Mem Cogn (2011) 39:1033–1041 Table 3 Mean ratings of the different scenarios on distinc- tiveness, imagery, familiarity, and richness Survival Professor Elderly person Moving Survivalstereotype Distinctiveness 3.79 (1.40) 2.21 (0.79) 2.37 (0.96) 2.47 (0.91) 2.16 (0.83) Imagery 3.21 (1.08) 4.11 (0.87) 2.79 (1.36) 4.32 (0.82) 3.74 (1.05) Familiarity 1.58 (0.61) 3.37 (1.07) 2.94 (1.35) 2.63 (1.30) 3.31 (1.11) 1039 Richness 2.32 (1.11) 2.37 (1.01) 2.37 (0.76) 2.32 (1.06) 3.16 (1.21) General discussion The goal of the present experiments was to investigate whether the survival recall advantage can be conceptualized in terms of survival-stereotype activation. Neither of our experiments yielded direct support for this hypothesis. In fact, we found that the survival group displayed superior retention in both experiments, even when pitting the survival group against strong stereotypes (i.e., professor, Experiment 1; survival-stereotype, Experiment 2). Thispattern lends further support to an interpretation of the survival recall advantage in functional —that is, adaptive value—terms. Our hypothesis was that the survival instruction would elicit a strong stereotype that, in turn, would enhance recall performance. The rationale behind this was that studies consistently show that the activation of stereotypes can boost or deteriorate memory performance (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2000). For example, priming an elderly person stereotype activates elderly-related connotations (e.g., slow, bad memory, dementia), and these,in turn, impact memory performance. Hence, we hypothesized that the survival instruction would activate a large number of positive qualities that, together, would boost memory performance. Our pilot study illustrates that the survival instruction elicits stereotypes: Participants attributed positive connotations to the survival instruction and thought mostly about traits such as intelligent, healthy, good memory, and physically strong. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 1 confirmed that stereotypes can ameliorate memory, in that the professor group displayed better memory performance, relative to the elderly person group. We expected in Experiment 1 to find similar recall rates in the professor and survival groups, and we anticipated that those groups would exhibit higher recall levels than would the other groups, but this was not borne out by the data. Although stereotype activation was successful, in the sense that participants in the professor stereotype condition remembered significantly more words than did participants in the elderly person stereotype condition, we found that the survival group outperformed all other groups. Experiment 2 was based on the characteristics obtained in a pilot study in which we examined the associations people have when they are presented with the survival instruction. In general, people attribute positive connota- tions to the survival instruction.On the basis of these positive connotations, we constructed a new survival- stereotype instruction. Still, when we compared the group that was given this instruction with the standard survival group, the survival recall advantage remained intact. As in Experiment 1, this result runs counter to our idea that the survival recall effect is caused by stereotype activation. However, we also asked an independent group of parti- cipants to describe the traits that they thought of when reading all the scenarios (survival, moving, professor, elderly person, and survival-stereotype). Interestingly, we found that people described significantly more positive traits when reading the survival and survival-stereotype scenarios than when reading the other scenarios. When these data were looked at more closely, they suggested that although the survival and survivalstereotype scenarios did not differ in the number of elicited positive traits, we still found that the original survival group showed superior memory performance.Thus, the survival-processing advantage cannot be explained in terms of the number of positive traits elicited by the scenario. In contrast to previous studies, we did not find, in the present experiments, evidence to suggest that survival scenarios enhance false recall (Otgaar & Smeets, 2010; Otgaar et al., 2010; see also Howe & Derbish, 2010). However, as we and others have noted (Howe & Derbish, 2010; Otgaar & Smeets, 2010), adaptive memory studies (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2010; Nairne et al., 2007), such as the present one, were not specifically designed to test whether survival processing amplifies false recall. In order to test such an effect, one should preferably rely on stimuli that are specifically developed to elicit robust levels of false recall (e.g., Deese–Roediger–McDermott word lists; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The question that remains is which proximate mecha- nisms might carry the survival recall advantage. Weinstein et al. (2008), for example, argued that the survival recall advantage is the result of the operation of basic memory processes such as enhanced schematic or self-referential processes. However, in their study, they found no evidence for such an interpretation. Also, Kang et al. (2008) hypothesized that the heightened arousal and novelty induced by the survival instruction led to a superior increase in memory recollection. As was mentioned before, they failed to obtain support for this.