132 D. Koepsell can best be encouraged through new institutions. Legal and regulatory bodies ought to devise these institutions both within and among sovereigns. Professional organization as well ought to embrace and adopt ethical training of their members, understanding that scientists are citizens of broader groups whose funding and support they require. Education in principles not just of scientiﬁc integrity, but also social responsibility, ought to be developed and embraced. Currently, scientiﬁc integrity and ethics are taught only in the briefest and most superﬁcial manners, and are not generally necessary for any scientist not doing human subject research. But in light of the potential for sciences and their technologies to be used for harm, and given the scale of some of these potential harms, more general education in science and morality should be required. This is especially true where the potential impact of a particular science is great, as with nanotechnology, genetic engineering, and similar technologies (Guston and Sarewitz 2002) (Corneliussen 2006). As discussed above, scientists are generally beholden to public funding, at least to some extent, and just as many governments now require some minimum training in the core bioethical principles of Belmont and its offspring, so too could grant funding in technologies like nanotech and genomics depend on some minimum education in ethics. Besides education, the principles and proposed calculus of risks, harms, and beneﬁts, could be used in post-hoc analyses to determine culpability where scientists release dangerous sciences or technologies which actually cause harms. Just as medical doctors were culpable in the Nuremburg trials, so too might future scientists be morally and legally culpable for the apocalyptic (or even slightly less-so) repercussions of their negligence or recklessness. Of course, mens rea must be considered, but merely citing the ‘‘eventual’’ fallacy will not sufﬁce to defend all scientiﬁc inquiry and its resultant dissemination, either through publication or technology. Scientists must not only have a sense that they are morally culpable for the uses of their discoveries where they understand the risk—harm—likelihood calculus, but they must also be liable to be held culpable where harms result from their acts, and where they possess a culpable mens rea. Just as governments take it upon themselves to fund and advance research and development, both out of scientiﬁc curiosity and as a way to grow economically, so should they adopt the responsibility to educate scientists to be better citizens. As taxpayers provide for investigations into nature’s truths, sometimes with no potential for economic beneﬁt, they must also be considered as beneﬁciaries or targets of the fruits of scientiﬁc inquiry. An expansion of the Belmont Principles might include recognizing: we are all human subjects of certain inquiries. Where discoveries possess the potential of great harms, environmental catastrophes, mass extinctions, or worse, the collapse of an entire biosphere (as with ice-nine, or ‘‘grey goo’’), scientists must take it upon themselves to measure their aesthetic appreciation of truths in themselves with gravity of worst-case repercussions. Institutions and regulatory bodies must encourage this, and provide guidance in the form of practical moral education of all scientists, not just in medicine and bioethics, but for all ﬁelds of inquiry. Teaching ethical principles to scientists need not stiﬂe research. Nor does it imply that scientists must watch their thoughts. They need not restrict their thoughts, but they ought to guide them. Minds should be free 123