The traffic behavior of University of Louisville network with the interconnected backbone routers and the number of Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) subnets is investigated using the Random Matrix Theory (RMT) approach. We employ the system of equal interval time series of traffic counts at all router to router and router to subnet connections as a representation of the inter-VLAN traffic. The cross-correlation matrix C of the traffic rate changes between different traffic time series is calculated and tested against null-hypothesis of random interactions. The majority of the eigenvalues i of matrix C fall within the bounds predicted by the RMT for the eigenvalues of random correlation matrices. The distribution of eigenvalues and eigenvectors outside of the RMT bounds displays prominent and systematic deviations from the RMT predictions. Moreover, these deviations are stable in time. The method we use provides a unique possibility to accomplish three concurrent tasks of traffic analysis. The method verifies the uncongested state of the network, by establishing the profile of random interactions. It recognizes the system-specific large-scale interactions, by establishing the profile of stable in time non-random interactions. Finally, by looking into the eigenstatistics we are able to detect and allocate anomalies of network traffic interactions.
The same group of researchers extended their work in @cite_20 . Under the new assumption that any network anomaly induces the changes in distributional aspects of packet header fields, they detected and identified large set of anomalies using the entropy measurement tool.
@cite_20
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The increasing practicality of large-scale flow capture makes it possible to conceive of traffic analysis methods that detect and identify a large and diverse set of anomalies. However the challenge of effectively analyzing this massive data source for anomaly diagnosis is as yet unmet. We argue that the distributions of packet features (IP addresses and ports) observed in flow traces reveals both the presence and the structure of a wide range of anomalies. Using entropy as a summarization tool, we show that the analysis of feature distributions leads to significant advances on two fronts: (1) it enables highly sensitive detection of a wide range of anomalies, augmenting detections by volume-based methods, and (2) it enables automatic classification of anomalies via unsupervised learning. We show that using feature distributions, anomalies naturally fall into distinct and meaningful clusters. These clusters can be used to automatically classify anomalies and to uncover new anomaly types. We validate our claims on data from two backbone networks (Abilene and Geant) and conclude that feature distributions show promise as a key element of a fairly general network anomaly diagnosis framework. Detecting and understanding anomalies in IP networks is an open and ill-defined problem. Toward this end, we have recently proposed the subspace method for anomaly diagnosis. In this paper we present the first large-scale exploration of the power of the subspace method when applied to flow traffic. An important aspect of this approach is that it fuses information from flow measurements taken throughout a network. We apply the subspace method to three different types of sampled flow traffic in a large academic network: multivariate timeseries of byte counts, packet counts, and IP-flow counts. We show that each traffic type brings into focus a different set of anomalies via the subspace method. We illustrate and classify the set of anomalies detected. We find that almost all of the anomalies detected represent events of interest to network operators. Furthermore, the anomalies span a remarkably wide spectrum of event types, including denial of service attacks (single-source and distributed), flash crowds, port scanning, downstream traffic engineering, high-rate flows, worm propagation, and network outage. Network anomaly detection is an important and dynamic research area. Many network intrusion detection methods and systems (NIDS) have been proposed in the literature. In this paper, we provide a structured and comprehensive overview of various facets of network anomaly detection so that a researcher can become quickly familiar with every aspect of network anomaly detection. We present attacks normally encountered by network intrusion detection systems. We categorize existing network anomaly detection methods and systems based on the underlying computational techniques used. Within this framework, we briefly describe and compare a large number of network anomaly detection methods and systems. In addition, we also discuss tools that can be used by network defenders and datasets that researchers in network anomaly detection can use. We also highlight research directions in network anomaly detection. Payload anomaly detection is a relatively young branch of intrusion detection focusing on the analysis of packet payloads to identify attacks in the application layer. Previous payload anomaly detection systems have used models such as Support Vector Machines and various Markov models. The model proposed in this paper for analysis is the Conditional Random Fields model. Conditional Random Fields have been successfully applied to anomaly detection methods other than payload anomaly detection. In this paper, a prototype payload anomaly detection system is discussed then tested against a public data set. The results of the testing show that the Conditional Random Fields model is a very powerful model for payload anomaly detection.