Scientists’ Moral Responsibility and Dangerous Technology R&D 131 If L ? P[R, then a scientist can make a moral case for pursing an investigation into something posing a large, general risk. Otherwise, there is simply no moral justiﬁcation for further inquiry. Taking ice-nine as an example: R L P R L P = 100 (near-likelihood of world-wide catastrophe if released into the environment) = 99 (being generous, on a long enough time-line, this number grows to 100) = 0 (there’s no ‘‘cure’’ for ice-nine) Or taking smallpox research (now, as opposed to before the eradication): = 90 (smallpox could escape and cause enormous human devastation) = 70 (there’s a chance that Russian stockpiles have already made their way into others’ hands) = 10 (we already have smallpox vaccines that work well, but maybe we can develop vaccines for other strains or genetically-modiﬁed versions) Note that the value of P changes as the likelihood of potential independent discovery changes because of the temporal caveat. Thus, it is right to inquire into the state of scientiﬁc knowledge elsewhere. However, this imposes an additional burden not to increase the value of L by disseminating knowledge that leads others to dangerous knowledge where there is no supervening imperative due to potential beneﬁts from the knowledge. The ‘‘eventual’’ argument changes over time, and depending upon actual conditions in the world. If, for instance, we know that some rogue state or terrorist group has been experimenting with smallpox, then the calculus changes. It changes even more if we can identify the nature of those experiments and thus target scientiﬁc inquiry to a speciﬁc threat. But a generalized threat posed by the potential of someone acquiring knowledge or technology somewhere at some time means that this calculus requires scientiﬁc caution. For sufﬁciently deadly inquiries or applications, scientists should perceive a duty to refrain at least from disseminating certain types of knowledge, if not necessarily from theoretical inquiry alone (unless that inquiry may reasonably be justiﬁed by the above calculus). The ‘‘eventual’’ fallacy is committed by simple recourse to the truism that over an inﬁnite time-span, all natural truths will be discovered, and all potential uses and misuses of technology will be developed, so present research on any science or application of technology is morally justiﬁed. Implications for Institutions Unlike the Belmont Principles, which could be used to guide the development of regulatory institutions, the expanded ethical horizon I have argued for above requires individual responsibility on the part of scientists. The calculus proposed must be employed by scientists before they ever get to the point of disseminating their ideas. It is a personal, moral responsibility that must be cultivated. Nonetheless, encouraging the development and adoption of these principles, and adopting the notion of a broad horizon of scientiﬁc responsibility (encompassing not just individual human subjects, but also responsibility toward humanity in general), 123