For this study, we adapted a single-target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT). With this ST-IAT, participants were asked to learn associations with the same genetic words as in Study 1 via practice trials. However, they were not asked to learn associations with ‘‘socialization’’ words as a contrast category. Participants were subsequently asked to learn associations with fate words vs. choice words, as in Study 1. Afterwards, participants participated in several critical trials. In the first critical trial, subjects placed genetic words in the same category as fate words, while ‘‘choice’’ words were partitioned in another category (a Gene + Fate/ Choice trial). In the second critical trial, subjects placed genetic words in the same category as choice words, while fate words were partitioned into another category (a Gene + Choice/Fate trial). By comparing the response times between these trials, we can get a clearer sense of how genes are related to fate, as opposed to choice, without invoking a comparison to socialization. As before, we adopted the scoring algorithm most often used in analyzing IAT data [35], which computes an individual, standardized measure of one’s bias. Participants also completed two explicit measures of genetic determinism: the Belief in Genetic Determinism Scale [11] and the Genetics, Disease, & Stigma Survey [36]. Results Study 1 We used a one-sample t-test to assess whether or not the standardized differences between the trials per participant generally differed from zero. Again, if the standardized differences in response times between the trials were different from zero, there would be evidence that it was easier than for participants to pair genes with fate and socialization with choice than vice versa. The results confirmed our hypothesis, t(46) = 8.24, p, 001. The average D-score was substantial (M = 0.43, SD = 0.34), and the difference between the mean for the two trials was 320 ms. Participants were slower to place gene words in the same category as choice words while placing socialization words with fate words, when compared to placing gene words with fate words and socialization words with choice words. Thus, this is evidence that participants are quicker to see genes as linked to fate when socialization is simultaneously associated with choice, rather than vice versa. Study 2 Again, because Study 19s effects relied on associations with socialization, Study 2 was designed to minimize concerns that linkages with socialization drove effects. If participants were faster to place genes and fate into the same category, while relegating choice to another category, than they were to place genes and choice in the same category when placing fate in its own category, then this would be evidence that participants implicitly associate genes with fate more than choice. We conducted a one-sample t- test on participant’s standardized response time difference between trials, to see if a consistent bias arose on this standardized difference measure. Indeed, participants showed a significant bias (M = 0.13, SD = 0.36), such that they responded more quickly when genes were related to fate and ‘‘choice’’ was considered separately, t(128) = 4.26, p,001. The bias was smaller than observed in Study 1, though this may be expected since we did not contrast genes with socialization. The average participant responded to the Gene + Fate/Chance trial 133.76 ms faster than they responded to the Gene + Chance/Fate trial. Curiously, participants’ standardized difference scores were uncorrelated with either of the explicit measures – the Belief in Genetic Determinism Implicit Essentialism Scale (a = .90), r = .02, p = 79, and the Genetics, Disease, & Stigma Survey (a = .74), r = 2.03, p = .75, which is consistent with the notion that these attitudes are operating outside of conscious control. Additionally, the two explicit scales correlated moderately with each other, r = .59, p,.001, demonstrating convergent validity. Study 2 confirms that genes and fate are more closely linked than genes and choice. Thus, the findings in Study 1 were likely driven in part by an association between genes and fate. This is evidence that the automatic connection between genes and fate is stronger than its connection with opposing constructs, which may bias more deliberative judgments about the properties of genes. Discussion Over two studies, people implicitly associated genes with fate more than they did with choice. These implicit associations can help explain the essentialist reactions that people show when encountering genetic concepts [11,15,16]. People may form genetic essentialist associations implicitly, which may influence their explicit thoughts about these concepts as well. It is unclear whether learning about genetic concepts con- tributes to implicit associations, or whether implicit genetic essentialism is universal. The cross-cultural and developmental evidence for essentialism suggest that people may be universally predisposed to think in essentialist ways, although studies of genetic essentialism have largely been limited to Western adult populations. It would be fruitful to explore how children in different cultures conceptualize genetic concepts when they first learn them. The conclusions that can be drawn from these studies are restricted, though, due to limitations. First, because we exclusively used IAT-like tasks, our results relied on the dichotomies inherent in the IAT. Although people implicitly associate genes with fate words more than choice, it is quite possible that genes may not prompt fate-like constructs on their own. Also, it is unclear how automatic bias interacts with controlled genetic essentialist beliefs. In the current study, automatic genetic essentialist attitudes were uncorrelated with explicit attitude measures. This finding diverges from the low, but significant, correlations with explicit measures found in other IAT research. This suggests that these implicit genetic attitudes may have few consequences for explicit attitude measures. This is an important consideration with regard to the scrutiny over what the IAT exactly measures. For instance, if these studies assess the implicit activation of cultural ideas and attitudes [37], they may not impinge upon explicit attitudes, and their implications for participant’s own behaviour are less clear. More research is necessary to disentangle exactly what these implicit attitudes may mean for cognition and behaviour. Nonetheless, understanding how genetic concepts are associated with essential- ist thinking is aided by this demonstration that people automat- ically associate fate words with genetic concepts more readily than they do choice words. Supporting Information Appendix S1 The complete list of words in respective categories is provided. (DOCX) Author Contributions Conceived and designed the experiments: WAG SJH. Performed the experiments: WAG. Analyzed the data: WAG. Wrote the paper: WAG SJH. PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e38176