Query: detection rule: Detects changes to the PowerShell execution policy in order to bypass signing requirements for script execution
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects changes to the PowerShell execution policy in order to bypass signing requirements for script execution. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential PowerShell Execution Policy Tampering id: fad91067-08c5-4d1a-8d8c-d96a21b37814 related: - id: cf2e938e-9a3e-4fe8-a347-411642b28a9f type: similar - id: 87e3c4e8-a6a8-4ad9-bb4f-46e7ff99a180 type: similar - id: 61d0475c-173f-4844-86f7-f3eebae1c66b type: similar status: test description: Detects changes to the PowerShell execution policy in order to bypass signing requirements for script execution references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-executionpolicy?view=powershell-7.3 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-11 modified: 2023-12-14 tags: - attack.defense-impairment logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: - \ShellIds\Microsoft.PowerShell\ExecutionPolicy - \Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ExecutionPolicy Details|contains: - Bypass - Unrestricted filter_main_svchost: Image|contains: - :\Windows\System32\ - :\Windows\SysWOW64\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators cr. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Directory Service Restore Mode(DSRM) Registry Value Tampering id: b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0 related: - id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators create a Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) local administrator account with a password that rarely changes. The DSRM account is an “Administrator” account that logs in with the DSRM mode when the server is booting up to restore AD backups or recover the server from a failure. Attackers could abuse DSRM account to maintain their persistence and access to the organization''s Active Directory. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "0", the administrator account can only be used if the DC starts in DSRM. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "1", the administrator account can only be used if the local AD DS service is stopped. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "2", the administrator account can always be used. ' references: - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785 - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/detecting-dsrm-account-misconfigurations/ - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials author: Nischal Khadgi date: 2024-07-11 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1556 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior filter_main_default_value: Details: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high