We consider crowdsourcing problems where the users are asked to provide evaluations for items; the user evaluations are then used directly, or aggregated into a consensus value. Lacking an incentive scheme, users have no motive in making effort in completing the evaluations, providing inaccurate answers instead. We propose incentive schemes that are truthful and cheap: truthful as the optimal user behavior consists in providing accurate evaluations, and cheap because the truthfulness is achieved with little overhead cost. We consider both discrete evaluation tasks, where an evaluation can be done either correctly, or incorrectly, with no degrees of approximation in between, and quantitative evaluation tasks, where evaluations are real numbers, and the error is measured as distance from the correct value. For both types of tasks, we propose hierarchical incentive schemes that can be effected with a small amount of additional evaluations, and that scale to arbitrarily large crowd sizes: they have the property that the strength of the incentive does not weaken with increasing hierarchy depth. Interestingly, we show that for these schemes to work, the only requisite is that workers know their place in the hierarchy in advance.
The Bayesian Truth Serum scoring method proposed in @cite_15 elicits truthful subjective answers on multiple choice questions. The author shows that the truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium with the highest payoff. The model is different from other approaches in that besides the answers, workers need to provide predictions on the final distribution of answers. Workers receive a high score if their answer is surprisingly'' common - the actual percentage of their answer is larger than the predicted fraction. Similarly, incentive mechanisms in @cite_28 @cite_1 @cite_7 @cite_17 @cite_6 require workers provide belief reports along with answers on tasks. Truthful mechanisms in @cite_34 @cite_19 @cite_23 requires knowledge about the distribution from which answers are drawn. Our mechanisms do not rely on worker's beliefs on other workers' responses nor require knowledge about the global answer distribution.
@cite_7 @cite_28 @cite_1 @cite_6 @cite_19 @cite_23 @cite_15 @cite_34 @cite_17
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Crowdsourcing is widely proposed as a method to solve a large variety of judgment tasks, such as classifying website content, peer grading in online courses, or collecting real-world data. As the data reported by workers cannot be verified, there is a tendency to report random data without actually solving the task. This can be countered by making the reward for an answer depend on its consistency with answers given by other workers, an approach called peer consistency. However, it is obvious that the best strategy in such schemes is for all workers to report the same answer without solving the task. Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] show that, in some cases, exerting high effort can be encouraged in the highest-paying equilibrium. In this article, we present a general mechanism that implements this idea and is applicable to most crowdsourcing settings. Furthermore, we experimentally test the novel mechanism, and validate its theoretical properties. Crowdsourcing platforms enable to propose simple human intelligence tasks to a large number of participants who realise these tasks. The workers often receive a small amount of money or the platforms include some other incentive mechanisms, for example they can increase the workers reputation score, if they complete the tasks correctly. We address the problem of identifying experts among participants, that is, workers, who tend to answer the questions correctly. Knowing who are the reliable workers could improve the quality of knowledge one can extract from responses. As opposed to other works in the literature, we assume that participants can give partial or incomplete responses, in case they are not sure that their answers are correct. We model such partial or incomplete responses with the help of belief functions, and we derive a measure that characterizes the expertise level of each participant. This measure is based on precise and exactitude degrees that represent two parts of the expertise level. The precision degree reflects the reliability level of the participants and the exactitude degree reflects the knowledge level of the participants. We also analyze our model through simulation and demonstrate that our richer model can lead to more reliable identification of experts. Prediction markets are economic mechanisms for aggregating information about future events through sequential interactions with traders. The pricing mechanisms in these markets are known to be related to optimization algorithms in machine learning and through these connections we have some understanding of how equilibrium market prices relate to the beliefs of the traders in a market. However, little is known about rates and guarantees for the convergence of these sequential mechanisms, and two recent papers cite this as an important open question. In this paper we show how some previously studied prediction market trading models can be understood as a natural generalization of randomized coordinate descent which we call randomized subspace descent (RSD). We establish convergence rates for RSD and leverage them to prove rates for the two prediction market models above, answering the open questions. Our results extend beyond standard centralized markets to arbitrary trade networks. We present the results of a survey that collected information about the demographics of participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk, together with information about their level of activity and motivation for working on Amazon Mechanical Turk. We find that approximately 50 of the workers come from the United States and 40 come from India. Country of origin tends to change the motivating reasons for workers to participate in the marketplace. Significantly more workers from India participate on Mechanical Turk because the online marketplace is a primary source of income, while in the US most workers consider Mechanical Turk a secondary source of income. While money is a primary motivating reason for workers to participate in the marketplace, workers also cite a variety of other motivating reasons, including entertainment and education.