Yoon and Lam BMC Public Health 2012, 12:717 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/717 industry’s opposition primarily because alcohol tax was seen as a “stable source of government revenue [23]”. On average, the alcohol tax had contributed approxi- mately 0.4 to 0.5 percent of the government’s total rev- enue annually from early 2000 to 2005. For this reason, the tax rate on alcoholic beverages remained intact until the first half of the 2000s despite the industry’s political pressure and strong resistance. The corporate movement and new tax reduction strategies By mid-2004, two factors appeared to have contributed towards a new policy climate that favored a reduction in the alcohol tax. One was the robust economic rebound despite the severe economic fallout caused in part by the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003. The Hong Kong economy exhibited a broad- based upturn in 2004 with a rise in real gross domestic product (GDP) of 8.7 percent amid a strong inflow of capital funds and an upsurge in consumer spending [30]. The other arguably more important factor was the per- sistent lobbying and political pressure from the alcohol industry. Over the years, the alcohol industry incessantly lobbied the government to lower the alcohol tax rate [31]. In its efforts to lower (and eventually abolish) the tax in question, the alcohol industry sought out industry al- lies such as the hospitality and trading industries and forged agreements with them to collectively advocate its position. Although forming alliances was not a new in- dustry practice, it became an increasingly important strategy. Among others, the Hong Kong Wine & Spirits Industry Coalition (HKWSIC) was notable for this [32]. The coalition was first formed with the wine industry only and named as the Hong Kong Wine Industry Coali- tion (HKWIC) in 2002 “to lobby the government on in- dustry related issues such as alcohol duties [33].” Then the alcohol tax increase in 2001–2002 prompted a more typical formation of like-minded industry groups which shared similar vested interests. Fredric Dufour, the man- aging director of Richemont Hong Kong, a transnational retailer of liquor products, tobacco and other luxury goods, became the first chairman of the HKWSIC [34]. In order to convince policy makers and political lea- ders, the coalition needed a representative that could provide legislative tax initiatives, help industry lobbyists gain access to lawmakers and senior government offi- cials, demonstrate constituent support for alcohol tax re- duction and testify on the industry’s behalf. Tommy Cheung Yu-Yan, who holds the seat of the catering in- dustry functional constituency in the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, acted as a core policy link between the HKWSIC and the government, advocating for reductions in alcohol taxation. Page 5 of 12 At the Legislative Council meetings in 2002, he repeat- edly delivered the message that the high cost of quality wines and spirits in Hong Kong damages Hong Kong’s tourism sector [35]. In order to convince politicians and government officials, the idea of Hong Kong becoming a regional hub in the alcohol trade was advanced. The co- alition claimed that a lowered duty on wine would boost tourism and further strengthen Hong Kong’s image as a wine distribution centre [35]. The central idea was that a wine tax cut would encourage more investment from international wine traders, which would in turn result in more employment and economic growth. Indeed, Hong Kong’s political leaders have long been interested in transforming Hong Kong into a regional wine trading centre [36]. In 2000, then-Financial Secre- tary Donald Tsang once mentioned that Hong Kong had great potential as a wine hub as the demand for wine in Asia and mainland China was rising [22]. The Hong Kong Trade Development Council estimated that the total market for wine in Asia was expected to grow at between 10 percent and 20 percent per annum to a probable consumption value of US$ 17 billion by 2012, and rising to US$ 27 billion by 2017 [37]. Such rosy esti- mates began to garner political support for building Hong Kong into a wine trading centre. For senior gov- ernment officials who regarded rapid economic prosper- ity as the paramount political priority, this policy option was too attractive to resist. Through meetings with Le- gislative Council members as well as officials in the Fi- nancial Services and Treasury Bureau, the coalition provided a variety of supporting arguments and figures to substantiate their case [38]. Faced with relentless industry lobbying, the Hong Kong Government then began to consider assessing the existing alcohol duty regime. In December 2004, the government launched a Public Consultation on the Duty on Alcoholic Beverages to seek feedback on the appropri- ate level of alcohol taxation [39]. In its consultation document, the government indicated that while the gov- ernment maintained its position that “the duty on alco- holic beverages should not be abolished but be retained as a form of tax,” a review of the alcohol taxation policy might be needed primarily because “there are constant calls from the liquor industry and the catering sector for a reduction in the duty on alcoholic beverages [40].” This statement clearly reflects the increasing pressure from the alcohol industry to lower the duty on alcohol. Amidst signals from the government that alcohol tax reduction was under consideration as a likely option, the alcohol industry had high hopes, leading it to establish task forces, mobilize more public campaigns, and assem- ble arguments [41]. The coalition urged the government to lower the tax on alcohol by at least half. The campaign had gathered momentum after signs of a government