To achieve general intelligence, agents must learn how to interact with others in a shared environment: this is the challenge of multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL). The simplest form is independent reinforcement learning (InRL), where each agent treats its experience as part of its (non-stationary) environment. In this paper, we first observe that policies learned using InRL can overfit to the other agents' policies during training, failing to sufficiently generalize during execution. We introduce a new metric, joint-policy correlation, to quantify this effect. We describe an algorithm for general MARL, based on approximate best responses to mixtures of policies generated using deep reinforcement learning, and empirical game-theoretic analysis to compute meta-strategies for policy selection. The algorithm generalizes previous ones such as InRL, iterated best response, double oracle, and fictitious play. Then, we present a scalable implementation which reduces the memory requirement using decoupled meta-solvers. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of the resulting policies in two partially observable settings: gridworld coordination games and poker.
The double oracle (DO) algorithm @cite_66 solves a set of (two-player, normal-form) subgames induced by subsets @math at time @math . A payoff matrix for the subgame @math includes only those entries corresponding to the strategies in @math . At each time step @math , an equilibrium @math is obtained for @math , and to obtain @math each player adds a best response @math from the full space @math , so for all @math , @math . The algorithm is illustrated in Figure . Note that finding an equilibrium in a zero-sum game takes time polynomial in @math , and is PPAD-complete for general-sum @cite_88 .
@cite_88 @cite_66
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This paper investigates a zero-sum game played on a weighted connected graph @math between two players, the tree player and the edge player. At each play, the tree player chooses a spanning tree @math and the edge player chooses an edge @math . The payoff to the edge player is @math , defined as follows: If @math lies in the tree @math then @math ; if @math does not lie in the tree then @math , where @math is the weight of edge @math and @math is the weight of the unique cycle formed when edge @math is added to the tree @math . The main result is that the value of the game on any @math -vertex graph is bounded above by @math . It is conjectured that the value of the game is @math . The game arises in connection with the @math -server problem on a road network; i.e., a metric space that can be represented as a multigraph @math in which each edge @math represents a road of length @math . It is shown that, if the value of the game on @math is @math , then there is a randomized strategy that achieves a competitive ratio of @math against any oblivious adversary. Thus, on any @math -vertex road network, there is a randomized algorithm for the @math -server problem that is @math competitive against oblivious adversaries. At the heart of the analysis of the game is an algorithm that provides an approximate solution for the simple network design problem. Specifically, for any @math -vertex weighted, connected multigraph, the algorithm constructs a spanning tree @math such that the average, over all edges @math , of @math is less than or equal to @math . This result has potential application to the design of communication networks. It also improves substantially known estimates concerning the existence of a sparse basis for the cycle space of a graph. Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general PLS -complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes @math -approximate Nash equilibria in these games. In particular, for congestion games with linear latency functions, our algorithm computes @math -approximate pure Nash equilibria in time polynomial in the number of players, the number of resources and @math . It also applies to games with polynomial latency functions with constant maximum degree @math ; there, the approximation guarantee is @math . The algorithm essentially identifies a polynomially long sequence of best-response moves that lead to an approximate equilibrium, the existence of such short sequences is interesting in itself. These are the first positive algorithmic results for approximate equilibria in non-symmetric congestion games. We strengthen them further by proving that, for congestion games that deviate from our mild assumptions, computing @math -approximate equilibria is PLS -complete for any polynomial-time computable @math . In this paper, we study games with continuous action spaces and non-linear payoff functions. Our key insight is that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these games. We begin by studying Lipschitz games, which encompass, for example, all concave games with Lipschitz continuous payoff functions. We provide an efficient algorithm for computing approximate equilibria in these games. Then we turn our attention to penalty games, which encompass biased games and games in which players take risk into account. Here we show that if the penalty function is Lipschitz continuous, then we can provide a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme. Finally, we study distance biased games, where we present simple strongly polynomial time algorithms for finding best responses in @math , @math , and @math biased games, and then use these algorithms to provide strongly polynomial algorithms that find @math , @math , and @math approximations for these norms, respectively. In this paper we study polynomial identity testing of sums of @math read-once algebraic branching programs ( @math -RO-ABPs), generalizing the work in (Shpilka and Volkovich 2008,2009), who considered sums of @math read-once formulas ( @math -RO-formulas). We show that @math -RO-ABPs are strictly more powerful than @math -RO-formulas, for any @math , where @math is the number of variables. We obtain the following results: 1) Given free access to the RO-ABPs in the sum, we get a deterministic algorithm that runs in time @math , where @math bounds the size of any largest RO-ABP given on the input. This implies we have a deterministic polynomial time algorithm for testing whether the sum of a constant number of RO-ABPs computes the zero polynomial. 2) Given black-box access to the RO-ABPs computing the individual polynomials in the sum, we get a deterministic algorithm that runs in time @math . 3) Finally, given only black-box access to the polynomial computed by the sum of the @math RO-ABPs, we obtain an @math time deterministic algorithm.