences had a slight effect on the opinions but 60 percent of the supporters behind leftist parties also belonged to those two groups. Only 5 per cent of the sample did not answer, which indicates that the issue was very well-known in Hungary by then and almost all citizens felt competent to judge its importance. One may draw the conclusion that the communication from the political elite on the issue had integrated 95 per cent of the population. Nézőpont conducted another survey in September. Some 87 percent of the population was ‘against illegal migration’, 55 percent supported the closing of the southern borders, and only 28 percent agreed with the quota system recommended by the European Commission.

The results suggest that the government and Jobbik succeeded in convincing citizens that ‘illegal immigration’ had to be stopped. On the other hand, only 18 percent thought that only economic migrants are seeking asylum in Europe. The greater part of Hungarians thought that either a greater or smaller part of the migrants were fleeing a war zone. Tárki, another polling company, also conducted surveys on the issue. They raised questions about asylum seekers with the term ‘refugees’, a construct favored by the left. One of their reports (The Social Aspects, 2016) says that, among the citizens of the four Visegrád countries, Hungarians were the most willing to give shelter to refugees coming from war-torn countries. Another survey, repeated yearly since 1992, focused on xenophobia and on attitudes towards aliens in general (The Social Aspects, 2016). Data showed that the ratio of xenophobes jumped to the highest level ever since 1992 in April 2015 (46 percent), declined by July (39 percent) and even further by October (36 percent), losing ten points since April.

The surveys suggest that the government succeeded in making the crisis the most important issue for Hungarians, and that was favorable for the ruling government party, which put forward a diversified discourse and showed a more diverse communication on the issue than the radical right. The decreasing xenophobia may indicate that on seeing the government’s capability of managing the crisis, more and more people gave up an uninformed rejecting attitude and pondered the issue, weighing up the terrible conditions of a great number of migrants and the danger of terrorists mingling among them might bring.

CONCLUSION

The paper argued that the interconnection of situations, leaders’ communication and expectations from citizens shapes leadership performances in Hungary. Using the CIP model we presupposed that the success and failure of politicians depended on two factors: on the ability to use suitable outstanding leadership styles and on the capability of recognizing what kind of rhetoric is the best to satisfy citizens’ expectations in a specifically reconstructed situation. Whilst the Mumfordian con-
cept classifies leaders either as charismatic or ideological, our innovation is the demonstration of leadership diversity. We argue that successful politicians combine the elements of charismatic, pragmatic and ideological types.

Accordingly, by applying pre-defined leadership styles the case study presented the ways the three outstanding leaders constructed the migration situation and behaved. We used the opinion polls to measure the success and failure of the different leaders’ choices.

We saw that Orbán applied the most diverse leader communication, Gyurcsány was the least sophisticated and Vona was somewhere in between. Orbán was able to communicate according to all three styles. His favorite was charismatic leadership but he excelled as pragmatic as well, and did not refrain from ideological leadership either. He constructed and reconstructed the situations in a profitable way in a political sense: he connected migration to terrorism, by which he could make people accept that the government should heavily intervene in the process and fight Brussels, which approached the issue from a different angle. He was fairly successful in reaching out to all the groups that expected charismatic or ideological or pragmatic leadership.

Vona gained popularity in early 2015 on recognizing the vacuum of vision on the governmental side and putting forward a vision on a happier Hungary; in that situation, he talked as a charismatic leader. He was not incarnated as a pragmatic leader, though, and returned to an ideological leader after the beginning of the migration crisis, the insufficiency of which was reflected by a shrinking popularity.

Although Gyurcsány was able to keep his support in 2015, he could not widen it. Rather than experimenting with a clear-cut charismatic leadership and putting forward a well elaborated vision friendly toward asylum seekers, he adopted an ideological posture. The choice of ignoring migration for a long time and then flirting with ideological leadership proved insufficient.

Our approach considers the situations in leadership as discursive co-products. Although political leaders are usually proactive actors in constructing, they never have total dominance because other politicians with different agendas and citizens also have constructions. Hence, it is hardly possible to define straight causalities because all three components: politician, situation, citizens, are continuously moving in the interaction. Another point is that not only the way of acting but the way of constructing a situation is part of the style. That is to say: a charismatic leader will construct a situation in a specific way dissimilar to the constructions offered by ideological and pragmatic leaders.

We are nonetheless aware of some inherent limitations to our analysis. A first one pertains to the selection bias: the analysis would have slightly different findings concerning the success of leaders, if we focused on other issues than the ‘European migration crisis’ of 2015. The second concerns the sampling: the dataset of the surveys were not available for secondary analysis; which limited our analysis to shedding some light on the voter perceptions of migration. Lastly, the inclusion of
the media coverage on the crisis and the leaders would have provided further details on the discursive-interactive mechanism of political leadership. It is an especially valid point in Hungary where the mass media system is heavily politicized and nowadays rather dominated by narratives favorable to the ruling government forces. Further data analysis could allow us to assess the role of citizens’ approval concerning political leadership.

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