Abstract

This research analyses the concept of leadership within transnational Islamic tradition in Indonesia and their response towards democracy, particularly within three largest transnational organizations of Tablighi Jamaat, Jemaah Tarbiyah, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Based on an extensive literature study and in depth interviews, this research found that: first, leadership concept in the tradition of (1) Tablighi Jamaat is called “Amir” which is appointed through a dialogue (musyawarah). The Amir is responsible to preach ‘the da’wah ‘ala> Minha>j an-Nubuwwah (proselytizing Islam using Prophetic methods) through ‘khuru>j fi> sabi>lilla>h; (2) Jemaah Tarbiyah is called “Majlis Syuro” as the highest body of the Islamic party which functions as “ahlul halli wal ‘aqdi” (the consultative assembly) in its political movement represented by Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous
Justice Party (PKS); and (3) HTI is called “Khalifah” that calls for the system of ‘Khila>fah ‘ala> Minha>ji an-Nubuwwah’. Second, those three organizations have divergent responses regarding the practice of democracy in Indonesia. The responses are (1) Jamaah Tabligh chooses to be apolitical and let its followers whether to participate in the democracy or not; (2) Jemaah Tarbiyah supports the democracy system by establishing Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and (3) HTI opposes democracy because the concept is born from the capitalist ideology, a kufr system as it created by human and is not taken from Shari’ah concept.

Keywords: Leadership, Transnational Islamic, and Democracy

A. Introduction

The selection of leaders in Islam is a very important question, as exemplified by the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad saw, not just to bury the Prophet's body but to resolve the question of who is the successor of the Prophet so that there is no horizontal conflict due to the leadership conflict between the Muhajirin and Anshar. Finally, it was agreed that the successor of the Prophet was Abu Bakr after Umar bin Khattab appointed him for replacing the Prophet as a mosque priest when the Prophet was sick.

In Islam, there is no standard rule about the system of government that Muslims should adopt, but there is only an order to choose a leader. The obligation of leadership is based on a number of arguments, namely: (a) the word of Allah in the QS an-Nisa' [4]: 59 and 83 ordering obedience to the monks, and (b) the Prophet's hadith, "Whoever dies in a state of disrepair , then he died in ignorance, "If three of you are traveling, then one of them should be chosen as leader "and" Verily the man most beloved by and closest to his seat of God on the Day of Judgment is the just (leader) … ”

The question of electing a leader in Islam has often caused a polemic in the bodies of Islamic organizations, especially in terms of power struggles and relations with the country. This is due to the difference in understanding the concept of Islamic leadership and the system of government in accordance with Islamic teachings. This discrepancy arises because the Prophet and his companions

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1 Ahmad Khoirul Fata, “Kepemimpinan Dalam Perspektif Pemikiran Politik Islam” 2 (1) (Juni 2012): 5.
(especially *Khulafaur Rosyidin*) did not provide any standard guidelines in showing leaders.

In this study, the researchers attempt to delve into the concept of Islamic leadership conceptualized by three transnational Islamic ideologies that have many followers in Indonesia, the Tablighi Jamaat, the Jemaah Tarbiyah affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia [HTI] affiliated with Hizbut Tahrir (HT) and how these ideologies respond to the practice of democracy in Indonesia. To obtain these data, this study used a qualitative approach by analyzing primary sources (literature review) and interviewing informants with insights on these three ideologies.

The Tablighi Jamaat Movement is a preaching movement under the guidance of the Prophet (Da’wa>h ‘ala> Minha>j an-Nubuwwah) with the Khuru>j’ fi> Sabi>lilla>h method at the center of society that centers his preaching on mosques. According to Kamaruzzaman, the movement was initiated by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas bin Muhammad Ismail al-Hanafi ad-Diyubandi al-Jisti al-Kahdahlawi (1885-1944), a Sufi scholar who was at Deobond in 1927 in Mewat, South Delhi, India. Noorhaidi Hasan called it a purely political philosophy and focused more on individual moral reforms. According to O. Roy, Barbara cites it as a "new-fundamentalist" movement limited to sharia practice in matters of ritual, dress, and behavior that have no systematic ideology or global political agenda.

Farish A. Noor, quoted by Roland Gunawan referred to the Jama'ah Tabligh's notion of the "literalist fundamentalist pietist movement", or the faith movement as rooted in Islamic fundamentalism (the Quran-Sunnah) as the cornerstone and

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2 Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, “The History of Jama’ah Tabligh in Southeast Asia: The Role of Islamic Sufism in Islamic Revival,” Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 46, no. 2 (26 Desember 2008): 356–357.

3 Noorhadi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Search for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia Translated by Hairus Salim (Jakarta: LP3ES associate with KITLV Jakarta, 2008).

4 Barbara D. Metcalf, Aktivisme Islam Tradisional: Deoband, Tabligh, dan Talib dalam Dick van der Meij, Dinamika Kontemporer dalam Masyarakat Islam, (terj.) oleh Somardi, (Jakarta: INIS, 2003).
interpreted both literally (harfiyah). While Abdul Aziz called the movement a peaceful fundamentalist. Abdul Aziz cited Mumtaz Ahmad's views on some of Tablighi Jamaat's fundamentalism, namely: (1) interpreting the Qur'an and the Hadith literally, (2) strongly rejecting the liberal Islamic understanding, (3) claiming to restore pure Islam, and (4) confident that his movement is based on Islam in the face of modernity.

The Jemaah Tarbiyah movement in Indonesia stems from the campus propaganda movement. In the 1980s, campus preachers began introducing the term "usrah" (family) that adopted Hasan al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood. This campus missionary is morphed into the official Student Activities Unit (UKM), the Campus Cohort (LDK). From the Jemaah Tarbiyah or the LDK this is the birth of the Indonesian Muslim Student Union (KAMMI) as the active center of LDK to channel its political aspirations on campus. After Suharto's demise on May 21, 1998, KAMMI leaders began considering the establishment of an Islamic political party, named the Justice Party (PK) which later became the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The PKS are the political arm of KAMMI activists to pursue political careers through the political party.

The Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) movement was popularized by the Hizbut Tahrir (HT) piloted by al-Ustadz Taqiyudin an-Nabhani in the Palestinian city of al-Quds [Baitul Maqdis] in 1953. HTI is an Islamic political party that aims to rebuild the Islamic State, that is: The Caliphate led by a caliph who was appointed and adopted by the Muslims to run a government based on the Bible and

5 Farish A. Noor, “Roland Gunawan, Menelisik Gerakan Sosial-Keagamaan; Jama’ah Tabligh Sebagai Sampel,” t.t., http://rolandgunawan.blogspot.com/2012/02/menelisik-gerakan-sosial-keagamaan.html.
6 Abdul Aziz, “The Jamaah Tabligh Movement in Indonesia: Peaceful Fundamentalist” 11 (3), (2004): 473.
7 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema PKS Suara dan Syariah, cet. ke-3, (Jakarta: KPG (Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2012).
8 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, 43.
9 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, 44–45.
10 Anonim, Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir dan Strategi Dakwah Hizbut Tahrir, (terj.) Abu Afif dan Nur Khalish, cet. ke-5 (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2013), 43.
11 Anonim, 3.
the Prophet's Sunnah\textsuperscript{12}. HT entered Indonesia in the 1980s by pioneering preaching on Indonesian campuses which later named itself Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).\textsuperscript{13}

In 2017, HTI was abolished by the Indonesian government for rejecting Pancasila's basis as a state. This is explained in Article 59 paragraph 4 of Law No. The Year 17 of 2017 on the Organization of the People is a prohibited institution from embracing, developing, and disseminating any teaching or understanding contrary to Pancasila.\textsuperscript{14} HTI's rejection of the principles of Pancasila and the practice of democracy in Indonesia can be proved by key doctrines in the body of HTI, such as the HT/HTI opposition to democracy because of the anti-Islamic concept of Islam that HT/HTI understands that sovereignty belongs to shara', not to the people.\textsuperscript{15}

B. The Concept of Leadership and Transnational Islamic

Al-Qur'an mentions leaders in several terms, such as Khali>fah, Ima>m, Wa>li, Ulil Amri, Qawwa>m, Sult}a>n, Ma>lik, and Za'i>m.\textsuperscript{16} In Arabic, the term leader is called ar-ra'i>s from the word ra'usa-ya'r asura' san wa ri'a>san meaning to lead. The word ar-ra'is> the plural form of ru'asa> ' means head, chairman, leader, president, and foreman. The word ri'a>sah means leadership.\textsuperscript{17} The leader is also called al-'Ami>r which is derived from the word 'amara-ya'muru-amran-ama>ran which means to command and control. The word al-'ami>r plural form 'umara>' means Amir, Prince, Crown Prince, King, Chief, Leader, Ruler. The word al-'ima>rah means knowledge and territory / power of Amir." \textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{12} Anonim, 23.
\textsuperscript{13} Ahmad Musyafiq, “Spiritualitas Kaum Fundamentalis,” Walisongo Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan Lembaga Penelitian (Lemlit) IAIN Walisongo Semarang 20, no. 1 (mei 2012): 64.
\textsuperscript{14} “Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang RI No. 2 Tahun 2017 tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang No. 17 Tahun 2013 tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan” (t.t.).
\textsuperscript{15} Taqiyyuddin an-Nabhani, Daulah Islam, (terj.) Umar Faruq, cet. ke-7 (Jakarta: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2012), 341–342.
\textsuperscript{16} Zainal Arifin, Tafsir Ayat-Ayat Manajemen Hikmah Idariyah dalam Al-Qur’an (Yogyakarta: Prodi MPI FITK UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2019), 22.
\textsuperscript{17} Ahmad Warson Munawwir, Al-Munawwir Kamus Arab-Indonesia (Surabaya: Pustaka Progressif, 1997), 458–59.
\textsuperscript{18} Ahmad Warson Munawwir, 38.
The transnational term according to Mark R. Amstutz quoted by Abdurakhman means something that extends to or exceeds the borders of the country. Transnational movement patterns cannot be mapped within conventional political boundaries. The relationship is no longer governed by the government but involves the citizens of one country and the another citizens.\(^\text{19}\) While Transnational Islamic is a movement beyond the territorial limits of the country. For example, Pan Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, HizbutTahrir in Lebanon, and Tablighi Jamaat in India. The struggle of the transnational Islamic has often criticized those who are different in religious practice,\(^\text{20}\) understand Islam monolithically and reject local and spiritual variants of Islam, as a form of false and perverted Islam because it is corrupted and immoral.\(^\text{21}\)

Transnational Islamic is also an Islamic movement that seeks to formalize Islam in national law in a number of countries, including Indonesia,\(^\text{22}\) and even "Transnational Islamic" in the discourse of Islamism in Indonesia is likely to be pinned on hard-core Islamic groups (fundamentalism). Ach. Shayku cites results from the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), that neofundamentalist Islamic ideology is now popular with transnational Islam which is: (1) international (transnational), (2) non-national-state movements, but the people, (3) dominated by scripturalist thinking, fundamentalism or radicalism, and (4) partially adapted to modern ideas and instruments. Some of the Islamic organizations that belong to this

\(^{19}\) Abdurakhman, “Gerakan Tarbiyah 1980-2010: Respon Ormas Islam Terhadap Gerakan Islam Transnasional” (Disertasi, Jakarta, Universitas Indonesia, 2013).

\(^{20}\) Muh. Khamdan, “Pengembangan Nasionalisme Keagamaan Sebagai Strategi Penanganan Potensi Radikalisme Islam Transnasional,” ADDIN P3M STAIN Kudus 10, no. 1 (2016): 210.

\(^{21}\) Abdurrahman Wahid, \textit{Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia (Jakarta: Gerakan Bhineka Tunggal Ika, (The Wahid Institute dan Maarif Institute, 2009), 43.

\(^{22}\) Rendy Adiwilaga, “Puritanisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Islam Transnasional serta Implikasinya Terhadap Pancasila sebagai Ideologi Bangsa,” \textit{Journal of Governance Fakultas Ilmu Pemerintahan Universitas Sultan Agung Tirtayasa} 2, no. 1 (Juni 2017): 132.
group are the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbut Tahrir, Jihadi, Salafi Dakwah and Salafi Sururi, Tablighi Jamaat, and Shia.23

C. The Concept of Leadership of Transnational Islamic Perspective

1. Amir in Tablighi Jamaat

The concept of leadership in Tablighi Jamaat ideology is called Amir. Although the Tablighi Jamaat is not a formal organization with an organizational structure, it has the highest Amir that its followers follow. The first performer was Maulana M. Ilyas (1885-1944), the initiator of the Tablighi Jamaat movement in India. After his death, his son succeeded him as the second Amir, namely: Maulana M. Joseph (1917-1965). After Maulana M. Yusuf died in 1965, Maulana M. Ilyas's great-grandson, Maulana In'am al-Hasan, became the third Amir. After the three of them, from 1995 onwards, the Tablighi Jamaat is collectively based and based in Nizamuddin New Delhi. 24

As-Sirbuny in his preface to the book of Malfuzhat Three Hadratji, that Maulana M. Ilyas, Maulana M. Yusuf, and Maulana In'amul Hasan besides being called Amir are also called “Hadhratji”. Hadhratji/hadhrat/hadhirat is a call for a glorified person. In Urdu, pronunciation of "Messiah" is often used to name an elder (glorified). Extra "Ji" is a sincere heart to someone who was respected and loved.25 In the missionary activities Khuru>j fi> Sabi>lilla>h, each congregation is obligated to appoint one of its members to Amir. The appointment is made by deliberation. Amir's duty here is to lead and distribute the job to his members in a deliberative manner.26 Each decision is made in consultation led by Amir and must be supervised by The members of the Amir are the leaders of the troupe (jaulah) while preaching in the middle of the community, obtained ustadz

23 Ach. Syaikhu, “Pergulatan Organisasi Islam dalam Membendung Gerakan Ideologi Islam Transnasional,” JURNAL FALASIFA 3, no. 1 (Maret 2012): 118–19.
24 American Policy Council, “Tablighi Jama’at,” 13 April 2015, 7, http://almanac.afpc.org/sites/almanac.afpc.org/files/Tablighi%20Jama%27at.pdf
25 Syaikh Maulana M. Ilyas al-Kandhalawi, Malfuzhat Tiga Hadratji (terj.) oleh A. Abdurrahman Ahmad As-Sirbuny, (Cirebon: Pustaka Nabawi, 2012), 2.
26 Zainal Arifin, “KEPEMIMPINAN SPIRITUAL PESANTREN TEMBORO Strategi Kebudayaan Kiai dalam Membentuk Perilaku Religius” (Disertasi, Pascasarjana UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 2017), 71.
Saefudin, M.Pd. the following: The term "Amir" in the Tablighi Jamaat is a reference to the head of the group (pilgrims). To be an Amir there are no specific conditions, and one cannot simply nominate to be an Amir, since the adoption of an Amir is a matter of deliberation. Usually chosen to be an Amir are people who are more God-fearing, fair, honest, trustworthy, responsible, and able to protect pilgrims. This concept of Amir is in QS. an-Nisa' [4]: 59. As long as Amir still commands good, Allah commands him to obey. On this basis, God indirectly commands us to appoint leaders.

In the book "Mudzakarah Usaha Da'wah Rasulullah" it is explained that the practice of jaulah is divided into two congregations, namely: First, the congregations in the mosque consist of: (1) Z}a>ki>ri>n (meditation), (2) Taqri>r (the seated person talking about the greatness of Allah and his six companions, (3) Mustami' (taqri>r listener), and (4) Istiqba>l (the receptionist) Second, the congregation outside (go home) the people around the mosque are: (1) Ami>r (pilgrim leaders), (2) Dali>l (guide), (3) Mutakalim (spokesman), and (4) Ma'mu>r (enlivening follower). 27

Amir was the main thing is preached Da’wa>h 'ala> Minha>ji an-Nubuwwah, meaning propaganda system that has the chain (example) of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. 28 The concept of propaganda was based on normative and the culture of the Dawah model developed by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. The following are the arguments used by the Tabligh Congregation in Da’wa>h 'ala> Minha>ji an-Nubuwwah: QS. Al-Fus}ilat [41]: 33, QS. Adz-Dza>riya>t [51]: 55, QS. Tha>ha> [ ]]) 20]: 132, QS. Luqma>n [31]: 17, QS. A>li Imra>n [3]: 104, QS. A>li Imra>n [3]: 110, etc. 29

2. The Majlis Syuro on the Jemaah Tarbiyah Ideology

The Jemaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia is an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) of Egypt. The Jemaah Tarbiyah then transformed

27 Anonim, Mudzakarah Usaha Rasulullah saw (Magetan: Pustaka al-Barokah, t.t.), 39.
28 Zainal Arifin, "KEPEMIMPINAN SPIRITUAL PESANTREN TEMBORO Strategi Kebudayaan Kiai dalam Membentuk Perilaku Religius," 186.
29 Maulana Muhammad Zakariyya al-Kandahlawi Rah.a, Kita>b Fadi>lah A’ma>l (terj.) Tim Penerjemah Masjid Jami’ Kebon Jeruk Jakarta, (Jakarta: Pustaka Ramadhan, 2011), 342–45.
into a political movement by forming the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The concept of leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood is called 'Mursyid' and Hasan al-Bana itself is the first Mursyid 'Am. The concept of the Moslem is commonly used in the tradition of Sufism. It is possible to be influenced by IM ideology, Tariqah Sunnıyah and the Shufiyyah and even Hasan al-Banna has been active in the Tariqah Hashafiyah Syadziliyyah.\(^{30}\)

While the concept of leadership in the Jemaah Tarbiyah movement in Indonesia is called the Majlis Syuro. Majlis Syuro is the supreme leader of the PKS as set out in AD/ART PKS Article 14 reads: The Majlis Syuro is the Supreme Council of the Party which serves as the board of the "Ahlul Halli wal-'Aqdi" (Consultative Assembly) Party; led by a chairman. As for the chairman of the Syariah Assembly during the period 2015-2020 was Dr. Salim Segaf Al Jufri (http://pks.id). According to ustadz Lutfi, one of the activists of the Jemaah Tarbiyah movement in Salatiga that the leadership of the Majlis Syuro is more concerned with community building. The Jemaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia, which is a Muslim Brotherhood (IM) affiliate in Egypt, dominates the region of Asia (Southeast Asia) due to its large number of followers.

3. Caliphate in the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Ideology

HTI is a transnational movement affiliated with HT initiated by Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani in Palestine. It is evident from the reference books used by HTI that Taqiyuddin Nabhani. Thus, the concept of leadership offered is also adopted by the so-called HT, while the Islamic system of governance is Khilafah 'Ala> Minha>j an-Nubuwwah. The caliphate system is the system that God wants. In this system, the Caliph is appointed through the Qur'an and the sunnah. The arguments that make this statement very much are taken from the Bible, as-Sunnah, and Ijmak Companions. As Allah says in the QS al-Maidah [5]: 48.\(^{31}\)

\(^{30}\) Otoman, “Pemikiran Politik Hasan Al-Banna (1906–1949) dan Pembentukan Radikalisme Islam”, *Tamaddun* 15, no. 1 (Juni 2015): 39.

\(^{31}\) Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, *Struktur Negara Khilafah* (*Pemerintahan dan Administrasi*), (terj.) oleh Yahya AR (Jakarta: HTI, 2006), 14.
In the system of the Caliphate there is no system of "crown prince". Inheritance of power has never been a law automatically imposed in a country, as it is in the royal system. The law for the legalization of power in the Islamic State is bai'at through Ahlul Halli wal 'Aqdi. A caliph is appointed by bai'at and is never appointed by inheritance,\(^{32}\) as is the case in the royal system. The royal system was not an Islamic system of government, though the king was merely a symbol but had no power, as were the British and Spanish empires. The Caliph is the ruler and executor of the Shari'a of Allah. Islam also does not recognize the monarchical system of kings and rulers, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, because the Caliphate does not inherit a monarchy like kings. The caliph was chosen and appointed instead of inherited.\(^{33}\)

The Republic system also excludes the Islamic system because it rests on a democratic system in the hands of the people. The Khilafah system stands on the basis of the Islamic system of sovereignty in the hands of Shari'ah. Therefore, the Caliphate cannot be dismissed by the people, even though he has the right to choose and oversee and correct. The caliph is dismissed by the provisions of the law of shara 'if it is against the law of shara'. Termination by decision of the court of magistrates who has the right to terminate the Caliph according to the word of Allah in the QS an-Nisa \(4\): 59. The Caliphate's office in Islam is not limited to the duration but to the extent of the implementation of Islamic law.\(^{34}\)

D. The Response of Transnational Islamic and Islam Nusantara on Democracy Practices In Indonesia

Afifudin Muhajir argues that the presence of a country in the Islamic view is not a goal (a religion), but a means to achieve its purpose. The purpose of a nation is to bring about the birth of human beings, both in the world and in the Hereafter. In fact, Islam does not discriminate between religion and the state, but rather considers the state a religious representation in order to manage

\(^{32}\) Taqiyyuddin an-Nabhani, *Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam*, (terj.) oleh Abu Amin, dkk, 12 (Jakarta: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2013), 84.

\(^{33}\) Anonim, *Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir dan Strategi Dakwah Hizbut Tahrir*, (terj.). Abu Afif dan Nur Khalish, 90–91.

\(^{34}\) Anonim, 92–93.
aspects of the people's welfare. Then there is the expression al-Islām wa dawlah (Islam is a religion and a country).\textsuperscript{35}

According to Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy quoted by Ahmad Syafii Maarif that in essence human beings have three glories based on QS al-Isra\textsuperscript{[17]}: 70, that is (1) personal glory (kara>mah fardiyah) in the art of Islamic preservation human and human nature, (2) the dignity of society (kara>mah ijtima>'ayh) in which the status of human equality is fully guaranteed, and (3) the political dignity (kara>mah siya>sayah) in which Islam gives all rights politics for humanity to be chosen for political positions because humans are the Caliphate on earth.\textsuperscript{36}

Islam does not prohibit its people from being political, because it is part of human rights. These include the implementation of democratic systems in Indonesia, such as running for president, the House of Representatives, the Governor, and others. According to Afifudin Muhajir, one of the advantages of the democratic system is the right and obligation of the people to control, monitor, advise, and critique powerful leaders. This condition opens up the possibility of teaching alar makruf nahi munkar, as Allah Swt says in QS at-Taubah [9]: 71.\textsuperscript{37}

1. The Response of The Tablighi Jamaat to Democracy

The Tablighi Jamaat is a transnational Islamic movement that forbids its followers (Tablighi) to talk about politics even though there is no ruling on anti-politics.\textsuperscript{38} However, the Tablighi Jamaat's view of political issues was positive, as long as it aimed to perpetuate religion and the masses of people, saving from worldly suffering and the afterlife, not as a vehicle of lust and detachment of religious interests, it clearly turned their backs on Nabawi politics.\textsuperscript{39}

The politics of Nabawi is a 'devotion' to Prophet in bringing people to the will of God in the world and the Hereafter, not blind politics that justifly all means to gain wealth and the throne. Sheikh Zakaria said, “In the political world, people tend to be proud,

\textsuperscript{35} Afifudin Muhajir, \textit{Fiqh Tata Negara} (Yogyakarta: IRCiSoD, 2017), 23–24.
\textsuperscript{36} Ahmad Syafii Maarif, \textit{Islam dan Pancasila sebagai Dasar Negara: Studi tentang Perdebatan dalam Konstutuante}, edisi revisi, (Jakarta: Pustaka LP3ES, 2006), 171–72.
\textsuperscript{37} Afifudin Muhajir, \textit{Fiqh Tata Negara}, 109.
\textsuperscript{38} Burhanuddin Muhtadi, \textit{Dilema PKS Suara dan Syariah}, cet. ke-3, 3.
\textsuperscript{39} A. Abdurrahman Ahmad As-Sirbuny, \textit{Kupas Tuntas Jamaah Tabligh} 3 (Cirebon: Pustaka Nabawi, 2002), 58.
tempted to seek fame and fame. Therefore, seek only to save Islam from the attacks of the infidels and to prevent them from deceiving the Muslims.  

The Tablighi Jamaat has never had any aim for power or government. Even to politicians, Shaykh Ilyas, quoted as-Sirbuny, said, "I thank the politicians, because they have brought the government's attention to them, so that I can calmly carry out my preaching." , do not forbid, do not comment on the politics of any country. Because of this, political unrest has created a crackdown among Muslims. Shaykh Ilyas also has personal political views, but does not offer his political views to anyone. He urged his followers to engage in preaching, ta'lim, dhikr, worship, and service.41 In the opinion of ustazd Saefudin, M.Pd. the following: I think Tabligh Congregation followers should not be politicized, because if the Tablighi Jamaat or any individual following the Tablighi Jamaat is politically inclined, they will take their side of the political party, prioritizing their political parties and in all likelihood they will look down on political parties others or others whose ends are dividing the people while Islam is Rah}matan Lil’ A>lami>n.

2. The Response of The Jemaah Tarbiyah to Democracy

The Muslim Brotherhood (IM) views the tarbiyah as an ideal way of interacting with humans, both directly and indirectly in accordance with its distinctive systems and devices to process changes in the human condition to better conditions.42 The IM describes Islam as follows: (a) The Islamic law and teachings governing the entire human affairs of the world and the hereafter. Islam is faith and worship, government and people, in and of itself, spiritualism and charity, as well as mushaf and sword, (b) the basics and basis of Islamic teaching are the book of Allah and His Messenger, and (3) Islam is a living system that embraces and governs the lives of our people and nations at all times. 43

40 A. Abdurrahman Ahmad As-Sirbuny, 62.
41 A. Abdurrahman Ahmad As-Sirbuny, 66–69.
42 Ali Abdul Halim Mahmud, Perangkat-Perangkat Tarbiyah Ikhwanul Muslimin, (terj.) oleh Wahid Ahmad, dkk, (Solo: Era Adicitra Intermedia, 2016), 5.
43 Hasan al-Banna, Risalah Pergerakan Ikhwanul Muslimin, (terj.) oleh Anis Matta, dkk (Surakarta: Era Adicitra Intermedia, 2018), 200–202.
The IM does not demand the legitimacy of the government for the sake of her and her group. The government is part of the Brotherhood, so they continue to work in order to cleanse them from the hands of the rulers who do not want to carry out the hokum of God.\textsuperscript{44} Therefore, the Brotherhood is also a Nationalist. Hasal al-Banna explains the picture of Brotherhood nationalism as follows: Islam has clearly required work for the good and devotion to its homeland. A Muslim is the most nationalist and the greatest contribution to the nation, as God has required of them. Thus, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun is the one who cares for the good of his homeland and is most willing to sacrifice his people. They long for the honor, prosperity, and prosperity of their country. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun loves his homeland and strives to maintain his nationalist unity.\textsuperscript{45}

In addition to the Brotherhood of a Nationalist, but also a support of the Arab unity, for Hasan al-Banna, this was the second chain of events in the revival. In the next step, the Brotherhood moves to establish an Islamic unity, which is the perfect network for the emergence of an integrated Islamic state. Therefore, the Brotherhood upholds the caliphate as a symbol of the unity of Islam and the formal form of Muslim international unity. The Caliphate is a reference point for Islamic law enforcement. Therefore, the Companions put the caliphate first in their care of the Prophet's body.\textsuperscript{46}

The Jemaah Tarbiyah's view of democracy in Indonesia is not very different from that of IM. According to Burhanuddin Muhtadi, the Jemaah Tarbiyah theological thought was drawn from the ideas of the Hasan al-Banna Brotherhood and the Islamic Brotherhood of Islam al-Mawdudi which centered on the argument that Islam is (1) al-di>n: total way of life (aqi>dah wa shari>'ah, (2) in the world (religion and country), and (3) in the world (ukhrawi and world). The Jemaah Tarbiyah's views on democratic practice in Indonesia can be a solution to the establishment of Islamic State,\textsuperscript{47} thus establishing

\textsuperscript{44} Hasan al-Banna, 226–27.
\textsuperscript{45} Hasan al-Banna, 232–33.
\textsuperscript{46} Hasan al-Banna, 236–237.
\textsuperscript{47} Burhanuddin Muhtadi, \textit{Dilema PKS Suara dan Syariah}, cet. ke-3, 37–41.
the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). PKS operates within the framework of democracy and embraces the ideas of the nation and promotes peaceful movement and avoids the use of force in achieving its goals.” 48

3. The Response of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) to Democracy

HTI entered Indonesia in the 1980s by pioneering preaching on Indonesian campuses that later named itself HTI.49 It was opposed to the idea of democracy because of sovereignty in the hands of the people, it should belong to syara’ as Allah swt says in QS an-Nisa [4]: 59.50 According to HTI, democracy is born of the womb of the capitalist ideology that has the motto, "government of the people, by the people, and for the people". Democracy is a system of denial of man-made and not the law of Shari'a. Implementing a democratic system means implementing the infidelity system and calling on the democratic system means promoting a system of disbelief. 52

The ideology of Capitalism is based on the separation of religion from life (secularism). In this ideology, man has the right to make his living rules, maintaining human freedom consisting of freedom of speech, opinion, title, and personal freedom. From this ideology emerges a democracy that has the view that humans have the right to make rules (laws) and that the people are a source of power that can legislate and employ heads of state to enact laws. A democratic system is a contract of labor between the people and the head of state.53 In a democratic system the authority of law is in the hands of men, not of God. This is contrary to His word: "... the law is God's only ..." (Yusuf [12]: 40).54

48 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, 49.
49 Ahmad Musyafiq, “Spiritualitas Kaum Fundamentalis,” 64.
50 Taqiyyuddin an-Nabhani, Daulah Islam, (terj.) Umar Faruq, cet. ke-7, 341–342.
51 Anonim, Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir dan Strategi Dakwah Hizbut Tahrir, (terj.). Abu Afif dan Nur Khalish, 99.
52 Anonim, 79–80.
53 Taqiyyuddin an-Nabhani, Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam, (terj.) oleh Abu Amin, dkk, 50–51.
54 Taqiyyuddin-Nabhani, Struktur Negara Khilafah (Pemerintahan dan Administrasi), (terj.) oleh Yahya AR, 27.
The draft Law Policy drafted by Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani has outlined the concept of the caliphate system that distinguishes the democratic system found in Articles 22, 26, 31, and 34 as follows.55

"The system of government is governed by four constitutions, namely: (a) sovereignty belongs to shara 'not to the people, (b) power is in the hands of the people, (c) the appointment of a Caliph is obligatory on all Muslims, (d) Caliphs have the right for the enactment of Islamic law 'and to enact basic laws and laws. "Every muslim, intelligent, male or female Muslim has the right to choose the Caliph and observe it. Non-Muslims have no right to vote. "(Article 26)" The appointment of the head of the caliphate is considered valid if it meets seven conditions, namely: male, Muslim, independent, transitional, rational, just, and competent.” (Article 31), and "the method of lifting the Caliphate is bai’at. (Article 34)

E. The Response of Islam Nusantara to Transnational Islamic and Democracy Practices In Indonesia

From the above discussion, the authors can conclude that there is a third difference in the Transnational Islamic ideology in responding to the practice of Democracy in Indonesia, as this ideology tends to be apolitical and influenced by a rational and religious focus on preaching. Second, the Jemaah Tarbiyah which has strong affiliations with the al-Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt supported the practice of democracy in Indonesia by establishing the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) for having the view that Islam does not separate religion and country and embraces the concept of nation-state). Third, HTI affiliated with HT founded by Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani strongly rejects the practice of democracy in Indonesia because it is not man-made (God-made) law.

The Islam Nusantara has different views on these three Transnational Islamic ideologies. The term Islam Nusantara became popular after it was made public by the PBNU Chairman KH Said Aqil Siradj at the opening of the Istighotsah Celebrating Ramadhan and the Opening of the NU Scholars Alim, Sunday, June 14, 2015 at

55 Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, Daulah Islam, (terj.) oleh Umar Faruq, cet. ke-7, 343–345.
the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta.\textsuperscript{56} The Islam Nusantara is the theme of the 33rd Nahdlatul Scholars in the East Java Wave on August 1-5, 2015.\textsuperscript{57,58} On this basis, the Islam Nusantara is identical with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organization.

KH Said Aqil Siradj described the Islam Nusantara as a friendly, anti-radical, inclusive and tolerant Islam.\textsuperscript{59} According to Azyumardi Azra, quoted by Abdul Chalik, the Islam Nusantara has the theological character of the Ash'ariyah, the Shafi’i school, and following the Imam Ghazali Sufism.\textsuperscript{60} The Islam Nusantara is a combination of Islamic theological values with Indonesian traditions,\textsuperscript{61} culture and customs, or the synthesis of local revelation and culture.\textsuperscript{62} The three pillars of the Islam Nusantara by Ma'ruf Amin cited by Akhiyat include: (1) thinking (intuition) including moderate thinking (tawassut), (2) movement (harakah) for improvement (maslahah), and (3) real action ('amāliyyah) by respecting the local traditions and culture of the people as long as they do not deviate from Islamic values.\textsuperscript{63}

The Islam Nusantara has a different view of Transnational Islamic on democracy, Pancasila, and the country. For the Nusantara scholars, who represent Islam and the nation are symbols and religious rituals are a means of establishing communion and

\textsuperscript{56} Mohamad Guntur Romli, \textit{Islam Kita, Islam Nusantara Lima Nilai Dasar Islam Nusantara}, (Tangerang: Ciputat School, 2016), 17.

\textsuperscript{57} Mujamil Qomar, “Islam Nusantara: Sebuah Alternatif Model Pemikiran, Pemahaman, dan Pengamalan Islam,” \textit{EL HARAKAH Jurnal Budaya Islam} 17, no. 2 (5 Februari 2016): 199.

\textsuperscript{58} Ahmad Gaus A.f dan Herdi Sahrasad, “Culture And Religion: The Movement And Thought Of Islam Nusantara Nowadays, A Socio-Cultural Reflection,” \textit{EL HARAKAH Jurnal Budaya Islam} 21, no. 1 (12 Juni 2019): 2.

\textsuperscript{59} Romli, \textit{Islam Kita, Islam Nusantara Lima Nilai Dasar Islam Nusantara}, 18.

\textsuperscript{60} Abdul Chalik, “The Position Of Islam Nusantara In Geopolitical Dinamycs Of Islamic World,” \textit{MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-IImu Keislaman} 40, no. 2 (23 November 2016): 437.

\textsuperscript{61} Sembodo Ardi Widodo, “Cultivating Cultural Education Values of Islam Nusantara in MA (Islamic Senior High School) Ali Maksum Krapyak,” \textit{Jurnal Pendidikan Islam} 5, no. 1 (1 Juni 2016): 4.

\textsuperscript{62} Qomar, “Islam Nusantara,” 200.

\textsuperscript{63} Akhiyat Akhiyat, “Islam Nusantara Antara Ortodoksi Dan Heterodoksi,” \textit{Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam} 17, no. 1 (28 Mei 2017): 256–257.
spreading rahmah to the whole world. In the Islam Nusantara’s thought, Pancasila is understood as a sublime treaty between Indonesian Muslims and other peoples to be cared for and respected together. Islam Nusantara is in accordance with democracy because it is able to display the mindset such as tasamuf (tolerant), tawassuth (moderate), tawazun (balanced), i’tidal (upright, consistent).

The acceptance of the Islam Nusantara (NU) with the Indonesian state concept of Pancasila has officially begun since the NU Muktamar in 1984 in Situbondo. Husain Muhammad (quoted by Abi Attabi’), explained that in the Muktamar it was agreed on Pancasila as the ideology of the United Nations of Indonesia (NKRI) final. KH Ahmad Siddiq, the main conceptualist of the 1984 Muktamar decision. According to Husain Muhammad, there are at least three reasons for the acceptance of the NU against Pancasila, namely (1) this country is factually and practically inhabited by a plural and heterogeneous peoples, (2) in real Islam has no formal formal teaching about the State, and (3) Implementing the teachings of Islam is the responsibility of the people, not the responsibility of the State. At that time, KH Ahmad Siddiq (Chairman of the PBNU in the 80s) also conveyed his (his) views on the NU, namely: Tawassuth (moderate) Tawazun (balanced) Tasamuh (tolerant) I’tidal (Vertical, Consistent, Iistiqamah), and Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Mungkar (Encouraging good deeds and preventing all things that can undermine and diminish the values of life), as well as three principles of brotherhood (brotherhood), namely: Islam (Islam), Nationality (Wathaniyyah) and Humanity (Basyariyyah).

Ahmad Ali MD (quoted by Abi Attabi’), explained that the NU received four national pillars including Pancasila, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, NKRI, and UUD 1945 for not being against Islam.

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64 Ngatawi Al-Zastrouw, “Mengenal Sepintas Islam Nusantara,” Hayula: Indonesian Journal of Multidisciplinary Islamic Studies 1, no. 1 (30 Januari 2017): 11.
65 Al-Zastrouw, 14.
66 Romli, Islam Kita, Islam Nusantara Lima Nilai Dasar Islam Nusantara, 116.
67 Abi Attabi’, Antologi Islam Nusantara di mata Kyai, Habib, Santri dan Akademisi, (Yogyakarta: Aswaja Pressindo, 2015), 9–10.
68 Romli, Islam Kita, Islam Nusantara Lima Nilai Dasar Islam Nusantara, 97.
69 Attabi’, Antologi Islam Nusantara di mata Kyai, Habib, Santri dan Akademisi, 76–77.
reasons Indonesian Muslims accept Pancasila are: (1) Pancasila is a treaty (treaty) that must be fulfilled, which must be fulfilled as a mandate and forbidden to betray (2) Pancasila is a point of reference, common platform (the phrase 'sawa>') in the national context, (3) the five precepts in Pancasila in accordance with Islamic teachings, (4) Pancasila is the "objectivity" of Islamic values, and (5) the consensus (ijma') of the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, NU and Muhammadiyah who have received Pancasila and declared that Pancasila was not against Islam.70

F. Conclusion

Based on the results of this study, it can be concluded as follows: First, the concept of leadership in the tradition of Transnational Islamic ideology can be distinguished as follows: (a) The Tablighi Jamaat mentions leaders with the term “Amir” deliberately chosen to proclaim the Da’wah ala’> Minha>j Nubwwah, (b) The Jemaah Tarbiyah mentions the concept of a leader with the term “Majlis Syuro” as the Party’s Supreme Authority functioning as “Ahlul Hall wal-Aqdi' (The Consultative Assembly) in its political movements, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and (c) HTI mentions the concept of a leader in the term “Caliph”, while the governing system is the Khalifah ala Minhaj an-Nubwwah.

Second, the third response to the transnational Islamic ideology of democracy in Indonesia is (a) the Tablighi Jamaat forbids its followers to discuss politics and to give their personal political choices as long as they have a political impact, (2) the Jemaah Tarbiyah supports the practice of democracy in Indonesia, one with the establishment of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and (3) HTI rejects Pancasila ideology and democratic practice in Indonesia because democracy is born of the womb of capitalist ideology and is a system of denial of man-made rather than sharia law. In view of this, HTI was dissolved by the Indonesian Government[.]

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