Newton Optimization on Helmholtz Decomposition for Continuous Games

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Abstract

Many learning problems involve multiple agents that optimize different interactive functions. In these problems, standard policy gradient algorithms fail due to the non-stationarity of the setting and the different interests of each agent. In fact, the learning algorithms must consider the complex dynamics of these systems to guarantee rapid convergence towards a (local) Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we propose NOHD (Newton Optimization on Helmholtz Decomposition), a Newton-like algorithm for multi-agent learning problems based on the decomposition of the system dynamics into its irrotational (Potential) and solenoidal (Hamiltonian) components. This method ensures quadratic convergence in purely irrotational systems and pure solenoidal systems. Furthermore, we show that NOHD is attracted to symmetric stable fixed points in general multi-agent systems and repelled by strict saddle ones. Finally, we empirically compare the NOHD’s performance with state-of-the-art algorithms on some bimatrix games and in a continuous Gridworld environment.

1 Introduction

In recent years, Reinforcement Learning (RL) (Sutton, Barto et al. 1998) methods with multiple agents (Busoniu, Babuška, and De Schutter 2010; Zhang, Yang, and Başar 2019) have made substantial progress in solving decision-making problems such as playing Go (Silver et al. 2016), robotic control problems (Lillicrap et al. 2015), playing card games (Brown and Sandholm 2019) and autonomous driving (Shalev-Shwartz, Shammah, and Shashua 2016). Furthermore, in other machine learning fields, powerful algorithms that optimize multiple losses have recently been proposed. Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) (Goodfellow et al. 2014) is an example, which achieves successful results in Computer Vision (Isola et al. 2017; Ledig et al. 2017) and Natural Language Generation (Nie, Narodytska, and Patel 2018; Yu et al. 2017). On the other hand, thanks to their ability to learn in the stochastic policy space and their effectiveness in solving high-dimensional, continuous state and action problems, policy-gradient algorithms (Peters and Schaal 2006) are natural candidates for use in multi-agent learning problems. Nonetheless, multiple policy-gradient agents’ interaction has proven unsuccessful in learning a set of policies that converges to a (local) Nash Equilibrium (Mertikopoulos, Papadimitriou, and Piliouras 2018; Papadimitriou and Piliouras 2016). More than one agent leads to the failure of standard optimization methods in most games due to the non-stationarity of the environment and the lack of cooperation between the agents. How to optimize multiple policy-gradient agents is a problem of theoretical interest and practical importance. Over the past two years, a growing number of papers has addressed this problem by focusing on continuous (differentiable) games, i.e., games where the agent’s objective functions are twice differentiable with respect to the policy parameters (Mazumdar, Ratliff, and Sastry 2020). Some of them only consider the competitive setting due to the success of GANs (Mescheder, Nowozin, and Geiger 2017). The general case was considered only recently, where the gradient descent update rule was combined with second-order terms (Balduzzi et al. 2018; Letcher et al. 2018; Foerster et al. 2018; Schäfer and Anandkumar 2019). Some of them guarantee linear convergence under specific assumptions. In this paper, we study how to build a Newton-based algorithm (NOHD) for learning policies in multi-agent environments. First of all, we start by analyzing two specific game classes: Potential Games and Hamiltonian Games (Section 3). In Section 4, we propose a Newton-based update for these two classes of games, for which linear-rate algorithms that guarantee convergence are known, proving quadratic convergence rates. Then, we extend the algorithm to the general case, neither Hamiltonian nor Potential. We show that the proposed algorithm respects some desiderata, similar to those proposed in (Balduzzi et al. 2018), the algorithm has to guarantee convergence to (local) Nash Equilibria in (D1) Potential and (D2) Hamiltonian games; (D3) the algorithm has to be attracted by symmetric stable fixed points and (D4) repelled by symmetric unstable fixed points. Finally, in Section 6, we analyze the empirical performance of NOHD when agents optimize a Boltzmann policy in three bimatrix games: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Matching Pennies, and Rock-Paper-Scissors. In the last experiment, we study the learning performance of NOHD in two continuous gridworld environments. In all experiments, NOHD achieves great results confirming the quadratic nature of the update. The proofs of all the results presented in
2 Related Works

The study of convergence in classic convex multiplayer games has been extensively studied and analyzed (Rosen 1965; Facchinei and Kanzow 2007; Singh, Kearns, and Mansour 2000). Unfortunately, the same algorithms cannot be used with neural networks due to the non-convexity of the objective functions. Various algorithms have been proposed that successfully guarantee convergence in specific classes of games: policy prediction in two-player two-action bimatrix games (Zhang and Lesser 2010; Song, Wang, and Zhang 2019); WoLF in two-player two-action games (Bowling and Veloso 2002); AWESOME in repeated games (Conitzer and Sandholm 2007); Optimistic Mirror Descent in two-player bilinear zero-sum games (Daskalakis et al. 2017); Consensus Optimization (Mescheder, Nowozin, and Geiger 2017); Competitive Gradient Descent (Schäfer and Anandkumar 2019 and Mazumdar, Jordan, and Sastry 2019) in two-player zero-sum games. Other recent works propose methods to learn in smooth-markets (Balduzzi et al. 2020), sequential imperfect information games (Perolat et al. 2020), zero-sum linear-quadratic games (Zhang, Yang, and Basar 1965; Facchinei and Kanzow 2007, and Zhang and Lesser 2010; Song, Wang, and Zhang 2019) the authors studied game dynamics by decomposing sequential imperfect information games (Perolat et al. 2020), zero-sum linear-quadratic games (Zhang, Yang, and Basar 1965; Facchinei and Kanzow 2007, and Zhang and Lesser 2010; Song, Wang, and Zhang 2019) the authors studied game dynamics by decomposing sequential imperfect information games (Perolat et al. 2020), zero-sum linear-quadratic games (Zhang, Yang, and Basar 1965; Facchinei and Kanzow 2007, and Zhang and Lesser 2010; Song, Wang, and Zhang 2019).

3 Preliminaries

We cast the multi-agent learning problem as a Continuous Stochastic Game. We adapt the concept of Stochastic Game and Continuous (Differentiable) Game from (Foerster et al. 2018; Balduzzi et al. 2018; Ratliff, Burden, and Sastry 2016). In this section, after introducing Continuous Stochastic Games, we recall the game decomposition proposed by Balduzzi et al. (2018). Then, we describe the desired convergence points in the end. We introduce Newton’s method.

Continuous Stochastic Games A continuous stochastic game (Foerster et al. 2018; Balduzzi et al. 2018) is a tuple $G = (X, U, f, C, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ where $n$ is the number of agents; $X$ is the set of states; $U_i, 1 \leq i \leq n$ is the set of actions of agent $i$ and $U = U_1 \times \cdots \times U_n$ is the joint action set; $f : X \times U \to \Delta(X)$ is the state transition probability function (where $\Delta(\Omega)$ denotes the set of probability measures over a generic set $\Omega$); $C_i : X \times U \to \mathbb{R}$ is the cost function of agent $i$, and $\gamma_i \in [0, 1]$ is its discount factor.

The agent’s behavior is described by means of a parametric twice differentiable policy $\pi_{\theta} : X \to \Delta(U_i)$, where $\theta_i \in \Theta \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ and $\pi_{\theta}(x)$ specifies for each state $x$ a distribution over the action space $U_i$. We denote by $\theta$ the vector of length $rd$ obtained by stacking together the parameters of all the agents: $\theta = (\theta_1^T, \ldots, \theta_n^T)^T$. We define an infinite-horizon trajectory in game $G$ by $\tau = \{x_t, u_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \in \mathbb{T}$, where $u_t = (u_1(t), \ldots, u_n(t))$ is the joint action at time $t$, $x_t \sim f(x_{t-1}, u_{t-1})$ (for $t > 0$), and $\mathbb{T}$ is the trajectory space. In stochastic games, all agents try to minimize their expected discounted cost separately, which is defined for the $i$-th agent as:

$$V_i(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau}[C_i(\tau)],$$

where $C_i(\tau) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t_i C_i(x_t, u_t)$ and the expectation is with respect to the agents’ policies and the transition model. Note that the expectation depends on all the agents’ policies. We do not assume the convexity of the functions $V_i(\cdot)$. We define the simultaneous gradient (Letcher et al. 2018) as the concatenation of the gradient of each discounted return function with respect to the parameters of each player:

$$\xi(\theta) = (\nabla_{\theta_1} V_1^T, \ldots, \nabla_{\theta_n} V_n^T)^T.$$

The Jacobian of the game (Letcher et al. 2018; Ratliff, Burden, and Sastry 2013) $J$ is an $rd \times nd$ matrix, where $n$ is the number of agents and $d$ the number of policy parameters for each agent. $J$ is composed by the matrix of the derivatives of the simultaneous gradient, i.e., for each player $i$ the $i$-th row of its hessian:

$$J = \nabla_\theta \xi = \begin{pmatrix}
\nabla^2_{\theta_1} V_1 & \nabla_{\theta_1, \theta_2} V_1 & \cdots & \nabla_{\theta_1, \theta_n} V_1 \\
\nabla_{\theta_2, \theta_1} V_2 & \nabla^2_{\theta_2} V_2 & \cdots & \nabla_{\theta_2, \theta_n} V_2 \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
\nabla_{\theta_n, \theta_1} V_n & \nabla_{\theta_n, \theta_2} V_n & \cdots & \nabla^2_{\theta_n} V_n
\end{pmatrix}.$$

Game dynamics $J$ is a square matrix, not necessarily symmetric. The antisymmetric part of $J$ is caused by each

A complete version of the paper, which includes the appendix, is available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2007.07804.pdf. 

Given a vector $v$ and a matrix $H$, in the following we will denote by $v^T$ the transpose of $v$ and with $\|v\|$ and $\|H\|$ the respective $L2$-norms.

To ease the notation, we will drop $\theta$ (e.g., $\pi_i$ instead of $\pi_{\theta_i}$) when not necessary.
agent’s different cost functions and can cause cyclical behavior in the game (even in simple cases as bimatrix zero-sum games, see Figure 2). On the other hand, the symmetric part represents the “cooperative” part of the game. In (Balduzzi et al. 2018), the authors proposed how to decompose $J$ in its symmetric and antisymmetric component using the Generalized Helmholtz decomposition (Wills 1958). 

Proposition 1. The Jacobian of a game decomposes uniquely into two components $J = S + A$, where $S = \frac{1}{2}(J + J^T)$ and $A = \frac{1}{2}(J - J^T)$.

Components $S$ and $A$ represent the irrotational (Potential), $S$, and the solenoidal (Hamiltonian), $A$, part of the game, respectively. The irrotational component is its curl-free component, and the solenoidal one is the divergence-free one.

Potential games are a class of games introduced by (Monderer and Shapley 1996). A game is a potential game if there exists a potential function $\phi : \mathbb{R}^n \times d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, such that: 
$$
\phi(\theta_i^*, \theta_{-i}) - \phi(\theta'_i, \theta_{-i}) = \alpha(V_i(\theta_i^*, \theta_{-i}) - V_i(\theta'_i, \theta_{-i})).
$$

A potential game is an exact potential game if $\alpha = 1$; exact potential games have $A = 0$. In these games, $J$ is symmetric and it coincides with the hessian of the potential function. This class of games is widely studied because in these games gradient descent converges to a Nash Equilibrium (Rosenthal 1973; Lee et al. 2016). In the rest of the document, we refer to potential games we refer to exact potential games.

Hamiltonian games, i.e., games with $S = 0$, were introduced in (Balduzzi et al. 2018). A Hamiltonian game is described by a Hamiltonian function, which specifies the conserved quantity of the game. Formally, a Hamiltonian system is fully described by a scalar function, $H : \mathbb{R}^n \times d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. The state of a Hamiltonian system is represented by the generalized coordinates $q$ momentum and position $p$, which are vectors of the same size. The evolution of the system is given by Hamilton’s equations: 
$$
\frac{dq}{dt} = \frac{\partial H}{\partial p}, \quad \frac{dp}{dt} = -\frac{\partial H}{\partial q}.
$$

The gradient of $H$ corresponds to $(S + A^T)\xi$ (Balduzzi et al. 2018). In bimatrix games, Hamiltonian games coincide with zero-sum games, but this is not true in general games (Balduzzi et al. 2018).

Desired convergence points In classic game theory, the standard solution concept is the Nash Equilibrium (Nash et al. 1950). Since we focus on gradient-based methods and make no assumptions about the convexity of the return functions, we consider the concept of local Nash Equilibrium (Ratliff, Burden, and Sastry 2016).

Definition 1. A point $\theta^*$ is a local Nash equilibrium if, $\forall i$, there is a neighborhood $B_i$ of $\theta^*_i$ such that $V_i(\theta_i^*, \theta^*_{-i}) \geq V_i(\theta'_i, \theta^*_{-i})$ for any $\theta_i \in B_i$.

Gradient-based methods can reliably find local (not global) optima even in single-agent non-convex problems (Lee et al. 2016; 2017), but they may fail to find local Nash equilibria in non-convex games.

Another desirable condition is that the algorithm converges into symmetric stable fixed points (Balduzzi et al. 2018).

Definition 2. A fixed point $\theta^*$ with $\xi(\theta^*) = 0$ is symmetric stable if $S(\theta^*) \succeq 0$ and $S(\theta^*)$ is invertible, symmetric unstable if $S(\theta^*) \prec 0$ and a strict saddle if $S(\theta^*)$ has an eigenvalue with negative real part.

Symmetric stable fixed points and local Nash equilibria are interesting solution concepts, the former from an optimization point of view and the latter from a game-theoretic perspective.

Newton method Newton’s method (Nocedal and Wright 2006) guarantees, under assumptions, a quadratic convergence rate to the root of a function, which, in optimization, is the derivative of the function to be optimized. This method is based on a second-order approximation of the twice differentiable function $g(\theta)$ that we are optimizing. Starting from an initial guess $\theta_0$, Newton’s method updates the parameters $\theta$ by setting the derivative of the second-order Taylor approximation of $g(\theta)$ to 0:

$$
\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \nabla^2 g(\theta_t)^{-1}\nabla g(\theta_t).
$$

For non-convex functions, the hessian $\nabla^2 g(\theta)$ is not necessarily positive semidefinite and all critical points are possible solutions for Newton’s method. Then, Newton’s update may converge to a local minimum, a saddle, or a local maximum. A possible solution to avoid this shortcoming is to use a modified version of the inverse of the hessian, called Positive Truncated inverse (PT-inverse) (Nocedal and Wright 2006; Paternain, Mokhtari, and Ribeiro 2019).

Definition 3 (PT-inverse). Let $H \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ be a symmetric matrix, $Q \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ a basis of orthogonal eigenvectors of $H$, and $\Lambda \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ a diagonal matrix of corresponding eigenvalues. The $|\Lambda|_m \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ is the positive definite truncated eigenvalue matrix of $\Lambda$ with parameter $m$:

$$
(|\Lambda|_m)_{ij} = \begin{cases} 
|\Lambda_{ii}| & \text{if } |\Lambda_{ii}| \geq m, \\
0 & \text{otherwise}.
\end{cases}
$$

The PT-inverse of $H$ with parameter $m$ is the matrix $|H|_m^{-1} = Q|\Lambda|_m^{-1}Q^T$.

The PT-inverse flips the sign of negative eigenvalues and truncates small eigenvalues by replacing them with $m$. Then the usage of the PT-inverse, instead of the real one, guarantees convergence to a local minimum even in non-convex functions. These properties are necessary to obtain a convergent Newton-like method for non-convex functions.

4 Newton for Games

In this section, we describe how to apply Newton-based methods to Continuous Stochastic Games. We start by showing how Newton’s method can be applied to two game classes: Potential games and Hamiltonian Games. Then we describe an algorithm to extend Newton’s method in general games.

Newton’s Method for Potential Games

Potential games are a class of games characterized by the existence of a potential function $\phi : \mathbb{R}^n \times d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ which describes the dynamics of the system. In these games, gradient
Newton’s Method for Hamiltonian Games

Hamiltonian games are characterized by a Hamiltonian function \( H : \mathbb{R}^{n \times d} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \). In these games, the gradient descent does not converge to a stable fixed point but causes cyclical behavior. Instead, the gradient descent on the Hamiltonian function converges to a Nash equilibrium. Figure 2 shows the dynamics of gradient descent w.r.t. \( \xi \) and \( \nabla H \) on a Hamiltonian game; the figure points out that a gradient descent on \( \xi \) cycles.

Example 4.1. Take a two-player bilinear game with agents with parameters \( \theta_1 \) and \( \theta_2 \) minimizing respectively \( f(\theta) : \mathbb{R}^{n \times d} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) and \( g(\theta) : \mathbb{R}^{n \times d} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) respectively. A point in this class of games is a Nash Equilibrium if \( \xi(\theta) = 0 \), i.e., \( \nabla \theta_1 f = 0 \) and \( \nabla \theta_2 g = 0 \), because \( \nabla \theta_1 f = 0 \) and \( \nabla \theta_2 g = 0 \). Considering this, the Nash Equilibrium can be calculated in closed form (if the inverse exists) by setting the gradient equal to zero:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\nabla \theta_1 f \\
\nabla \theta_2 g
\end{bmatrix}
+ 
\begin{bmatrix}
\nabla \theta_1 \theta_2 f & 0 \\
0 & \nabla \theta_2 \theta_1 f
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
\theta_1 \\
\theta_2
\end{bmatrix}
= 0
\]

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\theta_1 \\
\theta_2
\end{bmatrix}
= -
\begin{bmatrix}
0 & \nabla \theta_2 \theta_1 f \\
\nabla \theta_1 \theta_2 f & 0
\end{bmatrix}^{-1}
\begin{bmatrix}
\nabla \theta_1 f \\
\nabla \theta_2 g
\end{bmatrix}
\]

The example above provides the intuition that the solution to quadratic Hamiltonian games is achieved by the following update rule (in Hamiltonian games \( S = 0 \)):

\[
\theta_{i+1} = \theta_i - A(\theta_i)^{-1}\xi(\theta_i).
\]

Algorithm 1 NOHD

input: discounted returns \( V = \{V_i\}_{i=1}^{n} \), PT inverse parameter \( m \)
output: update rule

\[
\xi = \text{Compute } \xi, J, S, A, S_m^{-1}.
\]

if \( \cos \nu S \geq 0 \) then

if \( \cos \nu S \geq \cos \nu A \) then \( \xi \) else \( \xi \)

else

if \( \cos \nu S \leq \cos \nu A \) then \( \xi \) else \( \xi \)

end if

In the following theorem, we state that even in this class of games the convergence to a local Nash Equilibrium (using the above update) is quadratic (see Figure 2). The proof is in Appendix A.

Theorem 1. Suppose that \( \xi \) and \( A \) are twice continuously differentiable and that \( A \) is invertible in the (local) Nash Equilibrium \( \theta^* \). Then, there exists \( \epsilon > 0 \) such that iterations starting from any point in the ball \( B(\theta^*, \epsilon) \) with center \( \theta^* \) and ray \( \epsilon \) converge to \( \theta^* \). Furthermore, the convergence rate is quadratic.

Newton’s Method for General Games

In general games, it is not yet known whether and how the system’s dynamics can be reduced to a single function as for Potential and Hamiltonian games. Thus, finding a Newton-based update is more challenging: if we apply Newton’s Method with the Jacobian PT-transformation, we can alter the Hamiltonian dynamics of the game. Instead, applying the inverse of the Jacobian as in the Hamiltonian games can lead to local maxima. In this section, we show how to build a Newton-based learning rule that guarantees desiderata similar to those considered in (Baldazzi et al. 2018); the update rule has to be compatible (D1) with Potential dynamics if the game is a Potential game, with (D2) Hamiltonian dynamics if the game is a Hamiltonian game and has to be (D3) attracted by symmetric stable fixed points and (D4) repelled by unstable ones. By compatible we mean that given two vectors \( u, v \) then \( u^T v > 0 \).

The algorithm that we propose (see Algorithm 1) chooses the update to perform between the two updates in (5) and (6). The choice is based on the angles between the gradient of the Hamiltonian function \( H \) and the two candidate updates’ directions. In particular, we compute

\[
\cos \nu S = \frac{(S_m^{-1} \xi)^T \nabla H}{\|S_m^{-1} \xi\| \|\nabla H\|}, \quad \cos \nu A = \frac{(A^{-1} \xi)^T \nabla H}{\|A^{-1} \xi\| \|\nabla H\|}.
\]

When the cosine is positive, the update rule follows a direction that reduces the value of the Hamiltonian function (i.e.,
Lemma 1. Given the Jacobian $J = S + A$ and the simultaneous gradient $\xi$, if $\mathbb{S} \geq 0$ then $\cos \nu_S \geq 0$; instead if $\mathbb{S} \prec 0$ then $\cos \nu_S < 0$.

The idea of NOHD is to use the sign of $\cos \nu_S$ to decide whether to move in a direction that reduces the Hamiltonian function (aiming at converging to a stable fixed point) or not (aiming at getting away from unstable points). In case $\cos \nu_S$ is positive, the algorithm chooses the update rule with the largest cosine value (i.e., which minimizes the angle with $\nabla H$), otherwise NOHD tries to point in the opposite direction by taking the update rule that minimizes the cosine. In the following theorem, we show that the update performed by NOHD satisfies the desiderata described above.

Theorem 2. The NOHD update rule satisfies requirements (D1), (D2), (D3), and (D4).

Proof. (Sketch) The requirement (D1) is satisfied if $(S^{-1} \xi)^T \nabla \phi$ and $(A^{-1} \xi)^T \nabla \phi$ are nonnegative and $\mathcal{G}$ is a Potential game; in this case the update rule is $S^{-1} \xi$ because $A = 0$. We have that $\nabla \phi = \xi$ and $\epsilon^T S^{-1} \xi \geq 0$ as said before. For requirement (D2) we can make similar considerations: in this case we have to show that $(S^{-1} \xi)^T \nabla H$ and $(A^{-1} \xi)^T \nabla H$ are nonnegative when $\mathcal{G}$ is a Hamiltonian game, that is equal to say: $(A^{-1} \xi)^T A^{T} \xi = \|\xi\|^2$. Finally, the fulfillment of desiderata (D3) and (D4) is a consequence of Lemma 1.

Given the results from Theorem 2 and Lemma 1, we can argue that if $\xi$ points at a stable fixed point then NOHD points also to the stable fixed point otherwise if $\xi$ points away from the fixed point also NOHD points away from it.

Then we prove that NOHD converges only to fixed points and, under some conditions, it converges locally to symmetric stable fixed points.

Lemma 2. If NOHD converges to a $\theta^*$ then $\xi(\theta^*) = 0$.

Theorem 3. Suppose $\theta^*$ is a stable fixed point, and suppose $A$, $S$, $J$ are bounded and Lipschitz continuous with modulus respectively $M_A$, $M_S$, $M_J$ in the region of attraction of the stable fixed point $\xi(\theta^*)$. Furthermore assume that $\|A^{-1}\| \leq N_A$ and $\|S^{-1}\| \leq N_S$. Then there exists $\epsilon > 0$ such that the iterations starting from any point $\theta_0 \in B(\theta^*, \epsilon)$ converge to $\theta^*$.

More details about the proofs are given in Appendix A.

Remark 1. In this paper, we focus our attention on convergence towards symmetric stable fixed points. However, some Nash Equilibria are not symmetric stable fixed points. On the other hand, symmetric stable fixed points are an interesting solution concept since in two-player zero-sum games (e.g., GANs [Goodfellow et al. 2014]), all local Nash Equilibria are also symmetric stable fixed points [Balduzzi et al. 2018].

5 Learning via Policy Gradient in Stochastic Games

Usually, agents do not have access to the full gradient of the Jacobian, and we need to estimate them. We define a $T$-episodic trajectory as $\tau = \{x_0, u_0, C_0, \ldots, C_{T}, u_T, x_{T+1}, \ldots, C_{T'}, u_{T'}, x_{T'}, \ldots, C_T, u_T\}$. Following policy gradient derivation [Peters and Schaal 2008], $\nabla_{\theta_i} V_i$ can be estimated by 

$$\nabla_{\theta_i} M V_i = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=1}^{M} \sum_{t=0}^{T} C_{m,t}^{i} \nabla \log \pi_{\theta_i} (x_{m,t}, u_{m,t})$$

$$\times \sum_{t'=0}^{t} \left( \nabla \log \pi_{\theta_i} (x_{m,t'}, u_{m,t'}) \right) \left( \nabla \log \pi_{\theta_i} (x_{m,t'}, u_{m,t'}) \right)^T.$$

Then, to estimate the Jacobian $J$, we have to compute the second-order gradient $\nabla_{\theta_i} \nabla_{\theta_j} V_i$, with $1 \leq k \leq n, 1 \leq j \leq n$. If $k \neq j$ we derive [Foerster et al. 2018] the second-order gradient, exploiting the independence of agents’ policies:

$$\nabla_{\theta_k} M V_i = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=1}^{M} \nabla g_{m,\theta_i} (\theta_k) \nabla \log \pi_{\theta_i} (\tau_m)^T + \nabla^2 g_{m,\theta_i} (\theta_k).$$

6 Experiments

This section is devoted to the experimental evaluation of NOHD. The proposed algorithm is compared with Consensus Optimization (CO) [Mescheder, Nowozin, and Geiger 2017], Stable Opponent Shaping (SOS) [Letcher et al. 2018], Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness (LOLA) [Foerster et al. 2018], Competitive Gradient Descent (CGD) [Schäfer and Anandkumar 2019], Iterated Gradient Ascent Policy Prediction (IGA-PP) [Zhang and Lesser 2010] and Symplectic Gradient Adjustment (SGA) [Balduzzi et al. 2018].

Matrix Games

We consider two matrix games: two-agent two-action Matching Pennies (MP) and two-agent three-action Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) (games’ rewards are reported in Appendix B). Considering a linear parameterization of the agents’ policies, MP and RPS are respectively Hamiltonian games and a linear parameterization of the agents’ policies and exact computation of gradients and

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6 With $\nabla_{\theta_i}^M$, we intend the estimator of $\nabla_{\theta_i}$ over $M$ samples.

7 All derivations are reported in Appendix.

8 In Appendix we report results also for Dilemma game.
Jacobian. In this setting, games lose their Hamiltonian or Potential property, making the experiment more interesting and the behavior of NOHD not trivial. The results are shown in Figure 3 (left side). For each game, we perform experiments with learning rates 0.1, 0.5, 1.0. In the plots are reported only the best performance for each algorithm. In Matching Pennies we initialize probabilities to [0.86, 0.14] for the first agent and to [0.14, 0.86] for the second agent; instead in Rock Paper Scissors to [0.66, 0.24, 0.1]. The figure shows that each algorithm is able to converge to the Nash equilibrium (in MP, CO converges with a learning rate of 0.1 and takes more than 1000 iterations. The plot is reported in Appendix). In Table 1 we reported the ratio between the number of steps each algorithm takes to converge and the maximum number of steps in which the slowest algorithm converges. For this simulation, we sampled 50 random initializations of the parameters from a normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation 0.5. Table 2 shows that NOHD significantly outperforms other algorithms even when starting from random initial probabilities.

In the second experiment, the gradients and the Jacobian are estimated from samples. The starting probabilities are the same as in the previous experiment. We performed 20 runs for each setting. In each iteration, we sampled 300 trajectories of length 1. Figures 3 (right side) show that NOHD also in this experiment converges to the equilibrium in less than 100 iterations. Instead, the other algorithms exhibit oscillatory behaviors.

Table 1: Ratio between the mean convergence steps to Nash Equilibrium and the maximum mean convergence steps. 50 runs, sampling from a normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(0, 0.5^2)$.

| Game | NOHD | CGD | LOLA | IGAPP | CO | SOS | SGA |
|------|------|-----|------|-------|----|-----|-----|
| MP   | 0.49 | 0.84 | 1.00 | 0.99  | 0.99| 0.99 | 0.99 |
| RPS  | 0.38 | 0.97 | 0.84 | 1.00  | 0.99| 0.99 | 0.99 |

Table 2: Computation time of one learning update of each algorithm with increasing parameter space size. 20 runs.

| Setting | NOHD | CGD | LOLA | IGAPP | CO | SOS | SGA |
|---------|------|-----|------|-------|----|-----|-----|
| 4       | 0.7205 | 0.6979 | 0.6983 | 0.7186 | 0.7302 | 0.7265 | 0.7006 |
| 16      | 0.7898 | 0.7787 | 0.7735 | 0.7906 | 0.8358 | 0.8051 | 0.7758 |
| 36      | 1.1416 | 1.0625 | 1.0874 | 1.0705 | 1.1992 | 1.1444 | 1.1066 |
| 64      | 1.9486 | 1.6342 | 1.6162 | 1.6735 | 1.9555 | 1.8955 | 1.8850 |
| 100     | 3.4070 | 2.7734 | 2.6905 | 2.8169 | 3.4799 | 3.3126 | 3.2977 |
| 144     | 5.9191 | 4.6260 | 4.4351 | 4.8438 | 6.5164 | 5.8440 | 5.7876 |

Continuous Gridworlds

This experiment aims at evaluating the performance of NOHD in two continuous Gridworld environments. The first gridworld is the continuous version of the second gridworld proposed in [Hu and Wellman 2003]: the two agents are initialized in the two opposite lower corners and have to reach the same goal; when one of the two agents reaches the goal, the game ends, and this agent gets a positive reward. Each agent has to keep a distance of no less than 0.5 with the other agent and, if they decide to move to the same region, they cannot perform the action. Also, in the second gridworld the agents are initialized in the two lower corners and have to reach the same goal, but they have to reach the goal with a ball. An agent can take the opponent’s ball if their distance is less than 0.5; the ball is randomly given to

For readability, we show only a starting point. Appendix B contains the results for different starting points and more experiments.
one of the two agents at the beginning of each episode. The agents’ policies are Gaussian policies, linear in a set of respectively 72 and 68 radial basis functions, which generate the $\nu$ angle for the step’s direction. For each experiment, we perform 10 runs with random initialization. In Figure 4 we compare the performance of NOHD with CO, IGA-PP, LOLA, SOS, and CGD in the two gridworlds. The figure shows the mean average win of the two players at each learning iteration of the algorithms. In figure 4, at the top, we can see how NOHD outperforms the other algorithms in the first gridworld, converging in less than 30 steps to the equilibrium. At the bottom, results for the second gridworld are shown: NOHD converges quickly than the other algorithms, but Consensus has comparable performance.

**Computational Time**

In Table 2 we report the computation time of an update of each algorithm with increasing policy parameter sizes $|\theta|$, from 4 to 144. As we can see, the computation time of NOHD is comparable to that of the other algorithms.

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10 More information about the experiments are given in Appendix.

7 Conclusions

Although multi-agent reinforcement learning has achieved promising results in recent years, few algorithms consider the dynamics of the system. In this paper, we have shown how to apply Newton-based methods in the multi-agent setting. The paper’s first contribution is to propose a method to adapt Newton’s optimization to two simple game classes: Potential games and Hamiltonian games. Next, we propose a new algorithm NOHD that applies a Newton-based optimization to general games. The algorithm, such as SGA, SOS, and CGD, considers that agents can also act against their own interests to achieve a balance as quickly as possible. We also show that NOHD avoids unstable equilibria and is attracted to stable ones. We then show how the algorithm outperforms some baselines in matrix games with parametric Boltzmann policies. Furthermore, the algorithm manages to learn good policies in two continuous gridworld environments. In future work, we will try to extend the algorithm NOHD to settings where the agent cannot know the other agents’ policies and cost functions.

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A Proofs and derivation

In this appendix, we report the proofs and derivations of the results presented in the main paper.

Proofs of Section 4

Theorem 1. Suppose that $\xi$ and $A$ are twice continuous differentiable and that $A$ is invertible in the (local) Nash Equilibrium $\theta^*$. Then, there exists $\epsilon > 0$ such that iterations starting from any point in the ball $\theta_0 \in B(\theta^*, \epsilon)$ with center $\theta^*$ and ray $\epsilon$ converge to $\theta^*$. Furthermore, the convergence rate is quadratic.

Proof. The proof is the standard proof of convergence for Newton’s methods. We report here the steps for completeness. Since $\xi$ is twice differentiable, its Taylor series expansion in $\theta_0$ is:

$$\xi(\theta) - \xi(\theta_0) - A(\theta - \theta_0) = O(\|\theta - \theta_0\|^2).$$

(7)

Because $A$ is twice continuous differentiable then $\exists \epsilon_1, M > 0$ s.t. if we take $\theta_0, \theta \in B(\theta^*, \epsilon_1)$ then we have that:

$$\|\xi(\theta) - \xi(\theta_0) - A(\theta - \theta_0)\| \leq M \|\theta - \theta_0\|^2.$$  

(8)

Since $A$ is twice continuous differentiable and for assumption it is invertible in $\theta^*$ then there exists $\epsilon_2, N$ s.t. $\forall \theta \in B(\theta^*, \epsilon_2)$ $A^{-1}$ exists and $\|A^{-1}(\theta)\| \leq N$ (see lemma 5.3 in [Chong and Zak 2004]).

Let $\epsilon = \min(\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2)$. Now, we substitute $\theta$ with $\theta^*$ in $S$ and we use the assumption that $\xi(\theta^*) = 0$:

$$\|A(\theta_0 - \theta^*) - \xi(\theta_0)\| \leq M \|\theta - \theta_0\|^2.$$  

(9)

If we use the update rule and we take $\theta_1 \in B(\theta^*, \epsilon)$ we have that:

$$\|\theta_1 - \theta^*\| = \|\theta_0 - \theta^* - A^{-1}(\theta_0)\xi(\theta_0)\|
= \|A(\theta_0)^{-1}(A(\theta_0)(\theta_0 - \theta^*) - \xi(\theta_0))\|
\leq \|A(\theta_0)^{-1}\| \|A(\theta_0)(\theta_0 - \theta^*) - \xi(\theta_0)\|,$$  

(10)

where in the last step we used the triangular inequality. If we used the inequalities [8] we have that:

$$\|A(\theta_0 - \theta^*) - \xi(\theta_0)\| \leq M \|\theta_0 - \theta^*\|^2.$$  

(11)

If we suppose that $\|\theta_0 - \theta^*\| \leq \frac{\alpha}{MN}$ with $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, then:

$$\|\theta_1 - \theta^*\| \leq \alpha \|\theta_0 - \theta^*\|^2.$$  

(12)

Then by induction we obtain that:

$$\|\theta_{k+1} - \theta^*\| \leq \alpha \|\theta_k - \theta^*\|^2.$$  

(13)

Hence $\lim_{k \to \infty} \|\theta_k - \theta^*\| = 0$ and therefore the sequence $\theta_k$ converges to $\theta^*$ if we take $\epsilon \leq \frac{\alpha}{MN}$, and the order of convergence is at least 2.

Lemma 1. Given the Jacobian $J = S + A$ and the simultaneous gradient $\xi$, if $S \succeq 0$ then $\cos \nu_S \geq 0$; instead if $S \prec 0$ then $\cos \nu_S < 0$.

Proof. We know that $\cos \nu_S \succeq \frac{(S + A^T)^T \nabla J}{\|S + A^T\| \|\nabla J\|}$; then the sign of $\cos \nu_S$ depends on $(S + A^T)^T \nabla J$. Suppose that $S \succeq 0$. We show that if $S \succeq 0$ then $S^{-1}(S^T + A^T) \succeq 0$:

$$S^{-1}(S^T + A^T) = S^{-\frac{1}{2}} S^{-\frac{1}{2}} (S + A^T) = S^{-\frac{1}{2}} (S_m^{-\frac{1}{2}} (S + A^T) S^{-\frac{1}{2}}) S^{-\frac{1}{2}}.$$  

We use the fact that $S^{-\frac{1}{2}}$ is positive definite for construction. So there exists a unique square root matrix $S^{-\frac{1}{2}}$ that is symmetric. Then the matrix $S^{-\frac{1}{2}}(S + A^T)$ is similar to $S^{-\frac{1}{2}}(S + A^T) S^{-\frac{1}{2}}$. For every vector $u \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times d}$:

$$u^T S^{-\frac{1}{2}}(S + A^T) S^{-\frac{1}{2}} u = z(S + A^T) z \geq 0,$$

where $z = u^T S^{-\frac{1}{2}} = S^{-\frac{1}{2}} u$ because $S^{-\frac{1}{2}}$ is symmetric. Using the same reasoning it is shown that if $S \prec 0$ then $S^{-\frac{1}{2}}(S^T + A^T) \prec 0$.  

Theorem 2. The NOHD update rule satisfies requirements (D1), (D2), (D3), and (D4).
Proof. D1 NOHD has to be compatible with Potential game dynamics if the game is a Potential game: $\xi^T S_m^{-1} \nabla \phi > 0$ and $\xi (A^{-1})^T \nabla \phi > 0$. We notice that $\nabla \phi = \xi$ and that $A = 0$ because the game is a Potential game. $\xi^T S_m^{-1} \xi > 0$ for every $\xi \neq 0$ since $S_m^{-1}$ is positive definite for construction.

D2 NOHD has to be compatible with Hamiltonian game dynamics if the game is a Hamiltonian game: $\xi S_m^{-1} \nabla H > 0$ and $\xi (A^{-1})^T \nabla H > 0$. We know that $\nabla H = (S^T + A^T)\xi$ and that $S = 0$ because the game is a Hamiltonian game. Then $\xi^T (A^{-1})^T (A^T) \xi = ||\xi||^2$.

D3 NOHD has to be attracted to symmetric stable fixed points. It means that if $S + A$ is positive definite, and so, $\xi^T (S + A) \xi \geq 0$. Then $S \geq 0$. From Lemma 1 we know that also $\xi^T S_m^{-1} (S + A^T) \xi \geq 0$ so $\cos_{\nu_S} \geq 0$. The update rule take the $\max(\cos_{\nu_S}, \cos_{\nu_A})$ that from the previous consideration is always positive.

D4 NOHD has to be repelled by unstable symmetric fixed points. It means that if $S + A$ is negative definite, and so, $\xi^T (S + A) \xi \geq 0$. Then $S \prec 0$. From Lemma 1 we know that also $\xi^T S_m^{-1} (S + A^T) \xi \geq 0$ so $\cos_{\nu_S} < 0$. The update rule take the $\min(\cos_{\nu_S}, \cos_{\nu_A})$ that from the previous consideration is always strict negative.

\[ \tag*{Lemma 2} \text{If NOHD converges to a } \theta^* \text{ then } \xi(\theta^*) = 0. \]

Proof. Suppose that $\theta^*$ is not a fixed point, so $\xi(\theta^*) \neq 0$. The process is stopped in $\theta^*$ if and only if $S_m^{-1} \xi = 0$ and $A^{-1} \xi = 0$, because if $\xi^T S_m^{-1} = 0$ and $\xi^T S_m^{-1} \neq 0$ we always take $-S_m^{-1} \xi$ as update since $||\cos_{\nu_S}|| \geq ||\cos_{\nu_A}||$. $\xi^T S_m^{-1} = 0$ only if $\xi = 0$ because $S_m^{-1}$ is positive definite by construction, then we contradict the hypothesis.

We have to mention that with this lemma we prove only that the convergence points of the game are fixed points, i.e. $\xi = 0$.

\[ \tag*{Theorem 3} \text{Suppose } \theta^* \text{ is a stable fixed point, and suppose } A, S, J \text{ are bounded and Lipschitz continuous with modulus respectively } M_A, M_S, M_J \text{ in the region of attraction of the stable fixed point } \xi(\theta^*). \text{ Furthermore assume that } ||A^{-1}|| \leq N_A \text{ and } ||S^{-1}|| \leq N_S. \text{ Then there exists } \epsilon > 0 \text{ such that the iterations starting from any point } \theta_0 \in B(\theta^*, \epsilon) \text{ converge to } \theta^*. \]

Proof. Since $\xi$ is differentiable by assumption we can write:

\[ \xi(\theta) - \xi(\theta^*) = \int_0^1 [J(\theta + t(\theta^* - \theta))](\theta^* - \theta_n) dt. \]

So we have:

\[ \theta_1 - \theta^* = \theta_0 - S(x)^{-1} \xi(\theta) - \theta^* = \theta_0 + S(x)^{-1} \xi(\theta) - \xi(\theta^*) - \theta^* = \theta_0 - \theta^* S(x)^{-1} \int_0^1 (J(\theta + t(\theta^* - \theta))) (\theta^* - \theta_0) dt = S(\theta)^{-1} \int_0^1 (J(\theta_0 + t(\theta^* - \theta_0))) - S(\theta_0) (\theta^* - \theta_0) dt. \]

Taking the norm and supposing that the current update is with $S(\theta)^{-1}$

\[ ||\theta_1 - \theta^*|| \leq ||S(\theta)^{-1}|| \int_0^1 ||J(\theta_0 + t(\theta^* - \theta_0))) - S(\theta_0)|| ||\theta^* - \theta_n|| dt \]

\[ = ||S(\theta)^{-1}|| \int_0^1 ||J(\theta_0 + t(\theta^* - \theta_0))) - J(\theta_0) + A(\theta_0)|| ||\theta^* - \theta_0|| dt \]

\[ \leq ||S(\theta)^{-1}|| \left( \int_0^1 ||J(\theta_0 + t(\theta^* - \theta_0))) - J(\theta_0)|| ||\theta^* - \theta_0|| dt + \int_0^1 ||A(\theta_0)|| ||\theta^* - \theta_0|| dt \right) \]

\[ \leq ||S(\theta)^{-1}|| ||\theta^* - \theta_0|| \left( \int_0^1 Lt ||\theta^* - \theta_0|| dt + \int_0^1 M_A dt \right) \]

\[ \leq N_S L ||\theta^* - \theta_0||^2 + N_A M_A ||\theta^* - \theta_0|| \leq (N_S L + N_A M_A) ||\theta^* - \theta_0||. \]

If we suppose that $||\theta^* - \theta_0|| \leq \frac{2}{L \alpha L + N_A M_A}$ with $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, then:

\[ ||\theta^* - \theta_1|| \leq \alpha ||\theta^* - \theta_0||. \]
Then by induction:

\[ ||\theta^* - \theta_n|| \leq \alpha ||\theta^* - \theta_{n-1}||. \]

Hence, \( \lim_{n \to \infty} ||\theta^* - \theta_n|| = 0 \), so if we take \( \epsilon \leq \frac{\alpha}{\max(N_{SL} + N_{AM}, N_{AL} + N_{SM})} \) the sequence converges.
| Head | Tail |
|------|------|
| Head | -1   | -1   | 1    |
| Tail  | 1    | 1    | -1   |

Table 3: Matching pennies payoffs.

| Head | Tail |
|------|------|
| Head | -1   | -1   | -3   | 0 |
| Tail  | 0    | -3   | -2   | -2 |

Table 4: Dilemma payoffs.

| Rock | Paper | Scissors |
|------|-------|----------|
| Rock | 0     | 0        | -1     | -1 |
| Paper| 1     | 0        | 0      | -1 |
| Scissors | -1 | 1    | 1      | -1 |

Table 5: RPS payoffs.

Figure 5: Agent 1’s probability to perform action 1 in Matching Pennies with Consensus. Exact gradients. 20 repetitions. Learning rate 0.1. 95% c.i.

B Experimental results

In this appendix, we report some additional experimental results on the two games Matching Pennies and Rock–Paper–Scissors. We compare NOHD against 6 baselines (Consensus [Mescheder, Nowozin, and Geiger 2017], LOLA [Foerster et al. 2018], IGAPP [Zhang and Lesser 2010], SOS [Letcher et al. 2018], CGD [Schäfer and Anandkumar 2019]), SGA [Balduzzi et al. 2018]. We settled the hyperparameter $a, b$ of SOS as in the original paper $a = 0.5$ and $b = 0.1$ (even if the experiments in the original paper are on another game). The parameter $m$ of the PT-inverse is settled to 0.03 in all the experiments. We conduct experiments with a linear parametrization of the policy and a Boltzmann parametrization of the policy. In the Boltzmann experiments we show results with exact gradients and estimated gradients. We estimated the gradients with batch size equals to 300 and horizon 1. Below we report the payoff matrices of Matching Pennies (Table 3), Rock–Paper–Scissors (Table 5), and Dilemma (Table 4).

In Figure 5 we report the results for Consensus with 2000 iterations and learning rate 0.1 in order to show that the algorithm converges.
Matching pennies linear parametrization

In this section we reported the behavior of NOHD and the other benchmarks in a linear parametrization of Matching Pennies game. As you can see NOHD, as CGD, converges to the Nash Equilibrium in only one step. We show the best results searching between learning rates 1.0, 0.5, 0.1, 0.05.

Figure 6: Agents’ probably to perform action 1 in Matching Pennies. The initial probabilities are settled to 0.8 and 0.2. From top right to bottom left: CGD, consensus, LOLA, IGAPP, SOS, NOHD, and SGA.
Matching pennies with exact gradients

In this section we reported the experiments on Matching Pennies game with 20 different starting probabilities, sampled from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Figure 7 shows how all the algorithms succeed in converging to the Nash Equilibrium, but NOHD converges in less than 100 iterations.

Figure 7: Agent 1’s probability to perform action 1 in Matching Pennies. From top right to bottom left: CGD, consensus, LOLA, IGAPP, SOS, NOHD, and SGA. True gradients. 20 random sampled initial probabilities. Learning rate 0.1, 0.5, 1.0. 95% c.i.
Matching pennies with approximated gradients

In this section, we reported the experiments on the Matching Pennies game with 20 different starting probabilities, sampled from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. In this case we estimate the gradient and the Jacobian using 300 sampled trajectories. Figure 8 shows how all the algorithms succeed in converging to the Nash Equilibrium, but NOHD converges in less than 100.

Figure 8: Agent 1’s probability to perform action 1 in Matching Pennies. From top right to bottom left: CGD, consensus, LOLA, IGAPP, SOS, NOHD, and SGA. Estimated gradients batch size 300. 20 random sampled initial probabilities. Learning rate 0.1, 0.5, 1.0. 95% c.i.
Rock paper scissors with exact gradients

In this section, we reported the experiments on Matching Pennies game with 20 different starting probabilities, sampled from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.5. For every algorithm we perform experiments with learning rates 0.1, 0.5, 1. Figure 9 shows how all the algorithms succeed in converging to the Nash Equilibrium, but NOHD converges in less than 100 iterations.

Figure 9: Agent 1’s probably to perform action 1 in Rock Paper Scissors. From top right to bottom left: CGD, consensus, LOLA, IGAPP, SOS, NOHD, and SGA. Estimated gradients batch size 300. 20 random sampled initial probabilities. Learning rate 0.1, 0.5, 1.0. 95% c.i.
Rock Paper Scissors with approximated gradients

In this section, we reported the experiments on Rock–Paper–Scissors game with 20 different starting probabilities, sampled from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.5. In this case, we estimate the gradient and the Jacobian using 300 sampled trajectories. Every algorithms do not perform well with learning rate 1.0 and for this reason we report results only with learning rates 0.1, 0.5. Figure 10 shows how all the algorithms succeed in converging to the Nash Equilibrium, but NOHD converges in less than 100.

Figure 10: Agent 1’s probability to perform action 1 in Rock Paper Scissors. From top right to bottom left: CGD, consensus, LOLA, IGAPP, SOS, NOHD, and SGA. Estimated gradients. 20 random sampled initial probabilities. Learning rate 0.1, 0.5. 95% c.i.
Continuous gridworlds

In this section we report some details on the setting of gridworld experiments. In this experiment the agent is described by a gaussian policy with variance 0.1 and mean features are respectively 72 and 68 radial basis function which describes the two agent position, and in the second gridworld, which agent has the ball. In the first gridworld the reward that an agent take is 0 for every state except the goal state where is 50. In the second is −1 for every state and 3 in the goal state. The hyperparameters used for these experiments are:

- Learning rate: 0.01
- Batch size: 100
- Trajectory length: 30
- Discount factor: 0.96

Below we report the second experiment where the second player is always NOHD. Figure ?? shows that all algorithms converge to a stable policy against NOHD or NOHD learn a winner policy against the algorithm.
Generative Adversarial Network

NOHD

SGA

Figure 12: Generator’s learnt distribution for iterations 0, 100, 200, 300, 400.

We show a simple experiment with a mixture of 4 bi-variate Gaussians with means: $(1.5, -1.5)$, $(1.5, 1.5)$, $(-1.5, 1.5)$, $(-1.5, -1.5)$. The generator and discriminator networks are both with two ReLu layers with 10 neurons per layer. The output of the discriminator has size 1 and the output of the generator has size 2. The learning rate is 0.01. We report that NOHD finds all the modes in 400 steps and we compare these results with SGA. The results shown below are for random seed 25.