Asp et al. Neural correlates of credulity information. As another way of putting the question, what does the prefrontal cortex do to prevent credulity and gullibility? To address this question, Asp and Tranel (2012) recently devel- oped the False Tagging Theory (FTT), a neuroanatomically based theoretical model of belief and doubt processes. In brief, the FTT asserts that (1) the process of belief occurs in two stages, men- tal representation and assessment (Gilbert, 1991); (2) all ideas that are represented are initially believed, but a secondary psy- chological analysis (assessment) can produce disbelief (or doubt) (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1993); (3) the mental representation of the idea, which is initially believed or regarded as true, must be “tagged” to indicate false value, producing doubt (Gilbert, 1991); (4) the prefrontal cortex is necessary for the “false tag” in the assessment component of belief; and (5) “false tags” are affective in nature, akin to the central tenets of Damasio’s (1994) “somatic marker hypothesis.” Our model suggests that the key function of the prefrontal cortex is “false tagging” which, in the cognitive domain, acts to doubt cognitive representations (which are initially believed). The FTT views the prefrontal cortex as providing a sin- gular function that multiple modalities can access and use (Asp and Tranel, 2012); however, certain prefrontal regions are more inclined to “false tag” for particular modalities, and we suggest that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is particularly critical for false tagging cognitive representations. Therefore, the ventromedial portion of the prefrontal cortex is of central inter- est to the study of cognitive belief and doubt. Other prefrontal regions may also play critical roles in doubting, e.g., acting as a false tagging resource “reserve” (Asp and Tranel, 2012). However, this study will focus exclusively on the vmPFC’s role in the belief and doubt process. The FTT predicts that dysfunction of the vmPFC should result in a “doubt deﬁcit,” consequences of which should be credulity and a tendency to believe inaccurate information. Several preliminary studies have bolstered the theory, including the ﬁndings that patients with focal damage to the vmPFC (1) often have a general personality trait that is overconﬁdent, boast- ful, grandiose, obstinate, and egocentric (Stuss and Benson, 1984; Damasio et al., 2011), indicating a lack of normative doubt; (2) are more gullible to disreputable characters (Damasio, 1994; Croft et al., 2010); and (3) are more likely to believe fundamentalist reli- gious dogma (Asp et al., 2012). Thus, vmPFC patients and older adults may have a vulnerability to believe deceptive or mislead- ing information because vmPFC dysfunction impairs normative doubt. Under our FTT, beliefs are broad and cover all mental represen- tation, including all cognitive representations such as knowledge, ideas, opinions, attitudes, and rules (Asp and Tranel, 2012). Tra- ditional perspectives of cognitive representation have suggested that these cognitions are like tools in a warehouse; they are actual objects in the brain that can be retrieved and used (Gilbert, 1993). The underlying assumption is that cognitions in these models are static; they are the bits, the 1’s and 0’s, of the mind’s computer. There are several shortcomings to this computational view, most notably, that (1) the mind’s “CPU” (the person getting the tools from the warehouse) must perform homuncular-type operations (e.g., Baddeley, 2002) and (2) cognitions are impotent (Gilbert, 1993). Computational models require a faculty or mechanism (a “CPU”) to do action with static cognitions (the 1’s and 0’s), which cannot produce effects on their own. However, the FTT asserts that all cognitions are beliefs; they are “empowered” intrinsically with simple comprehension (Gilbert, 1993). Thus, when an individual understands a novel proposition, the individual is automatically put in a “state” of belief. Here, the mental representation is not impotent but will induce action, given appropriate circumstances. To avoid every passing idea to be acted on, the vmPFC can doubt or disbelieve cognitions by applying false tags to mental represen- tations. Understanding a cognition is, then, more like the “state” of a shot of an ice hockey player directed at a goalie. If the goalie does not stop the shot (false tag the cognition), the shot will go in the net (a cognition-consistent action will be performed). The belief will be acted upon if not blocked by the vmPFC. In this model, post-rolandic cortices are constantly ﬁring shots and the vmPFC is reliably blocking some percentage of them. If this logic is applied to a decision-making scenario, each choice that is identiﬁed (i.e., understood) is a belief (“if this, then that” cognitions) and “false tags” block disadvantageous or inappropri- ate choices for the context. False tags (or doubt) via the vmPFC act to select appropriate responses during decision-making by neg- atively biasing the inappropriate (i.e., “untrue”) representations. Therefore, we propose that dysfunction or damage to the vmPFC has a two-pronged, but intimately related, effect: (1) a tendency toward credulity for deceptive or misleading information; and (2) disadvantageous behavioral decision-making. The purpose of the present study was to investigate credulity and ﬁnancial decision-making for misleading information pre- sented in a real-world, ecologically valid paradigm (deceptive advertising) in patients with focal brain damage, with the goal of identifying a systems-level neuroanatomical correlate for these cognitive functions. We chose consumer advertisements which had been deemed deceptive and deliberately misleading by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and examined participants’ credulity toward the advertisements. Our theory suggests that when normal individuals are exposed to misleading information they will ini- tially believe the information but then will tend to self-generate doubt from their store of knowledge and experience. To examine the interaction between “self-generated” doubt and doubt from explicit information, we created two types of misleading ads: (1) “deceptive-uncorrected” ads, which are misleading and do not have any explicit information that may induce doubting, and (2) “deceptive-corrected” ads, which are misleading but do have an end disclaimer which should induce doubting. The FTT asserts that doubt is mediated by the vmPFC. Thus, we hypothesized that patients with damage to the vmPFC, compared to patients with brain damage outside the prefrontal cortex and healthy individu- als, (1) would be more likely to believe the misleading aspects in both the “deceptive-uncorrected” and the “deceptive-corrected” ads, and (2) would indicate higher intention to purchase the products featured in both types of ads. MATERIALS AND METHODS PARTICIPANTS We studied 39 individuals with adult-onset brain lesions from the Patient Registry of the Division of Behavioral Neurology and Cognitive Neuroscience at the University of Iowa. The eti- ologies of the lesions included cerebrovascular disease (n D 21), Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience July 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 100 | 2