126 D. Koepsell real-world threats, and ethical challenges as that posed by Vonnegut’s book. Is the beauty and truth of science justiﬁcation enough to investigate even the deadliest potential technologies or discoveries? Are there ethical principles that bind individual scientists in the absence of regulatory institutions? Can the Belmont principles be extended to scientists doing research only indirectly involving human subjects where the potential effects of an avenue of study impact humanity as a whole? Extending The Moral Horizon Most arguments concerning the morality of certain types of basic research focus on issues of dual-use and unintended consequences. These arguments concentrate on the distinction between ‘‘legitimate’’ scientiﬁc investigation vs. unethical uses of the research. As discussed above, this presupposes that scientiﬁc research is always in a different moral position than the application of that research. What justiﬁes this assumption? Do scientists enjoy a unique position occupied by no other ﬁelds or professions? Let’s examine some reasons why they might before considering whether scientiﬁc inquiry itself, prior to its application through a particular technology, may ever confer moral culpability. Some might contend that scientiﬁc inquiry alone can never confer moral culpability because inquiry is personal, a matter of conscience, and subject to no restrictions at all. Limiting inquiry in one realm might lead us on a slippery slope of censorship, thought-police, and other clearly unsavory interference with free thought. We don’t want regulators to prevent scientists from doing legitimate research, looking over shoulders to police scientiﬁc investigations, and preventing the acquisition of knowledge about nature. Indeed, governmental interference with scientists’ research has provoked the wrath of both scientists and the public, especially when done in the name of particular ideologies (Jones 2007). Let’s take it as a given that this sort of regulation is tricky at best, Orwellian at worst. But just because we don’t want government or regulators overseeing the actions of an individual, doesn’t mean that that person’s actions or even intentions, are free from moral scrutiny. We often and comfortably make moral judgments about conduct and intentions that have no direct effect on others, even when we don’t tolerate or desire any institutional regulation. Yet there are still strong arguments supporting the notion of unfettered scientiﬁc inquiry, devoid both of governmental and self-regulation. Science doesn’t kill people; people with technologies kill people. Of course, this is a perversion of the U.S.’s National Riﬂe Association motto: ‘‘guns don’t kill people; people kill people.’’ There is some sense to this. Artifacts like crossbows, riﬂes, and nuclear weapons cannot be morally culpable, only people can be. In the name of greater personal freedom, both of conscience and property, governments ought not to restrict inquiry into, or ownership of, dangerous items. The law, codes of ethics, and public and private morality are well-equipped to deal with unethical uses of artifacts, so the principle of maximal freedom requires that we allow not only inquiry into, but possession of knives, riﬂes, and nuclear weapons (at least for certain nations). But this is not quite the case in practice, and we do tolerate restrictions on owning certain artifacts. Thus, in the U.S., even the most ardent gun aﬁcionado cannot legally own a fully automatic weapon, to say nothing of a tactical 123