INTRODUCTION

The difficulty in defining history as a scientific discipline is explained by the fact that this term is ambiguous and can be found in the scientific literature in three meanings. First of all, history is a certain entity, substance, which unfolds its existence in time. A similar interpretation of history is close to speculative concepts of the philosophy of history. Another definition is Popper’s (2013) term “historicism”. The significance of this understanding of history is associated with the study of the origins of history, its purpose and meaning, as well as with various attempts to reveal universal patterns, rhythms and trends that affect the development of mankind. Secondly, history is treated as the past, as the interconnection of certain events, phenomena and processes. And thirdly, history is a science, a system of worldviews about the past and how this past should be studied. More often than not, in order to separate the third definition from others, the term historiography is used.

In the latter case, history becomes part of epistemology. The main task of the epistemology of history is to study the question of how much knowledge of the past is possible, what features of its study exist.

The leading problems of Historical and Pedagogical knowledge include the problems of Historical and Pedagogical fact, explanation and interpretation, the influence of ideology, as well as the problem of truth, or, more generally, the problem of verifying Historical and Pedagogical statements and concepts and the like. A separate problem for modern socio-humanitarian knowledge is the problem of the distinction of history and the philosophy of history (KARPOV, 2018). Many modern concepts reject the need for such a separation, arguing that any Historical and Pedagogical concept is philosophical and Historical and Pedagogical. Thus, in the tropological conception of historiography, an attempt is made to eliminate the boundaries between Historical and Pedagogical science and the philosophy of history. White (1987) defines the work of a historian as a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse, designed to fulfill the role of a model (or sign) of past structures and processes. White’s attention remains the content of the activities of historians, as well as their compliance with the requirements of science.

METHODOLOGY

The study was carried out using the following theoretical methods: systems analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, comparison, classification, generalization and systematization, idealization and abstraction.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The language of the historian is the language of fiction. However, the question of language is considered by the scientist in the framework of the problem of style. White’s (1987) attention is focused on the problem of the influence of certain rhetorical procedures on the writing of a Historical and Pedagogical work. His tropological theory is based on the works of N. Fry, M. Foucault, R. Bart.
Only a logical, research analysis of a certain Historical and Pedagogical discourse, from his point of view, is doomed to failure due to the fact that he connects logic with rhetoric, subordinating it to the latter. White (1987) poses the question of Historical and Pedagogical reality and the problem of reference, that is, the relation of narrative to Historical and Pedagogical reality: "... How figurative speech can be used to create images of objects that are no longer perceptible, and endow them with an aura of a kind of reality "such in such a way that they fall under the explanations and interpretations chosen by this historian of technology? ". If there is no reality as correlates of a certain concept, then there can be no principles allowing one to choose a more objective one from the two concepts. The criticism of objectivism as a whole rests on the incorrect application of the category "Historical and Pedagogical reality".

Analyzing the specifics of Historical and Pedagogical narrative, White comes to the conclusion: "A discursive sequence in which different levels of representation are related in the same way is significantly different from a logical sequence in which one is derived from the other". Logical-deductive components "can complement this representation with formal proof, claiming a logical sequence, as a sign and indicator of its rationality". The methods of rhetorical organization of a Historical and Pedagogical source can be completely different, the number of their combinations tends to infinity.

In the preface to his work, he summarized the problem of the relationship between history and the philosophy of history as follows: "... first, there cannot be" history itself, "which would not be at the same time a” philosophy of history “; secondly, the possible forms of historiography are the same as the possible forms of speculative philosophy of history; thirdly, these forms, in turn, are in fact a formalization of poetic insights that analytically precede them and which authorize specific theories used to provide a Historical and Pedagogical account of the form of "explanation"; Fourth, there are no definite theoretical grounds on the basis of which one could reasonably make a judgment about the superiority of one of these forms over the others as more "realistic"; Fifth, as a consequence of this, we are obliged to choose between competing interpreted strategies in any attempt to reflect on history as a whole; sixth, as a conclusion from this, the best reason for preferring one vision of history over others is aesthetic and moral than epistemological; and, finally, the last, the requirement of scientization of history is a statement about the superiority of the special modality of Historical and Pedagogical conceptualization, the basis of which is either moral or aesthetic, but whose epistemological justification has yet to be established “ (KROTOV, 2016).

Traditionally, Historical and Pedagogical science and historicism are opposed, according to White (1987), for the following reasons: firstly, the historian is aimed at finding the unique, inimitable, private, while the historian is interested in the general; secondly, the historian takes an interest in formulating a point of view more than in constructing a theory; it is interesting for a historian; thirdly, the historian uses the narrative form of representation; the historian uses analytic; also, the historian studies the past, while the historian studies the past only in the context of establishing patterns that would allow the future to be predicted. His main thesis: the border between the philosophy of history and historiography, as well as between Historical and Pedagogical science and historicism, is imaginary. The view of the historian is subject, in his opinion, to the laws of narrative discourse.

The contrast between Historical and Pedagogical science and historicism is thus based on a misunderstanding that Historical and Pedagogical discourse, like any other, includes two positive trends - metaphorical and metonymic. So, historiography is a combination of prosaic and poetic elements. “A rhetorical analysis of Historical and Pedagogical discourse would allow us to show that each story that deserves such a name contains not only a certain amount of information and explanation (or interpretation) of what information means, but also a more or less open message (message) about attitude), which readers should accept before they become acquainted with the data and their formal interpretation (KOSTIKOVA, 2018). This message is contained in figurative elements, appear in a discourse that subconsciously directs the reader’s train of thought about the quality of the subject under study “.

According to his concept, it is impossible to avoid the figurative use of language. In fact, this indicates that it is impossible to build a nonHistorical and Pedagogical model of Historical
and Pedagogical science: the historian’s speech already includes a certain ideological and ethical dimension, which at the time the problem is posed makes the historian’s argumentation historicistic.

White (1987) distinguishes two levels in historiography: literal and figurative. Analyzing a specific historiographic discourse, it is necessary to take into account the rhetorical level. According to White (1987), it is worth abandoning the language of description, explanation, evidence. Do not create a Historical and Pedagogical discourse similar to a scientific one. Historical and Pedagogical discourse should be considered in terms of metaphor, figuration, and plotting (emplottment). The rejection of the logical-deductive composition of narrative is a guarantee against pseudoscientific explanations of speculative concepts of the Historical and Pedagogical process. Of primary interest is “the ways in which historians constructed the past as a possible object of scientific research or hermeneutic load and, more importantly, as an object of narration”. Such an activity of a historian is largely a product of his imagination than rational knowledge: “Many historians continue to perceive” facts “as what is” given “and refuse to admit, unlike most Ukrainian scientists, they are not so much” established “(found) “how many are constructed using questions, the researcher confronts the phenomenon located in front of him”. In general, the position of White (1987) is close to a poststructural understanding of the relationship between fact and reality, in particular, this can be seen when comparing the tropological concept of R. Barth’s theory. The latter argued that “a fact is only a linguistic existence … this is the only discourse where the referent is seen as external to the discourse, although it is impossible to achieve it except for this discourse”. White (1987) insists on the purely linguistic nature of Historical and Pedagogical facts. For example, in the opinion of White (1987), we have many events; it would be more correct to talk about a report of events.

Events are described in chronology, but need to be detailed as elements of a narrative. Such a series of events can be organized in various ways and provided with values of various types. So, H. White continues, such a narrative can be organized in various ways.

At the same time, certain events can be granted privileged status, which are assigned exclusively to events of a certain type. This may mean that the historian prioritizes explanation in the spirit of economic determinism. The meaning of the event is not contained in it itself, but is part of the language, the historian uses: “All Historical and Pedagogical narratives suggest a figurative characterization of the events that they are trying to present and explain. And this means that Historical and Pedagogical narratives, which are considered as verbal artifacts, can be characterized by comparison with the type of figurative discourse “ (LEBEDEV, 2013; KRYSHTANOVYCH, 2021).

Another representative of the radically constructivist position in the narrative philosophy of history is Ankersmith (1997). He openly contrasts the “narrativist philosophy of history” and “the epistemological philosophy of history”, certainly characterizing these two directions. The epistemological philosophy of history arose, firstly, as a result of the denial of German historicism; secondly, it is based on the denial of speculative concepts of the philosophy of history: “Historicism and speculative systems were rejected, since it was assumed that they did not satisfy the epistemological criteria of Historical and Pedagogical knowledge”. Thirdly, the epistemological philosophy of history focuses on the attempt to propose a universal model of Historical and Pedagogical interpretation. Also, in a certain way, “Collingwood hermeneutics” influenced her.

Turning to the problem of the correlation of historicism and speculative versions of the philosophy of history, Ankersmith (1997) concludes that in Anglo-Saxon philosophy historicism was erroneously associated with ethical relativism: “Ethical relativism incorrectly connects a temporally-fixed set of ethical norms with their temporally independent variability, was erroneously deduced from under the ban to scientists Ranke “. Historicism was mixed with historicism, which, in turn, was identified with speculative versions of the philosophy of history. At the same time, Ankersmit (2002) argues that Popper (2013) against historicism aims at claiming prophecies of the latter: “Since historians are usually interested in exploring the past, not the future, Popper’s criticism has not been successful in presenting speculative types of philosophy as an illegal form of what historians try to do legally”. 
Ankersmith (1997) considers it untenable to draw a demarcation line between historiography and the speculative philosophy of history. In his opinion, speculative concepts, like well-established historiography, are trying to establish the “essence” of a certain subject of the past, therefore they cannot be distinguished from each other using well-known criteria by which metaphysical are distinguished and the statement is verified.

The researcher makes certain comparisons with the turn that, in his opinion, took place in the philosophy of science. This turn is connected with the names of Rorty (1981). Turning to Rorty (1981), F. Ankersmith writes: “... Historiography is especially a discipline where” compelling the language “tends to be confused with the” demand of experience “and where what would seem to be a discussion about events reality, in fact, a discussion about what language we use “.

The linguistic philosophy of history is an adequate response to the crisis of the analytical philosophy of history. First, she suggests that “the historian’s speech is not transparent and passive in an environment through which we can see the past as we see what is written in the letter, through a glass paperweight that lies on a sheet of paper”. Secondly, the historian’s speech is metaphorical, or tropological, in the sense that White (1987) understood. So, the Historical and Pedagogical narrative is referentially opaque, or rather, self-referential to the same extent as the metaphor.

Obviously, narrativism denies the distinction between speculative forms of the philosophy of history and Historical and Pedagogical science, considering any Historical and Pedagogical concept to be speculative. The leading idea of narratives is that the speculative philosophy of history and historiography are a single whole. That is, there are no Historical and Pedagogical concepts that would not contain a speculative part.

For a correct study of the fallacy of the very formulation of the problem, narrativists should analyze the essence of the speculative philosophy of history. This term is not generally accepted. A possible alternative is the concept of “historicism” (POPPER, 2013), “substantive philosophy of history” (DANTE, 1962a). Both concepts, in fact, analyze the same phenomenon, but are guided by different categorical apparatus.

To begin with, it’s worth understanding the use of the term “historicism”, since it has become polysemantic. In English scientific literature it is used in several meanings. For the first time Reynolds (1999) drew attention to the general features of narrativism and historicism in the article “What is Historicism?”.

According to the first interpretation of historicism, this is the principle by which objects should be understood within a certain Historical and Pedagogical context. Reynolds (1999) suggests calling this version of historicism “mundane” (mundane). This interpretation of historicism is very close to what is commonly called historicism. However, in Anglo-Saxon philosophical literature such a distinction is not clearly traced (DANTE, 1962b).

The second interpretation is connected with the theories of Dilthey (1988) and Collingwood (1980), with their attempts to find criteria that would allow to distinguish between the humanities and the natural sciences. In fact, these attempts are connected with what Popper (2013) understood by the anti-naturalistic doctrine of historicism. Proponents of this definition insist on significant differences between what are called nomothetic and ideographic sciences. Nomothetical sciences are based on identifying general trends, describing and explaining recurring phenomena using general laws. The subject of ideographic sciences is a person, according to the methodology of these sciences is based on the search for a unique, individual.

The third definition assumes that historicism is a theory that tries to find the rhythms and laws of history. So, Reynolds (1999) separates the position of Popper (2013) from others and reduces it exclusively to criticism of pronaturalistic doctrines, which, in our opinion, is not entirely correct. However, such reduction is also carried out by narrativists when it comes to the essence of historicism and speculative concepts of the philosophy of history. Moreover, Reynolds (1999) refers the concept of a change of scientific paradigms, belongs to Kun (2003), to this kind of historicism. Indeed, the almost dialectical triad of T. Kuhn “normal science - crisis leads to revolution - new normal science” strongly recalls the criticism criticized by Popper (2013) as a concept of certain laws and rhythms of history.
The fourth interpretation of the term “historicism” is related to the assertion that the standards of rationality are not authorities. They themselves depend on temporary changes. In other words, there are no “unHistorical and Pedagogical” standards of scientific rationality (KUKARTEVA, 2007).

The fifth version of historicism is based on the assertion that there are no absolute values of any kind whatsoever: all ideals are relative, their content depends on the Historical and Pedagogical period. A similar version of historicism is associated with postmodernism, as a cultural trend, and rhetorical constructivism, as a certain direction in the philosophy of science (DILTHEY, 2001).

This kind of historicism is based on relativistic theses. Such theses carry a more radical conclusion that all the concepts of “truth”, “objectivity”, “mind”, “scientific knowledge” to a large extent are constructions adopted by a certain culture in a certain Historical and Pedagogical period. According to this definition, people are forced to abandon any idea of the objectivity of Historical and Pedagogical reality. Reynolds (1999) calls this kind of historicism complete historicism. These views are very characteristic of narrativism in its most radical form. Reynolds (1999) is right when he defines postmodernism as a project or mood, the purpose of which is to deny the ideals of rationality of the Enlightenment.

The concept of Reynolds (1999) requires substantial detail. Firstly, he does not make a clear distinction between the concepts of “historicism” and “historicism”. Historicism considers the principle that the subject of research should be analyzed in its development. Secondly, it is necessary to adjust the term of historicism, which would combine the criticism of the historicism of Popper (2013) and the criticism of the total historicism of Reynolds (1999). According to A. Reynolds, total historicism is based on two principles: 1) self-referential speech, and therefore, it is concluded that speech cannot provide us with a reference to objects and things in the outside world; 2) all knowledge is penetrated by ideology, therefore, there can be no objective and ideologically neutral knowledge.

Criticizing the first principle, Reynolds (1999) claims that he relies completely on a certain linguistic model, assumes that the meaning is produced by the speaker and has no direct relation to objects. This linguistic model developed at the beginning of structuralism, then poststructuralism, for which structuralism is actually background knowledge.

A. Reynolds notes that this model is not holistic. Alternatively, the value theory of C.S. The pier, where the signs have and carry out the reference to external objects.

The positive aspect is that the definition is not static, eternal in the sense in which it was described by Plato. The meaning of the sign in C.S. Pierce embraces the form of communication that he makes, and the sign is always open to change and improvement.

According to A. Reynolds, the adoption of a poststructural theory of meaning leads to absurd consequences. Firstly, “if people cannot carry out reference to objects in the external environment. If our words refer only to other words or mental images, then we are not very different from brains in a barrel (brains in a vat) ”. It follows from this that in this case an example of Putnam (1982) thought experiment is appropriate. Secondly, if poststructuralism has reached a certain objective idea of the essence of language, then it becomes possible to understand how to overcome the ideological component of language. But, the internal inconsistency of poststructuralist and postmodern concepts is as follows: on the one hand, they reject reality as such, except for the reality of the text, on the other - in their own texts they assume the presence of this reality. According to A. Reynolds, the following is false in postmodernism: “Since all theorizing is “textual “, it means that the world as a whole should be a text”. If the mediator between the objective reality and the subject is language, this means that reality itself must be a language (hereinafter).

Thus, the fundamental mistake of total historicism, according to A. Reynolds, is to mix “origin” with “justification”: “It is typical for thinkers of the Enlightenment to say that origin and confirmation are one and the same ; to show that something comes from God, or pure reason, or sensations, or the scientific method means with the need to prove it something “.
To analyze this mistake, narrative is necessary to turn to the concept of Popper’s (2013) historicism. Criticism of historicism was carried out by Popper (2013) in his works “The Poverty of Historicism” and “Open Society and Its Enemies”. In the first work, he clearly formulated the problem of the method of social sciences. At first, in his opinion, history (like other social sciences) was perceived as an inferior scientific discipline compared to the natural one: “... as for the social sciences, they apparently still have not found their own Galileo”. Awareness of this “inferiority” has prompted many historians to voluntarily or involuntarily compare the methodology of the history of the methodology of the natural sciences. This comparison periodically led to two opposite consequences: either the methods of the natural sciences were blindly copied and applied in Historical and Pedagogical knowledge, or a certain similarity of these branches of scientific knowledge as a whole was denied and a strict division of all sciences into the humanities (ideographic) and the natural (nomothetic) was made.

All historicist doctrines, in a certain way, examined the issue of applying the method of natural sciences in social cognition. The former argue that it is possible to use natural-science methods in Historical and Pedagogical knowledge, while other similar events are inappropriate. However, the scientist draws attention to another aspect of this situation: “The methodologist of the anti-naturalistic or pronaturalistic views is respected, accepts a theory that combines both, depends more on his views on the nature of the science being studied and its subject (JENKINS, 1999). But the position of the methodologist will also depend on his ideas about the methods of physics ”. This aspect is extremely important for understanding Popper’s criticism of historicism, since usually its position is reduced only to the rejection by Historical and Pedagogical science of the right to discover laws, trends and rhythms in history, as well as to criticism of the prophetic intentions of historicist doctrines.

CONCLUSIONS
The pro-doctrinal doctrines are trying to find some universal laws that move history and that would allow the fulfillment of prophecies about the future. These doctrines are characterized by an understanding of history as a unity of the past, present and future. Understanding the past is the basis for making predictions. If we talk about the narrative philosophy of history, then it is characterized by an attempt to reveal some rhetorical laws and rhythms with which the historian creates an ordered world, to escape beyond which he is not able to. Thus, the image of a “closed universe” arises, which once again confirms the thesis of the kinship of narrativism and the speculative philosophy of history. In a broader context, this leads us to the idea that skepticism (in any Historical and Pedagogical form) is a natural consequence of the theory of knowledge based on essentialist standards.

Thus, the ideas examined indicate the presence in the modern scientific discourse of a polylogue, a dialogue of cultures, a plurality of conceptual views, both opposing and related, thereby substantiating the existence of a postmodern worldview paradigm. The result of the study was the characterization of historical and pedagogical aspects in philosophical discourse.

REFERENCES
ANKERSMIT, F. Aesthetic politics: political philosophy beyond fact and value. Stanford University Press, 1997, 436 p.

ANKERSMIT, F. Historical and pedagogical representation. Cultural Memory in the Present. Stanford University Press, 2002, 336 p.

COLLINGWOOD, R. The idea of history. Autobiography. Yu.A. Aseeva. M.: Nauka, 1980.486.

DANTO, A. Narrative sentences. History and Theory: Studies in the philosophy of history, 1962a, Vol. 2. No. 2. 146-179.

DANTO, A. Analytical philosophy of history. Cambridge University Press, 1962b, 311 p.

DILTHEY, V. Outline to the criticism of Historical and Pedagogical reason. Questions of philosophy, 1988, No. 4. 135-152.
DILTHEY, V. The essence of philosophy. M.: Intrada, 2001, 159 p.

JENKINS, K. Why history? Ethic and postmodernity. London; N.Y.: Routledge, 1999, Vol. 10. 232 p.

KARPOV, S. Razmyshleniya o ponimanii istorii [Reflections on understanding the story]. Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 8. History. 2018, No. 1. pp. 3-17.

KOSTIKOVA, A. Filosofiya yazyka: rekonstruktsiya problemnogo polya [Philosophy of language: reconstruction of the problem field]. Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 7. Philosophy. 2018, No. 1. pp. 23-31.

KROTOV, A. U Istokov istoriko-filosofskogo issledovaniya vo Frantsii [At the origins of Historical and Pedagogical and philosophical research in France]. Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 7. Philosophy, 2016, No. 1. pp. 21-34.

KRYSHTANOYCH, S.; TIURINA, T.; PIECHA, L.; RUSYN, H.; PROKOPENKO, A. Modeling the process of ordering the main obstacles to the professional competence of future teachers. Laplage Em Revista, 2021, 7(3A), p.470-479. Available at: https://doi.org/10.24115/S2446-6220202173A1441p.470-479. Access: June 21, 2021.

KUKARTSEVA, M. Epistemologiya i ontologiya istorii [Emistomology and ontology of history]. Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 7. Philosophy, 2007, No. 1. pp. 24-35.

KUN, T. The structure of scientific revolutions: collection. scientific Art.: AST: Ermak, 2003. 365.

LEBEDEV, S. Traditsionnaya epistemologiya [Conventionalist Epistemology]. Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 7. Philosophy. 2013, No. 2. pp. 13-34.

NORMAN, A. Telling it like it was: Historical and Pedagogical narrations on their own terms. History and theory. Studies in the philosophy of history, 1991, Vol. 30. No. 2. 119-135.

PEARCE, C. Logical foundations of the theory of signs. SPb.: Aletheya: Laboratory of metaphysical studies. at philos. Fak. St. Petersburg State University, 2000. 49.

POPPER, K. The open society and its enemies. Princeton University Press, 2013, 808 p.

PUTNAM, H. Significance and reference. New in foreign linguistics. Vol. XIII: Logic and Linguistics: Problems of Reference. M.: Rainbow, 1982, pp. 377-390.

REYNOLDS, A. What is historicism? International studies in the philosophy of science, 1999, Vol. 13. No. 3. 275-287.

RORTY, R. Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton University Press, 1981. 424 p.

WHITE, H. The Content of the form. Narrative Discourse and Historical and Pedagogical Representation. Baltimore, 1987, 238 p.
Pedagogical and philosophical in postmodern philosophical discourse: the world as text

Pedagógico e filosófico no discurso filosófico pós-moderno: o mundo como texto

Pedagógico y filosófico en el discurso filosófico posmoderno: el mundo como texto

Resumo
O objetivo principal do estudo é determinar os aspectos históricos e pedagógicos do discurso filosófico. A dificuldade em definir história como disciplina científica se explica pelo fato de esse termo ser ambíguo e pode ser encontrado na literatura científica em três significados. Em primeiro lugar, a história é uma certa entidade, uma substância, que se desdobra no tempo. Uma interpretação semelhante da história está próxima dos conceitos especulativos da filosofia da história. As ideias examinadas no artigo indicam a presença no discurso científico moderno de um polílogo, um diálogo de culturas, uma pluralidade de visões conceituais, tanto opostas quanto relacionadas, corroborando assim a existência de um paradigma pós-moderno de cosmovisão. O resultado do estudo foi a caracterização de aspectos históricos e pedagógicos no discurso filosófico.

Palavras-chave: Pedagogia. Filosofia. Pós-moderno. História. Aprendizagem.

Abstract
The main purpose of the study is to determine the historical and pedagogical aspects of philosophical discourse. The difficulty in defining history as a scientific discipline is explained by the fact that this term is ambiguous and can be found in the scientific literature in three meanings. First of all, history is a certain entity, a substance, which unfolds its existence in time. A similar interpretation of history is close to speculative concepts of the philosophy of history. The ideas examined in the article indicate the presence in the modern scientific discourse of a polylogue, a dialogue of cultures, a plurality of conceptual views, both opposite and related, thereby substantiating the existence of a postmodern worldview paradigm. The result of the study was the characterization of historical and pedagogical aspects in philosophical discourse.

Keywords: Pedagogy. Philosophy. Postmodern. History. Learning.

Resumen
El objetivo principal del estudio es determinar los aspectos históricos y pedagógicos del discurso filosófico. La dificultad para definir la historia como una disciplina científica se explica por el hecho de que este término es ambiguo y se puede encontrar en la literatura científica con tres significados. En primer lugar, la historia es una determinada entidad, una sustancia, que despliega su existencia en el tiempo. Una interpretación similar de la historia se acerca a los conceptos especulativos de la filosofía de la historia. Las ideas examinadas en el artículo indican la presencia en el discurso científico moderno de un polílogo, un diálogo de culturas, una pluralidad de visiones conceptuales, tanto opuestas como relacionadas, lo que corrobora la existencia de un paradigma posmoderno de cosmovisión. El resultado del estudio fue la caracterización de aspectos históricos y pedagógicos en el discurso filosófico.

Palabras-clave: Pedagogía. Filosofía. Posmoderno. Historia. Aprendizaje.