Fault Tolerant Adaptive Parallel and Distributed Simulation through Functional Replication

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Abstract

This paper presents FT-GAIA, a software-based fault-tolerant parallel and distributed simulation middleware. FT-GAIA has been designed to reliably handle Parallel And Distributed Simulation (PADS) models, which are needed to properly simulate and analyze complex systems arising in any kind of scientific or engineering field. PADS takes advantage of multiple execution units run in multicore processors, cluster of workstations or HPC systems. However, large computing systems, such as HPC systems that include hundreds of thousands of computing nodes, have to handle frequent failures of some components. To cope with this issue, FT-GAIA transparently replicates simulation entities and distributes them on multiple execution nodes. This allows the simulation to tolerate crash-failures of computing nodes. Moreover, FT-GAIA offers some protection against Byzantine failures, since interaction messages among the simulated entities are replicated as well, so that the receiving entity can identify and discard corrupted messages. Results from an analytical model and from an experimental evaluation show that FT-GAIA provides a high degree of fault tolerance, at the cost of a moderate increase in the computational load of the execution units.

Keywords: Simulation, Parallel and Distributed Simulation, Fault Tolerance, Adaptive Systems, Middleware, Agent-Based Simulation

1. Introduction

Computer simulation is an important tool to model, analyze and understand physical, biological and social phenomena. Among the different methodologies Discrete Event Simulation (DES) is of particular

0 An early version of this work appeared in [1]. This paper is an extensively revised and extended version of the previous work in which more than 30% is new material.
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interest, since it is frequently employed to model and analyze many types of systems, including computer
architectures, communication networks, street traffic and others.

In a DES, the system is modeled as a set of entities that interact. The simulation has a state which
evolves through the generation of events issued by simulated entities or by a (human or synthetic) supervisor
of the simulation. Events occur at discrete points in time. The overall structure of a sequential event-based
simulator is relatively simple: the simulator engine maintains a list, called Future Event List (FEL), of all
pending events, sorted in non-decreasing time of occurrence. The execution of the simulation consists of
a loop: at each iteration, the event with lower timestamp \( t \) is removed from the FEL, and the simulation
time is advanced to \( t \). Then, the event is executed, possibly triggering the generation of new events to be
scheduled for execution at some future time.

Continuous advances in our understanding of complex systems, combined with the need for higher model
accuracy, demand an increasing amount of computational power. The simulation of complex systems might
generate a huge amount of events, due to the enormous amount of entities to be simulated and the high rate
of events they trigger. Just as an example, think at the Internet of Things (IoT), the network of physical
devices, vehicles, home appliances and other items embedded with computational and that communication
capabilities, that nowadays is considered the most prominent infrastructure on top of which novel smart
services will be implemented. Simulating such a kind of system is very demanding and imposes the use
of sophisticated simulation techniques [2]. In this kind of scenarios, sequential DES techniques become
inappropriate for analyzing large or detailed models. DES must thus evolve into something that is able to
handle simulations at larger scales.

An alternative approach, called Parallel Discrete Event Simulation (PDES) refers to the execution of a
single discrete event simulation program on a parallel computer [3]. The goal is to parallelize the execution
of the simulation events for better scalability.

Parallel And Distributed Simulation (PADS) is concerned with the execution of a simulation program on
computing platforms containing multiple processors [4]. PADS takes advantage of multiple execution units
to efficiently handle large simulation models. These execution units can be distributed across the Internet, or
grouped as massively parallel computers or multicore processors. While PADS has been used for concurrent
execution of many different simulation paradigms (e.g. continuous simulation, concurrent replication), this
paper focuses on the distributed execution of discrete event simulations, i.e. we use the PADS techniques
for implementing DES models.

More in detail, in PADS, the simulation model is partitioned in submodels, called Logical Processes
(LPs) which can be evaluated concurrently by different Processing Elements (PEs). More precisely, the
simulation model is described in terms of multiple interacting Simulated Entities (SEs) which are assigned
to different LPs. Each LP runs on a different PE, where a PE is an execution unit acting as a container of
a set of entities. The simulation execution consists of the exchange of timestamped messages, representing
simulation events, between entities. Each LP has an incoming queue where messages are inserted before being dispatched to the appropriate entities. Without loss of generality, through this paper we will assume that a PE is a single core of a multicore processor. Figure 1 shows the general structure of a parallel and distributed simulator.

Clearly enough, PADS can strongly benefit from the use of cloud computing infrastructures. Cloud computing allows instantiating and dynamically maintaining computing (virtual) machines that meet arbitrarily varying resource requirements. Service level agreements can be employed in order to understand if the cloud provides the Quality-of-Service the user is expecting. QoS guarantees, together with the possibility of arbitrarily adding or removing resources on demand, provide the simulationist with a very useful computing environment to execute complex simulations, without having to manage the computing infrastructure. However, as in every distributed system, cloud virtual machines can fail. Thus, fault tolerance schemes are required.

Execution of long-running applications on increasingly larger parallel machines is likely to hit the reliability wall. This means that, as the system size (number of components) increases, so does the probability that at least one of those components fails, therefore reducing the system Mean Time To Failure (MTTF). At some point the execution time of the parallel application may become larger than the MTTF of its execution environment, so that the application has little chance to terminate normally.

As a purely illustrative example, let us consider a PADS with $L$ LPs. Let $X_i$ be the stochastic variable representing the duration of uninterrupted operation of the $i$-th LP, $1 \leq i \leq L$, taking into account both hardware and software failures. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each LP resides on a different PE, so that each hardware failure (i.e. a PE crash) affects an LP only. Assuming that all $X_i$ are independent and exponentially distributed (this assumption is somewhat unrealistic but widely used), we have that...
the probability $P(X_i > t)$ that LP $i$ operates without failures for at least $t$ time units is

$$P(X_i > t) = e^{-\lambda t}$$

where $\lambda$ is the failure rate. The joint probability that all $L$ LPs operate without failures for at least $t$ time units is therefore $R(L, t) = \prod_i P(X_i > t) = e^{-\lambda t}$; this is the formula for the reliability of $L$ components connected in series, where each component fails independently, and a single failure brings down the whole system.

Figure 2 shows the value of $R(L, t)$ (the probability of no failures for at least $t$ consecutive time units) for systems with $L = 10, 100, 1000$ LPs, assuming a MTTF of one year ($\lambda \approx 2.7573 \times 10^{-8} s^{-1}$). We can see that the system reliability quickly drops as the number of LPs increases: a simulation involving $L = 1000$ LPs and requiring one day to complete is very unlikely to terminate successfully.

Although the model above is overly simplified, and is not intended to provide an accurate estimate of the reliability of actual PADS, it does show that building a reliable system out of a large number of unreliable parts is challenging.

To put the numbers above more in context, we report on Table 1 the number of cores in the top ten High Performance Computing (HPC) systems that appear on the June 2018 edition of the Top500 Supercomputer.
| Name            | System                                      | N. of cores | $R_{\text{max}}$ (TFlop/s) | $R_{\text{peak}}$ (TFlop/s) |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Summit          | IBM Power System AC922                      | 2,282,544   | 122,300.0                   | 187,659.3                    |
| Sunway TaihuLight| Sunway MPP                                   | 10,649,600  | 93,014.6                    | 125,453.9                    |
| Sierra          | IBM Power System S922LC                     | 1,572,480   | 71,610.0                    | 119,193.6                    |
| Tianhe-2A       | TH-IVB-FEP Cluster                          | 4,981,760   | 61,444.5                    | 100,678.7                    |
| ABCI            | PRIMERGY CX2550 M4                          | 391,680     | 19,880.0                    | 32,576.6                     |
| Piz Daint       | Cray XC50                                   | 361,760     | 19,590.0                    | 25,326.3                     |
| Titan           | Cray XK7                                    | 560,640     | 17,590.0                    | 27,112.5                     |
| Sequoia         | BlueGene/Q                                  | 1,572,864   | 17,173.2                    | 20,132.7                     |
| Trinity         | Cray XC40                                   | 979,968     | 14,137.3                    | 43,902.6                     |
| Cori            | Cray XC40                                   | 622,336     | 14,014.7                    | 27,880.7                     |

Table 1: The top ten HPC systems in June 2018 Top500 Supercomputer list. $R_{\text{max}}$ and $R_{\text{peak}}$ are the maximum and theoretical peak LAPACK performance, respectively.

Five systems (Summit, Sunway TaihuLight, Sierra, Tianhe-2A, and Sequoia) have more than one million cores, while the others are in the range of hundreds of thousands. As the size of HPC systems grows, reliability issues become more and more relevant.

The reliability of HPC systems has been investigated, among others, in [11, 12]. In [11], the authors report about 0.5 hardware failures/year per processor on average, across several different HPC systems. It is quite instructive to observe that the root cause of faults include environmental factors (e.g., power outages), human errors, network failures, software errors, and hardware failures [12, 13].

Therefore, a 10-million processors HPC system with a MTTF of two years for each processor will experience $10^7/2 = 5 \times 10^6$ failures/year. In general, it is well understood that no matter how reliable the basic components are, the future generation of supercomputers will experience an ever increasing stream of failures and must cope with them.

This paper describes a novel approach to deal with fault tolerance in PADS. The proposed solution, termed FT-GAIA, is a fault tolerant extension of the GAIA/ARTİS parallel and distributed simulation middleware [14, 15]. FT-GAIA deals with crash errors and Byzantine faults by resorting to server groups [16]: simulation entities are replicated, in the cloud / distributed computing system, so that the model can be executed even if some of them fail. This functional replication is implemented by adding a related software layer in the GAIA/ARTİS stack. The replication of all the simulated entities is transparent to user-level. Thus, FT-GAIA can be used as a drop-in replacement to GAIA/ARTİS when fault tolerance is the major concern. Needless to say, fault tolerance increases the computational and communication loads at LPs, thus causing a moderate increment on the performance of the simulator.

The remainder paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the state of the art related to
fault tolerance in PADS. The GAIA/ARTİS parallel and distributed simulation middleware is described in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the description of FT-GAIA, a fault tolerant extension to GAIA/ARTİS. An empirical performance evaluation of FT-GAIA, based on a prototype implementation that we have developed, is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 discusses a probabilistic model that drives an analytical evaluation of the proposed scheme. Finally, Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.

2. Background and Related Work

In distributed systems, two typical approaches used to cope with hardware-related reliability are checkpointing and functional replication.

The checkpoint-restore paradigm requires the running application to periodically save its state on non-volatile storage (e.g. disk) so that it can resume execution from the last saved snapshot in case of failure. It should be observed that saving a snapshot may require considerable time; therefore, the interval between checkpoints must be carefully tuned to minimize the overhead.

Functional replication consists of replicating parts of the application on different execution nodes, so that failures can be tolerated if there is some minimum number of running instances of each component. Note that each component must be modified so that it is made aware that multiple copies of its peers exist, and can interact with all instances appropriately.

It is important to remark that functional replication is not effective against logical errors, i.e., bugs in the running applications, since the bug can be triggered at the same time on all instances. A prominent – and frequently mentioned – example is the failure of the Ariane 5 rocket that was caused by a software error on its Inertial Reference Platforms (IRPs). There were two IRP, providing hardware fault tolerance, but both used the same software. When the two software instances were fed with the same (correct) input from the hardware, the bug (an uncaught data conversion exception) caused both programs to crash, leaving the rocket without guidance [17]. The N-version programming technique [18] can be used to protect against software errors, and requires running several functionally equivalent programs that have been independently developed from the same specifications.

Although fault tolerance is an important and widely discussed topic in the context of distributed systems research, it received comparatively little attention by the PADS community. In what follows, we describe related works on simulation that deal with this main issue.

2.1. Checkpointing

In [19] the authors propose a rollback based optimistic recovery scheme in which checkpoints are periodically saved on stable storage. The distributed simulation uses an optimistic synchronization scheme in which out-of-order (i.e. “straggler”) events are handled according to the Time Warp protocol [20]. The
The novel idea of this approach is to model failures as straggler events with a timestamp equal to the last saved checkpoint. In this way, the authors can leverage the Time Warp protocol to handle failures.

In [21, 22], the authors propose a framework called Distributed Resource Management System (DRMS) to implement reliable IEEE 1516 federation [23]. The DRMS handles crash failures using checkpoints saved to stable storage, that is then used to migrate federates from a faulty host to a new host when necessary. The simulation engine is again based on an optimistic synchronization scheme, and the migration of LPs (the so called “federates” in the IEEE 1516 terminology) is implemented through Web services.

In [24], the authors propose a decoupled federate architecture in which each IEEE 1516 federate is separated into a virtual federate process and a physical federate process. The former executes the simulation model and the latter provides middleware services at the back-end. This solution enables the implementation of fault tolerant distributed simulation schemes through migration of virtual federates.

The CUMULVS middleware [25] introduces the support for fault tolerance and migration of simulations based on checkpointing. The middleware is not designed to support PADS but it allows the migration of running tasks for load balancing and to improve a task’s locality with a required resource.

A slightly different approach is proposed in [26]. In which, the authors introduce the Fault Tolerant Resource Sharing System (FT-RSS) framework. The goal of FT-RSS is to build fault tolerant IEEE 1516 federations using an architecture in which a separate FTP server is used as a persistent storage system. The persistent storage is used to implement the migration of federates from one node to another. The FT-RSS middleware supports replication of federates, partial failures and fail-stop failures.

Recently, in [27], the authors proposed a transparent middleware for dealing with Byzantine fault in HLA-based parallel and distributed simulations. In this case, the solution is based on the usage of replication, checkpointing and message logging technologies.

Finally, an approach based on the usage of virtualization techniques is described in [28]. The authors introduce a fault resilient framework that dynamically handles virtual machines failures inside the cloud environment. The proposed fault resilient framework is based on state saving and snapshots of processed event list that are implemented in each LP.

2.2. Functional Replication

In [29], the authors propose the use of functional replication in Time Warp simulations with the aim to increase the simulator performance and to add fault tolerance. Specifically, the idea is to have copies of the most frequently used simulation entities at multiple sites with the aim of reducing message traffic and communication delay. This approach is used to build an optimistic fault tolerance scheme in which it is assumed that the objects are fault free most of the time. The rollback capabilities of Time Warp are then used to correct intermittent and permanent faults.
In [30] the authors describe DARX, an adaptive replication mechanism for building reliable multi-agent systems. Being targeted to multi-agent systems, rather than PADS, DARX is mostly concerned with adaptability: agents may change their behavior at any time, and new agents may join or leave the system. Therefore, DARX tries to dynamically identify which agents are more “important”, and what degree of replication should be used for those agents in order to achieve the desired level of fault tolerance. It should be observed that DARX only handles crash failures, while FT-GAIA also deals with Byzantine faults.

3. The GAIA/ARTİS Middleware

To make this paper self-contained, we provide in this section a brief introduction of the GAIA/ARTİS parallel and distributed simulation middleware; the interested reader is referred to [14] and the software homepage [31].

The Advanced RTI System (ARTİS) is a parallel and distributed simulation middleware loosely inspired by the Runtime Infrastructure described in the IEEE 1516 standard “High Level Architecture” (HLA) [32]. ARTİS implements a parallel/distributed architectures where the simulation model is partitioned in a set of LPs [4]. As described in Section [1] the execution architecture in charge of running the simulation is composed of interconnected PEs and each PE runs one or more LPs (usually, a PE hosts one LP).

In a PADS, the interactions between the model components are driven by message exchanges. The low computation/communication ratio makes PADS communication-bound, so that the wall-clock execution time of distributed simulations is highly dependent on the performance of the communication network (i.e. latency, bandwidth and jitter). Reducing the communication overhead can be crucial to speed up the event processing rate of PADS. This can be achieved by clustering interacting entities on the same physical host, so that communications can happen through shared memory.

Among the various services provided by ARTİS, time management (i.e., synchronization) is fundamental for obtaining correct simulation runs that respect the causality dependencies of events. ARTİS supports both conservative (Chandy-Misra-Bryant [33]) and optimistic (Time Warp [20]) synchronization algorithms. Moreover, a distributed implementation of the time-stepped synchronization is included.

The Generic Adaptive Interaction Architecture (GAIA) [15, 31, 34] is a software layer built on top of ARTİS. In GAIA, each LP acts as the container of some SEs: the simulation model is partitioned in its basic components (the SEs) that are allocated among the LPs. The system behavior is modeled by the interactions among the SEs; such interactions take the form of timestamped messages that are exchanged among the entities. From the user’s point of view, a simulation model based on ARTİS follows a Multi Agent System (MAS) approach. In fact, each SE is an autonomous agent that performs some actions (individual behavior) and interacts with other agents in the simulation.

In most cases, the interaction between the SEs of a PADS are not completely uniform, meaning that
there are clusters of SEs where internal interactions are more frequent. The structure of these clusters of highly interacting entities may change over time, as the simulation model evolves. The identification of such clusters is important to improve the performance of a PADS: indeed, by putting heavily-interacting entities on as few LPs as possible, we may replace most of the expensive LAN/WAN communications by more efficient shared memory messages.

In GAIA, the analysis of the communication pattern is based on a set of simple self-clustering heuristics [15] that are provided by the framework. All the provided heuristics are generic and not model dependent. For example, in the default heuristic, every few timesteps for each SE is found which LP is the destination of the large percentage of interactions. If it is not the LP in which the SE is contained then a migration is triggered. The migration of SEs among LPs is transparent to the simulation model developer; entities migration is useful not only to reduce the communication overhead, but also to achieve better load-balancing among the LPs, especially on heterogeneous execution platforms where execution units are not identical. In these cases, GAIA can migrate entities away from less powerful PEs, towards more capable processors if available.

4. Fault Tolerant Simulation

FT-GAIA is a fault tolerant extension to the GAIA/ARTİS distributed simulation middleware. As will be explained below, FT-GAIA uses functional replication of simulation entities to achieve tolerance against crashes and Byzantine failures of the PEs.

FT-GAIA is implemented as a software layer on top of GAIA and provides the same functionalities of GAIA with only minor additions. Therefore, FT-GAIA is mostly transparent to the user, meaning that any simulation model built for GAIA can be easily ported to FT-GAIA. The FT-GAIA extension will be integrated in the next release of the GAIA/ARTİS simulation middleware and will be available from the official GAIA/ARTİS Web site [31].

FT-GAIA works by replicating simulation entities (see Fig. 3) to tolerate crash-failures and Byzantine faults of the LPs. A crash may be caused by a failure of the hardware – including the network connection – and operating system. A Byzantine failure refers to an arbitrary behavior of a LP that causes the LP to crash, terminate abnormally, or to send arbitrary messages (including no messages at all) to other LPs.

Replication is based on the following principle. If a conventional, non-fault tolerant distributed simulation is composed of \( N \) distinct simulation entities, FT-GAIA generates \( N \times M \) entities, by generating \( M \) independent instances of each simulation entity. All instances \( A_1, \ldots, A_M \) of the same entity \( A \) perform the same computation: if no fault occurs, they produce the same result.

Replication comes with a cost, both in term of additional processing power that is needed to execute all instances, and also in term of an increased communication load between the LPs. Indeed, if two entities \( A \)
and B communicate by sending a message from A to B, then after replication each instance A_i must send the same message to all instances B_j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ M, resulting in M^2 (redundant) messages. Therefore, the level of replication M must be chosen wisely in order to achieve a good balance between overhead and fault tolerance, also depending on the types of failures (crash failures or Byzantine faults) that the user wants to address.

Handling crash failures. A crash failure happens when a LP crashes, but operates correctly until it halts. When a LP terminates, all simulation entities running on that LP stop their execution and the local state of the computation is lost. From the theory of distributed systems, it is known that M instances of each simulation entity are required to tolerate up to (M - 1) crash failures. Each instance must be executed on a different LP, so that the failure of a LP only affects one instance of all entities executed there. This is equivalent to running M copies of a monolithic (sequential) simulation, with the difference that a sequential simulation does not incur in communication and synchronization overhead. However, unlike sequential simulations, FT-GAIA can take advantage of more than M LPs, by distributing all the N × M entities on the available execution units. This reduces the workload on the LPs, reducing the wall-clock execution time of the simulation model.

Handling Byzantine Failures. Byzantine failures include all types of abnormal behaviors of a PE. Examples are: the crash of a component of the distributed simulator (e.g., LP or entity); the transmission of erroneous/corrupted data from an entity to other entities; computation errors that lead to erroneous results. In this case M instances of each SE are necessary to tolerate up to \( [(M - 1)/2] \) Byzantine faults using the majority rule: a SE instance B_i can process an incoming message m from A_j when it receives one copy of m from the (strict) majority of the instances of sender A (the strict majority of M instances is \( [(M + 1)/2] \)). This applies to synchronous systems where the message delay is bounded and faulty nodes
cannot forge messages (i.e., messages are in some sense authenticated). Again, all $M$ instances of each SE must be located on different LPs.

In is worth noting that, GAIA (and therefore FT-GAIA) is based on a time-stepped approach, leading to a synchronous system. Moreover, the presence of a specific end-of-step synchronization message that needs to be received by all LPs represents a bound on the possible latency for correct messages. Thus, we can conclude that FT-GAIA works in a synchronous scenario.

The majority rule, as implemented in FT-GAIA, requires that the sequences of messages produced by each working instance of the same simulation entity are equal, i.e. the payload of the $i$-th message of each sequence is exactly the same. This comes from the fact that many simulation models require reproducibility of the results, irrespective from the implementation details such as the number of LPs used, or how entities are mapped to the LPs. In turn, reproducibility requires that once started, the behavior of the simulation as a whole is fully deterministic. However, there might be scenarios where strict determinism is not required, e.g. in mixed simulations relying on Monte Carlo methods when different execution paths are actually required. For such scenarios, Byzantine failures are difficult if not impossible to identify, because the messages produced by the instances of the same SE could be different yet correct. In these situations, deciding whether a message is correct or not would require some model-specific knowledge, if such knowledge exists at all. Extending FT-GAIA to allow the modeler to specify such knowledge is relatively straightforward, but so far we have not encountered any use case demanding it.

**Allocation of Simulation Entities.** Once the level of replication $M$ has been set, it is necessary to decide where to create the $M$ instances of each SE, so that the constraint that each instance is located on a different LP is met. In FT-GAIA the deployment of instances is performed during the setup of the simulation model. In the current implementation, there is a centralized service that keeps track of the initial location of all SE instances. When a new SE is created, the service creates the appropriate number of instances according to the redundancy model to be employed, and assigns them to the LPs so that all instances are located on different LPs. Note that all instances of the same SE receive the same initial seed for their internal pseudo-random number generators; this guarantees that their execution traces are the same, regardless of the LP where execution occurs and the degree of replication. At the cost of some extra coordination among the LPs even the initial SEs deployment could be decentralized. This not challenging under the design viewpoint but would require a more complex implementation and thus it has been left as future work.

**Message Handling.** We have already stated that fault tolerance through functional replication has a cost in term of increased message load among SEs. Indeed, for a replication level $M$ (i.e., there are $M$ instances of each SE) the number of messages exchanged between entities grows by a factor of $M^2$.

A consequence of message redundancy is that message filtering must be performed to avoid that multiple copies of the same message are processed more than once by the same SE instance. FT-GAIA takes care of
automatically filtering the excess messages according to the fault model adopted; filtering is done outside of the SE, which are therefore totally unaware of this step. In the case of crash failures, only the first copy of each message that is received by a SE is processed; all further copies are dropped by the receiver. In the case of Byzantine failures with replication level $M = 2f + 1$, each entity must wait for at least $(f + 1)$ copies of the same message before it can handle it. Once a strict majority has been reached, the message can be processed and all further copies of the same messages that might arrive later on can be dropped.

**Entities Migration.** PADS can benefit from the migration of SEs to balance computation/communication load and reduce the communication cost, by placing the SEs that interact frequently “next” to each other (e.g. on the same LP) \[15\]. In FT-GAIA, the entity migration is subject to a new constraint: the instances of the same SE can never reside on the same LP. More specifically, the SEs migration is handled by the underlying GAIA/ARTIS middleware: each LP runs a clustering mechanism based on a heuristic function that tries to put together (on the same LP) the SEs that interact frequently through message exchanges. Special care is taken to avoid putting too many entities on the same LPs that would become a bottleneck. Once a new feasible allocation is found, the migration of a SE is implemented through moving its state variables to the destination LP. In different terms, our design choice has been to maintain GAIA and FT-GAIA as separate as possible. In fact, the clustering heuristics used by GAIA are totally unaware of the functional replication of SEs. This has simplified the development of FT-GAIA as a separate software module at the cost of using the generic self-clustering heuristics provided by GAIA. Most likely, specifically tailored heuristics would be able to obtain a better clustering of SEs when considering the presence of copies of the same SEs.

5. **Experimental Performance Evaluation**

In this section we evaluate a prototype implementation of FT-GAIA by implementing a simple simulation model of a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communication system. The simulation model built on top of FT-GAIA is executed under different workload parameters that will be described in the following. The Wall Clock Time (WCT) of the simulation runs is recorded (excluding the time to setup the simulation) such as other metrics of interest. The tests were performed on a cluster of workstations, each host being equipped with an Intel Core i5-4590 3.30 GHz processor with 4 physical cores and 8 GB of RAM. The operating system was Debian Jessie. The workstations are connected through a Fast Ethernet LAN.

5.1. **Simulation Model**

We simulate a simple P2P communication protocol over randomly generated directed overlay graphs. Nodes of the graphs are peers while links represent communication connections \[36, 37\]. In these overlays, all nodes have the same out-degree, that has been set to 5 in our experiments. During the simulation,
each node periodically updates its neighbor set. Latencies for message transmission over overlay links are generated using a lognormal distribution \[38\].

The simulated communication protocol works as follows. Periodically, nodes send PING messages to other nodes, that in turn reply with a PONG message that is used by the sender to estimate the average latencies of the links (note that communication links are, in fact, bidirectional). The destination of a PING is randomly selected to be a neighbor (with probability \(p\)), or a non-neighbor (with probability \(1 - p\)). A neighbor is a node that can be reached through an outgoing link in the directed overlay graph.

Each node of the P2P overlay is represented by a SE within some LP. Unless stated otherwise, each LP was executed on a different PE, so that no two LPs shared the same CPU core. Three different scenarios are considered: a no fault scenario, where no faults occur, a crash scenario, where crash failures occurs and finally a Byzantine scenario where Byzantine faults occurs.

We executed 15 independent replications of each simulation run. In most of the charts in this section, mean values are reported with a 99.5% confidence interval.

5.2. Impact of the number of LPs and SEs

Figure 4 shows the WCT of the simulation that was executed for 10000 timesteps with a varying number of SEs; recall that the number of SEs is equal to the number of nodes in the P2P overlay graph. The number of LPs was set to 3, 4, and 5; the number of hosts is equal to the number of LPs, so that each LP is executed on a different physical machine. The WCT for the three failure scenarios is shown (i.e., no failure, single crash and single Byzantine failure). In all cases, the adaptive migration heuristic provided by GAIA is disabled.

Results with 3 and 4 LPs are similar, with a slight improvement with 4 LPs. Conversely, higher WCT is observed when 5 LPs are used. As expected, the higher the number of SEs the higher the WCT. This happens since the simulation incurs in a higher communication overhead. All curves show a similar trend: in particular, it is worth noting that the increment due to the faults management schemes is mainly caused by the higher number of messages that are exchanged among nodes.

Figures 5 and 6 show the WCT with 8000 and 16000 SEs with varying number of LPs; again, each LP has been executed on a different physical host. The two charts emphasize the increment of the time required to complete the simulations with 5 LPs and in presence of Byzantine faults. This is due to the increased number of messages exchanged among the LPs: each message needs to be sent to three \((2M + 1)\) different destinations in order to guarantee the expected fault tolerance.

5.3. Impact of the number of LPs per host

In the previous experiments, each LP has been allocated in a different host. Figure 7 shows the WCT when more than one LP is run in each host. In particular, the following setups are considered: (i) 4 LPs
placed over 4 hosts (1 LP per host), (ii) 8 LPs placed over 8 hosts (1 LP per host), (iii) 8 LPs placed over 4 hosts (2 LPs per host), and (iv) 16 LPs over 4 PEs (4 LPs per host). Note that, in any case, the number of LPs/host never exceeds the number of cores/host, so that every LP runs on a separate processor core. For each setup, the three failure scenarios already mentioned (no failures, crash, Byzantine failures) are considered. Again, the migration heuristic provided by GAIA is disabled. Each curve in the figure is related to one of those scenarios, when varying the amount of SEs. It is worth noting that, when two or more LPs are run on the same host, they can communicate using shared memory rather than through the LAN. This means that, in this case the inter-LP communication is more efficient. For better readability, in this experiment the confidence intervals have been calculated but not reported in the figure.

We observe that the scenario with 4 LPs over 4 hosts is influenced by the number of SEs and the failure scenario, while in the other cases it is the number of LPs that mainly determines the simulator performance. When 8 LPs are executed on 4 hosts, the performance is slightly better than the case where 8 LPs are
executed on 8 hosts. This is due to the better communication efficiency provided by shared memory with respect to the LAN interface.

The worst performance is measured when 16 LPs are executed on 4 hosts. This is due to the fact that the amount of computation in the simulation model is quite limited. Therefore, partitioning the SEs in 16 LPs has the effect to increase the communication cost without any benefit from the computational point of view (i.e., in the model there is not enough computation to be parallelized).

5.4. Impact of the number of failures

The impact of the number of faults on the simulation WCT is now studied. Two different setups are considered, one with 5 LPs over 5 hosts (Figure 8), and one with 8 LPs over 4 hosts (Figure 9). The choice of 5 LPs is motivated by the fact that this is the minimum number of LPs that allows us to tolerate up to two Byzantine faults. Furthermore, the P2P simulation model used in this performance evaluation shows a significant degradation of performance when the number of LPs is larger than 8. As described before, this is due to the specific characteristics of the simulation model, in which there is a limited amount of computation that can be parallelized. On the other hand, partitioning the model on a large number of LPs sharply increases the communication cost. More in detail, the setup with 8 LPs on 4 hosts allows testing 3 Byzantine faults with 2 LPs per host in a setup with a limited communication overhead.
Figure 6: WCT as a function of the number of LPs, with 16000 SEs. Migration is disabled. Lower is better.

Figure 8 shows the WCTs measured with 0, 1 and 2 faults. Each curve refers to a scenario with 2000 or 6000 SEs with crash or Byzantine failures. As expected, the higher the number of faults, the higher the WCTs, especially when Byzantine faults are considered. Indeed, in this case a higher amount of communication messages is required among SEs in order to properly handle faults.

A higher WCT is measured with 8 LPs, as shown in Figure 9. In this case, the amount of faults has a limited influence on the simulation performance. As before, the computational load of this simulation model is too low for gaining from the partitioning in 8 LPs. In other words, the latency introduced by network communications is so high that both the number of SEs and the number of faults have a negligible impact on performances.

5.5. Impact of SEs migration

Finally, Figure 10 shows the WCT of a simulation composed of 4 LPs (in which each LP was executed on a different host) with different failure schemes, when the adaptive migration of SEs provided by the GAIA framework is enabled/disabled. Also in this case, for better readability, the confidence intervals are not reported in figure.

In this case, the trend obtained with the SEs migration is similar to that obtained when no migration is performed but the overall performance are better when the migration is turned off. This is due to the
overhead introduced by the self-clustering heuristics and the state of the SEs that are transferred between the LPs. In other words, the adaptive clustering of SEs that in many other simulation models has provided a significant gain, in this case, is unable to give a speedup.

The main motivation behind this result is the fact that, in this prototype, we have decided to use the very general clustering heuristics that are already implemented in GAIA/ARTİS. These heuristics assume that the simulation model is composed of a set of agents, each one with its specific behavior and communication pattern. In the case of FT-GAIA, this is not true. In fact, all the copies of a given SE share exactly the same behavior and interactions. Moreover, as described before, FT-GAIA adds the constraint that the instances of the same SE can never reside on the same LP. This constraint affects the free flow of SEs among the LPs and consequently reduces the clustering efficiency.

For these reasons, we think that more specific replication-aware clustering heuristics need to be designed to improve the clustering performance while balancing the overhead introduced by the fault tolerance.

Figure 7: WCT as a function of the number of LPs, with different numbers of LPs for each host; migration is disabled. Lower is better.
6. Analytical Reliability Evaluation

In Section 4, we have seen that the FT-GAIA extension of the GAIA/ARTIS middleware works by making $M$ copies of each SE, and ensuring that each copy resides on a different LP. This requirement, that we call FT-GAIA constraint from now on, guarantees that FT-GAIA can tolerate up to $M - 1$ crash failures of LPs, or up to $\lfloor (M - 1)/2 \rfloor$ Byzantine failures.

In this section we perform a reliability analysis of an FT-GAIA simulation to complement the experimental performance evaluation from Section 5. The goal of this analysis is to estimate the reliability of FT-GAIA when the number of failures is higher than the thresholds above; also, we want to study what happens if the FT-GAIA constraint is not enforced, that is, what happens if more than one instance of the same simulation entity is allowed reside on the same LP. These kinds of analyses would be complex and time-consuming if performed through actual experiments as in the previous section, so we resort to a simpler probabilistic evaluation. We remark that the analysis below is only concerned with the system reliability, and does not consider any performance metric. Indeed, the content of this section is orthogonal to the performance analysis described in Section 5. Analytical performance models for distributed simulations.
Figure 9: WCT as a function of the number of faults; 2000 timesteps over 8 LPs; migration is disabled. Lower is better.

have been proposed in the past [39], but their extension to FT-GAIA would be non-trivial and is outside the scope of this work.

We analyze the system reliability of FT-GAIA under crash or Byzantine failures of the LPs, since they are the basic component that can fail in GAIA-FT. Indeed, a crash of a whole host implies a crash of all the LPs running on it, and a crash of a SE implies a crash of the whole LP where the SE is executed.

The analysis presented below relies on the following assumptions:

- All crashes are permanent: a crashed LP is never brought back to a functioning state.
- Every LP has the same probability to crash.
- All instances of each simulation entity are randomly and uniformly placed on the available LPs, either respecting or not respecting the FT-GAIA constraint (we will analyze both scenarios).
- SEs are never migrated from one LP to another.

While some of the assumptions above are quite limiting, they simplify the analysis considerably and still provide useful qualitative information.
6.1. Crash Failure Model

Given a simulation with $L$ LPs and $N$ simulation entities, with $M$ instances of each entity ($1 \leq M \leq L$), we assume that $X$ randomly chosen LPs crash during the simulation ($0 \leq X \leq L$). We want to compute the system reliability, that is, the probability that a sufficient number of instances of each entity survived to ensure that the simulation produces the intended results. In the crash failure model, the reliability $R_C$ is the probability that at least one instance of each entity resides on a LP that does not crash; in case of byzantine failures, the reliability $R_B$ is the probability that at least $\lceil (M + 1)/2 \rceil$ entities (the majority) reside on LPs that do not crash.

For each SE $i$, let $N_i$ be the random variable denoting the number of instances of $i$ that reside on LPs that did not crash. The pmf (probability mass function) $\Pr(N_i = k)$, $0 \leq k \leq M$, can be derived easily by casting the original problem into an “urn problem”. If $k$ is greater than $L - X$, then $\Pr(N_i = k)$ is zero since less than $k$ LPs survived through the end of the simulation. If $0 \leq k \leq L - X$, then $P(N_i = k)$ is the probability of getting $k$ white balls out of $M$ extracted without replacement from an urn containing $X$ black balls (representing crashed LPs) and $L - X$ white balls (representing LPs that did not crash). Therefore we have:
\[
\Pr(N_i = k) = \begin{cases} 
\binom{X}{M - k} \binom{L - X}{L} / \binom{L}{M} & \text{if } 0 \leq k \leq L - X \\
0 & \text{if } L - X < k \leq M 
\end{cases}
\]

(1)

The system reliability \(R_C\) under the crash failure model is the probability that the simulation terminates successfully. This is the joint probability that \(N_i \geq 1\) for each \(i\). If there are more instances of each SE than crashed LPs, then \(R_C = 1\) since the FT-GAIA constraint ensures that there is at least one live instance of each entity. On the other hand, if \(M \leq X \leq L\) it may happen that all instances of the same entity fail, and the system reliability can then be computed in this case as:

\[
\prod_{i=1}^{N} \Pr(N_i \geq 1) = \prod_{i=1}^{N} (1 - \Pr(N_i = 0)) = \left[ 1 - \binom{X}{M} / \binom{L}{M} \right]^N
\]

Therefore, \(R_C\) is defined as:

\[
R_C = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } 0 \leq X < M \\
\left[ 1 - \binom{X}{M} / \binom{L}{M} \right]^N & \text{if } M \leq X \leq L 
\end{cases}
\]

(2)

Note that if \(X = L\) (all LPs failed) then \(R_C\) is zero as expected. Also, observe that \(R_C\) tends to zero as the number of entities \(N\) approaches infinity.

6.2. Byzantine Failure Model

The reliability \(R_B\) under the Byzantine failure model can be computed in a similar way. The minimum number of working instances of each SE that are required to guarantee that the simulation terminates is \([((M + 1)/2)]\). If the number of failures \(X\) is strictly lower than \([((M + 1)/2)]\), then \(R_B = 1\). If the number of failed LPs is greater than or equal to \([((M + 1)/2)]\), the reliability becomes strictly less than 1 and can be computed as the joint probability that the majority of the instances of each entity \(i\) are active:

\[
\prod_{i=1}^{N} \Pr(N_i \geq [(M + 1)/2]) = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \left[ \sum_{k=[(M+1)/2]}^{L} \Pr(N_i = k) \right] 
\]

\[
= \left[ \sum_{k=[(M+1)/2]}^{L} \Pr(N_i = k) \right]^N
\]

Hence we have:
\[ R_B = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } 0 \leq X < \lceil (M + 1)/2 \rceil \\
\sum_{k=\lceil (M+1)/2 \rceil}^{L} \Pr(N_i = k) & \text{if } \lceil (M + 1)/2 \rceil \leq X \leq L 
\end{cases} \] (3)

Figure 11 shows the reliability of FT-GAIA using \( L = 100 \) LPs with \( M = 21 \) instances of each entity, as a function of the number of crashes \( X \). Under the crash failure model (top figure) the system tolerates up to \( M - 1 = 20 \) crashes; under the Byzantine failure model (bottom figure), the system tolerates up to \( \lceil (M + 1)/2 \rceil - 1 = 10 \) crashes. When \( X \) exceeds the thresholds, the reliability drops; in fact, \( R_B \) drops faster than \( R_C \), because the Byzantine failure model requires a higher number of active instances to guarantee that the simulation terminates successfully.

Figure 12 shows the reliability of FT-GAIA as a function of the number of entities \( N \) for different number of faults \( X \) (note that the values of \( X \) differ for the crash and Byzantine failure models); we assume \( L = 100 \) LPs and \( M = 21 \) instances of each entity. Protecting the simulation against Byzantine faults requires a higher number of active instances for each SE, since the model is more general than the crash failure model. However, the drawback is that the reliability \( R_B \) drops very quickly as \( N \) increases even when the number of faults \( X \) slightly exceeds the threshold. Therefore, the user must be aware that Byzantine faults are much more sensitive to the choice of the “correct” value of \( M \) than crash failures.

### 6.3. Impact of the FT-GAIA Constraint

We now study what would happen if the FT-GAIA constraint is not applies, i.e., if FT-GAIA were allowed to put more than one instance of same entity on the same LP. Given a simulation with \( L \) LPs, \( N \) entities that are replicated \( M \) times, and \( X \) LPs that crash during the simulation, let \( N_i^* \) be the number of surviving instances of entity \( i \) under the assumption that the FT-GAIA constraint does not apply. This scenario can again be analyzed as an urn problem, in this case where the balls are extracted with replacement. The random variables \( N_i^* \) follow a binomial distribution \( B \left( M, \frac{L-X}{L} \right) \), so we have:

\[ \Pr(N_i^* = k) = \binom{M}{k} \left( \frac{L-X}{L} \right)^k \left( \frac{X}{L} \right)^{M-k} \]

As above, the system reliability \( R_C^* \) under the crash failures model can be expressed as:

\[ R_C^* = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \Pr(N_i^* \geq 1) = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \left( 1 - \Pr(N_i^* = 0) \right) = \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{X}{L} \right)^{M} \right]^N \] (4)

Eq. (4) tells us that the system reliability \( R_C^* \) is strictly less than 1 even in presence of a single crash failure. Indeed, if the instances of each SE are randomly placed on the LPs, there is a small but non-
negligible probability that all instances of, say, entity \( i \) are placed on the same LP that will crash, aborting
the whole simulation. This can not happen if the FT-GAIA constraint is enforced.

Figure 13 compares the system reliability with and without the FT-GAIA constraint. We consider a
system with \( L = 100 \) LPs and \( N = 10^6 \) simulation entities that are replicated \( M = 21 \) times. The FT-GAIA
constraint allows the system to sustain up to \( M - 1 = 20 \) failures; indeed, when \( X < M \) the reliability \( R_C \)
computed using Eq. (2) is 1. When \( X < M \) the reliability \( R_C^* \) computed using Eq. (4) is slightly less than 1;
however, the difference is so tiny to be almost negligible. Indeed, Eq. (4) shows that the probability that all
instances of one SE reside on the same (crashed) LP gets smaller as the number of replicas \( M \) increases.
However, it is important to remember that this is true if the SE instances are randomly placed on the LPs.

In practice, however, the placement is not random, at least when the automatic clustering and migration
facilities of GAIA/ARTÍS are enabled. Indeed, GAIA/ARTÍS monitors the communication pattern of
the SEs, and migrate those that exhibit a high level of interaction on the same LP to reduce the number
of remote communications [15]. If the placement of SEs is not random, the FT-GAIA constraint becomes
essential to limit the probability that too many instances of the same SE fail at the same time.

6.4. Discussion

We can use the results above to provide some guidelines on how the replication level \( M \) can be chosen
in practice. Note that choosing the “best” value of \( M \) is a difficult problem, since the answer depends
on the simulation model that is executed, on the execution environment, and on the failure model that is
considered.

If the user requests a strong guarantee that the simulation run is completed without failures, then it is
necessary to choose a value of \( M \) that produces a system reliability equal to 1. Assuming that the GAIA-FT
constraint is enforced, Eq. 2 and 3 tells us that the system reliability is one if the number of expected
failures \( X \) is strictly less than \( M \) for the crash failure model, and strictly less than \( \lfloor (M + 1)/2 \rfloor \) for the
Byzantine failure model.

The number of expected failures \( X \) can be expressed as

\[
X = L\lambda t
\]

where \( \lambda \) is the failure rate of each LP, and \( t \) is the duration of the simulation run. Both parameters can be
estimated empirically; in particular, \( \lambda \) can be computed as the inverse of the MTTF, that is a quantity that
can be easily observed from the operational history of the system.

Therefore, the simulation can be completed with probability 1 in the crash failure model if \( X < M \);
taking into account Eq. (5) we get:

\[
M > L\lambda t
\]
Similarly, the simulation can be completed with probability 1 in the Byzantine failure model if \( X < \lfloor (M + 1)/2 \rfloor \); again, taking into account Eq. (5) we get:

\[
M > 2L\lambda t - 1
\]  

(7)

The user is responsible for deciding which failure model to use. Once the choice is made, the smallest integer value \( M \) satisfying (6) or (7) is the replication level that provides the strongest guarantee to complete the simulation, under the simplifying assumptions stated at the beginning of this section.

The experimental evaluation illustrated in Section 5 shows that providing protection against Byzantine failures is more costly in term of wall clock time; however, Byzantine failures are more general than crash failures. If the user trusts the computation and assumes that a running SE will always compute the correct result, the more lax crash failure model can be considered, allowing a lower replication level \( M \) to be chosen.

7. Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper we described an approach to provide fault tolerance through functional replication in parallel and distributed simulations. Our solution, called FT-GAIA, is an extension to the GAIA/ARTIS simulation middleware that acts transparently to the user that creates and manages the simulation. Fault tolerance is provided by replicating simulation entities and distributing them on multiple execution nodes. This is a particularly important issue to cope with, especially if we expect to have execution nodes running complex simulation over virtual machines hosted by public or private cloud systems. Replication of their execution guarantees tolerance to crash-failures and Byzantine faults of computing nodes. In order to mitigate the costs of communication among simulation entities, the middleware exploits an automatic migration of simulated entities among execution nodes with the aim to balance the computational load and minimize the communication overhead.

A preliminary performance evaluation of FT-GAIA has been presented, based on a prototype implementation. Results show that a high degree of fault tolerance can be achieved, at the cost of a moderate increase in the computational load of the execution units. Moreover, a probabilistic model that drives an analytical evaluation of the proposed scheme is introduced.

As a future work, we aim at improving the efficiency of FT-GAIA by leveraging on ad-hoc clustering heuristics that are aware of the fault tolerance mechanism implemented by FT-GAIA. For example, evaluating the impact on the clustering of all the copies of a given simulation entity instead of considering each entity by itself. Indeed, we believe that specifically tuned clustering and load balancing mechanisms can significantly reduce the overhead introduced by the replication of the simulated entities. Another aspect that needs to be investigated is the impact of the functional replication on different synchronization algorithms used in distributed simulations, e.g. the Chandy-Misra-Bryant (CMB) conservative approach based
on NULL messages \cite{33}, or the Time Warp optimistic protocol \cite{20} based on rollbacks, that are the most commonly used in practice.

**Symbols**

- $L :=$ Number of Logical Processes (LPs)
- $N :=$ Number of Simulation Entities (SEs)
- $M :=$ Number of copies of each SE ($M \in \{0, \ldots, L\}$)
- $X :=$ Number of crashed LPs ($X \in \{0, \ldots, L\}$)
- $N_i :=$ Number of instances of SEs $i$ that do not crash
- $R_C :=$ System reliability under the crash failure model
- $R_C^* :=$ System reliability under the crash failure model (without the FT-GAIA constraint)
- $R_B :=$ System reliability under the Byzantine failure model

**Acronyms**

- DES Discrete Event Simulation
- FEL Future Event List
- GVT Global Virtual Time
- HPC High Performance Computing
- IRP Inertial Reference Platform
- LVT Local Virtual Time
- LP Logical Process
- MTTF Mean Time To Failure
- PADS Parallel And Distributed Simulation
- PDES Parallel Discrete Event Simulation
- PE Processing Element
- SE Simulated Entity
- WCT Wall Clock Time
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Figure 11: Reliability of FT-GAIA to crash (top) and Byzantine failures (bottom), as a function of the number of failures $X$; we assume $L = 100$ LPs and $M = 21$ instances of each entity. The vertical line is at $M$. 
Figure 12: Reliability of FT-GAIA for crash failures as a function of the number of simulation entities $N$, with $L = 30$ LPs and $M = 11$ instances of each entity.
Figure 13: Reliability with and without the FT-GAIA constraint as a function of the number of failed LPs $X$, with $L = 100$ LPs, $N = 10^6$ entities and $M = 21$ instances of each entity (vertical line).