Physical-Layer Security with Multiuser Scheduling in Cognitive Radio Networks

Yulong Zou, Senior Member, IEEE, Xianbin Wang, Senior Member, IEEE, and Weiming Shen, Fellow, IEEE

Abstract—In this paper, we consider a cognitive radio network that consists of one cognitive base station (CBS) and multiple cognitive users (CUs) in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, where CUs transmit their data packets to CBS under a primary user’s quality of service (QoS) constraint while the eavesdroppers attempt to intercept the cognitive transmissions from CUs to CBS. We investigate the physical-layer security against eavesdropping attacks in the cognitive radio network and propose the user scheduling scheme to achieve multiuser diversity for improving the security level of cognitive communications with a primary QoS constraint. Specifically, a cognitive user (CU) that satisfies the primary QoS requirement and maximizes the achievable secrecy rate of cognitive transmissions is scheduled to transmit its data packet. For the comparison purpose, we also examine the traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes. We analyze the achievable secrecy rate of the intercept probability of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes as well as the artificial noise scheme in Rayleigh fading environments. Numerical results show that given a primary QoS constraint, the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme generally outperforms the traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes in terms of the achievable secrecy rate and intercept probability. In addition, we derive the diversity order of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme through an asymptotic intercept probability analysis and prove that the full diversity is obtained by using the proposed multiuser scheduling.

Index Terms—Physical-layer security, multiuser scheduling, cognitive radio, achievable secrecy rate, intercept probability, diversity order.

I. INTRODUCTION

Cognitive radio has been recognized as a promising technology that enables unlicensed secondary users (also known as cognitive users) to dynamically access the licensed spectrum that is assigned to but not being used by primary users (PUs) [1]-[3]. In cognitive radio, PUs have a higher priority in accessing the licensed spectrum than cognitive users (CUs). At present, there are two main cognitive radio paradigms: 1) overlay cognitive radio [4], [5], in which CUs first identify the white space of the licensed spectrum (called spectrum hole) through spectrum sensing and then utilize the detected spectrum hole for data transmission; and 2) underlay cognitive radio [6], [7], in which CUs and PUs are allowed to simultaneously access the licensed spectrum as long as the quality of service (QoS) of PUs is not affected. Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest on the cognitive radio topic which has been studied extensively from different perspectives (see [8] and references therein).

Cognitive radio security has been attracting continuously growing attention, due to the open and dynamic nature of cognitive radio architecture where various unknown wireless devices are allowed to opportunistically access the licensed spectrum, which makes cognitive radio systems vulnerable to malicious attacks. Recently, considerable research efforts have been devoted to the cognitive radio security against the primary user emulation (PUE) attack [9] and denial-of-service (DoS) attack [10]. More specifically, a PUE attacker attempts to emulate a primary user (PU) and transmits signals with the same characteristics as the PU, which constantly prevents CUs from accessing the spectrum. In contrast, a DoS attacker intentionally transmits any signals (not necessarily emulating the PU’s signal characteristics) to generate interference and disrupt the legitimate user communications. It needs to be pointed out that both the PUE and DoS attackers transmit harmful active signals which can be detected by authorized users and then prevented with certain strategies. In addition to the active PUE and DoS attackers, an eavesdropper is a passive attacker that attempts to intercept the legitimate transmissions, which is typically undetectable since the eavesdropper keeps silent without transmitting any active signals. Traditionally, the cryptographic techniques relying on secret keys have been employed to protect the communication confidentiality against eavesdropping attacks, which, however, increases the computational and communication overheads and introduces additional system complexity for the secret key distribution and management.

As an alternative, physical-layer security is now emerging as a new secure communication means to defend against eavesdroppers by exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless channels. This work was pioneered by Shannon in [11] and further extended by Wyner in [12], where a so-called secrecy capacity is developed from an information-theoretical prospective and shown as the difference between the capacity of the channel from source to destination (referred to as main link) and that of the channel from source to eavesdropper (called wiretap link). It was proved in [13] that if the ca-
capacity of the main link is less than that of the wiretap link, the eavesdropper will succeed in decoding the source signal and an intercept event occurs in this case. To improve the physical-layer security of wireless transmissions, some recent work was proposed by exploiting the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) [14]-[16] and cooperative relays [17], [18]. It was shown that the secrecy capacity significantly increases through the use of MIMO and user cooperation techniques. Notice that the aforementioned work [14]-[18] addresses the traditional non-cognitive radio networks and the physical-layer security against eavesdropping attacks is rarely investigated for cognitive radio networks. Compared to traditional wireless networks, there are some unique challenges to be addressed for the physical-layer security in cognitive radio networks, e.g., the PU’s QoS protection issue and the mitigation of mutual interference between PUs and CUs. More specifically, when applying the MIMO and user cooperation techniques for physical-layer security in cognitive radio networks, we need to consider how to avoid causing additional harmful interference to PUs. This requires certain modification of the conventional MIMO and user cooperation mechanisms for protecting the PUs’ QoS while maximizing the cognitive radio security.

In this paper, we explore the physical-layer security in a cognitive radio network consisting of one cognitive base station (CBS) and multiple cognitive users (CUs), where multiple eavesdroppers are assumed to intercept the cognitive transmissions from CUs to CBS. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. Firstly, we propose the multiuser scheduling scheme to achieve multiuser diversity for improving the cognitive transmission security against eavesdropping attacks, in which a cognitive user (CU) that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate of cognitive transmissions is scheduled for data transmission under the PU’s QoS constraint. Secondly, we examine the traditional multiuser scheduling [19], [20] and the artificial noise scheme [21], [22] for the purpose of comparison with the proposed multiuser scheduling. Also, we evaluate the security performance of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes as well as the artificial noise scheme in terms of the achievable secrecy rate and intercept probability. Finally, we conduct the diversity order analysis and show that the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme achieves the diversity order of $M$, where $M$ represents the number of CUs.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model of cognitive transmissions in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In Section III, we propose the multiuser scheduling scheme for cognitive transmissions to defend against eavesdropping attacks and analyze the achievable secrecy rate in Rayleigh fading channels. For the comparison purpose, we also present the traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes and analyze their achievable secrecy rates. Section IV conducts the intercept probability analysis of the multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes and shows the security advantage of the proposed multiuser scheduling approach over the artificial noise scheme. Next, Section V presents the diversity order analysis and proves the full diversity achieved by the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks in Section VI.

II. SYSTEM MODEL

In cognitive radio networks, CUs are allowed to access the licensed spectrum that is assigned to PUs and mutual interference typically exists between CUs and PUs. As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a cognitive radio network that consists of one CBS and $M$ CUs, e.g., an IEEE 802.22 wireless regional area network (WRAN) [2] where a CBS serves multiple customer premise equipments (CPEs) which are also known as CUs. In Fig. 1, $N$ eavesdroppers are assumed to intercept the cognitive transmissions from CUs to CBS, where all nodes are equipped with single antenna and the solid and dash lines represent the main and wiretap links, respectively. For notational convenience, $M$ CUs and $N$ eavesdroppers are denoted by $\mathcal{U} = \{U_i| i = 1, 2, \ldots, M\}$ and $\mathcal{E} = \{E_j| j = 1, 2, \ldots, N\}$, respectively. Throughout this paper, we assume the underlay cognitive radio, i.e., when PT is transmitting to PR over a spectrum band, a CU is also allowed to transmit its data to CBS over the same band at the same time as long as the PU’s QoS is not affected. In order to protect the PU’s QoS, the interference received at PR shall be guaranteed not to exceed the maximum tolerable level denoted by $I$ through limiting the transmit power of CU$_i$ ($P_i$), yielding

$$P_i = \frac{I}{|h_{ip}|^2},$$

where $h_{ip}$ represents the fading coefficient of the channel from CU$_i$ to PR. As shown in Eq. (1), for the PU’s QoS protection, the transmit power of a cognitive user becomes a random variable, which leads to some new challenges in the resultant secrecy rate and intercept probability analysis. Due to the mutual interference between primary and cognitive transmissions [3], the interference will also be received at CBS from PT. As discussed in [23] and [24], the interference caused by PT to CBS can be modeled as a Gaussian random process, since the primary signal is typically processed at CBS with non-coherent detection. Moreover, the thermal noise follows a complex Gaussian distribution, which makes the
interference plus noise at CBS become a complex normal random variable with zero mean and variance $N_b$ as denoted by $CN(0, N_b)$, where subscript $b$ denotes CBS. Similarly, the interference and noise received at an eavesdropper $E_j$ can also be modeled as a complex normal random variable with zero mean and variance $N_{e_j}$, where $E_j \in \mathcal{E}$. In the cognitive radio network, CBS is regarded as a centralized controller and its associated CUs access the licensed spectrum using an orthogonal multiple access method such as the orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) as specified in IEEE 802.22 network [2]. Considering that CU $i$ transmits its signal $x_i$ with power $\frac{I}{|h_{ip}|^2}$, the received signal at CBS is given by

$$ y_b = \sqrt{\frac{I}{|h_{ip}|^2}} h_{ib} x_i + n_b, \quad (2) $$

where $h_{ib}$ represents the fading coefficient of channel from CU $i$ to CBS and $n_b \sim CN(0, N_b)$ denotes the interference and thermal noise received at CBS. Meanwhile, due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, the eavesdroppers can overhear the transmission from CU $i$ to CBS. Following the physical-layer security literature (see [15]-[18] and references therein), we assume that the eavesdroppers are aware of all the parameters of the cognitive transmission from CU $i$ to CBS including the carrier frequency, spectrum bandwidth, coding and modulation scheme, encryption algorithm, and so on, except that the source signal $x_i$ is confidential. Hence, the received signal at eavesdropper $E_j$ is given by

$$ y_{e_j} = \sqrt{\frac{I}{|h_{ip}|^2}} h_{ie_j} x_i + n_{e_j}, \quad (3) $$

where $h_{ie_j}$ represents the fading coefficient of the channel from CU $i$ to $E_j$ and $n_{e_j} \sim CN(0, N_{e_j})$ denotes the interference and thermal noise received at eavesdropper $E_j$. In this paper, we assume that $N$ eavesdroppers independently perform their tasks to intercept the cognitive transmission. If none of $N$ eavesdroppers succeeds in decoding the source signal, the cognitive transmission from CU $i$ to CBS is secure; otherwise, the cognitive transmission is not secure and an intercept event is considered to occur in this case. Both the main and wiretap links as shown in Fig. 1 are modeled as Rayleigh fading channels, i.e., $|h_{ip}|^2$, $|h_{ib}|^2$ and $|h_{ie_j}|^2$ follow exponential distributions with means $\sigma_{ip}^2$, $\sigma_{ib}^2$ and $\sigma_{ie_j}^2$, respectively. Although only Rayleigh fading channels are considered throughout this paper, similar performance analysis and results can be obtained for other wireless fading models (e.g., Nakagami fading) with path loss and shadowing. In addition, we assume that the global channel state information (CSI) of both the main links and wiretap links is available in performing the multiuser scheduling, which is a common assumption in the physical-layer security literature (e.g., [25] and [26]). Notice that studying the case of the global CSI available can provide a theoretical performance upper bound on the achievable secrecy rate of cognitive transmissions. We will also examine the traditional multiuser scheduling scheme that does not need the eavesdroppers’ CSI.

III. PROPOSED MULTIUSER SCHEDULING AND ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS

In this section, we propose the multiuser scheduling scheme to improve the physical-layer security of cognitive transmission and analyze its achievable secrecy rate. For the comparison purpose, the traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise approaches are also presented as benchmark schemes. Numerical secrecy rate results are provided to show the physical-layer security improvement by exploiting the multiuser scheduling.

A. Proposed Multiuser Scheduling Scheme

This subsection presents the multiuser scheduling scheme to defend against eavesdropping attacks. Given a spectrum band available for the cognitive transmission, a CU among $M$ CUs should be selected and scheduled for its data transmission to CBS. Without loss of generality, consider that CU $i$ is scheduled to transmit its signal $x_i$ to CBS. Assuming the optimal Gaussian codebook used at CU $i$ and using Eq. (2), we can obtain the achievable rate at CBS as

$$ R_b(i) = \log_2(1 + \frac{|h_{ib}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b}), \quad (4) $$

where $U_i \in \mathcal{U}$. Meanwhile, from Eq. (3), the achievable rate at eavesdropper $E_j$ from CU $i$ is given by

$$ R_{e_j}(i) = \log_2(1 + \frac{|h_{ie_j}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_{e_j}}), \quad (5) $$

where $E_j \in \mathcal{E}$. Considering that $N$ eavesdroppers independently perform their interception tasks, the overall rate of the wiretap links is the maximum of individual rates achieved at $N$ eavesdroppers. Thus, the overall rate $R_e(i)$ is the highest one among $R_{e_j}(i)$ for $E_j \in \mathcal{E}$, yielding

$$ R_e(i) = \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} R_{e_j}(i) = \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \log_2(1 + \frac{|h_{ie_j}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_{e_j}}), \quad (6) $$

As discussed in [13] and [14], the achievable secrecy rate is shown as the difference between the capacities of the main link and the wiretap link. Therefore, from Eqs. (4) and (6), the achievable secrecy rate of cognitive transmission from CU $i$ to CBS in the presence of $N$ eavesdroppers is obtained as

$$ R_s(i) = \left[R_b(i) - \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} R_{e_j}(i)\right]^+, \quad (7) $$

where subscript $s$ denotes ‘secrecy’ and $|x|^+ = \max(x, 0)$. In general, a CU with the highest achievable secrecy rate should be selected as the optimal user and scheduled for data transmission. Hence, from Eq. (7), the user scheduling criterion can be given by

$$ \text{OptimalUser} = \arg \max_{i \in \mathcal{U}} \left[C_b(i) - \max_{j \in \mathcal{E}} C_{e_j}(i)\right] $$

$$ = \arg \max_{i \in \mathcal{U}} \left[\log_2(1 + \frac{|h_{ib}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b}) - \log_2(1 + \max_{j \in \mathcal{E}} \frac{|h_{ie_j}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_{e_j}})\right], \quad (8) $$
where \( \mathcal{U} \) represents the set of \( M \) CUs. One can observe from Eq. (8) that not only the channel state information (CSI) of main link \( h_{ib} \), but also the wiretap link’s CSI \( h_{ie} \) is considered in performing the multiuser scheduling. Thus, from Eq. (8), the achievable secrecy rate of proposed multiuser scheduling scheme with \( M \) CUs in the presence of \( N \) eavesdroppers is given by

\[
R_s^P = \max_{i \in \mathcal{U}} \left[ \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{I|h_{ib}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b} \right) \right] + \log_2 \left( 1 + \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \frac{I|h_{ie}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_e} \right),
\]

(9)

where superscript \( P \) denotes ‘proposed’. Notice that random variables \( |h_{ib}|^2, |h_{ip}|^2 \) and \( |h_{ie}|^2 \) follow exponential distributions with means \( \sigma_{ib}^2, \sigma_{ip}^2 \) and \( \sigma_{ie}^2 \), respectively. For notational convenience, \( \sigma_{ib}^2, \sigma_{ip}^2, \sigma_{ie}^2 \) are, respectively, denoted by \( \theta_{ib} \sigma_m^2, \theta_{ip} \sigma_m^2, \theta_{ie} \sigma_m^2 \), where \( \sigma_m^2 \) represents the reference channel gains of the main link and the wiretap link, respectively. Moreover, let \( \lambda_{me} = \sigma_m^2 / \sigma_e^2 \) denote the ratio of \( \sigma_m^2 \) to \( \sigma_e^2 \), which is referred to as the main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER) throughout this paper. Denoting \( x_i = |h_{ib}|^2, y_i = |h_{ip}|^2 \) and \( z_{ij} = |h_{ie}|^2 \), we can easily obtain an ergodic secrecy rate of cognitive transmission from Eq. (9) as

\[
\tilde{C}_s^P = \prod_{i=1}^{M} \prod_{j=1}^{N} \frac{1}{\sigma_{ib}^2 \sigma_{ip}^2 \sigma_{ie}^2} \frac{1}{\sigma_m^2} \prod_{j=1}^{N} \frac{1}{\sigma_{ie}^2} x_i y_i z_{ij},
\]

(10)

where \( x_i > 0, y_i > 0, \) and \( z_{ij} > 0 \). It needs to be pointed out that obtaining a closed-form solution to the high dimensional integral in Eq. (10) is challenging, however the ergodic secrecy rate of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme can be numerically determined through computer simulations.

### B. Traditional Multiuser Scheduling Scheme

In this subsection, we present the traditional multiuser scheduling scheme [19] as a benchmark scheme, where the main objective is to maximize the achievable data rate at the desired destination CBS without considering eavesdropping attacks. Thus, in the traditional multiuser scheduling, a CU that maximizes the achievable rate at CBS is viewed as the optimal user among \( M \) CUs. Using Eq. (4), the traditional multiuser scheduling criterion can be written as

\[
\text{OptimalUser} = \arg \max_{U_i \in \mathcal{U}} R_b(i) = \arg \max_{U_i \in \mathcal{U}} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{I|h_{ib}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b} \right),
\]

(11)

from which the overall achievable rate at CBS using the traditional multiuser scheduling scheme with \( M \) CUs is given by

\[
R_b = \max_{U_i \in \mathcal{U}} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{I|h_{ib}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b} \right),
\]

(12)

For notational convenience, let ‘o’ denote the optimal CU that is selected by the traditional multiuser scheduling scheme. Similarly to Eq. (6), the overall achievable rate at \( N \) eavesdroppers from the optimal CU is obtained as

\[
R_e = \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{I|h_{ie}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_e} \right),
\]

(13)

where subscript ‘o’ denotes the optimal CU. Combining Eqs. (12) and (13), the achievable secrecy rate of the traditional multiuser scheduling scheme is given by

\[
R_s^T = \max_{U_i \in \mathcal{U}} \left[ \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{I|h_{ib}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b} \right) - \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{I|h_{ie}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_e} \right) \right] + \log_2 \left( 1 + \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \frac{I|h_{ie}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_e} \right),
\]

(14)

where superscript \( T \) denotes ‘traditional’. Similarly to Eq. (10), the ergodic secrecy rate of traditional multiuser scheduling scheme can be obtained from Eq. (14) as

\[
\tilde{C}_s^T = \prod_{i=1}^{M} \prod_{j=1}^{N} \frac{1}{\sigma_{ib}^2 \sigma_{ip}^2} \frac{1}{\sigma_{ie}^2} \prod_{j=1}^{N} \frac{1}{\sigma_m^2} \frac{1}{\sigma_e^2} x_i y_i z_{ij},
\]

(15)

where \( x_i, y_i, z_{ij} > 0 \) and \( R_s^T \) is given by Eq. (14).

### C. Conventional Artificial Noise Scheme

This subsection presents the conventional artificial noise scheme [21],[22] for the purpose of comparison with the user scheduling approaches. The reasons for choosing the artificial noise scheme for comparison are twofold: (1) The artificial noise scheme is one of the most commonly used methods for the wireless physical-layer security, which is often adopted as the basis of comparison; (2) Although there are some different anti-eavesdropping techniques (e.g., the artificial noise scheme [21],[22], cooperative beamforming [27], resource allocation [28], etc.), they each have their respective but complementary advantages. Thus, for simplicity, we only consider the artificial noise approach as the benchmark scheme. In the artificial noise scheme, CUs are enabled to generate interfering signals (called artificial noise) intelligently so that only the eavesdroppers are adversely affected by the interfering signals while the intended CBS is unaffected. It has been shown in [21] that such artificial noise can be designed to interfere with the eavesdroppers only without affecting the legitimate receiver, if and only if the number of antennas at the legitimate transmitter is more than the number of antennas at the legitimate receiver. Since all nodes as shown in Fig. 1 are equipped with single antenna, we consider that \( M \) CUs collaborate with each other and share their antennas to form a virtual transmit antenna array, which guarantees that the number of transmit antennas is larger than the number of receive antennas at CBS for \( M \geq 2 \). Without loss of generality, we denote the desired signal by \( x \) which will be transmitted to CBS through the virtual transmit antenna.
array. Meanwhile, the artificial noise vector is denoted by \( \mathbf{w} = (w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_i, \ldots, w_M) \), where \( w_i \) is to be transmitted by CU. Notice that in the artificial noise scheme, certain transmit power should be allocated to produce artificial noise. The simple equal power allocation between the desired signal and the artificial noise is shown as a near-optimal and effective strategy \([21]\), which is used throughout this paper. Hence, considering that \( M \) CUs simultaneously transmit the desired signal \( x \) and the artificial noise vector \( \mathbf{w} \), the received signal at CBS can be expressed as

\[
y_b = \sum_{i=1}^{M} \sqrt{\frac{P_i}{2}} h_{ib} x + \sum_{i=1}^{M} \sqrt{\frac{P_i}{2}} h_{ib} w_i + n_b,
\]

(16)

where \( P_i \) is the transmit power at CU, and \( n_b \) is the AWGN with zero mean and variance \( N_b \). Since all CUs transmit simultaneously, the total transmit power at CUs shall be constrained to limit the interference received at PR. Given the maximum tolerable interference \( I \) at PR and \( M \) CUs simultaneously transmitting the desired signal and artificial noise, the interference received at PU from each CU is limited by \( \frac{I}{M} \) for equal allocation. Thus, the transmit power at CU, \( P_i \), is given by

\[
P_i = \frac{I}{M|\mathbf{h}_{ip}|^2}, \tag{17}
\]

where \( h_{ip} \) represents the fading coefficient of the channel from CU to PU. Moreover, the artificial noise vector \( \mathbf{w} \) should be designed to interfere with the eavesdroppers without affecting the intended CBS, implying

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{M} \sqrt{\frac{P_i}{2}} h_{ib} w_i = 0, \tag{18}
\]

for \( \mathbf{w} \neq 0 \). The artificial noise requirement as specified in Eq. (18) can be easily satisfied when the number of CUs \( M \geq 2 \). Substituting Eqs. (17) and (18) into Eq. (16), we can obtain the achievable rate at CBS as

\[
R_b = \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{I}{2M N_b} \left| \sum_{i=1}^{M} h_{ib} \right|^2 \right), \tag{19}
\]

Meanwhile, the received signal at eavesdropper \( E_j \) is written as

\[
y_{ej} = \sum_{i=1}^{M} \sqrt{\frac{P_i}{2}} h_{ie_j} x + \sum_{i=1}^{M} \sqrt{\frac{P_i}{2}} h_{ie_j} w_i + n_{ej}, \tag{20}
\]

where \( n_{ej} \) is a zero-mean AWGN noise of variance \( N_{ej} \) received at \( E_j \). Since the wiretap channels \( h_{ie_j} \) are independent of the main channels \( h_{ib} \), the artificial noise satisfying Eq. (18) will result in harmful interference at the eavesdropper \( E_j \), i.e.,

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{M} \sqrt{\frac{P_i}{2}} h_{ie_j} w_i \neq 0. \nonumber
\]

Hence, the achievable rate at \( E_j \) can be given by

\[
R_{ej} = \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{I}{2M N_{ej}} \left| \sum_{i=1}^{M} h_{ie_j} \right|^2 \right), \tag{21}
\]

from which the overall achievable rate at \( N \) eavesdroppers is given by the highest one among \( R_{ej} \) for \( 1 \leq j \leq N \), yielding

\[
R_e = \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} R_{ej} = \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{I}{2M N_{ej}} \left| \sum_{i=1}^{M} h_{ie_j} \right|^2 / \left( I \left| \sum_{i=1}^{M} h_{ie_j} \right|^2 + 2M N_{ej} \right) \right) \tag{22}
\]

Combining Eqs. (19) and (22), the achievable secrecy rate of the artificial noise scheme is given by

\[
R_s^A = \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{I}{2M N_{ej}} \left| \sum_{i=1}^{M} h_{ie_j} \right|^2 / \left( I \left| \sum_{i=1}^{M} h_{ie_j} \right|^2 + 2M N_{ej} \right) \right) \tag{23}
\]

where superscript \( A \) stands for ‘artificial noise’. A closed-form expression of the ergodic secrecy rate for the artificial noise scheme can be derived by averaging out the random variables \( h_{ib}, h_{ie_j} \) and \( h_{ip} \) in Eq. (23), which is challenging and cumbersome. Nevertheless, given the parameters \( M, N, I, N_b, \) \( N_{ej} \), \( h_{ib}^2 \), \( h_{ie_j}^2 \) and \( h_{ip}^2 \), the ergodic secrecy rate may be readily determined through computer simulations. So far, we have completed the achievable secrecy rate analysis of the multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes. The following presents numerical secrecy rate results to show the advantage of the proposed multiuser scheduling over the traditional user scheduling and the artificial noise schemes.

\[\text{D. Numerical Secrecy Rate Results}\]

This subsection presents the numerical secrecy rate results of the traditional multiuser scheduling, the artificial noise scheme and the proposed multiuser scheduling. Fig. 2 shows the achievable secrecy rate comparison among the single user
transmission, the artificial noise scheme and the multiuser scheduling approaches by using Eqs. (10), (15) and (23). It is observed from Fig. 2 that in low MER region, the artificial noise scheme performs better than both the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling approaches. As MER increases beyond a critical value, the artificial noise scheme becomes worse than the multiuser scheduling approaches, even worse than the single user case in high MER region. This is because that with an increasing MER, the wiretap link becomes much weaker than the main link and the eavesdroppers will most likely fail to intercept the legitimate transmissions. Therefore, as MER increases, the eavesdroppers’ channel conditions become worse and worse and thus it is unnecessary to generate the artificial noise to confuse the eavesdroppers in high MER region. However, the artificial noise scheme wastes some power resources for producing the artificial noise, which makes its achievable secrecy rate become lower than that of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme in high MER region. In addition, one can see from Fig. 2 that the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed multiuser scheduling is strictly higher than that of the traditional multiuser scheduling across the whole MER region, showing the advantage of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme. Moreover, as MER increases, the achievable secrecy rate improvement of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme over the traditional multiuser scheduling becomes less notable. This is due to the fact that for sufficiently large MERs, the wiretap link is negligible as compared with the main link and thus the achievable secrecy rate at CBS through the main link dominates the achievable secrecy rates of Eqs. (9) and (14), leading to the convergence of the achievable secrecy rates between the proposed and traditional multiuser scheduling schemes.

In Fig. 3, we show the achievable secrecy rate versus MER of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes as well as the artificial noise approach for different number of eavesdroppers $N$ with $M = 4$ and $I = N_b = N_{e_j} = 0$dBm. As shown in Fig. 3, for both cases of $N = 2$ and $N = 8$, the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes initially have lower secrecy rate than the artificial noise scheme in low MER region. As MER continues increasing beyond a certain value, the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes finally outperform the artificial noise scheme in terms of the achievable secrecy rate. Fig. 3 also demonstrates that as the number of eavesdroppers increases from $N = 2$ to $N = 8$, the achievable secrecy rates of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes are significantly reduced. In contrast, the achievable secrecy rate of the artificial noise scheme decreases non-significantly. This is because that the artificial noise scheme generates significant interferences against eavesdropping attacks, which makes its achievable secrecy rate robust to the eavesdroppers’ channel conditions. In addition, one can see from Fig. 3 that the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme always performs better than the traditional multiuser scheduling in terms of the achievable secrecy rate, which further confirms the advantage of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme.

Fig. 4 shows the achievable secrecy rate versus MER of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes as well as the artificial noise approach for different number of CUs $M$ with $N = 2$ and $I = N_b = N_{e_j} = 0$dBm. One can observe from Fig. 4 that for both cases of $M = 2$ and $M = 8$, the achievable secrecy rates of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes are lower than that of the artificial noise scheme in low MER region. However, when MER is larger than a certain value and continues increasing, the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes significantly outperform the artificial noise scheme in terms of the achievable secrecy rate. It can also be seen from Fig. 4 that as the number of CUs increases from $M = 2$ to $M = 8$, the achievable secrecy rates of both the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes increase significantly. Although the secrecy rate of the traditional multiuser scheduling is lower than that of the proposed multiuser scheduling, its secrecy rate also improves as the number of CUs increases from $M = 2$.
to $M = 8$, showing the security enhancement of exploiting multiuser scheduling even when the eavesdroppers’ CSI is unavailable. Therefore, if the eavesdroppers’ CSI is unknown, we can consider the use of traditional multiuser scheduling scheme that does not require the eavesdroppers’ CSI. If the eavesdroppers’ CSI becomes available, the proposed multiuser scheduling would be a better choice.

IV. INTERCEPT PROBABILITY ANALYSIS OVER RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS

In this section, we analyze the intercept probability of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes as well as the artificial noise scheme over Rayleigh fading channels. We also provide numerical results on the intercept probability to show the advantage of proposed multiuser scheduling scheme over the traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes.

A. Proposed Multiuser Scheduling Scheme

This subsection presents the intercept probability analysis of proposed multiuser scheduling scheme. As discussed in [12] and [13], an intercept event occurs when the achievable secrecy rate of the main link becomes less than that of the wiretap link. Thus, from Eq. (9), we can obtain an intercept probability of the cognitive transmission with the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme as Eq. (24) at the top of the following page. Notice that random variables $|h_{ib}|^2$, $|h_{ip}|^2$ and $|h_{ie}|^2$ are independent of each other for different CUs. Thus, the intercept probability of proposed multiuser scheduling scheme can be computed from Eq. (24) as

$$P_{int}^P = \prod_{i=1}^{M} \Pr \left( \frac{|h_{ib}|^2}{N_b} < \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}_j} \frac{|h_{ie}|^2}{N_e_j} \right),$$

(25)

where $M$ is the number of CUs. Considering that $|h_{ib}|^2$ and $|h_{ie}|^2$ are independent exponentially distributed random variables with respective means $\sigma_{ib}^2$ and $\sigma_{ie}^2$, and letting $x = \frac{|h_{ib}|^2}{N_b}$, we can obtain

$$\Pr \left( \frac{|h_{ib}|^2}{N_b} < \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}_j} \frac{|h_{ie}|^2}{N_e_j} \right) = 1 - \Pr \left( \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}_j} \frac{|h_{ie}|^2}{N_e_j} < x \frac{N_e_j}{N_b} \right)$$

$$= 1 - \int_{0}^{\infty} \prod_{j=1}^{N} \left[ 1 - \exp \left( - \frac{N_e_j x}{N_b \sigma_{ie}^2} \right) \right] \frac{1}{\sigma_{ib}} \exp \left( - \frac{x}{\sigma_{ib}} \right) dx,$$

(26)

where $N$ is the number of eavesdroppers. Using the binomial theorem, we can expand term $\prod_{j=1}^{N} \left[ 1 - \exp \left( - \frac{N_e_j x}{N_b \sigma_{ie}^2} \right) \right]$ as

$$\prod_{j=1}^{N} \left[ 1 - \exp \left( - \frac{N_e_j x}{N_b \sigma_{ie}^2} \right) \right] = 1 + \sum_{n=1}^{2^N - 1} (-1)^{|E_n|} \exp \left( - \sum_{E_j \in E_n} \frac{N_e_j x}{N_b \sigma_{ie}^2} \right),$$

(27)

where $\mathcal{E}_n$ is the $n$-th non-empty subcollection of $N$ eavesdroppers and $|\mathcal{E}_n|$ represents the cardinality of set $\mathcal{E}_n$. Substituting Eq. (27) into Eq. (26) and performing the integration yield

$$\Pr \left( \frac{|h_{ib}|^2}{N_b} < \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}_j} \frac{|h_{ie}|^2}{N_e_j} \right) = \sum_{n=1}^{2^N - 1} (-1)^{|E_n| + 1} \left( 1 + \sum_{E_j \in E_n} \frac{N_e_j \sigma_{ie}^2}{N_b \sigma_{ie}^2} \right)^{-1}.$$  

(28)

Combining Eqs. (25) and (28), we obtain a closed-form expression of the intercept probability for the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme as

$$P_{int}^P = \prod_{i=1}^{M} \left[ \sum_{n=1}^{2^N - 1} (-1)^{|E_n| + 1} \left( 1 + \sum_{E_j \in E_n} \frac{N_e_j \sigma_{ie}^2}{N_b \sigma_{ie}^2} \right)^{-1} \right].$$

(29)

Denoting $\sigma_{ib}^2 = \theta_{ib} \sigma_{n}^2$, $\sigma_{ie}^2 = \theta_{ie} \sigma_{e}^2$, and $\lambda_{me} = \sigma_{m}^2 / \sigma_{e}^2$, the preceding equation can be rewritten as

$$P_{int}^P = \prod_{i=1}^{M} \left[ \sum_{n=1}^{2^N - 1} (-1)^{|E_n| + 1} \left( 1 + \sum_{E_j \in E_n} \frac{N_e_j \theta_{ib}}{N_b \theta_{ie} \lambda_{me}} \right)^{-1} \right].$$

(30)

where $\lambda_{me} = \sigma_{m}^2 / \sigma_{e}^2$ is called main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER) throughout this paper.

B. Traditional Multiuser Scheduling Scheme

In this subsection, we analyze the intercept probability of traditional multiuser scheduling scheme for the comparison purpose. From Eqs. (12) and (13), an intercept probability of the cognitive transmission relying on the traditional multiuser scheduling scheme is given by

$$P_{int}^T = \Pr (R_b < R_e) = \Pr \left[ \max_{U_i \in \mathcal{U}} \frac{|h_{ib}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b} \frac{N_b}{|h_{ie}|^2} \right] \left( 1 + \frac{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b}{|h_{ie}|^2} \right),$$

(31)

which can be further simplified to

$$P_{int}^T = \Pr \left[ \max_{U_i \in \mathcal{U}} \frac{|h_{ib}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b} < \frac{\lambda_{me}}{N_e_j} \right].$$

(32)

Although obtaining a general closed-form solution to Eq. (32) for any $M$ and $N$ is difficult, numerical intercept probabilities of the traditional multiuser scheduling scheme can be easily determined through computer simulations. For illustration purposes, the following presents the intercept probability analysis for a special case with the single CU (i.e., $M = 1$). Substituting $M = 1$ into Eq. (32) gives

$$P_{int}^T = \Pr \left[ \frac{|h_{ib}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b} < \max_{E_j \in E_n} \frac{|h_{ie}|^2}{N_e_j} \right]$$

$$= 1 - \Pr \left[ \frac{|h_{ib}|^2}{N_b} > \frac{|h_{ie}|^2}{N_e_j} \right].$$

(33)

Notice that random variables $|h_{ib}|^2$ and $|h_{ie}|^2$ follow exponential distributions with respective means $\sigma_{ib}^2$ and $\sigma_{ie}^2$ and...
are independent of each other. Denoting \( x = |h_{ib}|^2 \), we can obtain

\[
P_{\text{int}}^T = \Pr \left\{ \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \left[ \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{I|h_{ib}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b} \right) - \log_2 \left( 1 + \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \frac{|h_{ie_j}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_{e_j}} \right) \right] < 0 \right\} ,
\]

for \( M = 1 \), where the last equation is obtained by using the binomial expansion formula, \( \mathcal{E}_n \) is the \( n \)-th non-empty subcollection of \( N \) eavesdroppers, and \( |\mathcal{E}_n| \) represents the cardinality of set \( \mathcal{E}_n \).

\[ (34) \]

C. Conventional Artificial Noise Scheme

This subsection presents the intercept probability analysis of the artificial noise scheme. Using Eq. (23), we obtain the intercept probability of the artificial noise scheme as

\[
P_{\text{int}}^A = \Pr \left\{ \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \left[ \frac{I}{2M N_b} \sum_{i=1}^{M} |h_{ib}|^2 \right] < \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \left[ \frac{I}{2M N_{e_j}} \sum_{i=1}^{M} |h_{ie_j}|^2 \right] \right\} ,
\]

which can be used to compute the numerical intercept probability of the artificial noise scheme. Moreover, using inequality

\[ I \sum_{i=1}^{M} |h_{ib}|^2 + 2MN_{e_j} > 2MN_{e_j} \]

on the intercept probability \( P_{\text{int}}^A \) as

\[
P_{\text{int}}^A < \Pr \left\{ \frac{I}{2M N_b} \sum_{i=1}^{M} |h_{ib}|^2 < \frac{I}{2M N_{e_j}} \sum_{i=1}^{M} |h_{ie_j}|^2 \right\} \]

\[ (36) \]

Considering a special case of \( M = 1 \), we can simplify Eq. (36) as

\[
P_{\text{int}}^A < \Pr \left\{ \frac{|h_{ib}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b} < \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \frac{|h_{ie_j}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_{e_j}} \right\} .
\]

\[ (37) \]

Substituting \( P_{\text{int}}^T = \Pr \left\{ \frac{|h_{ib}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_b} < \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \frac{|h_{ie_j}|^2}{|h_{ip}|^2 N_{e_j}} \right\} \) from Eq. (33) into Eq. (37) yields

\[
P_{\text{int}}^A < P_{\text{int}}^T ,
\]

for \( M = 1 \). This theoretically proves the intercept probability of the artificial noise scheme is strictly lower than that of the traditional user scheduling scheme for \( M = 1 \). In what follows, we show the numerical intercept probabilities of the traditional and proposed user scheduling schemes as well as the artificial noise approach.

D. Numerical Intercept Probability Results

This subsection presents the numerical results on intercept probability of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes as well as the artificial noise scheme. In Fig. 5, we show the intercept probability versus MER of the multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes with \( M = N = 4 \) and \( I = N_b = N_{e_j} = 0 \) dBm, \( \sigma^2_{ib} = \sigma^2_{ip} = 1 \), and \( \theta_{ib} = \theta_{ie_j} = 1 \).

Fig. 5. Intercept probability versus MER of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes as well as the artificial noise scheme. In Fig. 5, we show the intercept probability versus MER of the multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes with \( M = N = 4 \) and \( I = N_b = N_{e_j} = 0 \) dBm. It is seen from Fig. 5 that the intercept probability of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme is smaller than that of the traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes, showing the advantage of the proposed multiuser scheduling over the conventional approaches. Fig. 5 also shows that the artificial noise scheme has lower intercept probability than the traditional multiuser scheduling scheme, which confirms the result of Eq. (38). In addition, Fig. 5 demonstrates that the slope of intercept probability curve of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme in high MER region is much steeper that that of the traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes. This means that with an increasing MER, the intercept probability of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme is reduced at much higher speed than that of the traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes.

Fig. 6 shows the intercept probability versus MER of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes for different number of CUs \( M \) with \( N = 4 \), where \( M = 4 \),
M = 6 and M = 8 are considered for illustration. As shown in Fig. 6, for all cases of M = 4, M = 6 and M = 8, the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme significantly outperforms the traditional scheme in terms of intercept probability, especially in high MER region. Also, as the number of CUs increases from M = 4 to M = 8, the intercept probabilities of the proposed and traditional multiuser scheduling schemes are reduced significantly. Therefore, increasing the number of CUs can effectively improve the security performance of cognitive transmission. This confirms the security benefits by exploiting the multiuser scheduling to defend against eavesdropping attacks in cognitive radio networks.

V. DIVERSITY ORDER ANALYSIS

In this section, we analyze the diversity order of proposed multiuser scheduling scheme to provide an insight into the impact of the number of CUs on the intercept probability performance of cognitive transmission in the presence of N eavesdroppers. First, let us recall the definition of traditional diversity order used to evaluate the wireless transmission reliability performance in [29], which is given by

\[
d = - \lim_{\text{SNR} \to \infty} \frac{\log P_e(\text{SNR})}{\log \text{SNR}},
\]

where SNR stands for signal-to-noise ratio and \( P_e(\text{SNR}) \) represents bit error rate (BER). In the geometric sense, the traditional diversity order is to characterize the slope of BER curve as SNR tends to infinity. However, in the presence of eavesdropping attacks, the intercept probability is used to evaluate the wireless security of cognitive transmission. Moreover, it is observed from Eq. (30) that the intercept probability is independent of signal power, which makes the traditional diversity order definition become inapplicable to the cognitive transmission scenario with multiple eavesdroppers. Considering the fact that MER is a dominant factor in determining the intercept probability of cognitive transmission, we define a so-called security diversity as an asymptotic ratio of the logarithmic intercept probability to logarithmic MER \( \lambda_{me} \) with \( \lambda_{me} \to \infty \). Accordingly, the diversity order of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme is given by

\[
d = - \lim_{\lambda_{me} \to \infty} \frac{\log P_{\text{int}}^P}{\log \lambda_{me}},
\]

where \( P_{\text{int}}^P \) represents the intercept probability of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme. Letting \( X = \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} |h_{ie_j}|^2 \) wherein random variables \( |h_{ie_j}|^2 \) follow independent exponential distributions with respective means \( \sigma_{ie_j}^2 \), we obtain the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X as

\[
\begin{align*}
P_X(x) &= \Pr (X < x) \\
&= \Pr \left( \max_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}} \frac{|h_{ie_j}|^2}{N_{e_j}} < x \right) \\
&= \prod_{j=1}^N \left[ 1 - \exp\left( - \frac{N_{e_j}x}{\sigma_{ie_j}^2} \right) \right],
\end{align*}
\]

which can be rewritten as

\[
P_X(x) = 1 + \sum_{n=1}^{2^N-1} (-1)^{|\mathcal{E}_n|} \exp\left( - \sum_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}_n} \frac{N_{e_j}x}{\sigma_{ie_j}^2} \right),
\]

where \( \mathcal{E}_n \) is the n-th non-empty subcollection of N eavesdroppers and \( |\mathcal{E}_n| \) represents the cardinality of set \( \mathcal{E}_n \). From Eq. (42), the probability density function (PDF) of X is given by

\[
p_X(x) = \sum_{n=1}^{2^N-1} (-1)^{|\mathcal{E}_n|+1} \sum_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}_n} \exp\left( - \sum_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}_n} \frac{N_{e_j}x}{\sigma_{ie_j}^2} \right).
\]

Hence, using Eqs. (25) and (43), we can obtain \( P_{\text{int}}^P \) as

\[
P_{\text{int}}^P = \prod_{i=1}^M \Pr \left( \frac{|h_{ie_j}|^2}{N_b} < X \right) = \prod_{i=1}^M \int_0^\infty \left[ 1 - \exp\left( - \frac{N_{e_j}x}{\sigma_{ib}^2} \right) \right] p_X(x) dx.
\]

Letting \( \lambda_{me} \to \infty \) and using Appendix A, we have

\[
1 - \exp\left( - \frac{N_{e_j}x}{\sigma_{ib}^2} \right) = \frac{N_{e_j}x}{\sigma_{ib}^2} + O\left( \frac{1}{\lambda_{me}} \right),
\]

where \( O\left( \frac{1}{\lambda_{me}} \right) \) represents high-order infinitesimals. Hence, substituting Eqs. (43) and (45) into Eq. (44) and ignoring the high-order terms yield

\[
P_{\text{int}}^P = \prod_{i=1}^M \left[ \sum_{n=1}^{2^N-1} (-1)^{|\mathcal{E}_n|+1} \int_0^\infty \exp\left( - \sum_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}_n} \frac{N_{e_j}x}{\sigma_{ie_j}^2} \right) dx \right]
\]

\[
= \prod_{i=1}^M \left[ \sum_{n=1}^{2^N-1} (-1)^{|\mathcal{E}_n|+1} \left( \sum_{E_j \in \mathcal{E}_n} \frac{N_{e_j} \sigma_{ib}^2}{N_b \sigma_{ie_j}^2} \right) \right],
\]

Fig. 6. Intercept probability versus MER of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes for different number of CUs M with N = 4, I = N_b = N_{e_j} = 0dBm, \( \sigma_{ie_j}^2 = \sigma_{ib}^2 = 1 \), and \( \theta_{ib} = \theta_{ie_j} = 1 \).
for $\lambda_{me} \to \infty$. Denoting $\sigma^2_{ib} = \theta_{ib} \sigma^2_{m}$ and $\sigma^2_{ie_j} = \theta_{ie_j} \sigma^2_{e}$ and letting $\lambda_{me} \to \infty$, we can rewrite $P_{\text{int}}^P$ from Eq. (46) as

$$P_{\text{int}}^P = \prod_{i=1}^{M} \left[ \sum_{n=1}^{2^{N-1}} (-1)^{|E_n|+1} \left( \sum_{E_j \in E_n} \frac{N_{e_j} \theta_{ib}}{N_{b} \theta_{ie_j}} \right)^{-1} \right] \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_{me}} \right)^M. \tag{47}$$

One can observe from Eq. (47) that the intercept probability of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme behaves as $(\frac{1}{\lambda_{me}})^M$ for $\lambda_{me} \to \infty$. Substituting Eq. (47) into Eq. (40) yields

$$d = M, \tag{48}$$

which shows that the diversity order is the same as the number of CUs, implying the full diversity achieved by the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme. One can also see from Eq. (48) that the diversity order is independent of the number of eavesdroppers, i.e., the security diversity of proposed multiuser scheduling scheme is insusceptible to the number of eavesdroppers. To be specific, although increasing the number of eavesdroppers would definitely degrade the intercept probability performance, it won’t affect the speed at which the intercept probability decreases as $\lambda_{me} \to \infty$. In contrast, as the number of CUs increases, the slope of intercept probability curve of the proposed multiuser scheduling becomes steeper as $\lambda_{me} \to \infty$ in the geometric sense. In other words, as $\lambda_{me} \to \infty$, the intercept probability of proposed multiuser scheduling scheme decreases at faster speed with an increasing number of CUs. Therefore, exploiting multiuser scheduling can effectively improve the physical-layer security of cognitive transmission to defend against eavesdropping attacks.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have explored the physical-layer security of cognitive transmissions in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers and proposed the multiuser scheduling scheme to improve the cognitive transmission security against eavesdropping attacks. For the comparison purpose, we have studied the traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise approach as benchmark schemes. We have analyzed the achievable secrecy rates of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes as well as the artificial noise scheme with a maximum tolerable interference constraint for the primary QoS protection. It has been shown that given a primary QoS constraint, the achievable secrecy rates of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes are smaller than that of the artificial noise scheme in low MER region. As MER increases beyond a critical value, both the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes have higher achievable secrecy rates than the artificial noise scheme. Moreover, the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme always outperforms the traditional multiuser scheduling in terms of the achievable secrecy rate. We have also derived the closed-form intercept probability expressions of the multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes and demonstrated that the intercept performance of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme is better than that of the traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes. In addition, we have examined the diversity order performance through an asymptotic intercept probability analysis and shown that the full diversity is achieved by the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme, showing the advantage of exploiting multiuser scheduling for enhancing the cognitive transmission security against eavesdropping attacks.

It is worth mentioning that in this paper, we have not considered user fairness in the multiuser scheduling for improving the cognitive radio security against eavesdropping attacks. For example, if a cognitive user experiences severe propagation loss in a shadow fading environment, it will be rarely scheduled for accessing the channel by using the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme, causing a long channel access delay. It is thus of high practical interest to extend the results of this paper e.g. using the QoS guaranteed user scheduling (e.g., the proportional fair scheduling [30]). More specifically, user fairness should be further considered in the QoS guaranteed scheduling, attempting to maximize the achievable secrecy rate while at the same time guaranteeing each user with certain opportunities to access the channel. We will leave the above interesting problem for our future work.

APPENDIX A

PROOF OF EQ. (45)

For notational convenience, we denote $t = \frac{N_b x}{\sigma_{ib}}$ where the PDF of random variable $x$ is given by Eq. (31). The mean of $t$ is expressed as

$$E(t) = \int_{0}^{\infty} \frac{N_b x}{\sigma_{ib}} p_X(x) dx. \tag{A.1}$$

Substituting Eq. (43) into Eq. (A.1) yields

$$E(t) = \sum_{n=1}^{2^{N-1}} (-1)^{|E_n|+1} \left( \sum_{E_j \in E_n} \frac{N_{e_j} \theta_{ib}}{N_{b} \theta_{ie_j}} \right)^{-1}. \tag{A.2}$$

Denoting $\sigma^2_{ib} = \theta_{ib} \sigma^2_{m}$ and $\sigma^2_{ie_j} = \theta_{ie_j} \sigma^2_{e}$, we have

$$E(t) = \sum_{n=1}^{2^{N-1}} (-1)^{|E_n|+1} \left( \sum_{E_j \in E_n} \frac{N_{e_j} \theta_{ib}}{N_{b} \theta_{ie_j}} \right)^{-1} \cdot \frac{1}{\lambda_{me}}, \tag{A.3}$$

where $\lambda_{me} = \sigma^2_{m}/\sigma^2_{e}$. One can observe from Eq. (A.3) that $E(t)$ approaches zero for $\lambda_{me} \to \infty$. Meanwhile, using Eq. (43), we can obtain the mean of $t^2$ as Eq. (A.4) at the top of the following page, which shows that $E(t^2)$ approaches to zero for $\lambda_{me} \to \infty$. Since both $E(t)$ and $E(t^2)$ approach to zero as $\lambda_{me} \to \infty$, we can easily obtain that random variable $t$ approaches to zero with probability one for $\lambda_{me} \to \infty$. Hence, considering $t \to 0$ with probability one and using Taylor series expansion, we obtain

$$\exp(-t) = 1 - t + O\left(\frac{1}{\lambda_{me}}\right), \tag{A.5}$$

for $\lambda_{me} \to \infty$, where $O\left(\frac{1}{\lambda_{me}}\right)$ represents high-order infinitesimals. Substituting $t = \frac{N_b x}{\sigma_{ib}}$ into Eq. (A.5) gives

$$\exp\left(\frac{N_b x}{\sigma_{ib}}\right) = 1 - \frac{N_b x}{\sigma_{ib}^2} + O\left(\frac{1}{\lambda_{me}}\right).$$
which completes the proof of Eq. (45).

\[
E(t^2) = \int_{0}^{\infty} \frac{N_0^2 x^2 \sigma_{ib}^2}{\sigma_{ib}^2} \sum_{n=1}^{2N-1} (-1)^{|E_n|+1} \sum_{j \in E_n} \frac{N_j \sigma_{ie,j}}{\sigma_{ie,j}^2} \exp(-\sum_{j \in E_n} \frac{N_j x}{\sigma_{ie,j}}) dx
\]

\[
= \sum_{n=1}^{2N-1} (-1)^{|E_n|+1} \int_{0}^{\infty} \frac{N_0^2 x^2 \sigma_{ib}^2}{\sigma_{ib}^2} \sum_{j \in E_n} \frac{N_j \sigma_{ib,j}}{\sigma_{ie,j}^2} \exp(-\sum_{j \in E_n} \frac{N_j x}{\sigma_{ie,j}}) dx
\]

\[
= 2 \sum_{n=1}^{2N-1} (-1)^{|E_n|+1} \left( \sum_{j \in E_n} \frac{N_j \sigma_{ib,j}}{-\lambda_{me}} \right)^2, \quad \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_{me}} \right)^2,
\]

which in turn leads to

\[
1 - \exp\left(-\frac{N_0 x}{\sigma_{ib}^2}\right) = \frac{N_0 x}{\sigma_{ib}^2} + O\left(\frac{1}{\lambda_{me}}\right), \quad (A.6)
\]

REFERENCES

[1] J. Mitola and G. Q. Maguire, “Cognitive radio: Making software radios mobile,” IEEE Personal Commun., vol. 6, pp. 10-19, Apr. 1999.
[2] T. Brown and A. Sethi, “Potential cognitive radio denial-of-service attacks in cognitive radio systems,” in Proc. IEEE 20th Annual Joint Conf. on Communications, Seattle, WA, Jun. 2007.
[3] Y. Zou, Z.-D. Yao, and B. Zheng, “Cooperative relay techniques for cognitive radio systems: Spectrum sensing and secondary user transmissions,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 13-18, Apr. 2011.
[4] H. Li, “Cooperative spectrum sensing via belief propagation in spectrum-heterogeneous cognitive radio systems,” in Proc. 2010 IEEE Wireless Commun. and Net. Conf. (WCNC), Sydney Australia, Apr. 2010.
[5] Y. Zou, Z.-D. Yao, and B. Zheng, “Cooperative transmissions with multiple relays in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 648-659, Feb. 2011.
[6] H. Li, “Cooperative spectrum sensing via belief propagation in spectrum-heterogeneous cognitive radio systems,” in Proc. 2010 IEEE Wireless Commun. and Net. Conf. (WCNC), Sydney Australia, Apr. 2010.
[7] Y. Zou, J. Zhu, B. Zheng, and Y.-D. Yao, “Adaptive cooperation diversity scheme with best-relay selection in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 58, no. 10, pp. 5438-5445, Oct. 2010.
[8] R. Zhang and Y.-C. Liang, “Exploiting multi-antennas for opportunistic spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Topics Signal Process., vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 88-102, Feb. 2008.
[9] L. Lu, X. Zhou, O. Onnukkow, and Y. Li, “Ten years of research in spectrum sensing and sharing in cognitive radio,” EURASIP Journal on Wireless Commun. and Net., vol. 2012, DOI: 10.1186/1687-1499-2012-28, Jan. 2012.
[10] H. Li and Z. Han, “Dogfight in spectrum: Combatting primary user emulation attacks in cognitive radio systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 3566-3577, Nov. 2010.
[11] T. Brown and A. Sethi, “Potential cognitive radio denial-of-service vulnerabilities and protection countermeasures: A multi-dimensional analysis and assessment,” in Proc. IEEE International Conf. Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Net. Commun., Orlando Florida, Aug. 2007.
[12] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 28, pp. 656-715, 1949.
[13] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355-1387, 1975.
[14] S. K. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. E. Hellman, “The Gaussian wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, pp. 451-456, Jul. 1978.
[15] Z. Li, W. Trappe, and R. Yates, “Secret communication via multiantenna transmission,” in Proc. 41st Conf. Information Sciences Systems, Baltimore, MD, Mar. 2007.
[16] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 4961-4972, Oct. 2007.
[17] Y. Zou, X. Wang, and W. Shen, “Optimal relay selection for physical-layer security in cooperative wireless networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 31, no. 10, pp. 2099-2111, Oct. 2013.
[18] Y. Zou, X. Wang, and W. Shen, “Intercept probability analysis of cooperative wireless networks with best relay selection: A fundamental tradeoff in the presence of eavesdropping attack,” in Proc. 2013 IEEE Intern. Conf. Commun. (IEEE ICC 2013), pp. 1-5, Budapest, Hungary, Jun. 2013.
[19] E. G. Larsson, “On the combination of spatial diversity and multiuser diversity,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 517-519, Aug. 2004.
[20] Q. H. Spencer, C. B. Peel, A. L. Swindlehurst, and M. Haardt, “An introduction to the multi-user MIMO downlink,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 42, no. 10, pp. 60-67, Oct. 2004.
[21] S. Goel and R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artificial noise,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 2180-2189, Jul. 2008.
[22] X. Zhou and M. McKay, “Secure transmission with artificial noise over fading channels: Achievable rate and optimal power allocation,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Tech., vol. 59, no. 8, pp. 3831-3842, Aug. 2010.
[23] D. Cabric, A. Tkachenko, and R. W. Broderson, “Experimental study of spectrum sensing based on energy detection and network cooperation,” in Proc. First Int. Workshop Tech. and Policy Access. Spectrum, Boston, MA, Aug. 2006.
[24] G. Bansal, M. Hossain, and V. Bhargava, “Optimal and suboptimal power allocation schemes for OFDM-based cognitive radio systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 11, pp. 4710-4718, Nov. 2008.
[25] M. Bloch, J. O. Barros, M. R. D. Rodrigues, and S. W. McLaughlin, “Wireless information-theoretic security,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2515-2534, Jun. 2008.
[26] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. P. Petropulu, and H. V. Poor, “Improving wireless physical layer security via cooperating relays,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875-1888, Mar. 2010.
[27] A. Mukhijee and A. Swindlehurst, “Robust beamforming for security in MIMO wiretap channels with imperfect CSI,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 351-361, Jan. 2011.
[28] H. Qin, et al., “Optimal power allocation for joint beamforming and artificial noise design in secure wireless communications,” in Proc. The 2011 IEEE Intern. Conf. Commun., Kyoto, Japan, June 2011.
[29] L. Zheng and D. Tse, “Diversity and multiplexing: A fundamental tradeoff in multiple antenna channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 49, no. 5, pp. 1073-1096, May 2003.
[30] H. J. Kushner and P. A. Whiting, “Convergence of proportional-fair sharing algorithms under general conditions,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 1250-1259, Jul. 2004.
Yulong Zou (S’07-M’12-SM’13) received the B.Eng. degree in information engineering from the Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications (NUPT), Nanjing, China, in July 2006, the first Ph.D. degree from the Stevens Institute of Technology, New Jersey, United States, in May 2012, and the second Ph.D. degree from NUPT, Nanjing, China, in July 2012.

Dr. Zou is currently serving as an editor for the IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE Communications Letters, EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing, and KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems. He is also serving as the lead guest editor for a special issue on “Security Challenges and Issues in Cognitive Radio Networks” in the EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing. In addition, he has acted as symposium chairs, session chairs, and TPC members for a number of IEEE sponsored conferences including the IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM), IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC), International Conference on Communications in China (ICCC), and so on.

His research interests span a wide range of topics in wireless communications and signal processing including the cooperative communications, cognitive radio, wireless security, and green communications. In these areas, he has published extensively in internationally renowned journals including the IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions on Communications, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, and IEEE Communications Magazine.

Xianbin Wang (S’98-M’99-SM’06) is an Associate Professor at The University of Western Ontario and a Canada Research Chair in Wireless Communications. He received his Ph.D. degree in electrical and computer engineering from National University of Singapore in 2001.

Prior to joining Western, he was with Communications Research Centre Canada as Research Scientist/Senior Research Scientist between July 2002 and Dec. 2007. From Jan. 2001 to July 2002, he was a system designer at STMicroelectronics, where he was responsible for system design for DSL and Gigabit Ethernet chipsets. He was with Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore (formerly known as Centre for Wireless Communications), as a Senior R & D engineer in 2000.

His primary research area is wireless communications and related applications, including adaptive communications, wireless security, and wireless infrastructure based position location. Dr. Wang has over 150 peer-reviewed journal and conference papers on various communication system design issues, in addition to 23 granted and pending patents and several standard contributions.

Dr. Wang is an IEEE Distinguished Lecturer and a Senior Member of IEEE. He was the recipient of three IEEE Best Paper Awards. He currently serves as an Associate Editor for IEEE Wireless Communications Letters, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology and IEEE Transactions on Broadcasting. He was also an editor for IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications between 2007 and 2011. Dr. Wang was involved in a number of IEEE conferences including GLOBECOM, ICC, WCNC, VTC, and ICME, on different roles such as symposium chair, track chair, TPC and session chair.

Weiming Shen is a Senior Research Scientist at the National Research Council Canada and an Adjunct Professor at Tongji University, China, and University of Western Ontario, Canada. He is a Fellow of IEEE. He received his Bachelor and Masters degrees from Northern (Beijing) Jiaotong University, China and his PhD degree from the University of Technology of Compigne, France. His recent research interest includes agent-based collaboration technology and applications, wireless sensor networks. He has published several books and over 300 papers in scientific journals and international conferences in the related areas. His work has been cited over 6,000 times with an h-index of 37. He has been invited to provide over 60 invited lectures/seminars at different academic and research institutions over the world and keynote presentations / tutorials at various international conferences. He is a member of the Steering Committee for the IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing and an Associate Editor or Editorial Board Member of ten international journals (including IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering, Computers in Industry; Advanced Engineering Informatics; Service Oriented Computing and Applications) and served as guest editor for several other international journals.