CHAPTER 1

The Beginning of a Post-colonial Foreign Policy in Africa

This chapter sets the scene for the formation of states in Africa, as a result of independence, beginning late in the 1950s, particularly in the sub-Saharan region. As World War II concluded and a new world order emerged, pitting the US-led, democratic capitalist western world against the USSR-led communist-socialist world, European countries, war ravaged and desperately holding onto increasingly assertive and soon-to-be independent colonies in Asia and Africa, found themselves increasingly on the periphery of global order debates, but also provided ammunition to the USSR and its allies, given continuing colonialism. Pressure also came from within the colonies in the form of independence movements, from the more receptive Soviet orbit, from the US itself given the pointed contradictions, from regional organizations, such as the Arab League and afield, Asian countries and their collective action (e.g., the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement), and the liberated African countries such as Ghana and former French West Africa. The chapter outlines the most important issues addressed in the monograph—read foreign policy—that would confront the countries, individually, and together, as they struggled to rid the continent of the yoke of colonialism especially in the southern African region.

A book—any book—that purports to articulate an African foreign policy evokes intellectual disquiet, even suspicion. Africa is territorially massive, covering 11.7 million mi², 20% of Earth’s land area and has
(54+) countries (Western Sahara), a 1.3 billion persons or 16.64% of earth’s population and its fastest growing as of 2019. North-South, and East-West, it covers almost 5000. 2600 different languages are spoken, with likely the same number of ethnic, social, linguistically, historically, religiously, culturally and economically disparate groups. Even their colonial experiences were different. As diverse and different as the nations are, there is a diversity of viewpoints of and positions on issues such as foreign policy.

It is useful to articulate a working definition of foreign policy. Foreign policy is about a country and its government enunciating interests that translate into its interaction strategies with other countries, organizations, MNCs and other ‘actors’ who can influence its actions, reactions, decisions and outcomes. Thus, of necessity, defining foreign policy should include the range of actors, often acknowledged to be countries with articulated preferences and interest(s), strategies that involve unilateral, bilateral and multilateral negotiations, coercion, concession or a mix thereof, entailing actions aimed toward at least one or more actor external to the country or actors, a decision, and a means of communicating preferences and outcomes. Formally, foreign policy is “the strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities. This includes decisions to do nothing.”¹

Most IR scholarship holds that states are the primary actors in international relations, that they all have, and articulate their preferences, that these preferences are mostly unchanging from one to the other (i.e., states are functionally similar). States signal these preferences to other states and actors and to their own publics. It is useful to consider where these interests arise from, despite the proposition that states are unitary actors. Without delving into domestic audiences and sources of legal authority in states, often, leaders pursue policies harmful to their states in their name. Some territorially expansive states have different population and interest groups that vary the interests, but even in smaller states such as Rwanda, such interests can vary. Even in unitary, homogeneous states (e.g., Somalia), these interests vary and often pull the fabric of states’ centrality apart.

¹Valerie M. Hudson, “The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis.” In Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Timothy Dunne, Eds., Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 14.
These differences are aptly captured by Benedict Anderson, writing that “an American will never meet, or even know, the names of more than a handful of his [300] million-odd fellow-Americans. He has no idea what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity.”2 There are shared commonalities binding them within the polity—a national anthem, president, senate or federal structures—and other interests such as foreign wars, trade and immigration, upon which a nation builds some form of consensus. If even countries disagree on their interests, a foreign policy for Africa is less defensible. This is not just due to its size (~3.5X the US), but due to its diversity that also has common features, e.g., colonial experiences, liberation outcomes, post-colonial paths and current interests. There is a further distinction between sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the North African region (Maghreb/Sahel), culturally, religiously, demographically and historically.

An argument on the more fortuitous proposition of examining Africa’s most critical states’ foreign policy, and their influence on the continent’s major issues is plausible. Several states come to mind: South Africa (even with its tortured history), Egypt (the Arab world’s cultural and religious center), Nigeria (most populous African country with the highest GDP), or Equatorial Guinea, the wealthiest country in Africa (GDP p.c. of US$ 34,865). Ethiopia was not colonized but endured several years of Italian occupation after 1935, and Liberia, the American Colonization Society’s creation as a destination for newly-freed African slaves, or Mauritius, consistently ranked highest in measures of democracy in Africa, or perhaps D. R. Congo, with its perennial conflicts, or the failed Somalia, decidedly merit scholarly inquiry. Given the earlier recognition of a perceived common destiny and colonial experience, a continental approach is more useful.

Even those countries not listed have unique history, characteristics and circumstances with merit. Yet as most theorists might posit, these are not major powers, and therefore, their actions are less consequential to the broader interstate interactions. Rather than wade into interstate, regional and continental contests over whom, when and why, and potentially risk another interstate war, this research approaches the question of Africa’s foreign policy from an “issues” perspective. It focuses on issues that have

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2 Benedict R. O. G. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991), 26.
been especially important to Africa and required collective action. Even after resolving the selection criteria—issues versus states—a subsequent challenge presents: What issues are, have been most important, and how should they be studied, even organized?

African states, entering a largely structured and stratified world order, had less influence than especially European and Asian states. But they faced issues unique to, or reflecting their own experience: apartheid and Ian Smith’s UDI in Rhodesia are good examples. But even with a most egregious issue such as apartheid, where one might expect an African consensus on the evil apartheid portended, some countries defected from consensus. Should the Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Union’s (AU) predecessor, take a hard-line position (favored by most countries) and support armed struggle? Could the OAU negotiate with the apartheid South African leadership to find inclusion for the disenfranchised majority, as a minority of countries argued? In advocating for collective action, did intervention necessarily rise to the level of interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation, which African countries were unequivocally opposed to?

Decolonization fervor challenged the extent to which countries were willing to go. Even as its diplomats used every occasion at the UN to demand decolonization, Frontline States (FLS) such as Tanzania actively hosted, and Libya trained freedom fighters, violating sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of sovereign nations, at the behest of the OAU. Still, new challenges arose around colonial borders and the dispersal of language groups that led to irredentism, as in Somalia. How would countries deal with borders, irredentism and the conflict it entailed? What—if there would be one—would the African position on the Cold War and the East/West divide be? Was this even important for Africa? What countries considered extremely important varied, even though most of Africa’s new countries seldom articulated their foreign policy.

Many African countries were now independent, sovereign nations, free, and able to pursue their own interests and craft foreign policy. The pursuit of these interests brought them into close proximity with each other, and with issues that often affected the countries the same way—trade, development, neo/colonialism, regional and the ~ phone residual relations (Francophone, Anglophone, Lusophone and other), defense agreements, etc. The individual countries’ positions often differed from the continental position on foreign policy issues, and countries regularly violated the continent-wide tenets of independence, of sovereignty and
non-interference in the domestic issues of other countries even when genocides were occurring. Tanzania, for example, cheerfully and successfully intervened in Uganda in 1978–1979, ousting Amin; granted, Amin’s expansionist ambitions brought upon him the Armageddon of an invasion by the all-around, usually mild-mannered Tanzania’s wrath.

**Defining Africa’s Important Issues**

A cursory Google web search of the term ‘key issues + African Union’ produces the usual suspects: a list of three, seven, top or ten issues perceived to be Africa’s most important. Some are as perennial and predictable as sunrise (conflict, poverty, hunger), while others are newer (state failure, terrorism, war and hegemony). For AU’s 2017 Heads of States and Governments summit, Gaffey identified three ‘key issues’ (i) the status of Western Sahara in light of Morocco’s stated desire to rejoin the African Union in 2017 and subsequent re-admission; (ii) preventing genocide in South Sudan (Africa’s newest country promptly degenerated into ethnic conflict after nearly 40 years of conflict and OAU/AU peace activities); and (iii) leadership changes and election of the AU Commission Chair, where Chad’s Moussa Faki succeeded Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

In the Crisis Group’s briefing No. 135 of January 2018, seven major issues confronting the AU are discussed. They include the need for the AU to identify a strategic direction through consensus-building on institutional and financial reform, contain disruptions occasioned by Morocco/Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (AU Member State, recognized by 85 countries around the world, with diplomatic representation in 40 of them); elections in the DRC (postponed to two years beyond the deadline and the almost inevitable rejection of the results); facilitating deployment of election observers to 17 countries holding elections in 2018; stemming conflict in and implementing peace (based on the AU roadmap) in the Central African Republic; continuing to support Somalia and not withdrawing AU troops (deployed through AMISOM); and stabilize South Sudan, independent in 2011, and which has experienced conflict since 2014.³

³The Crisis Group, “Seven Priorities for the African Union in 2018.” *Briefing No. 135/Africa*, 17 January 2018.
The AU has sought to address the most critical issues, yet, despite the OAU having existed for almost 40 years, it had remained largely ineffective. Part of the reason is the inclusive, rather than exclusive nature of membership. Could African states and the OAU have found more success by predating membership on the European Union (EU)-like Acquis Communautaire? The AU has in some instances shown grit, including deploying troops to Somalia, later transforming into an UN-supported peacekeeping mission, AMISOM. There are issues where the AU collaborates on much better as a continental body (on decisions binding to the members states)—e.g., broadly supporting boycotts and embargoes directed at the apartheid South African government. Thus, this is a more profitable route to take, in assessing how African countries have made their decisions on the most important issues, especially those affecting member states.

Most issues affecting African countries can generally be classified as domestic policy, or foreign policy issues. A robust IR debate addresses the influence domestic politics has on foreign policy and vice versa. This link is the subject of Putnam’s 1988 *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games*. In analyzing the 1978 Bonn summit outcomes, Putnam postulates that “neither a purely domestic nor a purely international analysis could account for this episode. Interpretations cast in terms either of domestic causes and international effects (‘Second Image’) or of international causes and domestic effects (‘Second Image Reversed’) would represent merely a ‘partial equilibrium.’”\(^4\) Putnam argues for a more ‘general equilibrium,’ linkage and simultaneity in the influence of domestic issues and preferences on global politics and vice versa. Africa is special—or not: it is not immune to this logic of two-level games *a la Putnam*. Diplomacy does not guarantee that consensus will be reached,\(^5\) although per de Senarelens, “the conventional divide between domestic politics and international relations has become obsolete as the former,

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\(^4\) Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988): 430.

\(^5\) For additional discussions on two-level games, strategy and bargaining, and the interplay between domestic and international politics, see, among others, Kahler (1993), Moravcsik (1993), Milner and Tingley (2015), James Rosenau (2003) (with a substantive discussion on distant proximities - greater globalization and localization of global vignettes), and de Senarelens (2016).
while largely determined by the latter, can in turn affect regional and world security and wellbeing.”

During the earliest independence years, Africa faced the urgent question of what to do with newly-inherited national borders. Should nations keep them, or should the OAU consider new boundaries? Leading pan-Africanist leaders such as Nyerere, Kenyatta, Nkrumah and Banda and others acknowledged the urgency of the issue, in conference, they kept the borders. Not even a year later, the borders led to regional conflicts: Kenya and Somalia, 1964–67, Ethiopia and Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Eritrea becoming independent in 1993) and Nigeria and Cameroon, over the Bakassi Peninsula. States’ borders, crafted without regard for ethnic composition, resulted in splitting of territories occupied by Somalis (between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya), the Maasai (Kenya and Tanzania), among others. In large part, this division and subsequent decisions assured that Rwanda, Kenya/Somalia, Ethiopia/Somalia, Somalia/Djibouti would persist long after.

The Critical Issues

Appreciating Africa’s complexity, the breadth of its issues, its rich history, current opportunities and challenges, and future strategies, an assessment of its foreign policy from independence to the present is warranted. Its pre-colonial period does not lend itself to continental analysis; there were states, kingdoms and empires, but these were scattered and seldom undertook coordinated actions. Some African states’ foreign policy decisions and strategies, formulated after 1950, have been informed by pre- and colonial issues, foreign pacts, geography, spheres of influence, trade, territorial interests and foreign powers domination of global power relations. After they liberated themselves, they could formulate own foreign and domestic policy strategies, although structures and foreign policy were often sprinkled with European flavor. They soon became Cold War trapeze artists: they were courted by the eastern and western blocs, while most former colonies were choosing non-alignment. Thus, though

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6 Pierre de Senarelens, “Psychoanalysis and the Study of Emotions in International Politics.” In Yohan Ariffin, Jean-Marc Coicaud, Vesselin Popovski, Eds., Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 171.
they were often *de jure* non-aligned, former European colonial powers influenced them in/directly and the east/west wooed them.

Independence confronted myriad African issues, the most pertinent of which are discussed here. Criteria for consideration are these: issues that affected Africa or parts thereof, had global implications, or led to intervention individual states, groups and external actors (e.g., UN, NATO, OECD, EU). Some are addressed more generally as they affected countries in different ways but were always present. An example is the Washington Consensus conditionalities relating to reforms to allow access to loans. The changes not just donor-driven: domestic pressure, political activism and broader global changes such as the fall of communism gave oxygen to African political reforms. Other ‘mandated reforms’ were geared toward economics and were thus replicated in Regional Economic Communities and the African Economic Community but also as a precondition for foreign aid. Reforms included free trade, removing non-tariff barriers, free markets, better governance and political freedom among others. African countries detested the preconditions but global power structure changes assured that the only loan sharks they could borrow from, made the rules, and there really was no viable alternative.

Africa’s foreign policy issues can be analyzed through myriad lenses and even theoretical approaches. This study applies three broad lenses. First, colonization of African societies, which forced them to transition from sub-state, homogeneous, pre-colonial societies into the legally ill-defined colonial ‘entities,’ subjected to foreign rule through fraudulent treaties and brute force. Their freedom came after 1950, and their introduction into a global order was in the context of an ongoing global Cold War. The second lens was the immediate post-Cold War period: here, the issues centered on a new global order. Inextricably interlinked issues included state-failure and the rise of (violent) non-state actors, who often utilized the dire levels of human development and poverty to recruit into militia and terrorist groups focused especially on western interests. The capitalist-democratic western alliance-imposed aid preconditions, including trade liberalization, free markets, good governance and expansion of political space. The third lens reflects more recent global trends: whereas the capitalist-democratic front has persisted, challengers emerging from post-colonial states such as China, Brazil and India. Increasingly, they have offered an alternative to the western-dominated global apparatus, and suggest a model that African countries can follow.
Suffice to say, these three lenses cannot cover the entirety or complexity of Africa’s past, present and future issues. Africa did not have or stake common positions out of the gate, but their experiences and unwavering determination to end minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia and other residual colonialism created shared interests and thus natural alli(anc)es. OAU’s founding was vital, and its constituent nations launched efforts to untangle the complex mess of future states the Europeans left. Africa’s institutes found themselves trying to undo the damage done by the colonial administrators, including balkanization and splitting homogenous groups, and divide-and-rule that sowed seeds of an inevitable future conflict. African states held diametrically inconsistent positions: if colonial governments were not legitimate and did not represent Africans’ aspirations, were they obligated to honor treaties and agreements colonists acceded to? Conversely, they kept the colonial borders, thus recognizing decisions by authorities they considered illegitimate. The desire for self-governance was so strong that African nations upheld these agreements that were often detrimental to their own historical practices and interests.

One such example, thorny then and now, was agreements governing the Nile waters; it heavily favored Egypt, and prohibited upstream countries from damming the river. The Nile’s origin is Lake Victoria, fed by rivers in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Three pre-independence agreements were the culprits: a 1902 treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia; H. E. “Menilik II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be constructed any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat.” The 1929 Anglo-Egyptian treaty (often referred to as ‘exchange of notes’) stated that: “save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the River Nile and its branches, or on the lakes from which it flows […] which would in such a manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the quantity of water arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower its level.”

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7 Joseph Awange and Obiero Ong’ang’a, *Lake Victoria: Ecology, Resources, Environment* (Berlin: Springer, 2006), 287.

8 Mwangi Kimenyi and John Mukum Mbaku, *Governing the Nile River Basin: The Search for a New Legal Regime* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 37.
The third was the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan; it reinforced the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian treaty’s provisions, and increased water usage allocations for both Sudan and Egypt.\(^9\)

The April 1955 Bandung Conference brought together nations newly independent and proposed to form an alternative to the east/west blocs. It was the first Afro-Asian conference that articulated countries’ desire to pursue a non-alignment policy.\(^10\) Six African countries—Egypt, Ethiopia, (then) Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya and Sudan—sent delegations. Countries attending the conference represented a “combined population [that] made up approximately two-thirds of the world’s people.”\(^11\) During the conference, Nehru’s support for African countries’ independence was a notable rallying point. Eventually, the Non-Aligned Movement was founded at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, with the agreement that the members “had to pursue an independent foreign policy, peaceful coexistence, and abstain from joining cold war military alliances.”\(^12\)

African countries’ non-alignment policy was severely tested, yet they had little trouble reconciling sovereignty with active support of anti-colonial movements and ultimate independence of other African ‘countries’ and territories still subjected to foreign control.\(^13\) The actual practice of non-alignment was mostly unsuccessful: newly independent countries remained beholden to former colonial powers. Frequently, bilateral relations with former colonial powers overshadowed those established with neighbors. Still, the principle of non-alignment became a central pillar of African countries’ relations with the rest of the world.

\(^9\) Kimenyi and Mbaku, *Governing the Nile River Basin*, 2015.

\(^10\) C. M. Turnbull, “Regionalism and Nationalism.” In Nicholas Tarling, Ed., *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: Volume 2, The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

\(^11\) Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesar, “Introduction: The Spirit of Bandung.” In Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesar, Eds., *Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 4.

\(^12\) Marco Wyss, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Sandra Bott and Janick Maria Schaufelbuehl, “Introduction: A Tightrope Walk—Neutrality and Neutralism in the Cold War.” In Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Janick Schaufelbuehl and Marco Wyss, Eds., *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs*? (New York: Routledge, 2016), 4.

\(^13\) Wyss, et al., “Introduction: A Tightrope Walk,” 2016.
Parallel to the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, then-sovereign African countries were engaged in deciding the character of future African unity. Three major schools of thought presented (as groups): Brazzaville Group, Monrovia Group and Casablanca Group. The Brazzaville Group was populated by Francophone states that favored continental integration based on economic cooperation and closer ties with their overlord, France. The Casablanca Group envisioned African unity as a federal government structure, akin to that of the US. This approach intimated a political and economic union of African countries. The Monrovia Group was numerically superior to the other two. It favored a looser continental association, but emphasized that state sovereignty was sacrosanct. This ultimately informed the Organization of African Unity’s structure.

As nations contended with OAU’s structure and found challenge in regionalism advocated by Nyerere, Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny, old and new regional organizations formed. They were infused with historical basis, regional and economic integration and services and political aspirations. The organizations were not all new: in 1967, the first East African Community (EAC I) was formed. It replaced the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO). Further back in 1917, Kenya and Uganda had a customs union (Tanzania joined later). The customs union was succeeded by an abortive East African High Commission in 1947. In French-controlled Equatorial and West African region, L’Afrique-Équatoriale française (French Equatorial Africa), comprising of the Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon and Congo was reflected this trend. It had regional federal structures (currency, trade, transport) that fostered regional integration but also assured French control in the event of independence. The French vision came to pass: in 1959 countries founded the Union douanière équatoriale (Equatorial Customs Union).

A major issue in Africa’s foreign policy is the persistent manifestation of the spectrum of political violence. It ranges from interstate wars

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14 Kimenyi and Mbaku, *Governing the Nile River Basin*, 2007.
15 Hector Carcel, Luis A. Gil-Alana and Godfrey Madigu, “Currency Union in the East African Community: A Fractional Integration Approach.” In Almas Heshmati, Ed., *Economic Integration, Currency Union, and Sustainable and Inclusive Growth in East Africa* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 42; and The Republic of Kenya, “The Kenya Gazette,” Vol. LXVII-No. 43 (Nairobi: GP, 21 September 1965), n.p.
16 Aghrout, “Africa’s Experiences with Regional Co-Operation and Integration,” 1992.
(e.g., Kenya vs. Somalia, Ethiopia vs. Somalia, Libya vs. Egypt, Algeria vs. Western Sahara, Djibouti vs. Eritrea (a border conflict), Uganda vs. Tanzania’s *vita vya Kagera*, among others. Intrastate wars (civil wars), low-intensity conflicts and coups d’états account for the near 40% of global conflicts attributed to Africa. Interspersed with these are international, and African-led peace overtures, peacekeeping missions, military interventions the world is happy happen (e.g., Tanzania-Ugandan war, or the ECOWAS near-intervention in The Gambia after Yahya Jammeh’s refusal to concede defeat in elections), and ongoing attempts to activate a Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

Some conflicts have attracted international dispute resolution mechanisms and UN-sponsored prosecution of war criminals. They include the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),\(^{17}\) the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone (and Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone).\(^{18}\) The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC, or, International Criminal Court Statute) in July 1998, and its entry into force in July 2002 ushered in a new era for Africa and the world. War crimes would be more systematically addressed. Notwithstanding, majority of its prosecutions and arrest warrants issued have led to the ICC being accused of bias, a “court for Africans” even as its mechanism addresses conduct during conflict.

Another major issue touching on Africa’s foreign policy is human rights. Africa’s record here is less than stellar, perhaps predictably so, given that their first instance of statehood of diverse previously conflictual groups was the colonial state. The very nature of the independent state born out of colonialism with its egregious treatment of African subjects, and the broader global geopolitical realities of the Cold War meant that states could get away with human rights violations with impunity. After all, the colonial state was built on a foundation of oppression and in the US, civil rights were only now producing positive outcomes, denying the major powers any standing to advocate for human rights. Push-back

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\(^{17}\) The full title of the court is: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994.

\(^{18}\) United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library. “UN Documentation: International Law.” *UN Documentation: International Law.* [https://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts](https://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts).
might drive countries into the Sino-soviet camp, and that was decidedly the least optimum outcome.

An unintended consequence of this reality was that African leaders had little impetus to level the playing field or address the grievances informed by ethnic schisms exacerbated by colonialism. Most quickly abandoned any pretense of multiparty democracy. But the extent to which governments could run amok was changing: The Rome Statute recast sovereignty as states’ responsibility to protect, with the implied possibility of external intervention. Cold War realities that enabled countries’ bad behavior could lead to intervention. Intriguingly, 30 African countries have ratified the Rome Statute, none have unsigned. As distasteful as the now-diluted concept of sovereignty is, governments have reluctantly conceded that their new raison d’être is protecting their citizens, and if they don’t, international collective responsibility to intervene may occur.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been applied successfully in Africa, including during Kenya’s post-2007 election. R2P was used to address Libyan government’s response to the 2011 Arab Spring protests. Even in Darfur, former Sudanese president al-Bashir found himself scrambling out of countries that might arrest him and hand him over to the ICC on the basis of suspected war crimes in Darfur. Africa has also increasingly sought to pursue pacific settlement of disputes. It has also responded with moves to encourage greater accountability for leaders using NEPAD’s Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) that evaluates governance, and the fiscally-attractive Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership with a US$5 million award. Other mechanisms include data and reports issuing from the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) indicators.

Economic development has been, predictably, most salient to African countries. As they became independent, it was clear that colonial neglect, despite arguments to the contrary, rapid development and elimination of poverty, disease and illiteracy were urgent. For almost three-quarters of a century, colonial powers bestowed upon Africa the worst HDI indicators. Tanzania had few paved roads, DRC had one doctor for the whole country and 16 doctoral students. Despite escaping colonization, half of Ethiopia’s high school teachers in 1962 were Peace Corps Volunteers. Funding human and economic development for countries dependent on, and net exporters to the west was challenging, in addition to colonial obligations they inherited. Despite strong advocacy for independent financial
institutions such as a UN bank, they found little success and had to subject themselves to the Bretton Woods institutions conditions for loans, or accept aid from donors, funding that came with strings attached.

Spurred by the west, trade liberalization was afoot, led by technocratic institutions such as GATT. Development theory suggests that Africa and other Global South countries were unable to compete with developed countries that had only recently colonized them. Africa was unsuccessful in driving favorable trade conditions, agreements and exemptions. The western prescription for economic growth entailed “reforms” including the Structural Adjustment Program (SAPs) and Washington Consensus. The result was, unsurprisingly, a steep decline, a decrease, elimination and under-investment in basic services and introduction of user fees for countries with meager per capita GDP. Predictably, social services, health and educational sectors suffered and reversed most of the progress countries had made.

Other issues that inform African countries’ foreign policy include regional economic communities (RECs). Some are holdovers from colonial institutions, while others issued from the post-colonial Brazzaville, Casablanca and Monrovia groups. Many applied the EU model to pre-colonial institutions and aspired to integrate on the basis of shared economic conditions, to pool resources and expand markets. Over time, some developed military and security cooperation: ECOWAS organized ECOMOG while IGAD, even absent a standing military apparatus, undertook the IGAD SOM mission and more loosely, EAC member states deployed troops to Somalia. Overall, economic development is a priority for African countries. This is warranted: their development indices show exceptionally high unemployment rates, an ever-growing “youth bulge” where 60% of Africa’s population is below 30. The growing importance of technology as a fourth factor of production is tied to economic development. Africa has notched some wins such as M-Pesa (mobile money platform) and Ushahidi crowdsourcing software. Applying technology to the challenges of economic development can increase the pace of development.19

Collective actions implied in Africa’s foreign policy line up with trends among the world’s major economies and regions. Africa is courted, for better or worse, by these established and by rising powers for its resources

19 UNICEF, “Levels & Trends in Child Mortality Report, 2018.” New York, 2018.
BRICs and the UE are partners with the AU, and have supported African solutions to the continent’s challenges. Its institutions have repurposed their role and expanded its structures and issues. It is leading in mitigating conflict, viz. the AMISOM mission. Outside of effects and implications of Sars-Cov-2 (COVID-19), institutions, e.g., Africa’s CDC and newly-fangled AfCFTA with a 1.4 billion market, hold promise, compliment RECs, AEC and a future political federation, perhaps fulfilling Agenda 2063, a century past colonialism.

**Research Monograph Outline**

A foreign policy for Africa remains imprecise. There are 54 sovereign nations, a few non-self-governing countries, European enclaves, disparate issues, interests and geography. Synthesizing each country’s foreign policy is attractive; still, it is undeniable that continental issues might best be addressed through the O/AU lenses. Since some of the major issues—trade, sovereignty, conflict—attract global involvement and countries’ issues sometimes overlap or appear related, an O/AU lens is prudent as are the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. As a collection of independent nations, the immediate post-independence period was obtruded into a Cold War landscape, with proxy wars often fought in Africa. Tellingly, convergence of interests with unusual, self-interested allies such as the USSR, which supported the liberation movements to spite and/or challenge the US and its allies, the Cold War had an outsized impact on Africa. Other proxy battlefields included wars, such as the Ogaden War of 1977–78, Angola, Namibia and the Congo.

The post-Cold War period, beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall and ultimately, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, led to countries and the OAU scrambling to conform with a new, less forgiving world order. The straw-man was no more, and the new hegemon, the US, intended of remaking the world in its image. Unable to play the US against any other country and with only one option, African countries danced to the tune of western global capitalism and democracy. Africa failure to secure independent global development institutions and

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20 Other scholars have studied Africa’s foreign policy, from antiquity to present (Nanjira 2010), individual countries (Mandela 1993: South Africa’s future foreign policy); and foreign policy of the Congo and South Africa (Jackson 1984), but the number of such studies is woefully small.
financing basis was now leveraged against them, and there was great
nostalgia in such institutions as the UN’s Special Fund (SUNFED).
Despite glaring inequalities and dependency of African nations, free trade
and market liberalization was a thing. Would African nations adapt to the
new boss’ whims or meet a most Jurassic Park end?

Besides identifying the major events that have occurred in Africa since
the 1950s, the book addresses theoretical explanations of Africa’s foreign
policy-making processes and whether they comport to processes else-
where; the politics of geography, new statehood, residual impacts and
implications of colonization as well as territorial integrity, the complexity
and impact of the Cold War on Africa’s most important issues (libera-
tion for all) and responses to apartheid. It considers nationalism, national
unity, dispersal of homogeneous populations across state borders and the
challenges it procures, such as separatism, secession, rebellion and state
contestation. It highlights the parallels of Regional Economic Commu-
nities (RECs) and a repurposed AU, BRICs, their foreign policy preferences
and the new ‘race’ for engagement with Africa, seeking to frame new
directions and relationships away from a capitalist-democratic world order.
Lastly, an inflection, a blueprint of Africa’s future foreign policy is
considered.

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