This paper establishes a fundamental theory of secure clock synchronization. Accurate clock synchronization is the backbone of systems managing power distribution, financial transactions, telecommunication operations, database services, etc. Some clock synchronization (time transfer) systems, such as the global navigation satellite systems, are based on one-way communication from a master to a slave clock. Others, such as the network transport protocol, and the IEEE 1588 precision time protocol (PTP), involve two-way communication between the master and slave. This paper shows that all one-way time transfer protocols are vulnerable to replay attacks that can potentially compromise timing information. A set of conditions for secure two-way clock synchronization is proposed and proved to be necessary and sufficient. It is shown that IEEE 1588 PTP, although a two-way synchronization protocol, is not compliant with these conditions, and is therefore insecure. Requirements for secure IEEE 1588 PTP are proposed, and a second example protocol is offered to illustrate the range of compliant systems.
@cite_5 propose measuring the propagation delays during initialization of clock synchronization and monitoring the propagation delays during the normal operation of the time synchronization protocol. However, @cite_5 does not prove that such a defense would be sufficient to prevent the delay attacks.
@cite_5
2130677190
Due to the increasing dependency of critical infrastructure on synchronized clocks, network time synchronization protocols have become an attractive target for attackers. We identify data origin authentication as the key security objective and suggest to employ recently proposed high-performance digital signature schemes (Ed25519 and MQQ-SIG)) as foundation of a novel set of security measures to secure multicast time synchronization. We conduct experiments to verify the computational and communication efficiency for using these signatures in the standard time synchronization protocols NTP and PTP. We propose additional security measures to prevent replay attacks and to mitigate delay attacks. Our proposed solutions cover 1-step mode for NTP and PTP and we extend our security measures specifically to 2-step mode (PTP) and show that they have no impact on time synchronization's precision. Recently, a few efficient timing synchronization protocols for wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been proposed with the goal of maximizing the accuracy and minimizing the power utilization. This paper proposes novel clock skew estimators assuming different delay environments to achieve energy-efficient network-wide synchronization for WSNs. The proposed clock skew correction mechanism significantly increases the re-synchronization period, which is a critical factor in reducing the overall power consumption. The proposed synchronization scheme can be applied to the conventional protocols without additional overheads. Moreover, this paper derives the Cramer-Rao lower bounds and the maximum likelihood estimators under different delay models and assumptions. These analytical metrics serves as good benchmarks for the thus far reported experimental results In this paper specific variants of delay attacks are examined. First, the Network Time Protocol is regarded. Second, delay attacks and implications on the time synchronization of the Precise Time Protocol are described. In particular, consequences for the offset calculation O prox are regarded. At the end of the paper possible countermeasurements are described. The authors address the problem of clustering a circuit for minimizing its delay, subject to capacity constraints on the clusters. They present an algorithm for combinational circuits and give sufficient conditions under which it is optimum. In addition, they address the problem of minimizing the number of clusters and nodes without increasing the maximum delay found by the algorithm. Finally, they extend the clustering algorithm to minimize the clock cycle of a sequential synchronous circuit. >