Scientists’ Moral Responsibility and Dangerous Technology R&D 133 to explore all possibilities, but the context for inquiry must always be considered to encompass something broader than just the institutions of science. Where one realizes grave or catastrophic implications for a particular path of inquiry, one does owe a duty to those on whose behalf you are musing, and who would inevitably become the target of resulting catastrophic technologies. Just as any of us may privately muse about acts of horror or violence, we assume greater duties as we begin to discuss, plan, or execute those acts. The same must be true form scientists, as in any other public profession or private life. Respect, beneﬁcence, and justice apply not only to human subjects of particular experiments, but more generally to humanity as a whole. The result of all this should be better trust of scientists and their profession, and a greater realization on the part of scientists that their work proceeds through mutual trust and appreciation between scientists and the public. In the end, we all should beneﬁt as scientists begin to realize their duties are personally-held, and broadly applicable. When faced with the choice to inquire into something whose only or most likely application is harmful or deadly, scientists should have the moral strength, educational background, and public support to refuse in light of ethical principles generally accepted, well considered, and backed by strong public institutions. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. References Atlas, R. M., & Dando, M. (2006). The dual-use dilemma for the life sciences: perspectives, conundrums, and global solutions. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science, 4(3), 276–286. Childress, J., Meslin, E., & Shapiro, H. (Eds.). (2005). Belmont revisited: Ethical principles for research with human subjects. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Cohen, H. W., Gould, R. M., & Sidel, V. W. (2004). The pitfalls of bioterrorism preparedness: the anthrax and smallpox experiences. American Journal of Public Health, 94(10), 1667–1671. Corneliussen, F. (2006). Adequate regulation a stop-gap measure, or part of a package? EMBO Reports, 7, s50–s54. Ehni, H.-J. (2008). Dual use and the ethical responsibility of scientists. Archivum Immunologiae et therapiae Experimentalis, 56, 147–152. Guston, D. H., & Sarewitz, D. (2002). Real-time technology assessment. Technology in Society, 24(1–2), 93–109. Jones, N. L. (2007). A code of ethics for the life sciences. Science, Engineering Ethics, 13, 25–43. Miller, S., & Selgelid, M. J. (2008). Chap. 3: The ethics of dual-use research. In S. Miller (Ed.), Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences. The Netherlands: Springer Sciences. Musil, R. K. (1980). There must be more to love than death: A conversation with Kurt Vonnegut. The Nation, 231(4), 128–132. Nixdorff, K., & Bender, W. (2002). Ethics of university research, biotechnology and potential military spin-off. Minerva, 40, 15–35. Preston R. (2002). The demon in the freezer house. New York: Random Somerville, M.A., & Atlas, R. M. (2005). Ethics: a weapon to counter bioterrorism. Science, 307, 1881– 1882. 123