BENEFITS FOR THE PRUSSIAN ARMY BY THE INHABITANTS OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF POZNAŃ BETWEEN 1815–1844. STATE OF RESEARCH AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES

Zarys treści: Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie wyników wstępnych badań zagadnienia świadczeń na rzecz wojska w Wielkim Księstwie Poznańskim w latach 1815–1844. Temat ten jest nieobecny w polskiej historiografii, a w literaturze niemieckiej został poruszony jedynie w nieobiektywnych publikacjach wydanych przed 1945 r. Dlatego konieczna jest aktualizacja obecnego stanu wiedzy, zwłaszcza w celu zidentyfikowania grupy istotnych źródeł w archiwach polskich i niemieckich. W artykule przedstawiono stan badań w tym zakresie, omówiono kluczowe aspekty organizacyjne i strukturalne obecności wojsk pruskich w Wielkopolsce oraz nakreślono katalog głównych kategorii świadczeń na rzecz wojska w omawianym okresie. Postulaty badawcze sformułowane na tej podstawie stanowią przyczynek do planowanych badań nad kwestią wpływu świadczeń wojskowych na sytuację materialną mieszkańców prowincji.

The content outline: The aim of the article is to present the results of a preliminary study into the issue of benefits for the army in the Grand Duchy of Poznań in 1815–1844. This subject is absent from Polish historiography, while in German literature it was only addressed in biased works written before 1945. It is therefore necessary to update the current body of knowledge, especially in order to identify a significant group of sources in German and Polish archives. This article presents the state of research on the issue, the key organizational and structural aspects of the presence of Prussian troops in Greater Poland, and finally a catalogue of the main groups of benefits for the army in the discussed period. The research postulates formulated on this basis constitute an introduction to the planned studies on the problem of the impact of benefits on the material situation of the inhabitants of the province.

Słowa kluczowe: świadczenia, podatki, armia, Królestwo Prus, Wielkie Księstwo Poznańskie, kwaterunek, zaopatrzenie wojsk
The impact of the presence of the partitioning powers’ armies on the socio-economic life within Polish lands after 1815 remains an insufficiently and unevenly studied issue. In this regard, I agree with one of the most distinguished researchers in this field, Michał Baczkowski, who has argued that this topic did not arouse serious interest amongst researchers until the late 1980s. Baczkowski, an outstanding expert on the subject of the Austrian partition, accurately identifies two reasons for this state of affairs. On the one hand, researchers in the immediate post-partition period were reluctant to show the history of the armies of the three empires in a positive light, and on the other, relevant source materials, located mainly in foreign archives, were difficult to access after 1945. It is also true that researchers have focused their attention primarily on the second half of the nineteenth century, as a period directly related to the outbreak of World War I. These conclusions, formulated primarily in the Galician context, are for the most part also relevant to the area of the Russian partition in the nineteenth century. Especially with regards to the Kingdom of Poland, one can point to several studies discussing such issues as the dislocation of the Tsarist army, the conscription of Polish nationals into the Imperial Army, transport policies, or the region’s military potential.

1 M. Baczkowski, Galicja a wojsko austriackie 1772–1867, Kraków, 2017, pp. 8–9; id., Pod czarno-żółtymi sztandarami. Galicja i jej mieszkańcy wobec austro-węgierskich struktur militarnych 1868–1914, Kraków, 2003, pp. 6–7.
2 For more on the above, see id., “Znaczenie armii austriackiej dla rozwoju cywilizacyjnego Galicji (1848–1918),” Kwartałnik Historyczny, 2009, No. 2, pp. 71–90.
3 A. Dobroński, “Dyslokacja wojsk rosyjskich w Królestwie Polskim przed I wojną światową,” Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. 20, 1976, pp. 241–284; M. Kulik, Armia rosyjska w Królestwie Polskim w latach 1815–1856, Warszawa, 2019; id., “Dokumentacja dyslokacji oddziałów rosyjskich na ziemiach polskich (przełom XIX i XX wieku),” in: Dzieje biurokracji na ziemiach polskich, ed. by A. Górak, K. Latawiec, D. Magier, vol. 4, pt. 1, Lublin and Siedlce, 2011, pp. 569–583; id., “Warszawski Okręg Wojskowy Rosyjskiej Cesarskiej Armii w latach 1895–1914,” Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, 224, 2008, No. 4, pp. 5–24; K. Latawiec, “Rosyjskie siły zbrojne na obszarze guberni lubelskiej w latach 1864–1914,” Teka Komisji Historycznej Oddziału Lubelskiego Polskiej Akademii Nauk, vol. 1, 2006, pp. 124–144; Ł. Madej, “Zmiany w liczebności i potencjale bojowym wojsk rosyjskich w Królestwie Polskim w XIX i na początku XX wieku,” Studia z dziejów wojskowości, vol. 1, 2012, pp. 182–211.
4 W. Caban, Służba rekrutów Królestwa Polskiego w armii carskiej w latach 1831–1873, Warszawa, 2001; M. Kulik, “Polacy w jednostkach Rosyjskiej Gwardii
The situation is slightly different when it comes to the last of the partitions, namely the lands which formed part of the Kingdom of Prussia between 1815–1919. In this context, Baczkowski’s conclusions formulated in relation to Galicia remain valid, i.e. that the impact of the Prussian armed forces on the economic life of Polish lands under the Hohenzollern rule has never been thoroughly studied by Polish historians. Considering the above, I have decided to focus the present article on the issues surrounding the benefits for the army by the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Poznań (Posen). Due to the dearth of research regarding this subject, this study has only a preliminary character. The article is based on official publications and archival material found in the collections of the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (the Secret State Archives Prussian Cultural Heritage – hereinafter GStA PK) in Berlin-Dahlem and the State Archive (hereinafter APP, as in Archiwum Państwowe) in Poznań. I would like to present a draft catalogue of the benefits mentioned above and reconstruct the formal framework of their functioning. In addition, based on the cases already identified at this stage of research, I would like to put forward several issues which need considering in the future.

The chronological scope of the research has deliberately been limited to the years 1815–1844, which includes both the clear turning point marked by the Prussian military’s return to Greater Poland, and two normative events that were crucial in shaping the eventual form of the benefits. In 1844, the Grand Duchy of Poznań’s tax system underwent a process of unification which eliminated the last remaining peculiarities from the pre-partition period. This had a significant impact on the population with regards to how military benefits were provided.

w Warszawie na przełomie XIX i XX wieku,” Niepodległość i Pamięć, 37–40, 2012, No. 1–4, pp. 37–53.

5 T. Kociatkiewicz, Stan sieci kolejowej Królestwa Polskiego przed wojną w 1914 r., Warszawa, 1914; M. Krzysica, “Rola czynników wojskowo-politycznych w budowie kolei żelaznych w Królestwie Polskim,” in: Studia z dziejów kolei żelaznych w Królestwie Polskim (1840–1914), ed. by R. Kołodziejczyk, Warszawa, 1970, pp. 9–44.

6 A. Dobroński, Potencjał militarny Królestwa Polskiego w latach 1907–1914, Warszawa, 1976; J. Froehlich, Królestwo Polskie jako teren strategiczny. Studium wojskowo-geograficzne, Warszawa, 1911; Z. Mieczysławski [J. Piłsudski], Gieografja militarna Królestwa Polskiego, Warszawa, 1910.

7 M. Baczkowski, Pod czarno-żółtymi..., p. 183.

8 „Verordnung über die anderwiete Regulirung der Grundsteuer in der Provinz Posen. Vom. 14. October 1844,” in: Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlich Preußischen Staaten 1844, No. 39, pp. 601–608 and related ordinances; see: J. Wąsicki, Ziemie polskie pod zaborem pruskim. Wielkie Księstwo Poznańskie 1815–1848. Studium historycznoprawne, Warszawa and Poznań 1980, pp. 199–203.
The same year, a new mobilization plan was introduced by the Kingdom of Prussia,\(^9\) which strongly interfered with several rules related to the duties of subjects in peacetime and during war.\(^10\) Therefore, I would argue that the year 1844 was an important watershed moment in the development of the formal aspects of military benefits, which allows me to expand the present discussion beyond a purely political context. The conclusions drawn from this study will form the basis for further planned research regarding the nature and the consequences which specific forms of benefits had on the socio-economic life of Greater Poland under Prussian rule.

**State of research**

When assessing the state of Polish historiography with regards to the issue raised above, it should be noted that, in contrast to the variety of reliable studies concerning the presence of Prussian troops in Polish territories between 1795–1806,\(^11\) the period following the signing of the Final Act at the Vienna Congress is sparingly described in literature. It is enough to say that until recently, the only works to deal with the subject of Poles serving in the Prussian army were preliminary articles by Witold Molik and Waldemar Rezmer.\(^12\) The hundredth anniversary of the signing of the Final Act, 1844, which was the year of the new mobilization plan, should thus be considered more an important moment in the history of the Kingdom of Prussia than in the history of Greater Poland. However, the study of that period and the motivations behind the new plan is a crucial point in understanding the socio-economic consequences of the Prussian invasion and the nature of benefits that were provided to the Poles who served in the Prussian army.

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\(^9\) Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin-Dahlem (hereinafter: GStA PK), IV. HA Preußische Armee, Rep. 16 Militärvorschriften, No. 643, Mobilmachungsplan für die preußische Armee, 10 Apr 1844. Information on the development of the plan and its implementation; GStA PK, I. HA, Ministerium des Innern (MdI), Rep. 77, Tit. 332r, No. 7, Bd. 4 and Bd. 5, Kommission zur Entwurfung eines Mobilmachungsplanes, Bd. 4, 1832–1843 and Bd. 5, 1844–1853.

\(^10\) See F. Meinecke, *Das Leben des Generalfeldmarschalls Hermann von Boyen*, vol. 2: 1815–1847, Stuttgart, 1899, pp. 530–533.

\(^11\) J. Kosim, “Pruskie plany z 1796 r. poboru mieszkańców Warszawy do wojska,” in: *Społeczeństwo polskie XVIII i XIX wieku: studia o uwarstwieniu i ruchliwości społecznej*, ed. by J. Leśkiewicz, vol. 6, Warszawa, 1974, pp. 89–107; id., *Okupacja pruska i konspiracje rewolucyjne w Warszawie 1796–1806*, Wroclaw, 1976. Several aspects of the issue have recently been brought back to light and supplemented with interesting insights concerning the lodging and supply of Prussian troops; Z. Włodarczyk, “Wojsko w mieście. Żołnierze Hohenzollernów w Prusach Południowych (1793–1806),” *Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia historica*, 103, 2019, pp. 73–88; id., “Siedziby kamer wojennomo-ekonomicznych w Prusach Południowych (1793–1806),” *Poznański Rocznik Archiwalno-Historyczny*, vol. 8/9, 2001–2002, pp. 83–89.

\(^12\) W. Molik, “Polacy w korpusie oficerskim armii pruskiej w XIX i początkach XX wieku. Casus Kazimierza Raszewskiego,” in: *Polacy i osoby polskiego pochodzenia w siłach zbrojnych i policji państw obcych*, Toruń, 2001, pp. 299–309; W. Rezmer, “Polacy w korpusie oficerskim armii niemieckiej w I wojnie światowej (1914–1918),” in: *Społeczeństwo polskie na ziemiach pod panowaniem pruskim w okresie I wojny światowej (1914–1918)*, ed. by M. Wojciechowski, Toruń, 1996, pp. 137–148.
Benefits for the Prussian army by the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy

Sary of the outbreak of World War I sparked a new wave of interest in this topic, mainly in relation to the Great War\(^\text{13}\); however, the most valuable and comprehensive contemporary studies regarding the entire period between 1815–1919 are still works by German authors.\(^\text{14}\) Although these studies do discuss the important social aspect of universal military service, they do not contribute much new information to the state of knowledge when it comes to the economic and civilizational aspects of the issue. Only sparse information can be derived from analyzing the numerous works concerning the development of the railway network in the Prussian partition, all of which are imbued with the conviction that the army had a positive impact on the region, despite the fact that only local arguments were used to support such claims.\(^\text{15}\)

There are also a few papers regarding the role played by Polish lands within the Prussian military system, but these are, unfortunately, based entirely on secondary literature, which makes them completely derivative.\(^\text{16}\) Studies developed in Poland after World War II that dealt strictly with the Prussian and German military are marked by an understandable aversion to the German army. The military history of Prussia was presented as a one-dimensional narrative leading directly to the Nazi era.\(^\text{17}\) It is easy to deduce that under such circumstances it was difficult to even think about using the rich resources of the State Archive

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\(^{13}\) R. Kaczmarek, *Polacy w armii kajzera. Na frontach I wojny światowej*, Kraków, 2014; B. Kruszyński, *Kaczmarek-regimenty. Niemiecka 10. Dywizja Piechoty podczas fazy wstępnej I wojny światowej w roku 1914*, Poznań, 2018.

\(^{14}\) D. Bangert, "Polnischer Adel-österreichisches und preußisches Heer. Das Verhältnis des polnischen Adels zur k. k. Armee und zur kgl. Preußischen Armee 1816–1914," *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung. Länder und Völker im östlichen Mitteleuropa*, 1, 1972, pp. 466–521; J. Boysen, *Preußische Armee und die polnische Minderheit. Royalistische Streitkräfte im Kontext der Nationalitätenfrage des 19 Jahrhunderts (1815–1914)*, Marburg, 2008; see also: id., "Faktoren der Integration bzw. Abstinentz polnischer Adliger und Nichtadliger gegenüber dem Preußischen Heer nach 1815," *Militär und Gesellschaft in der frühen Neuzeit*, 2013, No. 1, pp. 65–84.

\(^{15}\) See J. Jędrysiak, "Wpływ czynników wojskowych na rozwój sieci kolejowej byłego zaboru pruskiego," in: *Gospodarczy bilans otwarcia polskiej niepodległości*, ed. by T. Głowiński, M. Zawadka, Wrocław, 2018, pp. 227–248.

\(^{16}\) K. Oleijnik, “Wielkopolska i Ziemia Lubuska w systemie militarnym państwa pruskiego i Drugiej Rzeczy w latach 1795–1918,” in: *Działania militarne w Wielkopolsce i na Ziemi Lubuskiej*, ed. by W. Wróblewski, Warszawa, 2002, pp. 201–219; L. Turek-Kwiatkowska, “Wojsko w miastach pomorskich w XIX wieku: stosunki demograficzne,” in: *Działania militarne na Pomorzu*, ed. by W. Wróblewski, Warszawa, 2001, pp. 167–184.

\(^{17}\) L. Moczulska, *Miecz Nibelungów. Zarys historii armii pruskiej i niemieckiej 1618–1967*, Warszawa, 1967, p. 6; A.J. Kamiński, *Militaryzm niemiecki. Główne zagadnienia społeczne i polityczne*, Warszawa, 1962, pp. 7–53, 440–459.
in Poznań. In the Polish People’s Republic, for understandable reasons, the aversion to the military institutions of the partitioning powers was prolonged and sustained, resulting in military aspects being poorly represented in works devoted to the political and economic history of the Prussian partition.\(^\text{18}\)

As a result, the last proper attempts to investigate this topic were made by German authors, especially Manfred Laubert with his tireless documentation of Prussian presence in Greater Poland. The main advantage of Laubert’s works is undoubtedly his extensive use of archival sources from Berlin and Poznań, including material destroyed during World War II.\(^\text{19}\) An extensive chapter in Laubert’s flagship volume *Die Verwaltung der Provinz Posen 1815–1847*,\(^\text{20}\) which deals with many issues pertinent to the present study, probably constitutes the only attempt to actually describe the coexistence of the Prussian army with the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Poznań. Unfortunately, like in other works by the same author, the narrative is focused on one goal – to highlight the endemic hostility of the Polish population towards Prussian orders.\(^\text{21}\) Hence, by using selective examples, Laubert tried to prove that Poles had been consistently rejecting the “Prussian good will,” offered also in the context of the military organization of the province. This statement was of course based on random reports by Prussian officers previously published by the author, which depicted the attitude of the Hohenzollern subjects in Greater Poland in an unflattering manner.\(^\text{22}\)

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\(^{18}\) S. Karkowski, *Historya Wielkiego Księstwa Poznańskiego*, vol. 1: 1815–1852, Poznań, 1918, pp. 7–11, 21; J. Kozłowski, *Wielkopolska pod zaborem pruskim 1815–1918*, Poznań, 2004, pp. 64–65; C. Łuczak, *Przemysł Wielkopolski w latach 1815–1870*, Warszawa, 1959, pp. 106–108; id., *Życie gospodarczo-społeczne w Poznaniu 1815–1918*, Poznań, 1965, pp. 25–27, 43, 209; F. Paprocki, *Wielkie Księstwo Poznańskie w okresie rządów Flottwella (1830–1842)*, Poznań, 1970, pp. 32–33, 71, 81–82, 92–110, 133–137, 159–160, 174; J. Wąsicki, op. cit., pp. 197–199.

\(^{19}\) K. Kaczmarczyk, “Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu w czasie okupacji niemieckiej,” *Archeion*, vol. 17, 1948, pp. 84–100.

\(^{20}\) M. Laubert, *Die Verwaltung der Provinz Posen 1815–1847*, Breslau, 1923, pp. 92–113.

\(^{21}\) “Keine der von Preußen eingeführten Neuerungen hat mit so starkem Widerwille der Bewohner zu kämpfen gehabt wie die Heeresorganisation mit ihrem demokratischen Prinzip der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht,” ibid., p. 92. For opinions on Laubert see: W. Jakóbczyk, “[rec:] Manfred Laubert, *Die Preussische Polenpolitik von 1772–1914. Dritte verbesserte Auflage*. Kraków 1944,” *Roczniki Historyczne*, vol. 17, 1948, No. 1, pp. 254–257; F. Paprocki, op. cit., pp. 5–7.

\(^{22}\) M. Laubert, “Die Berichte des Majors von Royer-Luehnes über Posen und Polen 1816/1817,” in: id., *Studien zur Geschichte der Provinz Posen in der ersten Hälfte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, Posen, 1908, pp. 66–116; id., “Ein Bericht des komman-
Laubert always put special emphasis on the case of General Antoni Amilkar Kosinski and the failed attempt to establish units consisting of Polish nationals, with the events presented exclusively from the Prussian point of view,\(^\text{23}\) with a very selective use of the general’s published correspondence.\(^\text{24}\) This tendency is particularly evident in the reports sent to Berlin by Eduard von Flottwell and Karl von Grolman, which, while interesting, are also extremely critical of Prussia’s Polish subjects – not surprisingly, considering the period in which they were published.\(^\text{25}\) Laubert was obviously not the only scholar whose work addressed issues concerning the Prussian army in Greater Poland. A series of articles written by Hugo Sommer, devoted to topics such as the military garrisons of Poznań\(^\text{26}\) and other cities in Greater Poland\(^\text{27}\) as well as the history of Poznań’s General Command (Generalkommando),\(^\text{28}\) were published in *Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für Polen*, a German scientific journal printed in Poznań during the interwar period. All these studies share strong anti-Polish overtones, which was a typical feature of local research of the time. However, they may potentially constitute a good starting point for future Polish authors, as they indicate potential topics of discussion and materials that could be used in studying the subject from the native perspective. So far, they have only been used selectively and in an insufficient way. This state of affairs has prompted me to attempt to provide a list of requisite benefits for the army in Greater Poland between 1815–1844.

\(^\text{23}\) M. Laubert, “Die Anstellung des Generals von Kosinski in der preußischen Armee 1817,” *Historische Monatsblätter für die Provinz Posen*, 1904, No. 12, pp. 191–201; id., “Die Errichtung einer Posener Nationalkavallerie nach 1815,” *Die Ostmark*, 1921, No. 7, pp. 72–73; id., “Generalleutnant von Kosinski in preußischen Diensten,” *Historische Monatsblätter für die Provinz Posen*, 1913, No. 6, p. 93.

\(^\text{24}\) Zbiór korespondencji J. Amilkara Kosińskiego z lat 1815–1820 tyczącej się formacji siły zbrojnej narodowej w W. Księstwie Poznańskiem oraz stosunku W. Księstwa do monarchii pruskiej, Poznań, 1861.

\(^\text{25}\) M. Laubert, “Militaria in laufenden Immediatberichten Grolmans und des Oberpräsidenten Flottwell,” *Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift im Wartheland*, 1943, No. 7/8, pp. 33–39.

\(^\text{26}\) H. Sommer, “Die Stadt Posen als preußischer Truppenstandort von 1815 bis 1918,” *Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für Polen*, 1928, No. 12, pp. 130–153.

\(^\text{27}\) Id., “Preußische militärische Standorte im Posener Lande, in Westpreußen und Oberschlesien,” *Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für Polen*, 1933, No. 25, pp. 51–92.

\(^\text{28}\) Id., “Das Generalkommando in Posen von 1815-1918,” *Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für Polen*, 1930, No. 19, pp. 55–106.
The Prussian army in the Grand Duchy of Poznań 1815–1844

Any presentation regarding benefits for the army in the Grand Duchy of Poznań in my opinion requires a brief description of how the Prussian armed forces operated after 1815 and the organizational problems they encountered in Greater Poland. These issues have been accurately and sufficiently highlighted in Polish historiography. The main architect behind the reorganization of the Prussian army was Hermann von Boyen, who was the Minister of War between 1814–1819. The system introduced by Boyen, who believed the main problem of the military was that prior to 1806 the size of the so-called “old army” had been incongruous with the demographic and economic capabilities of the state, was based on several key pillars. The success of the spontaneous uprising of Prussian subjects in 1813 gave Boyen the impetus to implement his ideal scenario of a true national army (Volksarmee), which was to become the foundation for the future reconstruction of the entire state system. According to Boyen’s calculations, the adoption of the new system in 1814 enabled Prussia to muster an impressive number of 271,461 soldiers out of a population of 4.5 million. Based on available reports, Curt Jany calculated that in November 1815 Prussia could have had as many as 358,000 people under arms. The problem was replicating these numbers in peacetime, after the enthusiasm surrounding the anti-Napoleonic uprising had waned. A step in the right direction was undoubtedly the introduction of universal military service, proclaimed in the Wehrgesetz of September 3, 1814. All men over the age of 20 (if certain requirements were met, the age could be reduced to 18) were

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29 “Boyens Darstellung der Grundsätze der alten und der gegenwärtigen preußischen Kriegsverfassung,” ed. by M. Lehmann, Historische Zeitung, Neue Folge 37, 1891, pp. 56–80.
30 F. Meinecke, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 134–141; H. Stübig, Armee und Nation. Die pädagogisch-politischen Motive der preußischen Heeresreform, Frankfurt am Main, 1971, pp. 239–256; id., “Heer und Nation. Zur Entwicklung der pädagogisch-politischen Ideen Hermann von Boyens,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, vol. 58, 1999, pp. 1–22.
31 “Boyens Darstellung...,” pp. 65–67.
32 C. Jany, Geschichte der Königlich Preußischen Armee vom 15. Jahrhundert bis 1914, vol. 4: Die Königlich Preußische Armee und das Deutsche Reichsheer 1807 bis 1914, Berlin, 1933, p. 114.
33 “Gesetz über die Verpflichtung zum Kriegsdienste. Vom 3ten September 1814,” in: Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlich Preußischen Staaten 1814, Berlin, 1815, pp. 79–82.
obliged to defend the homeland as part of either the permanent army, the first or second call-up Landwehr, or the Landsturm.

In order to achieve combat readiness, the Prussian army needed to embark on a long and costly mobilization process. Its rules were only established in the plan approved on March 21, 1831,\(^{34}\) from whence one can fully speak about Prussia in terms of benefits in peacetime and at war. Due to budgetary problems, even during peacetime the number of Prussian troops did not nearly reach the requisite amount. According to Boyen’s calculations, there should have been 144,000 soldiers (representing 1.5% of the population),\(^{35}\) but in reality these numbers fluctuated between 121,000–130,000 in the years 1815–1840\(^{36}\); in the winter months, the number usually fell to around 100,000 due to cost cutting.\(^{37}\) This was despite Berlin allocating over 40% of state revenue to the army between 1821–1850.\(^{38}\) The problem increased during mobilization. Boyen calculated that in 1817 (with just over 10 million subjects\(^{39}\)), his system, in the event of war, would provide a total of 298,187 soldiers and 40,587 horses for the first call-up Landwehr and the army reserve. The second call-up Landwehr necessary to defend the province was to number 180,000 soldiers.\(^{40}\) According to the calculations contained in the annex to the 1831 mobilization plan,\(^{41}\) on a war footing the Prussian army was to number 12,494 officers and 493,397 soldiers, which constituted a field army of 9,196 officers and 353,239 soldiers and a reserve of 3,298 officers and 140,158 soldiers (from among almost 12.5 million subjects\(^{42}\)). A huge amount of effort and time was required to reach full-time military readiness. Increasing the number of horses in the army was a great challenge. According to Boyen, who made pertinent

\(^{34}\) State Archives in Poznań (hereinafter: APP), NP, ref. no. 567, Mobilmachungsplan für die Königliche Preußische Armee, Berlin, 21 Mar 1831.

\(^{35}\) F. Meinecke, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 125; D. Schmidt, Die preußische Landwehr. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der allgemeinen Wehrpﬂicht in Preußen zwischen 1813 und 1830, Berlin, 1981, p. 131.

\(^{36}\) “Statistik über die Entwicklung des Militäretats,” in: Das Königl. Preußische Kriegsministerium 1809 · 1. März · 1909, Berlin, 1909, pp. 147–157.

\(^{37}\) D. Walter, Preußische Heeresreformen 1807–1870: militärische Innovationen und der Mythos der „Roonschen Reform,” Paderborn, Wien, und München, 2003, p. 332.

\(^{38}\) Prusy w dobie kształtowania się kapitalizmu (1806–1871), ed. by G. Kucharczyk, Poznań, 2014, p. 340.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., p. 373.

\(^{40}\) “Boyens Darstellung...,” p. 73.

\(^{41}\) GStA PK, IV. HA Großer Generalstab, Kriegsarchiv, Rep. 15A, No. 851, Anhang XXXIV, Übersicht von der gesamten Stärke der Armee, inclusive Beamte, Hautboisten, Trainsoldaten, Handwerker, p.p., Berlin, 21 Mar 1831, f. 228.

\(^{42}\) Prusy w dobie..., p. 373.
calculations during his preparatory work on the mobilization plan in 1819, the Prussian army needed 100,257 animals during wartime, which was quite a considerable number when one takes into account that according to the calculations, the number of horses available in the entire territory of Prussia amounted to 1,363,239 in 1822 and to 1,402,352 in 1825. This was, of course, due to the incomplete status of units during peacetime. For example, in the event of mobilization line cavalry regiments were required to add a total of 488 horses to each regiment in order to reach the required number of 800 full-time mounts. According to data from the 1831 mobilization plan, Prussian needs in this area were calculated slightly lower, numbering 90,619 horses. As a result, data on the size of the mobilized army between 1830–1833 indicate that it deviated significantly from the set out objectives, although, of course, the entire force was never put on a war footing:

Table 1: The strength of the Prussian army in the years 1830–1833

| Date          | Soldiers | Horses | Guns |
|---------------|----------|--------|------|
| December 1830 | 190,462  | 31,068 | 428  |
| October 1831  | 210,476  | 42,091 | 544  |
| May 1832      | 155,531  | 33,654 | 512  |
| October 1832  | 132,891  | 32,590 | 512  |
| May 1833      | 130,702  | 28,926 | 404  |
| December 1833 | 115,460  | 28,108 | 388  |

Source: C. Jany, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 154.
Although in comparison to 1800, the percentage of Polish subjects amongst the Prussian population after 1815 dropped from 38% to 15%, they still constituted the largest minority. One-fifth of the territory of the Kingdom of Prussia consisted of Polish lands.\footnote{\textit{Handbuch der preußischen Geschichte}, vol. 2: \textit{Das 19 Jahrhundert und Große Themen der Geschichte Preußens}, ed. by O. Büsch, Berlin and New York, 1992, p. 101.} Greater Poland was a strong center of Polish nationalism and was therefore the object of particular mistrust on the part of a large portion of the Prussian political elite. Boyen acknowledged this state of affairs, hence in his project for the peacetime Prussian army structure presented in February 1815, no separate General Command (\textit{Generalkommando}) was to be created in the Grand Duchy of Poznań. These commands, each headed by a so-called \textit{Kommandierender General} (KG), were one of the most important elements of Boyen’s vision. The KG held the highest authority within their \textit{Kommando-Bezirk}, exercising supreme command over all military personnel in the province, as well as over governors and commanders of fortresses and major cities, unless the monarch ordered otherwise.\footnote{GStA PK, IV.HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 535, Abschrift: Verordnung über dem gegenwärtigen Wirkungskreis der Kommandierenden Generale in den Provinzen am rechten Elbeufer, Berlin, 28 Aug 1814, f. 1–4v.} Therefore, they were to be “provincial generals” responsible for all aspects pertaining to the defense of their subordinate region. Initially, the \textit{Verordnung} of April 30, 1815\footnote{”Verordnung wegen verbesserter Einrichtung der Provinzial-Behörden. Vom 30sten April 1815,” in: \textit{Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlich Preußischen Staaten 1815}, Berlin, 1815, pp. 85–98.} established five General Commands: Prussia, Brandenburg and Pomerania, Silesia and Poznań, Saxony, Rhineland-Westphalia.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 93–98; F. Meinecke, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 84–85.} It was also planned to exclude the so-called \textit{Netzedistrikt}, which due to a large number of German colonists was to form the V \textit{Generalkommando} together with the territories of Brandenburg and Pomerania. As a result of the intervention of Chancellor Karl von Hardenberg, who feared an exacerbation of nationalist sentiments triggered by the introduction of such a military structure within Polish lands, only the last ordinance was accepted;\footnote{F. Meinecke, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 84.} however, it was soon modified. In accordance with the royal order of May 14, 1815, on May 24 Lieutenant General Heinrich von Thümen took over the territories of the Bydgoszcz (Bromberg), Poznań and Kalisz (Kalisch) departments surrendered to Prussia as temporary \textit{Kommandierender General}.\footnote{\textit{Befehl, sich in den Besitz der neu erworbene Teile Polens zu setzen, 1. Kommandierender General in Posen ad interim} is mentioned in the biography of Thümen;
The fact of assigning this position to Thümen marked a departure from Boyen’s concept of military organization of the eastern lands. Thümen was originally intended to only take command of a brigade stationed in Poznań and be subordinate to the IV Generalkommando. This decision was probably motivated by the intention to emphasize the importance of this area to the monarchy, which was significant due to the nervous atmosphere in which the delimitation of the border between Prussia and the Kingdom of Poland had taken place. Finally, one of the seven Generalkommandos was created in Poznań. Brandenburg and Pomerania remained united in one General Command until 1820.

The assignment of permanent troops to individual commands remained a separate problem. Contrary to Boyen’s intentions, King Frederick William III pushed through the creation of eight army corps (hereinafter AK, as in German Armee-Korps), whose supplementary districts (Ergänzungsbezirke) were to correspond with the new territorial division of the state. Each corps was initially to be composed of two infantry brigades, four cavalry regiments, an artillery brigade and a pioneer battalion. This changed on August 5, 1818, when they were substituted for mixed divisions (each comprising one infantry, one cavalry and one Landwehr brigade), whilst uniform numbering from 1 to 16 was also introduced. It was not until the order of April 3, 1820 that the positions of commander of AK and of Generalkommando were unified. The eight army corps along with a Guard Corps formed the basic structure of the Prussian army until 1866.

“Heinrich Ludwig August von Thümen,” in: K. von Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, vol. 3, Hamburg, 1937, p. 444. Its content was published in “Königlicher Befehl an den Generalleutnant Thümen,” in: H. Sommer, “Das Generalkommando...,” annex 1, pp. 102–103.

54 F. Meinecke, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 85.
55 “Heinrich Ludwig August von Thümen...,” pp. 447–449.
56 F. Meinecke, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 85; K. von Priesdorff, op. cit., vol. 4, Hamburg, 1937, p. 25.
57 F. Meinecke, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 90.
58 C. Jany, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 126–127.
59 “Nachweisung wie die bisherigen Brigaden künftig eingetheilt und benannt werden sollen,” Militair-Wochenblatt, 1818, No. 118, pp. 723–725.
60 “Verordnung vom 3. April, betreffend die Verhältnisse der kommandirenden Generale, bei der jetzt bestehenden Eintheilung der Armee. (Bekannt gemacht den betreffenden Militair-Behoerden durch das Kriegs-Ministerium unterm 5. April 1820),” in: Preußische Militair-Gesetz-Sammlung enthaltend bis zum Jahre 1835..., ed. by C. Friccius, Berlin and Elbing, 1836, pp. 155–156.
61 BA-MA, Chef des Heeresarchiv, RH 18/1784, König Friedrich Wilhelm III. von Preußen an das Kriegsministerium: Ernennung der Kommandierenden Generale des
Until the end of Prussian rule, the V Army Corps in Greater Poland was stationed and had its headquarters in Poznań. Apart from the transition period, since the year 1820 the starting order of battle of the corps consisted of the 9th Division in Glogów (Glogau) and the 10th Division in Poznań, as well as the 5th Artillery Brigade, the 5th Battalion of Pioneers, the 37th Reserve Inf Regt in Świdnica (Schweidnitz), and four garrisons and two invalid companies. It can therefore be seen that only one division was stationed in Greater Poland, which resulted from the desire to dilute the Poles proportion in local regiments. A part of the former Netzedistrikt, then Regierungsbezirk Bromberg of the Province of Posen, also housed units of the II AK, as the staff of the 4th Cavalry Brigade was stationed in Bydgoszcz in 1820; however, prior to 1852 this area was not heavily militarized. The above situation does not seem logical, as the area that was in opinion of many Prussian military men under threat of insurrection should have been manned as heavily as possible. Due to the weakness of other security forces, like V Brigade of Königlich Preußische Landgendarmerie formed in 1820s, Prussian army was also responsible for police activities and border security. In general, Greater Poland was militarized with Prussian troops to a very limited extent; as Sommer noted, changes only started to be introduced after 1830, but they did not actually pick up pace until after 1860. A preserved document from 1839 states that 9,522 people were quartered in the 16 garrisons located throughout the entire Grand Duchy of Poznań, but the number of actual soldiers and military officials was potentially as low as 6,808, as the total figure provided in the list included both military men and their families. Poznań was naturally the best staffed, with its garrison inhabited by 4,495 people, including 3,179 soldiers. According to Sommer, this was the result of disorganized barracks infrastructure and lack of exercise areas and shooting ranges, which significantly hindered maneuvers.
Laubert also supported the claim regarding the poor condition of the military infrastructure. It is difficult to assess without a doubt how true both Sommer’s and Laubert’s theories were, and to what extent these theories were shaped by stereotypes. While it can be assumed that immediately after 1815 the situation in Greater Poland was not ideal, the poor infrastructure after decades of Prussian rule in the province can hardly be attributed to the region’s “endemic” poverty. Perhaps the Prussian military authorities were, for various reasons, purposefully underfunding the necessary requisite expansion of military buildings, which is a hypothesis that requires further research.

The fact that the location of troops stationed in the Grand Duchy was frequently changed is indisputable. Let us take a close look at the most “Polish” of the units – the 10th Division, which between 1820–1851 included the 10th Infantry Brigade, the 10th Cavalry Brigade and the 10th Landwehr Brigade. The command of the Infantry Brigade throughout the discussed period was situated in Poznań. In 1820, it included the 6th and 19th Infantry Regiments (1st and 4th West Prussian); the former had its staff headquarters and one of its battalions based in Poznań since 1817, while the others were stationed in Rawicz (Rawitsch) and Wschowa (Fraustadt). This state of affairs changed in 1821, when the 6th Inf Regt was moved to Silesia (becoming part of the 9th Division) and was replaced by 18th Inf Regt (3rd West Prussian), which was stationed in Poznań, Rawicz, Gniezno (Gnesen) and Wschowa. This arrangement did not change until 1846. Command of the 19th Inf Regt throughout this period was based in Poznań, and between 1818–1822 its battalions were stationed in Poznań, Bydgoszcz and Gniezno; when a fire destroyed the latter city in 1819, the units were transferred to Nakło (Nakel), Szubin (Schubin) and Kcynia (Exin). Further organizational changes saw the battalions being housed in Toruń (Thorn), Poznań and Bydgoszcz between 1822–1823, in Gniezno and Poznań between 1823–1828 and finally in Poznań and Bydgoszcz from 1828.

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67 M. Laubert, Die Verwaltung..., pp. 99–100.
68 Meaning that they included a significant percentage of recruits of Polish nationality.
69 E. von Conrady, Geschichte des Königlich Preußischen sechsten Infanterie-Regiments, von seiner Stiftung im Jahre 1773 bis zum Ende des Jahres 1856, Glogau, 1857, p. 264.
70 Ibid., p. 267.
71 R. von Wedell, Geschichte des Königl. Preußischen 18. Infanterie-Regiments von 1813 bis 1847, Posen, 1848, pp. 213–214, 234.
72 R. von Leszcynski, 50 Jahre Geschichte des Königlich Preußischen 2. Posenschen Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 19, 1813 bis 1863, Luxemburg, 1863, p. 202.
The re-transfer of two battalions of the 6th Inf Regt to Greater Poland took place in 1831, and detached battalions with their command in Poznań were deployed in Rawicz (1831), Krotoszyn (Krotoschin) and Zduny (1833). The subunits remained in these locations until 1836, when they returned to Silesia.\(^{73}\) This situation was obviously the result of events which occurred in the Kingdom of Poland in the years 1830–1831 and during the cholera epidemic. The Cavalry Brigade was also made up of two regiments. Between 1820–1832, these were the 7th Hussar Regiment and the 6th Uhlans Regiment (Second West Prussia), the latter of which was replaced in 1833 by the 1st Uhlans Regiment. The hussars had their command headquarters in Leszno (Lissa), and from 1817 their squadrons were also stationed in Kościan (Kosten), Ostrów (Ostrowo) and Kępno (Kempen). In 1821, the squadron from Kościan was moved to Krotoszyn, and in 1826, the squadron from Kępno was relocated to Milicz (Militsch).\(^{74}\) The next change took place in 1832, when the regiment’s headquarters and one of its squadrons was relocated to Poznań, whilst the other squadrons were stationed in Nakło and Inowroclaw (Inowroclaw). A year later, the latter two garrisons were moved to Rogoźno (Rogasen) and Września (Wreschen), respectively; however, due to a problem with the supply of water for horses, the squadron from Rogoźno was relocated to Inowroclaw in 1837.\(^{75}\) The situation concerning the housing of the Uhlans regiments was similarly fractured. The command of the 6th Regiment was based in Poznań, which was also home to one of the squadrons, along with Inowroclaw, Rogoźno and Słupca (1817–1819). Due to the delimitation of the border, which resulted in Słupca joining the Congress Kingdom of Poland, its squadron was transferred to Czarnków (Czarnikau). However, both Czarnków and Rogoźno were abandoned between 1822 and January 1831, during which time the regiment had garrisons in Poznań, Inowroclaw, Nakło and Kościan. The two former places were also rated very poorly by soldiers.\(^{76}\) Command of the 1st Regiment was based in Milicz, whilst its subunits were stationed in Pleszew (Pleschen), Kępno and

\(^{73}\) APP, NP, ref. no. 498, Letter No. 3702 of the Commander of the V Army Corps, Infantry General Karl von Grolman to Eduard von Flottwell, Poznań, 29 Sep 1833, f. 178–179; E. von Conrady, *Geschichte des Königlich…*., pp. 277–278, 283; H. Sommer, “Die Stadt Posen…,” p. 135.

\(^{74}\) A. von Deines, *Das Königs-Husaren-Regiment (1. Rheinisches) Nr. 7 von der Formation des Stammregiments bis zur Gegenwart*, Berlin, 1876, pp. 96–99.

\(^{75}\) Ibid., pp. 102–103.

\(^{76}\) H. Bothe, *Geschichte des Thüringischen Ulanen-Regiments Nr. 6*, Berlin, 1865, pp. 170–173, 178.
The Landwehr Brigade was made up of two regiments, of which only the 19th Regiment was stationed in the Grand Duchy of Poznań. Its headquarters were in Poznań, and its battalions had assembly points in Šrem (Schrimm) and Leszno. The second Landwehr regiment was stationed in Silesia. There was also the 37th Reserve Inf Regt (Poznań) battalion. Most of the units and warehouses of the Fifth Artillery Brigade were based in Silesia, with only one other significant warehouse stationed in Greater Poland, namely in Leszno. The pioneers were stationed exclusively in Silesia. Such frequent changes are difficult to explain, and although some of them were probably associated with poor conditions in individual garrisons, it is not a far reach to assume that they may have been made due to specific military and political reasons.

Perhaps both phenomena described above resulted from the difficulty faced by the Prussian authorities when trying to establish Polish units in the Grand Duchy of Poznań. The concept of forming Landwehr cavalry regiments of a seemingly national character, intended to attract commanders from the Polish aristocracy, which would in turn promote military service among the general population, was unsuccessful. The person selected to implement this plan, General Kosinski, completely failed to live up to Prussian expectations. This is merely a hypothesis, but perhaps the awareness of the reluctant attitude on the part of the Polish population negatively affected the willingness of the Prussian government to invest in an area which was potentially threatened by an armed insurrection.

Catalogue of population benefits for the army

Although the works of Laubert and Sommer describe a number of individual cases related to the issue of benefits, German historiography contains no comprehensive study of this issue with regards to the entire Prussian state. Whilst analyzing the situation with regards to Galicia, Baczkowski primarily mentioned issues concerning supply, housing

77 J.D. von Dziengel, Geschichte des Königlich Westpreussischen Ulanen-Regiments (Nr. 1) von 1745–1860, Potsdam 1861, passim.
78 R. von Leszczynski, 50 Jahre Geschichte..., p. 201.
79 J. Kaulfuß, M. Schönfeld, Geschichte des Feld-Artillerie-Regiments von Podbielski (Niederschlesisches) Nr. 5, Berlin, 1890.
80 M. Laubert, “Die Errichtung....,” pp. 72–73.
81 For a critical view of his attitude, see: M. Laubert, “Die Berichte....,” pp. 96–97; id., “Die Anstellung....,” pp. 191–201; id., “Generalleutnant....,” p. 93.
(and related service tariffs) and the delivery of transports. Similar issues are also raised by Kulik with regards to the Russian army in the Kingdom of Poland in the first half of the nineteenth century. As far as the Prussian context is concerned, some suggestions for the period prior to 1806 can be found in the text of Zdzisław Włodarczyk, which lists issues of accommodation, servicing and maintenance funds for military personnel and their families. Włodarczyk also indicates the potential tax burden related to the new military structure. His remarks are a valuable starting point, but they are only relevant for the period before 1814, when instead of relying on a professional army, the Hohenzollern monarchy introduced universal military duty.

An indication of the continued validity of the problems listed above can be found in the archived materials regarding the sphere of benefits which are stored in GStA PK (IV. HA, Rep. 16), in a partially preserved fonds concerning the Prussian army, and in the Ministerium des Innern (MdI, I. HA Rep. 77). In the first instance, the norms regarding the administration of the army (Armee-Verwaltung) contain instructions on the general principles of the following: supply during peace and wartime, service and lodging, supplies in kind, money, and issues regarding the provision of transportation for the army. The situation is similar in the MdI collection, in which the section concerning army supplies (Versorgung des Heeres) is divided into the following groups: Naturallieferungen und Magazinfuhren, Pferdegestellung, Militärverpflegung, Militäruniformen, Servis- und Einquartierungs wesen. Similar division can be found in the State Archive in Poznań, in a collection devoted to military matters contained in the fonds of the Supreme Presidium of the Poznań Province. After analyzing the content of these files, I was prompted to put forward a thesis that the benefits for the army can be generally divided into three main groups:

1. Servicing and lodging of soldiers and horses;
2. Supplies for troops in garrisons and during marches under war and peace;
3. Horses and transport means for training and mobilization purposes.

Of course, the categories overlap in many respects, but in my opinion these three groups correspond to the most general typology of benefits. Below I will try to outline how they were organized and implemented in the Grand Duchy of Poznań.

82 M. Baczkowski, Galicja a wojsko..., pp. 110–114; id., Pod czarno-żółtymi..., pp. 190–201.
83 M. Kulik, Armia rosyjska..., pp. 154–167.
84 Z. Włodarczyk, “Wojsko w mieście...,” pp. 77–79.
In fact, Frederick Wilhelm III ordered to fully unify the military organization of Greater Poland with the rest of the Prussian state as early as May 1815. In February 1816, the introduction of new Prussian military laws was announced; after quite a long discussion on necessary amendments, they began to fully take effect in December 1816. However, Greater Poland was temporarily exempted from covering the costs of maintaining a permanent army and was only obliged to finance 6,400 infantry and 960 cavalry personnel, with two Landwehr regiments for each of these formations. It is not entirely clear when exactly the Grand Duchy of Poznań began to incur military costs on an equal footing with other provinces, but some indications can be found through the analysis of the benefits mentioned above.

Matters concerning service tariffs and military lodging were generally governed by the order of March 17, 1810. The formal liquidation of service obligations in the Grand Duchy of Poznań did not occur until June 1817, but in May 1816 it was recommended that military hospitals should comply with the general lodging rules. The purpose of the rule was to eliminate the excessive burden on cities inflicted by their hosting of army units. According to the related guidelines issued in August 1821, the guiding principle of the service was the assumption that rules concerning stationing of the army in the monarchy should be uniformly regulated. Military personnel had the right to housing during peace, the responsibility for which was taken by the relevant authorities. Military lodging could be provided in kind, that is in the form of royal or communal buildings, or alternatively, through monetary compensation.

85 J. Boysen, *Preußische Armee...*, pp. 14–15.
86 “Obwieszczenie tyczące się utworzenia siły zbrojnej krajowej W. X. poznańskiem z dnia 19 Lutego 1816,” in: *Zbiór korespondencji...*, pp. 13–25.
87 “Publications des Gesetzes über die Verpflichtung zum Kriegsdienste vom 3 September 1814,” *Amtsblatt der Königlichen Regierung zu Posen* (hereinafter: *AB*), 1817, No. 31, pp. 669–677; APP, NP, ref. no. 591, Letter from Chancellor Karl von Hardenberg to Provincial President Joseph von Zerboni di Sposetti, 8 Mar 1816, f. 25–26; Copy of a letter from Minister of War Hermann von Boyen to Chancellor Karl von Hardenberg, Berlin, 26 May 1816, f. 28–29.
88 “Obwieszczenie tyczące...,” pp. 15–16.
89 GStA PK, I. HA. MdI, Rep. 77, Tit. 332cc, No. 15 Bd. 1, Allgemeines Regulativ über das Servis- und Einquartierungs-Wesen, Berlin 17 Mar 1810, f. 2–8.
90 “Betrifft die verfügte Zahlung des Quartier- und Stall-Servises pro 1. October 1816 bis Ende Februar 1817, und das Militair-Quartier-Wesen im Allgemeinen,” *AB*, 1817, No. 27, pp. 812–817.
91 “Wegen Einrichtung der Garnison-Lazarette,” *AB*, 1816, No. 8, pp. 160–162.
92 GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 195, Bestimmung über Servis und Einquartierung vom 21. August 1821.
The decision depended on matters such as the status of the troops, the situation in the province or the state of mobilization. The obligation to provide military lodging was binding for all cities and villages in the Kingdom, as stipulated in the regulations. Initially, however, the military authorities were only supposed to ensure that the troops were able to exercise their own powers, while the civil authorities and their appointed deputies were responsible for the overall process. This situation lasted until January 1, 1825, when according to the order of March 1, 1820, overall supervision of military lodging was taken over by the Ministry of War, which carried out its duties directly through Intendanturen. These functioned within each AK, and from July 2, 1822, they became the Ministry of War’s provincial authorities for economic affairs, whose exact scope of activity was determined by the order of Minister Karl Georg Ernst von Hake of February 10, 1828. These provincial authorities were the only intermediary between the Ministry and the lower economic authorities of the army, and they supervised all administrative aspects connected to the troops, most importantly purchasing provisions. Of course, they therefore also became responsible for the supervision of housing and field hospitals, logistics and warehousing, provision management, and general accounting.

Lodging was divided into personal quarters and animal lodging, primarily military horses. The regulations clearly defined who was entitled to housing. The people entitled to receive lodging outside the barracks were officers according to their rank, important civilians connected with the army and some NCOs and other military personnel. It was stipulated that the holder could not demand a higher standard from the host and municipal authority than defined in the regulations. The official duties of the lodger constituted a criterion for assessing individual lodging requirements. Following these specific guidelines was of particular importance in the Grand Duchy of Poznań because, as indicated in the order of 1817, up to that point the troops had only refrained from complaining about the lodging standards thanks to their “extraordinary discipline and modesty.” Due to the poor provincial infrastructure, the regulations were designed to protect both sides against abuse. The overmanned garrison in Poznań was also allowed to

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93 Ibid., f. 4–6.
94 “Das Geschäfts-Verfahren bei dem auf die Militair-Intendanturen übergange- nen Servis- und Garnison-Verwaltungswesen betreffend,” AB, 1825, No. 4, pp. 84–87.
95 “Der Wirkungskreis und die amtliche Stellung der Militair-Intendanturen betreffend,” AB, 1828, No. 9, pp. 93–97.
96 “Betrifft die verfügte....,” p. 812.
create its own regulations with regards to this matter, which followed the example set by Berlin.\textsuperscript{97}

The regulations precisely defined the location and parameters of quarters, i.e. rooms should preferably be located on lower-level floors in the same part of the main building and have a good view of the street. The dwelling required furnishing with, among other things, the right amount of firewood and the right number of beds, tables and chairs. There were no guidelines as to the required quality and condition of the items and furniture that were to be provided, they simply needed to be able to withstand normal usage. Standards were set, however, in relation to the frequency of changing bed linen and towels. Additional requirements concerned the accommodation of cavalrmen, as specific equipment was to be assigned depending on the number of horses catered for. In addition to private quarters, the city authorities were obliged to provide public premises to satisfy the need for military hospitals, guardhouses and jails, training grounds for the cavalry units, storage for gun powder, workshops and storage for food and fodder. The municipal authorities had to hand over these buildings to the army free of charge and ensure they were maintained and equipped.

Lodging in kind could only be provided until Easter, after which the military and its staff had to take care of it themselves. If difficulties arose, in particular when financial compensation was not sufficient, the housing management authorities had to either take responsibility for the maintenance of the accommodation or provide individual subsidies. Collecting funds for these subsidies was the responsibility of the municipalities. The entire scheme was financed with the help of the so-called service tariff. According to the regulation of 1810, all cities in erstwhile Prussia were divided into classes according to which the tariff was calculated, with the final amount allocated to finance military housing. Compensation claims for the services were forwarded by the cities to the service cash desks of the province, which paid out appropriate sums on a monthly basis. The provinces which did not benefit from housing were to be subsidized to offset losses. In 1815, the service amount was set at 677,790 thalers and the cities were divided into the following categories, each with a specific amounts allocated:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{1\textsuperscript{st} class} – at least 10,000 residents, 20/25 silver groschen per head;
  \item \textbf{2\textsuperscript{nd} class} – 3,500–10,000 residents, 15 or 18 silver groschen and 9 pfennigs per head;
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{97} GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 195, Bestimmung über Servis und Einquartierung vom 21. August 1821, f. 6.
Benefits for the Prussian army by the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy

3rd class – up to 3,500 residents, 10 silver groschen / 12 groschen and 6 pfennig per head.

Cities were granted freedom in the method of collecting these sums, hence the service in the Grand Duchy of Poznań was financed from various sources, including income tax, which increased the burden significantly. This was not fair, as in the rest of the new and recovered provinces, housing was much more favorably financed through land tax. This situation changed when the Tax Act of 30 May 1820 was announced, which introduced a uniform land tax in the whole Kingdom. This meant that the sourcing of the service fee became more favorable for the older provinces. A necessary condition stipulated in the act was that each province was to conduct a tax review, so in practice no significant changes occurred until 1844.

The territory of the Grand Duchy of Poznań was, as mentioned above, obliged to provide lodging and service tariffs to the army, although at this stage I am not able to reconstruct the detailed scheme of financing the benefits. It is known that the main taxes in Greater Poland included taxes from the pre-partition period: the ofiara (literally “offering”) and podymne (chimney tax). These taxes were far from perfect, which is evidence, for example, by the calculations contained in a letter from February 25, 1826, in which it is stated that the Poznań District was to incur additional military costs at the amount of 8 and ½ silver groschen for every thaler obtained through the ofiara and 1 groschen and 1 pfennig for every thaler received from the chimney tax. These additional costs, when combined, amounted to 794 thalers, 27 silver groschen and 3 pfennigs. After calculating the collected amount, only 489 thalers, 27 silver groschen and 1 pfennig were obtained. The analysis carried out afterwards showed that this was due to the chimney tax in the Grand Duchy being one of the most unfair taxes, as it disproportionately affected the less prosperous. The great landowners paid

98 GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 332cc, No. 32, Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die anderweite Aufbringung der Servis-Abgabe in den Städten der östlichen Provinzen, 14th October 1844, s.p.
99 GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 332cc, No. 32, Motive zum Gesetz-Entwurfe über die Umwandlung des Servises in eine Grundsteuer, 14th October 1844, s.p.
100 “Gesetz über die Einrichtung des Abgabenwesens. Vom 30sten Mai 1820,” in: Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlich Preußischen Staaten 1820, No. 39, pp. 135–136.
101 F.G. Schimmelfennig, Die Preußischen direkten Steuern, vol. 1, Potsdam, 1842, pp. 106–111.
102 GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 1217, No. 10, Letter, Berlin, 25 Feb 1826, s.p. It should be noted that the necessity to calculate the surplus that year primarily concerned the purchase of horses for the Landwehr.
chimney tax on just one house, which significantly reduced their tax burden. A much fairer tax was the ofiara, which, according to precise calculations, rendered 4/7 of the overall funds – 10,754 thalers, as compared to 6,648 thalers from the chimney tax. When analysing the content of subsequent editions of the Amtsblatt der Königlichen Regierung zu Posen, it should be noted that the problems resulting from the need for municipalities to bear additional military costs were a permanent element of Greater Poland’s reality, although to it cannot be unequivocally concluded to what extent they concerned housing. However, assuming that the cost of the service was also covered by the chimney tax, it is difficult not to get the impression that Greater Poland was providing insufficient funds in this regard.

The above matter obviously requires a more detailed analysis, which would then allow to compare it against other provinces. Preserved testimonies create the impression that the military quarters were viewed negatively by both sides in the relationship. The lack of barracks forced the authorities to transfer the burden of providing military lodging on residents, which was experienced most acutely in Poznań with its overloaded garrison. As has already been mentioned, Greater Poland was initially simply unprepared to receive large military units, hence the stationing of only one division in its territory had an additional justification. Garrisons were only established in the few places mentioned earlier, but this still required considerable investments. The development of the barrack infrastructure in Leszno cost 1,233 thalers (1819/1820), in Ostrów it cost 281 thalers and in Rogoźno – 572 thalers; however, it is difficult to fully assess the scale of these undertakings and the impact they had on individual garrisons. The reluctance of the local population to provide lodging to the army was clearly emphasized in a report drawn up by the regional authorities of Bydgoszcz in 1818, which is interesting since it was probably the most Germanized area within the Grand Duchy. Still, the duty was perceived as being an extreme burden and

103 Ofiara was established in 1789 for the army needs as a mixed property and land tax for the clergy and szlachta in the amount of 10 and 20 percent, respectively. After its increase in the Prussian times, it was a 24% tax imposed on the church-owned, municipal and urban estates; F.G. Schimmelfennig, op. cit., pp. 216–220.

104 GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 1217, No. 10, Votum beim Einem Königlichen Hochländlichen Ministerium des Innern, nebst dem gefälligst mitgetheilte Acten wieder vorzulegen, Berlin, 7 May 1826, s.p.

105 For the period after 1825, information on extraordinary military costs is available for almost every district, e.g. AB, 1825, No. 4, 7, 9, 10, 14, 16, 21, 23, 31, 32, 39; 1826, No. 4, 9, 13, 15, 21, 23, 41, 43; 1828, No. 9, 27, 30, 32, 40, 43, 45, 51.

106 M. Laubert, Die Verwaltung..., p. 99.
the authorities suggested that they would much rather for all soldiers to be accommodated in barracks, as was intended in Inowroclaw and potentially in Czarnków. On the other hand, in the later period there were several instances in which the municipal authorities attempted to deduct unlawful administrative charges from the service tariff.

Of course, housing the military could also be a potential source of income for individual residents. Material from the MdI includes trace information on proceedings in the case of Leiser Gabriel, a peasant from Września, regarding his contract for quartering 40 cavalry horses in 1833. Gabriel complained that he had only been paid half of what was due to him. He requested compensation for the other half in order to cover the costs of renovating his stable, as he wanted to continue quartering military horses. However, the authorities did not accede and the stable went unused for three years, which in turn led to its ruin, as the owner needed the payments coming from housing the military to maintain the property. The authorities of Września perceived the matter differently. In June 1833, the city was indeed required to accommodate a cavalry squadron, which due to lack of space could not be fully housed in the barracks. Subsequently, Gabriel was contracted to provide stable accommodation for 40 horses at a service rate of 10 thalers per month, half of which was allocated towards maintaining the stables. A civil contract was signed for this purpose. In the time of its duration, Września received an advance payment of 500 thalers from the military fund to organize the garrison, which included funds for the construction of new stables. This exceeded earlier estimates, as the garrison was to only cost 268 thalers, 5 silver groschen and 6 pfennigs. After long negotiations, the city authorities finally agreed to a contract worth 281 thalers, 10 silver groschen and 1 pfennig. From this amount, Gabriel was to receive 121 thalers, 19 silver groschen and 8 pfennigs. A stable was built in the duration of the contract; however, 12 horses were removed from it after 18 months, which significantly reduced Gabriel’s costs. After being asked to return part of the payment, Gabriel refused. The case was finally resolved at civil court, which shows the scale of the problems that were associated with housing the

107 Ibid. p. 102.
108 “Die Auszahlung der Servisgelder an die Bequartierten,” AB, 1832, No. 51, p. 482.
109 GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 1252, No. 1, Letter from the host Leiser Gabriel to King Frederick William III, Września. 25 Mar 1836, s.p.
110 GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 1252, No. 1, Letter No. 1068 to Minister of the Interior and Police, Poznań, 7 Dec 1836, s.p.
military.\textsuperscript{111} The reluctance to comply with the benefits cannot be seen as universal, as attention should also be paid to the different populations that lived in the province. In my opinion, this issue requires more attention, especially with regards to the material from the Poznań archive.

Supplies provided in kind during peacetime can be divided into four main categories\textsuperscript{112}:

1. The supply of bread;
2. The supply of meals to marching troops;
3. The supply of victuals;
4. The supply of fodder.

Bread provisions were regulated in detail by an order issued on January 16, 1826. Bread was to be supplied by royal bakeries or contracted enterprises. Supplies were usually made in kind, meaning that no monetary payments were used. The bread was to be made from well-ground rye flour and was to smell and taste good, it should not contain particles left over from the milling process and it should be turned and evenly baked. In order to control the issue of weight, the bread must not be more than a day old,\textsuperscript{113} but older bread was allowed in exceptional cases. All disputes and complaints about its quality and weight were to be resolved by the authorizing officer, with the possibility of filing an appeal to the appropriate commission.\textsuperscript{114} The instruction of March 16, 1819 regulated the delivery of bread to the garrisons. The portions were divided into light and heavy ones. The light portion was the equivalent of one-fifth of a loaf of bread a day for 30 days each month, which meant that the soldier received six loaves per month. The heavy portion consisted of rations for 210 days and was issued in the event of prolonged absence from the garrison, on marches or when temporary absence from the garrison for official reasons was granted.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{111} This is not the only documented case concerning Września. In 1833, an inspection had to be carried out in both Września and Rogoźno in connection with complaints about the condition of the accommodation; APP, NP, ref. no. 498, Letter No. 5136 of the Commander of the V Army Corps, Infantry General Karl von Grolman to President Eduard von Flottwell, Poznań, 5 Nov 1833, f. 61; On September 27, 1838, Września’s demand for payment for housing was rejected; GStA PK, I. HA. MdI, Rep. 77, Tit. 332cc, No. 22, Copy of a letter from Minister of the Interior and Police Gustav von Rochow to the Supreme Presidium of the Province in Poznań, Berlin, 19 Nov 1838, s.p.

\textsuperscript{112} GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 221, Naturalverpflegung der Truppen im Frieden, s.t., f. 7.

\textsuperscript{113} This was because on the first day after baking, the bread had a weight of 2–3 lots, which then increased to 5–6 lots on the third and fourth day. 1 lot = 14.606g.

\textsuperscript{114} GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 221, Naturalverpflegung der Truppen im Frieden, s.t., f. 7–11.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. f. 11–12.
A much more complicated issue was the distribution of food outside the garrison, when the soldiers were on the march. This was regulated by several instructions and orders issued in 1819, 1821 and 1827.\textsuperscript{116} In 1818, the existing divergences in the rules regarding the marching of troops along regular military roads from the general regulations within the monarchy were abolished. The definition of marching encompassed any grouping of units involved in garrison changes and detachments, as well as journeys undertaken by convalescents, reservists, vacationers, recruits and troops concerned with the transporting of supplies. Soldiers and non-commissioned officers on the march were to be fed by their hosts if possible, and if the host was incapable of providing sufficient amounts, the units were to be supplied from the previously prepared warehouses.\textsuperscript{117}

Soldiers had to rely on the hospitality of their host and should be content with what they received. However, in order to ensure the host met the required standards, strict rules were introduced. Soldiers were entitled to two pounds of well-baked rye bread and half a pound of meat, as well as vegetables and salt – this applied to both lunch and dinner. Marching units were not entitled to breakfast, nor were the hosts obliged to provide beer, wine or even coffee. The pertinent authorities were to ensure that liquor was available at affordable prices for the soldiers at the place where they stayed.\textsuperscript{118} Remuneration for meals could be paid in two ways: half from the royal coffers or fully by the soldier being fed. The first case included all detachments and persons sent out on official business. According to the regulations of 1818, hosts were to receive four silver groschen in thalers daily per quartered soldier. Soldiers paid two groschen from their own salary immediately, and another two groschen were paid upon receipt issued for a specific day. The two groschen’s deduction from the soldier’s pay covered an allowance for victuals and a groschen for bread. The other two groschen were to come from a special fund. Considering the timescales involved, the cities involved in the process had to be paid in advance. It was necessary to ensure that the hosts always received their four groschen immediately, as this ensured that they would be devoted and could be trusted to fulfill their role in the

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., f. 21v.

\textsuperscript{117} GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 180, Neuere Bestimmungen über Verpflegung der Truppen auf Märschen bewirkt und Vorspann vergütet werden soll, Berlin, 6 Jun 1818, f. 1–2.

\textsuperscript{118} GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 221, Naturalverpflegung der Truppen im Frieden, s.t., f. 39–40.
As from 1822, the host was entitled by law to receive five silver groschen per person per day, which remained unchanged until the 1840s. From this amount, soldiers were obliged to immediately pay 1 silver groschen and 3 pfennigs. However, if it was possible to obtain bread from the warehouses, the sum decreased to 3 silver groschen and 9 pfennigs. The officers had to take care of and pay for their own meals. They only became entitled to an allowance when marching for more than 14 days. In certain cases, soldiers could be supplied with food after pay deduction, which came out of the so-called victuals allowance. The deduction could not be higher than 1 silver groschen and 10 pfennigs for units receiving the allowance of 15 silver groschen per month; for those whose allowance amounted to 12 and ½ silver groschen, the deduction could only be as high as 1 silver groschen and 9 pfennigs.

The final issue regarding supply concerned fodder for service horses. Again, the portions were divided into two categories: light and heavy. The heavy portion consisted of 3 Metze of oats, 5 pounds of hay and 8 pounds of straw, whereas the light portion comprised 2 and ½ Metze of oats, 5 pounds of hay and 8 pounds of straw. Changes to the above could only be made with the consent of the Ministry of War, which would then allow to add 9 Metze of rye or 13 Metze of barley etc. Marching rations were also divided into light and heavy portions. Light marching rations consisted of 3 Metze of oats, 3 pounds of hay and 4 pounds of straw, heavy marching rations consisted of 3 and ½ Metze of oats, 3 pounds of hay and 4 pounds of straw. In case of large-scale exercises lasting four weeks, the Ministry of War permitted the issuance of field rations, with the light portion consisting of 3 and ½ Metze of oats, 3 pounds of hay and 4 pounds of straw, whilst the heavy portion comprised 3 and ¾ Metze of oats, 3 pounds of hay and 4 pounds of straw.

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119 GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 180, Neure Bestimmungen über Verpflegung der Truppen auf Märscben bewirkt und Vorspann vergütet werden soll, Berlin, 6 Jun 1818, f. 1–2.
120 GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 221, Naturalverpflegung der Truppen im Frieden, s.t., f. 43v.
121 GStA PK, I. HA, MdI, Rep. 77, Tit. 332z, No. 13 Bd. 9, Ueber die Natural-Verpflegung der Truppen im Frieden, Berlin 1837, s.p.
122 GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 221, Naturalverpflegung der Truppen im Frieden, s.t., f. 67v.
123 Ibid., f. 71.
124 1 Prussian Metze = 3.4351 liters.
125 GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 221, Naturalverpflegung der Truppen im Frieden, s.t., f. 79–80v.
Regulations concerning supplies were extended to include the area of Greater Poland as early as 1816.\textsuperscript{126} The reality, however, was far from ideal, which was fully demonstrated by certain events which occurred between 1830–1833. The first order to mobilize troops to establish a cordon on the border with the Kingdom of Poland was issued on December 5, 1830.\textsuperscript{127} Concerns were expressed by Minister Hake in regards to the consequences of concentrating troops in the V Army Corps district.\textsuperscript{128} Providing accommodation for large numbers of soldiers in small towns unsuited to such a purpose would be very difficult. There was no problem with regards to bread, as Bydgoszcz held significant amounts of flour, most of which was to be transported to Poznań. Obtaining food for horses was a problem, hence Hake suggested that the demand should be satisfied via national deliveries. Hake also advised that high quality oats and straw should be bought in Silesia and Brandenburg and transported from Wrocław (Breslau) and Głogów to Poznań. He even went as far as to propose additional requisitions and purchase of foreign products in the spring. These guidelines were quickly implemented.\textsuperscript{129} On March 10, 1831, Frederick William III issued an order entrusting Field Marshal August Neidhardt von Gneisenau with command of the Observation Army, consisting of the I, II, V and VI Army Corps, which was to be stationed along the eastern border of Prussia.\textsuperscript{130} Less than a week later, Grolman, the commander of the 9th Division, complained that the state of supplies in the province was terrible. In his opinion, a large part of the population was trying to avoid the duty of supplying food to the army. Hence, he suggested abandoning official procedures and sending out soldiers with money to buy supplies.\textsuperscript{131}
received the query from his subordinate, commander of the V Army Corps General of the Cavalry Friedrich von Röder presented the matter to the Minister of War. In his opinion, the problems with feeding the army resulted from the extreme poverty of small landowners and the bad will of large landowners in Greater Poland. The hosts did not receive the standard 5 groschen for food provisions, but took whatever amount the authorities had managed to agree to with the military officer in command of the troop. This bred numerous problems because the suppliers had to be paid the statutory amount, but the soldiers did not always receive their food rations. Contrary to Grolman, Röder emphasized the good will of the civil authorities and suggested that, in view of the situation at hand, he should guarantee the hosts 1 silver groschen and leave the remaining 4 to the soldiers, so that they could negotiate and purchase individual items. Hake presented this idea to the civil authorities, emphasizing the unfriendly attitude of Poznań’s subjects towards Prussian soldiers.

The administration of the Grand Duchy of Poznań did not quite agree with the point of view of the military authorities. Although on March 30, Oberpräsident Flottwell issued a circular informing of the obligation of the Grand Duchy of Poznań to take care of marching troops and bypass the current rule of providing 5 groschen per day per soldier, he did not fail to take notice of the asymmetry of the relationship. The host was obliged to grant the soldiers hospitality, regardless of whether he was prepared to accommodate them or not. In Flottwell’s opinion, the problems surrounding the provision of food were not due to bad will, but rather to the conditions imposed on the population. In addition, he believed that the regulations allowing soldiers to obtain food on their own could pose a threat to the local order. In this regard, he called for closer cooperation between the military and the local authorities. The military authorities had to accept the fact that urban and rural communes agreed to provide them with food without remuneration based solely on the authority of the local officials, and that attempts to find other solutions might cause disruptions to order.

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132 GStA PK, I. HA. MdI, Rep. 77, Tit. 332z, No. 10, Copy of a letter from the Commander of the V Army Corps, Cavalry General Friedrich von Röder to Minister of War Karl Georg Ernst von Hake, Poznań, 19 Mar 1831, s.p.
133 GStA PK, I. HA. MdI, Rep. 77, Tit. 332z, No. 10, Letter from Minister of War Karl Georg Ernst von Hake to Minister of the Interior and Police Gustav von Brenn, Berlin, 30 Mar 1831, s.p.
134 GStA PK, I. HA. MdI, Rep. 77, Tit. 332z, No. 10, Copy of a letter from President of the Province of Poznań Eduard von Flottwell, Poznań, 2 Apr 1831, s.p.
In a further letter, he indicated that the military’s predicament was rather unfortunate. Supplies in kind were in fact expensive, but the idea of leaving soldiers without the support of their hosts in the months when food prices were highest was truly terrible. It was therefore proposed that in the period from April to June the payment should be raised to 6 silver groschen per head for soldiers and non-commissioned officers. The final outcome of the dispute is unknown, but the extended regulations regarding the supply of troops in the field that were introduced at the time did not address the problem, as they only set out detailed standards regarding the portions to which soldiers were entitled.

The issue of remunerating the suppliers continued to breed problems after mobilization, due to the emergence of the issue of cost elimination. In March 1833, it was emphasized that insufficient settlements resulted in filing defective claims and forms of payment. Therefore, in Greater Poland, the pertinent rules had to be reinforced. Nonetheless, in October 1833 soldiers were still attempting to force the hosts to return part of the payment for food. Some of the persons involved in the procedure were individual reservists, who were not entitled to the supplies at all. Therefore, it was considered necessary to stop giving the money to soldiers and instead to transfer it directly to the hosts. The entire affair clearly reflects the imperfections of the Prussian system of supplying the troops. In the relatively poor region of Greater Poland, it resulted in many difficult interactions between the army and the local population, which, when examined, can help deepen our understanding of the socio-economic situation in the province in the first half of the nineteenth century.

The benefits consisting in providing quarters and supplying food were required constantly, both in peacetime and during war. The last category of benefits to be distinguished, namely the quotas for draft horses and transport means, had a slightly different character. The demand
for this type of benefit, of course, stemmed directly from the regular peacetime stationing of the Prussian army described earlier. However, before the introduction of the mobilization plan in 1831, the whole process was not sufficiently regulated. The plan itself stipulated a principle according to which horse selection for line units was carried out partly through domestic deliveries billed to the royal account, and partly with monetary compensation. The latter was payable only to specific personnel, mainly officers, at the amount of 100 thalers for a riding horse and 80 thalers for a gelding. Purchases from domestic suppliers and from abroad were to be an exception to the rule and had to be preceded by a special order. Landwehr horses were to be delivered free of charge. Information on the army’s demands for horses during mobilization and the departments and places to which they were to be delivered had to be provided to each government department during peacetime. This imposed an obligation on the local authorities to make accurate inventory of the number and categories of horses in their ward, which would in turn ensure delivery within 14 days of the mobilization order being given.\textsuperscript{139} The scale of supplies which were to be provided by the residents of the Grand Duchy of Poznań was clearly reflected by the requisite numbers defined in the authorized plan.\textsuperscript{140} It should be mentioned that according to the established system, horses from the area of the V Army Corps also found their way to other corps, and as a result, Greater Poland (the Poznań and Bydgoszcz regions combined) was obliged to provide the following number of horses in the event of mobilization:

\begin{center}
\textbf{Table 2: Number of horses mobilized in the Grand Duchy of Poznań}
\end{center}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Army Corps} & \textbf{Landwehr} & \textbf{Line troops} & \textbf{Guard} & \textbf{Total} \\
\hline
I & 238 & – & – & 238 \\
\hline
II & 616 & 850 & 148 & 1,614 \\
\hline
V & 1,604 & 2,615 & – & 4,219 \\
\hline
VI & 237 & 576 & – & 813 \\
\hline
Total: & 2,695 & 4,041 & 148 & 6,884 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Source: GStA PK, I. HA, MdI, Rep. 77, Tit. 332r, No. 7, Bd. 3, Anhang XXVIII, Repartition der bei einer Mobilmachung der Armee von den Regierungs-Departements zu stellenden Pferde, Berlin, 11 Apr 1831, s.p.

\textsuperscript{139} APP, NP, ref. no. 567, Mobilmachungs-plan für die Königliche Preußische Armee, Berlin, 21 Mar 1831, f. 204–205.

\textsuperscript{140} GStA PK, I. HA., MdI, Rep. 77, Tit. 332r, No. 7, Bd. 3, Anhang XXVIII, Repartition der bei einer Mobilmachung der Armee von den Regierungs-Departements zu stellenden Pferde, Berlin, 11 Apr 1831, s.p.
Of course, the V Army Corps was also supplied with horses from Silesia, which is not surprising considering its structure:

### Table 3: Number of horses mobilized for the V Army Corps

| Region   | Landwehr | Line troops | Total  |
|----------|----------|-------------|--------|
| Poznań   | 1,200    | 1,955       | 3,155  |
| Bydgoszcz| 404      | 660         | 1,064  |
| Wrocław | 709      | 1,157       | 1,866  |
| Legnica  | 906      | 1,477       | 2,383  |
| **Total:** | **3,219** | **5,249** | **8,468** |

Source: GStA PK, I. HA, MdI, Rep. 77, Tit. 332r, No. 7, Bd. 3, Anhang XXVIII, Repartition der bei einer Mobilmachung der Armee von den Regierungs-Departements zu stellenden Pferde, Berlin, 11 Apr 1831, s.p.

In total, this resulted in the need to provide almost 7,000 horses, which should not have been a challenge for a province which had approximately 103,975 horses in 1825.\(^{141}\) At the same time, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the Prussian complaints regarding the terrible condition of the horses in the province were justified, but they prompted some to propose to establish a special breeding program for military purposes.\(^{142}\) This situation may have had an impact on the low number of horses, as the military authorities had strict requirements for horses intended for the army, with the standards set out in detail in the regulations on the process of selection and payment regulation.\(^{143}\) The obligation to provide the requisite number of horses rested on every subject. Only certain categories of service animals were excluded. In view of such state of affairs, the inhabitants of each province had to be informed in times of peace about their obligations in the event of mobilization. Therefore, the civil and military authorities were obliged to issue orders regarding this matter. The selection of horses was to be carried out by a committee appointed annually, composed of three delegates of good standing. It was explicitly stated that the maximum

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\(^{141}\) Of course, these numbers were modified in subsequent years. The original calculations annexed to the plan differed slightly from the initial figures; GStA PK, IV. HA, Rep. 15A: Großer Generalstab, Kriegsarchiv, No. 851, Anhang XXVIII, Repartition der bei einer Mobilmachung der Armee von den Regierungs-Departements zu stellenden Pferde, Berlin, 21 Mar 1831, f. 245–279.

\(^{142}\) F. Paprocki, op. cit., pp. 133–136.

\(^{143}\) “Verordnung über das Verfahren bei eintretender Mobilmachung der Armee zur Herbeischaffung der Pferde durch Landlieferung. Vom 24. Februar 1834,” *AB*, 1834, No. 20, pp. 207–212.
price for a horse could not, in principle, exceed 100 thalers; in the case of insufficient numbers, it was possible to make more expensive purchases, but only up to 120 thalers. The payment was made automatically. Coercive measures and fines from 5 up to 50 thalers without possibility of appeal were introduced for those who refused to comply with the benefit. The army’s needs in this matter had priority. Regulations setting out pertinent norms for Greater Poland were issued in 1838. According to the new rules, quotas were to be divided between counties, taking into account aspects such as specific horse categories and the proximity to their intended destination. As a result of this process, called repartition, every Landrat was required to submit information regarding the state of mobilization in the province within a period of eight weeks. In the subsequent years, until the next repartition, the report was to be submitted annually by July 1. The regulation also precisely specified the procedure of transporting, assessing and collecting animals. All in all, the whole process seemed to be very well organized, but further study is required in order to properly assess how well it was implemented, including the study of the archival materials available in Poznań.

Similar regulations must have applied to requisitioning means of transport for military purposes; however, at present it is difficult to determine the details of their functioning, especially in peacetime. It should also be noted that the preserved materials regarding mobilization show that only the V Army Corps was required to supplement its ranks with 732 coachmen and craftsmen, of which 252 were to come from the Grand Duchy of Poznań. In addition, the Poznań region mobilized 43 personnel for the I Army Corps, 45 for the II Army Corps and 49 for the V Army Corps. Once again, however, the obligations in this domain also require further investigation.

144 “Reglement zur Gestellung, Auswahl und Abschätzung der Mobilmachungs-Pferde in der Provinz Posen,” in: Anhang zur Nro. 20 des Amtsblatts, 1838, pp. 1–19.
145 GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 237, Instruktion für Intendanturen über Vergütung von Reise- und Vorspannkosten vom 18. Juni 1821, f. 3v–8; GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 243, Reglement über das militärische Vorspann-, Boten- und Transportwesen im Frieden, s.t. The former document contains only very general information on the regulations in force. References to the transport of troops by rail included in the latter allow to define the date of introducing the regulations as at least the 1840s.
146 GStA PK, I. HA. MdI, Rep. 77, Tit. 332r, No. 7, Bd. 3, [Table of demand for carters and craftsmen in individual army corps], Berlin, 20 Aug 1831, s.p.
Conclusions

The catalogue of military benefits presented above, of course, provides only an outline of the subject. Each category requires a separate, thorough analysis, including the study of such sources as statistical and fiscal data. The relevant source material is scattered across individual collections, but most of it is accumulated within the archives of Berlin-Dahlem and Poznań. The results of the above preliminary research bear evidence to the great potential of this subject, which I would like to explore further in the coming years. The catalogue of issues outlined so far allows to formulate several hypotheses. First, it would seem that in the period immediately after 1815, the area of the Grand Duchy of Poznań was not adapted to accommodate large troop formations. The fact that there was only a small number of cities able to accommodate garrisons meant that even despite a smaller number of units as compared to other provinces, it was difficult to provide them with appropriate supplies. This particularly concerned cavalry and staff units. As a result, Poznań became overloaded with troops. An issue that requires deeper study is the subject of the economic benefits that were derived from housing the military; the case of Gabriel, the aforementioned host from Września, proves that some residents tried to exploit the service tariff for their own financial gain. In general, it should be noted that from the point of view of the Prussian military authorities, Greater Poland was a poor area, with its modest means becoming particularly evident during the mobilization in 1830–1831, when the established regulations failed to be implemented. This also manifested itself in the condition of the horses owned by local inhabitants, which did not fully meet army standards. However, in order to provide a full assessment of this issue it is necessary to carry out a comparative analysis against other regions of the Prussian state. The comments made by Prussian officers cannot be taken at face value, as they often represent a biased view. The Kingdom of Prussia’s financial situation between 1815–1844 was critical, which impacted the entire financing scheme of the armed forces, including investment in developing military infrastructure. The problems encountered by Poznań were certainly present in other provinces of the monarchy. The general crisis surrounding the weakest of the five European great powers makes it difficult to point to any positive influence the army may have had on the civilizational and economic development of Polish lands. At the time, Prussia was undergoing another stage of rebuilding its economic and military system after the crash of 1806–1807, with the period characterized
by the persistence of many makeshift and underdeveloped solutions in both domains.

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Benefits for the Prussian army by the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Poznań between 1815–1844. State of research and research perspectives (Summary)

The present article is an introduction to the issue of benefits for the Prussian army incurred by the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Poznań between 1815 and 1844. This subject is completely absent in Polish historiography, while in German literature it was only addressed in the biased works written before 1945. As a result, the period between the restitution of the permanent Prussian military organization in the province, and the abolition of the last tax
peculiarities of Greater Poland in 1844, is completely unknown in the context of the economic, social and civilizational consequences of the presence of the partition state’s troops in this area. With this in mind, I undertook the task of developing a catalogue of benefits for the army occurring in the indicated period. The source of inquiries are official publications and available archives from the collections of Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin-Dahlem and the State Archives in Poznań. On this basis, the key organizational and structural aspects of the presence of Prussian troops in Greater Poland were presented, and finally the catalogue of the main groups of benefits for the army in the discussed period. The research postulates formulated on this basis constitute an introduction to the planned studies on the problem of the impact of lodging, supplying and distribution of horses on the material situation of residents and the civilizational development of the province. I will verify the theses I put forward in the present work in subsequent studies.

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