The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals to matching students to schools. A well-known algorithm to solve this problem is the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which runs in polynomial time. It has been proven that stable marriage procedures can always be manipulated. Whilst the Gale-Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate, we prove that there exist stable marriage procedures which are NP-hard to manipulate. We also consider the relationship between voting theory and stable marriage procedures, showing that voting rules which are NP-hard to manipulate can be used to define stable marriage procedures which are themselves NP-hard to manipulate. Finally, we consider the issue that stable marriage procedures like Gale-Shapley favour one gender over the other, and we show how to use voting rules to make any stable marriage procedure gender neutral.
@cite_0 suggested lying strategies for an individual woman, and proposed an algorithm to find the best partner with the male optimal procedure. We instead focus on the complexity of determining if the procedure can be manipulated to obtain a better result. Moreover, we also provide a universal manipulation scheme that, under certain conditions on the profile, assures that the female optimal partner is returned.
@cite_0
1557896792
Given a set of n men represented by n points lying on a line, and n women represented by n points lying on another parallel line, with each person having a list that ranks some people of opposite gender as his her acceptable partners in strict order of preference. In this problem, we want to match people of opposite genders to satisfy people’s preferences as well as making the edges not crossing one another geometrically. A noncrossing blocking pair w.r.t. a matching M is a pair (m, w) of a man and a woman such that they are not matched with each other but prefer each other to their own partners in M, and the segment (m, w) does not cross any edge in M. A weakly stable noncrossing matching (WSNM) is a noncrossing matching that does not admit any noncrossing blocking pair. In this paper, we prove the existence of a WSNM in any instance by developing an (O(n^2) ) algorithm to find one in a given instance. The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position. The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals to matching students to schools. A well-known algorithm to solve this problem is the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which runs in polynomial time. It has been proven that stable marriage procedures can always be manipulated. Whilst the Gale-Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate, we prove that there exist stable marriage procedures which are NP-hard to manipulate. We also consider the relationship between voting theory and stable marriage procedures, showing that voting rules which are NP-hard to manipulate can be used to define stable marriage procedures which are themselves NP-hard to manipulate. Finally, we consider the issue that stable marriage procedures like Gale-Shapley favour one gender over the other, and we show how to use voting rules to make any stable marriage procedure gender neutral. Abstract This article reports an experimental study that aimed to quantitatively analyze motion coordination patterns across digits 2–5 (index to little finger), and examine the kinematic synergies during manipulative and gestic acts. Twenty-eight subjects (14 males and 14 females) performed two types of tasks, both right-handed: (1) cylinder-grasping that involved concurrent voluntary flexion of digits 2–5, and (2) voluntary flexion of individual fingers from digit 2 to 5 (i.e., one at a time). A five-camera opto-electronic motion capture system measured trajectories of 21 miniature reflective markers strategically placed on the dorsal surface landmarks of the hand. Joint angular profiles for 12 involved flexion–extension degrees of freedom (DOF's) were derived from the measured coordinates of surface markers. Principal components analysis (PCA) was used to examine the temporal covariation between joint angles. A mathematical modeling procedure, based on hyperbolic tangent functions, characterized the sigmoidal shaped angular profiles with four kinematically meaningful parameters. The PCA results showed that for all the movement trials ( n =280), two principal components accounted for at least 98 of the variance. The angular profiles ( n =2464) were accurately characterized, with the mean (±SD) coefficient of determination ( R 2 ) and root-mean-square-error (RMSE) being 0.95 (±0.12) and 1.03° (±0.82°), respectively. The resulting parameters which quantified both the spatial and temporal aspects of angular profiles revealed stereotypical patterns including a predominant (87 of all trials) proximal-to-distal flexion sequence and characteristic interdependence – involuntary joint flexion induced by the voluntarily flexed joint. The principal components' weights and the kinematic parameters also exhibited qualitatively similar variation patterns. Motor control interpretations and new insights regarding the underlying synergistic mechanisms, particularly in relation to previous findings on force synergies, are discussed.