Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9 2017 41. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Risk Assessment: Step 4—Risk Characterization. Available online: http://epa.gov/riskassessment/risk-characterization.htm (accessed on 26 March 2012). 42. Note that these steps are conducted after a planning and scoping stage. 43. Hornstein, D.T. Reclaiming environmental law: A normative critique of comparative risk analysis. Columbia Law Rev. 1992, 92, 562–633. 44. Administrative Procedure Act. U.S. Code, Sections 553–559, 701–706, Title 5, 2011. 45. Lubbers, J.S. A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking, 4th ed.; ABA Publishing: Chicago, IL, USA, 2006. 46. Adler, M.D. Against “individual risk”: A sympathetic critique of risk assessment. Univ. Pa. Law Rev. 2005, 153, 1121–1250. 47. Adler, M.D. Risk, death and harm: The normative foundations of risk regulation. Minn. Law Rev. 2003, 87, 1293. 48. As stated above, this article uses the cumulative risk assessment paradigm to discuss EPA’s interpretation of its statutory authority, but the analysis applies whenever there is judicial review of an agency’s interpretation a statute it has been charged with implementing. 49. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. vs. Natural Resources Defense Council; 467 U.S. 837, 1984. 50. Sunstein, C.R. Cost-benefit default principles. Mich. Law Rev. 2001, 99, 1651–1723. 51. FDA vs. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp; 529 U.S. 120, 2000. 52. Morton vs. Ruiz; 415 U.S. 199, 1974. 53. New Jersey vs. EPA; 517 F.3d 574, D.C. Cir. 2008. 54. Whitman vs. American Trucking Associations; 531 U.S. 457, 2001. 55. The Sunstein article analyzes case law mainly relating to agency consideration of cost, and concludes that in order to achieve regulatory goals–for example, to allocate resources so that they save more lives or produce a cleaner environment–regulators must often take account of all of a proposed regulation’s adverse effects, at least where those effects clearly threaten serious and disproportionate public harm. Therefore, the author concludes that courts should read silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes as permitting, not forbidding, rational consideration of all consequences of regulation ([50], p. 1652, citing [54], p. 490, Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Although the Sunstein article addresses an agency’s discretion to consider cost where a statute is silent, the analysis can be analogized, in part, to an agency consideration of cumulative risk assessment results where a statute is silent as to risk. 56. American Trucking Associations vs. EPA; 175 F.3d 1027, D.C. Cir. 1999. 57. Competitive Enterprise Institute vs. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; 956 F.2d 321, D.C. Cir. 1992. 58. American Water Works Association vs. EPA; 40 F.3d 1266, D.C. Cir. 1994. 59. Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition vs. Federal Aviation Administration; 154 F.3d 455, D.C. Cir. 1998. 60. George E. Warren Corp. vs. EPA; 159 F.3d 616, D.C. Cir. 1998. 61. Michigan vs. EPA; 213 F.3d 663, D.C. Cir. 2000. 62. Massachusetts vs. EPA; 549 U.S. 497, 2007. 63. North Carolina vs. EPA; 531 F.3d 896, D.C. Cir. 2008.