HOW SOCIAL INEQUALITY BEGETS SOCIAL INSTABILITY IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

In the north of Nigeria, the traditional hegemony has built an enduring multifaceted system of oppression that the local politicians maintain and benefit from. In this context, social exclusion and institutional stratification correlate to each other in describing a system of hegemony that is especially designed to deprive millions of people the basic needs in life, conditioning a large army of youths to a hapless and hopeless social underclass. Social instability herein vividly depicts break down of social order, separatist movements in all the three main regions of the country, terrorism, extrajudicial killings, human kidnapping for ransoms, broad day atrocities, most of which are all too familiar even to the outside world. Additionally, the conditions of living in northern Nigeria, best described as grotesque poverty and inequality has attracted a lot of research work in different fields of social sciences both within and outside the country. It has been observed that the theories and explanations proffered on the issue have not provided any significant solution, therefore there is a need for interdisciplinary approach. To achieve this objective, the authors have taken the perspectives of economic sociology for a critical and analytical approach by employing novel tools to detect asymmetries of systems of social institutions and their concrete relationship with a range of social outcomes. Thus, it has become possible to detect those asymmetries and the concrete ways they influence the extant institutions. Further still, this work explores the inequality problems by making a careful appraisal of the intrinsic relationships inherent of structures and agents, their contributions to social instabilities in the north of the country. The authors used combined methods of primary observation and secondary data to allow a cursory look into how social inequality underlies social instability now too ubiquitous in northern Nigeria.

Key words: poverty, social inequality, instability, northern Nigeria.

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Қалай ақпараттық техникалық соңузылған Нигериядағы ақпараттық тұрақсыздықты түдіріді

Солтүстік Нигерияда дұстурлі ғегемония жерілікті саясаткерлер қолданып жасаған және ұтатын тұрақты, қабылдау егіз жүйесінің құрылысы. Бұл тұрғыда ақпараттық оқшаулау мен институционалды стратификация миллиондарға адамдардың негізгі өмірін ғажайып жеткіліктірер ең арнайы үшін арқылы жасаған ғегемония жүйесіне сипаттауда бір-бірімен корреляция жасайды, қағаздардың ұлға арнайы қасиет пеп үмітсіз ақпараттық тұрақсыздық теменің сыйлығы айналдырыды. Елдің солтүстігінде ақпараттық тұрақсыздық — бұл қоғамдық тәрізді бүзу, елдің барлық ұш аймактарының сепаратисттік қозғалыстыр, терроризм, сотсіз өлім жасайды, тәлем үшін адам ұралуы, жалпы қатыған оралға жатар қатығанда, бұлардың қабылдауға сыйлығы де басқармалы. Соның қатары, Нигерияның солтүстігінде грозескілік қадақтар пеп үмітсіз дәп сипаттаған әмір сүру жағдайлары ақпараттық ғылымдардан артықшылық салаларына іші және қалыңдықтар, денеңіңде қоптеген зерттеулер журғізді. Осы өмірді бойынша усынылған теориялар мен тұсініктемелер ескандай маңызды шешімдеге әкелмеген байқалды, сондықтан панаралық тәсіл қажет. Осы мәселелердін жетілу үшін орталық автор ақпараттық інституттар жүйелерінің ассимиляциясы және әліардың бірқатар ақпараттық нәтижелермен спецификалық байланысы ашуға құның қарабағандары қолданып, синің және аналитикалық қозғалар үшін экономикалық ақпараттаға перспективалары қабылдайды. Осы оқшау, осы ассимиляциялардың және әліардың қолданыстығы інституттак әсер етілінің нәкты тәсілдерінің анықтауға мүмкіндік туды. Соның қатары, бұл өмірдің құрылыстыры әлеуметтік ақпаратдың қоқыс үлесін мүкіндік өмірді қамтып беруі. Сонғы дәрежеде, Ақпараттық техникалық соңузылған Нигерияның соңузылған әлеуметтік тұрақсыздықтың негізін алып, ақпараттық
Introduction

A stark social reality is starring the North of Nigeria, whereas there seems to be no specific solutions in sight to confront enduring socio-economic challenges. Upon securing what seems de facto nominal independence after decades of colonial dominion, the young African states soon confronted the realities of running societies with complex political, economic and socio-cultural as well as administrative systems, for which they were ill-prepared. Nigeria has been struggling with the task of nation-building since its independence in 1960 (Okorie, 2016). The new country, it was also alleged – inherited inexperienced leaders who lacked national consciousness and constituency and were more tuned to the subverted indigenous ethos of government and culture. By 1960 most of those who took over the reins of power from Britain had a very short experience in democratic governance while those in the North had also only a modicum of western education. (ibid)

Of the many challenges the young Nigerian state faced – and continues to face to date – was the search for the principles by which to consolidate and cohere the society. Not surprising, at the declaration of independence from the Great Britain in 1960, the young country recorded an estimated 45.2 million people, with three main regions namely the Yoruba dominant in the West, the Igbo in the east and the Hausa-Fulani in the vast north (Wikipedia). These three regions are also home to no fewer than 250 ethnic groups with distinct languages, diverse cultures, and political interests. Lacking the political and economic wisdom to cohere the society, local politicians resorted to patronizing the traditional leaders for society consolidation. This patronage has consequentially empowered the traditional leaders to assume supreme power over the legitimately elected politicians, even though they (traditional leaders) remain an informal institution not accorded any constitutional supremacy. This marked the beginning of a patron-client political system that will
have lasting consequences for the country’s political life.

The illegitimacy and indeed the moral and ethical bankruptcy, of the multiple and overlapping networks of customary and modern governance have created vast space of alienation and social exclusion in a world where the armies of impoverished youth were neither citizens nor subjects, a social landscape for the politics of resentment to fester (McGovern 2012; Chaveau and Richards 2008). Rural and urban, federal and local, religious and secular, customary and modern, the crises of authority were all instrumental in the processes that created a rural and urban underclass, alienated and excluded from the worlds of legitimate authority, and from the market order. These floating populations – the lumpen proletariat, Quranic students and land-poor peasants in the northern parts of the country, the unemployed youth in the south east detached from the old gerontocracy order, unable to pursue their measures of personal advancement through marriage, patronage, and work. Existentially, young men, unanchored from social, civic and political structures, occupied a social space of massively constricted possibility, in a world where economic recession and the dreadful logic of provisioning and self-interest deprived millions of the basic needs in life, conditioned to a hapless and hopeless social underclass. Thus, the youth in these regions was, by default, nothing much of an extended social category as a permanent way of life (Watts, 2017).

The logic of indigeneity and indeed, the legitimacy of community forms of rule encoded within the constitution, in effect institutionalized a parallel system of governance represented by chieftaincy in the south and emirate rule in the north. In this multi-ethnic political drama, indigenes looked to customary, or traditional institutions as a source of legitimacy and authority, and nowhere more so than around question of access to and control over land (ibid). The patronage political tradition has inevitably cumulated in institutional corruption and lack of credibility for the holders of public offices. Institutional corruption here means contracts undone, breach of trusts or pervasive dishonesty, damaged investment environment, failing infrastructures and massive economic loss, youth marginalization and an inescapable break down in social order. The centripetal tendentious patronage of the traditional hegemony by the legitimate community rulers has proved counterproductive by the centrifugal tendentious institutional failure and existential predicament now starring the nation.

While all this provided the context for the first steps towards the construction of early versions of patron-client relations along ethnic, regional and party lines, the resources with which to fund the supporting networks came in greater abundance in the post-civil war period of oil boom when Nigeria became awash in petrol-naira, thanks largely to ‘the two great oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979’ that ensured that ‘staggering new revenues poured into’ the country. This massive oil rents helped the politicians fed their patrons upon whom they depend for political nominations and success at elections, much to the chagrin of the unsuspecting voters.

The goal of this paper is not to reproduce the arguments and theories on the theme, but merely to point to the linkage between institutional stratification and existential predicament and the way in which information from each can, perhaps help throw light on our interpretation of the other. Historically, the authorities of African feudal lords have never been catalysts for progress, safe only for promoting debilitating internecine wars, pillaging communities and slave raiding. Sadly, we see the reminiscence of this hapless past in contemporary Africa. Once again 62% of Africans are living precariously and are susceptible to slavery, (GSI, 2018). Africans are being shipped across the Atlantic in the most inhuman conditions to places where they are treated with hostility and indignation, slaving away only to remit money home to impoverished relatives. A clear indication that the African economy lacks the capacity to absorb its able bodied, employable youths.

**Table 1** – Estimated vulnerability to modern slavery. Source: Global Slavery Index 2018

| Country | lacking basic needs | inequality | Dis-enfranchised groups |
|---------|---------------------|------------|-------------------------|
| Nigeria | 41.3                | 50.2       | 47.1                    |

But if, as has been the case after the end of colonization all over Africa that economic production is much below that capacity to absorb the ever-growing army of youths that form the bulk of the African population, it would appear logical to devise doable social development initiatives to garner the underused capacity of the continent’s economy to address society’s challenges. Mass job-creating initiatives such as building Community Parks, constructing bridges and access roads; river channelization are
The study is descriptive and takes its base on the indicators of empirical studies by the author. The study mainly focuses on the scope of the institutional stratification, with particular reference to the effects on the everyday life of millions of people in the region.

For a better grasp of this discourse, it is imperative to shed light on the meaning of the fundamental concepts of this paper. These are: ‘social exclusion’, ‘social inequality’, ‘social instability’.

The alternative views, presented by different authors on this subject raise many questions, but can-
Results and discussions

All of this comes with two main lessons from the intense and exciting time expended studying it. The first was a great astonishment that permanently changed the way social reproduction is perceived, and does so permanently and quite deeply. It includes the overwhelming damages that are often done through ill-advised and disreputable political choices by those who exercise the power of government. Any group of human beings can, and very probably will, learn to misperceive and misvalue a way of life to which they have grown accustomed and which happens to offer them many agreeable privileges.

Up until the mid-1960s, Nigeria was still remarkably happy and quite a prosperous society by the standards of Sub-Saharan Africa. But it was severely damaged already by its leaders’ ineptness, lack of visions and profligacy; and in the six years after gaining independence, everyday life for the immense majority of the huge population was devastated by the predatory cynicism of second and altogether more devastating military regimes leading to the outbreak of the Biafra War. It was instructive to see how vulnerable the life chances of a whole population can be to the handling of its trade flows with the world economy, and much easier to take in and comprehend these in the case of a large and diverse society but with a simpler and more exposed economy like Nigeria.

Since the mid-1960s Nigeria’s political and economic fate has fluctuated considerably, both under protracted civilian rule and in the intervals of military governments acquired through ethnic power struggle and neglect of the rule of law. But by the start-1970s the country was already so deeply wounded by the civil war, both as an economy and society or assemblage of societies, that full recovery or dynamic economic development were clearly beyond it. By February 1976, you could say, Nigeria had a brilliant future firmly behind it. Because it continued to suffer a series of severe damages from profligacy, flamboyant but deeply flawed subsequent leaders. No one can calculate the economic loss of having uninspiring leaders.

Another grim lesson learnt from these years, accordingly, was the discovery of limited capacity of representative democracy either to guarantee its own survival in many settings or to reverse structural economic disadvantage or historically cumulative political damage. These were not the lessons in the comparative advantage of any competing brand of openly autocratic rule anywhere found. They were lessons that certainly showed in a most unwelcome manner, why terminating colonial rule fell so far short of establishing effective political autonomy. I learnt the last lesson too, equally clearly if far slower, from a briefer passage of consecutive study of the history of twentieth-century revolutions, and about what revolutions are, why they occur, why they have the consequences which they have, and what they mean. As sources of instruction, the relatively peaceful and consensual decolonization of Nigeria with its sad aftermath, and the great revolutionary bloodbaths of the twentieth century – in Russia, China, Chile, Mexico, Vietnam, Algeria, or Iran – were in many ways complementary (Dunn, 2006). I found it profoundly disconcerting to be forced to realize how comprehensively the lives of almost everyone in the society can be at the mercy of the competence and scruple of their somewhat adventitious rulers.

The most important achievement of this paper is that by making critical appraisals of the systems and cultures prevalent in the north, it has been possible to detect the relationships between agents and structures, the system of social exclusions, the secret agenda being used by the hegemony to keep citizens in the dark and thus deny them the skillset necessary for a normal living. How the awareness of this deprivation is gradually leading to resistance from the youths. Whereas, in the prevailing situations, the most potent levers needed to lift up the society to a higher standard of living are incomes of the population (groups, households and individuals) and their social welfare, their access to material goods and services, living conditions, and recreation. Lifting the population out of poverty is integral to social progress of any given society, and is considered a continuous process, pursuant to legislations and government policies. Thus, social progress is conventionally considered a two-stage task. In the first stage, the task is to lift up the bottom-rung population in absolute poverty (involuntary poverty) to the level of relative poverty, or a befitting standard of
living, while the task in the second stage involves elimination of absolute poverty at all fronts. Unfortunately, steps in these directions are perceived as threats and are systematically precluded in northern Nigeria (Dobrenkov et al. 2010).

Reversion to the old ways of life leading to the eminence of the Weberian traditional authority has taken the form of serfdom and feudalism underscored by absolute poverty and hopelessness particularly in the northern parts of Nigeria today. As stated by ex-president Goodluck Jonathan in ‘My Transition Hours: ‘A situation where 52.4% of males in the northeastern region of Nigeria have no formal Western education. The figure is even worse when you take into account the states mostly affected by the insurgency. 83.3% of the male population in Yobe state has no formal Western education. In Borno state, it is 63.6%. Bearing this in mind is it a coincidence that the Boko Haram insurgency is strongest in these two states? – (Goodluck, 2015).

In the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Index Nigeria Country Briefing (OPHI, 2017) the poverty map of Nigeria’s states runs as follows:

Table 2 – Oxford Poverty and Human Development Index Nigeria Country Briefing

| State     | Poverty headcount rate | Poverty gap index | Squared poverty gap index |
|-----------|------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| Zamfara   | 92%                    |                   |                           |
| Jigawa-   | 88%                    |                   |                           |
| Bauchi    | 87%                    |                   |                           |
| Sokoto-   | 87%                    |                   |                           |
| Kebbi     | 86%                    |                   |                           |
| Katsina   | 82.2%                  |                   |                           |
| Gombe     | 77%                    |                   |                           |
| Taraba    | 78%                    |                   |                           |
| *Bayelsa  | 29%                    |                   |                           |
| *Osun     | 11%                    |                   |                           |

* states in the south.

Arguably, there are development disparities throughout Nigeria as can be seen in the last two southern states. Poverty in Nigeria according to Elombah (2011) increased from 27% in 1980 to 66% in 1996, in 1999 it increased to 70%, by 2011 it was estimated that more than 85% of Nigerians live in poverty. Additionally, a research carried out by an NGO called NAPED showed figures on the incidence of poverty in the six geopolitical zones in the country including:

Table 3 – Incidence of poverty in the Nigeria six geopolitical zones. (NAPED, 2013)

| Geopolitical Zone | Incidence of Poverty (in %) |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| North-East        | 78%                         |
| North-West        | 74%                         |
| North-Central     | 70%                         |
| South-South       | 30%                         |
| South-West        | 28%                         |
| South-East        | 23%                         |

the percentage of people who are poor and live on less than five dollars a day. It can be vividly seen from the above table that, the northern part of the country has the largest percentage of poverty rate, this has long become a source of concern and fierce debates in the country.

Table 4 – Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria. National Bureau of Statistics Report (NBS, 2020)

| State     | Poverty headcount rate | Poverty gap index | Squared poverty gap index (Severity) |
|-----------|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|
| NIGERIA   | 40.09                  | 12.85             | 5.63                                |
| Urban     | 18.04                  | 4.47              | 1.68                                |
| Rural     | 52.10                  | 17.42             | 7.78                                |
| Abia      | 30.67                  | 7.15              | 2.59                                |
| Adamawa** | 75.41                  | 27.64             | 13.21                               |
| Akwa Ibom | 26.82                  | 7.25              | 2.74                                |
| Anambra   | 14.78                  | 3.24              | 1.06                                |
From the table above, the disparity between north and south states is startling, makes one wonder what form of self-rule makes this possible. The survey could not cover Borno state for lack of security. Borno state is the seat of the dreadful Boko Haram insurgents. Since Yobe is the most adjacent to Borno state, it is safe to assume that poverty level in the state could be as high as 92%. Yobe and Borno states are also the states where Boko Haram is forcefully campaigning against Western Education. Meanwhile the ruling elite and the Muslim clerics all studied at various Christian Missionary schools established during the colonial era, they attended universities based on Western education system.
The subsistent living of a person.

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ies. It means susceptibility to violence, and it often

exclusion of individuals, households, and communi-

It means susceptibility to violence, and it often

lies without access to clean water or sanitation (United

ations, 2011).

The above definition from the United Nations
agrees with Kankwenda’s words as quoted by Al-
imeka, which looked at poverty as a multidimen-
sional phenomenon that is both a state and process.

“Poverty is … a state of deprivation or denial of the
basic choices and opportunities needed to enjoy a
decent steward of living; to live a long, healthy con-
structive life and to participate in the cultural life of
the community”. (Kankwenda, 2002:64).

The above also bears a striking resemblance to
the characterization of the phenomenon of poverty
by the World Bank and the Copenhagen Declara-
tion of 1995. According to World Bank: Poverty is
pronounced deprivation in well-being, and compris-
es many dimensions. It includes low incomes and
the inability to acquire the basic goods and services
necessary for survival with dignity. Poverty also en-
compasses low levels of health and education, poor
access to clean water and sanitation, inadequate
physical security, lack of voice, and insufficient ca-
pacity and opportunity to better one’s life (World
Bank, 2012, 3). Absolute poverty means a condi-
tional access to a minimum permissible set of goods
and services necessary for the biological needs, or
the subsistent living of a person.

As if this was not enough, Talk (2012) estimat-
ed as many as 10million child beggars in northern
Nigeria with other 15-20 million unschooled and
unemployable adult beggars. In northern Nigeria,
modern-day slavery is a way of life for millions of
people. The sight of middle-aged and older people
seen reclining tiredly on mats spread in streets cor-
ner and are beggars with no discrimination to gen-
der is ubiquitous everywhere in northern Nigeria. A
2013 survey indicated that the population of waifs
and strays in the streets of northern cities stood at
a staggering 12.4 million. The Quranic education –
almajiri system, predominantly found in the north of
Nigeria – has produced child beggars in multitude.
This does not include adult beggars throughout the
northern states. The Almajiri are children generally
denied of parental care and they form the majority of
the beggar population (Onoyase, 2013).

In this predicament of mass pauperization, it is
difficult to estimate how many people are still be-
ing held under slavery in the elite homes across the
northern region. One such revelation, asserted by
the Emir of Kano – Sanusi Lamido – in an interview
with the Financial Times Correspondent in March of
2018 is indisputable:

FTC: “It looks empty (the palace) who else lives here?”
SL: “You would be surprised. You’ve got some princesses,
grandfather’s sisters, my cousins, my father’s sisters, my nieces.
Then we’ve got the wives and the concubines of previous emirs
who chose to stay here. And you’ve got the help and their fami-
lies. Historically, you had slaves in the palace, and they’re now
basically part of the families.

So they’re there. They literally call themselves the slaves
of kings. They use that word, but you don’t buy or sell or own
them”.

FTC: “Isn’t this all a bit …medieval?”
SL: “It’s important for us to retain our history, to retain
your roots…” (FT, 2018).

As J.S. Mills puts it, ‘a state which dwarfs its
men, in order that they may be more docile instru-
ments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will
find that with small men no great thing can really
be accomplished’ (Mills, 1859). It is too horrendous
that many African leaders relish in keeping slaves
for slavery work in their households. Unfortunately
for the youths in the north of Nigeria, the tradition-
al hegemony seemed to have successfully meshed
Islam with traditional African feudalism, using the
former to justify the latter to their unsuspecting sub-
jects. Any social order so crafted as to suppress
a great part of its men, with the sole aim of alienating
them from their constitutional rights will soon real-
ize that with disaffected men no significant progress
is achievable. This is especially true for the north of the country today. Sociologists and anthropologists believe that people who have traditional views on life also tend to be more inclined to resist changes, even when the benefits of such changes are too obvious. For the north of Nigeria, any changes in the status quo – particularly those not originated from the traditional leaders – are perceived as deviance and disobedience to the authority, and potential threats to life. Unsurprisingly, elsewhere reversion to the traditional ways of life and preferences for the one-man hegemony has resulted in nothing but poverty and misery for most Africans.

Thus, leaders of the region feel complacent and secure in their domain and so are averse to pursuing creative and constructive agenda leading to progressive changes however the backward their region is. Leaders of northern Nigeria have tacitly pursued programmes that make western secular education a privilege for the few, not least, engineering and technology have been systematically neglected for a very long time, public schools are poorly funded and derelict, while teachers are raptly allowed to waste away. Not surprisingly, the youths in the north have no confidence in the leadership and generally, there is no trust among the mass of the population.

In Nigeria, at the heart of the insurgencies that make the society seems no longer ease as things continue to fall apart is a frontier space populated by a generation of young men (of wildly different cultural identities and political outlooks) expelled from, and deeply suspicious of, institutions of authority that they perceive to lack credibility, functional adequacy, and legitimacy. They are apparently caught between the crumbling social and political orders of gerontocratic customary rule – by twilight institutions – and the inevitable disorder of failing forms of secular post-colonial state authority. Construed thus, the crisis of youth can therefore be expressed in a multiplicity of forms: a crisis of identity, of rights, of institutional deprivation, of social exclusion, of masculinity, of the spirit, of employment and so on. (Watts, 2017).

A view for future research

Although it is remarkable that the country has resisted the strong waves of social dissent and threats of secession for decades, further research needs to be done into how the country has continued to weather the storm of potential disintegration. What then can be done to avert the existential predicament that is taking the form of an imminent total disintegration of the country? This profound problem will require no less profound solution. Two such solutions are in question: one is social and the other is economical. There is an urgent need to dismantle the system of institutional deprivation that the traditional hegemony built, that politicians maintain and benefit from. It is against this backdrop of precarious everyday life that the author proposes the need for a far-reaching economic reform that would give impetus to social reforms, benefit everyone from the very richest to the poorest; a reform that is capable of ending poverty at all fronts and give the impetus for sustainable economic development. This income based economic proposal would improve all citizens’ lives materially, and the poorer one is now the greater one’s relative benefit would be. In the current circumstances, the country needs a revolutionary yet non-radical economic reform achievable via a new fiscal reform: Central Bank Sovereignty (CBS) (Adeleke, 2019) a conceptual and not mathematical; a monetary system whereby the right to create money is vested in the Central Bank that will provide money for the government, businesses, and individuals, hence Central Bank Sovereign Currency.

While the author believes unequivocally that the system would be capable of ending poverty without using debts to fund government spending, nonetheless, the system calls for further research into the mechanism and adaptation. In the system under question, government would receive as much money as it ever needed, money would be sufficient but not excessive. This would also mean an end to that crude system of taxation (all taxes, personal or business: income, property, sales, payroll, etc.) and welfare programmes, more importantly, we would achieve 100 percent employment, a stable sustainable economic growth. Under this proposed system supply of money and our economic output would be determined by our demography only. Thus, it would be possible to achieve a stable and sustainable economic growth with minimum impact on the environment, as our economic output would be determined by our demography only. We would be able to ameliorate the environment and prevent further degradation. All of these would be achieved, without redistributing anything, and without any further regulations.

Conclusion

Between agents and structures in the north of Nigeria, there are conceptual conflicts of interest, while the former is being constrained, the latter is unruffled and indifferent towards the plight of the
society and with impunity. This volume has discussed the causes and effects of social exclusion and inequality being perpetrated by means of keeping generations of youths in the north of Nigeria in the dark; it further reveals the set of institutions and structures of undisclosed agenda through which social stratification and inequality are perpetrated.

In this context, it is horrendous that many African leaders relish in keeping people as slaves for slavery work in their households, or denying millions of youths the basic constitutional rights of access to western education that should provide them with the right skill set to make them employable. Unfortunately for the youths in the north of Nigeria, the traditional hegemony seemed to have successfully blended Islam with traditional African feudalism, to keep their unsuspecting, gullible subjects in the dark. Any social order so crafted as to suppress a great part of its men, with the sole aim of alienating them from their constitutional rights will soon realize that with disaffected men no significant progress is achievable. This is especially true for the north of the country today.

It is just natural that people who have traditional views on life also tend to be more averse to changes, even when the benefits of such changes are too obvious. For the north of Nigeria, any changes in the status quo – particularly those not originated from the traditional leaders – are perceived as deviance and disobedience to the authority, and potential threats to life. Thus, leaders of the region feel complacent and secure in their domain and so are averse to pursuing creative and constructive agenda that would lead to progressive changes however the backward their region is. Leaders of northern Nigeria have tacitly pursued programs that make western secular education a privilege for the few, not least, engineering and technology have been systematically neglected for a very long time, public schools are poorly funded and derelict, while teachers are rapitly allowed to waste away. Unsurprisingly, elsewhere reversion to the traditional old ways of life and preferences for the one-man hegemony has resulted in nothing but poverty and misery for most Africans.

The findings in this volume should have policy implications for the leaders of the northern Nigeria, as the way of life the hegemony ultimately succeeded in establishing is an facing an unprecedented challenge. Today, we are moving already toward the experience of an acute event, we are experiencing, with growing doubt and fear, the results of accumulating stresses.

At bottom, the problem is that the foundation of that region, the society, the inequity way of life is coming apart. If policy makers fail to solve that problem, collapse is inevitable, the whole country appears to be in very real danger of collapsing. Institutionalized stratification, social exclusion, absolute poverty and inequality have long reached an inflection point for the whole of the north, to the extent that it has become imperative to dismantle the system of traditional hegemony that politicians maintain and benefit from. We are at a point at which the disruptive social media and the internet both have the capacity to make social inequality so intolerable as to garner supports for radical movements to change it.

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