We present a method for solving service allocation problems in which a set of services must be allocated to a set of agents so as to maximize a global utility. The method is completely distributed so it can scale to any number of services without degradation. We first formalize the service allocation problem and then present a simple hill-climbing, a global hill-climbing, and a bidding-protocol algorithm for solving it. We analyze the expected performance of these algorithms as a function of various problem parameters such as the branching factor and the number of agents. Finally, we use the sensor allocation problem, an instance of a service allocation problem, to show the bidding protocol at work. The simulations also show that phase transition on the expected quality of the solution exists as the amount of communication between agents increases.
The Collective Intelligence (COIN) framework @cite_4 shares many of the same goals of our research. They start with a global utility function from which they derive the rewards functions for each agent. The agents are assumed to use some form of reinforcement learning. They show that the global utility is maximized when using their prescribed reward functions. They do not, however, consider how agent communication might affect the individual agent's utility landscape.
@cite_4
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This paper surveys the emerging science of how to design a “COllective INtelligence” (COIN). A COIN is a large multi-agent system where: i) There is little to no centralized communication or control. ii) There is a provided world utility function that rates the possible histories of the full system. In particular, we are interested in COINs in which each agent runs a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm. The conventional approach to designing large distributed systems to optimize a world utility does not use agents running RL algorithms. Rather, that approach begins with explicit modeling of the dynamics of the overall system, followed by detailed hand-tuning of the interactions between the components to ensure that they “cooperate” as far as the world utility is concerned. This approach is labor-intensive, often results in highly nonrobust systems, and usually results in design techniques that have limited applicability. In contrast, we wish to solve the COIN design problem implicitly, via the “adaptive” character of the RL algorithms of each of the agents. This approach introduces an entirely new, profound design problem: Assuming the RL algorithms are able to achieve high rewards, what reward functions for the individual agents will, when pursued by those agents, result in high world utility? In other words, what reward functions will best ensure that we do not have phenomena like the tragedy of the commons, Braess’s paradox, or the liquidity trap? Although still very young, research specifically concentrating on the COIN design problem has already resulted in successes in artificial domains, in particular in packet-routing, the leader-follower problem, and in variants of Arthur’s El Farol bar problem. It is expected that as it matures and draws upon other disciplines related to COINs, this research will greatly expand the range of tasks addressable by human engineers. Moreover, in addition to drawing on them, such a fully developed science of COIN design may provide much insight into other already established scientific fields, such as economics, game theory, and population biology. We consider the problem of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), where the agents are located at the nodes of a time-varying communication network. Specifically, we assume that the reward functions of the agents might correspond to different tasks, and are only known to the corresponding agent. Moreover, each agent makes individual decisions based on both the information observed locally and the messages received from its neighbors over the network. Within this setting, the collective goal of the agents is to maximize the globally averaged return over the network through exchanging information with their neighbors. To this end, we propose two decentralized actor-critic algorithms with function approximation, which are applicable to large-scale MARL problems where both the number of states and the number of agents are massively large. Under the decentralized structure, the actor step is performed individually by each agent with no need to infer the policies of others. For the critic step, we propose a consensus update via communication over the network. Our algorithms are fully incremental and can be implemented in an online fashion. Convergence analyses of the algorithms are provided when the value functions are approximated within the class of linear functions. Extensive simulation results with both linear and nonlinear function approximations are presented to validate the proposed algorithms. Our work appears to be the first study of fully decentralized MARL algorithms for networked agents with function approximation, with provable convergence guarantees. Artificial intelligence is commonly defined as the ability to achieve goals in the world. In the reinforcement learning framework, goals are encoded as reward functions that guide agent behaviour, and the sum of observed rewards provide a notion of progress. However, some domains have no such reward signal, or have a reward signal so sparse as to appear absent. Without reward feedback, agent behaviour is typically random, often dithering aimlessly and lacking intentionality. In this paper we present an algorithm capable of learning purposeful behaviour in the absence of rewards. The algorithm proceeds by constructing temporally extended actions (options), through the identification of purposes that are "just out of reach" of the agent's current behaviour. These purposes establish intrinsic goals for the agent to learn, ultimately resulting in a suite of behaviours that encourage the agent to visit different parts of the state space. Moreover, the approach is particularly suited for settings where rewards are very sparse, and such behaviours can help in the exploration of the environment until reward is observed. Following work on designing optimal rewards for single agents, we define a multiagent optimal rewards problem (ORP) in common-payoff (or team) settings. This new problem solves for individual agent reward functions that guide agents to better overall team performance relative to teams in which all agents guide their behavior with the same given team-reward function. We present a multiagent architecture in which each agent learns good reward functions from experience using a gradient-based algorithm in addition to performing the usual task of planning good policies (except in this case with respect to the learned rather than the given reward function). Multiagency introduces the challenge of nonstationarity: because the agents learn simultaneously, each agent's learning problem is nonstationary and interdependent on the other agents. We demonstrate on two simple domains that the proposed architecture outperforms the conventional approach in which all the agents use the same given team-reward function (even when accounting for the resource overhead of the reward learning); that the learning algorithm performs stably despite the nonstationarity; and that learning individual reward functions can lead to better specialization of roles than is possible with shared reward, whether learned or given.