ABSTRACT
We address the problem of secure data deletion on log-structured file systems. We focus on the YAFFS file system, widely used on Android smartphones. We show that these systems provide no temporal guarantees on data deletion and that deleted data still persists for nearly 44 hours with average phone use and indefinitely if the phone is not used after the deletion. Furthermore, we show that file overwriting and encryption, methods commonly used for secure deletion on block-structured file systems, do not ensure data deletion in log-structured file systems.

We propose three mechanisms for secure deletion on log-structured file systems. **Purging** is a user-level mechanism that guarantees secure deletion at the cost of negligible device wear. **Ballooning** is a user-level mechanism that runs continuously and gives probabilistic improvements to secure deletion. **Zero overwriting** is a kernel-level mechanism that guarantees immediate secure deletion without device wear. We implement these mechanisms on Nexus One smartphones and show that they succeed in secure deletion and neither prohibitively reduce the longevity of the flash memory nor noticeably reduce the device’s battery lifetime. These techniques provide mobile phone users more confidence that data they delete from their phones are indeed deleted.

1. INTRODUCTION
Deleting a file from a storage medium serves two purposes: it reclaims storage and ensures that any sensitive information contained in the file is no longer accessible. When done for the latter purpose, it is critical that the file is securely deleted, meaning that its content does not persist on the storage medium after deletion.

Secure deletion is almost always ignored in file system design [2,3,7,11,14,17], largely for performance reasons. Typically, deletion is implemented as a rapid operation where a file is unlinked, meaning its metadata states that it is no longer present while the file’s contents remain in storage until overwritten by new data [4]. While many users expect that deleting messages will delete them, clearing the browser’s history will clear it, and changing their location will overwrite their previous location, in reality this information remains on their devices without any guarantees of deletion. Surveys of repurposed hard drives found that many contained private financial or medical data that could be recovered with trivial forensic cost and effort [4]. However, secure deletion is not only important when media is repurposed; it also enables users to protect the confidentiality of their data if their devices are compromised, stolen, or confiscated under a subpoena. In the case of a subpoena, the user may be forced to disclose all passwords, keys, or other credentials that enable access to the data stored on the device; in such a scenario, users can only sanitize their device before it is seized.

Secure deletion is particularly important on modern smartphones, as they increasingly store personal data such as the owner’s private conversations, browsing history, and location history. Mobile phones further store business data, which for company policy or legal reasons should be deleted after some time elapses or should not be available at some geographic locations, e.g., should be deleted before a phone owner leaves a certain jurisdiction. Currently, the only secure deletion option available on the Android mobile phone is the **factory reset**: a procedure that securely erases all user data on the phone, returning the phone to its initial state. This is clearly inappropriate for users who wish to selectively delete data, such as some emails, but retain other data, such as their address books or installed applications.

Secure deletion mechanisms have been proposed for some widely-used block-structured and journalled file systems, like ext2 and ext3 [1,8,9]. These mechanisms typically modify the kernel and enforce that when a file is marked for deletion it is overwritten with arbitrary data. Another mechanism that was proposed for preserving data confidentiality under device seizure is full-drive encryption, where the decryption key is generated from user’s password upon system boot. This mechanism is effective but has limitations: users can be coerced or legally bound to disclose their credentials, or might be legally obliged to delete data.

In this work, we address secure deletion on modern smartphones with a focus on the file system YAFFS [3]. Unlike ext2 and ext3, YAFFS is a log-structured file system.
developed specifically for flash memory storage. Android phones’ internal memory uses YAFFS to store data such as browsing cache, maps cache, names of nearby wireless networks, GPS location data, SMS messages, electronic mails, and telephone call listings.

We analyze how deletion is performed in YAFFS and show that log-structured file systems provide no temporal guarantees on data deletion; deleted data persists for around 44 hours with average phone use (Nexus One [3]) and indefinitely if the phone is not used after the deletion. Furthermore, we show that mechanisms such as file overwriting or encryption of individual files, proposed for data deletion on block-structured file systems [12, 6] do not ensure data deletion in log-structured file systems. Namely, overwriting a file in log-structured file systems simply writes a new version of a file, but does not remove the original copy. Similarly, when a file is encrypted, the ciphertext will be written to a new location, but the plaintext will remain on the flash drive until storage space is needed and garbage collection is invoked.

We propose three mechanisms for secure deletion in YAFFS, two programs at user-level and one kernel-level file system change. The two user-level mechanisms are purging, which provides guaranteed rapid deletion of all data previously marked to be deleted, and ballooning, a continuous operation that reduces the expected time that any piece of deleted data remains on the medium. The third mechanism is zero overwriting, a kernel-level file system change that securely deletes any data the moment it is removed from the file system.

We implement these mechanisms for the Nexus One smartphone and show that they neither prohibitively reduce the longevity of the flash memory nor noticeably reduce the device’s battery lifetime. The purging operation occupies the phone for half a minute, but it can be configured to run during the phone’s idle time. Ballooning provides a trade off between the time until data is securely erased and the resulting wear on the flash memory. Zero overwriting securely deletes data immediately without imposing any additional wear on the device. However, it has the drawback of requiring kernel-level modifications and may not be suitable for all flash memories.

Finally, we discuss the conditions under which our mechanisms can be applied to other log-structured file systems such as JFFS, and propose a modification to UBI—a higher-level flash interface—that would implement ballooning on any flash file system that makes use of it.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give background on flash memory and file systems. In Section 3 we examine the current state of secure deletion in YAFFS. In Sections 4 and 5 we present our three solutions, along with experimental results. In Section 6 we discuss related work and in Section 7 we discuss generalizations of our approach and introduce future work.

2. SYSTEM MODEL AND BACKGROUND

System Model. We consider a scenario in which users have data on their mobile device that they wish to securely delete. This includes cache files that should be continually deleted, such as their location histories as encoded by the names of the wireless networks and cellular base stations with which their devices communicated.

The adversary that we consider in this paper is the coercion attacker, the strongest attacker for the data deletion problem. The attacker can—at any moment—both obtain the user’s device and compel the user to reveal any secret keys and passphrases [13]. The unpredictable nature of the attack prevents the user from performing any phone sanitization procedure before disclosure. This differentiates the secure deletion problem from data deletion in the context of repurposed hardware [4].

This strong attacker model also means that simple solutions to preserving data confidentiality under device compromise will fail. Encryption of all the data that is written onto the device would not work since the adversary will be given all our encryption keys. The use of factory reset would not be practical as the unpredictable compromise time would require erasing the entire phone’s memory with such frequency that little useful data could reside on the device.

We therefore need novel solutions to this problem. We consider solutions at two levels of system integration: user-level and kernel-level. User-level means that our application can only perform actions that a normal application installed from the marketplace can perform. This mode of access is greatly limited: an application’s interaction with the file system consists solely of the creation and deletion of its own local files. It cannot change the file system’s behaviour in any way to achieve secure deletion. Kernel-level access is much less limited: it assumes that arbitrary changes can be made to the file system and a new kernel can be installed on the device.

Log-structured File Systems. A log-structured file system differs from a traditional block-based file system (such as FAT or ext2) in that the entire file system is stored as a chronological record of changes from the initial empty state. As files are written, new fixed-size chunks are appended to the log indicating the resulting change; a chunk can store either a file’s header or some data, and is always added to the log’s end. The file system maintains in RAM information on where the newest version of each header and data chunk can be found.

Log-structured file systems complicate secure deletion because the traditional approach of overwriting a file with new content simply appends a second version of the file, while the first still remains in the log’s history. Similarly, encrypting a file will also just append a new encrypted version of that file, while the plaintext remains in the erase block level, which has a larger granularity than
Flash memory is a non-volatile storage medium consisting of an array of electrical components that store information. The contents of flash memory cannot be altered in place, but rather an erase procedure must be performed on a larger granularity than reading or writing. Flash erase is costly: its increased voltage requirement precipitates a block reallocation, which implies the deletion of any data previously stored on the block, and returns the first empty block it finds. When allocating a block reduces the total number of empty blocks in the system below the minimum threshold, then blocks containing wasted space are compacted to reclaim storage. If there is no block that can be compacted, that is, there is not a single unneeded chunk stored on the medium, then YAFFS reports the file system as full and fails to allocate a block.

Garbage collection in YAFFS is either initiated by a thread that performs system maintenance, or takes place during write operations. Usually, only a few chunks are copied at a time, whereby the work to copy a block is amortized over many write operations. If the file system contains too few free blocks then a more aggressive garbage collection is performed. In this case, blocks with less deleted space are collected, and the procedure continues until the entire block can be reclaimed.

Figure 1 shows the lifetime for stored data. At time $t_0$ the block is allocated and data is written onto it soon after. At time $t_1$ the data is deleted. At time $t_2$ the block is reallocated, thus removing the data from the medium. The difference $t_2 - t_1$ is called the deletion latency, and $t_2 - t_0$ is called the block reallocation period.

Flash Memory. Flash memory is a non-volatile storage medium consisting of an array of electrical components that store information. The contents of flash memory cannot be altered in place, but rather an erase procedure must be performed on a larger granularity than reading or writing. Flash erase is costly: its increased voltage requirement precipitates the wearing out of the medium. Erase blocks can only handle a finite number of erase operations—roughly $10^4$ to $10^5$ [15]—before becoming unusable.

Flash file systems are typically log-structured for two reasons. First, the large erase granularity of flash memory maps exactly to the garbage collector’s erase blocks in a log-structured file system. Second, log-structured file systems do not require in-place updates for data; this is well-suited to flash memory’s inability to perform in-place updates.

3. DATA DELETION GUARANTEES IN EXISTING YAFFS SYSTEMS

In this section, we investigate data persistence on Android phones. We examine the time that it takes for one erase block to be reclaimed after being marked for deletion. In particular, we measure the average and worst-case data deletion latency for specific devices, application configurations and usage patterns. To measure the average time taken for block reallocation, which implies the deletion of any data previously stored on the block, we instrument the file system at the kernel level to log block allocation information.

Our results show the existence of a large deletion latency, where data that a user may believe to be deleted in reality remains accessible on the mobile phone. This motivates our secure deletion solutions in the next sections.

3.1 Instrumented YAFFS

We built a modified version of the YAFFS Linux kernel module that logs data about block allocations and chunk writes. We log whenever a new block is allocated, which signals that the block is now empty and that whatever data was previously on the block has been erased (or moved). We also log every write operation: both of file headers and of file data. This allows us to determine how often writes occur, in which chunks they occur, and when files are deleted.

During block allocations, we log the system time in microseconds, the unique physical block number (in our case, ranging from 1 to 1570), the block’s sequence number, and the number of free chunks and erased blocks according to YAFFS’s statistics. We also log the file system’s partition name to demultiplex the data, as the Android phone has multiple YAFFS partitions.

Logging every chunk write gives us a fine-grained view of the system’s writing and deleting behaviour. We log the system time in microseconds, the chunk’s physical location, the operating system’s owner of the file, the block on which it is written, the type of data being written (i.e., a file, a directory, a header, etc.), the file id, and where in the file the data is being written.

With the collected information, we can determine how much data is written to the file system, and the timing and frequency of block erasures. We can also log the time when we write a particular file to the file system, which we cross-reference in our logs to determine the block number on which it resides. Given this information, along with the time when each block is erased and the time the data was marked for deletion by the user, we can compute the deletion latency (cf. Figure 1).

By logging the ownership of chunks, we can also determine the distinct writing patterns of different running applications. We will later use this to construct profiles that model...
different scenarios in our simulated environment.

3.2 Deletion Latency on Android

To understand the severity of the existing problem with current implementations, we examine in detail the deletion latency on an Android phone. First, we focus on a subset of applications that could be used daily on a smartphone to determine deletion latency when using only such applications. We then continue to use the smartphone throughout our daily routine to find out, on average, how long data remains “alive” on the system before being erased. The data we collected on the phone’s writing patterns was later used to simulate an Android mobile phone.

The system under test is a Nexus One running the latest Android OS (2.2.1) under what can be considered normal daily use: browsing the web, saving images, listening to music, writing and receiving SMS messages, and making calls. To understand the writing patterns of some commonly used applications, we let a user use the phone’s browser, maps and gallery applications plus a popular game found on the Android Market. The user used the phone unaware of the test, thereby eliminating any bias which could be introduced by knowing which system properties were examined.

Writing Patterns. For the browser test, the user surfed the web for approximately 8 minutes, performing activities such as logging into a university website, getting weather forecasts, and searching for images. For the maps case, the user interacted with the application for approximately 6 minutes, searching for a particular destination, looking at its “street view” and calculating a route to it. The game and gallery examples ran for approximately 4-5 minutes each.

Statistics for each test are summarized in Table 1 and example traces are plotted in Figure 2. The absence of lines after allocation of some blocks indicates that their content is still present on the system after their deletion time. This short usage scenario, which was executed for 23 minutes, gives an idea of how commonly used applications write to disk.

| Application | Never deleted | Allocated blocks | Mean reallocation period (s) |
|-------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|
| Browser     | 168          | 335             | 54                         |
| Maps        | 185          | 57              | 75                         |
| Game        | 165          | 1               | N/A                        |
| Gallery     | 168          | 2               | 2                          |
| Overall     | 44.7         | 1               | 1439                       |

Figure 2: Snapshot of block allocations for two different applications. Dots represent block allocations. The only blocks that are reallocated are the ones between which a line is present. The line shows the time those blocks have been “alive” in the system before being reallocated. All other blocks are never reallocated throughout the test.

Deletion Latency. To get a better idea of deletion latency, we used the instrumented phone daily. The experiment lasted 670 hours, roughly 27.9 days. In total, throughout the experiment, we recorded 20345 block allocations initiated by 73 different writers. A writer could be any application including the Android OS itself or one of its services (e.g., GPS, DHCP, compass, etc.). The experiment’s logs show that blocks are reclaimed, on average, every 44.7 hours (the median being 44.5 hours). The worst case for block reallocation time for the experiment is 327.7 hours. This is not surprising given the YAFFS implementation, but it highlights the critical need for secure deletion solutions.

4. USER-SPACE SECURE DELETION

In this section, we introduce two solutions for secure deletion: purging and ballooning. Both solutions work at user-level and are designed for the scenario where a security-conscious mobile phone user wants to install a secure deletion application from an application marketplace, but is unwilling to install a new phone operating system.

A user-level application has limited access to the flash device. The application cannot force the file system to perform block erasures, prioritize garbage collection of particular areas in memory, or even know where on the device the user’s data is stored. The interface to the file system for such applications consists of the creation, modification, and deletion of the user’s own local files. In the next section we show a simpler solution that requires kernel-level modifications to the Android mobile phone; here we propose a solution for this highly-constrained environment.
4.1 Purging

To guarantee the secure deletion of all sensitive data on a YAFFS file system from user-space requires that we delete all the sensitive data and then completely fill the drive with new data. The fact that it must be completely filled follows from the implementation of YAFFS’s block allocation strategy. In the worst case, we must assume a deleted chunk is the only deleted chunk on an erase block of otherwise live data. The block allocation strategy first uses empty blocks, then compacts non-empty blocks by selecting the one with the fewest number of live chunks. In the worst case, when all other erase blocks have at least two empty chunks, then only by filling the drive to complete capacity are we assured that our deleted chunk is securely erased.

Purging is the operation that completely fills the file system’s empty space with a junk file, thereby ensuring that all previously deleted data is securely erased. After filling the drive, the junk file is deleted so that file system is again usable. It is a rapid operation that must be explicitly executed. This can take the form of automated triggers, which execute periodically when the phone is idle, whenever the browser cache is cleared, when particular apps are closed, or upon receipt of SMS messages with self-destruction requests. It is particularly useful for employees who are contractually obligated to delete customer data before crossing a border.

Completely filling the drive is possible provided the user is not subjected to disk-quota limitations, but it typically requires garbage collecting (i.e., erasing) nearly every erase block on the storage medium. This is because deleted chunks can occur in any erase block that sees active use, resulting in small data gaps throughout the file system—even chunk-aligned appendps will still erase the previous file header.

To test our hypothesis, we performed the following experiment. We first configured an Android phone to run with our instrumented YAFFS implementation. We took a pristine snapshot of the phone’s internal NAND memory by logging into the phone as root, unmounting the flash drive, and copying the raw data using `cat` from `/dev/mtd/mtd5` (the device that corresponds to the phone’s data partition) to the phone’s external memory (SD card). The resulting file was then copied to our PC and examined using `grep` and `hexdump`. We wrote an arbitrary secret pattern not yet written on the device, and obtained a memory snapshot to confirm it had been written. We then deleted the pattern, obtained a new snapshot of the memory, and confirmed that the pattern still remained in memory. Finally, we filled the drive to capacity with a junk file, deleted it, and obtained another snapshot to confirm that the pattern was now irrecoverable. The time it took to execute the purge operation was between thirty seconds to a minute.

Figure 3 shows the resulting block allocations reported by the instrumented version of YAFFS around the time of this experiment. The X-axis corresponds to time in hours, and the Y-axis shows the numbered erase blocks. A small square in the graph indicates when each erase block was allocated. At the right side, we see the near immediate allocation of every block on the medium. This is the consequence of filling the drive to capacity; YAFFS must effectively garbage collect every block so as to reclaim every available chunk.

4.2 Ballooning

In contrast to purging, which guarantees rapid secure deletion of data from user-space, we now present ballooning, which achieves probabilistic continuous secure deletion. Ballooning reduces the expected time any deleted data—regardless of when it is deleted—remains accessible on a mobile phone. We begin by looking at the time between subsequent allocations of the same flash erase block, which is the time that data written on that block is accessible.

The block reallocation period in a log-structured file system is the expected time that will elapse between allocations of a block in the file system (cf. Figure 1). This is based mainly on two factors: the write frequency on the medium, and the expected number of other blocks that will be allocated before the particular block is reallocated. Were the storage medium’s size to increase tenfold, one would expect to observe a similar increase in the block reallocation period.

The type of contents on the block also has an effect: long-term operating system files tend not to be deleted, and therefore blocks containing only such files will not be reallocated as their contents tend not to be deleted. Such blocks are clearly not a concern for secure deletion, and so their existence only decreases the expected number of blocks that will be used for non-permanent data storage. The block reallocation period is proportional to the expected number of blocks used for active storage and inversely proportional to the number of blocks that are allocated per unit time.

The cyclic behaviour of block allocations in YAFFS is evident in Figure 4 (cf. Figure 3), which shows the sequence of block allocations from our collected Android mobile phone data. While some noise exists, we see that block allocation numbers generally increase over time and wrap cyclically, and so the block reallocation period is dependent on both the number of blocks and the system-wide time between block allocations.

Our proposal is to fill the file system with junk content,
Figure 4: YAFFS’ block allocations over time on an Android phone.

Figure 5: Architecture of the ballooning application.

d thereby reducing the block reallocation period. This reduction results from fewer blocks being available for allocation, and will thus reduce the deletion latency. As a result, YAFFS will be forced to employ more frequent garbage collection, as the file system will perpetually believe it is in a state of reduced capacity. Our application will delete the junk files when the drive requires more space, and will regenerate them whenever there is “too much” free space.

4.3 Ballooning Application

The operation of our ballooning application is illustrated in Figure 5. It runs periodically on the Android phone, examining the file system (using `stat`) to determine the number of free chunks. It creates junk files if the free capacity exceeds the upper threshold, and deletes junk files (if possible) when the free space drops below the minimum. The junk files’ exact size is also parameterizable, and defined in multiples of erase blocks—deleting one junk file will free at least one erase block for new data.

The oldest junk file is always deleted before more recent ones to load-balance the wear on the flash memory. Long-lived junk files can also be erased, with new ones written, to ensure that their corresponding erase blocks will be used for more active data storage. The new ones should be written before deleting the old ones to ensure they reside on different erase blocks. This system is illustrated in Figure 5.

We implemented our application and ran it successfully on the Android phone. The only permission it required was the ability to run while the phone was in a locked state; the application also needs to specify that it will run as a service, meaning execution occurs even when the application is not in the foreground. The application can be installed without any elevated privileges on the phone and operates entirely in user-space. Ballooning must maintain a minimum of 5% of the blocks free to avoid perpetual warnings about low free space.

4.4 Experimental Evaluation

Besides running our application on the Android phone, we collected more statistics by simulating its behaviour on a simulated flash drive mounted as a YAFFS file system. We implemented this drive in RAM using the kernel module nandsim. Nandsim creates a virtual flash device that can be mounted as any flash-based file system. We wrote a discrete event simulator that writes, overwrites, and deletes files on the phone’s storage, which is simply a mounted directory on our simulation computer.

Our real-life Android phone usage, described in Section 3.2, was used to generate all the probability distributions for file creation, modification, and deletion. After a week of logging all write activities on the phone, we computed the following two distributions for each Android writing application: the time between successive creations of two new files, and the type of file to create. A file type is defined by its lifetime, a distribution over the period between opening a file for write, a distribution over the number of chunks to write to a file each time it is opened, and a distribution over the chunks of a file that indicates where the writes will occur.

Additionally, we implemented a secret writer that operated alongside the simulated writers. It infrequently wrote a one-chunk secret message, waited until a new block was allocated, and deleted the secret message. We logged the time before and after we opened the file to write the secret message, and the time it was deleted. By cross-referencing this with our block allocation information, we determined to which blocks the secret was written, and the time when these blocks were reclaimed thus erasing the secret.

In our YAFFS implementation, we measured the rate of block allocations, which allowed us to compute the additional cost of Ballooning as follows. The block allocation rate tells us directly the rate that chunks are written to the flash device. Data can be written from two sources: the actual data written by the simulator, and data copied by YAFFS’s garbage collection mechanism. Since we are using fixed write distributions, the expected rate of writes from the simulator is identical between experiments. Therefore, the observed disparity in block allocation rates reflects exactly the additional writes that are required by our space filling application to achieve secure deletion.

Figure 6 (cf. Figure 3) shows YAFFS block allocations when using our ballooning application. We see that as the range of possible block allocations shrinks considerably, the sequen-

1Non-immediate deletion was done to avoid having an erase header get collocated with file data, since YAFFS considers erase headers as live data until all other traces of the file are removed from the medium.
our application's parameters are the size of the junk files, the lower threshold on the file system's free space when junk files are deleted, and the upper threshold when junk files are created. These variables affect the total expected free space on the partition during execution, which will be in the range defined by the thresholds. This is typically, though not always, between the lower threshold and the size of one junk file. The amount of free space on the drive is what affects both deletion time and the block allocation rate. To get an idea of how these parameters are affected, we ran our simulation for different parameters and computed the median erasure time and block allocation rate. Figure 7 shows the result of this experiment, which is a scatter plot with the median deletion time on the Y-axis and block allocations per hour on the X-axis; each point on the plot shows the results from one of our simulations. We see from the figure that these two quantities are inversely proportional. As the block allocations rate increases—due to less free space and thus more frequent garbage collection—the time secrets remain on the device decreases.

We selected some representative configuration parameters and investigated them further. Table 2 shows measurements of the deletion time distribution (measured in hours) including the minimum, median and maximum measures. Each row of the table corresponds to a different amount of free space (measured in the expected number of free erase blocks) as affected by using a specific parameter set for our ballooning application. For each parameter set, the simulation was run eight times; the results were averaged and the 95% confidence intervals were computed.

We observe that by leaving still 250 blocks free, corresponding to 15% of the drive’s capacity, we get much better secret erasure times than if ballooning is not used, and in the extreme case of 10 free blocks, half the secrets are deleted in an hour and a quarter.

Since each run of the simulation uses identical write probability distributions, we have shown that limiting the drive’s spare capacity must result in more frequent and less optimal garbage collections. This is measured as the rate of block allocations, and in particular, the ratio between the expected rate and the observed rate represents the scale of the additional cost of our application. Table 3 shows the results for block allocations (abbreviated as allocs) per hour using the same selected parameters for our program as with Table 2.

We see from Table 3 that limiting the available space significantly impacts the block allocation rate. The first step, at 250 blocks free, has only a 61% increase in block allocations and reasonably fast deletion. However, achieving deletion in less than an hour requires much more frequent block allocation. In the next section, we look at how increased block allocations affect the device wear in terms of flash memory and battery consumption.

### 4.5 Wear and Tear

The primary drawback of our approach is the additional wear that increased erasures put on the mobile phone, both in terms of damage to the flash memory and power consump-
The expected minimum device lifetime at various block allocation rates is shown in Table 4. This lifetime is inversely proportional to the block allocation rate, and even with our conservative estimate of block allocation rates, we observe there exists a trade-off between wear and tear. The expected lifetime in years using 1571 erase blocks available in the block allocation rate, and inversely proportional to the lifespan. We convert the block allocation rate into an expected lifetime in years using 1571 erase blocks available in the block allocation rate, and inversely proportional to the lifespan. We show the expected minimum device lifetime at various block allocation rates in Table 4.

Table 2: Deletion time in hours for different configuration parameters.

| Free space (erase blocks) | Percentile Measurements |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|
|                           | 1st | 50th | 90th | 95th | 100th |
| No ballooning             | 0   | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0     |
| 250                       | 40.18 ± 3.93 | 48.76 ± 1.32 | 55.88 ± 2.24 | 56.99 ± 2.37 | 58.93 ± 2.32 |
| 50                        | 7.92 ± 1.62  | 15.06 ± 1.51 | 22.82 ± 1.68 | 23.77 ± 1.61 | 25.03 ± 1.29 |
| 25                        | 0.08 ± 0.03  | 4.51 ± 0.57  | 8.37 ± 0.69  | 9.28 ± 1.03  | 10.54 ± 1.41 |
| 10                        | 0.06 ± 0.05  | 2.36 ± 0.32  | 5.24 ± 0.81  | 6.25 ± 1.20  | 9.59 ± 1.79  |
| Purging                   | 0.02 ± 0.01  | 1.26 ± 0.18  | 3.14 ± 0.27  | 3.81 ± 0.43  | 17.42 ± 11.29|

Table 4: Expected minimum device lifetime at various block allocation rates.

To test if ballooning has acceptable power requirements, we analyzed the power consumption of write operations. We measured the battery level through the Android API, which gives its current charge as a percentage of its capacity. The experiment consisted of continuously writing data to the flash memory of a phone in a background service while monitoring the battery level in the foreground. We measured how much data must be written to drain 10% of the total battery capacity. We ran the experiment four times and averaged the result. The resulting mean is within the range of 11.01 ± 0.22 GB with a confidence of 95%, corresponding to 90483 full erase blocks worth of data. Since this well exceeds the total of 1570 erase blocks on the Android’s data partition, we are assured our experiment must have erased the blocks as well as written to them, thus measuring the cost of erasure. Even using the most aggressive ballooning strategy, where 325.37 blocks are allocated an hour, it will still take 11.5 days for the ballooning application to consume ten percent of the battery. Furthermore, by looking at the built-in battery usage information, we learned that the testing application was responsible for only 3% of battery usage, while the Android system accounted for 10% and the display for 87%. We conclude that ballooning’s power consumption is not a concern.

5. KERNEL-SPACE SECURE DELETION

Our second solution for secure deletion is at the kernel layer, where we modify the YAFFS file system. This models the scenario where a mobile phone user is willing to install a custom kernel for their mobile phone and has super-user access to the hard drive. Our goal is to provide a simple, easily auditable, and small change to the file system to achieve secure deletion of all deleted data without additional user action.

The principle behind NAND flash programming is that an erase sets all bits to the value of binary one, and programming simply selects some bit positions to instead have the value of binary zero. It is not possible to program a zero into a one, as this operation requires erasing the corresponding erase block. Programming a flash chunk multiple times between erasure is known as multiple programming. The original version of YAFFS (YAFFS1) used multiple programming to set a deleted flag. When a chunk was deleted, it was reprogrammed so this flag was set to zero, obviating the need to perform reverse lookups in memory data structures to determine which chunks should be copied during garbage collection. This technique was removed in YAFFS2 to be more portable for flash memory that do not permit multiple programming.

Our solution is to use the YAFFS1 technique of multiple programming to instead rewrite the entire chunk’s contents to zeros, thus removing the data from the system. Since the Android’s hardware supports multiple programming, portability is not a concern for the patched kernel. This solution requires super-user permissions to install a new YAFFS version. It is attractive because it requires only a tiny change to YAFFS to enable guaranteed immediate secure deletion without causing any additional wear on the device. Figure 8 shows an example of how zero overwriting removes sensitive information.

This solution may still leak information through advanced forensic techniques, perhaps allowing an observer to determine how recently a gate was set to zero, thus indicating
Our deletion tests consisted of creating a file with some sensitive information and then erasing it different ways. We tested the following: a deleted file, a file completely overwritten, a file partially overwritten, and a file partially truncated. The tests using partial truncation and overwriting always erased the entire sensitive part of the file. Tests were done using block-aligned and block-unaligned overwriting and truncation. We first ran our tests using the standard version of YAFFS, ensuring that the data was still recoverable. In each test, the sensitive data is completely erased from the file system, but remains accessible by unmounting it and reading the raw data. Using our modified version of YAFFS, we found that the information was irrecoverable from both the file system and the underlying flash medium immediately after running the deletion tests.

A trade off with this solution is that deleting or truncating files is a linear operation in their size, as the zero overwriting happens in the foreground. It is also wasteful when a chunk is overwritten shortly before the entire erase block is erased. It would be possible to write a larger YAFFS patch that maintains a list of blocks that need to be zero overwritten, with a sanitization daemon running in the background; this approach is used to provide secure deletion to the ext2 file system [1]. Care would be needed to ensure that sanitization is not performed if the erased block has been erased (and new data added) since it was queued for sanitization.

## 6. RELATED WORK

Lee et al. [10] present a secure deletion approach for YAFFS using encryption. They encrypt every file, and include the corresponding encryption key in every file header written to the file system. Secure deletion is thus achieved whenever all the headers for a file are deleted. They propose changing the deletion code to force deletion of header blocks containing file keys. Their approach is elegant in that files are seamlessly encrypted and decrypted by their proposed changes to the YAFFS file system, and it reduces the problem of rapid secure deletion to the problem of collocating headers for the same file. They collocate headers using an in-memory prefix-tree based on the file id, where all file headers on a leaf node will reside on the same block. A leaf node is split into two nodes when it is half full.

It is difficult to compare their approach with ours in experiments because their approach was not implemented. Moreover, despite detailed algorithms, they had not considered contracting paired leaf nodes when they are sparsely full; over time the file system space for header data might sprawl as tree growth is never curtailed. They simulated their algorithm by assuming files were modified at most twice; our examination of Android phone data found that a third of all chunks were file headers, suggesting much more frequent modifications. Since their strategy is based on treating headers specially, it is important to model them realistically. They intend to delete file header blocks each time a file is removed; however our data indicates that Android phones delete nearly 10000 tiny cache files a day—securely deleting each would result in the frequent creation of bad blocks. We suspect it would be better to delay and batch deletions, and instead of collocating file headers based on arbitrary file id, use attributes that may predict similar lifetimes, such as creation time or file owner. Finally, they add secure deletion by changing an existing file system, but do not examine how their changes effect the original design decisions of the file system. Device wear concerns from header collocation and increased erasures were not discussed in their paper.
Wei et al. [16] have considered secure deletion on flash storage in the context of solid state drives (SSDs). An SSD makes use of a Flash Translation Layer (FTL). This layer allows a regular block-based file system (such as FAT) to be used on flash memory by handling the nuances of erase blocks opaquely through the FTL’s layer of indirection. This layer has the same effect as a log-structured file system, where the FTL writes new entries at empty locations, so old entries remain until the entire erase block can be reclaimed. They executed traditional block-based approaches to secure deletion and determined that they do not properly sanitize data on flash storage. They also showed alarmingly that some built-in sanitization methods do not function correctly either. They propose to address this concern by having flash hardware manufacturers make use of zero overwriting, and add it into the FTL hardware. They state that circumventing the problem of a lack of secure deletion requires changes in the FTL, but depending on how the FTL is implemented, our user-level approaches may also succeed similarly without requiring hardware changes.

7. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented three solutions for secure deletion on YAFFS file systems: purging and ballooning at the user-level, and zero overwriting at the kernel level. The kernel-level solution is the most effective, and suitable for any user who is willing to apply a small patch to their file system. Ballooning is useful for users who wish to guard their location privacy by not having their phones likely to record more than a user-specified time interval of location data. Purging is useful for users who wish to be assured that some deleted data has been securely erased from their phone.

Generalizing our Approach. Purging will work for any log-structured file system provided both the user’s disk quota is unlimited and the file system always performs garbage collection to reclaim even a single chunk of memory before declaring that the drive is unwritable. Ballooning’s utility varies with the implementation details of the underlying file system. For example, JFFS is another log-structured flash file system that uses a linear block allocation scheme. This assures “perfect” wear levelling; the erasure count of any two blocks on the medium will differ by at most one. Consequently, filling the drive to near capacity will result in thrashing where all the stored data is continually being shuffled.

Zero overwriting will work for any type of file system, provided that both the underlying flash memory permits the second programming to occur, and the file system will never attempt to read memory that it has already deleted. Note that this is not the case in YAFFS1, where deleted chunks are re-read during garbage collection to determined if they had been marked (through reprogramming) as deleted.

The UBI Flash Interface. Recently, Nokia has developed a new flash interface, called Unsorted Block Images (UBI), which allows in-place updates and removes the concerns of both wear-levering and bad block detection. UBI exposes the following interface based on logical erase blocks (LEBs):

read and write to a LEB, erase an entire LEB, and atomically update the contents of an entire LEB (i.e., in-place edits at the erase block level). It also allows dynamic creation of UBI partitions using unallocated LEBs. It is neither possible for an LEB to become bad, nor is wear-levering a concern for LEBs.

Underlying this interface is a simple mapping from LEBs to physical erase blocks (PEBs), where PEBs correspond to actual erase blocks on the flash medium. Wear monitoring is handled by maintaining a tally of the erasures at the PEB level, and transparently remapping LEBs when necessary. Remapping also occurs when a bad block is detected. Despite remapping, a LEB’s numerical identifier will remain constant regardless of changes to its corresponding PEB.

Ballooning achieved secure deletion by artificially reducing the size of the flash partition, thus reducing the period between a block’s allocations. UBI exposes the ability to dynamically create partitions from unused logical blocks in its block pool. It is theoretically possible for UBI to dynamically grow or shrink the size of a partition—were it to know which blocks are not currently being used by the file system above it, and were the file system to know that its size is volatile.

As future work we plan to design and implement dynamic-resizing capabilities in UBI that would also require minimal changes to non-UBI-aware file systems like YAFFS. These file systems view the medium as a contiguous range of numbered blocks, along with a mapping from block numbers to states—either good or bad. A UBI-enhanced YAFFS implementation might allow for dynamic resizing of its partition size using the bad blocks map. UBI will manage how many erase blocks are given to each partition, permitting the optimal size of each file system to be controlled by UBI. The slack space it chooses is based on the trade off between device wear and secure deletion. UBI would also be able to intelligently monitor the drive, for example observing its write and erasure rate. It may also give some partitions fewer free erase blocks than others, when the former are being used explicitly to store sensitive files such as encryption keys.
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