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Acronyms

ACEA Association of European Automobile Constructors
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area
AICO ASEAN Industrial Cooperation
AISI American Iron and Steel Institute
AMA Automobile Manufacturers Association
APTA Automotive Products Trade Agreement
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATC Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
ATMI American Textile Manufacturers Institute
BBC Brand-to-Brand Complementation
CCMC Committee of Common Market Motor Vehicle Constructors
CECOM Committee of European Copier Manufacturers
CEFIC Conseil Européen des Fédérations de l'Industrie Chimique (European Chemical Industry Council)
CUSFTA Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement
EACEM European Association of Consumer Electronics Manufacturers
EC European Community
EECA European Electronic Component Manufacturers Association
EIA Electronic Industries Association
ERT European Roundtable
EU European Union
EUROFER European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries
FBI Federation of British Industries
FDI Foreign direct investment
FIRA Foreign Investment Review Agency
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP  Gross domestic product
GSP  Generalized System of Preferences
HDTV  High-definition television
IDAC  Import Duties Advisory Committee
IT  Information technology
JAMA  Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Association
JETRO  Japan External Trade Organization
JSEPA  Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement
LDP  Liberal Democratic Party
MCA  Manufacturing Chemists Association
MES  Minimum efficient scale
METI  Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
MFA  Multifiber Arrangement
MFN  Most favored nation
MVMA  Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
NACE  Nomenclature Générale des Activités Economiques (Statistical Classification of Economic Activities)
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement
NFISM  National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers
NIE  Newly industrialized economy
OAP  Offshore Assembly Program
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLS  Ordinary least squares
R&D  Research and development
RDI  Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie (Federation of German Industry)
RTAA  Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
SIC  Standard Industry Classification
SOCMA  Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association
TRIM  Trade-related investment measure
UAW  United Automobile Workers
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCTC  United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations
USITC  U.S. International Trade Commission
USTC  U.S. Tariff Commission
USTR  United States Trade Representative
VER  Voluntary Export Restraint
WTO  World Trade Organization