Brain Struct Funct (2012) 217:783–796 might involve reconstructing attributes and intentions that we apply to others and vice versa. However, earlier neuroimaging evidence concerning the likely implication of the ToM network in moral cognition has two weak points. First, the interpretations of relevant fMRI studies were largely driven by reverse inference, i.e., identifying psychological processes from mere topography of brain activity (Poldrack 2006). That is, rather than investigating moral cognition tasks alone, the neural net- works of moral cognition and ToM should have been compared directly by independent conditions involving either task. Second, the relevant fMRI studies crucially hinge on the repeatedly criticized functional localizer technique, which rests on strong a priori hypotheses (Friston et al. 2006; Mitchell 2008). The present ALE meta-analysis overcomes these two limitations by a largely hypothesis-free assessment of two independent pools of numerous whole-brain neuroimaging studies, providing strong evidence for the high convergence across the neural networks associated with moral cognition and ToM. Converging neural correlates across moral cognition and empathy Brain activity related to both moral cognition and non-pain empathy converged signiﬁcantly in an area of the dmPFC, which was not revealed by the ALE on ToM. Converging activation of the dmPFC may suggest an implication of this highly associative cortical area in more complex social- emotional processing. In line with this interpretation, a recent fMRI study identiﬁed a similar brain location as highly selective for processing guilt (Wagner et al. 2012), an emotion closely related to moral and social transgres- sion (Tangney et al. 2007). Moreover, the dmPFC has consistently been related to the (possibly interwoven) reﬂection of own and simulation of others’ mind states (Lamm et al. 2007; Jenkins and Mitchell 2010; Mitchell et al. 2006; D’Argembeau et al. 2007). Nevertheless, we feel that it might be currently unwarranted to confer precise functions to circumscribed parts of the dmPFC (cf. above), given the danger of reverse inference when deducing mental functions or states from regional activation patterns (Poldrack 2006). We therefore cautiously conclude that the observed convergence in the dmPFC probably reﬂects an unidentiﬁed, yet to be characterized, higher-level neural process that is related to affective and social processing. It is interesting to note that the AM was signiﬁcantly involved in the individual ALEs on morality and non-pain empathy, although in contralateral hemispheres. This brain region is thought to automatically extract biological sig- niﬁcance from the environment (Ball et al. 2007; Sander et al. 2003; Bzdok et al. 2011; Mu¨ller et al. 2011). In particular, AM activity typically increases in the left 791 hemisphere in elaborate social-cognitive processes and in the right hemisphere in automatic, basic emotional pro- cesses (Phelps et al. 2001; Bzdok et al. 2012; Markowitsch 1998; Gla¨scher and Adolphs 2003). This lateralization pattern thus seems well in line with the consistent engagement of the left AM in moral cognition and right AM in non-pain empathy. Moreover, activity in the PCC was found in adjacent, yet non-overlapping, locations during moral cognition and non-pain empathy. The PCC is thought important for the modality-independent retrieval of autobiographical memories and their integration with cur- rent emotional states (Fink et al. 1996; Maddock et al. 2001; Maddock 1999; Schilbach et al. 2008a). It might therefore be speculated that moral judgments and empathic processing could both rely on the integration on past experiences. Given that both PCC clusters do not overlap, however, it remains to be investigated whether (a) moral cognition and non-pain empathy engage distinct regions in the PCC, (b) the observed topographic pattern is purely incidental given the limited spatial resolution of meta- analyses, or (c) the differences in PPC activation reﬂect differences in stimulus-material and hence autobiographic associations. Furthermore, it is important to note that the AI/IFG and aMCC/SMA were revealed as the most signiﬁcant points of convergence in the ALE on non-pain empathy but did not show any overlap with the ALE on morality. In particular, the AI/IFG and aMCC/SMA form a network that is widely believed to represent one’s own and others’ emotional states regardless of the actual affective or sensory modality (Lamm et al. 2011; Wicker et al. 2003; Singer et al. 2004; Lamm and Singer 2010; Fan et al. 2011). Moreover, this network, especially the anterior insula, is not only impli- cated in meta-representation of emotional states but also in interoceptive awareness (Craig 2002, 2009; Kurth et al. 2010). Interoception-related meta-representation of emo- tion has thus been suggested to underlie the concomitant involvement of the aMCC/SMA and AI/IFG in neuroim- aging studies on empathy as reﬂecting affective sharing (Singer and Lamm 2009; Fan et al. 2011). In summary, we draw three conclusions from these observations. First, affective sharing, one core aspect of empathy, is unlikely to be involved in moral judgments, given the lack of consistent involvement of the AI/IFG or aMCC/SMA in paradigms probing the latter. Second, general affective processes might play a role in both moral judgments and empathy, given that the respective meta- analyses individually revealed the dmPFC (direct overlap) and the amygdala (oppositely lateralized). Third, the neural correlates of moral judgments are much closer related to the neural correlates of ToM than to those of empathy, as evidenced by the quantity of overlap in the conjunction analyses. 123