Query: write Sigma for Detects the use of "ioreg" which will show I/O Kit registry information. This process is used for system information dis
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of "ioreg" which will show I/O Kit registry information. This process is used for system information dis. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: System Information Discovery Using Ioreg id: 2d5e7a8b-f484-4a24-945d-7f0efd52eab0 status: test description: 'Detects the use of "ioreg" which will show I/O Kit registry information. This process is used for system information discovery. It has been observed in-the-wild by calling this process directly or using bash and grep to look for specific strings. ' references: - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0373d78db6c3c0f6f6dcc409821bf89e1ad8c165d6f95c5c80ecdce2219627d7/behavior - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4ffdc72d1ff1ee8228e31691020fc275afd1baee5a985403a71ca8c7bd36e2e4/behavior - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5907d59ec1303cfb5c0a0f4aaca3efc0830707d86c732ba6b9e842b5730b95dc/behavior - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_ph/research/20/k/new-macos-backdoor-connected-to-oceanlotus-surfaces.html author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk date: 2023-12-20 modified: 2024-01-02 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1082 logsource: product: macos category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: /ioreg - CommandLine|contains: ioreg selection_cmd1: CommandLine|contains: - -l - -c selection_cmd2: CommandLine|contains: - AppleAHCIDiskDriver - IOPlatformExpertDevice - Oracle - Parallels - USB Vendor Name - VirtualBox - VMware condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative activities level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the dump of highly sensitive files such as "NTDS.DIT" and "SECURITY" hive. Attackers can leverage the "wbadmin". Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Sensitive File Recovery From Backup Via Wbadmin.EXE id: 84972c80-251c-4c3a-9079-4f00aad93938 related: - id: 6fe4aa1e-0531-4510-8be2-782154b73b48 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects the dump of highly sensitive files such as "NTDS.DIT" and "SECURITY" hive. Attackers can leverage the "wbadmin" utility in order to dump sensitive files that might contain credential or sensitive information. ' references: - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/2cc01b01132b5c304027a658c698ae09dd6a92bf/yml/OSBinaries/Wbadmin.yml - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wbadmin/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-start-recovery - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-start-backup author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2024-05-10 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \wbadmin.exe - OriginalFileName: WBADMIN.EXE selection_backup: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' recovery' - recoveryTarget - itemtype:File CommandLine|contains: - \config\SAM - \config\SECURITY - \config\SYSTEM - \Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high