How has neuroscience affected lay understandings of personhood? A review of the evidence

Cliodhna O’Connor and Helene Joffe
University College London, UK

Abstract
The prominence of neuroscience in the public sphere has escalated in recent years, provoking questions about how the public engages with neuroscientific ideas. Commentaries on neuroscience’s role in society often present it as having revolutionary implications, fundamentally overturning established beliefs about personhood. The purpose of this article is to collate and review the extant empirical evidence on the influence of neuroscience on commonsense understandings of personhood. The article evaluates the scope of neuroscience’s presence in public consciousness and examines the empirical evidence for three frequently encountered claims about neuroscience’s societal influence: that neuroscience fosters a conception of the self that is based in biology, that neuroscience promotes conceptions of individual fate as predetermined, and that neuroscience attenuates the stigma attached to particular social categories. It concludes that many neuroscientific ideas have assimilated in ways that perpetuate rather than challenge existing modes of understanding self, others and society.

Keywords
folk psychology, neuroscience, public engagement with science

Introduction
On 17 July 1990, US president George H.W. Bush declared the 1990s to be the ‘Decade of the Brain’. The following years saw major advances in neuroscience as a discipline – most notably in the establishment of fMRI as a standard methodological instrument – and an explosion in the volume of neuroscientific research published. As the field has progressed, the subjects it tackles have become increasingly complex, with particular acceleration of research with potential social and policy implications (Illes et al., 2003). Subject matters traditionally assigned to the humanities and social sciences – such as religion, love, art, crime and politics – now make frequent appearances in neuroscience journals (Frazzetto and Anker, 2009; Littlefield and Johnson, 2012). The expansion of the neuroscientific research programme to topics of acute social concern has raised neuroscience’s
profile in society, propelling it into the public sphere. Neuroscience has been appropriated by many diverse fields that see it as relevant to their own interests, including law (Walsh, 2011), marketing (Chancellor and Chatterjee, 2011), public policy (Seymour and Vlaev, 2012), education (Ansari et al., 2012), parenting (O’Connor and Joffe, 2012) and economics (Schüll and Zaloom, 2011).

For social scientists, the increasing prominence of neuroscience provokes important questions about how members of the public engage with this new knowledge. This issue is often framed in ‘deficit model’ (Wynne, 1993) terms, placing priority on evaluating the accuracy of public understandings of neuroscience (Herculano-Houzel, 2002; Pasquinelli, 2012; Sperduti et al., 2012). Whether a conception is scientifically correct or incorrect is, however, largely irrelevant to its substantive effect on people’s thinking about themselves, others and society. The most important consideration in gauging neuroscience’s societal influence is not lay ideas’ correspondence with established scientific ‘facts’, but the meaning attached to neuroscientific ideas in personal and social life. Since the brain is regarded as the organ most closely related to mind and behaviour, some have speculated that the proliferation of neuroscientific knowledge has produced a shift in everyday conceptions of personhood or ‘folk psychology’ (Goldman, 1993; Sousa, 2006). Given the significance of folk psychological understandings in guiding everyday behaviour, perception and social interaction, examining neuroscience’s influence on commonsense conceptions of personhood is arguably a more pressing task than establishing whether public understandings of the brain are scientifically correct.

Within discussions of neuroscience’s societal significance, it is commonplace to encounter claims that neuroscience is producing revolutionary changes in understandings of individuals and society. For example, Lynch (2009) claims that neuroscientific knowledge is ‘propelling humanity toward a radical reshaping of our lives, families, societies, cultures, governments, economies, art, leisure, religion – absolutely everything that’s pivotal to humankind’s existence’ (2009: 7). Similar sentiments, though less dramatically presented, are in evidence throughout the academic literature that reflects on neuroscience’s position in contemporary society. For example, Illes and Racine (2005) state that neuroscientific insights ‘will fundamentally alter the dynamic between personal identity, responsibility and free will’ (2005: 14); Farah (2012) asserts that ‘neuroimaging has contributed to a fundamental change in how we think of ourselves and our fellow persons’ (2012: 575); and Abi-Rached (2008) speaks of ‘this “neuro-age”’, whereby human behaviour and the other aspects that define us as a species are predominantly formulated in neurochemical terms’ (2008: 1162).

Such claims clash with established models of public engagement with science, which cast doubt on the notion that new scientific knowledge, within a relatively narrow time-span, provokes revolutionary changes in public thinking. Social representations theory, one key paradigm for theorizing lay uptake of science, posits that the primary psychological task upon encountering new scientific information is ‘to make the unaccustomed familiar’ (Moscovici, 2008[1961]: 17) – that is, to transfer ‘strange’ new ideas into a conceptual register with which one is familiar and therefore comfortable. This is achieved by ‘anchoring’ the new idea within established cultural categories and ‘objectifying’ it with familiar symbols, images and metaphors. While different models of public engagement with science employ different analytical tools, research from a variety of theoretical standpoints converges on the conclusion that people selectively attend to and interpret science in ways that cohere with their pre-existing values, identities and beliefs (Joffe and Haarhoff, 2002; Kahan et al., 2011; Morton et al., 2006; Munro, 2010; Wynne, 1993). New scientific information can indeed challenge and modulate existing understandings; however, it can also assimilate into and reinforce established ideas. It is therefore not self-evident that neuroscience will substantively alter understandings of personhood in predictable directions. Delineating the influences neuroscience exerts on contemporary society requires careful empirical research.
A body of research examining the role played by neuroscience in everyday conceptions of personhood has recently amassed. However – perhaps because it traverses several disciplines, methodological approaches and fields of interest – it has thus far maintained a relatively low profile. It is often unacknowledged in scholarly or intellectual discussions about the cultural significance of neuroscience, with the result that such discussions remain largely speculative and polemical. The purpose of this article is to collate and review this empirical evidence concerning the influence of neuroscience on commonsense understandings of personhood. After probing the prominence of neuroscience in public consciousness, the article proceeds to examine the empirical evidence for three frequently encountered claims about neuroscience’s societal influence: that neuroscience fosters conceptions of the self that are dominated by biology, that neuroscience promotes conceptions of individual fate as predetermined, and that neuroscience abates the stigma attached to certain social categories.¹

How prominent is neuroscience in public consciousness?

With neuroscience’s prominence in popular media escalating, several studies have undertaken to systematically examine the characteristics of media coverage of neuroscience. A recent analysis shows that references to neuroscience in UK newspapers increased sharply between 2000 and 2010, most often manifesting within advice on ‘optimizing’ brain function, demonstration of biological bases for intergroup differences, and recruitment of neuroscience’s scientific authority to ‘prove’ arguments or assertions (O’Connor et al., 2012). Regarding neuroscience’s practical applications, O’Connell et al. (2011) establish that the media show particular interest in applications involving lie-detection, marketing and public policy. Racine, Waldman, Rosenberg and Illes’ (2010) analysis identifies three key trends in media coverage of neurotechnologies (e.g. fMRI, EEG, PET): neuro-realism, which refers to the use of neuroscientific information to make phenomena seem objective or ‘real’; neuro-essentialism, which connotes representations of the brain as the essence of a person; and neuro-policy, which captures the deployment of brain research to support political agendas. Research also indicates a strong visual dimension to media coverage, with media text frequently accompanied by brain images produced by functional neuroimaging technologies (Dumit, 2004; Gibbons, 2007). The highly-mediated, technological nature of this image production is often obscured, such that the images may resemble direct photographs of neural activity (Beck, 2010; Roskies, 2007). These images may therefore afford a ‘truth value’ to the arguments proffered in media text.

The social significance of neuroscience’s expanding media presence is intensified by experimental evidence suggesting that neuroscientific information may wield particular rhetorical force. Weisberg et al. (2008) show that explanations of psychological phenomena that include logically irrelevant neuroscience information are judged more satisfying than the same explanations presented without the neuroscience information. Similarly, McCabe and Castel (2008) document how articles summarizing cognitive neuroscience research appear more credible when accompanied by a redundant image of a brain scan than by a bar graph or no visual information. Three-dimensional brain images are particularly persuasive (Keehner et al., 2011). These experiments suggest that the symbols of brain research confer legitimacy on the arguments they accompany. However, it should be noted that these experiments required participants to evaluate fictitious scientific articles, which may not be a highly ecologically valid task. A more recent study focusing on evaluations of popular news articles reports that inclusion of fMRI images does not enhance an article’s persuasiveness relative to articles accompanied by other, or no, imagery (Gruber and Dickerson, 2012).

Research thus indicates that neuroscience is widely reported in the mainstream media and is convincing in certain experimental contexts. However, this does not guarantee that it has
meaningfully penetrated public consciousness. Evidence shows that there can be considerable divergence between media and mental representations of a scientific issue (Ten Eyck, 2005). People exposed to media information may ignore it, quickly forget it, or interpret and deploy it in idiosyncratic ways. Unfortunately, little research exists interrogating neuroscience’s prominence in the minds of the lay public. One exception is Wardlaw et al.’s (2011) survey of perceptions of neuroimaging applications, in which 17% of respondents report having ‘no awareness’ of neuroimaging applications, 47% rate themselves as ‘a little aware’, 26% as ‘quite aware’ and 10% as ‘very aware’. These figures do not suggest extensive familiarity with neuroscience, and the level of public awareness they indicate may be inflated by the study’s recruitment strategies, which included advertising the survey on science blogs.

Some insight into neuroscience’s position in public consciousness can be derived from Rodriguez’s (2006) semantic analysis of usage of neuroscience-related terms in everyday speech. This analysis shows that neuro-vocabulary frequently materializes in vernacular language (e.g. ‘she is brainy’), suggesting that neurobiology occupies a space in the conceptual schemata that underpin people’s everyday talk. As Rodriguez (2006) acknowledges, however, the study provides limited insight into the breadth of this space or the meanings that speakers have in mind when they use ‘brain’ terms.

In summary, empirical research has established that neuroscience is increasingly visible in the popular press. However, little direct research with members of the public casts light on either the extent to which brain-related ideas are spontaneously recruited in naturalistic thought and conversation, or the meanings that these ideas carry for people.

**Does neuroscience foster a conception of the self that is based in biology?**

Many commentaries on the societal significance of neuroscience have framed the issue within the historical battle between materialist and dualist theories of the person, that is whether what we call ‘mind’ is fundamentally physical matter or exists separately from the body on some non-physical plane. Neuroscientific advances have been hailed as the force that will drive dualism from society, ushering in conceptions of self, emotion and behaviour that are entirely rooted in biochemical processes (Churchland, 1995; Churchland, 2008; Crick, 1995). Sociological writings suggest that the assimilation of biological information into conceptions of self and identity is already in motion, a position exemplified by terms such as ‘neurochemical self’ (Rose, 2007), ‘cerebral subject’ (Ortega, 2009) and ‘brainhood’ (Vidal, 2009).

The suggestion that understandings of the self are becoming progressively materialized has, however, met with limited empirical support. In an analysis of focus groups composed of individuals with varying degrees of involvement with brain research (e.g. neuroscientists, patients, teachers), Pickersgill et al. (2011) report that participants professed an interest in the brain, but rarely directly attributed behaviour entirely to brain processes. Some participants actively resisted neuroscientific ideas, perceiving them as threatening their established conceptions of mind and self – for example, undermining the importance of family and socialization in development. This sense of threat was not universal, however, with others experiencing neuroscience as simply irrelevant to their self-perception. Choudhury, McKinney and Merten (2012) describe similar results from a study of how adolescents engage with the idea of the ‘teenage brain’: while teenagers stated that knowledge about the neuroscience of adolescence was important, they also rejected it as boring or irrelevant to their own self-understanding. Mirroring Pickersgill et al.’s (2011) findings, behaviour was rarely understood in purely biological terms, but rather seen as a product of relationships with parents, teachers and society more generally.
Research with clinical populations indicates a greater penetration of brain-based ideas into self-understanding. In Illes et al.’s (2008) survey of 72 patients diagnosed with major depressive disorder, 92% reported that they would want a brain scan to diagnose depression if possible, while 76% believed that brain scans would improve their understanding of their mental state. Buchman et al.’s (2013) interviews with 12 individuals diagnosed with mood disorder revealed that participants very decisively endorsed the ‘chemical imbalance’ explanation of depression. Qualitative analysis indicated that much of brain-based explanations’ appeal derived from their apparent ability to provide an objective, morally neutral tool to legitimize people’s experience. Dumit (2003) and Cohn (2004) suggest that the visual element of brain scans is a particularly potent legitimizing resource, allowing for the objectification of ‘depression’ or ‘schizophrenia’ as material entities rather than nebulous diagnostic categories. This ‘proving’ quality of neurobiological information can be mobilized in efforts to sustain a positive identity. Fein (2011), Rapp (2011) and Singh (2011), for example, observe that individuals with developmental disorders such as autism spectrum disorders (and their families) can adopt neuroscientific language to represent themselves as subject to unique, ‘hard-wired’ challenges and abilities. Such identity-protective positioning of neurobiological information also characterizes the burgeoning ‘neurodiversity movement’. This campaign, spearheaded by the autism community, represents developmental disorders as simply alternative biological ways of being that are equally legitimate as ‘neurotypicality’ (Vidal, 2009). Thus, for people diagnosed with particular psychiatric conditions, neurobiological explanations of their thoughts and feelings are sometimes psychologically and socially functional, with their endorsement serving identity-supportive ends.

The divergent findings of research with clinical and non-clinical populations suggest that the brain’s prominence in self-understanding is largely contingent on whether a person has been provoked to consider their ‘brainhood’ by extrinsic events such as diagnosis and medication. The brain may not intrude spontaneously in day-to-day consciousness, but rather becomes salient when something goes wrong (Pickersgill et al., 2011). However, even this experience-contingent salience is equivocal: neuroscientific explanations of disorder can be hotly contested (Martin, 2010) and rarely represent the exclusive explanatory mode deployed in conceptualizing the disorder. When neuroscientific ideas are accepted it is usually in partial and contingent ways, operating alongside alternative – sometimes contradictory – means of understanding experience. Bröer and Heerings (2013), for instance, employ a Q-sort methodology to establish that the disorder-understandings of adults with ADHD comprise a matrix of psychological, sociological and holistic concepts that exist alongside, and interact with, neurological conceptualizations. Gross’s (2011) ethnography of a neuro-oncology unit further indicates the multi-dimensionality of disorder meanings, finding that brain tumour patients’ self-conceptions are split into two elements: one that is based in, and another that is completely separate from, the brain. A form of Cartesian dualism allows these patients to conceive of the tumour not as an illness of the self but as the disease of ‘just another organ’.

Thus, even when biological explanations of thought, emotion or behaviour are accepted, they do not drive out non-biological explanations. Assertions that neuroscientific advances will inevitably purge society of dualistic understandings of personhood flounder because they fail to acknowledge the complexity and multi-dimensionality of self-conception.

**Does neuroscience promote conceptions of individual fate as predetermined?**

Neuroscience has also been marshalled in the long-standing philosophical battle between conceptions of the person as a free agent with independent volition and as a being whose character, behaviour and life-course are pre-patterned by their biological constitution. Certain philosophers and
neuroscientists have painted neuroscience research as the definitive refutation of the notion of free will, which is cast—in Nobel Laureate Francis Crick’s words—as ‘no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules’ (Crick, 1995: 3). This debate can extend beyond questioning whether free will exists in an ontologically ‘real’ sense (an issue outside the scope of the present article) to encompass clear predictions about neuroscience’s influence on commonsense beliefs about free will. For example, Green and Cohen (2004) assert that ‘the net effect of this influx of scientific information will be a rejection of free will as it is ordinarily conceived’ (2004: 1776), celebrating this as a socially progressive prospect. It is important to note that such postulations are not universal: many scientists caution against premature over-extrapolation of empirical results (Lavazza and De Caro, 2010; Rose, 2005; Roskies, 2006) and the potentially troubling societal repercussions of rejecting free will (Baumeister, Masicampo and DeWall, 2009; Vohs and Schooler, 2008). In addition, recent findings regarding the brain’s ‘plasticity’ or capacity for change have been interpreted as evidence against biological determinism. This will be discussed shortly; first, however, the article assesses the empirical evidence for the contention—still mooted from certain quarters (e.g. Churchland, 1995; Economist, 2006; Farah, 2012; Harris, 2012)—that the popularization of neuroscience will transform conventional understandings of free will.

One of the key social arenas in which the free will issue plays out is within attribution of responsibility for behaviour. Legal and moral codes, along with daily interpersonal interaction, hinge on the conviction that individuals have control over, and hence responsibility for, their actions. Some have suggested that viewing behaviour as biologically determined fundamentally undermines the concept of personal responsibility. However, research shows that people confronted with behaviour that is framed as neurologically caused continue to interpret it through the lens of individual responsibility (De Brigard et al., 2009). Laypeople do not necessarily see moral responsibility and biological determination as incompatible, and are willing to attribute responsibility to an individual even when clear that (s)he did not intend their actions (Nahmias, 2006). Attribution of responsibility for unintended acts is particularly likely if they produce destructive outcomes or are morally ‘bad’ (Alicke, 2008). This implies that the movement of neuroscientific evidence into criminal defence cases will not radically transform jurors’ reasoning (Rose, 2007; Schweitzer et al., 2011). Research thus suggests that attributions of responsibility are complex and multifaceted, and a direct ‘more neurologically determined–less personal responsibility’ effect appears unlikely.

Belief in personal responsibility persists because it is predicated on what Morris et al. (2001) call implicit theories of agency: robust cultural theories, transmitted across generations, defining the kinds of entities that act intentionally and autonomously to cause events. In western societies, the individual human intentional agent is unambiguously positioned as the primary and ‘natural’ causal force (Wellman and Miller, 2006); people socialized into western cultures often cannot conceptualize how agency could operate at any level beyond the individual (Morris and Peng, 1994). Individual independence and self-determination is culturally valorised: the experience of possessing free will is positively emotionally valenced (Stillman et al., 2011) and people disfavour deterministic understandings of behaviour (Fahrenberg and Cheetham, 2000). It may be difficult for deterministic interpretations of neuroscience to pierce such culturally embedded folk understandings. In fact, far from contradicting traditional assumptions, some writers have suggested that neuroscientific explanations dovetail with individualistic attribution, directing attention inside the individual skull (Choudhury et al., 2009; Vidal, 2009). Neuroscientific understandings may thereby support the continued neglect of the socio-structural contexts that shape actions, perceptions and emotions.

An emerging nuance in debates about neuroscience and determinism acknowledges that neuroscience is a non-uniform body of knowledge, encompassing different ideas and approaches that could have differential societal effects. The implications of the brain for understandings of
determinism/free will depend on what type of brain is represented. A key dimension here relates to whether neural structure and function are seen as genetically pre-programmed or as ‘plastic’ and thereby modulated by experience. The latter representation has recently come to prominence and has been proclaimed the biological condition for individual agency, the idea being that neuroplasticity facilitates the ability to initiate self-change (Papadopoulos, 2011; Pitts-Taylor, 2010). Some argue that neuroplasticity also has political implications: if the brain is the seat of beliefs and emotions, then if the brain is malleable so too must be identity and concurrent societal processes (Thornton, 2011).

The concept of plasticity has assimilated into popular arenas, manifesting particularly in exhortations to ‘boost’ or ‘train’ one’s brain (O’Connor et al., 2012; Pitts-Taylor, 2010). This trend represents the brain as a resource whose efficacy is contingent on its owner’s actions: individuals can enhance their neural function through nutrition, mental exercise or artificial means (e.g. pharmaceuticals), or endanger it through exposure to risky activities or substances. While the salience of these messages in media dialogue has been empirically established (O’Connor et al., 2012), the extent to which people endorse them in everyday life remains unclear. Most investigative attention has focused on pharmaceutical enhancement of neural performance, a practice portrayed as widespread by commentators in the media (Forlini and Racine, 2009; Partridge et al., 2011) and academic literature (Farah et al., 2004; Schanker, 2011). Some data indicate substantial levels of unprescribed neuro-pharmaceutical use within certain populations – for example, university students (Smith and Farah, 2011) – though other studies suggest it is rare (Coveney, 2011). Uptake of pharmaceutical enhancement may, however, represent something of a red herring in evaluating the depth of engagement with brain optimization: more likely, it is via less extreme and costly practices – such as purposefully changing nutritional patterns or attempting crossword puzzles – that the logic of brain enhancement most deeply penetrates everyday life. As yet, no research with lay populations assesses receptivity to non-pharmaceutical brain enhancement, though sales figures for electronic ‘brain-training’ devices indicate a rapidly expanding market (NeuroInsights, 2009).

The prominence of the notion of plasticity could be interpreted as liberating, conveying that individuals can control their neurological destinies. However, some have voiced concern that plasticity places ultimately repressive demands on individuals to ‘maximize’ their untapped neurological potential (Pitts-Taylor, 2010; Thornton, 2011). Brain optimization ideas appear to cohere with the contemporary zeitgeist of self-improvement, at the root of which lie concerns about self-control, a cardinal value in western cultures (Joffé and Staerklé, 2007). In recent times, demands for self-control have been most vocally articulated within the health domain: ‘healthism’ pertains not only to physical health but to establishing oneself as a virtuous, disciplined citizen (Crawford, 2006; Rabinow, 1992). One works on the self through working on the body. The language and substantive content of appeals to brain optimization echo the central ethos of contemporary health discourse, emphasizing individual responsibility and lifestyle choices (Blaxter, 1997; Crawford, 2006). The brain is emerging as a new site at which efforts to achieve self-control and self-improvement can operate. Much of the brain optimization discourse has coalesced around the topic of dementia, the promised aversion of which stands as the most compelling incentive for ‘brain-training’ (Palmour and Racine, 2011; Williams et al., 2011). The fear dementia elicits can be largely traced to a perception that it dissolves personal identity, independence and self-determination (Van Gorp and Vercruysse, 2012). Public dialogue thereby conveys that disciplined regimes of brain optimization can stave off the ultimate, permanent loss of self-control. Thus, much popular discussion of the brain appears to reiterate a cultural ethic of self-control. How this translates into everyday experience remains unclear, however, as analysis of the self-control ethic in media
discourse has not been accompanied by research that directly examines how individuals engage with these ideas in daily life.

The suggestion that the diffusion of neuroscience will erode belief in free will therefore appears unsubstantiated. Deterministic ideas collide with deeply entrenched cultural understandings of individual responsibility and self-control, and as yet little evidence suggests that these values will buckle under the pressure. Indeed, it seems more likely that neuroscientific information is being co-opted into these value systems, rejuvenating them and driving them forward within superficial refractions.

Do neuroscience explanations reduce stigma?

A frequent context through which neuroscience manifests in society is the explanation of human variation, with observed differences between particular categories of people traced to reported differences in their neurobiological characteristics (Choudhury et al., 2009; Dumit, 2004; O’Connor et al., 2012). Systems of social categorization infringe on all stages of neuroscience research: from the selection of research topics – for example, investigating whether the predefined categories of criminals, adolescents or schizophrenics have distinctive neurological features; to research methodology – particularly in specifying the demographic variables to be factored into sample composition and the parameters of ‘normality’ that constitute an appropriate control sample; and research interpretation – as seen in the formal labelling of autistic traits as ‘male’ (Jack and Appelbaum, 2010). Neuroscience thus invokes and reproduces certain assumptions about social categories. Through what philosopher Ian Hacking (1995) describes as a ‘looping effect’, classifying people works on them and changes them, altering how they think about themselves and how others perceive them. If neuroscience is implicated in cultural efforts to delineate ‘types’ of people, how might this affect social identities and intergroup relations?

Some evidence suggests that new social identities are forming around neuroscientific information. As neurobiology has supported new classifications (e.g. certain psychiatric diagnoses) there have been instances of concomitant collective mobilization, with people assembling around shared neurobiological explanations to advocate for research, treatment and services (Novas and Rose, 2000). The aforementioned neurodiversity movement exemplifies this. Advocacy groups across a broad range of issues – for example, addiction, mental illness, juvenile justice and homosexuality – have embraced neuroscientific explanations, hailing their potential to divert society from a discourse of blame and moral condemnation (Corrigan and Watson, 2004; Hall et al., 2004; Walsh, 2011). Research with mentally ill populations has shown that patients themselves expect biomedical explanations to reduce the stigma they encounter (Buchman et al., 2013; Easter, 2012; Illes et al., 2008). Neuroscientific framings of behaviour – for example, representing addiction or mental illness as brain diseases – are thus widely expected to promote tolerance towards traditionally stigmatized groups.

The actual effect of neuroscientific explanations on orientations towards stigmatized groups may, however, be considerably more complex. Research on attitudes to mental illness indeed indicates that attribution of undesirable behaviour to biological factors reduces blame (Corrigan and Watson, 2004; Mehta and Farina, 1997; Rüsch et al., 2010). However, biomedical attributions for mental illness are also linked to increases in social distance (Bag et al., 2006; Dietrich et al., 2006; Read and Harré, 2001; Rüsch et al., 2010), perceived dangerousness (Corrigan and Watson, 2004; Dietrich et al., 2006; Read and Harré, 2001; Walker and Read, 2002), fear (Dietrich et al., 2006), perceived unpredictability (Walker and Read, 2002) and harsh treatment (Mehta and Farina, 1997). Longitudinal analysis of public attitudes shows that increased endorsement of
biomedical explanations of mental illness has not been accompanied by increased tolerance (Pescosolido et al., 2010). Aside from mental illness, unfavourable correlates of biological explanations have also been detected for attitudes regarding gender (Brescoll and LaFrance, 2004; Morton et al., 2009), race (Jayaratne et al., 2006; Williams and Eberhardt, 2008) and obesity (Teachman et al., 2003). Furthermore, some data suggest biological explanations operate as self-fulfilling prophecies for those to whom they are applied, for example undermining women’s mathematical performance (Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2006), increasing overweight individuals’ calorie intake (Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2011) and promoting fatalism among mentally ill people about their prospects of recovery (Easter, 2012; Lam and Salkovskis, 2007).

In a comprehensive review, Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) attribute the negative social consequences of biological explanations to the operation of psychological essentialism. Wagner, Holtz and Kashima (2009) define essentialism as the attribution of a group’s characteristics to an unalterable and causal ‘essence’, which involves (i) establishing discrete, impermeable category boundaries; (ii) perceived homogeneity within the category; (iii) using the essence to explain and predict the group’s surface traits; and (iv) naturalization of the category. Representations of neuroscience currently circulating in society conform to these trends, with long-established stereotypes of particular social groups (e.g. women, overweight people, adolescents) reconstituted as invariable features of their natural constitutions (Fine, 2010; Kelly, 2012; O’Connor et al., 2012). Essentialism has destructive effects on intergroup relations, promoting a sharp ‘us–them’ split in which particular groups are marked out as biologically ‘other’. Dumit (2003, 2004) and Buchman et al. (2010) argue that neuroimaging data have been particularly effective at constructing this ‘otherness’: it is commonplace both in academic and popular literature (on, for example, addiction) to encounter two differently coloured brain images placed side by side, establishing a categorical distinction between ‘the normal brain’ and ‘the addicted brain’. There is little sense of addiction as a spectrum; rather, addicts are homogenized as almost a different species. Neuroscience may thus promote essentialistic representations of social groups and incite concurrent movements towards stigmatization and discrimination.

The consequences of neuroscience for attitudes to social groups cannot be characterized as unambiguously positive or negative. The effects of neurobiological frames seem to vary between domains: for example, effects are generally more promising for attitudes to homosexuality than race, gender, mental illness or obesity (Haslam and Levy, 2006; Jayaratne et al., 2006). Effects also vary within domains: for example between different mental disorders, with tolerance most compromised when the disorder purportedly involves violence (Schnittker, 2008). However, it seems unlikely that neuroscientific explanations will eradicate stigmatizing or prejudicial understandings of social groups. In some cases, neuroscientific explanations of human difference may reinforce, rather than dismantle, the social and symbolic boundaries that separate categories of people.

**Conclusions**

Lynch (2009) contends that we are on the cusp of a ‘neurorevolution’ whose effects will eclipse the great societal revolutions – agricultural, industrial and informational – that history has thus far witnessed. However, the bulk of the evidence reviewed above suggests that claims that neuroscience will dramatically alter people’s relations with their selves, others and the world are overstated. In many cases, neuroscientific ideas have assimilated in ways that perpetuate rather than challenge existing modes of understanding. This is perhaps not surprising: beliefs relating to free will, self-control, individual responsibility and essentialism are entangled in dense networks of cultural narrative and are consequently likely to prove obdurate. These beliefs are, however,
not entirely inviolable, with the research reviewed above also documenting instances where traditional understandings – for example, in the self-conceptions of psychiatric patients – have been modulated by neuroscientific information, even if in partial and contingent ways.

This review shows that many empirical questions remain about neuroscience’s influence on lay conceptions of personhood. Uncertainties linger over issues as basic as whether the public are aware of neuroscience: is the media’s attentiveness to neuroscience reflected in ordinary thought? While existing evidence indicates it is unlikely neurobiology will come to dominate folk psychology, might certain factors (e.g. individual differences or socio-demographic variables) differentially promote acceptance or rejection of neuroscientific understandings? Incorporating neurobiological information into self-perception is more likely within clinical populations, but even here neurobiological explanations are not absolute: how do they interact with other non-biological understandings? Media analysis suggests that neuroscience is assimilating into existing ideologies relating to free will, responsibility and self-control, but is this mirrored in ordinary thinking about these issues? Finally, while existing data cast doubt on neuroscience’s potential as a stigma-reduction mechanism, research on biological essentialism has concentrated largely on mental illness. As neuroscientific categories move beyond the clinical domain – for example, into criminality, personality, gender and sexuality – their effects on attendant social identities and intergroup relations must be closely tracked.

The cumulative implication of the research reviewed in this article is that neuroscience’s cultural influence cannot be evaluated in terms of a single narrative about personhood that it imposes on society. The neuroscientific ideas that reach the public sphere do not encounter passive receptacles of information, but active audiences who approach it through the lens of pre-existing worldviews, assumptions and agendas. Neuroscience is open to a multiplicity of interpretations and uses in society, and has a corresponding multiplicity of effects. For social scientists, this means that the critical priority for forthcoming investigation must revolve around disentangling the contingencies under which neuroscience exerts (or does not exert) distinctive impacts. Necessary developments include complementing analysis of neuroscience in the media with examination of its manifestation in personal lives; more extensive investigation of engagement with neuroscience within non-clinical populations; and departure from the hitherto near-exclusive focus on developed, western societies. Ongoing debates about the cultural significance of neuroscience should closely attend to such research developments, thereby supporting a dialogue in which the nuances of the domain are openly acknowledged and empirical findings prioritised over polemic and speculation.

**Funding**

This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from The Faraday Institute for Science & Religion at St Edmund’s College, Cambridge.

**Notes**

1. To provide some procedural detail on the literature review: the collection of literature on neuroscience and lay understandings of personhood reviewed here was amassed gradually over a two-year period. Relevant papers were identified via periodic keyword searches (using search-terms such as ‘neuroscience & self’, ‘neuroscience & society’, ‘neuroscience & identity’) of electronic databases (e.g. Social Science Citation Index, SCOPUS), and the bibliographies of papers thus acquired were examined to procure additional references. An electronic database was set up to store the literature gathered. This database was organized into folders based on papers’ subject matter (e.g. ‘neuroscience in the media’, ‘neuroscience and clinical categories’), with new folder categories created as required by incoming papers. The set of
categories in the database thus provided a broad overview of the literature’s primary preoccupations. The majority of the categories addressed one of four overarching issues: neuroscience’s public prominence, its influence on self-conception, its implications for deterministic beliefs and its effects on social stigma. These four issues set the structure for the present article.

2. Though Dar-Nimrod and Heine’s (2011) review centres on the effects of genetic explanations, many of its conclusions can be generalized to neurobiological explanations (Haslam, 2011).

References

Abi-Rached JM (2008) The implications of the new brain sciences. EMBO Reports 9(12): 1158–1162.
Alicke MD (2008) Blaming badly. Journal of Cognition and Culture 8(1–2): 179–186.
Ansari D, Smedt BD and Grabner RH (2012) Neuroeducation – A critical overview of an emerging field. Neuroethics 5(2): 105–117.
Bag B, Yilmaz S and Kirpinar I (2006) Factors influencing social distance from people with schizophrenia. International Journal of Clinical Practice 60(3): 289–294.
Baumeister RF, Masicampo EJ and DeWall CN (2009) Prosocial benefits of feeling free: Disbelief in free will increases aggression and reduces helpfulness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 35(2): 260–268.
Beck DM (2010) The appeal of the brain in the popular press. Perspectives on Psychological Science 5(6): 762–766.
Blaxter M (1997) Whose fault is it? People’s own conceptions of the reasons for health inequalities. Social Science & Medicine 44(6): 747–756.
Brescoll V and LaFrance M (2004) The correlates and consequences of newspaper reports of research on sex differences. Psychological Science 15(8): 515–520.
Bröer C and Heerings M (2013) Neurobiology in public and private discourse: The case of adults with ADHD. Sociology of Health & Illness 35(1): 49–65.
Buchman D, Illes J and Reiner P (2010) The paradox of addiction neuroscience. Neuroethics 4(2): 65–77.
Buchman DZ, Borgelt EL, Whiteley L and Illes J (2013) Neurobiological narratives: Experiences of mood disorder through the lens of neuroimaging. Sociology of Health & Illness. 35(1): 66–81.
Chancellor B and Chatterjee A (2011) Brain branding: When neuroscience and commerce collide. AJOB Neuroscience 2(4): 18–27.
Choudhury S, McKinney KA and Merten M (2012) Rebelling against the brain: Public engagement with the ‘neurological adolescent’. Social Science & Medicine 74(4): 565–573.
Choudhury S, Nagel SK and Slaby J (2009) Critical neuroscience: Linking neuroscience and society through critical practice. BioSocieties 4(1): 61–77.
Churchland PM (1995) The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Churchland PS (2008) The impact of neuroscience on philosophy. Neuron 60(3): 409–411.
Cohn S (2004) Increasing resolution, intensifying ambiguity: An ethnographic account of seeing life in brain scans. Economy and Society 33(1): 52–76.
Corrigan PW and Watson AC (2004) Stop the stigma: Call mental illness a brain disease. Schizophrenia Bulletin 30(3): 477–479.
Coveney C (2011) Cognitive enhancement: Exploring modafinil use in social context. In: Pickersgill M and van Keulen I (eds) Sociological Reflections on the Neurosciences. Bingley: Emerald, pp.203–228.
Crawford R (2006) Health as a meaningful social practice. Health 10(4): 401–420.
Crick F (1995) The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. New York: Touchstone.
Dar-Nimrod I and Heine SJ (2006) Exposure to scientific theories affects women’s math performance. Science 314(5798): 435.
Dar-Nimrod I and Heine SJ (2011) Genetic essentialism: On the deceptive determinism of DNA. Psychological Bulletin 137(5): 800–818.
De Brigard F, Mandelbaum E and Ripley D (2009) Responsibility and the brain sciences. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12(5): 511–524.
Dietrich S, Matschinger H and Angermeyer MC (2006) The relationship between biogenetic causal explanations and social distance toward people with mental disorders: Results from a population survey in Germany. *International Journal of Social Psychiatry* 52(2): 166–174.

Dumit J (2003) Is it me or my brain? Depression and neuroscientific facts. *Journal of Medical Humanities* 24(1): 35–47.

Dumit J (2004) *Picturing Personhood: Brain Scans and Biomedical Identity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Easter MM (2012) ‘Not all my fault’: Genetics, stigma, and personal responsibility for women with eating disorders. *Social Science & Medicine* 75(8): 1408–1416.

Economist. (2006) Free to choose? Modern neuroscience is eroding the idea of free will. *The Economist* 381 (19 December): 16–18.

Fahrenberg J and Cheetham M (2000) The mind-body problem as seen by students of different disciplines. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 7(5): 47–59.

Farah MJ (2012) Neuroethics: The ethical, legal, and societal impact of neuroscience. *Annual Review of Psychology* 63(1): 571–591.

Farah MJ, Illes J, Cook-Deegan R, Gardner H, Kandel E, King P, Paren E, Sahakian B and Wolpe PR (2004) Neurocognitive enhancement: What can we do and what should we do? *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* 5(5): 421–425.

Fein E (2011) Innocent machines: Asperger’s syndrome and the neurostructural self. In: Pickersgill M and van Keulen I (eds) *Sociological Reflections on the Neurosciences*. Bingley: Emerald, pp.27–49.

Fine C (2010) *Delusions of Gender*. London: Icon Books.

Forlini C and Racine E (2009) Disagreements with implications: Diverging discourses on the ethics of non-medical use of methylphenidate for performance enhancement. *BMC Medical Ethics* 10(1): 9.

Frazzetto G and Anker S (2009) Neuroculture. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* 10(11): 815–821.

Gibbons M (2007) Seeing the mind in the matter: Functional brain imaging as framed visual argument. *Argumentation and Advocacy* 43(3–4): 175–188.

Gross S (2011) A stone in a spaghetti bowl: The biological and metaphorical brain in neuro-oncology. In: Pickersgill M and van Keulen I (eds) *Sociological Reflections on the Neurosciences*. Bingley: Emerald, pp.99–119.

Goldman AI (1993) The psychology of folk psychology. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 16(1): 15–28.

Green J and Cohen J (2004) For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 359(1451): 1775–1785.

Gruber D and Dickerson JA (2012) Persuasive images in popular science: Testing judgments of scientific reasoning and credibility. *Public Understanding of Science* 21(8): 938–948.

Hacking I (1995) The looping effects of human kinds. In: Sperber D, Premack D and Premack AJ (eds) *Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.351–383.

Hall W, Carter L and Morley KI (2004) Neuroscience research on the addictions: A prospectus for future ethical and policy analysis. *Addictive Behaviors* 29(7): 1481–1495.

Harris S (2012) *Free Will*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Haslam N (2011) Genetic essentialism, neuroessentialism, and stigma: Commentary on Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011). *Psychological Bulletin* 137(5): 819–824.

Haslam N and Levy SR (2006) Essentialist beliefs about homosexuality: Structure and implications for prejudice. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 32(4): 471–485.

Herculano-Houzel S (2002) Do you know your brain? A survey on public neuroscience literacy at the closing of the decade of the brain. *The Neuroscientist* 8(2): 98–110.

Illes J and Racine E (2005) Imaging or imagining? A Neuroethics challenge informed by genetics. *The American Journal of Bioethics* 9(2): 5–18.

Illes J, Kirschen MP and Gabrieli JDE (2003) From neuroimaging to neuroethics. *Nature Neuroscience* 6(3): 205–205.

Illes J, Lombera S, Rosenberg J and Arnow B (2008) In the mind’s eye: Provider and patient attitudes on functional brain imaging. *Journal of Psychiatric Research* 43(2): 107–114.
Jack J and Appelbaum LG (2010) ‘This is your brain on rhetoric’: Research directions for neurorhetorics. *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 40(5): 411–437.

Jayaratne TE, Ybarra O, Sheldon JP, Brown TN, Feldbaum M, Pfeffer CA and Petty EM (2006) White Americans’ genetic lay theories of race differences and sexual orientation: Their relationship with prejudice toward blacks, and gay men and lesbians. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 9(1): 77–94.

Joffe H and Haarhoff G (2002) Representations of far-flung illnesses: The case of Ebola in Britain. *Social Science & Medicine* 54(6): 955–969.

Joffe H and Staerklé C (2007) The centrality of the self-control ethos in western aspersions regarding out-groups: A social representational approach to stereotype content. *Culture & Psychology* 13(4): 395–418.

Kahan DM, Jenkins-Smith H and Braman D (2011) Cultural cognition of scientific consensus. *Journal of Risk Research* 14(2): 147–174.

Keehner M, Mayberry L and Fischer M (2011) Different clues from different views: The role of image format in public perceptions of neuroimaging results. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, 18(2): 422–428.

Kelly P (2012) The brain in the jar: A critique of discourses of adolescent brain development. *Journal of Youth Studies* 15(7): 944–959.

Lam DCK and Salkovskis PM (2007) An experimental investigation of the impact of biological and psychological causal explanations on anxious and depressed patients’ perception of a person with panic disorder. *Behaviour Research and Therapy* 45(2): 405–411.

Lavazza A and De Caro M (2010) Not so fast. On some bold neuroscientific claims concerning human agency. *Neuroethics* 3(1): 23–41.

Littlefield MM and Johnson J (eds) (2012) *The Neuroscientific Turn: Transdisciplinarity in the Age of the Brain*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lynch Z (2009) *The Neuro Revolution: How Brain Science is Changing Our World*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Morris MW and Peng K (1994) Culture and cause: American and Chinese attributions for social and physical events. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67(6): 949–971.

Morris MW, Menon T and Ames DR (2001) Culturally conferred conceptions of agency: A key to social perception of persons, groups and other actors. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 5(2): 169–182.

Morton TA, Haslam SA, Postmes T and Ryan MK (2006) We value what values us: The appeal of identity-affirming science. *Political Psychology* 27(6): 823–838.

Morton TA, Postmes T, Haslam AS and Hornsey MJ (2009) Theorizing gender in the face of social change: Is there anything essential about essentialism? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 96(3): 653–664.

Moscovici S (2008[1961]) *Psychoanalysis: Its Image and Its Public* (trans. Macey D). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Munro GD (2010) The scientific impotence excuse: Discounting belief-threatening scientific abstracts. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 40(3): 579–600.

Nahmias E (2006) Folk fears about freedom and responsibility: Determinism vs. reductionism. *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 6(1–2): 215–237.

NeuroInsights (2009) *The State of the Brain Fitness Software Market 2009*. Available at: http://www.neuroinsights.com/marketreports/brainfitnesssoftware.html (accessed 28 June 2011).

Novas C and Rose N (2000) Genetic risk and the birth of the somatic individual. *Economy and Society* 29(4): 485–513.

O’Connell G, De Wilde J, Haley J, Shuler K, Schafer B, Sandercock P and Wardlaw JM (2011) The brain, the science and the media. *EMBO Reports* 12(7): 630–636.

O’Connor C and Joffe H (2012) Media representations of early human development: Protecting, feeding and loving the developing brain. *Social Science & Medicine*. Epub ahead of print 13 December 2012. DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2012.09.048.
O’Connor C, Rees G and Joffe H (2012) Neuroscience in the public sphere. *Neuron* 74(2): 220–226.

Ortega F (2009) The cerebral subject and the challenge of neurodiversity. *BioSocieties* 4(4): 425–445.

Palmour N and Racine E (2011) Direct-to-consumer marketing of dietary supplements for dementia: An example of unhealthy commerce of neuroscience. *AJOB Neuroscience* 2(4): 30–33.

Papadopoulos D (2011) The imaginary of plasticity: Neural embodiment, epigenetics and ecomorphs. *The Sociological Review* 59(3): 432–456.

Partridge BJ, Bell SK, Lucke JC, Yeates S and Hall WD (2011) Smart drugs ‘as common as coffee’: Media hype about neuroenhancement. *PLoS ONE* 6(11): e28416.

Pasquinelli E (2012) Neuromyths: Why do they exist and persist? *Mind, Brain, and Education* 6(2): 89–96.

Pescosolido BA, Martin JK, Long JS, Medina TR, Phelan JC and Link BG (2010) ‘A disease like any other’? A decade of change in public reactions to schizophrenia, depression, and alcohol dependence. *The American Journal of Psychiatry* 167(11): 1321–1330.

Pickersgill M, Cunningham-Burley S and Martin P (2011) Constituting neurologic subjects: Neuroscience, subjectivity and the mundane significance of the brain. *Subjectivity* 4(3): 346–365.

Pitts-Taylor V (2010) The plastic brain: Neoliberalism and the neuronal self. *Health* 14(6): 635–652.

Rabinow P (1992) Artificiality and enlightenment: From sociobiology to biosociality. In: Crary J and Kwinter S (eds) *Incorporations*. New York: Zone Books, pp.234–252.

Racine E, Waldman S, Rosenberg J and Illes J (2010) Contemporary neuroscience in the media. *Social Science & Medicine* 71(4): 725–733.

Rapp R (2011) A child surrounds this brain: The future of neurological difference according to scientists, parents and diagnosed young adults. In: Pickersgill M and van Keulen I (eds) *Sociological Reflections on the Neurosciences*. Bingley: Emerald, pp.3–26.

Read J and Harré N (2001) The role of biological and genetic causal beliefs in the stigmatisation of ‘mental patients’. *Journal of Mental Health* 10(2): 223–235.

Rodriguez P (2006) Talking brains: A cognitive semantic analysis of an emerging folk neuropsychology. *Public Understanding of Science* 15(3): 301–330.

Rose N (2007) *The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rosenberg J and Illes J (2010) Smart drugs ‘as common as coffee’: Media hype about neuroenhancement. *PLoS ONE* 6(11): e28416.

Rüsch N, Todd AR, Bodenhausen GV and Corrigan PW (2010) Do people with mental illness deserve what they get? Links between meritocratic worldviews and implicit versus explicit stigma. *European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience* 260(8): 617–625.

Schank S (2012) Are neuroimages like photographs of the brain? *Philosophy of Science* 74(5): 860–872.

Rüsch N, Todd AR, Bodenhausen GV and Corrigan PW (2010) Do people with mental illness deserve what they get? Links between meritocratic worldviews and implicit versus explicit stigma. *European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience* 260(8): 617–625.

Schank S (2012) Are neuroimages like photographs of the brain? *Philosophy of Science* 74(5): 860–872.

Schnittker J (2008) An uncertain revolution: Why the rise of a genetic model of mental illness has not increased tolerance. *Social Science & Medicine* 67(9): 1370–1381.

Schüll ND and Zaloom C (2011) The shortsighted brain: Neuroeconomics and the governance of choice in time. *Social Studies of Science* 41(4): 515–538.

Schweitzer NJ, Saks MJ, Murphy ER, Roskies AL, Sinnott-Armstrong W and Gaudet LM (2011) Neuroimages as evidence in a mens rea defence: No impact. *Psychology, Public Policy & Law* 17(3): 357–393.

Seymour B and Vlaev I (2012) Can, and should, behavioural neuroscience influence public policy? *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 16(9): 449–451.

Singh I (2011) A disorder of anger and aggression: Children’s perspectives on attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder in the UK. *Social Science & Medicine* 73(6): 889–896.

Smith M and Farah MJ (2011) Are prescription stimulants ‘smart pills’? The epidemiology and cognitive neuroscience of prescription stimulant use by normal healthy individuals. *Psychological Bulletin* 137(5): 717–741.
Sousa P (2006) On folk conceptions of mind, agency and morality. *Journal of Cognition & Culture* 6(1–2): 1–25.

Sperduti A, Crivellaro F, Rossi PF and Bondioli L (2012) ‘Do octopuses have a brain?’ Knowledge, perceptions and attitudes towards neuroscience at school. *PLoS ONE* 7(10): e47943.

Stillman TF, Baumeister RF and Mele AR (2011) Free will in everyday life: Autobiographical accounts of free and unfree actions. *Philosophical Psychology* 24(3): 381–394.

Teachman BA, Gapinski KD, Brownell KD, Rawlins M and Jeyaram S (2003) Demonstrations of implicit anti-fat bias: The impact of providing causal information and evoking empathy. *Health Psychology* 22(1): 68–78.

Ten Eyck TA (2005) The media and public opinion on genetics and biotechnology: Mirrors, windows, or walls? *Public Understanding of Science* 14(3): 305–316.

Thornton DJ (2011) *Brain Culture: Neuroscience and Popular Media*. London: Rutgers University Press.

Van Gorp B and Vercruysse T (2012) Frames and counter-frames giving meaning to dementia: A framing analysis of media content. *Social Science & Medicine* 74(8): 1274–1281.

Vidal F (2009) Brainhood, anthropological figure of modernity. *History of the Human Sciences* 22(1): 5–36.

Vohs KD and Schooler JW (2008) The value of believing in free will. *Psychological Science* 19(1): 49–54.

Wagner W, Holtz P and Kashima Y (2009) Construction and deconstruction of essence in representing social groups: Identity projects, stereotyping, and racism. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 39(3): 363–383.

Walker I and Read J (2002) The differential effectiveness of psychosocial and biogenetic causal explanations in reducing negative attitudes toward mental illness. *Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes* 65(4): 313–325.

Walsh C (2011) Youth justice and neuroscience: A dual-use dilemma. *British Journal of Criminology* 51(1): 21–39.

Wardlaw JM, O’Connell G, Shuler K, DeWilde J, Haley J, Escobar O, Murray S, Rae R, Jarvie D, Sandercok P and Schafer B (2011) ‘Can it read my mind?’ – What do the public and experts think of the current (mis) uses of neuroimaging? *PLoS ONE* 6(10): e25829.

Weisberg DS, Keil FC, Goodstein J, Rawson E and Gray JR (2008) The seductive allure of neuroscience explanations. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 20(3): 470–477.

Wellman HM and Miller JG (2006) Developing conceptions of responsive intentional agents. *Journal of Cognition & Culture* 6(1–2): 27–55.

Williams MJ and Eberhardt JL (2008) Biological conceptions of race and the motivation to cross racial boundaries. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 94(6): 1033–1047.

Williams SJ, Higgs P and Katz S (2011) Neuroculture, active ageing and the ‘older brain’: Problems, promises and prospects. *Sociology of Health & Illness* 34(1): 64–67.

Wynne B (1993) Public uptake of science: A case for institutional reflexivity. *Public Understanding of Science* 2(4): 321–337.

**Author biographies**

**Cliodhna O’Connor** is a PhD candidate in the Division of Psychology & Language Sciences, University College London, UK. Her research explores the popularization of neuroscientific knowledge and its implications for social life and ‘commonsense’ beliefs.

**Helene Joffe** is a social and health psychologist who publishes extensively in the risk area. Her particular area of interest is public engagement with the scientific messages that exist in the public sphere. Her areas of study include emerging infectious diseases, earthquakes, climate change and neuroscience.