Internet of Things connects lots of small constrained devices to the Internet. As in any other environment, communication security is important and cryptographic algorithms are one of many elements that we use in order to keep messages secure. It is necessary to use algorithms that do not require high computational power, lightweight ciphers are therefore an ideal candidate for this purpose. Since these devices work in various environments, it is necessary to test security of implementations of cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we explore a possibility of attacking an ultralightweight cipher PRESENT by using a multiple fault attack. Utilizing the Differential Fault Analysis technique, we were able to recover the secret key with two faulty encryptions and an exhaustive search of 216 remaining key bits. Our attack aims at four nibbles in the penultimate round of the cipher, causing faulty output in all nibbles of the output. We also provide a practical attack scenario by exploiting Hardware Trojan (HT) technique for the proposed fault injection in a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA.
@cite_11 used a combination of differential fault analysis and statistical cryptanalysis techniques to attack lightweight block ciphers. They tested their methodology on PRESENT-80 and PRINT-48. The attack on PRESENT is aimed at middle rounds of algorithm, using single random S-box and multiple S-boxes fault attack. The main outcome of the paper is an extension of the fault model from the usual fault model, which aims at ultimate or penultimate rounds, to the other rounds as well.
@cite_11
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Differential fault analysis is one of the most efficient side channel attack techniques that threat the security of block cipher. However, it often requires a penultimate or an antepenultimate round faulty encryption and is not suitable for middle round fault. This paper presents attacks combining differential fault analysis with statistical cryptanalysis techniques against lightweight ciphers. The analysis makes use of statistical cryptanalysis techniques in practice rather than theoretically, and exploits the weakness of bit-permutation adopted by many lightweight block ciphers under fault attack. Specific attacks against PRESENT and PRINT CIPHER are given to prove the validity. The result shows that about one fifth of the iterative rounds are needed to be protected for these lightweight ciphers with bit-permutation. PRESENT is a hardware-optimized 64-bit lightweight block cipher which supports 80-and 128-bit secret keys. In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis DFA on PRESENT-80 128. The proposed attack is based on a 2-byte random fault model. In detail, by inducing several 2-byte random faults in input registers after 28 rounds, our attack recovers the secret key of the target algorithm. From simulation results, our attacks on PRESENT-80 128 can recover the secret key by inducing only two and three 2-byte random faults, respectively. These are superior to known DFA results on them. PRESENT is a lightweight block cipher designed by A. in 2007 for extremely constrained environments such as RFID tags and sensor networks, where the AES is not suitable for. In this paper, the strength of PRESENT against the differential fault attack on the key schedule is explored. Our attack adopts the nibble oriented model of random faults and assumes that the attacker can induce a single nibble fault on the round key. The attack can efficiently recover the secret key with the computational complexity of @math , and sixty-four pairs of correct and faulty cipher texts on average. In this paper, we present two differential fault analyses on PRESENT-80 which is a lightweight block cipher. The first attack is a basic attack which induces a fault on only one bit of intermediate states, and we can obtain the last subkey of the block cipher, given 48 faulty cipher texts on average. The second attack can retrieve the master key of the block cipher, given 18 faulty cipher texts on average. In the latter attack, we assume that we can induce faults on a single nibble of intermediate states. Given those faulty cipher texts, the computational complexity of attacks is negligible.