The Concept of Truth

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"The ghost of the Tarski hierarchy is still with us."
Saul Kripke

Abstract On the basis of elementary thinking about language functioning, a solution of truth paradoxes is given and a corresponding semantics of a truth predicate is founded. It is shown that it is precisely the two-valued description of the maximal intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued semantics.

1 Analysis of the truth concept and the informal description of the solution

Roughly, by the “classical language” will be meant every language which is modelled upon the everyday language of declarative sentences. An example is the standard mathematical language which is basically an everyday language supported by the symbolisation process and by the mechanism of variables. Due to definiteness, the language of the first order logic, which has an explicit and precise description of form and meaning, will be considered. By the “language” will be meant an interpreted language, a language form together with an interpretation.

Besides a formal (grammatical) structure and an internal meaning structure, a language has an external meaning structure too, a connection between language forms and external objects which constitute the subject of the language. For the classical language there are assumptions that there are objects which the language mentions, that every name is a name of some object, that to every functional and relational symbol an operation or a relation between objects is associated, and that every atomic sentence is true or false, depending on if “it is” or “it is not” its content. These assumptions have grown from everyday use of language where we are accustomed to their fulfillment, but there are situations when they are not fulfilled. The Liar paradox and other paradoxes of truth are witnesses of such situations. They are the results of a tension between implicitly accepted assumptions on the language and their unfulfilment.

Let’s investigate the sentence $L$ (the Liar):

$L$: $L$ is a false sentence. (or “This sentence is false.”)

using the everyday understanding of truth and language, to investigate truth of $L$ we must investigate what it says. But it says precisely about its own truth, and in a contradictory way. If we assume it is true, then it is true what it says — that it is false. But if we assume it is false, then it is false what it says, that it is false, so it is true. Therefore, it is a self-contradictory
sentence. But what is even more important is a paradoxical feeling that we can’t determine its truth value. The same paradoxality, but without contradiction, emerges during the investigation of the following sentence $I$ (the Truth teller):

$I$: $I$ is a true sentence. (or “This sentence is true.”)

Contrary to the Liar to which we can’t associate any truth value, to this sentence we can associate the truth as well as the falsehood with equal mistrust. There are no additional specifications which would make a choice between the two possibilities, not because we haven’t enough knowledge but principally. Therefore, we can’t associate a truth value to these sentence, neither.

There are various analysis and solutions which will not be considered here (good surveys can be found in \cite{Mar84, Hel82, Vis89, She94}). This analysis begins with a basic intuition that the previous sentences are meaningful (because we understand well what they say, even more, we used that in the unsuccessful determination of their truth values), but they witness the failure of the classical procedure for the truth value determination in some “extreme” situations. Paradoxality emerges from a confrontation of the implicit assumption of the success of the procedure and the discovery of the failure. A basic assumption about the classical language is that every sentence is true ($\top$) or false ($\bot$). Truth values of more complex sentences are determined according to truth values of simpler components in a way determined by the internal semantics of the language. To visualize better this semantical relationship of sentences we will imagine them as nodes of a graph $S$ and we will draw arrows from a sentence to all sentences on which its truth value depends. Because of definitness we will consider sentences of an interpreted first order language. Due to simplicity we will assume that for every object $a$ of a domain $\text{dom}(L)$ of the language $L$ there is a closed term $\bar{a}$ which names it. The logical vocabulary of the language is standard and it consists of connectives $\neg, \land, \lor, \rightarrow, \leftrightarrow$ and quantors $\forall, \exists$. Arrows of the semantical graph $S$ are defined by the recursion on inductive structure of sentences. Instead of strict definitions “pictures” of tipical nodes of the graph will be shown:

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{graph.png}
\caption{Semantical graph $S$ for every binary connective $\circ$ $a_i \in \text{Dom}(L)$ $a_i \in \text{Dom}(L)$}
\end{figure}
The truth values of the sentences will be described as a function \( I : S \rightarrow \{ \top, \bot \} \), which associates the truth value, \( \top \) or \( \bot \), to every sentence.

The internal semantics of the language describes determination of the truth value of a compound sentence in terms of the truth values of simpler sentences to which it shows (by arrows of the semantical graph). The description consists of standard conditions on the truth function \( I \):

1. \( I(\neg \varphi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I(\varphi) = \bot \\ \bot & \text{for } I(\varphi) = \top \end{cases} \)

2. \( I(\varphi \land \psi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I(\varphi) = \top \text{ and } I(\psi) = \top \text{ (both are true)} \\ \bot & \text{for } I(\varphi) = \bot \text{ or } I(\psi) = \bot \text{ (at least one is false)} \end{cases} \)

3. \( I(\varphi \lor \psi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I(\varphi) = \top \text{ or } I(\psi) = \top \text{ (at least one is true)} \\ \bot & \text{for } I(\varphi) = \bot \text{ and } I(\psi) = \bot \text{ (both are false)} \end{cases} \)

4. \( I(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I(\varphi) = \bot \text{ or } I(\psi) = \top \\ \bot & \text{for } I(\varphi) = \top \text{ and } I(\psi) = \bot \end{cases} \)

5. \( I(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I(\varphi) = I(\psi) \text{ (both are true or both are false)} \\ \bot & \text{for } I(\varphi) \neq I(\psi) \text{ (one is true and another is false)} \end{cases} \)

6. \( I(\forall x \varphi(x)) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } \forall a \in \text{dom}(L) \ I(\varphi(\bar{a})) = \top \\ \bot & \text{if } \exists a \in \text{dom}(L) \ I(\varphi(\bar{a})) = \bot \end{cases} \)

7. \( I(\exists x \varphi(x)) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } \exists a \in \text{dom}(L) \ I(\varphi(\bar{a})) = \top \\ \bot & \text{if } \forall a \in \text{dom}(L) \ I(\varphi(\bar{a})) = \bot \end{cases} \)

According to these conditions, to determine the truth value of a given sentence we must investigate the truth values of all sentences which it shows, then eventually, for the same reasons, the truth values of the sentences which these sentences show, and so on. Every such path along the arrows of the graph leads to atomic sentences (because the complexity of sentences decreases along the path) and the truth value of the initial sentence is completely determined by the truth values of atomic sentences which it hereditarily shows. In common situations language doesn’t talk about the truth values of its own sentences, so the truth values of its atomic sentences don’t depend on the truth values of some other sentences. They are leafs of the semantic graph — there are no arrows from them leading to other sentences. To investigate their truth values we must investigate external reality they are talking about. For example, for the simplest atomic sentence \( P(\bar{a}) \) to investigate its truth value we must see whether the object \( a \) has the property \( P \). The assumption of the classical language is that it is or it is not the case —
\( P(\bar{a}) \) is true or false. It is fulfilled in standard situations, whether effectively or principally. Therefore, every atomic sentence has a definite truth value, so the procedure of determination of the truth value of every sentence also gives a definite truth value, \( \top \) ili \( \bot \). Formally, it is secured by the recursion principle which says that there is a unique function \( I : S \rightarrow \{\top, \bot\} \) with values on atomic sentences being identical to externally given truth values, and it obeys previously displayed classical semantic conditions.

But the classical situation can be (and it is) destroyed when atomic sentences talk about the truth values of other sentences. Then there are arrows from atomic sentences to other sentences along which we must continue to investigate the truth value of the initial sentence. The simplest such a situation is when language contains the truth predicate \( T \) by means of which it can talk about the truth values of its own sentences. Then language has atomic sentences of the form \( T(\varphi) \) with the meaning “\( \varphi \) is a true sentence”. The truth conditions for \( T(\varphi) \) are part of the internal semantics of the language, as there are for example the truth conditions on \( \varphi \land \psi \). They don’t depend on the external world but on the truth value of the sentence \( \varphi \) by a logical sense we associate to the truth predicate \( T \)— we consider \( T(\varphi) \) to be true when \( \varphi \) is true, and to be false when \( \varphi \) is false.

So, in the case of presence of the truth predicate \( T \) there are new arrows in the graph

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{\textbf{\( T(\varphi) \)}} \\
\downarrow \\
\varphi
\end{align*}
\]

and a new condition on the truth function:

\[
I(T(\varphi)) = \begin{cases} 
\top & \text{for } I(\varphi) = \top \\
\bot & \text{for } I(\varphi) = \bot
\end{cases}
\]

Now, to investigate the truth value of a sentence it is not sufficient to reduce the problem to atomic sentences in general, but we must again continue the “voyage” upon arrows to more complex sentences. Because of the possible “circulations”, there is nothing to insure the success of the procedure. Truth paradoxes just witness such situations. Three illustrative examples follow
The procedure of the truth value determination has stopped on the atomic sentence for which we know is false, so $T(1 + 1 = 3)$ is false, too.

The Liar: For $L : T(\neg L)$ we have

$$L : T(\neg L)$$

$$\neg L$$

But now the procedure of the truth value determination has failed because the conditions for the truth function can’t be fulfilled. Truth value of $T(\neg L)$ depends on truth value of $\neg L$ and this again on $L : T(\neg L)$ in a way which is impossible to obey.

The Truthteller: For $I : T(\bar{I})$ we have

$$I : T(I)$$

Now, there are, as we have already seen, two possible assignings of truth values to the sentence $I$. But this multiple fulfillment we must consider as a failure of the classical procedure, too, because it assumes to establish a unique truth value for every sentence.

Paradoxes emerge just because the classical procedure of the truth value determination sometimes doesn’t give a classically assumed (and expected) answer. As previous examples show such assumption is an unjustified generalization from common situations to all situations. We can preserve the classical procedure, also the internal semantic structure of the language. But, we must reject universality of the assumption of its success. The awareness of that transforms paradoxes to normal situations inherent to the classical procedure. I believe this is the solution of paradoxes. But, there remains
the solving of another significant question — how to insure a success of the truth value determination procedure which is crucial for the validity of the classical logic, and in the same time to preserve the internal semantic structure of the language. Certainly, prohibition of a language which talks of its own truth can’t be considered as a satisfactory solution, nor the hierarchy of languages in which every language can talk only about truth of sentences which belong to the language below it in the hierarchy. Although circularity is a substantial part of paradoxical situations its rejection is a too rough solution which impoverishes language inacceptably. As Kripke showed in [Kri75] circularity is deeply present in an everyday language use not only in an unavoidable way but also in a harmless way, and only in some extreme situations it leads to paradoxes. Kripke showed it on examples which involve external meaning structure of language (“empirical facts”), but the same occurs in internal meaning structure, too. Neither there circularity leads necessary to paradoxes, as the following example shows.

Let’s determine truth value of the sentence the Logician: Log : T(Log) ∨ T(¬Log) (This sentence is true or false)

Semantical dependencies are the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Log} : & \quad T(\overline{\text{Log}}) \lor T(\overline{\text{¬Log}}) \\
T(\text{Log}) : & \quad \overline{T(\text{¬Log})} \\
T(\overline{\text{Log}}) : & \quad T(\overline{\text{¬Log}}) \\
\text{¬Log} : & \quad T(\overline{\text{Log}})
\end{align*}
\]

If Log were false then, by the truth conditions, T(¬Log) would be false, ¬Log would be false too, and finally Log would be true. Therefore, such valuation of the graph is impossible. But if we assume that Log is true, the truth conditions generate a unique consistent valuation. Therefore, the truth determination procedure gives the unique answer — that Log is true.

Kripke showed in [Kri75] that circumstances which lead to paradoxes cannot be isolated on a sintactical level, but an intervention in the semantic language structure is neccessary. The intervention is here made in the following way. The primary classical semantics is preserved, so the classical procedure of truth value determination is preserved too, but the wrong classical assumption of its total success is rejected. The rejection doesn’t change
the meaning of the classical conditions on the truth function, because they are stated in a way independent of the assumption that the function is everywhere defined. Their functioning in the new situation is illustrated in the following sentence:

$$L \lor 0 = 0$$

On the classical condition for the connective $\lor$ this sentence is true precisely when at least one of the basic sentences is true. Because $0 = 0$ is true consequently the total sentence is true regardless of the fact that $L$ hasn’t the truth value. Equally, if we apply the truth value condition on the connective $\land$ to the sentence

$$L \land 0 = 0$$

the truth value will not be determined. Namely, for the sentence to be true both basic sentences must be true, and it is not fulfilled. For it to be false at least one basic sentence must be false and this also is not fulfilled. So, nonexistence of the truth value for $L$ leads to nonexistence of the truth value for the whole sentence.

Classical truth value conditions specify the truth value of a compound sentence in terms of truth values of its direct components regardless whether they have truth values or not. The lack of some truth value may lead, but does not have to, to the lack of the truth value of the compound sentence. It is completely determined by the classical meaning of the construction of a sentence and by the basic assumption that all sentences are considered meaningful regardless of the truth value.

Therefore, some sentences, although meaningful, valued by the classical conditions have not the truth value, because the conditions do not give them a unique truth value. This leads to the partial two - valued semantics of the language. Where the procedure gives a unique truth value, truth or falsehood, we accept it, where it fails because it does not give any truth value or permits both values, the sentence remains without the truth value. This kind of semantics can be described as the three - valued semantics of the language — simply the failure of the procedure will be declared as a third value | (undetermined). It has not any additional philosophical charge. It is only a convenient technical tool for the description.

But this semantics is not accepted here as the final semantics of the language. A decidable reason for the rejection is the opinion that the two - valued semantics is natural to human kind and that every other semantics can be reduced to the two - valued by an appropriate modelling (a confirmation for the thesis is that descriptions of all semantics are two - valued). To remain on three - valued semantics would mean that the logic would not be classical, the one we are accustomed to. Concerning the truth predicate itself, it would imply the preservation of its classical logical sense in the two
- valued part of the language extended by the “silence” in the part where the classical procedure fails. Although in a metadescription $T(\bar{\phi})$ has the same truth value (in the three-valued semantic frame) as $\varphi$, that semantics is not the more initial one (although it extends it) nor it can be expressed in the language itself (because the language is silent about the third value, or better said, the third value is the reflection in the metalanguage of the silence in the language). So the expressive power of the language is weak. For example, the Liar is undetermined. Although we have easily said it in metalanguage we cannot express in the language $L$ itself, because, as it has already been said (in metalanguage), the Liar is undetermined. Not only that the “zone of silence” is unsatisfactory because of the previously stated reasons (it leads to the three-valued logic, it loses the primary sense of the truth predicate and it weakens the expressive power of the language), but it can be interrupted by a natural additional valuation of the sentences which emerges from recognising the failure of the classical procedure. This point will be illustrated on the example of the Liar. On the intuitive level of thinking, by recognising the Liar is not true nor false we state that it is undetermined. So, it is not true what it claims — that it is false. Therefore, the Liar is false. But this does not lead to restoring of the contradiction because a semantical shift has happened from the primary partial two-valued semantics (or three-valued semantics) toward its two-valued description, which merely extends it in the part where it is not determined. Namely, the Liar talks of its own truth in the frame of the primary semantics, while the last valuation is in the frame of the final semantics. The falsehood of the Liar in the final semantics doesn’t mean that it is true what it says (that it is false) because the semantical frame is not the same. It means that it is false what it talks of its own primary semantics (that it is false in the primary semantics). It follows that it is not false in its primary semantics. But, it cannot be true in the primary semantics because then it would be true in the final semantics (which only extends the primary where it fails). Therefore it is undetermined in the primary semantics. So, not only have we gained a contradiction, but we also have received another information about the Liar.

It is easy to legalize this intuition. Using the truth predicate, the language talks about its primary semantics. The classical procedure and the classical meaning of the truth predicate determines its primary semantics, which is, due to the failures of the procedure, a partial two-valued semantics (= a threvalued semantics). But the description of the primary semantics itself is its natural extension to the final two-valued semantics. Therefore, the final semantics of the language has for its subject precisely the primary semantics of the language which it extends furthermore in the part where it is silent using the informations about the silence. The transition can be described
easily on the semantical graph. To get the final valuation from the primary valuation we must revaluate only the atomic sentences of the form \( T(\varphi) \). Such sentences have the same meaning in both semantics — that \( \varphi \) is true in the primary semantics, but the truth conditions are not the same. While in the primary semantics the truth conditions for \( T(\varphi) \) are classical (the truth of \( T(\varphi) \) means the truth of \( \varphi \), the falsehood of \( T(\varphi) \) means the falsehood of \( \varphi \)), in the final semantics it is not so. In it the truth of \( T(\varphi) \) means that \( \varphi \) is true in the primary semantics, and falsehood of \( T(\varphi) \) means that \( \varphi \) is not true in the primary semantics. It does not mean that it is false in the primary semantics, but that it is false or undetermined. So, formally looking, in the final semantics \( T(\varphi) \) inherits truth from the primary semantics, while other values transform to falsehood.

We can see best that this is a right and a complete description of the valuation in the primary semantics by introducing predicates for other truth values in the primary valuation:

\[
F(\varphi) \overset{=}{=} \text{\( \varphi \) is false in the primary semantics} \iff T(\neg \varphi)
\]

\[
U(\varphi) \overset{=}{=} \text{\( \varphi \) is undetermined in the primary semantics} \iff \neg T(\varphi) \land \neg F(\varphi)
\]

According to the truth value of the sentence \( \varphi \) in the primary semantics we determine which of the previous sentences are true and which are false. For example, if \( \varphi \) is false in the primary semantics then \( F(\varphi) \) is true while others (\( T(\varphi) \) i \( U(\varphi) \)) are false.

Once the final two - valued valuations of atomic sentences are determined in this way, valuation of every sentence is determined by means of the classical conditions and the principle of recursion. This valuation not only preserves the primary logical meaning of the truth predicate (as the truth predicate of the primary semantics) but it also coincides with the primary valuation where it is determined. Namely, if \( T(\varphi) \) is true in the primary semantics then \( \varphi \) is true in the primary semantics, so \( T(\varphi) \) is true in the final semantics. If \( T(\varphi) \) is false in the primary semantics then \( \varphi \) is false in the primary semantics, so \( T(\varphi) \) is false in the final semantics. Since the truth conditions for compound sentences are the same in both semantics this coincidence spreads through all sentences which have determined value in the primary valuation. Therefore \( T(\varphi) \to \varphi \) and \( F(\varphi) \to \neg \varphi \) are true sentences in the final semantics.

Having in mind this kind of double semantics of the language, we can easily solve all truth paradoxes. On an intuitive level we have already done it for the Liar. To distinguish inside which semantic frame we use a certain term we will put prefix “p” for the primary semantics and prefix “f” for the final semantics. In that way we will distinguish for example “f-falsehood” and “p-falsehood. The form of the solution is always the same. A paradox in the classical thinking means that the truth value of a sentence is undetermined in the primary semantics. But, then it becomes an information in the final
semantics with which we can conclude the truth value of the sentence in the final semantics.

First, let’s investigate the situations which lead to the contradiction like the Liar. Of such kind is, for example, the **Strong Liar** $LL : \neg T(LL)$ (“This sentence is not true”). In the naive semantics it leads to a contradiction in the same way as the Liar, because there “not to be true” is the same as “to be false”. Recognising a failure of the classical procedure, we continue to think in the final semantics and state that it is p-undetermined. So, it is not p-true. But, it claims just that, so it is f-true. Therefore, we conclude that the Strong Liar is undetermined in the primary semantics and true in the final semantics. It is interesting that the whole argumentation can be done directly in the final semantics, not indirectly by stating the failure of the classical procedure. The argumentation is the following. If $LL$ were f-false, then it would be f-false what it said — that it is not p-true. So, it would be p-true. But, it means (because the final semantics extends the primary one) that it would be f-true and it is a contradiction with the assumption. So, it is f-true. This statement does not lead to a contradiction but to an additional information. Namely, it follows that what it talks about is f-true — that it is not p-true. So, it is p-false or p-undetermined. If it were p-false it would be f-false too, and this is a contradiction. So, it is p-undetermined. Therefore, although the Liar and the Strong Liar are both p-undetermined, the latter is f-true while the former is f-false.

Let’s analyse in the same way **Curry’s paradox** $C : T(\bar{C}) \rightarrow l$ (“If this sentence is true then $l$”), where $l$ is any false statement. On the intuitive level if $C$ were false then $T(\bar{C})$ is true, and so is $C$ itself, and it is a contradiction. If $C$ was true then the whole conditional $(C)$ and its antecedent $T(\bar{C})$ would be true, and so the consequent $l$ would be true, which is impossible with the choice of $l$ as a false sentence. Therefore we conclude in the final semantics that $C$ is p-undetermined, and so it is f-true (because the antecedent is f-false). The argumentation can also be completely translated in the final semantics as follows. Namely, if $C$ were f-false then the antecedent would be f-true. It means that $C$ would be p-true and therefore f-true (by the accordance of two semantics), and it is a contradiction. So, $C$ is f-true. From it we conclude that $T(\bar{C})$ is f-false or $l$ is f-true. Because $l$ is f-false it follows that $T(\bar{C})$ is f-false, so $C$ is not p-true. It is therefore p-false or p-undetermined. If it were p-false it would be f-false, so it is p-undetermined.

In the same way other truth paradoxes, which lead to contradiction on the intuitive level, lead to positive argumentation in the final semantics. But, the situation is different with paradoxes which do not lead to contradiction, which permit more valuations, like the **Truthteller**. Its analyses gives that it is p-undetermined. It implies that it is not p-true which means that
(I : T(\bar{I})) it is not I. So, I is f-false. But, this thinking cannot be translated directly into the final semantics. The argumentation formulated in the final semantics do not give the answer as well as in the primary semantics. It is necessary to investigate primary valuations of the semantical graph. Of course, if we enrich the language with the description of semantical graphs and truth valuations then it is possible to translate the intuitive argumentation.

Through this kind of modeling, the truth predicate of the primary semantics is described by the final semantics of the language. Of course, it does not coincide with the truth predicate of the final semantics. But the goal was not to describe the predicate. Moreover, it emerges from the description of the primary truth predicate. Being at the same time an extension of the primary predicate, it describes itself partially, but not completely. In that sense the ghost of the Tarski hierarchy is still with us. For some it is an evil ghost because it does not permit the complete description of the truth predicate of the final semantics. For the author it is a good ghost because thanks to him the truth predicate of the primary semantics is completely described.
2 Formal description of the solution

Let $L$ be an interpreted first order language with a domain $D$. It will be permitted that $D$ can be an empty set. Then $L$ reduces to its logical vocabulary. Also, because of simplicity, we will assume that for every object $a \in D$ of the language there is a closed term $\bar{a}$ which names it.

We will extend $L$ to the language $LT$ which will talk additionally about the truth of its own sentences. Along with objects of the language $L$ its domain will contain its own sentences, too. Its vocabulary will contain the predicate $S$ (= “to be a sentence”) which will distinguish sentences from other objects and the predicate $T$ (= “to be a true sentence”) which will describe the truth of the sentences. Every sentence $\varphi$ will have its own name $\bar{\varphi}$, but there will be also special names for sentences. Giving to them suitable denotations we will achieve intended selfreferences. For example, the constant $\bar{I}$ will be interpreted as a name of the sentence $T(\bar{I})$, and so we will construct the Truthteller in the language.

Vocabulary of the language $LT$ consists of the vocabulary of the language $L$ together with new simbols — unary predicates $S$ and $T$, sentence constants $\bar{I}, \bar{L}, \overline{\neg L}, \overline{LL}, \ldots$ and the special operator $\bar{\cdot}$.

A set of terms $TLT$ and a set of formulas $FLT$ of the language $LT$ are defined as the smallest sets which satisfy all conditions for terms and formulae of the language $L$ and additional conditions:

1. Sentence constants $\bar{I}, \bar{L}, \overline{\neg L}, \overline{LL}, \ldots$ are terms

2. If $t$ is a term then $S(t)$ and $T(t)$ are formulae

3. If $\varphi$ is a formula then $\overline{\varphi}$ is a term.

A set of free variables of a term or a formula are defined by standard recursive conditions plus one more condition — that free variables of the term $\overline{\varphi}$ are precisely free variables of a formula $\varphi$. Sentences of the language $LT$ are closed formulae of the language. A set of them will be marked $SLT$.

The interpretation (model) of the language $LT$ is given in the following way. Domain $DLT$ consists of all objects from domain $D$ together with all sentences from $LT$: $DLT = D \cup SLT$. All predicates of the language $L$ are extended inside new domain in such manner that they give falsehood if at least one argument is outside domain $D$, and functions of the language $L$ are extended in such manner that they give some constant value, let’s say the sentence $T(\bar{I})$, if at least one argument is out of the domain $D$.

New simbols are interpreted in the following way. The simbol $S$ has the meaning “to be a sentence”, that is, it is interpreted by the set of sentences...
of $LT$. The symbol $T$ will be the truth predicate of the primary semantics, in other words it will have the meaning “to be a true sentence in the primary semantics” once we define what the primary semantics is. In the primary semantics it will be achieved in such manner that $T$ will be introduced as a logical symbol (like $\land$ for example) with the classical truth conditions, and in the final semantics it will be achieved directly interpreting it as the set of true sentences in the primary semantics. The sentence constants will be interpreted as names of appropriate sentences:

1. $\overline{T}$ is the name of a sentence $T(\overline{T})$
2. $\overline{L}$ is the name of a sentence $T(\overline{\neg L})$
3. $\overline{\neg L}$ is the name of a sentence $\neg T(\overline{\neg L})$
4. $\overline{LL}$ is the name of a sentence $\neg T(\overline{LL})$

and so on.
A closed term $\overline{\varphi}$ is interpreted as the name of the sentence $\varphi$.
Compound closed terms are interpreted as names of appropriate objects of the language in the standard way.

Sentences will be of primary concern and the mechanism of referring to them will be the following. In the metalanguage we will use Greek letters $\varphi$, $\psi$, ..., for variables in sentences. So, in the language we can refer to any sentence $\varphi$ by a closed term $\overline{\varphi}$. To express that something is true for all sentences, for example that from truth in the primary semantics follows truth in the final semantics, we will simply say that for every sentence $\varphi$ $T(\overline{\varphi}) \to \varphi$ is a true sentence of the language.

And one more detail. Because of the uniformity of notation, the use of the simbol $\overline{\cdot}$ is threefold. Basic use is in the construction of the term $\overline{\varphi}$ by which we refer to the sentence $\varphi$. For example, $\overline{1=1}$ is a name in the language $LT$ of the sentence $1=1$ of $LT$. The second use is in the construction of sentence constants by which we achieve selfreference. For example, in the expression $\overline{L}$ it hasn’t a basic use because it is not a name of the sentence $L$. Namely, there is no such sentence in the language $LT$. The sign $L$ we can eventually understand as a metalanguage name for the sentence, which is, in the language named by the sentence constant $\overline{L}$, and it is, by the previous, the sentence $T(\overline{\neg L})$. The third use of the simbol is in a sense of an operator which to any object $a$ of a domain of the original language $L$ associates its name $\overline{a}$ in the language. Contrary to the previous uses, that which is put “under the dash” generally is not an expression of the language, but an object external to the language.
What follows is a description of the primary semantics, that is the description of the primary truth valuation of sentences of the language $LT$. Because of the assumption that every object $a \in DLT$ has its name $\bar{a}$ we may consider only sentences. Valuations of arbitrary formulae and terms will be introduced later. Conditions for the truth valuation $I_c$ of the sentences are classical together with the classical condition for the truth predicate $T$, but what is rejected is the classical assumption that it is a total function, defined for every sentence. Among all functions of the kind we will select the one which is on its domain unique (let’s remember the possibility of multiple valuations is considered as a failure of the classical procedure), and between all those functions we will select the maximal one, because we accept every success of the truth value determination. So we define the classical truth value function $I_c$ of the language $LT$ as a partial function $I_c : ST \mapsto \{\top, \bot\}$ which obeys the following:

1. On atomic sentences which begin with predicates of the language $L$ values of $I_c$ coincide with truth values of the sentences in the language $L$ interpreted over extended domain $DLT$, on atomic sentences of the form $S(a)$ it gives truth ($\top$) if $a$ is a sentence, otherwise falsehood ($\bot$), and on atomic sentences of the form $T(a)$ where $a$ isn’t a sentence it gives a falsehood.

2. Classical conditions:

   (a) $I_c(\neg \varphi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I_c(\varphi) = \bot \\ \bot & \text{for } I_c(\varphi) = \top \end{cases}$

   (b) $I_c(\varphi \land \psi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I_c(\varphi) = \top \text{ and } I_c(\psi) = \top \text{ (both are true)} \\ \bot & \text{for } I_c(\varphi) = \bot \text{ or } I_c(\psi) = \bot \text{ (at least one is false)} \end{cases}$

   (c) $I_c(\varphi \lor \psi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I_c(\varphi) = \top \text{ or } I_c(\psi) = \top \text{ (at least one is true)} \\ \bot & \text{for } I_c(\varphi) = \bot \text{ and } I_c(\psi) = \bot \text{ (both are false)} \end{cases}$

   (d) $I_c(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I_c(\varphi) = \bot \text{ or } I_c(\psi) = \top \\ \bot & \text{for } I_c(\varphi) = \top \text{ and } I_c(\psi) = \bot \end{cases}$

   (e) $I_c(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I_c(\varphi) = I_c(\psi) \text{ (both are true or both are false)} \\ \bot & \text{for } I_c(\varphi) \neq I_c(\psi) \text{ (one is true and another is false)} \end{cases}$

   (f) $I_c(\forall x \varphi(x)) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } \forall a \in DLT \text{ } I_c(\varphi(\bar{a})) = \top \\ \bot & \text{if } \exists a \in DLT \text{ } I_c(\varphi(\bar{a})) = \bot \end{cases}$

   (g) $I_c(\exists x \varphi(x)) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } \exists a \in DLT \text{ } I_c(\varphi(\bar{a})) = \top \\ \bot & \text{if } \forall a \in DLT \text{ } I_c(\varphi(\bar{a})) = \bot \end{cases}$
3. classical condition on the truth predicate:

\[ I_c(T(\varphi)) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I_c(\varphi) = \top \\ \bot & \text{for } I_c(\varphi) = \bot \end{cases} \]

4. uniqueness on the domain:

If there is a function \( I : ST \leadsto \{ \top, \bot \} \) which obeys all three previous conditions, then for every sentence \( \varphi \in \text{Dom}(I_c) \cap \text{Dom}(I_c) \) \( I(\varphi) = I_c(\varphi) \).

5. maximality:

For every function \( I : ST \leadsto \{ \top, \bot \} \) which obeys all previous conditions \( \text{Dom}(I) \subseteq \text{Dom}(I_c) \).

From the definition uniqueness of such function easily follows. If there were two such functions according to the last condition they would have the same domain, and by the fourth condition they would coincide on it, so they would be equal. Later, the existence of such function will be proved.

The concept of truth values of sentences is extended to arbitrary formulae in a standard way — by fixing meanings of variables. The function \( v : \text{Var} \longrightarrow \text{DLT} \) (where \( \text{Var} \) is a set of variables of the language) which determines meanings of variables will be called a \textbf{valuation}. In a given valuation \( v \) a formula \( \varphi(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n) \) with free variables \( x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n \) is considered true \( \leftrightarrow \) the associated sentence \( \varphi(v(x_1), v(x_2), \ldots, v(x_n)) \) is true, and false \( \leftrightarrow \) the associated sentence is false. Also, in a given valuation \( v \) a term \( t(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n) \) with free variables \( x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n \) is considered to denote the same as the closed term \( t(v(x_1), v(x_2), \ldots, v(x_n)) \).

To expose better the structure of the classical truth value function we will extend it to a total function in a way that we will associate the third value \( | \) (the undetermined) to the sentences on which it isn’t defined. This function will be called the \textbf{truth value function of the primary semantics} \( I_p : ST \longrightarrow \{ \top, \bot, | \} \):

\[ I_p(\varphi) = \begin{cases} I_c(\varphi) & \text{for } \varphi \in \text{Dom}(I_c) \\ | & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]

A set of sentences on which \( I_p \) gains classical truth values \( \top \) and \( \bot \) will be called its \textbf{domain of determination} \( \text{DDI}_p \).

From the definition we can easily find truth conditions (truth tables) of sentence constructions for the function. If arguments of the construction are classical (\( \top \) or \( \bot \)), then the value is classical too, given by the classical conditions. If some arguments have a value the undetermined (\( | \) ), then we investigate if this failure propagates to the determination of the value of the
construction on the classical conditions. If this is the case, then the value is also equal to the undetermined, and if it is not the case, the value is the classical one. For example, the value of the sentence $\varphi \land \psi$ for $\varphi$ undetermined and $\psi$ false is false because on the classical conditions it is sufficient that at least one sentence is false (here it is $\psi$) for the whole sentence to be false. But if $\psi$ is true then the truth value of the compound sentence essentially depends on a truth value of $\varphi$. According to the classical conditions, if $\varphi$ is true then the conjunction is also true, and if $\varphi$ is false then it is false, too. But $\varphi$ is undetermined, so the failure propagates through the conjunction which is therefore undetermined, too. In such way the following **truth value conditions of the primary semantics** $I_p$ are given: on

1. $I_p(\neg \varphi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I_p(\varphi) = \bot \\ \bot & \text{for } I_p(\varphi) = \top \\ \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

| $\varphi$ | $\neg \varphi$ |
|---------|----------------|
| $\top$  | $\bot$         |
| $\bot$  | $\top$         |
|         | $\bot$         |

2. $I_p(\varphi \land \psi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I_p(\varphi) = \top \text{ and } I_p(\psi) = \top \text{ (both are true)} \\ \bot & \text{for } I_p(\varphi) = \bot \text{ or } I_p(\psi) = \bot \text{ (at least one is false)} \\ \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

| $\varphi$ \ $\psi$ | $\top$ | $\bot$ | $\bot$ | $\bot$ |
|---------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| $\top$              | $\top$| $\bot$| $\bot$| $\bot$|
| $\bot$              | $\bot$| $\top$| $\bot$| $\bot$|
| $\bot$              | $\bot$| $\bot$| $\bot$| $\bot$|

3. $I_p(\varphi \lor \psi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I_p(\varphi) = \top \text{ or } I_p(\psi) = \top \text{ (at least one is true)} \\ \bot & \text{for } I_p(\varphi) = \bot \text{ and } I_p(\psi) = \bot \text{ (both are false)} \\ \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
4. $I_p(\varphi \to \psi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I_p(\varphi) = \bot \text{ or } I_p(\psi) = \top \\ \bot & \text{for } I_p(\varphi) = \top \text{ and } I_p(\psi) = \bot \\ \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\varphi \setminus \psi & \top & \bot & | \\
\hline
\top & \top & \top & | \\
\bot & \top & \bot & | \\
| & \top & | & |
\end{array}
\]

5. $I_p(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{for } I_p(\varphi) = I_p(\psi) \neq | \text{ (both are true or both are false) } \\
\bot & \text{for } I_p(\varphi) \neq I_p(\psi) \text{ and none value is } | \\
& \text{(one is true and the other is false) } \\
& \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\varphi \setminus \psi & \top & \bot & | \\
\hline
\top & \top & \bot & | \\
\bot & \top & \top & | \\
| & \top & | & |
\end{array}
\]

6. $I_p(\forall x \varphi(x)) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } \forall a \in DLT I_p(\varphi(\bar{a})) = \top \\ \bot & \text{if } \exists a \in DLT I_p(\varphi(\bar{a})) = \bot \\ \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

7. $I_p(\exists x \varphi(x)) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } \exists a \in DLT I_p(\varphi(\bar{a})) = \top \\ \bot & \text{if } \forall a \in DLT I_p(\varphi(\bar{a})) = \bot \\ \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Let’s note that all connectives and quantors except $\leftrightarrow$ preserve their classical meaning.
These conditions on a threevalued truth function are known in literature as Strong Kleene threevalued semantics (see for example [GB93]). Usually, it is interpreted as a semantics of a success of parallel algorithms or as a semantics of truth value investigations of sentences in a sense that sentences which hasn’t yet a truth value are declared as undetermined. Here it is interpreted as the classical procedure of truth value determination extended by the propagation of its own failure.

Concerning the truth predicate the classical determination of truth value of $T(\bar{\varphi})$ fails precisely when determination of truth value of $\bar{\varphi}$ fails. So, $I_p$ obeys the following

$$I_p(T(\bar{\varphi})) = I_p(\varphi)$$

The function which obeys the additional condition is called a fixed point of Strong Kleene semantics.

From the uniqueness condition on $I_c$ on its domain it follows an appropriate uniqueness condition on $I_p$ on the domain of its determination $DD(I_p)$. Namely, for every fixed point $I$ if the sentence $\varphi$ belongs to $DD(I) \cap DD(I_p)$ (both valuations have a determined value on it) then $I(\varphi) = I_p(\varphi)$. It is easy to prove that it is equivalent to the following condition on compatibility with other fixed points:

For every fixed point $I$ of Strong Kleene semantics it is true that

1. $I_p(\varphi) = \top \rightarrow I(\varphi) = \top$ or $I(\varphi) = |$

2. $I_p(\varphi) = \bot \rightarrow I(\varphi) = \bot$ or $I(\varphi) = |$

Such fixed point is called an intrinsic point.

The maximality condition of the function $I_c$ entails the maximality condition on $I_p$ — for every other intrinsic fixed point $I$ $DD(I) \subseteq DD(I_p)$.

Therefore $I_p$ is a maximal intrinsic fixed point of the Strong Kleene semantics. It is well known (for details see for example [GB93]) that there is a unique such point and it entails that there is a unique classical truth value function $I_c$. Namely, for such $I_p$ we can define $I_c : ST \sim \{\top, \bot\}$ such that $D(I_c) = DD(I_p)$ and for every $\varphi \in D(I_c) I_c(\varphi) = I_p(\varphi)$. It is easy to see that $I_c$ satisfies all conditions on a classical truth value function. So it is proved

**Theorem.** There is a unique classical truth value function $I_c$ of the language $LT$.

With this result the primary semantics of the language $LT$ is completely determined. Because in its threevalued formulation it is precisely the maximal intrinsic fixed point of the Strong Kleene semantics this analysis of the
classical procedure and its failures gives an argument for the choice between various fixed point of various threevalued semantics.

The **Final semantics** $I_f$ of the language $LT$ is achieved, as it has already been described in the first section, by taking the primary semantics for its subject. The truth predicate will talk again about truth value of sentences in the primary semantics, but now in the frame of the final semantics. Therefore, all other semantical specifications remain the same like in the primary semantics, except for truth values of its atomic sentences of the form $T(\bar{\varphi})$ which now has an external specification:

$$
I_f(T(\bar{\varphi})) = \begin{cases} 
\top & \text{for } I_p(\varphi) = \top \\
\bot & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
$$

Now the function $I_f$ has given values $\top$ or $\bot$ on all atomic sentences. As it obeys all classical conditions on truth values of compound sentences it is a classical total twovalued truth function. By the recursion principle on the sentence structure there is a unique such function $I_f : ST \rightarrow \{\top, \bot\}$.

From the following definitions it is clear that by the predicate $T$ we can describe the remaining truth values of the primary semantics:

$F(\bar{\varphi}) \leftrightarrow T(\neg \bar{\varphi})$  
$U(\bar{\varphi}) \leftrightarrow \neg F(\bar{\varphi}) \land \neg T(\bar{\varphi})$

It is also convenient to introduce a predicate “to have a determinate truth value”

$$D(\bar{\varphi}) \leftrightarrow F(\bar{\varphi}) \lor T(\bar{\varphi})$$

To gain better insight in expressive power of the final semantics some sentences, which are true in it, will be listed. The proofs are not given because they are straightforward.

First of all, in the final semantics sentences which express its consistency are true. Namely, for every sentence $\varphi$ it is true

$$\neg(T(\bar{\varphi}) \land F(\bar{\varphi}))$$

The following truths are direct descriptions of truth tables of Strong Kleene semantics:

1. denial:

   (a) $T(\neg \bar{\varphi}) \leftrightarrow F(\bar{\varphi})$
   (b) $F(\neg \bar{\varphi}) \leftrightarrow T(\bar{\varphi})$
   (c) $U(\neg \bar{\varphi}) \leftrightarrow U(\bar{\varphi})$

2. conjuction:

   (a) $T(\bar{\varphi} \land \bar{\psi}) \leftrightarrow T(\bar{\varphi}) \land T(\bar{\psi})$
   (b) $F(\bar{\varphi} \land \bar{\psi}) \leftrightarrow F(\bar{\varphi}) \lor F(\bar{\psi})$
(c) \( U(\varphi \land \psi) \leftrightarrow (T(\varphi) \land U(\psi)) \lor (U(\varphi) \land T(\psi)) \lor (U(\varphi) \land U(\psi)) \)

3. disjunction:
   (a) \( T(\varphi \lor \psi) \leftrightarrow T(\varphi) \lor T(\psi) \)
   (b) \( F(\varphi \lor \psi) \leftrightarrow F(\varphi) \land F(\psi) \)
   (c) \( U(\varphi \lor \psi) \leftrightarrow (F(\varphi) \land U(\psi)) \lor (U(\varphi) \land F(\psi)) \lor (U(\varphi) \land U(\psi)) \)

4. conditional:
   (a) \( T(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \leftrightarrow F(\varphi) \lor T(\psi) \)
   (b) \( F(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \leftrightarrow T(\varphi) \land F(\psi) \)
   (c) \( U(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \leftrightarrow (T(\varphi) \land U(\psi)) \lor (U(\varphi) \land F(\psi)) \lor (U(\varphi) \land U(\psi)) \)

5. biconditional:
   (a) \( T(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) \leftrightarrow (T(\varphi) \land T(\psi)) \lor (F(\varphi) \land F(\psi)) \)
   (b) \( F(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) \leftrightarrow (T(\varphi) \land F(\psi)) \lor (F(\varphi) \land T(\psi)) \)
   (c) \( U(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) \leftrightarrow U(\varphi) \lor U(\psi) \)

6. universal quantification:
   (a) \( T(\forall x \varphi(x)) \leftrightarrow \forall x T(\varphi(x)) \)
   (b) \( F(\forall x \varphi(x)) \leftrightarrow \exists x F(\varphi(x)) \)
   (c) \( U(\forall x \varphi(x)) \leftrightarrow \neg \exists x F(\varphi(x)) \land \exists x U(\varphi(x)) \)

7. existential quantification:
   (a) \( T(\exists x \varphi(x)) \leftrightarrow \exists x T(\varphi(x)) \)
   (b) \( F(\exists x \varphi(x)) \leftrightarrow \forall x F(\varphi(x)) \)
   (c) \( U(\exists x \varphi(x)) \leftrightarrow \neg \exists x T(\varphi(x)) \land \exists x U(\varphi(x)) \)

The iteration of the truth predicate is not interesting because the following is true:

1. \( T(T(\overline{\varphi})) \leftrightarrow T(\varphi) \)
2. \( F(T(\overline{\varphi})) \leftrightarrow F(\varphi) \)
3. \( T(F(\overline{\varphi})) \leftrightarrow F(\varphi) \)
4. \( F(F(\overline{\varphi})) \leftrightarrow T(\varphi) \)
Previous rules reduce the investigation of the truth value of a sentence $\varphi$ in the primary semantics, that is to say an investigation of truth values of $T(\bar{\varphi})$ and $F(\bar{\varphi})$ in the final semantics, to an investigation of truth values in the final semantics of atomic sentences of the form $T(t)$ and $F(t)$, where $t$ is a name of an object which isn’t a sentence, or $t = \bar{\psi}$ where $\psi$ is an atomic sentence which doesn’t begin with predicate $T$ or $F$, or it is a sentence constant. In first two cases the answer is simple:

- If $t$ isn’t a name of a sentence then $\neg T(t) \land \neg F(t)$
- If $\psi$ is an atomic sentence which doesn’t began with $T$ or $F$ then
  1. $T(\bar{\psi}) \leftrightarrow \psi$
  2. $F(\bar{\psi}) \leftrightarrow \neg \psi$

Therefore, what remains is to determine truth values of sentences $T(C)$ and $F(C)$ where $C$ is a sentence constant. It is the most interesting part of the language because selfreferent sentences are constructed by the sentence constants. Principally we can determine truth values of such sentences by the analysis of the primary semantics, but it is interesting to see in what amount selfreference and intuitive argumentation leading to paradoxes in the classical language can be reproduced in the language $LT$. In an intuitive argumentation a transition from assumption about truth value of a sentence to acception or rejection of what it says is a crucial step. At first sight we can describe it in the final semantics using the sentences

$$T(C) \rightarrow C \quad \text{and} \quad F(C) \rightarrow \neg C$$

But there is a technical problem that $C$ is a sentence constant which names a sentence, let’s say $d(C)$, and not the sentence itself. So a correct description is

1. $T(C) \rightarrow d(C)$
2. $F(C) \rightarrow \neg d(C)$

For example, the sentence constant $\overline{LL}$ names $d(\overline{LL}) = \neg T(\overline{LL})$ (the Strong Liar) so its description in $LT$ is

1. $T(\overline{LL}) \rightarrow \neg T(\overline{LL})$
2. $F(\overline{LL}) \rightarrow \neg \neg T(\overline{LL})$
Using the description we can translate the intuitive argumentation in the language $LT$. Let $T(LL)$ be true. Then, by the first description, $\neg T(LL)$ is true and it is a contradiction. If we assume $F(LL)$ then, by the second description, $\neg\neg T(LL)$, that is $T(LL)$ is true and it is also in a contradiction with the statement of consistency of the primary semantics $\neg (T(\varphi) \land F(\varphi))$. So, $U(LL)$. Particulary, it means that $\neg T(LL)$. Therefore, we showed in the language $LT$ that the Strong Liar is undetermined in the primary semantics and true in the final semantics.

In the same way, every paradox which leads to a contradiction in a classical semantics can be translated in an argumentation in the final semantics which states truth values of a sentence in the primary and final semantics. But, as it has already been shown in the previous section in an informal way, such description is not sufficient to state truth values of selfreference sentences, which don’t lead to a contradiction, but permit one truth valuation (as the Logician) or more (as the Truthteller). For example, for the Truthteller the description is

1. $T(I) \rightarrow T(I)$
2. $F(I) \rightarrow \neg T(I)$

But it is true for every sentence and we can deduce nothing about the Truthteller. In such cases it is necessary to look at the semantical graph and state the primary valuation of the sentence $\varphi$ to know in the language $LT$ what is a truth value of $T(\varphi)$ and of $\varphi$.

We will display some other principles which talk about the truth predicate $T$ (and $F$). Of course, we know that Tarski’s schema $T(\varphi) \leftrightarrow \varphi$ for every $\varphi$ is not valid ([Tar35]). Here, it is a consequence of the fact that $T$ is not a truth predicate for the final, but for the primary semantics of the language. But it is true that the final semantics is an extension of the primary one by the description of its failures. Everything true in the primary semantics is true in the final semantics, and everything false in the primary one is false in the final one, that is for every sentence $\varphi$ it is true:

1. $T(\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi$
2. $F(\varphi) \rightarrow \neg \varphi$

Of course, for sentences which have a definite truth value in the primary semantics the converse is also true:

$D(\varphi) \rightarrow (T(\varphi) \leftrightarrow \varphi) \land (F(\varphi) \leftrightarrow \neg \varphi)$

For $\varphi_1$ and $\varphi_2$ logically equivalent sentences in classical logic it is true that they are logically equivalent in the primary semantics, so it is true in the final semantics:
1. $T(\varphi_1) \leftrightarrow T(\varphi_2)$
2. $F(\varphi_1) \leftrightarrow F(\varphi_2)$
3. $U(\varphi_1) \leftrightarrow U(\varphi_2)$
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