130 D. Koepsell Thus, we should investigate these things ﬁrst (because we have good intentions).’’ Of course, this reasoning justiﬁes investigating any and all science and technologies, no matter how potentially destructive or threatening to humanity or the environ- ment. But it presupposes (a) that the investigators doing the work have good intentions, (b) that the technology or discovery would eventually be carried out by others, and (c) that once discovered or applied, it can be contained. Let’s assume that, in fact, ice-nine, or smallpox for that matter, will come into the hands of individuals or groups with less-than-good intentions. Will discovering it, or investigating it now do any good? In the case of ice-nine, clearly the answer is no. In the case of smallpox, beneﬁcence would argue for the research if for some reason we believed that smallpox could not be contained with existing technologies. If, for instance, we believe that the Australian ‘‘mousepox trick’’ could be applied to smallpox, then devising ways to treat genetically-altered mousepox might be an act of beneﬁcence. But without an animal model for similarly altered smallpox, then we’d need ﬁrst to try the ‘‘trick’’ on smallpox. Again, we have a recursive, self- fulﬁlling justiﬁcation to pursue any and all research, including on any devastating, horriﬁc, or deadly technology one can think of. Moreover, there’s always reason to question whether one’s own motivations will always be pure, or that a technology will always remain in one’s control or contained. The ‘‘Eventual’’ Fallacy The ‘‘eventual’’ fallacy justiﬁes any investigation, and scientiﬁc inquiry, no matter the potential consequences. It fails if we broaden the moral horizon offered by the Belmont principles to include humanity as a whole when we are considering sciences and technologies posing no natural threat. Implicit in bioethical principles is some utilitarian calculus. Science proceeds not in a vacuum, but as a socially devised institution. It is conducted by professionals, with funding from mostly public sources, and with relative freedom under the auspices of mostly academic environments. As a largely public institution, and as the beneﬁciaries of the public trust and wealth, scientists must consider the consequences of their inquiries. They are not lone, mad scientists, hunched over Frankenstein apparatus in private attics. Nor is worrying about the possible existence of Dr. Frankenstein sufﬁcient to warrant all inquiries. Rather, science must be free to inquire into any and all of nature’s mysteries, but scientists must also aware of being beholden to a world at large, bound by concerns about consequences of their research, and ultimately dependent upon public support for their institutions. The ‘‘eventual’’ argument makes sense when the risks posed by investigating a deadly thing are outweighed by the likelihood of that deadly thing’s being discovered and used by others combined with the potential of a scientiﬁc investigation developing a plausible protection of the public at large. So, roughly: R L P = risk, = likelihood of independent discovery and use, and = potential beneﬁt from scientiﬁc investigation now 123