Sound Garbage Collection for C using Pointer Provenance

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Garbage collection (GC) support for unmanaged languages can reduce programming burden in reasoning about liveness of dynamic objects. It also avoids temporal memory safety violations and memory leaks. Sound GC for weakly-typed languages such as C/C++, however, remains an unsolved problem. Current value-based GC solutions examine values of memory locations to discover the pointers, and the objects they point to. The approach is inherently unsound in the presence of arbitrary type casts and pointer manipulations, which are legal in C/C++. Such language features are regularly used, especially in low-level systems code.

In this paper, we propose Dynamic Pointer Provenance Tracking to realize sound GC. We observe that pointers cannot be created out-of-thin-air, and they must have provenance to at least one valid allocation. Therefore, by tracking pointer provenance from the source (e.g., malloc) through both explicit data-flow and implicit control-flow, our GC has sound and precise information to compute the set of all reachable objects at any program state. We discuss several static analysis optimizations, that can be employed during compilation aided with profiling, to significantly reduce the overhead of dynamic provenance tracking from nearly 8x to 16% for well-behaved programs that adhere to the C standards. Pointer provenance based sound GC invocation is also 13% faster and reclaims 6% more memory on average, compared to an unsound value-based GC.

CCS Concepts: · Software and its engineering → Garbage collection; Automated static analysis.

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Garbage Collector Safety, Pointer Provenance, Optimistic Hybrid Analysis

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1 INTRODUCTION

Unmanaged languages such as C/C++ are the languages of choice for a vast set of large, complex, ubiquitous, and critical software bases, such as Linux, openssl, MySQL, and these languages continue to be popular among many developers. Unmanaged languages require programmers to explicitly allocate and free memory space. This requirement not only increases programming burden, but is also a source of common classes of bugs: use-after-free and memory leaks. Use-after-free bugs are not just a reliability issue, but a significant source of security vulnerabilities in modern systems [Caballero et al. 2012], as they compromise temporal memory safety [Nagarakatte et al. 2010]. In spite of significant advancements, prior solutions for temporal memory safety incur prohibitive performance overheads (~ 60% [Nagarakatte et al. 2010; Simpson and Barua 2013;]

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Memory leaks also compromise system reliability and can cause unpredictable performance [Vilk and Berger 2018]. Prior solutions have tried to address memory leaks through a combination of offline bug detectors [Caballero et al. 2012; Hastings and Joyce 1991], and runtime systems that probabilistically repair these bugs [Berger and Zorn 2006; Dhurjati and Adve 2006; Dhurjati et al. 2003].

Replacing manual deallocation of memory in unmanaged languages with a sound and efficient garbage collector (GC) would address all of the above problems by guaranteeing temporal memory safety, avoiding memory leaks, and reducing programmer burden. Unfortunately, a sound GC for weakly-typed languages like C/C++ has remained elusive.

A sound GC is one that guarantees to not free an object that is accessed later. Typically, a sound mark-and-sweep GC [Cohen 1981] automatically recclaims memory at runtime by freeing a set of objects that can be guaranteed to be unreachable from a set of “root” pointers (pointers in global variables, stack variables, and registers). To compute this set at runtime, given a pointer, a GC should be able to (1) identify a pointer’s dynamic points-to object, that is, the object reached by dereferencing the pointer, and (2) locate all the pointers contained in that reachable object. We refer to the latter set as the pointers-within set for an object. In strongly-typed, memory-safe languages like Java, both of these operations are straightforward [Bacon et al. 2001]. A pointer’s value can be used to identify its dynamic points-to object due to spatial memory safety [Nagarakatte et al. 2009], and the pointers-within set of an object can be easily determined due to the strong type system.

C/C++, however, is weakly-typed. Pointer values can reside in, or be computed from, non-pointer variables, making it difficult to locate them within a reachable object at runtime. Even if we can locate all the locations with pointer values, they are not guaranteed to point within the referenced objects. This is true even in spatially memory safe programs, as a pointer value may be arbitrarily transformed to point away from the object, then manipulated back just before a dereference. Such pointer manipulations are regularly used in low-level systems code [Memarian et al. 2019].

Prior works on GC for C/C++ [Boehm 1993, 2004] have tried to overcome some of these problems using value-based heuristics, but these works do not guarantee soundness. They assume that only memory locations with values within an allocated heap object’s address range are valid pointers, and that the value points within the referent object. This assumption is unsound as they cannot identify the referent object when a pointer value goes out-of-bounds due to arbitrary pointer manipulations allowed in C/C++. They are also imprecise, and therefore, prone to memory leaks when non-pointer locations hold values that happen to be within the heap address range. Finally, they have to examine the value of every reachable memory location to determine if it is a pointer or not, leading to higher performance overhead.

In this paper, we design the first sound GC for C/C++ called Provenance-based Garbage Collection (Prov-GC). We observe that a C/C++ program cannot create a pointer out-of-thin-air; instead, pointer values must be derived from a valid pointer source. Valid pointer sources are from allocation functions (e.g. malloc) and the address-of ($) operator. These pointer values subsequently propagate to other variables either through explicit data-flow or implicit control-flow. Thus, our key idea is to use dynamic information-flow tracking to soundly and precisely determine the set of all memory locations that hold values derived from pointers, and the object locations they point-to. Our mark-and-sweep GC uses this information to soundly reclaim unreachable objects.

1Ideally GCs would free objects that will not be accessed later, but real GCs settle for the cannot be accessed approximation.
“taint”. Furthermore, taint propagation through implicit control-flow (a necessity for us to ensure soundness) is known to be not only expensive in terms of performance, but also can imprecisely taint a significant fraction of memory locations [Clause et al. 2007].

We observe several optimization opportunities that we exploit using hybrid taint analysis [Banerjee et al. 2019] to realize a low-overhead DIFT for pointer provenance. A common property that our static analysis exploits is that if an instruction destination operand’s taint meta-data is guaranteed to not change, then the taint monitor for that instruction can be elided. This property holds true for instructions that are non-pointer operations (e.g., \texttt{inta = intb \times 10;}), which is the vast majority of the instructions executed. We also show that if an instruction’s destination operand is a statically declared pointer and its source operand is guaranteed to be a “safe” pointer (value points within the object), then its taint value is known at compile time, and therefore a runtime monitor is unnecessary (e.g., \texttt{int* ptr = safe_ptr;}). This category includes common pointer assignments, where the pointer has not been manipulated arithmetically. Finally, if the source and destination operands of an instruction are the same (e.g., \texttt{ptr = ptr+4;}) then there is no need to update the destination’s taints.

Somewhat surprisingly, tracking implicit information flows, known to be intractable in general, turns out to be practical for pointer provenance. Conditional branches dependent on pointer variables can propagate taint implicitly to its control-dependent instructions. While we do not expect reasonable programmers to use such programming constructs, to realize sound GC, we must consider its possibility, as they are legal in C/C++. Fortunately, we are able to show that when branch conditions are based on comparisons between in-bounds pointers or with NULL value, there is insufficient implicit information flow to require dynamic tracking. While we need modest dynamic checks to establish that pointer values are in-bounds, we never have to propagate implicit flow for the programs we studied.

Finally, to prove the above properties statically to aggressively elide dynamic taint monitors, we apply Optimistic Hybrid Analysis (OHA) [Banerjee et al. 2019; Devecsery et al. 2018]. OHA uses profiled likely invariants to predicate the whole-program context-sensitive flow-sensitive static taint analysis.

The C standard [ISO 2018] specifies several restrictions on using pointers and operations that can be performed on pointer types. We show that assuming these properties benefits our pointer provenance tracking significantly, and reduces the overall cost of GC for standard-compliant programs. We provide solutions with and without this optimization, because, in practice, there are many programs that regularly violate the standard [Memarian et al. 2016], and as such they require provenance tracking without optimizations that depend on these C standard specifications.

We evaluate our Prov-GC tool on several long-running large applications as well as memory-intensive benchmark programs. Unlike the Boehm-Demers-Weiser GC (BDW-GC) [Boehm 2004], Prov-GC is sound. For well-behaved programs that are C standards-compliant, we pay only an additional 16% average performance cost to dynamically track pointer provenance. Of which, 14% is due to explicit data-flow tracking, and the remaining is to track implicit-flow. We find that our optimistic optimizations that elide dynamic monitors are very effective with adequate profiling. Without them, we see nearly 8x slowdown. In addition to soundness, compared to BDW-GC, the performance of our GC invocation is about 13% faster, as we avoid scanning, and reclaim about 6% more memory per GC invocation due to our GC’s improved precision.

16% performance overhead of our GC is especially appealing as it obviates the need for a slower dynamic temporal safety solution (60% overhead [Zhang et al. 2019]), besides reducing programming burden and avoiding memory leaks.
We make the following contributions in this paper:

- We present Prov-GC, a GC that is sound for all legal C/C++ programs. Previous GC solutions for C/C++ are unsound as they might free reachable objects.
- We present the idea of dynamic pointer provenance, and use it to realize a sound GC for C/C++.
- We show how we can elide taint monitors for a vast majority of instructions such as operations on non-pointers, “safe” pointers, etc.
- We show tracking implicit information-flow in the context of pointer provenance is necessary and practically feasible.
- We show how the C standard specifications induce a significantly improved provenance tracking solution for standard-compliant programs.
- We apply optimistic hybrid analysis [Devecsery et al. 2018] to optimize dynamic pointer provenance and realize an efficient GC that incurs 16% overhead. This overhead is much lower than dynamic temporal safety checking, and it avoids memory leaks and reduces programmer burden.

2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION

This section discusses the motivation for using GC in weakly-typed languages like C/C++, and the unsolved problems in realizing a sound GC for them.

2.1 Why GC for C/C++?

GC obviates the need for manual memory management and thereby eliminates two common classes of bugs in unmanaged languages: memory leaks and use-after-free [Caballero et al. 2012; Vilk and Berger 2018].

Memory leaks and use-after-free bugs are considered important classes of bugs and thus have received significant attention from academia and industry, who have tried to address these bugs through a variety of methods. For memory leaks, there exists a number of offline debugging tools and runtime probabilistic methods to mitigate the ill effects of these bugs [Bond and McKinley 2006; Clause and Orso 2010; Hauswirth and Chilimbi 2004; Jump and McKinley 2007; Novark et al. 2009; Rudafshani and Ward 2017; Vilk and Berger 2018; Xu et al. 2011]. We argue that GC for C/C++ would address the memory leak problem more comprehensively than these methods.

Use-after-free bugs are particularly important because they compromise system security. These bugs violate temporal memory safety [Nagarakatte et al. 2010], which along with spatial safety is necessary to ensure full memory safety. Recognizing the importance of memory safety, even commodity processors (e.g., Intel MPX) [Oleksenko et al. 2018] have started providing specialized hardware support for efficiently implementing spatial memory safety checks. Spatial memory safety, however, solves only part of the problem. Efficiently guaranteeing temporal safety remains expensive, as state-of-the-art solutions incur \( \sim 60\% \) performance overheads [Zhang et al. 2019].

We argue that if we can realize a sound and efficient GC for C/C++, it would not only reduce the burden on future software development, but also help improve reliability and security of both future and legacy systems. If the execution time overhead of GC can be made lower than the overhead of other temporal safety solutions, then it certainly would be a superior solution, as it not only removes temporal errors, but also improves programmability.

2.2 GC and its Pointer Data Requirements

Identifying dead objects precisely at a given instant of a program’s execution is hard as it depends on future execution. Therefore, current GCs conservatively identify live objects by assuming that the set of all “reachable” objects from a “root” set of pointers are live. The root-set consists of
all pointers in the registers, global and stack address space. A reachable object can still be dead as it may never get referenced in future. Current GCs use either incremental mark-and-sweep [Boehm 2004] or reference counting [Shahriyar et al. 2012, 2013] to compute reachability. In this paper, we use mark-and-sweep, though our provenance-based approach could also be used by a reference-counting GC.

When a mark-sweep GC is invoked, it performs two separate steps: marking computes the live set of objects that are transitively reachable from a root set of pointers, and sweeping reclaims memory from unreachable objects. To perform the reachability analysis, the mark step requires two crucial pieces of information about pointers: a pointer’s points-to object (PT), and an object’s pointers-within set (PW). The points-to object of a pointer is the dynamic object that can be dereferenced using that pointer. The pointers-within set of an object is the set of all pointers that are contained within that object.

Both points-to and pointers-within data are straightforward to determine soundly and precisely in type and memory safe languages such as Java, Python, and C#. The points-to object of a pointer can be determined from its value due to spatial memory safety. That is, a pointer’s value is guaranteed to be within the address range of its points-to object. Furthermore, due to type safety, given an object, it is possible to precisely and quickly determine its pointers-within set, because only variables that are typed as pointers can hold pointer data; non-pointer variables cannot hold pointer data. Determining points-to and pointers-within data in weakly-typed languages like C/C++, however, is a significant challenge as we discuss next.

2.3 Value-Based GCs for C/C++ are Unsound
All prior attempts to provide GC for C/C++ use value-based heuristics to compute points-to and pointers-within information. For example, the best-known such work [Boehm 2004] computes the pointers-within set of an object by scanning every pointer-sized field in the object and checking if its value falls within the address range of any allocated heap object. If the check succeeds, then that field is assumed to be a pointer, and the points-to object for that field is assumed to be the allocated heap object whose address range includes that field’s value.

Value-based GCs work by assuming that any allocated heap object that may be referenced in the future has at least one live register or memory location pointing to it at all times. This assumption may be violated, for instance, if the C program breaks any of the following three assumptions: (A1) Pointers are only stored in variables that are declared to be pointers or in sufficiently large integral type that can hold a pointer. (A2) If a memory location’s value falls within the bounds of an allocated heap object then it is a valid pointer, or else it is a non-pointer. (A3) A pointer discovered through its value is assumed to point within its points-to object. Value-based GCs are unsound whenever any of the above invariants is violated.

In C/C++, even legal programs can violate these three assumptions because C/C++ has a weak type system and allows programs to store pointer values in integers and manipulate them in arbitrary ways. Figure 1 shows an example of a XOR linked list, a clever representation of a doubly linked list used in memory constrained embedded systems [xor 2004]. Each node stores the XOR of pointers in the two directions and recovers them using XOR operations during traversal. Note that none of the inner nodes store literal values of pointers, but have information encoded to reconstruct two valid pointers. A purely value-based GC approach can incorrectly reclaim objects pointed to by such hidden pointers, e.g. node C’s address is not stored literally anywhere in the program state. This is a legal C program which can break the correctness of a value-based GC. More extreme examples are also possible via casting and other manipulations; for example, a program may split a
```c
typedef struct { uintptr_t val, xptr; } xorlist;

xorlist *head = NULL, *tail = NULL;

void traverse(xorlist *start) {
    xorlist *prev = NULL, *curr = start;
    while (curr) {
        printf("%ld
", curr->val);
        uintptr_t next = (uintptr_t) prev ^ curr->xptr;
        prev = curr;
        curr = next;
    }
}

void main() {
    insert(...);
    traverse(head); // use xptr to traverse
    traverse(tail); // in both directions
}
```

**Fig. 1.** Doubly Linked Lists can save space by storing the XOR of previous and next node pointers in a single integer location; `uintptr_t` is sufficiently long to hold pointer values. The inner nodes never store literal pointer values, but have sufficient information to reconstruct valid pointers to its two adjacent nodes.

pointer into several smaller integers then reconstruct the pointer later; this would violate all three assumptions.

Value-based GCs can also be imprecise because they may think a non-pointer is a pointer when its value happens to lie within the heap address range. If this non-pointer’s value points to an unreachable object, then GC would avoid reclaiming it. This can lead to memory leaks and lower performance. There has been follow-up work [Henderson 2002; Rafkind et al. 2009] that addressed this problem by adding another assumption that pointers only reside in declared pointer typed variables. This approach achieves greater precision, but sacrifices even more soundness, as it would ignore an integer value derived from a pointer through a cast.

Value-based GCs can also incur significant overhead while scanning the state space for pointers. Given a reachable object, GC has to scan each of its fields, and check if it could be a valid pointer or not. The check involves looking into a data-structure that maintains the address ranges of all heap objects.

In this work, we improve upon pure value-based GCs by using dynamic pointer provenance to soundly and precisely determine the set of all pointers and the objects they point-to. Also, this can quickly identify pointers-within set of an object without scanning each field, improving GC performance.

### 2.4 Need for Sound GCs

Guaranteeing correct GC behavior—i.e. objects reachable from the root set of pointers will not be freed—is important for all programs in the same way that it is important to have a sound compiler or runtime. Value-based GCs impose additional restrictions, as seen in §2.3 earlier, making them work correctly only on a subset of the language. These language properties might not be followed by legacy programs, and can be generally difficult to verify for new programs and compiler implementations that strive to conform to the standards but still may not. Moreover, new programs also reuse existing library code. So, there is value in supporting sound GC behavior for all programs without imposing additional restrictions on the language itself.
3 PROVENANCE-BASED GARBAGE COLLECTION

In this section we discuss the design of a sound and efficient provenance-based garbage collector. We will first motivate how a provenance-based garbage collector solves the soundness issues of prior GCs. Then we outline a simple-but-sound strawman GC. Finally, we discuss optimizations that reduce the overhead of our strawman GC, leading to a provenance-based GC that is both fast and sound.

We assume that, aside from temporal safety errors, the given program is a valid C/C++ program, and that it obeys the properties necessary for the compiler and hardware to guarantee a well-defined behavior. This includes spatial memory safety [Nagarakatte et al. 2009] and data-race-freedom [Adve and Hill 1990], which many prior works have addressed.

3.1 The Soundness of Provenance-Based GC

In this work, we argue that instead of using the value of a pointer to identify its points-to set, a GC can use the provenance of the pointer to soundly derive its dynamic points-to.

The soundness of our provenance-based solution is based on the assumption that allocated heap memory addresses cannot appear out-of-thin-air. That is, without knowing the return value of a call to an allocation function (e.g. malloc in C), it is impossible for the programmer to compute the address of any given dynamically allocated heap object. This assumption is true of most real type-unsafe languages, such as C. Given this assumption, any well-behaved program must ensure that any heap addresses dereferenced by a load or store operation are derived from the return of heap allocation functions. Consequently, an object allocated within the heap is only reachable in the future if it has one or more live register or memory values (henceforth values) which draw provenance from its allocation function’s return value.

Throughout the remainder of this paper, we will use the term pointer to refer to a register or memory location whose value is directly or indirectly derived from one or more allocation return values. We use the term points-to set of a location to refer to the set of object allocation function return values from which the pointer is derived. The points-to set may be thought of as the set of objects that this pointer may be used to access in the future. A memory location with empty points-to set is not a pointer.

Since a heap pointer value cannot appear out-of-thin-air, and all pointers must have a provenance to at least one valid allocation, it is therefore sufficient to track all points-to sets for all pointers to reconstruct all currently reachable objects.

3.2 A Simple Provenance-Based GC

To show how pointer provenance can construct a sound GC, we present a simple, strawman design of a provenance-based GC.

Our strawman GC will naively track the points-to set for every register or memory location (henceforth location) in an execution by constructing a map from each location to the set of heap object allocations its value is derived from.

To dynamically track the points-to sets of all pointers, we apply a standard dynamic information flow (DIFT) policy, treating all heap object allocations as sources and using both data-flow and implicit-flow taint tracking. More specifically, the program begins with each location’s points-to set empty. Whenever an allocation function returns, we add that allocation to the destination location’s points-to set. Thereafter, whenever the program modifies a location, the points-to set of that location will be updated to contain the union of the points-to sets of any pointers it depends on. We note that for this analysis to be sound, when a location is modified, it must consider not
only data-flow dependencies, but also any implicit control-flow dependencies as well (e.g., when branch conditions depend on pointers).

A properly constructed DIFT analysis [Austin and Flanagan 2009; Schwartz et al. 2010] will, by construction, ensure that the points-to set of each pointer is conservative. That is, if the pointer could be used to dereference an object in the future, that object will be within that pointer’s points-to set.

In order to avoid scanning memory to locate pointers, we also maintain a pointers-within set mapping for each allocated heap object. The pointers-within set will logically contain the memory location of every pointer within the allocated heap object. The pointers-within set for an object can be trivially maintained by initializing the set to empty when the object is allocated, then adding a pointer to the set whenever such a pointer is stored to a location within the object.

Once the collection phase of the GC actually begins, our GC only needs to iterate through the root set of the program (any locations statically reachable - globals, or reachable from any stack frames and registers), add these locations to a temporary set called the working set. Then, the GC will iterate through the working set and for each object in the working set identify all pointers with the object’s pointers-within set. The GC then adds any objects in the points-to sets of those pointers to both the working set, and a set of live objects. This process iterates until the live set does not change. Any object not in the set of live objects at the conclusion of the algorithm may then be reclaimed.

While this straw-man solution provides a sound GC, tracking provenance metadata through all operations and through implicit flows will typically be very expensive. Fortunately, most instructions operate on non-pointers. Also, in the common case, pointers stay within object bounds, and do not propagate pointer data to other locations through control flow. We leverage these properties to significantly reduce the amount of provenance tracking required to construct a sound GC.

3.3 Optimizing Explicit Provenance

The strawman system described earlier requires dynamically inserting a monitor (to propagate points-to set) on nearly every instruction within the program. This would result in very high overheads [Clause et al. 2007]. However, we observe that for a significant fraction of instructions, its runtime monitors do not change their destination operands’ points-to (taint). We use static analysis to elide these dynamic monitors without losing soundness. This section discusses three optimizations that elide such redundant monitors: 1) eliding non-pointer tracking, 2) eliding “safe-pointer” tracking, and 3) eliding monitors for pointers with the same operands.

3.3.1 Non-Pointer Tracking Elision. Within C programs, the vast majority of computation operates on data which is not logically derived from pointer values. If we can statically prove that a location within the program has an empty points-to set, then that location is a non-pointer, and the dynamic run-time system need not dynamically track the points-to set of that location. This detection can be accomplished by using static information flow analysis [Banerjee et al. 2019; Sabelfeld and Myers 2003] to compute a sound may points-to set, then eliding dynamic points-to set operations on locations with an empty may points-to set. For the example in Figure 2, we can trivially elide any provenance tracking for line 5 since neither of its operands have data-flow from any pointers, in fact they are constants.

3.3.2 Safe Pointer Tracking Elision. Next, we observe that the vast majority of pointers in C programs (1) have exactly one object in their points-to sets (singleton set) and (2) have a value within the allocated memory range of that object (in-bounds). We call these safe pointers.
void explicit_flow() {
    unsigned int n = 10, o = 1000;
    obj* A = malloc(n*sizeof(obj)); // PT(A) = {malloc1}
    char** B = malloc2(n*sizeof(obj)); // PT(B) = {malloc2}
    long z = o / n; // elided by E1
    char* p = A; // elided by E2
    long d = B - A; // PT(d) = {malloc2, malloc1}
    ...
    for (unsigned int i = 0; i < n * sizeof(obj); i++) {
        char* q = p + d; // PT(q) = {malloc1, malloc2}, elided by E2 and line 10
        *q = p;
        p = p + 1; // PT(p) = {malloc1}, elided by E3
    }
}

Fig. 2. Explicit pointer provenance propagation

Safe pointers are handled correctly by value-based GC. Because the pointer value can be used to dereference only one object, and since the pointer value is in-bounds, we can use its value to determine its object. For the same reasons, we do not need to track the points-to set of any location in the program we know is a safe pointer, as we can identify its points-to set from its value at collection time.

To perform this optimization, we perform a static data-flow analysis to identify which instructions in a program must define safe pointers. While statically identifying safe pointers precisely in a program is hard, we construct a sound but imprecise data-flow analysis as follows. A pointer defined by the assignment from an allocation function is clearly safe. Assignment from a safe pointer is also safe. The result of any operation is safe, provided it satisfies two conditions: (1) the operation has only one pointer operand, and that operand is a safe pointer, and (2) the operation is guaranteed to not modify the pointer to point outside the bounds of the object it references (provably in-bounds).

**Leveraging Dereferences.** Our static safe-pointer identification methodology is conservative, and consequently will falsely identify many safe-pointers as non-safe. It is sound, but potentially introduces unnecessary dynamic checks. To help identify additional sources of safe pointers, we observe that any time an address is dereferenced, it must be an in-bounds pointer, otherwise the program would have undefined behavior (violating spatial memory safety). If we can additionally prove that the dereferenced pointer’s points-to set is a singleton set, then we know the pointer is a safe pointer. To accomplish this, we construct another static taint analysis, with the goal of identifying singleton taint sets. To construct such an analysis, we observe that a points-to set can only propagate from a singleton-set to a non-singleton-set when it depends on multiple pointers. Therefore, a static analysis can determine pointers that must have singleton points-to sets by checking if its transitive dependency set contains no operations with multiple pointer dependencies. We leverage this must-have singleton-points-to sets analysis with our observation about dereferenced pointers being in-bounds to identify an additional source of safe-pointers: dereferenced pointers with singleton points-to sets.

3.3.3 **Equivalent Points-to Propagation.** Our third optimization exploits the fact that many pointer redefinitions do not change the points-to metadata, and therefore they can be elided. This is trivially true when the source and destination pointer operands are the same. For the example in Figure 2, the provenance (points-to) of $p$ on line 11 cannot change. It is possible for arithmetic operation on a pointer to result in an out-of-bounds value. But in a well-defined (spatially memory safe) program,
it cannot be dereferenced before it is reverted back to be within bounds. We use a static data-flow analysis that elides the monitor for an instruction when it can be proven that the provenance of its destination operand is same as its source either directly or transitively through data-flow.

A related optimization is that, if the provenance of a location remains constant within a loop, our analysis hoists it out of the loop through a loop invariant code motion [Aho et al. 2006].

In summary, we can elide provenance tracking operations when –

E1 All source operands have empty provenance.
E2 The resultant pointer is safe.
E3 The resultant pointer is assigned to the same identifier as the source operand, directly or via temporaries.

3.4 Optimizing Implicit Provenance

Although rare, it is both possible and legal for weakly-typed programs to deconstruct and reconstruct pointers through implicit flow operations, as shown in Figure 3. Traditionally, implicit information flow DIFT is known to have severe limitations as the majority of locations can get tainted, and doing so, as proposed in our strawman solution would result in very poor heap object collection rates and slow provenance tracking performance. However, recall that the goal of a sound provenance-based GC is not to ensure that no taint is lost, as a security analysis would, but rather to ensure that a pointer cannot be reconstructed from any provenance data. In order for an address range to be reconstructed, there must be enough data about the pointer propagated implicitly to definitely reconstruct it. We observe that for many comparisons, the binary outcome of that comparison doesn’t propagate enough information to reconstruct the pointer, even if the comparison were made many times.

We consider two specific comparison cases for a valid in-bounds pointer ptr1:

I1 == or != NULL
I2 == or != another valid in-bounds pointer ptr2

The outcome of the comparison determines the value of ptr1 from two possible partitions – $S_1 = \{\text{NULL}\}$ or $\{\text{ptr2}\}$ and $S_2$ = the set of all other valid pointers. When in $S_1 = \{\text{NULL}\}$, ptr1 is an invalid pointer. When in $S_1 = \{\text{ptr2}\}$, ptr1’s (or ptr2’s) value cannot be deduced from their equality alone but must be explicitly carried in ptr1 (or ptr2). When in $S_2$, we have eliminated only one possible value and still need sufficient information to determine ptr1’s value. Sufficient information to recover the pointer must then propagate either via at least one explicit data flow, or via a series of $2^{64} - 1$ equality comparisons, which are unreasonable to do in any practical amount of time. So, we can safely elide tracking implicit provenance propagation via these constrained comparisons. For all other comparisons, our sound GC propagates the provenance set through implicit operations.

```
long implicit_copy(long ptr) {
    long hidden_ptr = 0;
    for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(ptr) * 8; i++) {
        long mask = 1 << i;
        if (ptr & mask) {
            hidden_ptr |= mask; // set bit in hidden_ptr
        }
    }
    return(hidden_ptr);
}
```

Fig. 3. Copying a pointer via implicit flow
The above condition for in-bounds pointers can be guaranteed statically for safe pointers but must be checked dynamically for unsafe pointers. Prior work on memory safety has enabled efficient spatial bounds checking [Nagarakatte et al. 2009; Simpson and Barua 2013], and checks required for pointer comparisons only incur a fraction of those costs. Note, we cannot assume that the pointers used in comparison are guaranteed to be in-bounds. They may be out-of-bounds, and later become in-bounds before being dereferenced.

```c
1 obj* A = malloc(n*sizeof(obj)); // PT(A) = \{malloc\}
2 char** B = malloc(n*sizeof(obj)); // PT(B) = \{malloc\}
3 unsigned int o = 1000;
4 bool flag = false;
5 long x = A + o;  // PT(x) = \{malloc\}
6 long y = B - o;  // PT(y) = \{malloc\}
7 char* p = A;
8 if (B != NULL) flag = true; // elided by I1
...  
9 if (A == p) flag = true;    // elided by I2
...
10 if (x == y) {
    p = A + 2*x;
    // PT(p) = PT(A) \cup PT(x) \cup PT(y) = \{malloc1, malloc2\}
11 }
```

Fig. 4. Implicit pointer provenance propagation

Consider the example code in Figure 4. After the comparison on line 8, the flag being true simply indicates that the pointer B is non-NULL which cannot be used to recover a valid pointer within object B. Similarly after line 9, if flag is true (or false), you still need either (or both) of A and p to access the object(s). However, line 10 propagates sufficient information to recover a pointer value. When x == y succeeds, it encodes the distance between objects A and B, so that even if all pointers to B are discarded, a pointer to B can still be recovered as in line 11. To handle this information flow, we add the pointer provenance of line 10’s comparison operands, x and y, to the control-dependent line 11’s result p.

3.5 Other Points-To Set Propagation Channels

Pointer information can escape the managed address space and leak through external channels, such as by writing them to the file-system and reading them back. Safely handling such channels would require elaborate mechanisms to preserve the pointer provenance of such escaping values, and treat them as always live to exclude from being collected. Such pointer propagation channels being practically rare, we conservatively disable GC when any value escaping the program’s address-space has non-empty pointer provenance.

3.6 C Standard for Pointers

The C standard [ISO 2018] places certain restrictions on the possible values of pointers, limiting acceptable pointer behaviors in correct programs with well defined behaviors on all platforms. The standard disallows arbitrary manipulations on pointers [§6.5.6], but allows arbitrary, implementation defined, conversions between integer and pointer types [§6.3.2.3]. As a result, pointer-typed values may be in one of three states: (1) in-bounds: well defined in-bounds values, (2) one-past-end: pointing to a location just past the end of an array, and (3) imp-def: an implementation-defined value converted from an integer, which is unknown in the general case. We will now show that Prov-GC can leverage these restrictions to expand the set of safe pointers (§3.3.2) to significantly reduce pointer provenance tracking.
If we ignore the imp-def case for now, then these properties are clearly highly advantageous to our garbage collector. Because, if all pointer typed values are in-bounds or one past the end of an array, then all pointer typed values are safe-pointers by definition. Thus, our GC can apply our optimization discussed in §3.3.2 for all pointer type values.

The imp-def case does not present an instance of an in-bounds pointer, as it allows an arbitrary value to be present in a pointer. Fortunately, however, the lack of definition between conversion from an integral to pointer-typed value disallows the program from reasoning about any value stored in that pointer, except under very specific conditions covered shortly. As any pointer in imp-def instance is not defined by the standard, a program cannot portably rely on it to reconstruct a pointer later, and thus it cannot be used to legally dereference or construct a pointer in the future, allowing Prov-GC to conservatively treat it as a safe-pointer.

The one exception we referred to is a defined conversion from a pointer value to an integral value and back as defined in §7.20.1.4 of the C standard. This conversion applies to intptr_t values. For these values a void pointer may be converted to an intptr_t type and back. The conversion is not defined, except when the value stored in intptr_t variable is unchanged. Thus, any manipulated value of the integer would not have a standard-defined mapping when converted back to a pointer, and therefore our earlier conclusion for imp-def applies. If the value is unchanged when it is stored as intptr_t, then when it is converted back to a pointer type, it has to be either in-bounds or one-past-end.

Note that our example of XOR linked list in Figure 1 complies with the above restrictions because it only uses intptr_t type to convert pointers into integers, and it recovers the exact value of the original pointer using XOR operation before converting it back to a valid pointer.

We note that this optimization relies on the programmer writing strictly standard compliant portable C code. Many implementations of C compilers do define mappings when performing pointer to integer conversions, and many code-bases do legally (but not portably) rely on these facets of the compiler [Chisnall et al. 2015; Memarian et al. 2016]. As a result, we provide solutions with and without this optimization. Programs that strictly adhere to the C standard can take advantage of this optimization.

### 3.7 Optimistic Hybrid Analysis

Provenance-based GC relies heavily on dynamic taint tracking [Schwartz et al. 2010], and consequently can incur significant overheads. Fortunately, recent work has shown that dynamic taint tracking can significantly benefit from a technique known as optimistic hybrid analysis [Banerjee et al. 2019; Devecsery et al. 2018]. Optimistic hybrid analysis (OHA) is a method of dynamic analysis optimization based on the insight that optimization should be done for the common case. Traditional hybrid analyses use a sound static analysis to reason about all possible future executions (and many impossible ones, due to over-approximation). However, when optimizing a dynamic analysis, the optimization need only care about the execution that will actually happen. To help approximate this, OHA uses a predicated static analysis, which takes in a set of assumptions (called likely invariants), and only guarantees that the static analysis is sound for executions in which these likely invariants actually remain invariant. Assuming these invariants allows the static analysis to reason much more effectively about the analyzed program, dramatically improving its ability to reduce dynamic checks. In this case, it allows the dynamic taint analysis to be aggressively optimized by eliding taint tracking monitors along paths that do not propagate taints in the predicated static analysis. A runtime system then checks the likely invariants at runtime, and falls back to a conservative analysis if the invariants ever fail.
We leverage OHA to improve our provenance-based GC in two ways: (1) we use it to improve our static empty points-to analysis in §3.3, (2) we assume pointers used in comparisons are in-bounds, reducing the amount of implicit flow tracking done in §3.4. For our first use of OHA, we simply apply the same optimizations found in the Iodine tool [Banerjee et al. 2019] to improve our common-case identification of empty may-points-to sets. Our second use is slightly more subtle. A conservative analysis would require that we propagate implicit flow information for any pointer which may be out-of-bounds during the I1 and I2 implicit flow checks. However, it is very rare for a pointer used within a comparison to be out-of-bounds, so we assume the invariant that any pointer used in a comparison is in-bounds. Using this invariant, we can remove any implicit flow taint tracking that may occur in the common case, so long as we first dynamically verify that all pointers used in comparisons for branches are in-bounds. If the check fails before the comparison, we soundly switch to the conservatively optimized analysis that propagates taint through the implicit flow.

4 IMPLEMENTATION

In this section we discuss the implementation of Prov-GC, an instance of Provenance-based Garbage Collection for C programs. Prov-GC relies on three primary components: (1) a Static Pointer Provenance Analysis (PPA), (2) a Dynamic Pointer Provenance Tracking (PPT) instrumented on the target program, and (3) a Provenance-based GC library for use by the target program. Our static analysis, and dynamic analysis instrumentation is implemented in the LLVM 7.0 compiler infrastructure [Lattner and Adve 2004], and the Provenance-based GC library is a modification of the Boehm-Demers-Weiser GC [Boehm 2004] to use provenance metadata for GC. We discuss the implementation details below.

4.1 Static Pointer Provenance Analyses

The goal of our static analyses is to classify all LLVM static single assignment form [Alpern et al. 1988] values in a program into three partitions—non-pointers, safe-pointers, and unsafe pointers. Once this partition is computed, Prov-GC instruments instructions that define safe-pointers and unsafe-pointers with necessary PPT operations (only pointers-within set tracking for safe pointers, and both pointers-within and points-to tracking for unsafe), and no tracking is needed for non-pointers.

The first static PPA analysis we use is an information flow analysis that identifies values that may be influenced by pointer sources in two ways—a whole-program context-sensitive data-flow analysis, and a control-flow dependence analysis. To perform this, we construct a whole-program definition-use graph (DUG) [Aho et al. 2006]. We add a node to the DUG for an instruction that defines a value and edges to connect definitions to their uses. Our DUG is context-sensitive so that each function local DUG is replicated per call site, except for recursive calls, and expanded to create the inter-procedural DUG. This makes the information-flow analysis much more precise by distinguishing between distinct invocations of the same function. This DUG creation in turn requires a pointer-analysis to identify indirect information-flows via aliasing memory accesses, so as to add data-flow edges in the DUG from pointer definitions to its aliasing uses. To this end, we use Andersen’s-based whole-program context-sensitive flow-insensitive inclusion-based pointer-analysis [oha]. Once the DUG is created, we assign an empty static points-to set to every value and initialize the set for values defined by pointer sources, i.e. a heap allocation function (e.g. malloc). It then traverses the whole-program DUG iteratively, accumulating the union of points-to sets of values that are used in a definition, until all points-to sets reach a fixed point. At the end of this data-flow analysis, all values with empty points-to sets are definitely non-pointers, and the rest are may-be pointers.
**Optimistic Hybrid Analysis**: Static data-flow analysis is traditionally imprecise (has many false positives), particularly inter-procedural pointer-analysis with indirect function calls becomes imprecise as well as unscalable. As a result many non-pointer values will be incorrectly identified as may-be pointers in a traditional version of our PPA static analysis. We tackle this imprecision problem using OHA [Devecsery et al. 2018], which assumes likely program invariants—such as unreachable code, indirect function callees, and unrealized call contexts, to predicate the DUG construction. As a result, the analysis becomes more scalable as well as precise, allowing us to discard many non-pointers and computing more precise points-to sets. We use Iodine [Banerjee et al. 2019], an OHA optimized taint analysis tool, with minimal changes to track the points-to sets as taint metadata.

[§3.3 E1]: OHA optimized data-flow analysis identifies non-pointers much precisely for which we can elide dynamic tracking.

**Safe Pointer Optimizations** [§3.3 E2]: So far, we’ve identified non-pointers; we further classify pointers into safe and unsafe sets as defined in §3.3.2. To do so, we construct a conservative data-flow analysis, identifying must-be safe-pointer operations as operations which may not pass through unsafe operations (where safe operations are those defined in §3.3.2). We find the following LLVM instructions to be safe: (1) assignments from values of equivalent size, (2) loads from addresses which have only had safe pointers stored to them, (3) LLVM GEP (pointer arithmetic) instructions in which the result is in-bounds of the allocation pointed to by the manipulated pointer, (4) passing as arguments in function calls, (5) returning pointers from function calls. We consider all other operations to be unsafe. Once we compute this analysis, we use it to elide points-to set tracking for any safe pointers.

**Equivalent Points-to Optimizations** [§3.3 E3]: The property reasons equivalence of a pointer’s points-to set when a pointer value is assigned back to same source-level identifier as its source operand. To map SSA values to their source identifiers, we use LLVM’s source-level debugging information, and check if values are assigned transitively to the same identifier. Then, we can elide dynamic tracking operations for all the definitions along the define-use chain. The metadata creation operation must still be performed for the first definition. When this first definition is inside a loop, we use the reaching definition from outside the loop that is used by this value to perform the points-to set tracking instrumentation, so that a later loop invariant code motion optimization can hoist this one-time metadata creation operation outside the loop. This optimization can benefit for example when traversing an array inside of a loop.

**Implicit Flow Optimizations** [§3.4 I1, I2]: Finally, the static analysis optimizes implicit provenance tracking. Since statically proving pointer values derived using arbitrary arithmetic must-be in-bounds is challenging, we assume this property as an OHA invariant and check for it dynamically as discussed in §3.7. When any branch conditional on an equality or non-equality comparison has any pointers in the comparison, we instrument the spatial safety invariant check for the pointer operands and then optimistically elide the implicit PPT operations. For any other logical comparison used in conditional branches, we always instrument all control-dependent value definitions.

### 4.2 Dynamic Pointer Provenance Tracking

After the static provenance analysis, we instrument the target program for dynamic Pointer Provenance Tracking (PPT) operations. This entails three types of pointer metadata operations, and OHA invariant checks.

**Root-set Pointers**: In an ideal world, Prov-GC would be able to identify all dynamic data in the root-set, statically, based on the state of the program at GC time, and finding the root set would require no instrumentation. However, as LLVM operates on an intermediate state, and doesn’t
expose the mapping of this state to actual dynamic runtime state, Prov-GC requires some runtime instrumentation to identify the root set. To accomplish this, we instrument the main entry function to record the locations of all global values which may hold pointers. Every function, at entry, adds to this record the locations of all local pointer values and removes them before returning. This ensures that the GC can always locate statically identified safe pointer locations, and we only need to track the rest.

**Pointer Metadata Creation:** Any location that could not be statically identified as a non-pointer has two pieces of metadata associated with it: A pointer flag indicating that it has a safe pointer value, or its dynamic points-to set when it’s unsafe. The metadata is split into two separate structures—a shadow memory with two bit taints (00:non-pointer, 01:safe-pointer, 11:unsafe-pointer) and the points-to set in a splay-tree [Sleator and Tarjan 1985] indexed by the pointer value location. The shadow memory taints are set when a safe pointer is assigned to a non-pointer or is loaded/stored from/to memory. When a safe pointer becomes unsafe, the original safe pointer’s dynamic value is used to retrieve the object id from the GC Allocator Table (discussed later in §4.3). When the resultant unsafe pointer value is not in-bounds this object, the points-to set is created on-demand in the splay-tree and the shadow memory taint is set to 11.

**Pointer Metadata Tracking:** The shadow memory taint creations, lookups and transfers are efficiently handled using LLVM DFSan [dfs] instrumentation. For explicit propagation of unsafe pointers, the points-to set metadata is computed as union of the sources. Since, most dynamic points-to sets are likely singleton, the set is represented as a tuple, and the first boolean item indicates if the second value is the singleton points-to value or a pointer to the points-to set. For implicit propagation, we use Iodine’s recovery mechanism to create two paths, with and without the implicit tracking, based on the spatial safety invariant. In the instrumented path, all control dependent instruction values become unsafe and their points-to set accumulates that of the comparison operands.

**OHA Invariant Checks:** In addition to Iodine’s [Banerjee et al. 2019] likely invariants used for information-flow analysis, our implicit provenance optimizations in §3.4 add additional spatial bounds checks for pointer comparison operands. These checks use the pointer’s dynamic value to query the lower bound allocation base address and then check if it’s within that allocation’s bound address.

### 4.3 Garbage Collection

Prov-GC keeps an *allocation table* of active allocations with their base and bound addresses, indexed by their base address. This is exposed to the provenance tracking mechanism for computing the dynamic points-to and enforcing the spatial safety invariant checks.

Prov-GC uses the dynamic points-to and taint metadata maintained by PPT to compute the pointers-within set for a given object bounds efficiently. First, the splay tree representation of the Points-to set facilitates fast range queries, so that given an objects’ bounds, locations within its bounds with non-empty points-to sets can be efficiently computed. This yields all the unsafe pointers within an object. Next, the one-to-one mapping of heap locations to their taint bits in shadow memory enables efficiently searching for and computing offsets of the safe pointers within the objects’ bounds using bitwise arithmetic.

Garbage collection begins by pushing the root-set of pointers maintained by our root-set tracking into a set known as the GC root-set. Then it queries the allocation table to locate remaining pointers within the bounds of the global data segment and the current stack to include in the GC root-set. Then marking continues by transitively performing the range-queries into the bounds of the objects in their points-to set. The range-based query techniques quickly locate all pointer values within
an object’s bounds, much faster than value-based scanning for large objects. This significantly improves the performance of Prov-GC.

Finally, when Prov-GC collects objects, it needs to additionally remove the metadata associated with them. The PPT module provides callbacks to Prov-GC to remove the Points-to metadata through a range-deletion operation, and also resets the shadow memory taints for the objects’ bounds.

4.4 Source Transformations for GC

Running target programs with GC require some source-level changes to communicate between the collector and the client program. To convey applications’ allocation requests, we replace all allocation calls e.g. malloc() with corresponding GC_malloc()’s, and remove all free()’s. Some applications like redis, need to be notified by the GC for special handling of deallocated objects, for which we use BDW-GC interface to register the application specific finalization code.

5 EVALUATION

Our evaluation shows the following:

• Dynamic Pointer Provenance Tracking incurs reasonably low overheads, even for memory-intensive benchmarks.
• Prov-GC reduces scanning overheads so that individual GC invocations run faster compared to BDW-GC.
• Prov-GC is the only sound garbage collector, and yet improves memory reclamation rates over value-based GC and yields benefits similar to other unsound GC solutions [Rafkind et al. 2009].

5.1 Experimental Setup

We evaluate Prov-GC over several real-world applications and benchmark programs including:

• SPECint 2006 C benchmarks: perlbench, bzip2, gcc, mcf, gobmk, hammer, sjeng, libquantum, h264ref [Henning 2006].
• nginx web server [ngi] serving static webpages.
• redis database server [red] performing key-value store, list operations, and geographic search [til].
• postfix mail server [pos] running performance test generators.
• vim running pattern search and text processing [vim].

We run nginx serving pydoc3 documentation and loading several webpages; redis benchmarking application and performing geo-search [til]; the postfix stress tests; vim challenge solutions from [vim]; SPEC benchmarks with their reference inputs. Our static analysis is optimized using optimistic hybrid analysis [Devecsery et al. 2018]. So first, we profile a program over a set of profiling executions to gather likely invariants which we then use in a predicated static analysis to construct our final optimized dynamic provenance tracking analysis. Our profiling methodology is adopted from that used in Iodine [Banerjee et al. 2019], an optimistically optimized taint tracking tool, where we generate a diverse set of inputs per program by sweeping the programs’ parameter space. We gather invariants by running on a profile set consisting 400 executions and also on regression test suites for nginx, redis and vim. All provenance tracking and GC experiments run on a separate test set of 100 executions. The one-time costs of profiling are far outweighed by the benefits of optimistic analysis.
Table 1. Benchmark configurations

| Program    | base Peak Memory | Heap Limit | # Collections |
|------------|------------------|------------|---------------|
| perlbench  | 580 MB           | 1024 MB    | 2             |
| bzip2      | 856 MB           | 1024 MB    | 3             |
| gcc†       | 940 MB           | 1024 MB    | ×             |
| mcf        | 832 MB           | 1024 MB    | 3             |
| gobmk      | 32 MB            | 32 MB      | 2             |
| hammer     | 60 MB            | 48 MB      | 1             |
| mcf        | 180 MB           | 256 MB     | 2             |
| libquantum | 108 MB           | 128 MB     | 2             |
| h264ref    | 68 MB            | 48 MB      | 2             |
| nginx*     | 26 MB            | 16 MB      | 2             |
| redis*     | 316 MB           | 512 MB     | 3             |
| postfix    | 588 MB           | 1024 MB    | 4             |
| vim        | 244 MB           | 512 MB     | 3             |

†we’re unable to run gcc with bdw-gc, *nginx and redis employ their own custom GC allocators

For each target program, we create 3 versions: (1) base without GC, (2) bdw-gc with value-based BDW-GC and (3) prov-gc with our sound Prov-GC. The base versions use glibc 2.26 allocator, except for nginx and redis which use their own custom allocator wrappers that use jemalloc 5.1.0. All programs are compiled with clang 7.0 at the -O3 optimization level. For the bdw-gc versions, we replace calls to allocator functions (e.g. malloc()) with corresponding GC allocator functions (e.g. GC_malloc()) and omit all deallocations (i.e. free()) and use BDW-GC version 7.4.16 built without thread support, and with the parallel and incremental collection being disabled (GC_MARKERS=1 GC_DISABLE_INCREMENTAL). We use different heap limits as listed in Table 1 to trigger sufficient number of GC invocations as the programs exhibit widely varying memory footprints and programs like nginx are designed for low memory overhead. We were unable to run gcc using BDW-GC, so we exclude this program from the GC results §5.3 onward. Finally, the prov-gc versions compile with our static analysis that instruments them with the provenance tracking mechanism, and run with the Prov-GC allocator using the same configurations as above.

All experiments are run on a single core of an Intel Xeon E5-2620 processor with 64GB RAM running Linux 4.18.

5.2 Provenance Tracking Overheads

To understand how static analysis can significantly reduce the overhead of provenance tracking, we run Prov-GC configured only to track provenance (i.e. collection disabled), and then selectively enable optimizations within Prov-GC. Our results can be found in Figure 5: each benchmark shows 4 different overheads normalized to base—‘Cons’ uses the sound static analyses described in §3.3 and §3.4 to optimize provenance tracking; ‘Opt’ further optimizes using optimistic hybrid analysis as described in §3.7; the two ‘+C’ versions then use the specific optimization in §3.6 leveraging the C Standard. We find that the overhead of provenance tracking, including implicit flow tracking, for our benchmarks is actually quite reasonable, with an average overhead of 16% (11% excluding gcc). This result is actually quite surprising, as this number includes the cost of implicit flow tracking, which is known for dramatically increasing taint tracking overhead due to over-tainting. However, with our combination of static analyses, and optimistic hybrid analyses, we are able to dramatically reduce this result to only 16%. Note that this solution requires strict adherence to the C standard, which is stronger than spatial memory safety. While spatial memory safety only checks that pointers are in-bounds when dereferenced, the standard requires that pointers be in-bounds always for well-defined behavior. Therefore, the design point that does not assume the C Standard
is also quite useful in supporting sound GC for legacy non-portable C programs that do not follow this strict standard. Programs that violate the standard [Chisnall et al. 2015; Memarian et al. 2016] can still employ sound GC, although incurring a higher overhead of \(~ 60\%\) (37\% excluding gcc). Note that this cost is still comparable to that of Temporal Memory Safety checking solutions (60\% overhead [Zhang et al. 2019]).

gcc is a very large program for which whole program context-sensitive pointer analysis does not scale, even when predicated using optimistic hybrid analysis. The context-insensitive pointer analysis for this program results in much less precise may-alias relations. Consequently, non-pointers can be imprecisely classified as may-be pointers, and safe pointers to be unsafe. This induces much weaker static optimizations resulting in severe dynamic overheads. The average overhead of provenance tracking excluding gcc is 11\%.

We further study the various sources of our provenance tracking overheads in detail. For explicit provenance tracking, \(~ 21\%\) of its overhead attributes to the provenance metadata creation– i.e. when a safe pointer becomes unsafe, we compute the provenance metadata from the value of the source safe pointer. This substantiates that very few pointer values become tainted as unsafe and the remainder of the overhead is in tracking their provenance propagation. On the contrary, for implicit provenance tracking, the overhead is entirely in validating the invariant of spatial bounds checking for pointer comparisons, as we discussed in §3.4, and none of our tested programs ever violate these checks. The framework overheads of checking the other optimistic invariant assumptions are negligibly low.

**Summary.** Optimistic hybrid analysis combined with our optimizations in §3.3 significantly elides tracking operations for most non-pointers and safe pointers, and tracks only few unsafe pointers. Pointer provenances do not propagate implicitly via common pointer comparisons as we reasoned in §3.4, and checking for that involves a subset of spatial memory safety check overheads. The cost of soundness for GC in our Pointer Provenance Tracking is \(~ 16\%\). This is significantly lower than the cost of providing Temporal Memory Safety (\(~ 60\%\) [Zhang et al. 2019]).
Note that, to the best of our knowledge, these benchmarks do not exercise unsafe pointer propagations and BDW-GC also works correctly for them. For the programs that exercise unsafe pointer manipulations, BDW-GC might break, but Prov-GC still works correctly. However, programs with pathological pointer manipulations may incur higher overheads with Prov-GC. So, Prov-GC provides soundness in all cases without hurting performance significantly in the common case.

5.3 GC Overheads

Next, we show how the presence of dynamic pointer provenance information can be used to achieve an efficient GC solution. To study this effect, we compare the collection times of a single GC invocation with prov-gc against that of bdw-gc. Since our pointer provenance metadata is maintained separately outside the GC managed heap, the first GC invocation of a program happens at the same execution point under consistent configurations. But, since bdw-gc can reclaim unsoundly and retain imprecisely, the subsequent GC invocations can happen at different program states. So for equivalent comparison, we only measure collection statistics upon the first GC invocation and then terminate the program.

![Collection Overhead](image)

**Figure 6.** prov-gc reduces overhead of a single GC invocation; collection time is normalized to that of bdw-gc

Figure 6 plots the overhead of a GC invocation with prov-gc normalized to that with bdw-gc. prov-gc generally improves the GC collection times compared to bdw-gc and completes collecting \(~13\%\) faster. While bdw-gc performs expensive value-based scanning over large allocations to locate potential pointers for marking, prov-gc can locate values with pointer provenance using the fast range queries over its metadata. This benefit can compound while marking large allocations with sparsely located pointers.

5.4 GC Effectiveness

We study the effectiveness of provenance-based GC in terms of its memory retention rate, i.e. the fraction of heap size after and before a GC invocation, once again in our previous single GC invocation setup. Figure 7 plots the mean memory retention for each program. prov-gc is strictly more precise than bdw-gc and reclaims as much as \(21\%\) more memory in the case of vim, and \(~6\%\) more on average. This benefit varies with the programs’ memory usage patterns, and is low for programs with a stable working set like mcf, hmmer and sjeng. Prior works on Precise GC [Rafkind et al. 2009] for C report better reclamation (up to \(~70\%) benefits on a different set of applications, although they do not guarantee that the reclaimed objects will not be used in the future.
5.5 GC Heap Size Sensitivity

Finally, we look at the end-to-end performance of prov-gc and its space-time trade-off with varying heap sizes. Figure 8 shows the execution times of prov-gc and bdw-gc normalized to that of base for four benchmark programs with varying heap size limits on the x-axes; the labeled numbers on the plots indicate the number of GC invocations per benchmark configuration. Overall, prov-gc runs slower than bdw-gc and the difference between their execution time plots is attributed to the dynamic Pointer Provenance Tracking overheads. We observe that more frequent GC invocations at lower heap size limits lead to higher execution time overheads. This behavior is consistent for both bdw-gc and prov-gc although interestingly prov-gc’s improved reclamation rate results in fewer GC invocations for vim at lower heap limits.

5.6 Memory Overheads

To evaluate the additional memory overheads of maintaining the pointer metadata, we measure the sizes of the two metadata structures—shadow memory, and splay tree, at collection time. Programs running with Prov-GC have 30.8% more memory footprint on average, with perlbench seeing the highest overhead of 35.1%. Of this memory overhead, ~27.1% is due to the shadow memory structure, and ~3.6% is occupied by the splay tree structure.

Tracking pointer provenance metadata incurs some additional memory overheads, and hence may not be suitable for applications with large memory footprints in memory constrained environments. However, the advantages of sound garbage collection are much prominent in contrast.
6 LIMITATIONS

Possible leaks: All GCs are imprecise and can lead to memory leaks. Prov-GC too may suffer from memory leaks in pathological cases where it finds benign data-flows from pointer values, e.g. when certain bits of malloc return addresses are checked for bookkeeping purposes. In practice we do not observe such behavior.

Thread safety: Prov-GC’s implementation currently supports single-threaded programs. Future work can address this limitation by combining prior work on data-flow analysis for concurrent programs [Chugh et al. 2008] with our optimistic hybrid analysis techniques to construct a static pointer provenance analysis for concurrent programs. The C11 standard, by requiring data-race freedom, allows extending the sequential reasoning of many program analyses to concurrent programs [Effinger-Dean et al. 2011]. Note that the provenance metadata accesses do not introduce any new races, and the per-word taint metadata is already covered by the program’s existing synchronization for shared objects.

7 RELATED WORK

In §2, we discussed the limitations of well-known value-based GC for C w.r.t soundness, precision, and GC performance. Below we relate relevant GC work that address each of these problems to our work. We also discuss work that relates to the techniques (provenance) we use and the added benefits of GC (temporal safety).

GC Soundness: Prior work has developed compiler checks to reject C/C++ programs that may violate soundness of value-based GC. Precise GC solutions check that programs do not store pointer values into integral types [Henderson 2002; Rafkind et al. 2009] during compilation. Conservative GC [Boehm 2004] checks its assumptions (e.g., that integers are not converted to heap pointers), and preserve original pointer values around compiler optimizations of pointer arithmetic [Boehm 1996; Boehm and Chase 1992]. However, these solutions can reject legal C/C++ programs, because they essentially make pointer manipulations and casting illegal.

GC Efficiency: Traditional mark-sweep collection [Boehm 2004] has been optimized using parallel marking algorithms [Boehm et al. 1991; Endo et al. 1997], by collecting incrementally [Baker and Hewitt 1977; Deutsch and Bobrow 1976], by treating generations of objects separately [Ungar 1984; Yip 1991], or by organizing the heap into regions and performing mark-region GC [Blackburn and McKinley 2008; Endo et al. 1997]. The fragmentation problem when dealing with ambiguous pointers in uncooperative environments like C has been addressed by mostly-copying collectors that move heap objects with no direct references from the root set [Bartlett 1988, 1989; Hosking 2006; Smith and Morrisett 1998; Yip 1991]. These optimizations are orthogonal to our goal to realize sound GC for C, but they can be integrated into our GC.

GC Precision: Precise GC techniques disambiguate pointers from non-pointers to some degree, relying on programmer annotations to register live pointers in a shadow stack to be managed by GC libraries [Edelson 1990; Edelson and Pohl 1991; Schreiner 1996], or with cooperation from the compilers [Jones et al. 1999]. When compiling high-level languages to C [Henderson et al. 1995; Peyton Jones et al. 1993; Tarditi et al. 1992], a virtual machine with its own stack and registers convey necessary type information to the GC, but this complicates code generation and makes systems fragile and non-portable. As inefficiencies of conservative collection arise mostly due to their conservative treatment of the root pointers [Hirzel et al. 2002], type-accurate GC [Henderson 2002] accurately locate pointers in a shadow stack through extensive source transformations. Later systems [Baker et al. 2007; Jung et al. 2006; Rafkind et al. 2009] improve upon this by optimizing metadata storage, and using static liveness analysis assuming the programs obey several constraints.
Such techniques are primarily motivated to solve the leakage and fragmentation issues by enabling copying collection, although they incur significant additional framework overheads [Henderson 2002; Rafkind et al. 2009] and their reduced retention and compaction benefits are marginal [Shahriyar et al. 2014]. But importantly, these systems are more unsound than conservative GC in assuming that pointer values are only stored into pointer types.

Reference Counting: In contrast to above reachability-based tracing collectors, Reference Counting keeps count of incoming references to each object [Collins 1960] and reclaims an object when its reference count falls to zero. This is natively supported in many languages like- Objective-C, Perl, PHP, and Swift, and also in C++ via ‘smart pointers’. This requires the compiler to identify all pointer updates and account reference counts which can become expensive; so it is deferred and performed periodically and incrementally [Deutsch and Bobrow 1976]. Reference counting is inefficient compared to precise GC [Shahriyar et al. 2012, 2013], and moreover cannot collect cyclic garbage requiring separate cycle collectors [Bacon and Rajan 2001; Lins 1992] or forbidding cycles altogether [Apple 2013]. Importantly, they inherently rely on type safety and cannot handle pointer information flowing into non-pointers. Our dynamic pointer provenance could be used to maintain reference counts to objects, and thereby realize a sound reference-count based GC for C.

Taint and Provenance Analysis. There is a significant body of work on static and dynamic information-flow analysis by tracking taints. They have been largely used to ensure that private data do not leak through untrusted channels [Newsome and Song 2005]. Static analysis [Sabelfeld and Myers 2003], including optimistic hybrid analysis [Banerjee et al. 2019; Devecsery et al. 2018], has been used to reduce the overhead of dynamic-taint tracking. While we leverage this body of work, our static analysis elides runtime monitors by taking advantage of special properties that is true only in dynamic pointer provenance. Also, unlike classical taint solutions, we show how implicit-flow tracking is necessary and feasible to track in our context.

Recent work has introduced static pointer provenance for C [Memarian et al. 2019] in order to improve static alias analysis. This static analysis was used by C compilers to improve compiler optimizations. In contrast, we discuss dynamic pointer provenance, and optimistic hybrid analysis to optimize it. Recent work used dynamic pointer provenance for implementing capability checks [Davis et al. 2019] to improve security. In contrast, we use dynamic pointer provenance to construct sound GC for weakly typed languages, and optimize that using optimistic hybrid analysis.

Memory Safety. Temporal memory safety ensures that programs access only allocated memory, and Spatial memory safety ensure that all accesses are within allocated object bounds. Spatial MS is ensured by dynamically checking that intermediate pointer arithmetic do not cross valid object boundaries [Jones and Kelly 1997], and further tracking their intended objects for out-of-bounds pointers [Ruwase and Lam 2004]. This approach has been improved by allocating memory in pools and storing object bounds more efficiently [Dhurjati et al. 2003], by restricting memory allocation sizes and layout to efficiently compute bounds checks [Akritidis et al. 2009], eliminating redundant checks through static analysis [Bodik et al. 2000; Simpson and Barua 2013], and hybrid solutions combining static analysis with hardware support [Nagarakatte et al. 2009]. Temporal MS requires tracking liveness of objects and checking for erroneous uses of uninitialized objects and dangling pointers (use-after-free, double-free), which has also been heavily optimized using static analysis [Nagarakatte et al. 2010; Simpson and Barua 2013; Zhang et al. 2019].

Another approach to MS, adopted by Cyclone [Jim et al. 2002], CCured [Necula et al. 2002], SafeCode [Dhurjati et al. 2003], Checked C [Elliott et al. 2018], and Managed C++ [Microsoft 2004], is to enforce constraints through a strong type system and then perform sound analysis to check for memory errors, but the language becomes much restricted than C, making porting programs hard.
A contrasting approach is to combine heuristics, programmer annotations, and unsound analyses in designing tools [Austin et al. 1994; Ding and Zhong 2002; Dor et al. 1998; Evans 1996; Heine and Lam 2003; Sparud 1993] that detect most memory usage errors in practice.

Our sound GC guarantees temporal MS for legacy C/C++ code by automatically collecting safe garbage that cannot be accessed later, and we show this can be done more efficiently.

Dynamic Type Inference. Types can be inferred from binaries during execution [Caballero and Lin 2016; Lee et al. 2011], optionally aided with static analysis [Elwazeer et al. 2013], for many applications including- decompilation, binary rewriting, vulnerability detection, memory forensics, etc. The typed binary can be executed with dynamic type-safety checks [Burrows et al. 2003]. Our dynamic tracking infers more than pointer types, as it also tracks the pointer provenance when type-safety is violated.

8 CONCLUSION
Traditionally, Garbage Collectors have relied only on values to identify pointers in uncooperative environments like C. C being weakly typed, this is unsound for several legal pointer manipulations. We show that tracking pointer provenances using Dynamic Information Flow Tracking can soundly identify all pointer information, even those hidden by their values, and a Provenance-based GC will therefore safely collect only objects which cannot be accessed later.

To realize a practical Pointer Provenance Tracking solution, we leverage Optimistic Hybrid Analysis, and identify properties that allow us to elide tracking for most common pointer operations. Our tool Prov-GC tracks pointer information propagations with only ~ 16% overhead, even via implicit control-flows, and also improves the overhead and effectiveness of collection.

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