Quantum information processing is at the crossroads of physics, mathematics and computer science. It is concerned with what we can and cannot do with quantum information that goes beyond the abilities of classical information processing devices. Communication complexity is an area of classical computer science that aims at quantifying the amount of communication necessary to solve distributed computational problems. Quantum communication complexity uses quantum mechanics to reduce the amount of communication that would be classically required.
There are other pseudo-telepathy games that are related to the magic square game. Ad 'an Cabello's game @cite_31 @cite_26 does not resembles the magic square game on first approach. However, closer analysis reveals that the two games are totally equivalent!
@cite_31 @cite_26
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In this paper, we examine the use of Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) for a variant of one of the most popular and profitable games in the world: the card game Magic: The Gathering (M:TG). The game tree for M:TG has a range of distinctive features, which we discuss here; it has incomplete information through the opponent's hidden cards and randomness through card drawing from a shuffled deck. We investigate a wide range of approaches that use determinization, where all hidden and random information is assumed known to all players, alongside MCTS. We consider a number of variations to the rollout strategy using a range of levels of sophistication and expert knowledge, and decaying reward to encourage play urgency. We examine the effect of utilizing various pruning strategies in order to increase the information gained from each determinization, alongside methods that increase the relevance of random choices. Additionally, we deconstruct the move generation procedure into a binary yes no decision tree and apply MCTS to this finer grained decision process. We compare our modifications to a basic MCTS approach for M:TG using fixed decks, and show that significant improvements in playing strength can be obtained. Part I of this paper has described a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information. It has been shown that, if the various players' subjective probability distributions satisfy a certain mutual-consistency requirement, then any given game with incomplete information will be equivalent to a certain game with complete information, called the “Bayes-equivalent” of the original game, or briefly a “Bayesian game.” Part II of the paper will now show that any Nash equilibrium point of this Bayesian game yields a “Bayesian equilibrium point” for the original game and conversely. This result will then be illustrated by numerical examples, representing two-person zero-sum games with incomplete information. We shall also show how our theory enables us to analyze the problem of exploiting the opponent's erroneous beliefs. However, apart from its indubitable usefulness in locating Bayesian equilibrium points, we shall show it on a numerical example the Bayes-equivalent of a two-person cooperative game that the normal form of a Bayesian game is in many cases a highly unsatisfactory representation of the game situation and has to be replaced by other representations e.g., by the semi-normal form. We shall argue that this rather unexpected result is due to the fact that Bayesian games must be interpreted as games with “delayed commitment” whereas the normal-form representation always envisages a game with “immediate commitment.” We present an empirical framework for testing game strategies in The Settlers of Catan, a complex win-lose game that lacks any analytic solution. This framework provides the means to change different components of an autonomous agent's strategy, and to test them in suitably controlled ways via performance metrics in game simulations and via comparisons of the agent's behaviours with those exhibited in a corpus of humans playing the game. We provide changes to the game strategy that not only improve the agent's strength, but corpus analysis shows that they also bring the agent closer to a model of human players. Pseudo-random number generation on the Atari 2600 was commonly accomplished using a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). One drawback was that the initial seed for the LFSR had to be hard-coded into the ROM. To overcome this constraint, programmers sampled from the LFSR once per frame, including title and end screens. Since a human player will have some random amount of delay between seeing the title screen and starting to play, the LFSR state was effectively randomized at the beginning of the game despite the hard-coded seed. Other games used the player’s actions as a source of randomness. Notable pseudo-random games include Adventure in which a bat randomly steals and hides items around the game world and River Raid which used randomness to make enemy movements less predictable. Relying on the player to provide a source of randomness is not sufficient for computer controlled agents which are capable of memorizing and repeating pre-determined sequences of actions. Ideally, the games themselves would provide stochasticity generated from an external source such as the CPU clock. In practice, this was not an option presented by the hardware. Atari games are deterministic given a fixed policy leading to a set sequence of actions. This article discusses different approaches for adding stochasticity to Atari games and examines how effective each approach is at derailing an agent known to memorize action sequences. Additionally it is the authors’ hope that this article will spark discussion in the community over the following questions: