THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2012, 65 (7), 1241–1249 Rapid communication When far becomes near: Shared environments activate action simulation Debra Grifﬁths1 and Steven P. Tipper2 1Cognition and Communication Research Centre, School of Life Sciences, Northumbria University, Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK 2Centre for Clinical and Cognitive Neuroscience, Bangor University, Bangor, UK It has been proposed that one means of understanding a person’s current behaviour and predicting future actions is by simulating their actions. That is, when another person’s actions are observed, similar motor processes are activated in the observer. For example, after observing a reach over an obstacle, a person’s subsequent reach trajectory is more curved, reﬂecting motor priming. Importantly, such motor states are only activated if the observed action is in near (peripersonal) space. However, we demonstrate that when individuals share action environments, simulation of another person’s obstacle avoiding reach path takes place even when the action is in far (extrapersonal) space. We propose that action simulation is inﬂuenced by factors such as ownership. When an “owned” object is a potential future obstacle, even when it is viewed beyond current action space, simulations are evoked, and these leave a more stable memory capable of inﬂuencing future behaviour. Keywords: Action observation; Action simulation; Peripersonal space; Object ownership; Mirror neurons. A core function of the brain is to extract information from the environment that enables animals to make appropriate responses. From encoding the rough terrain while running to processing the shape and location of an object to be grasped, the conversion of vision into action is crucial for survival (Gibson, 1979). A qualitative distinction in such visuomotor representations is between near (peripersonal) space where objects can be acted on immediately and far (extrapersonal) space where objects are beyond immediate action. There is clear evidence that these two forms of representation do coexist in the brain (e.g., Previc, 1998). For example, Vuilleumier, Valenza, Mayer, Reverdin, and Landis (1998) describe a patient who suffered from lateral neglect in far (extrapersonal) but not near (peripersonal) space; while Halligan and Marshall (1991) report the opposite pattern of neglect in near but not far space. Healthy partici- pants also show a smaller version of neglect called Correspondence should be addressed to Debra Grifﬁths, Cognition and Communication Research Centre, School of Life Sciences, Northumbria University, Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE1 8ST, UK. E-mail: Debbie.Grifﬁths@northumbria.ac.uk This research was supported by a Wellcome Trust Programme grant awarded to S.P.T. http://www.psypress.com/qjep # 2012 The Experimental Psychology Society http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2012.688978 1241