Efficient Gossip Protocols for Verifying the Consistency of Certificate Logs

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Abstract—The level of trust accorded to certification authorities has been decreasing over the last few years as several cases of misbehavior and compromise have been observed. Log-based approaches, such as Certificate Transparency, ensure that fraudulent TLS certificates become publicly visible. However, a key element that log-based approaches still lack is a way for clients to verify that the log behaves in a consistent and honest manner. This task is challenging due to privacy, efficiency, and deployability reasons. In this paper, we propose the first (to the best of our knowledge) gossip protocols that enable the detection of log inconsistencies. We analyze these protocols and present the results of a simulation based on real Internet traffic traces. We also give a deployment plan, discuss technical issues, and present an implementation.

I. INTRODUCTION

A public-key infrastructure (PKI) and cryptographic protocols, such as the widely deployed TLS, are crucial elements for many applications on today’s Internet, as they enable users to communicate sensitive data in a—supposedly—secure manner. Unfortunately, since the inception of TLS, many severe attacks have been reported [1], [2]. These attacks concern not only the protocol itself, but also the oligarchical trust model that TLS relies on. Certificate authorities (CAs) are usually considered as trusted by web browsers when their self-signed certificates are present in the default list that major vendors provide with their software. These CAs are numerous (e.g., more than one thousand CA public keys are trusted by Windows or Firefox [3]). Attackers can exploit vulnerabilities and potentially compromise private keys in order to obtain fake certificates, and CAs can also intentionally produce certificates that will not be used by the genuine owner of the corresponding domain. In particular, government agencies that run or collaborate with CAs have the ability to impersonate certain domains and intercept decrypted traffic through man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks [4]. For example, cases of unauthorized certificates issued by trusted intermediary CAs have been reported in Turkey [5] and France [6]. To mitigate these problems, several approaches based on the concept of a monitored public log of certificates have been proposed. They aim at making the issuance process more transparent and accountable. However, introducing a log as a new trusted third party moves the initial problem rather than resolves it and raises the classical question “Quis custodiet ipso custodes?” (Who watches the watchmen?) An ideal solution would give users a way of verifying that they all share a consistent view of the log, on a worldwide scale. Indeed, an attacker who can obtain a fraudulent certificate and launch a MITM attack may also have the ability to control the log and provide a view that contains a specific certificate only to targeted victims. This attack will be referred to as a split-world attack [7]. To better illustrate it, we can take the example of a malicious government that performs a MITM attack on its citizens. To prevent this from happening, it is crucial that clients have a means of exchanging information about the log, even if our hypothetical government tries to prevent anyone from reporting the attack.

A gossip protocol (i.e., a protocol in which peers select partners in a somewhat random fashion in order to propagate messages over the whole network) seems to be a promising way of solving this problem, as it would be efficient and convenient to deploy. However, we note that the term “gossip protocol” must not be taken strictly in the traditional sense in this paper. As the protocol should not require a dedicated network or infrastructure, peer selection is not completely random but client-driven, i.e., gossiping is realized during standard HTTPS connections and servers are used as intermediaries to exchange information from client to client. The gossip protocol should guarantee that misbehavior is detected, while privacy concerns are taken into consideration. The complex structure of the Internet and the diverse behaviors of its users make developing such a protocol a challenging task. Moreover, the gossip or epidemic-style protocols that can be found in the literature [8], [9] are not applicable in this context, as they generally require membership management or an overlay network, instead of pre-existing connections.

The main contributions of this paper are: a) We present different gossip protocols that meet the conditions stated above and we demonstrate the properties that they exhibit. b) We derive results about these protocols from a simulation framework that we developed with the objective of having an accurate model of Internet traffic, using both public and private sources of statistical data that we had at our disposal. c) We discuss deployment, and implementation issues. d) We identify the possible attack scenarios and show how the presented protocols can detect them. e) We describe a proof-of-concept prototype of the system and show performance results.

II. BACKGROUND

Merkle trees. The important data structure used in many public-log systems is the Merkle tree, also called hash tree, or just tree throughout this paper. More specifically, logs are usually composed of a binary version of this tree in which leaf nodes are hashes of some data (e.g., certificates) and non-leaf nodes are hashes of their two concatenated children. Hash trees have interesting properties for constructing a secure and efficient log [10]. In particular, knowing the root (also called head) of a tree, one can prove that a leaf is part of it, with a number of nodes logarithmically proportional to the number
Roles and entities. The different participants in the system can assume the following roles: Clients, usually web browsers, establish connections to servers (identified by a domain name) via TLS. Note that, in some cases, the term “client” might be used to refer to clients of the log, but this is generally clear from the context. Certification Authorities (CAs) are responsible for the issuance of certificates. Logs allow anyone to submit certificates and make these certificates publicly available. Monitors inspect every new entry added to certain logs to verify that they behave correctly and to detect illegitimate certificates. They may even store entire copies of logs to fulfill their objective. Auditors verify that the log is behaving in a consistent manner with some partial information that they have or that they fetch from the log. Different roles (e.g., client and auditor, CA and monitor) may be assumed by a single entity. Typically, CAs may want to monitor some logs in order to verify that certificates are not incorrectly issued on their behalf.

III. Model

Assumptions. To simplify technical descriptions, we generally assume that there is only one log, but our work can be extended to multiple-log scenarios by running several instances of the protocols in parallel. We also consider that CT is fully deployed (i.e., within every TLS Handshake the server sends an appropriate SCT) and there is some fraction of servers and clients that use our protocol. It is assumed that these clients and servers do not remove or modify gossip-related data/software and that the cryptographic primitives that we use are secure.

Adversary model. We consider that an adversary can operate a malicious log and provide evidence that a certificate is in the hash tree only to specific clients (split-world attack), with the objective of hiding traces of this certificate to other clients of the log that are potentially monitoring it. In order to degrade the efficiency of the gossip protocol, the adversary can introduce malicious clients/servers and inject chosen messages into the gossip protocol. We also consider the simpler case where the view is consistent, but an SCT is produced by the log and the corresponding certificate is never added to the tree.

IV. Desired Properties

The crucial property we seek is the detectability of a log’s misbehavior, i.e., if the log presents a different set of certificates to different clients at a given point in time, if it does not respect the append-only property, or if, having produced an SCT, it fails to add the corresponding certificate to the tree within one MMD, then the gossip protocol should detect it. The speed of detection must be considered, but is not as important as the guarantee that any malicious behavior will eventually be detected with high probability. As the environment of the gossip protocol is the Internet, the protocol should be scalable, i.e., when new clients or servers join the system, the solution should continue to reach its goal as properly as before (if not better than before). The solution should also be efficient, in terms of storage, computation, and communication (the number of out-of-band connections should be minimized, in particular, connections to the log server). Another important property is deployability. The protocol must not require an additional infrastructure or an overlay network, and the deployment must be done seamlessly via a regular software update. Moreover, as the deployment of such a system would likely be incremental, it must be determined how effective the solution is in function of the number of clients and servers supporting the protocol. Additionally, the protocol must preserve users’ privacy. In other words, it must not be possible to determine which websites a user has visited based on the content of the protocol’s messages.

![Diagram of ChronTree](image-url)
V. GENERAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, we give a high-level overview of message flows and describe the actions performed by the different parties. Figure [2] presents the notation that we will use.

\[ s_a: \text{STH with tree size } a. \]
\[ s_a \leftarrow s_b: \text{variable assignment.} \]
\[ p_{a,b}: \text{proof of consistency between } s_a \text{ and } s_b. \]
\[ t: \text{SCT sent by the server.} \]
\[ l: \text{set of audited SCTs maintained by the client.} \]
\[ t \notin l: \text{SCT } t \text{ is not contained in the set } l. \]
\[ l \leftarrow l \cup \{t\}: \text{SCT } t \text{ is added to the set } l. \]
\[ m_0: \text{server’s default gossip message (only for Prot. 2).} \]
\[ m_1: \text{client’s gossip message (depends on the protocol).} \]
\[ m_2: \text{server’s gossip message (depends on the protocol).} \]
\[ g: \text{associative array (map) of gossip messages, with integer (tree sizes) as keys, sorted in ascending order.} \]
\[ g[a]: \text{gossip message stored in } g \text{ under key } a. \]
\[ g.size(): \text{number of gossip messages stored in } g. \]
\[ g.keys(): \text{set of keys stored in } g. \]
\[ g.removeFirst(): \text{the first message (with the lowest tree size) is removed from } g. \]
\[ \emptyset: \text{empty set/value.} \]
\[ \mu: \text{upper bound for the number of messages stored in } g. \]
\[ f: \text{gossip factor, i.e., proportion of clients that gossip.} \]

![Fig. 2: Notation.](image)

All parties can query the log with the following functions:

```
getSTH(): returns the latest STH.
getConsistencyProof(a, b): returns a consistency proof between STHs with tree sizes a and b.
getAuditProof(t, a): returns the audit proof for the certificate corresponding to an SCT t and a tree size a.
```

The only way to hold perfect evidence that the log is misbehaving is to have two (or more) STHs (with a valid signature) and observe that they are inconsistent. To detect this, we will be using the following function:

```
checkSTHs(s_a, s_b, ...): STHs passed as arguments (or STHs contained in more complex pieces of data, such as gossip messages, given as arguments) meet the two following criteria: Two STHs with the same tree size have the same root hash, and an STH with a larger timestamp than that of another STH has a larger or equal tree size.
```

This function does not give any output. If the verifications passes, the protocol can simply go on, but if a verification fails, the normal protocol flow immediately stops and the inconsistency is reported/gossiped (as it will be described in VI). Also, clients and servers always verify that a received gossip message is valid with:

```
validMessage(m_1): returns a boolean value indicating whether m_1 is non-empty and valid (according to the message format definition of the given protocol in VI).
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A simple execution of the whole protocol is presented in Figure [3]. The initial (one-time) operation conducted by a server’s owner is to contact the log, submit the certificate, and obtain an SCT in exchange. Afterwards, the server should send this SCT during the establishment of all TLS connections. Gossip messages are then piggybacked on the requests and responses of client-driven HTTPS traffic. Before a client connects to a server, a gossip message m_1 is selected with the function m_1 = getClientMessage(). This message is sent along the client’s HTTPS request. The server receives this message and selects its own message accordingly with m_2 = getServerMessage(m_1). Then, both parties update their local state: clientUpdate(t, m_2) and serverUpdate(m_1). Note that, for efficiency concerns, the response must be selected immediately and the update procedure must be performed after the response is selected (and possibly after it is sent). Depending on the received message, it might be necessary to request a proof from the log to complete the update procedure. If there are multiple logs in the system, the protocol can be executed in parallel for each log, and several gossip messages (one per log) can be sent. If an anomaly is detected, it must be reported to an appropriate entity, which we will assume to be a monitor.

As the exchange is done through HTTPS, the user receives (besides m_2) the server’s certificate and a corresponding SCT t. As gossiping SCTs may be inefficient and cause privacy issues (there is a unique SCT for each certificate in the log), we choose to gossip STHs. Upon receipt of an SCT, there are several pieces of data that clients must fetch from the log a) the latest STH (that should be stored), b) a
consistency proof between the latest STH and a previous one (if available), and c) an audit proof—for the certificate that corresponds to the received SCT—against the tree size of the latest STH. The whole process can then either be repeated every time an SCT is received or the SCTs (for which the operation has already been accomplished) can be saved. These two possibilities yield opposite outcomes in some aspects. The former allow clients to have a more recent view of the log. The latter, instead, may leave clients with an outdated view of the log but requires a much smaller number of connections.

VI. PROTOCOLS

A. STH-Only Gossiping

In order to design an efficient and secure protocol, one important observation needs to be made: any inconsistency that can be detected with an STH of a certain tree size can also be detected with an STH of larger tree size—provided that the consistency between these two STHs has been proven. In other words, if a tree extends another tree, the smaller one can be discarded without decreasing the likelihood of detecting an attack. Based on this principle, we devise an STH-only gossip protocol, i.e., in which a valid gossip message simply consists of a valid STH (a non-empty STH, in the right format, and whose signature is verified with the known log’s public key).

As soon as clients obtain an STH from the log (as described in §2), they store it and send it in all their gossip messages. Servers and clients only keep the STH with the largest tree size they encountered and send it in all their gossip messages. When clients receive an STH with a different tree size than that of the STH they already have, they always contact the log for a consistency proof. If the proof is correct and if the tree size of the received STH is larger than that of the STH that is currently stored, then the client only keeps the received STH. Clients keep track of SCTs and only contact the log when necessary (as discussed before). Servers also communicate with the log to obtain consistency proofs before discarding STHs. If all parties perform this verification, then a strong alert signal can be produced when the log server is unresponsive. This approach is detailed in Protocol 1.

B. STH-and-Consistency-Proof Gossiping

We now design a gossip protocol with the same security properties as the protocol described above, but we aim at reducing the number of connections to the log, by gossiping consistency proofs together with STHs. This is important not only for efficiency reasons, but also to minimize the ability of an adversary to infer who is gossiping and who is not. As it will be discussed in more details in §4 if gossip messages are conveyed through HTTPS headers, they are encrypted and thus it is harder for a passive attacker to determine whether a given client is gossiping or not. However, if the adversary can observe the communication between the client and the log, then it can guess, depending on the traffic, if the client gossiping. This possibility can be reduced if the type and number of requests sent by the client to the log is essentially the same whether the client is only CT-enabled or gossiping. This second approach is presented in Protocol 2.

Message format. Messages have the same format for both clients and servers. Let \( s_a \) and \( s_b \) be STHs for hash trees of sizes \( a \) and \( b \) respectively, where \( a < b \), and let \( p_{a,b} \) be a consistency proof between tree sizes \( a \) and \( b \), then a valid message \( m \) is a triplet of the form: \( m = (s_a, s_b, p_{a,b}) \).

Clients and servers always verify that a given message is in the right format (with validMessage()). This format is desirable for the following reasons. Since consistency proofs are not cryptographically signed, one cannot confirm that a proof genuinely comes from a certain log, but if the two corresponding STHs are provided with it, at least it can be verified that it is valid, preventing attackers from flooding servers with invalid proofs. Furthermore, with such a format, if a message is valid but results in an inconsistency (e.g., two STHs have the same tree size but not the same root hash), it can only mean that the log is misbehaving. If an invalid proof was sent alone or with only one STH, it could mean, in some cases, that either the server or the log is the origin of the problem, without any way for clients to determine which one it really is.

Storage. Clients store three elements that correspond to the content of a message, namely two STHs \( s_a \) and \( s_b \) and a consistency proof \( p_{a,b} \). However, a valid message cannot be immediately constituted, because this data is not available at the very first execution of the protocol. Clients also keep a set of audited SCTs. Servers keep a collection of valid messages sent by clients. More precisely, servers store messages in a map \( g[k] \). Servers also save the STH with the largest tree size they encountered, denoted \( s_n \) (initially set to \( 0 \)).

Message selection. Selecting a message on the client-side simply consists of grouping the two STHs and the proof if they are available, or returning an empty message otherwise. On the server-side, the way in which messages are stored allows a response to be selected efficiently. Servers simply select the message in their map by using the tree size of the STHs in the client’s message as a key, provided that such a message exists. Otherwise, a default message \( m_0 \) is sent.

Update procedure. If the server’s message contains a proof that allows the client to obtain an STH with a larger tree size, then the content of the server’s message replaces the client’s previous data. Otherwise, a consistency proof is needed. If the SCT delivered with the server’s certificate has never been verified by the client, then the log is contacted for an audit proof. If the message received by the server is not valid, it is simply dropped. Otherwise, the server keeps the message in its map under a key that corresponds to the tree size of the first STH. If a similar message already exists, it is replaced. When necessary, servers also request consistency proofs, but there are two situations in which these proofs are not needed: when one of the STHs in the received message correspond to the STH with the largest tree size \( s_n \) and the consistency proof is valid, and when both STHs in the received message are already stored (then the root hashes can simply be compared). If a message \( m_1 \) received by the server contains an STH with a larger tree size than \( n \), then \( n \) is updated and the default message is set to \( m_1 \). The message is stored if the tree size of the second STH in the message is equal to or greater than \( n \). An upper bound \( \mu \) on the storage size must be defined as a configuration parameter. When this limit is reached and a message is added, the first entry of the map (i.e., the message referenced by the smallest tree size) must be removed.

\(^1\)To reduce the size of this map and avoid duplicates, servers can store STHs and consistency proofs separately and keep only references to these instead of entire messages.
Protocol 1: STH-only gossiping (notation and auxiliary functions are defined in [17])

Client-side

Stored data: STH $s_a$, set of audited SCTs $l$

Function getClientMessage() : message

\[ \text{return } s_a; \]

Procedure clientUpdate($t, m_2$)

Input: SCT $t$, server message $m_2 := s_b$

if validMessage($m_2$) then

checkSTHs($s_a, s_b$);

if $a \neq b$ then

getConsistencyProof($a, b$);

if $a < b$ then

$a \leftarrow b$;

if $t \not\in l$ then

$s_a \leftarrow \text{getSTH}()$;

checkSTHs($s_a, s_c$);

getAuditProof($t, c$);

if ($s_a \neq \emptyset$) and ($a < c$) then

getConsistencyProof($a, c$);

$s_a \leftarrow s_c$;

$l \leftarrow l \cup \{t\}$

Server-side

Stored data: STH $s_b$

Function getServerMessage($m_1$) : message

Input: client message $m_1 := s_a$

if not validMessage($m_1$) then

\[ \text{return } \emptyset; \]

else

\[ \text{return } s_b; \]

Procedure serverUpdate($m_1$)

Input: client message $m_1 := s_a$

if not validMessage($m_1$) then

\[ \text{return}; \]

if $s_b \neq \emptyset$ then

checkSTHs($s_a, s_b$);

if $a \neq b$ then

getConsistencyProof($a, b$);

if ($s_2 = \emptyset$) or ($b < a$) then

$s_b \leftarrow s_a$;

VII. REPORTING/GOSSPING ANOMALIES

We made the assumption that a monitor has the ability to receive and process the anomalies reported by clients or servers. A monitor is the entity that fits best into this role, since its function is to constantly verify that the log server is not misbehaving, by contacting it at regular intervals and possibly by keeping an entire copy of the tree. However, it might not be possible to reach this monitor at all times, either because it is blocked by an attacker or because of a technical issue. This is why clients and servers should both report and gossip about anomalies as soon as they are detected and as long as the problem is not fixed (e.g., until a proof becomes available or until the log becomes untrusted). Anomalies of different kinds can be detected in several circumstances. When it happens, the normal execution of the gossip protocol must stop and a special message must be reported and sent in place of all normal gossip messages. We define two special messages.

A warning message (containing a description of the problem and, if applicable, the incriminated STH-proof) is generated when: a) The log is unresponsive (either because it deliberately does not produce any response or because of network issues), and it remains unresponsive after a number of attempts (specified as parameter) to contact it again. b) The latest STH has a timestamp older than one MMD before the time at which it was fetched. c) An STH/SCT with an invalid signature or an invalid proof is received from the log.

An inconsistency message is generated when the checkSTHs function (as described above) fails. This message consists of two or more valid STHs (signed by the log) that mutually present an inconsistency concerning their tree size, root hash, or timestamp.

The recipient of a warning message must independently verify, by contacting the log, that the described problem exists (provided that such an observation, e.g. "the log is unresponsive", was not already made recently). If the problem is confirmed, then it must be reported to the monitor—we may assume that the attacker cannot block this access to all clients—and the message must be propagated further through gossiping. On the other hand, when a valid inconsistency message is received, the log can immediately be considered as untrustworthy and the message can directly be reported and propagated, as it contains sufficient cryptographic evidence.

Also, an inconsistency message will take priority over a warning message.

VIII. SIMULATION

A. Simulation Framework

The main challenge in evaluating a scheme such as the one we propose is to create a reliable client-server connection model. One important obstacle is the scarcity of authentic traces of real-world connections (as this data is privacy-sensitive). However, the framework that we developed and that we describe in this section emulates realistic connections on a worldwide scale. To be precise, the traffic of 112 countries (for which sufficient statistical data was available) is simulated. Only a fraction of clients execute the given gossip protocol. This proportion of clients is referred to as the gossip factor, denoted $f$. The MMD is set to 2 hours, as for the first pilot logs run by Google and exactly one new STH is produced by the log every MMD. In each country, the number of Internet users was estimated with the total population [13] and the percentage of individuals using the Internet [14].

In order to determine how many connections users perform during the day and how these connections are distributed among users, we used a private 24-hour-long trace of real HTTP/HTTPS traffic from 2014 provided directly by SWITCH (major manager of networks among universities and research facilities in Switzerland). This data contains more than 104 million entries for HTTP and more than 74 million entries for HTTPS, where each entry is a triplet of the form: relative time (in seconds), client ID (anonymized), and server ID (anonymized). For each hour, we approximated the parameters
negative binomial is a generalization of the Poisson distribution \cite{15} that in our context since the variance exceeds the mean to a large extent. The distribution that corresponds to both the variance and the mean, but this is not sufficient in a period of time is the Poisson distribution. It relies on a single parameter of a negative binomial distribution\footnote{Another simpler model that can express the number of events occurring in a period of time is the Poisson distribution. It relies on a single parameter that corresponds to both the variance and the mean, but this is not sufficient in our context since the variance exceeds the mean to a large extent. The negative binomial is a generalization of the Poisson distribution \cite{15} that allows the variance to be different from the mean.} by using maximum-likelihood estimation. Random numbers of connections can then be generated and used in the simulation. As different types of traffic are generated during different periods of the day (for each country), we also take time zones into consideration.

Then, it must be determined to which websites these users connect. Amazon’s Alexa Web Information Service provides a vast quantity of precious information in this regard. In particular, we collected data (in June 2014) about the top 100 domains for each of the 112 countries. This includes the number of page views per million, i.e., the number of page views that a particular site generates among one million pages that are viewed by typical users. Based on this distribution, a random domain can be picked. We have also taken into consideration the possibility that a client connects to a domain outside of the top 100 by reducing the total number of connections that a client perform proportionally.

We scanned the servers of all these top domains to determine not only if they support HTTPS (e.g., by verifying that the port 443 is open), but also if their certificate is valid, if a connection can be established, and if they automatically redirect clients to HTTPS. Globally, this condition is met by 287 out of 5107 servers scanned (i.e., around 5.62%). In our simulation, all these servers (and only these) are both CT-enabled and gossiping, unless stated otherwise. This assumption is both realistic, because major websites (that already enforce the usage of TLS) are more likely to adopt new security mechanisms rapidly; and sufficient, because these sites generate a substantial part of the global Internet traffic (about 33.5\% of the page views of a country on average). The validity period of all certificates is set to 24 months (moderately below the maximum of 39 months imposed by the CA/B Forum \cite{16} for certificates issued after 1 April 2015). For each certificate, the date of issuance is chosen uniformly at random in the 24 months preceding the start of the simulation.

### B. Results

We show simulation results in four distinct cases. The first basic situation in which no gossip protocol is used can be subdivided into two cases: when clients keep track of the SCTs they received and verified, and when they do not. We compare these cases with the two protocols presented in \cite{V1}. All results were collected during a simulation of 365 days, and the gossip factor was set to 0.1\% (2,462,216 gossiping clients), unless stated otherwise. Results are usually rounded to the nearest hundredth, except when more precision is needed. The storage limit \( \mu \) was set to 10,000 messages, but, as the storage requirements of our protocols are low, this limit was never reached in the 365 days period.

**SCT distribution.** Since one of our strategies consists of keeping STHs with the largest tree size, it is worth investigating how effective our protocols are in spreading recent

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**Protocol 2: STH-and-consistency-proof gossiping (notation and auxiliary functions are defined in \cite{V1})**

| **Client-side** |
|-----------------|
| **Function** get\_\_client\_message() : message |
| if \((s_a = \emptyset)\) or \((s_b = \emptyset)\) or \((p_{a,b} = \emptyset)\) then |
| return \(\emptyset\); |
| else |
| return \((s_a, s_b, p_{a,b})\); |
| **Procedure** client\_update(t, m_2) |
| **Input**: SCT \(t\), server message \(m_2 := (s_c, s_d, p_{c,d})\) |
| if valid\_message\(\(m_2\)\) then |
| check\_STHs\((s_a, s_b, s_c, s_d)\); |
| if \((b \neq c)\) and \((b \neq d)\) then |
| get\_\_consistency\_proof\((b, d)\); |
| if \(b < d\) then |
| \(s_a \leftarrow s_c;\) |
| \(s_b \leftarrow s_d;\) |
| \(p_{a,b} \leftarrow p_{c,d};\) |
| if \(t \notin I\) then |
| \(s_c \leftarrow \text{get\_\_STH}();\) |
| \(\text{check\_\_STHs}\((s_a, s_c)\);\) |
| \(\text{get\_\_audit\_\_proof}\((t,e)\);\) |
| if \((s_b \neq \emptyset)\) and \((b < c)\) then |
| \(p_{b,c} \leftarrow \text{get\_\_consistency\_\_proof}\((b, e)\);\) |
| \(s_a \leftarrow s_b;\) |
| \(s_b \leftarrow s_c;\) |
| \(p_{a,b} \leftarrow p_{b,c};\) |
| else |
| \(s_a \leftarrow s_c;\) |
| \(t \leftarrow I \cup \{t\};\) |
| **Server-side** |
| **Stored data**: STH with the largest tree size \(s_n\), map \(g\), default message \(m_0\) |
| **Configuration parameter**: storage limit \(\mu\) |
| **Function** get\_\_server\_message\((m_1)\) : message |
| **Input**: client message \(m_1 := (s_a, s_b, p_{a,b})\) |
| if \((\text{not valid\_\_message}\((m_1)\))\) or \((g.\text{size} = 0)\) then |
| return \(\emptyset\); |
| else if \(b \in g.\text{keys}\) then |
| return \(g[b]\); |
| else |
| return \(m_0\); |
| **Procedure** server\_update\((m_1)\) |
| **Input**: client message \(m_1 := (s_a, s_b, p_{a,b})\) |
| if not valid\_\_message\((m_1)\) then |
| return; |
| if \(s_n \neq \emptyset\) then |
| check\_\_STHs\((s_a, s_b, s_n, g[a], g[b])\); |
| if \((a \neq n \neq b)\) and \((a \notin g.\text{keys})\) or \((b \notin g.\text{keys})\) then |
| \(p_{b,n} \leftarrow \text{get\_\_consistency\_\_proof}\((b, n)\);\) |
| \(g[b] \leftarrow (s_b, s_n, p_{b,n});\) |
| if \((s_a = \emptyset)\) or \((n < b)\) then |
| \(n \leftarrow b;\) |
| \(m_0 \leftarrow m_1;\) |
| \(g[a] \leftarrow m_1;\) |
| else if \(n = b\) then |
| \(g[a] \leftarrow m_1;\) |
| while \(g.\text{size} > \mu\) do |
| \(g.\text{removeFirst}();\)
STHs. Figure 4 illustrates how the last 12 STHs (i.e., those that have been generated in the last 24 hours, since the MMD is set to 2) are distributed as a percentage of clients having them stored at the end of an MMD. We can observe that the two non-gossiping cases form a lower and an upper bound for the distribution of the latest STH. Indeed, when SCTs are saved, after some time, clients do not need to contact the log very often as they tend to visit the same domains most of the time. The distribution is almost uniform, because clients can keep the same STH as long as they do not connect to a website they had never visited before. In this case, more than 78% of the clients hold an STH that is more than one-day old. On the other hand, when SCTs are not saved, the same information (including the latest STH) must be fetched from the log every time an HTTPS connection is established with a CT-enabled server. Under these circumstances, only less than 26% of gossiping clients do not hold one of the last 12 STHs. This performance cannot be exceeded by a gossip protocol that relies on existing client-driven connections. There might be a bias in the results coming from the fact that we used a 24-hour trace of HTTP(S) traffic. This trace does not necessarily contain those clients that establish connections less often (e.g., once a month). The lack of longer authentic traces prevents us from modelling the system more accurately; nevertheless, the presented results are relevant and undoubtedly helpful to analyze the protocols.

Although distribution measurements are not directly useful to demonstrate how well a protocol performs in detecting attacks, they can show how much clients collaborate to obtain their vision of the log when combined with another metric. Indeed, there are only two ways for clients to get a recent STH: contacting the log or receiving an appropriate gossip message. If the distribution is close to the upper bound and the number of STHs fetched from the log is low, it means that the protocol achieves an efficient communication of log-related information between clients, and attacks are more likely to be detected rapidly. The number of STH queries (getSTH() function) per MMD was measured to be about 7.02 million when SCTs are not saved (one query for each HTTPS connection), and only about 10,000 when SCTs are saved (this concerns both gossip protocols).

Overhead. Another decisive characteristic that must be analyzed is the overhead that gossip protocols introduce. More precisely, we express the overhead as the number of log connections strictly generated by the gossip protocol (not by the standard CT framework, i.e., we do not consider queries for the latest STH and the audit proof, but only queries for consistency proofs that are needed upon receipt of certain gossip messages) over the total number of HTTPS connections performed by gossiping clients. The average number of HTTPS connections per MMD was measured to be approximately 7.02 million in all cases, and the overhead was about 8.58% (602,263.2 log connections per MMD) for the STH-only protocol and only about 0.0058% (407.58 log connections) for the second protocol, when proofs are gossiped. This constitutes a substantial overhead reduction and shows, therefore, that gossiping consistency proofs is indeed pertinent. In the first protocol, exactly half of the gossip-related queries to the log originate from clients and the other half from servers, since they need to request consistency proofs under the same conditions, i.e., when the STHs they exchange have a different tree size. In contrast, when the second protocol is used, more queries (72.09%) come from clients.

Storage. For both gossip protocols, the storage required on the client-side (strictly for gossiping) is fixed: a few kilobytes for, at most, a consistency proof and the pair of corresponding STHs. Moreover, the average number of SCTs stored by clients was measured to be about 11–12 (recall that only one hundred websites are considered for each country). Considering that SCTs are only a few hundred bytes, this storage is almost negligible compared to other data that browsers usually store: history, cookies, cached media files, and so on. On the server-side, the second protocol needs to store gossip messages. The size of the map used to store these messages is monotonically increasing and the maximum number of messages that can be stored at a certain point in time is related to the number of different STHs that have been generated by the log. We observed that the largest map contained 4380 messages at the end of the 365 days of simulation. As an example, a limit of 10,000 messages would require less than 16 MB of storage while being able to hold more than two years worth of log data.

Scalability. Table 1 shows how the protocols behave when we vary the gossip factor f. We also compare the situation in which HTTPS servers in the top 10 domains are gossiping (as before) with the situation in which only the global top domain (google.com) is gossiping while HTTPS servers are still CT-enabled. We observe that both protocols perform better, in terms of distribution of recent STHs, when more clients or more servers participate and that the overhead of the second protocol gets even smaller when the gossip factor is increased. It is worth noting that even when only the global top domain (google.com) is gossiping, the protocol achieves a performance close to the results we presented before (with many more servers). This is explained by the fact that google.com is responsible for an important part of the total number of page views in all countries. Moreover, we remark that, although the distribution results are very similar for both protocols, the overhead is substantially lower when proofs are gossiped. Figure 5 shows how the overhead evolves when we change the number of gossiping servers. The second protocol not only generates a much lower overhead than the first one, but we see that it scales well, as the overhead increases steadily but slowly when more servers participate to the protocol.
TABLE I: Average number of gossiping clients with the latest STH or any of the last 12 STHs, average overhead (as defined before), and storage usage defined as the average number of messages stored by servers over the number of different STHs generated by the log, for both gossip protocols. Different gossip factors $f$ and different sets of gossiping servers are considered.

| Prot. | Latest STH | Last 12 STHs | Overhead |
|-------|------------|--------------|----------|
| Prot. 1 | $f = 0.001\%$ | $f = 0.01\%$ | $f = 0.1\%$ |
| Latest STH | 6.06 % | 8.9 % | 9.03 % |
| Last 12 STHs | 47.67 % | 66.88 % | 66.79 % |
| Overhead | 6.71 % | 6.77 % | 6.77 % |

| Prot. 2 | Latest STH | Last 12 STHs | Overhead |
|-------|------------|--------------|----------|
| Latest STH | 5.75 % | 7.73 % | 8.6 % |
| Last 12 STHs | 51.87 % | 63.23 % | 64.48 % |
| Overhead | $2.25 \cdot 10^{-3} \%$ | $2.2 \cdot 10^{-4} \%$ | $1.2 \cdot 10^{-3} \%$ |

![Graph showing overhead in function of the number of gossiping HTTPS servers in the top X domains of each country](image)

**IX. Analysis and Discussion**

There are two opposite scenarios of split-world attacks in which the detectability property of our protocols can be analyzed. The first scenario is the one in which a MITM attack targets a single client, using an illegitimate certificate, and the log is controlled by the attacker (e.g., a government) to provide this certificate only to the victim. If the client is gossiping and connects to a non-compromised gossiping server, then there are two possibilities regarding the tree sizes of the exchanged STHs. If they are equal, then the root hashes will not be the same and the attack will be detected. Those two STHs are a strong evidence that the log is misbehaving, and anyone who receives them can acknowledge the attack. If the tree sizes are different, then both the client and the server will request a consistency proof that the log will not be able to produce. This means that the log will either respond with an incorrect proof or be unresponsive. In both cases, an alert message will be gossipied and possibly reported to some entity (e.g., a monitor). Here, there is no tangible evidence that the log is malicious, so all participants in the gossip protocol should independently try to confirm the assertion contained in an alert message they receive to produce a signal as strong as possible. The second attack scenario is the one in which the whole population is divided into different parts, for example, when a country performs a large-scale permanent MITM attack. As soon as a gossiping client connects to a gossiping server that is not hit by the MITM, the attack will be detected as before. Even with a country-wide firewall, this is very likely to happen if at least one user travels to another country with his device and connects to a server that supports the protocol. Of course, this statement holds only if the number of gossiping clients and servers is sufficient.

The speed of adoption for a new security feature such as the one we described depends on the software update mechanism. As modern browsers are usually automatically updated at regular intervals, a fast deployment rate could be guaranteed for clients. On the other hand, servers usually need to be updated manually and the adoption of a new technique could be much slower. In any case, this is not to be considered as a major issue as long as the protocol is scalable and the price to pay in terms of additional connections and storage is not too high, which was shown to be the case in [VIII-B].

In order to reduce the overhead introduced by the gossip protocol even more, consistency proofs should be requested in batch at regular intervals, instead of immediately when needed. The same goes for verifying the claim contained in a warning message. This will not only decrease the number of requests to the log, but also avoid to fetch the same information several times in the defined period of time. Attacks would only be detected slightly more slowly, depending on the value at which the interval is set.

The gossiped pieces of data are usually not privacy-sensitive, as they should be identical for all users and thus should not allow to infer which domains a client visited. However, if the log fails to prove that a certificate was added to the tree, the corresponding SCT must be reported and this causes privacy issues. The SCT (tagged as, e.g., “not present in the log” or “log unresponsive”) could be sent back only to the server it came from, but this is ineffective if the server is malicious, so it should be required that users give their consent to gossip the fraudulent SCT.

**X. Realization in Practice**

**Protocol layer (TLS vs. HTTPS).** To satisfy the deployability requirement, we used HTTPS traffic to transport gossip messages. Hence, our protocols can be implemented either in the TLS layer (as suggested in [17]) or in the HTTP layer. The first option is to use a TLS extension and to introduce a dedicated field in ClientHello and ServerHello for the gossip messages. The advantage of such a solution is that all TLS-supported services (e.g., SMTP over TLS) can be used for gossiping. Unfortunately, this approach has some drawbacks too. First, ClientHello and ServerHello messages are sent...
unencrypted. Therefore, an eavesdropper could determine whether a client is gossiping and read the exchanged messages. In such a setting, an adversary could launch a MITM attacks only on non-gossiping users. Moreover, too many additional bytes introduced to ClientHello or ServerHello messages may cause latency in the TLS Handshake [13]. This last point is crucial in a multi-log setting. The alternative approach is to use HTTP headers. The gossip messages would be exchanged through HTTPS requests and replies, after the TLS Handshake is completed. This guarantees that an eavesdropping adversary cannot even distinguish whether a client is gossiping or not. Also, this approach allows to send longer messages. The maximum size of an HTTP header is a configuration parameter, usually set between 4–16 KB. Furthermore, the gossip exchange can occur for every HTTPS request/reply (with TLS, it happens only during the handshake).

**Implementation.** To prove the feasibility and efficiency of our proposals, Protocol 2 was implemented and evaluated for both clients and servers. For log operations, the CT Python API was used. The server-side component was realized with the Django web framework, and the client-side consisted of a simple HTTP client that connects to the server, selects a message, and includes it into an HTTP header dedicated to gossiping. When an HTTP request is received, the server’s middleware checks if it contains a gossip header and then updates the local storage accordingly. Then, the server sends a corresponding HTTP reply and embeds the selected message into the gossip header as well. In turn, the client receives the reply, processes the message, and updates its storage.

**Performance.** To evaluate the performance of this implementation, several tests were conducted on a commodity machine (Intel i5-3380M, 2.90 GHz with 16 GB of RAM) running Ubuntu 14.04, with a 100 Mbps Internet connection. For the log, one of Google’s CT log server was used, and all operations were executed 100 times. The latency incurred by downloading an STH, a consistency proof, or an audit proof was on average 162 ms. The verification of STH validity, consistency between two STHs, and SCT audit proof took on average 68.87 ms, 0.17 ms, and 0.28 ms, respectively. The most important computational overhead is caused by the log’s signature verification, but it will not be noticed by users, given that these operations are non-blocking.

**XI. Conclusion**

Detecting and disseminating the misbehavior of log servers is the missing aspect of the current log-based PKI architectures. In this paper, we presented the first gossip protocols for Certificate Transparency that aim at detecting several types of attacks by log servers. The concepts that we developed might be adapted to other public-log approaches [19]–[22]. Our proposals do not require any overlay network or dedicated infrastructure, and can be incrementally deployed. We evaluated our schemes using real traffic traces to show that the protocol in which both consistency proofs and STHs are gossipied is the most promising approach for detecting inconsistencies with a small overhead. Our research showed that it is possible to implement a gossip protocol that would greatly improve security with a small deployment effort and without sacrificing performance or privacy. Thus, gossip protocols will play an important role in the upcoming deployment of Certificate Transparency.

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