We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1 e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P != NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with heterogeneous goods and restricted valuations. Our mechanism is an instantiation of a new framework for designing approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms. A typical such algorithm first optimizes over a fractional relaxation of the original problem, and then randomly rounds the fractional solution to an integral one. With rare exceptions, such algorithms cannot be converted into truthful mechanisms. The high-level idea of our mechanism design framework is to optimize directly over the (random) output of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the input to the rounding algorithm. This approach leads to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and these mechanisms can be implemented efficiently when the corresponding objective function is concave. For bidders with MRS valuations, we give a novel randomized rounding algorithm that leads to both a concave objective function and a (1-1 e)-approximation of the optimal welfare.
The aforementioned works @cite_15 @cite_9 are precursors to our general design framework that optimizes directly over the output of a randomized rounding algorithm. In the framework of Lavi and Swamy @cite_9 , the input to and output of the rounding algorithm are assumed to coincide up to a scaling factor, so optimizing over its input (as they do) is equivalent to optimizing over its output (as we do). In the result of @cite_15 , optimizing with respect to their proxy bidders'' is equivalent to optimizing over the output of a particular randomized rounding algorithm.
@cite_9 @cite_15
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We design an expected polynomial time, truthful in expectation, (1-1 e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions and matroid weighted-rank functions. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P ≠ NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with heterogeneous goods and restricted valuations. Our mechanism is an instantiation of a new framework for designing approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms. A typical such algorithm first optimizes over a fractional relaxation of the original problem, and then randomly rounds the fractional solution to an integral one. With rare exceptions, such algorithms cannot be converted into truthful mechanisms. The high-level idea of our mechanism design framework is to optimize directly over the (random) output of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the input to the rounding algorithm. This approach leads to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and these mechanisms can be implemented efficiently when the corresponding objective function is concave. For bidders with MRS valuations, we give a novel randomized rounding algorithm that leads to both a concave objective function and a (1-1 e)-approximation of the optimal welfare. We study the problem of efficiently optimizing submodular functions under cardinality constraints in distributed setting. Recently, several distributed algorithms for this problem have been introduced which either achieve a sub-optimal solution or they run in super-constant number of rounds of computation. Unlike previous work, we aim to design distributed algorithms in multiple rounds with almost optimal approximation guarantees at the cost of outputting a larger number of elements. Toward this goal, we present a distributed algorithm that, for any e > 0 and any constant r, outputs a set S of O(rk e1 r) items in r rounds, and achieves a (1-e)-approximation of the value of the optimum set with k items. This is the first distributed algorithm that achieves an approximation factor of (1-e) running in less than log 1 e number of rounds. We also prove a hardness result showing that the output of any 1-e approximation distributed algorithm limited to one distributed round should have at least Ω(k e) items. In light of this hardness result, our distributed algorithm in one round, r = 1, is asymptotically tight in terms of the output size. We support the theoretical guarantees with an extensive empirical study of our algorithm showing that achieving almost optimum solutions is indeed possible in a few rounds for large-scale real datasets. In recent years scholars have built maps of science by connecting the academic fields that cite each other, are cited together, or that cite a similar literature. But since scholars cannot always publish in the fields they cite, or that cite them, these science maps are only rough proxies for the potential of a scholar, organization, or country, to enter a new academic field. Here we use a large dataset of scholarly publications disambiguated at the individual level to create a map of science-or research space-where links connect pairs of fields based on the probability that an individual has published in both of them. We find that the research space is a significantly more accurate predictor of the fields that individuals and organizations will enter in the future than citation based science maps. At the country level, however, the research space and citations based science maps are equally accurate. These findings show that data on career trajectories-the set of fields that individuals have previously published in-provide more accurate predictors of future research output for more focalized units-such as individuals or organizations-than citation based science maps. Much of the past work on asynchronous approximate Byzantine consensus has assumed scalar inputs at the nodes [4, 8]. Recent work has yielded approximate Byzantine consensus algorithms for the case when the input at each node is a d-dimensional vector, and the nodes must reach consensus on a vector in the convex hull of the input vectors at the fault-free nodes [9, 13]. The d-dimensional vectors can be equivalently viewed as points in the d-dimensional Euclidean space. Thus, the algorithms in [9, 13] require the fault-free nodes to decide on a point in the d-dimensional space. In our recent work [12], we proposed a generalization of the consensus problem, namely Byzantine convex consensus (BCC), which allows the decision to be a convex polytope in the d-dimensional space, such that the decided polytope is within the convex hull of the input vectors at the fault-free nodes. We also presented an asynchronous approximate BCC algorithm. In this paper, we propose a new BCC algorithm with optimal fault-tolerance that also agrees on a convex polytope that is as large as possible under adversarial conditions. Our prior work [12] does not guarantee the optimality of the output polytope.