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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Buštíková, L., & Baboš, P. (2020). Best in Covid: Populists in the Time of Pandemic. Politics and Governance, 8(4), 496-508. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i4.3424

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Best in Covid: Populists in the Time of Pandemic

Lenka Buštíková 1,* and Pavol Baboš 2

1 School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA; E-Mail: lenka.bustikova@asu.edu
2 Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava, 811 01 Bratislava, Slovakia; E-Mail: pavol.babos@uniba.sk

* Corresponding author

Submitted: 1 July 2020 | Accepted: 1 November 2020 | Published: 17 December 2020

Abstract
How do populists govern in crisis? We address this question by analyzing the actions of technocratic populists in power during the first wave of the novel coronavirus crisis in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. We identify three features of the populist pandemic response. First, populists bypassed established, institutionalized channels of crisis response. Second, they engaged in erratic yet responsive policy making. These two features are ubiquitous to populism. The third feature, specific to technocratic populism, is the politicization of expertise in order to gain legitimacy. Technocratic populists in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia weaponized medical expertise for political purposes.

Keywords
ANO; Covid-19; Czech Republic; health expertise; nationalism; OL'aNO; pandemic; populism; Slovakia; technocratic populism

1. Introduction
On August 31, 2020, Andrej Babiš uttered the following words at the Strategic Forum in Slovenia: “My profession is businessman, crisis manager, actually Prime Minister of the Czech Republic...we have results, best in Covid” (Bled Strategic Forum, 2020). His statement reflected the general sentiment following the first wave of the pandemic in Europe. The Czech Republic quickly introduced strict measures including mask mandates and seemed to have had the virus under control by early summer 2020. On June 30, thousands of Czechs participated in a farewell party to the pandemic on the Charles Bridge in Prague. However, by mid-October, the Czech Republic had recorded more new cases per million people than any other country in the world (Lázňovský, 2020). In May, Igor Matovič also touted Slovakia as “best in Covid” and emphasized that it had the lowest death rates in the European Union (“Bulharsko a Čierna Hora,” 2020). By October, infections started to surge, which forced Slovakia to re-introduce tough freedom of movement restrictions. Technocratic populists in both countries responded quickly to the pandemic threat in the spring, but also to shifts in the public mood during the
summer. In spring, they handled the first pandemic wave well. However, when the public demanded to return to everyday life, governments unraveled restrictions, and a massive second wave ensued.

We explore the inner mechanics of technocratic populism in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Both Prime Ministers (Andrei Babiš and Igor Matovič), leading governing coalitions that grappled with the challenge of Covid-19, afford a rare opportunity to study populist governance in crisis (Caiani & Graziano, 2019; Moffitt, 2015). Our analysis identifies three features of the populist response to the pandemic. First, populists bypassed established, institutionalized channels to combat the crisis. Second, they engaged in erratic yet responsive policy making. These two features are ubiquitous to populism. The third feature, the instrumentalization of knowledge, is specific to technocracy and technocratic populism. Technocratic populists politicize expertise in order to gain legitimacy and use narratives of expert-driven governance to establish a direct link with voters. Therefore, responsive crisis management, legitimized by science and expertise, is especially conducive to their appeal. The Czech and Slovak leaders illustrate this weaponization of medical expertise for political purposes.

Technocratic populism is an output-oriented populism that directly links voters to leaders via expertise. de la Torre (2013, p. 34) used the term to describe President Rafael Correa, formerly an economics professor, as someone who “combine[d] populist rhetoric with top-down technocratic policies,” and called for the end of “partocracy” in Ecuador. Technocratic populism arises as a response to the crisis of governance by mainstream parties. When voters in inadequately governed states reject left-wing Tweedledums and right-wing Tweedledees, they opt for leaders that offer expertise outside of the dysfunctional deliberative political realm (Pop-Eleches, 2010).

Berlusconi in Italy, Babiš in Czechia, and Ivanishvili in Georgia turned their business expertise into political capital. Macron in France was trained as an elite-level technocrat but also worked in the banking sector. Matovič started in a publishing business but joined the political opposition in Slovakia during 2010. He tasered the political establishment with clownish stunts and a decade later, he won the elections. All the above-mentioned leaders rejected the notion of a left-right continuum in politics. Some of them might appear centrist, but first and foremost, they adopt policies that are politically expedient and responsive (Mair, 2009) to the immediate needs of pockets of voters, which they strategically target. When in power, they weaponize expertise to undermine accountability and oversight while aggrandizing their own power.

The article proceeds as follows. First, we outline how technocratic populism differs from other forms of populism. Second, we justify the party classification of ANO in the Czech Republic and OLaNO in Slovakia as populist parties (Zulianello, 2020). ANO (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens), led by Andrej Babiš, presided over the pandemic response in the Czech Republic with the social democrats. OLaNO (Ordinary People and Independent Personalities), led by Igor Matovič, formed a governing coalition with three other parties after winning the February 2020 elections in Slovakia on an anti-corruption platform. However, the government’s agenda was immediately overshadowed by Covid-19. We discuss the Czech case first, and then compare and contrast it with the Slovak case. The article concludes with a discussion of the broader implications for the study of technocratic populism.

2. Technocratic Populism

Populism is a thin ideology (Hawkins & Littvay, 2019; Mudde, 2019; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018) and a strategy to gain power (Grzymala-Busse, 2019; Hanley & Vachudova, 2018; Taggart, 2000; Vachudova, 2020; Weyland, 2020) that can lead to executive aggrandizement (Bermeo, 2016). Populist ideologies emphasize, as well as combine, economic divisions, identity politics and technocratic expertise. Populist types are defined by the core definitions of the “people.” They respond to three different grievances: economic inequality, identity-based exclusion and governance that negatively affects “ordinary people” (Canovan, 1981; Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo, & Ostiguy, 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013).

Technocratic populism politicizes expertise to gain legitimacy and instrumentalizes governance (Aprasidze & Siroky, 2020; Perrottino & Guasti, 2020; Verzichelli & Castaldo, 2020). However, it is a variant of populism (Bickerton & Accetti, 2017) rather than the rule of experts (Dargent, 2014). Technocratic populists’ rule in the name of the “people” on the grounds of expertise. They “strategically use the appeal of technocratic competence and weaponize numbers to deliver a populist message” (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019, p. 304).

Furthermore, populists use technocracy in their quest to bypass the institutions of representative democracy (Caramani, 2017; Guasti, 2020a; Urbinati, 2019).

Table 1 locates technocratic populism as a sub-type of populism (which pitches the elite against the “people”). We use Canovar’s definitions of “the people” (Canovan, 1981). Technocratic populist parties respond to the grievances of “ordinary people” who are dissatisfied with governance by mainstream politicians and offer both expertise in governance and a direct link to voters. Exclusionary populism responds to grievances associated with ethnic diversity, while inclusionary populism seeks to remedy economic exclusion (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). When populists opt for divisive identity politics (Buštíková, 2020; Meguid, 2008; Mudde, 2019), they fabricate the category of the “enemy of the people” and apply it to political opponents (Pappas, 2019). Populists maintain flexibility to define “the other” along many identity marks, such as ethnicity, culture, language or gender (Jenne, 2018; Vachudova, 2020). The instrumen-
tual use of ideology is a cornerstone of populist policy inconsistency and flexibility.

Once populists are in power, we can observe their policy making. In Europe, the decline of social democracy allowed for a populist shift to the left (Berman & Snegovaya, 2019), yet at the same time it did not displace identity (Kates & Tucker, 2019). In Eastern Europe, populists have effortlessly combined exclusive identity politics with welfare and family protection (Bill & Stanley, 2020; Buštíková & Kitschelt, 2009; Enyedi, 2020). However, populist left-leaning economic platforms do not possess the programmatic and universalistic consistency of social democratic parties. Populist economic policies are targeted, even erratic, and disregard “responsibility.” Mair identified a growing tension between problem solving and satisfying public demands: responsibility and responsiveness. In his words: “governments are now finding it increasingly difficult to be responsive to voters. In seeking to act responsibly, that is trying to...meet the everyday responsibilities of office, governments now find themselves...constrained” (Mair, 2009, pp. 13–14).

In order to account for the erratic nature of populism, we highlight a distinction between targeted, responsive policies and universalistic policies of responsible governments that provide long-term public goods (Kitschelt, 2000). Targeted policies that deliver club goods and cater to blocks of voters are limited in scope, and typically focus on short-term gains. Extreme responsiveness results in ad-hoc and even erratic policies crafted to respond to immediate needs, such as those that arise from social media, which provides populists with instantaneous popularity boosts.

Populists’ offerings of state-sponsored benefits to voter-blocks is a responsive, flexible strategy that can be used to secure votes both from the poor as well as from the wealthy. Policy cherry-picking blurs traditional left and right divisions in politics (Edwards, 2010; Pirro, 2017; Rovny & Polk, 2020; Szikra, 2018). Free of responsibility, populists can at the same time lower tax and inflate deficits and offer “free” public benefits to cater to blocks of voters. In seeking to act responsibly, that is trying to...meet the everyday responsibilities of office, governments now find themselves...constrained” (Mair, 2009, pp. 13–14).

| People     | Grievance | Universalistic Policies | Responsible Governments | Responsive Governments |
|------------|-----------|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| Nation     | Identity  | mainstream right        | inclusionary populism    |
| Underdog   | Economy   | mainstream left (social democrats) |
| Ordinary   | Governance| technocracy             | exclusionary populism    |

3. ANO and OĽaNO

How do populists wield power during crisis? We are frequently limited to seeing populists in the opposition benches. But, when populists come to power and experience crisis, we can observe how they govern. Eastern European populists are versatile and defy typological precisions (Bernhard et al., 2020). Nevertheless, quality of governance is a perennial weakness of both countries, since the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993 (Basta & Buštíková, 2016). Two decades later, dissatisfied voters turned to anti-establishment parties founded on the promise to combat political corruption. ANO and OĽaNO are two prime examples.

ANO, a technocratic populist party led by Andrej Babiš, won the 2017 elections and has been leading a minority coalition government since 2018 (Havlík, 2019). Igor Matovič, who leads OĽaNO, won elections on an anti-corruption platform and formed a governing coalition in March 2020 (Gyárásó & Učeň, 2020). Figure 1 places Czech and Slovak political parties’ score on indicators of populism as measured by the Global Party Survey (2019). The mainstream parties are in the bottom-left quadrant, populists are in the top-right quadrant. Both ANO and OĽaNO favor populist over pluralist rhetoric (the x-axis) and populist rhetoric is salient in their platforms (the y-axis).

ANO and OĽaNO reject programmatic divisions and oppose traditional, “establishment” parties on the left and right. Both have flexible and opportunistic policy platforms that respond to shifts in public moods, social media impulses and extensive internal polling, which provides them with flexibility to adjust their policy positions. ANO started as a fiscally conservative party promising effective, lean governance in 2011. However, ANO’s core voters in 2020 are primarily retirees who depend on the state.

OĽaNO’s is equally versatile. During the 2019–2020 electoral campaign, Igor Matovič declared that he considered most of the far-right LSNS voters, as well as most of...
the leftist Smer-SD voters, to be “normal” people and he welcomed their votes. Matovič’s lack of traditional ideology is also reflected in the party’s manifesto, which does not include a single word that would programatically relate to the left or right. OĽaNO’s manifesto divides people into “us” vs. “them” categories. “Us” are “brave and honest people” who deserve “to live better.” “Them” are thieves and mafia-linked politicians who “stole the state” and “friends of these politicians” who benefited from the corrupt system (OĽaNO, 2020, p. 10). Matovič’s populist electoral campaign promised justice for all.

In terms of economic policies, both ANO and OĽaNO appeal to the segments of left leaning, working-class constituents. Both “responsively” design targeted economic policies to buy off voters (Baboš, Világi, & Oravcová, 2016; Malová & Dolný, 2016) without the “responsibility” of budget constraints. Matovič advocates for sound public finances. Yet, he refuses to eliminate redistributive policies introduced by the previous party in power, Smer-SD, such as free trains for students or increased pensions. Similarly, since in power, ANO accelerated spending on targeted welfare programs, yet at the same time, decreased taxes.

Reactive, impulsive measures driven by social media popularity or selective access to leaders are symptoms of populism. This is exemplified by Andrej Babiš’s appeal on social media to “call me and I will fix it right away” (Landsman, 2018) in his effort to micromanage every aspect of the Czech economy. Instantaneous popularity on social media is the ultimate measure of success. Igor Matovič’s style is similar. He refused to hire a professional spokesperson that would represent the office of the Prime Minister. He prefers direct communication with citizens and extensively uses Facebook for policy updates. He even occasionally uploads posts from Slovak cabinet meetings live via Facebook.

Populist reactiveness is exemplified by Andrej Babiš’s personalized efforts to “Save Max.” Maxík (little Max) was born in June 2018 with spinal muscular dystrophy. Drugs that can cure this condition are expensive, unavailable and not covered by public insurance. The cure is available abroad and must be performed before the second birthday of a sick child. Max’s family organized social media campaign and raised over 2 million Euro, predominantly from small donors. Their efforts generated a large wave of solidarity and publicity. Once the collection was concluded, the Ministry of Finance announced that the family will have to pay value added tax (VAT) on the money raised. Public backlash ensued. Max’s advocates criticized the state for failing to rescue a sick child as well as for predating on civic solidarity.

Under mounting criticism, Prime Minister Babiš got involved. In his weekly Sunday recordings “Čau lidi” (“Hi people”) on Facebook, he proclaimed that he will make every effort to “Save Max.” First, Babiš promised to suspend the VAT and to find a legal tax loophole. When no loophole was found, Babiš opted to “have a call” with public health insurance providers. In a miraculous turn of events, in April 2020, the two largest public insurance companies decided to alter their policies.
for Max and two other boys in a need of identical treatment for spinal muscular dystrophy (Kubátová, 2020). The insurers decided to fully cover the treatment for three boys. The public was enthusiastic and praised the Prime Minister for saving three kids. Babiš hijacked a civic initiative to increase his visibility and popularity. There was no policy adaptation. Parents and patients in similar situations and in need of unavailable treatments therefore would need to organize an online campaign and hope to catch his eye.

4. Pandemic Response in Czechia

The official platform of ANO revolves around four issues: security, state effectiveness, state investment and human capital investment. Babiš’s motto is to “run the state as a firm” as a testament to his business background (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). In 2017, ANO won elections with almost 30% of the vote; and in 2018, it formed a minority government with the Social Democrats. Once in charge, Babiš went on a spending spree with a range of policies targeting older and poor voters. ANO aggressively increased both salaries and the numbers of employees who depend on the state for living.

In 2019, the government’s target for 2020 was a budget deficit of 40 billion Czech crowns (1.5 billion Euro). However, the coronavirus crisis forced more spending. In April 2020, the government widened the target to a projected record deficit of 500 billion crowns (18.8 billion Euro). Although ANO runs on a platform of a lean, business-like efficient state, the state under his rule had become over-bloated, even before the pandemic.

The Covid-19 crisis in the spring of 2020 tested the state’s effectiveness. The government reacted swiftly and introduced strict emergency measures on March 11. Schools, non-essential business and offices were shut down. Non-essential travel was restricted and borders with neighboring countries were closed. According to the Ministry of Health, as of September 4, 2020, Czechia, a country of 10.6 million people, registered 26,452 cases and 426 deaths. From the standpoint of public health, the first wave of the pandemic was handled successfully (Guasti, 2020b).

ANO imposed unconstitutional measures to protect public health (Guasti, 2020a), including the closure of the border. The Chief of the Emergency Task Force during the first wave, Roman Prymula, floated the idea that borders might remain closed for two years. The government forbade Czech citizens to leave the country (with some exceptions), as part of the emergency measures. For many, it was reminiscent of the iron curtain. Opposition politicians called the measure unconstitutional and the Senate started to prepare a complaint for the Constitutional court. Anticipating legal defeat, the government backed off and opened the borders (for its own citizens) in late April. For foreigners, the borders remained sealed.

A large component of the success in taming Covid-19 has to be attributed to the surge of civil society activism, volunteering, solidarity, human capital mobilization and exemplary compliance with public safety measures, at least during the first wave (Tabery, 2020). The state required all citizens to wear masks in public, initially including streets, parks, shops and public transportation and introduced fines for non-compliance. However, since masks were sold out and practically unavailable both for citizens and health care workers, citizens responded by producing home-made masks and home-made hand sanitizers. These were distributed via friendship circles, civic organizations and volunteer groups. Health and hospital workers lacked masks, respirators and protective gear as well. This led to the outpouring of private donations and to innovation (such as masks printed on 3D printers). Civil society plugged the holes where the state had failed.

Andrej Babiš first mocked the use of masks and then forced the whole country to dig up their sewing machines, while threatening non-compliance with fines. Then, he jumped on the civil society bandwagon. In March 28, 2020, he sent a tweet to President Trump with a link to the viral #Masks4All video: Mr.President @realDonaldTrump, try tackling virus the Czech way. Wearing a simple cloth mask decreases the spread of the virus by 80%! Czech Republic has made it OBLIGATORY for its citizens to wear a mask in the public (Babiš, 2020). Just like with the “Save Max” campaign, the Prime Minister used a viral social-media activity to present himself as a “man of the people” and to claim credit for the actions of civil society.

The crisis showcased Andrej Babiš’s instantaneous responsiveness. In a press conference on March 14, Babiš was asked to address severe shortages of respirators in hospitals and among health workers. He denied it: “It is not true that health workers do not have respirators. Tell me where, I will personally deliver (respirators) to them” (Bartoníček, 2020). Babiš later apologized and acknowledged the shortages. To secure the necessary supplies, social democratic Vice Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior Jan Hamáček used personal networks in China to purchase PPE. When a Chinese plane landed in Prague on March 20 with more than one million respirators in the amount of 75 million Czech crowns (2,760 thousand Euros), both the Prime Minister Babiš and the Vice Prime Minister Hamáček greeted the cargo personally at the tarmac. In the midst of the pandemic, the highest officials from both governing parties competed for media attention over the PPE (for which Czechia had overpaid).

Tensions between Babiš’s ANO and the Social Democrats, a junior coalition partner, extended beyond the sight of the cameras. Each party controlled different portfolios and the government branches were competing with each other more than coordinating. The Ministry of Health (controlled by ANO) was also purchasing respirators and medical supplies from China, independently of the Ministry of Interior (controlled by Social Democrats),
and for a higher price. The Ministry of Interior paid 1.5 to 2.5 Euro for one FFP2 respirator, but the Ministry of Health paid up to 5 Euro per piece (Novák, 2020). Despite the rhetoric, effective governance was clearly lacking.

Because the government was purchasing medical supplies under emergency measures, oversight and transparency in public procurement were suspended. Small Czech firms and firms with limited political connections were excluded from pandemic-related acquisitions by all ministries. The quick, non-transparent process of spending public funds invited corruption. The Supreme Audit Office (Nejvyšší kontrolní úřad) initiated an investigation into suspicious public procurement of medical supplies immediately after the emergency measures were terminated on May 17.

When recapitulating the crisis, Babiš praised the emergency measures in a radio interview on May 7: “Finally, I was able to run the state as a...firm, it was effective and to the point. We were able to see our decisions implemented right away” (iDNES.cz, 2020). The desire to manage the crisis as directly as possible led to bypassing institutional guidelines that were put in place in cases of emergency. In the initial stages, this led to chaos, but it gave Babiš maximum control over the pandemic response and focused media attention on him. Furthermore, these unorthodox steps were justified by relying on a loyal, handpicked, expert. Epidemiologist Roman Prymula, a non-elected Deputy Minister, became the public face of the pandemic response.

Technocratic populism in a pandemic is a double-edged sword. Expertise was prioritized over deliberation. Panicked citizens followed cues on the importance of masks and distancing, which allowed the government to tame the virus in the first wave. Responsiveness is compatible with “blunt” measures that do not require fine-tuning, like shutting the borders or lockdowns. These measures immediately satisfied the public urge for safety and were effective from the public health standpoint. However, in order to combat the virus over the long run, governments need to implement responsible policies that require higher levels of state capacity, coordination and meticulous planning.

Although there is a Central Emergency Task Force (ústřední krizový štáb) to respond to emergencies such as natural disasters and epidemics, which has always been headed by an elected minister, Prime Minister Babiš bypassed the (Social Democratic) Minister of Interior Jan Hamáček. Instead, he selected epidemiologist Roman Prymula to lead the fight against the virus. Babiš bent the rules to control the task force directly. Professor Prymula holds the rank of colonel and is an expert on vaccines and immunization. Even though he lacked the security clearance required for all Deputy Ministers, he activated the Central Emergency Task Force on March 16 and began coordinating the purchase of respirators, medical supplies and PPEs.

Without a minister in charge, the task force’s ability to coordinate procurement and response was undermined. On March 30, Prymula was forced out, although during the second wave he became the Minister of Health. Adam Vojtěch, the first sacrificial lamb, was forced to resign on September 21 to deflect blame away from the Prime Minister. His technocratic replacement, Prymula, was sacked on October 23 to appease public anger as the crisis was spiraling out of control in autumn.

During the first wave, Roman Prymula was the star of press conferences along with the Prime Minister. When asked who is in charge to combat the pandemic, Babiš noted: “For me, the biggest expert is the Deputy Minister Prymula. We are in touch online. All the time” (Guryčová, 2020). Prymula’s popularity rose. Eventually, he outshone both the Prime Minister and his Minister of Health Vojtěch. A representative survey from early April found that Prymula was perceived by more than a third of the adult population (34%) as the person who contributes most to the efforts to combat the spread of the coronavirus. Minister of Interior Hamáček received the second-best marks, closely followed by Babiš. The public perceived the ANO Minister of Health, Vojtěch, as marginal compared to Prymula, Hamáček and Babiš (National Pandemic Alarm, 2020).

Babiš shielded himself with Prymula’s medical expertise, which helped him to usurp power and the media spotlight. He undercut his junior coalition partner and the political opposition. Babiš viewed Hamáček as a competent political rival who could outshine him, which led to tension in the governing coalition. Most importantly, Babiš’s decision to elevate Prymula interfered with a delicately designed system of institutional response in which the Ministry of Interior played a vital coordinating role. It undermined the efforts of the Central Emergency Task Force because the Ministry of Interior, controlled by Social Democratic minister Hamáček, could not effectively co-ordinate with a Ministry of Health, controlled by ANO’s minister Vojtěch.

After mishaps, chaos and criticism, Babiš eventually ceded. Hamáček took over the Emergency Task Force on March 30. When the crisis eased, the task force was dissolved on June 11. When asked about the tensions over the task force leadership, Hamáček suggested that the Prime Minister:

Initially did not know what the Central Emergency Task Force is supposed to do. [Babiš] was afraid that this will result in dual governance. I have been telling him since the beginning that nobody questioned the role of government that needs expert recommendations to make decisions. That is the job of the Central Emergency Task Force. (Tomček, 2020)

ANO politicized expertise. State and regional chief hygienists and epidemiology advisors found themselves in the hot seat. Rastislav Maďar, an epidemiology advisor to the Minister of Health Vojtěch resigned in August, after the government issued a set of contradictory guidelines about whether students should wear masks when
they go back to school in September. He refused to be blamed for the chaos.

The Chief Hygienist Eva Gottvaldová who underplayed the threat of Covid-19 was sacked in March 2020. She was replaced by Jarmla Rážová, who was tasked with developing a system of tracing and prevention. The system of tracing (e-Rouška) has been ineffective, despite the state’s efforts to implement it since the summer. Citizens were therefore encouraged to make their own calls to people they were in contact with if they tested positive. Do-it-yourself mask making has turned into do-it-yourself tracing. In the words of the Head Hygienist of Prague, Zdeňka Jágrrová, “I am very sorry, but we cannot handle tracing” (“Omlouvám se, nejsme schopni to zvládat,’’ 2020).

To undermine the system of prevention more, Prime Minister Babiš did not comply with official Covid-19 policies. He refused to go into quarantine, as required, when the Chief Hygienist Rážová was tested positive on September 2, 2020. Babiš and Rážová were in close physical contact at meetings. Complying with a two-week quarantine requirement would diminish Babiš’s ability to participate in campaign events for regional and Senate elections in October 2020. In sum, although the number of deaths in the Czech Republic from Covid-19 was comparatively low after the first wave that ended in the summer, the system of prevention was not robust (Guasti, 2020b).

The government used expertise to justify political decisions and was not interested in promoting independent expert deliberations. The opposition, already restrained by emergency measures and tamed by fears of the virus, wanted to scrutinize expertise behind government decisions. It called for numbers, predictions and analysis that validated government steps. Expert-driven response was guided by epidemiological concerns. Data on patients and testing were collected by the Institute of Health Information and Statistics (ÚZIS) at the Ministry of Health (under ANO). The government was criticized for not sharing medical data and the underlying analysis that guided policy decisions. Academics, medical experts and data analysts could not access data to simulate independent epidemiological models (Šustr, 2020). ÚZIS was not even sharing data with other ministries and economic consultants working for the government.

Daniel Münich, a member of the economic advisory team of the Central Emergency Task Force, complained that Prymulá kicked him out of the meeting at the Ministry of Health when he asked for more data. In his view, limiting access to epidemiological data hampered his team’s efforts to forecast the economic impacts of the pandemic. The Ministry of Health countered, citing privacy concerns over data sharing. Similarly, political opposition also requested more data, transparency and alternative expert views. In May 2020, the Senate issued a public statement asking the government to share expertise:

When making long term strategic plans, the government does not work in a systematic manner with relevant data. Until to this day, the government did not issue a detailed analysis of the evolution of Covid-19 epidemic and the impact of the epidemic on citizens’ health and the Czech economy. (KoroNERV-20, 2020)

Babiš controlled the narrative in the first wave: he saved the country by following the recommendations of a prominent expert. He touted the low infection rate and a low death count as a national victory. Babiš also used the adherence of expertise to stir populist sentiments. When Angela Merkel warned German citizens in March that up to sixty percent of Germans might get infected, Andrej Babiš accused her of spreading panic and suggested that Europe is not doing enough: “The Czech Republic took preventive measures sooner than all countries in Europe, including Germany, precisely so that we prevent massive spread of the virus. We were the first ones to ban direct flights from Italy...we closed schools” (ČTK, 2020).

Initially, the Covid-19 crisis strengthened ANO. In July, polling agencies estimated that up to 32% of respondents would vote for ANO, a two percent increase in preferences since 2017. However, the Senate and regional elections during the outbreak of the second wave in October revealed that ANO’s support plateaued. However, due to political fragmentation, no other party is in a position to challenge ANO’s dominance (Buštilková & Guasti, 2017). In the pandemic, ANO continued to build a strong electoral foundation by maintaining ideological flexibility, expanding the state, deepening deficits and targeting voters with benefits.

Babiš established a direct link with voters to selectively communicate expertise. The novel coronavirus response was consulted with health experts but was not subject to expert deliberations. Expertise was used instrumentally to bypass institutionalized channels to combat crisis. It legitimized ANO’s leadership and strengthened a mode of populist responsiveness. In the first wave, Prime Minister’s party ANO won the pandemic popularity contest. We now compare and contrast this with the pandemic response in Slovakia.

5. Pandemic Response in Slovakia

OLaNO’s victory in 2020 signaled a rejection of the incumbent party, Smer-SD (Direction—Social Democracy), which had been in power since 2006. Smer-SD, led by Robert Fico, was founded as a social democratic party but later embraced populism (Bugarić, 2008), building on what has become a perennial feature of Slovak politics. Smer-SD combined targeted welfare policies with fiscal liberalism to maximize power. Two ruptures reshaped party politics in Slovakia and strengthened populist politics. First, the migration crisis of 2015, which coincided with the parliamentary elections campaign in March 2016, destabilized the political system. Second, the politically motivated murder of an investigative jour-
nalist, Ján Kuciak, and his fiancée in 2018 destroyed Fico’s legitimacy.

The murder of Ján Kuciak accelerated the rise of an anti-establishment “movement,” OĽaNO. Deep ties between the leading figures of Smer-SD, the mafia, and corrupt members of the justice system undermined public trust in the ruling parties and state institutions. Public outrage, followed by mass protests, forced Prime Minister Fico to resign. Igor Matovič, a prominent and credible critic of corruption since 2010, a self-appointed leader of the opposition, seized the opportunity and won the 2020 parliamentary elections with 25% of the popular vote.

Igor Matovič rejected established parties, which he refers to as “the partocracy” (Malová & Dolný, 2016, p. 4). As a very innovative presenter, skilled in utilizing social media and in attracting media attention, he prefers direct communication with citizens and does not have a spokesperson (as of October 12, 2020). Richard Pekar, the head of the Press Office of the Government, told media in June: “Igor Matovič is too sensitive to allow anybody to speak in his name” (Mikušovič, 2020). After being asked if he advised the Prime Minister on what he posts on Facebook, he replied: “No. The Prime Minister considers his Facebook profile to be his personal matter. He insists rather strongly he remains himself” (Mikušovič, 2020).

As a man of the people, Matovič prefers to connect directly with voters, yet at the same time, like Babiš, he exercises a firm grip on his party. Like ANO, OĽaNO has an almost non-existent party organization and no party base. The party had only four members between 2012 to 2016. In late 2019, the government amended the Law on Political Parties, which introduced minimum standards for political parties, such as a minimum number of party members. To comply with the rules, OĽaNO increased the number of its members to 45.

During the 2020 campaign, Matovič broadened the scope of his populist appeals. OĽaNO’s core appeal was anti-corruption, but it expanded the platform to include salient issues such as healthcare and childcare. In a brazen populist move, the party crowdsourced its electoral manifesto. Igor Matovič launched an online opinion poll that proposed eleven policy ideas. The poll was open to all Slovak citizens, regardless of political affiliation, and it attracted considerable media attention. 67,415 people participated in the poll. However, most policies proposed by Matovič were impossible to implement or of questionable legal standing. For example, one of the policies was a pledge to cancer patients that they will have a right to be operated in two weeks after their diagnosis. The poll sent a strong signal that OĽaNO responds to ordinary people’s grievances.

On February 29, 2020, OĽaNO won elections. Matovič formed a governing coalition and his government was appointed on March 21. The vote of investiture took place in the middle of the pandemic on April 30. In the meantime, the outgoing Prime Minister Pellegrini and the Central Emergency Task Force (CETF) spearheaded the Covid-19 response. The Law on Governing State in Emergency Situations (National Council of the Slovak Republic, 2002) defines the Central Emergency Task Force as the supreme advisory and coordinating body that synchronizes the various ministries, regional authorities and municipalities. The government, as the only executive body with the power to approve binding decisions, has to approve CETF’s proposals to make them legally valid.

Initially, an emergency situation (výnimkošť situácia) was announced on March 11. It allowed the government to procure emergency supplies for hospitals and other medical institutions. The state of emergency was declared several days later. At his request and before assuming the office, Igor Matovič’s was regularly invited to the meetings of the CETF organized by the outgoing government. Leaders of the new coalition led by OĽaNO were critical of Pellegrini’s pandemic response and viewed the mitigation measures as slow and insufficient.

Igor Matovič assumed power on March 21, 2020 and set upon a course of instantaneous responsiveness. The government was sworn in on Saturday. It worked hard the whole weekend, which signaled to the public that the new team powered through sleepless nights for the benefit of the people. The first wave of the pandemic revealed Matovič’s populist tendencies in executive office in three ways. First, he created informal structures, parallel to the state institutions, to address the coronavirus pandemic. Second, in the absence of ideology, he relied on expertise as an alternative legitimation mechanism. Third, like Babiš, Matovič was very responsive to public reactions to the government measures and adapted very swiftly when faced with a vocal, dissatisfied public.

On Monday, March 23, after less than 48 hours in office, Matovič ditched the Central Emergency Task Force (CETF) used by the outgoing government and established a new, parallel institution: “The Permanent Emergency Task Force” (PETF; Office of Government, 2020). PETF was officially tasked with gathering and analyzing pandemic related information and coordinating the government, ministries, and other state authorities. However, PETF was problematic. From a constitutional standpoint, Slovakia has a well-developed system of crisis management, including institutions responsible for particular tasks in crisis management. The legal framework explicitly defines the competences of various actors. However, the tasks and competences of the new PETF institution set up by Matovič overlapped with the existing bodies. Second, PETF was illegal, since Matovič created PETF using his “deciw powers”: he signed a document that established a brand-new crisis management task force. Only about a month later, Matovič officially provided the cabinet with the “information” that he founded PETF. Afterwards, the cabinet voted to acknowledge it.
Neither the constitution nor any other law gives the Prime Minister the power to create new governing bodies. Therefore, any consequences that originated from, or were based upon, PETF’s decisions might be rendered unconstitutional in the future. Moreover, the PETF statute assumes the existence of an appointed staff secretary responsible for producing and keeping meeting records. The PETF never appointed any secretary and no meeting records have been kept. The new government made critical decisions without transparency or traceable accountability. Facing crisis, Matovič abused his power. The existing legal framework had processes in place to provide for an optimal functioning of the legal task force. It was unnecessary to establish the PETF, a parallel institution to CETF. The government violated official procedures and did not comply with institutional rules and norms.

During the first wave of the pandemic, Igor Matovič, as well as Andrej Babiš combined technocratic expertise with populism. Public health epidemiologists played an important role in taming the public health crisis, and during the first wave Slovakia did exceptionally well. Before the second wave hit the country, Slovakia had the smallest number of Covid-19 deaths per capita in Europe. However, Matovič’s government also relied on medical professionals to provide legitimacy for other decisions as needed. Two examples illustrate politicized expertise: curfew and supermarket opening hours.

The government introduced a six-day curfew to prevent domestic travel that could increase the spread of the virus, which experts had recommended. To avoid the curfew, many chose to travel one day in advance. Upon introduction, the police units blocked traffic in the capital, and people spent hours stuck on the highway. Dissatisfied people voiced anger on social media, and traditional media soon followed. The Prime Minister deflect ed the blame for comprehensive controls onto the Police. The Police Chief pushed back and argued that the Police only enforced the government decree, which did not have any provisions that would allow the police to check vehicles randomly. Matovič responded with a press conference and with Facebook posts in which he accused the Police Chief of misunderstanding government intentions. As a true populist, Matovič’s resolved the issue directly with citizens, as he was used to doing as an opposition politician. Yet, this time, he attacked his own policy and a branch of government that was implementing his orders.

The second example relates to shopping regulations during the pandemic. The government made two controversial decisions. First, seniors were limited to shop only between 9 and 12 (later reduced to 11) in the morning. The association of seniors, lawyers and the Public Defender of Rights criticized this policy. Matovič resorted to expertise to reject criticism: “I will respect whatever the consilium of experts approve. The Chief Public Health Officer makes the final decision” (“Igor Matovič stoji za,” 2020). This time, the Prime Minister put on his technocratic hat and was not responsive for two reasons. Pensioners typically do not vote for OĽaNO and public pressure to change the opening hours was neither strong nor sustained. Second, the Permanent Emergency Task Force decided that shops must close on Sundays to sanitize the shop floors and for workers to rest. The shop closure was unpopular, but Matovič defended it as an expert recommendation: “Some people might want warm pastries [on Sundays], but the experts will decide” (Dibáková, 2020).

The beginning of Igor Matovič’s tenure was defined by the combination of technocratic and populist governance. As a former anti-establishment politician who campaigned on mistrust in formal institutions, he established parallel institutions with dubious legal standing to respond to the pandemic. As a technocrat, he relied on expertise from epidemiologists. As a populist, however, he did not hesitate to overturn expert decisions when pressed by public opinion. After winning elections, he further cultivated his unmediated communication style with citizens, even if it undermined his own governance. Responsive and impulsive actions that cater to immediate voter needs have been key to his leadership. He has enhanced his populist appeal further by instrumentalizing expertise during the pandemic.

6. Conclusion

How do populists govern in crisis? This study compares the Czech and Slovak responses to the threat of Covid-19. Igor Matovič and Andrej Babiš followed the recommendations of health experts. From the epidemiological perspective, both countries performed well during the first wave. However, they did not subject officially endorsed health expertise to alternative viewpoints. Furthermore, during the first wave, they did not invest in state capacity required to combat the second wave, such as an effective system of tracing, locating and isolating hot-spots. Public health expertise was exploited to silence criticism and used to justify policies during the state of emergency that did not follow formal rules. Expertise was also used to bypass institutionalized channels to combat crises and to establish a mode of an instantaneous response to the pandemic threat.

Both countries, especially Slovakia, handled the outbreak of the novel coronavirus well. Using politicized expertise, responsiveness and mass mobilization, Andrej Babiš and Igor Matovič, won the pandemic popularity contest in the first wave. The Slovak success can be attributed to the government’s responsiveness, but to other issues as well. First, the international mobility of Slovaks is low, which confined the virus territorially. Second, the Slovak health care system is perceived by the public as inefficient. In anticipation of its collapse, citizens obeyed mitigation measures, for they feared that they would not receive adequate care if infected.

Easy come, easy go. Because the first wave was tamed, and because voters wanted to go on vacation and to ditch their masks, Babiš’s government loosened...
almost all restrictions over the summer. However, new cases started rising up at an astonishing rate in late September, catching the Czech Republic unprepared and without an adequate system of tracing. Nothing can demonstrate the pitfalls of responsiveness better than Babiš’s reaction to the autumn surge of positive cases on his weekly Facebook feed: “Hi people, the public demanded that we loosen up, and so, we did. Unfortunately, we were wrong” (“Čau lidi, byla poptávka,” 2020).

Crisis strengthens populists and so did the pandemic (Bieber, in press; Guasti & Mansfeldova, 2018; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Moffitt, 2015). In Slovakia, a newly elected populist prime minister used expertise to weaken formal institutions and to legitimize responsive, often erratic, decisions. In the Czech Republic, the pandemic entrenched technocratic populism. In both countries, populists used emergency powers to undermine institutional accountability and to paralyze civil society (Bernhard, 2020). Andrej Babiš and Igor Matovič reinforced personalized ties with voters and pursued borderline unconstitutional policies that were both responsive and technocratic. Yet, economies weakened by lockdowns will down all governments in the future. The spring surge in solidarity, quick yet blunt measures, and responsiveness driven by medical expertise worked miracles in the first wave. Unfortunately, it may have set the stage for failure in the second wave, which requires responsible, de-politicized and fine-tuned governance.

Acknowledgments

We thank Michael Edinger, Petra Guasti, Vello Pettai, Grigore Pop-Eleches, Marion Reiser, and David Siroky for comments. Earlier version of the draft was presented at the International Workshop: Anti-Elitism: Varieties of Technocratic Populism around the World, University of Jena, Germany, February 2020 and at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in September 2020. We acknowledge support of the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic. This work was supported by Slovak Research and Development Agency under the contract No. APVV-17-0464.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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About the Authors

**Lenka Buštíková** is an Associate Professor in the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University. Her research focuses on party politics, voting behavior, clientelism, and state capacity. Her book, *Extreme Reactions: Radical Right Mobilization in Eastern Europe* (Cambridge University Press), demonstrates that far right parties mobilize against politically ascendant minorities. It received the Davis Center Book Prize in political and social studies. She is currently serving as an Editor of *East European Politics*.

**Pavol Baboš** is a Senior Researcher at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava. His main research area is Euroscepticism and voting behavior. He regularly publishes in international academic journals and contributes to popularization of science in Slovak media. He has rich experience in multinational European research consortia, in the past he taught methodology of political science in Comenius University in Bratislava and Bologna University, Italy.