Query: Sigma YAML for kubernetes / application / audit
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a "privileged" container, an action which could be indicative of a threat actor mounting a conta. Logsource: kubernetes / application / audit. Rule: title: Privileged Container Deployed id: c5cd1b20-36bb-488d-8c05-486be3d0cb97 status: test description: 'Detects the creation of a "privileged" container, an action which could be indicative of a threat actor mounting a container breakout attacks. A privileged container is a container that can access the host with all of the root capabilities of the host machine. This allows it to view, interact and modify processes, network operations, IPC calls, the file system, mount points, SELinux configurations etc. as the root user on the host. Various versions of "privileged" containers can be specified, e.g. by setting the securityContext.privileged flag in the resource specification, setting non-standard Linux capabilities, or configuring the hostNetwork/hostPID fields ' references: - https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/techniques/Privileged%20container/ - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-kubernetes.html#privilegeescalation-kubernetes-privilegedcontainer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/kubernetes-pod-created-with-hostnetwork.html - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/kubernetes-container-created-with-excessive-linux-capabilities.html author: Leo Tsaousis (@laripping) date: 2024-03-26 tags: - attack.t1611 - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: category: application product: kubernetes service: audit detection: selection: verb: create objectRef.resource: pods capabilities: '*' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the download of suspicious file type from a well-known file and paste sharing domain. Logsource: windows / create_stream_hash. Rule: title: Suspicious File Download From File Sharing Websites - File Stream id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464 related: - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99 type: similar - id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d type: similar - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586 type: similar - id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97 type: similar - id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f type: similar - id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c type: similar - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794 type: similar - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb type: similar - id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8 type: similar - id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c type: similar - id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7 type: similar status: test description: Detects the download of suspicious file type from a well-known file and paste sharing domain references: - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=90015 - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a - https://fabian-voith.de/2020/06/25/sysmon-v11-1-reads-alternate-data-streams/ - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-24 modified: 2026-03-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.s0139 - attack.t1564.004 logsource: product: windows category: create_stream_hash detection: selection_domain: Contents|contains: - .githubusercontent.com - 0x0.st - anonfiles.com - bashupload.com - cdn.discordapp.com - chunk.io - ddns.net - dl.dropboxusercontent.com - ghostbin.co - github.com - glitch.me - gofile.io - hastebin.com - mediafire.com - mega.nz - onrender.com - pages.dev - paste.ee - pastebin.com - pastebin.pl - pastetext.net - pixeldrain.com - privatlab.com - privatlab.net - send.exploit.in - sendspace.com - storage.googleapis.com - storjshare.io - supabase.co - temp.sh - transfer.sh - trycloudflare.com - ufile.io - w3spaces.com - workers.dev - x0.at selection_extension: TargetFilename|contains: - .cpl:Zone - .dll:Zone - .exe:Zone - .hta:Zone - .lnk:Zone - .one:Zone - .vbe:Zone - .vbs:Zone - .xll:Zone condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Some false positives might occur with binaries download via Github level: high