Scientists’ Moral Responsibility and Dangerous Technology R&D 127 nuclear bomb. Moreover, we do not restrict thinking about, and inquiring to an extent, laws of nature generally. Indeed, many of us would consider it immoral to restrict such thought or inquiry as an intrusion into matters of personal conscience. But does this necessarily imply that while the freedom of personal conscience enables us to think about and inquire into all the universe’s natural laws, taking any and all further steps must escape moral judgment? Take, for instance, the problem of child pornography. Do we hold a pedophile morally guiltless just because, while he might have amassed a collection of pedophilic literature or cartoons, he or she never actually abused a child or contributed to the abuse of a child? Notions of free speech and conscience might protect that behavior, but we are willing to not just judge certain further positive acts relating to pedophilia as not only morally blameworthy, but worthy also of legal culpability. Intentions matter, even when intention alone is not enough to spur public regulation. Stated intentions matter more, and even when they do not rise to the level of legal culpability, they may spark appropriate moral indignation or outrage. And ﬁnally, positive acts based on intention matter even more, and can provoke both appropriate moral indignation, outrage, or public recrimination. The pedophile who possesses photos, even while he or she might not have directly contributed to a harm, has indirectly done so and our moral outrage and legal repercussions grow accordingly. The case of the pedophile might make us reconsider the notion that, while all thought and conscience should be totally free of external restriction, both are nonetheless immune to moral judgment. Similar cases may be made about individuals in both their personal and professional capacities who hold intentions, and even take positive actions without direct consequences or harms, yet that invoke some moral culpability. Do we hold the businessperson who thinks about the social or personal consequences of his or her actions in the same regard as one who does not, even where no real difference accrues to customers, colleagues, or society? I argue that when considering the ethics of scientists, we must not only look at regulations, laws, and codes used to review or punish their actions, but we should also consider intentions and motivations with an eye toward education. Moral training of scientists, as with other professionals, presupposes not only that we wish to keep them from breaking laws or running afoul of professional codes of conduct, but also that we wish to help develop moral insight that can guide behaviors (Miller and Selgelid 2008). Take an example from another profession whose members affect peoples’ lives daily, with sometime dire consequences. Even where an attorney, for instance, injures no one by his lies, the fact of the lie alone ought to concern us. Both in their individual and professional capacities, people who lie are not to be trusted and deserve our moral judgment. In professions like engineering, science, medicine, and law, moreover, the consequences of actions taken with ill- intentions matter much more to clients, colleagues, patients, and society as a whole simply because the potential for harms is so great. We should take account of a broader moral horizon when considering the ethics and morality of scientists, just as we do with other professionals, and ask whether and when intentions and positive actions on those intentions trigger an individual duty to refrain, and subsequent moral judgment by others, even where the law or regulations 123