Trust Estimation in Peer-to-Peer Network Using BLUE

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Abstract—In peer-to-peer networks, free riding is a major problem. Reputation management systems can be used to overcome this problem. Reputation estimation methods generally do not consider the uncertainties in the inputs. We propose a reputation estimation method using BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased estimator) estimator that consider uncertainties in the input variables.

Index Terms—Trust, Reputation, BLUE, Free Riding

I. INTRODUCTION

P eer-to-peer systems have attracted considerable attention in recent past as these systems are more scalable than client server systems. But distributed nature of peer-to-peer networks brings many challenges for system designers. These networks are designed keeping in mind that every node is honest and co-operative. It means, if some node takes some resource from the community, it will also facilitate the community.

But nodes are the entities operated by rational human beings. So nodes are expected to behave in a selfish manner i.e. they try to maximise their utility. This results in their non co-operative behaviour. This phenomenon is explained by famous Prisoners Dilemma, in which Nash Equilibrium (NE) is achieved when both prisoners deceive each other [1]. Similarly in a file sharing network, if nodes are considered as players, their NE happens when none of them share the resources [2]. Tendency of nodes to draw resources from the network and not giving anything in return is termed as ‘Free Riding’. An Experimental study [3] on Gnutella network in 2005 also confirmed this fact by showing that number of free rider nodes is as high as 85%.

Such type of problems also exist in e-commerce systems like e-bay. In e-commerce portals like e-bay, people sell and buy different things on-line. Buyers and sellers generally do not know each other. So the possibility of cheating or possibility of providing a product or service of inferior quality always exists. To avoid this, e-bay uses a rating based reputation system. After every transaction, user gives a feedback rating to his counterpart and based on these ratings, reputation is decided. This reputation helps users in making decision about transactions [4].

Trust or reputation management systems can also be used in peer to peer networks to overcome the problem of free riding as well as to ward off some of the attacks. We have proposed a reputation aggregation method using differential gossip in [9]. In a peer to peer file sharing network, trust or reputation of a node represents its co-operative behaviour towards other nodes. A node seeking some resource from another node measures the ratio of received resource to the requested resource after every transaction and uses it to update the trust value. If a node imparts all the requested resource, it’s reputation is considered as one and if a node always declines sharing of resources, it has reputation as zero.

Good method for trust estimation is needed to design a good reputation management system. Trust can be estimated in a very simple way as the ratio of received to requested resources but this simple method can not overcome the effect of noise (i.e. uncertainty) in the estimation of trust value. We are proposing a trust estimation method using BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) [29]. This method overcomes the noise effects considerably and requires almost same amount of memory and computation.

Remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section two discuses the related work in reputation management while section three describes the system model. In section four the estimator for trust using BLUE is derived. Section six presents the numerical results and section seven concludes the paper.

II. RELATED WORK

Different authors have used different methods for estimation of trust value of a node. It is also termed as the contribution from the node. Buragohain et.al. [5] and Wang et.al. [6] take the ratio of resource contributed by the node to the ratio of absolute measure of contribution, multiplied by the cost of resource. Buragohain et.al. does not discuss the mechanism to measure of contributions of a node by the receiving node. In [7] receiving node computes the trust value of a node on the basis of received data in the transactions with the sending node. In [7], quality of transaction is sent to service provider node in form of a cookie. Duttay et.al.
and Papaioannou _et al._ suggests that each node should calculate reputation of other node on the basis of service received from the other nodes depending upon number of transactions done with those nodes, delay in the transactions and the download speed. Andrade _et al._ calculates the reputation of a node by taking the difference of resources received from and provided to the node. In _[22], [19], [18]_ and _[17]_, a node adjusts the reputation of other node on the basis of quality of transactions with that node. Eigen-Trust _[14]_ normalises the rating on each transaction whereas Power-Trust _[17]_ uses Bayesian approach to calculate reputation locally.

Mengshu _et al._ takes the ratio of successful transactions to total transactions. PET _[16]_ classifies the service quality into four types (every type provides some score), then calculates ratio of score obtained by a node to total score it could have got. After calculating this ratio, it is combined with feedback obtained from different nodes and final reputation is calculated. Banerjee _et al._ calculates reputation of a node for a particular type of resource by taking the ratio of number of times this type of resource was asked from that node to the number of times this type of resource was asked from that node. In Fuzzy-Trust _[15], [21]_, nodes do fuzzy _inference_ on parameters to calculate the trust score locally for another node ‘’x’’ and then aggregate it with trust scores of the node ‘x’ as received from other nodes using their weights. Peer can also give rank to the interacting nodes on the basis of normalized download volume received from them during a fixed period _[22]_. The rank of an interacting node is computed using a function that increases when the node provides a resource and decreases when a resource is allocated to the node _[23]_.

In _[24]_, peer maintains a binary vector of m bits. After a transaction happens one or zero is added at most significant position of the vector, after shifting right all the previously placed bits by one place. This trust vector is considered as a m bit binary number. To compute the trust, value of the m bit binary number is divided by 2^m. This ensures that the trust value lies in between 0 and 1. In _[25]_, peer takes the ratio of the total contribution received from a node to the sum of total contribution received from that node and total allocation done by the peer for that node. In _[26]_, peer calculates the ratio of the sum of resource it has received from a node to the resource it has requested from that node for last ten transactions. Moon _et al._ classifies the services from a node and assigns different weights to different services, _e.g._ weight for file transfer is 0.4, weight for query response is 0.2 etc.. Peer gives score to the interacting node accordingly.

### III. System Model

In this paper we are studying a peer-to-peer network. There is no dedicated server in this network. Peers in this network are rational, _i.e._ they are only interested in their own welfare. They are connected to each other by an access link followed by a back bone link and then again by an access link to the second node.

We are assuming that the network is heavily loaded _i.e._ every peer has sufficient number of pending download requests, hence these peers are contending for the available transmission capacity. We also assume that every peer is paying the cost of access link as per the use. So, every peer wants to maximises it’s download and minimise it’s upload so that it can get maximum utility of it’s spending and this leads to problem of free riding.

If a node is downloading, some other node has to upload. So the desired condition is, download should be equal to upload for a node. Usually this means that there is no gain. Even in this scenario the node gains due to interaction with others, chance of survival increases. Thus interaction itself is an incentive. A node will usually try to get the content and avoid uploading it as this maximises gain for it. Thus free riding becomes optimal strategy. So a reputation management system need to be enforced to safeguard the interest of every node by controlling free riding.

In reputation management system, every node maintains a reputation table. In this table, the node maintains the reputations of the nodes with whom it has interacted. Whenever it receives a resource from some node, it adjusts the reputation of that node accordingly. When a node asks for the resource from this node, it checks the reputation table and according to the reputation value of requesting node, it allocates resource to that node. This ensures that every node is facilitated from the network as per its contribution to the network and consequently free riding will be discouraged.

For using such a reputation management system node needs to estimate the trust value of the nodes interacting with it. This estimation can be made on the basis of measured trust values after every transaction. These measurements can be done using any way described in literature. For simulation purpose we have considered trust value observed by node i for node j in transaction k as follows,

\[
x_{ij}^k = \frac{Z_{ij}^k}{R_{ij}^k}
\]

Here _R_{ij}^k_ represents the amount of resources requested by node i from node j for _kth_ transaction; _Z_{ij}^k_ represents the amount of resource received by node i from node j in _kth_ transaction.

In estimation of trust value by such methods few important points are missed out. These points are as follows.

1) In p2p networks, when a peer asks for some resource, it is not guaranteed that it will get the asked resource. So, generally peer asks for larger amount of resource than needed and when it is offered more resource then its requirement, it refuses the
extra offered resource. Also it does not give any credit for this extra offer.

2) Once requesting node decides about the node from which it is going to take data, both of the nodes decide about the rate of data according to their upload and download capacities. But at the some time underlying network may not able to provide this kind of data rate because of congestion in the network at different routers. So, even if service provider node is trying to give data at the committed rate to the requesting node, it can not give and this affects the reputation assignment as reputation is assigned based on the actual data rate.

3) If some requested node has already got too many requests, it will not be able to provide the quality of service that it could have provided with lesser load. Hence the requesting node needs to estimate the reputation of service provider node considering the load and previous transactions with that node.

To resolve above issues, the trust value should be calculated according to the following method: if node j offered the data against the request of node i and it didn’t accept the offer.

\[ t_{ij} = \delta \]  

(2)

Here \( \delta \) should be upper bounded in such a way that no node can play game for its benefit. It means if value of \( \delta \) will be too high, node will make an offer even if it doesn’t want to serve and on asking for resource it will deny. So node will upper bound it by the ratio of its download capacity to the total requests made by the node.

Whereas if node i accepts the offer 

\[ t_{ij} = \frac{\text{actual service rate}}{\text{feasible service rate}} \times \frac{\text{willing service rate}}{\text{requested service rate}} \]  

(3)

Here actual service rate is the average rate at which receiver received the data and feasible service rate is the rate at which the TCP Reno algorithm can get the throughput via underlying link with packet loss probability \( p \). This rate can be computed using the expression given in [23].

\[ B(p) \approx \left( \frac{W_{\text{max}}}{\text{RTT}} \right)^{-} \left( \frac{1}{\text{RTT} \sqrt{\frac{2np}{\Theta}} + T_0 \cdot \min \left( 1, 3 \sqrt{\frac{3p}{\Theta}} \right) b(1 + 32p^2)} \right) \]  

(4)

Here \( B \) is feasible service rate as a function of packet loss probability \( p \); \( W_{\text{max}} \) is the maximum window opened by receiver, \( \text{RTT} \) is the round trip time between two nodes; \( T_0 \) is timeout period and \( b \) is number of packets acknowledged by single a acknowledgement.

Ratio of willing service rate and requested service rate (let’s call it \( A \)) needs to be estimated on the basis of observed samples of the ratio of offered service rate and requested service rate (let’s call it \( x[n], \) where \( n \) is time instant). Let the model for the estimation of \( A \) be

\[ x[n] = A - w[n], \]  

(5)

Here \( x[n] \) is the observed value for a node in a particular transaction, \( A \) is the exact value and \( w[n] \) is the noise in estimating the exact value. Let us assume that \( A \) is constant and mean value of \( w[k] \) is \( W \) and the ratio of \( W \) and \( A \) is \( C \)

\[ C = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{C_1 C_2}, & \text{if } C_1 \times C_2 > 1 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \]  

(6)

Here

\[ C_1 = \frac{\text{requests made by the node}}{\text{download capacity of the node}} \]  

(7)

\[ C_2 = \frac{\text{total capacity shared by the nodes in the network}}{\text{total requests made by nodes in the network}} \]  

(8)

Here \( C_1 \) is the ratio of the total request made by that node and download capacity of the node i.e. how much node over requested, and \( C_2 \) is the ratio of total capacity shared by all the nodes and total requests made in the network by all the nodes. \( C_2 \) is statistically the average offer against unit request by a node in the network. Multiplying \( C_2 \) with \( C_1 \) will give us the average offer to the node against its capacity. Uncertainty have identical distribution for every sample and samples are independent, i.e. the noise samples are i.i.d.. Hence every sample will have same variance. Let us assume this variance be \( \sigma \).

IV. Estimation of Trust

Based on observed values of trust, exact trust value can be estimated using some estimator. We have used Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) [29] for this purpose. Taking expectation of \( x[k] \) in eqn [5]

\[ E[x[k]] = E[A] - E[w[k]], \]  

(9)

so the scaled mean will be

\[ S[k] = \frac{E[x[k]]}{\Theta} \]  

(10)

where \( \Theta \) is the parameter to be estimated i.e. \( A \) in this case, so

\[ S[k] = \frac{A - W}{A} \]  

(11)

so

\[ S = \left( 1 - \frac{W}{A} \right)_{1 \times N} \]  

(12)

Here \( 1_N \) is a \( 1 \times N \) matrix of 1s i.e. \([1 1 1 1 1 1 \ldots \ldots \ldots 1] \). The covariance matrix

\[ C = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma^2 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma^2 & \ldots & 0 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & \ldots & 0 & \sigma^2 \end{bmatrix}_{N \times N} \]  

(13)
\[ C = \sigma^2 I_{N \times N} \]  

As we know that the BLUE [29] is

\[ \hat{A} = \frac{S^t C^{-1} X}{S^t C^{-1} S} \]  

substituting the values,

\[ \hat{A} = \frac{\left(1 - \frac{W_A}{\alpha}\right)^{1 + \frac{1}{\alpha}} I_{N \times N} X}{\left(1 - \frac{W_A}{\alpha}\right)^{1 + \frac{1}{\alpha}} I_{N \times N} \left(1 - \frac{W_A}{\alpha}\right)^{1 + \frac{1}{\alpha}}} \]  

solving, we get

\[ \hat{A} = \frac{1}{\frac{N}{1 - \frac{W_A}{\alpha}}} \sum_{k=1}^{N} x[k] \]  

\[ \hat{A} = \frac{\overline{x[N]}}{1 - \frac{W_A}{\alpha}} \]  

So, we can see that we need to compute the sample mean of all samples and the ratio of noise mean and parameter mean.

This formulation have two problems, first it is difficult to compute the sample mean when the number of samples is large and second, if value of A is changing after some time, this estimator doesn't consider that change. So, we can use exponential moving average of samples i.e.

\[ \overline{x[N]} = \alpha \cdot x[N] + (1 - \alpha) \cdot \overline{x[N - 1]} \]  

Here \( \alpha \) depends on the rate of change in behaviour of nodes. We have evaluated the performance for three different values of \( \alpha \) i.e. 0.1, 0.01 and 0.001 whereas \( x[1] = x[1] \).

Value of \( C_2 \) is estimated regularly on the basis of its download capacity and total requests made. Whereas value of \( C_2 \) for complete network is difficult to find. High degree nodes will regularly gather the capacities shared and requests made by the their neighbouring nodes. On the basis of this data high degree nodes will evaluate the value of \( C_2 \). Node will periodically ask neighbouring high degree node(s).

As shown in related work, estimation of trust has been done by a number of ways in literature. We are just considering just one of these ways. But the uncertainties are generally not considered in all of these. So our method can be used for all of them.

V. Numerical Results

Performance of algorithm for reputation estimation for peer to peer file sharing is evaluated by simulation as well.

![Fig. 1. Average absolute change in reputation for homogeneous network](image1)

![Fig. 2. Average absolute change in reputation for heterogeneous network](image2)

A. Trust Estimation

B. Trust Estimation

Performance of estimation method proposed in this paper has been evaluated for 200 node network. Time is considered as slotted. Every slot is termed as an iteration. At the start of every slot every node queries for some resource and after getting reply it asks for resource from replying nodes. Node asks for resource as
bandwidth without referring the reputation table. Value of $\delta$ has been assumed as 0.3. Reputation is measured by node $i$ for node $j$ in transaction $k$ has been defined as,

$$R^{k}_{ij} = \frac{Alo^{k}_{ij}}{Req^{k}_{ij}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)

Here $Req^{k}_{ij}$ represents the amount of resources requested by node $i$ from node $j$ for $k^{th}$ transaction; $Alo^{k}_{ij}$ represents the amount of resource received by node $i$ from node $j$ in $k^{th}$ transaction.

We have plotted the average absolute change in reputation estimation with increasing number of iterations up to 500. Here, absolute change in reputation ($\Delta R$) is

$$\Delta R(\text{itr}) = \sum_{i,j} |R_{i,j,\text{itr}} - R_{i,j,\text{itr}-1}|.$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

$R_{i,j,\text{itr}}$ is the reputation of $j$ for $i$ in $i$th iteration, $d_i$ is the degree of $i$th node, $N$ is the total number of nodes and $\text{itr}$ is the number of iteration under consideration.

In figure 1 and 2 $\Delta R$ is plotted by taking the average of last ten measurements [26] and proposed reputation estimation method using these measurements for homogeneous and in figure 2 for heterogeneous networks for 200 nodes with $\alpha=0.1$ and 0.3. Here by homogeneous network we mean a network where every node has same download capacities and is ready to serve same number of nodes. Whereas by heterogeneous network we mean that nodes have different download capacities and are ready to serve different number of nodes.

This is evident in both figure 1 and 2 that using estimator the change in reputation is less. This implies that by use of proposed estimator reputation can be estimated more accurately.

In figure 3 and in figure 4 the utilisation level of shared resources in the network is plotted for homogeneous and heterogeneous networks of 200 nodes for $\alpha=0.1$ and 0.3.

VI. Conclusion

In peer-to-peer networks, free riding is a major problem that can be overcome by using reputation management system. A reputation management system includes two processes, first estimation of reputation and second aggregation of reputation. In this paper we have proposed an estimation technique using BLUE.

The proposed trust estimator considers uncertainties in the trust estimation. The average absolute change in trust values in the trust table of nodes is considerably less then the older techniques. It implies that reputation can be estimated more accurately using this estimator. The better estimation of reputation will lead to a better utilisation of resource in the system as evident.

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