THE COOPERATION BETWEEN FLEET I COMMAND AND INDONESIAN MARITIME SECURITY AGENCY IN ELIMINATING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN THE MALACCA STRAIT

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ABSTRACT
The cooperation between maritime stakeholders in an effort to eliminate transnational crime that occurs in the waters of the Malacca Strait is one of the options taken to overcome the limitation of facilities and infrastructure. A good cooperation will certainly have a positive impact on the security at sea, especially in the Malacca Strait. This study focuses on the factors influence the cooperation between the Indonesian Navy’s Fleet I Command and the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency to eradicate transnational crime, as well as identifying applicable regulations and problems at the operational level. The method used is qualitative through interviews, observation, and literature study. Basically, both institutions already have the tools needed to work well with others, however there is a need for joint use of existing facilities to achieve synergy through cooperation between the two institutions. The conclusion is that there is still a need for more intensive cooperation between the two institutions and formal interaction through effective cooperation procedures so that efforts to eliminate transnational crime in the waters of the Malacca Strait can run more optimally.

KEYWORDS: Cooperation, transnational crimes, strategy, Malacca Strait

1. INTRODUCTION
Indonesia as the largest archipelagic country in the world, consisted of 17,504 islands stretching from Sabang to Merauke. It’s territorial waters covering an area of 3.2 million square kilometers plus an Exclusive Economic Zone covering an area of 2.7 million square kilometers, make Indonesia's territorial waters larger than its land area [1]. Beside Indonesia's strategic position which is located between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean provides geographical advantages, Indonesia is also flanked by two continents, Asia and Australia, and even though this condition is very potential as a beneficial factor for Indonesia, it also can bring potential threat or disruption to the maritime security that can affect national defense.
In the era of globalization, the forms and patterns of threats to a country have changed. Threats to a country are no longer in the form of military aggression or open war from other countries, but the current potential threats have evolved by involving non-state actors or non-state actors [2]. Based on the 2015 Indonesian Defense White Paper, transnational crime is seen as a threat to global security. In the Southeast Asian region, this type of crime is a serious threat and creates vulnerability for security stability. In Law no. 5 of 2009 concerning the ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crimes, mentions a number of crimes included in transnational organized crime, namely money laundering, corruption, illegal animal and plant trade, human trafficking, and migrant smuggling. According to Suhirwan, Indonesia needs to ratify the convention given the potential threat of transnational crime that is increasingly dynamic faced by Indonesia's current strategic position [3]. Based on the existing trend, currently there are several types of transnational crimes that are rife in Indonesia, including the trafficking of narcotics and illegal drugs, human trafficking, sea piracy, smuggling of weapons, money laundering, and terrorism [4], where all the threats of transnational crimes have the potential to enter from or occur in the sea area due to Indonesia's very open position.

The sea has four main functions that can benefit the country in times of peace as well as in the time of war [5]. First, the sea is a gathering place for resources, both biological and energy, which play an important role for the country. Second, the sea as a transportation and trade route which is the main connecting element of trade activities and is part of globalization which is considered to increase peace and prosperity. Third, the sea as a medium of information and dissemination of ideas, where the increased flow of goods is often followed by the exchange of new information or knowledge from various parts of the world. In this regard, currently this function has been displaced by developments in information technology. Fourth, the sea as an attribute of power where the state uses the sea as an instrument in an effort to fulfill its national interests. The Strait of Malacca, which is located between two mainland areas, namely Sumatra Island and the Peninsula, is one of the most important international straits in the world. The importance of the Malacca Strait in international shipping activities can be seen from the existence of oil flows transported by ships passing through the Strait are three times larger than the Suez Canal and 15 times greater than those flowing through the Panama Canal. In addition, two-thirds of the crude oil cargo originates from the Persian Gulf destined for Japan, South Korea and China. In fact, more than half of the world's shipments pass through the Strait of Malacca [6]. There are more than 200 ships passing through the Strait of Malacca every day and around 70,000 ships per year. Of these vessels 80% carry oil that is transported to Northeast Asia as well as a third of the goods traded in the world. The condition of dense shipping traffic and the condition of the shallow and narrow strait with many small islands make the Straits of Malacca ideal for potential crimes which in turn can impact the country's defense at sea.

In an effort to eradicate transnational crimes that occur in the Malacca Strait and its surroundings, serious attention is needed from stakeholders at sea, including the Fleet I Command (Koarmada I) as the main operations component of the Indonesian Navy in the West and the Indonesian Maritime
Security Agency (Bakamla) as the implementer of security and safety enforcement in the territorial waters of the Indonesian state. Fleet I Command has the function of carrying out Indonesian Defense Forces (TNI) duties in the field of marine defense, enforcing the law and maintaining security in the marine area of national jurisdiction, carrying out TNI duties in the development of the strength of the marine dimension, and carrying out the empowerment of the marine defense area [7]. Meanwhile, The Maritime Security Agency is in charge of enforcing security and safety in the territorial waters of the Indonesian state and waters of the jurisdiction of the Indonesian state [8]. The similarity of the functions and duties of the two agencies in one hand can be useful for supporting each other in efforts to eradicate transnational crime at sea, on the other hand it can cause problems such as the emergence of sectoral egos in carrying out tasks because each has their own views and basis for their duties and functions. According to Lukman Yudho, the communication factor greatly influences policy acceptance by target groups of law enforcement agencies, so that the quality of communication will affect the effectiveness of implementing defense strategies at sea [9].

Basically, the two maritime agencies already have facilities and infrastructure at their respective operational levels to carry out efforts to eradicate transnational crimes. Fleet I Command has elements of the Republic of Indonesia Warship (KRI) which routinely carries out patrols in its working area, including the waters of the Malacca Strait, while Indonesian Maritime Security Agency has elements of the State Ship (KN) which are used to carry out its operations. In terms of surveillance, Fleet I Command has coastal radars, long range camera, and AIS receiver on the Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMSS), while Indonesian Maritime Security Agency has AISSAT as a means of monitoring the Malacca Strait. What is slightly different is in the personnel sector, where Fleet I Command is manned entirely by the Indonesia Navy personnel, while the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency crew comes from civilians and also from the military who are "loaned" from the Indonesian Navy. Each agency has its own advantages and disadvantages in terms of the means to eradicate transnational crime, so good cooperation and synergy are needed to achieve the optimal results.

2. RESEARCH METHOD
This study uses a qualitative method with the intention of providing an overview and recommendation of the relationship and synergy between Fleet I Command and the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency in terms of efforts to eradicate transnational crime in the Malacca Strait. The way to obtain data in this research is to study literature from various sources such as official documents, journals, books, and website pages. In addition, observations were made of the phenomena that occurred between the two institutions and also asked sources via telephone lines to obtain the information needed to support the research. In this study, the inductive method is used with the conceptual approach to the use of facilities and interoperability. The inductive method is used to describe data in the field regarding the ability of existing surveillance and detection facilities related to interactions between institutions, where the data obtained is then exchanged to produce information which is further analyzed by adhering to the theory of cooperation between agencies in efforts to eradicate transnational
crime. Furthermore, to analyze the relationship between agencies in this effort, it is carried out by using the synergy theory.

3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

3.1. Capabilities and Means of Both Agencies

According to Hamid, there are two powers in a maritime country, they are naval power and sea power [10]. Naval power is the concept of operating the country’s naval fleet in the sea area within the territorial boundaries of a country. Meanwhile, sea power, which is a form of control of the sea area by using a strong marine fleet, is designated for strategic marine areas, especially to ensure smooth shipping and foreign trade. In terms of naval power, according to Ken Booth, the Navy has three roles, the military role, the constabulary role and the diplomatic role [11]. The role of the military is the role of the Navy in winning armed conflicts or wars by optimally utilizing military force, while the constabulary role is carried out in the context of law enforcement at sea, and the role of diplomacy is carried out by using sea power as a means of diplomacy to support the state in foreign policy. The implementation of cooperation in the eradication of transnational crimes at sea with other maritime agencies such as Indonesian Maritime Security Agency is expected to run well in line with these three roles. Whereas in the case of sea power, ships are the main element required in carrying out operations at sea, so their availability both in terms of quality and quantity will determine the success of each operation carried out. With the increasing number of ships owned, the level of attendance at sea will be higher which of course will have a deterrent effect on crimes at sea. Meanwhile, in terms of surveillance capabilities, detection means are one of a series of early warning systems that produce data such as the identity and movement patterns of ships and traffic at sea which are then processed into information for analysis so that indications of crimes can be identified. This information can then be forwarded to elements in the field to carry out investigations or prosecutions.

3.1.1 Elements of Fleet I Command

In a peaceful situation, the elements of Fleet I Command carry out the function of presence at sea in their working areas through patrol operations. In carrying out these functions, Fleet I Command has five task force group and one special force unit, they the Escort Ship Group (Satkor), the Amphibious Ship Group (Satfib), the Auxiliary Ship Group (Satban), the Fast Attack Ship Group (Satkat), the Mine Warfare Ship Group (Satran) and the Special Force Frogman Command Unit (Satkopaska). However, in carrying out patrol operations, warships that posses high speed, high endurance and good maneuverability are needed, so that in general the Fleet I Command ships who carrying out patrol operations are mostly the Escort Ship Group and the Fast Attack Ship Group, plus the small patrol ships from the Naval Main Base IV Tanjungpinang, because it under the jurisdiction of Fleet I Command and is located quite close to the Malacca Strait. Overall, Fleet I Command has at least 25 ships which are commonly used for continuous patrols in the Malacca Strait, consisting of 13 ships from Escort Ship Group, 12 ships from Fast Attack Ship Group, and 4 ships from Naval Main Base IV Tanjungpinang. The ships originating from the Escort Ship Group generally have a length of between
70-90 meters with a speed of between 20-25 knots and are armed with air defense missiles, torpedoes, rockets and 30mm cannons [12]. While the ships elements originating from the Fast Attack Ship Group and Naval Main Base IV Tanjungpinang generally have a length of between 40-60 meters with a speed of 20-30 knots and are armed with 12.7mm submachine guns and 40mm cannons, some of which are also equipped with anti-ship surface missiles. In addition, to expand the scope of operations, maritime reconnaissance aircraft are also involved in the implementation of the operation title although structurally, the use of maritime reconnaissance aircraft must be coordinated with the Indonesian Navy Aviation Center (Puspenerbal). In addition, in certain situations such as piracy, terrorism or hostage-taking in the middle of the sea that requires infiltration or sabotage, personnel from Special Force Frogman Command Unit can be involved in handling the problem.

| GROUP                      | SHIP           | TYPE     |
|----------------------------|----------------|----------|
| 1 Escort Ship Group        | KRI TOM-357    | MRLF     |
|                            | KRI JOL-358    | MRLF     |
|                            | KRI USH-359    | MRLF     |
|                            | KRI PTM-371    | ASW      |
|                            | KRI CND-375    | ASW      |
|                            | KRI STS-376    | ASW      |
|                            | KRI STO-377    | ASW      |
|                            | KRI SSA-378    | ASW      |
|                            | KRI WIR-379    | ASW      |
|                            | KRI TPD-381    | ASW      |
|                            | KRI IBL-383    | ASW      |
|                            | KRI TUM-385    | ASW      |
|                            | KRI SRE-386    | ASW      |
| 2 Amphibious Ship Group    | KRI TGK-531    | LST      |
|                            | KRI TCB-532    | LST      |
|                            | KRI TSG-536    | LST      |
|                            | KRI TCN-543    | LST      |
|                            | KRI TSB-544    | LST      |
|                            | KRI SMR-594    | LPD      |
|                            | KRI TKD-518    | LST      |
| 3 Auxiliary Ship Group     | KRI BPP-901    | Tanker   |
|                            | KRI DUM-901    | Tanker   |
|                            | KRI BON-907    | OGTB     |
|                            | KRI LSR-924    | Patrol   |
|                            | KAL ANTABENA   | -        |
|                            | KAL YUDHIISTIRA| -        |
|                            | KAL ARSA II    | -        |
| 4 Fast Attack Ship Group   | KRI TDK-631    | FPB      |
|                            | KRI LDG-632    | FPB      |
|                            | KRI BKD-633    | FPB      |
|                            | KRI CLT-641    | FMB      |
|                            | KRI KJG-642    | FMB      |
|                            | KRI BLD-643    | FMB      |
|                            | KRI ALG-644    | FMB      |
|                            | KRI SUR-645    | FMB      |
|                            | KRI SWR-646    | FMB      |
|                            | KRI PAR-647    | FMB      |
|                            | KRI HLS-630    | FMB      |
|                            | KRI KRB-648    | FMB      |
| 5 Mine Warfare Ship Group  | KRI PRA-726    | MCMV     |
|                            | KRI PRG-727    | MCMV     |
| 6 Special Force Frogman Command Unit | KRI PRA-726 | MCMV   |

**Figure 1. The list of Fleet I Command Task Force Group**

Source: DSP Koarmada I, 2020
3.1.2 Elements of Indonesian Maritime Security Agency

In carrying out operations at sea, the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency as a whole has 10 ships that can be used for patrols in a relatively long time. The elements of the ship consist of one 110-meter headquarter unit, 3 80-meter patrol boats, and six 48-meter patrol boats. In addition, for patrol activities in a relatively short distance, Indonesian Maritime Security Agency has 16 units of Catamaran type vessels measuring 15 meters and 14 rigid inflatable boats measuring 12 meters [13]. Most of these patrol boats has a maximum speed of 20 knots and for patrol boats measuring 48 meters and above are armed with 12.7mm submachine guns. Faced with the vast operational area in the Malacca Strait, the number of Indonesian Maritime Security Agency ships is far from sufficient so that sometimes it requires support in its implementation, but in operations that require the support of Fleet I Command ships, they must first ask for approval from the TNI Commander, where the request does not always get approval and it sometimes make the operation cannot be carried out optimally.

3.1.3 Fleet I Command Surveillance Facilities

In terms of surveillance, Fleet I Command has a Command and Control Center (Puskodal) as a service element who is tasked with assisting the Commander of The Fleet in carrying out command and control activities in collecting, assessing and presenting information on operational and training activities along with the analysis. In monitoring the Malacca Strait area, the Command and Control Center relies on the Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMSS) information system which consists of sensor equipment in the form of an Automatic Identification System (AIS) monitor, FLIR Camera and coastal radar which has a range of up to 90 Nm. In terms of location and placement, the IMSS infrastructure is divided into four. The first is the Fleet Command and Control Center (FCC) which is located at the Command Headquarters in Jakarta. The second is the Regional Command and Control Center (RCC) located at the Batam Naval Base. The third is the Coastal Surveillance Station (CSS) which is located at eight Indonesian Navy outpost radar unit along the Malacca Strait and the last is the Shipboard Surveillance System (SSS) installed in the six warships. Under ideal conditions, this system is capable of implementing detection and classification of targets with sensor capabilities as well as reliable communication capacities, especially in the Malacca Strait. The main capability of this system is the ability to display the position of warships carrying out an operation in addition to the situation of surrounding water traffic in real time. Currently, the IMSS system is in an unprepared state, due to the fact that there are quite a number of damaged equipment in both the CSS and SSS so that the detection and surveillance capabilities of Fleet I Command are quite dull. In carrying out operations and prosecution against selected targets, Fleet I Command obtained information sources from intelligence, and although information related to detection could also be obtained from Indonesian Maritime Security Agency, it is still incidental based on personal requests from the personnel on the field and there is no standard operating procedure yet.
3.1.4 Indonesian Maritime Security Agency Surveillance Facilities
In terms of surveillance in the Malacca Strait, the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency is equipped with monitoring facilities that are spread across their ships and stations. Eventhough their patrol sector is not always in the Malacca Strait, 6 units of Bakamla patrol boats measuring 48 meters are equipped with radar, AIS, and long range cameras connected to the sattelite. Indonesian Maritime Security Agency marine safety and security monitoring stations in Aceh, Tanjung Balai Karimun, and Batam have also been equipped with AIS base stations, coastal surveillance radar, long range cameras, and global maritime distress and safety system (GMDSS). In addition, Indonesian Maritime Security Agency surveillance capabilities have also been sharpened by formerly AISSAT Bakamla which has been developed into the Bakamla Integrated Information System (BIIS). This system is able to provide information and early warning notification by analyzing suspicious objects or events based on certain behavior or anomalies so that it can provide time to respond to the information.
3.2 Inter-Institutional Cooperation Pattern

According to James quoted from Susanto and Munaf, the relationship between two or more parties can produce a level of communication that is faced with elements of cooperation and trust [14]. Based on the pattern of cooperative relationships that may occur, it will produce three communication characteristics. The first is defensive, low level of cooperation and trust resulting in passive-defensive communication patterns. The second is respectful, high cooperation and trust resulting in high communication patterns, mutual respect and compromise. The third is synergistic, where good cooperation and mutual trust will produce a synergistic communication pattern, which means that the cooperation that exists will produce a greater output than the sum of the outputs of each party. This is related to the existence of many institutions authorized to carry out maritime safeguards, through synergy between institutions that can produce a much greater power output in maintaining security and stability at sea. So far, the involvement of elements of Fleet I Command in every operation held by Indonesian Maritime Security Agency shows that the synergy between the two institutions is at the level of respect, namely having an understanding in communicating that is compromise and mutual respect.

One of the factors that influence is because most of the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency crew, especially those who posted on the ships, were Indonesian Navy personnel, both from Fleet I Command or other Indonesian Navy units. In addition, based on the information obtained from the command and control center of the two institutions, so far there has been a process of information sharing between the two in supporting the implementation of operations. On the other hand, there are still problems related to the use of Fleet I Command ships in the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency.
operations and the information sharing process, namely their irregular or continuous nature. In achieving a synergistic condition, a synergy between elements of the patrol boat in operation is needed and this should be accompanied by a synergy in data exchange that can provide information about crimes more precisely and accurately. Guided by Penrose's theory, where synergy is a resource-based effort, the means in the form of ships and accurate information together are resources that become the power to combat transnational crime at sea. Furthermore, synergy between institutions should be able to give victory to all parties involved without feeling defeated by the results achieved because of the synergy and all parties should get the same benefits from the synergy that has been established. In the effort to eradicate transnational crimes in the Malacca Strait, it is necessary to coordinate between the two institutions that are mutually reinforcing. An alternative step that can be taken is to formulate some legal cooperation agreement to clarify the position of each institution.

In terms of operation, the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency can carry out its operations in the Malacca Strait starting from the outermost coastline up to 12 nautical miles which is a territorial sea regime [15]. On the other hand, the results of the operation in the form of an arrest were handed over to Fleet I Command for further investigation, because the authority to carry out investigations rests with the Navy and other stakeholders according to their respective fields. According to Mahan, the strategy to achieve good maritime power does not only rely on the strength of the Navy, but also requires maritime strength and adequate supporting facilities from all stakeholders. Based on this theory, linked to the synergy of Fleet I Command and the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency, the two institutions can support each other with all the capabilities of each party.

According to Himmelman, cooperation carried out between institutions (inter agency working) can be identified as networking, coordination, cooperation and collaboration [16]. Furthermore, it can be interpreted that networking is the process of exchanging information, coordination is the exchange of information accompanied by changes, cooperation is networking and coordination accompanied by sharing of resources, while collaboration is a combination of all these elements plus an increase in the activities of certain mutually beneficial agencies. Referring to this theory, the relationship between Fleet I Command and the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency is still at the coordination stage because most interactions at the operational level are only carried out informally so that it does not have a solid basis for one institution to utilize the resources owned by other institutions, and without a strong foundation, it will be difficult to get support for patrol operations carried out to combat crimes at sea.

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In general, the two agencies have the necessary means in the effort to eradicate transnational crime in the Malacca Strait. The success in carrying out operations in order to maintain the stability of the situation in the strategic value of the Malacca Strait will certainly have an impact on Indonesia's position regionally and globally. From the results of research on the cooperation between Fleet I Command and the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency, it can be concluded that in the relationship
between the existing institutions, the synergy has not been fully developed. The existing problems include the absence of clear rules regarding the use of resources in the form of the use of defense equipment and information sharing between the two. In addition, the existing cooperative relationship is still informal and is at the coordination stage, so that decisions taken tend to be subjective in nature and not in accordance with the provisions. The recommendation that can be given is that it is necessary to make some kind of cooperation agreement while waiting for the revision of the Presidential Decree regarding the authority of each stakeholder at sea. The cooperation agreement should clearly regulate the procedures for the use of resources in the form of Fleet I Command naval power as well as the information required in the implementation of respective operations in order to combat transnational crime, especially in the Malacca Strait.

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