Query: Sigma YAML for linux / auditd
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detect unix shell configuration modification. Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Unix Shell Configuration Modification id: a94cdd87-6c54-4678-a6cc-2814ffe5a13d related: - id: e74e15cc-c4b6-4c80-b7eb-dfe49feb7fe9 type: obsolete status: test description: Detect unix shell configuration modification. Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered when a new shell is opened. references: - https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x68.html - https://web.archive.org/web/20221204161143/https://www.glitch-cat.com/p/green-lambert-and-attack - https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat author: Peter Matkovski, IAI date: 2023-03-06 modified: 2023-03-15 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1546.004 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: PATH name: - /etc/shells - /etc/profile - /etc/profile.d/* - /etc/bash.bashrc - /etc/bashrc - /etc/zsh/zprofile - /etc/zsh/zshrc - /etc/zsh/zlogin - /etc/zsh/zlogout - /etc/csh.cshrc - /etc/csh.login - /root/.bashrc - /root/.bash_profile - /root/.profile - /root/.zshrc - /root/.zprofile - /home/*/.bashrc - /home/*/.zshrc - /home/*/.bash_profile - /home/*/.zprofile - /home/*/.profile - /home/*/.bash_login - /home/*/.bash_logout - /home/*/.zlogin - /home/*/.zlogout condition: selection falsepositives: - Admin or User activity are expected to generate some false positives level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects process access requests to LSASS process with potentially suspicious access flags. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious GrantedAccess Flags On LSASS id: a18dd26b-6450-46de-8c91-9659150cf088 related: - id: 32d0d3e2-e58d-4d41-926b-18b520b2b32d type: similar status: test description: Detects process access requests to LSASS process with potentially suspicious access flags references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights - https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow - https://web.archive.org/web/20230208123920/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment - https://web.archive.org/web/20230420013146/http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf author: Florian Roth, Roberto Rodriguez, Dimitrios Slamaris, Mark Russinovich, Thomas Patzke, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Sherif Eldeeb, James Dickenson, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community date: 2021-11-22 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 - attack.s0002 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection_target: TargetImage|endswith: \lsass.exe selection_access: - GrantedAccess|endswith: - '30' - '50' - '70' - '90' - B0 - D0 - F0 - '18' - '38' - '58' - '78' - '98' - B8 - D8 - F8 - 1A - 3A - 5A - 7A - 9A - BA - DA - FA - '0x14C2' - GrantedAccess|startswith: - '0x100000' - '0x1418' - '0x1438' - '0x143a' - '0x1f0fff' - '0x1f1fff' - '0x1f2fff' - '0x1f3fff' - '0x40' filter_main_generic: SourceImage|contains: - :\Program Files (x86)\ - :\Program Files\ - :\Windows\System32\ - :\Windows\SysWOW64\ filter_optional_malwarebytes: SourceImage|endswith: :\ProgramData\MALWAREBYTES\MBAMSERVICE\ctlrupdate\mbupdatr.exe filter_optional_vscode: SourceImage|endswith: \AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe filter_main_windefend_1: SourceImage|contains: :\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\ SourceImage|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe filter_main_windefend_2: CallTrace|contains|all: - '|?:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Definition Updates\{' - '}\mpengine.dll+' GrantedAccess: '0x1418' filter_main_windefend_3: CallTrace|contains: - '|c:\program files\windows defender\mprtp.dll' - '|c:\program files\windows defender\MpClient.dll' filter_optional_vmwaretools: SourceImage|contains: :\ProgramData\VMware\VMware Tools\ SourceImage|endswith: \