occurs over temporal windows between action and effect that are longer than those studied previously (see also [11], [29]), according to the significant features of the given task. Fourth, we show that intentional binding measures are sensitive to graded variations in actual and subjective control associated with automation. The link between automation and sense of agency holds promise for future applications. From a cognitive engineering viewpoint, the ability to measure sense of agency quantitatively is important, since it allows sense of agency to be used as a measure in evaluating operator experience. In future research, we will test whether systems that produce stronger subjective sense of agency also produce better performance. When we get on an airplane, we believe (and hope!) that the pilot feels in personal control of the References 1. Baron S (1988) Pilot control. In: Wiener EL, Nagel DC, eds. Human factors in aviation. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp 347–386. 2. Norman DA (1990) The ‘problem’ with automation: Inappropriate feedback and interaction, not ‘over-automation’. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, B 327. 3. Gallagher S (2000) Philosophical concepts of the self: implications for cognitive sciences. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4: 14–21. 4. Wegner DM (2002) The illusion of conscious will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Wegner DM (2004) Precis of the illusion of conscious will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27: 649–692. 6. Young ME, Rogers ET, Beckmann JS (2005) Causal impressions: predicting when, not just whether. Mem Cogn 33: 320–331. 7. Haggard P, Clark S, Kalogeras J (2002b) Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience 5(4): 382–385. 8. Cravo AM, Claessens PME, Baldo MVC (2009) Voluntary action and causality in temporal binding. Experimental Brain Research 199: 95–99. 9. Ebert JP, Wegner DM (2010) Time warp: Authorship shapes the perceived time of actions and events. Consciousness and Cognition 19(1): 481–489. 10. Engbert K, Wohlschla¨ger A, Haggard P (2008) Who is causing what? The sense of agency is relational and efferent-triggered. Cognition 107(2): 693–704. 11. Humphreys GR, Buehner MJ (2009) Magnitude estimation reveals temporal binding at super-second intervals. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 35: 1542–1549. 12. Moore JW, Wegner DM, Haggard P (2009) Modulating the sense of agency with external cues. Consciousness and Cognition 18: 1056–1064. 13. Tsakiris M, Haggard P (2003) Awareness of somatic events associated with a voluntary action. Experimental Brain Research 149: 439–446. 14. Wenke D, Haggard P (2009) How voluntary actions modulate time perception. Exp Brain Res 196: 311–318. 15. Anderson J Levels of Automation and User Control - Evaluation of a Turbine Automation Interface, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden ISBN 978- 87-7893-245-7. 16. Andersson J, Osvalder AL Levels of Automation and User Control, In VTT Symposium (Valtion Teknillinen Tutkimuskeskus) 258: 107–110. Intentional Binding in Automated Control Settings aircraft. Our results offer the interesting possibility of testing whether this is actually true. In a next step, our work could provide guidelines regarding how to boost this feeling of control, and could assess whether feeling of control are related to actual levels of performance in controlling the aircraft. Author Contributions Conceived and designed the experiments: BB JCS PLB PH. Performed the experiments: BB. Analyzed the data: BB PH. Contributed reagents/ materials/analysis tools: BB JCS PLB PH. Wrote the paper: BB JCS PLB PH. 17. Aarts H, Custers R, Wegner DM (2005) On the inference of personal authorship: Enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information. Consciousness and Cognition 14: 439–458. 18. Sheridan T, Verplank W (1978) Human and Computer Control of Undersea Teleoperators, Man-Machine Systems Lab., MIT, Cambridge, MA. 19. Pronin E, Wegner DM, McCarthy K, Rodriguez S (2006) Everyday magical powers: The role of apparent mental causation in the overestimation of personal influence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 91: 218–231. 20. Wegner DM, Sparrow B, Winerman L (2004) Vicarious agency: Experiencing control over the movements of others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86: 838–848. 21. Daprati E, Franck N, Georgieff N, Proust J, Pacherie E, et al. (1997) Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients. Cognition 65: 71–86. 22. Sato A, Yasuda A (2005) Illusion of sense of self-agency: discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self- agency, but not the sense of self-ownership. Cognition 94: 241–255. 23. Wenke D, Fleming SM, Haggard P (2010) Subliminal priming of actions influences sense of control over effects of action. Cognition 115: 26–38. 24. Frith C, Blakemore S, Wolpert D (2000) Abnormalities in the awareness and control of action. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 355: 1771–1788. 25. Wegner DM, Wheatley T (1999) Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will. American Psychologist 54(7): 480–492. 26. Moore JW, Fletcher PC (in press) Sense of agency in health and disease: A review of cue integration approaches Consciousness and Cognition. In press. 27. Haggard P, Aschersleben G, Gehrke J, Prinz W (2002) Action, binding, and awareness. Common Mechanisms in Perception and Action 19: 266–285. 28. Garcia J, Ervin FR, Koelling R (1966) Learning with prolonged delay of reinforcement. Psychonomic Science 5: 121–22. 29. Buehner MJ, Humphreys GR (2009) Causal binding of actions to their effects. Psychological Science 20(10): 1221–1228. PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 March 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e34075