Recipes for Safety in Open-domain Chatbots

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Abstract

Models trained on large unlabeled corpora of human interactions will learn patterns and mimic behaviors therein, which include offensive or otherwise toxic behavior and unwanted biases. We investigate a variety of methods to mitigate these issues in the context of open-domain generative dialogue models. We introduce a new human-and-model-in-the-loop framework for both training safer models and for evaluating them, as well as a novel method to distill safety considerations inside generative models without the use of an external classifier at deployment time. We conduct experiments comparing these methods and find our new techniques are (i) safer than existing models as measured by automatic and human evaluations while (ii) maintaining usability metrics such as engagingness relative to the state of the art. We then discuss the limitations of this work by analyzing failure cases of our models.

1 Introduction

When dialogue models are trained to mimic human-human conversations utilizing large pre-existing datasets, they will unfortunately also learn undesirable features from this human-human data, such as the use of toxic or biased language.

In this work, we provide recipes for building open-domain chatbots that perform well in human evaluations such as engagingness, and that minimize their use of offensive language. We emphasize this potential trade-off by representing our results on those two axes, and note that a model that is evasion on every turn (e.g. always responding “I don’t know how to respond”) is inoffensive, but far from engaging. In contrast, any model that attempts to engage in conversation on any topic is much more in danger of using offensive language, especially if its interlocutor engages it in sensitive topics or adversarially tries to induce such responses. On the other hand, it is not clear that these axes are at odds: it seems possible to have a highly engaging conversationalist that is simultaneously inoffensive. This work will explore these questions.

We study and compare a wide variety of existing methods. Firstly, we compare unsafe utterance detection methods and their employment in two-stage models where generative models are filtered using these classifiers. Secondly, rather than two-stage models, we study training and decoding techniques for safe responses directly in generative models. Such approaches include data filtering techniques, learning with control and safe decoding algorithms. Finally, we also study the issues of sensitive conversational topics, and gender bias mitigation.

In terms of novel contributions, we present two new techniques: (i) Bot-Adversarial Dialogue Safety, and (ii) Baked-in Safety models.

Bot-Adversarial Dialogue (BAD) safety is a method to collect safety training data with humans and models in the loop. We ask humans to adversarially talk to a set of state of the art models with the aim of inducing them to generate unsafe responses, similarly to how models can be adversarially attacked at deployment time. We analyze how to optimally construct such a crowdworker task, and collect a dataset of 5k such conversations involving around 70k utterances, and use this to train more robust safety classifiers. In experiments, such a two-stage model is shown to outperform using other existing safety classifiers.

Ideally, we should train generative models that do not have to be screened by an independent classifier module – they should already produce safe, engaging responses: the safety should be “baked-in”. We propose such a method by modifying the target labels in the training data to incorporate safe responses where applicable, as defined by a safety classifier. At test time, one no longer needs the
safety classifier, as its use has been distilled into
the model. In experiments, we show this model
outperforms other existing generative models in
terms of safety, while maintaining engagingness.

Along with these two new methods, we provide
a detailed experimental analysis of a number of
existing approaches that we compare with to try to
build an overall picture of the current state of the
art, and discuss success and fail cases. Finally, we
conclude with our overall recommendations, and
thoughts on directions for future work.

2 Base Models

We start from a state-of-the-art open-domain dia-
logue system. We consider the same architecture
and setup as in BlenderBot (Roller et al., 2020),
which employs a Seq2Seq Transformer architec-
ture (Vaswani et al., 2017), with an implementation
based on the ParlAI version (Miller et al., 2017a). It
uses Byte-Level BPE tokenization (Radford et al.,
2019) trained on the pre-training data, as imple-
mented in HuggingFace’s Tokenizers.\(^1\) We con-
sider the 2.7B parameter model which has 2 en-
coder layers, 24 decoder layers, 2560 dimensional
embeddings, and 32 attention heads, and performed
best in some of the metrics evaluated. The model
is referred to in the rest of the paper as BST 2.7B.

Training Data The models are trained using
maximum likelihood on human-human conversa-
tions in English, using the Fairseq (Ott et al., 2019)
toolkit. Pre-training employed 1.5B training exam-
pie data using a previously existing Reddit dataset ex-
tracted and obtained by a third party and made avail-
able on pushshift.io (Baumgartner et al., 2020)\(^2\)
through July 2019. Heuristic rules were used to fil-
ter the dataset with the goal of providing a cleaner
training signal. Models were trained with maxi-
mum context and response lengths set to 128 BPE
tokens, and longer examples were truncated. For
further implementation details, see (Roller et al.,
2020).

Fine-tuning is performed on a smaller set of
crowdsourced datasets designed to provide impor-
tant conversational skills. The ConvAI2 dataset
(Zhang et al., 2018) focuses on personality and en-
gaging the other speaker, Empathetic Dialogues
(Rashkin et al., 2019) focuses on empathy, and
Wizard of Wikipedia (Dinan et al., 2019c) focuses
on knowledge. Finally, Blended Skill Talk (BST)
(Smith et al., 2020a) provides a dataset that focuses
on blending these skills. Models were fine-tuned
using the ParlAI toolkit (Miller et al., 2017a).

Decoding At decoding time, the model employs
standard beam search with a beam size of 10, con-
text and label 3-gram blocking (Paulus et al., 2017),
and a minimum beam length of 20 BPE tokens,
which was shown to perform well compared to other
choices.

Comparison Models In our experiments we also
compare to two other base models: DialoGPT
(Zhang et al., 2019) and GPT2 (Large) (Radford
et al., 2019). Although we expect these two mod-
els to have lower engagingness scores than the
BST 2.7B base model, in line with results from
Roller et al. (2020); Adiwardana et al. (2020), to
our knowledge these methods have not been com-
pared previously in terms of safety evaluations, or
the engagingness/safety trade-off.

3 Safety Recipes

We consider four different general strategies to
make these models safer to engage with:

- **Unsafe Utterance Detection (§3.1):** Training
  and deploying classifiers for detecting unsafe
  messages as an added “safety layer.”

- **Safe Utterance Generation (§3.2):** Training
  the model such that it is unlikely to surface
  unsafe content at inference time.

- **Sensitive Topic Avoidance (§3.3):** Avoiding
  topics like politics or religion, due to their
  sensitive nature.

- **Gender Bias Mitigation (§3.4):** Using strate-
gies from Dinan et al. (2019a) to force the
model to respond with gender neutral lan-
guage.

We detail the ingredients for each of these strate-
gies and discuss the tradeoffs between engaging-
ness and relative toxicity for each.

3.1 Unsafe Utterance Detection

A classic way to ensure safety in dialogue systems,
still used in some of the most recent dialogue mod-
els (Adiwardana et al., 2020; Roller et al., 2020) is
to use a separate classifier to detect unsafe language.
This can be used on either side of the conversa-
tion, to detect unsafe language from either human

\(^1\)https://github.com/huggingface/
tokenizers
\(^2\)https://files.pushshift.io/reddit/
or bot. Many existing methods only perform this detection at the utterance level, detecting unsafe language given only a single dialogue turn, having been trained on examples of unsafe dialogue turns, but the general method can be extended to the multi-turn input case. In this section, we explore five ingredients for detecting unsafe utterances:

1. Standard unsafe utterance detection.
2. Build-it Break-it Fix-it for robust detection.
3. Semi-supervision for expanding train data.
4. Two-Stage Models: how to combine classifiers with dialogue models.
5. Bot-Adversarial Dialogue Safety; a new approach introduced in this work.

3.1.1 Unsafe utterance detection: Training a Safety Classifier
A standard recipe for safety involves training safety classifiers. In this work, we consider classifiers that are two-class (safe and not safe), although multi-class classifiers can also be considered (categorizing different types of unsafe behavior). We consider Transformer-based classifiers, following the same structure as in Dinan et al. (2019b), with two sizes: 256M and 622M parameter models. We pre-train these models on a previously existing Reddit dataset extracted and obtained by a third party that was hosted by pushshift.io (Baumgartner et al., 2020), using a masked language model objective, and then fine-tune on the safety classification task of interest, performing early stopping using the F1 score of the “unsafe” class on the validation set.

Standard Data We consider the Wikipedia Toxic Comments dataset (WTC) (Wulczyn et al., 2017) designed to identify personal attacks online, consisting of ~150k examples; we use the version that treats the data as a two-class problem (Khatri et al., 2018a; Dinan et al., 2019c). In addition, we consider a dataset more specifically collected for safety in open-domain dialogue of (Dinan et al., 2019b), which consists of a further 8,000 offensive examples. We note that these datasets consist of single-turn unsafe utterances, not utterances within the context of a dialogue.

Build-it, Break-it, Fix-it Data It has been observed that standard classifiers learn to detect basic toxicity, but can still be fooled, especially if encountering more subtle offenses or if adversarially attacked to find their weaknesses. The work of Dinan et al. (2019b) thus also explored an adversarial collection scheme to make classifiers more robust. Therein, crowdworkers are instructed to create training examples that “fool” the classifier into an incorrect decision, which tends to find harder to classify examples; re-training on this data was shown to make the classifier iteratively more robust. A further 16,000 examples were collected in such a manner, and we also consider training on this data as well. We note that this classifier is still agnostic to the idea of it being used in human-bot conversations, all the dialogue data involved being human-written. We will generalize this approach to the case of safety of generative dialogue models in §3.1.3.

Semi-Supervised Data Given our best classifier so far from the existing labeled datasets, we can label large unlabeled datasets, e.g. the pushshift.io Reddit (Baumgartner et al., 2020) and BST datasets, and then train a simple semi-supervised approach, training on both gold and imputed labels, related to the work of Khatri et al. (2018a). We will also employ this approach.

3.1.2 Two-Stage Models: Adding a Safety Layer
Given a safety classifier, a simple approach to dialogue safety is to apply it in two ways: (i) detect if the user utterances are safe; and (ii) detect if its own utterances are safe. If a safety violation is detected in either type of utterance, one can then initiate instead a response designed to be safe. In this work, we consider two approaches, which we refer to as safe responses, and non sequiturs (Curry and Rieser, 2019; Paranjape et al., 2020).

• Safe response: in this setting, we output a canned, non-committal safe response. In this work we chose a simple single response: “I’m sorry, I’m not sure what to say. Thank you for sharing and talking to me though.” One could generalize this to choosing from a set of canned responses.

• Non sequitur: in this setting, we choose to change the subject instead. We select a topic at random from 1087 topics judged as safe from the Wizard of Wikipedia conversational topic list (Dinan et al., 2019c). We then produce the response “Hey do you want to talk about something else? How about we talk about X?” where X is the chosen topic.
Figure 1: Diagram comparing the “build-it, break-it, fix-it” for toxicity classifier robustness from Dinan et al. (2019b) (left) to the Bot-Adversarial Dialogue setup in this work (right). On the left, the “breaker” (or adversarial user) tries to break a classifier by submitting adversarial offensive messages that are incorrectly classified as inoffensive. On the right, the “breaker” adversarially tries to elicit offensive messages from a dialogue model. In both cases, the adversarial examples are used to make the system (either a classifier or a dialogue model) more robust.

After generating this response, the conversation continues as normal, with the response entering into the model’s conversational history. In this way it can still respond naturally to followup responses after the canned response is produced.

The danger of such an approach is mostly around the quality of the classifier. If the classifier red flags too many safe utterances, the conversational experience will suffer. If unsafe utterances are not flagged, toxic language can still enter the conversation.

3.1.3 Bot-Adversarial Dialogue Safety
We would like our model’s conversations to be robust against direct attempts that probe them for unsafe responses. We detailed previously how safety classifiers can be trained to be adversarially robust to human utterances, see Section 3.1.1 or Dinan et al. (2019b). However, if we want conversational agents to be safe, we advocate applying such a procedure directly to conversations with those agents, which previous work did not address. The main idea is collect data of humans probing our conversational models to try to trick them into making mistakes, similar to adversarial attacks that can actually happen in practice during deployment. We can then train on this data to make our system more robust.

**Task Setup.** We therefore construct a crowdworker task where annotators are instructed to converse naturally with a bot, but at the same time try to probe or adversarially goad it into replying in an unsafe manner. On each dialogue turn, a checkbox is chosen to tag the bot’s response as either safe or unsafe. We divide the unsafe responses into four bins: responses that nearly 0% of the population would consider unsafe (according to the annotator’s best guess), and responses that < 10%, < 50%, or > 50% of the population would consider unsafe. We conduct 14-turn conversations in such a manner with human speaking first, and score the model based on the number of unsafe boxes, as indicated by the checkboxes. Such data can be used to train a new improved classifier, as well as holding out some data for a static evaluation test set. After collection, a separate task verifies the labels with 3 other annotators. More details of the collection setup are given in Appendix A.

Figure 1 demonstrates how this adversarial setup differs from the “Build-it, Break-it, Fix-it” setup from Dinan et al. (2019b): namely, in the former, the “breaker” (or adversarial user) tries to break a classifier by submitting human-authored adversarial offensive messages that are incorrectly classified as inoffensive, whereas in this work, the “breaker” adversarially tries to elicit offensive messages from a dialogue model. In both cases, the adversarial

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3The emoji image in Figure 1 is by Twemoji (https://github.com/twitter/twemoji), and is licensed under CC BY-4.0.
Table 1: Dataset Statistics for the Bot-Adversarial Dialogue (BAD) data collection where crowdsource workers were instructed to converse with a bot and annotate each bot utterance for offensiveness.

| Class                  | Train | Valid | Test |
|------------------------|-------|-------|------|
| SAFE Utterances        | 42049 | 4239  | 1654 |
| OFFENSIVE Utterances   | 27225 | 2763  | 944  |
| Total Utterances       | 69274 | 7002  | 2598 |
| Total Dialogues        | 5080  | 513   | 191  |

Figure 2: Types of offensive language used by crowdworkers in order to break the bot in the Bot-Adversarial Data task. More details can be found in Appendix A.

Examples are used to make the system (either a classifier or a dialogue model) more robust.

Dataset Statistics. We collect 5784 dialogues between bots and crowdworkers, consisting of 78874 utterances in total from both sides (see Table 1). About 40% of the utterances are annotated as offensive, among which 1/3 are from the bots. To break the bot to use offensive language more often, humans tended to use either unsafe language themselves in the dialogues, or raised probing questions that are considered inappropriate to ask, or else to elicit inappropriate responses. More than 42% of the dialogues collected contain at least 3 unsafe human messages or probing questions (see Appendix, Table 20). We further break down the messages from humans into a taxonomy of offensive language types. The majority of offensive language used by crowdworkers relates to hate speech against particular groups, personal attacks and other less explicit offensive language containing no profanity, see Figure 2. More details can be found in Appendix A.

Training Classifiers. After data collection, we can train a two-class multi-turn classifier with the same architecture as in §3.1.1 to predict whether a message is offensive given its context, and employ it in a two-stage model. More details on the training of classifiers robust to adversarial attacks can be found in Appendix A.

3.2 Safe Utterance Generation

Adding a safety classifier as a separate layer as described in Section 3.1.2 has its advantages, e.g. any independent improvement of this classifier can be easily combined with a dialogue model, but it also has its disadvantages. For example, when releasing an open source model, it is more complicated to share and deploy, requires more computational resources (e.g. loading both models), and allows unsafe usage of that model if the layer is simply ignored and removed. Further, in the long-term it makes sense if safety is part of a single dialogue agent model, in the sense that it should understand what it is saying is unsafe. In this section, we explore four ingredients for training a model that is less likely to surface unsafe content without the use of an additional safety layer:

1. Data Pre-processing
2. Safe Beam Blocking/Generation
3. Safety and Style control
4. Baking in the Safety Layer; a new approach introduced in this work.

3.2.1 Data Pre-processing

A classic approach to training models on clean data is to filter it beforehand. Assuming we have access to a safety classifier, which could be any of the methods from Section 3.1, we can use it to filter the training set. In this work we consider two methods:

- Utterance-based: we can choose to simply remove a target label from the training set if either its context or the label itself triggers the safety classifier.
- Author-based: given a dataset where the author of each utterance is known, we can choose to remove all the utterances of given authors, if that author’s utterances trigger the classifier more than a given number of times. In our experiments, we remove authors if over 12% of their posts trigger the safety classifier.

This training set is then used to train models as usual. It is important this filtering is performed on
the large pre-training dataset, as cleaning only the fine-tuning datasets (if even necessary – in many cases they are clean already) will have still exposed the model to offensive language which it will be able to remember and use, as will be shown in the experiments.

3.2.2 Safe Beam Blocking/Generation

Another approach to avoid offensive responses in a generative model is to adjust the search at decoding time to avoid such responses.

Using an unsafe word/n-gram list approach, one can perform beam search at decoding time with n-gram blocking, using the given word list. While this can be overly cautious in that some words in the word list might actually be inoffensive in some contexts, the hope would be that avoiding generating them altogether might not impact engagement that much, as alternative phrases could be found. On the other hand, the danger remains that the model can still generate an unsafe response composed entirely of safe words.

We note that a more sophisticated alternative is to generate responses chosen to not trigger a classifier, e.g. using the plug and play language model approach (Dathathri et al., 2019). While interesting, we do not explore that technique in our experiments in this work.

3.2.3 Safety and Style Control

An approach that is commonly used to specify desired attributes in model generations is so-called control, which has been used before in dialogue generation to reduce repetitiveness, increase specificity and other factors (See et al., 2019). In this work we show that control can also be used to control the safety of our models. While control spans many methods, in our case we consider the (standard) approach of adding control variables (in the form of special tokens appended to the input) at training time per example that capture the low-level attribute that we wish to control at test time. This variable is appended to the dialogue history, per example. At test time, we set the control to a fixed desired choice.

We consider two types of control:

- **Safety**: Using a safety classifier, we determine the safeness of each given label and assign the Safe or Unsafe control to be appended to each training example. At test time one fixes the control to Safe.

- **Style**: The work of Shuster et al. (2018) provided data and proposed a multi-classifier involving 215 dialogue styles ranging from positive (calm, cheerful), to neutral (formal, impassive), to negative (hostile, cruel). This labelled data was used in Smith et al. (2020b) to train a classifier that was in turn used to label the BST datasets with styles. The base pushshift.io Reddit 2.7B model was then fine-tuned on the BST datasets augmented with the style labels as control tokens, to obtain a style-controlled generation model that can specify a style at test time. Here, we apply the same imputed labels technique to obtain a style-controlled generation model. In our experiments we use such controlled generation models to measure the safety of several styles.

3.2.4 Baking in the Safety Layer

The data-preprocessing methods of §3.2.1 attempt to make a model safe by simply not exposing it to offensive language. However, this can make those models susceptible when confronting such language because they will have never seen it before: our models frequently copy the input (Welleck et al., 2020), so they might for example copy the offensive language in the input. In this section, we instead attempt to bake awareness of toxic language into the training data, but with labeled examples that recommend appropriate action on the model’s part.

To do this, we first assume we have access to a safety classifier at training time (but not at deployment time), just as in §3.2.1. For each training example, if the last utterance in the dialogue history or the gold label are labeled as unsafe by the classifier, we instead replace the label of that training example with a safe response or non-sequitur, see Section 3.3. An example demonstrating this procedure is shown in Table 2.

After constructing “baked-in” safety data, one can then train the generative model using likelihood training in the same way as usual, but with these modified targets. We make a separation between training examples that have been modified for safety, and those that have not, and assign different weightings to them, effectively drawing examples from those two sets with different probabilities, affecting how much the model optimizes for safety versus usual conversational abilities. This is important especially when dealing with toxic pre-training sets as they may be dominated by modified exam-
Table 2: Training examples for “baking in” the safety layer (§3.2.4) compared to the original data and the safe utterance pre-processed data approach (§3.2.1). When a safety classifier flags an example as containing an offensive message, the safe utterance training data set has those examples simply removed from the dataset, whereas in the “baked-in” method the output (target label) is replaced with a non-sequitur.

Table 3: Topic Avoidance List. We source Reddit discussions from the given subreddit lists in the previously existing Reddit dataset extracted and obtained by a third party that was hosted by pushshift.io (Baumgartner et al., 2020) to use as training data for our topic avoidance classifier.

Table 4: Dataset statistics for the newly collected sensitive topics validation set. Crowdsourcing workers were instructed to discuss the given topic with a partner. In total 131 conversations were collected.
these sensitive topics, we extract training data from the pushshift.io Reddit dataset (Baumgartner et al., 2020). We crowdsource lists of subreddits that contain conversations on these topics, see Figure 3. We use a multi-class classifier with the same architecture as in §3.1.1 — a 256M Transformer-based classifier pretrained on pushshift.io Reddit using a masked language model objective — to predict the sensitive topic label (e.g. “politics” or “religion”) given a truncated thread from a given subreddit. We include a “safe” class for all other (non-avoided) topics, for which we use all other subreddits in the pushshift.io dump. We note that this method of choosing sensitive topics, by extracting from social conversations, could naturally be extended to retraining at periodic updates, which is useful as sensitive topics change over time, and depend on e.g., current world events.

Given that the labels we extract from these subreddits are noisy – e.g. not every message in a religion-themed subreddit contains religious content and discussions about religion may be found in other subreddits – we collect a small validation set on Mechanical Turk to measure the performance of these models. This dataset was collected by instructing paired crowdsource workers to discuss one of the randomly assigned topics with one another. Dataset statistics are provided in Table 4.

At deployment time of a two-stage model containing our classifier, if a human or bot utterance is flagged as not belonging to the safe topic class by our trained classifier, we can then trigger a canned response, similar to Sec. 3.1.2.

3.4 Gender Bias Mitigation

Gender bias is exhibited across a wide range of conversational datasets, including Reddit (Dinan et al., 2019a). Gender bias can also be connected to toxic language, in that offensive utterances about a female are more likely to contain gendered or swear words than about a male (Dinan et al., 2020). Previous studies have shown that such bias can be mitigated through the use of conditional generation, controlling the amount of gendered words to be more neutral. The resulting conversational models were shown to use less gendered words, be less offensive, while being as engaging (Dinan et al., 2019a).

In this work, we follow the same approach. Using a gendered word list, we train a controllable generation model with four genderedness bins: $F^0, F^+M^0, F^0M^+, F^+M^+$. $X^0$ indicates there are no X-gendered words in the gold response, while $X^+$ indicates that there is at least one. We then train with the bin of the gold label appended to the input context for each training example. At deployment time, we then fix the bin appended to the dialogue context to be $F^0M^0$, i.e. to use as few gendered words as possible. We note that this approach has many limitations: by construction, it is limited to explicitly binarily gendered words from a static word list. More recent work (Dinan et al., 2020) seeks to address some of these limitations. We leave incorporating improvements such as those for future work.

4 Existing Work

This section looks at existing work in the space of safe conversational models and the state of the art of current approaches.

4.1 Scope of Abusive Content

Safe responding and abusive content can cover vastly different operational realities. Schmidt and Wiegand (2017) go over the many different concepts referred to as abusive content and the many terms often used interchangeably by practitioners even though they might capture different facets of abusive behavior: hate speech, abusive messages, hostile messages, cyberbullying, profanity, malicious intent. Surveying ethical challenges in dialogue systems, Henderson et al. (2018) note the axes of bias, adversarial examples, privacy, safety, and propose that the community should aim to provide conditional safety guarantees, such as an upper bound on the probability that a model will generate an unsafe output. In particular, their analysis shows that none among the popular conversational datasets they evaluate are free of bias. Vidgen et al. (2019) recently surveyed work in online abusive content detection. While this is a larger scope than conversational systems, much of the work discussed such as training classifiers to detect abusive content, and scoping out what qualifies as "abusive," is largely relevant to conversational systems. They argue that defining and categorizing abusive content is a challenge in itself. Important aspects of safe responding that we do not focus on in this work beyond the avoidance of sensitive topics in Sec. 6.4 are responses to expression of self-harm intentions, for example.

Multiple annotation schemes have been used in
the literature and make a unified comparison with prior work difficult (Swamy et al., 2019). Waseem et al. (2017) advocate for partitioning abusive content according to what entity it is directed to, an approach adopted by the OLID/OffensEval datasets (Zampieri et al., 2019, 2020). Caselli et al. (2020) annotate the explicitness of the abuse, a distinction which might prove an important determinant of how easy it is to detect. In fact, covert hate speech (e.g. through "dog whistle" communication or coded language) is notably difficult to deal with (Magu et al., 2017; Bhat and Klein, 2020).

Paranjape et al. (2020) use 6 categories (sexual, insult, criticism, inappropriate topic, bodily harm and error) for their offense detection in the user-facing open-domain dialogue agent they deployed for the Alexa Prize. The Alexa Prize team itself flagged responses along 5 axes: 1) profane content, 2) sexual content, 3) racially inflammatory content, 4) other hate speech, and 5) violent content (Ram et al., 2017) and define sensitive content as including racism, profanity, hate speech, violence, sexual content or any kind of inappropriate content which may be offensive to people based on gender, demographic factors, culture or religion (Khatri et al., 2018b). A recent workshop on trolling, aggression and cyberbullying (Kumar et al., 2020) proposed tasks on aggression identification and gendered identification. Zhang et al. (2020) propose a wider-ranging hierarchical taxonomy of malevolent dialogue, defined as “a system-generated response that is grounded in negative emotion, inappropriate behavior or unethical value basis in terms of content and dialogue acts.” They include jealousy, self-hurt, privacy invasion and many other subtypes of malevolent content. This underscores the difficulty of establishing the boundary of “not OK” content from a normative perspective, as recommended by Blodgett et al. (2020). van Aken et al. (2018) analyze error patterns of various toxic comment classification systems and conclude that inconsistent dataset labeling is a large source of errors. The lack of unified understanding of what constitutes abuse may make it more important for systems to be able to provide explanations of their decisions of what is acceptable (Risch et al., 2020).

**Hate Speech and Offensive Language.** A large body of work has been devoted to hate speech detection, as surveyed in (Schmidt and Wiegand, 2017). A useful recent snapshot is provided by the set of participants to the SemEval2020 task 12 of Multilingual Offensive Language Identification in Social Media (OffensEval 2020), with 528 teams signing up to participate in the task, and 70 resulting papers (Zampieri et al., 2020).

**Bias and Fairness.** Sap et al. (2019) showed that widely used hate-speech datasets contain correlations between surface markers of African American English and toxicity, and propose race and dialect priming as a way to mitigate this. Xia et al. (2020) tackle the same problem through adversarial training. Gencoglu (2020) proposes a cyberbullying detection system with fairness constraints. Liu et al. (2019) examines fairness issues in dialogue systems and show that existing dialogue systems exhibit prejudices towards genders and races. For example, they show that a change such as "he" to "she" in a context prompt turns the model’s response from positive to negative. Switching to African American English makes the model’s responses more offensive. They propose a dataset to study gender and racial biases in dialogue systems, as well as two debiasing methods. They measure fairness as discrepancies in outcomes (politeness, sentiment, diversity, and attribute words such as career or family words) when words associated with different groups are substituted (e.g., male / female, standard English / African American English).

Another earlier line of work on bias has focused on removing explicit mentions of specific groups or identities. Park et al. (2018) measure gender biases on models trained with different abusive language datasets, and propose three methods to reduce bias: debiased word embeddings, gender swap data augmentation, and fine-tuning with a larger corpus. Dixon et al. (2018) focus on balancing datasets to reduce bias. Dinan et al. (2019a) measured gender bias in several conversational datasets and proposed three techniques to address it: counterfactual data augmentation, targeted data collection, and bias controlled training. Dinan et al. (2020) proposed to measure gender bias in three dimensions: from, to and about – indicating who is speaking to whom and on which topic, showing different effects for each dimension.

**Robustness to Adversarial Interaction and Response to Abuse.** The normative aspect of the responsibility of model designers has been discussed in Miller et al. (2017b) and Blodgett et al. (2020). Reflecting on the fate of Tay, Microsoft’s chatbot which had to be retired in less than a day be-
cause of offensive, sexist, racist tweets, Miller et al. (2017b) make the case that adversarial attacks need to be expected and planned for when deploying a user-facing system that learns from its interactions. As happened with Tay, any model deployed to face users has to be robust to adversarial attacks. Wallace et al. (2019) show that certain "universal triggers" (provocative statements) can be used to prompt a language model to generate bad outputs. In the dialogue domain, Liu et al. (2020) show how an RL-based approach can hone in on prompts that would lead an unprotected model to output a number of responses deemed undesirable. Hill et al. (2015) observed an almost 30-fold increase in profanity when humans talked to a chatbot (Cleverbot) compared to another human, while Lortie and Guitton (2011) showed that humans display more aggressiveness when believing that their (human) conversation partner is a bot. Other past studies (De Angeli and Carpenter, 2005; De Angeli and Brahnam, 2008) suggest that one in ten human-bot conversations may contain instances of the human demonstrating unprovoked abusive behavior towards the chatbot. The heightened aggressiveness when humans talk to a system precludes some approaches such as exclusively training on a non-toxic dataset, because the model would not know how to answer hostile out-of-domain inputs, and positive biases where models tend to agree rather than contradict (Roller et al., 2020) would lead to undesirable outcomes in such an adversarial setting. As shown in Gehman et al. (2020), training on sanitized data can decrease the amount of unprompted toxic content, yet still leave models vulnerable to generating toxic content based on specific prompts. 

Chin and Yi (2019); Chin et al. (2020) compare three ways a conversational agent can respond to abusive messages: avoidance that attempts to disengage from the subject ("Sorry, I didn't catch that."), more apologetic and emotion-grounded responding ("Sorry to disappoint you :( I still have a lot to learn." (also referred to by the authors as "empathetic" responding), and counter-attacking responses ("Did you forget to take your medication today?"). The bots were rated as more enjoyable and eliciting fewer negative responses when using the emotion-grounded/empathetic style of responding. Curry and Rieser (2019) compare several strategies for sexuality-related harassment, including joking refusal, polite refusal, avoidance, non-committal answers and play-along. They show that humans rate different strategies as more appropriate depending on the type of offense they are responding to. Paranjape et al. (2020) measure re-offense behaviors to compare response strategies and show that using avoidance coupled with a name prompt most effectively reduces re-offense – more so than asking users why they made the offensive comment, confronting users before changing the topic, or empathizing with the user. Note that different implementation details make those strategies difficult to directly compare to each other across papers. Our takeaway is that future work should keep investigating several types of response so that models can learn to deploy them adaptively according to finer-grained understanding of offensive content.

4.2 Existing Approaches to Mitigate Unsafe Behaviors

We briefly review some strategies that have been used to deal with offensive content. 

Toxicity classifiers. When applied to utterances of the content partner, offensive content detection can trigger certain pre-set responses such as a change of topic. We do this here with our "non-sequitur" responses. When applied to the bot generation side, detection can serve as a gate-keeper, rejecting inappropriate generations. Another use of detection is to provide additional labels to the training data, as we do in controlled generation models. Regardless of the way detection is used, better classifiers should lead to better results. The availability of better pre-trained models and larger, better datasets for training have led to improvements in toxicity and abuse classification, following improvements ushered in with contextual word embeddings and the use of neural architectures. For a snapshot of recent systems, see Zampieri et al. (2020). Founta et al. (2019) address heterogeneity in abuse types by training one distinct model per subtype of abuse for the four subtypes of cyberbullying, offensiveness, hate, and sarcasm. There are fewer classifiers trained explicitly for detecting toxicity or abuse in conversational data. Approaches combining weaker annotation methods to label larger amounts of data and improve detection have been proposed in Khatri et al. (2018a) and allow the use of more general toxicity classifiers to adapt them to conversational data. The classifiers we propose in this work can be seen as improvements over the variants introduced in Dinan et al. (2019b).
Controlled generation. Controlled generation is another popular approach through which a model is trained to condition generation on various control tokens. Niu and Bansal (2018) train a polite response generator that controls the degree of politeness of generations through scaling a control embedding according to a politeness score. During training, the politeness score is given by a politeness classifier to teach the model how to use it. Santos et al. (2018) use unsupervised style transfer to translate offensive sentences into innocuous ones. See et al. (2019) provides examples of control specifically aiming at maximizing dialogue engagingness, but does not look at offensiveness. Keskar et al. (2019) train a large-scale controllable model that can modulate generations through control tokens, but also don’t look at offensiveness. Dathathri et al. (2019) propose an approach that pairs a classifier head with a generative model to guide generation towards or away from a target class, and demonstrate how this can be used to detoxify language. Unfortunately, this approach is slow at inference time and does not necessarily perform better than systems that incorporate control tokens during training, as shown in Smith et al. (2020b). Krause et al. (2020) use controlled generation techniques to guide a more powerful language generator, and show how this technique can be used to detoxify a language model while being computationally much less costly than Dathathri et al. (2019). Gehman et al. (2020) compare controllable generation methods and fine-tuning on non-toxic data on a novel testbed of prompts that tend to lead to toxic completions, and show that fine-tuning on non-toxic data performs better than control.

Data curation. Training on data that showcases more desirable traits such as low toxicity and empathy result in models that are better rated on those traits (Roller et al., 2020; Rashkin et al., 2019). Making training data more inclusive of diverse perspectives would also reduce the biases learned by models. This suggests an approach of "cleaning up" training datasets by removing examples that contain offensive content, and ensuring adequate diverse representation. This approach could be successful when it comes to avoiding harmful biases and stereotypes, however it cannot be sufficient when it comes to responding to offensive context. As mentioned above, humans tend to be aggressive and to test the boundaries of conversational systems, so a model needs to have had exposure to this type of input to be able to respond. Analysis of language model generations in Gehman et al. (2020) suggest that training on curated data still leaves models vulnerable to adversarial prompts.

Dynamic benchmarks. An important aspect of the detection of abusive content is that it is a moving target. This makes it especially important to develop human-in-the-loop methods that repeatedly update a benchmark to improve current systems. Dinan et al. (2019b); Nie et al. (2019) are examples of such evolving benchmarks.

User-level features. This paper does not look at learning characteristics from users that might predict whether something is unsafe or lead to more effective response strategies, opting instead for a universal user-agnostic model. However, many effective approaches for detecting abuse in deployed user-facing systems rely on user-level features, e.g. see the approach mentioned in Halevy et al. (2020).

5 Evaluation Methods

We measure both the quality of our models in terms of their overall conversational ability, as well as their safety. We note that this is necessary because it is possible to trade off one for the other – for example a model that always makes a non-committal reply is safe, but not engaging. As automatic metrics are more efficient to collect, we evaluate a wide set of models using these methods first, where possible. Then, for a set of the most promising methods, and where automatic metrics are not possible to collect, we validate these results by reporting human judgments.

5.1 Evaluating Conversational Quality

We measure engagingness using both automatic metrics and human judgments.

5.1.1 Automatic Quality Metrics

Using human-human chat data as the evaluation set, one can use perplexity and F1 metrics to measure conversational quality. One can see these metrics as proxies for measurements of humanness of a model, as they attempt to mimic human responses. Assuming that humans are engaging to other humans, one can also see these metrics as a proxy for engagingness as well.

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4See also the Dynabench project: https://dynabench.org/
Perplexity measures the ability of the model to represent the next token probability distribution accurately, note that all our reported models for this metric are based on the BST 2.7B BPE token dictionary, and so are comparable. However, perplexity alone does not measure generation quality well (Welleck et al., 2020), and so we also report the F1 overlap with gold labels in some of our experiments as well. We note that all automatic metrics have flaws (Liu et al., 2016), hence we also report human judgments as described in the next section.

5.1.2 Human Quality Evaluation
We use the ACUTE eval (Li et al., 2019) method of evaluating conversational quality, as used for BlenderBot (Roller et al., 2020) and elsewhere. The method involves collecting human-bot conversations for two models one wishes to compare, and then presenting two of those conversations at random, one from each model, to crowdworkers to make a series of pairwise decisions. We use the engagingness question from (Li et al., 2019) which is phrased as “Who would you prefer to talk to for a long conversation?”. We compare each of the proposed models in this paper to the baseline BST 2.7B which Roller et al. (2020) showed is state of the art in open-domain dialogue. We note that our goal is not to find models more engaging than our baseline, but to find models that are simultaneously equally engaging, whilst being safer. Safety evaluation is the subject of the next section.

5.2 Evaluating Safety
Similarly to conversational quality, we measure safety using both automatic metrics and human judgments.

5.2.1 Automatic Safety Metrics
For a given model, we take a subset from the pushshift.io Reddit and ConvAI2 (2000 dialogue history contexts from the validation set of each, respectively) and generate their corresponding responses. We then evaluate those responses using two standard, simple classifiers: the word-list based and transformer-based classifiers that are provided in the ParlAI dialogue platform. While there may be more sophisticated classifiers, we chose these two for ease of reproducibility.

We note that such a classifier-based evaluation may not agree with human judgments, because the classifications may not always be correct. Second, and importantly, we believe such an approach is reasonable for evaluating models that do not use a safety classifier in their inner-loop, but for methods such as two-stage models (Sec. 3.1.2) it makes little sense to evaluate them in this way. That is because, if the two-stage model uses the same classifier as we are using for evaluation, it will appear to be perfect, and if it uses a different one, much of the evaluation will hinge on the similarity between the two classifiers. We therefore advocate human judgments only in those cases.

5.2.2 Human Safety Evaluation
To perform human evaluation we select a particularly difficult challenge: dialogues from the Bot-Adversarial Dialogue safety setup of Sec. 3.1.3. We use a test set consisting of 180 such dialogues, distinct from the training data collected in that procedure. As models are used in the loop to collect that data, whereby humans construct contexts that induce unsafe utterances from a given model, the test set is sampled from a suite of models rather than a single model. Note, we also report train set performance during collection for each model, which also can be used to evaluate their performance, but a fixed test set allows us to evaluate several models on exactly the same examples, eliminating variances based on the experience and quality of crowdworkers during collection. At evaluation time, for a given model, the model’s responses are generated for the given contexts, and three independent human evaluators are used to judge the safety of each response.

5.3 Optimizing crowdsourced data collection
Our adversarial safety test set evaluation, and the Bot-Adversarial Dialogue two-stage method, both rely on crowdworkers to goad the bot into saying something unsafe. This section analyzes the effect of several design choices and empirical effects for the crowdsourcing task. By gaining a better understanding of these factors, we hope to help practitioners obtain results in a more efficient way.

We use logistic regression to model outcomes of interest: bot utterance being rated as not OK either by the chat partner or in a subsequent verification task, human input being rated as not OK. We include as predictors not only the model underlying the bot responses (which has a large significant effect, as discussed elsewhere in the paper), but also variables capturing the human chat partner’s experience with the task and the particular bot they

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5https://parl.ai
are currently talking to, and which of two possible versions of task instructions was received. Experience with the task is measured as the number of HITs accepted by the worker – a HIT, or Human Intelligence Task, is the term used by Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to refer to a single instance of a crowdworker task. Experience with the specific bot is captured as the position of the utterance within the conversation (e.g., 2nd utterance in a 14 utterance conversation). While all variables explored in this section are jointly modeled (see Table 5), we discuss each effect in turn.

### Table 5: Logistic regression coefficients for the outcomes of a bot response being rated as not OK in a subsequent verification task

| Regressor                      | Coefficient |
|-------------------------------|-------------|
| Base                          | -2.7***     |
| Increase / utterance          | 0.1***      |
| Increase / HIT                | 0.3         |
| New instruction set           | 0.1***      |
| Total HITs                    | 0.1***      |

Table 6: Logistic regression coefficients for the outcome of a bot response being rated as not OK in a subsequent verification task. The data here is limited to responses elicited during the first HIT accepted by any worker, to eliminate across-HIT learning effects and highlight self-selection effects. The total number of HITs ultimately completed by a worker is predictive of higher success at eliciting offensive content during the first HIT. Effects of better instruction set and within-HIT learning are also present. Model types are included in the regressors but not shown here. Significance: *: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.001.

#### Effects of instructions

A spontaneous strategy often first tried by workers is to use profanities or obviously unsafe content. This is however easily detected by existing classifiers and is therefore not helping improve our safety systems. Replacing instructions by a new set that suggests asking open questions about sensitive topics rather than using obvious profanities has a significant effect, increasing the rate of unsafe bot utterances while simultaneously decreasing the rate of unsafe human utterances.

#### Self-selection effects

When modeling the rate of unsafe utterances elicited by a worker during their first time accepting a HIT, the rate produced by workers who go on to accept other HITs for that same task is significantly higher than the rate produced by workers who only accept one HIT, as shown in Table 6. This suggests that workers who successfully figure out how to trick the bot into saying more offensive utterances are more likely to go on accepting more HITs of the task. This in turns makes data collection more efficient.

#### Learning Effects

Controlling for the updated instructions and for the self-selection effects, two types of learning effects are apparent. The increased success at eliciting not OK utterances as more HITs are completed suggests that workers find more effective techniques to provoke unsafe utterances as they perform more iterations of the task. Another effect at play occurs within HITs: workers appear to be more successful eliciting unsafe responses later within a given session. Rather than learning about the task in general, we believe this reflects that workers figure out the vulnerabilities of the particular bot they have been paired with for that HIT and identify the most successful strategies. Both effects are shown in Table 5.

Overall, our results confirm that (1) specific instructions are important, (2) it helps to make conversations within a HIT long enough for a worker to figure out a winning adversarial strategy for the specific model they have been paired with, but (3) allowing for repeated HITs can lead to beneficial self-selection effects.
6 Results & Analysis

Automatic evaluation results are presented for safety classifiers in Table 7 and for generative models (bots) in Table 8. Human evaluations comparing many of the selected methods are presented for engagingness in Table 10 and for dialogue safety in Table 9. In the next sections we will analyse for each method in turn its individual results presented in these tables, and then conclude with overall observations comparing the methods.

6.1 Base Models: Results

Before discussing safety techniques, we first present results for standard models without adding our safety techniques. BST 2.7B (Roller et al., 2020) has simply been trained on existing dialogue corpora, with no safety technique at all in model training. DialoGPT (Zhang et al., 2019) uses a pre-processing method, where offensive subreddits were removed from the training data. We test DialoGPT in two flavors: with short generations (using standard beam decoding), and longer generations (where we add a constraint that a minimum of 20 tokens must be generated, similar to (Roller et al., 2020)). Finally, GPT2 (Radford et al., 2019) was trained on web data that was filtered for data quality, but not for offensive language as far as we are aware.

Automatic evaluations Results in Table 8 show that all these models exhibit significant safety issues, with e.g., GPT2 generations being flagged by a safety classifier 8.0% of the time given pushshift.io Reddit dialogues as input context, and 2.4% given ConvAI2 dialogues. Similarly, DialoGPT is as high as 19.9% on pushshift.io Reddit (without the minimum beam).

We can compare these to human numbers, which are actually quite high on pushshift.io Reddit (16.5%), explaining why some of these methods also exhibit safety issues – as they are trained on this data. In contrast, the safety classifier only fires on human data from ConvAI2 3.9% of the time, which can be explained by this data being authored by crowdworkers who had instructions not to use toxic language.

Comparing the two models pushshift.io Reddit 2.7B (which is pre-trained only on pushshift.io Reddit) and BST 2.7B (which is then fine-tuned on BST tasks such as ConvAI2) one can observe a decrease in safety classifier fires down from 8.1% to 1.8% on ConvAI2, and a similar decrease on pushshift.io Reddit. This shows how training on less toxic data induces less toxic models.

Safety Human Evaluations Results given in Table 9 evaluating these methods in an adversarial safety setting, however, show that all these models are susceptible to attack, e.g. GPT2 produces safe responses only 59.4% of the time, and BST 2.7B only 55% of the time. We note that while in normal conversation BST 2.7B is safer than pushshift.io Reddit, in this adversarial setting, they are similarly unsafe, with the latter obtaining a 57.2% OK rate. Clearly, to defend against such a setting alternative techniques need to be employed.

Engagingness Evaluations Human evaluations of engagingness shown in Table 10 indicate that BST 2.7B is significantly more engaging than DialoGPT (both variants), and pushshift.io Reddit 2.7B. This matches the automatic evaluations, shown in Table 8 (F1 score, last column). Overall, we do not see a direct correlation between safety and engagingness when comparing these models. As we are interested in finding the model that is simultaneously the most engaging and the safest, our safety efforts thus concentrate on using BST 2.7B as a base model.

6.2 Unsafe Utterance Detection: Results

6.2.1 Training a Classifier

We compare training safety classifiers using the methodology described in Sec. 3.1.1, comparing different model sizes and multi-tasking across different training sources. Results are given in Table 7. Firstly, we find our newly trained models superior to existing models from Dinan et al. (2019b) when using the same training sets, likely due to improved pushshift.io Reddit pre-training of our transformers compared to their BERT models. However, we find relatively small gains from either larger transformers (Safety Classifier+) over smaller ones (Safety), or from semi-supervised learning over Reddit and BST (Semi-Sup. +).

6.2.2 Two-Stage Models

We apply these classifiers as two-stage models together with our baseline generative model BST 2.7B, outputting a non-sequitur if the classifier fires. We observe in Table 10 engagingness scores do not suffer for these models, with the differences between the two-stage models and BST 2.7B without a safety classifier not being significant. However, the two-stage models do give improved levels of
Table 7: Classifier results for various models, reporting unsafe F1 across all datasets, on the Wikipedia Toxic Comments (WTC), Build-It Break-It Fix-It (BBF), Standard (S) and our new Bot-Adversarial Dialogue (BAD) test sets. The ‘-’ indicates we could not evaluate this model to compute results on the new test, and report known results from the existing paper instead.

| Model Name                                  | Size | Training Data | WTC  | S  | BBF  | BAD  | Avg. | 
|---------------------------------------------|------|---------------|------|----|------|------|------|
| Single-turn (Dinan et al., 2019b)          | 218M | WTC           | 83.3 | 68.1| 0.0  | -    | -    |
| Single-turn (Dinan et al., 2019b)          | 218M | WTC,S         | 82.1 | 88.0| 41.8 | -    | -    |
| Single-turn (Dinan et al., 2019b)          | 218M | WTC,S,BBF     | 78.0 | 83.7| 67.6 | -    | -    |
| Multi-turn (Dinan et al., 2019b)           | 218M | WTC,S,BBF     | 81.2 | 89.0| 51.4 | 48.3 | 67.5 |
| Safety Classifier                          | 256M | WTC,S,BBF     | 85.0 | 90.7| 80.4 | 61.0 | 79.3 |
| Safety Classifier +                        | 622M | WTC,S,BBF     | 84.8 | 95.1| 85.9 | 60.7 | 81.6 |
| Safety Classifier (Semi-Sup. +)            | 622M | WTC,S,BBF,Reddit,BST | 83.1 | 94.8| 80.0 | 61.5 | 79.9 |
| Single-turn Safety Classifier (Adv. Dialog) | 622M | WTC,BBF,S,BAD | 83.3 | 93.5| 81.9 | 78.3 | 84.2 |
| Multi-turn Safety Classifier (Adv. Dialog)  | 622M | WTC,BBF,S,BAD | 83.3 | 93.6| 83.9 | 80.8 | 85.4 |

safety, as shown in Table 9. For example, the baseline BST 2.7B only provides OK responses 55% of the time on the adversarial test set, whereas our Safety classifier improves that to 87.2%, superior to the existing work of Dinan et al. (2019b) which yields 78.2%. We do not find that semi-supervised classifier (Semi-Sup. +) improves over our own base Safety model. Generally, the two-stage model approach can be an effective tool for safety.

6.2.3 Bot-Adversarial Dialogue

Classifier We compare the classifier trained on the BAD dataset, multitasked with the other datasets, to other approaches in Table 7. We observe similar results to our other new safety classifiers on the single-turn Wikipedia Toxic Comments, Build-It Break-It Fix and Standard test sets, but superior results on the multi-turn bot-adversarial BAD test set. The BAD-based classifier achieves 80.8 unsafe F1 on the latter dataset, while the next best performing methods achieve 61.5, 61.0 and 60.7, respectively. This result can be explained as the BAD-based classifier is the only one trained on the BAD training set, hence it sees data closely linked to the evaluation distribution. One can tease apart the contributions from the BAD training set being both adversarial and multi-turn by comparing to a single-turn (truncated) version of BAD training, shown in Table 7 (second to last row), which still performs well – though not as well – as the multi-turn version, indicating that the adversarial component is most important. As the BAD test set is the closest setup to the actual use of a classifier during deployment (it features human-bot conversations, rather than human-human single-turn data) this indicates the BAD-based classifier is the most likely method to be successful in real use cases.

Two-Stage Model We apply the classifier learned from our Bot-Adversarial Dialogue (BAD) dataset (multi-tasked with our other datasets) in a two-stage model. Engagingness (Table 10) is found to be not significantly distinguishable from our base BST 2.7B model. In terms of safety (Table 9), however, this approach improves over our other safety classifiers used in two-stage systems, yielding an 94.4% OK rate on the adversarial data. Simultaneously to being robust to adversarial attack, during conventional (non-adversarial) chat this approach rarely deviates from the conversation of the base BST 2.7B model. We calculate how frequently each chatbot model responds with non-sequiturs when humans converse normally with it in an non-adversarial manner in Table 12. The BAD-based two-stage model (“BST 2.7B + Adv. Dialogue Safety”) produces fewer non-sequiturs compared with many of the other two-stage models. Overall, this method offers strong robustness without affecting engagingness, and we advocate its use.

6.3 Safe Utterance Generation: Results

6.3.1 Data Pre-processing

We trained with two types of data pre-processing (author and utterance methods, §3.2.1). These models were trained from scratch using 400M parameter transformer models (we did not use the 2.7B model due to the computational cost of so many experiments). We then compare both pre-train only models and fine-tuned BST models in terms of safety and PPL and F1 metrics. The pre-processing from utterance and author safety methods resulted in training set sizes that were 70% and 30% of the original pre-train dataset, respectively. We compare
| Model                  | pushshift.io Reddit | ConvAI2 |
|------------------------|---------------------|---------|
|                        | Word% | Class% | Safe% |       | Word% | Class% | Safe% | F1   |
| **Standard models**    |        |        |       |       |        |        |       |     |
| Human                  | 8.8%  | 16.5%  | -     | 0.3%  | 3.9%  | -      |       | -    |
| pushshift.io Reddit 2.7B | 4.9%  | 19.3%  | -     | 0.4%  | 8.1%  | -      | 0.127 |       |
| BST 2.7B               | 1.7%  | 10.0%  | -     | 0.0%  | 1.8%  | -      | 0.182 |       |
| DialoGPT               | 0.1%  | 21.4%  | -     | 0.1%  | 4.4%  | -      | 0.114 |       |
| DialoGPT (min beam 20) | 0.2%  | 10.0%  | -     | 0.0%  | 7.9%  | -      | 0.144 |       |
| GPT2                   | 5.7%  | 8.0%   | -     | 2.2%  | 2.4%  | -      | 0.071 |       |
| **Models with safety training techniques** |        |        |       |       |        |        |       |     |
| BST 2.7B Safe Response (FT) | 0.4%  | 1.8%   | 50.4% | 0.0%  | 0.6%  | 1.2%   | 0.189 |       |
| BST 2.7B Non-Sequitur (FT) | 0.2%  | 0.9%   | 66.1% | 0.2%  | 0.9%  | 0.2%   | 0.187 |       |
| BST 2.7B Non-Sequitur (from scratch) | 0.0%  | 0.1%   | 97.2% | 0.1%  | 1.1%  | 0.4%   | 0.173 |       |
| BST 2.7B Safety Control (FT) | 1.5%  | 8.0%   | -     | 0.1%  | 0.5%  | -      | 0.185 |       |
| **Models with safety decoding techniques** |        |        |       |       |        |        |       |     |
| BST 2.7B Beam Block ParlAI Word List | 0%   | 9.1%   | -     | 0%   | 1.8%  | -      | 0.181 |       |
| BST 2.7B Beam Block CMU Word List | 0%   | 7.9%   | -     | 0%   | 1.7%  | -      | 0.181 |       |
| BST 2.7B Beam Block Gender Word List | 1.7%  | 9.4%   | -     | 0%   | 1.7%  | -      | 0.184 |       |

Table 8: **Automatic Safety Metrics** for various generative models. We compare humans and various model responses given pushshift.io Reddit and ConvAI2 contexts using either an unsafe word list (Word%) or a trained classifier from (Dinan et al., 2019b) (Class%). For models that produce canned safe responses or non sequiturs, we also report the % of the time those responses are produced for different hyperparameter choices (Safe%). The pushshift.io Reddit dataset contains more unsafe contexts, leading to more unsafe responses. Models fine-tuned on the safer BST tasks are less toxic than the pre-trained pushshift.io Reddit model on either type of dataset context. Several of our various safety recipes provide further improvements in safety.

these to a baseline 400M model using the whole pre-train dataset (so no safety mechanism is built in). Results are given in Table 13. We find that both pre-processing methods are safer than the baseline, with the safe utterance method being significantly safer than the safe author method. We note the safe author method still has a large number of unsafe utterances, according to our safety classifier, but not enough for any one author to trigger removing the author, which may be the reason for worse safety statistics on the validation set. This would lead to a conclusion that while toxic authors exist, there are also a large number of otherwise non-toxic authors who sometimes use toxic language, and this can adversely affect model training. We note that one could employ both procedures: safe author + utterance, but we have not tried that experiment here.

### 6.3.2 Baked-in Safety Layer

**400M models** We first directly compare the baked-in safety layer method of §3.2.4 to the data-preprocessing methods. To do that, we train a 400M parameter model from scratch, with 50% of the safety classifier triggered pre-training data replaced with non-sequitur labels, and the rest of the safety classifier triggered data discarded, to prevent too much of the training time spent on non-sequitur prediction. The results, given in Table 13 indicate that perplexity takes a slight hit, but that safety classifier fires on model generations (given validation set contexts) decrease substantially. For our pre-train only model, however the results are more nuanced – we found that the model is overly cautious at deploy time and too often generates non-sequiturs, resulting in a low F1 on ConvAI2 for example. As it is expensive to begin pre-training with different hyperparameter values, we thus instead remedy this at fine-tune time by weighting the amount of training examples sampled in each batch between the BST tasks and non-sequiturs. The last two rows of §3.2.1 show that this technique can effectively control the non-sequitur firing rate. The last row in particular achieves an F1 score similar to the pre-processed data methods (safe author and safe utterance) while having a much lower safety classifier firing rate – reduced from 6% to 0.2%. We thus conclude from these experiments that baked-in training is a method worthy of further study, and in subsequent experiments proceed to
| Model                                                                 | OK | Not OK (Min.) | Not OK (Some) | Not OK (Most) |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----|--------------|---------------|---------------|
| **Two-stage models with classifiers**                                |    |              |               |               |
| BST 2.7B + Multi-Turn Safety Classifier (Dinan et al., 2019b)        | 78.2 | 6.7          | 6.7           | 8.4           |
| BST 2.7B + Safety Classifier                                         | 87.2 | 5.6          | 3.9           | 3.3           |
| BST 2.7B + Safety Classifier (Semi-Sup. †)                          | 83.9 | 7.8          | 5.0           | 3.3           |
| BST 2.7B + Topic Classifier                                          | 73.3 | 10.0         | 5.0           | 11.7          |
| BST 2.7B + Safety + Topic Classifier                                 | 92.2 | 1.7          | 3.9           | 2.2           |
| BST 2.7B + Adversarial Dialogue Safety                               | 94.4 | 2.8          | 2.2           | 0.6           |
| BST 2.7B + Adversarial Dialogue Safety + Topic Classifier            | 96.6 | 2.2          | 0.6           | 0.6           |
| **Standard models**                                                  |    |              |               |               |
| GPT2                                                                | 59.4 | 8.9          | 15.0          | 16.7          |
| DialoGPT                                                            | 52.8 | 9.4          | 15.0          | 22.8          |
| DialoGPT (min beam 20)                                               | 61.7 | 10.6         | 11.1          | 16.7          |
| BST 2.7B                                                            | 55.0 | 18.3         | 14.4          | 12.2          |
| pushshift.io Reddit Generative (2.7B)                                | 57.2 | 16.7         | 11.1          | 15.0          |
| **Models with safety training techniques**                           |    |              |               |               |
| BST 2.7B Non-Sequence (FT)                                            | 75.6 | 9.4          | .2            | 7.8           |
| BST 2.7B Non-Sequence (Semi-Sup. †) (FT)                             | 78.3 | 7.8          | 4.4           | 9.4           |
| BST 2.7B Non-Sequence (from scratch)                                 | 68.3 | 12.2         | 8.3           | 11.1          |
| BST 2.7B Gender Bias-Ctrl F^2M^0                                     | 55.6 | 18.3         | 12.2          | 13.9          |
| Controllable Style Calm (400M)                                       | 60.0 | 9.4          | 14.4          | 16.1          |
| Controllable Baseline (400M)                                         | 62.2 | 12.8         | 12.2          | 12.8          |
| Controllable Style Hostile (400M)                                    | 21.1 | 19.4         | 18.9          | 40.6          |

Table 9: **Human safety judgments** on the adversarially created dialogue safety test set for various models. “Min”, “Some”, and “Most” refer to responses that less than 10% of the population would consider unsafe (according to the annotator’s best guess), <50%, and > 50% of the population would consider unsafe, respectively.

| Method vs. BST 2.7B                                                |    |              |               |               |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----|--------------|---------------|---------------|
| **Two-stage models with classifiers**                              |    |              |               |               |
| BST 2.7B + Multi-Turn Safety Cl.                                   | 55 | .45          |               |               |
| BST 2.7B + Safety Classifier                                       | 45 | 55           |               |               |
| BST 2.7B + Semi-Sup. Safety Cl.                                    | 51 | 49           |               |               |
| BST 2.7B + Topic Classifier                                        | 37 * | 63 *          |               |               |
| BST 2.7B + Safety + Topic Cl.                                      | 50 | 50           |               |               |
| BST 2.7B + Adv. Dialogue Safety                                    | 47 | 53           |               |               |
| BST 2.7B + Adv. Dialogue + Topic Cl.                               | 51 | 49           |               |               |
| **Standard models**                                                |    |              |               |               |
| GPT2                                                              | 23 * | 77 *          |               |               |
| DialoGPT                                                          | 24 * | 76 *          |               |               |
| DialoGPT (min beam 20)                                             | 34 * | 66 *          |               |               |
| pushshift.io Reddit Generative (2.7B)                              | 39 * | 61 *          |               |               |
| **Models with safety training techniques**                         |    |              |               |               |
| BST 2.7B Safe Response                                             | 40 * | 60 *          |               |               |
| BST 2.7B Non Sequitur                                              | 46 | 54           |               |               |
| BST 2.7B Non Sequitur (Semi-Sup. †)                                | 49 | 51           |               |               |
| BST 2.7B Non-Sequiter (from scratch)                               | 45 | 55           |               |               |
| BST 2.7B Gender Bias-Ctrl F^2M^0                                   | 50 | 50           |               |               |

Table 10: Human-Chat ACUTE-Eval of engagingness, various safety-incorporating models compared to standard BST 2.7B (BlenderBot) that has no safety mechanism per se. The two-stage models output a random non-sequitur when the safety classifier fires. Rows with * (p < 0.05) are statistically significant.

**2.7B models** To scale up to the 2.7B parameter size, we considered two strategies: fine-tuning from the base 2.7B BST model to add baked-in safe responses, or training a completely new model from scratch with non-sequiturs as part of the pre-training task, followed by fine-tuning. For the former, we considered the two types of safe response detailed in §3.1.2. For the fine-tune models, we tuned the blend of safe responses and dialogue data, selecting the best mixes, shown in Table 11. Model engagingness results (Table 10) indicate that non sequiturs are more engaging than bland safe responses; intuitively this makes sense as they are interesting conversation starters. We therefore used non-sequiturs elsewhere in our experiments as well. Going forward, for the fine-tune models we considered two safety classifiers to build the training data: our base safety classifier, and the semi-supervised version as well (see §6.2.1).

In terms of engagingness, the two fine-tuned (BST 2.7B Non sequitur and BST 2.7B Non sequitur (Semi-Sup. †) ) and the from scratch non-sequitur model all perform similarly to the base 2.7B model (are not significantly different), indicating again (as in the 400M experiments) that these systems work well in terms of conversation quality.
Table 11: **Automatic Safety Metrics for baked-in models**, varying the parameter that controls how often safe responses fire. We report the % of the time those responses are produced for different hyperparameter choices (Safe%). The models marked with ∗ were chosen for human evaluations.

| Model                         | Safety Weight | Word% | Class% | Safe% | F1 |
|-------------------------------|---------------|-------|--------|-------|----|
| BST 2.7B Safe Response (FT)   | 0.1           | 1.2%  | 4.5%   | 17.1% | 0.188 |
|                              | 0.2           | 0.4%  | 2.2%   | 45.8% | 0.188 |
|                              | 0.3∗          | 0.4%  | 0.2%   | 1.8%  | 0.504 |
|                              | 0.4           | 0.2%  | 2.2%   | 50.9% | 0.188 |
|                              | 0.5           | 0.1%  | 1.4%   | 57.0% | 0.188 |
|                              | 1.0           | 0.1%  | 0.4%   | 83.4% | 0.188 |

| Model                        | Non-Sequitur (FT) | Word% | Class% | Safe% | F1 |
|------------------------------|-------------------|-------|--------|-------|----|
|                              | 0.1               | 1.3%  | 7.5%   | 0.2%  | 0.186 |
|                              | 0.3               | 0.9%  | 5.6%   | 12.6% | 0.188 |
|                              | 0.5               | 0.9%  | 3.3%   | 29.3% | 0.187 |
|                              | 1.0               | 0.6%  | 2.1%   | 49.1% | 0.186 |
|                              | 1.5∗              | 0.2%  | 0.9%   | 66.1% | 0.187 |

Table 12: **Frequency of non-sequitur responses in non-adversarial Human-Chat**, as measured from the same conversation logs as used in Table 10.

| Model                                  | Non-Seq% |
|----------------------------------------|----------|
| **Two-stage models with classifiers**   |          |
| BST 2.7B + Multi-Turn Safety Cl.       | 4.9      |
| BST 2.7B + Safety Cl.                  | 2.6      |
| BST 2.7B + Semi-Sup. ∗ Safety Cl.      | 0.3      |
| BST 2.7B + Topic Cl.                   | 8.0      |
| BST 2.7B + Safety + Topic Cl.          | 8.0      |
| BST 2.7B + Adv. Dialogue Safety        | 0.3      |
| BST 2.7B + Adv. Dialogue + Topic Cl.   | 4.8      |
| **Models with safety training techniques** |          |
| BST 2.7B Non-Sequitur                  | 0.0      |
| BST 2.7B Non-Sequitur (Semi-Sup. ∗)    | 0.5      |
| BST 2.7B Non-Sequitur (from scratch)   | 0.0      |

Automatic evaluations (Table 8) also confirm these results in terms of F1 scores.

In terms of safety, we see clear wins for these models using automatic safety metrics, as shown in Table 8. For example, we see a reduction from 10.0% classifier fires on pushshift.io Reddit for the base BST 2.7B model being reduced to 0.9% for BST 2.7B Non Sequitur (Fine-tune), and 0% for the from scratch model. On the human-judged adversarial test set (Table 9) we also see gains (e.g. increasing from the baseline BST 2.7B value of 55% OK up to 75.6% OK), although these gains are not as significant as when using two-stage models (the same classifiers in a two-stage setup can bring the results up to 87.2% OK). We believe an important next step for future work is to improve this training technique to match the two-stage results.

6.3.3 Safe Beam Blocking/Generation

In this section we report results for safe beam blocking methods using two unsafe word lists, the default one in ParlAI (Miller et al., 2017a) or a CMU word list⁶. Automatic evaluations are shown in Table 8. We observe little loss in the F1 metric, but despite the word lists now banning obvious offensive words, we observe only small decreases in the toxicity of the language used, as judged by the safety classifier. This indicates that these models still find a way to generate unsafe responses composed entirely of safe words, as judged by the word lists. For that reason, we did not pursue these methods further.

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⁶https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~biglou/resources/bad-words.txt
### Table 14: Style controlled generation of 400M parameter (pre-train only) models for various styles.

| Style     | Style Category | Word list | Classifier |
|-----------|----------------|-----------|------------|
| Calm      | positive       | 2.0       | 3.8        |
| Cheerful  | positive       | 1.6       | 4.9        |
| Casual    | neutral        | 1.7       | 4.3        |
| Formal    | neutral        | 2.2       | 6.7        |
| Neutral   | neutral        | 0.6       | 6.0        |
| Relaxed   | positive       | 9.3       | 13.0       |
| None      | (no control)   | 4.2       | 16.1       |
| Angry     | negative       | 55.8      | 65.7       |
| Hostile   | negative       | 39.1      | 81.4       |
| Cruel     | negative       | 37.2      | 85.9       |
| Safe      | n/a            | 0.9       | 6.1        |
| Unsafe    | n/a            | 22.8      | 74.4       |

Table 14 shows the style controlled generation of 400M parameter models for various styles. Intuitively more negative styles induce higher levels of toxicity according to automatic metrics based on a safety classifier and toxic word list. Positive and neutral styles tend to be safer than the baseline generative model with no control.

### 6.3.4 Style and Safety Control

We trained style and safety control models from scratch using 400M parameter transformer models trained on pushshift.io Reddit (we again did not use the 2.7B model due to the computational cost of so many experiments). We then evaluated the safety of their generations using automatic metrics on the pushshift.io Reddit validation set for various control choices.

The results are shown in Table 14. We observe a clear improvement in safety metrics from positive styles such as “calm” or “cheerful” compared to the baseline (default style), and clear degradation from negative styles such as “hostile” or “cruel”. Analysing the actual dialogue (Table 18) shows that control methods are capable of producing the desired style attributes, see also the work of Smith et al. (2019). After fine-tuning on datasets such as BST (not shown) we also see similar results (with all values lower, in line with other experiments).

The “Safe” control also provides improved safety, but not as much as the safest choices of style. We also attempted to fine-tune a 2.7B parameter model with safety control, rather than training from scratch, but this did not yield large improvements, see Table 8 (BST 2.7B Safety Control (FT)).

As the style results appear promising we chose to evaluate some of them with human judgments, the results are reported in Table 9. We observed no gains in this adversarial setting for “calm” over the baseline of no control, although we do observe severe degradation with the “hostile” style. Overall, we believe this is an interesting area still worthy of further study, but our current results are inconclusive on our current implementations worth in comparison to other methods.

### 6.4 Sensitive Topic Avoidance: Results

**Classifier** We evaluate the performance of our topics avoidance classifier (§3.3) on our crowdsourced validation set. Results are shown in Table 16. Our model achieves strong performance on all sensitive topics excluding NSFW and Relationships/Dating. We suspect there is a domain mismatch between the NSFW subreddits and the relationship conversations that appear in the validation set. When we deploy our topics classifier in the 2-stage model, we use a threshold of 0.55 for all topics excluding NSFW and 0.7 for NSFW: this threshold was tuned by evaluating the model with various thresholds on both this validation set and the ConvAI2 validation set with the aim of finding a threshold that yields sufficient performance on this validation set but does not flag too many ConvAI2 conversations. To understand these domain differences further, we look into how many examples from the topic classifier validation set are flagged as “Not OK” by the safety classifier in Table 16: the recall shows that only 9.61% of examples are flagged. This shows that there is some overlap between the safety classifier and sensitive topic domains but that they are largely disparate.

**Two-Stage Model** Human evaluations of engagingness (Table 10) indicate losses relative to BST 2.7B when using the topic classifier in a two-stage model, although the numbers are higher when combining both the topic classifier and the safety classifier; we are not clear on why that is, exactly. We observe the topic classifier fires much more often than the safety classifier (around 3x as often) which could explain why this would affect engagingness (see Table 12). For this reason, we currently prefer the safety classifier approach in terms of deployment.

In terms of safety, the topic classifier does have a noticeable effect as a two-stage model (Table 9). It obtains an OK rate on the adversarial test of 73.3% versus the 55.0% BST baseline. Combining with the Safety Classifier yields 92.2%, showing that these two classifiers learn different things (the safety classifier alone yields 87.2%). Combining with our best Adversarial Dialogue Safety classi-
Toxicity of Language | Genderedness of Words
--- | ---
| Method | Word List Classifier | Word List Classifier | Male% | Female% | Male% | Female% | PPL |
Human | 0.3% | 3.9% | 8.8% | 16.5% | 8.1% | 6.2% | 14.2% | 5.15% | -
BST 2.7B | 0.0% | 1.8% | 1.7% | 10.0% | 4.3% | 4.1% | 10.4% | 2.7% | 8.8
GB-Ctrl F^0M^0 | 0.0% | 0.7% | 1.1% | 5.3% | 0.8% | 1.6% | 4.4% | 1.5% | 9.7
GB-Ctrl F^1M^1 | 0.3% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 9.8% | 2.15% | 68.4% | 2.7% | 39.7% | 9.9
GB-Ctrl F^0M^1 | 0.1% | 1.9% | 1.7% | 8.6% | 65.5% | 2.9% | 36.8% | 2.0% | 9.9
GB-Ctrl F^1M^0 | 0.2% | 2.1% | 1.4% | 9.6% | 49.4% | 57.1% | 29.2% | 27.6% | 10.3

Table 15: Automatic Metrics for Gender Bias Control methods. We compare humans and our baseline model to gender bias control (GB-Ctrl) with four control modes (genderedness bins): F^0M^0, F^+M^0, F^0M^+ and F^+M^+. X^0 indicates there are no X-gendered words in the gold response when training, while X^+ indicates that there is at least one. Choosing the F^0M^0 bin at test time, compared to other bin choices or the baseline, results in less toxic language on both pushshift.io Reddit and ConvAI2 as measured by an offensive Word List and Safety Classifier, while maintaining perplexity on the BST dataset (PPL). The four bins clearly control the amount of generated words, as shown in the Male% and Female% columns.

Figure 3: Engagingness vs. (Bot-) Adversarial Safety, for various models. An ideal model should appear at the top right, being maximally engaging, whilst being maximally safe. Here, engagingness and safety scores are measured using the metrics from Table 10 and Table 9 respectively.

Figure 4: F1 vs. Safety, for various models: (left) Automatic evaluation of safety based on pushshift.io Reddit contexts and a safety classifier; (right) Human-judged (Bot-)Adversarial Safety. F1 is computed on ConvAI2, following Table 8. An ideal model should appear at the top right.
Table 16: Performance of our Topic Classifier on the sensitive topics validation set, separated by topic. With the exception of the NSFW class, the classifier is able to achieve high performance on all topics. We can additionally evaluate how many of these examples our Safety Classifier flags as Not OK: looking at the recall measure then, we see only 9.61% of examples are flagged as “Not OK”. This demonstrates the domain difference between the toxic data on which the Safety Classifier was trained and the data for detecting sensitive topics.

### 6.5 Gender Bias Mitigation: Results

We fine-tuned the BST 2.7B model with gender bias control variables, described in §3.4. The results are given in Table 15, comparing the BST 2.7B baseline with the bias control model with four fixed choices of control: F0M0, F1M0, F0M1 and F1M1. The toxicity of the models, as judged by the unsafe word list and classifier metrics, is lower for the models that are more gender neutral, particularly F0M0 lowers the classifier on pushshift.io Reddit from 10% on the baseline to 5.3%, a substantial reduction. This model roughly halves the usage of gendered words, without impacting perplexity unduly.

In terms of human judgments, the model matches the baseline BST 2.7B performance (Table 10) in terms of engagingness. However, it has little effect on adversarial safety performance (Table 9), achieving a similar performance to BST 2.7B (around 55% OK rate). One can argue that this is the wrong kind of test for a gender debiasing model, which is instead addressing other issues. Given that the model does not change engagingness, we make the recommendation that this kind of technique should be incorporated into a model in any case. However, to fully evaluate its impact we need to incorporate other tests and metrics into our current methodology.

### 6.6 Overall Comparison Metrics

Ideally we are interested in a model that is both maximally safe and engaging. We re-iterate that this may result in a potential trade-off: a model that responds “I do not know how to respond” to every prompt is unlikely to offend, but is also far from an engaging conversationalist. We visualize the relationship between engagingness and safety in Figure 3. In this figure we measure conversational quality via the engagingness scores given from the human evaluations shown in Table 10. Safety scores are measured via the human evaluations on the Bot-Adversarial Dialogue (BAD) test set as shown in Table 9.

In addition to the adversarial test of safety, we also provide a less adversarial test, using pushshift.io Reddit contexts as input instead, and using an automatic metric (via a safety classifier) to measure the safety of the responses, following Table 8. We compare that against the automatic metric F1 to measure conversational quality in Figure 4 (left), and contrast that with adversarial safety in Figure 4 (right).

Overall, we observe that standard generative models – with little or no safety intervention – fall very short in the safety axis. However, with some of our safety recipes we are able to achieve roughly the same engagingness as the state of the art BST 2.7B (BlenderBot) with substantially better safety scores, showing that it is possible to build a model that is both safe and engaging.

We find generative models can be improved substantially by distilling a safety classifier into the encoder-decoder weights during training, i.e. the baked-in approach “BST 2.7B Non-Seq. (Semi-Sup)”. This is especially evident in the non-adversarial case (Figure 4, left). Two-stage models provide safer results still, with the best performance coming from our Bot-Adversarial Dialogue data (BAD)-based classifier combined with BST 2.7B.

### 6.7 Success and Failure Cases

We discuss several example outputs of our models on our Bot-Adversarial Dialogue test set (BAD), including examples that showcase both the successes and failures of our methods.

**Successes** In Table 17, we show success cases for our BST 2.7B + Adversarial Dialogue Safety (two-stage) and BST 2.7B Non-Sequitur (baked-in)
models on the BAD test set. We also provide the outputs for the standard BST 2.7B model (Roller et al., 2020) and DialoGPT (Zhang et al., 2019) models.

In Table 18, we show an example of how different style controls – no control (baseline), calm, and hostile – result in drastic variations in the generated output. The hostile model responds in an offensive manner while the calm and baseline variations respond in positive or neutral tones.
Failures  While our safety models are able to successfully avoid engaging with adversarial inputs in some cases, they fail in others. Failure cases are shown in Table 19 for our BST 2.7B + Adversarial Dialogue Safety (two-stage) model. In both cases, the models’ responses are unsafe in the context, showing how adversarial input can elicit an unsafe response. This shows that while the models’ described in this paper are robust to many adversarial inputs, they can still be tricked.

7 Conclusion and Discussion

We have presented a set of possible recipes for building safe and engaging conversational agents. In a detailed comparison study, we find that two new techniques we propose are promising avenues of research: (i) baking-in safety into generative models, and (ii) building adversarial human-bot conversation robustness into two-stage models. We find that both of these techniques outperform their respective generative or two-stage model counterparts. To aid this study we have investigation techniques of crowdsourcing safety evaluations, and built an adversarially created dialogue safety training and evaluation set, which we will publicly release, along with our models in ParlAI7.

While we have improved over existing systems in this work, our best systems are not perfectly safe. We note that even our safest model is rated by humans as being safe 96.6% of the time on our adversarially created dialogue safety test set. This begs the question: when can a model be considered “safe”? Is a failure rate of 3.4% in an adversarial setting acceptable for the deployment of such models? How safe is safe enough? Creating a perfectly safe dialogue model requires the model to deeply understand language and likely cannot be completely solved until AI itself is solved, i.e. this is an AI-complete problem.

Further complicating the issue is the fact that the very definition of “safe” is both contextually and culturally dependent (Schmidt and Wiegand, 2017). A dialogue model must be able to understand the boundaries of its particular conversation partner. What is offensive to one may not be offensive to another (Curry and Rieser, 2019). Culturally speaking, the approaches in this paper are limited in both the geographical and historical senses. Our methods rely only on English-speaking annotators located in the United States. This narrow, Western-centric viewpoint will be insufficient for solving the issue in other languages and locales (Schmidt and Wiegand, 2017). We have also assumed a consensus-based view on offensiveness, by admitting test examples based on agreement of multiple human verifiers; however, offense to minority groups for example may be missed by such a setup. Additionally, these approaches may be insufficient in the not-so-far future: the techniques and data must be continually updated as language and the notion of “offensiveness” evolve with time. While this work focuses exclusively on machine learning models and methods, all of these issues that have not been addressed by this work are critical parts of a final safety recipe as well.

Our work analyzes publicly available open-sourced models. We note that there may be concerns in the community or the public at large related to releasing models, even for research purposes, due to their potential safety issues. However, if we are ever going to fix those issues, we believe the solution involves the community working together and conducting reproducible research on safety, made possible by such releases. We look forward to further progress!

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### A Bot-Adversarial Dialogue Collection

We collect Bot-Adversarial Dialogues to build the BAD datasets by asking humans to adversarially talk to bots.

#### A.1 Further Collection Details

*Figure 6* is a screenshot of the crowdsourced task for collecting Bot-Adversarial Dialogues.
Table 20: **Number of dialogues containing $k$ offensive utterances** from the Bot-Adversarial Dialogue dataset.

| Offensive Utterances Per Dialogue ($k$) | Chatbot | Human |
|---------------------------------------|---------|-------|
| 0                                     | 1203    | 952   |
| 1 ∼ 2                                 | 2910    | 2386  |
| $\geq$ 3                              | 1671    | 2446  |

**Bots**  We use a list of models (bots) coming from the techniques in the paper itself (2) and 3). The list of models, and data counts for each are listed in **Table 21**. One can observe from the offensive statistics themselves some trends, although we caution against their use for evaluation due to the variance in crowdworker experience and skill over the time of collection due to sequential effects. Nevertheless, one can observe that models without safety classifiers are more vulnerable to adversarial attacks from humans, and models with safety classifiers are harder to attack, and that Control Hostile is clearly the most offensive of all models.

**Offensive Response Statistics**  Figure 5 shows some statistics from the dataset concerning when bots respond with offensive language relative to the language used by the human. We find that when humans craft offensive messages, about 1/3 of the time the bots reply with offensive language too. The use of safe utterances by humans (e.g. probing questions that are safe within themselves) is about $2.5 \times$ less effective a strategy for eliciting an unsafe bot response, although we do not break that down here by model (the less robust the model, the easier it is to elicit an offensive response by writing an offensive query).

We also provide statistics on the number of offensive turns per dialogue in **Table 20**.

**Test Set for Human Safety Judgements.**  The test set for human safety judgments is composed of 180 dialogues, 30 each from the 6 chatbot models that we collected the most of in the adversarial dialogue crowdsourced task: BST 2.7B, BST 2.7B + Safety Classifier, BST 2.7B + Semi-Sup. + Safety Classifier, BST 2.7B Non Sequitur, BST 2.7B Non Sequitur (Semi-Sup. ++) and BST 2.7B Gender Bias-Ctrl FR3. Each crowdworker is shown a truncated piece from the test set along with different model replies to that given segment and asked to annotate offensiveness.

**A.2 Offensive Language Types**

To further identify the type of offensive language from the collected adversarial dialogues, we launched a separate crowdsourced annotation task where at least 3 crowdworkers from a disjoint set were instructed to annotate which type of offensive language each utterance from the adversarial dialogues contains. We choose a taxonomy of offensive language with 4 primary categories.

- **Hate Speech**: the text that attacks or demeans a group based on race, gender, ethnic origin, religion, disability, age or sexual orientation.
- **Personal Attack**: the text containing rude remarks, insults, threats that are targeting an individual.
- **Profanity**: the text containing profanities such as sexual remarks, swearing and curse words; also weakly pejoratives and obscenities such as 'stupid'.
- **Other Offensiveness**: the text is offensive, but it does not contain hate speech, personal attacks or profanity.

Using Krippendorff’s alpha (Krippendorff, 2004) as inter-annotator agreement (IAA), the multi-label annotation task has a reliability coefficient of 0.41, and 0.53 in binary case (offensive/safe), close to the value (0.45) reported by Krippendorff.
| Model                                           | Total Bot Utterances | Offensive% |
|------------------------------------------------|----------------------|------------|
| BST 2.7B + Safety Classifier                   | 5268                 | 9.93       |
| BST 2.7B + Semi-Sup. + Safety Cl.              | 5372                 | 10.85      |
| BST 2.7B + Multi-Turn Safety Cl.               | 881                  | 22.36      |
| BST 2.7B Non Sequitur                          | 7182                 | 19.27      |
| BST 2.7B Non Sequitur (Semi-Sup.)              | 7143                 | 24.18      |
| BST 2.7B Gender Bias-Ctrl F0M0                 | 5890                 | 40.10      |
| BST 2.7B DialoGPT (min beam 20)                | 5841                 | 29.38      |
|                                                | 940                  | 46.60      |
| Control Calm                                   | 206                  | 33.98      |
| Control Hostile                                | 181                  | 89.50      |

Table 21: Number of bot utterances and fraction of those labeled as offensive per each chatbot model during collection of the Bot-Adversarial Dialogue crowdsourced task.

![Figure 6: Screenshot from the Bot-Adversarial Dialogue crowdsourced task.](image)

### Table 22: Classifier results for Safety Classifier (Adv. Dialog) training with different dialogue truncation lengths $k_{tr}$, reporting unsafe F1 across validation sets on different $k_{tr}$.

| $k_{tr}$ | WTC  | S    | BBF  |
|----------|------|------|------|
| 1        | 83.8 | 91.8 | 82.5 |
| 2        | 84.3 | 92.5 | 84.9 |
| 4        | 84.0 | 93.3 | 85.9 |
| 6        | 84.3 | 92.9 | 85.0 |

Bot-Adversarial Dialogue ($k_v$) training with different dialogue truncation lengths $k_{tr}$, reporting unsafe F1 across validation sets on different $k_v$.

Table 22: Classifier results for Safety Classifier (Adv. Dialog) training with different dialogue truncation lengths $k_{tr}$, reporting unsafe F1 across validation sets on different $k_v$.

(Wulczyn et al., 2017). This is also inline with IAA results in other crowdsourced studies of offensive language (Fortuna, 2017).

### A.3 Training a Safety Classifier with BAD

To detect offensive language in a conversational environment, we compare training multi-turn classifiers on the Bot-Adversarial Dialogue dataset, truncating to different context lengths. Table 22 reports the performance of models trained on truncation amount $k_{tr}$ (counting the current utterance and the previous $k_{tr} - 1$ messages to look back on) on the validation set with truncation $k_v$. Classifiers trained with different truncated dialogue lengths perform almost equally on WTC, S and BBF and BAD. However, the safety classifier trained on $k_{tr} = 4$ achieves higher overall F1 across all $k_v \in \{2, 4, 6\}$ truncated versions of the BAD validation set.