Bacillus anthracis Evolution: Taking Advantage of the Topology of the Phylogenetic Tree and Human History to Propose Dating Points

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This review expands on a talk I gave during the “Biology of Anthrax” meeting held in Bari, Italy (September 3rd–6th, 2019). The talk was a synthesis of recent investigations taking advantage of the topology of the Bacillus anthracis phylogenetic tree to propose tentative dating points and scenarios. Currently available whole-genome sequence (WGS) data allowed identifying single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) among B. anthracis strains and drawing phylogenetic trees. The geographic origin of the strains and the topology of the tree were used to infer spreading events. Five star-like patterns in the tree (polytomies), each containing at least six branches, were detected. The analysis of the geographic distribution of the strains constituting one such polytomy suggests that it emerged not more than a few centuries ago. The key observation allowing this dating is the finding that the polytomy is anchored into Western Europe and that the main North-American lineage emerged from one of its branches, indicative of a post-Columbian export. From this point, I propose additional working hypotheses which may allow dating key nodes along the phylogeny of B. anthracis corresponding to four “Out-of-Africa” events. While trade of contaminated animal products seems to be the predominant driving force underlying modern long-distance spreading of B. anthracis, invasive military operations and more generally borders instabilities may have played an important role in earlier times. The testing of these hypotheses will require the sequencing of a significant number of additional strains from many countries.

Keywords: Anthrax, phylogeography, Bacillus anthracis, ecotype, communicable diseases, whole genome sequencing

INTRODUCTION

Bacillus anthracis is a soil-borne spore-forming bacterial species highly pathogenic for a wide variety of herbivores. Anthrax, the associated disease, has had a high economic impact in the pre-vaccines and pre-antibiotics era (1). Despite major therapeutic and control successes during the last century, anthrax is still endemic in many countries due to the long-term survival of B. anthracis spores in the environment, difficult to control propagation in wild fauna, export of contaminated animal products and/or insufficient vaccination programs (2–8). The spread of anthrax is thought to be associated with the emergence of agriculture, and the biblical fifth plague of Egypt 3500 years before present (ybp) is usually considered to be anthrax (see (9) for a review and (10, 11) for a reminder on limitations of historical records interpretations regarding infectious diseases).

Twenty years ago, the availability of the first whole genome sequences allowed the development of simple genotyping assays based on tandem repeats polymorphisms (MLVA) or key (canonical) single nucleotide polymorphisms (canSNPs). These PCR-based assays were subsequently applied to thousands of strains collected worldwide (4, 12–15). Large-scale SNP typing demonstrated that the evolution of B. anthracis is strictly clonal, implying that robust phylogenies can be drawn from whole genome SNP analysis (wgSNP) (13, 16, 17).

Since 2010, whole genome sequencing (WGS) data from hundreds of B. anthracis strains have been made public and thousands of core-genome SNPs have been identified (7, 18–20). The genetic diversity of B. anthracis is now well known, a convenient nomenclature based on canSNPs and algorithms for naming lineages have been developed (13, 19, 21).

Despite these impressive achievements in the past twenty years, our understanding of the natural history of B. anthracis remains weak in two major respects. Firstly, the age of the B. anthracis species or even of the most recent common ancestor (MRCA) of currently identified lineages is essentially unknown. In contrast with other pathogens, such as Mycobacterium tuberculosis (22), data analysis illustrated the absence of a reliable molecular clock, which could have allowed such dating (13, 19). The lack of direct temporal signal in the sequence data is likely linked to the capacity of B. anthracis to sporulate and enter a quiescent state for years or decades (1), and to the frequency of infection opportunities per year, which may vary among different ecosystems (according to environmental conditions, host availability, and for the last 140 years the impact of vaccination programs). In addition, no B. anthracis sequences have been identified so far in ancient DNA investigations. This may reflect a lower epidemiological impact in humans, a lower relative amount of bacterial DNA in investigated remains, or a different spatiotempo-
ral distribution regarding *B. anthracis* infections as compared, for instance, to *Yersinia pestis* infections. Secondly, the place of birth of *B. anthracis* itself and most of its sub-lineages is unknown. This is due, at least in part, to the ability of *B. anthracis* to travel long distances in association with animal products (23–25), and to the biased sampling of strains. A significant part of our knowledge of *B. anthracis* genetic diversity results from sequencing efforts in the USA, where many investigated strains are the result of recent importation events and the actual source is often unknown.

In recent years, the analysis of the topology of the *B. anthracis* phylogeny has allowed proposing dating points (7, 20). This review will summarize these suggestions, update the underlying analyses, and propose additional dating hypotheses.

**Polytomies, Origin and Fate**

Figure 1 shows the global phylogeny of *B. anthracis* deduced from wgSNP identification and maximum parsimony analysis using all currently available non-redundant WGS data. The figure illustrates the existence in the phylogeny of *B. anthracis* of a small number of remarkable topological features, star-like patterns called polytomies. For instance, the “Vollum” clade contains a polytomy with more than six branches (inset in Fig. 1). Figure 2 recalls that polytomies naturally occur during outbreaks. At least three publications reported WGS data from multiple isolates associated with outbreaks: Girault et al. sequenced 53 strains associated with outbreaks in France (26, 27), Ågren et al. (28) sequenced ten strains from an outbreak in Sweden, Braun et al. (29) sequenced 18 strains recovered from two nearby burial pits in Pollino National Park, Southern Italy. In each case, a typical star-like pattern is seen, constituted by strains differing by usually a single SNP from the progenitor genotype at the center of the polytomy. Polytomies appear to be a systematic outcome of outbreaks, but they are rarely maintained in the long term. The apparent paradox is in agreement with the ecotype bacterial species evolution model (30) in which an ecosystem maintains only one lineage. The long-term fixation of additional lineages reflects the establishment in new
The rate of 5.2 $10^{-10}$ mutation/bp/generation, a 5.2 $10^6$ bp chromosome strain. In the Italian investigation, the ratio is 0.28 SNP outbreaks, the value is 0.4 SNP per strain (23 SNPs in 53 outbreaks, France and Italy (27–29)). Circles’ size is proportional to the number of strains sharing the same wgSNP genotype. The smallest circles correspond to one strain. Branch lengths longer than one SNP are indicated. In the Swedish outbreak, 1–2 SNPs per strain are observed. In the French outbreaks, the value is 0.4 SNP per strain (23 SNPs in 53 strains). In the Italian investigation, the ratio is 0.28 SNP per strain. Using the estimates recalled by (28) (a mutation parameter was the number of infection/death cycles per year. A “one death per year” average value resulted in a 13,000 ybp estimate for the dating of the MRCA of currently known B. anthracis lineages, whereas a “0.5 death per year” value predicted a 27,000 ybp old MRCA. Later on, Kenefic et al. (31) investigated the predominant lineage in Canada and the USA, called Western-North American (WNA). They interpreted (I) the high number of SNPs separating ecosystems, such as potential host populations in new locations. The exceptional spreading events reflected by polytomies might result from historical events in particular those associated with invasive military conflicts, and might provide insights regarding B. anthracis phylogeography (7, 20).

Analysing the A.Br.011/009 Polytomy (TEA 011)

The first attempts to date nodes along the B. anthracis phylogeny based on molecular data were by van Ert et al. (13). The main parameter was the number of infection/death cycles per year. A “one death per year” average value resulted in a 13,000 ybp estimate for the dating of the MRCA of currently known B. anthracis lineages, whereas a “0.5 death per year” value predicted a 27,000 ybp old MRCA. Later on, Kenefic et al. (31) investigated the predominant lineage in Canada and the USA, called Western-North American (WNA). They interpreted (I) the high number of SNPs separating this lineage from its closest neighbors and (II) the evolution of the WNA lineage from north to south as indications of a pre-Columbian introduction via the Bering Strait more than 10,000 ybp. This was a reasonable assumption to interpret WGS data available in 2009, but currently available data made it clear that branch length expansion rates may show considerable variations among even very closely related lineages (19, 20, 27).

The TEA 011 (alias A.Br.011/009) polytomy was first described in 2014, based on the systematic whole genome sequencing of B. anthracis strains collected in France (19, 20, 27). Figure 3 shows the TEA 011 polytomy updated by considering currently available WGS data. TEA 011 represents approximately 10% of all sequenced strains. Seven branches numbered L1 to L7 radiate from the MRCA of the polytomy rooted using as an outgroup the “Ames ancestor” strain. The recently described Spanish strain 342/02 defines the new lineage L7 (32). Previously described sub-lineages L1, L2 and L4 [respectively containing the A.Br.140, A.Br.158 and A.Br.137 canSNP branches (19)] are the most frequently observed. In sub-lineage L1, a very early split separates French and Italian strains. One of the two Italian deep branching lineages present in sub-lineage L4 is represented by a strain from Sardinia. Sub-lineage L2 is particularly interesting as it contains three early-splitting sub-lineages, one of which contains secondary
splits to Spain, North-East France, West Africa and North America (Fig. 3). Strain 319/02 from Spain allows us to separate three departures outside of Europe, two towards West Africa (represented by strains from Senegal-Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire respectively) and one towards North America (the WNA lineage), all three characterized by very long branches. This observation, together with the otherwise restricted geographic distribution of strains belonging to TEA 011, provided a very strong argument in favor of post-Columbian contamination of North America from Western Europe instead of pre-Columbian contamination from Asia (20). The proposed interpretation for the emergence of the TEA 011 polytomy is that an outbreak occurred in one of the three European countries contributing founder lineages and that representatives were brought back in the other countries as a side effect of military operations. Southern Italy is the best candidate for being the place of the onset of the polytomy as lineages from the progenitor TEA 008/011 (7) are present in Sicilia (33). Figure 3 also suggests that the topology of TEA 011 reflects two layers of Spanish-French-Italian interactions. The first one is the initial outbreak. The second is illustrated by the more recent lineage L2 split with the Spanish and French branches, and by the split in lineage L4 involving the Sardinian and French lineages.

The three contamination events from West-European sources to West Africa and North America might have included intermediate points, i.e., one of the Atlantic islands colonized by West-European countries about one century before the Americas. However, the pattern of evolution of the WNA lineage from Canada (31) strongly suggests that the North America contamination occurred directly from Western Europe, with 16th or 17th century France as the current best candidate. No TEA 011 strain has been reported so far in other European countries relevant concerning exchanges with the northern part of North America, in particular UK or the Netherlands.

Figure 4 illustrates the rate of expansion of the WNA lineage. From the MRCA indicated by the red star to the tips of the phylogenetic tree, the L2 lineage expanded by approximately 20 SNPs in France, whereas WNA lineages expanded by up to 230 SNPs. This divergence occurred in the same time-span and the most parsimonious explanation for such a behavior is a ten-fold average increase in the number of infection/death cycles per year after arrival in North America. The more basal branches are observed in Canada, in agreement with previous investigations (31). Strain A0303 isolated from cattle is the closest to the ancestral European genotype. The strain is positioned directly on the branch leading to the rest of the WNA lineages. It contributes no specific SNP as if this strain was representing a still extant ancestral genotype.

One interpretation for the pattern shown in Figure 4 is that B. anthracis imported from Western Europe, possibly France, contaminated wildlife and spread from Eastern Canada towards Central Canada, where it reached plains bison herds. It was then carried south via bison migrations, as previously proposed (31). The A0303 strain would be a representative of the B. anthracis genotype as it was when it first reached plains bison. Places of past outbreaks would still be contaminated, allowing the reemergence of such ancestral genotypes (2). The success of the subsequent infections would indicate that the bison population was naive and highly susceptible. This recent introduction of anthrax in North America may have been one cause of the massive extinction of bison (34).

Figure 4 contains a major cluster. The geographic origin of many of the associated strains is not known, but eight among the nine strains with a known location are from Haiti. This cluster defines a polytomy with eight branches. The shortest is defined by three SNPs, the longest by 77. As reviewed in (10, 11), major anthrax outbreaks were observed in Haiti in 1770–1776. It was suggested at that time that the outbreaks resulted from the import of horses from North America. Consequently, Figure 4 further indicates that bison would have been reached well before the contamination of Haiti, possibly during the 17th century or very early 18th century.

Carrying B. anthracis to Canada: the “Régiment de Carignan-Salières” Hypothesis

It is tempting to search for a potential scenario regarding the introduction of the WNA lineage ancestor to Canada and the contamination of bison. Interestingly, there has been one major military operation between France and Canada during the 16th and 17th centuries, the sending of the Infantry Regiment “Carignan-Salières” to Quebec in the year 1665 (35). The “Régiment de Carignan-Salières” was based in Marsal, North-East France (Lorraine), where all extant French sublineage L2 strains have been collected (27). The “Régiment de Carignan-Salières” resulted from the merging in 1659 of two regiments, (36) previously sent to fight in Northern Italy in 1655–1656 against Spanish troops, many of which were coming from the Napoli area [then under Spanish rule and where a major anthrax outbreak was documented in 1617 (9)]. The infantry regiment crossed France from Marsal to La Rochelle in January-February 1665 and left La Rochelle in April and May 1665. As part of the same global operation aimed at strengthening the French colony in Quebec, twelve horses were transported from La Rochelle in May 1665 (37, 38), suggesting that they were selected among the regiment horses. The horses were the first among approximately 80 sent from France in years 1665–1671 (38).

Although it was not yet a general rule at that time, this regiment was wearing a uniform. Consequently, similar contamination might have been carried by many soldiers if some pieces of equipment (leather, wool, horsehair) were contaminated by B. anthracis spores. On the first winter after its arrival in Quebec, the regiment launched a military expedition against Mohawks. Estimates are that the expedition comprised approximately 500 men, tens of them died of exhaustion and hunger, with soldiers from the regiment representing half of the participants (the casualties estimates vary according to accounts, and do not distinguish soldiers and volunteers). The expedition lasted two months from January to March 1666 and reached Schenectady, New York state, 500 kilometers from Quebec (35). Corpses were presumably abandoned along the way back, and some might have subsequently constituted contaminated spots. Consequently, it is tempting to speculate that B. anthracis contaminated uniforms have been the seed of wildlife contamination of Eastern Canada in 1666. Another possibility is that horses themselves were carriers of the infection, or were contaminated after their arrival via contact with soldiers. Although not proved impossible, subclinical infection in horses is clearly not established (1), and the possibility of such a long term healthy carriage has never been documented. Contamination after arrival is similarly unlikely as the fate of each horse imported from France was individually recorded, and the introduction of the horses was considered as very successful (38). In addition, the amount of other
livestock present in Quebec at that time would certainly not have been sufficient to fuel the extremely fast expansion of the *B. anthracis* lineage after arrival in North America, illustrated in Figure 4.

### Tentatively Dating the Birth of the TEA 011 (A.Br.011/009) Polytomy

Interestingly, when excluding strains not isolated in Europe, or strains which might have been extensively cultivated (strains from public repositories or strains derived from the PasteurII-Carbosap vaccine), branch length heterogeneity within TEA 011 appears to be limited. The shortest lineage in the TEA 011 polytomy is lineage L5 with 18 SNPs and the longest is L4 with up to 65 SNPs (Fig. 3). This suggests that there might be a temporal signal within this subset, reflecting a homogeneous ecosystem in France, Italy and Spain. Figure 5 shows the result of a Bayesian Evolutionary Analysis Sampling Trees (BEAST) software (39) analysis. The reconstructed ancestral genotype (MRCA) as exported towards North America and West Africa was included in the analysis and dated to 1650 under the «Carignan-Salières» hypothesis. The analysis dates the emergence of the TEA 011 polytomy to the year 1450, with a 95% credibility interval of 1220–1620 CE (Fig. 5).

### Dating Internal Nodes Along *B. anthracis* Phylogeny

The proposed dating of the TEA 011 polytomy, i.e., only a few centuries back, indicates that *B. anthracis*, like other major pathogens, such as *M. tuberculosis* (22, 40), is quite young, and that its emergence may indeed be associated with the development of agriculture and pastoralism. An African origin for *B. anthracis* might be proposed based on the finding of an African *Bacillus cereus* lineage causing anthrax-like disease in wildlife in African tropical forests (41). *B. cereus* biovar anthracis (BcvA) possesses plasmids (pBCXO1 and pBCXO2) showing sequence similarity higher than...
99.9% with the *B. anthracis* virulence plasmids pXO1 and pXO2. The BcVA versus *B. anthracis* chromosomal sequence similarity is much lower (95%), implying that the virulence plasmids can occasionally be exchanged by horizontal transfer among different *B. cereus* lineages (41). A different *B. cereus* lineage carrying a pXO1 plasmid has been identified in North America (42). As a result, North America is a place where all three of the main *B. anthracis* lineages, A, B, and C, are represented, as well as *B. cereus* strains causing anthrax-like disease. It could be argued that North America, rather than Africa, is the birthplace of *B. anthracis* virulence plasmids. However, this would imply a very unlikely export from North America to the West-African tropical forest. Instead, a more parsimonious hypothesis might be that these lineages were imported into the United States. Although more information on the *B. cereus* lineages causing anthrax-like disease is required to reach a conclusion, I will hypothesize an African origin for the *B. cereus* strains carrying the virulence plasmids in the rest of this review. Phylogenetic analysis showed that the virulence plasmids present in these *B. cereus* lineages are outgroups concerning the plasmids present among extant *B. anthracis* lineages (41). This is as if one among possibly many *B. cereus* strains carrying the virulence plasmids and circulating within the tropical forest had, due to human activities, escaped this ecosystem to give birth to the *B. anthracis* ecotype, reminiscent of the scenario proposed to explain the emergence of *M. tuberculosis* from *Mycobacterium canettii* (40). Since this emergence, the plasmids carried by the founder strain have undergone a clonal evolution strictly congruent with the chromosome. One *B. anthracis* lineage, A.Br.005/006, also called “Ancient A” (19), is a candidate for representing the original ecotype that emerged from the African tropical forest “cradle”. This lineage is remarkable by its strong geographic association with Africa (Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, South-Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia). Among sequenced strains, the shortest branches are constituted by strains from Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda. No other *B. anthracis* lineage was reported yet from these countries. They are adjacent to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic from which *B. cereus* biovar anthracis strains were recovered and in which the genetic diversity of *B. anthracis* has not yet been reported.

Figure 6 is a tentative representation of the evolution of *B. anthracis* using the ecotype speciation model (30). In this representation, a local ecotype (“Ancient A” for Ancient anthracis) is descending from a *B. cereus* ancestor carrying pXO1 and pXO2. At some points along its evolution, the ecotype would have caused anthrax outbreaks, which spread out of Africa, giving birth to new geotypes. In the current topology of *B. anthracis* popula-
This review is proposing a global hypothetical scheme for the phylogeography of *B. anthracis* and its place of origin. This scheme will need to be challenged by the collection of new sequence data from many countries worldwide, including in particular African and Mediterranean countries.

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