Contextual bandits with linear payoffs, which are also known as linear bandits, provide a powerful alternative for solving practical problems of sequential decisions, e.g., online advertisements. In the era of big data, contextual data usually tend to be high-dimensional, which leads to new challenges for traditional linear bandits mostly designed for the setting of low-dimensional contextual data. Due to the curse of dimensionality, there are two challenges in most of the current bandit algorithms: the first is high time-complexity; and the second is extreme large upper regret bounds with high-dimensional data. In this paper, in order to attack the above two challenges effectively, we develop an algorithm of Contextual Bandits via RAndom Projection ( CBRAP ) in the setting of linear payoffs, which works especially for high-dimensional contextual data. The proposed CBRAP algorithm is time-efficient and flexible, because it enables players to choose an arm in a low-dimensional space, and relaxes the sparsity assumption of constant number of non-zero components in previous work. Besides, we provide a linear upper regret bound for the proposed algorithm, which is associated with reduced dimensions.
The total sequential rounds of playing bandits is @math . For each round @math with @math , a learner receives contextual information from the set of @math , where @math can be an extremely large integer representing a high-dimensional space. In this work, high-dimensional contextual data precisely mean that @math or even @math , which is the case mentioned in @cite_6 . Let @math be the number of arms and @math the reward of arm @math on round @math with @math and @math . We adopt @math to denote the @math norm of a vector @math , and @math to denote the identity matrix with dimensions of @math . For a positive definite matrix @math , the weighted norm of vector @math is defined as @math . The inner product is represented as @math , and the weighted inner product is @math .
@cite_6
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Motivated by online recommendation and advertising systems, we consider a causal model for stochastic contextual bandits with a latent low-dimensional confounder. In our model, there are @math observed contexts and @math arms of the bandit. The observed context influences the reward obtained through a latent confounder variable with cardinality @math ( @math ). The arm choice and the latent confounder causally determines the reward while the observed context is correlated with the confounder. Under this model, the @math mean reward matrix @math (for each context in @math and each arm in @math ) factorizes into non-negative factors @math ( @math ) and @math ( @math ). This insight enables us to propose an @math -greedy NMF-Bandit algorithm that designs a sequence of interventions (selecting specific arms), that achieves a balance between learning this low-dimensional structure and selecting the best arm to minimize regret. Our algorithm achieves a regret of @math at time @math , as compared to @math for conventional contextual bandits, assuming a constant gap between the best arm and the rest for each context. These guarantees are obtained under mild sufficiency conditions on the factors that are weaker versions of the well-known Statistical RIP condition. We further propose a class of generative models that satisfy our sufficient conditions, and derive a lower bound of @math . These are the first regret guarantees for online matrix completion with bandit feedback, when the rank is greater than one. We further compare the performance of our algorithm with the state of the art, on synthetic and real world data-sets. We consider settings in which we wish to incentivize myopic agents (such as Airbnb landlords, who may emphasize short-term profits and property safety) to treat arriving clients fairly, in order to prevent overall discrimination against individuals or groups. We model such settings in both classical and contextual bandit models in which the myopic agents maximize rewards according to current empirical averages, but are also amenable to exogenous payments that may cause them to alter their choices. Our notion of fairness asks that more qualified individuals are never (probabilistically) preferred over less qualified ones []. We investigate whether it is possible to design inexpensive subsidy or payment schemes for a principal to motivate myopic agents to play fairly in all or almost all rounds. When the principal has full information about the state of the myopic agents, we show it is possible to induce fair play on every round with a subsidy scheme of total cost @math (for the classic setting with @math arms, @math , and for the @math -dimensional linear contextual setting @math ). If the principal has much more limited information (as might often be the case for an external regulator or watchdog), and only observes the number of rounds in which members from each of the @math groups were selected, but not the empirical estimates maintained by the myopic agent, the design of such a scheme becomes more complex. We show both positive and negative results in the classic and linear bandit settings by upper and lower bounding the cost of fair subsidy schemes. We present a near-optimal distributed algorithm for @math -approximation of single-commodity maximum flow in undirected weighted networks that runs in @math communication rounds in the model. Here, @math and @math denote the number of nodes and the network diameter, respectively. This is the first improvement over the trivial bound of @math , and it nearly matches the @math round complexity lower bound. The development of the algorithm contains two results of independent interest: (i) A @math -round distributed construction of a spanning tree of average stretch @math . (ii) A @math -round distributed construction of an @math -congestion approximator consisting of the cuts induced by @math virtual trees. The distributed representation of the cut approximator allows for evaluation in @math rounds. All our algorithms make use of randomization and succeed with high probability. We show a parallel repetition theorem for the entangled value @math of any two-player one-round game @math where the questions @math to Alice and Bob are drawn from a product distribution on @math . We show that for the @math -fold product @math of the game @math (which represents the game @math played in parallel @math times independently), @math , where @math and @math represent the sets from which the answers of Alice and Bob are drawn.