The Mechanism of CSR Beliefs Dissemination: From Idea to Institution or Vice Versa

Iuliia Platonova¹, Maksim Tcvetkov², Olga Chkalova³, Marina Efremova⁴

Abstract:

The focus of this paper is the mechanism of ideology dissemination. It explains how ideology emerges from ideas and through shared beliefs develops to be expressed in recurring actions. Ideologies and institutions constitute an II-system, where ideas and rules interact mutually as form and substance.

The paper tackles the question whether shared beliefs can be disseminated through the institutional export, whether it is needed to export ideologies hot on the heels of institutions. Through logical modeling, game theory application and Sustainability/CSR example we illustrate the inverse mechanism of beliefs dissemination and substantiate the worth williness of institutions ideologization.

Keywords: Ideology, Belief, formal and informal Institutions, Mental Models, Institutional transplantation, Ideologization, Corporate Social Responsibility.

¹ Ass. Prof., Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod (UNN), Institute of Economics and Entrepreneurship, platonova.iuliia@yandex.ru
² Ass. Prof. Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod (UNN), Institute of Economics and Entrepreneurship macvetkov@yandex.ru
³ Professor, Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod (UNN), Institute of Economics and Entrepreneurship ochkalova@iee.unn.ru
⁴ Professor, Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod (UNN), Institute of Economics and Entrepreneurship, efremovamv@iee.unn.ru
Introduction

In as much as the paper concerns ideologies, it is expedient to begin with the proposition that a human being tends to perceive reality by means of belief. A human being is Homo credens not in a smaller extent than Homo sapiens. Belief-as-trust, belief-as-opinion, belief-as-aspiration, belief-as-ideology at last (Platonova, 2010) are the foundation of decision making. “Without believing one cannot make a step from being stuck in the state of doubts” (Peirce, 1877).

Belief-systems are affected by the ideas and can be redefined when the ideas are assimilated. Ideas initiate searching the arguments to overcome intervened doubts leading to the mind uneasiness and anxiety. To avoid such uneasiness fixation of belief is used. The latter influences behavior positively, on the one hand, by making environment predictable and decision-making easier. That’s why shared beliefs seem to be seeking for stability in shared practices, which are informal and formal institutions. On the other hand, such fixation by insensible degrees leads to path-dependency that is considered to be negative, as path-dependency prevents from pending changes of behavioral patterns, holds mind in illusion. Institutional transplantation is one of the ways to make the members of recipient social group redefine their beliefs, as during “de-institutionalization and re-institutionalization” beliefs’ taken-for-grantedness become compromised (Higss, 2009).

Thus, institutionalization of shared beliefs is the objective development of ideology from chaotic idea to stable rules, since it starts from sudden individual mental models conformity, supported with resources and then materialized in practices and physical objects (Athanasenas et al., 2015; Nechaev and Antipina 2016; Theriou, 2014 and Theriou et al., 2014). Beliefs dissemination caused by institutional transplantation seems to be subjective as it starts with spreading rules and continues with looking for mental models conformity to decrease the risk of opportunistic behavior and costs for monitoring of compliance with the rules (Duguleana and Duguleana 2016). The dimension of the research is micro level, so an individual accepting or rejecting ideas, believing and acting in accordance with his/her beliefs is an Object of research. Methods to be applied are institutional analysis (including game theory), method of logical modelling.

The paper is structured as follows. First, we get acquainted with the types of ideology. Then we come closer to the issue of so called “fixation of belief” (Pierce, 1877) and show why shared beliefs turn into shared practices and how and why they are kept from changes that explains institutional rigidity. Later on existing theories of ideology formation are illustrated; systemic approach is applied to describe the mechanism of how ideas turn into institutions. Institutional analysis and game theory allow us to show how ideology changes a believer’s attitude to payoff and utility, in such a way constructs and reconstructs institutions. We come to the conclusion, that ideology is needed to make institutions work and prevent opportunistic behavior,
since shared beliefs provide players with the options of possible set of strategies, help to predict decisions of others and easier find the equilibrium state of a game. Having considered the direct way of beliefs dissemination and institutionalization three scenarios of institutional change were defined resulting from the transformation of ideology: mediation, inversion and lock-in. Finally, we consider the issue whether shared beliefs may be formed and spread inversely by institutions or reconstructed by means of discourse, but not slowly developed from accepted ideas looking for similarities.

Logical modelling helps us to illustrate the connection between beliefs and institutions and the role of ideology as a “bridge between high-level principles and decision-making practice” (Goodpaster, 1985), fixing the practices caused by shared beliefs, filling the institutions with sense. The second, inverse, meaning of ideology is demonstrated with the example of Sustainable development/CSR belief dissemination.

*Types of Ideology:*

There can be defined several levels of ideology. According to the Schmid’s understanding (1981) and terminology, they are the following:

1. Primary ideology which is expressed in actions of an individual to fulfill his/her purposes. This ideology stems from practice, from the private experience, decisions led to positive results fixed in memory. Schmid calls it the “logic of a practice” (1981) highlighting its purposiveness and rationality.

2. Spontaneous ideology is based not merely on logic, but also on values, moral principles, ideas what is good and what is bad, what has to be changed. Schmid finds this type of ideology to be the “raw material” for the further levels of ideology (this type of ideology correlates with Durkheim’s myths).

3. Secondary ideology is the “result of collective accommodation of experiences” (Schmid 1981). This kind of ideology is expressed in traditions, customs, commonly recognized practices (that are defined as informal institutions by North, or rites by Durkheim).

4. Third order ideologies exist in the form of doctrine, justified truth promising better life to society in general. It may be fixed in formal rules and practices to be followed, often under compulsion for the sake of societal welfare. According to Durkheim (1938) this ideology is reflected in interrelated practices and materialized in the monuments, architecture, etc.

Thus, ideology seems to be the inevitable quality of a human being (Platonova, 2010). In the framework of this paper we understand ideology as a kind of belief fitted with reasoning and values which are sharable. Belief is indeed the reaction to uncertainty, to the questions which often cannot be plainly answered. To interpret the environment, to make decisions in accordance with this interpretation, to act not spontaneously and chaotically, rather consistently, to get motivation and move forward one has to develop and accept the set of ideas about environment as
representing reality. Questioning, believing as a reaction to an unanswered question and recurring practices caused by beliefs form these very mental models (North, 1993), myths (Durkheim, 1938), clusters of beliefs (van Dijk, 1998). When the clusters of beliefs or internal representations are shared among members of a group, they obtain the social dimension (van Dijk, 1998) and with this set of attributes they can be called ideology in the customary sense of the word.

Table 1. Types of Ideology

| Types               | Names by other authors                      | Dimension | Description                                                                 | Examples                                                                 |
|---------------------|----------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Prior ideology      | “Subject” effect (Althusser, 1969): replication of Ideology/ Practice/ Subject Product of a complex, real situation (Schmid, 1981) | Micro (individual) | “Mode of conception” (when we spontaneously understand the situation in a particular way, so we use “character mask” (K. Marx) “A theoretical construct, logic of a practice” (Schmid, 1981). This logic is relative to the purposiveness of the purpose of human life – driven by “the objective necessity implied by the preconditions of the practice” | Practice of capitalist who must accumulate profit (K. Marx). |
| Spontaneous ideology (first order) | Social representations (Van Dijk, 1998) Mental model (North, 1993, Denzau and North, 1994) | Micro (individual) | Practicing creates spontaneous ideologies, which contain pre-established ideological notions, which can be the result of clever ideological manipulation, so they might be falsely pretending to be truly original (Schmid, 1981) | By practicing the capitalist relations of production the bourgeois logic is transformed by the workers into a “spontaneous” workers’ ideology (Schmid, 1981) |
| Secondary Informal | Meso “Result of collective | Feminism,
ideology (second order) | institutions (North, 1991) | accommodation of experiences” (Schmid, 1981). Expressed in traditions, customs, and commonly recognized practices. | ideology of entrepreneur s, professional s’ ideology.
---|---|---|---
Third order ideology (political) | Informal + formal institutions (North, 1991) | “Partisan restructuring of the ideological raw material” (Schmid, 1981) | Communism , liberalism, fascism (Dugin, 2012)

**Fixation of belief:**

The process of ideology institutionalization seems to be a matter of course, inasmuch as individuals tend to keep their beliefs protected from doubts as belief is a “calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid or to change to a belief in anything else” (Peirce, 1877). Peirce calls it “fixation of belief” and define methods how to make believing state stable. Method of tenacity presupposes striving for desired calmness of mind that is often reflected in accepting an idea without consideration and keeping distrust to opposed opinions. A priory method is based on instinct and logical conscience, but often leads to not correct, but rather comfortable conclusions. Method of scientific investigation is the most reliable as presenting “any distinction of a right and a wrong way”, according to Peirce (1877).

The mentioned methods can be applied on the micro level only, since they help to fix merely what is called primary or spontaneous ideology. This Pierce’s classification of belief fixation methods leads us to the idea of ideology in its negative connotation as “false consciousness” (Marx and Engels, 1955). Pierce points out that individuals often incline to apply the method of tenacity or a priory method to fix their representation of reality, because firstly the scientific method claims time and undesirable efforts to be practiced, and secondly, individuals agree to be comforted in self-deception and prevent themselves from changes.

On the meso- and macro-levels, by the way, fixation of belief is also in use. Among the methods defined by Peirce there is one more, the method of authority, which appears to be the most appropriate for making shared beliefs (secondary ideologies) fixed. This method is applied by those who have power to create institutions attracting attention to the ideas to be accepted and believed in. “Let the will of the state act, then, instead of that of the individual. Let an institution be created which shall have for its object to keep correct doctrines before the attention of the people, to reiterate them perpetually, and to teach them to the young; having at the same time power to prevent contrary doctrines from being taught, advocated, or expressed” (Peirce, 1877). Considering the individuals’ weakness in their reality interpretation followed by decision-making, Pierce advocates the method of authority dispensing them from obligation to investigate and examine reality.
Institutions in the case of the method of authority are the instruments of beliefs fixation. According to the institutional theory, institutions as set of rules based on beliefs are created by people to maximize their wealth (North, 1990). Institutions presuppose not merely laws and contracts, customs and moral codes, but also mechanism of compulsion, which assures following the rules, makes them advantageous to be carried out.

Thus, institutions are closely connected to constraints to act in accordance with the existing ideology, which is beliefs shared by the members of society or at least by authorities creating the institutions and preventing the undesirable actions with sanctions and constrains. Assuming that individuals tend to keep the calmness of mind, it becomes clear why constraints resulting from the institutions are often accepted. “Refusal from flexibility of decision making leads to Institutions. When there is a gap between an agent’s competence and the difficulty of the decision problem to be solved (a C-D gap), the human agent constructs rules to restrict the flexibility of her own choices in such situations - i.e., institutions”.

From such a radical point of view, institutions channel the range of choices, they teach how to perceive the world, how to act – so they limit the human internal freedom and individuals accept it voluntarily as being directed to utility and pleasantness, calmness of mind. This way we approach the old philosophical question brightly illustrated by the Russian writer F. Dostoevsky in his famous The Grand Inquisitor parable (novel The Brothers Karamazov): does reality have to be constructed and regulated for the sake of people comfort and happiness or it should be left chaotic to inspire individuals’ search for truth? Boukaert and Ghesquiere (2004) analyze “an ethic of hypocrisy” or “ethical temptation” as a choice between a rational and a spiritual approach to ethics, understanding by rational ethics “a process of moral deliberation conducted by instrumental reason in order to maximize social happiness”.

In the framework of the paper we put the same question differently: are institutions to be developed evolutionally from beliefs once shared and disseminated to be later on reconsidered and changed when the method of scientific investigation makes some new quality of environment revealed? Or is it reasonable for the individuals’ sake to artificially institutionalize environment and keep it possibly unchanged and managed by specialists to maximize individuals’ wealth? The latter is expressed by any political ideology, that is the merge of both knowledge and ideology with each other presented as a doctrine, set of rules which are already not merely informal, but rather formal institutions (North, 1991).

**Ideology: The mechanism of beliefs dissemination and institutionalization**

*Belief evolving from idea to institution:*

Institutions may be developed as a result of ideological change accepted in collective–choice and reflected in political actions. This way of change is called
evolutional. Revolutionary, radical way of institutional change seems to happen as well. In this part of the article we consider the evolutional way of institutional development: slow change from beliefs to rules.

There may be defined necessary and sufficient conditions for ideology to be embodied in institutions. Necessary condition is conformity of mental models of actors taking part in ideology dissemination. Mental models conformity is about resemblance of spontaneous ideologies of individuals (Schmid, 1981). This resemblance is easier to be found among the members of one society influenced by common traditions, customs, cultural principles. The more mental models of individuals resemble, the higher the chance that individuals would share the same ideas and act in the same way.

Sufficient condition of ideology institutionalization is accumulation of resources. Conformity of mental models is not enough to construct or reconstruct environment in a new way. Resources as they are listed in economics: land, labor, capital goods, are needed to support the spread of ideas. Time and energy to be spent as attributes of conformity of mental models indicate the believers’ readiness to contribute to the ideology dissemination. Resources accumulation in its turn is the factor influencing how quickly and successfully the ideology dissemination may happen.

If ideological theory, scientifically developed or evolutionally brought to a state of traditions, provides the followers with informal rules, an ideological program plans how to create the formal ones and which way they are to fix the followers’ behavior. Institutions are “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions” (North, 1991). Developing one after another, according to North, informal (customs, traditions) and formal (laws, constitutions) institutions serve individuals’ striving for wealth-maximization. Institutions “evolve incrementally, connecting the past with the present and the future” (North, 1991).

Institutions are “devised to create order” (North, 1991). Ideology in this sense fixes institutions as institutions make individuals act in accordance with ideology. Thus, in this interaction ideology and institutions are the parts of one system (hereafter II-system) which can be illustrated as a treasure chest. A chest is to keep treasure, when empty it loses its meaning as a treasure keeper. And treasure without chest is easily removed part by part and loses its value as well, since parts are commonly valued less than unbroken, one piece gem.

The scheme 1 demonstrates how accepted ideas turned into individual ideologies (preliminary or spontaneous ideology by Schmid) by means of discourse practices are crystallized to the secondary ideology reflected in customs, traditions, and behavioral patterns. The process of institutionalization continues in attempt, firstly, to preserve initial ideas from changes, secondly, to make environment more certain and predictable.
**Scheme 1. Mechanism of beliefs dissemination and institutionalization (II-system)**

II-system (from Ideology to Institution) is an ideal one, illustrating static situation characterized with Ideology and Institution conformity. The latter means that institutions serve principles proclaimed by ideology and make actors who accept the ideology benefit from following the rules. Ideology in its turn fills institution with sense, makes individuals follow the rules not because of fear of compulsions, but because of believing in institutions effectiveness. Such combination is self-enforcing for both ideology and institution that is proved further in the paper with game-theory method.

II-system considers Ideology-Institution combination under static conditions. But environment is changing, and so are the beliefs. Environmental change might cause appearance of new knowledge, purposes, and values. When following this change institutions might be expected to be transformed as well. If formal rules still keep ideas, which might already be transformed from their initial state “I” to “I1” that may lead to lack of Ideology-Institution conformity and II-system crisis (Denzau and North, 1994). Further we consider how ideas and beliefs may be transformed on the way of ideology institutionalization.

**II-system transformation: institutional change:**
There have been developed different theories on institutional change. Some of them explain creation of institutions by political process, some theories put evolutionary development as the basis of institutions emergence. Some theories stress on slow institutional change searching for equilibrium state, other ones define sharp reaction to dissonance as the main driving force of behavior alteration. In the article we consider change of institutions continuing the idea of beliefs evolving from ideas to behavioral patterns and fixed rules. In this paragraph we begin with the question of what causes the change of ideologies. Then we propose scenarios of how II-system would change in case of ideological transformation.

In general words, obsolescence of existing belief-systems, ideologies stimulates their change. This causes institutional transformation to happen. Such obsolescence is reflected in cognitive dissonance and search for cognitive consonance and ideology reconsideration. Cognitive dissonance is the result of the following events (Faccini, Melki, 2011):

1. Evolution of knowledge;
2. Facing a problem to be solved;
3. Incoherence of proposed justifications;
4. Mental experience.

These events lead to the radical change of belief-system only in a radical situation, which are, according to Williamson (2000), great events (such as wars, occupation, perceived threats, military coups) or window opportunities (ideological lack described by Wilson and Kelling).

North assumes that individual experiences lead to the change of mental models if the results of the experience cannot be explained and approved with contemporary ideological principles. This change can cause ideological crisis and then a secondary ideology transformation, if it meets the conformity of mental models and ability to accumulate resources. Taking into consideration the cognitive process, it is worth noticing that Denzau and North distinguish two levels of learning (1994). The first type leads to appearance of new mental models as a result of individual experience and structuring the categories of environment in a new way. The second type of learning is not so radical. It influences available mental models change and does not provoke new ones to occur.

The similar learning scheme is presented by Piaget (1999). From his perspective there are two ways for individuals to interpret environment: assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation is coping by means of available mental models that presuppose the selection of information in accordance with the existing belief-system. Accommodation is about mental models modification or creation of the new ones to cope with the results of the cognitive process. Accommodation, on the contrast to the assimilation process, leads to the “break in an individual history of mental models” (Haase, Roedenberg, Soellner 2009).
New mental models are supposed to lead to the change of dominating ideology. Russian sociologist and philosopher Ahiezer A.S. defines two possible institutional reactions to ideological change, namely inversion and mediation (1997). Both scenarios are pictured below (Scheme 2). Inversion presupposes that either ideological change is ignored, disregarded by existing institutions or institutions accept ideological transformation, but do not change accordingly.

Consequently, inversion is considered by Ahiezer as rather negative process leading to instability. Abandoning the transformation institutions can cause either new ideology formation and subsequent ideological confrontation or the situation when an old institution operates without meeting new ideas. Mediation, on the contrary, presupposes institutional change in accordance with ideological transformation and meeting expectations of those who follow the principles of ideology.

In addition to inversion and mediation as the scenarios of evolitional change of institutions, there is one more, which radically differs from the ones proposed by Ahiezer. The difference is that this scenario does not presuppose any change of either ideology or institutions.
North, in spite of highlighting in his previous works the role of individual experience, in the later papers points out that institutions are rather unhurried in their change, even when not benefiting the society (1990). North explains this institutional rigidity by the assumption that individuals learn from the outcomes of their previous choices and then keep the results of the past learning experience unchanged.

The resistance to cognitive change, change of mental models underlies the rigidity of institutional change. This way North connects the institutional rigidity interpretation with path-dependence theory. The theory illustrates that, when facing a problem situation individuals tend to deconstruct the problem or act in accordance with the previously obtained mental model. As a result, locks-in appear, which are getting stuck with the traditional styles of thinking and acting (Haase, Roedenberg, Soellner, 2007) (Scheme 3).

Individual presuppositions and social domain resources (such as knowledge) put learners on the path, which they do not necessarily recognize. What can provide with such recognition of stay on the path is the external shock:

1. The enforcement of a formerly unenforced institutions;
2. Unexpected implementation of an institution which renders the individual unable to act according to its established mental model.

If not external shocks, then artificial institutional transformation can be applied to manage and change individual mental models. “In this way, policy can stabilize or destabilize the belief in certain institutions or ideologies” (Haase, Roedenberg, Soellner, 2009). Thus, beliefs, mental models when find conformity become shared by members of a community. It is the necessary condition of the second order
ideology formation and dissemination. To be successfully spread, the ideology needs to be supported with resources, such as working power and physical capital. In such a way first informal, then formal rules occur to create and fix the order how ideological principles are to be expressed in actions. These rules are institutions. Thus, there must be interconnection between ideologies and institutions to call it II-system. The system progresses and improves when the change of its elements is synchronized. And conversely, II-system becomes unstable when its elements change in different directions, with different rapidity or do not change at all losing conformity with environment.

Having considered the direct way of beliefs dissemination and institutionalization, we define three scenarios of institutional change resulting from the transformation of ideology: mediation, inversion and lock-in. Mediation is rather idealistic scenario suggesting the steady ideological transformation followed by consequent institutional change. Inversion explains contradiction stemming from institutional inertness, rigidity that causes their unconformity to a constantly evolving ideology.

The third scenario reveals contradictions as well, but ones of different nature – caused by rigidity of both ideology and institutions. This scenario can be called “lock-in” as the one explaining ideological and institutional rigidity with path-dependence theory, which reveals that decision-making is limited with the set of mental models formerly formed and kept unchanged in spite of transformations of environment. Path-dependence is the result of the second learning level (Denzau and North, 1994), application or interpretation of environment by means of assimilation Piaget (1999).

This way of interpretation is predominantly applied by individuals as a result of their strive for cost limitation, since it is much easier to reuse the previously obtained experience or commonly accepted practices resulting from the experience of others, than to start structuring categories of event space leading to uncertain outcomes. In such a way self-reinforcement mechanism as the basis of path-dependency is initiated.

The latter forms individuals “preprogrammed” by their experience and personal history (Peirce, 1981). Personal motivation (Denzau and North, 1994), great events (Williamson, 2000) or external shocks (Haase, Roedenberg, Soellner, 2009) may help to step aside from the path. Another way to initiate reflection, first level learning or accommodation appears to be policy making and management of institutions.

Such a summing up of the conclusions made so far in the paper moves to the main question whether there is the inverse way of beliefs dissemination. Inverse as used here means not evolutonal way, rather a radical one through artificial management of institutions in order to influence desirable ideological change and behavior of individuals.
Ideology: The mechanism of Institutions Ideologization

Game theory in the II-system understanding:
Before we move to the inverse mechanism of belief dissemination, we consider II-system (Ideology-Institutions interdependence) explained with the game theory method. Game in this theory is a model of a conflict situation. A conflict situation takes place when objectives of players of a game are either opposite to each other (antagonistic games), partly opposite (nonantagonistic games) or coincide (cooperative games).

The reason why game theory is applied for the II-system analysis is the following. When modelling a conflict situation, the set of possible actions of the game’s players has to be defined. Actions can be chosen consciously, so be reasoned (in this case they are called the private actions) or made randomly. Actions are accumulated to strategies of the players. The way the strategies are accomplished defines the result of the game (payoff).

The antagonistic games are characterized with the zero payoffs of the players, whereas the nonantagonistic games lead to the result different from the zero state. Solution concept or equilibrium of a game is reached when the players find such a set of strategies, which allows maximization of their wins even if they know in advance how the opponent would act. After the equilibrium state of a game is found; set of strategies to be used and frequency of this usage is defined by the players.

The equilibrium of a game actually is that very institution as being a set of actions and compulsion mechanism to make the rules work steadily (North, 1990). Loss of opportunity to maximize payoff can be considered also as a compulsion, since it makes a player follow the rules. The principles of the search for a game equilibrium are based on the players’ payoff analysis. At the same time the game theory considers shared beliefs, which are “central to self-enforcing institutions” (Greif and Laitin, 2004).

Coming closer to the issue of ideology considered through the game theory method, we point out that ideology defines the scale, dimension of how players estimate their wins. Such an idea can be found in Bowels (2003), Silberberg (1987), Greif and Laitin (2004) who conclude that ideology influences decision making as well as search for wealth. Moreover, the weight of ideology in players’ utility estimation is in inverse proportion to the price the players pay for the opportunity to express their values and interests. Consequently, ideology formation and dissemination among members of a social group can be seen as a way to influence and change a player’s utility estimation. Change of ideology causes the change of utility resulting from the same actions players used to commit before the ideology becomes transformed. In such a way the game equilibrium changes as well, meaning that actions change accordingly. Such a statement proves the idea of the direct way of beliefs (which are utility estimation in the terms of game theory) dissemination and institutionalization.
The example of ideology’s influence on players’ decision-making and further actions can be illustrated through the consideration of the situations showing the emergence of institutions. The three key problems lead to the emergence of institutions: equilibrium inefficiency (the prisoners’ dilemma), coordination of actions, inequality. In the equilibrium inefficiency situation players choose the decisions and actions effective for them both, not for the whole society. The game called “Two machine-gunners” is an illustrative example demonstrating the role of ideology in decision-making.

Two machine-gunners have to defeat the attack. Each of them has two strategies either fight or desert. If both of the machine-gunners fight, the attack will be defeated. If at least one of the players deserts, the one who fights will perish. If there is no ideology, shared beliefs in patriotism, native country’s interests superiority, then uncertainty of players concerning the possible opponent’s actions forms the following game matrix (Table 2):

| Strategies (A) | To fight | To desert |
|---------------|---------|----------|
| To fight      | 1;1     | -2;2     |
| To desert     | 2;-2    | -1;-1    |

Table 2. The game matrix of machine-gunners with no common ideology

In accordance with the principle of finding the dominant strategy, each player of the game will choose “to desert”. In such a case, the equilibrium state of the game differs from what society needs. If the players choose the strategies “to fight”, the integrated payoff for society equals 2 (1 + 1), while the other strategies combination leads to the results from -2 to 0 (Table 2).

There are two possible modes to reach the equilibrium state of the game and move it to the position desirable for society. First mode is external compulsion to force the machine-gunners fight, such as mine laying on the passages, severe disciplining, etc. However, external compulsion is characterized by the higher risk of opportunistic behavior, when the compulsion mechanism outcome becomes less controlled.

Therefore, another method defined to compel players to follow the rules leading to the society’s payoff maximization is triggering the internal mechanism of self-compulsion. Thereafter each of the players changes the utility estimation resulting from their unchanged strategies. Ideology of patriotism, shared beliefs in honor, self-devotion and self-sacrifice influence the game results in the following way (Table 3). Thus, changed payoffs cause the changed dominant strategies which are “to fight” in the case of ideological influence.

Summing up the game theory method applied to the II-system analysis we prove that ideology, providing individuals with particular utility estimation, influences decision-making and actions consequently. In course of time if the utility estimation
I. Platonova, M. Tcvetkov, O. Chkalova, M. Efremova

is stable, and repeatable actions become regular as well, this way they turn into institutions. Compulsions to keep these institutions working can be external (a physical punishment or social disapproval leading to stigmatization) or internal (individual beliefs and values provided with ideology). Merely external compulsion mechanism does not ensure following the rules as effective as the combination of external and internal factors influencing behavior. Thus, ideology serves as an internal motivator diminishing the risk of opportunistic behavior.

Table 3. The game matrix of machine-gunners influenced by ideology

| A       | B To fight | To desert |
|---------|------------|-----------|
| To fight| 1;1        | -2;2      |
| To desert| -2;1  | -2;2      |

On the other hand, institutions framing environment influence the change of beliefs along with “wealth, identity, ability, knowledge, residential distribution, occupational specialization” (Greif and Laitin, 2004) and even “beyond the behavior in the transaction it (institution) governs”. Further in the paper such a mechanism of ideological change caused by institutional transplantation is considered.

Institutional transplantation and inverse way of beliefs dissemination:

In the previous part of the article, the evolutional way of institutional change was considered. The described way of shared beliefs (which are secondary ideologies) dissemination and institutionalization we call evolutional as well, since the process itself is staged, gradual and rather slow. Revolutionary change of ideology is hardly possible, inasmuch as the state of metal models conformity and resources accumulation takes time to occur. Remembering scientific revolutions, the Kuhnian paradigm shift, it has to be noticed that the process is still evolutional showing how “set of ideas which is clearly distinguishable from the previous one will gain dominance and find expression in a new set of institutions, thus creating a new period of path-dependent and gradual change” (Dabrowska and Zweynert, 2014).

However, revolutionary change of institutions is a case of evidence. This kind of revolution can be arranged by means of rapid institutional transplantation and expressed in “critical junctures” (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007).

According to the theory of institutional transplantation, revolutionary change of institutions is conditioned by two factors: political will to transfer institutions and the institutional projection in correlation with the informal and formal rules existing in a different society institutions are planned to be transferred to. Institutional projection means estimation of the successful institutional transfer probability. The probability estimation is mainly juridical, since it supposes evaluation of different social groups’ formal institutions conformity. It is based on the comparison of the donor’s and the recipient’s legal systems and estimation of their equivalence (Reception/Dictionnaire encyclopedique de theorie et de sociologie du droit 1993).
Informal institutions of the recipient social group are to be taken into account when making an institutional projection.

Listing the subjects of institutional transplantation, Mamadouch, Jong and Lalenis (2002) define the following “transplanters”: state legislators, supranational agencies, subnational governments, administrative bodies, business firms, non-governmental organizations, political parties and media-companies. The main motives of “transplanters” are bringing improvement and development acceleration or breaking local resistance. The latter statement is “food for thought” in the context of our paper with its purpose to answer the question if institutional change may cause the change of ideology. In the framework of the paper, we are particularly interested in the theory suggesting that the change of behavior can lead to the change mental models, which means that ideology transformation can be the result of institutional change.

In spite of being rarely considered, the belief dissemination seems to be able to happen inversely as a result of institutional transplantation. Institutions as the sets of rules contain ideas justifying why these rules are to be followed. When exported (transferred, transplanted) institutions initially turn into empty chests as in a new environment they might not express any idea. In such a case, they appear to be pointless until there is a community of followers believing that the institutions serve a purpose of wealth.

Filling institutions with ideas intrinsic to them originally, what we call ideologization, can be organized by means of discourse practices through teaching, mass media propaganda, indoctrination, etc. From this stage, the next steps of beliefs dissemination are the same as previously considered: through teaching, propaganda, indoctrination the ideas are spread to be accepted or rejected, then shared and eventually institutionalized. It is certainly the simplified scheme showing the general path of ideas, beliefs, and rules. It is not for any particular reason we use a word “path” and not, for example, “trajectory”, despite both are synonyms. The issue is that institutional transplantation may cause path-dependence in a new environment. In the scheme 4 this export of path is pictured as a Scenario 1.

**Scheme 4. Three Scenarios of beliefs disseminations through the Export of Institutions**

![Scheme 4](image_url)
Scenario 2 (scheme 4) of the inverse beliefs dissemination can be described as institutional transplantation resulting stemming from a new ideology. It happens when exported institution becomes filled with ideas different from original ones. The reason of such a transformation of ideas is quite complex. Cultural identity, psychological peculiarity, cognitive abilities of individuals living in the environment the institutions are exported to, pedagogical and oratorical skills of those who teach, inspire, convince, political will concerning the new rules – not the complete list of possible reasons explaining why original ideas change and turn from I to I₁.

As the ideas, which are spread through discourse become assimilated with the ones relevant to the mental models of individuals of recipient-environment, it leads to the ideology transformation, conditioning institutional change. Obviously, the changed institutions do not resemble the donor ones even when they are still named alike the institutions they are originated from. The modern Russian history shows many example of institutional transplantation. Institutions evolutionally developed in the Western countries, when exported to the Russian environment, caused ideological injection and further assimilation of the liberal ideas to the local ones.

As a result, presumably, liberal ideology institutions are named in the western manner, but they have been functioning differently. The examples of such a scenario can be found in research papers. For instance, Dabrowska and Zweynert analyze the case of Stabilization Fund in Russia as an example of how “domestic discourses increasingly move away from the neo-liberal ideas that formed the background to the SF” (2014). They describe this kind of institutional transplantation “the import of ready-made institutions without a preceding import of ideas” (Dabrowska and Zweynert, 2014). The main reasons why institutional transplantation happens by the second scenario at most are the following (Dabrowska and Zweynert, 2014):

1. There is a lack of experts among the members of the social group importing institutions. Thus, the original ideas of imported institutions are not understood in appropriate manner or understood superficially.
2. There is a lack of discussion to spread and disseminate ideas and obtain broader support.
3. The “separation of ideas from their current institutional mooring” (Blyth, 2002) does not take place in the social group importing institutions.

The third reason of institutional transplantation by the second scenario turned out to be the pivotal one. Moreover, it still seems to be unclear how this “separation of ideas” can be managed. According to Dabrowska and Zweynert (2014) academic and political discourse are conductive to “detaching ideas from previous mental models” and their further adaptation to the recipient environment.

Summing up we would add, that the evolution of an ideology from ideas through personal beliefs to shared ones reflected in respective practices is a case of rather local and closed community, more or less independent from the rules and practices of another one. Globalization having started its strong, solid expansion in the 20th century predetermined the institutional transplantation across the globe. The only way to let globalization continue is providing more and more communities with the common rules and practices, since waiting for belief systems development and integration to the single one gives no evident forecast whether beliefs are going to be influenced with the same ideas and be transformed in the same way and form to the same ideologies. That explains why the inverse way of ideology formation is in use in the age of globalization.

The set of institutions exported from one community to another moves globalization further, “but no institution can undertake to regulate opinions upon every subject” (Peirce, 1877). The risk of opportunistic behavior and high costs of compulsion mechanism maintenance still makes an ideology significant for the rapid and low-cost institutionalization. That is why ideologization of transplanted institutions plays increasingly significant role in managing institutional change. The example of Sustainable development/CSR concept spreading around the world since 70s is quite demonstrative.

The concept of Sustainable development as an example of ideology formed in the inverse way:

The Concept of Sustainable development seems to have been shaping into the new ideology (Platonova 2013) based on the beliefs in economic prosperity, environmental quality and social balance (known also as triple bottom line), which Goodpaster defines as a shift from individualism or the “Lockean” ideology to “communitarian” ideology characterized with such values as communitarianism, rights and duties of membership, community needs, active planning state, holism-interdependence (1985).

“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the
environment's ability to meet present and future needs”, what is defined in the Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987.

The concept has been rapidly developing since 60s and is already practically implemented in CSR (corporate social responsibility). There is a big variety of how CSR is defined (Carroll, 1999). In general understanding CSR means voluntarily accepted (by a corporation) obligations to fulfill not merely shareholders’ expectations, but rather objectives and needs of society members.

Sustainable development is a broader notion assuming obligations of citizens, politicians, NGOs, etc. along with corporations and their employees to behave in a sustainable and responsible way. Sustainable development/CSR concept appears to be ideological by nature, since it deals with ethical principles, moral justification and has normative character (Goodpaster, 1985). In the framework of the paper, we are interested in how such an ideology as Sustainable development/CSR is disseminated: directly from ideas to institutions or inversely from institutions to ideas.

The idea of business responsibility to society is obviously not new. Protestant ethics influencing entrepreneurship in Germany, Old Belief as a basis of merchants’ business communities taking responsibility for social needs in Russia are just a couple of examples of shared beliefs stemming from religion. Those shared beliefs were spread, fixed in informal rules and behavioral patterns, so they constituted ideologies influencing business practices of that time.

What we have now is something different, and not because the new beliefs in social responsibility stem not from religion, but because these beliefs are formed and disseminated in a different way. Firstly, the declared scale of social responsibility beliefs dissemination is much broader then in the past; it is a global scale that is declared. Secondly, the mechanism applied to make beliefs dissemination quick appears to be this very inverse way we described, dissemination through institutionalization and subsequent ideologization.

Systemic thinking allows us to understand why Sustainable development/CSR belief cannot shape and spread in the direct way. For that, we imagine the economic environment as a system claiming to become global. The global system differs from the set of local ones with the absence of borders, barriers separating local systems from each other. The system cannot become global until all of the local ones follow the same rules and principles, stop competing with each other. Global problems such as economical (lack of resources, potential for further growth, etc.), ecological (global warming, exhaustion of the soil, etc.), social (overpopulation, child labor, poverty, etc.) cannot be solved locally. If only one local system changes the rules to be followed, it takes the risk of losing its competitiveness on the global scale as a minority with lack of resources and power.
According to Lim and Tsutsu (2012), strict regulation of corporations in one country would only benefit other countries where regulation is not so strict and burden placed on companies is not so heavy. The authors exemplify why CSR regulation and dissemination has to be global to help in solving global problems. The authors point out that institutional environment has to be managed to shape government and corporate actions to make them be driven by social responsibility principles (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012; Tcvetkov et al., 2015). They direct to the history of Sustainable development/CSR institutionalization.

If we take a look at the Sustainable Development Timeline issued by The International Institute of Sustainable Development, we may notice that the concept of Sustainable development is being actively institutionalized in Guidelines, Standards, etc. even before it is disseminated as ideology in the global scale. In 1990s, the global CSR frameworks have been established, among which two are considered the most prominent ones: the UN Global Compact and Global Reporting Initiative (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012). Both initiatives rely on self-reporting by corporations concerning their compliance with CSR framework requirements.

If we look at the statistics, we notice that the number of participants reporting in accordance with both initiatives has been growing. From the UN Global Compact Local Network 2013 report we find that since its official launch on July 26, 2000, the initiative has grown to more than 12,000 participants, including over 8,000 businesses from more than 140 countries. The increase in 2013 is 12.7% in comparison with the participants number of the former year. GRI guidelines are widely used by corporations, public agencies, SMEs, NGOs as well. About 7,000 organizations from different countries have a GRI profile.

Thus, Sustainable development/CSR initiatives that are actually formal institutions fixed in guidelines and standards are transplanted, exported globally. With time, these institutions seem to become self-enforcing, since attracting more adherents they leave the rest on the same market uncompetitive. Nevertheless, the fact that companies follow CSR ideas and principles does not mean that these ideas are accepted as valuable ones.

When transplanted for the development reasons institutions still keep original ideas, which are in a different environment unfamiliar for the majority of individuals, so in theory have no or only few followers. “Green washing”, “blue washing” are the terms appeared in relation to opportunistic behavior of those who declare CSR ideas, but do not believe in them. Cross-national time-series analyses carried out by Lim and Tsutsu (2012) show that institutional pressure is effective somehow, but leads to “ceremonial commitment in developed countries”, where corporations make “discursive commitments without subsequent action”. That is the example of opportunistic behavior driven by the intention to win from compliance with CSR principles without spending too much effort to insert these principles to a corporate strategy.
Such an opportunistic behavior may be reflected in using CSR as a merely image making instrument (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010) through PR-campaigns, outreach concerning GRI compliance, UN partnership, meeting sustainability principles without their practical application. To prevent opportunistic behavior two different methods can be applied, that we considered before with game theory. First method is external compulsion to force companies comply with CSR principles. This method, as we mentioned, does not completely prevent opportunistic behavior, moreover it can be rather costly to control compulsion mechanism effectiveness; and further still in contemporary democracies violence and force of any kind are condemned as expression of antihumanism what is ideologically against CSR values.

Another method of opportunism prevention is internal compulsion mechanism development, which is ideologization of CSR practices.

To trigger the mechanism of internal compulsion, ideologization appears to be accomplished through discourse practices. The main instruments for ideological discourse turned out to be mass media and education, which is confirmed with UN Global Compact Local Network 2013 report, where one may find the dominant types of activities related to CSR. These activities are leaning and outreach. Ideologization to be an effective instrument of rapid CSR institutions transplantation has to be directed not merely to companies’ leaders and executives, but also to consumers, since they create a demand and sustainable consumption patterns.

Ideologization is especially important to be applied towards consumers as formal institutions concern their economic actions to a lesser extent than they concern corporate practices. Without ideological matter, consumers tend to choose by price compared with quality, not with CSR compliance of a company-producer, “in general, the environmentally friendly product attribute can influence buying decisions only to small extent – it can play role only if price, cover and binding are the same” (Majlath, 2009).

CSR ideologization directed to consumers, potential employees and business leaders, seems to be predominantly accomplished, like in case of corporations, by means of mass media and education. One of the examples is Sustainable Schools in the UK, which are a government initiative resulting from the first Education SD Action Plan. On their website (http://se-ed.co.uk/) we find that “the Sustainable Schools framework was built on the principles of care – of oneself, of others and of the environment”.

Bachelor and Master educational programs on CSR and Sustainability, conferences and research projects in the CSR sphere financed by international funds, scientific and popular scientific journals related to CSR issues, etc. – all of the instruments of CSR discourse serve to ideologization of institutions created and transplanted globally. Obviously, CSR discourse has to be different in different societies, characterized with different shared mental models to conform with them and raise beliefs in CSR ideas, inasmuch as “we need to develop a framework that will enable
us to understand and model the shared mental models that guide choices and shape the evolution of political-economic systems and societies” (Denzau and North, 1994).

Conclusion

Certainly, ideologies influenced and have been influencing economic activities, i.e. markets, organizations, consumers. Economy like an actor with different theatrical characters played various roles: kept traditions, accomplished government plans, inspired individuals drive and ambitions. Only to the end of the XX century economy turned out to become the exponent of responsibility for long-term stable development called sustainability. The economic actors have been chosen to fulfill not merely the task of growth and development, but at the same time to solve social and ecological problems (Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, United Nations, 1987). Sustainable development as a new ideology tends to inspire markets, organizations and consumers to behave ethically, responsibly, in a “green” way (Platonova, 2013).

In the current situation of ongoing crises (economical, ecological, social) the process of ideology formation has been initiated in the inverse way by means of institutional transplantation to avoid slow waiting until beliefs become shared and spontaneously implemented in practice. The corporations, businesses have been seemingly chosen to start the transplantation of formal CSR institutions, since it appears to be easier and more democratic to make companies rather than individuals comply with the rules.

Inasmuch as corporations are not merely formal structures, but people, formal institutions without belief in their concernment do not ensure Sustainable development/CSR principles implementation in reality. Moreover, research findings demonstrate that “CSR practices have a strong inverse correlation with the strength of institutional coordination, regulatory standards and aggregate measures of social and ecological performance” (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010), that CSR may act as an explicit substitute in the environment characterized with weaker institutional pressure in liberal countries (Matten and Moon, 2008).

In other words, in spite of active transplantation of CSR rules, belief in Sustainable development/CSR principles expressed in actions such as sustainable production, sustainable consumption, social engagement, etc. matters a lot. Consequently, ideologization of exported CSR institutions is considered to be needed.

Knowledge about CSR and Sustainable development is spread by means of discourse practices: through mass media, education, research findings presentations, etc. Ideologization even seems to have become and going to be more effective in the Asian countries, where “communitarian” ideas of rights and duties of membership, community needs, holism-interdependence (Goodpaster, 1985) are traditionally,
unconsciously accepted, believed and shared. However, such a statement demands a special research on conformity of beliefs shared by the members of societies with Sustainable development/CSR ideas. Another possible direction of a further research is effectiveness of the instruments applied for ideologization of CSR institutions. And what is more, the risks of changing cultural identity of social groups experiencing institutional transplantation and ideologization by means of new ideas infusion seems to be the prominent research area as well.

Thus, by the example of Sustainable development/CSR beliefs dissemination the ideology can be observed from the different perspectives. Evolutional development from ideas of environmentalists through belief of activists’ Sustainable development concept became ideology, since it met necessary condition of mental models conformity and sufficient condition of resources accumulation. It seems that Sustainable development concept is promoted by skillful administrators, since it spreads beyond the national borders and is exported in the form of institutions throughout the world. It is more likely that institutional transplantation happens by the inversion scenario, which means either ignoring of ideological change or institutional rigidity. In both cases, ideologization is necessary from the perspective of the game theory. Until CSR followers find strategies to maximize their payoffs and get the equilibrium state of the game, CSR institutions are rather unstable.

In accordance with the principle of the dominant strategy finding, each CSR actor would choose “to desert”. In such a case, the equilibrium state of the game differs from what society needs. If we consider ideology as an internal compulsion to follow CSR rules, then each of the CSR actors changes the utility estimation and calculated payoffs consequently. Thus, changed payoffs would cause the changed dominant strategies which would be “to comply” in the case of ideological influence.

References

Ahiezer, A.S. 1998. Russia: the critics of historical experience (Sociocultural dynamics of Russia) in: 2 volumes, V. I, 2nd ed. (Siberian chronograph, Novosibirsk), pp. 783.

Althusser L. 1969. For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster, (New York: Pantheon Books).

Athanasenas, A., Chapsa, X. and Michailidis, A. 2015. Investigating Social Protection Convergence in the EU-15: A Panel Data Analysis. European Research Studies Journal, 18(2), 79-96.

Boukert L., Ghesquiere, R. 2004. Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor as a Mirror for the Ethics of Institutions. Journal of Business Ethics, 53: 29-37.

Blyth, M. 2002. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the 20th Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bowles, S. 2003. Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution. Princeton University Press, Nelson.

Capoccia, G. and Kelemen, R.D. 2007. The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism. World Politics, 59 (3), 341–369.

Carroll A.B. 1999. Corporate social responsibility: evolution of a definitional construct. Business & Society, vol. 38, No 3.
Caroll, A.B. and Shabana, K. M. 2010. The business case for corporate social responsibility: A review of concepts, research and practice. International Journal of Management Reviews, 85-105.

Denzau, A.T. and North, D.C. 1994. Shared mental models: Ideologies and institutions. Kyklos, 47 (1), 3-31.

Dugin, A.G. 2012. The forth Political Theory. (Arktos Media Ltd).

Duguleana, L., Duguleana, C. 2016. Structural Aspects of the European Union Economy. European Research Studies Journal, 19(1), 93-128.

Dabrowska, E. and Zweynert, J. 2014. Economic Ideas and Institutional Change: The Case of the Russian Stabilisation Fund. (New Political Economy).

Caroll, A. and Shabana, K. M. 2010. The business case for corporate social responsibility: A review of concepts, research and practice. International Journal of Management Reviews, 85-105.

Denzau, A.T. and North, D.C. 1994. Shared mental models: Ideologies and institutions. Kyklos, 47 (1), 3-31.

Dugin, A.G. 2012. The forth Political Theory. (Arktos Media Ltd).

Duguleana, L., Duguleana, C. 2016. Structural Aspects of the European Union Economy. European Research Studies Journal, 19(1), 93-128.

Dabrowska, E. and Zweynert, J. 2014. Economic Ideas and Institutional Change: The Case of the Russian Stabilisation Fund. (New Political Economy).

Caroll, A.B. and Shabana, K. M. 2010. The business case for corporate social responsibility: A review of concepts, research and practice. International Journal of Management Reviews, 85-105.

Denzau, A.T. and North, D.C. 1994. Shared mental models: Ideologies and institutions. Kyklos, 47 (1), 3-31.

Dugin, A.G. 2012. The forth Political Theory. (Arktos Media Ltd).

Duguleana, L., Duguleana, C. 2016. Structural Aspects of the European Union Economy. European Research Studies Journal, 19(1), 93-128.
the Innovative Development of the Country. European Research Studies Journal, 19(1), 71-83.
North, D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change And Economic Performance. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), pp.152.
North, D. 1991. Institutions. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (1), 97-112.
North, D. 1993. Institutional Change: A Framework of Analysis in Institutional Change: Theory and Empirical Finding. Edited by Sven-Erik Sjostrand, (M.E. Sharpe Armonk, New York).
Ovchinnikov, A., Kozenko, Z., Bichkov, M., Kabanov, V. and Karpova, A. 2016. Strategic Management of Sustainable Development of Agro – Industrial Complex with Economic Integration, European Research Studies Journal, 19(2), 307-315.
Peirce, C. 1877. The fixation of belief. Popular Science Monthly, 12, 1-15.
Piaget, J. 1955. The Construction of Reality in the Child. Translated by Margaret Cook, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London).
Platonova, Y. 2009. Notion of Faith in Philosophy of the first half of the 20th century. Vestnik of Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod. Series: Social Sciences’, 14 (2), 113-116.
Platonova, Y. 2010. Belief (faith) in one’s course of life comprehension. Ph.D. dissertation.
Platonova, Y. 2014. Is the Concept of Sustainable Development a contemporary Ideology?”, Proceedings of FIKUSZ’13 Symposium for Young Researchers, http://www.kgk.uniohuda.hu/sites/default/files/05_Platonova_Yulia.pdf. Accessed 12 September.
Schmid, H. 1981. On the origin of ideology. Acta Sociologica, 24 (1/2), 57-73.
Sustainable Development Timeline issued by The International Institute of Sustainable Development, http://iisd.org/pdf/2009/sd_timeline_2009.pdf. Accessed 04 July 2014.
Theriou, G.N., Aggelidis, V. and Theriou, N.G. 2014. The Mediating Effect of the Knowledge Management Process to the Firm’s Performance: A Resource-Based View. International Journal of Economics and Business Administration, 2(1), 87-114.
Theriou, G.N. and Aggelidis V. 2014. Management Accounting Systems, Top Management Team’s Risk Characteristics and Their Effect on Strategic Change. International Journal of Economics and Business Administration, 2(2), 3-38.
Thornton, P.H., Occasio, W. and Lounsbury, M. 2012. The institutional logics perspective: A new approach to culture, structure and process, (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York).
Tcvetkov M., Tcvetkova I. and Chkalova O. 2015. Transaction Costs under Globalization: The Example of Russian Economy. European Research Studies Journal, 18(2), 107-116.
Van Dijk, T.A. 1998. Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach. (Thousand Oaks & New Delhi, SAGE Publications, London).
United Nations Global Compact Local Network report, 2013.
Williamson, O.E. 2000. The new Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking ahead. Journal of Economic Literature, 38 (3), 595-613.
Williamson, C.R. 2009. Informal Institution rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance. Public Choice, 139, 371-387.