Public Assets Management in Brief: How Has Change in Resource Ownership Affected the Efficiency in Forest and Wildlife Operations?

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Abstract
It is imperative that power and authority to decide on matters relating to forest and wildlife operations are actually being devolved to local communities and the private sector, as well as discouraging neo-patrimonial and clientelistic actions in forest and wildlife management. The paper reveals that local organisations including the village governments, district governments and private sector are usually being expected to behave in ways that are as close as possible to the MNRT’s wishes. In other words, power and authority to make decisions on forest and wildlife resources continue to be centrally controlled by MNRT. The paper shows that both Forest Policy 1998 and Wildlife Policy 2007 (RE) advocate decentralisation of power and authority in forest and wildlife operations to local communities and private sector in Tanzania. However, during implementation of both policies, actions of bureaucrats controvert with particular policy provisions. The bureaucrats have decided to establish legal and regulatory provisions which prohibit the devolution process contrary to the existing policy requirements. Additionally, paper indicates presence of neo-patrimonial and clientelistic tendencies in forest and wildlife management. Patrons have been using respective regulations to advance their personal interest and also to legitimise their actions especially when they make neo-patrimonial decisions. In the same vein, they have been making clientelistic decisions on matters relating to forest and wildlife management, and maximise their personal benefits. Hence, paper suggests that because of the prevailing poor policy outcomes in forest and wildlife management, bureaucrats in MNRT should now reconsider and look at devolution in both forest and wildlife conservation as an alternative strategy for increasing efficiency in forest and wildlife operations. Paper also suggests that bureaucrats should ensure that the embedded neo-patrimonial elements or behaviours are discouraged in forest and wildlife conservation.

Keywords: Centralism, Decentralism, Neo-patrimonialism, Clientelism, Forest and Wildlife Management, Tanzania

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1. Introduction
Tanzania has been under socialist regime for over twenty years of its political independence from Great Britain during which time centralism was used in managing the country’s resources. However, upon various reforms in public sector, Tanzania decided to adopt decentralism as an alternative to centralism, and started to formulate policies which place emphasis on decentralising power and authority to the lower tiers of the government. The country formulated policies that encouraged participation of local communities and private sector in managing public assets such as forest and wildlife resources. Forest and wildlife conservation policies were among the policies which were affected by the changes earlier described.

Centralism is described as the control of disparate activities and organisations under a single authority (Stevenson and Waite 2011 p. 282). It is a theory of leadership in which power and control to decide involves having one central group of people. It is a concentration of authority at the top level of the administrative system (Marume and Jubenkanda 2016 p.106). It is a principal – agent type of relationship whereby the central government is the principal and local organisations are the agents (Boko 2002 p.3)

In modern African states, centralism has been embedded within decentralism as most of the actions taken to decentralise such as political decentralisation, is more of de-concentration of functions to the lower tiers of the government and not actual powers and authority to make decisions (Boko 2002 p.5). Moreover, even economic (or market) decentralisation which involves shifting the responsibility of provision of goods and delivery of services from the central government to the private sector has not succeeded, and can only succeed if the legal constraints on local communities and the private sector participation in service provision and goods delivery are removed, and in turn re-establish a well-designed and successful decentralisation system which could contain elements of all the four types of decentralisation, namely: political decentralisation, administrative decentralisation, fiscal decentralisation and lastly economic decentralisation (ibid p.5).

On the other hand, there is disagreement among scholars concerning the meaning of decentralisation. To most of them the act of transferring power and resources to lower tiers of the government is not decentralisation. Many of them however share the assumption that decentralisation is the transfer of power and resources away from the
central government (Schneider 2003 p.33).

In other respects, neo-patrimonialism is an administrative system of rules where an office of power is used for personal uses and gains (Von Soest 2006 p.7). Neo-patrimonial practices tend to benefit few individuals working in the public office, usually the patrons, who control the resources, as compared to the general population. Neo-patrimonialism can take various forms and usually affects policy making, especially developmental projects. It is also responsible for the misuse of aid and state budgets (Van de Walle 2007 p.1). Neo-patrimonialism originated in post-colonial era in most of the developing countries and is used to undermine political, social, and economic participation and competition (Van de Walle 2007 p.1).

Meanwhile, clientelism is a social order which depends on relations of patronage. It involves the exchange of goods and services for political support. It is a political or social system based on the relation of a client (or clientele), i.e. the clientele giving support to the patron in exchange for some special privilege or benefit (Stokes 2007 p.605). Clientelism is a universal feature of modern politics and is unlikely to disappear soon, although its nature varies according to the type of political regime in place (Van De Walle 2007 p.1). Based on the premise established above, researcher seeks to examine: how has change in government policy to decentralisation, affected operational efficiency during the course of improving forest and wildlife management in Tanzania?

1.1 Study objective
To examine the way change in government policy to decentralisation has affected operational efficiency during the course of improving forest and wildlife management in Tanzania.

1.2 Research Theories
The theoretical framework which underpinning this research lies with the Boko (2002) Centralist Theory, Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) Neo-patrimonial Theory and Van de Walle (2007) Clientelist Theory.

The empirical data is subjected to the assumptions and principles of each related theory in order to interpret them and explain the relationship that exists between change in government policy to decentralisation and operational efficiency in forest and wildlife management.

These theories interpret the empirical information in a way that enables to construing a new narrative. The new narrative could also assist in alleviating other embedded elements or behaviours which impede successful implementation of decentralisation in forest and wildlife operations.

The Boko (2002) Centralist Theory
Amongst the centralist theories of government in Africa is the Sylvain H. Boko’s Centralist Theory which states that centralisation is a principal – agent type of relationship whereby the central government is the principal and local organisations are the agents (Boko 2002 p.3).

The Boko (2002) centralist theory works as follows; in a centralist African state, the underlying assumptions are; local organisations (i.e. village governments, district governments, the private sector) are expected to behave in ways that are as close as possible to the central government’s wishes (i.e. non-financial wishes); and local organisations are expected to raise revenues for the central government (Boko 2002 p.3).

Meanwhile, in a centralist African state, Boko’s theory works by following the underlying principle amongst others that; the central government must take and maintain those responsibilities which cannot be effectively performed by the local organisations (Boko 2002 p.7).

The Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) Neo-patrimonial Theory
The theory states that the existence of neo-patrimonialism in a particular country as an administrative system of rules allows public resources to be used for personal gain (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994 p.454).

Many African states have decided to decentralise public operations (Bratton and Van de Walle p.454). However, decentralisation is said to be impeded by neo-patrimonialism (ibid p.455). Neo-patrimonialism is described as a formal and informal vertical distribution of resources based on possession of power among actors involved (Von Soest 2006 p.7).

The Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) Neo-patrimonial theory works as follows: in a neo-patrimonial state, some of the underlying assumptions are; the existing rules are expected to be flexible in order to respond to new challenges in resource management that would benefit the patrons; and the new rules should only be developed in response to new challenges to the patronage system in resource management (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994 p.454).

Meanwhile, in a neo-patrimonial state, the theory works by following some of the underlying principles that; the established rules of patrons must indicate who may participate in making public decisions concerning resource management; and the established rules must restrict competition and involvement of other actors in public resource management (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994 p.454).
The Van de Walle (2007) Clientelist Theory
The theory states that patrons usually decide to exchange benefits or take any action or measure including favours, leniency etc. (and these benefits are usually public resources) in order to prevent or avoid administrative changes to occur within a particular society, thus the public office determines allocation, distribution (actual handing out) and utilisation of public resources (Van de Walle 2007 p.2). In modern Africa, clientelism continues to dominate public resource allocation, distribution and utilisation but it is also described as being incompatible with policy reforms, and only devolution of power and authority will alleviate the existing high level of clientelism in Africa (ibid).

The Van de Walle (2007) Clientelist theory works as follows: in a clientelistic state, the underlying assumptions amongst others are: the patrons, at their discretion when distributing the resources (benefits) should know the clienteles’ preferences and target them with selective benefits; and the exchange of benefits usually should take place during a specific period (Van de Walle 2007 p.3).

Meanwhile, in a clientelistic state, the theory works by following underlying principle amongst others that: resource allocation must be directed towards the most loyal clienteles (Van de Walle 2007 pp.7-9).

1.3 Narratology of the Study
A qualitative approach was found to be more appropriate in understanding how has change in government policy to decentralisation, affected operational efficiency during the course of improving forest and wildlife management in Tanzania? The preference given to qualitative approach over quantitative in this study was due to the fact that, quantification of policy effects in Tanzania has been difficult because of lack of reliable, consistent and comprehensive data in almost all sources of statistics (UNEP 2002).

In this study, interpretivism was chosen as the research philosophy. Additionally, a flexible research design was adopted and an interpretive case study was employed. Since the study was qualitative, semi-structured interviews and interactions were conducted. In establishing the sample size and choosing respondents and sampling technique, the sample size was 40 respondents and non-probability sampling technique was chosen, and technique used was purposive.

Data transcription was carried out by professional transcribers and later translated from Swahili to English by independent translators to ensure limited chance of subjectivity and bias in the study. Data transcribed and translated were subsequently entered into NVivo software where they were auto-coded and analysed until themes were identified. After these themes were identified, each theme was further analysed and interpreted by using analytical techniques of Content analysis and Narrative analysis.

The logic behind data interpretation in narrative analysis is to translate the stories of respondent’s experiences into a narrative form. Narrative form is said to be produced, once a coherent story from data has been constructed. In short, through the use of narrative analysis, the author provides new and interpreted narrative which has a different message, embedded with unbiased personal opinion when being constructed (Segel and Heer 2010).

2. Decentralisation and Operational Efficiency in Forest and Wildlife Management
Study shows both Forest Policy 1998 and Wildlife Policy 2007 (RE) advocate decentralisation of power and authority in forest and wildlife operations to local communities and private sector. However, during implementation of both policies, actions of bureaucrats controvert with particular policy provisions. The bureaucrats have decided to establish legal and regulatory provisions which prohibit the devolution process contrary to existing policy requirements.

Study indicates that bureaucrats continue to believe that government's intervention in forest and wildlife operations is necessary through the use of Tanzania Forest Services Agency (TFS) and Wildlife Division (WD) at Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) headquarters respectively. The study further indicates that decision by bureaucrats to devolve forest and wildlife operations was only made to adhere to conditions for debt relief given by International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and other development partners, as currently the power and authority to decide on matters of forest and wildlife operations continue to be largely maintained by MNRT and not with local communities nor the private sector. The study also shows that decision by bureaucrats to continue implementing decentralisation is actually aiming at securing more grants and other forms of support from development partners.

In other words, study shows that the idea of allowing other actors to participate in managing forest and wildlife resources, is largely on paper and not in practice. The TFS and WD at MNRT continue to embrace the power and authority for making operational decisions on matters of forest and wildlife management under the existing legal and regulatory frameworks.

The Effects of Decentralisation in Forest Management
There has been some improvement in forest management since the Government decided to decentralise forest operations to some district and village governments. However, many significant operational decisions are still
made by MNRT, in this case through Forest Division (FD) and TFS.

Forest management has been decentralised in only few areas, while many other areas continue to be managed by MNRT through TFS. The actual decentralisation in the context of forest management is the introduction and implementation of Community Based Forest Management (CBFM) model in managing forest operations through village governments. However, centralised system of operations in forest management continues till date. The centralised system has been causing many challenges, and a major challenge has been on how to manage the country’s forest cover.

Forest cover is the total size of forest land which exists within the country. Currently, Tanzania has a forest area size of square hectares (ha) 48.1 million. However, the number of forest workers at the moment nationwide is only 3,000 for all forest management staff, from the lowest forest official to the director at the ministerial headquarters. In other words, 48.1 million square hectares (ha) of forests are being managed by 3,000 forest experts only, countrywide.

On average, each forest expert is required to manage about 16,000 square hectares. Hence, considering the minimal number of workers in forest management, forest operations are likely to be affected by the size of the forest cover. The Government could use local communities and private sector to reduce the problem of shortage of manpower which affects operational efficiency. As a result of this, some forest management programs such as Participatory Forest Management (PFM) have been introduced in order to alleviate the crisis.

The PFM advocates decentralisation in forest management. However, MNRT has not handed over power and authority of managing forest resources to other actors (i.e. local communities and the private sector). Consequently, MNRT has chosen to maintain ownership of forest resources by using the Joint Forest Management (JFM) model.

The study shows that MNRT has maintained its position of refusing to entrust power and authority for managing forest resources to other actors. The forest reserves in Tanzania are mainly divided into national forests, local government forests, communities (village) forests and private forests. In terms of the total size of the country’s forest land, a larger portion is centrally managed by TFS which has zonal offices countrywide.

Many bureaucrats continue to believe that centralisation is not only necessary, but is the best approach for solving social and economic challenges. However, with the existing systems and staffing level in forest management, study indicates that deforestation and forest degradation are likely to increase.

Study shows that TFS is primarily responsible for managing much of the forest cover which include national forests. Additionally, TFS is also responsible for managing forests located in general land outside the official Protected Areas (PAs). However, study indicates that there has been a challenge with TFS of lacking the legal mandate to manage forests located in general land i.e. the land outside the PAs.

Actually, it is on the general land that most deforestation incidents take place. Currently, TFS is able to conduct its forest operations on 33% of the entire protected forest land only. Meanwhile, the protected forest land is 50% of the entire country’s forest cover.

Thus, decentralisation in forest management can assist in improving efficiency by extending forest operations into other areas outside the protected areas where TFS is unable to reach. For example, by decentralising power and authority for managing forest operations, local communities through village government can identify and establish more village forests when preparing Land Use Plan (LUP) and become responsible and accountable for managing forest operations conducted under their jurisdiction.

Study also indicates that when conducting forest operations, the private sector has shown to have better technology and equipment with overall sophistication in managing forest resources, a case in point, is the Kilombero Valley Teak Company (KVTC) and Green Resources. On the contrary, TFS has displayed shortage of manpower, finances and other material resources such as motor vehicles which could be used to enhance operational efficiency.

Historically, TFS was established in 2011 after dissolving FD of MNRT. However, FD was re-established in year 2015. Basically, the MNRT’s decision to establish TFS under Government Executive Agencies Act No. 30 of 1997, was mainly aimed at strengthening efforts on revenue collection from forest products. The decision to dissolve FD within MNRT, actually surprised many as this was the policy desk of the minister responsible and by so doing, the policy advisory machine in forest management at MNRT was removed.

The TFS manages 33% of protected forests cover as earlier described. 57% of protected forest cover is managed by district governments (i.e. the local authority forest reserves) and only the remaining 10% of protected forest cover is managed by local communities through their respective village governments and the private sector. In other words, this 10% indicates the extent of decentralisation to the lowest tiers of local communities and private sector in managing forest resources.

The study shows comparatively, village and private forest reserves have better forest conditions compared to forest reserves which are being managed by either central or local governments. The main reason is due to the fact that power and authority to make decisions over resources management lies with the local communities and individuals who own the forest reserves.

Furthermore, study indicates that the private sector is being used more to assisting MNRT in financial and
technical aspects and information sharing. Nonetheless, there are very few private forest reserves such as Teak Plantation Forest Reserve managed by KVTC located between Kilombero and Ulanga districts in Morogoro region.

Truly, MNRT has not taken enough advantage of such strengths and opportunities of the private sector to improve forest operations and management as a whole. A case in point, is the Green Resources, a private company that operates in forest management with huge plantation forests nationally and internationally. Green Resources is a forestation company that ranks among the large producers of wood in East Africa.

In other respects, efficiency in forest operations is affected by delays in the approval process of LUP. Usually, no forest operation is allowed on a land which has not been approved. The study further shows that LUP is approved in the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development (MLHHSD). The study suggests that successful decentralisation in forest management, must involve other cross cutting policies such as the National Land Policy 1995. The land policy should take power and authority to decide on land matters down to lower tiers of the government and allow easy, quick and efficient decision making process. Currently, land commissioner at MLHHSD is the one deciding on approving or disapproving the LUP. Meanwhile, LUP is discussed, prepared and agreed by the local population on how best a particular piece of land should be utilized.

The Effects of Decentralisation in Wildlife Management

The village governments are responsible for looking after Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) through locally established Community Based Organisations (CBOs). The introduction of Wildlife Management Area (WMA) model is aimed at providing local communities with full control over sustainably managing wildlife animals for their own benefits.

The study shows that WMAs are meant for bringing power and authority down to local communities, to be on top of wildlife management process in areas where people reside between two or more official protected wildlife reserves. Thus, WMAs are mini-wildlife reserves managed by local communities through their village governments by using CBOs. However, study indicates that there are only few geographical areas in Tanzania where WMAs have been established and commenced to operate.

In these few WMAs, there is a problem of constant government intervention which causes decreased efficiency in wildlife operations. In other words, there is a minimal or rather limited devolution of power and authority needed to improve wildlife operations. The limited devolution of power and authority in managing WMAs, emanated from Wildlife Conservation Act 2009 and Wildlife Management Areas Regulations 2012 which gives MNRT more power and authority over matters relating to wildlife operations within WMAs.

Eventually, village governments through CBOs cannot run their wildlife operations independently in WMAs except only after receiving directives or support from MNRT. The study indicates that MNRT centrally makes decision such as collecting revenues from WMAs. Study further indicates that the funds collected are not timely disbursed back to the respective WMAs, where the funds were initially collected. And even when a particular WMA receives the disbursed fund, it usually not in accordance with the Twelfth Schedule of WMAs Regulations 2012 and also its computation is not transparent. The lack of sufficient funds has seriously affects wildlife operations in WMAs.

Moreover, study shows that lack of private sector and local communities’ power and authority to decide on matters relating to wildlife operations within WMAs has also been influenced by conservation politics. Conservation politics are a set of established policies, legal and regulatory settings best adapted to conservation. It involves working out which of the actors is better placed to well manage conservation of wildlife resources.

For example, study indicates that some Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) prepared a particular policy brief aimed to enabling local communities to enhance their revenue management systems in WMAs. The NGOs proposed a revenue management framework which could directly benefit the local communities. A set of proposals from NGOs including the framework itself, was initially discussed and accepted, but in a strange turn of events, those proposals were altered and others were even not included into the revised WMA Regulations 2002. The proposals were meant to be included during review of WMA Regulations 2002, and because of that, the revised and existing WMA Regulations 2012 have not included the agreed recommendations from NGOs particularly in area of revenue collection and its entire management.

The conservation politics can also be seen in the relationship that exists between bureaucrats within the MNRT. This typically occurs when forest and wildlife managers compete for resource allocation, especially at the time of budget disbursement and at the time of soliciting funds from development partners.

In managing revenues, usually when MNRT collects funds from WMAs, it remits the funds to the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MoFP). Thereafter, funds will be redistributed to the MNRT and back to respective WMAs. Study indicates that MNRT and MoFP could collect funds from WMAs through taxing the revenues generated in WMAs, and leave the funds in WMAs to support the wildlife operations.

Delays in funds disbursement back to WMAs from MNRT, tend to hinder efficiency in wildlife operations. Study shows that many wildlife operations in WMAs cannot be efficiently carried out because of delays and inadequacy of funds. Thus, devolution in the context of wildlife management largely depends on the successful
implementation of the WMA model in managing wildlife operations through CBOs under village governments. In those few geographical areas where the WMA model has been correctly implemented, it has brought encouraging results.

However, there have been some challenges during implementation of WMA model such as claim that local communities lack adequate skills and knowledge necessary to manage wildlife operations. Such claims usually come from bureaucrats, and it further indicating the continued existence of politics of conservation in wildlife operations.

The successful implementation of WMA model is also affected by other contradicting cross cutting laws, and subsequently affects wildlife operations. A case in point, is the Land Use Act No. 5 of 1999 which implements the National Land Policy of 1995. As earlier described, the Land Use Act presents a challenge particularly on land use planning and approval whereby the land commissioner at MLHHSD, has the sole power and authority to approve or disapprove the LUP which was prepared and agreed at the village level.

The Land Use Act directs local communities to seek approval from the land commissioner at MLHHSD after preparing the LUP. The study shows that village land which has been marked as WMA can be disapproved by the land commissioner who solely has been given such authority to do so. The land commissioner in Tanzania is responsible for the overall administration of all lands. The land officers at district and municipal levels have some power delegated to them but not authority.

The study also indicates that another challenge in managing WMAs lies in its operational framework. For example, WMA has always been described as village wildlife reserve but all key operational decisions cannot be made at the village level. The village governments must seek approval from MNRT before carrying out a particular wildlife operation. Study shows village governments through CBOs must seek approval from Director of Wildlife (DW) at MNRT when required to allocate hunting blocks to hunters as described in WMAs Regulations 2012.

On the other hand, overall government’s budget allocation to support MNRT wildlife operations is another operational efficiency setback. Often times, various ministerial plans and programs have not been efficiently implemented due to inadequacy of funds to support wildlife operations. Furthermore, lack of adequate working tools such as motor vehicles has adversely affected the efficiency in conducting wildlife operations. Game rangers and wardens have been using old and out-of-date tools to prevent and control illegal hunters who have increasingly become militarised.

Meanwhile, when the Government decided to devolve power and authority to the lower district level also known as Local Government Authorities (LGAs) through its decentralisation policy in 1972, the decision was intended to improve operational efficiency. Instead, during implementation of decentralisation policy, many workers in LGAs were retrenched including game wardens and scouts. It was believed that in order to increase operational efficiency, those possessing lower academic qualifications such as primary education of seventh grade, should be removed from public service through the well-known, Government Workers’ Retrenchment Program.

It was subsequently learned that implementation of decentralisation policy through retrenchment of workers was not properly conducted. After the removal of game rangers and wardens in the 70’s and 80’s, human-wildlife conflicts, wildlife trafficking and animal poaching became prevalent.

The continued growing conflict between humans and wildlife animals, wildlife trafficking, animal poaching has compelled the Government to revisit its previous decision on retrenchment of workers and start to employ game wardens and scouts. Currently, there is a college located at Ruvuma in Namtumbo area, North of Songea Town called Likuyusekamaganga which provides training to game wardens and scouts.

However, village governments seem to be unable to train their own game wardens and scouts due to limited financial resources. At the moment, many trainees are being sponsored by either MNRT or NGOs. The shortage of game wardens and scouts at the village level adversely affects wildlife operations and eventually leading to an increase in human-wildlife conflicts, wildlife trafficking and animal poaching.

Study also indicates that efficiency of wildlife operations is adversely affected by many and contradicting laws within wildlife management. The laws governing wildlife operations are Tanzania National Parks Act Cap. 282 of 2002 (RE), Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority Act Cap. 284 and Wildlife Conservation Act No. 5 of 2009. These laws are being respectively overseen their implementation by three wildlife authorities namely: Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA), Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA) and Tanzania Wildlife Authority (TAWA) which is established by Establishment Order 14. Study shows that these wildlife authorities have overlapping institutional responsibilities.

These wildlife authorities operate by using the three different laws which in most cases cause contradictions during their implementation. In order to minimise contradictions and increase efficiency in the overall wildlife operations, study suggests that these three laws must be harmonised or integrated, after all, at the moment there is only one wildlife policy in place.

Lastly, study shows that the continuity or sustainability of WMAs is in question, due to the fact that introduction and implementation of the particular model is being funded by Norway. There is a possibility for WMAs to collapse when Norway decides to withdraw its support. The introduction and operationalisation of
WMA model requires considerable financial investment and long set-up time. It takes eight to nine years to establish a particular WMA and make it operational.

Neo-patrimonialism and clientelism in forest and wildlife management

The neo-patrimonialism in forest and wildlife management is manifested when patrons use regulations in their favour in response to various challenges that they face in public resource management. A case in point, is the review of Wildlife Management Areas Regulations 2002 which took place in 2012, when some recommendations from NGOs on revenue management in WMAs were altered by patrons and replaced with their own recommendations, as earlier described. The study shows that patrons own hunting, timber and logging businesses.

As earlier described, NGOs and private sector prepared a particular policy brief during the review process of Wildlife Management Areas Regulations 2002. This policy brief was initially discussed and subsequently accepted. Unfortunately, during submission of the revised regulations, the recommendations proffered in the policy brief did not form part of the revised Wildlife Management Areas Regulations 2012. Finally, the WMAs Regulations 2012 were signed and became operational.

Such actions of refusing to incorporate recommendations from NGOs and the private sector typify neo-patrimonial tendencies of using regulations to legitimise patrons’ neo-patrimonial actions. Thus, study indicates that patrons have used regulations which are much easier and flexible to alter, to fulfil their neo-patrimonial intentions. These regulations are usually being formulated within the responsible ministries and approved by the respective ministers. Normally, regulations are prepared and approved internally as opposed to the legislations which must be approved by the Parliament. This arrangement makes the job of patrons much easier, as preparation and approval of regulations largely becomes an internal matter within the particular ministry.

Therefore, study shows that the revised WMAs Regulations 2012 have been formulated to protect neo-patrimonial interests of the patrons. To buttress this argument is also another example of the way in which TFS was established, as described earlier on.

TFS was established as a response to the new challenges which emerged after accepting the devolution in forest management, when MNRT decided to respond by establishing TFS under the Government Executive Agencies Act No. 30 of 1997. Study shows that TFS was established in response to the challenge of decentralising the power and authority in managing forest operations to local organisations.

Study indicates that TFS is now centrally controlling forest operations in national forest reserves which constitute 33% of the entire protected forests and 83% of the whole country’s forest cover which include 50% of unprotected forest land, as earlier described. However, TFS lacks efficiency in managing forest operations. Efficiency is defined as a situation whereby every resource is optimally allocated and used, leaving minimal wastes and losses (Coelli et al. 2005). The lack of efficiency opens doors for the patrons to take advantage of the prevailing situation. Furthermore, by establishing TFS, MNRT was solidifying its central position in forest management, contrary to the whole idea of devolution as stipulated in the Forest Policy 1998.

In other respects, study further indicates that patrons are ones deciding who should make public decisions concerning resource management. The local communities and private sector are not being allowed to make decisions concerning forest and wildlife management. For example, decision on allocation of hunting blocks is made centrally by DW at MNRT. The local communities cannot make their own investment decisions in respective WMAs without approval of DW.

In the case of clientelism in forest and wildlife management, study shows that patrons have been having the propensity to make decisions that go contrary to the expert recommendations and adversely affect the efficiency in forest and wildlife operations just to satisfy their patron-client relationships. Sometimes, patrons have been making clientelistic decisions to satisfy some members of local communities. Often times, patrons tend not to consider expert recommendations that do not build them to eyes of the clienteles.

Study indicates that when expert recommendations differ from the expectations of patrons, the particular issued recommendations will not be considered or sometimes patrons may choose to openly oppose the issued recommendations. For example, there have been sustained protests from villagers led by local patrons over the decision to expand Ruaha National Park. The decision to evacuate these households was based on issued expert recommendations on the importance of reallocating people as a way of expanding Ruaha National Park. The villages involved in the reallocation of people are Igomelo, Luhango, Nyeregete and Ikoga Mpya but patrons have been at the forefront trying to prevent the expansion of Ruaha National Park. Thus, study shows that there is a presence of clientelistic tendencies in forest and wildlife management, as such resistance demeans the value of experts’ recommendations which are primarily aimed at reducing the human-wildlife conflicts in the villages involved.

Hence, study suggests that because of the prevailing poor policy outcomes in forest and wildlife management, bureaucrats should now reconsider and look at devolution in both forest and wildlife conservation as an alternative strategy for increasing efficiency in forest and wildlife operations. Study also suggests that bureaucrats should ensure that the embedded neo-patrimonial elements or behaviours are discouraged in forest and wildlife operations. Study shows that because of the prevailing poor policy outcomes in forest and wildlife management, bureaucrats should now reconsider and look at devolution in both forest and wildlife conservation as an alternative strategy for increasing efficiency in forest and wildlife operations.
3. Conclusion
This paper has examined the way change in government policy to decentralisation has affected operational efficiency during the course of improving forest and wildlife management in Tanzania. The paper shows that both Forest Policy 1998 and Wildlife Policy 2007 (RE) advocate decentralisation of power and authority in forest and wildlife operations to local communities and private sector in Tanzania. However, during implementation of both policies, actions of bureaucrats controvert with particular policy provisions. The bureaucrats have decided to establish legal and regulatory provisions which prohibit the devolution process contrary to existing policy requirements. Additionally, paper indicates presence of neo-patrimonial and clientelistic tendencies in forest and wildlife management. Patrons have been using respective regulations to advance their personal interest and also to legitimise their actions especially when they make neo-patrimonial decisions. In the same vein, they have been making clientelistic decisions on matters relating to forest and wildlife management, and maximise their personal benefits.

Thus, paper concludes by suggesting that because of the prevailing poor policy outcomes in forest and wildlife management, bureaucrats in MNRT should now reconsider and look at devolution in both forest and wildlife conservation as an alternative strategy for increasing efficiency in forest and wildlife operations. The paper also suggests that bureaucrats should ensure that the embedded neo-patrimonial elements or behaviours are discouraged in forest and wildlife conservation.

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