Query: write Sigma for Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversar
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversar. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Enable Windows Remote Management id: 991a9744-f2f0-44f2-bd33-9092eba17dc3 status: test description: Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.006/T1021.006.md#atomic-test-1---enable-windows-remote-management - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/enable-psremoting?view=powershell-7.2 author: frack113 date: 2022-01-07 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.006 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection_cmdlet: ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Enable-PSRemoting ' condition: selection_cmdlet falsepositives: - Legitimate script level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects process access events where WerFaultSecure accesses MsMpEng.exe with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trac. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: Suspicious Process Access of MsMpEng by WerFaultSecure - EDR-Freeze id: 387df17d-3b04-448f-8669-9e7fd5e5fd8c related: - id: 8a2f4b1c-3d5e-4f7a-9b2c-1e4f6d8a9c2b type: similar - id: 1f0b4cac-9c81-41f4-95d0-8475ff46b3e2 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects process access events where WerFaultSecure accesses MsMpEng.exe with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace, indicating potential EDR freeze techniques. This technique leverages WerFaultSecure.exe running as a Protected Process Light (PPL) with WinTCB protection level to call MiniDumpWriteDump and suspend EDR/AV processes, allowing malicious activity to execute undetected during the suspension period. ' references: - https://blog.axelarator.net/hunting-for-edr-freeze/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-27 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_access product: windows definition: "Requires Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with CallTrace enabled.\nExample sysmon config snippet with grouping,\ \ as logging individual ProcessAccess events can generate excessive logs:\n<ProcessAccess onmatch=\"include\">\n <Rule\ \ groupRelation=\"and\">\n <TargetImage condition=\"end with\">\\MsMpEng.exe</TargetImage>\n <SourceImage condition=\"\ end with\">\\WerFaultSecure.exe</SourceImage>\n </Rule>\n</ProcessAccess>\n" detection: selection: SourceImage|endswith: \WerFaultSecure.exe TargetImage|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe CallTrace|contains: - \dbgcore.dll - \dbghelp.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate Windows Error Reporting operations level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_werfaultsecure_msmpeng_access/info.yml