Games of Incomplete Information and Myopic Equilibria

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Dedicated to the memory of Andrzej Granas (1929-2019)
Abstract: We consider a finitely defined game where the payoff for each player at each terminal point of the game is not a fixed quantity but varies according to probability distributions on the terminal points induced by the strategies chosen. We prove that if these payoffs have an upper-semicontinuous and convex valued structure then the game has an equilibrium. For this purpose the concept of a myopic equilibrium is introduced, a concept that generalizes that of a Nash equilibrium and applies to the games we consider. We answer in the affirmative a question posed by A. Neyman: if the payoffs of an infinitely repeated game of incomplete information on one side are a convex combination of the undiscounted payoffs and payoffs from a finite number of initial stages, does the game have an equilibrium?

Key words: Repeated games and game trees, topological structure of equilibria, fixed points, the nearest point retraction onto a simplex
1 Introduction

The following game inspired this work. Nature chooses a state $k$ from a finite set $K$ according to some probability distribution $p_0 \in \Delta(K)$. There are two players, Player One and Player Two. Player One, but not Player Two, is informed of nature’s choice. The players choose actions simultaneously which are commonly observable directly after those choices, and this situation is repeated an infinite number of times, but with nature’s choice of $k$ fixed from the start. The payoffs to both player are determined both by what the two players do and by nature’s choice. If the payoffs to the players are determined by the limit behaviour of the average payoffs, a infinitely repeated undiscounted game of incomplete information on one side has been described in Aumann and Maschler (1995), and the existence of their equilibria was established in Simon, Spie\'\z, and Toru\'nczyk (1995). We introduce the following game variation. For both players $i = 1, 2$ there are finitely many non-negative values $\lambda_1^i, \lambda_2^i, \ldots, \lambda_n^i$ with $0 < \lambda_1^i + \cdots + \lambda_n^i = \lambda^i < 1$ so that for Player $i$ the payoff at the $j$th stage is weighted according to $\lambda_j^i$ and the payoffs of the undiscounted infinitely repeated game are weighted according to $1 - \lambda^i$. Does such a game have a Nash equilibrium?

The above question was posed to us by A. Neyman (private communication, 2016), and our initial response to his question was “definitely not!” The proof of equilibrium existence for a game with a finite tree structure and perfect recall uses fixed point theory, through the original proof of Nash equilibria in Nash (1950) and the application of Kuhn’s Theorem (1953). However the proof of equilibrium existence for the undiscounted infinitely repeated game (Simon, Spie\'\z, and Toru\'nczyk 1995) uses a covering theorem that has similarity with the Borsuk-Ulam Theorem (and yet neither implies nor is implied by the Borsuk-Ulam Theorem). Why should there be a synthesis of these two very different proofs?

We show that the answer to A. Neyman’s question is affirmative. We make no synthesis of the two proofs, rather we apply properties of the equilibria of the infinitely repeated games to the finite stage game. To answer this question we introduce a new equilibrium concept, called a myopic equilibrium.

What is the main problem with understanding the strategic aspects of finitely many initial stages followed by an infinite stage game? Lets simplify the problem, so that $\lambda_1^1 = \lambda_2^1 = \lambda = \frac{1}{3}$, meaning that the first stage counts for $\frac{1}{3}$ of the payoff and all the remaining infinitely many stages count for $\frac{2}{3}$ of the
payoff. As Player Two knows nothing but $p_0$ about the state of nature on the first stage, he must choose some state independent mixed strategy $\tau$. As different states could have very different payoff structures, one would expect initial payoff advantages for Player One through actions that are dependent on the states of nature. But by doing so, Player One could reveal too much about the state, as $\frac{2}{3}$ of the payoff comes from the following stages. Both using her information too much and not at all seem to be foolish options for Player One. There is a delicate give and take between the initial choices of Player One at the different states and the conditional probabilities on the states that these choices induce.

By a pure strategy of Player One on the first stage we mean a determination of an initial action dependent on the state of nature, so that if $I$ is her set of actions then there are $|I|^{[K]}$ different pure strategies for the first stage. By a mixed strategy of Player One on the first stage we mean a probability distribution over those pure strategies. Lets assume that there is a subset of the equilibrium payoffs of the infinitely repeated game that change continuously with the conditional probability distribution on the states of nature. Keeping with the idea that $\lambda = \lambda_i^1$ for both $i = 1, 2$, we could define a game where on the first stage Player One chooses a mixed strategy for herself, Player Two chooses a mixed strategy for himself (necessarily state independent), followed by a payoff determined by the initial stage and an equilibrium payoff associated with the induced conditional probability on the states of nature. For any fixed mixed strategy of Player Two, the payoff for Player One will not in general be concave as a function of her mixed strategies. As there are many games that don’t have any equilibrium when a payoff function is not concave relative to the actions of the player concerned (see later example), we anticipated that the composite game of Neyman’s question would fail to have an equilibrium.

On closer examination, we discovered that replacing a mixed strategy of Player One with another mixed strategy of the same player was not the correct model of strategic deviation for these games. Assume that Player One is committed to some mixed strategy on the first stage for which every action is played with large positive probability at some state of nature. No matter what Player One does on that first stage there is no appearance of a strategic deviation. Unless Player One demonstrates an action that should never have happened, Player Two will continue to interpret the future actions of Player One according to a putative commitment to that mixed strategy,
and not to a different strategy that Player One might have chosen. For there to be an equilibrium it is necessary that any advantage from one action is properly offset by a subsequent disadvantage on the following stages, and that this holds simultaneously for all states of nature. We will see that the required equilibrium property leads directly to the definition of a myopic equilibrium.

A myopic equilibrium has the same mathematical structure as a kind of equilibrium used in evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theorists are concerned with the population distribution of types within an animal species. Some type may be more successful than another type used with positive probability. Such a situation would not be stable, as then the more successful type would grow in number in relation to the less successful type. Equilibrium in this context means that each type with positive probability receives the maximal payoff (maximized over all the possible types). This is mathematically equivalent to the formulation of a myopic equilibrium when types are substituted for actions. The proof that such an equilibrium exists (given continuity of payoffs) can be done with Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, (Sandholm 2010). There is, however, an important conceptual difference between a myopic equilibrium and this evolutionary type of equilibrium. Usually a species is not understood to be a player making choices and maximizing payoffs on its own behalf. In the evolutionary context either the individuals or the gene types are considered to be the players, whereas we retain the concept that, when translated to the evolutionary context, would make each species a player.

The myopic equilibrium concept was formulated to solve Neyman’s problem, as explained above. Its main application in this paper is however broader, to game trees where information is incomplete. It is intriguing that in order to prove that a certain game has a Nash equilibrium, it was necessary to formulate a new equilibrium concept that can differ greatly from the Nash equilibrium concept. That intrigue is accentuated by our desire to present the concept abstractly and independently. We do so because we don’t know in what other contexts the myopic equilibrium concept can be applied.

The concept of myopic equilibria could expand our concept of what is a subgame. Consider a three person game with simultaneous actions. Let \( I \) be the finite set of Player One’s actions. One way to analyse this game is to define for every distribution \( p \in \Delta(I) \) a game \( \Gamma(p) \) played by the second
and third players based on their assumption that \( p \) is the distribution by which the first player has acted. We could think of \( \Gamma(p) \) as a subgame and consider the collection of such subgames. For every such \( p \in \Delta(I) \), there will be a set of equilibrium strategies for the second and third players, and with them corresponding payoffs for all three players in the game \( \Gamma(p) \). If we return to the possible choices of the first player, represented by the set \( \Delta(I) \), we recognise a correspondence of payoffs for Player One, determined by the \( p \in \Delta(I) \) and the induced equilibria of the other two players. We can reformulate this as a one-player game with Player One as the only player. As a function of \( p \), the corresponding payoffs for the first player will not be affine; in general they will define a correspondence. We could view this game as an optimisation problem – the natural solution would be that the first player should choose the \( p \) with the largest corresponding payoff. With this approach, given a functional selection of payoffs defined on the \( p \in \Delta(I) \), one could see this optimisation as a kind of Nash equilibrium of a one player game, one in which the player commits herself to an optimal mixed strategy. But this optimisation approach would in general have no relationship to the Nash equilibrium of the original three player game! In a Nash equilibrium of a standard game defined by multi-linear functions, each action chosen with positive probability should share a common maximal payoff among all the actions that can be taken. But that in general will fail for the \( p \in \Delta(I) \) that optimise the payoff for Player One in this one-player game; the different actions given positive probability could result in very different payoffs (and also could be dwarfed by the payoff from an action given zero probability). Rather the solution concept for the one-player game directly relevant to the Nash equilibria of the original three player game is that of the myopic equilibria.

The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section we introduce the formal concept of myopic equilibria and prove its existence when the payoffs are continuous as functions of the strategy spaces. In the third section we define a truncated game tree and prove that all composite games from truncated game trees with certain structures have equilibria. In the fourth section we answer the question of A. Neyman and speculate on closely related applications. In the fifth and last section, we look at examples and a possible future direction of research.
2 Myopic equilibria

Nash equilibria are understood in terms of strategies that are best replies to themselves. A best reply is a strategy of a player that can replace that player’s existing strategy and maximise the payoff for that player. Usually one assumes that the set of strategies of a player is a compact and convex set and that, given fixed strategies of the other players, the payoff to that player is affine in its set of strategies. If one assumes that the payoff function is concave in that player’s strategies, the mathematics is similar, since optimal responses (existent from the compactness of the strategy set) are realised on a convex subset. If the payoff function to a player is only continuous with respect to his or her strategies, one would not expect there to be a Nash equilibrium, which can demonstrated with simple examples.

The idea that a strategy space is compact and convex comes initially from the assumption that it is the convex span of a finite set of actions. In this paper, we keep this assumption, though our definition of myopic equilibria could be generalised to a compact set of actions using support sets.

**Definition.** Let \( N \) be a finite set of players, and for each \( n \in N \) let \( I_n \) be a finite set of actions. Let \( \Delta = \prod_{n \in N} \Delta(I_n) \) be the strategy space for all the players. We say that \( x \in \Delta \) is a myopic equilibrium for a family of (payoff) functions \( \{w^n : \Delta \to \mathbb{R} \mid n \in N, i \in I_n \} \) if for all \( n \in N \) and \( i \in I_n \) with \( x^n_i \neq 0 \) one has \( w^n_i(x) = \max_{j \in I_n} w^n_j(x) \).

**Convention.** Above and further, given \( y \in \prod_{n \in N} \mathbb{R}^{I_n} \) we denote by \( y^n \) the image of \( y \) of under the natural projection onto \( \mathbb{R}^{I_n} \), and by \( y^n_i \) the \( i \)-th coordinate of \( y^n \), for \( i \in I_n \). With the function \( w : \Delta \to \prod_{n \in N} \mathbb{R}^{I_n} \) satisfying \( w^n_i(x) = (w(x))^n_i \), for all \( x \in \Delta, n \in N \) and \( i \in I_n \), we also say that \( x \) is a myopic equilibrium "for \( w \)", instead of "for \( \{w^n_i \mid n \in N, i \in I_n \} \)."

How does the myopic equilibrium concept compare with the conventional way to define a game and the conventional Nash equilibrium concept?

With the myopic equilibrium concept there are \(|I_n|\) different payoffs for Player \( n \), one for each of this player’s actions, and they are functions on the strategy space \( \Delta \). From these payoffs, one can define a functions \( g^n \) from \( \Delta \) to \( \mathbb{R} \) for each player \( n \) in the canonical way, by \( g^n(x) := \sum_{i \in I_n} x^n_i w^n_i(x) \). Such functions are not necessarily affine or concave in the strategies of a player. Starting with such functions \( g^n \), there will always be at least one way to define corresponding functions \( w^n_i \) for the \( i \in I_n \) that so induce the \( g^n \) as...
above, namely to define \( w^a_n(x) \) to be \( g^a_n(x) \) for every \( i \in I_n \). By defining the \( w^a_i \) in this way every point in \( \Delta \) is a myopic equilibrium, and that is not interesting. The interest in myopic equilibria lies entirely with how the payoffs are defined for the individual actions. One must guarantee minimally that whenever \( x \) calls for Player \( n \) to choose an action \( j \in I_n \) with certainty it follows that \( w^a_n(x) \) must equal \( g^a_n(x) \), but beyond that there will be many ways to define the \( w^a_i \).

If all the payoff functions \( w^a_i \) are restrictions of \(|N|\)-linear functions from \( \prod_{n \in N} \mathbb{R}^{I_n} \) to \( \mathbb{R} \) then they induce a system \( A = \{ A^n \}_{n \in N} \) of \(|N|\)-index matrices \( A^n : \prod_{n \in N} I_n \to \mathbb{R} \), and it can be shown that a Nash equilibrium of the von Neumann game corresponding to \( A \) is the same as a myopic equilibrium for \( \{ w^a_i | n \in N, i \in I_n \} \). But when the payoffs \( w^a_i \) are more general, the two equilibrium concepts can differ greatly, as we see in examples in §5.

There is a concept of local equilibrium, a member \( x \) of \( \Delta \) such that for every \( n \) the strategy \( x^n \) of player \( n \) defines a local maximum of this player’s payoff function. See Biasi and Monis (2013) for such an alternative concept in the context of differentiable payoff functions. However this concept of local equilibrium is still based on functions \( g^a \) defined on \( \Delta \), without necessarily separate functions \( w^a_i \) defined for each action, as described above. We will see later from an example that local and myopic equilibria can be very different.

The term “myopic” is also used to describe the equilibria of the one stage game induced by the assumption that players in a multistage game choose their strategies in the first stage but their behaviour is fixed in the remaining stages (Bolt and Tieman 2007).

We postpone until later discussing examples of myopic equilibria and pass to establishing some of their properties. We show first that the myopic equilibrium concept is amenable to a version the Structure Theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).

**Theorem 1.** Let \( \mathcal{W} \) be the vector space of all continuous functions from \( \Delta := \prod_{n \in N} \Delta(I_n) \) to \( \mathbb{R}^I := \prod_{n \in N} \mathbb{R}^{I_n} \), equipped with the norm \( \| w \|_{\text{sup}} := \sup_{x \in \Delta} \| w(x) \| \) induced by a norm \( \| \| \) on \( \mathbb{R}^I \). Let \( p \) be the projection of \( \mathcal{W} \times \Delta \) to \( \mathcal{W} \) and \( E \subset \mathcal{W} \times \Delta \) be the set of all pairs \( (w, x) \) with \( x \) a myopic equilibrium for \( w \). Then, there exists a homeomorphism \( \phi \) of \( \mathcal{W} \) onto \( E \) such that the straight-line homotopy \( H \) joining \( p \circ \phi \) to the identity is proper and each \( w \in \mathcal{W} \) differs from \( p(\phi(w)) \) by a constant function (i.e., a vector of \( \mathbb{R}^I \)).
**Remark 1.** A homotopy \( H : \mathcal{W} \times [0, 1] \to \mathcal{W} \) being proper means in this context that \( \inf_{t \in [0, 1]} \| H(w, t) \|_{\text{sup}} \to \infty \) as \( \| w \|_{\text{sup}} \to \infty \). In fact, above one has \( \| H(w, t) \|_{\text{sup}} \geq \| w \|_{\text{sup}}/3 - \delta \), where \( \delta = \max_{x \in \Delta} \| x \| \).

In the proof of this and the next theorem we’ll use a property of a standard retraction of an euclidean space \( \mathbb{R}^r \).

**Lemma 1.** Let \( J \) be a finite set. Then, there exists a continuous function \( r_j : \mathbb{R}^J \to \Delta(J) \) such that, given \( x \in \Delta(J) \) and \( y \in \mathbb{R}^J \), condition \( r_j(x+y) = x \) holds true if and only if \( y_i = \max_{j \in J} y_j \) for all \( i \in J \) satisfying \( x_i \neq 0 \).

**Proof:** For each non-empty \( I \subset J \) we consider \( \Delta(I) \) as a face of \( \Delta(J) \) and define \( Y_I = \{ y \in \mathbb{R}^J : y_i = \max_{j \in J} y_j \) if \( i \in I \} \). Observe that the sets \( Z_I = \Delta(I) + Y_I \) form a closed cover of \( \mathbb{R}^J \). Since for any \( z \in Z_I \) there are unique \( x \in \Delta(I) \) and \( y \in Y_I \) such that \( z = x + y \), we can define the projection \( \pi_I : Z_I \to \Delta(I) \) by \( \pi_I(x + y) = x \), where \( x \in \Delta(I) \) and \( y \in Y_I \). Note that for any two non-empty subset \( I \) and \( I' \) of \( J \), \( \pi_I \) and \( \pi_{I'} \) coincide on \( Z_I \cap Z_{I'} \).

One can check that the map \( r_j : \mathbb{R}^J \to \Delta(J) \) defined by the projections \( \pi_I \) satisfies the assertion of the lemma. \( \square \)

**Remark 2.** It can be shown that \( r_j \) is the nearest–point retraction with respect to the euclidean norm. (We don’t use this here.)

**Proof of Theorem 1:** Let \( r := \prod_{n \in N} r_n : \mathbb{R}^I \to \Delta \), where each \( r_n, n \in N \), is the corresponding mapping of \( \mathbb{R}^{I_n} \) onto \( \Delta(I_n) \) given by Lemma 1 for \( J = I_n \).

We divide the proof into 4 steps.

a) By the definition and the properties of the \( r_n \)’s, a point \( x \in \Delta \) is a myopic equilibrium for a function \( w : \Delta \to \mathbb{R}^I \) if and only if \( r(w(x) + x) = x \), i.e., if \( r((w + x)(x)) = x \). Hence the formula \( w(w, x) = (w + x, x) \) defines a homeomorphism of \( E \) onto \( E' := \{(w', x) \mid w' \in \mathcal{W} \text{ and } r(w'(x)) = x \} \).

b) We now fix \( x_0 \in \Delta \) and define maps \( \phi' : \mathcal{W} \to \mathcal{W} \times \Delta \) and \( \psi' : E' \to \mathcal{W} \) by the formulas (the composition signs are to be omitted):

\[
\phi'(w) = (w + w(x_0) - wrw(x_0), rw(x_0)) \tag{1}
\]

\[
\psi'(w, x) = w - w(x_0) + w(x) \tag{2}
\]

A direct verification shows that \( \phi'(\mathcal{W}) \subseteq E' \) and \( \psi' \phi' \) and \( \phi' \psi' \) are identities on \( \mathcal{W} \) and on \( E' \), respectively. Hence, \( \phi' \) is a homeomorphism of \( \mathcal{W} \) onto \( E' \).

c) The straight-line homotopy between \( p \phi' \) and the identity is \( (w, t) \mapsto w + ty_w \), where \( y_w := w(x_0) - wrw(x_0) \). We claim that always \( \| w + ty_w \|_{\text{sup}} \geq \| w + ty_w \|_{\text{sup}} \).
Indeed, \( \|w + ty_w\|_{\text{sup}} < M := \|w\|_{\text{sup}}/3 \) leads to
\[
\|ty_w\| \leq \|y_w\| = \|(w(x_0) + ty_w) - (w(rw(x_0)) + ty_w)\| < 2M
\]
and thus \( \|w\|_{\text{sup}} \leq \|w + ty_w\|_{\text{sup}} + \|ty_w\| < M + 2M \), a contradiction.

d) We now take \( \phi := u^{-1}\phi' \), i.e. \( \phi(w) = \phi'(w) - (r(x_0), 0) \). The relevant homotopy is then given by \( (w, t) \mapsto w + ty_w - tr(x_0) \). It and \( \phi \) have the desired properties by c), since \( \|tr(x_0)\| \leq \delta \) and \( ty_w - tr(x_0) \in \mathbb{R}^I \).

We also have a version of Nash’s Equilibrium Existence Theorem. It is convenient to formulate it with an expanded definition of myopic equilibria in mind, when on \( \Delta \) one has a multi–function \( W \) (rather than a single–valued function \( w \)).

**Definition.** Let to each \( x \in \Delta \) be assigned a set \( W(x) \subset \prod_{n \in N} \mathbb{R}^{I_n} \).

i) We say that \( x \in \Delta \) is a myopic equilibrium for the multifunction \( W : \Delta \to \mathbb{R}^I \) if there exists a point \( y \in W(x) \) such that whenever \( n \in N \) and \( i \in I_n \) satisfy \( x_i^n \neq 0 \), then \( y_i = \max_{j \in I_n} y_j \).

ii) If each set \( W(x) \) is of a product form \( W(x) = \prod_{n \in N} \prod_{i \in I_n} W_i^n(x) \), where \( W_i^n(x) \subset \mathbb{R} \), then in place of ”for the multifunction \( W \)” we also say above ”for the family of multifunctions \( (W_i^n)_{n \in N, i \in I_n} \)”.

**Theorem 2.** Let \( W \) be a multifunction on \( \Delta \) which takes values in non-empty, closed, convex subsets of \( \mathbb{R}^I \) and is upper–semicontinuous (meaning that \( \{x \in \Delta \mid W(x) \cap K \neq \emptyset\} \) is closed in \( \Delta \) whenever \( K \) is closed in \( \mathbb{R}^I \)). Then, there exists a myopic equilibrium for \( W \).

**Proof:** If \( W \) is single–valued and continuous, denoted now by \( w \), then by Brouwer’s Theorem the mapping \( \Delta \ni x \mapsto r(w(x) + x) \in \Delta \) has a fixed point \( x_0 \). (Here, \( r \) is that from the proof of Theorem 1.) By part a) of that proof, \( x_0 \) is a myopic equilibrium for \( w \).

In the general case we put a norm \( \| \| \) on \( \mathbb{R}^I \). For each positive integer \( k \) there exists a single-valued continuous function \( w_k : \Delta \to \mathbb{R}^I \) such that given \( x \in \Delta \) we have \( \|y - w_k(x')\| + \|x - x'\| < \frac{1}{k} \) for some \( x' \in \Delta \) and \( y \in W(x) \). (See e.g. Ancel (1985).) By the special case above, for each \( k \) there exists a myopic equilibrium \( x_k \in \Delta \) for the function \( w_k \). Then, an accumulation point of the set \( \{x_k\}_{k=1}^{\infty} \subset \Delta \) is a myopic equilibrium for \( W \). \( \square \)
3 Game Trees and Incomplete Information

We have to modify the concept of a finite game tree (Kuhn (1953), cf. Hart (1985)) so that the end points of the game are states for a continuation process, be it a follow-up game or something else. We call this modification a truncated game tree. It involves removing the final payoff from what conventionally is defined to be a game tree. The term is justified because any shorter truncation of a truncated game tree is also a truncated game tree. With our application, instead of a payoff determined by the end point there is a continuation payoff determined by the induced conditional probability distribution on the end points known in common, (which could be interpreted as a kind of subgame). But these continuation payoffs and their relationship to the conditional probabilities are exogenous to the truncated game tree.

The main inspiration is any game for which all players observe all actions taken, however they don’t observe the decision process behind those actions. The distinction can be strong with games of incomplete information, where a player can posses a secret and makes its behaviour dependent on that secret. As with poker, though one observes completely the behaviour of other players, it is the relationship between their private knowledge and their behaviour that one needs to understand as a player.

A game tree has vertices $V$ and directed edges or arrows between the vertices. Its vertices $V$ can be broken down into two types, nodes and end points. $E$ is the set of end points and every path of arrows starts at the root and ends at an end point, with each end point determining a unique such path of arrows. The set $D$ of nodes is the subset $V \setminus E$ and these are the vertices (except for the root $r$) to which comes exactly one arrow and from which, without loss of generality, come at least two distinct arrows.

For each player $n \in N$ there is a subset $D_n \subseteq D$ such that $\forall i \neq n \ D_i \cap D_n = \emptyset$. Define $D_0$ to be the set $D \setminus (\cup_{n \in N} D_n)$. To every player $n \in N$ there is a partition $\mathcal{P}_n$ of the set $D_n$.

For every $W \in \mathcal{P}_n$ with $W \subseteq D$ there is a corresponding set of actions $A^n_W$ such that there is a bijective relationship between $A^n_W$ and the arrows leaving every $v \in W$. For every $v \in D_0$ there is a probability distribution $p_v$ on the arrows leaving the node $v$, and therefore also on the nodes following directly after $v$ in the tree.

At any node $v \in W \in \mathcal{P}_n$ only the player $n$ is making any decision, and
this decision determines completely which vertex follows \( v \). At the nodes \( v \) in \( D_0 \) nature is making a decision, according to \( p_v \), concerning which vertex follows \( v \). If the game is at the node \( v \in D_n \) and \( v \in W \in P_n \) then Player \( n \) is informed that the node is in the set \( W \) and that player has no additional information, so that inside \( W \) player \( n \) cannot distinguish between nodes within \( W \).

Notice that any simultaneous move game can be so modeled, by choosing any order of players and giving all players indiscreet partitions.

With conventional game trees, we assume that once the set \( E \) of end points is reached that the game is over and the players learn the outcomes. But a truncated game tree may be a prelude to further activity, or the payoffs may be exogenous to the truncated game tree. We may need to define the knowledge of the players at the set \( E \). For each player \( n \in N \) let \( Q_n \) be a partition on \( E \). Let \( Q := \wedge_{n \in N} Q_n \) be the join partition on \( E \), meaning the finest partition such that for every \( n \in N \) every member of \( Q_n \) is contained in some member of \( Q \). The partition \( Q \) corresponds to the concept of common knowledge, meaning that a member \( C \in Q \) is what the players know in common whenever \( e \in C \) is the resulting end point. If there is a continuation game, the corresponding set \( C \in Q \) defines the appropriate subgame.

**Definition:** The truncated game tree has *perfect recall* for a player \( n \) if all paths leading to a partition member in either \( P_n \) or \( Q_n \) pass through the same previous partition sets in \( P_n \) and actions for player \( n \) in the same order and without repetition.

Though much is stated and proven without the assumption of perfect recall, it would be difficult to understand the relevance of most of what follows without the assumption of perfect recall.

For every player \( n \in N \) let \( S_n \) be the finite set of pure decision strategies of the players in the truncated game tree, by which we mean a function that decides, at every set \( W \) in \( P_n \), deterministically which member of \( A^n_W \) should be chosen. If each such \( A^n_W \) has cardinality \( l \) and there are \( k \) such sets then the cardinality of \( S_n \) is \( l^k \).

Now we define a new payoff structure from the truncated game tree and continuation payoffs. For any \( C \in Q \) let there be a correspondence \( F_C \subseteq \Delta(C) \times \mathbb{R}^{C \times N} \) of *continuation* payoffs and for every \( n \in N \) and \( e \in E \) let
$g^{e,n} : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ be a function. \(^1\)

For every $x = (x^n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \in \Delta := \prod_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \Delta(S_n)$, by $p_x$ we denote the probability distribution on $E$ defined by $x$, and for $C \in \mathcal{Q}$ with $p_x(C) > 0$ by $P_x(\cdot \mid C)$ the conditional probability on $C$ induced by $x$. For $s \in S_n$, by $x^s$ we denote the element of $\Delta$ obtained from $x$ by replacing $x^n$ by $s$.

We say that a vector $(y^n_s)_{n \in \mathbb{N}, s \in S_n}$ is proper for $x \in \Delta$ if

$$y^n_s = \sum_{e \in E} p_x^s(e) g^{e,n}(\nu^{e,n}), \ n \in \mathbb{N}, s \in S_n,$$

for some $\nu = (\nu^{e,n})_{e \in E, n \in \mathbb{N}} \in \mathbb{R}^{E \times \mathbb{N}}$ such that for each $C \in \mathcal{Q}$, the image of $\nu$ under the natural projection to $\mathbb{R}^{C \times \mathbb{N}}$ belongs to $F_C(P_x(\cdot \mid C))$ if $p_x(C) > 0$ or else, if $p_x(C) = 0$, belongs to some $F_C(q)$ for some $q \in \Delta(C)$ as determined in some way by $x$.

The term "proper values" refers to the fact that the continuation payoff corresponds to the conditional probability distribution, given that it is well defined. When the conditional probability is not well defined, meaning that a set $C \in \mathcal{Q}$ has reached that shouldn’t have been reached according to $x$, the continuation payoff corresponds to some distribution on $C$. That zero probability of reaching $C$ according to $x$ implies that somebody has acted in an inappropriate way and the use of such a continuation payoff could be interpreted as punishment. However there are problems with seeing such a continuation payoff as the punishment of some particular player, and this is discussed below.

**Theorem 3.** Let $F_C : \Delta(C) \to \mathbb{R}^{C \times \mathbb{N}}$, $C \in \mathcal{Q}$, be upper semi-continuous correspondences with non-empty convex values, and $g^{e,n} : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$, $(e,n) \in E \times \mathbb{N}$, continuous increasing functions. Then there exist $x \in \Delta$ and a vector $(y^n_s)_{n \in \mathbb{N}, s \in S_n}$ proper for $x$ and such that $y^n_s \geq y^n_t$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and all $s, t \in S_n$ with $x^n_s > 0$.

**Proof:** Let $\epsilon > 0$ be given and let $B$ be a positive quantity larger than any payoff from the correspondences $F_C$. For each $C \in \mathcal{Q}$ there is a function $\phi_{C, \epsilon} : \Delta(C) \to \mathbb{R}^{C \times \mathbb{N}}$ that is a continuous $\epsilon$ approximation of $F_C$. If $p_x(C) \geq \epsilon$ then define $\lambda_{x,\epsilon}(C) = 1$, and define $\lambda_{x,\epsilon}(C) = \frac{p_x(C)}{\epsilon}$ if $p_x(C) \leq \epsilon$.

---

\(^1\)The application in §4 will be $g^{e,n}(t) = \lambda r^n + (1 - \lambda) t$ for some $0 < \lambda < 1$ where $r_e \in \mathbb{R}^N$ is a payoff vector associated with the end point $e$. If the multifunctions $F_C$ were constant, that is $F_C(p) = F_C(p')$ for $p, p' \in \Delta(C)$, the payoff structure we define would not be different from that of a conventional game tree.
For every $x \in \Delta$, $n \in N$ and $e \in E$ let
\[ \tilde{f}_{\epsilon}^{e,n}(x) = g^{e,n}(\lambda_{x,\epsilon}(C)\phi_{C,\epsilon}^{e,n}(P_x(\cdot |C)) + (1 - \lambda_{x,\epsilon}(C))2B), \]
where $C$ contains $e$ and $\phi_{C,\epsilon}^{e,n}$ is the $(e,n)$-th coordinate of $\phi_{C,\epsilon}$. If $p_x(C) = 0$ then $\tilde{f}_{\epsilon}^{e,n}(x) = g^{e,n}(2B)$. For each $s \in S_n$, we let
\[ \tilde{f}_{s,\epsilon}^{n}(x) = \sum_{e \in E} p_x(s)\tilde{f}_{\epsilon}^{e,n}(x). \]
Notice that the $\tilde{f}_{s,\epsilon}^{n}(x)$ are continuous in $x$. By Theorem 2, for each $\epsilon > 0$ there exist a myopic equilibrium, say $x(\epsilon)$, for the family $(\tilde{f}_{s,\epsilon}^{n})_{n \in N, s \in S_n}$. Thus
\[ \tilde{f}_{s,\epsilon}^{n}(x(\epsilon)) \geq \tilde{f}_{t,\epsilon}^{n}(x(\epsilon)) \text{ for } s, t \in S_n \text{ with } x(\epsilon)^n > 0. \]
Observe that for some sequence $(\epsilon_k)_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ converging to 0 we have:
(a) the sequence $(x(\epsilon_k))_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ converges to some \( \bar{x} \in \Delta \),
(b) for each $n \in N$ and $s \in S_n$, the sequence $(\tilde{f}_{s,\epsilon_k}^{n}(x(\epsilon_k)))_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ converges to some $\tilde{y}_s^n$,
(c) for each $e \in E$ and $n \in N$, the sequence $(\tilde{\nu}_{\epsilon_k}^{e,n})_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ where
\[ \tilde{\nu}_{\epsilon_k}^{e,n} = \lambda_{x(\epsilon_k),\epsilon_k}(C)\phi_{C,\epsilon_k}^{e,n}(P_{x(\epsilon_k)}(\cdot |C)) + (1 - \lambda_{x(\epsilon_k),\epsilon_k}(C))2B, \]
converges to some $\tilde{\nu}_{e}^{e,n}$.

Note that for all $n \in N$ and $s \in S_n$ we have
\[ \tilde{y}_s^n = \sum_{e \in E} p_x(s)g^{e,n}(\tilde{\nu}_{e}^{e,n}). \]
Observe that if $\tilde{x}_s^n > 0$, where $s \in S_n$, then $x(\epsilon_k)^n > 0$ for almost all $k$. It follows that
\[ \tilde{y}_s^n \geq \tilde{y}_t^n \text{ for } s, t \in S_n \text{ with } \tilde{x}_s^n > 0. \]
Note also that the sequence $(p_{x(\epsilon_k)}(C))_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ converges to $p_{\bar{x}}(C)$.

Suppose that $p_{\bar{x}}(C) > 0$. Then $p_{x(\epsilon_k)}(C) > \epsilon_k$ for all sufficiently large $k$’s. For such $k$’s we have $\tilde{\nu}_{\epsilon_k}^{e,n} = \phi_{C,\epsilon_k}^{e,n}(P_{x(\epsilon_k)}(\cdot |C))$ for all $(e,n) \in C \times N$. Thus by (c), the sequence $(\tilde{\nu}_{C,\epsilon_k})_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$, where $\tilde{\nu}_{C,\epsilon_k} = (\tilde{\nu}_{\epsilon_k}^{e,n})_{e \in C, n \in \mathbb{N}}$, converges to $\tilde{\nu}_C \in F_C(P_{\bar{x}}(\cdot |C))$. 

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Now, suppose \( p_{\tilde{x}}(C) = 0 \). If for almost all \( k \), \( p_{x(e_k)}(C) = 0 \), we choose an arbitrary \( \nu_C \) in \( F_C(\Delta(C)) \). Otherwise, as \( \nu_C \) we choose any cluster point of the set \( \{ \phi_{C,e_k}(P_{x(e_k)}(\cdot | C) | p_{x(e_k)}(C) > 0) \} \), which is also in \( F_C(\Delta(C)) \).

Now, let \( \nu = (\nu^{e,n})_{e \in E, n \in N} \in \mathbb{R}^{E \times N} \) be such that the projection of \( \nu \) onto \( \mathbb{R}^{C \times N} \) is the vector \( \tilde{\nu}_C \) if \( p_{\tilde{x}}(C) > 0 \) and the defined above vector \( \nu_C \) if \( p_{\tilde{x}}(C) = 0 \). For \( n \in N \) and \( s \in S_n \), we define

\[
y^n_s = \sum_{e \in E} p_{\tilde{x}^n}(e) y^{e,n}(\nu^{e,n}),
\]

Note that by the definition the vector \( (y^n_s)_{n \in N, s \in S_n} \) is proper for \( \tilde{x} \).

Since \( \nu^{e,n} \leq \tilde{\nu}^{e,n} \) for all \( e \in E \) and \( n \in N \), it follows that \( y^n_s \leq \tilde{y}^n_s \) for all \( n \in N \) and \( s \in S_n \). Now, for any \( x \in \Delta \), if \( x^n_s > 0 \) for some \( s \in S_n \) and \( p_x(C) = 0 \) then \( p_{x^s}(C) = 0 \). It follows that if \( \tilde{x}^n_s > 0 \) for some \( s \in S_n \) then \( y^n_s = \tilde{y}^n_s \). Consequently, for \( s, t \in S_n \) with \( \tilde{x}^n_s > 0 \), we have \( y^n_s = \tilde{y}^n_s \geq \tilde{y}^n_t \geq y^n_t \), which completes the proof.

**Remarks:**

a) The proof of the above theorem has a resemblance to “trembling hand” arguments in Selten (1975) and the sequential equilibria of Krebs and Wilson (1982), however the mechanism for giving very small or infinitesimal probabilities to actions is different.

b) What the players observe in common is some set \( C \) in \( Q \). Given that they know each other’s strategies, the choice of \( x \) in \( \Delta \), they know in common a conditional probability distribution on elements contained in the set \( C \) in \( Q \). This doesn’t mean that each player knows only this about the payoffs, either his or her payoff or those of others. A player may learn much more, including potentially exactly which \( e \in C \) will be reached for any given \( C \in Q \). In such an event the player evaluates his or her actions according to that exact knowledge of the end point \( e \), however knowing also that the payoff at \( e \) is determined by the induced common knowledge distribution on \( C \). There is a similarity with poker, in which a player may know that he or she has the winning hand, but that player’s betting strategy reflects an understanding of what all players believe.

c) It would be tempting to define the continuation payoffs from the \( F_C \) always as those from a game, that is payoffs generated by strategies. However we would then require for all \( e \in C \in Q \) some determination of a payoff for each player \( n \in N \), including the case of some \( W \in Q_n \) given zero probability by the relevant strategy \( x \). There is a problem with defining a player whose
presence in the game has zero probability and yet receives a payoff that could potentially torpedo the equilibrium property. On the other hand, we did need to define such payoffs, as we had to consider the payoff consequences of decision functions chosen with zero probability according to $x$ and make sure that they did not profit the player in question over those decision functions given positive probability.

d) Also tempting would be to interpret the landing at a $C \in Q$ that is given zero probability by the $x \in \Delta$ as the trigger of some punishment of a player. With two-player games, if only one player had deviated, indeed that player can be held responsible for bringing the play to the set $C$. But with three or more players, it may be impossible to obtain common knowledge of which player had brought the game to this forbidden subset. Imagine the following example; there are three players $i = 1, 2, 3$ and each player has three strategies, left, right, and centre, and each player is required to play only centre. If all three players choose centre, then all three players are informed of this fact. If Player $i$ chooses left then Player $i - 1$ (modulo 3) is informed of this fact and if Player $i$ chooses right then Player $i + 1$ is informed of this fact; and in either case if Player $i$ was the only disobedient player, the only information that the third other player receives is that not all three players had chosen centre. Lets assume that Player 1 discovers that one of the other players was disobedient, but not which one. There are two possibilities, either Player 2 played right or Player 3 played left. Players 2 and 3 could both maintain that they were not disobedient. The effective punishment of Player 3 may be very beneficial to Player 2 which could place an otherwise sound equilibrium in doubt, as then Player 2 could deviate and then claim that it was Player 3 who deviated. With two players, this problem doesn’t appear, because the two could punish each other. With the above theorem, there is an implicit punishment through the choice of some continuation payoff for all the players, but no explicit punishment strategies, which may prove problematic.

e) We could have stated the theorem so that the multifunction of payoffs applies only to all distributions that can be generated by strategies, but it would have made no difference. This is because the set of distributions generated by strategies is closed, and an upper-semi-continuous multifunction with values as described and defined on a closed subset of distributions can be extended to an analogous multifunction defined on all distributions.
4 Games of Incomplete Information on One Side

We return to Neyman’s question. There is a finite set $K$ of states of nature. Nature chooses a state $k \in K$ according to a commonly known probability on $K$, and Player One, but not Player Two, is informed of nature’s choice. The finite sets of moves for the players are the same for all states, the set $I$ for Player One and the set $J$ for Player Two. After each stage of play, both players are informed of each others’ moves. The play is repeated indefinitely, and the chosen state remains constant throughout play.

For every state $k \in K$ let $A^k$ and $B^k$ be the payoff matrices of the two players with $I$ indexing the rows and $J$ indexing the columns. The entries $a^k_{i,j}$ and $b^k_{i,j}$ in $A^k$ and $B^k$ are the payoffs to the first and second players respectively, given that the state is $k$, the move of Player One is $i$, and the move of Player Two is $j$.

The strategies of the game are the same as those described in Simon, Spież, and Toruńczyk (1995) and Aumann and Maschler (1995), though the payoffs are defined differently. For the sake of completeness, we describe the strategy and payoff structures below.

A behaviour strategy of Player One is an infinite sequence $\alpha = (\alpha^1, \alpha^2, \ldots)$ such that for each $l \alpha^l$ is a mapping from $K \times (I \times J)^{l-1}$ to $\Delta(I)$.

A behaviour strategy of Player Two is an infinite sequence $\beta = (\beta^1, \beta^2, \ldots)$ such that for each $l \beta^l$ is a mapping from $(I \times J)^{l-1}$ to $\Delta(I)$.

Let $I$ and $J$ be the set of behaviour strategies of Players One and Two, respectively. Define the set of finite play-histories of length $l$ to be $H_l := K \times (I \times J)^l$, and define $H^k_l$ to be the subset $\{k\} \times (I \times J)^l$.

For any fixed $k \in K$, every pair of behaviour strategies $\alpha \in I$ and $\beta \in J$ induces a probability measure $\mu^{l,k}_{\alpha,\beta}$ on $H^k_l$, and with the initial probability $p_0$ such a pair induces a probability measure $\mu^{l}_{\alpha,\beta}$ on $H_l$.

To define the payoffs, for both players $i = 1, 2$ there is a finite sequence $\lambda^1, \lambda^2, \ldots, \lambda^n$ of non-negative real numbers such that $\lambda^i = \lambda^1_i + \cdots + \lambda^n_i$ and $0 \leq \lambda^i \leq 1$. For every $h \in H_n$ with $h = (k, i_1, j_1, \ldots, i_n, j_n)$ define $f^1_n(h)$ to be $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \lambda^1_i a^k_{i_1,j_1}$ and $f^2_n(h)$ to be $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \lambda^2_i b^k_{i_1,j_1}$. For every $h \in H_m$ with $h = (k, i_1, j_1, \ldots, i_m, j_m)$ define $\tilde{f}^1_m(h)$ to be $\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} a^k_{i_1,j_1}$ and $\tilde{f}^2_m(h)$ to be
An equilibrium is a pair of behaviour strategies \( \alpha \in I \) and \( \beta \in J \) such that for every \( k \in K \)

\[
a^k = \int_{\mathcal{H}^k_n} f^n_1(h) d\mu_{\alpha,\beta}^{n,k} + (1 - \lambda^1) \lim_{m \to \infty} \int_{\mathcal{H}^k_m} \tilde{f}_m^1(h) d\mu_{\alpha,\beta}^{m,k}
\]

and

\[
b^k = \int_{\mathcal{H}^k_n} f^n_2(h) d\mu_{\alpha,\beta}^{n,k} + (1 - \lambda^2) \lim_{m \to \infty} \int_{\mathcal{H}^k_m} \tilde{f}_m^2(h) d\mu_{\alpha,\beta}^{m,k}
\]

exist and for every pair \( \alpha^* \in I \) and \( \beta^* \in J \)

\[
\int_{\mathcal{H}_n} f^n_1(h) d\mu_{\alpha^{*},\beta}^{n} + (1 - \lambda^1) \lim_{m \to \infty} \sup_{\mathcal{H}_m} \int_{\mathcal{H}_m} \tilde{f}_m^1(h) d\mu_{\alpha^{*},\beta}^{m} \leq \sum_k p^k a^k
\]

and

\[
\int_{\mathcal{H}_n} f^n_2(h) d\mu_{\alpha^{*},\beta}^{n} + (1 - \lambda^2) \lim_{m \to \infty} \sup_{\mathcal{H}_m} \int_{\mathcal{H}_m} \tilde{f}_m^2(h) d\mu_{\alpha^{*},\beta}^{m} \leq \sum_k p^k b^k.
\]

Such games as described above we call Neyman games, to distinguish them from the conventional infinitely repeated games of incomplete information on one side, introduced in Aumann and Maschler (1995). If \( \lambda^i = 0 \) for both \( i = 1, 2 \) then the game is the one described there and the above is the definition of an equilibrium of such a game.

Notice the asymmetry in the behaviour strategies used to define equilibria. Player One’s strategy uses knowledge of the state of nature, so the maximisation, relative to a fixed strategy of Player Two, can be performed on each state independently. Player Two’s knowledge of the state of nature comes only from a calculations of Bayesian conditional probabilities according Player One’s chosen strategy and the actions taken.

With regard to the infinitely repeated game in Aumann and Maschler (1995), these authors with the help of R. Stearns introduced a solution concept known as a joint plan. For any \( p \in \Delta(K) \) define \( a^*(p) \) to be the value of the zero-sum game defined by the matrix \( A(p) := \sum_{k \in K} p^k A^k \), where \( p^k \) is the probability that \( p \) gives to the state \( k \in K \). Likewise define \( b^*(p) \) to be the value of the zero-sum defined by the matrix \( B(p) := \sum_{k \in K} p^k B^k \). A vector \( x \in \mathbb{R}^K \) is individually rational for Player One if \( x \cdot q \geq a^*(q) \) for all \( q \in \Delta(K) \). A pair \( (r, p) \in \mathbb{R} \times \Delta(K) \) is individually rational for Player
Two if \( r \geq \text{vex}(b^*)(p) \), where \( \text{vex}(b^*) \) is the unique convex function satisfying \( \text{vex}(b^*) \leq b^* \) and \( \text{vex}(b^*) \geq f \) for all convex functions \( f \) such that \( f \leq b^* \).

For every \( \gamma \in \Delta(I \times J) \) define \( \gamma A \in \mathbf{R}^K \) by

\[
(\gamma A)^k := \sum_{(i,j) \in I \times J} \gamma^{(i,j)} A^k(i,j)
\]

and define \( \gamma B \) likewise. A joint plan for an initial probability \( p_0 \) is

(1) a finite subset of probabilities \( V \subseteq \Delta(K) \) such that the convex hull of \( V \) contains the initial probability \( p_0 \),

(2) for every \( v \in V \) a \( \gamma_v \in \Delta(I \times J) \),

(3) for some finite \( n \) a finite set \( T \subset I^n \) of signals in bijective relation to the set \( V \) and a state dependent choice of an \( s \in T \) performed by Player One such that the signal \( s \in T \) implies by Bayes rule a conditional probability on the set \( K \) equal to its corresponding member in \( V \).

(4) if the signal \( s \) chosen corresponds to \( v \in V \), an agreement between the players to play through the rest of the game a deterministic sequence of pairs of actions \( ((i_1,j_1), (i_2,j_2), \ldots) \) such that in the limit the distribution \( \gamma_v \) is obtained, and

(5) punishment strategies of the two players to be implemented in the event that a player does not adhere to the agreed upon sequence of actions.

Aumann and Maschler showed that a joint plan describes an equilibrium of the undiscounted game if there is an individually rational \( y \in \mathbf{R}^K \) such that for every \( v \in V \) the following holds:

(1) \( (\gamma_v B) \cdot v \geq \text{vex}(b^*)(v) \),

(2) \( \forall k \in K \ (\gamma_v A)^k = y^k \) if \( v^k > 0 \),

(3) \( \forall k \in K \ (\gamma_v A)^k \leq y^k \) if \( v^k = 0 \).

If necessary, Player One is punished according to a strategy of Player Two such that simultaneously for every \( k \in K \) Player One is held down to no more than \( y^k \). This ability of Player Two is based on a theorem of D. Blackwell (1956).

The punishment of Player Two centers on the conditional probability of the states of nature as implied by the actions taken and the chosen strategy of Player One. There is a qualitative difference between the punishment of
the two players. The punishment of Player One is absolute with a quantity
determined for each state simultaneously. The punishment of Player Two
is relative to a conditional probability distribution on the states of nature.
The need to calculate payoffs according to expectation gives the effective
punishment.

The equilibrium payoffs of a joint plan equilibrium is the pair \((x, y)\)∈\(\mathbb{R}^K \times \mathbb{R}^K\) such that for every \(k \in K\) the value \(x^k\) is what the first player gets in
average expectation in the limit at the state \(k\) and \(y^k\) is what the second
player gets in average expectation in the limit at the state \(k\). Notice from
the structure of a joint plan that these values are well defined.

Hart (1985) showed that if \((x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2)\)∈\(\mathbb{R}^K \times \mathbb{R}^k\) are both equilib-
rium payoffs of two distinct joint plan equilibrium corresponding to the same
initial probability distribution on the states, then for every \(0 \leq \lambda \leq 1\) there
is an equilibrium of the game that delivers expected payoffs of \(\lambda(x_1, y_1) + (1 - \lambda)(x_2, y_2)\). The players accomplish this through a jointly controlled lottery, a
way for the players to choose one or the other joint plan equilibrium through
an initial phase of independent random behaviour. See also Aumann and
Maschler (1995) for an explanation of a jointly controlled lottery.

Now we apply Theorem 3 to prove the following theorem.

**Theorem 4.** The above question of A. Neyman is answered in the affirma-
tive, meaning that every Neyman game has an equilibrium.

**Proof:** In order to use Theorem 3, we have to define the truncated game
tree, the mixed strategy space \(\Delta\), the partitions \(Q_i\) on the end points of this
tree, the continuation vectors \(F_C\) for every \(C \in Q_1 \land Q_2 = Q\), the payoff
functions \(g^{ei}\) for the players \(i = 1, 2\), and also what continuation payoff is
chosen when a \((\sigma, \tau) \in \Delta\) means that the corresponding \(C\) will be reached
with zero probability.

Without loss of generality, we assume that both players have at least two
actions, or that \(I\) and \(J\), the set of actions of Players One and Two, re-
spectively, both have cardinality greater than one. If either had cardinality
one, there would be no strategic choices for one of the players and the result
follows from the straightforward optimization of the other player. We need
\(|I| > 1\) and \(|J| > 1\) to conduct the joint lotteries.

The first \(n\) stages of a Neyman game define the truncated game tree \(\Gamma_n\) for
which \(E := K \times (I \times J)^n\) are the end points. The truncated game tree
has $2n + 1$ levels of play, the first level 0 being Nature’s choice and the $2n$ following levels being alternations between Player One’s and Player Two’s choices of actions. To avoid confusion, we call the former stages and the latter levels. Player One chooses actions in the odd levels Player Two chooses actions in the positive even levels. The first to move is Nature, choosing some $k \in K$ at level 0. After Nature’s choice, Player One has a partition consisting of $|K|$ different singletons, representing a complete knowledge of Nature’s choice. This is followed by an action of Player Two at level 2, for which Player Two has only one partition member, meaning that Player Two has no information on which to base his choice of action. For every $0 \leq m < n$, at the conclusion of the $2m + 1$st level Player One’s partition consist of the singletons of $K \times (I \times J)^m$, which are used to determine Player One’s $m + 1$st action, followed by partition elements for Player Two (to determine his $m + 1$st action) defined by the different members of $(I \times J)^m$ (meaning that Player Two saw the first $m$ actions of Player One but not the $m + 1$st action). The partition $Q_1$ on $E$ for Player One consists of the $|K| \cdot |I^n| \cdot |J|^n$ many singletons (meaning that at the conclusion of the truncated game tree Player Two does learn what Player One did in the last stage of that tree). The partition $Q_2$ on $E$ for the second player consists of the sets of size $|K|$ of the form $K \times \{x\}$ for all $x \in (I \times J)^n$. The partition $Q = Q_1 \land Q_2$ defining the common knowledge is the same as $Q_2$ the partition corresponding to the second player. There is a one-to-one correspondence between every $C \in Q$ and every sequence $(i_1, j_1, \ldots, i_n, j_n)$ of moves by both players.

Let $S_1$ and $S_2$ be the set of pure decision functions of Player One and Player Two respectively. The space of mixed strategies of the truncated game tree is $\Delta := \Delta(S_1) \times \Delta(S_2)$. Likewise a pair of behaviour strategies for the whole game is equivalent to a point in $\Delta$ followed by a collection of behaviour strategies for the stages after the $n$th stage. Every choice of $(\sigma, \tau) \in \Delta$ combined with a sequence $i_1, j_1, \ldots, i_l, j_l$ of actions taken with positive probability induces through the Bayes rule a conditional probability on $C = \{(k, i_1, j_1, \ldots, i_n, j_n) \mid k \in K\}$. As stated above, the sequence $i_1, j_1, \ldots, i_l, j_l$ defines uniquely a member $C$ in $Q$ and $P_{\sigma, \tau}(\cdot | C)$ is that conditional probability, whereby it does not matter whether we see this as a distribution on the set $C = \{(k, i_1, j_1, \ldots, i_n, j_n) \mid k \in K\}$ or on the set $K$ itself.

Notice that for $e = (k, i_1, j_1, \ldots, i_n, j_n)$, the probability $P_{\sigma, \tau}(e)$ is the product of the probability of the choice of $k \in K$, the corresponding probabilities of
actions of Player One induced by $\sigma$ and the observable histories of play and the corresponding probabilities of actions of Player Two induced by $\tau$ and the observable histories of play. Since the probabilities of actions of Player Two so induced do not depend on $k \in K$ (because this is not observed by Player Two) we obtain that

\[ (*) \] If for $\sigma \in \Delta(S_1)$ and $\tau, \tau' \in \Delta(S_2)$ and some $C \in Q$ both $P_{\sigma,\tau}(C)$ and $P_{\sigma,\tau'}(C)$ are non-zero then the conditional probabilities $P_{\sigma,\tau}(\cdot | C)$ and $P_{\sigma,\tau'}(\cdot | C)$ are equal.

We define $F_C : \Delta(C) \to \mathbb{R}^{C \times \{1,2\}}$ such that for every $p \in \Delta(C)$ the set $F_C(p)$ is the convexification of the joint plan equilibria corresponding to the initial probability distribution $\Delta(C)$. For every $e \in E$, which corresponds to a history $h = (k, i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_n, j_n) \in \mathcal{H}_n$, also a member of some $C \in Q$, and some continuation vector $v \in \mathbb{R}^{C \times \{1,2\}}$, define the payoff $g^{e,i}(v^{e,i})$ to be $f_n^i(h) + (1 - \lambda^i)v^{e,i}$.

Now consider the case of $(\sigma, \tau)$ such that the conditional probability on some $C$ is ill defined. If there is no $\tau$ such that with $(\sigma, \tau)$ the set $C$ is reached with positive probability, then a continuation payoff can be chosen arbitrarily in $F_C(q)$ for any $q$. If there is some $\tau$ such that the set $C$ is reached with positive probability with $(\sigma, \tau)$, let the continuation payoff be any in $F_C(q)$ for $q$ being the conditional probability defined by $(\sigma, \tau)$. Notice that, by $(*)$, all such $\tau$ define the same conditional probability.

To apply Theorem 3, we need to know that $F_C$ so defined is u.s.c., non-empty, and convex valued. With regard to the conventional infinitely repeated undiscounted games, by Simon, Spież, and Toruńczyk (1995) joint plan equilibria exist for every probability in the probability simplex $\Delta(K)$ and the equality and inequality conditions defining them imply that they are upper-semi-continuous as a correspondence (indeed satisfying the stronger condition of “spanning”, Simon, Spież, and Toruńczyk (2002)). It follows from Hart (1985) that equilibrium payoffs are generated by convexifying the payoffs from joint plan equilibria corresponding to any fixed probability $p \in \Delta(K)$. As the vector space of payoffs is finite dimensional, the point-wise convexification of an upper-semi-continuous correspondence is also upper-semi-continuous.

From Kuhn’s Theorem (1953) we can equivalently consider mixed strategies for the first $n$ stages combined with behaviour strategies for the fol-
lowing stages. From Theorem 3, there are mixed strategies $\sigma$ and $\tau$ in $\Delta = \Delta(S_1) \times \Delta(S_2)$ on the first $n$ stages that satisfy the results of Theorem 3. We combine the $\sigma$ and $\tau$ with behaviour strategies for the remaining stages that correspond, for each $C \in Q$, to the equilibrium payoffs in $F_C(p)$ obtained from Theorem 3.

In the definition of $\sigma$ and $\tau$, as long as the set $C \in Q$ should be reached with positive probability by these strategies, neither player cannot detect deviation by the other player. Furthermore no action of either player in the first $n$ stages can change the conditional probability on any $C \in Q$. This is because the actions taken by both players define the $C \in Q$ and the only way to update the conditional probabilities is through observation of the played actions. Changing strategies can only result in a change in the distribution on the $C \in Q$ reached, but not the conditional probability associated with any fixed $C \in Q$.

We consider first what happens at the stages beyond the $n$th, and consider first the payoff of Player Two. Because of the way the continuation payoff was defined in all cases and because the first player is adhering to its prescribed strategy, it does not matter whether or not the $C \in Q$ is reached with positive probability, the $q$ used to define the continuation payoff in $F_C(q)$ is the conditional probability on the states as defined by the first $n$ stages of play. As his prescribed behaviour after the $n$th stage is an equilibrium of the the undiscounted Aumann-Maschler game whose distribution on the states of nature is that conditional probability $q$, there is no advantage for deviation. As for Player One, it doesn’t matter which state is chosen and what is the corresponding conditional probability $q$ on the states (as understood by Player Two), Player One gets the corresponding continuation payoff with the prescribed behaviour strategy and according to Blackwell (1956) cannot obtain a better payoff no matter which state was chosen.

The equalities and inequalities defining the myopic equilibrium, combined with the lack of incentive to deviate after the first $n$ stages, removes any incentive for either player to deviate in the first $n$ stages. \hfill $\Box$

Dropping the condition of perfect monitoring, we suspect that a proof of equilibrium existence is straightforward as long as Player One has the ability to send distinct non-revealing signals, the same sufficient condition for equilibria described in Simon, Spie\l , and Toruńczyk (2002).

For the application of Theorem 3, it is not necessary that the payoffs from
the initial $n$ stages are related in any way to the payoffs from the following undiscounted game. The only relevance of the first $n$ stages to the following stages is the induced probability distribution on the states $K$. We could therefore introduce two sets of payoffs, one for a discounted game with infinite sequences $\lambda_1^i, \lambda_2^i, \ldots$ for both players $i = 1, 2$ and another set of payoffs for an undiscounted game. Arbitrary pairs of payoffs so combined together would allow for $\epsilon$-equilibria for every $\epsilon > 0$ (by defining the truncated game tree from arbitrarily many initial stages). Following Theorem 3 we could do the same for any definition of payoffs for the initial $n$ stages.

But what of 0-equilibria? The obtaining of good payoffs in one of the two games, either the undiscounted or discounted, would be a distraction for obtaining good payoffs in the other game. At present it is not known whether such equilibria exist (optimal strategies) even in the zero-sum games where the undiscounted and discounted payoffs are defined using the same matrices. Given that optimal strategies do exist for such a zero-sum game, nevertheless the performing of joint lotteries to convexify the payoffs would be a distraction from the process of playing the discounted game. Therefore to demonstrate a 0-equilibrium here would require an extension of Theorem 2 to the “spanning property” of Simon, Spież, and Toruńczyk (2002) rather than the much simpler property of convex valued. Nevertheless one would have to show also that the equilibrium behaviour of the players from an infinite sequence of game tree truncations would be appropriate for the undiscounted game.

Though the theorem can deliver powerful results concerning the equilibria of composite games, one does have to be careful that the given continuation payoffs are supported by equilibria of the continuation game. Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information can lack equilibria if one gives to Player Two some very slight information that Player One does not have; such are games of “incomplete information on one and a half sides” in Sorin and Zamir (1985). Exactly this problem arises because the continuation payoffs of the theorem are determined by a distribution on the set $C$ that is common knowledge, and yet a player may know more than this and choose not to accept any payoff scheme determined by such common knowledge. In the application to Neyman’s question, this problem was avoided by an established theory concerning the equilibria of games with incomplete information on one side. Indeed even with imperfect monitoring over a finite set of stages, there may be problems with the “individual rationality” condition necessary
for an equilibrium in some contexts (Stapenhorst (2016)). The desire not to let such difficulties detract from the power of the theorem was furthermore a reason for formulating the theorem without there being necessarily a continuation game.

5 Other examples and applications

Although it was developed for understanding the Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated games, the concept of a myopic equilibrium is independent of these games.

Look at the following simple example, based on the $2 \times 2$ matrix $A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$ and representing the conventional zero-sum matching pennies game with two players and two actions. From this simple game create a non-zero-sum game in the following way. If $(p, 1 - p)$ is the mixed strategy of Player One and $(q, 1 - q)$ is the mixed strategy of Player Two (probabilistic choices for the two pure actions), let the payoff of Player One be $(p, 1 - p)A(q, 1 - q)^t + \max(p, 1 - p)$ and let the payoff of Player Two be $-(p, 1 - p)A(q, 1 - q)^t + \max(q, 1 - q)$. It is easy to see that there would be no Nash equilibrium in the usual sense of best replies, as in response to any mixed strategy of the other player a payoff of 1 could be obtained by choosing with certainty one or the other action, and yet a payoff of 1 could not be obtained by both players simultaneously (as the sum of their payoffs being at least 2 is possible only if both chose some action with certainty and then one of the players would have a payoff of no more than 0). One can also show that this game does not have local equilibria as described above.

Now define the payoff from an action $i = 1, 2$ of Player One as $e_iA(q, 1 - q)^t + \max(p, 1 - p)$, where $e_1 = (1, 0)$ and $e_2 = (0, 1)$. Do the same for Player Two: his payoff is $-(p, 1 - p)Ae_i^t + \max(q, 1 - q)$. Given that both $p$ and $q$ are fixed at $\frac{1}{2}$, both actions of both players yield the same expected payoff of $\frac{1}{2}$, meaning that a myopic equilibrium is defined. One could interpret the $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ distribution as the accidental result of a flip of the coin that does not change the probability by which that choice is made.

To demonstrate further the fundamental difference in equilibrium concepts, look at the following one-person optimisation example where there is both a Nash equilibrium and a myopic equilibrium, but they are very different.
Our single player Piers wants to vote for Donald Trump, but is deeply embarrassed by the desire to do so. Behaviour in the voting booth is secret, however the voting intention of Piers before entering the voting booth is not secret (at least from his wife and closest friends) and this influences the utility of his behaviour. Let us assume that $p$ is the probability that Piers will vote for Trump and that Piers loses $5p$ in utility through that voting intention, regardless of what he actually does. All things being equal, regardless of the value of $p$, in the voting booth there is an advantage of 1 to vote for Trump over Clinton. Without loss of generality, lets assume that once in the voting booth the utility of voting for Trump and Clinton is $1 - 5p$ and $-5p$ respectively. Regardless of the probability $p$, voting for Trump is always preferable to voting for Clinton, which makes for one unique myopic equilibrium, namely a certain vote for Trump ($p = 1$). Define the payoff function on the probability simplex in the way outlined above – as a function of $p$, the expected utility to Piers would be $p(1 - 5p) + (1 - p)(-5p) = -4p$. The unique optimal payoff as a function of $p$ would be 0 obtained at $p = 0$, meaning a certain vote for Clinton (and this defines the unique Nash equilibrium). However the certain vote for Trump, the unique myopic equilibrium, results in an expected payoff of $-4$. We see from this example that a myopic equilibrium of a one-player game is not necessarily a local maximum.

The distinction between myopic equilibria and Nash equilibria for one player games can exist when neither occur at the boundary of the probability simplex. Now we assume, for whatever reason, that the embarrassment of wanting to vote for Trump disappears when one actually votes for Clinton. Following this idea, the utility for voting for Trump and Clinton could be $1 - 5p$ and 0, respectively. As a problem of optimisation, the expected utility of the distribution $(p, 1 - p)$ is $(1 - 5p)p = p - 5p^2$, a strictly concave function with a unique maximal solution. By taking the derivative and setting it to zero, one discovers that the value is maximised at $p = \frac{1}{10}$ (the unique myopic maximum and Nash equilibrium) for the value of $\frac{1}{20}$. However the unique myopic equilibrium is obtained at $p = \frac{1}{5}$, where both the utility of voting for Clinton and voting for Trump are equal and are equal to 0.

Our Theorem 1 was a modification of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), designed to understand the stability of equilibria. In this context, stability of a subset of equilibria means that perturbing the payoffs of the game results always in new equilibria that are close to this subset. In this respect, see also Govindan and Wilson (2002 and 2005) and Mertens (1989 and 1991). Similar
applications of algebraic topology to myopic equilibria may be relevant to evolutionary game theory.

We believe the most relevant application of myopic equilibria will be toward a new and more liberal understanding of what is a subgame in a game tree. Conventionally, the concept of a subgame is very restrictive; it is a node where upon being reached all players know that this node and only this node has been reached. It is common for students to identity subgames erroneously because of this restrictive definition. With the concept of myopic equilibria, for a subset of nodes intermediate to the flow of the game we can perceive a family of subgames as distributions on this set, determined by the mixed strategies of players who had acted previously. From Theorem 1 we know that the equilibrium correspondence as a function of these distributions has a topological structure implying the spanning property of Simon, Spież, and Toruńczyk (2002). This orientation would be empowered by a generalisation of Theorem 2 employing the spanning property, both in the resulting structure of myopic equilibrium solutions and in the input correspondence of payoffs.

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