Yoon and Lam BMC Public Health 2012, 12:717 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/717 industries so that these like-minded actors could form common ground in the pursuit of changing the tax- ation policy. Over the years, coordinated efforts among these actors were fundamental to facilitating action, representing their shared interests about how alcohol tax policy should be changed, and determining the outcome of pol- icy debates towards a zero-alcohol tax. The formulation of alcohol tax policy was effectively facilitated by the bridges the coalition built with politicians to allow for a broader and more coordinated array of influence. Our findings clearly point to a prominent role played by a few business-friendly legislators such as Tommy Cheung and James Tien on the policy-making scene. They acted as what could be known as “policy brokers”, whose posi- tions and bargaining power enabled them to influence outcomes of policy debates to their advantage [72,73]. The very fact that these policy elites represent business interests speaks of the homogeneity of the coalition. By managing coordinated interactions of constituent actors and acting in a concerted manner, the coalition was able to achieve such unprecedented success. The second tactic was to deliberately employ the com- munication programme and publicity that might fit into the overall aim of making the city a tax-free environ- ment. The coalition needed to develop an appropriate blend of ideas to lobby for the abolition of taxes on alco- hol. While the underlying policy goal of the alcohol in- dustry was to foster corporate preferences, calling for tax reductions publicly as such was not ideal. Therefore, a message was carefully presented in such a way that al- cohol tax reduction would benefit Hong Kong as a whole. The coalition’s message was structured around four key ideas which were closely tied in with the coali- tion’s corporate interests. The first idea was that tax reduction would stimulate Hong Kong’s economy, boost tourism and thus enhance employment prospects. More specifically, the coalition maintained that Hong Kong should be the region’s centre for wine exhibition, trading and logistics. The core argument was that removing wine duties would en- courage more investment from international wine tra- ders, which would in turn create more jobs and bring other economic benefits to Hong Kong. Second, in an attempt to gain public support, it was claimed that ex- cessive alcohol duties deprived ordinary Hong Kong drinkers of the enjoyment of affordable alcoholic bev- erages. Newspaper interviews and other speaking oppor- tunities were strategically used to carefully shape the public perception that a cut in alcohol taxation would vastly benefit consumers through a reduction in retail prices. The third idea advanced by the industry coalition was that Hong Kong’s high alcohol tax drives consumers to lower jurisdictions to buy alcoholic beverages, thereby Page 9 of 12 losing revenue for the government and reinforcing the illegal smuggling and illicit activities connected with the alcohol market. Indeed, the alcohol industry repeatedly propagated an idea that should the existing tax be main- tained, the government would not achieve its intended increase in revenue as a result of alcohol smuggling and trading-down effects toward the consumption of cheaper alcohol. Fourth, moderate consumption of wine was framed as conducive to good health. Although the bene- ficial effects to the heart of moderate consumption of red wine are contentious, the alcohol industry communi- cated these benefits to the public in a very aggressive manner. Our findings reveal that policymakers appeared to have been swayed by the industry’s argument, notably the economic merits of their proposition. The resultant outcome was that the alcohol tax policy in Hong Kong was interpreted and formulated solely in the trade arena rather than in the domain of public health. Because gov- ernment officials and policy elites saw alcohol as an or- dinary commodity [74], it was commonly believed that eliminating taxes on alcohol and expanding for com- merce would be beneficial to the city as a whole. In par- ticular, the idea of turning Hong Kong into the fine wine hub for the Asian market sharply attracted government authorities to the extent that policies for tax reduction and elimination could be executed over such a short period of time. The new licensing act clearly reflected the government’s inclination towards a market-based ap- proach in view of what is seen as the booming demand for wine from Asia and mainland China [75]. Regrettably, where the alcohol tax policy was framed and justified strictly in fiscal/economic terms, an alterna- tive argument from CSOs was barely present. Because the rhetoric of competitiveness, free markets, and eco- nomic prosperity dominated political and policy agen- das, there was little room for CSOs to counteract commercial interests. Such general lack of counter arguments on the tax reduction from the community at large appeared to facilitate the implementation of the zero-tax policy. Additionally in Hong Kong, CSO activ- ities have traditionally been confined to certain public health issues such as tobacco control and air pollution. Defining alcohol as a public health concern emerged only recently after the zero alcohol tax was implemen- ted [14,76]. Hong Kong’s experience in alcohol tax pol- icy changes sheds light on a scenario where in the absence of strong civil and public health advocacy, the alcohol industry assumes the key role in policy making [77]. Put bluntly, the real and potential harms to public health by alcohol misuse are being insidiously cast aside by the industry players in their bid to pursue vested interests with the misleading claims of health benefits.