Brain Struct Funct (2012) 217:783–796 789 Fig. 2 Conjunction analyses for topographical convergence across brain activity related to moral cognition and theory of mind (ToM) or empathy. Left panel overlapping activation patterns between the meta-analysis on moral cognition and the difference analysis between ToM and empathy (cluster-forming threshold: p \ 0.05). Right bottom panel overlapping activation patterns between the meta- analysis on moral cognition and the difference analysis between empathy and ToM (cluster-forming threshold: p \ 0.05). Right top panel sagittal and coronal slices of juxtaposed results from the meta- analyses on moral cognition (green) and empathy (red) to highlight similar convergence in the posterior cingulate cortex and amygdala (extent threshold: k = 10 voxels to exclude presumably incidental results). Coordinates in MNI space reported in the neuroscientiﬁc literature on moral cognition with those of ToM (assumed to be more rational) and empathy (assumed to be more emotional) using coordinate- based ALE meta-analysis. By doing so, we demonstrated that moral cognition, indeed, recruits brain areas that are also involved in abstract-inferential (ToM) and rapid- emotional (empathy) social cognition. Furthermore, TPJ, mPFC, and MTG emerged as potential nodes of a network common to moral cognition, ToM, and empathy. Individual analyses on the neural correlates of moral cognition, theory of mind, and empathy To our knowledge, we here conducted the ﬁrst quantitative meta-analytic assessment of the neural network engaged in moral cognition, that is, reﬂection of the social appropri- ateness of people’s actions. The obtained pattern of con- verged brain activation is in very good agreement with qualitative reviews of fMRI studies on moral cognition (Moll et al. 2005b; Greene and Haidt 2002). Concurrently, dysfunction in prefrontal, temporal and amygdalar regions is discussed as linked to psychopathy and anti-social behavior based on neuropsychological, lesion, and fMRI studies (Blair 2007; Anderson et al. 1999; Mendez et al. 2005). The results of the meta-analysis of ToM were consistent with earlier quantitative analyses (Spreng et al. 2009; Mar 2011) of neuroimaging studies, in which participants attributed mental states to others to predict or explain their behavior. Put differently, the obtained network is likely to be implicated in the recognition and processing of others’ mental states (Amodio and Frith 2006; Gallagher and Frith 2003; Schilbach et al. 2010). The meta-analysis on empathy across various affective modalities excluding pain was based on neuroimaging studies in which participants understood and vicariously shared the emotional experience of others. This analysis revealed the aMCC extending into the SMA and the AI extending into the IFG as the most prominent points of convergence. This is in line with a recent image-based meta-analysis on empathy for pain (Lamm et al. 2011). The present analysis on non-pain empathy, however, addition- ally revealed activation in the AM, rACC, and PCC. Consequently, empathy for pain- and non-pain-related affect appears to be implemented by an overlapping net- work that might recruit supplementary areas/networks depending on the speciﬁc affective modality with which participants are to empathize. In other words, the observed network is likely to be involved in vicariously experiencing others’ affective states (Singer et al. 2004; Wicker et al. 2003). It is noteworthy that all brain areas revealed by the meta-analysis on moral cognition also converged sig- niﬁcantly in the analyses on either ToM or empathy. It is thus tempting to speculate that moral cognition might rely on remodeling mental states and processing affec- tive states of other people. Conversely, some of the brain areas, which show signiﬁcant convergence in the ALE on ToM and empathy, were not signiﬁcant in the ALE on moral cognition. This suggests that moral cognition might be realized by speciﬁc subsets, rather than the entirety of the neural correlates of ToM and empathy. 123