CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The European Union is often understood through its motto ‘united in diversity,’ adopted in 2000 and in use for years earlier. Yet the primary focus has often centered on unity or the policies that bring together the divergent populations of the Union. Diversity is self-evident and obvious. However, this diversity is at the core of the European integration project and the novel ways in which the EU has been recognizing difference and incorporating it into its institutions and modus operandi constitutes an often-neglected aspect of EU integration.\(^1\)

For over a decade, the European Union appears to be lost in an endless series of crises, beginning with the global economic crisis of 2008, the subsequent Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, and the COVID 19 crisis. These have constituted the most serious challenges to the European Union since the establishment of the European Community of Coal and Steel more than half a century earlier. The integration project has seen periods of economic stagnation and political conflict, including President de Gaulle’s “Non” to British Membership, the period of ‘Eurosclerosis’ during the oil shock of the 1970s, and political stagnation of the Community. Even during the decades preceding the current crises, there have been serious setbacks, including the French and Dutch rejection of the European constitution, the Danish referendum in which

\(^1\) A similar argument has been made by Prügl and Thiel (2009), p. 9.
the Maastricht Treaty was temporarily rejected, and other setbacks to European integration.

The past decade, with its recession and the ensuing debt crisis in recent years, has raised a question of economic and financial collapse and tested the solidarity of the Union to its limits. In addition to the difficulties of the EU in responding effectively to the economic crisis and its subsequent debt and currency crises, the difficulties in persuading German citizens to support the economies in Europe’s South, particularly Greece, demonstrated the constraints of the EU. Solidarity is always a fragile good; many modern states suffer from the difficulty of convincing their citizens of the need for solidarity with co-citizens. In addition, the European project has been challenged by populist parties. Combining anti-elite rhetoric with hostility toward migration and global cooperation, these parties have been successful in elections in recent years and have found copycats among mainstream parties. Some mainstream parties, British conservatives in particular, have challenged the usefulness of the European integration project and some of its basic premises. The ‘Brexit’ referendum in June 2016 resulted in a majority of citizens in a Member State voting to leave the European Union. Thus, the European integration project finds itself in the most serious crisis since its beginnings in the 1950s. Yet it has also succeeded in establishing an unprecedented level of cooperation and integration on the European continent. In core areas of EU politics, for example environment, transport, internal market, and consumer protection, it has established a web of rules, which apply to more than 400 million people. In fact, despite or because of the crisis, the EU has increased in popularity among its citizens, and record numbers identify themselves as Europeans. This paradox between a high level of integration—often invisible to most citizens or taken for granted—and its challenges merits a revaluation of the European Union as a polity that has sought to accommodate difference. Diversity is inherent in any social group as a result of the multitude of its composing identities. Unless oppressed by authoritarian rule, diversity is intrinsically in permanent tension with the unity of the respective group.

Crisis and resilience shine a light on a core challenge and achievement of the EU, namely its ability to accommodate diversity. We argue that the EU has developed a set of unique responses to the challenges of diversity throughout its existence. A union of not just diverse states but citizens with divergent understandings of citizenship, solidarity, and a variety of national identities has had to find novel ways to incorporate difference.
Rather than a ready-made plan, the European project gradually built up institutions and instruments to mediate and incorporate this diversity. We will argue that this experience also offers insight into how states can engage with diversity. As such, we analyze the European Union through the lens with which one might view a state and argue that its policies contain lessons for other states.

The European Union since its founding has been defined by its diversity in terms of languages, religions, historical experiences, and traditions. While observers often note that the EU has become more diverse with the enlargement toward post-Communist countries, they may easily downplay the variety among (and within) the Member States of the ‘old’ EU. In response, the EU has developed a careful web of institutions and policies that seek to accommodate this diversity while allowing the EU to function and evolve. The recent crises highlighted not only the tenuous nature of these structures, but also the mechanisms that the EU has developed to weather the crises.

This is not to argue that the EU with all its institutions and structural particularities constitutes a role model for countries seeking to accommodate diversity around the world, or that the EU offers a set blueprint—in fact, its ability to respond through creative ambiguity to challenges of diversity offers greater insight than the formal institutions themselves. In general, the transfer of institutions without accounting for different contexts has not served the process of state-building and democratization. Yet, understanding how one polity addresses a particular feature of its social structure, be it inequality, size, or diversity, can help draw broader lessons.

The core argument of this book is that the EU has developed implicit and explicit forms of addressing the diversity that extend beyond merely acknowledging the diversity of its Member States. These range from offering a distinct layer of European citizenship, to prohibiting discrimination, to developing institutional mechanisms that ensure a balance of the majority while giving a voice to smaller Member States. This development was piecemeal and gradual, rather than being based on a grand design of how to accomplish ‘unity through diversity.’ We argue that an essential feature of the EU’s approach to diversity has been not by design, but by confronting particular challenges over time, thus creating an evolving and growing

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2 For example, the difference in wealth within Germany (East/West) and Italy (North/South).
response to diversity. What evolved is not a unified, coherent set of laws or policies, but a complex, multi-layered, and asymmetric web. The result is by no means comprehensive or perfect. National minorities are often marginalized both nationally and in the EU, including the large pan-European Roma community. Racial diversity and migration are often marginalized, as numerous EU Member States still refuse to recognize their own diversity through migration.

What the EU is, was, or should be has been one of the most difficult questions to answer. It has been variously called an ‘empire’ (Zielonka 2005, pp. 11–14), a ‘small power’ (Toje 2010, pp. 5–10, 182–184), a community of values (Richardson 2002–2003), a system of governance (Jordan 2001), a trading power (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006), a normative power (Diez 2005), and much else. The variety of labels often reflects different perspectives. Seen as a foreign policy power, it gains a different shape than as an actor upon and together with the Member States.

The multitude of ascriptions is also a result of the EU itself having been notoriously elusive in its self-definition (Zielonka 2005, pp. 4–7). This evasion has been largely an exercise in survival and adaptability. The creative ambiguity of the EU has been a core feature of the Union and also what has kept it going. In fact, this conundrum itself is already a response to the challenges of diversity. The EU could be understood as an ‘incompletely theorized agreement,’ a term coined by the American constitutional lawyer Cass Sunstein. He notes that agreement on overarching concepts might be elusive. Ambiguity and abstraction—rather than great detail—can provide accommodation for otherwise conflicting positions (Sunstein 2001, p. 56). While such an approach might be criticized for avoiding confrontation on key issues in a society, ‘incompletely theorized agreements’ have clear benefits in divided societies: “Especially in a diverse society, silence—on something that may prove false, obtuse, or excessively contentious—can help minimize conflict…and save a great deal of time and expense” (Sunstein 2001, p. 58). As such, these types of agreements not only reduce “the political cost of enduring disagreements” (Sunstein 2001, p. 60), but might also provide for the necessary institutional stability. Had the European Union at its foundation as European Economic Community been defined as a confederation or as a federation, the project would have alienated a number of Member States and political actors. It is unlikely that any subsequent treaty would have been signed, not to mention ratified, had it contained such a clear definition of what the EU was. In fact, the creative ambiguity of what the European Union is has not only
spurred vivid debate for decades among scholars, but has in many ways been the foundation of the European Union.

Just like a state that calls itself a ‘Democratic People’s Republic’ should not be taken at face value (but rather the opposite), a polity that refuses to call itself anything should not mean that scholars should refrain from naming it.

Jiří Přibáň has observed that “the Union’s complexity, polycentric structure and functionally differentiated pluralism represent a departure from the nation-state and its sovereignty as a unified system of representative authority in full territorial and political control” (Přibáň 2009, p. 30). Indeed, much of the literature on the EU notes its distinct and unique character.³ Michael Walzer in his discussion of toleration, to which we will return in the next chapter, argues that, in addition to different regimes of toleration, the European Union “isn’t an empire or a consociation but something different from both and perhaps new in the world” (Walzer 1999, p. 48). Yet this distinction risks leading to a conceptual dead end by arguing and reinforcing the EU’s approach as unique and incomparable. Of course, the EU—with its institutional structure and historical trajectory—is unlike any other state or international organization, and is thus unique. However, the ghost of uniqueness renders comparison futile and limits inquiry. Social sciences and law thrive from comparison and the ability to identify broader trends and typologies. If taken as a case sui generis, it cannot serve as a case to be compared with other polities, nor can politics of diversity or any other domain be applied to it. Neither it is productive. Whereas the combined features of the EU are particular and not easily compared, if taken individually they are not immune to comparison.

Populations diverse in terms of national identity, ethnicity, language, and religion inhabit polities around the world and very few states are homogenous. While the ‘nation-state’ remains widely used and is deeply ingrained in the language and understanding of international relations (United Nations, Völkerrecht), it is largely a fiction. The classic definition of nation-states with well-delineated borders and peoples applies to few states and is adopted either by default or as an aspirational goal that nation and state ought to be congruent (Gellner 2006). This ideal type of state is often associated with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, but is in fact a product of later centuries (Zielonka 2005, p. 10).

³See, for example, Börzel (2012), and comments in Caporaso et al. (1997).
Once confronted with diversity, the state can respond in multiple ways. The first choice centers on whether the state seeks forms of accommodation, or rejects the diversity. Rejecting diversity includes a wide range of policies, from assimilation or ignoring the particular group, to repressive measures, such as expulsions, ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and genocide. While there is a large difference between a state that forces its minorities to change their names or discourages (or prohibits) the use of their mother tongue and one that expels its minorities or kills them, they are all based on rejecting diversity. This may be because the majority considers itself the rightful and sole owner of the state, or because minorities are associated with past grievances or current threats. States might also confront different minority groups in a variety of ways. These repressive policies have been widespread since the emergence of the modern nation-state in the nineteenth century and can be found around the globe. In addition to the profound moral problems that rejecting diversity implies, the policies of eliminating diversity have generally failed (McGarry and O’Leary 1993). The continued attempts by some self-proclaimed nation-states to reduce diversity through assimilation, integration, and more odious policies such as expulsions and genocide are offset by large streams of migration and previously voiceless groups ‘remembering’ or inventing their group identity. Genocides and expulsions often remain ‘incomplete,’ as significant parts of the target population survive. The normative cost is high, as state policies do not merely violate the human rights of those targeted, but usually such state policies also make majorities complicit in mass violence or at least repression, and repressive policies toward minorities often go hand in hand with authoritarianism. More gradual assimilation might entail less repression, but unless the population subject to assimilation does not hold a strong national identity, as might have been the case in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, resistance and resentment are common responses.

Accommodating diversity thus seems like the obvious state response. Even if states opt for this response, it entails a wide range of different approaches. These might be weak multicultural policies that accept the diversity of a society without actively preserving or promoting it, as is the case in many European countries that confront migration. Fully recognizing and including the voice of different groups takes a range of policies, from minority rights to power-sharing and ethnic federalism. Yet strategies remain contested; and where identity matters, institutions that seek to incorporate different groups are often fragile and might risk reinforcing
the lines of fragmentation they seek to overcome. There is no universal policy to address the very different needs of communities around the world. While policies such as minority rights and political inclusion of different groups—especially through power-sharing—have seen widespread adoption in post-conflict settings, they are not without their challengers in practice and theory, and there is no blueprint that could be adopted across the world without considering local context and demands.

Debates on accommodating differences, especially in divided societies, have focused on a set of institutional responses. At the center of most academic debates has been power-sharing. Power-sharing describes divergent institutional responses that aim to include different identity groups in the decision-making process. Power-sharing institutions come in a variety of shapes and forms. Some might be temporary arrangements, as in post-election coalitions to bridge high levels of polarization, while others are long-lasting and constitutionally prescribed, as in Belgium or South Tyrol. Another line of distinction is between corporate and liberal power-sharing. Liberal power-sharing describes power-sharing institutions that allow for considerable flexibility and give priority to individual over collective rights, whereas corporate power-sharing is rigid and subordinates the citizen to the collective ethnic group, as in, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina (McCulloch 2014). Critics of power-sharing have advocated more inclusive and cross-community institutions that challenge the notion of group representation altogether (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Separate, but not disconnected, are other debates on institutional design focused on federalism, in particular federal or territorial autonomy along ethnic lines. Here, a key question is the balance of power between the units and the center, as well as the degree of homogeneity or diversity within the territorial units (Erk and Anderson 2009). Finally, minority rights constitute the third pillar of debates on institutional responses to diversity, centering on the balance between human rights, non-discrimination, and group-based minority rights (Kymlicka 2007).

The different institutional options include different underlying concepts of integration and distinctiveness, that is, how members of identity-based groups should be part of a larger integrated society versus the preservation of the distinctive features of the community. The second large debate framing the variety of options centers on the balance between recognizing and institutionalizing groups and the potential risks of reinforcing group boundaries. There is no clear-cut conclusion to the debates, but rather state policies toward diversity need to balance these different
considerations. If the institutions are too rigid and based along the lines of ethnicity or other collective markers, they restrict individual choice and reproduce divisions in society. If they neglect deeply rooted differences, they might not address disputes over identity and political representation, and often inadvertently favor a particular actor (Marko 2019).

Bringing the European Union into this debate will thus enrich the options of accommodation, as well as show their limitations based on the experience of the EU. Literature on diversity and state strategies to accommodate different groups has drawn on ‘successful cases’ for decades. Every resolved ethnopolitical conflict suggests itself as a model for others, from more recent settlements in South Tyrol and Northern Ireland to Switzerland, Canada, or the United States (Gagnon et al. 2003; Schneckener 2002; Watts 2002). Failed or difficult cases, such as Iraq or Bosnia and Herzegovina, serve as examples of the difficulties in accommodating difference as well (McCulloch and McGarry 2017; Hartzell and Mehler 2019; Bieber and Keil 2009).

Bringing the EU in adds an important case for studying policies of diversity. While not a state, the Union has established institutions and practices that not only resemble a state, but also offer insight into how states and sub-state units might confront diversity. This book does not propose the EU as a generalizable model for diverse societies around the world, as in fact no state or sub-state unit can be used as such. Yet, understanding the approaches and experience of addressing diversity in the EU can be useful for greater comprehension of the EU itself, and helps shed new light on other cases.

The obvious and immediate challenge to discussing the EU in conjunction with states is that the EU is not a state. “What is the EU?” is the question that has been bedeviling research on the EU for decades (Fabbrini 2017; Hooghe and Marks 2019; Jordan 2001; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). Indeed, there is no consensus on what the EU actually is. The EU has been studied as an international organization or a regional grouping. Others have focused more on its processes, whereas many others consider the EU to be a distinct and unique structure. However, as Olson and McCormick have suggested, “we could also try to understand the EU as a political system in its own right and compare its structure and operating principles with those of conventional national political system” (McCormick and Olsen 2018, pp. 76–77). And indeed, we do not argue that the EU is a state. Yet many states lack key features associated with statehood as well. The EU explicitly refrains from understanding itself as a
state, and integration has only been possible because it did not claim to strive to become a state.

While the EU is not a state, it shares many features with states, such as external borders and shared political institutions, including elections, common laws and courts, citizenship, and symbols. These co-exist and interact with its Member States and have given rise to the notion of the EU as part of a multi-level governance, that is, to not separate the EU from the Member States, but instead to consider the complex and intrinsic rules and institutions that link both. In this sense, the EU is certainly not a state in the conventional sense, but its framework allows it to be comparable to states.

It is important to consider that many states do not function as the ideal type of state that consists of a polity with a fixed boundary, a steady population, independence, and international recognition. Many states also maintain the fiction of being nation-states, despite being inhabited by a diverse population. There are states that exceed the EU in terms of diversity, with small Papua New Guinea displaying far greater linguistic diversity than the EU, and Nigeria being home to both greater religious and linguistic differences. Some political arrangements are as complex as the EU, such as Belgium and large federations such as India, Canada, or Russia (in the case of the latter, mostly on paper). Numerous countries exercise less control over their political sub-units, or have less authority over their external borders—not just failed states such as Somalia, but also Bosnia and Herzegovina.

What sets the EU apart from these states is the non-hierarchical relationship between the constituent units and the whole, as well as the absence of the EU’s claim to statehood, which facilitates the symbiotic relationship with states.

While the study of the EU has emerged as a distinct and separate field of research from both international relations and national politics, it is not helpful to limit the study of the EU to a sui generis phenomenon. This is not to deny the particularities of the Union that set it apart. However, overemphasizing the particularities undermines key principles of social science, namely generalizability and comparability. This book does not seek to offer an answer to whether or not the EU should or should not be considered a state. First, the answer to such a question will not only vary depending on the normative perspective, but also on the disciplinary standpoint. Second, the distinguishing line between the EU and conventional states has become blurred in recent decades, as the EU gained
competences and institutions and the weakness of many states increased, both due to the rise of international regimes and to sub-national challenges. Third, we can find numerous states around the world that de jure or de facto have less state-like competences than the European Union. In the developing world, many states might have great ambitions, but often only limited means to exercise control.

Rather than positing the EU in one category and states in another, this book proposes to understand them all as part of a continuum with the ideal type of a classic nation-state at one end—centralized, with one center of power and authority—and anarchy at the other—the absence of any central authority. Between two such ideal types, polities would cluster in distinct groups: from centralized, relatively homogenous states such as Japan, to federal systems like Germany or the United States, to multinational federal systems like Bosnia or Belgium, and to failed and very weak states, such as Somalia or South Sudan. This clustering highlights the distinction between the voluntary and regulated fragmentation of authority, as in the EU or federal systems, and involuntary and non-consensual fragmentation as in failed states.

While one might want to distinguish a polity that is no longer a state from those that are, they are still part of the same continuum and thus can be understood in this framework of polities. Therefore, irrespective of where the line is drawn, polities grouped together more closely on this continuum might have more in common than those at its far ends. Thus, there is little doubt that multinational federations are more suitable for comparison among themselves than comparing Canada with, say, Iceland.

As a result, this book argues that the EU can be compared with states and understood in the context of states. Thus this book is an effort to understand the EU with the tools applied to diverse and complex states, rather than to international organizations, and to understand the EU as a sui generis construct; its findings aim to speak to our understanding of accommodating diversity in complex states.

In addition to exploring the tools of diversity accommodation, this book will also draw on the literature that explores how states construct a sense of shared identity and citizenship among their inhabitants. While the EU, to take Eugen Weber’s powerful metaphor of “Peasants into Frenchman” (Weber 1976), does not strive to transform “Frenchmen into Europeans,” European identity has emerged as a layer of identification in addition to French or any other national identity. The multiplicity of identity, as will be discussed later in this book, constitutes a reflection of the
multiple layers of the institutional structure. Europeanness is a supplement to national identity—be it identified in civic or ethnic terms—and a large number of Europeans identify as such. According to the 2018 Eurobarometer 2% of Europeans feel exclusively European, a seemingly small number, but equal to the percentage of Greeks or Czechs in the EU, and representing a larger number than citizens of 16 smaller EU Member States. Considering the possibility of multiple identities, most Europeans see themselves as both citizens of their country and of the European Union (European Commission 2018, p. 36).

Understanding how the EU reflects and manages diversity also requires us to move beyond institutions alone. Scholarship on post-conflict state-building and institutional accommodation, be it power-sharing or federalism, has focused extensively on institutions, while devoting less attention to questions of symbols or citizenship. In contested polities, of course, symbols are often particularly contested and mediators either seek to avoid the questions, if possible, or propose new, ‘neutral’ symbols, such as the flags of countries that map its shape (Kosovo and Cyprus) or adopt generic pro-European stars in blue and yellow (Bosnia). State symbols and the identities they promote are crucial questions for diverse polities with strong, competing identities. Though the mechanisms used in nation-states seeking to build a shared identity and understanding are instructive, even they cannot be replicated in the same manner in multinational, diverse polities such as the EU.

1.1 THE ARGUMENT AND APPROACH

This book argues that the European Union has developed a unique set of tools, policies, and approaches toward diversity that are best understood in the context of states’ similar efforts to cope with diversity, from ethnicity to religion and language. Rather than exploring the EU as either an international organization or a sui generis system, seeing the EU as part of the same continuum of polities that includes more conventional states can help us understand the EU better and also provide for valuable pointers toward broadening state tools of diversity management. The EU, by virtue of its ‘unfinished’ structure, its expansion, and its size, clearly differs from most states. However, we argue that one can examine the EU through the analytical lens of a state. As such, the argument is about establishing a dialogue between two schools of scholarship, namely scholars of the EU and those studying diversity and divided societies.
This study is the product of the meeting of different disciplines—law and political science—and fields of inquiry—EU and diversity management. The book approaches the topic out of the conviction that this dialogue is fruitful and can contribute both to the scholarship of the EU and to that of diversity.

The multiple crises the EU has been confronted with in recent years, from the economic crisis to the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with challenges to European solidarity and the Brexit referendum, show that the EU is struggling to find a response to external shocks and internal difficulties of solidarity and legitimacy. We thus do not propose the EU as a model, but as a creative and organically grown effort to mitigate and manage difference on the European continent. Whether these strategies will ultimately prevail in the face of the crises remains open at the point of writing. Irrespective of the outcome, an understanding of these approaches is important and provides insights for other complex state structures that are set up to govern complicated societies confronted with high levels of diversity.

1.2 Structure of the Book
This book will first outline how the experience of diversity fits into the context of other cases and how diversity in the EU can be best understood. It will then explore how the Union has understood itself and the balance between unity and diversity, before exploring how it has negotiated these in key fields, from institutions, to symbols, citizenship, and minorities. In conclusion, it will discuss the underlying principles of solidarity and the applicability of these features and strategies for other diverse states.

In Chap. 2, we will place the EU in the context of other multinational polities—historical and contemporary. The historical and global comparison helps locate the EU among regimes of diversity and will illustrate that the EU does not fit a clear typology, as it shares key features with a number of polities that have sought to negotiate diversity. It will explore five different types of polities seeking to balance unity and diversity: (1) early modern multipolar regimes; (2) early modern federal systems; (3) early modern complex empires; (4) multinational federalism; and (5) ethno-national power-sharing.

Next, Chap. 3 will discuss how this diversity has shaped the European Union and its construction. Mapping the diversity of the EU is more
than merely listing the working languages of the EU, its regions, religions, and nations. In addition, we explore the relevance and salience of the EU’s diversity, the diversity of diversities. In as large a space as the one encompassed by the EU, some forms of diversity primarily touch regions of Member States, while others are not limited to just one or several Member States, such as the Roma minority, with some six million EU citizens hailing from this community (more than Danes or Finns in the EU), or migrants and EU citizens who live outside their own Member States.

Chapter 4 in this section will explore how the EU has understood the concepts of unity, the will and ability to work together, and diversity, as well as the intrinsic recognition that difference is at the core of the European project, and how it has negotiated the tension between cooperation and hierarchy.

In the second section, the book explores EU strategies toward diversity. As with other states, diversity is not a choice, but a reality, and can be met with a variety of responses. The EU cannot afford to deny diversity as states have often sought to do, but not all forms of diversity in the EU are recognized equally and by the same approaches. As the four chapters in this section will highlight, these strategies and approaches did not emerge out of a single deliberate choice, but rather grew and adapted over time.

Chapter 5 discusses the institutional responses to diversity. Perhaps most obviously, the EU is often defined and studied through its institutions. As they emerged to represent the Member States, the EU institutional architecture incorporated into its DNA the balance between unity and diversity, namely with the goal to represent the Member States in their diversity while ensuring the ability to function as a unified institutional system and acknowledging the diversity of Member States in terms of size.

Symbols are the focus of Chap. 6. The chapter outlines how the symbols of the EU emerged and how they are central to reflecting both the diversity in the EU and creating shared symbolic markers. Take the euro: its bills contain stylized examples of architectural features found in Europe. However, no bill displays statesmen or women of the EU or its Member States, nor can you find anywhere a real building. Such a display of neutrality stands in contrast to the state-centered coins of the EU, full of heroes, artists, rulers, and national symbols. Thus, even money has two different responses toward difference, one that underlines symbolic difference based on Member States, and another that places greater emphasis on a vague communality.
In Chap. 7, citizenship will be the focus, namely the emerging European citizenship and how it co-exists with the citizenship of Member States and the implicit assumptions about representation and inclusion. In particular, it will focus on how a shared citizenship provides the basis of solidarity.

Finally, in Chap. 8, we will examine the EU policies toward minorities. As the EU itself has few competences in the field and only limited tools to promote and integrate minorities, it has drawn extensively on the emerging minority rights framework of the Council of Europe. The emerging European minority rights regime will be at the center of this final chapter.

In conclusion, the book will identify the broad lessons from the EU experience for diverse and divided states, and reflect on what the diversity management of the EU tells us about the EU and its ability to overcome crises that have shaped European integration or disintegration over the past decade.

The EU, as this book argues, has been constantly re-negotiating diversity. It emerged without a clear commitment to which kind of diversity it should reflect and incorporate, besides the cooperation of Member States that are intrinsically different. Instead, it has evolved as diversity and the understanding of it changed within it. The continuous evolution brings along its own challenges and inconsistencies, as this book also highlights. Tensions between diversity and unity, as they emerge, are rarely resolved, but usually managed, postponed, and renegotiated. European integration does not provide a template for other complex and diverse polities, but instead, the process of negotiating diversity and also accepting the tension is a central lesson from the EU. We will return to the question of solidarity and responsibility in the conclusion, yet the idea of negating diversity is premised on the solidarity of the participants and the responsibility toward the shared project. This is often a neglected feature of accommodation in diverse societies: without a basic commitment to seeking compromise and engaging in mutual solidarity, difference cannot be negotiated.

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