We introduce Pixie, a novel, camera based two factor authentication solution for mobile and wearable devices. A quick and familiar user action of snapping a photo is sufficient for Pixie to simultaneously perform a graphical password authentication and a physical token based authentication, yet it does not require any expensive, uncommon hardware. Pixie establishes trust based on both the knowledge and possession of an arbitrary physical object readily accessible to the user, called trinket. Users choose their trinkets similar to setting a password, and authenticate by presenting the same trinket to the camera. The fact that the object is the trinket, is secret to the user. Pixie extracts robust, novel features from trinket images, and leverages a supervised learning classifier to effectively address inconsistencies between images of the same trinket captured in different circumstances. Pixie achieved a false accept rate below 0.09 in a brute force attack with 14.3 million authentication attempts, generated with 40,000 trinket images that we captured and collected from public datasets. We identify master images, that match multiple trinkets, and study techniques to reduce their impact. In a user study with 42 participants over 8 days in 3 sessions we found that Pixie outperforms text based passwords on memorability, speed, and user preference. Furthermore, Pixie was easily discoverable by new users and accurate under field use. Users were able to remember their trinkets 2 and 7 days after registering them, without any practice between the 3 test dates.
Pixie also differs from 2FA methods that involve visual tokens, e.g, QR-codes @cite_53 @cite_71 , as the trinket is secret to the user, the attacker needs to discover the trinket and also take possession of it. We note that a Pixie variant could be used in conjunction with the security token concept: the token displays a pattern (e.g., a QR code, random art), which the user captures using Pixie.
@cite_53 @cite_71
1990556702 1870725489
Modifying code after the compiler has generated it can be useful for both optimization and instrumentation. Several years ago we designed the Mahler system, which uses link-time code modification for a variety of tools on our experimental Titan workstations. Killian’s Pixie tool works even later, translating a fully-linked MIPS executable file into a new version with instrumentation added. Recently we wanted to develop a hybrid of the two, that would let us experiment with both optimization and instrumentation on a standard workstation, preferably without requiring us to modify the normal compilers and linker. This paper describes prototypes of two hybrid systems, closely related to Mahler and Pixie. We implemented basic-block counting in both, and compare the resulting time and space expansion to those of Mahler and Pixie. Two-factor authentication (TFA), enabled by hardware tokens and personal devices, is gaining momentum. The security of TFA schemes relies upon a human-memorable password p drawn from some implicit dictionary D and a t-bit device-generated one-time PIN z. Compared to password-only authentication, TFA reduces the probability of adversary’s online guessing attack to 1 (|D| ∗ 2) (and to 1 2 if the password p is leaked). However, known TFA schemes do not improve security in the face of offline dictionary attacks, because an adversary who compromises the service and learns a (salted) password hash can still recover the password with O(|D|) amount of effort. This password might be reused by the user at another site employing password-only authentication. We present a suite of efficient novel TFA protocols which improve upon password-only authentication by a factor of 2 with regards to both the online guessing attack and the offline dictionary attack. To argue the security of the presented protocols, we first provide a formal treatment of TFA schemes in general. The TFA protocols we present enable utilization of devices that are connected to the client over several channel types, formed using manual PIN entry, visual QR code capture, wireless communication (Bluetooth or WiFi), and combinations thereof. Utilizing these various communication settings we design, implement, and evaluate the performance of 13 different TFA mechanisms, and we analyze them with respect to security, usability (manual effort needed beyond typing a password), and deployability (need for additional hardware or software), showing consistent advantages over known TFA schemes. This paper describes a case study on the use of a formal methods tool for checking security properties of Tokeneer, a U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) project developed by Praxis, and released in 2008. We modelled Tokeneer as a series of abstract mathematical models related refinement steps in Event-B. We used the Rodin toolset for modelling Tokeneer in Event-B and for discharging associated proof obligations, and we used the EventB2Java code generator to generate Java code for the Event-B model of Tokeneer. After that, we wrote a series of JUnit tests to validate if the Java implementation of Tokeneer adhered to the security properties of Tokeneer described in the documentation provided by Praxis. To the best of our knowledge, modelling Tokeneer in Event-B and checking that its implementation adheres to those security properties is something that hasn’t been attempted before. This paper proposes a challenge-response authentication system for web applications called Snap2Pass that is easy to use, provides strong security guarantees, and requires no browser extensions. The system uses QR codes which are small two-dimensional pictures that encode digital data. When logging in to a site, the web server sends the PC browser a QR code that encodes a cryptographic challenge; the user takes a picture of the QR code with his cell phone camera which results in a cryptographic response sent to the server; the web server then logs the PC browser in. Our user study shows that authentication using Snap2Pass is easy to learn and considerably faster than existing one-time password and challenge-response systems. By implementing our solution as an OpenID provider, we have made this scheme available to over 30,000 websites that use OpenID today. This paper also proposes Snap2Pay, an extension of Snap2Pass, to improve the usability and security of online payments. Snap2Pay allows a consumer to use one-time credit cards as well as the Verified by Visa or Mastercard SecureCode services securely and easily with just a snap of a QR code.