H. Herrestad & S. Biong store of objects that may be full or empty. Other informants describe the act of hoping as a compulsive action. Asked about how she avoids disappointments, one informant answered: ‘‘Stop hoping. No, I don’t know . . . you cannot stop hoping either.’’ Hence, the meaning of the act of hoping is expressed through different metaphors, and whether or not one can lose all hope depends on the metaphor in use. Specific hopes, however, may lead to disappoint- ment. Some informants describe limits for when a particular hope must be fulfilled: ‘‘If I am not . . . in full swing with something and . . . well established before I am 30, then . . . I have given up the hope.’’ Other informants have hopes that cannot be disappointed because they don’t specify an object or a limit to the hope. ‘‘You cannot go around and hope all the time and be disappointed. (I: No. So how is it now?) I hope, I hope for the best.’’ Hence, the meaning of the act of hoping is expressed as either something that will end by a deadline or continue indefinitely. One informant was specific in placing herself as agent in pursuing what was hoped for: ‘‘I will go in the other direction now.’’ The other informants were unspecific with respect to agency: ‘‘I don’t want to drink [alcohol] any more . . . so I must hope there are some measures.’’ Another example: ‘‘And the eco- nomic issues must sort themselves out in some way or other.’’ As can be seen, these narrations about how they hope are grouped according to whether the act of hoping may stop or not, whether hopes have a limit or not, and whether hopes have a specific agency or not. In attempting to condense these aspects of hoping into a fundamental opposition, we have come to think of hopes as either being definite, i.e., as being a specific hope with a responsible agent and a deadline like a plan that can fail and be discarded, or as being indefinite, i.e., as being a kind of compulsive, wishful thinking without specification of agency or limits. Hence, the common thread in the informant’s narratives of the meaning of the act of hoping can be constructed as the theme of having definite or indefinite hopes. Comprehensive understanding The structural analysis revealed the multitude of meanings constructed by the informants around the experience of hope after having experienced a suici- dal crisis. The na¨ıve reading led to the interpretation that hope is relational. The structural analysis has developed this understanding further by emphasizing the relational aspects of the informant’s hopes both for their future life and their hopes for death. Even when others are not explicit parts of the object of hope, these hopes are expressed in a relational context. The fact that even the informant’s hopes for death are relational hopes has led us to a first formulation of the main theme of the interviews as relational hopes for life and death. In addition we found a third theme to be the meaning of the act of hoping, which we condensed to the theme of having definite or indefinite hopes. When we re-conceptualized the text, we understood the common meaning expressed by all the informants about hope as definite and indefinite relational hopes for life and death. Discussion Comprehensive understanding versus pre-understanding The aim of this study was to interpret the lived experience of hope in some patients hospitalized for intentional self-harm. We asked the informants to reflect on the various aspects of hope described by Dufault and Martocchio (1985). In the light of our comprehensive understanding our informants em- phasize the affiliative aspect of hope more than other aspects. In describing the act of hoping, our infor- mants expressed both definite and indefinite hopes. Hopes can be indefinite in being unspecific concern- ing what must happen to fulfill the hope, when it must happen, or who must see to it that it happens. We find this distinction between definite and in- definite hopes to be more clarifying than Dufault and Martocchio’s distinction between two spheres and dimensions cutting across both spheres. Hence, the expressions of the lived experience of our informants have altered our understanding of the various aspects of hope. However, we still find our initial definition of hope inspired by Thomas Aquinas to be sound, as will be illustrated in the next section. Hope and disappointment One might ask whether all the expressions we have quoted really can be regarded as expressions of hope. Would it not be more adequate to regard some of their expressions as expressing intentions, some as expressing mere wishful thinking? When a person expresses a wish to die, should we not interpret this as an expression of hopelessness? We believe these questions may illustrate the difference between our phenomenological hermeneutic interpretation of how the informants narrate about their lived experi- ence in response to our questions about what they hope, and an interpretation according to existing psychological theories or clinical practice. This difference is better illustrated by an example from the data presented above: ‘‘I don’t want to drink [alcohol] any more . . . so I must hope there are 6 (page number not for citation purpose) Citation: Int J Qualitative Stud Health Well-being 2010, 5: 4651 - DOI: 10.3402/qhw.v5i1.4651