AN EXPLORATION OF LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE CONFLICTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUMAN RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This study focused on the legislative-executive conflicts from the perspective of human relations in Nigeria. The study examined the significant effects of executive-legislature relations and conflicts on the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. Survey research design was adopted. The data gathered were analyzed using both descriptive and inferential analytical techniques. Multiple regression analysis using the ordinary least square (OLS) approach was used for analysis. Findings revealed that struggle for political power, disagreement on budget & financial matters, polarized relationship, legislative arrogance & gridlocks on policies of government have strong significant effects on the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. Furthermore, findings show that struggle for political power & domination, processes re-engineering, pride & personality clash and oversight function of the legislature have effects on the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. The study concluded that management of the legislature-executive relations and conflicts in the Nigerian presidential democracy is vital to socio-political development process of the nation. The study recommended that the executive and the legislature arms should consistently take into account "struggle for political power, disagreement on budget & financial matters, polarized relationship, legislative arrogance & gridlocks on policies of government" as they do not only pattern executive-legislature relationship but also predict the possibility of improved socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States.

Contribution/ Originality: This study is the first to use new estimation methodology with respect to the subject matter. The study is also the first to have investigated legislative-executive conflicts from the perspective of human relations in Nigeria.

1. INTRODUCTION

The nature of legislature-executive relations in the Nigerian context is induced by both conflict and cooperation. It has been established in varying studies that conflicts in most cases have constructive nature. Scholars and researchers (such as Rahim (2011); Obasan (2011); Rothman (2014); Oseremen and Osemeke (2015)) have proven that conflict does not often results to destructive outcomes, while the study of Tepper, Moss, and Duffy (2011) proved that conflicts have destructive implications. Cooperation in the Nigeria political context may be highly risky. Though in the general context, it is expected to be productive and constructive. It is difficult to ascertain whether conflict or cooperation dominates with benefits or liabilities. Legislature-executive conflict is
constructive (to limiting and controlling government). Kopecky (2014) views it as being destructive (contributing to gridlock over major public policy decisions, thus making government ineffective).

The relationship between the legislature and the executive in Nigeria has been described by conflict and political competition. In spite of the unequivocal provisions of the 1999 Constitution aimed at redressing the issues related to legislature-executive relations, managing executive-legislature relations has been the absolute most problematic issue both at the federal and the state level (Abonyi, 2006). Consequently, there is the need for both the executive and legislature to promptly and constructively resolve conflicts resulting from their interactions in order to avert its dysfunctional consequences on the democratic process (Momodu & Matudi, 2013). This will lead to enhanced relationship between the legislative & executive arms (thereby bringing about improved legislative activities and executive success). Alcántara and Montero (2008) added that variables for explaining the degree of executive success are attitudinal discipline, coherence of government party/coalition (self-placement variable), the legislative majority, fragmentation and polarization of the parties in the legislature, and the electoral cycle. But “level of legislative party cohesiveness is also important because it provides us with crucial information about how legislatures function and how they interact with executives” (Owens, 2006). The correlation between these variables is necessary to determine executive success. This will enhance the socio-political development of Nigeria. Scholarly empirical researches on executive-legislature relations and its consequential conflicts appear scanty. This study bridged this gap.

1.1. Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study was to explore the legislative-executive conflicts from the perspective of human relations in Nigeria. The specific objectives were to:

i. Examine the significant effects of executive-legislature relations on the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States.

ii. Investigate the significant effects of legislature-executive conflicts on the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The terms used in lieu of ‘legislature’ are peculiar to countries or regions. This accounts for its various terminologies around the globe today. It is referred to as ‘Legislature’ in Britain, ‘National Assembly’ (the central legislature) in Nigeria and ‘Congress’ in United States (Abonyi, 2006; Heywood, 2007; Lafenwa, 2009) expressed that its meaning is not severely contested. It is the forum for the representation of the electorates as a government body. It is the medium through which people have voices in political matters subject to law-making and regulations in the democratic system. In other words, members in the legislative arm are supposed to be the machineries of the people. Their priority is to articulate and express the collective will of the people (Fatile & Adejuwon, 2016). Osakede, Ijimakinwa, Adesanya, and Oshineye (2017) added that legislature is the law making body, and the makers of policy influencing works for the furtherance of democratic political system. Okoosi-Simbine (2010) also views legislature as the law-making, deliberative and policy influencing body working for the furtherance of democratic political system. Lafenwa and Gberevbie (2007) is of the cardinal belief that legislative arm of government is cardinal in democracy.

The executive is at the core of government in a democratic framework. Similarly, Laski (1992) expressed that the executive in all democratic systems exists to decide on the final choice of policy to be submitted to the legislative assembly for approval; see that the public services fully adhere to that policy as intended by the legislature; and ensures that it delimits and also coordinates the activities of the different departments of state. Ikoronye (2015) describes the executive as the governing body responsible for implementing the legislation passed by the legislature subject to the judiciary’s decision and instructions. The executive is responsible for providing
good and responsible governance for the state. The good governance here is inclusive of the formulation and proper implementation of various policies. That is why Fasagba (2010) considers the executive as strategically significant for the achievement of democratic products because of these enormous duties.

One of the main features of the functioning of any political system is the relationships between the legislature and the executive (Kopecky, 2014). An effective legislature and executive relations is expected to yield improved socio-economic and political development of Nigeria. From duo perspectives (formal and informal), the relationships between the legislature and the executive are complicated. On a broad note, the relationships between the legislature and the executive have both constructive and destructive implications. The first pattern of legislative-executive relations is the polarized connection that is a sort of worrying hostile connection between the executive and the legislature. Naturally, the constitutional prerogatives in legislatures and the executive are most essential because they structure the relationships between the two powers (National Democratic Institute, 2000). Constructive relations between the executive and the legislative branches of government are vital to the improvement and sustainability of the socio-political system (Holme, 2007).

Some of the factors that dictates the nature of the relationship between the executive and the legislative arms of government in Nigeria are the manner in which they struggle for political power; the disagreement they have on budget & financial matters, polarized relationship, the manner in which the legislature exhibit arrogance and the gridlocks on policies. High level of disagreements over policies and strategies formulation is often settled through good and mutual understanding. In some cases, there is often the pursuance of domination. A particular political party struggles to dominate and have the majority. Factors (such as processes re-engineering, pride & personality clash and oversight function of the legislature) are most likely to cause continuous conflict between the executive and the legislative. However, all these factors affect the socio-political development of Nigeria. Forestiere (2015) expressed that ideological polarization in legislature as far as the party system is concerned, impacts when parties are negotiating for political advantages. Importantly, ideological polarization is instrumental for appreciable broad policies. While governments anticipate stable majorities, widespread fragmentation and polarization may challenge the simple application of majority rule.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study was designed to utilize primary data through survey-based research. A well-structured questionnaire was used and administered to the respondents. The idea behind this was to obtain scientific and useable data. The study considered the total of 500 (five hundred) for its population. In this regard, the opinion and submission of the executive members and the state legislators including the Civil Service, Academics and Media were appreciated. In this study, multi-stage sampling technique was adopted. For the purpose of the study, sample unit was selected through a non-random sampling method. The study adopted a purposive sampling to select five (five hundred) respondents. This is non-probability sample, and it was selected based on characteristics of the differently identified population in Lagos State and Kogi State. The data generated for the study were analyzed using both descriptive and inferential analytical techniques. The analytical technique employed was multiple regression analysis using the ordinary least square (OLS) approach. The equations 1 & 2 below show expressions for the regression models:

\[
PSD = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + e \quad (1)
\]

Where,

- PSD = dependent variable (perceived socio-political development).
- a = constant.
- \(X_1, X_2, X_3, \ldots, \ldots, X_5\) are independent variables (struggle for political power, disagreement on budget & financial matters, polarized relationship, legislative arrogance, gridlocks on policies of government).
- \(X_1\) = struggle for political power.
X₂ = disagreement on budget & financial matters.
X₃ = polarized relationship.
X₄ = legislative arrogance.
X₅ = gridlocks on policies of government.
β₁, β₂, β₃, …, …, …, β₅ are regression coefficients.
e = Stochastic term

\[ \text{PSD} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + e \] (2)

Where,
PSD = Dependent variable (perceived socio-political development).
a = constant.
X₁ = struggle for power & domination.
X₂ = processes re-engineering.
X₃ = pride & personality clash.
X₄ = oversight function of the legislature.
A priori, β₁ > 0; β₂ > 0; β₃ > 0; β₄ > 0; β₅ > 0

4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

| Questionnaire | Frequency | Percentage |
|---------------|-----------|------------|
| Administered  | 500       | 100        |
| Returned      | 392       | 78.4       |
| Unreturned    | 108       | 21.6       |

Source: Field survey, 2019.

Table 1 indicates that 500 copies of questionnaires (100%) were administered; 392 copies of questionnaires (78.4%) were returned while 108 copies of questionnaires (21.6%) were not returned. Based on the result, the study based analysis on data from the returned copies of questionnaires.

| Variables       | Responses | Frequency | Percent |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------|---------|
| Gender          | Male      | 202       | 51.5    |
|                 | Female    | 190       | 48.5    |
|                 | Total     | 392       | 100.0   |
| Age             | Below 20 Years | 36     | 9.2     |
|                 | 21-25 Years | 54     | 13.8    |
|                 | 26-30 Years | 58     | 14.8    |
|                 | 31-35 Years | 104    | 26.5    |
|                 | 36-40 Years | 61     | 15.6    |
|                 | 41-50 Years | 39     | 9.9     |
|                 | Above 50 Years | 40    | 10.2    |
|                 | Total     | 392       | 100.0   |
| Marital Status  | Single    | 69        | 17.6    |
|                 | Married   | 115       | 29.3    |
|                 | Widow     | 61        | 15.6    |
|                 | Separated | 80        | 20.4    |
|                 | Divorced  | 67        | 17.1    |
|                 | Total     | 392       | 100.0   |

Source: Field survey, 2019.

Table 2 shows that 202 respondents (51.5%) were male; and 190 respondents (48.5%) were female. The result depicts that majority of respondents in the study area were male who are much interested in the subject matter, and
have peculiar perception on the relationship between the executive and the legislature in the Nigerian Presidential Democracy.

The Table 2 shows that 36 respondents (9.2%) were below 20 years; 54 respondents (13.8%) were within the age bracket of 21-25 years; 58 respondents (14.8%) were within the age bracket of 26-30 years; 104 respondents (26.5%) were within the age bracket of 31-35 years; 61 respondents (15.6%) were within the age bracket of 36-40 years; 39 respondents (9.9%) were within the age bracket of 41-50 years; and 40 respondents (10.2%) were 50 years and above. The implication of this is that majority of respondents that are bothered about and have contributed to management of legislative-executive relations and conflicts in the Nigerian presidential democracy in the study area were within the age bracket 31-35 years. Interestingly, this category of people is youth and can contribute significantly to facilitate the gathering of data for the study.

The Table 2 shows that 69 respondents (17.6%) were single; 115 respondents (29.3%) were married; 61 respondents (15.6%) were widowed; 80 respondents (20.4%) were separated; and 67 respondents (17.1%) were divorced. The result shows that majority of respondents in the study area were married. This may mean that married people feel the outcome of the interplay between the legislative and the executive the most. This is likely to occur in the economic and social implication of the relations and conflicts that exist between the legislative and the executive in the Nigerian presidential democracy.

### Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the relationships between legislature and executive arms.

| Variables                                | N   | Min  | Max   | Mean  | Std. Deviation |
|------------------------------------------|-----|------|-------|-------|----------------|
| Assembly of rubber stamps                | 392 | 1.00 | 5.00  | 2.4056| 1.26381        |
| Executive and legislature's hostile connection | 392 | 1.00 | 5.00  | 2.2474| 1.34659        |
| Collaborative relationship.              | 392 | 1.00 | 5.00  | 2.9617| 1.12451        |

Source: Field survey, 2019.

The Table 3 shows how the relationships between legislature and executive can be characterized. The table shows the mean score and standard deviation of each of the characterizing variable. Assembly of rubber stamps (mean=2.4056; standard deviation=1.26381), executive and legislature's hostile connection (mean=2.2474; standard deviation=1.34659) and collaborative relationship (mean=2.9617; standard deviation=1.12451) display almost the same level of strength. They all describe the relationships between legislature and executive well. Meanwhile, collaborative relationship is seen as the variable with the strongest mean; it describes the relationship between legislature and executive arms more than other variables. This may mean that collaboration between the legislature and executive arms is inevitable in the real sense in the Nigerian presidential democracy.

### Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for pattern of legislative-executive relations.

| Pattern                               | N   | Minimum | Maximum | Mean  | Std. Deviation |
|---------------------------------------|-----|---------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Polarized Relationship                | 392 | 1.00    | 5.00    | 2.5230| 1.19440        |
| Rubber Stamp Assembly                 | 392 | 1.00    | 5.00    | 2.5102| 1.18166        |
| Gridlocks on policies of government   | 392 | 1.00    | 5.00    | 2.2959| 1.27505        |
| Disagreement on political appointments| 392 | 1.00    | 5.00    | 2.3240| 1.30301        |
| Disagreement on Budget & financial matters | 392 | 1.00    | 5.00    | 2.3291| 1.35751        |
| Struggle for political power          | 392 | 1.00    | 5.00    | 2.3546| 1.19431        |
| Legislative arrogance                 | 392 | 1.00    | 5.00    | 2.3750| 1.21781        |

Source: Field survey, 2019.

The Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for pattern of legislative-executive relations. The table shows that polarized relationship (mean= 2.5230; standard deviation= 1.19440), rubber stamp assembly (mean= 2.5102; standard deviation= 1.18166), gridlocks on policies of government (mean= 2.2959; standard deviation= 1.27505), disagreement on political appointments (mean= 2.3240; standard deviation= 1.30301), disagreement on budget &
financial matters (mean= 2.9291; standard deviation= 1.35751), struggle for political power (mean= 2.3546; standard deviation= 1.19431), and legislative arrogance (mean= 2.3750; standard deviation= 1.21781) are pattern of legislative-executive relations. It is seen that polarized relationship is the strongest pattern of legislative-executive relations. This may mean that the relationship between the legislative and the executive arms is polarized.

Table 5a. Multiple regressions of legislative-executive relations and perceived socio-political development.

| Model | R      | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
|-------|--------|----------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1     | .737a  | .544     | .543              | .84754                      |
| 2     | .767b  | .588     | .586              | .80656                      |
| 3     | .775c  | .601     | .598              | .79488                      |
| 4     | .779d  | .607     | .603              | .78916                      |
| 5     | .785e  | .616     | .611              | .78167                      |

Note: Predictors in the Model: struggle for political power, disagreement on budget & financial matters, polarized relationship, legislative arrogance, gridlocks on policies of government. Dependent Variable: perceived socio-political development.

Table 5b. ANOVA of legislative-executive relations and perceived socio-political development.

| Model | Sum of Squares | DF | Mean Square | F       | Sig. |
|-------|----------------|----|-------------|---------|------|
| 1     | Regression     | 333.850 | 1  | 333.850 | 464.757 | .000b |
|       | Residual       | 280.150 | 390 | .718    |         |      |
|       | Total          | 614.000 | 391 |         |         |      |
| 2     | Regression     | 360.942 | 2  | 180.471 | 277.419 | .000d |
|       | Residual       | 253.058 | 389 | .651    |         |      |
|       | Total          | 614.000 | 391 |         |         |      |
| 3     | Regression     | 368.848 | 3  | 122.949 | 194.591 | .000d |
|       | Residual       | 245.152 | 388 | .652    |         |      |
|       | Total          | 614.000 | 391 |         |         |      |
| 4     | Regression     | 372.984 | 4  | 93.246  | 149.725 | .000d |
|       | Residual       | 241.016 | 387 | .623    |         |      |
|       | Total          | 614.000 | 391 |         |         |      |
| 5     | Regression     | 378.152 | 5  | 75.630  | 123.780 | .000d |
|       | Residual       | 235.848 | 386 | .611    |         |      |
|       | Total          | 614.000 | 391 |         |         |      |

Note: Predictors in the Model: struggle for political power, disagreement on budget & financial matters, polarized relationship, legislative arrogance, gridlocks on policies of government. Dependent Variable: perceived socio-political development.

Table 5a shows the effects of five variables (struggle for political power, disagreement on budget & financial matters, polarized relationship, legislative arrogance, gridlocks on policies of government) on perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. The adjusted R-squared compares the goodness-of-fit for the regression models that contain differing numbers of the independent variables (struggle for political power - 0.543, disagreement on budget & financial matters - 0.586, polarized relationship - 0.598, legislative arrogance - 0.603 and gridlocks on policies of government - 0.611). The results of the coefficient of determinations show that struggle for political power ($R^2= 0.544$), disagreement on budget & financial matters ($R^2= 0.588$), polarized relationship ($R^2= 0.601$), legislative arrogance ($R^2= 0.607$) and gridlocks on policies of government ($R^2= 0.616$) have explanatory power over the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. It is seen that 54.4% variation in the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States is explained by struggle for political power. 58.8% variation in the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States is explained by disagreement on budget & financial matters; 60.1% variation in the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States is explained by polarized relationship; 60.7% variation in the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States is explained by legislative arrogance; and 61.6% variation in the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States is explained by gridlocks on policies of government. The unexplained variations (in struggle for political power- 45.6%, disagreement on budget & financial matters- 41.2, polarized relationship- 39.9%, legislative arrogance- 39.3%, and gridlocks on policies of government- 38.4%) shows that there are other variables...
that can predict perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. The coefficient of determinations (R² value) proved that these variables have strong effects on the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States.

Table 5b shows the levels of variability within the regression models and forms the basis for tests of significance. The ANOVA table also reports that using the model is better than guessing the mean. The mean square residual values (0.718 for struggle for political power, 0.651 for disagreement on budget & financial matters, 0.632 for polarized relationship, 0.623 for legislative arrogance and 0.611 for gridlocks on policies of government) are smaller, indicating less deviation between the observed and fitted values. The P-value for the F test statistic (464.757 for struggle for political power, 277.419 for disagreement on budget & financial matters, 194.591 for polarized relationship, 149.725 for legislative arrogance and 123.780 for gridlocks on policies of government) are less than 0.001, providing strong evidence against the null hypotheses. The coefficient of determination (in Table 5a) for struggle for political power (R²= 0.544), disagreement on budget & financial matters (R²= 0.588), polarized relationship (R²= 0.601), legislative arrogance (R²= 0.607) and gridlocks on policies of government (R²= 0.616) indicate significant effects on the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States.

Table 5c. Coefficients of legislative-executive relations and perceived socio-political development.

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients | Standardized Coefficients | T | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |
|-------|------------------------------|----------------------------|---|------|------------------------|
|       | B | Std. Error | Beta |      |                        |
| 1     | (Constant) | .678 | .095 | 7.160 | .000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
|      | Struggle for political power | .774 | .036 | .737 | 21.558 | .000 | .504 | 1.982 |
| 2     | (Constant) | .557 | .092 | 6.046 | .000 |
|      | Struggle for political power | .555 | .048 | .529 | 11.547 | .000 | .504 | 1.982 |
|      | Disagreement on Budget & financial matters | .273 | .042 | .296 | 6.453 | .000 | .504 | 1.982 |
| 3     | (Constant) | .328 | .112 | 2.938 | .003 |
|      | Struggle for political power | .555 | .047 | .529 | 11.706 | .000 | .504 | 1.982 |
|      | Disagreement on Budget & financial matters | .234 | .043 | .254 | 5.434 | .000 | .472 | 2.119 |
|      | Polarized Relationship | .127 | .036 | .121 | 3.537 | .000 | .878 | 1.139 |
| 4     | (Constant) | .184 | .124 | 1.484 | .139 |
|      | Struggle for political power | .499 | .052 | .475 | 9.612 | .000 | .415 | 2.409 |
|      | Disagreement on Budget & financial matters | .201 | .045 | .218 | 4.503 | .000 | .433 | 2.310 |
|      | Polarized Relationship | .157 | .037 | .149 | 4.184 | .000 | .794 | 1.259 |
|      | Legislative arrogance | .117 | .045 | .114 | 2.577 | .010 | .521 | 1.920 |
| 5     | (Constant) | .226 | .124 | 1.826 | .069 |
|      | Struggle for political power | .494 | .051 | .471 | 9.609 | .000 | .415 | 2.411 |
|      | Disagreement on Budget & financial matters | .325 | .061 | .352 | 5.292 | .000 | .225 | 4.448 |
|      | Polarized Relationship | .153 | .037 | .146 | 4.124 | .000 | .794 | 1.260 |
|      | Legislative arrogance | .158 | .047 | .154 | 3.356 | .001 | .474 | 2.111 |
|      | Gridlocks on policies of government | -.178 | .061 | -.181 | -2.908 | .004 | .257 | 3.885 |

Note: a. Dependent Variable: Socio-political development.

Table 5c shows the coefficients of the variables and the perceived socio-political development. The coefficient of struggle for political power (unstandardized beta= 0.774) shows a positive relationship with the perceived socio-political development. The coefficient of struggle for political power (standardized beta= 0.737; p-value = 0.01)
shows greater contribution to the perceived socio-political development. The struggle for political power has high coefficient than the disagreement on budget & financial matters; given the struggle for political power (unstandardized beta-0.555) and the disagreement on budget & financial matters (unstandardized beta-0.273). It is seen also that struggle for political power has more contribution to the perceived socio-political development compared to disagreement on budget & financial matters; given the struggle for political power (standardized beta-0.529; p-value = 0.01) and the disagreement on budget & financial matters (standardized beta-0.296; p-value = 0.01). The results prove that both struggle for political power and disagreement on budget & financial matters have positive relationship with the perceived socio-political development. This may imply that members of the arm of government try as much as possible to improve on their performance so as to secure more political power. Also, disagreement on budget & financial matters is deduced as not being harmful for the Nigerian presidential democratic process; this disagreement is likely to curtail excessiveness or unnecessary spending that may not be healthy for the socio-political development of Nigeria.

The results in Table 5c show that struggle for political power also has the highest coefficient (unstandardized beta-0.555) compared with disagreement on budget & financial matters (unstandardized beta-0.234) and polarized relationship (unstandardized beta-0.127). Struggle for political power also has the highest contribution to the perceived socio-political development; given the struggle for political power (standardized beta-0.529; p-value = 0.01), the disagreement on budget & financial matters (standardized beta-0.254; p-value = 0.01) and polarized relationship (standardized beta-0.121; p-value = 0.01). The result proves that struggle for political power, disagreement on budget & financial matters and polarized relationship have positive relationship with the perceived socio-political development.

More so, the results in Table 5c shows that struggle for political power also has the highest coefficient (unstandardized beta-0.499) compared with disagreement on budget & financial matters (unstandardized beta-0.201), polarized relationship (unstandardized beta-0.157) and legislative arrogance (unstandardized beta-0.117). Struggle for political power still has the highest contribution to the perceived socio-political development; given the struggle for political power (standardized beta-0.475; p-value = 0.01), the disagreement on budget & financial matters (standardized beta-0.218; p-value = 0.01), polarized relationship (standardized beta-0.149; p-value = 0.01) and legislative arrogance (standardized beta-0.114; p-value = 0.01). The result proves that all the variables have positive relationship with the perceived socio-political development.

Finally, the results in Table 5c also shows that struggle for political power also has the highest coefficient (unstandardized beta-0.494) compared with disagreement on budget & financial matters (unstandardized beta-0.325), polarized relationship (unstandardized beta-0.153), legislative arrogance (unstandardized beta-0.158) and gridlocks on policies of government (unstandardized beta-0.178). struggle for political power also has the highest contribution to the perceived socio-political development; given the struggle for political power (standardized beta-0.471; p-value = 0.01), the disagreement on budget & financial matters (standardized beta-0.352; p-value = 0.01), polarized relationship (standardized beta-0.146; p-value = 0.01), legislative arrogance (standardized beta-0.154; p-value = 0.01) and gridlocks on policies of government (standardized beta--0.181; p-value = 0.01). The result proves that gridlock on policies of government has negative relationship with the perceived socio-political development. This may imply that many good policies of government have lost its implementation due to gridlock.

Table 6a shows the effects of four variables (struggle for power & domination, processes re-engineering, pride & personality clash, oversight function of the legislature) on perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. The adjusted R-squared compares the goodness-of-fit for the regression models that contain differing numbers of the independent variables (struggle for political power & domination= 0.450, processes re-engineering=0.521, pride & personality clash= 0.537 and oversight function of the legislature= 0.545). The result of the coefficient of determinations shows that struggle for political power & domination (R²= 0.452), processes re-engineering (R²= 0.524), pride & personality clash (R²= 0.541) and oversight function of the legislature (R²= 0.549) have explanatory
power over the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. It is seen that 45.0% variation in the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States is explained by struggle for political power & domination. 52.4% variation in the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States is explained by processes re-engineering; 54.1% variation in the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States is explained by pride & personality clash; and 54.9% variation in the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States is explained by oversight function of the legislature. The unexplained variations (in struggle for political power & domination – 55.0%, processes re-engineering – 47.6%, pride & personality clash – 45.9% and oversight function of the legislature – 45.1%) show that there are other variables that can predict socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. All the coefficient of determinations (R² value) proved that these variables have strong effects on the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States except struggle for political power & domination which has weak effect.

**Table 6a.** Multiple regressions of legislative-executive conflicts and perceived socio-political development.

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
|-------|---|----------|-------------------|--------------------------|
| 1     | .672a | .452 | .450 | .92914 |
| 2     | .724b | .524 | .521 | .86719 |
| 3     | .755c | .541 | .537 | .85269 |
| 4     | .741d | .549 | .545 | .84571 |

Note: Predictors in the Model: struggle for power & domination, processes re-engineering, pride & personality clash, oversight function of the legislature. Dependent Variable: perceived socio-political development.

**Table 6b.** Showing the ANOVA of legislative-executive conflicts and perceived socio-political development.

| Model | Sum of Squares | Df | Mean Square | F    | Sig. |
|-------|----------------|----|-------------|------|------|
| 1     | Regression     | 277.313 | 1   | 277.313 | 321.224 | .000a |
|       | Residual       | 336.687 | 390 | .863  |         |      |
|       | Total          | 614.000 | 391 |      |      |      |
| 2     | Regression     | 321.464 | 2   | 160.732 | 213.733 | .000a |
|       | Residual       | 292.536 | 389 | .752  |         |      |
|       | Total          | 614.000 | 391 |      |      |      |
| 3     | Regression     | 331.892 | 3   | 110.631 | 152.157 | .000b |
|       | Residual       | 282.108 | 388 | .727  |         |      |
|       | Total          | 614.000 | 391 |      |      |      |
| 4     | Regression     | 337.208 | 4   | 84.302 | 117.868 | .000c |
|       | Residual       | 276.792 | 387 | .715  |         |      |
|       | Total          | 614.000 | 391 |      |      |      |

Note: Predictors in the Model: struggle for power & domination, processes re-engineering, pride & personality clash, oversight function of the legislature. Dependent Variable: perceived socio-political development.

Table 6b shows the levels of variability within the regression models and forms the basis for tests of significance. The ANOVA table also reports that using the model is better than guessing the mean. The mean square residual values (0.863 for struggle for power & domination, 0.752 for processes re-engineering, 0.727 for pride & personality clash and 0.715 for oversight function of the legislature) are smaller, indicating less deviation between the observed and fitted values. The P-value for the F test statistic (321.224 for struggle for power & domination, 213.733 for processes re-engineering, 152.157 for pride & personality clash and 117.868 for oversight function of the legislature) are less than 0.001, providing strong evidence against the null hypotheses. The coefficient of determination (in Table 6a) for struggle for political power & domination (R² = 0.452), processes re-engineering (R² = 0.524), pride & personality clash (R² = 0.541) and oversight function of the legislature (R² = 0.549) have explanatory power over the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States.
Table 6c. Coefficients of legislative-executive conflicts and perceived socio-political development.

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients | Standardized Coefficients | T | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |
|-------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|---|------|-------------------------|
|       | B                           | Std. Error                | Beta |       | Tolerance | VIF |
| 1     | (Constant)                 | .084                      | .143 | .587 | .557       |     |
|       | Struggle for power & domination | 1.707                  | .095 | .672 | 17.923 | .000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| 2     | (Constant)                 | 2.224                    | .310 | 7.187 | .000       |     |
|       | Struggle for power & domination | 1.126                  | .117 | .448 | 9.642 | .000 | .579 | 1.727 |
|       | Processes re-engineering   | -.882                    | .115 | -.352 | -7.662 | .000 | .579 | 1.727 |
| 3     | (Constant)                 | 2.806                    | .354 | 8.219 | .000       |     |
|       | Struggle for power & domination | 1.181                  | .116 | .465 | 10.202 | .000 | .570 | 1.754 |
|       | Processes re-engineering   | -.030                    | .120 | -.412 | -8.602 | .000 | .517 | 1.933 |
|       | Pride & personality clash  | -.384                    | .101 | -.150 | -3.787 | .000 | .752 | 1.390 |
| 4     | (Constant)                 | 2.349                    | .406 | 5.790 | .000       |     |
|       | Struggle for power & domination | 1.146                  | .115 | .451 | 9.921 | .000 | .563 | 1.776 |
|       | Processes re-engineering   | -.866                    | .133 | -.346 | -6.505 | .000 | .412 | 2.428 |
|       | Pride & personality clash  | -.461                    | .104 | -.180 | -4.412 | .000 | .697 | 1.435 |
|       | Oversight function of the legislature | .345                 | .127 | .132 | 2.726 | .007 | .496 | 2.015 |

Note: a. Dependent Variable: Healthy for socio-political development in the State.

Table 6c shows the coefficients of the variables and the perceived socio-political development. The coefficient of struggle for political power & domination (unstandardized beta= 1.707) shows a positive relationship with the perceived socio-political development. The coefficient of struggle for political power & domination (standardized beta= 0.672; p-value = 0.01) shows greater contribution to the perceived socio-political development. The struggle for political power & domination has high coefficient than processes re-engineering; given the struggle for political power & domination (unstandardized beta= 1.126) and processes re-engineering (unstandardized beta= -0.882). It is seen also that struggle for political power & domination has more contribution to the perceived socio-political development compared to processes re-engineering; given the struggle for political power & domination (standardized beta= -0.448; p-value = 0.01) and processes re-engineering (standardized beta= -0.352; p-value = 0.01). The results prove that processes re-engineering has negative relationship with the perceived socio-political development.

The results in Table 6c show that struggle for power & domination also has the highest coefficient (unstandardized beta= 1.181) compared with processes re-engineering (unstandardized beta= -1.030) and pride & personality clash (unstandardized beta= -0.384). Struggle for power & domination also has the highest contribution to the perceived socio-political development; given that struggle for power & domination (standardized beta= 0.465; p-value = 0.01), processes re-engineering (standardized beta= -0.346; p-value = 0.01) and pride & personality clash (standardized beta= -0.150; p-value = 0.01). The result proves that processes re-engineering and pride & personality clash have negative relationship with the perceived socio-political development.

Finally, the results in Table 6c also shows that struggle for power & domination also has the highest coefficient (unstandardized beta= 1.146) compared with processes re-engineering (unstandardized beta= -0.866), pride &
personality clash (unstandardized beta = -0.461) and Oversight function of the legislature (unstandardized beta = 0.345). Struggle for power & domination also has the highest contribution to the perceived socio-political development; given that struggle for power & domination (standardized beta = 0.451; p-value = 0.01), processes re-engineering (standardized beta = 0.352; p-value = 0.01), pride & personality clash (standardized beta = -0.180; p-value = 0.01) and oversight function of the legislature (standardized beta = 0.132; p-value = 0.01). The result proves that struggle for power & domination with oversight function of the legislature has positive relationship with the perceived socio-political development while processes re-engineering with pride & personality clash has negative relationship with the perceived socio-political development.

5. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Findings revealed that struggle for political power, disagreement on budget & financial matters, polarized relationship, legislative arrogance & gridlocks on policies of government have strong significant effects on the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. The contribution of the struggle for political power to the perceived socio-political development is significantly positive one and it is above average. Nigerian Politics is characterized by power struggle. There is likelihood that members of the arm of government will try to performance exceedingly to secure political power and return to political office. Political power struggle is seen to have more contribution compared with the disagreement on budget & financial matters. It is seen also that disagreement on budget & financial matters has positive contribution to the perceived socio-political development of the study area. Disagreement on budget & financial matters is seen as having favourable effect on the socio-political development of Nigeria. The disagreement between the legislative & executive over budget & financial matters is to curtail excessiveness or unnecessary spending that may not be healthy for the socio-political development of Nigeria. It is however found that the contribution of the disagreement on budget & financial matters is weak. It is found that polarized relationship between the legislative & executive contribute positively to the socio-political development of Nigeria. Though, the relationship appears to be weak. This is surprising anyway. However, dividing views between legislative & executive arms may seldom attract improved socio-political development of Nigeria. Also, legislative arrogance is found to have positive contribution to the perceived socio-political development of Nigeria. These are however against the a-priori expectation of the study. The result proves that gridlock on policies of government has negative relationship with the perceived socio-political development. On rare note will gridlock on policies brings about improved socio-political development of Nigeria. Gridlock on policies of government hinders the progress of the perceived socio-political development of Nigeria.

Findings show that struggle for political power & domination, processes re-engineering, pride & personality clash and oversight function of the legislature have effects on the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. The effect of struggle for political power & domination on the perceived socio-political development is weak but positive. Processes re-engineering, pride & personality clash and oversight function of the legislature have strong effects on the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States.

It is found that struggle for political power & domination contributes to the perceived socio-political development greatly. Conflict arising from struggle for political power & domination seems to be constructive as it is confirmed empirically that it contributes positively and significantly to the perceived socio-political development of Nigeria. Processes re-engineering entered the model with negative sign. The implication of this is that it has negative contribution to the perceived socio-political development. This may mean that processes re-engineering between the legislative & executive arms are not sound enough. This may be tied to conflicts arising between the legislative & executive arms based on processes re-engineering in the Presidential Democracy of Nigeria. Pride & personality clash has negative contribution to the perceived socio-political development in the Presidential Democracy of Nigeria. Conflict arising from pride & personality clash is destructive. Finding shows that increase in such conflict may cause decrease in the socio-political development in the Presidential Democracy of Nigeria.
Oversight function of the legislature has positive contribution to the perceived socio-political development in the Presidential Democracy of Nigeria. This is because; the oversight function of the legislature entered the model with positive sign. This implies that conflict arising from oversight function of the legislature is constructive.

6. CONCLUSION

The management of the legislature-executive relations and conflicts in the Nigerian presidential democracy is vital to socio-political development process of the nation. Development is a parameter of a performing presidential democracy. Meanwhile, a sound presidential democracy must hinge on a well-designed political structure where the legislature-executive relations and conflicts are constructive and effectively managed. It is no doubt that a relationship without any element of conflict between the legislature and the executive could be dangerous for the socio-political development process of Nigeria. The socio-political development process of Nigeria may be transformed to favour all other aspect of the nation’s development parameters when relationship between the legislature and executive is not kept in total cooperation and resultant conflicts are constructively managed.

The relationship between the legislature and the executive is patterned by struggle for political power, disagreement on budget & financial matters, polarized relationship, legislative arrogance & gridlocks on policies of government. It is evident in the Nigerian political system that the executive helps the legislative arm members who are from the same political party to pursue political power. Within the four years term, the relationship between the legislature and the executive may be built to illuminate struggle for political power. Other variables enlisted also characterize the pattern of relationship between the legislature and the executive. Empirical evidence abound that struggle for political power, disagreement on budget & financial matters, polarized relationship, legislative arrogance & gridlocks on policies of government have strong significant effects on the perceived socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. Meanwhile, when the relationship between the legislature and the executive is characterized by increased struggle for political power, socio-political development becomes more prominent.

Members of the two arms of government may cooperate to boost their performance in order to secure political power and return to political office. Disagreement on budget & financial matters has been empirically proven to be favourable to the socio-political development of the study area. The disagreement between the legislative & executive over budget & financial matters may be instrument to the reduction of excessiveness or unnecessary spending that may not be healthy for the socio-political development of Nigeria. Polarized relationship between the legislative & executive, and legislative arrogance also contribute positively to the socio-political development of Nigeria. Gridlock on policies of government has negative relationship with the perceived socio-political development. Increase in divergent views on policy matters diminishes the socio-political development process of the nation.

Empirical evidence also bound that struggle for political power & domination, processes re-engineering, pride & personality clash and oversight function of the legislature have significant effects on the socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. The contribution of struggle for political power & domination to the socio-political development is high. Struggle for political power & domination stimulates constructive conflict that has essential and relevant implication on the socio-political development of Nigeria. It is empirically proven that pride & personality clash has negative contribution to socio-political development in the Presidential Democracy of Nigeria. The tide of pride & personality clash is not instrumental to desirable socio-political development of Nigeria. There will be continuous diminish in the socio-political development of Nigeria if pride & personality clash are not well managed and controlled. The oversight function of the legislature is found to be instrumental to improved socio-political development in the Presidential Democracy of Nigeria. Conflict arising from oversight function of the legislature is constructive and needed to transform the socio-political development in the Presidential Democracy of Nigeria.
7. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Based on the findings of the study, the study recommended that:

1. The executive and the legislature arms should consistently take into account “struggle for political power, disagreement on budget & financial matters, polarized relationship, legislative arrogance & gridlocks on policies of government” as they do not only pattern executive-legislature relationship but also predict the possibility of improved socio-political development of Kogi and Lagos States. Struggle for political power, disagreement on budget & financial matters, polarized relationship and legislative arrogance should not be conceived as being detrimental to the socio-political development of Nigeria. Meanwhile, gridlock on policies of government should be minimized as it has negative effect on the socio-political development.

2. The executive and the legislature arms should take advantage of conflicts arising from struggle for political power & domination and oversight function of the legislature as it contributes positively to the socio-political development in the Presidential Democracy of Nigeria. This is because; the conflict arising from struggle for political power & domination and oversight function of the legislature is constructive. The executive and the legislature arms should minimize conflicts arising from processes re-engineering and pride & personality clash as they contribute negatively to the socio-political development in the Presidential Democracy of Nigeria.

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