Breaking an image encryption algorithm based on chaos

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Recently, a chaos-based image encryption algorithm called MCKBA (Modified Chaotic-Key Based Algorithm) was proposed. This paper analyzes the security of MCKBA and finds that it can be broken with a differential attack, which requires only four chosen plain-images. Performance of the attack is verified by experimental results. In addition, some defects of MCKBA, including insensitivity with respect to changes of plain-image/secret key, are reported.

Keywords: image; encryption; chaos; differential attack.

1. Introduction

Rapid development of information technology and popularization of digital products require that multimedia data are transmitted over all kinds of wired/wireless networks more and more frequently. Therefore, secure delivery of multimedia data becomes increasingly important. However, traditional text encryption schemes fail to be competent for the task due to the big differences between textual and multimedia data. Under the pressure of this challenge, researchers attempted to propose special multimedia encryption schemes utilizing all kinds of nonlinear theories in the past decade. The subtle similarity between chaos and cryptography makes chaos considered as an ideal tool to design secure and efficient encryption schemes and a great number of multimedia encryption schemes based on it have been presented [Chen & Yen, 2003; Chen et al., 2004; Pisarchik et al., 2006; Xiang et al., 2007; Ye, 2010; Wong et al., 2010]. Unfortunately, many of them have been found to be insecure and/or incomplete from the viewpoint of modern cryptography [Wang et al., 2005; Li et al., 2008b; Arroyo et al., 2008; Zhou & Au, 2008; Ercan & Cahit, 2009; Li et al., 2009b; Solak et al., 2010]. References [Álvarez & Li, 2006; Li et al., 2004] conclude some general rules about evaluating the security of chaos-based encryption schemes.

In Yen & Guo, 2000, a chaotic key-based algorithm (CKBA) for image encryption was proposed. The algorithm encrypts each pixel by four possible operations: XORing or XNORing it with one of two predefined sub-keys. A pseudo-random number sequence (PRNS), obtained from a one-dimensional chaotic
system, is used to determine which operation is exerted. As shown in [Li & Zheng, 2002], CKBA can be easily broken with only one known/chosen-plaintext attack. [Rao & Gangadhar, 2007] proposes a modified chaotic-key based algorithm (MCKBA) by employing a modular addition operation like [Socek et al., 2005]. To further enhance the security against brute-force attack, [Gangadhar & Rao, 2010] replaces the one-dimensional chaotic system generating PRNS with a simple hyperchaos generator proposed in [Takahashi et al., 2004] and names the algorithm HCKBA (Hyper Chaotic-Key Based Algorithm). Since the two schemes MCKBA and HCKBA share the same structure, this paper only analyzes the security of MCKBA and finds that the scheme can be broken with only four chosen plain-images. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results are provided to support the conclusion. In addition, some other security defects of MCKBA, including insensitivity with respect to changes of plain-image/secret key, are discussed.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The image encryption algorithm under study is introduced in Sec. 2. Detailed cryptanalysis on the algorithm is presented in Sec. 3 with experimental results. The last section concludes this paper.

2. Modified Chaotic-Key Based Algorithm (MCKBA)

The plaintext encrypted by MCKBA is a gray-scale image of size $M \times N$ (width x height). The plain-image is scanned in the raster order and represented as a 1D signal $I = \{I(i)\}_{i=0}^{MN-1}$. Then, a binary sequence $I_b = \{I_b(l)\}_{l=0}^{8MN-1}$ is constructed, where $\sum_{j=0}^{7} I_b(8 \cdot i + j) \cdot 2^j = I(i) \forall i \in \{0, \cdots, MN - 1\}$. With a predefined integer parameter $n$, an $n$-bit number sequence $J = \{J(i)\}_{i=0}^{[8MN/n]-1}$ is generated for encryption, where $J(i) = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} I_b(n \cdot i + j) \cdot 2^j$. Note that sequence $I_b$ is padded with some zero bits if $(8MN)$ is not a multiple of $n$. Without loss of generality, assume $n$ can divide $(8MN)$ here. MCKBA operate on the intermediate sequence $J$ and get $J' = \{J'(i)\}_{i=0}^{8MN/n-1}$, where $J'(i) = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} I'_b(n \cdot i + j) \cdot 2^j$. Finally, cipher-image $I' = \{I'(i)\}_{i=0}^{MN-1}$ is obtained, where $I'(i) = \sum_{j=0}^{7} I'_b(8 \cdot i + j) \cdot 2^j$. With the above notations, MCKBA can be described as follows:

- **The secret key**: two random numbers $key_1, key_2 \in \{0, \cdots, 2^n - 1\}$, and the initial condition $x(0) \in (0, 1)$ of the following chaotic Logistic map:

$$x(i + 1) = 3.9 \cdot x(i) \cdot (1 - x(i)),$$

where $\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} (key_{1,j} \oplus key_{2,j}) = \lceil n/2 \rceil$, $key_1 = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} key_{1,j} \cdot 2^j$, $key_2 = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} key_{2,j} \cdot 2^j$, and $\oplus$ denotes eXclusive OR (XOR) operation.

- **Initialization**: run the chaotic system to generate a chaotic sequence, $\{x(i)\}_{i=0}^{MN/(2n)-1}$. From the 32-bit binary representation of $x(i) = \sum_{j=1}^{32} b(32 \cdot i + j - 1) \cdot 2^{-j}$, derive a pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS), $\{b(l)\}_{l=0}^{16MN/n-1}$.

- **Encryption**: for the $i$-th plain-element $J(i), i = 0 \sim 8MN/n - 1$, the corresponding cipher-element $J'(i)$ is determined by the following rule:

$$J'(i) = \begin{cases} 
(J(i) + key_1) \oplus key_1, & \text{if } B(i) = 3, \\
(J(i) + key_1) \odot key_1, & \text{if } B(i) = 2, \\
(J(i) + key_2) \oplus key_2, & \text{if } B(i) = 1, \\
(J(i) + key_2) \odot key_2, & \text{if } B(i) = 0,
\end{cases}$$

where $B(i) = 2 \cdot b(2i) + b(2i + 1), a + b = (a + b) \mod 2^n$ and $\odot$ denotes XNOR operation. Since

\[\text{To make the presentation more concise and consistent, some notations in the original paper [Rao & Gangadhar, 2007] are modified, and some details of MCKBA are also supplied.}\]
\[a \oplus b = \overline{a} \oplus \overline{b} = a \oplus \overline{b},\] the above equation is equivalent to

\[J'(i) = \begin{cases} (J(i) + key_1) \oplus key_1, & \text{if } B(i) = 3, \\ (J(i) + key_1) \oplus key_1, & \text{if } B(i) = 2, \\ (J(i) + key_2) \oplus key_2, & \text{if } B(i) = 1, \\ (J(i) + key_2) \oplus key_2, & \text{if } B(i) = 0. \end{cases} \quad (3)

- **Decryption**: the decryption procedure is similar to that of the encryption, but with Eq. (3) replaced by following

\[J(i) = \begin{cases} (J'(i) \oplus key_1) \overline{key_1}, & \text{if } B(i) = 3, \\ (J'(i) \oplus key_1) \overline{key_1}, & \text{if } B(i) = 2, \\ (J'(i) \oplus key_2) \overline{key_2}, & \text{if } B(i) = 1, \\ (J'(i) \oplus key_2) \overline{key_2}, & \text{if } B(i) = 0, \end{cases} \quad (4)

where \(a \oplus b = (a - b + 2^n) \mod 2^n\).

3. Cryptanalysis

3.1. The Differential Attack

Differential attack is usually a chosen-plaintext attack, assuming that the attacker can obtain ciphertexts for some set of chosen plaintexts. The goal of the attack is to gain information about the secret key or plaintext by analyzing how differences in the chosen plaintexts affect the resultant difference at the corresponding ciphertexts. Note that difference is defined with respect to any given operation, e.g., XOR. In [Rao & Gangadhara 2007, III.B] and [Gangadhara & Rao, 2010, Sec. 3.2], the authors claimed that MCKBA is very robust against chosen-plaintext attack. However, we will show how it can be broken very easily with only four chosen plain-images.

Since plain-image and intermediate sequences \(J\) can be obtained from each other without any secret key, choosing the former is actually equivalent to choosing the latter. If two known intermediate sequences \(J_1 = \{J_1(i)\}_{i=0}^{8MN/n-1}\) and \(J_2 = \{J_2(i)\}_{i=0}^{8MN/n-1}\) are encrypted with the same secret key, their corresponding encrypted results \(J'_1 = \{J'_1(i)\}_{i=0}^{8MN/n-1}\) and \(J'_2 = \{J'_2(i)\}_{i=0}^{8MN/n-1}\) satisfy the following relation

\[J'_1(i) \oplus J'_2(i) = \begin{cases} (J_1(i) + key_1) \oplus (J_2(i) + key_1), & \text{if } B(i) = 3, \\ (J_1(i) + key_1) \oplus (J_2(i) + key_1), & \text{if } B(i) = 2, \\ (J_1(i) + key_2) \oplus (J_2(i) + key_2), & \text{if } B(i) = 1, \\ (J_1(i) + key_2) \oplus (J_2(i) + key_2), & \text{if } B(i) = 0. \end{cases} \quad (5)

Regardless the value of \(B(i)\), \((J'_1(i) \oplus J'_2(i))\) can be represented by an equation in the following form

\[y = (a + x) \oplus (b + x), \quad (6)\]

where \(a, b, x, y \in \{0, \ldots, 2^n - 1\}\).

The following theorem discusses how to solve the above equation.

**Theorem 1.** Assume that \(a, b, x\) are all \(n\)-bit integers, then a lower bound on the number of queries \((a, b)\) to solve Eq. (6) for any \(x\) is \((i) 0\) if \(n = 1\); \((ii) 1\) if \(n = 2\); \((iii) 2\) if \(n = 3\); or \((iv) 3\) if \(n \geq 4\).

**Proof.** First, rewrite Eq. (6) as the following equivalent form

\[\tilde{y} = y \oplus a \oplus b = (a + x) \oplus (b + x) \oplus a \oplus b. \quad (7)\]

Let \(x = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} x_j \cdot 2^j\), \(a = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_j \cdot 2^j\), \(b = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_j \cdot 2^j\), and \(\tilde{y} = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \tilde{y}_j \cdot 2^j\). Then, except \(\tilde{y}_0 \equiv 0\), Eq. (7) can be decomposed into the following iteration form

\[\begin{cases} c_{i+1} = (x_i \cdot a_i) \oplus (x_i \cdot c_i) \oplus (a_i \cdot c_i), \\ \tilde{c}_{i+1} = (x_i \cdot b_i) \oplus (x_i \cdot \tilde{c}_i) \oplus (b_i \cdot \tilde{c}_i), \\ \tilde{y}_{i+1} = c_{i+1} \oplus \tilde{c}_{i+1}, \end{cases} \quad (8)\]
where \( i \in \{0, \ldots, n - 2\} \), \( c_0 = 0 \), \( \hat{c}_0 = 0 \).

Table 1 lists the values of \( \hat{y}_{i+1} \) under all possible different values of \( a_i, b_i, \hat{y}_i, x_i, c_i \). From Table 1, one can see that the values of unknown bit \( x_i \) can be determined if and only if \( (a_i, b_i, \hat{y}_i) \) falls in the 1, 2, 4, 7-th column (zero-based) of the table, namely
\[
(a_i + b_i \cdot 2 + \hat{y}_i \cdot 2^2) \in \{1, 2, 4, 7\}.
\]

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\( (x_i, c_i) \) & \( (0, 0) \) & \( (0, 1) \) & \( (1, 0) \) & \( (1, 1) \) \hline
\( (0, 0) \) & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \hline
\( (0, 1) \) & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \hline
\( (1, 0) \) & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \hline
\( (1, 1) \) & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Corollary 3.1. The \( (n - 1) \) least significant bits of \( x \) in Eq. \((\ref{eq:corollary})\) can be determined easily by setting \((a, b)\)

When \( n = 1 \), Eq. \((\ref{eq:corollary})\) becomes \( \hat{y} \equiv 0 \). So, no pair of \((a, b)\) is required to achieve the value of \( x \). Since \( \hat{y}_{n-1} \) bears no relation with \( x_{n-1} \), we only need to discuss how to obtain the \((n - 1)\) least significant bits of \( x \) for other values of \( n \).

- \( n = 2 \): Since \( \hat{y}_0 = 0 \), \( c_0 = 0 \), one can get \( x_0 = \hat{y}_1 \) by setting \((a_0, b_0) = (1, 0)\);
- \( n = 3 \): No matter what \((a_0, b_0)\) is, \( \hat{y}_1 \in \{0, 1\} \). Therefore, it is impossible to obtain \( x_1 \) with only set of \((a_1, b_1)\) for any \( x \). Select \((a, b)\) satisfying that \((a_0, b_0) = (1, 0)\), get \( x_0 \) as the above case. Let \((a_1, b_1) = (1, 0)\), \( x_1 \) can be determined if \( y_1 = 0 \); otherwise we have to resort to another query \((a', b')\).
- \( n \geq 4 \): In this case, \((\hat{y}_1, \hat{y}_2)\) and \((\hat{y}_1', \hat{y}_2')\) can be all possible values. Observing Table 1, it can be easily verified that there is no \((a, b)\) and \((a', b')\) satisfying either Eq. \((\ref{eq:corollary})\) or
\[
(a'_i + b'_i \cdot 2 + \hat{y}_{i'} \cdot 2^2) \in \{1, 2, 4, 7\}
\]

for \( i = 1, 2 \). This means \( x_2 \) cannot always be determined. Therefore, we need one more query \((a^* = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_j^* \cdot 2^j, b^* = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_j^* \cdot 2^j)\). Let \( \bar{y}^* = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \bar{y}_j^* \cdot 2^j \) denote the corresponding output with respect to Eq. \((\ref{eq:corollary})\). Given a set of \((a_{i+k}, b_{i+k}, a'_{i+k}, b'_{i+k})\), one can get \((c_{i+k+1}, \bar{y}_{i+k+1}, c'_{i+k+1}, \bar{y}'_{i+k+1})\) from \((c_{i+k}, \bar{y}_{i+k}, c'_{i+k}, \bar{y}'_{i+k})\) and value of \( x_{i+k} \), where \( i, k \in \mathbb{Z} \). Let arrows of plain head and “V-back” head denote \( x_{i+k} = 0 \) and \( x_{i+k} = 1 \) respectively. Figure \ref{fig:example} illustrates mapping relationship between \((c_{i+k}, \bar{y}_{i+k}, c'_{i+k}, \bar{y}'_{i+k})\) and \((c_{i+k+1}, \bar{y}_{i+k+1}, c'_{i+k+1}, \bar{y}'_{i+k+1})\) for a given \((a_{i+k}, b_{i+k}, a'_{i+k}, b'_{i+k})\), where \( k = 0, 1, 2 \). Since \((c_0, y_0, c_0^*, y_0^*) \equiv (0, 0, 0, 0, 0)\), the dashed arrows in Fig. \ref{fig:example} describe Eq. \((\ref{eq:3.1})\) with the three sets of \((a, b)\) for \( i = 0, 1, 2 \). Note that the data in the fourth column of the table shown in Fig. \ref{fig:example} is exactly the same as the first one. Therefore, Fig. \ref{fig:example} shows calculation of Eq. \((\ref{eq:corollary})\) under all different bit levels if the variable \( i \) shown in Fig. \ref{fig:example} go through \( 3 \cdot t \), where \( t = 0 \sim [n/3] \) and \( i + k \leq n - 1 \). From Fig. \ref{fig:example} it can be easily verified that the following relationship
\[
(a_{i+k} + b_{i+k} \cdot 2 + \bar{y}_{i+k} \cdot 2^2, a'_{i+k} + b'_{i+k} \cdot 2 + \bar{y}'_{i+k} \cdot 2^2, a''_{i+k} + b''_{i+k} \cdot 2 + \bar{y}''_{i+k} \cdot 2^2) \cap \{1, 2, 4, 7\} \neq \emptyset
\]
is always satisfied, which means \( x_{i+k} \) can be derived from Table \ref{table:corollary}. This completes the proof.

Corollary 3.1. The \((n - 1)\) least significant bits of \( x \) in Eq. \((\ref{eq:3.1})\) can be determined easily by setting \((a, b)\)
Proposition 1. Assume that the proof is straightforward.

ii) When (a ⊕ x) ≥ 2^{n-1} and x ≥ 2^{n-1}; (a ⊕ x ⊕ 2^{n-1}) (x ⊕ 2^{n-1}) = ((a ⊕ x) - 2^{n-1}) - (x - 2^{n-1}) + 2^n mod 2^n = (a ⊕ x) - x; ii) When (a ⊕ x) ≥ 2^{n-1} and x < 2^{n-1}; (a ⊕ x ⊕ 2^{n-1}) (x ⊕ 2^{n-1}) = (((a ⊕ x) - 2^{n-1}) - (x - 2^{n-1}) + 2^n) mod 2^n = (a ⊕ x) - x; iii) When (a ⊕ x) < 2^{n-1} and x ≥ 2^{n-1}; (a ⊕ x ⊕ 2^{n-1}) (x ⊕ 2^{n-1}) = ((a ⊕ x) + 2^{n-1}) - (x - 2^{n-1}) = (a ⊕ x) - x; iv) When (a ⊕ x) < 2^{n-1} and x < 2^{n-1}; (a ⊕ x ⊕ 2^{n-1}) (x ⊕ 2^{n-1}) = ((a ⊕ x) + 2^{n-1}) - (x + 2^{n-1}) = (a ⊕ x) - x. Similarly, Eq. [12] can be proved.
Corollary 3.1 means that one can only choose four intermediate sequences, $J_0$, $J_1$, $J_2$ and $J_3$, to break MCKBA, where

$$J_0(i) \equiv \left( \sum_{j=0}^{[n/3]-1} 1 \cdot 8^j \right) \mod 2^n,$$
$$J_1(i) \equiv \left( \sum_{j=0}^{[n/3]-1} 7 \cdot 8^j \right) \mod 2^n,$$
$$J_2(i) \equiv \left( \sum_{j=0}^{[n/3]-1} 4 \cdot 8^j \right) \mod 2^n,$$
$$J_3(i) \equiv \left( \sum_{j=0}^{[n/3]-1} 6 \cdot 8^j \right) \mod 2^n.$$  \hfill (12)

With respect to the 1D representation of 2D images defined in Sec. 2, basic repeated pattern of the corresponding gray-scale images of $J_0$, $J_1$, $J_2$ and $J_3$ are [73, 146, 36], [255, 255, 255], [36, 73, 146], [182, 109, 219], respectively. As shown in Proposition 1, the unknown most significant bits of secret key can be further derived from it.

The complexity of the differential attack is mainly determined by verifying the $n-1$ bits of each element in $\{key^*(i)\}_{i=0}^{MN/(2n)-1}$ from Table 3.1 so the complexity is proportional to the size of the plain-image.

### 3.2. Breaking the Secret Key

The differential attack described in the above subsection only outputs an equivalent key. We will show that the secret key can be further derived from it.

Assume $\{b(l)\}$ distributes over $\{0,1\}$ uniformly, the probability $key_1 \notin (key^*(i))_{i=0}^{8MN/n-1}$ or $key_2 \notin (key^*(i))_{i=0}^{8MN/n-1}$ is $(1/2)^{8MN/n}$. So, we can obtain set $(key_1, key_2)$ with a very high probability $1 - (1/2)^{8MN/n-1}$. Since $\sum_{j=0}^{n-2}(key_1,j \cdot 2^j) \neq \sum_{j=0}^{n-2}(key_2,j \cdot 2^j)$, one can narrow the scope of $B(i)$ from Eq. (5) as follows

$$B(i) \in \begin{cases} \{2,3\}, & \text{if } \sum_{j=0}^{n-2}(key^*(i),j \cdot 2^j) = \sum_{j=0}^{n-2}(key_1,j \cdot 2^j), \\ \{0,1\}, & \text{if } \sum_{j=0}^{n-2}(key^*(i),j \cdot 2^j) = \sum_{j=0}^{n-2}(key_2,j \cdot 2^j), \end{cases} \hfill (13)$$

where $key^*(i) = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1}(key^*(i),j \cdot 2^j)$ and $key(i) = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1}(key(i),j \cdot 2^j)$.

#### Proposition 2

Assume that $a$ and $x$ are both $n$-bit integers, $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$, if $a$ is odd, then $p = ((a + x) \oplus x)$ is always odd and $q = ((a + x) \odot x)$ is always even.

**Proof.** This proposition can be proved by two equations

$$(1 + x_0 \mod 2) \oplus x_0 \equiv 1,$$
$$(1 + x_0 \mod 2) \odot x_0 \equiv 0.$$

From Proposition 2 and Eq. (2), one can narrow the scope of $B(i)$ also according to encryption result of the second chosen intermediate sequence shown in Eq. (12), as follows

$$B(i) \in \begin{cases} \{1,3\}, & \text{if } J_1'(i) \text{ is odd}, \\ \{0,2\}, & \text{if } J_1'(i) \text{ is even}. \end{cases} \hfill (14)$$

Once $key_1$ and $key_2$ are determined, value of $B(i)$, for $i = 0 \sim 8MN/n - 1$, can be determined exactly from Eq. (13) and Eq. (14). There are only two possible combinations of $key_1$ and $key_2$. If the searched version is the right one, $\{B(i)\}_{i=0}^{8MN/n-1}$ can be constructed correctly. Let $\{B^*(i)\}_{i=0}^{8MN/n-1}$ and $\{B^*(i)\}_{i=0}^{8MN/n-1}$ denote the obtained version of $\{B(i)\}_{i=0}^{8MN/n-1}$ corresponding to the two combinations of
key1 and key2. Since Eq. (14) is unrelated with key1 and key2, one can assure that \( B^*(i) = B^*(i) \oplus 2 \), i.e., 
\[ b^*(2i) = 1 - b^*(2i) \] and \( b^*(2i + 1) = b^*(2i + 1) \), for \( i = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1 \) and \( j = 0 \) to \( 2^m - 1 \).

Construct \( \{x^*(i)\}_{i=0}^{MN/(2^n)-1} \) and the whole secret key can be recovered correctly with only four chosen plain-images. In addition, some

In this paper, security of the image encryption algorithm MCKBA has been studied in detail. It was found that the whole secret key can be recovered correctly with only four chosen plain-images. In addition, some

4. Conclusion

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Fig. 2. Four chosen plain-images (The black boundary of Fig. 2b is not its part).

other defects of the algorithm, including insensitivity with respect to changes of plain-image/secret key, were discussed. Analogue of MCKBA, HCKBA, have the same security problems. Due to such a low level of security provided by the two schemes (essentially one scheme), their application in practice should be performed with extreme caution.

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Fig. 3. The corresponding cipher-images of the four chosen plain-images shown in Fig. 2.

Fig. 4. The decryption result of another cipher-image encrypted with the same secret key: a) cipher-image; b) decrypted plain-image.

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