Transnational Migration and Environmental Security in Africa: Theory and Evidence from Nigeria

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Abstract: Migration is a strong expression of spatial flows, which gives not only life and impetus to the dynamic global political economy, but also to changes in demography and environment. Africa’s migration history is complex, and deeply rooted in historical antecedents. Hence, migration policies in Africa, nay, Nigeria began to take shape after independence was granted to her in the early 1960s. This paper interrogates the nexus between transnational migration and environmental security in Africa with theoretical and empirical evidence from Nigeria. Specifically, we examined how environmentally-linked migration that spans Nigeria’s territory interacts with geopolitical and social factors to influence herdsman-farmers conflicts in the 21st century Africa political economy. The theoretical framework that anchored the study is the group identity and simple scarcity. Data was gathered through the documentary method of data collection. Our data analysis was based on qualitative descriptive analysis and the ex-post facto research design was adopted. The study found that environmental issues and natural resources scarcity in particular, have made migration a global problem. The study recommended for the need to integrate and translate climate change adaptation, migration policies, and conflict management programmes into concrete projects for they are not stand-alone levers, but functions within the wider political economy.

Keywords: Transnational migration, migration-environment nexus, Environmental security, Conflicts and Geopolitics

1. INTRODUCTION

The artificial territorial demarcation of countries induced an important evolution in the study of transnational migration and security studies, both in theory and in practice. In Africa, every country has been affected by transnational migration, in all its forms. Some people choose to migrate; others are forced to do so by natural disasters, coups, insurgencies, dictatorships, war, and conflict. Internal conflict in Africa is often the result of migration pressures and resource scarcities. According to official statistics, about 30 million Africans—about 3 percent of the population—have migrated internationally (including within Africa). This figure which includes both voluntary migrants and international refugees—almost certainly underestimates the size and importance of migration from and particularly within Africa. About two-thirds of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly poorer migrants, go to other countries in the region; the bulk of migrants remain within their sub regions. In West Africa, for example, more than 70 percent of intra-African emigration was within the sub region. In contrast, more than 90 percent of migrants from North Africa travel to countries outside the region (Ratha, Mohapatra, Özden, Plaza, Shaw & Shimeles, 2011).

Migration in different typology moves along with it the social, economic and environmental conflicts/challenges. Empirical evidence demonstrates Africa's peripheral role in the world economy. For example, West African countries have in common the lowest standards of living in the world. Eleven out of the fifteen members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are among the bottom thirty countries in the 2011 Human Development Index (HDI) compiled by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (UNDP, 2011). With regard to forged migration in Africa, nearly 2.2 million Africans living in countries other than the ones in which they were born are
recognized as refugees, displaced mainly by war or drought and other natural disasters (UNHCR, 2010). The number of refugees has declined sharply from the late 1990s, when their numbers reached about 5 million and 1 out of every 5 Africa migrants was a refugee (Hatton & Williamson 2003; and Lucas 2006). The decline reflects the lower frequency of coups, guerilla insurgency, government collapse, and civil war. However, these have increased with the incessant migration-environment induced security challenges in the African continent.

There is no gain saying that environmental insecurity abound in Africa. What is disturbing is the trend in the conflicts associated with migration-environment induced threats. The 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated that already 25% of Africa’s population experience high levels of water stress and that by 2050, up to 600 million Africans will be at risk (IPCC, 2007). Africa has conflicts in the Nile basin over the issue of river Nile water; in the Horn of Africa over the use of pasture/grazing land; in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over minerals and natural resources; in Liberia over diamond and timber; in Sierra Leone over natural resources and minerals; in Angola between UNITA and MPLA over legitimacy of government and the conflict sustained by access to natural resources like Diamond in the north for UNITA and oil in the south for MPLA that controls the government; in Zambia over the use of fertile land; in the Great Lakes region of Africa over water, minerals, fertile land and illegal hunting; in East Africa between the Massai in Kenya and Tanzania and the Turkana tribe over pasture/grazing lands, farmlands and protected zones; in Ethiopia between Borona and Degodia and in Sudan’s Darfur region between the government and local communities over oil resource sharing, access to land, minerals and desertification (Phil-Eze, 2009). The list is endless, as Nigeria is not an exception.

Nigeria is a federal structure, with 36 states and has 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) (IDMC, 2012). Nigeria as a developing country has the largest economy on the African continent in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) (Caulderwood, 2014); and with economic growth of more than 6% in 2014 (World Bank, 2015 cited in Métivier, 2015). The country gained independence in 1960, and after several decades of political instability, with numerous military coups, civilian rule was eventually established in 1999. In addition to the numerous economic, political and social challenges it has to cope with, Nigeria is facing environmental risks that are pervasive in the years and decades as a result of climate change. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the whole African continent will become increasingly exposed to the negative impacts of climate change (Ferris & Stark, 2012), notably including population movements. The United Nations Environment Programme has stated that by 2060, there will be around 50 million environmental migrants in Africa (Afifi, 2011). Environmental migration and security have become a front burner from the policy makers, through the academia, the local communities, and to the general public in Nigeria.

Flowing from the above, the study specifically interrogates the link between migration and environmental threats with empirical and theoretical evidence from farmers/herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria.

2. CONCEPTUAL AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW

Environmental migration discourse has become a new form of overpopulation discourse, positioning environmental migration as a threat to sustainability and has emerged as transnational security challenges. The key challenge here is how to achieve a better conceptual and literature review in environmental issues and migration studies. While many migration scholars make assumptions about the nature, complex causes, and impacts of environmental change, many scholars studying environmental change base their often unrealistically high migration projections on outdated push-pull or neoclassical migration models. The lack of integration between these fields is manifested in the weak theorization, and lack of sound empirical evidence on links between migration and environmental change.

Primarily, environment can be seen as the total surrounding of man, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna and humans, including their interactions. Environment should be human focused and human centered because the condition of the environment is derived from human perception and human surrounding (Phil-Eze, 2009). According to Mondal (2015), environment entails materials and forces that surround the living organism or anything immediately surrounding an object and exerting a direct influence on it. Environment has natural and artificial fronts. The identifiable natural components of the environment include: biosphere, lithosphere, atmosphere and
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hydrosphere. With regard to the artificial environment, it refers to the socio-cultural milieu and also to the values that form the people’s pattern of life, societal organization and institutions together with the notable growth and development as well as the physical setting wherein such processes obtain (Mondal, 2015).

Migration, at its simplest can be understood as the movement of people from one place to another. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines migration as ‘The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification (IOM, 2014).

While the majority of migrants migrate in search of work and economic and social opportunities, a relatively small percentage of migrants are people fleeing armed conflict, natural disaster, famine or persecution.

Environment and migration scholars argued that environmental change provided a useful lens to study migration. Environmental change, as a complex and multidimensional process linked to social, economic, political, and technological change, parallels the complexity of migration as a process of transformation. Not only are both driven by a range of structural forces, but also migration and environmental change processes take shape and evolve over time and space and on different analytical scales. Kniveton (2012) maintains: Notwithstanding that the impact of the environment is largely manifest through the other determinants of migration, say through yield loss, or that different drivers combine non-linearly in their impact on migration, we would argue that environmental change poses a set of questions that while not exclusive to the environment allow a different perspective on understanding of the migration process.

There is increasing awareness that environmental factors are among many other variables working in concert to shape, prompt or constrain migration flows; and that environmental factors tend to affect migration more indirectly and their indirect impacts depend on their interaction with structural drivers of migration, such as economic and political conditions (Foresight, 2011; Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, Geddes & Thomas, 2011, and Zetter, 2010). Changes in the environment have an indirect effect and are a part of a larger complex of factors affecting mobility (as well as immobility) by impacting people’s livelihoods, access to resources and wellbeing (Castles, 2012 and Versvoort, 2012). Gomez and Christensen, (2010) cited in Rath, Mohapatra, Özden, Plaza, Shaw & Shimeles, (2011) posits that refugees imposes a substantial burden on host countries by requiring additional public expenditures, putting pressures on infrastructure, and contributing to environmental degradation. (For example, the presence of Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees was perceived by their Sudanese hosts to pose an enormous strain on the fragile Sudanese economy (Ek & Karadawi, 1991).

Newland (2012) holds that environmental change as a call to action often draws upon the belief that changes in the environment will necessary lead to new forms of (forced) migration and an overall significant increase in the volume of migration flows. Moreover, she questions whether in playing this role, environmental migration discourse has become a new form of overpopulation discourse, positioning environmental migration as a threat to sustainability. Castles (2012) and Nicholson (2012) similarly contend that governments perceive environmental change as a new enemy or threat, however, that this represents a larger contemporary political shift taking place from state to perceived non-state enemies and to perceived transnational security challenges. In this way, a war on ‘environmental change’ has emerged alongside wars on drugs or terror. Representations of threat position migrants either as passive victims or as threats themselves (Witsenburg 2012).

De Haas (2012) argues that policy debates about migration and environmental change continue to position movement as a response to deprivation. This ignores the fact that (particularly long-distance) migration requires significant resources and that extreme deprivation may actually lead to situations of involuntary immobility (Carling 2002). Policy debates surrounding this issue frame migration as a problem needing to be resolved and stopped. They also link migration to a problem or deficit, rather than an opportunity at home or elsewhere shaping movement decisions. De Haas (2012) contends that policy debates need to acknowledge modern migration theories, which highlight how migration is an intrinsic part of broader development processes (De Haas 2009), rather than a response to poverty. Environment-migration relationships involving environmental variability must examine the extent to
which such variations are an established feature of socio-economic life or present themselves as shocks to understand variability’s implications for migration processes.

Scholars such as Deudney (1990) lament the interlinking of environmental problems with security studies, for Dalby, since matters such as ozone depletion, pollution, and ‘many situations with a vaguely environmental designation’ are now ‘part of international political discourse and policy initiatives, environment cannot be separated from matters of what is now called “global” security’ (Dalby, 2002a: 95). For state-makers environmental security is, first and foremost, threats posed to sovereign states by environmental change (Swatuk, 2004). Proponents of environmental security argue that if environmental change is a potential source of social conflict, and if societies face dangers from environmental change, then security policies – indeed, the very concept itself – must be redefined to account for these threats (Conca and Dabelko, 1998).

The potential for conflict as a result of migration, environmental degradation and conflict has been documented in extant literature. Brown and Crawford clearly reject the notion that migration itself leads to conflict, but cite the claim by Schubert et al. that migration can increase the likelihood of conflict in transit and target regions (Brown & Crawford 2009). Several investigations also show that a great influx of migrants into new areas has been a significant factor in many environmental conflicts (Barnett and Adger 2007). What is generally recognised is that the most important factor behind the potential for migration to cause armed conflict is the political and institutional response to migrants. As Welzer emphasises, there is no scientific evidence that armed conflicts follow large migration flows, but climate change-induced migration must be considered a potential cause of violence when the demand on resources becomes greater than the resource availability (Welzer 2008). There are a number of situations where migration following changes in environmental contexts has led to armed conflict (Mobjörk, Eriksson, & Carlsen, 2010).

As a corollary to the above, the dynamics of the relationship that underscores migration and environmental nexus with empirical and theoretical evidence from farmers/herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria is yet to be given adequate scrutiny. Thus, we state categorically that widespread depletion and degradation of aquifers, rivers, land and other water resources, either from human induced stress or from climatic change, has the potential to produce violent conflicts.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework that anchored the study is the group identity and simple scarcity. According to the group identity theory, group identity conflicts are likely to arise from large-scale movements of population brought about by social strife, environmental change and conflicts. The theory posits that as different ethnic and cultural groups are propelled together under the circumstances of deprivation and stress, we should expect inter-group hostility, in which a group would emphasize its own identity while denigrating, discriminating against, and attacking outsiders. The focus of this theory is on the way groups reinforce their identities and the “we-they” cleavages that often result (Homer-Dixon, 1999: 105).

Homer-Dixon (1991) presents an argument on induced population movement. Homer-Dixon’s rationale on the possibility of conflict arising from large-scale population movements is grounded in group identity theory. He further reveals that the social psychology of intergroup conflict also suggest that social identity groups become more permeable (communities become more deeply segmented) under conditions of relative deprivation and threats to self-esteem. Where these conditions exist, quite trivial differences can be instrumentalized, fuelling hostility towards out-groups.

Homer-Dixon identifies four key social effects of change in the environment which generates large scale population movement and three principal types of acute conflict that is likely to result from these social effects. In fact, these social effects are often causally interlinked. Homer-Dixon hypothesizes those four social effects to a large extent increase the probability of conflict in developing countries: decreased agricultural production, population displacement, economic decline, and disruption of legitimized and authoritative institutions and social relations. Drawing on the traditional theories of conflict, it is postulated that severe change in the socio-economic structure and environment may generate among others simple scarcity conflicts. The conflicts (simple scarcity conflicts) that result from induced population movement may arise over three types of resources in particular: agricultural productive land, river water and fish.
The theory used here argues that environmental induced migration leads to conflicts. People can or adapt to adverse environmental changes by leaving affected areas. The choice of leaving the area is because of levels of technological expertise, which they lack. People living in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) like Nigeria may have no choice but to migrate from the affected areas. Environmental migration, in turn, increases the likelihood of conflict at its destination. The empirical findings on environmental migration suggest that climate change intensify migration, particularly in LDCs, and that migration lead to violence/conflicts as being witnessed in Nigeria. Climate change, migration and security are three issues that intersect in northern Nigeria. Thus, they are embedded in a web of factors with environmental, economic, social and political dimensions.

The outcome of this study implicated climate change, desertification and drought, land tenure and scarcity, as well as pastoral migration as factors that account for the spiral farmer/herder conflict in Nigeria. This corroborates the dominant scholarly standpoint on the subject matter, as we have seen in the aforementioned theoretical frame work. In Nigeria, environmental issues exacerbate violence and cause migration movements, underlining the fact that natural factors have massive consequences in terms of security, and have to be taken into account when addressing violence and migration in Nigeria. Thus, it is obvious that the migration and environment securitization is induced by natural resource use and mismanagement.

3.1. Migration and Environmental Insecurities in Africa: A Strong or Weak Link?

Africa’s migration history is complex, and present-day migration trends are deeply rooted in historical antecedents. Adepoju (2008) places African migratory movements in four broad categories: 1. labour migration to and within West Africa (90% of West African migrants stayed within their region and 39% of all intra-African migrants went to West Africa in 2009-2010; Shimeles, 2010) and Central Africa; 2. refugee flows in East Africa; 3. labour migration from Southern African countries to South Africa; 4. (irregular) cross-border migration (of specific ethnic groups and pastoral peoples) in West and East Africa, which Adepoju describes as probably the most common form of migration in Africa.

The links between migration and environmental change are hotly debated with alarmist projections on the one hand which estimate that between 200 million (Myers, 2005) and a billion people (Christian Aid, 2007) will be displaced by 2050 resulting in mass migration into Europe. On the other hand are more balanced assessments which, based on past experience and current migration patterns, foresee more mobility within developing regions rather than movements between continents (Foresight, 2011). Thus, migration is linked to environmental change as well as other economic, social and demographic factors. Migration is in fact already an important adaptation strategy for the poor coping with gradual onset climate stresses and shorter, sudden shocks (Tacoli, 2009).

The link between environmental insecurities and conflict in Africa is self-evident, due to negative impact that has been experienced by African peoples. While global warming, depletion of the ozone layer, pollution and deforestation are global problems in nature, desertification, soil erosion and water shortage, and the degradation emanating from the activities of multi-national companies (MNCs) by way of exploring or exploiting the environment for either oil (as in the Niger Delta of Nigeria) or precious stones (as in Liberia and Serra Leone etc) prominent in Africa, are linked to conflicts in the continent. In Africa, 45% of the landmass is desertified and has played a part in armed conflicts. It contributed to political instability, starvation and social breakdown in Niger, Somalia and, more recently, in the Darfur region of Sudan. Because desertification reduced the land available for farming and grazing, conflicts tend to erupt in the pursuit of space (Bakut, 2012).

Security is about survival and the conditions of human existence (Buzan, 1991), the absence of which, creates the conditions for conflict. This means that the conception of security embraces non military dimensions such as the environment, ethno-religious and nationalist identities, poverty and human insecurity and disease. Security is therefore, inextricably linked to peace and the conditions that create conflict, which include the environment. Thus, the conflicts arising out of environmental degradation are on the increase and pose serious challenge to African governments in terms of development, foreign policy, the environment and security. Migration and environment therefore, has a strong link to insecurities in Africa.

3.2. The Migration-Environmental Conflicts in Nigeria: No Longer At Ease

The connection between migration and environment, and its concomitant insecurity is rooted in the scarcity or abundance of natural resources within and between states, including the mismanagement
of or depletion of natural resources and the unequal access to natural resources (Annan, 2003). Nigeria, over the years has been enmeshed in intractable environmental conflicts that range from migration cum climate induced, through natural resources o mineral exploitation with their attendant indirect effects. The impacts of climate change are ravaging the northern states, gradually turning the region into a semi-arid zone and increasing the rate of desertification. Nigeria's southern region has had to cope with severe incidences of coastal and soil erosion. This is undermining the economic asset base, destroying human settlements and livelihoods, which could invariably lead to the deterioration of security. In the south, we observe an increase in communal clashes over farming land and a struggle for control over depleting natural resources. In the north, the unrest has taken on a deadly dimension (Mshelia, nd).

Nigerians are presently witnessing signs of climate change in a rising sea level, more frequent flooding, and outbreaks of conflicts and killings by herders against the host farmers in the north-central part of the country. In the northern part of the country, expanding desertification—which refers to the degradation of land productivity in dry land areas—has caused 200 villages to disappear. These opposing pressures, driven by climate change, have pushed internal migrants toward the center of Nigeria. Herdsmen, predominantly Hausa and Fulani, have long used migration and the nomadic herding of cattle, goats and sheep as a strategy for adapting to seasonal climatic variability (Blench, 2005). Human mobility and climate change in Nigeria occur amid serious threats to national and local governance.

People are moving from northern and southern Nigeria into the Middle Belt region where population is relatively low and where there is availability of vast arable land. The consequent rapid growth in population has caused the farmers to struggle for farmland which is becoming scarce by the day. With this development, grazing areas that were hitherto abundant are being taken over by scattered small farms, making grazing in these areas difficult. Tensions have grown over the past decades, with increasingly violent flare-ups spreading throughout the northern and southern states as incidents of violent conflicts between farmers and pastoralists have occurred in at least 22 of the country’s 36 states. The conflicts have been commonly credited to Fulani herdsmen expanding from the traditional grazing routes into the agricultural land which in turn always results into conflict over access to pasture. While the crop farmers accused the pastoralist of destruction of their crops and contamination of community water points, the pastoralist accuse the crop farmers of denying them access to grazing areas and occasionally rustling their cattle.

According to Okoli & Atelhe (2014), the factor of desertification of the northern ecological belt interfaces with that of population explosion (as a result of influx of migrant farmers/pastoralists) to create a situation of land scarcity and hunger. Again, indigenization of herding communities correlates with legalization of farming/grazing rights to engender land tenure (ownership) disputes. The whole variables interact to produce the wave of rising conflicts and contestations between the farming and herding communities.

In an attempt to explain the occurrence of the conflict, Adogi (2013:3-4) maintains a perspective wherein he implicated ecological and demographic factors and dialectics. Putting his perspective into focus, he asserts that the predominant Fulani herdsmen of the lower Sahel and Sudan Savannah ecologies from the north-west and north-east of Nigeria are now migrating and gradually becoming natives in the Middle Belt region – to find greener pasture for their herds. This is not acceptable to the root and tuber farmer of the Middle Belt that is already farming close to the climatic margin of cultivation. The farmer fears that Fulani herds will destroy his farmlands. The natural result is clash over right to the lands.

The conflicts occurring frequently between farmers and herdsmen in the north eastern and north central regions of Nigeria are directly linked with the narrowing of both farming and grazing land due to the pressure of desert encouragement. The Nigeria Watch database indicates that between 2005 and 2014, violent deaths over land issues and cattle grazing accounted for 3.79% of all violent deaths. Conflict between these groups is likely to increase as farms continue to grow in size to feed a growing population, pastoralists continue to move further into new territory seeking fertile lands to graze their cattle, and climatic changes negatively impact both livelihoods. While there have been several clashes between the Fulani herdsmen and the farming communities, the escalation reached another level in 2014 with the Fulani herdsmen killing 1,229 people in comparison with 63 deaths in 2013. In 2017,
there were coordinated attacks against local farmers, such as the Agatu massacre in Benue state and the killing of 40 persons in Nimbo, Enugu state.

The 2018 New Year killing in Benue state remains a national tragedy. Daily, bloodletting by pastoralists’ continues unabated with all the ominous implications for peace and security. We make bold to state that the herder/farmer conflict in Nigeria has been, in the main, occasioned by the rising migration and settlement of the Fulani pastoralists in search of arable grazing fields. The movement brings the herders into conflictive relations with the native farming communities, who are often bent on asserting their exclusive right to land tenure and inheritance in that context. This movement of the pastoralists must be understood as a consequence of the global trend of climate change/environmental security leading to conflicts over grazing land.

One common features of the environmental discourse in Nigeria is that it has become unfriendly, unsustainable and engenders conflict. The migration induced environmental issues poses the most serious threat to stability in the country. This has pitched migrant pastoral nomads against virtually all the farming communities in the North central region of the country. The tremendous importance attached to land resources as an inheritance and property in Nigeria makes conflicts between the migrating herders and the indigenous populations (land owners) inevitable (Ajaero, Mozie, Okeke, Okpanachi and Onyishi, 2015).

The heavy dependence on land for survival and resources by the Nigerian people makes the natural and physical environment the source of conflicts. However, the spatial character of the conflicts reflects regional disparities, ecological specificities and institutional ineptitude. The increasing labor-related migration of pastoralists as a result of the desertification, droughts and water scarcity shows strong evidence of contributing to clashes/conflicts between pastoralists and farmers over grazing land/rangeland.

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Environmental security and migration nexus has implications for social stability in Africa, nay, Nigeria. The threats posed to nation states, entities and semi-autonomous self governing territories by environmental change manifests in humanitarian, socio-economic and geopolitical insecurities. The phenomenon of herder/farmer conflict in Nigeria has been situated in resource conflict debacle. This thrives in an atmosphere of ecological scarcity and competition, as well as livelihood crisis. The problem has been accentuated by the global trend of climate change which has led to the shrinking of ecological space and resources, leading to intense pressure on, and competition for, the available resources. The spiraling migration of pastoralists from the far north towards the central part of Nigeria has resulted in a sort of dialectical relations between the Fulani herdsmen and the settled native farmers.

The recent bloody clashes between herdsmen and farmers represent a new dimension on the nation’s security map. There are too many clouds on the horizon. Only urgent steps by government can clear them in the interest of national security. The study found that internal peace and security of host communities have been threatened; environmental resources of the communities have equally been over burdened and that trans-boundary flows of environmental problems differ from traditional external security threat because they are uncontrolled and unintended. Thus, the increasingly trans-boundary character of Nigeria’s economies, politics, technology and environmental security raises an important problem in linking the environment to a traditional security perspective. The trans-boundary character of most environmental problems makes it difficult for them to fit into the state centred ideology of security policies, but the world security and specifically African political economy cannot continue to depend on such conceptions and institutions of state security alone.

The consequence of the Migration-environment conflict nexus in Nigeria undermines nation building efforts. It manifests in slow development, as foreign investors are daily forced inevitably to cut any direct links to Nigeria as a result of trauma and fear of personal violence, and for the security of their lives and property. Nigeria’s increasingly global image as a place which is too dangerous to visit is not only deleterious to its economy, it is dangerous to its capacity among nations that can compete, attract and retain strategic work force for the economy of the 21st century in the emerging global stage. Herein lay the political economy of migration and securitization of environmental conflicts.
As a corollary from the above, the study recommends as follows:

1. Climate change adaptation, migration policies, and conflict management programmes require increased funding and should not only be a policy priority, but should also be translated into concrete projects.

2. There is an urgent need to reform and improve grazing arrangements that encourages ranching. The government must immediately mobilize and encourage state and local governments as well as wealthy cattle owners to embark on establishment of modern ranches in the cattle-rearing zones of the country.

3. Climate change adaptation strategies have to be conflict and migration-sensitive, which means that adaptation programs have to mitigate the drivers of conflict and migration.

4. We advocate for sedentary system of cattle ranching. There is indeed, the need for permanent settlement of pastoralists both in the far north and semi humid zone of the middle belt.

These recommendations must recognize the right of the Fulani herdsmen to graze and lead their herds to markets in the south while the rights of farmers to grow their crops and live in peace must be acknowledged. Both parties are victims of failure of government in the past who failed to plan for them.

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