Toward Agent-based Modeling of the U.S. Department of Defense Acquisition System

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Abstract

The systems development, procurement and sustainment of a nation’s military equipment is vital to its national interests, but the process is complex, constantly changing and highly adaptive, as well as time consuming and costly. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) expends both large amounts of capital and manpower to equip its armed forces. This research seeks to identify opportunities to gain better insight into the functioning of the defense acquisition system, building on previous simulations. A case is made that the DoD Requirements, Planning Acquisition, Technology and Logistics System is a complex adaptive system that has characteristics appropriate for exploration with agent-based modeling. This paper reviews relevant literature, existing models and presents preliminary analysis on an agent-based simulation of the DoD acquisition system. This research finds that agent-based modeling can provide insights to inform new acquisition theory.

Keywords: Agent-based modeling (ABM), Complex Adaptive Systems, Modeling and Simulation, Defense Acquisitions

1. Introduction

This paper considers simulation of the U.S. system for identifying, funding, developing and fielding military weapon systems. Despite its obvious success in producing superior combat power, the system has been plagued for decades by cost and schedule overruns and, at times, performance shortcomings.1, 2 Dozens of major reform efforts,
and hundreds of organizational guidelines, policy and process changes, aimed at controlling overruns, have been proposed or implemented over the past six decades. Unfortunately, the changes made only marginal improvements.\footnote{1-10} Many experts continue to question why reforms were not more effective and what changes really should be made.\footnote{9} A 2011 report by one government panel claimed the existence of over three hundred reports and studies written on acquisition reform since the mid 1980’s alone.\footnote{11} Despite the large number of government reports and studies, there remains a lack of scholarly research on the theoretical underpinnings of the system.\footnote{12, 13} This paper postulates that considering the complexity of the system will lend some new insights to inform military procurement theory. Developments in Systems Theory and Complexity Science may provide a useful set of tools to build a framework for characterizing the system as a whole and the relationship to its parts. This paper introduces a research methodology for examining the U.S. weapon procurement system as a complex adaptive system (CAS) and using agent-based modeling (ABM) to identify significant causal factors that contribute to the performance of the procurement system.

The U.S. weapon procurement system is an interesting subject of study for a number of reasons not least of which is the complexity due to its size and scope. U.S. military Research, Development, Testing and Engineering (RDT&E), Procurement, and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) consumed an average outlay of about $330 billion per year in FY 2015 constant year dollars from 1962 to 2014.\footnote{14} Figure 1 is a graph of these outlays during that period. In addition, according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as of the first quarter of 2014, the Defense Acquisition System directly employs over 135,000 government civilians and about 16,000 military members.\footnote{15} Defense contractors can employ a far greater number of people across the nation.\footnote{16}

![Figure 1](image1.png)

**Figure 1.** $Billions (FY 2015 Constant) in Defense Department Outlays. Data source is FY15 Green Book Table 6-11 \footnote{14}

The U.S. weapon procurement system can be thought of as a “meta-organization”\footnote{17, 18} formed by the integration of several autonomous and semi-autonomous organizations. To begin with, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) uses three separately led “decision-making support systems” to identify requirements, plan, budget, develop, acquire, test and field weapon systems. The three systems are the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS), Planning Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS).\footnote{19}

![Figure 2](image2.png)

**Figure 2.** Three decision systems are used to acquire US Defense weapon systems.
Taken together these three systems are known as Big “A” where “A” stands for acquisition. See Figure 2. It is called Big “A” to distinguish the aggregate from one of the component systems, the DAS which is sometimes referred to as little “a”. The Big “A” interfaces with two other organizations: the U.S. Congress, and a number of defense contractors to form an even more complex interconnected “meta-organization” which ultimately designs, produces and maintains equipment for U.S. military forces as described in Table 1. For the purpose of this paper, this entire meta-organizational system is referred as the “U.S. military procurement system” or simply “the system”. The complexity of the system frustrates predictive analysis and reform efforts.

Table 1: Participating organizations in the U.S. military procurement meta-organization

| Participating Organization | Acquisition Function | Leader / Decision Maker |
|---------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
| Planning, Programing, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) | Plan, program and determine resources | DoD Comptroller |
| Joint Capabilities and Development System (JCIDS) | Identify capability gaps that translate to weapon system requirements | U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| Defense Acquisition System (DAS), known as Little “a” | Develop, acquire, test and field weapon systems | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics |
| Congress | Legislative oversight and appropriations | U.S. House and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairmen and members |
| Office of the Secretary of Defense | Execute defense policy | Secretary of Defense |
| Defense Contractors, Integrators, Suppliers | Produce systems, make profit | Business Leaders |
| Warfighters | Use/ operate systems | Combatant Commanders |

Agent-based modeling is particularly well suited for developing and testing theory about the complex behavior of the meta-organization described above. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a literature review identifies authoritative references describing the defense acquisition system, its problems, attempts at solutions, applicable complex adaptive systems theory and an overview of some existing simulations. Research questions are posed, potential agents and potential factors affecting the system are proposed as candidates for initial simulation studies.

2. Review of Literature

It should be clear that a better understanding of the behavior and dynamics of the military procurement system is essential for efficient and effective program management and systems engineering efforts for the DoD. Wilson, a political scientist, studied government agencies from “the bottom up”, vice top down in his book, Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it. He writes “by looking at bureaucracies from the bottom up, we can assess the extent to which their management systems and administrative arrangements are well or poorly suited to the tasks the agencies actually perform”. Wilson traces the failures of some government reorganizations to a lack of understanding by the architects about what the employees actually do. Sources were obtained beginning with recent government reports on ongoing reform efforts, foundational literature on the utility of complexity science and agent-based modeling and finally existing research on simulations of the U.S. weapon procurement system. The search included a review of secondary sources which inform and influence current reform trends. Some prominent sources of information and analysis on the system are produced by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD AT&L), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Acquisition Research Program, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congressional Research Service (CRS) and industry groups such as the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) as well as academic literature from several domains.
Fox describes the following characteristics of the military procurement system: “price is usually not an overriding factor; product and quantity are determined, not by the management of the firm, but by governmental authority; and competition normally focuses on proposed design rather than the physical product, and on promises of performance rather than the performance itself...the supplier often holds a monopoly and the purchaser holds a monopsony (i.e., one buyer only).”

Many authors list similar characteristics to demonstrate difference between the military procurement system and typical commercial markets upon which many economic theories are based. McNaugher noted three separate “dimensions” to the procurement system: technical, military and political that can each possess “divergent needs”. These descriptions highlight the unique nature of the military procurement system and provide some clues about why theories from other fields can fail to anticipate important behaviors of this system.

The solution to these issues are not straightforward. There is uncertainty reflected in the literature regarding causation and remedies. Table 2 summarizes some common recommendations for procurement system changes/reforms found in the literature. The recommendations are grouped under categories of potential causal factors representing similar controls. Proponents believe these factors to effect some aspect of program cost, schedule and performance. Many of the factors in Table 2 have been proposed repeatedly over several decades and many were attempted during the various reforms since the 1950s. The similarity of the recommendations across time indicate that authors may be basing their recommendations on similar theories. The lackluster results of the reforms mentioned in the introduction call into question the recommendations along with their theoretical basis. In fact, Shafer and Snider recently proposed that the lack of theory on the behavior of the U.S. military procurement system is due in part to the interdisciplinary nature of the problem.
Table 2. A Summary and Categorization of Recommendations from Literature

| Possible Causal Factor          | Recommendations from Literature                                                                 |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Incentives**                  | Use incentive fee contracts⁹                                                                   |
|                                 | Require PM to serve after major milestones⁹                                                    |
|                                 | Revise perverse incentives like pulling funding based on spending rate, program awards based on cost⁹, ³¹, ³² |
|                                 | Use independent cost estimates ²⁵, ³³                                                          |
|                                 | Create incentives for Commanders and PMs to drive individual efficiency efforts³¹               |
|                                 | Use competition or competitive forces³⁴                                                         |
| **Organizational/ Structural**  | Centralize control of system (Joint and OSD control or integrate services’ acquisitions under OSD)⁹, ²⁷ |
|                                 | Decentralize control of system⁵                                                                |
|                                 | Manage programs as “Portfolios”²⁷, ³⁸                                                         |
|                                 | “Zero-base” acquisitions (wholesale redesign, transformation/reengineering)¹¹, ³⁶               |
|                                 | Establish “clear chain of command” ²⁷, ³⁷                                                     |
| **Workforce Education/ Experience** | Prepare program managers and other acquisition personnel with skills and experience⁶, ⁷, ³⁸ |
|                                 | Professionalize the acquisition career fields¹¹, ²⁷                                            |
|                                 | Cross flow program managers into operations and vice versa¹¹                                    |
|                                 | Program managers should have experience with program management⁷, ²⁹                         |
| **Rules/Norms/ Policy**         | Revise “harmonize” and eliminate law, regulation and rules in phases in partnership with stakeholders⁹, or quickly remove all or most rules¹¹, ²⁷ |
|                                 | Forbid “excessive concurrency”²⁵                                                                |
|                                 | Require Services to estimate and consider lifecycle affordability before program start²⁷, ²⁸   |
|                                 | Require higher program manager tenure²⁷, ³⁷                                                     |
|                                 | Use evolutionary acquisition model as opposed to revolutionary²⁵, ²⁸, ³⁶, ³⁶                   |
|                                 | Prototype²⁵, ²⁷                                                                                  |
|                                 | Freeze requirements early in the process¹¹, ²⁵                                                  |
|                                 | Reduce number of decision reviews⁵, ¹¹, ²⁷                                                      |

2.2. Complex Adaptive Systems

Holland says Complex Adaptive Systems: “are systems that have large numbers of components, often called agents, that interact and adapt or learn.”³⁹ Gell-Mann uses a similar definition.⁴⁰ The individuals and organizations that make up the Contractors, the Program Office, PPBE, JCIDS, Congress, and threats may be considered as interacting agents and meta-agents. If a system is complex, Lewin¹¹ suggests the following characteristics should be expected:

- sensitivity to initial conditions,
- emergent behaviors,
- composition of components,
- uncertain boundaries,
- nesting,
- state memory,
- non-linear relationships, and feedback loops.

These properties can make predictive analysis difficult or impossible using analytical methods so researchers often turn to simulation.
Authors in many fields are finding varied uses for complexity science. Examples of CAS identified in the literature include healthcare systems\(^2\), and supply chains\(^3\) among others. Military theorists note complexity arising from the demand for increased interagency cooperation by the U.S. military and U.S. and Coalition governments, in response to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the international terrorist threat. Common among the literature on the “interagency” problem is a lack of central control.\(^{44-46}\) Reed considers the entire U.S. Department of Defense a complex system and found that participants’ activities can cause unpredictable outcomes.\(^{47}\) Complexity is not confined to social systems. Today’s system engineers and system architects are engineering and analyzing “Systems of Systems” (SoS) which arise from interconnected, independent component systems. Maier found three types of SoS: Directed, Collaborative and Virtual (listed in the order of increasing independence of their component systems).\(^{48}\) He warns architects that misclassifying a System of Systems as “directed” vice “collaborative” can lead to systems which depend on unreliable cooperation across boundaries. The problem of anticipating and shaping the behavior of a loosely coupled group of autonomous or semi-autonomous entities has an increasing number of applications across technology, business, government and society in general. In answer to Shaffer and Snider\(^12\), one academic field that accounts for the interdisciplinary nature of the military procurement system is the study of complex adaptive systems.

### 2.3. Existing Models and Simulations

This section describes three existing dynamic simulations of the entire U.S. military procurement system. The review omits static process modeling such as the Acquisition Process Model\(^49\) or The Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Life Cycle Management System Chart\(^50\) due to space limitation. The review also omits some existing dynamic simulations that focus only on parts of the system.

Work by Burgess and Clark beginning in the mid 1980’s culminating in the early 1990’s appears to be the first published attempts at formulating a dynamic simulation of the entire U.S. military procurement system.\(^{17, 51, 52}\) Their research utilized a model of the Defense Acquisition System created under the System Dynamics paradigm. The simulation purpose was to assess policy changes.\(^{52}\) Burgess and Clark also introduce the term meta-organizational system which is “several independent organizations working toward a common set of objectives.” The participating “organizations may or may not have competing goals as well as their common objectives.”\(^{17}\) Interestingly, complex organizational structures like this appear to be becoming more common over time. Gulati observed similar behavior in business organizations and coined the same term using a very similar definition in 2012.\(^{18}\) The idea that the defense acquisition system is a meta-organization is a key insight because just as Maier notes with Systems of Systems, this loosely coupled structure seems to impart otherwise unexplainable dynamics. Burgess and Clark classify the Defense Acquisition System as a meta-organizational system with various independent sectors. In their System Dynamics model, the sectors are called: Defense, Industry, Threat and National. Burgess and Clark suggest that study of meta-organizations will require a different theoretical framework than traditional organizations.

A second set of system level simulations and mathematical models of the military procurement system is presented in work by Pennock\(^36\), Pennock, Rouse and Kollar\(^13\) and Bodner, Smith and Rouse.\(^53\) This set of research uses a variety of modeling methods such as stochastic models, game theory, dynamic programming, economic valuation models and discrete event simulation to represent various aspects of the military procurement system. Pennock presents a stochastic model of a weapon program with multiple rational stakeholders who place non-cooperative technology demands on the program.\(^{36}\) The model’s resulting stable technology policy is one that utilizes immature technology. This model helps to explain the prevalence of immature technology observed in programs by GAO and others despite the fact that it is contrary to official DoD policy. Pennock also presents a discrete event simulation of the defense acquisition system which is used to assess evolutionary acquisition policies. The results show that evolutionary acquisition should increase weapon system performance however, it does not reduce cost unless overhead can be significantly reduced. Bodner, Smith and Rouse use a version of this discrete event simulation in a 2009 report to determine the effect of weapon system modularity policies on the performance of the military procurement system.\(^53\) Other research by Pennock, Rouse and Kollar recommends a methodology to assign economic value to different procurement system reform projects based on phased reforms with real options to proceed.\(^36\) Their study found that in some cases relatively small process improvement projects can produce dramatic increases in buying power.

In 2009, Wirthlin developed the Enterprise Requirements and Acquisition Model (ERAM) simulation to identify enterprise leverage points in defense acquisition program performance.\(^35\) Data about the events and products were
gathered through analysis of existing policy and guidance, as well as numerous interviews with defense acquisition experts, which provided face validity. The events and products were those required for a typical aerospace defense program throughout the lifecycle, with emphasis placed on activities and events prior to Milestone C. Because the DoD acquisition process entails great complexity and has lots of stochastic processing times, discrete event system simulation is one appropriate analysis methodology for improving the current system. Tasks within JCIDS, DAS, PPBES and the defense contractors are characterized by triangular probability density functions representing task time. Decision logic is characterized by the probability of occurrence for each type of decision. The overall schedule (time in months) for simulated programs are collected and analyzed with various interventions in the process.

2.4. Agent-Based Modeling

Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) is a modeling paradigm that has proven useful in describing complex systems. ABM is gaining greater popularity due to availability of large datasets and increased computing power. Bonabeau says “an agent-based model consists of a system of agents and the relationships between them.” He uses the term “microscopic modeling” to distinguish ABM from “macroscopic modeling” techniques like differential equation models. Bonabeau enumerates three benefits of ABM over other modeling techniques: “1) ABM captures emergent phenomena; 2) ABM provides a natural description of a system; and 3) ABM is flexible”. Carley summarizes organizational design possibilities using agent-based modeling techniques. North and Macal offer extensive practical advice on many aspects of ABM design such as construction, verification and validation. Bonabechev and Filippov describe how to translate a discrete event simulation or a system dynamics simulation into an agent-based model. Rahmandad and Sterman explore the effect of network heterogeneity on differential equation models and corresponding agent-based models that employ various agent interaction network configurations. They find that network heterogeneity is more easily accounted for using an agent-based approach and that network configurations can cause significant differences in model output. Macal extends both the Boshchev and Filippov and the Rahmandad and Sterman research by offering a generic transformation from a class of System Dynamics models to equivalent agent-based models. Future research with agent-based modeling may be able to use similar techniques to capitalize on the existing system level simulations of the military procurement system that are based on discrete event and system dynamics paradigms.

3. Preliminary Modeling Considerations

The literature suggests that ABM is an appropriate tool for characterizing the military procurement system. An agent-based simulation will allow us to examine system limitations, estimate baseline performance, assess tradeoffs and hopefully architect better arrangements. Agent-based simulation of the system should provide additional insight not available through analytical, system dynamics or discrete event methods. ABM allows for heterogeneity in the stakeholders in the system. Each class of stakeholder may derive value from separate aspects of a program. In addition, ABM can more easily account for the many situations where programs in development deviate from the standard process. The ABM can also model the network effects arising from interactions between weapons programs or between the various organizations involved. This section presents our initial work on specifying model components.

3.1. Desired Outputs

An ABM architecture will produce outputs useful to make choices between different system configurations. Cost, schedule and performance for products of the acquisition system are the primary performance measures of interest. Depending on the focus of the study, some additional outputs will be reaction time of alternate systems to crisis events, relative technical superiority and measures of efficiency. The model should produce performance metrics for an ideal system along with a representation of the current system and interventions. The performance metrics can be used to establish a baseline to measure performance against and inform us on some system limitations.
3.2. Agent Candidates and Selection

Initial models will use a simplified subset of the multitude of agent types in the real system. The research team utilized available reports on the acquisition system along with simplifying assumptions to choose a number of agents for a preliminary model. Programs are modeled as meta-agents which represent the program manager and staff. Other necessary meta-agents are decision making entities from other organizations in Table 1 such as congressional members and their staff, JCIDS (Joint Staff) organizations, PPBES (financial management) agents, Defense contractors, user agents along with perhaps threat agents. All of these interacting meta-agents begin to establish an inherent structure, which could be examined; a notional graph is shown in Figure 3. Nodes of various types represent agents. The three decision making support systems from Figure 2 are shown consisting of a variety of heterogeneous nodes. Icons of airplanes, tanks satellites etc representing major defense acquisition programs are shown in the DAS group. Around each of the program icons, are six nodes representing standard leadership positions in each program office. The large yellow geometric shapes (square, circle, triangle) are the three distinct leaders of the three decision making support functions listed in Table 1. Subordinate agents in each decision making support function are shown as smaller agents with corresponding geometric shapes. The five largest prime contractors are represented by the group of large grey circular nodes labeled “Industry”. Blue and Red nodes representing members of congressional committees in two houses of congress are shown in the group labeled “Congress”. Major functions supported by each agent group are represented by icons such as, dollar signs for programming and budgeting, lightbulbs for concept generation and parchment for laws and regulation. Agents in the notional model are linked by way of communication or command channels. The bolded red links represent DoD level coordination between the leads of the three decision making support systems. The nodes and links between subordinate members of the decision making support systems overlap representing the interactions required between the three systems. This figure is intended to highlight the heterogeneity and interconnectedness of actors in the military procurement system and to illustrate the application of an agent approach to modeling it. Publicly available information and data from previous studies provide a framework to populate the notional model. This construct will allow future work in refining models of these meta-agents with additional data as it becomes available.

Figure 3. Notional structure of agents interacting across the entire military procurement meta-organizational system
3.3. Early Modeling

The team constructed a number of preliminary agent-based models of aspects of the military procurement system based on the agent types shown in Figure 3. The early efforts have focused on building a model framework using NetLogo\textsuperscript{62} which can be modified to allow future designed experiments. The experimental phase will include embellishments designed to assess the influence of factors such as those found Table 2 or other “factors the Department can actually affect (policies, contract terms, incentives, workforce skills, etc.).”\textsuperscript{1} The preliminary efforts increased the team’s confidence in the utility of the ABM approach for modeling this system. The preliminary agent simulations easily run on desktop computers. These models utilize hundreds of meta-agents with simple if-then behavior rules. Models of a much larger scale are possible. Examples of models with millions of agents can be found in the literature. Several challenges of the agent approach are: lack of existing valid models of agent behavior as well as difficulty in data collection and parameterization of the model. Construction of a valid and useful agent-based model of this system will be iterative and phased.

4. Concluding Remarks

The literature review revealed a lack of dramatic performance improvements in the system after years of reforms. One reason might be misunderstandings and false assumptions about how the system behaves. Additionally, there is no practical way to test alternative structures and policies on the system to gain insight into effectiveness before implementation. Modeling and simulation shows promise in cases like this where experimenting is impractical or expensive. Several researchers have modeled various aspects or the whole of the military procurement system. Yet none so far have explicitly recognized it to be a complex adaptive system and taken an agent approach. Previous system level simulations are based on system dynamics\textsuperscript{17}, discrete event\textsuperscript{35} and business process modeling\textsuperscript{49} paradigms. There are also a small number of mathematical descriptions of some of the dynamics.\textsuperscript{36} Agent-based modeling is a useful tool in the study of complex adaptive systems and taking agent perspective should provide new insights into the complex interactions between component programs, organizations and other agents in the military procurement system. Dynamic simulation studies can help formulate theory and demonstrate likely outcomes of several proposed strategies. The paper sought to excite researchers to provide further system characterization and to continue to build an academic body of knowledge on the functioning of this system through simulation.

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