Block-Sparse Adversarial Attack to Fool Transformer-Based Text Classifiers

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Abstract

Recently, it has been shown that, in spite of the significant performance of deep neural networks in different fields, those are vulnerable to adversarial examples. In this paper, we propose a gradient-based adversarial attack against transformer-based text classifiers. The adversarial perturbation in our method is imposed to be block-sparse so that the resultant adversarial example differs from the original sentence in only a few words. Due to the discrete nature of textual data, we perform gradient projection to find the minimizer of our proposed optimization problem. Experimental results demonstrate that, while our adversarial attack maintains the semantics of the sentence, it can reduce the accuracy of GPT-2 to less than 5% on different datasets (AG News, MNLI, and Yelp Reviews). Furthermore, the block-sparsity constraint of the proposed optimization problem results in small perturbations in the adversarial example.

1 Introduction

In recent years, with the emerging high computational devices, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have attracted tremendous attention in many different fields such as computer vision [7] and Natural Language Processing (NLP) [18] due to their great performance. However, it has been shown that these models are highly vulnerable to perturbation of input samples, in particular to adversarial examples [17]. These examples, which are generated by making small or often imperceptible changes to the original input, can mislead the learning model to classify the adversarial example into a wrong predetermined target class (targeted attack) or to a different class than the true one (untargeted attack). Recently, many methods have been proposed to generate adversarial examples in image data to make the systems fail [12, 10], but these methods cannot be directly extended to NLP models, due to both the different nature of the data representation and the difficulty of characterizing imperceptible changes in text.

In visual applications, the main methods for generating adversarial examples are based on optimization and gradient descent. However, this is not readily extendable to textual data due to its specific nature. Therefore, there exists only a few white-box attacks, which have access to the parameters and gradients of the system, against NLP models. Although it is not possible to calculate the gradients in the discrete space of textual data, it has been proposed to find the gradients in the embedding space, which is continuous. For example, Papernot et al. [13] replace random words in the input sentence with the nearest word in the embedding space whose difference with the original word is in the direction of the gradient. Sato et al. [16] extends Adv-Text [11] to generate adversarial perturbations by imposing the directions of the perturbations in the embedding space to align with meaningful embedding vectors. However, these methods may perturb many words in the sentence which makes the changes quite perceptible. On the other hand, Guo et al. [6], recently proposed Gradient-based Distributional Attack (GBDA) against text transformers. They consider a probability distribution over all the vocabulary for each word in the adversarial sentence. They optimize this continuous matrix of distribution to fool the target model. However, their proposed formulation is highly over-parameterized.

The second difficulty in dealing with textual data is the definition of imperceptibility of the adversarial attack. The \( \ell_p \)-norm, which is common in images to measure the difference of adversarial example and the input,
is not readily applicable in textual data. There are different definitions for imperceptibility of adversarial attack in the literature. Some approximate it by the number of edits in the original text \cite{4, 5}. On the other hand, many attacks define imperceptibility as the semantic similarity between the adversarial example and the original input. They first select random words or find the most important words in the sentence based on different metrics such as the word saliency \cite{15}. Afterwards, they replace the selected words with their synonyms \cite{15, 20}, other words with similar embedding vectors \cite{1, 8}, or words predicted by a masked language model \cite{9}. However, most of these methods assume the black-box scenario and use heuristic strategies that result in sub-optimal performance.

In this paper, we propose a method based on gradient projection to generate token-level adversarial examples against transformer-based text classifiers. We assume the white-box scenario, which gives us access to the model parameters and also their gradients. We consider perturbing the sequence of embedding vectors of the tokens in the input sentence. However, since we want only a few tokens to be changed, only a few blocks of the perturbation vector should be nonzero. Therefore, we add the block-sparsity constraint for the perturbation vector in the optimization problem. Moreover, we preserve the semantics of the sentence by projecting into the embedding vectors of the tokens which have the maximum cosine similarity with the embedding vectors of the corresponding original tokens. We evaluate our proposed attack against target transformer model with GPT-2 architecture \cite{14} fine-tuned for different downstream NLP tasks such as natural language inference, sentiment analysis and news categorization. We compare our results with GDBA \cite{6}, a state-of-the-art white-box attack against text classifiers. To our knowledge, GDBA is the only white-box attack in the literature against transformer models. Experimental results indicate that the proposed adversarial attack achieves a competitive success rate in comparison to the GBDA method. Moreover, the projection to the closest token into the embedding space results in high semantic similarity between the adversarial example and the original sentence. Furthermore, our proposed block-sparsity constraint lead to small perturbations.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the problem of generating adversarial examples. Our attack algorithm is describe in Section 3. We evaluate our algorithm against different transformer models and discuss the experimental results in Section 4. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 5.

2 Problem Formulation

In this section, we present the formulation of generating adversarial example for textual data in untargeted attacks.

Consider \( f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y} \) to be the target text classifier model which correctly predicts the class of the input sentence \( x \in \mathcal{X} \) to be \( y = f(x) \in \mathcal{Y} \). Every sentence is considered to be tokenized to a sequence of tokens. We are looking for an adversarial example \( x' \), which differs from the input sentence \( x \) in only a few tokens and is semantically similar to it. However, the target model should classify \( x' \) wrongly, i.e., \( f(x') \neq y \).

Let \( x = x_1x_2...x_n \) be the input sentence which is a sequence of \( n \) tokens of the vocabulary set \( \mathcal{V} \). We assume that the adversarial example \( x' = x'_1x'_2...x'_n \) is also a sequence of \( n \) tokens. The tokens of these sentences are in a discrete space. Therefore, each of these tokens is transformed to a continuous vector, called an embedding vector, as the input of the target transformer model \cite{14}. Let \( \text{emb}(\cdot) \) denote the embedding function that gets a token as the input and transforms it to a continuous vector. Therefore, we can represent the sentence \( x \) in the embedding space as a sequence of embedding vectors \( \mathbf{e}_x = [\text{emb}(x_1), \text{emb}(x_2), ..., \text{emb}(x_n)] \) by transforming each of its tokens by the function \( \text{emb}(\cdot) \). Similarly, let \( \mathbf{e}_x' = \mathbf{e}_x + \mathbf{r}_x \) represents the adversarial example as a sequence of embedding vectors. \( \mathbf{r}_x = [r_1, r_2, ..., r_n] \) is the sequence of the perturbation vectors of each token.

Now, in order to fool the model with an untargeted attack, we can find an adversarial example by maximizing the loss function of the classifier, i.e., cross entropy.

Figure 1. Block diagram of the proposed method.
This is equivalent to finding the perturbed sample \( e' \) that minimizes the loss \( \mathcal{L}_{Adv} \), which is defined as the negative of the cross entropy:

\[
\mathcal{L}_{Adv} = -\mathcal{L}_f(e', y),
\]

where \( \mathcal{L}_f \) is the loss function of the model when the input is the adversarial example \( e' \) and the ground-truth class is \( y \).

The above problem could lead to a large perturbation of the textual data. In order to constraint the changes to be small, we want to modify only a few tokens of the sentence. Therefore, only a few perturbation vectors (some blocks of \( r_x \)) that correspond to the modified tokens are non-zero, while others are zero. In other words, the non-zero entries of the perturbation \( r_x \) occur in clusters, which means \( r_x \) should be block-sparse. To impose the block-sparisity of the perturbation, we can impose the sparsity on the norm of each block [4]. Hence, in the final optimization problem, we will minimize the \( \ell_1 \) relaxation over all the \( \ell_2 \) norms of perturbation blocks \( r_i \) to ensure the sparsity of non-zero blocks:

\[
\mathcal{L}_{BSparse} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \|r_i\|_2.
\]

Finally, we can reformulate the original optimisation problem of [1] by integrating the above block sparsity constraint. Therefore, our objective is to find the block-sparse perturbation that fool the target classifier by solving the following optimization problem:

\[
e_{x'} = \arg\min_{e_x \in \mathcal{E}_V} \mathcal{L}_{Adv} + \alpha \mathcal{L}_{BSparse},
\]

where \( \mathcal{E}_V \) is the discrete subspace of every token of the vocabulary set \( V \) in the embedding space. Moreover, \( \alpha \) is the hyper-parameter that determines the relative importance of the block-sparsity term.

### 3 Proposed Method

In this section, we explain our algorithm to find the solution of the proposed optimization problem [3]. The block diagram of our method can be found in Figure 1. As depicted in this figure, we first transform each token of the input sentence to a continuous embedding vector and then we use gradient projection to solve the optimization problem [3].

Since we are dealing with textual data, [3] is a discrete optimization problem. In other words, the tokens of the resultant adversarial example should be in the vocabulary set \( V \); hence \( e_{x'} \) should be in the discrete subspace \( \mathcal{E}_V \). First, we consider \( e_{x'} \) to be in the embedding space \( \mathcal{E} \) (and not necessarily in \( \mathcal{E}_V \)). Thus, we can perform gradient descent to solve the optimization problem [3].

In each iteration of our algorithm, we first update the embedding vectors of all the tokens of the adversarial example in the continuous space \( \mathcal{E} \). Let \( e_{g,i} \) denote this updated vector in the continuous space corresponding to the \( i \)-th token. Afterwards, we project the updated embedding vectors \( e_{g,i} \), which may not necessarily correspond to a token in the vocabulary \( V \), to the embedding vectors of the closest meaningful tokens. We use cosine similarity metric to find the closest embedding vectors in \( \mathcal{E}_V \) and apply the projection for each token independently:

\[
\forall i \in \{1, ..., n\} : \quad e_{p,i} = \arg\min_{e \in \mathcal{E}_V} \frac{e^\top e_{g,i}}{\|e\|_2 \|e_{g,i}\|_2}.
\]

Furthermore, since we are dealing with discrete data, it is possible that through iterations we come across a previously computed embedding vector after the projection. Moreover, if the perturbation vector is too small, the updated vectors will be projected to the previous

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**Algorithm 1 Block-Sparse Adversarial Attack**

1. **Input:**
   - \( f(\cdot) \): Target classifier model, \( \mathcal{V} \): Vocabulary set
   - \( x \): Tokenized input sentence, \( lr \): Learning rate
   - \( A \): Set of decreasing values for Hyper-parameter \( \alpha \) to control the importance of the block-sparsity term
   - \( K \): Maximum number of iterations

2. **Output:**
   - \( x' \): Generated adversarial example

3. **procedure**

   **initialization:**
   1. \( \text{buffer} \leftarrow \text{empty}, y \leftarrow f(x), k \leftarrow 0 \)
   2. \( \forall i \in \{1,...,n\} \quad e_{g,i} \leftarrow \text{emb}(x_i) \)
   3. \( \alpha \leftarrow \text{init} \)

   **while** \( \alpha \in A \) **do**
   4. \( \text{buffer} \leftarrow \text{buffer}, k \leftarrow k + 1 \)
   5. \( f(e_p) \leftarrow y, k \leftarrow K \)**
   6. **while** \( f(e_p) \neq y \)**
   7. **if** \( e_p \) not in buffer **then**
   8. \( \text{add } e_p \text{ to buffer} \)
   9. **end if**
   10. **end while**
   11. **if** \( f(e_p) \neq y \)**
   12. **break** (adversarial example is found)
   13. **end if**
   14. **end while**

4. **end procedure**

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In each iteration of our algorithm, we first update the embedding vectors of all the tokens of the adversarial example in the continuous space \( \mathcal{E} \). Let \( e_{g,i} \) denote this updated vector in the continuous space corresponding to the \( i \)-th token. Afterwards, we project the updated embedding vectors \( e_{g,i} \), which may not necessarily correspond to a token in the vocabulary \( \mathcal{V} \), to the embedding vectors of the closest meaningful tokens. We use cosine similarity metric to find the closest embedding vectors in \( \mathcal{E}_V \) and apply the projection for each token independently:
sentence. In these cases, the algorithm will be stuck in a loop as the computed gradients will stay the same. To prevent such undesirable scenarios, we update the embedding vectors by the projection step only when the projected sentence has not been generated before. To this end, we save all the updated sentences in a buffer, and update the embedding vectors by the projected ones only if the output of the projection step is not in the buffer. These steps are performed iteratively until the target model is fooled or a maximum number of iterations is reached (the algorithm fails to find an adversarial example in this case).

As another consideration, we do not fix the value of $\alpha$ in (3), which determines the importance of imperceptibility. For higher values of $\alpha$, the algorithm tries to find adversarial examples with smaller token error rate that are more similar to the original sentence. However, by increasing $\alpha$, the success rate of finding an adversarial example decreases. Therefore, we will consider a large value for this hyper-parameter at first. If the algorithm fails to find an adversarial example, we will decrease the value of $\alpha$. Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo-code of the proposed method for finding the minimizer of the discrete optimization problem (3).

### 4 Experimental Result

In this section, we evaluate our proposed adversarial attack in different text classification tasks such as natural language inference, sentiment classification, and news categorization.

**Datasets.** We evaluate our proposed method on the test set of three datasets: MNLI \(^2\) (natural language inference), AG News \(^2\) (news categorization), and Yelp Reviews \(^2\) (sentiment classification). Some statistics of these datasets can be found in Table 2.

**Model.** For the target model, we fine-tuned a pre-trained transformer model with GPT-2 architecture on all the mentioned datasets.

**Baseline.** We compare the result of our method with that of GDBA \(^2\). To our knowledge, GDBA is the only white-box attack in the literature against transformer models.

**Hyper-parameters.** We use Adam optimizer to find the minimizer of the proposed optimization problem with learning rate \(0.15, 0.3\). Moreover, the coefficient $\alpha$ in (3) is in the set \(\{10, 8, 5, 2\}\) divided by the length of the sentence. For larger values of learning rate and smaller values of $\alpha$, the attack is more aggressive and more words of the sentence are modified. Therefore we will change them in the mentioned sets if only the attack fails.

### Table 1. Examples of successful adversarial examples on different datasets.

| Dataset | Sentence | Prediction | Text |
|---------|----------|------------|------|
| MNLI    | Original Neutral (97.26%) | Premise: In the summer, the Sultan’s Pool, a vast outdoor amphitheatre, stages rock concerts or other big-name events. Hypothesis: **Most** rock concerts take place in the Sultan’s Pool amphitheatre. |
|         | Adversarial Entailment (99.19%) | Premise: In the summer, the Sultan’s Pool, a vast outdoor amphitheatre, stages rock concerts or other big-name events. Hypothesis: **Many** rock concerts take place in the Sultan’s Pool amphitheatre. |
| AG News | Original Sci/Tech (99.39%) | Motorola and HP in **Linux**-based code, a step forward in network gear makers’ efforts to rally around a standard. |
|         | Adversarial Business (83.56%) | Motorola and HP in **PC**-based code, a step forward in network gear makers’ efforts to rally around a standard. |
| Yelp    | Original Negative (99.90%) | This place holds a nostalgic appeal for people born and raised in Pittsburgh who grew up eating here. If that experience is what you’re looking for, please visit. If you’re looking for a tasty meal, go somewhere else. 5 stars for history, 0 for food quality and flavor. |
|         | Adversarial Positive (96.54%) | This place holds a nostalgic appeal for people born and raised in Pittsburgh who grew up eating here. If that experience is what you’re looking for, please visit. If you’re looking for a tasty meal, go somewhere else. 5 stars for history, 1 for food quality and flavor. |
success rate of our attack is superior in all cases, except for the MNLI dataset, in which our method achieves competitive results. Table 1 also shows some adversarial examples against different datasets generated by our method.

We investigate the effect of the hyper-parameter $\alpha$ in the optimization problem (2) on the performance of our method on AG News dataset. Figure 2 depicts the effect of this hyper-parameter on the accuracy of the target model, semantic similarity, and token error rate. By increasing $\alpha$, success rate of our attack decreases while semantic similarity increases and the token error rate decreases. It is worth mentioning that we fix the learning rate of our attack at 0.15 for this experiment. Therefore, the accuracy is lower than the one reported in Table 3.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed a new white-box attack based on gradient projection against text classifiers. We proposed an optimization problem with a block-sparsity constraint to ensure that only a few words of the sentence are modified. Experimental results show that our attack is highly effective on fooling text classifiers in different tasks and it preserves the semantics of the sentence. In all tasks, the accuracy of the target model drops to less than 5% and the semantic similarity is more than 80%. We also compared our attack with GDBA, the only white-box attack against transformers. The success rate of our attack is superior to GDBA in all cases except for the MNLI dataset, in which our method achieves comparable results to GDBA.

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