From Old Wars, To New Wars

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Abstract. There has been a tremendous shift of interest the way war was fought before the cold war and after 1991. This paper refers to the former as old wars and the latter as new wars. It, therefore, has examined some old wars, which were waged for geopolitical concerns and ideologies. New wars have also been examined to illustrate that they are far from fitting the description of old wars. Hence the conclusion determines that the new wars are sources of the market for new weapons, and lacking the ingredient of the old wars: ideologies and nationalism. In some cases, the new wars are using the rhetorics of ethnic, religious, or tribal identities. But in the real sense, the new wars are entrepreneurial innovations skills of the weapons industry. They are willing to tolerate the risk of wars as long as there is a significant chance for income. Hence, in the long run, the war in itself does not result in peace, but immense profits and securing of resources for the dominant elite few.

Keywords: Old Wars; New Wars; Entrepreneurship; Warpreneurship.

INTRODUCTION

For most of the period documented, supremacies developed to be strong as a result of their economic and military might. Since militaries are legitimate, war is perceived to be tolerable and it is not felt to be wicked nor is accepting it seen as a wrong perspective. Therefore, warfare, or the status of aggression, is such an exceptional classification of violence [11]. War is a species of violence that is intentional, institutionalized, and organized. Warfare is also the actions of might to coerce the adversary to bow to our will by rendering the enemy powerless [9]. War is not just an autonomous episode, but a continuation of politics by different means [44]. And war as an act of force has no rational restraints to the utilization of the force. Both parties in the war, therefore, compel their adversary to follow suit: application of force without no logical limit, to disarm the enemy. For that reason, wars are some of the extreme originators of brutality worldwide [46].

Consequently, for warfare to transpire with logical parties, either one of them will be expecting some achievements from the combat to exceed incurred expenses. Devoid of this precondition there can be durable harmony [34].

For instance, it may be possible that the feuding nations are individually positive and extremely persuaded that there will be advantages from the conflict. In such instance, violence would flare up, in consideration that the contradiction of opinions is acceptably great to pay off for the war expenses. For example, on the assumption that the feuding states suppose with high enough probability to triumph in a war, it would be difficult for the existence of agreements that would deter violence [21]. There must also be some conceivable conditions that, the leaders are anticipating benefits from warfare in the form of wealth, authority, territory, or prestige.

Consequently, this paper sets out to confirm, that, there is a pronounced discrepancy from the gains anticipated from the older wars and the new wars. With this, the contemporary leaders are anticipating gains for themselves and their cronies. These gains would simply be a business venture. Whereas war for the glory of the old wars were ethnic, religious, or tribal identities and some real social identities which would be defined as nationalism.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Old Wars

These old wars were fought for geopolitical interests and ideologies. The case in 1866, hostilities broke out between Austria and Prussia. This was after Bismarck made a challenge to Austria's dominance in the Confederation of German and he recommended the abolition of the Confederation. The Treaty of Prague was signed seven weeks later by the Austrians, dissolving the Confederation of German. In this case, nationalism triumphed, and Prussia achieved charge over the newly composed North Germany confederation, 21 smaller German political units, and the union of Prussia [43].

The first world war commenced on the 28th of July 1914 amongst two parties; the triple entente and the triple alliance [3]. It concluded on 11th November of 1918. Disparities in strategies remain to be blamed, even though the paramount source of the war was the shooting of Austria's Archduke Franz Ferdinand [4]. The war was attributed to four main aspects: Alliances, Militarism, Nationalism, and Imperialism. This is because the large militaries turn out to be possible risks over other nations. The intimidated nations start to force coalitions to safeguard their territories. Colonialism marked as a cause for the reason that, creating a kingdom requires the workforce, for instance, a military to subdue and regain the territory that they have subjugated [2]. The coalition structure, therefore, implied that a confined skirmish would without trouble escalate into a threatening universal one. Patriotism and commitment to a treaty, saw Britain enter the war, thereby bringing almost all of the European Continent into War [4].

World War two started on 1st September 1939, when Hitler intruded into Poland from the west. France and Britain declared war on Germany two days later, making it officially a World War. The Treaty of Versailles in effect had crippled the German economy. Germans were outraged against their leaders since they were dismayed by their approval of such a treaty [18]. These emotions of dismay would later on, reverse to emotions of bitterness towards Europe states that drafted the treaty, and towards their state for accepting it. The citizens of German's bitterness was not departing, because they held responsible for their economic predicaments on the Treaty, and regarded their country as one bordered and encircled by revengeful adversaries [48]. Adolf Hitler was therefore regarded as engaging to correct most of these difficulties, once he undertook the activities that commenced the war. Hitler was interested in ridding Germany of the elected administration, and to forge its economic, military, and geography to be dominant again, and to merge the German citizen [17]. Consequently, this was an ideological and nationalism war; for the people and the nation.

In the case of Japan, it was severely affected by the economic slump, and the faith of its citizen in the government was lost [8]. The military was looked upon by the citizens as the one to bring a resolution to these economic difficulties. The Japanese military, therefore, attacked China, which is a territory endowed with richness of mineral deposits and other resources. This was to get natural resources for its factories to produce more goods that it needed. Japan also felt that its expansion in places such as the Philippines and Guam was under threat by the USA armed forces, and they, therefore, made a preemptive attack on Pearl Harbor, in December 1941 [8]. World War II had henceforth begun in Asia. This too was a war for the people and the nation.

As for the Korean War of 1950-1953, it commenced when the North Korean Communist military went over the 38th parallel and attacked the non-communist South Korea. It has been documented that, the Korean war had its origins from a composite of outer disputes of the USA and USSR policies concerning the East-Asia and the internal struggles in the Korean peninsula. Even though the Korean peninsula was not a strategic interest to the USA, the political atmosphere at that phase did not warrant the policymakers to give the impression of being "soft on Commemism" [27]. In this regard, this was the political character of the Korean War.

On the Korean peninsula, the dilemma on whom was to disarm the imperial military of Japan was a critical issue linked to the future of an independent Korea after the collapse of Japanese expansionism [32]. Consequently, the USA and USSR's independent disarming of the Japanese military regarding their location below or above the 38th parallel, was the actual inauguration of
the Korean War. In this regard, this war can be construed to be a rational elongation of the USA and USSR occupational strategy.

Nevertheless, from a distinct viewpoint, North Korea’s offensive on 25th June 1950 could be considered as a series of post-colonial internal incidents in the struggle in the direction of unifying the Koreas [25]. As the leaders of each of the Koreas were eager for unification before 1950, the departure of the American military kindled the passion of the merger by all means [32]. With this contextual background, it is evident as to how the Korean peninsula war at the outset was a kind of nationalism conflict but ultimately established into the conflict amongst the East and West alliances (cold war).

The Arab-Israeli War of 6th October 1973, popularly referred to as the Yom Kippur War, had its conception sown in Israel’s spectacular six-day triumph in the 1967 conflict. The Arab militaries endured a humbling loss, which the Egyptian President Nasser felt the most [13]. For President Anwar Sadat who succeeded President Nasser, the status quo of the Israelis in Sinai was unbearable. With a collapsing economy, due to the dis-possession of the Suez Canal proceeds due to its cessation as a result of the preceding conflict, and still bearing the embarrassment of 1967, President Anwar had a feeling that he had to amend conditions [7]. The Egyptians were defeated in the 1973 October war with Israel paving the course for a peace treaty that culminated with the surrender by the Israelis of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. The war consequently assisted President Anwar to acquire his comprehensive strategic objective [42]. Therefore, in 1973, President Anwar had a perfect political objective; land for peace, but which had to be achieved from a limited military expedition.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had a clear political objective as Moscow could not envisage losing their political dominance in a neighboring patron nation. It was an apprehension reinforced by the suspicions that Islamic fundamentalism would likely diffuse into its Muslim borders [15]. These are only a few wars that have been fought over nationalism ideologies. Mueller in other words defines them as ‘old war’ [35].

Through the UN and Regional Organizations, the major powers have kept contact with each other. The global arrangements during the 20th century were therefore devised to confront the inter-state rivalry and civil conflicts. Nevertheless, conflict and warfare have not been eliminated. But due to the achievements in decreasing inter-state conflicts due to the current global systems, the leftover practices of conflict cannot suit precisely within “war” [52]. Most of what passes as wars in the current world are typically symbolized by the unscrupulous and innovation competition by ‘thugs’, and never in any way by the elemental collision of cultures and ideologies. Most of these ‘thugs’ and their agents give a justification of ideological rhetoric or national ethnicity to give justification to their actions since expressing their thrill for profit would be politically improper [35]. And one war stands out as one that was persuaded by lack of tangible cultural and ideological rhetoric security but instead financial proceeds concerns; the American and its allies war on Iraq on 20 March 2003.

Nevertheless, some examples of contemporary wars that can still pass the definition of old wars include the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), Iraq invaded Kuwait (1990), Croatian War of Independence (1991-1995), Bosnia war (1994-1995) and the Yemen war (2014-to date).

The 2nd Sudan civil warfare between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) took place from 1983 to 2005. The war was a protraction of the 1st Sudan civil war (1955-1972). It originated in southern Sudan, and it lasted for 22 years with the South calling for abolishing of Islamic law, and the domination of the oil grounds that had been newly discovered on the border section within the South and North Sudan [40]. Consequently, after six years of the conflict, it resulted in the liberation of South Sudan once the war concluded. This brief illustrates that it was a war of nationalism.

The story that Saddam one day woke up and decided to invade Kuwait is just not true. Going back to history, Iraq and Kuwait were sectors of Basra jurisdiction during the period of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, Iraq considered Kuwait as a segment of its territory based on the governing structure of the Ottoman Empire [12]. It is for this reason that, immediately Kuwait was granted independence in 1961, Iraq attacked it on those alleged grounds of ownership. Luckily or unluckily depending on where your standpoint, the British army repelled them [30]. Nonetheless, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2nd August 1990 was on the pretext of altered justifications. The USA, United Kingdom, and the Gulf
countries were waging an economic war against Iraq. Kuwait kept disregarding OPEC’s quotas, causing billions of dollars’ worth of damage to Iraq’s economy. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was just the result of a 2-years long escalation. By occupying Kuwait as its 19th province, Baghdad would perhaps have “regulated 20 percent of OPEC oil production, and 25 percent of the world’s oil reservoirs [40]. These would have helped Iraq to pay off its debts to Saudi Arabia that had accumulated due to the Iran-Iraq war, and which the Saudis had refused to write-off. By this invasion and occupation, Baghdad to some degree sought to recover its stature as an influential Arabic nation in the neighborhood. Another illustration of a war of nationalism.

There was also the Croatian War of Independence (1991-1995) and the Bosnia war (1994-1995). The earlier Socialist state of Yugoslavia was an ensuing creation of German occupying it in World War II, and acrimonious civil unrest that followed thereafter. It was an amalgamation of six nations, composed of the Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Albanians, Bosnian Muslims, and the rest under a moderately casual communist administration. Even though numerous diverse tribal and religious parties had existed in harmony under the repressive communist government of Yugoslavia for 40 years, this suddenly got altered once the republics commenced to a breakdown in the course of the tumble of communism at the beginning of 1990s. The regions of Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed independence, and warfare immediately flayed among the Serbs and the splinter regions. Bosnia, having a multifaceted blend of Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, followed to attempt its liberation but the minority Serbs (12% of the Croatian populace) thwarted and mobilized [37]. They assaulted with the assertion that they were at hand to “free” their fellow Serbian Orthodox Christians residing in Bosnia [24]. Approximately a million Croats and Bosnian Muslims got displaced out of their home environment in systematic tribal cleansing [6]. The tribal Serbs were also expelled from the south of Croatia, and the Croatian Government quietly confiscated tens of thousands of their houses settling tribal Croatians relocating from Serbia and Bosnia in the confiscated assets. On 4th August 1995, the Croatian military attacked Croatian regions under the Serb’s influence instigating thousands to escape. Thereafter, Bosnia and Croatia became entirely liberated, as Macedonia and Slovenia had previously got their independence. Montenegro, later on, followed the trend. In 1999, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo once again in an additional vicious conflict to gain self-rule fought the Serbs. The Serbs lost in the war-battered, beaten, and on their own. In this war, it was purely political philosophies and ideas that contributed immensely to the brutal conflict, as the leaders transferred their nationalist principles onto their general public.

The Yemen conflict had its origins during the Arab Spring of 2011, which obligated the long-time dictatorial President Abdullah Saleh, to relinquish authority to Mansour Hadi who was his deputy. The political changeover was presupposed to stabilize the Middle East’s poorest nation. But as a President, Mansour Hadi strained to administer with numerous complications comprising corruption, militant assaults, food insecurity, and the enduring allegiance of most army officers to his predecessor [16].

War broke out in 2014 after the Houthis seized the opportunity of the new Mansour Hadi’s vulnerability, and acquired jurisdiction of the northern Saada region and adjacent regions [28]. The Houthis proceeded to capture the city Sanaa, compelling president Hadi to go to exile overseas. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and other eight mostly Sunni Arabic nations supported by the USA, France, and the UK commenced air assaults on the Houthis, with the stated objective of reinstating the Mansour Hadi’s administration. Saudi Arabia and its allies were weary that, unrelenting triumphs of the Houthis would possibly hand influence to their regional rival and Shia-majority nation of Iran, a base in Yemen, Saudi’s southern neighbor. Besides, Riyadh alleges that Tehran is aiding the Houthis using arms and logistical funding, an accusation that Tehran refutes.

Up to the present day, Iran and Saudi Arabia have managed to evade straightforward armed hostility. Alternatively, both establishments tussle for dominance by proxy conflicts in where they are manipulating prevailing rivalry and struggles in the neighborhood to their advantage. Yemen is more than just a battleground of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry, as each is supporting opposite parties in Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Syria. Nevertheless, the war in Yemen, is vital to the Saudi-Iranian influence tussle, as it is strategically closer to Riyadh. Nonetheless, with the minimum endeavor, Iran has managed to ensure that Riyadh is engaged
and placing a substantial political, financial, and military liability on them [51].

Although the conflict between Tehran and Riyadh has often been referred to as a struggle between regional zones of dominion in the Middle East, it is their religion as Sunnis and Shi’as, rather than regional endeavors that motivate their competition. Both republics compete to exploit their religious scopes of influence in the Middle East, creating a presently unstable neighborhood even further insecure.

New wars

But then, the international organization has gone through a zealous revolution in the contemporary years. A transformation molded by the conclusion of the Cold War in 1990, the globalization phenomena, and the development of fresh arrangements of collaboration and struggles amongst nations and non-nation players. This revolution has produced the growth of a fresh kind of war that is unique from previous ones. In the last years of the 20th century, a different type of wars was established, particularly in Eastern Europe and Africa [23]. These different types of conflicts have been designated by the concept of New wars. The new wars have provoked scholars to re-evaluate the characteristics of warfare from very new dimensions, of the players involved and their interests. The number of intrastate wars has diminished, whereas the frequency of interstate wars has heightened. Therefore, these conflicts are at times termed as internal conflicts or civil wars [23]. But, some of them have been baptized as a war on terror.

Some authors have argued that the modern-day war is primarily privatized and/or illegitimate, and therefore cannot properly be defined as war. An exceptional illustration of this sort of thought is in John Mueller’s book, The Remnants of War. He asserts that warfare has become obsolete and what has been left are thugs as the ‘residual combatants’ [35]. These civil wars or internal conflicts from the new perspective is that, they are exclusively engaged in by the non-state players, and mostly inspired by financial gains, and that they are ruthless than the previous wars [31]. New wars are mostly packaged in the labels of distinctiveness (ethnic or religion). But their ambition is to achieve admission to the government for certain associations, either local, transnational, international, or both, instead of carrying out rules or policies for the wider communal good.

As a result, 9/11 enabled the leadership of the dominant elite few too without difficulty focus the reasoning of the populace and thereby shaping the world that they influence. One of the efficient methods of improving and preserving supremacy and funding for warfare is to retain the common citizen in perpetual fright and more recently, of “terrorism and terrorists”. That way, the public will consent to a greater part of taxpayer’s money being expended on financing the ceaseless army-industrial-complex.

Among the five persistent aspects that inform the art of war according to Sun Tzu, is The Moral Law. The Moral Law ensures that the people are in complete consensus with their leader so that they can abide by the leader notwithstanding their lives, and undeterred by any dangers [45]. The secret to motivating people and maintaining their morale is to get them to think less about themselves and more about the ‘cause’. Involve them in a cause, a crusade against a common detested foe. Make them see their survival as tangled to the victory of the military.

On 7th October 2001, the USA armed force, with the support of the British royal armed force, began a bombing expedition against the Taliban fighters, thereby formally beginning Operation Enduring Freedom in response to a terrorist’s attack on September 11, 2001, on the Twins Towers which killed 2,977 people excluding the 19 hijackers. The military expedition was to eliminate Al Qaeda and the Taliban administration that had sheltered and maintained them. This was to avert any future aggression on America by ‘terrorists’ delighting in a secure haven in Afghanistan. In the subsequent 17 years, the USA incurred approximately 2,400 military mortalities in Afghanistan [47]. The US Congress had also budgeted over $132 billion (Cost of War Update as of March 31, 2019) in support of Afghanistan ever since 2002, with around 63% of it for defense [47]. These are gains from a war for the leader and their cronies, and simply a business venture.

It can also be argued that the US’s presence in Afghanistan had as much to do with the survival of Bush in the 2005 general election after the 9/11 attack dented his image as a president
who had not protected the US from a harrowing home attack. By attacking and toppling the Taliban government, Bush was portraying machismo to the Americas, and as the right man needed to finish the job of going after criminals everywhere, and making America safe again. This is one of the best ways to preserve political power and war funding by keeping the citizens in continuous fright of terrorists and terrorism. As a result, the American citizens consented to a bigger part of government revenues being spent on funding the boundless industrial-military-complex.

Interestingly, after the CIA tracked Osama bin Laden to the Tora Bora cave southeast of Kabul on Dec 3, 2001, the American military leisurely engaged to capture him, as they left the operation to be undertaken by a ragtag Afghan contingent [10]. It resulted in an eventual escape of bin Laden for Pakistan. This raises the following questions: would his capture have led to the end of the storyline of making America safe again, and therefore an end to the reasons for spending billions on the military in Afghanistan? Was the US troops a less assertive role in his capture of a strategy to ensure his escape? But what is clear with the new wars is that they have to be given more lease of life because it is good for business. In the mid-2019, the American administrators were negotiating directly with the Taliban ‘terrorists’ on the concerns of countering terrorism. It is still vague on what type of political arrangements can contain both the Taliban and the US to the level that, the former completely forsake their armed war/insurgency.

In 2003, the USA attacked Iraq under the pretense that Iraq bared a security risk to America, as it stocked weapons of mass destruction, and for the reason that, Baghdad sponsored terrorism against Americans. Another pretext was to save Iraqi citizens from Saddam Hussein’s decade’s old tyranny [29]. In the aftermath of 9/11, the political elite was able to justify that war and rally the American citizens on what engagements to be involved to vanquish terrorism (common detested foe) [14]. Assuming that some topmost leaders in the Bush government had by then resolved to oust President Saddam Hussein notwithstanding the 9/11 assault, President Bush would have found it difficult to garner any backing from the American citizens and its partners. The political resolve and the factual grounds vital to validate the warfare were absent. Nearly all the military new technology built-in terms of trillions of dollars since the 1980s, and intended for a tilt a war with the Soviet Union to US advantage, had never been previously tested in a combat scenario. By introducing the high-tech weapons during the operation, it was showcasing their effectiveness to their customers. This meant that their success rate in Desert Storm had to be shown, to be dazzling by the western media who had strategically been embedded in the operation.

Without a doubt, even before the dust of the warfare had settled in the gulf, arms manufacturers from Britain, France, United States West Germany, and other countries were gathering in the Middle East to hawk their merchandise. Saudi Arabia is by far the biggest buyer had an interest in Apache helicopters, Abrams M1A1 tanks, AWACS radar planes, F-15 fighters, Patriot missiles, Bradley fighting vehicles, Seaward helicopters and multiple-launch rocket systems [1]. Israel wanted more Patriot missiles, the M-109 artillery piece, advanced F-15 fighter, and the portable battlefield-navigation systems [1]. Egypt showed interest in buying the Hawk missiles, M-60 tank upgrades, and F-16 fighters [27]. And the United Arab Emirates, and so did Bahrain and Turkey had made clear that they would like to have the Patriot missiles and Abrams M1A1 tanks [1].

The only political objectives accomplished was the conceited determination of the Bush administration to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and prove that it can overthrow any regime it disliked [22]. In review, the military triumph look likes it destabilized, not progressed, the security or material benefits of the Americans, and their international stature.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria also known as ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh emanated from the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2004. But it dilapidated into insignificance for numerous years but sprouted in 2011. During the years that followed, it grabbed the opportunity of rising volatility in Syria and Iraq to wage assaults and strengthen its hierarchy. The formation switched its identity to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013. In June 2014, its leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi proclaimed the establishment of a caliphate extending from Diyala in Iraq to Aleppo in Syria and gave the establishment a new name of Islamic State [50].
The USA and its allies commenced attacking Islamic militant targets in Iraq in August 2014 and extended the operation to Syria the month that followed. This operation was later referred to as “Operation Inherent Resolve.” The Iraqi Prime Minister Al Abadi affirmed triumph over ISIS in Iraq on 9th December 2017. On 19th December 2018, the USA affirmed that ISIS was conquered and indicated there were intentions to pull out all armed forces personnel supportive of their allies of Arabs known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian Kurds in Syria.

It is significant to remember that, both Iran and Qassem Soleimani played in the fight against ISIS. Iranian-backed militias also pushed the ISIS back in Iraq and Syria, with Soleimani often leading the fight from the front line [36]. Iran saw the radical Sunni militant group as a threat too but was probably also conscious of the influence it was receiving by assisting Iraq and Syria to defeat ISIS. Consequently, regarding American overseas strategy in Syria, they were fighting ISIS and at the same time waging war on Assad in Syria, even when ISIS establishment was waging war on Assad in Syria, and Moscow was supporting Syria battle ISIS. Therefore, they might battle the Russians to prevent them from battling with Syria against ISIS. That sounds insane, for the reason that it is ridiculous.

Again the American overseas strategy in Iraq was, they sought to fight Iran proxies while also fighting ISIS, even though Iran proxies were fighting against ISIS in Iraq, and that Iran was helping its proxies battle ISIS, so they might have had to battle Iran to block them from battling with their proxies against ISIS. Now, that sounds ridiculous, and it should as that as the ways of the new wars. It might be seen that geopolitical interests and ideologies are at play, but the reality is different. That is a region that has an enormous market for wantrepreneurs. A market that has to be protected and exploited at all costs.

In September 2015, Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war surprising its own nearest commentators of Moscow’s overseas and security strategy. It had persistently been held that the Russian armed force would not possibly be mobilized to involve in excursion assignments beyond Russia’s closest vicinity of the post-USSR. In Syria, Putin’s banking on President Assad’s administration was visibly important, but the indication that he would expose his military to rescue al-Assad appeared not a possibility. Surprisingly, that was exactly what transpired. Regarding this action, it is imperative to answer questions of why Putin would engage in such an adventure, and literally and adventure.

Moscow had never been engaged in wars primarily to show off the military prowess of the fatherland. But the continuous declined in weapons trade by the Russian corporations raised a concern. The collective weapons trades of the 10 Russian organizations during the 2018 grading were, $36.2 billion a minimal reduction of 0.4 percent of 2017 [41]. This was an arms trade fall from 9.7 percent in 2017 to 8.6 percent in 2018. This could be partly related to the considerable development in the collective weapons sales of the USA and European organizations in 2018. The arms manufacturers in the USA and Europe were doing something right that the Russians had not been doing, and that is, they had successfully showcased and sold their weapons in various war theatres.

In part, the market launch of fresh innovations of weapons in Syria means that Kremlin can count on it. So, the Syrian conflict was used as a live-fire testing range for a new generation of Russian weapons and operational techniques. This was made obvious by systematic deployments of every type of combat aircraft in the Russian catalog, including modern Russian attack helicopters Mi-28Ns, Mi-35Ms, Ka-52s, and fighter jets Su-25SM, Su-24 Su-27, Su-34s, S-300VMD and S-400 anti-air missile systems, strategic bombers that had previously at no time been able to fire a weapon in a war scenario [41].

The conflict in Syria has had a good repercussion on the Russian weapons industry. The conflict has worked as a testbed, and as an audition for new Kremlin military accessories, and has been able to get new orders of their equipment including the S400 anti-aircraft missiles for Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and India.

On 14th October 2011, the Kenya Defense Force (KDF) invaded Somalia. Coincidentally, four kidnappings took place in Kenya days before its armed force’s incursion into Somalia. On 11th September 2011, six Somali gunmen attacked Kiwayu Safari Village resort near Kiwayu Island where United Kingdom nationals Judith Tebbutt
and her husband David were reportedly spending their first night on vacation. David Tebutt was shot in the chest and died at the scene whilst reacting to the raid. Judith Tebout was taken to a waiting speedboat and taken to Somalia that same night [38]. Montserrat Serra and Blanca Thiebout Spanish Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) aid workers working in Dadaab, Northern Kenya, were kidnapped on 13th October 2011, and their Kenyan MSF driver Mohamed Hassan Borle shot and injured [5]. The gunmen escaped to Somalia, taking the car and both the women with them. Kenya used these incidents as an excuse to breach the Somali border. All this was under the pretext that Al-Shabaab was to be blamed for the increase in insecurity, the spill-over of skirmishes to neighboring countries, more particularly in Kenya, and the severe humanitarian condition that was persisting in vast regions of Somalia. However, Kenya had already appeared targeted for terrorist assaults in the past before the development of Al-Shabaab. For example, the 7th August 1998 bombing of the American Embassy in Kenya, in which 213 people were killed and 4000 others left wounded [26]. Kenya, therefore, embarked on heavy military spending that was informed by the need to defend its territory against the Somalia-based Al-Shabaab terrorists who had in the past targeted civilians and security agencies in major towns as well as in border townships. As informed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Kenya acquired 186 million dollars’ worth of current military weapons in five years between 2010-2105, in comparison to 8.6 million dollars’ expenses between 2005-2009 which was a 20 percent increase during the season and the uppermost in East Africa [39].

Military imports by Kenya increased significantly and in 2007–11, it acquired 32 WZ 551 APCs and 4 Z-9WA helicopters from China, 15 second-hand F-5E combat aircraft from Jordan, 35 Puma M-26 APC from South Africa valued at Sh 1.6 billion that are immune to an explosion from land mines and improvised explosive devices (IED) and 3 Mi-171 helicopters from Russia [20]. The stockpile also includes the largest vessel in the Kenya Navy fleet at 43 million dollars’ naval ship from Spain christened KNS Jasiri [20]. During the 2013–17 period, it acquired 2 second-hand combat helicopters, 13 transport helicopters, a small number of self-propelled howitzers, and 65 light armored vehicles [49].

Surprisingly, after the KDF incursion into Somali, during the period 2011–2012 Kenya has been attacked approximately 17 times, with the usages of grenades and other explosive devices. Close to 48 people have perished in these assaults, and approximately 200 people injured [26]. The targets have included churches, police agents infrastructure, bars and nightclubs, a downtown building of small shops, learning institutions, and a bus station. This points to a deteriorating security situation in Kenya despite its military operation in Somali that was supposed to make Kenya even safer. A military operation that has seen the country spend immensely on military equipment up to an extent that, it is alleged to be in an arm’s race with the neighbors.

The main reason for the deteriorating security situation in Kenya is, for the leaders to justify their military operation in Somali by keeping the public in perpetual fear. As a result, they can justify to the citizens on endless military financing. These new ways have nothing nationalism about them but they are made to create good business for the leaders and their associates. With good business, they will be able to bankroll their preferred candidates to be elected in various legislative positions as leaders.

Also, Kenya was diverting weapons supplied by Ukraine to South Sudan which was still under the European Union arms embargo. There has been evidence of the deliveries and satellite images showing that some T-72 tanks were delivered to Southern Sudan via Kenya [19]. Despite the USA being convinced that arms have been diverted to Southern Sudan by Kenya and Ukraine, the USA did not call for international sanctions to be enacted against either country. And security commentators have concluded that Kenya was acting on the behest of the Americans who were interested in ensuring that, Ukraine earns foreign exchange which it was lacking due to the crisis it was having with Russia.

The Ugandan engagement in Somalia can be argued is the most recent example of the Museveni regime’s multi-pronged ‘image management’ strategy to secure agency in its relations with donors. The mission’s first troops of 1,650 Ugandan soldiers were deployed in March 2007. The regime has, it will be suggested, undertaken numerous activities in the foreign and domestic spheres to ensure that donors perceive it in a particular way vis-à-vis their interests: including the mediator, guarantor of stability in a volatile region orally in the War on Terror. In so doing, it
has been able to largely avoid scrutiny in areas of traditional donor concerns such as democratization, corruption, and military activity, thereby achieving a considerable degree of agency in a theoretically highly unequal relationship. For example, in 2014 and 2015 Kampala purchased weapons from Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia, and then sent them to South Sudan’s military in violation of a European Union arms embargo that had been existing since 2011.

Whereas old wars were nationalism wars for the glory of the state, the new wars have gained for the leader and their cronies, which is simply is warpreneurship. What is clear with the new wars is that they have to be given more lease of life because it is good for business.

CONCLUSION

Weapons business prospects continue being there but competition is now as much about persistence as growth. And, as worldwide competition continues to intensify, sources of market advantage are becoming ever more difficult to sustain over some time. Therefore, the weapons businesses must adopt the entrepreneurial skills of willing to bear the risk of a new war if there is a significant chance for revenue. Making profits out of war is a very old phenomenon as there are enterprises constantly supplying material to prepare armies and consequently profit from war. War also never works for any individual or group, except the Warpreneurs: the wealth who propagate and influence nationalistic and fascist war-mongering the world over, making trillion-dollar profits from death and destruction, while hyping their patriotism, and inspiring the citizen’s backing. But in the long run, the war in itself does not result in peace, but immense profits and securing of resources for the dominant elite few. As the retired USMC Major General Smedley Butler once wrote, “War is a Racket” not only for the American business interests but the world’s weapons entrepreneurs.

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