We describe our work in the collection and analysis of massive data describing the connections between participants to online social networks. Alternative approaches to social network data collection are defined and evaluated in practice, against the popular Facebook Web site. Thanks to our ad-hoc, privacy-compliant crawlers, two large samples, comprising millions of connections, have been collected; the data is anonymous and organized as an undirected graph. We describe a set of tools that we developed to analyze specific properties of such social-network graphs, i.e., among others, degree distribution, centrality measures, scaling laws and distribution of friendship.
With respect to data collection aspects, the work by @cite_33 on OSNs (in particular on Facebook) is closely related to our work.
@cite_33
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Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become an integral part of today's Web. Politicians, celebrities, revolutionists, and others use OSNs as a podium to deliver their message to millions of active web users. Unfortunately, in the wrong hands, OSNs can be used to run astroturf campaigns to spread misinformation and propaganda. Such campaigns usually start off by infiltrating a targeted OSN on a large scale. In this paper, we evaluate how vulnerable OSNs are to a large-scale infiltration by socialbots: computer programs that control OSN accounts and mimic real users. We adopt a traditional web-based botnet design and built a Socialbot Network (SbN): a group of adaptive socialbots that are orchestrated in a command-and-control fashion. We operated such an SbN on Facebook---a 750 million user OSN---for about 8 weeks. We collected data related to users' behavior in response to a large-scale infiltration where socialbots were used to connect to a large number of Facebook users. Our results show that (1) OSNs, such as Facebook, can be infiltrated with a success rate of up to 80 , (2) depending on users' privacy settings, a successful infiltration can result in privacy breaches where even more users' data are exposed when compared to a purely public access, and (3) in practice, OSN security defenses, such as the Facebook Immune System, are not effective enough in detecting or stopping a large-scale infiltration as it occurs. Online Social Networks (OSN) are fun, popular, and socially significant. An integral part of their success is the immense size of their global user base. To provide a consistent service to all users, Facebook, the world's largest OSN, is heavily dependent on centralized U.S. data centers, which renders service outside of the U.S. sluggish and wasteful of Internet bandwidth. In this paper, we investigate the detailed causes of these two problems and identify mitigation opportunities. Because details of Facebook's service remain proprietary, we treat the OSN as a black box and reverse engineer its operation from publicly available traces. We find that contrary to current wisdom, OSN state is amenable to partitioning and that its fine grained distribution and processing can significantly improve performance without loss in service consistency. Through simulations of reconstructed Facebook traffic over measured Internet paths, we show that user requests can be processed 79 faster and use 91 less bandwidth. We conclude that the partitioning of OSN state is an attractive scaling strategy for Facebook and other OSN services. A fundamental question when studying underlying friendship and interaction graphs of Online Social Networks (OSNs) is how closely these graphs mirror real-world associations. The presence of phantom or fake profiles dilutes the integrity of this correspondence. This paper looks at the presence of phantom profiles in the context of social gaming, i.e., profiles created with the purpose of gaining a strategic advantage in social games. Through a measurement-based study of a Facebook gaming application that is known to attract phantom profiles, we show statistical differences among a subset of features associated with genuine and phantom profiles. We then use supervised learning to classify phantom profiles. Our work represents a first-step towards solving the more general problem of detecting fake phantom identities in OSNs. Online Social Networks (OSNs) have attracted millions of active users and have become an integral part of today's web ecosystem. Unfortunately, in the wrong hands, OSNs can be used to harvest private user data, distribute malware, control botnets, perform surveillance, spread misinformation, and even influence algorithmic trading. Usually, an adversary starts off by running an infiltration campaign using hijacked or adversary-owned OSN accounts, with an objective to connect with a large number of users in the targeted OSN. In this article, we evaluate how vulnerable OSNs are to a large-scale infiltration campaign run by socialbots: bots that control OSN accounts and mimic the actions of real users. We adopted the design of a traditional web-based botnet and built a prototype of a Socialbot Network (SbN): a group of coordinated programmable socialbots. We operated our prototype on Facebook for 8weeks, and collected data about user behavior in response to a large-scale infiltration campaign. Our results show that (1) by exploiting known social behaviors of users, OSNs such as Facebook can be infiltrated with a success rate of up to 80 , (2) subject to user profile privacy settings, a successful infiltration can result in privacy breaches where even more private user data are exposed, (3) given the economics of today's underground markets, running a large-scale infiltration campaign might be profitable but is still not particularly attractive as a sustainable and independent business, (4) the security of socially-aware systems that use or integrate OSN platforms can be at risk, given the infiltration capability of an adversary in OSNs, and (5) defending against malicious socialbots raises a set of challenges that relate to web automation, online-offline identity binding, and usable security.