We consider crowdsourcing problems where the users are asked to provide evaluations for items; the user evaluations are then used directly, or aggregated into a consensus value. Lacking an incentive scheme, users have no motive in making effort in completing the evaluations, providing inaccurate answers instead. We propose incentive schemes that are truthful and cheap: truthful as the optimal user behavior consists in providing accurate evaluations, and cheap because the truthfulness is achieved with little overhead cost. We consider both discrete evaluation tasks, where an evaluation can be done either correctly, or incorrectly, with no degrees of approximation in between, and quantitative evaluation tasks, where evaluations are real numbers, and the error is measured as distance from the correct value. For both types of tasks, we propose hierarchical incentive schemes that can be effected with a small amount of additional evaluations, and that scale to arbitrarily large crowd sizes: they have the property that the strength of the incentive does not weaken with increasing hierarchy depth. Interestingly, we show that for these schemes to work, the only requisite is that workers know their place in the hierarchy in advance.
The PeerRank method proposed in @cite_32 obtains the final grades of students using a fixed point equation similar to the PageRank method. However, while it encourages precision, it does not provide a strategyproof method for the scenario that students collude to game the system without making the effort to grade truthfully.
@cite_32
2950051380
We propose the PeerRank method for peer assessment. This constructs a grade for an agent based on the grades proposed by the agents evaluating the agent. Since the grade of an agent is a measure of their ability to grade correctly, the PeerRank method weights grades by the grades of the grading agent. The PeerRank method also provides an incentive for agents to grade correctly. As the grades of an agent depend on the grades of the grading agents, and as these grades themselves depend on the grades of other agents, we define the PeerRank method by a fixed point equation similar to the PageRank method for ranking web-pages. We identify some formal properties of the PeerRank method (for example, it satisfies axioms of unanimity, no dummy, no discrimination and symmetry), discuss some examples, compare with related work and evaluate the performance on some synthetic data. Our results show considerable promise, reducing the error in grade predictions by a factor of 2 or more in many cases over the natural baseline of averaging peer grades. CrowdGrader is a system that lets students submit and collaboratively review and grade homework. We describe the techniques and ideas used in CrowdGrader, and report on the experience of using CrowdGrader in disciplines ranging from Computer Science to Economics, Writing, and Technology. In CrowdGrader, students receive an overall crowd-grade that reflects both the quality of their homework, and the quality of their work as reviewers. This creates an incentive for students to provide accurate grades and helpful reviews of other students' work. Instructors can use the crowd-grades as final grades, or fine-tune the grades according to their wishes. Our results on seven classes show that students actively participate in the grading and write reviews that are generally helpful to the submissions' authors. The results also show that grades computed by CrowdGrader are sufficiently precise to be used as the homework component of class grades. Students report that the main benefits in using CrowdGrader are the quality of the reviews they receive, and the ability to learn from reviewing their peers' work. Instructors can leverage peer learning in their classes, and easily handle homework evaluation in large classes. We introduce a new approach to the machine-assisted grading of short answer questions. We follow past work in automated grading by first training a similarity metric between student responses, but then go on to use this metric to group responses into clusters and subclusters. The resulting groupings allow teachers to grade multiple responses with a single action, provide rich feedback to groups of similar answers, and discover modalities of misunderstanding among students; we refer to this amplification of grader effort as “powergrading.” We develop the means to further reduce teacher effort by automatically performing actions when an answer key is available. We show results in terms of grading progress with a small “budget” of human actions, both from our method and an LDA-based approach, on a test corpus of 10 questions answered by 698 respondents. Crowdsourcing offers a practical method for ranking and scoring large amounts of items. To investigate the algorithms and incentives that can be used in crowdsourcing quality evaluations, we built CrowdGrader, a tool that lets students submit and collaboratively grade solutions to homework assignments. We present the algorithms and techniques used in CrowdGrader, and we describe our results and experience in using the tool for several computer-science assignments. CrowdGrader combines the student-provided grades into a consensus grade for each submission using a novel crowdsourcing algorithm that relies on a reputation system. The algorithm iterativerly refines inter-dependent estimates of the consensus grades, and of the grading accuracy of each student. On synthetic data, the algorithm performs better than alternatives not based on reputation. On our preliminary experimental data, the performance seems dependent on the nature of review errors, with errors that can be ascribed to the reviewer being more tractable than those arising from random external events. To provide an incentive for reviewers, the grade each student receives in an assignment is a combination of the consensus grade received by their submissions, and of a reviewing grade capturing their reviewing effort and accuracy. This incentive worked well in practice.