124 D. Koepsell There is a vast and growing literature addressing the ethics of so-called ‘‘dual- use’’ scientiﬁc research, often in the context of the smallpox example, and other bio- security or bio-weapons agents and research. The frame of this discussion has largely included the perpetuation of the notion that ‘‘legitimate’’ research often has illegitimate uses or consequences. Some have argued from this context that scientists must take upon themselves certain ethical duties and responsibilities, while others have maintained the standard argument that moral culpability lies with those applying the research, not those doing it (Ehni 2008) (Somerville and Atlas 2005) (Nixdorff and Bender 2002). Looking at the development of bioethics as a ﬁeld, and considering its institutions and principles, one might ask whether the Belmont report needs some updating. With a little tweak, we might well fashion a set of principles just as elegant and concise as those enumerated in the Belmont report, aimed not just at scientists doing research on human subjects, but rather at those whose research impacts humanity as a whole. Let’s consider this possibility, see how a modiﬁed set of Belmont principles might be applied more generally to all scientiﬁc research, and then take up the question of how institutions might then be created that could implement these principles. The discussion is framed with examples, both real-world and hypothetical, and considers also the extent to which some scientiﬁc research might never be considered ‘‘dual-use.’’ Respect, Beneﬁcence, and Justice These three essential principles of biomedical ethics frame all reviews of proposed biomedical research involving human subjects. Although based on long-debated principles of ethics in general, and owing much to standard notions of both utilitarian and deontological ethics theories, the Belmont principles are thoroughly pragmatic, and derived clearly from the most prominent ethical lapses that stoked the report’s authorship. They include: 1. Respect for persons 2. Beneﬁcence 3. Justice The principle of respect for persons is akin to the Kantian notion that people may not use each other as means to ends, but must treat each other with equal dignity— as ends in themselves. In the Tuskeegee study and other notable lapses of scientiﬁc ethics, human subjects were used as means to ends, just as other scientiﬁc tools might be, without regard for equal dignity of the subject. The principle of beneﬁcence simply requires that human subjects research be conducted with good intentions. It ought to be pursued not merely for the sake of scientiﬁc curiosity, but rather to cure some ill, to correct some harm, or otherwise beneﬁt humanity. Finally, the principle of justice requires that populations or individuals who are vulnerable (like children or historically-mistreated minorities) must be speciﬁcally protected in the course of research. Debate about the merits and application of these principles continues, but they have also become institutionalized in the form of guiding principles used by governmentally-created review bodies that now oversee all human-subjects research 123