In this paper, we present a link between preference-based and multiobjective sequential decision-making. While transforming a multiobjective problem to a preference-based one is quite natural, the other direction is a bit less obvious. We present how this transformation (from preference-based to multiobjective) can be done under the classic condition that preferences over histories can be represented by additively decomposable utilities and that the decision criterion to evaluate policies in a state is based on expectation. This link yields a new source of multiobjective sequential decision-making problems (i.e., when reward values are unknown) and justifies the use of solving methods developed in one setting in the other one.
Another approach related to the first one is to consider refinements of Pareto dominance, such as Lorenz dominance (which models a certain notion of fairness) or lexicographic order @cite_2 @cite_5 . In fact, with Lorenz dominance, the set of optimal value functions may still be exponential in the size of the state and action spaces. Again, one may therefore prefer to determine its @math -cover @cite_22 in practice.
@cite_5 @cite_22 @cite_2
2401796785 2215828449
This paper is devoted to fair optimization in Multiobjective Markov Decision Processes (MOMDPs). A MOMDP is an extension of the MDP model for planning under uncertainty while trying to optimize several reward functions simultaneously. This applies to multiagent problems when rewards define individual utility functions, or in multicriteria problems when rewards refer to different features. In this setting, we study the determination of policies leading to Lorenz-non-dominated tradeoffs. Lorenz dominance is a refinement of Pareto dominance that was introduced in Social Choice for the measurement of inequalities. In this paper, we introduce methods to efficiently approximate the sets of Lorenz-non-dominated solutions of infinite-horizon, discounted MOMDPs. The approximations are polynomial-sized subsets of those solutions. This paper deals with fair assignment problems in decision contexts involving multiple agents. In such problems, each agent has its own evaluation of costs and we want to find a fair compromise solution between individual point of views. Lorenz dominance is a standard decision model used in Economics to refine Pareto dominance while favoring solutions that fairly share happiness among agents. In order to enhance the discrimination possibilities offered by Lorenz dominance, we introduce here a new model called infinite order Lorenz dominance. We establish a representation result for this model using an ordered weighted average with decreasing weights. Hence we exhibit some properties of infinite order Lorenz dominance that explain how fairness is achieved in the aggregation of individual preferences. Then we explain how to solve fair assignment problems of m items to n agents, using infinite order Lorenz dominance and other models used for measuring inequalities. We show that this problem can be reformulated as a 0--1 non-linear optimization problems that can be solved, after a linearization step, by standard LP solvers. We provide numerical results showing the efficiency of the proposed approach on various instances of the paper assignment problem. We investigate the minimization of Newton's functional for the problem of the body of minimal resistance with maximal height @math cite butt in the class of convex developable functions defined in a disc. This class is a natural candidate to find a (non-radial) minimizer in accordance with the results of cite lrp2. We prove that the minimizer in this class has a minimal set in the form of a regular polygon with @math sides centered in the disc, and numerical experiments indicate that the natural number @math is a non-decreasing function of @math . The corresponding functions all achieve a lower value of the functional than the optimal radially symmetric function with the same height @math . We prove the approximation ratio 8 5 for the metric s,t -path-TSP, and more generally for shortest connected T-joins. The algorithm that achieves this ratio is the simple "Best of Many" version of Christofides' algorithm (1976), suggested by An, Kleinberg and Shmoys (2012), which consists in determining the best Christofides s,t -tour out of those constructed from a family @math of trees having a convex combination dominated by an optimal solution x* of the Held-Karp relaxation. They give the approximation guarantee @math for such an s,t -tour, which is the first improvement after the 5 3 guarantee of Hoogeveen's Christofides type algorithm (1991). Cheriyan, Friggstad and Gao (2012) extended this result to a 13 8-approximation of shortest connected T-joins, for |T|≥4. The ratio 8 5 is proved by simplifying and improving the approach of An, Kleinberg and Shmoys that consists in completing x* 2 in order to dominate the cost of "parity correction" for spanning trees. We partition the edge-set of each spanning tree in @math into an s,t -path (or more generally, into a T-join) and its complement, which induces a decomposition of x*. This decomposition can be refined and then efficiently used to complete x* 2 without using linear programming or particular properties of T, but by adding to each cut deficient for x* 2 an individually tailored explicitly given vector, inherent in x*. A simple example shows that the Best of Many Christofides algorithm may not find a shorter s,t -tour than 3 2 times the incidentally common optima of the problem and of its fractional relaxation.