Hybrid War and Its Strategic Implications to Turkey*
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Abstract

Discussions on the hybrid threats and hybrid wars have begun to gain interest among the security communities around the world since 2000s, and exponentially increased after Russian-Ukraine conflict in 2014. The political and military conflict between Russia and Turkey since November 2015 has carried the discussion to Turkey. Now it is believed that Turkey is in fact in a multi-front hybrid war with some of its neighbors but not just Russia. In this article it is aimed to fully explore hybrid war concept and its strategic implications to Turkey. The definitions of hybrid threat, hybrid conflict and hybrid war is considered in the first section. Then Russian hybrid war concept is discussed. Next, features and consequences of hybrid war are applied to Turkey in order to identify the strategic implications. Finally, recommendations are made as to a way ahead for Turkish decision makers with respect to fighting hybrid war.

Key Words: War, hybrid threat, hybrid war, Russia, Turkey

Introduction

Discussions on the hybrid threats and hybrid wars have begun to gain interest among the security communities around the world, including the United States

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(US), United Kingdom (UK), Israel and NATO since 2000s. Several scholars and analysts have argued that hybrid war would become more dominant in the twenty first century. Michael Evans, for instance, has claimed at the beginning of 2000s that the reality of war in the first decade of the twenty-first century was likely to transcend a neat division into distinct categories, symmetry and asymmetry. Similarly, Colin Gray has noted that there was going to be a blurring, a further blurring, of war categories.

In historical evaluations of war, it is expressed that warring parties have employed irregular forces as well as regular forces, used indirect tactics to create surprise and deception together with direct application of force, and used newly produced weapons and barrier systems. Hybrid war goes back as far as the Peloponnesian Wars in the fifth century BC. In that war, the Spartans used the insurgencies against the Athenians to bring them to terms. Throughout the history of war, many perfect examples of hybrid war can be seen. In the Western Front of the First World War which had turned into trench warfare at the outset, for instance, the armies of both sides had used various tactics for four years and hybridized the war which started as a conventional one. The winter war between the former Soviet Union and Finland in 1939-1940 includes several perfect examples of hybrid tactics. Although the USSR possessed more than three times as many soldiers as the Finns, thirty times as many aircrafts, and a hundred times as many tanks, Finnish forces with high morale exploited the enemy’s vulnerabilities and repelled Soviet attacks for several months, much longer than the former Soviet Union expected. The German Army on the Eastern Front during the Second World War suffered continual disruptions to its lines of communication as a result of the activities of tens of thousands of Soviet partisans and other irregulars, many remnants of conventional forces bypassed during the opening phases of Operation Barbarossa. During the Cold War, several conflicts including French and American Vietnam Wars, French-Algeria War, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan hold some features of hybrid war. After the Cold War, many interstate conflicts in Eastern Europe and Caucasus are so hybrid in nature that nearly all of them have been fought with proxies.

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1 Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer 2003. p.141.
2 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2005. p.1.
3 Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian Wars, New York, Penguin, 2003. p.488.
4 Oktay Bingöl, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nın Muharebenin Dönüşümündeki Rolü”, Ümit Özdağ (ed.) 100. Yılınca Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Kripto, Ankara, 2014. p. 43.
5 Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives, New York, Vintage Books, 1993. p.489.
6 Tomas Ries, Cold Will: The Defense of Finland, London, Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988. p.79-80.
7 Peter R. Mansoor, “Introduction: Hybrid War in History”, Murray Williamson, Peter R. Mansoor (eds), Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents From the Ancient World to the Present, USA, Cambridge University Press, 2012. 1-18.
The discussions on hybrid war have increased after Israel-Hezbollah War in 2006, Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 and lastly Russian-Ukraine conflict in 2014.

2006 Lebanon War clearly identifies Hezbollah as the typical example of a modern hybrid challenger. As a non state actor, it employed the state-like military capabilities from advanced anti tank guided missiles to long-range rockets and anti-ship missiles. These are the weapons that normally belong to nation-states. Additionally Hezbollah demonstrated an ability to utilize other elements of power, particularly strategic and operational level information operations. Furthermore, Hezbollah was able to integrate regular and irregular fighters on the battlefield. These fighters did not just share the same battle space; they truly integrated their operations to achieve tactical advantages. During the war, Hezbollah lost a tremendous amount of its offensive firepower and a substantial amount of its infrastructure and trained fighting force. However, Israel failed to rout the Iranian-backed force, and may have lost the strategic battle of perceptions.

Yet, hybrid war has not been conceptualized. The US Department of Defense is not using hybrid war concept officially. In NATO, although the term “hybrid” is used there is no formal concept agreed by nations. Instead, “comprehensive approach” is referred to counter hybrid threats.

The political and military conflict between Russian Federation (RF) and Turkey from 24 November 2015 until July 2016 has carried the discussion to Turkey. Now it is believed that Turkey is in fact in a multi-front hybrid war with some of its neighbors but not just RF. However, Turkish-Russian hybrid conflict had dominated the debates on the subject since it produced significant political, military and economic consequences in terms of internal stability and foreign security of Turkey.

In this article it is aimed to fully explore hybrid war concept and its strategic implications to Turkey. The definitions of hybrid threat, hybrid conflict and hybrid war will be considered in the first section. This discussion will lead to an examination of several related concepts. Then Russian hybrid

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8 Douglas E. Mason, “An Assessment of Lebanon-Israeli War”, US Joint Forces Staff College, Unpublished Master Thesis, 2009, p.45. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a530150.pdf (18.07.2017)

9 Frank G. Hoffman, “Lessons from Lebanon: Hezbollah and Hybrid Wars”, FPRI, 2 August 2006, http://www.fpri.org/article/2006/08/lessons-from-lebanon-hezbollah-and-hybrid-wars/ (17.07.2017)

10 “Briefing to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives”, United States Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC 20548, 10 September 2010.

11 “Hybrid war – does it even exist?”, NATO Review Magazine, http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/EN/index.htm (13.04.2016)
war concept is discussed. Next, features and consequences of hybrid war will apply to Turkey in order to identify the strategic implications. Finally, recommendations will then be made as to a way ahead for Turkish decision makers with respect to fighting hybrid war.

**Concept of Hybrid Threats and Hybrid War**

Although theoretical studies on the hybrid threats and war are relatively new, there are some definitions to mention about. The meaning of the term “hybrid” can be found at various sources. It is used as noun and adjective. Hybrid is something of mixed origin or composition. It refers to something of mixed character and composed of different elements. In Turkish, it is used as noun to refer to something of mongrel, mixed blood and state of being together of two different power sources. From these meanings, it is deduced that the terms “hybrid war” and “hybrid threat” refer to a war and a threat with mixed character.

This is of course a simple definition. In fact, there are some differences between the terms “hybrid threat”, “hybrid conflict” and “hybrid war” although they are often used interchangeably to refer to the interconnected nature of challenges such a ethnic conflict, terrorism, migration and weak institutions; multiplicity of actors involved such as regular and irregular forces, criminal groups; and diversity of conventional and unconventional means used including military, diplomatic, technological. However, these terms could be distinguished by taking into account different levels of intensity of a threat and intentionality of actors involved.

In this context, the hybrid threat is at the lowest level of intensity of threat and results from convergence and interconnection of different elements, which together form a more complex and multidimensional threat. In NATO sources, hybrid threats are defined as those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives. These may include a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures employed in a highly integrated design. NATO accepts that cyber war, asymmetric

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12 “Hybrid”, *The American Heritage Dictionary*, Second College Edition, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985, p.629.
13 “Definition of hybrid in English”, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/hybrid (13.04.2016)
14 “Hibrit”, Güncel Türkçe Sözlük, http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_gts&arama= gts&guid=TDK.GTS.575032f461dfc0.99754101 (12.04.2016)
15 “At a glance: Understanding Hyper Threats”, *EU Parliament Fact Sheet*, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/564355/EPRS_ATA(2015)564355_EN.pdf (18.05.2016)
16 “At a glance: Understanding Hyper Threats”,
17 “Wales Summit Declaration”, NATO Web Page, 05 September 2015, PARA 13. http://www. nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm; Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Håkan Gunneriusson, “ Hybrid Wars: The 21st-Century’s New Threats To Global Peace And Security”,

conflict scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, transnational organized crime, demographic challenges, resources security, retrenchment from globalization and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are multimodal, low-intensity, kinetic as well as non-kinetic threats. They pose threat to the international peace and security, and have become known as hybrid threats.\textsuperscript{18} The European Union (EU), on the other hand, add maritime disputes among various states, exploit of resource dependency between countries, covert operations by for instance RF in Ukraine, and constraints on use of orbital space by regional powers like China to the list of hybrid threats.\textsuperscript{19}

Before moving to hybrid war, hybrid conflict needs to be discussed. Hybrid conflict is a situation in which parties refrain from the overt use of armed forces against each other unless necessary, rather, relying on a combination of military intimidation falling short of an attack, exploitation of economic and political vulnerabilities, and diplomatic or technological means to pursue their objectives.\textsuperscript{20} Such a conflict currently exists between Russian Federation and NATO, US and EU not only on Ukraine and Crimea, but also on various issues ranging from energy supply routes to Arctic politics. The conflict between RF and Turkey for the period of November 2015-July 2016 perfectly fits this definition on the ground that parties harmed each other although they had not used armed violence. There are of course some objections on this definition. First of all, there is nothing new in such an environment to be called as hybrid conflict. In a high intensity or conventional armed conflict, means, tactics and actors listed above also exist. Thus a question arises: what is really new in the idea of hybrid conflict. The answer can be given as use of cyber power and exploitation of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL)/Law of Armed Conflict (LAC). Cyber threats are so new that they are not included in IHL/LAC and domestic laws in most cases. The adversaries exploit this weakness. The second area to mention is the fact that hybrid conflict takes place at strategic level of war and especially cognitive and moral domain. This will be further elaborated in the following paragraphs.

With respect to hybrid war, some see mixed character simply as a blurring of capabilities at the tactical level, such as a Hezbollah guerilla fighter using a high-tech anti-tank weapon\textsuperscript{21}, or PKK shooting Turkish helicopters with (Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPAD). Moreover, in the western world and particularly in the US, the recent discussions about hybrid war have

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Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 43, No. 1, 2015, pp. 77 – 98. p. 79.
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18 Bachmann, Gunnerliusson, Ibid p. 78.
19 "At a glance: Understanding Hyper Threats", Ibid.
20 Matthew Rusling, "Shifting Gears: For the Military, a Future of ‘hybrid’ wars", National Defense, September 2008, p. 32. https://www.questia.com/read/1G1-185248253/shifting-gears-for-the-military-a-future-of-hybrid(19.05.2016)
\end{verbatim}
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been primarily focused at the tactical and to a lesser degree at the operational level, not at the strategic level. Tactical examples are only a very small portion of the hybrid aspect of challenges, however many analysts and scholars focus on as Colin Gray who maintains that these changes are tactical or operational which does not change the nature of war.\(^2\)

If the nature of war is accepted as an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will, thus it is primarily political activity as argued by Clausewitz\(^2\), there is no doubt that Colin Gray is right. However, there are some reasons to disagree with the argument that the nature of war is constant if the war is thought as a system with political, economic, military and psychological components and an interaction between states. First of all, emerging information technologies in recent decades enhance the ability of entities such as terrorist organizations\(^2\), national liberation movements, insurgencies, criminal groups and other non-state actors as well as states. Any actor among these can easily impose its will on a powerful adversary provided that critical vulnerabilities are determined and right strategies are applied. In fact, it is the ability of a belligerent to impose its will, not the amount of violence achieved, that will decide the winner of any given conflict.\(^2\) The role of force or violence is also changing. The recent wars and conflicts between states raised an important question of whether or not violence remains a necessary component of war. The most striking example of a victory by a party without using violence/armed force is the Cold War. The USSR was defeated and collapsed without any armed conflict with the US. Its defeat resulted mainly from the weaknesses in cognitive, moral and economic domains. In 1998, Turkey forced Syria to end the support given to PKK by the ways short of violence.\(^2\) In 2004, the EU, US and the United Nations (UN)
and flexibility, not only of forces, but of strategy, also appear to be key aspects of Sun Tzu’s teachings that emerge in hybrid war.\(^{31}\)

Regarding the principles of war, commonly accepted nine principles\(^{32}\) including mass, objective, offensive, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security and simplicity generally apply to hybrid war. There are of course some differences such as surprise taking priority and decentralized unity of command due to mixing characters of actors and tactics. Moreover, hybrid war is adding two new principles: speed and perception management.

Another concept of war is the levels of war. In conventional understanding, three levels of war are accepted: strategic, operational and tactical levels. Hybrid warfare also plays out all levels of war, from the tactical, to the operational and strategic. In particular, military organizations must not ignore the political framework and its narrative within which all wars occur. At the strategic level, nations might choose to support insurgent movements with conventional forces to weaken an adversary. At the operational level, a commander might use guerilla forces to harass enemy lines of communication or prevent the enemy from massing forces. A terrorist organization may choose to accept an urban defence in a strategic city against a well equipped army and delays its operations for months, and influences the perceptions of domestic audience and international community. Finally, regular and irregular forces might occasionally join tactically.\(^{33}\) At the tactical level, non-state actors using anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles is just one of examples of hybrid tactics. However, the actions at the tactical level fast produce strategic effects due to speed of communication.

When it comes to domains of war such as cognitive, moral and physical, hybrid war is mainly fought at the first and second domains. Physical domain is rather symbolic producing consequences for the first two. The center of gravity (CoG) of hybrid strategies is placed on population. By bringing the population into conflict, hybrid war magnifies the importance of perceptions. Modern communications systems amplify the transmission rates of propaganda and

\(^{31}\) Ibid, 58, 67-68.

\(^{32}\) Mass is concentration of combat power at the decisive place and time. Objective means that every military operation must be directed towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Offensive implies that military force must seize, retain, and exploit the initiative whenever and wherever possible. Suprise means striking the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Economy of force is allocation of minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Maneuver aims to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Unity of command is a necessity for every objective in order to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. Security is to never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. Simplicity refers to preparation of clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. US Army Field Manual FM 3-0: Operations, AppendixA, https://fas.org/irp/dod-dir/army/fm3-0.pdf(18.03.2016)

\(^{33}\) Mansoor, Ibid, p.3.
public information. The battle to shape perceptions plays out among three audiences: local population, home front of the opponent and wider regional and international community.34

Since the CoG of HW is placed on populations and perceptions, the information warfare (IW) takes importance. IW is aimed at creating confusion and ambiguity on the nature, the origin and the objective of the overt and covert actions.35 Although information operations have always been used in times of war, they are quite different in the modern context. The effects the information can cause to the development of the conflict, as audience perception of the outcome of the conflict matters more than the actual facts on the ground. The technological ability to follow actions, almost without geographical limitations, makes the involvement of global audiences in the conflict even more significant. Domestic, diaspora and foreign audiences now can interact with events in a real time as they follow online news sources and connect through social media. Thereby the fight over control people’s perceptions and behaviour has become an integral part of modern conflicts including hybrid wars.36 As David Stipples asserts, “information warfare that integrates electronic warfare, cyberwarfare, and psychological operations (PSYOPS) into a single fighting organisation will be central to all warfare in the future”.37

In terms of actors, hybrid wars include regular forces, irregular forces such as guerilla groups, militia, insurgents, terrorist groups, criminal organizations and even civilian groups.38 The state and not-state actors play out simultaneously in hybrid war.39 Hybrid wars have given ways to emerge various types of warriors over the centuries. Currently there are several types of warriors on different battlefields fighting hybrid wars. Some of them include, but not limited to, modern mercenaries, private military companies’ soldiers, hired veterans, proxy warriors, national freedom fighters, terrorist and foreign terrorist fighters, warlords and their militia, drug lords and their militias, digital

34 John J. McCuen, “Hybrid Wars”, Military Review, March April 2008, p.107-113.
35 Jan Joel Andersson, “Hybrid operations: lessons from the past”, EUISS, October 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_33_Hybrid_operations.pdf (21.07.2015)
36 Sanda Svetoka, Anna Reynolds, “Social Media as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare”, NATO StratCom COE May 2016, p.10. http://www.stratcomcoe.org/download/file/id/5314 (18.07.2017)
37 David Stulptjes, “The next big war will be digital and we are not ready for it”, The Conversation, November 26, 2015, https://theconversation.com/the-next-war-will-be-an-information-war-and-were-not-ready-for-it-51218 (19.07.2017)
38 Frank G. Hoffmann, “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats”, War on the Rocks, 28 July 2014, http://warontheroocks.com/2014/07/on-not-sonew-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/ (19.05.2016)
39 Merle Maigre, “Nothing New in Hybrid Warfare: The Estonian Experience and Recommendations for NATO”, German Marshall Fund Policy Brief, February 2015, p.1. http://www.gmfus.org/file/4272/download (11.05.2016)
warriors like hackers and “trolls”, and child and woman soldier in addition to the combatants of a state/states defined by IHL/LAC.\(^{40}\)

Hybrid war is often confused with the compound war and the fourth generation war (4GW). In fact there is a clear distinction between hybrid and compound wars. The latter involves regular and irregular forces fighting under unified strategic direction, whereas the former is a special case in which regular and irregular capabilities are fused into a single force.\(^{41}\) On the other hand, the 4GW is an evolved form of insurgency when an adversary uses all available networks, political, economic, social, and military, to target the enemy’s decision makers that their objectives are either unattainable or too costly.\(^{42}\) While there are elements of 4GW in hybrid war, hybrid war is a much broader concept that focuses on external threats vice the internal threats 4GW describes.\(^{43}\)

**Russian Federation and Hybrid War**

Russian hybrid war experiences go back as far as 1920s when the USSR adopted a covert war concept aiming to shape decision making process in the western countries and deceive the opponents. A special task force of Soviet intelligence agency KGB had established broad network in the western countries and the US,\(^{44}\) and competed with CIA and NATO’s stay behind forces. The USSR had initiated hybrid warfare against Estonia in December 1924 by supporting an insurgency,\(^{45}\) and implemented similar strategies in Bulgaria and Germany.\(^{46}\)

The USSR invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 shortly turned to a high intensity conflict with hybrid tactics at all levels and domain of war. For instance, 700 Russian soldiers wearing Afghan army uniforms seized the government buildings in Kabul.\(^{47}\) The RF gained experiences and learned lessons from Chechnya wars in 1990 and early 2000s.\(^{48}\) While Russian cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007 indicates non kinetic dimension, Russian offensive against Georgia in 2008 is an example of kinetic aspect of Russian hybrid war. While

\(^{40}\) “Rule 3. Definition of Combatants”, *ICRC Customary IHL*, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule3#Fn_93_2(28.05.2016)

\(^{41}\) Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid vs Compound War”, *Armed Forces Journal*, October 2009. http://armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/(24.05.2016)

\(^{42}\) Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, St. Paul, Zenith Press, 2006. p. 2.

\(^{43}\) Daniel T. Lasica, “Strategic Implications of Hybrid War: A Theory of Victory”, *School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 2009. p14.

\(^{44}\) Pavel Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, Boston, Back Bay Books, 1995.

\(^{45}\) Tiit Pruuli, *Detsembrimäss. Aprillimäss*, Tallinn, Eetriüksus, 2008, p. 59-62.

\(^{46}\) Jaan Lepp, “Kommentaar: 1. detsembri aasta,” *Estonian World Review*, 9 January 2009, http://www.eesti.ca/?op=article&articleid=22421.(16.01.2016)

\(^{47}\) Maigre, Ibid. p.2.

\(^{48}\) William J. Nemeth, “Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid War”, Unpublished Master Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, US, Monterey, CA, 2002.
Russian hybrid warfare concept gained much from the lessons learned during the Color Revolutions and the conflicts of the Arab Spring, the intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 set a turning point. Some of critical features of Russian hybrid strategies and tactics are discussed below.

The RF has implemented a complex strategy against Ukraine including use of regular and irregular forces, economic sanctions, financial pressure, energy blockade, political destabilization, information operations and cyber attacks. In addition, the RF has coordinated and synchronized available hybrid tools in time and space to create desired effects and reach determined end states. Furthermore, it has leveraged Russian speaking people and dissident groups to divide Ukraine people and weaken Ukraine government. Russian Special Forces in civilian and local clothes without insignia were infiltrated in Crimea and Donbas. These Special Forces seized the government buildings with the support of local collaborators. The RF also resorted to terror tactics to suppress the pro-Ukraine population in Crimea. Pro-Maidan protests in Crimea, especially in Simferopol and Sevastopol, disappeared in one day because of threats and intimidation by the pro- Russian population and especially Russian irregular forces.49

Russian army had started military preparation for annexation of Crimea in 2013.50 Between 2013 and March 2014, eight big exercises were conducted.51 A largest exercise was conducted in the Central Military District in April 2013, comprising 65,000 soldiers, 177 aircraft, 56 helicopter, and 5,500 vehicles.52 In March-April 2014, a joint exercise of the Western and Southern Military Districts was executed in Baltic and Nordic areas. While 150,000 Russian soldiers had participated in this exercise, a NATO exercise was joined by 6,000 soldiers in the same areas.53

While non-military means of power were deployed, Russian army also relied on more traditional conventional measures for their success. This was amply demonstrated in the battles at Debaltsevo, Donbass airport and Ilovaisk, during which much of the fighting involved high intensity combat,

49 Mehmet S. Erol, Şafak Oğuz, “Hybrid Warfare Studies and Russia’s Example in Crimea”, Gazi Akademik Bakış, Vol. 9, No. 17. Winter 2015. p.271.
50 Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, “Ukrayna-Kırım Krizi” ya da “İkinci Yalta Süreci”, Karadeniz Araştırma-ları Dergisi, Sayı 41, Bahar, 2014, p. 2.
51 Heidi Reisinger, Aleksandr Golts, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare: Waging War below the Radar of Traditional Collective Defence”, NATO Defense College, Research Paper No. 105. November 2014, p. 4. http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=426.(18.02.2016)
52 Reisinger, Golts, Ibid. p.3.
53 Daniel Hamilton, “Advancing U.S.-Nordic-Baltic Security Cooperation”, Center for Transatlantic Relations, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advance International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 2014. p. 97. http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/Advancing_U.S.-Nordic-Baltic_Security_Cooperation/Advancing_U.S.-Nordic-Baltic_Security_Cooperation. (11.01.2016)
including the extensive use of armor, artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, as well as drones and electronic warfare. During these battles, massed bombardments were deployed to considerable lethal effect—in short but intense bombardments battalion sized units were rendered inoperable, suffering heavy casualties.\textsuperscript{54}

Hybrid war discourse has recently drawn attention in the RF. For instance, military counselor to Putin, Surkov has described Russian recent operations as non-linear war.\textsuperscript{55} Similarly Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the Russian Armed Forces has mentioned about new methods of war by emphasizing non linear nature of conflict. The military operations are started by well trained small special groups without declaration of war, and they are aimed to defeat the adversary with fierce attacks against strategic, economic and military targets.\textsuperscript{56} Gerasimov expresses that hybrid war consists of six stages that use military, economic and diplomatic mechanisms to pressure a nation or group to elicit desired reactions and responses. Stage 1 is hidden emergence when differences of opinion or policy conflicts begin to emerge. Stage 2 is aggravation, when these differences transform into contradictions that are noticed by political and military leadership. Stage 3 is the beginning of conflict, which features the deepening of contradictions and the start of open strategic deployment of military means. Stage 4 is crisis, which consists of crisis reactions and a full range of actions. Stage 5 transitions to resolution and features isolating and neutralizing military conflict. It is in this phase that leadership shifts to a more political and diplomatic relationship and when the search for conflict regulation begins. Stage 6 is the establishment of peace and post conflict operations. At this point, gains from the action are consolidated, and the main goal segues into lowering tensions between the two countries.\textsuperscript{57}

According to Gerasimov, the hybrid conflict starts at the point when two states have a difference of interests, a much lower threshold than Western definitions, escalates along the stages, and ends with post conflict actions.

The aim of Russian hybrid attacks is to destabilize, shape and subdue the adversary without invasion and annexation of any territory as a first choice. Among the strategies and tactics Russia employs are diplomacy, information operations, economic sanctions, covert and overt military actions targeting...
to shape the perceptions of decision makers, and public opinion. It also uses covert operations, bribery and blackmail to corrupt the officials.58

The RF chooses to launch its hybrid attacks along seams between state-society, various agencies/departments at the strategic level and subordinate units at the operational/tactical levels that exist within a targeted government or country. These actions are usually successful because the more technical the coordination required to respond, the more likely the response will arrive too late to be effective. By applying pressure along these seams, the RF is able to enact a kind of reflexive control- making your opponent do what you want without the opponent realizing it.59

Russian army has implemented a series of programs covering 2008-2020 to gain hybrid war capabilities.60 Russia has made significant adjustments on the force structure since 2013, in this context, airborne, marine and special forces have taken priority. In this regard, the RF has restructured an airborne force consisting four divisions and five brigades (total 20 battalions), and a marine force of four brigade and eight regiment, and reinforced special forces.61

Several western analysts believe that the RF has expanded hybrid conflict against the West after the annexation of Crimea. It is argued that Russia’s hybrid toolbox and the scope and purpose of its goals vary from seeking a regional sphere of influence in the former Soviet space to a much more ambitious and longer term project — the re-establishment of Russia as a key international player. The means to this end are becoming clearer: create and exploit rifts in the West, delegitimize NATO, weaken the European Union and divide the West. This is called as Hybrid Conflict 2.0 and operates alongside Hybrid Conflict 1.0, which describes the initial hybrid strategies in Ukraine and Baltic states with limited scope, scale and objectives.62

**Strategic Implications of Hybrid Threats and War to Turkey**

The conceptual discussion in the first section and Russian strategies above suggest that hybrid war will promise success if the adversary’s vulnerabilities offer exploitable windows of opportunity to the hybrid aggressor who is willing to apply hybrid strategies and tactics. The weaknesses and vulnerabilities to be exploited by a hybrid adversary may include the followings.

- Weakness and fragility of the state in terms of domestic peace and internal stability in economic, societal, military and political spheres,

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58 Maigre, Ibid. p.1-2.
59 Canady, Ibid, p.22.
60 McDermott, Ibid..
61 Reisinger, Golts, Ibid. p.8.
62 Graeme P. Herd, “Hybrid Conflict 2.0 Targeting the West, Per Concordiam, George Marshall Center, Special Edition: Countering Russian Propaganda, 2016. p.10.
Dependency in critical sectors including energy and defense industries,
Regional and international isolatedness.
Break up of common identity, lack of national consciousness, social polarization, segmentation and being vulnerable for information warfare at cognitive and moral domains,
Decline in domestic public confidence to the target state’s institutions and political elites,
Lack of compromise among political elites on the national security and foreign policy issues,
Internal security problems,
Corrupt civilian and military leadership, problematical civil-military relations and mutual distrust,
Incompetence, degeneration, corruption of formal security sector; mistrust among security actors,
Lack of strategic vision and crisis management capability,
Polarisation of media and intellectuals.

Turkey has significant weaknesses and vulnerabilities similar to listed above. Some of them need to be elaborated. Turkey is becoming weaker and fragile in some areas in recent years. It is for instance among the countries giving warning of the Failed State Index 2015. Its rank is 90th out of 188 countries, and some of Turkey’s group members including Saudi Arabia, Serbia, and Ghana have scored better. On the other hand Greece holds 44 steps higher position. In terms of indicators, Turkey has got worse scores on group grievances, insecurity and factionalized elites.63 These indicators point out the high level of polarization, marginalization, radicalization and multi dimensional conflicts. In fact, one of the most challenging problems for Turkey in the first decade of the twenty first century is polarization and radicalization. This is a continuation of dynamics that emerged in previous decades but has deteriorated recently. Many warn of the dangers of polarization in Turkey. According to one researcher, Turkey faces problems and serious challenges, of which the most critical and pressing is the ongoing and unprecedented level of polarization in the country’s political sociology.64 A columnist for the New York Times claims that Turkey is on a dangerous course of hate-filled polarization, and that things will only get worse unless our leaders stop entrenching themselves to win the next political war and start thinking about winning the peace.65

63 “Failed State Index 2015”, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015(16.05.2016)
64 Fuat Keyman, “The AK Party: Dominant Party, New Turkey and Polarization”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 16 / No. 2 /2014, 19-31.
65 Mustafa Akyol, “Paranoia and Polarization in Turkey”, The New York Times, 16 April 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/opinion/mustafa-akyol-paranoia-and-polarization-in-turkey.html?_r=0 (18.05.2016)
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Regarding Human Development Index (HDI) 2015, Turkey ranks 72 among 188 countries, and is classified as having high human development.\(^6^6\) However, HDI takes three indicators such as average life expectancy at birth, schooling for adults and expected schooling years for children, and standard of living measured by gross national income per capita into account.\(^6^7\) Thus it does not explain the strengths and weaknesses of a country. While the World Freedom Report 2015 classifies Turkey’s political system as partial democracy\(^6^8\), the World Press Freedom Index argues that there are serious restrictions on press freedom.\(^6^9\) Turkey ranks 149 out of 180 countries.

Lastly, the Global Peace Index 2015 describes Turkey as a country in a conflict environment and assigns 135th rank among 162 countries.\(^7^0\) Such a description fits Turkey’s present security challenges. In the twenty first century, Turkey has to deal with reemerging leftist terrorism, protracted and trans-border PKK conflict, radical Islamic movements, foreign terrorist fighters, several side effects of the civil wars and instabilities beyond its borders. Such a challenging environment clearly requires a comprehensive and robust strategy agreed by all domestic actors in a democratic system. Unfortunately, Turkey lacks such a strategy and remains vulnerable to the consequences of a hybrid war.

On the other hand Turkey has many difficulties devising the right policy towards the PKK threat. There is neither a comprehensive national counter insurgency strategy nor the institutional structure to implement it. The political parties are polarized on significant issues, even on the terms of “peace” and “process”. Holding initiative, the PKK has easily employed hybrid strategies and tactics such as advocate of ceasefire and peace process when it deemed beneficial to its strategic purposes, urban warfare in the towns and cities that it selected, coordinated attacks to military barracks, massacre of civilians, attacks to helicopters and armored vehicles with highly developed weapons and so on.

For Turkey, the spillover effects of the instability and conflicts in Iraq and Syria are devastating. Existing sectarian and ethnic fault lines have been disrupted and many terrorist organizations have gained opportunities to stage terrorist acts. The most pressing problem seems to be foreign terrorist

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\(^{66}\) "Key to HDI countries and ranks, 2014", http://reporthdr.undp.org/(18.02.2016)

\(^{67}\) "Human Development Index (HDI)", http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi(11.04.2016)

\(^{68}\) "Freedom in the World 2015", https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.V1Kn8pZ-PmQ(15.05.2016)

\(^{69}\) "World Press Freedom Index 2015: decline on all fronts", https://rsf.org/en/news/world-press-freedom-index-2015-decline-all-fronts(12.02.2016)

\(^{70}\) "2015 Global Peace Index", http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index/2015(11.06.2015)
fighters going to Syria and Iraq, using Turkey as a source or transit country.\textsuperscript{71} The estimated number of Turkish foreign fighters in Syria varies. It is believed that 2,000-2,500, to Jihadist organizations such as ISIS and Al-Nusra, and 8,000 to PYD/YPG have participated from Turkey. There is no information about participation in the Free Syrian Army and its affiliated groups.\textsuperscript{72}

Based on above facts, it could not be argued that Turkey is too close to the failure. Nevertheless, societal polarization, radicalization of politics, existing security challenges and uncompromised politics have given alarms and increased Turkey’s fragility. Such fragility creates significant vulnerabilities and exposes Turkey to hybrid war.

Hybrid adversaries work to exploit the critical dependencies of their rivals to gain strategic advantages. In this respect, Turkey has several dependencies in economic, political-diplomatic, military, technological and research and development spheres. The first area is energy dependency, particularly natural gas. Turkey imports 99 percent of natural gas, mostly from possible hybrid opponents: 57 percent from the RF and 20 percent from Iran.\textsuperscript{73} Most is supplied by pipelines which is vulnerable against hybrid attacks. Regarding oil, Turkey imports 87 percent from international markets. More than half of supply comes from potential hybrid adversaries; 26 percent from Iran, 27 percent from Iraq.\textsuperscript{74} While such a dependency on critical raw materials shows the lack of strategic vision of Turkish political leaderships over past long years, it puts Turkey’s national security at risk in conflict hybrid scenarios.

Secondly, Turkey is technologically dependent of the west on many areas including defense technologies. Turkey’s critical land, air and naval systems have long been dependent on the western technology. Although the efforts have been made to produce national systems for long years, they have given little fruit so far. This puts Turkey at risk when a hybrid war is fought. Turkey still has to import critical equipment and military systems such as aircrafts, ships and intelligence systems although there is relatively increased national production. Turkey defense industry is among the third league of defense industries owned states while its requirements match the first and second league countries such as UK, China, RF, France and Israel.\textsuperscript{75} Turkey’s

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\textsuperscript{71} "Country Reports on Terrorism 2014", United States Department of State Publication Bureau of counterterrorism, June 2015, p.148. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf(19.01.2016)

\textsuperscript{72} Oktay Bingöl, “Foreign Fighters and Turkey’s Problem”, Journal of Security Strategy Political Studies, Vol.2, Issue.1, Summer 2016, p.68.

\textsuperscript{73} “Turkey Natural Gas Supply by source”, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR(29.04.2016)

\textsuperscript{74} “Turkey Crude Oil Supply Mix”, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR(29.04.2016)

\textsuperscript{75} Oktay Bingöl, Ali Bilgin Varlık, “Türk Savunma Sanayiiinin Sürdürülebilirliğini ve İhracat Potansiyelinin Artırılmasında Şekillendirilecek Geleceğe Uygun Strateji Belirleme”, TASAM Report, 08.04. 2015.
\end{flushleft}
annual defense budget that is below NATO required level of two percent of Gross Domestic Product is not sufficient\(^{76}\) when considering its modernization needs in the context of hybrid capacities and the size of its army.

Thirdly, Turkey has an information and research dependency especially in social sciences and security studies. In this regard, military doctrinal dependency is striking. Most of Turkish military doctrines, field and tactical manuals are translated from the western sources, particularly from the US. There is no internationally accepted national journal on terrorism in Turkey\(^ {77}\) which is one of most terrorism affected countries in the world. Security issues including terrorism and military subjects are seen an explicitly confidential area and are not studied in universities and/or research centers. There is no military and/or armed forces studies journal.

In addition to the dependencies, the foreign relations pose serious risks to Turkey’s political and military capability to deter hybrid adversaries and fight them when necessary. First area is the fact that Turkey has been encircled by troubled neighbors. Turkey is at hybrid war with the regime, ISIL, PYD and others in Syria, Iran, Iraq, RF and Armenia. The foreign relations with Greece, Southern Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, the EU an even with the US are fragile. Turkey’s isolated position particularly in the Middle East does not provide her with acceptable opportunities to establish alliances and balance potential adversaries. This is a significant weakness in emerging hybrid strategic environment. When Turkey approaches Sunni Monarchies of the Gulf to overcome such a weakness, fragile domestic fault lines activate.

Turkey has been in a hybrid conflict context for long years, intensifying in the last decade, especially after a Russian aircraft was shot down by Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) at Syrian border on 24 November 2015.\(^ {78}\) On this event, Russia had initiated temporally coordinated attacks against Turkey in physical, moral, economic and cognitive domains to exploit Turkey’s vulnerabilities. The battle in the cognitive and moral domains was especially intense. Russian Federation soughted to gain regional and international legitimacy in its struggle against Turkey and targeted Turkish public will. Russian hybrid war became effective and created strategic implications as a result of interaction of several internal, regional and international dynamics influencing Turkey.

Russian hybrid strategies against Turkey perfectly fit some of the strategies and tactics discussed above. The RF has implemented several

\(^{76}\) Ibid. p.9  
\(^{77}\) There is only one published in Turkey: Defence Against Terrorism Review. However, it is a NATO journal. Judith Tinnes, “100 Core and Periphery Journals for Terrorism Research”, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2013. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/258/html(17.04.2016)  
\(^{78}\) “Turkey Shoots Down Russian Military Jet”, The Wall Street Journal, 24 November 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-shoots-down-jet-near-syria-border-1448356509(18.02.2016)
economic sanctions on Turkey including ban on tourism, agricultural product, suitcase trading, international contracts, and direct investments. The RF endangered Turkish foreign policy in Syria by targeting Turkey supported rebels and Syrian Turks (Turkomans), and by supporting Esad regime and PYD/YPG which is accepted as a terrorist organization by Turkey.

The deployments of Russian S-300/400 missile systems to Syria had established a no-fly zone for Turkey. Thus Russia closed Syrian airspace to Turkey which could not fly its aircrafts to target PYD/YPG and ISIL even if it was attacked by them. After the shot down of Russian aircraft, PKK terrorist activities inside Turkey dramatically increased. PKK used Russian made man-portable air-defense system MANPADS which is a big threat to Turkish aircrafts and particularly helicopters although the weapon used by PKK to hit Turkish helicopter on 14 May 2016 does not prove Russian direct involvement. While Russian direct military support to PKK is questionable, diplomatic and moral support to PKK, PYD/YPG and affiliated political organizations is clear. Moreover, Russian hybrid concept had focused on indicating Turkey’s supports to ISIL. Overall, Russia fought in cognitive and moral domains and aimed to shape perceptions of Turkish public opinion, regional and international community.

**In Lieu of Conclusions: Recommendations for Turkish Decision Makers**

Defeating hybrid threats and winning a hybrid war requires, first of all, to understand what is hybrid war and make preparation in terms of civil military relations, suitable theory and adjusted policies, strategies, concepts and doctrines, structures, education of civilian and military leaders, equipment, training and readiness of forces.

The most important measure is clearly building a resilience society. This means that Turkish society should be freed from further polarization and marginalization of various sub groups. Identities should not be exploited

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79 Mustafa Sönmez, “Cost of Russian crisis continues to rise”, Hurriyet Daily News, 7 March 2016. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/cost-of-russian-crisis-continues-to-rise.aspx?PageID=238&NID=96107&NewsCatID=344(17.03.2016)

80 “Is the deployment of S300 and S400 a non-flying zone for Turkey airforce in Syria?”, https://www.quora.com/Is-the-deployment-of-S300-and-S400-a-non-flying-zone-for-Turkey-airforce-in-Syria(18.05.2016)

81 Andrew J. Tabler, Soner Cagaptay, “The PKK Could Spark Turkish-Russian Military Escalation”, The Washington Institute, 25 May 2016. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-pkk-could-spark-turkish-russian-military-escalation(29.05.2016)

82 Such weopans have been used in Syria and Iraq armies, and could also be procured from conflict environment.

83 “PYD opens office in Moscow, inauguration attended by HDP deputy”, Daily Sabah Diplomacy, 11 February 2016. http://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2016/02/11/pyd-opens-office-in-moscow-inauguration-attended-by-hdp-deputy(18.04.2016)

84 Roland Oliphant, “Russia says it has proof Turkey involved in Islamic State oil trade”, The Telegraph, 2 December 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/12029095/Russia-says-it-has-proof-Turkey-involved-in-Islamic-State-oil-trade.html(12.03.2016)
by politicians to consolidate their electoral bases. However, this requires a radical change in mentality, not only of the ruling party and ruling elites but also opposition parties and the media, to develop a more positive approach.

Turkish strategic paradigm must reorient to give more emphasis to the cognitive and moral domains, just as potential enemies’ paradigms have changed. It may be time to learn and adapt to the enemy’s way of war with an increase in the effective use of the cognitive and moral domains. The use of the media in hybrid war is a force multiplier to complement hybrid war asymmetric advantages.

Turkey’s response to hybrid war will require a whole of government approach that is very difficult for Turkey to coordinate, plan, and de-conflict. This actually requires inter-agency planning and implementation mechanism which Turkey is clearly lacking.

The western states and organizations have long endeavored to formulate suitable policies to deter hybrid threats. The EU and NATO efforts led to the emergence of a comprehensive approach blending all actors and available instruments: military forces, diplomacy, humanitarian aid, political processes, economic development, and technology. While NATO has developed Comprehensive Approach in 2008 the EU’s own comprehensive approach was adopted in December 2013. In these approaches, government-led actions have increasingly been complemented by whole-of-society strategies aimed at managing risks and building resilient societies by believing that the focus on resilience helps to mitigate risks that might lead to hybrid conflicts in the future and improves associated resource-management practices. The western governments have recently taken concrete steps to increase and modernize their civilian and military capabilities. The EU is aware of the fact that some of the present legal concepts and frameworks are anachronistic and do not always address hybrid threats adequately. It initiated new legal measures to overcome the weaknesses. Lastly many countries have adjusted to hybrid threats by expanding the missions of existing institutions or creating new organizations.

Turkey obviously needs such a comprehensive approach which requires a cooperative and constructive internal and external atmosphere, and a transformed security sector. Yet it is unfortunate that Turkey, being trapped to polarization and conflict, does have many difficulties to overcome.

85 “A ‘Comprehensive Approach to Crises’, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm(16.05.2016)
86 “What EU Comprehensive Approach?” ECDPM, Briefing Note 71, October 2014, http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/BN71-What-EU-Comprehensive-Approach-October-2014.pdf(17.05.2016)
87 “At a glance: UNderstanding Hyber Threats”
Effective political and military leadership is significant for the success of hybrid war. Political leaders set national objectives, work to bolster national will, and build and keep intact international coalitions to share resource burdens. They develop and explain strategic narrative that maintains popular support for the war effort. Above all, they must understand the nature of their opponent as well as the extent of the commitment necessary to win the war. Military leaders must adjust existing doctrine to take into account the kind of war in which their forces engage, as well as to counter enemy strengths and exploit enemy weaknesses. Senior leaders must create viable operational concepts that link the strategy to tactical actions. Leaders at all levels must gather lessons from ongoing military operations and alter doctrines, operational concepts, and strategy to meet unexpected challenges and opportunities. In a nutshell, leadership matters.

The most significant building block for being ready for hybrid war is to establish a suitable civilian military relations model. This model is radically different than classical Civil Military Relations (CMR) which sees civilian and military spheres two distinct areas. The academicians studying Turkish CMR have so far focused on the hierarchal link between the military and the civilian government and searched for an answer to the question of whether Chief of Gen.Staff (COGS) should be under Prime minister and/or Minister of Natl. Defence (MOND), and they have mainly ignored the operational aspects and changing strategic environment and warfare strategies and tactics including hybrid threat and warfare. The solution to Turkey’s long lasting problems seems to be a Civil Military Integration (CMI) rather than classical CMR as discussed and proposed in a study. In this regard, the military’s changing roles in new wars including hybrid war should be taken into consideration. The military and civilian spheres are no longer completely or clearly distinct in the twenty first century’s hybrid wars. Therefore, the military should be given the opportunity to acquire soft capabilities and to cooperate and interact with civilians, rather than isolating it from the civilian sphere. In an integrated approach, the military should work with civilian institutions, and civilians from relevant state institutions should be incorporated into appropriate branches of military headquarters, such as personnel, intelligence, logistics, defense planning, civil military cooperation, budgeting and finance.

Another area is developing a theory of hybrid war that threatens Turkey. Turkey must find appropriate methods and capabilities to deter adversaries from conducting hybrid war against its national security. In order to efficiently and effectively develop a hybrid war concept, regarding the National Security,

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88 Mansoor, Ibid.p.17.
89 See the full article for more detailed discussion of Civil Military Integration. Oktay Bingöl, “Turkey’s New Civil Military Relations (CMR) Revisited: Civil Military Integration”, Sertif Demir (ed.) Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Security Perspectives in the 21st Century: Prospects and Challenges, Florida, Brown Walker Press, 2016. p.300.
National Defense, and National Military Strategies, if there is any, must explicitly address hybrid war. For this endeavor to be effective however, a commonly accepted understanding of the concept must be established. Currently, there are no comprehensive definitions and understandings of hybrid war in Turkey. Additionally and more importantly further intellectual research on the hybrid war concept such as journal articles, books, symposiums, seminars and conferences must be conducted. Yet there is limited effort in this area.

Knowledge of high ranking civilians as well as military including the members of cabinet and parliament, bureaucrats and media is a key prerequisite for a successful endeavor to defend against hybrid war. Yet there is no appropriate high level educational institution offering courses to Turkish decision and policy makers. To do this, an advanced security and strategy academy needs to be established to educate senior elected and appointed national security decision makers and general officers.

Turkey’s military focus is traditionally on the physical domain. The structure of the TAF is a conventional and hierarchical one, reflecting the Cold War approaches. The headquarters at operational and tactical levels are dominated by single service officers. Moreover, Turkish General Staff (TGS) Headquarters has limited jointness and is lacking interagency staff. TAF does not have sufficient planning and implementation capacity in critical areas such as joint effects teams, strategic communication, public affairs, civil military cooperation, psychological operations and information operations. It also lacks political advisers at strategic and operational levels, and legal advisers at especially tactical-operational levels. As hybrid adversaries mainly use cognitive and moral domains, this will challenge Turkey. These capabilities must be owned and fully integrated from the outset. The use of information operations must be an overarching theme in any inter-agency approach in a hybrid war. TAF’s strategic, operational and tactical level doctrines also need to be adjusted to the requirements of hybrid war. The military could make significant modifications to be able to meet the hybrid threats and hybrid tactics to be employed by potential adversaries. The agents in hybrid war environment increasingly apply decentralized networked structures, dispersed attack teams and non linear actions. TAF, with its overwhelming hierarchical structure and centralized decision making system, will have difficulties with hybrids threats. In order to overcome such a weakness, the leaders at all levels, but especially tactical level such as team, squad, company and task force must

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90 In TGS HQ, there are almost ten high level generals/admirals (4 and 3 stars) positions including COGS, his deputy and heads of J directorates. In 2016, there are one air force general and seven army generals, no admiral at heads of J’s level. Air force general is the Head of Logistics which is considered “non-operational”. This information is taken from Turkish official gazettes published in 2014/15. Official Gazettes: 29437 (6 August 2015); 29438 (7 August 2015), 29081 (7 August 2014). http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/default.aspx#(03.06.2016)

91 A limited capacity in psychological operations was lost in the period between 2007-2012, namely “Ergenekon” and other cases.
be better trained and equipped with required competences. This is not as simple as hiring young civilians instead of conscripted soldiers and requires cognitive transformation which has so far proved very difficult for almost all military establishments around the world including TAF.

In terms of equipment, it is quite clear that combat power in hybrid war consists of more than just the tank, artillery, infantry, aircraft, ships, and other weapons that a military force possesses. Intelligence, civil affairs, psychological operations, and interagency civilian capabilities are necessary to fight hybrid wars. However, transformation of Turkish defense industry planning and equipment procurement policies to meet the requirements of future hybrid wars cannot be achieved unless conceptual, doctrinal and structural steps discussed above are taken.

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92 Mansoor, Ibid. p.16.
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