The EU’s Humanitarian Policy in Africa and Migration Crisis

Marina A. KUKARTSEVA
DSc in Philosophy, Professor, Department of International and National Security, Diplomatic Academy of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Address: 53/2, Ostozhenka St., Moscow, 119034, Russian Federation.
E-mail: mkukartseva@gmail.com

ABSTRACT. The article considers the essence and peculiarities of realizing of human security in the EU external policy in general and specifically in Africa. The article reveals the principles of the EU interest in Africa as a focus of their humanitarian policy: phantoms of the collective memory of the political class of Western European countries, huge potential of resources and markets, migration and terrorist threat. It is argued that this policy is considered by the EU as its strategic foreign policy narrative, in the course of which the Union, while ensuring the security of the African continent, primarily realizes its own interests. Specific features of the interpretation of this narrative in official documents of Germany as a key member of the EU are specified. It is revealed that Germany aims to play a major role in shaping European policy towards the African continent, and the specificity of its approach is economic-centric, which distinguishes it from the EU’s general approach to Africa. The key question of the article is how is disinterested Germany’s role, despite its permeation with the spirit of liberal values as a supplier of human security to African countries. It is shown that the discrimination of refugees and migrants in migration flows in the EU emphasized the importance of the Union’s activities in ensuring human security in Africa. In accordance with its goal to become the leading actor of the EU policy on the continent, its role as a leader of the liberal world and the peculiarities of the consequences of the migration crisis for the political and party system of the country and the stability of the social state, Germany proposed the German “Marshall Plan” for Africa as a concretization of its humanitarian policy on the continent. The parameters of this Plan, its advantages and implementation difficulties are considered. It is concluded that Germany’s approach to Africa, on the whole, indisputably contributes to the latter’s development. At the same time, it is to a large extent focused on solving the tasks of ensuring national security of Germany itself, promoting the interests of German business, creating new German “reserves” in Africa through the African partnership. In this bi-directional process there is no obvious contradiction, but the results of this process can become ambivalent.

KEY WORDS: Africa, EU, Germany, migration, human security, Germany’s Marshall Plan with Africa, foreign policy, diplomacy

Humanitarian Policy of the EU

In the late XX- early XXI centuries, following the end of the Cold war and the related transformation of the world political system, new aspects in the understanding and interpretation of the phenomenon of security emerged. These aspects were formulated from the issues
that were (to a certain extent and for understandable reasons) outside the focus of attention of both politicians and experts; namely, these problems are disease, poverty, ecology. In essence, at the beginning of the new millennium, security studies “saw a paradigm shift from a political-realistic approach to liberal-humanistic” [Ullman 1983; Tuchman 1989]. This resulted in the introduction into the political vocabulary of a new concept of “humanitarian security.” Its core lies in a change of priorities: first and foremost, human security must be ensured, and the security of states comes second [Duffield, Waddell 2006]. At the same time, the latter retain the function of a security agent, acting as instruments of power and administration in the fields of education, local self-government, maintenance of public order, social security, etc. [Mckee 2009].

The European Union first announced the need to incorporate the concept of humanitarian security into its foreign policy in the European Security Strategy of 20031, and has consistently developed this idea ever since. They established an independent Study Group on Security potential in Europe, operating under the overall patronage of the High Representative for Common Foreign Security and Security Policy, Javier Solana. Later, it changed its name to the Human Security Group under the leadership of M. Kaldor [Kaldor, Martin, Selchow 2007]. Since 2004, this group has prepared a series of studies in which the concept of human security was gradually developed until it was fully articulated. These studies were called the Barcelona Report (2004)2, the Madrid Report (2007)3, and the Berlin Report (2016)4. The findings identified human security as a new reference model for ensuring security [Henk 2005], based on the recognition of the unconditional relationship between security and development [Youngs 2008]. Its involves giving the leading role to the centrality on the person, understood as the identification and elimination of a wide range of socio-humanitarian threats and vulnerabilities of people, and the creation of a stable and reliable state of their security. In 2016, the policy of ensuring human security was enshrined in the European Union’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy as the strategic foreign policy narrative of the Union5. This implied the completion of the political nucleus of the EU’s international identity – a principled rejection of all violence, the triumph of liberal values, which were seen as the norm for international life.

Expert assessments of the importance and productivity of the concept of human security vary. Some researchers argue that the European Union has become the main driving force behind the implementation of the human security policy [Martin, Owen 2010]. Others – that humanitarian security has not yet become a strategic narrative of the EU, and has only to a small ex-

1 Evropeyskaya Strategiya Bezopasnosti. Bezopasnaya Evropa v luchshem mire [European Security Strategy. A safer Europe in a better world] (2009) // European Council Council of the European Union // http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30825/qc7809568ruc.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.
2 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities (2004) // London School of Economics and Political Science // http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/humanSecurity/barcelonaReport.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.
3 A European Way of Security. The Madrid Report (2007) // London School of Economics and Political Science // http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40207/1/A_European_Way_of_Security%28author%29.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.
4 From Hybrid Peace to Human Security: Rethinking EU Strategy towards Conflict (2016) // Securityintransition.org, February 24, 2016 http://www.securityintransition.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/SHSGReport.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.
5 Shared Vision, Common Action. A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016) // http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eusgs_review_web_0.pdf, data обращения 12.10.2018.
tent, though in some cases quite successfully, been incorporated into its foreign policy. Critics of the concept believe that the EU, like a number of other states in the world, such as Japan, Norway or Canada, implements human security practices primarily in order to strengthen its place and role in world politics; that is, to successfully and effectively defend and promote their national interests on the international scene. It is only in the second place that the human security policy pursued by these countries is linked to the real objectives of improving and protecting the lives of people [Black 2006]. In that case, human security practices are no more than a soft tool of violence in the “power hand” [Booth 2007].

**Key research issues of the Article.** Is there a contradiction between Germany’s policy on human security in Africa and the national security objectives of the Federal Republic itself? To what extent are these policies practiced by a selfless supplier of human security to Third World countries, and in what way are they used to strengthen its influence on the continent?

**Africa as the focus of the EU humanitarian policy**

Despite the contrast between these assessments, the EU persistently and consistently continues to pursue a policy of human security, giving special importance to Africa. It is the largest recipient of European official development assistance (ODA). For the period 2007-2013, the EU allocated 141 billion euros to Africa, with total ODA for 2014-2020 amounting to over 31 billion euros. For the Union, Africa is the focus of their humanitarian policy for three key reasons that are difficult to present in any hierarchy.

First, it is the collective guilt felt by the EU’s political class, and above all by the political class in Western Europe, in light of the negative consequences of the colonial policies in Africa that were carried out by the leading European powers from the second half of the XIX century to the end of World War II. These consequences include the creation of artificially delineated territorial boundaries, which resulted in forcibly separating many ethnic groups (for example, the Somalis, divided between France, Italy and Great Britain); a barbaric destruction of the tribal system as an institutional fabric of many African states; the eradication of traditional beliefs; linguistic expansionism; forced mobilization of indigenous population during the two world wars, which led to numerous losses among the Africans on the battlefields of European battles, and much more. In the mid-XXth century, the unfortunate failures of decolonization for Western countries, such as attempts to democratize African societies, contributed to an escalation of social, political and ethnic tensions on the continent. It resulted in civil wars in the Gulf of Guinea states (Liberia, Sierra Leone), the escalation of the civil war in Angola and the beginning of ethnic cleansing in the Great Lakes area (DRC, Rwanda, Uganda). As a result, today the African continent is suffering from bloody inter-State strife and conflict. According to a report by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), between 1990 and 2018, the region’s share in the world’s human losses due to armed conflict of all kinds amounted to 84%⁶. Even though fifty-four African states have their own history, the distinctness of their political culture, the lack of sufficient political

---

⁶ ACLED Version 8 (1997–2017) (2017) // Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project // http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ACLED-Version-8-All-Africa-1997-2017_dyadic-file.xlsx; accessed 12.10.2018.
experience and the immaturity of their political elites force relatively young African states to repeat the public administration mistakes made by the European powers in Africa in the late XIX and early XX centuries. Today, these powers seek to correct their mistakes by providing African states with multilateral support.

Second, Africa is a continent of great opportunities: demographic development, an abundance of resources, and a growing middle class could soon shape vast markets – both for resources and as market outlets [Abramova, Fituni 2015]. Africa is a “Klondike of interaction” with many countries of the world [Gerasimova 2016]. However, we must also point at the enormous social and economic risks caused by the same demographic processes. Africa is the only continent where the poverty rates will keep rising, and it risks falling extremely behind the world’s average growth rates. However, Africa’s subregions are intensively developing their integration mechanisms, which are geared toward different growth rates and with a different focus of interests. However, being endowed with natural resources often becomes deadly to African countries, leaving behind the usual consequences of the resource curse, haunting resource-rich countries. In Africa, one of the fatal manifestations of this curse is the problem of “conflict (bloody) diamonds.” The problem arises in connection with the so-called alluvial diamonds, whose deposits surface in areas adjacent to bodies of water. The mining of such diamonds is based on simple, artisanal techniques that require minimal investment and short-term training for workers, which is an attractive way to mine minerals illegally that brings huge amounts of money to criminal groups.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, the proven and the anticipated reserves are considered the largest in the world, which has led to decades of war, looting and massive impoverishment of the country’s 50 million people. The same is true in Angola, where in the 1990s UNITA funded the hostilities with the funds from the sale of “conflict diamonds,” with several African countries involved in the process – Togo, Zambia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Morocco7. In CAR, the industry represented by gold and diamond mining amounts to about 500 thousand carats per year8. The extensive level of diamond mining and smuggling in this country caused three civil wars (2004–2007, 2012–2013, 2013–2014). A ceasefire between the two groups engaged in illegal diamond mining – rebels from the Muslim group Séléka and the Christian militia Anti-balaka was only achieved through a France-initiated military intervention in 2013-2016.

In response to the situation in May 2000, at the initiative of South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, representatives of states-producers of rough diamonds and states-consumers met in Kimberly, South Africa to find solutions to the problem of “conflict” diamonds. The initiative was called “the Kimberley process” (KP)9. The KP introduces a mandatory certification scheme (KPCS), adopted in November 2002.10 Its goal is to eliminate the entry into trade of illegally mined diamonds, including in areas of armed conflict. Today,

---

7 Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against Unita. The “Fowler Report” (2000) // Global Policy Forum // http://www.globalpolicy.org/global-taxes/41606-final-report-of-the-un-panel-of-experts.html, accessed 12.10.2018.
8 Hugon Ph. (2016) Les Défis de la Stabilité en Centrafrique, Paris: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques // http://www.iris-france.org/docs/kfm_docs/docs/philippe-hugon---centrafrique---fvrier-2014mise-en-page-1.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.
9 What is the Kimberley Process (n/y) // Kimberley Process // http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/what-kp, accessed 12.10.2018.
10 Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme (n/y) // Kimberley Process // http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/system/files/documents/20131122_kpcs_core_document_eng_amended_clean.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.
within the framework of the Process, such certification control of export-import operations provides up to 98% of the world’s diamond turnover, and the Process itself unites 81 countries\(^{11}\).

The European Union, by fully promoting certification to curb the illicit trade in raw materials, is committed to ensuring that government revenues from mining and other key African industries are used to address the challenges, particularly those related to their development\(^{12}\).

Third, Africa is a source of migration and terrorist threat to the EU. At the same time, North Africa, linked to the countries of the Middle East and the Mediterranean, occupies a place in the policy of the Union, different from the SSA, which comprises states located south of the Sahara.

North Africa, populated mainly by Caucasians, borders directly on Europe and has long-standing historical, economic and cultural ties with it. A number of Western countries have their enclaves in North Africa. For example, Spain has six enclaves in Morocco, two of which – Ceuta and Melilla – are open to Schengen visa holders, and visa-free travel is reserved only for residents of nearby Moroccan provinces of Tetuan and Nador. From Ceuta and Melilla, you can reach Spain by ferry. That is why these enclaves, surrounded by barbed-wire fences, get regularly stormed by thousands of African migrants in attempts to reach the European Union. Attempts to cross the border of Ceuta grew by 71% in 2017, and Colonel Jose Luis Gomez Salinero of the Civil Guard Command of the city warned that his people are being forced to fight “very young and very physically strong” migrants, armed with cold weapons and ready to resort to “any violence” to achieve their goal [Montgomery 2018]. In mid-June 2018, Madrid officially announced that the cabinet intends to do everything possible to dismantle these fences to avoid further casualties on both sides. This decision is completely inconsistent with the key objective of the EU policy in North Africa – ensuring Euro-Atlantic and regional security, creating a kind of a stability corridor between the EU and other territories of the South – but it is fully in line with the EU human security principles and policies.

In turn, the SSA has traditionally been an area of trade and economic interest of the EU. Recently, however, it, like North Africa, has been turning into a zone of influence for terrorism and radical Islam, which not so long ago seemed very unlikely not only to the EU but also to the entire international community. This fact was noted among others at the ministerial meeting of the Southern African Development Community-EU Ministerial Political Dialogue in 2018\(^{13}\).

The EU’s greatest fear is destabilization of Nigeria, where the population is roughly equally divided between Muslims and Christians, creating permanent interfaith tensions. In the Nigerian state of Borno in the northeast of the country is the core of the famous terrorist group “Boko Haram”. Cells of this organization can be found in many other states of the north of the state – from Yobe, Plateau and Kano to Bauchi, Adamawa, and Sokoto. Since 2013, Boko Haram has intensified its activities by planning terrorist acts along the

\(^{11}\) 2018 KP Participants List (n/y) // Kimberley Process // http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2018-kp-participants-list, accessed 12.10.2018.

\(^{12}\) European Union and the Kimberley Process (n/y) // Kimberley Process // http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/, accessed 12.10.2018.

\(^{13}\) Southern African Development Community-EU Ministerial Political Dialogue 2018 (2018) // European Union External Action Service // http://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/42564/southern-african-development-community-eu-ministerial-political-dialogue-2018_en, accessed 12.10.2018.
border areas of the states neighbouring Nigeria, such as Chad and Niger. A multinational group of the Lake Chad basin states has been established to conduct a joint operation to destroy terrorists and radical extremists. It included Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Benin – overall, over 1.5 thousand people. As a result of a large-scale advance, the countries managed to knock out the followers of Boko Haram from a number of states, but they could not destroy the whole threat. Boko Haram aptly exploits the grievances among the Muslim population, extreme poverty, and high youth unemployment in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, with unprecedented corruption in the ruling elite leading to the economic and political marginalization of the country’s northeast.

It can be argued that insurgencies and civil wars have led to an ongoing political crisis and regional instability on the African continent in certain areas of North Africa, from Libya to Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Somalia; in Western Sahara, from Morocco to Mauritania; in West Africa – Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Côte D’Ivoire. The situation has also recently worsened in Nigeria, mainly in the Niger Delta and in northeastern Nigeria; in Eastern and Central Africa – Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi, Gabon and Congo; Zaire and Zambia; in South Africa – in Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.

Therefore, the EU, in numerous joint agreements with African countries and subregions, including the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Great Lakes and the Gulf of Guinea, the Cotonou Agreement, the Lomé and Yaoundé Conventions, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, has consolidated the ideas and principles of its policies on the continent, including humanitarian policies. Their goal is to focus not only on protecting territorial borders, but also on protecting people from “poverty, migration, HIV/AIDS infections, environmental instability and social exclusion, which is directly related to human and, hence, global security” [Duffield, Waddell 2006]. The key principle is a comprehensive, “inclusive” approach to problem-solving that covers various areas of the continent and their sub-regions.

The EU’s integrated approach to the Sahel region is particularly illustrative, viewed as having a direct impact on the Union’s interests and security [Thompson 2016; Kartsonaki, Wolff 2015]. The Sahel is treated by the EU as an “ineffective” region, facing difficulties in “providing protection, assistance, development and public services to the local populations” and “insufficient operational and strategic capacities (...) to ensure human security.” The Sahel states themselves are incapable of supporting decent living conditions in their own territory, and the “effective” EU aims to help them by participating actively in critical political processes, thereby strengthening its role as a key international actor in addressing the regional crisis.

In 2011, the EU adopted a Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, which sets out the principles of the European approach to solving the problems of the region. They are specified in the 2015 Sahel Regional Action Plan. The key moti-
vation for both the Strategy and the Plan is that any threats to the stability and security of the region also threaten the stability and security of the European Union. Many disasters – from poverty and population growth to environmental concerns – “not only affect the local populations but increasingly impact directly on the interests of European citizens.” In this context, the European Union aims to achieve the necessary political and humanitarian sustainability in the region. The focus is not on analyzing the nature of threats or “shocks,” but on identifying and systemizing “major vulnerabilities” that threaten the development of the region’s resilience. The EU currently supports Sahel countries in three main areas: political partnership through regular EU-G5 dialogs; development assistance, which includes €8 billion in support to the region during 2014-2020, including through the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, established in 2015; security support: the EU supports specific regional security initiatives by deploying three missions – two civilian in Niger and Mali (EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali) and an EU training mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) within the framework of CSDP. This is the EU’s comprehensive, integrated approach: the specifics of the situation in hand dictates the need to reassess the entire set of existing practices and choose the most effective of them.

In 2017, on the initiative of the EU in Germany and France, the Alliance for the Sahel was established. In February 2018, the European Commission held an international summit conference on the Sahel in Brussels, together with the African Union, the United Nations, and the Sahel five, with the goal of strengthening international support for the region. The EU’s general idea is that “[e]nsuring the security, stability and development of the countries of the Sahel is in the interest first of all of the local populations but also of European citizens,” Mogherini said at the Elysée Palace launch. “We are neighbours and we need to respond together to the challenges of fighting terrorism, trafficking and climate change,” said Mogherini.

Nevertheless, some researchers believe that the EU’s generosity, “its constant appeal to rights, freedom, and people, conceals their persistent will to manage and contain the unrest, not to resolve it.” This is true in the sense that the EU’s flexibility in implementing human security policies depends on the degree of threat to its own interests. In this regard, migration is a matter of particular concern for the EU: “Poverty creates its inherent instability, which can affect uncontrolled migration flows,” “Migration pressure in-

17 Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (n/y) // European Union External Action Service // http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.
18 AGIR – Building Resilience in the Sahel & West Africa (2017) // European Commission // http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/sahel_agir_en.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.
19 Factsheet: EU Relations with Sahel Countries (2016) // European Union External Action Service // http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/factsheets/docs/sahel-european-union-factsheet_en.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.
20 Alliance for the Sahel’s Will Reinforce EU Work for Stability and Development of Key Region (2017) // European Union External Action Service // http://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/29876/alliance-sahel-will-reinforce-eu-work-stability-and-development-key-region_en, accessed 12.10.2018.
21 The European Union’s Partnership with the G5 Sahel Countries (2018) // ReliefWeb // http://reliefweb.int/report/world/european-unions-partnership-g5-sahel-countries, accessed 12.10.2018.
22 Alliance for the Sahel’s Will Reinforce EU Work for Stability and Development of Key Region (2017) // European Union External Action Service // http://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/29876/alliance-sahel-will-reinforce-eu-work-stability-and-development-key-region_en, accessed 12.10.2018.
23 Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (n/y) // European Union External Action Service // http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.
increases, which means serious consequenc-
es for the EU24.”

Germany’s policy of human security in Africa

Germany, as part of its foreign human security policy, proposed its own approach to African development25 in 2014. This approach has been expressed in a paper entitled “Key Principles of Federal Government Policy in Africa” (Afrikopolitische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung), prepared by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs26. Germany’s rules for working with the African continent contain three main sections: An analysis of the situation at hand, an analysis of the parameters of Ger-
many’s presence in Africa, and an analysis of the parameters of a holistic, networked approach to German policy in Africa. Let us take a closer look at them.

The first section emphasized that Ger-
many, like the EU as a whole, has a com-
prehensive approach to its humanitarian policy in Africa. Africa’s potential stems from its rapid demographic development, rich natural resources, and the great po-
tential of agricultural production. Afri-
can markets are developing dynamically and are becoming increasingly interesting for Germany’s economy, due to the grow-
ing purchasing power of the African pop-
ulation, rising demand for German prod-
ucts and high technology, increased in-
vestment, and innovative proposals. The document states that, contrary to popu-
lar belief, political stability is also gain-
ing strength in Africa through the growth of democratic institutions. However, con-
tinued risks need to be reduced if further progress is to be made. The potential for destabilization of regional crises is quite high due to the growing mass of refugees, displaced persons, climate change, water shortages, etc. Africa’s “fragility” remains a problem with significant impact on Eu-
rope. Risk factors include lack of effective governance, ethnocentrism and national-
ism, uncontrolled small arms stockpiles, organized crime, national and internation-
al terrorism, especially in North Africa and the Sahel. Moreover, Germany should explore better the activities of third parties (China, India, Turkey, Brazil, Japan, and the US) in Africa, with a strategic interest in developing Europe’s authority and influence in Africa.

The general conclusion of this section is that cooperation with Africa is in Ger-
many’s national interest. The financial cri-
sis in Europe and its management have made Germany a central player in Europe, which Africa, too, recognizes. As a result of these factors, Germany’s presence in Af-
rica should be expanded, and the second, most extensive and detailed section of the document is devoted to the parameters of this presence.

In total, it identifies fifteen German pri-
orities in cooperation with Africa27.

1. Further strengthening of the region-
al integration. The goal is to promote po-

cial and economic cooperation, reduce tensions, create larger markets with free movement of labor and capital, reduce trade barriers, and increase the attractive-

24 AGIR – Building Resilience in the Sahel & West Africa (2017) // European Commission // http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/ countries/factsheets/sahel_agir_en.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.
25 Deutschland und Afrika: Konzept der Bundesregierung (n/y) // Bundesministerium der Verteidigung // http://www.bmvg.de/ de/themen/dossiers/engagement-in-afrika/das-engagement/grundlagen/deutschland-und-afrika-konzept-der-bundesregierung, accessed 12.10.2018.
26 Afrikapolitische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung (2014) // Bundesministerium der Verteidigung // http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2014/05/2014-05-21-afrikapolitische-leitlinien.html, accessed 12.10.2018.
27 Afrikapolitische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung (2014) // Bundesministerium der Verteidigung // http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2014/05/2014-05-21-afrikapolitische-leitlinien.html, accessed 12.10.2018.
ness of countries to domestic and foreign investors. Germany seeks to focus its African policies on promoting regional organizations, including through the transfer of the European Union’s integration experience.

2. Strengthening the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The objective is to support African countries in conflict management through targeted assistance in the areas of training, counselling and equipment for military and security forces. To counteract the disintegration of States and prevent the negative impact of such disintegration on neighbouring sub-regions and on Europe by preventing crises in a timely manner. To promote economic recovery and combat the structural causes of conflict, demobilization and re-integration of militias, security sector reforms and effective trade control. Maintain certification of “conflict minerals”.

3. The promotion of agriculture, which is a key area of African development, rural development and sustainable urbanization. Of particular importance is the development of value chains (processing and marketing), as well as support for inter-firm cooperation. The German economy should participate in this process with its contributions. Within the framework of the EU-Africa partnership, Germany plans a joint action plan for agricultural and food security research.

4. Strengthening the rule of law, and combating corruption. The emphasis on ensuring the rule of law is effective because it optimizes the economy and society. Germany’s legal system and the police will share their experience with African partners, including in the defense of human rights. One of the goals is providing demand-based, fairly funded and accessible to all sectors of the population, comprehensive social protection, and medical care.

5. Protection of refugees, the transformation of migration policies into preventive and development-oriented policies. The goal is to address the causes of migration, better manage regional, transcontinental migration, and regular migration.

6. Building partnerships for the Arab economies in transition in North Africa in the Middle East, focusing on youth, in particular, to give it a positive future.

7. Use of raw materials as an instrument of stability and economic development, conservation of natural resources. Trust cooperation in the commodity sector improves supply security for the German economy.

8. Support for economic growth, trade, and investment. The goal is to create values through more sustainable economic growth. Of particular importance is the support of entrepreneurs, small and medium-sized enterprises with innovative potential, financing of microenterprises. Maximum flexibility in access to the EU market. Germany is helping to solve energy problems and build a sustainable energy supply in partner countries by promoting enterprise-level cooperation.

9. Identifying the potential of African markets for the German economy. German companies, with a largely long-term business model, are good partners for sustainable economic development. They contribute to the training of skilled workers and set high standards of corporate social responsibility. It is necessary to work in African partner countries to improve the regulatory framework and investment climate in general for the local population, as well as for Africa’s investment opportunities in Germany.

10. Ensuring education at all levels and intensifying cooperation in science and research. The goal is to ensure universal access to high-quality education in all areas, especially for marginalized groups. Germany will support the AU in establishing a Pan-African University in the areas of water, energy, and climate change.

11. Strengthening global governance, protection of natural resources and the
environment, and preservation of biodiversity. The objective is to find common ground on global and, in particular, continental African interests (food, climate, water, chemicals and waste management, biodiversity, poaching, resource use, and resource efficiency).

12. Developing cultural cooperation to enhance knowledge of their cultural roots to increase the resilience towards extremism. The preservation of cultural and natural heritage, as well as inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialog, is a central part of the cultural participation of the Federal Government in Africa.

13. Enhancing the knowledge of the specifics of African political actors in order to better understand key African and global issues, including addressing and responding to crises.

14. Strengthening coordination with strategic partners in Africa – China, India, Brazil, Turkey, the United States, and others. The aim is to engage these partners in constructive interaction.

15. African Partnership Forum to strengthen Africa’s commitment to the dialog process.

Almost half of these priorities are targeted at economic objectives, and the other half are transparently connected with them. This underscores the German government’s general ideology for addressing global problems in general, and Africa in particular: emphasizing opportunities, especially economic opportunities, and ensuring African countries’ transition from dependence on natural resources to industrial development. Germany’s key challenge is to convince investors, both private and international, of the economic climate in Africa that, multiplied by the continent’s stunning human capital, its potential will solve both its problems and Germany’s national security problems. Such ideology is a part of the international political identity of Germany that has developed since the Second World War: adherence to liberal principles of political life, to the globalization trade policy-oriented on the conquest and simultaneous development of foreign markets, transnationalization, promotion of small and medium-sized businesses in the Third World.

The final section of the plan, therefore, deals with the principles and objectives of Germany’s broad, integrated approach to Africa, covering the activities of all its federal ministries. Germany calls on its political class to bear greater responsibility for peace and security in Africa. Africa’s political, economic, and social transformation, as well as its many unresolved problems, requires a new approach by German policymakers on the continent. These include optimizing cooperation in the fields of energy and raw materials production and use, promoting sustainable development, and in-depth cooperation in the field of environmental and climate protection. The goal of such new approaches is to achieve equitable partnerships with Africa, which will enable Germany and the EU as a whole to find common answers to global, regional and national problems, and ensure a secure state of human security.

The document under consideration reveals that the feature of Germany’s policy on human security in Africa is, first, that Germany intends to play a key role in shaping the European policy on the continent, acting on the principle of coherence and the application of a variety of country strategies. To this end, a network of German field presences in Africa has been established, with more than 2,000 experts from the German Development Service, the Foreign Trade Chamber, police and liaison officers, military advisers and military advisory groups. In order to achieve synergy, Germany seeks to expand the relationship between development and security objectives. Secondly, the specifics of the German policy on human security in Africa are based on the full support of its economy, first of all, and second of all, of the complex of human rights issues. This
sets it apart from the EU’s common approach. Germany’s assessment of the continent’s prospects of integration into the world economy is positive, and it is a starting point for further joint action. On average, Africa’s economy has grown up to 60% per year since the start of the new millennium, with double-digit growth in some countries. So we must double our efforts to develop Africa’s economy, engage German and global businesses on the continent, and develop strategies to encourage private investment to boost growth, create jobs, and optimize employment. Together, these strategies must address the causes of African migration to Europe.

The migration crisis in the EU

In the context of the European refugee crisis, a lot of attention is paid to people fleeing the Syrian conflict, which has made the number of people seeking asylum for the first time in the EU the highest in the Union’s history. But, in the EU, and Germany in particular, in addition to Syrians, tens of thousands of Africans have arrived from a multitude of countries scattered across the continent, from north to west. Some people flee from authoritarian regimes (for example, in Eritrea), others from conflicting countries (for example, Somalia). Many are leaving more stable democracies, especially in the west and north of the continent, where unemployment is often the main problem, especially among young people (for example, in Tunisia). That is where the fault line lies – in the distinction between refugees and migrants. A refugee is a person forced to flee because of persecution, war or violence, whereas a migrant is a person forced to flee because of climatic and demographic anomalies, economic depression, in search of better jobs, etc.

In this regard, it is interesting to see briefly how the focus of EU cooperation with the African Union has shifted before and after the migration crisis.

In 2014, during the Fourth European Union–Africa Summit in Brussels, entitled “Investing in People, Prosperity and Peace,” partners emphasized the timeliness of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES) goals for the period 2014–2017, which forms a part of a joint strategy agreed in 2007, and which has been implemented on the basis of interim action plans.

In 2014, the road map focused primarily on economic growth, investment, and security. The key aspects of closer EU–Africa cooperation were the fight against terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and human trafficking. Therefore, a central role was given to further development of the existing African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), support for the African Standby Force (ASF). At the height of the migration crisis in 2015, European and African countries held the EU–Africa summit on migration in Malta. The partners agreed, without giving up the implementation of the road map, to cooperate more closely, first of all, in the field of migration. The basis for this was their proposed action plan, which set five key objectives. A total of sixteen concrete measures have been formulated to help achieve these goals by the end of 2016. European leaders established the European Union’s Emergency Trust Fund to Support stability and Address the root causes of illegal migration and population displacement.

28 Afrikapolitische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung (2014) // Bundesministerium der Verteidigung // http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2014/05/2014-05-21-afrikapolitische-leitlinien.html, accessed 12.10.2018.
29 Combating the causes of illegal migration, improving cooperation in the field of legal migration and mobility, providing greater protection for migrants and asylum-seekers, combating illegal migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, and optimizing cooperation on the return and readmission of migrants.
in Africa. Money from this fund was supposed to help put the plan into effect.

The fifth (interestingly, no longer the EU – AU, but an AU – EU) summit in 2017, held in Côte d’Ivoire (Abidjan) under the common title “Investing in youth for a sustainable future,” summarized the road map’s implementation results and outlined new prospects, particularly in combating migration. In the light of the changed circumstances, the key areas of cooperation were the challenges of creating economic opportunities for young people as a platform for their realization in their native rather than alien continent, and the key trend was investing in Africa.

To this end, an EU external investment plan was proposed, under which the European Sustainable Development Fund was established to attract private investors to Africa. The basic idea was that to stop migration, Africa must be well-equipped economically, thereby giving the continent stability and prosperity in the long run.

The subject of special interest is the G20 summit in Hamburg in 2017, which showed the world’s extreme concern for Africa and the importance that the EU attaches to the continent. This significance was emphasized by the host of the summit – the Federal Republic of Germany: “A. Merkel expressed concern that Africa’s deepening disenchantment with the West would force some people to look for hope elsewhere.”

The summit adopted the G20 Africa Partnership Programme, which provides for the establishment of a Compact with Africa to expand private investment and private enterprise. A large share of this investment will be undertaken by German companies, which is why “it is called the “Merkel Plan for Africa,” and it has a role to play as important as the “Marshall Plan” for Europe in the 1940s.”

### Migration crisis in Germany

In 2015, Germany opened borders for refugees fleeing to Europe from Syria, Iraq, and Africa, due to wars, climate change, the fall and emergence of authoritarian political regimes, etc. In less than a year, Germany received more than one million refugees and migrants, and Chancellor Merkel became a favorite of the international humanitarian community and leader of the liberal world.

When Germany’s borders were open, many supporters of that decision predicted the country’s immediate economic growth. But, in an interview given in November 2017, the German Commissioner for Immigration, Refugees, and Integration, Aydan Özoguz, despite all her optimism, had to admit that the people who had arrived in Germany in 2015 were struggling to find jobs. They are limited by the combination of a lack of education and the necessary skills, a lack of knowledge of German production behavior – and their unwillingness to learn and a language barrier. Moreover, up to three-quarters of migrants and refugees over the next five years are likely to remain

---

30 5th African Union – EU Summit (2017) // European Council Council of the European Union // http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2017/11/29-30/, accessed 12.10.2018.  
31 EU External Investment Plan (2017) // European Commission // http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/factsheet-eip-20171120_en.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.  
32 EU External Investment Plan (2017) // European Commission // http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/factsheet-eip-20171120_en.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.  
33 EU External Investment Plan (2017) // European Commission // http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/factsheet-eip-20171120_en.pdf, accessed 12.10.2018.  
34 An Interview with Aydan Özoguz, German Commissioner for Immigration, Refugees and Integration (2017) // International Migration, vol. 55, no 6, pp. 5–11 // http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/imig.12404, accessed 12.10.2018.
unemployed. So, in her view, “if someone arrives in the country and is likely to remain there for any reason, integration must begin immediately.” This statement seems strange because the right to stay is granted for three years, after which the refugee must return home (of course, if the situation there is no longer dangerous). Why should he then be integrated into anything is unclear. So, at home, the response to the head of government’s decision was mixed; in the end, it led to an internal political crisis that has not yet been resolved. It has become clear that measures to prevent a wave of future refugees and migrants are not just urgent, but existential, and the problem of migrants itself is being protected not only by populist parties and social movements, but also by the chancellor’s associates from her sister party. At the same time, the German authorities are facing a difficult task: they must strike a balance between their own liberal values, respect for the rights of refugees / migrants and the need to ensure national security, protect their political system, social protection systems and, ultimately, protect not only their legal but also social state.

In this regard, the emphasis was revised. “Most people coming across the Mediterranean are migrants, not refugees,” said Gunther Noke, Germany’s representative for Africa [Green 2017]. That is why the solution to the migration crisis must focus on Africa, especially those African countries where migrants intending to go to Europe accumulate, and those countries serving as transit points on that journey.

The events of 2015 turned Africa into a kind of a concentration of meaning for Germany in the task of finding a solution to the migration problem. Their sustainable development assistance has become increasingly linked with efforts to reduce migration.

**Germany’s Marshall Plan for Africa**

In 2017, the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development proposed a German Marshall Plan for Africa.1

The 34-page document should create a new format for partnership between Africa and Europe – a partnership that goes far beyond the traditional one based on development cooperation projects, which would cost Germany up to €300 million. In fact, it is a concrete plan for implementing the Federal Government’s “Key Policy Guidelines in Africa of the German Federal Government.”

The plan contains ten main points. They aim to note that Europe needs a new pact for the future between it and Africa, since by 2050 Africa’s population will double. It was emphasized separately that Africa needed African solutions rather than European ones, so it was necessary to abandon the donor-recipient mentality that had prevailed for decades and move toward an economic partnership. The plan’s main emphasis is that Africa needs private investment, which is why it relies on a new kind of economic policy: Economic diversification, supply-chain creation, targeted support for agriculture, small and medium businesses, improved access to the EU single market, and the removal of trade barriers.

In the five chapters of the Plan, these ten basic ideas are signed in writing. The first chapter stressed that Africa and Europe are partner continents, and therefore rely on the synergy of values and interests in their cooperation. The second chapter highlights the nature of the Mar-

---

1 A Marshall Plan with Africa (2017) // Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development // http://www.bmz.de/en/countries_regions/marshall_plan_with_africa/contents/index.html, accessed 12.10.2018.
shall Plan, which is built on three pillars, elaborated in more than a hundred ideas. These are economic activity, trade and employment; peace and security; democracy and the rule of law. The Platform for the Plan, set out in chapter three, was agricultural development and food security; protection of natural resources; energy and infrastructure development; and adequate humanitarian policies in the areas of health, education and social protection. In the final part of the plan, the prospects for its implementation were revealed, which, in the opinion of the German government, are very optimistic.

Difficulties and problems in the implementation of the Marshall Plan

Before the plan was formulated, however, German officials held very few preliminary consultations with African countries, which is understandable due to the urgency of the moment and the desire for urgent action. Such haste has led to a number of problems.

At first, Germany showed a willingness to negotiate with many, if not all, countries on the continent, even those breaking records on violence against their populations and having little understanding of human rights, but could be useful in curbing the new flows of migrants. These include, for example, Sudan, where the German Society for International Cooperation coordinated an EU project aimed at strengthening Sudanese efforts to identify and detain migrants. The project provided training and equipment to the border police, assistance in the establishment of two camps for refugees and migrants. However, Germany’s cooperation with an authoritarian Sudanese regime has actually strengthened it. The average African government does not usually seek to profit from the development of the domestic economy, it relies on the assistance of international donors and which it uses for its own benefit. In addition, although stable public administration in African countries from the second half to the late 1980s was associated with the rule of a number of charismatic leaders, among them there were many autocrats and dictators (Mobutu Sese Seko, Mohamed Siad Barre, Jean Bedel Bokassa), as well as ambiguous monarchs who used dubious means to unite multiethnic states (Haile Selassie I).

Few African leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania and Tanganyika), and Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia’s first prime minister), have tried to enter into a true partnership with European economic interests by developing new concepts and triangles. However, they faced a series of domestic crises sponsored by, among others, foreign countries, which served as a lesson to many others, who could potentially follow suit. Many African political elites are often incapable of ruling, turning themselves into dictators like Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Idi Amin in Uganda, or Bokassa in CAR, ending up in the role of both pro-Western puppets and bandits who plunder Africa’s resources in exchange for personal gain.

The “Key Policy Guidelines of the Federal Government in Africa” set out the task of deepening the knowledge of German professionals about the specifics of African political actors. The lack of a real solution has led Sudan’s political elites to use German aid to intensify violence in Darfur and to persecute other minorities in the country. By holding back migrants, Germany is multiplying the ranks of refugees. The same mistake was made in 2016, when, at the request of then-German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, the country allocated 3.9 million euros to Libya to improve conditions for refugees and migrants. However, the Libyan leadership
was not in control of a large part of the country and was accused by the international community of human rights violations, including against migrants and asylum-seekers. Germany’s officials insist that the money allocated was not intended to support that government, but indirectly it did help to legitimize it.

The Government of Germany understands these problems, so it became more cautious about who to work with, intensifying cooperation with countries that are reform-oriented and that proved their will to them, ensuring the rule of law and political participation of all citizens. For this reason, Rwanda and Ethiopia, which were originally among the first seven countries interested in the Marshall Plan, have never become German partners for investment or reform because of their human rights concerns. The difficulty, however, is that there are many authoritarian countries in Africa, many of which have interests in both Germany and the EU. There are no mechanisms to eliminate any possibility that the money allocated will not go to support these regimes as of now. At the same time, Germany, channeling colossal tranches to African states, generates a dependency syndrome, dependence on Western countries, developing the paternalism of the Euro-Atlantic space over the continent.

Another issue is that some African leaders have made it clear that Germany is simply imposing economic strategies on them in its own interest. At an event in Berlin on the eve of the G-20 summit in Hamburg, Guinean President Alpha Conde, the current chairman of the African Union, said: “We need partners ... but if we want to create a reservoir, we want to be masters, not subcontractors for a German or European company ... We do not want to stretch our hands and ask for money” [Green 2017]. African elites compete with each other to defend their economic territory and the role they play as agents. They ensure that foreign companies do not operate directly on the African market without their permission, guarantee that they have direct access to consumers, improve Africans’ access to capital, and the labor market. African leaders, among other things, often avoid forging both productive relationships with citizens of the country they govern and bilateral relations with Western countries by engaging in endless negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international organizations that eventually explain to the African leader what his country’s citizens need. For this reason, African populations are generally removed from long-term policy planning in their countries. With poverty, hunger, the degradation of political elites, the criminalization of the economy, and tribal tensions continuing to persist, it is at least difficult to expect the German Marshall Plan to have any real success in the medium term.

Conclusion

The key research questions (is there a contradiction between Germany’s policy on human security in Africa and the national security objectives of the Federal Republic itself? To what extent is this policy a practice of a selfless supplier of human security to third world countries, and in what way is it a means of strengthening its influence on the continent?) can be answered as follows. Germany is indeed implementing a sufficiently effective humanitarian policy in Africa, but it is not just about achieving the continent’s common welfare (which they honestly pursue), but

37 Ghana, Côte D’Ivoire, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Tunisia And Ethiopia.
also about protecting Germany itself – both politically and economically. Ultimately, the challenge is to consolidate the African continent’s position as a zone of prosperity for both its own and German/European businesses. The effectiveness of human security policies is determined by Germany’s economocentric approach to the continent, where the main objectives are GDP and employment growth, especially among young people. The strategic direction is to build up Germany’s new “labor reserves” in Africa through the African partnership, as it did in the colonial era from the 1800s to the 1960s: European miners and settlement farmers used cheap forced labor on occupied lands to produce and extract raw materials. Unlike then, German business today seeks to adopt the continent’s domestic industrial and agricultural markets in mutual interests. To be sure, this could lead – albeit unintentionally, but expectedly – to the devastation of small farmers, the growth of unskilled labor, and the welfare of African national elites at the same time. In African countries, the competition for foreign capital can “create a so-called race to the bottom: emerging economies are racing to create the most favorable conditions for this capital, including lower labor requirements,” which could lead to migration of the population [Zotin 2018]. Moreover, German lawyers will have to assist African national elites in working to change their legislation to optimize Germany’s economic presence there. It can be noted that there is no obvious contradiction between the objectives of Germany’s humanitarian policy in Africa and the protection of its national interests. The German and African sides are coming to terms with each other and they need this movement, having a common economic interest and common security challenges. And in realizing this interest there will be both winners and losers, but only time will show which side will lose more.

References

Abramova I. O., Fituni L. L. (2015) Yaschik Pandory XXI. Vliyanie «afrikanskogo faktora» na mirovuyu ekonomiku i politiku vse eshe nedootseneno [Pandora’s Box XXI. The Influence of the “African Factor” on the World Economy and Politics Is Still Underestimated]. Problemy sovremennoj ekonomiki. No 4(56). Pp. 96–100.

Black D. (2006) Mapping the Interplay of Human Security Practice and Debates: The Canadian Experience. A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms (eds. MacLean S.J., Black D.R., Shaw T.M.), Aldershot & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, Pp. 53–62.

Booth K. (2007) Theory of World Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Duffield M. (2007) Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Duffield M., Waddell N. (2006) Securing Humans in a Dangerous World. International Politics. Vol. 43. No 1. Pp. 1–23.

Gerasimova O. (2016) Rossiya – Afrika: Klondajk vzaimodejstviya. Interv’yu s Fituni L.L. (Institut stran Afriki RAN) [Russia–Africa: Klondike of Interaction. Interview with Fituni L.L (Institute of African Countries, RAS)]. Vestnik Rossijskogo universiteta Druzhby narodov. Seriya «Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya». Vol. 16. No 2. Pp. 334–349.

Green A. (2017) G20 Development Pledges Overshadowed by Climate Rift. Devex.com, July 12, 2017. Available at: http://www.devex.com/news/g20-development-pledges-overshadowed-by-climate-rift-90641, accessed 12.10.2018.

Henk D. (2005) Human Security: Relevance and Implications. Parameters. Vol. 41. No 5. Pp. 91–106.

Kaldor M., Martin M., Selchow S. (2007) Human Security: a New Strategic Narrative for Europe. International Affairs. Vol. 83. No 2. Pp. 273–288.
Kartsonaki A., Wolff S. (2015) The EU’s Responses to Conflicts in Its Wider Neighbourhood: Human or European Security? *Global Society*. Vol. 29. No 2. Pp. 199–226. DOI:10.1080/13600826.2015.1021242

Korendyasov E.N., Sharova A.Yu. (2017) Partnerstvo G20 – Afrika: povtorenie projdennogo ili obnovlenie? [G20 – Africa Partnership: Repetition or Renew? Follow-up to the Outcome of the G20 Summit in Hamburg]. *Institute of African Countries*. Available at: http://www.inafran.ru/node/1476, accessed 12.10.2018.

Martin M., Owen T. (2010) The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and EU Experience. *International Affairs*. Vol. 86. No 1. Pp. 211–224. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00876.x

Mckee K. (2009) Post-Foucauldian Governmentality: What Does It Offer Critical Social Policy Analysis? *Critical Social Policy*. Vol. 29. No 3. Pp. 465–486.

Montgomery J. (2018) Spain’s Socialist Government Vows to Dismantle Border Fences Obstructing African Migrants. *Breitbart News*, June 15, 2018. Available at: http://www.breitbart.com/london/2018/06/15/spains-socialist-government-dismantle-border-fences-obstructing-african-migrants/, accessed 12.10.2018.

Thompson B.C. (2016) The European Union’s Human Security Discourse. *The Korean Journal of International Studies*. Vol. 14. No 1. Pp. 161–188. DOI:10.14731/kjis.2016.4.14.1.161

Tuchman J. (1989) Redefining Security. *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, no 2, Pp. 162–77.

Ullman R. (1983) Redefining Security. *International Security*. Vol. 8. No 1. Pp. 129–153.

Youngs R. (2008) Fusing Security and Development: Just Another Euro-platitude? *Journal of European Integration*. Vol. 30. No 3. Pp. 419–437. DOI:10.1080/07036330802142079

Zotin A. (2018) Ekonomika protesta: bor’ba s globalizatsiей. Kak rabochie obedinyayutsya protiv outcoursinga [The Economy of Protest: the Fight against Globalization. How Do Workers Unite against Outsourcing. *Kommersant*. June 24, 2018. Available at: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3663032, accessed 12.10.2018.