Religio-Centric Migrant Policies of Eastern Europe

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Abstract

Migration has been the most specific characteristics of the human being and the initial step of globalization since the beginning of history. In today’s world, while globalization and migration continue to feed each other, states are seeking ways to cope up with growing numbers of newcomers. While states have been in search of the “better” and have taken steps accordingly, they have been trying to restrict the “others” to do the same. Walls have been erected or wars have been made to keep the territories safe for the inhabitants by keeping the others on the other side of the borders. However, the definition of the “others” has continually changed from region to region and from time to time. On one hand, universal and regional norms and values are discussed and, on the other hand, specific and marginal measures are considered. As being the Christian Roman Heritage, European perception of “identity” and the “other” has mostly been constructed on the fear of invasions coming from the East that hold Muslim identity since the first Islamic conquests on East and West Roman territories. This being the case, a fear of Islam is triggered after the refugee crisis stimulated by the Syrian civil war. Though there are many other determining factors in migrant policies, significant religio-centric refugee policies of the countries in Eastern Europe and the answer of why religion, culture, and the politics are too much interlocked lie in the historical and cultural ties of Europe.

Keywords: International Politics, Migrant Policy, Eastern Europe, Migration, History, Religion, Identity, Syrian.

Summary

Human beings have always been on the move since they existed. Though its form and purpose might change in due course, the mobility itself has been remaining as one of the most specific characteristics of human. With the rise of globalization; the feeling and action of migration to flee from conflicts, natural disasters, or economic problems in the search for better conditions increased. In today’s world, while globalization and migration continue to feed each other, states are seeking ways to cope up with growing numbers of newcomers. The reaction towards migrants and refugees became more and more systematic with the changing conditions of the world. Strengthening borders and levelling up the security measures have turned into a policy which is established for the sake of protecting the nation and the nation-state
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In one hand. And on the other hand, these measures are also taken to protect the national identity, which is composed of religion and culture as well as language and history. In the case of Europe, and specifically, Eastern Europe, these measures have clearly been seen during the last decade.

Though migration is not a new phenomenon for Europe, it has been more sweeping than ever before. Especially the year 2015 was a milestone in the aspect of migration policies. After the Syrian crisis erupted in 2011, caused by the internal instability in Syria, millions of people replaced both within and beyond the country. Though the war in Syria had been going on for four years until then, the illegal immigration to Europe reached its peak in 2015. In October 2015, the monthly number of the refugees entering Europe, 218,394, was almost equivalent to the total that entered over the whole of 2014, and more than 50 per cent of these were Syrians. Europe has been one the most attractive destinations for both Syrians and other migrants fleeing from the East and the Middle East due to economic, political, and social problems.

During the wake of the crisis, there was a sharp contradiction within Europe. Eastern Europe has adopted a sharper political discourse in rejecting migrant-friendly policies. Though their style of the discourses differs from West to East, it is understood from the results of the elections throughout Europe that the perception towards migrants is more or less the same all around Europe. It is well seen in the public surveys that every other day people are getting more anxious about the migrants and their voting tendencies are shaped according to migration policies of the political parties. Throughout Europe, far-right parties who are strictly against Muslim migrants are becoming the parts of the governing coalitions.

In spite of the consensus of politicians and the approach of the citizens are generally very much similar in practice, the political discourse of the West and the East differs. This might be due to the integration process of the East resulting from the effects of the Cold War which left them more than 40 years back. While the West had already started focusing on the elements like democracy, respect of human rights, pluralism, non-discrimination, and tolerance, the East was putting up a fight for liberty. Therefore, it would not be easy for the Eastern countries of the EU, who became a member of the Union after the 2000s, to close this gap immediately in the first place. In spite of the fact that they all share some common historical or cultural links, the East had a lot to overcome in many aspects, from economy to ideology and from abstract values of pluralism to non-discrimination. As the political culture
of Western Europe is more settled, while they prefer more abstract ways; Eastern Europe, who still needs years to interiorize the European norms, does not seem to hesitate to prefer a more direct and offending language.

It is known that history, religion, sectarian differences, geopolitical and geostrategic substances are interrelated among the factors that determine the political reflexes of the countries and historical legacy is a prominent element in constructing the identities of the nations. In the same way, the identity of the EU, specifically Eastern Europe, is mostly constructed on the historical links which include common identity and values. Being ruled by the Ottomans -whose identity is coded as Muslim- and having lived under a communist regime for decades made them attached to religion in most ways. Developing a religious resistance against a religious threat and attaching to religion after being kept far from religion during the Cold War had a traumatic effect on the perception of threat on the East. But it should be remembered that the more otherised the migrants are, the more radicalized they become in time. During the age of global migration, for the future safety of the communities, migration policies should be carried out from humanitarian and security perspectives; not according to the religious or ethnic backgrounds of the immigrants. Human rights, multiculturalism, respect to the differences are not just definitions written on the conventions; but the universal values of humanity to be inherited by future generations and adopted by successor governments.

Doğu Avrupa’nın Din Merkezli Göçmen Politikaları

Öz

Göç, tarihin başlangıcından bu yana, insanoğlunun en özgün karakteristiği ve küreselleşme menin ilk adımı olmuştur. Günümüzde küreselleşme ve göç birbirini besleyip büyümeye devam ederken, devletler de her geçen gün sayları hızla artan göçmenlerle nasıl baş edebileceklerini yollarını aramaktadırlar. Ulkeler hep “daha iyi olanın” peşinden giderken ve bu doğrultuda adımlar atarken, “ötekilerin” aynı şeyi yapmasına kısıtlamaya çalışmışlardır. Ötekileri sınırın diğer tarafında tutmak suretiyle ülke topraklarını kendi vatandaşlarına dönüştürmek için duvarlar inşa edilmiş ya da savaşlar yapılmıştır. “Öteki”nin tanımlı ise dönemden dönemye ya da bölgenin bölüge değişiklik göstermeye devam etmiştir. Bir yandan evrensel ve bölgesel normlar ve değerler tartışılırken, bir yandan da spesifik ve marjinal tedbirler düşünülmektedir. Hıristiyan Românın mirasçısı olan Avrupa’nın “kimlik” ve “öteki” algısı; Doğu ve Batı Roma topraklarında
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Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Politika, Göçmen Politikası, Doğu Avrupa, Göç, Tarih, Din, Kimlik, Suriyeli.

INTRODUCTION

Human beings have always been on the move since they existed. Though its form and purpose might change in due course, the mobility itself has been remaining as one of the most specific characteristics of human. Since the beginning of history; communities have been searching for the “better” in most areas, while, on the other hand, trying to restrict the “others” to do the same. Walls have been erected or wars have been made to keep the territories safe for the inhabitants by keeping the others on the other side of the borders. However, the definition of the “others” has continually changed from region to region and from time to time.

Though, in Europe, the definition of the “others” more or less has remained as it was for centuries. One of the most important motives for the formation of the political and geographical map of Europe is the phenomenon of religion. Since the Roman Empire adopted Christianity as the official religion of the state in the 4th century, none of the other religions has been able to find a ground to be expanded in Europe. Invasions and threats, coming from the East which was seen as a common enemy for the Europeans -whether it is Seljuks (for the Eastern Rome), Andalusians or the Ottomans, and whether it is direct or indirect- caused great fear. The religious identities of these threats, against whom the Crusades or the Crusade-like wars held, were Islam; thus, Europeans very much linked the unwanted ones with Muslims. The religious motivation of the common enemy, therefore, helped the religious motivation to be increased against.

History, religion, sectarian differences, geopolitical and geostrategic substances are interrelated among the factors that determine the political reflexes of the countries. Though migration is not a new phenomenon, today,
it has been more sweeping than ever before. With the rise of globalization; especially after the Cold War, the feeling and action of migration to flee from conflicts, natural disasters, or economic problems in the search for better conditions increased. Correspondingly, the reaction towards migrants and refugees became more and more systematic with the changing conditions of the world. Strengthening borders and levelling up the security measures have turned into a policy which is established for the sake of protecting the nation and the nation-state. The concept of critical mass, which refers to “the size that something needs to reach before a particular change, event, or development can happen”¹ has been under discussion with reference to the migrants and refugees in parallel to these politics. Since uncontrolled waves of migration, reaching or surpassing the critical mass might demolish the demographic structure and social fabric of the target state, migration and refugee policies have started to be hotly debated both or maintain a venture from humanitarian and security nexus.

The year 2015 was a turning point in migration and refugee politics. After the Syrian crisis erupted in 2011, caused by the internal instability in Syria, millions of people replaced both within and beyond the country. According to UNHCR, with 4.9 million refugees, 6.6 million IDPs², and nearly 250,000 asylum-seekers, an estimated 11.7 million Syrians were displaced by end-2015, seeking protection within Syria or abroad³. Though the war in Syria had been going on for four years until then, the illegal immigration to Europe reached its peak in 2015. In October 2015, the monthly number of the refugees entering Europe, 218,394, was almost equivalent to the total that entered over the whole of 2014, and more than 50 per cent of these were Syrians⁴. While debates over the fairness of the Dublin Convention were going on, steps were taken by the founding members to co-operate with Turkey on Syrian refugees by signing a readmission agreement. Though this was highly adopted by Western Europe, most of the countries in Eastern Europe; including Estonia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Poland, preferred

¹ Cambridge Dictionary of English, “Critical mass”, 10 January 2020, https://www.dictionary.cambridge.org/tr/sözlük/ingilizce/critical-mass.
² Internally Displaced Persons
³ UNHCR, “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015”, date of access: 10 January 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf.
⁴ Tom Miles – Depetris Mariana, “October’s Migrant, Refugee Flow to Europe Roughly Matched Whole of 2014”, Reuters UK. November 2, 2015, date of access: 10 January 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-un/octobers-migrant-refugee-flow-to-europe-roughly-matched-whole-of-2014-idUSKCN0SR15P20151102.
to adopt a particular anti-refugee attitude, focusing on the Muslim origin of the Syrian immigrants.

In this article, the background of religio-centric refugee policies of the countries in Eastern Europe will be discussed within the framework of globalization and Islamophobia. Common features of these countries in both historical and regional aspects will be revealed from a descriptive analysis perspective and statements will be built on analytical data.

1. GLOBALIZATION AND MIGRATION

Although the migration phenomenon varies according to the causes of migration, considering the content of the article, the types of migration to be discussed here are forced, voluntary, legal, and illegal migrations. Voluntary migrations are mostly shaped around the ideas of increasing the living standards of individuals, while forced migration has occurred mostly as a result of incidents like wars, disasters, and exiles that individuals cannot control\(^5\). The realization of these migrations is possible by legal and illegal means. A person who enters into the other country by legal ways (with the permission of the authorities) and lives in that country within the framework of the law by leaving his/her country legally in accordance with his/her request -mostly for economic reasons- is called an immigrant. On the other hand, illegal immigrant can be defined as the individual’s living or working illegally on an ongoing basis in the country where s/he entered illegally\(^6\).

Migration, which can be defined as the geographical movement in its simplest form, has played a significant role in changing the order of the world since the earliest known periods. What makes people and their sense of belonging valuable and meaningful is their connection and relationship with the place they live. In this context, migration establishes a ground for the change and transformation of beliefs, thoughts, rules, and structures which are strongly related to human beings, especially to the individuals\(^7\). Within this point of view, while being fed by globalization in one sense, migration feeds globalization as well. Because, globalization is a historical process that began with the first movement of people out of Africa into other parts of the world since the earliest known periods. What makes people and their sense of belonging valuable and meaningful is their connection and relationship with the place they live. In this context, migration establishes a ground for the change and transformation of beliefs, thoughts, rules, and structures which are strongly related to human beings, especially to the individuals. Within this point of view, while being fed by globalization in one sense, migration feeds globalization as well.

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\(^5\) Robert Mcleman–François Gemenne, “Environmental Migration Research: Evolution and Current State of the Science”, Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration, eds. Robert Mcleman et al. (Routledge Int. Handbooks, 2018), 7.

\(^6\) IZA World of Labour, “Enforcement and Illegal Migration, 2014”, date of access: 15 January 2020, https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/81/pdfs/enforcement-and-illegal-migration.pdf.

\(^7\) Süleyman Ekici–Tuncel Gökhan, “Göç ve insan”, Birey ve Toplum Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 5/1 (2015): 9.
world while, in the meantime, delivering their ideas, customs, and products to new lands. Migration history, in this regard, is intensively integrated with the history of globalization. Yet, human mobility involves very complex and intangible elements when compared with the circulation of today’s commodities. Herewith; its long-term outputs and cost calculation are very much dynamic and far from definite estimation.

Though globalization history dates back to human history, owing to developments in many fields; specifically, technology, it accelerated in the 20th century, increased abruptly after the Cold War and reached a critical threshold in the 2000s. According to the International Organization of Migration data of 2019, there are 272 million international migrants globally who live in the countries they were not born or did not hold citizenship which corresponds approximately 3.5% to the world population. This rate, unfortunately and naturally, is not evenly distributed among countries. While migrants who are seeking better social and economic conditions prefer wealthy countries to move, migrants who try to save their lives in the first place usually prefer neighbouring safe countries -which might turn into transit countries in later stages. Especially after the refugee crisis, caused by the Syrian civil war, migration became one of the forthcoming issues throughout the world. The flocks of people, who came suddenly and unexpectedly in a very short period of time, brought with the need of all previous international contracts and conventions on migration to be reviewed.

As migration has many social, financial, cultural, and environmental aspects and effects; it is quite typical to approach the migrant-receiving issue with suspicion for most of the states and their citizens. One of the significant aspects of migration is the movement of culture and its constituents that arrive at the hosting states along with the migrants. With the help of globalization, the flow of culture is now much more facilitated. Migrants -typically the forced ones- prefers in general to preserve their identities on the territories they move to. Keeping close links with the other members of the same identity in the hosting state makes it possible to turn this situation to a threat for the hosting communities who are in quest of conserving the dominant identity.

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8 Yaleglobal, “History of Globalization”, date of access: 16 January 2020, https://www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/history-globalization.
9 IOM, “World Migration Report 2020. International Organization for Migration”, date of access: 15 January 2020, https://www.publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2020-chapter-2.
Though multiculturalism is supported by a great mass; still, the protection of the possessed cultural values is of the same size importance.

2. HISTORICAL LEGACY OF THE EU AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

One of the most important motives for the formation of the political and geographical map of Europe is the phenomenon of religion. Since the Roman Empire adopted Christianity as the official religion of the state in the 4th century, none of the other religions has been able to find a ground to be expanded as Christianity does in Europe. When Western Rome collapsed and turned into a fragmented structure, the Frankish Empire, dominating present-day northern France, Belgium, and western Germany, established the most powerful Christian kingdom of early medieval western Europe\(^{10}\). Though Easter Rome was also Christian, there was a sectarian differentiation between them. The East–West Schism, also called the Great Schism of 1054, was the break of communion between what is now the Roman Catholic Church and Eastern Orthodox Churches, which has lasted since the 11th century\(^{11}\). With this break, the Vatican had the opportunity to dispatch and rule Western Europe -the previous hinterland of Western Rome- through religion. Though this controversy between the Orthodox East and the Catholic West is very much suitable for politicization, the fact that the Seljuks were strongly suppressing the Eastern Rome while the Andalusian State were advancing into the interior of today’s France, the upper identity of Christianity helped the Europeans to unite against the common enemy. The identity of the common enemy -or the “others”- was then identified as Islam and Muslims. The religious motivation of the common enemy, therefore, helped the religious motivation to be increased against. The spirit of the Crusades was constructed under these circumstances. The ultimate goal of the Crusades, coordinated by the leadership of the Vatican, composed of many European states and the feudal and targeted the holy lands of Jerusalem, took a dominant role in shaping the European identity.

With the retreat of the Seljuks from the scene of the history by handing over its place to Ottomans, the threat continued exponentially for Europe. That the Ottoman State took Europe and especially the Balkans as the target of expansion led the European reunification. The religious identity of the

\(^{10}\) Britannica, “Frank People”, date of access: 19 January 2020, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Frank-people.

\(^{11}\) Frank Leslie Cross – Elizabeth Anne Livingstone, “Great Schism”, Oxford Dictionary of the Great Church, (Oxford University Press, 2005), 239.
threat was again Islam. The battles of First and Second Kosovo, Nicopolis, and Varna were all offensive moves aiming at defending against the “danger”. Just like the Crusades, these wars happened under the morale and intense religious motivation of the clergy. The only reason why these wars are not called Crusades is that their ultimate goal was not Jerusalem. Yet, they were aiming to stop the Ottomans, saving the occupied Christian geography and the people in captivity who were mostly Orthodox. The Ottoman’s seizure of Istanbul and the aftermath expansion in the Balkans and construction of permanent fortifications left lasting traumatic effects to Europe. The identity formation process, caused by harsh and hurtful blows, was heavily influenced by a classification and categorization approach that takes danger as a benchmark. The first category was composed of occupied and lost lands including today’s Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and the Balkans and their people in captivity who were religious brothers -though being Orthodox-; the second category was the buffer lands of today’s Austria, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Italy; and the third category was the land of Western Europe who was insecure while commiserating with the occupied lands, supporting and fortifying the buffer lands. This emerging picture forced the people of Europe, under or feeling the threat of the Seljuks or the Andalus or the Ottoman, to develop a sight from the perspective of religion and name the threats as Muslims. Therefore; any kind of threat coming from the East, still, is very much linked with the historical experiences.

In time, with the collapse of the Ottoman State and the elimination of the threat coming from the East, national identities and sectarian differences started to revive within Europe. During the First and the Second World War and specifically the Cold War, ideological disintegration became more evident. The ideological dissociation of Europe for more than 40 years during the Cold War left many damages behind in most ways. During the years of the Cold War between 1947 and 1991, while Western countries in Europe were laying the foundations of economic unity, Eastern countries were being overwhelmed by the communist regime under restricted economic conditions. Having been under communist pressure for so many years, the fall of the Berlin Wall opened a clear way leading to the collapse of the USSR. The fall of the wall and the end of the Cold War was regarded, in one way, as the fall of ideological conflicts, because it was thought that international co-operation and better relations would be possible when ideological disagreements
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finished\textsuperscript{12}. Though the co-operation opportunities of the EU were primarily based on the essence of sharing the European continent’s territories rather than the dissolution of ideological divergences in the foundation phase of the Union, the economic situations of the founding countries were more or less similar. For these reasons, it was not difficult to determine the founding principles and there were no sharp differences of opinion and the way of political applications. As the Union expanded within the European continent the backwardness of the East started to show up, specifically when essential values of the union are to be tested. Of course, there were several issues with the integration of the ‘Eastern Bloc’ states, not least the economic implications; Western Europe was flourishing in a new and more open market of free trade, whilst the Eastern states remained ‘Stalin-esque’ industrial nations\textsuperscript{13}. Their industry in the East was monotype and far from catching up with the modern technology of that period. Hence; many required serious investment to bring them up to Western standards and some would need ‘propping up’ with Western funds; yet, the idea of free movement between European nations made this more difficult as many of the fit and capable workers in the East sought to emigrate to richer states\textsuperscript{14}. This occasion explains the political stances and discourses of the Eastern countries towards migrants on several accounts. However, the division of the West and East Europe is not only seen in the economic field. In the post-Cold War period, it became more obvious that the effects of the communist regime had been more devastating than it was thought. While the West had already started focusing on the elements like democracy, respect of human rights, pluralism, non-discrimination, and tolerance, the East was putting up a fight for liberty. The gap between the West and the East had widened during the years of War. Therefore, it would not be easy for the Eastern countries of the EU, who became a member of the Union after the 2000s, to close this gap immediately in the first place. In spite of the fact that they all share some common historical or cultural links, the East had a lot to overcome in many aspects, from economy to ideology and from abstract values of pluralism to non-discrimination.

\textsuperscript{12} Mustafa Büyükgebiz, “How the Enemy Has Changed: Islamophobia and post-9/11 Syndrome in John Le Carre’s Novel: A Most Wanted Man”, Pamukkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 25 (2016): 228-235.

\textsuperscript{13} Ben Bradley, “European Unity in the Post-Cold War Era”, 2012, date of access: 10 January 2020, https://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/22/the-cold-war-may-have-ended-but-europe-is-still-just-as-divided/.

\textsuperscript{14} Bradley, Ben. “European Unity in the Post-Cold War Era”.
Soon after the end of the Cold War; countries, who were once a member of the Warsaw Pact or who broke away from Russia and gained their independence, turned into countries of producing immigrants towards the West for various reasons, especially for economic reasons. This process of migration is remarkable just because migrants were composed of qualified people. It should be noted that countries that produce migrants, for whatever reason and in any way, are paradoxically not open up to receive migrants. Their economic realities support this attitude in most ways because their level of economic welfare is -or the perception is- far below the limits of sharing. If this attitude reaches to radical heights, nation consciousness becomes traumatic and causes sceptical complications. Because religion plays one of the most important roles in gaining awareness of being a nation. The reason for the continuing increase in religious sensitivity in Eastern European countries after the Cold War lies beneath this reality. The “others” are kept a tight grip with an urge to protect the country’s existence and the nation. In other words, historical memories of countries in Eastern Europe, who had been occupied throughout their history and have just emerged from the Cold War, turn into historical barriers for the migrants.

Historical legacy is a prominent element in constructing the identities of the nations. The identity of the EU is mostly constructed on the historical links which include common identity and values. Beyond the aspect of security, the question of the borders introduces the aspect of identity: that which connects the nations within the EU together is also what distinguishes them on the outside, and the distinction between “a within” and “from without” is constitutive of a sense of identity\(^\text{15}\).

3. THE GREAT WAVE OF MIGRATION TOWARDS EUROPE

When the Syrian internal disorder outbroke in 2011, the general reaction of the EU countries was mostly political rather than social. The biggest problem might have been that it was unpredictable that the migrant crisis would grow so much in such a short time and millions of people would be displaced. Since the very beginning every following year after the crisis, increasing numbers of people were displaced both within and beyond the borders of Syria. But 2015 was a significant milestone in terms of the course of the Syrian crisis.

\(^{15}\) The Research and Studies Centre on Europe, European, 466 (2018), “Europe and the Identity Challenge: Who We Are?”, date of access: 16 January 2020, https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0466-europe-and-the-identity-challenge-who-are-we.
Russia intervened for the first time to Syria in that year and along with this intervention, the attempts of the international radical terrorist organizations to fill the emerging authority gap in Syria made the already unsafe land of Syria even more insecure. While the number of Syrians in Turkey was only 14,237 in 2012, it became 1,519,286 in 2014 and reached to 2,503,549 in 2015\textsuperscript{16}. Turkey, hosting the biggest number of Syrians, turned into a transit country as well. The Syrians, looking for better economic and social opportunities, started to try illegal migration routes to arrive in Europe. The number of illegal border crossings reached its peak in 2015 leaving hundreds of thousands of dead bodies in the seas.

![Figure 1. Monthly Average Number of Detections of Illegal Border Crossings in the EU\textsuperscript{17}.](image)

Though being the main force, the Syrian crisis was not the only reason in the rise of the migration flow to Europe and the Syrians were not the only group to migrate. In 2015, record numbers of people left their homes and fled to Europe due to the rise of ISIS, the Syrian civil war, and instability in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and elsewhere as a result of which more than 2 million people requested asylum within the EU between 2015 and 2016\textsuperscript{18}.

\textsuperscript{16} DGMM, Directorate General of Migration Management, Ministry of Interior, 2020, “İstatistikler”, date of access: 19 January 2020, https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638.

\textsuperscript{17} European Parliament, 2015, “Recent Migration Flows to the EU”, date of access: 21 January 2020, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-AaG-565905-Recent-Migration-flows-to-the-EU-FINAL.pdf.

\textsuperscript{18} Annabelle Timsit, “Things Could Get Very Ugly Following Europe’s Refugee Crisis”, date of access: 19 January 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/qa-sasha-polakow-suransky-immigration-europe/543537/.
Since the refugee crisis began, the European Union has spent millions discouraging people from making the journey, funding and supporting countries that have become main points of entry, and speeding up the return of people to their countries of origin. But these measures remained at a relatively minor level, did not stop or decrease the flow of the migrants towards Europe, on the contrary, the increase in the number of the migrants caused separations within Europe. Indeed, the policy challenges associated with the management of the European Union’s external borders and asylum responsibilities date back to the establishment of the Schengen System and its corollary, the Dublin Regulation. The Regulation entered into force on January 1, 2014 setting down the criteria and the mechanisms of determination of the member state in the change of examining the request of international protection presented by a third-country national or by a stateless person in one

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19 IOM, International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Available Data and Information”, date of access: 19 January 2020, https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/Mixed-Flows-Mediterranean-and-Beyond-Compilation-Overview-2015.pdf.

20 Priyanka Boghani, “The Human Cost of the EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis”, date of access: 19 January 2020, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-human-cost-of-the-eus-response-to-the-refugee-crisis/.

21 Elizabeth Collett–Le Coz Camille, “After the Storm: Learning from the EU Response to the Migration Crisis”, Migration Policy Institute Europe 2018.
of the European states\textsuperscript{22}. According to the Regulation, the illegal migrants are to be sent back to the first country in Europe where the migrants first arrived. When migration flow reached an uncontrollable point, it was understood that the Regulation was unacceptable for the first arrival countries, especially for Greece and Italy who were the target countries of illegal sea routes of migration.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3}
\caption{Monthly arrivals by countries of first arrival\textsuperscript{23}}
\end{figure}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Sea & Land & Total \\
\hline
\textbf{Greece} & 853,650 & 3,713 & 857,363 \\
\textbf{Bulgaria} & - & 31,174 & 31,174 \\
\textbf{Italy} & 153,842 & - & 153,842 \\
\textbf{Spain} & 3,845 & - & 3,845 \\
\textbf{Malta} & 106 & - & 106 \\
\textbf{Cyprus} & 269 & - & 269 \\
\hline
\textbf{TOTAL} & 1,011,712 & 34,887 & 1,046,599 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Total arrivals overview: countries of first arrival\textsuperscript{24}}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{22} Annapaola Ammirati, “What is the Dublin Regulation?”, date of access: 17 January 2020, 0https://www.openmigration.org/en/analyses/what-is-the-dublin-regulation/.
\textsuperscript{23} IOM, International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Available Data and Information.
\textsuperscript{24} IOM, International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Available Data and Information”.

As the figures above show, if the Regulation had been fully applied, the burden-sharing would not have been equal among the EU countries. When the flow of migrants turned into a crisis and when it was understood that the previously signed conventions, significantly Dublin Regulation, did not work, it was time for Europe to take more strict measures and implement more consistent policies for stopping the influx before it reaches to European territories. In March 2016, controversial deal with Turkey was stricken, one of the main transit hubs along the eastern Mediterranean route, particularly for those fleeing war-torn Syria and according to the deal anyone -refugee or migrant- who tried to cross from Turkey to Greece outside of proper channels would be sent back and for every Syrian sent back to Turkey, the EU would accept one refugee25. The aim of this deal was, in general, shifting the crisis out of the EU borders by sharing the cost, at least supposedly. During the negotiations and even after the signal of the deal, despite a sharp decrease in the number of the illegal border crosses, another problem aroused within the members of the EU. It is possible to claim that the migrant crisis had a triggering effect on the historical sensibilities and fears towards “others”, and, as the cases below well support, soon, initiated discussions over the European identity.

4. BREAKUP IN THE EU: ANTI-REFUGEE ATTITUDES OF THE EASTERN EUROPE

It is known that the migration issue not a new phenomenon for Europe. Throughout its history, all parts of Europe, including Eastern Europe, have been the lands of both emigration and immigration. Especially after the Cold War, citizens of the European countries immigrated to different countries within Europe. However, with the migration influx after the 2010s triggered mostly by the Syrian civil war and the political instability in the Middle East, the Muslim identity of the migrants became more visible due to their growing numbers. This situation, in a very short time, activated the historical reflexes and migrants are connected with their religious identities.

In the wake of the migrant crisis in 2015, deep contradictions have arisen, both internally within individual countries and between EU countries, and there is major disagreement on how to handle the increased influx of refugees and migrants; with strong opposition to receiving refugees in particularly

25 Priyanka Boghani, “The Human Cost of the EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis”.

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Hitit Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 19, Sayı: 1
Eastern European countries\textsuperscript{26}. Eastern Europe adopts a sharper political discourse in rejecting migrant-friendly policies, and, though the style of the discourses differs from West to East, it is understood from the results of the elections throughout Europe that the perception towards migrants is more or less the same. In many Western European countries, resistance to immigration has also increased, and political parties critical of immigration have grown in popularity\textsuperscript{27}. Throughout Europe, nearly every major right-wing populist party emphasizes cultural and religious objections to Muslim immigration\textsuperscript{28}. The effects of this discourse are seen in a wave of elections that saw far-right parties -in France, the Netherlands, Germany, Hungary, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Italy- make gains in parliaments and join governing coalitions with mainstream parties\textsuperscript{29}. After the European Parliament elections, the National Rally (Rassemblement National) became France’s largest party, and in both Italy and Austria strongly immigration-critical parties are part of the government coalition\textsuperscript{30}. According to European Islamophobia Report, Europe’s average public opposition to further migration from predominantly Muslim states is 55\%, ranging from 41\% in Spain to 71\% in Poland.\textsuperscript{31}

In spite of the consensus of politicians and the approach of the citizens are generally very much similar in practice, the political discourse of the West and the East differs. This might be due to the integration process of the East resulting from the effects of the Cold War which left them more than 40 years back. As the political culture of Western Europe is more settled, while they prefer more abstract ways; Eastern Europe, who still needs years to interiorize the European norms, does not seem to hesitate to prefer a more direct and offending language. When we look at the dates that they became a member of the EU, we see that all of them became members of the EU in 2004 or 2007 which supports the idea that the selected political discourse might be

\textsuperscript{26} Eirik Christophersen, “Hour of Reckoning for European Refugee Policy”, date of access: 19 January 2020, https://www.nrc.no/shorthand/fr/hour-of-reckoning-for-european-refugee-policy/index.html.

\textsuperscript{27} Eirik Christophersen, “Hour of Reckoning for European Refugee Policy”.

\textsuperscript{28} Shadi Hamid, “The Role of Islam in European Populism: How Refugee Flows and Fear of Muslims Drive Right-Wing Support”, date of access: 19 January 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-role-of-islam-in-european-populism-how-refugee-flows-and-fear-of-muslims-drive-right-wing-support/.

\textsuperscript{29} Annabelle Timsit, “Things Could Get Very Ugly Following Europe’s Refugee Crisis”.

\textsuperscript{30} Eirik Christophersen, “Hour of Reckoning for European Refugee Policy”.

\textsuperscript{31} EIR, European Islamophobia Report 2016, eds. Enes Bayraklı, Farid Hafez (Ankara: Seta Yayınları, 2017), 6.
a matter of interiorizing the EU norms. We will shortly analyse the attitudes of some of these Eastern European countries -Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Slovenia- towards migrants after the refugee crisis of 2015.

4.1. Hungary

Over the course of 2015, a total of 411,515 migrants and asylum seekers were registered arriving in Hungary and during September it reached its peak\textsuperscript{32}. During the same month of 2015, a refugee child, who was running at the borders of Hungary with his father was tripped up by a Hungarian journalist which in a very short time became one of the heart-breaking symbols of the refugee crisis.

Hungary is one of the countries that fortified its borders during this process. Along with the declaration of “emergency situation caused by mass immigration” and deploying troops to the southern border, during 2015, the government completed the fence along the Serbian border, finished the fence along with the Croatian border control with regard to Slovenia and declared that -if needed- it was ready to extend the fence towards Romanian border\textsuperscript{33}. In Hungary, where climbing through the fence or damaging it became a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment, the Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, calling the migrants a “poison”, boasted that the borders were “hermetically sealed”\textsuperscript{34}. Viktor Orban, presents himself as the protector of Christian Europe and is particularly critical of accepting Muslim refugees\textsuperscript{35}. He stated that most refugees come to Europe not because they are fleeing dangerous conditions at home but because they want to take the advantage of economic opportunities, as such, they shouldn’t be considered “refugees” so much as “Muslim invaders”\textsuperscript{36}. This discourse found and finds a ground in the public in Hungary. Muslim refugees were a central campaign issue in the 2018 Hungarian elections and Prime Minister Viktor Orban of the Fidesz Party expanded his support by gaining half a million new voters since the

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\item[32] IOM, International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Available Data and Information.”
\item[33] IOM, International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Available Data and Information.”
\item[34] Shara Tibken –E. Solsman Joan, “For Refugees on Hungary’s Border, Razor Wire Trumps Tech”, date of access: 19 January 2020, https://www.cnet.com/news/for-refugees-on-hungary-serbia-border-razor-fence-wire-trumps-tech/.
\item[35] Eirik Christophersen, “Hour of Reckoning for European Refugee Policy”.
\item[36] Bild, “Victor Orban: Hungary Doesn’t Want Muslim Invaders”, date of access: 21 January 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-hungary-doesnt-want-muslim-invaders/.
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previous election. According to the findings of the Eurobarometer poll in 2018, Hungary is an extreme case in terms of the intensity of anti-Muslim feeling.

4.2. Bulgaria

During 2015, Bulgarian authorities apprehended a total of 31,174 migrants entering, exiting, and within the country. Though this number does not seem too high when compared with other European countries, Bulgaria is one of the countries carrying out a policy against migrants of different religions. The government established the National Council for Migration and Integration; while, on the other hand, amending the Law of Public Procurement in the Parliament for construction of the fence on the Bulgarian-Turkish border and deploying the units of the gendarmerie directorate to assist the border police in guarding the country’s frontier with Turkey. During the debates on the refugee crisis, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov focused on the demographic balance and declared “if more Muslims came from abroad, the demographic structure of their country might be at risk of radical change.” In another speech, he said that his country has “nothing against Muslims,” but that accepting Muslim refugees might tilt the country’s religious make-up, which is then 60% Orthodox Christian and 8% Muslim.

Though Bulgaria is hosting a big percentage of Muslim minority when compared with other European countries, it is ordinary to witness hate speeches from the bottom of the community to top of the political level. In 2015, Bulgaria was criticized by various international organizations for its failure to adequately investigate and prosecute hate crimes and tackle prejudice against

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37 Peter Kreko – Enyedi Zsolt, “Orban’s Laboratory of Illiberalism”, Journal of Democracy 29/3 (2018):39-51.
38 European Commission, “Special Eurobarometer 469: Integration of Immigrants in the European Union”, 2018, date of access: 21 January 2020, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/special/surveyky/2169.
39 IOM, International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Available Data and Information.”
40 IOM, International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Available Data and Information.”
41 Veselin Zhelev, “Migration Threatens Demographic Balance says Bulgarian PM”, date of access: 21 January 2020, https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/128450.
42 Cassie Werber, “These European Countries Are Willing to Accept Some Migrants – But Only If They Are Christian”, date of access: 21 January 2020, https://qz.com/490973/these-european-countries-are-willing-to-accept-some-syrian-migrants-but-only-if-theyre-christian/.
asylum seekers, migrants, Muslims, Roma, and LGBT people\textsuperscript{43}. During the election campaign in March 2017, the extreme nationalist coalition parties blockaded the Turkish-Bulgarian borders and prevented thousands of people of Turkish-Muslim origin to enter Bulgaria in order to practice their right to vote and the newly elected parliament, especially the extreme nationalists, proposed discriminative amendments to the Penal Code to criminalize Islam in the country\textsuperscript{44}.

4.3. Estonia
Comparing the numbers with the other Member States, with 226 applications, it is clear that Estonia is amongst the bottom of the list when it comes to the number of received asylum applications in 2015; though one of the extremist approaches was carried out by Estonia during the crisis. Refugees and the mandatory quotas of the EU are perceived to have a very negative impact on the society of Estonia as a whole, some even associate it as a threat to their own security\textsuperscript{45}.

During the years of the refugee crisis, the discourses of the representatives of the government were far from welcoming and tolerant. Social Policy Minister of Estonia, Margus Tsahkna, told that they, eventually, belonged to the Christian culture, so they were “closed to Muslim refugees” and he would prefer to give Syrian Christians a priority, should Estonia have an opportunity to choose whom to resettle there\textsuperscript{46}. This political discourse was adopted by the upmost level of the government as well. The Prime Minister Taavi Roivas admitted that although Estonia has a long experience with Russian-speaking immigrants, integrating asylum seekers from Africa and the Middle East is an “enormous task” for the country, which is why the government stood against the EU’s initial quota plan\textsuperscript{47}.

4.4. Czech Republic
Along with Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland; Czech Republic was also critical and against the EU decision of compulsory refugee relocation quota

\textsuperscript{43} BTI, “Bulgaria Country Report”, date of access: 21 January 2020, https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/BGR/.
\textsuperscript{44} EIR, \textit{European Islamophobia Report 2017}, eds. Enes Bayraklı, Farid Hafez (Ankara: Seta Yayınları, 2018), 130.
\textsuperscript{45} Liis Luuk, “Migration Crisis in the EU: A New Threat for Estonia?” (Master’s Thesis, Tallinn University of Technology, 2016), 47.
\textsuperscript{46} ERR News, “Rõivas: Refugees will be resettled across Estonia”, date of access: 21 January 2020, https://news.err.ee/116210/roivas-refugees-will-be-resettled-across-estonia.
\textsuperscript{47} ERR News, “Rõivas: Refugees will be resettled across Estonia.”
system and openly expressed its preference for Christian migrants. Czech President Milos Zeman declared that “refugees coming from a completely different culture in the background could not be in a good position in their country” and called Muslim immigrants as “potential terrorists”\(^ {48}\). From the beginning of the refugee crisis, President Zeman became a symbol of defiant anti-Muslim, anti-refugee, racist, and xenophobic rhetoric and it is not a coincidence that on the anniversary of the 1989 Czechoslovak Velvet Revolution in November 2015, Zeman sang the Czech national anthem on stage with an extremist anti-Islamic activist who demanded that gas chambers and concentration camps be set up for Muslims\(^ {49}\).

It is not surprising that Zeman’s political party won the following Presidency elections when we consider the general public opinion of the Czech. According to a 2015 opinion poll 72.3% of Czechs like Zeman for his anti-refugee statements and in September 2015, 69% of Czech citizens were against accepting refugees and migrants from the Middle East and Africa\(^ {50}\). Another rising party in the Czech Republic is Tomio Okamura’s, the anti-Islam and Eurosceptic leader of the Czech Republic’s Freedom and Direct Democracy party, which came fourth in parliamentary elections in October 2017 with the slogan of “No to Islam, No to Terrorism”\(^ {51}\).

### 4.5. Slovakia

Just after the refugee crisis in Europe Interior Minister of Slovakia declared; “In Slovakia, we have a really tiny community of Muslim people. We even do not have mosques. That’s the reason we want to choose people who really want to start a new life in Slovakia. And Slovakia, as a Christian country, can really help Christians from Syria to find a new home in Slovakia”\(^ {52}\). As being on the extreme side of religio-centric and ethno-centric policies, though being the home of migrants from near geography, Slovakia has been deadly against the migrants, specifically the Muslim ones.

\(^{48}\) Cassie Werber, “These European Countries Are Willing to Accept Some Migrants – But Only If They Are Christian”.

\(^{49}\) EuropeNow, “Why is the Czech Republic So Hostile to Muslims and Refugees?”, date of access: 21 January 2020, https://www.europenowjournal.org/2017/02/09/why-is-the-czech-republic-so-hostile-to-muslims-and-refugees/.

\(^{50}\) EuropeNow, “Why is the Czech Republic So Hostile to Muslims and Refugees?”.

\(^{51}\) EIR, European Islamophobia Report 2017, 162.

\(^{52}\) Andrew Rettman, “EU States Favour Christian Migrants from Middle East”, date of access: 20 January 2020, https://euobserver.com/justice/129938.
Political parties in Eastern Europe have a historical predisposition towards ethno-nationalism, which effects the discursive strategies adopted by competing political parties, and it is no surprise that this is what occurred in Slovakia\(^{53}\). While far-right Slovak National Party (SNS), a previous Fico coalition partner, took 15 seats in the elections held in 2016, the neo-Nazi People’s Party Our Slovakia (LSNS) entered to the parliament for the first time with 14 seats\(^{54}\). At the level of attitudes, behaviours, the media, and political context, the 2016 campaign should have focused on the economy, tackling corruption, and providing an opportunity for the incumbent political party and prime minister to remain in power; instead, it was dominated by the so-called refugee crisis and various political parties spoke on this issue, often revealing negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims\(^{55}\). It is not a hidden fact that the discourse of the politicians is generally shaped by the expectations of the voters. According to the European Commission’s Public Opinion Researches, Islamophobia is at its strongest in the EU in Central Europe and especially in Slovakia\(^{56}\).

### 4.6. Poland

The Polish response to the crisis that escalated across Europe in 2015, banning refugees from crossing its borders, has been one of the least welcomings in Europe\(^{57}\). Just after the crisis in 2015, the Polish Prime Minister, Ewa Kopacz, said that Poland, “as a Christian country”, has a special responsibility to help Christians and that “they would only choose Christian Syrians”\(^{58}\). In 2016, the coming Prime Minister of Poland, Beata Szydlo, continued the discriminative approach of his predecessor and declared that his country would accept Christian refugees from Syria rather than Muslims, implying that the latter are potential threats\(^{59}\).

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\(^{53}\) Aaron Walter, “Islamophobia in Eastern Europe: Slovakia and the Politics of Hate”, *A Journal for Historians and Area Specialists*, date of access: 21 January 2020, https://www.connections.clio-online.net/article/id/artikel-4705.

\(^{54}\) Global Security, “Slovak Republic – Political Parties”, 2020, date of access: 21 January 2020, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/sk-political-parties.htm.

\(^{55}\) Aaron Walter, “Islamophobia in Eastern Europe: Slovakia and the Politics of Hate”.

\(^{56}\) Aaron Walter, “Islamophobia in Eastern Europe: Slovakia and the Politics of Hate”.

\(^{57}\) Kasia Narkowicz, “Refugees Not Welcome Here: State, Church and Civil Society Responses to the Refugee Crisis in Poland”, *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 31 (2018): 357-373.

\(^{58}\) Rettman, “EU States Favour Christian Migrants from Middle East”.

\(^{59}\) Przemyslaw Osiewicz, “Europe’s Islamophobia and the Refugee Crisis”, date of access: 20 January 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/europes-islamophobia-and-refugee-crisis.
The radical discourses of the politicians are well supported by the Polish community. According to a survey by the Polish Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS), Poles are the biggest Europhiles in the EU, and yet the clear majority would rather lose EU funds than accept Muslim refugees as part of relocation processes. Pol. Osiewicz, “Europe’s Islamophobia and the Refugee Crisis”. The Polish response to the refugee crisis should, therefore, be analysed as a subtext to a broader political change in the country towards nationalism that has as its goals to push out all foreign “invasion”. Pol. Kasia Narkowicz, “Refugees Not Welcome Here: State, Church and Civil Society Responses to the Refugee Crisis in Poland”, 357-373. When we go through the details of the mentioned survey we see that at least 31% of the respondents said they believe refugees intend to “Islamize Europe” and 23% perceive them as potential terrorists; what is more, the average Polish citizen believes that Muslims constitute more than 7% of society, while in reality, Muslims make up less 0,1% of the population; 70 times less than the perceived number.

5. SLOVENIA

From the start of the crisis on 16 October 2015 to the end of the year, 378,604 migrants and asylum seekers were registered to enter Slovenia who faced its first large influx of migrants. IOM, International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Available Data and Information.” It was literally chaos for both Slovenia and its neighbours who were struggling with the same issue. In October, Hungary closed its border with Croatia with a razor-wire fence, and Croatia began directing migrants westward towards Slovenia in response to which Slovenia began erecting a razor-wire fence on its border with Croatia to control the influx of migrants. IOM, International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Available Data and Information.” It is symptomatic that in October 2015 the Slovenian Ministry for Foreign Affairs strongly protested against the Hungarian intention of installing barbed wire at borders, saying that this is reminiscent of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain, but, ironically, only a month later Slovenia found itself buying the same wire fences from Hungary and installing them at the eastern and southern borders of Croatia.

On 21 October, when the highest number of migrants entering Slovenia in one day reached to 12,616 persons, the Parliament amended the Defence

60 Osiewicz, “Europe’s Islamophobia and the Refugee Crisis”.
61 Kasia Narkowicz, “Refugees Not Welcome Here: State, Church and Civil Society Responses to the Refugee Crisis in Poland”, 357-373.
62 Osiewicz, “Europe’s Islamophobia and the Refugee Crisis”.
63 IOM, International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Available Data and Information.”
64 IOM, International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Available Data and Information”.
65 Jernej Zupancic, “The European Refugee and Migrant Crisis and Slovenian Response”, European Journal of Geopolitics 4 (2016): 95-121.
Act granting the Armed Forces additional powers for border protection and security at reception and accommodation centers, to support to the Police. As Slovenia is a typical transit country and officially first “Schengen” border country; despite the high number of immigrants who crossed Slovenian borders, relatively small there really remain. Yet, In Slovenia right-wing politicians and radical groups, who are very active on social media and through the organization of public events and protests, overtly and explicitly display Islamophobic discourses. Adapting practice from other countries, since online platforms transgress national borders, also in Slovenia racist anti-immigrant visual images and short populist slogans spread like wildfire and a growing number of people across the demographic spectrum suddenly began posting calls for the annihilation of all migrants, musing about Hitler being right, and resolving that this is the only way to protect the Western Christian civilisation, Slovenia, the Slovenian nation.

CONCLUSION

Today, there are many different, independent, and interrelated factors that shape a country’s migrant policies from economic to cultural and social dynamics. However, migration policies of the states, on the other hand, are drawn according to the global and specifically regional occasions and in close connection with the historical and cultural links of that state as well. When the mass migration waves of the last decade and the economic, political, and social reasons lying behind migration are considered; it is seen that migration producing countries are generally the geography of the Muslim-domination. After the Syrian crisis, with the peak of illegal migration towards Europe, the historical background of the societal memory again returned to the stage. With the blistering critical approach of Eastern Europe for the Muslim migrants, once more it is seen that history, religion, sectarian differences, geopolitical and geostrategic substances are interrelated among the factors that determine the political reflexes of the countries.

Though discrimination based on religion is specifically prohibited under European law—which is one of the reasons people fleeing sectarian conflicts...
in places like Syria seek asylum there in the first place\textsuperscript{70}; since 2015, negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims have been very common in certain Eastern European countries and have led to political demands that are incompatible with the democratic requirement of religious freedom and EU anti-discrimination laws\textsuperscript{71}. Especially after harsh and offending discourses of the representatives of the states against Muslim migrants, it is understood that it was not only an anti-migrant policy; instead, it was mostly religio-centric migrant policy. Their stance well showed that the migration issue is not handled on the basis of a humanitarian issue. Nor it was completely a matter of population or cost, it was more than these: religion and culture. The reason why in the preamble of the Treaty on European Union the term of “area” is preferred instead of “territory” is that territory refers to a geographic piece of land; however, area is beyond that, beside geographic facts it also refers to cultural and religious inheritance of Europe.

For a country, who receives and produces migrants within the European territory, calling the Muslim migrants as “invaders” could well be explained with the fears coming from the past. The roots of today’s religio-centric politics date back to centuries before. Being ruled by the Ottomans -whose identity is coded as Muslim- and having lived under the communist regime for decades made them attached to religion in most ways. Developing a religious resistance against a religious threat and attaching to religion after being kept far from religion during the Cold War had a traumatic effect on the perception of threat on the East. The small and the middle-sized Central European nations have never been able to rid themselves of their fear that they could be annihilated or that their national community could cease to exist\textsuperscript{72}.

The increased migration of Muslims against the background of globalization and conflicts in the Middle East, and the threat perceived by the Christian or non-religious majority population, highlights how the peaceful coexistence of people of different cultures and religions in danger\textsuperscript{73}. It would not be wrong to claim that there is a parallelism between anti-Islam and anti-West discourses. The more otherised the people are, the more radicalized they become in time. Policies that respect human rights, justice, and accountability,

\textsuperscript{70} Werber, “These European Countries Are Willing to Accept Some Migrants – But Only If They Are Christian”.

\textsuperscript{71} Aaron Walter, “Islamophobia in Eastern Europe: Slovakia and the Politics of Hate”.

\textsuperscript{72} EuropeNow, “Why is the Czech Republic So Hostile to Muslims and Refugees?”.

\textsuperscript{73} Aaron Walter, “Islamophobia in Eastern Europe: Slovakia and the Politics of Hate”.
and that manifest the values on which democracy is founded, are an essential element of effective counterterrorism policies\textsuperscript{74}. During the age of global migration, for the future safety of the communities, migration policies should be carried out from humanitarian and security perspectives; not according to the religious or ethnic backgrounds of the immigrants. Human rights, multiculturalism, respect to the differences are not just definitions written on the conventions; but the universal values of humanity to be inherited by future generations and adopted by successor governments.

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\textsuperscript{74} Ben Emmerson, “Perception that Refugees are more Prone to Radicalization Wrong and Dangerous”, Special Rapporteur on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism – UN Rights Expert, UN News, (24 October 2016).
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