Electoral Authoritarianism in Togo: How Has Foreign Aid Impacted the Democratization Process in Togo From 2005 to 2010?

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After four decades of military dictatorship, Togo is still facing a dilemma of whether to break with the past and take a path of democratization or make changes in the continuity. The death of the former President Gnassingbe Eyadema in 2005 was seen by the Togolese community at home and around the world as a window of opportunity or a step toward the emergence of the political liberalization in the country. Unfortunately, with the backing of the Togolese army, Faure Gnassingbe, one of the sons of Eyadema, was enthroned as the country’s new President since 2005. The international economic sanctions on Togo in the aftermath of the death of Eyadema, due to continuing human rights abuses and violations by the authoritarian regime, have accentuated the already acute suffering and poverty of the Togolese population. However, the 2006 Global Political Agreement reached between the traditional political opposition parties and the government paved the way to the normalization of the international cooperation with Togo and hence the lifting of economic sanctions by the international community. Drawing from Solow-Swan growth model and a cross-national causality test of the development-democracy-growth hypothesis of Abbas Pourgerami, this paper investigates the impact of foreign aid on the democratization process since 2005 and argues that foreign aid played a paramount role in consolidating electoral authoritarianism instead of establishing a viable democracy in Togo.

Keywords: Togo, foreign aid, political agreement, democratization, authoritarianism, human rights

Introduction

The Republic of Togo is located in West Africa between Benin to the east and Ghana to the west. Burkina Faso is its northern neighbor. Alongside with Benin, Ghana, and other coastal countries in the region, Togo lies close to the Atlantic Ocean, also known as the Gulf of Guinea. The country had been under two colonial powers—the Germans from 1884 to 1914 and the French from 1914 to 1960. Togo became an independent state on April 27, 1960. After a few years of democracy, the first democratically elected president of Togo, Sylvanus Olympio, was assassinated in 1963. This was the very first coups d’état in Africa. The late strongman, General Eyadema Gnassingbe, who claimed responsibility for the coup three years later, came to power and installed a military dictatorship from 1967 and 2005. After the death of the dictator, on February 5, 2005, his son, Faure Gnassingbe, was brought to power, first by the army and second by a controversial presidential...
election in which 400 to 500 people lost their lives and thousands were wounded according to the United Nations (UN News, 2005).

Due to the democratic deficit in Togo during General Gnassingbe’s rule, the European Union (EU), the country’s major foreign aid provider, has suspended its cooperation with Togo since early 1990s. A little window of opportunity for the emergence of political liberalization in Togo which opened with the death of the late president in 2005 has become a dream for the Togolese. Human rights abuses and violations continued even with the son as the new president. The EU’s sanctions on Togo did not prevent Togo’s former colonial power (France) from supporting the oppressive regime. This is well expressed by Amnesty International that “France continues to provide substantial military and economic support to the country, which only increases the feeling of impunity for the government members”. As living conditions continued to deteriorate, the ruling party and the main political opposition parties were forced by the international community to sign a comprehensive political agreement (CPA) in August 2006, an agreement which convinced the EU to resume its cooperation with Togo.

For example, in 2008, Togo was able to receive US$32.9 million from the World Bank as contribution to the Community Development Project (CDP), US$28 million to improve governance, transparency, management of public sectors, to name a few. In addition, the World Bank reported that from 2005 to 2009 a total of US$851,610,000 was given to Togo by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, which include but are not limited to France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy, as the net bilateral aid or the disbursements of official development assistance (ODA) (World Bank, 2010). Despite the flow of foreign aid into the country, it was not among the fifteen percent of the Sub-Saharan countries that were reported in the Freedom House’s 2008 survey as free or democratic (Freedom House, 2010).

This paper discusses the impact of foreign aid on the democratization process in Togo between the last five years: 2005-2010. After a review of the literature on both foreign aid and democracy in Section I, different theories and hypotheses are discussed in Section II. The paper also lays out and discusses recent aid projects, agreements and loans in Section III. Strengthening civil society and community-based grants are presented in Section IV. Section V focuses on the results which show the impact of the different kinds of loans and/or grants accorded to Togo during the last five years. Finally, based on our findings, the concluding section of the paper provides some policy recommendations on how democracy can be promoted and consolidated in Togo.

A Glance at the Literature

There has been a panoply of literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid and democracy. However, little has been written on whether foreign aid promotes democracy or not. Researchers, such as Doucouliagos and Paldam (2011), in their article titled “The Ineffectiveness of Development aid on Growth: Update”, found that “on average, aggregate development aid flows are ineffective in generating growth” (p. 8). Doucouliagos and Paldam (2006) argued that a larger portion of foreign aid is often used for public consumption while only a little amount of the aid is used as investment to generate growth. This means that aid may be an indirect driver of economic development, but not the direct one. Freytag and Heckelman (2011) asserted that aid ineffectiveness may be imbedded in the lack of good governance in aid recipient countries.

Some scholars argued that aid should be directed at promoting democracy and economic development by creating democratic institutions and better market institutions. This is the case with Scully (1992) who supported the idea that freer markets, which must be considered here as better institutions, not only generate
higher growth as property rights are highly respected, but also they promote more equal distribution of wealth or income, and to some extent, more democracy. The assumption is that aid is better used if it is used to put in place a good institutional framework. Although Hodler (2007) argued that the higher aid effectiveness depends on how good are the institutions that the use of aid helps develop, Murphy and Tresp (2006) thought otherwise. Indeed, Murphy and Tresp (2006) contended that even if the institutional setting is favorable, aid does neither generate growth nor enhance it.

Knack (2004) presented a multivariate analysis of the impact of foreign aid on democratization in a large sample of countries during the period between 1975 and 2000. Using political freedoms and civil liberties as measures of democracy, and two alternative measures of aid intensity—ODA as a percentage of gross national product and as percentage of government expenditures—he finds that aid has no effect on democratization in these countries. However, prior to his study on the impact of foreign aid on democratization, Knack (2001) argued that countries which depend heavily on foreign aid experience a systemic corruption and low level of bureaucratic quality. Similarly, scholars, such as Friedman (1958), Grossman (1992), and Maren (1997) argued that there is a high probability that foreign aid undermines any prospect of democracy in aid beneficiary countries. In his article titled “Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives”, Freidman states that foreign aid is hostile to civil liberties and democracy, for the most beneficiaries of this aid remain the governments which use foreign aid to strengthen their powers and develop the public sector of the economy in detriment to the private sector. As the literature reveals, emergence and survival of democracy are less likely in countries where the economy is dominated by the public sector. The more power a government has the less free and empowered is the civil society.

Other research has shown that donors often attach foreign aid with conditionality in such a way that it undermines recipient nations’ sovereignty. Conditionality is used here to mean pressure to reform policies of governments in aid beneficiary countries. The perfect example of this is the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in developing countries. Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor (2004) stated that “any aid donor objective may thus be sought through three alternatives methods: selectivity; traditional ‘ultimatum’ conditionality; or new conditionality” (p. 219). Selectivity implies the reallocation between recipient governments. Burnside and Dollar (2000) proposed that donors should rather adopt selectivity than conditionality and argue that the effectiveness of aid is associated with the good policies of aid recipient countries. Easterly, Levine, and Roadman (2003) disagreed with Burnside and Dollar’s argument on the linkage between aid effectiveness and good policy. They, however, argue that aid effectiveness is not necessarily associated with a good policy. But Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) after defining “good policy” as a relative concept, recommended that the foreign aid should be allocated to recipient countries by taking into account their existing economic policies and levels of poverty, altogether. In other words, “the marginal aid dollar should flow to where its effectiveness is highest, under the joint influence of existing policies and levels of poverty” (Mosley et al., 2004, p. 218).

From the literature on aid, Selbervik (1999) pointed out the existence of two generations of conditionality. The first generation of conditionality, also known as economic conditionality, is introduced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1980s. Under this economic conditionality, recipient countries must adopt a certain form of economic policies in order to be eligible for aid. The second generation of conditionality, political conditionality, emerged in the 1990s. Under this second generation of conditionality, the provision of development aid has been conditioned to political reforms that would pave way for the
“promotion and fulfillment of human rights, democracy and good governance objectives” (p. 13). Selbervik (1999) made an interesting distinction between negative conditionality (threats to terminate, or reduce aid flow) and positive conditionality (promises to reward policy reform achievements). She then reveals the gap in the literature and argues that the vast literature on aid focus only on the negative conditionality. The developing countries in their quest for development aid have been forced to meet certain goals without consideration of their own cultural, economic, and political realities. Grossman (1992) and Maren (1997) had demonstrated how aid can be one of the root causes of political instability in recipient countries, such as Somalia (see for example, Knack, 2004, p. 253).

While trying to investigate the relationship between wealth and democracy, Lipset (1959) and Moore (1966) found that correlation between wealth and democracy exists only under some circumstances and other circumstances there is no association between the two variables. Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) also agreed with Lipset and Moore on the conditional relationship between democracy and growth. Olson (1982) argued that the more a country becomes democratic, the more it diverts its investment spending to consumption. However, Olson (1993) acknowledged that democratic regimes enhance economic growth better than autocracies, for in democracies, elected officials have interests in the well-being of their constituencies since they are going to ask for their citizens’ votes. The well-being of citizens is not of much concern for governments in dictatorial regimes. This is to highlight the assumption that democracies are more likely to increase social welfare than autocracies.

Plumber and Martin (2003) offered a model to explain why and how democracy affect economic growth. In their model they place rational and self-interested governments at the center of their explanation. They hypothesize that “If political participation is severely restricted, governments rationally choose rents as an instrument to buy political support” (p. 29). As Plumber and Martin have argued, providing public goods becomes the most efficient way for the government to maintain the status quo and hold on to power. They have also argued that an increase in the level of democracy in countries that have autocratic political system is accompanied with an increase of the gross domestic product per capita or per capita GDP until a certain level of democracy beyond which governments tend to invest more in the provision of public goods at the expense of private investment, generator of growth. This suggests two distinct relationships—a positive relationship between government spending, and u-shaped relationship between democracy and government spending. On the other hand, Barro (1996) found a non-linear relationship or inverse u-shaped relationship between regime type and economic performance. This inverse u-shaped association between the two variables is known as “the Barro-effet” (see for example, Plumper & Martin, 2003, p. 29). Benadou (1996) had demonstrated a mixed relationship between democracy and economic growth. In his empirical research, he finds that, on the one hand, he discovers that democracy has significant positive effects on economic growth and, on the other hand, he also finds significant negative effects on economic growth.

Although the literature on aid effectiveness is vast, the topic of aid effectiveness is often discussed in a broad term. Most scholars and aid researchers are rather interested in looking at whether aid promotes economic development than investigating the relationship between foreign aid and democracy. Using the case study of Togo from 2005 to 2010, this paper is expected to fill the gap in the literature by specifically focusing on the impact of foreign aid on the democratization. Although this is not the first study on the association between aid and democracy, this study contributes to the literature which is in its early stage.
Theories and Hypotheses

Before putting forward any theory and hypothesis, let us give some operational definitions of both the concept of “foreign aid” and that of “democracy”. Foreign aid is a voluntary transfer of funds in most cases from richer countries to poorer ones. It includes, but not limited to, technical assistance, military assistance, and official development assistance (ODA), which comprises of humanitarian aid and debt relief. The focus in this paper is on the official development assistance as foreign aid. Democracy is defined here as a system of government where elected officials are expected to be accountable to people they represent. It is a system which guarantees civil liberties and political rights or freedoms.

Indicators that measure civil liberties include, but are not limited to, freedom of press, freedom of assembly and demonstration, freedom of political organization, independent judiciary, personal social rights, and socio-economic rights. Political freedoms are measured by the extent to which the country’s current legislators and executives, including the country’s President, are selected through free and fair elections in which the opposition parties and civil society have participated. In addition, political freedoms are measured by whether or not the country is free of military control and/or foreign control (Freedom House, 2011). Rivera-Batiz (2002), in comparing democracies to authoritarian regimes, argued that “democracies allow populations to peacefully and regularly oust inept, inefficient and corrupt government administrations, while allowing people to keep more efficient, successful regimes, thus tending to make the quality of governance on average higher in the long-run” (p. 226). As reviewed in the literature, democracies are more interested in the well-being of their citizens than autocracies do.

Major aid donors have provided development aid to developing countries on the basis of growth enhancing, and to some extent, of promoting democracy. Two main growth theories provide an explanation of economic growth. These theories are the neoclassical growth theories and endogenous growth theories (Sakyi, 2011). Neoclassical growth theorists assert that technology is the main factor of economic growth. They assume that the more technological capability a country has, the more it can increase its productivity growth. Neoclassical growth theorists also assume that “capital accumulation only drives productivity in the short-run (as capital suffers from diminishing returns in the long-run)” (Sakyi, 2011, p. 148). Neoclassical growth theory is based on the Harrod-Domar Model. According to this model, when aid is used to build development infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, dams, among other things, it will generate economic growth. This growth theory is well formulated by Easterly (2002) who wrote: “Domar assumed that output (GDP) is proportional to machines, so the change in out will be proportional to the change in machines, that is, last year’s investment” (p. 30).

On the other hand, endogenous theories stipulate that technological revolution emerges from innovations of new ideas, without which economic growth will not be sustained. This is basically the idea of Nobel laureate Robert Solow who argues that “investment in machines cannot be a source of growth in the long run … that the only possible source of growth in the long run is technological change” (see for example, Easterly 2002, p. 47). After conducting a cross-national causality test of development-democracy-growth hypothesis, Pourgerami (1988) found that “the level of economic development determines the type of political institutions and the type of political institutions impacts the rate of economic growth” (p. 123). Assuming that aid promotes growth, and growth promotes democracy under certain circumstances as revealed in the literature, then we can deduce that
foreign aid can promote democracy under the same circumstances. From this aid-growth-democracy theory, this paper hypothesizes that if aid promotes democracy, therefore a recipient country’s democracy status improves as its aid levels increase. And the null hypothesis (H0) derived from this is that there is no relationship between aid and democracy in Togo. The next section presents a variety of aid projects and their relevance in promoting democracy.

Aid Projects and Grants From 2005 to 2010

Most international donors suspended their provision of development aid to Togo even before the death of the former Togolese President, Eyadema Gnassingbe, due to political unrest of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Because of the flagrant violation of human rights by the dictatorial regime of Gnassingbe, the European Union decided to cut any cooperation with Togo. The deteriorating economic fabric of the country forced the Togolese government to seek the resumption of international cooperation. In 2004, the late President Gnassingbe initiated a series of negotiations with the European Union. At the end of the negotiations, the Government of Togo agreed to provide a framework to end the country’s political impasse which lasted for over a decade. The framework happened to be known as the “22 Commitments” or agreements between Togo and the European Union (GlobalSecurity.org, 2000-2020). The “Commitments”, not only were designed to bring about the political liberalization and respect for human rights in Togo, but also have remained, amongst others, the major aid project since 2005.

Although this is not a place to present all the 22 undertakings pledged by the government of Togo, but it is very important to highlight some of the main points of the project that are of crucial to the returning of the international donors and foreign investment in the country. These commitments include:

- A return to democracy through a resumption of dialogue with the traditional opposition and civil society;
- A revision of the electoral arrangements (voter registrations, formation of independent national electoral commission, local and legislative elections, etc.);
- Strengthening human rights and fundamental freedoms (freedom of expression and press, freedom of association, and freedom of movement);
- Strengthening the rule of law;
- Decentralization process, which include separation of the security forces from defense (Commission of the European Community [CEC], 2006).

The implementation of the 22 undertakings or commitments was the precondition of the resumption of Togo-EU cooperation. The Togolese government undertook a series of consultations with its traditional political opposition under the mediation of Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso. The negotiations between the Government of Togo and the opposition resulted in an agreement called a Comprehensive Political Agreement (CPA), which was signed on August 20, 2006 (CEC, 2006). An opposition leader in the name of Yaovi Agboyibor was appointed by President Faure Gnassingbe as the country’s Prime Minister. The latter prepared successfully the 2007 legislative elections with no major incident. The Commission of the European Community qualified these elections as the “first free and transparent elections” since the country’s independence. The immediate implication of these first “democratic” legislative elections, according to the EU, was the resumption of cooperation between Togo and the international community.

In 2008, the EU accorded a grant of 124.8 million Euros in an agreement called “The Country Strategy and National Indicative Program 2008-2013”. This foreign aid targeted specifically the areas of governance and
support for economic and institutional reforms, support for economic recovery through infrastructure development, and cancellation of payment arrears of external debts to the IMF. The EU has been also supportive of strengthening the Togolese civil society, for democracy cannot emerge and sustain without a strong civil society. In addition, France granted a sum of 100 million Euros bridging loans to Togo, loans, which allow the Togolese government to pay off its arrears to the World Bank. Furthermore, France, through the French development Agency (FDA), has provided the country with another US$3.9 in the form of grant to develop its agriculture and clear its debts with the African Development Bank (API, 2008). Again, in the area of economic recovery, the EU donated 12 million Euros to help Togo recover from the effects of the recent global economic crisis and pledged an additional 27.6 million Euros, which is yet to be released for 2010 budget support (AllAfrica, 2010).

In order to help Togo hold transparent, free, and fair presidential elections on March 4, 2010, an EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) composed of 30 long-term and 80 short-term observers was deployed to the country. The long-term observers have been mandated to monitor the entire elections’ process, which include preparations of voting materials, election campaigns, voting, and post-elections results and complaints. The short-term observers, on the other hand, were just deployed to monitor the pulling day. To that end, the European Commission donated 12.6 million Euros under the European Development Fund to support the elections (Europa, 2010).

**Strengthening Civil Society and Community Development Grants**

Even though there is no United States Agency for International Development (USAID) presence in Togo due to the fact that the United States has no bilateral development assistance program with Togo, under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Mission, the Development Assistance Office overviews the programs as follows:

**The Ambassador’s Special Self Help Program**

It was a grass-roots assistance program designed by the U.S. Embassy of Togo to promote community-based development which will help improve the living standards of Togolese people. It was in fact one-year project with a maximum grant of US$5,000. A variety of income generating projects were selected yearly throughout the country. As it was named, any self-help project was left to the community which must control over the project future in terms of funding and management (Togo US Embassy, 2011).

**Democracy and Human Rights Program**

This program was funded by the Democracy and Human Rights Fund (DHRF). It assisted small and discrete local organizations which focused on democracy-based activities on human rights. Grants ranging from US$10,000 to US$15,000 were awarded to these local groups so as to promote a vibrant civil society, an independent judiciary, free, and fair elections, and the advocacy of human rights (Togo US Embassy, 2011).

**The Ambassador’s HIV/AIDS Program**

The grant allocated for this program was US$157,505. Currently, the program is operating under the banner of Operation Haute Protection (OHP)—HIV/AIDS Prevention for the Togolese Military. The subcontractor for this project was Population Service International (PSI) whose main objectives were to educate and provide counseling to soldiers and their families in military bases in Togo on sexually transmissible infections (STI). PSI also provided testing and treatment to those already infected with STI. In addition, PSI worked in collaboration with other local organizations to provide support for people living with HIV/AIDS.
Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP)

HAP was set up to provide humanitarian assistance to needy people. The aim was to secure alliances in order to achieve U.S. security interests in Togo. Construction or repair of public schools, medical clinics, orphanages, installation and repair of water sanitation, among other things, were examples of humanitarian assistance projects. US$500,000 was the maximum amount of money that was allocated to such a program. This was the biggest projects among the six micro-projects that were under the sponsorship of the US Embassy of Togo (Togo US Embassy, 2011).

Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP)

People living with HIV/AIDS, orphans, and vulnerable people, such as women and children were the beneficiaries of DHAPP. The program was run by local nongovernmental organizations and community-based groups of about 15 to 20 people eligible as beneficiaries. As with the Ambassador Self-Help Program, the most grant allocated to DHAPP is US$5,000 (Togo US Embassy, 2011).

Gender and Disability Program

An amount of US$249,100 was allocated to community-based projects in Togo through the subcontractor FETAPF, a Disabled Association Network in Togo, which sought funding through USAID West African Regional Program based in Accra, Ghana. So far sixteen micro-projects had already started since 2009. Although the Gender and Disability program with FETAPF was due to end in March 2011, nothing has been said on whether it actually ended or not (Togo US Embassy, 2011).

Results

In 2008, after the comprehensive political agreement with the Togolese traditional opposition and the civil society, President Faure Gnassingbe put in place a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) chaired by a Catholic Bishop, Nicodeme Barrigah, to investigate the political violence from pre-independence year 1959 to 2005, a year of his first controversial elections and bring those who committed gross crimes to justice (Afrol News, 2011). This move of the Togolese government was welcomed by the entire world, especially, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. However, the commission has not been able to publish or release the result of its investigation. Impunity remained one of the main issues that are hindering the consolidation of democracy in the country. Surprisingly, the chair of the TRC, was accused of playing the role of Judah while he was forced to hand over to security forces the members of the opposition who were trying to compile the elections results provided by their representatives at the election polls (IciLome, 2011).

The short-term consensus between the former rivals—the Togolese government and its political opposition—brought some kind of confidence in the refugees who started to return home. According to UN Refugee offices in the neighboring countries of Benin and Ghana, only 7,000 of the 40,000 refugees have not yet returned home (Integrated Regional Information Networks [IRIN], 2008). However, other forms of human rights violations and abuses, such as arbitrary arrests and imprisonments of political opponents, restriction of freedom of expression and freedom to protest, and extrajudicial killings, are still going on in the country. Political prisoners are held in detention without trial and some are even denied family visits. For example, in 2009,

Vincent Sodzi, member of the opposition Union of Forces for Change, was arrested in October in Badou, apparently
for possessing military uniforms and guns. He was held without charge at Atakpame civil prison in central Togo at the end of the year. (Amnesty International, 2010, p. 323)

Even though freedom of speech is not as restricted as it was before the death of President Eyadema in 2005, right to protest against the government remains, however, very restricted. Political marches and demonstrations are only allowed on weekends, especially, Saturdays. Anyone who dares to protest or conduct political rally of any kinds, was arrested and severely beaten by security forces (CVU, 18 March 2011).

Since 2005, Togo has been ranked 134 out of 178 countries by Transparency International (TI) with a score ranging between 2.4 and 2.8. The corruption perception index (CPI) used by TI, scores countries on the scale of 0 to 10, with 0 indicating the highest level of corruption and 10 indicating the lowest level of corruption. Based on this scale of measurement, Togo scores very low. This means that Togo is still classified among countries that are highly corrupt (TI, 2010). Although Togo has already ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) on July 6, 2005, it has yet to implement it (Akakpo, 2006, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2011).

**Concluding Remarks**

In seeking the resumption of its cooperation with the European Union in particular, and with the international community in general, Togo was asked to democratize its political system as a precondition. The implementation of 22 undertakings by the Togolese government has convinced the EU to lift its sanctions on Togo. Two main factors—the inter-Togolese dialogue between the government and its traditional political opposition, and the launch of a truth and reconciliation commission to investigate past human rights violations and abuses—have contributed substantially to the decrease in the country’s civil liberties rating from 5 in 2005 to 4 in 2010. The participation of all the political parties in the 2007 legislative elections, which according to the European Union, were free and transparent, and the 2010 presidential elections, which were held in a relatively peaceful atmosphere, have led to a slight drop in the Togo’s political rights rating from 6 to 5. The scale used to measure democracy indicators by Freedom House ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the greatest liberties, and 7, the lowest. Togo’s democratic status improves from not free in 2005 to partially free (Freedom House, 2005; 2010).

The improvement in democratic status of Togo occurs when foreign aid has been used to finance a variety of projects, such as strengthening civil society programs, revision of electoral arrangements, creation of Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), election supervision and monitoring, to name a few. Therefore, the improvement in the status can be credited to the provision of overseas aid by foreign countries and organizations. The hypothesis set in this paper, that is, if aid promotes democracy, therefore a recipient country’s democracy status improves as its aid levels increase, is confirmed by the findings. However, we must critically ask ourselves whether it was really the provision of aid that gave the Togolese government the incentives to change its behaviors and opt for political liberalization so as to pave a way for the emergence of democracy or an eventual pressure from the international community that might hide behind the actual donations.

If foreign aid is used appropriately to establish or strengthen democratic institutions, it may help promote democracy if and only if there is a political will from aid recipient countries to be democratic. Additionally, since the country’s CPI score was still very low (about 2.4 in 2010), effort should be made by the government to improve such a score by implementing the United Nations Conventions against Corruption that it has already
signed and ratified. The Togolese government must not only adopt a top-down approach when it comes to fight against corruption and bribery, it should also use a bottom-up approach which consists of introducing an education program at all levels of its education system—primary, secondary, and tertiary—so as to educate students starting from the early ages on the negative consequences of corruption and the potential benefits of transparency and accountability, for accountability is key to the emergence and sustainability of democracy. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of foreign aid and its impact on democratization process in Togo within a period of five years. The author recognizes that five years period is insufficient to conclude whether a country is democratic or not. Due to this limitation, further research and or studies, which will be expanded on a larger period of time, are needed on the topic matter.

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