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It just felt right: the neural correlates of the ﬂu- ency heuristic. Conscious. Cogn. 19, 829–837. Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any com- mercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could be construed as a potential con- ﬂict of interest. Received: 13 February 2012; accepted: 22 June 2012; published online: 12 July 2012. Citation: Volz KG and Gigerenzer G (2012) Cognitive processes in decisions under risk are not the same as in deci- sions under uncertainty. Front. Neurosci. 6:105. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00105 This article was submitted to Frontiers in Decision Neuroscience, a specialty of Frontiers in Neuroscience. Copyright © 2012 Volz and Gigerenzer . 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